Commentary on Aristotle, Prior Analytics (Book II): Critical Edition with Introduction and Translation [Critical ed.] 3110703165, 9783110703160

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Bibliography
Online Sources (Digitised Manuscripts, Databases)
Part I: Introduction
1 The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him: an Overview
2 A Note on the Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the Twelfth Century
3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II
4 Principles of the Edition
Part II: Leonis Magenteni In Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum II
Editio critica
Index nominum
Index verborum
Glossarium terminorum technicorum
Index locorum
Part III: Appendices
A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)
B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)
C Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD)
D Prolegomena to Anal. Pr. II
E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations
F Plates (Ambr. D 54 sup.)

Citation preview

Leon Magentenos Commentary on Aristotle, Prior Analytics (Book II)

Berlin‑Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina (CAGB)

| Series academica Herausgegeben von Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed, Diether R. Reinsch

Band 5

Leon Magentenos

Commentary on Aristotle, Prior Analytics (Book II) | Critical Edition with Introduction and Translation Edited by Nikos Agiotis

Herausgegeben durch die Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Dieser Band wurde im Rahmen der gemeinsamen Forschungsförderung von Bund und Ländern im Akademienprogramm mit Mitteln des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung und mit Mitteln des Regierenden Bürgermeisters von Berlin, Senatskanzlei – Wissenschaft und Forschung erarbeitet.

ISBN 978-3-11-070316-0 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-070348-1 ISSN 2700-6417 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021942778 Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Satz: le-tex publishing services GmbH, Leipzig Druck und Bindung: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Preface This volume is a substantially revised version of my unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Ioannina 2014, in Greek), which has been elaborated in the framework of the project Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina under the auspices of the Berlin‐Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften during the years 2014–2021). The first part of this book includes a bibliography, an inventory of referenced online sources, and an introduction divided into four chapters. The first chapter examines the reception of Leon Magentenos’ work and presents a comprehensive overview of the research conducted on this Byzantine scholar. The second chapter is devoted to the Greek exegetic tradition of the Prior Analytics that existed before Magentenos. The third chapter deals with manuscripts and printed editions transmitting Magentenos’ commentary on the second book of the Prior Analytics. This text seems to be the first coherent commentary on Prior Analytics II ever written in Greek since Late Antiquity (see chapter 2). The fourth chapter is concerned with the principles employed for the edition of the text and of the logical diagrams. The second part of the book comprises a critical edition of Magentenos’ comments as well an English translation. Three indices (nominum, verborum, locorum) and a glossary of technical terms conclude the section. The third part consists of five appendices: three relate to the logical diagrams attached to Magentenos’ commentary by the manuscript tradition; one contains hitherto unedited prolegomena to Prior Analytics II; the final appendix comprises collations of an earlier, interpolated version of Magentenos’ comments on the same book. Titles for Aristotelian treatises and name forms adhere to the conventions employed in the online database of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina project (https://cagb-digital.de). My warmest thanks for their remarks are due to Christian Brockmann, Sten Ebbesen, Dieter Harlfinger, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Lutz Koch, Sofia Kotzabassi, Glenn Most, Inmaculada Pérez Martín, Adrian Pirtea, Ioannis Polemis and Stefano Valente. I am thankful to Yuddi Gershon for proofreading the English text. A special debt is owed to Maïeul Rouquette for offering his expertise on the reledmac and the reledpar packages of the LaTeX typesetting software, by means of which this edition was prepared. Finally, I am grateful to Kathleen Prüfer for her help during the final proofs of this book. Berlin, 2021 Nikos Agiotis

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-201

Contents Preface | V Bibliography | X Online Sources (Digitised Manuscripts, Databases) | XXII

Part I: Introduction 1 1.1 1.2

The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him: an Overview | XXVII Reception | XXVII Modern Scholarship | XXXII

2

A Note on the Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the Twelfth Century | XXXIX

3 3.1

The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II | XLVII Manuscripts | XLVII Ambr. D 54 sup. | XLVIII Ambr. Q 87 sup. | XLVIII Escor. Φ.I.14 | XLIX Lips. Rep. I 68a | XLIX Mon. gr. 29 | L Mon. gr. 75 | L Mut. 205 | LI Par. Coisl. 157 | LI Par. Coisl. 167 | LII Par. gr. 1846 | LII Par. gr. 1972 | LII Par. gr. 1974 | LIII Utin. gr. 256 | LIV Vat. gr. 209 | LIV Vat. gr. 244 | LV Vat. gr. 1018 | LV Vat. gr. 1693 | LVI Vat. Reg. gr. 107 | LVII Vat. Reg. gr. 116 | LVII Vat. Urb. gr. 35 | LVIII Vind. Phil. gr. 208 | LIX

VIII | Contents

3.2

3.3

4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Printed Editions | LX Trincavelli’s Editio Princeps (Venice 1536) | LX Rasari’s Translation into Latin (Venice 1544) | LX The Second Edition of Rasari’s Translation (Lyon 1547) | LXI The Text’s Genealogy | LXI The Direct Tradition: Hyparchetypes V and D | LXI The Descendants of V | LXVI D, the Editio Princeps and the Latin Translation of the Commentary on Anal. Pr. II | LXXI The Indirect Tradition | LXXIII Principles of the Edition | LXXX Text | LXXX Apparatus | LXXXII Diagrams | LXXXII Readings of Anal. Pr. II | LXXXIV Conventions | XCI

Part II: Leonis Magenteni In Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum II Editio critica | 3 Index nominum | 141 Index verborum | 143 Glossarium terminorum technicorum | 145 Index locorum | 149

Part III: Appendices A

Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD) | 153

B

Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD) | 164

C

Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD) | 188

Contents | IX

D

Prolegomena to Anal. Pr. II | 192

E

Recensio Urbinatis: Collations | 195

F

Plates (Ambr. D 54 sup.) | 204

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Wallies 1899 Ammonii in Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium [CAG, 4.6], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1899. Wallies 1905 Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica priora commentaria [CAG, 13.2], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1905. Wallies 1909 Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica posteriora commentaria cum anonymo in librum II [CAG, 13.3], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1909. Wartelle 1963 A. Wartelle, Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d’ Aristote et de ses commentateurs. Contibution à l’ histoire du texte d’ Aristote, Paris 1963. Weidemann 2014 Aristoteles, De Interpretatione, ed. H. Weidemann, Berlin – Boston 2014. Wendland 1901 Alexandri in librum de sensu commentarium [CAG, 3.1], ed. P. Wendland, Berlin 1901. Westerink 1961 L. G. Westerink, ‘Elias on the Prior Analytics’, Mnemosyne 14 (1961) 126–139. Westerink 1967 Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David), Lectures on Porphyry’s Isagoge, ed. L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1967. Westerink 1976 L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Amsterdam 1976. Williams 1984 M. F. Williams, Studies in the Manuscript Tradition of Aristotle’s Analytica [Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie, 161], Königstein/Ts. 1984. Wilson 1983 N. G. Wilson, ‘A Mysterious Byzantine Scriptorium: Ioannikios and His Colleagues’, Scrittura e Civiltà 7 (1983) 161–176.

Online Sources (Digitised Manuscripts, Databases) Digitised Manuscripts Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana – TECA Digitale Laur. 72.5 http://mss.bmlonline.it/Catalogo.aspx?Shelfmark=Plut.72.5

Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF) – Gallica Par. Coisl. 330 Par. gr. 1846 Par. gr. 1917 Par. gr. 1972 Par. gr. 1974

http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b525023022 http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b107228898 http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b525049686 http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10721897f http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10721606h

British Library – Digitised Manuscripts Lond. Add. 7143 http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?ref=Add_MS_7143

Digital Vatican Library (DVL) Vat. Barb. gr. 87 Vat. gr. 209 Vat. gr. 244 Vat. gr. 245 Vat. gr. 1018 Vat. gr. 1024 Vat. gr. 1693 Vat. Reg. gr. 107 Vat. Reg. gr. 116 Vat. Urb. gr. 35

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Barb.gr.87 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.209 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.244 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.245 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1018 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1024 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1693 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Reg.gr.107 http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Reg.gr.116 https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Urb.gr.35

Library of Congress (LOC) Hieros. Patr. 150 https://www.loc.gov/item/00279392097-jo (cf. CAGB)

Münchener Digitalisierungszentrum (MDZ) – Digitale Bibliothek Mon. gr. 29 Mon. gr. 75 Trincavelli 1536 Rasari 1544 Rasari 1547

https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00110095-4 https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb00005975-7 https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10139780-0 https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10138958-1 https://mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10138747-3

Wolfenbütteler Digitale Bibliothek (WDB) Guelf. 24 Gud. gr. http://diglib.hab.de/mss/24-gud-graec/start.htm

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-203

Online Sources (Digitised Manuscripts, Databases) | XXIII

Databases Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina (CAGB) Persons Diels, Hermann Kalbfleisch, Karl Magentenos, Leon Torstrik, Adolf

https://cagb-digital.de/gnd/119061457 https://cagb-digital.de/gnd/116029110 https://cagb-digital.de/gnd/100974376 https://cagb-digital.de/gnd/117407224

Manuscript Descriptions Ambr. D 54 sup. Ambr. L 93 sup. Ambr. Q 87 sup. Hieros. Patr. 150 Lips. Rep. I 68a Marc. gr. 201 Mut. 205 Par. gr. 1846 Par. gr. 1972 Par. gr. 1974 Par. gr. 2064

https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/42545 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/42962 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/43164 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/35387 (cf. Library of Congress) https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/38411 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/69672 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/43536 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/51472 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/51599 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/51601 https://cagb-digital.de/diktyon/51693

Manuscripta Mediaevalia Lips. Rep. I 68a http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/dokumente/html/obj31583389

Pinakes | Πίνακες. Textes et manuscrits grecs Persons Magentinus Leo http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/auteur/1726/

Manuscript Records Esc. Φ.I.14 Mon. gr. 29 Mon. gr. 75 Par. Coisl. 157 Par. Coisl. 167 Utin. gr. 256 Vat. gr. 209 Vat. gr. 244 Vat. gr. 1018 Vat. gr. 1693 Vat. Reg. gr. 107 Vat. Reg. gr. 116 Vat. Urb. gr. 35 Vind. phil. gr. 208

http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/15146/ https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/44472/ https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/44519/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/49296/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/49306/ https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/64401/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/66840/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/66875/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/67649/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/68322/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/66277/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/66286/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/66502/ http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr/notices/cote/71322/

| Part I: Introduction

1 The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him: an Overview 1.1 Reception The locus communis of scholarship concerning Leon Magentenos is the uncertainty that surrounds both his identity and the exact date of his work.¹ However, the dissemination of codices that contain the works of this Byzantine scholar highlights his influence. Magentenos wrote commentaries on Porphyrios’ Isagoge and seemingly on all of Aristotle’s logical works, that is, the Organon.² Of particular interest is the manuscript tradition of Magentenos’ work on Int., Anal. Pr. and the Anal. Post. Regarding the first treatise, there are three commentaries ascribed to the Byzantine philosopher. Besides the textus receptus,³ there also exists a commentary on Int. printed by Aldus Manutius in Venice (1503).⁴ Adolf Busse disputed the authenticity of the latter text,⁵ but Börje Bydén has recently explained his reasons for thinking that this work might indeed have been authored by Magentenos.⁶ Moreover, there is a third commentary transmitted in Vat. gr. 2173 (15th c.) that bears no resemblance to the other two mentioned.⁷ As for dubia, we may point to two later codices which transmit individual scholia on the Anal. Pr. attributed to Magentenos. These differ from one another, as well as from the the rest of the textual witnesses.⁸

1 On Leon Magentenos see Ebbesen 1981b, I, 302–303; Kaldellis - Efthymiadis 2010, n. 233; Bydén 2011, 684–685; CAGB Database (link to the lemma on p. XXIII). 2 An elementary search in the Pinakes database reveals thirty-one manuscripts attributed to Magentenos (see link on p. XXIII; the reference to Par. gr. 2061 is an error, since this codex does not transmit any work of Magentenos); on this codex see p. XLIII. For the manuscript tradition of the commentary on the Anal. Pr., see below p. XLVII. 3 See Vat. gr. 244, ff. 91r–132v. The codex Par. gr. 1917 (13th c.) transmits the text with a different beginning (ff. 17r–24v, l. 24), which, according to Busse, is due to a later scholar replacing the missing part by compiling material from other commentators (Busse 1897, xxxix–xli). 4 Ἀμμωνίου τοῦ Ἑρμείου ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας Ἀριστοτέλους, Μαγεντηνοῦ μητροπολίτου Μιτυλήνης ἐξήγησις εἰς τὸ αὐτό. Ammonii Hermei commentaria in librum Peri hermenias, Margentini archiepiscopi Mitylenensis in eundem enarratio, Venedig 1503, ff. I 1r–L 3v; from now on Ps.‐Magentenos (?). This commentary was republished in Venice (1520), and then translated into Latin several times: Venice 1539, Paris 1544, Venice 1545, Lyon 1547 (with the last translation of the commentary on the Anal. Pr.); cf. Benakis 1987, 358. Ps.‐Magentenos (?) is transmitted in the following manuscripts: Ambr. D 54 sup. (1272; ff. 114r–129r, ascribed to Ioannes Philoponos: ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ἑρμηνείας· τοῦ φιλοπόνου ἐξήγησις), Lond. Add. 10040 (13th c.; excerpts), Par. gr. 1928 (14th c.) and Vind. Phil. gr. 10 (14th/15th c.). 5 Busse 1897, xli–xlii. 6 Bydén 2011, 684–685. 7 Lilla 1985, 40–41. We are currently preparing a digital critical edition of this text. 8 See below p. XLVII. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-204

XXVIII | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

A short text on the number of the so-called ‘predicables’ is transmitted anonymously in Vat. gr. 244, f. 32r and Par. Coisl. 170, ff. 173v–174v, whereas it was registered as τοῦ μαγεντηνοῦ in Laur. 71.3, f. 1v. To Magentenos was ascribed an essay on hypothetical syllogisms in Laur. 71.33, ff. 145v–146v.⁹ Moreover, when Max Wallies edited a commentary on Anal. Post. II under the name of Ioannes Philoponos,¹⁰ he actually argued in the preface to his edition that the work should not be attributed to Philoponos.¹¹ Owen Goldin is also doubtful of Philoponos’ authorship, and suggests that this work might be a condensed paraphrasis of a now lost commentary of Philoponos on Anal. Post. II, or of comments deriving from Ammonios’ lectures.¹² In a recent article, however, Sten Ebbesen is probably right in attributing this text to Magentenos on palaeographic and stylistic grounds.¹³ With regard to Byzantine scholars who must have used or at least known Magentenos’ work, we should first mention the commentary on the Anal. Pr. in Vat. Urb. gr. 35 (see p. LXXIII), as well as the copyist (that is, the interpolator) of his texts in Vat. gr. 244 (see pp. LXIII and LXXVI). Three lists deriving from the late Byzantine period record some of Magentenos’ works.¹⁴ Firstly, the inventory in Marc. gr. 203 (13th/14th c.) includes allusions to commentaries on Porphyrios’ Isagoge, Cat., and Int.¹⁵ Secondly, the register in Vat. gr. 241 (14th c.) transmits a reference to a commentary on the Anal. Pr.¹⁶ Finally, the list in Rom. Ang. 42 (14th c.) mentions all four works.¹⁷ There is also a fourth, older, list which is preserved in the codex Hieros. Patr. 106 (13th c.). It contains, however, no information on Magentenos.¹⁸ Ioannes Pediassimos (ca. 1274/ 1310–1314) had, perhaps, some knowledge of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. or employed the same source as Magentenos did.¹⁹ The monk Sophonias (13th/14th c.) must, in all probability, be the anonymous author who employed Magentenos’ commentary on the Soph. El. in his paraphrase of the corresponding Aristotelian treatise.²⁰ The scholar Isaac Argyros (ca 1300/1310–1375) used Magentenos’ commentaries on the Top. and the Soph. El. for his interpolated versions of Alexander’s commentaries, which are both transmitted in Neap. BN gr. III D 37 (321).²¹ Scholia of Magentenos on

9 See below p. LX. 10 Wallies 1909, 334–440. 11 Wallies 1909, v–vi. See also Cacouros 1996, 92–93. 12 Goldin 2009, 3–4. 13 Ebbesen 2015, 13. 14 See also Harlfinger 1971, 99. 15 Usener 1865, 135–136. 16 Hayduck 1885, v. 17 See the detailed description by D. Reinsch (June 1967) on the website of the CAGB Database. 18 Wendland 1901, xvii–xix. 19 See the Index locorum of the present edition. On the edition of the scholia of Pediassimos see De Falco 1926 and 1928. 20 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 333–336. 21 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 321–322; González Calderón 2014, 295, 309–317.

1.1 Reception | XXIX

the Top. where also put to use by Ioannes Chortasmenos (ca. 1370 – ca. 1436/37) in his Προλαμβανόμενα τῆς διαλεκτικῆς and the Μετάφρασις of Top. VIII.²² An anonymous scholiast of the late 14th or early 15th c. wrote comments on the Soph. El. using the respective treatise written by Magentenos as his source.²³ Vind. Phil. gr. 65 (15th c.) transmits a text that begins Μαγεντινοῦ γνώμη περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐστι ὁ δέκα τέλειος ἀριθμός (ff. 4r–9v). This is not actually a mathematical treatise written by Magentenos, as has been suggested by Johan Ludvig Heiberg and other scholars, but is in fact an anonymous text that integrates an excerpt from Magentenos’ commentary on the Cat.²⁴ Towards the end of the Byzantine period, the Patriarch Gennadios Scholarios (ca. 1400 – after 1472) asserts – in spite of his criticism of Magentenos’ scholia on Int.²⁵ – that Magentenos was at the time actually rather in favour as a commentator.²⁶ Gennadios, Bessarion (1399/1400–1472) and their teacher, Chortasmenos, were actually involved in producing an interpolated version of Theodoros Prodromos’ commentary on Anal. Post. II. Chortasmenos’ interpolations include extracts from Ps.‐Philoponos’ commentary on Anal. Post. II, which are attributed to Magentenos.²⁷ Both Gennadios and Bessarion had in their possession copies of the latter work,²⁸ mostly likely based on their tutor’s manuscript.²⁹ Two commentaries were printed under the name of Magentenos and then frequently translated into Latin during the sixteenth century. Ph. Labbé (1607–1667) is, to our knowledge, the first to provide information on these editions; he mentions the Ἐξήγησις on Int. contained in the aforementioned Aldine edition, as well as the editio princeps of the commentary on the Anal. Pr. by V. Trincavelli (Venice 1536).³⁰ Of particular interest is the copy of the Basel edition of the complete works of Aristotle which is currently exhibited in the Iviron Monastery museum on Mount Athos. Theophanes Eleavourkos (ca. 1500 – before July 1556), was once the owner of this volume

22 Kotzabassi 1999, 14–15. 23 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 317–320. 24 Vind. phil. gr. 65, f. 4r, vv. 3–10. The author himself introduces the excerpt after informing the reader on the following: ‘μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν δὲ καὶ διαφόρων ἐξηγητῶν ἔστι καὶ Μαγεντῖνος τις ὁ τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας καλῶς ἐξηγούμενος· ὅστις περὶ τοῦ πῶς ὁ δὲκα ἀριθμός ἐστι τέλειος λέγει ταῦτα …’ (f. 4r, vv. 2–3); cf. Heiberg 1899, 164; Hunger 1961, 182. 25 Cacouros 2015, 43. 26 Jugie 1936, VII, 3.79; Ebbesen 1981b, I, 303. 27 Cacouros 1994–95, 339–348; Cacouros 1996, 92–96; Ebbesen 2015, 13; Agiotis 2016; Valente 2021b. 28 Par. gr. 1932 and Marc. gr. 202 respectively 29 Leuven MS. FDWM 1. 30 Labbé 1657, 9–10. For the edition and the translations of this work in Latin, see pp. LX sqq. Almost two decades later, G. M. König (1616–1699) reproduces this information, but with a slightly different name-variant (Μαγεντῖνος). He also remarks that Leon Magentenos was metropolitan of Nikaia (König 1678, 493). This could indicate that König has confused Leon Magentenos and Ignatios Magentinos (on Ignatios Magentinos see p. XXXVII).

XXX | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

and added scholia deriving from various sources in the margins.³¹ Some of these scholia transmit Magentenos’ commentary on the Anal. Pr. Unfortunately, the excerpts from Magentenos’ work came to our notice too late to take them into consideration here, but an initial inquiry suggests that they depend on the editio princeps. Almost a century later, Nikolaos Komnenos‐Papadopoulos (1651–1740) mentions in his Praenotiones mystagogicae (Padua 1697) that Magentenos flourished around the year 1300 and was teacher of Konstantinos Armenopoulos (1320 – ca. 1385).³² According to Komnenos‐Papadopoulos, Magentenos wrote not only commentaries on the Aristotelian logic,³³ but also texts on numerous subjects.³⁴ However, Komnenos‐Papadopoulos’ treatise is well-known for its inaccuracies. Consequently, any effort to identify the ‘sources’ of his work would most likely be misdirected.³⁵ The negative reception of the Praenotiones by the Greek Orthodox Church, however, resulted in its partial translation (or, more accurately, its paraphrase) into Greek probably not long after its publication.³⁶ The translators’ purpose was to provide means for the Patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheos II (1641–1707) to understand the original Latin text so that he might then adapt the translated passages for his History of the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, a text which would be known later as the ‘Dodekabiblos’.³⁷ Neither Dositheos nor his collaborators seem to have been aware of the extent and number of Komnenos‐Papadopoulos’ factual errors. That said, they may well have suspected a fictitious reference to Magentenos in one instance; both Greek texts – Chrysanthos’ translation and the ‘Dodekabiblos’ – include citations (book and chapter numbers) of an alledged treatise by Magentenos, but there is no mention of its title, as occurs in

31 Agiotis 2021a. 32 Papadopoulos 1697, 8b, 143b; see also Ebbesen 1981b, I, 303. 33 Papadopoulos 1697, 8a–b deems, apparently, that V. Trincavelli edited only the comments of Leon on Int.: ‘Leo Magentinus Metropolites Mitylenaeus elegantissimae vir Sapientiae, cujus Commentarios in libros Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας edidit Aldus, et Victor Trincavellus Venetiis’. 34 Papadopoulos 1697, 8b (De neglectis canonum praeceptis), 116b (In expositione Regulam Nicephori Patriarche, in medio), 213b (De veteris philosophis), 214 (De moribus Asiaticis), 220a (Explicatio canonum poenitentialium Petri Alexandrini), 226a (De arcana philosophia), 233a (Explicatio canonum poenitentialium Gregorii Thaumaturgi), 235b (scholia on Pol.), 253b (scholia on An.), 281a (scholia on EN), 287b (De moribus gentium), 387a (scholia on Gener. Corr.). 35 Podskalsky 1988, 302: ‘Dieses Buch enthält neben einer beeindruckenden Materialfulle so viele sachliche Fehler, dass man daran zweifeln kann, ob diese der Flüchtigkeit oder der bewußten Täuschung zuzuschreiben sind’. 36 Critical edition Garitsis 2012; see especially pages ξβ΄–οβ΄, οζ΄–π΄. 37 Dositheos 1715; for the relationship between ‘Dodekabiblos’ and the translated Praenotiones, see Garitsis 2012, λα΄–μζ΄. The former work was edited and then published posthumously by Chrysanthos Notaras (1655/1660–1731). Chrysanthos was Dositheos’ nephew and successor to the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem, as well as one of the two translators of the Praenotiones. ‘Dodekabiblos’ was published later than is suggested by its frontpage (1715) – possibly in 1722; see Sarris 2005, 32–41.

1.1 Reception | XXXI

the Latin text. Apparently, this was not the applied method for titles of other works in the same passage.³⁸ Magentenos continued to be read by Greeks even as late as the eighteenth century. His influence is attested, for instance, by a diagram in the codex Lond. Add. 7143 (f. 369r)³⁹ that classifies the scholar among those scholiasts who wrote commentaries on Cat. and Int. This manuscript was copied and used in a Greek school of Constantinople not long prior to 1712. Another example derives from the controversy between the ardent Neo-Aristotelian Dorotheos Lesbios (†1770) and his opponent Nikolaos Zerzoules (ca. 1709–1772/73); Zerzoules invokes Magentenos – much like Gennadios did – as a favoured Aristotelian author in an attempt to defend his expertise on Aristotle against Lesbios in 1759.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Eugenios Voulgaris (1716–1806) mentions in the footnotes to his Logic (Leipzig 1766) comments of Magentenos on the Anal. Pr.⁴¹

38 Magentenos’ fictional work in the Praenotiones is the De veteris philosophis. In both Greek texts the respective citation has been adapted without mentioning the title in the latin text. (In textu numbers of the Praenotiones below correspond to marginal notes of this edition. We print in bold the references to the De veteris philosophis.) I. Papadopoulos 1697, 213b: ‘Quod de Barba diximus, idipsum habe de coma: nam et Romani prisei illi capillos aluere, et posteri Priscorum tondebantur, ut eruditis translatiuum est, et Numi testantur. At Graeci omni aevo, donec in Latinorum mores cessere, prolixa celarie gaudebunt; unde perpetuum penes (1) Homerum’ [in marg. ‘In Iliade passim’] ‘Graecorum Epitheton, καρηκομώοντες ἀχαιοί. Nec Graecis modo, sed Orientalibus populis passim usus Barbae, capillique, ut constat ex iis, quae narrat (2) Ctesias’ [in marg. ‘In fagmen. frag. 3’] ‘(3) Herodotus’ [in marg. ‘In Urania’] ‘(4) Jambilicus’ [in marg. ‘In Vita Solonis’] ‘(5) Heraclides’ [in marg. ‘In Vita Pittaci’] ‘aliique videndi penes (6) Magentinum’ [in marg. ‘De Vet. Philosoph. li. 2.c.11’] ‘qui ex Poetis idem deducit, praesertimque ex (7) Oppiano’ [in marg. ‘Halieut. li. 2’] ‘et (8) Nonno’ [in marg. ‘Dionysiac. lib. 9’]. II. Greek translation; Garitsis 2012, 181.1–10: ‘Ὁ δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν γενείων, λέγομεν καὶ περὶ τῆς κώμης. οἵ τε γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι Ῥωμᾶνοι ἔτρεφον κώμην, καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τύποι τῶν νομισμάτων, οἵ τε Γραικοὶ παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ καρηκομόωντες ὀνομάζονται· καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Ἀνατολικοὶ ἔτρεφον καὶ κώμην καὶ γένοιον. καὶ ὅρα Κτησίαν, καὶ Ἡρώδοτον, ἐν τῇ Οὐρανία, καὶ Ἰάμβλιχον, ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Σόλωνος, καὶ Ἡρακλείδην, ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πιτακοῦ, καὶ Μαγεντῖνον, βιβ.(λίῳ)βῳ , κεφ.(αλαίῳ) ιαῳ , καὶ Ὁπιανόν, Ἁλιευτικῶν βιβ.(λίῳ) βῳ , καὶ Νόννον, Διονυσιακῶν, βιβ.(λίῳ) θῳ ’. III. ‘Dodekabiblos’; Dositheos 1715, 777: ‘…μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τύποι τῶν νομισμάτων τῶν Ἡγεμόνων Γραικῶν τε καὶ Λατίνων. ἕβδομον, ὁ Ὅμηρος περιγράφει τοὺς Ἕλληνας καρηκομόωντας, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οἱ Ἀνατολικοὶ ἔτρεφον γένειον καὶ κόμην, καὶ μάρτυς ὁ Ἡρώδοτος ἐν τῇ οὐρανείᾳ, καὶ ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Σόλωνος, καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ, καὶ Μαγεντῖνος βιβλίῳ δευτέρῳ, κεφαλαίῳ ἑνδεκάτῳ, καὶ Ὀπιανὸς ἁλιευτικῶν βιβλίῳ δευτέρῳ, καὶ Νόννος διονυσιακῶν βιβλίῳ ἐνάτῳ’. 39 Link to the digitised copy on p. XXII. 40 Benakis 1977, 435–436. 41 Voulgaris 1766, 382 (2), 466 (1); cf. Anal. Pr. I 3, 25b19 sqq. and 1, 24b16 sqq. respectively.

XXXII | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

1.2 Modern Scholarship In more recent times, it was decided that Magentenos’ works should constitute part of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences’s Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca series (CAG 1891–1909). On 9th May 1878, during a meeting of the Academy, Eduard Zeller (1814–1908) presented, on behalf of the CAG editorial board, a draft list of the Aristotelian commentaries to be published in the new series; the twenty‐fourth volume was to include Magentenos’ treatises.⁴² The appropriate preparatory work on Magentenos was conducted by Adolf Torstrik⁴³ (1821–1877), the first editor of the CAG, during two trips to consult libraries in Italy (1876),⁴⁴ Paris, Oxford and Madrid (1877).⁴⁵ It seems that the task of editing the commentaries of the Byzantine scholar was probably assigned to Max Wallies (1856–1925), the editor of almost all commentaries on the Logica nova in the new series.⁴⁶ According to the reports of the CAG editorial board in the late 1880s, Wallies studied transcriptions of ‘Paris manuscripts’ that contained Magentenos’ commentary on the Top.⁴⁷ Additionally, archival material shows that he collated the text of Magentenos’ commentaries on Porphyrios’ Isagoge and on the Cat.,⁴⁸ as well as on the Anal. Pr. in the codex Coisl. 157.⁴⁹ Wallies’ progress was so significant, that the CAG editorial board deemed, already in 1886, that an edition of Magentenos’ corpus was viable.⁵⁰ In his overview of the CAG, however, Hermann Usener (1834–1905) relates that the plan was ‘tacitly’ abandoned after 1889.⁵¹ In reality, Karl Kalbfleisch⁵² (1868–1946), an associate and editor of the CAG, was still reporting five

42 Monatsberichte 1878, 406. 43 CAGB Database (link to the lemma on p. XXIII). On Magentenos see Torstrik’s (a) working journal in Register n. 18, 6 (note on the printed editions of Magentenos’ commentaries), 11 (reference to respective passages in Brandis 1836), 36 (citation of Magentenos’ works in Par. gr. 1917), 45 (citation of Magentenos’ commentaries in Vat. gr. 1018), 66 (a reference to Magentenos’ commentary on Int.), 67 (note on the printed edition of the commentary on Anal. Pr.), 138 (citation of Magentenos’ commentaries in Vat. gr. 1018); (b) notes on the manuscript tradition of Magentenos’ commentaries in Register n. 20.11, ff. 3r, 10r, 11r. 44 Monatsberichte 1876, 223. 45 Monatsberichte 1877, 178. 46 CAG volumes 2.1–3, 4.6, 5.1, 13.2–3, 23.3–4. The only exception is volume 21.1. This was edited by Michael Hayduck (1838–1809) and includes commentaries by Eustratios of Nicaea and an anonymous scholiast on Anal. Post. II. 47 Sitzungsberichte 1886, 334; 1887, 293. These codices must have been the Parisini 1843, 1874, 1917 and Coisl. 157; see Wallies 1891. For the text in Coisl. 157 see also p. LI. 48 Register n. 56. 49 The collations of this commentary are preserved in the margins of one of the three Aldine editions which are kept today in the holdings of the Library of the Berlin–Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities. For Magentenos’ text in the Aldine edition see p. XXVII. 50 Sitzungsberichte 1886, 334. 51 Usener 1892, 1008. 52 CAGB Database (link to the lemma on p. XXIII).

