Paraphrase of Aristotle, >De anima<: Critical Edition with Introduction and Translation [Translation ed.] 3110786028, 9783110786026

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Part I: 1 Textual Tradition
Part I: 2 Form and Content of Metochites’ In De anima
Part I: 3 Principles of This Edition
Part I: 4 Works Cited
Part I: 5 Indices
Part II: Theodoros Metochites: Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima
Sigla
Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων
Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων
Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων

Citation preview

Theodoros Metochites Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima

Berlin‑Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina (CAGB)

| Series academica Herausgegeben von Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed, Diether R. Reinsch

Band 8

Theodoros Metochites

Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima

| Critical Edition with Introduction and Translation Edited by Börje Bydén

Herausgegeben durch die Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Dieser Band wurde im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Forschungsförderung von Bund und Ländern im Akademienprogramm mit Mitteln des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung und der Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Gesundheit, Pflege und Gleichstellung des Landes Berlin erarbeitet.

ISBN 978-3-11-078602-6 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-078606-4 ISSN 2700-6417 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022937777 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Satz: le-tex publishing services GmbH, Leipzig Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Acknowledgments When an academic book has been as long in the making as the present one, it is only natural that its author has benefited from the help of many individuals and institutions. Regrettably, it is also natural under such circumstances that the beneficiary will have a hard time recollecting all those instances of help received. This is why the following list of acknowledgments is not by any means comprehensive, but rather singles out those individuals and institutions whose help was a sine qua non for bringing the book into being. To all my other benefactors I extend a collective but heartfelt “Thank you!” Work on the project started in 2004, when I received a post-doc scholarship from STINT (the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education) to visit the Byzantinisch‐Neugriechisches Seminar of Freie Universität Berlin. My first special thanks are due to my host at the Seminar, Professor Dr Diether Roderich Reinsch, for his warm and friendly reception. Professor Reinsch introduced me to Professor Dr Dieter Harlfinger, who kindly put the Aristoteles‐Archiv at my disposal, during my first stay in Berlin as well as on several later occasions. My second special thanks are due to him. Following an intermission, work briefly resumed in 2007 during a fellowship at the Dumbarton Oaks Byzantine Studies Program. I am grateful to all the staff and colleagues who made my short stay in Washington, D.C. worthwhile, not least to the Director of the Program, Professor Alice-Mary Talbot. Most of the work on the Text and Translation was in fact carried out between 2013 and 2019, within the framework of Representation and Reality: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on the Aristotelian Tradition, a research programme based in Gothenburg and funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation). I am grateful to all my colleagues in this programme (and its precursor, The Aristotelian Tradition: The Reception of Aristotle’s Works on Logic and Metaphysics, 2009–2011) for their contributions to discussions of various drafts, and especially to Professors Sten Ebbesen and Pavel Gregorić, whose comments were particularly extensive and incisive. I should also mention that I was awarded travel grants for in situ inspection of manuscripts in Venice and Rome from the Torsten and Ingrid Gihl Foundation in 2010 and 2011. Much of the Introduction was penned in 2020–2021, with the help of an honorarium from the Berlin‐Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. If it had not been for the efforts of Dr Lutz Koch to facilitate the later stages of the project, this might never have happened. I am deeply grateful for these efforts, as also for Dr Koch’s encouragement and sound advice over many years.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-201

VI | Acknowledgments

I am also very grateful to Dr Torben Behm, Ms Kathleen Prüfer and the whole production team at De Gruyter for their patient and professional assistance in seeing the book through the press. Last but not least, I owe an incalculable debt to Katerina Ierodiakonou for her unflinching love and support – in rain and in shine – and to Sigrid, Alvar and Hugo for always giving me a reason to keep on keeping on.

Gothenburg, August 2022 Börje Bydén

Contents Acknowledgments | V

Part I: Introduction 1 1.1

1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.3 1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4

Textual Tradition | XIII Manuscripts of the Greek text | XIII V = Vat. gr. 303 | XIII M = Marc. gr. Z 239 (coll. 911) | XV P = Par. gr. 1866 | XVI A = Alex. 87 | XVII L = Laur. Plut. 85,04 | XVII E = Scor. Φ.I.17 | XVIII U = BL Add. 8222 | XVIII R = Vat. reg. 118 | XVIII G = Par. gr. 1934 | XIX B = Mon. elect. 73 and W = Mon. elect. 74 | XIX Q = Vat. gr. 301 | XIX O = Vat. Ott. 278 | XIX Manuscripts of Metochites’ paraphrases not containing In De an. | XX Indirect tradition | XX George (Gennadios II) Scholarios’ epitome | XX Gentien Hervet’s translation | XXI Previous editions | XXI Genealogy of the manuscripts | XXII Principles of method | XXII Suspected archetypal errors | XXVI Conclusion | LIV Branches | LV Omissions of several words | LVII V | LVII P | LVII M E B/W | LVIII A | LIX L | LIX U R G | LIX Q | LX O | LXI Conclusion | LXI

VIII | Contents

1.4.5

1.4.6 1.4.7 1.4.8 1.4.9 1.4.10 1.4.11 1.5 1.6 2 2.1 2.2

2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3

The relationship between V and the other manuscripts (eliminatio codicum descriptorum) | LXII Sample text: In De an. 1.1.1–18 | LXIII Sample text: In De an. 3.1.1–12 | LXVI Filiations: O | LXIX Filiations: Q | LXIX Conclusion | LXX Filiations: L | LXX Conclusion | LXX Filiations: P | LXXI Conclusion | LXXIII Filiations: U R G | LXXIV Conclusion | LXXV Filiations: M E B/W | LXXV Conclusion | LXXV The relationships of V M A | LXXV M A | LXXVI M against V A | LXXVI A against V M | LXXVII V against M A | LXXVIII β | LXXVIII Suspected errors in β not in V | LXXIX Conclusion | C Suspected errors in V not in β | CI Conclusion | CXIII V | CXIII The relationship of β and V | CXIII Sources for this edition | CXIX Stemmata codicum | CXX Suspected authorial errors | CXXI Form and Content of Metochites’ In De anima | CXXXVIII Nature and purpose | CXXXVIII Sources | CXLVII Philoponus, Ps.‐Philoponus and Sophonias | CXLVIII Themistius | CXLIX Priscian | CXLIX Aristotle | CL Language | CLI The definite article | CLI Pronouns | CLII ἔστιν | CLVI

Contents | IX

2.3.4

2.3.5

Moods and tenses | CLVII The indicative with ἄν in main clauses | CLVII Spurious indicative with ἄν for subjunctive (or optative) with ἄν in dependent clauses | CLVII Spurious indicative for subjunctive (or optative) in final clauses | CLIX Spurious subjunctive with ἄν in main clauses, etc | CLIX Spurious optative without ἄν in main clauses | CLIX Conditional clauses | CLX Concessive clauses | CLXI Temporal clauses | CLXI Causal clauses | CLXII Consecutive clauses with ὥστε | CLXII Negatives | CLXIII

3 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.2 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4

Principles of This Edition | CLXIV Text | CLXIV Constitutio textus | CLXIV Division of the Text | CLXV Orthography | CLXV Closed and open combinations | CLXVII Accents and other diacritics | CLXVIII Punctuation | CLXX Translation | CLXXII Apparatuses | CLXXIV Apparatus criticus | CLXXIV Apparatus aristotelicus | CLXXVI Apparatus fontium | CLXXVI Apparatus locorum parallelorum | CLXXVI

4 4.1 4.2 4.3

Works Cited | CLXXVIII Abbreviations | CLXXVIII Ancient and medieval texts | CLXXVIII Modern works | CLXXIX

5 5.1 5.2

Indices | CLXXXV Index of names | CLXXXV Critical index | CLXXXVII

X | Contents

Part II: Theodoros Metochites: Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima Sigla | 2 Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων | 4 Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων | 100 Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων | 244

| Part I: Introduction

1 Textual Tradition I am fortunate to be able to rely on Martin Borchert’s masterful account (2011) of the textual tradition of Metochites’ paraphrase of the De generatione et corruptione for this part of my Introduction. More detailed descriptions of the MSS containing Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases and a careful discussion of their genealogy, firmly based on their respective physical features, will be found in that work. Much of the following will in effect consist of summaries of Borchert’s arguments, supplemented by evidence afforded by variant readings in the MS witnesses to the text of the paraphrase of the De anima. Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases (Εἰς πάντα τὰ Φυσικὰ Ἀριστοτέλους) in forty books – counting, as the author does, the paraphrase of the De respiratione as part of that of the De juventute et senectute et vita et morte – have mostly been transmitted as a single integrated work, albeit sometimes divided over two MS volumes. There are to my knowledge eighteen MSS preserving some or all of the paraphrases. For each of the three books of the De anima paraphrase (henceforth In De an.) there are twelve MS witnesses; one of these (B) contains books 1–2 only and one (W) contains book 3 only, so there are thirteen MSS to account for in all. In twelve of these Metochites’ paraphrase is the main text. The exception is A, which has the Aristotelian work as the main text, surrounded on three sides by the paraphrase (to compensate for the unequal length, the paraphrase sometimes runs on alone for a page or more). In addition to the direct tradition, there is a fifteenth‐century epitome by George (Gennadios II) Scholarios (see below, sec. 1.2.1) and a sixteenth‐century Latin translation by Gentien Hervet (see below, sec. 1.2.2).

1.1 Manuscripts of the Greek text Of the thirteen MSS preserving one or more books of In De an., three were copied in the fourteenth century, two in the fifteenth century and eight in the sixteenth century. They will be briefly described here in chronological order (in so far as their dates can be ascertained).

V = Vat. gr. 303 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Diktyon 66934. Paper. 596 fols, in three parts. Dated c. 1330–1350. The copyist is not known by name, but his hand has been identified in at least one more MS containing works of Metochites (Vat. gr. 182/181: Stoi-

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-202

V

XIV | 1 Textual Tradition

cheiosis astronomike).¹ On him see Bianconi (2005, 425–28). Description of V: Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 438–40). V contains all of Metochites’ paraphrases, in the following order: Proem (1r –2r ); Pinax (2v –3v ); In Ph. 1–8 (4v –110v [the folios have been displaced so that the paraphrase ends on f. 108r ]); In De an. 1 (111r –132r ); 2 (132r –161v ); 3 (161v –187v ); In Cael. 1–4 (187v – 258v ); In GC 1–2 (258v –297v ); In Mem. (297v –305r ); In Somn. Vig. (305r –312v ); In Insomn. (312v –319r ); In Div. Somn. (319r –322v ); In MA (322v –333r ); In Long. (333r –337v ); In Juv./In Resp. (337v –356v ); In IA (356v –367v ); In PA 1–4 (367v –430v ); In GA 1–5 (430v –516r ); In Meteor. 1–4 (517r –578r ); In Sens. 1–2 (579r –596v ). For the order of the paraphrases in V, see sec. 1.4.3. V has been part of the collections of the Vatican library at least since 1481.² As Borchert has shown,³ it has lost two folios (between ff. 11 and 12 and ff. 13 and 14 respectively), while several others have been placed in the wrong order (ff. 65–70; 105–110; 383–86). These losses and displacements are reflected in the texts of J, U and Q, but not in that of L. As will be seen below (sec. 1.4.5), J, U, Q and L are all most likely direct copies of V. Clearly, then, L must have been copied before, and J, U and Q after, the interventions that gave rise to the losses and displacements in V. L was probably copied in 1485 (or possibly a few years later); J and U are dated to 1545 and 1546 respectively, Q to 1559. The interventions in V must therefore have been carried out in Rome between 1485 and 1545. As it turns out, a MS described as Logotetus in naturali Philosophia in rubro ex papyro is listed in Vat. lat. 3966, 116r as one among a large number of books that were rebound, under the supervision of Tommaso Inghirami, between July 1510 and September 1516.⁴ As Mercati already suspected, this can only be V.⁵ It is noteworthy that Nikephoros Gregoras’ hand is found in several places in V, among them the authorial attributions on ff. 1r and 2v . For these, see Ševčenko (1962, 282–83 n. 3); for further examples, see Bianconi (2005, 416). Authorial attributions in Gregoras’ hand are also found in three MSS containing other works by Metochites, namely Vat. gr. 1365 (Stoicheiosis astronomike), Par. gr. 2003 (Semeioseis gnomikai) and Par. gr. 1776 (Carmina). It has been inferred that these MSS belonged to “une «édition» surveillée ou au moins rassemblée par Nicéphore Grégoras dans le monastère

1 He is also partly responsible for Vat. gr. 165, containing, inter alia, Nikephoros Gregoras, Roman History 1–12 (Harlfinger reported by Borchert 2011, lxxxvii), and, I suspect, Marc. gr. Z 532 (Metochites, Semeioseis gnomikai). On the latter, see Hult (2002, xx–xxi) and, most recently, Wahlgren (2018, xiv– xx). 2 It was identified by Devreesse (1965, 91; 129) as item 210 in the catalogue of 1481 and item 209 in the catalogue of 1484. It is not present in the catalogue of 1475, so presumably it was acquired by Sixtus IV. See also sec. 1.4.5, n. 28 below. 3 Borchert (2011, cxiii–cxxv); cf. Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 440). 4 Borchert (2011, cxxiii–cxxiv). 5 Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 440).

1.1 Manuscripts of the Greek text |

XV

de Chora”,⁶ to which Metochites’ library and literary remains were transferred during the last phase of his life, to be entrusted, after his death, to the care of Gregoras. It is clear that at least one MS of In De an. must have been accessible at Chora in June– August 1352, when In De an. 3.5.4–5 was quoted (as Aristotle’s own words) by Gregoras, who spent that summer under house arrest there, in the twenty-third part of his Roman History.⁷ A few variants in Gregoras’ quotation are not shared by any of the fourteenth‐century MSS: they are thus either pre-archetypal readings or the author’s own silent emendations.⁸ For the corrections in V, see sec. 3.3.1.

M = Marc. gr. Z 239 (coll. 911) Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice. Diktyon 69710. Paper. 557 fols. Dated c. 1330– 1340. On the copyists, see below. Descriptions of M: Giacomelli (2017); Mioni (1981, 351–53). M contains all of Metochites’ paraphrases, in the following order: Proem (1r –2r ); Pinax (2r–v ); In Ph. 1–8 (3r –109v ); In Cael. 1–4 (109v –180v ); In GC 1–2 (180v –217v ); In De an. 1 (217v –234r ); 2 (234r –260r ); 3 (260r –284v ); In Mem. (284v –290r ); In Somn. Vig. (290r – 296r ); In Insomn. (296v –302r ); In Div. Somn. (302r –305r ); In MA (305v –314r ); In Long. (314r –318v ); In Juv./In Resp. (318v –336r ); In IA (336r –347r ); In PA 1–4 (347r –405r ); In GA 1–5 (405r –485r ); In Meteor. 1–4 (485r –514v ); In Sens. 1–2 (541v –557r ). For the order of the paraphrases in M, see sec. 1.4.3. Bianconi (2003, 536–39) has distinguished between two hands (A and B) taking turns for most of the MS, and seven others (C–I) making briefer appearances. Most of In De an. was copied by scribe B, with only a few fill-ins by G and H (according to Bianconi, G is responsible for f. 224r .21–36 [1.3.4–5]; H for ff. 268r .10–33 [3.3.23–25], 271r [3.4.11–15] and 272v [3.4.24–3.5.3]). The latter scribe is notable for his ineptitude in dealing with breathings: there are multiple instances in his parts of the text of rough breathing marks where there should be smooth ones (and a few of the reverse case). To Bianconi’s list of passages by H should be added f. 274v .28–33 (3.6.9–10). At f. 274r .28–31 (3.6.7–8), it would seem as though a tenth scribe makes a small contribution (the duc6 Ševčenko 1962, 282 and n. 3: note the judicious remark by Borchert 2011, lxxx. 7 2: 1091.2–5, but, as van Dieten notes (1994, 333 n. 562), 26 words are missing from Schopen’s text (see the following note); for the date of composition see van Dieten 1994, 1–5. 8 Text according to Vat. gr. 1085, 79v : τέλειος [τέλειος : τελειωθεὶς Metoch.] φησὶ [φησὶ deest in Metoch.] νοῦς, αὐτοφυής ἐστιν ἐνέργεια· καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· οὐσία γὰρ [post γὰρ habet πως Metoch.] αὐτῷ ἡ ἐνέργεια εἴτουν τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς [οὐχ ὡς : οὐκ Metoch.] ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἀμφότερα ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρεῖται· οὐσία γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐνέργεια· ἢ [ἢ : ὡς εἴρηται καὶ Metoch.] οὐ μεταβάλλει, ἄλλό τι ὢν [ὢν : ὂν Metoch.] τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ἐνέργειαν. The words ἡ οὐσία καὶ—οὐσία γὰρ αὐτοῦ are missing from Schopen’s text (2: 1091.2–5).

M

XVI | 1 Textual Tradition

tus is most similar to Bianconi’s F, but the details differ somewhat). It must be acknowledged, however, that B’s style is in itself quite variable (see, e.g. f. 219v ), and perhaps it cannot be ruled out that the same hand is responsible for some of the different scripts exhibited in the MS. For the corrections in M, see sec. 3.3.1. On ff. 1r and 557r a monogram in red ink is found, showing the author’s title as logethétēs toû genikoû. Metochites carried this title between c. 1305 and Lent 1321, when he was appointed mégas logothétēs, which is the title used in Gregoras’ authorial attributions in V. Ševčenko (1975, 37, n. 143) asserted that M had been copied from “an ‘authenticated’ manuscript, whose monograms it took over”. As will be seen below (sec. 1.4.5), M’s exemplar (β) has been lost. If Ševčenko’s assertion is correct, the implication seems to be that β was copied before Lent 1321. This would then set a terminus ante quem for the publication of the work (see below, sec. 1.4.2). Moreover, unless the received opinion about V’s date is wrong, β could in that case not be a copy of V. It is, however, also possible that the monogram was copied to β from its exemplar, just as it was later copied from β to M and from M to W (see below). What the relationship is between V and β is perhaps the most pressing – and most difficult – question to be addressed in this Introduction (see below, secs 1.4.6–10). In M, too, Gregoras’ hand is found, namely on f. 227r , where the somewhat enigmatic last words of the paraphrase of De anima 1.3 (In De an. 1.3.42) have been supplemented with Aristotle’s last words in that chapter. For the identification of the hand, see Bianconi (2003, 539), who considers (2003, 536) that the MS “va sicuramente ricondotto al monastero di Cora” (see above, on V). M was part of Bessarion’s donation to the Biblioteca Marciana in 1468 (his ex libris is found on the front guard leaf: f. iiir ). As will be seen below (sec. 1.4.4), at least two copies of it were produced at Venice (E, B/W).

P = Par. gr. 1866 P

Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. Diktyon 51492. Paper (ff. 168–183 occidental, otherwise bombycin). 318 fols. Dated c. 1330–1350. Ff. 1r –167v and 184r –318v were copied by the “Metochitesschreiber”, identified by Lamberz (2000, 158–59) as Michael Klostomalles; ff. 168r –183v are by an unknown scribe. Klostomalles earned his sobriquet by copying several MSS containing works by Metochites, namely Vat. gr. 1365, Par. gr. 2003, Par. gr. 1776 – each of which, as mentioned (above, on V), carries an authorial attribution in Gregoras’ hand – and Vindob. phil. 95 (Orationes). Since he was an imperial notary, there are also several dated documents by his hand, the earliest from September 1311 and the latest from December 1342 (Lamberz 2006, 44–45). According to Groisard (2009), the closest equivalents of the watermarks in ff. 168–183 belong to the years around 1350 (on the possibility that these two quires are a later addition to P, see below, sec. 1.4.5). Descriptions of P: Groisard (2009); Omont (1888, 155).

1.1 Manuscripts of the Greek text |

XVII

P forms a two-volume set with Par. gr. 1935 (T = Diktyon 51562). Between them, P and T contain all of Metochites’ paraphrases, in the following order (as in V). P: Proem (1r [the beginning is missing: inc. καὶ μὴν ὅπερ εἴ[…] (12.16 DL)]); Pinax (1v ); In Ph. 1–8 (2r –120v ); In De an. 1 (121r –141v ); 2 (141v –171r ); 3 (171v –199v ); In Cael. 1–4 (199v –278v ); In GC 1–2 (278bis –318r ); T: In Mem. (1v –8r ); In Somn. Vig. (8r –14v ); In Insomn. (14v –21r ); In Div. Somn. (21r –24v ); In MA (24v –34r ); In Long. (34r –38v ); In Juv./In Resp. (38v –55v ); In IA (55v –66r ); In PA 1–4 (66r –123v ); In GA 1–5 (123v –211r ); In Meteor. 1–4 (211r –277r ); In Sens. 1–2 (277r –294r ).

(T)

A = Alex. 87 Bibliothḗkē toû Patriarcheíou, Alexandria. Diktyon 32974. Paper. 333 fols. Copied by Manuel of Corinth in 1484–1485 (Förstel 1999, 251–52). Descriptions of A: CAGB website; Wiesner (in Moraux & al. 1976, 1–2).

A

A forms a two-volume set with Mosq. gr. 239 (S = Diktyon 43864). Between them, A and S contain all of Metochites’ paraphrases (and the relevant works by Aristotle), except In Ph. 1–2, In PA, In GA and most of In IA, in the following order. S: In Ph. 3– 8 (83r –221r : the first section of Metochites’ paraphrase is that corresponding to 3.1, 201a 19–27: see Borchert 2011, xc). A: In GC 1–2 (1v –36r ); In Cael. 1–4 (36r –104r ); In Meteor. 1–4 (105r –184r ); In De an. 1 (185r –200v ); 2 (201r –222r ); 3 (222r –241r ); In Sens. 1–2 (242r –260r ); In Mem. (260r –266r ); In Somn. Vig. (266r –273v ); In Insomn. (273v –279v ); In Div. Somn. (279v –282v ); In MA (283r –292r ); In IA (293r –294r : the last section of Metochites’ paraphrase is that corresponding to 3, 705a 3–25); In Long. (312r –316r ); In Juv./In Resp. (316v –333v ). For the order of the paraphrases in S A, see sec. 1.4.3. For the corrections in A, see sec. 3.3.1.

(S)

There are a number of marginal notes in the part of A containing In De an. These are all related to the Aristotelian text rather than to Metochites’ paraphrase.

L = Laur. Plut. 85,04 Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence. Diktyon 16764. Parchment. 445 fols. Copied by Demetrios Damilas (Canart 1977–1979, 331), probably in Florence between 10 February and 9 July 1485, when V was on loan to Carlo Valgulio (thus Borchert 2011, cxxiv– cxxv), or else after c. 1490, when Damilas was resident at Rome. It may have been commissioned by Lorenzo de’ Medici, who died in April 1492 (see Speranzi 2010, 229 n. 39). Damilas was appointed scribe of the Vatican Library in February 1506, after which there seems to be no trace of him (see Casetti Brach 1990). Description of L: Bandini (1770, 249–50).

L

XVIII | 1 Textual Tradition L contains all of Metochites’ paraphrases, in the following order (as in V): Proem (1r – 2r ); Pinax (2v ); In Ph. 1–8 (3r –86v ); In De an. 1 (87r –101r ); 2 (101r –121v ); 3 (121v –140v ); In Cael. 1–4 (140v –195r ); In GC 1–2 (195r –224r ); In Mem. (224v –229v ); In Somn. Vig. (229v – 234v ); In Insomn. (235r –239v ); In Div. Somn. (240r –242v ); In MA (242v –249v ); In Long. (250r –253r ); In Juv./In Resp. (253v –266r ); In IA (266r –274r ); In PA 1–4 (274r –318r ); In GA 1–5 (318r –383r ); In Meteor. 1–4 (383v –431v ); In Sens. 1–2 (431v –445v ).

E = Scor. Φ.I.17 E

Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Madrid. Diktyon 15149. Paper. iii + 369 fols. Dated 25 July 1542 at Venice. Copied by Nikolaos Mourmouris of Nauplion (colophon on f. 368v ). Description of E: de Andrés (1965, 25–26). E contains the following paraphrases (order as in M): In Ph. 1–8; In Cael. 1–4; In GC 1–2; In De an. 1 (277r –300v ); 2 (301r –336r ); 3 (336r –368v ). A complementary volume (Scor. Δ.VII.15) containing the remaining paraphrases was lost in the fire of 1671 (de Andrés 1965, 25).

U = BL Add. 8222 U

British Library, London. Diktyon 38792. Paper. 437 fols. Dated 27 February 1546 at Rome. Copied by Christopher Auer (colophon on f. iiiv ). Description of U: British Library website.

(J)

U forms a two-volume set with Par. gr. 1936 (J = Diktyon 51563). Between them, U and J contain all paraphrases, in the same order as in V (U: In Ph. 1–8; In De an. 1 (137r – 160v ); 2 (160v –195r ); 3 (195r –227r ); In Cael. 1–4; In GC 1–2; In Mem.; In Somn. Vig.; In Insomn.; In Div. Somn.; In MA; In Long.; In Juv./In Resp.; J: In IA–In Sens.).

R = Vat. reg. 118 R

Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Diktyon 66288. Dated July 1548 at Paris. Description of R: Stevenson (1888, 85). R contains the following paraphrases (order as in V, but books 3–4 of In Cael., all of In GC and the beginning of In Mem. have been torn out): In Ph. 1–8; In De an. 1 (273–320); 2 (320–389); 3 (389–454); In Cael. 1–2; In Mem.; In Somn. Vig.; In Insomn.; In Div. Somn.; In MA; In Long.; In Juv./In Resp.

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G = Par. gr. 1934 Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. Diktyon 51561. Dated 1546–1559 (it was in the possession of Aymard de Ranconet, d. 1559: see Jackson 2009, 100–101). Description of G: Omont (1888, 166–67).

G

G contains the following paraphrases (order as in V): In Ph. 1–8; In De an. 1 (137r –160v ); 2 (160v –195r ); 3 (195r –227r ); In Cael. 1–4; In GC 1–2; In Mem.; In Somn. Vig.; In Insomn.; In Div. Somn.; In MA; In Long.; In Juv./In Resp.

B = Mon. elect. 73 and W = Mon. elect. 74 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich. Diktyon 44517 (B) / 44518 (W). Dated 20 April (B) and 4 November (W) 1551 at Venice. Copied by Kornelios Mourmouris of Nauplion (colophons in B, f. 383v and W, f. 439v ). Descriptions of B W: Molin Pradel (2013, 145– 48; 148–51).

BW

B and W form a two-volume set. Between them, they contain all of Metochites’ paraphrases, in the same order as in M. B contains In De an. 1 (317r –343v ) and 2 (343v –383v ); W contains In De an. 3 (2v –37v ). At f. 439v , W exhibits the same monogram as found in M.

Q = Vat. gr. 301 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Diktyon 66932. Dated May 1559 (colophon on f. 669r ). Description of Q: Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 437–38).

Q

Q contains all paraphrases, in the same order as in V. In De an. 1 (122r –143v ); 2 (144r – 176r ); 3 (176r –203r ).

O = Vat. Ott. 278 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Diktyon 65521. Dated 16th–17th centuries. Description of O: Féron & Battaglini (1893, 154). O contains only In De an. (1 [1r –40r ]; 2 [40r –94v ]; 3 [94v –147r ]).

O

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Manuscripts of Metochites’ paraphrases not containing In De an. In addition to the complementary volumes of P, A and U (i.e. T, S and J), there are two more MSS containing some of Metochites’ paraphrases but not In De an. These are Par. gr. 1933 (mid-16th cent.), which contains In Ph.; and Par. gr. 1948 (16th cent.), which contains In Cael. and In GC.

1.2 Indirect tradition 1.2.1 George (Gennadios II) Scholarios’ epitome George Scholarios’ epitome of Metochites’ paraphrases (ed. Jugie & al. 1936, 349–481) covers In Ph. 1–8, In Cael. 1–4, In De an. 1–3 (429–54), In Mem., In Somn. Vig., In Insomn., In Div. Somn., In MA, In Long., In Juv./In Resp., In Meteor. 1–3 and the first section of In Meteor. 4. The scholarly consensus seems to be that it was composed while the future patriarch was still an ordinary teacher, that is, before 1450, when he entered the monastery of the Pantocrator in Constantinople (Jugie & al. 1936, v; Tinnefeld 2002, 516). Demetracopoulos dated the codex unicus, the autograph Vat. gr. 115 (Diktyon 66746), to the 1440s–1450s on the basis of its watermarks, and suggested that this MS is “a clean copy of of his [sc. Scholarios’] abridgment …, which he had written during his teaching career” (2018, 298–99). At least in part it seems to have been intended as an aide-mémoire for the author.⁹ It is not easy to determine with any certainty the exemplar of an epitome, especially when the epitomist is as independent of mind as Scholarios (and the only available edition is based on a MS the reading of which, according to the editor, “est particulièrement pénible, l’auteur ayant multiplié les abréviations” [Jugie & al. 1936, vi]). Still, there are some subtle indications that Scholarios must have used either M or its ancestor β (see below, sec. 1.4.5–6): he reads εὐδιάθρυπτος in 2.8.10, 196.10 (cf. sec. 1.4.7 ad loc.); in his epitome of 3.1.12 (250.9–11) he places the last three common perceptibles in the order μέγεθος, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα (cf. the critical apparatus ad loc.); in his epitome of 3.10.2 (344.13–14) he suggests that the goal of the practical intellect is τὸ πρακτικόν, rather than τὸ πρακτόν (cf. the critical apparatus ad loc.), and repairs the error by supplying the head ἀγαθόν. Dependence on M or β is also indicated by a passage from Scholarios’ epitome of the Physics paraphrase quoted by Borchert (2011, clxxxvii–clxxxviii). On the other hand, Scholarios agrees with V against β in correctly including fish among the ἐναίμων in his epitome of 2.8.25 (202.21). If Scholarios made direct use of β, his epitome should theoretically be one of the main sources for recon-

9 According to the author’s marginal note introducing the annotations on Physics 6: ἐντεῦθεν τῶν ὑποθέσεων μόνων αἱ σημειώσεις εἰσὶ πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν γεγραμμέναι (ed. Jugie & al. 1936, 388).

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structing the text of this important MS; but in practice it is not feasible systematically to infer the readings of its exemplar.

1.2.2 Gentien Hervet’s translation Hervet’s Latin translation, first printed by Nicolaus Brylinger in Basel in 1559,¹⁰ contains In Ph. 1–8; In De an. 1 (183–214); 2 (214–59); 3 (260–303); In Cael. 1–4; In GC 1–2; In Mem.; In Somn. Vig.; In Insomn.; In Div. Somn.; In MA; In Long.; In Juv./In Resp.; In Meteor. 1–4. As Borchert has shown (2011, civ–cvii), it (a) shares a number of extensive omissions only with U, R and G, and (b) these MSS do not all share any extensive omissions that do not also occur in Hervet’s translation. Except for In Meteor., then, which is not included in U, R or G, Hervet’s translation must have been based either on one of these or on a common ancestor of them all, which also shared these extensive omissions. But (c) as we shall see below (sec. 1.4.5), U is a direct copy of V, which does not share these extensive omissions. Hervet’s translation must consequently have been based on U, R or G. Since (d) R and G do not contain In Meteor., Borchert concludes that the translation must have been based on U, supplemented with J. As a further argument against Hervet’s dependence on G one may add that his translation does not share the extensive omission exhibited by this MS in 3.1.8, 248.10–11 (see below, sec. 1.4.4), where Hervet reads “Quinetiam audtius [sic] quoque similiter. Sonos enim transvehit aër et aqua” (1559, 261). It may safely be excluded, then, that Hervet’s translation was based on G. But whether it was based on U or R is not immediately clear. As already mentioned, R was copied at Paris in 1548; it will be seen in section 1.4.5 that it was copied – with uncanny accuracy – from U. Moreover, since Hervet’s translation of In Meteor. has not – at least to my knowledge – been collated against the MSS, the evidence that it was based on J is only circumstantial. What is absolutely certain, however, is that Hervet’s translation can be disregarded for the purposes of establishing the text of Metochites’ paraphrases.

1.3 Previous editions Printed editions have so far appeared of the following parts of Metochites’ paraphrases: Proem: a transcription of M in Sathas (1872, οθʹ–πβʹ) and a critical edition based on V and M in Drossaart Lulofs (1943, 11–12);¹¹ Pinax: a transcription of M in Sathas (1872, πγʹ–πδʹ); 10 A second edition appeared from the same press in 1562; a third edition from an unknown press at Ravenna in 1614. 11 See now also the revision of Drossaart Lulofs’ edition in Kermanidis (2022, 147–50).

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In GC: a critical edition based on all extant MSS in Borchert (2011); In Mem.: a critical edition based on V, T, M and Hervet’s translation in Bloch (2005, 11–30); In Somn. Vig.: a critical edition based on V, M, L, R and Hervet’s translation in Drossaart Lulofs (1943, 13–22); In Div. Somn.: a transcription of V supplemented by readings from M in Demetracopoulos (2018, 292–97). In addition, a snippet of In Ph. 6 was edited, on the basis of P, G and Par. gr. 1933, by Ruelle (1907).

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts The following discussion will be restricted to those MSS containing In De an., but results valid for P, A and U are, mutatis mutandis, valid for their respective complementary volumes as well (i.e. for T, S and J). For details relating to the MSS not containing In De an., also including Par. gr. 1933 and Par. gr. 1948, see Borchert (2011).

1.4.1 Principles of method In this section, the genealogy of the MSS will be reconstructed on the basis of secondary readings. In order to carry out such a reconstruction, secondary readings have to be (1) identified and (2) assessed with respect to significance. (1) The identification of secondary readings will be based on the assumption that the whole MS tradition ultimately derives from a single original, submitted by the author, which did not contain variant readings. Secondary readings are all those readings in the extant MSS that were not in the original. Original readings are all those readings in the extant MSS that were in the original. Accordingly, every time the extant MSS exhibit two or more variant readings of the same passage, no more than one can be the original reading. All other variant readings of that passage must be secondary (and possibly all readings of that passage are). To identify, on any such occasion, which (if any) is the original reading, the editor will have to ponder the following two questions: (a) Which (if any) reading conforms best (or well enough) with the author’s linguistic habits? (b) Which (if any) reading makes best (or good enough) sense in the light of what the author could reasonably be expected to say in the given context? It is often difficult to answer these two questions with respect to any given choice of two or more variant readings in In De an. That is to say, even for passages in which the MSS exhibit two or more variant readings, it is not always easy to say which (if any) is the original and which are secondary, at least not for the present editor. There

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are a couple of reasons for this. The first and perhaps most important is that it often seems unsafe to assume that the author behaves predictably in accordance with any familiar principles, be it linguistic conventions or established patterns of philosophical thought. With regard to (a) the author’s linguistic habits, one should note that even though the lexicon, grammar and orthography in In De an. are predominantly Attic, there are several systematic and not-so-systematic deviations from this. The systematic deviations are already a challenge, although for future editors of similar texts this will no doubt be alleviated by the recent publication of the first comprehensive grammar of medieval vernacular Greek (Holton & al., 2019).¹² But the real difficulty lies in dealing with the not-so-systematic deviations. Some more notable features of Metochites’ language with implications for the constitutio textus (and the translation) are discussed in section 2.3 of this Introduction. As for question (b), it is true that in a work, the declared intention of which is “to provide some kind of aid … by laying bare [Aristotle’s] secrets for ready access”,¹³ our chances of finding firm criteria for adjudicating between readings on the basis of their meaning ought to be considerably greater – since “Aristotle’s secrets” are after all fairly well researched – than in a more autonomous or “creative” work. Unfortunately, however, there are many passages in In De an. in which no variant reading offered by any of the MSS can remedy the misrepresentation of Aristotle’s views or the distortion of the putative subsidiary sources. It cannot simply be assumed, then, that in other passages those variant readings that conform most closely to Aristotle or the putative subsidiary sources are necessarily original. Notwithstanding these and other difficulties, there are of course many instances of variance between the MSS where there can be little doubt which reading is original and which are not. These manifestly secondary readings – or, more exactly, the proper subset of these that also have high conjunctive and/or separative significance (see under (2) below) – are the basis on which the reconstruction of the genealogy of the MSS ultimately rests. Still, as I have already intimated, there are also many instances where it is more or less impossible to decide between the readings, because there is no real semantic, syntactic or pragmatic difference between them, or at least none that can be readily appreciated. Such cases may nonetheless play an important role as a check on the reconstruction: if the latter is correct, the distribution of these indifferent variant readings over the MSS should be possible to explain in terms of it; and if they are, this may be taken to confirm the reconstruction. That they are “indifferent” only means that we lack the criteria to decide whether they are original or secondary.

12 A grammar of the medieval Greek Hochsprache is still a dream for the future. For a brief description of the status quaestionis over a decade ago, see Wahlgren (2010); cf. also the editor’s Introduction and the various contributions in Hinterberger (2014). 13 ἔδοξα γοῦν βοήθειάν τινα … πορίσασθαι … γυμνῶν τἀπόρρητα τοῖς τῶν καλλίστων καὶ μεγίστων ἐρασταῖς … πρὸς τὸ τῆς χρήσεως ἕτοιμον (Proem 11.22–25 DL: see also sec. 2.1).

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When the MSS are at variance, at least we know (on the assumption set out above) that there is a secondary reading involved. But the inverse does not hold. Since the entire MS tradition may derive from a single archetype, which is not necessarily the author’s original (it could, for instance, be a copy of the author’s original), there may be secondary readings shared by all MSS. Knowing that there must be a secondary reading involved every time the MSS are at variance does not help the editor identify the ones on which all MSS agree. Any reading in any MS remaining after the elimination of descendants could in principle be an archetypal secondary reading. For the same reasons for which it is difficult to adjudicate between variant readings, then, a fortiori it is difficult to identify archetypal secondary readings. Admittedly, since these are shared by the whole tradition, their only value for the reconstruction of the MSS’ genealogy is precisely that they show that the whole tradition derives from a single archetype. But if an archetypal secondary reading is at all possible to identify, by whatever criteria we possess, this is in all likelihood because it is an error; if an error is a secondary reading, it must be an error of transmission; and for the purposes of establishing the text errors of transmission must, if possible, be emended. Moreover, even when whatever criteria we possess have been successfully applied to identify an error in the archetype, this is not necessarily a secondary reading. This is where another unfortunate circumstance concerning In De an. comes into play. For stretches, at least, the work gives the impression of having been written in haste, or at any rate without sufficient care or afterthought, and certainly of having been submitted for publication without having first been thoroughly revised or proofread. Inevitably, in a work of this nature there will be authorial errors. By authorial errors I mean discrepancies between what an author actually wrote and what they can reasonably be assumed, in the light of whatever criteria we possess, to have intended to write. These are not secondary readings, and are consequently of no value whatsoever for the reconstruction of the MSS’ genealogy. But they may be very difficult to distinguish from archetypal errors (which must, if possible, be emended). And they raise an urgent question when it comes to establishing the text: is it ever right to emend them, and if so, under what circumstances? My own reply to this question, at least in so far as applicable to the present edition, will be set out in sections 1.4.11 and 3.1.1 below. But there is more. There is reason to suspect (see sec. 1.4.10) that part of the tradition of In De an. represents a relatively extensive and in some respects systematic endeavour to amend authorial errors. And there is a clear possibility that this endeavour was sanctioned, not necessarily down to all the finer details, but in its general aim and direction, by the author. If this is the case, there may be any number of secondary readings that are not only immensely difficult to identify (since they may be even more likely than the respective original readings to be picked out by questions [a] and [b] above), but which arguably have an equal – perhaps even superior – claim to authenticity as well. To all intents and purposes, then, we would be dealing with a thoroughly contaminated tradition. Unfortunately, I think this is probably the case.

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I will explain my own procedure for dealing with this situation in sections 1.4.11 and 3.1.1. For the time being, let me give a few examples of readings shared by all MSS of In De an. that are manifestly errors in the one sense or the other, and which in my view are more likely to be authorial than scribal. In this list the results of sections 1.4.3– 5 have been anticipated inasmuch as all those MSS which are practically certainly descendants of V or M have been eliminated, with the sole exception of P. These as well as other suspected authorial errors will be discussed in section 1.6 below. 2.12.1, 236.10 (V160v P170r M259r A221r ) τῶν γὰρ ὁρατῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν … καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν … καὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ αἴσθησις· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς δόξειεν ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις οὐκ [V P M A : delere velim] ἀχωρίστως τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αὐτῆς αἰσθητῶν. 2.12.10, 242.3 (V161v P171r M260r A222r ) ὥσπερ ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστων τάχιστα πάσχει – τῶν ὁρατῶν, τῶν ἁπτῶν [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere ἀκουστῶν], τῶν ὀσφραντῶν – καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ μετουσίᾳ αὐτῶν αἰσθητὸς γίνεται. 3.6.10, 318.19 (V177v P188v M275r A233r ) γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος νοός, καὶ πρῶτον πάντως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιοῦντος [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere ποιουμένου (vel πάσχοντος vel γινομένου)]. 3.8.6, 334.13 (V180r P191r M277v A235r ) … καὶ ὅσα τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη, οἷον σχήματα, χρώματα, κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ ὑγεία καὶ τοὐναντίον, μορφαὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις συμβαίνει μὴ ἀχώριστα [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὰ] εἶναι δυνάμενα τῆς ὕλης, τῷ δὲ νῷ χωριζόμενα καὶ λόγῳ διαιρούμενα. 3.10.5, 346.14 (V182r P193v M279v A236v ) εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐ φαίνεταί πως κινῶν ἀχώριστος [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὸς] ὅλως τῆς ὀρέξεως· βουλὴ γὰρ καὶ βούλησις αὐτοῦ πρακτική ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ δὲ βούλησις, ὡς εὔδηλον, ὡς ὄρεξίς τις ….

(2) Not all secondary readings are equally valuable for the reconstruction of the genealogy of MSS. Some errors, for instance, are so easy to commit (for two or more individual scribes or for any scribe in a given historical setting) that it is perhaps no wonder if they have arisen independently in two or more different MSS. To give an example, lifted from the sample collations in section 1.4.5 below: 1.1.3, line 16 (6.1) τῷ γὰρ εἰδότι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη τὰ γνωστικά τε καὶ τὰ [om. P M A E B] παθητικά).

Let us assume that the reading of P M A E B is secondary. It still cannot be safely inferred from the fact that M and E share this secondary reading that either E is dependent on M, M is dependent on E, or M and E are dependent on a common source, because the secondary reading may have arisen independently in both. In the following discussions, secondary readings like this will be said to have low conjunctive significance.

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The contrary category of secondary reading comprises those that can scarcely have occurred in two different MSS unless one is dependent on the other or both are dependent on a common source (they are “irreproducible”). For example, in the passage just cited: 1.1.3, line 15 (4.18) τῷ γὰρ εἰδότι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν [ψυχῆς οὐσίαν : ψυχικῆς οὐσίας M E B] καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη τὰ γνωστικά τε καὶ τὰ παθητικά.

Here there can be little doubt that M and E are closely related, either lineally or collaterally. Such secondary readings are of high conjunctive significance. It is sometimes important to distinguish conjunctive significance from separative significance. In the following, a secondary reading will be said to be of low separative significance if it is so obvious and easy to emend (for an individual scribe or for any scribe in a given historical setting), or indeed so prone to being accidentally corrupted back to the original, that it is perhaps no wonder if a dependent MS does not share it. To give an example (again, from the sample collations in sec. 1.4.5 below): 1.1.1, line 6 (4.7) ὥσπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον τιμία καὶ καλὴ [καλλὴ M : -λ- E1sl B1sl (καλὴ Etext Btext )] ἡ ἀστρονομία τῆς ἰατρικῆς.

Here it cannot be safely inferred from the fact that M has an erroneous reading and Etext does not that Etext is independent of M, because the scribe of E may well have corrected M’s erroneous reading on the strength of his knowledge of spelling. (The fact that the scribe of E has noted M’s erroneous reading above the line rather suggests that these MSS are indeed closely related, either lineally or collaterally.) The contrary category of secondary reading consists of those that would more or less inevitably be repeated in a dependent MS (they are “irreversible”). For example, in the same passage: 1.1.1, line 6 (4.7) ὥσπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον τιμία καὶ καλὴ ἡ ἀστρονομία [καὶ καλὴ ἡ ἀστρονομία om. O] τῆς ἰατρικῆς.

Here the omission in O leaves little doubt that it is not the ancestor of any other MS. Such secondary readings are of high separative significance.

1.4.2 Suspected archetypal errors As shown in the preceding section, all MSS of In De an. share readings that are manifestly errors, whether in the sense of errors of transmission (which are secondary readings) or in the sense of authorial ones. Excluding a few cases of unconventional orthography and lexical accentuation (prosodic accentuation varies to such an extent that it can scarcely be used for reconstructing the MSS’ genealogy: see below,

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sec. 3.1.5), I have noted well over 150 suspected errors common to the whole tradition (allowing for the possibility of corrections in uncollated parts of those MSS that are practically certainly descendants of other extant MSS). These, then, are suspected of being either errors of transmission or authorial errors. As explained in the preceding section, it is not always easy to tell the one kind of error from the other, and the step from suspicion to conviction is in many cases precarious. Yet, as we shall see, it is highly likely that at least some of these suspected errors are really and truly errors of transmission, which gives us reason to believe that the whole MS tradition descends from a single archetype. The Aristotelian paraphrases may have been finished for publication around 1312 or perhaps a few years later.¹⁴ Since the oldest extant MSS were certainly produced within thirty–forty years of their composition, it is unlikely that the archetype was at more than two or three removes from the original. This means that the opportunity for errors to accumulate between original and archetype was limited. It seems reasonable, then, to expect a rather modest number of errors of transmission in the archetype. How many? A rough approximation can be obtained from the c. 700 instances in In De an. where M and A are at variance, since they are both likely to be direct copies of a now lost MS (β: see sec. 1.4.5). Allowing for the possibility that both disagree with their exemplar in, say, 10 percent of these instances, and assuming that each of them agrees with its exemplar in half of the remaining instances, the respective scribes must have committed c. 315 errors across the whole text (or a little less than two per printed page). A similar figure can be obtained from the sample in section 1.4.5, where P departs from its likely exemplar (V) fourteen times in about seven printed pages. Accordingly, even if the archetype of all extant MSS of In De an. is a direct copy of the author’s original, it may well contain a few hundred errors of transmission. Borchert (2011, xc–xcviii) identifies nine errors of transmission common to the whole tradition in the text of In GC. As a complement to this, I have compiled a list of about a hundred problematic passages common to the whole tradition in the text of In De an. where the problems are in my view more likely due to errors of transmission than to authorial mistakes or idiosyncrasies. Those problematic passages that are in my view more likely to involve authorial mistakes or idiosyncrasies will be discussed in section 1.6. Again, the results of sections 1.4.3–5 have been anticipated in the list inasmuch as all those MSS which are practically certainly descendants of V or M have been eliminated, with the sole exception of P. I have added a note to each passage explaining briefly why I suspect an error. In these notes, mention is sometimes made of β: as indicated above, this is the lost common ancestor of M and A. References to Aristotle which omit the name of the relevant work are always to the De anima.

14 For arguments in favour of a date of publication in 1310–1313, see Bydén (2003, 35 n. 114; 2019, 101–2 n. 52); for arguments in favour of a date of composition in 1317–1321, see Borchert (2011, xxvii– xxxii).

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References to Themistius, Philoponus (or Ps.‐Philoponus) and Priscian of Lydia (Ps.Simplicius) which omit the name of the relevant work are always to their respective paraphrases/commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima.¹⁵ This list, and those in sections 1.4.7 (suspected errors in β not in V), 1.4.8 (suspected errors in V not in β) and 1.6 (suspected authorial errors), also offer me an opportunity to explain the decisions I have made in these passages with regard to the constitutio textus. For the general principles governing these decisions, see section 3.1.1. 1.1.12, 8.14 (V112r P122r M218v A185v ) ὅτε δὲ μὴ μεριστήν [P : μεριστὴ V M A L], ἐπειδὴ μὴ σωματικὸν ὄγκον ἔχειν, φήσαι τις ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ἄρα μή, καὶ σωματικὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσα, αὖθις ὅμως ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστὶ μεριστή ….

Obviously, μεριστὴ can be an archetypal error only on condition that the reading in P is secondary relative to it, even if it coincides with the original. The nature of the reading in P will be discussed below (sec. 1.4.5). The text of V M A makes for an awkward argument (“… in case [the soul] is not divisible into parts, because someone should deny that the soul has corporeal bulk, it should still be inquired whether it may not nevertheless be divisible into parts in some other way, even though it does not have corporeal bulk …”). With the reading in P the argument becomes clear and cogent (“… in case someone should claim that the soul is not divisible into parts, since it does not have corporeal bulk, it should still be inquired whether it may not nevertheless be divisible in some other way, even though it does not have corporeal bulk …”), but we end up with a couple of minor grammatical irregularities: μή in a causal clause (although this may be explained by the infinitive, and even with the indicative it has parallels elsewhere in the work: see sec. 2.3.5) and the optative with ἄν in a temporal clause (this, too, has parallels in other clauses of a similar type: see ad 3.1.14, 252.3 and 3.1.15, 252.12 in sec. 1.6). For the infinitive in the causal clause, see Kühner & Gerth (§594.5b, 2: 551). There are irregularities in the text of V M A too: the optative with ἄν in a causal clause, which otherwise only occurs under special circumstances (see sec. 2.3.4, Causal clauses), and μή in a ὅτε-clause with an omitted ἐστίν, although this may be accounted for by the fact that the clause is not strictly temporal, but quasi‐conditional (it expresses a possibility, not a recurring fact). On balance, I think the text of V M A is not what the author wrote: it may indeed be the result of an attempt to rectify the grammatical irregularities of an original corresponding to the text of P. Thus I have emended the text in accordance with P. 1.1.13, 8.20 (V112r P122r M218v A185v ) καὶ ὅτι μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργεῖ ἅπερ ἐνεργεῖ, τόδε τι πρῶτον καὶ τόδε τι μεθύστερον [scripsi : μεθ’ ἕτερον V P M A L], ….

15 I find Steel’s arguments (Steel & Huby 1997, 105–40) for the reattribution of the commentary transmitted under Simplicius’ name to Priscian of Lydia utterly convincing.

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Τhe prepositional phrase μεθ’ ἕτερον, which does not seem to make a lot of sense in the context, does not occur elsewhere in In De an., and only half a dozen times in the whole of Greek literature as preserved in TLG (usually in the expanded phrase ἕτερος μεθ’ ἕτερον), while there are half a dozen other instances only in In De an. of μεθύστερον, which also makes perfect sense in this context. A caveat, however, is that Priscian, in a passage by which Metochites is probably inspired here (11.28–31), has ἀφ’ ἑτέρων εἰς ἕτερα. Still, it seems highly likely that this is an error of transmission, and thus I have emended the text. 1.1.30, 14.19 (V113v P123r M220r A186v ) καὶ δεῖγμα τούτου [V P M A : τοῦτο malim] σαφές (ὅτι κοινὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῷ σώματι)· πολλάκις μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγίστων συμβαμάτων οὐκ ἐπακολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη ….

The bracketed clause states the thesis argued, but on the most natural construal of the syntax it is the subject of δεῖγμα τούτου σαφές (cf. the similar construction in 1.2.34, 34.8–9), where τούτου obviously refers to the thesis argued, so that we end up with a tautology. The brackets are intended to block this construal in favour of the only construal that makes sense, which is to take the bracketed clause as an appositive of τούτου. This is awkward (since it involves the ellipsis of existential ἔστιν in the main clause) but possible, I think, and thus I have not intervened. Still, it is also possible that the original had τοῦτο, which reads much better: the bracketed clause would then be a complement to δεῖγμα, the predicate of the main clause; and τοῦτο, the subject of the main clause, would refer forward to the argument of the following clause (πολλάκις μὲν γὰρ …). 1.1.32, 16.4–8 (V113v P123v M220r A186v ) καὶ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φησί, δῆλον ὡς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς λόγοι εἰσὶν ἔνυλοι, εἴτουν δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς ὕλης καταλαμβανόμεναι ἀχώριστοι, καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁρισμοὶ ψυχικῶν δυνάμεών εἰσιν ὁρισμοί, εἴτουν ψυχικοὶ λόγοι [λογικοὶ P] ἡνωμένης ἀχωρίστως μετὰ τοιᾶσδε διαθέσεως τοῦ σώματος· [corrupta videntur: transponere velim τῆς ψυχῆς1 v. 2 et ψυχικοὶ v. 3]

It is difficult to make satisfactory sense of this passage – in particular, it is not clear why Metochites identifies the soul’s affections and activities with its capacities – and it is not unlikely that more extensive corruption is at play (although the only other variant in the four reported MSS is the one noted from P), but I have found no plausible remedy. The most urgent problem, however, is that ἡνωμένης lacks a subject noun: this could be resolved by switching the current positions of τῆς ψυχῆς before λόγοι εἰσὶν ἔνυλοι and ψυχικοὶ before λόγοι ἡνωμένης. 1.2.13, 24.7 (V115v P125r M221v A188r ) πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου εἶναι καταληπτικὸν κοινὴ πᾶσι δόξα, καὶ [ὅτι addere velim : deest in V P M A] οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαί τινος καταληπτικῶς καὶ οἱονεί πως ἡνῶσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ ἅπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ δι’ ὁμοιότητος.

The sentence beginning with οὐκ ἔστιν should presumably express another view shared by all those predecessors of Aristotle who focused their attention on the cog-

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nitive capacities of the soul (these are the subject of the preceding sentence), rather than the view of the author, so one may suspect that a conjunction subordinating it to δόξα has gone missing (or else, that ἔστιν is a corruption of an original εἶναι). 1.2.18, 26.6 (V116r P125v M222r A188v ) ἐν δὲ τῇ [ἐν τῷ addere velim : desunt in V P M A] Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, φησί, συναγωγῇ τῶν καθόλου περὶ τῶν ὄντων δοξάντων τῷ Πλάτωνι …

The suspected omission (in the summary of Plato’s general views … in On Philosophy) seems to me more likely to be a scribal error than an example of careless writing on the part of the author, but it is difficult to be certain. What tips the scales against intervening is that the suspected error does not affect the general sense of the passage. 1.2.26, 30.10 (V117r P126v M222v A189v ) ἀσωμάτους μὲν οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀρχὰς ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὸ κενὸν ἢ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· σωματικὰς δὲ [supplevi : deest in V P M A], καὶ τούτων αὖθις οἱ μὲν μίαν, τιθέμενοι τὸ πῦρ εἶναι ἀρχὴν ἢ τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ, οἱ δὲ πλείους ….

In the transmitted text, τούτων lacks an antecedent (the finite verb, understood from the previous sentence, is ἔδοξαν). The general sense is not in doubt here either, but the ellipse is so harsh, even by Metochites’ standards, that it seems unlikely to be authorial. 1.2.34, 34.13 (V118r P127v M223v A190r ) οὗτος δ’ ὁ Ἵππων ταῦτ᾿ ἔλεγε πρὸς Κριτίαν ἀπομαχόμενος τιθέμενον ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αἷμα· ᾤετο δ’ ὁ Κριτίας τὴν [om. P] ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ [V P M A : delere velim] αἷμα, ….

There seem to be three possibilities here: (1) Metochites first means to say that Critias supposed that blood was soul, and then converts this to say that he believed that the soul was blood, in which case he should have omitted the article before αἷμα in the second occurrence. (2) Metochites both times means to say that Critias supposed that blood was soul, in which case P’s reading is authentic, whether coincidentally or otherwise. (3) Metochites both times means to say that Critias supposed that the soul was blood, in which case he should have omitted the article before αἷμα in the first occurrence (and preferably added the article before ψυχὴν). On any possibility, then, the text of V M A should be emended. The reason why I prefer the first possibility is that this would explain why Critias’ view is stated twice in a row: it is to make the conversion explicit (if there is no factive presupposition connected with τιθέμενον after πρός, perhaps the intention is to correct the assumption on which Hippo contradicted Critias). In addition, this reading partly corresponds with Philoponus’ report of Critias’ view (89.8–22), where it is first stated that Critias τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλεγεν αἷμα εἶναι (89.12), and then the argument on which this claim is supposed to be based is set out, one premiss of which is οὐκοῦν τὸ αἷμα ψυχή (89.16; cf. 89.18). The corruption is also easy to explain as a repetition of ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αἷμα only four words earlier. Still, since there are two other possibilities that make tolerable sense, and it cannot be said for

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certain that any of these three possibilities was in the original, I have refrained from intervening in the text. 1.2.39, 36.13 (V118v P128r M223v A190v ) καὶ οἱ μὲν μίαν τιθέμενοι τὴν ἀρχήν – εἴτε τὸ πῦρ εἴτ᾿ ἄλλο τι – μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν [transposui : οὐσίαν αὐτὴν V P M A (forsan tamen pro αὐτὴν ἔλεγον καὶ potius est legendum καὶ αὐτῆς ἔλεγον)] ἔλεγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ….

The emphatic pronoun and the adverbial καί with οὐσίαν is awkward: “they said that the substance, too, of the soul, too, was one” (for emphatic αὐτός in In De an., see sec. 2.3.2). After the simple transposition of οὐσίαν αὐτὴν the sentence makes good sense: “they said that the substance of soul, too, was one and the same [sc. the unique first principle]”, and it is perhaps most likely that this is what Metochites actually wrote. The second suggested emendation yields an even better meaning, but involves a larger intervention: “they said that the substance of the soul, too, was one” (i.e. just like that of the first principle). In any case, this looks more like an error of transmission than as an authorial error. 1.2.40, 36.22 (V118v P128r M223v A190v ) οἷον οἱ τιθέμενοι τὸ θερμὸν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ζέειν παρωνύμως ἔλεγον εἶναι τὸ «ζῆν» καὶ τὴν «ζωήν» (εἴτουν τὴν τῆς ζωῆς αἰτίαν, τὴν ψυχήν [τὴν ψυχήν scripsi : τῆς ψυχῆς V P M A]) ….

The explanation in the transmitted text of the intended ζωή as “the cause of the life of the soul” is incomprehensible. In the emended text, where τὴν ψυχήν is in apposition to τὴν τῆς ζωῆς αἰτίαν, the explanation makes clear that the intended ζωή is indeed the soul – and it is the soul whose name is at issue here – which is called “ζωή” metonymically, by virtue of its being the cause of life. Very probably an error of transmission, the genitive being prompted by αἰτίαν. 1.3.4, 38.18 (V119r P128v M224r A191r ) ἐπεὶ γοῦν καθ’ αὑτὸ λέγεται κινεῖσθαι ἡ ψυχή – οὕτω γὰρ ὑποτίθενται τὸ ἔμψυχον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν – καὶ κατ᾿ οὐσίαν ἐστὶ [V P M A : εἶναι malim] τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ….

The paraphrased argument is a reductio, which infers the denial of at least one of the premisses from the denial of the conclusion. The premisses are the tenets of Aristotle’s opponents. This is reflected in the first causal clause (“since the soul is said to be moved by virtue of itself”), but not in the second (“and being moved belongs to the soul by virtue of its essence”). This plays havoc with the argument and misrepresents Aristotle’s views. The substitution of the infinitive for the indicative would restore order. It is possible that a scribe, confused by the preceding parenthesis, has attempted to correct what he suspected to be a demotic form.¹⁶ But it may also be an authorial oversight, which is why it is unchanged in the text.

16 Third-person indicative εἶναι is in evidence in vernacular texts from, respectively, the eleventh/ twelfth (singular) and twelfth/thirteenth (plural) centuries (Holton & al. 2019, 3: 1725).

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1.3.8, 42.4 (V119v P129r M224v A191r–v ) τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων ταῦτα, ἃ καὶ βίᾳ ἕλκεται καὶ ὠθεῖται καὶ ἄνω ῥιπτεῖται καὶ [κάτω addere velim : deest in V P M A] κατὰ φύσιν φέρεται.

ταῦτα refers to the properties motion and rest. ἃ refers to the bodies to which these belong. It is true that some bodies (fire and air) are carried upwards in accordance with nature, but these bodies are not thrown upwards by force, so in the transmitted text ῥιπτεῖται and φέρεται have to refer to different subsets of bodies as their respective subjects, which is awkward. The bodies that are thrown upwards by force (water and earth) are carried downwards in accordance with nature. It would be understandable if Metochites had chosen to focus on the properties of these bodies for rhetorical effect. So the addition of κάτω yields a superior meaning, and its omission between καὶ and κατὰ is palaeographically easy. The upshot is that this is probably an error of transmission, but since the text is comprehensible without the emendation I have still not intervened. 1.3.10, 42.11 (V119v P129r M224v A191v ) … καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς ποιεῖν· ἐν [γὰρ addere velim : deest in V P M A] κηρίνοις σφαιρίοις εἰς λεπτὸν κατεσκευασμένοις εἰσάγουσι κανθάρους …

There are a few cases of rhetorical asyndeton in In De an., but this seems unmotivated. I suspect an error of transmission, but, again, it is difficult to be certain. 1.3.18, 44.24 (V120r P129v –130r M225r A192r ) αὗται γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ [V P M A : ἐν τῷ malim] σώματι συμβαίνουσι καὶ θεωροῦνται ….

συμβαίνω takes a dative complement, but θεωροῦμαι does not: the result is a kind of syntactic zeugma. Since the modifier of the verbs might also be expected to be parallel to ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, it seems likely that ἐν originally preceded τῷ σώματι too. This would make the sentence run smoothly. The repeated preposition could easily have been missed by a scribe. Still, it is entirely possible that the transmitted text was in the original. 1.3.25, 48.11 (V121r P130v M225v A192r ) τὰς γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις – ἤτοι τὰς [supplevi : deest in V P M A] τοῦ παντός – κατὰ τὰς οὐρανίας φορὰς κυκλικὰς τίθεται ….

Plato’s Timaeus conceived of the motions of the soul of the universe on the basis of the heavenly movements. The motions of the universe and the heavenly movements are the same thing. The explanatory parenthesis must be intended to clarify which soul it was of whose motions Plato’s Timaeus conceived on the basis of the heavenly movements. Cf. 1.3.38, 54.21–22: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχή – ἡ τοῦ παντὸς δηλονότι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ – …. Most probably an error of transmission. 1.3.30, 50.13 (V121v P131r M226r A192v ) πλεονάκις γάρ, εἰ [καὶ addere velim : deest in V P M A] κατὰ μόρια ὡρισμένα διαιρεῖται, νοήσει τὸ νοητόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὖθις ἀπειράκις ….

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One would expect a concessive clause rather than a straightforward conditional, since presumably it is not only if the intellect is divided into a determinate number of parts that it will think of its object many – indeed, infinitely many – times: a fortiori it will do so if it is divided into an infinite number of parts. So the point must be that even if it is divided into a determinate number of parts – in which case one might have expected it to think of its object only a finite number of times – it will do so. The omission of καὶ before κατὰ is palaeographically easy, so I suspect an error of transmission. Still, since the text makes tolerable sense as it stands (if the concessive is true, then so is the conditional), it has been left that way. 1.3.32, 52.2 (V121v P131r M226r A192v –193r ) καὶ ἔτι, φησί, πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ – ὡς μεγέθη μεριστὰ ἄττα [μεριστὰ ἄττα V P M A : ὄντα μεριστὰ malim] – τεμμάχια τῶν ἀμερῶν τοῦ νοητοῦ ἅπτεσθαι ….

This is a difficult passage, based, it seems, on a rather free interpretation of Philoponus’ commentary (131.30–35). The hypothesis called into question by Aristotle in the paraphrased text is that the constituent parts of the intellect are themselves divisible into parts. This they would be if they were themselves magnitudes. The transmitted text of Metochites’ paraphrase is difficult to construe: μεγέθη can hardly be an attribute of τεμμάχια (the preferred spelling in all MSS), which is clearly the (head noun of the) subject of ἅπτεσθαι. A possible emendation would be to transpose ὡς and read τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ μεγέθη, ὡς μεριστὰ ἄττα τεμμάχια, by which μεγέθη becomes the subject of ἅπτεσθαι and τεμμάχια its appositive. A comparison with the following coordinated clause (see below ad 1.3.32, 52.3), however, suggests that ὡς is correctly placed. The best construal is then probably to take ὡς μεγέθη μεριστὰ ἄττα as a parenthetically inserted appositive to τεμμάχια, as shown by the punctuation adopted. But this is not entirely satisfactory. For one thing, it would be desirable if μεριστὰ could be taken with the subject of ἅπτεσθαι (which would then have to be τεμμάχια), so as to achieve closer conformity to Aristotle’s text (407a 18–19). The passage would yield a better meaning – and would more closely parallel the following coordinated clause – if we read πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ – ὡς μεγέθη ὄντα – μεριστὰ τεμμάχια τῶν ἀμερῶν τοῦ νοητοῦ ἅπτεσθαι …. ὡς μεγέθη ὄντα would then have causal force: ex hypothesi, the constituents of the intellect are divisible, since they are magnitudes. But this already involves both a transposition and an alteration, so it is perhaps a little far-fetched. Unsatisfactory though it may be, I have left the text as it stands. It may after all be the original reading. 1.3.32, 52.3 (V121v P131r M226r A193r ) … ἢ τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ ἀμερῆ – ὡς μεγέθους ὄντα [scripsi : ὄντος V P M A] πέρατα – καὶ ἄτομα τῶν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς μεριστῶν ἅπτεσθαι …

The participle should agree with its head noun, not with the genitive attribute: that is, these things are partless “since they are limits of a magnitude”, not “in their capacity

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as limits of an existing magnitude”. The genitive must have been prompted by the immediately preceding genitive. Very probably an error of transmission. 1.3.33, 52.7 (V121v P131r M226r A193r ) πάντως δὲ ὁ κύκλος τοιοῦτος, φησίν, οἷος [scripsi : οἷον V P M A] ὡς μέγεθος καὶ συνεχὲς θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰσθητῶς κατατεμνόμενος ….

Since the relative pronoun, subject of the infinitive θεωρεῖσθαι, has an antecedent in the nominative, one would expect it to be in the nominative itself (as is the following participle κατατεμνόμενος, which is probably supplementary to καταλαμβάνεσθαι in 1.3.33, 52.8, which, in turn, is probably the second infinitive of which the relative pronoun is the subject). Most likely an error of transmission by a scribe who expected the adverb οἷον (which is much more common). 1.3.33, 52.8 (V122r P131r M226r A193r ) … ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἐν φαντασίᾳ ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀμεγέθη [scripsi : ἀμεγέθης V P M A] φύσιν ἔχων καταλαμβάνεσθαι ….

φύσιν needs a specifying attribute: ἀμεγέθη is an excellent candidate. So is ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμεγέθη, but the corruption of two consecutive accusatives into nominatives is much more difficult to explain than that of one accusative following the nominative of a similar word and καί. Most likely an error of transmission. 1.3.35, 54.3 (V122r P131v M226v A193r ) ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ἄπειρος ἦν [om. P], κἂν [scripsi : ἂν V P M A] εἰ τοῦτο δοίημεν, κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν ἦν ἂν καὶ οὕτω διὰ μέσων ὅρων ἐπεμβαλλομένων προχωροῦσα κατ᾿ εὐθύ ….

ἄν cannot belong to either of the two protases (on conditionals in In De an., see sec. 2.3.4). A scribe may well have looked forward to ἦν ἂν in the apodosis (six words ahead). It is possible that the second protasis was simply introduced by εἰ, but only with κἄν does it have the appropriate concessive force. In any case, clearly a scribal error. 1.3.39, 56.1 (V122v P132r M226v A193v ) καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅτι γε βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ μένειν, καὶ οὕτω δὴ κινεῖσθαι – ἤτοι κυκλικῶς – ταύτην [post ταύτην suspicor perisse τε καὶ τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἑξῆς κινούμενον σῶμα vel sim.] (εἴτουν τὸν οὐρανόν), δέδεικται καὶ αἰτιολογεῖται ….

The transmitted text only makes sense on the supposition that the (world) soul and the heavens are considered by the author to be identical. But this is not borne out by the context. It seems reasonable, therefore, to think that a phrase referring to the heavenly body set in motion by the soul has been omitted. But it is by no means certain: Aristotle’s discussion (in 407b 5–9) also passes seamlessly from the motion of the heavens to the motion of the soul (but of course without suggesting that they are identical). 1.4.1, 58.2 (V123r P132v M227r A193v ) Ὅτι καὶ ἄλλον τινά, φησί, λόγον ἔνιοι περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπέθεντο, πιθανὸν μὲν δόξαντά τισιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεύθυνον καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ἐποπτεύουσι [A : ὑποπτεύουσι V P M] λόγοις ….

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Manuel of Corinth (the scribe of A) evidently saw what the context requires. ἐποπτεύω (and the cognates ἐπόπτης and ἐποπτεία), in the sense of “oversee, inspect, scrutinize”, is a rather frequently recurring word in Metochites (there are twenty instances of the verb in his printed works¹⁷), always in the active, twice with the adverbial modifier καλῶς, as here; in In De an. we only find ἐπόπτης once, in 3.4.19, 300.1. ὑποπτεύω also occurs (in the sense of “view with suspicion”), but is less frequent (four instances, always in the passive, unless Sem. gnom. 9.1.2, 88.13 is middle). But the required sense here is precisely “inspect, scrutinize”. So this is clearly a scribal error, prompted, perhaps, by ὑπεύθυνον four words earlier. Its conjunctive significance is high enough for us to assume that it was shared by V and β (i.e. it is more likely that ὑποπτεύουσι was corrected in A than that ἐποπτεύουσι was independently corrupted in M). 1.4.7, 60.14 (V123v P133r M227v A194v ) … ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων μεγεθῶν ἡρμοσμένην σύνθεσιν εἰς εἶδος καὶ κατάστασιν ἡντιναοῦν, ταύτην μὲν κληθῆναι προηγουμένως ἁρμονίαν, ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ παρομοίως [V P M A : παρωνύμως malim (cf. 1.2.40)] κληθῆναι ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν διαφόρων κοινωνίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν (ἤτοι διπλασίων, ἡμιολίων, ἐπιτρίτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων).

παρομοίως does not exactly spoil the sense of the passage, but nor does it contribute much. In view of this, the fact that the word does not occur elsewhere in Metochites’ printed works (the cognate adjective παρόμοιος occurs twice) cannot fail to arouse suspicion. The word we would expect to find here is παρωνύμως, used (twice) in a similar context in 1.2.40 (36.19–21). This may well be an error of transmission, but since the passage makes tolerable sense as it stands I have left it like that. 1.4.8, 60.25 (V124r P133v M228r A194v ) [supplevi : deest in V P M A] ἡ τινῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ ἡ πάντων ….

The repeated disjunction is highly desirable (ex hypothesi, the soul must be either the one or the other), and the corruption is easy. The position of γάρ after emendation is striking but not unparalleled. Very probably a scribal error. 1.4.22, 68.11 (V125v P135r M229r A195v ) καὶ μὴν ἐνίοτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως – καὶ μόνης [V P M A : fort. legendum μονῆς] αὐτῆς – τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν συνδιατίθεται τὰ ἔξω, τὰ σωματικά ….

The only way to understand the transmitted text seems to be to take καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς parenthetically. This makes tolerable sense: it is also remarked three lines down that we blush when we recollect shameful things, if only in memory. George Scholarios certainly read the transmitted text and thought he could make sense of it (434.4–5). But there may be reason to suspect that Metochites wrote μονῆς. The passage is adapted from Themistius and Philoponus. Themistius says in 28.17–22 that it makes no difference to the argument if the residues of perceptible objects are said to be “a state of 17 Or, more exactly, those 23 printed works that are searchable in TLG as of January 2021: when I mention Metochites’ printed works in the following, these are what I refer to.

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rest” (μονὴ καὶ ἠρεμία), for recollection starts from the projection of images and often ends in a state of rest, but often also leads to bodily responses such as blushing. It is true that Metochites does not reproduce Themistius’ denial that there is any relevance in the description of the starting point of recollection as a state of rest in the soul, but it seems natural that he should have picked up on this description anyway, since it works well with his understanding of Aristotle’s dichotomy between the inward motion of sense perception (towards a state of rest in the soul) and the outward motion of recollection (from a state of rest in the soul). Still, since it does seem to make some sense, I have retained the reading of the manuscripts. If it is an error, it is clearly one of transmission. 1.4.23, 68.18–19 (V125v P135r M229v A195v ) Ὅτι, φησίν, ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι μεθύστερον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ οὐσία τις ἄφθαρτος [οὖσα addere velim : deest in V P M A]· οὐσίαν δὲ τοῦτον ἐγγινομένην ἔφησεν ….

The predicate substantive without any preceding particle or attendant participle is harsh, and it is easy to imagine οὖσα having been omitted immediately before οὐσίαν. Aristotle (408b 19) has οὖσα (except in Par. gr. 1853 ante corr.), but not ἄφθαρτος. Quite possibly an error of transmission. 1.4.38, 76.15 (V127v P137r M230v A196v ) καὶ μὴν πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι φησίν· εἰ δύο ἅμα ἄτομα καὶ ἀμερῆ (ὡς αὐτὴ ἡ μοναδικὴ στιγμὴ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ σωματικῇ στιγμῇ), τί κωλύει καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ ἄπειρα ἀδιαίρετα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἅμα, φησί [V P M A : collocare velim post ἀδιαιρέτων v. 4]; τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀδιαιρέτου ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ἀδιαίρετος τόπος καὶ παμπλείστων ἂν εἴη ἀδιαιρέτων, ἐπεὶ … (κοινῶς οὕτω καλῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκριβούμενος τὴν στιγμὴν τόπον) ….

There is one φησί too many in the paraphrase of 409a 23–24 (the second one is also very awkwardly placed), and one too few in the paraphrase of 409a 24–25 (where one is sorely needed to tie down καλῶν in the parenthesis). It seems likely that the second φησί has been misplaced. A possible alternative to emendation is to take the second φησί with what follows (as, after all, the first φησί goes with what follows), but this is also very awkward before τοῦ γὰρ … (and, I think, unparalleled in the work). 1.5.2, 80.5 (V128r P137r M231r A197r ) ὡς ἂν διὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν διεισδύνῃ καὶ ἐμψυχοῖ [correxi : ἐμψυχῆ V P M A] αὐτά ….

It is clear from ἀνατυποῖ in 3.3.16, 278.4 and ἑνοῖ in 3.8.9, 336.4 that Metochites knew how to form subjunctives of contract verbs in -ο-. There seems to be only one instance in Greek literature of ἐμψυχέω (ἐμψυχεῖν in Philoponus, Op. mund. 205.23, in the sense of ἐμψύχω, not, as in the present passage, ἐμψυχόω). The corruption is easily explained by the homophony. So this is most probably a scribal error. For the moods in final/consecutive clauses after ὡς ἄν, see section 2.3.4 (the distribution is roughly 2/3 subjunctive, 1/3 optative, regardless of the tense of the governing verb).

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1.5.13, 84.11 (V129r P138v M231v A198r ) ἔτι δέ φησιν ἄτοπον ὅτι φασὶν οἱ αὐτοὶ ὡς οὐδὲν [supplevi : deest in V P M A] ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ πάντως πάσχει, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ.

The transmitted text would have to be construed with οὐδὲν as a determiner of ὅμοιον and translated “that nothing similar is affected by what is similar”, which makes poor sense and is not how Aristotle or the commentators describe the view in question. Moreover, the following sentence (τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν …) exemplifies the rule expressed by the emended text, where οὐδὲν is the object of πάσχει (“what is similar suffers nothing – i.e., is not in any way affected – by what is similar”), not that expressed by the transmitted text. Most probably an error of transmission. 1.5.22, 88.5 (V129v P139r M232r A199r ) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες διατοῦτο ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ γνωστικόν, ὡς ἂν διὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος πάντων [scripsi : πάντως V P M A] ἀντιλαμβάνηται, οὐδὲ οὗτοι φαίνονται περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λέγοντες.

ὡς ἂν—ἀντιλαμβάνηται explicates διατοῦτο, which either refers back to διὰ τὸ γνωστικὸν ἁπάντων καὶ αἰσθητικόν in 1.5.20, 86.20–21 or else forward to διὰ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ γνωστικόν. Either way, the sense requires that ἀντιλαμβάνηται should be complemented with the genitive object πάντων (as explained in 1.2.14, it is in order to apprehend all things that the soul, according to Aristotle’s predecessors, has to be constructed from all things, or, failing that, from their first principles, the elements: for like is known by like). The corruption of πάντων into πάντως is commonplace: it occurs in β in 1.2.32, 32.23 and in A – in a very similar thematic context and after the same verb – in 1.2.24, 30.1. Very probably an error of transmission. 1.5.23, 88.16 (V129v P139r M232v A199r ) ὥστε οὐ μόνον οὐ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς κοινόν τι καὶ ἓν λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ μιᾶς ὅλης καὶ ἐντελῶς [V P M A : ἐντελοῦς malim] χαρακτηρίζουσι καὶ ὁρίζονται ὅσοι τῷ αἰσθητικῷ … καὶ κινητικῷ ταύτην εἰδοποιοῦσι ….

A complete definition of an object of natural philosophy makes reference to both the material and the formal cause of the object, according to Metochites’ interpretation of De an. 1.1, 403a 25–b 9 (In De an. 1.1.30–36). This, however, is not what is at issue in the passage paraphrased here (410b 24–27), but rather whether a definition that makes reference only to cognitive (and motive) faculties is a definition of the soul in its entirety (the answer is that it is not: οὐδ’ ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς). This would be better expressed by the adjective in agreement with ψυχῆς than by the adverb modifying χαρακτηρίζουσι καὶ ὁρίζονται. The corruption could easily have occurred. Still, the transmitted text is not impossible, and may well be the original. 1.5.25, 90.2 (V130r P139v M232v A199v ) οἷον ὁ τὸ πῦρ γινώσκων [supplevi : deest in V P M A] θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας εἴσεται, τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ, καὶ ὁ τὸν θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν ψυχρὰν καὶ ξηρὰν γῆν, καὶ ὁ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος πᾶν καθόλου καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ στέρησιν.

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The required sense is “someone who knows fire, which is hot and dry”, not “someone who knows that fire is hot and dry” (in the latter case supplying after ξηρὸν would have recommended itself). Mutatis mutandis, this is the literal sense in all the subsequent examples of the rule that knowledge of one contrary entails knowledge of the other, where the names of the primary qualities are in the attributive rather than the predicative position. That is what they should be in the first example too. Most probably a scribal error. 1.5.36, 94.19 (V131r P140v M233v A200r ) οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσειέ τις [supplevi : deest in V P M A] εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τὸ ταύτην συνέχον ….

There are two instances of the (potential) optative without ἄν in a main clause in In De an. (as compared to almost 200 instances of the optative with ἄν, see sec. 2.3.4).¹⁸ The other instance is in a question, and so special considerations may apply (see sec. 1.6 ad 1.4.40, 78.3). The present instance could have been a cupitive optative if not for the negative particle. It seems likely, then, that we have to do with an error of transmission. Of three possible emendations – (1) substitute the future indicative for the optative; (2) add ἄν; (3) substitute μή for οὐ – both the first and the second are palaeographically easy as well as satisfactory with respect to the sense. φήσειε(ν) occurs in three other passages in In De an., twice in conditional clauses and once in a main clause with ἄν (3.2.4, 256.14). φήσει occurs once, in a conditional clause (1.3.13, 42.19). Elsewhere in Metochites’ printed works, φήσειε(ν) occurs four times, always with ἄν, in main clauses and indirect questions, twice in negative statements (Sem. gnom. 10.4 and In Mem. 12.14), φήσει only once, and again in a conditional clause (In Mem. 18.9). On conditional clauses in In De an., see sec. 2.3.4. 2.1.2, 100.12 (V132r P141v M234r A201r ) νῦν γε μὴν μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνων ἔλεγχον προτίθεται … διορίσασθαι τί ἐστι καὶ δηλοποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι [V P M A : ὑποδεῖξαι malim] κοινόν τι καθόλου πάσης ψυχῆς γνωριστικὸν εἶδος, ὃ δῆτα ἀπέδειξε μηδένα ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ συνιδεῖν τε καὶ συλλογίσασθαι ….

In In De an., ἀποδείκνυμι seems always to mean “demonstrate, prove”, and thus, when it takes an object, this is always a noun or a clause denoting a proposition (“demonstrate the conclusion” or “… that F is G”). 3.7.8, 326.8 τὸ ἑνοειδὲς αὐτῆς ἀποδείκνυσιν is only an apparent exception (“demonstrate its uniformity” = “demonstrate that it is uniform”). In order for the object of ἀποδεῖξαι to denote a proposition in this passage, one would have to postulate the ellipsis of εἶναι in the existential sense, which is linguistically unlikely and does not yield the desired meaning (“demonstrate that there is

18 Horrocks (2017, 235; 238–39) reports four examples (15b, 17a–b and one unnumbered) of ‘future’ optatives without ἄν from Anna Komnene, Alexias (respectively 1.16.9, Prologue 4.1, 1.4.1 and 2.2.4). Except for the first, these are, like the present example, near-homonyms of future indicative forms (with the addition of -ε), and have a simple future sense.

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a cognitive form shared by all soul”, rather than what it is). There is no reason, on the other hand, why ὑποδείκνυμι (“indicate”) should not take a non-propositional object, as in fact it does in 2.2.5, 118.6–7. There is at least one more example of the corruption of ὑπο- into ἀπο- in the archetype of In De an. (see ad 2.2.1, 116.1 below; cf. also the critical apparatus to 1.2.1, 20.3). In the present passage the scribe may have glanced forward to ἀπέδειξε ten words ahead. Clearly, then, there is much to be said in favour of emendation here, but since the transmitted reading does after all seem possible, I have retained it anyway. 2.1.4, 102.3 (V132v P142r M234v A201r ) τὸ δέ γε εἶδός ἐστι τόδε τι (ἤτοι ὁριστικὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐνεργοῦν τῇ ὕλῃ [τῇ ὕλῃ V P M A : ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ malim] καὶ εἰδοποιοῦν …).

The only other instance in In De an. of a dative complement or adjunct of ἐνεργῶ is in 2.4.6, 144.14, where it is the dative of advantage. τῇ ὕλῃ in the present passage cannot possibly be the dative of advantage. It could conceivably be an instrumental dative, but it is not unlikely that the preposition ἐν has been lost in transmission. 2.1.11, 104.25 (V133v P142v M235r A201v ) τὸ γὰρ τοιονδὶ [P2pc : τοιόνδι V Pac : τοιόνδε M A] σῶμα αὐτὸ συναμφότερον καὶ σύνθετον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ, οὔθ’ ὅλως τὸ σῶμα ….

What was presumably the original reading is shown five lines down in a back‐reference to this passage (104.30: ὅπερ ἔφη τοιονδί). Ross and Siwek print τοιόνδε in 412a 16–17 of the Aristotelian text, but, according to Siwek ad loc., three whole families and another six individual MSS have τοιονδί. The correct accent in P seems to be in a different hand from the scribe’s and may well be based on the consultation of a MS of Aristotle (so may, of course, the variant in β). 2.1.11, 104.28 (V133v P142v M235r A201v ) ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, εἴτουν ἐν ἄλλῳ καταλαμβάνεται πάντως, αὐτῷ [V P M A : ἐν αὐτῷ malim] τῷ σώματι ….

It may make little difference whether or not the preposition is repeated before the appositive, but it would also be an easy corruption. 2.1.18, 110.4 (V134v P143v M236r A202r ) ὡς ἄρα ἐπὶ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ κηροῦ ἐπιγίνεται … αὐτὸ τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα …, ὣς [correxi : ὡς V P M A] ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς σωματικῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους … παραπλησίως γίνεται ἕν.

The demonstrative is needed. As might be expected, Metochites uses ὥς mainly in his poetry (there are four instances of ὣς ἄρα in his printed works, one of which is in prose: Presb. 679), which might go some way towards explaining why the scribe(s) failed to notice the accent here. The alternative is to print οὕτως. Assuming that the original had ὣς, the conjunctive significance of the error is low. 2.2.1, 116.1 (V135v P145r M237r A203r ) Ὅτι βουλόμενος αἰτιολογῆσαι τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τύπον καὶ τὴν ὑπογραφὴν [A : ἀπογραφὴν V P M] περὶ τοῦ κοινῶς ὄντος ἁπάσῃ ψυχῇ προδιαλαμβάνει ὅτι …

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There is no doubt that ὑπογραφὴν is the original reading. The word occurs in the same (its normal) sense also at 2.1.12, 106.2 and 2.1.15, 108.3, whereas ἀπογραφήν makes no sense in the context, and the word is never otherwise used in the In De an., or indeed anywhere else in Metochites’ printed works. For these reasons the error has higher conjunctive than separative significance: that is, it is less likely that it was committed independently by the scribes of V and M than that it was corrected independently by Manuel of Corinth, the scribe of A (cf. above ad 1.4.1, 58.2). Accordingly, it is most likely an archetypal error. 2.2.9, 120.14 (V136v P146r M238r A203v ) ἔστι γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα· ἔστι καὶ κατὰ αἴσθησιν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ πάντα ζῷα καθόλου … ἔτι [ἔστι malim (licet ἔτι in 413a 24 habeat Arist.)] δὲ σὺν τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην κίνησιν, ἥτις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν τροφήν ….

Possibly an error of transmission. One would expect a third ἔστι to complete the enumeration of life forms; and unless expressed, the third ἔστι would have to be understood from the second one, which comes four lines earlier. This is not impossible, admittedly, but the corruption is also very easy. In favour of ἔτι, on the other hand, speaks the fact that Aristotle introduces the corresponding sentence (413a 24) thus. 2.2.18, 124.10 (V137v P147r M238v A204r ) ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστι προδήλως ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ὅτι ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχὴ μία μέν ἐστιν ᾗ [scripsi : ἡ V P M A] ἐντελέχεια τοῦ φυτοῦ, δυνάμει δὲ πολλαί …

Clearly a scribal error. Low conjunctive significance. 2.2.25, 128.1 (V138v P147v M239v A204v ) ὡς πάντων μέτοχοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, τινὰ δὲ οὐ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ἄπεστιν αὐτῶν ἔνια ὧν [scripsi : ὡς V P M A] ἔχει τἄλλα ζῷα …

Clearly a scribal error. Low conjunctive significance. 2.2.31, 132.2 (V139r P148v M240r A205r ) οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὀσφρήσει ἐστὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ γεύσει οἱ ψόφοι, οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἀλλ’ ᾗ [V M A : ἐν ᾗ malim] πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. See above ad 2.1.11, 104.28. 2.3.11, 140.13 (V140v –141r P150r M241v A206v ) ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἥττονα καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν εὐτελέστερα καὶ ὑποβεβηκότα οὐ συμπεριέχει καὶ τἄλλα τὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτά, τά γε μὴν ὑψηλότερά τε καὶ τελειότερα καὶ τἄλλ’ ἅπαντα συνεισάγει ἑαυτοῖς καὶ συμπεριέχει [scripsi : συμπεριάγει V P M A] τὰ ἥττονα ἑαυτῶν.

συμπεριάγει is a cosmological term, typically used of the sphere of the fixed stars, which carries the other spheres with it in its revolution from east to west (cf. 3.11.5, 358.6–7). What is meant here is clearly συμπεριέχει (“includes, encompasses”), as in the preceding line (and also three lines down, 140.16). The mistake must have been prompted by συνεισάγει three words before. Clearly an error, most probably scribal. Relatively high conjunctive significance. 2.4.10, 146.10 (V142r P151v M243r A207r ) φησὶ γάρ· [ὡς (vel ὅτι) addere velim : deest in V P M A] ὥσπερ ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς … πάντα ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ….

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This is a possible (and easy) scribal error. There are, however, a few other cases (e.g. 1.4.38, 76.13; 3.1.18, 254.13; 3.3.15, 276.18; 3.4.2, 290.7; 3.4.3, 290.16) where φησί introduces a paraphrase in the form of finite clauses directly, without a conjunction, so the text is best left as it is. 2.4.13, 148.11 (V142v P152r M243r A207v ) ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὰ μὲν γεηρὰ κάτω λέγοντα κατὰ φύσιν [supplevi : deest in V P M A], ἤγουν τὰς ῥίζας ….

An infinitive is needed to complement λέγοντα, and αὔξειν (or αὔξεσθαι, but the intransitive active is used nine times in In De an., the passive only once) makes for an adequate paraphrase of 415b 28–416a 2. Philoponus 276.6–7 has ἔλεγε γὰρ αὔξεσθαι τὸ φυτὸν … τῆς … γῆς τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τὰς ῥίζας ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω αὐξούσης; Themistius 51.2 has τὰ … φυτά φησι κάτω … ῥιζοῦσθαι, but if the latter infinitive were adopted in Metochites’ text, it would render the following gloss – ἤγουν τὰς ῥίζας – otiose. At any rate, some infinitive or other must have been lost in transmission. The conjunctive significance of the omission is obviously high. 2.4.18, 150.23 (V143r P152v M244r A208r ) … οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγε το ὅτι σαφεστέρα ἡ κατάληψις καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις ὧν εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὡς [scripsi : εἰς V P M A] τὰ πρός τι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐταῖς εἰς τὰς ἐνεργείας.

This is the third mention of “opposites, in the sense of correlatives, to the activities”: the first is in 2.4.3 (142.17–19: ῥητέον ἂν εἴη διατοῦτο μάλιστα πρότερον περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀντικειμένων – ὡς εἴρηται, κατὰ τὰ πρός τι – ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐταῖς), the second is just three lines above (150.20–21: ἤτοι τοῦ ἀντικειμένου – ὡς διώρισται, κατὰ τὰ πρός τι – τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτῇ τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως). Metochites also speaks of τὰ ὡς πρός τι ἀντικείμενα in 2.4.3 (142.15), and ὡς is more likely than κατά to have been misread as εἰς. The phrase ἀντικεῖσθαι ὡς τὰ πρός τι occurs in Themistius (4.36), Priscian (113.35– 114.1, commenting on the same passage as Metochites; 114.37) and Philoponus (39.36; 263.32). The corruption will have been facilitated by the anticipation of a repetition of the pattern ἀπό … εἰς … established in the preceding phrase (which is eventually realized in this phrase as well). 2.4.26, 156.19 (V144v P153v M245r A209r ) … καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἅμα ἐνεργοίη [correxi : ἐνεργῆ V P ut vid. A1pc : ἐνεργεῖ M] ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ.

It is not clear that A initially had ἐνεργεῖ, so perhaps this is just an error in M. But even if the archetype had ἐνεργῆ, this is also suspicious. There are three passages in In De an. where all the three main MSS (V M A) have the subjunctive with ἄν instead of the expected optative with ἄν (2.8.4, 194.5; 3.2.27, 266.29; 3.4.5, 292.27). In all three passages these forms are homophonous with the optative, and should, I think, be corrected as errors of transmission (on Metochites’ use of the moods, see sec. 2.3.4). In addition, there are two passages where the MSS vary (here and 1.3.30, 50.17, where M and A have the optative). Most probably, then, this is also an error of transmission and

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should be corrected. The most common form of the third person singular present active optative of ἐνεργέω in Middle to Late Byzantium is still ἐνεργοίη, although there are a few cases of ἐνεργοῖ. 2.4.32, 160.3 (V145r P154r M245r A209v ) καὶ εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτερον τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, εἴτουν δυνάμεως καὶ ἐνεργείας, τὸ γεννῶν [scripsi : γεννᾶν V P M A] οἷον ἑαυτό.

It is just barely possible to make sense of the transmitted text: “So the primary soul must exist by virtue of the principal aspect of its own proper substance, that is, its capacity and activity, [which is] to produce something like itself”. But the substitution of the participle for the infinitive yields a meaning that is so much better – and the presupposed corruption is so plausible – that emendation cannot be avoided. The sentence concludes a brief argument in favour of calling the nutritive capacity (“the primary soul”) “reproductive” rather than “preservative”, paraphrasing 416b 23–25, where Aristotle concludes “εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό”. The reason why Metochites uses the participle instead of the deverbal adjective may be that he expressly includes both the capacity to reproduce and the corresponding activity in the principal aspect of the primary soul’s substance, and the adjective properly denotes only the capacity. 2.5.9, 166.11 (V146r P155v M246v A210v ) … ᾗ δὲ πέπονθε κινηθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὁμοία [V M A : om. P : ὡς ὁμοία malim (cf. v. 166.17)] γέγονεν ἐνεργείᾳ ὅπερ αὐτό ….

A difficult passage. The paraphrased text is 417a 18–20, and the paraphrast’s task is to explain in what way the sense is similar and in what way not similar to the sense object. Metochites’ answer seems to be that they are not similar at the beginning of the process of sense perception, inasmuch as the former is potentially what the latter is actually, but it is “in so far as” they are similar (2.5.10, 166.17: ὡς ὁμοία αὐτοῦ) that, at the end of the same process, the sense has become what the sense object is. That is to say, their “similarity”, although it is actual only post factum, is somehow the basis of the identity of sense and sense object. 2.5.10 is in effect a reprise of the main part of 2.5.9, except for the addition of ὡς. It is difficult to see how the sentence in the present passage is supposed to be construed without ὡς. ὅπερ αὐτό is precisely the predicative complement of γέγονεν that the argument seems to require, and ὁμοία ὅπερ αὐτό, even if grammatically admissible (which is questionable), just seems to beg the question and thus to obscure what the point of the argument is. The omission of ὡς may well be a scribal error. 2.5.15, 170.18–19 (V147r P156v M247r A211v ) λέγεται γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει τὸ ἐκ τοῦ γεννῶντος σπέρμα, μήπω γενόμενον ζῷον, μηδ’ ἔχον τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἕξιν, δυνάμενον δὲ γενέσθαι καὶ [γενέσθαι καὶ V P M A : transponere velim] ζῷον καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν.

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The two infinitive phrases are what is coordinated, so the first καὶ should be placed before the first infinitive. Not an unlikely error of transmission, but cf. ad 2.9.13, 214.26 and 3.1.7, 246.28 below. 2.5.15, 172.5 (V147v P156v M247v A211v ) οὐ γὰρ οἴκοθεν μόνη ἐνεργεῖ, οὐδ’ αὐτὴ [M : αὐτῆ V P A] ἑαυτῇ ἀρκεῖ ….

Most probably a scribal error, corrected in M. Relatively low conjunctive significance. 2.6.3, 178.4 (V148v P157v M248v A212v ) εἰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἡ ὅρασις καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζεται [ex P correxi : ἐμποδιζηται V M A] μήτε ὑπὸ νόσου μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς θέσεως τοῦ ὁρατοῦ ….

This is one of three instances of a conditional clause with εἰ and the subjunctive in V (cf. ad 3.6.7, 314.16 below and sec. 1.4.8 ad 3.9.3, 338.18; see also sec. 2.3.4). It seems likely that the subjunctive was in the archetype and was corrected by Michael Klostomalles (the scribe of P). By the same token, it does not seem unlikely that in 3.9.3, 338.18 ἀπίδη (V’s reading) was in the archetype and was corrected by the scribe of β (M and A both have ἀπίδοι there). Whether the two errors were also in the original is not so easy to say, but at any rate the scribes of P and β must have considered themselves authorized to correct them. So should we. 2.7.4, 180.19 (V149r P158v M249r A213r L112v ) διαφανὲς δέ φησιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἤτοι τὸ συνὸν τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ φῶς· τοῦ τοιούτου γὰρ διαφανοῦς κινητικὸν τὸ χρῶμα, οὐ [V3?sl L : deest in P M A] τοῦ ἀφωτίστου καὶ οὐκ ὄντος διαφανοῦς ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον δυνάμει ….

The correction is of course necessary for the passage to make sense. It is made in V in a distinct ink, but the script looks similar to that of the main text. All the same, it cannot have been entered before P was copied (the reading of L has been included here to illustrate what I take to be the normal scribal response to the current text in V: οὐ is large and clear, only slightly above the line). The agreement of V1 , M and A is no certain indication of β’s dependence on V, since there is no guarantee that the correction in V was based on its exemplar or any other independent witness. In fact, the error is similar to a number of presumably authorial mistakes involving negative particles and privative adjectives (cf. sec. 1.6 ad 2.12.1, 236.10; 3.8.6, 334.13; 3.10.5, 346.14), which shows that it may well have been in the original. So should the error be adopted in the text? It goes against the grain. But if not, then surely other undeniable mistakes should also be corrected, even if the author may be to blame for them? 2.7.5, 182.8 (V149v P158v M249r A213r ) οἷά εἰσιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ὁ ὕαλος καὶ ἄλλα τινά, μετὰ τούτων δὲ καὶ πρὸ τούτων πάντων μάλιστα τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα, ὃ καὶ ἀίδιον λέγει. ὃ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀεί ἐστι [V P M A : ὂν malim] διαφανὲς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει πρότερον εἶναι διαφανὲς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανὲς μεταβάλλει· τἄλλα δὲ δυνάμει μέν εἰσι διαφανῆ ….

It seems likely that the relative pronoun in ὃ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀεί … is intended to refer, like the one in the preceding clause, to the heavenly body, and that the sentence that it

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introduces is intended to explain how the heavenly body is different from other transparent bodies. This makes perfect sense in the context and corresponds well with the probable source, Themistius 59.29–31. As the text stands, however, the relative pronoun has to be the subject of ἐστι in the relative clause that constitutes the subject of μεταβάλλει, and the sentence will then be a tautological statement to the effect that anything that is always actually transparent has not previously been (only) potentially transparent. In order for the relative pronoun to refer to the heavenly body, either a conjunction must be inserted between ἐστι and μεταβάλλει (more precisely between διαφανὲς and οὐκ) or else ὂν must be read for ἐστι. Since the ἐστι clause is explanatory of the μεταβάλλει clause, the latter option seems the best. The unmotivated asyndeton of the transmitted text is a further indication that ἐστι may not have been the original reading. 2.7.7, 182.19 (V149v P158v M249r A213r ) ἐν τούτῳ, φησί, καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐστίν, ὅταν δυνάμει ᾖ [A : ἧ V P M] διαφανές …

ᾗ is clearly an error of transmission (there are a couple of authentic instances in the preceding line), either an archetypal error, corrected by the scribe of A, or one that was independently committed by the scribes both of V and of M. Both the conjunctive and, especially, the separative significance are low. 2.8.4, 194.5 (V152r P161r M251v A214v ) εἰ παίοιτο ταχύτατα καὶ σφοδρῶς, οὐκ ἂν διαρρέοι [correxi : διαρρέη V P M A] …. See ad 2.4.26, 156.19 above. 2.8.14, 198.13 (V153r P162r M252v A215r ) ἁπτόμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ [V P M A : αὐτὸ malim] τοῦ ἐμφύτου τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀέρος αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσι τῶν ἀκουστῶν αὐτῶν ….

It is the water that is contrasted with the external air mentioned in the preceding sentence, so that seems to be where the emphasis should fall. The genitive for the nominative would be an easy corruption, but in view of the uncertainty surrounding Metochites’ use of pronouns (αὐτοῦ could, for instance, be used as a demonstrative here: see sec. 2.3.2) it seems better to let the transmitted text stand. 2.8.15, 198.20 (V153r P162v M252v A215r ) δέχεται μὲν ὑπὸ [V P M A : ἀπὸ malim (vel παρὰ, ut Them. 65.5)] τοῦ ἐκτός, ὡς πρότερον εἴρηται, διαφανοῦς τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ δι’ αὑτοῦ παραπέμπει πρὸς τὴν ὅρασιν ….

Quite possibly a scribal error (for the reverse error, cf. ad 2.1.2, 100.12 and 2.2.1, 116.1 above). Themistius uses παρά in the source passage, but that is less likely than ἀπό to have been corrupted into ὑπό. I have found no other instances of middle δέχομαι followed by ὑπό with the genitive in Metochites’ printed works. Still, since this usage seems to occur in Byzantine authors, and since there are only two or three passages in Metochites’ printed works where δέχομαι is followed by ἀπό with the genitive, I have preferred to let the transmitted text stand.

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2.8.24, 202.15 (V153v P163r M253r A216r L116r ) ἐξομοιοῦνται γὰρ ταῦτα φωνοῦντα τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, ὅτι ἀπότασιν [ut vid. Vpr : ἀπόστασιν Vac P M A L U O] ἔχει ὁ ἦχος αὐτῶν ….

Apparently, the correction in V is very late, since all its direct copies seem to have ἀπόστασιν (I have not been able to ascertain the reading of Q). The situation is really quite remarkable. There can be no doubt that ἀπότασιν is what Metochites ought to have written: this is the reading of Aristotle, 420b 8 (Siwek reports no variant readings here), which is repeated in the comments of Philoponus (376.37) and Priscian (148.13; 15) (again the editors report no variant readings), and even in Sophonias’ paraphrase (88.26). ἀπόστασιν, on the other hand, makes no sense in the context. Still, the mistake was made, possibly by the scribe of V (assuming that it is the ancestor of β), possibly by the scribe of α, possibly by the author himself, and no later copyist seems to have reacted. The question is whether we should envisage (a) that it was not until the seventeenth century or later that someone took the initiative to use a sharp-edged object to set things right in V, or (b) that the correction was actually performed much earlier, but the resulting τ, where the low end of the stem and the left end of the horizontal stroke still curve slightly towards each other, was not clear enough to be taken as anything but a ϛ by the scribes. Since the latter alternative is at least a remote possibility, and since it may well be the case that the error arose in α or V regardless of the date of the correction, I have chosen to print the meaningful reading over the meaningless one. 2.8.28, 204.9 (V154r P163v M253r A216r ) καὶ τοίνυν πρὸς δύο φησὶν εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τῆς [V P M A : τὸ τῆς malim] γλώττης ….

A head is needed for the genitive attribute in the comparative clause. Its omission is not an unlikely scribal error, but could also simply be sloppy writing. 2.8.30, 204.23 (V154v P163v M253r A216r ) καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πᾶσα τῆς φύσεως οἰκονομία ἵνα εἰσπνεόμενος ἔξωθεν ὁ ἀὴρ διὰ τοῦ φάρυγγος καταψύχῃ τόν τε πνεύμονα καὶ πολλῷ μάλιστα τὴν καρδίαν, ὑπηρετεῖ [A : ὑπηρετῆ V P M] δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ πρὸς τὸ φωνεῖν.

It has just been argued (2.8.28–29) that analogously to the tongue, which has one necessary and life‐preserving function (tasting) and one non-necessary and life‐enhancing function (voice), the respiratory apparatus has two functions, one of which is necessary (cooling down the heart) and the other is the vocal function. Since the vocal function is a non-necessary function of the tongue, it is difficult to see how it could be a necessary function of the respiratory apparatus, so the analogy between tongue and respiratory apparatus is most likely intended to apply not only to the number of functions possessed by each organ (two) but also to the respective status of these functions (one necessary, one non-necessary). This is exactly how the analogy is employed in the main source for the passage, Philoponus 381.2–14. Most likely, then, Metochites intended to employ it in the same way; and in order to do that, he had to use the

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indicative as transmitted by A. On this reading the last clause (ὑπηρετεῖ δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ πρὸς τὸ φωνεῖν) is coordinated with the preceding main clause (i.e. the purpose of the dispensation of nature is cooling, but the respiratory apparatus is also of service for vocalizing), rather than with the final clause, as it must be with the subjunctive (i.e. the purpose of the dispensation of nature is both cooling and vocalizing). It is possible that the archetype had the indicative, and even that it was correctly copied in β, but independently corrupted in V and M (no doubt owing to the influence of the preceding subjunctive), but perhaps more likely that A’s reading is either a successful correction or a felicitous corruption of the subjunctive. 2.9.1, 208.1 (V155r P164v M254r A216v ) Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν [A : ἔστιν V P M] ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι ὡρισμέναι τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφοραί ….

This may well be an authorial error (intending to write, e.g. … ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι ῥαδίως ὁρισασθαι τὰς τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφοράς, and changing the construction midway). There are no other instances of feminine plural subjects taking singular verbs in In De an. (although there is one in the Physics paraphrase, discussed by Borchert 2011, clxviii–clxix), so if the reading is original it is not likely to reflect an authorial practice beyond general carelessness. But it may equally well be a scribal error. Still, its conjunctive significance is higher than its separative ditto: the superior reading in A is no doubt a conjectural correction. 2.9.13, 214.26 (V156v P166r M255v A218r ) οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις δι’ ἀναπνοῆς ἔοικεν εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητήρια τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἄτονα καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀτονίαν περικεκαλύφθαι τῇ φύσει καὶ συνεσφίγχθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ βλάπτοιντο διατοῦτο, καὶ [διατοῦτο καὶ V P M A : transponere velim] χρῆσιν εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῦ ἀέρος, ὡς ἂν σφοδρότερον αὐτοῦ προσβάλλοντος τοῖς φλεβίοις καὶ τοῖς πόροις τοῦ ὀσφραντικοῦ αἰσθητηρίου καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτω διανοίγοντος ἡ ἀντίληψις τῷ ζῴῳ γίνηται τῆς ὀσμῆς.

διατοῦτο makes much better sense with χρῆσιν εἶναι than with βλάπτοιντο. The MSS also punctuate after βλάπτοιντο. But with their word order διατοῦτο καὶ χρῆσιν εἶναι … would seem to be a completely unexpected new main clause in indirect speech (where καὶ is an adverb with χρῆσιν εἶναι), not an expected third infinitive governed by ἔοικεν. There are, however, a few other similar cases of apparent transposition involving a conjunction (cf. ad 2.5.15, 170.18–19 above and 3.1.7, 246.28 below), so perhaps it cannot be ruled out that the transmitted text was in the original, but meant to be understood as καὶ διατοῦτο. 2.11.6, 226.18 (V158v P168r M257v A219v ) … ἐδόκει ἂν τηνικαῦτα ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ μία μόνη [supplevi : deest in V P M A] αἴσθησις καὶ ὡς ἓν αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον τό τε ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν …

The parallelism between sense organ, sense capacity and perceptible object – each of which would have seemed, under the specified counterfactual circumstances, to be

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only one in kind – seems to require the article in each case. Its omission is an easy corruption, so this is probably a scribal error. 3.1.7, 246.28 (V162v P172r M262r A223r ) καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς [ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς V P M A : transponere velim (cf. Them. 80.23–25)] ὅσα γεηρότερα μόρια τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ ἀναίσθητά εἰσιν, οἷον ὀστᾶ, τρίχες, ὄνυχες ….

The desired sense – and that of the source passage in Themistius (80.23–25) – is (1) “it is clear that this [i.e. that earth is unsuitable for discernment] is why the more earthy bodily parts are imperceptive”, not (2) “it is clear from this [i.e. that earth is unsuitable for discernment] that the more earthy bodily parts are imperceptive”. What we may expect at this point is to be informed, not of the well-known fact that hair and nails are imperceptive, but of the circumstance that this well-known fact can be adequately explained on the hypothesis that earth is unsuitable for discernment. It is, however, also possible to take ἐντεῦθεν as cataphoric, in which case the well-known fact that hair and nails are imperceptive is simply adduced as evidence in favour of the hypothesis, and this is how I have chosen to deal with the situation in the punctuation of the text as well as the translation. Moreover, since this is not the only apparent transposition involving a conjunction in In De an. (cf. ad. 2.5.15, 170.18–19 and 2.9.13, 214.26 above), it is perhaps also conceivable that the text as it stands is intended to be understood in the desired sense (1). 3.1.15, 252.22 (V164r P173v M262v A224r ) … οὐκ ἔστι διατίθεσθαι – ἤτοι ὡς αἴσθησιν πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι – τὴν ὅρασιν ὡς ὑπὸ ὁρατοῦ [supplevi : deest in V P M A] τοῦ φαινομένου ξανθοῦ ᾗ γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ φαινομένου λευκοῦ ᾗ Κλέωνός ἐστιν υἱός …

It is not possible for the visual sense to be modified by what appears as yellow, in so far as this is sweet or bitter, in the way that it is modified by its own object (i.e. by what appears as yellow, in so far as it is yellow). Very probably a scribal error. 3.1.17, 254.6 (V164r P174r M262v A224r ) ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ εἰρημένα ὥς τι αἰσθητὸν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἓν ὑποκείμενον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἀγνοουμένῃ καὶ ἐλλειπούσῃ ἴσως, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ θεωρούμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων (καθὼς εἴρηται ἡμῖν, ἐν δυσὶ τρόποις τὸ [V P M A : τοῦ malim] κατὰ συμβεβηκός) ….

The reminder that there are two kinds of thing called “coincidental” seems rather abrupt, unless the point is to specify that the features that were previously described as coincidental perceptible objects are really not coincidental at all in either of the two senses of “coincidental” previously mentioned; that is, exactly what was stated in 3.1.16, 252.24–25 (οὐχ ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους δύο τρόπους τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός). But that would require the genitive of the article. It seems likely, but, alas, by no means certain, that this is what the original had. 3.2.1, 256.7–8 (V164v P174v M263r A224v ) ἀδύνατον γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ὅτι ὁρᾷ, μὴ αἰσθανόμενον καὶ εἰδότα αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν [scripsi : αἰσθανόμενον V P M A], εἴτουν τὸ χρῶμα.

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τὸ αἰσθανόμενον is clearly meant to express the object of perception (for instance, the colour). This, of course, it can only do if it the participle is passive, which seems unlikely. At least I am not aware of any parallel. It is not impossible that the mistake should be credited to the author, but it seems more likely that it is a scribal error, prompted by the authentic αἰσθανόμενον five words earlier. 3.2.21, 264.20 (V166v P176v M264v A225v ) … οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ ἀνὰ μέρος αὐτῶν αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀτόμῳ τοῦ χρόνου, τῷ νῦν, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί, ὅτε αἰσθάνεται καὶ λέγει [V2?pc P : λέγη Vac M A] τὸ ἕν, κατὰ ταυτὸν καὶ θάτερον λέγει.

The subjunctive is most likely an archetypal error. If both β and P were copied from V, P’s agreement with the corrected text might suggest that β was the earlier copy. But the separative significance of the error is low: the correction may well be independent in P. The correction in V is in a different ink from that in 2.7.4, 180.19 (see ad loc. above). 3.2.27, 266.29 (V167r P177r M265r A226r ) ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἄν τις εὐλογώτερον ἐνταῦθα, φησίν, ὑπολάβοι [correxi : ὑπολάβη V P M A], ἐοικέναι τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν μοναδικὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῇ στιγμῇ ….

Again, the subjunctive is most likely an archetypal error; the reason why it was not corrected in any MS could be that it was mistakenly thought to be in a conditional clause (i.e. that ἄν = ἐάν). For the subjunctive with ἄν instead of an expected optative with ἄν in the MSS, cf. ad 2.4.26, 156.19 above and 3.4.5, 292.7 below; see also section 2.3.4. 3.3.12, 274.23 (V169r P179r M267r A227r ) καὶ τὸ μὲν [μὴ addere velim : deest in V P M A] ἀληθεύειν καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι ἐν τούτοις ἴσως καὶ ἐνίοτε ἐνδέχεται ….

The transmitted reading is not impossible (“perhaps it is possible sometimes to be right and [sometimes] to be deceived about these things …”), but the passage definitely reads better with the negative particle (“perhaps it is possible sometimes to be wrong and deceived about these things …”), and the omission of μὴ after μὲν is an easy mistake to make for a scribe. 3.3.31, 286.11 (V171r P181r M269r A228v ) αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐφ’ ὧν [ἐφ’ ὧν V P M A : ἐφ’ οἷς vel ἐξ ὧν malim (cf. supra 3.3.29)] ἐστι καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ὡς εἴρηται ….

In the passage most likely referred to by ὡς εἴρηται (3.3.29, 284.16–19), imagination is said to be “founded upon” the perceptible objects and to “take its origin from” them (ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἥδρασται καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν), not to “apply to them”. It is not unlikely that ἐφ’ ὧν is a scribal error for ἐξ ὧν. 3.3.33, 288.13 (V171v P181v M269v A229r ) ὁρίζεται λοιπὸν ταύτην καὶ ὑπογράφει κίνησιν – τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι – ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γινομένην [scripsi (licet γινομένης in 429a 2 habeant plerique codd. Arist.) : γινομένης V P M A]

The transmitted text makes little sense. That being said, several MSS of Aristotle have a very similar nonsensical text in 429a 1–2 (ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως

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τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης [γιγνομένη cett. edd.]). It is by no means inconceivable that Metochites rephrased this text without bothering to emend the error, but the continuation of 3.3.33 shows that he correctly understood what Aristotle meant (“For on receiving actual perceptible objects and actual perceptions the soul is, as mentioned, subsequently moved …”), so I prefer to think that the same scribal error has occurred here as in the Aristotelian tradition (its conjunctive significance is very low, on account of the genitive article preceding the prepositional phrase). 3.4.4, 290.23 (V172r P182r M270r A229v ) εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ νοητά [φησι addere velim : deest in V P M A]· καὶ δῆλόν γε, ὅτι οὔτε ἀεὶ νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ νοοῦμεν ….

It is not clear what the construction of εἶναι is. I can see four theoretical possibilities: (1) εἶναι is the subject of δῆλόν γε (ἐστιν); (2) εἶναι is governed by δεῖ in the preceding sentence; (3) εἶναι is in indirect speech; (4) εἶναι is the third person singular indicative. There are no real parallels for (1) – 3.7.8, 326.13–14 is an apparent one, where ἀλλὰ δῆλόν ἐστιν is really parenthetical – and καὶ preceding δῆλόν γε seems to militate against it. (4) is ruled out by the fact that the subject is in the accusative. (2) and (3) both have disadvantages: (2) after δεῖ we should expect μή rather than οὐ (on negatives in In De an., see sec. 2.3.5); it does not yield a very good meaning; and δεῖ ought to have been expressed in the new clause anyway. The (3) indirect‐speech construction, finally, would be introduced very abruptly (the quasi‐quotations of Aristotle following φησὶν οὖν six lines above [290.16] are in direct speech and only extend for a couple of lines). Still, this construction also has advantages: there is some correspondence between what Aristotle says and the infinitive clause (it is an amplification of the three words ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο in 429a 16); moreover, there is nothing in the following that seems to correspond to μέν, unless it is καὶ δῆλόν γε, in which case the contrast must be between what Aristotle says and what is clear anyway. To rid ourselves of the disadvantages of the indirect‐speech construction while preserving its advantages, then, we must suppose that φησί has fallen out. Still, since there are also a couple of other passages in In De an. where an infinitive has no construction that makes acceptable sense (see sec. 1.6 ad 2.7.23, 190.14 and 2.11.11, 230.7), it is hard to feel certain that this is an error of transmission. 3.4.5, 292.7 (V172v P182r–v M270r A229v ) ὡς ἄν, φησί, πάντα «κρατῇ», τουτέστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διασαφεῖ, πάντα γνωρίζῃ [V P : γνωρίζει M A]· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν γνωρίζοι [correxi : γνωρίζη V P M A] πάντα ἔξωθεν, μή τι συνυπάρχον ἔχων

The second γνωρίζη is very likely a scribal error, prompted by the first γνωρίζη (which is the form we should expect, in spite of M A). There are two other passages in In De an. (2.8.4, 194.5 and 3.2.27, 266.29) where all MSS have the subjunctive with ἄν when the optative with ἄν is expected. In both of these, as in the present passage, the subjunctive is homophonous with the optative. Cf. ad 2.4.26, 156.19; see also section 2.3.4.

L | 1 Textual Tradition

3.4.6, 292.14 (V172v P182v M270r A229v ) … ἀλλ’ ἐοικέναι δοκεῖ γραμματείῳ [γραμματείῳ correxi (cf. infra 3.4.22) : γραμματίω V P M A (sed ut vid. γραμματείω Aac )] ἀγράφῳ.

I have normalized in accordance with the second occurrence of the word (3.4.22, 302.2), where the spelling is correct in all MSS. It is true that γραμματίον is the spelling also in some MSS of Ps.‐Philoponus 516.25 (A1 D) and in some MSS of Themistius 97.22 (P) and 97.23 (P Qpc ), but the present passage is more likely to be inspired by Ps.‐Philoponus 524.13–14, where this spelling is not reported. Accordingly, I have classified it among the suspected errors of transmission (rather than among the suspected authorial errors). 3.4.17, 298.9 (V173v P183v M271v A230v ) … ἔοικε, φησί, τῇ γραμμῇ νῦν μὲν κατ’ εὐθεῖαν τεινομένῃ [scripsi (secundum Arist. 429b 17 et maxime Them. 96.21) : κινουμένη V P M A], νῦν δέ πως οὐ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν ὁρωμένῃ ἀλλὰ κλωμένῃ πως καὶ περιστρεφομένῃ διαφόρως ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ ….

The transmitted text makes little sense. Not that κινοῦμαι cannot be used of a line: according to the advocates of the view that the soul is a self-moving number, reported by Aristotle at 1.4, 409a 3–5, a line if moved generates a plane. But this is not what is at issue in the present passage. Aristotle has ἐκταθῇ and Themistius (who is the main secondary source here) ἐκτεινομένῃ, so it seems highly likely that the original reading was τεινομένῃ, which must have been mistaken by a scribe for the other verb, which is so much more common in the general context. 3.4.23, 302.15 (V174v P184v M272r A231r ) εἰ δὲ μὴ νοητόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καθὸ νοῦς ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλο τι, ἔσται τις μίξις αὖθις ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ διαφορότης (καθ’ ὃ νοῦς καταλαμβάνεται καὶ καθ’ ὃ νοεῖται), καὶ σύνθετος οἱονεί πως καὶ αὖθις οὐκ ἀμιγὴς οὐδ’ ἁπλοῦς [ὁ νοῦς (ἔσται) addere velim : desunt in V P M A].

The second of the two coordinated apodoses lacks a subject (and a predicate verb), which cannot be supplied from the first one, since its subjects are clearly different. One may suspect that ὁ νοῦς (and possibly ἔσται) has fallen out after ἁπλοῦς. 3.5.4, 308.14 (V175v P185v M273r A231v ) … καὶ οὐκ [V P M A : οὐχ ὡς Greg. (fort. recte)] ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἀμφότερα ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρεῖται.

The text is stylistically better in Gregoras’ quotation (see sec. 1.1 on V), but whether this is because it was amended by the excerptor or because it preserves the original reading is anybody’s guess. Gregoras offers five variants (or six, if the reporting verb φησίν is counted) in as many lines, three of which are per se unlikely to be authentic; the remaining two are this and the next item (3.5.5, 308.17). There is no other evidence to suggest that Gregoras had access to a pre-archetypal version of the text, although it is clearly possible. 3.5.5, 308.17 (V175v P185v M273r A231v ) … καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει – ἄλλο τι ὂν [V P M A : ὢν Greg. (fort. recte)] τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ἐνέργειαν – ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε ….

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See the preceding entry (3.5.4, 308.14). The subject of μεταβάλλει is ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς. Cf. also sec. 1.4.7 ad 2.5.3, 162.14. 3.6.4, 312.22 (V176v P186v M274r A232r ) ἤγουν ὅταν συντιθῆταί [supplevi : deest in V P M A] καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς καὶ ὅταν διαιρῆταί τι καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς ….

A subject seems as much needed with συντιθῆται as with διαιρῆται. Most probably a scribal error. 3.6.7, 314.13 (V176v P186v M274r A232v ) τὸ μῆκος τοίνυν ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἓν ἐνεργείᾳ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ [V P M A : αὐτὸς malim] ἔχων τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καθ’ αὑτό ….

If the pronoun is emphatic, it must surely belong to ὁ νοῦς rather than to τὸ ἀδιαίρετον (“the intellect itself also possesses indivisibility”, rather than “the intellect also possesses indivisibility itself”), and in that case it should be masculine. The reason why I have not intervened in the text is that there is a possibility that the pronoun is demonstrative (see sec. 2.3.2), and if so, it may well belong to τὸ ἀδιαίρετον (“the intellect also possesses this [kind of] indivisibility”). 3.6.7, 314.16 (V176v P186v M274r A232v ) εἰ δέ γε διαιρεθείη [correxi : διαιρεθῆ V P M A], ἅμα ἂν καὶ ὁ χρόνος συνδιαιροῖτο ….

This is one of three instances of a conditional clause with εἰ and the subjunctive in V (cf. above ad 2.6.3, 178.4 – indicative in P – and sec. 1.4.8 ad 3.9.3, 338.18 – optative in M A). In view of the c. 120 instances of εἰ with the indicative and c. 25 instances of εἰ with the optative, I think we can safely assume that Metochites would not knowingly use the subjunctive in such a clause; as evidenced by θεωρηθείη four lines down (314.20), he also knew how the optative of the aorist passive was formed. The subjunctive and the optative are nearly homophonous, so there can be little doubt that this is a scribal error. See also section 2.3.4. 3.7.15, 330.6 (V179v P190v M277r A234v ) ἆρα [correxi (secundum Arist. 431b 17) : ἄρα V P M A] ὁ νοῦς, μὴ κεχωρισμένος τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους, φησίν (ἤτοι ἐν τῷ σώματι ὤν), δύναται νοεῖν τι τῶν κεχωρισμένων τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀνωτέρων τῆς ὕλης, ἢ οὐ δύναται ἔνυλος ὢν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν νοῦς αὐτά ἐστι τὰ πράγματα;

There is great uncertainty in the MSS about the accents of ἆρα and ἄρα. Here they all got it wrong, but this is not necessarily of any conjunctive significance. 3.7.16, 330.13 (V179v P190v M277r A234r ) οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἰς τοῦτ’ εἶναι παντελῶς ὃς καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα [αὐτὰ] [seclusi : adest in V P M A] εἴδη χωρίζει αὐτὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ νοεῖ ….

Possibly the duplicate is the result of a half-baked stylistic/grammatical correction (αὐτὰ having being added in the preferred position but not removed from the original position).

LII | 1 Textual Tradition

3.9.5, 340.3 (V181r P192r M278r A235v ) καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, φησί, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινοῦν τὴν ψυχήν [τὴν ψυχὴν V P M A : τῆς ψυχῆς malim], ἐν τίνι θετέον;

It is argued at length in De anima 1.3 that it is impossible for the soul to be moved, let alone with respect to place. The question that Aristotle asks in the passage paraphrased here (432b 7–8) is in fact “what is it that moves the animal with respect to place?” So it seems unlikely that Metochites intended to write τὴν ψυχήν. I say “unlikely”, because he actually goes on in 3.10.1 to speak of the soul as being moved both endogenously and exogenously. In the sentence following the present passage (340.3– 7) the capacity to cause motion with respect to place is contrasted with the capacity of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς) to cause growth and diminution, which belongs to plants as well as animals. τῆς ψυχῆς may, then, be what was intended in this sentence as well. I say “intended”, since it cannot be excluded that the error, if indeed it is one, is an authorial slip of the pen, but it seems more likely to be scribal. 3.10.3, 346.1 (V182r P193v M279v A236v ) καὶ τοίνυν γίνεται τὸ τέλος τοῦ τοιούτου πρακτικοῦ νοὸς τῆς πράξεως αὐτῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πράξει καὶ ἀρχὴ [correxi : ἀρχῆ V P M A] ὑποτίθενται ἐξανάγκης οἱ θεμέλιοι τῇ οἰκοδομήσει ….

The final point reached by practical reasoning in the example (which is adapted from Priscian or Ps.‐Philoponus) are the foundations of the house, which become the starting-point of the action (of building). The starting-point is the first element of the action and does not itself have a first element. ἀρχή and πρᾶξις should therefore not be coordinated and the dative ἀρχῆ must be wrong. The simplest emendation, and the one for which I have opted, is to substitute the nominative, which in that case is, like πρῶτον, a predicative adjunct to οἱ θεμέλιοι. Another possibility is to substitute the accusative, which would then be an adverb, again synonymously coordinated with πρῶτον. The adverb τὴν ἀρχήν is frequent in Metochites (it occurs, for instance, three lines down, in 346.4), but ἀρχήν without the article does not seem to be used, at least not in his prose works. In any case it is a very likely scribal error, prompted by the preceding dative. 3.11.3, 356.15 (V184r P195v M281r A237v ) ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία οὑτωσί πως ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς, ἐν οἷς πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ἀντεξέτασις [scripsi (cf. Them. 121.22) : ἀνεξέτασις V M A : ἐξέτασις P] καὶ αἵρεσις γίνεται, πότερον τόδε αἱρετώτερον ἢ τόδε ἀνιχνεύουσι καὶ ἀναζωγραφοῦσι ….

ἀνεξέτασις is apparently a word. It has an entry in Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität, although it should be noted that there are only four instances in TLG, one of which is in George Scholarios’ epitome of Metochites’ In Cael. (416.5). But regardless of its credentials, it is most likely to be a scribal error in the present passage. The sense required is that of “comparative examination”, which would be provided by the word with the ἀντι- prefix but scarcely by that with the ἀνα- prefix. The probable source text (Themistius, 121.22) has ἀντεξέτασις. And even if it is not in evidence in his own

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works, ἀντεξέτασις is hardly a word with which Metochites would have been unfamiliar, since it is used by many of his favourite authors, including Aelius Aristides, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Hermogenes, Iamblichus and Libanius, as well as by his own father (George Metochites, Hist. dogm. 2.2.14). ἐξέτασις in P is possibly Michael Klostomalles’ attempt to replace V’s ἀνεξέτασις with a word he knew that seemed to make sense. 3.11.3, 356.18 (V184r P195v M281r A237v ) ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ, εἴτε ἡδεῖ [V P M : δεῖ A : τῷ ἡδεῖ malim] εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἀνευρίσκεται αὐτοῖς τὸ αἱρετώτερον φάντασμα.

It seems reasonable to think that the measure by which the more choiceworthy image is chosen is either pleasure or something else; whether the measure is pleasant or not, on the other hand, seems beside the point. The substantivization requires the article (and Themistius has τὸ ἡδύ in the probable source passage [121.27]), so it seems likely (although by no means certain) that this has been lost in transmission. 3.12.7, 364.18 (V185r P197r M282v A239r ) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ἐμψύχοις – οἷα τὰ φυτά, μένοντα καὶ μὴ κινούμενα – οὐκ ἀναγκαία [P M : ἀναγκαῖα V A] ἡ αἴσθησις ….

The neuter plural form of the adjective, following the two neuter plural participles, is very probably an archetypal error, spotted and corrected independently in P and M. 3.12.8, 366.3–4 (V185r P197r M282v A239r ) (1) τοῖς δέ γε φυτοῖς, ἃ μόνιμά ἐστι καὶ πεπηγότα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι τὴν αἴσθησιν· (2) ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴ πορεύονται, οὐδ’ οἷά τέ ἐστιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ βλάπτοντα καὶ προσίεσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα· (3) μάτην γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις [μάτην—αἴσθησις collocare velim post αἴσθησιν v. 2]· (4) πάντα γὰρ τὰ πελάζοντα ἐξανάγκης αὐτῶν ἅπτεται, εἴτε βλάπτοντά εἰσιν εἴτε μή ….

The suspected clause (3) does not explain the immediately preceding statement (2), but the statement before that (1), whereas the immediately following clause (4) explains statement (2). Possibly the suspected clause has been dislocated by first being omitted, because of a saut du semblable au semblable, and added in the margin or between the lines, and then being incorrectly reinserted in the next copy (α or V). If this is correct, it suggests that V’s (or even α’s, if β and V are mutually independent) exemplar was itself a (presumably non-authorial) copy of another manuscript (presumably the author’s original). 3.12.9, 368.1 (V185v P197v M282v A239r ) πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατ’ αὐτὰ ψυχὴν ἔτι μᾶλλον προδήλως ἀσυντελὴς αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρίσις (εἴτουν ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γνωστικὴ ἕξις), τὴν κρείττονα καὶ τιμιωτέραν καὶ βελτίονα πολλῷ – τὴν [delere velim: adest in V P M A] κατὰ νοῦν γνωστικήν – δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἔχουσιν.

It is true that the definite article is sometimes unexpectedly repeated in In De an., but mostly we then have to do with the pattern article + adjective + article + substantive

LIV | 1 Textual Tradition

(see ad 1.4.28, 72.6–7 in sec. 1.6). But here we have the pattern article + adjectives + article + adjective + substantive, and the only way to make sense of it seems to be to understand the second article and the following adjective as parenthetically interposed. It may well be an error of transmission: the addition of an article by a scribe is more common than one may think. For instance, there are 42 instances in In De an. where M and A disagree over whether there should be an article or not; judging by V, these can be divided into 25 cases of omission (7 in M, 18 in A) and 17 cases of addition (5 in A, 12 in M). (Incidentally, there are also 42 instances of the same disagreement between β and V: 21 instances where β has the article and V does not, and 21 instances where it is the other way around.) In view of the frequently unconventional treatment of the article in the work (see sec. 2.3.1), however, I have not emended the text. 3.12.11, 368.18 (V186r P197v M283r A239v ) δι’ ὁράσεως δὲ ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως οὐκ ἀνάγκη τις, ὅτι χρῶμα, φησί, καὶ ψόφοι καὶ ὀσμή, ἃ ταύτης [V P M : ταῦτα A : τούτων malim] εἰσὶν αἰσθητά, οὔτε τρέφει, φησίν, οὔτ’ αὔξησιν ποιεῖ οὔτε φθίσιν ….

It is difficult to see how this could be an authorial oversight, the genitive singular demonstrative pronoun following immediately upon the plural nominative relative pronoun referring to the different objects of the different senses just enumerated. On the other hand, the only way the genitive singular can make sense seems to be if it is taken as referring collectively to the distal senses (or the non-necessary senses, the ones that are for the sake of well-being), and we certainly have not been prepared for that in the preceding paragraphs. Unfortunately, the genitive singular is not so easy to explain as an error of transmission either, which is why it has been left in the text, unsatisfactory as this may be. 3.13.1, 374.8 (V186v P198v M283v A240r ) ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ μὴ εἶναι ἔφη ὁτιοῦν αἰσθητήριον (καὶ ἡ αἰτία δι’ ἣν προείρηται), ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐκ πυρὸς [προδιώρισται] [seclusi : adest in V P M A] (καὶ ἡ αἰτία δι’ ἣν καὶ τοῦτο προδιώρισται) ….

This is most likely an error of transmission, in which case its conjunctive significance is obviously high. Otherwise, it might be the remainder, in the original, of an alternative phrasing of the following parenthesis (προδιώρισται καὶ ἡ αἰτία δι’ ἣν καὶ τοῦτο). 3.13.2, 374.21 (V187r P199r M284r A240v ) … οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς τῆς γῆς ἕξεις ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πάντων ἄλλας [V P M A : ἄλλων malim] πάσας …

The feminine accusative form is perhaps most likely a scribal error, but since the transmitted text is not incomprehensible and the presumed mistake could also rather easily have been made by the author himself, I have not intervened. Conclusion: Some of the suspected errors listed in this section may be authorial and thus of no value for the reconstruction of the genealogy of the MSS. Others may in fact not be errors at all. But it seems highly unlikely that the list does not contain at least a

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handful of archetypal errors, including some that have relatively high conjunctive significance. As the listed errors are relatively evenly distributed over the paraphrase – although they do have some tendency to come in clusters, as might be expected, if they are due to the flagging attention of one or two, three at the very most, scribes – it appears that the text transmitted in all MSS of In De an. descends from a single archetype from beginning to end. Having said that, I should hasten to add that there is still always the possibility of occasional contamination from an extra‐stemmatic source (for instance, in the form of authorial or authorized corrections) in one or another of the MSS. I will explain why this is so in the Conclusion to sec. 1.4.4.

1.4.3 Branches One may form a hypothesis about the genealogical relations of the MSS already from the number and order of paraphrases transmitted in each of them. As we have seen above, P (and T), L, U (and J), R, G and Q transmit the paraphrases in the order in which they appear in V. Sample collations below (sec. 1.4.5) will confirm the dependence of these MSS on V and indicate their internal relationships. On the other hand, M, E and B/W were found to share an order slightly different from that of V (In Ph., In Cael., In GC, In De an., etc., rather than In Ph., In De an., In Cael., In GC, etc.). From this it may be tentatively inferred that these MSS form a separate branch of the tradition. This will be confirmed by sample collations below (sec. 1.4.5). The order in M, E and B/W, where In De an. is the first in a series of paraphrases dealing with ensouled creatures, follows more closely the standard order of study, as outlined by Aristotle in Meteorologica 1.1 (338a 20–339a 10) and amplified by the later tradition, than does that in V.¹⁹ But in the Pinax in M the paraphrases are listed in a different order from that in which they actually follow, namely, that in which they appear in V (and in which they are also listed in the Pinax in V).²⁰ As Borchert argues (2011, cii–ciii), this is a strong indication that the order in V is the original one. Since Metochites expressly states in his Proem that his paraphrases have been arranged “in an orderly fashion and according to a plan”, commencing with the general theory of nature in the Physics and then proceeding through Aristotle’s investigations of specific

19 For the standard order of study of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, see e.g. Simplicius, In Ph. 2.8– 3.12; Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Meteor. 1.5–4.11; Philoponus, In Meteor. 3.26–4.21. 20 The discrepancy between the Pinax and the actual order of the paraphrases in M was observed in a marginal note by Bessarion (f. 2r ): ἕπονται τὰ περὶ οὐρανοῦ, εἶτα τὰ περὶ γενέσεως· εἶτα τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐκ ἀληθῶς ἔκκεινται.

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topics in the sequence that seemed most appropriate,²¹ one has to conclude that it is also the order intended by the author. Metochites does not explain why he considered the position between In Ph. and In Cael. more appropriate than the standard one for In De an., so we can really only speculate. Aristotle begins the De anima by asserting that, of all branches of study, that concerned with the soul deserves to be placed in the first rank both on account of its exactitude and on account of the intrinsic value of its subject matter. When this is paraphrased in the introduction to In De an. (1.1.1–2), Metochites adds (following Philoponus, In De an. 24.3–7) that the reason why the study of the soul is more exact than “the branches that deal with enmattered … things” is that its subject matter is immaterial. The De caelo and the De generatione et corruptione, of course, deal with material things, namely, the simple bodies, and first with the first and, as Metochites adds at the beginning of In Cael. (following Simplicius, In Cael. 4.31–33), most valuable among them, the heavens.²² What is more, Metochites makes it clear on many occasions (e.g. In De an. 1.2.18; 2.1.6; 2.3.6; 3.12.1; 3.12.9) that he does not share the ancient philosophers’ belief that the heavenly bodies are ensouled. It may have been, then, the axiological priority of its immaterial subject matter that seemed to Metochites to demand that In De an. should be placed before all the paraphrases dealing with material things, whether ensouled or not. The anomalous placement of In Meteor. and In Sens. at the end of the collection may have a more prosaic explanation: the only extant commentaries on the corresponding Aristotelian treatises in the fourteenth century were those by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and these may not have been available to Metochites until most of his work was already finished (see further Bydén 2019, 101–2).²³ A displays an order of its own. The reinstatement of In Meteor. immediately before and In Sens. immediately after In De an. represents two further steps in the direction of standardization. It seems reasonable to connect this with the other unique feature of this MS, namely, that it contains the text of the paraphrased Aristotelian treatises. The fact that the placement of De generatione et corruptione before De caelo represents a step in the opposite direction is not necessarily a counter-argument, since it may simply reflect the sequence in one of the sources of A’s Aristotelian text, for instance

21 Περιέξει δὲ αὕτη σὺν τάξει καὶ [σὺν τάξει καὶ V M : post Vollgraffium σύνταξις Drossaart Lulofs] κατὰ λόγον ἑξῆς τὰ τῆς φυσικῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματείας κατὰ μέρος ἕκαστα, ἀρξαμένη πρὸ πάντων, ὡς ἄρ’ ἦν εἰκός, ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν καθόλου περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σπουδασθέντων τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ προιοῦσα ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ [V M : αὐτῶν Drossaart Lulofs] συνταγμάτων ὡς ἄρ’ ἔδοξέ μοι κατὰ καιρὸν εἶναι χρήσασθαι [V M : χρῆσθαι Drossaart Lulofs] καὶ διαθέσθαι τἀκόλουθον τῆς τάξεως· δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ πίναξ ὃν ἐνταῦθα προεκτιθέαμεν (12.33–36 DL). 22 περὶ οὐρανοῦ δὲ ἐπιγράφει τὰ βιβλία ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τιμιωτέρου τῶν πέντε ἁπλῶν σωμάτων καὶ τἄλλα ὠς δῆλον ἐστὶ περιέχοντος (V187v ). 23 See now also Kermanidis (2022, 176–80) for a discussion of possible reasons for the rearrangements of the standard order.

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Par. gr. 1859 (Diktyon 51485) – one of at least three sources used for the De generatione et corruptione, according to Rashed (1999, 277) – in which the De caelo is not included, but the De generatione et corruptione follows immediately upon the Physics.²⁴ It will be shown in section 1.4.5 that A belongs to the same branch as M, E and B/W. The order in M, E and B/W may well be inherited from the hyparchetype of this branch (β).

1.4.4 Omissions of several words Extensive omissions are a type of secondary reading with many obvious advantages for the reconstruction of the genealogy of MSS: the fact that they are errors of transmission is rarely in doubt, especially if there is the possibility that they have resulted from a saut du même au même; they always have comparatively high conjunctive significance; and their separative significance is naturally superlative. In this section, which is largely a summary of Borchert’s results (2011, xcviii–cxi), supplemented by my own findings, the main objective is to ascertain which MSS do not descend from which, as a relatively easy first step towards establishing the filiations of all MSS. The first thing to be noted is that neither in the text of In De an. nor anywhere else do there seem to be any extensive omissions in V that are not shared by any other MSS, except for those caused by the loss of two folios in the early sixteenth‐century rebinding of V (see above, sec. 1.1), which must obviously be shared by any MSS that were copied from V subsequent to this date (and their descendants) but not by earlier copies. In fact, one more qualification is in order. On three occasions extensive passages have actually been omitted from V’s main text of In De an., always because of a saut du même au même; but on all three occasions the omitted passages have then been added in the margins by the main scribe, with clear references to their respective points of insertion (for the content of the passages, see the critical apparatus ad locc.):

V

2.1.24, 112.17–18 (12 words, in the outer margin of f. 135r ); 2.7.13, 186.5–7 (25 words, in the outer margin of f. 150r ); 2.11.3, 224.19–23 (47 words, in the lower margin of f. 158r ).

Borchert reports four extensive omissions, each due to a saut du même au même, exhibited only by P (2011, cvii–cviii). The fact that these omissions are unique to P seems to exclude the possibility that any extant MS is a descendant of P. One of the reported omissions belongs to the text of In De an.: 2.1.12, 106.5 (V133v P143r ) καὶ τούτου τοῦ δυναμένου ζωὴν ἔχειν, οὐ τοῦ μὴ δυναμένου ζωὴν ἔχειν [οὐ—ἔχειν om. P], ὡς ἄρα ἐκ διαιρέσεως καὶ τοῦτο προέφημεν ….

24 The situation seems to be the same in one of three other surviving MSS in the branch to which Rashed assigns A’s text of the De generatione et corruptione, namely Ambr. Q 1 sup. (Diktyon 43134).

P

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In addition to those reported by Borchert, the following omission (due to a saut du semblable au semblable), combined with a repetition, is also unique to P: 1.3.27, 50.1 (V121r P130v ) … ὥσπερ εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὐ συνεχεῖς ἀλλ’ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων κατὰ μέρος μεταξὺ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν. ὡσαύτως δ’ ἔχει καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ νόησις [-τως δ’ ἔχει καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ νόησις : -περ εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὐ συνεχεῖς P] ἄλλη μετ’ ἄλλην ….

So is the following (due to a saut du même au même): 2.5.9, 166.11–12 (V146r P155v ) … οὐκ ἂν κινοῖτο ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργείᾳ τόδε τι, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις δυνάμει μὲν ἦν πρότερον ὅπερ αὐτό), ᾗ δὲ πέπονθε κινηθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὁμοία γέγονεν ἐνεργείᾳ ὅπερ αὐτό [ᾗ δὲ πέπονθε—ὅπερ αὐτό om. P], καὶ ἀντελάβετο αὐτοῦ ….

That P has no descendant is confirmed by other separatively significant errors in P not shared by any other MSS. For examples from In De an., see section 1.4.5. M E B/W

Borchert reports a number of extensive omissions, each due to a saut du même au même, exhibited by all and only M, E and B/W (2011, xcviii–cii). The fact that they all exhibit these omissions strongly suggests that these MSS are closely related, either lineally or collaterally. This is confirmed by other conjunctively significant errors in M, E and B/W (for examples, see below, sec. 1.4.5). The fact that these omissions are exhibited only by MSS in this group seems to exclude the possibility of any of these being the ancestor of any MS outside the group. One of the reported omissions pertains to In De an.: 2.3.4, 134.25–136.1 (V139v M240v ) καὶ τοίνυν ἐν τῇ πείνῃ τῆς τροφῆς ξηρῶν καὶ θερμῶν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, ἐν δὲ τῇ δίψῃ τῆς πόσεως ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία [ἐν δὲ τῇ δίψῃ—ἐπιθυμία om. M E B], ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ….

As for the internal relationships of the group, it is clear from the respective dates of its members that M cannot be a descendant of either E or B/W and that E cannot be a descendant of B/W. Furthermore, E has a number of separatively significant errors not shared by B/W (including extensive omissions: see Borchert 2011, c–ci). Hence it appears that B/W cannot be a descendant of E either. These results are corroborated by other separatively significant errors in each of E and B/W not shared by any other MSS (for examples, see below, sec. 1.4.5). Further corroboration is found in the fact, reported by Borchert (2011, ci), that, in a passage in In De an. (1.3.5, 40.13) where M is illegible because of damage (224r ), E and B/W each offers a text unique to that MS. There are two possible ways to account for this situation. Either Ε and Β/W are mutually independent descendants of M or all MSS in the group are mutually independent descendants of a common ancestor which has been lost without a trace. In the latter case, this common ancestor would have to have been in Constantinople in 1330–40 (when M was copied) and in Venice in 1542 (when Ε was copied) as well as in 1551 (when B/W was copied). But there is no record of any such MS (and should

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it have existed, there almost certainly would be), whereas we know that M has been in Venice since 1468. Moreover, in those passages for which all MSS have been collated for this edition, all separatively significant errors in M are shared by Ε and B/W. For these reasons, it seems almost certain that E and B/W are mutually independent descendants – indeed, direct copies – of M. Similarly, Borchert reports (2011, ciii–civ) several extensive omissions exhibited only by A, which seem to exclude the possibility of any extant MS being a descendant of A. Cases in In De an. include the following, each due to a saut du même au même (for the content of the omitted passages, see the critical apparatus ad locc.):

A

1.1.11–12, 8.9–12 (45 words) (cf. Borchert 2011, ciii); 1.2.7, 22.8–9 (14 words); 1.2.23, 28.20–21 (13 words); 1.3.11, 42.14 (12 words); 2.1.14, 106.25–26 (17 words); 2.1.17, 108.11 (4 words); 2.4.30, 158.15– 16 (12 words); 2.8.25, 202.19 (9 words); 3.2.5, 256.17–18 (11 words); 3.2.20, 264.14 (5 words).

This result, too, is corroborated by many other separatively significant errors in A not shared by any other MSS (see below, sec. 1.4.5). Similarly, Borchert reports (2011, cix–cx) several extensive omissions exhibited only by L (none of which pertains to In De an.), which seem to exclude the possibility of any extant MS being a descendant of L. This result, too, is corroborated by other separatively significant errors in L not shared by any other MSS. For examples from In De an., see below, section 1.4.5.

L

Borchert also reports a number of extensive omissions, each due to a saut du même au même, exhibited by all and only U, R and G (2011, civ–cvii). The fact that they all exhibit these omissions strongly suggests that these three MSS – whose pages are, perhaps not coincidentally, co-extensive (U and G even share the same foliation) – are closely related, either lineally or collaterally. This is confirmed by other conjunctively significant errors in all three MSS (for examples, see below, sec. 1.4.5). The fact that the omissions are shared only by MSS in this group seems to exclude the possibility of any of these being the ancestor of any MS outside the group. One of the reported omissions pertains to In De an., namely:

URG

1.2.13, 24.2–3 (V115v U142r R283 G142r ) Ὅτι δύο τὰ προειρημένα, τό τε κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ γνωστικόν, ἴδια εἶναι καὶ χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, εἴτουν τῶν ἐμψύχων, ἅπαντες οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ δόξαντες, ὡς εἴρηκε προλαβών, οἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ἀποβλέψαντες [ὡς εἴρηκε—ἀποβλέψαντες om. U R G] οὕτω δὴ τὸ κινητικώτατον αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέθεντο.

Other extensive omissions in the text of In De an. exhibited only by U, R and G include 2.1.4–5, 102.5–6 (V132v U161v R322 G161v ) … κἀντεῦθέν ἐστι καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ αὐτοῦ τόδε τι καὶ αὐτὸ καταστὰν εἰς τὴν φύσιν καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος λαβὸν οὐσιώδη τινὰ ὅρον. αὐτὸ μέντοι τὸ εἶδος καινοπρε- [καὶ δι᾿ αὐτὸ—καινοπρε- om. U R G] πῶς ὀνομάζει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐντελέχειαν ….

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3.5.6, 310.3–4 (V175v U212r R423 G212r ) … καὶ ζητῶν τὸν λόγον φησὶν ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀπαθής ἐστιν αὐτοενέργεια, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ὢν ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ πάντα ὤν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀθρόον [ἐστιν αὐτοενέργεια—ἀθρόον om. U R G] καὶ οὐ γινόμενος οὐδὲ μεταβάλλων ….

In addition, the texts of U, R and G all reflect the loss of two folios and the displacement of several folios in V resulting from its rebinding in 1510–1516 (see above, sec. 1.1). As for the internal relationships of this group, see below, section 1.4.5. It should be noted already at this point, however, that there is at least one extensive omission in G’s text of In De an. not shared by any other MS, namely: 3.1.8, 248.10–11 (V162v U196v R392 G196v ) διαφανὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως· διηχὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ [ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ—ὕδωρ om. G]. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὡσαύτως· δίοσμον γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ….

This suggests that no extant MS is a descendant of G (and that Hervet’s translation is not based on it either: see above, sec. 1.2.2), which is confirmed by other separatively significant errors in G not shared by any other MSS. For examples from In De an., see below, section 1.4.5. Q

Borchert also reports (2011, cx–cxi) several extensive omissions exhibited only by Q, which seem to exclude the possibility of any extant MS being a descendant of Q. One of the reported omissions pertains to In De an.: 1.2.17, 26.5–6 (V116r ) … ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς εἴρηται, μέσως ἔχουσα ἀντιλαμβάνηται, ἐν μὲν ταυτότητι τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων, ἐν ἑτερότητι δὲ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων [ἐν ἑτερότητι—ἐχόντων om. Q].

Other extensive omissions in the text of In De an. exhibited only by Q include 3.1.8, 248.3–5 (V162v Q177v ) … μεμιγμένως δὲ παραλαμβάνεται εἰς τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνέργειαν, τὰ δὲ δύο, ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καταλαμβάνονται [εἰς τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνέργειαν—καταλαμβάνονται om. Q] τῆς ὁράσεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως …. 3.1.9–10, 248.21–23 (V163r Q177v ) ταῦτα γὰρ μέσα εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν αἰσθήσεων τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καθὼς δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτα τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων [τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν—αἰσθήσεων om. Q] ὡρισμένα εἰσί …. 3.1.12, 250.14 (V163v Q178r ) … καὶ ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν καθ’ [ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν καθ’ om. Q] αὑτὸ αἰσθητόν …. 3.1.18, 254.16–17 (V164v Q179r ) … ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι [καὶ ἀκόλουθα] καὶ ὡς ἕν τι αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον τῇ αἰσθήσει (οἷον τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτὸ [ὡς ἕν τι—αὐτὸ om. Q] ὡς ἕν τι, καὶ τἄλλα δηλονότι ὡσαύτως).

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This strongly suggests that no extant MS is a descendant of Q. This result is confirmed by other separatively significant errors in Q not shared by any other MSS. For examples from In De an., see below, section 1.4.5. Finally, Borchert reports (2011, cxi–cxii) one extensive omission only found in O’s text of In De an., which seems to exclude the possibility of any extant MS being a descendant of this MS: 1.2.8, 22.12–13 (V115r O8v ) Ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα σχεδὸν ἀπιδόντες – ὡς ἴδιον δηλαδὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ κίνησις καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τοῖς ἐμψύχοις τὸ κινεῖσθαι – καὶ ὅσοι αὐτοκίνητον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέθεντο, ἀπεφήναντο τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν, κινούσης μὲν τὸ σῶμα [ὑπέθεντο—σῶμα om. O] τῆς ψυχῆς ….

This result, too, is corroborated by a plethora of other separatively significant errors in O not shared by any other MSS. For examples from In De an., see below, section 1.4.5. Conclusion: To sum up the results of this section, it would seem that, of the extant MS witnesses of In De an., only V, M, U and R do not have any extensive omissions that are not shared by any other MSS. Therefore, no other MSS than these would seem to have any descendants. U and R share a number of omissions with G that are not exhibited by any MSS outside this group. Therefore, they do not seem to have any descendants outside this group. M, on the other hand, shares a number of omissions with E and B/W that are not exhibited by any MSS outside this group. Therefore, it does not seem to have any descendants outside this group. Consequently, since it has been established (in sec. 1.4.2) that all MSS are most likely descendants of a single archetype, it would seem that all MSS except V must be descendants either of V or of some lost MS(S) (and V, of course, must be the descendant of some lost MS). Our next task, then, will be to ascertain, for each and every extant MS except V, whether or not it is a descendant of V. If all MSS are descendants of V, our best chance of success in reconstructing the original text will come from using V as our basis and emending its text wherever we identify a secondary reading. Even so, it may still be worthwhile to pay attention to any copies that were produced chronologically and institutionally close to the composition of the work (that is to say, in our case, P, M and any descendants of other such copies that may have been lost), as it may well be the case that these contain corrections of V that were authorized by the author himself (and if not by him, then at least by other individuals entrusted with his literary remains). If, on the other hand, some – or indeed all – extant MSS turn out to be independent of V (being descendants of some lost MS(S)), we will have to take the more circuitous route of first reconstructing the archetype from the combined testimonies of V and the independent MSS and then using the reconstructed archetype as the basis for our emendatory efforts. Let us see, then, what we can find out about the relationship between V and the rest of the MSS.

O

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1.4.5 The relationship between V and the other manuscripts (eliminatio codicum descriptorum) Let me first present, as a reference point for the following discussion (and at the same time as a synoptic demonstration of the textual characteristics and mutual relationships of the several MSS), two samples of In De an. (1.1.1–18 and 3.1.1–12) with collations of all MS witnesses in the apparatus. Variations in prosodic accent and punctuation have not been recorded. The apparatus is negative, except that corrections (including erasures), supralinear or marginal text and other noteworthy features in the several MSS have been noted “positively” (see sec. 3.3.1). I should caution that while the collations are accurate enough for the present purposes, they cannot be relied upon in every detail.

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Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων

V111r

Ἰστέον ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίου ἐναρχόμενος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ὅτι πᾶσα γνῶσις ἐπιστη- 1.1.1 μονικὴ καλή τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμία· ἔστι μέν γε ἄλλη ἄλλης βελτίων ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀκριβεστέρα – ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ γεωμετρία τῆς ἰατρικῆς – ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι περὶ ὑποκείμενον τιμιώτερον καὶ σεμνότερον – ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀστρονομία τῆς γεωμετρίας· τιμιώτερον γὰρ τῆς ἀστρονομίας τὸ ὑποκείμενον περὶ ὃ καταγίνεται (ἤτοι 5 τὰ οὐράνια πράγματα) ἢ τὸ τῆς γεωμετρίας – ἢ καὶ δι’ ἀμφότερα – ὥσπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον τιμία καὶ καλὴ ἡ ἀστρονομία τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὅτι καὶ ἀκριβεστέρα ταύτης καὶ περὶ τιμιώτερον ὑποκείμενον καταγίνεται. κατ’ ἀμφοτέρους δὲ τοὺς τρόπους καὶ καλὴ καὶ τιμία ἐστί, φησίν, ἡ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς γνῶσις, 1.1.2 καὶ βελτίων ἢ κατὰ τὰς πολλάς· περὶ γὰρ ἄυλον ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν, ᾧ καὶ ὁ νοῦς συνουσίωται, καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάγεται ἡ θεωρία εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ θεῖα καὶ καθάπαξ νοερά, καὶ ὅτι, περὶ ἄυλον οὕτως 10 ὑποκείμενον καταγινομένη, ἀκριβεστέρα ἐστὶ πάντως – καὶ πολὺ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἀσάλευτον ἔχουσα – ἢ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἔνυλα καταγινόμεναι καὶ τρεπτὰ καὶ γενητὰ καὶ μεταβλητὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἑστὼς ἀκλόνητον παρεχόμενα τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπισκέψει. Ὅτι πρὸς πλεῖστα συμβάλλεται καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν ἡ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θεωρία· 1.1.3 καὶ πρὸς θεολογίαν γάρ, ἐπεὶ δι’ αὐτῆς, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνάγεσθαι ἔστιν εἰς τὰ θεῖα νοερὰ καὶ παντάπασιν 15 ἔξω τῆς γενητῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν· τῷ γὰρ εἰδότι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη τὰ γνωστικά τε καὶ τὰ παθητικά, οἷον θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ἔξεστι ταῦτα ῥυθμίζειν καὶ καθιστάνειν εὖ. μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχή τις ἐνταῦθα ἡ 1.1.4 ψυχή, εἴτουν ποιητική (καὶ γὰρ ποιητική πως δοκεῖ τῆς ζωτικῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὴ ἡ ψυχή), ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ εἰδικὴ καὶ τελική· δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖται καὶ τέλος οἱονεὶ ἔχει τὰ ἔμψυχα, εἰς ὅπερ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ 20 ὁρᾷ τὴν ψυχήν. | [1.1.5] Ὅτι περὶ ψυχῆς ἔστι μὲν προηγουμένως ἐπιζητεῖν τίς ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς, ἔπειτα V111v καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρούμενα, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια ταύτης ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ γνωστικὰ καὶ διανοητικά, τὰ δὲ οὐ ταύτης μόνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ὅλου συνθέτου ζῴου κοινά, ὡς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ θυμοῦσθαι, τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἔστι μέν γε, φησί, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων καὶ δυσχερῶν πάνυ τοι ἡ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐπι- 1.1.6 25 στήμη καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ὁρισμὸς καὶ ἡ κατάληψις· καθόλου γάρ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι ἐν πολλοῖς ἐστι καὶ διαφόροις τῷ εἴδει (ὧν ἁπάντων ἡ οὐσία ζητεῖται δι’ ὁρισμῶν δηλονότι δηλοῦσθαι), ἄπορόν ἐστι πότερον μία ἐστὶν ἡ μέθοδος τῶν ὁρισμῶν διὰ πάντων τῶν ὁριζομένων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, καὶ

i titulum om. A : θεοδώρου μετοχίτου μεγάλου λογοθέτου, τὰ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίων τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου O || βιβλίων ] βιβλίον Q 1 περὶ om. U R G 2 γε om. A 4 τὸ ὑποκείμενον iter. A || τὸ om. G 6 καὶ καλὴ ἡ ἀστρονομία om. O || καλὴ ] καλλὴ M : -λ- Esl Bsl (καλὴ Etext Btext ) || ἡ ἀστρονομία om. A 7 τοὺς iter. Bac (exp.) : om. O || καλὴ ] καλῆ M E B || τῆς om. A 8 βελτίων ] βελτίω B 10 ἀσάλευτον ] ἀλευτον Otext (‑σά- Osl ) 11 ἔνυλα ] ἕνυλα O || ἑστὼς ] ἑστῶς V M A L E U R G Β Q : ἐστῶς O 14 ἀνάγεσθαι Opc (ex ἀναγέσθαι) || θεῖα ] καὶ add. A 15 γενητῆς ] αἰσθητῆς P || ψυχῆς οὐσίαν ] ψυχικῆς οὐσίας M E B 16 τὰ³ om. P Μ Α E B || θυμὸν ] οὐσίαν add. Oac (exp.) || ἔξεστι ] ἕξεστι B : ἔξ ἔστι O 17 καθιστάνειν M1pc (‑ει- M1ras ) || πρὸς Qpc (ex μάλπρος) || πραγματείαν ] πραγματίαν B O || ἀρχή τις Opc (ex ἀρχὴ τῆς) : ἀρχήτης M Bac : ἀρχὴ της Epc (ex ἀρχήτης) 18 ψυχή¹ ] καὶ add. B || πως Opc (ex πῶς) : πῶς Q 19 αὐτὴ ] αὐτῆ B Q 21 οὐσία ] οὐσι O 22 διανοητικά ] νοητικὰ M E B 23 ζῴου ] λόγου Q 23–24 ὀρέγεσθαι ] ὁρέγεσθαι Q 25 ὁρίζεσθαι ] ὀρίζεσθαι B 26 εἴδει ] εἰ δι’ ut vid. O || δι’ ὁρισμῶν ] δι’ ὁρισμὸν M E : διορισμῶν A : διορισμὸν B : δι’ ὡρισμὸν Qac (ὁ- Qsl , exp. ὡ‑)

LXIV | 1 Textual Tradition

ζητητέον τίς αὕτη (ὥσπερ ἐστὶ μία μέθοδος ἡ ἀποδεικτική, φησί, τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκότων ταῖς 1.1.7 οὐσίαις καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ὡς τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς ἠκριβώσατο καὶ διωρίσατο), ἢ οὐ μία ἐνταῦθα ἀλλὰ πλείους αἱ μέθοδοι ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις ὑποκειμένοις ὧν βουλόμεθα δι’ ὁρισμῶν 30 γνῶναι, φησί, τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄπορον καὶ ζητητέον ποία περὶ ἕκαστον ὑποκείμενον ἡ μέθοδος καὶ ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι· πότερον, φησίν, ἀπόδειξίς τις ἢ διαίρεσις, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων 1.1.8 ἠβούλετο, ἢ τοὐναντίον σύνθεσις εἰς ἓν πλειόνων ὡντινωνοῦν ἢ ἄλλη τις μέθοδος. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἔτι ἄπορα καὶ πολλὰς ἐμπαρέχοντα πλάνας πῶς ἔστιν ἀνευρίσκειν τὰς ἑκάστων οἰκείας ἀρχάς, ἐξ ὧν ζητεῖν ἔστι τὰ προκείμενα αὐτὰ ἕκαστα εἰς τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι, εἴτε κατὰ διαιρετικὴν μέθοδον εἴτε κατ’ ἄλλον 35 1.1.9 τινὰ τρόπον, ὡς εἴρηται. ἄλλαι γάρ, φησίν, ἄλλων ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν – ἤγουν τὸ διωρισμένον ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μονὰς αὐτή – καὶ ἄλλη τῶν ἐπιπέδων – ἤτοι τὸ συνεχὲς ποσὸν ἢ τὸ σημεῖον ἴσως ἢ ἡ γραμμή – καὶ ἄλλη πάλιν ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν ἑκάστων. 1.1.10

Ὅτι προδιαλαμβάνει καὶ προεκτίθεται μετὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἑξῆς τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ζητηθῆναι προβλήματα περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ προηγουμένως ζητητέον εἶναί φησι περὶ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάγεται, εἴτουν ὑπὸ ποίαν τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν· ἤτοι πότερον οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή – ὡς οἱ πλείους ἔδοξαν – ἢ V112r ποσόν – ὥσπερ ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἔλεγε ποσὸν ταύτην, φάσκων ὡς ἀριθμός | ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κινῶν ἑαυτόν – ἢ ποιόν – ὡς οἱ ἰατροὶ λέγουσι κρᾶσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι – ἢ πρός τι – ἔνιοι γὰρ λόγον τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν τίθενται, πᾶς δὲ λόγος, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ εἴτε κατὰ τὸ τριπλάσιον εἴτε κατὰ τὸ τετραπλάσιον εἴτε 1.1.11 κατ’ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν θεωρεῖται, πάντως τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν – ἢ ἄλλο τι, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν δέκα γενῶν; ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον ἐστί, φησί, περὶ τοῦ γένους τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερον δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἢ «ἐντελεχείᾳ», εἴτουν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ᾠὸν καὶ τὸ σπέρμα δυνάμει τὸ μὲν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ φυτόν· ὁ βοῦς δὲ καὶ ὁ ἵππος ἐντελε1.1.12 χείᾳ ζῷα, καὶ τὸ δένδρον ὡσαύτως ἐντελεχείᾳ φυτόν. ἑξῆς δὲ πάλιν ζητητέον, φησί, πότερον μεριστή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἀμερής· καθόλου γὰρ τὰ σωματικά, ἔχοντα ὄγκον, μεριστά εἰσι, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἤτοι τὰ νοερά, ἀμερῆ. ὅτε δὲ μὴ μεριστήν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ σωματικὸν ὄγκον ἔχειν, φήσαι τις ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ἄρα μή, καὶ σωματικὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσα, αὖθις ὅμως ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστὶ μεριστή, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγομεν καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰ καὶ τά· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μὴ μερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὰ σωματικὰ μόρια, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα θέσιν ἔχει καὶ τόπους καὶ διαστάσεις καὶ λόγους πρός 1.1.13 τε τὸ ὅλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἔστι δὲ ὅμως μερίζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχει διαφόρους. καὶ ὅτι μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργεῖ ἅπερ ἐνεργεῖ, τόδε τι πρῶτον καὶ τόδε τι μεθύστερον, ἔτι ζητητέον εἶναί φησι πότερον πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις ζῴοις ὁμοειδής ἐστιν ἢ μὴ ὁμοειδής, καί, εἰ μὴ ὁμοειδής ἐστιν, ἆρα μηδὲ

28 τίς ] ἐστιν add. Μ Α E B || ἐστὶ ] ἐστὶν Q || μέθοδος Bpc (ex μέγεθος) || ἡ om. L 29 ἠκριβώσατο ] ἡκριβώσατο Q 30 ὑποκειμένοις ] ὑπομένοις Etext (‑κει- Esl ) || δι’ ὁρισμῶν ] διορισμῶν A 31 ποία U1pc (ex ὁποία) 31–32 ὑποκείμενον om. Q 33 ἓν ] ἐν O 34 οἰκείας ] ἰδίας A 35 προκείμενα ] προειρημένα G || εἰς om. G || κατὰ διαιρετικὴν ] καταδιαρετικὴν Q 36 ἀρχαί ] ἀρχὴ U || ὥσπερ ] ὥστε U R G || ἄλλη ἀρχὴ transp. P 37 διωρισμένον ] διωρισμένων O 38 ἢ om. Q || ἡ om. U R G 40 τῆς om. A 41 πλείους ] πλοίους M E Q || ἔδοξαν Opc (ex ἐδόξ‑) 42 Ξενοκράτης ] ἐνοκράτης add. O || ἔλεγε ] ἔλεγεν Q || φάσκων ] φάσκον ut vid. E O || κινῶν Emarg : κινῆν Etext (exp.) || ἑαυτόν Bpc (ex ἑαυτῶν) 43 ποιόν ] ποιών Q || οἱ om. Μ Α E Β || λέγουσι ] λέγουσιν Q || κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V P M L U R G B Q O : κράσην Etext (‑ι- Esl ) 44 τίθενται ] τίθεται O || τριπλάσιον ] διπλάσιον A || τετραπλάσιον ] τραπλάσιον O 45 ἄλλο ] ἄλλον O 46–48 περὶ—φησί om. A 48 δένδρον ] δένδρο O || ἐντελεχείᾳ om. Q 49 ἀμερής ] ἀμερῆς B : ἀμερὲς Qac (‑η-  Qsl , exp. -ε‑) || ἔχοντα ] ἔχον add. Bac (exp.) || εἰσι ] ἐστὶ Μ Α E B : εἰσίν Q 50 τὰ νοερά ] τανοερὰ ut vid. Q || ἀμερῆ ] μερῆ O || μεριστήν ] μεριστή V M A L E U R G B Q O || τὴν A1sl 51 εἰ ] ἡ Q || μή, καὶ transp. P : καὶ M E B : μὴ A || ὄγκον om. Q 53 κατὰ ] καὶ Q || διαστάσεις Opc (‑ει‑) 54 ἃς om. Q 55 ἐνεργεῖ ἅπερ Qpc (ut vid. ex ἐνεργεία περ) || ἐνεργεῖ ] ἐνεργεία B : ἐνεργεῖα O || μεθύστερον scripsi : μεθ’ ἕτερον codd. 56 ὁμοειδής Mac : ὁμοιοειδὴς M1pc A B || ἆρα ] ἄρα P Μ Α E B || μηδὲ ] μὴ δὲ V P M A L E B Q O

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1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXV

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ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν διαφόρων ζῴων ψυχή; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μόνον ψυχῆς ἡ πρόθεσις, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάσης ἁπλῶς ψυχῆς. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διάφοροί εἰσι τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγονται ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ζῷον, οὕτως ἂν εἶεν καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχαὶ διάφοροι μὲν τῷ εἴδει, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τι ἀναγόμεναι. καίτοι γε εὐλαβείας ἂν εἴη, φησίν, ἄξιον μήποτε τὰ ἐννοηματικὰ ταῦτα γένη λεγόμενα καὶ ἃ κατὰ πολλῶν κατηγορεῖται οὐδόλως εἰσὶν ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ καὶ οὐσίᾳ, ἤ, εἰ εἰσίν, οὐ πρῶτά εἰσι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἀλλ’ ὕστερα μᾶλλον αὐτῶν, κοινῇ τινι ἐμφάσει ἐπιλογιζόμενα καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ μετ’ αὐτὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα θεωρούμενα. ἔτι, φησί, ζητητέον πότερον μία τίς ἐστι ψυχὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ κατὰ διαφόρους | δυνάμεις θεωρουμένη – φυτικήν, αἰσθητικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας – ἢ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ· καίτοι γε ἄτοπόν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, εἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ δούρειος ἵππος ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ πολλοὺς ἐντὸς συνηγμένους εἶχε, καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος πολλὰς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κρύπτει ψυχάς. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ πολλὰς ἔχειν ψυχὰς λέγειν ἔστι τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν μίαν διάφορα μόρια ἔχουσαν, ζητητέον ἔτ’ ἐστὶ πῶς ἔστι χωρίζειν ταῦτα, καὶ πῶς τινα μὴ χωριζόμενα ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καταλαμβάνονται· οἷον τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ θεωρεῖται ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ ὑποκειμένῳ· ἅμα γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἀμφότερα· τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ χωρίζεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον χωρίζεται· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἐμψύχων, ὡς τὰ φυτά, τὸ μὲν θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν ἔχοντα, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ ἔχει πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λογικὸν αὐτῆς. καὶ μὴν ἐπεὶ μία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, διάφορα δὲ ἔχει μόρια, πότερον ἄρα ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀρκτέον τῆς ζητήσεως καὶ θεωρίας ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μορίων μᾶλλον; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅλον γνωριμώτερόν ἐστιν ἐνίοτε τῶν μορίων, καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα μορίων τὸ ὅλον μάλιστα καταλαμβάνεται. ἔτι, φησί, ποῖα πρότερον ἄξιον ζητεῖν, τὰ μόρια ἢ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν ἑκάστων, ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις, ὁποῖαι εἰσί; πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν μάλιστα καταλαμβάνονται αἱ δυνάμεις. καὶ μὴν ἔτι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ὡς πρός τι θεωροῦνται (οἷον αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθητῶν εἰσιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ νοήσεις νοητῶν), πότερον τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς ζητητέον πρῶτον ἢ μᾶλλον τὰ αὐταῖς ἀντικείμενα, ἤτοι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὑποκείμενα, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ἴσως εὐχερέστερον προχωρούσης τῆς θεωρίας καὶ καταλήψεως εἰς αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας, κἀντεῦθεν εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς;

57 ψυχή ] φησὶ M E B || ἀνθρώπου ] οὐρανοῦ Q || μόνον ] μόνης P 58 καὶ om. Q || διάφοροί ] διαφόροι O 59 τῷ ] τῶν Ο 60 τῷ ] τὸ Ο || εὐλαβείας ] εὐβλαβείας B || φησίν A1sl : φησισίν Bac (exp. -σι‑) 61 ἃ ] ἀ- ut vid. O || κατὰ πολλῶν ] καταπολλῶν Q || οὐδόλως ] οὐδ’ ὅλως E 62 εἰ om. A B Q || τῶν R2marg : om. U Rtext G || ὕστερα ] ὕστερον Μ Α E B || τινι ] τοινί Qac (‑ι- Qsl , exp. -οι‑) 63 μετ’ αὐτὰ ] τ’αὐτὰ Btext (με- Bsl ) : μετὰ τὰ Etext (‑τ’αὐ Esl ) : μετὰ ταὐτὰ Q || καθ’ ἕκαστα ] καθ’ ἕκα M B : καθέκαστα A 64 ψυχὴ Epc (ex ψυχῆ) || δυνάμεις ] δυνάμει M Ε B || φυτικήν ] φυσικὴν A L 65 δούρειος ] δούριος R 66 εἶχε ] εἶχεν Q 67 διάφορα ] διαφορὰν ut vid. Q || ἔτ’ Umarg : om. Utext || ἔστι ] ἐστὶν Q 68 καταλαμβάνονται V1pc (ex καταλαμβάνεται : -ν- V1sl ) : καταλαμβάνεται L U R G 69 ἔστι ] ἔστιν O 70 αὐτῷ ] τῶ O 72 τὸ¹ Usl : τὴν P || αἰσθητικόν ] αἰσθητικὴν P 73 ἄρα ] ἆρα Q 75 καθ’ ἕκαστα ] καθέκαστα A U R G || τὸ ] ὅ add. Bac (exp.) || πρότερον ] πότερον Μ Α E B 76 ἑκάστων ] ἑκάστω O 77 εἰσί ] εἰσὶν Q 78 ἐνέργειαι Epc (ex ἐνεργεία) || ὡς om. U R G || θεωροῦνται ] θεωρεῖται Q 80 αἰσθητὰ ] ἐσθητὰ O 81 τὰς iter. Q

1.1.14

1.1.15 V112v 1.1.16

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1.1.19

LXVI | 1 Textual Tradition

V161v

Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν Περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων

3.1.1 Ὅτι ἐναρχόμενος τοῦ τρίτου βιβλίου τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης προτίθεται ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλαι πλείους αἰσθήσεις παρὰ τὰς προδιωρισμένας πέντε· τὴν ὅρασιν, τὴν ἀκοήν, τὴν ὄσφρησιν, τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν ἁφήν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τούτου δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ διηπόρησεν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ μία ἐναντιότης ἐστὶν V162r ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι, | μήποτε οὐκ ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν διαφόρων ἐνταῦθα ἐναντιοτήτων αἴσθησίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ μόνη ἡ ἁφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἔστιν ἢ ἄλλαι λανθάνουσαι καὶ ἀγνοούμεναι ἀντιληπτικαὶ τῶν διαφόρων ἐναντιοτήτων τῶν ἐν τοῖς 3.1.2 ἁπτοῖς, ὡς εἴρηται, θεωρουμένων. φησὶν οὖν ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν ἀντίληψις διὰ τῆς ἁπτικῆς αἰσθήσεως προδήλως, καὶ εἰ ἐν διαφόροις ἐναντιότησίν εἰσι – τῶν μὲν αὐτίκα πελαζόντων, ὡς τῶν ψυχρῶν, θερμῶν, σκληρῶν, μαλακῶν, τῶν δέ, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτίκα, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐστὶ κατάληψις διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς, οἷον τῶν κούφων καὶ τῶν βαρέων – ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς, εὔδηλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθητῶν ὡσαύτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ ἐλλείπει οὐδεμία αἴσθησις, οὐδὲ καταλείπεται μάλιστα αἰσθητά τινα, ὧν μὴ ἔστι καταλη3.1.3 πτικὴ αἴσθησις. καὶ γὰρ δή, φησίν, εἴ τις ἂν ἐλλείποι ὡντινωνοῦν αἴσθησις, πάντως καὶ τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν ταύτης ὄργανον, εἴτουν αἰσθητήριον, ἐκλείπειν ἀνάγκη· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι καὶ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἤρτηται, καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐξανάγκης ταῦτα σύνεστιν. εἰ γοῦν ἐλλείπει τις αἴσθησις, ἐλλείπει καὶ τὸ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν αἰσθητήριον· ἀλλὰ μὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς σὺν ἀντιθέσει ἀντιστροφῆς, ὅτε μηδὲν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐλλείπει, ἀλλ’, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἐστι πρόδηλον, πάντ᾿ 3.1.4 ἔστιν, οὐδεμία ἄρα οὐδ’ αἴσθησις ἐλλείπει. καὶ τοῦθ’ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει πρόδηλον οὕτω συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς ζωτικῆς αὐτῆς τελειότητος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τελειότερα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἥττονα καὶ ἀτελέστερα· οἷον ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ ἔχει τὴν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ταύτης εἴδη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τελειοτέρα αὐτῆς οὖσα, καὶ ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἐξανάγκης ὡσαύτως ἔχει τὴν ζωτικήν, εἴτουν αἰσθητικήν, ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ταύτης εἴδη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχει καὶ τὴν ὅλην αἰσθητικὴν ψυχήν, τελειοτέρα ταύτης οὖσα, ἔχει πάντως τὰς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς πάσας δυνάμεις. ἐπεὶ γοῦν πέντε αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἴτουν τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, προδήλως καταλαμβάνονται αἱ εἰρημέναι, αὗται ἂν εἶεν καὶ μόναι αἰσθήσεις, καὶ οὐδεμία παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλη ἐλλείπει λανθάνουσα ἴσως καὶ ἀγνοουμένη· τὰ γὰρ τελειότε3.1.5 ρα ἀχωρίστως ἔχει τὰ ὑποβεβηκότα καὶ ἀτελέστερα. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων μίαν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα

i titulum om. P Α 1 ἐναρχόμενος ] ἀρχόμενος Vpr L U R G Q || ἀποδεῖξαι ] ἀποδείξαι O 2 προδιωρισμένας ] προδιορισμένας Q || τὴν ἀκοήν, τὴν ὄσφρησιν iter. O (in marg. inf. et in textu) || τὴν² M1sl 3 δευτέρῳ ] δεύτερον O || ἐναντιότης ] ἐναντιότις W 4 μήποτε ] πή ποτε U R G 5 διαφόρων ] διαφορῶν O || ἐναντιοτήτων ] ἐναντιωτήτων A || ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A O 6 ἢ om. O || ἀγνοούμεναι ] ἀγνοουμέναι Q || ἐναντιοτήτων ] ἐναντιωτήτων A 8 εἰ om. U R G Q || εἰσι Wmarg : om. Wtext 10 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 11 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A || καὶ² om. L 12 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V P M L E U R G O 12–13 καταληπτικὴ ] ἡ add. U R G 13 ἐλλείποι A1pc (ex ἐλλείπει) : ἐλλείπει G Q || τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν ] τοῦ πηρετικὸν Q 14 ταύτης ] αὐτῆς U R G || ἐκλείπειν ] ἐκκλείπειν E 15 οἰκείων ] οἱκείων ut vid. O || ἤρτηται ] ἤτηται ut vid. W : εἴρηται Q || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A E W || εἰ γοῦν R2marg : ἤγουν U Rtext G 16 αἴσθησις ] πάντως καὶ τὸ ὑπηρε e v. 13 add. Pac (exp.) 17 ὅτε Opc (ex ὅτι) : ὅτι Q || μηδὲν ] μὴ δὲν ut vid. M E W || αἰσθητηρίων ] αἰσθητιρίων Q 17–18 κείμενον· ἀλλ’ —ἐλλείπει P1marg : om. Ptext 17 ὁρᾶν ] ρᾶν ut vid. Q 18 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V P M L E W O 19 ζωτικῆς αὐτῆς om. O || ἔχει ] ἔχειν Q || ἥττονα ] ἤττονα E W 20 τὰ om. Q || τελειοτέρα ] τελειότερα Q || οὖσα Wpc (ex οὐσης) 21 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A E W || ἔχει om. M A E W || αἰσθητικήν ] ἔχει add. M E W 23 ταύτης ] τῆς O || τῆς Osl || αἰσθήσεις om. M A E W 24 ἀνθρώποις ] αἰσθήσεις add. M A E W || ψυχῇ iter. Aac (exp. A1 ) : ψυχὴ O 25 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V P M L E W O 26 μίαν ] μόνην add. M A E W

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1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXVII

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(ὥσπερ τὰ καλούμενα ζωόφυτα μίαν μόνην αἴσθησιν ἔχει, τὴν ἁφήν), ἔνια δὲ δύο αἰσθήσεις ἔχει, ἔνια δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας. καὶ πάντως ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχει, τὴν πρώτην θεωρουμένην καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελεστέροις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄρα τῶν ζῴων ἡ τελειότης ἡ ζωτική ἐστιν, ἥτις δή ἐστιν | ἐν τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τελειότης τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, εἴτουν ζωτικῆς, ψυχῆς. ἐν τούτοις δὴ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις εἰσίν. ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητήριά ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει, ὡς εἴρηται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τὰ αἰσθητήρια σώματά εἰσι, καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἑνός εἰσι τῶν ἁπλῶν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων σωμάτων – πυρός, ἀέρος, ὕδατος, γῆς – ἢ μεμιγμένα ἐξ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητήριον τῆς ὄψεώς ἐστιν ὑδατῶδες καὶ ὑγρόν, οἷον ἡ κόρη· τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐστιν ἐξ ἀέρος, ὃν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ σύμφυτον ἔφησεν εἶναι καὶ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένον τῷ ὀργάνῳ τῆς ἀκοῆς· τὸ δὲ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως κατ᾿ ἀμφότερα θεωρεῖται τὰ τοιαῦτα δύο ἁπλᾶ σώματα (τό τε ὕδωρ δηλονότι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα)· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πεζοῖς ζῴοις διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἰσθητήριον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐνύγροις διὰ τοῦ ὕδατός ἐστι (προείρηται γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐ μόνον τοῖς πεζοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνύγροις ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι). καὶ διείληφε μὲν οὕτω τὰ τρία αἰσθητήρια ταῦτα τὰ δύο ἁπλᾶ σώματα, ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. τό γε μὴν τῆς γεύσεως αἰσθητήριον καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ καθ’ ἓν μόνον τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένον ἐξ αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεται· τὸ πῦρ δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μόνον ὡς ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ καθορᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἴσως τῆς δραστηριότητος καὶ ὅτι καθόλου τῇ αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει σύμφυτόν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐμφύτου θερμοῦ ζωτικήν, εἴτουν αἰσθητικήν, εἶναι ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ γῆ οἵα τέ ἐστι διὰ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ παχυμερὲς κἀντεῦθεν ἀνοίκειον εἰς κρίσιν ὡς ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ παραλαμβάνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ὅσα γεηρότερα μόρια τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ ἀναίσθητά εἰσιν, οἷον ὀστᾶ, τρίχες, ὄνυχες), ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ ἡ γῆ παραλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἔχει ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ. ὅτε τοίνυν τῶν τεσσάρων ἁπλῶν σωμάτων καὶ στοιχείων τὰ δύο μὲν οὐ πέφυκεν ὡς ἁπλᾶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καθορᾶσθαι, τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ, μεμιγμένως δὲ παραλαμβάνεται εἰς τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνέργειαν, τὰ δὲ δύο, ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καταλαμβάνονται τῆς ὁράσεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχειώδη σώματα, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐδ’ ἄλλα εἰσὶ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια, οὐδ’ ἐλλείπει τι αἰσθητήριον, οὐδὲ μὴν ἐξανάγκης, ὡς προείρηται, οὐδ’ αἴσθησις. ταῦτα γε μὴν τὰ ἁπλᾶ δύο σώματα καὶ εἰς μίαν αἴσθησιν ἔστι τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν ἐξυπηρετεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ὅρασις καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αὐτῇ ὑποκειμένων· διαφανὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως· διηχὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὡσαύτως· δίοσμον γὰρ καὶ | ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. καὶ μὴν οὐ μόνον μία τῶν εἰρημένων αἰσθήσεων ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ δύο ἢ καὶ αἱ τρεῖς ἴσως χρήσαιντ’ ἂν ἀντιστρόφως τῷ ἑνὶ μόνῳ ἱκανῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν ἢ τῷ ὕδατι ἢ τῷ ἀέρι· ἴσως γάρ, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων μόνον εἴη, τὰς τοιαύτας τρεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔτι δέ φησιν ὡς πᾶσα ἀντίληψις αἰσθητικὴ οὕτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ, διὰ μέσου· τὸ δὲ μέσον ἢ σύμφυτόν ἐστιν αὐτῇ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἔξωθεν· καὶ σύμφυτον μέν

27 τὰ ] τοῦ O || μόνην αἴσθησιν ἔχει ] ἔχει μόνην αἴσθησιν M A E W || ἁφήν ] ἀφὴν A 28 τέτταρας ] τέτταρα P || ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A 30 δὴ Opc (ut vid. ex δὲ) 31 ἐλλείπει ] ἐλείπει W 34 ἐξ M1sl || ὃν ] ὂν O 35 ἐγκατῳκοδομημένον ] ἐγκατῳκοδομημένων Wtext (‑ο- Wsl ) || ὀσφρήσεως ] σφρήσεως Q 36 δύο ἁπλᾶ transp. M A E W || δηλονότι om. M A E W || ἀέρα ] δηλονότι add. M A E W || πεζοῖς ] ζοῖς Otext (πε- Osl ) || ἐστὶ ] ἐστὶν U R G 38 μόνον ] μόνων ut vid. O 41 πῦρ Gmarg : om. Gtext 42 ἐμφύτου Opc (ex ἐμφύ τοῦ) 43 ἐνέργειαν ] ἐνεργείαν O || οἵα ] οἷα V P L Q O 44 αἰσθητηρίῳ Opc (ex αἰσθητιρίω) 45 γεηρότερα Wpc (ex γεηρώτερα) 46 καθὼς Epc (ex καθῶς) || ἁφῇ ] ἀφῆ A 48–49 εἰς—καταλαμβάνονται om. Q 50 σώματα om. A 51 οὐδ’¹ ] οὐδὲ G || ἐλλείπει ] ἐλείπει O || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A Ε G W || οὐδ’² ] οὐδὲ G 52 ἐξυπηρετεῖν ] ἐξ ὑπηρετεῖν ut vid. R 53 γὰρ καὶ transp. A 54 ἀλλὰ—ὕδωρ om. G 54–55 ἀλλὰ—ὕδωρ Wmarg : om. Wtext 55 γὰρ καὶ om. O || καὶ² om. O || ὕδωρ ] πῦρ U R G : ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὡσαύτως ex v. 54 add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 56 ἱκανῶς iter. Q 57 τῷ ] τὸ W || μόνον ] μόνο M Etext W (‑ν Esl ) || τοιαύτας ] τοαύτας O 58 πᾶσα ] πᾶσαν Q 59 μέσου ] μέμέσου M E Wac (exp. μέ- W) || αὐτῇ ] ut vid. αὐτὴ P Q

V162v 3.1.6

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3.1.8

V163r

3.1.9

LXVIII | 1 Textual Tradition

ἐστιν ὡς αἱ σάρκες ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς σαρξὶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς γεύσεως, καθὼς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ ὑπέδειξέ πως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἀλλότριον δὲ ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ μέσα εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν αἰσθήσεων τῶν τε 3.1.10 αἰσθητῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καθὼς δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτα τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡρισμένα εἰσί (τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ὄντα τῶν ἁπλῶν ἄττα στοιχείων, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὡρισμένων μικτά), καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ ἐγγινόμενα καὶ θεωρούμενα πάθη, ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀντιλαμβάνονται, ὡρισμένα εἰσὶ καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐγνωσμένα, οὔτ’ ἄρ᾿ οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐλλείπει, δι’ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν αὐτῶν, οὔτε αἴσθησίς τις ἐλλείπει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις, φησίν, εἰσὶν ἐντελῶς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις – τοῖς τὴν ζωτικὴν δηλονότι τελειότητα ἔχουσιν, οὐ τοῖς πεπηρωμένοις καὶ κολοβοῖς καὶ ἀτελέσιν, οἷα τὰ ζωόφυτα ἀτελῆ τὴν ζωτικὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ αἰσθήσει τῇ ἁφῇ, καὶ ἄλλα ἐν δυσὶν ἢ τρισὶν αἰσθήσεσι θεωρού3.1.11 μενα οὐ μὴν ἁπάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντα, οὐδὲ τελειότητα τῆς ζωτικῆς ἔχοντα ψυχῆς. τελειότης δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τῆς ζωτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινητικὴν δύναμιν ζῴοις, ἐν οἷς προδήλως εἰσὶ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ, φησί, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικὸν ἔχουσα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν καὶ τὸ ὀπτικὸν εἰς τὸ ἔξωθεν ἐμφανῶς οὐκ ἔχει, ἄλλ’ ἔχει γε μὴν ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα, φησίν, ἵνα μηδ’ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλείπῃ τις αἴσθησις, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἁπάσας ἔχῃ ὡς τελειότητα ζωτικὴν ἔχουσα· εἰ δὲ μὴ προβέβληται τὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ ἐντὸς κρύπτεται καὶ λανθάνει, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ λόγον τῇ φύσει γέγονεν· οὐ γάρ τις χρεία αὐτῶν τῷ ὑπὸ γῆν ἐν τῷ ὀρύττειν ζῶντι ἐμψύχῳ, ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ἀσπάλαξ· τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καὶ ἀχρεῖον ἄηθες τῇ φύσει. [3.1.12] ἐπὶ τούτοις δή φησιν ὡς οὐδὲ ἔστι V163v τις ἄλλη ἰδία | αἴσθησις παρὰ τὰς πέντε τῶν κοινῶς θεωρουμένων ἐπ’ αὐταῖς, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ· ταῦτα γάρ – ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται – θεωρεῖται κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον τούτων καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾑτινιοῦν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιθεωρεῖται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ δηλωθέντα. τῷ γὰρ ὁρατῷ – εἴτουν τῷ χρώματι – ἐνθεωρεῖται καὶ κίνησις ὁτὲ καὶ στάσις, καὶ ὁρᾶται τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ κινούμενον ἐνίοτε καὶ ἑστώς, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὡς μέγεθος ὁρᾶται (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον συνεχές), ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ ὡς ἀριθμός – εἴτουν ἀριθμητόν – ὁρᾶται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται, ἤτοι ἓν ἢ δύο ἢ ἕτερος ὁστισοῦν ἀριθμός. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ταῦθ’ ἕκαστα θεωρεῖται (ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τούτων προδιείληπται).

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60 αἱ M1sl || ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς O || καθὼς ] καθώσκαθως O 61 τούτου ] τούτοις Q || ὑπέδειξέ ] ὑπέδειξαι Qtext (‑ε Qsl ) || ἀλλότριον ] ἀλότριον Wtext (‑λ- Wsl ) 62 μέσα om. W 62–64 τῶν τε—αἰσθήσεων om. Q 64 αὐτὰ om. W 65 ἄττα correxi : ἅττα codd. || τὰ om. M E W || ἐγγινόμενα ] ἐνόμενα Otext (‑γγι- Omarg. inf. ) 66 καὶ αὐτὰ A1sl || οὔτ’ ] οὕτως U R G 67 αἰσθητῶν om. Q 68 ζῴοις ] πεζοῖς U R G || τὴν ] ψυχ add. Qac (exp.) 69 τελειότητα ] τελειότητας E || πεπηρωμένοις ] πεπειρωμένοις Q || κολοβοῖς ] κολωβοῖς V P L U R G Q Ο (‑οῖ- Ppc ) 70 ἁφῇ ] ἀφῆ A Ο 71 ἔχοντα ] τῆς add. E 72 ἔχουσι ] ἔχουσιν Q || κινητικὴν ] κινητὴν P 73 πᾶσαι ] πάσαι W Q || καὶ³ om. U R G || ἀσπάλαξ ] ἀπάλαξ P || κινητικὸν ] κινητὸν P 74 ἔχουσα ] ἔχου O 75 ἐλλείπῃ ] ἐλλείπει M E W || ἁπάσας ] πάσας U R G || ἔχῃ ] ἔχει Mac W O (‑η ut vid. M1pc ) 76 ὀφθαλμῶν ] ὀμμάτων A 77 φύσει ] φήσει O 78 ἀσπάλαξ ] ἀπάλαξ P || ἄλογον ] ἄλλογον Wac (exp. -λ‑) || ἐπὶ ] ἐπεὶ O || τούτοις ] τού Otext (‑τοις Omarg. inf. ) || οὐδὲ ] οὐδὲν P : οὐδ’ Q || ἔστι ] ἔστιν M E W 79 κοινῶς Qpc Opc (ex κοινῶν) 80 σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ ] μεγέθους· ἀριθμοῦ· σχήματος M A E W || καὶ om. Q 81 δοκεῖ ] δυκεῖ O 82 ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν καθ’ om. Q || αὑτὸ ] ἑαυτὸ Q || αἰσθητόν ut vid. Opc (ex αἰσθητων) 83 τῷ² om. M A E W : τὸ Q || χρώματι Qpc (ex χρῶμα τι) 84 ὁτὲ ] τὲ Q || ἑστώς correxi : ἑστῶς codd. 85–86 ἀριθμητόν ] καὶ add. M A E W 86 δὲ ] δὴ M A E W 87 θεωρεῖται ] καὶ καταλαμβάνεται· ἤτοι ἓν ἢ δύο, ἢ ἕτερος add. Qac (exp.) || καὶ om. Q O 88 προδιείληπται ] προδιήλειπται V P L O : προδιείλειπται Qtext ([ι]-η-[λ] Qsl )

60

65

70

75

80

85

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Let us see, then, what conclusions can be drawn from this material as regards the relationship between V and the other MSS. Starting from the most recent among the latter, O stands out on account of its many unique errors, not a few of which are quite spectacular. On the other hand, where V can be suspected of error, O usually agrees with it. Notable cases include 3.1.7, line 43 (οἵα : οἷα V P L O), where many other MSS have the correct gender and number, and 3.1.12, line 88 (προδιείληπται : προδιήλειπται V P L O), where many other MSS have the correct spelling. The one exception in the samples is 3.1.1, line 1 (ἐναρχόμενος : ἀρχόμενος Vpr L U R G Q), where O has what was evidently V’s reading before erasure, although the erasure can be no later than c. 1492, the latest possible date for the copying of L (see sec. 1.1). This reading would, however, have been easy to restore by comparison with the first sentence of each of the preceding books. Occasionally (1.1.4, line 17; 1.1.10, line 42; 3.1.1, line 5), O shares an error with other MSS, but these cases are invariably easy corruptions due to homophony (and thus of low conjunctive significance). All in all, the presence of many suspected conjunctively significant errors shared by V and the absence of presumed original readings not shared by V strongly suggest that O is a descendant of V. Moreover, Borchert (2011, cxii) pointed out that an omission of 25 words in O in In De an. 2.7.13, 186.5–7 coincides with a portion left out in the text of V but added by the main scribe in the margin (cf. above, sec. 1.4.4), and that a further corruption (συμβεβηκός ἐστι for συμβέβηκε τῶδε) is found in a passage (In De an. 3.1.15, 252.14) which is partly illegible in V: the latter argument is strengthened by the fact that O also omits ἄν in the next line, which is equally illegible in V. Borchert drew the reasonable conclusion that O is a descendant of V, in all likelihood a direct copy. The case is similar with Q. This MS agrees with most suspected errors in V, the main exception being that it does not normally separate οὐδέ and μηδέ from μία, but this phenomenon, I would submit, falls under accidentals, so that considerable variation may be expected. In 3.1.12, line 88, the scribe first miswrote προδιείλειπται for προδιείληπται, and then turned back to add an η above the line, but not above the syllable -λει‑, where it would have been appropriate, but instead above the accentuated syllable, so as to accord with the erroneous spelling in V. Q also adds a substantial number of unique, separatively significant, errors, including (as we have seen in sec. 1.4.4) three extensive omissions. All in all, the presence of many suspected conjunctively significant errors shared by V and the absence of presumed original readings not shared by V strongly suggest that Q is a descendant of V, most likely, as Mercati asserted, a direct copy.²⁵ The case is clinched by the fact that Q reflects the loss of two folios as well as the displacement

25 Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 437).

O

Q

LXX | 1 Textual Tradition

of several folios in V resulting from its rebinding in 1510–1516 (see above, sec. 1.1).²⁶ Moreover, Mercati pointed to the existence in its lines of fenestrae coinciding with passages that are illegible in V because of water damage.²⁷ Conclusion: Q and O are certainly descendants, in all likelihood direct copies, of V, and can be disregarded for the purposes of the constitutio textus. L

Leaving the two groups of interconnected MSS for last, L is next in line. This expertly executed MS very rarely disagrees with V. In the samples above it shares with it all its suspected errors (e.g. 3.1.7, line 43 and 3.1.12, line 88, both mentioned above in connection with O) as well as most if not all of its other quirky habits, including unconventional orthography (1.1.10, line 43; 3.1.10, line 69), and somewhat arbitrary choices with regard to closed and open combinations (1.1.13, line 56; 1.1.17, line 75; 3.1.2, line 12; 3.1.3, line 15; 3.1.3, line 18; 3.1.4, line 21; 3.1.4, line 25). In 3.1.1, line 1 it has ἀρχόμενος in accordance with the post rasuram reading of V; whereas in 1.1.16, line 68 it agrees – as do U, R and G – with V’s ante correctionem reading καταλαμβάνεται (καταλαμβάνονται Vpc ), which is perhaps no wonder, since V’s correction is easy to overlook, and, besides, the subject of the verb is neuter plural, so the singular form is perfectly in order here. Only three times does L have a trifling error of its own: a missed article (1.1.6, line 28); a lost adverbial καί (3.1.2, line 11); and a venial misreading of a single letter, which it coincidentally shares with A (φυσικήν for φυτικήν in 1.1.15, line 64). As it was copied before the rebinding of V, it cannot be expected to reflect the losses and displacements that resulted from this (see above, sec. 1.1). All the same, the resounding presence of suspected conjunctively significant errors and other special features shared with V and the absence of presumed original readings not shared with V strongly suggest that L is a descendant of V. Moreover, Borchert (2011, cxxv–cxxvi) has pointed to the existence of numerous fenestrae in the lines of L, where presumably its exemplar could not be read, which coincide with passages that are more or less illegible in V. Borchert’s examples were chosen from the water-damaged last folios of V, but others can be found in the text of In De an. Thus a space of a word’s length has been left blank after συμβέβηκε in In De an. 3.1.15, 252.14 (123r ), where V (164r ) is almost impossible to read (see the discussion of O above). Since, furthermore, L was copied in Italy, probably at Florence, possibly at Rome, at a time (1485–1492) when V was part of the Vatican Library (but intermittently on loan), it is practically certain that it is a direct copy of V.²⁸

26 Since these losses and displacements do not affect the text of In De an., this argument is not applicable to O. 27 Mercati & Franchi de’ Cavalieri (1923, 440). 28 It should be noted, however, that the Vatican inventories of 1481 and 1484 include two codices of commentaries on Aristotle by “Theodorus Logotheta” (Devreesse 1965, p. 91 item 210 and p. 92 item

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LXXI

Conclusion: L is thus certainly a descendant, indeed a direct copy, of V, and can be disregarded for the purposes of the constitutio textus. P has a few more disagreements with V, but on these occasions it is for the most part clearly in the wrong. We have already seen above (sec. 1.4.2) that it shares a large number of suspected errors of transmission with all other MSS. One fairly certain archetypal error of high conjunctive significance is found within the scope of the samples above (1.1.13, line 55), besides a number of other possible errors of transmission shared by all MSS, including transpositions (3.1.7, lines 44–45) as well as erroneous spellings, accents and breathings (e.g. 1.1.10, line 43 – supposing that A’s superior reading here was not in its exemplar – and 3.1.10, line 65). In addition, however, we find that P shares some highly probable (3.1.7, line 43) and some other possible (e.g. 3.1.10, line 69 and 3.1.12, line 88) errors of transmission with V against M and A, while adding a few manifest errors (e.g. 1.1.16, line 72; 3.1.5, line 28; 3.1.11, lines 72, 73 [bis] and 77; 3.1.12 line 78) and a few indifferent variants (e.g. 1.1.9, line 36, 1.1.13, line 57) of its own. Outside the scope of our samples, the following is an instructive example of the tendency of both P and L to agree with V even against all odds (and against M and A): 1.4.34, 74.7–8 (V127r P136v M230r A196r L97v ) ἐὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὑφαίρεσιν ποιήσῃς, ἑτεροιοῦται [A : ἑτεριοῦται M : ἑταιρειοῦται V P L] ὁ ἀριθμός ….

There are several other similar cases: for instance, P and L both share V’s erroneous breathings in 1.4.16, 66.2 (ὠδί) and 1.4.22, 68.15 (ἴεται), and both share, as against M and A, its manifest error in 1.4.16, 64.23 (V125r P134v M228v A195r L96r ) … καὶ πάλιν κρίνει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν φόβον [M A: τοῦ φόβου V P L] ….

On one occasion P may at first glance even seem to agree with an error in V not shared by L, but this may be a correction by a later hand in L: 1.5.24, 88.25 (V130r P139v M232r A199v L99v ) … ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφαικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι [Μ A L2?pc : ἕπεσι V P] λόγος …

In the following passage, on the other hand, P seems to side with M and A against a manifest error (scribal or authorial) in V, but it is not absolutely clear that V has the circumflex here (it may be partly erased, possibly due to an attempt at correction):

217; p. 129 items 209 and 216); in the inventories of 1504–1505, 1508–1510 and later there seems to be only one (Cardinali 2015, p. 108 item 99; p. 191 item 148; cf. Devreesse 1965, p. 163 item 150; p. 197 item 248; p. 245 item 144; p. 310 item 819).