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| XXXIII

years later to Hermann Diels⁵³ (1848–1922) on the Parisini that transmitted Magentenos’ commentary on the Soph. El.⁵⁴ Finally, as late as 1902, Diels, the successor of Torstrik, observed that there still remained nine commentaries that had not yet been included in the formal list of CAG works (that is, commentaries other than those already published).⁵⁵ No commentary of Magentenos found its way into print within the framework of the CAG project. Editorial efforts and further study on Magentenos’ work have been undertaken later by individual research projects. Sten Ebbesen contributed a significant breakthrough by publishing excerpts from the commentaries on Cat.⁵⁶ and on Soph. El.,⁵⁷ as wells as by studying the sources and reception of Magentenos’ commentary on Soph. El.⁵⁸ The prooimion to the Top. and the comments on Top. II were edited by Sofia Kotzabassi,⁵⁹ who also examined the reception of this commentary in the late Byzantine period.⁶⁰ Felippe González Calderón has also recently shown that Magentenos used Alexander’s commentary on the Top.⁶¹ Christian Brockmann and Stefano Valente have investigated the manuscript tradition of the commentary on the Anal. Post.⁶² According to Sten Ebbesen, Magentenos’ period of writing activity should be dated between the middle of the twelfth and the third quarter of the thirteenth centuries.⁶³ Ebbesen’s arguments can be summarised as follows:

53 CAGB Database (link to the lemma on p. XXIII). 54 In a letter addressed to Diels (Paris, 9 July 1894) Kalbfleisch remarks the following: ‘Was die Übereinstimmung mit Leo Magent. betrifft, so habe ich bereits ganz in der in Ihrem geschätzten Briefe bezeichneten Weise einige Blätter des Cod. Coisl. 167 s. XIV, der den Leo M. enthält, daraufangesehen und in die Abschrift vom A einige Bemerkungen eingetragen, welche, wie ich hoffe zur Feststellung des Verhältnisses genügen werden’. The siglum A is attibuted to Par. gr. 1972, whereas the text with which Magentenos’ commentary is compared, is of course the commentary on the Soph. El. that is attributed to Michael of Ephesos; for the letter of Kalbfleisch see Register n. 5. 55 These commentaries should be: Ps.‐Themistios (Sophonias) on Parva naturalia (CAG 5.6), Philoponos on Anal. Pr. (CAG 13.2) and on Anal. Post. (CAG 13.3), an anonymous on Anal. Post. II (CAG 13.3), Philoponos (Michael of Ephesos) on Gener. An. (CAG 14.3), Eustratios of Nicaea on Anal. Post. II and an anonymous on the same book (CAG 21.1), Michael of Ephesos on Parva naturalia (CAG 22.1) and on Part. An., Mot. An., Inc. An. (CAG 22.2); see Sitzungsberichte 1902, 45. 56 Ebbesen 1975–76, 383–384; Ebbesen 1981b, II, 278–279. The text in both cases derives from Vat. gr. 244, ff. 45v and 37v respectively. 57 Ebbesen 1981b, II, 280–306. Text and logical diagrams deriving from an earlier version of the comments on Soph. El. in Vat. Urb. gr. 35, as well as further excerpts from Vat. gr. 244 (ff. 585v, 620v, 624v) were published in Bülow - Ebbesen 1982, 55–113 and 114–115 respectively. 58 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 314–322, 333–340. 59 Kotzabassi 1999, 109–152. 60 Kotzabassi 1999, 15–16. 61 González Calderón 2014, 421–430; cf. Kotzabassi 1999, 47. 62 Brockmann 2019, 219–227; Valente 2021a; Valente 2021b. 63 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 303.

XXXIV | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

– –

the terminus ante quem is determined by Ambr. D 54 sup., a manuscript copied in 1272, making it the oldest dated codex that contains Magentenos’ comments.⁶⁴ the terminus post quem is provided by an anonymous commentary on Soph. El., which has as its main source the final version of Michael of Ephesos’ comments. This anonymous source was in turn employed by Magentenos for his own work on the Soph. El. The anonymous commentator ‘cannot have worked much earlier than 1150’, since he quotes scholia attributed to Michael of Ephesos. Michael of Ephesos’ floruit is traditionally thought to be after 1118 since he participated in the Aristotelian project of Anna Komnene.⁶⁵

Both arguments point in right direction, but they are not particularly conclusive and give rise to additional questions. The first question concerns palaeographical desiderata. Vat. gr. 244 is of principal value concerning the manuscript tradition of Magentenos’ works. This is not only because the text of many later codices depends directly or indirectly on the Vaticanus,⁶⁶ but also because this textual witness derives from a rather early stage of the tradition. Christian Brandis was the first to examine the codex and deemed it as quite old (‘ziemlich alt’).⁶⁷ Giovanni Mercati was the first to date the manuscript to the thirteenth century,⁶⁸ in which he was followed by Diether Reinsch,⁶⁹ Sten Ebbesen,⁷⁰ Jacques Brunschwig⁷¹ and Sofia Kotzabassi.⁷² The dating of the codex, nevertheless, is in need of further investigation, since certain palaeographical features may in fact indicate an earlier date (see p. LXI). The second question deals with uncertainties relating to the dating of Magentenos’ floruit made by Sten Ebbesen. The use of the final version of Michael’s scholia on the Soph. El. by Magentenos’ anonymous source does not exclude the possibility that the anonymous was a contemporary of Michael of Ephesos. On the other hand, it is also not absolutely certain whether the commentary on Soph. El. edited by M. Wallies in CAG 2.3 was actually written by Michael.⁷³ Furthermore, recent scholarship has

64 The colophon on f. 203r informs the reader that the copyist’s task came to an end on 15 July 1272 (on the treatises of Magentenos in this codex see pp. XLVIII, LXXI sqq.). 65 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 300, 303, 305–307. 66 See Kotzabassi 1999, 57 (comments on Top. II) and Ebbesen 1981b, III, 71 (comments on Soph. El.), as well as the stemma codicum on p. LXXIX below. 67 Brandis 1831, 50. 68 Mercati - Franchi de’ Cavalieri 1923, 313. 69 The information is found in an unpublished description of the Vat. gr. 244 in the Aristoteles‐Archiv (Freie Universität Berlin). 70 Ebbesen 1981b, 314 claims that the main text and scholia in the codex were copied ‘probably around 1275’. 71 Brunschwig 2007, LXI. 72 Kotzabassi 1999, 49. 73 Moore 2005, 560; Golitsis 2018, 615; cf. Ebbesen 1981b, I, 283.

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convincingly suggested that Michael’s work should not be dated only in light of his participation in Anna’s Aristotelian circle, since he might have written his commentaries earlier than that.⁷⁴ Sofia Kotzabassi offers an argument in favour of dating Magentenos’ floruit to the thirteenth century, by explaining the absence of some of his works in the aforementioned commentary lists. The older inventories do not include references to all of Magentenos’ commentaries, maybe because at the time of their creation he had not yet finished writing those that are ‘missing’.⁷⁵ Yet, it should not escape our notice that the registers cite texts of influential and identified authors. Anonymously circulating works and – most importantly – commentaries that were still not canonical, could not be included. Besides, these lists should rather not be considered as up to date; for instance, both the Paraphraseis of Int. and Anal. Pr. by Michael Psellos were widely circulating during the Palaeologan period,⁷⁶ but only the first work is mentioned in the oldest inventory (13th c.).⁷⁷ The sources explicitly or tacitly employed in Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. are not particularly illuminating in establishing a probable time frame for Magentenos’ floruit either. Comment 134 on Anal. Pr. II is an interesting case, since it is actually an elaborated version of a passage included in an anonymous collection of scholia on Lucian’s Vitarum auctio. The oldest manuscript transmitting this text is Marc. gr. 434 (ff. 123v–128v) which is dated to the eleventh century.⁷⁸ However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the excerpt was of an earlier date than the Marcianus. On the topic of Aristotelian writers, Magentenos quotes Alexander and Philoponos in his comments on Anal. Pr. I,⁷⁹ he cites a passage from Philoponos’ commentary on Anal. Post. I,⁸⁰ while the views of Proklos, Marinos and Alexander on the aim (σκοπός) of Anal. Pr. II are also mentioned in the first scholion on this book. It is worth noting, however, that the multitude of sources used in the passage cannot be straightforwardly explained. Magentenos may have indeed excerpted material from a scholion

74 Golitsis 2018, 610–611. 75 Kotzabassi 1999, 6 (14). 76 Pérez Martín 2013, 164. 77 Wendland 1901, xviii. 78 Mioni 1985, 202–203; the same scholion is transmitted in Vat. Urb. gr. 118 (13th c.). See Rabe 1906, v. 79 Vat. gr. 244, ff. 221v i.m. v. 35–222r v. 6: ‘καὶ παρὰ μὲν | τῶ φιλοπόνω ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς ἐν δευτέρω σχήματι ἀνελύθη· παρὰ δὲ τῶ ἀλεξάνδρω ἐν πρώτω οὕτως· τὰ μέρη τῆς οὐσίας ἀναιρεθέντα, συναναιρεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὰ δὲ συναναιροῦντα τὴν οὐσίαν, οὐσία ἐστί· τὰ μέρη ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας, οὐσία ἔστι· εἶτα προσυλλογίζεται τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν, λαβὼν μέσον ὅρον τὸ ὅλον· τὰ μέρη τῆς οὐσία συναναιρεῖ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ συναναιροῦντα τὸ ὅλον, συναναιρεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὰ μέρη ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας ἀναιρεθέντα συναναιρεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν’ (cf. Wallies 1883, 347.1–13; Wallies 1905, 317.14–24). For Ammonios as a source of the commentary (or commentaries) of Magentenos on Int. see Bydén 2011, 685. 80 See schol. 152.

XXXVI | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

attributed to Marinos,⁸¹ but in the case of Proklos the only information on his commentary on Anal. Pr. derives from Ammonios and a later anonymous commentator on Anal. Pr. I (see p. XLII).⁸² Proklos was held in high esteem by the Byzantines during the eleventh and twelfth centuries,⁸³ so the reference to him may be explained as being of this trend. This, in turn, perhaps facilitated the addition of this prominent writer’s name to the prooimion.⁸⁴ All three opinions along with an explicit reference to Alexander are found once more in the prooimion of the comments on Anal. Pr. II edited under the name of Philoponos in the CAG series⁸⁵ (see also p. XLII). There is, however, a passage in Magentenos’ commentary on Porphyrios’ Isagoge, which hints that the first three quarters of the twelfth century may have in fact been Magentenos’ floruit. The text comments on the notion of ‘genus’ and it is transmitted by all textual witnesses that contain the commentary in its entirety:⁸⁶ Porphyrios (Busse 1887, 2.5–7): τοῦτο δὲ ἔοικε πρόχειρον εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον· Ἡρακλεῖδαι γὰρ λέγονται οἱ ἐκ γένους κατάγοντες Ἡρακλέους καὶ Κεκροπίδαι οἱ ἀπὸ Κέκροπος καὶ οἱ τούτων ἀγχιστεῖς. Magentenos (Vat. gr. 244, f. 7rv): Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον | τοῦ γένους, ἤγουν τὸ [τοῦ a.c.] πλῆθος τὸ ἀπό τινος ἑνὸς καταγόμενον, ἔοικεν εἶναι ἡμῖν πρόχειρον, ἤγουν γνώριμον, μᾶλλον παρὸ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἑκάστου· πρῶτον γὰρ ἔγνωσταί μοι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Κομνηνῶν, εἶθ’ οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἤγουν ὁ Κομνηνός, ἐξ οὗ κατάγονται.

The reference to the Komnenian dynasty (1057–1059, 1081–1185) and the probable allusion to Alexios I are significant pieces of historical information given by the commentator Magentenos himself. Alexios was not the founder of the dynasty, but it was during his reign (1081–1118) that the Komnenoi really came to prominance.⁸⁷ All later Byzantine dynasties (the Angeloi, Lascarides, Palaiologoi, and the Grand Komnenoi) were of course related to the Komnenoi, but nonetheless the appraisal by means of analogies with mythical heroes would have been more plausible during the reign of this enormous family. After all, its members and relatives made up approximately 90%

81 Agiotis 2014, 18. 82 Wallies 1899, 31.24; 39.2 respectively. 83 Trizio 2014, 182–208. 84 Ebbesen 1981a, 10–11. 85 Wallies 1905, 387.6–388.6. 86 Laur. 85.1 (13th–14th c.), f. 11v; Mut. a.V.6.02 (16th c.), f. 6v; Par. Coisl. 157 (15th c.), f. 3v; Par. Coisl. 170 (14th c.), f. 168r; Par. gr. 1845 (13th/14th c.), f. 2r; Par. gr. 1972 (14th c.), f. 9r; Vat. gr. 317 (14th c.), f. 5v. Extracts – save for the abovementioned scholion – are also transmitted in Ambr. M 71 sup. (14th c.), Laur. 71.03 (13th c.), Par. gr. 1928 (14th c.), Par. gr. 2089 (13th c.); to these we might add Laur. Conv. Soppr. 4, ff. 4r–7r (14th c.), whose text we were unable to examine. 87 Magdalino 1993, 27–34.

1.2 Modern Scholarship | XXXVII

of the state elite by the middle of the twelfth century.⁸⁸ To put it differently, such an invocation should not be expected as late as the thirteenth century or during the civil unrest that followed the violent death of the unpopular Andronikos I Komnenos. He had been deposed as emperor in September 1185 by Isaac II Angelos, his political opponent and founder of the next dynasty.⁸⁹ Last, but not least, documents and sigillography may also shed some light on Leon Magentenos’ last name; it seems that he was not the only Magentenos in Byzantium.⁹⁰ In spite of insignificant variants in spelling and accentuation,⁹¹ we also know of one Ignatios Magentinos (Ἰγνάτιος Μαγεντῖνος), a metropolitan of Nikaia in 944.⁹² Information on the πατρίκιος καὶ χαρτουλάριος Michael Magentenos (Μιχαὴλ Μαγεντηνός) and the βεστάρχης Hypatios Magentinos (Ὑπάτιος Μαγεντινός) is derived from seals dating to the eleventh century.⁹³ Perhaps ‘Magentenos’ was a family name that bore some indication of relationship to Magentia near Rome⁹⁴ or perhaps Mazenta in Lombardy.⁹⁵ This hypothesis is not improbable, since Byzantium traditionally maintained cultural, political and financial relationships with the Italian peninsula. Even within the context of Byzantine Aristotelianism alone, Ioannes Italos⁹⁶ (ca. 1025 – after 1082), Barlaam the Calabrian⁹⁷ (ca. 1290 – May/June 1348) and Drosos of Aradeo⁹⁸ (14th c.) are all notable examples of this phenomenon. To conclude, the rich manuscript tradition of Magentenos’ commentaries, later sources, as well as the interest taken by recent scholarship make it evident, despite the lack of biographical information, that this prelate was an influential Aristotelian

88 Sorlin 1976, 374; on the ‘Komnenian system’ of administration and the pivotal role of the imperial family see Magdalino 1993, 180–201. 89 Isaac reigned from 1185 to 1195. For the events before and after the deposition of Andronikos I, see the Χρονικὴ διήγησις of the contemporary Niketas Choniates (ca. 1155–1217); van Dieten 1975, 340.21 sqq. 90 Wartelle’s information that in some manuscripts the scholiast is named Ioannes is not correct (Wartelle 1963, 192 and n. 508, 555, 1060, 1068, 1757). 91 We also register the following three trivial errors: (a) the title of the commentary on Cat. in Par. gr. 1845 (f. 17r) is τοῦ μανγεντηνοῦ ἐξήγησις εἰς τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας, whereas the bibliographical note on f. Ir informs the reader that the codex contains Categorias, Analytica et Topica, cum Magnentii scholiis; (b) in the title of the printed commentary on Int. attributed to Magentenos (Venice 1503; see p. XXVII), we read Margentinus; (c) Montfaucon 1715, 225 misread Λεοντίου in the title of the commentary on Soph. El. in Par. Coisl. 167 (cf. Par. Coisl. 167, f. 1r i.m.: ἑρμηνεία τοῦ ἱεροτάτου μητροπολίτου μιτυλήνης κυροῦ λέοντος τοῦ μαγεντηνοῦ). 92 Pratsch 2004, 265–268. 93 Jordanov 2006, n. 404 and 404A respectively. 94 Mentioned in the sources since the 13th c.: Contatoris - Corsinus 1706, 428; Toponomastica 1997, 368. 95 Also known since the 13th c.: Toponomastica 1997, 369. 96 Ierodiakonou 2011, 623–625. 97 Trizio 2017. 98 Moraux 1976 et al., 483; PLP, n. 5865, 91834.

XXXVIII | The Reception of Magentenos’ Work and Modern Scholarship on him

interepreter. He may have been a member of a family providing the Byzantine state with officials as early as the tenth century, while their last name may hint towards a familial origin in the Italian peninsula. Solid information for the dating of Magentenos’ treatises is offered by the codex Ambr. D 54 sup. (1272), whereas Vat. gr. 244, which probably contains the entire corpus of Magentenos’ works, might have been copied earlier than has been traditionally suggested, that is earlier than the thirteenth century. Other than codicological and palaeographical evidence, Magentenos’ sources cannot be traced after the first decades of the twelfth century. Meanwhile, Magentenos himself mentions the Komnenian dynasty in rather positive terms. It is therefore eminently reasonable to consider the period prior to 1185 or even the first half of the twelfth century as being a more suitable floruit for this scholar’s writing activities.

2 A Note on the Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the Twelfth Century The purpose of this chapter is to offer a brief outline concerning the Greek exegetical tradition in relation to the Anal. Pr.¹ (paraphrases, synopses, short introductions, essays on specific issues, commentaries, individual scholia etc.) prior to the oeuvre of Leon Magentenos.² It should be pointed out, however, that the following is by no means exhaustive, since hitherto unknown works might still be concealed in the manuscript tradition or in need of further investigation. This might include, for example, extracts of texts that Magentenos might have used as sources (see Appendix D). Indirect sources (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Diogenes Laertios, Simplikios, Ioannes Philoponos, Suda) report that the pupil of Aristotle and later Head of the Lyceum Theophrastos of Eresos (ca. 371 – ca. 287 BC), Aristotle’s immediate successor at the Peripatetic school, wrote at least eight works, which were related to the content of Anal. Pr.³ Testimonies in later commentaries of Late Antiquity (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ps.‐Ammonios, Ioannes Philoponos) also mention that another member of the Lyceum and a collaborator of Theophrastos, Eudemos of Rhodes (second half of 4th c. BC), also commented on the Aristotelian logical treatise.⁴ A new era for Aristotelian studies began after the edition of the Aristotelian corpus made by Andronikos of Rhodes (second half of 1st c. BC).⁵ Boethos of Sidon (second half of 1st c. BC), student and then successor to Andronikos as head of the Peripatetic school in Athens, is reported to have written Περὶ ἀποδείξεως.⁶ Furthermore, there are indications that another scholar of that period, Ariston of Alexandria, also authored a text in which he elaborated on Aristotelian syllogisms.⁷

1 Anal. Pr. is – after Cat. – the most frequently copied treatise in those Greek manuscripts that are concerned with Aristotelian logic. According to the database of Pinakes (last accessed on 25 April 2017), 174 out of the 841 manuscripts transmitting the whole or parts of the Organon contain this treatise (Cat. = 176 mss; Int. = 169 mss; Anal. Post. = 127 mss; Top. = 112 mss; Soph. El. = 99 mss). 2 For a historico‐philosophical survey on the tradition of the Anal. Pr. from Theophrastos until the modern era see Ebert - Nortmann 2007, 116–176. 3 See Schneider 2016b, 1061–1067, n. 1 (Ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων, three books), n. 3 (Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν), n. 4 (Ἀναλυτικῶν ἐπιτομή), n. 38 (Ἐνστάσεις, three books), n. 91 (Περὶ συλλογισμῶν λύσεως), n. 137 (Περὶ κρίσεως συλλογισμῶν), n. 161 (Περὶ παραδείγματος), n. 219 (Ὁριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν). 4 Schneider 2016a, 287. 5 Moraux 1973, 45–94. 6 Wallies 1899, 31.11–25; Moraux 1973, 143, 164–170; Gili 2011; Chiaradonna - Rashed 2020b, 13–14; Rashed 2020a, 64–74. 7 Moraux 1973, 186–191. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-205

XL | The Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the 12th Century

Sosigenes and Herminos are dated to the middle of the next century. We learn from indirect sources that Sosigenes dealt with the topic of μίξεις,⁸ whereas Herminos sought to clarify or complete the theories of Aristotle in Anal. Pr. I.⁹ Moreover, in the Διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων penned by Albinos, a Platonist active during the same period, we find a section summarising the content of Anal. Pr. I 1–7.¹⁰ In his Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων Galen (129 – ca. 216 AD), a student of Albinos, informs the reader that when he was younger, he had written an eight-book commentary on the Anal. Pr. just to educate himself in logic.¹¹ At any rate, he did not intend to publish this text;¹² as for a broader readership, however, he directed the fifteen books of his Περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως.¹³ Furthermore, at least sixteen of Galen’s treatises related (as far as it can be inferred from their titles) to material present in the Analytica.¹⁴ Except for fragments of Περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως¹⁵ and plausible indirect testimonies of the same text in the eighth book of Clement’s Στρωματεῖς,¹⁶ the rest of these works have been lost.¹⁷ Galen’s Εἰσαγωγὴ διαλεκτική, on the other hand, is extant.¹⁸ It was written later than Περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως and despite its concise character, this essay provides an excellent account of Anal. Pr. I 1–6.¹⁹ The study of Aristotelian treatises culminated towards the end of the second or the start of the third century. In his extant commentary on Anal. Pr. I²⁰ Alexander of Aphrodisias frequently refers to another (now lost) work which was entitled Περὶ μίξεων or Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς μίξεις διαφορᾶς (or διαφωνίας) Ἀριστοτέλους.²¹ Porphyrios of Tyre (234 – ca. 305) may have written specifically a commentary on Anal. Pr. on top of his Introduction to the Categorical Syllogisms.²² Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480 – ca. 526) made extensive use of the latter work,²³ which was later translated into Arabic by Abu ‘Uthman al-Dimashqi.²⁴ According to indirect sources, 8 Wallies 1899, 39.24–26; Moraux 1984, 340–344. 9 Wallies 1883, 72. 26 sqq., 89.31–91.22; Moraux 1984, 361–362, 383–393. 10 Louis 1945, 5.6–6.7; Moraux 1984, 441, 455–458. 11 Boudon‐Millot 2007, 166.1. 12 Boudon‐Millot 2007, 166.18–19. 13 Moraux 1984, 690–691. 14 Boudon‐Millot 2007, 166.18–169.10. See also Boudon 2000, 461–462, n. 37–43, 46, 51–53, 55, 58, 62, 66, 69. 15 Moraux 1984, 691 (15), Boudon‐Millot 2007, 220. 16 Havrda 2017, 34–50. 17 Boudon‐Millot 2007, 220–227. 18 Kalbfleisch 1896. 19 Kalbfleisch 1896, VII 4–X. 20 Wallies 1883. 21 Wallies 1883, 125.30–31, 207.35, 213.26, 238.37, 249.38–250.1. See Moraux 1984, 340; Moraux 2001, 94. 22 Chase 2012, 1355. 23 Thörnqvist 2008a, xix–xxi; Thörnqvist 2008b, xx. 24 Edition of fragments of the Arabic translation in Smith 1993, 112–116.

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Iamblichos of Chalkis (ca. 245 – ca. 320), a contemporary of Porphyrios, also wrote a commentary on Anal. Pr.²⁵ The paraphrase of Anal. Pr. I published in the CAG series under the name of Themistios²⁶ (ca. 317 – ca. 388) is, in all probability, a work actually written by the monk Sophonias (13th c.).²⁷ The original text of Themistios has since been lost, but it was translated into Latin by Vettius Agorius Praetextatus (ca. 320–384) and then later into Arabic by al-Dimashqi (ca. 900).²⁸ Both translations have been also lost, but extracts of the Arabic text were translated into Hebrew by Todros Todrosi (active ca. 1330). His translation of passages pertaining to Anal. Pr. I 1–11 is extant.²⁹ Another work of Themistios on Anal. Pr. I has been transmitted in the form of an Arabic translation, namely the Treatise in Response to Maximos on the Subject of the Reduction of the Second and Third Figures to the first one.³⁰ There exist several hypotheses regarding the identity of the philosopher Maximus.³¹ The fifth and the early sixth centuries were a time of prolific output for commentators writing on Anal. Pr. According to modern scholarship, the scriptura inferior of the palimpsest codex Par. gr. 1330 dates from this period. This codex transmits excerpts and logical diagrams of a hitherto unknown commentary on Anal. Pr.³² It therefore preserves perhaps the oldest testimony concerning the manuscript tradition of commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. In all probability, commentaries on Anal. Pr. were authored by Syrianos of Alexandria (†437), as well as two of his pupils, Proklos of Lykia (412–485) and Hermeias of Alexandria (middle of the 5th c.).³³ Marinos of Neapolis (middle of the 5th c.) was an apprentice to Proklos before succeeding him as head of the Neoplatonic school in Athens. Only a fragment of his commentary on Anal. Pr. II survives, a section concerning its aim (σκοπός).³⁴ Ammonios (ca. 435/445–517/526), another pupil of Proklos, also penned a commentary. This text is partially extant under the title Σχόλια εἰς τὸ Α΄ τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν ἀπὸ φωνῆς Ἀμμωνίου, that is, notes taken during the lectures of Ammonios on Anal. Pr. I 1–2.³⁵

25 Wallies 1899, 31.18–22, 38.40–39.2; Dillon 2000, 833. 26 Wallies 1884. 27 Rose 1867. 28 Meiser 1880, 3.6–4.3; Kahlos 2012, 1506. 29 Rosenberg - Manekin 1988. 30 Arabic Text and French translation by Rashed 2020b, 290–335. For the debate between Themistios and Maximos see the references of Ammonios, David the ‘Invincible’ and an anonymous commentator on Anal. Pr. I in Wallies 1899, 31.19; Topchyan 2010, 107.10–17; Par. gr. 2061, ff. 30r–31r (see p. XLIII) respectively. See also Rashed 2020b, 256. 31 Schamp et al. 2016, 881. 32 Faraggiana 2009, 217–218. 33 Wallies 1899, 31.23–25, 38.40–39.2, 43.26–36; Goulet 2000a, 641; Goulet 2000b, 687; Luna - Segonds 2012, 1557–1558. 34 Agiotis 2014, 15. 35 Wallies 1899, 1–36.

XLII | The Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the 12th Century

There are another three commentaries with similar titles: two of them are transmitted in the codex Par. gr. 2064 and must be contemporary with Ammonios;³⁶ the third text is the Σχολικαὶ ἀποσημειώσεις ἐκ τῶν συνουσίων Ἀμμωνίου τοῦ Ἑρμείου by Ioannes Philoponos (ca. 490 – ca. 570).³⁷ As for the latter treatise it is generally accepted that Philoponos is not the writer of the commentary on Anal. Pr. II, although it was edited under his name in the CAG series.³⁸ Wallies, the editor, doubts Philoponos’ status as author,³⁹ whereas Ebbesen deems it to be ‘a Byzantine collection of scholia’.⁴⁰ According to Minio-Paluello, Boethius must have translated into Latin excerpts of a now lost Greek commentary on the Anal. Pr.⁴¹ However, Ebbesen argues that the Greek source should be either a commentary from the sixth century, or a Byzantine ‘rehash of material from that period’ which was perhaps translated into Latin by James of Venice in the first half of the twelfth century.⁴² Four texts were written after the fashion of the Neoplatonist Alexandrian sixthseventh century lecture‐commentaries. The following ‘rules’ apply in relation to their structure: every lecture or lesson (πρᾶξις) is usually divided into a general discussion of the passage under examination (θεωρία) followed by an analysis of particular issues (λέξις). Conformity concerning the respective technical terms (πρᾶξις = θεωρία + λέξις) is not always to be taken for granted. ⁴³ A certain Elias is the author of an introduction to Anal. Pr. which is transmitted under the title Σχόλια σὺν θεῷ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον τῶν Προτέρων Ἀναλυτικῶν ἀπὸ φωνῆς Ἠλιοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπάρχων.⁴⁴ Additionally, David the ‘Invincible’ is potentially the author of a commentary on Anal. Pr. I 1–2, 25a2.⁴⁵ This commentary was later translated into Armenian by David himself or under his supervision.⁴⁶ Finally there are two anonymous texts dating perhaps from the same period, since they exhibit the same division into lectures:⁴⁷ a commentary on Anal. Pr. I 1–7,

36 The first in Wallies 1899, viii–ix.21 (on Anal. Pr. I 8); the second in Wallies 1899, 37–76, ix.22–xii.16 (on Anal. Pr. I 8–26). 37 Wallies 1905, 1–386. 38 Wallies 1905, 387–485. 39 Wallies 1905, vi. 40 Ebbesen 1981a, 10. 41 Minio-Paluello 1957, 100–101. 42 Ebbesen 1981a, 8–9. 43 See below and Praechter 1909, 531–533; Richard 1950, 198–199; Westerink 1976, 25; Ebbesen 1996, 85–86. 44 Westerink 1961, 134–139; Helmig 2018, 278. 45 Topchyan 2010, 30–131; Hermig 2018, 278–280. 46 Topchyan 2010, 7–17. 47 Westerink 1967, xvi claims that concerning this type of commentary ‘the only certain terminus ante quem is the year 726, when the tradition to which these texts belong was ended abruptly by the closing down of the university of Constantinople’. However, the closure of the ‘university of Constantinople’, which coincides with the beginning of the iconoclast era, seems to be a myth. The story (that the persecutions against the iconophiles after 726 resulted in the closure of the schools) was probably

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29b6–7 transmitted (with text loss) in Par. gr. 2061⁴⁸ (15th/16th c.) and a commentary on Anal. Pr. II.⁴⁹ The codices Marc. gr. 201 and Par. gr. 2064 are both dated to the second half of the tenth century. The monk Ephraim completed copying the Marcianus in November 954 and was probably also the scribe of the anonymous scholia in semi-uncial script in the margins around the text of the Anal. Pr.⁵⁰ The Parisinus has already been mentioned with regard to the commentaries of Ammonios and Ps.‐Ammonios, however the codex additionally transmits a plethora of logical diagrams as well as two sets of anonymous scholia (with each scholion usually beginning with ὅτι) on Anal. Pr. I 8–46 (ff. 156r– 175v, 178r–185r and ff. 185r–225ra ).⁵¹ To the beginning of the next century (1007) is dated an anonymous compendium of logic under the title Συνοπτικὸν σύνταγμα φιλοσοφίας. J. L. Heiberg divided it into 67 sections.⁵² Sections 25–48 correspond roughly to Anal. Pr. I 1–28, section 64 examines the five types of syllogisms (demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical and poetical), section 65 contains examples of each kind of syllogism, section 66 is a revised and augmented version of the previous section, and, finally, section 67 concludes the text.⁵³ Approximately eleven years after the completion of this anonymous compendium, Michael Psellos was born (1017/18 – ca. 1078 or after 1081). Given that

made-up by the political opponents of the emperor Leo III (717–741); see Lemerle 1971, 89–94; Rochow 1991, 117. 48 The scribe, Ianos Laskaris (RGK, II, n. 197; III, n. 245), left his work incomplete, since the text in the lower half of f. 26v, as well as in f. 27rv was never copied. Moreover, a bifolio (ff. 21–24) seems to be misplaced; the correct text sequence is: ff. 1–16, 21–24, 17–20, 25–31. The text includes eleven or perhaps thirteen lectures, since in one case a θεωρία is followed by two πράξεις (in this commentary πρᾶξις is the equivalent of λέξις), whereas the last lecture includes between θεωρία and πρᾶξις an appendix, namely a second θεωρία, concerning the aforementioned debate between Themistios and Maximos. The text is falsely attributed to Magentenos by a later librarian on f. Ar of the codex, however this information found its way in the respective catalogue; see Omont 1888, 186. Excerpts are edited in Brandis 1836, 139a36–141a3, 144a25–26, 146a9–18, 147b42–148a2, 148b23–28, 151a41–b4, 154b13–29, 37–43, 155b8–19, 156b34–157b18. 49 Transmitted in several manuscripts (Ambr. A 242 inf., ff. 1r–62r [16th c.]; Ambr. D 122 inf., ff. 1r– 53r [16th c.]; Laur. 72.08, ff. 1r–39r [beginning of the fifth decade of the 16th c.]; Oxon. Bodl. Canon. gr. 68 [15th/16th c.]; Oxon. Col. Nov. 230 [15th/16th c.]; Par. gr. 1873, ff. 1r–76r [1561], Par. gr. 2055, ff. 1r–48v mutilated ending [15th c.]; Perus. A 35, ff. 165r–196r [14th c.]; Vat. gr. 231 [16th c.]). The commentary on Anal. Pr. II is devided into two sections (τμῆμα α΄: chapters 1–14; τμῆμα β΄: chapters 15–27) which include a total of fifteen lectures. However, the lectures may in fact be more, since there are two to five consecutive πράξεις after some θεωρίαι (πρᾶξις is employed, as in the case of the previous commentary, as the equivalent of λέξις). The text was published for the most part in Brandis 1836, 187a16–188a41, 189b25–190a27, b4–18, 191a7–36, b27–41, 192b25–193a5, b6–28, 194a40–47, b36–45, 195b21–25. 50 See the detailed description by C. Giacomelli in the CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII). 51 See CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII). 52 Heiberg 1929, 1–50; Ebbesen 1981b, I, 262–265; Barnes 2002, 97–100. 53 Heiberg 1929, 18.3–39.13; 47.23–48.26; 48.27–50.9

XLIV | The Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the 12th Century

Psellos was one of the most prolific scholars of the Byzantine period, it was without question that Anal. Pr. could not have been missing from his logical repertorium.⁵⁴ There are three extant works on Anal. Pr. written by him: 1. Παράφρασις εἰς τὸ πρῶτον τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν⁵⁵ 2. Περὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν προτάσεων καὶ περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων σύντομος ἔφοδος⁵⁶ 3. Περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν.⁵⁷ Psellos’ method in these works consists principally in stitching together snippets of the Aristotelian text. Contrary to its title, the second text concerns only the second section of the first part of Book I (Anal. Pr. I 9, 30a15 – 19, 38a16), namely the modal syllogisms. Ioannes Italos (ca. 1025 – after 1082), Psellos’ pupil, wrote a treatise, Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, at the request of the son of the emperor Andronikos Doukas, as well as a series of Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις on various philosophical issues. The first work principally concerns both books of the Anal. Pr.,⁵⁸ whereas Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις include two notes on the three Aristotelian figures (Anal. Pr. I 4–6),⁵⁹ two notes on the modal syllogisms (Anal. Pr. I 8–22)⁶⁰ and a survey of deductions (Anal. Pr. I 1–7).⁶¹ In the twelfth century, besides the commentary written by Leon Magentenos, we know of two further Aristotelian commentaries on Anal. Pr. Michael of Ephesos is generally accepted to be the writer of a commentary on Soph. El. (cf. p. XXXIV). In this text, the author mentions his (now lost) commentary on Anal. Pr.⁶² The second text contains a series of scholia by an anonymous metropolitan of Nikomedeia on the conspicuous Anal. Pr. II 4, 57a36–b17.⁶³ The anonymous author might be identified with Niketas, metropolitan of Nikomedeia;⁶⁴ there are three contemporary sources that make mention of him.⁶⁵ Anselm of Havelsberg (ca. 1099–1158) informed Pope Eugenius III that in 1136 he held two debates with Niketas, who was, at the time, οἰκουμενικός

54 See Moore 2005, 233–252, 541. 55 Unedited. Two short excerpts from codices Par. gr. 1918 and Vat. Barb. gr. 164 are edited in Brandis 1836, 141b 4–17 and Franchi de’ Cavalieri - Lietzmann 1929, xvii respectively; cf. Moore 2005, 246–247 (PHI.18). 56 Duffy 1992, 33–35 (opusc. 10); Moore 2005, 246 (PHI.17). 57 Duffy 1992, 35–38 (opusc. 11); Moore 2055, 249–250 (PHI.21). 58 Cereteli 1924, 8.13–10.16, 17.17–28.12. 59 Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων, Εἰς τὰ τρία σχήματα; see Joannou 1956, 60–61, n. 47–48 respectively. 60 Περὶ μίξεων, Περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τε καὶ περὶ ἐνδεχομένου; see Joannou 1956, 72–74, n. 53–54 61 Περὶ συλλογισμῶν, see Joannou 1956, 74–78, n. 55. 62 Wallies 1898, 10.5–11, 58.24–29. 63 A short extract was published in Brandis 1836, 189a12–28 from Par. gr. 1917. The codex Taur. C.III.18 (12th c.) also contains the scholia of this anonymous metropolitan (oral communication of Prof. Dieter Harlfinger). We are currently preparing a critical edition of this commentary. 64 Nesseris 2014, I, 112–114. 65 Magdalino 1993, 325.

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διδάσκαλος.⁶⁶ Niketas must have also been the metropolitan of Nikomedeia mentioned by Theodoros Prodromos (ca. 1100 – ca. 1156/1170) in a letter to Alexios Aristenos.⁶⁷ Finally, around 1155, the metropolitan of Ephesos Georgios Tornikes refers to Niketas as being one of Anna Komnene’s tutors in his funeral oration for the deceased princess.⁶⁸ To conclude, the edition of the Aristotelian corpus by Andronikos of Rhodes sparked a prolific tradition of exegetical texts on Anal. Pr. The well-known tripartite structure of Anal. Pr. I is quite straightforward: 1. in chapters 1–26 Aristotle presents, after some preliminary remarks, the three figures and their moods before following that with an examination of modal syllogisms 2. in chapters 27–31 he examines a set of rules for finding suitable premises in order to prove all kinds of conclusions 3. chapters 32–46 are a study on how syllogisms can be assigned to one of the three figures. This clear-cut structure of Anal. Pr. I probably facilitated its teaching, specifically the writing of commentaries and a plethora of compendia or essays dedicated to specific sections (Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων, Περὶ μίξεων etc.). Anal. Pr. II, on the other hand, gives the impression of being ‘a collection of afterthoughts’⁶⁹ concerning not just Anal. Pr. I, but also Anal. Post., Top., Soph. El. and Rhet.:⁷⁰ – chapters 1–15 require previous knowledge of Anal. Pr. I 1–7 – chapters 16–22 are a miscellany concerning argumentation – chapters 23–27 are a list of argument types which are not deductions. This incoherence seems to have caused a certain amount of perplexity among Aristotelian commentators. Ammonios and Ps.‐Philoponos correlate the content of Anal. Pr. II with Top.;⁷¹ Marinos and Psellos claim that the principles of the sophistical as well as those of the dialectical reasoning are the aim of book II;⁷² as this book contains subjects that Aristotle skipped in Anal. Pr. I, an anonymous commentator (see above p. XLIII) deems Anal. Pr. II as an appendage to book I;⁷³ Magentenos then suggests that in book II Aristotle presents what is an impediment to the demonstrative deduc-

66 Migne 1855, 1142, 1162. 67 Migne 1864, 1280–1282. 68 Darrouzès 1970, 300.30–301.2. 69 Smith 1989, xiv. 70 Strobach - Malink 2015, 64–69. 71 Wallies 1889, 4.25–31 and Wallies 1905, 388.4–6 respectively. 72 Agiotis 2014, 15 and Duffy 1992, 37, opusc. 11.3–4 respectively; see also p. 192, Prooemion I 10–15. 73 Brandis 1836, 187a24–26 and also below p. 194, Prooemion III 6–7.

XLVI | The Greek Exegetical Tradition of the Anal. Pr. up to the 12th Century

tion.⁷⁴ At any rate, it must have been a common belief that Anal. Pr. II did not contain anything that could not also be found in other sections of the Organon. This may explain why Anal. Pr. II did not draw the attention of many commentators. It is rather telling that we do not possess any surviving commentary on both books of Anal. Pr. prior to Magentenos’, and also that not many exegetical texts on book II were written. In this respect, the reasons for Magentenos’ ‘innovation’, combined with the appraisal of the Komnenoi presented in the previous chapter, may hark back to the tradition initiated by Anna Kommene, namely that of writing commentaries on Aristotelian treatises where previously a scarcity of commentaries abounded.⁷⁵

74 See in the edition below, schol. 1.17–18 and also p. 193, Prooemion II 1–2. 75 Darrouzès 1970, 283.4–7.

3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II 3.1 Manuscripts Leon Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. is extant in thirty-two manuscripts.¹ – In the margins of two of these manuscripts, a small number of individual scholia on Anal. Pr. I are annotated as τοῦ Μαγεντηνοῦ (or similar). The content of these scholia differs from the rest of the tradition, as well as from each another (there is one exception).² – One codex contains a redaction with interpolated extracts that derive from an earlier version of the commentary.³ – Ten manuscripts transmit the commentary in its entirety or with minor omissions.⁴ – A further eight codices contain the comments on or large sections of book I.⁵ – One codex includes a few sections of the commentary on book II.⁶ – In nine cases excerpts were copied as parts of scholia collections or as part of other commentaries.⁷ – Finally, there exists a manuscript dated to the late fifteenth century that contains an anonymous Latin translation of Magentenos’ comments on Anal. Pr. I.⁸ In the following alphabetical classification we list twenty one codices that transmit either the entirety, or parts, or individual scholia of Magentenos’ comments on Anal. Pr. II. All entries inlcude a brief description detailing date, physical description, contents and secondary literature. Manuscripts examined in loco are denoted by means of an

1 To these we should add Magentenos’ comments in the Basel edition of the Aristotelian corpus of the Iviron monastery on Athos. The excerpts are not considered here; see p. XXIX. 2 Princeton MS 173, ff. 15v, 16r; Vat. Barb. gr. 164, ff. 39r, 65r, 66r, 67rv. A marginal scholion τοῦ Μαγεντηνοῦ on Anal. Pr. I 1, 24a25 is to be found in both Princeton MS 173, f. 16r and Vat. Barb. gr. 164, f. 39r. 3 Vat. Urb. gr. 35. 4 Ambr. D 54 sup., Mut. 205, Par. Coisl. 157, 167, Par. gr. 1846, 1972, Vat. gr. 209, 244, 1018, Vat. Reg. gr. 107. 5 Ambr. D 43 sup., Ang. 30, Laur. 71.10, 85.1, Leuven MS FDWM 1, Par. Coisl. 170, Par. gr. 1917, Vat. gr. 317. 6 Vat. gr. 1693. 7 Ambr. Q 87 sup., Esc. Φ.I.14, Lips. Rep. I 68a, Mon. gr. 29, 75, Par. gr. 1974, Vat. gr. 245 (scholia on Anal. Pr. I), Vat. Reg. gr. 116 and Vind. phil. gr. 208. 8 Vat. lat. 4560; see Ebbesen - Pinborg 1981–82, 314–315. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-206

XLVIII | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

asterisk (*) on the right side of the pertinent shelf mark. Codices, for which I consulted Professor Diether Reinsch’s unpublished descriptions are marked with the letter ‘R’.⁹

Ambr. D 54 sup. [olim N 46] (= D) 1272 (ff. 37r–203r, 204rv); 13th c., end (ff. 9r–36v, 203v, 205r–268v); second half of 14th c. (ff. 1rv, 3r–8v); 15th c. (f. 2rv) bombycine (paper: ff. I–III, 1–8, 216, 223–242, 245– 257, 260, 263–264, 266–267, I´–III´) mm 258x130 (ff. 2, 116, 118, 120, 122, 126, 130, 133, 140, 150, 216–268: fluctuating size between mm 85x130 and mm 258x175) ff. ΙII, 268, IIΙ´ Contents: (f. IIr) Table of contents. (f. 1r) Note ducat. decem and the older signature mark of the codex N. 46. (f. 1v) Letters. (ff. 2rv) anonymous introduction to the Organon. (ff. 3rv) Astronomical diagrams. (ff. 9r–36v) Cleomedes, De motu circulari corporum caelestium with scholia. (f. 36v) Verses of 〈Ioannes〉 Tzetzes probably deriving from his verse commentary on Porphyrios’ Isagoge. (ff. 37r–63v) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. (ff. 42r–64r, 216rv) Porphyrios’ Isagoge alternating with Ammonios’ commentary. (ff. 64v–113v) 〈Ioannes Philoponos〉, In Cat. (ff. 114r–129r) Commentaries by 〈Ps.-Magentenos (?)〉 and 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (ff. 129r–148r) on Int. (ff. 118r-140v) Int. (occasionally in the margins of the commentaries by 〈Ps.-Magentenos (?)〉 and 〈Leon Magentenos〉). (ff. 148v–197v, 204rv, 198r–203r) 〈Leon Magentenos〉, In Anal. Pr. copied by Alexios Solymas (the comments on book II begin on f. 191r). (ff. 206r–215v) Anal. Post. (ff. 217r–229v, 251r–253v) Cat. (ff. 230r–250v, 254r–268v, 203v, 205r–206r) Anal. Pr. Blank folia: Irv, IIv–IIIv, 4r–8v, Ι´–IIΙ´. Secondary Literature: Martini - Bassi 1906, 266–268; Turyn 1972, 22–23; Pasini 2007, 229; Agiotis 2013, 5 (28); Beta 2014, 37 (2); CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII).

Ambr. Q 87 sup. (= Q) Middle to third quarter of 14th c. paper (bombycine: ff. 1–2) mm 290x220 (ff. 192– 199: mm 290x220) ff. ΙII, 278, I´ Contents: (ff. 1r–2v) Nikephoros Gregoras, De constructione astrolabii. (ff. 3r– 7v) Matthaios Vlastares, Syntagma canonum. (f. 8rv) A list of metropoleis and archbishoprics. (f. 8v) Explanations of Greek terms originating from Latin. (ff. 9r–10r) A riddle by 〈Vasileios Megalomytes〉; a myth by Aisopos; an epigram by Isaac Argyros dedicated to Ioannes Chrysostomos; epigrams (one of them, on f. 10r, on the Organon); a diagram on the division of philosophy; indices concerning Porphyrios, Isagoge and Cat. (ff. 10r–21r) Porphyrios, Isagoge with the commentary of 〈Ammonios〉 (excerpt). 9 These documents are kept in the Aristoteles‐Archiv (Freie Universität Berlin).

3.1 Manuscripts | XLIX

(ff. 21v–23v) Individual anonymous scholia on Porphyrios, Isagoge and Cat. (ff. 24r– 49r) Cat. with scholia. (ff. 53r–76r) Int. with the commentary by Ammonios (from f. 49r). (ff. 79v–191v) Anal. Pr. and a commentary attributed to Philoponos (from f. 76v). This work (henceforth referred to as Philoponos 2) consists of an abridged version of Ioannes Philoponos’ comments, excerpts from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary and Leon Magentenos’ prooimion of his commentary on Anal. Pr. II (the latter text may be found on f. 149v).¹⁰ (ff. 192r–199v) Euclides, Elementa with scholia. (ff. 200r–202v) 〈Maximos Planoudes〉, Prolegomena in rhetoricam. (ff. 204r–217v) Aphthonios, Progymnasmata with scholia (from f. 202v). (ff. 220v–221v) Hermogenes, De statibus with 〈Maximos Planoudes〉, Prolegomena (ff. 218r–219v) and an index (f. 220). (ff. 222r–223v, 227r–229v) Galen, De ossibus ad tirones. (ff. 224r–226v, 230r–240v) Galen, De musculorum dissectione ad tirones with anonymous texts which are medical in nature (f. 241r). (ff. 241v–270v) Text on medicinal plants. (ff. 271r–278v) Paulos Aiginetes, Epitome medica (excerpts). Blank folia: 23r. Secondary Literature: Martini - Bassi 1906, 791–794; Touwaide 1992, 291 (3); Debru - Garofalo 2005, 17; Pasini 2007, 307–308; CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII).

Esc. Φ.I.14 (= Em ) Middle of 16th c. paper mm 325x233 ff. Ι, 273 Contents: (ff. 1r–9v) An anonymous commentary, i.e. an interpolated version of Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Post. (on ff. 5v–6r scholion 157 of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II).¹¹ (ff. 10r–158r) Eustratios, In Anal. Post. II. (ff. 161r–176v, 177v–243r) Scholia on the Phys. and an anonymous commentary on the latter work (from f. 166v). (ff. 246r–268v) 〈Olympiodoros〉, In Mete. (ff. 269r–273r) Anonymous scholia on Part. An. I. and on Plant. II. Blank folia: 158v–160v, 177r, 243v–245v, 248v, 255r. Secondary Literature: De Andrés 1965, 21–22; Agiotis 2015, 5, 83–98; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII).

Lips. Rep. I 68a (= I) after 1442 (ff. 1r–30v); 15th/16th c. (ff. 31r–54v) paper mm 280x210 ff. I, 54, II´ Contents: (ff. 1r–30v) Passages from Anal. Pr. I with 〈Philoponos 2〉 in the margins (excerpts). The prooimion by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 on book II can be found in the lower

10 See also the entries on codices Lips. Rep. I 68a, Par. gr. 1974, Vat. Reg. gr. 116 and Vind. Phil. gr. 208. 11 See also the entries on codices Mon. gr. 29, 75 and Utin. gr. 256.

L | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

margin of f. 15r. (ff. 31r–54v) 〈Ioannes Philoponos〉, In Anal. Pr. I (excerpt). Blank folia: Irv, II´rv. Secondary Literature: Moraux 1973, 412–413; CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII); Manuscripta Mediaevalia (link on p. XXIII).

Mon. gr. 29 (= Mk ) ca. 1550 paper mm 350x244 ff. Ι, 420, I΄ Contents: (f. Irv) folio bearing adhesively affixed leaves with the description of the codex in Hardt 1806, 162–170. (ff. 1r–54v) Proklos, In Platonis Cratylum commentaria. (ff. 55r–91v) Theon of Smyrna, Expositio rerum mathematicarum. (ff. 92r–101r) Excerpts from the work of Atticus. (ff. 101r–104r) Georgios Gemistos Plethon, Oratio funebris in Helenam Palaeologinam. (ff. 104r–105v) Anonymous astronomical texts. (ff. 105v–106r) Epitheta deorum. (ff. 106r–107r) Excerpts from the work of Hero of Alexandria. (ff. 108r–159r, 170v–175v) Nemesios, De natura hominis. (ff. 160r–165r) Markos Eugenikos, Oratio de vitae termino. (ff. 165r–170v) 〈Markos Eugenikos〉, Tractatus de resurrectione. (ff. 176r–182v) An anonymous commentary, i.e. an interpolated version of Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Post. (on ff. 179v–180r scholion 157 of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II).¹² (ff. 183v–315r) 〈Eustratios〉, In Anal. Post. II. (ff. 316r–396v) Works by Synesios of Kyrene. (ff. 397r–413r) Nikephoros Gregoras, Explicatio in Synesii De insomniis (excerpts). Blank folia: 91Arv, 107v, 159v, 159Ar–159Dv, 183r, 315v, 384v, 396Ar–396Bv, 413v, I΄rv. Secondary Literature: Tiftixoglou 2004, 179–186; Valente 2021c; MDZ (link on p. XXII); Pinakes (link on p. XXIII).

Mon. gr. 75 (= Nk ) ca. 1550 paper mm 347x240 ff. Ι, 407, I΄ Contents: (f. IIv) folio bearing adhesively affixed leaves with the description of the codex in Hardt 1806, 451–453. (ff. 1r–112v) Maximos of Tyre, Orationes. (ff. 113r– 123r) An anonymous commentary, i.e. an interpolated version of Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Post. (on ff. 118r–119v scholion 157 of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II).¹³ (ff. 124r–295v) 〈Eustratios〉, In Anal. Post. II. (ff. 297r–332v) Rhet. Al. (ff. 333r–399v) Scholia on Aischylos’ works. Blank folia: Ir–IIr, 112Ar–112Bv, 123v, 296rv, 332Ar–332Cv, 339Ar–399Bv. Secondary Literature: Molin Pradel 2013, 152–156; Valente 2021c; MDZ (link on p. XXII); Pinakes (link on p. XXIII). 12 See also the entries on codices Esc. Φ.I.14, Mon. gr. 75 and Utin. gr. 256. 13 See also the entries on codices Esc. Φ.I.14, Mon. gr. 29 and Utin. gr. 256.

3.1 Manuscripts |

LI

Mut. 205 [olim α.W.3.18] (= M) First half of the 16th c. paper mm 334x234 ff. I, 300, I´ Contents: (f. 1r) Note 352. (f. 1v) Note on the Aristotelian commentaries in the codex. (ff. 2r–7r, 11r–247r) Anal. Pr. I with the commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (excerpts on ff. 178r–182v) and Ioannes Philoponos, a text on hypothetical syllogisms attributed to Psellos and then the commentary by Leon Magentenos (from f. 109r). (ff. 7v–10r) Excerpts from Euclides, Elementa with scholia ascribed to Psellos. (f. 10v) Michael Psellos’(?) Ἔφοδος σύντομος καὶ σαφὴς τῆς εὑρέσεως τῶν συλλογισμῶν τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων. (ff. 247v–298v) Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Pr. II copied by an anonymous scribe (περὶ τῶν ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου ἐξήγησις του μαγεντηνοῦ). Blank folia: 299r–300v. Secondary Literature: Puntoni 1896, 506–507; De Gregorio - Eleuteri 1993, 158– 159; Moore 2005, 247–248, 566; CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII).

Par. Coisl. 157 (= E) after 1330 parchment mm 370x268 ff. 614 (+ 118a, 171a) Contents: (ff. 1r–27r) Porphyrios, Isagoge with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 and 〈Leon Magentenos〉. (ff. 29v–100v) Cat. with the commentaries by Simplikios (excerpts from f. 27r) and Leon Magentenos (ff. 29r–101r). (ff. 104v–174r) Int. with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 (ff. 101r–174v and ff. 202v–204r) and 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (ff. 102r–174v). (f. 175r) Diagram. (ff. 175v–179v) 〈Michael Psellos (?), Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν〉. (ff. 180r–280v) Anal. Pr. with the commentaries by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (from f. 179r; on ff. 254v–280v the ‘Metochitesschreiber’ (Michael Klostomalles?) copied the commentary on the book II alternating it with the Aristotelian text), 〈Ioannes Philoponos〉 (excerpts) and Alexander of Aphrodisias. (ff. 281v–361v) Anal. Post. with the commentaries by Leon Magentenos (ff. 281r–331r) and 〈Ps.-Philoponos〉 (ff. 331v–362r) on books I and II respectively. (ff. 363v–524v) Top. with the commentaries by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (excerpts; ff. 362r– 524v) and Alexander of Aphrodisias. (ff. 526v–614r) Soph. El. with the commentaries by 〈Michael of Ephesos〉 (excerpts from f. 525r) and 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (ff. 526r–614v). Secondary Literature: Devreese 1945, 140–142; Ebbesen 1981b, III, 70–71, 288; Prato 1991, 146–147; Kotzabassi 1999, 22–23 (75), 49, 53–56; Moore 2005, 249, 559– 560; Lamberz 2006, 44–45; Brockmann 2019, 222–223; Valente 2021a; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII).

LII | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

Par. Coisl. 167 (= S) First half of 14 c. parchment mm 305x222 ff. I, 317 Contents:(f. Irv) Subscriptions and notes. (ff. 1r–112v) Leon Magentenos, In Soph. El. (ff. 113r–178r) Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Pr. (on f. 145v begin the comments on book II). (178v–317r) 〈Leon Magentenos〉, In Anal. Post. I (until f. 256v) and 〈Ps.-Philoponos〉, In Anal Post. II. Blank folia: 317v. Secondary Literature: Devreese 1945, 149–150; Ebbesen 1981b, III, 70–71, 288; Brockmann 2019, 222–223, 224 (50); Valente 2021a; Pinakes (see p. XXIII).

Par. gr. 1846 (= P) Second half of 14th c. paper mm 278x205 V, 185, III´ Contents: (ff. 1–4r) The prooemion of the commentary by Ioannes Philoponos on Anal. Pr. I. (ff. 4r–6r, 13r–14r) Euclides, Elementa (excerpts) alternating with scholia that are ascribed to Psellos (ff. 4r–6r). (ff. 6v–13r) Nicomachos of Gerasa, Introductio arithmetica with the comments by Ioannes Philoponos. (f. 15r) Michael Psellos (?), Ἔφοδος σύντομος καὶ σαφὴς τῆς εὑρέσεως τῶν συλλογισμῶν τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων. (ff. 15v–185r) Anal. Pr. with the commentaries by Leon Magentenos (from f. 19v) Ioannes Philoponos (on book I), Ps.‐Philoponos (book II), Alexander of Aphrodisias (excerpts), Themistios (excerpts), Ammonios (excerpts), Michael Psellos (excerpts of his Paraphrasis), Neophytos Prodromenos (individual scholia) and Ioannes Chortasmenos (individual scholia). In the margins of ff. 146r–182r 〈Neophytos Prodromenos〉 copied the comments on book II (περὶ τῶν ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου ἐξήγησις, τοῦ μαγεντηνοῦ). Ioannes Chortasmenos copied an excerpt from an earlier passage in Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. in the outer margin of f. 176v, next to Magentenos’ commentary (143.2 οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ – 10 καὶ εἰ μέν). (f. 185rv) Two texts and a diagram on Ἁρμονική (the first text is attributed to Ioannes Philoponos, whereas the second one along with the diagram to Nikephoros Gregoras). Blank folia: 14v. Secondary Literature: Omont 1888, 152; Cacouros 1998, 188, 191–195; Berger 2005, 141; Bravo - Pérez 2005, 456; Cataldi Palau 2008, 213; Gastgeber 2010, 416; Moore 2005; 247–248; CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII); Gallica (link on p. XXII).

Par. gr. 1972 (= F) First half of 14th c.

bombycine mm 342x242 III, 769, III´

3.1 Manuscripts |

LIII

Contents: (ff. 2v–5v, 8r–33v) Porphyrios, Isagoge alternating with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 (from f. 1r) and Leon Magentenos (from f. 1v). (ff. 36r–117r) Cat. with the commentaries by Simplikios (excerpts from f. 33v) and Leon Magentenos (ff. 35v–118v). (ff. 121r–202v) Int. with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 (excerpts) and Leon Magentenos (f. 118v–203r). (ff. 203v–208r) 〈Michael Psellos (?)〉, Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν (here with the title Σύνοψις τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων ἤτοι ψιλὴ τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἴδησις ἐπιπόλαιος). (ff. 210r–321r) Anal. Pr. with the commentaries by 〈Ioannes Philoponos〉 (excerpts), Alexander of Aphrodisias and Leon Magentenos (ff. 209r–321r; from f. 290r the comments on book II alternating with the Aristotelian text). (ff. 322r–436r) Anal. Post. alternating with the commentaries by 〈Philoponos〉 and Leon Magentenos (from f. 321v) on book I, as well as with the commentary of 〈Ps.-Philoponos〉 on book II (ff. 391r–437r). (ff. 439v–654r) Top. alternating with the commentaries by 〈Alexander of Aphrodisias〉 (excerpts) and Leon Magentenos (from f. 437v). (ff. 656v–768r, 7rv, 769rv) Soph. El. with the commentaries by 〈Michael of Ephesos〉 (excerpts from f. 654v) and 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (from f. 656r). Blank folia: 35r, 208v, 236v. Secondary Literature: Omont 1888, 22, 48, 53–56; Ebbesen 1981b, III, 287; Kotzabassi 1999, 22, 48, 53–56; Léannec‐Bavavéas 1999, 301; Moore 2005, 259–260; Muratore 2009, I, 252–3, 302, 319 (14), 345; ΙΙ, 57, 405, 448, 503, 532, 575–576, 686, 780; Brockmann 2019, 222–225; Valente 2021a; CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII); Gallica (link on p. XXII).

Par. gr. 1974 (= Z) ca. 1451 paper mm 290x198 IV, 330 (+ 330a–c), III´ Contents: (ff. 1r–7v, 9r–19r) 〈Ammonios〉, In Porph. Isag. (ff. 7v–8r) Introductory text on logic. (f. 8v) Vita Aristotelis. (f. 19rv) Text on Cat. (ff. 20r–37r) Porphyrios’ Isagoge with the commentary by Ammonios (excerpts). (ff. 37r–42v) Ammonios, In Cat. (ff. 44r–87v) Cat. with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 and 〈Philoponos〉 (excerpts). (ff. 88r–92r) 〈Ammonios〉, In Int. (excerpts) (f. 92r) Scholion of a certain Isaak (Argyros?) on the quality and quantity of premises. (ff. 94r–137v) Int. with the commentaries by 〈Ammonios〉 and 〈Leon Magentenos〉. (ff. 144r–292v) Anal. Pr. with the commentary by 〈Philoponos 2〉 on Book I (ff. 138r–142r; see p. XLIX). 〈Ioannes Eugenikos〉 has copied the prooimion of Leon Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II onto f. 244r (τοῦ μαγεντηνοῦ, εἰς τὸ βον τοῦ ἀριστοτέλους προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν). (ff. 294r–330r) Anal. Post. Blank folia: 43rv, 92r–93v, 142v–143v, 234v–235r, 293rv, 313v, 330v–330cv. Secondary Literature: Omont 1888, 173; RGK II, n. 217; Muratore 2009, I, 377 (35); Laffitte 2010 (link to the inventory on p. XV); CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII); Gallica (link on p. XXII).

LIV | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II Utin. gr. 256 (= Ua ) 1471–1487 (ff. 1r–180r); 1301–1325 (ff. 181r–204r) paper mm 280x200 ff. 204 Contents: (ff. 1r–10r) An anonymous commentary, i.e. an interpolated version of Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Post. (on ff. 5v–6v scholion 157 of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II).¹⁴ (ff. 11r–179r) Eustratios, In Anal. Post. II. (ff. 181r–204r) Rhet. Al. Blank folia: 10v, 179v–180v. Secondary Literature: Mioni 1965, 440–441; Formentin 1987, 51–52; Vendruscolo 2006–07, 290, 292–293; Bieker 2015; Valente 2021c; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII).