P

LXXII | 1 Textual Tradition

1.4.10, 62.13 (V124r P133v M228r A194v L95v ) … πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ «γαίᾳ [γαία P M A : γαῖα (ut vid.) V L] μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν»;

There are a few other occasions where P agrees with M and/or A against V (as in 1.1.3, line 16 and 1.1.13, line 56), but all of these are either manifest errors or indifferent variants of low conjunctive significance (a couple of omissions and additions of articles, a couple of simple transpositions, an instance of the substitution of δέ for δή). There seems to be no reason to suspect that any more extensive contamination has occurred between β and P (see further Borchert 2011, cxcvii–cxcviii), although our samples do include the following passage, which calls for an explanation: 1.1.12, line 51 (8.15) (V112r P122r M218v A185v ) … ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ἄρα μή [om. M], καὶ [om. A : μὴ καὶ transp. P] σωματικὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσα, αὖθις ὅμως ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστὶ μεριστή …

There can be little doubt that V’s reading is right here: μή belongs to the predicate verb of the indirect question after ζητεῖν (“whether it may not after all”), καί to the concessive participle (≈ καίπερ). The situation in M and A is perhaps best explained by assuming that their common ancestor (β) had first omitted μή and then added it above the line, whereupon it was overlooked by the scribe of M and taken for a correction by the scribe of A (Manuel of Corinth).²⁹ There is nothing unusual in V at this point. If there had been any other evidence to suggest that P is influenced by β, one might therefore have been tempted to add this passage to that dossier; but, as we have seen, this is not the case, and the fact that P disagrees with V over the same two words as M and A is probably no more than a coincidence. Since two quires of P, from f. 168 to f. 183, are made of different paper from the rest and moreover were copied by a different scribe (2.11.2, 224.18 ἐναντιότησι—3.4.19, 298.23 νῦν δὲ ἁπλῶς), Groisard (2009) raised the question whether these may have been inserted later as part of a restoration effort, but concluded, on the grounds of the seamless continuation of the text, that it is more probable “qu’il y ait eu collaboration entre deux copistes contemporains dont l’un a momentanément relayé l’autre”. I can add that there is no indication that different exemplars were used by the two scribes: especially, in cases of disagreement between V on the one hand and M and A on the other, both scribes practically always agree with V. All of the above suggests rather strongly that P is a descendant of V. This hypothesis is further supported by a compelling piece of evidence adduced by Borchert (2011, cxxvi–cxxviii): at one point in the text of In GC both P and L offer the meaningless text καὶ οὐκ ἀνακλήσει πρὸς ἓν τῶν τεσσάρων … instead of the meaningful text καὶ οὐκ ἀνακυκλήσει πρὸς ἓν τῶν τεσσάρων … shared by V, A and (with a slight variation) M,

29 Borchert argues that Manuel has interpreted other supralinear additions as corrections (2011, clxvii–clxviii).

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except that in V a fold across f. 287 has in effect concealed the two letters -κυ- omitted in P and L.³⁰ Indirect evidence for the dependence of P on V is also provided by a lacuna in T, the complementary volume of P, in a passage of In PA where V is illegible (but M is not; In PA is not included in A or S) (Borchert 2011, clxv). The case may seem to be settled, then. The only obstacle is that there are after all a few passages where P alone offers a superior text. Borchert (2011, clx–clxi) mentions three superior readings in P not shared by any other extant MSS, and two where it agrees with M as well as L; in all these passages, however, the error in V is obvious and easily emended. This is not so much the case in the passage in 1.1.12 already discussed above (sec. 1.4.2): 1.1.12, line 50 (8.14) (V112r P122r ) ὅτε δὲ μὴ μεριστήν [P : μεριστὴ V cett.], ἐπειδὴ μὴ σωματικὸν ὄγκον ἔχειν, φήσαι τις ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν ….

The error in V M A L is small but not (separatively) insignificant. In order to emend it without outside help a scribe will have to read in advance and grasp the syntax of the whole sentence before copying. But not only that, because the sentence is possible to construe even on the reading of V M A: he also has to appreciate that if the sentence is emended, the argument of which it forms part will be more reasonable; and furthermore, he has to consider himself authorized to emend the sentence in such a way that the argument will be more reasonable (if only for the simple reason that he assumes that the sentence has been corrupted in transmission). There is no sign that the reading of P is an afterthought. There seem to be three possibilities. (a) Michael Klostomalles copied V and did what I have just described. Against this hypothesis militate, apart from the intrinsic difficulty of the emendation, all the other instances of manifest errors of transmission in V, where Klostomalles has not attempted to ameliorate the text. (b) Klostomalles had access to outside help, in the form of another MS or through oral instruction either by the author or, more likely, other people entrusted with the author’s Nachlass. This hypothesis explains why he would have considered himself authorized to emend the text, and it makes the intrinsic difficulty of the emendation irrelevant, but apart from that the same objection can be raised against it as against the former hypothesis. (c) Klostomalles copied V and made a mistake which accidentally restored the original (or at least produced a more reasonable argument than that put forward in the text of V). The fact that he did not attempt to correct his mistake could of course be due to his recognition that it made for a more reasonable argument. Conclusion: It is highly likely that P is a descendant of V, but there may be reason to suspect occasional contamination from other sources (namely, in the form of au-

30 Another example of the “photographic” reproduction in P of a nonsensical erasure in V is given by Borchert at 2011, clxv.

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thorial or authorized corrections). This means that while there is no point in trying to reconstruct a common ancestor of P and V, P should at least be consulted in cases where V is suspected of error. URG

It has already been mentioned (sec. 1.4.4) that U R G reflect the losses and displacements in V after rebinding. In addition, they share practically all suspected errors of transmission in V. Leaving aside punctuation, prosodic accentuation and closed and open combinations, there is only one exception in the samples above: 3.1.7, line 43 (οὐδ’ ἡ γῆ οἵα [M A E U R G W : οἷα V P L Q O] τέ ἐστι …). Although this is a manifest error, most probably one of transmission, its separative significance is low (note that M, A, E and W also have the presumed original reading here). U R G also share a large number of manifest errors, including several extensive omissions (see above, sec. 1.4.4), that are not found in V (e.g. 1.1.1, line 1; 1.1.9, line 36; 1.1.9, line 38; 1.1.14, line 62; 3.1.1, line 4; 3.1.3, line 13; 3.1.8, line 55; 3.1.10, line 66). Only occasionally do they share one of these errors with another MS, and when they do the error is always of low conjunctive significance (e.g. 3.1.1, line 8). As already established, they are thus a closely related group with no descendants outside the group. But what are the relationships within the group? The samples above contain one error in U not shared by R G (1.1.9, line 36: ἄλλαι γάρ, φησίν, ἄλλων ἀρχαί [R G cett. : ἀρχὴ U], ὥσπερ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν). However, its separative significance is low. They also contain one error in R not shared by U G (1.1.15, line 65: δούρειος [U G cett. : δούριος R]), again of low separative significance. On the other hand, there are about a dozen errors in G not shared by U R (or any other MS), some of which, including the thirteen-word omission in 3.1.8, line 54, are of high separative significance. We can thus safely conclude (as we have already done) that no extant MS is a descendant of G. Further, the respective dates of U and R make it impossible for the former to be a descendant of the latter. Accordingly, the presence of conjunctively significant errors in all three MSS and the absence of separatively significant errors in U not shared by R G strongly suggest that both R and G are descendants of U. This hypothesis is also supported by other considerations. If all the conjunctively significant errors shared by U R G were inherited from a common ancestor of which U R were as good as flawless copies, this common ancestor would have to be a descendant of V after rebinding, available at Rome in 1546 (when U was copied) and at Paris in 1548 (when R was copied), and subsequently lost without a trace. Since it is unlikely that any such MS would have existed without there being any record of it – whereas we know that V was at Rome in 1546 – we can safely conclude that R G are descendants of U, and, furthermore, that U is a direct copy of V.³¹ R’s extreme faithfulness to U and the respective 31 On f. iir of U an early nineteenth‐century hand has written “This is the only copy that ever was permitted to be taken of the Scarce original witness in the Vatican Library”. We know that V is not the original and that U is not its only copy; still, there may be a kernel of truth in the statement.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXV

dates of the two MSS conspire to make it practically certain that the former is a direct copy of the latter. By the same token, it is impossible on the basis of the sampled material to say conclusively whether G is a copy of R or whether both are mutually independent copies of U. The fact, however, that U and G, but not R, have the same foliation clearly speaks in favour of the latter alternative. In any case, U must have been transferred from Rome to Paris (it was commissioned by Georges d’Armagnac) more or less immediately upon execution. It may be noted that a second hand in R has occasionally entered variant readings from another MS in the margin (1.1.14, line 62 and 3.1.3, line 15). The source of these variants may well be V, in which case they were most likely entered after 1689, when Queen Christina’s library, of which R was part, was acquired by Alexander VIII. Conclusion: As descendants of V, U R G can thus be disregarded for the purposes of the constitutio textus. As one might expect on account of their shared extensive omissions (see above, sec. 1.4.4), M, E and B/W also share many other manifest and suspected errors as well as indifferent variant readings not in any other MSS (e.g. 1.1.2, line 7; 1.1.3, line 15; 1.1.5, line 22; 1.1.12, line 49; 1.1.13, line 57; 1.1.15, line 64; 3.1.4, line 21; 3.1.9, line 59; 3.1.10, line 65; 3.1.11, line 75). In addition, they share many such errors and variants with A (for examples, see below, “The relationships of V M A”). As already mentioned, each of E and B/W also has its own manifest errors not shared by any other MSS (e.g. 1.1.2, line 8 [B]; 1.1.4, line 18 [B]; 1.1.14, line 60 [B]; 3.1.8, line 57 [W]; 3.1.9, line 62 [W]; 3.1.10, line 64 [W]; 3.1.10, line 69 [E]). On the other hand, there are in our samples no errors in M not shared by at least one of E and B/W (note, however, 1.1.1, line 6, where E and B both have the correct spelling in the text, with the addition of M’s idiosyncratic extra -λ- supra lineam), although each of E and B has at least one presumed original reading where the other two MSS have an error (1.1.10, line 41 [M E]; 1.1.14, line 63 [M B]); these errors are, however, both of low separative significance. All this supports the previously drawn conclusion (sec. 1.4.4) that E and B/W are mutually independent descendants – indeed, direct copies – of M. E and B/W can thus be disregarded for the purposes of the constitutio textus. Conclusion: O, Q, L, U, R, G and, with certain reservations, P are all practically certainly descendants of V. E and B/W are both practically certainly descendants of M. There is no reason to discuss any of these descendants of V and M (again, with certain reservations for P) further in this context. The relationships of V M A. Instead we should focus on the relationships between the three remaining MSS: V, M and A. As noted in sec. 1.4.2, there are around a hundred passages where they all share what I suspect to be an error of transmission. It was also noted that some of these may in fact be authorial errors or perhaps no errors at

M E B/W

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all. Still, there remain dozens of passages where they all share what to my mind are manifest errors of transmission. MA

β

M against VA

M and A also share many manifest and suspected errors as well as indifferent variant readings against V, some of which are of high conjunctive significance. Among the examples in the samples above we may single out 1.1.6, line 28; 1.1.10, line 43; 1.1.12, line 49; 1.1.14, line 62; 1.1.18, line 75; 3.1.4, lines 21 and 23–24; 3.1.5, lines 26 and 27; 3.1.6, line 36 (bis); 3.1.12, lines 80, 83, 85–86 and 86. For additional errors of high conjunctive significance shared by M and A but not by V, see Borchert (2011, clv–clviii) and below, sec. 1.4.7. Clearly, then, M and A are closely related, either lineally or collaterally. But as has just been noted, M also has a number of manifest or suspected errors as well as indifferent variant readings not shared by A. Moreover, it was seen in section 1.4.4 that M and its descendants have a number of extensive omissions not shared by any other MSS. Therefore, A cannot be a descendant of M. That M cannot be a descendant of A is clear already from the respective dates of the two MSS. In addition, it was seen in section 1.4.4 that A has a number of extensive omissions not shared by any other MSS. Clearly, then, M and A are not lineally related. Since it was also seen in section 1.4.4 that they cannot be descendants of any other extant MS than V, the only conceivable explanation of the fact that M and A share many conjunctively significant manifest or suspected errors as well as indifferent variant readings against V is that they are mutually independent descendants of a lost MS. The lost common ancestor of M and A is β. When M disagrees with V and A, it usually has either a manifest error or an indifferent variant.³² That is to say, it shares almost all the manifest or suspected errors of transmission in V. The exceptions invariably concern either diacritics or spacing in combinations, which sometimes have semantic and/or syntactic import. Notable instances where M is in the right against V and A include 2.5.15, 172.5 (V147v Μ247v Α211v ) οὐ γὰρ οἴκοθεν μόνη ἐνεργεῖ, οὐδ’ αὐτὴ [M : αὐτῆ V A] ἑαυτῇ ἀρκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔξωθεν κινεῖται. 2.11.2, 224.17 (V158r Μ257r Α219r ) … ἕπεται μηδὲ μίαν [correxi : μηδεμίαν V A : μὴ δὲ μίαν M] εἶναι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλλὰ διαφόρους ἐν διαφόροις ταῖς ἐναντιότησι. 3.3.13, 276.5 (V169r Μ267r Α227r ) φανταζόμενοι δὲ ἅττα [M : ἄττα V A] ἂν καὶ φανταζοίμεθα οὐδὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν διατιθέμεθα ἢ πάσχομεν ὁτιοῦν …. 3.11.1, 356.3–4 (V183v Μ281r Α237v ) ἡ δέ ἐστι καὶ λογιστική, οἵα [M : οἷα V A] ἐστὶν ὅταν οἴκοθεν ἐντὸς κινῆται τὸ ζῷον, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ….

32 Typical errors and other variants unique to M and its descendants include the reduplication of λ and the omission of one or several letters in words.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXVII

3.12.7, 364.18 (V185r Μ282v Α239r ) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ἐμψύχοις – οἷα τὰ φυτά, μένοντα καὶ μὴ κινούμενα – οὐκ ἀναγκαία [M : ἀναγκαῖα V A] ἡ αἴσθησις ….

While it is likely that most of these inferior readings in V and A are errors of transmission, they are all of low separative significance. That is to say, the superior readings in M could easily be conjectural corrections. The four or five additional cases where M is in the right against V and A concern lexical accentuation. These errors in V and A may well be authorial. Even if they should be scribal, they are all of low separative significance. Similarly, when A disagrees with M and V, it usually has either a manifest error or an indifferent variant.³³ That is to say, it, too, shares the vast majority of manifest or suspected errors of transmission in V. Occasionally, A, too, is clearly in the right against M and V; most of these instances concern diacritics (e.g. on six occasions A alone renders the correct accentuation of κρᾶσις) or spacing in combinations. Four of them have semantic and/or syntactic import, namely: 1.4.1, 58.2 (V123r Μ227r Α193v ) Ὅτι καὶ ἄλλον τινά, φησί, λόγον ἔνιοι περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπέθεντο, πιθανὸν μὲν δόξαντά τισιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεύθυνον καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ἐποπτεύουσι [A : ὑποπτεύουσι V M] λόγοις …. 2.2.1, 116.1 (V135v Μ237r Α203r ) Ὅτι βουλόμενος αἰτιολογῆσαι τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τύπον καὶ τὴν ὑπογραφὴν [A : ἀπογραφὴν V M] περὶ τοῦ κοινῶς ὄντος ἁπάσῃ ψυχῇ …. 2.7.7, 182.19 (V149v Μ249r Α213r ) ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὸ φῶς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἐν τούτῳ, φησί, καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐστίν, ὅταν δυνάμει ᾖ [A : ἧ V M] διαφανές …. 2.9.1, 208.1 (V155r Μ254r Α216v ) Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν [A : ἔστιν V M] ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι ὡρισμέναι τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφοραί ….

Even though the separative significance of V’s and M’s errors in 1.4.1 and 2.2.1 is not negligible, it is likely that these superior readings in A as against V M are the result of conjectural emendation of archetypal, or possibly authorial, errors. They were all discussed in section 1.4.2. In the following four cases it is more uncertain whether A’s readings are authentic, but at least they make for greater clarity or correspond better to classical grammar and usage: 1.1.3, 4.17 (V111r Μ218r Α185r ) … ἀνάγεσθαι ἔστιν εἰς τὰ θεῖα [καὶ add. A (fort. recte) : deest in V M] νοερὰ καὶ παντάπασιν ἔξω τῆς γενητῆς οὐσίας ….

33 Typical errors and other variants unique to A include the addition of -ν, not only to ἐστί, where it is innocuous, but also to ἔχει, where it is not; the absence of the article; the consistent use of the smooth breathing in ἁφή.

A against VM

LXXVIII | 1 Textual Tradition

1.5.7, 82.7 (V128v Μ231r Α197v ) εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα δι’ ὁμοιότητα νοεῖν οἵα τε ἔσται [V M : ἐστιν A (fort. recte)] ἡ ψυχή, ἀνάγκη …. (for conditionals in In De an., see sec. 2.3.4) 2.4.23, 154.18 (V144r Μ244v Α208v ) Ὅτι, κἂν εἰ ἐναντία λέγωσιν [V M : λέγουσιν A] ἔνιοι περὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτός γε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνάπτει (for concessive clauses in In De an., see sec. 2.3.4) 3.12.9, 366.14 (V185v Μ282v Α239r ) τίνι γὰρ ἔσται βέλτιστον [V M : βέλτιον A (fort. recte)] ἡ αἴσθησις, τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ σώματι; (see ad loc. in sec. 1.6)

Note also the more complex situations discussed in sec. 1.4.7 ad 1.5.13, 84.13 and sec. 1.4.8 ad 2.3.10, 140.7. All these cases corroborate the impression that Manuel of Corinth, the scribe of A, was both willing and able to make occasional emendations of the text. In no case, however, is his emendation of such a nature that it seems to presuppose the consultation of a pre-archetypal version of the text. V against MA

When M and A agree against V, the rate of manifest error is lower. The assessment of presumed original readings in M and A but not in V will be crucial for determining the filiation of β, the common ancestor of M and A. We saw in section 1.4.4 that there are no extensive omissions in V that are not also in M and A. It remains to ascertain whether there are other errors of high separative significance in V but not in M and A that may exclude the possibility that β was a descendant of V. On the other hand, we shall also have to examine whether there are extensive omissions or other errors of high separative significance shared by M and A but not by V that may exclude the possibility that V is a descendant of β.

1.4.6 β Leaving aside readings corrected by the scribe (i.e. readings in Mac and Aac ) as well as variations in the use of closed and open combinations and prosodic accentuation, there are upwards of 400 instances in In De an. where M and A agree with each other but disagree with V. The overwhelming majority of these will have been instances of disagreement between V and β. For the sake of convenience, I will henceforth assume that by default all readings shared by M and A were in β. Possible exceptions will be dealt with as the occasion arises. In the following two sections (1.4.7 and 1.4.8), I will briefly discuss all those disagreements between V and β where at least one reading seems per se likely to be wrong, in order to arrive at a considered opinion regarding the relationship between V and β. In principle, of course, there are three possibilities: (1) V is a descendant of β; (2) β is a descendant of V; (3) V and β are mutually independent descendants of a common ancestor, which is not the original. Possibility (3) is the only one that strictly speaking admits of proof by the method employed here. For if both V and β repeatedly exhibit errors of high separative significance not shared by the other MS, then neither of them can be the descendant of the

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts |

LXXIX

other, and consequently – since they also share errors of relatively high conjunctive significance – they must be mutually independent descendants of a common ancestor, which is not the original. But if either V or β (or both) does not exhibit such errors, then there simply is no indication as to whether or not the other MS is its descendant. So we shall first have to see whether we can prove possibility (3), failing which we must look around for other circumstances, connected with particular disagreements or otherwise, that speak in favour of (1) or (2). Let me first turn to those disagreements where I think the reading of β is likely to be wrong.

1.4.7 Suspected errors in β not in V For some of these readings in β it will be self-evident why they must be wrong. For most of them, I have added a few lines of explanation. If needed, further elucidation may be sought in the Translation. 1.1.3, 6.1 (V111r P121r M218r A185r ) τῷ γὰρ εἰδότι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη τὰ γνωστικά τε καὶ τὰ [V : om. P M A] παθητικά – οἷον θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν – ἔξεστι ταῦτα ῥυθμίζειν καὶ καθιστάνειν εὖ.

The cognitive and the affective parts of the soul are clearly intended as distinct and mutually exclusive (and furthermore exhaustive). This is best expressed by repeating the article before the second adjective. The omission of the article after τε καὶ is an easy corruption, as evidenced by the fact that it happened in P. On the other hand, Metochites’ use of the article is in general rather erratic, and there are several comparable cases in In De an. both with and without the repeated article (cf. ad 1.5.39, 96.22 below). It is thus by no means inconceivable that the article before the second adjective was lacking in the original. Non liquet. 1.1.10, 8.5 (V112r M218v A185v ) … πότερον οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή – […] ἢ ποιόν – ὡς οἱ [V : om. M A] ἰατροὶ λέγουσι κρᾶσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι ….

The (generic) article seems necessary. Its omission would be an easy corruption due to iotacism. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 1.1.13, 8.22 (V112r M218v A185v ) … καί, εἰ μὴ ὁμοειδής ἐστιν, ἆρα [V : ἄρα M A] μηδὲ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν διαφόρων ζῴων ψυχή;

It is clear that the interrogative particle is needed, not the inferential one. The accentuation of these particles is however prone to considerable variation in the MSS, and it is possible that this reflects the situation in the original. Non liquet.

LXXX | 1 Textual Tradition

1.1.14, 10.6 (V112r M218v A185v ) … εἰ εἰσίν, οὐ πρῶτά εἰσι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἀλλ’ ὕστερα [V : ὕστερον M A] μᾶλλον αὐτῶν, κοινῇ τινὶ ἐμφάσει ἐπιλογιζόμενα καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ μετ᾿ αὐτὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα θεωρούμενα.

With the construction suggested by the punctuation the plural adjective is needed; but ὕστερον is also possible, if taken as an adverb with ἐπιλογιζόμενα. Non liquet. 1.1.18, 10.22 (V112v M219r A186r ) ἔτι, φησί, ποῖα πρότερον [V : πότερον M A] ἄξιον ζητεῖν ….

Definitely an error of transmission in β (cf. Arist. 402b 11–12). Low separative significance. 1.1.21, 12.8 (V112v M219r A186r ) … συνεπιλογίζεται καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς καθ’ αὑτὸ [V : καθ’ αὑτά M : καθαυτά A] ….

On two other occasions in the immediate context (1.1.22, 12.11; 1.1.23, 12.18), the singular καθ’ αὑτό is used with the plural τὰ συμβεβηκότα, so this is probably an error of transmission (or a scribal correction) in β. Relatively low separative significance. 1.1.30, 14.23 (V113v M220r A186v ) ὅταν μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁρμὴν ἔχῃ [V A1pc (ex ἔχει) : ἔχει M] ….

Probably β had the indicative, corrected in scribendo in A. If so, it is clearly an error of transmission in β. There are eight other passages in In De an. where the present indicative with ἄν unexpectedly occurs in a dependent clause in at least one of V M A, but only one passage where it occurs in all of them. For arguments in favour of assuming errors of transmission behind all these occurrences, see section 2.3.4. The error is of low separative significance. 1.1.37, 18.5–6 (V114r M220v A187r ) ἔστι γὰρ ἄλλα τινὰ ἀεὶ μὲν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὰ [καὶ αὐτὰ V : om. M A] θεωρούμενα καὶ ἀχώριστα τρόπον τινὰ ταύτης ….

The emphatic pronominal adjective is perhaps not strictly needed, but at least desirable in the context, and the nearest occurrence of καὶ αὐτὰ is more than two lines down in V, so it is difficult to explain why it would have been mistakenly added here. Probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 1.2.4, 20.15 (V114v M221r A187v ) … ἐπειδὴ καὶ εὐκινητότερα πάντων τὰ σφαιρικὰ [V M1pc (ex σφερικὰ) : σφερικὰ A] ….

Probably β had the misspelling, corrected in scribendo in M. Intriguingly, M, but not A, has the same misspelling in the preceding line. Probably an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 1.2.6, 20.23 (V115r M221r A187v ) καὶ οὕτως ἦν ἂν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐμψύχοις σώμασιν αὐτίκα ἐκλείπειν [V : ἐπιλείπειν M A] καὶ θνῄσκειν, ἐκφορηθέντων διὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰρημένων σφαιρικῶν ἀτόμων ….

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LXXXI

The sense needed is “to succumb”, which is well attested for ἐκλείπειν but not for ἐπιλείπειν. The latter word may have suggested itself to the scribe of β through the appearance of ἐπιλείψει four lines earlier (20.19). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.2.24, 30.3 (V117r M222v A189r ) ἐν γὰρ τῷ λέγειν «ἀριθμὸν» τὸ γνωστικὸν αὐτῆς δηλοῦσιν …· ἐν δὲ τῷ εἰπεῖν «κινῶν ἑαυτὸν» τὸ κινητικὸν αὐτῆς δηλοῦσι πάλιν [V : πάντως M A].

There can be little doubt that V’s reading is correct, but the error is not so easy to explain, unless the exemplar of β was partly illegible here (in which case it was not V). Still, very probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 1.2.32, 32.23 (V117v M223r A189v ) ὡς ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τιθέμενος ὡσαύτως καὶ αὐτός, ᾗ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων ταύτην συνίστησι, τὸ γνωστικὸν πάντων [V : πάντως M A] ἐντεῦθεν αὐτῆς ὑποδεικνύει ….

The genitive is objective: it is the soul’s capacity to know all things that is supposed to result from its being constructed from a first principle of existing things, on the principle of “like is known by like”, just as in 1.2.31 Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia are said to have held the view that the soul’s capacity to comprehend all things (τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ πάντων καταληπτικόν) results from its being constructed from a first principle of existing things. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 1.2.34, 34.11 (V118r M223r A190r ) … οὗτος [V : οὕτως M A] δ’ ὁ Ἵππων ταῦτ᾿ ἔλεγε πρὸς Κριτίαν ἀπομαχόμενος τιθέμενον ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αἷμα ….

There seem to be no other circumstances in the context to which οὕτως could refer apart from the preceding report of Hippon’s views, which makes it somewhat redundant beside ταῦτ᾿. Cf. ad 1.5.13, 84.13 below. Philoponus, whose commentary has been drawn upon for the following report of Critias’ views, refers to Hippon as οὗτος at 88.22. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.3.4, 38.21 (V119r M224r A191r ) τέσσαρες δέ εἰσιν οἱ τρόποι τῆς κινήσεως, καθὼς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει παραδίδωσιν [V : ἀποδείκνυσιν M A] ….

Not such a straightforward case, perhaps (cf. Borchert 2011, cxliv), but παραδίδωσιν seems to be exactly the right word in the context, and παραδίδωμι is less frequent than ἀποδείκνυμι in the paraphrase (five instances including this one, usually in a similar context, against twenty instances, including this one, sometimes in a similar context but then always in the perfect tense). Probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 1.3.27, 48.23 (V121r M225v A192v ) ὥσπερ εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ [V : om. M A] ἀριθμοὶ οὐ συνεχεῖς ἀλλ’ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις ….

LXXXII | 1 Textual Tradition

The (generic) article seems necessary. Its omission is a relatively easy corruption. Probably an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 1.3.34, 52.15 (V121v M226r A193r ) καὶ ἔτι εἰ ἀίδιός ἐστιν ἡ κυκλικὴ [V : κυκλοφορικὴ M A] περιφορά ….

As might be expected, κυκλοφορική does not occur as an attribute of περιφορά in Greek literature, whereas κυκλική does, including in Metochites’ own Byzantios 29. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.3.39, 56.3 (V122v M227r A193v ) … καθὼς ἄρα καὶ προσῆκόν ἐστι συνορᾶν τε καὶ νοεῖν ὅτι τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐσκεύασται [V : ἐσκεύασθαι M A] σοφῶς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον.

Definitely an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 1.4.3, 58.16 (V123v M227v A194r ) ἀλλὰ κἀνταῦθα εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς εἰρημένης ὑποθέσεώς φησιν ὅτι ἡ ἁρμονία λόγος μέν τίς ἐστι [καὶ add. M A : deest in V] τῶν ἡρμοσμένων καὶ τῶν μεμιγμένων σύνθεσις, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἐστί.

The added καὶ could only connect λόγος and σύνθεσις, which would leave λόγος without a genitive attribute. The paraphrased Aristotelian clause is καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις … (407b 32–33). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.4.8, 60.25 (V124r M228r A194v ) ἡ τινῶν [τινων V : τίνων M A] γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτων σύνθεσις ἔστι ψυχὴ ἢ ἡ πάντων ….

Obviously, the indefinite pronoun is intended. For the orthotone enclitic of the printed text, see sec. 3.1.5. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 1.4.11, 62.17 (V124r M228r A194v ) καὶ ἕπεται πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἄπορα καὶ ἐναντιώματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἃ προέφην [V : ἔφην M A];

Both readings make sense in the context, but V’s reading is preferable on account of being more specific and more likely to be corrupted into the more generic word than the other way around. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.4.12, 64.3 (V124v M228v A195r ) … ἐπεὶ ἀναιρουμένων ἐνίων μορίων ἀνομοιομερῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῴου, οἷον [V : om. M A] χειρὸς ἢ ποδός, παραμένει ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ φθείρεται παντάπασι τὸ ζῷον.

Even if it occasionally occurs in In De an. that an example is provided which is not introduced by some such adverb as οἷον or ἤτοι, this is very likely to be an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.4.21, 68.8 (V125v M229r A195v ) … ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα ταῦτα ὧν πρότερον τὴν πεῖραν ἔσχομεν [πρότερον τὴν πεῖραν ἔσχομεν V : τὴν πεῖραν ἔχομεν πρότερον M A] ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXXIII

The aorist seems necessary: we recollect things of which we have previously had an experience (the experience itself is not enduring). Most probably an error of transmission in β. Together with the transposition the separative significance is very high. 1.4.28, 72.2 (V126v M229v A196r ) ἀλλά γε δή, καθὼς καὶ προελέγετο, [ὅτι add. M A : deest in V] τὸ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μετ’ αὐτῆς ἀχωρίστως· διατοῦτο καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰ ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις ἄφθαρτοι ….

If the conjunction is omitted with V, the main clause introduced by ἀλλά γε δή is τὸ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι … οὐκ ἔστιν …τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης πάθη, and καθὼς καὶ προελέγετο is a parenthetical reminder that a statement to this effect has been made previously (in 1.4.14– 18, and more remotely 1.1.30). If the conjunction is added with β, the main clause introduced by ἀλλά γε δή is διατοῦτο καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν …, and everything that intervenes is a comparative clause designed to show the consistency of the statement of the main clause with what has been said before. The reason why V’s text is more likely to be authentic is that τὸ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι … οὐκ ἔστιν … τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης πάθη is partly a quotation, partly a paraphrase of the Aristotelian text currently under consideration (408b 25–27), not just something that has been said earlier (while διατοῦτο καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν … has no direct counterpart in the Aristotelian text). The error in β is of relatively low separative significance. 1.4.39, 78.2 (V127v M230v A197r ) τίς γὰρ ἡ [V : om. M A] διαφορὰ καὶ τὸ κωλύον εἰς τοῦτο;

The article seems necessary (otherwise the interrogative pronoun would have had to be repeated with τὸ κωλύον). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 1.5.9, 82.21 (V128v M231v A198r ) … οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ [ἐκ add. M A : deest in V] τῶν συνθέτων αὐτῶν ….

The repetition of the preposition is strictly redundant but makes for greater clarity. This is exactly the reason why it is also likely to be a stylistic amendment in β. Relatively low separative significance. 1.5.13, 84.13 (V129r M231v A198v ) τοῦτο δὲ φάσκοντες οὕτω – καὶ ἀληθῶς [οὕτω – καὶ ἀληθῶς V : καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως Mtext (ordinem ut in A litteris β α indicat M1sl ) : καὶ οὕτως ἀληθῶς A (fort. recte)] φάσκοντες – φασὶν ἔπειτα ….

Apparently β had A’s text. In so far as οὕτω in V is taken as an adverb of manner closely with the immediately preceding participle, A’s text makes for greater fluency: in V οὕτω would then be redundant beside τοῦτο, whereas in A it serves a purpose with the second φάσκοντες. Cf. ad 1.2.34, 34.11 above. But it is perhaps more likely that οὕτω in V is meant to connect the participle with the finite verb appearing after the parenthesis, to emphasize the self‐contradiction involved (“At the same time as they

LXXXIV | 1 Textual Tradition

are making this claim … they proceed to say …”). β’s text may thus be the result of a misguided amendment. 1.5.15, 84.24 (V129r M232r A198v ) ἑκάστη γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα εἰς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἑνὸς μόνου τοῦ ὁμοίου αὐτῇ ἐμποιεῖ γνωστικὴν δύναμιν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ ἅπαντα παρ᾿ αὐτὴν ἀγνοεῖν αἰτία [V : αἴτια M A].

αἰτία is of course the predicative complement of ἀρχὴ in line 1. The neuter plural adjective must have suggested itself to a scribe on account of τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ ἅπαντα. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.5.17, 86.8 (V129v M232r A198v ) πάντα γὰρ ἢ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σύγκειται [V : σύγκεινται M A] ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν ….

It seems more unlikely than not that Metochites would have used first a singular verb and then a plural verb with the same neuter plural subject within a span of five words. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.5.19, 86.17 (V129v M232r A199r ) ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοί γέ [V : om. M A] φασι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι ….

γε appropriately highlights the contrast between the stated views of the previously reported thinkers and the conclusions they ought to have reached from the premisses they held to be true. A relatively easy corruption. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.5.22, 88.6 (V129v M232r A199r ) καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ φυτά, ἔμψυχα ὄντα, μὴ [V : οὐ M A] μόνον οὐ μετέχει τῆς κατὰ φορὰν κινήσεως, ἀλλ’ οὔθ’ ὅλως ἔχει αἴσθησιν ….

οὐ looks like a scribal correction. It is of course the correct form according to classical grammar, and a few lines down (1.5.23, 88.14–15) we do find οὐ μόνον οὐ…, ἀλλ’ οὐδέ in a consecutive clause with the indicative (although β omits the second οὐ of the first clause here), but 1.5.4 (80.16–17) contains an object clause (or possibly a causal clause) with the indicative, modified as a whole by μὴ μόνον οὐκ, and 2.1.24 (112.16–17) contains a main clause with the indicative, modified as a whole by μὴ μόνον οὐ (in 1.5.4 A has omitted οὐκ; in 2.1.24 there is no disagreement among the MSS). Accordingly, in so far as μὴ is an error it is in all likelihood authorial, and since the attempts in β to correct negative particles are half-hearted at best (cf. ad 2.1.28, 114.15 below), I think it is better left to stand. 1.5.31, 92.12 (V130v M233r A200r ) … ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερὴς καὶ ἀνομοειδής [V : ἀνομοιοειδὴς M A] ἐστιν, ἐξανάγκης ἕπεται ….

Themistius, Philoponus and Priscian all use ἀνομοειδής in this context, as the opposite of Aristotle’s ὁμοειδής, in the sense of “heterogeneous”, i.e. not being (as a whole)

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXXV

of the same kind (as the parts); the only instance of ἀνομοιοειδής in the De anima commentators is in Philoponus 478.3, where (a) the manuscripts differ, (b) Hayduck considers emendation, and (c) the reference is to perceptible objects of different kinds, i.e. within the respective spheres of different senses. An authorial error is not inconceivable, but it is more likely that we have to do with an error of transmission in β (prompted by ἀνομοιομερής). Relatively high separative significance. 1.5.31, 92.15 (V130v M233r A200r ) … τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ μορίῳ τοῦ ἀέρος (ἤτοι [V : ἢ M A] τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν αὐτῆς διαφόρων εἰδῶν).

ἤτοι here must mean “whether” rather than “either”, so it is not strictly interchangeable with ἤ. Very probably an error of transmission in β (haplography). Relatively low separative significance. 1.5.32, 92.21 (V131r M233r A200r ) … ὥστε οὐχ ἁπλῶς [V : ἁπλᾶ M A] καὶ ὁμοίως πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἔμψυχα καὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν ψυχήν.

Even if we disregard the highly implausible word order of β’s text, it does not make much sense. The legitimate conclusion in the context is not that not everything that exists is simple but that it is not simply (i.e. without qualification) and in the same way ensouled: ἁπλῶς καὶ ὁμοίως is a single phrase, modifying [εἶναι] ἔμψυχα. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 1.5.39, 96.22 (V131v M234r A200v ) … ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ τμήματα καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ τὴν [V : om. M A] κινητικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει.

The capacities for perception and for self-motion are distinct. Cf. above, ad 1.1.3, 6.1. Nevertheless, in 1.5.23, 88.13 the same two capacities are linked without the article being repeated, so this is by no means a certain error of transmission in β. An especially egregious example of the failure to repeat the article before a coordinated word with a distinct referent is found in 1.2.29, 32.6: … πρὸς τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποβλέποντα …, where the whole point must be that Anaxagoras focuses his attention on both capacities. Non liquet. 2.1.4, 102.6 (V132v P142r M234v A201r L101r ) … κἀντεῦθέν ἐστι καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ αὐτοῦ τόδε τι καὶ αὐτὸ καταστὰν εἰς τὴν φύσιν καὶ δι᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος λαβὸν [(ut vid.) V1pc (ex λαβὼν) P L : λαβὼν M A] οὐσιώδη τινὰ ὅρον.

λαβὸν agrees with τὸ σύνθετον, so the neuter is correct. The correction in V is not very clearly legible, and perhaps it cannot be excluded that a scribe would have read the word even post correctionem as λαβὼν (although P and L do both have λαβὸν). Otherwise, one might be tempted to see in this an indication of β’s independence of V, the error in their common ancestor having only been corrected in the latter. Still, the conjunctive significance is rather low: as seen in the next entry (2.1.11, 104.21), omicron and omega are not infrequently confused even where one might not expect it.

LXXXVI | 1 Textual Tradition

2.1.11, 104.21 (V133v M235r A201v ) … τί ποτέ ἐστι τῶν τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων [V : προειρημένον M A] ὡς οὐσιῶν ἡ ψυχή ….

Clearly an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 2.1.11, 104.24 (V133v M235r A201v ) ἢ πῶς ἄρα αὐτή [V : αὐτό M A] τε ἡ ὕλη ἅμα καὶ τὸ εἶδος;

Clearly an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 2.1.13, 106.14 (V133v M235v A202r ) ἔστι γὰρ καὶ [ὁ add. M A : deest in V] ὕπνος – εἴτουν ἀργία καὶ ἠρέμησις – καὶ ἐγρήγορσις ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, εἴτουν τοῖς ζῴοις ….

The article with ὕπνος is optional, but if used one would expect it with ἐγρήγορσις as well. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.1.28, 114.15 (V135v M237r A203r ) … εἰ μή τις λέγοι, φησί, τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς – τὰ μὴ [V : οὐ M Α] συνδεδεμένα ἀχωρίστως τοῖς σωματικοῖς – οὕτως εἶναι ἐντελεχείας καὶ ταῦτα ….

As Borchert points out (2011, cxlv), the reading of β looks more like a scribal correction than a corruption: there are other cases where β and V disagree about the negative particle (cf. ad 1.5.22, 88.6 above), and it is not unlikely that these are due to a half-hearted attempt to amend the text in this respect. Supposing it to be a correction, however, the present instance is unexpected, since μή is not necessarily wrong either in classical Attic – the negated participle having general reference (it stands in apposition to τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη, not to ταῦτα τὰ μέρη) – or in later Greek – the negated word being a participle —, so on that account one might be inclined to think οὐ is more likely the original reading, in which case it should be added to the evidence in favour of β’s independence of V. If οὐ is indeed the original reading, it was probably deliberately altered (i.e. corrected rather than corrupted) in V. Non liquet. 2.2.2, 116.11 (V136r M237v A203r ) πρῶτα γὰρ τῇ φύσει καὶ αἴτια τὰ στοιχεῖα, κἀκ τούτων οἱ χυμοί, κἀκ τούτων τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ συνίσταται (καὶ μερίζεται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται), κἀκ τούτων τελευτῶντα [τὰ add. M A : deest in V] συντίθεται [V : σύνθετα M A] τὰ [Vsl : om. M A] ζῶα ….

Borchert argues (2011, clvii–clviii) that the situation in β must have been precipitated by the supralinear position of the article in V (or possibly in the exemplar of V), presumably because if the article were erroneously inserted after τελευτῶντα this would require the emendation of the following finite verb. The question is only why the article would have been erroneously inserted to begin with (and if it was, why the scribe did not simply correct it instead of tampering with the syntax). I am more inclined to think that it is a (misguided) stylistic amendment. σύνθετος is used in In De an., both as an adjective and as a noun, not only of the compound of soul and matter (as clearly intended, for instance, in 2.12.9, 240.12) but also of compound bodies in contradistinction to simple bodies (e.g. 1.5.6, 82.6; 1.5.8–9, 82.16–22; 1.5.16, 84.27–86.1; 1.5.30, 92.8;

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXXVII

2.5.3, 162.10; 2.11.15, 232.12); and sometimes there seems to be a kind of superimposition of these two notions, as if the world only consisted of simple bodies and ensouled creatures (e.g. 2.4.17, 150.11). Especially instructive with regard to the present case is 2.4.10, 146.17, where V has αὐτὸ τὸ σύνθετον (τὸ ζῷον, εἴτουν τὸ ἔμψυχον), whereas M and A omit the article before ζῷον, which may be by oversight, but is in my view also more likely an attempt at stylistic amendment. I discuss this in more detail in my note ad loc.; suffice it to say in this context that in both these cases (2.2.2, 116.11 and 2.4.10, 146.17) β’s reading requires that σύνθετον be understood as a non-restrictive attribute (“animals, which are composite”, rather than “those animals that are composite”, since, of course, all animals are composite, in both of the senses mentioned above), and that one may have some sympathy with the perception that the construction with one expressed verb is more elegant than that with two. Still, Borchert is of course right to argue that β’s reading is an error – it is highly unlikely to have been in the original, and it has on the whole little to recommend it – and that its conjunctive significance is high. So is its separative significance. 2.2.4, 118.4 (V136r M237v A203r ) … ὅτι «θυμός ἐστιν ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως», ἕτερον δ’ αὖθις δηλοῦντα ὅπως [δηλοῦντα ὅπως V : transp. M A] γίνεται ….

The word order in β, where the interrogative adverb introducing the “indirect question” is separated from the predicate verb of its clause by the participle governing the clause, is scarcely admissible. Since this is not, however, the only example in In De an. of apparent transposition across clause boundaries (see ad 2.5.15, 170.18–19; 2.9.13, 214.26; 3.1.7, 246.28 in sec. 1.4.2), it is hard to be absolutely certain that it was not in the original. Still, I think it is most probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.2.5, 118.9 (V136r M237v A203r ) … τινὲς δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ δηλοῦσιν, ἤτοι ἐξ ὧν μέσων τὸ συμπεραινόμενον καὶ ὡς τέλος ἐπιφαινόμενον [V : φαινόμενον M A] συλλογίζεται ….

Metochites speaks in 2.2.7–9 about the conclusion as “supervening” (ἐπιγινόμενον, 118.21 and 120.5) upon the premisses of the argument. That is the sense required here, too, and for this the prepositional prefix is necessary. Definitely an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 2.2.8, 118.26 (V136v M238r A203v ) τὸ γοῦν λέγειν εὑρεῖν τοιοῦτον μέσον ἀμφοῖν ἀνάλογον, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνισμὸν ποιήσασθαι· οὗτος [V : οὕτως M : οὕτω A] γὰρ ἔσται ἡ τετραγωνικὴ πλευρὰ ἀφ᾿ ἧς τὸ τετράγωνον ἰσόπλευρον γίνεται τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἑτερομήκει, ἤγουν ὁ δεκαὲξ ἄριθμός ….

As is clear from 2.2.7, 118.22, οὗτος is = οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, which is the mean proportional to the two sides. Since the antecedent is not in the immediate context, the reading in β may be a mistaken correction. Anyway, it is fairly certainly a secondary reading in β. Relatively low separative significance (not so much because it is easy to correct, but because it may easily be corrupted back to the original).

LXXXVIII | 1 Textual Tradition

2.2.24, 126.19 (V138r M239v A204v ) καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἄλλο [V : ἄλλω M A] τῷ λόγῳ τὸ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι ἢ δοξαστικῷ ….

An easy corruption due to the homophony and the following dative. Certainly an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 2.3.5, 136.15 (V140r M241r A205v ) ἕπεται δέ, φησίν, ἐπ’ ἐνίων τῶν [V : om. M A] ἐχόντων τὴν ἁφὴν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπους κινητικόν ….

The partitive genitive of the substantivized participle (“in the case of some of those that possess touch”), for which the article is necessary, is much preferable to the circumstantial participle (“in the case of some of them, when/if they possess touch …”). A fairly easy corruption, fairly certainly an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.3.7, 138.2 (V140r M241r A205v ) ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα [οὐκ add. M A : deest in V] ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον ….

Possibly the result of a half‐completed transposition (the intended result being ὥσπερ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα οὐκ ἄλλο τι …). Fairly certainly a secondary reading in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.3.12, 140.19 (V141r M242r A206v ) ἐνταῦθα μέν γε, φησίν [V : om. M A], οὐ περὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ….

φησίν refers unambiguously to Aristotle, 415a 11–12. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.4.10, 146.17 (V142r M243r A207v ) καὶ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἡ φύσις τὰ ὀργανικὰ σώματα πρὸς τέλος τὸ οὗ κατασκευάζει (τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτήν), πρὸς τέλος δὲ τὸ ᾧ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ σύνθετον (τὸ [V : om. M A] ζῷον, εἴτουν τὸ ἔμψυχον) ….

Both readings are perfectly possible. With V’s text, τὸ σύνθετον is most probably substantivized and τὸ ζῷον an appositive (as also in e.g. 2.1.20, 110.18: τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον, ὁ πέλεκυς), but note that there are sufficiently many cases in In De an. of the pattern [article + adjective or participle + article + noun] to arouse the suspicion that Metochites may have treated this pattern as equivalent to the more familiar pattern [article + noun + article + adjective or participle] (see further below, sec. 2.3.1). With β’s text, σύνθετον is a non-restrictive attribute. On balance, V’s reading seems more likely to be the original (cf. ad 2.2.2, 116.11 above). 2.4.12, 148.8 (V142v M243r A207v ) ἀδύνατον δὲ τρέφεσθαι ἄλλως, εἰ μὴ τὰ ἔχοντα [τὴν add. M A : deest in V] ψυχήν ….

ψυχή does not normally take the article when used generally and distributively. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | LXXXIX

2.4.12, 148.10 (V142v M243r A207v ) ὥστε, ποιητικὸν αἴτιον οὖσα τοῦ τρέφεσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ, ποιητικὸν ἂν αἴτιον εἴη καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως τῆς γινομένης [V : γενομένης M A] διὰ τροφῆς.

The present participle (of customary action or general truth) seems necessary. Probably an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 2.4.33, 160.9 (V145r M245v A209v ) … οὐ μόνα δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθόλου γε τὰ αὐξόμενα [V : αὐξανόμενα M Α] ….

This may well be a stylistic amendment in β. There are ten instances of αὔξω in In De an. and no instances of αὐξάνω (except this one in β), so αὐξόμενα is likely to have been in the original. Relatively high separative significance. 2.4.34, 160.14 (V145r M245v A209v ) ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν χεὶρ κινεῖ μόνον [V : μόνη M Α], σύμφυτος οὖσα τῷ σώματι ….

There are several examples of β having adjectival μόνος where V has adverbial μόνον (e.g. 2.2.19, 124.19 [only A]; 2.3.7, 138.11; 2.5.3, 162.19). It seems likely that these are stylistic amendments in β. Often the substitution makes no difference to the sense of the passage, but here μόνον is required: the hand, in contrast to the rudder, only causes motion (i.e. it is not also moved). Very probably a secondary reading in β (quite possibly a misguided emendation). Relatively high separative significance. 2.5.3, 162.14 (V145v M245v A209v ) … ἐπεὶ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, αἰσθητήριον ὢν [V : ὂν M A] τῆς ὀπτικῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως ….

While it is certainly not unprecedented for ὤν to be attracted to the gender of the predicative complement (as in Plato, Ap. 29a6–8), it seems more likely that ὢν should have been corrupted into ὂν after αἰσθητήριον than vice versa. Probably, then, an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 2.5.5, 162.26–164.1 (V145v M246r A210r ) ἂν δὲ μὴ κινηθῆ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν, δύναμις οὖσα μόνον μένει ἀνενέργητος εἰς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὴ [φησὶ add. M A : deest in V] καὶ τὸ καυστόν, φησίν [V : om. M A], ἂν μὴ καίηται ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔξωθεν, [φησὶν add. M A : deest in V] ἐν τῷ δυνάμει μόνον μένει καυστὸν ἀνενέργητον ….

φησίν is perfectly placed after the verbatim quotation “τὸ καυστόν” in V (cf. De an. 417a 7–8). How the situation in β has arisen is hard to say. Still, this is pretty clearly an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 2.5.10, 166.17 (V146r M246v A210v ) ᾗ δὲ πεπονθυῖα καὶ κινηθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ διετέθη ἀντιληπτικῶς ὅπερ αὐτό, τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτοῦ ἐνήργησεν ὡς ὁμοία αὐτοῦ, εἴτουν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου κεκινημένη [V : κινουμένη M A].

Metochites’ argument is not so easy to follow here, but it seems clear that the “movement” undergone by the sense is supposed to be, in one way or another, prior to the

XC | 1 Textual Tradition

apprehension of the perceptible object. An aorist participle would probably have done the job just as well as V’s perfect participle (note the alternation between perfect and aorist participles and indicatives in the first clause of the passage); not so, however, β’s present participle. Very probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 2.5.15, 170.14 (V147r M247r A211v ) ταῦτα δὴ [V : δὲ M A] διορισάμενος οὔτως ….

The “progressive” δή is clearly preferable here to the blunt δέ. The corruption is easy. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.5.15, 170.24 (V147r M247v A211v ) παραχρῆμα γὰρ γεννηθὲν κλαυθμυρίζει [V : κλαυθμηρίζει M Α] αἰσθανόμενον ἀέρος καὶ περιέχοντος ψυχροτέρου ἢ πρότερον.

Probably an error of transmission in β (but may also be a correction in V). Low separative significance. 2.5.15, 172.3 (V147v M247v A211v ) … ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις τῆς [V M1pc (ex τῶν) A] αἰσθήσεως [V : αἰσθήσεων M Α] δεῖταί τινων ἔξωθεν ….

Possibly β had ἡ μὲν ἕξις τῶν [βtext : τῆς βsl ] αἰσθήσεων [βtext : -ως βsl ]. In any case, the plural is certainly an error (τῆς αἰσθήσεως is an attribute of ἡ ἕξις, parallel to ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια in the preceding line). If β had the plural forms only, the error is of relatively high separative significance. 2.5.19, 174.4 (V148r M248r A212r ) πλήν γε διαφέρει ὅτι ὁ μὲν κηρὸς ὡς ὕλη γίνεται [V : λέγεται M A] τῷ εἴδει τῆς σφραγίδος, τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ὕλη τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ….

The difference between the wax and the perceptive capacity is not just a matter of terminology, so the reading of β is very probably in error. High separative significance. 2.6.3, 178.2 (V148v M248r A212v ) ἴδιον γάρ ἐστιν οὗ μίαν τινὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται καὶ οὗ μία εὐστοχεῖ … οὐ μὴν καὶ [V : om. M A] ἄλλη τις αἰσθάνεται, ἤτοι γεῦσις ἢ ὄσφρησις ἢ ἄλλη.

Since the suggestion is that a special perceptible object is that which is perceived by a single sense and not additionally by another sense, καὶ seems highly appropriate. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.6.3, 178.10 (V148v M248v A212v ) οἷον ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἵππος, τὸ ὁρώμενον ἢ ὅτι ἐν γῇ κεῖται ἢ πέτρᾳ ἢ ὁποιοῦν [V : ὁπηοῦν M A].

Probably another normalizing amendment in β. 2.7.5, 182.4 (V149r M249r A213r ) εἰσὶ γάρ τινα σώματα ἃ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ μὴ κεχρωσμένα ὄντα, μηδὲ φωτεινά, δεκτικὰ δὲ ὄντα φωτὸς τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ φωτίζεται· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ παρουσία ἐνταῦθα τοῦ φωτὸς ὡς χρῶμα αὐτοῖς [V : αὐτῆς M A], ὥστε εἶναι ἐντεῦθεν διαφανῆ.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | XCI

αὐτοῖς refers to the potentially transparent bodies, which are the subject of the following infinitive. The only possible antecedent for αὐτῆς is ἡ παρουσία, but this makes no sense. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.8.7, 194.22 (V152r M251v A214v ) ἐν μέντοι ταῖς προσβολαῖς τοῦ φωτὸς ταῖς γινομέναις [V : γενομέναις M A] πρὸς στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα … διάδηλος ἡ ἀνάκλασις τοῦ φωτὸς γίνεται ….

The present participle (of customary action or general truth) seems necessary. Cf. ad 2.4.12, 148.10 above. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.8.10, 196.10 (V152v M252r A214v ) αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὐ γεγωνεῖ, φησί, διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς εἶναι, τουτέστιν εὔθρυπτος [V : εὔλυτος M A] καὶ εὐδιάλυτος [V : εὐδιάθρυπτος M A] ….

The explanandum is ψαθυρός in 419b 35. εὔθρυπτος is the expected term in the context. It is used by Aristotle in the same sense as ψαθυρός at 420a 8, and by Themistius (63.25, 64.23) both shortly before and shortly after his own explanation of ψαθυρός (namely, εὐδιαίρετος). Moreover, εὐδιάθρυπτος would be an odd choice of explanatory word, since it is much rarer than both ψαθυρός and εὐδιάλυτος (there are around twenty instances in the literature, more than half of which are in works of Cyril of Alexandria, but one of which is admittedly in Philoponus’ In De an. [360.15], as against almost two hundred instances of εὐδιάλυτος). Very probably an error of transmission in β. If it were an authorial error, the scribe of V would probably have had to consult the Aristotelian text (or a paraphrase or commentary) in order to correct it. High separative significance. 2.8.18, 200.8 (V153r M252v A215v ) … ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἴρηται ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὡς μὴ μεταβαίνειν ὅλος [V : ὅλως M A] καὶ ἄλλος ἀντ᾿ ἄλλου ἐκ διαδοχῆς εἰσάγεσθαι ….

After the negative ὅλως is most naturally interpreted as “(not) at all”, but the sense required is “(not) as a whole”, which is precisely what is expressed by the predicate adjective. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.8.19, 200.17 (V153v M252v A215v ) καὶ ἔοικεν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ ζωτικῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἀκοήν, ὅταν ὁ ἔμφυτος αὐτῇ ἀήρ, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἔχῃ καθὸ ἀὴρ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον [V : ἔχων M A] ….

The participle should agree with τὸ κινεῖσθαι, not with ὁ ἀήρ. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.8.25, 202.21 (V154r M253r A216r ) … ἃ δὴ πάντα ἄναιμα ὄντα καὶ ἄφωνά εἰσι· καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων [V : ἀναίμων M A] δέ τινα ἄφωνά εἰσιν, οἷον οἱ [V : om. M A] ἰχθύες πάντες ….

XCII | 1 Textual Tradition

Fish are sanguineous (and moreover contrasted here to bloodless animals), so ἀναίμων is obviously wrong, and definitely an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance (as evidenced by George Scholarios’ correction: see above sec. 1.2.1). The omission of the article with πάντες is not necessarily ungrammatical, but unusual and unexpected (although a similar example is found in 1.3.5, 40.10: ἅπαντες σχεδὸν φυσικοί). This, too, is probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.8.29, 204.15 (V154r M253v A216r ) … οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῦ ἀέρος διπλὴν [V : διπλῶς Μ A] ἔχειν φησὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ….

The suggestion is not that breathing has its activity in two ways or senses, but that it has a twofold activity. This is better expressed by the predicate adjective. Very probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 2.9.2, 208.8 (V155r M254r A216v ) διατοῦτο καὶ οὐδ’ εὐχερές ἐστι τὸ λέγειν ὡρισμένως καὶ ἠκριβωμένως περὶ αὐτῆς· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ γένος οὔτε κατ᾿ εἴδη καταλαβεῖν [V : διαλαβεῖν M A] ἔστι καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν αἰσθητά ….

β’s reading may seem superior to V’s (διαλαβεῖν and διορίσασθαι forming a synonymous pair) until it is realized that Themistius (67.32) has οὐδὲ τοσαῦτας διαφορὰς καταλαμβάνομεν in what seems to be the main source for this passage. Perhaps, then, rather than being synonymously paired for amplification, καταλαβεῖν refers primarily to comprehension κατὰ γένος, διορίσασθαι to comprehension κατ᾿ εἴδη. Probably an error of transmission in β, possibly due to assimilation to διορίσασθαι. High separative significance. 2.9.3, 208.23 (V155r M254v A217r ) … ἀτονωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐν ἡμῖν αὕτη, καὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτὴν αἰσθητῶν τὰς διαφορὰς ἀκριβώσασθαι, μόνον δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς [V : αὐτοῖς M A] τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις, τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἢ λυπεῖσθαι ….

Neither reading is perhaps impossible: αὐτῆς would be an anaphoric personal pronoun referring to αὕτη in the preceding line (the sense of smell), and τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις would then be the dative complement of συμβαίνει; αὐτοῖς would be the emphatic pronoun with τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις, and συμβαίνει would then be complemented only by the prepositional phrase. But either way the required sense of the prepositional phrase is “in the case of …”, and this is the normal sense for the genitive after ἐπί while dubious for the dative. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.9.5, 210.11 (V155v M254v A217r ) … οὕτως κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀπ’ [V : om. M A] αὐτῆς τῆς γεύσεως ὀδμὰς λέγομεν γλυκείας καὶ πικράς ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | XCIII

The preposition seems necessary (τῆς γεύσεως is the general conceptual source domain of the metaphor, not the particular word used metaphorically). Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.9.5, 210.14 (V155v M254v A217r ) κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων χρήσεως λέγεται οὐ κυρίως καὶ [οὐ κυρίως καὶ V : καὶ οὐ κυρίως M A] ἐπὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ….

With the word order of V, καὶ is an adverb with ἐπὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν; οὐ κυρίως is = ἀκύρως. With the word order of β, οὐ κυρίως would have to be parenthetical. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.9.10, 212.24 (V156r M255r A217v ) καὶ γὰρ αἱ μέλιτται ἕλκονται [V : ἕλκωνται M A] ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τροφὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ ἀποτρέπονται τοὺς καπνοὺς ὡσαύτως ….

Apparently just a slip of the pen in β (there is nothing in the immediate context that may have created the impression that a subjunctive is called for). Clearly an error of transmission in β (but with very low separative significance). 2.9.13, 214.24 (V156v M255v A218r ) καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ὁρᾶν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢν [V : εἰ M A] μὴ ἀναπετάσωσι [V : ἀναπετάσουσι M Α] τὰ τοιαῦτα ….

Whatever the direction of change, this is clearly a grammatical/stylistic amendment rather than a corruption. Which is the direction of change – and whether the correction is justified – is difficult to say without a clearer idea of the difference between the future indicative and the aorist subjunctive in conditional clauses in Late Byzantine prose (see below, sec. 2.3.4 and Horrocks 2017). 2.10.4, 220.6 (V157v M256r A218v ) καὶ ἀνήκουστον ὡσαύτως τό τε μὴ [τε μὴ V : μήτε M A] πεφυκὸς ἀκούεσθαι (ὡς τὸ λευκόν) καὶ τὸ ἀμυδρῶς ἀκουόμενον ….

This is a conjunction of two terms, only the first of which is negated, and the second of which is preceded by καί, so V is clearly right. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Borchert (2011, clviii) suggests that it probably resulted from the erroneous insertion of a supralinear τε in the exemplar; in that case, however, β cannot have been a copy of V. Relatively low separative significance. 2.10.11, 222.21–22 (V158r M257r A219r ) σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσι [V : δοκοῦσιν M A], φησίν [V : om. M A], αἱ διαφοραὶ εἶναι τῶν χυμῶν.

Aristotle actually says “σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν” (422b 14), so φησίν is apposite. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 2.11.3, 224.20 (V158r M257r A219r ) … οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ, τοῦ ψόφου [V (ψ- vix legitur) : φόβου M A], εἴτουν τῆς φωνῆς ….

XCIV | 1 Textual Tradition

β’s reading is remarkable for its absurdity. The first letter of ψόφου is virtually illegible in V, so this may be counted as a direct indication of β’s dependence on V. Definitely an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.11.6, 226.23 (V158v M257v A219v ) ὥσπερ ἐν ἐκείναις ἦν ἂν συμφυὲς ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡνωμένον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ κοινὴ τῶν εἰρημένων αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψις [αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψις V : transp. M A] ….

The position of ἀντίληψις between the modifier and the head of its genitive attribute is hardly admissible, although Metochites does seem to have a very liberal attitude to such matters (see sec. 2.3.1). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.11.12, 230.19 (V159v M258r A220r ) … ἔπειτα δι᾿ αὐτῆς τὴν πληγὴν αὐτὸς λαβών, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τε ἡ ἀσπὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήξαντος ἐπλήγη καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ [V : αὐτῶ M A] ἡνωμένως καὶ αὐτὸς ᾧ ἐπίκειται αὕτη.

The antecedent of the pronoun must be ἡ ἀσπὶς. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 2.11.15, 232.8 (V159v M258r A220v ) Ὅτι ἁπτά εἰσι, φησίν [V : om. M A], αἱ πρῶται διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα ….

The first sentence of a new section usually contains φησίν, and this is rather close to Aristotle’s own words in 423b 27 (although the neuter plural in the predicative complement reveals Philoponus’ influence [lemma 434.6; paraphrase 434.9]). Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 3.1.5, 246.6 (V162r M260v A222v ) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων μίαν [μόνην add. M A : deest in V] αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα (ὥσπερ τὰ καλούμενα ζωόφυτα μίαν μόνην αἴσθησιν ἔχει, τὴν ἁφήν), ἔνια δὲ ….

Both readings are of course entirely possible, but in view of μίαν μόνην αἴσθησιν in the parenthesis it seems more likely for the preceding μόνην to have been mistakenly added between μίαν and αἴσθησιν than to have been mistakenly omitted. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.1.12, 250.19 (V163v M262r A223v ) ὥσπερ δὲ [V : δὴ M A] ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ….

The transition is from one domain of application to another, so δὲ is exactly what one would expect. δὴ has probably insinuated itself from the main clause. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.1.15, 252.17 (V164r P173v M262v A224r L123r ) ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατᾶσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τρόποις τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ὑπονοεῖν ψευδῶς τὸ θεωρούμενον τόδε [V P : τὸ δὲ M A L] ξανθὸν εἶναι ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts |

XCV

164r–v are partly difficult to read in  V because of ink bleeding. There is not really anything in it that could be mistaken for an accent over -δε, but a circumflex on the verso page has bled through to make the accent over τό- rather indeterminate. The fact that L has τὸ δὲ shows that even a highly accomplished scribe could read V that way. Possibly a direct indication that β is a descendant of V, although admittedly weak (since the error is of low conjunctive significance). 3.1.15, 252.22 (V164r M262v A224r ) … οὐκ ἔστι διατίθεσθαι ἤτοι ὡς αἴσθησιν πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὴν ὅρασιν ὡς ὑπὸ ὁρατοῦ τοῦ φαινομένου ξανθοῦ ᾗ γλυκὺ ἢ [V : ἧ M A] πικρόν, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ φαινομένου λευκοῦ ᾗ Κλέωνός ἐστιν υἱός.

Definitely an error of transmission in β, the conjunction ἢ having been assimilated to the adverb ᾗ two words earlier. Low separative significance. 3.1.18, 254.20 (V164v M263r A224r ) … ἀλλὰ κοινῶς, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν [V : om. Μ Α] αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως θεωρεῖσθαι.

Since αἰσθητῶν is determined by the distributive ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, the article seems necessary. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.2.1, 256.7 (V164v M263r A224v ) ἀδύνατον γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ὅτι ὁρᾷ, μὴ αἰσθανόμενον καὶ εἰδότα [V : ἰδόντα M A] αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν, εἴτουν τὸ χρῶμα.

At first blush, β’s reading seems more appropriate: it is impossible to perceive that one sees a visible object without seeing the visible object. But οἶδα can be used of perceptual cognition, as it is, for instance, in Themistius 85.3 (οὔτε ἡ γεῦσις, λευκὸν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν) and on numerous occasions in Ps.‐Philoponus’ commentary on De an. 3.2 (e.g. 466.4–5: … μόνον καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ χρῶμα οἶδεν ἡ ὄψις, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῷ μὴ εἶναι χρῶμα οἶδε κατὰ ἀπόφασιν). And since that is the case, the question is whether we should not expect here a word that stands to αἰσθανόμενον in the sphere of direct perceptual cognition as καταλαμβάνειν stands to αἰσθάνεσθαι in the sphere of indirect perceptual cognition (i.e. perceiving that one perceives), rather than a word that specifies the type of perception used as an example (which is specified anyway by the mention of the perceptible object, the colour). Whichever reading is wrong, it is likely to be due to homophony. But since ἰδόντα seems at first blush more appropriate, it is easier to imagine εἰδότα being corrupted into it than the other way around. Probably, then, the original reading is, after all, V’s. For αἰσθητόν, see section 1.4.2 ad 3.2.1, 256.7–8. 3.2.8, 258.9 (V165r M263v A224v ) ἔστι δέ, φησίν, ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ [V M2pc : ἐνέργεια Mac A] αἴσθησις τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ πάντως ἕν ….

ἐνεργείᾳ is an attribute of αἴσθησις, “the actual perception”. The nominative probably insinuated itself from the first subject of the clause, facilitated by the immediately

XCVI | 1 Textual Tradition

preceding nominatives αὐτὴ ἡ. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.2.13, 260.18 (V165v M264r A225r ) καὶ μὴ διορίζεσθαι [V : διωρίζεσθαι M A] ὡς ….

Apparently just a slip of the pen (and one among numerous examples of confusion of omega and omicron). Clearly an error of transmission in β. Very low separative significance. 3.3.3, 270.9 (V167v M265v A226r ) καὶ ἄλλην δὲ αὐτοῦ [V : αὖ M Α] ῥῆσιν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σημαίνουσαν ἐκτίθεται, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον δέ φησιν ὡσαύτως βούλεσθαι ….

αὐτοῦ refers to Empedocles, whose fr. 108 is quoted by Aristotle after fr. 106, which has just been quoted by Metochites too, and before Od. 18.136–137. αὖ is not impossible, as far as the meaning is concerned, but clearly inferior. Besides, the word does not occur elsewhere in In De an. or in Metochites’ other printed prose works (αὖθις, on the other hand, occurs more than 360 times in his printed works, 40 times in In De an.). Very probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 3.3.5, 270.17 (V168r M266r A226r ) καίτοι γέ φησιν αὐτοὺς [τοὺς add. M A : deest in V] ταῦτ᾿ οἰομένους καὶ λέγοντας οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐντελῶς λέγειν ….

Substantivized (β) and circumstantial (V) participles are both possible here (in the construction with substantivized participles αὐτοὺς seems redundant, but that is no reliable indication that it is erroneous). Still, the construction with circumstantial participles is much to be preferred. Probably an error of transmission (due to dittography) in β. Relatively high separative significance. 3.3.21, 280.5 (V170r M267v A227v ) οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ὅτι φαίνεται ἡμῖν [V : om. M A] τόδε τι ὃ τελείως καταλαμβάνομεν ….

ἡμῖν dovetails neatly with the first person plural of λέγομεν and is supported by the Aristotelian text (428a 14). Since it does not occur elsewhere in the context of this passage, it is clearly more likely to have been omitted by mistake than to have been added by mistake. Very probably an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 3.3.30, 286.4 (V171r M269r A228v ) … ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἐν πλείστοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων πέφυκε πάσχειν οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι δὲ οἷς [ἡ add. M A : deest in V] αἴσθησις ….

αἴσθησις does not normally take the article when used generally and distributively. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.4.3, 290.16 (V172r M270r A229v ) φησὶν οὖν· ἆρα [V : ἄρα M A] ἂν εἴη τὸ νοεῖν, ὥσπερ προελέγετο ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts |

XCVII

It is clear that the interrogative particle is needed, not the inferential one. The accentuation of these particles is however prone to considerable variation in the MSS, and it is possible that this reflects the situation in the original (cf. ad 1.1.13, 8.22 above). Non liquet. 3.4.5, 292.6 (V172v M270r A229v ) … ὡς ἄν, φησί, πάντα «κρατῇ», τουτέστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διασαφεῖ, πάντα γνωρίζῃ [V : γνωρίζει M A] ….

For β’s present indicative with ἄν, cf. ad 1.1.30, 14.23 above. For arguments in favour of assuming errors of transmission behind all occurrences of the present indicative with ἄν in the MSS of In De an., see sec. 2.3.4. An easy corruption, especially after διασαφεῖ. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Low separative significance. 3.4.12, 296.12 (V173v M271r A230r ) ὡσαύτως δὴ [V : δὲ M A] καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἔχει καὶ τὰ νοήματα, ὅταν ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ἕξει ᾖ ἢ καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ….

The sentence expresses a fact that can be inferred from the preceding sentences, so δὴ is clearly more apposite. Cf. above ad 2.5.15, 170.14 (and, for the reverse situation, ad 3.1.12, 250.19). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.4.21, 300.20 (V174r M272r A230v ) … καθ’ ὃ ποιῇ [V Apc : ποιεῖ M Aac ] ἂν ἴσως τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ πάσχῃ [V M Apc : πάσχει Aac ] τὸ αἰσθητικόν ….

It seems likely that β had the indicative of both verbs. If so, we probably have to do with errors of transmission in β. Cf. ad 1.1.30, 14.23 and 3.4.5, 292.6 above (and sec. 2.3.4 below). Low separative significance. 3.4.23, 302.12 (V174v M272r A231r ) εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔνυλα καθὸ νοητά – νοητὰ γάρ [V : om. M A] – ἔσονται καὶ νόες ….

With V’s text, νοητὰ γάρ has to be taken as an elliptical parenthesis supplying the premiss needed for completing the argument (but understood in the preceding part of the apodosis): “if this is the case, then all enmattered objects, too, by virtue of being intelligible (for they are intelligible), will also be intellects.” β’s text may be the result of an attempt to read the passage as an uninterrupted conditional sentence (εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔνυλα καθὸ νοητὰ νοητὰ ἔσονται καὶ νόες). The meaning it yields is, however, inferior (because partly tautological): “if this is the case, then all enmattered objects, too, by virtue of being intelligible, will be intelligible and intellects.” In other words, if γὰρ is removed, νοητὰ will be otiose. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 3.5.3, 308.3 (V175r M272v A231v ) … (ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν τὸ νοεῖν ὅταν βουλώμεθα)· καὶ ἔχει [V : ἔχῃ Μ A] ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς τοὺς δύο λόγους ….

XCVIII | 1 Textual Tradition

The subjunctive must be a corruption or a misguided correction prompted by misconstruing the clause in which it stands as a continuation of the parenthesis. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.5.3, 308.7 (V175v M273r A231v ) καὶ ἔστι ταυτόν, ὥσπερ προείρηται, ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς [V : αὐτὸ M A] καὶ τὸ [M A : om. V] νοητόν …. See sec. 1.4.8. 3.6.3, 312.14 (V176r M273v A232r ) «πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι» – ἤτοι κεφαλαί – «ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν», ἢ καὶ ἄλλάττα [V : ἄλλα M A] τυχὸν μέλη ….

Both readings are perfectly possible (for the accentuation of ἄλλάττα, see sec. 3.1.4), but it is much more likely that V’s should have been corrupted into β’s than vice versa. Probably, then, an error of transmission in β. High separative significance. 3.6.3, 312.18 (V176r M273v A232r ) οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον αὐτὸ ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἡ διάμετρος ἰδίᾳ οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος, συντεθέντα [V : συντιθέντα M A] δέ, ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος …, ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές.

The neuter plural nominative of the aorist passive participle, not of the present active participle, is the required form. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.6.12, 320.11 (V177v M275r A233r ) ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις ὁρᾷ τόδε λευκόν – ἤτοι [V : om. M A] ὡς οἰκεῖον αἰσθητόν – ἀληθεύει ….

Both readings are possible, but I have a slight preference for V’s text, where ἤτοι indicates more clearly that the point of the phrase ὡς οἰκεῖον αἰσθητόν is to bar the interpretation of τόδε λευκόν as a compound object that happens to be white, i.e. a coincidental perceptible object. Non liquet. 3.8.7, 334.16 (V180r M277v A235r ) καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὅταν θεωρῇ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νοῦς, φησί (τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἕξεων καὶ παθῶν καὶ τῶν προειρημένων τῶν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως εἴτουν τῶν μαθηματικῶν), ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι [V : φάντασμά τι M A] θεωρεῖν ταῦτα ….

The famous variant from De an. 432a 8 is repeated here, but in the present context β’s reading is impossible, since θεωρεῖν already has an object. For this reason, it is not likely to be a correction. Ironically, the Aristotelian text in A has φαντάσματι. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.9.9, 342.16 (V181v M279r A236r ) καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πολλάκις κρίνων τις τὸ πρακτόν, εἴτε [τὸ add. M A : deest in V] φοβερὸν εἴτε ἡδύ ….

The two alternatives should be adjectival (“whether the course of action is daunting or tempting”), not substantival (and if they were substantival, the article should have been repeated before the second alternative). Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | XCIX

3.10.2, 344.13 (V181v M279r A236r ) … ὁ πρακτικός, ὅστις διαφέρει τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ κατὰ τὸ τέλος· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τέλος τὸ ἀληθές, τοῦ δὲ τὸ πρακτόν [V : πρακτικὸν M Atext : -ὸν A1?sl ] ….

It looks as though the supralinear variant in A is in the hand of the main scribe (Manuel of Corinth). If so, it is perhaps more likely to have been imported from the exemplar (whether β or a copy of β) than from a different source. It may also be a suggested correction of which Manuel was not certain (otherwise he would no doubt have expunged the ending now left in the text). But whether or not β had the correct reading noted as a variant, it must have had πρακτικὸν in the text, which is clearly an error of transmission (the goal of the practical intellect is τὸ πρακτόν, the possible course of action). Its separative significance depends, of course, on whether β had the correct reading noted as a variant. 3.10.5, 346.10 (V182r M279v A236v ) καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἄλλο τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλο αἴτιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς πράγματος, οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη πάντως [ὡς add. M A : deest in V] αἴτιον ὡς ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλου ….

ὡς before αἴτιον ruins the sense. It is clearly a dittography, facilitated, perhaps, by the legitimate ὡς after αἴτιον. Clearly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.12.1, 362.3 (V184v M281v A238v ) πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν δὲ τοῦτο εἴρηται τῶν θειοτέρων κατὰ τοὺς [V : om. M A] φιλοσόφους ἐμψύχων οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ….

The (generic) article seems necessary. Very probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. 3.12.10, 368.5 (V185v M283r A239v ) καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐπεὶ [V : ἐπειδὴ M A] τὸ ζῷον ἔμψυχον σῶμά ἐστι ….

Either reading is of course entirely possible, but it seems more likely both that Metochites would have written ἐπεὶ rather than ἐπειδὴ immediately after δὴ and that a scribe would in this context have added rather than omitted -δὴ. Probably, then, an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance. 3.12.14, 370.16 (V186r M283v A240r ) οἷον, φησίν, εἴ τις [φησίν, εἴ τις V : εἴ τις φησὶ M A] κηρὸν τυπώσει δακτυλίῳ, μέχρι του δίεισι κατὰ μετάδοσιν ἡ σφραγίς ….

The subject of φησίν is Aristotle (435a 2–3, paraphrased on the basis of Themistius). This is clear with V’s reading, less so with β’s, especially since φησίν is occasionally followed by a direct quotation or paraphrase in a finite mood, without any conjunction (see sec. 1.4.2 ad 2.4.10, 146.10). It is possible that V’s reading is a stylistic amendment of the reading in β. If, on the other hand, V’s reading is (as seems more likely) the original one, the reading in β must be an involuntary corruption. Probably an error of transmission in β. Relatively high separative significance.

C | 1 Textual Tradition

3.12.14, 370.18 (V186r M283v A240r ) ὁ λίθος γὰρ ἀδύνατος [V : ἀδύνατον M A] κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς σφραγίδος τοῦ δακτυλίου ….

It seems unlikely for an adjective taking the infinitive in personal construction to stand in the “general” neuter. There is another case involving neuter ἀδύνατον in personal construction in 2.4.33, 160.9, where it is not the gender of the adjective itself that is striking, but the fact that its infinitive takes a predicative complement in the feminine nominative (τροφὴ γὰρ εἶναι ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἀδύνατον ἄνευ τοῦ πεφθῆναι). 3.13.2, 374.19 (V187r M284r A240v ) ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν ἁπλῶν ἔσται (οὐδὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς γῆς, ἐξ ἧς μᾶλλον δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως, ὡς [V : οὐ M A] παχυμερεστέρας) ….

The reason why earth would be a more plausible candidate than the other elements for being the sole constituent of flesh is surely not that it is not coarser than the other elements. Certainly an error of transmission in β. Relatively low separative significance. Conclusion: Let us take stock. There are in β’s text of In De an. at least sixty fairly certain – and at least thirty less certain but still probable – errors of transmission in addition to the archetypal errors. It is true that many of these – especially of the fairly certain ones – have low or relatively low separative significance, but that only means that any single one of them may conceivably be corrected or corrupted back to the original reading, and the cumulative significance of several dozen errors of relatively low significance can be very high indeed. And the ones that have relatively high separative significance are not so few anyway.³⁴ One must conclude that it is practically impossible that all these fairly certain errors, and at least a few of the probable ones, should have been corrected by the scribe of V, unless he had systematic recourse to an independent source. This corroborates the conclusion of Borchert (2011, cxlix–cli; clx), who argues from the presence of a large number of figures in V, which must have been taken over from its exemplar, but are absent in M and A/S, that V cannot be a descendant of β. In addition, the reviewed material includes three passages that may be interpreted as direct indications of β’s dependence on V, since the respective errors in β may be explained by some particular feature in V (2.2.2, 116.11; 2.11.3, 224.20; 3.1.15, 252.17), and, somewhat discomfortingly, three passages that may suggest β’s independence of V (2.1.4, 102.6; 2.1.28, 114.15; 3.5.3, 308.7). We shall have to keep these passages in mind in section 1.4.10, where we must arrive at a final verdict on the relationship between β and V. To be able to do that, however, we must first examine and evaluate those disagreements between β and V where V is more likely to be wrong. 34 E.g. 1.2.6, 20.23; 1.2.24, 30.3; 1.3.4, 38.21; 1.3.34, 52.15; 1.4.3, 58.16; 1.4.12, 64.3; 1.4.21, 68.8; 1.5.15, 84.24; 1.5.19, 86.17; 1.5.32, 92.21; 2.2.2, 116.11; 2.2.5, 118.9; 2.3.5, 136.15; 2.3.12, 140.19; 2.4.33, 160.9; 2.4.34, 160.14; 2.5.5, 162.26–164.1; 2.5.10, 166.17; 2.5.19, 174.4; 2.6.3, 178.2; 2.8.10, 196.10; 2.8.29, 204.15; 2.9.3, 208.23; 2.9.5, 210.11; 2.9.5, 210.14; 2.10.11, 222.21–22; 3.3.3, 270.9; 3.3.21, 280.5; 3.4.23, 302.12, 3.6.3, 312.14.

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | CI

1.4.8 Suspected errors in V not in β

1.2.28, 32.1 (V117r M223r A189v ) ᾗ δὲ ἐκ σφαιρικοῦ [τοῦ add. V : deest in M A : fort. legendum του] σχήματος οὐσιοῦται, εὐκινητότατόν ἐστι ….

V’s reading may actually be authentic here, given that the article often appears in unorthodox positions in In De an. (see sec. 2.3.1). In this instance, its position may well have been considered unorthodox enough for it to be deliberately deleted by the scribe of β. The short genitive of the indefinite pronoun is relatively rare in Metochites: there are about a dozen instances in his other printed prose texts, usually in the collocation ἄλλου του, which also occurs once in In De an. (3.13.4, 376.12), besides eight instances of the phrase ἕνεκά του and two of the phrase μέχρι του. Non liquet. 1.2.29, 32.5 (V117v M223r A189v ) τὸν … Ἀναξαγόραν … καταλαμβανόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ κινῆσαι λέγοντα τὸν νοῦν τὰς ὁμοιομερείας δῆλον εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸν πάντως [καὶ αὐτὸν πάντως M A : πάντως καὶ αὐτὸν V] πρὸς τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποβλέποντα λέγειν οὕτω ….

καὶ coordinates the infinitives (δῆλον) εἶναι and λέγειν (and their respective arguments). If πάντως precedes καὶ, it has to go with (δῆλον) εἶναι. This is by no means impossible, but the result is a comically overstated first infinitive clause and a strangely understated second infinitive clause. So I am inclined to think that β is in the right here. The separative significance of V’s error is not negligible. 1.2.32, 32.20 (V117v M223r A189v ) … ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον [M1pc (fort. ex κρίσταλλον) : κρίσταλον V : κρύσταλον A] ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ὑδατώδους οὐσίας καὶ ψυχρότητος, οὐχ ὕδωρ ….

This spelling error may well be authorial. The word does not occur elsewhere in Metochites’ printed works. Philoponus and Ps.-Philoponus consistently have κρύσταλλος (the word is not found in Arist. De an. or the other ancient commentators). If it is an error of transmission in V, it is of very low separative significance. 1.3.30, 50.17 (V121v M226r A192v ) ὥστε εἰ κατὰ μόρια μεγέθη πάντως ὄντα ἀεὶ διαιρεῖται, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τὸ νοητὸν νοεῖ, ἀπειράκις ἂν καὶ αὖθις νοήσειεν [M A : νοήση V] ἕκαστον νοητόν ….

On the subjunctive with ἄν where the optative would be expected, see below, sec. 2.3.4. The reading of V is probably an error of transmission, and that of β is probably authentic, but since the situation in the MSS with regard to the moods is highly volatile, with numerous errors as well as corrections, one cannot draw any firm genealogical conclusions from this. 1.4.10, 62.13 (V124r P133v M228r A194v L95v ) γαίᾳ [γαία M A P : γαῖα (ut vid.) V L] μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ.

CII | 1 Textual Tradition

It is not absolutely clear that V has the circumflex, but it was certainly read that way by Demetrios Damilas (the scribe of L). Assuming that V does have the circumflex, P’s agreement with β only goes to show that the emendation is an easy one to make. A probable error of transmission in V: it is clear from 1.2.15, 24.19–21 that the author was familiar with the quotation. 1.4.16, 64.23 (V125r M228v A195r ) κρίνει μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ θυμῷ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως …· καὶ πάλιν κρίνει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν φόβον [τὸν φόβον M A : τοῦ φόβου V] ….

As exemplified in the first clause of the passage, κρίνω in this sense (“discern”, “cognize”) takes an accusative object. Hence it is not very likely that the error in V is due to the omission of περί. Regardless, it is very probably an error of transmission, but the separative significance is rather low. 1.4.34, 74.7–8 (V127r M230r A196r ) ἐὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὑφαίρεσιν ποιήσῃς, ἑτεροιοῦται [A : ἑτεριοῦται M : ἑταιρειοῦται V] ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐλάττων γινόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον.

Probably an error of transmission in V. Relatively low separative significance. 1.5.11, 84.5 (V129r M231v A198r ) εἴ γε δοίημεν ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι [τὰ add. V : deest in M A] στοιχεῖα πρῶτα ἐξ ὧν αὐτὰ συνίσταται ….

στοιχεῖα is general and distributive, so β’s must be the correct reading. The error is understandable, since the primary elements are usually referred to in the definite form, but the correction is also rather easy to make. Very probably an error of transmission in V. 1.5.15, 84.22 (V129r P138v M231v A198v L99r ) … πλείονος ἀγνοίας ἂν εἴη αἴτιον ἑκάστη ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα [M A : ἑνοῦσα V P L] ἢ γνώσεως· ἑκάστη γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα [M A P : ενοῦσα V : ἑνοῦσα L] εἰς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἑνὸς μόνου τοῦ ὁμοίου αὐτῇ ἐμποιεῖ γνωστικὴν δύναμιν ….

It is possible that the scribe of V misunderstood ἐνοῦσα the first time it occurred, and then, when it ocurred again, realized that he may have made a mistake, but was not certain, so left it undetermined and did not go back to correct the previous occurrence. The same error in V in 2.10.8, 222.3 (ἑνόντος for ἐνόντος) may, however, suggest that the mistake was not on a semantic level. ἑνοῦσαν for ἐνοῦσαν occurs again in V at 2.10.10, 222.15 (cf. also 3.11.2, 356.9). However that may be, it is a clear scribal error, but its separative significance is very low. 1.5.24, 88.18 (V129v P139r–v M232r A199v L99v ) … ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφαικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι [Μ A L2?pc : ἕπεσι V P] λόγος ….

Apparently a slip of the pen. The correction is easy to make (as is evidenced by the fact that it is found in L, although this may be in a second hand).

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts | CIII

1.5.36, 94.21 (V131r M233v A200r ) … ὅτι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης [M A : ἀπολειπούσης V] τὸ σῶμα, παραυτίκα διαπνεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ διαρρεῖ καὶ λύεται σηπόμενον ….

The aorist is surely required (cf. 1.4.13, 64.5: πῶς ἀπολιπούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων φθείρεται …;). Very probably an error of transmission in V. Low separative significance. 1.5.39, 96.20 (V131v M234r A200v ) … καὶ ὁμοειδῆ εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ· ἀλλήλοις μέν, ὅτι, κἂν [καὶ add. V : deest in M A] τῷ ἀριθμῷ τεμνόμενα οὐχ ἕν εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὖν τῷ εἴδει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν εἰσι ….

The collocation κἂν καί is not unusual in thirteenth- and fourteenth‐century texts (it is interesting to note that it occurs three times in the corpus aristotelicum – always in the De plantis, back‐translated from Latin by Manuel Holobolos around the turn of the fourteenth century), but does not occur elsewhere in the printed works of Metochites. Perhaps it has been edited out: at any rate, there are eight instances in In De an. (and at least eighteen instances in other paraphrases: see Borchert 2011, cxxxvi and nn. 271–72) where καί after κἄν has been erased in V (2.4.23, 154.18; 2.5.13, 168.24; 2.7.22, 190.10; 2.7.24, 190.15; 3.2.11, 260.7; 3.3.10, 274.9; 3.7.14, 330.2; 3.10.1, 344.6). In two of these instances (2.4.23 and 3.3.10), a secondary (?) hand has written εἰ over the erasure. There are two alternative ways to account for this situation. (a) The original had κἂν καί in all these instances, which were faithfully copied and subsequently emended – except in the present passage – in V. (b) καί was in all these instances added and subsequently emended – except in the present passage – in V (or possibly added in an intermediary between the original and V and emended in V). In favour of (b) speaks the circumstance that the collocation does not occur elsewhere in the printed works of Metochites. Against (b) speaks the circumstance that if καί was added in all these instances, it must have been done deliberately. But a deliberate systematic intervention like that is not likely to have been made on a whim. So one would have to assume that the scribe in question either took a bold initiative of which his commissioner or supervisor (or, in case the enterprising scribe was that of an intermediate MS, the commissioner or supervisor of V) subsequently disapproved or misunderstood a directive of his commissioner or supervisor. On balance, then, (a) seems the more likely scenario. καί after κἄν could after all have been edited out in MSS of Metochites’ other works as well. Were the emendations in V carried out by the main scribe or a later hand? It seems fairly clear that in most if not all instances where εἰ has been written over the erasure (there are at least eight such instances in the whole MS: Borchert 2011, cxxxvi n. 271), it is not in the hand of the main scribe. Yet this hand cannot be that much later, since P has the same text as Vpc in all instances in In De an. where καί after κἄν has been erased in V, including those two in which εἰ has been written over the erasure.

CIV | 1 Textual Tradition

The date of the emendations may be of genealogical importance, since M and A also have the same text as Vpc in all these instances. Arguably, then, if β was a copy of V, it cannot have been produced until after the emendations in V were carried out. It is true that the present passage throws a spanner into this argument, inasmuch as it shows that if one accepts that β was a copy of V, one also has to accept that καί after κἄν could have been omitted in β regardless of the reading in V. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the scribe of β would have independently chosen to replace καί with εἰ in exactly those eight out of 26 instances in which the corrector of V chose to do so. So the argument holds. On the alternative hypothesis, that is, if β was independent of V, we have to accept scenario (b) as set out above. As regards the constitutio textus, it is clear that if one accepts scenario (b), one is right to follow Vpc M A in all relevant instances. But then one must follow M A also in the present instance, since καὶ must by all accounts be an unauthorized addition in V, simply overlooked by the corrector. If, on the other hand, one thinks that the original had κἂν καί in this passage as well as in the 26 instances in which καί has been erased in V, one is faced with the dilemma as to whether to print the original text or adopt what seems to be authorized corrections in the extant MSS. My own view is that a moderate implementation of the former policy is in principle the most reasonable course of action when it comes to stylistically motivated corrections like these (see secs 1.4.11 and 3.1.1). Nevertheless, since pursuing this policy in the case of κἂν καί would involve printing a text which is not supported by any MS in eight instances, and scenario (b) cannot be definitively ruled out, I have followed Vpc M A in all these instances and, in the name of consistency, M A in the present instance. 2.1.2, 100.10 (V132r M234r A201r ) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν [M A : om. V] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αὐτοῦ βιβλίῳ.

β’s reading is stylistically superior, but not necessarily what was in the original. The collocation μὲν οὖν occurs eleven times in V’s text of In De an. (never after a demonstrative). Even if there is a clear possibility that β’s reading is a stylistic amendment, however, printing it is worth the risk. If it is authentic, on the other hand, the separative significance of the error in V is obviously high. 2.2.6, 118.11 (V136r P145v M237v A203r L103v ) οἷον, φησίν, ὁ τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν [V1pc M A : τετραγωνικὸν Vac P L] ὁριζόμενος καὶ λέγων «τὸ εἶναι ἴσον τετράγωνον ἰσόπλευρον ὀρθογώνιον ἑτερομήκει» ….

The correction in V is rather subtly executed – so much so, in fact, that it was ignored by the scribes of both P and L – which is the reason why I report the reading in this section. All the same, it is there, and there is no need in this case to assume either a correction by the scribe of β or his use of another manuscript than V. 2.2.6, 118.18 (V136v M237v A203v ) τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐστι πάντως καὶ ὀρθογώνιον τετράπλευρον [M A : τετράγωνον V] ἰσόπλευρον, ἄλλως θεωρούμενον ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts |

CV

It is true that the square is described as a rectangular equilateral quadrangle in the definition that this passage is supposed to exemplify (see the preceding entry), but it seems more important that the figure which is said to be the same (in area) as the square in the example is described as an oblong quadrilateral figure of sixteen cubits (2.2.6, 118.16–17): the point is that there will inevitably also be an equilateral quadrilateral figure of the same area. This is possibly an amendment in β; it is not so easy to explain as a scribal error in V, although the description in the definition may of course have lingered in the scribe’s mind. If it is a scribal error in V, it is of relatively high separative significance. 2.3.10, 140.7 (V140v M241v A206r ) ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς ἅπαντα τὰ ζῷα τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μετέχοντα αἰσθήσεων ἐξανάγκης καὶ τὴν ἁπτικὴν ἔχει, ἔνια δὲ τὴν [M A : τὰ V] ἁφὴν μόνην [V M : om. A] ἔχοντα, οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἄλλας ….

As far as the meaning is concerned, the best text is probably A’s, where the circumstantial participle can be naturally taken to have concessive force (“But some, although they do have touch, do not have the other senses …”). But β must have had M’s text, where the circumstantial participle is more naturally taken to have causal force (“But some, since they only have touch, do not have the other senses …”), and the resulting truism is possibly awkward enough to have occasioned a conjectural emendation in A. In V’s text, the substantivized participle is an appositive to ἔνια, which – again, pleonastically – serves to specify which animals are in focus (“But some – the ones that only have touch – do not have the other senses …”). As far as the meaning is concerned, then, there is little to choose between the readings of β and V. But the fact that ἁφήν otherwise always takes the article after ἔχω in In De an. (eight instances) suggests that this may well be an error of transmission in V. Relatively high separative significance. 2.4.4, 142.20 (V141v M242r A206v ) Ὅτι προδιαληπτέον, φησί, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων [τῶν add. V : deest in M A : fort. legendum εἰδῶν] τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς τροφῆς αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς γεννήσεως ….

The extra τῶν in V is redundant, whether it is taken as a partitive genitive or as an appositive. One would expect εἰρημένων to be the attribute of a noun further determined by τῆς ψυχῆς (as e.g. in 2.2.19, 124.18 and 2.2.22, 126.4: τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς; in 3.3.20, 278.26–280.1: τῶν γε μὴν ἄλλων εἰρημένων γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς; or in 1.5.42, 98.7: τὸ πρῶτον εἰρημένον εἶδος τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς). There are no other cases in In De an. of τὸ εἰρημένον being followed by a substantivized possessive genitive. For these reasons, I have adopted β’s reading, which may well be an amendment (or a happy corruption) of V’s. V’s reading may be a scribal error prompted by the two preceding instances of τῶν in the same phrase, or (more speculatively) reflect an original εἰδῶν (cf. 2.4.1, 142.2–3: λοιπὸν διεξελθεῖν πρότερον ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδῶν καὶ μορίων ἕκαστον). Still, it cannot be excluded that the error is authorial.

CVI | 1 Textual Tradition

2.4.4, 142.21 (V141v M242v A206v ) Ὅτι προδιαληπτέον, φησί, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς τροφῆς αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς γεννήσεως, εἴτουν τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ [M A : om. V] γεννητικοῦ, ταυτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ καθόλου περὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς ….

One might be inclined to think that the single article in V is right: since, as Aristotle says (416a 19–20), the nutritive and the reproductive capacities are one and the same (the “vegetative soul”, as Metochites puts it), the two substantivized adjectives must both refer to this. Still, these are capacities for distinct activities, and that seems to be how they are treated here: in 2.4.5, 142.23–24 Metochites proceeds to explain that they are both (τὸ θρεπτικόν τε καὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν ὁμοίου) special properties of the vegetative soul. So it may well be the case that he wished to keep the capacities distinct also in the present passage, in which case β is probably right. 2.4.19, 152.10 (V143v M244r A208v ) … τὸ τρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς μόνον [M A : μόνων V] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γινομένων, ἀλλ’ ἔνθα ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ποσότητα οὐσιώσεως καθαρῶς συνεμφαινομένην ….

The required sense is not “does not apply only to things that are generated from their contraries in an unqualified way”, but rather “does not apply to things that are only generated from their contraries in an unqualified way”. Thus the adverb, not the adjective, is needed. Apparently a scribal error in V. The separative significance is very low, seeing that (a) that there are several other apparent corrections of adjectival μόνος into adverbial μόνον and vice versa in β (see ad 2.4.34, 160.14 in sec. 1.4.7), and (b) the superior reading in β need not even be a deliberate correction but could also be a corruption, of one of the commonest kinds (ο/ω substitution), of the false reading in V. 2.5.15, 170.24 (V147r M247v A211v ) παραχρῆμα [M Α: παρὰ χρῆμα V] γὰρ γεννηθὲν κλαυθμυρίζει αἰσθανόμενον ἀέρος καὶ περιέχοντος ψυχροτέρου ἢ πρότερον.

Perhaps to be classified as an orthographical variant rather than an error in V. Still, β’s reading may well be a simple stylistic amendment. Very low separative significance. 2.7.22, 190.11 (V151r M250v A214r ) ὑπερτίθεταί γε μὴν τό γε νῦν εἶναι τοὺς περὶ τούτων [M A : τούτου V] λόγους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑξῆς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐρεῖν ἐπαγγέλλεται.

The plural is presupposed by the anaphoric personal pronoun (αὐτῶν) in the following clause. β’s reading may well be a correction. It is perhaps as likely that the error is due to the author as it is that it is due to a scribe. If it is the latter, its separative significance is still relatively low. 2.8.15, 198.17 (V153r M252v A215r ) διατοῦτο καὶ ἕλικας [M A : ἔλικας V] ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν οὓς ὁρῶμεν ἡ φύσις ἐποιήσατο ….

1.4 Genealogy of the manuscripts |

CVII

Like the cases in 1.5.15–36 discussed above, an apparent slip of the pen on the part of a scribe (probably V’s). Very low separative significance. 2.8.31, 206.1–2 (V154v M253v A216v ) … ἀλλὰ παθούσης τῆς κατὰ τὸν φάρυγγα ἀρτηρίας ὑπό τινος ἢ θερμοτέρας καὶ δριμυτέρας [-ι- A1pc (ut vid. ex -υ‑) M : δρυμυτέρας V] δήξεως [M A : δείξεως V] ἢ ὑπὸ ψυχροτέρας τινὸς προσβολῆς ἐπισυμβαίνει ….

Two more spelling mistakes. Especially δείξεως is likely to be due to insufficient attention on the part of a scribe (probably V’s). δριμύς and cognates are, however, with one exception (3.4.8, 294.3), consistently spelt δρυμ- in V, so δρυμυτέρας may well be an authorial error. Both corrections are easy to make. 2.8.32, 206.7–8 (V154v M254r A216v ) καὶ ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ὅτι ὁ ἔξωθεν ἀὴρ σύμφυτος γινόμενος τῷ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένῳ τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀέρι καὶ πλήττων αὐτὸν διαπορθμεύει [M A: διαπορθμεύειν V] δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀκουστὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὸν εἰσπνεόμενον ἔξωθεν ἀέρα ἑνοῦσθαι ….

Probably an error of transmission in V, although it is difficult to see why it would have arisen (perhaps through anticipation of the infinitive governed by ἔοικεν). Anyway, the syntax absolutely requires the indicative, so β’s text must be printed. Relatively high separative significance. 2.9.3, 208.17 (V155r M254v A217r ) οὐκ ἔχει δὲ καὶ [V : om. M A] διηρθρωμένας καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐγνωσμένας ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι τὰς καταλήψεις αὐτῶν ….

The emphasis on διηρθρωμένας (or the suggestion of its incompatibility with ἀκριβῶς ἐγνωσμένας) seems undesirable (and this may have prompted the correction, if that’s what it is, in β), but it is still not unlikely that it is the original reading. 2.9.4, 210.3–4 (V155v M254v A217r ) μόνῳ δὲ τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ ἡ διαφορά ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς [ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς V : αὐτοῖς ἐστι M Α] τῶν ὁρατῶν, οὐ κρίνεται δὲ παρ᾿ αὐτῶν οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν οὔτ᾿ ἄλλ’ ὁτιοῦν χρῶμα ….

Another example where somewhat awkward phrasing in V is set against β’s smoother text. It is perfectly possible that V’s is the original reading and β’s is a stylistic amendment. 2.9.13, 216.2 (V156v M255v A218r ) ὡς ἂν σφοδρότερον … ἡ ἀντίληψις τῷ ζῴῳ γίνηται [A : γίνοιτο M : γίνεται V] τῆς ὀσμῆς ….

The most likely explanation for this situation seems to be that β had γίνεται and the scribes of M and A each independently corrected it. It is not so easy to say who was most successful: A’s correction is palaeographically better and conforms to classical grammar (regardless of whether the emendation suggested in 214.26 [διατοῦτο καὶ :

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transponere velim] is accepted, the predicate verb of the governing clause is in a primary tense); but M’s correction conforms to the usage in the preceding final clause, governed by the same primary tense predicate verb. The ratio of subjunctives to optatives in final/consecutive clauses after ὡς ἄν is roughly two to one in In De an. The variation seems free (see sec. 2.3.4). For V’s present indicative with ἄν, cf. ad 1.1.30, 14.23 and 3.4.5, 292.6 in section 1.4.7. For arguments in favour of assuming errors of transmission behind all unexpected occurrences of the present indicative with ἄν in the MSS of In De an., see section 2.3.4. In this passage an error is all the more likely as there are almost two full MS lines between ἄν and the verb. In any case, even if V must be in error here, it is far from clear that the error was not shared by β. 2.10.8, 222.3 (V157v M256v A218v ) ἐνόντος [M A : ἑνόντος V] ….

See above ad 1.5.15, 84.22. An easy correction. 2.10.10, 222.15 (V158r Mr Ar ) ἐνοῦσαν [A : ἑνοῦσαν V : spiritus non legitur in M] ….

See above ad 1.5.15, 84.22. Another easy correction. 2.12.4, 238.7 (V161r M259v A221v ) ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἀμεγέθης, εἶδος μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ [V : αἰσθητηρίῳ M A] τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ [V : ὑποκειμένῳ M A] καὶ λόγος τίς οὖσα ….

Again (cf. ad 1.2.28, 32.1 above), this apparent violation of the rule that the definite article is repeated only if the attributive is placed after its head noun is not an isolated instance. That is to say, V may well have the original text here. β’s text conforms to the aforementioned rule, and may seem preferable on that account, but it is to my mind easier to explain it as a stylistically (or grammatically, if you prefer) motivated deliberate transposition than it is to explain V’s text as a corruption. It may still well be the case, of course, that Metochites, on second thoughts, would have preferred β’s text. See also section 2.3.1. 2.12.9, 240.13 (V161v M260r A221v ) … ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα σώματα καὶ τὰ σύνθετα πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν τε καὶ [τῶν add. M A (fort. recte) : deest in V] γευστῶν, εἴτουν τῶν χυμῶν ….

The extra article may seem necessary to distinguish between the objects of touch and taste, especially since it is only the latter that are glossed as “flavours”. Since there are several other instances, however, both in V and in β, where two nouns or substantivized adjectives with distinct extensions share a single article, it is by no means certain that the extra article was in the original. See section 1.4.7 ad 1.1.3, 6.1 and 1.5.39, 96.22. 3.1.7, 246.27 (V162v M261r A223r ) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ γῆ οἵα [M A : οἷα V] τέ ἐστι ….

As was seen above (sec. 1.4.5), this error in V was corrected in U. It may well have been corrected in β, too. That is, it is of low separative significance.

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3.1.10, 248.29 (V163r M261v A223r ) οὐ τοῖς πεπηρωμένοις καὶ κολοβοῖς [M A : κολωβοῖς V] καὶ ἀτελέσιν ….

If scribal, this spelling error is of very low separative significance. 3.1.12, 250.21 (V163v M262r A223v ) ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τούτων προδιείληπται [M A : προδιήλειπται V] ….

Another error of very low separative significance. See also above, section 1.4.5. 3.2.13, 260.19 (V165v M264r A225r ) … οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς ἔδοξεν οὐδ’ ἐρρέθη [M A : ἐρέθη V].

Another error, probably scribal, due to insufficient attention to spelling. An easy correction. 3.2.17, 262.17 (V166r M264r A225r ) ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον, αἴσθησιν καὶ ἀντίληψιν ἔχον τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ, καταλαμβάνει πάντως τὰς αὐτοῦ διαφοράς …, τίνι ἄρα καταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα [M A : om. V] ἔστι, καὶ ποία ταῦτα καταλαμβάνει αἴσθησις ….

The reading of β shifts some of the emphasis from the verb to its object, but does not go far enough to achieve actual clarity: for this the object would have to signify a predicative relation, e.g. ταῦτα ὡς διάφορα. Still, β’s text is preferable, and the absence of the pronoun in V may well be due to a scribal omission. If it is, the error is of relatively high separative significance. 3.3.2, 270.6 (V167v M265v A226r ) πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις [M A: μή τις V] ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποις ….

Correcting V’s reading here would only be easy for a scribe if either he were familiar with the quotation (most probably through the Aristotelian text) or else had a smattering of Homer. Neither of these conditions is unrealistic but neither can be taken for granted. One of the strongest indications of β’s independence of V. 3.3.8, 272.16 (V168r M266r A226v ) … καὶ ὅλως ταυτὸν εἶναι τὸ [V : τῶ M A] αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ [V : τὸ M A] λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ….

β’s text makes for greater clarity, but this is of course no guarantee of authenticity. May well be a stylistic amendment. Non liquet. 3.3.31, 286.10 (V171r M269r A228v ) ἔτι δ’ ἔστι κατ᾿ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ τὰ ὄντα [αὐτὰ add. M A (fort. recte) : deest in V] ἀνατυποῦσθαι, ἔστι [δὲ add. M A (fort. recte) : deest in V] καὶ ψεύδεσθαι, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀναπλάττειν ….

The emphatic pronoun after ὄντα is attractive and may well be authentic. Since it would not be so easily restored, once omitted, this could be another relatively strong indication of β’s independence of V. The connective particle after ἔστι is also desirable, but in this case it is more doubtful whether it was in β’s exemplar (and indeed in

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the original), since there are several other examples in In De an. of asyndeton in enumerations with ἔστι, and this might have been amended more or less mechanically by a scribe, especially if he was invested with the special authority to make that kind of amendment. 3.4.12, 296.13–14 (V173v M271r A230r ) καὶ τοίνυν, τὸ αὐτὸ ὢν [V : ὂν M A] ὅπερ τὰ αὐτοῦ νοήματα, ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ἐνεργῶν καὶ νοῶν ἅττα [M A : ἄττα V] δὴ ὅπερ αὐτὸς δηλονότι ἐστίν ….

For the participle, see ad 2.5.3, 162.14 in section 1.4.7. As for the pronoun, there is great uncertainty in the MSS about the breathing of ἅττα and ἄττα, perhaps because it is not always perfectly clear (this is a case in point) whether the word in question is a relative or an indefinite pronoun. Both ἅττα δή and ἄττα δή are favourite collocations of Metochites’: 37 of 67 occurrences in the whole of Greek literature as preserved in TLG are in prose works of his. 3.4.17, 298.8 (V173v M271v A230v ) τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἄυλον ὂν ἀύλως κρίνει ἀποχρῶν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ. ἄλλως οὖν καὶ ἄλλως ἑκάτερον κρίνων καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δὲ χωριστός [V : χωριστῶς M A (fort. recte)] ….

I have a slight preference for the adverb because of the parallelism with ἄλλως … καὶ ἄλλως. All the same, it is perhaps the lectio facilior. It could well be the result of either (possibly misguided) correction or corruption. Non liquet. 3.4.21, 300.19 (V174r M272r A230v ) καὶ ταῦτα μεταξύ τε αὐτῶν [τε αὐτῶν V : transp. M A (fort. recte)] τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κοινοῦ τινὸς θεωρουμένου ….

The connective τε can only be coordinated with καὶ before τῶν αἰσθητῶν. It thus belongs to αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων and should rightly be placed after αὐτῶν. However, there are a handful of cases in the literature where two genitives after μεταξύ are connected by τε … καί in the same position as in V’s text in this passage (including ?Aristotle, Metaph. 11.1, 1059b 6, in Ross’ edition, although τε is missing in the texts of Par. gr. 1853 and Vindob. phil. 100). It is not inconceivable, therefore, that V’s reading is the original and that β’s is a grammatical/stylistic amendment. In the only comparable case in Metochites’ printed works, Or. 3.16.8, τε is in the correct position. Non liquet. 3.5.3, 306.22 (V175r P185r M272v A231v ) οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει, ὡς φῶς τι συμπλεκόμενον [M Aac : συμπλεκόμενος V P et ut vid. A1pc ] αὐτῷ τελειοποιεῖ, καὶ κατασκευάζει αὐτὸν ….

On V’s reading one would have to punctuate after ὡς φῶς τι, and the following sentence would be asyndetic: “The productive intellect, then, is related to the potential intellect like some light: by being connected with it, it brings it to full development and sets it up ….” The analogy would then be incomplete, since there would be no mention

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of what the light is related to, and it would also be unexplained why the light is qualified by the indefinite pronominal adjective. On β’s reading the action of the productive intellect on the potential intellect is compared to the way in which light brings to full development a thing (τι) that is connected with it (συμπλεκόμενον αὐτῷ). This seems much preferable. If -ν has indeed been corrected into -ς in A, this might be because of misunderstanding of the syntax on the part of the scribe (as presumably in V), or it might be a (unique, I think) testimony to contamination in A from V or P. 3.5.3, 308.7 (V175v M273r A231v ) καὶ ἔστι ταυτόν, ὥσπερ προείρηται, ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς [V : αὐτὸ M A] καὶ τὸ [M A : deest in V] νοητόν ….

An intriguing situation: neither V nor β has a text that seems to make much sense, but it is easy to arrive at one that does by combining their testimonies, which is what I have done – exceptionally – in the edition. This obviously suggests mutual independence. First and foremost, it is difficult to see why β would have had τὸ unless it was in its exemplar (it should be noted, however, that there are more than twenty other instances in In De an. where β has the article and V does not). One of the strongest indications of β’s independence of V. 3.5.7, 310.8 (V175v M273r A231v ) τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ [M A : αὐτῶ V] ἠβούλετο καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι λέγων ….

There can be no doubt that V is wrong. Even if Metochites uses the dative of agent rather liberally with non-perfect verb stems, ἠβούλετο is no passive and Aristotle is the subject of the sentence. Clearly an error of transmission, but one that should be relatively easy to spot and correct. 3.9.3, 338.18 (V180v M278r A235r ) εἰ γὰρ εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπίδοι [M A : ἀπίδη V] τίς ἐν αἷς ἡ διαίρεσις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς αὐτῆς γίνεται ….

V’s reading is clearly wrong (cf. ad 2.6.3, 178.4 and 3.6.7, 314.16 in sec. 1.4.2, and see sec. 2.3.4 on the moods in conditional clauses in general), but of very low separative significance. 3.9.6, 340.9 (V181r M278v A235v ) οἷον περὶ ἀναπνοῆς λέγω καὶ ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως· ἃ νῦν [δὴ add. M A (fort. recte) : deest in V], φησί, παρείσθω ….

δή seems just right here, but may of course for that very reason have been added by an expert corrector. The collocation νῦν δή does not occur elsewhere in In De an., but does so six times in other printed prose works by Metochites. Non liquet. 3.10.8, 348.10 (V182v M280r A236v ) ὅταν ὁ νοῦς μὲν καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἄλλο βούληται [M Α : βούλεται V], ἡ ἐπιθυμία δὲ εἰς ἄλλο κινῇ [correxi : κινεῖ codd.] καὶ ἄλλου ὀρέγηται [ut vid. M1pc Α1pc (ex ὀρέγεται) : ὀρέγεται V] ….

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Cf. ad 1.1.30, 14.23 and 3.4.5, 292.6 in section 1.4.7. For arguments in favour of assuming errors of transmission behind all unexpected occurrences of the present indicative with ἄν, see section 2.3.4. In this case, all verbs were probably (erroneously) in the indicative in the archetype. The correction is easy, but why κινεῖ was retained in β is anybody’s guess. 3.10.8, 348.15 (V182v M280r A237r ) ἐν δέ γε τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, ἐν οἷς μὴ ἔστιν ὅλως αἴσθησις καὶ λογισμὸς τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν [ἐν add. M A : deest in V] αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἤδη ὂν τοῦ χρόνου αἴσθησις, τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν ἐκτεινομένοις καὶ ἐπαΐουσιν – ἐν τούτοις, φησίν ….

The best thing would probably have been to leave out the personal pronoun altogether, especially as ἐκτεινομένοις and ἐπαΐουσιν seem to be circumstantial participles with the relative οἷς; but since it is there, it is probably intended as a reminder of the scope of application expressed by ἐν οἷς. In which case β’s reading may well be right. Non liquet. 3.12.7, 364.21 (V185r M282r A239r ) … ἀνάγκη αἴσθησιν εἶναι τῶν πελαζόντων …, ὡς ἂν τὰ μὲν φεύγῃ [M A : φεύγοι V] ὅσα φευκτά, τὰ δὲ ἀσπάζηται ὅσα δεῖ ….

Both the optative and the subjunctive occur in final/consecutive clauses with ὡς ἄν after primary tenses (see below, sec. 2.3.4). Presumably, however, Metochites would have avoided having different moods in two successive coordinated clauses, so β should be followed. The error is of low separative significance. 3.12.8, 366.5 (V185v M282v A239r ) πάντα γὰρ τὰ πελάζοντα ἐξανάγκης αὐτῶν ἅπτεται [V : ἅπτονται M A (fort. recte)], εἴτε βλάπτοντά εἰσιν εἴτε μή ….

On a similar note as in the preceding remark, presumably Metochites would have used, or at least meant to use, the same number of the verb for the same subject in the same sentence, but who knows? Possibly a scribal corruption in V, possibly a scribal correction in β. 3.13.4, 376.16 (V187r M284r A240v ) … αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτὰς αἰσθήσεων ἐνίοτε γίνονται βλαβεραὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων αὐτῶν μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ζῴου αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ᾗ ἑκάτερον καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἁφὴν πάλιν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ φθαρτικὸν ἔχει [M A : deest in V] καὶ τὸ γευστόν, εἴτουν ὁ χυμός, τὸ φθαρτικόν ….

ἔχει appears indispensable. The two possible alternatives are (a) to delete the article before each occurrence of φθαρτικόν, but this is a more considerable intervention, or (b) to assume that the last two coordinated clauses mean “but it is, again, on account of touch that the object of smell is what is destructive and the object of taste, that is, flavour, is what is destructive”, but this is not particularly satisfactory. Since V’s omission of ἔχει here must be assigned a fairly high separative significance, this is one of the strongest indications of β’s independence of V.

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3.13.6, 378.7 (V187v M284v A240v ) … ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόσεστιν ἵνα τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ ἃ καταλαμβάνει καὶ θεωρεῖ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς ἔξω προφέρῃ [M A1pc (ex προφέρει) : προφέρει V] ….

As in the cases of the present indicative with ἄν (see sec. 1.4.7 ad 1.1.30, 14.23 and sec. 2.3.4), the massive preponderance of the subjunctive after ἵνα (of 24 other instances of verb forms in ἵνα-clauses 23 are in the subjunctive in all MSS and one is in the optative in all MSS) suggests that an error of transmission is at play here, perhaps committed in the archetype, perhaps in V. The present readings could be explained either as mutually independent corrections in M and A (if β had the indicative) or as an initial error in A, prompted by the two preceding indicatives, then quickly corrected (if β had the subjunctive). In short, it is not clear whether β had the subjunctive; and even if it did, the indicative in V is easily corrected. Conclusion: About half of the forty-odd superior readings in β discussed in this section seem relatively clearly to involve an error of transmission in V. In four of these the separative significance of the error is high or relatively high: 2.8.32, 206.7–8; 3.3.2, 270.6; 3.5.3, 308.7 and 3.13.4, 376.16. If these cannot be plausibly explained as conjectural emendations of the text of V, we must assume that β is dependent on a different source.

1.4.9 V If, as argued above (secs 1.4.2 and 1.4.8), V contains errors that are not authorial, V cannot be the original. Moreover, the fact that – as mentioned in sec. 1.4.4 – the scribe of V has, on three occasions in In De an. and on at least two other occasions in other paraphrases (Borchert 2011, cxxix–cxxxii), added in the margins chunks of text that were omitted in the main text, each time apparently because of a saut du même au même – an unmistakable copying error – shows without a doubt that V must be the copy of another MS. Was the exemplar of V the original? If β is dependent on V, there is nothing to prevent this being the case. But if β is independent of V, the secondary readings shared by β and V must have arisen in some ancestor(s) of both, and this common ancestor cannot, then, have been the original. So let us now, from our current vantage-point, finally address the question that has loomed so large throughout the discussion: what is the relationship between β and V?

1.4.10 The relationship of β and V It is striking that in many of the disagreements between β and V, not only in those discussed in section 1.4.8, where β seems to have a superior text, but even more con-

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spicuously in those disagreements, not addressed in this Introduction, where there are no compelling reasons in terms of the sense or the grammar of the passage to prefer the one reading to the other (many of which are transpositions), β seems to offer the more conventional or “polished” reading.³⁵ This suggests that β may have been an “edited” copy: that is to say, a copy whose scribe (or scribes) was authorized and encouraged to make certain types of amendments to the text, predominantly of a stylistic nature, to judge from the reviewed material. If β was such an edited copy, so that the scribe was to some extent actively looking for passages in need of amendment, and if it is assumed, as seems reasonable,³⁶ that the scribe was a competent conjectural critic, then a higher degree of separative significance is also required in order for an error in V not shared by β to warrant the conclusion that β is not a descendant of V. Supposing, then, that the scribe of β played the role of a copy editor rather than that of a mere copyist, it is not immediately clear whether the reviewed material contains any errors in V that may warrant the stated conclusion. Of the four relatively certain errors of transmission in V but not in M or A that were cited above as being of relatively high separative significance (2.8.32, 206.7– 8 διαπορθμεύει [M A : διαπορθμεύειν V]; 3.3.2, 270.6 μῆτις [M A : μή τις V]; 3.5.3, 308.7 ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς [V : αὐτὸ M A] καὶ τὸ [M A : deest in V] νοητόν; 3.13.4, 376.16 ἔχει [M A : deest in V]), it is perhaps the one in 3.5.3 that makes the strongest case. The situation there is difficult to explain in terms of scribal emendation, since neither V’s nor β’s text makes much sense as a whole, but both seem to preserve a part of the original lacking from the other. Still, the omission of the article in V’s text is such a conspicuous (and common) error that perhaps it is conceivable that the scribe of β could have emended it even as he committed a new error of his own. In addition, there are the two passages discussed in section 1.4.7: in 2.1.4, 102.6 β shares an inferior reading with Vac (and thus perhaps with V’s exemplar) against V1pc ; and in 2.1.28, 114.15 β’s inferior reading is unlikely to be a case of unintentional corruption (and thus likely to be either an authorial or archetypal error or a misguided correction). Neither of these is, however, impossible to explain on the hypothesis that β is a copy of V: the type of variant at play in 2.1.4 is one of the most common (ο/ω substitution), so the error may have arisen in β independently of the reading in V’s exemplar; in 2.1.28 the error might conceivably be the result of hypercorrection. All in all, I think it is a fair summary of the situation to say that there is no single disagree-

35 Cf. Borchert (2011, cxlv): “So weichen M und A/S in einer regelmäßigen Weise in Akzentuation und Worttrennung sowie im Gebrauch der Negation und der Modi von V ab. M und A/S bieten dabei überwiegend die mit den klassischen Regeln und Usancen übereinstimmende Lesart, während V dagegen verstößt.” See also ibid., clx–clxxiii. 36 Cf. Borchert (2011, clxxiii): “Angesichts dieser Stellen … ist über eine allgemeine inhaltliche Aufmerksamkeit hinaus mit einer erheblichen aristotelischen Kompetenz des oder eines Schreibers von β … zu rechnen, welche auch konjekturale Eingriffe der in den angeführten Beispielen festzustellenden Qualität als vorstellbar erscheinen lässt.”

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ment between β and V that definitely rules out β’s being a copy of V, but there are a small number of disagreements that are decidedly easier to explain on the hypothesis that β is independent of V. So, if the arguments in favour of β’s independence are inconclusive, are there any arguments in favour of β’s dependence on V? We have come across a few passages that might be harnessed to this end (2.2.2, 116.11; 2.11.3, 224.20; 3.1.15, 252.17, all discussed in sec. 1.4.7). Of these, perhaps 2.11.3 makes the strongest case: a nonsensical reading in β where V is partly illegible. Still, even here, the situation in V can only partially explain that in β: the scribe of β must also have suffered a momentary lapse of concentration at this point, in which case the error may arguably have arisen regardless of the reading in his exemplar. And if anything, an illegible letter in the exemplar is likely to sharpen rather than to dull the concentration of a scribe. Borchert (2011, clx–cxcvii) argues at length in favour of β’s dependence on V. His case is mainly built around a number of passages where Vac seems to have had the original reading and β agrees with Vpc (or, in one case, with a variant noted by a secondary hand in V) (2011, clxxvi–clxxxv). In addition, he presents a few examples of presumed secondary readings in β that, he suggests, may be explained as reactions to scriptural features of the original reading in V. The latter, I think, can all be safely disregarded. For one thing, the two more substantial examples are not necessarily secondary readings in β. (1) In the paraphrase of De caelo 2.13 we read: … ὥστε εἰ μὴ ἔστι φύσει κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία, οὐδὲ βιαία [V (‑α sl) : βία M A] ἐστί.

It is not clear whether there is any semantic or syntactic reason to prefer the one reading to the other. It seems reasonable to assume that ἔστι in the protasis and ἐστί in the apodosis have the same force. If the force is existential (“if there is no natural motion or rest …”), one might not expect the subject of the apodosis to take an attributive adverb, since it lacks an article (cf. Kühner & Gerth §462m, 1: 609–10); but if the force is existential, then φύσει must be attributive, although the subject of the protasis lacks an article, so why not βίᾳ? If, on the other hand (as is not unlikely, in view of εἰ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὅλως κτλ. in the preceding lines), the force is “modal” (“if motion or rest is not possible by nature …”), then βίᾳ seems necessary. Moreover, if the adjective is the original reading, then, since it is treated as a two-ending adjective seven lines earlier (εἰ μηδεμία φυσικὴ κίνησις ἔστιν, οὐδὲ βίαιος ἔστιν), it is unexpected to see it treated as a three-ending adjective in this passage, although it is true that the specifically feminine form also occurs elsewhere in the paraphrase. Besides, even if βίᾳ is a secondary reading, it is hard to see how its genesis could be explained by the scriptural features of βιαία in V, since, when βιαία occurs elsewhere in V (with the same scriptural features), β, too, has βιαία (and the same applies to other words ending in a supralinear α). (2) In the paraphrase of Physics 4.11 we read:

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Ὄτι καθὸ πέρας ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν τῆς ἑκάστοτε κινήσεως, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ πέρατι εἶναι τῆς κινήσεως· καθὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖ [S : ἀριθμεῖται M : ἀριθμοὶ V P L], ὁ χρόνος – θεωρούμενος κατὰ τὸ νῦν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον – ἔστιν ἀριθμός, ὡς ἀριθμούμενος, καθὸ διώρισται (“In so far as the now is a limit of the motion at any given moment, time is not a number (rather, it belongs incidentally to it to be a limit of the motion); but in so far as it [sc. the now] numbers, time – as manifested on the basis of the earlier and later now – is a number, in the sense of something numbered, in the manner specified”).

I think it is clear that V (f. 43v ) has ἀριθμοὶ, not ἀριθμὸς, as Borchert suggests (2011, clxxxv). So do P and L. I also think it is clear that this is an error. The most likely cause of the error is the confluence of homophony – supposing that the exemplar had ἀριθμεῖ – and the occurrence of ἀριθμὸς in the same position in the preceding line. With the punctuation above it should, in addition, be clear that the passage offers an interpretation of Ph. 4.11, 220a 21–22 – in which ἀριθμεῖ is a well-known crux – along the lines of Alexander of Aphrodisias as reported by Philoponus, In Ph. 738.27–28. If we were to read ἀριθμός for ἀριθμεῖ we would end up in either a combination of incoherence (what is the connection between the attributes of the now and the attributes of time?) and tautology (“in so far as time is a number, time is a number”) or a double case of mistaken identity (“in so far as the now is a number [and time is the now], time is a number”). M’s reading is perhaps a scribal emendation occasioned by mistakenly identifying ὁ χρόνος, rather than τὸ νῦν, as the subject of ἀριθμεῖ, which might easily happen in the light of the punctuation in the MSS (although we admittedly do not know how the passage was punctuated in β). As it turns out, then, this passage would seem, instead, to be another relatively strong indication of β’s independence of V. Turning to the cases where β shares an error with Vpc (or Vsl ) against Vac (or Vtext ), one has to admit that some of these are really quite perplexing. There are in particular two cases, in other respects quite different in nature, where there can be no doubt that the earlier reading in V is superior, but the whole remaining tradition agrees with the later reading in V. In the one (a) a secondary hand in V has noted a manifestly false variant above a perfectly reasonable reading in the paraphrase of De caelo 3.8: … καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὕδωρ λοιπὸν ὕδωρ ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἀήρ, ἄλλα [ἀλλὰ M P] σχήματα κατὰ τοὺς περιέχοντας τόπους μεταλαμβάνοντα [Vtext : -βάλλοντα V2sl : μεταβάλλοντα M A P L].

In the other (b) it looks as if the main scribe of V has altered a perfectly reasonable reading into a manifestly false one in the paraphrase of De generatione animalium 5.3: … ἐπειδὴ καὶ τἄλλα τὰ φυόμενα ἐν τοῖς βορειοτέροις μέρεσι σκληρότερα γίνεται καὶ λιθωδέστερα ἢ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νοτίοις, καὶ τὰ προσήνεμα, φησί, τῶν γινομένων ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις τόποις· ψύχεται γὰρ πλεῖστον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις [(ut vid.) Vac : ζώοις V1?ras M P L] ….

Two questions present themselves: (1) why were these false readings entered in V? (2) And why were they adopted in β? As to (1), Borchert (2011, clxxx) imagines that a reader has failed to understand the text in (b), drawn the conclusion that something

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is amiss, and proceeded to emend. To this one may object (pace Borchert 2011, cxciv) that the text in (b) is not difficult to understand. There must be literally hundreds if not thousands of passages in Metochites’ paraphrases more difficult to understand than this one, which have not been emended. The only difficulty here seems to be the one that results from the alteration. Moreover, for a misunderstanding to lead to a mangled text is perhaps standard procedure for many a modern editor of ancient and medieval literature, but the idea that any ordinary dunce in the Middle Ages should have felt authorized to correct a text whenever they encountered a minor stumbling-block would be truly terrifying – if it were plausible. Anyway, as noted above, the alteration looks to me to be in the main scribe’s hand, but I may be mistaken. Borchert does not explain why the false reading in (a) was entered in V, but his answer to question (2) is that the readings were copied from V. In fact, he envisages (2011, cxciv–cxcvi) the following scenario: (i) V was first copied from α; (ii) then β was copied from V; (iii) then α was revised; (iv) then V was revised on the basis of α; (v) then P was copied from V (and M was copied from β). One might have thought that stages (iii) and (iv) would have crucially involved the addition of about twenty-five sets of figures first in α, then in V, since most of these figures are absent from M and A, although present in P; however, Borchert recognizes that they seem to have been added in scribendo in V, and thus prefers to explain their absence from M and A by editorial decisions on the part of the scribe of β. Instead, stages (iii) and (iv) are postulated in order to explain why there are passages in which β agrees with Vac although Vpc is undoubtedly or very probably right. I will come to these in a moment. The false readings in the passages from the paraphrases of De caelo and De generatione animalium ([a] and [b] above) – as well as any other readings shared by Vpc and β – must accordingly have been introduced in V at a very early date, more precisely between stages (i) and (ii) in Borchert’s scenario. They were not, it may be noted, recorrected at stage (iv). One has to assume, then, that this monumental codex, destined to become the archetype of the whole textual tradition of the Grand Logothete’s Aristotelian writings, was handed over to the meddlesome reader, armed with his quill, as soon as the ink on its pages was dry. Other interventions in the text that must be dated to this stage, on Borchert’s scenario, include the erasures of καί after κἄν (see above, sec. 1.4.8, ad 1.5.39, 96.20) and a tiny number of other changes, all of which come across as astonishingly pedantic against the background of the unrelenting flow of linguistic and argumentative challenges that face any reader of Metochites’ work: the erasure of an indifferent τε, the insertion of an unnecessary article and the alteration of προχωροῦσα into προϊοῦσα, apparently to avoid repetition. No doubt these are normal changes – justifiable or otherwise – within the framework of a comprehensive stylistic revision, where they would be accompanied by hundreds of similar changes. That the first corrector of the work would have pounced upon these particular passages to the exclusion of all others, in contrast, beggars belief. There are, however, alternative answers available to the two questions raised above. To begin with (2), the false readings may be simple scribal errors in β. It is true

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that a rather high level of distraction on the part of the scribe is required for either to occur (especially the one in the De generatione animalium), but we have already seen other examples where this condition was clearly fulfilled (e.g. 1.1.18, 10.22; 1.2.24, 30.3; 1.2.32, 32.23; 1.3.34, 52.15; 1.5.15, 84.24; 2.1.11, 104.21 and 24; 2.3.7, 138.2; 2.5.19, 174.4; 2.7.5, 182.4; 2.8.25, 202.21; 2.10.4, 220.6; and not least 2.11.3, 224.20). And the textual changes mentioned in the previous paragraph, including the deletion of καί after κἄν, are, as already stated, entirely in keeping with the sort of editorial enterprise that β seems to have represented. As for (1), then, regardless of whether β was copied from V or from α, if it represented an edited – and authorized – version of the text, it would only be natural for V to be collated against it whenever the opportunity arose (even if admittedly there are no traces of systematic emendation of V on the basis of β). Both the genuine corrections and the scribal errors may thus have been introduced in V from β. This would explain, for instance, why -λαμβάνοντα in the De caelo passage was not expunged when -βάλλοντα was added above the line. -βάλλοντα may simply have been noted as a variant. Finally, we come to the cases where β shares an error with Vac against Vpc (see Borchert 2011, clxxxviii–cxc). If Borchert’s scenario corresponds to the facts, these corrections in V must have been carried out after stage (ii), presumably at stage (iv). But at least some of them seem indistinguishable in execution from the ones we have already discussed. Erasures, of course, may look similar today whether they were carried out six and a half or seven centuries ago (although it should be noted that all the erasures discussed by Borchert must have been carried out before P was copied). But the correction of λεγομένων into λεγομένου on f. 80r in the Physics paraphrase looks like it is in the main scribe’s hand, as does that of θερμὴν into θερμὸν on f. 258v of the De generatione et corruptione paraphrase (this is also conceded by Borchert 2011, clxxxix). And still β agrees with the errors in Vac . Admittedly, these are not errors of high conjunctive significance, but in so far as they indicate anything, it is that V and β are independent of each other and dependent on a common source. In sum, then, the situation is much the same on this as on the other side of the argument: there does not seem to be any single agreement between V and β that definitely rules out the latter’s independence of the former. More surprisingly, some of the agreements adduced in favour of β’s dependence on V have turned out on closer inspection to be easier to explain on the contradictory hypothesis. And there are still outstanding questions. For instance, if β represents, as everything seems to suggest, an edited version (and if, as seems likely, the undertaking, if not necessarily the actual result, had the author’s approval and support), why would it have been copied from V rather than from its exemplar, α? And what about the monogram in M (and W)? It is true, as Borchert says (2011, cliii–cliv), that the first folio of V has been repaired, possibly at an early date (but at any rate after Gregoras wrote the authorial attribution on its recto, since this is partly covered by the paper used for the repair), and its rebinding in the 1510s was evidently fairly heavy-handed, so it cannot with certainty

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be excluded that V, too, may once have carried the same monogram. Still, there is no trace of it now, and nor is it found in P or any other of V’s undisputed copies.

1.4.11 Sources for this edition Seeing that Borchert’s investigation, as meticulous and thorough as it is, has ultimately failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether or not β is dependent on V, it is perhaps not very likely that the question will ever be definitively settled. Our best hope is that a full collation of V’s, M’s and A/S’s texts of all of Metochites’ paraphrases will eventually bring to light some conclusive evidence, or at least tip the scales of probability decisively one way or the other. The collation of their texts of In De an. has failed to do so. The fortunate thing is that it does not matter all that much for the establishing of the text which hypothesis one plumps for. This is due, on the one hand, to the historical circumstances shared by V and β and, on the other, to the special character of β. The shared historical circumstances are the chronological and institutional proximity to the composition of the Aristotelian paraphrases and the resulting possibility that β contains authorial or at least authorized changes to the text. This means that each disagreement over more substantial matters must be judged on the merits of the respective readings anyway. The difference in this regard is only that if one assumes that β is independent, one will attach greater authority to it on the whole, and as a consequence probably adopt a greater number of its readings. The special character of β was touched upon in the preceding section. To all appearances, it represents an edited version of the text. This means that when it comes to less substantial matters, such as orthography and the finer points of grammar and style, the chances are that V will follow the original more closely, even if β is its sibling. And by and large it seems reasonable to aim at reconstructing the original with respect to such matters, in spite of the likelihood that the edited version is the text that the author himself wished to bequeath to posterity. Readers in our time and age (notably scholars) have a legitimate interest in knowing how the author actually expressed himself in writing, idiosyncrasies and all. That being said, there is no need to take this policy to the extreme: it would be perverse, for example, to insist on printing outright spelling errors featured in V but not in β (especially since, whatever the relation between V and β, it is always possible that the errors are due to a scribe). In brief, then, my pragmatic way of dealing with the situation has been to try to judge each variant reading offered by any of the three main MSS (and in more substantial matters also any variants offered by P) on its own merits, and to follow V wherever the variants seem more or less “indifferent” (i.e. where there is no compelling reason to prefer the one to the other(s) in terms of content, grammar or lexicon), but select all and only those readings in β that seem clearly superior. For a more detailed account of my ratio edendi, see section 3.1.

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1.5 Stemmata codicum To reflect our genealogical stalemate, I have prepared two stemmata, one of which (a) I think is on balance better supported by the available evidence, and one of which (b) is roughly the one suggested by Borchert (I have modified his own stemma [2011, cxcvi] so as to accommodate the objections raised above). The dashed lines represent possible rather than necessary influence. Corrections in the later MSS are not accounted for. Note also that the descendance of Hervet’s translation from U rather than R has not been proven, even if it is likely. (a) ω α

(corr.)

β V

M

P

A

L U

E Q

B/W

R

G Hervet

O

1.6 Suspected authorial errors | CXXI

(b) ω α

(corr.)

V1

β

V2 P

M

L

A U

E Q

B/W

R

G Hervet

O

1.6 Suspected authorial errors Finally, here is a list of all those suspected errors that seem more likely to go back to the original than to have arisen in the course of transmission. 1.3.1, 38.3 (V118v P128r M223v A190v ) … ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖν φησιν εἶναι [V P M A : delere velim] προηγουμένως μήποτε ψεῦδός ἐστι ….

Either δεῖν or εἶναι (in the “modal” use described below, sec. 2.3.3) is appropriate; both at the same time is adoleschia. If it is an error of transmission, εἶναι is more likely to have been added than δεῖν. But it may well be an authorial lapse, which is why no word has been bracketed in the text. 1.3.25, 48.7 (V121r P130v M225v A192r ) εἶτα διελὼν τὴν κύκλῳ ταύτην φορὰν διὰ τὸ βάθος [τὸ βάθος V P M A : τοῦ βάθους malim] αὐτῆς εἰς δύο τὰς ἀντικειμένας φοράς, ….

For the required spatial sense I would have expected the genitive after διά, but, again, it is difficult to know whether Metochites would have felt the same. Since, furthermore, a similar scribal error would have had to be committed twice in order to get from the genitive to the accusative, it is likely that the accusative was in the original. Possibly

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this is an example of the language of classical tragedy having established itself as a pattern for learned Byzantine prose. 1.4.11, 62.15 (V124r P133v M228r A194v ) καὶ ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν [V P M A : τὸν αὐτὸν malim] ἔστι, φησίν, ἀπορεῖν – τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα – φάσκοντα ….

It would be distinctly odd to emphasize Empedocles’ name when the preceding paragraph was also taken up by a response to him. We would expect καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔστι, φησίν, ἀπορεῖν Ἐμπεδοκλέα φάσκοντα …, just as in 1.4.10, 62.13 we have ὁ αὐτὸς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς …. But in view of the widespread irregularities in the use of αὐτός (see below, sec. 2.3.2), and since the presupposed corruption would consist in a transposition over four words, it is better to let the text stand. I have punctuated as if αὐτὸν is the personal pronoun with τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα in parenthetical apposition, but it could also be demonstrative. 1.4.28, 72.6–7 (V126v P136r M230r A196r ) ταῦτα γὰρ πάθη – εἴτουν ἐνέργειαι – κοινῶς τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, εἴτουν τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ ἐμψύχου, καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος [τοῦ ἔχοντος—σώματος V P M A : τοῦ σώματος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος malim] ἐκεῖνο ….

What the text should mean is clear: these affections belong to the compound animal; that is, they do belong to the body that possesses a soul, but only in so far as it possesses a soul. Whether the transmitted text could mean this is not so immediately clear. One could envisage adding dashes around αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, as if it were in apposition to τοῦ ἔχοντος … ἐκεῖνο, but this would be extremely awkward. The transposition suggested in the critical apparatus restores a more natural word order, but the presupposed corruption is perhaps a bit too complicated to carry conviction. This is, however, not the only instance in In De an. with a similar word order (i.e. article + attributive + article + noun) (cf. sec. 1.4.8 ad 1.2.28, 32.1 and 2.12.4, 238.7, and below ad 2.1.21, 110.21), and it is perhaps not unlikely that it reflects a contemporary development in the vernacular (see sec. 2.3.1). At any rate, the phenomenon is too common in the work to be explainable by postulating errors of transmission in every instance. 1.4.35, 74.15 (V127r P136r M230v A196v ) ἐὰν γὰρ μόνον σῴζοιτο [V P M A : σῴζηται malim] τὸ ποσόν – εἴτουν ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν μονάδων – καὶ ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις τοῦ Δημοκρίτου ….

This is one of two instances in In De an. (the other one is 2.9.10, 214.4, for which see below) in which a conditional clause introduced by ἐάν has the optative. I have hesitantly retained the transmitted text in both instances, partly because a scribal error is not so likely in the present case. See also ad 3.1.3, 244.16 and 3.10.5, 346.8–9 below, as well as sec. 2.3.4 (Conditional clauses). 1.4.40, 78.3 (V127v P137r M230v –231r A197r ) πῶς δὲ ἄρα καὶ νοοῖντο [ἄν addere velim : deest in V P M A], ὡς τοῦτο καθόλου πᾶσι δοκεῖ, χωρισταὶ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ ψυχαί;

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There are two instances of the (potential) optative without ἄν in main clauses in In De an. The other instance (φήσειε in 1.5.36, 94.19) is easily explained as a scribal error (for φήσει). This one cannot be dealt with so readily. Possibly it is another example of the language of classical tragedy, where the potential optative without ἄν sometimes occurs in questions (Kühner & Gerth §395.6, 1: 230), having made inroads into learned Byzantine prose (cf. ad 1.3.25, 48.7 above). 1.5.8, 82.18 (V128v P138r M231v A198r ) ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς δι’ ὧν ἕκαστα τῶν συνθέτων ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν στοιχείων συνίσταται καὶ οὐσι οῦται, ἵνα κἀντεῦθεν [V P M A : κἀνταῦθα malim] τῇ ὁμοιότητι τῶν λόγων γνωρίζῃ τὰ ὅμοια, ἤτοι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς τῶν συνθέτων καὶ αὐτά γε μὴν τὰ σύνθετα.

This is one of a small number of cases (cf. 1.5.21, 82.18 and perhaps 1.5.24, 88.21–22) where there seems to be some confusion between ἐνταῦθα (“here; in this case”) and ἐντεῦθεν (“hence; for this reason”). This may be due to scribal errors, but one could also envisage an idiolectal extension of ἐντεῦθεν into a general deictic adverb of manner (“thus; in this way”). 1.5.21, 86.23 (V129v P139r M232r A199r ) οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι· οὐ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἐν ἁπάσαις ψυχαῖς ἐνυπάρχον ἐντεῦθεν [V P M A : ἐνταῦθα malim] ὁρίζεται καὶ δηλοῦται. See ad 1.5.8, 82.18 above. 1.5.25, 90.1 (V130r P139v M232v A199v ) ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑκάστης ἐναντιώσεως τὸ ἓν μόνον μέρος ἔχουσαν [V P M A : ἔχον malim] οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια αὐτῷ γινώσκειν ….

The sentence is ungrammatical. The suggested emendation is a closer paraphrase of Aristotle’s text (411a 3–4): “For what possesses only one member of each contrary pair is capable of knowing not only that member and those things that are similar to it”; a grammatically more coherent way of conveying what seems – judging from the feminine participle – to be Metochites’ interpretation would be “ἱκανὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑκάστης ἐναντιώσεως, καὶ ἓν μόνον μέρος ἔχουσα, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια αὐτῷ γινώσκειν …” (For even if it possesses only one member of each contrary pair, it [sc. the soul] is capable of knowing not only it [sc. that member] and those things that are similar to it …). Still, there is probably no reason to suspect any error of transmission here. 2.1.15, 108.3 (V134r P143v M235v A202r ) ὃ δὴ φυσικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔτι ἀκριβέστερον ὑπογράφων ὑποτίθεται καί φησι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ὀργανικόν, ὡς εἶναι [V P M A : οὖσαν malim] ἐντελεστέραν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπογραφήν, εἴ τις λέγει ταύτην ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι φυσικοῦ σώματος δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος ὀργανικοῦ ….

As is clear from the conditional with its general third-person subject, the phrase introduced by ὡς should express the grounds on which Aristotle adds ὀργανικόν to the “delineation” of the soul, not the intended (or factual) result of adding it. It is not unlikely, however, that Metochites added the conditional as an afterthought, without

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fully realizing its impact on the range of reasonable interpretations of the phrase that it modified. 2.1.19, 110.6 (V134v P143v M236r A202r ) πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ εἶναι [καὶ τοῦ εἶναι delere velim (cf. infra vv. 4–5) : adsunt in V P M A] (λέγεται γὰρ ἓν τῷ γένει, λέγεται καὶ τῷ εἴδει, λέγεται καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, λέγεται καὶ τῷ δεσμῷ ἕν, εἴτουν κόλλῃ εἴτ’ ἄλλῳ τῳ – καὶ ἔτι καθ’ ἕτερα ἄττα λέγεται τὸ ἕν, ὡς τὰ περὶ τοῦτων Ἀριστοτέλης διορίζεται καὶ παραδίδωσιν ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά), ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι λεγομένου καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, κυρίως καὶ μάλιστα τὸ ἓν εἶναι πέφυκέ πως οἰκείως λέγεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ἐντελεχείας τῶν συντιθεμένων

The first καὶ τοῦ εἶναι is obviously superfluous. Still, there is no reason to doubt that it was in the original. There is a similar, but milder, anticipation in 2.1.7 (102.23 and 104.1). 2.1.21, 110.21 (V134v P144r M236v A202v ) οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἁπλῶς σώματος ἡ ἐντελέχεια ψυχή ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ οὑτωσί πως ἔχοντος τοῦ [V P M A : delere velim] φυσικοῦ ….

οὑτωσί πως ἔχοντος should specify the relevant σῶμα φυσικόν, so according to the rules of classical grammar the article should not be repeated. On the other hand, unorthodox use of the article is rife in In De an. (cf. ad 1.4.28, 72.6–7 above), and it is not unlikely that the present case reflects a contemporary development in the vernacular (see sec. 2.3.1). I have left the text as it is, while translating as if it were emended. 2.2.5, 118.7 (V136r P145v M237r A203r ) … φησὶν ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν [τῶν συλλογισμῶν hic habent V P M A : transponere velim post αὐτὸ τὸ (συμπέρασμα) v. 2] αὐτὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὸ θεωρούμενον τέλος ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις δηλοῦσι, τινὲς δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ δηλοῦσιν ….

In the transmitted text τῶν συλλογισμῶν is most naturally taken as a partitive genitive with ἔνιοι. But this makes no sense, since ἔνιοι must refer to the ὁρισμοί previously discussed. Instead, τῶν συλλογισμῶν should be a possessive genitive with τὸ συμπέρασμα, preferably placed either between the article and the noun or after the noun. It is possible that it has been dislocated, but still more likely, perhaps, that it has simply been infelicitously placed by the author. 2.3.6, 136.20 (V140r P149v M241r A205v ) … ἃ καὶ κατὰ τόπον ἐστὶ κινητικὰ καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ διανοητικὰ δοκεῖ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἶναι (ἀπαθῆ μέν γε ἄλλως [ὄντα addere velim : deest in V P M A] καὶ ἀνενδεῆ τροφῆς καὶ αὐξήσεως) ….

Unless the participle is added the phrase is most naturally taken as a continuation of ἔμψυχα καὶ διανοητικὰ … εἶναι and thus as part of the reported doxa (“[the heavenly bodies] are considered by the philosophers to be ensouled and capable of reasoning, although otherwise impassible and free from the need of nourishment and growth”), which is possible, although, I think, less apposite than to take it with ἃ καὶ κατὰ τόπον ἐστὶ κινητικὰ (“they are capable of locomotion, and considered by the philosophers to be ensouled and capable of reasoning, although they are otherwise impassible …”).

1.6 Suspected authorial errors |

CXXV

However, Metochites may have meant it to be understood this way even without the participle. 2.3.7, 138.6 (V140r P149v M241r A206r ) … οὕτως οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινὸν «ἡ ψυχὴ» ἄλλο τι παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος – ἤτοι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πρώτου – κατὰ μέρος καταλαμβανόμενα, ἃ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριθμεῖται, οὐ [V P M A : οὐδὲ malim] συνωνύμως, ὡς εἴρηται, κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορούμενον ….

With οὐδὲ we have an elliptic clause coordinated with the preceding elliptic clause (οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινὸν «ἡ ψυχὴ» ἄλλο τι παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος … κατὰ μέρος καταλαμβανόμενα), and τὸ κοινὸν «ἡ ψυχὴ» is the subject in both, which makes perfect sense: the general term does not refer to a distinct thing besides the particular soul forms, nor is it synonymously predicated of the particular soul forms. With οὐ we have a participial phrase modifying αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα (the mere name under which the particular soul forms are ranged, which is not synonymously predicated of these). In the final analysis the meaning will be much the same, but with οὐ it is expressed in a much more convoluted and obscure way. Still, it is by no means impossible that the transmitted text is what Metochites intended. 2.4.10, 146.16 (V142r P151v M243r A207v ) καὶ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἡ φύσις τὰ ὀργανικὰ σώματα πρὸς τέλος τὸ οὗ κατασκευάζει [πρὸς addere velim : deest in V P M A] (τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτήν), πρὸς τέλος δὲ τὸ ᾧ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ σύνθετον ….

τὴν ψυχήν αὐτήν could be taken (in parallel with πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ σύνθετον) as a direct modifier of κατασκευάζει, with πρὸς τέλος τὸ οὗ in apposition (“nature constructs the organic bodies with a view to the soul as a goal in the sense of objective”), but as the text stands it has to be the other way around: τὴν ψυχήν αὐτήν must be in apposition to τέλος τὸ οὗ. The meaning will again be similar, but the expression is more convoluted and open to misconstrual. Still, it is by no means inconceivable that this is what Metochites intended. 2.4.18, 150.18–19 (V143r P152v M243v A208r ) … ἀπὸ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἔναρξις [ἐστιν ἡ ἔναρξις V P M (ἔναρξις A1sl : ἀρχὴ Atext ) : ἔχει τὴν ἔναρξιν malim (sc. ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχή, cf. Them. 51.26–27)] προχωροῦσα εἰς τὸ γεννητικόν ….

A has ἀρχὴ in the text and ἔναρξις above the line. It is tempting to think that this might have originated in ἐστιν ἡ ἔναρξις αὐτῇ [sc. τῇ φυτικῇ ψυχῇ], which might then have been followed by προχωρούσῃ; but there is no trace of αὐτῇ (or, for that matter, ἀρχὴ) in M. The notion of a proceeding beginning has little to recommend it, even though the general sense is clear enough. This is based on Themistius 51.26–27, who simply says “ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρχεται μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τρέφειν, τελευτᾷ δὲ εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν”. Still, it is by no means inconceivable that the transmitted text is what Metochites intended. 2.4.21, 154.5 (V143v P153r M244v A208v ) τὴν γὰρ τροφήν, ἤτοι ἄρτον ἢ βρῶμα ὁτιοῦν, πεττόμενα, ἤτοι μεταβάλλοντα καὶ γινόμενα [πεττόμενα—μεταβάλλοντα—γινόμενα : numerum singularem, genus

CXXVI | 1 Textual Tradition

vel femininum vel neutrum, exspectaveris] ὅπερ τὰ τρεφόμενα, ποιεῖν τὴν πρόσθεσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τρεφομένοις ….

The lack of concord is quite natural: the author sets out to speak about nourishment in general (collectively) but changes focus midway to consider it in relation to the individual things that are nourished by it (distributively). A very similar situation is found in 3.12.7, 364.18–20, where τὴν τροφήν is the antecedent of a neuter plural relative pronoun. 2.5.8, 166.2 (V146r P155v M246r A210v ) τοῦ γὰρ φωτιστικοῦ καταλαβόντος [V P M A : fort. legendum καταλάμποντος (cf. Phlp. 297.6)], αὐτίκα πάντα φωτὸς πλήρη ….

The transmitted text is perfectly fine as it is, but it is at least a noteworthy coincidence that the corresponding passage in Philoponus reads “ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φανῆναι τὸ φωτιστικὸν ἀθρόον πᾶν τὸ ἐπιτήδειον καταλάμπεται …”. Metochites may have considered writing καταλάμποντος, only to realize that a near homonym would fit the bill just as well. 2.5.16, 172.12 (V147v P156v M247r A211v ) διὸ νοεῖν μὲν ἔστιν ἔχοντας τὴν ἕξιν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν κινουμένους, καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντας τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἄλλως ὅτι μὴ ἔξωθεν [κινουμένους addere velim : deest in V P M A] καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ἑκάστοτε αἰσθητῶν.

It is true that the continued parallelism of the two infinitive clauses may aid in suggesting to the reader what word must be mentally supplied in the second clause, but κινουμένους in the first clause is by then so far behind that its addition also in the second clause must surely have been intended, whether or not it was actually entered in the original. Could be an error of transmission, but more likely, perhaps, an authorial oversight. 2.6.5, 178.19 (V148v P158r M248v A212v ) μάλιστα δέ, φησίν, ἀντιλαμβάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστῃ, οὐ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῃ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἢ τὸ κοινόν. ἀλλ’ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει [fort. addendum τὰ κοινά τε : desunt in V P M A] καὶ τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητά· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν αἰσθητά ….

2.6.2 discusses the common perceptible objects, 2.6.3–4 the special perceptible objects. In 2.6.5 follows a discussion of coincidentally perceptible objects. If the transitional clause introducing the latter in the MSS had been ἀλλ’ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητά I would have had no objections, even though the immediately preceding sentence seems to sum up the whole discussion in 2.6.2–4 (this transitional clause would then have corresponded to καὶ τὰ μὲν κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα in 2.6.3, 176.23–24). But ἀλλ’ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει καὶ τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητά does not seem right. Either καὶ ought to be deleted or τὰ κοινά τε added. The former may be a smaller intervention, but the latter yields a better meaning. (Another possibility is to substitute a different verb for ἔχει, e.g. διώρισται.)

1.6 Suspected authorial errors |

CXXVII

2.7.23, 190.14 (V151r P160v M251r A214v ) τὸ δὲ μέσον αὐτὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτὸς καλεῖν φησιν ὀνόματι· κεκλῆσθαι [V P A : κεκλεῖσθαι M : κέκληται malim] δ’ ὅμως καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ὕστερον «δίοσμον».

Aristotle obviously does not himself say that the medium of smell was called “transodorant” by later writers. However, Themistius does say (61.31–32) that the designation is owed to the commentators and not to Aristotle. Themistius is sometimes cited in In De an. as if he were Aristotle (e.g. φησίν followed by a paraphrase not of Aristotle but of Themistius, as is basically the case in the former half of the quotation above: Aristotle only says that the medium of smell is nameless); but if this is what has happened here, it is remarkable that the author does not seem to have realized the absurd implication. 2.8.5, 194.10 (V152r P161r M251v A214v ) Ὅτι τὴν ἠχώ φησι γίνεσθαι ὅταν ὁ πληγεὶς ἀὴρ εἷς ὢν καὶ μὴ διατεθρυμμένος ἔν τινι σκληρῷ [V P M A : στερεῷ malim (ut infra vv. 194.15 et 22; Them. 63.33; Prisc. 141.12; 141.14; cf. tamen Phlp. 360.32; 361.3)] γενόμενος λείῳ ἢ [καὶ malim (ut Prisc. 141.12; 141.14)] κοίλῳ, εἴτε ἄντρῳ εἴτε ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ … γενόμενος λείῳ ἢ κοίλῳ ….

The air should enter into some smooth and hollow solid, as is clear from Themistius and Priscian’s accounts, on which Metochites’ text seems to be closely based (cf. also 2.8.6, 194.15–16: ὅταν ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀὴρ εἰς λεῖα καὶ στερεὰ ἐμπέσῃ ἀντιφράττοντα, καθώς, φησί, τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτός, and 2.8.7, 194.21–22: ἐν μέντοι ταῖς προσβολαῖς τοῦ φωτὸς ταῖς γινομέναις πρὸς στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα). There are three principal ways to account for the occurrence of σκληρῷ (hard, resistant to touch) instead of the expected στερεῷ (solid). One is that Metochites simply treated σκληρός as semantically interchangeable with στερεός. This seems less likely, since Metochites must have been relatively well-versed in mathematical terminology even before he began his astronomical studies and there is no other evidence for this phenomenon (it is true that σκληρός is substantivized a few more times in the In De an., but in the six other occurrences in his printed works it is an adjective meaning “hard”, literally or figuratively, whereas στερεός is usually substantivized and means “solid, three‐dimensional figure”). The second possibility is that the repeated combination of the two words in the preceding sections (2.8.1–4) unconsciously induced him to substitute the one for the other. The third possibility, of course, is that σκληρῷ is a scribal error for στερεῷ. Why “smooth” and “hollow” are presented as alternatives (ἤ rather than καί) – clearly both the smoothness and the hollowness are needed to produce an echo, as stated in Priscian’s account – is a different matter, possibly the result of a scribal error. 2.8.10, 196.11 (V152v P161v M252r A215r ) ὅταν δὲ εἷς ὢν καὶ συνεχὴς ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀντιτύπων πλήξῃ ἐν ἑνὶ γινόμενος ἐπιπέδῳ [ἐν ἑνὶ γινόμενος ἐπιπέδῳ V P M A : fort. legendum ἐν λείῳ γινόμενος ἓν ἐπίπεδον ἔχοντι vel. sim. (cf. supra 2.8.5 et Them. 64.7–10)] καὶ μὴ διατεμνόμενος ὡς εἰς σκληρὰ ἄνισα, πάντως ἐντεῦθεν ἐμπίπτων ἐμποιεῖ τοὺς ψόφους.

CXXVIII | 1 Textual Tradition

The transmitted text may be an attempt to say in four words what the suggested emendation says in six, but it is just barely comprehensible, especially in view of the contrast with the several uneven hard things. Possibly there is some corruption involved, but it seems more likely that the passage is simply a manifestation of Metochitean deinótēs. 2.8.23, 202.10 (V153v P163r M253r A215v ) οὐ μέντοι γέ ἐστι τὸ [V P M A : collocare velim ante ὀξύ v. 2 (secundum Arist. 420a 32)] ταχύ, φησίν, ὀξύ, οὐδὲ τὸ [V P M A : collocare velim ante βαρύ v. 3 (secundum Arist. 420a 32)] βραδὺ βαρύ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὀξὺ γίνεται διὰ τὸ τάχος, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ διὰ τὴν βραδυτῆτα.

Assuming that the terms are not ambiguous (each term sometimes denoting an abstract quality, sometimes its bearer, or sometimes denoting a phenomenal quality, sometimes its physical cause), this passage seems to (a) deny that if something is quick it is also high-pitched (“sharp”) and to (b) affirm that if something is high-pitched, the cause of this is quickness (and similarly for the properties of slow and low-pitched). That is all well and good, except for the fact that Aristotle in 420a 31–33 states the converse of (a): “it is not the case that what is high-pitched is quick … (but the motion [of what is high-pitched] becomes such as described on account of quickness)”. The reason for this is of course that his concern here is with explaining what high pitch is rather than with establishing which things are high-pitched. Anyway, the passage in Aristotle is obscure and Metochites is obviously rushing through it. Its content would hardly be clearer with the transpositions suggested, but at least the paraphrase would follow the paraphrased text. Still, it is perhaps unlikely that a scribe would inadvertently make two transpositions of this kind in the span of a line. On balance, probably an authorial mistake. 2.9.3, 208.16 (V155r P164v M254v A217r ) μόνον δ’ ἔχει ἐν τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὴν [V P M A : καθ’ αὑτὴν malim] αἰσθητοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη τοῖς μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖσθαι ….

The personal pronoun for the reflexive even in a case like this may well be a feature of the author’s idiolect (see below, sec. 2.3.2), so unless the hypothetical scribal error is very easy to commit (e.g. merely the wrong breathing mark), the text should probably be considered authentic. Cf. the next entry (2.9.4, 210.6). 2.9.4, 210.6 (V155v P165r M254v A217r ) ἀτονοῦσα φυσικῶς πρὸς τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν [V M A : καθ’ αὑτὴν malim] αἰσθητῶν μόνῳ τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ ἀνιαρῷ διαστέλλει ταῦτα …. See ad 2.9.3, 208.16 above. 2.9.5, 210.16–17 (V155v P165r M254v A217r ) … ἡ δὲ ἀλώη [V M A : ἁλώη  P : ἀλόη malim] καὶ τὸ λιβανωτὸν καὶ ὁ στείραξ [V P M A : στύραξ malim] ὡς μὲν γευστὰ πικρὰ καὶ ἀηδῆ, ὡς δὲ ὀσφραντὰ ἡδέα ….

Unconventional spelling of two exotic commodities (a global TLG search for στείραξ returns no hits). Probably authorial errors.

1.6 Suspected authorial errors | CXXIX

2.9.6, 210.23–24 (V155v P165r M255r A217r ) καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως εὐφυῶς ἔχοντα μέγα συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν [καὶ – φρονεῖν V P M A : corrupta videntur (nescio utrum pro τὰ—ἔχοντα legendum τὸ—ἔχειν an pro συμβάλλεται legendum διαφέρει)].

This makes little sense. I can think of two simple remedies, either of which would work well in the context: (a) καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως εὐφυῶς ἔχοντα μέγα διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν; (b) καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως εὐφυῶς ἔχειν μέγα συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν. It is possible that the author started with the intention of writing (a) and lapsed into (b). In any case, it is not very likely to be a scribal error, so the text is best left to stand. 2.9.10, 214.4 (V156r P165v M255v A217v ) οὔτε γὰρ ἐκπνέοντα δύναται ὀσφραίνεσθαι οὔτε, ἐάν τις αὐτὰ τὰ ὀσφραντὰ ἐνθείη [V P M A : ἐνθῇ malim] ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν πόρων τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ὀσφραίνεσθαι αὐτῶν ….

This is one of two instances in In De an. with the optative in a conditional clause after ἐάν (the other one is in 1.4.35, 74.15, for which see above). There is almost the reverse situation in 3.6.7, 314.16 (see sec. 1.4.2). The present case could well be a scribal error, but since this is less likely to be the case in 1.4.35 I have retained the transmitted text in both cases (see also ad 3.1.3, 244.16 below). 2.10.6, 220.16 (V157v P167r M256v A218v ) … τὸ ποτὸν ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄποτον· γεῦσις [V P M A : ἀμφοτέρων addere velim (habent tamen in 422a 32 ἀμφότερα codd. Arist.)] γάρ ἐστι καὶ γευστὰ ἀμφότερα, τὸ μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ὡς φθαρτικόν.

It certainly looks as if something has gone amiss here. But in fact the passage just transmits a probable error common to the whole textual tradition of the De anima, where all MSS have γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφότερα in 422a 32: καὶ γευστὰ has been added by way of explanation, from Philoponus (404.17–18). It is clear from τὸ μὲν … τὸ δὲ in line 3 that ἀμφότερα refers to τὸ ποτὸν … καὶ τὸ ἄποτον, which is why any impulse to supply τοῦ ἀγεύστου after τὸ ἄποτον in line 1, on the strength of Philoponus 404.14– 15, is misguided. 2.10.9, 222.7 (V157v P167r M256v A218v ) ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, μὴ [V P M A : οὐχ malim] ὑγρὰν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ταύτην, ἀλλ’ οἵαν δύνασθαι ὑγραίνεσθαι σῳζομένην ….

As is clear from the preceding paragraph as well as the following argument, the negated word is ἐνδέχεται rather than εἶναι (ὅπερ ἐλέγετο refers to the words οὔτε ξηρὰν ταύτην ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὔτε ὑγρὰν ἐνεργείᾳ in 2.10.8, 222.4–5). Consequently, this is more than just a case of μή with the indicative in a main clause: since the negative particle will most naturally be taken with the infinitive, the sentence will yield the wrong meaning (“it is possible for the tongue not to be actually wet”, rather than “it is not possible for the tongue to be actually wet”). Most probably an authorial error.

CXXX | 1 Textual Tradition

2.11.7, 228.3 (V158v P168r–v M257v A219v ) τοῦ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἱκανὸν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ὅτι μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν τῶν εἰρημένων διαφόρων ἐναντιοτήτων καὶ ὡς ἓν αἰσθητήριον ἡ σὰρξ πίστις καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ γεῦσιν [V P M A : γλῶτταν malim (secundum Arist. 423a 17)] ἁφῆς ….

The argument for a real distinction between taste and touch is really based on the double duty of the tongue (but no other part of the flesh) as an organ of both. It is true that γεῦσις can be used metonymically of the tongue, but if that is how it is supposed to be understood here, the problem is that the next sentence (228.3–4) explains it – in apparent contradiction to the thesis argued – as a sense activity (or capacity) related to both kinds of perceptible object. Still, the likelihood is perhaps that Metochites used γεῦσιν instead of γλῶτταν, for the sake of variatio, and then lost control of the argument. Cf. ad 3.13.4, 376.14 below. 2.11.11, 230.7 (V159r P168v M258r A220r ) Ὅτι μετὰ ταῦτα λοιπὸν σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεται ὡς δοκεῖ μέν τισιν ἡ ἁφὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις ἀμέσως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν καὶ μὴ διά τινων μέσων …, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ εἶναι [V P M A : ἔστι malim] τοὐν μέσῳ καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον.

This is probably another example of improper use of the declarative infinitive due to carelessness on the part of the author. εἶναι and its arguments can only be the subject of δοκεῖ μέν τισιν; but if εἶναι and its arguments are the subject of δοκεῖ μέν τισιν, then the author is ascribing two contradictory views to the reported thinkers; but the view expressed by εἶναι and its arguments is in fact Aristotle’s, so it should be expressed either in a clause coordinated with δοκεῖ μέν τισιν and governed by ἀποφαίνεται or (more likely in view of τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ and the general presumption, in a paraphrase of an Aristotelian work, that Aristotle’s view is correct) in a clause coordinated with ἀποφαίνεται. Another possibility is that εἶναι is in fact the indicative (εἶναι third person singular/plural indicative appears in vernacular texts from, respectively, the eleventh/twelfth [sing.] and twelfth/thirteenth [plur.] centuries [Holton & al. 2019, 3: 1725]). 2.12.1, 236.10 (V160v P170r M259r A221r ) τῶν γὰρ ὁρατῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν … καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν … καὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ αἴσθησις· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς δόξειεν ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις οὐκ [V P M A : delere velim] ἀχωρίστως τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αὐτῆς αἰσθητῶν.

This is one of several mistakes involving double negatives. It is very likely authorial. It is actually rather surprising that not more of these have been corrected in β, M or A. I have considered making an exception to the rule of leaving more or less certain authorial errors uncorrected, since in a case like this the emendation could be signalled in the text by the presence of square brackets. This would, however, be in conflict with the restricted conventional use of square brackets to enclose words that were in the archetype but not in the original. Cf. below ad 3.8.6, 334.13; 3.10.5, 346.14; 3.12.5, 364.8.

1.6 Suspected authorial errors | CXXXI

2.12.6, 238.20 (V161r P170v M259v A221v ) … ὅτι μηδὲ ἔχει τι λόγον ἀρχῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχον καὶ μέσον πως [M A : πῶς V P : ὡς malim (nisi forte pro διατίθεσθαι v. 3 legendum est διατιθέμενον)] πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰ ἐναντία διατίθεσθαι ….

The best one can do with the transmitted text is probably to take τι as the subject of ἔχει, construe the latter with διατίθεσθαι, and let ἔχον be a circumstantial – let’s say causal – participle in agreement with τι: “since neither can anything in them, having the function of a principle and a roughly intermediate position, be modified relative to both contraries”. But this is extremely strained and does not follow the paraphrased text (424b 1–2) particularly closely. Most likely the intended subject of ἔχει are the “things that are acted upon by perceptible objects in conjunction with their matter” mentioned in the preceding main clause. The first suggested emendation (changing πως into ὡς) would translate as “since they also do not have anything with the function of a first principle in them(selves), which is intermediate, so as to be modified in relation to both contraries”; the second (changing διατίθεσθαι into διατιθέμενον) would translate as “since they also do not have anything with the function of a first principle in them(selves), which is disposed as a rough intermediate to both contraries”. With both these emendations ἐν αὐτοῖς would have to be taken as a reflexive, and we would have μηδὲ with the indicative in a causal clause, but both of these features seem to be within the boundaries of the author’s idiolect. The second emendation could perhaps find some support in Themistius 78.32–34 (and Philoponus 440.13–15). I suspect, however, that the author is to blame for the situation. 2.12.7, 238.24 (V161r P170v M259v A221v ) … τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὡσαύτως ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύναμίν τινα μέσον [ἔχουσαν (vel οὖσαν) addere velim : deest in V P M A] ἔχειν καὶ ἀντιληπτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ….

From the transmitted text it looks as if μέσον is used adverbially (= ἔσω), but since the apprehension of contraries is mentioned, and in the light of the preceding and following passages, we would expect something to be said about the intermediate state in which the capacity for perception must be. Accordingly, I have translated as if μέσον is a predicate noun with δύναμιν, which is perhaps admissible. Most likely there is no error of transmission involved, simply careless writing. 2.12.7, 240.5 (V161r P170v M259v A221v ) οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πάσχει ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἔχει τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔχει ᾗ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ μέσως [V P M A : μέσον malim] πως ἔχον καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰ ἐναντία ἀντιληπτικὴν γνωστικῶς ….

To make sense of the transmitted text one has to construe ἔχον both as an intransitive verb with μέσως πως and as a transitive verb with δύναμιν as its direct object. The suggested emendation removes this syntactic awkwardness while preserving the approximate meaning of the sentence. Another possibility would be to read δύναμις for δύναμιν (and ἀντιληπτικὴ for ἀντιληπτικὴν): “in so far as it is perceptive, roughly

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intermediate and a capacity …”. Again, the situation is more likely to be caused by careless writing than by errors of transmission. 2.12.10, 242.3 (V161v P171r M260r A222r ) ὥσπερ ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστων τάχιστα πάσχει – τῶν ὁρατῶν, τῶν ἁπτῶν [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere ἀκουστῶν], τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ….

This is clearly a slip on the part of the author: air is only a medium for the objects of the distal senses. All in all, there is a lot to suggest that the final chapter of In De an. 2 was written in haste. 3.1.3, 244.16 (V162r P171v M260v A222v ) καὶ γὰρ δή, φησίν, εἴ τις ἂν [V P M A : delere velim] ἐλλείποι ὡντινωνοῦν αἴσθησις, πάντως καὶ τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν ταύτης ὄργανον, εἴτουν αἰσθητήριον, ἐκλείπειν ἀνάγκη ….

There are two instances in In De an. of the optative in a conditional clause introduced by ἐάν (1.4.35, 74.15 and 2.9.10, 214.4, for which see above) and three instances of the optative with ἄν in a conditional clause introduced by εἰ (the other two are in 3.10.5, 346.8–9, for which see below). There are also a couple of instances of the optative with ἄν in a temporal clause (see the following entries, ad 3.1.14, 252.3 and 3.1.15, 252.12). All of these are suspicious, but on balance more likely than not to have been in the original (see below, sec. 2.3.4, Conditional clauses). 3.1.14, 252.3 (V163v P173v M262r A223v ) ἔστι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς ὅταν ὑπὸ τῆς ὁράσεως καταληφθείη [V P M A : καταληφθῇ exspectaveris] τόδε τι μὴ μόνον ὡς ξανθὸν ὁρατὸν ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ πικρὸν ἢ γλυκύ ….

This is one of two instances of the optative in a temporal clause introduced by ὅταν (the other is in 3.1.15, 252.12). There is also an instance of the optative with ἄν in a temporal clause introduced by ὅτε (1.1.12, 8.14–15, after emendation). All these clauses have it in common that they express fictional states of affair, in the two ὅταν-clauses to exemplify the application of a concept, in the ὅτε-clause to introduce a possible objection. The author may have had his reasons for using the optative with ἄν in such contexts. 3.1.15, 252.12 (V163v P173v M262r A224r ) ἕτερος δὲ ὡς ὅταν [V1sl ] φαίη [V P M A : φῇ exspectaveris] τις τὸ προσιὸν καὶ ὁρώμενον εἶναι λευκόν …. See ad 3.1.14, 252.3 above. 3.1.15, 252.19 (V164r P173v M262v A224r ) ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατᾶσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τρόποις τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ὑπονοεῖν ψευδῶς τὸ θεωρούμενον τόδε ξανθὸν εἶναι ὅπερ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ποτε πρότερον ᾐσθάνθη ὡς γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, μὴ ὄν γε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς· ἔστιν [V P M A : ἔστι δ’ malim] ὡσαύτως καὶ ἰδόντα τόδε τι τὸ λευκὸν ὑπονοεῖν εἶναι ὃ πρότερον κατενόησε ….

It is possible that ἔστι δ’ has been corrupted into ἔστιν, but more likely that it is a case of rhetorical asyndeton, even if it is difficult to see the motivation behind it. There are other cases in In De an. of similar asyndetic enumeration.

1.6 Suspected authorial errors | CXXXIII

3.1.18, 254.16 (V164v P174r M263r A224r ) ἵνα μὴ τὰ προειρημένα κοινὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς θεωρούμενα δόξειεν ἴσως οὐχ ὡς κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ὡσαύτως θεωρούμενα, ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλουθα [καὶ ἀκόλουθα hic habent V P M A : collocare velim post κοινὰ εἶναι v. 2 (cf. Arist. 425b 5– 6)] καὶ ὡς ἕν τι αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον τῇ αἰσθήσει ….

The common perceptible objects are correctly perceived as concomitant with the special perceptible objects, and if they were perceived as the same as the special perceptible objects they would not be perceived as concomitant with them – although, as Aristotle says in 425b 8–9, the reason why they would, if there were only one sense, be perceived as the same as the special perceptible objects is that they are concomitant with them. One is loath to admit that Metochites must have completely misunderstood his sources regarding such a relatively trifling matter. If a scribal error had seemed more plausible, it would have been easy to opt for charity. There is approximately a line’s length between κοινὰ εἶναι and αὐτὰ εἶναι, so some kind of parablepsis is imaginable, but in order for such a forward transposition to occur the scribe would have had to lose his place at least twice. Probably, then, an authorial mistake. 3.3.15, 276.18–19 (V169r P179r M267r A227r ) … φησί· τὸ νοητικόν, ἐπεὶ διεστειλάμεθα ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι – τούτου τὸ μέν ἐστι φαντασία, τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις [φησί— ὑπόληψις anacolutha esse videntur (φησὶ τὸ νοητικόν, ἐπεὶ διεστειλάμεθα ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, τὸ μὲν εἶναι φαντασίαν, τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψιν vel sim. malim)] ….

This is most likely just a case of careless writing. The MSS punctuate as if τούτου belongs to τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, but I fail to see to what the reference would be: sense perception is not a topic in the preceding sentences. 3.3.26, 282.24 (V170v P180v M268v A228r ) οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως ἡ αἴσθησις κριτικὴ ἢ ὡς ὁρᾷ, οὔτε ἡ δόξα ἄλλο τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ψευδής – δηλονότι τῆς προτέρας ἀληθείας [δηλονότι—ἀληθείας hic habent V P M A : collocare velim post ἐστὶ v. 2] – ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ ….

The explanatory parenthesis must belong with ἄλλο τι, which is obscured by the interposition of καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ψευδής. But it is by no means impossible that the transmitted text is what the author wrote: there are several other examples of awkwardly placed explanatory phrases and clauses in In De an. (e.g. 3.7.11, 328.2–3; 3.10.16, 352.11–12). 3.3.34, 288.16 (V171v P181v M269v A229r ) μετείληφε δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κυριωτέρας αἰσθήσεως, τῆς ὄψεως [ἡ φαντασία addere velim : desunt in V P M A], ἧς τὸ ὄνομα, φησίν, ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους, ὅτι μηδ’ ἔστιν ἄνευ φωτὸς ὁρᾶν.

As it stands, the text seems to suggest, nonsensically, that it is the word ὄψις that is derived from φάος. It is true that if one should accept that ἡ φαντασία must have dropped out, one would have a problem with αὐτὸ in line 1. With the transmitted text this could be an anaphoric personal (or demonstrative) pronoun (see below, sec. 2.3.2),

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the antecedent of which would be τὸ φανταστικόν (the last word in the preceding sentence). After the suggested emendation it would have to go, as an emphatic pronoun, either with τοὔνομα (which makes good sense, but the hyperbaton is rather violent) or with τὸ φαινόμενον (which makes tolerable sense, perhaps, seeing that it draws attention to the pun). It must be admitted, however, that to an inattentive reader the paraphrased text (429a 2–4) may seem to convey precisely the nonsensical meaning suggested by Metochites’ paraphrase. On balance, then, since the omission of a foursyllable noun plus article is a relatively major corruption, it is perhaps more likely that the error is authorial. 3.4.22, 300.24 (V174v P184r M272r A230v ) ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν τὰ νοητὰ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τελειωτικὸν [V P M A : τελείωσις exspectaveris, sed cf. supra 2.7.6] τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ νοῦ ….

Odd as it may seem to describe the activity of thinking as being what brings about the full development (or “perfection”) of the intellect’s potentiality (rather than being that full development itself), it is of course in a way both; there is a parallel in the description of light in 2.7.6, 182.14–15 as, on the one hand, the actuality of what is transparent and, on the other hand, what brings about its full development. No need to suspect corruption. 3.4.26, 304.1 (V174v P184v M272v A231r ) ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐνύλων νοητῶν, ὧν ἀχώριστός ἐστιν ἡ ἀντίληψις τῆς αἰσθήσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ἐμφύτου [V P M A : συμφύτου malim (cf. tamen supra 2.8.11–19, ubi utramque vocem in eodem sensu usurpat auctor)] φαντασίας ….

συμφύτου would be more apposite for the relation between imagination and sense perception, but in 2.8 Metochites uses ἔμφυτος and σύμφυτος interchangeably for the air inside the ear, which is naturally connected with the sense of hearing: Aristotle and the commentators only use συμφυής in this context (ἔμφυτος is used by the commentators mainly for innate heat). 3.5.5, 308.19 (V175v P185v M273r A231v ) οὐσία γὰρ αὐτοῦ ταυτὸν καὶ ἐνέργεια, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει – ἄλλο τι ὂν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ἐνέργειαν – ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε μεταβατικῶς καὶ διεξοδικῶς χρώμενος πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ ἀθρόον πάντα ἔχων [V P M A : ἔχει malim] τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ πάντα ….

The last phrase needs to be parallel to the whole preceding clause, not just to the immediately preceding participial phrase. That is to say, it should not be a modifier of the subject of οὐ μεταβάλλει, since this means that the productive intellect does not change by using a discursive procedure, but by having all the forms etc., when surely it is not supposed to change at all. This could be a scribal error, but it seems more likely that the author simply lost track of the construction of the sentence. 3.6.10, 318.19 (V177v P187v M275r A233r ) γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος νοός, καὶ πρῶτον πάντως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιοῦντος [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere ποιουμένου (vel πάσχοντος vel γινομένου)].

1.6 Suspected authorial errors |

CXXXV

Clearly an error, and more likely to be authorial than scribal. A salutary warning, in any case, against overestimating the diagnostic skills (or ambitions) of the scribes of V and β. 3.8.6, 334.13 (V180r P191v M277v A235r ) διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἴδεσίν ἐστι τὰ νοητά, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη, οἷον σχήματα, χρώματα, κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ ὑγεία καὶ τοὐναντίον, μορφαὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις συμβαίνει μὴ ἀχώριστα [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὰ] εἶναι δυνάμενα τῆς ὕλης, τῷ δὲ νῷ χωριζόμενα καὶ λόγῳ διαιρούμενα.

This is one of several errors (no doubt authorial) involving double negatives with ἀχώριστος. Cf. ad 2.12.1, 236.10 above. In this case, of course, bracketing the negative particle is not an adequate solution (since it negates δυνάμενα). A scribal error is unlikely. Cf. also ad 3.10.5, 346.14 and 3.12.5, 364.8 below. 3.10.5, 346.8–9 (V182r P193v M279v A236v ) εἰ γάρ τινα δύο, φησίν, ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴη ἂν [delere velim : adest in V P M A] αἴτια, καθ’ ἕν τι πάντως κοινὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἴτια τοῦ ἑνός· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἄλλο τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλο αἴτιον ἂν [delere velim : adest in V P M A] εἴη τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς πράγματος, οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη πάντως αἴτιον ὡς ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλου ….

These are two of a total of five instances in In De an. of the optative with ἄν in a conditional clause. Two of these five clauses are cases of ἐάν with the optative (cf. ad 1.4.35, 74.15 and 2.9.10, 214.4 above). The remaining one is in 3.1.3, 244.16 (for which see above). I have left the text as it is in all these passages, but not without hesitation. The main reason is that the presupposed scribal errors are not always so easy to explain: in this passage, for instance, the same illicit addition would have to have been made twice in the course of a line or two. See also sec. 2.3.4 (Conditional clauses). 3.10.5, 346.14 (V182r P193v M279v A236v ) εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐ φαίνεταί πως κινῶν ἀχώριστος [V P M A : sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὸς] ὅλως τῆς ὀρέξεως· βουλὴ γὰρ καὶ βούλησις αὐτοῦ πρακτική ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ δὲ βούλησις, ὡς εὔδηλον, ὡς ὄρεξίς τις …. See ad 2.12.1, 236.10 and 3.8.6, 334.13 above (cf. also 3.12.5, 364.8). 3.10.16, 352.11–12 (V183r P195r M280v A237v ) τοίνυν ἐοικέναι τοῦτό φησι τῇ περὶ τὸ κέντρον τοῦ κύκλου κινήσει· ἠρεμοῦντος γὰρ τοῦ κύκλου [V P M A : forsan vult dicere κέντρου (licet infra v. 352.17 circulus quiescere dicatur)] γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ κίνησις [ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ κίνησις collocare velim post κύκλου2 (vel κέντρου) v. 2] – ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως τῇ ἀποστάσει τοῦ κέντρου καὶ τῷ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ διαστήματι – καὶ περὶ ὃ ἡ κίνησις (περὶ γὰρ τὸ κέντρον ὁ κύκλος κινεῖται καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ περιστρέφεται καὶ τρόπον τινὰ φέρει).

A difficult passage. The antecedent of ἀφ’ οὗ is obviously τοῦ κύκλου. One may have wished for the relative clause to start immediately after the antecedent, but it may have been deliberately postponed for the sake of the parenthesis explaining why the motion starts from the referent of the antecedent (ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως …), similarly to the parenthesis explaining why the motion takes place around the referent of the

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antecedent of περὶ ὃ (περὶ γὰρ τὸ κέντρον …). It seems that the antecedent of περὶ ὃ and the antecedent of ἀφ’ οὗ must be identical. But it is clear from the latter explanatory parenthesis that the intended antecedent of περὶ ὃ is τοῦ κέντρου. And in fact the former explanatory parenthesis strongly suggests that the intended antecedent of ἀφ’ οὗ, too, is τοῦ κέντρου. It seems likely, then, that τοῦ κύκλου is an error for τοῦ κέντρου. This may be a scribal error (repeating τοῦ κύκλου five words earlier: Manuel of Corinth made a similar mistake – immediately corrected – a few lines down) or it may be an authorial one. Or it may perhaps not be an error at all: a few lines down the circle is said to be at rest as a whole, although it rotates [around] the centre with respect to its parts. 3.12.5, 364.8 (V185r P197r M282r A238v ) ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐμψύχων – οἷα τὰ φυτά – οὐ δύναται δέχεσθαι τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης οὐδ’ ἀχώριστα [οὐδ’ ἀχώριστα V P M A (οὐδ’ ut vid. A1pc ) : sine dubio vult dicere οὐδὲ χωριστὰ] ταύτης ἀλλ’ ἐξανάγκης μετὰ ταύτης, ἀδύνατον εἶναι ταῦτα αἰσθητικά. See ad 2.12.1, 236.10 and 3.8.6, 334.13 above (cf. also 3.10.5, 346.14). 3.12.7, 364.19 (V185r P197r M282v A239r ) αὐτόθεν γὰρ ἔγγιστα συμπαροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν τροφὴν ἐξανάγκης (ἐξ ὧν [V P M A : ἧς exspectaveris, sed cf. 2.4.21] καὶ πέφυκε καὶ οὐσίωται διὰ τῶν δεδομένων ὀχετῶν καὶ διόδων τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὑπηρετικῶν μορίων) …. See ad 2.4.21, 154.5 above. 3.12.9, 366.14 (V185v P197v M282v A239r ) τίνι γὰρ ἔσται βέλτιστον [V P M : βέλτιον A (fort. recte)] ἡ αἴσθησις, τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ σώματι;

Whether Manuel of Corinth corrected the text on the basis of his Sprachgefühl or on the basis of Arist. 434b 5, the superlative here is strange. Still, it is more likely than not to have been in the original. 3.13.4, 376.14 (V187r P199r M284r A240v ) … καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθήσεων [V P M A : αἰσθητῶν malim] ἐνίοτε γίνονται βλαβεραὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων αὐτῶν μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ζῴου αὐτοῦ ….

Aristotle’s discussion (435b 7–19) is about the possible destructive impact of the extremes of perceptible objects, although not necessarily qua perceptible objects, since – except for tangible and tasteable objects – it is unclear to what extent these act on bodies (cf. De an. 2.12, 424b 9–13). Accordingly, in his discussion in De an. 3.13 Aristotle consistently speaks of the extremes of perceptible objects. Metochites himself repeatedly says, in the context of the present passage (drawing mainly on Priscian), that it is not qua perceptible objects that the extremes of the several perceptible objects may have their destructive impact. The sudden mention here of the extremes of sense perceptions is therefore rather unexpected. Also in the context of the present passage, however, Metochites uses the terms ἁφή and γεῦσις where we might expect him to speak of tangible and tasteable objects: these terms could perhaps be used metonymically for the objects in question (although cf. 3.2.10, 260.4–6), but the present passage suggests that there may be some more profound confusion at play. In any case, this is not so likely to be an error of transmission.

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3.13.4, 376.19 (V187r P199r M284r A240v ) καὶ τοῦτ’ εὐλόγως ἕπεται· πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ [καθ’ αὑτὸ V P M A : κατ’ αὐτὸ malim] αἰσθητήριον φθείρει ….

The subject of the clause is feminine, so any direct reflexive pronoun should be feminine. But since the antecedent of αὑτὸ is not πᾶσα … ὑπερβολὴ – there are no sense organs for the extremes of perceptible objects, as one may surmise from the fact that these extremes tend to destroy the sense organs there are – but αἰσθητοῦ, αὑτὸ should not be a reflexive pronoun. Still, in view of the general disregard of the distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns in the work (see sec. 2.3.2), the lapse is most likely authorial.

2 Form and Content of Metochites’ In De anima 2.1 Nature and purpose Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases fill some 1200 folio pages in V. They cover every book of every treatise in the corpus aristotelicum from the Physics to the De generatione animalium (Bekker pages 184–789), except for, on the one hand, the spurious De mundo and De spiritu and, on the other, the Historia animalium. It is clear from the outset that the composition of such a massive and in some sense systematic work must have been a carefully planned enterprise. It is by no means the only large-scale systematic exposition of Aristotelian philosophy preserved from the early Palaiologan period. Leaving aside Leon Magentenos’ commentaries on the Organon, which should probably be backdated to the early to mid twelfth century,¹ there are, to begin with, George Pachymeres’ works: the Philosophia, a compendium in twelve books of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy, was written c. 1285–1295;² a series of more extensive “exegetical” commentaries on the Organon, the Physics, the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics may date from the following decade.³ Around the same time Sophonias composed his paraphrases of the Categories, the Prior Analytics, the Sophistici elenchi, the De anima and parts of the Parva naturalia.⁴ To these may be added, even if they transcend the strictly Aristotelian realm, such philosophical compendia as Nikephoros Blemmydes’ Epitome logica and Epitome physica (final version c. 1260), not to mention the Synopsis variarum disciplinarum, a.k.a. Encyclopaedia (c. 1326), by Metochites’ friend and contemporary Joseph Rhakendytes, whose parts on logic and natural philosophy are drawn from Blemmydes’ two Epitomae as well as Pachymeres’ Philosophia.⁵ Certain aspects of Metochites’ enterprise are no doubt to be understood against the background of the encyclopedic tastes and aspirations of his time. Whether his

1 For a review of the evidence, including the date of the oldest manuscript, Vat. gr. 244 (Diktyon 66875), see now Agiotis (2021, xxxiii–xxxviii; lxi–lxii), who concludes that it is “eminently reasonable to consider the period prior to 1185 or even the first half of the twelfth century as being a more suitable floruit for this scholar’s writing activities”. 2 Several books of the Philosophia have appeared in critical editions in the Academy of Athens’ series Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina. For the date of the work, see Pappa (2002, 16–17), who cautiously sets it between 1285 and c. 1307, and Golitsis (2007, 63–64), who argues for a date before 1296. 3 On Pachymeres’ “exegetical” commentaries, see Golitsis (2007). 4 On Sophonias, see Searby (2016). The Parva naturalia paraphrased by Sophonias are Mem., Somn. Vig., Insomn. and Div. Somn. 5 The date of the Encyclopaedia may be inferred from a reference in a letter to Joseph from Nikephoros Gregoras (Ep. 22 Leone), written between May 1326 and May 1328. On Joseph’s work, see Gielen (2013). For the dates of Blemmydes’ Epitomae, see Lackner (1981). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-203

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decision to write on Aristotle’s natural philosophy has anything to do with the fact that three complete series of commentaries on the Organon had already been published in the long century before he set to work is a matter for speculation. But the very comprehensiveness of the enterprise is clearly no accident. In his Proem, Metochites explains that part of his purpose has been to make it “possible for any random person to have to hand everything by Aristotle about his views on existing things and nature in general as well as in particular”.⁶ He emphasizes that he has taken pains to collect it all in a single volume.⁷ He repeatedly asserts that the enterprise has been motivated by his “humanitarianism” (φιλανθρωπία).⁸ Unfortunately, Metochites is not very specific about who the prospective beneficiaries of his humanitarian efforts may be, except that they are “lovers of the noblest and most important things” – including “learning” – and, of course, that they suffer.⁹ One may at least surmise that the actual beneficiaries would have been not so much struggling philosophy students as gentlemen scholars like Metochites himself, who could afford to own a copy of his work and use it as a reference volume. As we know, the circulation was limited: only four extant MSS – two of which contain only half the work – belong to the fourteenth century (see sec. 1.1). Alongside his humanitarian virtue‐signalling, Metochites stresses more than once that he expects his work to be useful, no less so to the author himself than to others (11.25; 12.16–20; 12.26 DL). But he also addresses an anonymous dedicatee, who was presumably presented with a copy, sarcastically predicting – if I interpret him correctly – that the Aristotelian paraphrases will prove a more valuable asset to the dedicatee in the future than the dedicatee’s contributions to Metochites’ own “everyday prosperity” have been in the past.¹⁰ The dedicatee may have been Metochites’ rival at court, Nikephoros Choumnos, or – much less likely, I think – his student, Nikephoros Gregoras.¹¹ We know that both men read at least parts of the paraphrases.¹² Another early reader, as Metochites himself informs us in

6 τάχα γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐξέσται παντί γε ὁτῳοῦν ἐκ τῆς παρούσης συντάξεως ἔχειν ἅπαντα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς περὶ πάντων, ὅσ’ ἔδοξεν ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τῇ φύσει καθόλου τε καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστα … (12.10–11 DL). 7 … καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ σύνταγμα … (11.29–30 DL); … ὧς ἄρα δὴ συνεσκεύασται ἡμῖν πάνθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ ἐκτέθειται, ἢ μᾶλλον ἔγκειται πρὸς ἑτοίμην τὴν χρῆσιν … (12.15–16 DL). 8 The catchword φιλάνθρωπος and cognates occur five times in two pages in the Proem (11.7, 11.14, 11.16, 12.8, 12.31 DL) and once (v. 313 Cunningham & al.) in the twenty-four lines of Carm. 12 devoted to the Aristotelian paraphrases. 9 … τοῖς τῶν καλλίστων καὶ μεγίστων ἐρασταῖς … (11.25 DL) … τοῖς φιλομαθέσιν … (11.30 DL) … καὶ κάμνουσιν ἴσως ἐνίοις … καὶ μὴ ῥᾷστ’ ἐποπτεύουσι … τοῖς ἀπορωτέροις … (12.2–6 DL). 10 … καὶ ἴσως οὐκ εὐπεριφρόνητόν σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονος ἀμέλει λόγου, ἢ ὅσα κομιδῇ πλεῖστα βιωτικῆς εὐκληρίας φθάσανθ’ ἡμῶν παρεσκεύασταί σοι … (12.29–31 DL). For the interpretation, see Bydén (2019, 101–2 n. 52). 11 Cf. Borchert (2011, xxxi–xxxii); Bydén (2019, 101–2 n. 52). 12 Choumnos’ reaction was to suggest, with ill-concealed irony and in a highly polemical context, that a monument with Metochites’ effigy should be erected “at the Peripatos”, bearing an inscription to the effect that Metochites knows the titles of all of Aristotle’s writings and that these writings are “his

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the short section on the Aristotelian paraphrases in his self‐promotional Carmen 12 (vv. 303–26) from the late 1320s, was the church historian Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos, who “repeatedly expressed his admiration” for the work.¹³ The intended readership, then, will have consisted of these men and their peers. What did Metochites think he could do to relieve their suffering? He resolved, as he puts it – acknowledging the forbidding character of Aristotle’s treatises on natural philosophy, which is due, he says, both to the depth and complexity of their content and to the fact that they are deliberately couched in impenetrable language,¹⁴ and imagining that some lovers of learning were “struck by a vehement desire to follow Aristotle’s laborious paths to philosophy” but forced by the “labyrinthine and impassable” character of these paths to stop and turn around –,¹⁵ “to provide some kind of aid … by summarizing, in commentaries, [Aristotle’s] secrets in a very succinct way and laying them bare for ready access by those who love what is most noble and important”.¹⁶ Three key selling points of the Aristotelian paraphrases advertised in the

lustrous treasure, which he borrows and hoards from here, there and everywhere” and keeps “revising, rearranging and remodelling”, as so many others have done, for no obvious purpose, except to pass for Aristotelians themselves (Πρὸς τοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας …, 375–76 Boissonade). Gregoras, on the other hand, praised his mentor for having elucidated both “the celestial paths of the heavenly bodies and the rational principles subject to coming-to-be and passing-away”, indeed, for having “served them up like a kind of convenience food for everyone” (Ep. 22.83–94 Leone, to Joseph Rhakendytes; Ep. 23.66– 78 Leone, to Metochites himself), with clear reference to the Stoicheiosis astronomike as well as the Aristotelian paraphrases. This verdict must be read in the light of other, even more excessive, displays of adulation on Gregoras’ part. The Aristotelian paraphrases are also coupled with the Stoicheiosis in a brief passage in Gregoras’ funeral oration over Metochites (Roman History 1: 478.16–18 Schopen). 13 τὸν μὲν ἄρα πόνον ἡμέτερον τόδε σύνταγμά μοι | πολλὸν ἀεὶ σύ γε θωύμασας ὥς κεν μάλ’ ἔοργα (vv. 318–19 Cunningham & al.). 14 … τοῦτο μὲν βαθύνουν καὶ πολύστροφον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ λογικαῖς ἐργασίαις, καὶ θαυμαστὸν οἷον ὑψίνουν τε καὶ ἠκριβωμένον πάνυ τοι διὰ τῶν λεπτοτάτων αὐτῶν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἔτ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπίτηδες, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως, ἐπιμελῶς ἠσκημένον τῷ ἀνδρὶ δυσθήρατον καθάπαξ καὶ δύσληπτον, καὶ ἀνήμερον κομιδῇ καὶ δυσπρόσιτον, ἐπιβούλῳ σκοπῷ καλύπτον τἄνδον τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀόρατα, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἅμα τῶν τρόπων καθόλου καματηρὸν καὶ δύσκολον ἐνταῦθα χρῆσθαι, καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀνόδευτον καὶ δυσδιεξίτητον τοῖς ἐπειγομένοις (11.17–21 DL). In this last suggestion, Metochites is only following the ancient commentary tradition, where the reasons for Aristotle’s obscurity is one of ten questions to be settled before studying Aristotle’s works. See Hadot (1990, 113–22). For Metochites’ own views on Aristotle’s obscurity, see Bydén (2003, 61–69). It is especially noteworthy in this connection that Themistius, in the preface to his paraphrase of Posterior Analytics 2, a text whose influence is detectable both in Metochites’ Proem and in the well-known programmatic preface to Sophonias’ De anima paraphrase, refers to the fact that many of these “appear to have been designed for concealment” (1.16–17) in a bid to justify his own conception of a new kind of treatise on Aristotle’s works: what we call the Aristotelian paraphrase. 15 ὅσοις τοι τοὺς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπελθεῖν ἀγῶνας καὶ δρόμους εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἔρως μὲν τάχα σφοδρὸς ἐπιγίνεται, πονηρῶς δ’ ἔχει τὰ τῆς διεξόδου σφίσι, καὶ τὸ λαβυρινθῶδες ἐνταῦθα καὶ δυσδιέξιτητον ὀκλάζειν ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἀποτρέπεσθαι … (12.8–10 DL). 16 … ἔδοξα γοῦν βοήθειάν τινα … πορίσασθαι … δι’ ὑπομνηματισμῶν ὁριστικῶς εὖ μάλ’ ἐπιτέμνων παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ γυμνῶν τἀπόρρητα τοῖς τῶν καλλίστων καὶ μεγίστων ἐρασταῖς … πρὸς τὸ τῆς χρήσεως

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Proem are that they are comprehensive (11.28–29; 12.10–11 DL), clear (11.29 DL) and concise (11.24–25 DL). A fourth is, as I have already mentioned, that they are all collected in one volume (11.29–30 DL). These features, Metochites assures us, will enable any user effortlessly to look up Aristotle’s views on any given subject (12.10–15 DL). The convenience and ease of use of the work are also emphasized at 12.1–2 DL (the predicate verb – ἔδοξα – is found at 11.26 DL) and 12.5–6 DL. Comprehensive as they are, Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases are of course by modern standards not particularly easy to use. Even contemporary readers may have felt that they fell short in this respect of the standard set, for instance, by Pachymeres’ Philosophia. Pachymeres rearranged his material according to topics, divided it into books, chapters and sections, which he numbered, and attached a descriptive heading to each section. Metochites’ Aristotelian paraphrases lack all these facilities apart from a rather erratic division into unnumbered sections. As a consequence, his cross‐references come in three grades of precision: “in the nth book of the treatise on so-and-so”, “previously/later in this book/treatise” and “elsewhere”. And only those readers who already know in which of the forty paraphrased books Aristotle expressed his views on the subject of their interest will be saved the trouble of perusing the best part of 1200 pages in order to “look them up”. New sections of In De an. are marked in V, P and M by a hard punctuation mark (:– in V; : + in P; : in M), a line break and the conjunction Ὅτι, normally with a rubricated initial capital (in V and P, but not in M, the breathing and the accent are also normally in red ink). Strictly speaking this indicates that the first sentence in each section is dependent on an understood ἰστέον or σημειωτέον (“nota bene”). The sections are of uneven length, from a mere three lines (1.1.40) up to almost five pages (2.1.1–17) in this edition. Their thematic unity is not necessarily very strong. As for conciseness, it is true that the Aristotelian paraphrases are considerably shorter than the fully-fledged “exegetical” commentaries on the same works, but they are still on average two to three times as long as the paraphrased Aristotelian texts.¹⁷ The extra space is to a large extent taken up by words and phrases more or less semantically equivalent to those used by Aristotle and introduced by the particle combinations ἤτοι, εἴτουν or ἤγουν (there are on average two to three such integrated glosses per printed page), as well as by short examples, often borrowed from the an-

ἕτοιμον (11.22–25 DL). Patristic usage of ὁριστικός, which is likely to have evolved from both of the two technical senses of “definitional” and “indicative” (grammatical mood), seems to combine or oscillate between the meanings of “clear”, “brief”, “straightforward” and “descriptive”. For the adverb, see, e.g. (pace Lampe, s.v. p. 973), ?Basil of Caesarea, De baptismo libri duo 1516.14; 1517.15; 1517.23 et passim. 17 At c. 62,000 words Metochites’ paraphrase of the De anima is in fact longer than Themistius’, although slightly shorter than Sophonias’, and shorter still than each of the two “exegetical” commentaries (counting Philoponus’ on books 1–2 and Ps.‐Philoponus’ on book 3 as one commentary for the sake of convenience). Metochites may have compared his Aristotelian paraphrases specifically with works of the latter type.