Vat. gr. 209*R (= Y) End of 14th c. paper (f. 219: parchment) mm 295x207 ff. II, 219 Contents: (f. Ir) Signature mark. (f. IIr) Table of contents. (f. IIv) A list of the commentators on the Anal. Pr. (ff. 1r–16v) 〈Georgios Chrysococces, Expositio in Constructionem Persarum〉. (ff. 17r–32r) Astronomical tables. (f. 36rv) Euclides, Elementa (excerpts) with scholia ascribed to Psellos. (f. 37v) Michael Psellos (?), Ἔφοδος σύντομος καὶ σαφὴς τῆς εὑρέσεως τῶν συλλογισμῶν τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων. (ff. 38r–181v) Anal. Pr. along with the commentaries by Leon Magentenos (from f. 41v), Ioannes Philoponos (on book I starting from f. 33r), Ps.‐Philoponos (on book II), 〈Michael Psellos〉 (excerpts of his Paraphrasis on ff. 107v–108r, 109r–110r, 111v, 113r, 114r, 115r, 118r, 119r, 120v, 122rv, 123v), Ps.‐Themistios, Neophytos Prodromenos (individual scholia), Alexander of Aphrodisias (excerpts) and Ammonios (excerpts). In the margins of ff. 144v–175v an anonymous scribe copied the comments of Magentenos on Anal. Pr. II (περὶ τῶν ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου ἐξήγησις του μαγεντηνοῦ). (f. 182rv) Two texts and a diagram on Ἁρμονική (the first text is attributed to Ioannes Philoponos, whereas the following diagram with the text are ascribed to Nikephoros Gregoras). (ff. 184r–218v) Anal. Post. I with the commentary of Ioannes Philoponos (starting from f. 183r) and scholia ascribed to Themistios, Apollonios, Proklos, Leon Magentenos and Neophytos Prodromenos. (f. 219v) Buying contract in Latin (the second leaf of the bifolio, which contains the last part of the contract, is fixed on the binding of the codex). Blank folia: I´v, 32v, 219r. Secondary Literature: Mercati - Franchi de’ Cavalieri 1923, 258–261; Tihon 1987, 486; Ierodiakonou 1996, 104; Cacouros 1998, 189; Mondrain 2000, 14; Berger 2005, 141; Moore 2005, 247; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

14 See also the entries on codices Esc. Φ.I.14, Mon. gr. 29 and 75.

3.1 Manuscripts | LV

Vat. gr. 244*R (= V) 12th/13th c. bombycine fluctuating size between mm 350x258 and mm 355x265 ff. V, 652, II´ (+ 120–129 bis, 157a, 170a) Contents: (f. Vr) Table of contents. (ff. 1r–2v) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. (excerpts). (ff. 4v–31v) Porphyrios, Isagoge Leon Magentenos’ commentary (ff. 3r–28). The scribe’s scholia were adjusted as a second layer of exegetic material in the margins around Magentenos commentary. The anonymous copyist follows this method throughout the codex. (ff. 32v–89r) Cat. with 〈Leon Magentenos’〉 (ff. 32r–90r) and Simplikios’ (excerpts from f. 31v) commentaries. (ff. 93r–132v) Int. with Leon Magentenos’ (from f. 91r) and Ammonios’ (first excerpt on f. 90v; the last one ends on f. 133v) commentaries. (ff. 133v–136v) 〈Michael Psellos (?)〉, Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν (here with the title Σύνοψις τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων ἤτοι ψιλὴ τῶν συλλογισμῶν εἴδησις καὶ ἐπιπόλαιος) with diagrams (f. 137r). (ff. 141r–297r) Anal. Pr. with Leon Magentenos’ (from f. 139r; on ff. 240r–296v the comments on book II), Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (excerpts), 〈Ammonios’〉 and 〈Ioannes Philoponos’〉 (book I) commentaries. On ff. 166v–168r Ammonios, In Int. (excerpt). (ff. 301v-416r) Anal. Post. with 〈Leon Magentenos’〉 (from f. 301r) and 〈Ioannes Philoponos’〉 (from f. 369v) commentaries on book I and II respectively. (ff. 417r–581r) Top. with 〈Leon Magentenos’〉, 〈Alexander of Aphrodisias’〉 (excerpts; the last one on f. 568v) commentaries. (ff. 583v–652r) Soph. El. with 〈Leon Magentenos’〉 (from f. 583r) and Michael of Ephesos’ (from f. 581v; excerpts) commentaries. Blank folia: Ir–IVv, Vv, 137v–138v, 169rv, 219rv, 239v, 297r–300v, 416v, I´r–II´v. Secondary Literature: Brandis 1831, 50; Mercati - Franchi de’ Cavalieri 1923, 313– 317; Ebbesen 1981b, I, 302, 314; ibid. III, 289; Hunger 1990–91, 34; Hunger 1991, 74–75; Kotzabassi 1999, 25, 49, 50–51; Cavallo 2000, 232; Moore 2005, 249, 560; Brunschwig 2007, xlviii (82); Agiotis 2015, 4–5; Brockmann 2019, 219–224; Valente 2021a; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

Vat. gr. 1018*R (= R) 15th c. paper (ff. I, II, 675: parchment) mm 292x215 (f. 221A: mm 130x100; f. 278A: 207x135) ff. II, 675 (+ 1a, 7a, 101 bis, 154a, 221a, 261a, 278a, 421a, 501a, 601a, 633a, 643a) Contents: (ff. Ir–IIr) Signature marks of the codex. (f. IIv) Note in Latin in the inner margin. (f. 1rv) Neophytos Prodromenos, Ἔφοδος συνοπτικὴ τῆς λογικῆς πραγματείας Ἀριστοτέλους. (ff. 2r–8v) Int. with scholia; some of them derive from the relevant commentaries by Leon Magentenos (f. 6v) and Ammonios (from f. 7). (ff. 9r–36r, 69r–70r) David, In Porph. Isag. (ff. 36v–68v) David, In Cat. (ff. 70r–72v) Anonymous text on Int. (ff. 72v–81r) Two anonymous texts on Anal. Pr.: περὶ συλλογιστικῆς τῶν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ σχήμασι (until f. 77r) followed by περὶ μίξεως

LVI | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

συλλογισμῶν καὶ διαφορῶν ὑλῶν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ σχήμασιν. (ff. 81v–82v) Anonymous text on Soph. El. (ff. 84r–90v) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. with diagrams (f. 90v). (ff. 91r–103v) Porphyrios, Isagoge with scholia. (ff. 107r–154Ar) Cat. with the commentaries of 〈Ammonios〉 and 〈Ioannes Philoponos〉 (excerpts until f. 154Ar). (ff. 155r–173r) Int. with marginal scholia. (ff. 174r–175r) Ammonios, In Int. (ff. 175v– 195v) Michael Psellos, In Int. paraphr. (ff. 195v–200v) Michael Psellos (?), Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν. (ff. 203r–205r) Ioannes Philoponos, In Anal. Pr. I and Ps.‐Philoponos, In Anal. Pr. II (ff. 208r–354v) Anal. Pr. with Michael Psellos’(?) Ἔφοδος σύντομος καὶ σαφὴς τῆς εὑρέσεως τῶν συλλογισμῶν τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων (f. 211), the commentaries by Alexander (from f. 272r) and Leon Magentenos (from f. 291v). Two anonymous scribes undertook the task of copying Magentenos’ comments on the second book on ff. 317r–353v (περὶ τῶν ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων τοῦ δευτέρου βιβλίου· ἐξήγησις τοῦ μαγεντηνοῦ; the first scribe wrote ff. 317r–318v while the second scribe¹⁵ wrote ff. 319r–353v (from f. 319r onwards the commentary of Magentenos is copied in the margins of the Aristotelian text). Excerpts from the New Testament can to be found on f. 221Arv. (ff. 355r–472v) Anal. Post. with the commentary of Philoponos on book I; the comments of Ps.‐Philoponos on book II (ff. 449r–480v) are attributed to Magentenos (see above p. XXVIII). On f. 446r an excerpt from Alexander, In Top.; on ff. 446r–447v two individual scholia on Cat.; on f. 447v excerpt from Ps.‐Ammonios, In Anal. Pr. (ff. 482r–599v) Top. with the commentaries by Leon Magentenos (ff. 481r–594v) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (excerpts). (ff. 608r–654v) Soph. El. with the commentary by Michael of Ephesos (ff. 601r–674v); here, the latter work is attributed to Ammonios. Blank folia: Ir, IIr, 5rv, 7v, 83rv, 90r, 104v–106v, 133v, 154Av, 173v, 201r–202v, 205v– 207v, 211v, 221r, 238v, 270v, 286r–287v, 342rv, 445v, 501v, 553v, 599v–600v, 634v. Secondary Literature: Brandis 1831, 52–53; Mercati 1926, 77; Mioni 1976, 311; Ebbesen 1981b, II, xvii, xxxii, xxxvii; III, 290; Cacouros 1998, 188–190, 194; Mondrain 2000, 14; Kotzabassi 2002, 24, 49, 51–53, 56–57; Berger 2005, 141; Bravo - Pérez 2005, 456, 460; Moore 2005, 248, 560; Canart 2008, 52; Cataldi Palau 2008, 203; Muratore 2009, 74 (1); Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII)].

Vat. gr. 1693 (= X) 14th/15th c. paper mm 243x159 ff. VI, 398 Contents: (ff. 1r–19r) 〈Ioannes Damaskenos, Dialectica〉 (excerpts from the recensio fusior). (f. 19v) Single scholion on Soph. El. (ff. 20r–27v) Porphyrios, Isagoge. (ff. 28r–42v) Cat. (f. 42v) Verses attributed to 〈Michael Psellos〉. (ff. 43r–100v) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. (ff. 101r–159r) Ammonios, In Cat. with the commentary of 15 Cf. Cacouros 1998, 189–190; the author suggests that this scribe should be identified with Georgios Tribizias (1423–1485); on Tribizias see RGK, I, n. 73; Liakou-Kropp 2008.

3.1 Manuscripts | LVII

Ioannes Philoponos (excerpts). (f. 159v) A diagram on ἀστρολάβος and a diagram on ἁρμονική. (ff. 160r–204r) Michael Psellos, In Int. paraphr. (ff. 205r–212v) 〈Leon Magentenos〉, In Anal. Pr. II (chapters VII–XΙ copied by an anonymous scribe). (ff. 213r–223r) Int. with scholia (one of them on f. 214v is attributed to Michael Psellos). (f. 223v) Syllogistical diagrams displaying the fourteen valid moods of the three figures and scholia. (ff. 224r–283r) Anal. Pr. with scholia. (ff. 283r–321r) Anal. Post. (f. 321rv) Ioannes Pediasimos on In Anal. Post. (excerpts). (ff. 322r–379r) Top. (ff. 379v–395v) Soph. El. Blank folia: 204v, 280v. Secondary Literature: Gianneli - Canart 1961, 15–18; Kotter 1969, 36; Canart 1979, 55 (239, 241); Moore 2005, 521–22; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

Vat. Reg. gr. 107* (= K) End of 14th c. paper mm 320x260 ff. I, 488, I´ (+ 465a) Contents: (ff. 3r–16r) Porphyrios’ Isagoge with anonymous comments starting from f. 1r. (ff. 18v–56v) Cat. with the commentary by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (from f. 17r). (ff. 58r–92r) Int. with the commentary by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (from f. 57r). (ff. 92v–94r) 〈Michael Psellos (?)〉, Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν. (ff. 97r– 211v) Anal. Pr. with the commentary by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (from f. 95r). The anonymous copyist filled the margins of ff. 172r–210v with Magentenos’ comments on book II (schol. 21–227 with omissions) and inserted excerpted material from 〈Ps.-Philoponos’〉 commentary and from other anonymous sources. (ff. 211v–281r) Anal. Post. with the comments by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (ff. 211r–255r) and 〈Ps.-Philoponos〉 (from f. 255r) on books I and II respectively. (ff. 281r–439r) Top. with the commentary by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 (until f. 438v). (ff. 440r–488v) Soph. El. with the commentary by 〈Michael of Ephesos〉 (ff. 439r–488r). Blank folia: Irv, 16v, 41v, 88v, 94v, 95v, 107v, 198v, I´rv. Secondary Literature: Stevenson 1888, 77; Ebbesen 1981b, III, 289; Kotzabassi 1999, 25, 47 (3); Brockmann 2019, 222–225; Valente 2021a; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

Vat. Reg. gr. 116* (= G) 14th/15th c. paper mm 284x220 Ι, 393, I´ (+ 60, 62, 63, 74, 125: bis) Contents: (f. Ir) Note (in Latin) on the Aristotelian content of the manuscript and signature marks. (ff. 1r, 3r–6v) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. (f. 1v) A diagram on Anal. Pr. I (the so-called pons sinorum; see e.g. Wallies 1905, 274). (ff. 1v–2r) Anonymous prolegomena to the Organon, inc. τὸ ὄργανον τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀριστοτέλους, διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα τὰ τμήματα, des. οἱ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι ἑνὶ μόνω

LVIII | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

τμήματι περιέχονται. A very similar version of this text can be found in Ambr. D 82 sup., f. 39r (13th c.) and in Par. gr. 2062, f. 133r (14th c.). (f. 2r) Ps.‐Alexander’s letter to Aristotle; Ἰωάννου ποιητοῦ τοῦ Βαρβακάλλου verses dedicated to Aristotle; references to the work titles of the corpus aristotelicum; epigram to the Organon; Isaak Argyros on the Organon. (f. 2v) Note concerning Ammonios’ dating. (ff. 7r–24v) Porphyrios, Isagoge with scholia (until f. 24r); one of the scholia is ascribed to the patriarch Photios (f. 13v). (f. 25r) Vita Aristotelis. (f. 25v) Ioannes Philoponos, In Cat. (excerpt). (ff. 26r–27r) Ammonios, In Cat. (excerpts). (ff. 27r–28v) Ammonios, In Int. (excerpts). (f. 28v) Isaac Argyros, In Int. (single scholion). (ff. 29r–58v) Cat. with scholia; one of them is attributed to Photios (f. 42v). (ff. 58v–75v) Int. with scholia. (ff. 75v–77v) 〈Michael Psellos (?)〉, Διδασκαλία σύντομος καὶ σαφεστάτη περὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν (the part on Int.). (ff. 77v–79v) Anonymous compendium on assertoric and nonmodal syllogisms (roughly Anal. Pr. I 4–26). (ff. 79v–80r) Anonymous text on the hypothetical syllogisms. (ff. 80v–82r) Anonymous scholia on Cat., Int. and Anal. Pr. (f. 82r) Prolegomena to Anal. Pr., inc. καὶ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι μὲν τοῦ ἀριστοτέλους, des. ἐφ’ ἑξῆς δ’ ἡμῖν τῆς κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν ἐξηγήσεως ῥητέον ἄν εἴη. (ff. 82r–82v) An anonymously transmitted abridged version of Michael Psellos’ (?) Περὶ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων τῶν συλλογισμῶν. (ff. 83r–86v) An anonymous treatise Περὶ συλλογισμοῦ.¹⁶ (ff. 87r–171r) Anal. Pr. with the commentary by Philoponos 2 (see p. XLIX) (on f. 145v the prooimion by 〈Leon Magentenos〉, In Anal. Pr. II); scholia ascribed to Isaac Argyros (ff. 89v, 162v); an explanation of a diagram on Anal. Pr. which is attributed to a certain Alousianos (f. 133rv; f. 133r: ἐξήγησις εἰς τὸ περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων διάγραμμα· τοῦ ἀλουσιάνου). (ff. 174v–227v) Anal. Post. with an anonymous commentary (ff. 172r–173v, 204v–227v). (ff. 233r–342v) Top. with an anonymous commentary (ff. 230v–341v). (ff. 342v–392v) Soph. El. with an anonymous commentary (ff. 343r–387v). (f. 393r) Anal. Pr. with scholia. Blank folia: Iv, 171v, 228r–230r, 232v, 392v, I´rv. Secondary Literature: Brandis 1831, 51–52; Stevenson 1888, 81–83; Wallies 1905, xv–xvii; Ebbesen 1981b, I, 291; ibid. III, 289; Kotzabassi 1999, 25, 47 (3); Moore 2005 240, 249; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

Vat. Urb. gr. 35R (= U) Before 902/903 parchment mm 270x215 (ff. 247, 272, 329–332: mm 270 x ca. 120; the outer margins of these folia were cut off) ff. I, 441, I´ (+ 380a–f)

16 There are three versions of this text attibuted either to Neilos Kabasilas (ca. 1300 – 1363), or to his nephew, Nikolaos Chamaetos Kabasilas (1319/1323 – after 1391); see Agiotis 2021c. On the Latin translation of the text which is ascribed to Neilos Kabasilas, see p. LXI.

3.1 Manuscripts |

LIX

Contents: (ff. 1r–2v) Division‐diagrams related to Porphyrios, Isagoge, a short text on the six definitions of philosophy and a prooemion to the following work. (ff. 3r–20v) Porphyrios, Isagoge with scholia and pertinent diagrams (f. 21r). (ff. 22r– 54v) Cat. with comments (from 21v). (ff. 54v–74v) Int. with scholia. Some of these are attributed to Olympiodoros, one to Michael of Ephesos. A few scholia derive from 〈Michael Psellos, In Int. paraphrasis〉 and many are closely related to Ammonios’ and Stephanos’ commentaries. (ff. 75r–192v) Anal. Pr. with abstracts from Ioannes Philoponos’ and Ps.‐Philoponos’ commentaries on Anal. Pr. I and II respectively, as well as abstracts from an anonymous commentary containing an interpolated, earlier version of Leon Magentenos’ scholia (for the comments on book II see ff. 147r–192v). (ff. 193r–264r) Anal. Post. with scholia. (ff. 265r–399v) Top. with scholia mostly on books VI–VII. (ff. 400r–441r) Soph. El. with 〈Leon Magentenos’〉 commentary (excerpts); in the margins of ff. 440v–441r and on f. 441v an excerpt from Michael Psellos, 〈Εἰς τὸ ‘ἐὰν δὲ λεγόντων ἡμῶν’〉. Blank folia: 264v, 299v, 328v. Secondary Literature (indicative): Stornajolo 1895, 41–43; Ross 1957, 87–92; Minio-Paluello 1964, v–ix; Brunschwig 1967, passim; Follieri 1969, 28–32; Harlfinger 1971, 43 (3), 49; Follieri 1973–74; Tarán 1978, xxv–xli; Ebbesen 1981b, III, 71, 75, 289; Williams 1984, passim; Share 1994, passim; Brockmann 2004, 51; Moore 2005, 161; Rashed 2005; Ebert - Nortmann 2007, 176–178; Brunschwig 2007, passim; Weidemann 2014, ix–x et passim; Agiotis 2015, 3, 19–47; Valente 2018, 112–113; Valente 2021a; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII); DVL (link on p. XXII).

Vind. Phil. gr. 208 (= L) Second half of 15th c. paper mm 215/220x150/155 ff. Ι, 144 Contents: (ff. 1r–8v) Georgios Gemistos Plethon, De virtutibus. (f. 9rv) Plethon, De differentiis (excerpt). (ff. 9v–16r) Xenophon, De republica Lacedaemoniorum. (ff. 17r–115r) 〈Philoponos 2〉, In Anal. Pr. (see p. XLIX). Comments on book I: ff. 17r– 100r, 111rv, 112v, 114r–115r; the prooimion by 〈Leon Magentenos〉 on book II: f. 101r; comments on book II: ff. 101v–110v, 113r. (ff. 116r–120v) 〈Libanios〉, Declamationes (n. 28). (ff. 121r–122v) Notes concerning calendar issues. (ff. 123r–134) Galen, In Hippocratis librum de victu acutorum (excerpts). Blank folia: 16v, 100v–100/4r, 112r, 113v–113/3v, 115v–115/2r, 135rv. Secondary Literature: Hunger 1961, 317; Stefec 2013, 224–225; Pinakes (link on p. XXIII).

LX | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II

3.2 Printed Editions Trincavelli’s Editio Princeps (= t) Ἰωάννου Γραμματικοῦ τοῦ Φιλοπόνου εἰς τὰ Πρότερα ἀναλυτικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, ὑπόμνημα. Μαγεντινοῦ σχόλια εἰς τὰ αὐτά. Σύνοψις περὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν. Ioan. Gram. Philoponi comentaria (sic) in Priora analytica Aristotelis. Magentini comentaria in eadem. Libellus de syllogismis. Privilegio Senatus Veneti cautum est, nequis hosce libros per decennium impune, aut imprimat, aut alibi impressos in hac civitate, vel aliis Veneto imperio subditis vendat, MDXXXVI.¹⁷ Contents: (ff. IIIr–LXXXXIIIIv) Ioannes Philoponos, In Anal. Pr. I (ff. LXXXXIIIIv– CXIXv) Ps.‐Philoponos, In Anal. Pr. II (ff. Ir–XXXXIv) Leon Magentenos, In Anal. Pr. (ff. XXXIr–XXXXIr: the comments on book II). (ff. XXXXIIr–XXXXVv) The last section of this volume includes three essays printed together under the title Ἀνωνύμου σύνοψις περὶ συλλογισμῶν (the given title is probably due to the fact that the first essay begins with ‘Τῆς συνόψεως τῶν συλλογισμῶν στοχαζόμενοι’): (a) on categorical syllogisms (ends in f. XXXXIIIIv.18); on hypothetical syllogisms (ends in f. XXXXVr.9 and is followed by a table presenting six kinds of hypothetical syllogisms); (b) again on the categorical syllogisms (ends in f. XXXXVv). The first essay is in some cases ascribed to either Georgios Choiroboskos, or Michael Psellos,¹⁸ whereas Laur. 71.33, ff. 145v–146v transmit a slightly shorter version of the text on the hypothetical syllogisms under the name of Magentenos.¹⁹ The fact that all three essays were edited together must be a reflection of the manner in which they were copied in the manuscript that Trincavelli used for his edition.

Rasari’s Translation into Latin (= r1 ) Magentini in Priores Aristotelis resolut. explanatio Ioanne Baptista Rasario interprete. Cautum Privilegiis, Summi Pontificis, ac illustrissi Senatus Veneti, nequis hunc librum in aliquo suae diotiones loco imprimat, aut alibi impressum vendere audeat. Venetiis apud Hieronymum Scotum, MDXXXXIIII.²⁰ Contents: Anal. Pr. II alternating with the commentary by Leon Magentenos on pp. 47–67, in two columns.

17 Editorial note on f. XXXXVv: ‘Venetiis in aedibus Bartholomaei Zanetti Casterzagensis, aere vero, et diligentia Ioannis Francisci Trincavelli. Anno a partu Virginis. MDXXXVI. Mense Aprili’. See the digitised copy of MDZ (link on p. XXII). On Marc. gr. 231 and 235 as possible templates for Philoponos’ text in this edition, see Wallies 1905, xxiii–xiv and Sicherl 1993, 58–61 respectively. 18 Moore 2005, 248–249, PHI.20. 19 See p. XXVIII. 20 See the digitised copy of MDZ (link on p. XXII).

3.3 The Text’s Genealogy

| LXI

The Second Edition of Rasari’s Translation (= r2 ) Ammonius in Porphyrii institutionem. Magentinus in librum Aristotelis De interpretatione. Magentinus in Priora analytica Nili De ratiocinationibus libellus. Georgii Pachymerii Epitome in universam Aristotelis artem differendi. Ioanne Baptista Rasario interprete. Ex eiusdem interpretis recognitione. Lugduni apud Sebastianum Gryphium, MDXLVII.²¹ Contents: (pp. 3–54) Ammonios, In Porph. Isag. (pp. 55–102) Ps.‐Magentenos (?), In Int. (pp. 103–226) Anal. Pr. alternating with the commentary of Leon Magentenos (pp. 188–226: book II). (pp. 227–261) Georgios Pachymeres, In Arist. Organon paraphr. (pp. 262–270.2) The Latin translation of a brief treatise On Syllogisms attributed to Neilos Kabasilas.²² (pp. 270.3–278) A short essay on the Organon (Porphyrios’ Isagoge, Cat., Int., Anal. Pr. I 2–6, Soph. El.) which was printed together with Kabasilas’ work.

3.3 The Text’s Genealogy The Direct Tradition: Hyparchetypes V and D Manuscript V is written on oriental paper folded in quarto;²³ the codex is traditionally dated to the thirteenth century (see p. XXXIV). As for systematic presentation of palaeographical features, however, Herbert Hunger points towards similarities between the second ductus of the scribe²⁴ and that of state documents in the eleventh century,²⁵ and dates the codex to the twelfth century.²⁶ Furthermore, Guglielmo Cavallo has highlighted the bureaucratic connotations of the script in the codex (‘scritture …ricche di connotazioni burocratiche’) and so also dated it to the twelfth century.²⁷ We may add that hands similar to V can be found in Vat. gr. 65 (before 1063), Vat. Barb. gr. 369 (end of 11th c.),²⁸ Vat. gr. 504 (1105),²⁹ Vat. gr. 586 (1124),³⁰ Laur. 74.18 (scribe Ioan21 See the digitised copy of MDZ (link on p. XXII). 22 See p. LVIII. 23 Later additions of western-paper folia are only few and easy to distinguish; e.g. the binio at the end of the codex (ff. 297–300) bearing a watermark similar with Briquet 1977, n. 6292 (1509/10). For the characteristics of the oriental paper see Irigoin 1950, 134–136. 24 See ff. 521v main text of Top. and i. m. ext., scholion ρκε΄, l. 15 – 522v, 530v i. m. ext., scholion ρπθ΄ – 531v. 25 Hunger 1990–91, 34. 26 Hunger 1991, 74–75. 27 Cavallo 2000, 232. 28 Canart - Perria 1991, 79; Cavallo 2000, 231. 29 I am thankful to Inmaculada Pérez Martín for drawing my attention to the codex Vat. gr. 504 and for suggesting that V might be dated to the Komnenian period. See also Canart - Peria 1991, 80–81, 101; RGK III, n. 313; Canart 1998, t. 38 n. 53. 30 Devreesse 1937, 512–513; RGK III, n. 460.

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nikios; second quarter of the 12th c.)³¹ and Vat. gr. 1903 (end of 12th c.?).³² Therefore further palaeographical investigation is required to resolve the question of V’s dating. V transmits overall better readings than D (see below p. LXIV) and probably contains the whole of the commentary on Anal. Pr. II.³³ The text layout of the Vatican manuscript is characterised by its symmetry.³⁴ The scribe leaves a few folia empty before each treatise of the Organon.³⁵ This he does in order to later add the corresponding prooemia or introductory material. He always attempts to adequately arrange the space left for scholia on a given passage.³⁶ The second ductus, which was mentioned above, is principally employed for editorial interventions which occur throughout the codex. Specifically, these are corrections of the main text,³⁷ additional marginal scholia (which were afterwards inserted in the main text of the commentary in the descendants of V)³⁸ and diagrams.³⁹ Magentenos’ comments are copied onto the upper, lower and outer margins of the Organon, to which Greek numbers are supplied, connecting them with the text. The enumeration of scholia was carried out by the copyist himself as is occasionally implied in his notes⁴⁰ and corrections.⁴¹ Moreover, there are comments whose Greek numbers are not added in the Aristotelian text,⁴² scholia numbered by later hands⁴³ as well as omissions or repetitions of numbers.⁴⁴ At any rate,

31 Bandini 1770, 120–121; RGK II, n. 283; Cavallo 2000, 232. On Ioannikios see Wilson 1983; Brockmann 2008. On the date of his activities see Vuillemin-Diem Rashed 1997, 176–178. 32 Cavallo 2000, 232; cf. Canart 1970, 615–616; Canart - Perria 1991, 81. 33 The text is incomplete and ends on f. 296v: Anal. Pr. II 27, 70b37 ἀντι[στρέφει; the missing part was added by a later hand on f. 297r. 34 Ebbesen 1981b, I, 314–316. 35 As regards the text of the Top. in V, Brunschwig 2007, XLVIII (82) suggests that Par. Coisl. 330 was most likely the exemplar of V. On the exegetical material used by the scribe in the case of the Anal. Post. see Brockmann 2019, 220–221; Valente 2021a. 36 See the editorial note concerning the recto side on f. 302r i. m. inf. (Anal. Post.): ‘ἐπιχειρήσας προστιθέναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δυσὶ τμήμασι τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς τὰ εὑρεθέντα εἰς σαφήνειαν πλείονα, κατέλιπον τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ τὸ τῶν τετραδίων στενὸν οὐ συνεχώρησεν’. See also Valente 2021a. 37 For Anal. Pr. II see ff. 255r s.l. 15, 258r s.l. 3. 38 For Anal. Pr. II see ff. 253v, 256r, 258r, 259r, 262r, 263rv, 277r, 279r, 281v, 282v, 285rv, 288v, 290v, 291r–292v, 294rv. 39 For Anal. Pr. II see ff. 241v–242v, 246v–247r, 253v–255v, 259r, 263v, 269v, 274v, 281rv, 282v, 285r, 291rv, 294v. 40 See f. 158r i. m. ext.: ‘τὰ σημεῖα τῶν ἑρμηνειῶν ἐτέθησαν ἄλλων ἄλλως ἀπὸ σφάλματα τοῦ ἀντιγράφου:– πρῶτον οὖν ὀφείλεις ἀναγνῶναι τὸ οε΄ εἶτα τὸ οδ΄’. 41 On f. 160v i. m. inf., for instance, at the end of scholion π΄, the scribe erases a few words and then copies them on the upper margin of f. 161 as the beginning of a new scholion with the number πα΄. See also the refererences to inconsistencies or different layers of commenting in the two hyparchetypes on p. LXV. 42 Comments 83, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96, 117, 124, 141, 157, 170, 172, 188, 226. 43 Comments 49, 50, 51, 70, 73, 123, 192, 193, 194. 44 The scribe omits numbers οζ΄ and ροζ΄ of Anal. Pr. I and II respectively, whereas the scholia ο΄–οστ΄ of the first book (ff. 163–166) should have been numbered ρ΄–ρστ΄.

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the numbering of Magentenos’ scholia in the Vatican manuscript does not always follow the same pattern. Sometimes numbering is introduced according to books or even smaller sections. On other occasions, enumeration runs sequentially through whole treatises, from beginning to end.⁴⁵ A second layer of additions⁴⁶ is attached to the Aristotelian text by means of various reference symbols.⁴⁷ Alexios Solymas finished copying D on 15th July 1272 according to the colophon on f. 203r.⁴⁸ It seems that the codex was later to the possession of Ioannes Chortasmenos.⁴⁹ Solymas makes no effort to distinguish between what belongs to Magentenos and what does not. In many cases, the scribe does not even take the trouble to mark the beginning or the end of a given scholion. He did, however, intend to add many of the initial letters later, since he occasionally left space for that purpose. Whenever they are added, the initial letter are copied with red ink. Magentenos’ commentary is copied in D anonymously and is incomplete.⁵⁰ There are more diagrams attached to the scholia than in V (see p. LXXXIX). In some cases the text in V has been augmented (or simplified in D): 3.8 post ΔΖ add. πλατύτερον ἐκεὶ περὶ τούτων ἕξεις τὴν μέθοδον V : – D 3.23 ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ οὐδείς D : καὶ πάλιν τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ· τὸ (τῶ a.c.) Γ παντὶ τῶ Β· καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶ Β· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐδεὶς ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτήν, καὶ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῶ Α· καὶ τὸ μὲν Α οὐδενὶ τῶ Β συνήχθη διὰ τῶν ληφθησῶν προτάσεων· τὸ δὲ Β οὐδενὶ τῶ Α διὰ τὴς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος V 4.7 post ἀντιστραφήσεται add. πρὸς τὴν πᾶς· εἰς τὴν τὶς εἰς τὴν οὐδεὶς ἢ εἰς ἑαυτήν V :–D 10.2–4 ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου, ἤγουν τοῦ Α, ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ λογικῷ, οὐ δῆλον γέγονεν διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἤγουν ἡ μείζων πρότασις, ἡ V : ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου ὅρου τοῦ Α· τὸ ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ λογικῶ, συνήχθην ἀπὸ μείζονος πρότασεως τῆς D 12.5–7 ἤγουν πλὴν οὐ γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν, ἤγουν διὰ προτάσεως ἀποδεδειγμένης ἔκ τινος συλλογισμοῦ V : ἤγουν οὐ διὰ προτάσεως ἀποδεδειγμένης ἔκ τινος συλλογισμοῦ, συνάγεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου D 24.14 οἱ τὴν ἀστρονομίαν συστήσαντες V : οἱ ἀστρονόμοι D 27.6 πειρᾶται εἰπεῖν V : λέγει D

45 See Mercati - Franchi de’ Cavalieri 1923, 313–317. 46 Many of these comments derive from the commentary written by Ps.‐Philoponos, In Anal. Pr. II. 47 On reference marks in Greek manuscripts see e.g. Atsalos 1991, 211–231; McNamee 1992, 28–48; Agiotis 2016; Valente 2021b. 48 Turyn 1972, I, 22–23; II, 222c, d; below p. 205. 49 Turyn 1972, I, 23. 50 The part of the text from scholion 211.8 πάλιν until the end of the comments on Anal. Pr. II is missing. The possibility that D transmits a shorter version of the commentary should be excluded. There follows no analysis of positive syllogisms, although they are mentioned beside hypothetical syllogisms at the beginning of the scholion (schol. 211.2).

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27.12–13 τὸ μὴ ὂν ἄνθρωπος V : τοῦτο D 27.16 τὰς προτάσεις καὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα D : ἃ εἴπομεν περὶ τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος V 30.5 πειρᾶται δεῖξαι V : δείκνυσι D 33.2 ὡς εἴπομεν V : om. D 50.2 τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον V : τὴν ἀντιφατικὴν D 50.3 τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον V : τὴν ἀντιφατικὴν D 86.4 post τρεῖς add. ἀριθμοὺς V : – D 103.4–6 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύκλω δείξεως. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ κύκλω δεῖξις καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖσθαι ταὐτὰ εἶναι V : καὶ ταυτὰ εἶναι D Similar augmentations are also true for the text in D: 2.14 post μέσος add. ἑνὶ τῶν ἄκρων ὑποκείμενος γίνεται και D : – V 3.31 post οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει add. ὡρισμένως πρός τι D : – V 3.31 post οὐ συνάγεται add. ἐπὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ καὶ ἀποφατικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ D : – V 10.7–8 ἤγουν τοῦ λογικοῦ D : om. V 11.2–3 τούτου ἐστί V : τοῦτο ἐστίν, ἤγουν τοῦ β΄ σχήματος· ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ D 88.1 ἀντίφασιν ἐνταῦθα V : ἱστέον ὅτι ἐνταῦθα ἀντίφασιν D 168.3 post Β add. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ D : – V It can be concluded that V and D share a common ancestor as is indicated by the following conjunctive errors in scholia which are not transmitted by the interpolated version of Magentenos’ commentary in U (see p. LXXIII): 31.11 ἐστί correxi : εἶναι VD 115.7 ἀντικειμένων correxi : κειμένων VD 151.1 τετραπλάσιον correxi : τετραπλάσια VD 179.5 ἔστιν … ἔστιν … ἔστι correxi : εἰ … εἰ … εἰ VD 192.1 διὰ πάντων scripsi cum Sαβ : δι’ ἁπάντων VD There are also variants in V and D which are similar probably due to their common ancestor: 24.5 ἡ γεωμετρία, ἡ ἀστρονομία correxi : ἡ φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς· τὸ περὶ οὐρανοῦ τὰ μετέωρα· ἡ γεωμετρία· ἡ ἀστρονομία V : ἡ φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις· τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς· τὸ περὶ οὐρανοῦ· ἡ γεωμετρία· ἡ ἀστρονομία· τὰ μετέωρα D 119.2 ἀσύμμετρος correxi : σύμμετρος V : ὡς σύμμετρος D The two texts are independed of each other. There are ‘saut du même au même’ errors (homoeoteleuta) in V when compared to the correct readings in D: 10.1–2 ἤγουν – μέσου D : om. V 27.14–15 ζῴου δὲ – εἰδῶν D : om. V 114.1–2 Δι’ ἀδυνάτου – ὑποθέσει D : om. V 153.24 διότι – ἐστι D : om. V

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Similarly, there are errors (homoeoteleuta / homoeoarcton*) in D when compared against correct readings in V: 7.3–4 διὰ – συμπεράσματα V : om. D 13.1–2 ἔσται – ἐκεῖ V : om. D 15.3 πᾶν ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν V : om. D 81.5–6* ἢ τὸ – καὶ πᾶς V : om. D 93.2–3 διότι – ἐστι V : om. D 126.1 λόγος – ψευδὴς V : om. D 150.3–5 οὐχ – γωνίας V : om. D 157.9 καὶ2 – οἶδεν V : om. D 157.17–19 τετραγώνου1 – ΑΒΓΔ V : om. D 157.26–28 διπλάσιόν ἐστι – τετράγωνον1 V : om. D 186.5 καὶ – χαρίζεσθαι V : om. D Furthermore, there exists a special category of variants. Clearly, owing to inconsistencies or different layers of commenting that already existed in the archetype, the sequence of scholia in both hyparchetypes does not always correspond to the passage order within Anal. Pr. II. There are four types of such inconsistencies (see also p. LXXXI): – Scholia or glosses with the same, but wrong sequential position in V ante correcturam and D. The scribe of V sometimes recognised the errors. Although he initially recorded that some of these scholia belonged to Magentenos’ text (that is, he gave them Greek numbers), he then corrected himself by erasing the scholia at their original location and rewrote them in margine or inter lineas in their proper place. In most cases, he ‘reattached’ the scholion to the Aristotelian text by using a symbol instead of a number (see above p. LXII). – Scholia forming a single item in V ante correcturam and/or D. – Scholia or glosses with different sequencing in V and D. – Scholia or glosses omitted in either V or D. Table 1 includes a specimen (comments 135–150; see p. LXVI) of the scholia clutter that exists in both V and D, as well as its evolution in the later manuscript tradition. At the same time, the arrangement in Table 1 may function as a preliminary account of the relations between manuscripts.

LXVI | 3 The Transmission of Magentenos’ Commentary on Anal. Pr. II Table 1: Sequence of scholia 135–150 V a.c.

V p.c.

S

FE

K

PYM

X

Dtr1 r2

135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 a3 **136 138 138 138 138 140 135 140 *138 143 141 141 141 a1 143 a5 **139 a3 144 a3 147 141 a8 a6 *141 146 a5 140 148 a3 144 143 a3 148 a6 a5 149 a4 145 144 140 149 140 a6 140 a7 146 145 a5 147 143 143 a3 a5 148 146 a6 136 144 144 a5 a6 149 148 143 137 145 145 143 140 150 149 144 138 146 146 a6 143 a8 145 139 147 147 144 a8 147 146 141 148 148 145 144 136 *147 a3 149 149 146 145 137 148 a5 a8 a8 150 146 138 149 a6 150 150 148 139 a8 149 a2 141 150 150 a8 150 * = in margine; ** = inter lineas; a1–8 = glosses attached to Leon’s comments a1 = on Anal. Pr. II 21, 66b23 εἰ – 24 μηδενί a2 = on b26–27 πάλιν – συστοιχίας a3 = on b27–28 οἷον – τῷ Β a4 = on b30–31 ἆρ’ οὖν – 31τούτων a5 = on b31– ἐπίσταμαι – πως a6 = on b33 ὅ πως a7 = on b34–35 Ἐπὶ – λεχθέντος a8 = on 67a8 ὁμοία – ἀπάτη

The Descendants of V Manuscript S S and Par. Coisl. 170 were copied by the same scribe and might together have comprised a single edition of Magentenos’ commentaries on the Organon.⁵¹ S has been occasionally supplemented with section titles or lemmata, but overall it is an excellent copy of V. The text in S bears none of the errors in the rest of the direct tradition (manuscripts FEK, PYMR, X; see below), whereas it transmits all the errors of V beside its own separative errors: 3.26 Β1 V : om. S 3.29 μόνον V : μένον S 51 See Ebbesen 1981b, III, 75–76.

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3.30 ἄρα V : om. S 70.1–2 ἐναντίον iter. S 74. 2 γένηται post σχήματι transp. S : – V 81.5–6 ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν – ἀποφατική V : om. S ex homoeoteleuto 94.1 μὴ V : om. S 145.9 ἐναντίον V : om. S 155.3 ἔχει V : om. S α and Manuscripts FEK The dependance of FEK on V through an intermediary common ancestor has been suggested by eminent scholars in previous editions of Magentenos’ commentaries.⁵² As one of them remarks, the scribe of α ‘very rarely commited an error’.⁵³ It is indeed so; I was able to assume the existence of α on the basis of the following readings (on manuscripts β [= PYMR] and X see below). 28.3 δηλονότι οὐσῶν V : οὐσῶν δηλονότι FE : δηλονότι post ἡγουμένου transp. K (δηλονότι must have been supplemented supra lineam in α) 40.1 τὴν2 VSβ : om. α 60.2 αὐτῇ post ἀντικείμενον transp. FE (αὐτ῀ F) : om. K (αὐτῇ must have been supplemented supra lineam in α) : – VSβ 81.5 καθόλου ἀποφατική VSβ : ἀποφατικὴ καθόλου α 141.2 ὑπάρχει post ἀμπέλῳ transp. α : – VSPYM (schol. om. X) 153.19 τοῦ2 VSPYM (schol. om. R) : om. α : deest in X 176.6 ἤγουν VSβ : om. α 182.1 εἰ VSβ : εἰς α 184.8 τὸ αἱρετὸν … τῷ αἱρετῷ VSβ : τῷ αἱρετῷ … τὸ αἱρετὸν α 184.10 τῷ ὅλῳ ante τὸ ὅλον transp. α : – VSβ That being said, the dependance of E on F and the provenance of both F and K from V can be confirmed in the case of the commentary on Anal. Pr. too. The main text and comments in K were copied by two different scribes working together (see, for instance, f. 203v) probably towards the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁵⁴ At the beginning of Anal. Pr. II, the second scribe copies scholia by Ps.‐Philoponos, which he then mingles and eventually replaces with Magentenos’ own work (scholia 21–227 with omissions; some of them are due to scholia missing

52 Ebbesen 1981b, III, 76–78 and Kotzabassi 1999, 52–56 where this text bears the siglum ‘p’. See also Brockmann 2019, 222; Valente 2021a. 53 Ebbesen 1981b, III, 76. 54 This can be attested by examining of the watermarks. On the watermarks of ff. 13, 31 see Mošin Traljić 1957, n. 1968 (1393). Mošin - Traljić 1957, n. 1072 (1385/1400) is very similar to the watermark of f. 22.

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from V). The copyist also employed this method in other works in K as well.⁵⁵ Further, K transmits errors when compared to correct readings of FE: 24.16 ἀστέρα FE : om. K 24.18 post αὐτῶν add. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων K : – FE 153.3 γνῶσιν FE : τέχνην K 153.28 post Β2 add. ὅλω K : – FE 160.2 Β2 FE : A K 161.1 οὖν FE : γοῦν K 211.10 ante ἐπιστήμη add. δύναμις καὶ K : – FE 211.12 ἐπιστητόν FE : αἰσθητόν K 212.10 κατασκευάζει FE : παρασκευάζει K 212.10 κατασκευάζων FE : παρασκευάζων K Beside strikingly similar layout with F, E transmits separative errors not found in F (and K): 1.11–12 ὁ διαλεκτικὸς οὐ λαμβάνει F : οὐ (δια– eras.)λαμβάνει ὁ διαλεκτικός E 24.3 γνῶναι μόνον F : μόνον γνῶναι E 25.2 ἔν τισι γὰρ τούτων θεωρεῖται τὸ ζῷον F : om. K 27.14 εἶναι post ἄνθρωπον transp. E : – F 118.2–3 συνάγοντος F : εἰσάγοντος E 121.6–7 εἰ δὲ – ἀδύνατον iter. E 127.14 ὁ ἐρωτῶν post μέλλει transp. E : – F 134.6 post ψευδῶς add. τὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν E : – F 134.16 εἶχεν post χειρὶ transp. E : – F 153.28 παντὶ ante τῷ Γ transp. Ε : – F I was not able to find any separative errors in F with regard to the respective correct readings in K. A dependance of K on F, however, should be excluded because of the different sequential position (and omissions) of scholia in the two manuscripts (see p. LXVI, Table 1). Finally, there are additional errors in F (and E) against the correct readings of V (and the rest of the tradition). Nevertheless, there is no way to tell whether these errors were originally commited in F or α, since K does not transmit the respective scholia. 2.3 εἴδη post συλλογισμῶν transp. FE : – V 3.9 ζητεῖν post προτάσεις transp. FE: – V 7.5 ἕτερον V : om. FE

55 Ebbesen 1981b, III, 77.

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β and Manuscripts PYMR PYMR transmit the errors contained in V, but the separative errors of α or S (or X; see below). The manuscripts PYR are related with the editorial work of Neophytos Prodromenos (second half of 14th c.)⁵⁶ and share similar features, notably text layout, ornamental elements and diagrams. The omission of scholia 36, 147, 165, 199, as well as the following conjunctive errors in PYMR indicate that β is their common ancestor. 2.31 δοιάζει VSFED : ἐνδοιάζει β : deest in KX 28.1 δύο πρὸς ἄλληλα VSαD : πρὸς ἄλληλα δύο τινά β : deest in X 49.10 post προτάσεων add. ἀνάπαλιν ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ χρώμενοι καὶ κατασκευάζομεν τὴν ἑτέραν β 184.17 ἀληθὲς ἄρα τὸ τὴν ὑγείαν εἶναι μεῖζον αἱρετόν VSαD : om. β : deest in X 186.4 προδηλωτικόν VSαD : πρῶτον δηλωτικόν β : deest in X 201.8 post ταύτης add. τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον β (P s.l.) : – VSαD : deest in X It seems that the text in β has occasionally been slightly augmented or syntactically modified. A few examples (beside β are mentioned only manuscripts which transmit the following scholia): 41.1–2 ἤγουν τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως VSFED : ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι τὸ μὲν κατηγορικὸν τὸ καθόλου οὐ δείκνυται διὰ τοῦτου τοῦ τρόπου, ἤγουν τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως, τὸ δὲ στερητικὸν ἔστι δεῖξαι β 84.3 post ἡδονή2 add. ἢ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν β : – VSαD 174.1 post οὐδενὶ add. τῷ Α, ἤγουν τὸ γελαστικόν β : – VSFED 191.2 ante δηλονότι add. καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει καὶ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ μέσον, ἤγουν ὁ μέσος ὅρος β : – VSαD 196.1–2 τούτου δὲ πίστις καὶ δεῖξις, ἤγουν τῆς ΑΒ προτάσεως, γίνεται ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἤγουν τοῦ Δ VSαD : τούτου δέ, ἤγουν τῆς ΑΒ προτάσεως, τουτέστιν τοῦ εἶναι κακὸν πρὸς ὁμόρους ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον, πίστις καὶ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἤγουν τοῦ Δ, τουτέστι Θηβαῖοι κατὰ Φωκέων ἐπανῃρημένοι μαχέσασθαι ἄμφω διεφθάρησαν β Later additions of scholia in the margins of V are usually noted by means of the indication ‘σχόλιον’ in the margins of PYR. R may be dated later than PY,⁵⁷ it omits large chunks of the commentary and contains repetitions of text: e.g. (a) scholia 117.4 τῆς – 125, 134.19 ἀγνοῶμεν – 150.10 γινώσκει, 153.21 ἐπιστήμῃ – 165 are omitted; (b) scholion 112 was copied twice (ff. 336rv and 343v; in the latter case the text ends at 112.5 καὶ2 ). Titles and lemmata in R are much shorter than in PYM. Diagrams in R’s margins are drawn less carefully than in the case of PY. The close relation of PYM to each

56 Cacouros 1998, 187–95; Mondrain 2000, 13–14, 16–17. 57 See the watermark of f. 33 which is very similar to Briquet 1977, n. 7369 (1424).

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other, as well as the independence of PYM and R from one another are evident from the following readings too. Separative errors of R against correct readings of PYM: 2.13 ποιεῖ τὸ πρῶτον PYM : τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖ R 3.9 περὶ PYM : om. R 7.4 πλείονα PYM : om. R 7.22 τὸ ἀναίσθητον παντὶ ἀψύχω καὶ PYM : om. R 10.3–4 διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ – οὐ προαποδέδεικται PYM : om. R 27.1 διδάξας PYM : δείξας R 94.1 γένος τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ἐστί PYM : ἐστι post γένος transp. R 94.2 πολλοὶ τρόποι PYM : τρόποι πολλοὶ R Separative errors of PYM against correct readings of R: 3.19 τὸ A ἄρα R : τὸ ἄρα Α PYM 7.16 post ἀποφατικοῦ add. συλλογισμοῦ PYM : — R D. Reinsch has already demonstrated that the Parisinus was used as the template for the Vaticanus.⁵⁸ From P’s watermarks it can be inferred that it was probably copied towards the end of the fourteenth century.⁵⁹ Y exhibits the errors of P and has its own separative errors, which are to be found also in M. Examples of errors of YM against correct readings of P (R omits the relevant scholia) and a couple of supra lineam additions in P which were later inserted in the text of YM: 155.10 συνελογίσατο P : συνελογίζετο YM 157.15 ἕτερον P : om. YM 157.16 καὶ ἐκ τῆς ΒΘ P : om. YM 153.30 ante τῷ ἐξωγκωμένην add. τῶ Γ P s.l., YM 155.5 post συμβαίνει add. καὶ P s.l., YM M was copied⁶⁰ at the request and expense (f. 298v: ‘προστάγματι καὶ δαπάνῃ’) of the diplomat and humanist Albertus Pius (1475–1550). As for Magentenos’ scholia, M contains the same text as PY, but not the diagrams or the Anal. Pr. Separative errors of M against correct readings of Y: 134.19 οἷον Y : οἷος M 153.12 ἐν τῷ Y : οὕτω M 153.18 ὅπερ Y : ὥσπερ M

58 See the online description of the CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII). 59 Briquet 1977, n. 797 (1390/99) is very similar with the watermark of the ff. 159, 161, 163–165, 167, 172, 178, 180. 60 De Gregorio - Eleuteri 1993, 159 suggests that the same scribe copied Mut. gr. α.V.6.5 (198), 104r–115r and Vat. Ott. gr. 76 from f. 219r.

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157.23 τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν τετραγώνου Y : τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτῷ τετραγώνῳ M 160.2 ὑπολαμβάνει Y : ὑπολαμβάνον M 160.3–4 ἔσται – ἀνδρίας Y : om. M A few common or obviously related readings between D and β may indicate interpolation in β. 3.11 ἐξοιασδήτινος VSFE : ἐξοιασδήποτε Dβ : deest in KX 7.16 συναχθήσεται VSFE : συναχθήσονται Dβ : deest in KX 7.20 ἄρα Dβ : om. VSFE : deest in KX 65.9 ἄνθρωπον ζῷον VSα : ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον DPRY : ἄνθρωπον ζῶον εἶναι Μ : deest in X 201.12 ἐγγυτέρα α : ἐγγτρ ´ V : ἐγγυτέρω S : ἐγγύτερον Dβ Manuscript X X transmits chapters VII–XΙ with omissions. It exhibits the same errors as V and has its own separative errors. The most critical of the separative errors, however, is the omission of scholia present in two facing folia in V (ff. 280v–281r = 134.19 οἷον – 141). We may therefore infer that X depends on V.

D, the Editio Princeps and the Latin Translation of the Commentary on Anal. Pr. II The works of Leon Magentenos stirred the interest of editors many times during the sixteenth century. Within a period of just 44 years a commentary on Int. ascribed to Magentenos was published five times, while his commentary on the Anal. Pr. three times (see also pp. XXVII, XXIX). This remarkable editorial activity was in all probability due to the philosophical debate among Aristotelians in Padua in this period.⁶¹ At any rate, the text of the first edition of the commentary on Anal. Pr. by Vittore Trincavelli (1496–1568) was reliant on the text of the Ambrosianus, since the former transmits all the errors of the latter. The editor intervenes only to add the author’s identity, the title of the commentary and occasionally section titles, lemmata and insignificant corrections. Fewer than 10 years later, Giovanni Rasari (1517–1578) did not hide his enthusiasm when translating the Greek edition into Latin (Venice 1544).⁶² The translation of both texts (Anal. Pr. and commentary of Magentenos) is printed in two columns, with the two texts alternating within a given column. Here follow the beginning and the end of the editio princeps of Magentenos’ comments on Anal. Pr. II, as well as their first translation into Latin: 61 Randall 1940, 177–206 (especially 192–195). 62 See the note of r1 , misplaced folio between ff. 4 and 5: nescio quo bono fato in Magentini in eum librum explanationem incidi. On this edition, see Shiel 1998, xlix.

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Inc.: t, XXXr: Διαφόρως τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας σκοπὸς ἀπεδόθησαν (ἀπεδόθη D) παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν· πρόκλος μὲν εἶπεν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος r1 , 47r b: Huiusce tractationis argumentum varie, ac dissimiliter veteres interpretes posteris prodidere. Proclus autem inquit in iis, quae ante sunt dicta, forma ratiocinationum, hoc est conclusionem tractata fuisse Des.: t, XXXXIv: οὔτε δὲ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια μέρους τοῦ σώματος, οὔτε ἡ γραμμὴ τῆς ἐπιφανείας· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον μέρος τῆς γραμμῆς. r1 , 66v b: sed neque superficies corporis est pars, neque linea superficiei. igitur neque punctum esse lineae partem dicemus.

However, at the end of the translated Aristotelian text on f. 67v Rasari notes that the Greek text was incomplete by remarking ‘Deest explanatio’. The lack of completeness was due to the fact that he used D, itself incomplete (see p. LXIII). This deficiency was remedied three years later. In editorial note in the second edition of the Latin text (Lyon in 1547), the publisher Sebastian Gryphius (ca. 1490–1556) informs the reader that a revised edition of Rasari’s collected translations was necessary for scientific and typographical reasons.⁶³ The new edition was not printed in columns. Magentenos’ text alternated with Anal. Pr., while the missing part of the commentary was replaced by the relevant passages from Philoponos 2 (see p. XLIX). Here follow the beginning and the end of Greek and Latin texts of the scholia of Philoponos 2 (in manuscript Q), as well as the relevant passages of Ps.‐Philoponos on Anal. Pr. II: First scholion Philoponos 2 (Q, f. 190r i. m. ext.): Τὸ δὲ σημεῖον διαιρεῖται εἴς τε τὸ τεκμήριον καὶ εἰς τὸ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενον σημεῖον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενον ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἰκότι, τὸ δὲ τεκμήριον μετὰ ἀσφαλείας r2 , 224: Signum dividitur et in coniecturam, ita enim τὸ τεκμήριον dico, et in id, quod homonyme signum dicitur; idque quod homonyme dicitur, idem est quod verisimile. Coniectura vero, sine dubitatione Wallies 1905, 481.1–3: Τὸ δὲ σημεῖον διαιρεῖ εἰς τεκμήριον καὶ ὁμώνυμον σημεῖον. τὸ ὁμώνυμον δὲ σημεῖον ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἰκότι. τὸ δὲ τεκμήριον μετὰ ἀσφαλείας γίνεται ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, καὶ εἰ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἄλυτον γίνεται Last scholion Philoponos 2 (Q, f. 191r i. m. ext.): Τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἔχειν μεγάλα τὰ ἄκρα, οὕτως ὠνόμασται ἴδιον, οὐχ ὡς παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ τῷ εἴδει τῶν λεόντων ὑπάρχον, ἀλλ’ ὡς παντὶ μέν, οὐ μόνῳ δέ· δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ εἴδι τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν, μὴ παντὶ δέ.

63 r2 , a 1v.

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r2 , 226: Signum leonum ait esse extremas partes magnas habere; quod proprium nominatum est, non quod toti et soli speciei leonum insit, sed quod omni et non soli conveniat; quippe cum possit etiam in alia quapiam specie inteligi. Wallies 1905, 484.15–16: Τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον σημεῖον, ὃ τοῖς λέουσιν ὑπάρχει, ἔστω τοιοῦτον, καθὸ ἴδιον λέγομεν παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχειν μὴ μόνῳ δέ.

The Indirect Tradition Manuscript U The famous Vat. Urb. gr. 35 is one of the most important textual‐witnesses of the Organon. According to the colophon on f. 441v, the codex was commissioned by the deacon, and later archbishop of Caesarea, Arethas (860 – after 944) and it was copied by the subdeacon Gregorios. Since this note was written by Arethas himself, we may infer that the manuscript was copied before his appointment to the archbishopric of Caesarea, that is, before 902/903.⁶⁴ Two copyists or perhaps one⁶⁵ added two layers of scholia on the Anal. Pr. in the margins around the treatise. Both hands should be dated to the twelfth century, the ductus of scribe B, however, is extremely similar with the one in Vat. gr. 244. I would not exclude the possibility that in both cases the ductus may belong to the same person working during different periods of his life. Scribe A and scribe B in U had at their disposal three sources, (a) abstracts from the commentary of Ioannes Philoponos on Anal. Pr. I, (b) excerpts from the commentary of Ps.‐Philoponos on Anal. Pr. II, and (c) a redaction comprising scholia deriving from an interpolated version of Magentenos’ commentary and an unknown source. I name the interpolated text of Magentenos in U recensio Urbinatis.⁶⁶ In contrast, I name the text of the present edition recensio vulgata. In the case of Anal. Pr. II, scribe A (dark brown ink) copied Ps.‐Philoponos as far as f. 163r, whereas scribe B (light brown ink) filled the margins with the text of the redaction, which he occasionally tried to insert into the text that had already been copied by his colleague (see e.g. ff. 147r, 158v). The redaction copied by scribe B in the margins of Anal. Pr. II contains a total of 88 scholia, of which 61 belong to the recensio Urbinatis, whereas the remaining 27 are of unknown origin. The comments of the recensio Urbinatis can be divided into six groups:

64 PmbZ, n. 20554. 65 I am thankful to Dr. Stefano Valente for drawing my attention to the possibility that both ductus might belong to the same scribe. 66 In order to distinguish between the text of the Anal. Pr. and the recensio Urbinatis, we have employed the traditional siglum A for the former and the siglum U for the latter (see p. LXXXIV).