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cient commentators, and often introduced by the relative adverb οἷον (roughly one per printed page). Earlier discussions are frequently briefly recapitulated, or at least cross‐referenced, with the phrases ὡς εἴρηται, ὡς διώρισται, or the like (see further below). In particular, new sections tend to begin with a transitional sentence, which briefly recapitulates the results of the preceding section, often in the form of a prepositional phrase or a participial phrase (“having determined x and y …”), and introduces the topic now under consideration (“… he next wants to investigate z and says …”). It is obvious, on the other hand, that Metochites deliberately avoids any extensive digressions from the Aristotelian text under consideration. He has hardly exploited any material of this character in his subsidiary sources, neither from Philoponus, where it is very abundant, nor from the other ancient commentators, where it is less so. When, for example, Philoponus, in commenting on 1.5, 411a 26–b 3 (193.2–195.24), seizes the opportunity to discuss the implications of that passage for his own conviction that Aristotle recognized a substantial difference between the rational and the irrational souls and ascribed immortality only to the former, there is no trace of this in Metochites; but when Philoponus returns to the topic in connection with 1.5, 411b 14–19 (199.23–200.6), Metochites copies his remark that Aristotle’s words seem to imply that the intellect is separable, and “if it is separable, it is inevitably also imperishable”, only to add, characteristically: “Anyway, staying on the original topic of the discussion, …” (1.5.38, 96.6–7). Similar reminders that the argument must be resumed after a brief departure occur, e.g. at 1.3.16, 44.11; 2.2.12, 122.6; 2.10.9, 222.7; 3.6.9, 318.1–2; 3.6.11, 318.21; 3.13.2, 374.11. The policy just described is not, however, strictly enforced. A few digressions do occur, for instance in 1.2.18–22, where Plato’s theory of number is summarized and applied to his psychology, following the lead of the ancient commentators, who all (including Themistius) add an amount of extraneous material in commenting on 1.2, 404b 18–21. And the inspiration to expatiate does not always derive from the ancient commentators. Witness 2.5.9–10, where Aristotle’s straightforward but Solomonic solution, in 2.5, 417a 18–20, to the age-old dilemma of whether perception is of what is like or what is unlike (it is of both: “what is unlike is affected, but when it has been affected it is like”) receives such a complicated exegesis that Aristotle’s text looks like a brilliant summary by comparison. No ancient commentator wastes more than six lines on clarifying this passage. Another feature that adds bulk to Metochites’ paraphrase is repetition. In 1.2.36–39, for instance, we are told no less than four times in twenty lines that Anaxagoras is an exception to the rule that all previous natural philosophers supposed that the soul consists of the first principles in order to be able to know “like by like”. And in 2.10.4 the three ways in which things can be “invisible” are enumerated, as a template for the ways in which things can be imperceptible by the other senses, with only small variations on the preceding enumeration, which came as recently as in 2.9.8. True as it may be that clarity and conciseness are sometimes hard to reconcile, for a self‐confessed summarizer Metochites does appear to be unusually, perhaps unnec-

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essarily, prolix. One may argue that George Scholarios’ epitomes (see above, sec. 1.3.1), since they are about six times shorter than the originals, also come correspondingly closer to embodying the virtue of conciseness claimed by Metochites in his Proem. Whether they are also easier to follow than the originals is a matter of opinion, but they were certainly praised for their clarity by Jugie, their modern editor.¹⁸ The fact that Metochites’ convoluted style with its sometimes unusual diction and its frequent affronts to Attic grammar may be every bit as difficult to understand as Aristotle’s allegedly impenetrable prose is possibly more of a problem for us than it was for Metochites’ contemporaries, but I would not bank on it. On some aspects of the language of In De an., see below (secs 2.3 and 3.2). There is some ambivalence in the literature as to the correct classification of the Aristotelian paraphrases. Are they really paraphrases, or perhaps rather commentaries?¹⁹ One thing that may seem self-evident, but perhaps deserves pointing out all the same, is that there are, from a purely formal point of view, no hard and fast boundaries between the genres of paraphrase and (continuous or “exegetical”) commentary. Even in the earliest surviving commentaries on Aristotle’s works, those by Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, paraphrase is an integral element,²⁰ and conversely, Themistius’ excursus on the productive intellect in his De anima paraphrase is as “exegetical” as anything one might come across in a continuous commentary. Aristotelian scholars in the Palaiologan period were very much prone to formal experimentation, in the sense that they happily combined literary features normally associated with different genres. Sophonias is often held up as an example of this, but that is only because he himself, in the preface to his De anima paraphrase, offers a binary classification of all the previous secondary literature on Aristotle as either “paraphrastic” or “exegetical”, and professes to have preserved the virtues and eradicated the vices of both categories in his own work. There can be no doubt that Sophonias’ classification oversimplifies the situation, not only on account of the porous boundaries between the two genres, but also because “exegetical commentaries” come in many different styles and formats, as attested by Simplicius’ survey in the preface to his Categories commentary (1.8–2.29).²¹ Metochites, too, eludes Sophonias’ dichotomy. He does not, for instance, “take on the role of Aristotle”, so as to expound the Philosopher’s views in the first person, which is considered by Sophonias as a distinctive mark of the paraphrase (In De an. 1.11–12). His preferred style is the third-person report, lavishly sprinkled with

18 “Ici encore, la qualité maîtresse qu’admire le lecteur est la clarté, et ce n’est pas un mince mérite chez un abréviateur d’Aristote” (Jugie & al. 1936, v). 19 Borchert (2011) wisely sidesteps the issue by calling them “paraphrastische Kommentare” (see also his discussion, ibid. xlii–xlv). 20 D’Ancona 2002, 224; Fazzo 2004, 8–11. 21 On Sophonias’ classification and the literary features of Aristotelian commentaries and paraphrases in the Late Palaiologan period, see also Bydén (2006).

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the reporting verb φησίν (three to four instances per printed page). Nevertheless, in some respects there are interesting parallels between the programme delineated in Sophonias’ preface and Metochites’ paraphrastic practices. Sophonias’ main complaint about traditional “exegetical” commentaries on Aristotelian works is that they fail to preserve the continuity of Aristotle’s argument (because it is divided into individual lemmata each followed by extensive discussion of particular points: In De an. 1.5–8, 1.23–2.4, 2.8–20). His main complaint about traditional paraphrases of Aristotelian works is that they provide no access to Aristotle’s actual wording (since their aim was only to convey the sense in a more readable style: In De an. 1.11–19, 1.22–23, 2.20–28). Neither continuity nor quotation accuracy is mentioned among the “selling points” of the Aristotelian paraphrases in Metochites’ Proem. But the way he actually goes about his business in In De an. shows, I think, that these were matters of concern to him. We have already seen how he avoids digressions, apparently in an effort to adhere to the progression of Aristotle’s text. But the incorporation of words and phrases from the latter is also a characteristic feature of his style. So it is, to a considerable extent, of Sophonias’ and indeed even Themistius’ styles. But in contrast to his predecessors, Metochites had at his disposal a device for highlighting his Aristotelian quotations, since he eschewed the paraphrastic first-person artifice.²² For on the whole, words and phrases directly quoted from Aristotle’s text in In De an. do tend to cluster around occurrences of φησίν. These clusters, then, practically fulfil the function of a lemma in an “exegetical” commentary (this is for the most part reflected in the paragraph division of the Edition and Translation). One should probably assume that the understood subject of φησίν, unless otherwise specified, is always Aristotle, even though the subordinate or coordinate clauses may occasionally have no equivalent in Aristotle’s text, but rather in one of Metochites’ subsidiary sources (see notes to 2.2.22, 2.4.20, 2.6.4, 2.8.5, 2.12.2 and 3.1.13 in the Translation). It is admittedly hard to envisage how Themistius’ paraphrase or Philoponus’ commentary has come to be mistaken for Aristotle’s text, but it is even harder to think of any other reason why Metochites should have referred in this indiscriminate manner to both his primary and his subsidiary sources. One passage, however, which seems to fly in the face of this assumption is 2.7.23, 190.14, where κεκλῆσθαι can only be governed by φησιν in the previous clause (or else, which comes to the same thing, an “implicit” φησιν). Assuming that the subject of φησιν is Aristotle, the resulting attribution is not

22 It is true that neither Themistius nor Michael Psellos, the other author mentioned by Sophonias (In De an. 1.21) as an example of the paraphrastic genre, employs this artifice consistently (on the artifice in Psellos, see Ierodiakonou 2002, 165–66), but by and large they do employ it, and thus make it impossible for the reader to distinguish between Aristotelian and other elements of the text. In the oldest MS of Sophonias’ paraphrase, Laur. Plut. 07,35 (Diktyon 16058), Aristotelian quotations are usually indicated by marginal quotation marks, but this method is obviously precarious, since the marks are liable to be misplaced or lost in the process of textual transmission; and it is not clear anyway whether the marks originated with the author.

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just factually wrong, but downright absurd: “Aristotle says that he himself is unable to designate the medium of odour by a name, but that this, too, has been designated by later writers as ‘transodorant’” (see also ad loc. in sec. 1.6). Aristotle is also mentioned by name 27 times (and is once referred to as “the Philosopher”, in distinction to “the commentators”: 3.10.15, 352.7); Themistius and “Simplicius” (Priscian) once each (3.10.12, 350.13 and 3.10.13, 350.17); Philoponus never. By eschewing the paraphrastic artifice and reclaiming the first-person forms for himself, Metochites is thus in a position to distinguish between himself as author of the paraphrase and Aristotle as author of the paraphrased text. In In De an. there are twenty-odd instances of past tense forms of verbs of saying in the first person, both in the plural (most frequent) and in the singular (there are also present tense forms in the first person plural, but these are usually of general reference). The most natural interpretation of this situation is that, unless otherwise specified, third person forms refer to Aristotle and first person forms refer to Metochites himself. Apart from the aforementioned cases where φησίν introduces a statement derived from a subsidiary source, this interpretation does not seem to be contradicted by any circumstances in the actual usage. That is to say, not only φησίν and λέγει, but also (προ‑)ἔφη, (προ‑)εἶπε, (προ‑)ἔλεγε, (προ‑)εἴρηκε and ἐρεῖ, appear by default to refer to Aristotle and to statements made in the paraphrased texts, while (προ‑)ἔφην and (προ‑)ἔφημεν (and occasionally ἐλέγομεν and εἰρήκαμεν) appear by default to refer to Metochites and to statements made in the paraphrases. There are, however (as with φησίν), also cross‐references by past tense forms of verbs of saying in the third person that lead us to subsidiary sources rather than to Aristotle: for instance, ἔλεγεν in 3.4.1, 290.5 seems to refer to Themistius’ paraphrase of 3.3, 427b 14–17 (88.30–32) rather than the Aristotelian text. The question is, then, how to interpret passive forms of verbs of saying, such as (προ‑)εἴρηται (c. 270 instances) and (προ‑)ἐλέγετο (c. 30 instances), but also, for instance, (προ‑)διώρισται (c. 80 instances). My own interpretation is that while the perfect forms, (προ‑)εἴρηται and (προ‑)διώρισται, refer to the Aristotelian text,²³ (προ‑)ἐλέγετο normally, but not necessarily always, refers to Metochites’ paraphrase itself. As we have seen, the latter form normally serves to secure the continuity of the argument: after a long parenthesis, for instance, the discussion may be brought back to topic by the phrase ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, …. The perfect forms, on the other hand, usually preceded by ὡς, no doubt serve the pedagogical purpose of connecting new information with already familiar material (and sometimes that of repeating the already familiar material), but are arguably also meant to underscore the adequacy

23 Thus, for instance, the antecedent of ὃ μὴ πρότερον εἴρηται in 2.8.4, 192.23–194.1 is a statement the absence of which in De an. 2.7 Metochites has already noted (2.7.24, 190.15–16), so εἴρηται cannot refer to the paraphrase. And while it is true that τὸ εἰρημένον διηχές in 2.8.2, 192.7 has not been mentioned in the Aristotelian text, Metochites seems to think it has (see 2.7.21, 190.6–7 and the note to the Translation).

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of the interpretation offered in the passage in which they occur, by showing how it is consistent with statements made by Aristotle previously in the paraphrased work or in the passage currently under consideration. An (unusually, perhaps) illustrative example of the latter function can be found in the following passage: And as we say (ὡς φαμέν), the motion of [the formal] life is comparable to this kind of operation: what was stated (ὅπερ εἴρηται) was that one must conceive of that by means of which [the animal] is moved as the same thing both as a starting-point and as an end-point. And from this it is possible to understand how “being moved and being at rest” is conceived of in this case … (3.10.16, 352.14–17).

It seems clear that ὅπερ εἴρηται here is a reference to the text under consideration (433b 22), while ὡς φαμέν introduces the interpretative framework favoured by Metochites. The discussion to which this passage belongs (3.10.11–18) is the only one in In De an. where Metochites uses his reclaimed first-person forms to take sides in an interpretative disagreement. It is about 3.10, 433b 21–27, where Aristotle says that the bodily entity used by the desiderative faculty of an animal’s soul as an organ (or instrument) for setting the animal’s body in motion is found at a place where beginning and end are the same, that is, different in account but inseparable in magnitude, such as a joint. According to Metochites, some commentators, including Themistius, Alexander and Plutarch, maintain that the place Aristotle has in mind is the heart, from which arises the vital pneuma or spirit, which is the organ by which an animal’s body is set in motion (cf. Aristotle, MA 10, 703a 9–16). The report of Themistius’ view is relatively unproblematic: it is based on the author’s own words (In De an. 121.7–9), although, as Todd points out (1996, 194), the vital (or “connate”) spirit is not mentioned in this passage. The fact that it is bracketed with Alexander’s and Plutarch’s is perhaps more surprising. It is true that Priscian ascribes one or two similar interpretations to “Aristotle’s commentators” (In De an. 301.15–30; cf. 303.31–33), and it is not unlikely that the commentators in question are in fact Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens, since they are both referred to for the clarification of details in the immediate context (In De an. 302.24–33 and 304.9–20), but even if this is the case they are not mentioned by name in the relevant passage. Metochites goes on to set out an alternative interpretation, based on Priscian’s doctrine of the twofold entelechy. In Priscian’s view, the “bodily” entity through which, or, rather, in virtue of which (καθ’ ὅ), an animal’s body is set in motion is properly speaking its specifying life (εἰδοποιοῦσα ζωή), which is “bodily” only in the sense of being wholly immersed in the body (In De an. 301.30–302.17; 303.8–10; 303.33–305.18). The “joint” mentioned by Aristotle is taken by Priscian simply as a comparison (that is, of course, also how it is understood on the Themistian interpretation mentioned above). The Priscianic interpretation is emphatically endorsed

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by Metochites: “With this view I myself also agree completely …”.²⁴ By attributing it not only to “Simplicius” but also to Iamblichus, who is not mentioned by name in the relevant passages of Priscian’s commentary, but whose authority is reverently acknowledged in the programmatic statements of its introduction (1.14–21), Metochites shows that he had read the Lydian commentator’s work carefully enough to be aware of its debt to the Syrian philosopher, but not enough, perhaps, to recognize the originality of this particular doctrine.²⁵ Otherwise, the use of first-person forms, when not of general reference, is limited to cross‐references within the paraphrase. Personal views are rarely if ever expressed. Metochites’ furthest steps in that direction are represented by a few subtle repudiations of views that are in open conflict with Orthodox Christian dogma (see 1.2.18, 26.13–15; 2.1.6, 102.16–17; 2.3.6, 136.19–22; 3.12.1, 362.2–4; 3.12.9, 366.11–15). Whether or not Metochites was in the end successful in his humanitarian enterprise, he clearly conceived of his Aristotelian paraphrases as an œuvre de haute vulgarisation. Another characteristic feature of such works – besides comprehensiveness, clarity, concision and ease of use – is a natural tendency towards the mainstream. One way for the popularizer of science or philosophy to avoid extreme or eccentric views is to collate the opinions of several authorities, and as a principle follow the majority view, or at least a view that seems compatible with more than one authority. With few exceptions (such as the discussion in 3.10.11–18), this eclectic approach is in evidence on every page of In De an. Of course, Metochites does not say that his aim is to present the views of the majority of Aristotle’s interpreters. He says that it is to clarify Aristotle’s views. But since he grants that it is not only the language in which they are couched that prevents easy access to Aristotle’s views, but even more so the thoughts themselves, which are amazingly “deep and multifaceted” as well as “lofty and precise” (Proem 11.17–19 DL), it is hard to see why he would court disaster by bypassing the views of Aristotle’s interpreters. Which, of course, he did not. In fact he seems to have drawn on almost every commentary on Aristotle’s natural philosophy to have survived from the previous centuries. Why shouldn’t he? He was after all the Emperor’s μεσάζων, and would not be denied his requests, even for books. In the next section we shall take a closer look at the sources for In De an.

2.2 Sources Metochites’ main sources for In De an. are, besides Aristotle’s De anima, Philoponus’ commentary and Themistius’ paraphrase, but every once in a while a snippet of infor-

24 τούτῳ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς συντίθεμαι μάλιστα … (3.10.14, 352.1–2). 25 On Priscian’s doctrine of the twofold entelechy, see Perkams (2008, 165–77).

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mation crops up that could only derive from Priscian of Lydia (Ps.-Simplicius). In the paraphrase of De an. 3, especially from 3.7 onwards, borrowings from Priscian become more regular. In contrast to Sophonias, who admits, in the preface to his paraphrase (In De an. 3.3–4), to having incorporated entire sections from earlier commentators, especially Philoponus, into his work, Metochites as a rule does not refer to his subsidiary sources by name. The only exception in In De an. is the passage in 3.10.11–18 discussed in section 2.1.²⁶ Moreover, while Sophonias often copies whole phrases, sentences and even paragraphs from his subsidiary sources with only the minimal changes required to fit them into their new syntactic and pragmatic context, Metochites’ borrowings are always heavily paraphrased, sometimes to the point that even the ideas they express are transformed in the process (see the apparatus of parallel passages appended to the Translation). This makes them rather more difficult to identify and especially to demarcate with any precision. Different sources are also often combined. An instructive example of Metochites’ method in this regard is provided by the first two paragraphs of the work, where four lines of Aristotelian text are expanded into seventeen by a deft amalgamation of ideas from all three extant ancient commentators on the passage (again, see the apparatus of parallel passages). When the ideas expressed in the sources are distorted, this need of course not always be due to misunderstanding – passages in other commentators may be legitimately utilized as springboards to fresh insights – but for the most part this is probably the case. At any rate, when the ideas expressed by Metochites differ from those expressed in his putative sources, they are rarely if ever as good. Philoponus, Ps.‐Philoponus and Sophonias. Philoponus is the most exploited subsidiary source for In De an. 1 and 2. In In De an. 3, of course, the matter gets complicated, since there are two commentaries on De anima 3 attributed to Philoponus, one of which (= Ps.‐Philoponus) survives in extenso,²⁷ while the continuation of the commentary on De anima 1–2, which we may call the “Ammonian” commentary,²⁸ is extant only in William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of chapters 3.4–8 and an Arabic adaptation of a lost Greek paraphrase, together with excerpts in Sophonias and scholia in cod. Laur. Plut. 87,20 (Diktyon 16837).²⁹ It is not unlikely that Metochites had 26 He also makes an unspecific reference to “the later commentators on [Aristotle’s] writings” in 3.7.16, 330.11–12, where he is in fact thinking of Themistius, and to “Theophrastus and those who came after him” in 2.7.21, 190.8. 27 For arguments pro and contra Philoponus’ authorship, see Charlton (2000, 1–12), who ascribes it to Stephanus of Alexandria, and Golitsis (2016), who defends the traditional attribution. 28 Since, according to its full title, it was largely drawn from Ammonius’ lectures (see further Golitsis 2019). 29 For Moerbeke’s translation, see Verbeke (1966); for the Arabic adaptation, see Arnzen (1998, 80– 139); for the excerpts in Sophonias, see Van Riet (1965); for the newly discovered scholia, see Steel (2017).

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access to either the original text or the paraphrase of the Ammonian commentary on De anima 3.³⁰ At any rate, there are a few passages in In De an. 3.4–8 where there seem to be closer parallels to this than to any other commentary. There are also a couple of passages in In De an. 3.1–3 where there seem to be closer parallels to Sophonias’ paraphrase than to any other commentary. For these, I refer to the apparatus of parallel passages appended to the Translation. Some of the vocabulary in In De an. 3, such as ἐναπομένω in 3.2.7 (258.4 and 7), which occurs five times in Philoponus’ commentary on De anima 1–2, but not in any other ancient commentary on the De anima, may possibly also indicate dependence on the Ammonian commentary.³¹ In 2.4.7, 144.19–20 there is a brief passage with a close parallel in Sophonias’ paraphrase but not in any extant ancient commentary (see the apparatus of parallel passages to the Translation, ad loc.). Pending other explanations (coincidence seems unlikely, but Sophonias may draw on lost or unedited older material), this may be taken as an indication that Metochites was familiar with the work of his contemporary. I have found no other similar indications (apart from the possibility that the parallels in In De an. 3.1–3 are due to direct dependence), but my investigations have not been very systematic. Themistius. Themistius is relied upon throughout In De an., especially in book 3. Except for a few lines that reveal the influence of Priscian,³² he is the only subsidiary source for the paraphrase of De an. 3.5. The single most extensive borrowing from Themistius is probably the passage on the unity of the sense capacity as a whole, at the very end of the discussion of sense perception, in 3.2.23–29, which is in effect a paraphrase of Themistius 85.27–87.16 rather than of the corresponding sentences in Aristotle. Metochites was apparently very impressed by this passage in his well-spoken predecessor, so much so that he returned on a couple of occasions, in his Semeioseis gnomikai (89, 577–80 MK and 95, 599–603 MK), to Themistius’ comparison (in 87.8– 11) of the five individual senses to messengers and the unified sense capacity to their king, developing some of its implications, but substituting the intellect for the sense capacity (the intellect “must punish transgressions and never ever allow the senses to ‘drink neat wine’ and revel independently of its orders”).³³ Priscian. The brevity and irregularity of Metochites’ borrowings from Priscian in In De an. 1–2 may seem to suggest that Metochites only had access to the Lydian commen-

30 Arnzen (1998, 104–7) argues that the excerpts in Sophonias derive from the lost paraphrase. 31 Obviously, such correspondences can never be more than a heuristics for establishing dependences: while ἐναπομένω, for instance, is an extremely rare word in pagan authors, it is quite common in Christian authors from Late Antiquity onwards. 32 See further Bydén (2022, 73–74). 33 … τὰ ὑπερβάθμια κολάζειν, καὶ μὴ ξυγχωρεῖν καθάπαξ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔξω τῶν ἐντολῶν ἀκρατίζεσθαι καὶ βακχεύειν (600 MK).

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tator’s work in the form of selected scholia. This suggestion is, however, contradicted by the passage in 3.10.11–18, in which the reference to Iamblichus seems to presuppose familiarity with the commentary as a whole. A more likely explanation of Metochites’ relative neglect of Priscian’s commentary may be that he did not find it conducive to two of the features that, if my suggestions in section 2.1 were correct, he wanted his paraphrase to embody, namely, close adherence to Aristotle’s text and a mainstream interpretation.³⁴ Aristotle. I have not made any systematic inquiries into the Aristotelian text presupposed by Metochites, partly because it is for the most part not very clearly reflected in his rather transformative style of paraphrase, partly because he may well have worked from multiple sources: he is after all using material from all the extant earlier commentaries in Greek (perhaps with the exception of Sophonias), and if he found these in scholia they would have accompanied an Aristotelian text, while if he used the continuous commentaries they would all have included either lemmata of the text or close paraphrases (cf. Borchert 2011, lviii–lx). In a couple of passages the observation by Rashed (2001, 59) and Borchert (2011, lxi–lxiv) that In GC often agrees with Vat. gr. 253 (L) seems to be borne out for In De an. too: thus in 433a 29 Metochites seems to have read (3.10.6, 346.22–23) first τὸ πρακτικόν (τὸ πρακτόν Ross) and then πρακτόν; according to Siwek, only L offers the combination of these two readings. Similarly, in 430b 26 he seems to have read (3.6.11, 318.22–23) φάσις τις (φάσις τι Ross); only L has τις. There are, however, also many passages where Metochites seems to have read a variant not offered by L. For instance (readings of Aristotle MSS as reported by Siwek): 1.2.15, 24.19 γαίῃ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν (γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν Ross 404b 13–14 : γὰρ om. κ σ V P Dc ); 1.3.21, 46.11 κωμῳδιοδιδασκάλου (κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ Ross 406b 17–18 : κωμῳδιοδιδασκάλῳ ρ y Hc Nc Rc V2 ); 1.5.36, 94.21 διαπνεῖ (διαπνεῖται Ross 411b 9 : διαπνεῖ τε ρ σ y Dc ); 1.5.41, 96.27 legit fort. ψυχὴ ἀρχή (ἀρχὴ ψυχή Ross 411b 28 : ψυχὴ ἀρχή Od Fc Lc Τ); 2.6.5, 178.21–24 Διάρρους (Διάρους Ross 418a 21 : Διάρρους ξ m Dc e Ec Fc ); 3.3.33, 288.13 γινομένης (γιγνομένη Ross 429a 2 : γι(γ)νομένης omnes praeter E1 L Kc Ec i m); 3.4.5, 292.8 ἀντιφράξει (ἀντιφράττει Ross 429a 20–21: ἀντιφράξει κ σ S U W Ha1 ); 3.8.7, 334.16 φαντάσματι [V : φάντασμά τι M A] (φάντασμά τι Ross 432a 8 : φαντάσματι ξ Ha U Lc i y); 3.10.5, 346.19 ὀρεκτικόν (ὀρεκτόν Ross 433a 28 : ὀρεκτικόν X T1 Bd ).

34 Even if long digressions like those scattered over Philoponus’ commentary and occasionally occurring even in Themistius – notably 100.16–109.3 on the productive intellect – are uncommon in Priscian, his exegesis is normally geared towards showing the consistency of Aristotle’s account with a more general theoretical (Platonist) framework.

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As is seen, no clear pattern can be detected. Once Metochites even agrees with a modern conjecture: it looks as if he may have read σφαῖρα σφαῖραν in 3.11, 434a 13 with Torstrik, Essen and Ross (3.11.5, 358.6).³⁵

2.3 Language This is not the place for a detailed study of Metochites’ language, so I shall restrict myself to discussing some characteristic departures from classical Greek with potential ramifications for editing and translating In De an. (see also sec. 3.2).

2.3.1 The definite article Metochites does not always conform to the grammatical rule which says that the definite article is repeated only if the attribute is placed after its head noun (the “second attributive position”). Thus, for instance, in 1.4.28, 72.6–7 we read (in all three main MSS plus P) καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο …, where we might expect καὶ τοῦ σώματος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο (or καὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο σώματος). This may reflect a contemporary development in the vernacular: the phenomenon appears in texts from at least the fourteenth century onwards, to judge from the examples given by Holton & al. (2019, 4: 1973–74), who refer to it as “so called ‘reverse determiner spreading’”. Occasionally (e.g. 2.12.4, 238.7), this word order is exhibited in V but not in β. In one instance (1.2.28, 32.1), Metochites may have taken the further step of removing the article before the preposed adjective, if V is in the right here: ᾗ δὲ ἐκ σφαιρικοῦ [τοῦ add. V : fort. legendum του] σχήματος οὐσιοῦται, εὐκινητότατόν ἐστι …. Among other noteworthy features in the use of the article can be mentioned that attributive numerals sometimes precede the article (e.g. 1.3.25, 48.7: εἰς δύο τὰς ἀντικειμένας φοράς). This usage seems to have been relatively widespread already in Early Imperial times. Also, the noun after the interrogative determiner takes the article on two occasions (1.3.22, 46.18; 1.5.28, 90.15), both in the phrase διὰ τίνα τὴν

35 Borchert’s conclusion is well worth quoting in full: “Die Analyse ergibt, dass die im Text des Metochites festzustellende Kombination signifikanter Lesarten nicht mit dem Textbestand einer einzigen individuellen Handschrift oder dem einer näher eingrenzbaren Familie übereinstimmt, sondern charakteristische Elemente aus den Textbeständen aller Handschriftengruppen reflektiert sowie umgekehrt charakteristische Lesarten von an anderer Stelle reflektierten Handschriften nicht reflektiert. Metochites ist also entweder eklektisch vorgegangen oder hat eine Handschrift benutzt, in der die verschiedenen Textbestände bereits in der aus seiner Paraphrase erschließbaren Weise kontaminiert waren” (2011, lxi).

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αἰτίαν: this phrase otherwise only occurs in Galen (eight instances in TLG). In 2.2.15, 122.21–22 and 3.2.8, 258.18 the same noun takes the article after διὰ and the relative pronoun. For the position of the article with pronouns, see the next subsection.

2.3.2 Pronouns One of the most striking linguistic features of In De an. is the lavish use of the pronoun/ pronominal adjective αὐτός. This accounts for more than 3 percent of the word tokens; the corresponding figure in Aristotle is 1.2 percent. There seem to be four distinct uses of αὐτός in In De an., three of which (1–3) are classical: (1a) Used by itself in the nominative, or (1b) in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the predicate position, it is emphatic. The high frequency of αὐτός in In De an. seems to be due mainly to the very high frequency of emphatic αὐτός (with the caveat that some instances are ambiguous between this and use [4]). (2) Used by itself, preceded by the article, or in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the attributive position, it means “same”. (3) Used by itself in oblique cases it is an anaphoric third-person personal pronoun. (4a) Used by itself in the nominative (or, in genitive absolutes, in the genitive),³⁶ or (4b) in agreement with a head noun in any case and standing in the predicate position, it is a demonstrative pronoun (4a) or adjective (4b).³⁷ How to interpret and best to translate each instance of αὐτός has been a vexing problem throughout my work on the Translation. It is not always immediately evident which of the uses listed above is the relevant one. This is especially true of cases where αὐτός agrees with a head noun and appears in the predicate position, and thus theoretically could be either (1b) emphatic or (4b) demonstrative. In the vast majority of instances, however, it seems clear that the relevant use is the emphatic one. Leaving aside those rare cases in which exophoric deixis may occur in In De an.,³⁸ the only possible functions for αὐτός used as a demonstrative are anaphoric and cataphoric. In its emphatic use, αὐτός is neither anaphoric nor cataphoric. So the touchstone for deciding whether a particular instance of predicative αὐτός is emphatic or demonstrative must be whether it is anaphoric, cataphoric or neither. In the first two pages of In De an. there are exactly four instances of αὐτός agreeing with a head noun and standing in the predicate position:

36 It may also be thus used in oblique cases, but in so far as it is anaphoric this is indistinguishable from use (3). 37 On the development of demonstrative αὐτός from Late Antiquity, see Manolessou (2001); Horrocks (2010, 128–29; 148–49; 295); Holton & al. (2019, 2: 874–75, 2: 915, 2: 924–25, 2: 998; 4: 1980–82). 38 I am not sure whether true exophoric deixis actually occurs, but there are several instances of the Aristotelian τόδε (τι), which arguably is a nominalization of that pronoun in its exophoric use.

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(1.1.2, 4.11) καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάγεται ἡ θεωρία εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ θεῖα καὶ καθάπαξ νοερά …. (1.1.4, 6.5) δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖται, καὶ τέλος οἱονεὶ ἔχει τὰ ἔμψυχα, εἰς ὅπερ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ, τὴν ψυχήν …. (1.1.8, 6.22) ἐξ ὧν ζητεῖν ἔστι τὰ προκείμενα αὐτὰ ἕκαστα εἰς τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι …. (1.1.9, 6.25) ἄλλαι γάρ, φησίν, ἄλλων ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν – ἤγουν τὸ διωρισμένον ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μονὰς αὐτή ….

There is also one instance where αὐτός stands between an attributive adjective and its head noun, presumably modifying the adjective: (1.1.3–4, 6.2) καὶ πρὸς θεολογίαν … καὶ πρὸς ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν … μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν ….

In none of these instances does the head noun with which αὐτός agrees refer to anything mentioned previously or later in the immediate (or, indeed, the not so immediate) context. Consequently, αὐτός must be emphatic in all these instances. As such, it serves to mark the referent of its head noun as being a thing of special importance or relevance (in 1.1.8, perhaps, by extension, simply a different thing from something previously mentioned). This kind of marking is often best expressed in spoken English by stress, and in written English by italics. Thus I have often represented clear cases of emphatic adjectival αὐτός by italicising the head noun in the Translation. Of course, not all cases of emphatic αὐτός are exactly like these, and the word has also often been rendered as “(him‑, her‑) itself” or “themselves”, and occasionally as “the very …”. Not seldom “actual” suggests itself as a fairly accurate translation, but with a couple of exceptions I have avoided this on account of the risk of confusion with the philosophical terms of art (ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἐνεργείᾳ). Nevertheless, there are also many cases in In De an. of αὐτός in the predicate position that can be understood as demonstrative. Some of them can probably only be thus understood. Here are a few examples: (1.5.2, 80.7) οἱ μὲν γὰρ … ἐνέχονται ἀτόπῳ αὐτόθεν τῷ λέγειν δύο σώματα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι …. καὶ ἔοικέ πως τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ τὸ λέγειν ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς στιγμαῖς ἐνεῖναι ἅμα ἐν ταυτῷ καὶ τὰς μοναδικὰς στιγμὰς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ….

τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ seems unambiguously to refer to the preceding statement, that two bodies occupy the same place. (3.2.15, 262.5) … ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνενέργητός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ μέτρου, ἢ καὶ φθαρτική, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων αὖθις τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ προσῆκον μέτρον ….

τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν is the same kind of ratio as the one mentioned in the preceding clause. In the following passage we seem to have instances of both the emphatic and the

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demonstrative use (in the latter instance αὐτός again stands between an attributive adjective and its head):³⁹ (3.10.13, 350.17–18) Ἰάμβλιχος δέ, ᾧ καὶ Σιμπλίκιος συντίθεται, τὸ ὀργανικὸν αὐτὸ κινοῦν … τὸ εἰδητικὸν αὐτό φασιν εἶναι τῆς ζωῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ….

τὸ ὀργανικὸν αὐτὸ κινοῦν refers to the topic of discussion since 3.10.11; τὸ εἰδητικὸν αὐτό … τῆς ζωῆς has not been mentioned previously in this context. It may be added that some instances that may be interpreted as (4b) demonstrative adjectival αὐτός may also be interpreted as instances of use (3), the personal pronoun, with a noun in apposition, e.g. 1.2.23, 28.20: … τὰς παρὰ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀρχὰς τιθεμένας εἰς αὐτό – τὸ γνωστικόν – ἑξῆς …, or 1.4.36, 76.2: τὸ κινοῦν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μόνον (which may be = τὸ κινοῦν ἐξ αὐτοῦ – τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ – μόνον). Examples of (4a), where αὐτός is apparently used as an independent demonstrative pronoun, are a bit more frequent: (1.4.10, 62.8) τὰ αὐτὰ δέ, φησίν, ἔστι λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα. καὶ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ τὰ εἴδη τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων ….

Here αὐτὸς obviously refers to Empedocles, and it seems irrelevant to stress the fact that he generates the forms of the parts of animals himself. (2.7.12, 184.26) καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν οὐ μόνον τοῦ φωτισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σκότους. αὐτὸ δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον διαφανὲς δυνάμει ….

Here αὐτὸ clearly refers to the subject of illumination and darkness mentioned in the preceding sentence. In the genitive, αὐτός can also occur as the subject of a genitive absolute: (2.9.3, 208.19) … ὥσπερ ἡ γεῦσις ἔχει μὲν τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐγνωσμένων ὄντων αὐτῶν τοῦ μὲν γλυκέος, τοῦ δὲ πικροῦ, ἐπισυμβαίνει τῷ μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἀνιᾶσθαι ….

Here αὐτῶν refers to the perceptible objects of taste, mentioned in the main clause. Finally an example of cataphoric demonstrative αὐτός: (2.4.19, 152.4) ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁ τῆς τροφῆς λόγος, ἐφ’ ὧν οὐ μόνον ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων αὕτη καταλαμβάνεται γένεσις ….

Conversely, οὗτος is occasionally used when αὐτός might be expected: (1.3.35, 52.24) αἱ δ’ ἀποδείξεις, καὶ αὗται κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν διὰ προτάσεων μέσων προά γονται εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα ….

39 Cf. Kühner & Gerth §465.4 Anm. 5, 1: 628.

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The instances of demonstrative αὐτός are, however, relatively few in In De an., and especially the instances of (4b) demonstrative adjectival αὐτός are vastly outnumbered by the instances of (1b) emphatic adjectival αὐτός. This could suggest that they represent involuntary lapses into the vernacular. The usual demonstrative is οὗτος, which occurs over 800 times (much more often as a pronoun than as a pronominal adjective). There are about 30 instances of ἐκεῖνος; and more than 50 of ὅδε, but many of these involve the technical term τόδε (τι). Unlike the case in classical Greek, the genitive of αὐτός relatively often stands in the attributive position in In De an. (c. 40 instances).⁴⁰ In most of these instances, its semantic value is probably best taken as possessive (e.g. 2.1.7, 102.20: … ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων …), but in some of them it can also be understood as partitive (e.g. 2.2.20, 124.24: … ἑκάτερον τῶν αὐτοῦ τμημάτων …) or separative (e.g. 1.5.25, 90.5: … καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος πᾶν καθόλου καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ στέρησιν), and in some it is unequivocally objective (e.g. 3.2.8, 258.11: … ὁ ψόφος … ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἀκοή). Some of these instances may be possible to explain as demonstrative αὐτός, on the assumption that this has inherited the syntactic properties of the classical demonstratives, genitives of which do stand in the attributive position. In many cases, however, the genitive of αὐτός in this position refers to the subject of the clause in which it stands (or to the subject of a governing clause); that is to say, it is directly (or indirectly) reflexive (e.g. 1.1.38, 18.15: καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται παραπλησίως κατὰ μέρος περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ὑποκείμενα [περιεργάζονται]; 1.2.1, 20.1: κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔθος ἐν πάσῃ προθέσει βουλόμενος κἀνταῦθα προεκθέσθαι τὰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόξας, λέγει …; 1.3.28, 50.4: ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων νοήσει [ὁ νοῦς]). Reflexive pronouns, too, stand in the attributive position in classical Greek. In principle, then, we could in such cases have to do with the third-person reflexive pronoun, in its normal position, but erroneously given a smooth breathing. The third-person reflexive pronoun is after all also used in In De an. (c. 160 instances, more than a third of which are in the set prepositional phrase καθ’ αὑτό). However, since (a) there are so many instances of the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position and little or no variation in the MSS; (b) there are also many instances of the genitive of αὐτός in the predicate position that refer to the subjects of their own clause or of a governing clause, where the MSS are also more or less unanimous in giving the smooth breathing; and (c) several instances of the genitive of personal (or demonstrative) αὐτός in the attributive position do not refer to the subjects of their own clause or of a governing clause, it seems more likely that the reason for this situation simply is that Metochites had no qualms about us-

40 Exceptions to the rule in classical Greek occur almost only when the noun takes a second attribute: see Kühner & Gerth §464.4 with Anm. 2, 1: 619–20.

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ing the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position, and that he uses it reflexively or non-reflexively with little or no discrimination.⁴¹ The latter suspicion is strengthened by the occurrence of passages like 2.9.3, 208.16 (μόνον δ’ ἔχει ἐν τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη τοῖς μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖσθαι …), where more than just the breathing prevents us from taking αὐτὴν as a reflexive pronoun, although it undoubtedly refers to the subject of the clause; and 3.13.4, 376.19 (πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει …), where more than just the breathing prevents us from taking αὑτὸ as a personal (or demonstrative) pronoun, although it undoubtedly does not refer to the subject of the clause. One may even find a reflexive and a personal pronoun with the same referent in the same clause, as in 1.3.12, 42.18 (πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸ κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ …), although it is of course possible that αὐτοῦ is an error of transmission here. In the light of this, the description of use (3) above should be rephrased to read “used by itself in oblique cases it is (3a) an anaphoric third-person personal pronoun or (3b) a reflexive pronoun”. Consequently, I have in these instances as a rule not corrected a smooth breathing unanimously exhibited in the MSS. The only exceptions are a few instances after prepositions where it seems to me, on the basis of his usage elsewhere in the work, that Metochites must have intended the reflexive (e.g. 1.3.14– 15, 44.5–10: δι’ αὑτό; 2.8.15, 198.21: δι’ αὑτοῦ; 2.10.1, 218.6: μεταξὺ αὑτῶν). In view of the rather frequent erroneous breathings in all MSS, such corrections should not in principle be considered a major intervention. The other suspicion, that Metochites had no qualms about using the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position, is strengthened by the occurrence of other irregularities in the position of complements and adjuncts (e.g. prepositional complements in the predicate position, as in 2.5.4, 162.21–22: δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καὶ συνειλημμένη καὶ ἀχωρίστως συνουσιωμένη αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, where the dative complement αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις … seems to exclude the possibility that ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις is adverbial).

2.3.3 ἔστιν “Modal” ἔστιν, normally complemented by an infinitive phrase, occurs relatively frequently in In De an., not only in the well‐established sense of “it is possible that …”, but also in the senses of “it is necessary/desirable/appropriate that …”. Examples of cases where it seems unavoidable to take it in one of the latter senses include several instances in which it is part of a phrase that formulates the agenda for the next few paragraphs, interchangeably with phrases like ζητητέον ἐστί (e.g. 1.1.5, 6.6: περὶ 41 And he is probably not the only one to do so: the genitive of αὐτός in the attributive position is common in many Byzantine authors from Arethas (Scholia in Cat. 175.6) onwards.

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ψυχῆς ἔστι μὲν προηγουμένως ἐπιζητεῖν τίς ἡ οὐσία …; 1.1.12, 8.15: ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ἄρα μή …; 1.1.24, 12.20: ἀπορεῖν ἔστι, φησί, καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον …), but also instances where it is detached from this pragmatic function, such as these: (2.5.8, 164.19) … τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ διαιρεῖν ἔστιν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ὡς ἂν γένος πρὸς εἶδος …. (2.5.11, 166.18–19) ὥσπερ δέ, φησί, τὰ νῦν ἀδιορίστως λεγόμενα – τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν – ἔστι διαιρεῖν οὑτωσί, οὕτω διαιρεῖν ἔστι καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρὸς τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄν, καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο θεωρεῖν αὐτὰ τῷ λόγῳ.

It also allows of degrees (“it is more appropriate to …”, “one should rather …”), as is seen in (3.3.31, 286.18) … τὰ γὰρ ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας μᾶλλον ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ λέγειν ….

2.3.4 Moods and tenses As for the use of the moods, some of the departures from classical Greek in the MSS are probably due to errors of transmission. This holds especially for instances of the indicative where a subjunctive may be expected and the subjunctive where an optative may be expected. The indicative with ἄν in main clauses. Of the 38 instances where the three main MSS agree on the indicative with ἄν in a main clause, 34 are in modo irreali, usually with the imperfect, only a couple of times with the aorist and once with the pluperfect. The remaining four are future indicatives, in three cases (1.3.14, 42.24; 2.5.14, 170.6; 3.1.13, 250.22) ἐρεῖ, in one (3.8.5, 334.5–6) συνήσει. This seems to be accepted Middle and Late Byzantine usage. Horrocks (2017, 235) gives an example (15a) from Anna Komnene, Alexias (1.16.6). Spurious indicative with ἄν for subjunctive (or optative) with ἄν in dependent clauses. The present indicative with ἄν occurs a number of times in dependent clauses in at least one of the three main MSS. Leaving aside the category of concessive clauses with κἄν (for which see below), two cases of the imperfect with ἄν in dependent clauses assimilated to unreal contexts, and the special case of 1.1.23, 12.17 (see below), all these present indicatives are probably due to errors of transmission. Some of them only occur before correction by the respective scribe(s). If we disregard the latter as well, there remain nine instances where at least one MS has the present indicative with ἄν in a dependent clause: 1.1.30, 14.23 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 1.5.25, 88.23 (final/consecutive clause, ὡς ἄν); 2.4.17, 150.9 (temporal clause, μέχρις ἄν); 2.9.13, 216.2

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(final/consecutive clause, ὡς ἄν); 3.4.5, 292.6 (final/consecutive clause, ὡς ἄν); 3.4.21, 300.20 (relative clause); 3.10.8, 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 3.10.8b , 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν); 3.10.8c , 348.10 (temporal clause, ὅταν). In five of these β appears to have had the indicative: in three cases this has been corrected into the subjunctive in M, A or both. V has the subjunctive in five instances and the indicative in four (once in a final/consecutive clause and three times – coordinated – in a temporal clause). There is only one instance where all MSS have the indicative, in 3.10.8b , where it is coordinated with two other verb forms, both of which are indicative in V and subjunctive in M and A (in one case post correctionem). In six of the nine instances the indicative and the subjunctive are homophonous. In the remaining three the distinctive mood suffix is in the unstressed penultimate syllable. It is clear from the many disagreements and scribal corrections in the MSS that confusion between homophonous or near‐homophonous indicatives and subjunctives was absolutely commonplace. Normally, the predicate verbs of final/consecutive clauses introduced by ὡς ἄν (ὡς ἄν can also introduce clauses of comparison) stand in the subjunctive or the optative. Of 29 instances of verb forms in such clauses, 16 are subjunctive in all MSS; 8 are optative in all MSS; one (3.4.5, 292.6) is subjunctive in V, indicative in M and A; one (1.5.25, 88.23) is subjunctive in V and A, indicative in M; one (3.12.7, 364.21) is subjunctive in M and A, optative in V; and one (2.9.13, 216.2) is subjunctive in A, optative in M and indicative in V. There is also one occurrence (1.5.2, 80.5) where all MSS have a non-existent form (ἐμψυχῆ, see ad 1.5.2 in sec. 1.4.2). The variation between the subjunctive and the optative seems free: in fact, the optative always follows a main clause in a primary tense. In one case (3.12.7, 364.21) a subjunctive and an optative are coordinated in V: I have somewhat hesitantly corrected the optative on the basis of M and A. The case is similar with temporal clauses introduced by ὅταν, although there is an even greater preponderance of the subjunctive here. Of 74 instances of verb forms in such clauses, 61 are subjunctive in all MSS; two are optative in all MSS (see below, “Temporal clauses”); five are undetermined, since they are of contract verbs; one (2.8.6, 194.14) is an imperfect assimilated to an unreal context; one (1.1.30, 14.23) is subjunctive in V and Apc , indicative in M and Aac ; one (3.7.6, 324.17) is subjunctive in V A Mpc , probably future indicative in Mac ; one (3.10.8, 348.10) is subjunctive in M and A, indicative in V; one (3.10.8c , 348.10) is subjunctive in Mpc and Apc , indicative in V, Mac and Aac ; and one (3.10.8b , 348.10) is indicative in all MSS. As already noted, the last three verb forms are coordinated. In the relative clause in 3.4.21, 300.20, where two verb forms are coordinated, the first form is subjunctive in V and Apc , indicative in M and Aac , the second is subjunctive in V, M and Apc , indicative in Aac . The special case of 1.1.23, 12.17 is a relative clause with ἄν and οὐκ ἔστιν with the infinitive. Here it seems that the indicative is due to the specific semantic (“modal”) value of οὐκ ἔστιν, which cannot be transferred

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to the other moods (cf. Kahn 2003, 294), and ἄν may be felt to belong to the relative pronoun.⁴² In the light of the above, the most likely explanation for the occurrence of the present indicative with ἄν in these nine instances seems to be that they are errors of transmission, some in V, some in β, some, perhaps, in a common ancestor (the archetype). Accordingly, the four present indicatives with ἄν in dependent clauses in V should be emended: in two cases this can be done with the support of both M and A, in one case with the support of A. Spurious indicative for subjunctive (or optative) in final clauses. The present indicative also occurs in final clauses introduced by ἵνα. ὅπως (ἄν) is not used as a final conjunction in In De an. Οf 25 verbs in final clauses introduced by ἵνα, 23 are in the subjunctive in all MSS, one is in the optative in all MSS, and one (3.13.6, 378.7) is in the subjunctive in M and Apc and in the indicative in V (if in 2.8.30, 240.23 the indicative in A is right against the subjunctive in V and M, that clause is naturally taken as coordinated with the preceding main clause: see ad loc. in sec. 1.4.2). This suggests that the indicative in V (προφέρει), which is homophonous with the subjunctive and follows after two indicatives in a relative clause, is an error of transmission and should be emended with the support of M and Apc . Spurious subjunctive with ἄν in main clauses, etc. The optative with ἄν in main clauses, substantive clauses, causal clauses, result clauses and comparative clauses (modus potentialis) occurs almost 200 times in In De an. In addition, there are five passages where at least one of the three main MSS have the subjunctive with ἄν in such contexts, namely: 1.3.30, 50.17 (V : optative M A); 2.4.27, 156.19 (V A1pc : indicative M); 2.8.4, 194.5 (all MSS); 3.2.27, 266.29 (all MSS); 3.4.5, 292.7 (all MSS). The situation in 2.4.27 is a bit complicated and may involve a more extensive error of transmission (see ad loc., sec. 1.4.2). In the three passages where all MSS have the subjunctive this is homophonous with the optative of the same tense stem, voice and person: διαρρέη for διαρρέοι (2.8.4), ὑπολάβη for ὑπολάβοι (3.2.27); γνωρίζη for γνωρίζοι (3.4.5). In the last‐mentioned passage, this verb form follows four words after an authentic occurrence of γνωρίζη (γνωρίζει in β). These are most likely errors of transmission and should be emended. Spurious optative without ἄν in main clauses. In 1.5.36, 94.19 the three main MSS all have the optative without ἄν in a main clause, which is a negative declarative clause

42 On the topic of relative clauses, it may be noted that ὅστις, when it is not combined with the particle οὖν, does not seem to be used as a general relative, but instead often introduces non-restrictive (digressive) relative clauses (e.g. 1.3.25, 48.10; 1.5.10, 82.23; 1.5.41, 96.27; 2.3.12, 140.21; 2.5.1, 162.3; 2.5.8, 164.21; 2.9.7, 212.5; 3.10.2, 344.12; 3.11.4, 358.3). On occasion, however, it also introduces restrictive relative clauses, as in 1.5.23, 88.11–12.

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with οὐ. This is most likely a scribal error (see ad loc., sec. 1.4.2). In 1.4.40, 78.3 there is another instance of the optative without ἄν in a main clause which does not express a wish; it does, however, express a question, and so special considerations may apply (see ad loc., sec. 1.6). Conditional clauses. In thirteen conditional clauses with ἐάν (ἄν, ἤν) all three main MSS have the subjunctive. In two (1.4.35, 74.15 and 2.9.10, 214.4) they all have ἐάν with the optative. In 2.9.10 we may well have to do with a scribal error (ἐνθείη for expected ἐνθῇ): it is almost the reverse of the error in 3.6.7, 314.16 (see below). 1.4.35 is more difficult to explain in this way, since it is not as close to being a homophone (σῴζοιτο for expected σῴζηται). It is, however, coordinated with a subjunctive, and for that reason doubly suspicious. All the same, I have left the transmitted text as it is in both cases, but not without hesitation.⁴³ Of c. 200 conditional (and concessive) clauses with εἰ, c. 120 have the present indicative (often ἐστίν) or omit the copula. There are a couple of perfect indicatives and ten future indicatives. The latter rarely if ever have the “minatory and monitory character” often attached to them in classical Greek (Gildersleeve 1876 and 1888). C. 25 clauses with εἰ have the optative (present or aorist). Apart from the two cases of ἐάν with the optative mentioned above, there are also three occurrences of the optative with ἄν in a conditional clause with εἰ (3.1.3, 244.16; 3.10.5, 346.8 and 9). While this is certainly suspicious, errors of transmission are perhaps less likely to be the cause, not least on account of the fact that two of these occurrences are within two lines of each other. I have thus left the transmitted text as it is in these cases too. In addition, there are three conditional clauses with εἰ that have the subjunctive: 2.6.3 (178.4), 3.6.7 (314.16), and 3.9.3 (338.18), the latter only in V. The subjunctives in 3.6.7 and 3.9.3 are homophonous (or nearly so) with the corresponding optative, and so I have printed the optative in both cases (see the notes on these passages in sec. 1.4.2). In the subjunctive in 2.6.3, which is coordinated with an indicative, the mood suffix is in the unstressed penultimate syllable (ἐμποδίζηται). Here I have printed the indicative (which is also the reading of P). In the apodoses, we find the present indicative or the omission of the copula c. 90 times, optatives with ἄν c. 40 times (mostly present forms, some aorists), the future indicative 16 times and only once the subjunctive with ἄν (3.2.27, 266.29; see above, “Spurious subjunctive with ἄν in main clauses”), although the subjunctive with ἄν in 3.4.5 (292.7; ibid.) also deserves another mention here, since it takes a conditional participle. Finally, there are around twenty unreal conditionals with either a secondary tense and ἄν or, in two cases, ἔδει, and, in one case (2.8.13, 198.5), οὐκ εἶχεν with the infini-

43 Horrocks (2017, 237) reports an example (16a) of ἤν with the optative in Anna Komnene, Alexias (1.2.7).

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tive, in the apodosis. It is perhaps not unlikely that in the latter case εἶχεν is treated as an “imperfect of unfulfilled possibility”, so that the omission of ἄν is authorial and well considered, although οὐκ εἶχε(ν) (or οὐκ ἔσχε(ν)) without ἄν does not seem to occur in the apodosis of a conditional sentence anywhere else in Metochites’ printed works, nor does it ever seem to have counterfactual force. Anyway, I have not treated the omission of ἄν in 2.8.13 as a suspected error of transmission. As an addendum I may mention in this connection that εἰ μή alternates with ὅτι μή and ἤ to introduce necessary conditions after οὐκ ἄλλως, which are never expressed by finite clauses, but sometimes by participles (conjunct or even absolute, as in 2.5.5, 164.5). Concessive clauses. There are twenty clauses introduced by κἄν in all three main MSS. As mentioned above (ad 1.5.39, 96.20, sec. 1.4.8), V has erasures immediately following κἄν in eight of these, over two of which εἰ has been written in a secondary (?) hand. In several instances the reading ante correctionem was manifestly καί: presumably this is true also of the less obvious cases. In one case (1.5.39), V, but not M or A, still has κἂν καί, followed by the present indicative. Apart from the two secondary εἰ (2.4.23, 154.18 and 3.3.10, 274.9), there are three other instances of κἂν εἰ (1.4.38, 76.17; 2.1.21, 110.23–24; 2.10.3, 218.21). In V, two of these five instances are followed by the present indicative (2.10.3, 3.3.10), two by the present subjunctive (1.4.38, 2.4.23) and one by the aorist optative (2.1.21). A has the present indicative in 2.4.23. In three other clauses κἄν is followed by the indicative in all MSS: aorist in 2.7.24, 190.15; perfect in 3.7.14, 330.2 and 3.10.1, 344.6–7. In all of these there is an erasure immediately following κἄν in V (manifestly of καί in 2.7.24). In one clause (3.2.11, 260.7) the copula is omitted; here, too, κἄν is followed by an erasure in V. In the ten remaining clauses (without εἰ or καί) κἄν is followed by the subjunctive in V (although ὁρῶνται in 2.3.3, 134.15 is ambiguous). In M and A one occasionally finds the indicative (M Aac in 2.5.13, 168.24; M in 2.7.22, 190.10; Mac in 2.5.15, 170.23), but only when the indicative and the subjunctive are homophonous. In two of these ten instances (2.5.13 and 2.7.22) κἄν is followed by an erasure in V. In addition, I have conjectured κἂν for ἂν before an εἰ-clause with the present optative in 1.3.35, 54.3. Concessive clauses introduced by εἰ καί or καὶ εἰ follow the patterns of conditional clauses introduced by εἰ (indicatives of all tenses and the occasional optative). Temporal clauses. Clauses introduced by ὅταν, the most frequent temporal conjunction, were discussed above (“Spurious indicative with ἄν … in dependent clauses”). Of six predicate verbs in clauses introduced by ἡνίκα and ὁπηνίκα, four are present indicatives; ἡνίκα is once found with the future indicative (1.2.5, 20.19) and once with the pure subjunctive (2.4.27, 158.1) where the subjunctive with ἄν (or the present indicative) might be expected. Similarly, πρίν occurs once (3.4.6, 292.14) with the expected subjunctive with ἄν after a negative clause and once (2.5.15, 170.20) with the unexpected pure subjunctive after an affirmative clause. Although at least the pure sub-

CLXII | 2 Form and Content of Metochites’ In De anima

junctives are suspicious,⁴⁴ they have not been emended, since this would in each case presuppose a relatively major scribal error, and the data is insufficient for determining the author’s idiolectal variation with any confidence. When μέχρι(ς) is used as a conjunction, it always takes ἄν (nine occurrences), but the mood may be optative or subjunctive seemingly regardless of context. It is used mainly with the present (“so long as”), only once with the aorist subjunctive and ἄν (2.5.8, 164.24–25). Otherwise it is used as a preposition, as is ἄχρι (once, 3.5.1, 306.10). ἔως is only used as a preposition. ἔστε, on the other hand, occurs twice (2.7.12, 186.1; 3.12.14, 370.21), both times with the subjunctive and ἄν. ὅτε may mean “in case” and take the optative (1.4.15, 64.16–17) or the optative with ἄν (1.1.12, 8.14–15, after emendation). Otherwise (twelve occurrences) it always takes the present indicative. As mentioned above, the predicate verb of a ὅταν-clause twice stands in the optative (aorist: 3.1.14, 252.3; present: 3.1.15, 252.12). These optatives may be comparable to the ones in ὅτε-clauses: their clauses are preceded by ὡς (“e.g.”) and refer to examples of types of coincidentally perceptible objects (see further ad locc. in sec. 1.6). Causal clauses. ἐπεί and ἐπειδή almost always have a causal force (there is an instance with temporal/quasi-conditional force in 3.3.7, 272.9, and possibly one with purely temporal force in 1.3.2, 38.10; for the latter see the note to the Translation ad loc.). Together the two conjunctions occur 113 times, almost always with the indicative, usually the present. Two of these indicatives are imperfects with ἄν dependent on the apodoses of unreal conditional sentences. As in the case of ὅτε-clauses, there are a small number of instances where the optative with ἄν occurs after these conjunctions, too, and always under special circumstances: in 2.1.13, 106.19 ἐπειδή introduces a whole potential (or “less vivid future”) conditional sentence; in 2.1.22, 110.25 and 2.12.7, 238.22 ἐπεί introduces independent clauses; in 3.10.1, 344.2 ἐπειδή introduces two coordinated causal clauses, the first of which has the optative with ἄν and is quasi‐concessive, while the second has the indicative. ἐπειδάν does not occur. I have not examined the moods and tenses in causal clauses after ὅτι and ὡς. Consecutive clauses with ὥστε. ὥστε occurs both with the infinitive (33 times) and with finite tenses (indicative 41 times, optative with ἄν 22 times, omitted verb 20 times). Some of the infinitives may be in reported speech. On the whole, the distribution seems to follow classical patterns inasmuch as the infinitive is more likely to express an expected or intended result than a factual one, the finite tenses more likely to express a factual result than an expected or intended one. In two instances of the infinitive after ὥστε the negative is οὐ (1.5.15, 84.24; 1.5.32, 92.20–21). 44 Of 14 other occurrences of ἡνίκα-clauses in printed prose works by Metochites, one has the optative and 13 have indicatives, most of them in a past tense; πρίν is mainly an adverb, occasionally takes the infinitive and once (Sem. gnom. 5.1.4) even the aorist optative with ἄν.

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2.3.5 Negatives οὐ and its compounds are almost three times as frequent as μή and its compounds (more than 1100 instances against slightly less than 400). In the majority of cases, Metochites’ usage conforms to the rules of classical grammar: οὐ is generally used with participles that are not conditional or general (and occasionally with declarative infinitives, e.g. 3.3.5, 270.17–18: καίτοι γέ φησιν αὐτοὺς ταῦτ’ οἰομένους καὶ λέγοντας οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐντελῶς λέγειν); μή is generally used with the indicative in conditional, conditional relative, and indefinite temporal clauses. But there are also many examples of non-classical usage. It is, for instance, striking that μή is sometimes used with the indicative in (a) causal clauses and (b), as was common already in Late Antiquity, in direct or indirect “why” questions: (a) (1.3.3, 38.15) κινοῦνται δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ βαδίζουσιν …. (2.4.27, 158.2) ὅτι δὴ καὶ μὴ μόνον πρόσθεσις καὶ αὔξησις ἐνεργεῖται τῷ ἐμψύχῳ …. (3.4.12, 296.5) ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὁ νοῦς αὐτός τι ἐνεργείᾳ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ νοήματα, ὅταν νοῇ ὁ αὐτὸς γενόμενος τοῖς νοουμένοις, τηνικαῦτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ….

The use in 1.3.3 could be by analogy with the rather frequent use of ὅτι μή in conditional relative clauses (“in so far as not”, “unless”, “except”). (b) (1.5.36, 94.23) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, διατί μὴ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἡ ψυχή, τὸ συνέχον καὶ ἑνοποιοῦν; (3.1.18, 254.13) Ὅτι ζητεῖ ἑξῆς διατί μὴ μία αἴσθησις ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ πλείους ….

There is also an example of μή with the present subjunctive in an independent clause, the force of which is suggested by the context not to be exactly that of a “doubtful assertion”, as is common in Plato (cf. Kühner & Gerth §394.7, 1: 224; Smyth §1801, 404): (1.5.37, 96.3) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὡς ἕν τι τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι, τὸ λέγειν καὶ αὐτὸν ὅτι ἓν ὁτιοῦν μέρος τοῦ σώματος συνέχει μὴ γελοῖον παντάπασιν ᾖ καὶ ἄτοπον ὅλως πλάσαι ….

Whether there are any general principles that allow us to explain why Metochites adheres to the classical rules concerning negatives when he does and why he does not when he does not will have to remain an open question. There are a few instances in In De an. where V and β disagree over the negative particle. Two of these were discussed in sec. 1.4.7: in 1.5.22, 88.6 οὐ is most likely a stylistic amendment in β; in 2.1.28, 114.15 the case is not so clear.

3 Principles of This Edition 3.1 Text 3.1.1 Constitutio textus In accordance with the reconstruction of the MSS’ genealogy presented in section 1.4, the only MSS that have been systematically employed as sources for the text are V and β (β = the agreement of M and A). Because of the lingering possibility that β was independent of V, or at least occasionally contaminated by an independent source (possibly the author himself or his original), and the likelihood that it was an edited copy, presumably produced with the author’s approval and support, I have attached significant value to its testimony, and have not hesitated to adopt its readings whenever they are in my view clearly superior to V’s (that is, whenever they yield a meaning that agrees better with whatever the author could charitably and reasonably be expected to say in the given context and/or with the linguistic conventions that the author could be expected to follow). Nevertheless, I have chosen to give priority to V whenever the two sources are in disagreement and their respective variant readings are “indifferent”; that is to say, when no clear criterion exists, in terms of content, grammar or lexicon, by which one is preferable to the other. As I have explained above (sec. 1.4.11), the reason why V should in my view be accorded this special status is precisely that it is more likely than β to reproduce the author’s own idiosyncratic style, and the interest of authenticity presumably trumps the interest of elegance in the edition of a historical text like In De an. Partly for the same reason I have taken a restrictive approach to emendation.¹ Accordingly, wherever there is a clear probability that a manifest error shared by all the MSS was in the original, I have left the text as it is and appended a note in the critical apparatus (“x malim”; “x addere velim”; “x delere velim”; “x transponere velim”). In cases, on the other hand, where it seems much more likely that we have to do with an error of transmission, I have usually intervened, especially where the remedy is obvious and easily administered. I have been somewhat less reluctant to make interventions in the form of additions or deletions than in the form of alterations or transpositions, since in the former cases the brackets in the text suspend the requirement to look in the critical apparatus in order to notice that the text has been emended. In addition to the manifest errors there are a relatively large number of borderline cases, where the unanimously transmitted text makes some sense, but would make better sense after a relatively small emendation. Such cases have for the most part not led to any interventions in the text, but have been noted in the critical apparatus. The

1 Cf. the judicious remarks by Bloch (2005, 7–9). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-204

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vast majority of suspected authorial or archetypal errors are briefly discussed above, in sections 1.4.2 and 1.6 (the discussion of any particular passage can be easily located by using the Critical index). It was established in section 1.4.5 that P is a descendant of V, but since it was produced in relative chronological and institutional proximity to the composition of the work, there may still be reason to suspect occasional contamination from prearchetypal sources. P has therefore been collated for all dubious or particularly vexing passages, but its readings have not been recorded in the critical apparatus, except for a few cases of particular interest (they are, however, included in the discussions in sections 1.4.2 and 1.6).

3.1.2 Division of the Text The Text and Translation are divided in accordance with the chapter division of Aristotle’s text in general use since the Renaissance. Most new chapters coincide with a new section in the MSS’ text of Metochites’ paraphrase. The exceptions are 1.5 and 3.10. Each chapter has been subdivided into paragraphs (numbered in the outer margin). These usually begin with a sentence containing the verb φησίν, “he (sc. Aristotle) says”, since the clusters of words and phrases quoted verbatim from Aristotle around occurrences of this verb are the closest equivalent in the paraphrase to lemmata in a continuous commentary (see sec. 2.1). The section division of the MSS’ text of the paraphrase is reflected in line breaks, indentations and a capitalized Ὅτι. A line break and a blank line have also been inserted before chapters 1.5 and 3.10 and before and after the only more extensive poetic quotation, in 1.2.15.

3.1.3 Orthography Whenever there is any support, even if only partial, in V, M or A, for the established spelling of a word (including lexical accentuation), I have imposed this spelling across the board. If, on the other hand, all three MSS consistently agree on an unconventional spelling, I have retained this. Thus I have not corrected στείραξ (for στύραξ) and ἀλώη (for ἀλόη) in 2.9.5, 210.16–17 or γιγκλισμός (usually γιγγλυμός or γίγγλυμος) in 3.10.17, 352.20 and 354.4. Nor have I corrected κωμῳδιοδιδάσκαλος in 1.3.21, 46.11, the reading of all three MSS. The form with -ιο- is not recorded in LSJ, but occurs in the scholia to Aristophanes and in several MSS of Aristotle (1.3, 406b 17–18).² τεμάχιον in 1.3.32, 52.2 and κατατεμαχίζω in 1.3.31, 50.23 are spelt with a double μ in all MSS. This has not

2 Besides, there is no reason to treat this word differently from κωμῳδιογράφος and κωμῳδιοποιός, which are recognized variant forms since antiquity (and duly recorded in LSJ).

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been corrected. ἐκπυρηνίζω in 1.2.5, 20.22 is spelt with a double ρ in all MSS. This has not been corrected. All MSS (A post corr.) accentuate ἀκροχόρδονες for ἀκροχορδόνες in 3.12.6, 364.13. This has not been corrected. On the other hand, the perfect participle κεκραμένος is usually spelt κεκραμμένος in all three MSS (1.1.26, 14.2; 2.10.2, 218.12; 3.7.6, 324.19; 3.8.8, 334.19), but has the regular spelling in V and M in 3.2.16, 262.8. On the basis and authority of the latter case I have normalized the spelling everywhere. Similarly, all three MSS have γραμματίω in 3.4.6, 292.14 but γραμματεῖον in 3.4.22, 302.2. Thus I have printed γραμματείῳ in 3.4.6. κρίνω is usually accentuated, in all three MSS, as if the ι were short (e.g. κρίνον for κρῖνον), but in 3.7.8, 326.17 M and A have the established accentuation. Thus I have imposed the latter on all instances. Similarly, κρᾶσις is usually accentuated as if the α were short (e.g. κράσις) in V and M, whereas A usually has the established accentuation. Thus I have imposed the latter on all instances. Similarly, ἀκτίς is usually accentuated as if the ι were short (e.g. ἀκτίνες for ἀκτῖνες), but in 3.12.15, 372.3 M and A have the established accentuation. Thus I have imposed the latter on all instances. I have always printed -ώς in the neuter singular nominative and accusative of active perfect participles of athematic verbs, although all three MSS sometimes have -ῶς (e.g. in 1.1.2, 4.13 all three MSS have ἑστῶς – although P has ἑστὼς —; in 3.1.12, 250.17 all three MSS have ἑστῶς; in 3.10.8, 348.12 M and A have ἐνεστῶς, but V – as well as P – have ἐνεστὼς). In 3.1.10, 248.29 V has κολωβοῖς where M and A have the established spelling κολοβοῖς. Thus I have printed the latter. V usually has δρυμ- for δριμ- (2.8.31, 206.1–2; 2.9.5, 210.12; 2.10.5, 220.12; 2.10.11, 222.21 – but not 3.4.8, 294.3). M and A always have the established spelling (sometimes post corr.), which I have imposed throughout. There is also variation between different established spellings in all three MSS. In these cases I have not intervened. Thus I have retained the variation between τελεώτερος and τελειότερος,³ between ὀσμή and ὀδμή,⁴ between γλῶσσα and γλῶττα,⁵ as well as between τέσσαρα and τέτταρα.⁶ In case of disagreement (1.2.22, 28.16; 1.2.26, 30.11; 1.3.5, 40.4–5; 2.6.2, 176.13), I have followed V. As is common, there is some confusion between, respectively, γενητός/ γεννητός and ἀγένητος/ἀγέννητος, in the senses of “generated” and “ungenerated”. Here I have followed V, which has the shorter forms derived from γίνομαι in all instances but one (3.12.2, 362.7, where I have normalized).

3 -εώ- 2.3.8; 2.3.11; 3.3.11; -ειό- 2.3.11; 3.1.4 (bis). 4 -σ- 2.3.4; 2.7.21 (bis); 2.7.23; 2.7.24 (ter); 2.9.1; 2.9.10; 2.9.13; 2.12.10; 3.4.8 (bis); 3.12.11; 3.13.4; -δ- 2.7.21 (bis); 2.9.5; 2.12.7 (ter). 5 -σσ- 2.8.28; 2.11.13; 2.11.14 (bis); -ττ- 2.8.28; 2.8.29; 2.10.3 (bis); 2.10.8; 2.10.10; 2.12.11; 3.2.24; 3.2.29; 3.13.6. 6 -σσ- 1.2.15; 1.2.35; 1.3.4; 1.3.5 (bis); 2.2.6; 2.2.7 (ter); 2.11.15; -ττ- 1.2.19; 1.2.20; 1.2.21; 1.3.4; 2.2.8; 3.1.5; 3.10.10.

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There are many irregularities relative to breathings in all three MSS, but no word invariably has the nonstandard breathing (although ἁφή is almost always spelt ἀφή in A). Thus I have always printed the standard breathing. No clear distinction is upheld in the three MSS between the indefinite pronoun ἄττα and the relative pronoun ἅττα. I have selected or corrected in accordance with the syntax of each individual passage. Sometimes it is difficult to decide which word is intended (e.g. 3.4.12, 296.14). As is seen, I have often followed the more regular orthography of β. A general argument in favour of this policy is that, even if β was a copy of V, it was apparently an edited copy, so that the more regular orthography is likely to be the result of corrections, not of corruptions, and of corrections that the scribe must have considered himself authorized to make. A general argument in favour of not extending this policy to include the grammatical or purely stylistic corrections in β is that grammatical and stylistic corrections interfere more substantially than orthographic ones with the author’s idiolect, and even though the scribe in this case too must have considered himself authorized to make the corrections, there is a value in preserving the substantial features of an author’s idiolect, however awkward it may seem, and even if preserving these features should be against the author’s own wish. A general argument in favour of following the predominant orthography in β even in instances where β exceptionally follows V is that these instances are most easily explained as oversights (on the assumption that any author or editor normally seeks to spell the same word consistently in the same way, even if admittedly the variation between τελεώτερος and τελειότερος, γλῶσσα and γλῶττα, etc., sometimes in the same paragraph or even in the same line, would seem to challenge this assumption). I have consistently printed iota subscripts where lexically or morphologically motivated. There are no iota subscripts or adscripts in V’s, Μ’s or A’s text of In De an.

3.1.4 Closed and open combinations There is considerable variation, not only between the three MSS, but also in each of them severally, with respect to the separation of words in a number of set prepositional phrases. V consistently writes ἐξανάγκης. This phrase is for the most part written divisim in M and A. I have followed the usage in V. A always, and V almost always (except in 2.3.31, 132.2), writes διατοῦτο. This phrase is sometimes written divisim in M. I have followed the predominant usage. In contrast, M and A invariably have διόλου, whereas V on one occasion (2.5.19, 174.7) has δι’ ὅλου. Here, too, I have followed the predominant usage. All three MSS always and unanimously have διατί (the interrogative pronoun) rather than διὰ τί. I have followed this usage. In M and A, the interrogative determiner, too, is once written iunctim (1.5.28, 90.15: διατίνα … τὴν αἰτίαν, for διὰ τίνα … τὴν αἰτίαν). I have not followed this usage. On the other hand, I have always printed πρὸ ὀλίγου, which is invariably the reading of M and A, although V sometimes (six times out of twenty) has προολίγου. Like-

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wise, I have always printed ἐπὶ πλέον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, which are invariably the readings of M and A, although V on one occasion (1.5.40, 96.23) has ἐπιπλεῖστον. In the name of consistency, I have also printed M’s ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ rather than V’s and A’s ἐπιτοπολύ in 3.6.12, 320.6. V and M practically always have καθ’ αὑτό, καθ’ ἕκαστα etc. A usually has καθαυτό, καθέκαστα, etc. I have followed the usage in V and M. As regards καθ’ ὅ/καθό, V seems to make a distinction between its use as a preposition plus relative pronoun and its use as an adverb (roughly interchangeable with ᾗ). I have tried to uphold this distinction. Likewise, δηλονότι is always written iunctim when used as an adverb, but divisim when it is the adjective/adverb and the conjunction (e.g. 3.9.9, 342.15). In one instance (2.5.14, 170.7), V has εἰδεμή for εἰ δὲ μή. This has been corrected. All three MSS occasionally, and M always, have μὴ δέ for μηδέ. This has been corrected. V usually, and M and A rarely, have μὴ δὲ μίαν for μηδεμίαν. This has been corrected. Conversely, in 2.11.2, 224.17 μηδεμίαν (V A) has been corrected into μηδὲ μίαν. V and M write ἄλλάττα, A writes ἄλλ’ ἄττα. I have followed the usage in V and M. I print the neuter singular nominative or accusative indefinite relative pronoun ὅ τι divisim, except in ὅτι μή, ὁτιοῦν. This does not affect accentuation (thus I print ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν).

3.1.5 Accents and other diacritics As noted in the preceding section, I have normalized lexical accents whenever there is support for this somewhere among the three MSS. I have also normalized prosodic accentuation (i.e. accentuation in the context of enclitics), which varies somewhat in the MSS – a sign, perhaps, that it was considered, if not by the author, then at least by the scribes, to be a matter of concern to the scribes rather than the author. The purpose of normalization in this case, as in the more important case of punctuation (see below, sec. 3.1.6), is to facilitate reading for a twenty-first-century readership which, I presume, is more familiar with the rules (relatively) clearly formulated in our standard Greek grammars and applied in most modern editions of ancient as well as medieval Greek texts than with the variable and still largely uncharted practices of medieval authors and scribes. All three MSS sometimes (although not always at the same time) accentuate the indefinite adverb πως like the interrogative adverb πῶς. If there is any method or system behind the scribal practices in this regard, I have yet to discover it. I have corrected the usage in accordance with modern editorial practices. Since there is a lexical difference involved, all these variants have been noted in the critical apparatus. As regards the accentuation of ἔστι(ν)/ἐστί(ν), I have adopted the practices endorsed by Kühner & Blass (§90.2, 1: 344) and Smyth (§187, 43), who combine Herodian’s rule (De enclisi 553.10–16) that the word should be written ἔστι(ν) (a) whenever it begins a sentence or clause, and (b) whenever it follows οὐκ, εἰ, ὡς, καί, ἀλλά

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or τοῦτο, with Hermann’s rule (1801, 84–90) that the word should be written ἔστι(ν) (c) whenever it expresses existence or possibility (or, in general, is emphatic: cf. Kahn 2003, 424 n. 7). I have followed Smyth in also writing ἔστι(ν) after μή, which is not in Herodian’s list, but in the corresponding list in Etymologicum magnum (301.3–5, 863), where, on the other hand, οὐκ is omitted. In addition, I have written ἔστι(ν) whenever the word seems to express necessity or desirability (on “modal” ἔστιν in In De an., see sec. 2.3.3). The scribe of V usually writes ἔστι(ν) after any punctuation mark and always after οὐκ (as well as οὐδ’), εἰ, ὡς (with one exception), καί, ἀλλά and μή (as well as μὴδ’ [sic]), but ἐστί(ν) after τοῦτο. Outside these contexts ἔστι(ν) is rarely used (but does occur, regardless of whether it is motivated by Hermann’s rule).⁷ The variation between ἐστι(ν) and ἐστί(ν) is erratic: in most cases after an oxytone, sometimes after a perispomenon, and sometimes after a proparoxytone with an accent added on the ultima, there is no accent; in most other cases there is. Τhus we find, on consecutive lines, θυμὸς ἐστὶν ὄρεξις and θυμός ἐστι ζέσις (136r : 2.2.4, 118.4–5), and very many other similar examples. As regards the accentuation of indefinite τὶς/τις, I have adhered to the practices endorsed by Kühner & Blass (§90.5, 1: 345–46). This means, basically, that τὶς is orthotone when emphatic. This rule covers both its use as the particular quantifier (when it is opposed to the universal quantifier πᾶς) and in contrasting pairs (“τινὲς μὲν …, τινὲς δὲ …”). Metochites sometimes uses ὁτέ like ποτέ, as a free-standing adverb followed neither by μέν nor by δέ (e.g. 3.1.12, 250.16; 3.2.2, 256.10; 3.5.8, 310.22). This is always orthotone in all three MSS, and that is also how it has been printed. In 3.5.5, 310.1–2 all three MSS accentuate καὶ χωριστὸς μέν ἐστιν ὁτὲ … ὁτὲ δ’ οὔ. Since this clause requires a copula (the subject is understood from the preceding coordinated clause, where the predicate is an intransitive verb), I have treated the ὁτὲ after ἐστιν as another example of the free-standing adverb (instead of normalizing to ἔστιν ὅτε). As mentioned in the preceding section, I have followed the usage of V and M in writing ἄλλάττα iunctim and with two acute accents.

7 Kahn (2003, 420–24) argues convincingly against the hypothesis underlying Hermann’s rule, namely, that the variation between ἔστι(ν) and ἐστί(ν) in ancient Greek is determined by semantics (ἔστι[ν] being, supposedly, the emphatic variant used to express, e.g., existence and possibility). In fact, this hypothesis finds little if any support either in the textual traditions of ancient authors or in the findings of historical linguistics. As for Byzantine authors, it seems clear at least that the MSS of In De an. do not follow Hermann’s rule but do follow Herodian’s, albeit with certain modifications (which may vary between scribes: I have not investigated the matter systematically). There are two main reasons why I have opted to follow the modern grammarians rather than the MSS (or V) in this respect: (1) since ἔστι(ν) is usually written after any punctuation mark in the MSS, it would make little sense to follow the MSS in these instances unless one also adopts their punctuation (on which see sec. 3.1.6); (2) the fact that Hermann’s rule is difficult to justify historically does not exclude the possibility that a formal distinction between existential/“modal” and copulative uses is helpful to the reader. For a recent defence of Hermann’s rule, see Probert (2003, 144–46).

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Dashes and round brackets are counted as punctuation marks for the purposes of accentuation (e.g. an oxytone before a dash or a left round bracket carries the acute). Guillemets are not counted as punctuation marks. ταυτό, ταυτότης, etc., are almost always written without the coronis in all three MSS. I have followed this practice. τοὐναντίον, τἀναντία, etc., on the other hand, are almost always written with the coronis in all three MSS. I have followed this practice as well. It may be noted that in both these series of expressions the article is sometimes written separately (τὸ αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον). In 2.9.6, 210.21 and 2.9.10, 212.23 all three MSS have ἄνθρωπος without the article, although the article seems required. This is possibly a scribal error for ἅνθρωπος.

3.1.6 Punctuation There are eminently valid reasons for being cautious in normalizing orthography. Punctuation, however, is a different matter. Metochites’ sentences are often long and complicated, often contain parenthetically inserted phrases or clauses, and are sometimes slightly anacoluthic to boot. They can be pretty difficult to parse unless one is aided by extensive punctuation. But the punctuation(s) of the MSS is not likely to be particularly helpful. Here is an almost randomly chosen sample from 2.8.4 (194.6–8): (V152r ) ὑπερβάλλει γὰρ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ταχὺ τῆς πληγῆς τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ στερεῶν ὡς εἴρηται καὶ πλάτος ἐχόντων σωμάτων, τὴν διάθρυψιν τοῦ ἀέρος· κἀντεῦθεν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ψόφοι γίνονται:– (M251v ) ὑπερβάλλει γὰρ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ταχὺ τῆς πληγῆς, τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ στερεῶν ὡς εἴρηται· καὶ πλάτος· ἐχόντων σωμάτων, τὴν διάθρυψιν τοῦ ἀέρος κἀντεῦθεν, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ψόφοι γίνονται: (A214v ) ὑπερβάλλει γὰρ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ταχὺ τῆς πληγῆς, τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ στερεῶν ὡς εἴρηται καὶ πλάτος ἐχόντων σωμάτων, τὴν διάθρυψιν τοῦ ἀέρος κἀντεῦθεν, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ψόφοι γίνονται:+

The only punctuation mark shared by all three MSS in this passage is also the one most detrimental to the understanding: the direct object is separated from its verb by a comma. I have argued elsewhere (Bydén 2012) that it is right and reasonable to maintain the unfashionable custom of imposing modern punctuation on Byzantine texts in all those cases where the advantages for prospective readers are likely to outweigh the disadvantages. There is no need to repeat my arguments here, except to say that In De an. is a case in point: readers not versed in Byzantine scribal practices would undoubtedly find Metochites’ thorny prose even harder to digest with the punctuation(s) of the MSS than without any punctuation at all. I use the bracketed plural -s advisedly. Normalizing the punctuation has the added benefit of removing the need to choose between the different practices of different scribes. These are as variable as the sample above suggests. In the more extensive samples I have taken, the punctuation of P differs from that of V (which

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is almost certainly its exemplar), and that of A from that of M (which is almost certainly its sibling), approximately once in every two printed lines; the punctuation of A differs from that of V about once per printed line; and that of M differs from that of V even more frequently. And this is without even attempting to distinguish between low, middle and high dots, although the scribes seem to have used at least two of them, Manuel of Corinth perhaps all three. This clearly indicates, I think, that each scribe punctuated the text as he saw fit (although he was obviously guided by the punctuation of his exemplar), and there is no way of knowing which scribe’s practices come closest to those of the author. On the other hand, of course, normalizing the punctuation has the disadvantage that readers coming from different linguistic and educational backgrounds are obliged to figure out what the editor’s practices are and temporarily accept these as the normal. In order to mitigate the first part of this obligation, let me say a few words about the conventions I have applied in editing In De an. But first a disclaimer. The punctuation in this edition has no other purpose than to facilitate the comprehension of the text. I have not tried to achieve clockwork consistency, as it were, for consistency’s sake, but always focused on finding the best way to help the reader grasp what I take to be the meaning of the passage in question. In all likelihood, therefore, I have punctuated sentences more heavily the longer and more convoluted they are. By and large, however, main clauses are separated by commas if and only if they are contrastive or their subjects are different. Short parenthetical clauses consisting of one or several words like φησίν, ὡς εἴρηται, etc., or introduced by ἤτοι, εἴτουν, etc., are separated from the surrounding clause by commas (or sometimes brackets or dashes). Adverbial clauses are separated from their main clauses by commas when they are modifiers of the whole main clause (e.g. 1.2.32, 32.22–23: ᾗ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων ταύτην συνίστησι, τὸ γνωστικὸν πάντων ἐντεῦθεν αὐτῆς ὑποδεικνύει …; 2.11.16, 232.13–14: τὸ δὲ «ᾗ σῶμα» εἴρηται, ὅτι …). Adjectival (relative) clauses are only separated from their main clauses by commas if they are non-restrictive (digressive) (e.g. 3.1.11, 250.2–3: … ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινητικὴν δύναμιν ζῴοις, ἐν οἷς προδήλως εἰσὶ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις). Conjunct “satellite” participial phrases are often, absolute “satellite” participial phrases very often, separated from the rest of their clauses by a comma (or sometimes brackets or dashes), especially in longer sentences (e.g. 2.9.13, 214.27–216.2: ὡς ἄν, σφοδρότερον αὐτοῦ προσβάλλοντος τοῖς φλεβίοις καὶ τοῖς πόροις τοῦ ὀσφραντικοῦ αἰσθητηρίου καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτω διανοίγοντος, ἡ ἀντίληψις τῷ ζῴῳ γίνηται τῆς ὀσμῆς). Appositives (often introduced by ἤτοι, εἴτουν, etc.) are separated from the words to which they stand in apposition by a comma (or sometimes brackets or dashes) (e.g. 2.11.16, 232.18: διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται ὅτι ταῦτά εἰσι τὰ ἁπτά, αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σώματος). On the other hand, subject clauses are not separated from their main clauses (their predicates) by commas (e.g. 2.12.6, 238.14–15: εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι …). Nor are object clauses after verbs of saying and indirect questions after verbs of asking (e.g. 2.11.16, 232.18: διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται ὅτι …). Adverbial clauses are not separated from their

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main clauses by commas when they are not modifiers of the whole main clause (e.g. 1.2.31, 32.14–16: ᾗ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ σύστασις ἐδόκουν ταύτην ἔχειν τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ πάντων καταληπτικόν ….). Restrictive adjectival (relative) clauses are not separated from their main clauses by commas (e.g. 2.7.19, 188.18–19: … ἡ μὲν αἰτία δι’ ἣν τὰ χρώματα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ φαίνεται δήλη γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων …). Some readers will no doubt find that I have made excessive use of dashes and brackets. My defence is that I have only used them to the extent that I believe they facilitate the construction of sentences. As I just mentioned, Metochites’ prose is littered with phrases and clauses that interrupt both the syntax and the train of thought. My primary criterion for choosing between dashes and brackets has been whether the enclosed passage ends with a punctuation mark. Before punctuation marks I have put brackets. Guillemets have been used both for explicit quotations and, in some cases, for words that refer to their own type rather than to their normal referents (“mention, not use”). As in Aristotle and other ancient authors, the distinction between mention and use is often precarious.

3.2 Translation The primary aim of the Translation is to reproduce the theses and arguments of the original text as clearly and comprehensibly as possible. This may be taken to mean that I have in some sense striven for “functional equivalence”, but not that I have done so at the expense of “formal equivalence”. The original text is a philosophical text, and, the way I see it, philosophical theses and arguments are to a considerable extent inseparable from the language in which they are expressed. Consequently, I do not think it would be possible to reproduce – successfully, to spell it out – the theses and arguments of the original text without maintaining a high degree of formal equivalence. I have practically never resorted to paraphrase. Whenever there is a word in the Translation that has no counterpart in the original, it is because, in my view, (1) it contributes to clarity and comprehensibility, and (2) the addition of the counterpart in the original would make no difference to the sense of the passage. If I have had any doubts about the fulfilment of the second condition, I have enclosed the word in square brackets. In the vast majority of cases referred to in this paragraph the copula has been omitted in the Greek, as frequently happens. In many other cases I have tacitly inserted “namely” or “that is” before an explanatory word, phrase or clause, although there is no such word (e.g. εἴτουν, ἤγουν, ἤτοι, οἷον) in the original. As has been explained above (sec. 2.3.2), I have often rendered the emphatic pronoun αὐτός by italics. In addition, I have often translated anaphoric pronouns by their antecedents. In Greek anaphoric pronouns can be used more extensively than in En-

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glish, without much risk of ambiguity, since the gender of the pronoun usually makes the antecedent clear. It is often considered desirable in translations of philosophical texts that, so far as possible, every single word type in the original should correspond to a single word type in the translation and vice versa. In principle, I agree with this sentiment. It is also undeniable, however, that the full implementation of such a policy in a translation from Greek into English is incompatible with the stated aims of clarity and comprehensibility (and more so the less Greek the readers have). In seeking to strike a balance between the clarity of the local context and the consistency of the text as a whole I may have come down slightly more on the former side than the majority of recent translations of ancient Greek philosophy into English do. In a few passages, where the transmitted text is problematic, I have instead translated a suggested emendation. This has always been signalled in a footnote (and for the most part a translation of the transmitted text has also been provided). Of course, the clarity and comprehensibility of a translation is only part of its functional equivalence to the original. Not even that, if the original is obscure and incomprehensible. Some readers may feel that this Translation smooths off too many rough edges in Metochites’ style. I agree that the failure to convey the original’s style may be a serious flaw in a translation, especially if the author was (or is) as highly conscious of their rhetorical appearance as Metochites was. But the element of obscurity and incomprehensibility in the Aristotelian paraphrases is probably the result of insufficient care rather than a deliberately cultivated feature. For, as Metochites himself observed in his Semeioseis gnomikai, a philosopher is not at all concerned about language except only as a means of expressing in public the rational activities that are natural to human beings …. Philosophers regard the cultivation of a style as a highly superfluous thing ….⁸

To put it differently: in so far as obscurity and incomprehensibility are part of Metochites’ style, the stated aims of clarity and comprehensibility appear to be at odds with the implementation of a functionally equivalent translation. But since there is reason to believe (a) that the obscurities and infelicities that do occur in In De an. are for the most part involuntary results of time pressure and other unfortunate circumstances, and (b) that readers of the Translation will be more interested in finding out what the author is trying to say than in seeing exactly how he makes a mess of it, I have opted, as a general rule, to push gently in the direction of clarity and comprehensibility. Still, it is my hope and belief that enough will remain of the author’s personal voice even after this treatment to satisfy all but perhaps the most ardent Metochites aficionados.

8 Οὐ γὰρ μέλει τῆς γλώττης τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ὁπῃοῦν ἄλλως ἢ ὥστε καὶ φέρειν ἔξω μόνον τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰς τοῦ λογικοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνεργείας …. Ἡ δὲ περὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπιμέλεια περίεργον εἶναι φιλοσόφοις μάλιστα δοκεῖ … (Sem. gnom. 26.1.2–3).

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Speaking of which: I wrote in an encyclopedia article many years ago that while Metochites “is notorious for his thorny style, especially in his poems, and also in some of his prose …, the prose of his Paraphrases is plain (and repetitive) to the point of monotony” (Bydén 2011, 1267). I would like to take the opportunity here to qualify the latter part of this statement. It is certainly true that Metochites’ style varies with the task it is intended to perform, and the task of his Orationes as well as his Semeioseis gnomikai – not to mention his Carmina – is apparently not to please and entertain. But just like Drossaart Lulofs’ remark that, while the Proem “causes all sorts of difficulty to the reader”, Metochites’ diction in the Aristotelian paraphrases themselves is “clear and simple” and his periods “long, but not obscure”,⁹ so also my 2011 statement exaggerates the contrast. Not all terminology in In De an. is clear and simple, and some periods are truly obscure. Try 2.5.9–10, for instance.

3.3 Apparatuses 3.3.1 Apparatus criticus The critical apparatus is basically negative. That is to say, with certain exceptions, all and only witnesses to readings different from those adopted in the text are recorded. “All witnesses” are = V, M and A. The main exception is that corrections (including erasures), supralinear or marginal text and other noteworthy features in the several MSS have been noted “positively”. Thus, for instance, {κέντρου A1pc (ex κύκλου)} means that all MSS have the reading κέντρου, but in A this is a correction of κύκλου by the main scribe. The main reason why it is inconvenient to report these features negatively is that it is not always possible to know what the ante correctionem reading of a MS was. On the other hand, {κρᾶσιν] κράσιν V M Aac } means that κρᾶσιν is found only in Apc . There is another exception to the negative principle: very occasionally, P is recorded as being in agreement with the reading adopted in the text, because it may shed some light on the situation in Vac and Vpc . Words in lemmata in the critical apparatus represent the same words in the text. The words in the text have been edited. Consequently, words in lemmata in the critical apparatus may have certain features – prosodic accents, iota subscriptum, capital initial, even punctuation, in the case of a multiword lemma – that differ from the way the same words are written in the MSS. That is to say, no inference can be made about

9 “Introductionem in Commentaria qui legerit statim reperiet illa iudicia vera esse [the reference is to a damning verdict of Metochites’ prose style delivered by Tycho Mommsen]. Sermone tumidiore et illic utitur, vocabulis quibusdam novam vim attribuit, omnis denique generis difficultates lectori affert. Sed ubi sermone facili opus est, ubi Aristotelis tenebris lumen adhibere vult, verbis planis ac perspicuis utitur, periodisque longis quidem, non tamen obscuris” (Drossaart Lulofs 1943, xxv).

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the presence or absence of a prosodic accent in the witnesses from its presence or absence in a lemma in the apparatus. In contrast, readings different from those adopted in the text are always reported exactly as they are written in the respective MSS. The punctuation and the prosodic accentuation of the MSS are as a rule not recorded in the critical apparatus. There are two exceptions. In the MSS, τί and πῶς are sometimes the orthotone indefinite pronouns. Since in modern practice, however, πῶς is always interrogative and τί is always interrogative unless followed by an enclitic (or, in a very small number of cases, it is emphatic and followed by a punctuation mark), I have treated τί and τι and πῶς and πως, respectively, as different words for the purposes of the critical apparatus. For transpositions, the following conventions have been used: (a) when a single word has been transposed across a single word, this is reported as {καὶ ταῦτα transp. M}; (b) when a single word has been transposed across two or several words, or the transposition is complex, this is reported as {καὶ ταῦτα ἔχει] ἔχει καὶ ταῦτα M}; (c) very long transpositions are treated as an omission plus an addition: {φησίν om. M … εἶναι] φησίν add. M}. If I write “seclusi” the implication is that the reading in question is present in all witnesses. If I write “supplevi” the implication is that the reading in question is not present in any witness. I use “correxi” only for emendations of accent and spelling errors (including erroneous breathing marks), “scripsi” for all substantial emendations. Most suspected archetypal and authorial errors that have not been emended are reported in the critical apparatus, usually with the labels “malim”, “delere velim” or “addere velim”, “collocare velim post …”, sometimes (where the degree of suspicion is lower) with the label “fort. legendum”. No formal distinction is made between suspected archetypal errors and suspected authorial errors (most suspected errors are, however, discussed under either of these two headings above [1.4.2 and 1.6]; the discussion of any particular passage can be easily located by using the Critical index). “x : y exspectaveris” is used where diction or grammar in isolated passages deviates markedly from standard usage but are probably part of the author’s idiolect, and there are no grounds to suspect an error of transmission. More systematic deviations from standard usage have not been noted in the critical apparatus (but a few more notable ones have been discussed above, sec. 2.3). Most suspected archetypal and authorial errors, emended or otherwise, have been discussed in sections 1.4.2 and 1.6 respectively. Uncertainty about the hand responsible for a correction or an addition above the line or in the margin is signalled by a question mark (e.g. {σκληρότης A2?pc (ex σμικρότης)}). Uncertainty about other matters is signalled by the phrase “ut vid.” If this phrase is within brackets, it applies to the preceding word(s), normally a reading. If it is not within brackets, it applies to the following word(s). Thus, for instance, (a) {εἴτουν] ἢ (ut vid.) A} signals uncertainty about the reading in A; (b) {αἰσθάνεται (αἰM1pc , ut vid. ex ἐ‑)} signals uncertainty about the reading in Mac ; (c) {χερσαῖα (‑αῖ- ut

CLXXVI | 3 Principles of This Edition vid. M1pc )} signals uncertainty about whether or not -αῖ- is the result of a correction in M. Most corrections of the In De an. text in V seem to have been made by the scribe in scribendo, but about a dozen cases are different from the main text with respect to the ink or other features. In all of these except one P agrees with Vpc , so the corrections must have been made very early on. The latter are all of a rather trivial nature; in all of them except one β, too, agrees with Vpc : it seems likely, then, that they were made from the exemplar. They have all been noted in the critical apparatus with the siglum V2?pc . In the remaining case (2.7.4, 180.19, for which see sec. 1.4.2), neither P nor β agrees with Vpc . This correction has been noted in the critical apparatus with the siglum V3?pc . Similarly, the few corrections of the In De an. text in M A that do not seem to be in the hand of the respective scribes have been noted with the sigla M2?pc and A2?pc . Note that, although the In De an. text was copied by three or perhaps four different scribes, the siglum M1 always refers to the scribe of the passage in question. Normally, if a lemma in the critical apparatus refers to a word token which occurs in the same line as another word token of the same type, the word is followed by a superscript number (1–4). Note, however, that if the accent is different, the two word tokens are counted as different types, and are consequently not numbered in the same series. For instance, if the line reads ἔτι δέ φησι· πῶς δὲ ἄρα καὶ νοοῖντο, ὡς τοῦτο καθόλου πᾶσι δοκεῖ, and M has ἔτι δέ φησι· πῶςδὲ ἄρα etc., this will be recorded as {δὲ M1sl } (not {δὲ2 M1sl }).

3.3.2 Apparatus aristotelicus This apparatus simply notes the passages of the De anima paraphrased in different portions of the text.

3.3.3 Apparatus fontium This apparatus simply notes the sources of explicit quotations and explains references. Author names and titles of works are abbreviated in accordance with LSJ (Priscian of Lydia’s name is however always abbreviated simply as Prisc.). DK refers to Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker., 6th ed., edited by Hermann Diels and Walter Krantz (Berlin, 1951–1952).

3.3.4 Apparatus locorum parallelorum In this apparatus, which is appended to the Translation, I have referenced those passages in Themistius, In De an., Priscian of Lydia, In De an., Philoponus, In De an. 1–2

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and 3.4–8, Ps.-Philoponus, In De an. 3 (see above, sec. 2.2) that are potential sources for anything in Metochites’ paraphrase that is not mere rephrasing of Aristotle’s words. If it seems clear which subsidiary source Metochites is following, I have usually not bothered to reference the others. If more than one possible source has been referenced for a passage, they appear in order of relevance (roughly equivalent to the likelihood of having been actually used). For In De an. 3.1–3, Sophonias, In De an. has also been taken into account, albeit not systematically.

4 Works Cited 4.1 Abbreviations CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae. 23 vols. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882–1909. Kühner & Blass = Kühner, Raphael & Friedrich Blass, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Erster Teil: Elementar- und Formenlehre. 3rd edn. 2 vols. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1890 (vol. 1) & 1892 (vol. 2). Kühner & Gerth = Kühner, Raphael & Bernhard Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre. 3rd edn. 2 vols. Hannover & Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1898 (vol. 1) & 1904 (vol. 2). Lampe = A Patristic Greek Lexicon, edited by G. W. H. Lampe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. LBG = Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität, besonders des 9.–12. Jahrhunderts, erstellt von Erich Trapp, unter Mitarbeit von W. Hörandner, J. Diethart & al. 2 vols. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994–2005. LSJ = A Greek–English Lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott. 9th edn. Revised and augmented throughout by Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940. Ross = Aristotle, De anima. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary, by Sir David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. Siwek = Aristotelis Tractatus de anima, graece et latine. Edidit, versione latina auxit, commentario illustravit Paulus Siwek. Rome: Desclée & C.i , 1965. Smyth = Greek Grammar by Herbert Weir Smyth. Revised by Gordon M. Messing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956. TLG = Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature. http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu

4.2 Ancient and medieval texts Alexander of Aphrodisias. De anima. Ed. I. Bruns (Alexandri de anima cum mantissa). CAG Suppl. 2.1. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887. Alexander of Aphrodisias. In Meteorologica. Ed. M. Hayduck (Alexandri in Aristotelis Meteorologicorum libros commentaria). CAG 3.2. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899. Arethas of Caesarea. Scholia on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories. Ed. M. Share. Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina 1. Athens, Paris & Brussels: Akadēmia Athēnōn, 1994. Choumnos, Nikephoros. Πρὸς τοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐλέγχοις τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ κακοτεχνῶς ῥητορευόντων καὶ τἀναντία Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς αὐτῷ δοκοῦσιν ἀστρονομοῦντας, in Anecdota Graeca e codicibus regiis, vol. 3, ed. J.-F. Boissonade (Paris: in regio typographeo, 1831), 365– 91. Etymologicum magnum. Ed. T. Gaisford. Oxford: e typographeo academico, 1848. Gregoras, Nikephoros. Epistulae. Ed. P. A. M. Leone. Matino: Tipografia di Matino, 1982–1983. Gregoras, Nikephoros. Roman History = Nicephori Gregorae Historiae Byzantinae. Ed. L. Schopen & I. Bekker. 3 vols. Bonn: Weber, 1829–1855. Herodian. De enclisi, in Grammatici Graeci, vol. 3.1, ed. A. Lentz (Leipzig: Teubner, 1867), 551–64.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-205

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Metochites, George. Historia dogmatica 1–2. Ed. J. Cozza-Luzi. Nova Patrum Bibliotheca 8. Rome: J. Spithoever, 1871. Metochites, Theodore. Byzantios. Ed. J. Polemis. Βυζαντινοὶ Συγγραφεῖς 18. Thessalonica: Ἐκδόσεις Ζήτρος, 2013. Metochites, Theodore. Carmen 12. Ed. M. Cunningham, J. Featherstone & S. Georgiopoulou, in Okeanos: Essays presented to Ihor Ševčenko on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students, ed. C. Mango & O. Pritsak (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1984), 100–116. Metochites, Theodore. In De memoria et reminiscentia. In Bloch (2005, 11–30). Metochites, Theodore. Presbeutikos. Ed. L. Mavromatis, in La fondation de l’empire serbe: Le kralj Milutin. Βυζαντινὰ Κείμενα καὶ Μελέται 16 (Thessalonica: Centre for Byzantine Research, 1978), 89–119. Metochites, Theodore. Proem to the Paraphrases. In Drossaart Lulofs (1943, 11–12). Metochites, Theodore. Semeioseis gnomikai, 1–26 & 71: ed. Hult (2002), 27–60: ed. Hult (2016), 61–70 & 72–80: ed. Wahlgren (2018), 81–120: ed. C. G. Müller & T. Kiessling (Theodori Metochitae Miscellanea philosophica et historica), Leipzig: F. C. G. Vogelius, 1821. Philoponus, John. In De anima 1–2. Ed. M. Hayduck (Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria). CAG 15. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1897. Philoponus, John. In De anima 3.4–8 (in Latin translation by William of Moerbeke). Ed. Verbeke (1966). Philoponus, John. In Meteorologica 1. Ed. M. Hayduck (Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Meteorologicorum librum primum commentarium). CAG 14.1. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1901. Philoponus, John. De opificio mundi. Ed. W. Reichardt. Leipzig: Teubner, 1897. Priscian (olim Simplicius). In De anima. Ed. M. Hayduck (Simplicii in libros Aristotelis de anima commentaria). CAG 11. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882. Ps.‐Philoponus. In De anima 3. Ed. M. Hayduck (Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria). CAG 15. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1897. Scholarios, George. Adnotationes in Aristotelis opera diversa. Ed. Jugie & al. (1936). Simplicius, In De caelo. Ed. J. L. Heiberg (Simplicii in Aristotelis De caelo commentaria). CAG 7. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1894. Simplicius, In Physica. Ed. H. Diels (Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria). CAG 9–10. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882–1895. Themistius. In De anima. Ed. R. Heinze (Themistii in libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis). CAG 5.3. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1890.

4.3 Modern works Agiotis, Nikos. 2021. Leon Magentenos, Commentary on Aristotle, Prior Analytics (Book II): Critical Edition with Introduction and English Translation. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter. Arnzen, Rüdiger. 1998. Aristoteles’ De anima: Eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in Arabischer und Persischer Überlieferung. Leiden: Brill. Bandini, Angelo Maria. 1770. Catalogus codicum graecorum Bibliothecae Laurentianae. Vol. 3. Florence: Typis regiis.

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Drossaart Lulofs, Hendrik Joan. 1943. Aristotelis de somno et vigilia liber, adiectis veteribus translationibus et Theodori Metochitae commentario. Leiden: Burgersdijk en Niermans. Ebbesen, Sten. 1981. Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post‐Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies. Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum 7. 3 vols. Leiden: Brepols. Fazzo, Silvia. 2004. Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition, in: Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, ed. P. Adamson, H. Baltussen & M. W. F. Stone. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement 83.1: 1–19. Féron, Ernest, & Fabio Battaglini. 1893. Codices manuscripti graeci Ottoboniani Bibliothecae Vaticanae. Vatican City: ex Typographeo Vaticano. Förstel, Christian. 1999. Manuel le Rhéteur et Origène: note sur deux manuscrits parisiens. Revue des études byzantines 57: 245–54. Giacomelli, Ciro. 2017. Beschreibung Marc. gr. 239 (Vorstufe). https://cagb-digital.de/handschriften/diktyon-69710 Gielen, Erika. 2013. Ad maiorem Dei gloriam: Joseph Rhakendytès’ Synopsis of Byzantine Learning, in Encyclopaedism from Antiquity to the Renaissance, ed. J. König & G. Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 259–76. Gildersleeve, Basil L. 1876. On εἰ with the Future Indicative and ἐάν with the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets. Transactions of the American Philological Association 7: 5–23. Gildersleeve, Basil L. 1888. Review of Transactions of the American Philological Association 1887. The American Journal of Philology 9: 491–92. Golitsis, Pantelis. 2007. Georges Pachymère comme didascale. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 58: 53–68. Golitsis, Pantelis. 2016. John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Third Book of Aristotle’s De anima, Wrongly Attributed to Stephanus, in Aristotle Re-Interpreted: New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 393–412. Golitsis, Pantelis. 2019. μετά τινων ἰδίων ἐπιστάσεων: John Philoponus as an Editor of Ammonius’ Lectures, in Aristotle and His Commentators: Studies in Memory of Paraskevi Kotzia, ed. P. Golitsis & K. Ierodiakonou, 167–93. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter. Groisard, Jocelyn. 2009. Cote: Grec 1866. https://archivesetmanuscrits.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cc19971q Hadot, Ilsetraut. 1990. Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories: Fasc. 1: Introduction, Première partie (p. 1–9,3 Kalbfleisch). Leiden: Brill. Hermann, Gottfried. 1801. De emendanda ratione graecae grammaticae. Pars prima. Leipzig: G. Fleischer. Hervet, Gentien. 1559. Theodori Metochitae in Aristotelis Physicorum, sive Naturalium auscultationum libros octo, & Parva (quae vocantur) naturalia, Paraphrasis longe doctiszima, & quae prolixi Commentarij vicem explere queat. Basel: N. Brylinger. Hinterberger, Martin, ed. 2014. The Language of Byzantine Learned Literature. Turnhout: Brepols. Holton, David, Geoffrey Horrocks, Marjolijne Janssen, Tina Lendari, Io Manolessou & Notis Toufexis. 2019. The Cambridge Grammar of Medieval and Early Modern Greek. 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horrocks, Geoffrey. 2010. Greek: A History of the Language and Its Speakers. 2nd edn. Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell. Horrocks, Geoffrey. 2017. ‘High’ and ‘Low’ in Medieval Greek, in Variation and Change in Ancient Greek Tense, Aspect and Modality, ed. K. Bentein, M. Janse & J. Soltic (Leiden: Brill), 219–41. Hult, Karin. 2002. Theodore Metochites on Ancient Authors and Philosophy: Semeioseis gnomikai 1–26 and 71. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Indexes. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 65. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.

CLXXXII | 4 Works Cited

Hult, Karin. 2016. Theodore Metochites on the Human Condition and the Decline of Rome: Semeioseis gnomikai 27–60. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Indexes. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 70. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 2002. Psellos’ Paraphrasis on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. K. Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 157–81. Jackson, Donald F. 2009. Greek Manuscripts of the de Mesmes Family. Scriptorium 63: 89–121. Jugie, Martin, Louis Petit & X. A. Sideridès. 1936. Œuvres complètes de Georges (Gennadios) Scholarios. Vol. 7: Commentaires et résumés des ouvrages d’Aristote. Paris: Maison de la bonne presse. Kahn, Charles H. 2003. The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek. 2nd edn. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett. Kermanidis, Markos. 2022. Allegorie und Lob der Physik: Das Proömium der Paraphrase des Theodoros Metochites zu naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles. Byzantinische Zeitschrift 115: 143–83. Lackner, Wolfgang. 1981. Die erste Auflage des Physiklehrbuches des Nikephoros Blemmydes, in Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen, ed. F. Paschke (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag), 351– 64. Lamberz, Erich. 2000. Das Geschenk des Kaisers Manuel II. an das Kloster Saint-Denis und der ‚Metochitesschreiber‘ Michael Klostomalles, in Λιθόστρωτον: Studien zur byzantinischen Kunst und Geschichte. Festschrift für Marcell Restle, ed. B. Borkopp & T. Steppan (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann), 155–65. Lamberz, Erich. 2006. Georgios Bullotes, Michael Klostomalles und die Byzantinische Kaiserkanzlei unter Andronikos II. und Andronikos III. in den Jahren 1298–1329, in Lire et écrire à Byzance, ed. B. Mondrain (Paris: Collège de France, CNRS), 33–48. Manolessou, Io. 2001. The Evolution of the Demonstrative System in Greek. Journal of Greek Linguistics 2, 119–48. Menn, Stephen. 2002. Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and the Programme of the De Anima. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22: 83–139. Mercati, Giovanni & Pio Franchi de’ Cavalieri. 1923. Codices Vaticani graeci 1: Codices 1–329. Rome: Typis polyglottis Vaticanis. Mioni, Elpidio. 1981. Codices Graeci manuscripti Bibliothecae Divi Marci Venetiarum. Vol. 1. Thesaurus antiquus. Codices 1–299. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato. Molin Pradel (2013) = Kerstin Hajdú, Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München. Vol. 2: Codices graeci Monacenses 56–109, neu beschrieben von Marina Molin Pradel. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Moraux & al. 1976. Aristoteles Graecus: Die griechischen Manuskripte des Aristoteles, untersucht und beschrieben von Paul Moraux, Dieter Harlfinger, Diether Reinsch, Jürgen Wiesner. Vol. 1: Alexandrien–London. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter. Omont, Henri. 1888. Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque nationale. Vol. 2: Ancien fonds grec. Droit–Histoire–Sciences. Paris: A. Picard. Pappa, Eleni. 2002. Georgios Pachymeres, Philosophia Buch 10: Kommentar zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Editio princeps. Einleitung, Text, Indices. Athens: Akadēmía Athēnōn. Perkams, Matthias. 2008. Selbstbewusstein in der Spätantike: Die neuplatonischen Kommentare zu Aristoteles’ De anima. Berlin & New York: De Gruyter. Probert, Philomen. 2003. A New Short Guide to the Accentuation of Ancient Greek. London: Bristol Classical Press. Rashed, Marwan. 1999. Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der aristotelischen Schrift “De generatione et corruptione”. Diss. Universität Hamburg. Rashed, Marwan. 2001. Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der aristotelischen Schrift “De generatione et corruptione”. Wiesbaden: L. Reichert.

4.3 Modern works | CLXXXIII

Ruelle, Charles-Émile. 1907. L’argument d’Achille (Aristote, Physique, VI, 9). Commentaire inédit de Théodore Métochite. Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes 31: 105–110. Samaran, Charles & Marie-Louise Concasty. 1969. Christophe Auer, copiste de grec et de latin au XVIe siècle. Scriptorium 23: 199–214. Sathas, Konstantinos N. 1872. Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη Αʹ: Βυζαντινὰ ἀνέκδοτα. Venice: Τύποις τοῦ Χρόνου. Searby, Denis. 2016. Sophonias, in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. 6, ed. R. Goulet (Paris: CNRS Editions), 473–77. Ševčenko, Ihor. 1962. La vie intellectuelle et politique à Byzance sous les premiers Paléologues: Études sur la polémique entre Théodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choumnos. Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae. Subsidia 3. Brussels. Ševčenko, Ihor. 1975. Theodore Metochites, the Chora and the Intellectual Trends of His Time, in The Kariye Djami, vol. 4, Studies in the Art of the Kariye Djami and Its Intellectual Background, ed. P. A. Underwood, 17–91. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Speranzi, David. 2010. La biblioteca dei Medici: Appunti sulla storia della formazione del fondo greco della libreria medicea privata, in Principi e signori: Le Biblioteche nella seconda metà del Quattrocento, Atti del Convegno di Urbino, 5–6 giugno 2008, ed. G. Arbizzoni. Collana di studi e testi 25 (Urbino: Accademia Raffaello, 2010), 217–64. Steel, Carlos & Pamela Huby. 1997. Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense‐Perception with ‘Simplicius’, On Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5–12. London: Duckworth. Steel, Carlos. 2017. Newly Discovered Scholia from Philoponus’ Lost Commentary on De anima III. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 84, 223–43. Stevenson, Henry, Sr. 1888. Codices manuscripti graeci Reginae Svecorum et Pii Pp. II Bibliothecae Vaticanae. Vatican City: ex Typographeo Vaticano. Tinnefeld, Franz. 2002. Georgios Gennadios Scholarios, in La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, vol. 2 (XIIIe–XIVe s.), ed. C. G. Conticello & V. Conticello (Turnhout: Brepols), 477–541. Todd, Robert B. 1996. Themistius, On Aristotle’s On the Soul. London: Duckworth. van Dieten, Jan Louis. 1994. Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte: Historia Rhomaike 4. Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur 39. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann. Van Riet, Simone. 1965. Fragments de l’original grec du «De Intellectu» de Philopon dans une compilation de Sophonias. Revue Philosophique de Louvain 63, 5–40. Verbeke, Gérard. 1966. Jean Philopon, Commentaire sur le De Anima d’Aristote: traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Louvain-la-Neuve: Publications Universitaires de Louvain & Paris: Béatrice‐Nauwelaerts. Wahlgren, Staffan. 2010. Byzantine Literature and the Classical Past, in A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language, ed. E. J. Bakker. Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell. Wahlgren, Staffan. 2018. Theodore Metochites’ Sententious Notes: Semeioseis gnomikai 61–70 and 72–81. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Indexes. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 71. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.

5 Indices 5.1 Index of names Aristotle passim Metochites, Theodore passim Aelius Aristides LIII Agiotis, Nikos CXXXVIII Alexander of Aphrodisias LV, LVI, CXVI, CXLIII, CXLVI Alexander VIII, pope LXXV Anaximenes LXXXI Andronikos II, emperor CXLVII Arethas of Caesarea CLVI Arnzen, Rüdiger CXLVIII Aspasius CXLIII Auer, Christopher XVIII Bandini, Angelo Maria XVII Basil of Caesarea CXLI Battaglini, Fabio XIX Bessarion XVI, LV Bianconi, Daniele XIV–XVI Blass, Friedrich CLXVIII–CLXIX Blemmydes, Nikephoros CXXXVIII Bloch, David XXII, CLXIV Borchert, Martin XIII–XV, XVII, XX–XXII, XXVII, XLVI, LV, LVII–LXI, LXIX–LXXIII, LXXVI, LXXXI, LXXXVI–LXXXVII, XCIII, C, CIII, CXIII–CXX, CXXXIX–CLI Brylinger, Nicolaus XXI Bydén, Börje XXVII, LVI, CXXXIX, CXL, CXLIII, CLXX Canart, Paul XVII Cardinali, Giacomo LXXI Casetti Brach, Carla XVII Charlton, William CXLVIII Choumnos, Nikephoros CXXXIX–CXL Christina of Sweden LXXV Critias XXX Cyril of Alexandria XCI Damilas, Demetrios XVII, CII de Andrés, Gregorio XVIII Demetracopoulos, John XX, XXII Devreesse, Robert XIV, LXX–LXXI https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-206

Diogenes of Apollonia LXXXI Drossaart Lulofs, Hendrik Joan XXI–XXII, CLXXIV D’Ancona, Cristina CXLIII Empedocles XCVI, CXXII, CLIV Essen, Ernst CLI Fazzo, Silvia CXLIII Franchi de’ Cavalieri, Pio Féron, Ernest XIX Förstel, Christian XVII

XIV, XIX

Galen CLII Georges d’Armagnac LXXV Gerth, Bernhard XXVIII, CXV, CXXIII, CLV Giacomelli, Ciro XV Gielen, Erika CXXXVIII Gildersleeve, Basil CLX Golitsis, Pantelis CXXXVIII, CXLVIII Gregoras, Nikephoros XIV–XVI, L–LI, CXVIII, CXXXVIII–CXL Gregory of Nazianzus LIII Gregory of Nyssa LIII Groisard, Jocelyn XVI, LXXII Hadot, Ilsetraut CXL Harlfinger, Dieter XIV Hayduck, Michael LXXXV Hermann, Gottfried CLXIX Hermogenes of Tarsus LIII Herodian the Grammarian CLXVIII–CLXIX Hervet, Gentien XIII, XXI–XXII, LX, CXX Hinterberger, Martin XXIII Holobolos, Manuel CIII Holton, David XXIII, XXXI, CXXX, CLI, CLII Horrocks, Geoffrey XXXVIII, XCIII, CLII, CLVII, CLX Hult, Karin XIV Iamblichus LIII, CXLVII Ierodiakonou, Katerina CXLIV Inghirami, Tommaso XIV

CLXXXVI | 5.1 Index of names

Jackson, Donald XIX Jugie, Martin XX, CXLIII

Probert, Philomen CLXIX Psellos, Michael CXLIV

Kahn, Charles CLXIX Kermanidis, Markos LVI Klostomalles, Michael XVI, XLIII, LIII, LXXIII Komnene, Anna XXXVIII, CLVII, CLX Kühner, Raphael XXVIII, CXV, CXXIII, CLV, CLXVIII–CLXIX

Ranconet, Aymard de XIX Rashed, Marwan LVII, CL Rhakendytes, Joseph CXXXVIII, CXL Ross, David XXXIX, CX, CL–CLI Ruelle, Charles-Émile XXII

Lackner, Wolfgang CXXXVIII Lamberz, Erich XVI Lampe, G. W. H. CXLI Libanius LIII

Sathas, Konstantinos XXI Scholarios, George (Gennadios II, patriarch) XIII, XX–XXI, XXXV, LII, XCII, CXLIII Searby, Denis CXXXVIII Sevčenko, Ihor XIV–XVI Simplicius LV, LVI, CXLIII, CXLVII Siwek, Paweł XXXIX, XLV, CL Sixtus IV, pope XIV Sophonias XLV, CXXXVIII, CXL, CXLI, CXLIII–CXLIV, CXLVIII–CL, CLXXVII Speranzi, David XVII Steel, Carlos XXVIII, CXLVIII Stephanus of Alexandria CXLVIII Stevenson, Henry XVIII

Magentenos, Leon CXXXVIII Manolessou, Io CLII Manuel of Corinth XVII, XXXV, XL, LXXII, LXXVIII, XCIX, CXXXVI, CLXXI Medici, Lorenzo di XVII Mercati, Giovanni XIV, XIX, LXIX–LXX Metochites, George LIII Mioni, Elpidio XV Molin Pradel, Marina XIX Mommsen, Tycho CLXXIV Mourmouris, Kornelios XIX Mourmouris, Nikolaos XVIII Omont, Henri XVI, XIX Pachymeres, George CXXXVIII, CXLI Pappa, Eleni CXXXVIII Perkams, Matthias CXLVII Philoponus, John (and Ps.-Philoponus) XXVIII, XXX, XXXIII, XXXV–XXXVI, XLI, XLV, L, LII, LV, LVI, LXXXIV–LXXXV, XCI, XCIV–XCV, CI, CXVI, CXXVI, CXXIX, CXXXI, CXLI–CXLII, CXLIV–CXLV, CXLVII–CL, CLXXVI–CLXXVII Plato XXX, XXXII, LXXXIX, CXLII Plutarch of Athens CXLVI Priscian of Lydia (Ps.-Simplicius) XXVIII–XXIX, XLI, XLV, LII, LXXXIV, CXXVII, CXXXVI, CXLV–CL, CLXXVI

Themistius XXVIII, XXXV–XXXVI, XLI, XLIV, XLVII, L, LII, LIII, LXXXIV, XCI–XCII, XCV, XCIX, CXXVII, CXXXI, CXL–CXLVII, CXLIX–CL, CLXXVI Tinnefeld, Franz XX Todd, Robert CXLVI Torstrik, Adolf CLI Valgulio, Carlo XVII van Dieten, Jan Louis XV Van Riet, Simone CXLVIII Verbeke, Gérard CXLVIII Wahlgren, Staffan XIV, XXIII Wiesner, Jürgen XVII William of Moerbeke CXLVIII Xanthopoulos, Nikephoros Kallistos CXL

5.2 Critical index |

CLXXXVII

5.2 Critical index 1.01.03, 04.17 1.01.03, 06.01 1.01.10, 08.05 1.01.12, 08.14 1.01.12, 08.15 1.01.13, 08.20 1.01.13, 08.22 1.01.14, 10.06 1.01.18, 10.22 1.01.21, 12.08 1.01.30, 14.19 1.01.30, 14.23 1.01.32, 16.04–08 1.01.37, 18.05–06 1.02.04, 20.15 1.02.06, 20.23 1.02.13, 24.07 1.02.18, 26.06 1.02.24, 30.03 1.02.26, 30.10 1.02.28, 32.01 1.02.29, 32.05 1.02.32, 32.20 1.02.32, 32.23 1.02.34, 34.11 1.02.34, 34.13 1.02.39, 36.13 1.02.40, 36.22 1.03.01, 38.03 1.03.04, 38.18 1.03.04, 38.21 1.03.08, 42.04 1.03.10, 42.11 1.03.18, 44.24 1.03.25, 48.07 1.03.25, 48.11 1.03.27, 48.23 1.03.30, 50.13 1.03.30, 50.17 1.03.32, 52.02 1.03.32, 52.03 1.03.33, 52.07 1.03.33, 52.08 1.03.34, 52.15 1.03.35, 54.03 1.03.39, 56.01

LXXVII LXXIX LXXIX XXVIII, LXXIII LXXII XXVIII LXXIX LXXX LXXX LXXX XXIX LXXX XXIX LXXX LXXX LXXX XXIX XXX LXXXI XXX CI CI CI LXXXI LXXXI XXX XXXI XXXI CXXI XXXI LXXXI XXXII XXXII XXXII CXXI XXXII LXXXI XXXII CI XXXIII XXXIII XXXIV XXXIV LXXXII XXXIV XXXIV

1.03.39, 56.03 1.04.01, 58.02 1.04.03, 58.16 1.04.07, 60.14 1.04.08, 60.25 1.04.10, 62.13 1.04.11, 62.15 1.04.11, 62.17 1.04.12, 64.03 1.04.16, 64.23 1.04.21, 68.08 1.04.22, 68.11 1.04.23, 68.18–19 1.04.28, 72.02 1.04.28, 72.06–07 1.04.34, 74.07–08 1.04.35, 74.15 1.04.38, 76.15 1.04.39, 78.02 1.04.40, 78.03 1.05.02, 80.05 1.05.07, 82.07 1.05.08, 82.18 1.05.09, 82.21 1.05.11, 84.05 1.05.13, 84.11 1.05.13, 84.13 1.05.15, 84.22 1.05.15, 84.24 1.05.17, 86.08 1.05.19, 86.17 1.05.21, 86.23 1.05.22, 88.05 1.05.22, 88.06 1.05.23, 88.16 1.05.24, 88.18 1.05.24, 88.25 1.05.25, 90.01 1.05.25, 90.02 1.05.31, 92.12 1.05.31, 92.15 1.05.32, 92.21 1.05.36, 94.19 1.05.36, 94.21 1.05.39, 96.20 1.05.39, 96.22

LXXXII XXXIV, LXXVII LXXXII XXXV XXXV, LXXXII LXXII, CI CXXII LXXXII LXXXII LXXI, CII LXXXII XXXV XXXVI LXXXIII CXXII LXXI, CII CXXII XXXVI LXXXIII CXXII XXXVI LXXVIII CXXIII LXXXIII CII XXXVII LXXXIII CII LXXXIV LXXXIV LXXXIV CXXIII XXXVII LXXXIV XXXVII CII LXXI CXXIII XXXVII LXXXIV LXXXV LXXXV XXXVIII CIII CIII LXXXV

CLXXXVIII | 5.2 Critical index

2.01.02, 100.10 2.01.02, 100.12 2.01.04, 102.03 2.01.04, 102.06 2.01.11, 104.21 2.01.11, 104.24 2.01.11, 104.25 2.01.11, 104.28 2.01.13, 106.14 2.01.15, 108.03 2.01.18, 110.04 2.01.19, 110.06 2.01.21, 110.21 2.01.28, 114.15 2.02.01, 116.01 2.02.02, 116.11 2.02.04, 118.04 2.02.05, 118.07 2.02.05, 118.09 2.02.06, 118.11 2.02.06, 118.18 2.02.08, 118.26 2.02.09, 120.14 2.02.18, 124.10 2.02.24, 126.19 2.02.25, 128.01 2.02.31, 132.02 2.03.05, 136.15 2.03.06, 136.20 2.03.07, 138.02 2.03.07, 138.06 2.03.10, 140.07 2.03.11, 140.13 2.03.12, 140.19 2.04.04, 142.20 2.04.04, 142.21 2.04.10, 146.10 2.04.10, 146.16 2.04.10, 146.17 2.04.12, 148.08 2.04.12, 148.10 2.04.13, 148.11 2.04.18, 150.18–19 2.04.18, 150.23 2.04.19, 152.10 2.04.21, 154.05 2.04.23, 154.18 2.04.26, 156.19 2.04.32, 160.03

CIV XXXVIII XXXIX LXXXV, CXIV LXXXVI LXXXVI XXXIX XXXIX LXXXVI CXXIII XXXIX CXXIV CXXIV LXXXVI, CXIV XXXIX, LXXVII LXXXVI LXXXVII CXXIV LXXXVII CIV CIV LXXXVII XL XL LXXXVIII XL XL LXXXVIII CXXIV LXXXVIII CXXV CV XL LXXXVIII CV CVI XL CXXV LXXXVIII LXXXVIII LXXXIX XLI CXXV XLI CVI CXXV LXXVIII XLI XLII

2.04.33, 160.09 2.04.34, 160.14 2.05.03, 162.14 2.05.05, 162.26–164.01 2.05.08, 166.02 2.05.09, 166.11 2.05.10, 166.17 2.05.15, 170.14 2.05.15, 170.18–19 2.05.15, 170.24 2.05.15, 172.03 2.05.15, 172.05 2.05.16, 172.12 2.05.19, 174.04 2.06.03, 178.02 2.06.03, 178.04 2.06.03, 178.10 2.06.05, 178.19 2.07.04, 180.19 2.07.05, 182.04 2.07.05, 182.08 2.07.07, 182.19 2.07.22, 190.11 2.07.23, 190.14 2.08.04, 194.05 2.08.05, 194.10 2.08.07, 194.22 2.08.10, 196.10 2.08.10, 196.11 2.08.14, 198.13 2.08.15, 198.17 2.08.15, 198.20 2.08.18, 200.08 2.08.19, 200.17 2.08.23, 202.10 2.08.24, 202.15 2.08.25, 202.21 2.08.28, 204.09 2.08.29, 204.15 2.08.30, 204.23 2.08.31, 206.01–02 2.08.32, 206.07–08 2.09.01, 208.01 2.09.02, 208.08 2.09.03, 208.16 2.09.03, 208.17 2.09.03, 208.23 2.09.04, 210.03–04 2.09.04, 210.06

LXXXIX, C LXXXIX LXXXIX LXXXIX CXXVI XLII LXXXIX XC XLII XC, CVI XC XLIII, LXXVI CXXVI XC XC XLIII XC CXXVI XLIII XC XLIII XLIV, LXXVII CVI CXXVII XLIV CXXVII XCI XCI CXXVII XLIV CVI XLIV XCI XCI CXXVIII XLV XCI XLV XCII XLV CVII CVII XLVI, LXXVII XCII CXXVIII CVII XCII CVII CXXVIII

5.2 Critical index | CLXXXIX

2.09.05, 210.11 2.09.05, 210.14 2.09.05, 210.16–17 2.09.06, 210.23–24 2.09.10, 212.24 2.09.10, 214.04 2.09.13, 214.24 2.09.13, 214.26 2.09.13, 216.02 2.10.04, 220.06 2.10.06, 220.16 2.10.08, 222.03 2.10.09, 222.07 2.10.10, 222.15 2.10.11, 222.21–22 2.11.02, 224.17 2.11.03, 224.20 2.11.06, 226.18 2.11.06, 226.23 2.11.07, 228.03 2.11.11, 230.07 2.11.12, 230.19 2.11.15, 232.08 2.12.01, 236.10 2.12.04, 238.07 2.12.06, 238.20 2.12.07, 238.24 2.12.07, 240.05 2.12.09, 240.13 2.12.10, 242.03

XCII XCIII CXXVIII CXXIX XCIII CXXIX XCIII XLVI CVII XCIII CXXIX CVIII CXXIX CVIII XCIII LXXVI XCIII XLVI XCIV CXXX CXXX XCIV XCIV CXXX CVIII CXXXI CXXXI CXXXI CVIII CXXXII

3.01.03, 244.16 3.01.05, 246.06 3.01.07, 246.27 3.01.07, 246.28 3.01.10, 248.29 3.01.12, 250.19 3.01.12, 250.21 3.01.14, 252.03 3.01.15, 252.12 3.01.15, 252.17 3.01.15, 252.19 3.01.15, 252.22 3.01.17, 254.06 3.01.18, 254.16 3.01.18, 254.20 3.02.01, 256.07 3.02.01, 256.07–08 3.02.08, 258.09

CXXXII XCIV CVIII XLVII CIX XCIV CIX CXXXII CXXXII XCIV CXXXII XLVII, XCV XLVII CXXXIII XCV XCV XLVII XCV

3.02.13, 260.18 3.02.13, 260.19 3.02.17, 262.17 3.02.21, 264.20 3.02.27, 266.29 3.03.02, 270.06 3.03.03, 270.09 3.03.05, 270.17 3.03.08, 272.16 3.03.12, 274.23 3.03.13, 276.05 3.03.15, 276.18–19 3.03.21, 280.05 3.03.26, 282.24 3.03.30, 286.04 3.03.31, 286.10 3.03.31, 286.11 3.03.33, 288.13 3.03.34, 288.16 3.04.03, 290.16 3.04.04, 290.23 3.04.05, 292.06 3.04.05, 292.07 3.04.06, 292.14 3.04.12, 296.12 3.04.12, 296.13–14 3.04.17, 298.08 3.04.17, 298.09 3.04.21, 300.19 3.04.21, 300.20 3.04.22, 300.24 3.04.23, 302.12 3.04.23, 302.15 3.04.26, 304.01 3.05.03, 306.22 3.05.03, 308.03 3.05.03, 308.07 3.05.04, 308.14 3.05.05, 308.17 3.05.05, 308.19 3.05.07, 310.08 3.06.03, 312.14 3.06.03, 312.18 3.06.04, 312.22 3.06.07, 314.13 3.06.07, 314.16 3.06.10, 318.19 3.06.12, 320.11 3.07.15, 330.06

XCVI CIX CIX XLVIII XLVIII CIX XCVI XCVI CIX XLVIII LXXVI CXXXIII XCVI CXXXIII XCVI CIX XLVIII XLVIII CXXXIII XCVI XLIX XCVII XLIX L XCVII CX CX L CX XCVII CXXXIV XCVII L CXXXIV CX XCVII XCVIII, CXI, CXIV L L CXXXIV CXI XCVIII XCVIII LI LI LI CXXXIV XCVIII LI

CXC | 5.2 Critical index

3.07.16, 330.13 3.08.06, 334.13 3.08.07, 334.16 3.09.03, 338.18 3.09.05, 340.03 3.09.06, 340.09 3.09.09, 342.16 3.10.02, 344.13 3.10.03, 346.01 3.10.05, 346.08–09 3.10.05, 346.10 3.10.05, 346.14 3.10.08, 348.10 3.10.08, 348.15 3.10.16, 352.11–12 3.11.01, 356.03–04 3.11.03, 356.15 3.11.03, 356.18 3.12.01, 362.03

LI CXXXV XCVIII CXI LII CXI XCVIII XCIX LII CXXXV XCIX CXXXV CXI CXII CXXXV LXXVI LII LIII XCIX

3.12.05, 364.08 3.12.07, 364.18 3.12.07, 364.19 3.12.07, 364.21 3.12.08, 366.03–04 3.12.08, 366.05 3.12.09, 366.14 3.12.09, 368.01 3.12.10, 368.05 3.12.11, 368.18 3.12.14, 370.16 3.12.14, 370.18 3.13.01, 374.08 3.13.02, 374.19 3.13.02, 374.21 3.13.04, 376.14 3.13.04, 376.16 3.13.04, 376.19 3.13.06, 378.07

CXXXVI LIII, LXXVII CXXXVI CXII LIII CXII LXXVIII, CXXXVI LIII XCIX LIV XCIX C LIV C LIV CXXXVI CXII CXXXVII CXIII

| Part II: Theodoros Metochites: Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima Editio critica

Sigla Codices manu scripti V Vat. gr. 303. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome (Diktyon 66934), c. 1330–1350. M Marc. gr. Z 239 (coll. 911). Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice (Diktyon 69710), c. 1330–1340. A Alex. 87. Bibliothḗkē toû Patriarcheíou, Alexandria (Diktyon 32974). 1484–1485. Raro citatur P = Par. gr. 1866. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris (Diktyon 51492), c. 1330–1350.

Abbreviationes V1 V2 Vac Vmarg Vpc Vpr Vras Vsl Vtext

manus prima in V manus secunda in V V ante correctionem V in margine V post correctionem V post rasuram V in rasura V supra lineam V in textu

add. adn. cett. cf. cod(d). eras. exp. fort. iter. om. transp. v(v). vid. Alex. Arist.

addidit/addiderunt adnotavit/adnotaverunt ceteri confer codex, codices (nisi aliud constat = V M A) erasit expunxit/expunctum, -a, -o, -is fortasse iteravit/iteraverunt omisit/omiserunt transposuit/transposuerunt versus, -um, -us videtur Alexander Aphrodisiensis, -i, -um Aristoteles, -is, -em

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-001

Sigla |

Greg. Phlp. Prisc. Sophon. Them.

Nicephorus Gregoras (vide Introduction, sec. 1.1) Philoponus, -i, -um Priscianus Lydus, -i, -um Sophonias, -ae, -am Themistius, -i, -um

Apparatus Sub textu Graeco (1) apparatus criticus (2) apparatus aristotelicus (3) apparatus fontium

Sub translatione Anglica (1) apparatus locorum parallelorum (2) adnotationes in translationem

Vide etiam Introduction, sec. 3.3.

3

Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων 1 V111r Ἰστέον ὅτι, τοῦ πρώτου περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίου ἐναρχόμενος, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ὅτι

πᾶσα γνῶσις ἐπιστημονικὴ καλή τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμία· ἔστι μέν γε ἄλλη ἄλλης βελτίων ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀκριβεστέρα – ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ γεωμετρία τῆς ἰατρικῆς – ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶναι περὶ ὑποκείμενον τιμιώτερον καὶ σεμνότερον – ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀστρονομία τῆς γεωμετρίας· τιμιώτερον γὰρ τῆς ἀστρονομίας τὸ ὑποκείμενον περὶ ὃ καταγίνεται (ἤτοι τὰ οὐράνια πράγματα) ἢ τὸ τῆς γεωμετρίας – ἢ καὶ δι’ ἀμφότερα – ὥσπερ ἐστὶ βελτίων καὶ μᾶλλον τιμία καὶ καλὴ ἡ ἀστρονομία τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὅτι καὶ ἀκριβεστέρα ταύτης καὶ περὶ τιμιώ2 τερον ὑποκείμενον καταγίνεται. κατ’ ἀμφοτέρους δὲ τοὺς τρόπους καὶ καλὴ καὶ τιμία ἐστί, φησίν, ἡ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς γνῶσις, καὶ βελτίων ἢ κατὰ τὰς πολλάς· περὶ γὰρ ἄυλον ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν, ᾧ καὶ ὁ νοῦς συνουσίωται, καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἀνάγεται ἡ θεωρία εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ θεῖα καὶ καθάπαξ νοερά, καὶ ὅτι, περὶ ἄυλον οὕτως ὑποκείμενον καταγινομένη, ἀκριβεστέρα ἐστὶ πάντως – καὶ πολὺ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ ἀσάλευτον ἔχουσα – ἢ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἔνυλα καταγινόμεναι καὶ τρεπτὰ καὶ γενητὰ καὶ μεταβλητὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἑστὼς ἀκλόνητον παρεχόμενα τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπισκέψει. 3

Ὅτι πρὸς πλεῖστα συμβάλλεται καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν ἡ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θεωρία· καὶ πρὸς θεολογίαν γάρ, ἐπεὶ δι’ αὐτῆς, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνάγεσθαι ἔστιν εἰς τὰ θεῖα νοερὰ καὶ παντάπασιν ἔξω τῆς γενητῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἠθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν· τῷ γὰρ εἰδότι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ταύτης μέρη τὰ γνωστικά τε καὶ

i titulum rubro scriptum habent V M : om. A 2 γε om. A 5 τὸ ὑποκείμενον iter. A 7 καλὴ ] καλλὴ M || ἡ ἀστρονομία om. A 8 καλὴ ] καλῆ M 9 τῆς om. A 13 ἑστὼς correxi : ἑστῶς codd. 17 θεῖα ] καὶ add. A (fort. recte) 18 ψυχῆς οὐσίαν ] ψυχικῆς οὐσίας M 1–8 402a 1–3 8–14 402a 3–4 15–6.5 402a 4–7 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-002

5

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In De an. 1.1 |

5

Paraphrase of the First Book On the Soul 1

5

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20

One should note that Aristotle begins his first book on the soul by saying that every kind of scientific knowledge is fine and valuable. Admittedly, one kind is better than the other either because it is more exact – as geometry [is better] than medicine – or because it deals with a more valuable and noble subject – as astronomy [is better] than geometry, for the subject of astronomy, with which it deals (that is, the heavenly objects) is more valuable than that of geometry – or, indeed, for both reasons, as astronomy is better, more valuable and finer than medicine, because it is both more exact than it and deals with a more valuable subject. In both these respects, he says, 2 knowledge about the soul is both fine and valuable, and better than most kinds of knowledge: for it deals with an immaterial subject, with which the substance of the intellect is also linked, and thus, as a result, this branch of study leads back to the divine and in a word intellective entities; and because, since it thus deals with an immaterial subject, it is inevitably more exact – and has considerable persuasive power and dependability – in comparison with the branches that deal with enmattered, mutable, generable and changeable things, which do not provide the inquiry about them with any stable object in an unaltered state. [Note] that the study of the soul also contributes to very many [branches of study] 3 with truth and knowledge about a number of other things. [It contributes] to theology, for, as mentioned, through it one can be led up to the intellective entities that are divine and in every way external to the generable substance; but also to moral philosophy, since it is possible for someone who knows the essence of the soul and the

1–2 Of the ancient commentators only Priscian (6.22–26) glosses Aristotle’s tēn eídēsin (402a 1) as tēn … gnōsin … tēn epistēmonikḗn. 2–8 All ancient commentators use astronomy and geometry as examples – geometry being more exact than astronomy – but only Philoponus (22.20–25) includes medicine (which he compares unfavourably with astronomy both in respect of its being less exact and in respect of its having a less valuable subject). No ancient commentator compares geometry with medicine. 8– 16 The idea that the study of the soul is more exact because the soul is immaterial (and thus immortal) is expressed by Philoponus (24.5–15); the idea that its subject is valuable because it extends through everything from the realm of plants to intellect is expressed by Themistius (1.20–24); the idea that it is so because there is a sort of continuity between the soul and the first principles is expressed by Priscian (7.22–27). Philoponus (24.21–30) demarcates clearly in this context between the study of the soul and the study of intelligible objects, but later (25.23–26) explains that the study of intelligible objects also includes the soul as the last (i.e. lowest) of the intelligible and divine objects. 18 Priscian (7.34) glosses Aristotle’s alḗtheian (402a 5) as tēn tōn óntōn epistēmonikḗn gnōsin; Philoponus (24.34–35) as philosophían. 18–20 cf. Prisc. 8.10–12; Phlp. 25.8–12. 20–7.2 cf. Them. 2.1–3.

6 | Theodoros Metochites

τὰ παθητικά – οἷον θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν – ἔξεστι ταῦτα ῥυθμίζειν καὶ καθιστάνειν εὖ· 4 μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχή τις ἐνταῦθα ἡ ψυ-

χή, εἴτουν ποιητική· καὶ γὰρ ποιητική πως δοκεῖ τῆς ζωτικῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὴ ἡ ψυχή· ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ εἰδικὴ καὶ τελική· δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖται καὶ τέλος οἱονεὶ ἔχει τὰ ἔμψυχα εἰς ὅπερ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ τὴν ψυχήν. V111v

6

7

8

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| [5] Ὅτι περὶ ψυχῆς ἔστι μὲν προηγουμένως ἐπιζητεῖν τίς ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς, ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρούμενα, ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια ταύτης ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ γνωστικὰ καὶ διανοητικά, τὰ δὲ οὐ ταύτης μόνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ὅλου συνθέτου ζῴου κοινά, ὡς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ θυμοῦσθαι, τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἔστι μέν γε, φησί, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων καὶ δυσχερῶν πάνυ τοι ἡ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ὁρισμὸς καὶ ἡ κατάληψις· καθόλου γάρ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι ἐν πολλοῖς ἐστι καὶ διαφόροις τῷ εἴδει (ὧν ἁπάντων ἡ οὐσία ζητεῖται δι’ ὁρισμῶν δηλονότι δηλοῦσθαι), ἄπορόν ἐστι πότερον μία ἐστὶν ἡ μέθοδος τῶν ὁρισμῶν διὰ πάντων τῶν ὁριζομένων, καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, καὶ ζητητέον τίς αὕτη (ὥσπερ ἐστὶ μία μέθοδος ἡ ἀποδεικτική, φησί, τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ὡς τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς ἠκριβώσατο καὶ διωρίσατο), ἢ οὐ μία ἐνταῦθα ἀλλὰ πλείους αἱ μέθοδοι ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις ὑποκειμένοις ὧν βουλόμεθα δι’ ὁρισμῶν γνῶναι, φησί, τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν καὶ ἄπορον καὶ ζητητέον ποία περὶ ἕκαστον ὑποκείμενον ἡ μέθοδος καὶ ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι· πότερον, φησίν, ἀπόδειξίς τις ἢ διαίρεσις, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἠβούλετο, ἢ τοὐναντίον σύνθεσις εἰς ἓν πλειόνων ὡντινωνοῦν ἢ ἄλλη τις μέθοδος. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἔτι ἄπορα καὶ πολλὰς ἐμπαρέχοντα πλάνας πῶς ἔστιν ἀνευρίσκειν τὰς ἑκάστων οἰκείας ἀρχάς, ἐξ ὧν ζητεῖν ἔστι τὰ προκείμενα αὐτὰ ἕκαστα εἰς τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι, εἴτε κατὰ διαιρετικὴν μέθοδον εἴτε κατ’ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον, ὡς εἴρηται. ἄλλαι γάρ, φησίν, ἄλλων ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀριθμῶν – ἤγουν τὸ διωρισμένον ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μονὰς αὐτή – καὶ ἄλλη τῶν ἐπιπέδων – ἤτοι τὸ συνεχὲς ποσὸν ἢ τὸ σημεῖον ἴσως ἢ ἡ γραμμή – καὶ ἄλλη πάλιν ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν ἑκάστων.

1 τὰ om. M A || καθιστάνειν M1ras (‑ει‑) 2 ἀρχή τις ] ἀρχήτης M 8 διανοητικά ] νοητικὰ M 12 δι’ ὁρισμῶν ] δι’ ὁρισμὸν M : διορισμῶν A 14 τίς ] ἐστιν add. M A 17 δι’ ὁρισμῶν ] διορισμῶν A 22 οἰκείας ] ἰδίας A 6–9 402a 7–10 9–21 402a 10–19 21–26 402a 19–22 15–16 ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς: cf. APo. 1.6, 75a 28–31

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cognitive as well as the affectable parts of it, such as passion and appetite, to bring these into a harmonious and well-ordered state. Most of all, however, [it contributes] 4 to the study of nature itself, for in this realm the soul is, as it were, a first principle, namely, a productive one: for the soul does in a sense appear to be a productive first principle of the vital substance; but furthermore also a formal and a final one, since it is through their soul that ensouled creatures are endowed with form, and in their soul they have, as it were, a goal on which nature herself keeps an eye. [Note] that the first question to be addressed with regard to the soul is what its essence and its nature is, and after that also [what] the things manifested in connection with it [are], some of which are special to the soul, such as the capacities for knowledge and reasoning, and some do not belong only to the soul but are shared by the whole compound animal, such as having sense perception, being impassioned, having desires and the like. Admittedly, the scientific knowledge of the soul, he says, and the definition and comprehension of its essence, is an exceedingly laborious and difficult pursuit. For, in general, since definitions are given of many things that differ in species (that is to say, of all those things whose essence we seek to reveal by means of definitions), it is a problem whether (a) there is a single way to deal with definitions across all definienda, even though they are different, so that we must inquire what this method is (just as there is a single method of demonstration, he says, for the essential attributes of substances and subjects, according to the way that these matters have been detailed and delineated in the Analytics); or (b) there is in this case not a single but several methods applicable to the different subjects whose essence we wish to know, he says, through definitions, so that it is in this case again a difficulty and a problem and a matter for inquiry what kind of method and manner of defining [is suitable] in the case of each respective subject: whether it is, he says, a kind of demonstration, or a division, as Plato preferred, or, on the contrary, a combination of several things, whatever they may be, into one, or some other kind of method. Again, it remains a problem, and a source of many errors, in the case of these [subjects], how one can find the first principles proper to each of them, on which to base one’s inquiries into the several objects put forward to be defined, whether by the method of division or in some other kind of way, as has been mentioned. For different things, he says, have different first principles, just as the numbers have one first principle – namely, discrete quantity, or the monad itself – and the plane figures have another one – namely, continuous quantity, or the point, perhaps, or the line – and each other thing, whatever it may be, has another first principle in its turn.

2–7 Philoponus mentions the three senses in which the soul is a first principle of living creatures, but his explanations are rather different (25.32–26.12). 10–13 cf. Phlp. 27.4–7. 20–21 cf. Phlp. 30.1–3. 25–27 cf. Them. 2.18–21. 27–31 cf. Them. 2.21–24. 31–34 cf. Phlp. 32.14–18.

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Ὅτι προδιαλαμβάνει καὶ προεκτίθεται μετὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἑξῆς τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ζητηθῆναι προβλήματα περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ προηγουμένως ζητητέον εἶναί φησι περὶ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ ποῖον γένος ἀνάγεται, εἴτουν ὑπὸ ποίαν τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν· ἤτοι πότερον οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή – ὡς οἱ πλείους ἔδοξαν – ἢ ποσόν – ὥσπερ ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἔλεγε ποσὸν ταύτην, φάσκων ὡς ἀριθμός | ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κινῶν ἑαυτόν – ἢ ποιόν – ὡς οἱ ἰατροὶ λέγουσι κρᾶσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι – ἢ πρός τι – ἔνιοι γὰρ λόγον τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν τίθενται, πᾶς δὲ λόγος, εἴτε κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ εἴτε κατὰ τὸ τριπλάσιον εἴτε κατὰ τὸ τετραπλάσιον εἴτε κατ’ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν θεωρεῖται, πάντως τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν – ἢ ἄλλο τι, ὡς εἴρηται, τῶν δέκα γενῶν; ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον ἐστί, φησί, περὶ τοῦ γένους τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερον δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ, εἴτουν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ᾠὸν καὶ τὸ σπέρμα δυνάμει τὸ μὲν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ φυτόν· ὁ βοῦς δὲ καὶ ὁ ἵππος ἐντελεχείᾳ ζῷα, καὶ τὸ δένδρον ὡσαύτως ἐντελεχείᾳ φυτόν. ἑξῆς δὲ πάλιν ζητητέον, φησί, πότερον μεριστή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἀμερής· καθόλου γὰρ τὰ σωματικά, ἔχοντα ὄγκον, μεριστά εἰσι, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα – ἤτοι τὰ νοερά – ἀμερῆ. ὅτε δὲ μὴ μεριστήν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ σωματικὸν ὄγκον ἔχειν, φήσαι τις ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ ἄρα μή, καὶ σωματικὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσα, αὖθις ὅμως ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστὶ μεριστή, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγομεν καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰ καὶ τά· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μὴ μερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὰ σωματικὰ μόρια, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα θέσιν ἔχει καὶ τόπους καὶ διαστάσεις καὶ λόγους πρός τε τὸ ὅλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἔστι δὲ ὅμως μερίζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχει διαφόρους. καὶ ὅτι μεταβατικῶς ἐνεργεῖ ἅπερ ἐνεργεῖ, τόδε τι πρῶτον καὶ τόδε τι μεθύστερον, ἔτι ζητητέον εἶναί φησι πότερον πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις ζῴοις ὁμοειδής ἐστιν ἢ μὴ ὁμοειδής, καί, εἰ μὴ ὁμοειδής ἐστιν, ἆρα μηδὲ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν διαφόρων ζῴων ψυχή; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μόνον ψυχῆς ἡ πρόθεσις, ἀλλὰ περὶ

2 τῆς om. A 4 πλείους ] πλοίους M 5 οἱ om. M A 6 κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V M 7 τριπλάσιον ] διπλάσιον A 9–12 περὶ—φησί om. A 13 εἰσι ] ἐστὶ M A 14 μεριστήν ex P scripsi : μεριστή V M A 15 τὴν A1sl || μή om. M || καὶ om. A 17 τὰ² ] τινα malim 20 μεθύστερον scripsi (licet Prisc. 11.30 habeat ἀφ’ ἑτέρων εἰς ἕτερα) : μεθ’ ἕτερον codd. 22 ὁμοειδής Mac : ὁμοιοειδὴς M1pc A || ἆρα ] ἄρα M A || μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. 23 ψυχή ] φησὶ M 1–9 402a 23–25

9–12 402a 25–b 1

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[Note] that, after what has been said, he next makes a preliminary analysis and exposition of the problems that need to be addressed with regard to the soul. And the problem that must first be addressed, he says, with regard to the soul, is under which genus it is subsumed, that is, under which of the ten categories. In other words, is the soul a substance (as most thinkers have held), a quantity (as for instance Xenocrates described it as a quantity, when he said that the soul is a self-moving number), a quality (as for instance the physicians say that it is a blend); a relative (for some thinkers suppose that it is a ratio of the elements, and every ratio, whether it is manifested as one to two, three to one, four to one or any other ratio, is inevitably a relative), or, as mentioned, another of the ten categories? In addition to this, the question must be raised, he says, with regard to the genus of soul, whether it exists potentially or “completely”, that is, actually. For the egg and the seed are potentially an animal and a plant respectively; but the ox and the horse are completely animals, and similarly the tree is completely a plant. Next in turn the question must be raised, he says, whether the soul is divisible into parts or partless. For it is a universal fact that corporeal things, which have bulk, are divisible into parts, whereas things with which this is not the case – that is, intellective entities – are partless. And in case anyone should claim that the soul is not divisible into parts, since it does not have corporeal bulk, the further question must be raised whether it may not nevertheless be divisible into parts in some other way, even though it does not have corporeal bulk, as we say that medicine and philosophy are divided into such and such parts. For it is possible that the soul cannot be divided in accordance with any bodily parts, since the latter have position and locations, extensions and ratios relative to the whole as well as to each other, while it is nevertheless possible for it to be partitioned in accordance with the different capacities it has. And since it performs the activities it performs in a transitional way, one thing first and another thing after that, the further question must be raised, he says, whether all soul, [as manifested] in the different animals, is of the same kind or not; and if it is not of the same kind, could it, then, also be the case that not all soul, [as manifested] in the different animals, falls under the same genus? For the task is not to deal only with the soul of human beings, but with all soul without

2–10 cf. Phlp. 32.28–33.6. 10–14 cf. Them. 2.38–3.1. 14–25 cf. Them. 3.7–15. 25–26 cf. Prisc. 11.28–31 (although there the transitional activity of the soul is more reasonably mentioned in connection with the previous question). 17–18 I have translated the text of Par. gr. 1866. The text transmitted in the three main MSS is more naturally translated: “And in case it is not divisible into parts, because someone should deny that the soul has corporeal bulk ….” 22 any bodily parts : this translation may require the emendation suggested in the apparatus. The transmitted text is more naturally translated as “its bodily parts”. 26 another thing after that : this translates the emended text. The transmitted text is more naturally translated as “one thing after another”.

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πάσης ἁπλῶς ψυχῆς. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διάφοροί εἰσι τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγονται ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, τὸ ζῷον, οὕτως ἂν εἶεν καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχαὶ διάφοροι μὲν τῷ εἴδει, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τι ἀναγόμεναι. καίτοι γε εὐλαβείας ἂν εἴη, φησίν, ἄξιον μήποτε τὰ ἐννοηματικὰ ταῦτα γένη λεγόμενα καὶ ἃ κατὰ πολλῶν κατηγορεῖται οὐδόλως εἰσὶν ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ καὶ οὐσίᾳ, ἤ, εἰ εἰσίν, οὐ πρῶτά εἰσι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, ἀλλ’ ὕστερα μᾶλλον αὐτῶν, κοινῇ τινι ἐμφάσει ἐπιλογιζόμενα καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ μετ’ αὐτὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα θεωρούμενα. ἔτι, φησί, ζητητέον πότερον μία τίς ἐστι ψυχὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ κατὰ διαφόρους | δυνάμεις θεωρουμένη – φυτικήν, αἰσθητικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας – ἢ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ· καίτοι γε ἄτοπόν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, εἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ δούρειος ἵππος ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ πολλοὺς ἐντὸς συνηγμένους εἶχε, καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος πολλὰς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κρύπτει ψυχάς. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ πολλὰς ἔχειν ψυχὰς λέγειν ἔστι τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλ’ ἔχειν μίαν διάφορα μόρια ἔχουσαν, ζητητέον ἔτ’ ἐστὶ πῶς ἔστι χωρίζειν ταῦτα, καὶ πῶς τινα μὴ χωριζόμενα ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καταλαμβάνονται· οἷον τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο μὲν καὶ ἄλλο τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ θεωρεῖται ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ ὑποκειμένῳ· ἅμα γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἀμφότερα· τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ χωρίζεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον χωρίζεται· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἐμψύχων, ὡς τὰ φυτά, τὸ μὲν θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν ἔχοντα, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ ἔχει πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λογικὸν αὐτῆς. καὶ μήν, ἐπεὶ μία ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, διάφορα δὲ ἔχει μόρια, πότερον ἄρα ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀρκτέον τῆς ζητήσεως καὶ θεωρίας ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μορίων μᾶλλον; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅλον γνωριμώτερόν ἐστιν ἐνίοτε τῶν μορίων, καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα μορίων τὸ ὅλον μάλιστα καταλαμβάνεται. ἔτι, φησί, ποῖα πρότερον ἄξιον ζητεῖν, τὰ μόρια ἢ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν ἑκάστων, ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις, ὁποῖαί εἰσι; πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν μάλιστα καταλαμβάνονται αἱ δυνάμεις. καὶ μὴν ἔτι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ὡς πρός τι θεωροῦνται (οἷον αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθητῶν εἰσιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ νοήσεις νοητῶν), πότερον τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς ζητητέον πρῶτον ἢ μᾶλλον τὰ αὐταῖς ἀντικείμενα (ἤτοι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὑποκείμενα), ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ἴσως εὐχερέστερον προχωρούσης τῆς

4 φησίν A1sl 5 εἰ om. A 6 ὕστερα ] ὕστερον M A 7 καθ’ ἕκαστα ] καθ’ ἕκα M : καθέκαστα A 8 δυνάμεις ] δυνάμει M || φυτικήν ] φυσικὴν A 13 καταλαμβάνονται V1pc (ex καταλαμβάνεται, -ν- V1sl ) 21 καθ’ ἕκαστα ] καθέκαστα A 22 πρότερον ] πότερον M A 3–7 402b 5–9 7–18 402b 9–10 18–21 402b 9–10 21–12.2 402b 11–16 9–11 φησιν ὁ Πλάτων: cf. Pl. Tht. 184d

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qualification. For it may be the case that, just as a horse and a human being are different in species but are nevertheless subsumable under the same genus of animal, the souls in them could also be different in species, but nevertheless subsumable under the same genus, whatever it may be. Still, he says, caution is called for, lest perhaps these so-called conceptual genera, the ones that are predicated of several things, do not at all exist in any actual or substantial sense; or, in so far as they do, are not primary in relation to the individual things, but rather posterior to these, the result of extrapolation by virtue of some common characteristic and manifested as functions and appendages of the individual things themselves. Further, he says, the question must be raised whether there is in each individual a single soul that manifests itself in different capacities – the vegetative, the perceptive, and the others – or there are many souls in each individual – although Plato says that it would be absurd if each of us should conceal in himself a multitude of souls in the same way that the wooden horse of Troy contained a multitude of men crowded inside it. But if one should not say that an animal has many souls, but rather that it has one soul with different parts, the further question must be raised how it is possible to separate these, and how things can be comprehended as distinct if they are not separated. For instance, the soul’s capacities for nourishment and for growth are conceptually distinct, but are inherent and manifested in a single subject, since they both invariably co-exist; whereas the capacity for sense perception, while also capable of being conceptually separated, can be separated in respect of its subject too. For we can observe that some ensouled things, like plants, have the capacity for nourishment and growth, but do not also have the capacity for perception. And the soul’s rational capacity stands in the same relation to its perceptive capacity. Moreover, granted that the soul is one and has different parts, does it follow that our inquiry and study should begin from the whole or rather from the parts? For on the one hand the whole is sometimes better known than the parts, and on the other hand it is primarily on the basis of the individual parts that the whole is grasped. Further, he says, which things deserve to be investigated first, the parts or the activities of each of these? That is, what kind of things are the perceptive capacity and the intellect, or what kind of things are the acts of sense perception and the acts of thinking? For often the capacities are primarily grasped on the basis of the activities. And yet again, since the activities manifest themselves as relative to something (as for instance perceptions are perceptions of perceptible objects and acts of thinking are [acts of thinking] of intelligible objects), ought one first to investigate the activities themselves or rather their opposites (that is, the perceptible and intelligible objects),

1–4 cf. Them. 3.18–20. 4–9 cf. Them. 3.32–34; Phlp. 38.1–4. 9–24 cf. Them. 4.12–23. 24–28 cf. Phlp. 38.31–39.3; Them. 4.23–29. 31 cf. Phlp. 39.7–10. 32–35 cf. Phlp. 39.11–14; 39.34–40.2; Them. 4.36–37.

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θεωρίας καὶ καταλήψεως εἰς αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας, κἀντεῦθεν εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς; Ὅτι, προθέμενος οὕτως ἀξιόλογα ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς προβλήματα καὶ ζητήματα, φησὶν ἔπειτα ὡς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁρισμῶν τῶν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῶν προτεθέντων ὡντινωνοῦν πραγμάτων ἔστι καταλαμβάνειν καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐτοῖς, καί εἰσιν εἰς τοῦτο οἱ ὁρισμοὶ χρήσιμοι, ὡς ἔχει μάλιστα τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς μαθημα21 τικοῖς. ὁ γὰρ γινώσκων, φησί, τί ἐστιν εὐθὺ καὶ τί καμπύλον συνεπιλογίζεται καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς καθ’ αὑτό, καὶ ὁ γινώσκων τί ἐστι τρίγωνον εὐχερῶς εἴσεται καὶ V113r ὅτι παντὸς | τριγώνου αἱ τρεῖς γωνίαι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι εἰσίν, ὅπερ ὁ γεωμέτρης δείκνυ22 σιν ὡς καθ’ αὑτὸ ὂν τῷ τριγώνῳ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιστρόφως, φησίν, ἐκ τῆς καταλήψεως αὖθις τῶν συμβεβηκότων καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς πράγμασιν – ἃ κατανοεῖν ἔστι φανταστικῶς πως, φησίν, ἐνίοτε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικῶς – ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν προχώρησις καὶ εἰς τὴν εὕρεσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. 20

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Ὅτι πάσης ἀποδείξεως ἀρχή, φησίν, ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως καὶ τὰ καθ’ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκότα συνεπιλογίζεσθαι ἔστι (περὶ ἅ φησιν ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ὡς προείρηται)· ὥστε καὶ ὡς πόρισμά τι ἐντεῦθεν συνάγει καὶ ἐπιλογίζεται ὅτι ἐφ’ ὅσων ἂν ὁρισμῶν οὐκ ἔστι συγκαταλαμβάνειν εὐχερῶς οὔθ’ ὅλως εἰκάζειν τὰ καθ’ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς ὁριζομένοις λογικοί εἰσιν, εἴτουν διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ δοξαστικοί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὁρισμοί, καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς οὐδ’ ἐντελεῖς ὁρισμοί.

Ὅτι ἀπορεῖν ἔστι, φησί, καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον αὐτὰ τὰ πάθη πάντα καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς μόνης εἰσίν, ἢ τινὰ κοινῶς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐδετέρου ἴδια ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνθέτου ζῴου κοινά, καὶ τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἀμφοῖν καὶ τίνα τῆς ψυχῆς 25 μόνης. φησὶν οὖν ὅτι πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὡς τὰ πλείω τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνθέτου ζῴου (οἷον τὸ ἥδεσθαι, τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι, τὸ θαρρεῖν, τὸ

24

4 καὶ delere velim 5 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 8 καθ’ αὑτό ] καθ’ αὑτά M (quod melius videri potest, sed cf. infra vv. 11 et 15) : καθαυτά A 9 ἴσαι ] ἶσαι V 14 ἐστὶν om. A 15–16 ση′ adn. Mmarg 16 πόρισμά τι ] πορίσμτι M 3–7 402b 16–18 14.1 403a 5–8

7–10 402b 18–21

10–13 402b 21–25

15–16 ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς: cf. APo. 1.6, 75a 28–31

14–19 402b 25–403a 2

20–23 403a 3–5

23–

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on the assumption that our study and our comprehension is likely to advance more easily from there towards the activities and then from there towards the capacities and the parts of the soul?

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[Note] that, after having thus raised these significant problems and questions with 20 regard to the soul, he then says that on the basis of the definitions relating to the essence of whatever objects have been put forward for study, it is also possible to grasp the essential attributes of the objects themselves, and [that] the definitions are useful to this end: this holds true especially in the case of mathematical objects. For someone 21 who knows, he says, what straight and curved are can immediately also extrapolate the essential attributes of these; and someone who knows what a triangle is will also without difficulty understand that in every triangle the three angles are equal to two right angles, which is precisely what is shown by the geometer to belong essentially to triangles. But, on the other hand, he says, it is also possible, conversely, to advance 22 from grasping the essential attributes of the objects of study – which it is sometimes possible, he says, to understand by means of imagination, somehow, rather than by means of demonstration – even to the discovery of the definitions of the objects of study. [Note] that he says that the starting point of every demonstration is the definition. 23 For it is primarily and properly from this that it is also possible to extrapolate the essential attributes (and, as already mentioned, these are what he says in the Analytics that demonstration is about); accordingly, he infers and extrapolates from this, as a sort of corollary, that all those definitions in the case of which the essential attributes of the definienda are not possible to grasp immediately and easily or to infer at all, those kinds of definitions are “logical”, that is, dialectical and opinion-based, and neither infallible nor complete definitions. [Note] that he says that a problem and a question should be raised as to whether 24 all the affections and the activities of the soul belong exclusively to it, or some belong to it and the body in common, and are not special properties of either but common to [both parts of] the compound animal; and [in the latter case,] which are the ones common to both and which belong exclusively to the soul. Well then, he says that it is 25 obvious that most affections of the soul do not belong exclusively to it but to the compound animal (for instance, having pleasure, being angered, being confident, having appetite, having sense perception in general), whereas thinking seems to be a special

13–17 cf. Prisc. 14.37–15.4. 21–25 cf. Prisc. 15.14–23. 27 cf. Phlp. 44.35.

14 | Theodoros Metochites

26 ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὸ ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι), δοκεῖ δὲ ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν. καίτοι

γε, φησίν, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντασίας ἀλλὰ συγκεκραμένον ἐστὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ τοῦτο γ’ ἂν εἴη κοινὸν τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος· ἡ γὰρ φαντασία μετὰ τῶν σωματικῶν ἐστιν ἡνωμένη· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς 27 αἰσθήσεως χωρίζει καὶ λαμβάνει τοὺς τύπους τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα ὑποθετικῶς τοῦτό φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι οὐ πάσῃ νοήσει συνημμένη ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία, ἀλλ’ ἔστι καὶ νόησίς τις ἰδία μόνης τῆς ψυχῆς. Ὅτι, εἴπερ εἰσί τινα ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδια, ἐνδέχεται καὶ χωρίζεσθαι ταύτην τοῦ σώματος· εἰ δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ ταύτης πάθη τινὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐνέργειαι, οὐκ ἂν νοοῖτο χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεται, φησί, τὸ εὐθὺ τῆς χαλκῆς ἅπτεσθαι V113v σφαίρας, εὐθὺ λέγων ἐνταῦθα τὸ μετέχον τοῦ εὐθέος, | ὥσπερ καὶ λευκὸν λέγεται μὲν 29 ἡ λευκότης αὐτή, λέγεται δὲ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς λευκότητος. καὶ τοίνυν, φησί, τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ μετέχον τῆς εὐθύτητος συμβαίνει ἅπτεσθαι τῆς σφαίρας οὐχ ᾗ εὐθὺ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μετέχον αὐτοῦ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ τὸ εὐθύ· εἰ δ’ οἷόν τ’ ἦν χωριστὸν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἥψατο τῆς σφαίρας· ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν.

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Ὅτι τὰ δηλωθέντα πάθη καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια – θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, τὸ φιλεῖν, τὸ μισεῖν – κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ εὐθέος ἀχώριστά ἐστι τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. καὶ δεῖγμα τούτου σαφές (ὅτι κοινὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῷ σώματι)· πολλάκις μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγίστων συμβαμάτων οὐκ ἐπακολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη (ἤτοι ταράττεσθαι ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον), ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀπὸ μικρῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀξιολόγων τῶν ἀφορμῶν ἐπισυμβαίνει ταῦτα, ὥστε πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστοτε κρᾶσιν τῶν σωμάτων ταῦτα συμβαίνει (ὅταν μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁρμὴν ἔχῃ δηλονότι πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα 31 πάθη). ἐνίοτε γάρ, καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος, φησί, φοβεροῦ καὶ οἵου πρὸς φόβον καὶ δειλίαν κινεῖν, ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῦτα διὰ χυμοῦ καὶ κράσεως ἀφορμάς – ὥσπερ ὁρᾶν ἔστι τοῦτο

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1 ση′ adn. Mmarg 2 συγκεκραμένον correxi : συγκεκραμμένον codd. 9 εἰσί ] εἰσὶν A 10–12 ση′ adn. Amarg 10 νοοῖτο M1pc (ut vid. ex νοεῖται) 19 τούτου ] τοῦτο malim || τῷ (ut vid.) A1pc (ex τὸ) 20 μὲν om. A 22 ἑκάστοτε ut vid. M1pc || κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V M 23 ἔχῃ A1pc (ex ἔχει) : ἔχει M 1–8 403a 8–10 9–16 403a 10–16 17–16.4 403a 16–24

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property of the soul. Still, he says, if even thinking does not occur without imagination, 26 but is mixed together with imagination, then even this must be common to the soul and the body in combination. For imagination is united with the corporeal things. For imagination is dependent on sense perception. For it is from sense perception that the imprints are separated and taken on by the imaginative capacity of the soul. One must 27 note that in this passage Aristotle is stating this as a hypothesis. In the sequel it will be clear that imagination is not conjoined with every act of thinking, but there is also a kind of thinking which is a special property of the soul alone. [Note] that if there are in fact any activities that are special to the soul, then it is 28 also possible to separate the latter from the body. But if there are no affections and activities that are special to the soul, then it cannot be conceived of as separate from the body, but the situation is similar, he says, to that in which what is straight is said to touch a bronze sphere (referring in this context to what partakes of straightness as “[what is] straight”, just as on the one hand whiteness itself is called “[what is] white”, but on the other hand what partakes of whiteness is also called “[what is] white”). Accordingly, he says, it belongs to what is straight in the sense of partaking of 29 straightness to touch the sphere not in its capacity of straight, but by virtue of the body that partakes of straightness, since the straightness is inseparable from it [sc. from the body that partakes of it]. If, on the other hand, it had been possible for it to be separate, it would not have touched the sphere. But it is not possible. [Note] that the affections referred to and other similar ones – passion, mildness, 30 fear, pity, courage, loving and hating – are inseparable from the body, in accordance with the example of what is straight, for in these the body is somehow affected. There is a clear indication of this (the fact that these are also shared by the body): for often these kinds of affection (that is, the animal’s becoming upset, angered or frightened) fail to ensue upon very significant incidents, whereas sometimes they do result from small and insignificant causes, so that their occurrence is relative to the temperamental make-up of the bodies on each given occasion – that is to say, whenever [the bodies] have, to a greater or lesser degree, an inclination towards these kinds of affection. For sometimes, he says, even though there is nothing there that is frightening or li- 31 able to induce fear or anxiety, these [affections] follow as a result of causes related to humour and temperamental make-up, as can also be seen very clearly in the case of

3–5 cf. Phlp. 45.19–20. 5–8 cf. Prisc. 17.2–11; Phlp. 46.6. 23–17.2 cf. Them 7.8–17.

13–16 cf. Prisc. 18.8–13; Phlp. 49.18–21.

17–18 by virtue of the body that partakes of straightness: one might have expected “by virtue of being a body that partakes of straightness”, but I cannot extract this meaning from the Greek.

16 | Theodoros Metochites

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μελαγχολώντων προδήλως· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίας ἡστινοσοῦν εὐλόγου καὶ πράγματος οὐδενὸς φοβεροῦ φοβοῦνται μάλιστα καὶ δειλαίνουσι. καὶ δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν ὡς οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ταῦτα τὰ πάθη μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ συνθέτου ὅλου ζῴου καὶ τῆς κράσεως αὐ32 τῆς καὶ τῆς ἕξεως τῆς σωματικῆς. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φησί, δῆλον ὡς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς λόγοι εἰσὶν ἔνυλοι, εἴτουν δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς ὕλης καταλαμβανόμεναι ἀχώριστοι, καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁρισμοὶ ψυχικῶν δυνάμεών εἰσιν ὁρισμοί, εἴτουν ψυχικοὶ λόγοι ἡνωμένης ἀχωρίστως μετὰ τοιᾶσδε διαθέσεως τοῦ σώματος· οἷον ὁ βουλόμενος ὁρίσασθαι τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι οὕτως ἂν ὁρισμὸν ἐντελῆ ποιήσαιτο λέγων ὅτι ὀργή ἐστιν ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως ζέοντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος· ὁ ὁρισμὸς γὰρ οὗτος ἔχει μὲν καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πάθους τῆς ψυ33 χῆς, ἔχει δ’ ἀχωρίστως καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑλικὴν αἰτίαν. ὥστε φυσικοῦ ἂν εἴη, φησί, τὸ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων αὐτῆς παθημάτων θεωρεῖν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν καὶ γενητὴν ὕλην ἡ πρόθεσίς ἐστι τῷ φυσικῷ. [34] Ὅτι διαφέρει ὁ διαλεκτικός, φησίν, ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ φυσικός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαλεκτιV114 κὸς | αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ τοῦ ὁριζομένου εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον διαλαμβάνει, ὁ δὲ φυσικὸς τὴν ὕλην αὐτὴν καὶ περὶ ὃ θεωρεῖται ὁ λόγος. οἷον ὁ μὲν διαλεκτικὸς ὁρίζεται τὴν ὀργὴν ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, αὐτὸν μόνον τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους ὑπαγορεύων· ὁ δὲ φυσικὸς ὁρίζεται ταύτην ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος. ὁ δὲ τέλειος ἂν εἴη λόγος καὶ ὅρος τῆς ὀργῆς ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συγκείμενος, ἤτοι ὁ λόγος ὁ εἰρημένος τοῦ πάθους, ὁ μετὰ τῆς 35 ὕλης ἐν ᾗ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ θεωρεῖσθαι αὐτόν. καὶ πάλιν ὁρίζεταί τις, φησί, τὴν οἰκίαν ὅτι σκέπασμά ἐστι κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων· ὁ δέ, φησί, λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα ἐκτίθεται καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν ὕλην μόνην· ἄλλος δὲ μετὰ τῶν τοιούτων τῆς ὕλης πραγμάτων, ἃ ἐξανάγκης ἐστὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς 36 εἶδος προστίθησιν ἀμφότερα συντιθείς. καὶ τοίνυν αὖθις ζητεῖ τίς τούτων ὁ φυσικός, ὁ r

4–8 corrupta videntur (fort. sunt transponenda τῆς ψυχῆς1 v. 5 et ψυχικοὶ v. 7) 17 τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους ] τοῦ πάθους τὸν λόγον M A || ὑπαγορεύων ] ἀπαγορεύων M 18 ζέσιν A1pc (ut vid. ex ἐστιν) || περὶ καρδίαν ] περικαρδίου A || ὁ δὲ τέλειος ] τέλειος δ’ A 19 ἀμφοτέρων ] ἀμφοτέρως M 23 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης A 4–11 403a 24–27

11–13 403a 27–28

14–20 403a 29–b 3 20–24 403b 3–7 24–18.18 403b 7–16

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melancholic people. For they get extremely frightened and anxious in the absence of any reasonable cause whatsoever and any frightening reality. From this it is clear that these affections do not belong to the soul so much as they belong to the whole compound animal and its temperamental make-up and bodily state. And if this is so, he 32 says, it is clear that these kinds of affections and activities of the soul are enmattered rational accounts – that is, capacities of the soul which are comprehended together with the matter as inseparable [from it] – and the definitions concerned with them are definitions of soul‐capacities, that is, rational accounts of a soul that is inseparably united with a certain kind of disposition of the body. Ιn this way someone who for instance wants to define “being angered” would produce a complete definition by saying that anger is a desire for retaliation accompanied by seething of the blood in the area of the heart. For this definition includes, on the one hand, the rational account or the form of the affection of the soul, but it also includes as an inseparable part the material cause belonging to the body. Consequently, he says, it must fall to 33 the natural philosopher’s lot to study a soul of this description and soul‐affections of this description, since the natural philosopher’s task is concerned with things within the realm of natural and generable matter. [Note] that a dialectical definition, he says, and a physical one are different: the 34 dialectical definition only picks out the form of the definiendum, or the rational account; but the physical one picks out the matter, or that in the area of which the rational account manifests itself. For instance, in defining anger as a desire for retaliation, the dialectical [definition] mentions only the rational account of the affection; but the physical one defines it as a seething of the blood in the area of the heart. The complete account or definition of anger, however, would be the combination of both, that is, the aforementioned account of the affection that includes the matter in which it necessarily inheres and manifests itself. And again, he says, one person defines a house as a 35 building designed to prevent destruction by winds, rain and heat; whereas someone else, he says, picks out stones, bricks, wood and, in a word, only the matter; but a third person combines both things by adding to the material objects of this sort, which necessarily belong to the definienda, also the form that inheres in them. And so he asks a 36

2–4 cf. Phlp. 50.22–26. 28–30 cf. Them. 7.36–37. 6–9 Why Metochites identifies the soul’s affections and activities with its capacities is not clear. There is also a textual problem here, in that hēnōménēs (“united”) lacks a subject noun. I suggest a possible solution to the textual problem in the critical apparatus. As for the tenor of the passage, I have found no plausible remedy.

18 | Theodoros Metochites

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ἐκ τῆς ὕλης μόνης ἢ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ἢ ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετος; καὶ ἀποφαίνεται ὅτι ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετός ἐστιν ὁ τέλειος καὶ φυσικὸς ὅρος, ὁ δὲ κατ’ ἀμφότερα τἄλλα οὐκ ἔστι καλῶς χρώμενος, καὶ μάλιστα παντάπασιν ἔκτοπος ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τοὺς λόγους καταγινόμενος τὰ μηδόλως κατὰ φύσιν χωριστά, ὁποῖα τὰ εἰρημένα μηδ’ ὡς οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἔνια χωρίζειν ὁπωσοῦν δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ ἄλλα τινὰ ἀεὶ μὲν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ ἀχώριστα τρόπον τινὰ ταύτης, νῷ δὲ ὅμως ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως χωριζόμενα, οἷα τὰ μαθηματικά (τὸ τρίγωνον, τὸ εὐθύ, τὸ καμπύλον). ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ ἀεὶ καὶ αὐτὰ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης θεωρεῖται, χωρίζεται δὲ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως νοούμενα τῷ μαθηματικῷ. ἀλλ’ ὁ φυσικὸς οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ’ εἴη τὰ κατ’ αὐτὸν χωρίζειν, ἤτοι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη, ἃ μηδαμῶς πέφυκε χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος (οἷον θερμότητα, ψυχρότητα, σκληρότητα, μαλακότητα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα). πάντα γε μὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα καθόλου τοῦ φυσικοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τινὰ μερικῶς ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντα ὁ φυσικὸς καταγίνεται. ὁ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ὁστισοῦν τεχνίτης περὶ μόνα τὰ κατὰ μέρος περιεργάζεται, οἷον ὁ τέκτων περὶ τὸ μαλακὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ (καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μανόν τε καὶ τὸ πυκνόν), καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται παραπλησίως κατὰ μέρος περὶ τὰ | αὐτῶν ὑποκείμενα· ὁ δὲ φυσικός, ὡς εἴρηται, καθόλου περὶ πάντα τὰ εἴδη καὶ τοὺς λόγους τὰ τῆς ὕλης ἀχώριστα· ὁ δέ γε τῆς ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρῶτος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καλούμενος φιλόσοφος περὶ πάντα τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων ἃ τῆς ὕλης ἔξω καὶ κεχωρισμένα. Ὅτι κατ’ ἐπανάληψιν τοῦ λόγου πάλιν φησὶν ὡς τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον θυμὸς καὶ φόβος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὐ χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης ᾗ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ τὰ μαθηματικὰ χωριστά εἰσι (γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα). * *

*

1 ὁ³ M1sl 5 ὁπωσοῦν ] ὁποσοῦν M 5–6 καὶ αὐτὰ om. M A καμπύλον ] καμπῦλον V 15 τεχνῖται ] τεχνίται V 19–21 403b 16–19

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new question: which among these is the physical [definition]? The one which is based only on the matter [of the definienda], the one which is based on their form, or the one which is a combination of both? And he lays it down that the one which is a combination of both is the complete and physical definition, whereas each of the other two is inadequately formulated, and especially that one is completely bizarre which centres on those affections and rational accounts that are not at all naturally separable, like the ones just mentioned, which are not even capable of being separated in the way in which it is possible, in some sense, to separate some of them. For there are 37 some other [affections] which are also always manifested in matter and which are, in a sense, inseparable from it, but are nevertheless capable of being separated intellectually through abstraction, such as mathematical objects (triangle, straight and curved). For even these are always found to exist in conjunction with matter, but are capable of being separated through abstraction when they are present to the mathematician’s intellect. The natural philosopher, however, will not be able to separate the objects 38 within his domain, that is, the affections of the soul, which are in no way of such a nature as to be separated from matter and from a somehow qualified body (such as heat, cold, hardness, softness, and the like). But it is the natural philosopher’s task to study all such things universally; for the natural philosopher does not deal with some things taken individually but with all things. Any specialised craftsman, on the other hand, will take an interest only in particular things, as for instance a carpenter deals with the softness in a piece of wood (and the hardness, the lightness and the denseness), and similarly the other craftsmen deal with their respective particular subjects. But the natural philosopher, as was mentioned, deals universally with all the forms 39 and rational accounts that are inseparable from matter. But he who practices the highest philosophy and is called by him [sc. Aristotle] a “first philosopher” deals with all those forms of existing things that are external to and separated from matter. [Note] that he resumes the argument by saying once again that the affections of 40 the soul, such as passion, fear and similar things, do not as such exist in separation from matter in the way in which mathematical objects – a line, planes, and that kind of thing – do exist in separation. * *

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3–4 cf. Phlp. 59.11–13; 60.25–26; Prisc. 20.25–29; 21.26–27. 8–17 cf. Phlp. 57.28–34. 8–14 cf. Them. 8.17–23. 19–22 cf. Phlp. 61.9–15.

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Ὅτι, κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔθος ἐν πάσῃ προθέσει βουλόμενος κἀνταῦθα προεκθέσθαι τὰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς δόξας, λέγει προηγουμένως ταῦτα εἶναι τῶν ψυχῶν ἴδια καὶ οἷς διαφέρει τὰ ἔμψυχα τῶν ἀψύχων· τό τε κινεῖσθαι ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. διατοῦτο δὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω σχεδὸν δοκοῦσι περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ κινοῦσα τὰ ἐν οἷς ἐστιν, ἤτοι τὰ ἔμψυχα· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ᾤοντο καθόλου κινεῖν ἕτερον, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινοῖτο, ἐξανάγκης καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι ὑπετίθεντο, καὶ κινεῖσθαι γε ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς καὶ εἶναι αὐτοκίνητον. καὶ τοίνυν ὁ Δημόκριτος, σὺν αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ ὁ Λεύκιππος, πυρώδους εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνόμισαν φύσεως, πάντων δὲ τῶν τοιούτων στοιχειώδη αἴτια λέγοντες τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἄπειρα ἄτομα σώματα, ὑφ’ ὧν τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, ἃ καὶ οὑτωσί πως ἐκάλουν «ξύσματα», οἷά εἰσι καὶ φαίνονται τὰ ἐν ταῖς δι’ ὀπῶν τινων διϊκνουμέναις τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ φωτὸς ἀκτῖσιν ἄτομα διαπαντὸς κινούμενα. ταῦτα τοίνυν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰ ἄπειρα ἄτομα στοιχειώδεις ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ διάφορα τὰ αὐτῶν σχήματα λέγοντες, ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς σφαιρικῶν σχημάτων ὑπετίθεντο οὐσιοῦσθαι καὶ συνίστασθαι τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εὐκινητότερα πάντων τὰ σφαιρικά. ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ συνίστασθαι καὶ οὐσιοῦσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω λέγοντες, μάλιστ’ ἔχειν ᾤοντο τὸ κινητικὸν καί, ἀπαύστως ἀεὶ κινουμένας αὐτάς, ἐντεῦθεν κινεῖν τὰ ἐν οἷς εἰσιν, ἤτοι τὰ ἔμψυχα. καὶ σημεῖόν τε καὶ ἀπόδειξιν τούτων ἔλεγον αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν ζῴων ἀναπνοήν, καὶ ὅτι μέχρις ἂν ἀναπνεῖν ἐξισχύωσι τὰ ἔμψυχα, μέχρι τούτου καὶ ζῶσιν· ἡνίκα δὲ ἐπιλείψει αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, ζῆν οὐκ ἔχουσι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ περιέχον αὐτὸ τὰ | σώματα ψυχρὸν εἶναι καί, ψυχροῦ γε αὐτοῦ ὄντος, ἐντεῦθεν πυκνούμενα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα καὶ συστελλόμενα ἐξωθεῖν καὶ οἱονεὶ ἐκπυρρηνίζειν τὰ ἐντὸς σφαιρικὰ ἄτομα. καὶ οὕτως ἦν ἂν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐμψύχοις σώμασιν αὐτίκα ἐκλείπειν καὶ θνῄσκειν, ἐκφορηθέντων διὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰρημένων σφαιρικῶν ἀτόμων, εἰ μὴ ἔξωθεν συνεχῶς ἐγίνετο βοήθεια διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῦ ἀέρος, ἑτέρων ὁμοίων ἀντεισ-

1 τὸ ] τὸῦ M1 || πάσῃ ] πᾶσι A 2 ταῦτα εἶναι transp. M A 3 ἔμψυχα τῶν ἀψύχων A1pc (ut vid. ex ἄψυχα τῶν ἐμψύχων) || ἀφ’ ] fort. legendum ὑφ’ (sed cf. 1.3.3; 2.5.16) 4 καὶ A1sl || τῆς A1sl 6 κινοῖτο ] κινεῖτο M || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 12 ἀκτῖσιν correxi : ἀκτίσιν codd. 14 σφαιρικῶν ] σφερικῶν M 15 σφαιρικά M1pc (ex σφερικὰ) : σφερικὰ A 22 ἐκπυρρηνίζειν ] ἐκπυρηνίζειν malim 23 ἐκλείπειν ] ἐπιλείπειν M A 1–4 403b 20–27

4–7 403b 27–31 7–12 403b 31–404a 5

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[Note] that since here, too, in accordance with his habit in everything he undertakes, he wants to make a preliminary exposition of his predecessors’ views about soul, he starts by saying that the following are special properties of the soul, by which ensouled creatures are distinguished from soulless things: that they are moved by themselves and that they have sense perception. Because of this it is also the case that practically all [of his predecessors] have this view about the soul, that it is what sets in motion those things in which it is present, that is, the ensouled creatures. But since they were of the opinion that in general nothing could set anything else in motion unless it was also itself in motion, they supposed that the soul was also, of necessity, in motion, and indeed, that it was set in motion by itself and was a self-moved thing. Thus Democritus – and with him also Leucippus – took the view that the soul is of a fiery nature, while they claimed that the infinitely many indivisible bodies in the air, by the combination and motion of which everything in the world is generated and sustained, are elemental causes of all such things. These bodies they called something like “motes”, similar in nature and appearance to those indivisible objects that are constantly in motion in the rays of sunlight flowing in through certain windows. So, since they supposed, as mentioned, that these infinitely many indivisible objects were elemental first principles of the things that exist, and claimed that they were of different shapes, they supposed that it was from the spherical shapes among them that fire and souls derive their substance and are constructed, since spherical things are indeed more mobile than anything else. Since, then, they thus claimed that it was by these that souls were constructed and endowed with substance, they were of the opinion that souls first and foremost possessed the capacity to cause motion and that, since these were themselves always in incessant motion, as a result they set in motion the things in which they were present, that is, the ensouled creatures. They said that the breathing of animals was evidence and proof of these opinions, and that, for as long as ensouled creatures have the ability to breathe, for that long they also live; but as soon as breathing fails them, they are unable to live. For obviously, [they said,] what surrounds the bodies is cold, and since it is cold, the bodies, which are as a result compacted and compressed by their surroundings, expel and, as it were, squeeze out the spherical indivisibles inside. In this way, then, it would befall the ensouled bodies themselves to collapse and die immediately, once the aforementioned spherical indivisibles in them have been transported out of them in the aforementioned fashion, if outside help were not continuously brought in by the breathing of

12–14 cf. Phlp. 67.6–8. 20–21 cf. Phlp. 67.15–16. 28–31 cf. Phlp. 68.21–23.

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αγομένων, ἃ καὶ ἀναπληροῦσι καὶ συνέχουσι καὶ ζῳογονοῦσι κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀεὶ τὰ σώματα. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰσαγόμενα, οὕτω δὴ ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος κατεψυγμένα, συστέλλουσι τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ ἀπείργουσι μὴ σκίδνασθαι μηδὲ παντάπασιν ἐκφορεῖσθαι· διατοῦτο δὴ καὶ ἔλεγον, ὡς εἴρηται, μέχρι τοσούτου ζῆν τὰ ἔμψυχα, μέχρις ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀναπνεῖν αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ Λεύκιππον ᾠήθησάν τε καὶ 7 ἔλεγον περὶ ψυχῆς, πρὸς τὸ κινητικὸν καὶ αὐτοκίνητον αὐτῆς ἀπιδόντες. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καί τινες τῶν Πυθαγορείων, φησίν, ἔδοξαν, ἤτοι διὰ τῶν σφαιρικῶν τούτων ἀτόμων – εἴτουν «ξυσμάτων» – γίνεσθαι καὶ συνίστασθαι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ταῦτα κινεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς τὸ σῶμα· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κινεῖσθαι ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν ταῦτα κινοῦσαν. 8

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Ὅτι, πρὸς ταῦτα σχεδὸν ἀπιδόντες – ὡς ἴδιον δηλαδὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ κίνησις καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τοῖς ἐμψύχοις τὸ κινεῖσθαι – καὶ ὅσοι αὐτοκίνητον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέθεντο, ἀπεφήναντο τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν, κινούσης μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αὐτῆς κινουμένης· οὐ γὰρ ᾤοντο ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ κινούμενόν τι κινεῖν ἕτερον. τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸν Πλάτωνά φησι καὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμαίωνα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας, φησί, τὸ αὐτὸ δοκεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν φασι κινῆσαι τὴν τῶν πάντων οὐσίαν· ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας πρῶτός ἐστιν ὁ τὸν νοῦν ἀποφηνάμενος αἴτιον εἰς τὴν γένεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὰς ὁμοιομερείας κινήσαντα. τόν γε μὴν Δημόκριτον φανερώτερον τὰ περὶ τούτων φησὶ λέγειν, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τιθέντα τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο λέγοντα τὴν αἴσθησιν παρὰ τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἕκαστον ὅπερ φαίνεται, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἄλλο τι τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ | νοητὸν παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ νῦν μὲν φαίνεται, φησί, λέγων τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ φαινομένου, νῦν δὲ ἀορίστως ταυτὸν τιθεὶς τὸν νοῦν τῇ αἰσθήσει καντεῦθεν πάντα τὰ ζῷα μέτοχα τοῦ νοὸς εἶναι, ὡς ἄρα ψυχὴν τὸν νοῦν λέγων. καίτοι γε πρόδηλόν ἐστι, φησίν, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα τὸν κατὰ φρόνησιν νοῦν ἅπαντ’ ἔχει τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπίσης ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι, μὴ ὅτι γε καθόλου πάντα τὰ ζῷα.

4 διατοῦτο ] διὰ τοῦτο M 8–9 καὶ²—ψυχὴν om. A 16 δοκεῖ A1pc (ut vid. ex δοκεῖν) 23 ταυτὸν ] ταυτὸ M A 25 γε om. M A 6–10 404a 16–19 26 404b 5–6

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air, whereby other similar [indivisibles] enter into them in exchange, which fill up the bodies, keep them together and revitalize them in constant succession. And presumably, since they have been cooled by the surroundings, the [indivisibles] that in this way enter from outside also compress what is inside and prevent it from dispersing or in any way being transported out [of the ensouled bodies]. So it was because of this that they also claimed, as mentioned, that ensouled creatures live for as long as they have the ability to breathe. Such, then, are the opinions about the soul stated by the school of Democritus and Leucippus, who focused on its capacity to initiate motion and to be moved by itself. The same views were also held, he says, by some Pythagore- 7 ans: namely, that the soul is generated and constructed by means of these spherical indivisibles (that is, “motes”), and that these set the soul – and through it the body – in motion; and that either they are the soul, and it is moved by itself, or else the soul is something else, which moves them. [Note] that, since all those who supposed that the soul is self-moved also focused almost entirely on these things (that is to say, the fact that motion is a special property of the soul and that it is by virtue of the soul that being moved belongs to ensouled creatures), they declared that the animal sets itself in motion when the soul sets the body in motion while also itself being in motion. For they did not think it was possible for anything that was not in motion to set another thing in motion. [Aristotle] says this on account of Plato, Xenocrates and Alcmaeon. But Anaxagoras, too, he says, appears to say the same thing, that the soul causes motion, and all the other people who take their cue from him and claim that the intellect sets the substance of all things in motion. For Anaxagoras is the first to have declared that the intellect is a cause with regard to the generation of existing things, since it sets the homogeneous things in motion. Democritus, for his part, spoke more clearly about these things, he says, as he proposed that intellect and soul were one and the same thing, and said that sense perception is not a distinct thing besides the intellect, but each thing is exactly what it appears to be, which implies that what really is and is intelligible is not a distinct thing besides what appears to be. But Anaxagoras, he says, is sometimes clearly saying that the intellect is correlated with truth and sense perception with appearance, but sometimes indiscriminately supposing that the intellect is the same thing as sense perception and that consequently all animals partake of intellect, as if by “intellect” he meant a soul. Yet it is obvious, he says, that not all animals possess intellect in the sense of understanding: not even all human beings possess it in equal measure, let alone all animals in general.

2–5 Philoponus (69.14–16) more reasonably suggests that the entering indivisibles prevent the ones already on the inside from being expelled by virtue of the heat generated by their movement (which counteracts, presumably, the compressive impact of the cold surroundings). 19–20 cf. Phlp. 71.6–7.

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Ὅτι δύο τὰ προειρημένα, τό τε κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ γνωστικόν, ἴδια εἶναι καὶ χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, εἴτουν τῶν ἐμψύχων, ἅπαντες οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ δόξαντες, ὡς εἴρηκε προλαβών, οἱ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ἀποβλέψαντες οὕτω δὴ τὸ κινητικώτατον αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέθεντο (κἀκ τίνων καὶ ὅντινα τρόπον ἤδη εἴρηται), οἱ δ’ αὖθις εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν αὐτῆς ἀποβλέψαντες ἐνόμισαν ταύτην ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ὄντων τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου εἶναι καταληπτικὸν κοινὴ πᾶσι δόξα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαί τινος καταληπτικῶς καὶ οἱονεί πως ἡνῶσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ ἅπτεσθαι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ δι’ ὁμοιότητος. 14 ἐπεὶ γοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ πάντων τῶν ὄντων γνωστικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἐξανάγκης, δι’ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένη, ἐκ πάντων ἄρα συνίσταται καὶ οὐσιοῦται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐκ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτῶν πάντων ἐξανάγκης οὐσιοῦται καὶ συνίσταται. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ μάλιστ’ ἔδοξαν κατὰ φύσιν προσῆκον εἶναι. ὅθεν δὴ καί, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔδοξε τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἢ μίαν ἢ πολλὰς ὁσασδήποτε, ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐσιοῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν 15 ὑπετίθετο. καὶ πρῶτόν φησιν αὐτίκα τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, ὡς οὕτω περὶ ψυχῆς ἔδοξεν· οὗτος γὰρ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ὑποτιθέμενος ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων – καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὡς ποιητικὰ αὐτῶν αἴτια τὴν φιλίαν τε καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, τὴν μὲν ὡς συναγωγὸν καὶ συγκριτικόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς διακριτικόν – ἐκ τούτων δὴ ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῶν συνίστασθαι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔλεγε. διατοῦτο καὶ οὕτωσί πως λέγει· 13

γαίῃ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.

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τὴν κρᾶσιν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσιοῖ. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι καταληV116r πτόν· | τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἀρχῶν συνισταμένων, ἐξανάγκης καὶ τὴν

ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων καὶ ἀρχῶν συνίστασθαι, ὡς ἂν τῶν ὄντων εἴη ἀντιληπτική. καὶ τοίνυν ἐν μὲν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὸ κρᾶμα τῆς ψυχῆς τίθησιν ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ

7 καὶ ] ὅτι addere velim 9 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 11 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 12 ἔδοξε ] ἔδοξεν A 18 διατοῦτο ] διὰ τοῦτο M 19 μὲν ] μὲν γὰρ (quod metrum requirit) Arist. 404b 13 20 δῖαν ex Arist. 404b 14 correxi (ut metrum requirit) : δίαν V (ut Phlp. cod. Par. gr. 1914) : διᾶνον M : δῖον A (ut nonnulli Arist. codd.) 23 κρᾶσιν correxi : κράσιν codd. 24 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 26 κρᾶμα correxi : κράμα V : κράμμα M A || καὶ² ] τῆς add. M 1–14 404b 7–11 14–18 404b 11–12 19–21 404b 13–15 22–26.6 404b 16–18 19–21 γαίῃ—λυγρῷ DK 31 B109 26–26.1 ἐν—τῷ Τιμαίῳ: cf. Pl. Ti. 35a

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[Note] that while, as he has already stated above, all thinkers before him consid- 13 ered the two aforementioned capacities, the motive and the cognitive ones, to be special to and characteristic of the soul (that is, of ensouled creatures), some of them, who focused on motion, therefore supposed that the soul was the entity most prone to initiate motion (of what [they supposed] it consisted and in what way has already been discussed); but some, in contrast, who focused on its capacity for knowledge and sense perception, took the opinion that its structure and substance was derived from the first principles of existing things. For they all shared the view that what anything is capable of comprehending is what is similar to it, and [that] it is quite impossible to grasp a thing comprehendingly and to be, as it were, united with it and in contact with it except through similarity. Anyway, since the soul cognitively grasps all existing things, 14 the consequence is necessarily, if it grasps them on the basis of similarity, that it is constructed and derives its substance from all things; or, if not from all things, then at least it necessarily derives its substance and is constructed from the first principles of all things. And this they considered to be eminently conformable to nature. For this reason, then, they also supposed – according as each of them took the view, respectively, that there is one first principle of existing things, or any number of them – that the soul derives its substance from these. To begin with, he mentions straight away 15 that Empedocles had this kind of view about soul. For he posited the four elements as the first principles of existing things, and in addition to these, as their productive causes, Love and Strife, the one as a gathering and combining factor, the other as a separating one. And from these, then, he said that the substance of the soul was also constructed as from first principles. That is why he also says roughly the following: By earth we see the earth, by water water, By aether divine aether, by fire ravaging fire, By Love Love, and Strife by hateful Strife. In the same way, [Aristotle] says, Plato, too, derives the substantial make-up of the 16 soul from the elements and first principles that he posits. For he, too, is of the view that a thing is [only] possible to comprehend for a similar thing and that, since things are constructed from the universal first principles, the soul, too, must necessarily be constructed from the same elements and first principles in order to be able to grasp existing things. Accordingly, he posits in the Timaeus that the blend of the soul consists of the unpartitioned and primary substance as well as the partitioned one, in

3–18 cf. Phlp. 72.33–73.14. 19–21 cf. Phlp. 73.15–17. 21–22 cf. Phlp. 73.27–32. 74.32–34. 32–27.2 cf. Them. 10.23–25; Prisc. 27.38–28.4.

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χὰς τῶν ὄντων ὑποτιθέμενος, τὸ μὲν ὡς τῆς ἀμερίστου οὐσίας, θάτερον δὲ ὡς τῆς μεριστῆς, ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσιοῖ, ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον καὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς εἴρηται, μέσως ἔχουσα ἀντιλαμβάνηται, ἐν μὲν ταυτότητι τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων, ἐν ἑτερότητι δὲ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων. ἐν δὲ τῇ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, φησί, συναγωγῇ τῶν καθόλου περὶ τῶν ὄντων δοξάντων τῷ Πλάτωνι – ὃ δὴ σύνταγμα οὐ νῦν ἐμφέρεται, ἱστόρηται δὲ παρὰ Ξενοκράτους τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ διαδόχου συντεθεῖσθαι – καὶ ἐν τούτῳ δὴ τῷ συντάγματι τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνά φησιν, ὡς αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων αἱ εἰδητικαὶ καὶ καθόλου οὐσιοῦσι τὴν ψυχήν· τὰ γὰρ ἄυλα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη, ἃ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἀριθμοὺς ἐκάλουν, ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀσωμάτων (οἷον τοῦ αὐτοζῴου τοῦ νοητοῦ αὐτὸ τὸ νοητὸν μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος· εἴη δ’ ἂν τὸ αὐτοζῷον κατὰ Πλάτωνα ἡ καθόλου τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πάντες οἱ προέχοντες τῶν παλαιῶν φιλοσόφων ἔμψυχον τὸ πᾶν καὶ καθόλου τὸν κόσμον ὑπέθεντο). καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ αὐτὰ δοκῶν καὶ λέγων ὁ Πλάτων ὁρᾶται· τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς ποσὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς ἀσωμάτου καὶ μὴ ὄγκον ἐχούσης οὐσίας παραλαμβάνειν ἀνοίκειον κρίνων, τῷ διωρισμένῳ προσχρῆται ἐνταῦθα, ἤτοι τῷ ἀριθμῷ. καὶ τοίνυν τοὺς πρώτους ἀριθμοὺς ἀπὸ μονάδος μέχρι τετράδος ἀρχὰς ὑποτίθεται τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς ἀσωμάτου αὐτῆς οὐσίας. καὶ τοῦτ’ εὐλόγως ἐδόκει αὐτῷ· ἡ γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ὁ δύο καὶ ὁ τρία καὶ ὁ τέτταρα ἀριθμοὶ συντιθέμενοι, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, γεννῶσι τὸν δέκα ἀριθμόν, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ τελειότης τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ· περὶ αὐτὸν γὰρ τὸν δέκα ἅπαντες οἱ ἑξῆς ἄπειροι ἀριθμοὶ συντίθενται καὶ κυκλικῶς περιστρέφονται. οὕτω δ’ ὑποτιθέμενος ὡς ἀρχὰς τοὺς εἰρημένους ἀριθμούς, τὴν μὲν μονάδα ὡς σημεῖον ἀμερὲς ἔλεγε, ῥυϊσκομένην δὲ τὸ μῆκος ποιεῖν, | ἤτοι τὴν γραμμήν, ὡς δυάδα ἀπὸ σημείου ἀρχομένην καὶ εἰς σημεῖον περατουμένην· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δυάδος, εἴτουν τοῦ

4 καὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς εἴρηται ] ὡς εἴρηται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων A 6 τῇ ] ἐν τῷ (vel τοῖς) addere velim 8 Ξενοκράτους ut vid. A1pc (‑κ‑) 9 φαίνεσθαι A1sl 13 αὐτοζῷον ] αὐτὸ ζῶον M 13–15 ση′ adn. Mmarg 13 καὶ² ] ὁ add. A 6–28.18 404b 18–21

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order that, being intermediate between both, it might consequently be in contact with both. The upshot is that Plato, who similarly posits the Same and the Other as first principles [not only in the Timaeus but] in many other works as well, the one as being correlated with the unpartitioned substance, the other as being correlated with the partitioned one, also derives the substance of the soul from these, in order that, analogously, being intermediate between both, as mentioned, it might apprehend, by virtue of sameness, those things that are always in the same condition and, by virtue of otherness, those things that are partitioned and not always in the same condition. But, he says, in the summary of Plato’s general views about existing things in On Philosophy – a work which is not in circulation nowadays, but is reported to have been composed by Xenocrates, the Platonic Successor – in this work, too, he says, Plato seems to say the same thing, that the formative and universal first principles of existing things endow the soul with substance. For [Plato says that] the immaterial and incorporeal forms – which both Plato and the Pythagoreans used to call “numbers” – are first principles of incorporeal things (as for instance the intelligible length and depth and width as such [are principles] of the intelligible animal as such – and the “animal as such” must be, on Plato’s view, the soul of the world as a whole, for in fact both Plato and Aristotle and all the leading ancient philosophers supposed that the universe and the world as a whole is ensouled). Moreover, Plato can also be seen to entertain and express the same opinions from the following: since he judges that it is unsuitable to include continuous quantity in the first principle of incorporeal, bulkless, substance, he has recourse in this case to discrete quantity, that is, number. And consequently he posits the first numbers, from the monad to the tetrad, as first principles of existing things and of the incorporeal substance itself. And this was a reasonable opinion for him to have. For the monad and the numbers two, three and four, if added together, obviously generate the number Ten, which is the perfection of number. For it is around the number Ten that all the following infinitely many numbers are added and rotated in a circle. As he thus posited the numbers mentioned as first principles, he said that the monad was a point without parts, but by flowing it created the length (that is, the line), as a dyad starting from a point and terminating

2–8 cf. Them. 11.7–12. 9–11 Philoponus (75.34–76.1) and Priscian (28.7–9) agree that the title On Philosophy refers to Aristotle’s own work on Plato’s unwritten doctrines, also known as On the Good. Themistius (11.37–12.1) mentions another work by Xenocrates, On Nature, which he apparently has used as a source for his paraphrase of this section. 14 cf. Phlp. 76.1–2. 15–16 cf. Them. 11.18bis –20. 20–22 cf. Them. 11.20–22. 25–28 cf. Phlp. 76.8–16. 28–29.5 cf. Phlp. 77.27–78.7; 32.14–18; Them. 11.30–37; Prisc. 28.30–29.1. 9–10 in … On Philosophy : this translates the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. The transmitted text is more naturally (if somewhat nonsensically) translated “in the summary about philosophy of Plato’s general views about existing things”.