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1. Two scholia in the vulgata (47, 86) correspond to two diagrams in the Urbinas. In the case of scholion 47, the correspondence is only partial.⁶⁷ 2. Nine scholia in the Urbinas transmit less text than the vulgata (1, 27, 33–35, 42, 75, 84, 206).⁶⁸ 3. Nine scholia in the vulgata are blended together (major or minor transpositions, different wording, omissions and additions of text, diagrams) so as to form four scholia in the Urbinas (93/102/94; 134/141; 157/152; 184/185).⁶⁹ 4. Twenty-eight scholia are to be found almost verbatim in both versions (14, 21, 24, 25, 44, 48, 49, 55, 57, 65–72, 78, 81, 83, 85, 111, 113, 146, 150, 164, 194, 226). 5. Eleven of the comments in the Urbinas transmit more text or partially different wording than the vulgata (59, 90, 103, 123, 127, 180, 186, 187, 200, 201, 221).⁷⁰ 6. Two scholia in the vulgata (153, 205) are separated into four comments transmitting more text in the Urbinas.⁷¹ Could it be that the recensio Urbinatis is derived from a source other than Magentenos, which was then used by him? Had that indeed been the case, then Magentenos would most probably have included in the vulgata at least a few of the additions made in groups 3, 5 and 6. It seems likely that the extra material of the scholia and diagrams in groups 3, 5 and 6 was probably added by another commentator (or other commentators) during an excerpting phase, from which groups 1, 2 and 4 where excluded. This process resulted to an interpolated text, namely the lost α* (see the stemma on p. LXXIX). As α* was incomplete, this meant much of Anal. Pr. II was left uncommented upon. Therefore scribe B himself (or possibly even the compiler of α*) decided to fill the lacunae by applying a second layer of interpolations, in other words the 31 remaining scholia in the redaction of U. Moreover, the recensio Urbinatis seems to stem from an earlier stage of Magentenos’ commentary because of the text in groups 1 and 2, and the fact that the latter text transmits fewer scholia than the vulgata. Furthermore, there are mistakes in the vulgata when compared to the correct readings in U: 70.4 Γ U : Β VD 94.8 τέτοκε – ἔχει U : γάλα ἔχει διότι τέτοκε VD 113.2–3 εἰς2 – συλλογισμοὺς U : εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμὸν V : ἀδυνάτους συλλογισμοὺς D 127.4 παρὰ U : περὶ VD 146.6 τῷ Β … τὸ Γ U : τῶ Γ … τὸ Β V : τῶ Β … τῶ Γ D

67 See p. 195. 68 See p. 195. 69 See p. 196. 70 See p. 198. 71 See p. 202.

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There are errors in V when compared with U and D: 24.17 καὶ UD : om. V 81.3 οὐδεὶς … τίς UD : τὶς … οὐδείς V 157.22 αὐτῶ ἶσα UD : ἶσα αὐτῶ V 180.11 τὸ Α UD : om. V 184.5 αἱρετωτέραν UD : αἱρετώτερον V 184.6 παρὰ UD : περὶ V And there are also errors in D when compared with U and V: 33.1–2 ἐπεὶ – εἴπομεν UV : ἐπειδὴ σκοπός ἐστι τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας D 81.5–6 ἢ – καὶ πᾶς UV : om. D 85.2 καὶ UV : ὡς D 150.3–5 οὐχ ἁπλοῦν – γωνίας UV : om. D 180.3 συναληθεύσει UV : συνακολουθήσει D 180.3–6 καί, καθ’ οὗ – τῷ Δ UV : om. D Manuscripts QGILZ All five manuscripts transmit schol. 1 as part of Philoponos 2 (see p. XLIX). Furthermore, conjunctive errors against the witnesses transmitting schol. 1 (VFESβ Dt) make it clear that QGILZ belong to the same family. 1.6 τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ – προτάσεων VSFEβ Dt : τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ὕλη δὲ αἱ προτάσεις QGILZ 1.11 ἄλλα τινά VSFEβ Dt : τὰ λοιπὰ QGILZ 1.11 διαψεύδεται VSFEβ Dt : ψεύδεται QGILZ 1.12 ἕτερον VSFEβ Dt : β´ρ Q, β´ον Z, δεύτερον GIL 1.15 ἔστι – ἀληθές VSFEβ Dt : ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀληθές QGILZ Q was in the possession of Manouel Evgenikos.⁷² G and Z probably depend on Q. Similarities between Q and G include not only content and common readings, but also pagination, text layout, diagrams, initials, rubric and decorative elements. However, of the two G must have been copied later, since the watermark of ff. 141–145 (Magentenos’ scholion on f. 145v) date from the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁷³ Furthermore, the arrangement of text diagrams in G indicates that features existing in Q were incorporated in its drafting. Another peculiarity of G is that the copyist supplemented the exegetic material on unequal folia inserted later. This is also the case with schol. 1. On the other hand, Z was copied by a contemporary and possible relative of Manouel Evgenikos, Ioannes Evgenikos.⁷⁴ Ioannes must have had

72 RGK II, n. 344e. 73 Briquet 1977, n. 11718 (1390/1412). 74 RGK II, n. 217.

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access to Q, but his task remained incomplete, since the comments of Philoponos 2 on Anal. Pr. II were never copied onto the spacious margins of Z (ff. 244v–292v). Furthermore, QZ transmit a shorter version of a variant in GIL (see also above, the common abbreviation in 1.12): 1.3 ἐδίδαξεν VSFEβ Dt : διδάξας QZ : διδάξας ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης GIL There is also a reading in Q which is slightly different in GIL. However, the respective reading in Z seems to be an error (homoeoarchon) due to the variant in Q. 1.20 τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον VSFEβ : τὸ εἰκός, τὸ σημεῖον, τὸ τεκμήριον, καὶ τὰ λοιπά GIL : τὸ εἰκός, τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον, καὶ τὰ λοιπά Q : τὸ εἰκός, τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ τὰ λοιπά Z : τὸ τεκμήριον καὶ τὸ σημεῖον Dt There is a separative error in G, which was corrected in IL: 1.19 ἐπαγωγή VSFEβ QILZ Dt : ὑπαγωγή G On the topic of manuscript I, it appears that Theodoros Agallianos⁷⁵ (ca. 1400–1474), a collaborator of Manouel Evgenikos, probably copied passages from Anal. Pr. after 1442.⁷⁶ These he then supplemented with excerpts from Philoponos 2. Manuscript I probably depends on G, since it cannot depend on Z or L: there are no conjunctive errors with Z, whereas L (which does not transmit the Anal. Pr.) includes I’s errors and its own separative errors. 1.1 παρούσης VSFEβ QGIZ Dt : σκοπούσης L 1.3 ἤγουν VSFEβ QGIZ Dt : ἢ L 1.12 ἀλλὰ πιθανάς VSFEβ QGIZ Dt : om. L 1.20 ἐπεὶ VSFEβ QGIZ Dt : ἐπὶ L There exists one common reading of QGILZ and β. However, due to its trivial character, it is perfectly possible that this variant occurred independently in Q and its descendants: 1.3 ante τοῦ συμπεράσματος add. περὶ QGILZ β Q may depend on any one of VSF, since no error in Dt or E can be found in Q. However, there is a common omission present in Q and F, namely the lemma for the Aristotelian text. Manuscripts Ua Em Mk Nk All four codices transmit scholion 157 as part of an anonymous commentary on Anal. Post. I 1, 71a1–b25 and, as Stefano Valente was able to convincingly show, manuscripts

75 RGK I, n. 126; II, n. 163; III, n. 208. 76 Description of the CAGB Database.

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Em Mk Nk depend on Ua .⁷⁷ Ioannes Argyropoulos⁷⁸ (ca. 1415–1487) was the scribe of Ua ,⁷⁹ whereas the apographa of the latter manuscript were copied by Petros Karnabakas / Karneades⁸⁰ (he is the ‘common denominator’ in all three cases), as well as other scribes.⁸¹ The incomplete commentary on Anal. Post. I was edited by M. Hayduck⁸² and is the product of interpolation between the anonymously transmitted commentary on Anal. Post. in V and the scholia on its margins.⁸³ Ebbesen’s view is that this anonymous commentary should be attributed to Magentenos (see p. XXVIII). As an additional point in favour of that argument, we may add a reference to scholion 157 of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II in the anonymous commentary on Anal. Post. I in V (f. 303r i.m. inf., scholion ι΄: ‘περὶ δὲ τούτου εἴπομεν ὄπισθεν’). In the interpolated text of Ua , as well as in its apographa, this reference has been replaced by scholion 157 which, in turn, is an adaptation of a passage from Philoponos’ commentary on Anal. Post. I.⁸⁴ The outcome of such text elaboration, that is to say the presence of scholion 157 in the anonymous commentary on Anal. Post., is probably an indication, according to Valente, which hints towards the existence of a lost manuscript υ between V and Ua . The interpolation must have taken place in the intermediary υ.⁸⁵ To be sure, this hypothesis may be correct, however nothing prevents the assumption that Ioannes Argyropoulos, the scribe of Ua and a well-known Aristotelian scholar of the Renaissance, was himself perfectly capable of inserting scholion 157 in Ua . Ua Em Mk Nk do not transmit any of the separative errors of PYM, whereas XR, and of course QGILZ, omit scholion 157. As can be seen, on two occasions Ua Em Mk Nk actually transmit the correct variant: 157.2 ἡ ἀρετὴ διδακτόν Ua Em Mk Nk : ἡ ἀρετὴ διδακτή SEPYM Dt : ἡ ἐφετ(ον) διδακτ(ον) V : ἡ (ἐφ)ετὴ διδακτική F : ἡ (ἐφ)ετὴ διδακτή Κ 157.5 δὲ1 Ua Em Mk Nk : om. VSα Dt

77 See Valente 2021c. I am grateful to Dr. Stefano Valente for sending me the preprint version of his essay. The four manuscripts in the latter paper bear the sigla EMN and U respectively. For reasons of reference and in order to avoid confusion with the sigla UEMN, which are used in this volume to declare manuscripts transmitting Anal. Pr. II or the respective commentary by Magentenos (see the sigla in sections 3.1 and 4.4), I have opted for the addition of superscripted letters (after the surnames of the scribes involved) to the sigla employed by Valente. 78 RGK, I, n. 158; II, n. 212; III, n. 263. 79 Vendruscolo 2006–07, 292, 293; Bieker 2015. 80 RGK, I, n. 346–347; II, n. 474–475; III, n. 551. 81 The text of scholion 157 in Em was copied by Nikolaos Malaxos; see Valente 2021c. On Malaxos see RGK, I, n. 312; II, n. 432; III, n. 502. 82 Hayduck 1907, vii–xviii; the manuscript in Hayduck’s edition bears the siglum E. For the text of the scholion see Hayduck 1907, xiii.19–xiv.12. 83 V, ff. 301r–305r. See Ebbesen 1996, 88 (49); Ebbesen 2015, 14; Valente 2021c. 84 See apparatus fontium. 85 Valente 2021c.

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In the first case, in V ἀρετή has been replaced by ἐφετόν (perhaps a varia lectio in the exemplar used by the scribe of the Vaticanus). The correction might have occurred independantly in S, E and PYM. The reading διδακτόν might be an indication that Ua depends on V rather, than on one of its three descendants, namely FEK. Ua Em Mk Nk present the following separative errors with regard to the rest of the tradition: 157.2 ἐρωτῶντα VSαPYM Dt : ἐρωτὸν Ua Em Mk Nk 157.8 post ἐστι2 add. φησί(ν) Ua Em Mk Nk : — VSαPYM Dt 157.20 post ΘΖ add. καὶ Ua Em Mk Nk : — VSαPYM Dt There are separative errors for each of the manuscripts Em Mk Nk due to the script and the abbreviations in Ua : 157.2 Σωκράτη Ua Mk , Σωκράτ (η) Nk VSαPYM Dt : Σωκράτει Em 157.8 ἀρετή Ua Em Nk VSαPYM Dt : ἀρωτή Mk 157.26 γίνονται Em VSαPYM Dt : γι΄ Ua : γίνεται Nk : γὰρ Mk 157.31 ᾔδει Ua Mk Nk VSαPYM Dt : εἴδει Em Furthermore, each of the manuscripts Mk and Nk has its own separative errors when compared to the rest of the family members: 157.4 post ἀρετὴ add. οὐ Nk : — Ua Em Mk VSαPYM Dt 157.13 τοῦ τετραγώνου, οὗ ἐστιν Ua Em Nk VSαPYM Dt : om. Mk ex homoeoteleuto 157.16–17 ΑΒΓΔ Ua Em Nk VSαPYM Dt : ΑΒΓ Mk 157.19 τετραγώνῳ Ua Em Nk VSαPYM Dt : τετραγώνων Mk In the stemma codicum on the following page, sigla of texts with attached diagrams are printed in bold, interpolations are printed with dashed lines, and dubious relations are printed with dotted lines. (On the textual tradition of the commentary by Magentenos on Anal. Pr. see also pp. XXIX, XLVII.)

3.3 The Text’s Genealogy

| LXXIX

ω* ω**

α* U

1200

V

1250 D α 1300 F β

S

E

1350 Q

P Y

K

1400

G R

Ι

1450

Z

L Ua 1500

X M t

1550

r1

r2

Em

Mk

Nk

4 Principles of the Edition 4.1 Text This critical edition of Magentenos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II is based on the text of V and D. U was taken into account with regard to the twenty-eight scholia shared verbatim by both the recensio vulgata and the recensio Urbinatis, namely the comments in the fourth group (see p. LXXIV; on the notation of these comments in the text of the edition see p. LXXXII). The remainder of the recensio Urbinatis (i.e. groups 1–3, 5–6) is considered only when they transmit better readings than the vulgata. For a complete collation of the recensio Urbinatis Appendix E may be consulted. Variant readings in other textual witnesses are noted only when they offer salient conjectures. V is preferred in cases of dubious spellings (e.g. endings in -ν or -ς; ταὐτόν/ταὐτό, οὕτως/ οὕτω etc.), unless D agrees with U. With regard to spelling variants; the iotacism of ἀνδρία is kept (as in previous editions of Magentenos’ commentaries), since it is based on the textual tradition of the Anal. Pr. during the eleventh century and does not construe a different meaning (see below p. LXXXIX).¹ The comments of Magentenos share a common syntactical characteristic present in Byzantine texts – the replacement of the future indicative with the aorist subjunctive in conditional clauses introduced by εἰ.² There are also syntactical peculiarities in concessive and temporal clauses due to the relation between the two moods: – εἰ + aorist subjunctive (+ future indicative)³ – εἰ + aorist subjunctive, future indicative with ἄν in the apodosis⁴ – ἐάν + present indicative⁵ – κἄν + present indicative⁶ – ὅταν + present of future indicative⁷ – ὅτε + present subjunctive⁸ These peculiarities are retained in our edition and are taken into consideration when making corrections. While Greek numbers for the comments in V are provided by the scribe himself (see p. LXII), the enumeration of comments in our edition uses bold arabic numerals. 1 The word is written with - ι - in V, but it has been corrected in D and U. 2 Funk 1961, 188–189; Kotzabassi 1999, 60; Stone 2009, 129; see e.g. scholia 22.1–2, 51.3, 67.1–2, 108.1. 3 Funk 1961, 193; Kotzabassi 1999, 60; see scholion 141.16–19. 4 Stone 2009, 131; see scholion 156.6–7. 5 Funk 1961, 190; see scholia 20.4, 91.1. 6 Funk 1961, 190; see scholion 20.7–8. 7 Funk 1961, 193; see scholia 15.1, 45.2, 93.1, 131.4. In one instance an aorist subjunctive follows a future indicative verb; see scholion 142.12–15; Funk 1961, 193; Kotzabassi 1999, 60; Stone 2009, 126. 8 Funk 1961, 193; scholion 118.1–2. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-207

4.1 Text |

LXXXI

These are printed before the relevant Bekker page number for each lemma. In addition, lemmata are printed in italics. Quantifiers (i.e. πᾶς, οὐδείς, τίς, οὐ πᾶς) are placed inside curly single quotation marks (‘ ’). Words or statements employed as either explanatory formulations, as examples, or as sentences of a dialogue are also placed inside curly singe quotation marks. Additions are printed within angle brackets (〈 〉). Omissions are printed within square brackets ([ ]). Editorial conventions regarding additions of Greek text are not printed in the translation. Added lemmata are not translated. If two or more scholia refer to the same passage in Anal. Pr. II, then the relevant Bekker page and lemma (unless the latter is transmitted by the manuscript tradition) are printed only before the first scholion. As the punctuation does not follow any set rules in any of the manuscripts, modern usage has been adopted. The only exception is the combination of colon and en-dash (:–) for signifying the end of a scholion. Correspondance to the folia of the editio princeps is indicated in the outer margins of the comments and the mark // in the Greek text. Furthermore, the following system of conventions (in the Greek text only) serves a dual purpose: 1. The documentation of the relative position of the scholia in both hyparchetypes of the recensio vulgata, i.e. to provide information regarding the structure of the final version of the commentary by means of notation within and at the end of the text of a scholion. The traditional apparatus note would require more space, while it does little to draw the attention of the reader to this kind of information. In the case of Magentenos’ text, in fact, this may apply to indicating cases of possible interpolation already existing in the archetype (or its exemplar) or to distinguishing different phases of successive filling up of marginal or interlinear scholia (see p. LXV). Examples of notation: (a) At the end of scholion 227: ‘[⇐ 225]’ = ‘see comment 225 for information regarding the position of scholion 227 in the sequence of text in one of the hyparchetypes’. (b) At the end of scholion 135: ‘[V a.c., D ⇒ 141]’ = ‘here follows comment 141 in V ante correcturam and D’. A note of the type ‘[⇐ 135]’ should then be printed at the end of comment 141. (c) At the end of scholion 221: ‘[(221–222) V]’ = ‘comments 221 and 222 form a single item in the order indicated inside the brackets’. A note of the type ‘[⇐ 221]’ is then printed at the end of comment 222. (d) At the end of scholion 145: ‘[oD]’ = ‘comment 145 is omitted in D’. This kind of notation at the end of a chapter title means ‘chapter omitted in D’. (e) In the text of a scholion: ‘[/V]’ = ‘here begins a new comment in V’; see for instance scholion 75.3. 2. The documentation of scholia belonging to one of the six scholia‐groups of the recensio Urbinatis presented on p. LXXIV. Examples of notation at the end of the respective scholia:

LXXXII | 4 Principles of the Edition

(a) (b) (c) (d)

‘[U-]’ = ‘comment belonging to either the first, or the second group’. ‘[≈ U]’ = ‘comment belonging to the third group’. ‘[= U]’ = ‘comment belonging to the fourth group’. ‘[U+]’ = ‘comment belonging to either the fifth, or the sixth group’.

Concerning the English translation of the Greek text and in order to maintain consistent English terminology in the field, particularly with reference to Aristotelian lemmata and terminology, we have consulted the revised ‘Oxford Translation’ by Jonathan Barnes and the translations of Robin Smith and Gisela Striker.⁹

4.2 Apparatus At the bottom of each page of Greek there are three sets of notes, the apparatus diagrammatum, the apparatus criticus and the apparatus fontium. The first apparatus contains always the lemma and the number of the respective diagram in Appendix A. The apparatus fontium includes references to sources and parallela as well as cross references. Among the references of this apparatus is included further information concerning the three paratexts in Appendix D (orthography and accentuation have been normalized). These short excerpts deal with the aim of Anal. Pr. II. They are thus of special interest with respect to the views expressed in schol. 1. In the apparatus criticus the Aristotelian variants are followed by the indication ‘Arist.’ and the respective siglum or sigla placed in brackets, e.g. [variant] Arist. (nC).

4.3 Diagrams Diagrams were paratextual material employed in the manuscript tradition of Aristotelian treatises in order to explain and/or summarize difficult passages. Such figures not only enhanced the reader’s understanding of an inconvenient technical text – as in the case of the Anal. Pr. – but they also functioned as visual memory aids.¹⁰ However, every effort either to edit diagrams, or to restore them in their relation to a commentary should always take their sources into account. There are five essential difficulties: – As we have shown in the case of the interpolated recensio Urbinatis, diagrams may find themselves rendered as text in later versions of a commentary (see p. LXXIV).

9 Barnes 1984, Smith 1989, Striker 2009. For the text of the ‘Oxford Translation’ see Jenkinson 1928. A fourth English translation of Anal. Pr. can be found in Tredennick 1938. 10 For the use of logical diagrams in Greek manuscripts, see e.g. Brumbaugh 1961; Brumbaugh 1965; Brumbaugh 1968; Bülow - Ebbesen 1982, 50–51; Panizza 1999, 22–47; Cacouros 2001, 21–33; Prapa 2012, 31–41; Rambourg 2012, 1–36; Agiotis 2015, passim; Agiotis 2021b; Krewet - Hegel 2021b.

4.3 Diagrams | LXXXIII

– – – –

Diagrams in source ‘x’ may be drawn differently in source ‘y’. Diagrams were culled from different sources (see Table 1 below). Similar captions or complete lack of wording in a diagram may make determining its text source difficult, even if it should be the commentary at hand. The transmission of diagrams does not always go hand in hand with the transmission of text. To use Magentenos as an example, three out of twelve manuscripts that transmit the whole or large sections of the commentary on Anal. Pr. II do not contain any diagrams at all (see stemma codicum on p. LXXIX). Magentenos himself twice insinuates the general principles for drawing a diagram (schol. 219, 220). However, he refers just once to ad hoc diagrams (schol. 121.4: ἀναγεγραμμένα σχήματα). It must be noted, however, that in this last case the manuscript tradition transmits no diagram pertaining to the relevant passage. Morever, Magentenos makes no reference whatsoever to the rest of the diagrams edited in this current volume.

For the present edition the logical diagrams present in V and D were taken into consideration. In V, special concern as to the consistent placement, right proportion and correspondence to the comments has been given for the diagrams in the margins around the text of the commentary. In D, by contrast, the diagrams were drawn after the text of the scholia was copied, but no care was taken to position them in accordance with the respective text. As can be seen from Table 2, six groups of logical diagrams pertaining to Anal. Pr. II can be distinguished. There are diagrams that could derive either (a) from the text of Magentenos, or (b) from the text of Magentenos or Aristotle, or (c) from the text of Magentenos or Ps.‐Philoponos. Then there are (d) diagrams which have the Aristotelian text as their source, and (e) diagrams related to the scholia of Ps.‐Philoponos. From a total of 129 diagrams, 33 actually or possibly derive from the scholia of Magentenos, but only 5 diagrams of this group are transmitted in both hyparchetypes. Table 1: Diagrams in V and D

(a) Magentenos (b) Magentenos / Aristotle (c) Magentenos / Ps.‐Philoponos Subtotal (d) Aristotle (e) Ps.‐Philoponos Total

V 10 — 2 12 31 1 44

D 8 6 2 16 47 8 71

Common 5 — — 5 6 3 14

Total 23 6 4 33 84 12 129

Only diagrams in the first three groups have been used for the present edition. Because of the aforementioned loose connection between diagrams and text, the former are

LXXXIV | 4 Principles of the Edition

edited in Appendix A. They are related to the commentary by means of the apparatus diagrammatum, while every diagram in Appendix A is supplied with the respective reference of the latter apparatus. The remainder of the diagrammatic material, namely the diagrams of groups ‘d’ and ‘e’, are edited in the Appendices B and C respectively. Different colours are used for providing ‘critical’ information related to the drawings: black for common features; red for omissions in D; violet for omissions in V; blue for different diagrams of the same argument in either manuscript; and olive for additions in D. Simple footnotes are employed for variants regarding the captions. Diagrams copied in the second ductus of V bear an asterisk (*) after the number of the respective reference.

4.4 Readings of Anal. Pr. II The purpose of the following survey of variants is to trace the general traits of the Aristotelian text employed by Leon Magentenos in his commentary on Anal. Pr. II. The following chronological list of thirteen vetustissimi and vetusti that transmit Anal. Pr. II may, however, not be comprehensive, should in the light of new evidence, other codices be dated as contemporaneous with Magentenos.¹¹ – Ambr. L 93 sup., 9th/10th c., ff. 149r–189v (= n) – Vat. Barb. gr. 87, 9th/10th c., ff. 92r–120v (= R)¹² – Sinait. gr. NEM 138, beginning of the 10th c., f. 7rv (= N).¹³ The fragment transmits Anal. Pr. is II 22, 67b32 ὡ]σαύτω[ς – 68b7 καὶ – Vat. Urb. gr. 35, 902/903, ff. 159r–192v (= A)¹⁴ – Marc. gr. 201, 954, ff. 68v–85r (= B) – Laur. 72.5, second half of the 10th c. ff. 150r–152v (= d).¹⁵ From Anal. Pr. II 26, 69b4 τῇ προτάσει is relevant here, as the previous part of Book II (ff. 124v–149v) was copied by a scribe of the second half of the thirteenth century. – Athous Laur. H 23, 11th c., ff. 47v–95v (= H)

11 The dates of the manuscripts were taken from the respective manuscript catalogues and the bibliography referenced below. On the textual tradition of the Anal. Pr. see Waitz 1844, 1–29; Ross 1949, 87–95; Minio-Paluello 1964, v–x; Williams 1984, 1–8, 80–101; Brockmann 2004, 50–63; Ebert - Nortmann 2007, 177–179. On the most important manuscripts transmitting the Anal. Pr. see Brockmann 2004, 51–52. 12 Link to the online digitised copy of DVL on p. XXII. The manuscript bears the siglum V in the editions of Brunschwig 1967, Brunschwig 2007, Bodéüs 2001 and Weidemann 2014. In contrast, the siglum R was employed in Montanari 1984 and Montanari 1988. In our edition V is assigned to Vat. gr. 244, so we have consequently opted for the siglum R. 13 In Reinsch 2001 the Sinaiticus was given the siglum S. We have assigned the siglum N, since in our edition S is attributed to Par. Coisl. 167. 14 Link to the online digitised copy of DVL on p. XXII. 15 Link to the online digitised copy of TECA Digitale on p. XXII.

4.4 Readings of Anal. Pr. II

– – – – – –

|

LXXXV

Par. Coisl. 330, 11th c., ff. 115v–149v (= C)¹⁶ Vat. gr. 1024, 11th c., ff. 16v–64v (= c)¹⁷ Laur. CS 192, first half of 12th c., ff. 60r–73r (= l) Guelf. 24 Gud. graec., 12th c., ff. 59v–84v (= g);¹⁸ with text loss of Anal. Pr. II 21, 67a35 ἄτοκος – 22, 68a11 τὸ Α Taur. C III 18, 12th, ff. 233r–318v (= T) Bas. F II 21, second half of 12th c. to first half of 13th c., ff. 91v–121v (= u)

M. Williams’s study on nABdCc¹⁹ is very helpful, but it contains some incorrect and several confusingly cited readings. Waitz on the other hand, collated only parts of the Anal. Pr. in u.²⁰ Thus, we provide concerning the Aristotelian variants in the text of Magentenos new collations for all seven manuscripts. D. Reinsch’s collations were taken into consideration for N.²¹ RHlgT are collated here for the first time.²² We have classified the Aristotelian readings into two overlapping groups, which include seven subgroups: I. Citation (a) typical lemmata attached to the beginning of scholia (e.g. schol. 1, 2, 3, 13 etc.) (b) lemmata with wording interrupted at times by brief remarks (introductive or explanatory), or by syntactic adaptations (e.g. schol. 5, 29, 37, 40 etc.) (c) quotations of Aristotelian text within the scholia (d) readings based on syntactically modified Aristotelian text II. The texts of V and D (only V after 211.9 γραμμῆς) (a) common readings identical with variants of one or more Organon manuscripts (b) common readings that differ from the Aristotelian text (c) different readings, each of them transmitted by at least one textual witness of Anal. Pr. II.

All variants are listed below. Every entry begins with a scholion‐number and ends with a reference to the pages of the Bekker edition, followed by a ‘||’. A quantitative overview is illustrated in Table 3 (p. LXXXIX).

16 Link to the online digitised copy of Gallica on p. XXII. 17 Link to the online digitised copy of DVL on p. XXII. 18 Link to the online digitised copy of WDB on p. XXII. 19 Williams 1984, 33–49. 20 Waitz 1844, 146. 21 Reinsch 2001, 66–67. 22 Manuscripts nRABdClg were collated from digital colour files, whereas microfilms were employed for cHTu.

LXXXVI | 4 Principles of the Edition

[The superscript ‘2’ to the right of a siglum (e.g. C2 ) refers to interventions (additions, deletions, corrections etc.) made by later hands. Other conventions include: a.c. = ante correctionem; add. = addidit; a.r. = ante rasuram; cancel. = cancellavit; i.m. = in margine; i.r. = in rasura; om. = omisit; p.c. = post correctionem; p.r. = post rasuram; s.l. = supra lineam; transp. = transposuit.]

Ia IIa 6.1/53a12–13 εἰ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχει ABdCHclu et Magent. : εἰ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν n : εἰ δὲ τὸ Α τινὶ μὴ υπάρχει τῷ Β RgT : deest in Nd || 19.1/53b24 καὶ ἐπὶ nRABCHclgu et Magent., κἀπὶ T : deest in Nd || 20.1/53b28 ἀλλὰ τῆς δευτέρας nRACHclgT et Magent. : om. Bu : add. B2 s.l. : deest in Nd || 35.1/57b28 δ’ (δὲ) nRABCclgTu et Magent. : om. H : deest in Nd || 38.1/58a27–28 ἡ γὰρ αὑτὴ πρότασις, τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Α RABCHclgΤu et Magent. : om. n : n2 i.m. : deest in Nd || 43.1/58b26 μιᾶς nABCHclΤu et Magent. : ἑτέρας R : om. g : deest in Nd || 45.1/59a3 ᾖ nABCHclgu : om. RΤ et Magent. : deest in Nd || 58.1/60a7 ἀναιρεῖται nABCHclgu (T legere non potui) et Magent. : ἀνήρηται Rg : deest in Nd || 84.1/64b12 αὐτοὺς nRABCHclgu et Magent. : post αὐτοὺς add. αὐτοῖς T : deest in Nd || 67.1/61b39–40 μὴ παντὶ … τινὶ nABCHclu et Magent. : μὴ τὸ παντὶ … τὸ τινὶ Rgl2 s.l. : τὸ μὴ παντὶ … τὸ τινὶ T : deest in Nd || 67.1/61b40 ὑπάρχειν nABCHclTu et Magent. : ὑπάρχον Rg : deest in Nd || 68.1/62a4 οὐδὲ n : οὐ RABCc2 l, fortasse g s.l., T et Magent. : οὗ Hcu : deest in Nd : οὐδὲν scripsit Ross || 78.1/63b17 τῆς nABCHclu et Magent. : ante τῆς add. αὐτῆς Rg, T i.r. : deest in Nd || 83.1/64a36 λανθάνειν nRABCclgTu et Magent. : post λανθάνειν add. τοὺς προσδιαλεγομένους n : λαμβάνειν H : deest in Nd || 92.1/64b26 ἢ nRABCclgu et Magent. : om. H : deest in Nd || 103.1/65a16 ὑπάρχει nRABCcgTu et Magent. : ὑπάρχη H, mut. A2 : deest in Nd || 104.1/65a22–23 τῷ Β τὸ Α ABCclT et Magent. : τὸ Α om. H : τὸ Α add. n2 s.l., R2 s.l. : τῷ Α τὸ Β g : deest in Nd || 113.2/65b1 εἰς nABCHclu et Magent. : post εἰς add. τὸ RgT : deest in Nd || 115.1/65b1–2 μὴ ἀντιφήσας nRCHclgTu et Magent. : μὴ ἀντι φείσας B a.c. : μὴ ἀντι φήσας B p.c. : ante μὴ ἀντιφήσας add. ὁ A || 134.1/66b18–19 θέσει τῶν ὅρων ἀπατώμεθα nABCHclgTu, lemma Magenteni desinit cum θέσει : ἠπατώμεθα τῇ θέσει τῶν ὅρων R : deest in Nd || 136.1/66b20 πρώτοις nA, B p.c., C a.c., Hclu et Magent. : πρώτως R, B a.c., C2 p.c., gT : deest in Nd || 137.1/66b22 αὑτά nRA, B a.r., C a.c., Hclgu et Magent. : αὐτό B p.r., C2 p.c., T : deest in Nd || 158.1/67b12 τὸ n, A2 p.r., B, fortasse C p.r., c, l p.c., Tu et Magent. : τῷ A a.r., fortasse C a.r., H, l a.c. : deest in Ndg || 164.1/67b22 ἆρ’ B p.c. et Magent. : ἄρ’ nRA, B a.c., CHcTu : deest in Ndg || 165.1/67b27 ἀντιστρέφῃ n ABCHclTu et Magent. : ἀντιστραφῇ R : deest in Ndg || 182.1/68a16 τὸ nRClgT et Magent. : om. NABHcu : deest in d || 189.1/68b16 ἑτέρου nRABCclgTu et Magent. : θατέρου H : deest in Nd || 190.1/68b22 Γ l p.c., gT et Magent. : ἄχολον n p.r., ABCHc, l a.c., u : supra ἄχολον add. Γ A2 : supra Γ add. τὸ ἄχολον R2 : ἄχολον Γ n a.r. : deest in Nd || 194.1/68b35 οὖν nRABHclgTu et Magent. : om. Cl : deest in Nd || 194.1/68b35– 36 καὶ γνωριμότερος RABCHclgTu et Magent. : om. n : add. n2 i.m. : deest in Nd || 200.1/69a18 οὐ συνῆπτε nRABCclgu et Magent. : οὐ συνάπτει H : deest in Nd || 207.1/69a18 τὸ nRABdCHcgTu et Magent. : τὶ l : deest in N || 215.1/70a9