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μήκους καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς, ῥυϊσκομένης εἰς πλάτος γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίπεδον, ἤτοι τὰ τρία· πρῶτον γὰρ ἐπίπεδον καὶ σχῆμα τὸ τρίγωνον· καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου, ἤτοι τοῦ τρία, προχωρήσεως γινομένης εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ βάθος, ἤτοι εἰς τὰ τέτταρα, γίνεσθαι τὰ στερεά, 21 ὧν πρώτην εἶναι τὴν πυραμίδα, ἐπὶ τῷ τριγώνῳ συνισταμένην. καὶ τοίνυν οὕτω τοὺς εἰδητικοὺς τούτους ἀριθμοὺς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ὑποτιθέμενος, ὡς ἀρχὰς καὶ τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπελογίζετο, ἐξ ὧν τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκε γνωστικῶς τῶν ὄντων· τέτταρας μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὰς γνωστικὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις· νοῦν· ἐπιστήμην, ἥτις ἐπὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ πάντως συλλογιστικῶς ἑδράζεται· δόξαν, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσαν κατὰ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἐφ’ ᾗ ἀχωρίστως καὶ 22 ἡ φαντασία θεωρεῖται. τῶν οὖν τεσσάρων γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων αὐτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν μὲν νοῦν κατὰ τὸ ἓν ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἀμέσως ἅπτεσθαι τῶν γνωστῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐπιστήμην κατὰ τὰ δύο ὡς γραμμὴν ῥυϊσκομένην ἀπὸ ἑνὸς εἰς ἕν – ἀπὸ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀεί, ἤτοι τῶν προτάσεων – συλλογιστικῶς τελευτᾶν εἰς ἓν ἀεί, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα· τὴν δὲ δόξαν κατὰ τὰ τρία θεωρουμένην κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου εἰκόνα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ νῦν μὲν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, νῦν δὲ τοῦ ψεύδους ἅπτεσθαι· τὴν δέ γε αἴσθησιν κατὰ τέτταρα εἰς τὰ στερεὰ περατοῦσθαι καὶ τέλος εἶναι καὶ ὑλικώτερον τῶν γνωστικῶν ἕξεων τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποκείμενα ἐν στερεοῖς καὶ ὄγκον ἔχουσι θεωρεῖται. Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἐκθέσθαι ἕνεκεν τοῦ γνωστικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀρχὰς τιθεμένας εἰς αὐτό – τὸ γνωστικόν – ἑξῆς φησιν ὡς ἔνιοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα ἀποβλέψαντες, τό τε κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ γνωστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ συνάπτοντες ταῦτα, κοινῶς ὁμοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔδοξαν καὶ ἀπεφήναντο, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν οἱ εἰπόντες ὅτι ψυχή 24 ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς κινῶν ἑαυτόν. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον Ξενοκράτης, ὁ προειρημένος Πλατωνικὸς διάδοχος, εἴρηκε, συμφερόμενος τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, οἳ δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ πάντων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἐτίθεντο, καὶ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀριθμός ἐστιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ λέV117r γειν «ἀριθμὸν» τὸ γνωστικὸν αὐτῆς δηλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἀρχὴ κατ’ αὐτοὺς τῶν |

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2 τρία ut vid. A1pc (‑ρ‑) 5 τούτους A1sl 10 θεωρεῖται ut vid. A1ras || δυνάμεων αὐτῶν transp. M A 11 νοῦν A1pc (ut vid. ex οὖν) || ἓν ut vid. A1pc 12 τὰ om. M A 16 τέτταρα ] τέσσαρα A || τὰ om. M A 16–17 ὑλικώτερον ] ὁλικώτερον A 19 ἐκθέσθαι ] ἐκτίθεσθαι M 20–21 ἑξῆς—γνωστικὸν om. A 25 ὅτι A1pc (ex ὅτε) 19–30.3 404b 27–30

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in a point; and from the dyad – that is, the length or line – flowing into breadth, the plane – that is, the number Three – was generated: for the triangle is the first plane and figure. And from the plane (that is, the number Three), by a procession into depth (that is, into the number Four), the solids were generated, the first of which is the pyramid, which is constructed on the basis of the triangle. Accordingly, having thus 21 supposed that these formative numbers were first principles of the existing things, he extrapolated that they were also first principles of the cognitive capacities of the soul, which, having derived its substance from them, is naturally equipped for the cognitive apprehension of existing things. For [he said that] the cognitive capacities of the soul were four: intellect; scientific knowledge, which is invariably established by deduction in the capacity for reasoning; opinion, which is ambiguous with respect to falsehood and truth; and sense perception, on the inseparable basis of which imagination, too, manifests itself. Among the four cognitive capacities, then, of the soul, 22 [he said that] (1) the intellect, in conformity with the One, is always in the same way in immediate contact with the objects of cognition; (2) scientific knowledge, in conformity with the [number] Two, always arrives deductively at one thing, the necessary true conclusion, just like a line that flows from one [point] to one [point] – for it always starts from one thing, namely, the premisses; (3) opinion, which is manifested in the [number] Three, in conformity with the image of a plane figure, starts from one thing and ends in the ambiguity between two: sometimes it touches upon the truth, sometimes upon a falsehood; whereas (4) sense perception, in conformity with the [number] Four, terminates in the solid figures and is a final stage and more material than the [other] cognitive competences of the soul, since the perceptible objects of the soul also manifest themselves in solid figures endowed with bulk. [Note] that once [Aristotle] has also presented, so far as the soul’s cognitive capac- 23 ity is concerned, the first principles posited by the Platonists with reference to it (the cognitive capacity), he next says that some thinkers, who had directed their attention to both the motive and the cognitive capacities of the soul, and connected the two, offered integrated and unified opinions and accounts of the soul, as is the case with those who maintained that the soul is a self-moving number. This account was offered 24 by Xenocrates, the previously mentioned Platonic successor, in agreement with the Pythagoreans, who of course themselves also posited the numbers as first principles of all existing things and [supposed] that the soul is a number. For in calling it “number” they indicate the soul’s cognitive capacity: for number is according to them a first

5–9 cf. Phlp. 78.7–9; 80.29–32; Them. 12.26–27. 9–24 cf. Phlp. 78.9–26; 79.21–34; Them. 12.5–13; Prisc. 29.2–11. 27–31.5 cf. Them. 12.30–33. 30–31.5 cf. Phlp. 81.25–30.

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ὄντων· καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς συνισταμένη – ἤτοι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ – πάντων γνωστικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὄντων ὡς ὁμοίων ἑαυτῇ, καθὼς δὴ προείρηται τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καταληπτὸν εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ εἰπεῖν «κινῶν ἑαυτὸν» τὸ κινητικὸν αὐτῆς δηλοῦσι πάλιν. Ὅτι, κοινῶς ἅπαντες τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποτιθεμένων αὐτοῖς ἀρχῶν συνιστῶντες, καθὼς ἕκαστος ἔδοξε περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφήνατο. διηνέχθησαν οὖν διαφόροις δόξαις περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτῶν, κἀντεῦθεν συνδιηνέχθησαν ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλας ἔδοξαν, οἱ μὲν ἀσωμάτους, οἱ δὲ σωματικάς, 26 καὶ οἱ μὲν μίαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀπείρους· ἀσωμάτους μὲν οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀρχὰς ἢ τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὸ κενὸν ἢ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· σωματικὰς δὲ , καὶ τούτων αὖθις οἱ μὲν μίαν, τιθέμενοι τὸ πῦρ εἶναι ἀρχὴν ἢ τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ, οἱ δὲ πλείους, οἱ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα λέγοντες ἀρχάς, ἀπείρους δὲ οἱ λέγοντες τὰ ἀμερῆ καὶ ἄτομα σώματα ἄπειρα ἀρχὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ἀπείρους ὁμοιομε27 ρείας, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον δηλονότι καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν. πάντες δέ, φησίν, οἱ διαφόρως οὕτω δόξαντες περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐσιοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ πῦρ ὑποθέμενοι πάντων ἀρχὴν ὡς λεπτομερέστατον κἀντεῦθεν – διὰ πάντων ῥᾷστα διεισδῦνον καὶ κινοῦν – οὕτω πάντως καὶ κινητικώτατον ὂν καὶ ἀεὶ κινούμενον καὶ μηδόλως ἠρεμοῦν, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πυρώδους οὐσίας ἔθεντο, πρὸς τὸ κινητικὸν αὐτῆς μάλιστα ὁρῶντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Δημόκριτος, καθὼς προείρηται, 28 διὰ τὸ κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων σφαιρικῶν συνίστησι ταύτην. ὃν δή φησι καὶ γλαφυρώτερον ἐκ τούτων τὸ προτεθὲν αὐτῷ δηλοῦν, τό τε κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοιούτων ἡ ψυχή, λεπτομερεστάτη τις οὖσα καὶ διὰ 25

1 πάντων ] πάντως A 3 κινῶν ] κοινῶν A || αὐτῆς δηλοῦσι ] δηλοῦσιν αὐτῆς A || πάλιν ] πάντως M A 7 τῆς om. A 9 ἢ¹ om. A || καὶ¹ A1sl 10 ἄλλοι supplevi 11 τέτταρα ] τέσσαρα M A 14–15 τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους ] τοῦ εἰρημένου λόγου A 15 λεπτομερέστατον M1pc (ex λεπτομερέστερον) 16 ῥᾷστα (ut vid.) A1pc (ex ῥᾶον) : ῥᾶον M || διεισδῦνον ] διεισδύνον M A || πάντως ] fort. legendum πρώτως (ut Arist. 405a 7) 17 ἔθεντο M1pc (ut vid. ex ἔθετο) 18 αὐτῆς A1sl 19 σφαιρικῶν M1pc (ex σφερικῶν) 4–19 404b 30–405a 7

19–32.2 405a 8–13

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principle of existing things; and it is because the soul is constructed from the first principle – that is, from number – that it cognitively apprehends all existing things, since these are similar to it, in accordance, obviously, with the previously stated idea that “like can be comprehended by like”. In calling it “self-moving”, on the other hand, they indicate its capacity to initiate motion. [Note] that since all thinkers had in common that they constructed the soul from the first principles that they posited, they all gave accounts of the soul corresponding to their respective opinions about the first principles. So they disagreed in having different opinions about the first principles, and as a consequence they also disagreed in the same way about the soul. For different thinkers favoured different first principles: some favoured incorporeal ones, others corporeal ones; some favoured a single one, others several, and some indeed infinitely many. Incorporeal ones [were favoured by] those who posited the numbers, or intellect, or void, or indeed Love and Strife, as first principles. Corporeal ones [were favoured] by others, and among these, in turn, were some [who favoured] a single one and posited that fire, air or water was a first principle, some [who favoured] several – the followers of Empedocles, who spoke of the four elements as first principles – and infinitely many [were favoured by] those who spoke of infinitely many partless and indivisible bodies as first principles and those who spoke of infinitely many homogeneous things, as of course the followers of Democritus and Anaxagoras did. But all thinkers, he says, who hold these divergent opinions about the first principles, derive the substance of the soul from the latter, for the reasons stated. And those who posited fire as the first principle of everything, on account of having the tiniest parts and thus also, as a result (since it most easily enters between all things and causes motion), inevitably being not only most prone to cause motion but also always in motion and never ever at rest, correspondingly classified the soul with the fire-like substance, since they focused their attention especially on its motive capacity – just as Democritus, too, as previously mentioned, constructs the soul from the indivisible spherical [bodies] on account of its motive capacity. Of the latter [Aristotle] says that he also accomplishes the task of explaining the motive capacity of the soul as well as its being always in motion in a rather refined way on the basis of these [bodies]: for inasmuch as the soul, which is a thing with exceedingly minute parts, extending with superlative ease between all things, consists of such [bodies], it is exceedingly prone to cause motion, but inasmuch as its substance is derived from

6–10 cf. Phlp. 82.29–30; Prisc. 30.26–28. 12–20 cf. Phlp. 82.17–24. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 84.17–19. 27– 28 cf. Phlp. 83.24–28. 31–33.2 cf. Phlp. 84.14–21; Them. 13.11–14. 24–25 Or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “being in a primary way not only exceedingly prone to cause motion but also always in motion”.

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γε μὴν Ἀναξαγόραν ἀδηλότερον μέν, ὡς καὶ προείρηκε φθάσας, ὅμως δ’ οὖν διὰ τῶν πλειόνων ὧν λέγει καταλαμβανόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ κινῆσαι λέγοντα τὸν νοῦν τὰς ὁμοιομερείας δῆλον εἶναι, | καὶ αὐτὸν πάντως πρὸς τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποβλέποντα λέγειν οὕτω· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοὸς τὸ γνωστικὸν δηλοῦται, καὶ διὰ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰς ὁμοιομερείας αὖθις, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, τὸ κινητικόν. εὖ μέν γέ φησιν αὐτὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ὡς ἀπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ καθαρός. ἀλλὰ καὶ Θαλῆς, φησί, πρὸς τὸ κινητικὸν μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀφεώρα· λέγεται γὰρ αὐτόν, φησίν, ἔμψυχον δοξάζειν τὸν λίθον καὶ ὡς ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν τὴν μαγνῆτιν ἕλκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὸν σίδηρον· οὕτω δὴ προδήλως τῷ κινητικῷ μᾶλλον ὑπεμφαίνεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐδόκει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Διογένην τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην, ἀρχὴν τιθέμενοι τὸν ἀέρα ὡς λεπτομερέστατον καὶ διὰ πάντων ἥκοντα καὶ κινητικώτατον κἀντεῦθεν οὐσιοῦντες τὴν ψυχήν, ᾗ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ σύστασις ἐδόκουν ταύτην ἔχειν τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ πάντων καταληπτικόν, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, ὡς ὁμοίαν ὁμοίων, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀερώδη λεπτομέρειαν ᾗ οὐσιοῦται κινητικώτατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ σκοπὸν ὁρᾶν φησι καὶ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον, τιθέμενον ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων τὴν θερμὴν καὶ ξηρὰν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἤτοι τὴν πυρώδη οὐσίαν (ταύτην γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης καλεῖ «πῦρ», ἐπειδὴ τὴν φλόγα ὑπερβολὴν πυρός, οὐ πῦρ, τίθεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ὑδατώδους οὐσίας καὶ ψυχρότητος, οὐχ ὕδωρ)· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ὡς ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τιθέμενος ὡσαύτως καὶ αὐτός, ᾗ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων ταύτην συνίστησι, τὸ γνωστικὸν πάντων ἐντεῦθεν αὐτῆς ὑποδεικνύει· ᾗ δὲ ἄπαυστον ῥοὴν καὶ ἄστατον παντάπασι κατ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς

1 σφαιρικοῦ ] σφερικοῦ Mtext (‑αι- M1sl ) : φαιρικοῦ A : τοῦ add. V (fort. legendum του) 5 ὁμοιομερείας ] ὁμερείας M || καὶ αὐτὸν πάντως ] πάντως καὶ αὐτὸν V 9 Θαλῆς ] θαλὴς A 10 αὐτόν, φησίν transp. M 13 Ἀπολλωνιάτην ] ἀπολλιωνάτην (ut vid.) M1pc (ex ἀπολλιωνιάτην) 16 δὲ om. A 18 θερμὴν καὶ ξηρὰν ] ξηρὰν καὶ θερμὴν M A 20 πυρός A1pc (π‑) || κρύσταλλον ut vid. M1pc (fort. ex κρίσταλλον) : κρίσταλον V : κρύσταλον A || τῆς A1pc (ex πυρὸς) 23 πάντων ] πάντως MA 2–9 405a 13–19 9–12 405a 19–21

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17–34.2 405a 26–29

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a spherical figure, it is exceedingly easy to move: for spherical things are more easily displaced and moved than others. When it comes to Anaxagoras, [Aristotle says that,] even though he is more obscure, as he has already mentioned above, it is nevertheless clear that he, too, is found, throughout most of his statements, to be of the opinion that the soul and the intellect are the same thing, and to say that the intellect sets the homogeneous things in motion; and [that] he, too, undoubtedly speaks like that because his attention is focused on [both] the cognitive and the motive capacities of the soul. For the [mention of] intellect indicates its cognitive capacity, while, on the other hand, as is obvious, [the statement] that it sets the homogeneous things in motion [indicates] its motive capacity. He says that he was certainly right to suppose that the intellect is simple, unmixed and pure. But it seems, he says, as though Thales, too, chiefly focused on the motive capacity of the soul. For it is reported, he says, that he was of the opinion that stones are ensouled and that magnets attract iron and cause it to move on account of having souls: accordingly, he was clearly of the opinion that the soul is chiefly expressed by the motive capacity. Similarly, the followers of Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, too, who posited air as a first principle, on account of having exceedingly minute parts, extending between all things and being exceedingly prone to cause motion, and who derived the soul’s substance from it, were of the opinion that it is inasmuch as its structure is derived from a first principle of existing things that the soul has its cognitive capacity and its capacity to comprehend all things, on the assumption that it [can comprehend] things that are similar to it, as has been mentioned many times; and that it is because of the air-like fine‐grainedness to which it owes its substance that the soul is exceedingly prone to cause motion. He says that Heraclitus, too, has the same aim in view when he posits, as a first principle of existing things, the hot and dry exhalation, that is, the fire-like substance (this is what Aristotle calls “fire”, since he classifies flame not as fire but as an excessive state of fire, just as [he classifies] ice not as water but as an excessive state of the water-like substance and coldness), for [he says that] the soul consists of this exhalation. Seeing, then, that he, too, in the same way posits [that the soul is constructed] from a first principle, Heraclitus indicates, inasmuch as he constructs the soul from a first principle of existing things, that its capacity to know all things is a result of this, and lays it down, inasmuch as he supposes and thinks that an incessant and entirely restless flux belongs to the first principle itself and to all those things that are derived from it, that as a result

10–11 cf. Phlp. 86.1–4. 15–23 cf. Phlp. 87.2–5; Them. 13.23–25. 25–28 According to Philoponus (87.10–13), on whom Metochites is surely drawing here, things are a bit more complicated: Aristotle classifies flame as an excessive state of fire, but what Heraclitus calls “fire” is the dry exhalation. 2–5 Ironically, what Aristotle complains about “above” (404b 1) as being unclear in Anaxagoras is precisely whether the soul and the intellect are the same thing.

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34 | Theodoros Metochites

ἁπάντων ὑποτίθεται καὶ δοκεῖ, κινητικώτατον πάντων ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀεικίνητον τὴν 33 ψυχὴν κατασκευάζει. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ὁ φυσικός, φησίν, ὁ ἐκ Κρότωνος πρὸς ταῦ-

τα ἀφορῶν ἀθάνατον εἶναι λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἐκ τῶν οὐρανίων συνεστῶσαν καὶ ἀεὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖνα ἄπαυστον κινουμένην (ὥσπερ ἥλιος, φησί, καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἀστέρες καὶ καθόλου γε τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα). οὕτω δὴ καὶ οὗτος τῷ κινητικῷ μάλιστα χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν νοεῖ, καὶ δῆλός ἐστι καὶ τὸ γνωστικὸν αὐτῆς ἐντεῦθεν συνεισάγων, κατὰ τὰ 34 οὐράνια σώματα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τιθέμενος. τὸν δέ γε Ἵππωνά φησιν ὕδωρ τίθεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, κἀντεῦθεν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴεσθαι, τούτου δεῖξιν εἶναι φάσκοντα ὅτι ἡ σπερματικὴ τῶν ζῴων ἀρχὴ πάντων ὑγρά ἐστιν, οὐ μόνον V118r δὲ τῶν ζῴων, | ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν τὰ σπέρματα εἰς ὑγρότητα λυόμενα εἶθ’ οὕτως τὰς τῶν φυτῶν ἀναδόσεις καὶ γεννήσεις προάγει. οὗτος δ’ ὁ Ἵππων ταῦτ’ ἔλεγε πρὸς Κριτίαν ἀπομαχόμενος τιθέμενον ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αἷμα· ᾤετο δ’ ὁ Κριτίας τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ αἷμα, πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποβλέπων· τὴν γὰρ αἴσθησιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος ᾤετο εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πίστιν προσῆγε τῷ λόγῳ ὡς τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὴ μετέχοντα αἵματος ἀναίσθητά εἰσιν (οἷον ὄνυχες, ὀδόντες, τρίχες). καίτοι γε προδήλως ἀπομάχεται πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν τὸ τὰ νεῦρα ὀργανικὰ εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἄναιμα παντάπασιν ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν ζῴων ἄναιμά εἰσι καθόλου 35 (οἷα τὰ ἔντομα). ὅλως δέ, φησίν, ἕκαστος τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσικῶν ὁ μὲν τὸ ὁ δὲ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων ἀρχὴν ἐτίθετο πλὴν τῆς γῆς· ταύτην γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὑπέθετο ἀρχὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, πλὴν εἴ τις καὶ ταύτην συνηρίθμει μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων (ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ὑποτιθέμενος ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων, συνεισῆγεν ἐξανάγκης αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἓν γάρ ἐστι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡ γῆ). 36

Ὅτι πάντες οἱ φυσικοὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁρίζονται, ὡς καὶ προείρηται, τῷ κινητικῷ, τῷ γνωστικῷ, καὶ μὴν πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ. πάντες δ’ οὖν ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτήν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται, συνίστασθαί φασιν, ὡς ἂν πάντ’ εἰδέναι ἔχῃ· τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔδοξαν πάντες πλὴν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου· οὗτος γὰρ

11 γεννήσεις ] γενήσεις Mtext (‑ν- M1sl ) A || οὗτος ] οὕτως M A || ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα M A 13 τὸ¹ delere velim 16 τῆς ] τοῖς M 18 πρὸ αὐτοῦ M1marg || ὁ μὲν τὸ ὁ ut vid. M1ras 21 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 22 τεττάρων ] τεσσάρων M A 24 αὐτήν iter. A 2–7 405a 29–b 1

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of this the soul is of all things what is most prone to cause motion and is always in motion. But Alcmaeon, [Aristotle] says, the naturalist from Croton, is also directing his 33 attention to [both] these things, when he declares that the soul is immortal on account of being constructed from the heavenly bodies and forever being incessantly moved in conformity with them (like the sun, he says, and the moon and the stars, and in general the heavenly body). As is seen, then, this man, too, conceives of the soul as being chiefly characterized by its motive capacity, and clearly treats its cognitive capacity as a concomitant result of this, supposing as he does that its substance conforms to the heavenly bodies. Hippo, on the other hand, posited, he says, that the first princi- 34 ple of existing things was water and consequently believed that the soul, too, was the very same thing: he said that an indication of this was that the seminal principle of all animals is wet, and not only that of the animals, but even the seeds of plants only induce the sprouting and generation of plants once they have begun to dissolve into wetness. Now, this man, Hippo, said these things by way of contradicting Critias, who posited that blood was soul; but Critias believed that the soul was blood because he focused his attention on the perceptive capacity of the soul; for he believed that sense perception takes place through the blood. Indeed, he also invoked as evidence for his account that those parts of animals that are not supplied with blood are insensitive (for example, nails, teeth and hair). And yet this opinion is patently contradicted by the fact that it is the nerves, which are entirely bloodless, that are the instruments of sense perception in animals, and that quite a few animals are completely bloodless (for example, insects). In general, he says, each of his predecessors in natural philos- 35 ophy posited the one or the other of the elements as a first principle, except earth. For no one posited this as a first principle among existing things, unless perhaps someone threw it in with the other elements for good measure (as for instance Empedocles, who posited the four elements as first principles of existing things, necessarily also included earth among these: for earth, too, is one of the four elements). [Note] that all natural philosophers define the soul, as previously mentioned, by 36 its capacity to initiate motion, its cognitive capacity and also, in addition to these, its incorporeality. Thus they all maintain – and this has also been mentioned – that it is constructed from the first principles, in order that it may be able to know all things, for like, they say, is comprehended by like. They were all of this opinion, except for Anaxagoras: for while he conceives, as mentioned, of the soul and the intellect as the

1–2 cf. Phlp. 87.24–25. 2 cf. Them. 13.30. 3–5 cf. Phlp. 88.11–13. 6–9 Philoponus, who is clearly a source here, suggests (88.11–17) that Alcmaeon was mainly interested in the motive capacity of the soul and professes ignorance about his explanation of its cognitive capacity, because of lack of information. 14–22 cf. Phlp. 89.12–22; Them. 13.34–14.1. 24–27 cf. Phlp. 89.26–28. 29–30 cf. Phlp. 90.22–25; Them. 14.5–8; Prisc. 32.32–33.4. 33–37.4 cf. Phlp. 91.9–16.

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ταυτόν, ὡς εἴρηται, νοῶν τὴν ψυχήν τε καὶ τὸν νοῦν, ἁπλοῦν ὅμως καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ πάντων τὸν νοῦν φησι· καὶ εἰ ἁπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ ἀμιγὴς οὕτω καὶ ἀνόμοιος πάντως, οὐκ ἂν τῶν ὄντων γνωστικῶς ὡς ὁμοίων ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο. διατοῦτο καί, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, πλὴν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου πάντες ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τίθενται τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ἂν γνωστικῶς τῶν ὄντων ἀντίληψιν ἔχῃ, ὡς ὁμοίως ἔχουσα. αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας ἀσυμφώνως πρὸς πάντας μόνος ἄλλως τὰ περὶ τούτου φησί· τὸν γὰρ νοῦν ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ πάντων τιθέμενος οὐ λέγει πάντως τῶν ὄντων γνωστικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ὡς ὁμοίων. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν διασαφεῖ, φησί, πῶς ἄρα τὴν γνῶσιν δύναται τῶν ὄντων ἐνεργεῖν, μηδὲν ὅμοιον μηδὲ κοινὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ κεκτημένος, ὡς ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀμιγής· τίνι γὰρ τρόπῳ τὴν κατάληψιν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ὅμοιός ἐστιν; [39] ἀλλ’, ὅπερ | ἐλέγετο, ἅπαντες, φησίν, οἱ φυσικοὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, πρὸς ὃ ὑπέθεντο τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπετίθεντο καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας. καὶ οἱ μὲν μίαν τιθέμενοι τὴν ἀρχήν – εἴτε τὸ πῦρ εἴτ’ ἄλλο τι – μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔλεγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· οἱ δὲ πολλὰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων τιθέμενοι ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐτίθεντο· καὶ οἱ τὰς ἐναντιότητας τιθέμενοι ἀρχάς – ἤτοι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα τυχὸν καὶ γῆν – ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ὁμοῦ συνιόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐδόκουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἓν ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων ὧντινων ἄρα ἀρχὴν τιθέμενοι τῶν ὄντων – ἤτοι τὸ θερμόν, ὡς ἔνιοι τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν, ὡς ἔνιοι τὸ ὕδωρ – τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐτίθεντο. ὅθεν δὴ καί τινες παρωνύμως αὐτὴν καλεῖσθαι ἐκομψεύοντο ἀφ’ οὗ ἐτίθεντο ἀρχικοῦ αἰτίου, οἷον οἱ τιθέμενοι τὸ θερμὸν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ζέειν παρωνύμως ἔλεγον εἶναι τὸ «ζῆν» καὶ τὴν «ζωήν» (εἴτουν τὴν τῆς ζωῆς αἰτίαν, τὴν ψυχήν), οἱ δ’ αὖθις ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν ψύξεως καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ψύχειν παρωνομάσθαι ἐδόκουν τὴν ψυχήν. * *

*

2 εἰ ] ἡ M 3 διατοῦτο ] διὰ τοῦτο M 9 μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. 13 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν transposui : οὐσίαν αὐτὴν codd. (forsan tamen pro αὐτὴν ἔλεγον καὶ potius est legendum καὶ αὐτῆς ἔλεγον) || ἔλεγον A1pc (fort. ex ἐλέγετο) 21 ζῆν M1pc (ex ζεῖν) 22 τὴν ψυχήν scripsi : τῆς ψυχῆς codd. 23 παρωνομάσθαι ] παρωνομᾶσθαι A 8–10 405b 21–23 10–15 405b 15–21

15–19 405b 23–26 19–23 405b 26–30

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same thing, he nevertheless maintains that the intellect is simple and pure and not mixed with anything; and if it is thus simple and unmixed and completely dissimilar [to everything else], it cannot cognitively apprehend existing things on account of their being similar to it. This is also why, Aristotle says, they all, except for Anaxagoras, posit that the soul [consists] of the first principles, in order that it may have a cognitive apprehension of existing things on account of being similar to them. It is only Anaxagoras who makes statements on this issue that differ from and disagree with everybody else’s: for since he posits that the intellect is simple and not mixed with anything, he undoubtedly denies that it cognitively apprehends existing things on account of their being similar to it. Nor, on the other hand, does he make clear, [Aristotle] says, how in that case it can exert cognition of existing things, if it possesses no similarity or commonality with them, on account of being simple and unmixed. For by what means can it attain comprehension, if it is not similar [to its object]? Anyway, what we were saying was that all natural philosophers, he says (except for Anaxagoras), in accordance with their respective suppositions about the first principles of existing things, supposed the soul to be the same and to belong to the same substance. Those who posited a single first principle, whether fire or something else, said that the substance of the soul, too, was one and the same, while those who posited a plurality of first principles of existing things also posited that the substance of the soul was derived from the same plurality of things: those who posited the contrarieties – that is, fire and water, or, possibly, air and earth – as first principles were of the opinion that the substance of the soul also consists of the contraries as they come together in one place, but in addition anyone who posited any single member of any pair of contraries as a first principle of existing things – that is, heat, as some, [who posited] fire, [thought], or cold, as others, [who posited] water, [thought] – posited that the substance of the soul, too, was the same thing. Τhis is also why some thinkers would ingeniously suggest that the soul’s name was derived from the principal cause that they posited: for example, those who posited heat said that “living” (to zēn) and “life” (zōḗ) – that is, the cause of life, the soul – are derived from heat (to thermón) itself and seething (to zéein), but others, again, were of the opinion that the soul’s name (psuchḗ) was derived from “cold” (psuchrón), from the refrigeration (psúxis) during inhalation and from cooling (to psúchein) itself. * *

*

26–32 cf. Them. 14.21–25; Phlp. 92.3–11. 17–18 I have translated the emended text. The transmitted text means, roughly, “… said that the substance, too, of the soul, too, was one”. 29 I have translated the emended text. The transmitted text means “the cause of the life of the soul”. to thermón : in so far as the suggestion is that the words “living” and “life” are literally derived from the word “heat”, one would have expected to zestón, but Metochites is probably only using slightly careless language to suggest – as Themistius and Philoponus do – that the words “living” and “life” are derived from a word that signifies heat, namely, “seething”.

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Ὅτι, μετὰ τὸ ἐκθέσθαι τὰς τῶν παλαιοτέρων αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δόξας προχωρῶν ἔπειτα εἰς τοὺς ἐλέγχους τῶν μὴ δοκούντων αὐτῷ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι, ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖν φησιν εἶναι προηγουμένως μήποτε ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὅλως λέγειν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς κινήσεως οὕτως ὡς ἔλεγον, ὅτι, αὕτη τῆς κινήσεως οὖσα αἰτία καὶ κινητικὸν τοῦ ζῴου, ἐξανάγκης καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαί τι κινεῖν ὅλως ᾤοντο μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινούμενον· καὶ τούτου χάριν ἔλεγον τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν. οὗτος δ’ ἴσως ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ πρὸς Πλάτωνα φέρει, ἀνατρέπων καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι καθάπαξ ἀξιῶν τὸ κινεῖσθαι νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ τοίνυν φησὶν ὅτι δέδεικται μὲν αὐτῷ πρότερον ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτῷ ἀποδέδεικται. ὅμως δ’ οὖν καὶ νῦν αὖθις τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ κατασκευάζων (ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ἕτερον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι), κατὰ διαίρεσιν τὸν λόγον προάγων φησὶν ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸ κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται κινεῖσθαι ὃ μὴ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ οἱ κοιμώμενοι πλωτῆρες ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ, κινουμένου αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλοίου, κινοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, κινοῦνται δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ βαδίζουσιν, οὐδὲ | τοῖς οἰκείοις εἰς τοῦτο μορίοις – ἤτοι τοῖς οἰκείοις ποσί – χρῶνται, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἐπεὶ γοῦν καθ’ αὑτὸ λέγεται κινεῖσθαι ἡ ψυχή – οὕτω γὰρ ὑποτίθενται τὸ ἔμψυχον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν – καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἀνάγκη καθ’ ἕνα τινὰ τρόπον τῶν διωρισμένων τῆς κινήσεως ταύτην κινεῖσθαι. τέσσαρες δέ εἰσιν οἱ τρόποι τῆς κινήσεως, καθὼς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει παραδίδωσιν· ἀλλοίωσις, ἥτις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ ποιοῦ· φορά, ἥτις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ ποῦ· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ ποσοῦ ἡ αὔξησις καὶ

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[Note] that he then proceeds from expounding his predecessors’ views about the soul to refuting those views that he thinks are stated incorrectly, and says that it must first of all be investigated whether it is not false and wholly impossible to ascribe motion to the soul in the way that his predecessors did, when they said that since the soul can cause motion and set the animal in motion, it is itself necessarily also moved. For they believed that it was not at all possible for anything to cause motion unless it was itself also moved, and they said that the animal itself moved itself because of this. It is presumably at Plato he directs the following argument, which purports to demolish and to reject as utterly impossible any thought and statement that ascribes motion to the soul. Accordingly, he says that he has previously shown, in the Physics, that it is 2 not necessary for everything that causes motion also to be moved itself, since he has demonstrated that the prime mover is unmoved. But as he nevertheless argues here 3 again this very point (that it is not necessary for everything that sets another thing in motion also to be moved itself), he develops his argument by way of a division and says that everything that is moved is moved either by virtue of itself or coincidentally; but that is said to be moved coincidentally whose source of motion is not itself, as for instance the sleeping sailors on a ship are themselves moved together with the ship, when this is being moved, but are moved coincidentally, since they are not walking, and so are not employing their own bodily parts – that is, their own legs – to this end, in what is the natural motion for human beings. Anyway, since the soul is said to be 4 moved by virtue of itself – for this is how [his predecessors] suppose that the ensouled creature moves itself – and being moved belongs to the soul with respect to its essence, it is necessary that it should be moved according to one of the specified types of motion. And the types of motion are four, as he teaches in the Physics: alteration, which is [motion] within the ambit of the category of quality; locomotion, which is [motion] within the ambit of the category of location; but within the ambit of the category of

4–10 cf. Phlp. 92.21–27; 96.10–12. 10–12 cf. Phlp. 96.22–25; Prisc. 34.22–24; Them. 14.33–15.14. 15 coincidentally: cf. Phlp. 97.7. 17 sleeping sailors : cf. Prisc. 34.24–25; Them. 15.21–22. 20–22 This looks like a garbled paraphrase of Philoponus (98.15–17), who says that the question is whether motion is part of the essence of the soul, as it is according to those who claim it is a self-moved thing, or it is just essentially possible for it to be moved, or indeed, as Aristotle will argue, impossible. 24 cf. Phlp. 98.22–23. 26–41.4 cf. Phlp. 99.1–8; Prisc. 34.31–32. 11–12 since … unmoved: It is possible that this perfect indicative introduced by epeidḗ is intended as a temporal clause denoting an action contemporaneous with that of the governing clause (the predicate of which is also a perfect indicative), although this is not in conformity with the grammar of classical Attic. In that case, it should be translated “… in the course of demonstrating that the prime mover is unmoved”. 22 Or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus: “and being moved [is said] to belong to the soul with respect to its essence”.

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ἡ φθίσις ἕτεραι δύο κινήσεις· οὐ γὰρ κἀνταῦθά ἐστιν ἓν καθολικὸν ὄνομα ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσεως ἡ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποῦ ἡ φορά. τέτταρες οὖν εἰσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, αἱ κινήσεις ἄνευ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς· ταύτας γὰρ οὐ κινήσεις ἀλλὰ μεταβολάς φησιν ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει. τὰς γοῦν τέσσαρας ταύτας κινήσεις – ἤτοι τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν φοράν, τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν φθίσιν – ἐν τόπῳ συμβέβηκε θεωρεῖσθαι, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει δέδεικται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φορὰ καὶ ἡ αὔξησις καὶ ἡ φθίσις πρόδηλον παντὶ συνιδεῖν ὡς ἐν τόπῳ θεωροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις αὐτή, ἐπειδὴ μεριστή ἐστι καὶ περὶ μεριστὸν ὑποκείμενον, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐν τόπῳ θεωρεῖται. ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀσώματός ἐστιν, ὡς ἅπαντες σχεδὸν φυσικοὶ καὶ μάλισθ’ ὁ Πλάτων ταύτην φησίν, ὁ καὶ μάλιστα ταύτην λέγων κινεῖσθαι· ὥστε πῶς ἂν κινοῖτο, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐν τόπῳ ἐστί, πᾶσα δὲ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τέσσαρας τρόπους ἐν τόπῳ θεωρεῖται; εἰ μή τις οὕτω ταύτην λέγει κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὡς ἄρα τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ τρίπηχυ αὐτὸ τὸ διάστημα τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι λέγονται κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ συγκινεῖσθαι κινουμένῳ τῷ σώματι· ἐν τόπῳ μέντοι οὐκ εἰσὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ τρίπηχυ ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν· ἀλλ’ εἰ κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡς ὑποτιθέμεθα, τὸ κινεῖσθαι, εἴη ἂν ἐν τόπῳ· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, ὡς εἴρηται. ἄλλως τε, φησίν, εἰ ἄρα τι κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖται, καὶ βίᾳ ἂν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινηθείη (ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄνω κινούμενον παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίᾳ κάτω κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ βῶλος κατὰ φύσιν κάτω κινουμένη παρὰ φύσιν ἄνω κινεῖται), | καὶ ἀντιστρόφως γε μήν, εἴ τι κατὰ βίαν κινεῖται, πάντως πρότερον κατὰ φύσιν ὁπῃοῦν κινεῖται· πρότερα γὰρ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν· καὶ εἰ ἄρα παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί τινα, ἀνάγκη πρότερον ἐννοεῖν τὰ τούτων ἐναντία, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἠρεμίας· ἃ κατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις πάντως γινόμενα τόποις (ὡς ἄρα τὸ πῦρ ἄνω καὶ ἡ γῆ κάτω ἠρεμοῦσι), ταῦτ’ ἄρα καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τόποις (ἤτοι ἀνάπαλιν ἡ μὲν γῆ ἄνω, τὸ δὲ πῦρ κάτω), καὶ ἃ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οἰκείοις ἠρεμεῖ τόποις πολλῷ μᾶλλον

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quantity there are two different motions, growth and diminution: for there is no single universal name that applies to both in this case, in the way that “alteration” applies to [all] motion within the ambit of quality and “locomotion” applies to [all] motion within the ambit of location. The motions, then, as stated, are four, excluding generation and destruction: for he says in the Physics that these are not motions but changes. Anyway, 5 these four motions – that is, alteration, locomotion, growth and diminution – are in fact found to occur in a place (this has also been shown in the Physics). For it is plain to see for everyone that locomotion as well as growth and diminution are found to occur in a place, but even alteration, since it is divisible into parts and involves a subject that is divisible into parts, is also found to occur in a place. But the soul does not exist in a place, since it is indeed incorporeal, as practically all natural philosophers say it is, in particular Plato, the one who particularly stresses that it is moved. So how, then, can it be moved, since it does not exist in a place, and all motions that conform to the four types mentioned are found to occur in a place? Unless someone says that the soul is moved coincidentally in the following way: namely, as the whiteness and the very length of three cubits in the body are said to be moved coincidentally and to be moved along with the body as it is being moved, although the whiteness and the three cubits are not in a place, except coincidentally, since the body in which they inhere is in a place. But if being moved belongs to the soul with respect to its essence and by virtue of itself, in accordance with our supposition, it will be in a place; which is impossible, as stated. Besides, he says, if something has a motion in accordance with 6 nature, it may also be moved by force and in violation of nature (as for instance fire, which has an upward motion in accordance with nature, is moved downwards in violation of nature and by force; and a lump of earth, which has a downward motion in accordance with nature, is moved upwards in violation of nature), and, indeed, conversely, if something has a motion in violation of nature, it is inevitable that prior to this it has some kind of motion in accordance with nature: for what is in accordance with nature is prior to what is in violation of nature; and thus, if something is in violation of nature, it is necessary first to conceive of what is contrary to this, namely, what is in accordance with nature. Αnd the situation is the same with rest: what is at rest in 7 accordance with nature conditionally on appearing in its own proper place (as fire is at rest above and earth is so below), this will consequently also be at rest in violation of nature in the contrary places (that is, conversely, earth above, fire below), and what is at rest in violation of nature in a place other than its own is a fortiori first at rest in

4–5 cf. Phlp. 98.27–28. 7 cf. Phlp. 99.18–19. 11–12 Philoponus (99.38–100.4) concedes that Aristotle’s argument so far is sufficient against Plato, but points out that it is not sufficient against those who say that the soul is a body (that is, pace Metochites, most of those natural philosophers who were discussed in the previous chapter). 26–28 cf. Phlp. 101.30–33.

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καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινήσεις καὶ ἠρεμίας – ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τιθέναι καὶ λέγειν οὐδὲ πλάττειν ἐστί, φησί, ῥᾴδιον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἄλογα καὶ ἀσύμβατα ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν· τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων ταῦτα, ἃ καὶ βίᾳ ἕλκεται καὶ ὠθεῖται καὶ ἄνω ῥιπτεῖται καὶ κατὰ φύσιν φέρεται. καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ ἄνω κατὰ φύσιν φέροιτο, πῦρ ἂν εἴη καὶ κοῦφον· τῶν γὰρ κούφων τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι· εἰ δὲ κάτω φέροιτο, γῆ ἂν εἴη καὶ βαρύ· τῶν γὰρ βάρος ἐχόντων τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φέρεται, τῶν μεταξύ τινος εἴη ἂν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ’ οὔτε κοῦφον οὔτε βαρὺ οὔτε τούτων τι μεταξύ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι, φησίν, εἰ οὕτω λέγεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ κινουμένη, ὡς ἂν μοχλείᾳ κινοῦσα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῷ ζωγρίῳ θηρία κινούμενα συγκινεῖ τὰ περικλείοντα αὐτά – καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς ποιεῖν· ἐν κηρίνοις σφαιρίοις εἰς λεπτὸν κατεσκευασμένοις εἰσάγουσι κανθάρους, καὶ οὗτοι δὴ κινούμενοι συγκινοῦσι καὶ τὰ κήρινα αὐτῶν δοχεῖα – εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ τὰ ὑποδείγματα ταῦτα κινουμένη ἡ ψυχὴ μοχλείᾳ τινὶ συγκινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, εὔδηλον ὡς καθ’ ἣν ἂν αὐτὸ κινῆται κίνησιν κινεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἀντιστρόφως πάντως, ἣν φαίνεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα κίνησιν, ταύτην κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ αὐτὸ συγκινοῦσα. ἐπεὶ γοῦν τὸ σῶμα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖται κίνησιν, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πρότερον μάλιστα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖται κίνησιν. πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸ κινεῖται ἢ κατὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ· ταῦτα δὲ χώραν οὐκ ἔχει ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμεροῦς καὶ ἀσωμάτου ψυχῆς. εἰ δ’ ὅλως φήσει τις τοῦτο ἐνδέχεσθαι, κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ συγκινεῖν μοχλείᾳ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον τὸ σῶμα, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐξιέναι ταύτην τοῦ σώματος κατὰ τὰ ὑποδείγματα | καὶ κινεῖσθαι μόνην ἀκίνητον ἐῶσαν αὐτό, καὶ πάλιν εἰσαγομένην ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖν ὡσαύτως τὸ σῶμα ὡς πρότερον, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐν νεκροῖς εἰσαγομένην σώμασι ταῦτα κινεῖν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ζῆν· ταῦτα δὲ πλασματώδη τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδύνατα. ἴσως δ’ ἄν τις ἐρεῖ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν,

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accordance with nature in its own proper place. Indeed, it is not easy, he says, even to pretend to apply these things – the types of motion and rest that accord with nature and that violate it – to the soul in thought and in language, since they are completely inconsistent and incongruous with the substance of the soul. For these properties belong to bodies, which are both pulled and pushed and thrown upwards by force and carried in accordance with nature. Moreover, if the soul is carried upwards in accordance with nature, it must be fire and something light. For it belongs to light things to be carried upwards. But if it is carried downwards, it must be earth and something heavy. For it belongs to things that possess heaviness to be carried downwards. But if it hovers between these [extremes], the substance of the soul must be one of the intermediate [bodies]. But the soul is neither light nor heavy nor anything in between these [extremes]. Further, he says, if it is in the sense of causing motion by leverage that the soul is said to cause motion when it is in motion, just as wild animals in a crate, when they are in motion, set what encloses them in simultaneous motion – similarly to what some children are also in the habit of doing in their games: they put beetles in thinly moulded wax balls; and when these are in motion, they set their wax containers in simultaneous motion – if, then, in accordance with these examples, it is by some kind of leverage that the soul, when it is in motion, sets the body in simultaneous motion, it is obvious that it is with respect to the type of motion in which it itself is that it also sets the body in motion, and conversely it is inevitably with respect to the type of motion in which the body appears to be that the soul, which sets the body in simultaneous motion, is moved. Given, then, that the body is moved with respect to locomotion, it is clear that the soul, too, is moved beforehand precisely with respect to locomotion. But everything that is moved is moved either with respect to itself as a whole or with respect to some parts of itself; but there is no room for parts in the partless and incorporeal soul. And if anyone should claim that this is at all possible, namely, for the soul to be moved with respect to place and to set the body in simultaneous motion by means of leverage in the manner described, then it will also be possible for the soul to depart from the body, in accordance with the examples, and be moved on its own while leaving the body immobile, and, on entering the body again, to move it in the same way as before, and consequently, on entering even dead bodies, to set these in motion and make them alive; but these notions are artificial, completely absurd and impossible. But perhaps someone will say that the soul is moved coincidentally when

4–6 cf. Them. 16.3–5. 12–22 cf. Phlp. 106.8–18. 29 cf. Phlp. 108.12–14. 33–45.6 cf. Them. 17.9–15; 17.20–23. 6 carried in accordance with nature: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “carried downwards in accordance with nature”.

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κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος, ὃ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἴσως ἂν εἴη λέγειν. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, φησίν, ὃ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὑποτίθεταί τις ἔν τινι (ὥσπερ κατ’ οὐσίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν), τοῦτο καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλου εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὃ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει οἴκοθεν (ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ κινεῖσθαι), τοῦτο καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἔξωθεν ἔχειν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀγαθόν, φησίν, ἢ τόδε τι ὄν, τοῦτο δι’ ἄλλο εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ ὂν ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν εἶναι. ἀντιδιαστέλλει δὲ ταῦτα, τό τε «καθ’ αὑτὸ» καὶ τὸ «δι’ αὑτό», πρὸς μὲν τὸ «καθ’ αὑτὸ» ἀντιδιδοὺς τὸ «δι’ ἄλλο», πρὸς δὲ τὸ «δι’ αὑτὸ» ἀντιδιδοὺς τὸ «ἄλλου ἕνεκεν» εὖ μάλα κατὰ λόγον· οἷον τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐστι καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ οὐ δι’ ἄλλο· ὡς ποιητικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· καὶ πάλιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν δι’ αὑτὸ καὶ αἱρετόν, οὐχὶ ἕνεκά τινος ἄλλου. ὥστε τὸ «δι’ αὑτὸ» πρὸς τὸ τελικὸν τείνει αἴτιον· τὸ δὲ «καθ’ αὑτὸ» ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ θεωρεῖται αἰτίου. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κινεῖσθαι καθ’ αὑτὸ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν οἴκοθεν, ὡς οἱ λέγοντες ὑποτίθενται, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἄν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ κινεῖσθαι φαίη τις ἂν μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξωθεν, εἴ γε δὴ τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, φησίν, ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ὅλως βούλεται κινεῖσθαι λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν. ἔτι δ’ εἰς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τοῦτό φησιν, ὡς εἰ ἄρα αὐτοκίνητός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, εἴπερ κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατ’ ἄλλο μέρος αὐτῆς κινοῦσα καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο κινουμένη, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὅλη μὴ μόνον κινοῦσα ἀλλὰ καὶ κινουμένη, ἐξίσταται λοιπὸν ἑαυτῆς, εἴτουν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κατ’ οὐσίαν αὐτῇ ἐστι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ὑποτιθέασιν οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει, ἐξίσταται οὗ πρότερον ἦν, εἴτε κατὰ τόπον κινεῖται εἴτε κατὰ ποιὸν εἴτε κατὰ ποσόν· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχή, εἰ κινεῖται κατ’ οὐσίαν, ἑαυτῆς ἐξίσταται. οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται κατά τι τῶν εἰρημένων (ἢ τόπον ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν)· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἦν σῶμα· αὗται γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ σώματι συμβαίνουσι καὶ θεωροῦνται· ἀλλ’ ἅπαντες ἀσώματον | κοινῶς δοξάζουσι τὴν ψυχήν. λείπεται γοῦν κατ’ οὐσίαν αὐτὴν κινουμένην ἑαυτῆς ἐξίστασθαι, εἴτουν

4 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 5 δι’ αὑτὸ correxi : δι’ αὐτὸ codd. 6 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A || δι’ αὑτό correxi : δι’ αὐτὸ V M : διαυτὸ (ut vid.) A || καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ (ut vid.) A 7 δι’ αὑτὸ correxi : δι’ αὐτὸ V M : διαυτὸ (ut vid.) A 9 δι’ αὑτὸ correxi : δι’ αὐτὸ codd. || οὐχὶ ] οὐχ’ M A 10 δι’ αὑτὸ correxi : δι’ αὐτὸ codd. || καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 11 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ (ut vid.) A 13 τὴν ψυχὴν ] τῆ ψυχῆ M 18 κινεῖσθαι M1pc (‑ει‑) 21 κατὰ² ] τὸ add. M 24 τῷ ] ἐν τῷ malim 25 κατ’ οὐσίαν ] κατουσίαν A 15–46.6 406b 11–15 20–21 ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : cf. Ph. 5.5, 235b 8–11

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the body is moved, and perhaps it is not an absurd remark either. But it is not possible, [Aristotle] says, for that which someone supposes to be essential in a thing – as they say that it is essential for the soul to be moved – also to be in that thing by the agency of something else, or for that which belongs to a thing intrinsically and by nature – as being moved [is supposed to belong] to the soul – also to belong to it extrinsically and by the agency of something else, just as it is not [possible], he says, for what is by virtue of itself good or an individual “this” to be so on account of another thing, or for what exists on account of itself to exist for the sake of something else. There is a contrast here between “by virtue of itself” and “on account of itself”, inasmuch as he opposes “on account of another thing” to “by virtue of itself” and “for the sake of something else” to “on account of itself”, which is all very reasonable. For instance, seeing belongs to the eyes by virtue of themselves and not on account of anything else, for the eyes are a productive cause of seeing. On the other hand, virtue is good and choiceworthy on account of itself and not for the sake of anything else. Accordingly, “on account of itself” refers to the final cause, but “by virtue of itself” brings out an aspect of the productive cause. But what we were saying was that being moved will not belong to the soul by virtue of itself and its intrinsic essence, as the advocates [of this view] suppose, but it might be possible [that it does so] coincidentally and extrinsically. In fact one may even say that the soul is above all moved extrinsically by the perceptible objects, if indeed this is, he says, being moved: for he does not want to say that the soul is moved at all. He further adds the following by way of refutation of the view that the soul is moved: supposing that the soul is self-moved, [then,] if it is true that it moves itself, not by causing motion with respect to one part of itself and being moved with respect to another part, but rather by not only causing motion but also being moved as a whole, the result is that it departs from itself, that is, from its essence, in being moved, if it is true that being moved belongs to it with respect to its essence, as the advocates [of this view] suppose, and not coincidentally. For, as has been demonstrated in the Physics, everything that is moved departs from that which it previously was, whether it is moved with respect to place, quality or quantity. Consequently, the soul, too, if it is moved with respect to its essence, departs from itself. For it is not moved in any of the respects mentioned (whether place, quality or quantity): for in that case it would be a body. For these motions occur in, and are manifested in, a body as a subject. But everybody shares the opinion that the soul is incorporeal. The

6–8 cf. Phlp. 111.19–21. 8–16 cf. Phlp. 111.23–112.1; Prisc. 38.3–10. 21–25 cf. Phlp. 113.6–10. 27 cf. Phlp. 113.14–17. 28–30 cf. Prisc. 38.26–30. 30–33 cf. Phlp. 113.29–32; 114.3–6.

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τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, καὶ κινουμένην οὕτω φθείρεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔοικεν εἶναι ἡ κατ’ οὐσίαν αὕτη μεταβολὴ τῆς ψυχῆς φθορὰ αὐτῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φθορά, ἥτις δὴ οὐ κίνησις κυρίως ἀλλὰ μεταβολή, ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει διώρισται· μεταβολή ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι· ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἀσώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ὡς πάντες ὑποτίθενται, εἰ ὅλως κινεῖται, κινεῖται δὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐξίσταται τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, εἴτουν τοῦ εἶναι ψυχή, ὅτι πᾶσα κίνησις ἔκστασίς τίς ἐστι τοῦ πρότερον ὄντος. Ὅτι ἔνιοι, φησίν, ὧν καὶ Δημόκριτός ἐστιν, οὕτω κινεῖν φασι τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται. εἰ γοῦν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖται· ὡς γὰρ κινεῖται, οὕτω δὴ καὶ κινεῖ, φασί· κινουμένας γὰρ τὰς 21 ἀτόμους σφαίρας ἀεὶ συγκινεῖν τὸ σῶμα καὶ συνέλκειν. καί φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτ’ ἐοικέναι καὶ παραπλήσιον εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ Φιλίππου τοῦ κωμῳδιοδιδασκάλου, ὃς ἔλεγε τὴν ξυλίνην Ἀφροδίτην τὸν Δαίδαλον κατασκευάσαι κινεῖσθαι ἐγχέαντα χυτὸν ἄργυρον ἐντὸς αὐτῆς. τούτῳ δή φησιν ἐοικέναι τῷ κωμικῷ λόγῳ τὴν κίνησιν ἥν φασι κινεῖν τὸν 22 εἰρημένον τρόπον τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν. ἐρωτᾶν γε μὴν ἄξιον αὐτούς, φησίν, εἰ κινοῦσα οὕτω τὸ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ αὕτη (ὁρᾶται γὰρ ἐνίοτε καὶ ἠρεμοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ κινούμενον), ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴ λοιπὸν ἂν ἠρεμοίη, ἐπεὶ οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὡς εἴρηται, κινουμένης αὐτῆς συγκινούμενον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ἡνίκα τὸ σῶμα ἠρεμεῖ, οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἠρεμεῖ· καὶ τίς ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἠρεμία, καὶ διὰ τίνα τὴν αἰτίαν, χαλεπὸν κατιδεῖν. καὶ πῶς ἠρεμεῖν ὅλως ἔχει τὸ ἀεικίνητον ὑποτιθέμενον; καὶ πῶς αἱ σφαῖραι παύονται τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φορὰν ἔχουσαι φέρεσθαι 23 ἀπροσκόπτως; ἀλλὰ μὴν εὔδηλον, φησί, παντὶ καθορᾶν ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα κατὰ νόησιν καὶ κρίσιν κινεῖ καὶ προαίρεσιν (εἴτουν ὄρεξιν καὶ φαντασίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐνταῦθα χρῆται τῇ «προαιρέσει»), τὸ μὲν κατὰ νόησιν κινεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τιθείς, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, εἴτουν ὄρεξιν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων.

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remaining possibility is that by being moved with respect to its essence the soul departs from itself, that is, from its essence, and that by being thus moved it is destroyed. For indeed, this kind of substantial change on the part of the soul also appears to be its destruction. For destruction, too – which is not, it should be noted, a motion in the proper sense but a change – is defined in the Physics: it is a change of the substance itself into non-being. Consequently, given that the soul is incorporeal, as everybody supposes, if it is moved as a whole, and moved with respect to its essence, not coincidentally, it departs from its essence, that is, from being a soul, since every motion is a departure from what was previously the case. [Note] that some thinkers, he says, including Democritus, maintain that the soul moves the body in the same way that it is itself moved. If, then, the soul sets the body in motion with respect to place, it is clear that it is itself moved with respect to place; for in the same way that it is moved, they say, it also causes motion: for as the indivisible spheres are moved they always set the body in simultaneous motion and pull it along. Aristotle says that this is comparable and similar to the tale of Philip the Comedian, who related that Daedalus set up the wooden Aphrodite to be moved by pouring liquid silver into her. To this comic tale, then, he says that the motion alleged by these thinkers to be imparted by the soul to the body in the manner described is comparable. But it is nevertheless, he says, appropriate to ask them whether, if the soul sets the body in motion in this way, it is also the soul that causes it to rest (for it can be seen to be also at rest sometimes and not always in motion), so that, as a result, the soul itself may also be at rest, since, as stated, the body is of such a nature as to be set in simultaneous motion with it when it is moved, the consequence being that when the body is at rest, the soul is not in motion either, but at rest. It is difficult to see what state of rest it is that belongs to the soul and by what it is caused. And how can that which is supposed to be in eternal motion be at rest at all? And how do the spheres stop being moved when they can be naturally carried forever unobstructedly by the same spatial movement? Rather, it is plain to see for everyone, he says, that the soul moves the body by virtue of thought, judgment and choice (that is, desire and imagination, for that is how “choice” is used here), and he attributes the causing of motion by virtue of thought to the rational soul, and [the causing of motion] by virtue of choice, that is, desire, to the irrational [souls].

1–2 cf. Phlp. 114.23–24. 3–6 cf. Phlp. 113.26–28. 24–28 cf. Phlp. 115.8–13. 29–30 The source for this is no doubt Priscian (39.34–35), although he says that “choice” is used instead of “desire”, and that “thought” includes imagination. 17 liquid silver: The expression is from the Aristotelian text, where it may refer to molten silver, but more likely to “quicksilver”, i.e. mercury.

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Ὅτι καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος τοῦ Πλάτωνος τρόπον τινὰ οὕτω φυσιολογεῖ, φησί, τὴν ψυχὴν

V121r κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα· συμπεπλεγμένην αὐτῷ, ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται κινεῖν καὶ αὐτό. | συνίστησι γὰρ

ταύτην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς λόγους, ὡς ἄν, ἐκ τούτων ὡς στοιχείων συγκειμένη καὶ κατ’ αὐτοὺς μεριζομένη, συμφύτως αἴσθησιν ἔχῃ πάσης ἁρμονίας, καὶ συμμέτρως γε 25 μὴν τὸ πᾶν φέρῃ, φερομένη αὐτή. καὶ τοίνυν, ὡς ἂν συμφώνους, φησί, φορὰς οὕτω φέροιτο εἰς τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῶν ὄντων, τὴν εὐθυωρίαν κατέκαμψεν εἰς κύκλον· εἶτα διελὼν τὴν κύκλῳ ταύτην φορὰν διὰ τὸ βάθος αὐτῆς εἰς δύο τὰς ἀντικειμένας φοράς, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ὁρῶνται, ὧν ἡ μία ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ἀνωτάτω περιφορᾶς, καθ’ ἣν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑῴων εἰς τὰ πρὸς δύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ κυκλοφορία, τὴν ἑτέραν αὐτῶν εἰς ἑπτὰ πάλιν φορὰς διεῖλεν ἀντιφερομένας κάτωθεν, αἵτινές εἰσι πάντως αἱ τῶν ἀστέρων. τὰς γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις – ἤτοι τὰς τοῦ παντός – κατὰ τὰς οὐρανίας φορὰς κυκλικὰς τίθεται· τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν καθόλου φύσιολογῶν ἐκεῖθεν περὶ τῶν μερικῶν 26 διεξέρχεται. καὶ οὕτω μὲν τὰ τοῦ Τιμαίου. ἀνατρέπων δὲ ταῦτά φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· πρῶτον πῶς μέγεθος ὅλως λέγει ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός; τὴν γὰρ δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, φησί, βούλεται πάντως ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς, ὃς καὶ μόνος θεωρεῖται ἐν κυκλοφορίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ ἐπιθυμητικὴ ψυχή ἐστιν ὅλως κυκλοφορική· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὡς αὗται κατ’ εὐθυφορίαν προΐασι καὶ ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν προκειμένων οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσαι καὶ περιστρεφόμεναι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις κατ’ εὐθείας ἐκπιπτούσας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθητῶν – ὡς ὅρασις καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι – καὶ αἱ 27 ὀρέξεις, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νοῦς ἀμέσως ἀντιλαμβανόμενος καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιστρέφων. ὃς δὴ καὶ εἷς ἐστι τὸν τρὸπον τοῦτον, εἰς ἑαυτὸν συνάγων καὶ περαίνων ἄμεσος, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ συνεχὴς ἄλλον τρόπον, οὐχ ὡς τὰ μεγέθη ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀριθμός, τῷ ἐφεξῆς εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ἐφεξῆς ὧν οὐδὲν μέσον ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὐ συνεχεῖς ἀλλ’ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων κατὰ μέρος μεταξὺ τῶν

1 φησί ] γὰρ add. A 7 τὸ βάθος ] τοῦ βάθους malim 8 ἐστιν ] ἐστὶ A 9 ἑῴων A1pr (ut vid. ex ἑώνων) 11 τῆς supplevi (cf. 1.3.38) 15 φησί, βούλεται transp. M A 21 περαίνων ] συμπεραίνων A 22 μεγέθη ] μεγέθει M 22–23 ἐφεξῆς ] ἐφ ἑξῆς A 23 μέσον A1pc || οἱ om. M A 24 συνεχεῖς ] συνεχῆς M 1–5 406b 26–29 5–13 406b 29–407a 2

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[Note] that Plato’s Timaeus, too, he says, in a sense offers the same physical account of the soul’s setting the body in motion: since it is combined with it, it sets it, too, in motion, in the course of being moved. For [Timaeus] constructs the soul on the basis of the harmonic ratios, in order that, being composed of these as elements and being partitioned in accordance with them, it may have a connate perception of all harmony, and, indeed, that it may carry the universe in a commensurate way, as it is itself being carried. Accordingly, in order that it might be carried like this by consonant spatial movements, [Aristotle] says, to the apprehension of the things that exist, he bent its straight course into a circle; and having subsequently divided this circular movement in its depth into two opposite movements, as can be seen in the heavenly bodies, one of which belongs to the upper circuit, along which the circular movement from east to west takes place, he divided the other, in its turn, into seven lower movements in the opposite direction, which are undoubtedly those of the stars. For he supposes that the motions of the soul – that is, those of the soul of the universe – are circular, in accordance with the heavenly movements. For he uses the general physical account that he offers of the soul of the universe as a starting-point for his discussion of particular [souls]. So far Timaeus’ doctrine. By way of refuting this, Aristotle says: to begin with, how can he speak at all of magnitude with reference to the soul of the universe? For his discussion undoubtedly refers to the soul of the universe, he says; and this is the intellect, which, indeed, is the only [part of the soul] that manifests itself in circular movement. For neither the perceptive nor the appetitive soul is at all prone to circular movement. For we can observe how these souls proceed in a rectilinear movement and apprehend their objects without bending and turning around. In fact, both sense perception – such as sight and the other sense capacities – and the desires apprehend the perceptible objects along straight lines issuing from the soul, not as the intellect does, which apprehends immediately by turning around towards itself. Clearly, in this way the intellect is also a unitary thing in that it converges towards itself and achieves its end immediately and undividedly, as mentioned; and in a different way it is a continuous thing, not as magnitudes are, but as number is: by succession. For things of the same kind between which nothing exists are successive, just as numbers, too, are not continuous but successive to each other, for they are things of the same kind between each of which, taken individually, nothing exists. And the situation is the same

13–15 Metochites thus interprets Aristotle, 407a 1–2, in the opposite way to that recommended by Philoponus (123.21–23), who suggests that we add the preposition katá (“in accordance with”), so as to read “since the movements of the heavens are in accordance with the motions of the soul”. 20– 26 cf. Phlp. 124.33–125.11. 23–25 cf. Them. 20.25–26. 28–51.4 cf. Phlp. 126.4–29; Them. 20.29–35. 10 in its depth: I have translated as if diá governed the genitive here: the diá with the accusative of the transmitted text is more naturally rendered as “because of its depth”.

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ὁμοειδῶν. ὡσαύτως δ’ ἔχει καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ νόησις ἄλλη μετ’ ἄλλην καὶ αὐτὰ δὴ μάλιστα τὰ νοήματα, εἴτουν αἱ ἐνέργειαι· οὐ γὰρ συνεχῆ ὡς μεγέθους μόρια, ἀλλ’ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς. ἄλλως τε δὴ πῶς ἄρα καὶ νοήσει ὁ νοῦς, ὡς μέγεθος κυκλοφορούμενον θεωρούμενος; ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων νοήσει ἢ ἐν τῇ ὁλότητι αὐτοῦ· καὶ εἰ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν αὐτοῦ νοήσει, ἤτοι | τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ ἀμερῶν, εἴτουν τῶν σημείων αὐτῶν, ἃ ὡς ἐν μεγέθει ἐν αὐτῷ ἄπειρά ἐστιν (εἰ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τιθέναι χρὴ τοῦ μεγέθους), ἢ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν θεωρουμένων ὡς μεγεθῶν καὶ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὰ ἄτομα αὐτοῦ – εἴτουν τὰς στιγμάς – ὁ νοῦς – μέγεθος ὤν, ὡς ὑποτίθεται – νοήσει, ἀδιεξίτητος ἔσται ἡ νόησις· ἀπειράκις γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ νοήσει· ἄπειροι γὰρ αἱ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει παντὶ στιγμαὶ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τὰ ἄτομα, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον αὐτὸ νοητὸν ἀπειράκις εἶναι νοητὸν καὶ οὐδέποτε πάντως διεξιτητόν, ὅπερ παντάπασιν ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ κατὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ καὶ τμήματα ὁ νοῦς, μέγεθος ὤν, νοήσει, μεγέθη ὄντα ὁποσαοῦν καὶ αὐτά, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀκολουθήσει ἄτοπα· πλεονάκις γάρ, εἰ κατὰ μόρια ὡρισμένα διαιρεῖται, νοήσει τὸ νοητόν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὖθις ἀπειράκις· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ὁ νοῦς, πάντως καὶ ἐπ’ ἄπειρον διαιρετός· τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους ἴδιον· ὥστε εἰ κατὰ μόρια μεγέθη πάντως ὄντα ἀεὶ διαιρεῖται, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τὸ νοητὸν νοεῖ, ἀπειράκις ἂν καὶ αὖθις νοήσειεν ἕκαστον νοητόν. καίτοι γε, φησί, φαίνεται ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅπαξ νοεῖν. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἱκανόν ἐστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων ἅπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν τοῦ νοητοῦ (ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν ἱκανόν), τίς ἄρα χρεία ἢ τίς ἀνάγκη τῆς τοῦ νοῦ κινήσεως ἢ τοῦ ὅλως μέγεθος ὄντα αὐτὸν λέγειν καὶ ὡς μέγεθος νοεῖν; τί γὰρ συμβάλλει αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ νοεῖν τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι; καὶ ἱστάμενος γὰρ καθ’ ὁτιοῦν μόριον ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο ἂν τοῦ νοητοῦ. ἀλλὰ μήν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ μόρια ὁ νοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνεται τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ κύκλῳ ἅπτεται αὐτοῦ, οὐ κατατεμμαχιζόμενος ᾗ κύκλος καὶ ᾗ μέγεθος, τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐπαφὴ τῶν μορίων; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅλως ἐπαφὴ τῶν μορίων, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὅλου πάντως· τὸ γὰρ

1 δ’ ] δὲ A 4 αὐτοῦ M1pr (ut vid. ex αὐτῶν) 6 δὴ ] δὲ M 9 ἔσται ] καὶ add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 13 ἄτοπα M1pc (ex ἄτομα) || εἰ ] καὶ addere velim 16 καθ’ ἕκαστον ] καθέκαστον A 17 νοήσειεν ] νοήση V 18 εἰ om. A 19 ἄρα χρεία transp. M A 19–20 μέγεθος A1sl 21 καθ’ ὁτιοῦν ] καθοτιοῦν A 22 μὴ V1sl 23 κατατεμμαχιζόμενος ] κατατεμαχιζόμενος malim 3–18 407a 10–15 18–52.1 407a 15–18

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with the intellect and the one act of thinking after the other, and especially with the thoughts themselves, that is, the activities. For they are not continuous in the way that the parts of a magnitude are, but are successive to each other in the manner of numbers. Apart from everything else, how then is the intellect even going to think, if it is manifested as a magnitude carried in a circular movement? For it will think either with one or another of its parts or in its entirety; and if it thinks with one or another of its parts, [it will do so] either [with one or another] of its indivisible and partless parts, that is, its points, which exist in it in infinite numbers as in a magnitude (if indeed these should also be counted as parts of the magnitude), or [with one or another] of those parts of it that are themselves manifested as magnitudes. But if it is with its indivisible parts – that is, its points – that the intellect – being, according to the supposition, a magnitude – thinks, then the act of thinking will be inexhaustible. For it will think of the same thing an infinite number of times. For the number of points, or indivisible units, in every magnitude is infinite, in such a way that even a determinate intelligible object will be thought an infinite number of times and will absolutely never be exhausted, which is completely absurd. And if the intellect, being a magnitude, is going to think with parts and sections of itself that are themselves also so many magnitudes, in that case, too, the same absurdities will follow. For if it is divided into a determinate number of parts, [the intellect] will think of the intelligible object a great number of times, or rather, once again, an infinite number of times. For if the intellect is a magnitude, it is inevitably also divisible ad infinitum, for this is a special property of magnitude. Consequently, if it is forever divided into parts that are always magnitudes, and it thinks of the intelligible object with each of them, it will, once again, think of each intelligible object an infinite number of times. And yet, he says, it seems as though it is possible to think of it only once. Moreover, if it is sufficient that the intellect touches the intelligible object with any of its parts (which is in fact sufficient), what is the use, then, or what is the need, of the motion of the intellect, or in general of saying that, since it is a magnitude, it also thinks as a magnitude? In what way does it benefit its thinking to be a magnitude or to be in motion? For it would apprehend the intelligible object with some part even if it were at a standstill. What is more, if the intellect does not apprehend the intelligible object with [some of its] parts, but rather touches it all along a circle, without being sliced up the way a circle and a magnitude are, what is the touching that belongs to the parts? But if there is no touching at all that belongs to the parts, there is, inevitably, none that belongs to the whole either. For the parts are the whole, as is self-evident, and the whole is nothing except its parts.

27–30 cf. Phlp. 130.8–10. 33–34 cf. Phlp. 130.30–131.1. 18 if: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “even if”.

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32 ὅλον τὰ μόριά ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτόθεν δῆλον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τὸ ὅλον ἢ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἔτι,

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φησί, πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ – ὡς μεγέθη μεριστὰ ἄττα – τεμμάχια τῶν ἀμερῶν τοῦ νοητοῦ ἅπτεσθαι, ἢ τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ ἀμερῆ – ὡς μεγέθους ὄντα πέρατα – καὶ ἄτομα τῶν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς μεριστῶν ἅπτεσθαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύμβασις ἢ ὁπῃοῦν ἕνωσις τῶν ἀμερῶν τε καὶ μεριστῶν, οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ὅλως ἐφαρμόζειν καὶ συνάπτειν ἀλλήλοις, οὐδ’ ὡς εἰπεῖν συμπαρεκτείνεσθαι τὰ ἀμερῆ τοῖς μεριστοῖς. πάντως δὲ ὁ κύκλος τοιοῦτος, φησίν, οἷος ὡς μέγεθος καὶ συνεχὲς θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰσθητῶς | κατατεμνόμενος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἐν φαντασίᾳ ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀμεγέθη φύσιν ἔχων καταλαμβάνεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ νοῦ κίνησις ἡ νόησις, κύκλου δὲ κίνησις ἡ περιφορά. εἰ οὖν ἡ τοῦ νοῦ κίνησις κυκλοφορική ἐστιν, ὡς ὑποτίθεται, ἡ νόησις αὐτὴ περιφορά ἐστι, καὶ ὡς μέγεθός ἐστι κυκλικὸν καὶ ὡς συνεχές, οὐχ οἷον φαντασίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ οἷον διαστατὸν ἐν ὑπάρξει εἶναι· περιφορὰ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἀληθὴς ὑποτίθεται, ἐκεῖθεν λήγουσα ὅθεν ἤρξατο, ὡς εἶναι ἀληθὲς μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς κυκλικῆς γραμμῆς. κἀντεῦθεν τά τε προειρημένα ἄτοπα ἀκολουθεῖ, ὡς μεγέθους τοῦ νοῦ θεωρουμένου καὶ τῆς νοήσεως περιφορᾶς, καὶ ἔτι, εἰ ἀίδιός ἐστιν ἡ κυκλικὴ περιφορά (πάντως γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη καταλήγειν ὁπῃοῦν αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ πάντα τρόπον ὁμαλὸν καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτῆς), πῶς ἔστιν ἀίδιον καταλαμβάνειν καὶ κυκλικὴν τὴν τοῦ νοὸς ἐνέργειαν καὶ κίνησιν; τί γὰρ ἀεὶ νοήσει; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀίδιόν τι νοεῖν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ νοήσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ καὶ αἱ πρακτικαί – ἤτοι αἱ περὶ ποιήσεις καὶ δημιουργίας καὶ πρακτὰ καταγινόμεναι – πέρας ὁτιοῦν ἑκάστη προτίθεται, οὗ χάριν εἰσί, κἀνταῦθα καταλήγουσι καὶ οὐκ ἀίδιοί εἰσιν. αἱ δ’ ἁπλῶς θεωρητικαὶ καὶ αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἀποδείξεις εἰσί, φησίν, ἢ ὅροι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅροι προδήλως εἰσὶ περαίνοντες εἰς ὁτιοῦν καὶ ἱστάμενοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἱστῶντες τὸ νόημα, καὶ κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν, οὐ περιοδικῶς, ἐκ τοῦδέ τινος ἀρχόμενοι καὶ παρατείνοντες εἰς λῆξιν ἄλλην πάντως τῆς ἀρχῆς· αἱ δ’ ἀποδείξεις, καὶ αὗται κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν διὰ προτάσεων μέσων προάγονται εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, καὶ οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσι κυκλικῶς εἰς

1 αὐτοῦ om. A 2 μεριστὰ ἄττα ] ὄντα μεριστὰ malim || τεμμάχια ] τεμάχια malim 3 ὄντα scripsi : ὄντος codd. 7 οἷος scripsi : οἷον codd. 8 ἀμεγέθη scripsi : ἀμεγέθης codd. 11 φαντασίᾳ A1pc (φ‑) 15 κυκλικὴ ] κυκλοφορικὴ M A 20 κἀνταῦθα ] A1pc (ut vid. ex κἀντεῦ‑) 25 προάγονται ] προάγωνται (ut vid.) M 1–6 407a 18–19 6–15 407a 19–22

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Further, he says, how is it possible for the slices – inasmuch as they are some kind of divisible magnitudes – in the intellect to touch the partless parts of the intelligible object? Or [how is it possible] for what is in the intellect as partless – since they are limits of a magnitude – and indivisible parts to touch the divisible things in the intelligible objects? For there is no alignment or any sort of unity between what is partless and what is divisible into parts, nor is it at all in the nature of these things to be fitted and connected to each other, or for the partless things to be, so to speak, coextensive with those that are divisible into parts. But the circle, he says, is unconditionally of the kind that manifests itself as a magnitude and a continuous thing, which is perceptibly cut up, so to speak, and not [of the kind that] is understood to be unextended and to have a nature without magnitude, as in imagination. For an act of thinking is the motion of an intellect, and a revolution is the motion of a circle. If, then, the motion of the intellect is a circular movement, in accordance with the supposition, the act of thinking is itself a revolution, and is circular in the way in which a magnitude is so and a continuous thing is so, not the sort of [magnitude] that manifests itself in imagination, but the sort that is extended in actual existence. For the act of thinking is supposed to be a true revolution, which terminates at the point from which it started out, so as to be a true magnitude and continuous thing, the sort of thing that consists of a circular line. From these suppositions – that the intellect manifests itself as a magnitude and the act of thinking as a revolution – the aforementioned absurdities follow. But there is more: if the circular revolution is eternal (for undeniably there is no necessity for it to terminate anywhere, on account of its absolute regularity and uniformity), how can the activity and motion of the intellect be understood as eternal and circular? What is it going to think of in eternity? It is not possible [for it] to think of anything eternal, for the acts of productive and practical thinking – that is, those that are concerned with instances of producing, creating and acting – all set themselves some limit, for the sake of which they exist, and that is where they terminate, so they are not eternal. Those acts of thinking, on the other hand, that are simply contemplative and concerned with the rational accounts of existing things are either demonstrations, he says, or definitions. And it is obvious that definitions reach a limit at some point and come to a standstill, or rather bring the thought to a standstill: they start out from a given point and extend in a straight line, not in a circular one, to a terminus which is necessarily different from the starting-point. As for demonstrations, these, too, proceed in a straight line through the intermediary of premisses to the conclusion; the premisses are not circularly curved towards themselves in such

1–8 cf. Phlp. 131.30–35. 8–16 cf. Phlp. 132.10–23. 22–23 cf. Phlp. 133.4–5. 1–2 for … intellect: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “… for the divisible – since they are magnitudes – slices in the intellect” ….

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ἑαυτὰς αἱ προτάσεις ὡς πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ περιστρέφειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ εἱρμὸν προϊοῦσαι περαίνουσι τὸν συλλογισμὸν καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν εὕρεσιν τοῦ προκειμένου, καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν αὐταῖς ἡ προχώρησις. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ἄπειρος ἦν, κἂν εἰ τοῦτο δοίημεν, κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν ἦν ἂν καὶ οὕτω διὰ μέσων ὅρων ἐπεμβαλλομένων προχωροῦσα κατ’ εὐθὺ 36 καὶ οὐδόλως ἀνακάμπτουσα, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐδὲ περιστρεφομένη κυκλικῶς. καὶ μὴν ἔτι, φησίν, εἰ κυκλικῶς ἦν περιστρεφομένη πολλάκις ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις, πολλάκις ἂν ἦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ νόησις, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ περίοδος τοῦ κύκλου· ὅπερ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως ἀκαίρως χρῆσθαι καὶ πόρρω λόγου καὶ πρὸς οὐδεμίαν τὴν χρείαν, καὶ ταῦτ’ 37 ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον καὶ νοῦν γινομένων. ἔτι, φησίν, ἡ νόησις ἠρεμία μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ V122v κίνησις· ἵστησι γὰρ | καὶ ἀταραξίαν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ βεβαιότητα ἄσειστον· διατοῦτο καὶ «ἐπιστήμη» λέγεται, ἐπὶ στάσιν τινὰ περαίνουσα καὶ ἠρεμίαν ἐμποιοῦσα ἐν οἷς ἀπορεῖν ἦν πρότερον· οὕτω δὲ ἄρα καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἔχει, ἀνενόχλητον λῆψιν καὶ ἠρεμίαν παρεχόμενος. εἰ οὖν ἠρεμία ἐστὶν ἡ νόησις, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν αὐτῇ εἴη μᾶλλον τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ βίᾳ. καὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τὸ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον μακαριότης, καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐν μακαριότητι, ὅπερ αὐτοὶ βούλονται καὶ φασί, κινούμενος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν μένων ἀλλὰ τῷ παρὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνών; ὅλως δὲ καὶ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι αὐτὸν σώματι ἐπίπονόν τε καὶ οὐκ εὔδαιμον, οὗ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν ἔχει διόλου ποθεινήν, ὡς Πλάτων τε καὶ πάντες ἄλλοι λέγειν εἰώθασιν· ἐφίεται γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν σωματικῶν δεσμῶν, καὶ βέλτιον τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι αὐτῷ. Ὅτι καὶ ἄδηλός ἐστι, φησίν, ὅσον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ Τιμαίῳ, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχή – ἡ τοῦ παντὸς δηλονότι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ – οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἰτία τούτου, ὅτι οὐδὲ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐστίν – ὡς ἀποδέδεικται διὰ πολλῶν ἤδη – τὸ κινεῖσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλ’ εἴ γε καὶ ὅλως δοίη τις κινεῖσθαι ταύτην, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν κινοῖτο. πάλιν δὲ τὸ σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ μάλιστα ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ πᾶσι πρόδηλον, ὡς τοῖς ἐμψύχοις σώμασι τὸ κι39 νεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅτι γε βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ μένειν,

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a way as to circumscribe the same things several times, but complete the deduction and the demonstrative discovery of the relevant proposition through a serial process, and their progression is not infinite. But even if it had been infinite – even if we should grant this – it would still have been proceeding rectilinearly, straight through the intermediary of intercalated terms, without ever being circularly curved, as mentioned, or rotating. And further, he says, if it had been the case that the same act of thinking 36 rotates in a circle several times, it would have been an act of thinking of the same thing several times, just as the circle has the same circumference. But this is neither a fact nor a possibility, to behave so inexpediently and unreasonably and pointlessly, especially in matters within the ambit of reason and intellect. Further, he says, an act of 37 thinking is rather a state of rest than a motion. For it causes a standstill and produces freedom from disturbance as well as unshakable certainty. This is also why we speak of “scientific knowledge” (epistḗmē), since it reaches its limit in some stance (epi stásin tina) and produces rest in those who were previously at a loss. Consequently, this is the situation with deductions, too, which provide undisturbed comprehension and rest. If, then, the act of thinking is rest, being moved must rather be contrary to its nature and enforced upon it. And how could what is contrary to nature and enforced be bliss, and how could the soul of the universe, or the intellect, be in bliss, which is what [these thinkers] themselves suggest and claim, if it is always in motion and does not stay with what is in accordance with nature but always consorts with what is contrary to nature? On the whole its very association with a body is an arduous and unhappy one, the dissolution of which it is always yearning for, as Plato and all the others are wont to say. For the intellect is longing for its freedom from corporeal bonds, and this, they say, is better for it. [Note] that it is also unclear, he says, at least from what is said by Timaeus, what 38 the cause is of the heavens’ being carried in a circle. For the soul – of the universe, that is, and of the heavens themselves – cannot be the cause of this, since being moved does not belong to the soul with respect to its essence (as has already been demonstrated by a number of arguments); but if one should indeed grant that the soul is moved at all, it will be moved coincidentally. On the other hand, a body cannot be moved by itself, but rather [must be moved] precisely by a soul. For this much is clear to everyone, that motion is bestowed upon ensouled bodies by their soul. Moreover, 39

3 cf. Them. 22.24. 11–16 cf. Phlp. 136.7–10. The etymology of epistḗmē is also found at id. 76.21. Ammonius, on whose lectures Philoponus’ commentary is based (cf. Golitsis 2019), elsewhere attributes it to Plato: Ammon. in Porph. Intr. 17.7–8; cf. Pl. Cra. 437a. 18–21 cf. Phlp. 136.32–137.2. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 137.26–28; Prisc. 48.30–31. 25 cf. Phlp. 138.25–26; Them. 23.13–14.

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καὶ οὕτω δὴ κινεῖσθαι – ἤτοι κυκλικῶς – ταύτην (εἴτουν τὸν οὐρανόν), δέδεικται καὶ αἰτιολογεῖται, καθὼς ἄρα καὶ προσῆκόν ἐστι συνορᾶν τε καὶ νοεῖν ὅτι τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐσκεύασται σοφῶς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ ζήτησις, φησίν, ἄλλης ἂν εἴη θεωρίας, οὐ φυσικῆς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ σχεδὸν πάντες κοινῶς, φησίν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν ὅσοι τοῖς περὶ τούτων ἐσχόλασαν λόγοις, ὅτι, τὴν ψυχὴν συνάπτοντες σώματι καὶ κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν ποιοῦντες, οὐ προστιθέασι τὴν αἰτίαν, πῶς συνάπτονται, οὐδὲ τίνι σώματι ἡ ψυχὴ ἡτισοῦν ἑκάστη οὐδὲ πῶς ἔχοντι συνέρχεταί τε καὶ συνάπτεται δι’ ἀκριβείας αἰτιολογοῦσι καὶ δεικνύουσι. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ἤτοι ἡ ψυχή, κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, ἤτοι τὸ σῶμα· καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ἐν παντὶ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ παντὸς πάσχει ἢ κινεῖται, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦδέ τινος τὸ ὧδε πως ἔχον· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ γλυκὺ εἰς τὸ λευκόν, οὐδὲ τὸ μαλακὸν εἰς τὸ μέλαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑκάστῳ προσῆκον καὶ οἰκείως πως ἔχον παθητὸν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ | πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται καὶ διατίθεται. ὥστε ἔδει, φησί, καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ σώματος διαστείλασθαι καὶ διευκρινῆσαι, καὶ πῶς κοινωνεῖν ἔχει αὐτῷ ἡ ψυχή· κατ’ ἄλλο γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος αὐτῆς καταλαμβάνεται διάφορον καὶ τὸ δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς σῶμα. ἀλλ’ οὐχ, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔλεγον, ἐν παντὶ σώματι καὶ διαφόρως καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχοντι μεταβαίνει ἡ αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἀπροσκόπτως, οἷον ἐκ φυτοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου εἰς ἄλογον ζῷον, κἀνταῦθα νῦν μὲν εἰς τόδε, νῦν δὲ εἰς τόδε (ἤτοι καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων). τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα λέγειν παντελῶς ἔκτοπα καὶ μυθώδη καὶ ἀλλότρια τῆς ἀληθείας· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν εἶδος ψυχῆς παντὶ σώματι συνάπτειν καὶ κοινωνεῖν πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῇ καὶ προσφυῶς ἔχοντι. τὸ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἀδιακρίτως οὕτως καὶ ἀορίστως λέγειν ὅμοιον, φησίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς τοὺς αὐλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν φήσειεν ἢ τὴν αὐλητικὴν εἰς τὸ σκυτορραφεῖν. * *

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1 post ταύτην suspicor perisse τε καὶ τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἑξῆς κινούμενον σῶμα vel sim. 3 ἐσκεύασται ] ἐσκεύασθαι M A 6 σώματι ] σώμασι A || κοινωνίαν ] κοινονίαν A 11 ὧδε non legitur in A || πως ] πῶς A 12 τὸ ] τῷ M || πως ] πῶς V 14 κοινωνεῖν ] κινωνεῖν A 16 καὶ³ M1sl 18 καθ’ ἕκαστα M1pc (‑στ‑) : καθέκαστα A 19 ἔκτοπα ] ἄτοπα A 20 καὶ κοινωνεῖν om. A 21 ἀορίστως ut vid. M3?pc (‑ο‑) 23 σκυτορραφεῖν ] δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῶ σώματι (= Arist. 407b 25–26) add. M3 (= Greg.) 4–13 407b 13–17 13–21 407b 17–24 21–23 407b 24–26

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it has not been shown in terms of a causal account that it is better for the soul to be moved than to stay in place, and for this (that is, the heavens), to be moved in precisely this way (that is, in a circle), in accordance with [the principle] that it is only appropriate to understand and think that all things have been wisely arranged by the benevolent Creator with a view to what is best. However, the investigation and inquiry into these kinds of things, he says, may belong to another course of study and not to natural philosophy. But there is another error that is common, he says, to practically 40 all thinkers who have devoted themselves to discussions of these things, namely, that when they join the soul to the body and create an association between the two, they do not add an explanation of the circumstances under which they are conjoined, nor do they show, in terms of a detailed causal account, the kind of body or the condition of the body with which each given soul is brought together and conjoined. For the one, that is, the soul, causes motion, and the other is moved, that is, the body; and the one acts, the other is affected. But it is not just anything that acts upon just anything, and nor is just anything affected or moved by just anything: rather, a thing in a certain condition [is affected or moved] by a certain kind of thing. For the sweet does not act upon the white, nor the soft upon the black; but the affectable object that is suitable for a given [agent] and that is in the appropriate condition is affected, moved and modified by it. Accordingly, he says, they should also have analysed and elucidated the prop- 41 erties of the body and the circumstances under which the soul can be associated with it: for the body capable of receiving the soul is also found to vary in accordance with the different forms of soul. It is not the case, as the Pythagoreans would claim, that the same soul migrates without impediment to just any body, in various and differing conditions – for example, from a plant to a human body and from a human being to an irrational animal, and, within that realm, sometimes to this and sometimes to that (that is, to all kinds of irrational animals). This kind of account is in fact completely bizarre, fantastic and foreign to the truth. For it is not in the nature of every form of soul to be conjoined and associated with every body, but [only] with a body that is proportionate to it and that is in a compatible condition. To give such an undifferenti- 42 ated and vague account in this connection is much the same thing, he says, as if one were to say that the art of carpentry acts upon flutes or the art of fluteplaying upon cobbling. * *

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6–7 cf. Prisc. 50.36–51.5. 16–17 cf. Phlp. 139.24–25. 24–26 cf. Them. 23.35–24.2. 2 and for this … heavens: as is shown by the gender of the demonstrative, its antecedent must be “the soul”. Perhaps a few words have fallen out, so that the text originally read something like “and for this [sc. the soul] as well as for the body that is in its turn moved by it (that is, the heavens) …”. 30–32 The translation is uncertain: Aristotle says “as if one were to say that the art of carpentry ‘slips into’ flutes”.

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Ὅτι καὶ ἄλλον τινά, φησί, λόγον ἔνιοι περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπέθεντο, πιθανὸν μὲν δόξαντά τισιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεύθυνον καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ἐποπτεύουσι λόγοις· ἔφησαν γάρ τινες τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἁρμονία κρᾶσίς τίς ἐστι καὶ σύνθεσις ἐξ ἐναντίων τινῶν (ἤτοι βαρέων καὶ ὀξέων) καὶ λόγων διαφόρων (τῶν μὲν διπλασίων, τῶν δὲ ὑποδιπλασίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἡμιολίων, τῶν δὲ ὑφημιολίων, καὶ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλων καὶ παντοίων), οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις αὐτοῖς θεωρεῖται καὶ διαφόροις κιρνῶσα ταῦτα καὶ συντιθεῖσα, καθάπερ ἁρμονία τις, εἰς ἔλλογον κατάστασιν (ἤγουν θερμά, ψυχρά, ξηρά, ὑγρά, σκληρά, μαλακὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα). ἀλλὰ τήν γε τοιαύτην δόξαν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πολλῶν ἐλέγχει· οἷον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ σώματος, ἡ ἁρμονία δὲ ὕστερον ἐπιγίνεται τοῖς ἁρμοζομένοις· καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλάκις αὐτῷ, ἡ δ’ ἁρμονία ἕπεται μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ μάχεται τοῖς ἡρμοσμένοις· καὶ ὅτι ἁρμονίᾳ μέν ἐστι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ψυχὴ δὲ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· καὶ ὅτι ἁρμονία μὲν μένουσα οὐ προσίεται ἀναρμοστίαν, ψυχὴ δὲ κακίας μεταλαμβάνει. καὶ τοιούτοις ἑτέροις παραπλησίοις χρῶνται ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς ἔφην, ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλὰ κἀνταῦθα εἰς ἔλεγχον τῆς εἰρημένης ὑποθέσεώς | φησιν ὅτι ἡ ἁρμονία λόγος μέν τίς ἐστι τῶν ἡρμοσμένων καὶ τῶν μεμιγμένων σύνθεσις, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἐστί· χρεία γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ποιήσοντος τὸν λόγον καὶ συνθήσοντος τὰ μιγνύμενα, εἴτουν χρεία τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ ἑτέρας ψυχῆς, ἥτις ἂν ταῦτα ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἡ μέν, ἡ ψυχή, κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, ἁρμονία δὲ οὐ κινεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγίνεται τοῖς ἡρμοσμένοις. ἀλλὰ μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, φησίν, ἁρμονίαν λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἤτοι κάλλους ἢ ὑγείας· ταῦτα γὰρ σύνθεσίς ἐστι διαφόρων ἀναλόγως τε καὶ εὐτάκτως. μάλιστα δ’ ἄν, φησί, τὸ ἄτοπον ἐλέγχοιτο τῆς τοιαύτης ὑποθέσεως, εἴ τις πειρᾶται προσφέρειν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ ἀποδιδόναι εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἤτοι τὸ ἥδεσθαι, τὸ θυμοῦσθαι, τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ φιλεῖν, τὸ μισεῖν. πῶς γὰρ οἰκείως ἂν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγοιτο ἁρμονία; ἢ πῶς ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἁρμονίας; καὶ μὴν ἔτι φησὶ πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἁρμονίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι ἡ ἁρμονία

2 ἀλλὰ ] καὶ add. M || ἐποπτεύουσι ] ὑποπτεύουσι V M 3 κρᾶσίς ] κράσις V M 5 ὑφημιολίων ] ὑφ’ ἡμιολίων A 12 μέν ἐστι ] transp. M A 16 ἐστι ] καὶ add. M A 19 αὐτῇ om. A || ποιήσῃ ] ποιήσοι A 1–15 407b 27–32 15–27 407b 32–408a 5

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[Note] that certain thinkers also proposed another kind of account of the soul, which has seemed plausible to some but is itself also accountable to truth and to carefully scrutinising discussions. For some thinkers claimed that the soul is an attunement. For an attunement is a kind of blending and combination of certain contraries (namely, low- and high-pitched ones) and of different ratios (some double, others subdouble, and some sesquialter, others subsesquialter, and in different cases different ratios of various kinds); and in the same way the soul, too, is manifested in the contrary and different things themselves (that is, hot, cold, dry, wet, hard, soft and the like) by virtue of blending and combining these, like a kind of attunement, into a proportionate arrangement. But this kind of opinion is refuted with many arguments both by Plato, to be sure, and by Aristotle in other works. For instance: that the soul is primary relative to the body, whereas the attunement supervenes later upon those things that are being attuned; that the soul rules and presides over the body and is often in conflict with it, whereas the attunement rather follows, and is not in conflict with, the things attuned; that attunement allows for different degrees, whereas one soul is not more or less [a soul] than another; and that a lasting attunement does not admit of dissonance, whereas a soul partakes of vice. And other similar arguments are employed both by others and by Aristotle, as I said, in other writings. But here, too, he says, with a view to refuting the stated proposition, that an attunement is a kind of ratio between things that are attuned, and a combination of things that are mixed, whereas the soul is neither of these. For in that case something would be needed that could produce the ratio and combine the things to be mixed, that is, the soul itself would need another soul that could do these things. And the one, the soul, sets the body in motion, obviously, but the attunement does not cause motion, but supervenes upon those things that are attuned. Rather, he says, it would be most appropriate to speak of attunement in the case of the corporeal virtues, that is, beauty or health, for [each of] these is a proportionate and orderly combination of different things. The absurdity of the aforementioned proposition will be most clearly exposed, he says, if one tries to apply, or “refer”, this kind of attunement account to the affections and activities of the soul, that is, having pleasure, being impassioned, having appetite, having pain, feeling love and feeling hate. For how could “attunement” be properly applied to such things? Or how is it possible for such things to belong to an attunement? Moreover, he

5 cf. Them. 24.20–21. 8–9 cf. Them. 24.17–19. 10–17 cf. Them. 24.21–30; Phlp. 142.3–143.1. 23– 25 cf. Them. 24.32–34. 26 beauty: cf. Them. 24.28. 27–32 cf. Them. 24.35–25.1; Phlp. 147.13–18.

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πρώτως λέγεται καὶ θεωρεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν αὐτῶν, ὅταν σύνθεσις αὐτῶν γένηται ἡρμοσμένη καὶ κατὰ λόγον εἰς κατασκευὴν τοιοῦδέ τινος εἴδους· τῶν μεγεθῶν δέ, φησί, τῶν ἐχόντων κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦτο λέγων τῶν μαθηματικῶν μεγεθῶν, ἤτοι τῶν ἐννοηματικῶς καὶ καθ’ ὑποτύπωσιν μεγεθῶν λεγομένων, γραμμῶν δηλονότι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα μαθηματικὰ μεγέθη πρόδηλον πάντως ὡς οὐκ ἔχει κίνησιν ἢ θέσεως οἰκειότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα. ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην ἁρμονίαν, ἣν προηγουμένως ἔφημεν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐν μεγέθεσί φησιν εἶναι τοῖς κίνησιν ἔχουσι καὶ θέσεως οἰκειότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον λίθοις, πλίνθοις, ξύλοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· τὴν γὰρ τούτων σύνθεσιν, ἀνάλογον καὶ ἡρμοσμένην οὕτως ὡς μηδὲν εἶναι μεταξὺ αὐτῶν τι τῶν ὁμοίων, προηγουμένως εἶναί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι ἁρμονίαν· μὴ εἶναι δέ τι τῶν ὁμοίων μεταξὺ αὐτῶν εἴρηται, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν κωλύει μεταξὺ αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀέρα ἢ κόλλαν ἴσως ἡντιναοῦν, ἃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ὁμοειδῆ. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων μεγεθῶν ἡρμοσμένην σύνθεσιν εἰς εἶδος καὶ κατάστασιν ἡντιναοῦν, ταύτην μὲν κληθῆναι προηγουμένως ἁρμονίαν, ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ παρομοίως κληθῆναι ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν διαφόρων κοινωνίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν (ἤτοι διπλασίων, ἡμιολίων, ἐπιτρίτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων), ὧν ἄρα καὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἐγχωρεῖ μεταξὺ | ἑτέρους εἶναί τινας λόγους ὁμοειδεῖς εἰς τὸ εἶναι κρείττονά τινα κατάστασιν ἁρμονίας καὶ συμφωνίας μουσικῆς. καὶ τοίνυν κατ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, φησίν, ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν. καὶ ὅτι γε οὐ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην σύνθεσιν τῶν μεγεθῶν, πρόδηλον τοῦτό φησι καὶ εὐέλεγκτον· διάφοροι γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται συνθέσεις καὶ παραθέσεις τῶν μορίων, ὥστε καὶ διάφοροι ἂν εἶεν καὶ πολλαὶ αἱ τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου ψυχαί· διάφοροι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν αἱ συνθέσεις ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ (οἷον ὀστῶν πρὸς ὀστᾶ ἢ πρὸς σάρκας ἢ πρὸς νεῦρα, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων πρὸς ἑαυτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα), ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν (οἷον κεφαλῆς πρὸς χεῖρας ἢ πρὸς ὤμους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως)· ἡ τινῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ ἡ πάντων· καὶ εἰ ἡ πάντων, πολλαὶ ἂν εἶεν καὶ διάφοροι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ· ἄλλως τε ὅσον τὸ ἄτοπον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων μορίων σύνθεσιν λέγειν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν τῆς

1–2 αὐτῶν γένηται ἡρμοσμένη ] γένηται ἡρμοσμένη αὐτῶν M A 2–3 φησί, τῶν ἐχόντων ] τῶν ἐχόντων φησὶ M A 11–12 κόλλαν ] κόλαν M 12–13 ἃ—ἡντιναοῦν iter. A 14 παρομοίως ] παρωνύμως malim (cf. 1.2.40) 15 κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V M Aac 16 τινας A1sl 18 ἐνδέχεται ] ἐνδέχεσθαι Atext (‑ται- A1sl ) 19 γε om. M A 19–20 τοῦτό φησι transp. A 23 σαρκῶν ] τὲ add. M A 25 ἢ¹ supplevi || τινῶν ] τίνων M A 19–62.7 408a 10–18

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also says, with a view to demolishing [the proposition] that the soul is an attunement, that attunement applies – as a word and a phenomenon – primarily to magnitudes, whenever they are combined in a way that is attuned and proportioned for the establishment of this kind of form. “To magnitudes”, he says, “that have motion and position”: he mentions this by way of contradistinction to mathematical magnitudes, that is, to what are called “magnitudes” in a notional way and in the sense of an outline, that is to say, lines and suchlike. For it is absolutely clear that mathematical magnitudes of this kind have no motion or natural propensity for a position vis-à-vis each other. Anyway, he says that the aforementioned attunement, the one that we said was 6 primarily understood [by the term], exists in magnitudes that have motion and a natural propensity for a position vis-à-vis each other, such as stones, bricks, boards and the like. For [he says that] it is the combination of these, [if it is] proportioned and attuned in such a way that there is no similar thing between them, which primarily is and is referred to as “attunement”. That “there is no similar thing between them” was said because there is nothing to prevent there being air between them, or perhaps some kind of adhesive, which are not things of the same kind as these. But, as we were say- 7 ing, [he says that] it is the attuned combination of the aforementioned magnitudes into a form and a fixed arrangement of some kind that is primarily called “attunement”; and that, by extension from this, the association and blending of the different ratios – that is, of the double, the sesquialter and the sesquitertian ratios and the like – is also called “attunement” in a similar way, for between these things, too, there is no room for there to be any other ratios of the same kind for the establishment of some superior arrangement of attunement and musical consonance. And thus it is not possible, he says, for the soul to be an attunement in either of the aforementioned senses. That it 8 is not [possible] in the sense of the aforementioned combination of magnitudes, that much is clear, he says, and [the claim is] easy to refute. For there are different such combinations and juxtapositions of parts, with the consequence that a single animal would also have many different souls. For there are different combinations, on the one hand, of homogeneous parts in an animal (for instance bones combined with bones, with flesh or with sinews, and flesh and sinews themselves combined either each with itself or with each other), and on the other hand also of non-homogeneous parts (for instance a head combined with hands or with shoulders, and similarly with the others). For either the combination of some of these or that of any of these is a soul. And if the combination of any of them is [a soul], there will be many different souls in the animal; not to mention what an absurdity [it would be] to maintain that the combination of such parts constitutes the intellect or the perceptive or desiderative capacities

4–9 cf. Phlp. 148.18–24. 9–16 cf. Phlp. 148.7–14. 26–33 cf. Phlp. 148.32–149.8. 35–63.1 cf. Phlp. 149.9–10. 21 in a similar way: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “in a derivative sense”.

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ἔστιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἷον τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν στοιχειώδη κρᾶσιν τῶν εἰρημένων μορίων, ἄλλην ἄλλων οὖσαν, ὡς εἶναι καὶ οὕτω διαφόρους καὶ πολλὰς τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ζῴῳ διὰ τὴν διάφορον μίξιν καὶ στοιχειώδη κρᾶσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἑκάστων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἰρημένων μορίων (ἤγουν σαρκῶν, ὀστῶν, νεύρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων)· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον, φησίν, ἡ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων καθ’ ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ’ ἣν ὀστοῦν. ὥστε πολλαὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ὡς εἴρηται, αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διάφοροι. τὰ αὐτὰ δέ, φησίν, ἔστι λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα. καὶ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ τὰ εἴδη τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων (οἷον ὅδε ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ σάρκα καὶ ὅδε νεῦρον καὶ ὅδε ὀστοῦν), καὶ τοίνυν ἔστι πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγειν· πότερον ὁ λόγος ἑκάστου ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἐνορᾶται αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἰρημένοις μορίοις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴτε αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος εἴτε ἄλλο τι ἡ ψυχή, πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι «γαίᾳ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ»; ἢ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τῶν μιγνυμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ γινώσκουσα, ὡς φαμέν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὰ μιγνύμενα. καὶ ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστι, φησίν, ἀπορεῖν – τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα – φάσκοντα τὴν φιλίαν ποιεῖν τὴν σύγκρασιν τῶν στοιχείων· ἆρα τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ φιλία καὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἕπεται πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἄπορα καὶ ἐναντιώματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἃ προέφην, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν | μίξιν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἡ φιλία; καὶ πῶς ἄρα αἰτία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως ἡ φιλία; καὶ μὴν ἔτι ζητεῖν ἔστιν εἰ πάντων ἁπλῶς ἡ μίξις ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία καὶ τῶν τυχόντων· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο λέγειν βουληθείη, ἀλλ’ αὐτόθεν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτίκα ὁ ἔλεγχος· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων μιγνυμένων εἰδοποιεῖται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον. καὶ εἰ ἐκ τῆς κατὰ λόγον μίξεως τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτός, πάλιν ἔστιν ἐρεῖν τὰ πρὸ βραχέος εἰρημένα ἄπορα. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔστι, φησίν, οὕτως ἀπορεῖν, εἴ τις ὡς ἁρμονίαν ὑποτίθεται καὶ λόγον τῶν μιγνυμένων σωματικῶν τὴν ψυχήν. ἀλλά γε μὴν καὶ αὖθις ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔστιν ἀπορεῖν, ὡς εἰ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ παρὰ τὴν μίξιν καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν τῶν εἰρημένων, πῶς ἅμα τῷ ὁτιοῦν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναιρεθῆναι καὶ φθαρῆναι φθείρεται καὶ λύεται καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τοῦ ζῴου; ἤγουν ἅμα τῷ

2 κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V M Aac 4 κρᾶσιν correxi : κράσιν codd. 5–6 τὸν αὐτὸν M1pc (ex τῶν αὐτῶν) 6 ἔχει ] ἔχειν A 7 καθ’ ἕκαστον ] καθεκαστον A 9 κρᾶσις ] κράσις V M 13 γαίᾳ ] γαῖα (ut vid.) V 15 αὐτὸν ] τὸν αὐτὸν malim 16 σύγκρασιν ] σύγκρισιν M 17 ἄπορα καὶ ἐναντιώματα ] ἄτοπα A || προέφην ] ἔφην M A 23 εἰρημένα ἄπορα transp. Mtext (ordinem ut in V A litteris β α indicat M1sl ) 7–15 408a 18–21

15–23 408a 21–24 23–64.4 408a 24–26

13 γαίᾳ—ὕδωρ DK 31 B109.1

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of the soul. Yet nor is it possible to say that the soul is the proportionate mixture of the different parts in the animal, like the ratio and the elemental blend of the aforementioned parts, which is different for different parts, so that there will also in this case be many different souls in a single animal, on account of the different mixture, elemental blend and ratios of each of the aforementioned parts in it (namely, flesh, bones, sinews and the rest); for it is not the case, he says, that the mixture of elements on which flesh is based and that on which bone is based have the same ratio. Consequently, there will be many different souls in each [animal], as stated. The same things can also be adduced, he says, in response to Empedocles. For he, too, generates the forms of the parts of animals from the blend of elements (for example, this ratio or blend of elements produces flesh, this one sinew and this one bone). Accordingly, it can be said in response to him: is the soul the ratio of each of these or is the soul something else besides the ratio, which “becomes present” and is manifested in the aforementioned parts themselves? And yet, whether the soul is the ratio itself or something else, how can the very same Empedocles say “we see earth by earth and water by water”? For either the soul that is exercising knowledge is the ratio of the mixed components, as we say, or it is something else besides the ratio and the mixed components. One can further, he says, raise the [following] problem for him (Empedocles) when he says that it is Love that produces the mixture of the elements: are Love and the ratio the same thing, so that once again the same problems and inconsistencies that Ι have already mentioned lie in store for him, or is Love something else besides the mixture and the ratio? And how, in that case, is Love a cause of the ratio and the mixture? Moreover, one must further raise the question whether Love is the mixture of all and any random things indiscriminately. For if this is what he wants to say, well, in that case the refutation follows immediately from the things themselves. For that which constitutes a soul is not endowed with form by random things mixed together, but according to a ratio. And if that which constitutes a soul and the ratio itself are derived from a mixture according to a ratio, one can again raise the problems brought up a little while ago. These problems, then, [Aristotle] says, can be raised in this way, if anyone proposes that the soul is like an attunement or a ratio of corporeal things mixed together. But, on the other hand, problems can also be raised on the basis of the contrary position. For example, if the soul is something else besides the mixture, the ratio and the attunement of the aforementioned things, how can it be that the soul is destroyed and released from the animal simultaneously with the removal and destruction of any of the aforementioned things? That is, simultaneously with the

9–18 cf. Phlp. 150.2–16. 23–29 cf. Phlp. 150.30–151.2.

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ἀναιρεθῆναι σάρκα τοῦ ζῴου λύεται καὶ ἡ ψυχή (ἢ νεῦρον ἢ ὀστοῦν)· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ὁμοιομερῆ μόρια ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκ τοῦ ζῴου ἀναιρούμενα ἐνταῦθα νοεῖν χρή, οὐ τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ, ἐπεὶ ἀναιρουμένων ἐνίων μορίων ἀνομοιομερῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῴου, οἷον χειρὸς 13 ἢ ποδός, παραμένει ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ φθείρεται παντάπασι τὸ ζῷον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλίν φησι· πῶς ἀπολιπούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτοῦ μορίων φθείρεται, εἴπερ μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψυχὴν ἔχει, μηδέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἡ ψυχή; ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει ἑκατέρωθεν ἀντιστρόφως, εὔδηλον ὡς ἄρα τι κοινόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕνωσις, καὶ οὐ πόρρω ταῦτα ἀλλήλων. Ὅτι, ἀποδείξας μὴ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσίν τινων ἁρμονίαν τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε κινεῖσθαι κύκλῳ μήθ’ ὅλως φέρεσθαι ἐν τόπῳ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἑαυτῇ (ὅτι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· κινοῦσα γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι καὶ αὐτὴ συγκινεῖται αὐτῷ), ἑξῆς φησιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κίνησις ἀλλοτρία ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἐπ’ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἴσως εἰς τὰ πάθη, φησί, ταῦτα βλέψας τις – οἷον τὸ θυμοῦσθαι, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ ἥδεσθαι, τὸ δειλιᾶν, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα – εἴποι τις ἂν κινεῖσθαι κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν ψυχήν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ 15 ταῦτα κινήσεις εἶναι, καὶ εἶναί γε ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ψυχῆς. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖος δέ, φησίν, οὐδ’ ἀληθὴς οὐδὲ οὗτος ὁ λόγος· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ εἰσὶ ταῦτα κινήσεις· ὅτε δὲ καὶ κινήσεις δοίημεν εἶναι ταῦτα, οὐκ εἰσὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· ἡ ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ κρίνει μόνον, ὥστε οὐ κινεῖται μᾶλλον ἐν τούτῳ ἢ ἠρεμεῖ· τὸ σῶμα δὲ ὡδί πως ἐν τούτοις διατίθεται καὶ r V125 κινεῖται κατά τι τῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ μεταβάλλει, | ὥστε τοῦ ζῴου μὲν ἂν εἴη κίνησις ἐν τούτοις, εἴ γε ταῦτα κινήσεις διὰ ψυχῆς· οὐ μὴν δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι ταῦτα κινήσεις. 16 κρίνει μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ θυμῷ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως, κινεῖται δὲ τὸ σῶμα κατά τι μόριον αὐτοῦ· ζέει γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν αὐτοῦ, εἴτουν τὸ αἷμα, ἐν τούτῳ· καὶ πάλιν κρίνει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν φόβον, συστέλλεται δὲ τὸ θερμὸν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ σώματος, καὶ καταψύχεται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ σῶμα. διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς «χλωροί» φησιν «ὑπαὶ δείους», καὶ πάλιν «ὦχρός τέ μιν εἷλε παρειάς». καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῆς

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removal of flesh – or sinew or bone – from the animal, the soul is also released. It is these kinds of homogeneous parts, removed from the animal in their entirety, that one must understand in this context, not the non-homogeneous parts; for when some of the non-homogeneous parts, such as a hand or a foot, are removed from the animal, the soul remains and the animal is not completely destroyed. Conversely, he also says: 13 how can it be that, after the soul has abandoned the body, each of the latter’s parts is destroyed, if it is neither the case that each of the parts has a soul nor that the soul is the ratio of the mixture of each of them? For since these things are mutually and reciprocally related in this way, it is obvious that there must be some commonality and unity between them, and that these things are not far removed from each other. [Note] that, once he has demonstrated that the soul is not, as has been supposed 14 by some thinkers, an attunement, and is not moved in a circle, nor at all locally moved by itself with respect to its essence ([that is,] except coincidentally, for when it sets the thing in which it inheres in motion, it is itself moved along with it), he proceeds to say that while locomotion is foreign to the soul and does not pertain to it at all, one might still perhaps, he says, if one focuses on these affections (namely, being impassioned, feeling pain, feeling pleasure, being anxious, reasoning and the like), say that the soul is moved with respect to these. For these affections are held to be motions, and they certainly do not take place without the soul. But this is not a necessary statement ei- 15 ther, he says, and not even true: to begin with, these affections are not motions; and even in case we should grant that they are motions, they do not belong to the soul. For the soul merely discerns, and thus is not in motion during this [activity] as much as it is at rest; the body, on the other hand, is being modified, moved with respect to some of its [parts] and changed in some determinate way during these [affections], so that there will be a motion of the animal during these [affections], if it is true that these are motions enabled by the soul; but they are nevertheless not motions of the soul itself. For during impassionment the soul itself discerns, as I said, a desire for retaliation, 16 while the body is moved with respect to some part of itself: for its hot part (that is, its blood) is seething during this [affection]. And again, the soul discerns fear, while the hot part of the body in this case recedes, and the body is cooled down and altered. This is also why the poet says “pale with fear”, and again “pallor lays hold of his cheeks”. And these [affections] cannot belong to the soul, for it would be ridiculous if one were

1 or sinew or bone: cf. Phlp. 151.28–31. 1–5 cf. Phlp. 152.13–17. 5–10 cf. Them. 25.29–33. 20–21 cf. Them. 27.13–14. 21–23 cf. Them. 27.19–20. 24–26 cf. Phlp. 156.19–21. 27–29 cf. Them. 27.14–16; Phlp. 156.26–27. 29–67.3 cf. Them. 27.20–25; Phlp. 156.27–28. 30–31 A. T. Murray’s translation.

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ψυχῆς· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, εἴ τις ὠχριᾶν ἢ ζέειν ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα φαίη τὴν ἀσώματον ψυχήν· 17 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι τοῦ σώματος ὡδί πως διατιθεμένου. καὶ

μὴν καὶ αὐτό, φησί, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι, εἴ γε κινεῖσθαι φαίη τις, οὐ μᾶλλον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄν τις φαίη ἢ κατά τι μόριον τοῦ σώματος εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν (ἢ πνεῦμα ἢ ἐγκέφαλον ἢ ἧπαρ ἢ ἄλλο, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἂν ᾖ), ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀλλοιότεροι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῷ διαλογίζεσθαι καὶ σκέπτεσθαι γίνονται κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἢ πρότερον – ὥσπερ δὴ τὰ περὶ τούτων, 18 φησίν, ἐν ἄλλοις ἔστιν ἀκριβολογήσασθαι. πλήν γε μὴν ἐνταῦθα τοσοῦτο λέγομεν, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ἢ κατά τινα φορὰν τῶν τοῦ σώματος – ὥσπερ δῆλον τοῦτο ἐν τῷ θυμοῦσθαι· φέρεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε καὶ προπηδᾷ αἷμα τοῦ σώματος ζέον, ἢ πάλλει ἡ καρδία – ἢ κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν – ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ ἥδεσθαι ἀλλοιοῦται ἡ διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος, ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, ὡς εἴρηται. διαταῦτα δὴ καὶ οὐκ ἂν εὐλόγως ταύτας λέγοι τις κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς κινήσεις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἀλογώτατα φαίη τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ τεκταίνειν ἢ σκυτορραφεῖν ἢ κιθαρίζειν· αἰτία μὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐνεργειῶν ἡ ψυχή, οὐ μὴν αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ αὐτουργοῦσα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἔχουσα τὴν κινητικὴν εἰς τὴν τούτων ἐνέργειαν δύναμιν. καὶ τοίνυν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκοδομήσεως οὐκ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων ταύτην ἐνεργεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· οὐκ αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μισοῦσα ἢ ἐλεοῦσα ἢ φιλοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ 19 ζῷον αὐτὸ πάσχει ἢ ἐνεργεῖ. εἰ δὲ βούλεταί τις, κινεῖται κατὰ ταῦτα αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ λέγεται κινεῖσθαι, φησίν, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται κινεῖσθαι τῇ χειρί, ἤτοι ὡς αὐτοῦ μέρει· τῆς γὰρ χειρὸς κινουμένης, ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται κινεῖσθαι V125v καθόλου. [20] οὐχ οὕτω τοίνυν λέγεται | κἀνταῦθα κινεῖσθαι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ ψυχῇ ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις πάθεσιν εἴτουν ἐνεργείαις, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἡ διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων παθῶν κίνησις ἢ εἰς αὐτὴν λήγει, φησίν, ἢ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς. οἷον εἰς αὐτὴν λήγει ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ προσβάλλοντα τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἰς αὐτὴν ἐντεῦθεν τείνει τὴν ψυχήν, δι’ ἧς ἀντιλαμβάνεται – εἴτουν διὰ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύμα-

1 ἢ¹ ] ἦ M 2 ὡδί ] ὠδί V 4 τοῦ σώματος om. M 8 δῆλον ] ἔστι add. M A ταῦτα M A 21 τοίνυν ] δὴ A 24 αἰσθήσεως ut vid. A1pc (‑σεως) 7–68.17 408b 11–18

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to say that the incorporeal soul is growing pale or seething or the like; rather, after the soul’s discernment, these [affections] belong to the body, which is modified in some determinate way. Indeed, even if someone should say that reasoning, he says, is a case of being moved, one cannot ascribe the motion to the soul so much as to some part of the body (whether the spirit, the brain, the liver or some other part, whatever it may be), since human beings also become different from before with respect to their appearance during conversation and study – in a way that must be described, he says, in a more detailed account of these matters elsewhere. Yet we will say this much in the present connection: these kinds [of affection] take place either by virtue of some spatial movement of the parts of the body – as is obviously the case in being impassioned, for sometimes the body’s blood rushes and flies seething [to the face], or the heart leaps up – or by virtue of an alteration – as, for instance, the disposition of the body is altered in feeling pain or pleasure, or even in reasoning, as mentioned. On this account, then, it would also be unreasonable for anyone to say that the soul undergoes these motions, just as if someone would say, completely nonsensically, that the soul weaves, does carpentry, makes shoes or plays the lyre. For the soul is a cause of these kinds of activity but is not itself what performs them; rather, [what performs them] is that which possesses the motive capacity directed towards the performance of these [activities]. Accordingly, just as in the case of housebuilding it is not the art of housebuilding itself but the person who possesses this that performs the activity by virtue of it, this is how it is also with the soul: it is not the soul itself that hates or commiserates or loves; rather, the animal undergoes or performs the action. Ιf anyone so wishes, it is moved in these respects thanks to the soul itself; but it is not said to be moved “thanks to” the soul, he says, in the sense in which a human being is said to be moved “thanks to” her hand, that is, in a part of herself, for when the hand is moved the human being is said, on the whole, to be moved. Accordingly, nor is it in this sense that the human being is here said to be moved “thanks to” the soul in the course of the aforementioned affections or activities; rather, it is because the motion involved in the aforementioned affections either terminates in it, he says, or [originates] from it. For instance, in the case of perceptible objects and sense perception, it terminates in it. For as the perceptible objects impinge upon the sense organs they extend from there to the soul itself, through which – that is, through the perceptive spirit emitted

3–7 cf. Phlp. 156.29–32 (brain); 157.6–7. 3–6 cf. Them. 27.25–28 (spirit). 7–8 cf. Phlp. 157.14–22 (who suggests that Aristotle is referring to De partibus animalium or De motu animalium). 9–13 cf. Them. 27.28–32; Phlp. 156.35–157.7. 15–26 cf. Them. 27.34–28.4. 31–69.1 cf. Them. 28.5–9; Phlp. 158.9–11. 16–22 If, as seems inevitable on account of the gender of the pronoun, “that which possesses the motive capacity directed towards the performance of” weaving etc. is the soul, this argument is an obvious non sequitur. 23–25 “thanks to”—in: the distinction is between two uses of the dative case in Greek, the “dative of means” (“thanks to”) and the “dative of respect” (“in”); cf. 2.2.27.

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τος – τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ὥστε ἡ μὲν προσβολὴ ἔξωθεν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς αὐτὰ πρῶτα τὰ σωματικὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια, κἀκεῖθεν διὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἵεται· αὕτη γὰρ προβάλλει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα, ὃ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει τῆς ἀντιλήψεως τῶν 21 προσβαλλόντων ἔξωθεν αἰσθητῶν εἰς τὰ αἰσθητήρια. τὸ δὲ «ἀπ’ αὐτῆς» εἴρηται, ὅτι ἐπ’ ἐνίων ἀνάπαλιν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρόεισιν εἰς τὰ σωματικὰ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ πάθος, εἴτουν ἡ κίνησις, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως· ἔχοντες γὰρ τεθησαυρισμένα τινὰ ὧν πεπειράμεθα δι’ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ φαντάσματα τούτων ἀνατυποῦντες, ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα ταῦτα ὧν πρότερον τὴν πεῖραν ἔσχομεν· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι δὲ ἔσωθεν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς προϊόντες, γινόμεθα καὶ ἐν ἱστορίᾳ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστων ὧν ἄρα ποτὲ πεπειράμεθα, ἰδόντες ἢ ἀκούσαντες ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐν αἰσθήσει λαβόντες ἃ νῦν ἑκάστοτε 22 μνημονεύομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ μὴν ἐνίοτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως – καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς – τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν συνδιατίθεται τὰ ἔξω, τὰ σωματικά· ἀναμνησθέντες γάρ τινων φοβερῶν ἐπιπεσόντων πρότερον ἡμῖν δειλαίνομεν τηνικαῦτα καὶ ὠχριῶμεν· καί τινων αἰσχρῶν ὡσαύτως ἀναμνησθέντες συμβαμάτων, καὶ τῇ μνήμῃ μόνον, αὖθις αἰδούμεθα καὶ ἐρυθροὶ γινόμεθα. διαταῦτ’, εἴρηται, ἢ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὰ ἔξωθεν ἵεται – ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ αἰσθητῶν – ἢ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἔξωθεν γίνεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι – ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως. Ὅτι, φησίν, ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι μεθύστερον ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ οὐσία τις ἄφθαρτος· οὐσίαν δὲ τοῦτον ἐγγινομένην ἔφησεν, ἵνα μή τις ὑπολάβῃ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἐγγίνεσθαι τῷ ἐμψύχῳ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγγίνεται ὑποκειμένοις τισὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· ἐγγίνεται 24 τοίνυν, φησίν, οὐχ ὡς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐσία τις ἄφθαρτος. ὅτι δ’ ἄφθαρτος ἐνV126r τεῦθεν, φησί, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ ἐφθείρετο ἐν τῷ | γήρᾳ τοῦ ζῴου, εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτὸν φθείρεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐχ οὕτως συμβαίνει, ἀλλὰ μάλιστ’ ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ καὶ κρείττων ἐστὶ πολλάκις ὁ νοῦς. εἰ δὲ συμβαίνει τυχὸν αὐτὸν ἐνίοτε μαραίνεσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν ἥττονα δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐλαττοῦσθαι καὶ οἱονεὶ φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστι δι’ αὐτόν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀπαθής ἐστι καθ’ ἑαυτόν· ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλο τοῦτο γίνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ

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1 ὥστε ut vid. A1pc || ἡ ] εἰ A 2 ἵεται ] ἴεται (ut vid.) V M 4 προσβαλλόντων V1pc (ex προβαλλόντων) 5 τὰ M1sl 6 τεθησαυρισμένα A1pc (ex τεθει‑) 8 πρότερον τὴν πεῖραν ἔσχομεν ] τὴν πεῖραν ἔχομεν πρότερον M A 10 πως ] πῶς V 11 μόνης ] fort. legendum μονῆς (cf. Arist. 408b 18 et praesertim Them. 28.17–18) 12 τὴν om. A 13 ἐπιπεσόντων πρότερον transp. M A 15 διαταῦτ’ ] διὰ ταῦτ’ M A || ἔξωθεν ] ἔξω A || ἵεται ] ἴεται V M 16 τὸ V2?pc (fort. ex τοῦ) 18–20 ση′ adn. Mmarg 18–19 ἄφθαρτος ] οὖσα addere velim 22 φησί ] ἔστι A 23 συμβαίνει M1pc (‑αί- ut vid. ex -έ‑) 26–70.2 ση′ adn. Mmarg 18–70.5 408b 18–21

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from it – [the human being] apprehends the perceptible objects. Consequently, the first things that the impingement of perceptible objects from outside [affects] are the bodily sense organs, and from there it is dispatched through the perceptive spirit to the soul. For the soul emits the perceptive spirit, which is what possesses the activity consisting in the apprehension of perceptible objects impinging from outside upon the sense organs. The phrase “[originates] from it” has been added because in some 21 cases, conversely, the activity or the affection, that is, the motion, proceeds from the soul to the bodily parts, as, for instance, in the case of recollection. For by having in storage some of the things that we have experienced through sense perception, and forming impressions of them, we recollect those things of which we previously had an experience. And as we are, in recollecting, proceeding from within, from the soul, we also arrive at a record of the perceptions of each thing that we have thus at some point experienced, by seeing, hearing or otherwise receiving in our sense what we now, in a given instant, remember in our soul. Indeed, sometimes there is a simultaneous mod- 22 ification of the external – bodily – parts, [originating] from the recollection – and only from it – within the soul. For on recollecting certain frightful things that have previously befallen us we grow at that time anxious and pale; and in the same way, on recollecting certain shameful events, even if only in memory, we again feel embarrassed and turn red. This is why, as stated, either what is external is dispatched to the soul, as in the case of the sense organs and perceptible objects, or the motion proceeds from the soul to what is external, as in the case of recollection. [Note] that he says that the intellect is likely to become present in the animal later, 23 as a kind of imperishable substance. He said that the intellect is a substance that becomes present in order that no one should presume that it becomes present in the ensouled creature in the way in which accidental properties become present in certain subjects. Accordingly, he says that it becomes present not as something like that but as an imperishable substance. Τhat it is imperishable, he says, is clear from the fol- 24 lowing: if it had perished in the old age of the animal, it would have been reasonable for it to perish; but this is not what happens: on the contrary, the intellect is often even more powerful in old age. And if perchance it sometimes happens that it does lose its strength, and it appears as though it does have less power and is being reduced in substance and, as it were, perishing, this is still not on account of the intellect itself, for in itself it is unaffectable. Rather, this happens on account of something else, just as old

16–17 cf. Phlp. 158.6–7. 17–19 cf. Them. 28.21. 22 cf. Phlp. 163.34–36. 23–26 cf. Phlp. 160.25–27. 29–30 cf. Phlp. 160.32–35; Prisc. 60.4–5. 15–16 Or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “from the recollection and the state of rest within the soul”.

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οἱ γέροντες ἀτονοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι διὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἀτονίαν, καίτοι γε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. οἷον, εἴ τις γέρων μὴ καλῶς ὁρᾷ, οὐ διὰ φθορὰν τοῦτο καὶ ἐλάττωσιν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος γίνεται· τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι καὶ τηνικαῦτα, καὶ ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν αἰσθητικὴ ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀτονίαν τοῦ ὀργάνου, εἴτουν τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἦν δυνατόν, φησί, καὶ ἐν τῷ γέροντι τὸν αὐτὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐνθεῖναι ὃν ἔχει καὶ ὁ νέος, ὡσαύτως ἂν ἐνήργει δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου – εἴτουν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ – τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ ἐν τῷ γέροντι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ νέῳ· τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστιν. ἵνα δὲ σαφέστερον ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, κατανοείτω τις τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς χύμασι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν· τὸ γὰρ ὀπτικὸν πνεῦμα, τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἐνεργεῖ διὰ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου (εἴτουν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ), ἐπιπροσθοῦντος αὐτῷ τοῦ χύματος. ἂν δ’ ὑφέληταί τις τὸ χῦμα ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, ὡσαύτως ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ὀπτικὸν πνεῦμα ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον· τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ γέροντι, παχυτέρων γινομένων καὶ στεγανωτέρων καὶ ξηροτέρων τῶν χιτώνων καὶ τῶν ὑμένων τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, καὶ μὴ διαφανῶν ὡς καὶ πρότερον, καὶ ἐπιπροσθούντων οὕτω, οὐκ ἔχει τὴν δίοδον τὰ προσβάλλοντα αἰσθητά, οὐδὲ διαπορθμεύεται ῥᾷστα εἰς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα ὡς καὶ πρότερον, καίτοι γε τὸ αὐτὸ ὄν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ὥσπερ δὴ παραπλησίως τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ ἐν ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς νόσοις. τὰ πάθη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ αἰσθητήρια γίνεται οἷς τὸ ὀπτικὸν πνεῦμα χρῆται καί, διαλυομένων τῶν παθῶν, τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν καταλαμβάνεται τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι μηδὲ πέπονθεν αὐτό τι. καὶ τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοός· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει ὁτιοῦν αὐτός. τὸ γὰρ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν, ὅπερ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἕξις, τὸ αὐτό ἐστι καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἧττον δ’ ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ μαραίνεσθαι, πάσχοντος αὐτοῦ ἔσωθεν | – ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἐστίν – ᾧ χρῆται καὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἀνάλογον εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν – εἴτε πνεῦμα εἴτ’ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν – ὥσπερ ὁ ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτης μόνης οὔσης τῆς διαφορᾶς, ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοὸς ἐντός ἐστι τὸ πάσχον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔξω τὸ

1 τὴν V1sl 3 αἰσθητικοῦ M1pc (‑ι- ex -η‑) 16 αἰσθητικὸν ut vid. V2?pc (‑κὸν) 17 τὸ πάθος (ut vid.) A1pc (ex τοῦ πάθους) 18 νόσοις ] νόσεις M || τὰ πάθη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ] ἐντεῦθεν τὰ πάθη γὰρ M A 20 μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. 21 γὰρ om. A 24 εἴτ’ ] εἴτε M A 5–20 408b 21–24 20–72.8 408b 24–27

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people also lose the intensity of their sense perceptions because of a lack of tension in the sense organs, even though the perceptive spirit remains the same. For instance, if an old man does not see well, this is not caused by the perishing and diminishing of the perceptive spirit, for this remains the same even at this time, and the soul has the same perceptive competence. Rather, this is caused by a lack of tension in the instrument, that is, in the sense organ itself, the eye. For if it had been possible, he says, to 25 insert into the old man, too, the same eye that a young man has, the perceptive spirit would perform its activity through the sense organ itself – that is, the eye – in the same way in the old man, too, as in the young man, for it remains the same. In order 26 that it might be clearer what is being said, one may wish to consider how this applies to the fluids of the eyes. For although it remains the same, the visual spirit does not perform its activity in the same way through the sense organ – that is, the eye – when the fluid blocks the latter. But if one drains the fluid from the eyes, the visual spirit performs its activity in the same way as it did before, for it remains the same and is unaffected. Similarly, in the case of the old man, as the sheaths and membranes of his eye grow thicker, tighter and drier, and are not transparent like they used to be, and are thus blocking [the eye], the impinging perceptible objects cannot find a passage and are not so easily transmitted to the perceptive spirit as they used to be, even though the latter remains the same. For the affection does not belong to it, but to the [instrument] that it employs; this also happens, in a similar manner, in intoxication and sickness. For from these origins the affections reach the sense organs employed by the visual spirit; and once the affections are removed, the perceptive spirit is found to be the same again, as it itself has not been affected by anything. Accordingly, as we 27 were saying, it is the same thing with the intellect, too. For it itself is not affected by anything at all. For the reasoning and contemplation in which its competence consists remains the same and is always, by virtue of its [sc. the intellect’s] nature, in the same condition, but it appears to have less ability and to lose its strength when that thing inside is affected – whatever it is – that it employs and that stands in the same relation to the intellect – whether it is spirit or something else – as the eye does to the sense capacity; the only difference being this, that in the case of the intellect what is affected is internal, whereas in the case of the sense capacity the sense organ is external. Any-

5–6 cf. Prisc. 60.24–25. 9–20 cf. Phlp. 161.18–27. 28 whatever it is : cf. Them. 30.18–19. 29 whether it is spirit or something else : cf. Phlp. 164.8; Prisc. 60.29–30. 30–31 cf. Them. 30.22–24 (who complains that this is not a sufficient explanation of the fact that the intellect is separable and the sense capacity is not). 25 the reasoning and contemplation: Metochites brackets what Aristotle clearly wishes to keep apart (408b 24–27), and thus illustrates that he does not distinguish neatly between “reasoning” or discursive thought (dianoeîsthai) and (intuitive) “thinking” (noeîn). Contrast the ancient commentators: Them. (30.24–34); Phlp. (164.16–21).

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αἰσθητήριον. καὶ μὴν τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα οὕτως ἔχει· ὥσπερ δηλαδὴ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, 28 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοὸς ἔσωθεν. ἀλλά γε δή, καθὼς καὶ προελέγετο, τὸ μὲν διανοεῖσθαι

καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης πάθη ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μετ’ αὐτῆς ἀχωρίστως· διατοῦτο καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰ ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις ἄφθαρτοι καὶ τοῦ σώματος χωρισταί· ταῦτα γὰρ πάθη – εἴτουν ἐνέργειαι – κοινῶς τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, εἴτουν τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ ἐμψύχου, καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο (ἤγουν τὴν ψυχήν), ἀλλ’ οὕτως αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ ἔχει ἐκεῖνο (ἤγουν 29 αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχήν). καὶ τούτου ἀπόδειξις, φησί, πρόδηλος ὅτι, τοῦ σώματος φθειρομένου, οὔτε μνημονεύει αὕτη λοιπὸν οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου μόνου ἦν ταῦτα – ἤγουν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς – ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ συναμφοτέρου, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀπόλωλεν (ἤτοι αὐτὴ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ ἕνωσις καὶ τὸ σύνθετον), φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος. ὁ δέ γε νοῦς αὐτός, φησί, θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ οἷον χωρίζεσθαι τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄφθαρτον. Ὅτι, διὰ πολλῶν οὕτως ἀποδείξας ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε μήθ’ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῆς μήθ’ ὅλως κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἑξῆς φησιν ὅτι πολὺ τῶν προειρημένων δογμάτων ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον καὶ ἀλογώτερόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἀριθμός ἐστι κινῶν ἑαυτόν. 31 ἐλέγχων οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον φησὶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχει εἰς ἀνατροπὴν κοινὰ τοῖς προειρημένοις – ὅσα γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον εἰς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ὅλως τὴν ψυχήν, ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἔστι λέγειν πρὸς τὸν Ξενοκράτειον λόγον κινούμενον αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν λέγοντα – τὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδια, ἤτοι τὰ πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν εἶναι. 32 πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ κινοίη ἢ κινοῖτο ἀριθμός; ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων σύγκειται, ἢ ἡ μὲν μονὰς κινεῖ μόνον, ἡ δὲ κινεῖται μόνον, καὶ λοιπὸν οὐ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν αὐτῆς κινεῖται, τὶ δὲ οὐ κινεῖται, ὃ μόνον, ὡς εἴρηται, κινεῖ, ἢ ἑκάστη τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μονὰς καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἄτομον καὶ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἀδιάφορον κινητικόν τέ V127r ἐστι καὶ κινητόν; εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἔστι, διαφέρει | ἑαυτοῦ. [33] ἔτι καταγελῶν ὥσπερ καὶ κατελέγχων καὶ δι’ ἑτέρου ἐπιχειρήματος τὸ αὐτὸ δόγμα φησὶν ὡς ἐπεὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσιν ὅτι ἡ στιγμὴ ῥυεῖσα γραμμὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ῥυεῖσα ἐπίπεδον, καὶ ἡ μο-

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2–8 ση′ adn. Amarg 2 προελέγετο ] ὅτι add. M A 3 ἀλλὰ ] καὶ addere velim 6–7 τοῦ ἔχοντος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ] τοῦ σώματος μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος malim 14 ἑξῆς ] ἐξῆς A 16 ἐλέγχων ] ἐλέγξων malim 8–12 408b 27–29 13–15 408b 30–33 16–24 408b 33–409a 3

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way, that is how the example works; that is to say: as things are in the case of the sense capacity, so they are internally in the case of the intellect. However, as we were also 28 saying previously, reasoning, loving, hating and the like are not affections of the soul alone but together with it [also], inseparably, of the body. For this reason the soul capacities corresponding to the affections are not imperishable and separable from the body either. For these are affections (or activities) that are shared by the complex of both, that is, the ensouled animal: by the body, to be sure, that possesses “that thing” (namely, the soul); but by the body only to the extent that it possesses “that thing” (namely, the soul). And a clear proof of this, he says, is that, when the body perishes, 29 the soul neither remembers nor loves thereafter. For these were not [affections] of “that thing” only (namely, of the soul), but of the common thing or complex of both, which was, of course, also destroyed – that is, the actual association, union and combination was – when the body perished. But the intellect itself, he says, is something more divine, unaffectable, capable of being separated from the body and imperishable. [Note] that, having in this way demonstrated by numerous arguments that it is not possible for the soul to be moved either by itself or in any way at all, he next says that a view far more absurd and unreasonable even than all those previously mentioned is the one that was stated by Xenocrates, that the soul is a number that moves itself. Setting out, then, to refute the statement just cited, he says that some of the arguments at his disposal for demolishing it are shared with the previous [refutations] – for those arguments that were previously intended to demolish the view that the soul is moved at all, these he can now also deploy against the Xenocratic statement, which has it that the soul itself is a number in motion – and some are special, namely, those relevant to demolishing the view that it is a number. For how is a number supposed to cause or undergo motion? Since a number is composed of monads, one alternative is that one monad only causes motion and another is only moved, the result being that it is not the whole soul that is moved, but part of it is moved, and part of it is not moved (the part which, as stated, only causes motion), and the other alternative is that each of the number’s monads both causes and undergoes motion – and how can what is indivisible, partless and without difference be capable both of causing motion and of being moved? For if it is, it differs from itself. He further says, by way of deriding the same doctrine as much as refuting it with yet another argument, that since the geometers state that a point that flows generates a line and a line that flows generates a plane, it follows that a monad that belongs to the number – that is to say, to the soul –

2–9 cf. Phlp. 164.16–21 (although he does not speak here of the body itself, even to the extent that it possesses a soul, but of the living creature). 6 or activities: cf. Phlp. 164.18–19. 19–24 cf. Phlp. 165.29–32. 26–28 cf. Phlp. 166.15–24 (who concludes that the soul would then be only those monads that cause motion). 28–31 cf. Phlp. 166.12–15. 31–75.7 cf. Phlp. 166.26–35.

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νὰς ἄρα κινηθεῖσα ἡ κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμόν – τουτέστι τὴν ψυχήν – γραμμὴν ποιήσει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔσται ἡ κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ γραμμή (τουτέστι καὶ ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ πᾶσα κίνησις αὐτῆς)· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἡ μονὰς τῆς στιγμῆς ἢ τῷ θέσιν ἔχειν· θέσιν δὲ ἔχει κἀνταῦθα ἡ μονάς, μέρος οὖσα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν θέσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι. ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖ ἡ στιγμὴ τῇ μονάδι κατὰ πάντα, οὕτως ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς – εἴτουν τῆς ψυχῆς – ἔσται, ὡς εἴρηται, γραμμή. καὶ ἔτι κατεπιχειρῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δόγματός φησιν· ἐὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὑφαίρεσιν ποιήσῃς, ἑτεροιοῦται ὁ ἀριθμός, ἐλάττων γινόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ἀλλά γε ἐπὶ τινῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐντόμων ζῴων, εἰ τέμνει τις ταῦτα, τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ γίνονται πλείονα, τῷ δὲ εἴδει τὰ αὐτά εἰσι καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔμψυχα καὶ ζῶντα· οἷον τὰ διάφορα τμήματα τῶν ἐντόμων ζῴων παραπλησίως ἕκαστα ζῇ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φυτῶν διατεμνόμενοι οἱ κλάδοι καταφυτευόμενοι ὡσαύτως εἰσὶν ἔμψυχοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἀπετμήθησαν φυτά. καὶ μὴν ἔτι φησίν· οὐκ ἂν διαφέροι τὸ τὰς μονάδας τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν κινεῖν ἢ καὶ τὸ σωμάτια μικρὰ καὶ ἄτομα κατὰ τὴν Δημοκρίτου δόξαν· ἐὰν γὰρ μόνον σῴζοιτο τὸ ποσόν – εἴτουν ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν μονάδων – καὶ ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις τοῦ Δημοκρίτου, καὶ νοήσῃ τις ταύτας ἀποβαλλούσας τὸ σφαιρικὸν σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔσονται ἢ στιγμαὶ καὶ μονάδες, κινοῦσαί τε καὶ κινούμεναι, ὥσπερ δὴ ἐν τοῖς συνεχέσι σώμασιν, εἴτουν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ζῴοις, τὸ μὲν νοεῖται κινεῖν, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθὼς δὴ τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγεται κινεῖσθαι αὐτὸ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τῷ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κινεῖν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖσθαι. οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ ἐνταῦθα τῷ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μείζονος μεγέθους, τὰ δὲ βραχύτατα, εἰ μόνον ἐστὶν ὡσαύτως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ ποσὸν τῶν κινούντων τε καὶ κινουμένων. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος οὐδὲν προσίσταται τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖσθαι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι μεγέθεσιν, | εἰ μόνον σῴζοιτο, ὡς εἴρηται, ὁ ἀριθμός. ἐξανάγκης οὖν ἔσται ἐν ταῖς μονάσι τὸ κινοῦν τι ἐν αὐταῖς, ὥστε ἐπεὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι – καθάπερ καθόλου ἐστὶ δόξα – τὸ κινεῖν, οὐκ

1 τουτέστι ] τοῦτέστι M 2 τουτέστι ] τοῦτέστι M 3 ἔχειν ] ἔχει A 4 τουτέστι ] τοῦτέστι M 7 δόγματός ] πράγματος A 7–8 ἑτεροιοῦται ] ἑταιρειοῦται V : ἑτεριοῦται M 14 ἔτι M1pc (ex ἔστι) || φησίν ] φησὶ M || ἢ A1sl 15 σῴζοιτο ] σῴζηται malim 16 νοήσῃ M1pc (ex νοήσει vel νοήσοι) 17 ἀποβαλλούσας V1pc (ex ἀποβαλούσας) 20 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία M 23 μεγέθεσιν ] μεγέθεσι M 24 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 25 τι ] τί V A || ἐπεὶ ] ἐπὶ A 6–13 409a 7–10 13–76.2 409a 10–18

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will also generate a line when set in motion, so that the motion of the soul will be nothing else than a line (that is to say, its passion, its appetite and all of its motions). For a monad does not differ from a point except in respect of having a position. But in this context the monad, too, has a position, since it is a part of the number, that is to say, of the soul, because the soul has a position in the body. Consequently, since the point is equivalent to the monad in every respect, its motion – that is, the soul’s – will therefore be, as mentioned, a line. And still arguing against the same doctrine he 34 says: if you make a subtraction from a number, the number becomes a different one, since it becomes smaller, and is not the same one as it was before. But in the case of some ensouled creatures, for instance plants and those that are referred to as insect‐animals, if one cuts these up, they become many in terms of their number, but in terms of their species they remain the same creatures, in the same way ensouled and alive. For instance, the different segments of insects are all severally alive and in motion in much the same way as before; and twigs cut off from plants that are planted again are ensouled in the same way as the plants from which they were cut. Moreover, 35 he further says: there would be no difference between saying that the number’s monads cause motion and saying that small indivisible corpuscles do so, in accordance with Democritus’ view. For if the quantity alone – that is, the number of the monads – is preserved in Democritus’ spheres, and one conceives them to cast off their spherical body, they, too, will be nothing but points and monads, [some] causing and [others] undergoing motion, just as in continuous bodies — that is, in ensouled animals – one thing is conceived to cause motion and another to be moved, inasmuch as the ensouled creature is said to be moved by itself in the sense that its soul causes motion and its body is moved. For it makes no difference to the present argument that some 36 [corpuscles] are of a larger magnitude and others are exceedingly small, if it is only the number, or the quantity, of things causing motion and things being moved that remains the same. For an exceedingly small magnitude in no way prevents the actualisation of the same things as in the case of the larger magnitudes, if, as stated, it is only the number that is preserved. Of necessity, then, there will be something in the monads that causes motion in them, with the consequence that, since causing motion belongs to the soul (as is the universal opinion), the soul will not be that thing in the

8–15 cf. Prisc. 63.4–10; Them. 31.17–19; Phlp. 167.3–13. 168.3–5. 24–29 cf. Them. 31.24–26.

18–21 cf. Them. 31.22–24.

21–24 cf. Phlp.

10–11 that are referred to as insect‐animals: the point is simply that the word “insect” (éntomon in Greek) connotes the segmentation of the body of an insect. 29–77.2 A premiss seems to be missing from this tangled argument, namely, that the same thing cannot both cause and undergo the same motion in the same respect, as argued in Physics 7–8 and pertinently mentioned by Philoponus in his comments on the passage paraphrased here (167.30–33).

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ἔσται ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ κινοῦν τε ἅμα καὶ κινούμενον ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην Ξενο37 κράτειον δόξαν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ κινοῦν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μόνον. ἄλλως τέ φησι· πῶς ἂν

εἶεν αἱ μονάδες ἡ ψυχή; τίνι γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων μονάδων; ἀνάγκη γὰρ αὐτὰς διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων μονάδων, ἐπεί, εἰ μὴ διέφερον, ἐκ πασῶν ἂν μονάδων συνίστατο ἡ ψυχή, ὅπερ οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι ἀληθὲς οἱ ταῦτα ὑποτιθέμενοι. τίνι οὖν τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσι μονάδων; οὐδενὶ πάντως ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ θέσιν ἔχειν· θέσιν γὰρ ἔχει, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, ἐν τῷ σώματι πάντως ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν συνισταμένη ψυχή, ὥστε στιγμαὶ ἂν εἶεν, ὡς καὶ ἤδη πρότερον εἴρηται. ἢ οὖν ἕτεραί εἰσι παρὰ τὰς τοῦ σωματικοῦ μεγέθους ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ στιγμάς, ἢ αἱ αὐταί· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕτεραί εἰσι, τὴν θέσιν ἔοικεν ἑκάστη ἔχειν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τοῦ σώματος στιγμῇ, ὡς ἀμερὴς ἐν ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ. καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ πάντως μὴ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ σωματικὸν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὸ ἄτομα καὶ τὰς στιγμάς· ἀποδέδεικται γὰρ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει μὴ συγκεῖσθαι τὸ μέγεθος 38 ἐξ ἀμερῶν σημείων, εἴτουν στιγμῶν. καὶ μὴν πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι φησίν· εἰ δύο ἅμα ἄτομα καὶ ἀμερῆ (ὡς αὐτὴ ἡ μοναδικὴ στιγμὴ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ σωματικῇ στιγμῇ), τί κωλύει καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ ἄπειρα ἀδιαίρετα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἅμα, φησί; τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀδιαιρέτου ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ἀδιαίρετος τόπος καὶ παμπλείστων ἂν εἴη ἀδιαιρέτων, ἐπεὶ μηδεμία χρεία τοπικοῦ μεγέθους ἐνταῦθα, κἂν εἰ πάνυ τοι πλεῖστα τὰ ἀδιαίρετα προστιθῆται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀμερεῖ τόπῳ (κοινῶς οὕτω καλῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκριβούμενος τὴν στιγμὴν τόπον), ὥστε εἰκὸς ἂν ἴσως εἴη ἐν ἑνὶ σημείῳ σωματικῷ καὶ στιγμῇ τὸ ὅλον ἔμ39 ψυχον εἶναι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω τὰ ἄτοπα, εἰ ἕτεραι αἱ μοναδικαὶ στιγμαὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι παρὰ τὰς τοῦ σώματος στιγμάς· εἰ δὲ αἱ αὐταί, ἤγουν εἰ αἱ σωματικαὶ

2 φησι ] φησὶν A 5 αὐτοὶ (ut vid.) M1pc (ex αὐτὸ) 11 τὸ³ delere velim 15 φησί post ἀδιαιρέτων v. 16 collocare velim 17 μηδεμία ] μὴ δὲ Mtext : μία M1sl : μὴ δὲ μία A 2–13 409a 18–23

13–78.3 409a 23–28

12–13 ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : cf. Ph. 6.1, 231a 21–232a 22 (ubi tamen vocem «σημεῖον» non usurpat Arist.)

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number which causes motion and at the same time is moved, in accordance with the Xenocratic view, but only that part of this number which causes motion. Besides, he 37 says, how are the monads supposed to be the soul? In what respect are they different from the other monads? For it is necessary that they should be different from the other monads, since, if they had not been different, the soul would have been constructed from all the monads, something which even those who propose this view themselves would not claim to be true. So in what respect are they different from the other monads? In absolutely no other respect than that of having a position. For it is clear that under all circumstances the soul that is constructed from them has a position in the body, with the consequence that they must be points, as already mentioned above. Either, then, they are other points besides the ones belonging to the bodily magnitude in which the soul inheres, or the same ones. And if they are other ones, they are likely to have their respective positions in the respective points of the body, each of them as a partless point in a partless place. It inevitably follows that it is not the bodily magnitude as a whole that constitutes the ensouled creature, but the indivisible items, or the points, in it. For it has been demonstrated in the Physics that a magnitude does not consist of partless marks, that is, points. Moreover, in addition to this 38 he further says: if there is a concurrence of two indivisible and partless things (such as a monadic point of the soul-number in a bodily point), what prevents the concurrence also of a vast, indeed infinite, number of indivisible things in the same place? For one and the same indivisible place that belongs to one indivisible thing will also belong to an enormous number of indivisible things, he says, since there is no need for spatial magnitude in this case, even if it should be a very large number of indivisible things that are added in the same partless place (thus calling the point by the common but not accurately used term “place”), the consequence being, presumably, that the whole ensouled creature is likely to exist in a single bodily mark or point. These, then, 39 are the absurdities that follow if the monadic points of the soul-number are other ones besides the points that belong to the body. But if they are the same, that is, if these

12–17 cf. Prisc. 64.24–28 (who does not, however, refer to the Physics). 24–25 cf. Prisc. 64.33–34 (referring to tópos in 409a 24; Phlp. 170.13–14 makes a similar remark about the term “space”, chōra, used in 409a 23). 25–26 the consequence drawn here may be a garbled paraphrase of Phlp. 170.22 (the animal will be ensouled in virtue of one point of its body) or Prisc. 64.34 (only the bodily mark will be ensouled). 15 that constitutes the ensouled creature: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “that is ensouled”. 22 he says: in the transmitted text this verb of saying is actually placed last in the preceding sentence, where it seems unusually inappropriate, whereas with this sentence a verb of saying is needed to tie up the nominative participle in the parenthesis.

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στιγμαὶ αὗταί εἰσιν ὁ τῶν μονάδων ἀριθμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς, διατί καὶ πάντα σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, στιγμὰς ἀπείρους πάντως ἔχοντα, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἔμψυχα; τίς γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ τὸ 40 κωλύον εἰς τοῦτο; ἔτι δέ φησι· πῶς δὲ ἄρα καὶ νοοῖντο, ὡς τοῦτο καθόλου πᾶσι δοκεῖ, V128r χωρισταὶ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ ψυχαί; οὐ γάρ εἰσι χωρισταὶ τῶν | γραμμῶν αἱ στιγμαί, οὐδὲ αἱ γραμμαὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπίπεδα τῶν στερεῶν, οὐδὲ τέμνονται αὐτῶν, ὅτι μηδὲ μέρη εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν. * *

*

2 ἡ om. M A 3 φησι ] φησὶν M A || δὲ M1sl || νοοῖντο ] ἄν addere velim 4 τῶν σωμάτων αἱ ψυχαί ] αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν σωμάτων M A || εἰσι ] εἰσιν M 6 μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. || εἰσὶν αὐτῶν transp. A 3–6 409a 28–30

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bodily points make up the soul-number consisting of monads, why is it that not all bodies and magnitudes, which undeniably have an infinite number of points, are ensouled? For what is the difference, and what is there to prevent this being the case? He further says: how, in that case, are souls to be conceived to be separable from their 40 bodies, as everyone unanimously thinks is the case? For points are not separable from lines, nor lines from planes, nor planes from solids, and nor can they be severed from them, since they are not parts of them but their limits. * *

*

4–7 cf. Prisc. 65.5–12 (who does not say that everyone thinks that souls are separable from their bodies, but that the advocates of the theory that the soul is a number do).

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5 Συμβαίνει δέ, φησί, τοῖς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν λέγουσι τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀτόπῳ ἐνέχεσθαι τοῖς λέγουσι σῶμα λεπτότατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι πάλιν λέγειν παρ’ αὐτούς, καὶ μᾶλλον συμφωνεῖν Δημοκρίτῳ, ὡς καὶ προεί2 ρηται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ λεπτότερον σῶμα φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ἂν διὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν διεισδύνῃ καὶ ἐμψυχοῖ αὐτά, ἐνέχονται ἀτόπῳ αὐτόθεν τῷ λέγειν δύο σώματα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, ὅπερ καθόλου ἀπηγόρευται καὶ προδήλως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. καὶ ἔοικέ πως τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ τὸ λέγειν ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς στιγμαῖς ἐνεῖναι ἅμα ἐν ταυτῷ καὶ τὰς μοναδικὰς στιγμὰς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἴσως γε καὶ ἀπείρους, ὡς 3 εἴρηται. ἴδιον δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα τοῖς λέγουσιν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦντα ἑαυτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ λέγειν ταύτην ἀριθμὸν μονάδων κινοῦντά τε οὕτω καὶ κινούμενον. καὶ ἔοικε τοῦτ’ αὖθις ταῖς τοῦ Δημοκρίτου ἀτόμοις σφαίραις, ὑφ’ ὧν ἐκεῖνος τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκίνει· τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαιρικὰ ἄτομα λέγειν κινοῦντα τε καὶ κινούμενα ἢ μονάδας – μέγεθος ἐχούσας ἢ ἀμεγέθεις – ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι κινούσας; 4

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Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἀπελέγξαι πολυτρόπως οὕτω τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης Ξενοκρατείου δόξης περὶ ψυχῆς – ὡς ἀριθμός ἐστι κινῶν ἑαυτὸν ἡ ψυχή – ἔτι δῆλον εἶναί φησιν ὅσον ἔχει τὸ ἄτοπον ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος (ὅτι μὴ μόνον οὐκ ἔστι χαρακτηριστικὸς ὅρος τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ συμβεβηκότων δηλωτικός), εἴ τις ἐπιβλέψει εἰς τὰ πάθη αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, φόβους, λύπας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη τι τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν; τοῦτο, φησίν, οὐδ’ ἐκ μαντείας ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο κατανοῆσαι, παντάπασι γελοῖον καὶ ἄτοπον ὄν. Ὅτι, τριῶν προτεθέντων ἃ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἔδοξεν (ὅτι τε κινητικώτατον ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ὅτι λεπτότατον σῶμα, καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων, ἵνα τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὰ ὅμοια καταλαμβάνῃ πάντα), τὰ μὲν δύο φησὶν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν ἱκανοὺς ἐλέγχους λαβεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ εἰσιν, οἷον τὸ εἶναι κινητικώτατον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι λεπτὸν

1 φησί ] φησιν A 5 ἐμψυχοῖ correxi : ἐμψυχῆ codd. 8 ταυτῷ ] ταὐτῷ M 10 ἀριθμὸν M1pc (ut vid. ex ἀριθμῶν) 12 ἐκίνει ut vid. M1pc (‑ί‑) 14 Ξενοκρατείου ut vid. A1pc (ξ‑) 16 οὐκ om. A 17 ἐπ’ αὐτῇ non legitur in V 24–82.1 λεπτὸν αὐτὴν transp. M A 1–13 409a 31–b 11

14–20 409b 11–18 21–82.1 409b 19–23

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Those who argue for the view described above, he says, turn out to be in one respect saying the same thing and being committed to the same absurdity as those who argue that the soul is an exceedingly fine-grained body, but in another respect saying yet another thing over and above what those thinkers say, and rather being in agreement with Democritus, as has also been stated previously. For those who maintained 2 that the soul is a more fine-grained body, so that it can penetrate through all the parts of the body and animate them, are immediately committed to the absurdity of saying that two bodies occupy the same place, something which is absolutely not permitted and plainly impossible. And, in a way, to say that the monadic points of the soulnumber, and possibly even infinitely many of these, as mentioned, also concurrently occupy the same place in the bodily points, is similar to that statement. But this – that 3 the soul is a number consisting of monads, which causes and undergoes motion in this way – is a different statement over and above the previous ones, which is unique to those who argue that the soul is a number that moves itself. And this, in turn, is comparable to Democritus’ indivisible spheres, by means of which that man tried to set the soul in motion. For what is the difference between speaking of (a) spherical indivisibles that cause and undergo motion and (b) monads – whether they have magnitude or lack it – which in the same way cause motion in the course of being moved? [Note] that, after having thus refuted in multiple ways the details of the above- 4 described Xenocratic view about soul (that the soul is a number that moves itself), he goes on to say that it is obvious how much absurdity this kind of statement entails (that it is not only not a definition fit to characterize the essence of the soul but is not even indicative of its attributes), if one takes into consideration its affections and activities: for instance, calculations, perceptions, fears, pains and the like. For how is any of these supposed to be a number that moves itself? This, he says, one would not be able to figure out even with the help of divination, since it is so completely ridiculous and absurd. [Note] that of three views held by the ancient thinkers that are up for discussion 5 ([a]) that the soul is what is eminently capable of causing motion; [b] that it is an eminently fine-grained body; and [c] that it consists of the primary elements of the things that exist, so that it may comprehend all similar things by virtue of its similarity [to them]), two, he says, have received sufficient criticism in the preceding chapters [to show] that they are not true, namely, (a) that the soul is what is eminently capable of

1–11 cf. Phlp. 172.4–13. 11–18 cf. Them. 32.7–11.

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ται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων. ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ διατοῦτο ἡ σύστασις καὶ οὐσία αὐτῇ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν, ἵνα τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον καταλαμβάνηται, μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ πρώτων στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων οὐσιοῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν συντιθεμένων, ἀπείρων ὄντων· εἰ δὲ μή, μόνα τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεῖα νοήσει, τὰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετα οὐκέτι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα δι’ ὁμοιότητα νοεῖν οἵα τε ἔσται ἡ ψυχή, ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων συνίστασθαι ταύτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν καθ’ οὓς ἕκαστον τῶν συνθέτων διαφόρως συντίθεται. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεῖα συντιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκείμενα, ἀλλὰ διάφοροί εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι οἱ προσήκοντες ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν συνθέτων ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων (οἷον σαρκός, ὀστοῦ, λίθου, φυτοῦ, ζῴου ὁτουοῦν). καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ῥῆσιν προφέρει τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δηλοποιοῦσαν τοὺς λόγους τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύστασίς ἐστι τοῦ ὀστοῦ. ἄλλον γὰρ τίθεται ἡ ῥῆσις αὕτη τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἄλλον τῆς γῆς καὶ ἄλλον τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ ἄλλον τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἴσους ἀριθμοὺς ἁπάντων, ὥστε εἰ πάντα γνωριεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ὁμοιότητι, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐ μόνα χρὴ παραλαμβάνειν τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεῖα εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς δι’ ὧν ἕκαστα τῶν συνθέτων ἐκ τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν στοιχείων συνίσταται καὶ οὐσιοῦται, ἵνα κἀντεῦθεν τῇ ὁμοιότητι τῶν λόγων γνωρίζῃ τὰ ὅμοια, ἤτοι τοὺς λόγους αὐτοὺς τῶν συνθέτων καὶ αὐτά γε μὴν τὰ σύνθετα. εἰ δὲ μή γε, οὐ γνωριεῖ τὰ σύνθετα· καὶ τί ἂν εἴη γελοιότερον καὶ ἀτοπώτερον τοῦ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσιοῦσθαι οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν συνθέτων αὐτῶν, οἷον σαρκός, ἵππου, λίθου, φυτοῦ, καὶ πάντων γε τῶν ἄλλων, ἀπείρων ὄντων; ἔτι δέ φησιν· εἰ τὰ ὄντα εἰς δέκα γένη ἀνάγεται, ἅτινα καὶ κατηγορίας οἱ φιλόσοφοί φασιν (οἷον τὴν οὐσίαν, τὸ ποσόν, τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὰ λοιπά), πῶς δὴ καὶ ταῦτα γνωριεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τι κοινὸν αὐτῶν στοιχειῶδες πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ ἕκαστόν ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ ὂν ὡς ὁμωνύμως

2 διατοῦτο ] διὰ τοῦτο M 6 οὐκέτι ] οὐκ ἔτι M A 7 ἔσται ] ἐστιν A (fort. recte) 15 εἰ M2pc (ut vid. ex ἡ) || ὁμοιότητι ] ὁμότητι M 17 αὐτοὺς A1pc (ut vid. ex αὐτῆς) 18 κἀντεῦθεν ] κἀνταῦθα malim 21 καὶ ] ἐκ add. M A || συνθέτων A1sl : στοιχείων Aac (exp. A1 ) 1–6 409b 23–31 6–11 409b 31–410a 2

11–22 410a 2–13 22–84.11 410a 13–22

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causing motion and (b) that it is a fine-grained body. Accordingly, it still remains to examine and to refute the third view as well, (c) that the soul is constructed from the primary elements of the things that exist. For if it is for this reason that its structure or substance is derived from the elements, namely, in order that what is similar may be comprehended by virtue of its similarity, it is necessary that the soul’s substance should be derived not only from the simple and primary elements of the things that exist, but also from all the things composed of these, which are infinitely many. Otherwise it will only think of the primary elements but not, in contrast, of the things that are composed of them. For if it is on the basis of similarity that the soul will be able to think of these, too, then it is necessary that it should be constructed not only from the primary elements of the things that exist, but also from the ratios according to which the respective composite things are differently composed. For it is not by being randomly combined that the primary elements produce the things that are composed of them: rather, the ratios that are suitable for each respective thing composed of the elements of the things that exist – for example, flesh, bone, a stone, a plant, any kind of animal – are different. To address this point he cites a passage from Empedocles which makes clear the ratios of the primary elements from which the structure of bone is derived. For this passage does not posit the same or equal amounts of fire, earth, water and air, respectively, but different amounts of all of them, so that, if the soul is to know all things by virtue of its similarity [to them], as stated, it needs to incorporate not only the primary elements into its substance, but also the ratios in accordance with which the several things that are composed of the primary and simple elements are constructed and made into a substance, in order that, in this case, too, it may know, by virtue of the similarity of the ratios, the things that are similar, that is, the ratios of the composite things and, indeed, the composite things themselves. Otherwise it is not going to know the composite things. And what could be more ridiculous and absurd than saying that the soul derives its substance not only from the elements of the things that exist, but also from the composite things themselves, such as flesh, horse, stone, plant, and indeed all the other things, which are infinitely many? He further says: if the things that exist are subsumed under ten genera, which the philosophers also call “categories” (namely, substance, quantity, quality and the rest), how then is it going to know these? For there is not any element-like primary thing common to them all, of which each of them consists. For “being” is said of them all as an ambigu-

32–85.1 cf. Phlp. 179.13–15. 23 in this case: this translates the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus; the transmitted text would have to be translated “for this reason”.

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ἢ ἐκ μόνων τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων τῆς οὐσίας φαίη τις ἂν συνίστασθαι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ταύτην μόνον γνωριεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα οὐδαμῶς (οἷον ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι καὶ τὰ λοιπά), ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν ἐννέα – εἴ γε δοίημεν ἐπὶ πάντων | εἶναι στοιχεῖα πρῶτα ἐξ ὧν αὐτὰ συνίσταται· τίνα γὰρ ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖα τῶν πρός τι ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ τοῦ κεῖσθαι; ἄλλως τε, εἰ δοίημεν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτῶν – ὡς ἐχόντων αὐτῶν στοιχεῖα – τὴν ψυχὴν συνίστασθαι, πολλὰ ἂν εἴη ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδ’ οὐσία μόνον. εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων τυχὸν τοῦ ποσοῦ συνίσταται (σημείου τυχὸν ἢ γραμμῆς), ποσὸν ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσία, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν λοιπῶν γενῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, οὐσία ἡ ψυχή, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ τἄλλ’ ἅπαντα. ἔτι δέ φησιν ἄτοπον ὅτι φασὶν οἱ αὐτοὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ πάντως πάσχει, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. τοῦτο δὲ φάσκοντες οὕτω – καὶ ἀληθῶς φάσκοντες – φασὶν ἔπειτα ὡς τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γινώσκεται καὶ ὅτι ἐναντίον τὸ ποιοῦν τῷ πάσχοντι, καὶ ἐναντιολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς. τὸ γὰρ γινῶσκον ὑπὸ τοῦ γνωστοῦ τρόπον τινὰ παθητόν ἐστι· διατίθησι γάρ πως τὸ γνωστὸν αὐτὸ τὸ γινῶσκον, ὥστε ποιεῖ τὸ γνωστὸν εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ γινῶσκον· πᾶν δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ μὴ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ, ὡς αὐτοί φασι. πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς οἷς ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐνέχεται καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ μάλιστα τῆς γῆς μετέχοντα – οἷον ὀστᾶ, νεῦρα, τρίχες – οὐδόλως αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ· ἔδει δὲ εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα πάντως τῶν ὁμοίων αἰσθητικά. καὶ μὴν εἰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ διατοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ σύστασις τῇ ψυχῇ, πλείονος ἀγνοίας ἂν εἴη αἴτιον ἑκάστη ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα ἢ γνώσεως· ἑκάστη γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα εἰς τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἑνὸς μόνου τοῦ ὁμοίου αὐτῇ ἐμποιεῖ γνωστικὴν δύναμιν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ ἅπαντα παρ’ αὐτὴν ἀγνοεῖν αἰτία, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχειν τὸ ἐκ μιᾶς ἑκάστης ἀρχῆς δύναμιν καθόλου γνωστικὴν ἁπάντων. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἄτοπον Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ, τῷ προελομένῳ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι τὸν σφαῖρον, ὃν αὐτὸς ὑποτίθεται θεόν, ἐκ φιλίας συγκεῖσθαι λέγων, ἀγνοεῖν ἀναγκαῖον πάντως τὸ νεῖκος, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ σύν-

3 οἷον ] τὸ (ut vid.) add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 5 εἶναι ] add. τὰ V 8 συνίσταται A1pc (ex συνίστασθαι) 9 εἴη μᾶλλον transp. M A 10 ἔστιν ] ἔσται malim 11 τὸ supplevi 13 οὕτω – καὶ ἀληθῶς ] καὶ ἀληθῶς οὕτως Mtext (ordinem ut in A litteris β α indicat M1sl ) : καὶ οὕτως ἀληθῶς A (fort. recte) 22 ἐνοῦσα¹ ] ἑνοῦσα (ut vid.) V || ἀρχὴ ἐνοῦσα ] transp. M || ἐνοῦσα² ] ενοῦσα (sine spiritu) V 24 αἰτία ] αἴτια M A 25 ἄλλο ] ἄλλον A 26 ὅτι ] καὶ add. A 11–18 410a 23–26

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ous predicate, not as a common and universal genus. Accordingly, one could either say that the soul is constructed from the primary elements of substance only, the consequence being that it will only know substance, not at all the other genera (namely, quantity, quality, relative and the rest), or [that it is constructed] from the elements of all the other nine genera, too – in so far as we grant that there exist, for all genera, primary elements from which they are constructed: for what would be the elements of relatives or of acting, being affected or having a position? Besides, if we grant that the soul is constructed from their elements (supposing they have elements), the soul will be many things rather than one, and not only a substance. For if it is constructed, for instance, from the elements of quantity (from the point, for instance, or the line), it will be a quantity rather than a substance; and the same applies in the case of each of the other genera, so that the soul is not, as everybody thinks, a substance, no more so than it is all the other genera, too. He further says that it is absurd for the same thinkers to claim that a thing is in no way acted upon by what is similar, but rather by its contrary; for what is hot is not in any way acted upon by what is hot, but rather by what is cold. But in spite of making this claim – which is a true claim – they proceed to say that like is known by like and that what acts is contrary to what is acted upon, and thus contradict themselves. For the subject of cognition is in a certain sense acted upon by the object of cognition. For the object of cognition modifies the subject of cognition somehow, and consequently the object of cognition acts upon the subject of cognition. But everything that acts acts upon what is contrary and not similar to it, as they themselves say. In addition to the many other [absurdities] entailed by the account set out above, the following may also be adduced: that those things that especially partake of earth – for example, bones, sinews and hair – do not seem to have sense perception at all; yet these things, too, should unconditionally have been capable of perceiving things that are similar. Moreover, if sense perception takes place by virtue of similarity, and it is for this reason that the soul derives its structure from the first principles, then each first principle present in it will be the cause of more ignorance than knowledge, for each first principle present in it creates a cognitive capacity in its structure only for the unique object that is similar to that first principle, and is a cause of ignorance of all other objects apart from that first principle, the result being that what is derived from a unique individual first principle does not have a universal capacity for knowing all things. But Empedocles, the thinker who favoured this view, is also faced with another absurd consequence: since he says that the Sphere, which he himself supposes to be a god, is composed of Love, it is absolutely necessary for it to be ignorant of Strife, and moreover to be ignorant even of the composite things. For the Sphere, which alone is constructed from the elements and Love, is able

1–13 cf. Phlp. 178.22–179.7. 34.13–17.

13–22 cf. Phlp. 179.29–180.6.

33–87.5 cf. Phlp. 181.23–182.5; Them.

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θετα ἀγνοεῖν· ὁ γὰρ σφαῖρος, μόνος ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῆς φιλίας συνεστώς, αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια νοεῖν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα ἕκαστα, ἔκ τε τῶν στοιχείων συνελθόντων καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τοῦ νείκους συνεστῶτα, πάντων ἐστὶ γνωστικά· ὥστ’ ἀκολουθεῖ γε, ὡς εἴρηται, μόνον τὸν σφαῖρον ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι πάντων, | πάντων πάντα νοούντων ὡς ἐκ πάντων συνεστώτων, αὐτοῦ δὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἀγνοοῦντος. καὶ μὴν ἔτι τί κωλύει, φησίν, ἐκ τῶν ὑποτιθεμένων – εἰ πάντα τὰ ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶ γνωστικά, καὶ διατοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων συνίσταται – καὶ τὸν λίθον καὶ τἄλλ’ ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα γνωστικὰ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχειν; πάντα γὰρ ἢ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σύγκειται ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν, ὥστ’ εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ταῦτ’ ἔμψυχα εἶναι καὶ αἰσθητικὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἤτοι ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν. καὶ ἔτ’ αὖθις εἰς τοῦτο ἐπιχειρῶν φησιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἔοικεν εἶναι κατὰ τοὺς οὕτω λέγοντας καὶ ὑποτιθεμένους ὕλη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ εἶναι ὡς εἶδος ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑνοποιοῦν ταῦτα· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν κρεῖττον καὶ προτιμότερον τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ ἀορίστων, καὶ πρῶτον κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἕνεκά του· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὰ στοιχεῖα δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕνεκά του. ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη ἑνοποιὸν καὶ κυριώτερον καὶ πρῶτον κατὰ φύσιν (καὶ μάλισθ’ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ κυριώτερον καὶ ἑνοποιοῦν πρῶτον)· ὥστε κατὰ φύσιν ὕστερα μᾶλλον τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρῶτα. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοί γέ φασι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, κἀντεῦθεν πρῶτα ταῦτα τίθενται τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ὅτι πάντες, φησί, κοινῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λέγοντες οἱ πρότερον περὶ αὐτὴν διαλαβόντες καὶ δογματίσαντες, καὶ ὅσοι διὰ τὸ γνωστικὸν ἁπάντων καὶ αἰσθητικόν φασιν αὐτὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων συγκεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅσοι τὸ κινητικώτατον 21 αὐτὴν ἔδοξαν καὶ ὑπέθεντο. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι· οὐ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἐν ἁπάσαις ψυχαῖς ἐνυπάρχον ἐντεῦθεν ὁρίζεται καὶ δηλοῦται. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πάντα

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to think of what is similar, while each of the composite things, which are constructed not only from the elements, when these have come together, but also from Love as well as Strife, are able to know all things. So the consequence really is, as stated, that the Sphere alone lacks understanding more than any other thing, since every other thing, being constructed from all things, thinks of all things, while it is ignorant of Strife. Moreover, what prevents [the inference], he says, from the stated suppositions – if all 17 things have the capacity to know similar things, and it is for this reason that the soul is constructed from the elements – that also a stone and all other existing things have the capacity for knowledge and possess a soul? For they all either are elements or are composed of the elements, either of all the elements or of some of them; consequently, it would have been reasonable if these, too, were ensouled and capable of perceiving similar things, that is, either all things or some things. And further, turning to attack 18 the following point, he says that it is likely that the elements, according to those who make these statements and suppositions, are matter in relation to the soul, and that the soul is like a form on top of these and something that unifies them. But something that unifies is always better and more valuable than things that are divided into parts and indeterminate, and is by nature primary, in the way in which that for which something exists is primary relative to that which exists for something. For the form and the end are that for which something exists, but the elements and the matter exist for something. As a consequence, the soul must be a unifying thing, higher in com- 19 mand and by nature primary (especially the intellect, primary among things higher in command and unifying). As a consequence, the elements are by nature secondary rather than primary. But these thinkers, for their part, make the opposite claim that the soul derives from the elements, and hence rank the elements as primary relative to the soul. [Note] that all those, he says, who have previously presented analyses and doc- 20 trines of the soul share the error of not speaking about all soul – both those who maintain that it is composed of the elements, on account of its capacity to know and perceive all things, and those who took the view or supposed that it is what is most prone to cause motion. For these accounts are not about all soul, since they do not result in 21 a definition or indication of any common feature present in all kinds of soul. For one thing, it is clearly not the case that all things that have sense perception also evidence

9–12 cf. Phlp. 182.17–22.

12–23 cf. Phlp. 182.26–183.12.

30–31 since they do not result in a definition or indication : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “since they do not give a definition or indication”.

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τὰ αἰσθανόμενα καὶ κινούμενα φαίνεται· ἔστι γὰρ καί τινα τῶν ζώντων – οἷα τὰ ζωόφυτα – ἀκινητοῦντα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν, ἣν μόνην ἁπασῶν τῶν κινήσεων λέγεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχή· ὥστε οὐ πάσης ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ κινητικόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες διατοῦτο ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ γνωστικόν, ὡς ἂν διὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος πάντων ἀντιλαμβάνηται, οὐδὲ οὗτοι φαίνονται περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λέγοντες· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ φυτά, ἔμψυχα ὄντα, μὴ μόνον οὐ μετέχει τῆς κατὰ φορὰν κινήσεως, ἀλλ’ οὔθ’ ὅλως ἔχει αἴσθησιν· καὶ μὴν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων, αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἔχει διανοητικὴν καὶ γνωστικὴν δύναμιν. εἰ δ’ ἄρα καὶ δοίημεν κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους, φησίν, ὡς πάντα τὰ μετέχοντα αἰσθήσεως | καὶ διανοίας μετέχει καὶ ταυτόν ἐστι νοῦς καὶ αἴσθησις, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἐστὶ πάσης ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ φυτά, ὡς εἴρηται, ἔμψυχα ὄντα, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. ἀλλά γε μὴν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἥτις ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν οὐ καθάπαξ ὅλη τούτου μετείληφε· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ γνωστικὸν ἔχουσα, οὐ πᾶσα καθόλου γνωστική ἐστιν· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἃ μηδαμῶς αἰσθήσεως μετέχει. ὥστε οὐ μόνον οὐ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς κοινόν τι καὶ ἓν λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ μιᾶς ὅλης καὶ ἐντελῶς χαρακτηρίζουσι καὶ ὁρίζονται, ὅσοι τῷ αἰσθητικῷ – εἴτουν γνωστικῷ – καὶ κινητικῷ ταύτην εἰδοποιοῦσι καὶ δηλοποιεῖν πειρῶνται. φησὶ δὲ ὡς ταυτὸ τοῦτο πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφαικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου εἰσιέναι, τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. τοῦτο δὲ πάντως οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐνίοις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναπνέει ταῦτα. ὥστε οὐδ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς κοινὸς λόγος ἐντεῦθεν δηλοῦται. ἔτι φησὶν ὡς εἴπερ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν συνιστᾶν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ὡς ἂν τοῖς ὁμοίοις γινώσκῃ τὰ ὅμοια, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἐκ πάντων συνιστᾶν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἐφ’

5 πάντων scripsi : πάντως codd. 6 δὴ om. M A || μὴ ] οὐ M A (quod exspectaveris, cf. infra v. 15) 15 οὐ² om. M A 16 ἐντελῶς ] ἐντελοῦς malim 18 Ὀρφαικοῖς ] Ὀρφαικῆς M || ἔπεσι ] ἕπεσι V 21–22 ἐντεῦθεν ] fort. legendum ἐνταῦθα 23 γινώσκῃ ] γινώσκει (ut vid.) M 8–17 410b 24–27 18 cf. Orph. Fr. 11

17–22 410b 27–411a 2

22–90.11 411a 2–7

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motion. For there are also some living creatures – for instance, the zoophytes – that are immobile with respect to locomotion, which is of all kinds of motion the only one that the soul is said to initiate. Consequently, the capacity to cause motion is not a special property of all soul. It is the same thing with those who say that the soul is made up of the elements for the stated reason, [that is,] on account of its capacity for sense perception and knowledge, in order that it may apprehend all things by means of its similarity [to them]: these people are evidently not speaking about all soul either. For, to begin with, plants not only fail to share in locomotion, but do not even have sense perception at all, even though they are ensouled. What is more, it is obvious that many animals, which do have sense perception, lack the capacity for reasoning and knowledge. Thus, even if we should grant, in accordance with the Pythagoreans, he says, that all things that share in sense perception also share in reasoning and that intellect and sense capacity are the same thing, even then sense perception does not belong to all soul. For plants, as mentioned, do not have sense perception, although they are ensouled. But what is more, even that soul which does possess the capacities for sense perception and reasoning has not obtained its share of these capacities simply as a whole: for even the human soul, which does possess the capacity for sense perception and knowledge, is not wholly cognitive in its entirety. For it also possesses the capacities for passion and appetite, which have no share at all in sense perception. The upshot is that all those thinkers who attempt to explain the soul and determine its form by reference to its capacity for sense perception – that is, its capacity for knowledge – and its capacity to cause motion not only fail to mention any single common feature pertaining to all soul, but do not even give a characterisation or definition that is applicable to a single soul in its entirety and complete. He says that it is the very same situation with the account in the so-called Orphic verses too. For it states that the soul enters from the whole world when the ensouled creatures breathe, being carried from outside by the winds. But this is absolutely impossible in the case of plants, and in the case of certain animals too, for these creatures do not even breathe. Consequently, in these verses the universal account of all soul is not articulated by them [sc. the Pythagoreans] either. He further says that, supposing it is true that one must construct the soul from the elements in order that it may know similar things by means of similar things, there is no need to construct it from all of them. For what

1–2 cf. Phlp. 184.29–31. 7–9 cf. Phlp. 184.24–25. 11–24 cf. Phlp. 185.34–186.21 (the thinkers referred to anonymously by Aristotle are identified as Pythagoreans by Phlp. ibid. and Prisc. 72.2–3). 11–15 cf. Phlp. 185.34–186.5. 17–19 cf. Phlp. 186.18–20. 24 that is applicable to a single soul in its entirety and complete: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “that is applicable to a single soul in its entirety and integrity”. 32–91.2 For what possesses … its contrary : the Greek sentence, as transmitted in the MSS, is ungrammatical. I have translated the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus: this is also a rather close paraphrase of what Aristotle says in 411a 3–4 (as it should be, since the sentence is in indirect speech).

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ἑκάστης ἐναντιώσεως τὸ ἓν μόνον μέρος ἔχουσαν οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια αὐτῷ γινώσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θάτερον, τὸ ἐναντίον· οἷον ὁ τὸ πῦρ γινώσκων θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας εἴσεται, τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ, καὶ ὁ τὸν θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν ψυχρὰν καὶ ξηρὰν γῆν, καὶ ὁ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ 26 τὸ μέλαν, καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος πᾶν καθόλου καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ στέρησιν. καὶ μᾶλλόν γε, φησίν, ὁ τὸ εἰδοπεποιημένον εἰδὼς καὶ θάτερον οἶδεν ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ αὐτίκα καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν, τὸ μέντοι καμπύλον οὔθ’ ἑαυτὸ τελείως παρέχει γινώσκειν οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ εὐθύ· ἀόριστον γὰρ καὶ πολύτροπον τὸ καμπύλον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μονοειδὲς ὡς αὐτό τε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐναντίον· τὸ δέ γε εὐθύ, ὥσπερ κανών τις, μονοειδές τέ ἐστι καὶ ὡρισμένον, κἀντεῦθεν ὁ τούτου τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀόριστον ἐναντίον αὐτίκα οἶδεν. 27 V130v 28

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Ὅτι, φησί, καὶ ταύτην τινὲς τὴν δόξαν ἔσχον, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ πάντων ἐστὶ καὶ μέμικται πᾶσι· διατοῦτο δή φησι καὶ τὸν Θαλῆν οἴεσθαι πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, ἐμφαίνοντα τὸ διὰ πάντων τῶν ὄντων κεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, αὐτὴν | θεῖον γε ὠς ἀληθῶς οὖσαν. καὶ πρὸς ταύτην δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἀντιλέγων, διὰ τίνα, φησί, τὴν αἰτίαν οὐκ εἰσὶ καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ καθόλου σώματα (πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ τὰ λοιπά), εἴπερ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ζῷα, ἀλλὰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος μάλιστα καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν μεμιγμένα, καὶ ταῦτα βέλτιον ὂν ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς τούτοις καὶ ἀμιγέσι καὶ ἀσυνθέτοις εἶναι τὴν ζωὴν ἢ τοῖς συνθέτοις καὶ ἀορίστοις καὶ πολυειδέσι; καὶ ἔτι ἀπορεῖν ἔστι, φησί, διατί τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴν τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίονα ὑποτίθενται καὶ ἀθανατωτέραν; καὶ ἄλλως δέ, φησίν, ἐνταῦθα συμβαίνει ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὸ ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον ἀπαντᾶν· τό τε γὰρ λέγειν τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ πῦρ ζῷα τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων καὶ προδήλως παραλόγων, τό τε λέγειν ταῦτα ψυχὴν ἔχοντα μὴ εἶναι ζῷα, καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων. τὴν τοιαύτην δὲ δόξαν ὑπέλαβον – τὸ εἶναι δηλονότι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις – ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἐνταῦθα ἀνάγκη εἶναι, φησίν,

1 ἔχουσαν ] ἔχον malim 2 ἀλλὰ A1sl || τὸ³ supplevi 7 τελείως παρέχει transp. M : παρέχειν τελείως A 8 καμπύλον ] καμπῦλον V 9 τε V1pc (ut vid. ex τὸ) 14 κεκρᾶσθαι correxi : κεκράσθαι codd. 15 διὰ τίνα ] διατίνα M A || τὴν² delere volueris, sed cf. 1.3.22; 2.2.15; 3.2.8 || καὶ om. M A 23 δόξαν om. M 24 εἶναι² A1sl 12–15 411a 7–8 15–19 411a 9–11 19–20 411a 11–13 20–23 411a 13–16 23–92.11 411a 16–20

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possesses only one member of each contrary pair is capable of knowing not only that member and those things that are similar to it, but also the other one, its contrary. For instance, someone who knows fire, which is hot and dry, will also know what is its contrary with respect to its qualities, water, which is cold and wet; and someone who knows air, which is hot and wet, will also know earth, which is cold and dry; and someone who knows white [will also know] black; and someone who knows any form in general will also know its privation. And it is rather the case, he says, that someone 26 who knows the [contrary] endowed with form will know the other [contrary] than vice versa. For indeed, by what is straight we immediately also know what is curved. What is curved, in contrast, does not completely allow either itself or its contrary – what is straight – to be known. For what is curved is indeterminate and multiform; it is not uniform in such a way as to let not only itself but also its contrary be known. But what is straight is uniform and determinate, like a kind of rule, and for this reason someone who possesses the scientific knowledge of what is straight immediately also knows every indeterminate contrary that is in violation of it. [Note] that he says that some thinkers also took the following view, namely, that the soul pervades all things and is mixed with all things. It was for this reason, he says, that Thales also believed that all things were filled with gods, thus intimating that the soul, which is itself a truly divine thing, is blended in with all things that exist. Arguing against this view as well, [Aristotle] asks: what is the cause on account of which even the simple and universal bodies (fire, air and the rest), but above all the particular ones, which are mixtures of these, are not animals, if the soul is also present in them, especially considering that it would be better for life to be present in these simple, unmixed and non-composite bodies than in the composite, indeterminate and multiform ones? One may further raise the problem, he says, as to why they suppose that the soul in the air is better and more immortal than the one in animals. But apart from this, he says, the result in this case is that we are faced with absurdity – or irrationality – on both sides: to maintain that air and fire are animals is an utterly absurd and patently irrational thing; but to maintain that these bodies are not animals although they have a soul, that is also an utterly absurd thing. The view just described – that is to say, that the soul is present in all these bodies – was adopted by these thinkers because it is necessary, he says, that the whole in this context should be

3–5 cf. Phlp. 188.6–11 5–6 cf. Phlp. 187.32–188.6 (who is here developing an argument purporting to show that the rule that the knowledge of contraries is one and the same can be extended even to contraries that are not opposed as form and privation, in spite of the reservations about such applications expressed at 187.17–22, where white and black are also used as examples. The same reservations are also expressed by Prisc. 72.24–31). 6–7 cf. Phlp. 187.13–22. 7–9 cf. Phlp. 187.28–32. 9–12 cf. Phlp. 187.7–11. 17 pervades all things: cf. Them. 35.27. 17–20 cf. Phlp. 188.16–18. 23–25 cf. Phlp. 188.31–189.2. 30–93.7 cf. Phlp. 189.18–25.

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ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς μορίοις. καὶ ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐὰν τέμνηται εἰς μόρια, εἰς ὁμοειδῆ τέμνεται (τὰ γὰρ μόρια αὐτῶν ὁμοειδῆ εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ), οὕτως ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμψυχότητος αὐτῶν· καθὼς ἔχει τὰ σώματα τὸ ὁμοιομερὲς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μέρους καταλαμβάνεται καὶ τὸ ὅλον, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὸ μέρος τὸ συντιθέμενον ἐκ τῶν καθολικῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων, εἴπερ ἔμψυχόν ἐστιν, ὁμοιομερὲς ὂν πάντως τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ αὐτὰ παρίστησι καὶ δηλοποιεῖ τὰ ὅλα ἔμψυχα ὄντα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς συνθέτοις ἔμψυχον νοεῖται, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον ἔσται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μόρια τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων συνιόντα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν πάντων τὰ σύνθετα ποιεῖ, οὕτως ἄρ’, ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ψυχῶν ἑκάστων τῶν στοιχείων, συνιόντα καὶ συντιθέμενα, ἔμψυχα ἀπεργάζεται τὰ σύνθετα· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μέρος ἔμψυχον, ὅμοιον δὲ τῷ μέρει τὸ ὅλον, 31 ἔοικεν ἄρ’ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔμψυχον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὸν μὲν ἀέρα σωματικῶς τεμνόμενον εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ ὁμοειδῆ καθορᾶν ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερὴς καὶ ἀνομοειδής ἐστιν, ἐξανάγκης ἕπεται τὸ μέν τι, φησίν, αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷδε τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ ἀέρος (οἷον καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς), τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ μορίῳ τοῦ ἀέρος (ἤτοι τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν αὐτῆς δια32 φόρων εἰδῶν). ὥστε φανερόν, φησίν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ V131r ὁμοειδῆ πᾶσαν εἶναι – ὅπερ προδήλως οὐκ ἀληθές· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ φυτικὸν τῆς | ψυχῆς καὶ ἄλλο τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τἄλλα – ἤ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν μέν – μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ὅλης τόδε μὲν τὸ εἶδος – εἶναι ἐν τῷδε τῷ συνθέτῳ καὶ μερικῷ, ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι, ὥστε οὐχ ἁπλῶς καὶ ὁμοίως πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἔμψυχα καὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν ψυχήν. 33

Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἀπελέγξαι ὡς οὔτε τὸ κινητικόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ διὰ τὸ συνίστασθαι ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ὡς ἂν τοῖς ὁμοίοις γινώσκῃ τὰ ὅ-

6 ἡμῖν ] ὑμῖν A || τοῖς A1sl 7 συνθέτοις A1pc 12 ἀνομοειδής ] ἀνομοιοειδὴς M A 13 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 14 τὸ θυμικὸν A1pc (ut vid. ex τῶ θυμικῶ) 15 ἤτοι ] ἢ M A 21 ἁπλῶς ] ἁπλᾶ M A 22 κινητικόν ] κινητόν malim (cf. Arist. 411a 25–26) 11–16 411a 20–22

16–21 411a 22–23

22–94.10 411a 24–b 3

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of the same kind as the parts. Just as air itself, or water, if divided into portions, is divided into portions of the same kind (for the parts of these are of the same kind as each other and as the whole), so it must also be with regard to its being ensouled: just as the bodies are characterized by homogeneity, and thus the whole can be comprehended from the part, so also, then, if a part composed of the universal simple elements is ensouled, it also suggests and makes clear that the wholes are ensouled, since it is inevitably homogeneous with the wholes. For if the water existing in us composite beings is conceived of as being ensouled, then in the same way the totality of water will be ensouled. For just as the the composite beings are produced from all the portions of the simple bodies, when these come together, so also, one might reasonably infer, the composite beings are rendered ensouled by the portions of the souls of the respective elements, when these come together and are combined. For if the part is ensouled, and the whole is similar to the part, it is a reasonable inference that the whole, too, is ensouled. However, if the air can be observed to be divided corporeally into homo- 31 geneous parts of the same kind, whereas the soul is not homogeneous and does not have parts of the same kind, it follows of necessity, he says, that one part of the soul (for instance, let us suppose, its passionate or appetitive part) exists in this portion of the air, and another part (whether its rational capacity or its perceptive capacity or any other of its different forms) in another portion of the air. As an obvious conse- 32 quence, he says, it is necessary that either the soul is itself homogeneous and of the same kind in its entirety – which is clearly not true, for the vegetative capacity of the soul is one thing, the perceptive capacity another thing, the rational capacity another thing, and so on – or, failing this, the soul is not in its entirety present in everything that exists, but one soul – or, rather, a certain form of the entire soul – is present in a certain composite and particular thing, and another form, whichever it may be, is present in another thing, the result being that it is not the case that all things that exist are simply and similarly ensouled and have one and the same soul. [Note] that once he has shown (a) that the capacity for motion does not belong 33 to the soul, and (b) that the soul does not have knowledge on account of being con-

7–12 cf. Them. 36.6–9. 17 cf. Phlp. 190.5–6. 18–19 cf. Phlp. 191.4–5. 21–23 cf. Phlp. 191.26–28. 28 the capacity for motion : tò kinētikón usually means “the capacity to cause motion”, and this has been assumed from the beginning of 1.3 to belong to the soul, in so far as it sets the body it ensouls in motion. Consequently, if tò kinētikón is to be retained here, it must be taken – non-standardly, but not unprecedentedly – in the sense of a passive capacity (standardly tò kinētón), or else we have to understand “on account of being constructed from the elements” as a modifier in both (a) and (b) (i.e. “that it is not on account of being constructed from the elements that the capacity to cause motion belongs to the soul and the soul has cognition …”). The main problem with the latter interpretation is that it does not correspond to what Aristotle says in 411a 24–26.

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μοια, ἑξῆς ἔπειτά φησιν ὡς ἐπεὶ διάφορα τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσιν (οἷον τὸ γινώσκειν, φησί, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δοξάζειν, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὄρεξις· ἀλλὰ μήν ἐστιν ὡσαύτως ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι τοῖς ζῴοις, σὺν τούτοις δὲ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις καὶ ἀκμή), πότερον, φησί, ταῦτα πάντα ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ καθ’ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖται, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μόριον αὐτῆς ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν συνισταμένης ἕκαστον τούτων θεωρεῖται (ὡς ἄλλῳ μὲν μορίῳ αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ διανοητικόν, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν), καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῇ πάσῃ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐνεργοῦμεν ἀμερίστως καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως (καὶ νοοῦμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ τἄλλ’ ἅπαντα 34 ἐνεργοῦμεν); καὶ μὴν ἔτι ζητεῖ ὡς, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ διάφορα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων θεωρεῖται, τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑνί ἐστι τούτων, καὶ τί τοῦτο, ἢ ἐν πλείοσίν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἢ ἄλλο τι πάλιν μόριόν ἐστιν αἴτιον αὐτοῦ, ἐν ᾧ δηλονότι θεωρεῖται αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ διαπορῆσαι ταῦτά φησιν ὡς λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν μεριστὴν καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν αὐτῆς μορίῳ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ νοεῖν, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος αὐτὸ τοῦτο βούλεται, τὸ μὲν ἐννοεῖν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τιθείς, τὸ δὲ 36 θυμοῦσθαι ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐν τῷ ἥπατι. ἀντιλέγων οὖν πρὸς τοῦτό φησιν ὡς εἰ μεριστή ἐστιν οὕτως ἡ ψυχή, τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ συνέχον αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ποιοῦν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσειέ τις εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τὸ ταύτην συνέχον· τοὐναντίον γὰρ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ συνέχει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ δῆλον τοῦτο, ὅτι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης τὸ σῶμα, παραυτίκα διαπνεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ διαρρεῖ καὶ λύεται σηπόμενον. εἰ V131v οὖν ἄλλο τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ | τὸ συνέχον αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχήν, πάλιν ἔστιν ἐκ διαιρέσεως ἐρωτᾶν πότερον κἀκεῖνο μεριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀμέριστον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, διατί μὴ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη αὐτό, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἡ ψυχή, τὸ συνέχον καὶ ἑνοποιοῦν; εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτό ἐστι μεριστόν, πάλιν ἔστι ζητεῖν κἀκεῖνο τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ συνέχον, κἀνταῦθα πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκ διαιρέσεως ἐρωτᾶν εἰ μεριστόν ἐστι κἀκεῖνο ἢ ἀμέριστον· καὶ προχωροίη ἂν 37 τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔτι δέ φησιν· εἰ συνέχει τὸ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή (ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐρρέθη ὅτι

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1 εἴδη ] ἔργα malim (cf. infra v. 10) 8 ἄλλῳ¹ (ut vid.) M1pc (ex ἄλλως) 19 ἂν supplevi || εἶναι τὸ σῶμα ] τὸ σῶμα εἶναι A || ταύτην om. A 21 ἀπολιπούσης ] ἀπολειπούσης V || διαπνεῖ ] διαπνεῖται exspectaveris (ut Arist. 411b 9); habent tamen διαπνεῖ τε nonnulli codd. Arist. et Sophon. 37.31 22 αὐτὴν ] αὐτοῦ M : αὐτὸ (ut vid.) A1pc (ex αὐτὴν) 27 πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V 10–13 411b 3–5 14–17 411b 5–6

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structed from the elements, in order to know like by like, he next proceeds to say that since there are different forms and affections of the soul (such as knowing, he says, perceiving, having opinions, and further having appetites, wishing, and in general desire; but, again, motion with respect to place is likewise also imparted to animals by their soul; and together with these growth, decline and maturity), [one may ask,] he says, whether (1) all of these individually take place in the soul as a whole, and they are all manifested in the soul as an entity with a single substance, or (2) each of them is manifested in a different part of the soul as an entity constructed from multiple parts (so that the capacity for reasoning belongs to one part of it, the perceptive capacity to another part, and each given capacity to a different part), and we do not perform all these activities – thinking and perceiving and all the other activities we perform – en masse in an unpartitioned and undivided manner in the soul as a whole? Further, 34 he also inquires whether, if all the individual [activities] mentioned are thus manifested in different parts of the soul, (i) life itself resides in one of these, and [in that case] which part this is, or (ii) it resides in several or in all the parts mentioned, or (iii) there is, again, some other part that is its cause, that is to say, in which life itself is manifested. [Note] that, once he has gone through these problems, he says that some thinkers 35 claim that the soul is divisible into parts and possesses the capacity for thinking by virtue of one of its parts and the capacity for having appetite by virtue of another one. Indeed, this is exactly what Timaeus is suggesting, too, when he locates thinking in the brain, being impassioned in the heart and having appetite in the liver. Arguing against 36 this claim, then, [Aristotle] says that if the soul is thus divisible into parts, what can it be that keeps it together and renders it numerically one? For surely no one will say that it is the body that keeps it together. For it is rather the other way around: it is the soul that keeps the body together. This is obvious, since, when the soul has left the body, the latter immediately begins to be gasified, liquefied and decomposed by rotting. If, then, it is something else that keeps the soul together, it should again be asked, on the basis of a division, whether this thing, too, is divisible into parts or indivisible. And if it is indivisible, why would the soul not rather be that thing, whatever it is, that keeps together and unifies? But if it is also divisible into parts, it should again be inquired what it is that keeps it, too, together, and in this case, too, [it should] again be asked, on the basis of a division, whether that thing, too, is divisible into parts or indivisible. And this would proceed ad infinitum. He further says: if the soul keeps the body 37

21–22 cf. Them. 37.4–6; Phlp. 194.29–32; 196.19–21. 2 forms and affections : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “activities and affections”.

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τοῦτο πᾶσι σχεδὸν δοκεῖ), ἐστὶ δὲ μεριστή, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτῆς μορίων ὁτιοῦν πάντως ἓν συνέξει τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὡς ἕν τι τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι, τὸ λέγειν καὶ αὐτὸν ὅτι ἓν ὁτιοῦν μέρος τοῦ σώματος συνέχει μὴ γελοῖον παντάπασιν ᾖ καὶ ἄτοπον ὅλως πλάσαι· τίνα γὰρ φύσιν ἔχει συνέχειν καὶ συνάπτεσθαι ὁ νοῦς σώματι; φαίνεται δὲ ταῦτα λέγων ὁ ’Αριστοτέλης τὸν νοῦν χωριστὸν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος λογιζόμενος· εἰ δὲ χωριστόν, πάντως καὶ ἄφθαρτον. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἦν τῷ λόγῳ σκοπός, ἐλέγξας ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ μεριστή, ἔτι καὶ πραγματικώτερόν πως ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ προδήλων παρίστησι τοῦτο. ὁρᾶν γάρ ἔστι, φησίν, ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἐμψύχοις οὖσιν, ὡς οὐ κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μόριον αὐτῶν τῶν φυτῶν – ἤτοι τὴν ῥίζαν, τὸ στέλεχος, τὸν κλάδον – ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον μόριον τὸ ὅλον εἶδος τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς σῶόν ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ τεμνομένου τοῦ φυτοῦ εἰς πλεῖστα τμήματα καὶ κλάδους, ἕκαστον τμῆμα τὴν ὅλην ἔχει φυτικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὁμοειδές ἐστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τμήμασι καὶ τῷ ἐκ πάντων τῶν τμημάτων ἑνὶ πρότερον συγκειμένῳ ὅλῳ φυτῷ. καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν τμημάτων τοῦ φυτοῦ φυτευθὲν πάσας τὰς τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἐντελῶς ἔχει (καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὁμοίου γεννητικήν), ὥστε ὁμοειδὴς ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν πᾶσι καὶ οὐ μεριστὴ ὡς εἶναι ἄλλο εἶδος αὐτῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ μορίῳ τοῦ φυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. καὶ τῶν ζῴων δὲ τὰ ἔντομα, εἰ τμηθείη εἰς δύο, ἑκάτερον, φησί, τῶν τμημάτων τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς – ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι – καὶ ὁμοειδῆ εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ· ἀλλήλοις μέν, ὅτι, κἂν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τεμνόμενα οὐχ ἕν εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὖν τῷ εἴδει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν εἰσι· καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ δὲ ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερον ὁμοειδές· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ τμήματα καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ τὴν κινητικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διαρκεῖ | ταῦτα ζῶντα, οὐκ ἄλλως, φησί, τοῦτο ἀκολουθεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄργανα ἃ ὑπηρετοῦντα σῴζει τὴν φύσιν, χρειώδη ὄντα, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. καὶ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἔμψυχα, φησί, τὰ φυτὰ δῆλον αὐτόθεν ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ψυχικὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις προδήλως ἔχειν (τὴν θρεπτικήν, τὴν αὐξητικήν καὶ τὴν γεννητικήν). ταύτας γὰρ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχει τὰ φυτὰ παρὰ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ἥτις καὶ ἀρχή τις ἔοικεν εἶναι. καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ ἔμψυχα κατὰ ταύτην τὴν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλήλοις κοινωνεῖ· πάντα γὰρ ταύτην

1 τοῦτο πᾶσι transp. M A 4 παντάπασιν ᾖ ] ἦ παντάπασι M A 8 πως ] πῶς V M || ἔστι, φησίν ] ἐστιν M A 9 οὖσιν ] οὖσι φησὶν M A 10 ῥίζαν ] ῥίξαν M 11 σῶόν ἐστι transp. A 13 ἄλλοις ] ἄλλοι A 20 κἂν ] καὶ add. V 22 τὴν² om. M A 23 ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ] ἐπιπλεῖστον V 28 φυτικὴν ] φυσικὴν A 6–21 411b 19–22 21–22 411b 24–27

22–24 411b 22–24 24–98.7 411b 27–30

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together (as was said a little while ago to be the view of practically everyone), and it is divisible into parts, then each individual part of it will inevitably keep together one of the parts of the body. But seeing that the intellect is also, as it were, one of the parts of the soul, [I fear that] it would be ridiculous in every way and absurd even to imagine saying that it, too, keeps together one part or another of the body. For what sort of natural propensity does the intellect have for keeping together and being conjoined with a body? When saying this, Aristotle is obviously reckoning that the intellect is separable from the body. But if it is separable, it is inevitably also imperishable. Anyway, staying on the original topic of the discussion, once he has shown, on the basis of what has been said, that the soul is not divisible into parts, he proceeds to present his case in, as it were, more empirical terms as well, on the basis of clear and evident facts. For one can see, he says, in plants, which are ensouled, that it is not the case that there are distinct forms of soul in distinct parts of the plants (for instance, the root, the stem and the branch), but, rather, the whole form consisting in the vegetative soul is intact within each individual part. For even if the plant is cut up into a very large number of sections and branches, each section possesses the whole vegetative soul and is of the same kind as the other sections and as the previously existing unified whole plant composed of all the sections. For indeed, each of the sections of the plant, if planted, possesses all the capacities of the vegetative soul completely (the nutritive capacity and the capacity to grow as well as the capacity to produce a similar creature), the consequence being that the soul in all of them is of the same kind, and is not divisible in such a way that there is one form of soul in one part of the plant and another form in another part. Even among animals, if insects are cut into two, each of the segments, he says, possesses the same soul capacities (namely, for sense perception and motion), and these are of the same kind as each other and as the whole: as each other because, even though they are not numerically one (on account of being cut up), they are still one and the same in respect of the form of soul; and in the same way each segment is of the same kind as the whole, for just as the erstwhile whole possessed both the capacity for sense perception and that for motion, so do its segments. But if these [divided insects] do not continue to live for very long, this, he says, follows for no other reason than because they lack organs that could assist in preserving their nature, being, as they are, of necessity deficient. Moreover, that plants are also ensouled, he says, is immediately clear from the fact that they manifestly possess the aforementioned soul capacities (the ones for nourishment, growth and reproduction). For plants possess these capacities as a result of having a soul, in fact one that appears to be a kind of first principle. In fact all ensouled creatures are mutually associated by virtue of this

7–8 cf. Phlp. 199.33–200.1. 9–11 cf. Phlp. 200.8–9. 11–27 cf. Them. 37.36–38.6. 32–99.1 cf. Them. 38.22–24.

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ἔχει κοινήν· καὶ χωριστὴ μέν ἐστιν αὐτὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς (τὸ γὰρ θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν καὶ γεννητικὸν εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φυτοῖς), τὰ δ’ ἄλλα γε εἴδη τῆς ψυχῆς – ἤτοι τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ λογικόν – οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως 42 ἄνευ τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἔμψυχα καὶ τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὴν φυτικὴν ἀχώριστον ἔχει ψυχὴν καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας κατ’ αὐτὴν τρεῖς δυνάμεις. ὥστε, ὅπου τὸ φυτικὸν εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἄλλα εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη· ὅπου δὲ τἄλλα ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ πρῶτον εἰρημένον εἶδος τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς.

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vegetative soul, for they all have this soul in common. And while it can exist separately by itself in the plants (for the nutritive, augmentative and reproductive form of soul exists separately in the plants), the other forms of soul – that is, the perceptive and the rational capacities – cannot exist at all without the vegetative soul. For indeed, both 42 those ensouled creatures that have sense perception and those that are rational also possess, as something inseparable, the vegetative soul and the three aforementioned capacities within its ambit. The result is that where the vegetative form of soul exists, it is not necessary for the other forms of soul also to exist, but where the other forms exist it is impossible that the first‐mentioned form, that consisting in the vegetative soul, should not also exist.

Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων 1 V132r Ὅτι, ἐναρχόμενος τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου τοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς, ἐν προοιμίοις εὐθὺς λέγει ὅτι

τὰ δεδογμένα περὶ αὐτῆς τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ διεξῆλθεν ἐν τῷ προλαβόντι βιβλίῳ, ἃ καὶ μὴ μόνον διελέγχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν οἷς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ εὐστοχεῖ ἀλλ’ ἔξω ταύτης φέρεται, ἀλλά γε μὴν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐρανίζεται ἃ τῷ προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖς συλλογίσασθαι ἔξεστιν, οἷον ὅτι ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχή, ὅτι οὐσία, ὅτι μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ πολλαὶ ὡς μερισταὶ θεωρούμεναι, ὅτι τινὰ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη χωριστὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων καὶ οὐ συνδέδεται αὐτοῖς οὕτως ὥστε μὴ χωρίζεσθαι καθ’ αὑτὰ εἰς τὰς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας, ὥσπερ ἔχει ὁ νοῦς, σὺν τούτοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλα 2 τινὰ νοούμενα σὺν αὐτοῖς, ἃ καὶ καθαρώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς κατὰ καιρὸν ἐρεῖ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αὐτοῦ βιβλίῳ. νῦν γε μὴν μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνων ἔλεγχον προτίθεται, περὶ πάσης ἀκριβέστατα καὶ ἐντελέστατα ψυχῆς – οὐ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐδ’ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν – ἔχων τὸν σκοπόν, διορίσασθαι τί ἐστι καὶ δηλοποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι κοινόν τι καθόλου πάσης ψυχῆς γνωριστικὸν εἶδος, ὃ δῆτα ἀπέδειξε μηδένα ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου V132v βιβλίῳ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ συνιδεῖν | τε καὶ συλλογίσασθαι, ὡς ἄρα γε ἔδει. [3] καὶ τοίνυν καθιστὰς εἰς ἀρχὴν προσήκουσαν τὸν περὶ τούτου λόγον φησὶν ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχή, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐσία ἐστίν, ὃ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι γενῶν ἕν ἐστιν· ἀπέδειξε γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ μήτε ποσὸν συνεχὲς οὖσαν τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἔλεγε, μήτε ποσὸν διωρισμένον (εἴτουν ἀριθμόν), ὡς ὁ Ξενοκράτης, μήτε ποιόν, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀλλότρια τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς ἀληθείας, αὐτὴν δὲ 4 οὖσαν οὐσίαν. τῆς οὐσίας δέ, φησί, κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους θεωρουμένης (ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει τὰ περὶ τούτων ἠκριβώσατο καὶ διεξῆλθεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ὕλη, ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ γινόμενον εἶδος, καὶ τρίτον ἔστι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συντιθέμενον, ἔκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους), ἡ μὲν ὕλη λέγοιτ’ ἂν ὡς δύναμις μόνον οὖσα καὶ οὐ τόδε τι (ἤτοι ὡρι-

i titulum rubro scriptum habent V M : om. A 10 οὖν om. V || ἐκείνων ] ἐκεῖνον M 12 ἔχων ] ἔχον M || ἀποδεῖξαι ] ὑποδεῖξαι malim 18 ὁ om. A 19 αὐτὴν ἁρμονίαν transp. M A 20 φησί A1sl 21 τούτων ] τούτου M 1–9 412a 3–4 9–20 412a 4–6 20–102.6 412a 7–9 20–23 ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : fort. Ph. 2.1–3? https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-003

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[Note] that, as he begins the second book of On the Soul, he immediately in the preface says that he has reviewed his predecessors’ opinions concerning the soul in the preceding book. In it he does not merely expose in what respects these opinions fail to capture the truth but instead fall short of it; on the contrary, he also adopts those among them that are possible to arrive at by reasoning if one applies one’s mind to them: for instance, that the soul is incorporeal; that it is a substance; that in each individual the soul is numerically one and there is not a plurality of souls manifesting themselves as divided; that some forms of the rational soul are possible to separate from the body and its parts, and are not bound up with them in such a way that they cannot attain separate and independent existence for the purpose of their own proper activities, as is the case with the intellect; while, together with these, there are also certain other things that are thought of with the help of [the body and its parts], which he will go on in the following chapters to describe more clearly in due course. So these 2 are the contents of his first book. But now, after his criticism of the earlier thinkers, he focuses his discussion on the soul as a whole – not the human soul or any other specific soul – with as much detail and completeness as possible, and sets out to define what it is, and to uncover and show forth a cognitive form universally shared by all soul, which, as indeed he demonstrated in the preceding book, none of his predecessors has detected and reasoned out, at least not in a proper fashion. Accordingly, he 3 sets his discussion of this subject on an appropriate footing by saying that the soul, as mentioned, is a substance, which is one of the universal genera applying to everything that exists. For he demonstrated in the first book that the soul is neither a continuous quantity, as Plato said, nor a discrete quantity (that is, a number), as Xenocrates said, nor a quality, as some people say, who claim that it is an attunement, but that these views are alien to the truth about soul, since the soul itself is a substance. And 4 substance, he says, is manifested in three types (this is also how these things were discussed and described in detail in the Physics: there is the matter; there is the form which is imposed on it; and thirdly there is that which is composed of both, of matter as well as of form): the matter may be spoken of as being a potentiality only, not an individual “this” (that is, a determinate thing, for in each thing the prime matter on

1–11 cf. Prisc. 81.3–10. 14–19 cf. Them. 38.35–39.3. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 207.26–30. 25–26 cf. Phlp. 207.35–36. 26–27 cf. Them. 39.5–6. 29–103.8 cf. Prisc. 83.25–39, who characteristically speaks of matter as indeterminate, form as determinative and the compound substance as determinate. 30– 103.2 cf. Phlp. 211.1–9, who distinguishes between prime matter, which is potentially any material thing, and proximate matter, which is potentially that specific thing of which it is the proper matter: Metochites collapses the distinction.

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σμένον πρᾶγμα· ἀόριστος γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ἤτοι δυνάμει, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἡ πρώτη ὕλη ἐν ᾗ τὸ εἶδος ἐγγίνεται, ἐννοηματικῶς μόνον καταλαμβανομένη εἶναι), τὸ δέ γε εἶδός ἐστι τόδε τι (ἤτοι ὁριστικὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐνεργοῦν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ εἰδοποιοῦν· καὶ πρῶτον αὐτὸ λέγοιτ’ ἄν, ὡς ἔφην, τόδε τι), κἀντεῦθέν ἐστι καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ αὐτοῦ τόδε τι καὶ αὐτὸ καταστὰν εἰς τὴν φύσιν καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος λαβὸν οὐσιώδη τινὰ ὅρον. αὐτὸ μέντοι τὸ εἶδος καινοπρεπῶς ὀνομάζει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης «ἐντελέχειαν», καθ’ ὃ δηλονότι τελειότητα ἔχει ἡ ὕλη, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἐντελὴς ἕξις τοῦ συνθέτου ἑκάστου πράγματος. τὴν δ’ ἐντελέχειάν φησι διαιρῶν τὴν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὴν ἕξιν αὐτήν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅπως ἂν νοοῖτο, εἴτε ἐνεργοῦσα εἴτε καὶ μή, τὴν δὲ ὡς τὸ ἔργον αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἤτοι τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἀποδεικνύειν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὐτή – εἴτουν ἡ ἐπιστήμη – ἐντελέχεια λέγοιτ’ ἄν, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσά τε καὶ μή, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς – ἤτοι τὸ θεωρεῖν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ τῇ ἕξει – ἐντελέχεια λέγοιτ’ ἄν. ἐρεῖ γε μὴν καὶ ἀποδείξει ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐντελέχειαν καὶ εἶδος ἐπὶ τῷ φυσικῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχήν, καθ’ ἣν αὐτὸ ἑκάστοτε ἕκαστον εἰδοποιεῖται καὶ ὁρίζεται. βούλεται δὲ ταύτην ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι ὡς ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς ἔργον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνεργούσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ ἐνεργούσης ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς σώμασιν ἡ οὐσίωσις τῆς ἐμψυχότητός ἐστιν· ἐν δέ γε τοῖς ἀιδίοις, οἷα βούλονται πάντες οἱ ἐκτὸς φιλόσοφοι τὰ οὐράνια καὶ κατ’ αὐτοὺς θεῖα, | αὐτοενέργειαν ἐν ταυτότητι ἀτρέπτῳ καὶ οὐχ ἕξιν μόνον βούλονται εἶναι τὴν ἐντελέχειαν. ταῦτα δὲ διορισάμενος ἑξῆς ἔπειτά φησιν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγραμμάτων, ὅτι μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐσίαι τὰ σώματα (εἴ τις πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν δηλονότι καὶ φυσικῶς ὡρισμένον ἐνορᾷ), τὰ σώματα δὲ τὰ φυσικά, ἤτοι τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντα, ἃ καὶ ἀρχαί εἰσι, φησί, τῶν ἄλλων. εἴρηται δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν τε μαθηματικῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν· οἱ γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ «οὐσίας» καλοῦσι, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὔτε οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτε σώματα, ὡς ἐκείνοις ἐδόκουν, ἀριθμοὶ καὶ σχήματα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· νοοῦνται δὲ

2 καταλαμβανομένη ] καταλαμβομένη Mtext (‑νο- M1sl ) 3 τῇ ὕλῃ ] ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ malim 6 λαβὸν (ut vid.) V1pc (ex λαβὼν) : λαβὼν M A : λαβὸν P 12 τε om. M A 24 κατὰ ] κατ’ A || οὔτε ] οὔτ’ M A 25 ἐδόκουν ] οἱ add. M A 6–13 412a 9–11 13–19 cf. 412a 21–27

19–104.3 412a 11–13

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which the form is imposed is indeterminate, that is, potential, and nothing whatsoever, since it is understood to have only conceptual existence); whereas the form is an individual “this” (that is, it is such as to determine the thing itself, since it performs its activity by means of the matter and endows [the matter] with form; and, as I said, it is the first thing that may be spoken of as an individual “this”); and, as a result, the thing composed of matter and form is itself also an individual “this”, since it has been settled into its nature and received some substantial determination on account of the form. Now, the form Aristotle calls, by a neologism, “actuality” (entelecheia), 5 by virtue of which, obviously, the matter has “full development” (teleiotēs); and it is the fully developed (entelēs) state of each individual composite thing. But he divides the actuality and says that one kind is like the competence, as for instance knowledge is, whether it is conceived of as being active or not; and the other kind is like the action or the activity, that is, contemplating or demonstrating. For it is indeed possible both for the competence – that is, the knowledge – to be spoken of as an “actuality”, whether it is in itself being active or not, and for its action – that is, as stated, the act of contemplating, or of actively employing one’s competence – to be spoken of as an “actuality”. He will in fact explain and demonstrate in the following that for a natural 6 body the soul, by virtue of which the individual [body] itself is in each case endowed with form and determined, is an actuality and form. And he means to say that this is an actuality in the sense of a competence rather than in the sense of an action. For indeed, in mortal bodies the soul is the substantiation of ensouledness, whether it is active or inactive; but in those that are eternal, as all the pagan philosophers allege that the heavenly and – in their view – divine bodies are, they allege that the actuality is not only a competence but also a self‐sufficient activity in immutable sameness. Having 7 determined these things he next goes on to say what he also says in many of his other writings, namely, that bodies are held more than anything else to be substances (that is to say, if one focuses on what is perceptible and naturally determined), and [more precisely] natural bodies, that is, those that exist by nature, which are also first principles, he says, of the others. This is said by way of contradistinction to mathematical as well as artificial objects, for the Pythagoreans call mathematical objects, too, “substances”; but the truth is that numbers and figures and the like are neither substances nor bodies, as these thinkers held, but are only objects of thought resulting from ab-

8–13 cf. Them. 39.16–22. 10–11 divides the actuality : cf. Phlp. 211.29. 17–24 cf. Prisc. 84.9–22. 29–30 cf. Phlp. 212.12. 30–105.4 cf. Prisc. 84.36–85.6. 32 objects of thought: cf. Phlp. 212.14. 4 by means of the matter: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “in the matter”. 10 state: the same word (hexis) is rendered “competence” in the next sentence; what it means is a state or condition by virtue of which an organism is capable of performing a natural activity.

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ταῦτα μόνον ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως· ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν τεχνητῶν· ἡ γὰρ κλίνη σῶμα μέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ φυσικόν, οὐδὲ ᾗ κλίνη, ἀλλ’ ᾗ ξύλον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ξύλῳ, ὃ φυσικόν ἐστι σῶμα, ἐπιγίνεται καὶ θεωρεῖται τὸ τεχνητὸν αὐτό, ἡ κλίνη. οὕτω δὴ οὐσίας μᾶλλον δοκούσας εἶναι τὰ φυσικὰ ἀποφηνάμενος σώματα, τούτων δή, φησί, τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔχει, δῆλα δὲ πάντως ὁρῶντι παντὶ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ ἔχοντα. δηλοποιῶν δὲ καὶ διοριζόμενος τὰ ἔχοντα ζωήν, ταῦτα εἶναί φησιν ὅσα ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἔχει δύναμιν κινήσεως θρεπτικῆς καὶ αὐξητικῆς, πάντως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ φθίνειν, οὐχ ὅτι ταύτας μόνας ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα (πρόδηλον γὰρ ὡς ἔνια ψυχὰς ἔχοντα καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχει, ἤτοι αἰσθητικὴν καὶ διανοητικήν, εἴτουν λογικήν), ἀλλ’ ὅτι πρώτως κατὰ τὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις θεωρεῖται ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἀδύνατον πᾶσαν ψυχὴν μὴ ταύτας ἔχειν τὰς δυνάμεις. ἔνιαι μὲν γὰρ ψυχαὶ καὶ πλείους τούτων ἔχουσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τό γε μὴν ἐπ’ ἐλάχιστον ἀδύνατον ὅλως εἶναι ψυχὴν μὴ ἔχουσαν τὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις. διατοῦτο καὶ ἐξανάγκης ἐστὶ τὰ ὅλως ἔχοντα σώματα ψυχήν – εἴτουν ζωήν – τὰς εἰρημένας ἔχειν δυνάμεις οἴκοθεν καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν, καὶ ἅπερ μὴ ταύτας ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον οὐδόλως εἰσὶν ἔμψυχα. καὶ μήν, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, πᾶν ἄρα σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἄν, φησίν, εἴη, οὐσία δὲ πάντως ἡ καταλαμβανομένη σύνθετος ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, ἀλλ’ οὔ τις τῶν ἄλλων δύο· οὔτε ὕλη, ἣν ἀόριστον καὶ δυνάμει μόνον οὐσίαν ἔφημεν, οὔτε εἶδος, | τόδε τι ποιοῦν καὶ ὁρίζον τὴν ὕλην, ὡς προέφημεν. [11] προδιαλαμβάνει δὲ καὶ προαγορεύει ταῦτα, βουλόμενος ἀπὸ ἐξετάσεως ἀνευρεῖν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτέ ἐστι τῶν τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων ὡς οὐσιῶν ἡ ψυχή· τὸ σύνθετον αὐτὸ σῶμα, ἢ ἡ ὕλη (εἴτουν τὸ σῶμα), ἢ τὸ εἶδος αὐτό (ἤτοι ἡ ἐντελέχεια)· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐρεῖ καὶ δείξει ὡς ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ σύνθετον τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ὕλης, οὔτε μὴν ἡ ὕλη. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἡ ὕλη – εἴτουν τὸ σῶμα – ψυχή; ἢ πῶς ἄρα αὐτή τε ἡ ὕλη ἅμα καὶ τὸ εἶδος; τὸ γὰρ τοιονδὶ σῶμα αὐτὸ συναμφότερον καὶ σύνθετον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψυχή, οὔθ’ ὅλως τὸ σῶμα· οὐ γάρ ἐστι καθ’ ὑποκειμένου θεωρούμενον – εἴτουν κυριώτερον μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ – αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα· μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν αὐτό ἐστιν ὑποκείμενον· ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, εἴτουν ἐν ἄλλῳ καταλαμβάνεται πάντως, αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. ὥστε ἐπεὶ οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον τὸ τοιονδὶ σῶμα τὸ ἐξ εἴδους καὶ ὕλης οὔτε τὸ σῶμα – εἴτουν ἡ ὕλη – ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, λείπεται τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσίαν, ὅπερ ἔφη τοιονδί, ἤγουν εἶδος,

2 κλίνη ] κλήνη M || ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ] ἀλλ’ οὐ A1sl 3 ἐστι σῶμα transp. A || αὐτό ] αὐτή A 4 δή ] τῶν φυσικῶν add. M A 5 τῶν om. M A 13 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 21 προειρημένων ] προειρημένον M A 22 ἡ ] ἐν add. M 24 ἂν om. A || αὐτή ] αὐτό M A 25 τοιονδὶ ex P correxi (cf. etiam infra vv. 29, 30 et nonnullos codd. Arist. in 412a 16–17) : τοιόνδι V : τοιόνδε M A 27 αὐτὸ τὸ A1pc (ex αὐτῷ τῷ) || ψυχὴ δὲ transp. M A 28 αὐτῷ ] ἐν αὐτῷ malim 29 οὔτε¹ ] αὐτὸ add. A 3–16 412a 13–15 16–106.1 412a 15–19

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straction; in addition, however, [this is said] by way of contradistinction to artificial objects, for a bed is a body, to be sure, but not a natural one and not in so far as it is a bed, but rather in so far as it is wood; and the artifice itself, the bed, is superimposed upon and manifested in the wood, which is a natural body. Ηaving thus declared that natural bodies are held more [than anything else] to be substances, he says that some of these bodies have life and some do not, and it is absolutely clear to any observer which of them do and which of them do not. To clarify and determine which ones have life he states that these are the ones that have of themselves a capacity for motion in the sense of nourishment and growth, and inevitably also for its contrary, decline, not because things with a soul have these capacities only (for it is obvious that some things with souls also have other capacities, namely, a capacity for perception and a capacity for reasoning, that is, a rational capacity), but because the soul is primordially manifested in the capacities mentioned, and it is impossible for any soul not to have these capacities. There are souls that have even more capacities than these, as stated, but it is impossible for a soul to exist at all without having at least the capacities mentioned. For this reason, it is also necessary for any bodies that have soul – that is, life – to have the aforementioned capacities of themselves and inherently, and those that do not have these capacities in the manner stated are not ensouled at all. Moreover, if this is the case, then every natural body that partakes of life will be, he says, a substance, and the sort of substance, inevitably, that is understood as a composite of matter and form, not either of the other two: not matter, which we declared to be undetermined and only potentially a substance; and not form, which determines the matter and makes it an individual “this”, as we said above. These distinctions and statements are made as a preliminary, since he intends to ascertain through examination and to demonstrate which of the three things previously mentioned as substances the soul is: the composite body, the matter (that is, the body), or the form (that is, the actuality), and he will go on to state and demonstrate that the latter is what the soul is, not what is composed of it and matter, nor indeed the matter. For how could the matter – that is, the body – be a soul? Or how could the matter itself together with the form [be a soul]? For the so and so qualified hylomorphic and composite body cannot itself be a soul, and nor can the body in general. For the body is not conceived of as being of a subject, or, to state it more appropriately, in a subject: rather, it is itself a subject. But the soul is in a subject, that is, it is understood to be, under all circumstances, in something else, namely, the body. Consequently, since the soul is neither the so and so qualified body composed of form and matter, nor the body (that is, the matter), the remaining possibility is that the soul is the formal substance, what, he said, is the “so

3–4 cf. Them. 39.27–29. Phlp. 215.4–17.

8–9 motion : cf. Prisc. 85.24–26.

10–12 cf. Prisc. 85.20–21.

30–34 cf.

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12 ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἤτοι ἐντελέχειαν αὐτοῦ, ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. καὶ τοίνυν δηλοῖ ὡς ἐν

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ὑπογραφῇ καὶ ὅρῳ τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι – εἴτουν εἶδος – σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ τεχνητοῦ σώματος – εἴτουν τῆς κλίνης ἢ τοῦ ἱματίου – ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ὡς διώρισται ἤδη πρότερον, καὶ τούτου τοῦ δυναμένου ζωὴν ἔχειν, οὐ τοῦ μὴ δυναμένου ζωὴν ἔχειν, ὡς ἄρα ἐκ διαιρέσεως καὶ τοῦτο προέφημεν εἶναί τινα φυσικὰ σώματα μὴ ἔχοντα ζωήν, οἷον λίθον, σίδηρον, τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα (πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ, γῆν), ἃ οὐκ ἔμψυχα πάντως εἰσί. καὶ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον εἴρηται σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν νεκρῶν σωμάτων· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ σώματα φυσικά, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχει δυνάμει ζωήν· ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἡ ἐντελέχεια αὐτῶν ἐστι ψυχή, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ἔχει. διττῶς δὲ διωρισμένης ἤδη πρότερον τῆς ἐντελεχείας, κατά τε τὴν ἕξιν, ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἐντελέχειαν χρὴ νοεῖν τὴν πρώτην, τὴν ὡς ἕξιν θεωρουμένην, οὐ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνος – εἴτουν ἀργία καὶ ἠρέμησις – καὶ ἐγρήγορσις ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, εἴτουν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ ὑπνώττοντα καὶ γρηγοροῦντα ἔμψυχά ἐστι· καὶ ἔοικεν μὲν τὸ ὑπνώττειν τῇ ἀνενεργήτῳ ἕξει (ἤτοι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ), τὸ δὲ γρηγορεῖν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ | τῆς ἐπιστήμης (ἤτοι τῷ θεωρεῖν)· ὥστε ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντοτε γρηγορεῖ τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπνώττει καὶ ἠρεμεῖ, χρὴ νοεῖν ἄρα τὴν ἐντελέχειαν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, τὴν ὡς ἕξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ἐπειδή, εἴ τις θεῖτο ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν καταλαμβανομένην, ὅταν ἄρα οὐκ ἐνεργῇ οὐδὲ γρηγορῇ τὰ ἔμψυχα ἀλλ’ ὑπνώττῃ καὶ ἠρεμῇ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τηνικαῦτα ἔμψυχα· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον τοῦτο· καὶ ὅτε γὰρ ὑπνώττει καὶ ὅτε γρηγορεῖ τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐμψυχότητα. καὶ τοίνυν, εἴ τις τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτουν τὴν ἐντελέχειαν, ὡς πρώτην λέγει, ἤτοι ἕξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἱκανῶς δηλοῖ καὶ ἀμφότερα συλλαμβάνει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν ἐστιν ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιστάμενον ἐνεργεῖν ἐστιν ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια. εἰ δέ τις λέγει τὴν δευτέραν ἐντελέχειαν, τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἐξανάγκης ἀκολουθήσει τὴν ἐμψυχότητα μόνως ἐπὶ τοῦ γρηγορεῖν λέγειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὅτε ὑπνώττει καὶ ἠρεμεῖ τὸ ἔμψυχον. καὶ οὕτω μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἐντελέχειάν φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐντελέχειαν δὲ οὐ παντός, ὡς εἴρη-

2 σώματος V1pc (ex σώματι) 10 ἐστι ] ἐστιν ἡ A 14 καὶ¹ ] ὁ add. M A 15 τοῖς ] τῆς A || ἔοικεν ] ἔοικε M A 19 ὡς M1sl 20 ἐνεργῇ M1pc (ex ἐνεργοῖ) 21 ἠρεμῇ M1pc (ex ἠρεμοῖ) 23 τὴν² iter. M 25–26 καὶ1 —ἕξις om. A 26 λέγει ] λέγοι M A 27 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 29 ὡς om. A 1–11 412a 19–21

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and so qualified”, or form, in the body: that is, its actuality. Accordingly, he indicates, by way of an outline and delineation, that the soul is in a certain sense an actuality – or form – of a natural body potentially having life. For the actuality of an artificial body – for instance, of a bed or a cloak – cannot be a soul, but [only] that of a natural one, as already described above, and moreover, of such a one as is capable of having life, not of one that is incapable of having life, just as we also said above, on the basis of a division, that there are some natural bodies that do not have life, such as stone, iron and the simple bodies (fire, air, water, earth), which are under all circumstances not ensouled. But the soul was also said to be the actuality of a natural body potentially having life in another sense, namely, in contradistinction to dead bodies. For these, too, are natural bodies, but do not potentially have life. For this reason, their actuality is not a soul either – for nor do they have a soul. Actuality has already been defined in two ways above: on the one hand in terms of a competence, like knowledge; on the other hand in terms of an activity, like contemplating. In the present context we should think of the first kind of actuality, the one conceived of as a competence, and not the second kind, the one defined in terms of being active. For both sleep – that is, inactivity and rest – and wakefulness occur in ensouled creatures, that is, animals; and they are ensouled whether they are asleep or awake. Sleeping is comparable to the inactive competence (that is, knowledge), whereas being awake is comparable to the active use of knowledge (that is, contemplating). Therefore, since the ensouled creature is not always awake, but also sleeps and rests, we should consequently think that the soul is the first kind of actuality, the one which is conceived of as a competence, or knowledge: for if one were to suppose that the soul is the second kind of actuality, the one conceived of as an activity, then the ensouled creatures would not be ensouled at any time that they are not active or awake, but asleep and at rest; but that would be absurd. For they have life and ensouledness both when they are asleep and when they are awake. Accordingly, if one describes the soul, that is, the actuality, as being of the first kind, that is, a competence, or knowledge, one represents it adequately and includes both kinds: for the competence, or the knowledge, is present both in possessing knowledge without actively using it and in actively using the knowledge possessed. For unless the competence, or the knowledge, is present, there will be no activity. But if one describes it as the second kind of actuality, the one defined in terms of being active, it will necessarily follow that ensouledness is only applicable to the case of being awake, and not at all when the ensouled creature is asleep and at rest. And thus he states that the soul is the first kind of actuality, but not the actuality of just any body, as mentioned, but of a natural one potentially having life, in accor-

12–34 cf. Them. 41.1–22.

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ται, σώματος ἀλλὰ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τοῦ δυνάμει ἔχοντος ζωήν, καθὼς διώρισται ἤδη πρὸ ὀλίγου· ὃ δὴ φυσικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔτι ἀκριβέστερον ὑπογράφων ὑποτίθεται καί φησι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ὀργανικόν, ὡς εἶναι ἐντελεστέραν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπογραφήν, εἴ τις λέγει ταύτην ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι φυσικοῦ σώματος δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος ὀργανικοῦ, τουτέστιν ὀργάνοις χρωμένου ὑπηρετικοῖς εἰς τὰς τῆς ἐμψυχότητος ἐνεργείας· οὕτω 16 γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος οὗτος κοινὸς ἀποδεδομένος ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς. καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ὀργανικά (εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν δηλονότι τῆς ἐμψυχότητος ὀργάνοις χρώμενα ὀφθαλμοῖς, χερσί, στόμασιν, ἀρτηρίαις, φλεψὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀργανικοῖς μορίοις καὶ χρειώδεσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν τῆς φυσικῆς ἐργασίας), ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ αὐτὰ παραπλησίως ὀργάνοις χρῆται· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τὰ ὄργανα, φησίν, ἁπλούστερα ἢ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις ἔνια τῶν ὀργάνων ἀνομοιομερῆ ὄντα ἐκ διαφόρων ὁμοιομερῶν συνέστηκεν, οἷον ἡ χεὶρ ἐκ σαρκῶν, νεύρων, ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα κατ’ 17 αὐτήν· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν φυτῶν ἁπλούστερά εἰσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰ ὀργανικά, δῆλα δὲ καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ὁρῶσι, φησίν, οἷον ὅτι τὰ φῦλλα ἕνεκεν τῶν περικαρπίων εἰσὶν εἰς αὐτῶν V134v φυλακήν, καὶ τὰ περικάρπια ἕνεκεν τῶν καρπῶν· | καὶ πάλιν αἱ ῥίζαι ἕνεκεν τῆς θρεπτικῆς ἐνεργείας τῶν φυτῶν· δι’ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡ θρεπτικὴ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ διὰ τῶν στομάτων ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις· ἐοίκασι γὰρ αἱ ῥίζαι ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ὥσπερ τὰ στόματα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. 18

Ὅτι τοῖς οὕτω νοοῦσι, φησί, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπορεῖν, καθὼς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ ἠπορεῖτο, πῶς ἕν ἐστι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ὅλως πῶς ἑνοῦται ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ψυχικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ εὐφυΐαν τοῦ

3 εἶναι² ] οὖσαν malim 8 ἀρτηρίαις ] καὶ add. M A 10 αὐτῶν ] αὐτὸν M om. A 15 φυλακήν ] φυλήν M 18–19 ση′ adn. Mmarg 6–17 412b 1–4 18–110.13 412b 6–9

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dance with the description already given a while ago. Delineating this natural body even more precisely, he makes the supposition and the statement that it is such as to be “organic”, in order that the delineation of the soul should be more complete, [which it will be] if one says that it is the actuality of an organic natural body potentially having life, that is to say, of one which employs subsidiary organs for the activities of its ensouledness. For formulated in this way this definition will be generally applicable to all soul. For it is not only the bodies of animals that are “organic” (that is, which 16 in the service of their ensouledness employ as organs eyes, hands, mouths, arteries, veins and other parts that are organic and necessary for the service of their natural activity), but even plants use organs in a similar way; although in their case, he says, the organs are simpler than in the animals. For in animals some of the organs, which are non-homogeneous, are composed of different homogeneous things, as, for instance, a hand is composed of flesh, nerves, bones and any other things that belong to it. In 17 the case of plants, the organic [parts and functions] are simpler, as mentioned, but even these are obvious to anyone with eyesight, he says: for instance, that the leaves exist for the sake of the pericarps, in order to protect them, and the pericarps for the sake of the fruits; and again, that the roots exist for the sake of the nutritive activity of the plants, for it is through them that the nutritive capacity acts, as it does in animals through their mouths. For the roots in plants are comparable to the mouths in animals. [Note] that for those who think and speak like this, he says, there is no occasion 18 to raise the problems that were raised in the preceding book as to how the ensouled creature is a unity of soul and body, and in general how the soul is united with the

3 more complete: cf. Prisc. 91.3. 5–6 cf. Phlp. 217.13–15. 11–12 cf. Phlp. 217.22–23. 21–111.15 cf. Phlp. 218.13–34. At 218.31–32 Philoponus refers, apparently by mistake, to the Physics for Aristotle’s account of the different meanings of “one”; Priscian, on the other hand, refers (at 91.30–32) to the Metaphysics, but not, it seems, to the passage Metochites must have in mind (namely, 5.6). 3 “organic”: this is a transliteration rather than a translation. “organikós” means “of such a nature as to serve as an ‘organ’, i.e. an instrument”. Aristotle’s use of the word in qualifying the whole body of which the soul is an actuality has long been a source of some consternation among scholars and translators, who have generally been reluctant to ascribe to Aristotle the view that the body is an instrument of the soul; for this reason, many of them have accepted the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to whom “an organic body is one that has a number of different parts which are able to perform services to the capacities of the soul” (De an. 16.11–12). See Menn (2002, 108–17) for an excellent discussion of the problem. 3–5 in order that …, [which it will be] if one says … : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “since the delineation of the soul will be more complete if one says …”. 14–15 he says: Aristotle does not seem to say anything like this, and nor do his commentators (on the contrary, Priscian [91.6–10] suggests that Aristotle mentions plants here because it is not obvious that their parts are “organic”, i.e. instruments of the soul). The following examples of “organic functions” in plants are offered by Aristotle at 412b 2–4.

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σώματος ἐπιγίνεται ὡς ἐντελέχεια ἀκολούθως ἡ ψυχή, ὡς διώρισται. ὡς ἄρα ἐπὶ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ κηροῦ ἐπιγίνεται, εὐφυΐαν καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα εἰς τοῦτο ἔχοντος τοῦ κηροῦ, αὐτὸ τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα (εἴτουν εἶδος), καὶ γίνεται τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὁ κηρὸς ἕν τι σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τε καὶ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθους (εἴτουν σχήματος), ὣς ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς σωματικῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους – εἴτουν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἐντελεχείας – παραπλησίως γίνεται ἕν. πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ εἶναι (λέγεται γὰρ ἓν τῷ γένει, λέγεται καὶ τῷ εἴδει, λέγεται καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, λέγεται καὶ τῷ δεσμῷ ἕν, εἴτουν κόλλῃ εἴτ’ ἄλλῳ τῳ· καὶ ἔτι καθ’ ἕτερα ἄττα λέγεται τὸ ἕν, ὡς τὰ περὶ τοῦτων Ἀριστοτέλης διορίζεται καὶ παραδίδωσιν ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά), ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι λεγομένου καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, κυρίως καὶ μάλιστα τὸ ἓν εἶναι πέφυκέ πως οἰκείως λέγεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ἐντελεχείας τῶν συντιθεμένων, ὡς εἴρηται, ἤτοι τῆς τε ὕλης καὶ οὗ ἐστὶν ὕλη (ἤτοι τοῦ εἴδους οὗ πέφυκεν εἶναι ὕλη)· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον κυρίως ἕν ἐστι. καὶ μὴν ἔτι τὰ περὶ τούτων παραδειγματίζων καὶ ὑποδεικνύων ὅπως ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος – εἴτουν τὸ εἶδος – τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος ὡδί πως ἔχοντος, φησὶν ὡς εἴπερ τὸ ὄργανον ὁ πέλεκυς φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα ᾗ πέλεκυς δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχων, ἦν μὲν ἂν ὁ σίδηρος ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σωματικόν, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ εἶναι πέλεκυν – ἤτοι ἡ μόρφωσις αὐτὴ καὶ τὸ τμητικὸν αὐτὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς – ἦν ἂν ἡ ψυχή, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον, ὁ πέλεκυς, τὸ ἔμψυχον ἢ τὸ ζῷον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτό, φησί, φυσικὸν σῶμα δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχον, ὁ σίδηρος τοῦ πελέκεος κατὰ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πελέκεός ἐστι ψυχή· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἁπλῶς σώματος ἡ ἐντελέχεια ψυχή ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ οὑτωσί πως ἔχοντος τοῦ φυσικοῦ, δηλονότι καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ εὐφυΐαν καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχοντος κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως. καὶ μέχρις ἂν εἴη αὐτοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ἐστὶν ἔμψυχον· παρελθούσης δὲ καὶ ἀφανισθείσης | ταύτης, οὐκέτ’ ἐστὶν ἔμψυχον, κἂν εἰ τὸ σῶμα ἐνίοτε λειφθείη μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχον ἀλλ’ ἐστερημένον τῆς εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐντελέχειαν οἰκειότητος. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ πέλεκυς αὐτὸς ἔχων αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ὡς εἴρηται, τοῦ πελέκεος, εἴη ἂν καὶ λέγοιτο πέλεκυς· αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἀλλοιωθέντος –

2 εἰς τοῦτο ἔχοντος ] ἔχοντος εἰς τοῦτο A 4 ὣς correxi : ὡς codd. 6 καὶ τοῦ εἶναι delere velim (cf. infra v. 10) 15 ὡδί ] ὠδί V 16 ἔχων M1pc (ut vid. ex ἔχον, quod malim) 19 φυσικὸν ] φησικὸν A || ἔχον ] ἔχων A 20 τοῦ² ] τὸ M 21 πως A1sl || τοῦ delere velim 22 αὐτοῦ ] fort. legendum ἡ αὐτοῦ 23 οὐκέτ’ correxi : οὐκ ἔτ’ codd. 24 λειφθείη ] ληφθείη A 25 ἔχων ] ἔχον M 13–18 412b 10–13 18–25 412b 15–17 25–112.3 412b 13–15 8–9 ἐν τοῖς Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά: Metaph. 5.6, 1015b 16–1017a 6

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body. For the soul supervenes as an actuality in conformity and accordance with the suitability and natural propensity of the body, as described. So just as in the case of the spherical wax the spherical shape – that is, the form – supervenes if the wax has the natural propensity and suitability for it, and the shape and the wax become a unified compound of the matter and the modification – that is, the shape – in the matter, so also the ensouled body, which is composed of its corporeal matter and its form (that is, its soul and actuality), becomes one in a similar manner. And while things are said to be “one” and “being” in many ways (for they are said to be “one” in respect of genus, and also in respect of species, and also in respect of number, and also by virtue of a bond, whether it be glue or something else; and in addition “one” is used in a few other ways, in accordance with Aristotle’s definitions and accounts of these in his Metaphysics), and while things are further also said to “be” both in the sense of “potentially being” and in the sense of “actually being”, it is somehow inherently natural for [the expression] “being one” to be properly and primarily used of the actuality of compounds, as mentioned, that is, of [compounds of] some matter and that whose matter it is (that is, the form for which it is by nature matter), for the compound of the two “is one” in the proper sense. Anyway, by way of illustrating these things further and indicating in what way the soul is the account – that is, the form – of a natural body disposed in a certain way, he says that if the tool [called] axe had been, in its capacity of axe, a natural body potentially having life, then the iron would have been its matter and corporeal component; the very being-an-axe, that is, the way it is shaped and the very thing about its make-up that renders it able to cut, would have been its soul; and the compound of both, the axe, would have been the ensouled creature or animal. As it is, however, this is not, he says, what the iron of the axe in this example is, a natural body potentially having life, nor is the form of the axe a soul. For it is not the actuality of any unspecified body that is a soul, but that of a natural body disposed in a certain way, namely, so as to be possessed of a first principle, a natural disposition and a suitability for motion and rest. And so long as its actuality exists, it is ensouled; but when this has passed away and disappeared, it is no longer ensouled, although the body may sometimes remain even when it does not have the same potentiality but is deprived of its natural affinity for its own actuality. For an axe, too, when it has the form of an axe, as mentioned, will be and will be called “an axe”; but when the form itself has been altered – that is, dissolved – and the erstwhile iron remains,

19–24 cf. Them. 42.19–23; Phlp. 220.35–221.2. 32–113.3 cf. Them. 42.23–25. 8 and “being”: the Greek words kaì toû eînai serve no purpose here, and are furthermore repeated, after the following parenthesis (l. 12), where they do serve a purpose; no doubt they would have been expunged if the author had noticed them when preparing his clean copy.

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εἴτουν διαλυθέντος – καὶ τοῦ προτέρου σιδήρου μένοντος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πέλεκυς ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως, φησίν, ὥσπερ ὁ τεθνηκὼς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ Σωκράτης ἢ ὁστισοῦν, οὐ λέγοιτ’ ἂν οὐδ’ εἴη ἄνθρωπος ἢ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ὁμωνύμως λέγοιτ’ ἂν ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν μορίων αὐτῶν τῶν ζῴων δῆλον ἂν εἴη, φησίν, ὃ λέγομεν· εἰκάζει γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ σώματι τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, εἴτουν τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν ὄψιν, εἴτουν τὴν ὀπτικὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, καί φησιν ὡς εἴπερ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ μὲν ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις, ὡς σῶμα δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ὕλη τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ. καὶ τοίνυν τῆς ὄψεως φθαρείσης οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι τὸ σωματικὸν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ὀφθαλμὸς ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ λέγεται καὶ ὁ τοῦ λιθίνου εἰδώλου ὀφθαλμὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ ὁ τοῦ γεγραμμένου ζῴου ὀφθαλμὸς ὀφθαλμός. ὥσπερ δέ, φησίν, ἔχει τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, ἤτοι ἡ ὄψις πρὸς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἀνάλογον ἔχει ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις τοῦ ζῴου πρὸς τὸ ὅλον αἰσθητικὸν σῶμα, εἴτουν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἡ αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἐντελέχεια, ἡ ψυχή. ὥστε καὶ ἀποβεβληκὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ δυνάμει ζῶν, οὐδ’ ὡς πρότερον, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὁμωνύμως, ὡς εἴρηται, κατὰ τὸ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ὑπόδειγμα. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ τεθνηκότος σώματός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐντελέχεια, ὅτι μηδ’ ἐστὶ δυνάμει τοῦτο ζωὴν ἔχον, ὡς εἴρηται. μὴ μόνον δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τούτου ἡ ψυχὴ ἐντελέχεια, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τοῦ καρποῦ· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε ζωὴν ἔχει οὔτε δύναται ζωὴν ἔχειν· τὸ σπέρμα δὲ καὶ ὁ καρπὸς οὐκ ἔτι πω δύναται ζωὴν ἔχειν, δύναται δὲ γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον φυσικὸν σῶμα οἷον δύνασθαι ζωὴν ἔχειν. κἀκ τούτων ἤδη λοιπὸν συμπεραίνων τὰ λεχθέντα φησίν· ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων δύο παραδειγμάτων – τοῦ τε πελέκεος καὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ – ἡ τμῆσίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτως ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ γρήγορσις, ἤτοι τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τῆς ἐντελεχείας, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων ἡ τμητικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ὄψις, εἴτουν ἡ ὀπτικὴ δύναμις, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων αὐτὴ ἡ πρώτη ἐντελέχεια, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, καὶ εἰ ἀνενέργητος ἦν· ἥνπερ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι κατὰ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχήν. καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ὕλη τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἅμα δὲ | καὶ ἡ ὄψις, ἐστὶν ὁ ὀφθαλμός, καὶ ὁ σίδηρος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πελέκεος ὁ πέλεκυς, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὸ φυσικὸν ὃν τρόπον εἴρηται σῶμα καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ἤτοι τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον, ἐστὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον.

3 λέγοιτ’ ἂν ] ἂν λέγοιτο M A 5 τὸν ] τῶν M || ὀφθαλμόν M1pc (ex ὀφθαλμῶν) 17–18 τὸ—ἔχειν V1marg (praefixo κείμενον) 23 εἴτουν ] ἢ A 27 ὃν ] ὂν M 3–10 412b 17–22

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it will not be an axe except homonymously, he says; just as a deceased human being, Socrates or whoever, will neither be called nor be “a human being” or “Socrates”, but these names will be used homonymously. Furthermore, he says, what we are saying 23 will also be clear from the parts of animals. For he compares the eye – that is, its matter – to the whole body, and sight – that is, the eye’s visual capacity – to the soul, and says that if the eye had been an animal, its sight would have been its soul, whereas the pupil itself and the other matter of the eye would have been its body. Accordingly, if its sight has been destroyed, the corporeal component of the eye is no longer an eye except homonymously, in the sense in which the eye of a stone idol and the eye of a painted figure are also called “eyes”. But, he says, as the part is to the part, that is, the 24 sight to the eye, in the same analogous relation also the animal’s sense perception as a whole stands to the perceptive body as a whole, that is, the entire actuality of the body – the soul – to the body itself. Consequently, that which potentially lives will not continue to exist when it has lost its soul, not even in the way in which it previously existed, but only homonymously, as mentioned, in accordance with the example of the eye. For the soul is not the actuality of a dead body, since the latter does not even potentially have life, as mentioned. However, the soul is not only not the actuality of this [sc. a dead body], but not of semen or a fruit either. For the former neither has life nor is capable of having life, whereas semen and a fruit are not capable of having life just yet, but are capable of becoming natural bodies of such a kind that they can have life. And then at last he draws from this the conclusion stated above and says: What 25 cutting and seeing are in the two examples mentioned – that of the axe and that of the eye – is analogous to what waking is in the case of the soul, namely, the actuality in its second sense, the one defined in terms of activity. And what the capacity for cutting and sight – that is, the capacity for sight – are in the two examples is analogous to what the first actuality – the one defined in terms of a competence that may not be activated – is in the case of ensouled creatures. And this is the kind of actuality that he just a moment ago declared the soul to be, in terms of a generally applicable definition. And lastly, just as the eye is the pupil and the other matter of the eye together with eyesight, and the axe is the iron and the axe’s form, so, analogously, the ensouled creature is both the natural body of the type specified and its actuality, that is, the compound of both.

4–5 that is, its matter: no ancient commentator suggests that when Aristotle says at 412b 20–21 that the eye is the matter of sight he means that the material components of the eye are (after all, he immediately proceeds to say that an eye without sight is not an eye at all), although Priscian (93.30–31) ascribes a similar view to Alexander. 17–21 cf. Them. 43.6–8; Prisc. 94.5–7. 21 cf. Prisc. 94.17. 21– 27 cf. Them. 43.14–18; Prisc. 94.17–19; Phlp. 223.10–14. 29–32 cf. Them. 43.18–20. 21 the conclusion stated above: the reference seems to be, as in Priscian’s commentary, to the delineation of the soul in sec. 15 (corresponding to 412a 27–b 1 in Aristotle’s text).

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Ὅτι, ἐξ ὧν εἴρηται, ἡ ψυχή, ἐπεὶ ἐντελέχειά ἐστι σώματος, οὐκ ἔστι χωριστὴ αὐτοῦ, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν ἀκριβέστερόν τινα αὐτῆς μόρια, ὅσα εἰσὶν ὡς ἐντελέχειαι σωματικῶν τινων μορίων, οὐκ εἰσὶν αὐτῶν χωριστά· ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις – εἴτουν ἡ ὀπτικὴ αὐτὴ δύναμις – τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀχώριστος (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄψις ἄνευ ὀφθαλμοῦ, εἴτουν τῆς ὕλης τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ), ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄλλα μέρη ψυχῆς ἄλλων τινῶν μερῶν σωματικῶν εἰσιν ἀχώριστα, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς θεωρούμενα καὶ μηδόλως πεφυκότα καθ’ ἑαυτὰ εἶ27 ναι τοῦ σώματος ἄνευ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων. «μόρια» δ’ ἐνταῦθα λέγει «ψυχῆς» οὐχ ὡς σωματικά (ἀσώματος γὰρ ἡ ψυχή), ἀλλὰ «μόριά» φησι τὰ διάφορα εἴδη – εἴτουν τὰς διαφόρους δυνάμεις – τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἔνιαι οὐκ εἰσίν – ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται – κεχωρισμέναι τῶν σωματικῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων, ὡς ἔστιν ἡ θρεπτική, ἡ αὐξητική, ἡ αἰσθητικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι κατ’ αὐτὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ μὴ οἷαί τε οὖσαι χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν μορίων. ἔνιαι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις χωρίζονται τῶν σωματικῶν, αἱ μηδὲ ἐντελέχειαι οὖσαι σωματικῶν μορίων, οἷον ὁ νοῦς· τίνος γὰρ καὶ εἴη 28 ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σωματικοῦ μορίου ὁ νοῦς; ἢ τίνι συνέχεται; πάντως γε οὐδενί (ὡς καὶ τοῦτο προδιώρισται), εἰ μή τις λέγοι, φησί, τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς – τὰ μὴ συνδεδεμένα ἀχωρίστως τοῖς σωματικοῖς – οὕτως εἶναι ἐντελεχείας καὶ ταῦτα καθάπερ ὁ πλωτὴρ λέγεται τοῦ πλοίου, ὃς καθ’ ἑαυτὸν μὲν χωριστός ἐστι πάντως τοῦ πλοίου, ᾗ δὲ πλωτὴρ ἀχώριστός ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ τοῦ πλοίου ἐστὶν ὁ πλωτήρ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸ πλοῖον ἐνεργείᾳ πλοῖον πλωτῆρος ἄνευ. 26

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[Note] that [it is clear] from what has been said that since the soul is the actuality 26 of a body, it is not separable from it, or, to be more precise, that certain parts of soul, namely, all those that exist as actualities of certain bodily parts, are not separable from these: just as sight – that is, the capacity for sight – is inseparable from the eye (for there is no sight without an eye, that is, the matter of an eye), so also other parts of soul are inseparable from certain other bodily parts, since they are found to exist in dependence on these and are not at all naturally suited to exist by themselves and independently of the body and the parts of the body. He speaks here of “parts of soul” not 27 in the sense [in which one speaks] of bodily parts, for the soul is incorporeal; rather, what he calls “parts” are the different forms – that is, the different capacities – of the soul, some of which do not – as was also determined in the previous discussions – exist in separation from the corporeal organic parts, as is the case with the nutritive, the augmentative, the perceptive and other comparable capacities of the soul which are not capable of being separated from the bodily parts. Some capacities of the soul are, however, separated from the bodily parts, namely, those which are not actualities of any bodily parts either, such as the intellect. For of which bodily part would the intellect be an actuality? In which is it contained? In absolutely none (this was also 28 determined above), unless someone would maintain, he says, that such parts of the soul as are not inseparably bound up with the bodily parts are also actualities in the sense in which a sailor is said to be that of a ship: in himself he is undeniably separable from the ship, but in his capacity as sailor he is inseparable from it. For a sailor is the actuality of a ship: for it is impossible for the ship to be a ship in active operation without a sailor. * *

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1 cf. Phlp. 223.21–22. 3–6 cf. Them. 43.23–24; Phlp. 225.12–15. 8–12 cf. Prisc. 94.33–36; Phlp. 225.8–11. 17 At 95.31–32, Priscian says “that the intellect should keep some body together (ti sunéchei sōma) is difficult even to envisage, as he said in Book 1”, referring to 1.5, 411b 18. Apparently oblivious of his own paraphrase of that passage (1.5.37), Metochites now seems to think that the difficulty lies in envisaging some body keeping together, or containing (sunéchein), the intellect. 18–21 cf. Phlp. 224.33–37.

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2 Ὅτι, βουλόμενος αἰτιολογῆσαι τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τύπον καὶ τὴν ὑπογραφὴν περὶ τοῦ κοινῶς ὄντος ἁπάσῃ ψυχῇ, προδιαλαμβάνει ὅτι ἄλλα τῇ φύσει γνώριμα καὶ ἄλλα ἡμῖν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ πρότερα τῇ φύσει γνώριμα ἀσαφέστερα ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν γνώριμα ἀσαφέστερα τῇ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι γίνεται ἡ πρόοδος τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐκ τῶν σαφεστέρων μὲν ἡμῖν ἀσαφεστέρων δὲ τῇ φύσει εἰς τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ ἀσαφέστερα, καθὼς τὰ περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐναρχόμενος τοῦ πρώτου τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀV136r κροάσεως διωρίσατο. [2] εἰσὶ δὲ σαφέστερα | τῇ φύσει καὶ ἡμῖν ἀσαφέστερα αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια τῶν αἰτιατῶν, ἀλλ’ ἡμῖν γε τὰ τελευταῖα τῇ φύσει σαφέστερα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρῶτα καὶ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει ἀναγόμεθα. πρῶτα γὰρ τῇ φύσει καὶ αἴτια τὰ στοιχεῖα, κἀκ τούτων οἱ χυμοί, κἀκ τούτων τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ συνίσταται (καὶ μερίζεται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται), κἀκ τούτων τελευτῶντα συντίθεται τὰ ζῷα. ἀλλ’ ἡμῖν γε πρῶτα γνωρίζεται τὰ ζῷα, κἀκ τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ, κἀκ τούτων οἱ 3 χυμοί, κἀκ τούτων τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἐπεὶ γοῦν οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἔχει, πειρατέον, φησί, τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκριβέστερον ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ αἰτιολογῆσαι τοὺς περὶ αὐτῆς ὁρισμούς. ὁ γὰρ πρότερον ἀποδεδομένος λόγος, τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς χαρακτηρίσας, ὑπέγραψεν ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὁρισμοῦ, μὴ προσαποδοὺς καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ, 4 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μόνον, ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν. οὐ χρὴ δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, φησίν, ἀποδιδόναι ἐν τοῖς προκειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ ὁριζομένοις, τὸ ὅ τι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διότι ἔστι. κἀκεῖνός

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[Note] that since he wishes to add an explanation to the sketch or outline that has been offered concerning what is common to all soul, he makes some preliminary distinctions to the effect that (a) some things are knowable in nature and other things to us; that (b) the things that are supremely knowable in nature are more obscure to us and those that are supremely knowable to us are more obscure in nature; and that (c) the progression of teaching and demonstration is from the things that are clearer to us but more obscure in nature towards those that are clearer in nature but more obscure to us, just as he also described these things in his introduction to the first book of the Physics. The first principles and the primary causes are clearer in nature and more ob- 2 scure to us than their effects are, but the things that are last in nature are clearer to us, and we ascend from these towards those things that are primary and clearer in nature. For the elements are primary in nature and causative; from these the humours arise; from the humours non-homogeneous things are formed (and divided into parts and comprehended); and from the non-homogeneous things, finally, animals are constituted. But for us it is the animals that are the primary objects of knowledge, and the non-homogeneous things are known, in reverse order, on the basis of these, the humours on the basis of the non-homogeneous things and the elements on the basis of the humours. Since, then, this is so, we must try, he says, to give a more precise ac- 3 count of the soul and to explain its definitions in terms of causes. For the previously given account, which emphasized what is common to all soul, merely delineated, by way of an outline of a definition, this fact, namely, what it is, without also adding the account or causal explanation that belongs to the definition itself. But we should 4 not merely state this fact, he says, about the subjects of our inquiries and definitions, namely, what they are, but also why they are. And that definition is complete, as he

1–2 common: cf. Phlp. 225.34; Prisc. 96.23–24. 2–11 This passage seems to incorporate elements mainly of Priscian, 96.26–35 (who refers to the beginning of the Physics at 96.31–32) and Philoponus, 230.7–14. Cf. also Themistius, 43.35–38 as well as the threefold division of things clearer to us in Philoponus, 226.10–227.10 (where the Physics is also referenced, at 226.14). No ancient commentator says that the direction of demonstration is from things clearer to us to things clearer in nature, although Themistius (43.37–38) more aptly suggests that we should proceed thus “also with regard to our rational inquiry” (tōi lógōi). 12–18 cf. Phlp. 230.20–25. 22–24 what they are: cf. Them. 44.1–3. 24– 119.2 cf. Phlp. 232.11–12 (who states that a complete definition should teach not only the fact but also the explanation). 24–119.7 Aristotle has not expressly said in Book 1 that a definition that indicates both the formal and the material cause is “complete”; he has clearly implied, however, that a definition that does not allow inferences about the per se attributes of the definiendum is incomplete (1.1, 402b 25–403a 2); but in natural philosophy only definitions that indicate both the formal and the material cause allow such inferences (1.1, 403b 7–9); consequently, in natural philosophy only these definitions can be complete (cf. Philoponus, 43.28–44.17). See also above, 1.1.36.

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ἐστιν ὅρος τέλειος, ὡς καὶ πρότερον ἔφθασεν εἰπών, ὁ καὶ τὸ εἶδος δηλῶν τοῦ ὁριζομένου καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· ἔφη γὰρ ὅρον εἶναι τοῦ θυμοῦ ἕνα τὸ εἶδος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν λόγον δηλοῦντα, ὅτι «θυμός ἐστιν ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως», ἕτερον δ’ αὖθις δηλοῦντα ὅπως γίνεται, ὅτι «θυμός ἐστι ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος», τέλειον δ’ εἶναι ὁρισμὸν τὸν συγκείμενον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, ὅτι «θυμός ἐστιν ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως ζέοντος τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος». καὶ τοίνυν παραπλησίως κἀνταῦθα ὑποδεικνύων τὰ κατὰ σκοπὸν καὶ παραδειγματίζων φησὶν ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν συλλογισμῶν αὐτὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὸ θεωρούμενον τέλος ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις δηλοῦσι, τινὲς δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ δηλοῦσιν, ἤτοι ἐξ ὧν μέσων τὸ συμπεραινόμενον καὶ ὡς τέλος ἐπιφαινόμενον συλλογίζεται· τὰ γὰρ αἴτια μέσα ἐστὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, δι’ ὧν συνάπτονται οἱ ἄκροι ὅροι, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς παραδίδωσιν. οἷον, φησίν, ὁ τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν ὁριζόμενος καὶ λέγων «τὸ εἶναι ἴσον τετράγωνον ἰσόπλευρον ὀρθογώνιον ἑτερομήκει» αὐτὸ λέγει τὸ ὡς συμπέρασμα καὶ τέλος καταλαμβανόμενον καὶ ἀποδεικνύμενον τῷ γεωμέτρῃ· ὁ δὲ λέγων τετραγωνισμὸν εἶναι μέσης εὕρεσιν τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτὴν ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἷον, ἵνα σαφέστερον δι’ ὑποδείγματος ποιήσωμεν τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστω ὁ δεκαὲξ ἀριθμός, ἤτοι | τὸ τῶν δεκαὲξ πήχεων ἑτερόμηκες τετράπλευρον ὑπὸ τῶν δύο καὶ ὀκτὼ γινόμενον (δὶς γὰρ ὀκτὼ δεκαέξ)· τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐστι πάντως καὶ ὀρθογώνιον τετράπλευρον ἰσόπλευρον, ἄλλως θεωρούμενον (τετράκις γὰρ τὰ τέσσαρα δεκαέξ). καὶ ὁ λέγων τετραγωνισμὸν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα τὸ ὀρθογώνιον ἰσόπλευρον ἴσον ἑτερομήκει οὐδεμίαν αἰτίαν λέγει ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον πρᾶγμα καὶ συμπέρασμά τι ἐπιγινόμενον καὶ θεωρούμενον ἐνταῦθα· ὁ δὲ λέγων τετραγωνισμὸν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα μέσης εὕρεσιν – ἤτοι ἀριθμόν τινα μέσον τῶν δύο πλευρῶν τοῦ ἑτερομήκους (ἤτοι τῶν δύο καὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ ὧν εἴρηται)· μέσον δὲ δηλονότι αὐτῶν εὑρισκόμενον ἀνάλογον (ὡς ἔχει ὁ τέσσαρα· ὃν γὰρ ἔχει λόγον ὁ ὀκτὼ πρὸς τὸν τέσσαρα διπλάσιον, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει καὶ ὁ τέσσαρα πρὸς τὸν δύο διπλάσιον, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον)· τὸ γοῦν λέγειν εὑρεῖν τοιοῦτον μέσον ἀμφοῖν ἀνάλογον, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνισμὸν ποιήσασθαι· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσται ἡ

3 λόγον (ut vid.) A1sl : ὅρον Atext 4 δηλοῦντα ὅπως transp. M A 7 κατὰ σκοπὸν ] κατασκοπὸν A || τῶν συλλογισμῶν post αὐτὸ τὸ (συμπέρασμα) v. 8 collocare velim 9 ἐπιφαινόμενον ] φαινόμενον M A 11 τετραγωνισμὸν V1pc (ex τετραγωνικὸν) 12 ἴσον ] ἶσον V 14 ἀποδίδωσι A1pc (ut vid. ex ἀποδείκνυσι) 17 τετράπλευρον ] τετράπλευρων M 18 τετράπλευρον ] τετράγωνον V 20 ἴσον ] ἶσον V || οὐδεμίαν ] οὐδὲ μίαν V 24 ἔχει λόγον transp. M A 26 οὗτος ] οὕτως M : οὕτω A 11–120.5 413a 17–20 11 ἐν τοῖς Ἀναλυτικοῖς: cf. APo. 2.2, 89b 36–90a 34

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has already said before, which indicates both the form and the material cause of the definiendum. For he said that there is one definition of passion which indicates the form itself or the account – that is: “passion is desire for retaliation” – and another one, again, which indicates how it comes about – that is: “passion is a seething of the blood around the heart” – but that a complete definition is that which is composed of both, that is: “passion is desire for retaliation when the blood around the heart is seething”. So here, too, he is using similar examples and illustrations relevant to the subject matter at hand, when he says that some [definitions] indicate the conclusion of deductions and what manifests itself as an end implicit in the definienda, and some indicate its cause, that is, the middle terms from which the statement that forms the conclusion and supervenes as an end is deduced. For the causes are middle terms of the deductions, through which the extreme terms are connected, as he teaches in the Analytics. For instance, he says, someone who defines squaring by saying “a rectangular equilateral quadrangle’s being equal to an oblong quadrangle” is stating precisely that which is understood and demonstrated by the geometrician as a conclusion and an end; but someone who says that squaring is the finding of a mean is stating the actual cause relevant to the purpose and the conclusion. For instance – to make what is being said clearer through an example – let there be the number sixteen, let us say an oblong quadrilateral figure of sixteen cubits generated by two and eight, (for two times eight is sixteen); and there is inevitably also a rectangular equilateral quadrilateral figure that is the same, albeit differently manifested (for four times four is sixteen). And someone who says that squaring in this case is the equilateral rectangle equal to an oblong states no cause, but only a fact and a conclusion that supervenes and manifests itself in the case at hand; whereas one who says that squaring is the finding, in this case, of a mean – that is, some number intermediate to the two sides of the oblong rectangle (that is, to the two and the eight just mentioned); a mean, obviously, which is found to be proportional to them (as is the case with four, for the double ratio in which eight stands to four is obviously the same double ratio in which four stands to two); anyway, to say “finding such a mean that is proportional to both” is [to say] “carrying out a squaring”, for this number will be the squaring side from which the equilateral

2–7 The definitions are versions of the examples given by Aristotle at 1.1, 403a 30–b 1, with “passion” being substituted for “anger”, as in Philoponus, 231.6–28. 11–13 Both Philoponus (231.13–15) and Priscian (97.8–10) refer to the Posterior Analytics in this connection, but not, as Metochites, to 2.2, but rather to 1.8, 75b 30–32 (or 2.10, 94a 11–14). 17–121.5 cf. Phlp. 232.30–233.12. 8–9 some [definitions] indicate the conclusion of deductions: this translation may require the word order suggested in the critical apparatus to the Greek text. As it stands, the text is more naturally taken to mean “some deductions indicate the conclusion …”, but this makes little sense in the context (and does not agree with anything either Aristotle or the ancient commentators say).

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τετραγωνικὴ πλευρὰ ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ τετράγωνον ἰσόπλευρον γίνεται τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἑτερομήκει (ἤγουν ὁ δεκαὲξ ἄριθμός, εἴτουν τὸ τῶν δεκαὲξ πήχεων χωρίον· τετράκις γάρ, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον καὶ εἴρηται, τὰ τέτταρα δεκαέξ) – ὁ τοίνυν οὕτω τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν ὁριζόμενος μέσης ἀναλόγου εὕρεσιν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ τετραγωνισμοῦ δηλοῖ, δι’ ἣν καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν καὶ ἐπιγινόμενον, ὡς προείρηται, συμπερασματικῶς θεωρεῖται. Ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην προδιάληψίν φησιν ἑξῆς – βουλόμενος ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου καὶ πρώτου ἡμῖν γνωρίμου κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἐνάρξασθαι καὶ προβῆναι εἰς τὰ πρῶτα τῇ φύσει καὶ αἴτια, ὡς εἴρηται – ἐν τούτῳ φησὶ διορίζεσθαι καὶ διαστέλλεσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου, τῷ ζῆν. κατὰ πολλοὺς δὴ τοὺς τρόπους θεωρουμένου τοῦ ζῆν – ἔστι γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ λογικὰ ζῷα· ἔστι καὶ κατὰ αἴσθησιν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ πάντα ζῷα καθόλου· καὶ κατὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἵστασθαι κατὰ τόπον, ὡς ἔχει τὰ κινούμενα τῶν ζῴων (ἐπειδή τινα τῶν ζῴων κατὰ αἴσθησιν ζῶντα ἀκινητεῖ παντάπασιν, ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ἑστῶτα, καὶ οἱονεὶ πεπηγότα, τόπου, οἷα δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ζωόφυτα, ἤτοι τὰ ὄστρεα· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ζῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· αἰσθάνεται γὰρ τῇ ἁφῇ)· ἔτι δὲ σὺν τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην κίνησιν, ἥτις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν τροφήν, φησί, καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν φθίV137r σιν – [10] κατὰ πολλοὺς οὖν οὕτω δὴ τρόπους λεγομένου τοῦ ζῆν | καὶ τῆς ζωῆς, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἐστὶν ἐν ἐνίοις ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕνα τούτων, ζῆν ὅμως ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ζωή ἐστιν ἐν οἷς ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε τὴν κατὰ νοῦν οὔτε τὴν κατὰ αἴσθησιν ἁπλῶς οὔτε τὴν κινητικὴν κατὰ τόπον ἔχει ζωήν, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον τὴν κινητικὴν ὥστε τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξειν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ φθίνειν· καὶ ταύτην μόνην 11 ἔχοντα ζῆν γε ὅμως καὶ τὰ φυτὰ λέγεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ «ζῷα» ταῦτα λέγεται. καὶ πρώτη γέ ἐστιν ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχή, οἴκοθεν τῶν φυτῶν ἐχόντων τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ τὸ αὐξητικόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὰ μέρη· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξει καὶ τρέφεται, κάτω δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἄνω αὔξει καὶ τρέφεται, οὕτω καὶ κάτω ταῖς ῥίζαις, καὶ πρὸς πάντα μέ-

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1 τὸ² M1pc (ex τῶ) || ἴσον ] ἶσον V 14 ζῇ ] δὴ M || ἔτι ] ἔστι malim (licet ἔτι in 413a 24 habeat Arist.) 17 ἐν om. M A 19 ἔχει ] ἔχειν A 6–21 413a 20–26

21–122.2 413a 26–31

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quadrangle equal to the oblong one is generated (namely, the number sixteen, that is, the area measuring sixteen cubits, for, as is obvious and as we have said, four times four is sixteen) – someone, then, who in this way defines squaring as the finding of a proportional mean indicates the cause of the squaring, because of which that which follows and supervenes as a conclusion also manifests itself, as stated above. [Note] that after these preliminary distinctions he goes on to say – since he wants 9 to begin from what is composite and a primary object of knowledge for us, as is reasonable, and to proceed towards what is primary in nature and causative, as mentioned – he goes on to say that an ensouled creature is defined and distinguished from an inanimate thing by this: that it is alive. Now, being alive manifests itself in a number of varieties – for it is possible [to live] on the basis of intellect, as is the case with rational animals; and also on the basis of sense perception, as is the case with all animals universally; and on the basis of being in movement and rest with respect to place, as is the case with those animals that have movement (for some animals that live on the basis of sense perception are completely immobile, since they are set, and as it were fixed, in a single location, as for instance the so-called “zoophytes”, that is, bivalves: for they, too, live on the basis of sense perception, for they can perceive through touch); but also, in addition to these, [it is possible to live] on the basis of the other kind of movement, the one that is restricted to nourishment, he says, and growth, and by the same token decline – anyway, life and being alive are thus spo- 10 ken of in terms of a number of varieties, and even if in some [living creatures] it is not present in all these varieties, but only in one, nevertheless, that variety, too, amounts to being alive, and there is life wherever it is present, as is the situation with plants. For plants have neither the kind of life that is based on intellect, nor the kind that is based on sense perception in an unqualified way, nor the kind that allows movement with respect to place, but only the kind that allows such movement as results in being nourished and growing and by the same token declining. And although they have only this kind of life, plants, too, are said to be alive, even if they are not said to be animals. In fact, the vegetative soul is the primary one, since plants have in and of 11 themselves the capacity for being nourished and the capacity for growth (and by the same token the contrary capacity), and in all directions. For it is not the case that they are nourished and growing upwards but not downwards: rather, just as they are nourished and growing upwards, so, too, [they are growing] downwards by their roots, and

6–8 cf. Phlp. 233.19–20. 7 composite: cf. Them. 43.36. 14–18 cf. Them. 44.28–29 (who mentions bivalves, “whether they are zoophytes or animals”); Phlp. 235.30–33 (who exemplifies zoophytes with sponges). 24–26 cf. Phlp. 234.5–7. 28–29 cf. Them. 45.14–15; 46.7–8; Phlp. 236.7–8. 31 in all directions: cf. Phlp. 234.9–10. 32–123.1 cf. Phlp. 234.17–20; Them. 44.15–16.

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ρη, ἔμπροσθεν, ὄπισθεν, δεξιά, ἀριστερά, μέχρις ἂν δύνηται, φησί, τροφὴν λαμβάνειν· 12 ὁπηνίκα δὲ ἀδυνατεῖ, φθείρεται πάντως. ἔχει δὲ καὶ χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἡ τοιαύτη

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ψυχή, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· τὰ δ’ ἄλλως ζῶντα ἀδύνατον ταύτης χωρίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς, φησί, πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν θείων τοῦτο λέγων, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς θείοις καὶ νοεροῖς τὸ ζῆν ἔστι τροφῆς ἄνευ καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως· ἀχρεῖα γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα. ἀλλ’, ὡς ἐλέγετο, ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὰς ἄλλας ζωάς – ἤτοι τὰς λογικὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθητικὰς τάς τε μετὰ κινήσεως τοπικῆς καὶ τὰς ἄνευ τοπικῆς κινήσεως, ὡς διώρισται – ἄνευ τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς τῆς ἐχούσης τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν δύναμιν. ὥστε ἔοικεν αὕτη εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν ἀρχὴ καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι. ζῷα δέ ἐστι κατὰ δεύτερον ἑξῆς λόγον – διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν – οἷά ἐστι καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κατὰ τόπον ζῷα καὶ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα· ζῷα γὰρ κἀκεῖνα διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ «ζῳόφυτα» λέγεται διὰ τὸ ζῶντα κατὰ τὰ φυτὰ ἀκίνητα πεπηγέναι πως· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν. καὶ δῆλον ἄρα ὡς πρώτη ἂν εἴη καὶ κοινὴ τοῖς ζῴοις αἴσθησις τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἡ ἁφή, ὥσπερ ἐλέγετο τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδῶν πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ κοινὸν τὸ φυτικόν· ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ φυτικὸν χωρίζεται τῆς ἁπτικῆς καὶ ἄλλης πάσης αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἔστι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τό τε θρεπτικὸν καὶ τἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰρημένα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζεται αἰσθήσεων, καθὼς ἔνια τῶν ζῴων ὁρᾶν ἔστι ταύτῃ μόνῃ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων χρώμενα καὶ ζῶντα, ὥστε πρώτη καὶ κοινὴ αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἴσθησις· ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστι προδήλως ὡς πάντα τὰ ζῷα ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἀπαραιτήτως ἔχειν, καὶ ταύτης ἄνευ οὐδὲν τῶν ζῴων συνίσταται οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔχει· ἔνια δὲ καὶ | χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ συνίσταται καὶ ζῷά ἐστι καὶ ζῇ. [15] δι’ ἣν δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ταῦτα συμβαίνει ὕστερον ὑπερτίθεται ἐν ἄλλοις ἐρεῖν, νῦν γε μὴν τοσοῦτον ἐπιλογισάμενος μόνον, ὅτι καθόλου ἡ ψυχὴ τούτοις ὥρισται· τῷ διανοητικῷ, τῷ αἰσθητικῷ μετὰ κινήσεως καὶ ἁπλῶς αἰσθητικῷ, καὶ τῷ θρεπτικῷ, εἴτουν φυτικῷ. ἑξῆς ἔπειτα ἀπορεῖ τε καὶ ζητεῖ πότερον τὰ τοιαῦτα διάφορα ψυχικὰ εἴδη ψυχαὶ διάφοροί εἰσιν ἢ μόρια ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριά εἰσι ψυχῆς, πότερον τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἰσὶ

9 ὥστε ] ὥστ’ M A 10–11 ση′ adn. Mmarg 12 πως correxi : πῶς codd. 15–16 ση′ adn. Mmarg 16 πάσης αἰσθήσεως transp. M 19 αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἴσθησις ] ἂν εἴη αἴσθησις αὕτη M : ἂν εἴη αὕτη αἴσθησις A 22 τὴν delere volueris, sed cf. 1.3.22; 1.5.28; 3.2.8 || γε A1pc (ut vid. ex δὲ) 25 ζητεῖ A1pc (ut vid. ex ζητῆ) 2–13 413a 31–b 4

13–21 413a b4–9 21–24 413b 9–13 24–124.4 413b 13–16

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in every direction, forward, backward, to the right and to the left, so long as they are able, he says, to take nourishment; but as soon as they are unable, they inevitably perish. This kind of soul can also be separate from the others, as is obvious in the case of plants; but it is impossible to exist in separation from this kind of soul for those creatures which have any other variety of life, he says, among mortal beings, as he adds for the sake of contrast with divine beings, since in the case of divine and intellective beings it is possible to live independently of nourishment and growth and decline, these things being unnecessary in their case. But, as we were saying, in the case of mortal beings it is impossible for the other kinds of life – that is, the rational and the perceptive ones, whether they involve movement with respect to place or not, in accordance with the distinction made – to be present without the vegetative life that comprises the capacity to be nourished and to grow. Consequently, this [kind of life] appears to be a first principle of living: it is on account of this first principle that living appertains to living creatures. And it is by virtue of another, second, principle – on account of their sense perception – that animals are animals, both such as have and such as do not have movement with respect to place; for even the latter are animals, on account of having sense perception, although they are called “zoophytes” on account of being somehow fixed throughout their immobile lives after the manner of plants [phytá]: for these, too, have the sense of touch. It is clear, then, that of all the senses that of touch must be primary and common to [all] animals, just as we were saying that amongst the forms of soul the vegetative one is primary and common [to all living creatures]. For just as the vegetative form is separate from the sense of touch and every other sense, and the nutritive capacity – as well as the others that were said to be comprised in it – exists by itself in the plants, in the same way the sense of touch, too, is separate from the other senses, inasmuch as some animals can be seen to employ and live by this sense alone, to the exclusion of the others, with the consequence that this sense must be primary and common [to all animals]. For it is plain to see that of necessity all animals must unconditionally possess this sense, and that no animal can be formed or live without this; whereas there are some that are formed, are animals and live even without the other senses. He defers stating the cause of these facts to another, later, occasion, adding for the time being only so much as to conclude that the soul is in general defined through the following [forms]: the capacity for reasoning; the capacity for sense perception involving movement (and for sense perception tout court); and the nutritive, or vegetative, capacity. Immediately thereafter he raises a problem and asks whether the above‐described different forms of soul are different souls or parts of a soul; and, in case they are parts of a soul, whether they are different

5–12 cf. Phlp. 234.30–235.2; Them. 44.22–24. 237.29–34; Prisc. 101.6–8.

17–19 cf. Phlp. 235.33–35.

36–125.5 cf. Phlp.

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διάφορα καὶ χωριστά, ἢ καὶ τοπικῶς ἐν τοῖς σώμασι κεχωρισμένα, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος, ὡς προειρήκαμεν, λέγει ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν μορίων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ ἥπατι, καὶ ἄλλο ἀλλαχοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ σώματι διώρισται. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου ἐρωτήματος, εἴτε ψυχαὶ ταῦτά εἰσιν εἴτε μόρια ψυχῆς, παρίησιν ἐξετάζειν· φθάνει γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ διαλαβὼν ὡς οὐ διάφοροι ταῦτα ψυχαί εἰσι, μόρια δὲ διάφορα – εἴτουν δυνάμεις – μιᾶς τῷ ἀριθμῷ ψυχῆς· περὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ἐρωτήματος διέξεισι καί φησιν ὡς ἐπ’ ἐνίων πρόδηλον ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ μέν εἰσι διάφορα τὰ τοιαῦτα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐ πέφυκε δὲ χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲ τόπους ἄλλα ἄλλους ἔχει ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἀλλ’ ἀχώριστά εἰσιν. ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστι προδήλως ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ὅτι ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχὴ μία μέν ἐστιν ᾗ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ φυτοῦ, δυνάμει δὲ πολλαί· διαιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἕκαστον τῶν τμημάτων αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν φυτικὴν ψυχήν· καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἕκαστον τμῆμα καὶ κλάδος ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν καὶ τὸ γεννητικόν, καὶ οὐ κεχώρισται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ’ ἅμα ταῦτά εἰσιν ἀχώριστα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν τμημάτων, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φυτῷ. ἀλλ’ εἴ γε ἦσαν ταῦτα χωριστὰ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τόπον εἶχεν ὁτιοῦν μόριον ἄλλο ἄλλο τοῦ ὅλου φυτοῦ, ἔδει τὸ μέν τι τμῆμα τοῦ φυτοῦ ἔχειν ἴσως τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δὲ τὸ αὐξητικόν, τὸ δὲ τὸ γεννητικόν· νῦν δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τμήματι τοῦ φυτοῦ διαιρεθέντος, ὡς εἴρηται, ἅπαντα ὁμοῦ συνόντα ἐπίσης τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς δείκνυσιν ὡς ἀλλήλων ἀχώριστά εἰσι κατὰ τόπον, τῷ λόγῳ μόνον χωριζόμενα, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις τμήμασι ψυχὰς ἀριθμῷ μὲν εἶναι διαφόρους, μίαν δὲ εἶναι ψυχὴν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκάστην. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς φυτικῆς τοῦτ’ ἔστι ψυχῆς τὸ ἀχώριστον τῶν αὐτῆς μορίων, | τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ κινητικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ σχεδὸν παντάπασιν ἀχώριστά εἰσιν, ὡς ὁρῶμεν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων· καὶ μὴν ἔντομον ὁτιοῦν διαιρεθὲν εἰς δύο ἑκάτερον τῶν αὐτοῦ τμημάτων δείκνυσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχον· καὶ αἰσθάνεται γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ κινεῖται μέχρι τινός. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ φαντασία ἐστὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, ἀμυδροτέρα μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις τῶν ζῴων, ἔστι δ’ ὅμως ἐν πᾶσιν ἀναμφιβόλως· ἥδεται γὰρ οἷς ἐντυγχάνει κατ’ αἴσθησιν τὸ ζῷον ἢ ἀνιᾶται· κἀντεῦθεν μνήμην ἴσχει καὶ ἅμα φαντασίαν τοῦ

2 τὸ μὲν iter. A || δὲ ] δ’ M A 4 εἰσιν ] εἰσὶ A 5 γὰρ ] δὲ A 9 τῷ M1sl 10 ᾗ scripsi : ἡ codd. 14 καὶ M1sl || ταῦτα om. M A 16 ἔχειν ἴσως transp. M A 17–24 ση′ adn. Amarg 17–19 ση′ adn. Mmarg 19 μόνον ] μόνω A 20 εἶναι² ] τὴν add. A 21 τῇ οὐσίᾳ ] τὴν οὐσίαν M 24 αὐτοῦ om. M 26 τινός A1pc (ut vid. ex παντός) 4–126.8 413b 16–24 1–3 καθὼς καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος … λέγει: cf. Pl. Ti. 44d; 69a–70c; 70d–71e

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and separate only conceptually and essentially, or they are also locally separated in the bodies, in accordance with the above-cited statement by Timaeus to the effect that one part of soul is in the brain, another is in the heart, another is in the liver, different parts in different places, and in a word that they are distinct from each other in the body. Now, he refrains from investigating the first question, whether these forms are souls or parts of a soul; for he has already determined in the first book that they are not different souls but different parts (that is, capacities), of a soul that is numerically one. But he does discuss the second question, and says that it is quite clear in some cases that the parts of soul in this sense are conceptually different, but are not of such a nature as to be separated from each other, and do not have different locations in the body, but are inseparable. For it is plain to see in the case of plants that the soul in them is one in its capacity of actuality of the plant, but potentially many. For after a plant has been divided, each of its sections possesses the vegetative soul in its entirety: for each section or branch has both the soul’s nutritive capacity and the capacities to grow and to reproduce, and these are not separated from each other, but coexist inseparably in each of the sections, just as they do in the whole plant. In fact, if they had been separate from each other and each of them had had some different part of the whole plant as its location, then it would have been necessary for one section of the plant to have, for instance, the nutritive capacity, another section the capacity to grow and a third section the capacity to reproduce. But the fact that, as it is, all the aforementioned parts of the soul are, as described, equally present together in each of the sections of a plant after it has been divided shows that they are inseparable from each other with respect to location and only conceptually separable, so that in a certain sense the souls in the different sections are found to be numerically different, but each of them is found to be conceptually one soul and essentially the same. And just as the inseparability of the parts applies in the case of the vegetative soul, so, too, the very same thing is seen to be the case with regard to the perceptive and motive capacities of the soul. For these, too, are as good as completely inseparable, as we can see in the case of animals: indeed, if any insect is divided into two, each of its segments is shown to have both capacities. For it has both sense perception – as has also been mentioned above – and movement, to some extent. And over and above sense perception, that which perceives also has imagination; it is fainter, to be sure, in the case of the lower animals, but is still indisputably present in all of them. For by virtue of sense perception an animal derives pleasure or discomfort from the things it comes across;

6–8 cf. Prisc. 100.31–101.4. 16–20 cf. Phlp. 238.14–16 (who refers this counterfactual to the example of insects, since plants have only a single soul capacity). 32–33 cf. Phlp. 240.12–15; Prisc. 102.8–9. 2–3 the above-cited statement by Timaeus: 1.5.35.

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πάθους (ταῦτα γὰρ ἀχώριστα τῆς αἰσθήσεως)· κἀντεῦθεν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἐν οἷς ἥδεται καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν τούτων ἔχει (καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅπαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων)· ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμία τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀκολουθεῖ ἀχωρίστως. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει οὕτως ἐπὶ τινῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ἀχώριστα κατὰ τόπον τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ἔστι, φησίν, ἀπορεῖν μήποτέ εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τόπον χωρισταὶ αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι τὸ ὀπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τῇ ῥινὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὠτίοις τὸ ἀκουστικόν, ἤγουν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ σώματος διάφοροι τῆς αἰσθήσεως – εἴτουν τῆς ψυχῆς – δυνάμεις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχει· περὶ δέ γε τοῦ νοῦ, φησίν (ὡς μόριον γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεται), ἄλλως πως ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα· πρόδηλον μὲν γὰρ καὶ προείρηται ὡς τὸ νοερὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο τι εἶδος ὑπερφέρον παρὰ πάντα αὐτῆς ἐστι, καὶ χωριστόν ἐστι παντάπασι τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, καὶ αὐτῶν διάφορον καθάπαξ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σωματικοῖς μορίοις συνεχομένων ἀχωρίστως ψυχικῶν μορίων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁτῳοῦν συνέχεται σωματικῷ μορίῳ ὁ νοῦς, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο καὶ προείρηται, ἀλλ’ ἔστι χωρίζεσθαι παντάπασι πεφυκὼς αὐτὸς τῶν σωματικῶν· εἰ δὲ χωριστὸς αὐτῶν, πάντως καὶ ἄφθαρτος, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξ ἀνάγκης διαφέρων τῶν ἄλλων ψυχικῶν μορίων, ὅσον τὰ ἀίδια τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ τὰ χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης τῶν ἀχωρίστων καθάπαξ. ἀλλὰ περί γε τοῦ νοὸς ἐξετάζειν ἔτι παρεὶς ἐπαναλαμβάνει καί φησι, περὶ τῶν προειρημένων μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι ταῦτα μέν εἰσιν ἀχώριστα κατὰ τόπους, ὡς εἴρηται, χωρίζεται δ’ ὅμως τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι ἄλλο τῷ λόγῳ τὸ αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι ἢ δοξαστικῷ (ἄλλο γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἄλλο | αἴσθησις), καὶ προδηλότερον ἔτι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα τροφή, καὶ ἄλλο αὔξησις καὶ ἄλλο ὄρεξις καὶ τἄλλα γε ἃ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, ὡς διώρισται, θεωρεῖται. καὶ μὴν ἔτι φησὶν ὡς τῶν τοιούτων ψυχικῶν μορίων τινὰ μὲν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἁπάντων ἔχει μετουσίαν, ὡς πάντων μέτοχοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι

12 σωματικοῖς μορίοις ] μορίοις τοῖς σωματικῆς M : μορίοις τοῖς σωματικοῖς A 13–16 ση′ adn. Amarg 14 τῶν M1pc 16–17 ση′ adn. Mmarg 17 ἔτι A1sl 18 μέν om. M 19 ἄλλο ] ἄλλω M A || τὸ A1pc (ex τῶ) 8–17 413b 24–27

17–22 413b 27–32 22–128.8 413b 32–414a 3

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as a result it retains a memory and by the same token an imagination of the experience (for these things are inseparable from sense perception); and as a necessary result of this it also has an appetite for those things from which it derives pleasure (and the complete contrary in the case of the contrary things). Consequently, appetite, too, is an inseparable concomitant of the things mentioned. So this is how things stand in some cases, as stated: the aforementioned parts of the soul are inseparable with respect to location. But there are some cases, he says, about which one may raise the problem whether the capacities of the soul are not also separate with respect to location. For the visual capacity seems to be located in the eyes, the olfactory capacity in the nose and the auditory capacity in the ears, that is, different capacities of sense perception – and thus of the soul – in different parts of the body. And that is how it is with these. As regards the intellect, however, he says (for he considers this, too, as a part of the soul), it is a somewhat different matter. For it is obvious – and it has already been said – that the intellective capacity of the soul is another, superior, form over and above everything that belongs to the latter, and that it is entirely separate from the body and the parts of the body, and altogether different even from those parts of the soul which are inseparably contained within the bodily parts themselves. For the intellect is not contained in any bodily part whatsoever (this has also been mentioned above); rather, it is naturally suited to be, in itself, entirely separated from the bodily parts. And if it is separate from them, then inevitably it is also indestructible, and of necessity stands as far apart from the other parts of the soul as eternal things do from destructible things and things that are separate from matter do from those that are altogether inseparable. Refraining for now, however, from inquiring into intellect, he picks up where he left off and says, with reference to the aforementioned parts of the soul, that these are inseparable with respect to location, as mentioned, but nonetheless conceptually separable. And it is obvious that being for the perceptive capacity is conceptually different from being for the opinative capacity (for opinion and sense perception are different things); and it is even more obvious that nourishment is something else apart from these, and growth is something else, and desire is something else, and so are those other capacities that are manifested in combination with matter, as has been determined. Moreover, he further says that some ensouled creatures have a share in all such parts of soul, inasmuch as human beings partake of all

9–11 cf. Phlp. 238.24–27; Prisc. 101.27–28. 12–13 cf. Phlp. 240.31–241.1. 22–23 cf. Prisc. 102.32–33. 7–9 he says: in fact Aristotle does not mention this problem, but it is raised both by Priscian (101.27–32), who finds an easy solution in the overarching unity of the sense capacity, and Philoponus (238.23–239.38), who takes it seriously enough to devote a page and a half’s worth of – ultimately inconclusive – discussion to it. 17–19 is not contained in : see note to 2.1.27; De an. 1.5, 411b 8 is quoted in the present context by Philoponus (241.35–36).

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τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, τινὰ δὲ οὐ πάντων, ἀλλ’ ἄπεστιν αὐτῶν ἔνια ὧν ἔχει τἄλλα ζῷα· καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔχει πλείω ἄλλα ἄλλων, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ ἓν μόνον εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, καθὼς ἔχει τὰ φυτὰ μίαν μόνην δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν φυτικὴν 26 καλουμένην. κἀν τούτῳ, φησί, διαφέρουσιν αἱ ζωαὶ ἄλλη ἄλλης, τῷ τὴν μὲν πλειόνων εἶναι ἐν μετουσίᾳ μορίων ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ ἐλαττόνων, ὥσπερ ἔχει τὰ ζῷα κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ψυχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ζῴων πλειόνων, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, αἰσθήσεων μετέχει, τὰ δὲ ἐλαττόνων, τὰ δὲ μιᾶς μόνης τῆς κοινοτάτης, ὡς εἴρηται, αὐτῆς τῆς ἁφῆς, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ζῳόφυτα κληθέντα. Ὅτι, βουλόμενος ἐπεξηγήσασθαι καὶ αἰτιολογῆσαι τὸν πρότερον ἀποδεδομένον ἤδη ὅρον τῆς ψυχῆς, διότι ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια (οὐ γὰρ ἀποχρῆναι ἔφη ἐπὶ τῶν ζητουμένων τὸ ὅτι μόνον ἐρεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διότι), φησὶν ὅτι διπλῶς λέγεται τὸ «ᾧ ζῶμεν»· λέγε28 ται γὰρ τῇ τε ψυχῇ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἐμψύχῳ σώματι. καὶ πρὸς σαφήνειαν τούτου παραδείγμασι χρῆται ὅτι, καθὼς λέγομεν τὸ «ἐπίστασθαι» διπλῶς (ἐπίστασθαι γὰρ λέγομεν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ψυχῇ), ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ «ὑγιαίνειν» διπλῶς (ὑγιαίνειν γὰρ λέγομεν τῇ ὑγείᾳ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἢ καθόλου τῷ σώματι), καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ὑγεία ὡς τὰ εἴδη αὐτά, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ τὸ σῶμα ὡς αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα τὰ δεκτικὰ ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν εἰδῶν, ἤτοι τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαστικόν (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ παθητικοῖς αὐτοῖς θεωρεῖται τὰ εἴδη καὶ αὐταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. ζῶμεν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς εἴδει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐνεργούσῃ, καθὼς καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὑγιαίνομεν τῇ

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the forms of soul, whereas some do not [have a share] in all of them, but some of those parts that the other animals possess are lacking in them. And some animals possess more forms than others, some less; and some ensouled creatures even possess only one form of soul, inasmuch as plants have only one capacity of soul, the one called “vegetative”. And lives differ from one another in this respect, he says, that one is en- 26 dowed with more parts of soul, another one with fewer, just as the situation is with animals with respect to the perceptive soul: for some animals clearly partake of more senses, others of fewer, and some partake only of the one that is the most common, as we said, namely, touch, as is the case with the so-called “zoophytes”. [Note] that, since he wishes to add a comment to the definition of the soul al- 27 ready given above and explain why [the soul] is an actuality (for he said that it is not sufficient to state only the fact relevant to the matter under investigation, but [it is necessary to state] also the reason why), he says that “that by which we live” is an ambiguous expression, for it is used not only of the soul but also of the ensouled body itself. And to clarify this he adduces examples to the effect that, just as the expression 28 “to know” is used in two ways (for we say that we know “by” [≈ thanks to] our knowledge and that we know “by” [≈ in] our soul), and, moreover, also the expression “to be healthy” is used in two ways (for we say that we are healthy “by” [≈ thanks to] our health and that we are healthy “by” [≈ in] the eye and in general “by” [≈ in] the body), and knowledge and health are like the forms themselves, but the soul and the eye (or the body) are like the subjects that are actually capable of receiving the forms, that is, the form that enables knowledge and the form that enables health (for it is in fact in the underlying and affectable things that the forms and the actualities themselves are manifested), the same applies to the above-cited expression too. For we are alive “by” [≈ thanks to] our soul as a form and an actively operating actuality, in the same way in which we also know “by” [≈ thanks to] our knowledge and are healthy “by” [≈ thanks

10–13 cf. Phlp. 244.3–7. 18–19 cf. Phlp. 244.23–24. 5–6 lives … he says: according to the vast majority of MSS, Aristotle actually says in 414a 1 that animals differ in this respect, just as in 413b 32–33 (corresponding to the preceding sentence in Metochites’ paraphrase) he distinguishes between animals according to their having all, some or only one of the soul capacities. Philoponus remarks that the word “animals” is used here (by synecdoche) for “living creatures” (243.14–17); Themistius makes a similar clarification (46.8); and in a couple of MSS the Aristotelian text in 414a 1 has been “corrected” accordingly (zṓntōn for zṓōn: the iota subscriptum that we print in zṓiōn was very rarely written out in medieval MSS). Metochites seems instead to have read – or misread – zōṓn (“of lives”) for zṓōn, perhaps led on by Priscian, who uses the word “life” in his commentary on this passage in the sense of “forms of soul” or soul capacities (103.17 and 22). 13–15 by which: the expression translates a relative pronoun in the dative case, the ambiguity intended being that between the “dative of means” and the “dative of respect”, as clarified by the following examples, in which the dative of means has been translated as “thanks to”, the dative of respect as “in”; cf. 1.4.21.

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ὑγείᾳ· ζῶμεν δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐμψύχῳ αὐτῷ σώματι ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ δεκτικῷ τοῦ εἴδους, καθὼς καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα τῇ ψυχῇ (ὑποκείμενον γὰρ ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεκτικὸν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ εἴδους, εἴτουν τῆς ἐπιστήμης), καὶ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ σώματι (ὑποκείμενον γὰρ αὖθις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ὑγείας). οὕτω δὴ διασαφήσας ὅπως ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος (ὡς ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διωρισμένου φυσικοῦ σώματος), ἑξῆς ἔπειτά | φησιν ὡς τριχῶς θεωρουμένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ εἴρηκεν ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει (λέγεται γὰρ «οὐσία» ἡ ὕλη, ἥτις ὡς δύναμις μόνον καταλαμβάνεται· λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν ᾧ καθίσταται τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀπαρτίζεται· λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύνθετον), νοουμένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς εἴδους οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὡς ὕλης οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνθέτου τοῦ ἐμψύχου οὐσίας, οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο, φησί, τὸ σῶμα ἐντελέχεια τῆς ψυχῆς – παντάπασι γὰρ ἔξω λόγου τοῦτο καὶ ἀπᾴδον τε καὶ ἀνοίκειον – ἀλλ’ ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια· οὐ μήν γε παντὸς τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιοῦδε, φησίν, ἤτοι τοῦ φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ, ὡς διώρισται. διατοῦτο καὶ καλῶς, φησίν, εἶπον ὅσοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ σῶμα ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς τοῦτο πρόδηλον, οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ σώματος, ὅτι οὕτως νοεῖται ὡς σώματός τι (εἴτουν εἶδος καὶ ἐντελέχεια), σώματος δὲ τοῦ δυναμένου πάντως, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς εἶδος καὶ ἐντελέχεια. οὐ γὰρ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ σώματι ἑκάστη ψυχὴ ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι πέφυκεν ἡ αὐτή, οἷον ἐν φυτῷ καὶ μύρμηκι καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πεφυκότι καὶ δεκτικῷ καὶ τῇ ἁρμοζούσῃ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, φησίν, ὑποκείμενον, εἴτουν πᾶσα ὕλη, παντός ἐστι δεκτικὸν εἴδους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν κηρῷ δύναται γενέσθαι πρίων ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ ὕλῃ, οὐδ’ ἐν πλίνθοις τὸ τοῦ πλοίου εἶδος ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ αὖθις καὶ ὕλῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ πεφυκότι ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἐγγίνεται καὶ συνέρχεται ἕκαστον εἶδος. οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶν εἶδος ἐν παντὶ ὑποκειμένῳ οἰκείως ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὀσφρήσει ἐστὶ τὸ

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6 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ : fort. potius hunc librum dicere vult (2.1, 412a 6–11) || ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : fieri potest, ut ad Ph. 1.7, 189b 30–191a 3 spectet (nisi potius Metaphysicam [e.g. 7.1, 1029a 2–7] dicere vult)

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to] our health; but we are also alive “by” [≈ in] the ensouled body in its capacity as a subject actually capable of receiving the form, in the same way in which we also know “by” [≈ in] our soul (for in this case it is the soul that is a subject capable of receiving the form, that is, the knowledge), and healthy “by” [≈ in] the body (for, again, it is the body that is subject to health). Having thus clarified in what sense the soul is a 29 form (in the sense of an actuality of the designated [kind of] natural body), he then goes on to say that since substance is manifested in three varieties, as he also stated both in the first book and especially in the Physics (for the matter – which is understood to be mere potentiality – is called “substance”, and so is the form into which the subject settles and crystallizes, and so is the compound of both), and since the soul is conceived of as a substance in the sense of a form, the body as a substance in the sense of matter and the compound of both as the substance consisting in an ensouled creature, the body will not, he says, be called an actuality of the soul – for this would be entirely devoid of reason, incongruous and inappropriate – but, rather, the soul will be called an actuality of the body: not, to be sure, an actuality of just any kind of body, but of this kind, he says, that is, of a natural and “organic” one, in accordance with the definition. For this reason, he says, those spoke well who said that the soul 30 is not a body, but on the other hand not independent of the body either. For it is not a body, that much is obvious; and it is not independent of body, since it is so conceived of as being something – namely, a form and an actuality – that belongs to a body and, unconditionally, to a body that has the capacity [for life] and in which the soul is naturally suited to inhere as a form and an actuality. For it is not as the Pythagoreans used to say, that the same individual soul is naturally suited to take its abode in every kind of body and associate with this, for instance, in a plant, an ant, a horse and a human being; rather, [it is only naturally suited to take its abode] in that very body which is naturally suited and receptive, and in the suitable matter or subject. For it is not the 31 case, he says, that every subject, or all matter, is receptive of every form: a saw cannot come into being in wax (in the sense of “in a subject” and “in matter”), nor again can the form of a ship come to inhere in bricks (again in the sense of “in a subject” and “in matter”), but each form comes to inhere in, and to associate with, the naturally suited subject and matter. For nor is every form at home in every subject: white and black do

3–4 cf. Phlp. 244.22–23. 4–5 cf. Phlp. 244.26–27. 16–17 cf. Them. 46.33–34; Phlp. 246.10–12. 20– 22 cf. Them. 46.37–39. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 247.14–17. 31–133.2 cf. Phlp. 247.17–19. 16 “organic”: see note to 2.1.15. 31–133.3 Metochites presents these latter examples as if they illustrated the same thesis as the preceding examples do, only from the starting-point of the form rather than the subject, but in fact the meaning of “subject” has been changed, from the kind of subject capable of receiving substantial forms (e.g. the “so and so qualified” body) to the kind of subject capable of receiving perceptible – and thus “accidental” – forms (as in Philoponus, 247.17–19).

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λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ γεύσει οἱ ψόφοι, οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον. καὶ διατοῦτ’ εὐλόγως εἴρηται τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ παντὸς ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος. * *

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not appear in the sense of smell, nor do sounds in the sense of taste, nor sweet and bitter in the sense of hearing, but each [appears in the sense] for which it is naturally suited. Therefore it was reasonable to say that the soul is not an actuality of just any body, but of a “so and so qualified” body. * *

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Ὅτι, μετὰ τὸ διασαφῆσαι καὶ αἰτιολογῆσαι ὅπως ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδός τι καὶ ἐντελέχεια αὖθις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἃ πρότερον εἴρηκε, λέγει ὡς τινὰ μὲν τῶν ἐμψύχων πάσας ἔχει τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις, τινὰ δὲ οὐ πάσας, ἀλλὰ τινάς, τινὰ δὲ καὶ μίαν μόνην, «δυνάμεις» λέγων τὸ λογικόν, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ θρεπτικόν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ θρεπτικόν, εἴτουν τὸ φυτικόν (ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τρέφεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν)· τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις ἐστί, φησί, πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ἅμα δὲ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία, ἐπιθυμίαν, θυμὸν καὶ βούλησιν· | καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τρία ὀρέξεις εἰσί τινες κατὰ διάφορα θεωρούμεναι εἴδη, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀνθρώποις πρόσεστι καὶ τὰ τρία μόρια τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ δύο, ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμός, ἐνίοις δὲ τὸ ἓν μόνον, ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τοῖς ἧττον ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθανομένοις. ὅλως γε μὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὲν αἴσθησιν, μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ ἀχωρίστως αὐτίκα καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαί ἐστιν ἢ ἀνιᾶσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἕπεται τῷ μὲν ἥδεσθαι τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀνιᾶσθαι τὸ ἀποτρέπεσθαι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀνιαρά· ὥστε ἀχωρίστως σύνεστι τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. καὶ γὰρ κἂν μὴ πᾶσι ζῴοις ὁρῶνται πᾶσαι συνούσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις (ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν πᾶσαι, τοῖς δὲ τινές, τοῖς δὲ καὶ μία μόνη, ἡ ἁφή, ἣν καὶ κοινὴν πάντων προέφημεν τῶν ζῴων), ὅμως τοῖς γε καὶ αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχουσι τὸ ἥδεσθαι αὐτίκα ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνιᾶσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἁφῇ· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ζῳόφυτα τὰ μόνῃ κεχρημένα τῇ ἁφῇ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐνδεέστερον τῶν ζῴων τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν προσπίπτουσι διαχεόμενα καὶ προδήλως οὕτως ἡδόμενα, τοῖς δὲ συστελλόμενα καὶ οἱονεὶ ἀνιώμενα, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἀποτρέπεσθαι. καὶ μὴν ἔτι τούτου, φησί, δεῖξις καὶ ἀληθὴς πίστις ὅτι τῆς ἁπτικῆς αἰσθήσεώς ἐστι τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐξ ὧν ἐστι τὸ τρέφεσθαι τοῖς σώμασι· ξηρῶν, ὑγρῶν, θερμῶν, ψυχρῶν. εὖ δὲ δῆλον ὡς τοῖς τοιούτοις τὰ ζῷα τρέφεται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὰ καὶ θερμὰ τροφή ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ πόσις. καὶ τοίνυν ἐν τῇ πείνῃ τῆς τροφῆς ξηρῶν καὶ θερμῶν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, ἐν

2 λέγει Mpr (ex λέγειν) 10–11 ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων ] τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων M A vid. ex τὸ) 21 τούτου, φησί transp. M A 25–136.1 ἐν—ἐπιθυμία om. M 1–4 414a 29–32 4–21 414a 32–b 6

21–136.12 414b 6–14

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[Note] that, having clarified and explained in what way the soul is a form and an actuality, he again recapitulates what he has previously stated and says that some ensouled creatures have all the capacities of the soul, whereas some do not have all, but some of them, and some have only one – and by “capacities” he means the rational, the locomotive, the perceptive and the nutritive ones. And plants have the nutritive – 2 that is, the vegetative – capacity (for growth as well as reproduction coexist with being nourished); but animals also have, he says, the perceptive capacity in addition to this, and the desiderative capacity coexists with the perceptive one; but the desiderative capacity is divided into three: appetite, passion and wish; for in fact these three are all specific desires manifested within the ambits of different forms [of soul], and in human beings all three parts of the desiderative capacity are present, in other animals two (appetite and passion), and in a few – namely, in those that have sense perception to a lesser extent than all the others – only one (appetite). Indeed, it is impossible for 3 there to be sense perception at all unless it is also immediately and inseparably followed by desire. For the experience of pleasure or discomfort coexists with perceiving, and these experiences are of necessity accompanied by, in the case of pleasure, appetite, and in the case of discomfort, the avoidance of the discomforting things themselves. Thus the desiderative capacity is inseparably associated with the perceptive one. For in fact, even if it can be seen that the senses are not all present in all animals (but, rather, that there are some in which all are present, some in which some are, and some in which only one sense is present, namely, touch, which we have already declared to be common to all animals), still, even for those which have only the sense of touch the experience of pleasure or discomfort is immediately attendant on the touch. For we can see that even zoophytes, which use only touch, and in a more inadequate way than virtually all other animals, are caused to dilate by some things that collide with them from outside, and thus clearly experience pleasure, but are caused to contract by other things, as if they are discomforted, and thus necessarily have appetite for the former things while trying to avoid the latter. Moreover, he says, a further indi- 4 cation and true confirmation of this is that the apprehension of those qualities – dry, wet, hot and cold – from which nourishing results for the bodies belongs to the sense of touch. It is clear enough that it is by these kinds of things that animals are nourished: for dry and hot things are nourishment, while cold and wet things are drink. Accordingly, an appetite for dry and hot things is involved in hunger for nourishment, and an appetite for cold and wet things is involved in thirst for drink, and thus it is clear that

8 cf. Phlp. 248.28–29. 8–13 cf. Phlp. 249.10–23. 13–15 cf. Phlp. 248.34–249.1. 16–19 cf. Phlp. 249.28–32. 24 cf. Them. 47.16–17. 25–28 cf. Phlp. 249.5–7. 28–29 cf. Phlp. 249.32–33. 32–34 cf. Them. 47.31–32.

136 | Theodoros Metochites

δὲ τῇ δίψῃ τῆς πόσεως ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἀχώριστός ἐστι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ ἐπιθυμία. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἔλαττον πάντων αἰσθανομένοις – κατ’ αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἁφήν – αὕτη σύνεστι· τῶν γὰρ εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων, ὡς πρόδηλόν ἐστι, πρώτως καὶ οἰκείως ἡ ἁφὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ὅτι καὶ ταῦτά εἰσιν οἷς τρέφεται τὸ ζῷον καὶ ὧν ἐστιν ἡ ὄρεξις διὰ τῆς πείνης καὶ τῆς δίψης, ὡς εἴρηται· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν οὔτε χρῶμα οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμή, ἅτινά εἰσι τῶν ἄλλων τριῶν αἰσθήσεων – ὁράσεως, ἀκοῆς, ὀσφρήσεως – αἰσθητά. ὅ γε μὴν χυμὸς ἁπτόν τί ἐστι καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τρόπον τινὰ ἁφή ἐστι, καὶ πολὺ τὸ κοινὸν τῇ τε γεύσει καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ χυμός – εἰ καὶ ἁπτόν ἐστιν ὅτι δὴ γευστόν – ὀρεκτὸν ὡς τροφὴ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα· οὐ V140r γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χυμὸς αὐτὸς | τροφή, ἀλλ’ ἥδυσμά τι ὡς εἰπεῖν τροφῆς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ κατα5 λαμβανόμενον. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τούτων ὑπερτίθεται ἐν ἄλλοις μεθύστερον διασαφῆσαι πλατυκώτερον, ἀλλ’, ὅπερ προελέγετο, πάλιν ἐπαναλαμβάνων φησὶν ὅτι ἀχωρίστως τῇ ἁφῇ συνεπακολουθεῖ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ φανταστικὸν καθόλου πάσῃ ἁφῇ, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς καὶ περὶ τούτου ἐρεῖν φησιν· ἕπεται δέ, φησίν, ἐπ’ ἐνίων τῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἁφὴν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπους κινητικόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλέον μετεχόντων 6 ψυχῆς ἢ κατὰ τὰ ζῳόφυτα. ἔτι δὲ κατὰ προσθήκην ἐνίοις ἕπεται καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν αὐτό, ἤτοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἴσως δὲ καὶ τούτων ἔστιν ἔτι τι τιμιώτερον καὶ ὑψηλότερον. τοῦτο δὲ λέγει ἢ πρὸς τὰ οὐράνια ἀφορῶν, ἃ καὶ κατὰ τόπον ἐστὶ κινητικὰ καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ διανοητικὰ δοκεῖ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις εἶναι (ἀπαθῆ μέν γε ἄλλως καὶ ἀνενδεῆ τροφῆς καὶ αὐξήσεως), ἢ πρός τινας ἄλλας φύσεις δαιμονίας, ἃς μεταξὺ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς ἐδόξασαν οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφοί. 7

Ὅτι φησίν, ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ τὸ «σχῆμα» λέγεται κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν διαφόρων σχημάτων, οὐχ ὡς γένος συνωνύμως κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὡς μόνον ὄνομα κοινόν, οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινῶς εἰρημένον κατὰ πάσης ψυχῆς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὡς συνωνύμως κατηγορούμενον ὡς κατὰ εἰδῶν ἐν οἷς ἅπασι θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ’ ὡς κοινῶς

6 κατὰ συμβεβηκός ] κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός M : κατασυμβεβηκός A 9 τε om. M || ἀλλὰ ] καὶ (ut vid.) add. Vac (erasum) 12 μεθύστερον διασαφῆσαι transp. M A 15 καὶ om. A || τῶν om. M A 19–21 ση′ adn. Mmarg 20 ἄλλως ] ὄντα addere velim 12–22 414b 14–19 23–138.28 414b 20–28 12–13 ἐν ἄλλοις: 2.7–11

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appetite is inseparable from the capacity for sense perception. Indeed, appetite is connected even with those creatures which have sense perception to the least extent of all (on the basis solely of touch); for, as is obvious, it is the aforementioned qualities that touch primarily and naturally apprehends, since they are also the means by which the animal is nourished, and the objects of the desire expressed in hunger and thirst, as stated. For the other perceptible objects [are the objects of this desire] coincidentally. For neither colour nor sound nor odour – which are the perceptible objects of the three other senses (sight, hearing and smell) – contributes anything to nourishment. To be sure, flavour, too, is itself also an object of touch, inasmuch as taste is also, in a certain manner, touch, and the commonality between taste and touch is significant, but nonetheless flavour is not – even if it is an object of touch inasmuch as it is an object of taste – desired as nourishment, in accordance with the statements above. For flavour is not itself nourishment but, so to speak, a sort of seasoning of nourishment, which is found to exist in the latter. What relates to these things he postpones for more exten- 5 sive clarification later in another context. But he recapitulates again what he was saying earlier and states that the desiderative capacity inseparably accompanies touch. As to whether the imaginative capacity, too, universally [accompanies] all touch, that question will also, he says, be discussed in the sequel. But, he says, in the case of some of those creatures that possess touch the locomotive capacity is also entailed, namely, in the case of those other animals whose share in soul is larger than that of the zoophytes. As a further addition the capacity for reasoning is also entailed in the 6 case of some animals, namely, human beings; but perhaps there is something that is even more honourable and elevated than these. He says this either with reference to the heavenly bodies, which are capable of locomotion and moreover considered by the philosophers to be ensouled and to have the capacity for reasoning (but to be otherwise impassible and free from the need of nourishment and growth), or else with reference to some other daemonic natures, which the pagan philosophers believed to exist in between divine and human life forms. [Note] that he seems to say that just as the term “figure” is applied jointly to the dif- 7 ferent figures, without being synonymously predicated of them as a genus, but merely as a common name, so it is also with the very term that we have applied jointly to all soul. For it is not synonymously predicated in the way [in which a genus is predicated] of all the species in which it is manifested, but is rather in this [restricted] sense, so to

6 cf. Phlp. 253.20–24. 8–10 cf. Them. 47.34–35. 23–28 cf. Prisc. 106.25–30. 255.6–15. 29–32 cf. Phlp. 255.25–26; 256.17–18; Prisc. 107.33–35.

26–28 cf. Phlp.

25–26 but to be otherwise impassible : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “although, apart from this, they are impassible …”.

138 | Theodoros Metochites

οὕτως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς θεωρούμενον καὶ λεγόμενον. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σχῆμα ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον – ὃ πρῶτόν ἐστι σχῆμα – καὶ τὰ μετ’ αὐτὸ ἑξῆς ἅπαντα σχήματα (ὄνομα γάρ ἐστι κατὰ ἀριθμοῦ πολλῶν διαφόρων κοινῶς λεγόμενον), οὕτως οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινὸν «ἡ ψυχὴ» ἄλλο τι παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος – ἤτοι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πρώτου – κατὰ μέρος καταλαμβανόμενα, ἃ ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριθμεῖται, οὐ συνωνύμως, ὡς εἴρηται, κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορούμενον (οἷον τοῦ φυτικοῦ, τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, λέγω, τοῦ κινητικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων). οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἴδιός τις λόγος αὐτοῦ τοῦ κοινοῦ ὀνόματος ὡς γένους τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸ εἴδεσι πεφυκὼς ἅπασι καὶ προσαρμόζων, ἀλλ’ ἔστι γε ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα ἴδιος λόγος κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖος. καὶ διατοῦτο χρὴ μὲν τῷ κοινῷ ὀνόματι τῷδε χρῆσθαι ὡς δηλωτικῷ πάντων καὶ ἑνοποιῷ οὑτωσί πως, οὐ χρὴ δὲ ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷδε μόνον τῷ κοινῶς εἰρημένῳ ἐπ’ αὐ8 τῶν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστά γε ζητεῖν τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν δηλωτικὸν αὐτοῦ. ὅτι V140v δ’ οὐχ ὡς συνωνύμως ταῦτα λέγεται πάνυ τοι πρόδηλον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σχή- | ματος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· τὸ γὰρ συνωνύμως κατηγορούμενον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν τῷδέ ἐστιν ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἢ ἐν τῷδε, οὐδὲ ἔλαττον, οὐδέ ἐστί τι πρῶτον τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὸ καὶ δεύτερον ἄλλο καὶ ἑξῆς, ἀλλ’ ἅπαντα ἐπίσης πρὸς αὐτὸ ἔχει, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε αὐτῷ οὐσιοῦται. ἐπ’ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν σχημάτων οὐκ ἔχει τοῦθ’ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τρίγωνόν ἐστι πρῶτον σχῆμα, καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸ ἐφεξῆς τὸ τετράγωνον, καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸ ἄλλο, καὶ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ’ ἄλλο· καὶ πάντων πρῶτον τὸ τρίγωνον, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἀναλύειν ἔστι καὶ διαιρεῖν ἕκαστον, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ τρίγωνον οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχει· τὸ θρεπτικόν ἐστι πρῶτον αὐτῆς (εἴτουν τὸ φυτικόν), καὶ ἐφεξῆς τὸ ζωτικόν, καὶ ἔπειτα τὸ λογικόν· καὶ καθ’ εἱρμὸν οὕτως ἡ προχώρησις, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ λογικὸν ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς ἄνευ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ («ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς» δ’ εἴρηται πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ ἀιδίων λογικῶν καὶ θειοτέρων), οὐδ’ ἔστι τὸ ζωτικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ κατὰ τόπους κινητικὸν ἄνευ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· αὐτὸ μέν γε τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἔστι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων χωρίς, ὥσπερ ὁρᾶται ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ὥστ’ εἶναι λοιπὸν πρῶτον αὐτὸ κατὰ φύσιν, κἀκ τοῦδε τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφεξῆς εἰς τὸ τελεώτερον προχώρησιν 9 θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ οἱονεί πως συνάγεσθαι. καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο παραπλησίως, φησίν, ὥσπερ

2 σχῆμα¹ ] οὐκ add. M A 4 τὸ κοινὸν «ἡ ψυχὴ» ] ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ κοινὸν M A 6 οὐ ] οὐδὲ malim 7 κινητικοῦ ] κοινητικοῦ M 11 μόνον ] μόνω M A 15 οὐδέ ] οὐδ’ M A 16 ἀλλ’ ἅπαντα ] ἀλλὰ πάντα M A 24 ζωτικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν ] αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ζωτικὸν M A 25–26 καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ] καθεαυτὸ A 28–140.3 414b 28–32

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speak, jointly manifested in and applied to all soul. For just as the term “figure” does not denote another thing besides the triangle – which is the first figure – and all the figures following after it (for it is a name applied jointly to a large number of different things), in the same way the common term “soul” does not denote another thing besides those parts, comprehended one by one, starting from a given origin (namely, the first part, the nutritive capacity), which are enumerated under the name of “soul”, which is not, as mentioned, synonymously predicated of them (I mean, for instance, of the vegetative capacity, of the perceptive capacity, of the motive capacity and of the others). For it is not the case that there is some special account of the common name that is, like that of a genus, naturally suited and applicable to all the species under it; rather, each of the items under the common name has a special account that belongs to it naturally. For this reason we should certainly treat this common name as indicative of them all and as unifying in this [restricted] sense, but must not content ourselves with only this term jointly applied to them, but should first and foremost search for what is special to each item and naturally indicative of this. It is quite clear, 8 both in the case of “figure” and in the case of “soul”, that these terms are not used synonymously. For that which is predicated synonymously is not to a higher degree present in any given item of which it is predicated than it is in any other, nor to a lesser degree; and nor is one of the items under it the first and another item the second and so on, but all of them are on a par in relation to it; and it does not express the essence of any given item to a higher degree than it does that of any other. In the case of the figures, however, this is not the situation: rather, the triangle is the first figure, the quadrangle is the next figure after this, and after that there is another one, and there is always one after another. And the first of them all is the triangle: each figure can be reduced to and divided into this, whereas the triangle itself cannot be reduced to any other figure. In the case of the soul, too, the situation is the same: its first capacity is the nutritive – that is, vegetative – one, the next is the animative one, and after that there is the rational one. And the progression is serial like that, so among mortal creatures the rational capacity does not occur without the nutritive one (the phrase “among mortal creatures” is added by way of contradistinction to the heavenly, eternal and more divine rational beings); nor do the animative, perceptive and locomotive capacities occur without the nutritive one; whereas the nutritive capacity itself does occur by itself even separately from the aforementioned capacities, as is seen in plants, the consequence being that it is what is naturally first and the origin from which the successive progression of the other capacities towards increasingly full development is seen to take place and to be, as it were, built up. And in this re- 9

1–5 cf. Phlp. 255.36–256.2. 12–15 cf. Phlp. 257.8–18; Prisc. 107.39–108.1. 28–31 cf. Phlp. 259.9–13; 260.14–22. 34–36 cf. Them. 49.2–4.

21–34 cf. Phlp. 256.2–22.

7 which is not …: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “and nor is it …”.

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καὶ ἐν τοῖς σχήμασι κἀνταῦθα· ἀεὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς δυνάμει ὑπάρχει τὰ πρῶτα· δυνάμει γὰρ τῷ τετραγώνῳ ἐνθεωρεῖται τὸ τρίγωνον – διαλυθήσεται γάρ, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, τὸ τετράγωνον εἰς τρίγωνα – καὶ δυνάμει τῷ αἰσθητικῷ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θρεπτικόν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς δὲ ὡσαύτως, φησίν, ἔστιν ὁρᾶν· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἁφῆς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις, ἄνευ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἔστιν ἁφή· ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς ἅπαντα τὰ ζῷα τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μετέχοντα αἰσθήσεων ἐξανάγκης καὶ τὴν ἁπτικὴν ἔχει, ἔνια δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν μόνην ἔχοντα οὐκ ἔχει τὰς ἄλλας, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητικὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχει. καὶ πάντα τὰ λογικὰ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐ μὴν πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα καὶ ὅλως ἔμψυχα μετέχει καὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔνια μέν, φησί, μετέχει τοῦ φανταστικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ νοός (οἷα τὰ ζῷα), ἔνια δὲ τῶν ἐμψύχων οὐδὲ τούτου μετέχει, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον ἔχει τὸ θρεπτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἥττονα καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν εὐτελέστερα καὶ ὑποβεβηκότα οὐ συμπεριέχει καὶ τἄλλα τὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτά, τά γε μὴν ὑψηλότερά τε καὶ τελειότερα καὶ τἄλλ’ ἅπαντα συνεισάγει ἑαυτοῖς καὶ συμ- | περιέχει τὰ ἥττονα ἑαυτῶν. καὶ κοινότερα μέν ἐστι λοιπὸν αὐτὰ τὰ ἐλάττονα καὶ πᾶσι σχεδὸν ἐνόντα καὶ ἐνθεωρούμενα, στενότερα δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ὀλίγων καταλαμβανόμενα αὐτὰ τὰ τελεώτερα, ἃ μὴ συνεισάγεται τοῖς ἄλλοις, αὐτὰ δὲ τἄλλα συνεισάγει καὶ συμπεριέχει ἑαυτῶν ἀχώριστα (τὰ ὑποβεβηκότα δηλαδή), καθὼς τοῖς λογικοῖς καὶ διανοητικοῖς αὐτοῖς ἕπεται καὶ σύνεισιν ἀχώριστα τἄλλα (ἤτοι τὸ κατὰ τόπους κινητικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ θρεπτικόν). ἐνταῦθα μέν γε, φησίν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος νοῦς ἀσύνδετος καὶ ἀνώτερός ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐξηρμένος τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ὕλης καθάπαξ, ἀλλ’ ἄρα περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ νοὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὅστις ὁ φανταστικός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐρεῖ, ἀχώριστος τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοός, ὃς συνέζευκται καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ ὕλῃ ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν – καὶ περὶ αὐτήν ἐστιν ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια – καὶ οὐκ ἀμέθεκτος αὐτῆς ἐστι παντάπασι καὶ ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄσχετος, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ εἰρημένος θεωρητικὸς νοῦς. * *

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5 ἔστιν¹ ] ἡ add. M 6 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 7 τὴν ] τὰ V || μόνην om. A || αἰσθητικὰ V1pc 13 συμπεριέχει scripsi : συμπεριάγει codd. 16–17 ὑποβεβηκότα ] ὑπερβεβηκότα M 19 φησίν om. M A 19–20 ση′ adn. Mmarg 24 ἐστι om. M A 3–25 415a 3–12

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spect the situation is much the same, he says, in this case as in that of the figures. For the first items are always present as potentialities in the subsequent ones: the triangle is manifested as a potentiality in the quadrangle – for, as is obvious, the quadrangle will be divisible into triangles – and the nutritive capacity is present as a potentiality in the perceptive one. The same thing can be seen, he says, also in the case of touch: 10 for without touch the other senses cannot exist, but touch exists without the other senses. For it can be seen that all those animals that partake of the other senses of necessity also possess the tactile sense; but some animals, which have only touch, do not have the others, whereas all those which have the capacity to perceive have touch. And all rational animals have sense perception, but it is not the case that all those animals that have sense perception – and [all] ensouled creatures in general – also partake of the capacity for reasoning; but some, he says, partake of the imaginative and affectable intellect (namely, the animals), whereas some ensouled creatures do not even partake of this, but possess only the nutritive part of the soul. The upshot is that 11 the lesser and so to speak baser and subordinate capacities do not also include the others, the ones that are above these, while the higher and more fully developed capacities also co-introduce all the others along with themselves and include those that are lesser than they themselves are. And consequently those capacities that are lesser and that are inherent and manifested in practically all [ensouled creatures] are more common, whereas the more fully developed capacities, which are not co-introduced by the others, but themselves co-introduce and include the others – that is, the subordinate capacities – as inseparable from themselves, are more narrowly confined and encountered in a small number of cases, inasmuch as the other capacities – that is, the locomotive, perceptive and nutritive ones – inseparably accompany and co-exist with the capacities for reasoning and thinking. To be sure, the discussion here does not, he 12 says, concern the contemplative intellect: for this kind of intellect is independent and superior to the above‐described capacities, and transcends the corporeal and material realm altogether; rather, the discussion is about the affectable intellect, which is, as he will explain in the following chapters, the one that is capable of imagination and inseparable from body and matter, as well as about the practical intellect, which is also conjoined with matter during its activity – and its activity is centred upon matter – and which is not entirely free, unrestrained and unparticipated by matter, as is the character of the aforementioned contemplative intellect. * *

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12–13 No ancient commentator says that the imagination ascribed by Aristotle at 415a 10–11 to some but not all animals is the affectable intellect, but Priscian says (108.29–30) that it is the determinate kind, which has a share in memory. The identification of the affectable intellect mentioned by Aristotle at 3.5, 430a 24–25 with imagination is made by Philoponus at 5.38–6.4 (and by Metochites again in 3.4.6). 28–31 cf. Prisc. 109.2–8.

142 | Theodoros Metochites

4 Ὅτι, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δήλου ὄντος ὡς κατὰ μέρος περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων ζητητέον τοὺς προσήκοντας λόγους, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, φησί, λοιπὸν διεξελθεῖν πρότερον ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰδῶν καὶ μορίων ἕκαστον – ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι κοινὸν ὅρον ἁπάντων εἶναι – κατὰ τὸν διωρισμένον τρόπον· ἔπειτα μετὰ τὸ σκέψασθαι καὶ ἀποδοῦναι καὶ διορίσασθαι ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς – ἤτοι τὸ διανοητικόν, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ θρεπτικόν καὶ τἄλλα – ζητητέον αὖθις καὶ 2 περὶ τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων ἑκάστῳ καθ’ αὑτό. ἐπεὶ δὲ σαφεστέρα γίνεται ἡ διδασκαλία ἡ περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἐάν τις προλαβὼν διεξέλθῃ πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῶν τῶν δυνάμεων (ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ καταλαβεῖν ἢ διορίσασθαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ῥᾳδίως ἐστὶν ἀνευρίσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ διανοητικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν), ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πρότερον διεξελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν (οἷον τῶν εἰρημένων· τοῦ νοεῖν, τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων), εἶτα περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν δυνάμεών τε καὶ 3 ἕξεων (τοῦ τε νοητικοῦ καὶ τῆς νοήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως). πάλιν δέ, φησίν, ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἔκδηλοι μᾶλλον γίνονται αἱ ἐνέργειαι («ἀντικείμενα» δὲ λέγει νῦν ἐνταῦθα τὰ ὡς πρός τι ἀντικείμενα· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν τῷ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ νοοῦν νοηV141v τὸν νοεῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον αἰσθητὸν | αἰσθάνεται), ῥητέον ἂν εἴη διατοῦτο μάλιστα πρότερον περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀντικειμένων – ὡς εἴρηται, κατὰ τὰ πρός τι – ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐταῖς, οἷον τοῦ νοητοῦ, τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ὅτι προδιαληπτέον, φησί, πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τῆς ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς τροφῆς αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς γεννήσεως, εἴτουν τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ γεννητικοῦ, ταυτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ καθόλου περὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ψυχῆς· αὕτη γὰρ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτά5 τη καὶ συνυπάρχουσα πᾶσιν, ὡς προείρηται. ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἴδιον τὸ θρεπτικόν τε καὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν ὁμοίου· συνεισάγεται δὲ πάντως τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ τὸ αὐξητικόν· ἔ-

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4 ὅρον ] ὅρων M 17 μάλιστα Mpr (ex μάλλ-) 20 εἰρημένων ] τῶν add. V : εἰρημένων εἰδῶν tento (cf. supra 2.4.1) 21 τοῦ2 om. V 22 καὶ καθόλου iter. Mac (exp. M1 ) 23–144.19 ση′ ὅλον τοῦτο adn. Mmarg 1–7 415a 14–16 7–13 415a 16–20 13–19 415a 20–22

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[Note] that, since it is clear from what has been said that we must seek the relevant accounts concerning each of the soul capacities severally, it is therefore necessary, he says, to set out first what each of the forms or parts of the soul is – seeing that there cannot be a common definition of them all – in accordance with the method specified; and then, after having examined and stated and defined what each part of the soul is (namely, the capacities for reasoning, for locomotion, for perception, for nourishment and the rest), we must furthermore also inquire into the per se attributes that belong to each of them. And since the doctrine concerning the capacities will be clearer if one 2 begins by first setting out the activities of the capacities (for on the basis of having comprehended, or defined, what it is to reason and to perceive it is easy to find out what the capacity to reason and the capacity to perceive are), it is thus necessary to give first an account of the activities (for instance, the aforementioned: thinking, perceiving and the like), and then an account of the capacities and competences themselves (the intellective capacity and thought as well as the perceptive capacity and sense perception). Again, he says, since the activities often become clearer from the opposites 3 of the activities (and in the present context he uses the term “opposites” of things that are opposed as relatives: for the intelligible object is opposed to thinking and the perceptible object to perceiving, for whatever is thinking is thinking an intelligible object and whatever is perceiving is perceiving a perceptible object), for this reason it is by all means imperative first to talk about the opposites – as mentioned, in the sense of correlatives – of the activities themselves (such as the intelligible object, the perceptible object, nourishment and the like). [Note] that the first things to discuss, he says, before all the other parts of the soul 4 that were mentioned above, are nourishment and reproduction, that is, the nutritive and reproductive capacity, or, to use a general term for the same thing, the vegetative soul. For this is the first and most common soul, which co-exists with all [the others], as already stated. For the nutritive capacity and the capacity to produce a similar crea- 5 ture are special properties of this soul; and with the nutritive capacity the capacity to

1–4 cf. Phlp. 262.13–16. 7–8 per se attributes: cf. Phlp. 262.25–28. 8 clearer: cf. Phlp. 263.30–31; 264.14–15; Them. 49.18–19. 15–19 cf. Phlp. 264.24–29. 15 clearer: cf. Phlp. 264.1–2; Them. 49.27–28. 20–21 in the sense of correlatives: cf. Them. 49.26–27. 25–26 cf. Phlp. 267.5–6. 28–145.1 cf. Prisc. 110.15; Phlp. 259.2–3; 267.2–3. 14 thought: one would have expected “intellect” (toū noū), which is the usual term for the capacity for thinking. Perhaps “thought” (tēs noḗseōs) was preferred because it is of the same morphological type as the following “sense perception” (tēs aisthḗseōs), which is the usual term for both the relevant capacity and the corresponding activity.

144 | Theodoros Metochites

στι γὰρ σκοπὸς τῇ φύσει καὶ ἔργον, ὡς αὐτός φησι, φυσικώτατον τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ὅσα τέλεια καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ μὴ πεπηρωμένα μηδ’ ἐκ ταυτομάτου γινόμενα – ὡς οἱ σκώληκες καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ σήψεως γίνεται – τὸ ἕτερον οἷον ἑαυτὸ ποιῆσαι (οἷον τὸ ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, τὸ δὲ φυτὸν φυτόν). ἔστι δ’ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁρμὴ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἂν ἅπαντα καθὼς οἷόν τέ ἐστι μετέχοι τοῦ θείου κατὰ τὸ ἀίδιον· τὸ γὰρ θεῖον οὐσίωται τῷ εἶναι καὶ ἀιδίως εἶναι, ἐφίεται δὲ πάντα τὰ ἔμψυχα αὐτοῦ τούτου, τοῦ θείου καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι. καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦτο τῇ φύσει, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πραγματεύεται καὶ σπουδάζει. 6 τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος διττόν, τὸ μέν, φησίν, οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ. οἷον διττὸν τὸ τέλος τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὗ ἕνεκα οἰκοδομεῖ, τὸ οὗ χάριν, ἡ οἰκία (ἐργάζεται γὰρ ἵνα ποιήσῃ τὴν οἰκίαν), καὶ τὸ ᾧ, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τέλος τῷ οἰκοδομοῦντι καὶ ἕνεκα τούτου οἰκοδομεῖ, ἤγουν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δι’ ὠφέλειαν καὶ προμήθειαν αὐτοῦ), ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ἐνεργεῖ τὸ γεννᾶν ἀεί, καὶ τέλος μὲν ἔχει τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐνεργεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ καὶ τέλος ἔχει ἄλλον τρόπον ἕνεκα τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἔμψυχον ἕκαστον, ᾧ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ πραγματεύεται. 7 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς κοινωνίαν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸ ἀιδίως εἶναι καὶ συνουσίαν συνεχῶς μετὰ τοῦ θείου, τῇ διαδοχῇ τοῦτο οἰκονομεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀεὶ ὄν, ποιεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον ὅμοιον ἀεὶ ἑαυτῷ, ὅπερ ἕτερον μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τῇ διαδοχῇ τὸ ἀίδιον οἰκονομεῖ καὶ τὴν μετουσίαν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ θείου. καὶ ἔστιν εἰς τοῦτο ὄργανον αὐτὸ τὸ σπέρμα (τῆς διὰ τὴν γέννησιν δηλονότι ἀιδιότητος), ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτου καὶ αἴτιον, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, ἡ ψυχή· ἄνευ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὰ τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ

1 γὰρ ] ὁ add. M A 3 οἷον¹ iter. A 4 καὶ ] ἡ add. M A 8 τὸ⁵ ] τω A 12 ἐνεργεῖ Vpr (ut vid. ex ἐνεργεῖν ἐστι) 17 τὸ ] τῶ M 18 τῇ διαδοχῇ om. M A || οἰκονομεῖ ] τῆ διαδοχῆ add. M A 19 καὶ¹ ] τοῦ add. M A 8–19 415b 2–7 19–146.5 415b 8–12

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grow is inevitably also co-introduced: for it is the aim of nature and, as [Aristotle] himself says, the most natural act for those ensouled creatures that are fully developed in themselves and neither mutilated nor spontaneously generated – as worms and all those creatures that are generated from matter and putrefaction are – to produce another creature like itself (as, for instance, an animal produces an animal and a plant a plant). It is towards this that the fervour and drive of nature is directed, in order that all things should, to the extent that it is possible, partake of divinity with respect to eternity. For the essence of divinity lies in existence and [more precisely] eternal existence, and all ensouled creatures covet precisely this: divinity and eternal existence. And this is the goal of nature and that for the sake of which all [ensouled creatures] exert and apply themselves. But “that for the sake of which”, or the goal, is twofold: 6 on the one hand, he says, it is the objective, on the other hand the beneficiary. For instance, the goal of the builder, that for the sake of which he builds, is twofold: (a) the objective, the house (for he works in order to produce the house), and (b) the beneficiary, which is the human being (for the builder has this goal and builds for the sake of this, namely, for the sake of the human being, for her benefit and with her interest in mind). Ιn the same way, then, nature, too, eternally actuates reproduction in ensouled creatures, and its goal for the actuation in question, that for the sake of which it acts, is divinity; but in another sense its goal and that for the sake of which it acts is the existence of the individual ensouled creature, for whose benefit it acts and exerts itself. And since it is impossible for perishable beings to have community in re- 7 spect of eternal existence and continuous co-existence with the divine, they manage this by succession: individual numerically single beings are not themselves eternally existent, but each being always produces something similar to itself, which is numerically different, but the same in species; and in this way it administers to itself eternity and participation in the good and divine by succession. And the seed is an instrument to this end (namely, that of eternity brought about by reproduction); but the first principle and cause of this is obviously the soul. For without the soul the workings of the seed and reproduction would not be possible, nor would any such enterprise on the

3–4 cf. Phlp. 267.25–26. 6 cf. Phlp. 270.29–30. 12–21 cf. Phlp. 269.30–270.7. 17–21 cf. Them. 50.15–17. 23–26 cf. Phlp. 270.30–32. 26–27 cf. Soph. 58.11–12. For the most part, Sophonias follows Philoponus’ account of the twofold goal of natural reproduction closely; but at this point, where Philoponus has explained that the goal in the sense of objective is the striving for divinity and the goal in the sense of beneficiary is the individual soul, and remarks (270.7–11) that this is true not only of the reproduction of animals but also of that of plants, since they, too have “organic” bodies, Sophonias adds a line and a half without a clear parallel in the text of Philoponus: “for in their case the seed is an instrument, as are the bodies of the souls in them, and the striving for eternity is present in them too.” The resemblance to Metochites’ statement seems too great to be coincidental. Either, then, Sophonias and Metochites must both have used a different version of Philoponus’ text than the one printed by Hayduck, or else Metochites depends on Sophonias here.

146 | Theodoros Metochites

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τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς (λέγεται γὰρ «αἰτία» καὶ «ἀρχὴ» ἡ ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ εἰδικὴ καὶ ἡ ὑλικὴ καὶ ἡ τελική), ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις αἰτία ἄνευ τῆς ὑλικῆς αἰτίας· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὡς ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ ὡς εἰδικὸν καὶ ὡς τελικόν (ἤτοι κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρεῖς τρόπους). καὶ πρῶτον δηλοῖ πῶς ἐστιν εἰδικὸν αἴτιον· φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι δῆλον ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου· τοῖς ζῴοις δὲ τὸ εἶναί ἐστι κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ ζῆν ἐστι διὰ τὴν ψυχήν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἔστι τὸ ζῆν ὅτι μὴ διὰ τὴν ψυχήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι τοῖς ζῶσιν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς αἰτία, καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐντελέχεια, ὡς διώρισται, τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης, ἥτις ἐστὶ δύναμις μόνον, ὡς εἴρηται. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅπως καὶ τελικὴ αἰτία ἡ ψυχή· φησὶ γάρ· ὥσπερ ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς – ἤτοι ὁ οἰκοδομικὸς ἢ ὁ ὑφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ παντὸς ἄλλου δημιουργικός – πάντα ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πάντα ἃ ποιεῖ ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ποιεῖ· ὀργανικὰ γὰρ πάντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν σώματα ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς τὴν ψυχήν· τὰ γὰρ ὀργανικὰ πάντα ἕνεκα τοῦ χρησομένου παρασκευάζεται. τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα διττὸν εἶναι πρὸ ὀλίγου διώρισται, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ· καὶ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἡ φύσις τὰ ὀργανικὰ σώματα πρὸς τέλος τὸ οὗ κατασκευάζει (τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτήν), πρὸς τέλος δὲ τὸ ᾧ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ σύνθετον (τὸ ζῷον, εἴτουν τὸ ἔμψυχον). μετὰ τοῦτο δ’ ἔπειτ’ αὖθις δεικνύει καὶ ὅπως ποιητικὸν αἴτιόν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή, ἤτοι ἀφ’ οὗ ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ εἴωθε καλεῖν τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον. φησὶ γοῦν προδήλως ποιητικὸν αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν ψυχήν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ψυχὴν κινοῦνται. εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ τυχὸν ὡς οὐ πάντα τὰ ἔμψυχα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖται κίνησιν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τινὰ ἃ μὴ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν κινεῖται, οἷα προδήλως τινὰ τῶν ζῴων – ἤτοι τὰ ζῳόφυτα – καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ φυτά, καὶ εἰ μόνης ἄρα τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως

3 ἡ¹ om. A || ὑλικὴ ] ὑλητικὴ M 5 εἰδικὸν V1pc (ex ὑλικὸν) 10 γάρ ] ὡς (vel ὅτι) addere velim 11 δημιουργικός ] δηουργικός M 14 χρησομένου ] χρύσομένου M || παρασκευάζεται ] παραλαμβάνεται A 16 κατασκευάζει ] πρὸς addere velim 17 τὸ³ om. M A 21 κινεῖται ] κινῆται A 5–9 415b 12–14 9–17 415b 15–21

17–148.10 415b 21–28

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part of nature. Now, while both “cause” and “first principle” are used in many senses (for we speak of the efficient as well as the formal, the material and the final cause and first principle), the soul is a cause in ensouled creatures in all senses except as a material cause, for it is one in the sense of an efficient cause, but also in the sense of a formal cause and in the sense of a final cause (that is, in the three senses mentioned). So first he explains in what way it is a formal cause: he says that it is evident that the cause of the being of each creature is coextensive with the form. But for animals being is coextensive with living, and living is brought about by the soul, for living is not possible in any other way than that brought about by the soul. For the soul is the cause of life for living beings, the account and the actuality – in the sense defined – of their natural matter, which is merely a potentiality, as mentioned. After this he explains in what way the soul is also a final cause. For he says [that] just as the practical intellect – that is, the [intellectual] capacity to build a house or to weave or to create anything else – does everything it does for the sake of something, in the same way nature, too, in all ensouled creatures, does everything it does for the sake of the soul. For all the bodies of animals as well as plants are “organic” in order for the soul to use them. For all organic things are devised for the sake of the prospective user. But “that for the sake of which” was just now defined as being ambiguous between the objective and the beneficiary. Accordingly, in this case nature constructs the organic bodies with a view to a goal in the sense of an objective, the soul, but [also] with a view to a goal in the sense of a beneficiary, namely, with a view to the composite thing, the animal, or the ensouled creature. And then, after this, again, he also shows in what way the soul is an efficient cause, that is, “that from which the motion takes its origin” (for that is how he usually calls the efficient cause). Thus he says that the soul is manifestly an efficient cause of the animals’ movement in respect of place: for it is on account of having a soul that they move. Now, if perchance somebody were to say that not all ensouled creatures move in respect of place, but there are some which do not move in this respect, such as, evidently, certain animals (namely, the zoophytes), as well as plants, and that, consequently, if it is only of movement in respect of place that the soul is an efficient cause, then the soul is not going to be an efficient cause in those kinds of ensouled creature that do not have movement in respect of place – even

6–9 cf. Phlp. 273.25–31; 271.34–36 (although Philoponus’ use of ousía and katá does not, as Metochites’, make it necessary to translate these words as “being” and “coextensive with”). 12–22 cf. Phlp. 274.2–19. 22–26 cf. Phlp. 274.26–29. 16 “organic”: i.e. of such a nature as to serve as an organ or instrument; see note to 2.1.15. 20–22 with a view to … the soul, … with a view to … the ensouled creature: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “with a view to the soul as a goal in the sense of an objective, and with a view to the composite thing (the animal, or the ensouled creature) as a goal in the sense of a beneficiary”.

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ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἡ ψυχή, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐμψύχοις τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν ποιητικὸν αἴτιον εἴη ἡ ψυχή – ἀλλά, φησί, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν κίνησιν, τὰ δὲ ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν κίνησιν· καὶ τούτων δέ ἐστι ποιητικὴ αἰτία ἡ ψυχή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τίς ἐστιν· ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον | ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις διὰ τὴν ψυχήν ἐστι προδήλως, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλως τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις ζῴοις ἡ αἴσθησις. ἡ δέ γε αὔξησις αὖθις διὰ τροφῆς γίνεται· ἀδύνατον δὲ τρέφεσθαι ἄλλως, εἰ μὴ τὰ ἔχοντα ψυχήν· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα οὐδόλως τρέφεται· ὥστε, ποιητικὸν αἴτιον οὖσα τοῦ τρέφεσθαι ἡ ψυχή, ποιητικὸν ἂν αἴτιον εἴη καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως τῆς γινομένης διὰ τροφῆς. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὰ μὲν γεηρὰ κάτω λέγοντα κατὰ φύσιν , ἤγουν τὰς ῥίζας (τῆς γῆς γὰρ τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι), τὰ δὲ πυρώδη ἄνω, ὡς ἔχουσιν οἱ κλάδοι (τοῦ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ἀνωφερές), καὶ οὕτω τὴν τῶν ῥιζῶν καὶ τῶν κλάδων εἰς τὰ ἐναντία φορὰν ὑπὸ τῶν στοιχείων αἰτιολογοῦντα, οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς. προηγουμένως γάρ, φησίν, οὐχὶ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτὰ ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου χρῆσιν καὶ ὑπουργίαν τῆς φύσεως. ἐπεὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ τὰ στόματα τοῖς ζῴοις ὄργανά εἰσι τῆς τροφῆς, οὕτω τοῖς φυτοῖς αἱ ῥίζαι ὄργανά εἰσι τῆς τροφῆς (δι’ αὐτῶν γὰρ τῶν ῥιζῶν ἕλκει τὰ φυτὰ καὶ πορίζεται τὴν τροφήν), ἄνω ἂν εἶναι λέγοιντο ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς αἱ ῥίζαι, δι’ ὧν τρέφεται, πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ὑπουργίαν τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ τὰ στόματα τοῖς ζῴοις ἄνω. καίτοι γε οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις ἄνω κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὰ στόματα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῆν χρῆσιν τῆς φύσεως ἄνω ἐστὶν ὄντως δι’ ὧν εἰς πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τροφὴ παραπέμπεται. ἄλλως τε, φησίν, εἰ διὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἦν τὰ μὲν τῶν φυτῶν μόρια κάτω φερόμενα, τὰ δ’ ἄνω, εἰ μή τί ἐστι τὸ συνέχον τε καὶ συνδέον, διέσπαστο ἂν καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἓν σῶμα ἦν τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων στοιχείων ὁλκήν, ῥηγνυμένων τῶν μορίων αὐτῶν· ὥστε χρεία ἂν ἐξανάγκης εἴη τινὸς τοῦ ταῦτα συνέχοντος ὥστε μὴ ῥήγνυσθαι· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἄλλο ἂν εἴη ἢ ἡ ψυχή. τινὲς δέ, φησίν, οὐχ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἅμα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν ᾐτιάσαντο τῆς κινήσεως τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐμψύχων, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ πῦρ· τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων καὶ στοιχείων τρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ὑπὸ τροφῆς αὔξειν ἔδοξαν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα προσθήκῃ τινὶ πλεονάζει, οὐ τροφῇ·

8 ἔχοντα¹ ] τὴν add. M A 10 γινομένης ] γενομένης M A 11 αὔξειν supplevi || τῆς A1pc (ut vid. ex τὴν) 14–15 ση′ adn. Mmarg 14 οὐχὶ M1pc 18 πορίζεται M1pc (ex πορίζονται) 20 ἐστι ] εἰσὶ M A 22–23 μόρια κάτω φερόμενα ] κάτω φερόμενα μόρια M A 24 τὰ ἐναντία ] τἀναντία M A || ὁλκήν ] ὀλκὴν V 25 ἂν ἐξανάγκης εἴη ] εἴη ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A1pc (εἴ- ut vid. ex ἂν) 10–22 415b 28–416a 5

22–26 416a 6–9 26–150.5 416a 9–13

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so, he says, even of those that do not have movement in respect of place some have movement in respect of alteration and some have movement in respect of growth and diminution; and the soul is an efficient cause of these [kinds of movement] too. For sense perception is a kind of alteration: for that which perceives is altered by the perceptible object. But sense perception is manifestly brought about by the soul: there is no other way that perceiving animals can have sense perception. And growth, again, comes to pass through nourishment. But it is not possible [for anything] to be nourished in any other way, if those things that have a soul are not [nourished]: for those things that do not have a soul are not nourished at all. Consequently, since the soul is an efficient cause of being nourished, it will also be an efficient cause of the growth that comes to pass through nourishment. This is why he also says that Empedocles was wrong in saying that in plants the earthy parts, that is, the roots, naturally grow downwards (for it is characteristic of earth to be carried downwards), and the fiery parts upwards, as is the case with the branches (for being carried upwards is characteristic of fire), and in thus explaining the movement in contrary directions of the roots and the branches respectively as being caused by the elements rather than by the soul itself. For in the first place, he says, up and down are not the same for all things, but vary according to each thing’s usage and employment of its nature. For just as mouths are organs of nourishment for animals, so roots are organs of nourishment for plants (for it is through the roots that plants draw and procure their nourishment), and therefore the roots, through which they are nourished, may be said to be up in plants, relative to the usage and employment of their nature, just as the mouths are up for animals. Admittedly, the mouths are not up even for all animals, so far as appearances go, but relative to the usage of their nature it is really the part through which nourishment is transmitted to the whole body that is up. Besides, he says, if it were on account of the elements that some parts of plants tend downwards and some upwards, then, unless there is some cohesive and connective factor, the plants would be torn apart and would not exist as a unified body, because of the pull in contrary directions of the contrary elements, as their parts would break asunder. As a necessary consequence, something is needed that can make these cohere, so as to avoid breaking asunder. But this something would be nothing else than the soul. But some thinkers, he says, have not as Empedocles attributed the cause of the motion of the parts of ensouled beings to fire and earth together, but to fire alone: for they were of the opinion that this alone of the simple bodies and elements is nourished and made to grow by nourishment. For

6–11 cf. Phlp. 275.10–15. 23–25 cf. Phlp. 276.26–29. 27 cohesive … factor: cf. Phlp. 277.1–2; Them. 51.13–14. 32–33 cf. Them. 51.16–17; Phlp. 277.6–7. 34–151.7 cf. Phlp. 278.12–21. 18 each thing’s usage and employment of its nature: or, perhaps, “nature’s usage and employment of each thing”.

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προστίθεται γὰρ τῷ ὕδατι ὕδωρ καὶ τῇ γῇ γῆ καὶ γίνεται αὔξησις αὐτῶν καὶ πλεονασμός· τὸ δὲ πῦρ δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως ὑπὸ τῶν καυστῶν δαπανωμένων ἐναντίων πρότερον ὄντων καὶ μεταβαλλόντων εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τρέφεσθαί τε καὶ αὔξειν, ὅθεν καὶ ἐν r V143 τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐμψύχοις – | εἴτουν τοῖς ζῴοις – δι’ αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς αὔξησιν. [17] ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο, φησί· συναίτιον μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως εἴη εἰς ταῦτα τὸ πῦρ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ὑπουργικόν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ μόνον τούτων αἴτιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ ἀπείρως αὔξει ὑπὸ τῶν καυστῶν, φησί, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι πέρας αὐτῷ λόγου τινός, εἴτουν ὅρου καὶ μήκους μέχρις οὗ δεῖ γενόμενον παύσασθαι τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ μὴ προβαίνειν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ προβαίνει καὶ αὔξει μέχρις ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνῃ ὕλης τινὸς καὶ καυστῶν. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ὡς ὕλη τις καταλαμβάνεται κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις σώμασι. τά γε μὴν σύνθετα αὐτά, εἴτε ζῷα εἴτε πάντα τἄλλα ἔμψυχα, πέρας ὁτιοῦν ὡρισμένον ἔχει τῆς φύσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἄπαυστός ἐστιν ἑκάστοις ἀεὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὔξησις· τοῦ δέ γε πέρατος ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον καὶ λόγος, οὐχ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὕλη τὸ πῦρ· τὸ γὰρ ὡρισμένον εἴδει καὶ λόγῳ ὁρίζεται, οὐχὶ ὕλῃ· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη ὑπὸ λόγου εἰδητικοῦ ὁρίζεται, καθὼς καταλαμβάνεται τοιαύτη τις οὖσα ἡ ψυχή, λόγος οἱονεί πως εἰδητικὸς καὶ οὐσιοποιός. Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ τῷ τε θρεπτικῷ καὶ τῷ γεννητικῷ χαρακτηρίζεται, πάντως δὲ ἅμα τῷ θρεπτικῷ συννοεῖται καὶ ἡ αὔξησις, ἀπὸ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἔναρξις προχωροῦσα εἰς τὸ γεννητικόν, περὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ διαληπτέον ἂν εἴη, φησί, πρῶτον, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς τροφῆς, ἤτοι τοῦ ἀντικειμένου – ὡς διώρισται, κατὰ τὰ πρός τι – τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτῇ τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο ὅτι σαφεστέρα ἡ κατάληψις καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις ὧν εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ὡς τὰ πρός τι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐταῖς εἰς τὰς ἐνεργείας. διαταῦτα δή, ὡς εἴρηται, περὶ τροφῆς πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἄρα σκεπτέ19 ον. δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ τροφή, φησίν, εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον ἐναντίου, τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ’ οὐ πᾶν παντὸς ἐναντίον· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτων, φησί, καθάπαξ, ὧν ἐστι γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ

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2 ἴσως om. A 9 ἐπιτυγχάνῃ ] ἐπιτυγχάνει Atext (‑η A1sl ) 11 πάντα τἄλλα transp. M A 12 ὡρισμένον ] ὁρισμένον A 18–19 ἐστιν ἡ ἔναρξις ] ἔχει τὴν ἔναρξιν malim (sc. ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχή: cf. Them. 51.26–27) || ἔναρξις A1sl : ἀρχὴ Atext 19 γεννητικόν A1pc (ex γενητικόν) 20 τῆς A1sl || ἤτοι ] εἴτουν M A 23 ὡς scripsi : εἰς codd. 23–24 αὐταῖς εἰς ] εἰς αὐτὰς malim 24 διαταῦτα ] διὰ ταῦτα M 5–16 416a 13–18 17–25 416a 19–21

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the other elements are increased by means of some addition, not by means of nourishment. For water is added to water and earth to earth, and so it comes about that they grow and increase. Fire, on the other hand, may perhaps seem to be nourished and made to grow by the consumption of those combustibles that were previously its contraries and which change into its nature, and for this reason the growth resulting from nourishment [may seem] to come about through fire also in plants and other ensouled creatures (that is, animals). But this is not true, he says: fire may perhaps be a contrib- 17 utory and auxiliary cause of this [process] together with the soul, but it cannot itself be the sole cause of it. For fire is made to grow without limit by the combustibles, he says, and is not limited by any ratio, that is, any boundary or line upon reaching which it must stop its growth and not advance further; rather, it advances forever and keeps growing so long as it can find some matter, or combustibles. Yet it itself is also understood to be a kind of matter, along the lines of the other elements, in the compound bodies. But the compound bodies, be they animals or any other ensouled creatures, do have some determinate limit to their nature, and for the individual [compound bodies] the growth of their being is not endless. And it must be the soul that is the cause and ratio of the limit, not matter (in the way in which fire is matter). For what is determinate is determined by form and ratio, not by matter. Rather, it is matter that is determined by a formative ratio, just the sort of thing that the soul is understood to be, a sort of, as it were, formative and substance‐making ratio. [Note] that, since (a) the vegetative soul is characterized by its nutritive as well as 18 its reproductive capacity; (b) thinking of the nutritive capacity inevitably involves simultaneously thinking also of growth; and (c) [the vegetative soul] takes its beginning from the nutritive capacity and proceeds to the reproductive one, we should discuss the nutritive capacity first, he says, or rather nourishment, that is, the opposite – in the sense defined, that of a correlative – of the actuality of the nutritive capacity. For in the same vein it was also said a short while ago that that understanding and that teaching are clearer which start from the activities and proceed to the capacities of which these are the activities, and from the correlative opposites of the activities to the activities themselves. For this reason, then, we must, as mentioned, first investigate nourishment. So the opinion prevails, he says, that nourishment is something that is 19 contrary to something – to that which is nourished – not, however, everything that

12 cf. Prisc. 113.11; Them. 51.23; Phlp. 278.4. 15 determinate: cf. Phlp. 278.8. 279.22–25. 23–24 cf. Them. 51.26–28; Prisc. 113.30–31.

22–23 cf. Phlp.

23–24 The translation follows the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus: the transmitted text seems not to make much sense; but in so far as it does, it must mean roughly the same. 29– 30 Taken strictly, the Greek text means “of the activities themselves to the activities”.

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ἐναντίου, ἐπειδὴ καθόλου πᾶσα γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει διώρισται· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν τὸ εἰρημένον ἐπὶ τῆς ἁπλῶς γενέσεως τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κάμνοντος τὸ ὑγιαῖνον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ μέλαν, ἤτοι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄρα τρέφεται· ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ὁ τῆς τροφῆς λόγος, ἐφ’ ὧν οὐ μόνον ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων αὕτη καταλαμβάνεται γένεσις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποσή τις V143v οὐσίωσις | καὶ οἱονεὶ τροφὴ τοῦ εἶναι ὡρισμένη διαστατικῶς ὡς εἰπεῖν· γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος, καὶ μήν γέ τοι καὶ τρέφεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ (τὸ «δοκεῖ» δὲ εἴρηται, ὅτι τὸ τρέφεσθαι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν συνθέτων, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπλῶν, οἷα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ). ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, τὸ τρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γινομένων, ἀλλ’ ἔνθα ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ποσότητα οὐσιώσεως καθαρῶς συνεμφαινομένην, εἴτουν συνεπομένην, καθὼς λέγεται τῷ πυρὶ γένεσις καὶ τροφὴ ἐκ τοῦ 20 ὕδατος (εἴτουν τοῦ ὑγροῦ· τὰ γὰρ ἐλαιώδη καὶ ταῦτα ὑγρά). καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων καθάπαξ ἁπάντων ὡσαύτως ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ ὕδωρ τρέφεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς γινόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, φησίν, ὅτι τὸ ὕδωρ ὑλικώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ κατὰ τὸ πῦρ. καὶ καθολικὸς ἔστω ὅρος τὰ ἀυλότερα τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ὑλικωτέρων, οὐ τὰ ὑλικώτερα τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀυλοτέρων· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ὡσαύτως ἀυλότερα ἐοίκασί πως εἴδεσιν, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὕλῃ· καὶ τρέφει μὲν καὶ ὡς τροφὴ παραλαμβάνοιτ’ ἂν ἡ ὕλη 21 τῷ εἴδει, οὐ μὴν λέγοιτ’ ἂν τρέφεσθαι ἡ ὕλη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους. καίτοι γε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι πάλιν, φησί, περὶ τῆς τροφῆς πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντιολογία γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ· τινὲς γὰρ ἔδοξαν ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὑφ’ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἡ αὔξησις γίνεται· πρόδηλον γὰρ ὡς ἡ αὔξησις

3 γὰρ ] δὲ A 7 τοι V1pc (ex τι) : τι M 10 μόνον ] μόνων V 16 ση′ adn. Mmarg || καθολικὸς M1pc (fort. ex -ῶς) || ὅρος A1pc (ex ὁ ὅρος) || ἀυλότερα ] ἀυλώτερα M 17 ἀυλοτέρων ] ἀυλωτέρων M A || ἀυλότερα ] ἀυλώτερα M A 18 τρέφει ] τρέφοι malim 20 πάλιν, φησί transp. A 19–154.8 416a 29–34 1–2 ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : cf. Ph. 1.5, 188b 21–26

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is contrary to anything. For [this opinion] does not apply indiscriminately, he says, to things that are generated from their contrary, since all generation without exception is from the contrary, as has been determined in the Physics. So the stated [opinion] does not apply to unqualified generation from a contrary. For something healthy is generated from something sick, and something black from something white, that is, from their contraries, but they are not, then, nourished by them. Rather, the account of nourishment applies to those things in the case of which not only this kind of generation from contraries is understood to happen, but also a kind of quantitative substantiation and, as it were, a nourishing of their being which is determined, so to speak, in terms of extension. For fire is generated from water, and indeed, also appears to be nourished by it (“appears” has been added because in reality nourishing takes place in compound bodies and by the agency of compound bodies, not in simple bodies and by the agency of simple bodies, such as fire and water). Anyway, as we were saying, [the opinion] that nourishment comes from the contraries of things does not apply to things that are only generated from their contraries in an unqualified way, but to cases where one can also observe and comprehend that a substantiating quantity is clearly co-indicated, that is, concomitant, in the way in which fire is said to be generated and nourished from water (that is, from what is wet: for oleaginous things, too, are wet). Even so, not even in all these cases is the situation indiscriminately the same. For it is 20 not the case that, conversely, water is nourished by fire, even though it is generated by it. The reason, he says, is that water is material to a higher degree than is the case with fire. So let it be a universal rule that (a) more immaterial things are nourished by more material ones; (b) more material things are not nourished by more immaterial ones. For fire and those things that are in the same way more immaterial are somehow comparable to forms, and the other things to matter. And matter may nourish and be absorbed as nourishment by the form, but matter cannot be said to be nourished by the form. Nevertheless, the problem should still be raised, he says, as to how nour- 21 ishment comes about and from what, from similar things or from contraries. For his predecessors were in conflict on this point. Some were of the opinion that nourishment comes from similar things, namely, from those by which growth is also produced. For

4–9 cf. Prisc. 114.11–14; 114.21–22. 4–6 cf. Them. 51.31–33; Phlp. 280.30–33. 11–13 cf. Phlp. 281.5–7. 17–18 cf. Them. 51.33–36; Phlp. 282.6–15. 19–22 cf. Prisc. 114.14–18. 21–22 cf. Them. 51.37–38; Phlp. 282.18–24. 22–27 cf. Them. 51.38–52.1; Phlp. 281.31–34; 282.15–18. 30–155.5 cf. Phlp. 283.11–12; Prisc. 114.26–28. 21 In fact, Aristotle does not specifically explain in the De anima why water is not nourished by fire (but see GC 2.8, 335a 14–21), although the commentators do. 23–24 The word order of the Greek might suggest that Metochites only wants it not to be a rule that more material things are nourished by more immaterial ones, but (b) is clearly supposed to follow from the argument in the next few lines.

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ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων· αὔξει γὰρ σὰρξ σαρκὸς προσθέσει καὶ ὀστοῦν ὀστοῦ προσθέσει καὶ τἄλλα παραπλησίως. εἰ οὖν ἡ αὔξησις τοῖς ὁμοίοις γίνεται, ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς δὲ γίνεται, ἕπεται τὴν τροφὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι, εἴτουν τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ὅμοια τρέφεσθαι, οὐ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. ἕτεροι δ’ ἔφησαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν· τὴν γὰρ τροφήν, ἤτοι ἄρτον ἢ βρῶμα ὁτιοῦν, πεττόμενα, ἤτοι μεταβάλλοντα καὶ γινόμενα ὅπερ τὰ τρεφόμενα, ποιεῖν τὴν πρόσθεσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τρεφομένοις· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον (ἢ εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐναντίων), ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντί22 ων εἶναι τοῖς τρεφομένοις ἡ τροφή (ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων). χρὴ γὰρ τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν νοεῖν καὶ καταλαμβάνειν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, τῶν τρεφόντων, ἃ μεταβάλλοντα – τὸν ἄρτον λέγω καὶ τὸ βρῶμα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα – προσκρίνεται τοῖς V144r τρεφομένοις, | ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὰ μεταβάλλει τὰ τρεφόμενα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τέκτονος, φησί, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη μεταβάλλει καὶ διατίθεται πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ τέκτων μεταβάλλει, οὐδὲ πάσχει ὁτιοῦν ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ μεταβολὴν ἐρεῖ τὴν ἐξ ἀργίας καὶ ἠρεμίας κίνησιν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν· ἐοικέναι γὰρ νοεῖ τῇ μὲν ὕλῃ τοῦ τέκτονος τὴν τροφήν, τῷ δὲ τέκτονι τὸ ἔμψυχον αὐτὸ τὸ τρεφόμενον (εἴτουν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν), κινούμενον εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς καθ’ αὑτὸ δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ ἐντυχίᾳ τῆς τροφῆς. Ὅτι, κἂν εἰ ἐναντία λέγωσιν ἔνιοι περὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτός γε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνάπτει τρόπον τινὰ τὰ αὐτῶν καί φησιν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐναντιολογοῦντας ἐν μέρει μὲν ἀληθεύειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύειν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ νοεῖσθαι τὴν τροφὴν αὐτὸ τὸ ἄπεπτον, ἤτοι τὸν ἄρτον καὶ τὸ κρέας καὶ τὰ πάντα ὄψα· ἔστι δὲ νοεῖσθαι τὴν τροφὴν αὐτὰ 24 ταῦτα πεφθέντα καὶ γενόμενα αἷμα καὶ σάρκα καὶ προσκριθέντα τοῖς τρεφομένοις. εἰ μὲν οὖν τις τὸ ἄπεπτον λέγει «τροφήν», ἀληθεύουσιν οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίων τρέφεσθαι λέγοντες τὸ τρεφόμενον· ᾗ γὰρ ἄπεπτον μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πεφθὲν εἰς τὸ οἰ-

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4 τροφήν¹ ] ὑφ’ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἡ αὔξησις γίνετ ex v. 152.22 add. Vac (exp. V1 ) 8 ἐναντίων ] ἐναντίον M 12 μεταβάλλει ] μεταβάλλη A 15 τῇ A1pc (ut vid. ex -ται) || ὕλῃ A1pc (ut vid. ex ὕλην) 16–17 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 18 εἰ V2?pc ras (ut vid. καὶ Vac ) || λέγωσιν ] λέγουσιν A 18–20 ση′ adn. Mmarg 20–21 ἄπεπτον ] ἅπτετον M 23 ἐξ ἐναντίων ] ἐξεναντίων A 23–24 τρέφεσθαι λέγοντες transp. A 8–17 416a 34–b 3

18–156.5 416b 3–9

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it is obvious that growth is produced by similar things: flesh grows through the addition of flesh, bone through the addition of bone, and similarly with the rest. If, then, growth is produced by similar things, and produced by nourishment, it follows that nourishment is produced by similar things, that is, that things are nourished by similar things, not by their contraries. Others, however, contended that nourishment is produced by the contraries of things. For it is the nourishment (that is, the bread, or any sort of food), [they said,] which, when it is digested (that is, changed and turned into the very same thing as that which is nourished), produces the increase of the thing that is nourished. But since all change is from contrary to contrary (or to what is in between the contraries), it appears that the things that are nourished get their nourishment from their contraries (or from what is between them and their contraries). For 22 one must understand and conceive of the change as taking place, as is obvious, in the things that nourish, which, as they are changed – I mean the bread, the food and the like – are assimilated to the things that are nourished, but the things that are nourished are not themselves changed; just as in the case of a builder and his material, he says, it is the material that is changed and modified for the housebuilding, not the builder himself, who is neither changed nor affected in any respect by the material, unless even in his case someone should say that the motion from inactivity and rest to activity is a change. For [Aristotle] conceives of the nourishment as comparable to the builder’s material, and the ensouled thing that is nourished – or rather the nutritive capacity in it – as comparable to the builder, as it is moved to the activity of its [nutritive] capacity as a result of the presence and impact of the nourishment. [Note] that even though some thinkers make conflicting statements about nour- 23 ishment, still Aristotle himself in a way combines their statements and says that those very people whose statements conflict are in part stating the truth, in part not stating the truth. For nourishment can be conceived of as what is undigested, that is, bread and meat and all kinds of dishes; but nourishment can also be conceived of as the same things after they have been digested and turned into blood and flesh and assimilated to the things being nourished. If, then, by “nourishment” one means what is 24 undigested, those who say that what is nourished is nourished by its contraries state the truth: for in so far as it is undigested it is changed, once it is digested, from the con-

9 from contrary to contrary : cf. Phlp. 283.17–20. 11–14 cf. Them. 52.9–11. 18–21 cf. Them. 52.16–19. 26–29 cf. Phlp. 284.8–11; Them. 52.23–25. 2–5 The tenor of this argument seems to be simply that the kind of growth that is produced by nourishment in the concrete sense (= food), which is also called “nourishment” in the sense of the action of the verb “to nourish”, is produced by similar things. “Nourishment” (trophḗ) is used in the concrete sense in the premisses, and as an abstract nomen actionis in the conclusion. 31 once it is digested: instead of the aorist participle one might have expected a present participle here, to the effect of “by being digested”.

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κεῖον τῷ τρεφομένῳ σώματι· εἰ δέ τις λέγει «τροφὴν» τὸ πεπεμμένον καὶ προσκριθὲν ὡς ὅμοιον τῷ τρεφομένῳ, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων αὖθις ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἡ τροφή· ᾗ γὰρ ὅμοιον πεπεμμένον καὶ μεταβληθὲν πάντως προσεκρίθη τῷ τρεφομένῳ. ὥστε συμβαίνει καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀληθεύειν τοῖς σκοπουμένοις κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, καίτοι γε τῷ φαινομένῳ τἀναντία λέγοντας. 25

Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν τρέφεται, φησίν, ὃ μὴ ψυχὴν ἔχει, τὸ τρέφον αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔμψυχον ἂν εἴη, καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ κυρίως τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγοιτ’ ἂν τρέφεσθαι, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ’ ἴσως καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρούμενα, ὥστε λέγεσθαι τὸ λευκὸν τρέφεσθαι καὶ τὸ τρίπηχυ τρέφεσθαι· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ’ ἂν λέγοιντο ταῦτα καὶ οὐ κυρίως τρέφεσθαι, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ τρεφομένῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δείκνυσιν ὡς μόνων τῶν ἐμψύχων τὸ τρέφεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ εἰκότως πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τρέφεσθαι.

Ὅτι ἄλλο, φησί, κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἡ τροφὴ καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὑποδεικνύει ὁποῖον ἑκάτερον οὑτωσί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ τρεφόμενον εἶδός ἐστι τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία, V144v ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ποσόν ἐστιν (ἤτοι μεγέθει ποσοῦται), ὡσαύτως | ἔχει καὶ τὸ τρέφον αὐτό· ᾗ μὲν εἶδος ὅ τι ποτ’ ὂν καὶ οὐσία τρέφει καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σῴζει τοῦ τρεφομένου (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τροφῆς σῴζεσθαι τὸ εἶναι τῷ τρεφομένῳ), ᾗ δὲ ποσόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτό, πρόσθεσιν καὶ αὔξησιν ἐμποιεῖ τῷ τρεφομένῳ. ὥστε ὡς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο θεωρεῖται καὶ ἄλλης καὶ ἄλλης δυνάμεως ψυχικῆς συναίτιον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἅμα ἐνεργοίη ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ. 27 ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀεὶ ἀμφότερα ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ, ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν τροφὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ, κἂν παύσηται, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔμψυχον· σωστικὴ γάρ ἐστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ καὶ φυλακτικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλως τὸ ἔμψυχον ὅτι μὴ μετὰ τῆς τροφῆς· αὐξητικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀεί, οὐδὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ πρόσθεσις ἀεί, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐξητικὸν καταπαύει. γίνεται

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2 τρεφομένῳ ] σώματι ex v. 1 add. A 10–11 ση′ adn. Mmarg 10 δὲ om. A 14 οὑτωσί ] οὑτωσίν A || τὸ om. A 17 τὸ ] τῶ M 19 ἐνεργοίη correxi : ἐνεργῆ V et ut vid. A1pc : ἐνεργεῖ M 21 ἔστι ] fort. legendum ἔσται || ἐστιν A1sl 6–12 416b 9–11 13–158.11 416b 11–17

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trary of the body being nourished into something that agrees with it; if, however, by “nourishment” one means what has been digested and assimilated in such a way as to be similar to what is nourished, then, on the other hand, nourishment truly does come from what is similar. For in so far as it has been digested and changed into something similar, it has inevitably been assimilated to that which is nourished. The upshot is that in fact both parties state the truth about the matter under consideration, but in different respects, even though apparently they are making conflicting statements. [Note] that since, he says, nothing is nourished which does not have a soul, the 25 thing that nourishes, or the nourishment, must be relative to the ensouled creature, and it is the ensouled creature that is said in itself and in the proper sense to be nourished. So are coincidentally, no doubt, also those things that are manifested in it, so that a white thing is said to be nourished, and a three cubits long thing is said to be nourished. But these things will be said to be nourished coincidentally and not in the proper sense, since they are the kinds of things that coincidentally belong to the thing that is nourished. And on this basis he shows that being nourished is a property of ensouled creatures only, and that what was said a little earlier, that fire is nourished by water, is not reasonable. He says that nourishment and being productive of growth are conceptually differ- 26 ent, and indicates the nature of each in the following way. Since what is nourished is an individual form and substance, but nonetheless also a quantity (that is, it is quantified in terms of magnitude), the same will also apply to what nourishes: inasmuch as it is some kind of form and substance, it nourishes and sustains the substance of what is nourished (for the being of what is nourished cannot be sustained without nourishment); but inasmuch as it, too, is a quantity, it produces increase and growth in what is nourished. The upshot is that [nourishment] is manifested as two distinct things, and is a contributory cause with two distinct soul capacities, and these will not necessarily be active at the same time in the ensouled creature. In fact, nor are 27 they both always active in the ensouled creature; rather, nourishment is always active in the ensouled creature, and should it stop, the ensouled creature fails to exist: for [nourishment] is conducive to sustaining, as mentioned, and preserving its substance, and the ensouled creature will not exist under any conditions that do not involve nourishment; but [nourishment] is not always productive of growth, nor is there always a quantitative increase: rather, it discontinues its capacity to produce growth. And this 5–7 cf. Them. 52.29–30. 11–12 a white thing: cf. Them. 52.32. 15–17 cf. Phlp. 284.31; 285.11–12. 19–25 cf. Phlp. 285.22–25 (where there is a lacuna roughly corresponding to the phrase “inasmuch … substance”). 27–33 cf. Them. 52.36–53.5. 33–159.4 cf. Phlp. 285.26–27; 285.35–286.9 (where the physiological change in the nourished creature is described as increasing dryness of the bodily parts, on account of which they “are no longer naturally suited to be extended [epekteínesthai]”, a phrase with several morphemes that are echoed by Metochites, although the meaning is quite different to his “decrease of tension in its nature”).

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δὲ τοῦτο πάντως, ἡνίκα τὸ ἀπορρέον τοῦ ἐμψύχου δι’ ἀτονίαν τῆς φύσεως ἴσον ᾖ τῷ προσκρινομένῳ, ἢ καὶ πλεῖον τυχόν (ὅτι δὴ καὶ μὴ μόνον πρόσθεσις καὶ αὔξησις ἐνεργεῖται τῷ ἐμψύχῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον μάλιστα, φθίσις)· ὥστε τὸ μὲν αὐξητικὸν οὐκ ἀεί, τροφῆς δὲ ἀπαραίτητος ἀεὶ χρεία τῷ τρεφομένῳ συντηρούσης, ὡς διώρισται, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῷ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐντεῦθεν ἡ αἰτία· περίττωμα γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς – ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δηλοῖ – τὸ σπέρμα, καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας τὸ γεννᾶν· καὶ γεννητικόν ἐστιν ἡ τροφὴ καὶ οὐσιοποιόν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ τρεφομένου – οὐ γὰρ γεννᾶται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γάρ· συντηρεῖται δέ, καὶ ἡ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν γέννησις οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος – ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὅμοιον αὐτῷ εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἔφεσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀιδίου, ὡς εἶναι κἀντεῦθεν ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῦ συντηρεῖσθαι καὶ διασῴζεσθαι τὴν τοῦ τρεφομένου ὄντωσιν. καὶ τοίνυν ἐντεῦθεν κινούμενος Ἀριστοτέλης ὁρίζεται ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ θρεπτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος, καί φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο δύναμιν ἐν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν οἵαν αὐτὸ σῴζειν εἰς τὸ καθ’ αὑτό, εἴτουν τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος, τὴν δὲ τροφὴν παρασκευὴν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν. διὸ καὶ στερηθεῖσάν φησι τῆς τροφῆς αὐτὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι, εἴτουν ἐνεργεῖν καὶ δείκνυσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε σῴζειν ἑαυτὴν ἄνευ τῆς προσηκούσης ὕλης (οὔθ’ ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν δύναμιν ἄνευ τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργεῖν ὕλης). τρία δέ, φησὶν ἐνταῦθα, ἐπὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πράγματος θεωρεῖται· τὸ τρέφον, τὸ τρεφόμενον, ᾧ τρέφεται· καὶ τρέφον γέ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, ἡ θρεπτική· τρεφόμενον δὲ τὸ ἔμψυχον αὐτό· ᾧ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ | τροφὴ αὐτή. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα, φησίν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν, τέλος δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ θρεπτικῇ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμει γεννᾶν ὅμοια, καὶ σκοπός, οἷος διώρισται, τῇ φύσει ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ ἀιδίου καὶ θείου, δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ταύτην δὴ τὴν πρώτην ψυχὴν γέννη-

1 ἴσον ] ἶσον V 9 ἔφεσιν ] ἕφεσιν A 9–11 σηʹ ὅρος τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ adn. M1marg A1marg (σηʹ om. A) 11 τοίνυν ] τοῖνυν M 13 καθ’ αὑτό ] καθαυτό A 14 οἰκείαν ] οἰκεῖαν A 15–16 ἀδύνατον—ἑαυτὴν om. A 16 ἑαυτὴν ] αὐτὴν M 21 θρεπτικῇ ] θρεπτικὴ A || τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμει ] δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς A 11–17 416b 17–20 17–19 416b 20–23

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6 ἐν ἄλλοις: cf. GA 1.18, 724b 21–726a 27; Pr. 4.27, 880a 9–10

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happens inevitably, as soon as the discharge from the ensouled creature is equal, on account of a decrease of tension in its nature, to what is assimilated, or even, occasionally, exceeds it (for it is not only increase and growth that are put into action by the ensouled creature, but also their exact contrary, decrease). Thus the capacity to produce growth is not always there, but there is always an inexorable need of nourishment, on the part of what is nourished, to help preserve its substance, as described. Moreover, this is also where the cause of procreation lies, for, as Aristotle makes clear elsewhere, semen is a residue of nourishment and procreation comes from a surplus; and nourishment is conducive to procreation and substance‐production, not of the nourished creature itself – for what exists is not procreated, since it exists, but it is preserved, and the procreation caused by the nourishment is not of that which exists – but of there being something similar to it, on account of its desire, as mentioned, for the divine and eternal. So for this reason, too, nourishment is a cause of the preservation and sustenance of the being of that which is nourished. Accordingly, this is Aristotle’s starting point as he moves on to define what the nutritive form of the soul is: he says that this is a capacity, in the ensouled creature in which it exists, that can sustain [the ensouled creature] in itself, that is, in its essence and intrinsic form, whereas nourishment is a preparation of the so-defined capacity for its own intrinsic activity. For this reason, he says, if this capacity is deprived of nourishment, it is incapable of existing, that is, of being active and being displayed. For it is not possible for it to sustain itself without the appropriate matter (nor, in general, for a productive capacity to be active without the relevant matter). Three things, he says here, are seen to exist in connection with this subject: that which nourishes, that which is nourished and that by which [the latter] is nourished. And that which nourishes is the primary soul, the nutritive one; that which is nourished is the ensouled creature; and that by which [the latter] is nourished is the nourishment. And since it is right, he says, to name all things after their goal, and the goal of the above‐described nutritive capacity of the soul is to produce similar creatures, and the aim of nature, such as it has been determined, lies in this [participation in] the eternal and divine, it must be right to call this primary

4–6 cf. Them. 53.1–2. 7–8 Philoponus (286.14–15) refers to the De generatione animalium (1.18) for the statement that semen is a residue of the final nourishment (which is also cited by Themistius, 53.6–7). The closest parallel to the statement that procreation comes from a surplus in the corpus aristotelicum seems to be the suggestion in Probl. 4.27 that the appetite for sex (tōn aphrodisíōn) comes from a surplus. This, in turn, has parallels with what Philoponus says next (286.15–17): “the motion in sexual [desires] (tōn aphrodisíōn) is greater or smaller depending on the quality and quantity of the nourishment”. 12–13 cf. Phlp. 286.20–21. 14–15 cf. Phlp. 286.24–26. 17 essence: cf. Them. 53.11. || intrinsic form: cf. Phlp. 286.27. 19–20 No ancient commentator remarks that the nutritive capacity itself cannot exist without nourishment, although they all of course paraphrase Aristotle’s statement that the thing in possession of such a capacity cannot do so. 20–21 cf. Them. 53.15. 21–22 cf. Prisc. 115.17–20. 22–26 cf. Them. 53.15–20; Phlp. 286.6–9. 29–161.3 cf. Them. 53.23–25.

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τικὴν τοῦ ὁμοίου καλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ φυλακτικὴν τοῦ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν ἐκείνου χάριν, καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο οὗ χάριν τὸ φυλάττειν· καὶ εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ κυριώτερον τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, εἴτουν δυνάμεως καὶ ἐνεργείας, τὸ γεννῶν οἷον ἑαυτό. Ὅτι δυσὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον χρῆται οἷς τρέφει, τῇ τε ἐνούσῃ εἰς τοῦτο δυνάμει καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν θερμῷ· καὶ ἡ μέν, ἡ δύναμις αὐτή, κινεῖ μόνον, οὐ κινεῖται δέ· κινεῖ γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐ κινεῖται δ’ ὅλως· τὸ θερμὸν δ’ αὐτὸ κινεῖται μὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, κινεῖ δὲ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος τὰ ὑπουργά, οὐ μόνα δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθόλου γε τὰ αὐξόμενα· τροφὴ γὰρ εἶναι ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἀδύνατον ἄνευ τοῦ πεφθῆναι· πέψις δὲ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄνευ τοῦ θερμοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ ἐνεργοῦντος καὶ μεταβάλλον34 τος. διατοῦτο καὶ πάντα, φησί, τὰ ἔμψυχα μετέχει θερμοῦ. ὥστε, ὅπερ εἴρηται, τῶν δύο ἡ μὲν δύναμις κινεῖ μόνον, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν κινεῖται καὶ κινεῖ. καὶ ἐοικέναι φησὶ ταῦτα τῇ χειρὶ καὶ τῷ πηδαλίῳ, ἃ κυβερνᾷ καὶ ἀμφότερα κινοῦντα τὸ πλοῖον· ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν χεὶρ κινεῖ μόνον, σύμφυτος οὖσα τῷ σώματι (ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ψυχικὴ δύναμις), τὸ δὲ πηδάλιον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς κινούμενον ὑπηρετικῶς κινεῖ (ὡς ἄρ’ ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ τρεφομένοις). 33

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2 φυλάττειν ] φυλλάττειν M 3 γεννῶν scripsi : γεννᾶν codd. 7 θερμὸν δ’ ] δὲ θερμὸν M A 9 αὐξόμενα ] αὐξανόμενα M A 10–11 ση′ adn. Mmarg 11 μετέχει ] τοῦ add. M A 14 μόνον ] μόνη M A 5–16 416b 25–31

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soul “the soul capable of producing a similar creature” rather than “the soul capable of preserving existence”. For in fact, even preservation takes place for the sake of this, and this is the goal for the sake of which preservation takes place. So the primary soul must be, in accordance with the principal aspect of its own proper substance, that is, its capacity and its activity, that which produces something like itself. [Note] that the ensouled creature employs two things by which [the primary soul] 33 nourishes: its inherent capacity for this and its natural heat. The one, the capacity, only causes motion and is not moved. For it moves the heat to its activity, but it is not at all moved. The heat, on the other hand, is set in motion by the nutritive capacity, and in turn sets the nourishment and the ancillary parts of the body in motion, and not only these, but also in general those parts that are subject to growth. For it is impossible for anything to be nourishment without being digested, and digestion cannot come to pass unless there is heat which causes motion, activity and change. It 34 is also for this reason, he says, that all ensouled creatures partake of heat. The upshot is exactly as stated: of these two things the capacity only causes motion, whereas the heat is moved and causes motion. And he says that these things are comparable to the hand and the rudder, which both move the ship in steering it, although the hand only causes motion, being naturally joined to the body (that is, just like the aforementioned soul capacity), whereas the rudder is set in motion by the hand and causes motion subordinately (that is, as is the case with the heat in things that are ensouled and nourished). * *

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6–7 cf. Them. 53.26. 7–9 cf. Phlp. 288.5–11 (reporting Alexander of Aphrodisias and arguing that Alexander’s interpretation fits the majority reading kinoûn mónon in 416b 27 rather than the variant read by Philoponus and printed by Ross, kinoúmenon mónon); Them. 53.30–33. 9–10 cf. Phlp. 287.24–28. 16–21 cf. Them. 53.28–33; Phlp. 288.12–21 (reporting Alexander of Aphrodisias). 6 the primary soul: it makes little sense, especially after what has been said in 2.4.31, to take “the ensouled creature” as the subject of the relative clause. In Aristotle’s text (416b 25–26) “the primary soul” is the subject of the sentence preceding that in which the relative clause is found, and can easily be supplied in the latter, as shown by Themistius’ paraphrase (53.26), which has clearly been drawn upon for the present passage (in Themistius paraphrase, however, “the soul” is also the subject of “employs”). As in Aristotle’s text, “the primary soul” is also the subject of the preceding sentence in Metochites’ paraphrase (2.4.32), although there is of course a section break in between.

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Ὅτι, συμπεράνας οὕτω τὸν περὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ – μᾶλλον δ’ ἐρεῖν φυτικοῦ – τῆς ψυχῆς λόγον, ἑξῆς προτίθεται διαλαβεῖν ἔπειτα καθόλου περὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κοινῇ πάσης, ἥντινά φησι συμβαίνειν, ὥς γε δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθητῶν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσις εἶναί τις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καί τινές γε ἔδοξαν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς εἶπον ὡς συμβαίνει ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων διατίθεσθαι καὶ πάσχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιλαμβανομένην αὐτῶν. εἰρήσθω γάρ, φησί, ταῦτα νῦν οὕτως ἁπλούστερον ὅπως ἄρ’ ἔχει καὶ εἰ ταῦτα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἢ μή, εἰρημένον μὲν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, προκειμένης δὲ ὅμως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς τῆς σκέψεως ἀκριβέστερον διελθεῖν. ἀπορεῖ δὲ προηγουμένως ὡς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια αὐτὰ αἰσθητά εἰσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἰσὶ σύνθετα (πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐνόντα αὐτοῖς εἰσιν αἰσθητά), διατί μὴ ἡ αἴσθησις, εἴτουν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, | ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ αὐτῶν ὡς αἰσθητῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμπιπτόντων, αἰσθητῶν. οἷον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, αἰσθητήριον ὢν τῆς ὀπτικῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως, αἰσθητόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτός, συγκείμενον ἐξ ὑγρότητος καὶ διαφόρων ὀργανικῶν μορίων, διατί μὴ ἡ ἐνοῦσα αὐτῷ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις αἰσθάνεται καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἤγουν ὁποῖός ἐστιν ὁ κατ’ αὐτὴν ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοντα; ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς δι’ ἧς ἡ ἁπτικὴ αἴσθησις ἐνεργεῖ, διατί μὴ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς σαρκὸς ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ ἁπτικὴ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτῆς μόνον τῆς σαρκὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἅπτεται καὶ αἰσθάνεται; καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων παραπλησίως. ἐπιλύεται δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ὅτι δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καὶ συνειλημμένη καὶ ἀχωρίστως συνουσιωμένη αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀργάνοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, καὶ οὕτω προχωρεῖ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν κινηθεῖσα αἰσθητῶν· κινηθεῖσα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθητῶν εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ ἐνέργειαν, οὕτως ἄρα δὴ αἰσθάνεται τῶν προσπιπτόντων. ἂν δὲ μὴ κινηθῆ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν, δύναμις οὖσα μόνον, μένει ἀνενέργητος εἰς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τὸ καυστόν, φησίν, ἂν μὴ καίηται ὑ-

7 τοῖς M1pc (ut vid. ex τῆς) 14 ὢν ] ὂν M A 19 μόνον ] μόνης M A1pc (ut vid. ex μονῆς) 25 ἂν ] ἐὰν M A 26 δὴ ] φησὶ add. M A || φησίν om. M A 1–9 416b 33–417a 2

9–20 417a 2–6 20–164.6 417a 6–9

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[Note] that, having thus concluded his account of the nutritive – or, rather, vegetative – capacity of the soul, he next undertakes to continue by making a general analysis of the common aspects of sense perception as a whole. This, he says, comes about – or so it appears – when [the sense] is set in motion, or affected, by external perceptible objects; for it appears to be a kind of alteration brought about by these, and at least some thinkers have formed and expressed an opinion about sense perception to the effect that what happens is that the sense is modified, or affected, by similar objects impinging from outside as it apprehends them. For the time being, he says, suffice it to state in this rather unqualified manner what the situation is like and whether it is possible or not that this is so, since (a) it has been stated already in On Coming-to-Be and Passing Away, and (b) the investigation in the following chapters is nevertheless planned to include a more detailed discussion. First of all, however, he raises the problem as to why, considering that the sense organs themselves are perceptible, since they are composed of the elements (for all perceptible objects are perceptible on account of the elements contained in them), it is that sense perception – that is, the perceptive capacity of the soul – does not also apprehend the sense organs and perceive them too as perceptible objects, just as it does the other perceptible objects, those that impinge from outside. To take an example: considering that the eye, which is an organ of the perceptive capacity for sight, is itself perceptible, being composed of wetness and various organic parts, why does not the perceptive capacity inherent in it also perceive it, that is, the quality of the eye – and of all the things that exist in it – that lies within its ambit? Likewise, in the case of the flesh through which the tactile sense performs its activity, why does not the perceptive capacity for touch inherent in the flesh have a perception of the flesh itself, but instead only feels and perceives the external objects through the flesh? And similarly as regards the other sense organs. His solution to the problem set out is that it is as a potentiality that the perceptive capacity in the sense organs is comprised within the actual sense organs themselves and inseparably co-existing with these, and that it then proceeds to activity by being set in motion by external perceptible objects. For it is when it has been moved by the external perceptible objects from existing as a potentiality to the activity that is natural to it, and only then, that it perceives the impinging objects. But if it is not moved by the external objects, it remains, since it is only a capacity, inactive with regard to

1–2 vegetative: cf. Phlp. 289.10; Prisc. 116.20. 4 or so it appears : cf. Phlp. 289.29–32. 7 modified : cf. Phlp. 289.28. 8–9 cf. Them. 54.4–6; 54.11–12. 10–12 cf. Them. 54.13–14; 54.18–19; Phlp. 290.22–28; Prisc. 117.17–22. 12–25 cf. Them. 54.21–28. 13–22 cf. Phlp. 291.2–6; 291.26–28. 26–29 cf. Phlp. 291.9–13. 26–28 cf. Them. 54.28–29.

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πὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔξωθεν, ἐν τῷ δυνάμει μόνον μένει καυστὸν ἀνενέργητον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν καυθείη ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔξωθεν προσπελάσαντος καὶ ποιοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ, καίτοι γε καυστὸν ὄν. ἀνάλογον δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· δυνάμει μόνον ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ οὖσα καὶ συνειλημμένη, ὡς εἴρηται, οὖσα αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄλλως, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθητῶν προσπιπτόντων κινούντων αὐτὴν εἰς ἐνέργειαν· δυνάμει 6 γὰρ μόνον πρότερόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι διχῶς λέγεται, κατά τε τὸ δυνάμει αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι καὶ οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι – ἀκούειν τυχὸν ἢ ὁρᾶν, κἂν μὴ νῦν κατ’ οὐδέτερον αἰσθάνηται, καθεῦδον τυχόν – καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν νῦν αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ἀμφότεροι αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγονται, οἵ τε δυνάμενοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, κἂν μὴ νῦν ἐνεργῶσι καὶ αἰσθάνωνται, καὶ οἱ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθανόμενοι), οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· τὶ μέν ἐστι δυνάμει ἕτοιμος καὶ πεφυκυῖα εἰς τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι, κἂν μὴ νῦν ἐνεργῇ· τὶ δέ ἐστιν αἴσθησις ἐνεργείᾳ ἀντιλαμβανομένη καὶ πάσχουσα ὑπό τινων αἰσθητῶν. Ὅτι, προθέμενος διορίσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν πῶς ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει καὶ διατίθεται, ἐν μέρει δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, προδιαλαμβάνει μνημονεύων V146r ὅτι πρότερον ἀδιορίστως εἴρηκεν ὡς ταυτὸν τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι | καὶ πάσχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν, καί φησιν· ἔστω νῦν ἀνεξέταστον ὡς ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πάσχειν πρὸς ἄλλα σκοπουμένοις καὶ βλέπουσιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν λυμαίνεται 8 λέγειν οὕτως ἀορίστως ταῦτα δὴ τὰ τρία ὡς ἓν εἰς τὸ νῦν προτεθειμένον. τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ διαιρεῖν ἔστιν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τὴν ἐνέργειαν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ὡς ἂν γένος πρὸς εἶδος· πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ κίνησις καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν πᾶσα ἐνέργεια κίνησις, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖται ἡ ἐνέργεια εἴς τε τὴν κίνησιν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἀτελὴς ἐνέργεια, καὶ εἰς τὴν εἰδικῶς ἐνέργειαν καταλαμβανομένην αὐτίκα τελείαν ὁτουοῦν πράγματος καὶ ἄχρονον ἐπιβολὴν ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει προχωροῦσα εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, οὔπω δὲ τελεία, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μετὰ τοῦ δυνάμει μένουσα, μέχρις ἂν σὺν χρόνῳ κατ’ ὀλίγον προχωροῦσα καταστῇ εἰς τὸ πέρας, ὡς τὰ περὶ τούτου ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει διώ-

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perceiving; just as a combustible, he says, unless burnt by an external fire, remains an unactivated combustible in mere potentiality, and will not, if the external fire does not come close to it and does not act in it, be burnt by itself, even though it is combustible. The situation is analogous with the sense capacity, too: since it is only as a potentiality that it co-exists with the sense organ and is, as mentioned, comprised within it, it will not be able to perceive in any way unless the external perceptible objects move it to activity by impinging upon it: for before that it exists only as a potentiality. In 6 fact, “to have perception” is used in two senses: on the one hand in the sense of being potentially capable of perceiving, or fit to perceive (to hear, perhaps, or to see, even when not currently perceiving in either way, on account, perhaps, of being asleep); and on the other hand in the sense that the actual perceiving is currently being active (for indeed, both are said to have perception, both those who are capable of perceiving, even when not currently being active and perceiving, and those who are actively perceiving). And the situation is the same with the sense capacity, too: it is one thing for it to be potentially ready and naturally fit to be activated, even when it is not currently active; it is another thing for the sense to apprehend actively and be affected by some perceptible objects. [Note] that, having undertaken to define and determine how the perceptive capac- 7 ity is partly affected, or modified, by what is similar and partly by what is not similar, he makes a preliminary determination by pointing out that he has previously spoken indiscriminately of the perceptive capacity’s being active, being moved and being affected as the same thing, and says: for the time being, let us treat being active, being moved and being affected as one and the same thing without examination, while we investigate and look into other things, since it does no harm with regard to our present undertaking to speak in this indiscriminate manner of these three things as being one. But in reality activity and motion are to be distinguished from one another as being re- 8 lated as genus to species. For every motion is also an activity, but not every activity is a motion: rather, activity is divided into, on the one hand, motion, which is incomplete activity, and on the other hand what is understood in a specific sense as the immediately completed activity and timeless application, so to say, of any given thing. For motion is an activity proceeding from being potential to being active, only not yet completed, but still remaining linked to the potentiality until, proceeding with time and gradually, it arrives at the limit, as the passages concerning this in the Physics have described. And while, as mentioned, activity is often the same thing as motion, it can also be complete in itself, as can be seen in certain cases. For when a source of light

4–7 cf. Phlp. 295.15–19; Them. 54.31–33. 26–35 cf. Phlp. 296.21–30. 26–30 cf. Them. 55.6–12. 35– 167.5 cf. Phlp. 297.4–10.

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ρισται· ἡ δ’ ἐνέργειά ἐστι μὲν καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις ὅπερ ἡ κίνησις, ὡς εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὡς αὐτοτελής, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἔστιν ἐπ’ ἐνίων· τοῦ γὰρ φωτιστικοῦ καταλαβόντος, αὐτίκα πάντα φωτὸς πλήρη, καὶ οὐ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ’ οὔ, οὐδὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθύς, τοῖς δ’ ἑξῆς σὺν χρόνῳ κατ’ ὀλίγον ἡ ἔλλαμψις. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις – οἷον ἡ ὅρασις αὐτίκα ἐπιβαλοῦσα ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ὁρᾷ – οὐ κατ’ ὀλίγον προϊοῦσα χρόνου δεῖται εἰς ἀντίληψιν 9 τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. οὕτω δὴ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐπὶ πλέον θεωρουμένης ἢ κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην δυναμένης, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν (εἰ νῦν γε ἀορίστως τιθείη τις ταῦτα ὡς ἕν), ᾗ μὲν δυνάμει μόνον πρότερον ἡ αἴσθησις οὖσα ἔπειθ’ ὕστερον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητοῦ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν κινοῖτο ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργείᾳ τόδε τι, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις δυνάμει μὲν ἦν πρότερον ὅπερ αὐτό), ᾗ δὲ πέπονθε κινηθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὁμοία γέγονεν ἐνεργείᾳ ὅπερ αὐτό, καὶ ἀντελάβετο αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἀντιληπτικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ 10 καταστᾶσα εἰς τὴν ἐνεργητικὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁμοιότητα. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δυνάμει πρότερον ἦν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου κεκίνηται καὶ τὴν ἀντίληψιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνήργησεν· ᾗ δὲ πεπονθυῖα καὶ κινηθεῖσα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ διετέθη ἀντιληπτικῶς ὅπερ αὐτό, τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτοῦ ἐνήργησεν V146v ὡς ὁμοία αὐτοῦ, εἴτουν | ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου κεκινημένη. [11] ὥσπερ δέ, φησί, τὰ νῦν ἀδιορίστως λεγόμενα – τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν – ἔστι διαιρεῖν οὑτωσί, οὕτω διαιρεῖν ἔστι καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρὸς τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄν, καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο θεωρεῖν αὐτὰ τῷ λόγῳ. λέγεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει διχῶς, ὡς λέγομεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι δυνάμει ἐπιστήμονα· δύναται γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμων· τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν μηδεμίαν ἔτι

2 post τοῦ rasuram duarum fere litterarum habet M 4 ὡσαύτως ] ὡσαύτω M 5 προϊοῦσα V1ras (ut vid. ex προχωροῦσα) 11 πέπονθε ] πέποθε M || ὁμοία ] ὡς ὁμοία malim (cf. v. 17) 17 κεκινημένη ] κινουμένη M A 22 τὸ om. A 17–168.4 417a 21–29

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has appeared, everything is immediately full of light, and it is not the case that some things are and others are not, nor does the illumination reach some things at once and then with time and gradually others. It is the same with perception, too, as for instance the visual capacity is active and seeing immediately upon being projected: it does not need time to gradually proceed to the apprehension of the visible object. Activity, then, is for the most part found to be like this or else to be conformable to mo- 9 tion, and can be conceptually distinguished vis-à-vis motion, but also vis-à-vis being affected (supposing that for the time being one conceives of these indiscriminately as being one). Thus, inasmuch as a sense is at first only potential and then, subsequently, is affected and moved by an actually existing perceptible object so as to become active, it cannot be moved by what is similar (for the perceptible object is actually an individual “this”, whereas the sense was at first potentially the same thing as the perceptible object); but inasmuch as it has been affected by being set in motion by the perceptible object, it is in so far as it is similar to it that it has become actually the same thing as the perceptible object, and that it has apprehended it after arriving from its potentiality for the apprehension of it to its actual apprehension of it and, so to speak, similarity to it. Inasmuch, then, as it was at first potential, whereas the perceptible object was 10 actual, it is not by what is similar that the sense has been moved so as to activate its apprehension of the perceptible object; but inasmuch as it is by having been affected and moved by the perceptible object that it has become and has been modified into being – on an apprehensive level – the same thing as the perceptible object, it is in so far as it is similar to the perceptible object – that is, [in so far as] it has been moved by what is similar – that it has activated its apprehension of the perceptible object. And 11 just as, he says, it is necessary to distinguish in this way the things that are now being spoken of indiscriminately (activity and motion, but no doubt also being affected), in the same way it is necessary to distinguish potential being vis-à-vis actual being, and to view these as being conceptually distinct. For “potentially” is used in two senses, as we say [for instance] that a human being is potentially a knower. For a human being has the capacity to become a knower, since this is part of human nature. This sense of “potentially” applies to those things that as yet possess no competence, but only a natural indefinite capacity, in the way in which matter is said to be a capacity only in

7–8 cf. Them. 55.6–7. 23–26 cf. Phlp. 298.25–28 (who explains that the distinctions between different senses of potentiality and actuality – not between potentiality and actuality – are instrumental to the distinctions between different senses of the other terms). 27–169.5 cf. Phlp. 299.14–18. 28– 29 human nature: cf. Phlp. 299.27–30; Them. 55.17–18; Prisc. 121.15–17. 31–169.2 cf. Phlp. 299.30–32. 14–15 The translation here may require the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. 29– 31 “potentially”, capacity: note that these two words render two different cases of the same Greek noun, dúnamis.

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πω ἐχόντων ἕξιν ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ φύσιν ἀόριστον δύναμιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ὕλη μόνον ἀορίστως λέγεται δύναμις, κατὰ φύσιν δεκτικὴ οὖσα τοῦ εἴδους, ὡς μήπω ἔχουσα. λέγεται δὲ αὖθις ὁ ἄνθρωπος δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων ὅταν ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἐνεργῇ κατ’ 12 αὐτήν· ὁ δὲ ἐνεργῶν τὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. ἀλλ’ ἀμφότεροι, φησίν, οἱ πρότερον τούτου εἰρημένοι δυνάμει ἐπιστήμονες διαφόρως ἔχουσι τὸ δυνάμει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως γίνεται ἐπιστήμων, μὴ πρότερον ὤν, ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἴσως ἕξεως καὶ ψευδοῦς προλήψεως, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἕξεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ἀργούσης ἐπιστήμης εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ τελειότητα, ὡς εἶναι διάφορον ἀμφοτέρων τὸ δυνάμει (τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι προχωρεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ προχωρεῖν ἐστιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς ἕξεως εἰς τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς), καὶ τὸ διάφορον οὕτω πλεῖστον τῷ λόγῳ ἀμφοτέρων ἐκ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου καὶ 13 ἐκ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει οὕτως ἐστὶ διπλοῦν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πάσχειν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ταυτὸν τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, διπλοῦν ἂν νοοῖτο καὶ κατὰ διπλοῦν σημαινόμενον τῆς πείσεως καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς· ἤγουν ὅταν τι φθείρηται εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, εἴτουν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον (ἤγουν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ἢ ἀπὸ ψευδοῦς προλήψεως εἰς τὴν ἐπιστήμην), καὶ ὅταν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἕξεως μεταβάλλῃ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, εἴ γε δεῖ τοῦτο πεῖσίν τινα καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ μεταβολὴν λέγειν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἡ γὰρ μεταβολὴ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις φθορά ἐστι τοῦ πρότερον ἐνόντος εἴδους, ἤτοι τοῦ λευκοῦ, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι μέλαν, ἢ τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ψυχρόν, ἤ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, τῆς προούσης ἀγνοίας ἢ ψευδοῦς ὑπολήψεως εἰς τὴν ἀληθῆ γνῶσιν· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως V147r ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἔστι φθορά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τελείωσις τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος | καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔκφανσις. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀλλοίωσις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φαίημεν τὸν φρονοῦντα, εἴτουν τὸν φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα, κἂν πρότερον ἠρεμῇ, ὅτε φρονεῖ, εἴτουν ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅτε οἰκοδομεῖ. εἰ δέ τις βούλοιτο καὶ ταῦτα καλεῖν ἀλλοιώσεις, ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀλλοιώσεως, οὐχ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον (ἤτοι φθορὰ τοῦ πρότερον ἐνόντος ἐναντίου), ἀλλ’ ὡς εἰς τό πως ὅμοιον

4 ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ] ἐπιστήμη A 7 προλήψεως ] προσλήψεως A 13 τῷ ] τὸ A 18 μεταβολὴν ] μεταβολλὴν M 21 ἀληθῆ ] ἀληθεῖ M 22–23 ἔκφανσις M1pc (ex ἔκφασις) 24 κἂν ] καὶ add. Vac (erasum) || ἠρεμῇ A1pc (ex ἠρεμεῖ) : ἠρεμεῖ M 25–26 βούλοιτο ] βούλητο Atext (‑οι- A1sl ) 27 πως correxi : πῶς codd. 4–12 417a 30–b 2

12–170.1 417b 2–9

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an indefinite way, being naturally capable of receiving the form, on the understanding that it does not yet have it. On the other hand, a human being is also said to be potentially a knower whenever she possesses the knowledge but is not active on the basis of it (while one who is actively using what belongs to the knowledge is actually at the knowledge). But these two, he says (the two potential knowers mentioned before 12 this last one), possess potentiality in different senses: the one becomes a knower, after previously not being one, through change and alteration from ignorance, or perhaps even from the contrary state, from a false presumption, whereas the other [proceeds] from her competence and her inactive knowledge to activity and full development, the result being that the potentiality in each of the two cases is a different thing (for the one is a case of proceeding to an activity from its contrary, the other is a case of proceeding to an activity not from its contrary but from the competence to the goal of the competence), and what is such a vast conceptual difference between the two cases is that the activity is [arrived at] from the opposite and from the competence respectively. And just as “potentially” is ambiguous in this way, so “being affected”, which is the 13 same thing as “being altered”, may be conceived of as being ambiguous, in accordance with a double significance of “affection” and “change”: namely, (a) when something is destroyed into its contrary, that is, changes from one contrary into the other (for example, as in the case of knowledge, when it changes from ignorance or from a false presumption into knowledge); and (b) when it changes from a competence into being active on the basis of that competence, in so far as one should call this an affection, an alteration and a change, which is not permissible. For change and alteration are the destruction of the form previously at hand, such as the white, into becoming black, or the heat into becoming cold, or, as in the case of knowledge, the previously existing ignorance or false presumption into true cognition. But an activity that starts out from a competence is not a destruction, but rather a full development and, so to speak, a manifestation of what is already at hand. Consequently, this cannot be an alteration either, for nor would we say that someone who understands, that is, who possesses understanding and knowledge, even if he was previously at rest, is being altered when he exercises his understanding, that is, when he is active on the basis of his knowledge; nor the house-builder when he is building a house. And if anyone should wish to call even these events alterations, what has been described will have to be some other form of alteration, not like the first one (that is, a destruction of the contrary that was previously at hand), but rather like a movement, so to speak, into what is somehow similar and based on [the potentiality] itself, which is how the situ-

7–8 cf. Phlp. 300.10–13. 15–27 cf. Phlp. 301.3–21; 302.6–14. 26 destruction … full development: cf. Them. 55.34–35. 31–33 cf. Phlp. 303.21–23; Them. 56.1–2. 33–171.1 cf. Phlp. 302.19–25.

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14 καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ κίνησις ὡς εἰπεῖν, καθὼς ἔχει ἡ τοῦ δυνατοῦ τῆς ἕξεως ἐντελέχεια. καὶ

μὴν τοῦτο μὲν πρόδηλον, τὸ τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὅταν φρονῇ καὶ θεωρῇ καὶ κινῆται εἰς τὴν ἐπιστήμην, μὴ διδασκαλίαν λέγειν αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν δυνάμει κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην δέξασθαι, ἤτοι τὸ παιδίον, ὅταν κτᾶται τὴν ἕξιν ταύτην καὶ διδάσκηται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος ἐπιστήμονος καὶ διδακτικοῦ, οὐκ ἄν τις προσηκόντως ἐρεῖ πάσχειν, οὐδὲ πάθος τοῦτ’ εἶναι· πάθος γὰρ κυρίως φθορά ἐστι καὶ στέρησις ἕξεως. εἰ δὲ μή, διπλοῦν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος· τό τε εἰς φθορὰν καθίστασθαι καὶ στέρησιν ἥντινά τις ἔχῃ ἕξιν (ἤγουν εἴ τις ἔχων ἐπιστήμην ἀπολέσειε ταύτην ὁπωσδήποτε), καὶ τὸ καθίστασθαι εἰς τὴν ἕξιν αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν πρότερον καὶ πεφυκός (ἤτοι τὸ καθίστασθαι τὸ παιδίον ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκαλικοῦ εἰς τὴν ἕξιν τῆς γνώσεως ἥτις δυνάμει ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ φυσικῶς προσήκουσα). εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς ἄλλο τί ποτε τοῦτο, καὶ οὐ κατ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρῶτον· οὐ 15 γάρ ἐστιν εἰς φθορὰν εἴδους προενόντος καὶ στερητικὴν διάθεσιν ἡ μεταβολή. ταῦτα δὴ διορισάμενος οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ παραδείγματος τῆς ἐπιστήμης, καὶ διελὼν ἐν αὐτῇ διπλῶς, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ δυνάμει, ἐπανάγων τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ προκείμενον – τὸ περὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ δηλονότι τῆς ψυχῆς – φησὶν ὅτι καὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ αὐτῷ διπλῶς ἐνυπάρχει καὶ λέγεται τὸ δυνάμει. λέγεται γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει τὸ ἐκ τοῦ γεννῶντος σπέρμα, μήπω γενόμενον ζῷον, μηδ’ ἔχον τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἕξιν, δυνάμενον δὲ γενέσθαι καὶ ζῷον καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον δυνάμει, ὡς ἔφημεν τὸ παιδίον, πρὶν λάβῃ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, δυνάμει εἶναι ἐπιστῆμον· δύναται γάρ, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. ὅταν δὲ διαπλασθὲν ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ ζωωθὲν τεχθῇ, αὐτίκα πάλιν λέγεται δυνάμει ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἕξις, κἂν μήπω ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ὅτι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἕξις τῆς v V147 αἰσθήσεως, δῆλον αὐτόθεν· παραχρῆμα γὰρ γεννηθὲν κλαυθμυρίζει αἰσθα- | νόμενον ἀέρος καὶ περιέχοντος ψυχροτέρου ἢ πρότερον. καὶ τοῦτό γε τὸ δυνάμει τοῦ αἰσθητι-

1 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 2 τὸν ] τὴν M || φρονῇ M1pc (ut vid. ex φρονεῖ) 2–3 θεωρῇ M1pc (ut vid. ex θεωρεῖ) 7 εἰ δὲ μή ] εἰδεμή V 8 εἴη ] εἴτο A || ἔχῃ M1pc (ut vid. ex ἔχει) : ἔχοι malim 12 οὐ κατ’ ] οὐκ ἀτ’ M 14 δὴ ] δὲ M A 16 ἐνυπάρχει M1pc (ex ἐν ὑπ‑) 17 αἰσθητικὸν M1pc (ex αἰσθητικῶ) || γεννῶντος ] γεννῶτος A 18–19 γενέσθαι καὶ transponere velim 22 ζωωθὲν ] ζωοθὲν A 23 ἐνεργῇ M1pc (ex ἐνεργεῖ) 24 παραχρῆμα ] παρὰ χρῆμα V || κλαυθμυρίζει ] κλαυθμηρίζει M A 1–13 417b 9–16 13–172.6 417b 16–21

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ation is with the actualization of the potentiality consisting in a competence. Indeed, 14 this much is perfectly clear: we do not say that a man who possesses the competence related to knowledge “receives instruction” and “is affected” by the object of knowledge whenever he understands and contemplates and is moved to his knowledge; but even that human being who by nature is potentially able to receive the knowledge, that is, the child, will not be appropriately said to “be affected” when it is acquiring this competence and is being taught by someone who is actually a knower and a teacher, and this [process will] not [be appropriately said] to be an “affection”. For an affection in the proper sense is the destruction and deprivation of a competence. Otherwise “affection” has to be ambiguous: (a) the induction of whatever competence one has into destruction and deprivation (for instance, if someone who has knowledge were to lose this in one way or another); and (b) the induction even of what was previously at hand potentially and as a natural propensity into a competence (for instance the child’s induction, by someone who has the capacity to teach, into the competence related to cognition that was potentially at hand in it and naturally belongs to it). For it is obvious that the latter [induction] is something else and that it does not correspond to the other, the first one. For the change does not result in the destruction of a form that was previously at hand, or in a privative condition. Having thus delineated these things as 15 they apply to the example of knowledge, and having divided the potentiality involved in knowledge into two, as mentioned, he brings the discussion back to the question at hand – namely, that about the perceptive part of the soul – and says that potentiality exists – and is spoken of – in two ways in the perceptive capacity too. For the semen that issues from the procreator is spoken of as potentially perceptive even when it has not yet become an animal and does not possess the competence for sense perception, but has the capacity to become an animal as well as to acquire sense perception. And this is potentiality in the first sense, in which we said that the child is potentially a knower before it has acquired the competence related to knowledge. For it has the capacity, and acquiring the knowledge is natural to it. But when the semen has been shaped in the womb, endowed with life and brought forth, it is in contrast spoken of as instantly having sense perception as a potentiality. For in [the infant] the competence is present, even if it is not yet active in the sphere of sense perception. That the competence for sense perception is present in it is self-evident. For immediately upon its birth it cries when it perceives air and an environment that is colder than before. And this potentiality of the perceptive capacity corresponds to the second potentiality of the knower, in which the competence related to knowledge is permanently present

2–4 cf. Phlp. 304.4–8. 4–15 cf. Phlp. 304.11–29. 15–18 cf. Them. 56.9–11; Phlp. 304.32–305.2. 28– 31 cf. Phlp. 306.6–7; Them. 56.16–17. 32–33 cf. Phlp. 306.14–16.

172 | Theodoros Metochites

κοῦ ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον δυνάμει τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν ᾖ ἡ ἕξις τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀεί, ὁτὲ δὲ ἐνεργῇ καὶ θεωρῇ. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐνέργειαν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις τῆς αἰσθήσεως δεῖταί τινων ἔξωθεν, τῶν προσπιπτόντων, ἵν’ ἐνεργήσῃ (ἤτοι ὁρατοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἀκουστοῦ ἢ ἁπτοῦ)· οὐ γὰρ οἴκοθεν μόνη ἐνεργεῖ, οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ ἀρκεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔξωθεν κινεῖται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργεί16 ας τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὔ τινων ἔξωθεν χρεία, ἀλλ’ οἴκοθέν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, φησίν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις τοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ μερικοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν καθόλου αἴσθησις, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἑκάστοτε ἑκάστου τῶν κατὰ μέρος. ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ καθόλου λαμβάνει καὶ θησαυρίζει ἐντὸς καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτούς, οὓς καὶ προΐσχεται ἐνεργοῦσα, ὅταν ᾖ βούλησις, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἐκτὸς χρεία. διὸ νοεῖν μὲν ἔστιν ἔχοντας τὴν ἕξιν ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν κινουμένους, καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντας 17 τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἄλλως ὅτι μὴ ἔξωθεν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ἑκάστοτε αἰσθητῶν. καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐταί, φησίν, αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, αἳ μὴ μόνον εἰσὶ θεωρητικαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πρακτὰ ὁρῶνται καὶ ποιητικαί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν μηχανικῶν – καὶ αὗται δὴ οὐκ ἀρκοῦνται τῇ οἴκοθεν ἕξει πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέονταί τινων ἔξωθεν· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐταῖς αἰσθητὰ καὶ κατὰ μέρος τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐν οἷς ἐνεργοῦσιν. Ὅτι, διαλαβὼν οὕτω καὶ διορισάμενος, καθὼς προὔθετο, τὰ περὶ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τοῦ δυνάμει, ὡς ἔστι κατὰ δύο τοὺς τρόπους, ἑξῆς φησιν ὅτι διαστέλλεται μέν, ὡς διώρισται, τὸ δυνάμει κατ’ ἀμφότερα· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀνομάσαι κυρίῳ τινὶ ὀνόματι τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον δυνάμει τὸ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον δυνάμει – τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν θεωρούμενον – καὶ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ κατ’ αὐτὸ μεταβολή, συγχωρητέον, φησί, καλεῖσθαι πάσχειν τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, εἰ 19 καὶ μὴ κυρίως, τὴν αἴσθησιν – ἤτοι τὴν προενοῦσαν ἕξιν – ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. τίς γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου σημαινομένου δυνάμει ἡ πεῖσις ἢ ἀλλοίωσις ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ; καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν αὐτό, εἴτουν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἕξις, δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ

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1 ἕξις ] ἕξης M 2 ὁτὲ ] ὅτε M 3 τῆς² M1pc (ex τῶν) || αἰσθήσεως ] αἰσθήσεων M A 5 αὐτὴ ] αὐτῆ V A 5–6 ἐνεργείας ] ἐργασίας M 7 καθ’ ἕκαστα ] καθέκαστα A 9 καὶ³ om. A 12 ἔξωθεν ] κινουμένους addere velim 15 δέονταί ] δέωνταί A 17 διαλαβὼν ] διαλαβὼς M 18 δύο τοὺς transp. A 21 ποτέ ] ποτ’ M A 24 ἢ ] ἡ add. M A 6–12 417b 22–26

12–16 417b 26–28

17–23 417b 30–418a 3

23–174.8 418a 3–6

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in him and he is intermittently active and contemplating. But the activity of sense perception differs from the activity of knowledge in that the competence for sense perception requires some external things that impinge upon it in order to be activated (such as a visible object or an audible or tangible one): for it is not active by itself and of its own accord, and is not self‐sufficient, but is set in motion externally. In the case of the activity of knowledge, however, there is no need for anything external; rather, the activity is endogenous. The reason, he says, is that sense perception apprehends 16 what is individual and particular. For there can be no sense perception of universals: it is always of a particular of some kind. Thinking, in contrast, grasps the universals and the accounts themselves and stores them inside, and whenever the wish is there, it holds these before itself in its activity, so there is no need for external things. This is why it is possible for those who have the competence to think by being moved by themselves, and this is in our power, but not possible for those who likewise have the competence to have sense perception by any other means than [by being moved] externally, by the perceptible objects that impinge on each given occasion. Moreover, 17 even in the case of the sciences, he says, which are not exclusively contemplative, but can also be seen to concern practical matters, or may be productive, as, for instance, the sciences of statesmen or engineers – even in the case of the latter sciences, then, their endogenous competence is not sufficient for their own proper activity, but they require in addition certain external things. For even in the case of these, the objects on which their activity is performed are perceptible and particular. [Note] that once he has thus defined, as he undertook to do, the things that relate 18 to “being affected” and “being active” as well as to “potentiality”, and determined that these terms have two senses, he next says that it is true that “potentiality” can be differentiated, as described, into these two senses; but since it is not possible to designate by any established word the difference from the first potentiality exhibited by the potentiality in the second sense – the one that is manifested [in the procession] from competence to activity – and the change, whatever it is, that is based on the latter potentiality, he says that we must acquiesce in saying that our sense – that is, the preexisting competence – “is affected” and “is altered” by the perceptible object, albeit not in a proper sense. For what kind of affection or alteration is brought about by the 19 perceptible object in that which is potential in the second sense? In fact, the perceptive capacity, that is, the competence for sense perception, is potentially the same thing as the perceptible object; and in its activity (that is to say, in its cognitive apprehension)

1–11 cf. Them. 56.17–23. 15–21 cf. Prisc. 125.5–8. 17–18 statesmen or engineers : cf. Phlp. 308.11. 28–29 cf. Them. 56.37–38. 31–175.11 cf. Phlp. 309.13–29; Them. 56.39–57.10.

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αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν, καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν αὐτίκα (τῇ γνωστικῇ δηλονότι ἀντιλήψει), τύπῳ ἀναματτόμενον καὶ γινόμενον ὅπερ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κηρὸς V148r ἀναλαμβάνει | καὶ ἀναμάττεται τὴν ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ σφραγίδα καὶ γίνεται ὅπερ αὐτή, δυνάμει ὢν πρότερον αὐτό. πλήν γε διαφέρει ὅτι ὁ μὲν κηρὸς ὡς ὕλη γίνεται τῷ εἴδει τῆς σφραγίδος, τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ὕλη τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ· ἀλλὰ λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον δυνάμει ὅπερ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅταν συνῇ τῷ αἰσθητῷ, γνωστικῶς γίνεται ὅπερ αὐτό· καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν ὅλον διόλου τὸ εἶδος δέχεται τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, ὁ δέ γε κηρὸς ἐξεπιπολῆς, οὐκ εἰς βάθος διόλου, τὸ τῆς σφραγίδος εἶδος δέχεται. * *

*

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it is immediately similar to it, being stamped with an imprint and becoming the exact same thing as the perceptible object, just as the wax takes on and is stamped with the seal in the ring and becomes the exact same thing as the seal, having previously been so potentially. Admittedly, there is a difference, inasmuch as the wax takes the role of matter relative to the form of the seal, whereas the perceptive capacity is not the perceptible object’s matter; but since it has the potentiality for conceptually taking in exactly that which the perceptible object actually is, the perceptive capacity only needs to be co-present with the perceptible object to become – on a cognitive level – the exact same thing as it. Αnd the perceptive capacity receives the form of the perceptible object as a whole in all its parts, while the wax receives the form of the seal superficially, and not in depth in all its parts. * *

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176 | Theodoros Metochites

6 Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ὁ λόγος, διαληπτέον περὶ αὐτῶν μάλιστα τῶν αἰσθητῶν· προείρηται γὰρ ὅτι πολλάκις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐνέργειαι σαφέστερον καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις καταλαμβάνονται. λέγονται τοίνυν, φησί, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, ὧν οἱ μὲν δύο εἰσὶ καθ’ αὑτά, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς καὶ τρίτος κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ καθ’ αὑτὰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς κοινῶς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἰδίως ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει· οἷον καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθάνεται ἡ ὅρασις ἰδίως τὸ χρῶμα, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ τὸν ψόφον, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις 2 τοὺς χυμούς. κοινῶς δέ εἰσιν αἰσθητὰ πέντε, φησί· κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, μέγεθος, σχῆμα. κοινῶς δέ εἰσι ταῦτα αἰσθητά, οὐχ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις πάντων αἰσθάνονται τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τινῶν μὲν πᾶσαι, τινῶν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν δύο ἢ τρεῖς, οὐ μὴν ἰδίως μία τις μόνη. κινήσεως μὲν γάρ – πάντως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἠρεμίας – πᾶσαι αἰσθάνονται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις τὰ ὁρατὰ εἴτε κινεῖται εἴτε ἠρεμεῖ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουστὰ εἴτε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τόπου προσβάλλει εἴτε ἐκ μεταφορᾶς καὶ διαφόρων τῶν τόπων αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις τῆς ὀδμῆς εἴτε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσβάλλει τόπου εἴτε πορρώτερον καὶ ἐγγύτερον ὡσαύτως αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις εἴτε κινεῖται καὶ μεταφέρεται τὰ γευστὰ εἴτε καὶ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ πολλῷ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεται εἴτε κινεῖται τὰ ἁπτὰ εἴτε μή. καὶ οὕτω μὲν κοινὰ πασῶν αἰσθητὰ ἥ τε κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἠρεμία· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς κοινὸς πασῶν ἐστι πρόδηλον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις ὁπόσα τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὁπόσα ἀκούει, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὁπόσων ὀσφραίνεται, εἴτε εὐώδη διάφορα εἴτε εὐώδη τε καὶ δυσώδη, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις ὁπόσα τὰ γευστά, ἡνίκα συμμίκτων αὐτῶν γεύεται καὶ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ ὁπόσων ἅπτεται. ἀλλ’ οὕτω μὲν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς κοινὸς πασῶν· τὸ δέ γε μέγεθος οὐ πασῶν ἀλλὰ τινῶν· οἷον ὄσφρησις μὲν v V148 οὐκ αἰσθάνεται μεγέθους, | οὐδὲ ἀκοή, οὐδὲ γεῦσις, ὅρασις δὲ καὶ ἁφὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὥσ3 περ καὶ τοῦ σχήματος ὅρασις καὶ ἁφή, ἀλλ’ οὐ γεῦσις, οὐδὲ ὄσφρησις, οὐδὲ ἀκοή. καὶ τὰ μὲν κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα· τὰ δὲ ἴδια ὧν μία τις ἑκάστη αἰσθάνεται. ἴδιον γάρ ἐστιν

4 καθ’ αὑτά ] καθαυτά A 5 καθ’ αὑτὰ ] καθαυτὰ A || κοινῶς M1pc (κ‑) || δὲ² ] δ’ M A αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 13 ὀδμῆς ] ὀσμῆς A 16 ἡ om. A 1–7 418a 7–11 7–23 418a 16–20

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[Note] that since the discussion is about sense perception, it is especially imperative to provide an analysis of perceptible objects. For it has already been said above that the activities and the capacities are often more clearly comprehended from the opposites of the activities. Perceptible objects, then, he says, are spoken of in terms of three varieties, two of which are [perceptible] in themselves, while the third and remaining variety is so coincidentally. Those that are [perceptible] in themselves can, on the one hand, be perceived jointly and, on the other hand, specially by each sense. For instance, sight specially perceives colour in itself, hearing does the same with sound and taste with flavours. There are five jointly perceived objects, he says: motion, rest, 2 number, magnitude and shape. These are “jointly perceived”, not because all such objects are perceived by all the senses, but because some of them are perceived by all and others by two or three senses, but none of them specially by a single sense. Motion – and inevitably also its contrary, rest – is perceived by all the senses: for not only does sight perceive whether the visible objects are in motion or in rest; hearing, too, perceives whether the audible objects arise from the same place or from changing locations and different places; and in the same way smell perceives whether the odour arises from the same place or from further away and nearer, taste perceives whether the objects of taste are moving and changing locations or not, and – to a much greater extent – touch perceives whether the tangible objects are in motion or not. And thus motion and rest are perceptible objects common to all the senses. But number, too, is clearly common to all the senses. For not only does sight perceive the numerical quantity of the things it sees; hearing, too, perceives how many things it hears, smell perceives how many things it smells (whether they are different things with a pleasant odour or things with a pleasant odour as well as things with an unpleasant odour), taste perceives how many the objects of taste are, when it tastes and perceives them mixed with one another, and touch how many things it touches. And thus, number, too, is common to all the senses. Magnitude, on the other hand, is not common to all but to some of them. Smell, for instance, does not perceive magnitude, nor does hearing or taste, but sight and touch do, just as sight and touch also perceive shape, but taste does not, nor does smell or hearing. So those are the common perceptible 3

2–4 cf. Phlp. 310.18–21; Prisc. 129.19–21. 9–12 cf. Phlp. 311.8–11. 13–16 cf. Phlp. 312.13–25 (who reasonably excludes taste on the grounds that it is really touch that perceives whether the objects of taste are moving or not). 16–21 cf. Them. 58.1–3. 20–21 cf. Phlp. 311.30. 22–26 cf. Phlp. 312.9–13. 29 cf. Them. 58.4–5; Phlp. 311.12; 311.20. 15–16 from changing locations : the phrase used is ek metaphorâs, which normally means “in a transferred sense”, but is here evidently intended “literally”; the cognate verb metaphérei is used similarly two lines down. It is interesting to note that the same words are also used non-standardly by Priscian (126.31–35) in attempting to explain how magnitude and shape can be perceived by smell and taste.

178 | Theodoros Metochites

οὗ μίαν τινὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται καὶ οὗ μία εὐστοχεῖ, οἷον τοῦ χρώματος ἡ ὅρασις αἰσθάνεται μόνη, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἄλλη τις αἰσθάνεται, ἤτοι γεῦσις ἢ ὄσφρησις ἢ ἄλλη. καὶ ἐπιτυγχάνει ἡ ὅρασις τοῦ χρώματος ὁποῖόν ἐστιν, εἰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἡ ὅρασις καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζεται μήτε ὑπὸ νόσου μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς θέσεως τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσυμμέτρου διαστάσεως αὐτοῦ· μέτρον γάρ τι ἔστι τῶν ὁρατῶν, κἂν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον ᾖ, οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ὁρατά. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ ψόφοι ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν τῆς ἀκοῆς. καὶ αἰσθάνονται μὲν αὗται τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητὰ αὐτῶν, ἡ μὲν τὸ χρῶμα, ἡ δὲ τὸν ψόφον· οὐκ αἰσθάνονται δὲ ὅ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν ταῦτα, οὐδὲ ποῦ· οὐ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ αὐταῖς καθ’ αὑτὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἴσως ἂν εἶεν καὶ ταῦτα αἰσθητά, οἷον ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἵππος τὸ 4 ὁρώμενον, ἢ ὅτι ἐν γῇ κεῖται ἢ πέτρᾳ ἢ ὁποιοῦν. ἐπὶ μέντοι τῆς ἁφῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον ὄνομα, φησί, τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐλέγοντο ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς «οἱ ψόφοι» ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως «οἱ χυμοί»· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς διάφοροι ἐναντιότητές εἰσι τὰ ἁπτά (ἤτοι τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητά), καὶ οὐχ ἑνὶ ὀνόματι κοινῶς ὀνομάζονται· οἷον τὸ μαλακὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρόν, τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ τἄλλα ὧν ἐστιν ἁφή, οὐκ ἔχει κοινὸν ὄνομα, ὥσπερ εἶχεν ἐν τῇ γεύσει τὸ πικρὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τἄλλα τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητὰ κοινὸν ὄνομα («τὸν χυμόν», ὡς εἴρηται), καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τἄλ5 λα κοινὸν ὄνομα ὁτιοῦν. μάλιστα δέ, φησίν, ἀντιλαμβάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστῃ, οὐ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῃ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἢ τὸ κοινόν. ἀλλ’ οὕτω μὲν ἔχει καὶ τὰ ἴδια αἰσθητά· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ὑφ’ ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη πάσχειν ὁπῃοῦν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ᾗ αἰσθητικόν· οὐ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ἡ ὅρασις τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Διάρρους ἢ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁρᾷ καθ’ αὑτά, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν τοῦ Διάρρους, φησί, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τοῖσδε τοῖς λευκοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἶναι, καὶ τῷ μὲν υἱῷ τοῦ Διάρρους, τῷ δὲ υἱῷ τοῦ Σωφρονίσκου. * *

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2 καὶ¹ om. M A 4 ἐμποδίζεται ex P correxi : ἐμποδίζηται V M A || θέσεως ] ὑποθέσεως A 4– 5 ἀσυμμέτρου ] μμέτρου Mtext (ἀσυ- M1sl ) 10 ὁποιοῦν ] ὁπηοῦν M A (fort. recte) 14 ἐστιν A1pc || ἁφή ] ἀφή A 19 ἔχει ] fort. addendum τὰ κοινά τε 22 φησί om. A 24 υἱῷ² om. A 17–19 cf. 418a 24–25

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objects. The special ones are those that an individual single sense perceives. For that [perceptible object] is special which it is possible for a single sense to perceive and which is perfectly captured by a single sense, as for instance colour is perceived by sight alone, and is not also perceived by another sense, be it taste or smell or another one. And sight captures the quality of a colour, if the sense is in a natural state and is not obstructed by disease or by the position of the visible object or by a measureless distance to it. For there is a measure for visible objects, and if they are beyond the measure, it is impossible for them to be visible. In the same way sounds are a special perceptible object of hearing. And these senses perceive their special perceptible objects, in the one case colour, in the other case sound; but they do not perceive what these perceptible objects are in terms of substance, nor where they are: for these things [sc. substance and place] are not in themselves perceptible by them, although coincidentally they, too, may perhaps be perceptible (for instance, that what is being seen is a human being or a horse, or that it lies in the earth or in a rock or wherever). In the 4 case of touch, however, there is no special name, he says, for its perceptible object, in the way that in the case of hearing it was said to be “sounds” and in the case of taste “flavours”. In the case of touch, in contrast, the tangible objects – that is, the perceptible objects within its ambit – are various contrarieties, which are not designated by any single common name. For example, soft and hard, cold and hot, dry and wet and the other objects of touch do not have a common name, in the way that, in the case of taste, bitter, sweet and the other objects within its ambit were seen to have a common name (“flavour”, as mentioned), and in the case of the other senses the other [perceptible objects have] some name or other in common. Primarily, he says, the senses 5 apprehend those perceptible objects that are special to each respective sense, not the common ones, and the special object is more perceptible to each respective sense than a common one. That, then, is the situation with the special perceptible objects, too. Coincidental perceptible objects, on the other hand, are those by which the perceptive capacity is not necessarily affected at all qua perceptive capacity. For sight does not see the son of Diares or the son of Sophroniscus, but the white and the black in them: for these it sees in themselves; but the son of Diares, he says, and the son of Sophroniscus it sees coincidentally, since it is coincidentally the case that these white objects are human beings: in the one case, that it is the son of Diares; in the other, that it is the son of Sophroniscus. * *

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5–7 cf. Them. 57.17–22; Phlp. 313.27–29; Prisc. 136.37–137.1. 11–13 cf. Phlp. 312.27; 318.2–3. 14–23 cf. Phlp. 314.23–35; 313.4–7; 313.11–12; Them. 57.24–29. 29 the son of Sophroniscus: cf. Phlp. 313.19–20. 15 Aristotle does not really say so – although he mentions at 418a 13–14 that there are several divisions of the object of touch, and the implications of this are discussed in 2.11 – but Philoponus and Themistius do, even when dealing with 2.6. 26 with the special perceptible objects, too: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “with the common and the special perceptible objects”.

180 | Theodoros Metochites

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Ὅτι, προθέμενος ἑξῆς διαλαβεῖν περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου αἰσθητοῦ, μέμνηται πρῶτον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καί φησιν εἶναι ὁρατὸν αὐτὸ τὸ χρῶμα ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ἅπερ ἑνί τινι | καλεῖν οὐκ ἔχει ὀνόματι, οἷον ὁρῶνται ἐν νυκτί τινα τῶν ὀστρέων καὶ ξηρὰ ξύλα καὶ πυγολαμπίδες καὶ ἄλλάττα ἃ μὴ ὁρᾶται ἐν τῷ φωτὶ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ διαφανές· διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ βούλεται καλεῖν αὐτὰ «χρώματα», οὐδ’ ἔχει πάλιν ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὀνομάζειν κοινῷ ταῦτα ὀνόματι. ὑπερτίθεταί γε μὴν τὰ περὶ τούτων σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς διαλαβεῖν, νῦν δέ γέ φησι καθ’ αὑτὸ εἶναι ὁρατὸν τὸ χρῶμα, ἤτοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὴν κεχρωσμένην. διαστέλλεται δὲ ὅτι οὐ λέγει νῦν ἐνταῦθα τὸ «καθ’ αὑτὸ» οἷον ἐν τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ διορίζεται· ἐκεῖσε γὰρ κατὰ δύο τρόπους φησὶ λέγεσθαι τὸ «καθ’ αὑτό», ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ λαμβάνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν ᾧ θεωρεῖται τὸ καθ’ αὑτό, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ τῆς σιμότητος λαμβάνεται ἡ ῥίν – ἔστι γὰρ σιμότης κοιλότης ἐν ῥινί – ἢ ὃ λαμβάνεται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτῷ, οἷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἀλλὰ κατ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν τοιούτων τρόπων, φησίν, ἐνταῦθα εἴρηται τὸ «καθ’ αὑτό», ἄλλ’ ὅτι ἡ αἰτία, φησί, τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατὸν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὴν κεχρωσμένην – εἴτουν τὸ χρῶμα – οἴκοθεν αὐτοῦ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστι· κινητικὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, φησί, διαφανοῦς· δι’ αὐτοῦ γὰρ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ· κινεῖ γὰρ τὸ χρῶμα τὸ διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πελάζει τῇ ὄψει. διαφανὲς δέ φησιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἤτοι τὸ συνὸν τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ φῶς· τοῦ τοιούτου γὰρ διαφανοῦς κινητικὸν τὸ χρῶμα, οὐ τοῦ ἀφωτίστου καὶ οὐκ ὄντος διαφανοῦς ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον δυνάμει· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ διαφανὲς διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὥστε ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχει φύσιν εἶναι ὁρατόν, οὐδ’ ἔστι πελάζειν τῇ ὄψει. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα προδιαληπτέον, φησί, περὶ αὐτοῦ πρότερον τοῦ φωτός τε καὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς. διαφα-

2 καλεῖν ] καλλεῖν M 3 πυγολαμπίδες A2?pc (‑γ- ex -λ‑) 4 ἄλλάττα ] ἄλλ’ ἄττα A || καλεῖν ] καλλεῖν M 5 ταῦτα ὀνόματι transp. A 11 ἐν¹ M2?pc 13 φησίν, ἐνταῦθα transp. M 17–20 σηʹ ὅρος διαφανοῦς adn. M1marg Amarg (om. σηʹ A) 19 οὐ V3?sl : om. M A P 1–5 418a 26–28

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[Note] that, having undertaken to analyse next each specific perceptible object, he first brings up the visible object and says that what is visible is colour, and also some other things that he cannot designate by a single name, as for instance certain bivalves, dry logs and fireflies can be seen at night, as well as certain other things that cannot be seen in light or set what is transparent in motion (this is why he is also reluctant to call them “colours”, but nor, on the other hand, can he call these things by any other common name). He defers, however, a clearer analysis of these things to the following sections; for the time being he says that what is visible in itself is colour, that is, the coloured surface. And he makes a distinction to the effect that now, in this context, he is not using the expression “in itself” in the sense defined in his logical treatise. For there he says that “in itself” is used in two senses: it is either (a) that in the definition of which the subject in which what is “in itself” exists is included (as the nose is included in the definition of snubness: for snubness is a concavity in a nose), or (b) that which is included in the definition of its subject (as for instance “rational” and “biped” are in the definition of human being). But in the present context, he says, “in itself” is used in neither of the aforementioned senses, but rather because, he says, the cause of the fact that the coloured surface – that is, the colour – is visible is internal and intrinsic to it. For colour has the capacity to set in motion what is actually transparent, he says. For the sense apprehends it through what is transparent. For the colour sets in motion what is actually transparent and approaches the eyes through it. And he is speaking of [what is] actually transparent, that is, what co-exists with light and in which the light actually is. For colour has the capacity to set in motion what is in this way transparent, not what is unilluminated and not really transparent except only in potentiality. For it is light that makes what is transparent actually transparent. Consequently, colour is visible in light, and it is not in its nature to be visible – nor can it approach the eyes – under any other circumstances. This is why it is especially imperative to provide first of all, he says, an analysis of light and of what is transparent. That, then, is transparent, he says, which, not being in itself visible, becomes visible

3 a single name : cf. Them. 58.25–26. 3–4 cf. Phlp. 319.25–26 (shells of bivalves, fireflies); Prisc. 129.10 (rotting logs). 5–6 cf. Phlp. 319.27–28. 6–7 common name : cf. Phlp. 319.24. 9 surface: cf. Phlp. 320.7; Them. 58.28 (neither of whom, however, conflates the coloured surface with the colour itself). 9–18 cf. Phlp. 320.7–20. 11–15 cf. Phlp. 320.9–17. 21–24 cf. Phlp. 321.36–322.11. 10–11 in his logical treatise: Metochites is thinking of Posterior Analytics 1.4, 73a 34–b 5 (a passage also referred to in Philoponus’ commentary, 320.9–17). 20 the eyes: the Greek word is ópsis, which is – unfortunately, so far as clarity is concerned – also one of the two standard terms for the visual sense itself (the other being hórasis).

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νὲς τοίνυν φησὶν εἶναι ὃ μὴ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὁρατὸν ὂν ὁρατὸν γίνεται δι’ ἀλλότριον χρῶμα, «χρῶμα» λέγων ἐνταῦθα κατὰ μεταφοράν τινα τὸ φῶς· εἰσὶ γάρ τινα σώματα ἃ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ μὴ κεχρωσμένα ὄντα μηδὲ φωτεινά, δεκτικὰ δὲ ὄντα φωτὸς τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ φωτίζεται· καὶ ἔστιν ἡ παρουσία ἐνταῦθα τοῦ φωτὸς ὡς χρῶμα αὐτοῖς, ὥστε εἶναι ἐντεῦθεν διαφανῆ. καὶ οὐ γίνεται κρᾶσίς τις ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦ φωτὸς ἡ παρουσία αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια τῶν διαφανῶν ᾗ διαφανῶν ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς παρουσία, ὡς εἴρηται, τοῦ φωτός, οἷά εἰσιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ὁ ὕαλος καὶ ἄλλα τινά, μετὰ τούτων δὲ καὶ πρὸ τούτων πάντων | μάλιστα τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα, ὃ καὶ ἀίδιον λέγει. ὃ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀεί ἐστι διαφανὲς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει πρότερον εἶναι διαφανὲς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανὲς μεταβάλλει· τἄλλα δὲ δυνάμει μέν εἰσι διαφανῆ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῦ φωτός, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ γίνεται διαφανῆ τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γάρ εἰσι διαφανῆ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν ᾗ ἀὴρ καὶ ᾗ ὕδωρ καὶ ᾗ ὁτιοῦν γέ τι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἔχειν κοινόν τι πρᾶγμα ἐπιθεωρούμενον αὐτοῖς, ὅ ἐστιν ἀνώνυμον, λέγονται καί εἰσι διαφανῆ. καὶ τὸ μὲν διαφανὲς τοιοῦτόν τι· φῶς δέ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές· τελειωτικὸν γάρ τί ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς τὸ φῶς ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις σώμασιν ἐγγινόμενον (οὐ μὴν ἐν παντὶ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐγγινόμενον τὸ φῶς διαφανῆ ταύτην ποιεῖ καὶ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαφανείας αὐτῆς γίνεται· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γῆ διαφανές). διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται τὸ φῶς ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές, τουτέστιν ᾗ φωτὸς δεκτικὸν εἰς τὸ εἶναι διαφανές. ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὸ φῶς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἐν τούτῳ, φησί, καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐστίν, ὅταν δυνάμει ᾖ διαφανές· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τι τὸ σκότος ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀπουσία τοῦ φωτὸς ὃ ποιεῖ τὸ διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές, ὡς χρῶμα ὂν αὐτοῦ. ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει· ὥσπερ τὸ χρῶμα πᾶν τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι ποιεῖ ὁρατόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ, πρότερον ὄντι δυνάμει καὶ ὄντι ἀοράτῳ, γινόμενον ποιεῖ αὐτὸ διαφανὲς καὶ ὁρατόν, καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, χρῶμα αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾖ ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές, εἴτε ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἐνεργεῖται (φωτιστικὸν γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐπεισιὸν τῷ ἀέρι), εἴτε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνωθεν οὐρανίων σωμάτων, ἡλίου, σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων, ὧν ἡ ἐνδημία φῶς αὐτίκα ἐμποιεῖ τῷ διαφανεῖ. ἔστι μέν γε ἡ τοῦ φωτὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ οὐ σωματική τις παρουσία καὶ ἀνάκρασις (οὐ γὰρ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖ, οὐδ’ ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ εἰσὶ δύο σώ-

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on account of an extraneous colour; and it is light that he here calls “colour” by a kind of metaphor. For there are certain bodies that are not coloured in themselves nor luminous, but are receptive of light, which are illuminated by the presence of light. And here the presence of light is [said to be] like a colour to these bodies, in the sense that they are transparent because of it. And the presence of light does not involve any kind of admixture of light in these bodies: rather, as stated, the presence of light in transparent bodies is their actuality in so far as they are transparent. Such bodies are air, water, glass and certain other things, among them – and before and above all of them – the heavenly body, which he also claims to be eternal. What is always actually transparent does not change from first being potentially transparent to being actually transparent, but all other things are potentially transparent in the absence of light, and become actually transparent owing to its presence. For air and water and any of the other things are not transparent in so far as they are air or water or whatever they are, but are said to be and are transparent by virtue of having a certain common feature that is manifested in them, which has no name. What is transparent, then, is as 6 described. Light, on the other hand, is the actuality of what is transparent, in so far as it is transparent. For light is something that brings the transparency to full development when it becomes present in the bodies mentioned (but not in all bodies: for when it becomes present in earth light does not render it transparent and does not become the actuality of its transparency, since earth is not transparent). That is why light was also said to be the actuality of what is transparent in so far as it is transparent, that is to say, in so far as it is capable of receiving light in such a way as to be transparent. In that thing in which light is an actuality, he says, there is also darkness, whenever 7 it is potentially transparent. For darkness in what is transparent is nothing other than the absence of the light that renders what is transparent actually transparent, being the analogue of its colour. For there is an analogy: just as colour makes everything in which it is present visible, so light, when it becomes present in what is transparent, which has hitherto been potential and invisible, renders it transparent and visible, and is, as mentioned, the colour of the transparent body itself, whenever it is actually transparent, whether it is actualized by fire (for fire is a source of light when it enters into the air) or by the heavenly bodies above, sun, moon and stars, whose visitation immediately implants light in what is transparent. Now, the presence of light in what 8 is transparent is not some kind of corporeal presence and admixture (for a body does not extend through a body, nor are two bodies simultaneously in the same place), nor

1–2 cf. Phlp. 322.31–34. 7–9 cf. Them. 59.11–15. 9–12 cf. Them. 59.28–31. 17–20 cf. Phlp. 324.28–35. 24–25 cf. Prisc. 133.17–21; Phlp. 341.14–16. 26–32 cf. Phlp. 342.25–30. 26–28 cf. Them. 59.35–60.2; Prisc. 133.23–24. 33–34 cf. Them. 60.17–18. 9–11 What is always actually transparent does not change: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “And since this is also always actually transparent, it does not change …”.

184 | Theodoros Metochites

ματα), οὐδ’ ἀπορροὴ σώματος τὸ φῶς ἢ τοῦ πυρὸς ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν οὐρανίων (καὶ αὖθις γὰρ ἂν ἦν σῶμα διὰ σώματος· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ἀπορροὴ σῶμα καὶ αὐτή ἐστιν)· ἀλλ’, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐνέργειά ἐστι τὸ φῶς τελειωτικὴ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. καὶ δῆλον, ὡς ἀθρόον τε καὶ ἀχρόνως ἅμα τε πάρεστι καὶ ἅμα πληροῖ πάντα τὸν περιέχοντα ἀέρα· εἰ γάρ τι σωματικὸν ἦν, χρόνου ἂν ἐδεῖτο εἰς τὴν τελειωτικὴν ταύτην ἐνέργειαν· νῦν δὲ ἀχρόνως ἅμα τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ φωτὸς ἡλίου ἀνατείλαντος αὐτίκα πληροῦται ὁ περὶ V150r πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἀὴρ τοῦ φωτός. [9] διατοῦτο, | φησί, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει διὰ κινήσεώς τινος, ἣ διὰ τάχος ὑπερβάλλον ἀναίσθητός ἐστιν, ἐπιλαμβάνειν τὸ φῶς τὸν ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τόπον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρόδηλον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἀληθείας καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοσοῦτο τάχος ἀμήχανον κινήσεως καὶ ἀτεχνῶς οὕτως ἄχρονος κίνησις; ἐν μικρῷ γὰρ ἄν, φησί, διαστήματι λάθοι ἂν ταχυτὴς ὑπερβολικὴ κινήσεως· τὸ δ’ ἀνατείλαντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπιτρέχειν αὐτίκα τὸ φῶς ἀπ’ ἄκρου τῆς γῆς διὰ πάσης τῆς γῆς παντάπασιν ἀπίθανος λόγος καὶ παραλογωτάτη δόξα. Ὅτι δεκτικὸν μέν ἐστι χρώματος τὸ ἄχρουν (ἤτοι τὸ μὴ ἔχον χρῶμα), ὥσπερ καὶ δεκτικόν ἐστι ψόφου τὸ ἄψοφον· εἰ δὲ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, ἄχρουν ἄρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς πᾶν· ἔχοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ χρῶμα, οὐκ ἂν ἐνεγίνετο αὐτῷ ἕτερον χρῶμα· ἐπειδὴ κινητικόν ἐστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς, καὶ οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγγίνεται, ὥστε εἰ προέχει χρῶμα τὸ διαφανές, ἀντιφράττον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον χρῶμα ἑτέρῳ ἔξωθεν ἐμ11 πίπτοντι αὐτῷ χρώματι. διατοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ διαφανὲς ἄχρουν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, τό τε παντελῶς ἀόρατον καὶ τὸ μόλις ὁπῃοῦν ὁρώμενον, οἷον αὐτό, φησί, τὸ σκότος· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀόρατον καὶ ἄχρουν καὶ τὸ παντελῶς ἀόρατον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μόγις πως ἄλλον τρόπον ὁρώμενον, οἷον ὡς στέρησις· καταλαμβάνει γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις οὐ μόνον τὸ πεφωτισμένον καὶ κεχρωματισμένον ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον φῶς ἀλλ’ ἐστερημένον αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἔχει τὸ σκότος. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καὶ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως αὐτῆς, ἤτοι τῆς τυφλώσεως, οὕτω 12 δὴ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν οὐ μόνον τοῦ φωτισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σκότους. αὐτὸ

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is light an effluence of a body, whether of fire or of any of the heavenly bodies (for again it would be a body extending through a body: for the effluence of a body is itself also a body). Rather, as we stated, light is an activity that brings what is transparent into full development in so far as it is transparent. And this is evident, for no sooner is it present than it fills, all at once and timelessly, all the surrounding air. For if it had been something corporeal it would have needed time for this developmental activity. But in fact it is timelessly that all the air around the earth is instantaneously filled with light as soon as the light of the rising sun is present. This is why, he says, Empedocles was 9 also incorrect to say that light comes to occupy the place in which it appears through some kind of motion, which is imperceptible owing to excessive speed. For it is plain as day that this is far from the truth and in conflict with appearances. For how would such an inconceivable speed of motion or, in effect, such timeless motion be possible? Over a small distance, [Aristotle] says, an excessive speed of motion may not be noticed; but that the light of the rising sun should instantaneously spread from the edge of the earth over the whole earth is a completely incredible account and a most irrational view. [Note] that it is the colourless – that is, what does not have a colour – which is 10 receptive of colour, just as it is also the soundless which is receptive of sound. But if this is the case, then everything transparent is colourless. For if it had a colour, no other colour could become present in it; for, as has been mentioned, colour is the kind of thing that sets what is transparent in motion, and it is by doing so that it becomes present in it, so if the transparent body already has a colour, then the colour that it has will be an obstruction to any other colour about to enter it from outside. This is 11 why it is necessary for the transparent body itself to be colourless, just like what is invisible, not only what is completely invisible but also what can just barely somehow be seen, as for instance, he says, darkness itself. For what is completely invisible is indeed both invisible and colourless, but so is that which can just barely be seen, in a different way, namely, as a privation. For sight apprehends not only an illuminated and coloured object, but in a way also an object that does not have light but is deprived of it, as is the case with darkness. For just as the same thing is the object of both sight and its privation, that is, blindness, in the very same way the same thing is the subject not only of illumination but also of darkness. And this is also what is said to be po- 12

5–8 cf. Them. 60.25–27. 16 irrational : cf. Phlp. 345.10. Them. 61.5–9; Phlp. 346.10–14.

20–23 cf. Them. 60.36–38.

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14–16 It is possible that Metochites means to say, as Aristotle and his ancient commentators do, that it is incredible that motion over such a large distance would go unnoticed. 30–32 … same thing is the object … same thing is the subject: “object” and “subject” translate the same Greek word here (hypokeímenon).

186 | Theodoros Metochites

δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον διαφανὲς δυνάμει, ἔστ’ ἂν δηλονότι μὴ γένηται ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις, φησίν, ἤγουν τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁτὲ μὲν φῶς ἐστιν, ὅταν ᾖ ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές, ὁτὲ δὲ σκότος, ὅταν ᾖ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανὲς ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. 13

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Ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστα ὁρατὰ καὶ κυρίως ὁρατὰ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὁρᾶται· ἑκάστου γὰρ ὑποκειμένου χρῶμα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μόνον ὁρᾶται· ἔνια δέ, φησί, καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ ὁρᾶται, ὧν καὶ αὐτῶν τὰ οἰκεῖα χρώματα οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἐν τῇ νυκτί, ἀλλὰ πυρώδη πως ὄντα ὁρᾶται ἐν νυκτί, ὅτι καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐν νυκτὶ ὁρᾶται, οἷά εἰσι μύκητες καὶ πυγολαμπίδες καὶ κέρατά τινα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ λεπίδες ἰχθύων καὶ σεσημμένα ξύλα, ἃ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μὲν οὐ φαίνεται, ἐν νυκτὶ δὲ φαίνεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ πυρώδους, ὡς εἴρηται, μετουσίαν. ἅτινα ἀνώνυμά φησιν εἶναι κοινῷ τινι ὀνόματι, ὡς καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἔλεγεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ «χρῶμα» ἀξιοῖ τὸ | κατ’ αὐτὰ φαινόμενον καλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ φθάσας διωρίσατο τὸ χρῶμα κινητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ· ταῦτα δὲ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ὥστε οὐδὲ κινητικά εἰσι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, οὐδὲ χρῶμά εἰσι. παρέρχεται δὲ νῦν αὐτὸς τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐν ἄλλοις μέλλων ἐρεῖν, ἐστὶ δὲ δῆλος· διὰ γὰρ τὴν πυρώδη μετουσίαν ἐν νυκτὶ φωτίζει τε καὶ λάμπει, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἄτονον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην φωτιστικὴν καὶ λαμπρὰν αὐτῶν ἕξιν οὐ φαίνεται ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἀλλὰ κατακαλύπτεται τῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ φωταυγείᾳ ἡ αὐτῶν φωτιστικὴ ἕξις. πλήν γε ὅτι καὶ τούτων τὰ χρώματα, φησίν, οὐ φαίνεται ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ἀλλ’ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ χρώματος, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ κινητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ· φαίνονται δὲ ἐν νυκτὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰ διὰ τὸ πυρῶδες λαμπρότητες, ὡς εἴρηται. Ὅτι σημεῖόν φησιν εἶναι ἀποδεικτικὸν τοῦ κινητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ χρῶμα, ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐπιτεθῇ τι χρῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, οὐχ ὁρᾶται· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐδεῖτο τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι, ὥστε, κινουμένου αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ χρώματος, ὡς εἴρηται, διὰ μέσου αὐτοῦ διαπορθμεύεσθαι τὸ χρῶμα τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ,

2 ἤγουν ] ἢ A 5–7 ὧν—ὁρᾶται V1marg (praefixo κείμενον) 8 ἐν νυκτὶ ] ἐνυκτὶ M 11 καλεῖν ] καλλεῖν M 14 δῆλος ] δῆλον M2?pc 16 κατακαλύπτεται ] καταλύπτεται Mtext (‑κα- M2?sl ) 17 καὶ om. A 19 δὲ om. M 21 σημεῖόν φησιν transp. A || εἶναι¹ om. M A 4–20 419a 1–11 21–188.4 419a 11–15

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tentially transparent: so long, obviously, as it does not become actually transparent. For the same nature, he says, that is, the same subject, is sometimes light, when it is actually transparent, and sometimes darkness, when it is not actually but potentially transparent. 5

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[Note] that most visible objects, and those that are visible objects in the proper sense, are visible in the day. For the colour of each underlying object is only visible in the day; but some [underlying objects], he says, are also visible at night, although the colours that are intrinsic to these are not visible at night either, but the [underlying objects] are nonetheless visible at night, on account of being somehow firelike, since fire is also visible at night. Of this kind are fungi, fireflies, certain horns, eyes and scales of fish and rotten logs, which are not apparent in the day but are apparent at night, owing, as mentioned, to their share in what is firelike. These, he says (as he also did a little while ago), have not been designated by any common name. For he does not consider it appropriate to call what appears in these things “colour”, since he has previously defined colour as being capable of setting what is actually transparent in motion; but these things are not visible in the day and in light, and consequently are not capable of setting what is transparent in motion and are not colour. He himself passes over the account and the explanation of these things for the moment, since he intends to state it somewhere else, but it is obvious. For owing to their firelike share they illuminate and shine at night; but owing to the fact that this kind of luminescent and shiny quality of theirs is feeble it is not apparent in the day, when the luminescent quality of these things is instead concealed by the excessive flow of light. Still, even of these things, he says, the colours are not apparent at night but rather in the day, since it is a special property of colour, as mentioned, to be the kind of thing that sets what is actually transparent in motion. At night, on the other hand, the luminescences connected with these things on account of their likeness to fire appear, as mentioned.

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[Note] that he says that there is a piece of evidence which demonstrates that colour 17 is the kind of thing that sets what is actually transparent in motion, namely, that, if some colour is applied to the eyes themselves, it is not visible. For if colour had not required the transparent body to be interposed, in order that, when the transparent body is set in motion by the colour, as mentioned, the colour might be transmitted to

2 cf. Phlp. 346.16. 10–12 cf. Them. 61.16–20. 10 fireflies : cf. Phlp. 346.31; Prisc. 135.20. 19– 22 cf. Them. 61.22–32 (reporting Sosigenes, although his view seems to be that the luminescent effect of these things is restricted by the small amount of luminescent substance, rather than by its intrinsic feebleness). 22–23 cf. Phlp. 348.3–4. 27–28 cf. Them. 62.7–8; Phlp. 349.34–350.2. 29–189.2 cf. Them. 62.10–12.

188 | Theodoros Metochites

ἔδει πάντως καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς κείμενον τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶσθαι· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔχει φύσιν τοῦτο γίνεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῶν τε ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν χρωμάτων αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς ἂν δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὡς εἴρηται, διαπορθμεύ18 ηται τὸ ὁρατὸν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς λέγει, φησίν, ὁ Δημόκριτος φάσκων ὡς εἰ ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν κενόν, βέλτιον ἂν ἔμελλεν ὁρᾶσθαι τὰ ὁρώμενα, ὡς καὶ μύρμηκα ἂν αὐτὸν ὁρᾶσθαι ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ κινούμενον. πάσχει γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται τὸ αἰσθητικὸν αὐτό, ὅταν ὁρᾷ· εἰ οὖν μὴ πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ (δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ ὁρατὸν ἐπιτιθέμενον τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ὡς εἴρηται, ὅτι δὴ μὴ πέφυκεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πάσχειν ἡ αἴσθησις), λείπεται ὑπό τινος ἄλλου ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφοῖν ὄντος πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἡ αἴσθησις ὥστε δὴ καὶ ὁρᾶν. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ ἐν μέσῳ τὸ διαφανές, ὃ κινεῖται μέν, ὡς εἴρηται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, προσβάλλει δὲ καὶ κινεῖ καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς τὴν ἀντίληψιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. ὥστε εἰ κενὸν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ὁτιοῦν, μὴ μόνον οὐκ ἂν ἐνήργει βέλτιον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἀντελαμβάνετο τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὔθ’ ὅλως ἂν εἶχεν ὁρᾶν, μὴ ὄντος ἐν μέσῳ τινὸς τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦντος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πάσχουσαν r V151 ὑπό τινος | προσβάλλοντος καὶ ἀλλοιουμένην οὕτως αὐτὴν ἄρα ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς τὴν ἀντίληψιν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. Ὅτι κατ’ ἐπανάληψιν πάλιν φησὶν ὡς ἡ μὲν αἰτία δι’ ἣν τὰ χρώματα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ φαίνεται δήλη γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τὰ χρώματα κινητικά ἐστι τῶν ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανῶν, τὸ δὲ διαφανὲς οὐκ ἄλλως ἐστὶν ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανὲς ἢ παρουσίᾳ φωτός, ὥστε 20 ἀνάγκη ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἐστὶ τὰ χρώματα φαίνεσθαι. τό γε μὴν πῦρ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ καθορᾶται, εἴτουν ἐν φωτὶ καὶ ἐν σκότει· καὶ τοῦτό φησιν ἐξανάγκης ἀκολουθεῖν· αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ διαφανοῦς· φωτὸς γὰρ παρουσίᾳ τὸ δυνάμει διαφανὲς ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανὲς γίνεται· ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ φωτιστικόν, ὥστε ἐξανάγκης, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ πῦρ ὡς φωτιστικὸν καὶ τοῦ διαφανοῦς αἴτιον καὶ ἐν φωτὶ καὶ ἐν σκότει φαίνεται.

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Ὅτι, ὥσπερ, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἔχει, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψόφων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀμέσως ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσων ἄλλων προσβάλλει ταῖς κατ’ αὐ-

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the sense organ through its mediation, then the colour ought unconditionally to have been visible also when placed upon the eyes themselves. But in fact this is not of such a nature as to occur. For between the eyes and the colours themselves what is actually transparent must be interposed in order for the visible object to be transmitted to the sense organ through the transparent body, as stated. This is also why Democritus was 18 incorrect to claim, he says, that if there were a void between the sense of sight and the visible objects, what is seen would be seen better, so that even an ant moving about in the heavens would be seen. For the perceptive capacity itself is affected and altered when it sees. If, then, it is not of such a nature as to be affected and altered by the perceptible object (for it is clear that a visible object applied to the eyes cannot be seen, as mentioned, in all likelihood because the sense is not of such a nature as to be affected by it), it remains for the sense to be affected and altered by something else, which is interposed between the two, with the result that it also sees. And this thing that is interposed is the transparent body, which is set in motion, as stated, by the perceptible object, and impinges upon the sense, setting it in motion and altering it towards the apprehension of the perceptible object. Consequently, if there were a void and nothing at all in the intermediate position, not only would the sense’s activity and apprehension of the perceptible object not be better, the sense would not be able to see at all, since there would not be any intermediate body setting it in motion and altering it. For it is necessarily when it is affected and altered by something impinging that the sense itself, as a result, is activated towards the apprehension of the visible object. [Note] that he says again, by way of recapitulation, that the cause of the colours’ 19 being apparent in the day has become clear from what has been stated above, namely, that colours are the kinds of things that set things that are actually transparent in motion, and what is transparent is not actually transparent except through the presence of light, the consequence of which is that colours are necessarily apparent in the day and not under any other conditions. Fire, however, is conspicuous both in the day 20 and at night, that is, in light as well as in darkness. This, he says, follows of necessity. For it is itself the cause of transparency. For what is potentially transparent becomes actually transparent through the presence of light, but the illuminative capacity is a special property of fire, so that fire, being the kind of thing that illuminates, is necessarily also, as stated, the cause of transparency, and apparent in light as well as in darkness. [Note] that, as the situation is with visible objects, he says, so it is also with sounds 21 and odour. For the latter, too, do not impinge upon the corresponding senses immedi-

24–27 cf. Phlp. 352.5–6. 31–32 cf. Phlp. 352.7.

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τὰ αἰσθήσεσιν (ἤτοι διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἀέρος), καὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀντίληψις τῇ αἰσθήσει τῇ ἀκουστικῇ ψόφου ἢ τῇ ὀσφραντικῇ ὀσμῆς, εἰ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴη τὰ αἰσθητά (ἤτοι τῷ πόρῳ τῶν ὤτων οἱ ψόφοι καὶ τῷ πόρῳ τῶν ῥινῶν αἱ ὀδμαί), ἀλλὰ δεῖ μέσα εἶναι κἀνταῦθα τὰ πρώτως ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κινούμενα, ἃ καὶ προσβάλλει λοιπὸν ἔπειτα τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καὶ διαπορθμεύει τὰ αἰσθητά, ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν τὸ διαφανές. τῶν γοῦν τοιούτων μέσων ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν – ἤτοι τῶν ψόφων – ἐκλήθη «διηχές», τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀδμῶν οὐκ ὀνομαστικῶς δεδήλωται ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτέλους, ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ Θεοφράστου καὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸν «δίοσμον» κέκληται. ὡσαύτως δέ φησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς (τὸ μὴ ἀμέσους εἶναι δηλονότι τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν), κἂν μὴ δοκῇ τοῦτο τῷ φαινομένῳ. ὑπερτίθεταί γε μὴν τό γε νῦν εἶναι τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑξῆς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐρεῖν ἐπαγγέλλεται. ἀλλ’, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ μὲν διηχές φησιν εἶναι πρόδηλον καὶ εἶναί γε αὐτὸ τὸν ἀέρα· τὸ δὲ μέσον αὐτὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς οὐκ ἔχειν αὐτὸς καλεῖν φησιν ὀνόματι· κεκλῆσθαι δ’ ὅμως καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῶν ὕστερον «δίοσμον». εἶναι δὲ τοῦτό φησι κοινῶς κατὰ τὰς ὀσμὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι· καίτοι γε καὶ τὸ διηχές, κἂν νῦν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι μόνῳ ἔφη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μετ’ ὀλίγον φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς ζῷα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθανόμενα καὶ ἀκουστικὴν ἔχοντα αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν | αἰσθανόμενα· τοὺς γὰρ ψόφους ἐκτρέπεται φόβῳ, καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀσμῶν ἕλκεται εἰς τὰ δελέατα. ὅσα γε μήν, φησί, τῶν ζῴων ἀναπνέοντα ὀδμᾶται οὐ δύναται ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὴν ὀσφραντικὴν ἔχειν ἀντίληψιν· τὰ δ’ ἄλλως ἔχοντα ταύτην ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι· τίς δὲ ἡ τούτων αἰτία, καὶ ταύτην ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐρεῖν ἐπαγγέλλεται. * *

*

3 πόρῳ¹ ] πόρρω A || πόρῳ² ] πόρρω A 6 μέσων iter. M 9 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 10 κἂν ] καὶ (ut vid.) add. Vac (erasum) || δοκῇ ] δοκεῖ M 11 τούτων ] τούτου V 11–12 περὶ αὐτῶν ἐρεῖν ] ἐρεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν M A 12 ἐπαγγέλλεται ] ἐπαγγέλεται M || μὲν om. M 13 καλεῖν φησιν ] φησι καλεῖν M A 14 κεκλῆσθαι ] κεκλεῖσθαι M : κέκληται malim || ὕστερον M1pc (ex ὑστέρων) 15 ἐν¹ om. M || κἂν ] καὶ add. Vac (erasum) 22 ἐπαγγέλλεται ] ἐπαγγέλεται M 9–14 419a 30–32 14–22 419a 32–b 3

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ately, but through the medium of other things (that is, through the medium of air); and the auditory sense will not have an apprehension of sound, nor the olfactory sense an apprehension of odour, if the perceptible objects are in the sense organs themselves, that is, if the sounds are in the ear canals and the odours in the nostril openings; but in these cases, too, the bodies first set in motion by the perceptible objects must be interposed, which then eventually impinge upon the sense organs and transmit the perceptible objects, just as the transparent body was said to do in the case of visible objects. Among these intermediate bodies, then, the one which is relevant to audible objects – that is, to sounds – was here called “transsonant”; whereas the one which is relevant to odours was not indicated by a name by Aristotle, but was called “transodorant” by Theophrastus and those who came after him. And [Aristotle] says that the same applies also to taste and touch (that is to say, that the impingements of their respective perceptible objects are not immediate), even if this might not seem to be the case, judging by their appearance. For the time being, however, he defers discussion about these things, but promises to talk about them in the following chapters. He does say, however, as mentioned, that it is evident what is transsonant, and that it is air; but the medium for odour he says that he himself is unable to designate by a name; yet this, too, was designated by later writers as “transodorant”. He says that with respect to odours this feature is common to both air and water; [note] however, [that] transsonance, too, even though he said just now that it is inherent only in air, will shortly be said to be inherent also in water. For it is in fact evident that aquatic animals, too, perceive sounds and have an auditory sense, but also that they perceive odours. For they keep clear of sounds out of fear, and on the other hand they are attracted to baits by the odours. Those animals, he says, which smell by way of breathing are indeed unable to have an olfactory apprehension in water, but those which are differently equipped have this apprehension also in water. And what the cause of these things is is also something that he promises to say in the following chapters. * *

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4 cf. Them. 62.23–24. 4–8 cf. Phlp. 353.6–9; Them. 62.20–22. 8–11 cf. Phlp. 354.13–16 (who attributes the invention of both words to “those who came later, including Theophrastus”); Them. 62.31–32 (who does not mention Theophrastus, only “the commentators”). In his paraphrase of De sensu 5, Metochites attributes the invention of “transodorant” to Themistius, “as they say” (V587v ). 17–18 cf. Them. 62.31–32. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 353.13–14. 8–9 In fact, Aristotle no more uses the term “transsonant” (diēchés) than he does the term “transodorant” (díosmon). 17–18 At least according to the grammar of Classical Greek, the transmitted text means that Aristotle says that the medium of odour has been designated by later writers as “transodorant”. It is not so unlikely that this is what Metochites actually wrote (and thus the transmitted text has been kept in the edition), but what he meant was presumably along the lines of the above translation. See also the note on this passage in the Introduction, sec. 1.6.

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8 Ὅτι ὁ ψόφος καὶ τὸ ψοφεῖν διπλῶς, ἢ δυνάμει, φησίν, ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ψοφοῦντα οὐ πάντα· τὰ γὰρ ἔρια καὶ οἱ σπόγγοι καὶ ὅσα μαλακὰ οὐ ψοφεῖ, χαλκὸς δὲ καὶ λίθοι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα στερεά τε καὶ λεῖα ψοφεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δυνάμει ψοφητικὰ αὐτὰ καθ’ 2 ἑαυτά, εἰσὶ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ψοφητικὰ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τὸν ψόφον. γίνεσθαι δὲ λέγει τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ ψόφον ἀεί τινος καὶ πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι· τινὸς μέν, ἤτοι τοῦ ψοφοῦντος· πρός τι δέ, ἤγουν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστικόν· ἔν τινι δέ, ἤγουν διὰ μέσου τινὸς τὸν ψόφον αὐτὸν διαπορθμεύοντος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον διηχές· πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος, ὥστε δύο εἶναι ἀνάγκη, ἄλλο τὸ πλῆττον αὐτὸ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ πληττόμενον· πληγὴν 3 δὲ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἄνευ φορᾶς· πᾶσα δὲ φορὰ ἐν ἀέρι ἢ ὕδατι. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ εἴρηται, οὐ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πλήττοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα ψόφον, ἀλλὰ τὰ στερεὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ λεῖά τε καὶ κοῖλα· τὰ στερεὰ μὲν καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ λεῖα – ὅτι τὰ μαλακὰ καὶ μὴ λεῖα – οἷα τὰ ἔρια καὶ οἱ σπόγγοι, οὐ δύναται πλήττειν τὸν ἀέρα διὰ τὸ κατατέμνεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς κατὰ μέρη κοιλοτήτων, καὶ τῆς μαλακότητος συνιζανούσης· τὰ δὲ στερεὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ λεῖα, πολὺν ἀθρόον καὶ ἀμερίστως ἐπιλαμβάνοντα ἀέρα, πλήττει καὶ ψοφεῖ· δεῖ δὲ εἶναι τὴν πληγὴν ἀθρόαν, ἵνα μὴ καταβραχὺ πληττόμενος ὁ ἀὴρ διαθρύπτηται καὶ διαρρέῃ, μὴ συνειλημμένος πολὺς ὥστε ψόφον ἐμποιεῖν. διατοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πλάτος ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πλήττοντα καὶ μὴ εἰς ὀξὺ λήγειν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ ἀθρόον ἐμπίπτειν, πλάτος ἔχοντα, πολὺν ἐπιλαμβάνῃ τὸν πληττόμενον ἀέρα. κοῖλα δὲ εἴρηται, ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα ἔνια ὄντα ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ψοφεῖ τε καὶ ἠχεῖ, οἷα τὰ χαλκεῖα καὶ τὰ κύμβαλα· ὡς γὰρ ἐν εἱρκτῇ κατακλειόμενος ὁ πληττόμενος ἀὴρ καὶ ἀνακλώμενος ἐν ταῖς κοιλότησι, νῦν μὲν ἔνθεν, νῦν δὲ ἔνθεν, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἔχων διολισθαίνειν καὶ διεξέρχεσθαι, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τὸν ψόφον ἐμποιεῖ παρατείνοντα· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὥσπερ πλείους 4 τὰς πληγὰς οὕτω γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἀνακλάσεις. γίνεσθαι δέ φησι νῦν – ὃ μὴ πρότερον

3–7 ση′ adn. Amarg 4–5 ἐνεργείᾳ M1pc 6 ἤγουν¹ ] ἤτοι M A || ἤγουν² ] ἢ (ut vid.) A 11 οἷα ] οἷον M A 19 τοιαῦτα ἔνια transp. M A || ἠχεῖ ] ἠχοῖ A || οἷα ] οἷον A 20 ἐν εἱρκτῇ ] ἐνειρκτῆ M 22 τὸν ψόφον ἐμποιεῖ ] ἐμποιεῖ τὸν ψόφον M A 1–9 419b 4–13 9–23 419b 13–18 23–194.8 419b 18–25

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[Note] that he says that “sound” and “making a sound” are ambiguous between potential and actual sound. For not all things make a sound: wool and sponges and anything that is soft do not make a sound, whereas brass and stones and all other things that are solid and smooth do make a sound; and they are in themselves potentially sonorific, but whenever they actually make a sound they are actually sonorific. And he says that an actual sound will always be of something, relative to something 2 and in something: of something, that is, of that which makes the sound; relative to something, that is, relative to hearing and the auditory capacity; in something, that is, through the medium of something that transmits the sound itself, namely, that which above was called “transsonant”. For a sound is a blow, so it is necessary that there are two things, one thing which strikes the blow and another thing which suffers the blow. But it is impossible that there should be a blow without spatial movement. And all spatial movement takes place in air or in water. But, as mentioned, not all things 3 that strike blows also produce sounds, but only those that are solid, hard, smooth and hollow. Those that are solid, hard and smooth, because things that are soft and not smooth, such as wool and sponges, cannot strike the air, since this will be cut up by the hollow spaces distributed throughout their parts, and since their softness will give way. Those things that are solid, hard and smooth, on the other hand, since they capture a large chunk of air all at once and undivided, do strike and make a sound. And the blow must be struck all at once, in order for the air not to be scattered and dispersed by being gradually struck, without being captured in a sufficiently large chunk to produce a sound. This is why it is also necessary for the things that strike to have breadth and not to terminate in an apex, so that, since they have breadth, the struck air can be captured in a large chunk at the moment when they collide with it all at once. [That they must be] hollow was mentioned because it is especially certain things of that nature which produce the most sound and resonance, as for instance brassware and cymbals. For when the struck air is shut up as if in an enclosure and reverberates in the hollow spaces, now from this direction, now from that, and is unable to escape and evaporate easily, the sound that it creates is the most enduring. For in this way it is as if a series of blows takes place during the reverberations. At this point he says – 4

3 stones: cf. Them. 64.5. 7–10 No ancient commentator interprets Aristotle’s “of something” and “relative to something” in 419b 10 as referring respectively to the cause of the sound and the sense (but rather to that which strikes the blow and that which suffers it: Them. 63.8–10; Phlp. 357.5–7; Prisc. 139.25–26). It is possible that Metochites was inspired to this interpretation by 419b 8–9 and Philoponus’ remarks on those lines (356.31–38). He seems to return to the received interpretation in 2.8.27. 12– 13 cf. Phlp. 359.9–11; Them. 63.10–11. 15–18 cf. Phlp. 355.8–10. 20–22 cf. Phlp. 355.3–7; 357.22–24. 25–30 cf. Phlp. 355.13–17; 359.15–18. 30–195.2 cf. Phlp. 359.26–28.

194 | Theodoros Metochites

εἴρηται – καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τοὺς ψόφους, οὐχ ᾗ ἀὴρ ἢ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πληγὴν τῶν στερεῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, σωμάτων, ἣν ἀνάγκη καὶ ταχυτάτην γίνεσθαι, ὡς V152r ἂν μὴ διαθρύπτηται ὁ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ προλαμβάνῃ τὴν διάθρυψιν αὐτοῦ | ἡ πληγή. ὥσπερ γὰρ διὰ χώνης τινὸς καταρρέειν ὁρμῶν σωρὸς ἢ ὁρμαθὸς ψάμμου, εἰ παίοιτο ταχύτατα καὶ σφοδρῶς, οὐκ ἂν διαρρέοι, νικώσης τῆς ταχυτῆτος τῆς προσβολῆς τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥεῦσιν, ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πληγῆς τοῦ ἀέρος· ὑπερβάλλει γὰρ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ ταχὺ τῆς πληγῆς τῶν σκληρῶν καὶ στερεῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ πλάτος ἐχόντων σωμάτων τὴν διάθρυψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, κἀντεῦθεν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ψόφοι γίνονται. Ὅτι τὴν ἠχώ φησι γίνεσθαι ὅταν ὁ πληγεὶς ἀὴρ εἷς ὢν καὶ μὴ διατεθρυμμένος ἔν τινι σκληρῷ γενόμενος λείῳ ἢ κοίλῳ, εἴτε ἄντρῳ εἴτε ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ, μὴ ἔχοντι διέξοδον, ἔτι ἄθρυπτος ὢν καὶ συνεχῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἀποπάλληται, ὥσπερ, φησίν, ἀπὸ ἀν6 τιτύπου τινός. γίνεσθαι δὲ φησὶν ἀεὶ τὴν ἠχώ, μὴ μέντοι ἐκδήλως καταλαμβάνεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνεκλᾶτο ὁ πληττόμενος ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἤκουεν ἑαυτοῦ ὅταν ἐφώνει πρὸς ἄλλον· λανθάνει δὲ ἡ ἀνάκλησις ἀεὶ τῆς ἠχοῦς καὶ γίνεται μόνον διάδηλος ὅταν ὁ πεπληγμένος ἀὴρ εἰς λεῖα καὶ στερεὰ ἐμπέσῃ ἀντιφράττοντα, καθώς, φησί, τοῦ7 το γίνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτός. ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τοῦ φωτὸς ἀνακλάσεις γίνονται· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπιλάμποντος οὐ μόνον τὰ ἡλιωθέντα φωτίζεται καὶ λαμπρύνεται, ἀλλ’, ἀνακλωμένης πάντως τῆς φωταυγείας, φωτίζεται καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς εἰς ἃ μὴ προσβάλλει ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτισμός, ἀντιφραττόμενος τυχὸν ὑπὸ τείχους ἤ τινος ἄλλης σκέπης· ἔδει γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα πάντως ἐν σκότει, εἰ μὴ ἐφωτίζετο ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνακλάσεως τῆς εἰς αὐτὰ γενομένης ἀπὸ τῶν φωτισθέντων ἀπροσκόπτως. ἐν μέντοι ταῖς προσβολαῖς τοῦ φωτὸς ταῖς γινομέναις πρὸς στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ἤτοι χαλκὸν ἢ ἄργυρον ἢ τὰ παραπλήσια, διάδηλος ἡ ἀνάκλασις τοῦ φωτὸς γίνεται, ὃ καὶ διορίζεται 8 τῇ σκιᾷ καὶ σαφῆ ποιεῖται τούτῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνάκλασιν. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παραπλησίως

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and this has not been mentioned earlier – that sounds take place both in air and in water, not in so far as it is air or water, but because of the blow struck, as mentioned, by the solid bodies, which must necessarily also be struck exceedingly fast, so that the air will not be scattered but the blow will forestall its scattering. For just as a heap or an eddy of sand which is about to run through a funnel, if it is struck very fast and vehemently, will not run through, since the speed of the onset overtakes its flow, so it is also in the case of a blow to the air. For the vehemence and speed of the blow struck by bodies that are hard and solid, as mentioned, and that have breadth, exceeds the scattering of the air, and that is how the sounds resulting from the blow arise. [Note] that he says that an echo occurs when the struck air, provided it is unified and undispersed, has entered into some smooth hardness or a hollow, either a cave or any other kind of container, which lacks an exit, and rebounds from there while still being unscattered and continuous, as if, he says, from something resistant. And he says that an echo always occurs, but is not [always] clearly apprehended. For if the air struck by the voice did not always reverberate, no one would hear themselves when speaking to someone else. However, the reverberation of the echo is always indiscernible and only becomes apparent when the struck air collides with smooth and solid obstacles, in much the same way, he says, as this happens also in the case of light. For there are always reflections of light from all things, too. For this is also clear: not only those things that are exposed to the sunlight are illuminated and brightened when the sun is shining, but, since the flow of light is inevitably reflected, those things nearby on which the light from the sun does not fall – perhaps because it is obstructed by a wall or some other screen – are also illuminated. For these things would inevitably have to have been in the dark if they had not been illuminated by the reflection reaching them from those things that are illuminated without hindrance. In those cases, however, where the light comes up against solid and smooth objects, such as brass, silver or similar things, the reflection of the light becomes apparent. The light is also demarcated by the shadow and by this fact renders its own reflection conspicuous. And the same thing, he says, as in the case of light takes place in much the same way

10–13 cf. Them. 63.32–35; Prisc. 141.11–15; Phlp. 360.20–22; 360.24–30. 64.6–8. 19–25 cf. Phlp. 362.12–18.

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1 and this has not been mentioned earlier : cf. 2.7.24. 11 smooth hardness or a hollow : or, with the emendations suggested in the critical apparatus, “smooth and hollow solid”. 13 as if, he says, from something resistant: Aristotle does not say anything to this effect in the paraphrased text. The Greek phrase translated as “something resistant” (antítupón ti) can also mean “a kind of counterpart” or “copy”, and Metochites may be playing on this sense here. No doubt what the air rebounds from must be – not be comparable to – something resistant, as Philoponus makes clear (360.20–21; 25; 27; 32; 361.16; cf. also Prisc. 141.30; 142.30).

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φησὶ γίνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς οὕτως ἐπὶ τοῦ πληττομένου ἀέρος, καὶ τὴν ἠχὼ μὲν ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι, καταλαμβάνεσθαι δὲ μάλιστα ὅταν ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἴρηται τὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος πληγῆς ἀκολουθήσῃ. 9

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Ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔλεγον οἱ τὸ κενὸν κύριον εἶναι φάσκοντες τῶν ψόφων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἑκάστοτε· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κενὸν ὅλως ἐνόμιζον εἶναι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἡμάρτανον, ᾗ δὲ τὸ κενὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐτίθεντο, οὐκ ἀλόγως παντάπασιν ἔλεγον· ὁ γὰρ ἀήρ – ὃν ὡς κενὸν ὑπελάμβανον – αὐτός ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον τῶν ψόφων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς· κυριώτατον δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον | οὐχ ὡς αἴτιον ἀλλ’ ὡς διαβιβαστικὸν καὶ διαπορθμευτικὸν αὐτῶν καί τινα τρόπον συναίτιον. αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὐ γεγωνεῖ, φησί, διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς εἶναι, τουτέστιν εὔθρυπτος καὶ εὐδιάλυτος· ὅταν δὲ εἷς ὢν καὶ συνεχὴς ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀντιτύπων πλήξῃ ἐν ἑνὶ γινόμενος ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ μὴ διατεμνόμενος ὡς εἰς σκληρὰ ἄνισα, πάντως ἐντεῦθεν ἐμπίπτων ἐμποιεῖ τοὺς ψόφους. καὶ ἔστι τοίνυν ψοφητικὸν αὐτὸ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ λεῖον καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὡς εἴρηται, κινητικὸν τῇ πληγῇ γινόμενον ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὅταν ὡς εἷς ᾖ καὶ οὐ διαθρύπτηται, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς ταύτης καὶ τῆς κινήσεως συνάπτηται καὶ συμφυὴς καὶ συνεχὴς γίνηται τῷ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄντι συμφύτῳ ἀέρι κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν μήνιγγα· διαδίδωσι γὰρ ὁ κινηθεὶς ἀήρ, σύμφυτος, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ συνεχὴς γινόμενος τῷ κατὰ τὰς μήνιγγας ἐγκατῳκοδομημένῳ καὶ τεθησαυρισμένῳ ἀέρι, τοὺς ψόφους· ὁ δὲ κατὰ διάδοσιν αὐτοὺς δεξάμενος ἀναφέρει καὶ διαπορθμεύει διὰ τῆς μήνιγγος εἰς τὸ ἐνταῦθα αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ γίνεται ἡ ἀντίληψις τῶν ψόφων αὐτῶν τῇ ἀκουστικῇ αἰσθήσει. καὶ διατοῦτο οὐδὲ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ ἐμψύχου ἡ διάδοσις τῶν ψόφων τῷ αἰσθητικῷ πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἡ φύσις ἐγκατέθετο ἀέρα ὅς ἐστι σύμφυτος τῷ ἔξωθεν ἀέρι κινοῦντι· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοῦ ἐμψύχου μόρια τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔμφυτον ἔχει ἀέρα, ἀλλ’ ἐν μόνοις ἐστὶ τοῖς ὠτίοις, ὡς εἴρηται, κατὰ τὴν μήνιγγα· οὐ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔξωθεν πληττόμενος καὶ κινούμενος ἀὴρ ὁ τῇ μήνιγγι ἐμπίπτων καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς τοὺς ψόφους ἀναφέρων τῷ αἰσθητικῷ πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔξωθεν ἀὴρ κινούμενος, συνεχὴς ὢν καὶ σύμφυτος – ὡς ὁμοφυὴς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας – τῷ ἐγκατοικοδομηθέντι

1 ἠχὼ ] ἠχῶ M 7 ὃν ] ὂν M 10 εὔθρυπτος καὶ εὐδιάλυτος ] εὔλυτος καὶ εὐδιάθρυπτος M A 11 ἐν ἑνὶ γινόμενος ἐπιπέδῳ ] fort. legendum ἐν λείῳ γινόμενος ἓν ἐπίπεδον ἔχοντι vel. sim. (cf. supra 2.8.5 et Them. 64.7–10) || γινόμενος ] γενόμενος M A 11–12 διατεμνόμενος ] τεμνόμενος A 13–21 ση′ ὅλον adn. Mmarg 14 ὡς om. A 22 ἀέρα ὅς ] ἀέρος A 27 ὡς A1sl : καὶ Atext ac (exp. A1 ) || ἐγκατοικοδομηθέντι ] ἐν add. M A 4–12 419b 33–420a 2

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in the case of air that is struck, and an echo always occurs, but is most clearly apprehended when the blow to the air follows the steps described above.

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[Note] that in a certain sense those who said that void is what is on any occasion responsible for sounds and voice were not speaking unreasonably. They were mistaken in so far as they held that void exists in the world at all, but in so far as they put void in the position of air they were not speaking entirely unreasonably. For air – which they supposed to be void – is what is primarily responsible for sounds and voice. It is primarily responsible, in the intended sense, not as a cause, but as being able to transmit and convey them and in a certain sense being an auxiliary cause. For it does not by itself make a sound, he says, because it is “brittle”, that is to say, it is easily broken up and easily dissolved. But, provided it is unified and continuous, when it strikes anything that is resistant and arrives at a single surface, thus avoiding being scattered as [it would be if it were arriving] at several uneven hard [surfaces], it inevitably creates sounds when it impinges from that quarter. Accordingly, what is sonorific is that which is hard and smooth and resistant, as stated; this becomes, through the blow, a thing that actually sets the air in motion, provided the air is unified and not dispersed, but is instead joined together by this blow and this motion, and becomes coalescent and continuous with the connatural air located by nature in the ears around the eardrum. For when the air that is moved becomes naturally connected and continuous, as mentioned, with the air that is walled in and stored up around the eardrums, it transmits the sounds; and when the latter air receives them on the basis of transmission, it carries them and conveys them through the eardrum up to the perceptive spirit there, and thus the apprehension of sounds ensues for the auditory sense. It is because of this that the transmission of sounds to the perceptive spirit does not occur via all parts of an ensouled creature either, but only via that part in which nature has implanted air that is naturally connected with the air outside, which causes the motion. For not all parts of the ensouled creature have this kind of innate air; on the contrary, it is found only in the ears around the eardrum, as mentioned. For it is not the struck and moved external air that impinges upon the eardrum and carries the sounds through it up to the perceptive spirit; rather, when it is moved, the external air, which is continuous and naturally connected – since it has the same nature and substance – with the air

3–9 cf. Phlp. 363.21–25. 7–9 cf. Prisc. 143.9–10. 10 cf. Phlp. 363.30. 11–12 cf. Phlp. 363.25–28; Them. 64.7–10. 17–18 cf. Them. 64.16–17. 19–23 cf. Phlp. 364.11–16. 28–199.3 cf. Phlp. 364.9–16. 11–13 The style is unusually cramped here; possibly the text is corrupt. The emendation suggested in the critical apparatus is based on 2.8.5 above combined with Themistius’ paraphrase and translates as “… and enters into something smooth which has a single surface …”.

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τοῖς ὠτίοις κατὰ τὴν μήνιγγα ἀέρι, κινεῖ λοιπὸν αὐτὸν τῇ συνεχείᾳ· ὁ δὲ παραπέμπει 13 ἅπερ ἐδέξατο εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν αἴσθησιν, εἴτουν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα. ἔστι δέ, φησίν,

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αὐτὸς ὁ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένος καὶ ἔμφυτος ἀὴρ τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀκίνητος, ἵνα καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀκίνητος μένων, ἤρεμός τε καὶ μὴ σεσοβημένος, ἀμιγῶς τε καὶ καθαρῶς παραδέχηται καὶ παραπέμπῃ τῇ αἰσθήσει τὰ ἔξωθεν ἐμπίπτοντα· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκινεῖτο, οὐκ εἶχεν ἀκριβεῖς τε καὶ καθαρὰς παραδέχεσθαι καὶ παραπέμπειν τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμπιπτόντων διαφοράς, ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένως πάντως καὶ τεθολωμένως. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔξωθεν κινούμενος ἀήρ ἐστιν ὁ διαβιβάζων εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν τοὺς ψόφους, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κινούμενος ὁ ἔμφυτος τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀὴρ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ διαπορθμευτικὸς | αὐτῶν, δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τῶν ζῴων ὄντων βόμβων αἴσθησις αὐτοῖς γίνεται. διακομίζονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ βόμβοι τῷ ὕδατι, τὸ δὲ ἅπτεται τοῦ ἐμφύτου τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀέρος· οὐ γὰρ προσπελάζον αὐτῷ συνεχὲς γίνεται ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι ὁ ἔξωθεν κινούμενος ἀὴρ συνεχὴς τῷ ἔσωθεν γίνεται ὡς ὁμοφυὴς ὢν αὐτῷ· ἁπτόμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐμφύτου τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀέρος αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσι τῶν ἀκουστῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα παραδέχεται ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ μέντοι διεισδύνει τὸ ὕδωρ ἐντός, ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀντιλάβηται τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις· καὶ γὰρ εἰσερχόμενον ἴσως ἐντὸς λυμαίνεται καὶ κίνδυνον ἐμποιεῖ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ. διατοῦτο καὶ ἕλικας ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν οὓς ὁρῶμεν ἡ φύσις ἐποιήσατο εἰς ἀποτροπήν τε καὶ προσκοπὴν τοῦ μήτε τὸ ὕδωρ μήτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμπιπτόντων ῥᾳδίως ἔχειν ἐντὸς εἰσάγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑγρόν, διαφανὲς ὄν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὑγρὰ διαφανῆ), δέχεται μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκτός, ὡς πρότερον εἴρηται, διαφανοῦς τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ δι’ αὑτοῦ παραπέμπει πρὸς τὴν ὅρασιν, ἀλλ’ ἔχει μέν γε αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑμένας τινὰς εἰς σκέπην, ὡς ἂν μὴ ὑπό τινος βλάπτοιτο τῶν ἔξωθεν· εἰς ὃν δὴ σκοπὸν κἀνταῦθα ἕλικας ἔφημεν ἐσκευάσθαι τῇ φύσει ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἀποτροπῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν χαλεπῶν ἕνεκεν. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, ὥσπερ τὸ ἔξωθεν ὕδωρ ἅπτεται μόνον τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶ συμφύτου ἀέρος, ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἔξωθεν κινούμενος ἀὴρ σύμ-

1 κινεῖ ] κοινεῖ M 5 οὐκ ] ἂν addere velim 12–24 τοῦτο adn. Mmarg 12 ὅτι A1sl 13 αὐτοῦ ] αὐτὸ malim 15 ἀντιλάβηται ] ἀντιλαμβάνηται A 17 καὶ om. M || ἕλικας ] ἔλικας V 20 ὑπὸ ] ἀπὸ malim (vel παρὰ, ut Them. 65.5) 21 αὑτοῦ correxi : αὐτοῦ codd. 23 ἕλικας ] ἔλικας V 2–200.6 420a 9–15

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that has been walled in inside the ears around the eardrum, in turn sets this in motion by virtue of their continuity; and the latter air relays what it has received to the sense itself, that is, to the perceptive spirit. But the air, he says, that is walled in inside the ear and innate to it is itself unmoved, in order that, by staying in itself unmoved, calm and unperturbed, it may receive and relay to the sense what impinges upon it from outside in a pure and uncontaminated manner. For if it had itself been moved as well, it would not have been able to receive and relay accurately and clearly the differentiating qualities of the things that impinge from outside, but, inevitably, only in a confused and muddled way. And it is clear that it is not the moved external air that transmits the sounds to the sense, but the air innate to the ear that, when moved by the external air, is what conveys the sounds, since sense perception of booming occurs to animals even when they are in water. For the booming is conveyed by the water and the water is in contact with the air innate to the ear. For the former does not, when it comes close to the latter, become continuous with it in the way described, since the moved external air becomes continuous with the internal air on account of having the same nature as it. But the water communicates the audible objects themselves to the air innate to the ears when it is in contact with it, and the sense receives these objects through the innate air. It is not the case that the water flows through to the inside in order for the sense to receive the audible object from it: in fact, if it does enter, it may cause harm and danger to the sense organ. This is also why nature has created the spirals that we see in the ears as a means to divert and prevent both water and anything else impinging from the outside from easily finding its way inside; just as, in the case of the eyes, the fluid in them, which is transparent (for all fluids are transparent), receives the visible objects from the transparent body on the outside, as previously mentioned, and relays them through itself to the visual sense; but this fluid contains certain membranes for protection, so that [the sense organ] will not be harmed by anything from the outside, which is exactly the purpose for which we said that in the present case, too, spirals have been installed by nature: that of safety and of diversion of irritants from the outside. Anyway, what we were saying is that, just as the external water only comes into contact with the connatural air in the ears, so it is also with the moved external air: it does becomes naturally connected with the air that is walled

4–6 cf. Them. 64.30–32. 9–16 cf. Them. 64.32–37. 16–20 cf. Phlp. 367.7–14. 20–29 cf. Them. 65.1–12 (although it is argued there that the purpose of the membranes of the eyes as well as of the spirals in the ears is to prevent the dispersal of the internal air and fluid); Phlp. 364.32–365.2; 369.27–32. 4 the ear: the Greek word is akoḗ, which is also the standard term for the auditory sense itself. 16 water : the emphasis reflects the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. With the transmitted text the emphasis should fall on “air” or “innate to the ears”; but it is also possible that autoû here is demonstrative: see the Introduction, sec. 2.3.2.

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φυτος μὲν γίνεται αὐτῷ τῷ ἔσω ἐγκατῳκοδομημένῳ ἀέρι καὶ κινεῖ αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν αὐτὸς ὁ ἔσω καὶ ἔμφυτος τῇ ἀκοῇ παραδεχόμενος διαδίδωσι καὶ παραπέμπει εἰς τὴν 17 αἴσθησιν τὰ ἀκουστά. καὶ μήν, ὥσπερ κάμνοντος ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ τοῦ περὶ τὴν κόρην χιτῶνος οὐκ ἔστι ῥᾳδία ἡ ὀπτικὴ ὑπηρεσία τῇ αἰσθήσει, ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ τῆς μήνιγγος κάματος καὶ τὸ πάθος λυμαίνεται τῇ αἰσθήσει τῆς ἀκοῆς· διάφραγμα γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ μῆνιγξ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ σύμφυτος τεθησαύρισται ἀήρ. 18

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Ὅτι, εἰ καὶ εἴρηται ὡς ὁ ἐντὸς τεθησαυρισμένος τῇ ἀκοῇ σύμφυτος ἀὴρ ἀκίνητός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὕτως εἴρηται ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὡς μὴ μεταβαίνειν ὅλος καὶ ἄλλος ἀντ’ ἄλλου ἐκ διαδοχῆς εἰσάγεσθαι· τήν γε μὴν ζωτικὴν ὡς εἰπεῖν κίνησιν, καὶ ἀμετάβατος μένων κατὰ τὸ ὁλοσχερές, εἴτουν τὴν τῶν οἰκείων μορίων κίνησιν, ἀεὶ κινεῖται· ἀεικίνητος γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα καὶ ἐν ταῖς νηνεμίαις αὐταῖς ὁρᾶται κινούμενα ἐν τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ταῖς ἀκτῖσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ὀπῶν διϊούσαις. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὁ ἔμφυτος τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀήρ, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰ καὶ ἀμετάβατος ὡς ὅλος ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὖν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος φύσιν τῷ | ὅλῳ ἠρεμῶν καὶ ἐν ταυτῷ μένων τοῖς μορίοις κινεῖται. καὶ δῆλον ὡς εἴ τις ἐπιθήσει τοὺς δακτύλους τοῖς ὠτίοις, ἦχος ἔνδον ἐστί· καὶ ἔοικεν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ ζωτικῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἀκοὴν ὅταν ὁ ἔμφυτος αὐτῇ ἀήρ, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἔχῃ καθὸ ἀὴρ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον· ὁ γὰρ ψόφος ἔξωθεν καὶ ἀλλότριον, οὐκ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐστίν. ἑξῆς δὲ ζητεῖ πότερόν ἐστι τὸ ψοφοῦν τὸ τύπτον ἢ τὸ τυπτόμενον. φησὶν οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἄμφω εἰσὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τοῦ ψόφου· κίνησις γάρ τις οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ψόφησις μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ ἔστι μὲν μία τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ (ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄνοδος καὶ ἡ κάθοδος), ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύο τῷ λόγῳ, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρουμένη, τοῦ μὲν ὡς ποίησις, τοῦ δὲ ὡς πάθος· καὶ ἔοικεν ὥσπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα, φησίν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντιτύπων· μέσον γὰρ τῶν δύο ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεται, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρούμενον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ προσβάλλοντα καὶ ἐμπίπτοντα, φησί, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ πληγὴ θεωρεῖται οὐ τὰ τυχόντα εἰσὶ ψόφου ποιητικά (οὐ γὰρ βελόνη βελόνην πλήξασα ψόφον ἐμποιήσει), ἀλλ’ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ πλάτος καὶ ὁμαλότητα ἐπὶ τῶν πληττόντων (ὡς καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέχθη τοῦτο)· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν πάντως ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πληττόντων τε καὶ πληττομένων γένοιτο ψόφος.

8 ὅλος ] ὅλως M A 9–12 ση′ adn. Mmarg 12 ἀκτῖσι correxi : ἀκτίσι codd. 13 ὅλος (ut vid.) M1pc (ex ὅλως) 15–16 ἔοικεν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοῦτο ] ἔοικε τοῦτο μᾶλλον εἶναι M A 17 ἔχον ] ἔχων M A 22 φησίν ] φησί M A 24–27 ση′ ὅρος φωνῆς adn. M1marg 7–18 420a 15–19 18–23 420a 19–23

24–28 420a 23–26

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in inside the ear, and sets it in motion, but then it is the latter, the air that is internal and innate to the ear, which, upon receiving the audible objects, transmits and relays them to the sense. Moreover, just as it is difficult for the sense capacity to perform its 17 visual function when the coating around the pupil in the eye is exhausted, so also the exhaustion and affection of the eardrum impairs the sense of hearing. For the eardrum is its barrier, inside of which the connatural air is also stored. [Note] that even if it was said that the internally stored air, which is connatural to the ear, is unmoved, still, it was said to be unmoved in the sense that it is not displaced as a whole and that one [portion of air] does not enter as a replacement for another: it is certainly always moved with respect to its vital, so to speak, motion, that is, the motion of its own proper parts, even though it remains undisplaced as a whole. For air is always in motion. And clearly particles in the air can be seen to be moved in the light and in the rays that penetrate through windows even in the absence of wind. Accordingly, even the air that is innate to the ear, as mentioned, although it is undisplaced as a whole, is nevertheless moved in respect of its parts, while being at rest and remaining in the same place as a whole, in accordance with the nature of air. It is also clear, if one puts one’s fingers into one’s ears, that there is an echo inside; and this seems rather to indicate that one’s ear is healthy and vital when the air innate to the ear, as mentioned, possesses the motion that is natural to it in its capacity of air. For sound comes from outside and somewhere else, not from [the innate air] itself. Next he inquires whether what makes the sound is that which strikes or that which is struck. So he says that both of them are what is productive of sound. For the act of making a sound is like a motion in between them both; and it is one in respect of its subject (just like the ascent and the descent); but it is also two, conceptually, since it can be viewed alternately as the action of the one or the affection of the other. It is comparable, he says, to things that rebound from resistant [surfaces]: they become one and the same intermediate between the two, alternately viewed in this way and the other. Moreover, he says, it is not the case that any random objects that impinge and collide and in which a blow is seen to take place are productive of sound (for a needle which strikes a needle will not produce a sound), but there must be both breadth and evenness in the objects that strike (and this was also mentioned just a while ago). If this is not the case, there is no way that a sound will be emitted from some random objects that strike and are struck.

4 the coating: cf. Phlp. 368.2–3; Prisc. 144.28–29. 7–13 cf. Phlp. 368.28–369.4; Them. 65.13–22; Prisc. 145.5–7; 145.11–12. 16–19 cf. Phlp. 368.15–21 (finger); Them. 65.22–25; Prisc. 145.7–11 (echo). 23– 25 cf. Them. 65.26–27. 30–31 both breadth and evenness: cf. Phlp. 372.6.

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Ὅτι αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων ἐν τῷ ψόφῳ τῷ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διαδείκνυνται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ψοφητικὸν πάντως δηλοῖ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ψόφων, εἴτε ὀξεῖς εἰσιν εἴτε βαρεῖς, ἀλλ’, ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ τὰ ψοφητικὰ ὦσι, τότε καὶ οἱ ψόφοι οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν δείκνυνται ὁποῖοί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ διὰ τοῦ φωτὸς τὰ χρώματα δείκνυται, ἄνευ δὲ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔχει φύσιν δηλοῦσθαι ὁποῖά εἰσιν, ὡσαύτως δὴ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ δηλοῦται ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ψόφοις. τὰ τοιαῦτα δέ, ἤτοι τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, μεταφορικῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν λέγονται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ κεντεῖ, φησί, καὶ διεισδύνει τάχιστα ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, τὸ δὲ ἀμβλὺ βραδέως κινεῖ καὶ ὥσπερ ὠθεῖ καὶ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ὀξὺ ταχέως καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραδέως καὶ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον. οὐ μέντοι γέ ἐστι τὸ ταχύ, φησίν, ὀξύ, οὐδὲ τὸ βραδὺ βαρύ, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὀξὺ γίνεται διὰ τὸ τάχος, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ διὰ τὴν βραδυτῆτα. καὶ τοίνυν ἔπειτα ὁρίζεται τὴν φωνὴν ψόφον εἶναι τῶν ἐμψύχων· οὐ γὰρ καλεῖται «φωνὴ» κυρίως ὁ τῶν ἀψύχων ψόφος, ἀλλ’ ὅσοι λέγονται τῶν ἀψύχων ψόφοι – οἷον τῶν αὐλῶν ἢ τῆς λύρας ἢ τῶν τοιούτων – «φωναὶ» καθ’ ὁμοιότητα λέγονται τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων φωνῆς· ἐξομοιοῦνται γὰρ ταῦτα φωνοῦντα τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, ὅτι ἀπότασιν ἔχει ὁ ἦχος αὐτῶν – ὥσπερ | ταυτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐμψύχων φωνή – καὶ μέλος – ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἐμψύχων ῥυθμοὺς ἔχουσι – καὶ διάλεκτον – ἐοίκασι γὰρ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ὀργάνων κατὰ τὰς φωνὰς ἐνίοτε διασαφεῖσθαι. οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔμψυχα καὶ ζῷα ἔχει φωνήν, ἀλλά τινα τῶν ζῴων ἄφωνά εἰσι, καὶ προηγουμένως φησὶν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἄναιμα ἄφωνά εἰσιν, οἷά εἰσι τὰ ἔντομα, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ μαλάκια, ἃ δὴ πάντα ἄναιμα ὄντα καὶ ἄφωνά εἰσι· καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων δέ τινα ἄφωνά εἰσιν, οἷον οἱ ἰχθύες πάντες. καὶ τοῦτό φησι κατὰ λόγον εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἀέρος, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι βιοῦν ἐν ἀέρι, διατοῦτο οὐδὲ φωνεῖν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ δή, φησί, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ Ἀχελῴῳ ποταμῷ ἱστορούμενοι ἰχθύες φωνεῖν δοκοῦσι μὲν φωνεῖν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν· ἀλλὰ τῶν βραγχίων αὐτῶν κινουμένων καὶ τὸ ἐναπειλημμένον ὑγρὸν ἐξωθούντων ἅμα συνθλίψει δοκοῦσι φωνεῖν.

4 γὰρ A1sl 5 ὡσαύτως ] οὕτως M 8–10 ση′ adn. Mmarg 10 τὸ¹ ante ὀξύ v. 10 collocare velim (secundum Arist. 420a 32) || τὸ² ante βαρύ v. 10 collocare velim (secundum Arist. 420a 32) 11 βαρὺ ] βραδὺ M 15 ἀπότασιν Vpr : ἀπόστασιν Vac M A P cett. || ὥσπερ ] καὶ add. A 18 ἔμψυχα M1pc (ἔ- ex ἀ‑) 19 εἰσι—ἄφωνά2 om. A 21 ἐναίμων ] ἀναίμων M A || οἱ om. M A 23 φωνεῖν ] φωνὴν A || φησί om. M A 23–24 ποταμῷ ] φησὶν add. M A 1–11 420a 26–b 4 11–21 420b 5–10 21–26 420b 10–14

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[Note] that the differentiating qualities of things that produce sound are shown in the actual sound. For a potentially sonorific thing does not in any way reveal the differentiating quality of its sounds, whether they are sharp [i.e. high] or heavy [i.e. low]; but when sonorific things are in a state of activity, then it is also shown what the sounds emitted from them are like. For just as colours are shown through the medium of light, and are not of such a nature that it is revealed what they are like without light, in the same way sharp and heavy are revealed in the actual sounds. These qualities – that is, sharp and heavy – are named by way of a metaphor from tangible objects. For a sharp object pierces, he says, and penetrates very thoroughly very quickly, whereas a blunt object causes slow motion, as it were by exerting pressure, and only to a limited extent. In the same way what is sharp in the realm of sounds, too, moves the sense very thoroughly in a short time, whereas what is heavy moves it slowly and to a limited extent. It is not that what is quick is sharp, he says, or what is slow is heavy; rather, the one becomes sharp on account of its quickness, and the other becomes heavy on account of its slowness. After this, then, he defines voice as being the sound of ensouled creatures. For the sound of inanimate things is not properly called “a voice”; rather, those sounds of inanimate things – for instance of pipes or a lyre or something similar – that are called “voices” are so called on the basis of a similarity with the voice of ensouled creatures. For in “vocalizing”, these [musical instruments] are similar to ensouled creatures, since their sound has modulation (just as the voice of ensouled creatures also has the very same feature), melody (just as the speech of ensouled creatures also has cadences) and articulation (for the sounds emitted by such instruments sometimes seem to be clearly articulated in the manner of voices). However, not all ensouled creatures and animals possess a voice, but some animals are voiceless: he says initially that all bloodless animals are voiceless, as for instance insects, but clearly also testaceans and molluscs, all of which, being bloodless, are also voiceless. But among sanguineous animals, too, some are voiceless, for instance all fishes. This, he says, accords with reason: for since voice is a movement of air, and these animals cannot live in the air, for this reason they cannot vocalize either. In fact, he says, even the fish in the Acheloos river, which are reported to vocalize, may appear to vocalize, but this does not correspond to the truth: rather, it is when their gills are in motion and simultaneously compressing and ejecting the fluid that has become enclosed in them that they appear to vocalize.

2–3 cf. Them. 65.38–66.1. 8–13 cf. Prisc. 147.15–18; Phlp. 373.17–23. 19–23 cf. Phlp. 376.36–377.3 (although there it is not melody but “modulation” [apótasis] which is equated with cadences); Prisc. 148.12–17. 25–26 cf. Them. 66.18–19. 28–29 cf. Phlp. 378.2; Them. 66.21–22. 31–33 cf. Phlp. 378.9–13. 13 what is quick is sharp … or what is slow is heavy: or, with the emendations suggested in the critical apparatus, “what is sharp is quick … or what is heavy is slow”.

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Ὅτι, καθὼς εἴρηται, τοῦ ἐμψύχου ἐστὶν ὁ ψόφος φωνή, καὶ οὐ διὰ παντὸς μορίου τοῦ ἐμψύχου ἐνεργεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ἀναπνευστικοῖς αὐτοῖς μορίοις· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τρία παρακολουθεῖ ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις, τό τε τύπτον αὐτὸ καὶ ὃ τύπτει καὶ ἐν ᾧ τύπτει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις τὸ μὲν τύπτον αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχικὴ δύναμις, ὃ δὲ τύπτει οἷον τὰ περὶ τὸν πνεύμονα (οἷον ἡ καλουμένη ἀρτηρία καὶ ὁ φάρυγξ), ἐν ᾧ δὲ τύπτει ἐστὶν ὁ ἀήρ (διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐστὶν ἡ τύψις), εὔδηλον ὡς ὅσα τῶν ζῴων δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα, ταῦτα καὶ φωνεῖ· δέχεται δὲ τὸν ἀέρα τὰ ἀναπνέοντα, οἷα τὰ πεζά, φησί, τὰ πτηνὰ λέγων καὶ τὰ χερσαῖα πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τῶν ἐν ὑγροῖς ζῴων. καὶ τοίνυν πρὸς δύο φησὶν εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τῆς γλώττης· ἡ γλῶσσα γὰρ εἰς δύο ὑπηρετεῖ, εἴς τε τὴν γευστικὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ εἰς τὴν φωνητικήν, ὧν ἡ μὲν γευστική ἐστιν ἀναγκαιοτάτη τῷ ζῴῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι ζῆν ἄνευ τῆς γευστικῆς· διατοῦτο καὶ πλείοσι τῶν ζῴων ἐνυπάρχει. τὰ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς εὖ εἶναι τὸ ζῷον καὶ κάλλιστα ἔχειν ἐμποιεῖ· διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ πολλοῖς ἔνεστι τῶν ζῴων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα πάντων εἶναι πέφυκεν, εἰ δὲ μή γε, τῶν πλειόνων· τὰ δέ γε καλλοποιὰ καὶ κόσμον ἐμποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις εἶναι. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ τῆς γλώττης, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῦ ἀέρος διπλὴν ἔχειν φησὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὥστε καταψύχειν ἐντὸς τὴν καρδίαν (περὶ οὗ καὶ πλατυκώτερον ἐν ἄλλοις ἐρεῖν ἐπαγγέλλεται)· ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ζῴοις χρήσιμον. ὄργανον δέ ἐστι τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ὁ φάρυγξ αὐτός, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἕνεκα τοῦ πνεύμονος, ᾧ δὴ πάνυ τοι | μέτεστι τοῦ θερμοῦ. κἀν τούτῳ διαφέρει, φησί, κατὰ πολὺ θερμότητι τὰ εἰρημένα πεζὰ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἐνύδρων· ἐγγὺς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡνωμένος τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ πηγῇ, τῇ καρδίᾳ. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πᾶσα τῆς φύσεως οἰκονομία ἵνα εἰσπνεόμενος ἔξωθεν ὁ ἀὴρ διὰ τοῦ φάρυγγος καταψύχῃ τόν τε πνεύμονα καὶ πολλῷ μάλιστα τὴν καρδίαν, ὑπηρετεῖ δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ πρὸς τὸ φωνεῖν. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πᾶς ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων ψόφος φωνή· ὁ γὰρ βήξ, τῶν ζῴων ὢν καὶ αὐτὸς ψόφος, οὐκ ἔστι φωνή· διατοῦτο καὶ προσδιορίσασθαι δεῖ τῷ προσειρημένῳ λόγῳ, ὅτι «τῶν ἐμψύχων – εἴτουν τῶν ζῴων – ὁ ψόφος ἔστι φωνή», καὶ τὸ «ὅταν ᾖ σημαντικὸς καὶ καθ’ ὁρμήν τινα καὶ πρόθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς»· ὁ γὰρ βὴξ οὐ κατὰ σκοπόν τινα καὶ πρόθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς γίνεται,

3–5 ση′ adn. Mmarg 8 χερσαῖα ut vid. M1pc (‑αῖ‑) 9 τῆς² ] τὸ τῆς malim 12 εἶναι ] ἔχειν M A || ἔχειν ] εἶναι M A 13 πάντων εἶναι transp. M A 15 τὸ² M1sl || διπλὴν ] διπλῶς M A 18 ἐστι ] ἐστιν M 20 κατὰ πολὺ ] καταπολὺ M A 23 ὑπηρετεῖ ] ὑπηρετῆ V M 26 καθ’ ὁρμήν ] καθορμὴν A 27 τῆς² om. A 1–8 420b 14–16 8–18 420b 16–22 17 ἐν ἄλλοις: cf. Resp. 8; PA 3.6

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[Note] that, as has been mentioned, voice is the sound of an ensouled creature, and it is not actuated through every part of the ensouled creature, but only in the respiratory parts. For since there are three concomitants of sounds, the thing that strikes, that which it strikes and that in which it strikes, and the thing that strikes in ensouled creatures is the soul capacity itself, what it strikes is for instance the area of the lungs (for instance, the so-called “artery” and the windpipe), and that in which it strikes is air (for the blow is struck through air), it is obvious that it is only those animals that receive air which also vocalize. But it is breathing animals, for instance, footed animals, that receive air, he says, referring to flying and landliving animals in contradistinction to aquatic ones. Accordingly, he says that the respiratory apparatus is useful for two things, just like the tongue. For the tongue serves two purposes: the activity of tasting as well as that of vocalizing. Of these the activity of tasting is absolutely necessary for the animal, for it is impossible to live without the activity of tasting: this is also why it belongs to a larger number of animals. The vocal function, on the other hand, creates well-being and prosperity for the animal. This is also why it is not present in many animals. For necessary functions naturally belong to all of them, or, failing this, the majority of them. Things that create prosperity and beauty, on the other hand, are not necessarily present in all or most of them. But just as the tongue has a twofold activity, he says, so, too, does the respiratory apparatus. For, on the one hand, it is necessary in order to cool down the heart on the inside (and he promises to speak about this at greater length in another work); on the other hand, it is also useful to animals for vocalization. The organ of breathing is the windpipe, and this exists for the sake of the lungs, which certainly have their fair share of heat. And these, he says, are where the big difference lies, in terms of heat, between the aforementioned “footed” animals and the aquatic ones. For they are adjacent to, and form a unity with, the source of heat, that is, the heart. And the purpose of the whole dispensation of nature is that the air, by being inhaled from the outside through the windpipe, should cool down the lungs and most especially the heart, but [the organ of breathing] is also of service to animals for vocalizing. But not every sound emitted by animals is a voice. For cough, which is also a sound of animals, is not a voice. This is why one must add to the previously stated definition – “voice is the sound of ensouled creatures”, that is, “of animals” – the qualification “when it is significant and corresponds to some impulse or intention in the soul”. For a cough does not correspond to any purpose or

9–10 cf. Prisc. 149.23; Phlp. 382.11–12. 25–26 cf. Them. 66.37–38. 26–28 cf. Phlp. 381.2–11. 29 cf. Phlp. 381.13–14. 30–33 cf. Them. 67.6–9. 33–207.1 cf. Phlp. 383.6–7; Them. 67.6–7.

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ἀλλὰ παθούσης τῆς κατὰ τὸν φάρυγγα ἀρτηρίας ὑπό τινος ἢ θερμοτέρας καὶ δριμυτέρας δήξεως ἢ ὑπὸ ψυχροτέρας τινὸς προσβολῆς ἐπισυμβαίνει· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ βηχὶ πλήττεται ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ ἔξωθεν εἰσπνεόμενος διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον σύμβαμα καὶ τὸ πάθος, ἐν δὲ τῇ φωνῇ πλήττει μᾶλλον αὐτὸς τὸν ἐναπειλημμένον ἐντὸς τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ φάρυγγι ἀέρα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν φανταστικὴν ὑποτύπωσιν τοῦ ζῴου τὰ τῆς φωνῆς σχηματίζεται. καὶ ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ὅτι ὁ ἔξωθεν ἀὴρ σύμφυτος γινόμενος τῷ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένῳ τῇ ἀκοῇ ἀέρι καὶ πλήττων αὐτὸν διαπορθμεύει δι’ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀκουστὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὸν εἰσπνεόμενον ἔξωθεν ἀέρα ἑνοῦσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐναποκεκλεισμένον ἐντός, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ καὶ φαντασίᾳ διατυποῦσθαι τὰς φωνάς, ὥστε οὐ μόνον διαφέρειν κατὰ τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς – ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ μετὰ φαντασίας σημαντικόν – τὸν τῆς φωνῆς ψόφον τοῦ ἐν τῷ βηχὶ ψόφου, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτήν· ἄλλως γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλως οὗτος γίνεται, ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ προκατέχεται μᾶλλον ἐντὸς ὁ εἰσπνεόμενος ἔξωθεν ἀήρ, ὡς ἂν κατ’ ὀλίγον δαπανᾶται εἰς τὴν ὑπουργίαν τῆς φωνῆς. καὶ δῆλον, φησίν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐκπνέοντα οὔτε εἰσπνέοντα φωνεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν τῷ ἐκπνέειν ἅμα καὶ φωνεῖν πολλὴ ἐκροὴ τῆς δαπάνης τοῦ ἀέρος γένηται, καὶ οὐκ ἔχῃ διαρθροῦν τὴν φωνὴν μέχρι τινὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀξιολόγου, ἀλλ’ ἐγκόπτηται· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναπνεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ἡ φύσις εἰς ἀμφότερα μεριζομένη τὰ ἔργα, ἀλλὰ τὸν προκατασχεθέντα ἀέρα πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν οἰκονομοῦσα καὶ δαπανῶσα συμμέτρως, ἔπειτ’ αὖθις κατὰ διαστήματα ἕτερον εἰσοικίζηται. ὅθεν καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ πλεῖον παρατείνοντες τὴν φωνήν, οὐκ ἐξ- | αρκοῦντος τοῦ δαπανωμένου πνεύματος, δοκοῦσιν οἱονεί πως ἐκπνεῖν, καὶ θαυμάζονται οἱ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον συνείροντες τὴν φωνὴν ὡς πολὺν προτεθησαυρισμένοι τὸν ἀέρα ἐντός. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν, φησί, καὶ οἱ ἰχθύες εἰσὶν ἄφωνοι, ὡς μὴ ἀέρος ἐν μετουσίᾳ γινόμενοι· καὶ διατοῦτο οὔτε φάρυγγα οὔτε πνεύμονα ἔχουσι· καθόλου δὲ καὶ ὅσα μὴ πνεύμονα ἔχει οὐδὲ καρδίαν ἔχει· ὁ γὰρ πνεύμων διὰ τὴν καρδίαν, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ καταπνεομένη, ὡς εἴρηται, καταψύχηται. * *

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intention in the soul, but supervenes when the artery in the windpipe is affected either by some excessively hot and acrid sting or by some excessively cold impact. And in coughing the air that is inhaled from the outside is being struck on account of the mishap or affection just mentioned, while in vocalizing it is rather the case that this air strikes the air enclosed inside the artery or the windpipe, and the vocalization is shaped in accordance with the impulse and the outline in the animal’s imagination. And similarly to what was being said a while ago about hearing, namely, that the ex- 32 ternal air, when it becomes naturally connected with the air walled in inside the ear and strikes it, conveys the audible objects through this air to the sense, it seems likely also in the present case that the air which is inhaled from the outside is unified with that which is shut up on the inside, as mentioned, and that the vocal units are formed by an impulse of the soul and by imagination. The upshot is that a vocal sound differs from the sound in a cough not only with respect to the purpose and the impulse of the soul (and also, of course, [with respect to being] significant in combination with imagination), but also with respect to its generation: for they are each generated in a different way, since in the case of vocalization the air which is inhaled from the outside is also to a larger extent entrapped on the inside beforehand, so as to be expended bit by bit on the service [rendered] by the voice. And it is obvious, he says, that it is im- 33 possible to vocalize while either (a) exhaling or (b) inhaling, so as to avoid that (a) the simultaneous exhalation and vocalization leads to a huge outflow of the allowance of air, and it becomes impossible to articulate the voice to any meaningful, so to speak, degree for being short of breath; and, in the case of inhalation, so as to avoid that (b) nature is impeded by being divided between the two functions, but instead dispenses and expends the already entrapped air evenly on the vocalization, and then brings in some more again at intervals. This is also why people who vocalize protractedly, when 34 the spirit expended is not sufficient, appear to somehow lose their breath; and those who vocalize continuously for the longest are admired for having stored up so much air inside beforehand. It is due to this cause, he says, that fishes are also voiceless, since they do not partake of air; and because of this they also lack both windpipes and lungs. And in general, those animals which have no lungs have no heart either. For the lungs exist because of the heart, in order for it to be cooled down, as stated, by being aerated by them. * *

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Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι ὡρισμέναι τῶν ὀσφραντῶν διαφοραί, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀκουστῶν τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν χρωμάτων (ἤτοι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα)· ἀσθενεστέρα γὰρ καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτος ἡμῖν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη, ἡ ὄσφρησις, ἰσχυρὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας, ἀλλὰ ἀτονωτέρα κατὰ πολύ, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων κρείττονα ταύτην ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς. διατοῦτο καὶ οὐδ’ εὐχερές ἐστι τὸ λέγειν ὡρισμένως καὶ ἠκριβωμένως περὶ αὐτῆς· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ γένος οὔτε κατ’ εἴδη καταλαβεῖν ἔστι καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητά, ὥσπερ καθόλου καὶ γενικῶς αἰσθητὸν ἐλέγετο τῇ γεύσει ὁ χυμός, ὃς εἰς εἴδη διαιρεῖται τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, καὶ τῇ ὁράσει τὸ χρῶμα, οὗ πάλιν εἴδη τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ τῇ ἀκοῇ ὁ ψόφος, οὗ πάλιν ὡς εἴδη τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ· καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς καθόλου μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὀνομάσαι ἑνὶ ὀνόματι – ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων – τὸ αἰσθητόν, κατ’ εἴδη δὲ διαιρεῖν ἔστι τὰ ἁπτὰ εἴς τε τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν, τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμόν, καὶ ὅσαι ἁπταὶ ποιότητες. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω διορίσασθαι καὶ ὀνόμασι χρῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀόριστα ταύτῃ τὰ ὑποκείμενα εἰς ἀντίληψιν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀνομάζειν αὐτά· μόνον δ’ ἔχει ἐν τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη τοῖς μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ καὶ διηρθρωμένας καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐγνωσμένας ὁτῳοῦν ὀνόματι τὰς καταλήψεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ἡ γεῦσις ἔχει μὲν τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐγνωσμένων ὄντων αὐτῶν τοῦ μὲν γλυκέος, τοῦ δὲ πικροῦ, ἐπισυμβαίνει τῷ μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἀνιᾶσθαι· τῇ ὀσφρήσει δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγνωσμένα καὶ διωρισμένα τὰ οἰκεῖα αἰσθητά, ὅτιπερ, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀτονωτέρα τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐν ἡμῖν αὕτη, καὶ οὐκ ἔχομεν τῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητῶν τὰς διαφορὰς ἀκριβώσασθαι, μόνον δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις, | τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἢ λυπεῖσθαι. καὶ ὥσπερ, φησί, τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν ζῴων, οἷοί εἰσιν οἱ καρκίνοι καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἰχθύες, οἷς καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι προκάλυμμα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν – καθάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν ζῴων τοῖς μαλακοφθάλμοις ἐστὶ προκαλύμματα τὰ βλέφαρα εἰς σκέπην τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ

1 εἰσὶν ] ἔστιν V M 4–5 ση′ adn. Mmarg 4 ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη ] αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις M A 6 ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν ] τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν M A 7 ἠκριβωμένως ] ἠκριβωμένος M 8 καταλαβεῖν ] διαλαβεῖν M A || διορίσασθαι M1pc (‑ο- ex -α) : ὁρίσασθαι Atext (δι- A1sl ) 11 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 16 κατ’ αὐτὴν ] καθ’ αὑτὴν malim 17 καὶ¹ om. M A (fort. recte) || διηρθρωμένας ] διηρθρωσμένας M 22 τὰς διαφορὰς ἀκριβώσασθαι ] ἀκριβώσασθαι τὰς διαφοράς M 23 αὐτῆς ] αὐτοῖς M A || ἢ ] καὶ τὸ A 24 καρκίνοι ] καρκῖνοι V A 1–23 421a 7–13 24–210.10 421a 13–18

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[Note] that, when it comes to odour and smell, there are no determinate differentiating qualities of olfactory objects, as of audible objects there are high [i.e. “sharp”] and low [i.e. “heavy”] and of visible objects there are the differentiating qualities of colour (that is, white, black and the rest). For [the sense of smell] is relatively weak and inarticulate in us. The explanation is that this sense, that of smell, is not so powerful in us as the other senses, but far feebler – and not only that, but in many irrational animals this sense is stronger than it is in us. This is also why it is not easy to give 2 a determinate and precise account of it either, for it is not possible to comprehend and demarcate the perceptible objects within its ambit either by genus or by species, as we were saying that what is perceptible by taste in a universal and generic sense is flavour, which is divisible into the species sweet and bitter; what is perceptible by sight is colour, the species of which, again, are white and black; what is perceptible by hearing is sound, the species of which, again, are high and low; and admittedly it is not possible to designate by a single name, as in the cases mentioned, the generic perceptible object of touch, but it is possible to divide the objects of touch by species into hard and soft, cold and hot and all the other tangible qualities there are. In the 3 case of smell, however, it is not possible to make such a demarcation and to apply names to the perceptible objects within its ambit: rather, the things that are subject to apprehension by this sense are indeterminate, and it is impossible to name them. The only thing that this sense is able to do with the perceptible objects within its ambit is to take pleasure in some among them and be offended by some: it does not also have apprehensions of them that are well articulated and precisely recognized by some name or other, as is the case with taste, which does have the capacity for taking pleasure in and being offended by its own proper perceptible objects, but it is only when these have been recognized as being either sweet or bitter that the taking pleasure in the one and being repulsed by the other supervenes. The sense of smell, however, does not recognize and demarcate its own proper perceptible objects, precisely because, as mentioned, this sense is feebler than the others in us; and we do not have the ability to detail precisely the differentiating qualities of the perceptible objects within its ambit, but in smelling the only thing that accompanies the objects of smell is this: taking pleasure or being offended. And just as, he says, those among the animals that 4 have hard eyes, such as crabs and fish in general, which also have no covering of their eyes – in the way in which the other animals, those that have soft eyes, have their eye-

7–9 cf. Phlp. 386.2–3. 9–19 cf. Phlp. 386.10–24. 19–24 cf. Phlp. 387.2–6; Prisc. 151.11–13 (reporting Plutarch of Athens). 31–211.10 cf. Phlp. 387.13–23.

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ἀσφάλειαν – ὥσπερ οὖν τοῖς σκληροφθάλμοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ζῴων οὐδεμία διαφορὰ τῶν χρωμάτων καταλαμβάνεται (ὅτιπερ ἄτονον αὐτοῖς τὸ ὀπτικὸν ἕνεκεν τῆς σκληρότητος τῶν ὀργανικῶν αἰσθητηρίων), μόνῳ δὲ τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ ἡ διαφορά ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁρατῶν, οὐ κρίνεται δὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν οὔτ’ ἄλλ’ ὁτιοῦν χρῶμα, οὕτως ἄρ’ ἐν ἡμῖν ἔχει ἡ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἴσθησις· ἀτονοῦσα φυσικῶς πρὸς τὴν κατάληψιν τῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητῶν μόνῳ τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ ἀνιαρῷ διαστέλλει ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὰς κατ’ εἶδος διαφορὰς αὐτῶν κατὰ λόγον κρίνειν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι οἰκείως, ἀλλὰ προσχρωμένη ἐπὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις αἰσθητοῖς τοῖς τῆς γεύσεως περὶ ἑκάστων ὁρισμοῖς κἀντεῦθεν ὀνομασίαις ἀναλόγως καὶ αὐτὴ κατ’ ἐκείνην τὴν γευστικὴν τὰ οἰκεῖα αἰσθη5 τὰ νομίζουσα. οἷον, ὥσπερ ἡ γευστικὴ καλεῖ «γλυκεῖς» καὶ «πικροὺς» χυμούς, οὕτως κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς γεύσεως ὀδμὰς λέγομεν «γλυκείας» καὶ «πικράς», ἔτι δὲ «δριμείας» καὶ «αὐστηρὰς» καὶ «λιπαράς»· ταῦτα γὰρ κυρίως ἐπὶ τῶν γευστῶν εἰσιν (εἴτουν τῶν χυμῶν), κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων χρήσεως λέγεται οὐ κυρίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν. καὶ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ κλῆσις εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐναντίως καὶ ἀνάπαλιν· οἷον τὸ μὲν μέλι καὶ ὁ κρόκος καὶ ὡς γευστὰ ἡδέα καὶ ὡς ὀσφραντὰ ἡδέα, ἡ δὲ ἀλώη καὶ τὸ λιβανωτὸν καὶ ὁ στείραξ ὡς μὲν γευστὰ πικρὰ καὶ ἀηδῆ, ὡς δὲ ὀσφραντὰ ἡδέα, πλήν γε ὅτι καὶ ἐναντίως ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἢ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχοντα, ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὰς ὀνομασίας 6 κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἐκεῖθεν ἔχει. εἰσὶ μέν γε τὰ τῆς γεύσεως αἰσθητὰ ἄμεινον καταληπτὰ ἢ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ γεῦσις ἁφή τίς ἐστι, βελτίονα δὲ καὶ ἀκριβεστέραν πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὴν ἁφὴν ἄνθρωπος ἔχει, καὶ ἄμεινον ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὴν τοιαύτην αἴσθησιν ἔχει· διατοῦτο καὶ φρονιμώτερος ὁ ἄνθρωπος πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐστίν, ὅτι ἀκριβεστέραν ἢ κατὰ τἄλλα τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τῆς 7 τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως εὐφυῶς ἔχοντα μέγα συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν. καὶ τούτου σημεῖον εἶναί φησιν ὅτι καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μαλακωτέρας τὰς σάρκας ἐν

3–4 ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ] αὐτοῖς ἐστι M A (fort. recte) 6 κατ’ αὐτὴν ] καθ’ αὑτὴν malim 7 ὁρίζεσθαι ] λογίζεσθαι A 10 καλεῖ ] καλλεῖ M || «πικροὺς» χυμούς transp. M 11 ἀπ’ om. M A 12 δριμείας ] δρυμείας V 13 δὲ om. A || καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ] καθομοίωσιν A 14 οὐ κυρίως καὶ ] καὶ οὐ κυρίως M A 16 ὡς² om. A || ἀλώη ] ἀλόη malim 17 στείραξ ] στύραξ malim 19–212.6 ση′ ὅλον adn. Mmarg 20 τὰ om. A || ἁφή ] ἀφή A 21 ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A || ἄνθρωπος ] ἅνθρωπος malim 23 ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A 23–24 καὶ γὰρ—φρονεῖν corrupta videntur (nescio utrum pro τὰ—ἔχοντα legendum τὸ—ἔχειν an pro συμβάλλεται legendum διαφέρει) 10–19 421a 26–b 3

19–24 421a 18–23 24–212.6 421a 23–26

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lids as covering for the protection and safety of their eyes – just as those animals, then, that have hard eyes, apprehend no difference between colours (precisely because their visual capacity is feeble, on account of the hardness of the sense organs that serve as instruments), and visible objects differ in their perception only in respect of being frightening and non-frightening, whereas neither white nor black nor any other colour is discerned by them, in the same way it is with the sense of smell in us: being by nature feebly endowed for the apprehension of the perceptible objects within its ambit, it distinguishes between these only in respect of being pleasant and repulsive, since it is unable to discern their specific differentiating qualities according to a principle and to demarcate them appropriately, but rather reapplies, by analogy, the definitions and accompanying designations of the several objects of taste to its own proper perceptible objects, and so itself treats its own proper perceptible objects after the pattern of the other sense, the gustatory one. Thus, just as the gustatory sense 5 calls flavours “sweet” and “bitter”, in the same way we speak, by a metaphor derived from taste itself, of sweet and bitter odours, and further pungent, tart and fatty ones. For these terms are properly applicable to objects of taste (that is, flavours), but by a metaphor and a comparison based on this usage they are also improperly applied to objects of smell. And sometimes the situations are identical and the term is applied to the same entities in both cases, but sometimes the situations are contrary to each other and [the terms are applied] inversely: as, for instance, honey and saffron are sweet both as objects of taste and as objects of smell, whereas aloe, frankincense and storax are bitter and unpleasant as objects of taste but sweet as objects of smell, only, in spite of the fact that their situation in the case of smell is contrary to what it is within the domain of taste, they still have their designations [as objects of smell] by a metaphor derived from the latter. Now, the perceptible objects belonging to taste are 6 possible to apprehend better than those within the domain of smell, since taste is a kind of touch and the tactile sense of human beings is better and more precise than all their other senses, and better than it is in other animals. This is why human beings also have better understanding than all the other animals, since their tactile sense is more precise than it is in the others. For indeed, being well endowed with respect to this kind of sense contributes greatly to understanding. And he says that an indication 7 of this is that, even as regards human beings, those who come to their tactile experiences with softer flesh are better endowed for understanding than those whose flesh

10–12 cf. Phlp. 388.12–14; Them. 68.4–7. 13–25 cf. Phlp. 389.25–390.2; Them. 67.19–20. 30–31 The translation is based on the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus; the transmitted text translates as follows: “For indeed, those animals that are well endowed with respect to this kind of sense contribute greatly to understanding.”

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V156r ταῖς ἐπαφαῖς ἔχοντες τῶν σκληροτέρας ἐχόντων ταύτας εὐφυέστεροι | πρὸς τὸ φρο-

νεῖν εἰσιν· ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸ εὐδιόδευτον καὶ εὐδιαφόρητον τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει περιττωμάτων, ὧν οὕτω δή – διὰ τὸ ῥᾴδιον τῆς μαλακότητος τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ μὴ ἀντίτυπον καὶ σκληρὸν ὥστε καὶ κατακλείειν καὶ ἀποφράττειν ταῦτα – ῥᾳδίως ἐν τοῖς μαλακοσάρκοις ἐκκρινομένων, μάλιστα τὸ φανταστικὸν πνεῦμα, ᾧτινι ὁ νοῦς ἐποχεῖται, ἀμιγῶς κρατύνεται, καὶ προκοπὴν λαμβάνει ἡ γνωστικὴ ἕξις. 8

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Ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀκοὴ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκούστου καὶ ἡ ὅρασις τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν στερήσεων αὐτῶν εἰσι καταληπτικαί, οὕτω καὶ τῇ ὀσφρήσει καταληπτὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν καὶ τὸ ἀνόσφραντον. τὸ δ’ ἀνόσφραντον πολλαχῶς ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον πρότερον εἴρηται. ἔστι γὰρ ἀόρατον καὶ τὸ μηδόλως ἔχον φύσιν ὁρᾶσθαι (ὡς ἔστιν ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος), καὶ τὸ φαύλως καὶ ἀμυδρῶς ὁρώμενον (ὡς τὸ σκότος προείρηται ὡς στέρησις φωτός, ἢ μᾶλλον τὸ λεγόμενον λυκόφως), καὶ τὸ βλαπτικὸν τῆς ὁράσεως (ὥσπερ αἱ ὑπερβάλλουσαι λαμπρότητες τοῖς ἀτενίζουσιν εἰς αὐτάς)· καὶ τὸ ἀνόσφραντον λέγεται τὸ μηδόλως ἔχον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι φύσιν τινὰ καὶ δύναμιν, λέγεται κἀκεῖνο οὗ βραχεῖά τίς ἐστιν ὄσφρησις, καὶ οὗ βλαπτική ἐστιν ἡ ὄσφρησις. Ὅτι, καθάπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις μέσῳ τινὶ χρῶνται διαπορθμεύοντι τὴν ἀντίληψιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν (ὡς ἔφημεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἶναι μέσον τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ διηχές, ἤτοι τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ), οὕτως τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, ὅπερ ἐκλήθη, ὡς προείρηται, «δίοσμον», κοινῶς ὂν κἀν τῇ ὀσφρήσει ἔν τε τῷ ἀέρι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα, φησίν, ὀσφραίνεται. καὶ τούτου σημεῖον, φησί, τὸ ἕλκεσθαι τοὺς ἰχθύας εἰς τὰ δελέατα ὀσφραινομένους αὐτῶν. Ὅτι ἀπορήσειέ τις ἄν, φησί, πῶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ πλείω τῶν ζῴων ἀναπνέοντα ὀσφραίνεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα, οἷα τὰ ἔντομα· καὶ γὰρ αἱ μέλιτται ἕλκονται ἐπὶ τὰ

4 καὶ² om. M A 5 ἐκκρινομένων ] ἐκκρινομένον Mtext (‑ων M2?sl ) 12 ἀόρατος ] ἔστι γὰρ ἀόρατον add. A1sl || φαύλως καὶ om. A 17–19 ση′ adn. Mmarg 18 τῆς² om. M A 23 ἄνθρωπος ] ἅνθρωπος malim 24 ὀσφραίνεται ] ὀσφραίνονται A || ἕλκονται ] ἕλκωνται M A 7–16 421b 3–8 17–22 421b 9–13 23–214.14 421b 13–21

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is harder. This is likely to be a result of the efficient percolation and discharge of natural residues: since these are easily excreted in soft-fleshed animals (because of the tractability that characterizes softness of flesh and the fact that it is neither resistant nor hard in such a way as to entrap and block these residues), the imaginative spirit, on which the intellect is carried, is maximally strengthened by the lack of admixture, and the cognitive competence makes progress. [Note] that, just as hearing can apprehend what is audible and what is inaudible, 8 sight can apprehend what is visible and what is invisible, and the other senses can apprehend both the perceptible objects within their ambits and the privations of these, so also both what is odorous and what is inodorous can be apprehended by the sense of smell. A thing can be inodorous in several ways, corresponding to what was previously said about being invisible. For invisible are (a) things that are not at all of such a nature as to be seen (as a voice is invisible); (b) things that are poorly and obscurely seen (as it was mentioned above that darkness – or rather what is called “wolflight” – [is invisible], since it is the privation of light); and (c) things that are harmful to sight (as excessive brightness is for those who stare into it). And “inodorous” is said of that which is not at all of such a nature or capacity as to be smelt, and also of that which has only a faint smell, as well as of that whose smell is harmful. [Note] that just as the other senses, too, employ some medium which conveys 9 the apprehension of the perceptible objects (as we said that in the case of sight and hearing what is respectively transparent and transsonant, that is, air and water, is a medium), so also in the case of smelling there is the same kind of thing, namely, that which was named, as mentioned above, “transodorant”, and which has a common presence – also in the case of smelling – both in air and in water. For indeed, aquatic animals, too, he says, perceive smell. An indication of this, he says, is that fish are drawn to bait when they smell it. [Note] that one may raise the problem, he says, of how it is that human beings and 10 the majority of animals perceive smell while breathing, whereas others do so without breathing, as, for instance, insects. For bees, too, are drawn to flowers and to their

1–5 cf. Phlp. 389.2–4; 388.21–23; Them. 68.14–16 8–18 cf. Them. 68.32–69.2. 12–16 cf. Phlp. 402.33–403.8. 19–24 cf. Them. 69.3–10. 25–26 cf. Phlp. 390.31–33; 391.8–11; Prisc. 154.8–9. 29– 215.1 cf. Them. 69.11–13; Prisc. 154.15–17. 14 “wolflight”: according to Aelian, De natura animalium 10.26, the word denotes that time of night when only the wolf – which allegedly has the sharpest sight of all animals – has enough light to see. It is in fact a late antique colloquialism for the twilight before dawn.

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ἄνθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τροφὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ ἀποτρέπονται τοὺς καπνοὺς ὡσαύτως· καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐντόμοις προδήλως ἄνευ ἀναπνοῆς, τὰ μέντοι τῶν ζῴων μετὰ εἰσπνοῆς ὀσφραινόμενα οὐ δύναται ἄλλως ὀσφραίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ εἰσπνέοντα· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκπνέοντα δύναται ὀσφραίνεσθαι οὔτε, ἐάν τις αὐτὰ τὰ ὀσφραντὰ ἐνθείη ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν πόρων τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ὀσφραίνεσθαι αὐτῶν, ὅτι μὴ πόρρωθεν ὄντων διὰ τῆς εἰσπνοῆς. τοῦτο γε μὴν ἴσως φησὶν εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητά, καὶ ὥσπερ οὔτε τὰ ὁρατὰ οὔτε τὰ ἀκουστὰ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς | τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις γινόμενα οὐδόλως εἰσὶ καταληπτά, ἂν μὴ διὰ μέσων τινῶν ὧν προείρηται ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτῶν γίνηται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὀσφραντὰ ἔχει· οὐκ ἄλλως ἐστὶν ὀσφραντά, ὅτι μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος μέσου ἀναπνεομένου. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀπορία· ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶν ζῴων διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ὀσφραίνεται, ἔνια δέ – οἷα τὰ ἔντομα – μὴ ἀναπνέοντα ὀσφραίνεται, μήποτε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων – τῶν μὴ ἀναπνεόντων – οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀντίληψις τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ὡς ὄσφρησις, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄλλο τι εἶδος αἰσθήσεως; φησὶ δὲ ἐπιλυόμενος τὰ περὶ τούτων ὡς ἀληθῶς κἀνταῦθα ὄσφρησίς ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν αἴσθησις, καὶ τοίνυν κἀνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναπνεόντων ὀσφραντῶν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἀντίληψις, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ὄσφρησις. καὶ μὴν κἀντεῦθεν δῆλόν φησιν, ὅτι καὶ ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ αὐτῶν τῶν δι’ ἀναπνοῆς ὀσφραινομένων, οἷον τὸ θεῖον καὶ τἄλλα τῶν φθοροποιῶν ὀσφραντῶν, ταῦτα παραπλησίως φθαρτικά ἐστι καὶ τῶν μὴ δι’ ἀναπνοῆς ὀσφραινομένων. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ὀσφρήσεων ἐνταῦθα τοῖς ζῴοις ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως τὰ μὲν σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ ἔχει τινὰ περισκεπάσματα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, ὧν διοιγομένων ὁρᾷ, ἀλλ’ αὐτόθεν ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν ὁρατῶν, τοῖς δὲ μαλακοφθάλμοις ἐπίκεινται βλεφαρίδες καὶ ἔλυτρα εἰς σκέπην, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ὁρᾶν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢν μὴ ἀναπετάσωσι τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τοῖς ὀσφραινομένοις δι’ ἀναπνοῆς ἔοικεν εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητήρια τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἄτονα καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀτονίαν περικεκαλύφθαι τῇ φύσει καὶ συνεσφίγχθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ βλάπτοιντο διατοῦτο, καὶ χρῆσιν εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῦ ἀέρος, ὡς ἄν, σφοδρότερον αὐτοῦ προσβάλλοντος τοῖς

1 ἐπὶ om. M A 2 αὐτοῖς ] αὐτοῦ M 4 ἐνθείη ] ἐνθῇ malim 6 μὴν om. M 8 εἰσὶ ] φησι A : φησὶν M 17 ὄσφρησις A1pc (ut vid. ex αἴσθησις) 20 τῆς² ] τοῖς A 24 ἢν ] εἰ M A || ἀναπετάσωσι ] ἀναπετάσουσι M A || ἄρα ] ἆρα A 26 συνεσφίγχθαι ] συνεσφίχθαι M A || διατοῦτο, καὶ ] transponere velim 27 σφοδρότερον Vpr (ex σφρο‑) 14–20 421b 21–26

20–216.2 421b 26–422a 3

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nourishment by the odour, and avoid smoke in the same way. And to insects this evidently happens without breathing, whereas those animals that perceive smell in connection with inhaling are unable to perceive smell in any other way than by inhaling. For they are neither able to perceive smell while exhaling, nor is it possible to smell the objects of smell if these are themselves placed in the actual openings of the [organ of] smell, but only when the objects are at a distance, by way of inhaling. In this regard, he 11 says, there is presumably conformity with the other perceptible objects: just as neither visible objects nor audible objects are at all possible to apprehend if they are placed on the actual sense organs, unless their apprehension by the senses is enabled by certain intermediate things that have been mentioned above, so is the case, then, also with objects of smell: they are not possible to perceive in any other way than through the medium of the air that is breathed. But the point of the discussion and the problem 12 raised was this: since the majority of animals perceive smell through breathing, but some – for instance, insects – perceive smell without breathing, is it possible, he says, that in the case of such animals (the ones that do not breathe), this kind of apprehension of the objects of smell is not [to be considered] as smell but as some other kind of sense? And by way of resolving this problem he says that it truly is smell in this case too: for the same sense is correlated with the same perceptible objects; accordingly, in this case too (the case of animals that do not breathe), it is an apprehension of objects of smell that they have, so smell is the same sense in them. Moreover, this is also 13 clear from the following, he says: that those things that are irritating and deleterious to animals that do perceive smell through breathing, for instance sulphur and other noxious objects of smell, those things are equally deleterious also to animals that do not perceive smell through breathing. What explains the difference between the animals’ senses of smell in this regard is the same as in the case of sight, where hard-eyed animals have no covering of their eyes that must be opened in order for them to see, but immediately see and apprehend the visible objects, whereas in soft-eyed animals eyelids and integuments are added for protection, and it is wholly impossible for the latter kinds of animal to see unless they open these things: in the same way it is likely (a) that those animals that perceive smell through breathing also have feeble organs of smell, (b) that, owing to this sort of feebleness, the organs have been covered and compressed by nature, so as not to suffer harm because of it, and (c) that the reason why animals make use of the breathing of air is that, when the air strikes more vehemently against the veins and the openings of the olfactory organ and as a result opens

6–9 cf. Them. 69.16–18. 12–17 cf. Them. 69.18–22.

24–217.1 cf. Phlp. 394.34–395.14.

32–33 so as not to—is that : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “so as not to suffer harm, and that this is why animals make use of the breathing of air, in order that …”.

216 | Theodoros Metochites

φλεβίοις καὶ τοῖς πόροις τοῦ ὀσφραντικοῦ αἰσθητηρίου καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτω διανοίγοντος, ἡ ἀντίληψις τῷ ζῴῳ γίνηται τῆς ὀσμῆς· διατοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τοιαῦτα ζῷα οὐ πέφυκεν ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ δύναται ἀναπνεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, 14 διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ἐξανάγκης ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἡ ὄσφρησις. ἔστι δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γεύσει ὁ χυμὸς καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ οἰκεῖον αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ὀσφρήσει ἡ ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις· καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς γίνοιτο ἡ ὁλκὴ αὐτῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀσφραντόν; ἀντιληπτικὸν γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ὁμοίου· καθόλου γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις προείρηται δυνάμει οὖσα ὅπερ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν· καὶ ὅπερ καθόλου εἴρηται ἐκδηλότατόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἕξις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ αὕτη V157r ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ καὶ ὀσφραίνηται· διατοῦτο | καὶ εἴρηται ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ τὸ ὀσφραντόν. * *

2 γίνηται ] γίνεται V : γίνοιτο M 2–11 422a 3–7

*

4 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A

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these, the animal may have an apprehension of the odour. This is also why such animals do not have it in their nature to perceive smell in water, since they cannot breathe in water either, as they can in air, and their perception of smell necessarily takes place through breathing. And just as flavour and what is wet is the proper perceptible object 14 in the case of taste, so is dry exhalation in the case of smell. So how would the intake of this come to pass in anything wet, seeing that the organ of smell, too, is potentially the same thing as the object of smell? For it is such as to apprehend what is similar. For above the general statement was made that the sense capacity is potentially the same thing as the perceptible object. And the general statement most evidently applies to the sense of smell: for whenever it is active and perceiving smell, this sense is the very quality of the object of smell in the sense organ. This is why it was also stated that the organ of smell is potentially the same thing as the object of smell. * *

*

1–4 cf. Phlp. 395.27–30. 5 dry exhalation : cf. Phlp. 396.1–3.

218 | Theodoros Metochites

10 Ὅτι τὸ γευστὸν τρόπον τινὰ ἁπτόν ἐστι· καὶ διατοῦτο, φησίν, οὐδέ ἐστι τὸ γευστὸν αἰσθητὸν διά τινος σώματος ἔξωθεν μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ἦν τὸ ὁρατὸν διὰ μέσου τοῦ διαφανοῦς καὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν διὰ μέσου τοῦ διηχοῦς καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν διὰ μέσου τοῦ διόσμου· ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ γευστόν, ἤτοι οὐ διά τινος μεταξὺ κατ’ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν αἰσθητόν, ἐπειδὴ ἁπτόν ἐστι τρόπον τινά, ἡ δὲ ἁφή, ὡς ἔστι πρόδηλον, καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν οὐκ ἔχει τι ἔξωθεν μεταξὺ αὑτῶν (ἐρεῖ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς καὶ ἀποδείξει ὅτι καὶ τούτων τί 2 ἐστι μέσον ἀνάλογον). καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα, φησίν, αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἐν ᾧ θεωρεῖται ὁ χυμός, ὕλης λόγον ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν χυμόν, ὥστε ἐπεὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ὕλης λόγον ἔχον πρὸς τὸν χυμόν, προδήλως ἐστὶν ἁπτόν, ἐξανάγκης καὶ ὁ χυμὸς ἁπτόν τί ἐστιν· ὥστε, καὶ εἰ ἐν ὕδατι ἦμεν, ἐμβληθέντος ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ γλυκέος ᾐσθανόμεθα ἂν τοῦ γλυκέος αὐτόθεν, οὐχ ὡς διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ἦν διὰ μέσου τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἡ ὅρασις, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίνεται συγκεκραμένη αὐτίκα ἡ ποιότης αὐτή, ἡ γλυκύτης, τῷ ὕδατι. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται (ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ τῷ διαφανεῖ καὶ ὡς ἓν γινόμενον μετὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ἢ ὡς ἀπόρροια αὐτοῦ· ἦν γὰρ ἂν σῶμα, ὅτι καὶ τὸ διαφανὲς σῶμα, ἤτοι ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόρροια τοῦ σώματος καὶ αὐτὴ σῶμα), ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ὡς μεταξὺ ὄν3 τος καὶ διαπορθμεύοντος, ὡς προείρηται, τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ χρῶμα. καὶ τοίνυν μεταξὺ μὲν τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ τῆς γεύσεως οὐδέν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ χρῶμά ἐστι τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω πάλιν τὸ γευστόν ἐστιν ὁ χυμός· ὡς γὰρ τὸ χρῶμα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὕτως ὁ χυμὸς πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν. παντὶ δὲ χυμῷ ἐξανάγκης σύνεστιν ἡ ὑγρότης, καὶ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν, εἰ μὴ δι’ ὑγρότητος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ξηρὰ τῶν γευστῶν οὐκ ἄνευ ὑγρότητος γίνονται γευστὰ καὶ αἰσθητά. οἷον οἱ ἅλες, κἂν εἰ ξηροί εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως εὔτηκτοί εἰσι, καὶ ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ γινόμενοι τήκονται καὶ εἰς ὑγρότητα λύονται· καὶ αὐτὴν γὰρ τὴν ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ συντήκουσιν ὑγρότητα. καὶ καθόλου γε ἐρεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως αἴσθησις χυμοῦ, εἴτουν γευστοῦ, ἄνευ ὑγρότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑπερκαιόμενα καὶ ὑπέρξηρα οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι γευστά.

5 ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A || πρόδηλον ] δῆλον Mac (πρό- M1sl ) 6 αὑτῶν correxi : αὐτῶν codd. 9 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || ἐστιν ] ἐστι A 12 συγκεκραμένη correxi : συγκεκραμμένη codd. 13 γινόμενον ] γιγνόμενον V 18 ὡς ] ὥσπερ M A 19–20 ση′ adn. Mmarg 19 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 20 καὶ² M1pc (ex τὰ) 1–16 422a 8–15 16–25 422a 15–19

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[Note] that the object of taste in a certain sense is an object of touch. And this is also why, he says, the object of taste is not perceptible through some external intermediate body, in the way in which the visible object was seen to be perceptible through the medium of what is transparent, the audible object through the medium of what is transsonant and the object of smell through the medium of what is transodorant: this is not also the case with the object of taste; in other words, it is not perceptible through something intermediate in the manner of those other objects, since it is in a certain sense an object of touch and, as is evident, the sense of touch and its object do not have anything external in between each other. (In the following, however, he will affirm and demonstrate that even in between these there is something analogous.) Also, the wet body, he says, in which the flavour is manifested, stands in the 2 relation of matter to the flavour, and consequently, since the wet body that stands in the relation of matter to the flavour is clearly tangible, the flavour, too, is necessarily something tangible. Consequently, even if we had existed in water, we would immediately on the submersion of something sweet in the water have perceived the sweetness, not through the wet body as a medium, in the way that sight was seen to take place through the medium of what is transparent, but because the quality itself – the sweetness— is immediately mixed together with the water. Colour, however, is not seen in this way (that is, as being in what is transparent as in matter and as becoming united with what is transparent, or as being an effluence from it; for then it would be a body, since what is transparent is also a body, namely, air or water; for the effluence from a body is itself a body), but rather through what is transparent as something intermediate, which conveys, as previously stated, the colour to the sense. Accordingly, there 3 is nothing in between the object of taste and the sense of taste. But just as the visible object is colour, so, again, the object of taste is flavour. For as colour stands to sight, so flavour stands to taste. But wetness is a necessary concomitant of every flavour, and it is impossible that a perception of flavour should take place unless through wetness. Indeed, even those tasteable objects that seem dry do not become tasteable and perceptible without wetness. For instance, salt, even if it is dry, is nevertheless susceptible to melting, and when placed on the tongue it melts ands dissolves into wetness, for it melts even the wetness on the tongue in the process. Generally speaking there is no perception of flavour at all, that is, of a tasteable object, without wetness. Indeed, it is impossible for extremely hot and dry things to be tasteable.

3–5 cf. Them. 70.16–17. 6–9 cf. Phlp. 398.4–8. 9–11 cf. Them. 70.21–24; Phlp. 398.13–15. 17– 18 the quality itself – the sweetness: cf. Phlp. 399.13–15; Prisc. 155.19–20 (neither of whom describes the water’s taking on the quality as a “mixture”).

220 | Theodoros Metochites

Ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ὡς προείρηται, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ τοῦ τε ἀκουστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκούστου (ἤτοι καὶ τῶν στερήσεων αὐτῶν· καταλαμβάνει γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπουσίαν τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστι τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγεύστου. «ἀόρατον» δὲ λέγομεν καὶ τὸ μὴ φύσιν ὅV157v λως ἔχον ὁρᾶσθαι (ὡς τὴν φωνήν) καὶ τὸ ἀμυδρῶς πως ὁρώμενον (ὡς τὸ σκότος) | καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν τῆς ὁράσεως (ὡς αὐτὰ τὰ λαμπρά), καὶ «ἀνήκουστον» ὡσαύτως τό τε μὴ πεφυκὸς ἀκούεσθαι (ὡς τὸ λευκόν) καὶ τὸ ἀμυδρῶς ἀκουόμενον (ὥσπερ καὶ «ἄπουν» λέγεται τὸ βραχυτάτους ἔχον πόδας, καὶ «ἀπύρηνος», φησίν, ἐλαία τυχὸν βραχύτατον πυρῆνα ἔχουσα)· ἔτι δὲ «ἀνήκουστον» λέγεται καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν κτύπου 5 τῆς ἀκοῆς. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον λέγεται καὶ ἄγευστον τὸ μὴ φύσιν ἔχον γεύσεως (ὥσπερ οἱ λίθοι), καὶ τὸ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον καὶ σχεδὸν ἀσημάντως γευστόν, καὶ τὸ τῆς γευστικῆς δι’ ὑπερβολὴν ἕξεως φθαρτικόν (ὡς τὰ δριμύτατα καὶ τἄλλα τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα). 4

Ὅτι δοκεῖ, φησίν, ἀρχή τις εἶναι τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ ἀγεύστου τὸ ποτὸν καὶ ἄποτον· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ γευστὸν ὡς μετέχον ὑγρότητός ἐστι γευστόν (τὸ γὰρ ὑγρὸν καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι τῷ γευστῷ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅρῳ τοῦ γευστοῦ λαμβάνεται τὸ ὑγρόν), τῷ δὲ ὑγρῷ ταυτόν ἐστι σχεδὸν τὸ ποτόν, τὸ ποτὸν ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄποτον· γεῦσις γάρ ἐστι καὶ 7 γευστὰ ἀμφότερα, τὸ μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ὡς φθαρτικόν. ἔστι δέ, φησί, καὶ κοινὸν γεύσεως καὶ ἁφῆς τὸ ποτόν· ὡς μὲν γὰρ ὑγρὸν ἁπτόν ἐστιν, ὡς δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἕξεώς ἐστι γευστόν.

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Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ τὸ γευστὸν ὑγρόν ἐστι, φησίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ἄνευ ὑγρότητος τρόπον τινὰ εἶναι, μήτε ἐντελεχείᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑγρόν· δυνάμει γάρ

4–5 ὅλως ἔχον transp. M A 5 πως correxi : πῶς codd. 6 τε μὴ ] μήτε M A 12 δριμύτατα A1pc (ut vid. ex δρυμύτατα) : δρυμύτατα V 13 φησίν, ἀρχή τις εἶναι ] τις, φησίν, εἶναι ἀρχὴ M : τις φησὶν ἀρχὴ εἶναι A || καὶ¹ ] τοῦ add. M A 14 καθ’ αὑτό ] καθαυτό A 15–16 ἐστι σχεδὸν transp. M A 16 γεῦσις ] ἀμφοτέρων addere velim (habent tamen in 422a 32 ἀμφότερα codd. Arist.) 17 ὡς φθαρτικόν ] ὀσφραντικὸν A 18 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 1–12 422a 20–31 13–19 422a 31–34 20–222.16 422a 34–b 10

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[Note] that just as sight perceives both what is visible and what is invisible, as 4 mentioned above, and hearing perceives both what is audible and what is inaudible (that is, the privations, too: for the sense apprehends the absence of its own proper object, too), in the same way taste, too, is of what is tasteable as well as what is untasteable. We call “invisible” (a) things that are not at all of such a nature as to be seen (such as voice); (b) things that are somehow seen obscurely (such as darkness); and (c) things that are destructive of sight (such as the bright objects themselves). Similarly, we call “inaudible” (a) things that are not of such a nature as to be heard (such as white); and (b) things that are faintly heard (just as a thing that has very short legs is also called “legless”, and an olive, he says, which happens to have a very small stone is called “stoneless”). Further, (c) things that are destructive of hearing owing to an excessive din are also called “inaudible”. In the same way, (a) things that do not have 5 the nature of taste (such as stones), are called “untasteable”, as well as (b) things that are tasteable to a small and practically unnoticeable degree, and (c) things that tend to destroy the competence for taste because of excess (for instance, very pungent and otherwise excessive things). [Note] that it seems, he says, that what is drinkable and what is undrinkable are 6 a kind of first principle of what is tasteable and what is untasteable. For since what is tasteable is tasteable in so far as it shares in wetness (for wetness belongs in itself to what is tasteable; for wetness is included in the definition of tasteable), and what is drinkable is practically the same thing as what is wet, what is drinkable must be a first principle of what is tasteable, and so must what is undrinkable. For both are taste, or tasteable, the one in the sense of a proper and natural [object of taste], the other in the sense of being destructive [of taste]. And what is drinkable, he says, is also common 7 to taste and touch, for in so far as it is wet it is an object of touch, but in so far as it is of the quality discussed here it is an object of taste. [Note] that, since the object of taste is wet, he says, it is also necessary for its organ 8 to be neither devoid of wetness in a certain sense, nor fully and actually wet. For, as previously mentioned, the sense organ is potentially the same thing as the percepti-

3–4 cf. Phlp. 402.31–32; 402.35–403.1; Them. 71.7–8. 6 voice: cf. Phlp. 403.21–22; Prisc. 156.22. 7 cf. Phlp. 403.4–6; 403.25–26. 9–11 cf. Phlp. 404.1–4. 13 stones: cf. Them. 71.15. 15 very pungent: cf. Them. 71.16. 18–22 cf. Phlp. 404.12–14. 22–23 both are taste, or tasteable: cf. Phlp. 404.17–18. 24–26 cf. Phlp. 404.26–27; Them. 71.28–29. 28–223.4 cf. Phlp. 405.3–12. 9–11 “legless”; “stoneless”: the corresponding Greek words are similar to that translated as “inaudible” in that they are formed with the privative prefix “a-” (cognate with Latin “in-” and Germanic “un-”).

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ἐστιν, ὡς προείρηται, τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὅπερ τὸ αἰσθητόν. διατοῦτο, εἴπερ μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὔτε παντάπασι ξηρὰ ἂν εἴη οὔτε δίυγρος ἡ γλῶττα· εἰ γὰρ δίυγρός ἐστιν, αὐτοῦ τούτου ἂν εἴη πρώτου αἴσθησις αὐτῇ, τοῦ ἐνόντος αὐτῇ ὑγροῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν κατὰ ταυτὸ καὶ τοῦ ἐπεισιόντος ὑγροῦ ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνοιτο· ἀλλ’, ὡς εἴρηται, οὔτε ξηρὰν ταύτην ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὔτε ὑγρὰν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλ’ οἵαν δύνασθαι γενέσθαι ὑγρὰν σῳζομένην ἐν τῷ ὑγραίνεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ ὑγραινομένην ἐνίοτε φθείρεσθαι· νίτρου γὰρ με9 ταλαμβάνουσα ὑγραίνεται μέν, ἀλλὰ φθειρομένη ὑγραίνεται. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, μὴ ὑγρὰν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ταύτην, ἀλλ’ οἵαν δύνασθαι ὑγραίνεσθαι σῳζομένην· εἴπερ γὰρ προϋπάρχει ὑγρά, αὐτῆς τῆς προϋπαρχούσης αὐτῇ ἕξεως αἴσθησις ἔσται αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ προγευματισάμενοι, φησίν, ἰσχυροτέρου τινὸς χυμοῦ, ἔτι μενούσης ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς πρώτης ἕξεως, οὐκ ἂν αἰσθάνοιντο τῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἑτέρων γευστῶν ἀ10 κριβῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔτ’ ἐκείνης εἰσὶ τῆς προτέρας ποιότητος ἐν τῇ γεύσει. καὶ τοῖς ὑπό τινων νόσων, φησί, νοσοῦσι τὴν γευστικὴν καὶ νοσεράν τινα ποιότητα ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσιν – ὥσπερ δὴ τοῖς ἰκτεριῶσι σύνεστι καὶ ἐπιπολάζει τῇ γλώττῃ ἡ πικρία – οὐκ ἔστι τῶν V158r γευστῶν ἑξῆς ἀληθὴς αἴσθησις· πρὸς γὰρ | τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἐνοῦσαν ποιότητα πεπλανημένως δοκεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπεισιόντα πάντα γευστά. 11

Ὅτι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων πρῶτα μὲν εἴδη εἰσὶ τὰ ἐναντία τὰ ἁπλᾶ, ἤτοι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἑξῆς δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν καὶ μετειληχότα ἀμφοτέρων, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως πρῶτα μὲν εἴδη τὰ ἁπλᾶ ἐναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, καὶ ἐχόμενα τούτων τοῦ μὲν γλυκέος τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ ἑτέρου δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν, μεταξὺ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ τὸ στρυφνὸν καὶ τὸ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσι, φησίν, αἱ διαφοραὶ εἶναι τῶν χυμῶν. * *

*

3 ἐνόντος ] ἑνόντος V 7 μὴ ] οὐχ malim 11 τῆς V1pc (ex τοῖς) 15 ἐνοῦσαν ] ἑνοῦσαν V : spiritus non legitur in M 21 δριμὺ ] δρυμὺ V 21–22 δοκοῦσι, φησίν ] δοκοῦσιν M A 22 διαφοραὶ ] διφοραὶ M 17–22 422b 10–16

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ble object. Therefore the tongue cannot be either completely dry or wet through and through, if it is to perceive: for if it were wet through and through, it would primarily have a perception of this, the wet stuff that is inherent in it, and would not to the same extent accurately perceive also the wet stuff that is subsequently added. Rather, as stated, it is not possible for the tongue to be actually either dry or wet, but [it must be] such that it can become wet while being preserved during the wetting. For sometimes it can be destroyed by being wetted: when it partakes of soda it is wetted, but is so by being destroyed. No, as we were saying, it is not possible for the tongue to be 9 actually wet, but [it must be] such that it can be wetted while being preserved. For if it is already wet beforehand, it will have a perception of the quality that already exists in it; just as those, he says, who have previously tasted some more powerful flavour cannot, for as long as the first quality remains in them, accurately perceive those other objects of taste that are subsequently added, but are still possessed by that previous quality in their gustatory sense. And those whose gustatory sense, he says, is impaired 10 by certain diseases and has a sickly quality to it – as bitterness is known to beset sufferers of jaundice and to cover the surface of their tongues – have no true perception of the subsequent objects of taste. For against the background of the first and inherent quality all the objects of taste that are subsequently added erroneously appear to be identical with it. [Note] that, just as in the case of colours the simple contraries – that is, white and 11 black – are primary forms, and these are followed by the colours in between them, which have a share in both, so also in the case of taste the simple contraries, sweet and bitter, are primary forms, and next to these are, on the side of sweet, fatty, and on the other side, salty; whereas pungent, tart, astringent and sour are in between them both. For by and large these would seem, he says, to be the differentiating qualities of flavours. * *

*

7–8 cf. Phlp. 405.29–30. 11–14 cf. Them. 72.1–3. 15–17 cf. Phlp. 406.8–10. 8–9 it is not possible for the tongue to be actually wet: this is what is said in the preceding paragraph and what the following argument requires, but the transmitted text actually says “… it is possible for the tongue not to be actually wet”, and perhaps it should be emended in accordance with the suggestion in the critical apparatus.

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11 Ὅτι, περὶ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἑξῆς βουλόμενος διαλαβεῖν, πρότερον εὐθὺς ἀπορίαν προβάλλεται καὶ ζήτησιν, εἰ ἔστι μία αἴσθησις ἡ ἁφὴ ἢ πολλαί. πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ ζητεῖ τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον τῆς ἁφῆς, ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ αἰσθανομένη καὶ κρίνουσα τὰ ἁπτά, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν σάρκα ἔσω τὸ αἰσθητήριόν ἐστι καὶ κριτήριον τῶν ἁπτῶν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ σὰρξ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον τῇ σαρκί – ἤγουν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐντόμοις, ταῖς μελίτταις δηλονότι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις – ἐστὶν οἷόν τι μεταξὺ τῶν ἁπτῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς (καθὼς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν ἔφημεν οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως τὸ διαφανές, ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς τὸ 2 διηχὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως τὸ δίοσμον). καὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον πρόβλημά φησι, κατασκευάζων προηγουμένως, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μία αἴσθησις ἡ ἁφὴ ἀλλὰ πολλαί, ὅτι, εἰ μία ἐστὶν ἡ ἁφή, μία καὶ ἐναντιότης τῶν ἁπτῶν· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὰ ἁπτά, πάντως οὐ μία ἡ ἁφὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς σὺν ἀντιθέσει ἀντιστροφῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μία ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν μία ἐναντιότης εἰδῶν ὑπὸ γένος τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ τε λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν πάλιν μία ἐναντιότης ὑπὸ γένος τὸν ψόφον τό τε ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γευστῶν πάλιν ὡσαύτως μία ἐναντιότης ὑπὸ γένος τὸν χυμὸν τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν), ἀλλὰ διάφοροί εἰσιν ἐναντιότητες ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν (τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν καὶ ἄλλαι τινές), ἕπεται μηδὲ μίαν εἶναι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ διαφόρους ἐν 3 διαφόροις ταῖς ἐναντιότησι. φησὶ δέ, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιλυόμενος ἄπορον, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων αἰσθήσεων μία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐναντιότης ἀλλὰ διάφοροι· οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ, τοῦ ψόφου, εἴτουν τῆς φωνῆς (μεγάλη γὰρ καὶ μικρὰ λέγεται φωνή), καὶ πάλιν λειότης καὶ σκληρότης (καὶ γὰρ λεῖαι καὶ σκληραὶ φωναὶ λέγονται)· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν οὐ μία ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιότης V158v ἀλλὰ διάφοροι. [4] ὥστε διατοῦτο, ὅτι πολλαὶ ἐναν- | τιότητες ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς, οὐκ ἔστιν

2 ἡ M1sl 3 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 4 αἰσθητήριόν ] κριτήριον A 13 τε om. M 17 μηδὲ μίαν correxi : μηδεμίαν V A : μὴ δὲ μίαν M 19–23 οἷον—διάφοροι V1marg inf (praefixo κείμενον) 20 ψόφου ] φόβου M A : ψ- vix legitur in V 21 μικρὰ λέγεται ] σμικρὰ λέγεται M1marg A : om. Mtext || σκληρότης A2?pc (ex σμικρότης) 1–8 422b 17–23

8–18 422b 23–27

18–226.3 422b 27–33

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[Note] that, as he next wants to analyse touch, or the tactile capacity, the first thing he does is to present straightaway a problem or question, namely, whether touch is one sense or many. In addition to this, he raises the question what the sense organ of touch is, whether it is the flesh itself that perceives and discerns tangible objects or there is besides the flesh something else on the inside which is the sense organ and means of discernment of tangible objects, while the flesh itself, or the counterpart of flesh (namely, that which exists in insects: in bees, obviously, and the others), is like a medium between the tangible objects and the sense of touch (just as we said that in the case of the other senses, for instance, in the case of sight, what is transparent [is a medium], in the case of hearing, what is transsonant [is a medium], and in the case of smell, what is transodorant [is a medium]). Accordingly, with respect to the first prob- 2 lem presented, he establishes initially that touch is not one sense but many, since, if touch is one sense, then there is also a unique contrariety of tangible objects; but if there are many [types of] tangible objects, it is inevitable that touch is not one sense, in accordance with the demonstration of the converse with negation. But since there is not a unique contrariety among tangible objects (as in the case of visible objects there is a unique contrariety of forms under the genus of colour, namely, that of white and black; and in the case of audible objects, again, high and low are a unique contrariety under the genus of sound; and, in the same way, again, in the case of tasteable objects, sweet and bitter are a unique contrariety under the genus of flavour), but here, in the case of tangible objects, there are different contrarieties (dry and wet, cold and hot, hard and soft, and a few others), it follows that there is not a unique sense either, but different senses for the different contrarieties. To resolve the problem just described, 3 he says that there is not a unique contrariety in the case of the aforementioned senses either, but different ones: for instance, in the case of hearing, loudness and softness are ascribed to the audible object, the sound, or the voice (for a voice is said to be loud or soft); and again, so are smoothness and roughness (for voices are also said to be smooth or rough). And in the same way there is, in the case of visible objects, too, not a unique contrariety among them, but different ones. Consequently, the fact 4

1–8 cf. Prisc. 158.11–17. 11–12 cf. Phlp. 408.2–5. 12–15 As both Priscian (159.21–25) and Philoponus (422.21–29) remark, Aristotle in fact states the inverse: “if touch is not one sense but many, it is necessary that the tangible perceptible objects are also many”; but since both conditionals are true, they suggest, he used them indiscriminately. Priscian adds that the purpose is to show “by conversion with negation” that touch is one sense. 16–20 genus : cf. Phlp. 408.18–19; Them. 72.33–34. 15 the demonstration of the converse with negation: i.e. the proof by contrapositive, or modus tollens.

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ἀληθὲς ὅτι οὐ μία ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθήσεις· τί δέ ποτέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ὡς καθόλου ἁπτὸν οὐκ ἔστι, φησί, δῆλον (ὥσπερ καθόλου ἦν ὁρατὸν ἓν ὀνόματι γενικῷ τὸ 5 χρῶμα, καὶ ἀκουστὸν ἓν ὁ ψόφος, καὶ γευστὸν ἓν ὁ χυμός). ἀλλ’ εἴ τις ἄρα φήσειεν ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ μίαν τὴν ἁφήν (εἴτουν τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν), τὸ ἐπιπολάζον αὐτὸ σαρκῶδες τοῦ σώματος, διὰ τὸ ἅμα τῷ θιγγάνειν τῆς σαρκὸς τὰ ἁπτὰ αὐτίκα τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτῶν ἐπιγίνεσθαι, οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο εἰς ἀπόδειξιν, φησίν, ὅτι αὐτό ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἡ σὰρξ ὡς εἶναι λοιπὸν καὶ ἕν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιτείνειεν ὑμένα τινὰ λεπτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ σαρκί, ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν ἦν αἴσθησις τῶν ἁπτῶν προσπελαζόντων καὶ θιγγανόντων αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα εἴ πως ἐξῆν γενέσθαι συμφυῆ τὸν ὑμένα αὐτὸν τῇ σαρκί, ὥστε ἔδοξεν ἂν λοιπὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον – καὶ ὡς ἓν εἶναι – τῶν ἁπτῶν ὁ ὑμήν, ἐπειδὴ τούτου 6 θιγγανόντων τῶν ἁπτῶν αὐτίκα ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτό. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχει τοῦτο λόγον, οὐδ’ ἀποδεικτικόν ἐστι τοῦτο τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον τῶν ἁπτῶν, τὴν σάρκα τοῦ ζῴου, καὶ μίαν τὴν κατ’ αὐτὴν ἁφήν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐννοήσειεν ὡς συμφυὲς τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ τῷ σώματι ὅλῳ καὶ περικεχυμένον ὅμοιον πάντοθεν καὶ ὡς ἔλυτρον αὐτὸ ἐπικαλύπτον (πάντως δὲ ἦν ὁρᾶν πάλιν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αἱ τρεῖς αἰσθήσεις αὗται καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνονται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἐντεῦθεν προσίστατο εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις), ἐδόκει ἂν τηνικαῦτα ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ μία μόνη αἴσθησις καὶ ὡς ἓν αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον τό τε ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν· εἰ δ’ ἦν δι’ ἀέρος ἢ δι’ ὕδατος καὶ ἡ ἁφή, ὥσπερ ἡ ὅρασις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς οὕτως· τῷ λόγῳ δέ – ὅτι παχύτερον καὶ ὑλικώτερον αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν – ἀνάλογον· ὥσπερ ἐν ἐκείναις ἦν ἂν συμφυὲς ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡνωμένον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ κοινὴ τῶν εἰρημένων αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψις, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ἂν ἴσως εἴη τὸ σαρκῶδες τοῦτο περίβλημα συμφυές, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη λοιπὸν δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τοῦτο περίβλημα τὸ σαρκῶδες μία ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολλῶν ἐναντιοτήτων, ἀλλὰ

4 εἴτουν ] ἢ (ut vid.) A 10 λοιπὸν αὐτὸ transp. M A 13 ἁφήν ] ἀφὴν A 16 αὗται om. A 18 ἓν¹ V1sl || ἡ supplevi 19 ἦν ] οὖν A || ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A 23 αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψις transp. M A 24– 25 περίβλημα ] περβλημα M 3–228.1 422b 34–423a 17

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that there are several contrarieties among the objects of touch does not make it true that there is not one but several senses corresponding to them. But what the unique tangible object in general is, he says, is not clear (in the way that there was seen to be a unique general visible object by the generic name of “colour”, a unique audible object, “sound”, and a unique object of taste, “flavour”). Now, if someone were to say 5 that there is a single sense organ and a single touch (that is, a single sense capable of tactile perception), namely, the fleshy part of the body that forms its surface, on the grounds that, at the same time as the tangible objects come into contact with the flesh, the perception of them ensues immediately, this would not be sufficient, he says, to prove that the flesh is the actual sense organ in a way that results in its being also a single one. For if one were to stretch a thin membrane over the flesh, the perception of those tangible objects that come close to it and come into contact with it would be the same, especially if it were somehow possible for the membrane itself to coalesce with the flesh, so that the membrane would as a result appear to be the actual sense organ correlated with the tangible objects, and to be a single one, since it would be possible for it to perceive the tangible objects as soon as they come into contact with it. But this is not reasonable, and nor is the argument sufficient to prove that there 6 is a single sense organ for tangible objects, namely, the animal’s flesh, and a single sense of touch corresponding to it. For if one were to conceive of air or water as having coalesced with the whole body, enveloping it evenly from all sides and covering it like a sheath (but it would still be absolutely possible to see, hear and smell, since these three senses all apprehend their perceptible objects both through air and through water, so nothing in this situation would stand in the way of the activity of senses of this kind), then, under these circumstances the sense organ would have appeared to be a single one, and the sense to be just a single one, and the visible, audible and odorous objects to be a single type of perceptible object. And if touch, too, had come to pass through air or water, as sight, hearing and smell do, then this would also have applied to touch. But with respect to the argument – seeing that this sense apprehends its own proper objects in a coarser and more material way – the case is analogous: as in the case of the other senses the air or the water would have been something that had coalesced and become unified [with the body], in which the common apprehension of the perceptible objects mentioned would have come to pass, so, too, in the present case, this fleshy covering will presumably be something that has coalesced [with the body], and consequently the sense concerned with the several contrarieties mentioned will not be a single one because of this single fleshy covering, but [may be]

2–5 cf. Phlp. 423.27–29; Them. 72.33–36. 5 if someone were to say: cf. Phlp. 424.4–7; 412.3–6. 20– 21 like a sheath: cf. Them. 73.10; 73.20–21.

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7 διάφοροι. τοῦ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἱκανὸν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ὅτι μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν

τῶν εἰρημένων διαφόρων ἐναντιοτήτων καὶ ὡς ἓν αἰσθητήριον ἡ σὰρξ πίστις καὶ ἀπὸ V159r τῆς κατὰ γεῦσιν ἁφῆς· ἡ γὰρ γεῦσις ἁφή τις ἐστίν, ὡς | προείρηται, πάντων τε τῶν ἁ-

πτῶν τῶν ἐν διαφόροις ἐναντιότησι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τῶν χυμῶν· ὥστε εἰ ἦν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σάρξ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντιοτήτων, τῶν ἁπτῶν, αἰσθανομένη καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 8 χυμῶν, μία τις ἂν ἐδόκει αἴσθησις εἶναι ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφή. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο προδήλως οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον δείκνυται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων· εἴ τι μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν γευστῶν, καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται πάντων· οὐ μὴν δέ, εἴ τι τῶν ἁπτῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται, καὶ τῶν γευστῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται· ὥστε ἄλλο τι αἰσθητήριον καὶ ἄλλη αἴσθησις τῶν γευστῶν καὶ ἄλλο αἰσθητήριον καὶ ἄλλη αἴσθησις τῶν ἁπτῶν. Ὅτι ἀπορεῖν ἔστι, φησίν, ἔτι περὶ τῆς ἁφῆς εἰ ἄρα ἅπτεται ἐν ὑγρῷ σῶμα σώματος ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀέρι· πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἔχει καὶ βάθος (αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τρίτη διάστασις τοῦ σωματικοῦ μεγέθους, ἤτοι ἐπὶ τῷ μήκει πρώτῳ καὶ τῷ πλάτει δευτέρῳ τὸ βάθος τρίτον)· εἰ οὖν πάντα τὰ ἁπτόμενα οὕτως διωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει ἐν τῷ ἡνῶσθαι – ἤτοι ὡς ἓν γίνεσθαι – τὰ ἔσχατα αὐτῶν, πῶς ἂν ἅπτοιντο, φησίν, ἀλλήλων τὰ ὑγρανθέντα σώματα; μετέχει γὰρ τὰ ἔσχατα αὐτῶν ὕδατος (εἴτουν ὑγρότητος)· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ δῆλον ὡς σῶμα· καὶ εἰ σῶμα, καὶ βάθος ἔχει. τὰ οὖν μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ σώματα καὶ δίυγρα μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλων δύναιντο ἅπτεσθαι· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις αὐτῶν ὑγρόν, σῶμα ὂν καὶ βάθος ἔχον· ὥστε τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς σώματα οὐ δυνατὸν ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ μέσον αὐτῶν ὑγρόν· εἰ δ’ ὀ10 λίγον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πολὺ εἶναι ἢ ὀλίγον. καὶ τοίνυν οὔτε ἰχθύος ἅψαιτ’ ἂν ἄγκιστρον οὔτε ἰχθὺς δελέατος, ὅτι μηδὲ πέφυκε τὰ ἔσχατα αὐτῶν εἶναι ξηρά, ὡς εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ἀλλὰ δίυγρά εἰσι. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἐξανάγκης ἕπεται· πάντων γὰρ

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2 διαφόρων A1sl 3 γεῦσιν ] γλῶσσαν malim (ut Arist. 423a 17) || ἁφή ] ἀφή A 4–9 ση′ adn. Amarg 6 ἐδόκει αἴσθησις transp. M A 12 φησίν om. M A || ἅπτεται ] φησὶν add. M A 15 οὖν om. A 16 ἅπτοιντο ] ἅπτοιτο Aac (‑ν- A1sl ) 18 δῆλον om. A 24 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || ἕπεται ] ἅπτεται M 1–11 423a 17–21

12–230.3 423a 22–b 1

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different ones. There is also an argument from tactile perception in the sphere of taste 7 in support of the contention that [the argument refuted in the preceding paragraphs] is not sufficient to prove that there is a single sense in the sphere of tactile perception of the different contrarieties mentioned or that the flesh is a single sense organ: for taste is a kind of tactile perception, as previously stated, of all the tangible objects belonging to different contrarieties, and in addition also of the flavours. Consequently, if the remaining flesh, too, had also been perceiving the flavours, as it perceives the other, tangible, contrarieties, then taste and touch would have appeared to be a single sense. But he shows that, as it is, this is clearly not the case, since the activities of 8 the sense organs do not reciprocate. For if some [sense organ] apprehends the objects of taste, it also apprehends all the objects of touch, but it is not the case that if some [sense organ] apprehends the objects of touch it also apprehends the objects of taste. Consequently, the sense organ and the sense for objects of taste are distinct from the sense organ and the sense for objects of touch. [Note] that he says that a further problem may be raised about touch, namely, 9 whether a body touches a body in [a] wet [environment], or even in air. For every body also has depth (for this is the third dimension of corporeal magnitude; that is, in addition to, first, length and, second, width, depth is number three). Now, if all things that touch each other were so defined in the Physics as to touch each other by the unification of their extremities (that is, by their becoming one), then how, he says, could wetted bodies touch each other? For their extremities partake of water (that is, of wetness); and water is obviously a body; and if it is a body, it also has depth. Those bodies, then, that partake of water and are wet through and through right up to their extremities will not be able to touch each other, for in between them is the wet stuff in their extremities, which is a body and has depth; consequently it is impossible for bodies in wet [environments] to touch each other. For there is always wet stuff between them. It may be a small amount, but it makes no difference whether the amount is large or small. And thus the hook will not touch the fish, nor will the fish touch the bait, since 10 it is not in the nature of their extremities to be dry, as things that touch each other have to be, but they are wet through and through. And the same thing follows of necessity

10–12 cf. Them. 74.3–5. 15–16 cf. Phlp. 428.15–16. 429.32–35. 27–28 cf. Them. 74.11–14.

17–18 cf. Phlp. 428.3–4.

18–20 cf. Phlp.

1 in the sphere of taste: it is possible that the text should be emended as suggested in the critical apparatus and translated “by the tongue”. Indeed, it is also possible that geûsis is used metonymically here. But in the next sentence it is explained literally, and in the argument that follows Metochites supposes that tangible objects can be perceived by the sense of taste as well as by the sense of touch (and not just, as Aristotle more reasonably says, that the sense organ of taste is also part of the sense organ of touch).

230 | Theodoros Metochites

σωμάτων οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἁφή· πάντων γὰρ σωμάτων ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι μεταξὺ ἀέρα, ὃς καὶ αὐτός ἐστι σῶμα, εἰ καὶ μὴ διάδηλόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ λανθάνει, ἐπειδὴ λεπτότερός ἐστιν ὁ ἀὴρ τοῦ ὕδατος. Ὅτι μετὰ ταῦτα λοιπὸν σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεται ὡς δοκεῖ μέν τισιν ἡ ἁφὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις ἀμέσως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν καὶ μὴ διά τινων μέσων (ὡς ἡ ὅρασις τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, εἴτουν τοῦ χρώματος, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ, εἴτουν τοῦ ψόφου, καὶ v V159 ἡ ὄσφρησις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ), τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ εἶναι τοὐν μέσῳ καὶ ἀνεπαί- | σθητον. ἔοικε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ προειρημένον παράδειγμα ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις νοήσοι λεπτότατον ὑμένα ἐπικείμενον τῷ σώματι· αὐτίκα γὰρ πάλιν ἅψαιτ’ ἂν ἡ σὰρξ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ 12 σκληροῦ, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἡ ἁφὴ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὑμένος ἐστίν. ὥστε τὸ διάφορον τῶν εἰρημένων δύο αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὰς ἑτέρας αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ὅτι βραχύ τί ἐστι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ νῷ μόνῳ θεωρητὸν τὸ ἐν μέσῳ αὐταῖς πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ λανθάνει τοῦτο ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐπ’ ἐκείνων δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπ’ ἐκείνων τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ αἰσθητὰ πρῶτον δρᾷ εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ κινεῖ αὐτὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὰ ποιεῖ πρῶτα, καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν πελάζει καὶ πάσχειν ποιεῖ καὶ διατίθεσθαι ὡδί πως ἐκάστοτε τὰ αἰσθητήρια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶνδε τῶν δύο αἰσθήσεων ἅμα τοῖς μέσοις αὐτοῖς αὐτίκα πάσχει καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια αὐτά, ὥσπερ ὁ πληγείς, φησί, δι’ ἀσπίδος ἐπικειμένης αὐτῷ οὐχ ὕστερον αὐτὸς πλήττεται, πρότερον τῆς ἀσπίδος πληγείσης, ἔπειτα δι’ αὐτῆς τὴν πληγὴν αὐτὸς λαβών, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τε ἡ ἀσπὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήξαντος ἐπλήγη καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ ἡνωμένως καὶ αὐτὸς ᾧ ἐπίκειται αὕτη. 11

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1 ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A 4 λοιπὸν om. A 6 τοῦ χρώματος V1pc (ex τὸ χρῶμα) 7 εἶναι ] ἔστι malim 10 ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A 12 τοῦτο (ut vid.) V2?pc (fort. ex τούτω) 15 ὡδί ] ὠδί V 19 αὐτῇ ] αὐτῶ M A 22 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 4–10 423b 1–12 10–20 423b 12–17 21–232.7 423b 17–26

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also in the case of air. For it will be impossible for any bodies to touch each other in the air. For it is impossible that there should not be air between all bodies, and air is itself a body, even if this is not as obvious as in the case of water, but rather goes unnoticed, since air is more fine-grained than water. 5

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[Note] that after this he goes on to state clearly that some people do believe that 11 touch and taste apprehend their own proper objects directly and not through some medium or other (in the way that sight apprehends the visible object, that is, colour; hearing apprehends the audible object, that is, sound; and the sense of smell apprehends the object of smell); but that in reality the medium both exists and is imperceptible. For it is as if, in accordance with the previously cited example, one should conceive of an exceedingly thin membrane stretched out over the body: the flesh would, again, instantaneously perceive the touch of what is soft as well as what is hard, but nevertheless the touch occurs through the medium of the membrane. Accordingly, the 12 difference between the two senses mentioned and the others is precisely this, (a) that what is in between these senses and the perceptible objects is something slight, which can only be observed by reason and intellect, and this escapes notice in the case of these senses, whereas [the counterpart] in the case of the other senses is evident; and (b) that in the case of the other senses the perceptible objects are first operating on the media: they first set the media in motion and cause them to be affected, and through the media they approach the sense organs and cause them to be affected and modified in this way or the other on each respective occasion; whereas in the case of these two senses the sense organs themselves are instantaneously affected at the same time as the media are: just as someone who is struck, he says, through a shield that covers him is not himself struck later, after the shield has been struck first, and then himself receiving the blow through it; rather, the shield is struck by the striker at the same time as the person whom it covers is himself struck together with it, at a single stroke. [Note] that, just as air and water are the media of sight, hearing and smell, so 13 it appears that the tongue is in the case of taste and the flesh is in the case of touch: these are not the sense organs. The situation with the latter senses is analogous to that with the former ones: as in the case of the former senses it was seen to be impossible to have a clear perception when the perceptible objects are placed on the sense or-

4 cf. Them. 74.16–17. || more fine-grained : cf. Phlp. 428.37. 29–233.8 cf. Phlp. 433.19–34. 9–10 The last clause (“that in reality—imperceptible”) renders an infinitive phrase that can syntactically only be the subject of dokeî mén tisin (corresponding, in the translation, to an object clause governed by “some people do believe”), but is clearly intended to be, like that clause, the object of apophaínetai (“he goes on to state”).

232 | Theodoros Metochites

θεμένων διαισθάνεσθαι (καθὼς ταῦτα προδιώρισται· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν σῶμα ἐπιτεθὲν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίως γίνεται, ὡς προείρηται), οὕτως ἄρα κἀνταῦθα ἀνάγκη μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων τὰ ἁπτὰ τιθέμενα καταλαμβά14 νεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώσσης καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς τιθεμένων τῶν γευστῶν καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἴσθησις ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ κατάληψις αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι εἴσω πάντως περὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ὑφ’ οὗ ἡ ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίνεται διὰ τῆς γλώσσης καὶ τῆς σαρκός. Ὅτι ἁπτά εἰσι, φησίν, αἱ πρῶται διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα, οἷον θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ξηρόν, ὑγρόν· ὑπὸ ταύτας γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀνάγονται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς βιβλίοις φησὶν ὅτι διωρίσατο· ταῖς γὰρ εἰρημέναις ποιότησι – ταῖς κατὰ τὰς δύο συζυγίας, ἤτοι τῷ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ – χαρακτηρίζεσθαι δειV160r κνύει τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἁπλᾶ τέσσαρα σώματα καὶ | στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ σύνθετα. 16 ταύτας γοῦν τὰς τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰς ᾗ σῶμα, ταύτας εἶναί φησι τὰ ἁπτά· τὸ δὲ «ᾗ σῶμα» εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ποιότητες τῶν σωμάτων οὐκ εἰσὶν ὡς σωμάτων· οἷον τί συμβάλλεται τὸ χρῶμα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σῶμα; πάντως οὐδέν· ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἔστι σώματά τινα ἃ μὴ κεχρωμάτισται, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀήρ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι σῶμα ἄνευ χρώματος, ἀδύνατον δὲ εἶναι σῶμα ἐν ᾧ μὴ θεωρεῖται τῶν εἰρημένων τις ποιοτήτων. διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται ὅτι ταῦτά εἰσι τὰ ἁπτά, αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σώματος. 17 διορισάμενος οὖν οὕτω τὰ ἁπτά, ἑξῆς φησι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ὅτι τὸ ἁπτικὸν αἰσθητήριον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προδιωρίσατο αἰσθητηρίων, ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἅπερ τὰ ἁπτά· πάσχει γάρ (καὶ παθητικόν τί ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, τὸ αἰσθητήριον). διατοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν – ἤτοι τὸ ἁπτόν – ὅπερ αὐτό ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο δυνάμει πρότερον· οὐδὲν γάρ τι πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται ὅτι δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὅπερ

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gans themselves (in accordance with the previous description of this [phenomenon]: a white body that is placed on the eye is not visible, and the same thing happens in the other cases, as stated above), so also in the present case objects of touch that are placed on the sense organs themselves are of necessity not apprehended. And since, 14 when tasteable and tangible objects are placed on the tongue and the flesh, perception and apprehension of these objects ensue, the tongue and the flesh are apparently not the sense organs, but it seems undeniable that something else on the inside close to the heart is the sense organ, by whose agency the apprehension of the perceptible objects comes to pass through [the medium of] the tongue and the flesh. [Note] that he says that it is the primary differentiating qualities of a body qua body 15 that are tangible, namely, hot, cold, dry and wet. For under these the other differentiating qualities are also subsumed, as he says that he has described in his books On Coming-to-Be and Passing Away. For [there] he shows that the four primary and simple bodies or elements, of which the other, compound, bodies consist, are characterized by the qualities mentioned (the ones in the two binary pairs, that is, hot and cold, dry and wet). Anyway: these differentiating qualities of the body qua body, he says, are 16 the tangible objects. “Qua body” has been added because the other qualities of bodies are not theirs in their capacity as bodies: for instance, what does colour contribute to something’s being a body? Absolutely nothing. For certain bodies can be seen that are not coloured, as for instance air, and perhaps also water. For it is not impossible for a body to exist without colour, but it is impossible for a body to exist in which none of the qualities mentioned is manifested. This is also why it was said that the tangible objects are these, the differentiating qualities of a body qua body. Having thus delineated the 17 tangible objects, he next speaks about the tactile sense organ, too, to the effect that, in accordance with what has been previously delineated in speaking of the other sense organs, the tactile sense organ is potentially the same thing as the tangible objects. For it is affected (and a sense organ is a thing capable of being affected, as has been mentioned many times). Because of this, the perceptible – that is, the tangible – object causes it to become the same thing as the perceptible object itself actually is, thanks to the fact that this is what the sense organ itself already is potentially. For nothing is affected by what is similar. This is also why it was said that the sense organ is potentially the same thing as the perceptible object, but is caused by the perceptible object to be-

7–8 close to the heart : cf. Prisc. 164.14–16. 17–20 cf. Phlp. 434.20–22.

11–16 cf. Phlp. 434.10–12; 434.17–20; Them. 76.34–36.

19 can be seen: it is perhaps ironic that Metochites should choose precisely this way of asserting the existence of bodies that have no colour, since the only thing we can be certain that they cannot be is seen (unless they have some other visible quality, such as phosphorescence).

234 | Theodoros Metochites

18 τὸ αἰσθητόν, γίνεται δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ὅπερ αὐτό. ὥστε καί, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἁπτὰ ἐναν-

τία ἐστί, μέσον πώς ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ἵνα ᾖ δυνάμει ἀμφότερα καὶ πρὸς ἑκάτερον μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι δυνάμει ὅπερ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὅπερ αὐτό· τῶν γὰρ ὑπερβολῶν πέφυκεν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτὸ μέσως πως ἔχον καὶ δυνάμει ὂν ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἄκρων, καὶ ἐναντίον ὂν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον πρὸς ἑκάτερον καὶ 19 πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων ὡς πρὸς ἐναντίον μεταβάλλον. οἷον τὸ μέσον θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ ἐν μετουσίᾳ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ δυνάμει ὅπερ ἀμφότερα, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ (ψυχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν ᾗ μετέχει ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν μεσότητα), καὶ μεταβάλλει πως ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει θερμοῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ ψυχροῦ – εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ ὡς εἰς ἐναντίον· καὶ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν αὖθις τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ᾗ μέσον θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, καὶ μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ψυχροῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ θερμοῦ – εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν τὸ αἰσθητήριον πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰ ἐναντία ἄκρα ἔχει, τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ αὐτῶν 20 ἑκάτερον καὶ μεταβάλλει ὡς ἐναντίον εἰς αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως εἴρηται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὅρασις τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου ἐστὶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκούστου, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ ἁφή ἐστι τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ V160v τοῦ ἀνάπτου· ἄναπτον δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ βραχυτάτην καὶ φαύλην | αἴσθησιν ἔχον ἁπτικὴν καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνεπαίσθητον, οἷος ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων· ἄναπτον καὶ τὸ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν ποιότητος φθαρτικὸν τῆς ἁφῆς στερητικῶς οὕτως λεγόμενον, ὥσπερ πρὸ ὀλίγου διωρίσατο καὶ διεῖλε παραπλησίως καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον καὶ τὸ ἀνήκουστον. * *

*

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come actually the same thing. Consequently, since the tangible objects are contraries, 18 the sense organ is also in a way intermediate, in order that it may potentially be both of the contraries and that it may change, relative to either of the contraries, from being potentially the same thing into being actually the same thing. For the sense organ is of such a nature as to perceive deviations by holding, itself, a kind of middle ground and being potentially each of the contrary extremes, and by being in this manner contrary to each of the extremes and changing into either of them as into a contrary. For 19 instance, what is intermediate to hot and cold is, on the one hand, sharing in both and potentially the same thing as both, but on the other hand it is conceptually contrary to the deviation that consists in being hot (for it is cold in so far as, in accordance with its intermediate nature, it shares in cold), and somehow changes, from being potentially hot – that is, from being cold – into the deviation that consists in being hot, as into a contrary. And vice versa, it is contrary to the deviation that consists in being cold in so far as it is intermediate between hot and cold, and changes from being potentially cold – that is, from being hot – into its contrary, the deviation that consists in being cold. This is how the sense organ relates to both of the contrary extremes, the tangible ones: it is potentially the same thing as each of them and changes as a contrary into either of them. Just as it was said, with reference to sight and hearing, that sight is 20 perception of what is visible and what is invisible and hearing of what is audible and what is inaudible, so also touch is perception of what is tangible and what is intangible. And things that only allow very slight and inadequate tactile perception, and are practically imperceptible, are also “intangible”, as for instance air and certain other bodies; also, things that are capable of destroying the sense of touch on account of an excess of quality are called “intangible” in a privative sense, just as “invisible” and “inaudible” were similarly defined and distinguished a little while ago. * *

9–18 cf. Phlp. 436.7–13.

*

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12 Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ διεξελθεῖν περὶ ἑκάστης κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεως ἑξῆς βούλεται κοινῶς περὶ τῆς καθόλου αἰσθήσεως διαλαβεῖν καὶ διορίσασθαι. καὶ τοίνυν φησὶν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ὅπερ κατ’ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ αἰσθητικὸν καθόλου πνεῦμα, διάφορα τὰ ὑπηρετικὰ αἰσθητήρια ἔχον εἰς τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τοὺς λόγους γε μὴν αὐτοὺς μόνους τῶν αἰσθητῶν δέχεται ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰ εἴδη, οὐ μέντοι μετὰ τῆς ὕλης συνημμένως αὐτὰ δέχεται. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἐπί τε τῆς ὁράσεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως· τῶν γὰρ ὁρατῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν – εἴτουν τῶν χρωμάτων – καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν – εἴτουν τῶν διαφόρων ψόφων – καὶ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν αὐτῶν εἰδῶν χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἡ αἴσθησις· ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς δόξειεν ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις οὐκ ἀχωρίστως 2 τῆς ὕλης ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθητῶν. ἀλλ’ ὅμως γε κἀνταῦθα, φησί, τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀντίληψις, οὐ τῆς ὕλης· ὁ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ μέλιτος γλυκύτητος αἰσθανόμενος ἐν τῇ γεύσει αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς γλυκύτητος αἰσθάνεται, οὐ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσιώσεως τοῦ μέλιτος· ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ σώματος θερμοῦ ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ ποιότητος καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ἀντιλαμβάνεται, καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ὡδί πως διατίθεται, 3 οὐ τῆς σωματικῆς καὶ ὑλικῆς οὐσίας. διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται αἴσθησιν εἶναι καθόλου τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ κηρός, φησίν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφραγίδος τοῦ χρυσοῦ δακτυλίου ἢ σιδηροῦ διατίθεται, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀναλαμβάνει, καὶ γίνεται ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο, οὐχ ᾗ σίδηρος δηλονότι ἐστὶν ἢ χρυσός, ἀλλ’ ᾗ τοιόνδε εἶδος· μένει γὰρ αὐτὸς κηρός, οὐ μεταλαμβάνων τῆς τοῦ σιδήρου ἢ χρυσοῦ οὐσίας, ἀλλ’ ἀναλαμβάνων τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς τῆς σφραγίδος εἶδος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴ4 σθησις αὐτῶν μόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεται γνωστικῶς τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. καὶ ἡ μὲν

1–2 σηʹ τί αἴσθησις adn. M1marg Amarg 6 καὶ² A1sl 10 οὐκ delere velim 14 θερμοῦ ] τινος A 15 ὡδί ] ὠδί V 17 φησίν A1sl 1–22 424a 17–24 22–238.7 424a 24–28

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[Note] that, after having discussed each sense individually, he next wants to make an overall analysis and delineation of the sense capacity in general. Accordingly, he says that a sense capacity is that which is able to receive the form of perceptible objects without their matter; this is based in the generally perceptive spirit in the animal, which has recourse to the different ancillary sense organs for the apprehension of the perceptible objects of each of these. Ιt is only the ratios or forms of perceptible objects that the sense capacity receives: it does not receive them in combination with their matter. This is obvious in the case of sight as well as in those of hearing and smelling: for the sense capacity apprehends the visible forms (that is, the colours), the audible forms (that is, the different sounds) and the odorous forms without their matter. But in the cases of taste and touch the sense capacity might seem to apprehend the perceptible objects within the respective ambits of these senses unseparated from their matter. Still, even here, he says, it is an apprehension of the forms, not of the matter. 2 For someone who perceives the sweetness of honey perceives in his gustatory sense the form of sweetness, not the material substantiality of the honey. In the same way, someone who touches a hot body apprehends the form and the quality of heat and it is by this that he is modified in a certain way, not by the corporeal and material substance. This is also why it was stated that a sense capacity in general is that which is 3 able to receive the forms of perceptible objects uncombined with their matter, just as the wax, he says, is modified by the seal of the gold or iron ring, and takes on its form, and becomes the same thing as that thing, not in so far as it is iron or gold, obviously, but in so far as it is a form of a certain description. For it itself remains wax, since it does not take part of the substance of the iron or gold [ring], but rather takes on the form of the seal in these objects. In the same way, the sense capacity, too, cognitively apprehends only the forms without the matter. This, then, is what the sense capac- 4

1–2 cf. Phlp. 437.4–5; Prisc. 165.26–28. 4 spirit : cf. Prisc. 438.25–27; 167.14–15. 77.31–34. 14–15 cf. Phlp. 437.17–19. 19–22 cf. Phlp. 437.13–15.

8–13 cf. Them.

10–13 might seem to apprehend the perceptible objects … unseparated from their matter: the translation omits a superfluous negative particle, transmitted in all the MSS (“not unseparated”), which may have been erroneously inserted by the scribe of the archetype or – more likely – by the author himself. 13 In fact, Aristotle does not bother to mention that taste and touch are like all other senses in apprehending only perceptible forms, but Themistius does (77.32–34). 23 the substance of the iron or gold [ring]: the Greek could also mean “the essence of iron or gold”, that is, the substantial forms of the metals of which a signet ring may be made, but (a) the mention of the “material substantiality of the honey” and the “material substance” of a hot body in 2.12.2 and, again, the “material substance of the honey” in 2.12.6, and (b) the fact that “the iron or gold” seems to be the antecedent of “these objects” in the next clause, suggest that what Metochites has in mind is the matter of the ring.

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αἴσθησις τοιαύτη· αἰσθητήριον δέ ἐστι, φησίν, ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐστὶ δύναμις, οἷον εἴρηται εἶναι καθόλου τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα. ἔστι δὲ ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ταυτὸν καὶ ἕν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ διάφορα, εἴτουν δύο, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν | αἴσθησις αὐτή – εἴτουν ἡ δύναμις ἡ αἰσθητική – ἀσώματόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀμερές, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον μέγεθος ἔχει, εἴτουν διάστασιν· τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἕκαστα τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ὡς ἔστι πρόδηλον, σωματοειδῆ καὶ διαστατά· ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἀμεγέθης, εἶδος μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ καὶ λόγος τις οὖσα. ὡς ἐντεῦθέν φησι δῆλον εἶναι καὶ ὅπως αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῆς κινήσεως – εἴτουν ποιήσεως – τῶν αἰσθητῶν φθαρτικαί εἰσι τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ἡ γὰρ ἀμετρία καὶ τὸ ἄλογον φθαρτικόν ἐστι πάντως τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ τῆς συμμετρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς μουσικοῖς ὀργάνοις θεωρουμένην ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς ἔλλογον συμφωνίαν καὶ τοὺς τόνους τῆς ἁρμονίας, εἴ τις σφοδρότερον, φησίν, ἐμπίπτων κρούει τὰς χορδάς, αὐτίκα φθείρει καὶ διόλλυσιν. ὡσαύτως δέ φησιν ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον εἶναι διατί καὶ τὰ φυτά, καίπερ ἔμψυχα ὄντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν πάσχοντα (ψύχεται γὰρ καὶ θερμαίνεται), οὐκ αἰσθάνεται· εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῶν μόνων κεχωρισμένων τῆς ὕλης ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ γλυκαινόμενον τῇ μίξει τοῦ μέλιτος οὐ τῇ ἀναλήψει τῆς ποιότητος αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς γλυκύτητος γλυκὺ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὑλικὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ μέλιτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ συλλαμβάνει. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάσχοντα ἡνωμένως μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν εἰδῶν μόνων διατιθέμενα, ἀναίσθητά εἰσιν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἔχει τι λόγον ἀρχῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχον καὶ μέσον πως πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰ ἐναντία διατίθεσθαι, ὥσπερ προείρηται τὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὕτως ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰ παθεῖν ἔχει ὑπὸ ὀδμῆς τὸ μὴ ἔχον δύναμιν ἢ μόριον ὑπηρετικὸν ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος ἢ ὑπὸ ψόφου τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὡσαύτως ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύναμίν τινα μέσον ἔχειν καὶ ἀντιληπτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἰδῶν

1 ἐστι, φησίν transp. M 2–3 ση′ adn. Mmarg 7 ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ] αἰσθητηρίῳ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ M A (fort. recte) 12 τις V1?pc (ex τι) || ἐμπίπτων (ut vid.) V2?pc (fort. ex ἐμπίπτον) 14 post οὔκ rasuram duarum fere litterarum habere videtur V || αἰσθάνεται M1pc (αἰ- ut vid. ex ἐ‑) 14–16 ὅρος αἰσθήσεως adn. Amarg (quae fort. ad textum aristotelicum adtinent) 18 μέλιτος ] μέλιττος M A 19 ὕλης ] καὶ addere velim 20 πως ] πῶς V : ὡς malim (nisi forte pro διατίθεσθαι v. 21 legendum est διατιθέμενον) 22 ἄν M1sl 24 μέσον ] ἔχουσαν (vel οὖσαν) addere velim 7–13 424a 28–32 13–22 424a 32–b 2

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ity is like. But the sense organ, he says, is the first thing in which such a capacity is present, the kind of thing that the perceptive spirit was said to be on a general level. And the sense capacity and the sense organ are one and the same thing with respect to what underlies them; but conceptually they are different, that is, two things, since the sense capacity itself – that is, the capacity for sense perception – is incorporeal and without parts, whereas the sense organ has magnitude, that is, extension. For that is what all the individual sense organs are like, as is perfectly obvious: body-like and extended. But the sense capacity is, as mentioned, incorporeal and without magnitude, since it is only a form and a kind of ratio in the underlying sense organ. From this, he 5 says, it is also clear in what way excesses of the motion – that is, of the action – of perceptible objects are liable to destroy the sense. For disproportion and irrationality are in every way destructive of ratio and proportion, just as in musical instruments the rational harmony and the pitches of the scale manifested in the strings are immediately destroyed and ruined, he says, if anyone strikes the strings with too forceful an attack. It is likewise clear from this, he says, why plants do not also perceive, de- 6 spite being ensouled and being affected by the objects of touch (for they do get cold and hot). For it is obvious that they do not take on the forms themselves alone and separated from their matter, but together with their matter: for even water, when it is sweetened by the admixture of honey, does not become sweet through taking on the quality or form of sweetness, but also takes up the material substance of honey within itself in the process. And, in general, those things that are acted upon by perceptible objects in conjunction with their matter, and are not merely modified by their forms, lack sense perception, since nothing in them has the function of a first principle and a sort of mean, so that it can be modified in relation to both contraries, as has been previously said to be the situation with the things involved in sense perception. For 7 one may also raise the problem whether that which has no capacity or auxiliary part for perceiving smell can be affected by an odour; or that which, similarly, cannot see or hear, because it has no capacity that is in an intermediate state and enables appre-

1–2 cf. Phlp. 438.25–27; Prisc. 167.13–15. 4 that is, two things: cf. Phlp. 438.36. 5 incorporeal: cf. Phlp. 438.37. 9 form: cf. Them. 78.17–18. 11–15 cf. Them. 78.21–24. 18–21 cf. Phlp. 440.35–441.1. 23–24 This is probably the best sense one can make of the transmitted text (ti is the subject of échei, which is construed with the object infinitive diatíthesthai, échon being a circumstantial participle in agreement with ti). Two possible emendations are suggested in the critical apparatus: the first (changing pōs into hōs) would translate as “since they also do not have anything with the function of a first principle in them(selves), which is intermediate, so as to be modified in relation to both contraries”; the second (changing diatíthesthai into diatithémenon) would translate as “since they also do not have anything with the function of a first principle in them(selves), which is disposed as an approximate mean between both contraries” (with both these emendations en autoîs would have to be taken as a reflexive). The second emendation could perhaps find some support in Themistius (78.32–34). 28 that is in an intermediate state and : this translation may require the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. The transmitted text translates most naturally as “inside that”.

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τῶν αἰσθητῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὀδμή, φησίν, ὄσφρησιν ποιεῖ, ὄσφρησίς τις ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄσφρησιν, εἴτουν ὀσφραντικὴν ἕξιν καὶ δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν οἷόν τε εἴη ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ ὀδμὴν δέχεσθαι; ὡσαύτως δ’ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πάσχει ὅ τι ποτ’ ἄρα ἔχει τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔχει ᾗ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ μέσως πως ἔχον καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὰ ἐναντία ἀντιληπτικὴν γνωστικῶς, ὡς προείρηται· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ φῶς οὔτε τὸ σκότος οὔτε ὁ ψόφος ποιεῖ τι εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναίσθητα. καίτοι γε ὁρᾶν ἔστι, φησίν, ἐνίοτε ὡς καὶ ξύλα καὶ λίθοι ὑπὸ ψόφου βροντῆς ῥήγνυνται, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ῥήγνυνται, οὐδὲ τῷ ἀκουστικὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν | ἢ πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀκουστῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἐν οἷς ταῦτα γίνεται ἔπειτα καὶ αὐτὰ πάσχει· πάσχων γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ πληττόμενος σφοδρότερον ὁ ἀήρ, ἐμπίπτων αὐτίκα σφοδρῶς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις σώμασι πλήττει καὶ αὐτὸς ταῦτα. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτω λέγεται, ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα σώματα καὶ τὰ σύνθετα πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν τε καὶ γευστῶν, εἴτουν τῶν χυμῶν· θερμαίνεται γὰρ ἡλίου ἀκμάζοντος ἢ θερμοτέρων τινῶν ἄλλων προσπελαζόντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ ψύχεται, καὶ γλυκαίνεται ὑγρανθέντα ὑπὸ γλυκέων· ἀλλ’ οὐ πάσχει οὐδὲ λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὰ πάθη μετὰ γνωστικῆς ἕξεως, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὥστε μόνον τρέπεσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν ἀναισθήτως. ὑπὸ μέντοι γε ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀκουστῶν καὶ ὀσφραντῶν οὐ πάντα πάσχει· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔνια πάσχει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ (ὡς διαφανῆ καὶ διηχῆ καὶ δίοσμα), ἀλλ’ ἀόριστά ἐστι καὶ εὔτροπα καὶ τάχιστα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ οὐ μένει αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀντίληψις ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν κατὰ τὴν γνωστικὴν ἀντίληψιν· διατοῦτο καὶ ὄζειν λέγεται ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀσφραντῶν πάσχων καὶ διαβιβάζειν τὴν ὀσμὴν ὡς πρὸς τὰ αἰσθανόμενα, οὐκ ὀσφραίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτός· καὶ ἔχει τοῦτο διάφορον τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄζειν πάθος ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τοῦ μέν ἐστι γνωστικὴ ἀντίληψις κατὰ τὸ

1 ἡ om. A || εἴη ] τὸ πάθος addere velim 2 ὄσφρησιν A1pc 3 καὶ³ ] ἐπὶ add. M A 5 μέσως ] μέσον malim 7 τὰ A1sl 8 τῷ² ] τὸ A 13 καὶ ] τῶν add. M A (fort. recte) 15 ὑπὸ ] τῶν add. M A 17 γε om. A 20 αἰσθητικῶν ] αἰσθητῶν A 22 διάφορον ] διάφορος A 11–242.9 424b 12–18

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hension of the contrary forms of perceptible objects, [can be affected] by colour or by sound. For if, he says, an odour produces a perception of smell, [the affection] must be a perception of smell, and how would it be possible for that which has no smell – that is, no competence and capacity for smelling – to perceive a smell and receive an odour? And the situation is the same in the case of objects of sight, objects of hearing and the rest: for it is not in so far as it is affected in some respect or other that a thing has sense perception; rather, it has sense perception in so far as it is able to perceive, holds a kind of middle ground and has a capacity for cognitive apprehension relative to both contraries, as already mentioned. For neither light nor darkness nor sound produces anything in imperceptive things like the ones discussed. And yet 8 one can sometimes see, he says, how trees as well as rocks are shattered by the sound of thunder, but they are not shattered by dint of perceiving or by dint of having a capacity for hearing or for being affected by objects of hearing: rather, it is through the affection of those things in which these [objects of hearing] appear that they themselves are subsequently affected. For when the air is affected and rather vehemently struck, it itself strikes the imperceptive bodies by immediately impinging vehemently upon them. That being said, however, it remains a fact that both inanimate bodies and 9 composite ones are affected by the objects of touch and of taste, that is, flavours. For they are heated when the sun is high or some other objects hotter than they are come near them, and cooled, and sweetened when wetted by sweet things; but they do not undergo or receive these affections together with a cognitive quality, in the way characteristic of perceiving, but only in such a way as to be altered and to change without perceiving. Not everything, then, is affected by visible, audible and odorous objects; 10 and if indeed some things are affected, as air and water have been said to be (inasmuch as they are transparent, transsonant and transodorant), they are still indeterminate and easily and swiftly altered and changed, and the apprehension does not remain in them as it does in things that are capable of perception on the basis of cognitive apprehension. This is why the air is said to have an odour when it is affected by odorous objects, and to transmit the odour all the way to those things that do have perception, but is not said itself to have the sense of smell or to have perception. And the affection involved in having an odour differs from that involved in having a perception [of smell] in that it belongs to the latter to apprehend cognitively by virtue of a means of percep-

11 rocks: cf. Phlp. 442.17. 13 affected by objects of hearing: cf. Phlp. 442.19–21. 8–9 This interpretation requires construing échon in line 240.5 of the Greek text both as an intransitive verb with mésōs pōs (“holds a kind of middle ground”) and as a transitive verb with dúnamin as its direct object noun. The emendation suggested in the critical apparatus removes this syntactic awkwardness while preserving the approximate meaning of the sentence.

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αἰσθητικὸν κριτήριον, τὸ δέ ἐστιν ὡς τὸ πάσχειν μόνον τάχιστα καὶ αἰσθητὸν μᾶλλον γίνεσθαι, οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστων τάχιστα πάσχει – τῶν ὁρατῶν, τῶν ἁπτῶν, τῶν ὀσφραντῶν – καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ μετουσίᾳ αὐτῶν αἰσθητὸς 11 γίνεται. ὥστε καὶ ἐπισημαίνεσθαί ἐστιν εἰκὸς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων μήποτε διατοῦτο καὶ ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα – ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο – οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰσθητήρια τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ τῶν γευστῶν, ἐπειδὴ αἰσθητὰ αὐτὰ γίνονται καὶ τάχιστα μεταβάλλει ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ γίνεται κατ’ αὐτά, ὡς εἶναι λοιπὸν ἄρα καὶ διαβιβαστικά – καὶ μέσα κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ – εἰς τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο ἃ διαφανῆ καὶ διηχῆ καὶ δίοσμά ἐστι), καὶ ὑπηρετικὰ καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων.

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tive discernment, whereas the former only amounts to being promptly affected, and becoming perceptible, rather than perceiving, in the way in which the air is promptly affected by each of the perceptible objects – the visible, the tangible and the odorous – and itself, by sharing in these, becomes perceptible. Therefore it is reasonable, 11 against the background of what has been said, to add the remark that perhaps this is why neither the flesh nor the tongue – as was argued a little while ago – are sense organs for the objects, respectively, of touch and taste, since they, too, are made perceptible by the perceptible objects, and are promptly changed by them and conform to them, so that, as a result, they are also media, parallel to air and water, capable of transmission to the sense organs (as those things that are transparent, transsonant and transodorant were described a little while ago), which have an auxiliary role and are intermediate between the perceptible objects and the sense organs.

1–4 cf. Prisc. 171.4–10. 4–12 The concluding paragraph has no counterpart in Aristotle’s text. It is vaguely inspired by Themistius (79.29–37). 3 the tangible: no doubt a slip for “the audible”.

Τὰ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίων 1 V161v Ὅτι, ἐναρχόμενος τοῦ τρίτου βιβλίου τοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης προτίθεται

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ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλαι πλείους αἰσθήσεις παρὰ τὰς προδιωρισμένας πέντε· τὴν ὅρασιν, τὴν ἀκοήν, τὴν ὄσφρησιν, τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν ἁφήν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τούτου δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ διηπόρησεν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ μία ἐναντιότης ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι, | μήποτε οὐκ ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν διαφόρων ἐνταῦθα ἐναντιοτήτων αἴσθησίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ μόνη ἡ ἁφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἔστιν ἢ ἄλλαι λανθάνουσαι καὶ ἀγνοούμεναι ἀντιληπτικαὶ τῶν διαφόρων ἐναντιοτήτων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς, ὡς εἴρηται, θεωρουμένων. φησὶν οὖν ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αὐτῶν ἀντίληψις διὰ τῆς ἁπτικῆς αἰσθήσεως προδήλως, καὶ εἰ ἐν διαφόροις ἐναντιότησίν εἰσι – τῶν μὲν αὐτίκα πελαζόντων, ὡς τῶν ψυχρῶν, θερμῶν, σκληρῶν, μαλακῶν, τῶν δέ, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτίκα, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐστὶ κατάληψις διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς, οἷον τῶν κούφων καὶ τῶν βαρέων – ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς, εὔδηλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθητῶν ὡσαύτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ ἐλλείπει οὐδεμία αἴσθησις, οὐδὲ καταλείπεται μάλιστα αἰσθητά τινα, ὧν μὴ ἔστι καταληπτικὴ αἴσθησις. καὶ γὰρ δή, φησίν, εἴ τις ἂν ἐλλείποι ὡντινωνοῦν αἴσθησις, πάντως καὶ τὸ ὑπηρετικὸν ταύτης ὄργανον, εἴτουν αἰσθητήριον, ἐκλείπειν ἀνάγκη· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι καὶ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητηρίων, καὶ ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἤρτηται, καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐξανάγκης ταῦτα σύνεστιν. εἰ γοῦν ἐλλείπει τις αἴσθησις, ἐλλείπει καὶ τὸ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν αἰσθητήριον· ἀλλὰ μὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς σὺν ἀντιθέσει ἀντιστροφῆς, ὅτε μηδὲν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐλλείπει, ἀλλ’, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἐστι πρόδηλον, πάντ᾿ ἔστιν, οὐδεμία ἄρα οὐδ’ αἴσθησις ἐλλείπει. καὶ τοῦθ’ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει πρόδηλον οὕτω συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῆς ζωτικῆς αὐτῆς τελειότητος· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τελειότερα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἥττονα καὶ ἀτελέστερα· οἷον ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ ἔχει τὴν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ταύτης εἴδη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, τελειοτέρα αὐτῆς οὖσα, καὶ ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἐξανάγκης ὡσαύτως ἔχει τὴν ζωτικήν – εἴτουν αἰσθητικήν – ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ

i titulum rubro scriptum habent V M : om. A || ἐναρχόμενος ] ἀρχόμενος Vpr 3 τὴν¹ M1sl 6 ἐναντιοτήτων ] ἐναντιωτήτων A || ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A 8 ἐναντιοτήτων ] ἐναντιωτήτων A 12 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 13 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 14 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V M 16 ἂν delere velim || ἐλλείποι A1pc (ex ἐλλείπει) 18 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 20 μηδὲν ] μὴ δὲν (ut vid.) M 21 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V M 25 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || ἔχει om. M A || αἰσθητικήν ] ἔχει add. M 1–15 424b 22–26

15–250.9 424b 26–425a 13

3–8 ἐν … τῷ … δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ : cf. 2.11, 422b 23–33 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110786064-004

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Paraphrase of the Third Book On the Soul 1

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[Note] that, as Aristotle begins his third book on the soul, he undertakes to demonstrate that there are no further senses besides the five previously defined: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. For in the previous, second, book he raised the problem of whether – since there is not a unique contrariety in the case of tangible objects, as there is in the case of the other perceptibles, those that constitute the objects of the other senses – it is not only the sense of touch itself that is concerned with all the different contrarieties in the case of these objects, but there is also another sense or other senses that, without being noticed or recognized, can apprehend the different contrarieties manifested, as mentioned, in tangible objects. Well, he says that there aren’t 2 any. For since clearly there is apprehension of all tangible objects through the sense of touch, regardless of the fact that they belong to different contrarieties – some of them being immediately adjacent, as cold things, hot things, hard things and soft things, whereas others may not be immediately adjacent but are nevertheless the objects of apprehension through touch, such as light and heavy things – since, then, this is the situation with touch and its objects, it is obvious that it is the same also with the other perceptible objects, those within the ambits of the other senses, and that no sense is lacking, nor are there any perceptible objects left behind that no existing sense can apprehend. For in fact, he says, if a sense of anything were lacking, it would be ab- 3 solutely necessary for the organ supporting this sense, that is, the sense organ, to be lacking as well. For sense perception is correlated with the perceptible objects and [enacted] through the appropriate sense organs, and these are mutually dependent and necessarily co-existent with each other. Therefore, if some sense is lacking, the corresponding sense organ is also lacking; but, according to the demonstration based on the conversion with negation, when none of the sense organs is missing, but they all – as is plain to see – are there, then no sense is missing either. That this is how 4 it is can be understood as plainly as that from the full animative development. For all things that are more fully developed contain in themselves those that are inferior and more undeveloped: for instance, the perceptive soul contains the vegetative soul and its forms and capacities, since it is more fully developed than this; and in the same way the rational soul necessarily contains the animative – that is, perceptive – soul

3–9 cf. Them. 80.4–8; Ps.-Phlp. 450.36–451.2. 13–14 cf. Them. 80.8–10. 14–16 cf. Prisc. 175.34–36; 176.24–27. 18–20 cf. Them. 80.14–15. 20–23 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 447.27–30. 23–24 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 450.1–3. 24–25 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 447.15–19; 451.9–11. 25–26 cf. Prisc. 173.16–17. 26–247.7 cf. Sophon. 105.29–106.3.

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ταύτης εἴδη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔχει καὶ τὴν ὅλην αἰσθητικὴν ψυχήν, τελειοτέρα ταύτης οὖσα, ἔχει πάντως τὰς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς πάσας δυνάμεις. ἐπεὶ γοῦν πέντε αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἴτουν τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, προδήλως καταλαμβάνονται, αἱ εἰρημέναι, αὗται ἂν εἶεν καὶ μόναι αἰσθήσεις, καὶ οὐδεμία παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλη ἐλλείπει λανθάνουσα ἴσως καὶ ἀγνοουμένη· τὰ γὰρ τελειότερα ἀχωρίστως ἔχει τὰ ὑποβεβηκότα καὶ ἀτελέστερα. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων μίαν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα (ὥσπερ τὰ καλούμενα ζωόφυτα μίαν μόνην αἴσθησιν ἔχει, τὴν ἁφήν), ἔνια δὲ δύο αἰσθήσεις ἔχει, ἔνια δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας. καὶ πάντως ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἔχει, τὴν πρώτην θεωρουμένην καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελεστέροις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄρα τῶν ζῴων ἡ τελειότης ἡ ζωτική ἐστιν, ἥτις δή ἐστιν | ἐν τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τελειότης τῆς αἰσθητικῆς – εἴτουν ζωτικῆς – ψυχῆς. ἐν τούτοις δὴ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις εἰσίν. ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητήρια ἔστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει, ὡς εἴρηται, δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν· τὰ αἰσθητήρια σώματά εἰσι, καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἑνός εἰσι τῶν ἁπλῶν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων σωμάτων – πυρός, ἀέρος, ὕδατος, γῆς – ἢ μεμιγμένα ἐξ αὐτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητήριον τῆς ὄψεώς ἐστιν ὑδατῶδες καὶ ὑγρόν, οἷον ἡ κόρη· τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐστιν ἐξ ἀέρος, ὃν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ σύμφυτον ἔφησεν εἶναι καὶ ἐγκατῳκοδομημένον τῷ ὀργάνῳ τῆς ἀκοῆς· τὸ δὲ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως κατ᾿ ἀμφότερα θεωρεῖται τὰ τοιαῦτα δύο ἁπλᾶ σώματα (τό τε ὕδωρ δηλονότι καὶ τὸν ἀέρα)· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πεζοῖς ζῴοις διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἰσθητήριον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐνύγροις διὰ τοῦ ὕδατός ἐστι (προείρηται γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐ μόνον τοῖς πεζοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐνύγροις ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι). καὶ διείληφε μὲν οὕτω τὰ τρία αἰσθητήρια ταῦτα τὰ δύο ἁπλᾶ σώματα, ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. τό γε μὴν τῆς γεύσεως αἰσθητήριον καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ καθ’ ἓν μόνον τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένον ἐξ αὐτῶν καταλαμβάνεται· τὸ πῦρ δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μόνον ὡς ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ καθορᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἴσως τῆς δραστηριότητος καὶ ὅτι καθόλου τῇ αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει σύμφυτόν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐμφύτου θερμοῦ ζωτικήν – εἴτουν αἰσθητικήν – εἶναι ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ γῆ οἵα τέ ἐστι διὰ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ παχυμερὲς κἀντεῦθεν ἀνοίκειον εἰς κρίσιν ὡς ἐν αἰσθητηρίῳ παραλαμβάνεσθαι (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ὅσα γεηρότερα μόρια τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ ἀναίσθητά εἰσιν, οἷον ὀστᾶ, τρίχες, ὄνυχες), ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν τῇ

3 αἰσθήσεις om. M A || ἀνθρώποις ] αἰσθήσεις add. M A || ψυχῇ iter. Aac (exp. A1 ) 4 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V M 6 μίαν ] μόνην add. M A 7 μόνην αἴσθησιν ἔχει ] ἔχει μόνην αἴσθησιν M A || ἁφήν ] ἀφὴν A 8 ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A 16 ἐξ M1sl 17–18 δύο ἁπλᾶ transp. M A 18 δηλονότι om. M A || ἀέρα ] δηλονότι add. M A 27 οἵα ] οἷα V 28 ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς transponere velim (cf. Them. 80.23–25) 16–17 ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ : cf. 2.8, 420a 3–19

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and its forms. Since, then, the rational soul in human beings also contains the whole perceptive soul, on account of being more fully developed than this, it inevitably contains all the capacities of the perceptive soul. Therefore, since five senses, namely, those mentioned, are clearly found to exist in human beings, that is, in the rational soul, these will also be the only senses, and no other sense besides these is lacking without being noticed or recognized. For the more fully developed things inseparably contain the subordinate and more undeveloped things. There are, indeed, some ani- 5 mals that have a single sense (as, for instance, the so-called zoophytes have only the sense of touch), while some have two senses, and others three or four. And invariably these have touch as well, the first sense found to exist both in the more undeveloped animals and thus also in those animals that have full animative development, which consists, no doubt, in local movement. For local movement is the full development of the perceptive – that is, animative – soul. In these animals, then, all the senses are also present. And that all the sense organs are present and none is lacking, as stated, is 6 clear from the following. The sense organs are bodies, and either they consist of one of the four simple bodies themselves – fire, air, water and earth – or they are mixtures of these. Thus the sense organ of sight – for instance, the pupil – is watery and wet; that of hearing consists of air, which, as he said in the second book, is naturally connected to the organ of hearing and inbuilt in it; whereas that of smell is found to be based on both these simple bodies (that is to say, water and air), for in landliving animals the sense organ of smell [operates] through air, and in aquatic animals through water (for it was also mentioned above that not only landliving animals but also aquatic ones have the sense of smell). So this is how the two simple bodies, air and water, have divided these three sense organs between themselves. The sense organ of taste 7 and touch, on the other hand, is not simple and based on a single element only, but is found to be a mixture of the elements. Fire, however, cannot be observed to be the sole constituent of a sense organ, presumably owing to its excessive efficacy, and because it is naturally connected to the capacity for sense perception in general. For without innate heat there can be no animative – that is, perceptive – activity. To be sure, nor can earth be utilized as the constituent of a sense organ, on account of its slowness and coarseness and its resultant unsuitability for discernment (indeed, this is clear from the following, namely, that those bodily parts which are relatively earthy, such as bones, hair and nails, are also imperceptive), except that earth, too, is included in

1–6 cf. Prisc. 173.30–33; Them. 81.15–17; Ps.-Phlp. 450.9–19. 7–9 cf. Them. 81.5–6. 11–14 cf. Prisc. 173.20–24. 15–22 cf. Them. 80.15–19. 26–249.1 cf. Sophon. 106.36–107.3. 26–28 cf. Prisc. 174.24–33. 28–249.1 cf. Them. 80.20–25. 31–32 this is clear from the following, namely, that : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “it is also clear that this is why …”.

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8 μίξει τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ ἡ γῆ παραλαμβάνεται, καθὼς ἔχει ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ. ὅτε τοίνυν

τῶν τεσσάρων ἁπλῶν σωμάτων καὶ στοιχείων τὰ δύο μὲν οὐ πέφυκεν ὡς ἁπλᾶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καθορᾶσθαι, τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ, μεμιγμένως δὲ παραλαμβάνεται εἰς τὴν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνέργειαν, τὰ δὲ δύο, ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις καταλαμβάνονται τῆς ὁράσεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα ἁπλᾶ καὶ στοιχειώδη σώματα, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐδ’ ἄλλα εἰσὶ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια, οὐδ’ ἐλλείπει τι αἰσθητήριον, οὐδὲ μὴν ἐξανάγκης, ὡς προείρηται, οὐδ’ αἴσθησις. ταῦτα γε μὴν τὰ ἁπλᾶ δύο σώματα καὶ εἰς μίαν αἴσθησιν ἔστι τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν ἐξυπηρετεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ὅρασις καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αὐτῇ ὑποκειμένων· διαφανὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως· V163r διηχὲς γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὡσαύτως· δίοσμον γὰρ καὶ | ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ. καὶ μὴν οὐ μόνον μία τῶν εἰρημένων αἰσθήσεων ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ δύο ἢ καὶ αἱ τρεῖς ἴσως χρήσαιντ’ ἂν ἀντιστρόφως τῷ ἑνὶ μόνῳ ἱκανῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν, ἢ τῷ ὕδατι ἢ τῷ ἀέρι· ἴσως γάρ, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων μόνον εἴη, τὰς τοιαύτας τρεῖς 9 αἰσθήσεις ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔτι δέ φησιν ὡς πᾶσα ἀντίληψις αἰσθητικὴ οὕτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ, διὰ μέσου· τὸ δὲ μέσον ἢ σύμφυτόν ἐστιν αὐτῇ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἔξωθεν· καὶ σύμφυτον μέν ἐστιν ὡς αἱ σάρκες ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς σαρξὶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς γεύσεως, καθὼς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ ὑπέδειξέ πως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἀλλότριον δὲ ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ μέσα εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων τριῶν αἰσθήσεων τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καθὼς δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων 10 ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτα τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡρισμένα εἰσί (τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ὄντα τῶν ἁπλῶν ἄττα στοιχείων, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὡρισμένων μικτά), καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ ἐγγινόμενα καὶ θεωρούμενα πάθη, ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀντιλαμβάνονται, ὡρισμένα εἰσὶ καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐγνωσμένα, οὔτ’ ἄρ᾿ οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐλλείπει, δι’ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν αἰσθητῶν αὐτῶν, οὔτε αἴσθησίς τις ἐλλείπει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις, φησίν, εἰσὶν ἐντελῶς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις (τοῖς τὴν ζωτικὴν δηλονότι τελειότητα ἔχουσιν, οὐ τοῖς πεπηρωμένοις καὶ κολοβοῖς καὶ ἀτελέσιν, οἷα τὰ ζωόφυτα ἀτελῆ τὴν ζωτικὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ αἰσθήσει τῇ ἁφῇ, καὶ ἄλλα ἐν δυσὶν ἢ τρισὶν αἰσθήσεσι θεωρούμενα οὐ μὴν ἁπάσας τὰς

1 ἁφῇ ] ἀφῆ A 6 σώματα om. A 7 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 10 γὰρ καὶ transp. A 12 ὕδωρ ] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ὡσαύτως ex v. 11 add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 14 μόνον ] μόνο M 16 μέσου ] μέμέσου M 17 αἱ M1sl 23 ἄττα correxi : ἅττα codd. 24 τὰ om. M 25 καὶ αὐτὰ A1sl 29 κολοβοῖς ] κολωβοῖς V 30 ἁφῇ ] ἀφῆ A 18–19 ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ : cf. 2.11, 422b 34–423a 21

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the mixture of the sense organs, as it is in the case of touch. Accordingly, seeing that 8 two of the four simple bodies and elements, fire and earth, are not of such a nature as to be found as simple constituents of the sense organs, but are utilized in mixed form for the activity of the sense organs, and two of them, air and water, are found in the sense organs of sight, hearing and smell, and there are no other simple and elemental bodies besides these, it is obvious that neither are there any sense organs besides the ones mentioned, nor is any sense organ lacking, nor, of necessity, as stated above, any sense. Indeed, both of these latter two simple bodies are capable of fully supporting [any] single one of the three senses mentioned. For sight apprehends its objects both through water and through air; for both air and water are transparent things. But it is the same thing with hearing, too: for both air and water are transsonant things; and it is the same thing with smell, too: for both air and water are transodorant things. And conversely, it might in fact be sufficient for the natural activity not only of one of the senses mentioned, but of two, or perhaps even three, to use one element only, either water or air. For perhaps it is possible, even if only one or the other of these is at hand, for the three senses of this kind to be active in it. He further says that every percep- 9 tive apprehension apprehends its own proper perceptible object in this way, through a medium, and the medium is either naturally connected to the sense itself or alien and external: it is “naturally connected” in the sense in which flesh, or the analogue of flesh, is so in the case of touch, and indeed in the case of taste, as Aristotle indicated in the preceding book; and it is “alien” in the sense in which air and water are so in the case of sight, hearing and smell. For in the case of the three senses mentioned, air and water are intermediate between the perceptible objects and the senses themselves, just as these things, too, were described in the preceding chapters. Accordingly, since 10 these things, which are intermediate between the perceptible objects and the senses, are of a determinate number (some of them being simple elements themselves, others being mixtures of things that are themselves of a determinate number), and moreover the affections that occur and are manifested in them, which the senses apprehend, are themselves also of a determinate and known number, it follows that none of the sense organs, through which the senses apprehend the perceptible objects themselves, is missing, nor is any sense missing, but all the senses, he says, are fully present in the animals (that is to say, in those that have full animative development, not in those that are mutilated, maimed and undeveloped, as for instance zoophytes, which have an undeveloped animative soul consisting only in the sense of touch, and other animals, which are found [to have an animative soul] consisting in two or three senses, but do not possess all the senses, and do not possess full development of the animative

8–16 cf. Them. 80.34–81.2. 16–22 cf. Them. 80.29–34. 31–251.3 cf. Them. 81.4–7.

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11 αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντα, οὐδὲ τελειότητα τῆς ζωτικῆς ἔχοντα ψυχῆς). τελειότης δὲ ἔστιν, ὡς

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εἴρηται, τῆς ζωτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ τόπον κινητικὴν δύναμιν ζῴοις, ἐν οἷς προδήλως εἰσὶ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ, φησί, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικὸν ἔχουσα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μὲν καὶ τὸ ὀπτικὸν εἰς τὸ ἔξωθεν ἐμφανῶς οὐκ ἔχει, ἄλλ’ ἔχει γε μὴν ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα, φησίν, ἵνα μηδ’ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλείπῃ τις αἴσθησις, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἁπάσας ἔχῃ, ὡς τελειότητα ζωτικὴν ἔχουσα· εἰ δὲ μὴ προβέβληται τὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἔξω, ἀλλ’ ἐντὸς κρύπτεται καὶ λανθάνει, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ λόγον τῇ φύσει γέγονεν· οὐ γάρ τις χρεία αὐτῶν τῷ ὑπὸ γῆν ἐν τῷ ὀρύττειν ζῶντι ἐμψύχῳ, ὡς ἔστιν ἡ ἀσπάλαξ· τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καὶ ἀχρεῖον ἄηθες τῇ φύσει. ἐπὶ τούτοις δή φησιν ὡς οὐδὲ ἔστι τις ἄλλη ἰδία | αἴσθησις παρὰ τὰς πέντε τῶν κοινῶς θεωρουμένων ἐπ’ αὐταῖς, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ· ταῦτα γάρ – ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται – θεωρεῖται κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον τούτων καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾑτινιοῦν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν εἶναι τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιθεωρεῖται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ δηλωθέντα. τῷ γὰρ ὁρατῷ – εἴτουν τῷ χρώματι – ἐνθεωρεῖται καὶ κίνησις ὁτὲ καὶ στάσις, καὶ ὁρᾶται τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ κινούμενον ἐνίοτε καὶ ἑστώς, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὡς μέγεθος ὁρᾶται (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον συνεχές), ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ ὡς ἀριθμός – εἴτουν ἀριθμητόν – ὁρᾶται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται, ἤτοι ἓν ἢ δύο ἢ ἕτερος ὁστισοῦν ἀριθμός. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ταῦθ’ ἕκαστα θεωρεῖται (ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν, ὡς ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τούτων προδιείληπται). μήποτε οὖν, φησίν, ἔστι τις ἰδία αἴσθησις, ἐρεῖ τις ἂν ἴσως, καὶ ἐλλείπει τοῖς ζῴοις, τῶν τοιούτων κοινῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις θεωρουμένων αἰσθήσεσιν; ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο, φησίν, ὅτι μηδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνθεωρεῖται ταῦτα καὶ γίνεται αὐτῶν αἴσθησις καθ’ ἑκάστην τῶν αἰσθήσεων· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ αἰσθητά ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως ὡς διατιθέντα πως τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ δραστικῶς αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἑκάστη αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν αἰσθητῶν· τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως πως ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ποιεῖ τι προσκρινόμενον εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἀλλ’ ἔστι διπλῶς θεωρούμενον τὸ κατὰ

5 ἐλλείπῃ ] ἐλλείπει M 6 ἔχῃ ut vid. M1pc (ex ἔχει) 7 ὀφθαλμῶν ] ὀμμάτων A 10 ἔστι ] ἔστιν M 11 σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ ] μεγέθους· ἀριθμοῦ· σχήματος M A 15 τῷ² om. M A 17 ἑστώς correxi : ἑστῶς codd. 18 ἀριθμητόν ] καὶ add. M A 19 δὲ ] δὴ M A 21 προδιείληπται ] προδιήλειπται V 23 τοῦτο, φησίν transp. A 25 πως correxi : πῶς codd. 27 πως correxi : πῶς codd. 9–254.12 425a 14–b 4

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soul either). Full development of the animative soul obtains, as mentioned, in those 11 animals which have the capacity for local movement, in which all five senses are also clearly present. In fact, even the mole-rat, he says, which has the capacity for local movement, admittedly does not wear its visual capacity and its eyes on the outside and openly, but does have them on the inside, beneath its skin, he says, in order that no sense should be lacking even in it, but it should have them all, since it has full animative development. And if its eyes do not protrude outwards, but are hidden and concealed on the inside, this, too, has been devised by nature in accordance with reason: for eyes are of no use to an ensouled creature that spends its life digging beneath the earth, which is what the mole-rat is. And what is not reasonable and useful is not customary for nature. Following this, he says that nor is there any other special kind 12 of sense perception besides the five [familiar ones] for the features jointly observed in addition to these, namely, motion, rest, shape, magnitude and number. For these features – as was also determined in the preceding chapters – are jointly observed in connection with the [special] perceptible objects; and it seems that each of them is not in itself perceptible by any individual sense, but is so coincidentally, and that what is in itself perceptible within the ambit of each sense is a distinct thing, while the features here referred to are coincidentally observed in addition to each of the perceptible objects. For motion and rest are alternately observed in the visible object (that is, colour); and the visible object is sometimes seen to be in motion and sometimes at rest, but is also seen, to be sure, as a magnitude (for everything that is moved is continuous), and is further also seen and apprehended as a number (that is, as countable), whether as one or as two or as any other number. And just as each of these features is observed in connection with sight, so it is also in connection with hearing and the other kinds of sense perception (in accordance with the analysis of these things, as I said, in the preceding chapters). Perhaps, then, he says, someone will suggest that there might be 13 a special sense that the animals lack for this kind of feature which is coincidentally observed jointly with the other senses. But this is not the case, he says, since it is [in fact] not coincidentally that these features are observed and that perception of them occurs within the ambit of each of the [five familiar] senses either. For these features, too, are perceptible by each sense in so far as they modify the sense somehow, and each sense apprehends them efficaciously in connection with the proper perceptible objects within its ambit. With a coincidental object it does not work like that, but in some other way, for it does not produce anything that is additionally discerned in the

3–11 cf. Them. 81.8–11; Ps.-Phlp. 450.21–27; 453.6–10. 26–253.29 cf. Them. 81.18–82.18. 26–28 he says: Aristotle does not, in fact, say that someone will suggest this hypothesis (he just refutes it), but so does Ps.-Philoponus (453.31–33; cf. Them. 81.18–22).

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συμβεβηκός, καὶ κατ’ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τρόπους οὐ δραστικῶς ἐστιν ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ὑφ’ ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς ὅταν ὑπὸ τῆς ὁράσεως καταληφθείη τόδε τι μὴ μόνον ὡς ξανθὸν ὁρατὸν ἀλλ’ ἔτι καὶ πικρὸν ἢ γλυκύ· συμβαίη γὰρ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον αἰσθητὸν τῇ μὲν ὄψει καταληφθῆναι ξανθὸν ᾗ ὁρατόν, τῇ δὲ γεύσει πικρὸν ἢ γλυκὺ ᾗ γευστόν. ὡς μὲν οὖν μία καθόλου ἡ αἴσθησις – μία γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἡ αἰσθητικὴ τοῦ ζῴου δύναμις – κατ’ ἀμφότερα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀντιλαμβάνεται, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῇ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ὡς ξανθὸν καὶ πικρὸν ἢ γλυκύ· ὡς δὲ ὁρατὸν τὸ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μέν ἐστιν αἰσθητὸν ὡς ξανθόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τῇ ὁράσει αἰσθητὸν καὶ ὡς γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ξανθὸν εἶναι καὶ γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, κατ’ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν καταλαμβανόμενον – μᾶλλον 15 δὲ τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει καθόλου, ὡς εἴρηται, θεωρούμενον. καὶ εἷς μὲν οὗτος τρόπος τοῦ V164r κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητοῦ· ἕτερος δὲ ὡς ὅταν φαίη τις | τὸ προσιὸν καὶ ὁρώμενον εἶναι λευκόν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος υἱόν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὁρατόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ Κλέωνος εἶναι υἱόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷδε τῷ λευκῷ ὁρατῷ σώματι Κλέωνος εἶναι υἱόν, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν συμβῆναι ἂν ἴσως καὶ λευκὸν ὁτιοῦν ἰδόντα ὑπονοεῖν ὅτι Κλέωνός ἐστιν υἱός· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατᾶσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τρόποις τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ὑπονοεῖν ψευδῶς τὸ θεωρούμενον τόδε ξανθὸν εἶναι ὅπερ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ποτε πρότερον ᾐσθάνθη ὡς γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, μὴ ὄν γε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς· ἔστιν ὡσαύτως καὶ ἰδόντα τόδε τι τὸ λευκὸν ὑπονοεῖν εἶναι ὃ πρότερον κατενόησε, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Κλέωνος, μὴ ὄντα, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι ὄντα. ὡς γὰρ εἴρηται καὶ διώρισται, οὐκ ἔστι διατίθεσθαι – ἤτοι ὡς αἴσθησιν πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι – τὴν ὅρασιν ὡς ὑπὸ ὁρατοῦ τοῦ φαινομένου ξανθοῦ ᾗ γλυκὺ ἢ πικρόν, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ φαινομένου 16 λευκοῦ ᾗ Κλέωνός ἐστιν υἱός. τά γε μὴν ἀνωτέρω εἰρημένα κοινῶς ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ προσκρίνεται ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει οὐχ ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους δύο τρόπους τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀντιλαμβάνεται γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστη τις αἴσθησις – ἤτοι τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰρημένων – ᾗ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἑκάστην αἰσθητόν· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ταῦτα αἰσθητὰ ταῖς διαληφθείσαις πέντε αἰσθήσεσιν, ὡς εἶναί τινα ἰδίαν μὲν αὐτῶν αἴσθησιν, λανθάνειν

1 ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ transp. M A 2 ὑφ’ ] ἐφ’ M || ὡς om. M A 3 καταληφθείη ] καταληφθῇ exspectaveris 10 ἢ ] καὶ A 12 ὅταν V1sl || φαίη ] φῇ exspectaveris 14 εἶναι1 —τῷδε vix leguntur in V || εἶναι υἱόν¹ transp. M 15 ἂν vix legitur in V 17 τόδε ] τὸ δὲ M A 19 ἔστιν ] ἔστι δ’ malim 20 γὰρ om. A 22 ὑπὸ¹ supplevi || ἢ ] ἧ M A 28 ἰδίαν μὲν transp. A

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sense itself either. Rather, there are two ways in which an object is observed coinciden- 14 tally, and in neither of these does an efficacious apprehension of it by the individual sense take place. For it is coincidental, for instance, in case this individual thing is apprehended by sight not only as a yellow visible object but also as bitter or sweet. For it may coincidentally happen to the same perceptible object to be apprehended by sight as yellow in so far as it is visible, but by taste as bitter or sweet in so far as it is tasteable. In so far, then, as sense perception is one general capacity (for the perceptive capacity of the animal is a single one for all the sense organs), it apprehends the same object in both ways, and this object is perceptible by it both as yellow and as bitter or sweet; but as a visible object the same thing is in itself perceptible as yellow, although coincidentally it is also perceptible by sight as sweet or bitter, since it is a coincidental fact that the same thing is both yellow and sweet or bitter, according as it is apprehended within the ambit of one sense or another – or rather, as stated, as it is observed by the single general capacity for sense perception. This is one type of 15 coincidentally perceptible object: the other is, for instance, in case someone says that what is approaching and being seen is (a) white and also (b) Cleon’s son. For being Cleon’s son does not belong to it in so far as it is visible; rather, being Cleon’s son is a coincidental feature of this white visible body, so that it might happen for this reason that one who sees something white supposes that it is Cleon’s son. For with both of the aforementioned types of coincidentally [perceptible object] it is possible sometimes to be deceived with regard to one’s perception, and to suppose wrongly that this yellow object of observation is the same thing that was on a previous occasion also perceived by one’s taste as sweet or bitter, although it is not really this thing; in the same way it is also possible to suppose, on seeing this individual white thing, that it is the thing that one noticed earlier, namely, Cleon’s son, although it is not, but is something else. For, as has been stated and determined, it is not possible for the sense of sight to be modified (that is, affected and altered as a sense), in the way that it is by a visible object, by that which appears as yellow, in so far as this is sweet or bitter, or by that which appears as white, in so far as this is Cleon’s son. It is [in fact] not coincidentally, in either 16 of the two senses of “coincidental” that have been distinguished, that those features that were said above to be coincidental objects of joint perception are additionally discerned by the individual sense. For the individual sense apprehends them – that is, motion, shape and the other objects mentioned – in so far as they are perceptible within the ambit of the relevant sense itself. The consequence is that these things cannot be coincidentally perceptible objects of the five senses distinguished, in such a way that there would exist some special sense for them, but this would be unrecog-

7–8 cf. Prisc. 185.32–186.2.

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δὲ καὶ ἐλλείπειν τοῖς ζῴοις. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἑκάστη αἴσθησις ἓν ἔχει τι τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν αἰσθητόν (οἷον ἡ ὄψις τὸ χρῶμα, ἡ ἀκοὴ τὸν ψόφον, ἡ ἁφὴ ὡς ἓν τὰς παθητικὰς αὐτὰς καλουμένας ποιότητας, εἰ καὶ διάφοροί εἰσι), καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλῃ, ὡς διώρισται, τὰ κατ’ 17 αὐτὰς αἰσθητά. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ εἰρημένα ὥς τι αἰσθητὸν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἓν ὑποκείμενον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἀγνοουμένῃ καὶ ἐλλειπούσῃ ἴσως, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ θεωρούμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων (καθὼς εἴρηται ἡμῖν, ἐν δυσὶ τρόποις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), ἐπειδὴ δραστικῶς αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ ὡς τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ἑκάστη αἴσθησις τῶν πέντε, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀλλοτρίας αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσεως. τὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων – εἴτουν τὰ ἀλλότρια – ἐστὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν· ὃ V164v δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριον ἀλλ’ ὡς ἑκάστῃ ἴδιον καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ θεωρεῖται | αἰσθητόν, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχει ταῦτα τὰ κοινῶς ἐν ταῖς πέντε αἰσθήσεσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἰδίαν τινὰ ἀγνοουμένην αἴσθησιν. 18

Ὅτι ζητεῖ ἑξῆς διατί μὴ μία αἴσθησις ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ πλείους, καί φησιν ἐπιλυόμενος τὴν τοιαύτην ζήτησιν· ἵνα μὴ τὰ προειρημένα κοινὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς θεωρούμενα δόξειεν ἴσως οὐχ ὡς κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ὡσαύτως θεωρούμενα, ἀλλ’ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὡς ἕν τι αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον τῇ αἰσθήσει (οἷον τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτὸ ὡς ἕν τι, καὶ τἄλλα δηλονότι ὡσαύτως). νῦν γὰρ δή, οὕτω πολλῶν οὐσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἐν πάσαις τῶν αὐτῶν θεωρουμένων, δῆλον γίνεται μὴ ὡς ἕν τι αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον ἡστινοσοῦν αἰσθήσεως ταῦτα καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κοινῶς, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐφ’ ἑκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως θεωρεῖσθαι. * *

*

2 ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A 6 τὸ ] τοῦ malim (ut supra v. 252.25) 16 καὶ ἀκόλουθα post κοινὰ εἶναι v. 15 collocare velim (secundum Arist. 425b 5–6) || ὡς om. A || τι correxi : τί codd. 17 τι ] τί M A 18 τι ] τί M A 20 τῶν om. M A 13–20 425b 4–11

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nized and lacking in animals. For it has been stated that each sense has some unique object that is perceptible within its ambit, as for instance sight has colour, hearing has sound, and touch has the qualities that, taken as one, are called passive, even if they are different. And the objects perceptible within their ambits are different for different senses, as has been determined. No, the features mentioned cannot be some unique, 17 in itself perceptible, object of some unrecognized and perhaps even missing sense, which is nevertheless coincidentally observed in connection with the other kinds of sense perception (as we have mentioned, there are two ways in which something can be coincidental), since each of the five senses apprehends each [of the features mentioned] efficaciously and as it is in itself, not as something alien and perceptible by an alien sense. For the senses are able to perceive each others’ perceptible objects – that is, the alien ones – coincidentally; but what is observed not as an alien but a special object, perceptible in itself, of any individual sense, that is not coincidental. The upshot is that there exists no unrecognized special sense for these features, which are jointly [perceived] in the five kinds of sense perception, as stated. [Note] that he next inquires why there is not one sense in us but several, and to 18 resolve this inquiry he says: in order to avoid the possibility that the aforementioned joint features observed in addition to the [special] perceptible objects should appear not to be joint and concomitant features observed in connection with several [perceptible objects] alike, but rather to be the same and to belong to the sense as a single perceptible object (for instance, shape and magnitude itself [would appear to belong to the sense] as a single object, and the others likewise, of course). For as it is, since the kinds of sense perception are of this number and the same features are observed in connection with all of them, it becomes clear that these features are not apprehended as a single perceptible object belonging to some sense or other, but are observed jointly, as stated, in connection with the respective perceptible objects of each respective sense. * *

*

1–5 cf. Prisc. 184.11–14. 17–27 cf. Them. 82.39–83.3; Ps.-Phlp. 461.22–26; 462.11–20. 8–9 as we have mentioned, there are two ways in which something can be coincidental: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “in [either of the] two senses of ‘coincidental’ that we have mentioned”. 19 and concomitant: these two words have been translated here, in accordance with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, rather than after “the same” in the next line, which is where they are found in the transmitted text. 19–20 [perceptible objects]: or, perhaps, [kinds of sense perception], as below.

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Ὅτι, ἐπειδή, φησίν, αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ καταλαμβάνομεν ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὅτι ἀκούομεν, ζητητέον πότερον τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσθήσει ᾗ ὁρῶμεν, ταύτῃ καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν – παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν – ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. ἀνάγκῃ γὰρ ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑαυτῆς αἰσθήσεται (εἴ γε τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσθήσει ᾗ ὁρᾶν ἐστι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὅτι ὁρᾷ), ἢ δύο αἰσθήσεις τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθήσονται, ἤτοι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ χρώματος – ἥ τε αἴσθησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ κριτικὴ αἴσθησις ὅτι ὁρᾷ· ἀδύνατον γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ὅτι ὁρᾷ, μὴ αἰσθανόμενον καὶ εἰδότα αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητόν, εἴτουν τὸ χρῶμα. ἔτι, εἰ ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει κρινούσῃ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ταύτης ὡσαύτως ἔσται τις ἑτέρα κριτικὴ αἴσθησις, καὶ ἔτι ταύτης ἑτέρα καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰς ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἡ κρίνουσα ὁτὲ καὶ ἀντιλαμβανομένη τοῦ κρινομένου ὡς αἰσθητοῦ. ὥστε τοῦτο, φησί, λογιστέον μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη εὐθὺς πρώτως, ὡς τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσθήσει ἐστὶ καὶ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ χρώματος – καὶ κρίνειν ὅτι ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν προσίσταται ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ εἶναι ταῦτα ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. | [4] ἀλλὰ φήσειέ τις ἂν ἴσως ὅτι τὸ τῇ ὄψει ὑποκείμενον αἰσθητόν – εἴτουν ὁρατόν – χρῶμά ἐστιν, ὥστε εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ κρίνομεν καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν αἴσθησιν – ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα δηλονότι, εἴτουν ὁρῶμεν – ᾗ καὶ ὁρῶμεν, ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις χρῶμα. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἐλέγχων καὶ ἀνατρέπων αὖθίς φησιν ὅτι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐστι τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐδὲ μονοτρόπως ἀεί· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει καὶ οὕτως ἐνίοτε αἰσθανόμεθα οὐ μόνον φωτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ σκότους (καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι προείρηται ὡς ἡ αἴσθησις αὕτη οὐ τοῦ διαφανοῦς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σκότους ἐστίν)· ὥστε οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ οὐδὲν ἰσχυρὸν τὸ εἰρημένον εἰς ἀνατροπήν. ἄλλως τέ φησιν οὐδὲ ἄτοπον τὸ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν λέγειν κεχρωματίσθαι

1 καὶ² M1sl 3 ἑτέρᾳ ] ἕτερα (ut vid.) A 4 ᾗ ] ἦ M || αἰσθάνεσθαί ] ἐσθάνεσθαι M 6 ἥ ] ἤ M 7 εἰδότα ] ἰδόντα M A 7–8 αἰσθητόν scripsi : αἰσθανόμενον codd. 9 ἔσται V1sl 11 μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη ] ἂν εἴη μάλιστα M A 15 εἰ M1pc (ex ἠ) 17 αὖθίς ] ὁ ἀριστοτέλης add. A 17–18 αἰσθάνεσθαι—ὄψει om. A 21 ἀλλὰ ] ἀλλ’ M A 22–258.1 λέγειν κεχρωματίσθαι πως ] κεχρωματίσθαι πως λέγειν M A 1–8 425b 12–15 8–13 425b 15–17 13–16 425b 17–20 16–22 425b 20–22

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[Note] that since, he says, we perceive and apprehend that we see and that we hear, we must investigate whether it is with the same sense with which we see that we also perceive that we see, or with another sense, and similarly also in the case of hearing. For necessarily either the sense itself will perceive itself (if, that is, perceiving that one sees belongs to the same sense to which seeing belongs), or else the same perceptible object will be perceived by two senses: for instance, the visible object – that is, colour – will be perceived both by its own sense and by the sense capable of discerning that one sees. For it is impossible to perceive and apprehend that one sees without perceiving and being aware of the perceived object itself (that is, the colour). Further, if it is by means of another sense’s discernment that we perceive that we see, then, by the same token, there will be another sense capable of discerning this sense, and yet another sense capable of discerning this, and so on ad infinitum. But if not, it will be the same sense that alternately discerns [that we perceive] and apprehends the object of discernment as a perceptible object. Therefore, he says, this must be precisely what we should immediately gather in the first place, that it belongs to the same sense both to apprehend the visible object (that is, the colour), and to discern that it sees, and there is nothing to preclude these capacities inhering in the same sense in different ways. But perhaps someone will say that what belongs to sight as a perceptible – that is, visible – object is colour, and that consequently, if it is with the same sense with which we also see that we also discern the perception itself (that is to say, the fact that we are perceiving, that is, seeing), then the perception is a colour. To refute and demolish this objection, however, he states again that it is obvious that perception by sight is not a simple thing and not always of a single type. For even when we do not see, we nevertheless sometimes perceive by sight not only light but also darkness (it was also mentioned in the previous chapters that sight is not only the perception of what is transparent but also of darkness). Consequently, the perception is not of the same type in these cases, but different in each case, and the objection is unable to withstand demolition. Besides, he says, it is not absurd to say that the eye itself is

22–24 cf. Them. 83.22–24. 28–259.1 cf. Them. 83.26. 8–9 without perceiving and being aware of the perceived object itself : in this clause the same participial form (aisthanómenon) occurs both in the predicate, where it has its usual medial sense (“perceiving”), and as an object, where it must be taken, rather more exceptionally, in a passive sense (“perceived object”). 23–24 I have disregarded the punctuation of the MSS (no punctuation after horōmen; high dot [V] or comma [M] after ópsei), although it seems the most natural one in view of the word order, in favour of an interpretation that makes more sense both in the immediate context and as a paraphrase of the Aristotelian text in 425b 20–22. With the punctuation of the MSS one would have to translate: “For even when we do not see with our sight, we nevertheless sometimes perceive not only light but also darkness …”. 28 the eye: the Greek word (borrowed from Themistius) is ópsis, which is also used, in the context of the wider argument, of the visual sense: cf. the note to 2.7.3.

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πως, εἴτουν ἐν χρώματος εἶναι μετουσίᾳ· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται, δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ τὸ αἰσθητόν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀντιλαμβάνηται, ὅπερ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τρόπον τινὰ γίνεται· δεκτικὸν γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. διό, φησί, καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐναπομένουσι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, ὡς καταλαμβάνειν ἔστι πολλάκις, αἱ αὐτῶν αἰσθήσεις, καί εἰσι καὶ αὐτῶν ἀπόντων φαντασίαι πως αὐτῶν ἐοικυῖαι τρόπον τινὰ ταῖς φανταστικαῖς ἁπλῶς ἀνατυπώσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις· ἐναπομένει γάρ, ὡς εἴρηται, κἀνταῦθα ἐνίοτε, καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἡ αὐτοῦ αἴσθησις. ἔστι δέ, φησίν, ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ αἴσθησις τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ πάντως ἕν, τῇ σχέσει δὲ διάφορα, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρούμενα· οἷον ὁ ψόφος, φησίν, ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἀκοή· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό ἐστι καὶ ἓν πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρεῖται· ὅταν δὲ δυνάμει ταῦτα ᾖ – ἔστι γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοὴ καὶ δυνάμει ψόφος, ὅταν δηλονότι ψοφητικόν τι ὂν οὐ ψοφῇ ἀλλ’ ἠρεμῇ – τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ κεχωρισμένα εἰσί, τὰ κατὰ τὸ δυνάμει θεωρούμενα. ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ ὁ ψόφος καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἀκοή, ταυτόν, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰσὶ καὶ ἅμα εἰσὶν ἥ τε ἀκοὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν· ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτὴ θεωρουμένη ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκοῇ, οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι τὴν ἀκοήν, τῷ ψοφητικῷ, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει εἴρηται, ὅτι ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ καὶ πάσχοντί ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ δρῶντι εἰς ἄλλο· | δι’ ἥντινα δὴ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθὼς καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει διώρισται. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, δύο μὲν οὕτω ταῦτα, ἥ τε ψόφησις καὶ ἡ ἀκοή, εἴτουν «ἄκουσις», ὡς φησίν, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρούμενα, καὶ ὡς ἓν πάλιν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. καὶ καθόλου γε ὡσαύτως οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς μόνης ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχοντος, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐ τοῦ δρῶντος αἰσθητοῦ. ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν ἔστι καὶ ὀνομαστικῶς ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρων χρῆσθαι (οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ), ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν· οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ «ψόφησις» ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ – ἤτοι τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ – καὶ «ἄκουσις» ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς αἰ-

4 ἀπελθόντων ] φησὶ add. M 9 ἐνεργείᾳ M2?pc : ἐνέργεια Mac A 14 ὁ om. M 16 αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκοῇ ] τῆ ἀκοῆ αὐτῆ M A || καὶ om. M A 18 δι’ ἥντινα ] διήντινα M || τὴν delere volueris, sed cf. 1.3.22; 1.5.28; 2.2.15 20 ἥ ] ἤ M 4–8 425b 24–25

8–14 425b 26–29 14–19 425b 29–426a 6

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24–260.6 426a 11–15

18–19 ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει : fort. Ph. 8.5,

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somehow coloured either (that is, that it has a share in colour). For, in accordance with the delineation of this in the previous chapters, the sense organ is itself potentially the same thing as the perceptible object, and whenever it actually apprehends the latter it becomes, in a certain way, the same thing as the perceptible object. For it is capable of receiving the visible object without its matter. This is why, he says, the perceptions of visible objects remain in the sense organs even after the visible objects have been removed, as can often be observed, and even when the latter are absent there are somehow images of them that in a certain way resemble those impressions and conceptions that are imaginary without qualification. For, as mentioned, here, too, the perception of the perceptible object sometimes remains even when the perceptible object is not present. The activity of the perceptible object, he says, relative to the sense organ, and the actual perception of the perceptible object, are entirely one with respect to what underlies them, although different with respect to their relation, according as they are considered under one aspect or the other; as for instance, he says, an actual sound and the hearing of it: for it is one and the same entity, but considered under one aspect or the other. But when these things exist potentially – for there is a potential hearing and a potential sound, namely, when something which has the capacity to sound does not sound but is silent – these kinds of things, which are considered under their potential aspect, are separate. In contrast, when the sound is actual and the hearing is actual, then the hearing and the audible object are the same, as mentioned, and simultaneous. But the activity itself is manifested in the hearing, not in the thing capable of sounding, which produces the hearing, in accordance with what is also stated in the Physics, namely, that the motion inheres in that which is moved and affected, not in that which is productive [of motion] and has an effect on something else. For this reason it is not necessary, either, for everything that produces motion also to be moved – this, too, in accordance with what is laid down in the Physics. Anyway, what we were saying was that these [activities], the sounding and the hearing, or “hearkening”, as he puts it, are two in this sense, namely, in so far as they are considered under one aspect or the other; and, on the other hand, they are one with respect to what underlies them. And the same applies in general, not only to hearing, but to every sense capacity: the perception and its activity belongs to the thing that is affected, as stated, not to the efficient perceptible object. But in some cases it is also possible to apply names [to the activities] on both sides (namely, on the side of the perception and on the side of the perceptible object), while in other cases it is not: for instance, in the case of hearing, the “sounding” on the side of the perceptible – that is, audible – object and

11–16 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 469.34–470.3; 475.9–11 (although he makes no mention of the sense organ); Prisc. 191.8–15. 16–21 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 471.19–30. 21–24 cf. Them. 84.4–6; Prisc. 192.25–27. 24–25 cf. Them. 84.7–9.

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σθήσεως, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὄψεως «ὅρασιν» μὲν λέγειν ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀνωνύμως δὲ ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ (εἴτουν τοῦ χρώματος)· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα ἀντιδιαστελλομένους λέγειν ὁπῃοῦν ὀνομαστικῶς, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐλέγετο οὐ μόνον ἡ «ἄκουσις» ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ «ψόφησις». καὶ «γεῦσις» μὲν ὡσαύτως ἐστὶ τοῦ γευστικοῦ, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γευστοῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ χυμοῦ – ἔστιν ὀνομασία τις παραπλησίως ὥσπερ τοῦ ψοφη11 τικοῦ – εἴτουν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ – εἴρηται ἡ «ψόφησις». καὶ μήν γε, φησίν, ἐπεὶ μία ἐστίν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἡ ἐνέργεια ἥ τε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, κἂν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως πρὸς ἑκάτερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἅμα φθείρεσθαι ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητικόν· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς· τὰ δέ γε δυνάμει αἰσθητά, ὡς διώρισται, καὶ αἰσθητικὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαίνεσθαί τε 12 καὶ φθείρεσθαι· δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι λευκὸν καὶ ἄνευ ὁράσεως. καὶ διατοῦτό φησι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἐνίους τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσιολόγων περὶ τούτων οἰηθῆναί τε καὶ ἐρεῖν, ἀδύνατον εἰπόντας εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτω καὶ ἀορίστως αἰσθητὸν ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως· οἷον οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὔτε χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως, οὔτε ἁπτὸν ἄνευ ἁφῆς· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐνεργείᾳ θεωρουμένων αἰσθητῶν ὀρθῶς τοῦτ’ ἔχει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν 13 θεωρουμένων οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς, φησίν, οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ λέγειν τὸ ἡνωμένον αὐτῶν καὶ ἄτμητον, καὶ μὴ διορίζεσθαι ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶνδε οὕτως ἔχει, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶνδε οὐχ οὕτως, οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτοῖς ἔδοξεν οὐδ’ ἐρρέθη. V166r

| [14] Ὅτι ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου αἰσθητοῦ λόγος τίς ἐστι καὶ κρᾶσις ἡ προσήκουσα καὶ πεφυκυῖα αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν. καὶ τοῦτό γε δῆλον ἀπὸ μιᾶς, καὶ ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ἔχει, οὕτω δηλονότι καὶ ἐπὶ πασῶν· ἡ γὰρ συμφωνία πάντως τῶν μελῶν ἀκουστῶν ὄντων φωνή τίς ἐστι καὶ ἀκοή (ταῦτα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἕν εἰσι, τὸ δὲ ὡς δύο, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως θεωρούμενα)· ἡ συμφωνία δὲ λόγος τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον·

2 ἐπὶ A1pc (ex ἐπεὶ) 7 κἂν ] καὶ add. Vac (erasum) 10 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 14 οὕτω ] οὕτως M A 15 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς Α 17 φησίν A1sl 18–19 ση′ adn. Mmarg 18 διορίζεσθαι ] διωρίζεσθαι M A 19 ἐρρέθη ] ἐρέθη V 20 κρᾶσις ] κράσις V 22 δηλονότι om. M A 24 ἔστι ] ἔστιν A || δῆλον A1sl 6–12 426a 15–19 12–19 426a 20–26

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the “hearkening” on the side of the perception itself are the same, whereas in the case of sight one can speak of “seeing” on the side of the perception, but [the activity] is nameless on the side of the perceptible object (that is, the colour). For in the latter case it is not possible to contrast the two by applying any sort of name, in the way that in the former case not only the name of “hearkening” but also that of “sounding” were used. In the same way, “tasting” belongs to the capacity for taste, but still there is no designation for the object of taste – that is, the flavour – to be used in a similar sense to that of “sounding” in the case of that which is capable of sounding (that is, the audible object). Moreover, he says, since, as mentioned, the activity of that which is capable 11 of sense perception and the activity of the perceptible object are one, albeit related to the respective [capacities] in different ways, it is necessary that these both exist, or appear, simultaneously and disappear simultaneously, the one as an actualized object of sense perception and the other as an actualized capacity for sense perception. And this holds true in the case of sight as well as hearing, smelling, taste and touch. It is not, however, necessary that potential objects of sense perception, as they have been described, and potential capacities of sense perception appear and disappear simultaneously. For it is possible [for something] to be white even in the absence of sight. And he says that this is the reason why some of the natural philosophers be- 12 fore him neither viewed nor stated the matter correctly when they said without any qualification or restriction that it is impossible for there to be a perceptible object in the absence of sense perception: [that,] for instance, [there can be] neither white nor black in the absence of sight, no flavour in the absence of taste and no tangible object in the absence of touch. For this is correct as far as it concerns perceptible objects considered as existing in actuality, but incorrect regarding those which are considered as existing in potentiality. This is why he also says that in believing and professing with- 13 out qualification that these things are unified and indivisible, and in failing to make a distinction to the effect that this applies to some of them but not to others, they were wrong in their opinion as well as their wording. [Note] that the perception of each perceptible object is a kind of ratio or a temper- 14 ing of the perceptible object itself, which is appropriate and naturally suited for the perception of it. This is clear, at any rate, from one case of perception, and what applies to this evidently applies to all cases. For the consonance of melodies, which are audible objects, is undoubtedly a vocal sound and a hearing (for these are on the one hand one, on the other hand two, according as they are considered under one aspect

17–18 cf. Them. 84.22.

29–263.8 cf. Them. 84.24–34.

27 this : sc. the necessity of simultaneous appearance and disappearance, or “mutual implication”.

262 | Theodoros Metochites

ἐν λόγῳ γὰρ καθίσταται πᾶσα συμφωνία· ὥστε λόγος ἂν εἴη αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἤτοι ἡ 15 φωνή, εἴτουν ἡ ἀκοή. καὶ λοιπὸν ἄρα, τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐκπίπτουσα μέτρου καὶ ὑπερ-

βάλλουσα ἢ ἐλλείπουσα, οὐκ ἔχει τι πάντως ἀνύειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνενέργητός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ μέτρου, ἢ καὶ φθαρτική, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων αὖθις τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ προσῆκον μέτρον· φθείρει γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, οἷον τό τε ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρὺ τὴν ἀκοήν, καὶ παραπλησίως ἐν τοῖς χυμοῖς τὴν γεῦσιν τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ τὴν ὄψιν τὸ ὑπέρλαμπρον καὶ τὸ ζοφερόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς 16 ὀσφρήσεως ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς. καὶ τοίνυν τὰ κεκραμένα καὶ κατὰ λόγον πως ἔχοντα αἰσθητὰ ἐπὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως αἰσθητά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἡδέα (ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις τρόπον τινὰ λόγος ἐστί), τὰ δ’ ἄλλως ἔχοντα καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέτρον λυπεῖ ἢ καὶ φθείρει. Ὅτι, βουλόμενος προχωρήσας ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι μία ἐστὶ καθόλου ἡ αἴσθησις, εἴτουν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις, κἂν ἐν διαφόροις αἰσθητηρίοις καταλαμβάνηται, φησὶν ὡς ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον, αἴσθησιν καὶ ἀντίληψιν ἔχον τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ, καταλαμβάνει πάντως τὰς αὐτοῦ διαφοράς (οἷον ἡ ὀπτικὴ τὰς τοῦ χρώματος διαφοράς, ἤτοι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ ἡ ἀκουστικὴ ὡσαύτως τὰς τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ διαφοράς, ἤτοι τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραπλησίως αὐτὰ τὰ διάφορα αἰσθητά, ἤτοι τὰ ὑποκείμενα ταῖς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεσι), τίνι ἄρα καταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα ἔστι, καὶ ποία ταῦτα καταλαμβάνει αἴσθησις, ἤγουν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ εὔοσμον καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰ διάφορα τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεων ὑποκείμενα; εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς τούτων 18 ἕκαστον αἰσθητόν ἐστι, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀντιληπτική. καὶ τοίνυν, φησίν, ἀνάγκη μίαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτῶν αἴσθησιν, ὡς ἑνὸς αἰσθητοῦ ἐν διαφόροις τοῖς εἴδεσι θεωρουμένου· ἡ γὰρ αὐτή, ἔοικεν, ἄλλη τις οὖσα παρὰ τὰς φαινομένας κατὰ μέρος αἰv V166 σθήσεις, αἰσθάνεται τῶν διαφόρων εἰρημένων | αἰσθητῶν (οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ 19 γλυκέος καὶ τοῦ εὐόσμου), καὶ εἴη ἂν μία ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου. εἰ δὲ μή, φησίν, εἰ ἑτέρα

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or the other). But a consonance is a kind of ratio, as is evident, for all consonance consists in a ratio. So the perception itself, that is, the vocal sound, or, alternatively, the hearing, must be a ratio. It follows, then, that if [the perception] falls outside of the 15 appropriate measure either by excess or by deficiency, it cannot accomplish anything at all, but either it remains completely inactive, as in the case of those [perceptible objects] which fall short of the ratio and the measure, or it is even destructive, as in the case of those [perceptible objects] which, in contrast, exceed this ratio and the appropriate measure. For each excessive thing is destructive: for instance, high and low pitch destroys the hearing, and similarly what is excessive in the domain of flavours destroys the sense of taste, what is exceedingly brilliant and what is tenebrous destroy the sight, and the same applies also in the case of smell as well as in that of touch. Accordingly, those perceptible objects which are tempered and based on some 16 kind of ratio are perceptible and pleasant in every case of perception, for perception is, in a way, a ratio, whereas things that are not based on a ratio or a measure cause pain or even destruction. [Note] that, as he moves on, he wants to demonstrate that sense perception – that 17 is, the perceptive capacity – as a whole is one, even if the apprehension takes place in different sense organs. Accordingly, he says that since it is inevitably each particular sense organ – having as it does perception and apprehension of its own proper perceptible object – that apprehends the differentiating qualities of this object (as for instance the visual capacity apprehends the differentiating qualities of colour, namely, white and black, and in the same way the auditory capacity apprehends the differentiating qualities of the audible object, namely, high and low pitch, and similarly the other perceptive capacities apprehend the different perceptible objects, that is, the objects of the respective particular senses), with what, then, is it possible to apprehend these objects, or what kind of sense capacity is it that apprehends them, namely, white, sweet, fragrant and, in general, as mentioned, the different objects belonging to the respective particular senses? For it is perfectly clear that each of these is a perceptible object, and what is capable of apprehending perceptible objects is a sense capacity. Accordingly, he says, it is necessary that the sense capacity correlated with 18 these objects is a single one, just as though it were correlated with a single perceptible object manifested in different kinds. For it seems likely that it is the same sense capacity, which is another one besides the apparent particular senses, that perceives the different perceptible objects mentioned (for instance white, sweet and fragrant), and so it must be a single one for each single animal. Otherwise, he says, if it were dis- 19

25–26 to apprehend these objects: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “to apprehend these objects as different”.

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καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη καὶ χωριζομένη, παραπλήσιον ἂν εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ τοῦδε αἰσθάνομαι καὶ σὺ τοῦδε· ἄλλου γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου ἂν εἴη· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ αἴσθησίς τίς ἐστι μία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ζῴῳ τοῦ τε λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὀξέος ἢ βαρέος, εἴτουν τῶν διαφόρων ὑποκειμένων· αἰσθητῶν γὰρ ὄντων αὐτῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ αἴσθησίς τίς ἐστιν αὐτῶν 20 ἀντιληπτικὴ μία. καὶ ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι, φησίν, ἐλέγετο, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἡ σὰρξ εἴη τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον τῆς ἁφῆς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἁπτικὴ δύναμις, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι τὸ πρῶτον ἔσωθεν, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγετο. καὶ παραπλησίως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτὰ τὰ σωματοειδῆ φαινόμενα αἰσθητήρια ἐν οἷς πρώτοις ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ καταλαμβάνεται, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἔσωθεν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις (εἴτουν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις), ὑπηρετικῶς αὐτοῖς χρωμένη τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, μία τις καὶ δεσπότις, ὡς ὑπομνηματισταῖς καὶ εἰσαγγελεῦσι διαφόροις. δεῖ γάρ τι ἓν νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ μὲν λευκόν, τὸ δὲ γλυκύ, καὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον δι’ ὑπηρετήσεων διαφόρων ἱκνούμενον ἢ μᾶλλον τὰ ἔξωθεν δεχόμενον καὶ δογματίζον καὶ κρῖνον πάνθ’ ἕκαστα τὰ διάφορα· καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐπιγνώμοσι τὰ κεχωρισμένα ταῦτα 21 καὶ διάφορα τῷ εἴδει κρίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μήν γε, φησίν, οὐδ’ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἑνί, ἡ αἴσθησις γίνεται τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν (παρὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς κριτικοῦ, ὡς εἴρηται). ὅταν γὰρ αἰσθάνηται αὐτὴ ἡ μία καὶ κοινὴ αἴσθησις τῆς ξανθότητος καὶ τῆς γλυκύτητος τοῦ μέλιτος ἢ τῆς ψυχρότητος καὶ λευκότητος τῆς χιόνος, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ ἀνὰ μέρος αὐτῶν αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀτόμῳ τοῦ χρόνου, τῷ νῦν· καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί, ὅτε αἰσθάνεται καὶ λέγει τὸ ἕν, 22 κατὰ ταυτὸν καὶ θάτερον λέγει. καὶ οὐ λέγω, φησίν, ὅτι, ὅτε τὸ ἓν λέγω, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς νοεῖται καὶ θάτερον, ὡς καταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτὸ τὸ «ὅτε» κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ καθ’ αὑτό, λεγόμενον· οἷον, εἴποι τις ἄν νῦν «ὁ Σωκράτης εἰσάγεται εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον», καὶ νῦν μὲν λέγει τοῦτο, οὐ μὴν δὲ νῦν εἰσάγεται ὁ Σωκράτης εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ὅτι νῦν τοῦτο λέγει, ὡς ἔστι τοῦτο δῆλον· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔ-

1 παραπλήσιον M1pc (ex παραπλησίως) 4–5 αὐτῶν ἀντιληπτικὴ transp. A 9 ἐστιν om. A 10– 11 δεσπότις ] δεσπότης A 13 κρῖνον correxi : κρίνον codd. 14 κεχωρισμένοις—τὰ om. A 14– 15 κεχωρισμένα ταῦτα καὶ διάφορα ] διάφορα ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα M : κεχωρισμένα A 18 ψυχρότητος καὶ λευκότητος ] λευκότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος M A 20 τῷ² om. M || λέγει V2?pc : λέγη Vac M A 21 ταυτὸν ] ταυτὸ M A 23 καθ’ αὑτό ] κατ’ αὐτὸ M : καταυτὸ A 25 τοῦτο δῆλον transp. MA 5–7 426b 15–17 15–21 426b 23–26

21–266.6 426b 26–29

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tinct and separate sense capacities [that perceived the different perceptible objects], it would be similar to the case in which I perceive this and you perceive that, for [each sense capacity] would be correlated with a distinct object. As it is, however, this is not the case, but there is in the same animal some single sense capacity which is correlated both with white and with high or low pitch, that is, with the different underlying objects. For since the objects themselves are perceptible, as stated, there is also some single sense capacity capable of apprehending them. And what was argued in the pre- 20 vious chapters, he says, was also correct: that it cannot be the flesh that is the primary sense organ of touch, in which the capacity for touch resides; rather, the primary sense organ is something else on the inside. Much the same applies to the other senses too: it cannot be in the apparent, corporeal, sense organs that the apprehension of the sense perception primarily takes place; rather, the capacity to perceive or the sense – that is, the perceptive capacity – is something else on the inside, a unitary and sovereign sense, which employs the services of the sense organs, as if they were so many commentators and reporters. For it must be some unitary thing that conceives and asserts that the one thing is white and the other is sweet, something that arrives at the one thing after the other with the help of different services, or rather receives them from outside and delivers its verdicts and judgments on each and every different thing; and it would be impossible, as stated, for separate arbiters to pass judgment on these separate and specifically different things. Moreover, he says, nor is it at one separate 21 instant of time after another, but rather in a single instant, that the perception of the different kinds of perceptible objects takes place (on the part of a single capacity for discernment, as stated). For when the unitary and common sense capacity perceives the yellowness and the sweetness of the honey or the coldness and the whiteness of the snow, it does not perceive them one by one at distinct instants of time, but rather at the same indivisible point of time, the now; and at the same single instant at which it perceives and asserts the one object, it also simultaneously and in an undivided manner asserts the other. And I do not mean, he says, that when I assert the one ob- 22 ject the other is also being conceived of coincidentally, so that the very expression “when” is understood to be used coincidentally rather than in the true sense and in itself. For instance, someone might now say “Socrates is being led into the prison”: he does assert this now, but Socrates is not now being led into the prison just because he asserts this now, as is obvious. Rather, it is coincidental that this is the case and is asserted now. But in the present case regarding the common sense capacity corre-

10–18 cf. Them. 87.1–11; 85.29–30; 86.6; 86.30–34. 30–31 in itself : cf. Prisc. 198.9; 198.11–12; 198.19. 34–267.7 cf. Them. 85.27–30. 33–34 Presumably Metochites means that in case “now” as a modifier of the verb of saying is referring to the time at which the stated event takes place, this is “coincidental”.

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στι καὶ λέγεται νῦν. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς ταύτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν V167r κατὰ ταυτὸν καὶ ἅμα | λέγει νῦν καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἔχει. [23] ὥστε οὐ

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μόνον κοινὸν καὶ ἀχώριστον αὐτό, φησί, τὸ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ καὶ ἑνὶ τῷ χρόνῳ· καὶ μία ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντα οὕτως ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀντίληψις τῶν διαφόρων ἀγγελιῶν αἳ διὰ τῶν διαφόρων αἰσθητηρίων κατὰ ταυτὸν εἰς αὐτὴν παραπέμπονται. ἀλλὰ μήν γε, φησίν, ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεπτέον μήποτε ἀδύνατόν τι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκολουθεῖ, ἤτοι τὸ συμβαίνειν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀδιαίρετον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ οὐ μόνον διαφόρους καὶ πλείους ἅμα κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις (εἴ γε κινήσεις δοίημεν τὰς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιλήψεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίας· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῇ μιᾷ ταύτῃ καὶ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν τῆς χιόνος καταλαμβάνεται (καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέλιτι ξανθὸν διὰ τῆς κόρης καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέλιτι γλυκὺ διὰ τῆς γλώττης), ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κόρη μόνη καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἐνίοτε τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν καταλαμβάνει (ὥσπερ, ὅταν ἐν βιβλίοις τισὶν ὁρῶμεν γεγραμμένοις, διὰ μὲν τῶν γραμμάτων τοῦ μέλανος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἅμα ἀδιαιρέτως), ἃ πάντως ἐναντία ἐστί. καὶ ἔοικεν ἐπὶ μιᾶς ταύτης αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητηρίου πλεῖον εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἄτοπον – ὅπως ἅμα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀντίληψις γίνεται – ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ κοινῆς εἰρημένης αἰσθήσεως τῆς αἰσθανομένης κατὰ ταυτὸν τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν. ἐπιλῦσαι δὲ βουλόμενος τὴν περὶ τούτου ἀπορίαν πρῶτόν φησιν ὡς ἄρα ἴσως ἂν εἴη λύσις τοῦ ἀπορουμένου ἐνταῦθα ὡς τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ἕν ἐστι τῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἰς ὃ διαπέμπονται αἱ διάφοροι ἀγγελίαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ τόν γε τρόπον τοῦτον ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον ἑαυτοῦ, κατὰ τὸ εἶναι δέ, εἴτουν κατὰ τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον αὐτόν, κεχωρισμένον καὶ ὡς πλείω θεωρούμενον, καὶ ἔστι μέν πως ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον τόπῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, ἔστι δέ πως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὡς διαιρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται. ἀλλ’ οὐ προσίεταί γε μὴν τὴν τοιαύτην τοῦ ἀπορηθέντος ἐπίλυσιν, οὐδ’ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν οἴεται πρὸς τὴν πρόθεσιν· δυνάμει μὲν γάρ, φησίν, εἶναί τι διαιρετὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, ὥσπερ δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, ἅμα δέ τι ἐνεργείᾳ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἢ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι, καὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα τὰ ἐναντία ἅμα παραδέχεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν οἷόν τέ ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἄν τις εὐλογώτερον ἐνταῦθα, φησίν, ὑπολάβοι, ἐοικέναι

2 οὐ om. M 6 τούτοις ] τοῖς τοιούτοις M A 19 ἴσως ] καὶ M 22 μᾶλλον αὐτόν transp. M 23 πως¹ correxi : πῶς codd. || πως² correxi : πῶς codd. 29 ἐνταῦθα, φησίν transp. M A || ὑπολάβοι correxi : ὑπολάβη codd. 6–18 426b 29–427a 1 18–24 427a 2–5 24–29 427a 5–9 29–268.19 427a 9–16

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lated with different kinds of perceptible objects, [this sense capacity] simultaneously and at the same time not only asserts both objects now but also [asserts] that this is what their situation is now. The consequence, he says, is that not only is the sense capacity itself common and unseparated, but it is so in an unseparated, undivided and single instant of time. And thus the perceptive capacity and apprehension of the different reports that are simultaneously transmitted to it through the different sense organs is one in every respect. Furthermore, he says, in addition to this we must examine whether an impossibility does not follow from what has been stated: namely, that one and the same undivided thing, at one and the same undivided point of time, ends up being affected not only by several different motions simultaneously (if indeed we should grant that the apprehensions of perceptible objects on the part of the sense capacity are motions), but even by contrary ones. For it is not only the case that the white and the cold of the snow are apprehended by this unitary and common sense capacity (and the yellow in the honey, with the aid of the pupil, as well as the sweetness in the honey, with the aid of the tongue), but sometimes even the pupil itself, unaided and by itself, apprehends white and black (as, for instance, when we look at the writing of certain books, we apprehend the black by way of the letters, but simultaneously we apprehend, in an undivided manner, the white in the writing material), which are absolute contraries. And it would seem that the absurdity that results in the case of this single sense and sense organ – that a simultaneous apprehension of contraries takes place – is greater than that involved in the simultaneous perception of different kinds of perceptible objects by the sense capacity that was said to be unitary and common. In an attempt to resolve the problem related to this, he first says that it may perhaps be a solution to the problem raised here that the underlying and apprehending entity, to which the different reports of perceptible objects are conveyed, is one in number, and in this way undivided and unseparated from itself, while, in respect of its being, or rather, in respect of its account, it is separated and manifested as a plurality; so that it is in a way an apprehending entity in its capacity of undivided in place and number, while in another way it perceives, in the manner described, diverse objects in its capacity of divided. He does not, however, accept the suggested solution to the problem raised and does not consider it to be sufficient for its purpose. For, he says, it is possible for something to be potentially divided as well as undivided, just as the same thing can be potentially hot as well as cold, but it is not possible for something to be at the same time actually hot as well as cold, or white as well as black, and accordingly it is not possible for the sense to receive these contrary forms simultaneously either. Rather, he says, it would be more reasonable in the present case to introduce another

7–22 cf. Them. 85.30–86.4. Them. 86.18–87.16.

23–30 cf. Them. 86.4–11.

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τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν μοναδικὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῇ στιγμῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ τῷ κέντρῳ V167v τῷ ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ, | εἰς ἣν αἱ πᾶσαι ἐκ τῆς περιφερείας γραμμαὶ περατοῦνται· μία μὲν

γὰρ αὕτη ἡ στιγμή, ἅμα καὶ πλείους· μία γὰρ οὖσα ὡς κέντρον τοῦ κύκλου, ὡς πολλαὶ θεωροῦνται, ὅτι πλειόνων γραμμῶν ἐστι καὶ διαφόρων πέρας· καὶ πῇ μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτήν ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετος, πῇ δὲ διαιρετή, ὡς καθ’ ἑκάστην τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ περαινουσῶν γραμμῶν 28 θεωρουμένη. καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κρῖνον αἰσθητικὸν ὡς ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἕν ἐστι καὶ μία δύναμις, ἣν πρώτην αἰσθητικὴν καὶ πρώτην αἴσθησιν οἴεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ πολλῶν διῃρημένων ἀντιλήψεων αἰσθητῶν τέλος γινομένην, οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ καὶ κεχωρισμένα κρίνουσαν ἅμα, τὴν μίαν. καὶ οὐ πάσχουσα τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ θεωροῦσα καὶ κρίνουσα ταῦτα, ἡ ὑποδεχομένη μία πολλὰ δι’ αὐτὰ θεωρεῖται, ἀσώματος οὖσα καὶ πέρας τι ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος βεβηκυῖα, τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ, ἐξ οὗ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητήρια ὡς ἀπὸ πηγῆς ἀπορρεῖ. 29 καὶ δῆλον ὅτι μήτε ἡ ὄψις ἡ πρώτη ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κόρῃ, μήτε ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ πρώτη ἐν τοῖς ὠσί, μήτε ἡ γεῦσις ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ, μήτε αἱ ἄλλαι ἐν οἷς εἰσιν (ἤτοι ἡ ὄσφρησις καὶ ἡ ἁφή), ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ πρώτῳ. καὶ πέντε μέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, καὶ πέντε οἱονεὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς δι’ ὀργάνων ὀχετοί, ἡ δὲ κυρίως αἴσθησις καὶ πρώτως ἡ τούτοις χρωμένη· καὶ ταύτῃ πάντως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν τῇ ὄψει καὶ ὅτι ἀκούομεν τῇ ἀκοῇ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν τὴν ὄψιν, ὡς μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων μιᾷ. * *

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2 ἐκ ] αἱ A 3–6 ση′ adn. Mmarg 4 καὶ¹ om. A 5 καθ’ ἑκάστην ] καθεκάστην A 6 κρῖνον correxi : κρίνον codd. 7–8 αἴσθησιν οἴεσθαι transp. M A 10–12 ση′ adn. Amarg 14 ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A 18 τὴν ὄψιν A1pc (ut vid. ex τῆ ὄψει)

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hypothesis, namely, that this unitary capacity for sense perception is comparable to a point, or rather to the centre of a circle, at which all lines from the circumference reach their limit. For while it is one, this point is simultaneously a plurality: while it is one in its capacity of the centre of a circle, it is manifested as a plurality inasmuch as it is the limit of several different lines. So on the one hand it is in itself undivided, but on the other it is divided inasmuch as it is considered on the basis of each and every line that reaches its limit at it. Analogously, the discerning perceptive capacity, too, 28 is – inasmuch as it is in itself undivided – a singular and unitary capacity, which may be believed and said to be the primary perceptive capacity and the primary sense; but inasmuch as it becomes the end-point of many diverse apprehensions of perceptible objects, it is not impossible for the unitary capacity also to become a plurality, which simultaneously discerns a plurality of separate objects. And without being affected by the contraries, but contemplating and discerning these, the unitary sense at the receiving end is manifested as a plurality on account of these, although it is incorporeal and a sort of limit placed on the spirit, which is the primary perceptive entity, from which all the sense organs spring as from a fountainhead. And it is clear that the pri- 29 mary visual capacity does not reside in the pupil, nor the primary auditory capacity in the ears, nor the gustatory capacity in the tongue, nor the other perceptive capacities – that is, the olfactory and tactile ones – in their respective organs, but in the primary spirit. So the sense organs are five, and there are, as it were, five conduits leading the perceptive spirit from a single fountainhead through organs; but the sense capacity in its proper and primary sense is that which employs these: it is undeniably by means of this that we perceive both that we see by means of the visual capacity and that we hear by means of the auditory capacity. It is not the case, then, that we discern our sight by means of our sight, as it seemed to be a little while ago: rather, we do so by means of this general sense capacity, which is one in all its applications. * *

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Ὅτι, μετὰ τοὺς περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγους βουλόμενος ἑξῆς περὶ φαντασίας διαλαβεῖν, πρῶτον διέξεισιν ὅτι τινὲς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ταυτὸν ἐνόμισαν αἴσθησιν καὶ λόγον καὶ διάνοιαν, γνωριστικὰ καὶ κριτικὰ ὡσαύτως ὡντινωνοῦν ὄντα, μὴ κατανοήσαντες μηδὲ διαστειλάμενοι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς διάφορον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἓν ὑπονοοῦντές τι, ὅτι κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχή, φησί, καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι. καὶ τοίνυν ἐκτίθεται ῥῆσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους τοῦτο αὐτὸ δηλοῦσαν ταύτην· «πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποις», τουτέστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ παρόντος ἑκάστοτε γνῶσις ἐγγίνεται καὶ προστίθεται· τοῦτο δὲ πάντως αἰσθήσεώς ἐστι, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι. καὶ ἄλλην δὲ αὐτοῦ ῥῆσιν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σημαίνουσαν ἐκτίθεται, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον δέ φησιν ὡσαύτως βούλεσθαι καὶ δηλοῦν τὸν νοῦν συντρέπεσθαι καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι οἷς ἑκάστοτε σύνεστιν, οἱονεὶ σωματικῶς καὶ παραπλησίως τῇ αἰσθήσει διατιθέμενον· αὐτὸ γὰρ δηλοῦν ἐν οἷς φησι «τοιοῦτος νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι | πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε»· τὰ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔμφασιν παρέχει ὡς ταυτὸν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὑπολαμβανόντων αὐτῶν. ὅλως δέ, φησίν, οἱ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσικοί – καθὼς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τούτου προεῖπεν – οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σωματικὸν τὸ νοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ποιοῦσι, τῷ θιγγάνειν αἰσθανόμενον καὶ καταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἃ σωματικά ἐστι. καίτοι γέ φησιν αὐτοὺς ταῦτ’ οἰομένους καὶ λέγοντας οὐ μόνον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐντελῶς λέγειν· ὤφειλον γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἀπάτης διορίσασθαι ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ τούτου γε μᾶλλον· μάλιστα γὰρ κατακρατεῖ τοῦτο ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον τοῖς ζῴοις ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα ἐνέχεται ἡ ψυχή, ἀγνοοῦσα περὶ τῶν ὄντων πλεῖστα καὶ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλα παρὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀπατωμένη καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσα· ὥστε ἐχρῆν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαλαβεῖν καὶ διορίσασθαι. ἢ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων αὐτό τι καθ’ ἑαυτό, ὡς Πρωταγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔδοξαν, καθὼς ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ δηλοῖ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ αὐτὰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ πάντως, εἰ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς ὁμοίοις καταλαμβάνεται τῇ θίξει, τὰ ἀγνοούμενα

3 γνωριστικὰ ] γνωστικὰ M 3–4 μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. 4 διαστειλάμενοι ] διαστειλλάμενοι M 6 τοῦτο ] τοῦτ’ M A || μῆτις ] μή τις V 9 αὐτοῦ ] αὖ M A 15 φυσικοί A1pc (ut vid. ex φασι) 17 αὐτοὺς ] τοὺς add. M A 18–19 ἀπάτης ] ἁπάτης (ut vid.) A 1–8 427a 17–24 8–17 427a 24–29 17–23 cf. 427a 29–b 2 23–272.3 cf. 427b 2–5 6–7 πρὸς—ἀνθρώποις DK 31 B 106.6 12–13 Od. 18.136–137 (τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | οἷον ἐπ’ ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε) 15 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ : cf. 1.2, 404b 8–405b 30; 1.5, 409b 24–410b 15 24 ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ: cf. Tht. 151d–152e

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[Note] that, after his discussions of sense perception, he wants to treat next of imagination, and first reports that some thinkers before him held that sense perception and reason or thought are the same thing, since they are in the same way capacities for knowing and discerning whatever it may be, without understanding or spelling out the difference between them, but supposing them to be a single thing, because, he says, the soul discerns and knows some existing thing in all these cases. Accordingly, he cites the following passage from Empedocles which indicates precisely this: “For ’tis in respect of what is present that man’s wit is increased”; that is to say, knowledge is engendered and expanded by what is present on any given occasion; and this undeniably belongs to a sense capacity, to be moved by the perceptible objects that impinge upon it. He also cites another passage from him to the very same effect, and says that in the same way Homer, too, suggested and indicated that the intellect is “turned” or altered together with those things with which it co-exists on each occasion, as if it were modified corporeally and in a similar way to the sense capacity. [Aristotle says that] he indicates this in the lines where he says “the spirit of men upon the earth is such as the day which the father of gods and men brings upon them”. For such passages convey the impression that they supposed sense perception and thinking to be the same thing. In general, he says, in accordance with his previous statements on this subject in the first book, those natural philosophers before him who maintained that the soul “knows like by like” turn the intellective part of the soul into nothing but a corporeal thing, since it perceives by contact and apprehends what is like it in the things that exist, which are corporeal. However, he says, in believing and saying this they give an account that is not only not correct but not even exhaustive: for they should also have defined what kind of thing error is; indeed, it should have been a priority, for this is precisely the condition that prevails among human beings, and precisely that in which the soul of animals is caught up most of the time, since it is ignorant of very many aspects of the things that exist and at different times maintains different erroneous beliefs in conflict with the truth. Consequently, it would only have been reasonable if they had discussed and provided a definition of this, too. For either no existing thing is anything in itself, as Protagoras and certain other thinkers held, according to Plato’s indications in the Theaetetus, but the very things that appear to each individual are also what exists, or else it is inevitably the case, if like is apprehended by like through contact, that what is unknown, in which the error resides, is

8–11 cf. Them. 87.23. 11–16 cf. Them. 87.23–28; Ps.-Phlp. 486.18–21. 18–22 cf. Them. 87.29–31. 24–25 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 487.12–13. 30–31 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 487.14–16; Prisc. 202.24–25; Sophon. 116.8–9. 32– 273.4 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 487.17–25; Sophon. 116.9–11. 7–8 J. A. Smith’s translation.

15–16 A. T. Murray’s and G. E. Dimock’s translation.

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καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἕξιν ἐξανάγκης ἀγνοεῖσθαι κἀντεῦθεν τὴν ἀπάτην γίνεσθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἔχει καὶ ἀντίστροφον, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον γνωρίζειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τὸ τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἀγνοεῖν καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ, φησί, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη ἅμα τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ μία τις εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ βέλτιον καταλαμβάνων καὶ κρίνων τῇ αὐτῇ γνώσει καὶ μιᾷ ὡσαύτως τὸ ἐναντίον – ὅτι φαῦλον τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀλυσιτελές – ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὁ περὶ ἓν ὁτιοῦν ἐξαπατώμενος καὶ ἄλλως ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ ὡς ἔστι πάντως καὶ περὶ θάτερον, τοὐναντίον, ὡσαύτως καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ἐξαπατᾶται. καὶ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὁμοιοῦσθαι, ἐπειδὴ τἀναντία γινώσκομεν ἅμα, ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον ἀνομοιοῦσθαι, ὅτε περὶ τἀναντία ἀπατῶμεθα καὶ ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀμφότερα ἄτοπα καὶ ἀδύνατα· ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς ὑποτιθεμένοις τῇ ὁμοιότητι τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κριτικὸν ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν. καὶ τοίνυν ἐπιλογιζόμενός φησιν ὡς δῆλον μέν ἐστιν ὡς ἀνοίκειος αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα τῶν οἰομένων σωματοειδές τι εἶναι τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (εἴτουν τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀδιαφόρως γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆται μετ’ ὀλίγον μέλλων ἀκριβώσασθαι ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ), καὶ ὅλως ταυτὸν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι τοῖς ζῴοις, φησίν (ἤτοι | τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι), τοῦ δέ – ἤτοι τοῦ διανοητικοῦ – μόνοις ἀνθρώποις μέτεστιν. ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα, ἔνθα ἡ μετουσία καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν – ἤτοι αἰσθήσεως καὶ λόγου – κοινωνία τίς ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ διάφορον· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ λόγου καὶ διανοίας ἔστιν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἐστι τἀναντία, ψευδοδοξία καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη καὶ ἀφροσύνη· ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερα θεωρεῖται, οὔτε τὰ ὀρθῶς οὔτε τὰ ἐναντίως ἔχοντα, ἄλλως τε ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἑκάστων αἰσθητῶν ὡς ἐπίπαν ἀληθής ἐστιν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ λευκὸν κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὅρασιν ἀληθές ἐστιν ὡς αἰσθητόν, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν οὕτως ἐστὶν ὡς ἔχει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἤτοι ᾗ αἰσθητόν. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν·

1 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 2 ἔχει ] ἔχειν A 3 τὸ¹ A1sl 12 τὴν A1sl τῶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ M A (fort. recte) 24 ἀληθής A1pc (ex ἀληθές) 3–12 427b 5–6 12–16 427b 6–7

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necessarily unknown on account of the existing state of dissimilarity and that the error arises from this. For this conforms to the rules of consequence and conversion: being ignorant and in error on account of dissimilarity is the contrary of knowing by virtue of similarity. But the opinion prevails, he says, that understanding and error regard- 7 ing contraries are co-existent, indeed a single thing. For a person who apprehends and discerns that what is [in fact] good is good and advantageous in the same way understands the contrary, that what is [in fact] bad is useless and disadvantageous, on account of one and the same knowledge. And a person who is in error about one thing, whatever it is, and holds a belief that does not correspond to the way things are, is inevitably also in error about another and contrary thing in the same way and on account of the same lack of knowledge. Consequently, we must either be similar to contrary things, in case we have co-existent knowledge of contraries, or else we must rather be dissimilar to contrary things, in case we are in error and ignorance about contraries, both of which alternatives are clearly absurd and impossible. But this is the consequence, if one assumes that the soul owes its cognitive and discerning capacity to likeness. Accordingly, he concludes by saying that it is obvious that those 8 thinkers have an inadequate view who believe that intellect, practical knowledge as such and thought – that is, the rational part of the soul, for here he is using the terms indiscriminately, since he is presently going to deal with these capacities in a precise manner appropriate for each of them – are something body-like and, in general, that using reason is the same thing as having sense perception. For the one is available to all animals, he says (namely, sense perception), but the other (namely, the capacity for reasoning) is only available to human beings. But not even in those cases in which 9 there is availability of both – that is, of sense perception and reason – is there any kind of union between the two: rather, the difference is significant. For in the case of reason or thought it is possible to perform correctly as well as incorrectly: correct performance is true opinion, scientific knowledge and practical knowledge, whereas incorrect performance is the contrary, false opinion, lack of scientific knowledge and lack of practical knowledge. In the case of sense perception, on the other hand, neither the correct nor the contrary types of performance are manifested: apart from everything else, sense perception of the several types of special perceptible objects is for the most part true. For the perception of a white object on the basis of sight itself is true as such, in so far as the perceptible object [is concerned], and the object underlying the sense is such in relation to the sense as it is [in itself], that is, in so far as it is perceptible. And the same applies to the other perceptible objects as to the visible

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ᾗ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ ἕκαστα ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἐπαληθεύει ἀντιλαμβανόμενα παρ’ αὐτῆς. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδοδοξεῖν καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι καὶ πρὸς τἀναντία τῶν ὄντων φέρεσθαι. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, οὐδενὶ τῶν ζῴων ὑπάρχει τὸ νοητικὸν αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ διάνοια, ὅτι μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώπῳ. δόξειε δ’ ἂν ἴσως τισὶν ὡς καὶ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων μετέχει πως τοῦ νοεῖν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν φαντασίας, ἣ τρόπον τινὰ νόησίς ἐστι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον· φαντασία μὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἄμεινον ταύτης, πολὺ δὲ λείπεται διανοίας, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστί. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἔστι φαντασία – ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἑδράζεται ἡ φαντασία· καὶ πᾶσα ἀνατύπωσις τῆς φαντασίας, κἂν εἰ ἀνέπαφός ἐστιν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ οὖν αἰσθητῶν ἐστιν ἀνατύπωσις (οἷον διαστάσεως καὶ τόπων καὶ μέτρων καὶ ἄλλων ὅσα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁρᾶται) – οὔτε οὖν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία, ἀλλ’ ἐπακολουθεῖ τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὔτε ἄνευ ταύτης ἔστιν – ἤτοι τῆς φαντασίας – ὑπόληψίς τις, εἴτουν κριτικὴ ἕξις· πᾶσαν γὰρ οὕτως ὀνομάζει ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν λογικὴν ἕξιν καὶ δύναμιν τῷ καθόλου τῆς ὑπολήψεως ὀνόματι. φησὶν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντασίας λογική τις καὶ κριτικὴ ἕξις, εἴτουν ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ προηγεῖται πάσης ὑπολήψεως, ὡς φησίν, αὐτὴ ἡ φαντασία· ἔστι δὲ τελεώτερόν τι παρὰ τὴν φαντασίαν αὐτὴ ἡ λογικὴ ἕξις καὶ ἄλλο τι παρ’ αὐτήν. καὶ προηγουμένως δῆλον εἶναι τοῦτό φησιν ἐντεῦθεν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ τῆς φαντασίας πάθος ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ ὡς ἂν βουλώμεθα ἔξεστι φαντάζεσθαι καὶ ἀνατυποῦσθαι καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ὥσπερ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ εἰδωλοποιεῖν νῦν μὲν ἵππον, νῦν δὲ ἄνθρωπον, νῦν δὲ ἅττα ἄν τις ἕτερα βούλοιτο, καὶ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα, | καὶ πολυκεφάλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πτερωτοὺς καὶ ὕδρας καὶ κενταύρους καὶ τέρατα· κρίνειν δὲ περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, οὐδ’ ὡς ἂν βουλώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθεύειν καὶ ἀπατᾶσθαι ἐν τούτοις ἴσως καὶ ἐνίοτε ἐνδέχεται, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν δοξάζειν ὡς βουλόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔστιν ἀνάγκη δοξάζειν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὡς ἄρα τις δοξάζει ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν, ἐπιτυγχάνοντα μὲν ἀληθεύειν, ἀποτυγχάνοντα δὲ ἴσως μὴ κατὰ

1 ἐπαληθεύει ] ἐπαληθεύειν M 3–4 ση′ adn. Mmarg 4 μόνον ] μόνω M A 5 διὰ A1pc (ex δι’ ἃ) 6–13 ση′ adn. Amarg 9 εἰ V2?pc ras (ut vid. καὶ Vac ) 20 ἅττα ] ἄττα V 23 μὲν ] μὴ addere velim 3–14 427b 13–16 15–276.2 427b 16–21

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ones. For in so far as they are the respective perceptible objects of each sense, they are truthfully apprehended by the sense. But in the cases of reasoning and practical knowledge it is also possible to have a false opinion, to be in error and to stray in the direction contrary to the existing things. Anyway, what we were saying was that the in- 10 tellective capacity and thought do not belong to any animal except to man alone. Now, some people may perhaps consider that certain animals, too, somehow have a share in thinking on account of having a share in imagination, which in a certain way is thinking and a distinct thing apart from sense perception. But this is not the way it is. For imagination is certainly a distinct thing apart from and better than sense perception, but it is far exceeded by reasoning: it is as it were an intermediate between the two. Indeed, without sense perception there is no imagination: for imagination is founded upon sense perception, and every imprint on the imaginative capacity, even if it is detached from perceptible objects, is still an imprint of perceptible objects (for instance, of extension and places and measures and the other features that are seen in connection with sense perceptions). So without sense perception, as stated, imagination does not exist (on the contrary, it follows in the wake of sense perception), but nor is there without it – that is, without imagination – any belief, that is, competence of judgment. For this is how in the present context Aristotle refers to every rational competence and capacity, by the general name of “belief”. He says, then, that there can be no compe- 11 tence of reason and judgment – that is, belief – without imagination; on the contrary, imagination is, according to what he says, a presupposition of every belief; but the rational competence is a distinct and more fully developed thing as compared with the capacity for imagination. And this, he says, is immediately clear from the following: 12 the experience of imagination depends on us, and it is in our power to imagine and envisage whatever we wish, and as it were place before our eyes and form a picture either of a horse or a human being or whatever else we wish, whether it exists or not, manyheaded and winged men as well as hydras, centaurs and monsters. But the forming of judgments about things that exist does not depend on us, and nor [can judgments be formed] whichever way we like, but [must be formed] in accordance with the natural state of affairs of the things themselves. And perhaps it is possible sometimes to be right and [sometimes] to be deceived about these things; it is not, however, up to us to have whatever opinion we like about them, but our opinion must correspond to how they are. For it is necessary that whatever opinion one has is either false or true: if one hits the mark, it is true; if, against one’s best intentions, one misses the mark, it is er-

5–7 cf. Them. 88.24–27. 7–8 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 490.22–23. 8–10 cf. Them. 88.25–30. 88.30–32. 20–21 cf. Them. 88.32–34. 26–27 cf. Them. 89.11–13.

17–19 cf. Them.

30–31 sometimes to be right and [sometimes] to be deceived: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “sometimes to be wrong and deceived”.

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βούλησιν ἀπατᾶσθαι καὶ ψεύδεσθαι, ἑπόμενον ἀκουσίως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀτευκτούσῃ τινὶ ἴ13 σως ὑπολήψει. ἔτι δέ φησι, διαστέλλων τὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς (δόξαν

δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὴν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν λέγει καὶ λογικὴν γνῶσιν), ὅτι ὅταν δοξάζωμέν τι ἢ θαρσαλέον ἢ φοβερὸν ἢ εὐφρόσυνον, συνδιατιθέμεθά πως τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἕξει καὶ πάσχομεν, ὡς αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων κοινωνοῦντες· φανταζόμενοι δὲ ἅττα ἂν καὶ φανταζοίμεθα, οὐδὲν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν διατιθέμεθα ἢ πάσχομεν ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ θεώμενοι, φησίν, ἐν γραφῇ ταῦτα, οὕτως ἔχομεν, μηδὲν κινούμενοι ἢ πάσχοντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεικαστικὸν τῷ ὄντι καὶ εἰκονιστικόν τι ἡ φαντασία, ὥσπερ ἔχει σχεδὸν καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γραφόμενα. 14

Ὅτι τῆς καθόλου ταύτης ὑπολήψεως διαφορὰς τίθεται ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην λέγων τὴν μετὰ αἰτίας καὶ ἀποδείξεως γνῶσιν, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀναιτίως γνῶσιν, εἴτουν ὑπόληψιν, φρόνησιν δὲ τὴν τῶν πρακτέων θεωρίαν καὶ κατάληψιν καὶ ὅλως κρίσιν τῶν ἃ ποιητέον ἢ μή. καὶ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων δῆλα πάλιν ὑπὸ τὴν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγόμενα (ὧν οὐδέν ἐστι πάντως ἡ φαντασία)· ὑπερτίθεταί γε μὴν μόνον μνησθεὶς αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα τὰς αὐτῶν διαφορὰς ἐν ἄλλοις διαλαβεῖν, ὡς δὴ καὶ πεποίηκεν ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς.

Ὅτι, βουλόμενος περὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἤδη ἐκδηλότερον διορίσασθαι καὶ ἐρεῖν καθόλου, φησί· τὸ νοητικόν, ἐπεὶ διεστειλάμεθα ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι – τούτου τὸ μέν ἐστι φαντασία, τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις· ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ φαντασία ὑπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν νοητικὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη ἡ φαντασία ὑπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν νοητικὴν ἕξιν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ τὰς αἰσθήσεις κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιστητῶν ἑκάστων συλλογιζόμεθα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν – V169v τὴν κυρίως οὕτως ὀνομα- | ζομένην φαντασίαν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τινος, καθὼς ἐνίοτε λέγεται καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁτιοῦν κατὰ μεταφορὰν φαντάζεσθαι καὶ φαίνεσθαι –

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3–5 ση′ adn. Mmarg 3 τι M1pc 5 ἅττα ] ἄττα V A 17 post καὶ rasuram trium fere litterarum habet M || ἐρεῖν V1pc 18–19 φησί—ὑπόληψις anacolutha esse videntur (φησὶ τὸ νοητικόν, ἐπεὶ διεστειλάμεθα ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, τὸ μὲν εἶναι φαντασίαν, τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψιν vel sim. malim) 20 νοητικὴν¹ M1pc (ut vid. ex νοητὴν) || νοητικὴν² ] νοητὴν M 21 ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ] τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν M A 2–9 427b 21–24 10–16 427b 24–26

17–20 427b 27–29 20–278.7 428a 1–4

16 ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς: fort. EN 6.3, 1139b 15–36?

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roneous and false, presumably because one is involuntarily, let’s say, following some misguided belief. He further says, in an attempt to distinguish imagination from opin- 13 ion (in this context he refers to belief in general, or rational cognition, as “opinion”), that whenever we have the opinion that something is either reassuring or intimidating or exhilarating, we are somehow co-modified with the relevant quality and affected, as if communicating with the real objects themselves; but when we imagine whatever it is we imagine, we are not at all modified or affected by these things, but are rather, he says, in a situation analogous to those who are looking at these things in a painting, without being moved or affected by them at all. Indeed, the capacity for imagination is really a capacity for representing and picturing, more or less as is the case with the paintings themselves. [Note] that he counts scientific knowledge, opinion and practical knowledge as 14 different forms of belief in this general sense. He uses “scientific knowledge” for knowledge which involves explanation and demonstration; “opinion” for simple and non-explanatory knowledge or belief; and “practical knowledge” for the contemplation and comprehension of appropriate actions, and, in general, the judgment of what should be done or not be done. And again, the contraries of these, too (of which imagination is by no means one), are clearly subsumed under belief in the general sense. Indeed, after only mentioning them here he defers to other works the analysis of their differences (which he has actually carried out in the Ethics). [Note] that, as he wants at this point to provide a clearer description and a gen- 15 eral account of imagination, he says: the intellective capacity, since we have distinguished it as being something else than sense perception – part of this is imagination, part belief. For imagination is also subsumed under the soul’s intellective competence. And since imagination in this sense is also subsumed under the the soul’s intellective competence, it is just like when we draw conclusions to the individual senses from the several types of perceptible objects and to the branches of knowledge from the several types of objects of knowledge: [we speak of] “imagination” – in the sense in which the word is properly used, not by some kind of metaphor, in the way in which even perceiving something by the senses is sometimes metaphorically referred to as “imag-

1–2 cf. Them. 89.7–10. 6–9 cf. Them. 89.17–20. 9–11 cf. Prisc. 207.8–9. 13–17 cf. Prisc. 207.20–22. 19–20 cf. Prisc. 207.26–27. 26–279.1 cf. Prisc. 208.3–8. 29–279.1 Ps.-Phlp. 496.2–5. 22–24 he says—part belief : the transmitted text is somewhat anacoluthic. With the emendations suggested in the critical apparatus one could translate “he says that the intellective capacity – since we have distinguished this as being something else than sense perception – is in part imagination and in part belief”.

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τήν γε μὴν ὡς εἴρηται φαντασίαν λέγομεν καθ’ ἣν φάντασμά τι γίνεται ἐν ἡμῖν, εἴτουν 16 ὑποτύπωσις αἰσθητῶν ἔσωθεν ἀνέπαφος. καὶ εἰ ἄρα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, φησίν, ἕξις ἂν εἴη

καὶ δύναμις ἡ φαντασία κριτική, καθ’ ἣν ἔστιν ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι γὰρ ἀληθὴς φαντασία ὅταν ἀνατυποῖ ἀληθῶς τὰ ὄντα ἢ ἅ ποτέ τις εἶδε καὶ ὧν πεπείραται· ψευδὴς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνατύπωσις δηλονότι τῶν μὴ ὄντων καὶ ὧν μὴ ᾔσθηταί τίς ποτε ἢ πεπείραται, ἢ δι’ ἀπώλειαν πάντως μνήμης καὶ ἀπάτην ἀτευκτῶν ἢ καὶ ἑκουσίως ψευδὴς ἱστοριογράφος ὡς εἰπεῖν γενόμενος. Ὅτι, καθόλου τῶν γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν μὲν αἴσθησιν εἶναι λέγων, τὴν δὲ δόξαν (ἣν ἔφημεν ἀμφοτερίζειν καὶ ἀναίτιον ὑπόληψιν εἶναι), τὴν δὲ ἐπιστήμην (τὴν δι’ αἰτίας ἀποδεικτικὴν τοῦ γνωστοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι ἠρτημένην), τὴν δὲ νοῦν (ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ καθόλου καὶ ἄμεσος ἐπιβλητικὴ καὶ ἀντιληπτικὴ τῶν ὄντων κατάληψις) – ταύτας τοίνυν λέγων εἶναι τὰς γνωστικὰς δυνάμεις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, μηδεμίαν εἶναί φησι τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, γνωστικὴν πάντως καὶ αὐτὴν δύναμιν 18 οὖσαν τῆς ψυχῆς. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, καθὼς καὶ προαπέδειξεν, ὅτι ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ δυνάμει ἐστὶ μένουσα ἀνενέργητος – ὡς ἡ ὀπτικὴ δύναμις ἢ ἄλλη τις – ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς ἡ ὅρασις αὐτή, ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ ὁρᾷ ἡ ὄψις· φαντασία δὲ γίνεται μή τινος τούτων, φησίν, ὑπάρχοντος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείροις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀνείροις οὔτε δύναμις μόνον ἐστίν – ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀνατυποῖ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν γνωστικὴ ἕξις – οὔτε ἐνέργεια ἁπλῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖταί τι, οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ὑπάρξει ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον φάν19 τασμά τι καὶ ἀνύπαρκτος ἀνατύπωσις. ἔτι δέ φησιν ὡς αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ ἐν βρεφικῇ ἡλικίᾳ, φαντασία δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, οὐδ’ 20 ἐν βρεφικαῖς ἡλικίαις, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον. καὶ ἔτι ἐνδέχοιτο ἄν, εἰ ταυτὸν εἴη ἡ φαντασία τῇ αἰσθήσει, πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις ἐνυπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχειν δοκεῖ, φησίν, ὥσπερ μύρμηκι καὶ μελίττῃ καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ἵππῳ τῶν οἰκείων εἶναι, ὡς πρόδηλον, κατὰ τὸ φαντάζεσθαι ἐπιγνώμοσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ σκώληκι. καὶ αἰσθήσεως μὲν ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἄλλων παραπλησίων δῆλον ὡς οὕτω διαστέλλεται ἡ φαντασία· τῶν γε μὴν ἄλλων εἰρημένων

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5 δηλονότι ] δηλότι M || ᾔσθηταί τίς ] ἥσθη ταύτης A 10 γνωστοῦ M1ras (‑οῦ, fort. ex γνωστικοῦ) A1pc 13 μηδεμίαν ] μὴ δὲ μίαν V 18 γάρ τι transp. M 19 ἐνέργεια ] ἐνεργεία M1?pc (ex ἐνέργεια) || ἐν ὑπάρξει ] ἐνυπάρξει A 21 βρεφικῇ M1pc (ut vid. ex βρεφηκῆ) 22 βρεφικαῖς ] φρεφισίαις M1pc (fort. ex φαντασίαις) 23 ἐνυπάρχειν ] ἐν ὑπάρχειν V || δοκεῖ Asl 8–20 428a 4–8 20–25 428a 8–11 25–280.2 428a 16–18

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ining” [phantázesthai] and “appearing” [phaínesthai] – anyway, we speak of “imagination”, in the sense just mentioned, as that by virtue of which an image arises in us, that is, a detached internal impression of perceptible objects. And if this is what it is 16 like, he says, then imagination must be a competence and a capacity for judgment, on the basis of which it is possible to be right or wrong. For imagination is right whenever it makes a true impression of that which exists, or of what one has at some point seen and experienced; and conversely, of course, an impression of what does not exist and of what one has never perceived or experienced is false, whether one’s mistake is caused entirely by loss of memory and delusion or one has, let’s say, deliberately become a false historian. [Note] that, although he says that, generally speaking, one of the cognitive capacities of the soul is sense perception, another is opinion (which we have stated to be of two kinds and [in the present context] to be belief unaccompanied by explanation), yet another is scientific knowledge (which is capable of demonstrating the object of cognition on the basis of an explanation and depends on reasoning and deduction), and yet another is intellect (which is the universal and immediate intuitive and apprehensive grasp of existing things) – although he says, then, that these are the cognitive capacities in the soul, he asserts that imagination is none of these, even though it is undeniably also a cognitive capacity of the soul. For it is not sense perception, as he has already demonstrated, for sense perception is either potential, in case it remains inactive – like the visual capacity or any other one – or it is actual, like the very act of seeing, whenever the visual capacity actually sees; but imagination occurs, he says, [even] when neither of these obtains, as for instance in our dreams. For in our dreams it is neither just a capacity (since the cognitive competence within the ambit of imagination in a certain sense actualizes and imprints something), nor is it without qualification an actuality (since it is in some respect not actualized and is not without qualification existent but is only an image and a non-existent impression). He further states that sense perception is always present from the very inception and at an infant age, but imagination is not always present and not at an infant age, as is obvious. Furthermore, if imagination were the same thing as sense perception, it would be possible for it to belong to all animals, but it does not seem, he says, to belong to the worm to be an arbiter on the basis of imagination as it does to the ant, the bee and, obviously, the dog and the horse among domestic animals. And it is clear from these and other similar considerations that imagination differs in this way from sense perception. But its difference from the other aforementioned cognitive capacities, the

5–10 cf. Prisc. 208.13–17. 23–27 cf. Prisc. 209.4–8; Them. 89.36–90.3; Ps.-Phlp. 494.19–24; 498.13–21. 28–30 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 494.26–30; Prisc. 209.10–11. 31–33 cf. Prisc. 209.19–22; Them. 90.5–8.

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γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς, τῶν ἀληθευουσῶν ἀεί, οἷον ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ, πολὺ καὶ πρόδηλον τὸ διάφορον αὐτῆς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχουσι· φαντασίαι δέ, ὡς V170r ἔστι δῆλον, | αἱ πλείους εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ μὴ ἀληθεύουσαι. [21] ἔπειτα, φησί, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συνήθους λεγομένου πιστώσασθαι τοῦτο ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ὅτι φαίνεται ἡμῖν τόδε τι ὃ τελείως καταλαμβάνομεν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τόδε ἢ ἵππος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων καὶ ἀορίστων καὶ ὧν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανόμεθα, τότε λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ὁρώμενον φαίνεται εἶναι ζῷον ἢ φαίνεται εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἔστι τυ22 χὸν ἀληθῶς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀμφότερα. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὔτε αἴσθησίς ἐστιν οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε νοῦς ἡ φαντασία, λοιπὸν ἐξετάσαι, φησί, μήποτε ταυτὸν εἴη τῇ δόξῃ ἡ φαντασία· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἔστι, φησί· γίνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἔστι καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής, ὥσπερ καὶ φαντασία, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πάσης μὲν δόξης ἕπεται πίστις· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεχόμενον, φησίν, οἷς δοξάζει τις μὴ πιστεύειν· προηγεῖται γὰρ καὶ καθολικωτέρα ἡ πίστις τῆς δόξης· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀληθῶν γνώσεων· καὶ τῆς πίστεως προηγεῖται τὸ πείθεσθαι· πειθόμενος γάρ τις πιστεύει οἷς πείθεται· οἷς δὲ τὸ πείθεσθαι, λόγος προηγεῖται τοῦ πείθεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν φαντασία μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἔστι ζῴοις· λόγος δὲ καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ πίστις, τίς ἂν εἴη, φησίν, ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις; πρόδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. 23

Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς οὔτε δόξα οὔτε αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία ἑξῆς λέγει ὡς οὔτε ἐκ κοινωνίας τινὸς αὐτῶν τῶν δύο ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ δόξα ἐστὶ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως, οὔτε δόξα δι’ αἰσθήσεως, οὔτε συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεώς ἐστι, φησίν, ἡ φαντασία· βούλεται δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸ ὡς οὔτε ποιητικὰ ἀμφότερα αἴτια τῆς φαντασίας ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ οἰκεῖον εἶδος ἑκάτερον περισῴζοντα· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὡς οὔτε ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἡ δόξα τῆς φαντασίας διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὡς δι’ ὀργάνου, καθὼς δὴ τέμνει ὁ τέκτων τὸ ξύλον διὰ τοῦ πρίονος· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὅτι οὐδὲ ὑλικὰ αἴτια ταῦτά εἰσι τῆς φαντασίας καὶ διὰ μίξιν τινὰ καὶ κρᾶσιν ἀμφοτέρων – ἤτοι

4 λέγομεν ] φησὶν add. M A 5 ἡμῖν om. M A 6 ἐναργῶς M2?pc (ut vid. ex ἐνεργῶς) 9 δόξῃ ] δόξει A 10 καὶ² om. M A 14 πείθεσθαι ] πίθεσθαι A || πειθόμενος A1pc (ut vid. ex πιθόμενος) 15 μὲν om. M A 15–16 ἄλλοις ] μὲν add. M A 25 αἴτια ταῦτά transp. M A || κρᾶσιν correxi : κράσιν codd. 2–8 428a 11–15 8–17 428a 19–24 18–282.15 428a 24–b 2

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ones that are always accurate, like scientific knowledge and intellect, is also considerable and obvious. For these always possess the truth, but most imaginings are false and inaccurate, as is clear. Then he points out that one can also convince oneself of 21 this from linguistic custom. For we do not say that it appears to us that a certain thing which we apprehend perfectly is, for instance, in the case of individuals, a human being or a horse; rather, it is when confronted with ambiguous and indeterminate things and things that we do not perceive clearly that we say that what is seen appears to be an animal or appears to be a human being, and this may or may not be what it truly is: for both are possible. Well then, since imagination is neither sense perception nor 22 knowledge nor intellect, it remains to examine, he says, whether perhaps imagination is the same thing as opinion. But it is not this either, he says. For admittedly opinion, too, just like imagination, becomes and is both true and false; but every opinion is accompanied by conviction. For it is not possible, he says, not to be convinced of the opinions one holds. For conviction precedes and is more general than opinion, for it obtains both in the case of opinion and in those of the other, true, cognitions; and persuasion precedes conviction, for it is when being persuaded that one is convinced of that of which one is being persuaded; and for those animals to which persuasion belongs, reason precedes the persuasion. Surely, however, imagination is found also in other animals, but what reason, persuasion or conviction, he says, might there be in [non-human] animals? Clearly there is none. [Note] that, after having demonstrated that imagination is neither opinion nor 23 sense perception, he goes on to say that imagination does not consist of some kind of union of these two capacities either. For imagination, he says, is neither opinion in conjunction with sense perception, nor opinion with the aid of sense perception, nor a combination of opinion and sense perception. By the first [denial] is meant that opinion and sense perception are not two efficient causes of imagination which both preserve their respective intrinsic form. By the second [denial is meant] that opinion is not an efficient cause of imagination “with the aid of” sense perception in the sense of “with the aid of an instrument”, as for instance a carpenter cuts wood with the aid of his saw. By the third [denial is meant] that these two capacities are not material causes of imagination, and that imagination does not arise on account of some mix-

14–15 cf. Prisc. 210.34–37. 15–17 cf. Prisc. 211.19–25; Ps.-Phlp. 496.33–497.2. 500.21. 25–283.3 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 501.17–502.4.

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4–9 appears: the Greek word is phaínetai, formed on the verbal stem phan-, from which is derived phantasía, translated here as “imagination” and “imagining”. 15–17 being persuaded : like Priscian and Ps.-Philoponus, Metochites is using present tense forms in a context in which aorist or perfect tense forms might have been expected (the perfect pepeîsthai is used by Aristotle).

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τῆς δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως – οὐ μενουσῶν ἀμιγῶς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις εἴδεσιν, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν 24 ἡ κρᾶσις τοῦ οἰνομέλιτος, ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία. κατ’ οὐδένα οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων

φησὶν αἴτια εἶναι τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς φαντασίας, διά τε τὰ προειρημένα ἐν οἷς ἀπέδειξε δηλονότι πολυτρόπως ὡς οὐκ ἔστι συνέρχεσθαι οὐδὲ ταυτὸν εἶναι δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὅτι, φησίν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ὑποκείμενον ἡ φαντασία περὶ ὃ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ οὗ ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, τούτου ἐστὶ καὶ φαντασία, προσήκει τὴν αὐτῶν σύνοδον εἶναι προηγουμένως κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου, εἰ μέλλει εἶναι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡ v V170 φαντασία· οὐ γάρ, ἂν ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις τόδε τι ὁρᾷ λευκόν, | ἡ δὲ δόξα τόδε τι ἄλλο δοκῇ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τούτων ἔσται τις μία φαντασία τινός. δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας (καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν δηλονότι καὶ τὴν δόξαν), ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἤτοι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἂν γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης αὐτὸς λευκὸς ὢν καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς δόξης καταλαμβάνηται, οὐχ ὁρᾷ ἡ ὄψις τὸν Σωκράτην ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ λευκῷ ὄντι ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὐ κατὰ ταυτὸ συνερχομένων φαντασία 25 ἕποιτο; ἄλλως τε, εἰ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα, μάχονται δὲ καὶ ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλαις, τίς ἂν συμπλοκὴ αὐτῶν γένοιτο, ἀφ’ ἧς ἄρα συμπλοκῆς ἔσται ἡ φαντασία; οἷον ἡ μὲν ὄψις ὁρᾷ τὸν ἥλιον ποδιαῖον ἴσως ἔχοντα μῆκος, δόξα δέ ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς πολλαπλάσιον ἔχοντος τῆς γῆς μῆκος· τίς οὖν συμπλοκὴ τούτων ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν φαντασία γένοιτο; καὶ ταῦτα καὶ αἱ δύο κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος – τὸ μῆκος δηλονότι – ταῦτα δὴ τἀναντία κρίνουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν κώπην ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἡ μὲν ὄψις κεκλασμένην ὁρᾷ, ἡ δὲ δόξα 26 εὐθεῖαν καὶ ὑγιῶς ἔχουσαν ταύτην δοκεῖ. ἐν γοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις, πῶς ἔσται κοινωνία κἀντεῦθεν φαντασία; οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως ἡ αἴσθησις κριτικὴ ἢ ὡς ὁρᾷ, οὔτε ἡ δόξα ἄλλο τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ψευδής – δηλονότι τῆς προτέρας ἀληθείας – ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον ἐξ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ψεῦδος οὐ γένοιτ’ ἂν ἄλλως ἢ ἐπὶ χρόνῳ διὰ λήθην καὶ ἀμνημοσύνην ἢ διὰ μεταβολὴν λαθοῦσαν τοῦ πρά-

2 κρᾶσις correxi : κράσις codd. 8 δοκῇ V2?pc (ex δοκεῖ) A1pc (ut vid. ex δοκεῖ) 14 ταυτὸ ] τὸ αὐτὸ M A 18 πολλαπλάσιον ] πολλὰ πλάσιον M 20 τὸ αὐτὸ M1pc (ex τοῦ αὐτοῦ) 24 δηλονότι τῆς προτέρας ἀληθείας post ἐστὶ v. 24 collocare velim 25 ψεῦδος ] ψεῦψος M 15–284.7 428b 2–9

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ture and blending of both (that is, opinion and sense perception), in which they will not abide by their intrinsic forms in an unmixed state, as is the case with the blend of honey and wine. So he denies that opinion and sense perception are causes of imagi- 24 nation in accordance with any of the patterns described, both for the reasons he just stated, when he demonstrated in a number of ways that opinion and sense perception cannot be combined or be the same thing, and also, he says, [for the following reason]: since imagination is concerned with one and the same subject with which sense perception is also concerned, and it is the object of a perception that is also the object of an imagining, the combination of them [sc. of sense perception and opinion] must apply non-coincidentally to the same subject, if imagination is to arise from both of them. For it is not the case that, if sense perception sees a certain white thing and opinion opines that a certain other thing is good, some single imagining of something arises from these. However, it is not only required that both of them – sense perception and opinion, that is – apply to the same subject: they also have to apply in the same respect, rather than the one in one respect and the other in another respect, that is, coincidentally. For if Socrates himself, being pale and good, is apprehended by sense perception and opinion, it is not the case that sight sees Socrates as good, except coincidentally, since it so happens that he, who is pale, is good. And how could an imagining follow from the two capacities when they are not combined in the same respect? Besides, if the sense perception and the opinion apply to the same subject and are con- 25 cerned with the same form, but are conflicting and contrary to one another, what sort of combination could there be of them such that an imagining would arise from it? For instance, sight sees the sun as having the width of perhaps one foot, but the opinion about it is that it has a width many times that of the earth, so what sort of combination could there be of these [sc. the perception and the opinion], or how could an imagining arise from them? Especially since the two capacities adjudge these contrary attributes to the same subject and with regard to the same form (namely, its width), just as sight, for its part, sees the oar in the water as being broken, while opinion opines that it is straight and in sound condition. So how can there be a union, and an imagining that 26 results from it, in cases like this? For nor is the sense capacity capable of judging in any other way than as it sees, nor can the opinion be a different thing – that is to say, from the former truth – and false in accordance with the sense perception at the same time at which it opines truthfully. For what changes from true to false cannot do so in any other way than over time, because of forgetfulness and oblivion, or because of an unnoticed change in the state of affairs (as, for instance, if Socrates will change from

9–18 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 504.36–505.8; Them. 90.33–91.1; Prisc. 212.30–37. 18–22 cf. Them. 91.1–4; Ps.-Phlp. 502.10–13; Prisc. 213.3–4. 22–24 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 505.18–19; 502.16–17. 24–27 cf. Them. 91.4–7. 27–30 cf. Them. 91.17–20. 27–29 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 502.14–16.

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γματος – οἷον εἰ μεταβαλεῖ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τοῦ λευκὸς εἶναι εἰς τοὐναντίον ἢ ὁ ἥλιος 27 ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου μήκους – ἢ ὅταν μεταπεισθῇ ὁ δοξάζων ἄλλο τι ἢ πρότερον. ταῦτα

δὲ ἅπαντα ἀδύνατα ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα τἀναντία κρίνωσι κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εἶδος· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη, φησί, κοινωνία τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς δόξης ἡ φαντασία. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀντιτείνων λέγει· ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων ἔν τε τῷ Φιλήβῳ καὶ τῷ Σοφιστῇ δοκεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν ὁρίζεσθαι μίξιν τῆς αἰσθήσεως μετὰ τῆς δόξης. Ὅτι, μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε δόξα οὔτε κοινωνία αὐτῶν – ἔτι γε μὴν οὔτε αἱ ἀληθεῖς καὶ βέβαιαι γνωστικαὶ κρίσεις, ἤτοι φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς – ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία βουλόμενος ὑποδεῖξαι τί ἔστι, φησὶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν κινεῖ μόνον, οὐ κινεῖται δέ, ὥσπερ τὰ αἰσθητὰ αὐτὰ κινεῖ μόνον τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐ κινεῖται δέ, τὰ δὲ κινεῖται καὶ κινεῖ, καθὼς αἱ αἰσθήσεις αὐταὶ κινοῦνται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, εἰσὶ δὲ V171r | οἷαι καὶ κινεῖν. [29] καὶ τοίνυν αἱ αἰσθήσεις αὐταὶ κινούμεναι ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινοῦσιν ἑτέραν ψυχικὴν δύναμιν, τὴν εἰκαστικὴν καὶ τυπωτικὴν αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι μὲν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τυπωτική· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία ἢ τύπος καὶ γραφὴ ἢ ἴχνος αἰσθητῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὲν εἶναι ἄνευ αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἥδρασται καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἄνευ αὐτῶν – καὶ μὴ ὄντων ἂν αὐτῶν – οὐκ ἂν ἦν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τοῖς ἐκ γεννήσεως τυφλοῖς οὐκ ἔστι φαντασία χρώματος, οὐδὲ 30 τοῖς ἐκ γεννήσεως κωφοῖς φαντασία ψόφου. ἔστι τοίνυν, ὡς φαμέν, ἡ φαντασία τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ ἄνευ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι· διαφέρει δὲ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν ἐστιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις μέχρι τοσούτου, μέχρις ἂν εἴη τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ μέχρις ἂν δηλονότι κινοῖτο – ἢ μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν πλήττοιτο – ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ παραμένει μέχρι πολλοῦ, καὶ μὴ κινούντων αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ οἴκοθεν ἐγείρεται ἐνίοτε ἔσωθεν, μὴ πελαζόντων μηδὲ κινούντων ἔξωθεν αὐτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἥδρασται τῇ παθήσει τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ

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being pale to the contrary or the sun will change from its previous width), or when someone is persuaded to take a different opinion from the one he previously had. But 27 all of this is impossible when sense perception and opinion at the same time adjudge contrary attributes to the same subject and with regard to the same entity and form. Consequently, he says, imagination cannot be a union of sense perception and opinion. It is in reaction to Plato that he says this, for in the Philebus and the Sophist Plato seems to define imagination as a mixture of sense perception and opinion. [Note] that, after having demonstrated that imagination is neither sense percep- 28 tion nor opinion nor a union of these, nor indeed the true and reliable kinds of cognitive discernment (namely, practical knowledge, scientific knowledge and intellect), he wants to indicate what it is, and says that (a) some things only cause motion but are not moved, as, for instance, the perceptible objects only move the sense but are not moved; whereas (b) some things are moved as well as cause motion, as, for instance, the senses are moved by the perceptible objects but are also capable of causing motion. Accordingly, the senses, as they themselves are moved by the percepti- 29 ble objects, move another soul capacity, which is capable of depicting and forming impressions of the perceptible objects, and this is imagination. For imagination is by common consent capable of forming impressions based upon perceptible objects and concerned with perceptible objects. For an imagining is nothing but an imprint and a sketch – or a trace – of perceptible objects, and it cannot exist without perceptions and perceptible objects, but is founded upon them and takes its origin from them: without them – if they did not exist – it would not exist. It is clear that those who are blind from birth cannot imagine colour, nor can those who are deaf from birth imagine sound. Accordingly, imagination, as we say, is correlative to perceptible objects and 30 concerned with perceptible objects, and without them it cannot exist. But it is different from sense perception and a distinct thing besides sense perception. For sense perception lasts for a certain duration, for as long as the perceptible objects exist, or for as long as it is moved – or to use a better word, struck – by the perceptible objects themselves, whereas imagination is both long-lasting, even when the perceptible objects themselves are not causing any motion, and is sometimes endogenously prompted from within, when the perceptible objects are not impinging or causing motion from outside. For sense perception is founded upon the actual impact of the perceptible

6–7 cf. Prisc. 211.33–35 (who refers to both dialogues); Ps.-Phlp. 504.4–7 (who refers only to the Sophist); Them. 90.29–30 (who refers only to Plato). 8–11 cf. Prisc. 213.23–24; Ps.-Phlp. 506.21; Them. 91.31–32. 11–17 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 507.11–15; Them. 91.33–38. 17–19 cf. Prisc. 206.11–14; 214.16–20; Ps.-Phlp. 507.16–18. 19–20 cf. Them. 91.16–17. 22–24 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 507.32–35. 25–30 cf. Them. 91.38–92.4. 28–29 cf. Them. 92.27–28. 32–287.3 cf. Them. 92.9–12.

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ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν αὐτῶν χωριστή, ἡ δὲ φαντασία τῇ ὑστέρᾳ τυπώσει ἥδρασται καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεθύστερον ἐκμαγεῖόν ἐστι. καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῇ ὑποκείμενον οἱ τύποι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἐν πλείστοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων πέφυκε πάσχειν οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι δὲ οἷς αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐν σκώληκι ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν εἴη ἂν ἴσως ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, οἷς μόνον τὸ κινεῖσθαι – ἤτοι πάσχειν καὶ πλήττεσθαι – φύσις ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐδὲν δ’ ἐπέκεινα τούτων ἐκτείνεται ἐνεργείας εἶδος καὶ μονῆς τρόπον τινὰ παρὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν αὐτὴν ἔντευξιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς φαντασίας τοιοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν ζῴων, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὰ ζῷα πολλὰ καὶ 31 ποιεῖν ἔχει φύσιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πάσχειν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον. ἔτι δ’ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ τὰ ὄντα ἀνατυποῦσθαι, ἔστι καὶ ψεύδεσθαι ἐν τῷ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀναπλάττειν· αἴτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐφ’ ὧν ἐστι καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ὡς εἴρηται, νῦν μὲν ἐπιτυγχάνει τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἀληθοῦς, νῦν δὲ οὔ· τριχῶς δὲ θεωρεῖται ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀντίληψις· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν – ὧν προδιωρισάμεθα καθ’ ἑκάστην – αἴσθησις, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα – ὡς καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται – ἀληθεύει ἑκάστη αἴσθησις ἤ μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν ἀκριβέστερον ὀλιγοστὸν ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ ψεύδεται. δευτέρα δέ ἐστι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀντίληψις τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς θεωρουμένων (ὡς καὶ τοῦτο προδιώρισται), ἤτοι αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ ἐν οἷς θεωρεῖται τὰ ἴδια V171v ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι. | τὰ γὰρ ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας μᾶλλον ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ἄλλως δηλονότι καταλαμβανόμενα, οὐχ ὡς οὐσίας καὶ ἄτομα, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις αὐτάς· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις τὸ λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾷ καθ’ αὑτό, τὸν δὲ Κλέωνα ἢ τὸν Σωφρονίσκον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ λευκὸν ὁρᾶται, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴδιον τῇ αἰσθήσει, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρᾷ· καὶ ὅτι μὲν λευκόν ἐστιν, ἀληθεύει· ὅτι δὲ τὸ λευκὸν Κλέων ἐστὶν ἢ Σωφρονίσκος, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀληθεύειν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψεύδεσθαι. τρίτη δέ ἐστι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἀντίληψις ἡ τῶν κοινῶν (ὡς καὶ τοῦτο πρότερον διώρισται), ἤτοι κινήσεως, μεγέθους, σχήματος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰρημένων· ἐφ’ 32 ὧν δὴ δύο ἀντιλήψεων τῶν ὑστέρων μάλιστα ἔστι καὶ ψεύδεσθαι. καὶ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθή-

2 ἐστι ] ἐστὶν A 4 οἷς ] ἡ add. M A 9 ἔχει ] ἔχειν A 10 ὄντα¹ ] αὐτὰ add. M A (fort. recte) || ἔστι ] δὲ add. M A (fort. recte) 11 ἐφ’ ὧν ] ἐφ’ οἷς vel ἐξ ὧν malim (cf. supra 3.3.29) 11–18 428b 17–21

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objects and lacks existence in separation from them, whereas imagination is founded upon the subsequent impression and is in a certain sense a subsequent mould of the perceptible objects. The object underlying it are the imprints of perceptible objects, which is also why in most animals the soul is of such a nature as to be affected and to act in this way, but not in all creatures that have sense perception. For this capacity is presumably not present in a worm or in certain other animals whose nature it is only to be moved – that is, affected and struck – by the perceptible objects, but in which no form of activity or, in a sense, permanence extends beyond these, over and above the simple encounter with the perceptible objects. And this is what imagination is like. It is, however, present in many animals, and it is in the nature of these animals to do many things, and obviously also to be affected, on the basis of imagination. Moreover, 31 on the basis of imagination it is possible to be correct, by making imprints of things that exist, and also possible to be in error, by forging things that do not exist. The explanation for this is that the perception of perceptible objects – on which, as has been mentioned, imagination, too, is founded – also sometimes hits upon being and truth and sometimes does not. And the apprehension of perceptible objects by the senses is manifested in three ways. On the one hand there is perception of the special objects, which we have already described for each individual sense, in the case of which – this has also been mentioned – each sense is correct in the highest degree, or, to put it more accurately, is rarely off the mark and erroneous. Secondly, the senses have apprehension of things that are coincidentally observed (this, too, has been described above), that is, of the underlying things in which the special objects are observed by the senses. For it is more appropriate in this context to think and speak of the underlying things, or the individual substances, as coincidental – when they are differently apprehended, of course, not as substances and individuals, but in their relation to the senses. For the sense sees the white in itself, but it sees Cleon or Sophroniscus – in whom the white, which is the actual special object of the sense, is seen – coincidentally. And it is correct about the fact that it is white; but it may be correct and it may be in error about the fact that the white is Cleon or Sophroniscus. The third kind of apprehension by the senses is that of the common objects (this has also been described above), namely, motion, magnitude, shape and the others that were mentioned. And it is especially in the case of the two last‐mentioned kinds of apprehension that it is also possible to be in error. In the same way imagination, too, is manifested in three 32

2 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 508.25–32. 5–9 cf. Them. 92.23–28. 13–33 cf. Them. 93.3–16. 33–289.1 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 509.5–9. 14–15 on which, as has been mentioned, imagination, too, is founded : this translation may require the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. The transmitted text would more naturally be translated as “to which, as has been mentioned, imagination, too, applies”.

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σεις αὐτὰς οὕτω τριπλῶς καὶ τὸ τῆς φαντασίας θεωρεῖται· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται ἡ φαντασία, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἀληθεύειν ἐστὶν αὐτῇ· καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητῶν, ἧττον ἂν εἴη τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐταῖς, ὡς εἴρηται, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ μάλιστ’ ἂν παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ τῆς φαντασίας ἕπηται· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τρόπων, τῶν ὑστέρων (ἤτοι ἐν οἷς κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν διωρισμένων κοινῶν ἀντιλήψει), μάλιστά ἐστι τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῇ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἀπούσης, ὅταν ἔπειτα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔσωθεν ἀναπλάττῃ καθ’ αὑτὴν καὶ ἀνατυποῖ. καὶ τοίνυν ἐπιλογιζόμενος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ ἤδη εἰρημένα φησὶν ὡς ἐπεὶ μηδεμία τῶν ἄλλων τῶν διωρισμένων γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδέδεικται οὖσα ἡ φαντασία, ἀνεδείχθη δὲ ἔτι καὶ ὅπως καὶ τίς ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αὐτῆς αἴτιον, ὁρίζεται λοιπὸν ταύτην καὶ ὑπογράφει κίνησιν – τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι – ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γινομένην· τὰ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήσεις παραλαμβάνουσα ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται μεθύστερον, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ εἰκαστικὸν καὶ τυπωτικόν, εἴτουν φανταστικόν. μετείληφε δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κυριωτέρας αἰσθήσεως, τῆς ὄψεως, ἧς τὸ ὄνομα, φησίν, ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους, ὅτι μηδ’ ἔστιν ἄνευ φωτὸς ὁρᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ δεδόσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως – μᾶλλον δὲ τἀληθὲς ἐρεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ – τὸ τοιοῦτον φανταστικὸν εἶδος τῇ ψυχῇ εἰς ἄλλην τινὰ κρείττω ζωὴν καὶ διοίκησιν καὶ μονὴν ἐντὸς ἢ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. πολλὰ γάρ, ὡς εἴρηται, κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φαντασίαν πράττειν ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐστὶ ζῴοις, φησίν, ὅσα μὴ νοῦν ἔχει καὶ λογικὴν ψυχήν, ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ· ἄνθρωποι δὲ χρῶνται ταύτῃ ὁπόταν ἐπικαλύπτηται πάθει τινί, φησίν, ὁ νοῦς αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐστὶν | ἢ νόσοις ἢ μέθαις· τηνικαῦτα γὰρ μὴ τοῦ νοεροῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνεργοῦντος, ἐνεργεῖ τὸ φανταστικόν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πάθεσιν. * *

*

1 γὰρ M1sl 9 καθ’ αὑτὴν ] καθαυτὴν A 9–10 ση′ ὅρος φαντασίας adn. M1marg 10 μηδεμία ] μὴ δὲ μία V || δυνάμεων om. M 12 ση′ ὅρος φαντασίας adn. A1marg 13 δηλονότι A1sl : ἀποδέδεικται Atext ac (exp. A1 ) || γινομένην scripsi (licet γινομένης in 429a 2 habeant plerique codd. Arist.) : γινομένης codd. 16 ὄψεως ] ἡ φαντασία addere velim 18 τοιοῦτον ] τοιοῦτο A 19 τῇ ψυχῇ A1pc (ex τῆς ψυχῆς) 22 τοῦ om. M A 23 μέθαις Mpr 24 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A 9–15 428b 30–429a 2

15–20 429a 2–5 20–25 429a 5–8

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ways, in accordance with the perceptions themselves; for imagination is given its starting‐points and set in motion by the perceptions, as mentioned, and by the perceptible objects, from which it also derives its susceptibility of being erroneous as well as being accurate. And when it conforms to the first variety, the one to do with the special perceptible objects, an imagining is less susceptible of being erroneous, just as the perceptions themselves are, as has been mentioned, and especially if the workings of imagination ensue while the perception is still present. But when it comes to the other, latter, varieties (that is, to those in which the perception is coincidental, and in the case of the apprehension of the above‐described common objects), the imagining is highly susceptible of being erroneous, whether the perception is present or absent, whenever it [sc. imagination] subsequently remodels and imprints the results of the perception internally in its own domain. Accordingly, Aristotle sums up what 33 has been stated so far by saying that since imagination has been demonstrated to be none of the other cognitive capacities of the soul that have been described, and it has further been shown both what its origin and efficient cause is and how [it arises], his remaining option is to define and describe it as a motion – of the soul, obviously – generated by an actual perception. For on receiving the actual perceptible objects and the actual perceptions the soul is, as mentioned, subsequently moved towards the capacity for making pictures and impressions, that is, for imagining. And as one may 34 imagine, it is also from the principal sense, sight, [that the capacity] whose name, he says, comes from “light” has taken its very name, since it is not possible to see without light either. It would seem that this kind of capacity for imagining has been bestowed on the soul by nature (or, more accurately speaking, by the Creator), with a view to another, better, way of life, regimen or inner abode than the one that is based on the senses. For an animal, as mentioned, can do many things on the basis of imagination 35 itself, which is why, he says, it also serves the other animals, those which do not have an intellect and a rational soul, as a substitute for an intellect. Human beings, on the other hand, make use of imagination whenever their intellect is occluded by some affection, he says, as happens during sleep, sickness or intoxication: for although the intellective capacity is not in these circumstances active in its own right, the capacity for imagining will clearly be active during such affections. * *

*

1–3 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 508.4–6. 4–11 cf. Them. 93.16–21. Ps.-Phlp. 511.29–32. 27–31 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 511.33–36.

11–12 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 509.20–22.

22–25 cf.

20–21 The way this sentence is phrased in the Greek, it seems to suggest, nonsensically, that it is the name of sight that is derived from “light”. With a bit of good will it is perhaps just possible to interpret the sentence as it has been translated above; but I suspect, as noted in the critical apparatus, that the phrase hē phantasía (= imagination) has been omitted by oversight, on the part of the author or a scribe, between tēs ópseōs (= sight) and the relative pronoun.

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4 Ὅτι, μετὰ τὸ ἐξετάσαι τὰ περὶ φαντασίας καὶ χωρίσαι ταύτην ἀπό τε τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τιμιωτέρων γνωστικῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων καὶ ταύτην ὁρίσασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἴρηται ἑξῆς προάγων τὸν λόγον, ζητεῖ καὶ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ὃ γινώσκει καὶ φρονεῖ, ἁπλῶς οὕτω δηλονότι λέγων περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους καὶ ἐν ᾧ καταλαμβάνεται ἣν πρὸ ὀλίγου ἔλεγεν, ἡ ἁπλῶς καὶ καθόλου ὑπόληψις, οὐ περὶ αὐτοῦ μόνου τοῦτο λέγων τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ καὶ τιμιωτάτου κτήματος ἐν τῷ 2 ζῴῳ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς, ὡς εἴρηται, λογικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι φησί· ζητητέον πότερον τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον χωριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀχώριστον· αὐτὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἰρηκὼς τὸν νοῦν θεῖόν τι εἶναι καὶ παντάπασι τῶν σωματικῶν χωριστόν. ἀλλ’, ὡς εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς προτίθεται, καὶ περὶ ταύτης ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἐξετάζει πότερον χωριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀχώριστον τῶν σωματικῶν κατὰ μέγεθος, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ὑπετίθετο τὸν λόγον μὲν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ καθιδρύων, τὸν 3 θυμὸν δὲ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τῷ ἥπατι. τοῦτο νῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξετάσαι προτίθεται, πότερον χωριστόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος τοῦ σώματος ἢ ἀχώριστον μὲν κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος (ἤτοι τὸ σωματικόν), ὡς ἔνιοι ἔδοξαν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μόνον θεωρεῖται χωριζόμενον. φησὶν οὖν· ἆρα ἂν εἴη τὸ νοεῖν, ὥσπερ προελέγετο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τῷ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν; καὶ ὥσπερ ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ νοητά, ἢ ἄλλο τίποτ’ ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄλλως προσήκει καλεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ, οὐ «πάθησιν» κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ προσήκει πάντως· ἀπαθῆ γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸν νοῦν), ἀλλ’ ἢ τελείωσιν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ οὕτω καλεῖν τὸ κατ’ αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐνούσης δυνά4 μεως ἐνέργειαν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς; εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ νοητά· καὶ δῆλόν γε, ὅτι οὔτε ἀεὶ νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀεὶ νοοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο μετ’ ἄλλο καὶ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ὡς ἐρεῖν· καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸν νοῦν ὅπερ

1 περὶ ] τῆς add. M A 8 πότερον A1pc 10 ψυχῆς αὐτῆς transp. M A 16 φησὶν οὖν ] φησὶ νοῦν (ut vid.) M || ἆρα ] ἄρα M A 19 καλεῖν ] καλλεῖν M 23 νοητά ] φησι addere velim 1–16 429a 10–13 16–292.4 429a 13–18 12–13 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ὑπετίθετο : cf. Ti. 44d; 69a–70c; 70d–71e

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[Note] that, after having examined the properties of imagination, separated this capacity both from sense perception and from the other, nobler, cognitive capacities of the soul, and having defined this capacity in the way already stated, he next moves the discussion forward by inquiring what that part of the soul is by virtue of which it has cognition and understanding; and he is obviously referring in this unqualified way to the rational form of the soul, the one in which the capacity he was speaking about a short while ago, namely, belief in an unqualified and general sense, is found to exist; [that is, he is] not referring by this exclusively to the first intellect, the noblest possession in the animal, but, as mentioned, to the rational form of the soul in an unqualified sense. This is clear, since he says: “We must investigate whether this kind of 2 part is separable or inseparable.” For it was he himself who stated in the previous discussions that the intellect is something divine and entirely separate from the bodily parts. Rather, as mentioned, his agenda is focused on the rational soul, and it is with regard to this as a part of the soul that he examines whether it is separable or inseparable from the bodily parts in respect of magnitude, as Plato supposed, when he located reason in the head, spiritedness in the heart and appetite in the liver. Apparently, this 3 is what he now sets out to examine, whether reason is separable from the body or is found to be inseparable with respect to its magnitude (that is, its corporeality), as some people have believed, and only conceptually separable. Thus he asks: “Might the act of thinking – just as the act of sense perception was said above to take place through the sense’s being affected by the perceptible objects – might in the same way also the act of thinking take place through [the intellect’s] being affected by the intelligible objects? And does the intellect stand to the intelligible objects as the capacity for sense perception stands to the perceptible objects?” Or is the relation a different one in this case, so that it is appropriate to use a different term in the case of the intellect, not “being affected”, as in the case of the senses? Undeniably, it is appropriate, for the intellect must be unaffectable. Must not what takes place with it rather be the full development and actualization of the capacity inherent in the intelligible objects, and should it not be called accordingly? For [he says] that the intellect is not the forms 4 themselves, or the intelligible entities, as is also clear, since we do not always think, and do not always think of the same things, but of one thing after another and in succession, so to speak. This indicates that the intellect is potentially the same thing as

3–19 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 520.31–34; Prisc. 222.9–11. 5–13 cf. Prisc. 217.23–29; 218.10–16; 218.29–36. 5–6 cf. Phlp. 2.33–34. 13–16 cf. Them. 93.33–94.2 (who reasonably says that Plato supposed the parts of the soul to be separate from each other in respect of place); Phlp. 6.27–7.37. 19–293.5 cf. Them. 94.5–15.

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τὰ εἴδη καὶ δεκτικὸν αὐτῶν, ἀπαθῆ μὲν καὶ μὴ ἔχοντα οἰκείαν μορφήν, δεκτικὸν δὲ πάσης μορφῆς καὶ εἴδους, καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον, οὐ καθ’ αὑτὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον (ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐλέγετο πρότερον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ κοινὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κριτικόν). [5] ὥστε μηδὲ φαύλως, φησί, μηδ’ ἔξω | λόγου, πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ἀπιδόντα φάναι ἀμιγῆ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν πάντων, ὡς ἄν, φησί, πάντα «κρατῇ», τουτέστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διασαφεῖ, πάντα γνωρίζῃ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν γνωρίζοι πάντα ἔξωθεν, μή τι συνυπάρχον ἔχων· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ κωλύσει πάντως καὶ ἀντιφράξει τὴν τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἔξωθεν μετουσίαν καὶ ἀντίληψιν· ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖ, φησίν, ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτό, ἤτοι τὴν δεκτικὴν δύναμιν. καὶ τοίνυν ὁ τοιοῦτος, φησί, νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς – ἤτοι ὁ εἰρημένος κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ νοοῦμεν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, οὐχ ὁ φανταστικὸς δηλονότι νοῦς (λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ φαντασία τρόπον ἄλλον «νοῦς» καὶ «παθητικὸς» μάλιστα «νοῦς») – ὁ τοίνυν εἰρημένος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς οὐδέν ἐστι, φησίν, ἐνεργείᾳ, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐοικέναι δοκεῖ γραμματείῳ ἀγράφῳ. διατοῦτο δὴ καὶ οὐδὲ μεμιγμένος ἐστὶν ὅλως τῷ σώματι, εἴτουν τοῖς σωματικοῖς· ἄλογον γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτ’ ἦν, ποιός τις ἂν ἦν, καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ μορφὴν ἔχων σωματικόν, ψυχρός τις ἢ θερμὸς ἢ ἄλλο τι; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὀργάνῳ χρῆται σωματικῷ, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέν ἐστι, χρῆται δὲ ὅμως εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐνέργειαν σωματικοῖς ὀργάνοις· ἀλλ’ ὁ νοῦς οὐχ οὕτως, οὐδ’ ἐστὶ σωματικὸν αὐτῷ ὄργανόν τι πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ ὑπηρετούμενον· ᾗ γὰρ ἂν μετελάμβανε τῆς αὐτοῦ τοῦ σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου ποιότητος, καὶ ἐκώλυεν ἂν αὕτη συνυπάρχουσα, ὡς εἴρηται, πρὸς τὴν μετουσίαν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶν. καὶ δῆλόν γε ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οἷς ὁ νοῦς εἰκάζεται κατὰ τὸ γνωστικόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἀσώματος, σωματικοῖς δὲ χρωμένη ὀργάνοις, τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνει παθῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔχει ὁμοίαν τῷ νῷ τὴν ἀπάθειαν, ἀλλὰ προληφθεῖσα πάθει δι’ αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κωλύεται πρὸς τὴν διαδοχὴν ἑξῆς τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας καὶ τὴν τῶν διαφόρων αἰσθητῶν ἀντίληψιν. καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντων αἰσθητῶν, οἷον τῶν

1 μὴ M1sl 3 ὥσπερ A1sl : οἶον Atext 4 μηδὲ correxi : μὴ δὲ codd. || μηδ’ correxi : μὴ δ’ codd. 6 γνωρίζῃ ] γνωρίζει M A 7 γνωρίζοι correxi : γνωρίζη codd. 8 ἐπ’ ] ἀπ’ A 12 γὰρ ] δὲ M 14 γραμματείῳ correxi (cf. infra 3.4.22) : γραμματίω codd. (sed ut vid. γραμματείω Aac ) 16 ἦν² V1?pc (ex ἦ) 19 αὐτῷ A1sl 22 ἀπὸ² om. M A 4–10 429a 18–22

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the forms, and is capable of receiving them, since it is, to be sure, unaffectable and without a shape of its own, but is still capable of receiving every shape and form, and is potentially of such a character as each form is, although it is not in itself of such a character (the same account was earlier applied to sense perception, since being capable of cognition and discernment is indeed common to both). Therefore it was neither inept, he says, nor unreasonable of Anaxagoras to maintain, with reference to the above‐described, that the intellect is not mixed with anything, in order, he says, to “rule over” everything, that is to say, as Aristotle himself clarifies, to have cognition of everything. For on this condition it may have cognition of everything outside of it: if it does not have anything that coexists with it. For if such a thing is present along with it, this will inevitably prevent and block the availability and apprehension of that which is extraneous and outside. Consequently, he says, there must not be anything in it except the very possibility, that is, the capacity to receive. Accordingly, he says, this kind of intellect that belongs to the soul – that is, the above‐described intellect in the rational sphere of the soul, by means of which we think, as mentioned, and hold beliefs; that is to say, not the intellect capable of forming images (for in a different sense imagination, too, is said to be “intellect”, more precisely “affectable intellect”) – the above‐described intellect that belongs to the soul, then, is nothing, he says, in actuality, before it thinks, but it seems to resemble a writing‐tablet without writing. Because of this it is not at all mixed with the body either, that is, with the bodily parts. For this [would be] unreasonable: if it were so, of what character would it be, in case it had some bodily form and shape, cold, hot or something else? No, it does not even use a bodily organ, in the way in which the capacity for sense perception, which is certainly part of the soul, nevertheless uses bodily organs for its own inherent activity: the intellect, however, does not, and it has no bodily organ to assist it in its business and its activity. For no matter how it would participate in the quality of the bodily organ itself, this quality would also, if it coexisted with it, as mentioned, be a hindrance to the availability to it of other forms. And this is clear already from [a comparison with] sense perception and the perceptible objects, to which the intellect is compared with regard to its cognitive capacity: the sense, for its part, being in itself incorporeal, but employing bodily organs, participates in the affections deriving from the latter, and its unaffectability is not like that of the intellect; rather, when it is already taken up with affection on account of the sense organs, it is hindered from subsequently continuing with its own activity and thus from apprehending the different perceptible objects. This is obvious in the case of intense and excessive perceptible objects, for

5–12 cf. Them. 94.20–24. 13–295.8 cf. Them. 94.27–95.3. 19 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 524.13–14. 22–24 cf. Phlp. 12.92–93. 30–31 cf. Phlp. 17.16–20. 31–32 cf. Phlp. 18.26–27. 32–35 cf. Phlp. 18.30–35.

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μεγάλων ψόφων ἢ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων ἢ τῶν ὀσμῶν· προληφθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετικῶν αἰσθητηρίων (οἷον ὑπὸ ψόφου μεγάλου, ὡς εἴρηται, ἡ ἀκοή, ὑπὸ λαμπροῦ χρώματος ἡ ὄψις, ὑπὸ σφοδρᾶς ὀσμῆς βαρυτάτης ἢ δριμυτάτης ἡ ὄσφρησις), οὐ δύναται λοιπὸν ἔπειτα αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ἀτονωτέρων καὶ ἐκλελυμένων μεθύστερον αἰσθητῶν, οὐδ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, κάτοχος ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ σφοδροτέρων αἰσθητῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, γινομένη, ὧν τὰ ἴχνη παραμένοντα τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐκκρούει τῆς τῶν ἄλλων, | ὡς εἴρηται, μορφῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ μετουσίαν καὶ πρόσληψιν. ἀλλ’ ὁ νοῦς οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τῶν μεγίστων νοημάτων ἐνέργειαν οἷός τέ ἐστιν ἔτι αὐτίκα καὶ τῶν εὐτελεστέρων ἅπτεσθαι νοημάτων ἄσχολος ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ ἀπόλυτος καὶ ἀκώλυτος· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀχώριστος τῶν σωματικῶν, ὁ νοῦς δὲ παντάπασίν ἐστιν αὐτῶν χωριστὸς μηδεμίαν ἐντεῦθεν ἔχων προσκοπὴν εἰς τὴν πάντων ἀντίληψιν καὶ ὑποδοχήν. ὅθεν δή, φησί, καὶ εὐλόγως εἴρηται τόπον τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τῶν εἰδῶν· εἴρηται δὲ τοῦτο τῷ Πλάτωνι οὐ περὶ πάσης, φησίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ νοητικῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐχ ὡς ἀγγεῖόν τι περιέχον αὐτά, ἀλλ’ ὡς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν δεκτικὴν οὖσαν αὐτῶν καὶ γινομένην πως αὐτὰ ἃ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ὁ μέντοι δυνάμει τοιοῦτος νοῦς ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν – ἤτοι νηπίοις – καὶ ἀγυμνάστοις, κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον δηλονότι τοῦ δυνάμει, ὡς ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται, ὅταν θεωρῆται κατ’ αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα ἐκτὸς τῆς παντελοῦς ἕξεως (ὡς λέγεται τὸ βρέφος τόδε δυνάμει ἀγωνιστὴς εἶναι κατὰ τὸ φυσικῶς ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τοῦτο)· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τελειότητι ἕξεως γένηται καὶ οἷός τε καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ τὰ καθόλου θεωρητὰ συναγαγὼν καὶ γενόμενος ἀνενδεὴς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστα διδασκαλίας τινὸς ἔξωθεν καὶ γυμνασίας, καὶ τηνικαῦτα πάλιν δυνάμει, κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει, ὅταν τὴν ἕξιν ἔχων τις οὐκ ἐνεργῇ, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως, φησίν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βρέφος ὁμοίως ἐπιστῆμον δυνάμει καὶ ὁ ἐπιστήμων τελείως κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν δυνάμει λέγεται ὅταν μὴ ἐνεργῇ τὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοὸς τὸ δυνάμει διπλῶς

3 δριμυτάτης ] M1ras (‑ι-, ut vid. ex -υ‑) 6 τῆς V1pc (ut vid. ex τις) A1pc (ut vid. ex τις) 10 ἀπόλυτος καὶ ἀκώλυτος ] ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπόλυτος M A 11 μηδεμίαν ] μὴ δὲ μίαν V 15 αὐτῶν ] αὐτῶ M 18 θεωρῆται ] θεωρεῖται M 12–16 429a 27–29 16–296.14 429b 5–9

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instance, loud sounds or strong colours or odours. For if the sense is already taken up throughout its subsidiary sense organs (for instance, if hearing is taken up, as mentioned, with a loud sound, sight with a brilliant colour, smell with an intensely rank or pungent odour), then it will not be able subsequently to perceive the less intense and fainter perceptible objects or to be moved by them, since it has been occupied by the previous, more intense perceptible objects, as mentioned, the traces of which remain in the sense and block the activity, availability and apprehensibility of the shape of the other perceptible objects in the sense, as mentioned. But with the intellect it is 9 not like that: rather, even subsequent to the activity of the most considerable intelligible objects it is still immediately capable of grasping also more trivial intelligible objects, being unoccupied, unrestrained and unimpeded by the previous ones. The explanation is that while the sense capacity is not inseparable from the bodily parts, the intellect is entirely separate from them and is in no way obstructed by them with respect to its apprehension and reception of all things. For this reason, he says, the 10 statement that the soul is a place of the forms was apt. However, it was not about the whole soul, he says, that Plato made this statement, but about its perceptive and intellective capacities, not as though it were some kind of vessel containing the forms, but in the sense that it is capable of receiving them in actuality and that it somehow becomes the very objects that it thinks and perceives. This sort of potential intellect, 11 then, on the one hand, exists even in [human beings] that are undeveloped – that is, infants — and untrained, evidently in the first sense of “potential”, which was defined in the preceding discussions, [and which applies] when a thing is considered solely in terms of the suitability, in abstraction from the fully developed competence (as this child is said to be potentially a champion in the sense of having the natural suitability for this). On the other hand, when it has reached the full development of a competence and is capable of being active by itself, once it has both collected the universal objects of contemplation and become independent of any external teaching and training for its particular activities, then, too, it is again potential, this time in the second sense of “potential”, [which applies] when someone who has the competence is inactive, but not, he says, in the same sense as previously. For nor is a child said to have knowledge potentially in the same sense in which a person who has fully developed knowledge in the sense of a competence is said to have knowledge potentially whenever he is not actively using it. In the same way, then, potentiality is manifested in two ways in the

11–14 cf. Them. 95.4–5. 15–19 cf. Them. 95.5–9; Ps.-Phlp. 524.6–16; Phlp. 14.29–45. 19–21 cf. Them. 95.9–10. 25–28 cf. Them. 95.10–17. 33–297.3 The passage is obscurely phrased, but the point seems to be that it is only with reference to an intellect that has reached its “second potentiality” that it is appropriate to speak of its two potentialities.

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θεωρεῖται, ὅταν μέν γε ἐπὶ τῆς τελειότητος τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γένηται καί, δυνάμει γε 12 ὢν καὶ αὖθις ὅπερ τὰ νοητά, ἐνεργείᾳ γίνηται ὅπερ αὐτὰ ἑκάστοτε. τηνικαῦτα δὲ καὶ

ἑαυτὸν κατὰ κύκλον πως ἐπιστρεπτικῶς νοεῖν ὡς νοητὸν δύναται, ὃ δὴ μόνον ἴδιον τῷ νοεῖν τῶν ἄλλων γνωστικῶν δυνάμεων· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τοῦτον ἐρεῖν ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὁ νοῦς αὐτός τι ἐνεργείᾳ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ νοήματα, ὅταν νοῇ ὁ αὐτὸς γενόμενος τοῖς νοουμένοις, τηνικαῦτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν μόνην ἔχῃ, τὰ νοήματα ὥσπερ ἐναποκείμενά πώς ἐστιν αὐτῷ· ὅταν δὲ νοῇ, αὐτός ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ ἃ νοεῖ (καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τὸ νοούμενον δηλονότι)· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὰ ἐπιστητά (ἤτοι ἡ γεωμετρία οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὰ γεωμετρικὰ θεωρήματα)· καὶ V173v ὁ νοῦς παρα- | πλησίως αὐτά ἐστι τὰ νοήματα, καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἠρεμούσης ὡσαύτως ἔχει τὰ θεωρήματα, κινηθείσης δὲ τῆς ἕξεως ἐνεργείᾳ τέ ἐστι τὰ θεωρήματα καὶ αὐτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα τὸ θεωροῦν· ὡσαύτως δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἔχει καὶ τὰ νοήματα, ὅταν ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ἕξει ᾖ ἢ καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ· καὶ τοίνυν, τὸ αὐτὸ ὢν ὅπερ τὰ αὐτοῦ νοήματα, ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ ἐνεργῶν καὶ νοῶν ἅττα δὴ ὅπερ αὐτὸς δηλονότι ἐστίν. Ὅτι, ἑξῆς βουλόμενος τῆς νοητικῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως διαφορὰς δηλῶσαι, φησὶν ὡς ἐπεὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕκαστον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρούμενον εἶδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν οἷον σύνθετον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μόνον καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (οἷον ἄλλο ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὕδατι εἶναι, ἤτοι ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ὕδατος· καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέγεθος, ἤτοι τὸ σωματικὸν ὁτιοῦν μέγεθος, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι, ἤτοι 14 ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ μεγέθους) – ἐπ’ ἐνίων γε μήν, φησί, συμβαίνει καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀύλων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ νοητὸν ὡς ὑποκείμενον ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ὁ λόγος· ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀύλων· οὐδὲν γὰρ 15 ἄλλο ἡ στιγμὴ ὡς ὑποκείμενόν τι ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος τῆς στιγμῆς – ὅμως, ἐπεί, φησίν, ἐπὶ πλείστων διαστέλλεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ἀπο13

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case of the intellect, too, once it has reached its full development in the sense of a competence and, since it is, once again, potentially the same thing as the intelligible objects, becomes in actuality the same thing as these are on each given occasion. At 12 that point it also has the ability, by a sort of circular turnabout, to think of itself as an intelligible object, which is a special feature exclusively of thinking among all the cognitive capacities. In fact, one could also put it in the following way: since the intellect itself is not anything in actuality apart from its thoughts, [it follows that] when it thinks, having become identical with the things of which it thinks, then it also thinks of itself. For when it only has the competence, the thoughts are as it were deposited in it; but when it thinks, it itself is actually what it thinks of (and, evidently, whatever each of the things that it thinks of is). For scientific knowledge, too, is nothing else than the things that are scientifically known (that is to say, geometry is nothing else than the geometrical theorems). Similarly, the intellect is the thoughts themselves, and as long as the competence is inactive, the same is true of the objects of contemplation, but once the competence is set in motion, the objects of contemplation are activated and that which contemplates is itself these. So the intellect is in the same situation as its thoughts, when it is only in a state of competence as well as when it is being active. Accordingly, since the intellect is identical with its own thoughts, it also thinks of itself when it is being active and thinking of things which, evidently, are the same thing that it itself is. [Note] that, as he next wants to elucidate the different divisions of the intellec- 13 tive capacity itself, he says that since each underlying thing is one thing and the form manifested in it is another thing, and the former is like a composite of matter and form, while the latter is only the form and the account of the underlying thing (as, for instance, the underlying water composed of matter and form is one thing, and what it is for water to be is another thing, namely, the account and the form of water; and the magnitude is one thing, namely, some bodily magnitude or other, and what it is for a magnitude to be is another thing, namely, the account and the form of the magnitude) – it is true, he says, that in some cases both of these coincide and are the same, 14 as in the case of intelligible and immaterial things; for an intelligible thing is not anything else in its capacity of underlying thing than the form itself and the account, and the same also applies to immaterial things, for a point is not any other thing in its capacity of underlying thing than the account of a point — but still, he says, since in 15 very many cases the underlying thing composed of matter and form and the form itself are different, it is worth raising the problem of whether it is the same intellect that

6–16 cf. Them. 95.19–28. 31–33 cf. Them. 96.6–7.

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ρητέον πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς νοῦς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κρίνει ὁ νοῦς ἀμφότερα ἢ 16 ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ (εἴτουν ἄλλως τὸ μὲν κρίνει καὶ ἄλλως θάτερον). καὶ τοίνυν ταῦτ’ ἀπο-

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ρήσας καὶ ζητήσας προσίεται ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ ταῦτ’ ἀμφότερα κρίνεσθαι· τὰ μὲν ἔνυλα καὶ σύνθετα μετὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς κρίνει, καὶ ἔστιν εἰς τοῦτο ἡ αἰσθητικὴ καὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ νοὸς δύναμις ἅμα καὶ τῇ φανταστικῇ· τὸ γὰρ κρῖνον ἐν τούτοις μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς συζύγου αὐτῇ φαντασίας κρίνει· τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἄυλον ὂν ἀύλως κρίνει ἀποχρῶν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μόνῳ. ἄλλως οὖν καὶ ἄλλως ἑκάτερον κρίνων καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δὲ χωριστός, ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἔοικε, φησί, τῇ γραμμῇ νῦν μὲν κατ’ εὐθεῖαν τεινομένῃ, νῦν δέ πως οὐ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν ὁρωμένῃ ἀλλὰ κλωμένῃ πως καὶ περιστρεφομένῃ διαφόρως ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ· ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὑπόδειγμα καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν τὸ σύνθετον ὡς σύνθετον καταλαμβάνῃ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὡς εἶδος τῇ μορφῇ συνεξομοιούμενος καὶ αὐτά, ὡς εἴρηται, γινόμενος τὰ πράγματα ἃ νοεῖ, ποτὲ μὲν ὥσπερ σύνθετος γίνεται, ἐοικὼς τῇ κεκλασμένῃ γραμμῇ, | ποτὲ δὲ ὡς ἁπλοῦς, ἐοικὼς τῇ εὐθείᾳ· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς συνθέτοις θεωρία ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς σιμότητός ἐστιν ὁ ὅρος· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι τὴν σιμότητα ἄνευ τῆς ῥινός, ἤτοι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐν ᾧ ἐστι. καὶ μήν, φησί, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ἤτοι τὰ μαθηματικά, παραπλησίως πως ἔχει· ἄλλο γάρ φησι τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι, ἤτοι ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ εὐθέος καὶ τῆς εὐθύτητος ᾗ εὐθύτης καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ τὸ εὐθύ· μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ, φησίν, ὁρᾶται καὶ ἐν μεγέθει τόδε τι ὁρᾶται καὶ ἔστι τὸ εὐθύ, ἤτοι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, κατὰ τὸ σιμόν. ὥστε, φησί, κἀνταῦθα ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως κρίνει ὁ νοῦς· νῦν μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ συνθέτου ἐξομοιούμενος τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ (ἤτοι τῷ εὐθεῖ εἶναι, εἴτουν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς εὐθύτητος, μετὰ τοῦ συνεχοῦς αὐτοῦ, ἤτοι τοῦ μεγέθους)· νῦν δὲ ἁπλῶς ὡς τοῦ εἴδους αὐτοῦ μόνου κριτὴς καὶ

4–5 αἰσθητικὴ καὶ κριτικὴ ] κριτικὴ καὶ αἰσθητικὴ M A 5 κρῖνον correxi : κρίνον codd. 8 τοῦ M1sl || χωριστός ] χωριστῶς M A (fort. recte) 9 τεινομένῃ scripsi (secundum Arist. 429b 17 et praesertim Them. 96.21) : κινουμένη codd. 13 γινόμενος τὰ πράγματα ] τὰ πράγματα γινόμενος A 15 σιμότητός ἐστιν ] σημότητος ἐ M (in fine lineae) 16–17 ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ] ἐξαφαιρέσεως V M 17 πως ] πῶς V 21 ἐξομοιούμενος ] ἐξ ὁμοιούμενος M A 7–16 429b 14–18 16–300.3 429b 18–22

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pertains to both, and whether the intellect discerns both by the same [subcapacity] or by different ones (that is, discerns the one in one way and the other in another way). Accordingly, having raised these problems and questions, he accepts that these two [types of cognitive object] are discerned by different [subcapacities]. Those things that are enmattered and compounded with matter are also discerned by the intellect itself, and it is to this end that the perceptive and discerning capacity of the intellect exists together with the capacity for imagination, for what does the discerning in these cases does it in conjunction with sense perception and its partner, imagination. But the form, being immaterial, is immaterially discerned by the intellect itself relying only on itself. In discerning each thing in a different way, then, the one in conjunction with the capacity for sense perception, the other separately, while being the same, [the intellect] is comparable, he says, to a line, which is now drawn straight, now seen to be not straight, somehow, but bent, somehow, and curved in a different way from the straight line. For it is the same line, but conceptually it is now like this, now like that. And so, in accordance with the illustration, the intellect, too, when it apprehends the composite as a composite and the form as a form, by being assimilated to their shapes and becoming, as mentioned, the very entities of which it thinks, now becomes, as it were, composite and comparable to the bent line, now, as it were, simple and comparable to the straight line. For as applied to these composite things, its contemplation is comparable to the way the definition applies to snubness. For it is not possible to define snubness in isolation from the nose, that is, the underlying thing in which it exists. Moreover, he says, the situation is roughly the same for things formed by abstraction, that is, mathematical objects. For what is straight and what it is to be for what is straight are different things, he says: that is to say, the account of the straight, or of straightness qua straightness, is one thing and the underlying straight thing itself is another. For what is straight, that is, the underlying thing, is seen in conjunction with a continuum, he says, and is seen as – and is – a certain “this” in a magnitude, in the manner of the snub. Consequently, he says, in this case, too, the intellect discerns one thing in one way and another thing in another way: on the one hand, as in the case of the composite thing, by being assimilated to the underlying thing (that is, to what it is for the straight to be, that is, to the account of straightness, in conjunction with the continuum, that is, the magnitude); on the other hand, simply by being conformed, as a discerner and inspector of the form itself alone. And generally speaking, as it is

3–10 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 529.17–26. 7–8 cf. Them. 96.11–13. 10–14 cf. Them. 96.18–22. 15–19 cf. Them. 96.24–27. 22–33 cf. Them. 96.30–97.1; Ps.-Phlp. 531.8–15. 12 which is now drawn straight: the translation is based on the conjecture teinoménēi, here “drawn”; the MSS unanimously report kinouménē, “moved”.

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ἐπόπτης συμμορφούμενος. καὶ καθόλου γε ἐρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ὡς ταῦτα τῷ λόγῳ χωρίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ λόγῳ χωρίζεται τῷ κρίνειν καὶ οἱονεί πως, ὡς διώρισται, τῷ συμμορφοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ὅτι ἑξῆς ἀπορεῖ δύο τινά· ἓν μὲν ὡς ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ μηδὲν ὅλως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχων κοινόν, πῶς ἄρα νοήσει, εἴ γε τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν; τοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντός ἐστι πάντως κοινόν τι, καθ’ ὃ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει· καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν καταλαμβάνεται ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ παθητικόν, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων αὐτῶν· ἐν γὰρ αὐτῇ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐγγίνεται διὰ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ πάθος· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ὅτι μὴ οὕτως γίνεσθαι ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ μέσῳ ἀμφοῖν κοινῷ, ὡς εἴρηται, τοῦ μὲν τὸ πάσχειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν· ὥστε εἰ καὶ ὁ νοῦς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, εἴη ἂν οὕτω οὐκ ἀμιγὴς οὐδ’ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἔνυλος, 21 εἴτουν σύνθετος ἐξ ὕλης τινὸς καὶ εἴδους. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀπόρημα καὶ ζήτημα τοιοῦτον· ἐπιλύεται δὲ τοῦτο λέγων ὡς οὐ κυρίως οὐδ’ οἰκείως ἔστι λέγειν ἐνταῦθα πάσχειν τὸν νοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν· τὸ γὰρ «πάσχειν» ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἂν λέγοιτο, ὡς κατά τι κοινόν, φησίν, ὄνομα (εἴτουν ὁμωνύμως)· ὅπου γε καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου οὐδὲ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὸ «πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν» κυρίως διωρίσατο λέγεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως πως χρῆναι καλεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα μεταξύ τε αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κοινοῦ τινος θεωρουμένου, καθ’ ὃ ποιῇ ἂν ἴσως τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ πάσχῃ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· σωματικὰ γάρ πως καὶ ἔνυλα τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ ἐν σωματικοῖς – τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις – ποιV174v εῖ. [22] ἀλλά γε μὴν οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα κυρίως προσίετο | λέγειν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ «πάσχειν». εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων οὕτω, πολλῷ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ «πάσχειν» κυρίως ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν τὰ νοητὰ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τελειωτικὸν τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ νοῦ ὥστε εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ ὅπερ τὰ νοητά, καθὼς προείρηται, δυνάμει ὄντα πρότερον· διώρισται γὰρ ἤδη πρότερον ὡς ὁ νοῦς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο πρότερον, πρὶν ἢ 20

1 ἐρεῖν V1pc (ex ἐρεῖ) 6 γε ] τε A 15 οἰκείως ] οἱκείως M 16 ἂν om. A 17 κοινόν, φησίν ] φησὶ κοινὸν M A 19 τε αὐτῶν transp. M A (fort. recte) 20 καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ A || ποιῇ ] ποιεῖ M Aac || πάσχῃ A1pc (ex πάσχει) 23 ἐπὶ ] ὑπὸ A 26 ἐστιν ἄλλο ] ἄλλο ἐστὶ M A 4–14 429b 23–26

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with the entities, so too with the intellect: as the former are conceptually separable, so, too, the [subcapacities] of the intellect are conceptually separable, according as they discern and are, as it were, conformed to the former, as has been described.

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[Note] that he next raises two problems, the first being that since, according to 20 Anaxagoras and according to Aristotle himself, the intellect is simple, unaffected and unmixed, and has nothing at all in common with other things, how, then, will it think, if it is true that to think is to be affected by the intelligible objects, just as to perceive is to be affected by the perceptible objects? For there must in any event be something that is common to what acts and to what is affected, by virtue of which the one acts and the other is affected. And it is in that [common thing] that the one is found to be such as to act and the other to be such as to be affected, as is seen in the case of the enmattered things themselves. For it is in the matter, or substrate, of the thing affected, that the affection is brought about through the thing that acts. And the one thing’s being affected and the other thing’s acting cannot take place in any other way than as described, in some such intermediate thing common to both, as stated. Consequently, if the intellect, too, is in the same way affected by the intelligible objects, it will for this reason be neither unmixed nor simple, but like an enmattered thing, that is, a composite of some matter and a form. Such is the first problem and question. He resolves it 21 by saying that one cannot say in a strict and proper sense that in this case the intellect is affected by the intelligible objects. For the expression “being affected” may be used in different ways, by virtue of some common name, he says (that is, ambiguously): after all, a little while ago he determined that even in the case of the senses themselves it is not appropriate to say that they are affected by the perceptible objects, but some other expression ought to be used, despite the fact that some common thing is manifested between the senses themselves and the perceptible objects, by virtue of which, presumably, the perceptible objects will act and the capacity for sense perception will be affected; for perceptible objects are somehow corporeal and enmattered, and act on the sense organs, which are corporeal. And yet not even in this case does Aristotle 22 accept that “being affected” is used in its proper sense. But if this is true in the case of the senses and the perceptible objects, then “being affected” must be all the more improperly applied to the intellect and the intelligible objects: rather, thinking of the intelligible objects does nothing other than bring about the full development of the potentiality of the intellect, resulting in the latter being in actuality the same thing as the intelligible objects, as stated above, having previously been so potentially. For it has already been determined that the intellect, prior to thinking, is nothing other than

15–18 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 532.25–27; Phlp. 30.8–11. 19–21 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 526.29–30; 533.15–17; Phlp. 31.39–40; 31.50. 21–34 cf. Them. 97.15–31.

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νοεῖν, ἢ δύναμις μόνον καὶ δεκτικὸν τῶν εἰδῶν (εἴτουν ἑκάστων τῶν νοητῶν), ὥσπερ γραμματεῖον, φησί, μὴ καταγεγραμμένον ἀλλ’ ἕτοιμον κατεσκευασμένον εἰς τὴν τῶν γραφησομένων ὑποδοχήν· τὸ μέντοι δυνάμει εἶναι τὸν νοῦν κατὰ τὸ διπλοῦν τοῦ δυνάμει διώρισται· ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀτελῶν κατ’ αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα, ὡς τὸ βρέφος δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστῆμον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τελειωθέντων κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, ὡς λέγεται ὁ ἐπιστήμων, ὅταν μὴ ἐνεργῇ, δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζητηθὲν καὶ ἀποδοθέν, καὶ οἵας διακρίσεως ἔτυχε παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, εἴρηται· ἕτερον δ’ αὖθις ἀπορεῖ καὶ ζητεῖ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ νοητόν, πῶς ἐστι νοητόν; εἰ μὲν καθὸ νοῦς ἐστι νοητόν, καὶ ἀντιστρόφως καθὸ νοητὸν νοῦς ἐστιν, ἐπειδή, καθὼς καὶ δῆλόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Ἀποδεικτικῇ λέγει καὶ διορίζεται, τὸ «καθὸ» ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ λοιπὸν ἔσται καὶ καθὸ νοητὸς νοῦς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἔνυλα καθὸ νοητά – νοητὰ γάρ – ἔσονται καὶ νόες (οἷον φυτά, λίθοι καὶ τἄλλα), εἴ γε ἓν τί ποτέ ἐστι τῷ εἴδει τὸ νοητόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διάφορον τῷ λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ μὴ νοητόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καθὸ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλο τι, ἔσται τις μίξις αὖθις ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ διαφορότης καθ’ ὃ νοῦς καταλαμβάνεται καὶ καθ’ ὃ νοεῖται, καὶ σύνθετος οἱονεί πως καὶ αὖθις οὐκ ἀμιγὴς οὐδ’ ἁπλοῦς. ἀλλ’ ἐπιλύεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ζήτημα λέγων ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως τὸ «νοητὸν» καταλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ ὡς κοινόν τι πάλιν θεωρεῖσθαι ὄνομα τὸ «νοητὸν» ἐπὶ διαφόρων, καὶ κυρίως μὲν εἶναι τὸ «νοητὸν» ἐπὶ τῶν ἀύλων, ἔνθα καὶ ὁ νοῦς δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὅπερ αὐτὰ τὰ νοητά. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, φησί, τῶν νοητῶν αὐτῶν θεωρημάτων τῶν ἔξω τῆς ὕλης οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὅπερ αὐτὰ τὰ θεωρήματα τὰ νοητά, κἀνταῦθα ταυτόν ἐστί πως ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητόν, καὶ ὅ τε νοῦς νοητὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν νοῦς· δυνάμει γάρ ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, ὁ νοῦς ὅπερ τὰ νοητά, καὶ νοητόν πως αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ· νοεῖ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστρεπτικῶς οὕτω πως, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰς ἑαυτὸν κυκλοῖ, ὃ μόνον ἴδιον τοῦ νοός, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς γνωστικοῦ ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐνύλων νοητῶν, ὧν ἀχώριστός ἐστιν

6 ὁ om. A || ἐπιστήμων¹ A1pc (ex ἐπιστῆμον) 8 καθὸ ] καθ’ ὃ M 10 αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ] ὁ ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὸς A || διορίζεται ] δι’ ὁρίζεται M 11 νοητὸς ] νοητὸν M A 12 γάρ om. M A 14 καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ M A 15 καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ M A || ἁπλοῦς ] ὁ νοῦς (ἔσται) addere velim 17 διαφόρων M1pc (ex διάφορον) 19 ἔξω ] ἕξω M 20 ἐστί πως ] πως ἐστὶν M A 21 ὅ τε νοῦς ] ὅτε ὁ νοῦς M 6–15 429b 26–29 15–304.4 430a 2–9 10 ἐν τῇ Ἀποδεικτικῇ : fort. APo 1.4, 73a 34–b 5?

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a mere potentiality and a capacity for receiving the forms (that is, the individual intelligible objects), like a writing‐tablet, he says, which has not yet been written upon but has been prepared so as to be ready for receiving the things that will be written. However, the intellect’s “being potentially” has been defined in accordance with the double meaning of “potential”: in the case of undeveloped things, in the sense of a mere natural suitability, as a child has knowledge potentially; in the case of things that have been fully developed, in the sense of a competence, as someone who has knowledge is said to have it potentially whenever he is not active. Well, the first question to be asked and answered has been stated, as well as the nature of the solution afforded by Aristotle. Next in turn he raises another problem and asks: “If the intellect is also an intelligible object, in what way is it intelligible?” If it is intelligible by virtue of being an intellect, then, conversely, it is also an intellect by virtue of being intelligible. For, as is clear in itself and as Aristotle says and lays down in the Posterior Analytics, “by virtue of” is convertible, and thus it will also be an intellect, by virtue of being intelligible. But if so, then all enmattered objects, too, by virtue of being intelligible (for they are intelligible), will also be intellects (for instance, plants, stones and the rest), assuming that what is intelligible is one thing in kind and not conceptually differentiated. But if the intellect is not intelligible by virtue of being an intellect, but by virtue of something else, then, on the other hand, that by virtue of which it is apprehended as an intellect and that by virtue of which it is an intelligible object will form a sort of mixture and diversity in it, and it will be, as it were, composite, somehow, and again it will be neither unmixed nor simple. He resolves this question, too, by saying that “intelligible” is understood in different senses and that “intelligible”, too, is found to be a name jointly applied to different things: in its proper sense [, he says, ] “intelligible” applies to immaterial things, and in this domain the intellect is potentially the same thing as the intelligible objects themselves. For knowledge, he says, of those intelligible objects of contemplation that are unconnected with matter is nothing other than precisely what the intelligible objects of contemplation themselves are. So in this case the intellect and the intelligible object are in a way identical: the intellect is an intelligible object and the intelligible object is an intellect. For, as has been repeatedly stated, the intellect is potentially the same thing as the intelligible objects, and is in a way itself an intelligible object of itself. For it thinks of itself and thus reverts to itself, as mentioned, in a sort of circle, which is a special feature only of the intellect and not of any other cognitive capacity. But when it comes to enmattered intelligible objects,

3–8 cf. Prisc. 235.14–17. 11–15 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 527.12–15. 15–18 cf. Phlp. c. 30.24–28; 35.37–43; Ps.-Phlp. 532.31–33. 18–22 cf. Phlp. 31.31–36; Ps.-Phlp. 527.8–10; 527.21–22; 533.6–11. 22–26 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 527.32–35; 533.4–6; Phlp. 33.97–34.99. 26–28 cf. Phlp. 41.54–65. 28–305.7 cf. Them. 97.34–98.4; Ps.-Phlp. 533.21–25; 534.3–5; Phlp. 33.97–34.2; 40.49–52. 32–33 cf. Prisc. 236.23–26.

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304 | Theodoros Metochites

ἡ ἀντίληψις τῆς αἰσθήσεως αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς ἐμφύτου φαντασίας, ἄλλως πως λέγεται καὶ V175r καταλαμβάνεται τὸ «νοητόν» ᾗ δυνάμει χωρίζει ταῦτα ὁ νοῦς τῆς ὕλης· | ταύτῃ γὰρ ἂν

καὶ εἴη μόνως ταῦτα νοητά, ἤτοι δυνάμει νοητά, οὐχ ἁπλῶς νοητά· ὁ δέ γε νοῦς κατὰ τὸ φύσει ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἀμιγὲς τῆς ὕλης νοητὸς ὄντως ἐστὶν ἑαυτῷ. * *

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the apprehension of which is inseparable from sense perception itself and the naturally connected type of imagination, the word “intelligible” is used and understood in a different sense of the capacity by which the intellect separates these objects from their matter: for only in this sense may these objects indeed be intelligible, namely, potentially intelligible, not intelligible without qualification. Intellect, on the other hand, in keeping with its natural simplicity and freedom from admixture of matter, is in a real sense intelligible to itself. * *

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1–2 sense perception itself and the naturally connected type of imagination: this translation might require the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus (sumphútou). The word émphutos, which is the reading of the MSS, properly means “inborn”, “connatural”; it is, however, used by Metochites, interchangeably with súmphutos, in 2.8, for the air inside the ear, which is naturally connected with the organ of hearing.

306 | Theodoros Metochites

5 Ὅτι ἑξῆς προτίθεται διαλαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ νοῦ ἐν τῷ δυνάμει, ὡς διώρισται, νῷ, ἤτοι τοῦ τελείου καὶ τελειωτικοῦ αὐτοῦ· καὶ τοίνυν φησὶν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ πάντων κατὰ φύσιν τὸ μέν ἐστί τι ὕλη – ὡς ἔστι πρόδηλον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων τῶν τε φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν· ὕλη γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῖς φυσικοῖς καὶ ὕλη τοῖς τεχνικοῖς ὡσαύτως οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα τῇ οἰκίᾳ – ὅπερ οὖν ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἐπεὶ τὸ μέν τί ἐστιν ὕλη, ὅπερ αὐτό ἐστι δύναμις μόνον (ἡ γὰρ ὕλη, ὡς ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῷ διώρισται, λόγον δυνάμεως μόνον ἔχει ἀορισταίνουσα), τὸ δέ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ – ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη δυνάμει τὰ πάντα, τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ, ἔφημεν, ἡ τέχνη ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ – ὥσπερ ἄρα ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχει, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὡς ἀνάλογον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν τῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὕλῃ, οὐ μὴν ἄχρι τοῦ πεφυκέναι μόνον καὶ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν τὸν σκοπὸν εἶναι τῆς φύσεως (μάτην γὰρ τοῦτο), 2 ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίως ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ εὐφυΐᾳ καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητι καὶ τὸ τέλειον. καὶ λοιπὸν ἐξανάγκης ἐστὶ τὸ τελειοποιοῦν τὸ δυνάμει· τελειοῦται δὲ οὐδὲν ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου, ὥστε ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ταύτας, καὶ τὸν μὲν εἶναι νοῦν οἷον δυνάμει τὰ πάντα (τὸ ἀνάλογον τῇ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὕλῃ), τὸν δὲ εἶναι τὸν τελειωτικόν, τὸν πάντα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ποιοῦντα ἃ δυνάμει ἐστίν, ὃν τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον συμπλοκῇ τελειοποιοῦντα ὡς ἕξιν τινὰ αὐτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ οἷόν ἐστι, φησί, τὸ φῶς ἐν τοῖς δυνάμει χρώμασι· τοῦτο γὰρ κυριώτερον εἰς τὸ παραδειγματίζειν, ἵνα μή τις αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ τῆς ἕξεως ἴδιον ἀνούσιόν τε πάμπαν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρούμενον νομίσῃ· τὸ γάρ τοι φῶς αὐτό τι ὄν, φησί, τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐπιδημοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ 3 ποιεῖ χρώματα καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ποιητικόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει, ὡς φῶς τι συμπλεκόμενον αὐτῷ τελειοποιεῖ, καὶ κατασκευάζει

2 ἐπειδὴ ] ἐπεὶ δὴ M A 5 τί om. M 10 ἀνάλογον ] ἔχει add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 12–13 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 19 τῆς om. M 20 τοι ] τι A || ὄν ] ὃν M 22 τὸν V1pc (ex τὸ) || συμπλεκόμενον ] συμπλεκόμενος V et ut vid. Apc (ex -ον) || τελειοποιεῖ ] τελειωποιεῖ A 1–308.5 430a 10–17

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[Note] that he next undertakes to deal with the productive intellect within the intellect that is potential in the sense defined, that is, with the part of it that is fully developed and which brings about full development. Accordingly, he says that since of all natural things there is one part that is matter – as is obvious in the case of enmattered things both natural and artificial, for the elements are matter for natural things, and in the same way, for instance, bricks and wood for a building are matter for artificial things – what we were saying, then, is that since there is one part that is matter, which itself is only a potentiality (for, as he has laid down on repeated occasions, matter only takes the role of potentiality, since it is indeterminate), and there is one part that is the cause and what is capable of producing in the matter (for the matter is all things potentially, whereas the cause actualizes all things in it, just as, we said, an art does in matter) – so, then, just as it is with everything [else], so it is also in a similar way with the soul: the potential intellect is its equivalent to the matter in other things, and the purpose of its nature does not extend merely to being naturally and suitably disposed (for this would be futile), but rather its natural disposition and suitability are necessarily also followed by its full development. As a consequence, it is neces- 2 sary that there should be that which brings what is potential to its full development. But nothing is brought to its full development by itself, but rather by something else, and thus it is necessary that there should be these different divisions in the soul, and that the one should be an intellect of such a kind that it is potentially all things (the equivalent to the matter in other things), and the other should be the intellect that brings about full development, which produces all those things in the first‐mentioned intellect that that intellect is potentially, and which should be understood, since it is through its connection with the first‐mentioned intellect that it brings that intellect to full development, to be a sort of competence that belongs to that intellect, or rather, he says, to be the kind of thing that light is in what are potentially colours. For this is more appropriate for the purposes of illustration, lest someone should believe, on the basis of the special property of a competence, that [the intellect that brings about full development] is entirely insubstantial and [only] manifested in something else. For light, he says, while itself being something, causes potentially existing colours to be actually present as colours, and is in a sense productive of them. The productive in- 3 tellect, then, is related to the potential intellect in the same way in which light brings to full development a thing that is connected with it, and sets the potential intellect

12–13 cf. Prisc. 241.35–37; 242.8–9. 14–20 cf. Them. 98.14–20. 23–25 cf. Them. 98.22–23. 26–31 cf. Prisc. 242.31–243.6. 33–309.1 cf. Them. 99.2–3.

308 | Theodoros Metochites

αὐτὸν ἃ δυνάμει πρότερον ἦν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, γινόμενος εἷς μετ’ ἐκείνου, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης ὑπόδειγμα ἔξωθεν ὤν, ὡς ἡ χαλκευτικὴ τῆς οἰκείας ὕλης ἔξω, τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ ἡ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου (ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ νοεῖν ὅταν βουλώμεθα)· καὶ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς τοὺς δύο λόγους, τόν τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τὸν τῆς τέχνης, ἅπαντα γινόμενος καὶ ἅπαντα ποιῶν. ἔστι δὲ τιμιώτερον ᾗ ποιοῦν ἢ καθὸ πάσχον· πανταχοῦ γὰρ τιμιώτερον V175v τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ πάσχον καὶ ἀρχή πώς | ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, εἴτουν τοῦ πάσχοντος. καὶ ἔστι ταυτόν, ὥσπερ προείρηται, ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ νοητόν· ἡ γὰρ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη, τελειωθέντος πάντως τοῦ δυνάμει, ὅπερ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ἐπιστητόν, ὡς ἐν 4 τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἴρηται. ἔστι μέν γε, φησίν, ὁ δυνάμει πρότερος τῷ χρόνῳ· ἀεὶ γὰρ πᾶσα εὐφυΐα προτέρα τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς ἐνεργείας· ἁπλῶς δὲ καὶ τῇ φύσει τοῦ τελείου οὐ πρότερος ὁ δυνάμει μᾶλλον, ἀλλ’ ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κυρίως πρότερον τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου, οὐδὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις· ὅ γέ τοι τελειωθεὶς νοῦς αὐτοφυής ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· οὐσία γάρ πως αὐτῷ ἡ ἐνέργεια, εἴτουν τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἀμφότερα ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρεῖται. 5 ὅλως δέ, φησίν, ἐντεῦθεν ἀναγκαῖον ὡς οὐδὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ἐνταῦθα ὁ δυνάμει τοῦ ποιητικοῦ, εἴ γε ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· οὐσία γὰρ αὐτοῦ ταυτὸν καὶ ἐνέργεια, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει – ἄλλο τι ὂν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ἐνέργειαν – ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε μεταβατικῶς καὶ διεξοδικῶς χρώμενος πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ ἀθρόον πάντα ἔχων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ πάντα· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἂν εἴη ταυτὸν ἥ τε οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· εἰ γὰρ μεταβαίνει ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε, ἀνάγκη τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν ὑπομένειν αὐτοῦ, τὴν δ’ ἐνέργειαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἐξαλλάττεσθαι· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ἀπαθής τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς καὶ τέλειος καὶ χωριστὸς τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ ἀμιγής καὶ ἀίδιος, ταυτὸν ὢν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοῶν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ νοῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ

3 ἔχει ] ἔχῃ M A 5 δὲ A1sl 7 αὐτὸς ] αὐτὸ M A || τὸ om. V 10 εὐφυΐα A1pc (ut vid. ex εὐφη‑) 12 ὅ ] δέ add. A || τοι om. A || τελειωθεὶς ] τέλειος Greg. 13 ἐνέργεια¹ ] ἐνεργεία M || πως om. Greg. 14 οὐκ ] οὐχ ὡς Greg. (fort. recte) 17 ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ] ἢ Greg. || ὂν ] ὢν Greg. (fort. recte) 19 ἔχων ] ἔχει malim || ἥ ] ἤ M || τε ] ἡ add. M 20 γὰρ ] καὶ add. M 5–310.2 430a 17–22

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up to be in actuality those things that it previously was potentially, in that it becomes one with it, and not – as suggested by the comparison to art – as something external, in the way in which the art of the coppersmith is external to its own proper matter, the copper, and the art of carpentry is external to the wood (which is why it is also in our power to think whenever we so wish); and the intellect within our soul possesses the two principles, the one corresponding to the matter and the one corresponding to the art, inasmuch as it becomes all things and produces all things. And it is a nobler thing in its capacity of something that produces than it is in its capacity of something that is affected; for that which produces is in every case nobler than that which is affected, and is in a way a first principle in relation to the matter, that is, to that which is affected. And, as previously stated, the intellect itself and the intelligible object are the same thing. For once the potential intellect has been entirely brought to its full development, the actualized knowledge is the same thing as the object of knowledge itself, as was stated in the preceding chapter. Now, the potential intellect, he says, 4 is admittedly prior in time: for every natural disposition is always prior in time to its actualization. But in an unqualified sense and in respect of the nature of the fully developed thing, it is not the potential but rather the productive intellect that is prior. For what is undeveloped cannot properly speaking be prior to what is fully developed, nor potentiality to actuality. After all, the fully developed intellect is an autogenous activity, and in its case substance and activity are the same. For its activity, that is, thinking, is in a way its substance, and the two things are not manifested as distinct in it. As a whole, he says, it is therefore necessary that the potential intellect in this 5 case should not even be prior in time to the productive one, granted that the latter is always in its active state. For its substance is the same as its activity, as mentioned, and it does not change from one thing into another – on account of being one thing in respect of its substance and another thing in respect of its activity – by using a discursive and step-by-step procedure for its acts of thinking, but rather it has all the forms and the objects of knowledge at once in its possession. For it is only on this condition that its substance and its activity can be the same. For if it proceeds discursively from one thing to another, it is necessary for its substance to persist and for its activity to change and be replaced; but this is not the case: rather, it itself is unaffected, fully developed, separate from enmattered things, unmixed and eternal, since it is the same in substance as it is in activity, and is not at one time thinking, at another time not thinking, in the way in which the intellect that is promoted from potentiality to ac-

1–7 cf. Them. 99.13–20. 7–9 cf. Them. 99.25–26. 11–12 cf. Them. 99.26–27. 99.30–34. 24–31 cf. Them. 100.5–12. 31–311.1 cf. Them. 99.32–36.

15–22 cf. Them.

27 it has: this translates the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus; the transmitted text would have to be translated “by having”.

310 | Theodoros Metochites

ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως προαχθεὶς εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, καὶ χωριστὸς 6 μέν ἐστιν ὁτὲ καὶ ἀμιγής, ὁτὲ δὲ οὔ. ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ προστίθησιν ὅτι οὐδὲ μνημονεύομεν

κατ’ αὐτόν, ἀίδιον ὄντα, καὶ ζητῶν τὸν λόγον φησὶν ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀπαθής ἐστιν αὐτοενέργεια – ὡς εἴρηται – καὶ ὢν ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ πάντα ὤν – ὡς εἴρηται – ἀθρόον, καὶ οὐ γινόμενος οὐδὲ μεταβάλλων, ἀλλ’ ἄφθαρτος πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ παθητικῷ νῷ, ὃς καὶ φθαρτός ἐστι καὶ μεταβλητὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ οὐδ’ ἄνευ τοῦ πάσχειν ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν· παθητικὸν γὰρ νοῦν τοῦτον εἶναι βούλεται καὶ 7 νοεῖ, τὸν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ἐνεργοῦντα. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ ἠβούλετο καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι λέγων· τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστι νοῦ πάθημα, ἀλλὰ τουδί, ἤτοι τοῦ ἔχοντος τὸν νοῦν, ᾗ αὐτὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, ὁ θεωρούμενος ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις· διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου – ἤτοι τοῦ ἔχοντος – οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἦν ταῦτα δηλονότι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ 8 νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τε καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστι. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἴρηκεν, V176r | νῦν δὲ ὅτι οὐ μνημονεύομεν τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦτο πάντως λέγων, οὐδ’ ἔχθρας ἔχομεν οὐδὲ φιλίας, τὸ αἴτιον ἀποδιδοὺς ταυτὸ ὃ καὶ πρότερόν φησιν ὅτι ταῦτα τοῦ παθητικοῦ ἦσαν νοός, ὃς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁρᾶται οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐνύλου πάθους· φθειρομένου δὲ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὁ μὴ ἄνευ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργῶν φθαρτὸς καὶ αὐτός· καὶ διατοῦτο οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ οὔτ’ ἄλλ’ οὐδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ὁ τέλειος καὶ τελειοποιὸς νοῦς (ὁ καὶ ποιητικός, ὡς εἴρηται), ὡς εἶναι τριπλοῦν τὸ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν θεωρούμενον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τὸν τέλειον καὶ τελειοποιὸν καὶ ποιητικὸν νοῦν, τὸν αὐτοόντα ἀίδιον τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν μετὰ τὸ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τελειούμενον καὶ προβαίνοντα, ἄφθαρτον καὶ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ ὁτὲ χωριστόν, ὁτὲ δ’ οὔ, τρίτον δὲ καὶ ἔσχατον τὸν διωρισμένον παθητικὸν νοῦν, ὃν καὶ φθαρτόν φησιν. * *

*

1 τὴν A1sl || ὁτὲ¹ ] ὀτὲ V || ὁτὲ² ] ὀτὲ V 2 ὁτὲ¹ ] ὀτὲ V || ὁτὲ² ] ὀτὲ V 8 αὐτὸ ] αὐτῶ V 10 ὁ² om. A 12 ἀπόλωλεν ut vid. M1pc A1pc : ἀπώλωλεν V 13 εἴρηκεν ] εἴρηκε M 17 ἄνευ ] τοῦ ἐνύλου ex v. 16 add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 2–23 430a 22–25 8–13 ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι: cf. 1.4, 408b 25–29

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tuality sometimes thinks, sometimes does not think, and sometimes is separate and unmixed, sometimes not. To this he adds that neither do we remember by virtue of [the 6 productive intellect], since it is eternal, and seeking the explanation he says that this intellect is an unaffectable pure activity (as mentioned), which is always actual and is all things at once (as mentioned), without coming to be or changing, but being indestructible in its activity, whereas remembering takes place in the affectable intellect, which is also destructible and mutable and does not have the capacity to think in a state of eternal sameness and without being affected. For he is implying and thinking that this is an affectable intellect, the one that is active in conjunction with matter. For this is exactly what he implied also in the preceding discussions, when he said 7 “reasoning and loving and hating are not an affection of the intellect, but of this, that is, of that which has the intellect, in so far as it has it”, and in which this kind of intellect – the kind considered in the passage quoted – is present. “Because of this it is also the case that when this is destroyed” – that is, that which has [the intellect] – “[the intellect] neither remembers nor loves, for obviously these things did not belong to it, but to the common entity, which has perished, whereas the intellect is presumably something more divine and unaffected.” Well, these statements were made in the pre- 8 ceding discussions, but what he is now saying is undoubtedly this, that we do not after death remember the things in our life, nor entertain hatred or love, affording the same explanation as before by saying that these things belonged to the affectable intellect, which is seen not to be free from enmattered affection in cases like these. And when the common entity perishes, the intellect that is not active without it is itself also liable to perish. And this is why the intellect that is fully developed and that brings about full development – which is also, as mentioned, productive – neither remembers nor loves, and is not any other of the aforementioned things either. The upshot is that what is manifested in the sphere of the intellect is threefold: first, there is the intellect that is fully developed, bringing about full development and productive, which is in and of itself eternal in its activity; second, there is the one that is developed and promoted to actuality after being potentially, which is also imperishable and sometimes separate, sometimes not; third and last, there is the affectable intellect just described, which he also declares to be perishable. * *

6–8 cf. Them. 101.5–9. 102.29; 105.13–108.34.

*

10–17 cf. Them. 101.18–23; 101.34–36; 105.18–21.

17–25 cf. Them. 100.37–

10 The “preceding discussions” are in 1.4, 408b 25–29; Metochites has borrowed the cross‐reference from Themistius.

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Ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει μεταλαμβάνων τὴν οἰκείαν μορφὴν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἐλλάμψαντος τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, πρῶτον μὲν νοεῖ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀδιαίρετα – ἤτοι τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀσύνθετα πράγματα – καθ’ ἑαυτά, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές· ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συνθέσει πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ διαιρέσει ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· τὰ γὰρ ἁπλᾶ σημαινόμενα, ἃ διορίζεται ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις καὶ ἅπερ «ὅρους» ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας καλεῖ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδος ἔχει· οἷον τὸ «Σωκράτης», τὸ «τρίγωνον», τὸ «ἰσογώνιον», τὸ «βαδίζειν»· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος. καὶ πρῶτα ταῦτα τῷ νῷ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀδιαίρετα, ὡς φησί· ταῦτα δὲ συντιθεὶς ἑξῆς ὁ νοῦς πρόεισι, καὶ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ τῇ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διαιρέσει τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· συντίθησι γὰρ ταῦτα οὐχ ὥσπερ σωρόν τινα, ἀλλ’ ὥστε συναγαγεῖν εἰς μίαν τινὰ νόησιν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἁπλῶν σημαινομένων, οἷον τὸ «Σωκράτης ἀγωνίζεται», «Πλάτων ὁμιλεῖ Διονυσίῳ». καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐοικέναι φησὶ τῇ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους συνθέσει, ὃς φησί· «πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι» – ἤτοι κεφαλαί – «ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν», ἢ καὶ ἄλλάττα τυχὸν μέλη, εἶτα τῇ φιλίᾳ συνετέθησαν τὰ διεσπαρμένα τῶν ζῴων μέλη· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων οὐ πᾶσα μελῶν σύνθεσις ποιεῖ τὸ ζῷον, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα πᾶσα σύνθεσις τῶν ἁπλῶν τούτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων τὸ ἀληθὲς ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὶ μὲν τὸ ἀληθές, τὶ δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος· οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον αὐτὸ ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἡ διάμετρος ἰδίᾳ οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος, συντεθέντα δέ, ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος (τῇ πλευρᾷ δηλονότι κατὰ τὸν γεωμετρικὸν λόγον), ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· σύμμετρος δὲ τεθεῖσα ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ λευκὸν τόδε τι νοῶμεν εἶναι ἤγουν τὸν Κλέωνα ἢ τὸ μὴ λευκόν, συντιθέντες | ἢ διαιροῦντες, ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει καὶ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τὸ ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἤγουν ὅταν συντιθῆταί καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς καὶ ὅταν διαιρῆταί τι καταφατικῶς ἢ ἀποφατικῶς (οἷον κατηγορεῖται τῆς χιόνος τὸ λευκόν, κατηγορεῖται τῆς χιόνος τὸ μὴ θερμόν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀποφατικῶς λέγεται τὴν χιόνα μὴ εἶναι ψυχρὰν ἢ τὴν χιόνα μὴ εἶναι λευκήν)· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς τοιαύταις τοῦ νοῦ συνθέσεσι καὶ διαιρέσεσι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. ἔστι γε μὴν ἐν τούτοις προσεννοεῖν καὶ χρόνον, ἤτοι παρελθόντα ἢ μέλλοντα, οἷον «Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδῶν βασι-

2 ἀδιαίρετα ut vid. A1pc 6 καλεῖ A1pc 9 δὲ om. A 13 συνθέσει ] θέσει Mtext (συν- M1sl ) 14 ἄλλάττα ] ἄλλα M A 16 οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα πᾶσα σύνθεσις ] οὐδὲ πᾶσα σύνθεσις ἐνταῦθα M A || τούτων ] τοιούτων M A 18 συντεθέντα ] συντιθέντα M A 22 τι supplevi 25 εἶναι λευκήν transp. M A 1–20 430a 26–b 2

17–18 430a 31 20–314.4 430b 2–6

5 ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις: cf. Cat. 4, 1b 25–2a 10 usurpat Arist. 13–14 DK 31 B 57.9

6 ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας: in Int. vocem «ὅρος» non

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[Note] that the intellect that, having been potential, acquires the shape appropriate for being active, when the productive intellect casts its light inside it, first thinks of the undivided things – that is, the simple and uncombined things – by themselves, in which falsehood and truth do not inhere, for falsehood and truth arise from combining things with each other and dividing them from each other in the act of thinking. For the simple objects of signification, the ones that are defined in the Categories and which [Aristotle] calls “terms” in the De interpretatione, possess neither truth nor falsehood: for instance, “Socrates”, “triangle”, “rectangular”, “walk”. For there is neither truth nor falsehood in these. So these simple and undivided things are the first [to be present] to the intellect, as he says. But the intellect next proceeds by combining these, and in their combination, or indeed division from each other, there is falsehood and truth. For it does not combine these things into some kind of random heap, but in such a way as to conjoin the plurality of simple objects of signification into a single act of thinking: for instance, “Socrates competes”; “Plato discusses with Dionysius”. And this, he says, is comparable to the “combination” of Empedocles, who says: “many temples” – that is, heads – “sprang up without necks”, or maybe other limbs as well, and then the scattered limbs of the animals were combined by Love. And just as in the case of these not every combination of limbs produces an animal, so in the present case not every combination of these simple and undivided things produces truth, but in some cases it produces truth, in other cases falsehood. For instance, the term “incommensurable” itself taken singly and “diagonal” taken singly are neither true nor false, but if combined into “the diagonal is incommensurable” (that is to say, with the side, according to the geometrical principle), they are true; if, however, “commensurable” is substituted, they are false. And in case we think that a certain white thing is, for instance, Cleon or a non-white thing, this is true or false, whether we combine or divide. For in fact truth and falsehood arise both from the combination and from the division, that is, when something is combined in the affirmative or the negative and when something is divided in the affirmative or the negative (for instance, “white” is predicated of snow, “not hot” is predicated of snow, and in the same way it is said in the negative that snow is not cold or snow is not white). For falsehood and truth arise from combinations and divisions of this kind on the part of the intellect. Further, it is possible to add, in these examples, the notion of time as well, that is, of past or future

1–8 cf. Them. 109.4–7. 7 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 543.8–9. 10–24 cf. Them. 109.7–16. 26–31 cf. Them. 109.27–33. 31–315.1 cf. Them. 109.18–19. 7 “terms”: the word (hóros) does not, in fact, occur in the De interpretatione.

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λεύς», καὶ «Κροῖσός ἐστι Λυδῶν βασιλεὺς» καὶ «Κροῖσος ἔσται Λυδῶν βασιλεύς»· καὶ τὰ συννοούμενα οὕτω μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου ἐπιδέχεται τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. ταῦτα δὲ ἐνθεωρεῖται μόνῳ τῷ νῷ· ἡ γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ ἐνεστῶτί ἐστι μόνῳ· ὁ νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα ἐνεργεῖν ᾗ νοῦς ἔχει. Ὅτι τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ᾧ πρῶτον ἐπιβάλλει ὁ νοῦς, τριχῇ θεωρεῖται· λέγεται γὰρ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ μῆκος, ὃ δυνάμει μέν ἐστι διαιρετὸν ἀεί, ἐνεργείᾳ δέ ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διαιρεῖσθαι εἰς ἄπειρον· λέγεται ἀδιαίρετον καὶ αὐτὸ ἁπλῶς τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν ᾧ ἐπιβάλλει ὁ νοῦς, ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου ἐλέγετο, δίχα τινὸς συμπλοκῆς καὶ συνθέσεως· λέγεται ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἄτμητον, ὡς ἡ στιγμή, πέρας οὖσα τῆς γραμμῆς (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ κατὰ πάντα ἡ στιγμή), καὶ ἡ γραμμή, πέρας οὖσα τῆς ἐπιφανείας (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ κατὰ πλάτος), καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, πέρας οὖσα τοῦ στερεοῦ 7 (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ κατὰ βάθος). τὸ μῆκος τοίνυν ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἓν ἐνεργείᾳ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχων τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καθ’ αὑτό, καὶ μὴν ἔτι καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος καθὼς τὸ μῆκος καὶ διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος θεωρεῖται, ὡς συνεχὲς καὶ αὐτός· εἰ γὰρ νοεῖται ὡς διαιρετὸν τὸ μῆκος, ὡς δυνάμει νοεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἀδιαίρετον τῷ νῷ καὶ ἓν καὶ χρόνῳ ὡσαύτως. εἰ δέ γε διαιρεθείη, ἅμα ἂν καὶ ὁ χρόνος συνδιαιροῖτο καὶ εἴη ἂν οἱονεὶ δύο μήκη, καὶ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ χρόνος, καὶ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐπιβολὴ ὡς ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἔσται εἰ διαιρεῖται ἐνεργείᾳ· εἰ δὲ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν τμημάτων ἐνεργείᾳ ἀδιαίρετον νοεῖται, καὶ 8 ὡς ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν ὡσαύτως ἐξανάγκης ἂν ἀδιαίρετος καὶ ὁ χρόνος θεωρηθείη. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ κατ’ εἶδος, ὡς διώρισται, ἁπλῶς, ὡς ἀδιαίρετον ὁ νοῦς 6

10 κατὰ V1sl 13 αὐτὸ ] αὐτὸς malim || καθ’ αὑτό ] καθαυτὸ A 15 ἀλλ’ ] fort. addendum εἰ 16 διαιρεθείη correxi : διαιρεθῆ codd. 18 οὕτω¹ A1pc (ut vid. ex ἐν τῶ) 19 καὶ om. M 5–16 430b 6–11 12–15 430b 7–10 16–20 430b 11–14 20–316.18 430b 14–20

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time: for instance, “Croesus was king of the Lydians”, “Croesus is king of the Lydians” and “Croesus will be king of the Lydians”. Things that are combined in thought in this way, together with time, also admit of falsehood and truth. But these things are manifested only in the intellect. For imagination and sense perception dwell in the present instant only, whereas the intellect is also able, in its capacity of intellect, to be active on either side [of the present instant]. [Note] that what is undivided, which is what the intellect first intuits, has three 6 aspects. For (a) “undivided” is used of length, which is always potentially divisible, but actually undivided, for it is not capable of being [actually] divided infinitely. (b) “Undivided” is also used of each and every form itself, taken simply, that the intellect intuits, as we were saying just a while ago, without any connection or combination. (c) “Undivided” is also used of what is entirely impossible to cut, as a point, which is the limit of a line (for a point is indivisible in every respect), a line, which is the limit of a surface (for it is indivisible in breadth), and a surface, which is the limit of a solid (for it is indivisible in depth). Accordingly, (a) a length is thought of by the intellect as 7 actually undivided and one in so far as the intellect itself also has non-coincidental indivisibility, and moreover in an undivided time as well. For time, just like length, has both a divisible and an undivided aspect, since it, too, is continuous. For if a length is thought of as divisible, it is thought of as potentially so, but it is one and undivided to the intellect and likewise in respect of time. And if it is divided, then concurrently the time will be divided with it, and there will be, as it were, two lengths; and in each of these there will be time, and the intuition of the intellect will be in each of them as in an undivided length and, again, in an undivided time as well. This is what will be the case if it is actually divided. But if it is thought of as the actually undivided composite of both sections, then also the time will necessarily manifest itself as undivided, in the same way as in the case of both [sections taken separately]. But (b) that which is 8 undivided not with respect to quantity but with respect to a form, taken simply, as described, is thought of as indivisible by the intellect in an indivisible manner and in a

1–2 cf. Them. 109.26–27. 2–3 cf. Them. 109.25–26. 4–5 cf. Them. 109.19–25. 7–8 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 546.15–16 (although he speaks of three kinds of indivisible magnitude). 8–15 cf. Prisc. 251.14–21. 7–8 Note also that the same Greek word (adiaíretos) means both “undivided” and “indivisible”, and likewise that the same Greek word (diairetós) means both “divided” and “divisible”. 15–17 The translation presupposes the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. The transmitted text would probably have to be translated as “a length is thought of by the intellect as actually undivided and one in so far as the intellect has non-coincidental indivisibility too”. 19–20 but it is one and undivided to the intellect and likewise in respect of time : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “but if it is one and undivided to the intellect, it is so likewise in respect of time”.

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ἀδιαιρέτως νοεῖ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ κυρίως ἀδιαιρέτῳ, πλήν – εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός – οὐ καθ’ ὃ αὐτὰ διαιρετά, φησίν (ἤτοι τὸ εἶδος αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ νόησις καὶ ὁ καθ’ ὃν νοεῖ χρόνος, εἴ γε τοῦτο χρὴ καλεῖν χρόνον τὸ ἀκαριαῖον καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν)· ᾗ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὰ r V177 ταῦτα ἀδιαίρετα (τό τε εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νῦν | καὶ ὁ ἐν ᾧ νοεῖ χρόνος, οἷον τὸ Σωκράτης αὐτὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ τὸ ξύλον καὶ τὸ τρέχειν καὶ πάνθ’ ἕκαστα ἁπλῶς). κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, εἴρηται, οὐχ ᾗ διαιρετὰ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτά, διαιρετὰ ἂν ταῦτα νοοῖτο, ὅτι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν ὀνόματα σύνθετά πως ἐκ συλλαβῶν τινων ἢ στοιχείων, ἃ συντιθέμενα πάντως διαιρετά ἐστι· καὶ δι’ αὐτὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς θεωρηθήσεται καὶ εἰρήσεται καὶ ἡ αὐτῶν νόησις καὶ ὁ τῆς νοήσεως χρόνος διαιρετά πως, οὐχ ᾗ διαιρετὰ καθ’ αὑτά· ἀδιαίρετα γάρ· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ ὁ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοήσεως χρόνος ἀδιαίρετος, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος σύνθεσιν δόξειεν ἂν καὶ νοηθείη πως διαιρετῶς, οὐχ ᾗ διαιρετά, ὡς εἴρηται, αὐτά (ἤτοι τὰ ἐν ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἤτοι ἡ νόησις αὐτὴ καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῆς νοήσεως)· ἀδιαίρετα γὰρ ταῦτα, καίτοι γε μὴ ὄντα χωριστά, μήτε ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ σημαινόμενον αὐτῆς τῆς παρατάσεως τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τὸ ἀκαριαῖον αὐτοῦ τοῦ χρόνου· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι χωρίζειν αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου· ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ καθάπαξ καὶ ὡς οὐδέν τι. καὶ οὕτω μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς διαιρετὸν ἂν ῥηθείη τὸ τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου εἴδους νόημα καὶ ὁ αὐτοῦ χρόνος, κυρίως δὲ καὶ ᾗ καθ’ αὑτὰ 9 ἀδιαίρετα. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν ἀδιαιρέτων, τὸ κατὰ τὴν στιγμήν – ἤτοι τὸ ἐν τοῖς πέρασιν, ὡς εἴρηται – ἀδιαίρετον θεωρούμενον, νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς, φησί, τῇ στερήσει, καθ’ ὃ ἄπεστι δηλονότι τοῦ συνεχοῦς ἢ ὁτουοῦν ἑκάστου ὃ νοητόν ἐστι καθ’ αὑτό· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ μήκους νοητόν ἐστιν ᾗ πέρας τοῦ μήκους καὶ ἀπουσία καὶ στέρησις αὐτοῦ (καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, ὡς εἴρηται), οὕτω δὴ ἐν τῷ νῷ γνωστόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ κακὸν ᾗ στέρησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γνῶσις καθ’ αὑτό· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ λέγεται μὴ νοεῖν τὸ κακὸν τὸν πρῶτον νοῦν καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ, ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου διώρισται· αὐτοούσιον γάρ ἐστιν – ὡς καὶ τοῦτο

2 καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ M A 6 τὰ iter. M 16 ὡς¹ M1sl || τι M1sl 17 καθ’ αὑτὰ ] καθαυτὰ A 19 καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ A 20 ἄπεστι δηλονότι transp. M A || ὁτουοῦν Mpc (ex ὁ τοῦ‑) || καθ’ αὑτό ] καθαυτὸ A 22 δὴ ] καὶ add. M A 23 καθ’ αὑτό ] καθαυτὸ A 25 πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V 18–318.6 430b 20–23

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strictly indivisible time, only not – unless coincidentally – in so far as they themselves are divisible, he says (that is, the form itself, the act of thinking of the form and the time in which the act of thinking takes place, if indeed “time” is what one should call what is momentary and in the present instant): for as they are in themselves, these things – the form itself in the present instant and the time in which the act of thinking takes place – are indivisible (for instance, [the form] Socrates itself, taken simply, and wood, and run, and all the several [forms], taken simply). But coincidentally, as mentioned, and not in such a way that they themselves are in themselves divisible, these things may be thought of as divisible, because the names attached to them are somehow composed of certain syllables or letters, and since they are composite they are inevitably divisible; and on account of the names the act of thinking of these things and the time of the act of thinking will both be manifested and spoken of as in a sense coincidentally divisible, but not in such a way that they are in themselves divisible; for they are indivisible. For what is signified by [each of] the names involved in the thinking is indivisible, and the time of the thinking of it is indivisible, but owing to the fact that the the name is composite, opinions and conceptions of these things may in a sense occur in a divisible way, but, as stated, not in such a way that the things themselves are divisible (that is, the things in which and the time in which the thinking takes place, that is, the act of thinking itself and the time of the act of thinking). For these things are indivisible, even though they are still not separable, and nor are the act of thinking, the signified object that belongs to the very extension of the name, and the momentariness of the time itself. For it is impossible to separate as such the present instant of time; for it is utterly indivisible and as it were a non-entity. In this way, then, the thought of the indivisible form and the time of the thought may be said to be coincidentally divisible, but strictly speaking and such as they are in themselves they are indivisible. The remaining one of the three kinds of undivided things, namely, 9 (c) the kind of indivisibility manifested in a point (that is, as stated, the kind that is manifested in limits), is thought of by the intellect, he says, by way of privation, that is to say, inasmuch as it falls short of continuity or any such thing as is in itself intelligible. For just as the point, or the limit of a length, is intelligible in so far as it is the limit of the length and its absence and privation (and [similarly] the line and the surface, as stated), in the same way evil, too, is cognizable by the intellect in so far as it is the privation of good, but there is no cognition of it in itself. This is also why the first intellect, or that which is divine, or simply productive of the potential intellect, as it was described a little while ago, is said not to think of evil: for – and this

2–4 cf. Prisc. 254.16–19. 9–26 cf. Them. 110.20–111.4. 28–29 cf. Them. 111.15; Ps.-Phlp. 552.6–7. 31–32 cf. Prisc. 256.21–27; Ps.-Phlp. 552.16–18. 33–319.2 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 547.8–16.

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εἴρηται – τὸ ἐνεργεῖν αὐτῷ, ἤτοι τὸ νοεῖν (καὶ νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ὄν). ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, ταῦτα ὡς στερήσεις καὶ ὡς ἀπουσίας ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγοις – ᾗ κοινωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὸ γνωστικόν – πρότερον ἐλέγετο ὡς ἡ ἀκοὴ οὐ μόνον τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἀνηκούστου, ἤτοι τῆς σιωπῆς καὶ τῆς ἀπουσίας τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις οὐ μόνον τὸ ὁρατὸν ὁρᾷ, εἴτουν τὸ φῶς, 10 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον – ἤτοι τὸ σκότος – ὡς στέρησιν καὶ ἀπουσίαν φωτός. δεῖ δέ, φησί, τοῦτ’ εἶναι – ἤτοι τὸ τοιοῦτον νοεῖν – ἐν τῷ δυνάμει νῷ, ὃς ἓν μέν ἐστι, δύναται δὲ ἕκαστα, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν ἐναντιότητες καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ V177v νῦν μὲν ὡδί, νῦν δὲ ὡδί· ἐν δέ γε τῷ νῷ ἐν ᾧ μηδεμία | ἐστὶν ἐναντιότης – ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, ἡ αὐτοενέργεια – ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μόνον νόησις· κἀντεῦθεν δή – ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι διώρισται – αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ χωριστὸς τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ὁ καταλαμβανόμενος ᾗ νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν καὶ ᾗ νοητὸν νοῦς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ, καὶ αὐτοενέργειά ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις προείρηται, ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη – εἴτουν θεωρία καὶ νόησις – αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν, χρόνῳ μέν, εἴρηται, δοκοῦσα προτέρα τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ θεωρουμένη τῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν μεταβάλλοντι, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὅλως οὐδὲ τῷ χρόνῳ προτέρα· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος νοός, καὶ πρῶτον πάντως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιοῦντος. τοῦτο δ’ ἂν ἴσως λέγοι οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν ποιητικοῦ, ὡς διώρισται, νοός, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ πρώτου μάλιστα νοός, τοῦ πάντων δη11 μιουργικοῦ καὶ ποιητικοῦ. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, ὁ αὐτοούσιος ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦς τοῖς ἀδιαιρέτοις νοητοῖς καὶ ἁπλοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιβάλλει πρώτως, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο οἱονεὶ φάσις τις, τουτέστιν ὡς ἁπλοῦς ὅρος καὶ ὄνομά τι κατά τινος πράγματος, ὡς ἐν τῇ Λογικῇ τὰ περὶ τούτων παραδίδωσιν Ἀριστοτέλης, «φάσιν» λέγων τὸ ἁπλοῦν ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ὅρον, «κατάφασιν» δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἑνός τινος ὅρου – εἴτουν φάσεως – κατά τινος ἄλλου θετικῶς, καὶ «ἀπόφασιν» ἑνός τινος αὖθις σύνθεσιν στερητικῶς κατά τινος ὡσ-

1 εἴρηται ] διώρισται A || αὐτῷ V1?pc (ut vid. ex αὐτὸ) M1pc (ut vid. ex αὐτὸ) 4 ἀκοὴ ] ἀκουὴ M || ἤτοι ] ἥτοι M 6 ἤτοι ] ἥτοι M 7 ἤτοι ] ἥτοι M || ἐστι ] ἐστιν A : ἐν τῷ δυν- add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 9 ὡδί¹ ] ὠδὶ V2?pc (-δ-) || ὡδί² ] ὠδὶ V || μηδεμία ] μὴ δὲ μία V M 12 καὶ² ] ὁ add. M A || καὶ³ ] ὁ add. M A || ὁ² ] fort. legendum ὃ 19 ποιοῦντος ] sine dubio vult dicere ποιουμένου (vel πάσχοντος vel γινομένου) 20–21 δημιουργικοῦ ] δημιουργοῦ M 22 πρώτως ] πρῶτον M A 23 ὄνομά τι V1pc (ex ὀνόματι) 25 ὅρον ] ὄρον M || ὅρου ] ὄρου M 6–21 430b 23–26

21–320.13 430b 26–30

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has also been mentioned – its activity – that is, thinking, and, indeed, thinking of the good itself and being – is in itself substantial. But what we were saying was that the intellect thinks of these things as privations and as absences, just as it was stated previously in the discussions of sense perception – with which intellect has the cognitive capacity in common – that hearing does not only perceive what is audible, but also what is inaudible, that is, silence and the absence of what is audible, and sight does not only see what is visible, namely, light, but also what is invisible, namely, darkness, as the privation and absence of light. But this – that is, this kind of thinking – 10 must, he says, take place in the potential intellect, which is one thing but has several capacities, as mentioned, in which contrarieties are present, and whose thinking is not simple but alternately thus and so. In that intellect, on the other hand, in which no contrariety is present (rather, as has been repeatedly stated, its substance is pure activity), there is only thinking of being and the good. Consequently (this was also determined in the preceding discussion), it is the intellect that is separate from matter, unmixed and simple, and what is, when comprehended as intellect, also intelligible, and, when comprehended as intelligible, intellect, and so itself thinks of itself and is simply pure activity in the existing things and entities. For, as has already been repeatedly stated, active knowledge – that is, contemplation and thinking – is the same thing as the [known] entity itself. Potential knowledge, on the other hand (although, as mentioned, held to be temporally prior to the activity when manifested in the individual subject itself, as this changes from potentiality to activity), is in fact not prior in an unqualified sense, nor as a whole even in time. For it comes from the intellect which is in actuality, and that which produces is inevitably first in relation to that which is produced. He probably says this not only with reference to the intellect within us that is productive in the sense described, but especially with reference to the first intellect, the one that is creative and productive of everything. But what we were saying was that 11 the intellect that is self‐substantial in its activity first intuits the undivided intelligible objects and simple forms, and this is comparable to an utterance, that is to say, to a simple term and a name that is said of some real object, in conformity with Aristotle’s teaching about these things in his logic, where he calls the simple name and the term an “utterance”, the positive combination of one term – that is, one “utterance” – with another one an “affirmation”, and, again, the privative combination of one term with

2–8 cf. Them. 111.20–22. 13–16 cf. Them. 111.34–112.8. 24–26 cf. Them. 111.35–112.1; Ps.-Phlp. 557.30–558.4; Phlp. 91.46–49. 27–28 cf. Phlp. 86.30–32. 29–321.1 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 546.1–6 (although he denies that Aristotle is here using “affirmation” and “denial” in the same sense as in his logic). 13–16 The translation here may require the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. 23–24 I have translated the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus. The transmitted text means “that which produces is inevitably first in relation to that which produces”.

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12 αύτως ἄλλου. φάσις τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου εἴδους νόησις,

εἴτουν ἐπιβολὴ τοῦ νοός, καὶ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους ᾗ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθής, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδής, ὥσπερ ἔχει ἡ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἀληθεύειν καὶ ψεύδεσθαι ταύτας)· ἀλλ’ ἡ ἁπλῆ φάσις αὕτη τοῦ νοός (εἴτουν νόησις καὶ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων εἰδῶν), ἀληθὴς οὖσα (καθὼς καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔφημεν τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθητοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀληθῆ εἶναι, οἷον τὴν ὅρασιν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ ὅτι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, καὶ ἑκάστην ἑκάστου ἄνευ τινὸς συμπλοκῆς ἐπιβάλλουσαν), ἔν γε τῇ συνθέσει – ὅταν δηλονότι συνάπτηται μετ’ ἄλλου νοητοῦ – ἐπιδέχεται τηνικαῦτα τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπόδειγμα τὸ τῆς ὁράσεως ἢ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἀπεικάζομεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις ὁρᾷ τόδε λευκόν – ἤτοι ὡς οἰκεῖον αἰσθητόν – ἀληθεύει· ὅτι δὲ τόδε τὸ λευκὸν Κλέωνα ὁρᾷ ἢ Δημοσθένην (συντιθεῖσα τὸ οἰκεῖον αἰσθητὸν μετ’ ἄλλου τινὸς δηλονότι, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι σώματος, ἢ Κλέωνος ἢ ὅτου δή), ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ ψεῦδος. * *

*

3 ποτὲ ] ὁτὲ M A 4 φάσις αὕτη transp. A 6 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ] ἐπιτοπολὺ V A || ὁρατοῦ ] τοῦ add. M A 11 τόδε¹ ] τι add. M A || ἤτοι om. M A || τὸ V1sl

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another in the same way a “denial”. Accordingly, the simple and uncombined act of 12 thinking – that is, an intuition on the part of the intellect – of an undivided form is an “utterance”, and it is true of the form itself, inasmuch as it is each one of them, not sometimes true and sometimes false, as is the case with the affirmation and the denial (for these can be true as well as false); but this simple “utterance” of the intellect (that is, the act of thinking and intuition of the undivided forms), which is true (just as we said that sense perceptions are for the most part true relative to their own proper perceptible object; for instance, the visual perception that it is white or black is true relative to the visible object, and so is each sense perception relative to its respective object, when it intuits it without any [predicative] connection), when it enters into a combination (that is to say, when it is conjoined with another intelligible object), then it admits of truth and falsehood, in exact accordance with the example of visual perception, or of any kind of sense perception, as suggested by the comparison we have made from the outset between things within the realm of intellect and sense perception. For in so far as the visual sense sees this white thing – understood as its own proper perceptible object – it is truthful; but in so far as it sees that this white thing is Cleon or Demosthenes – that is to say, by combining its own proper perceptible object with something else, namely, the body in which [the perceptible object] inheres, whether that of Cleon or of anything else – it is possible for the perception both to be true and to be false. * *

10–20 cf. Them. 112.14–20.

*

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7 V178r

Ὅτι, βουλόμενος ἤδη μετὰ τὸ διαλαβεῖν περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ περὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοὸς τοῦ τε δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐπελθεῖν λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοός, πάλιν περὶ αἰσθήσεως μνημονεύει καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως προφέρει κἀνταῦθα, ὡς ἀπεικάζων ἐν πᾶσι τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν γνωστικὸν 2 τῷ νῷ. καὶ τοίνυν φησὶν ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, ὡς πολλάκις προείρηται· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ κυρίως ἀλλοίωσις τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ κίνησις· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ὥρισται ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει τοῦ δυνατοῦ ᾗ δυνατόν, τουτέστιν ἔτι ὄντος δυνατοῦ καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῇ ἕξει τῆς κινήσεως ἧς κινεῖ3 ται, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐοικέναι τὴν κίνησιν τῇ γενέσει. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐκ ἔστιν ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ’, εἰ ἔστι, φησί, κἀνταῦθα κίνησις, καὶ εἰ οὕτω χρὴ λέγειν ἐνταῦθα κίνησιν, ἄλλη τις ἂν εἴη ἐνταῦθα κίνησις· ἐνέργεια γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐν ἕξει τελείᾳ ὄντος, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀτελὴς κατ’ ὀλίγον πρόοδος. οὕτω δή, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐ κυρίως ἐστὶ κίνησις ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐνέργεια ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει, πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον ἔχει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν· τοῦ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς οὐ κίνησίς 4 τις, οὐδ’ οἱονεί πως γένεσις, ὡς εἴρηται. τὸ μέν γε ἁπλῶς, φησίν, αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁτιοῦν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστι, καθὼς προείρηται, ὡς φάσις τις καὶ ἁπλῆ νόησις τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσκτᾶσθαι λύπην ἢ ἡδονήν, κατάφασίς τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ ἀπόφασις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοός ἐστι τὸ κρίνειν τῶν νοητῶν τὸ μὲν διώκειν, τὸ δὲ φεύγειν (ἤτοι τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν), ᾗ τὸ μὲν ὀρεκτόν, τὸ δὲ μή· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ὑπόδειγμα τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ

1 περὶ² om. M A 8 δυνατόν ] fort. addendum εἶναι ἐντελέχεια (vel ἐνέργεια) 11 γάρ om. A 15 οἱονεί A1pc 1–15 431a 4–7 15–324.14 431a 8–14 7–8 cf. Ph. 3.1, 201a 9–15

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[Note] that, as at this point – after having dealt with sense perception and with contemplative intellect, both the potential one and the one that is productive and always in activity by virtue of its substance – he wants to continue by discussing practical intellect as well, he again makes mention of sense perception and brings up the results of [his discussions of] sense perception in this context as well, since in all matters he compares the capacity for cognition within its sphere to the intellect. Accordingly, 2 he says that the perceptible objects make sense perception turn from being in potentiality into being in actuality, as has been stated many times before. But this is not strictly speaking an alteration of the sense, nor a motion. For motion is defined in the Physics as [the actuality] of what is potential in so far as it is potential, that is to say, of what is still potential and is not [yet] in the state [brought about] by the motion by which it is moved, so that in a way motion is similar to coming-to-be. But it is not like 3 this with the senses. On the contrary: if, he says, there is motion also in this case and if it is therefore appropriate to speak of “motion” in this case, it must be some other kind of motion in this case. For it is an activity of that which is in a fully developed state of competence, not a gradual undeveloped progression from non-being. Accordingly, inasmuch as in the case of sense perception the activity of the perceptible objects in the sense is not strictly speaking a motion, this applies a fortiori to the intellect and the intelligible objects. For the activity of the intellect is not a kind of motion in the intelligible objects, nor is it somehow similar to coming-to-be, as mentioned. Now, the 4 act of simply perceiving any given form is, he says, as previously stated, like an utterance and a simple act of thinking of the forms; but the incurring of pain or pleasure in addition to the perceptible objects, that must be a kind of affirmation and denial, just as, when it comes to the intellect, judging is the pursuit of some and the avoidance of some intelligible objects (that is, the good and the bad respectively), in so far as the ones are objects of desire and the others are not. For in accordance with the example of the pleasant and the painful in perceptible objects, it is in the connection of

1–4 cf. Prisc. 263.30–38; Ps.-Phlp. 554.5–13; 558.11–12. 4–6 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 558.12–16; Prisc. 264.12–20. 9–12 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 558.23–29; Prisc. 264.22–23 (who quotes Ph. 3.2, 201b 31–33). 10–12 cf. Phlp. 93.99–8; Them. 112.30–32. 12 cf. Them. 112.32–33; Phlp. 93.8–9. 15–16 cf. Phlp. 93.5–6; Ps.-Phlp. 558.28–29; Them. 112.31–32. 16 cf. Them. 112.27–28. 16–19 cf. Phlp. 92.81–83. 24–26 cf. Them. 113.3–9; Phlp. 94.26–29; Prisc. 265.31–266.5. 26–325.5 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 554.29–37. 9–12 Inasmuch as the distinction between motion (kínēsis) in a strict sense and the actualization of a “second” potentiality here rests squarely on the distinction between their different subjects (which are, respectively, in “first” and “second” potentiality), the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus (corresponding to “[the actuality]” in the translation) is perhaps not indispensable.

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τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοός· ταυτὸν δέ ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος οὕτω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοός, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνωστικῇ μεσότητι κατ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν· τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν ᾗ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁ νοῦς κρίνει· καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμία, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ νοὸς ἡ κρίσις αὕτη, ᾗ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ ᾗ κακὸν τὸ μὴ ὀρεκτόν, βούλησις. ἔστι δὲ ὡσαύτως κατ’ ἐνέργειαν τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικὸν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο κατὰ τὸ αἰσθητικόν (εἰ καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ταῦτα τῷ λόγῳ διαιρεῖται καὶ θεωρεῖται), ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐν τῇ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοὸς ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἡ βούλησις αὐτὴ καὶ τοὐναντίον· ὡς ἓν γὰρ ταῦτα ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ θεωρούμενα, εἰ καὶ λόγῳ διαστέλλεται· καὶ γὰρ εὖ γε δῆλον ὡς ἡ αὐτὴ κρίσις ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ κατά τε τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι | καὶ φεύγειν· καὶ τὸ φεύγειν γὰρ ὄρεξίς ἐστι τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ὄρεξιν ἡ φυγή. καὶ τὸ βουλητὸν ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ βούλησις καὶ τοὐναντίον τὸ αὐτό, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τόδε βούλησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρακτοῦ. ἔστι δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει τὰ αἰσθήματα αὐτὰ προκείμενα, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ λογιστικῷ πρακτικῷ νῷ τὰ φαντάσματα ἁπλᾶ καὶ φάσεις τινές· ὅταν δὲ ἐν τῇ κρίσει ὁ νοῦς τῶν φαντασμάτων τὸ μὲν φήσῃ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ μὲν διώκει, τὸ δὲ φεύγει, ὥσπερ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· ὅθεν δὴ καί φησι μηδέποτε νοεῖν τὴν ψυχήν – ἤτοι τὸν συγκεκραμένον νοῦν τοῖς σωματικοῖς, ἐν ᾧ τὸ διανοητικὸν τῶν πρακτῶν – ἄνευ φαντάσματος. ἔτι γε μήν, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἑνοειδὲς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ νοῦ διασαφῶν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἰκασμάτων, φησὶν ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ ἀὴρ κινεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ διατίθησί πως τὴν κόρην (μέσος ὢν δηλονότι τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ), ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἄλλο τι κινεῖται (ἡ ὁρατικὴ δηλονότι δύναμις καὶ ἀντίληψις

4 ἡδὺ ] ἠδὺ M 6 τὸ² ] καὶ A 11 ἡ A1pc (ut vid. ex εἰ) 14 τόδε A1pc (ut vid. ex τό τε) 17 φήσῃ M1pc (ut vid. ex φήσει) || ἀγαθόν ] ἀγαγαθὸν M 18 φησι ] φησὶν A 19 συγκεκραμένον correxi (cf. supra 3.2.16) : συγκεκραμμένον codd. 14–20 431a 14–17 20–326.6 431a 17–20

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intelligible objects, as mentioned, that truth and falsehood resides in the case of the contemplative intellect; and when it comes to the practical intellect, good and bad are the same as truth and falsehood [are in the case of the contemplative intellect], and the capacity for desire and the capacity for avoidance occupy the same cognitive middle ground within its sphere as they do in the case of sense perception. For the intellect judges what is pleasant and what is painful in so far as it is good and bad. So in the case of the capacity for sense perception, the capacity for desire and its opposite within its sphere are appetite; but in the case of the intellect, this judgment, according to which what is desirable is good and what is not desirable is bad, is wish. And 5 within the sphere of the capacity for sense perception, the capacity for desire and the capacity for avoidance are the same, not distinct things, in activity (even though these are conceptually divided and manifested as distinct), in the same way as the capacity to wish and the capacity not to wish [are the same] in the activity of the practical intellect, as is the wish itself and its contrary. For these capacities are manifested as one in terms of their subject, even though they are conceptually differentiated. Indeed, it is quite obvious that in the case of the capacity for sense perception it is the same [capacity for] judgment that covers both desire and avoidance. For avoidance, too, is desire for what is better and the withdrawal is caused by this desire. And similarly with what is wished for. For wish and its contrary are the same, since even not wishing something is a wish for what is good and what can be achieved by action. Now, the 6 images in the reasoning soul or in the calculative practical intellect are simple and a kind of utterances, just like the sense percepts that are presented in sense perception. And whenever the intellect in its act of judgment states that one of the images is good and another bad, it pursues the one and avoids the other, just as it is for sense perception with what is pleasant and painful. For this reason he also says that the soul – that is, the intellect that is mixed together with the bodily parts, in which the capacity to reason about what can be achieved by action resides – never thinks without an image. Moreover, by way of illustrating here the sameness and uniformity of the in- 7 tellect with the help of comparisons to the sphere of sense perception and perceptible objects, he says that there is a clear analogy between (a) the way in which the air sets the pupil in motion and fashions and modifies it somehow (namely, on account of being a medium between the visible objects and the capacity for sight), and as a result of this something else is set in motion (namely, the visual capacity and the apprehen-

6–9 cf. Phlp. 94.17–20; Them. 113.23–24. 9–20 cf. Them. 113.24–32. 20–25 cf. Phlp. 96.77–90; Them. 113.14–16. 25–28 cf. Phlp. 97.8–13; Prisc. 268.8–25. 28–30 cf. Phlp. 99.73–100.77; Prisc. 268.29–31; 269.2–3; 269.15–18. 30–327.8 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 560.9–18. 30–327.6 cf. Prisc. 269.29–40. 30–327.8 there is a clear analogy between (a) … and (b) : this construction renders a cumbersome comparative sentence (“just as … so also”) in the Greek.

326 | Theodoros Metochites

τῶν ὁρατῶν), παραπλησίως δέ – ὡς ταῦτα προδιώρισται – τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς διὰ μέσου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἔστι δ’ ὅμως τέλος καὶ ἔσχατον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἁπάντων ἓν μόνον κοινόν, ὡς προαποδέδεικται καὶ προδιώρισται, τὸ τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως (ὅπερ ὡς πλεῖστα τῷ λόγῳ θεωρεῖται ταῖς διαφόροις ἐνεργείαις), ὡσαύτως ἔχει δηλονότι καὶ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν· ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ εἰς ὃ πάντα 8 τείνει, διάφοροί εἰσιν αἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις νοητοῖς. μνησθεὶς δὲ κἀνταῦθα πάλιν τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως, φησὶ μέν, ὡς προδιώρισται, τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις διὰ βραχέων τὸ ἑνοειδὲς αὐτῆς ἀποδείκνυσιν ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις αἰσθητοῖς (ἤτοι λευκῷ καὶ γλυκεῖ), μιᾶς οὔσης ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ γνωστῶν αὐτῶν ἀνευρίσκων καὶ συμπεραίνων τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ δεικνύων διὰ στοιχείων καὶ γραμμάτων, ὡς εἴωθε, ὅπως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ κριτήριον αἰσθητοῖς, καὶ ἐναντίοις οὖσιν (οἷον τῷ λευκῷ καὶ τῷ μέλανι ἢ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ), οὐδὲν προσίσταται – ἀλλὰ δῆλόν ἐστι – μίαν εἶναι τὴν κριτικὴν αὐτῶν αἴσθησιν, ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καταντᾷ κριτήριον καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ διάφορα κριτικὰ αἰσθητήρια θεωρούμενα αἰσθητά (οἷον, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν)· ἓν γὰρ ἀποδείκνυσι κἀνταῦθα, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὸ κοινῶς ἐπὶ πᾶσι κρῖνον, ἐξ ἀναλογίας ἐν στοιχείοις κατ’ ἔθος ἐκτιθέμενος καὶ περαίνων τὸ προκείμενον. 9

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Ὅτι, ἐπαναλαμβάνων αὖθις τὰ λεγόμενα, φησὶν ὡς ὅτι τὸ νοητικὸν αὐτό – δηλονό-

V179r τι τὸ πρακτικόν – ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ τὰ εἴδη ἕκαστα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, | καθὰ 20 10 προείρηται, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθήμασι τὰ εἴδη ὧν ἀντιλαμβάνεται. καὶ τοίνυν συμβαίνει, φησί,

καὶ παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ μὴ παρούσης, τὸ διωκτὸν ἢ φευκτὸν τὸν νοῦν καταλογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν ᾗ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ᾗ κακόν, ὡς εἴρηται, καθὼς καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ ἡδὺ 11 καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν. οἷον ὁρῶν τις, φησί, τὸν φρυκτὸν πόρρωθεν νοεῖ ἐν φαντάσμασι τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρουσίαν, ἣ κινεῖ πάντως τὸν πρακτικὸν νοῦν κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,

14 τὸ M1sl 15 ὑπὸ διάφορα ] ὑποδιάφορα V 17 κρῖνον ] κρίνον V 19 ὡς ὅτι ] alterutram vocem delere velim || νοητικὸν ] νοητὸν M 23 κακόν ] κοινὸν A 6–18 431a 20–b 1 19–328.4 431b 2–10

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sion of the visible objects), and similarly the same things happen – as they have been detailed previously – through a medium in the case of hearing and the other senses, too, but nevertheless there is a single unique goal and ultimate point shared by all the perceptible objects (as has been previously demonstrated and described), that of the common sense (which is conceptually manifested as a vast plurality in terms of its different activities), and (b) the way things stand within the sphere of the intellect: while the ultimate point, towards which all things are directed, is one, the activities that stem from it are different in the different intelligible objects.Although he again 8 makes mention of the common sense also in the present context, it is in the preceding discussions, as previously described, that he talks about its properties. Nevertheless, he offers a renewed brief demonstration of its uniformity – for it is one either numerically or by analogy – across the different perceptible objects (for instance, white and sweet), in that he uncovers and infers this property on the basis of the perceptible and cognitive objects themselves and shows, with the help of letters and characters, as he often does, that by analogy – just as, in the case of perceptible objects falling under the same means of discernment, even if they should be contraries (as, for instance, white and black or hot and cold), there is nothing to prevent – on the contrary, it is obviously the case – that the sense capable of discerning them is a single one – in the same way, perceptible objects that are seen to fall under different discerning sense organs – for instance, as mentioned, white or yellow and sweet and bitter – also end up at the same means of discernment. For here, too, he demonstrates, as he also did previously, that there is a single discerning agent common to them all, deriving his thesis from an analogy and representing it by means of letters, according to his custom. [Note] that, as he resumes his discussion again, he says that the capacity for think- 9 ing – that is to say, for practical thinking – thinks of all the several forms in the shape of images, just as sense perception, too, as previously stated, [apprehends] the forms it apprehends in the shape of sense percepts. Accordingly, he says, the result is that, 10 whether sense perception is present or not, intellect registers and judges what is worth pursuing or avoiding in so far as it is good and in so far as it is bad, as mentioned, just as sense perception does with what is pleasant and what is painful. For instance, he 11 says, someone who sees a beacon from a distance conceives of the presence of the enemy in the shape of images, which ineluctably moves the practical intellect, by

6–8 cf. Phlp. 100.81–83. 8–12 cf. Prisc. 270.38–271.3. 15–21 cf. Phlp. 101.23–102.25. 21–23 cf. Phlp. 102.30–33. 23 representing: cf. Prisc. 270.39. 24–30 cf. Them. 113.32–36. 24 cf. Phlp. 104.95–96. 25 for practical thinking: cf. Prisc. 272.36–37; Them. 114.2–3; Ps.-Phlp. 561.23–24. 26–27 as previously stated: as far as I know, this has not been stated by Aristotle (or by Metochites), but cf. Them. 113.32–35.

328 | Theodoros Metochites

ὡς διώρισται, νῦν μὲν αὐτὸ κρίνειν φευκτόν, νῦν δὲ μή. ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινῶν τὰ φαντάσματα ὁ νοῦς (οἷον ὅτι ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ ἴσως πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ ἢ ἄλλο τι), ὡσαύτως κρίνει τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτὸν ὡς ἐκεῖ, φησίν, ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ ἡ12 δὺ ἢ τὸ λυπηρόν. ταῦτα δέ φησι τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοός, ὡς εἴρηται καὶ δῆλόν ἐστιν· ὅταν γὰρ ἄνευ πράξεως ὁ νοῦς θεωρῇ (ὁ θεωρητικὸς δηλονότι), τὸ ἀληθὲς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος θεωρεῖ· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικοῦ νοός ἐστιν ἡ εὕρεσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, εἴτουν τοῦ διωκτοῦ καὶ φευκτοῦ· τοῦ δὲ θεωρητικοῦ νοὸς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐστὶν ἡ εὕρεσις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀμφότερα συνορᾶν ὡς εἰς ἓν καθόλου ἀνάγεταί πως, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, πλήν γε ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ ὡς καθόλου θεωρεῖται καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀδιορίστως, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ τινί – ἤτοι μερικῶς – συλλογίζεται ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πρακτέοις τὸ ἑκάστοτε βέλτιον ζητεῖ ὁ νοῦς. Ὅτι, κἀνταῦθα πάλιν μνησθεὶς τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοός, διέξεισιν ἔτι πῶς ὁ νοῦς θεωρεῖ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ἤτοι τὰ μαθηματικά· ταῦτα γὰρ καλοῦνται «ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως», ὅτι ἀεὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπισυμβέβηκεν ἐν σώμασι καὶ ἐν ὄγκοις, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ὑφιστάμενα ὅτι μὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅ γε νοῦς ἀφαιρεῖται ταῦτα τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ καθ’ ὑπό14 στασιν τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ θεωρεῖ. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως οὕτω δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καλούμενα· θεωρεῖται δὲ ταῦτα, φησί, τῷ νῷ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἦν δυνατὸν τὴν σιμότητα νοεῖν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (ἤτοι τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῆς ῥινός), ὃ μὴ πέφυκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι τὴν σιμότητα ὅτι μὴ τῆς ῥινὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτῆς θεωρία καὶ ὁ λόγος μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐστὶ παντάπασιν ἀχώριστος· καθ’ αὑτὸ γάρ ἐστιν, ὡς πολλάκις τοῦτο καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς εἴρηται. τὸ

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2–3 οἷον—ἄλλο τι post φευκτὸν v. 3 collocare velim 6 θεωρεῖ A1pc 14 ἐπισυμβέβηκεν A1pc 17 θεωρεῖται ] θεωρεῖ A 4–11 431b 10–11 12–330.4 431b 12–17

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virtue of the desiderative capacity, as described, to judge it sometimes as a thing to be avoided, sometimes [as a thing] not [to be avoided]. On other occasions, when the intellect sets the images in motion in itself, independently of sense perception (for instance, that one should deliver battle on this location, perhaps, or that one should not, or something else), it judges what is worth pursuing and avoiding in the same way as in the other case, he says, sense perception discerns what is pleasant or painful. He 12 speaks of these things as belonging to the practical intellect, as has been mentioned and as is clear: for whenever the intellect – that is to say, the contemplative one – contemplates independently of action, it contemplates what is true and false as such. For the discovery of what is good and bad – that is, of what is worth pursuing and avoiding – belongs to the practical intellect, whereas the discovery of truth and falsehood belongs to the contemplative intellect. But it is imperative to understand that both of them in a sense lead back to one general thing, namely, good and bad, except that in the case of the contemplative intellect this is considered as general, unqualified and indeterminate, whereas in the case of the practical intellect it is what is good or bad for someone – that is, in a particular context – that is deduced. For when it comes to appropriate courses of action the intellect seeks what is advantageous in a given situation. [Note] that, at this point, too, he refers to the contemplative intellect again, as he 13 further specifies how the intellect contemplates the things that derive from abstraction, that is, mathematical objects. For these objects are said to “derive from abstraction” because they are always supervenient on bodies and masses and cannot exist independently of these, but the intellect abstracts these objects, which are inseparable in terms of subsistence, from the corporeal things and contemplates them in themselves. These, then, are the objects “derived from abstraction”, which are called like that in 14 the sense specified. But these are contemplated, he says, by the intellect, in the same way as if it were possible to define and think of snubness independently of its substrate (that is, the flesh and the nose), although this is not in its nature. For snubness cannot be otherwise defined than as a property of a nose, and the contemplation and account of snubness is in every way inseparably bound up with its substrate. For [that is what snubness] is in itself, as has been stated many times and in many contexts. As for concave, however, and straight, as well as triangle, equilateral and all similar

3–5 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 561.30. 6–7 cf. Them. 114.2–3. 8–16 cf. Them. 114.4–9. 8–9 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 562.9–10. 12–16 cf. Phlp. 107.45–55. 23–24 cf. Phlp. 107.64–108.67. 28–29 cf. Them. 114.14–16. 32–331.4 cf. Them. 114.17–21. 3–5 The example in the parenthesis might have been displaced from the following line (after “avoiding”), as suggested in the critical apparatus.

330 | Theodoros Metochites

μέντοι καμπύλον καὶ εὐθὺ καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ὅσα τὸ μαθηματικὸν καταγίνεται, κἂν ἐν ὑποστάσει γνωρίζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν σωματικῶν, ἀλλά γε ὁ νοῦς ἰδίᾳ ταῦτα καὶ ὡς κεχωρισμένα καθ’ ἑαυτὰ θεωρεῖ, ὅτι δὴ καὶ πέφυκε ταῦτα ὁρίζεσθαι χωρὶς ὑποκειμένων, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σιμότητος. 15

Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ καθόλου ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν νοῦς, ὡς ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἴρηται, αὐτά

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V179v ἐστι | τὰ πράγματα, ἔστι ζητῆσαι καὶ ἐξετάσαι· ἆρα ὁ νοῦς, μὴ κεχωρισμένος τῆς ὕλης

καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους, φησίν (ἤτοι ἐν τῷ σώματι ὤν), δύναται νοεῖν τι τῶν κεχωρισμένων τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀνωτέρων τῆς ὕλης, ἢ οὐ δύναται ἔνυλος ὢν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν νοῦς αὐτά ἐστι τὰ πράγματα; ὑπερτίθεταί γε μὴν τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον ἐν 16 ἄλλοις· νῦν δὲ ἐπαναλαμβάνει αὖθις τοὺς περὶ ψυχῆς λόγους. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν τὸν περὶ τούτων ὑπερτίθεται λόγον, ὡς εἴρηται· τοῖς γε μὴν τῶν αὐτοῦ μεθύστερον ἐξηγηταῖς δοκεῖ μὴ προσίστασθαι τὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ θεωρούμενον νοῦν θεωρεῖν τὰ ἄυλα· οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἰς τοῦτ’ εἶναι παντελῶς ὃς καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα [αὐτὰ] εἴδη χωρίζει αὐτὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ νοεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἐλάττωσιν αὐτῷ εἶναι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀύλων θεωρίαν, ὥστε μὴ ταῦτα ἔχειν θεωρητὰ καθώς εἰσι θεωρητὰ τοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀύλοις καὶ θείοις, ὅτι μὴ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐστιν αὐτῷ ταῦτα θεωρητά, οὐχ ὅτι μηδέποτε ταῦτα δύναται νοεῖν. * *

*

1 καμπύλον ] καμπῦλον V 2 post κἂν rasuram unius fere litterae (fort. ϗ) habet V || ἐν ὑποστάσει ] ἐνυποστάσει A 6 ἆρα correxi (secundum Arist. 431b 17) : ἄρα codd. 8 ὕλης¹ ] καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους ex v. 7 add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 11 μεθύστερον ] μεθ’ ὕστερον M 12 ἄυλα ] ἔνυλα A 13 αὐτὰ¹ seclusi 5–16 431b 17–19

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objects with which the mathematical discipline deals: even if it is in their nature to be recognized in the subsistence of corporeal things, still the intellect does contemplate these objects severally and as separate objects in themselves, precisely because it is also in their nature to be defined independently of substrates, the very thing that was seen not to be the case with “snubness”. [Note] that, since in general the intellect in actuality, as stated in the preceding 15 chapters, is the entities themselves, it is appropriate to inquire and investigate whether the intellect, if it is not separated from matter and magnitude, he says (that is, while being in the body), is able to think of any of those things that are separated from matter and superior to matter, or it cannot do this while being enmattered, since the intellect in actuality is the entities themselves. But in fact [Aristotle] postpones the discussion about these things to another occasion, and now resumes his discussions about the soul again. So he himself postpones the discussion about these things, as mentioned, 16 but the later commentators on his writings are of the opinion that there is no problem involved in the contemplation of immaterial things on the part of the intellect in its enmattered aspect, for it is not impossible for that which also separates the enmattered forms from matter and thinks of them, to be perfectly up to the task. For [— they say —] its inferior status with regard to the contemplation of immaterial objects, the result of which is that these objects are not available to it for contemplation in the same way as they are to those [intellects] that are themselves immaterial and divine, is due to the fact that they are not available to it for eternal and continuous contemplation, not that it never has the ability to think of them. * *

*

7–11 cf. Them. 114.31–33; Phlp. 110.29–32. 14–22 cf. Them. 115.3–9.

332 | Theodoros Metochites

8 Ὅτι, πάλιν ἐπαναλαμβάνων τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ὅπως ἐστὶν ὅπερ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ὄντων βεβαιούμενος, φησὶν ὅτι κατὰ διαίρεσιν πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἢ αἰσθητά ἐστιν ἢ νοητά, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ὡσαύτως τὰ αἰσθητά. ταῦτα μέν γε, καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῶν, θεωρεῖται καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ· καὶ ἡ μὲν δυνάμει αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη – ἤτοι ὅταν μόνον ὦσιν ἕξεις μὴ ἐνεργοῦσαι – τῶν δυνάμει εἰσὶν ἐπιστητῶν 2 τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐντελεχείᾳ. ἀνάγκη δέ, φησίν, ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐνύπαρκτα εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων καταλήψεων, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα εἶναι ἔφημεν ταύτην, ἢ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐνύπαρκτα αὐτὰ πράγματα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (οὐ γὰρ λίθος ἂν εἴη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐδὲ ξύλον, οὐδὲ πῦρ), ἀλλὰ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν ἐστι· καὶ διατοῦτο ἐλέγετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ὅπερ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα· εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, καθ’ ἃ εἰδοποιεῖται, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὴν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὖσαν ἀλλ’ ἄπαυστον ἐν μεταβολῇ 3 καὶ ἀόριστον. κἀντεῦθεν ὥσπερ ἐπιλογίζεται καί φησι θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα· ἡ γὰρ χεὶρ εὔδηλον ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων· δι’ αὐτῆς γὰρ χρώμεθα τοῖς ἔξω ὀργάνοις. καὶ ἡ ψυχή – ἤτοι ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ὁ νοῦς – ἔοικεν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα εἶδος τῶν εἰδῶν, ὁ μὲν τῶν νοητῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· δι’ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰδῶν. 4

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V180r πὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἥδρασται καὶ ἔν τισιν ὁ νοῦς μετὰ τῆς φαντασίας ἐνεργεῖ | καὶ ἀχώριστος 20

αὐτῆς), φησὶν ὅτι ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν σχεδὸν πρᾶγμα τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ αἰσθητῶν κεχωρισμένον δοκεῖ μεγέθους, ἤτοι διαστάσεως ὑλικῆς, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὰ νοητὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναλαμβάνει ὁ νοῦς τὰ νοητὰ εἴδη, ὥσπερ τοῦτο

11 ἐστι ] ἐστιν A 1–7 431b 20–28

13 μεταβολῇ ] μεβολῆ M

7–11 431b 28–432a 1

14–18 432a 1–3 19–334.18 432a 3–10

In De an. 3.8 |

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[Note] that, as he once again resumes his discussion about soul and tries to establish in what sense it is the same thing as the forms of existing things, he says that by division all existing things are either perceptible or intelligible, and knowledge, as mentioned, is in a way the objects of knowledge, and in the same way sense perception is the perceptible objects. Now, these things, both the perceptible and the knowable objects, as well as the perception and the knowledge of them, can be found both in a state of potentiality and in a state of actuality; and potential perception and knowledge – that is, perception and knowledge when they are only competences that are not being active – are correlated with potentially knowable and perceptible objects, but actual perception and knowledge are correlated with objects that are actually so. It is, however, necessary, he says, that either the materially existing underlying enti- 2 ties themselves are in the soul as a result of the comprehensions mentioned, since we said that the soul is the entities themselves, or their forms are. Now, it cannot be the case that the materially existing entities themselves are in the soul (for there cannot be a stone or a piece of wood or fire in the soul), but their forms are. And this is why it was said that the soul is the same thing as the existing things themselves. For it is quite clear that each individual existing thing exists by virtue of the forms, by virtue of which it is endowed with a specific form, not by virtue of the matter, which is not in a state of sameness but is incessantly in change and undetermined. And hence he 3 sums up the discussion, as it were, by saying that the soul can be seen to correspond to the hand. For the hand is obviously the tool of tools, since it is with its help that we wield external implements. And the soul – that is, sense perception and the intellect – appears to be, corresponding to the hand, a form of forms, the intellect of intelligible ones and sense perception of perceptible ones. For it is with their help that we apprehend the forms in them. Note that, as he yet again elucidates the topic of imagination, just as he did in 4 the preceding discussions ([by saying] that it is founded on sense perception and that the intellect performs certain activities in conjunction with imagination and inseparably from it), he says that since practically no material and perceptible entity appears to be separated from magnitude, that is, from material extension, it looks as though the intelligible objects in a certain sense are in the perceptible objects themselves. For the intellect picks up the intelligible forms from the perceptible objects, as

8–9 cf. Them. 115.16–17. 17–19 cf. Them. 115.19–22. 21–22 cf. Them. 115.28–29. 24–25 cf. Them. 115.29–30. 29–30 cf. Prisc. 283.29–31; Ps.-Phlp. 568.17–18.

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πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως νοητῶν, ἤτοι τῶν μαθηματικῶν, ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου διώρισται· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὰ μαθηματικὰ θεωρήματα κατασκοπεῖται, καὶ λοιπὸν ἔπειτα περαίνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁ νοῦς τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρούμενος ταῦτα. καὶ δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τι μὴ αἰσθανόμενον – οὐ πᾶσαν δηλονότι αἴσθησιν, ὅτι μηδ’ ἔξεστι ζῆν ἐστερημένον πάσης αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινὰ μὴ αἰσθανόμενόν τι αἴσθησιν – οὐκ ἂν μαθηματικῶς τι συνήσει, οἷον οὐκ ἂν ἐκ γενετῆς τυφλὸς κύκλον ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ ὅλως γεωμετρικόν τι, οὐδὲ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφὸς περὶ ψόφων ἢ περὶ ἁρμονικῶν ἀναλογιῶν, ἐπαΐειν δύναιτο. καὶ τὸ ἓν δὲ καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν συνῆξεν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ὅλως μετὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὁ νοῦς ἐπελογίσατο. διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἴδεσίν ἐστι τὰ νοητά, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη, οἷον σχήματα, χρώματα, κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ ὑγεία καὶ τοὐναντίον, μορφαὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις συμβαίνει μὴ ἀχώριστα εἶναι δυνάμενα τῆς ὕλης, τῷ δὲ νῷ χωριζόμενα καὶ λόγῳ διαιρούμενα. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὅταν θεωρῇ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νοῦς, φησί (τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἕξεων καὶ παθῶν καὶ τῶν προειρημένων τῶν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, εἴτουν τῶν μαθηματικῶν), ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι θεωρεῖν ταῦτα. καὶ ἔστι, φησίν, αὐτὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά τινα, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι χωρὶς ὕλης· ἀνατύπωσις γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν – καὶ ἴχνη, ὡς προείρηται – χωριζομένη τῆς ὕλης. εὖ δὲ δῆλον παντὶ ξυνορᾶν ὡς ἐνταῦθα περὶ τοῦ συγκεκραμένου τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ νοός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, ὃς ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἥδρασται, ἐποχούμενος τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ ἀχωρίστως αὐτῶν ἐνεργῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου περὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοὸς ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ παντός ἐστι νοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ· οὐ μόνον γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἁπλᾶ νοήματα τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς χωριστὸς τῆς φαντασίας νοεῖ, καὶ παντάπασι διαφέρει ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ ἃ νῦν λέγομεν οὐκ εἰσὶ φαν-

1 πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V 7 κωφὸς A1pc (κω‑, fort. ex τυ‑) || περὶ² om. M A 13 ἀχώριστα ] sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὰ 16 φαντάσματι ] φάντασμά τι M A 19 συγκεκραμένου correxi (cf. supra 3.2.16) : συγκεκραμμένου codd. 21 πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V 24 φαντάσματα M1pc (ex φάντασμα) 18–336.1 432a 12–14

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is perfectly clear in the case of intelligible objects that derive from abstraction, that is, mathematical objects, as was described a little while ago: for mathematical objects of contemplation are observed in matter, and then eventually the intellect derives these by abstracting from the matter in [the perceptible objects]. Indeed, it is obvious that someone who does not perceive anything – that is to say, not [one who lacks] all sense perception, since it is impossible to live deprived of all sense perception, but one who does not perceive anything within the ambit of an individual sense – will never have mathematical understanding of anything, as for instance someone who is blind from birth cannot have understanding of a circle or a triangle or in general anything geometrical, or someone who is deaf from birth of sounds or harmonic ratios. But one, two and number have also been derived by scientific knowledge from perceptible objects, and mathematical objects in general have been reasoned out by the intellect subsequent to sense perception. This is also why it was said by Aristotle that the intelligible objects are in the perceptible forms, and not only these ones, which derive from abstraction, but also all the states and conditions of the underlying perceptible substances themselves, like shapes, colours, motions, and further health and its opposite, appearances and all those attributes of the underlying things that happen not to be capable of existing in separation from their matter, but are separated by the intellect and conceptually distinguished. For in fact, whenever the intellect contemplates about such things, he says (the states and conditions in the perceptible objects as well as the previously mentioned objects that derive from abstraction, that is, the mathematical objects), it necessarily contemplates these together with an image. And the images themselves, he says, are like a kind of sense percepts, obviously without matter. For they are an imprint (or traces, as previously mentioned) of the perceptible objects themselves, which is separated from the matter. And it is plain to see for anyone that his discussion here concerns the intellect that is mixed together with sense perception and imagination, the one that is grounded in matter, carried as it is on sense perception and imagination and performing its activities inseparably from these, as he also said a little while ago about the practical intellect. But his discussion does not concern all intellect. For not only is it the case that the contemplative intellect thinks the primary and simple thoughts of existing things in separation from imagination, and that these thoughts are in every respect different from being images,

5–7 cf. Prisc. 284.8–10. 8–10 cf. Them. 116.3–5. 10 cf. Phlp. 114.24–25. 10–12 cf. Them. 116.6–7. 16–18 cf. Phlp. 114.32–35; 117.91–98; Prisc. 284.3–4. 24 cf. Them. 116.19–20. 25–27 cf. Phlp. 115.58–63. 29–337.2 cf. Prisc. 285.38–286.6; Ps.-Phlp. 563.12–19; Phlp. 115.58–116.64. 31 simple: cf. Them. 116.17. 18 of existing in separation from their matter: I have translated what I assume that the author wanted to say. The transmitted text means “of being inseparable from their matter”. Cf. 2.12.1, 3.10.5, 3.12.5.

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τάσματα μόνον· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ, φησί, φαντασμάτων τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ νοῦς ἐπιβάλλει. 9 ἔτι γε μήν φησιν ὡς τὰ τοιαῦτα φαντάσματα – καθὼς καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου διωρίζετο – οὐκ

εἰσὶ καταφάσεις τινὲς ἢ ἀποφάσεις· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος· ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ τῶν ἁπλῶν νοημάτων – ὅταν δηλονότι ἑνοῖ ταῦτα καὶ συμπλέκῃ ὁ νοῦς – V180v αὐτίκα | ἐξανάγκης ἐμφαίνεται τἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ κατάφασις ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις νοήμασιν (ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις). * *

2 πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V φάσεις M A 6 ἡ om. M 2–6 432a 10–12

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but even those thoughts that he is now talking about are not merely images: rather, he says that the intellect does not intuit that kind of thoughts without images. Moreover, 9 he says that such images – as was also determined a little while ago – are not some kind of affirmations or denials, for there is not truth or falsehood in them. It is rather in the combination of simple thoughts – that is to say, when the intellect unites and connects these – that of necessity truth or falsehood immediately manifests itself, and it is in the latter kind of thoughts that there is an affirmation (or denial). * *

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338 | Theodoros Metochites

9 Ὅτι, συμπεράνας τοὺς περὶ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ εἴδους τῆς ψυχῆς λόγους, ἤτοι τοὺς περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας καὶ νοός, ἔπειθ’ ἑξῆς φησιν ὡς ἐπεὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δύο ταῦτα ἐνθεωρεῖται μάλιστα καὶ κατ’ αὐτὰ γνωρίζεται ἡ ψυχή, τό τε γνωστικὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ τελείως ἤδη διώρισται, ἀναγκαῖον διαλαβεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τόπον κινητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόθεν ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ὁρμὴ καὶ πότερον μόριόν τι ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ’ οὗ τοῦτο, κεχωρισμένον τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ μέγεθος (ἤτοι σωματικῶς καὶ τοπικῶς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἥπατι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), ἢ λόγῳ μόνῳ κεχωρισμένον τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ μόριον οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ κινητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς πάσης ψυχῆς, οὐ μορίου, ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔργον· ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα καὶ μόριον ἔστι, πότερον ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς συνήθη καὶ περιλαλούμενα, ἤτοι τὸ λογικόν, 2 τὸ θυμικόν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἢ ταῦθ’ ὁμοῦ ἢ τούτων τι. ὅλως δέ, φησίν, ἀπορία εἰ κλητέον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς μόρια ἢ ὅτι ἀνάρμοστός ἐστι καὶ οὐ προσήκουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ὀνομασία ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ εἰ ὅλως κλητέον μόρια ψυχῆς, ζητητέον, φησί, πόσα ταῦτα· σχεδὸν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ πλεῖστα δοκεῖ καὶ πλεῖον ἀλλήλων διϊστάμενα ἢ καθ’ ὅσα ἐνόμισαν οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶπον, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες λογικόν, θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ 3 διαιροῦντες τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ λογικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ. εἰ γὰρ εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπίδοι τις, ἐν αἷς ἡ διαίρεσις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς αὐτῆς γίνεται, καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖται, φησί, μόρια πλεῖστα καὶ μείζω τούτων ἔχοντα διάστασιν· οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, φησίν, ὃ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς μόνον θεωρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ ὅμως κοινὸν καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις· ἔτι τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογόν τις ἐρεῖ – κριτικὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ γνωστικόν – οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη τις ἄν, φησί, ῥᾳδίως (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀναίτιός τις καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστος αὕτη κρίσις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ φανταστικὸν πάλιν, φησί, κατὰ τὸ εἶναι 4 καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ πάντων τούτων ἐστὶν ἕτερον. σὺν τούτοις δέ φησιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα δοκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη πάλιν, εἴ τις διασπᾷ, φησί, καὶ διατέμνει αὐτὸ ἀπό τε τοῦ λογικοῦ, φησί, τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἡ ὄρεξις ὁρᾶται, ἥτις ἐστὶ μετὰ κρίσεως καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ καὶ καλεῖται βούλησις· καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς πρόδηλον ὡς τὸ ὀρεκτικόν ἐστιν· ὅ τε γὰρ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία

5 ὁρμὴ ] ὀρμὴ V 11 περιλαλούμενα ] περιλαλώμενα (ut vid.) A 15 καθ’ ὅσα V1pc (ut vid. ex καθόσον) 16 λογικόν ] λογιστικόν exspectaveris (ut Arist. 432a 25) 17 διαφορὰς M1pc (ex διαφορᾶς) 18 ἀπίδοι ] ἀπίδη V 27 λογιστικῷ ] λογικῷ A 1–12 432a 15–22

12–17 432a 22–26

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24–340.2 432b 3–7

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[Note] that, having brought to an end his discussions about the cognitive form of the soul (that is, those concerning sense perception, reasoning and intellect), he next thereafter says that since these two capacities, namely, that of cognition and that of locomotion, are especially notable in the soul and the soul is recognized on the basis of them, and since the matter of the cognitive capacity has now been fully described, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the soul’s capacity for locomotion, too: [we must say] both where the relevant impulse originates and whether there is some part of the soul in which this originates, which is separated from the other parts in respect of magnitude (that is, corporeally and spatially, as Plato says that the calculative capacity is in the brain, the spirited capacity in the heart and the appetitive capacity in the liver), or the relevant part is separated from the others only conceptually, or there is no part correlated with the motive capacity of the soul, but, rather, the relevant function belongs to the whole soul, not to a part of it. But even if there is [such] a part, [we must say] whether it is another one than those with which most people are familiar and conversant, namely, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive, or it is these collectively or one of them. In general, he says, it is a problem whether one should speak of parts 2 in the case of the soul or this kind of designation is inappropriate and unsuitable in the case of the soul. And if it is at all appropriate to speak of parts of soul, one must investigate, he says, how many these are. For in effect they seem to be many more and set further apart from each other than [would be the case] with the number of parts that his predecessors recognized and mentioned, some of whom spoke of the rational, the spirited and the appetitive parts, while others divided the soul only with respect to rational and irrational. For if one pays attention to the differentiating features of this 3 kind in the soul – the points at which it is divided and separated – very many other parts will also be apparent, he says, at greater intervals than these: for instance, the nutritive, he says, which is also the only one to be manifested separately in plants, but nevertheless is common both to them and to the animals; and further the perceptive, which will neither be said to be irrational (seeing that it is capable of discernment and cognition) nor, he says, easily supposed to have reason (since this discernment is a non-explanatory and non-deductive one in animals); but again, also the imaginative part, he says, is different from all of these in respect of its being and its account. On the 4 other hand, he says, if together with these the capacity for desire, which appears to be something else besides these capacities, both in respect of its account and in respect of the capacity for its activity, should be detached and severed both from the rational part of the soul and equally from the irrational part, an absurdity would result, he says. For desire is also found in the calculative capacity, one that is combined with

9–11 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 571.22–27. 27–31 cf. Them. 117.10–15. 34–341.3 cf. Prisc. 291.5–7.

340 | Theodoros Metochites

ὀρέξεις εἰσί· καὶ εἰ ταῦτα τὰ τρία – ἤτοι ὁ λόγος, ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός – ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, V181r ἐν ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν ἐστιν | ἡ ὄρεξις. [5] καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, φη-

σί, τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινοῦν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν τίνι θετέον; ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὔξησις καὶ ἡ φθίσις καὶ τὸ κατ’ αὐτὰς κινητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, αἳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς ἐμψύχοις (καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν ζῴοις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον), δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τοῦ κοινῶς ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐμψύχοις θεωρουμένου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ γεννητικὸν τῶν ὁμοίων, 6 εἴτουν τὸ θρεπτικόν. καὶ ἄλλα δέ, φησίν, ἔστιν ὡσαύτως τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐξετάζειν ὅπως ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τίνι τακτέον αὐτά, οἷον περὶ ἀναπνοῆς λέγω καὶ ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως· ἃ νῦν, φησί, παρείσθω, εἰς δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐπανακτέον τὸν λόγον καὶ ζητητέον τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχὶ τὸ κοινὸν δοκοῦν μόριον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα τὸ κινητικόν – ἤγουν τὸ εἰρημένον θρεπτικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν – πρόδηλον δὴ τοῦτο· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις – ἤτοι τὸ πορευτικόν – ἕνεκά του καταλαμβάνεται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ οὕτω κινούμενον οὐ βίᾳ ὀρέξει τινὸς κινεῖται, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως κινηθῆναι κατὰ τόπον, ὅτι μὴ διώκοντά τι ἐφετὸν καὶ φεύγοντά τι φευκτόν· καὶ προδήλως ἡ κίνησις αὕτη μετὰ φαντασίας τινός ἐστι καὶ ὀρέξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ – ᾧ σύνεστι δηλονότι ἡ αὔξησις καὶ ἡ φθίσις καὶ τὸ γεννητικόν, ὡς εἴρηται – οὔτε φαντασία ἐστὶν οὔτε ὄρεξις οὔτε τὸ ἕνεκά του χώραν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ζῷα ὀρεγόμενα τροφῆς ἐπ’ αὐτὴν κινεῖται, καὶ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἕνεκά του· οὐ μὴν ταυτόν ἐστιν ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις ὅπερ τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τροφῆς, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τοπικῶς κατ’ ὄρεξίν ἐστι τὸ ἕ7 νεκά του, τῇ δ’ ἀλόγῳ θρεπτικῇ δυνάμει τοῦτο χώραν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, οὐκ ἔχει. ἔτι δέ, φησίν, εἰ ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπους, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ φυτά, ἐν οἷς προδήλως ἐστὶ τὸ θρεπτικόν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπους κινεῖσθαι καὶ ὄργανά τινα καὶ μόρια ὑπηρετικὰ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὃ προδήλως οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ τί λέγω, φησί, περὶ τῶν φυτῶν; ὅπου γε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ πλέον ἐστὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ – ἔνεστι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ θρεπτικόν – οὐ πᾶν ἔχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπους κινητικόν· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ζῷα ἔχει τὸ κι-

1 ὀρέξεις ] ὄρεξις M 3 τὴν ψυχήν ] τῆς ψυχῆς malim 5 ἂν ut vid. A1pc 8 λέγω ut vid. A1pc 9 νῦν ] δὴ add. M A (fort. recte) 10 κινοῦν ] κοινοῦν A 16 τινός ἐστι transp. A 2–10 432b 7–14 10–21 432b 14–17 21–342.10 432b 17–26

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judgment and which properly is and is called “wish”; and it is obvious that the capacity for desire exists in the irrational part of the soul, for spiritedness and appetite are desires. And if the soul consists in these three, namely, reason, appetite and spiritedness, then desire exists in each of them. Moreover, in what part should we locate the 5 very capacity that the present discussion is about, he says, the capacity that moves the soul with respect to place? For growth and diminution, and the soul’s capacity to cause these motions, which in fact exist in all ensouled creatures (not only in animals, but also in plants, as is obvious), would seem to belong to that part of the soul which is found to be common to all ensouled creatures, namely, the capacity to produce similar creatures, that is, the nutritive part. We must also, he says, in the same way examine 6 what the situation is with other capacities of the soul and in what part we should locate them: I mean, for instance, inhalation and exhalation as well as sleep and wakefulness. For the time being, he says, these must be disregarded: we should bring the discussion back to topic and investigate what it is that causes the animal’s motion in the sense of local movement. Well, that it is not the part that appears to be common to all ensouled creatures – namely, the aforesaid nutritive and reproductive part – which is the motive capacity in this connection, that much is clear. For locomotion – that is, the capacity for forward movement – is found to be for the sake of something. For everything that is moved in this way, unless by force, is moved by a desire for something, and it is impossible to move oneself in respect of place under any other circumstances than if pursuing something worth coveting or avoiding something worth avoiding. So this motion is clearly combined with some instance of imagination and desire. But in the nutritive part – that is to say, the part with which growth and diminution as well as the ability to reproduce are connected, as mentioned – there is neither imagination nor desire, nor does a final cause have any place. For it is when animals desire food that they move themselves towards it, and here there is a final cause; but the nutritive capacity and the desire for nutrition are not the exact same thing, but two conceptually distinct things; and in the case of locomotion the final cause lies within the scope of desire, but it has no place, as is clear, in the irrational nutritive capacity. Further, he says, if also the capacity to cause motion in respect of place had been in 7 the power of the nutritive capacity, then plants, too, in which the nutritive capacity is clearly present, would have been capable of moving themselves in respect of place and would have had some organs and parts serving this purpose, which they clearly do not. But why, he says, do I speak about plants? After all, not even the capacity for perception, which exceeds the nutritive capacity – whereas the nutritive capacity is included in it – has, as a whole, the capacity to cause motion in respect of place. For

22–27 cf. Them. 117.31–35. 28–29 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 582.6–10; Prisc. 292.11–20. 5–6 the capacity that moves the soul : or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “the soul’s capacity to cause motion”.

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νεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπους, ἀλλ’ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων – οἷα τὰ ζῳόφυτα – ἀκίνητά ἐστι καὶ διόλου 8 μόνιμα καίτοι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἔχοντα. καὶ μήν, φησίν, εἴπερ ἡ φύσις μὴ

μόνον οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ καὶ ἀκαίρως, ἀλλὰ οὐδέ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐλλείπει (εἰ μήπως ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσι καὶ τοῖς πεπηρωμένοις, ὥσπερ τὰ βρέφη οὐ πάντα τὰ ὀργανικὰ ἔχει ἀτελῆ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ ἀμβλώματα καὶ πεπηρωμένα ἐλλιπῶς ἔχει δι’ ἁμαρτίαν τῆς φύσεως· ἀλλ’ ἥ γε μὴν φύσις, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων παραλείπει, τὰ δέ γε εἰρημένα V181v ζῷα, ἅπερ ἀκίνητά ἐστι, τέλειά | ἐστι τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει· καὶ δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀκμάζειν καὶ τὸ φθίνειν, ὃ τῆς τελείας καταστάσεώς ἐστι καὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τῆς φυσικῆς ὡς εἰπεῖν), εἶχεν ἂν λοιπὸν ταῦτα τὰ ζῷα καὶ ὀργανικὰ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως μόρια, εἴ γε ἐπὶ τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ τῷ ζωτικῷ συνῆν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινοῦν. 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ὁ νοῦς, φησί, καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν μόνον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς πρόδηλον ὡς τὸ ἀληθὲς ζητεῖ μόνον καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ γνωστικός ἐστι μόνον, οὐ θεωρῶν πρακτόν τι ὥστε τὸ μὲν διώκειν, τὸ δὲ φεύγειν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς δὲ νοῦς θεωρεῖ μὲν τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτὸν καὶ περὶ τὸ πρακτόν ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχων πᾶσαν τῆς κινήσεως. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πολλάκις κρίνων τις τὸ πρακτόν, εἴτε φοβερὸν εἴτε ἡδύ, καὶ ἀλλοιούμενος ἢ κατὰ χρόαν ἢ τῷ φρίσσειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ, ὅμως ἵσταται ἀκίνητος, καί, τοῦ διανοητικοῦ λέγοντος φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν, ἐνίοτε τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μόριον ἀντιπράττον ἐπέχει ἢ καί, τοῦ διανοητικοῦ κωλύοντος τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἡ ὄρεξις κινεῖ, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρα10 τῶς ἐχόντων καὶ λόγῳ μὴ πειθομένων. καὶ δῆλον ὡς οὐ μόνου τοῦ διανοητικοῦ ἐστι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἰᾶσθαι δυνάμενος – καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἔχων δηλονότι – οὐκ ἰᾶται ἐνίοτε, ἀλλὰ χρῄζει ἐξανάγκης καί τινος ἔξωθεν, τοῦ κινοῦντος πάντως κατὰ χρείαν καὶ τελεσιουργοῦντος τὴν αὐτοῦ ἕξιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἡ ὄρεξις μόνη τὸ πορευτικὸν ἔχει, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, ᾗ προείρηται, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγκρατῶν ὁ νοῦς κυριεύων ἠρεμεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι κατ’ ὄρεξιν εἰς τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα. * *

*

11 ἐστι A1sl : φησι Atext ac (exp. A1 ) 15 ἔχων πᾶσαν transp. A 15–16 κρίνων τις transp. M A 16 εἴτε¹ ] τὸ add. M A 19 κωλύοντος A1pc (ex κα‑) 20 μόνου ] μόνον M A 21 ἔχων δηλονότι transp. M A 22 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 11–25 432b 26–433a 8

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not all animals have the property of moving themselves in respect of place, but some animals – for instance, the zoophytes – are immobile and entirely stationary in spite of possessing the perceptive as well as the nutritive capacities. Moreover, he says, if 8 it is true that nature not only does nothing in vain and inexpediently, but also does not omit anything necessary (unless perhaps in undeveloped and crippled creatures, as, for instance, infants do not have all the organs because they are undeveloped, and aborted and mutilated creatures are deficient on account of an error of nature; but nature, at any rate, as stated, leaves out nothing that is necessary, and the aforementioned animals, the ones that are immobile, are fully developed in respect of their own proper nature; for it is clear that they have the properties of reproducing and flourishing and declining, which is the mark of a state of full development and, so to speak, of the order of nature), then these animals would also have possessed parts serving as organs for locomotion, if really the property of moving oneself in respect of place had been in the power of the nutritive and the animative parts. Nevertheless, he says, the 9 intellect, or the capacity for reasoning, is not the only thing that causes motion either. For it is obvious that the contemplative intellect, for its part, only seeks for truth and falsehood and is exclusively cognitive, without contemplating anything achievable by action with a view to either pursuing or avoiding it. But even the practical intellect, although it does contemplate what is worth pursuing and avoiding and is concerned with what can be achieved by action, even so even it is not what has the capacity for motion in its entirety. It is clear that often someone who is judging a possible course of action, whether a daunting or a tempting one, and being altered either with respect to his complexion or through shuddering or in some other way, still remains immobile, and when the capacity for reasoning is urging the avoidance or pursuit of something, the desiderative and appetitive part sometimes counteracts so as to hold him back, or indeed, when the capacity for reasoning is trying to prevent motion, desire triggers it, as can be seen in the case of people who have an incontinent disposition and refuse to obey reason. So it is clear that motion is not a function of the capacity for reasoning 10 alone, just as someone who is capable of healing – that is to say, who possesses the medical art – sometimes does not heal, but necessarily requires something external in addition, which is indispensable for triggering the motion needed and for bringing his competence to its full development. Nor, however, does desire alone have the capacity to cause forward movement, since, on the other hand, as has been previously mentioned, in the case of continent people the intellect is in charge and causes them to keep still and not to be moved in accordance with their desire towards inappropriate things. * *

*

2 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 577.7. 6 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 577.11–12. 14 the animative parts : cf. Prisc. 291.20–21. 16–17 cf. Prisc. 295.19–21. 22–23 cf. Them. 118.12–13.

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10 Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ δύο φαίνεται εἶναι τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξίς τε καὶ νοῦς – εἴ γε δὴ κλητέον, φησί, καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν «νοῦν», ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τῶν ζῴων ἴσως ἂν κινοῖντο λόγῳ καὶ κρίσει νοὸς πολλάκις, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ φαντασίᾳ μόνῃ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων, τὰ ἄλογα, ἀεὶ φαντασίᾳ πάντως κινεῖται. διατοῦτο καί φησιν «εἴ γε καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡς νόησιν χρὴ τιθέναι», ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ κατὰ φαντασίαν κινεῖται, μὴ κατ’ ἐπιστημονικοὺς καὶ διανοητικοὺς λόγους. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι κἂν ἡ φαντασία, ὡς προείρηται, ἐπὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἥδρασται, ἀλλ’ οὖν καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἴκοθεν κατ’ αὐτήν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔξωθεν κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ὥστε τρία ἂν εἴη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰ κινοῦντα· νοῦς, φαντασία καὶ ὄρεξις· εἰ δέ γε καὶ δύο λέγοιντο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἴσως εὐλόγως ὡς καθολικῷ 2 τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐν τῇ νοήσει θεωρουμένης. νοῦς δέ, φησίν, ἐνταῦθα κινῶν λέγεται οὐχ ὁ θεωρητικὸς ἀλλ’ ὁ πρακτικός, ὅστις διαφέρει τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ κατὰ τὸ τέλος· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τέλος τὸ ἀληθές, τοῦ δὲ τὸ πρακτόν, ὡς πρὸ ὀλίγου τὰ περὶ τούτων r V182 διώρισται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κατὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν νοῦν ἕνεκά του· | ἡ γὰρ κατ’ αὐ3 τὴν κίνησις εὔδηλον ὡς ἕνεκά τινός ἐστιν, εἰς ὃ φέρει καὶ ὃ προτίθεται. οὗ δέ ἐστιν ἡ ὄρεξις, φησίν, ἡ τοιαύτη, τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ, τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ νοὸς τοῦ πρακτικοῦ, αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοὸς τὸ ἔσχατόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως αὐτῆς· οἷον ὡς ἐν ὑποδείγματι ὄρεξις μέν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν σκέπης τῷ σώματι ὥστε μὴ πάσχειν ἔξωθεν· αὕτη γοῦν ἡ ὄρεξις ἀρχή τις γίνεται καὶ κινεῖ τὸν πρακτικὸν νοῦν εἰς ἐπιβολὴν οἰκοδομήσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀσφαλείας, κἀντεῦθεν ἐννοεῖ τὰ πρὸς χρείαν τῆς σκέπης, οἷον ξύλα, πλίνθους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τοῖς δὲ ἐξανάγκης ὑποκεῖσθαι δεῖ εἰς ἕδραν θεμελίους, ὧν ἄνευ ἀδύνατον ἐπισυστῆναι τὰ πρὸς τὴν σκέπην τῶν σωμάτων τῷ νῷ καταλαμβανόμενα. καὶ τοίνυν γίνεται τὸ τέλος τοῦ τοιούτου πρακτικοῦ

2 κινοῖντο ] κινοῖτο M A1pc (ex κινεῖ‑) 6 post κἂν rasuram unius fere litterae (fort. ϗ) habere vid. V 13 πρακτόν ] πρακτικὸν M Atext : -ὸν A1?sl || πρὸ ὀλίγου ] προολίγου V 19 τις M1sl 21 τοῖς ] τούτοις malim || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 23 τοιούτου M1pc (ut vid. ex ποιητοῦ) 1–9 433a 9–12 9–346.2 433a 13–17

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From this, then, it would appear that there are two agents of motion, namely, desire and intellect – supposing that, he says, imagination, too, should be called “intellect”: for perhaps rational animals often move themselves by reason and intellective judgment, although sometimes by imagination alone; but the other, irrational, animals unconditionally always move themselves by imagination. This is why he also says “supposing we should consider imagination as thinking”, since many animals move themselves by virtue of imagination rather than by virtue of scientific and intellectual reasoning. And it is clear that even though imagination is, as previously stated, founded on sense perception, it nevertheless belongs to the intellective part of the soul as well, since the soul is endogenously, not exogenously, moved within the ambit of imagination, just as it is exogenously moved by perceptible objects within the ambit of sense perception. The result is that in this sense there would seem to be three agents of motion: intellect, imagination and desire. But even if they should be said to be two, namely, intellect and desire, this would perhaps also be reasonable, since it is for the purposes of a general argument, and given that imagination is understood to be comprised in thinking. The intellect, he says, that is spoken of in this context as a cause of 2 motion is not the contemplative but the practical one, which differs from the contemplative one in terms of its goal. For the goal of the one is truth and that of the other is what can be achieved by action, in accordance with the delineation of their properties a little while ago. Desire, too, is for the sake of something, in the manner of the practical intellect. For the motion based on it is obviously for the sake of something, towards which it leads and which it sets before itself. And the correlative of the aforementioned 3 desire, he says, the object of desire, this is the very starting-point of the practical intellect; and the end-point of the practical intellect is the starting-point of the action: as, to give an example in terms of human needs, there is desire for a shelter for the body in order that it may not be exposed to external harm. This desire, then, becomes a kind of starting-point and moves the practical intellect towards a project of house-building and protection from external harm, and as a result the practical intellect thinks about the things that are needed for the shelter, such as wood, bricks and the like; and under these there must necessarily be placed, as a fundament, foundation‐stones, without which it is impossible for the structure conceived by the intellect as a shelter for the body to be assembled. And accordingly the end-point of the aforementioned practical intellect becomes the starting-point of the action and of the aim; and as the first part

9–12 cf. Prisc. 296.3–7. 12–16 cf. Prisc. 296.25–27; Ps.-Phlp. 584.3–6. 18–19 cf. Prisc. 297.3–4. 20– 22 cf. Prisc. 297.7–9. 24–347.2 cf. Prisc. 297.15–23; Ps.-Phlp. 585.7–13.

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νοὸς τῆς πράξεως αὐτῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πράξει καὶ ἀρχὴ ὑποτί4 θενται ἐξανάγκης οἱ θεμέλιοι τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. ἀλλ’ ἐπανακτέον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι εὐλόγως

ἐλέγετο δύο ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ κινητικὰ τό τε ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ ἡ πρακτικὴ διάνοια, κινεῖ δὲ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοός· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἐν οἷς μὴ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, ὡς εἴρηται, κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ φαντασία, σύνεστιν αὐτῇ ἀχωρίστως τῇ ὀρέξει καὶ οὐδόλως ἄνευ ὀρέξεως κινεῖ, ὥστε ἐντεῦθεν ἐξεῖναι μᾶλλον συλλογίζε5 σθαι ἕν γέ τι εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν αὐτό. εἰ γάρ τινα δύο, φησίν, ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴη ἂν αἴτια, καθ’ ἕν τι πάντως κοινὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἴτια τοῦ ἑνός· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἄλλο τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλο αἴτιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς πράγματος, οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη πάντως αἴτιον ὡς ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλου· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀμφότερα ὑπό τι κοινὸν ἓν ταῦτα συνάπτειν, εἴ γε δὴ ὄντως ἀμφότερα ἔσται τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς αἴτια – ὥσπερ δὴ κἀνταῦθα τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς πορείας φαίνεται συνημμένον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γνωστικὸν καὶ κοινὸν ὂν μετὰ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ, ὡς αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος καὶ καθ’ ὅ ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις. εὖ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὐ φαίνεταί πως κινῶν ἀχώριστος ὅλως τῆς ὀρέξεως· βουλὴ γὰρ καὶ βούλησις αὐτοῦ πρακτική ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ δὲ βούλησις, ὡς εὔδηλον, ὡς ὄρεξίς τις· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις κινεῖ μόνη καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ δίχα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν καὶ μὴ πειθομένων λόγῳ, ὡς προείρηται· καὶ νοῦς μέν ἐστιν ἀεὶ κινῶν ὀρθῶς, ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία νῦν μὲν ὀρθή, νῦν δὲ οὐκ ὀρθή. ὥστε περιεκτικώτερον ἐνταῦθα ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν τοῦ γνωστικοῦ, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μάλιστα κινεῖ καὶ 6 πρώτως. καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι, φησίν, ἢ περὶ τἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὂν ἢ περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν (πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις εἰς τόδε τι ὡς εἰς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ τῷ κινουμένῳ πάντως ἐστίν, V182v εἰ καὶ ἀγνοεῖται ἢ ἐπισκοτεῖται ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ θυμῷ), περὶ ἀγαθὸν δὲ τὸ πρακτικόν, | οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀίδιον· ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τὸ πρακτόν, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εὐστοχεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτο δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

1 ἀρχὴ² correxi : ἀρχῆ codd. 2 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 6 ἐντεῦθεν ἐξεῖναι transp. M A 7 ὀρεκτικὸν ] ὀρεκτὸν M 8 ἂν delere velim || κοινὸν A1pc (fort. ex κενὸν) 9 ἂν delere velim 10 πάντως ] ὡς add. M A 14 καθ’ ὅ ] καθό A || ἀχώριστος ] sine dubio vult dicere χωριστὸς 21 ἐστίν ] ἐστὶ M A 24 καὶ M1sl 2–14 433a 17–22

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and the starting-point of the action the foundation‐stones for building the house are necessarily laid down. But we must resume the discussion: these two, the desiderative 4 capacity and practical thought, were reasonably said to be the motive capacities, but the desiderative capacity is what originally causes motion and is primary relative to the practical intellect. For in fact, in those cases where it is not reason and intellect, as stated, that cause the motion, but imagination, imagination, too, is inseparably connected with desire and causes no motion at all independently of desire, so that it is possible to conclude from this, rather, that what causes motion within the ambit of the desiderative capacity is one single thing. For if two things, he says, should be the 5 causes of one and the same thing, then it is absolutely necessary that they should be the causes of that one thing by virtue of some single thing they have in common. For indeed, if the two things should be the causes of one and the same thing by virtue of different things, then inevitably neither of them could be the cause of it as one and a whole. For this reason, then, it is also necessary to join together both of these things under some single thing they have in common, if they are both truly to be the causes of one and the same thing – as, indeed, in the present case concerned with forward movement, the cognitive capacity is also clearly joined together and associated with the desiderative capacity, and this is the primary cause of motion and that by virtue of which the motion takes place. For it is plain to see that even the intellect is clearly not somehow causing motion in complete separation from desire. For its motion is a deliberation and a wish to act on its part, and a wish, as is perfectly clear, in the sense of a kind of desire; but desire, on the other hand, causes motion on its own and independently of calculation in the case of people who are incontinent and refuse to obey reason, as previously mentioned. And intellect always sets in motion correctly, but desire and imagination are sometimes correct, sometimes incorrect. Consequently, the desiderative capacity is, so to speak, more comprehensive in this case than the cognitive one, and it is always the desiderative capacity that chiefly and primarily causes motion. And this capacity, he says, is concerned either with what is truly and really 6 good or with what is apparently good (for all motion unconditionally tends towards some individual thing as being something good for the thing that is moved, even if it is misidentified or muddled because of appetite or spiritedness), and with what is good in the sphere of action, not with the unqualified and eternal good. And since it is concerned with what can be achieved by action, it also admits of being correct and achieving the good, and it also admits of the opposite.

3–5 cf. Prisc. 297.28–30; 298.8–25. 11–14 cf. Prisc. 298.5–7. 22–24 cf. Them. 119.12–16. 25–28 cf. Prisc. 298.7–10. 32 cf. Them. 119.23–24. 20 in complete separation from desire: I have translated what I think the author intended to write; the transmitted text has “completely unseparated from desire”.

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Ὅτι μετὰ τὸ παραδοῦναι καὶ διασαφῆσαι ὡς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ὀρεκτική ἐστιν ἡ κινοῦσα τὸ ζῷον πάλιν ἐπανατρέχει εἰς ὃ προὔλεγεν, ὡς ἐάν τις εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας διαφόρους δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφορῶν διαιρῇ τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν εἰς διάφορα μόρια, πλεῖστα ἂν γίγνοιντο ταῦτα, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν (ὃ ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ φυτικῷ· ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ φυτικοῦ τούτῳ χρῆται), τὸ αἰσθητικόν, τὸ νοητικόν, τὸ βουλευτικόν (νοητικὸν λέγων τὸν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν, ὃς μόνως ἐστὶ θεωρία, καὶ βουλευτικὸν τὸν πρακτικὸν νοῦν· ἡ γὰρ 8 βουλὴ ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις ἐστί)· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις φησὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ ἄλλάττα. καὶ δῆλόν γε, φησίν, ὅτι ταῦτα διαφέρει ἀλλήλων πλέον ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικόν· γίνεσθαι δέ φησιν, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, καὶ ὀρέξεις ἐναντίας ἀλλήλαις, ὡς ὅταν ὁ νοῦς μὲν καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἄλλο βούληται, ἡ ἐπιθυμία δὲ εἰς ἄλλο κινῇ καὶ ἄλλου ὀρέγηται. γίνεσθαι δὲ τοῦτό φησιν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις τοῖς ἔχουσιν αἴσθησιν καὶ κατάληψιν χρόνου, ἤτοι τοῖς λογιζομένοις παρελθόν, ἐνεστὼς καὶ μέλλον, ἤγουν ἐν ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ μὲν νοῦς καὶ ἡ κατ’ αὐτὸν ὄρεξις – εἴτουν βούλησις – εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὁρᾷ, ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμία εἰς τὸ νῦν ἑκάστοτε ἕλκει. ἐν δέ γε τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, ἐν οἷς μὴ ἔστιν ὅλως αἴσθησις καὶ λογισμὸς τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἤδη ὂν τοῦ χρόνου αἴσθησις, τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν ἐκτεινομένοις καὶ ἐπαΐουσιν – ἐν τούτοις, φησίν, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι ὡς διώρισται ὀρέξεις (ἤτοι τοῦ νοὸς ἄλλη καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἄλλη), ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν ἑκάστοτε ἡδὺ αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδύ, ὅτι μὴ ὁρῶ9 σι, φησί, τὸ μέλλον. καὶ τοίνυν ὡς εἴδει μὲν ἕν ἐστι, φησί, τὸ κινοῦν αὐτό, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καθὸ ὀρεκτικόν· κοινὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ· πρῶτον δὲ πάντων, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, εἰς τὸ κινεῖν αἴτιον αὐτὸ μάλιστα τὸ ὀρεκτὸν πρᾶγμα· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κινοῦν μὴ κινούμενον· τὰ γὰρ ὀρεκτὰ πράγματα νοούμενα ἢ φανταζόμενα κινοῦσι τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ὀρεκτικὸν ἅμα τε κινεῖται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥστε εἴδει μέν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ κινοῦν ἕν ἐστι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν αὐτήν. τὰ μέντοι κινοῦντα τῷ ἀριθμῷ πλείω ἑνός· ἔστι γὰρ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον· ἔστι καὶ κινοῦν κι10 νούμενον. τρία γὰρ ἐνθεωρεῖται, φησί, τῇ κινήσει, τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ κινούμενον καὶ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον ἐρεῖν τέτταρα· τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν εἰς δύο διῄρηται· ἔστι 7

1 διασαφῆσαι ] διασαφῆναι A 4 γίγνοιντο ] γίνοιντο M 7 ἄλλάττα ] ἄλλ’ ἄττα A 10 βούληται ] βούλεται V || κινῇ correxi : κινεῖ codd. || ὀρέγηται ut vid. M1pc A1pc (ex ὀρέγεται) : ὀρέγεται V 11 post κατάληψιν rasuram unius fere litterae habere vid. V 12 ἐνεστὼς ] ἐνεστῶς M A 15 πᾶν ] ἐν add. M A 20 καὶ ] ἐν add. A 21 ὀρεκτὸν ] ὀρεκτικὸν Atext ac (‑ικὸν exp. A1 , -ὸν A1sl ) 26 τὸ κινούμενον A1pc (ex κινούμενον) 1–7 433a 31–b 3 7–19 433b 3–10 19–24 433b 10–12 24–350.6 433b 12–21

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[Note] that, after explaining and making it clear that it is the desiderative capacity of the soul that sets the animal in motion, he returns again to what he was saying earlier, that if one pays attention to the aforementioned different soul‐capacities when dividing what pertains to the soul into different parts, these parts will become very many: for instance, the nutritive part (which is the same as the vegetative part, for he is using this word instead of “vegetative”), the perceptive part, the intellective part and the deliberative part (by “intellective part” he means the contemplative intellect, which consists exclusively in contemplation, and by “deliberative part” the practical intellect, for deliberation is concerned with the appropriate courses of action). And to these he adds the desiderative part and others. It is obvious, he says, that these parts differ from each other more than the appetitive and the spirited parts do. And he says that desires contrary to each other also occur, as is obvious, as, for instance, when one’s intellect and judgment wish for one thing and one’s appetite pushes towards and strives for another. He says that this happens in those animals that have perception and comprehension of time, that is, in those that take into account the past, the present and the future, namely, human beings. For in these the intellect and the desire that pertains to it – that is, wish – look towards the future, whereas appetite pulls, on any given occasion, towards the present. In the other animals, in which there is no perception or taking into account of the future at all – rather, perception within the ambit of the currently existing part of time is everything to them, and beyond this they do not extend and do not understand anything – in these, he says, there are no contrary desires of the kind delineated (that is, one that belongs to the intellect and another one to the appetite), but for them the very thing that now, on each occasion, is pleasant is the good itself and the pleasant without qualification, since they do not see, he says, the future. Accordingly, he says, what causes motion – namely, as mentioned, the desiderative capacity in so far as it is desiderative – is specifically a single thing, for it is something common to intellect and appetite. But the first cause of all with regard to motion is obviously the very thing that is an object of desire. For this causes motion without being moved. For, by being thought or imagined, those things that are objects of desire set the desiderative part of the soul in motion, and the desiderative part is simultaneously moved by them and setting the animal in motion, so that specifically, as mentioned, what causes motion is a single thing, namely, what pertains to desire. But numerically there are more than one thing that cause motion. For there is an unmoved mover and there is also a moved mover. For there are three things, he says, manifested in motion: (a) that which causes motion; (b) that which is moved and (c) that by means of which it is moved. Or rather, to speak more pre-

7–9 cf. Prisc. 299.18–19. 15–16 cf. Prisc. 299.34–36. 300.36–301.14; Them. 120.28–121.1.

27 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 587.1–6.

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γὰρ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ὃ καὶ πρώτως εἴρηται κινεῖν· ἔστι καὶ κινοῦν κινούμενον, οἷον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· κινεῖται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ (κίνησις γάρ τίς ἐστιν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ | ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ)· κινούμενον δέ ἐστι τὸ ζῷον· ἐν ᾧ δὲ κινεῖται, φησίν, ἤτοι δι’ οὗ κινεῖ τὸ ζῷον ὀργάνου ἡ ὄρεξις, τοῦτο σωματικόν τί ἐστιν. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ τοῦ κινητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν λόγον ποιουμένοις κοινὸν ποιεῖσθαι – καὶ θεωρεῖν – τὸν τοιοῦτον περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον μετὰ τῶν σωματικῶν. ὅθεν δὴ καί φησιν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ καὶ συντετμημένως περὶ τοῦ ᾧ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν, ἤτοι τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ· ἡ γὰρ περὶ τούτου πλατυκωτέρα διδασκαλία τοῦ Περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως βιβλίου ἐστίν. ἐνταῦθα δὲ κεφαλαιωδῶς, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ ὀργανικῶς κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον – ἤτοι τὸ δι’ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις – φησὶν ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται εἶναι, καὶ λόγῳ μὲν ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ δύναται χωρίζεσθαι καὶ ἕτερα εἶναι ταῦτα, μεγέθει δέ, εἴτουν ὡς ὅλως ἡνωμένως, πρᾶγμά τι ἀχώριστον. ὃ δὴ οἱ μὲν τῶν ἐξηγουμένων, ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ Θεμίστιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Πλούταρχος, τὸν περὶ καρδίαν τόπον φασίν, ἐξ ἧς ἀναπηγάζει τὸ ζωτικὸν τοῖς νεύροις πνεῦμα ὀργανικὸν εἰς τὴν κίνησιν. πάντως δὲ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοῦ ζῴου ἔοικεν εἶναι, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ἔμπροσθεν, ὄπισθεν, δεξιόν, εὐώνυμον, ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ πάντως ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις. Ἰάμβλιχος δέ, ᾧ καὶ Σιμπλίκιος συντίθεται, τὸ ὀργανικὸν αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἐν ᾧ δηλονότι ἡ κίνησις, μᾶλλον δὲ καθ’ ὃ ἡ κίνησις, τὸ εἰδητικὸν αὐτό φασιν εἶναι τῆς ζωῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις· ἡ γὰρ ζωὴ εἰδοποιοῦσα τὸ ζῷον καὶ χαρακτηρίζουσα ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ λόγῳ πως ἐννοεῖται, καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος καὶ τὸ

2 τίς om. M 6 αὐτῆς ut vid. V1pc 18 ἡ¹ om. M A || καθ’ ὃ ] καθὸ A || αὐτό ] fort. legendum αἴτιόν (cf. Prisc. 302.12) 19 τῆς ζωῆς A1pc (ex τοῖς ζῴοις) 20 πως ] χωριστῶς (vel sim.) addere velim 7–354.12 433b 21–27 8–9 τοῦ Περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως: cf. praesertim MA 10

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cisely, four things, for that which causes motion is divided into two: there is (a1) an unmoved mover, as mentioned, the object of desire, which was also said to be what primarily causes motion; and there is also (a2) a moved mover, namely, the desiderative capacity, for it is moved by the object of desire (for the activity of the desiderative capacity is a sort of motion caused by the object of desire). (b) That which is moved is the animal. And (c) that, he says, by means of which it is moved, that is, the instrument through which desire moves the animal, that is something corporeal. The upshot is that it is necessary for anyone who wants to give an account of the motive capacity of the soul to give – and conceive of – a combined account of it like this, which includes the bodily parts. This is why he also speaks in a summary and compendious 11 way about that by means of which what causes motion causes motion, that is, the instrumental mover: his more extensive teaching on this subject belongs to the book On the Movement of Animals. In the present context he says, by way of summary, as mentioned, that that which moves the animal instrumentally – that is, that with the aid of which and by means of which the motion takes place – is located in that part in which the same thing can be a starting-point and an end-point, and can be separated as a starting-point and an end-point and be these distinct things conceptually, while being an inseparable entity in magnitude, that is, taken as a unified whole. Some of the 12 commentators, including Themistius, Alexander and Plutarch, say that this is the area around the heart, from which the animative spirit, which is instrumental to the motion, gushes forth into the sinews. It definitely seems likely that, being a starting-point and an end-point, it should be located in the middle of the animal relative to up and down, front and back and right and left, from which and towards which locomotion is undeniably directed. But Iamblichus says, and Simplicius agrees with him, that it is 13 the formal cause of life in animals that is this instrumental mover (that is to say, that by means of which, or rather by virtue of which, the motion takes place). For the life which bestows form and character on the animal is inseparable from it, even though it is somehow conceived of by reason, and the area around the heart and the spirit are somehow in an extended state, and by the same token one may conceive of it as

12–13 cf. Prisc. 303.21–25; 301.17–20; 303.15–16. 15–18 cf. Them. 121.5–7. 18–19 cf. Prisc. 301.28–30. 19 cf. Prisc. 302.24–33; 304.9–20. 19–24 cf. Them. 121.4–9; Prisc. 301.20–24. 20–21 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 587.24–25; 591.26–27; Prisc. 301.17–20; 303.31–33. 24–27 cf. Prisc. 303.33–36; 302.10–13 (who admittedly does not mention Iamblichus here, but see id. 1.7–21 and passim). 24–353.8 These paragraphs are not easy to interpret in their details, but the gist of them seems to be that “Simplicius’” view – that the instrument by which, according to Aristotle, desire moves the body is the formal life of the body – is supported by the parallel between Aristotle’s description of the instrument as differentiated in account but impossible to differentiate in magnitude and “Simplicius’” description of the formal life of the body as being separable from the body only in account, at the same time as being utterly unified. 27–28 even though it is somehow conceived of by reason: i.e. in itself, “separately”.

352 | Theodoros Metochites

14 πνεῦμα διαστατικῶς πως ἔχει, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοοῖτ’ ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ μερίζεσθαι. τούτῳ

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δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς συντίθεμαι μάλιστα, ὡς ὅλως νοουμένου τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῷ τῷ ζῴῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ νοουμένου, καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ τέλους νῷ μόνῳ τῆς διαιρέσεως νοουμένης κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀχωρίστου καταλαμβανομένου, ὥστε τὶ μὲν νοεῖσθαι ἠρεμεῖν, ὡς ἑξῆς αὐτός φησι, τὶ δὲ κινεῖσθαι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος οἱ ἐξηγούμενοί φασι τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ εἶναι τὴν ἠρέμησιν, μερικῶς δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ τῆς ζωῆς, εἰ νοεῖ τὸν λόγον τις, προσφυέστερον ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλοσόφου καταλαμβάνειν, ἤτοι τὸ νοεῖν ἐνταῦθα ἅμα τε ἠρεμίαν καὶ κίνησιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα διάστασις, οὐδὲ τόπου συνεισαγωγὴ τῷ εἰδητικῷ τῆς ζωῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅλον διόλου ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ἅμα μὲν κινεῖται, ἅμα δὲ ἠρεμεῖ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς οὐσίας. τοίνυν ἐοικέναι τοῦτό φησι τῇ περὶ τὸ κέντρον τοῦ κύκλου κινήσει· ἠρεμοῦντος γὰρ τοῦ κύκλου γίνεται ἡ κίνησις, ἀφ’ οὗ ἡ κίνησις – ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως τῇ ἀποστάσει τοῦ κέντρου καὶ τῷ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ διαστήματι – καὶ περὶ ὃ ἡ κίνησις (περὶ γὰρ τὸ κέντρον ὁ κύκλος κινεῖται καὶ | εἰς αὐτὸ περιστρέφεται καὶ τρόπον τινὰ φέρει). καὶ ἔοικε τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ, ὡς φαμέν, ἡ τῆς ζωῆς κίνησις καί, ὅπερ εἴρηται, ὡς τὸ ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡς ἀρχὴ νοητέον καὶ ὡς τέλος. καὶ καταλαμβάνειν ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν ὅπως νοεῖται καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐνταῦθα· ὡς ὅλον γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ ὁ κύκλος, κατὰ μέρη δὲ περιστρέφεται τὸ κέντρον· καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῇ κινήσει αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος τὸ κέντρον, καὶ ἅμα τῇ κινήσει καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν πως ἐν ταυτότητι ὄντος τοῦ κέντρου καὶ ὅλου τοῦ κύκλου. ἐοικέναι δέ φησι τοῦτο καὶ τῷ γιγκλισμῷ, ὃν τινές φασιν ὅταν δύο κρίκοι, εἷς ὑπὸ τὸν ἕτερον, ἅμα ὦσι, τινὲς δὲ ὅταν κρίκος τις ἔχῃ μέσον περόνην οἵαν κινεῖσθαι καὶ περιστρέφεσθαι· τοῦ γὰρ ἐντὸς κρίκου περιστρεφομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου

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also involving being divided into parts. With this view I myself also agree completely, seeing that the formal cause of life is conceived of [as belonging] as a whole to the animal as such, and conceived of [as located] in the same area, and that the distinction between starting-point and end-point is conceived of only by the intellect, in accordance with the essence of what is comprehended as inseparable, in such a way that it [sc. the magnitude conceived of as a starting-point and an end-point] is conceived of as being, as [Aristotle] himself goes on to say, in one respect at rest, and in another respect moved. For the commentators say that rest applies to the spirit as a whole and motion partially; but if one thinks through the argument, it is possible to comprehend what is said by the Philosopher, namely, that rest and motion are here conceived of as simultaneous, as having a more natural application to the formal cause of life. For in this case there is no extension involved, and no introduction of place together with the formal cause of life, but in being moved the animal as a whole is wholly moved at the same time as being wholly at rest in the sameness of its essence. Accordingly, [Aristotle] says that this is comparable to the motion of a circle around its centre. For the motion takes place although the circle is at rest, from which the motion starts – for it is the starting-point of the motion by virtue of the centre’s standing apart and the distance from it – and around which the motion takes place – for the circle is moved around the centre, and rotates and, in a sense, tends towards it. And as we say, the motion of [the formal] life is comparable to this kind of operation: what was stated was that one must conceive of that by means of which [the animal] is moved as the same thing both as a starting-point and as an end-point. And from this it is possible to understand how “being moved and being at rest” is conceived of in this case: for the circle is at rest as a whole, but with respect to its parts it rotates [around] the centre, and in it, the centre is also the starting-point and end-point of its motion, and in a way its being at rest is simultaneous with its motion, since the centre – and the circle as a whole – is in the same place. And [Aristotle] says that this is also comparable to the “pivot”, which some people say is when there are two rings at the same time, the one under the other, and some say is when a ring has a pin in the middle of such a kind as to be moved and rotated. For since, if the inner ring is rotated and the other is at rest, the convexity of the contained ring and the concavity of the containing one are

2–8 cf. Prisc. 304.1–7; 302.15–17. 16–19 cf. Prisc. 306.10–15; 305.38–306.2. 30–31 cf. Prisc. 304.19–20. 31–355.4 cf. Prisc. 304.36–305.15 (although he seems to be proposing a different theory from Plutarch’s here). 3 and conceived of [as located] in the same area: the translation is uncertain. 16 circle: perhaps Metochites intended to write “centre”, but see below l. 24. 28–29 some people say: namely, Plutarch of Athens (cf. Prisc. 304.9–11). 29–30 some say: in Priscian’s report (304.5–11) of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ interpretation, on which Metochites must be drawing here, it is made clear that the inner pin is supposed to remain unmoved.

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ἠρεμοῦντος, τοῦ περιεχομένου ἡ κυρτότης καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡ κοιλότης, ὡς μία τις ἐπιφάνεια οὖσα, καὶ ἅμα τὸ μὲν ὡς τελευτὴ τὸ δ’ ὡς ἀρχὴ νοουμένη, τὶ μὲν ἔοικεν ἠρεμεῖν, τὶ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, μεγέθει δὲ καὶ διαστάσει ἀχώριστον. τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐστι καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον λέγοιτο «ὁ γιγκλισμός», ἤτοι τῇ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ περόνῃ τοῦ κρίκου περιστρεφομένῃ συμπεριστρεφομένου πως τοῦ κρίκου· κἀνταῦθα γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ὑποδείγματος ὡσαύτως δηλοῦσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τέλος καὶ 18 ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως καὶ ἅμα ἠρεμίαν πως καὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει πᾶσαν τὴν ἔξωθεν καὶ ἀλλοτρίαν κίνησιν ἐν διαφόροις εἴδεσι θεωρουμένην ὑπὸ τὴν ὦσιν καὶ τὴν ἕλξιν ἀνήγαγεν, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖσθαί φησιν· ἐκτείνοντα γὰρ καὶ συστέλλοντα παρὰ μέρος τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ εὐώνυμα οὕτω κινεῖται, ταῦτα δὲ ὦσις πάντως καὶ ἕλξις· ὠθεῖ γὰρ τὸ μένον μόριον, ἐν τῷ ἀκινήτῳ βεβηκός, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἕλκει, τὸ σῶμα. * *

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like one surface, the one being at the same time conceived of as an end-point and the other as a starting-point, it seems to be at rest in one respect and moved in another, and to be two conceptually distinct things, but inseparable in magnitude and extension. It is the same thing also if the “pivot” is meant in the other sense, that is, if the ring is somehow rotated along with the rotating pin in the middle of the ring. For in this case too the comparison of the example is showing in the same way that the end-point and the starting-point of the motion are in the same place, and that there is in a way simultaneously rest and motion. And just as in the Physics he subsumed all external 18 and alien motion manifested in different forms under pushing and pulling, so he also says here that all things that move themselves with a natural motion move themselves by means of pushing and pulling. For it is by extending and flexing the right and the left parts in turn that they move themselves, and these motions are undeniably cases of pushing and pulling. For being poised in that which is unmoved, the part that is at rest pushes and pulls that which is moved, the body. * *

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8–11 cf. Prisc. 305.20–22; Ps.-Phlp. 589.7–9. 11–13 cf. Them. 121.14–15; Prisc. 305.23–27. 5–8 Priscian expressly denies that Alexander applied his interpretation of the pivot to the simultaneous beginning and end, movement and rest (304.26–28).

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Ὅτι, ἐπεὶ ὅλως τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν, τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντασίας, ἔτι δὲ ἡ φαντασία ἡ μέν ἐστιν αἰσθητική, εἴτουν ὅλη συνημμένη τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνεργοῦσα, ἡ δέ ἐστι καὶ λογιστική, οἵα ἐστὶν ὅταν οἴκοθεν ἐντὸς κινῆται τὸ ζῷον, οὐκ ἔξωθεν (ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διώρισται), ἥτις ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντως ἐστίν, ἡ δ’ ἄλλη – ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δηλονότι φαντασία – καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστί, ζητητέον εἶναί φησι πότερον ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελεστέροις τῶν ζῴων – ἐν οἷς μὴ πᾶσαί εἰσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνον ἡ ἁφή, οἷον τοῖς ζωοφύτοις, εὐλαῖς, σκώληξι καὶ ἄλλοις τισί – καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις γοῦν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι φαντασίαν ἢ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ὡσαύτως. φαίνεται γοῦν, φησίν, ἐνοῦσα αὐτοῖς ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ δῆλον ὡς ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν | ὧν ἅπτονται ἀλγοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τινῶν δὲ οὔ· ὥστε εἰ ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, πάντως καὶ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ ὄρεξις, ἧς ἀχώριστος ἡ φαντασία, ὡς διώρισται· φαντασία δὲ οὐκ ἄλλως, φησίν, ἂν εἴη ἢ ἀορίστως, καθὼς καὶ ἀορίστως, φησί, κινοῦνται καὶ ἀτελῆ καὶ συγκεχυμένην καὶ ἀδιόριστον τὴν κίνησιν ἔχουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία οὑτωσί πως ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς, ἐν οἷς πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ἀντεξέτασις καὶ αἵρεσις γίνεται, πότερον τόδε αἱρετώτερον ἢ τόδε ἀνιχνεύουσι καὶ ἀναζωγραφοῦσι καί – ὥσπερ ἐν ποσοῖς τισι καὶ οἷα μέτρῳ ἑνί τινι, πήχει ἢ παλαιστῇ ἢ ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ – τὸ μεῖζον ἐκ πολλῶν διώκουσιν· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινὶ μέτρῳ, εἴτε ἡδεῖ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἀνευρίσκεται αὐτοῖς τὸ αἱρετώτερον φάντασμα. τοῦτο δέ φησι καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ τοῖς μέν, ἤτοι τοῖς τὴν λογιστικὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν, ἐνεῖναι καὶ δόξαν (ἐπὶ γὰρ τῷ λογιστικῷ ἡ δόξα), τοῖς δὲ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνην φαντασίαν ἔχουσι ζῴοις καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης μόνης κινουμένην τὴν ὄρεξιν μὴ ἐνεῖναι καὶ δόξαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα ζῷα συλλογισμόν·

3 λογιστική ] λογικὴ A 3–4 οἵα ] οἷα V A 9 ἐνοῦσα correxi : ἑνοῦσα M A : spiritus non legitur in V 15 ἀντεξέτασις scripsi (cf. Them. 121.22) : ἀνεξέτασις codd. 16 ἀναζωγραφοῦσι Vpr (ex ἀναζωγραφοῦσιν) 17 μέτρῳ A1pc : μετρεῖν (vel sim.) addere velim || πολλῶν A1sl 18 ἡδεῖ ] δεῖ A : τῷ ἡδεῖ malim 19 φάντασμα A1pc 1–13 433b 31–434a 5

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[Note] that, in general, an animal possesses the motive capacity, as mentioned, in so far as it is a desiderative capacity, and the desiderative capacity does not exist without imagination; further, one kind of imagination is perceptive, that is, wholly connected with sense perception and performing its activity together with sense perception, and another kind is calculative, as it is when the animal is moved endogenously, not exogenously, as has also been described, and this is invariably found in human beings, while the other kind – that is to say, the perceptive kind of imagination – is also found in animals. Therefore he says that we must investigate whether it is possible that in the more undeveloped animals, too – in those which do not have all the senses but only touch, for instance zoophytes, maggots, worms and others – whether or not it is possible, then, that there is imagination, and similarly appetite, in these kinds of animal, too. At any rate it is evident, he says, that pleasure and pain are 2 present in them, and clearly they are hurt by some things when they touch them and not by others. Consequently, if pleasure and pain are present in them, so is inevitably appetite for the pleasurable and desire, from which imagination is inseparable, as has been determined. But imagination, he says, will not be present in any other way than indeterminately, just as, he says, these animals also move themselves indeterminately and their motion is undeveloped, confused and indeterminate. The perceptive 3 kind of imagination, then, is present in some such way in animals. But a deliberative kind of imagination is present in calculative animals, in which a comparison and a choice among a multitude of images takes place, as they try to ascertain and envisage whether this or that thing is the more choiceworthy and seek for the superior among a number of options, as if it were among some quantities possible [to gauge] by a single measure, a cubit or a palm or whatever else. For from among a number of options they try to single out, by some measure of this kind, whether pleasure or something else, the image that is the more choiceworthy for them. This, he says, also explains the fact 4 that in some animals – namely, those that have the calculative kind of imagination and desire – opinion is also present (for opinion is in the power of the calculative capacity), while in those animals that have only the perceptive kind of imagination and whose desire is only set in motion by this, opinion is not also present. For these kinds

1–8 cf. Them. 121.19–22. 5–6 cf. Prisc. 308.13–14. 10 τοῖς ζωοφύτοις … σκώληξι: cf. Ps.-Phlp. 589.28–35; 590.1–2; 590.4–5; 592.25–29. || εὐλαῖς: cf. Them. 122.5–6; Prisc. 307.24–25. 16–18 cf. Them. 122.10–13. 20–26 cf. Them. 121.22–27. 29–359.2 cf. Them. 121.29–33. 1–12 The first paragraph is one long complex causal sentence in the Greek. In the translation it has been divided into two units (to restore the original syntax, insert “since” after “that,” in line 1 and replace the full stop and “Therefore” in line 8 with a comma).

358 | Theodoros Metochites

ὅθεν πᾶσα μὲν βούλησις καὶ ὄρεξις, οὐ μὴν δὲ πᾶσα ὄρεξις καὶ βούλησις. εἴρηται γὰρ ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνην φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξις ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ 5 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνίοτε, ἥτις οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ βούλησιν καὶ λογισμόν τινα. νικᾷ γε μήν, φησίν, ἐνίοτε ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἄλογος ὄρεξις τὴν βούλησιν καὶ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν· ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἡ κρείττων καὶ ἀρχικωτέρα – ἡ λογικὴ καὶ βουλευτική – κρατεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τρόπον τινὰ συμπεριάγουσα ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα σφαῖραν, ὡς ὁρῶμεν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανίων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν λεγομένη σφαῖρα, ἡ ταχύτατα περιαγομένη ἀπ’ ἀνατολῶν εἰς δυσμάς, τὰς τῶν ἄλλων σφαίρας, τὰς ἀντιπεριφερομένας ἀπὸ δυσμῶν 6 εἰς ἀνατολάς, οὐχ ἱστῶσα τῆς οἰκείας κινήσεως συναντιπεριάγει ἑαυτῇ. ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι τούτοις τρεῖς φοράς, φησί· δύο πάντως τῶν ἀντιθέτων ὀρέξεων τῆς λογιστικῆς φαντασίας καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, καὶ μίαν, τὴν τοῦ ζῴου, ἣν ἡ κρατοῦσα ἀπὸ τῶν δύο ποιεῖ, ἢ ἡ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ λογικὴ δηλονότι ὄρεξις ἢ ἡ ἀκρατής, ἣ συμπεριάγει, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐνίοτε κρατοῦσα τὴν λογικήν· οὐ μήν γε πᾶσαν λογικὴν συμπεριάγει· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ κρατεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἀκίνητον μένει καὶ ἑδραῖον, κρατοῦν ἐν τῷ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτῷ πάντως ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἡ συμπεριαγομένη καὶ κρατουμένη ἐστὶ τῇ ἀλόγῳ ὀρέξει καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν φαντασίαν ἡ βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις καὶ κατὰ τὴν λογιστικὴν φαντασίαν. Ὅτι, πάσης τῆς ὑπολήψεως τῆς λογιστικῆς καὶ γνωστικῆς διπλῶς θεωρουμένης, τῆς μὲν καθόλου, ὡς τὸ «ἀσκητέον τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσι τοῖς λογικοῖς» καὶ «ἐπιτηδευτέV184v ον | τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὸ γυμνάσιον», τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὔσης, ὡς ὅτι «ὁ Σωκράτης ἀγαθός» ἢ «ἐμοὶ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι λυσιτελές» – οὕτω γοῦν διπλῶς θεωρουμένης πάσης ὑπολήψεως, τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τίνος ἂν εἴη τῶν δύο, ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου ἢ τῆς κατὰ μέρος; 8 φησὶν οὖν ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ὑπολήψεώς ἐστι· τόδε γάρ τι πρακτέον λογίζεται – τὸ κατὰ μέρος δηλονότι – καὶ αὐτίκα κινεῖται καὶ περαίνει τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν προηγουμένως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀπ’ ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου ὑπολήψεως καὶ ἀπὸ

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of animal do not have deductive reasoning. This is why every wish is also a desire, but not every desire is also a wish. For it has been stated that in the other animals, and sometimes also in human beings, there is also a kind of desire based only on the perceptive kind of imagination, which is not based on any wish and any calculation. For 5 sometimes, he says, the irrational desire defeats the wish and the calculative desire in human beings; and sometimes, conversely, the stronger and more authoritative desire – the rational and deliberative one – carries the day and in a sense moves the other desire by rotating it along with itself, as a sphere does a sphere, as we can observe in the case of the heavenly bodies. For the so-called sphere of the fixed stars, which is rotated exceedingly fast from the east to the west, counter‐rotates the other spheres, which are rotated in the opposite direction, from west to east, along with itself, without stopping them from having their own proper motion. The upshot, he says, is that 6 in a sense three kinds of movement are manifested in these [sc. rational animals]: two that belong to the diametrically opposed desires of the calculative and the perceptive kinds of imagination, and one that belongs to the animal, which is produced from the original two by the dominant desire, that is to say, either the continent and rational desire, or the incontinent one, which sometimes, as mentioned, dominates over the rational one and rotates it along with itself. Not that it rotates the whole rational soul, however: for the capacity for scientific knowledge is not moved nor dominated, but remains unmoved and stationary, since it is dominant in its being. And its being consists entirely in contemplating. Rather, what is being dominated and rotated along with the irrational desire, the one based on the perceptive kind of imagination, is the deliberative desire, the one based on the calculative kind of imagination. [Note] that, since all calculative and cognitive belief comes in two modes, the one 7 being universal, as in “all rational creatures should exercise virtue” and “philosophers should practise gymnastics”, the other particular, as in “Socrates is good” or “gymnastics is beneficial to me” – since, then, all belief comes in these two modes, from which of the two will motion take its origin, from the universal or the particular belief? Well, he says that it takes its origin from the particular belief. For one calcu- 8 lates that a certain individual action must be taken – that is to say, a particular one – and the desiderative capacity is immediately moved and effective. This, then, is the prevailing way, but it may also be the case that it takes its origin from both, from the

2–4 cf. Prisc. 310.12–14. 4–12 cf. Them. 121.34–37; Prisc. 310.30–34. 12–18 cf. Them. 122.1–4.

360 | Theodoros Metochites

τῆς κατὰ μέρος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν συλλογισμῷ ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν ἡ μείζων πρότασις (ὅτι δή τι ποιητέον καθόλου ἀνθρώποις, οἷον γυμναστέον τὸ σῶμα), ἡ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν ἡ δευτέρα πρότασις (ὅτι γυμναστέον ἄρα τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, τὸ σῶμα), καὶ ἕπεται αὐτίκα ἡ κίνησις καὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον ὡς ἐν τῇ χείρονι καὶ ἥττονι τῶν προτάσεων καὶ μερικωτέρᾳ, καθὼς τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν τῇ Λογικῇ διώρισται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου ὑπόληψις – εἴτουν πρότασις – ἠρεμεῖ πως καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτίκα τῆς ἐνεργείας, τῇ δὲ κατὰ μέρος συνημμένη ἐστὶν αὐτίκα ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. * *

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universal belief as well as the particular one. For, just as in a deductive argument, the universal belief is the major premiss, (that a certain action, say, should be performed by human beings universally, for instance, that the body should be exercised), and the particular belief is the second premiss (that therefore a particular body should be exercised), and the motion, or the exercise, follows immediately as in the weaker and minor and more particular of the premisses, as these matters have been laid down in the works on logic. For the universal belief – that is, premiss – is somehow at rest and does not immediately involve the performance of the activity, but the motion or the activity is immediately connected with the particular belief. * *

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5–6 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 590.17–20. 8–9 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 590.35–36; Prisc. 314.11–15. 1–7 Aristotle does not discuss practical syllogisms in his works on logic, but rather in his works on ethics (especially EN 7.3). He does, of course, “lay down” in his logic (APr 1.4–7) that a syllogism with a particular premiss must have a particular conclusion. Any particular premiss in the first- and second‐figure moods must be the minor (APr 1.4, 26a 17–21; 1.5, 27b 4–8), but in the third figure there are two moods (Disamis and Bocardo) with particular majors (APr 1.6, 28b 5–21). The rule that the conclusion follows the “weaker premiss” – in which it is understood not only that particular propositions are weaker than universal ones, but also that negative propositions are weaker than affirmative ones and, crucially, that problematic propositions are weaker than assertoric ones and assertoric propositions than apodeictic ones – is ascribed by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In APr 124.8–125.2; 173.32–174.3) to Eudemus and Theophrastus, who opposed Aristotle’s infamous claims (APr 1.9; 1.16) that sometimes an apodeictic conclusion can follow from an assertoric and an apodeictic premiss, and an assertoric conclusion from a problematic and an assertoric premiss. – Why Metochites states as the minor (“the second premiss”) a proposition that follows from the major is not clear (the minor necessary for the practical conclusion to follow in his example argument is of course “this is a [human] body”), but might have something to do with the fact that Ps.-Philoponus (594.2–9) understands Aristotle’s example as involving two syllogisms in which the conclusion of the former is the minor of the latter.

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Ὅτι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐξανάγκης ἅπαν ἔχει ἐν ᾧ ἐστι καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωή, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δηλονότι γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν· πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν δὲ τοῦτο εἴρηται τῶν θειοτέρων κατὰ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἐμψύχων οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄστρων, ἃ καὶ ἔμψυχα καὶ ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα εἶναι βούλονται. τὰ δὲ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ ἐξανάγκης ἔχειν φησὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἀπὸ γενέσεως καθ’ εἱρμὸν προϊόντα εἰς αὔξησιν, εἰς ἀκμήν, εἰς φθίσιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν ἐμψύχῳ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τροφῆς, ὥστε διατοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον, φησί, πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι γενητοῖς τε καὶ φθαρτοῖς ἐνεῖναι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν. αἴσθησιν δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί φησιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ζῇ γάρ πως, ἔμψυχα ὄντα, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται δέ· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι πᾶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον σῶμα ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι ἁπλοῦν, μηδ’ ἔγγιστα ἁπλοῦ, ἀλλὰ κρᾶσίν τινα ἔχειν τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων καὶ μεσότητά τινα πρὸς ἀντίληψιν πάντων τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰ εἰδῶν καὶ ποιοτήτων. ἔστι μὲν οὖν πᾶσα αἴσθησις καὶ πᾶν αἰσθητικὸν ἔμψυχον οὕτως ἔχον· ἔστι δὲ ἐξανάγκης προτέραν πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν ἁφὴν εἶναι· πᾶν γὰρ ἔμψυχον ἔχον τινὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἀδύνατον μὴ καὶ αὐτὴν ἔχειν τὴν ἁφήν· ἔνια δὲ τῶν ζῴων ταύτην μόνην ἔχει, ὡς ὁρῶμεν, ἄλλην δ’ οὔτινα· καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης καθόλου γε ἐρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. αὕτη δέ, καθὼς εἴρηται, ἐν μεσότητι καὶ κράσει ἐστὶ καὶ ἀντιληπτικῇ δυνάμει τῶν κατὰ ἕκαστον τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων εἰδητικῶν ποιοτήτων· ἅπτεται γὰρ τὰ ἔμψυχα ζῷα τοῦ θερμοῦ, ὃ τοῦ πυρός ἐστι, τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ὃ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐστί, τοῦ ψυχροῦ, ὃ τοῦ ὕδατός ἐστι, τοῦ ξηροῦ, ὃ τῆς γῆς ἐστιν, ὥστε πάντων ἅπτεται καὶ κοινόν τι πρὸς πάντα καὶ μέσως ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ πάντων κρᾶσιν | καὶ οὐσίωσιν. ὧν δέ, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐστὶν ἁπλοῦν ἢ ἔγγιστα ἁπλοῦ τὸ σῶμα, ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἁφή, τῆς εἰρημένης μεσότητος ἐστερημένοις, ὥσπερ ἔχει τὰ φυτά· ἔγγιστα γὰρ ἁπλοῦ σώματός εἰσι· πλείονος γὰρ μετέχει τῆς γῆς μόνης, ἣ καὶ μάλιστά ἐστιν ἀναίσθητος τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων. καὶ δῆλόν γε ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὐτῶν ὅτι τὰ ταύτης μετέχοντα μέ-

2 γενητὸν ] γεννητὸν M A 3 τοὺς om. M A 3–4 ἀγένητα ] ἀγέννητα M A 4 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 7 γενητοῖς correxi (cf. supra v. 2) : γεννητοῖς codd. 9–10 ση′ adn. Mmarg 10 κρᾶσίν ] κράσιν V A 13 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 14 μὴ καὶ A1pc (ex μὴ δὲ) || αὐτὴν om. A || ἔχειν τὴν ἁφήν ] τὴν ἀφὴν ἔχειν A 16–17 εἴρηται—κατὰ M1marg 20 κρᾶσιν ] κράσιν V A || καὶ³ om. A 21 ἁφή ] ἀφὴ A 23–24 ση′ adn. Mmarg 1–7 434a 22–26

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[Note] that everything in which both soul and life are present necessarily has the capacity for nourishment; that is to say, in so far as it is generated and destructible: this is said by way of contradistinction to those ensouled substances that according to the philosophers are more divine, and notably the stars, which, they suggest, are both ensouled and ungenerated as well as indestructible. Those things, however, which are 2 subject to generation and destruction, he says, must necessarily have the nutritive capacity as they progress successively from generation to growth, maturity and decline; and it is impossible for these states to be reached in any ensouled creature without nourishment, so on this account it is necessary, he says, for the capacity for nourishment to be present in all generated and destructible living creatures. But it is not 3 necessary, he says, for sense perception to be present in all living creatures, as, for instance, we can see that it is not present in plants. For they do live, somehow, since they are ensouled, but they do not perceive. The reason is that it is necessary for every percipient body not to be simple, nor very close to simple, but to exhibit a certain blend of simple bodies and a certain intermediacy, with a view to the apprehension of all the forms and qualities connected with the simple bodies. So this is the situation with all sense perception and every perceptive ensouled creature; but it is also a necessary fact that touch is prior to all other senses. For it is impossible that any ensouled creature that has any other senses should not also have the sense of touch, while some animals, as we can see, have only this and no other sense. And without this it is, generally speaking, impossible for an animal to exist. As mentioned, this sense consists 4 in an intermediacy, a blend and a capacity to apprehend the specific qualities of each individual simple body: for ensouled animals feel heat, which belongs to fire; wetness, which belongs to air; cold, which belongs to water; and dryness, which belongs to earth. Consequently, they feel all [the specific qualities of the simple bodies] and have something in common with all of them, and are in an intermediate condition, on account of having a substantial make-up and a blend that derives from all of them. In those things, however, whose body is, as mentioned, simple or very close to simple, there is no sense of touch, since they are deprived of the aforesaid intermediacy, as is the case with plants, for they are very close to being a simple body. For most of that of which they partake is merely earth, which is indeed also more imperceptive than the other elements. Indeed, it is clear from our own bodies that those of our bodily parts that partake of earth are the most imperceptive ones (these have also been mentioned

3–5 cf. Prisc. 316.36–39; Ps.-Phlp. 594.19–27. 13–16 cf. Them. 122.29–31. 21–27 cf. Prisc. 315.37–316.1. 27–365.1 cf. Them. 122.32–36; Ps.-Phlp. 594.33–595.2; 598.14–15.

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ρη ἡμῶν, πλεῖστον ταῦτα ἀναίσθητά ἐστιν (ὅσα καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται). διατοῦτο δὴ 5 εἴρηται μὴ τὴν ἁπτικὴν ἔχειν τὰ φυτά, ἧς ἄνευ, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. οὔτε

τοίνυν τὰ φυτὰ οὔτε τἄλλα τὰ μὴ ταύτην ἔχοντα οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἶναι ζῷα, οὔθ’ ὅλως τὰ μὴ δεκτικά, φησίν, αὐτῶν τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης· αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις, ὡς τοῦτο προδιώρισται, αὐτὰ ἔχουσιν αἰσθητὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης (οἷον ἡ ὄψις τοῦ χρώματος, ἡ ἀκοὴ τῶν ψόφων καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραπλησίως). ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐμψύχων – οἷα τὰ φυτά – οὐ δύναται δέχεσθαι τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οὐδ’ ἀχώριστα ταύτης, ἀλλ’ ἐξανάγκης μετὰ ταύτης, ἀδύνατον εἶναι ταῦτα αἰ6 σθητικά. ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐξανάγκης ἕπεται, τὸ τὰ τέλεια τῶν ἐμψύχων – ἤτοι τὰ πορευτικὰ ζῷα – τὴν αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν ἐξανάγκης ἔχειν· πάντα γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μάτην, τέλος δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις τὸ γεννᾶν ὅμοιον. καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει, ὡς εἴρηται, ἕνεκά τού ἐστιν, ὡς τὰ μόρια τῶν σωμάτων προδήλως ἔχει (ἢ ὡς συμπτώματά εἰσιν, οἷον ὡς αἱ ὑπὸ τὰς κοτύλας τῶν ἀγκαλῶν τρίχες ἢ οἱ ἀκροχόρδονες φύσει μέν εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα· οὐ γὰρ πρός τινα χρῆσιν ἢ σκοπὸν ταῦτα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως). εἰ οὖν τὰ πορευτικὰ ζῷα καὶ τέλεια ἡ φύσις ἕνεκα τοῦ οἰκείου τέλους ποιεῖ ὥστε καὶ μένειν καὶ εἶναι τῇ διαδοχῇ καὶ μὴ ἀτελῆ φθείρεσθαι, οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτ’ εἶναι 7 ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ἐμψύχοις – οἷα τὰ φυτά, μένοντα καὶ μὴ κινούμενα – οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἡ αἴσθησις· αὐτόθεν γὰρ ἔγγιστα συμπαροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν τροφὴν ἐξανάγκης (ἐξ ὧν καὶ πέφυκε καὶ οὐσίωται διὰ τῶν δεδομένων ὀχετῶν καὶ διόδων τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὑπηρετικῶν μορίων)· οἷς δέ ἐστι τὸ πορεύεσθαι ἀνάγκη αἴσθησιν εἶναι τῶν πελαζόντων (καὶ οἷς πελάζει), ὡς ἂν τὰ μὲν φεύγῃ ὅσα φευκτά, τὰ δὲ ἀσπάζηται ὅσα δεῖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως πορεύοιντο καὶ ἀκρίτως, οὐ πόρρω ἂν εἶεν διόλου τοῦ κινδύνου καὶ φθείροιντο ἂν τάχιστα, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἀπολαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος,

8 οὐδ’ ἀχώριστα ] οὐδ’ ut vid. A1pc : sine dubio vult dicere οὐδὲ χωριστὰ || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 8–9 ταῦτα αἰσθητικά transp. M A 9 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A : μετὰ ταύτης ex v. 8 add. Aac (exp. A1 ) 10 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 13 ἀκροχόρδονες A1pc (ex ἀκροχορδονὲς) 17 οἷα M1pc (ut vid. ex οἷον) 18 ἀναγκαία ] ἀναγκαῖα V A 19 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || ὧν ] ἧς exspectaveris, sed cf. 2.4.21 || ὀχετῶν ut vid. M1pc 21 φεύγῃ ] φεύγοι V 10–15 434a 31–32 15–366.9 434a 32–b 5

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earlier). So it was because of this that plants were said not to have the sense of touch, without which, as mentioned, it is impossible for an animal to exist. Accordingly, it is 5 possible neither for plants nor for any other creatures that do not have this sense to be animals; nor, in general, he says, for any creatures that cannot receive the forms themselves without the matter. For, as previously determined, the perceptible objects of the senses are the forms of perceptible bodies, without the matter (as, for instance, colour [is perceived by] sight, sounds by hearing, and similarly with the others). Those ensouled creatures, however (as, for instance, plants), which cannot receive the forms of perceptible bodies without the matter, or separated from the matter, but necessarily receive the forms together with the matter, for these it is impossible to be capable of perception. Most importantly, it follows of necessity that those ensouled creatures 6 that are fully developed – namely, animals capable of forward movement – necessarily possess the capacity for sense perception. For nature makes everything for the sake of something and nothing in vain; but the goal inherent in ensouled creatures is to produce a similar creature. And all natural things, as mentioned, are for the sake of something, as is clearly the case with the parts of bodies (or else they are coincidental, as for instance the hair in one’s armpits or one’s warts are natural yet coincidental: for it is not with a view to any use or purpose that these things have been fashioned by nature). If, then, nature also makes those animals that are capable of forward movement fully developed for the sake of their own proper goal, so that they may survive and exist by means of succession and may not perish in an undeveloped state, it is impossible for this to be the case without sense perception. For sense perception is admittedly 7 not necessary for stationary ensouled creatures (such as plants, which stay in place and do not move), since of necessity they have their nutriment immediately available very close at hand (the things from which they are grown and from which they derive their substance through the canals and conduits and ancillary bodily parts bestowed by nature). But for those that have forward movement it is necessary to have sense perception of those things that approach them (as well as those that they approach), so as to avoid those that should be avoided and embrace those that they should. And if they were to move forward without sense perception and indiscriminately, they would never be far removed from danger and would very soon perish. Then it will not be possible for them to secure their own proper goal, as mentioned: for they have a natural

5–7 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 598.34–37 (with 599.3–5). 7–11 cf. Ps.-Phlp. 598.26–28. 15–17 cf. Them. 123.22–24. 17 cf. Prisc. 319.8–9; Ps.-Phlp. 595.19. 24–26 cf. Them. 123.5–6; 123.14–15. 27–367.2 cf. Prisc. 319.14–24. 29–367.2 cf. Them. 123.7–13. 9 separated from the matter: I have translated what I think the author intended to write; the transmitted text has “unseparated from the matter”. 19–20 Or, alternatively, “If, then, nature makes those animals that are capable of forward movement and fully developed for the sake of their own proper goal …”.

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ὡς εἴρηται· φυσικὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τελειότης ὥστε μένειν καθ’ ὁτιοῦν ἀποκαταστάντα τῇ 8 φύσει ἐφῷ γεννᾶν ὅμοια. τοῖς δέ γε φυτοῖς, ἃ μόνιμά ἐστι καὶ πεπηγότα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη

προσεῖναι τὴν αἴσθησιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴ πορεύονται, οὐδ’ οἷά τέ ἐστιν ἐκφεύγειν τὰ βλάπτοντα καὶ προσίεσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα· μάτην γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις· πάντα γὰρ V185v τὰ πελάζοντα ἐξα- | νάγκης αὐτῶν ἅπτεται, εἴτε βλάπτοντά εἰσιν εἴτε μή· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ἑτοιμότερά εἰσι πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τοιαῦτα μόνιμα ἔμψυχα, εἴτουν τὰ 9 φυτά. τά γε μὴν πορευτικὰ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ μὴ μόνιμα ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ κριτικοῦ· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώντων πορευτικῶς οἷά τέ ἐστι χωρὶς νοῦ ζῆν, ὥσπερ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων. ἄνευ δὲ ἡστινοσοῦν αἰσθήσεως ἀδύνατον ὅλως ζῆν τὰ κινητικὰ καὶ μὴ μόνιμα ἔμψυχα ζῷα – ὅσα, φησί, γενητὰ καὶ ὑπὸ χρόνον καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχει γενέσεως. ὅσα δὲ ἀγένητα, ὡς αὐτὸς βούλεται καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φιλοσόφων, κινητικὰ δὲ κατὰ τόπον, οἷα τὰ ἄστρα καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ταῦτα οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ἔχειν καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐδὲν ἡ φύσις μάτην ποιεῖ, καὶ τίς χρεία αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεως; τίνι γὰρ ἔσται βέλτιστον ἡ αἴσθησις, τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ σώματι; ἔμψυχα γὰρ σώματα καὶ νοητικὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταῦτά φασι· τὸ γοῦν μὴ εἰκῇ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως γινόμενον ἐξανάγκης πρός τι χρήσιμον ἔσται· πρὸς τί γοῦν ἔσται χρήσιμον ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγενήτοις κινητικοῖς δέ, πρὸς ψυχὴν ἢ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα; πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐδεμία ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὄνησις οὔτε τροφῆς ἕνεκεν οὔτ’ ἄλλης τινὸς χρείας· ἄτροφα γὰρ καὶ ἀπαθῆ ὑπὸ πάντων ταῦτα οἴονται εἶναι· πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατ’ αὐτὰ ψυχὴν ἔτι μᾶλλον προδήλως ἀσυντελὴς αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρίσις (εἴτουν ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γνωστικὴ ἕξις), τὴν κρείττονα καὶ τιμιωτέραν καὶ βελτίονα

1 φυσικὴ ut vid. M1pc (ex φυσικῆ) || καθ’ ὁτιοῦν ] καθοτιοῦν A 4 μάτην—αἴσθησις post αἴσθησιν v. 3 collocare velim 5 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || ἅπτεται ] ἅπτονται M A (fort. recte) 8 τοῦ² M1sl 12 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V 14 βέλτιστον ] βέλτιον A (fort. recte) 16 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 16–17 ἔσται χρήσιμον transp. A 17 ἀγενήτοις A1pc (ex ἀγεννήτοις) || τὸ om. A 18 οὐδεμία ] οὐδὲ μία V 19 τινὸς χρείας ] χρεία τινὸς M 9–368.1 434b 5–8

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full development that allows them, once they have safely arrived at whatever state is in accordance with their nature, to remain there in order to produce similar creatures. But in plants, which are stationary and fixed, it is not necessary for sense perception 8 to be present as well. For since they do not move forward, they are not able to flee what is harmful and to approach what is beneficial either. For sense perception would be of no avail in them. For everything that approaches necessarily comes into contact with them, whether it is harmful or not. Hence this kind of stationary ensouled creatures – that is, plants – are also better prepared for suffering and for being at risk. For those ensouled creatures, on the other hand, that are able to move forward and 9 are not stationary, it is necessary to have sense perception, even more so than an intellect capable of judgment. For many living things are able to live forward‐moving lives without an intellect, as indeed most animals are. But to live without any kind of sense perception is not at all possible for those ensouled animals that are able to move themselves and are not stationary – those, he says, that are generated and subject to time and whose generation has a beginning. For those, on the other hand, that are, as he himself as well as the majority of philosophers suggest, ungenerated yet able to move themselves in respect of place, like the stars and the heavenly bodies, for them there is no necessity to have sense perception as well, since, by the same argument, nature makes nothing in vain, and of what use is sense perception to them? To which will sense perception be most advantageous, to their soul or to their body? For both Aristotle and the others claim that these are ensouled bodies and capable of thinking. Certainly, what is not randomly generated by nature will necessarily be useful for something; so for what will sense perception be useful in this kind of beings, which are ungenerated yet able to move themselves, for their soul or for their body? There is no benefit to be derived from sense perception as far as their body is concerned, whether with regard to nourishment or to any other need, for these beings are held to be non-feeding and unaffected by everything. And as far as their soul is concerned, the discernment that belongs to sense perception – that is, the cognitive competence that derives from it – is obviously even more dispensable to them, enjoying as they do the much more powerful, valuable and better cognitive capacity and activity based on

5–8 cf. Them. 124.11–14. 15–19 cf. Them. 123.20–22. 17 the stars : cf. Them. 123.30; Prisc. 320.20. || the heavenly bodies : cf. Ps.-Phlp. 595.33–36; 599.32–33. 24–27 cf. Them. 123.29–32; Alex. apud Ps.-Phlp. 595.39–596.5. 27–369.1 cf. Alex. apud Ps.-Phlp. 596.5–9. 5–6 For sense perception would be of no avail in them : as suggested in the critical apparatus, the whole argument would run more smoothly if this sentence were placed before the preceding one. 14 stationary: the Greek word is monimos, literally “apt to remain”. As contrasted with plants, animals are not apt to remain in one place; as contrasted with the heavenly bodies, they are not apt to remain in existence. Here and in the beginning of next paragraph it is possible that it is the second contrast that takes precedence, in which case “perennial” may be read for “stationary”.

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10 πολλῷ – τὴν κατὰ νοῦν γνωστικήν – δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἔχουσιν. ὥστε μόνοις ἀ-

ναγκαῖον τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχειν τοῖς μὴ μονίμοις τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ πορευτικοῖς, ἤτοι τοῖς ζῴοις· εἴ γε μὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχει, φησίν, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ μικτὸν εἶναι καὶ μέσως ἔχειν πρὸς παντὸς εἴδους ἀντίληψιν, ὡς προείρηται· εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν, ἀδύνατον ἁφῆς μετέχειν, ἣν πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ζῶσι. καὶ γὰρ δή, ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον ἔμψυχον σῶμά ἐστι, πᾶν δὲ σῶμα καὶ ἁπτόν ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ ἁπτὸν ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τῶν πελαζόντων καὶ παθητόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν καὶ κριτικὸν εἶναι τῶν πελαζόντων, εἴτουν ἁπτικόν, εἴπερ μέλλει σῴζεσθαι, ὡς ἂν κρίνῃ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον· ἡ γὰρ ἁπτικὴ δύναμις ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις οὐ διά τινων ἄλλων μέσων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ ὅρασις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις δι’ ἀέρος καὶ δι’ ὕδατος, ὡς διώρισται, ἀλλὰ διὰ σαρκὸς ἢ τοῦ ἀναλόγου τῇ σαρκί· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔχει τὸ κριτικὸν κατ’ αἴσθησιν ἐν τῷ ἅπτεσθαι τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ’ ἀναισθήτως ἔχει τὴν ἁφήν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄψυχα (λίθοι, ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα), οὐ δυνήσεται 11 τὰ μὲν φεύγειν, τὰ δὲ προσλαμβάνειν, οὐδὲ δυνατὰ ἔσται λοιπὸν σῴζεσθαι. καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἡ γεῦσις – ἡ κρίσις τῶν φευκτῶν καὶ μὴ χυμῶν – ἁφή τίς ἐστι· τροφῆς γάρ ἐστιν V186r ἡ γεῦσις, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ σῶμα | ἁπτόν. ὥστε πρὸς τὴν τελειότητα καὶ τὴν τοῦ σῴζεσθαι χρῆσιν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀναγκαιότατον ἡ φύσις κατεστήσατο τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς ἁπτικῆς· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὔξειν· δι’ ὁράσεως δὲ ἢ ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως οὐκ ἀνάγκη τις, ὅτι χρῶμα, φησί, καὶ ψόφοι καὶ ὀσμή, ἃ ταύτης εἰσὶν αἰσθητά, οὔτε τρέφει, φησίν, οὔτ’ αὔξησιν ποιεῖ οὔτε φθίσιν· διατοῦτο καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ζῴων οὐ πρόσεισιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις αὗται· αἵ γε μὴν δύο, ἡ ἁφὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις, ἀναγκαῖαι ἀπαραιτήτως τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ πρόδηλον ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ζῆν οὐδ’ εἶναι ζῷον ἄνευ ἁφῆς· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι τρεῖς αἱ 12 εἰρημέναι αἰσθήσεις ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, φησίν, εἰσίν, οὐ κατ’ ἀνάγκην. διατοῦτο καὶ τισίν, οὐ πᾶσιν, εἰσὶ τῶν ζῴων, τοῖς τελείοις καὶ πορευτικοῖς. καὶ πρόσεισιν αὗται αἱ αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἄμεινον ἔχοιεν εἰς τὸ ζῆν καὶ σῴζεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ

1 τὴν delere velim 5 ἁφῆς ] ἀφ’ ἧς A || ἐπεὶ ] ἐπειδὴ M A 10 σαρκὸς ] τῆς σαρκὸς malim (ut Them. 124.7) 12 ἄψυχα ] ἔμψυχα M 14–15 ἡ κρίσις—ἡ γεῦσις om. A 16 τῆς ἁπτικῆς ] τὴν ἁπτικήν malim 17 ἢ¹ ] δι’ add. A 18 ταύτης ] ταῦτα A : τούτων malim 1–8 434b 9–14 8–15 434b 15–19 15–19 434b 19–21

19–23 434b 22–26

23–370.5 434b 26–29

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intellect. The upshot is that it is necessary to have sense perception only for those en- 10 souled creatures that are capable of forward movement and are not stationary, that is, for animals. And if they do have sense perception, he says, it is necessary for their body to be mixed and to be in an intermediate condition, with a view to the apprehension of every form, as previously mentioned. For if it is simple, it cannot partake of touch, the presence of which in an animal is more necessary than that of all the other senses. For, obviously, since an animal is an ensouled body, and every body is also capable of being touched, the animal must also itself be capable of being touched, and hence affected, by the bodies that approach it. Therefore it is also necessary for it to be able to discern the bodies that approach it, that is, to be able to perceive them by touch, if it is to survive, in order that it may discern what is suitable and what is alien. For the capacity for touch in animals is not mediated by some other things that intervene, in the way that sight, hearing and smell are mediated by air and water, as has been described, but by flesh or the analogue of flesh. Which is also why, if animals do not have the ability to discern by sense perception when they are touching something, but the touch is imperceptible to them, as it is to inanimate things (stone and wood and those kinds of things), they will not be able to avoid some things and admit others, and then they will not be able to survive either. Moreover, taste – the discernment of 11 flavours to be and not to be avoided – is also a kind of touch. For taste is correlated with nutriment, and the nutriment is a tangible body. Consequently, nature has established the sense consisting in the capacity to perceive by touch as an absolutely necessary feature with a view to the full development of ensouled creatures and their survival practices. For it is the source of both nourishment and growth. But there is no need [for sense perception] through sight, hearing or smell, since colour, sounds and odour, he says, which are the objects of this [kind of] sense, do not nourish, he says, and cause neither growth nor decline. And this is why in many animals these senses are not also present. Two senses, touch and taste, are indispensably necessary for an animal, and it is evident that it will not be capable of living or of being an animal without touch. The other three senses mentioned, he says, are for the sake of well-being and not according to necessity. This is also why some, but not all, animals have them, 12 namely, those that are fully developed and capable of forward movement. It is in those animals that are capable of forward movement that these senses are also present, in order that the animals may be even better equipped for living and surviving. For an

1–3 cf. Them. 123.2–5. 11 cf. Prisc. 323.26–27. 14 cf. Them. 124.7–8. 31 fully developed: cf. Them. 124.20–21; Prisc. 324.23–24.

14–16 cf. Them. 124.4–6.

14 by flesh: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “by their flesh”. 21 the sense consisting in the capacity to perceive by touch: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, simply “the sense of touch”.

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μόνον δεῖ, φησί, τὸ ζῷον ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ φευκτὸν καὶ μή· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται διά τινος μεταξύ, ὃ πρῶτον πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, εἶτα παραπέμπει ἔσω τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ πάθος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως τοῦτ’ ἔχει, τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως· αὗται γάρ, ὡς προδιώρισται, διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ 13 ὕδατος τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνονται. ὥσπερ γάρ, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως ποιεῖ μέν τι ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς μέχρι του μεταβολῆς καὶ ὠθεῖ μὲν τόδε τι τὸ ἔγγιστα, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἄλλο αὖθις ποιεῖ καὶ ὠθεῖ τὸ μετ’ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτ’ αὖθις ἑξῆς ἄλλο, καὶ τοῦτ’ αὖθις μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος· καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν πρώτως ὠθοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον, κινοῦν μὴ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον κινούμενον μέν, οὐ κινοῦν δέ, τὸ ἐν μέσῳ δέ – ἢ τὰ ἐν μέσῳ δέ, ὅταν ᾖ πλείονα – καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, εἴτουν κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται (οἷον κινεῖ μὲν καὶ ὠθεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἡ ψυχή, ἥτις ἐστὶ κινοῦν μόνον, οὐ κινούμενον δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτό, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται, τὸ σῶμα δὲ κινεῖ τὴν θύραν κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν, ἡ θύρα δὲ κινεῖται ἴσως μόνον μηδὲν ἄλλο κινοῦσα), ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, μένοντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιουμένου· τὸ κινοῦν πρώτως κινεῖ μόνον, οὐ κινεῖται δέ, εἰσὶ δέ τινα μεταξὺ τοῦ κινοῦντος πρώτου καὶ κινουμένου ἐσχάτου, ἃ καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, 14 εἴτουν πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ, μέχρις αὐτοῦ τοῦ πέρατος. οἷον, φησίν, εἴ τις κηρὸν τυπώσει δακτυλίῳ, μέχρι του δίεισι κατὰ μετάδοσιν ἡ σφραγὶς αὐτὴ διατιθεῖσα τὸν κηρόν, κατὰ φύσιν οὕτως ἔχοντα· οὐ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι δρᾶν ὁ δακτύλιος πέφυκεν· ὁ λίθος γὰρ ἀδύνατος κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς σφραγίδος τοῦ δακτυλίου· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πάλιν καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, εἰ καὶ μὴ μεταλαμβάνει τῆς σφραγίδος, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον πεφύκασι μάλιστα τέμνεσθαι V186v τῷ δακτυλίῳ, ἔστ’ ἂν δηλονότι | ὁ ἀὴρ εἷς ᾖ καὶ μὴ διαθρύπτηται· μένοντος γὰρ ὡς ἑνός, τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος διαδίδωσι κατὰ διαδοχὴν εἰς ἄλληλα τὸ πρῶτον γενόμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος πάθος μέχρις αὐτοῦ τοῦ πέρατος, καθὼς προείρηται κατὰ μετάδοσιν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ εἶναι πάσχειν κατὰ μέρος καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀέρα, πληττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ψόφων ἢ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρώματος τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, ὡς διώρισται πρότερον, μέχρις ἂν εἰς πέρας ἥκοι (εἰς αὐτὰς δηλονότι τὰς αἰσθήσεις),

6 μέν τι ] μέντοι M 16 φησίν, εἴ τις ] εἴ τις φησὶ M A γίδος ] φραγίδος M 21 ἔστ’ ] ἕστ’ M 5–16 434b 29–435a 2

16–372.1 435a 2–5

11–12 ἐν ἄλλοις: cf. 1.3, 405b 31–407b 11; 1.4, 408a 29–b 31

18 ἀδύνατος ] ἀδύνατον M A

20 σφρα-

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animal must perceive what is to be and not to be avoided not only when touching it, he says, but also from a distance; and this perception will take place through some intermediate thing, which is first affected by the perceptible objects and then transmits the affection inwards to the sense, which is what happens in the case of seeing, hearing and smelling. For, as previously described, these senses apprehend their objects through the medium of air and water. For, he says, just as in the case of locomotion 13 there is something that causes a beginning of the motion, or of the change up to a point, and pushes the one thing that is closest, and this in turn acts on something else and pushes what comes after it, and next this in turn pushes something else, and this in turn something else, down to the limit; and that which makes the first push is itself unmoved, since it causes motion without being moved, while the last item is moved but does not cause motion, and the intermediate item – or items in case there are more than one – is both active and affected, that is, it both causes motion and is moved (as, for example, the soul, which is, as has been described elsewhere, only causing motion and is not in itself moved, moves and pushes the body; and the body, which is being moved as well as causing motion, moves the door, while the door is perhaps only moved without moving anything else), the same situation applies also in the case of alteration, although the altered thing stays in its place: that which first causes the motion only causes motion but is not moved, and there are some items in between the first mover and the last item moved, which both cause motion and are moved, that is, are affected and active, down to the limit itself. For instance, he says, 14 if someone should make an impression on wax with a signet ring, the seal itself will continue, by transmission, up to a point, to modify the wax, which is by nature disposed for this: for a signet ring is not of such a nature as to act upon just anything, for a stone is incapable of being moved by the seal of the ring; but again, even water and air, although they may not partake of the seal, are still of such a nature as to be in the greatest possible measure split by the ring, that is to say, for as long as the air is unified and not dispersed. For while it remains unified, its parts transmit to each other, in proper sequence down to the limit, the first affection caused in them by the first mover down to the limit itself, in accordance with the previous statement that the air, by virtue of being interposed, is affected and moved part by part, by transmission, as it is struck by the sounds or moved by the visible colour, as previously described, until a limit is reached (that is to say, the senses themselves), if it stays unified and

2 from a distance: cf. Them. 124.21–22; Prisc. 324.28–29; Ps.-Phlp. 604.12–13. 14–16 cf. Prisc. 325.27–30. 17–18 While the phrasing owes something to Themistius (124.28–29), the gist of the exegesis seems to be that of Ps.-Philoponus (605.7–9). 21–28 cf. Them. 124.30–34. 18 although the altered thing stays in its place: the Greek text could also mean “although the thing being altered stays [in place].

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15 εἷς καὶ ἄθρυπτος μένων, ὡς εἴρηται. διατοῦτό φησι βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ οἰκειότερον οὕτω

νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνακλάσεως, ὅτι οὐκ ἀποπέμπονται κωνοειδῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀκτῖνες, εἶτα γινόμεναι ἔν τινι λείῳ καὶ πυκνῷ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεναι πρόσω χωρεῖν ἀντιστρέφουσι καὶ ἀντανακλῶνται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, ποιοῦντα ὡς ὁρατὰ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα καὶ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἕως τοῦ λείου (ἤτοι αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατόπτρου ἢ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ κατόπτρῳ), ὃ λεῖον ὂν οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν ἀέρα θρύπτεσθαι, μὴ δυνάμενα ἔτι χωρεῖν ἀντιστρέφει, ἔτι ἀθρύπτου ὄντος τοῦ ἀέρος, ὡς ὁρατὰ αὖθις εἰς τὴν πρώτην κινήσασαν ἀρχήν, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ ὄντος γίνεται ἡ κατὰ ἀνάκλασιν αἴσθησις παραπλησίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν. * *

*

2 ἀποπέμπονται A1pc (ut vid. ex ἀποτέμνονται) || κωνοειδῶς ut vid. A1pc 4–6 ση′ adn. Mmarg 5 τοῦ² om. A 6 κατόπτρῳ ] κατόπτω M 1–9 435a 5–10

3 ἀκτῖνες ] ἀκτίνες V

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undispersed, as stated. For this reason he says that it is also better and more appro- 15 priate to think and speak in this way of reflection, namely: it is not the case that rays are conically emitted from the eyes, which subsequently, as they arrive at something smooth and dense and are unable to proceed further, turn around and are reflected back; but rather that the colour and the shape act as visible objects on the air and, by transmission, all the way to the smooth thing (that is, the mirror itself or what is similar to a mirror), which, being smooth, does not allow the air to be dispersed. As [the colour and the shape] are unable to proceed any further, they turn around again, as visible objects (the air still being undispersed), back to the first starting-point of the motion, in which, since the capacity for sight is also present, a sense perception based on reflection arises (in a similar way both in the case of visible objects and in that of audible ones). * *

*

5–11 In the Greek this is all one long sentence, in which a lengthy circumstantial participial phrase (“act[ing] as visible objects …”) separates the subject (“the colour and the shape”) from the predicate verb (“turn around”). In the translation the participial phrase and the predicate verb have been rendered by two separate clauses.

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13 Ὅτι, φησίν, ἀδύνατον τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἁπλοῦν εἶναι (ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένον), οἷον οὐ πύρινον ἢ ἀέρινον ἢ ὑδάτινον, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ γήινον· ἁπτὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἁπτικόν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ἄνευ ἁφῆς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὐδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ἄλλην εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν καὶ ἕξεων, μέσως πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔχουσα, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ εἰ πάντων ἀντιλήψεται, κοινῶς ἔχει πρὸς πάντα, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται ἁπλοῦν τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων, ὡς ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια, ἐκ πυρὸς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος, ἄνευ τῆς γῆς· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ μὴ εἶναι ἔφη ὁτιοῦν αἰσθητήριον (καὶ ἡ αἰτία δι’ ἣν προείρηται), ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐκ πυρὸς [προδιώρισται] (καὶ ἡ αἰτία δι’ ἣν καὶ τοῦτο προδιώρισται)· ἐνταῦθα δέ φησι καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς αἰσθητήριον εἶναι, οὐχ ὡς αὐτῷ δοκοῦν ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχώρησιν διὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, ὃς τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ πυρώ2 δους τὴν ὅρασιν ἔφησεν εἶναι. ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια εἶναι κατά τι τῶν ἁπλῶν στοιχείων, τὴν δὲ ἁφὴν τῇ μίξει αὐτῶν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ συμφύτου σώματος ἅπτεται τὸ ζῷον· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια δι’ ἄλλων, ὡς προδιώρισται, ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις διὰ τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ἡ ἀκοὴ διὰ τοῦ διηχοῦς, ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ διόσμου, ὡς προείρηται), ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο προδιώρισται. καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα μεταξὺ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ V187r τῶν ἁπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν | οὐδὲν δοκεῖ παραπλησίως εἶναι ἀλλ’ ἢ ἡ σύμφυτος τοῦ ζῴου σὰρξ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον αὐτῇ· ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν ἁπλῶν ἔσται (οὐδὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς γῆς, ἐξ ἧς μᾶλλον δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως, ὡς παχυμερεστέρας), ἀλλὰ μέσως πως ἔχει τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς ἅπαντα, θερμά, ψυχρά, ξηρά, ὑγρά, οὐ μόνον 3 πρὸς τὰς τῆς γῆς ἕξεις ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πάντων ἄλλας πάσας. καὶ γὰρ δῆλον κἀντεῦθεν, φησίν, ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, ὡς προέφημεν, τὰ μᾶλλον τῆς γῆς μετέχοντα – ὀστᾶ, ὄνυχες, τρίχες – ἀναίσθητά εἰσι· διατοῦτο καὶ εἴρηται ὡς οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὔτε

2 ἀέρινον A1pc 3 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A || οὐδεμίαν ] οὐδὲ μίαν V || αἴσθησιν ἄλλην transp. M A (ut Arist. 435a 13) || ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A 8 προδιώρισται seclusi 12 ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A 19 ἐξ ] ἑξ M || ὡς ] οὐ M A || πως ] πῶς V 20 θερμά ] θερμᾶ M 21 ἄλλας ] ἄλλων malim 21–23 ση′ adn. Mmarg 1–7 435a 11–15 19–21 435a 21–24 21–376.5 435a 24–b 7 10–11 διὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα: cf. Ti. 45b–46c

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[Note] that he says that the body of the animal cannot be simple (but rather mixed), for instance, not made [solely] of fire, of air or of water, and indeed not of earth either. For it is capable of being perceived by touch and of perceiving by touch, as mentioned, and without the sense of touch it is not possible for any other sense to exist. But the sense of touch is capable of apprehending all the different forms and qualities, since it holds an intermediate position to them all, from which it also follows that in so far as it apprehends them all, it is associated with them all, and so the body of the animal will not be simple or made up of one simple element, as is the case with the other sense organs, [which consist] of fire, of water or of air, with the exception of earth. For he has said that no sense organ at all consists of this element (and the explanation for this has been given previously), but not of fire either (and the explanation for this has also been outlined previously): here, however, he states that there is also a sense organ consisting of fire, not as an opinion of his own but by way of a hypothesis and a concession, on account of Plato, who said that sight belongs to the fiery element in respect of its substance. But what we were saying was that the other 2 sense organs exist on the basis of some individual simple element, but the sense of touch exists by virtue of a mixture of them [all]. For the animal feels touch through the body naturally attached to it. For the other sense organs apprehend their own proper perceptible objects through other things, as previously described (for instance, sight apprehends through what is transparent, hearing through what is transsonant and smell through what is transodorant, as previously stated), and these things are air and water, as has also been described above. And they are interposed between the sense organs and the perceptible objects, but in between what is capable of perceiving by touch and the objects of touch there seems to be nothing similar except for the flesh naturally attached to the animal (or the analogue of flesh). It follows that this kind of sense organ does not consist of a single simple body (not even of earth, of which it may perhaps especially seem to consist, inasmuch as it is especially coarse), but has in some sense an intermediate position and an association with all things, with hot, cold, dry and wet, and not only with the qualities of earth but with all other qualities of all things. Indeed, this is also clear from the following, he says: those parts of the 3 body that partake of earth to a higher degree, as we have said before – bone, nails and hair – are imperceptive. This is also why it was stated that the organ of touch is

2 or of water: cf. Them. 125.3. 12–15 cf. Prisc. 326.15–17. 29–30 all other qualities of all things: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “all qualities of all other things”.

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ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς μάλιστα τῶν ἁπλῶν μόνου τὸ τῆς ἁφῆς ἐστιν αἰσθητήριον, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένον. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἁφὴ ἀναγκαιοτάτη πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ζῷον, καὶ τὸ μὴ ταύτην ἔχον οὐ ζῷον· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μὴ ζῷον ταύτην ἔχει καὶ ἀντιστρόφως τὸ ζῷον ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν· στερισκόμενον γὰρ ἁφῆς οὐχ οἷόν τε 4 εἶναι ζῷον. δῆλον δέ, φησί, κἀντεῦθεν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὑπερβολαί – ἤτοι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ, τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, τοῦ γευστοῦ – φθείρουσιν αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια αὐτῶν (καθὼς καὶ τοῦτο προείρηται), αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῷον οὐ φθείρουσι, πλὴν εἰ μή που, φησί, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ ἐνίοτε ῥαγδαῖαι βρονταὶ φθείρουσι τὸ ζῷον, πλὴν οὐχ ᾗ ἀκουστὰ φθείρουσιν, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πλήττουσι τὸν ἀέρα σφοδρότερον καὶ τὸ πάθος προσπίπτει τοῖς σώμασιν ἀφόρητον, ὥστε τῇ ἁφῇ πάλιν τὸ ζῷον φθείρει, οὐχ ᾗ ἀκουστόν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ λαμπρότης τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐχ ᾗ λαμπρότης φθείρει, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πυρώδης τις καὶ θερμοτέρα ἀφορήτως δι’ ἀστραπῆς ἢ δι’ ἄλλου του πυρώδους τοῦ σώματος αὖθις ἅπτεται· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσμῆς ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γεύσεως αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν κατ’ αὐτὰς αἰσθήσεων ἐνίοτε γίνονται βλαβεραὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων αὐτῶν μόνων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ζῴου αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ᾗ ἑκάτερον καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἁφὴν πάλιν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ φθαρτικὸν ἔχει καὶ τὸ γευστόν, εἴτουν ὁ χυμός, τὸ φθαρτικόν· ἁφὴ γάρ πως προείρηται ὁ χυμός, αἱ δὲ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν – θερμῶν, ψυχρῶν, ξηρῶν, ὑγρῶν – αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον, ὡς ἔστι δῆλον, φθείρουσι. καὶ τοῦτ’ εὐλόγως ἕπεται· πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, εἰσὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν αἰσθητήρια μέρη τοῦ ζῴου, τῆς δὲ ἁφῆς αἰσθητήριον ἡ ὅλη τοῦ ζῴου σάρξ· ὥστε, τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου τῶν ἁπτῶν ταῖς αὐτῶν ὑπερβολαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, 5 φθειρομένου, τὸ ὅλον ἐξανάγκης ζῷον φθείρεται. καὶ γὰρ δή, καθὼς καὶ προείρηται, φησί, ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ ζῷον ἐξανάγκης ἔχει, καὶ ταύτῃ ὥρισται, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔσται ζῷον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ εἶναι ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη V187v ταύτας προσεῖναι τῷ ζῴῳ· οἷον ἡ ὅρασις καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ | εἶναι

1 τινὸς ] τῆς γῆς A || ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 2 ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A 4 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 6 τὰ iter. A 10 ἁφῇ ] ἀφῆ A || φθείρει A1pc 11–13 ση′ adn. Mmarg 12 ᾗ ut vid. V2?pc (ex ἢ) 14 αἰσθήσεων ] αἰσθητῶν malim, sed cf. 1.4.23 15 ἁφὴν ] ἀφὴν A 16 ἔχει om. V 17 ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A : ἁπτὸς vel ἁπτὸν (nisi forte τῆς ἁφῆς) malim, sed cf. supra v. 13, ubi γεύσεως fort. ad sensibilium spectat) 19 καθ’ αὑτὸ ] καθαυτὸ A : κατ’ αὐτὸ malim || εἰσὶ ut vid. A1pc 20 ἁφῆς ] ἀφῆς A 22 ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A || καθὼς καὶ transp. M A 23 τὸ ] τῶ A || ἐξανάγκης ] ἐξ ἀνάγκης M A 23–25 ση′ adn. Amarg 5–18 435b 7–14 18–378.4 435b 15–24

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not composed especially of earth or of any other single simple body, but is mixed. But the sense of touch is the most necessary of all the senses for an animal: without this it is impossible to be an animal, and whatever does not have it is not an animal. For it is both the case that what is not an animal does not have this sense and, inversely, that what is an animal necessarily does have this sense. For if deprived of touch, it is impossible to be an animal. It is also clear from the following, he says: while the 4 extremes of other perceptible objects – that is, visible, audible, odorous and tasteable objects – destroy their respective sense organs (this has also been previously mentioned), they do not destroy the animal itself, unless perhaps coincidentally, he says, as, for instance, sometimes forceful thunder destroys an animal, only not in so far as it is an audible object, but rather in so far as it hits the air too vehemently and the affection strikes the bodies with insufferable force, so that, again, it destroys the animal by touching it and not in so far as it is an audible object. And in the same way, the brightness of a visible object, too, is not destructive in so far as it is brightness, but again in so far as something fiery and excessively hot touches the body with insufferable force through the medium of lightning or some other fiery thing; and similarly, in the cases of smell and taste, those perceptions within their ambits that are extreme sometimes become harmful not only to the sense organs but also to the animal itself, not in so far as each of them is in itself perceptible, but again both the odorous object and the tasteable object – that is, flavour – possess the capacity to destroy on account of touch. For flavour has been said above to be a kind of touch, and the extremes of tangible objects – hot, cold, dry and wet ones – obviously destroy the animal itself. And this is a reasonable consequence. For every excess of a perceptible object destroys the correlative organ, and the organs correlated with the other perceptible objects are parts of the animal, but the organ of touch is the whole flesh of the animal. Consequently, when the organ of tangible objects is destroyed by the excesses of the latter, exactly as happens in the case of the other sense organs, too, the whole animal is necessarily destroyed. Indeed, as also previously stated, he says, an animal 5 necessarily possesses this sense, is defined by this sense and will not be an animal without this sense, whereas it has the other senses for the sake of its well-being, and there is no necessity for these senses also to be present in the animal. For instance, sight and smell are present in the animal by virtue of the fact that the animal exists in what is transparent and transodorant, as has been described, namely, air and water,

10–13 cf. Prisc. 328.35–39; Them. 126.2–4. 13–16 cf. Prisc. 329.9–12.

23–28 cf. Them. 126.9–12.

17 perceptions: or, with the emendation suggested in the critical apparatus, “perceptible objects”. 21 Or, with one of the emendations suggested in the critical apparatus, “… to be a kind of object of touch”. It is, however, also possible that by “touch” is here simply meant the object of touch.

378 | Theodoros Metochites

αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ καὶ διόσμῳ, ὡς διώρισται, τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τῷ ὕδατι, καὶ εἰσὶν αὗται ὡς ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο τῶν λαμπρῶν τε καὶ μή, εὐόσμων καὶ μή, ἃ οὐκ ἀνάγκη πάντως τῷ ζῴῳ, ἀλλὰ τελειότητός τινός εἰσι καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀφορμαί. ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἐν 6 τῷ διηχεῖ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὡς ἂν ἀκούῃ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἔξωθεν. καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὃ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσίν ἐστιν αἰσθητήριον, εὔδηλον ὡς οὐ μόνων τῶν ἡδέων καὶ μὴ αἰσθάνεται (τούτων δέ, ὡς εἴρηται, ᾗ ἁφὴ αἰσθάνεται), ἀλλὰ καὶ πρόσεστιν ἵνα τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ ἃ καταλαμβάνει καὶ θεωρεῖ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς ἔξω προφέρῃ, ὃ πάντως οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀλλ’, ὡς εἴρηται, εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τελειότητός τινος ἕνεκα. ὥστε ἐκ πάντων δῆλον ὡς ἡ ἁφὴ μόνη ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ζῷον· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις τοῦ εὖ εἶναι ἕνεκα πρόσεισιν.

4 ὃ Atext : -σα ut vid. A2?sl 5 μόνων ] μόνον A 6 ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A || καὶ¹ om. A 7 προφέρῃ A1pc (ex προφέρει) : προφέρει V 9 ἡ ut vid. A1pc (ut vid. ex εἰ) || ἁφὴ ] ἀφὴ A 10 πρόσεισιν ] πρόεισιν A 4–10 435b 24–25

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In De an. 3.13 |

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and they are present in order that it may have perceptions of brightness and its opposite and of fragrance and its opposite, which are not indispensably necessary for the animal but are expedients for a certain kind of full development or flourishing. In the same way hearing, too, is [present by virtue of the fact that the animal exists] in transsonant air and water, in order that the animal may have pleasant and painful auditory perceptions of external things. And the tongue, which is the sense organ 6 within the sphere of taste, clearly does not only have perceptions that are pleasant and unpleasant (and these perceptions it has, as has been stated, in its capacity of touch), but is also there in order to give outward expression to what is on the inside, or what the animal comprehends and contemplates, which is also something that is not indispensably necessary for the animal but is, as mentioned, for the sake of flourishing, or of a certain kind of full development. The upshot is that everything indicates that only the sense of touch is necessary for the animal, and without this sense it cannot be an animal, whereas the other senses are present for the sake of well-being.