4.4 Readings of Anal. Pr. II

IIb

IIc Ib IIa

IIb

IIc Ic IIa

|

LXXXVII

τοῦτο ABCgTu et Magent. (deest in D) : om. ndcl : 70a8–9 ἢ1 – ἐστι om. H ex homoeoteleuto : 70a8–9 ἢ1 – ἐστι add. H2 s.l. et i.m. : deest in N 7.1/53a15 πάντων Arist. (deest in Nd) : om. Magent. || 23.1/54a38 εἴδεσι τὸ γένος ABCHcl : supra τὸ γένος add. ἕτερον B2 c2 : εἴδεσιν ἕτερον γένος nRTu : deest in Nd : εἴδεσι τὸ ἕτερον γένος Magent. || 25.1/55a14–15 τὸ γὰρ ζῷον ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ABCHclgTu : ζῷον γὰρ ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐδενί nR : deest in Nd : τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ ἀριθμῷ Magent. || 27.1/57b1 δύο ἔχῃ οὕτω Arist. (δύο ἔχη H2 i.r., deest in Nd) : οὕτως ἔχῃ δύο Magent. || 69.1/62a36 ἐὰν Arist. (deest in Nd) : εἰ Magent. || 70.1/62b8 ἐὰν Arist. (deest in Nd) : εἰ Magent. || 99.1/65a8 εἰ nRABCcgT : ἧ Hl : deest in Nd : ἐὰν Magent. || 113.1–2/65a40–b1 τοῖς – ἐδείκνυτο Arist. (deest in Nd) : om. Magent. || 116.1/65b4 δ’ (δὲ) Arist. (deest in Nd) : om. Magent. || 118.1/65b14 ὅταν Arist. (ὅτ’ ἂν nRABH, deest in Nd) : ὅτε Magent. || 138.1/66b23 παντὶ τῷ Δ Arist. (deest in Nd) : τῷ Δ παντὶ Magent. || 150.1–2/67a13–14 οἷον – αἰσθητὸν Arist. (deest in Nd) : om. Magent. || 153.1/67a23 ἅμα Arist. (deest in Nd) : post ἅμα add. δὲ Magent. || 197.1/69a12 τῶν Arist. (deest in Nd) : om. Magent. || 214.1/70a7 γάρ Arist. (deest in N) : om. Magent. (deest in D) || 227.1/70b36–37 ᾯ δὲ τὸ Β, τὸ Α – μή nRABdCHclgu : ᾯ δὴ τὸ Γ, τὸ Β – μή T : deest in N : om. Magent. (deest in D) — 5.1/53a12 ἕτερον nABCHclgTu : post ἕτερον add. ἐστι R et Magent. : deest in Nd || 37.1/58a15 καὶ nABCHclgTu et Magent. : om. R : deest in Nd || 72.1/62b36 οὐδὲ nABCHclgTu et Magent. : οὐ δεῖ R : deest in Nd || 126.2/66a16 πρῶτον nRACHlgu et Magent. : om. Bc : add. B2 s.l., c2 s.l. : deest in Nd || 148.1/67a6 ὑπολαβεῖν nRABCHclgu et Magent. : ὑπολαμβάνειν T : deest in Nd || 160.1/66a15 τὸ ἀγαθῷ nRABCcu : τῶ ἀγαθῶ Hl : τὸ ἀγαθὸν T et Magent. : deest in Ndg || 160.1/66a15 Γ1 nABCHclu et Magent. : ante Γ1 add. τὸ R : deest in Ndg || 168.2/67b28 ἀντιστρέφειν n, R p.c., ABCHclTu et Magent. : ἀντιστρέφη R a.c. : deest in Ndg 40.1/58b6 δεῖξαι Arist. (deest in Nd) : post δεῖξαι add. διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως Magent. || 168.1/67b27 ἀντιστρέφῃ nABCHcluT : ἀντιστραφῇ R : deest in Ndg : ἀντιστρέφει Magent. || 168.2/67b27 τὸ μέσον Arist. (deest in Ndg) : τὸν μέσον ὅρον Magent. || 198.2–3/69a14 ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον Arist. (deest in Nd) : ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος Magent. — 5.4/24b19 τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης Cgun2 (ff. 80r–98v Anal. Pr. I 1, 24a1 – 10, 31a17 a librario s. XIV scripta sunt), A2 i.r., d2 i.r. et Magent. : τι τῶν κειμένων R2 i.r. : τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης B : ante τι transp. τῶν κειμένων B2 s.l. : τι ἀνάγκη τῶν κειμένων (cancel. ἀνάγκη) l : deest in NdHc || 39.8/58a32 παντὶ τῷ Γ nABHclgTu et Magent. : τῷ Γ παντὶ C : om. R: deest in Ndc || 176.2/67b38 ἅπαντος NA, B a.c., Ccl : ἂν παντὸς nRHTu, B2 p.c. et Magent. : deest in dg || 176.5/68a1 Α … Γ N, A p.c., B p.c., H, c p.c., l, T p.c., lemma Magenteni desinit cum Α : Γ … Α nR, A a.c., B a.c., C, c a.c., T a.c. : deest in dg

LXXXVIII | 4 Principles of the Edition IIb 213.2/70a7 ἢ … ἢ nCHclT : ἢ1 om. ABgu : ἢ1 add. d s.l. : supra ἢ1 add. καὶ C2 : supra ἢ1 add. ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ R : deest in N : καὶ … (τὸ ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ ληπτέον) καὶ Magent. (deest in D) IIc — Id IIa 129.2–3/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμῶν1,2 Magent. ut RACclu (προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg (προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλογίζωνται B : T μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται : deest in Nd || 186.2/68b4, 5 συνεῖναι nR, N2 p.c., ABCHclg Tu et Magent. : συνιέναι N : deest in d || 206.1/69b19 πᾶσι nABdΗclgu : ἅπασι RCT et Magent. : deest in N || 206.1–2/69b20 ἐνιστάμενον RCΗlgTu et Magent. : ἐνισταμένων nABdc : deest in N || 206.4/69b20 τῶν προτεινομένων RClgT, u2 p.c. et Magent. : τῷ προτεινομένῳ nABdΗc, u a.c. : deest in N || 206.13/69b28 τὸ1 ABcu et Magent. : om. nRdCΗlgT : deest in N || 206.16/69b28–29 τοὐναντίον nABdΗclgu : τὸ ἐναντίον T : τὰ ἐναντία RC et Magent. : deest in N IIb 195.3/68b39–40 δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ nRAB, C i.m., Hclgu, T2 i.m. : om. T : deest in Nd : δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἤγουν τὸ Β, τὸ ὑπάρχον τῷ τρίτῳ Magent. IIc 127.6/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμῶν D ut RACclu (μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg (μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμῶν V ut B (μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται), T (μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Nd || 129.1/66a35–36 μὴ προσυλλογίζονται nHg et D: μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται RACclu : μὴ προσσυλογίζονται V : μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται B : T μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται : deest in Nd || 130.3–4/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμῶν D ut RACclu (μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg (μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμῶν V ut B (μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται), T (μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Nd || 144.1/66b39 πρώτην n2 s.l., RABCHclTu, g2 s.l. et V : om. nAg et D : deest in Nd || 157.6/70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρεία D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρία V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 158.3, 4/70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρείας D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρίας V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 159.2, 3, 5/70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρείας, ἀνδρείαν D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρίας, ἀνδρίαv V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 160.1, 3, 4, 6/70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρεία, ἀνδρείας, ἀνδρείαν D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρία, ἀνδρίας, ἀνδρίαv V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 161.2, 4/70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρείας D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρίας V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 164.2–3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11 bis / 70b15, 32, 34 ἀνδρείας, ἀνδρείαν D ut nRABdg, C (70b15), c (70b15, 32), T (70b32) : ἀνδρίας, ἀνδρίαv V ut H, C (70b32, 34), c (70b34), T (70b15, 34) : deest in N || 201.3–4/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμοῦ D ut RACclu (μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg (μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμοῦ V ut B (μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται), T (μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Nd || 201.4/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμός D ut RACclu (μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg (μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμός V ut B (μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται), T (μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Nd || 205.4/66a35–36 προσυλλογισμός D ut RACclu (μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται), nHg

4.4 Readings of Anal. Pr. II

|

LXXXIX

(μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμός V ut B (μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται), T (μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Nd Table 2: Classification of Aristotelian Readings

IIa IIb IIc Total

Ia 33 16 — 49

Ib 8 4 — 12

Ic 4 1 — 5

Id 7 1 28 37

Total 52 22 28 102

From the 102 Aristotelian readings above, we may infer the following: – Subgroup IIa: – 33 readings belong to subgroup Ia. 16 of them are conjunctive errors in both Magentenos and in one or more textual witnesses for Anal. Pr. II (see Table 4 below). We decided to exclude subgroup 1a from the apparatus criticus of our edition, since these lemmata may have been supplemented by later scribes.²³ Table 3: Conjunctive errors of the Aristotelian tradition and Leon (Subgroup Ia/IIa) Arist. Magent.

–

n 1

R 1

A 1

A2 1

B 2

C 2

c 1

c2 1

l 2

g 1

T 2

u 1

Total 16

the remaining 19 readings in subgroup Ia include 10 conjunctive errors between Magentenos and the Aristotelian manuscripts. These readings are cited in the apparatus criticus (see Table 5 on p. XC).

Table 4: Conjunctive errors in the Aristotelian tradition and Magentenos Arist. Magent.

– –

R 4

C 2

c 1

g 1

T 2

Total 10

22 readings belong to subgroup IIb. These should be considered separative mistakes in the text of Magentenos. Subgroup IIc contains 28 readings. These can actually be reduced to 3 separative errors in V and D (see Table 5 below). Two of them are of particular interest:

23 For instance, Magentenos’ comments in the vulgata transmit 103 lemmata in a total of 227 scholia, whereas the 55 scholia of the recensio Urbinatis include only 9 lemmata.

XC | 4 Principles of the Edition

προσσυλογισμός is used for the correct προσυλλογισμός 6 times,²⁴ while ἀνδρία is used for the correct variant ἀνδρεία 21 times. The variants of προσυλλογισμός render a different meaning. Additionaly, ἀνδρία is transmitted by three codices from the eleventh and by a manuscript from the twelfth century. All three readings, however, are conjunctive errors between one of the two hyparchetypes and at least one codex containing Anal. Pr. II. The variants of this subgroup are included in the apparatus criticus. Table 5: Separative errors in VD, i.e. conjunctive errors between respective textual witnesses of Anal. Pr. II and V or D (Subgroup IIc) Arist. V D

–

nAg — 1

B 1 (6 x προσσυλλογισμός) —

CHcT 1 (21 x ἀνδρία) —

Total 2 1

Of 29 conjunctive errors in Tables 4–5 (26 + 3 representative readings in subgroup IIc), Magentenos’ scholia transmit, in most cases, mistakes in R, C and T (see Table 6 below).

Table 6: Conjunctive errors of the tradition of Anal. Pr. II and Leon Arist. Magent.

–

n 2

R 5

A 2

A2 1

B 3

C 5

H 1

c 3

c2 1

l 2

g 3

T 5

u 1

Total 29

To the 5 common errors with R [5.1/53a12 (also in T); 45.1/59a3; 176.2/67b 38 (also in T); 206.1/69b19 (also in CT); 206.14/69b28–29 (also in C)] we should add a separative error of Magentenos which seems to have as its premise a reading in Vat. Barb. gr. 87 (see p. LXXXVIII, lc, llb, 213.2/70a7).

24 Although in one occasion both manuscripts transmit the correct form; see schol. 129.2–3.

4.5 Conventions | XCI

4.5 Conventions Sigla Manuscripts with Leon Magentenos’ comments on Anal. Pr. II D F E K P R S U Ua V t α β

Ambr. D 54 sup. (before 1272) Par. gr. 1972 (beginning of the 14th c.) Par. Coisl. 157 (after 1330) Vat. Reg. gr. 107 (end of the 14th c.) Par. gr. 1846 (14th c.) Vat. gr. 1018 (15th c.) Par. Coisl. 167 (14th c.) Vat. Urb. gr. 35 (12th c.) Utin. gr. 256 (1301–1325) Vat. gr. 244 (12th/13th c.) Trincavelli’s editio princeps (Venice 1536) consensus of F and K consensus of P and R Manuscripts of Anal. Pr. II

A B C H N R T c d g l n u

Vat. Urb. gr. 35, 902/903 Marc. gr. 201, 954 Par. Coisl. 330, 11th c. Athous Laur. H 23, 11th c. Sinait. gr. NEM 138, beginning of the 10th c. (Anal. Pr. II 22, 67b32 ὡ]σαύτω[ς – 68b7 καὶ) Vat. Barb. gr. 87, 9th/10th c. Taur. C III 18, 12th c. Vat. gr. 1024, 11th c. Laur. 72.5, second half of the 10th c. (from Anal. Pr. II 26, 69b4 τῇ προτάσει) Guelf. 24 Gud. graec., 12th c. (with text loss of Anal. Pr. II 21, 67a35 ἄτοκος – 22, 68a11 τὸ Α) Laur. CS 192, first half of 12th c. Ambr. L 93 sup., 9th/10th c. Bas. F II 21, second half of 12th – first half of 13th c.

Abbreviations a.c. add.

ante correctionem addidit

XCII | 4 Principles of the Edition

cf. corr. cancell. diagr. f. (ff.) iter. i.m. i.r. om. p.c. s.l. schol. transp. v. vid.

confer correxit cancellavit diagramma/diagrammata in appendicem A folium (folia) iteravit in margine in rasura omisit post correctionem supra lineam scholium, scholia transposuit versus vide

〈Greek text〉 additions of the editor [Greek text] deletions of the editor

Writers and Works Anal. Pr. Anon. In Anal. Pr. II

Anon. In Anal. Post. I

Alex. In Anal. Pr. I Alex. In Top. Amm. Cael. Cat. D.I D.II D.III EN

Aristotelis Analytica priora et posteriora, ed. W. D. Ross - L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford 1964. C. Brandis, Scholia in Aristotelem, Berlin 1836, 187a16– 188a41, 189b25–190a27, b4–18, 191a7–36, b27–41, 192b25– 193a5, b6–28, 194a40–47, b36–45, 195b21–25. Anon. Εἰς τὸ πρῶτον τῶν δευτέρων Ἀναλυτικῶν, in: Eustratii in analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium [CAG 21.1], ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin 1907, vii–xviii. Alexandri in Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium [CAG, 2.1], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1883. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria [CAG, 2.2], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1891. Ammonii in Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium [CAG, 4.6], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1899. Aristote, Du ciel, ed. P. Moraux, Paris 1965. Aristote, Catégories, ed. R. Bodéüs, Paris 2001. Prooemion I to Anal. Pr. II on p. 192. Prooemion II to Anal. Pr. II on p. 193. Prooemion III to Anal. Pr. II on p. 194. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater, Oxford 1894.

4.5 Conventions | XCIII

Eucl. Hip. Iambl. Ital. Magent. In Top.

Magent. In Soph. El.

Magent. (?)

Marinus

Meno Metaph. Olympiod. Pedias. I Pedias. II Philop. In Anal. Pr. I Philop. In Anal. Post. I

Philop. In Phys. Phys.

Euclidis Elementa, vol. I: Libri I–IV cum appendicibus, ed. I. L. Heiberg - E. S. Stamatis, Leipzig 19692 . Hippocrates, Aphorismi, in: É. Littré, Oeuvres complètes d’Hippocrate, vol. IV, Paris 1844, 458–608. [Iamblichi] Theologoumena arithmeticae, ed. V. De Falco, Leipzig 1922. Ioannes Italos, Quaestiones quodlibetales, ed. P. Joannou, Ettal 1956. Leontis Magentini in Aristotelis topicorum prooemium et librum secundum commentaria, in: S. Kotzabassi, Byzantinische Kommentatoren der aristotelischen Topik. Johannes Italos & Leon Magentinos [Ἑταιρεία Βυζαντινῶν Ἐρευνῶν, 17], Thessaloniki 1999, 111–152. Dilectus scholiorum Leonis Magentini in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos, in: S. Ebbesen, Commentator and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post‐Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies [Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, 7], vol. I: The Greek Tradition, Leiden 1981, 280–306. ‘Leon Magentinos (?), Proömium zu Anal. Pr. I (Princeton MS 173)’, in: CAGB Database (https://cagb-digital.de, last accessed on 1 March 2021). Marinus, On the purpose of Anal. Pr. II, in: N. Agiotis, ‘Marinos and the purpose of Prior Analytics II’, Parekbolai 6 (2014) 15. Platonis opera, ed. J. Burnet, vol. III, Oxford 1903 (Stephani vol. II) 70a–100c. Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. W. Jaeger, Oxford 1957. Olympiodori prolegomena et in categorias commentarium [CAG, 12.1], ed. A. Busse, Berlin 1902. Ioannis Pediasimi In Aristotelis Analytica scholia selecta, ed. V. De Falco, Naples 1926. V. De Falco, ‘Altri Scolii di Giovanni Pediasimo agli Analitici’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 28 (1926) 251–269. Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria [CAG, 13.2], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1905, 1–386. Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis analytica posteriora commentaria cum anonymo in librum II [CAG, 13.3], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1909, 1–333. Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis physicorum octo libros (tres priores) commentaria [CAG, 16], ed. H. Vitelli, Berlin 1887. Aristotelis Physica, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1950.

XCIV | 4 Principles of the Edition

Ps.-Philop. Rhet. Schol. in Luc. Simpl. Top.

Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis analytica priora commentaria [CAG, 13.2], ed. M. Wallies, Berlin 1905, 387–485. Aristotelis ars rhetorica, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1959. H. Rabe, Scholia in Lucianum, Leipzig 1906. Simplicii in Aristotelis de caelo commentaria [CAG, 7], ed. J. L. Heiberg, Berlin 1894. Aristote, Topiques, ed. J. Brunschwig, Paris, vol. I 1967 / vol. II 2007.

| Part II: Leonis Magenteni In Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum II

| Editio critica

Ἀριστοτέλους Ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων τὸ δεύτερον

t, XXXIr

I 〈Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις〉

5

10

15

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1. (52b38) Ἐν πόσoις μὲν οὖν σχήμασι. διαφόρως τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας σκοπὸς ἀπεδόθη παρὰ τῶν παλαιῶν. Πρόκλος μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσι περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος (ἐν οἷς ἐδίδασκεν ποταπὸν συμπέρασμα συνάγεται ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν ἢ ἐκ μιᾶς ἀποφατικῆς, τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας καταφατικῆς), ἐνταῦθα δὲ διδάσκει περὶ τῆς ὕλης τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἤγουν τῶν προτάσεων· διαψεύδεται δὲ προφανῶς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων μέθοδον παρέδωκεν ἐφευρετικὴν τῶν προτάσεων. ὁ δὲ Μαρῖνος σκοπὸν ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα εἶπε διαλαβεῖν περὶ τῶν λυσιτελούντων εἰς τὴν διαλεκτικήν· τίνα δέ εἰσι ταῦτα; τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συνάγειν συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ ἄλλα τινά· διαψεύδεται δὲ καὶ οὗτος· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ὁ διαλεκτικὸς οὐ λαμβάνει ψευδεῖς προτάσεις, ἀλλὰ πιθανάς, ἕτερον δὲ ὅτι οὐκ εὐθὺς διδάσκει περὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος δοκεῖ κρείττονα σκοπὸν ἀποδοῦναι εἰπὼν ὅτι διδάσκει ὅσα ἔφθασε παραλεῖψαι παραδοὺς τὴν συλλογιστικὴν μέθοδον· ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές· πάντα γὰρ τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς συλλογιστικῆς μεθόδου παρέδωκεν καὶ οὐδέν τι παρέλειψεν. ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωσι τὰ παρεμποδίζοντα τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν συλλογισμὸν καὶ μὴ ἐῶντα προβαίνειν αὐτόν· εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συλλογίζεσθαι, ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, ἡ ἐπαγωγή, τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὁρῶμεν οὐ μόνον τὰ πρὸς ὑγείαν λυσιτελοῦντα φάρμακα διδάσκοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θανατηφόρα, οὐχ ἵνα τούτοις χρῶνται ἰατρεύοντες, ἀλλ’ ἵνα μᾶλλον ἐκφεύγωσι, καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης παρέδωκεν ἃ εἴπομεν ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ πραγματείᾳ, ἵνα ἀποδεικνύοντες μὴ τούτοις χρώμεθα ὡς παρεμποδίζουσι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν:– [U-] 2. Ἐν πόσοις μὲν οὖν σχήμασι, ἤγουν ἐν τρισίν. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν ποιεῖται, ὧν ἐδίδαξεν ἐν τῇ συλλογιστικῇ μεθόδῳ αὐτοῦ. τρία δὲ σχήματά

Tit. comm. Ἀριστοτέλους – δεύτερον V : εἰς τὰ δεύτερα τῶν προτάσεων D Tit. sect. I Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις addidi (cf. schol. 2.1–2) 1. 1 post σχήμασι add. καὶ διὰ ποίων καὶ πόσων προτάσεων D 1. 5 δὲ V : δ᾽ D 1. 8 σκοπὸν V p.c., D : σκοπ(ειν) V a.c. ἔχειν V : εἶχεν D 1. 14 παραδοὺς D : παραδιδοὺς V 1. 19 post ἐπαγωγή add. καὶ V 1. 20 τὸ τεκμήριον καὶ τὸ σημεῖον D οὐ V : μὴ D 1. 8–11 ὁ – τινά ] cf. 1. 2–6 Πρόκλος – προτάσεων1 ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 387.8–11; D.I.2–9 Marinus; D.I.10–14 1. 13–15 ὁ – μέθοδον ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 387.6–7; D.I.9–10; D.III.1–7 1. 17– 18 ἡμεῖς – αὐτόν ] cf. D.II; schol. 33.1–2 1. 20–24 ἐπεὶ – ἀπόδειξιν ] cf. Olympiod. 8.21–27; Magent. In Top. 112.75–113.102; Magent. In Soph. El. 280.12–20; D.III.7–14 2. 2–10 τρία – τρίτῳ ] cf. Magent. (?) https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-001

In Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38 – 53b3

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The Second Book of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics I A summary 1. With respect to the number of figures. The aim of the present treatise was explained in various ways by the ancient interpreters. Proclus said that in the previous chapters Aristotle taught about the forms of syllogisms, or rather about conclusion (in those chapters, in which he was teaching about what sort of conclusion is drawn from two affirmative premises or from a negative premise when the second one is affirmative); here, however, he teaches about the matter of a syllogism, or rather about its premises. But Proclus is clearly mistaken for in the chapter On Finding Suitable Premises Aristotle presented a method for the invention of premises. Marinus said that here Aristotle’s aim is to handle topics which are useful in regard to dialectical reasoning. Which are these? Drawing a true conclusion from false premises, begging the point at issue, the induction etc. But he is also mistaken, because first of all a dialectician does not take false premises, but plausible ones; secondly, Aristotle does not directly teach about dialectical reasoning, but about demonstration. Alexander again seems to have given a better account of the aim of this book after saying that Aristotle teaches about all those topics, which he previously omitted after presenting the syllogistic method. But this is also not true, for Aristotle presented every essential part of the syllogistic method and he omitted nothing. We, however, say that here Aristotle presents the hindrances to a demonstrative syllogism and the things that do not allow the latter to advance. These are: producing a syllogism from false premises; circular proof; begging the point at issue; induction; the sign and the evidence. And since we observe that physicians teach not only about drugs useful for healing, but also about lethal ones – not in order that they should use the latter while healing, but rather in order to avoid them – Aristotle also taught in the present treatise about the topics we mentioned, in order that we should not make use of the latter when demonstrating, since they impede the demonstration. 2. With respect to the number of figures, namely with respect to the three figures. At first he summarises what he taught with respect to his syllogis-

6 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

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εἰσι καὶ οὐ πλείονα, διότι καὶ τρία εἴδη εἰσὶ συλλογισμῶν· ἀποδεικτικόν, διαλεκτικὸν καὶ σοφιστικόν· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον σχῆμα λυσιτελεῖ σοι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καθόσον ἐν αὐτῷ μόνῳ συνάγεται τὸ ‘παντί’, καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικνύων τοῦτο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον κατασκευάζει, σπανιάκις δὲ καὶ ἀνασκευάζει· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον χρησιμεύει εἰς τὴν διαλεκτικήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἀνασκευάζει καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι πάντα τὰ συμπεράσματα ἀποφατικά εἰσι· τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἰς τὴν σοφιστικήν· οἱ γὰρ σοφισταὶ μερικὰ συνάγουσι, μερικὰ δὲ συμπεράσματα συνάγονται καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ. ἢ ὅτι, ἐπεὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς διὰ μέσου ὅρου γίνεται, ὁ δὲ μέσος τριττῶς λαμβάνεται· ἢ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν συντηρεῖ καὶ τῷ ὄντι μέσος ἐστὶν ὡς τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ τῶν ἄκρων ὑποκείμενος, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου κατηγορούμενος καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα (πρῶτον δὲ λέγεται ὡς τιμιώτερον, καθόσον ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ μέσος τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν φυλάττει, καὶ ὅτι πάντα τὰ προβλήματα ἐν αὐτῷ συνάγεται)· ἢ ὑπερανέστηκεν τῶν ἄκρων καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον· ἢ ὑπόκειται τοῖς ἄκροις καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ τρίτον. ἔστιν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἑτέραν αἰτίαν· πέντε εἰσὶ γνωστικαὶ δυνάμεις, ἤγουν νοῦς, διάνοια, δόξα, φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ συλλογίζεται ὡς πάντα γινώσκων κρειττόνως ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν· ἀχρόνως γὰρ καὶ ἀμερῶς, ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς πάντα γινώσκει ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχων τὰ εἴδη πάντων τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἡ αἴσθησις συλλογίζεται ἀντιληπτικὴ οὖσα τῶν μερικῶν· ἐκ τούτων δὲ συλλογισμὸς οὐ γίνεται· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ’ ἡ φαντασία συλλογίζεται· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις παραπέμπει τῇ φαντασίᾳ ταῦτα πάντα, περὶ ὅσα ἔφθασεν ἐνεργῆσαι· τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως παραπεμπόμενα τῇ φαντασίᾳ μερικά εἰσιν· ἐκ τούτων δὲ συλλογισμὸς οὐ γίνεται· φαντασία δὲ λέγεται ὡς φαοστασία τις οὖσα· ἐν αὐτῇ γὰρ ἵστανται καὶ ἠρεμοῦσι καὶ συντηροῦνται, ὅσα ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν αὐτῇ παρέπεμψεν· καὶ λοιπὸν ἡ διάνοιά ἐστι ἡ συλλογιζομένη· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ λάβῃ τοὺς ὅρους, ποιεῖ τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν συλλογισμόν, ὅθεν καὶ διάνοια λέγεται ὡς διὰ τοῦ νοῦ συλλογιζομένη, ἤγουν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ λαμβάνουσα τοὺς ὅρους· εἰ δὲ ἡ διάνοια λάβῃ τοὺς ὅρους ἐκ τῆς δόξης, ποιεῖ τὸν διαλεκτικὸν συλλογισμὸν ὡς ἐξ ἀμφιδόξων καὶ πιθανῶν προτάσεων συνιστάμενον, ὅθεν καὶ δόξαν λέγεται· δοιάζει γὰρ περὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει, οὐ μὴν ἀκριβῆ κατάληψιν ἔχει αὐτῶν· εἰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας, ποιεῖ τὸν σοφιστικὸν ὡς ἐκ μερικῶν προτάσεων συν-

2. 3 ante συλλογισμῶν add. τῶν D 2. 5 τοῦτο om. D 2. 7 εἰς V : πρὸς D 2. 8 ἀποφατικά εἰσι D : ἀεὶ ἀποφάσκειν V 2. 9 τὴν σοφιστικήν D : τὸ σοφιστικόν V σοφισταὶ scripsi : σοφιστικοὶ VD 2. 11 τρισσῶς D ἢ D : ἀεὶ V αὐτοῦ post τάξιν transp. D 2. 13 σχῆμα om. D 2. 14 post μέσος add. ἑνὶ τῶν ἄκρων ὑποκείμενος γίνεται καὶ D 2. 15 συνάγεται D : συνάγονται V 2. 17 post εἰσὶ add. τῆς ψυχῆς D ἤγουν om. D 2. 19 post ἀμερῶς add. καὶ D ante πάντα add. τὰ D 2. 21 ante τῶν add. πάντων D 2. 23 πάντα ταῦτα D 2. 26 καὶ3 om. D 2. 29 ὡς om. V λαμβάνουσα D : λαβοῦσα V ἡ om. D 2. 32 ἀμφιβάλει D 2. 33 post ὡς add. καὶ D 2. 11–16 ὁ δὲ μέσος – τρίτον ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Pr. I 65.20–22; Magent. (?) 2. 17–34 πέντε – διαγινώσκει ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Pr. I 1.19–2.24; Magent. (?)

In Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38 – 53b3

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tic method. There are three figures and not more, because there are also three kinds of syllogism: the demonstrative; the dialectical; and the sophistical syllogism. And the first figure is useful for the demonstration, in so far as ‘to all’ is deduced only in this figure and a demonstrator establishes the latter in most cases, but sometimes he also refutes this. The second figure is useful with regard to dialectical reasoning, for the dialectician always refutes an argument and in the second figure all conclusions are always negative. The third figure is useful with regard to sophistry, for sophists draw particular conclusions and particular conclusions are drawn also in the third figure. Or that, since a syllogism comes about through the middle term, the middle term is understood in three ways for it either keeps its proper place and is indeed in the middle – as subject to one of the extremes and predicate of the other – and makes the first figure (it is called the first figure since it is superior, in so far as the middle term preserves its proper place, and because all kinds of theses are inferred in the latter), or it stands over the two extreme terms and makes the second figure, or it is subjected to the extremes and makes the third figure. It is possible to mention another cause as well. There are five cognitive capacities, namely: intellect; discursive thought; opinion; imagination; and sense perception. And the intellect does not form syllogisms since it knows everything outright rather, than through a demonstration. For the intellect instantaneously and indivisibly knows all by means of simple intuition, since it has in itself all forms of beings. Nor does sense perception syllogize, since it is able to apprehend particular things and a syllogism does not come about from them. And, likewise, imagination does not syllogize either, for sense perception transmits to imagination all that concerning which the former had previously set in action; things transmitted to imagination by sense perception are particulars, but a syllogism does not come about from them. It is called imagination since it is some sort of light-at-a-standstill; for whatever sense perception has transmitted to imagination stops and rests and is preserved in the latter. And what remains is the syllogizing discursive thought. And if a discursive thought receives the terms from the intellect, it makes then a demonstrative

8 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

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ιστάμενον. καὶ 〈δῆλον〉 ὅτι πεπλανημένα καὶ ψευδῆ ἡ φαντασία διαγινώσκει· φανταζομένη γὰρ τὰ λάχανα ὑπερέχοντα τῆς γῆς οἴεται καὶ μείζονα ταύτης εἶναι οὕτω τοῦτο συνάγουσα· τὰ λάχανα ὑπερέχει τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὑπερέχοντά τινος μείζονα τούτου εἰσί, τὰ λάχανα ἄρα μείζονα τῆς γῆς εἰσι, μὴ διακρίνουσα ὅτι τὸ ὑπερέχον, εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ὑπερέχει, μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑπερεχομένου· εἰ δὲ ὡς ἐξεστηκὸς ὑπερέχει, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ μεῖζον εἶναι τοῦ ὑπερεχομένου:– 3. (52b38–39) Καὶ διὰ ποίων προτάσεων, ἤγουν ἢ ἐκ δύο καθόλου καταφατικῶν· ἢ ἐξ ἀποφατικῆς καὶ καταφατικῆς· ἢ τῆς μιᾶς καθόλου, τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας μερικῆς. καὶ πόσων προτάσεων, ἤγουν διὰ δύο. καὶ πότε· ὅτε τὸ μέσον τῷ μὲν ἑνὶ ὑπόκειται, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου κατηγορεῖται, ἢ ὅτε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων κατηγορεῖται, ἢ ὅτε ὑπόκειται ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ πῶς· // ἤγουν συμπλεκομένου τοῦ μέσου τοῖς δυσὶν ἄκροις καὶ οὕτως συνάγοντος τὰ δύο ἄκρα. ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων ἐδίδαξεν εἰς ποῖα βλεπτέον ἐν τῷ κατασκευάζειν, ἤγουν εἰς τὰ ΓΖ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνασκευάζειν εἰς τὰ ΔΖ. ἐν γοῦν τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων παρέδωκε μέθοδον, πῶς δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰς προτάσεις καὶ εὑρίσκειν περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου προβλήματος καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην· οἷον γάρ, 〈εἰ〉 πρόβλημα ἐξ οἱασδήτινος τέχνης ἢ ἐπιστήμης προτεθῇ, εἴτε ἰατρικόν, ἢ γεωμετρικόν, ἢ φυσικόν, ἐκεῖθεν ὁδηγούμενος εὐπορήσεις προτάσεων πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τούτου. ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν παρέδωκε διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ καὶ μεθόδου τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς προτάσεις τοῦ προτεθέντος εὑρήσομεν· πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα μόνον λέγεται, αἱ δὲ προτάσεις καταλιμπάνονται· πολλάκις δὲ ἡ μία καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγεται, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ἐᾶται. ἐν δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ πραγματείᾳ διδάσκει πῶς οἱ μὲν καθόλου πάντες συλλογισμοὶ πλείονα συνάγουσι συμπεράσματα διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς· οἷον τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα παντὶ τῷ Β· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἓν συμπέρασμα ἐκ τῶν ληφθεισῶν προτάσεων συναχθέν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ‘πᾶς’ πρὸς τὴν ‘τὶς’ ἀντιστρέφει, συνάξεις καὶ ἄλλο συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Α· τὸ δὲ ‘τινὶ’ τοῦτο

2. 34 δῆλον addidi διαγινώσκει V : διδάσκει D 2. 36 ὑπερέχει V : ὑπερέχουσι D 2. 38 κατὰ τὸν V : μετὰ D 3. 1 ἢ om. D 3. 1–2 καταφατικῶν καθόλου D 3. 2 ἀποφατικῆς καὶ καταφατικῆς V : ἀποφατικῶν καὶ καταφατικῶν D 3. 2–3 ἢ2 – μερικῆς om. D 3. 4 ἀμφοτέρων V : ἀμφότερα D 3. 5 ἀμφοτέροις ὑπόκειται D 3. 6 συνάγοντος V : συνάγονται D 3. 8 δὲ post ἀνασκευάζειν transp. D post ΔΖ add. πλατύτερον δὲ ἐκεῖ περὶ τούτων ἕξεις τὴν μέθοδον V 3. 11 εἰ addidi οἱασδήτινος V : οἱασδήποτε D προτεθῇ V : προστεθῆ D εἴτε V : ἢ D 3. 13 πρὸς om. D 3. 15 πολλάκις V : πολὺν D 3. 16 λέγεται – ἐᾶται om. D ex homoeoarcto 3. 19 τὸ2 V p.c., D : τῶ V a.c. καὶ om. D ἓν ante τοῦτο transp. D 2. 36–40 τὰ λάχανα – ὑπερεχομένου ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Pr. I 3.23–25 3. 6–8 ἐν δὲ – εἰς τὰ ΔΖ ] cf. Anal. Pr. I 28, 44b6–24 3. 13–16 ἐν – ἐᾶται ] cf. Anal. Pr. I 32, 46b40–46, 51b5

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syllogism, for which reason it is even called ‘dianoia’ since it deduces through (‘dia’) the intellect (‘nous’), or rather, it receives the terms from the intellect. And if a discursive thought receives the terms from opinion, it makes a dialectical syllogism since the latter comprises doubtful and possible premises. This is the reason it is even called opinion; for it is ambivalent about things and doubts them, and it does not really have any accurate understanding of them. And if a discursive thought receives the terms from imagination, it makes a sophistical syllogism, since the latter consists of particular premises. And it is evident that imagination discerns deceits and falsehoods; for since it imagines vegetables covering the earth, it believes that they are even larger than the latter by drawing the conclusion as follows: vegetables cover the earth, what covers something is larger than the latter, therefore vegetables are larger than the earth (by not clarifying that the thing covering is larger than what is covered in case the former covers the latter in terms of space and size; but if the former covers the latter by arising out of it, then it is not necessary for the former to be larger than what is covered). 3. And through what kind of premises; namely from either two universal affirmative premises, or from a negative and an affirmative, or when a premise is universal, whereas the other one is a particular one. And through how many premises; namely through two premises. And when; when the middle term is either the subject of the one extreme term and predicated of the other, or when it is predicated of both extremes, or when it is the subject of both extremes. And how; namely when the middle term is conjoined with the two extremes and thus brings the two extremes together. In the chapter On Finding Suitable Premises Aristotle taught about which terms one must look for with regard to establishing a premise, namely one must look for the terms AF, whereas with regard to refuting a premise one must look for the terms DF. At any rate, in the chapter On Finding Suitable Premises he presented a method on how one must search for and find premises concerning a proposed thesis in accordance with any inquiry and science or art whatsoever; e.g. should a question of any art or science be raised before you, either a medical, or a geometrical, or a natural one, you will find plenty of premises with regard to its demonstration by being guided by that chapter. And in the chapter On the Analysis of Syllogisms he presented in which way and through which method we should find the principles and the premises of a proposed thesis. For a conclusion is often stated, but its premises are omitted; or else, one premise and the conclusion are often stated, but the other premise is dismissed. In this treatise Aristotle teaches

10 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

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συνήχθη οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ληφθεισῶν προτάσεων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος· ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ ‘οὐδείς’. τῶν δὲ μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν οἱ μὲν κατηγορικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ πλείονα συνάγουσι τὰ συμπεράσματα διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οἷον τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα τινὶ τῷ Β· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν συνήχθη ἐξ ὧν ἐλάβομεν προτάσεων, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Α διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος συνήχθη, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ληφθεισῶν προτάσεων· οἱ δὲ ἀποφατικοὶ μερικοί, οἱ τὸ ‘οὐ παντὶ’ συνάγοντες, ἓν μόνον συνάγουσι συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β διὰ μέσου τοῦ Γ· οἷον τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β· ἡ δὲ στερητικὴ μερικὴ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄλλο συμπέρασμα οὐ συνάγεται διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς:– 4. (53a8–9) Τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τὶ κατά τινός ἐστι· λύσις ἐστὶ ἐνστάσεως· εἰπόντι γὰρ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι ἕτερον συμπέρασμα οὐ συνάγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν ‘οὐ πᾶς’ ἀντιστρέφειν, ἴσως ἄν τις ἀντέστη αὐτῷ λέγων τὴν ‘οὐ πᾶς’ ἀντιστρέφειν ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτήν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ‘τίς’, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ‘πᾶς’, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ‘οὐδείς’. φησὶ γοῦν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, ἀλλὰ ἀορίστως· τὸ γὰρ ‘Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β’ ἄδηλόν ἐστι, εἰ μέλλει ἀντιστραφῆναι, ποῦ ἀντιστραφήσεται. τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τὸ διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς γινόμενον τὶ κατά τινός ἐστι, ἤγουν ὡρισμένον ὀφείλει εἶναι οὐ μὴν ἀόριστον· ὥστε οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι συλλογισμοί, ἤγουν οἱ καθόλου καὶ οἱ μερικοὶ καταφατικοί, πλείω συμπεράσματα συνάγουσιν· ἓν μὲν ἐκ τῶν ληφθεισῶν προτάσεων, ἕτερον δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος:– 5. (53a12) Τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν, τοῦ ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β· καὶ τοῦτο λύσις ἐνστάσεώς ἐστι. πῶς φῇς τὸν συλλογισμὸν πολλὰ συμπεράσματα συνάγειν, εἴ γε συλλογισμός ἐστι λόγος, ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει; ἐν γὰρ τῷ εἰπεῖν 3. 30 τὸ Α – τῷ Β ] cf. diagr. 1 3. 22 συνήχθην D 3. 23 ὡσαύτως – οὐδείς V : καὶ πάλιν τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῶ Γ· τὸ (τῶ a.c.) Γ παντὶ τῶ B· καὶ τὸ A ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶ B· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐδείς ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτήν, καὶ τὸ B οὐδενὶ τῶ A· καὶ τὸ μὲν A οὐδενὶ τῶ B συνήχθη διὰ τῶν ληφθεισῶν προτάσεων· τὸ δὲ B οὐδενὶ τῶ A διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος V 3. 25 τοῦ συμπεράσματος cancell. V 3. 26 ἄρα om. V συνήχθην D 3. 27 συνήχθην D 3. 31 post οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει add. ὡρισμένως πρός τι D post οὐ συνάγεται add. ἐπὶ τοῦ μερικοῦ καὶ ἀποφατικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ D 4. 5 Ἀριστοτέλης V : σοφός D 4. 6 ἀλλὰ V : ἀλλ᾽ D ἐστι om. D 4. 7 post ἀντιστραφήσεται add. πρὸς τὴν πᾶς, εἰς τὴν τίς, εἰς τὴν οὐδείς, ἢ εἰς ἑαυτήν V τὸ2 om. D 5. 1 ἕτερόν ἐστι Arist. (R) et Magent. : ἕτερον Arist. (nABCHclgTu) : deest in Arist. (Nd) 5. 4 τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης Arist. (Cgun2 , A2 i.r., d2 i.r.) et Magent. : ante τι transp. τῶν κειμένων Arist. (B2 s.l.) : τι ἀνάγκη τῶν κειμένων Arist. (l cancell. ἀνάγκη) : τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης Arist. (B) : deest in Arist. (NdHc) 5. 3–4 Anal. Pr. I 1, 24b18–19

In Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38 – 53b3

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about how all universal syllogisms infer an abundance of conclusions by conversion; e.g. A belongs to all C, C belongs to all B, and therefore A belongs to all B; and this is one conclusion drawn from the taken premises, but since ‘all’ converts to ‘some’ you will draw yet another conclusion, that B belongs to some A; this very ‘to some’ was not drawn from the taken premises, but by conversion of the conclusion. Likewise, even the ‘no’ is inferred. From the particular syllogisms, positive syllogisms infer an abundance of conclusions by conversion of the conclusion; e.g. A belongs to all C, C belongs to some B, and therefore A belongs to some B; this conclusion was drawn from the premises that we took, whereas ‘B belongs to some A’ was inferred by conversion of the conclusion, yet not from the taken premises. On the other hand, particular negative syllogisms – those inferring the ‘not to all’ – infer only one conclusion, that A does not belong to all B through the middle term C; e.g. A belongs to no C, C belongs to some B, and therefore A does not belong to all B; a particular privative premise does not convert and for this reason no conclusion is inferred by conversion. 4. And a conclusion is one thing predicated about another. This is the resolution of an objection. For after Aristotle said that no further conclusion can be drawn in the case of a particular negative syllogism, since it is not possible for the ‘not all’ to convert, perhaps someone might oppose him by saying that the ‘not all’ converts either to itself, or to ‘some’, or to ‘all’, or to ‘no’. Aristotle claims at any rate that, even though the ‘not all’ converts, still this occurs in an indeterminate way; for it is unknown to where ‘A does not belong to all B’ would convert, if the latter were to convert. A conclusion resulting from conversion, however, is one thing predicated about another, or rather it has to be determinate – certainly not indeterminate. Therefore the other syllogisms, namely the universal and the particular affirmative ones, infer an abundance of conclusions; one drawn from the taken premises, and another from conversion of the conclusion. 5. And this conclusion, that B belongs to no A, is different than the previous one, that A belongs to no B; this is also resolution of an objection. How would you claim that a syllogism infers many conclusions, if a syllogism really is an argument in which certain things being stated, something other than what was

12 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

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ἕτερον ἐδήλωσεν ὡς ἕν τι συμπέρασμα συνάγει πᾶς συλλογισμός. λύων οὖν τὴν ἔνστασιν λέγει ‘οὐκ ἐναντιοῦμαι αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ’· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἕν ἐστι τὸ ἐκ τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων συναγόμενον συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β· τὸ δὲ ‘ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων συνήχθη, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος:– 6. (53a12–13) Εἰ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἤγουν, εἰ δὲ τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀντιστρέψαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ Β οὐ παντὶ τῷ Α· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ Α παντὶ τὸ Β ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ παντὶ ζῴῳ, τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει:–

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7. (53a15) Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κοινὴ 〈πάντων〉 αἰτία· ἤγουν κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ καθόλου συλλογισμοὶ καὶ οἱ μερικοὶ καταφατικοί, καθ’ ὃ πλείονα συνάγουσι τὰ συμπεράσματα διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἑτέρα αἰτία, δι’ ἣν οἱ καθόλου συλλογισμοὶ συνάγουσι πλείονα συμπεράσματα· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς περιοχῆς τοῦ ἐλάττονος ὅρου ἕτερον συνάξεις συμπέρασμα καὶ ἐκ τῆς περιοχῆς τοῦ μέσου ἕτερον, πλὴν πάντα τὰ συμπεράσματα συναχθήσονται ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σχήματος, τοῦ πρώτου, δι’ οὗ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός. λάβε τὸ Α οὐσίαν, τὸ Γ ἔμψυχον, τὸ Ε αἰσθητικόν, τὸ Β λογικὸν καὶ τὸ Δ ἄνθρωπον· ὁ μὲν πρῶτος συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ ἔμψυχον παντὶ λογικῷ καὶ ἡ οὐσία παντὶ λογικῷ· οὗτος μέν ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ἐλάττων ὅρος, τὸ λογικόν, περιέχει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, συνάξεις ἐκ τῆς περιοχῆς ἕτερον συμπέρασμα· ἡ οὐσία παντὶ λογικῷ, τὸ λογικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἡ οὐσία ἄρα παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ μέσος ὅρος, τὸ ἔμψυχον, περιέχει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ συνάξεις ἄλλο συμπέρασμα· ἡ οὐσία παντὶ ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ ἔμψυχον παντὶ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἄρα παντὶ αἰσθητικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ πλείονα συμπεράσματα συναχθήσεται καὶ ὁ μὲν πρῶτός ἐστιν οὕτως· τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐδενὶ ἀναισθήτῳ, τὸ ἀναίσθητον παντὶ λίθῳ, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἄρα οὐδενὶ λίθῳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ λίθος περιέχει τὴν μαγνῆτιν, συνάξεις ἕτερον συμπέρασμα οὕτως· τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐδενὶ λίθῳ, ὁ λίθος πάσῃ μαγνήτιδι, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἄρα οὐδεμιᾷ μαγνήτιδι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ μέσος ὅρος, τὸ ἀναίσθητον, περιέχει τὸ ἄψυχον, συνάξεις ἄλλο συμπέρασμα· τὸ

6. 1–4 εἰ δὲ τὸ Α – ὑπάρχει ] cf. diagr. 2 7. 8–15 τὸ Α – αἰσθητικῷ ] cf. diagr. 3 7. 17–23 τὸ αἰσθητικὸν – ἀψύχῳ ] cf. diagr. 4 5. 5 οὖν V : γοῦν D 5. 6 καὶ1 om. D γὰρ post ἐνταῦθα transp. D 5. 7 τὸ ὅτι D 6. 2–3 τῷ Α2 … τὸ Β V p.c. : τὸ A … τῷ B V a.c., D 6. 3 post ζῷον add. μὲν D 7. 1 lemma πάντων addidi 7. 2 τὰ om. D 7. 3–4 διὰ – συμπεράσματα om. D ex homoeoteleuto 7. 15 καὶ om. D 7. 16 δὲ om. D συναχθήσεται V : συναχθήσονται D 7. 18 καὶ om. D 7. 20 ἄρα om. V οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 7. 21–22 ante τὸ αἰσθητικὸν add. ὅτι V

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stated occurs out of necessity? For Aristotle made clear that every syllogism infers a certain conclusion by having said something other than what was stated. While resolving the objection then he says ‘I do not contradict myself’; for indeed even here the conclusion inferred by the stated premises is one: that A belongs to no B; the conclusion, however, the ‘that B belongs to no A’ was not drawn from the two premises, but by conversion of the conclusion. 6. If, however, it does not belong to some, or rather, if A does not belong to all B, then it is not necessary to convert the latter and say that B does not belong to all A; for it is possible for B to belong to all A; for if human being is not predicated of every living being, living being then is predicated of every human being. 7. This is then the common cause of all syllogisms; or rather, universal affirmative and particular affirmative syllogisms have something in common as far as they infer an abundance of conclusions by conversion. There is, however, yet another cause for which universal syllogisms infer plenty of conclusions. For from the content of the minor term you will draw a conclusion and from the content of the middle term another one, but all conclusions will be drawn in the first figure through this very figure, the first one, by means of which the first syllogism also comes about. Let us assume that A stands for essence, C for animate being, E for sense‐perceptible being, B for logical being and D for human being. The first syllogism is that essence is predicated of every animate being, animate being is predicated of every logical being, and therefore essence is predicated of every logical being. Indeed, this is the first syllogism. Since the minor term, the logical being, contains the human being, you will draw from the content of the former a second conclusion: essence is predicated of every logical being, logical being is predicated of every human being, therefore essence is predicated of every human being. But even the middle term, the animate being, contains the sense‐perceptible being and you will draw another conclusion: essence is predicated of every animate being, animate being is predicated of every sense‐perceptible being, and therefore essence is predicated of every sense‐perceptible being. Similarly then more than one conclusion will be drawn also in the case of a universal

14 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

αἰσθητικὸν οὐδενὶ ἀναισθήτῳ, τὸ ἀναίσθητον παντὶ ἀψύχῳ, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἄρα οὐδενὶ ἀψύχῳ:–

t, XXXIIr

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8. Ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ οὐ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχήματος συνάγονται πάντα τὰ συμπεράσματα, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλων καὶ δι’ ἄλλων· οἷον συνήχθη ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει διὰ μέσου τοῦ ζῴου· τὸ δὲ περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ὅρου, ἤγουν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἤγουν τὸ γραμματικόν, συναχθήσεται ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι οὕτως· ὁ // λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ γραμματικῷ, καὶ ὁ λίθος ἄρα οὐδενὶ γραμματικῷ. ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ λογικόν, τὸ περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου, ἤγουν τοῦ ζῴου, ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι συναχθήσεται οὕτως· ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ζῴῳ (ἀντιστρέφει γὰρ ἡ ‘οὐδεὶς’ πρὸς ἑαυτήν), τὸ ζῷον παντὶ λογικῷ, καὶ ὁ λίθος ἄρα οὐδενὶ λογικῷ:–

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9. (53a25–26) Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος ἔσται μὲν συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ὑπὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα μόνον, ἤγουν τοῦ περιεχομένου· ὑπὸ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεως ἀποδεδειγμένης διὰ συλλογισμοῦ· ὁ γὰρ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἡ μείζων πρότασις, συμπέρασμα ἦν τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος, πᾶν δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀποδέδεικται διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ:–

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10. (53a29–30) 〈Τοῖς – Α·〉 τοῖς δὲ περιεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου· ἤγουν τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου, ἤγουν τοῦ Α, ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ λογικῷ, οὐ δῆλον γέγονεν διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἤγουν ἡ μείζων πρότασις, ἡ ‘ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ζῴῳ’, οὐ προαποδέδεικται διὰ συλλογισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀναπόδεικτος ἐλήφθη· καίτοι γε τὸ Β, ἤγουν ὁ λίθος, οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Ε, ἤγουν τῷ λογικῷ, διότι τὸ λογικὸν ὑπὸ τὸ Α ἐστί· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ

8. 2–10 συνήχθη – λογικῷ ] cf. diagr. 5

10. 1–8 Τοῖς – λογικοῦ ] cf. diagr. 5

7. 23 ἄρα om. D 8. 2 συνάγονται V : συνάγεται D δι’2 om. D 8. 2–3 συνήχθην D 8. 3 ὅτι om. D ὑπάρχει om. D 8. 4 ἤγουν om. D 8. 7 ἤγουν om. D 9. 2 τὸ συμπέρασμα2 D : τοῦ συμπεράσματος V 9. 5 τοῦ om. D 10. 1 lemma addidi 10. 1–2 ἤγουν – μέσου om. V ex homoeoteleuto 10. 2–4 ὑπὸ – πρότασις, ἡ V : ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου ὅρου τοῦ A· τὸ ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ λογικῶ, συνήχθην ἀπὸ μείζονος προτάσεως τῆς D 10. 5 ἐλήφθην D

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negative syllogism and the first syllogism is as follows: sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no being without sense perception, thing without sense perception is predicated of every stone, therefore sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no stone. And since the stone contains the magnet, you will draw a second conclusion as follows: sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no stone, stone is predicated of every magnet, therefore sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no magnet. Since the middle term, as it is without sense perception, contains the inanimate being, you will draw a new conclusion: sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no being without sense perception, sense‐perceptible being is predicated of every animate being, therefore sense‐perceptible being is predicated of no inanimate being. 8. In the second and in the third figure, not all conclusions are drawn by the same figure, but by a different one on each occasion; e.g. in the second figure it was inferred through the middle term living being that stone is predicated of no human being. The particular term, namely grammarian, which is subordinated to the minor term, namely human being, will be inferred in the first figure as follows: stone is predicated of no human being, human being is predicated of every grammarian, therefore stone is also predicated of no grammarian. Similarly, logical being, i.e. the particular term subordinated to the middle term, namely living being, will also be inferred in the first figure as follows: stone is predicated of no living being (for ‘no’ converts to itself), living being is predicated of every logical being, therefore stone is also predicated of no logical being. 9. In the case of the second figure, however, a syllogism will be possible only for what is subordinated to the conclusion, namely for the subordinated term. A syllogism for what is subordinated to the conclusion will be possible from a premise demonstrated by syllogism; for the major premise ‘stone is predicated of no human being’ was the conclusion of the second figure and every conclusion has been demonstrated by a syllogism. 10. To the terms subordinated to the middle term; or rather the conclusion of the terms which are subordinated to the middle term, namely to A, that stone is predicated of no logical being, has not become clear by means of a syllogism; or rather, the major premise, that ‘stone is predicated of no living being’, has not been demonstrated before, but it was received undemonstrated. Furthermore B, namely the stone, is predicated of no E, namely of no

16 | Sectio I, schol. 1–13

Β ἀποφάσκεται τοῦ Α, ἤγουν τοῦ ζῴου, ἀποφανθήσεται καὶ τοῦ Ε, ἤγουν τοῦ λογικοῦ:– [(10–13) D]

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11. (53a31–34) 〈Ἀλλὰ – μὴ ὑπάρχειν.〉 ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ, ἀπεδείχθη διὰ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος καὶ συμπέρασμα τούτου ἐστί· μείζων δὲ πρότασις ἐλήφθη τοῦ συμπεράσματος, τοῦ ‘ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει γραμματικῷ’. ὅτι δὲ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Α, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μείζων πρότασις τοῦ ὅτι ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ τῷ Ε, ἤγουν τῷ λογικῷ, ἀναπόδεικτός ἐστι· ὥστε συνήχθη τὸ Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Ε οὐ διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν, ἤγουν οὐκ ἀπό τινος προτάσεως ἀποδεδειγμένης διὰ συλλογισμοῦ:– [⇐ 10] 12. (53a34–37) 〈Ἐπὶ – συλλογισμόν.〉 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν, τῶν μὲν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ συμπεράσματος οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἤγουν οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον συμπέρασμα συνάγεται, διότι οὐδὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν μερικήν· τῶν δὲ περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἔσται συλλογισμός, πλὴν οὐ διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν, ἤγουν πλὴν οὐ γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν, ἤγουν διὰ προτάσεως ἀποδεδειγμένης ἔκ τινος συλλογισμοῦ:– [⇐ 10] 13. (53b3) Ὥστ’ ἢ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ ἔσται ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων· ἤγουν, ὥστε ἢ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ, ἤγουν ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου συλλογισμῶν, ἔσται τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου περιεχομένου συναχθὲν συμπέρασμα ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένης προτάσεως, καὶ λοιπὸν οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου περιεχομένου συναχθὲν συμπέρασμα ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένης ἔσται προτάσεως· εἰ δ’ ἐπ’ ἐκείνων τῶν καθόλου ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένης προτάσεως συνεπεράνθη τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ περιεχομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερικῶν ἄρα συλλογισμῶν ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένης προτάσεως συναχθήσεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ περιεχομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου:– [⇐ 10]

11. 1–7 ἀλλ’ – συλλογισμοῦ ] cf. diagr. 5 10. 7 post ἀποφάσκεται add. ἀπὸ V post καὶ add. ἀπὸ V 10. 7–8 ἤγουν τοῦ λογικοῦ om. V 11. 1 lemma addidi 11. 2–3 τούτου ἐστί V : τοῦτο ἐστίν, ἤγουν τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος, ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ D 11. 4 ὑπάρχει om. D 12. 1 lemma addidi 12. 2–3 οὐκ – ἤγουν om. D 12. 5–7 ἤγουν – συλλογισμοῦ V : ἤγουν οὐ διὰ πρότασιν ἀποδεδειγμένην ἔκ τινος συλλογισμοῦ, συνάγεται τὸ συμπέρασμα τῶν περιεχομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ μέσου D 13. 1–2 ἔσται – ἐκεῖ om. D ex homoeoteleuto 13. 4–5 τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ – ἔσται προτάσεως om. D

In Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38 – 53b3

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logical being, because logical being is subordinated to A; and since B is denied of A, namely of the living being, it is will also be denied of E, namely of the logical being. 11. That B is predicated of no C, however, was demonstrated by a syllogism of the second figure and is conclusion of the latter; it was taken as major premise leading to the conclusion that ‘stone is predicated of no grammarian’. But that B is predicated of no A, which is exactly the major premise leading to the conclusion that stone is predicated of no E, namely of no logical being, is undemonstrated. Consequently, that B is predicated of no E was not inferred because of the syllogism, or rather it does not result from a premise demonstrated by means of syllogism. 12. In the case of the particular syllogisms no necessary result will be possible for terms subordinated to the conclusion, or rather no necessary conclusion is drawn since no syllogism came about in the first place because the major premise is particular. On the other hand, a syllogism will be possible for terms subordinated to the middle term, but not because of the syllogism, or rather because of a premise demonstrated from some syllogism. 13. Consequently either a syllogism will not be possible there, or else it will be possible here too; or rather, either a conclusion for a term subordinated to the middle term and drawn from a demonstrated premise will not be possible there, namely in the case of the universal syllogisms, and then neither a conclusion for a term subordinated to the middle term and drawn from a demonstrated premise will be possible in the case of particular syllogisms. If a conclusion for a term subordinated to the middle term is drawn from a demonstrated premise in the former case, then a conclusion for a term subordinated to the middle term will also be drawn from a demonstrated premise in the latter case.

18 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

II 〈Περὶ τοῦ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συνάγειν συμπέρασμα〉

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14. (53b4) Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ’ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ τῷ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συνάγειν συμπέρασμα τοῦ ‘ὅτι’ γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ‘διότι’ (ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ‘διότι’ ἐστί), λοιπὸν αἱ ψευδεῖς προτάσεις, κἂν ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα συνάγωσί ποτε, παρεμποδίζουσι τὸν ἀληθῶς συλλογισμὸν ὥστε συνάξαι συμπέρασμα τοῦ ‘διότι’. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διδάσκει τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συνάγεσθαί ποτε συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, ἵνα ἀποδεικτικῶς συλλογιζόμενος τηρῇς τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν προτάσεις ψευδεῖς. γίνωσκε δὲ ὅτι ἐξ ἀληθῶν προτάσεων ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς συνάγεται συμπέρασμα, ἐκ δὲ ψευδῶν ποτὲ 〈μὲν〉 ἀληθές, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδές. εἰ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι ψευδές, ἀνάγκη καὶ ψευδεῖς εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις, ἐξ ὧν συνήχθη· εἰ γοῦν τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστιν ἀληθές, ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἤγουν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τὰς προτάσεις, ἐξ ὧν συνήχθη, ἔστι δέ, ὥστε ἢ πολλάκις εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς ἢ πολλάκις ἡ μία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ψευδής· τὸ δὲ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συμπέρασμα συναγόμενον ἢ ἀληθές ἐστι ἢ ψευδὲς ἐξ ἀνάγκης:– [= U] 15. (53b8–9) 〈Πλὴν – ὅτι.〉 ὅταν μὲν ὁ μέσος ὅρος οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμὸς τοῦ μείζονος ἄκρου, τότε γίνεται συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ‘ὅτι’· οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν, πᾶν ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν λογικόν, πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος λογικός· καὶ ὅτι μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λογικός, συνῆξας, διατί δέ ἐστι λογικός, οὐ συνῆξας· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον λογικόν. εἰ δ’ εἴπῃς οὕτως, ὁ ἄνθρωπος λόγῳ χρᾶται, πᾶς ὁ λόγῳ χρώμενος λογικός, πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος λογικός, τὸ ‘διότι’, ἤγουν τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπέδωκας τοῦ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον λογικόν· ὁ γὰρ μέσος ὅρος ὁρισμός ἐστι τοῦ λογικοῦ:– [(15–22) D] 16. (53b11–16) 〈Πρῶτον – ἀδύνατον.〉 ὅτι δὲ ἐξ ἀληθῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συνάγεται συμπέρασμα, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τούτου. καὶ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ῥηθέντος λαμβάνει τὸ μὲν Α ἀντὶ δύο προτάσεων ὡς ἡγούμενον, τὸ δὲ Β ὡς συμπέρασμα καὶ ἑπόμενον, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἡγούμενον, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἑπόμενον· καὶ ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ μὴ

Tit. sect. II Περὶ – συμπέρασμα addidi (cf. schol. 2.1–2; 33) 14. 1 Ἔστι – εἶναι VD : ἄλλως U τῷ UV : τὸ D 14. 3 τοῦ2 UV : τὸ D 14. 4 ποτὲ συνάγωσι D 14. 5 ἀληθῶς V (cf. Magent. In Soph. El. δ΄.24–25) : ἀποδεικτικὸν UD 14. 9 μὲν addidi ut Eβ post ψευδές add. συνάγεται συμπέρασμα D 14. 10 συνήχθην D 14. 11 ἤγουν D : ἢ UV 14. 12 post ὥστε add. ἤγουν VD ἢ1 om. U 14. 13 ἀληθής … ψευδής VD : ψευδής … ἀληθής U 15. 1 lemma addidi cum SP 15. 3 πᾶν ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν om. D ex homoeoteleuto 15. 6 εἴπῃς scripsi cum SF : εἴπς V : εἴποις D 16. 1 lemma addidi 16. 2 συμπέρασμα συνάγεται D 16. 3 post προτάσεων add. καὶ D 16. 4 post ἄνθρωπος add. ἐστὶ D 14. 1–14 Ἐπειδὴ – ἀνάγκης ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 391.26–392.14 16. 1–14 ὅτι – συμπέρασμα ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 392.20–28

In Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b4 – 4, 57b17

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II On Drawing a True Conclusion From False Premises 14. It is indeed possible for circumstances to be such that the premises are true. Since a syllogism with respect to a ‘fact’ yet not with respect to the ‘reason why’ (a demonstration is a syllogism in respect of the ‘reason why’) comes about by drawing a true conclusion from false premises, then false premises – even if they lead to a true conclusion – impede the demonstrative syllogism so as to lead to a conclusion with respect to the ‘reason why’. And he teaches about the occasional drawing of a true conclusion from false premises for the following reason: in order that you guard yourself from assuming false premises when forming a syllogism demonstratively. Know moreover that a true conclusion is always drawn from true premises; when drawn from false promises, however, a conclusion is on one occasion true, on another false. And if the conclusion is false, it is then necessary for the premises, from which the former was drawn, to be also false. If then the conclusion is true, it is then possible for the premises, from which the conclusion was drawn, to be such, namely to be true, but it is possible for the premises often to be either false, or the one is true whereas the other one is false. A conclusion drawn from false premises, however, is either true or false by necessity. 15. Whenever a middle term is not the definition of the major extreme term, then a syllogism comes about with respect to ‘fact’; e.g. a human being is a walking erect being, every walking erect being is logical, therefore every human being is logical. And you drew the conclusion that a human being is logical, but you did not infer the reason for which a human being is logical; for the ability to walk erect is not the cause for a human to be logical. But if you had said as follows, ‘a human being makes use of speech, everyone who makes use of speech is logical, therefore a human being is logical’, then you would have given a definition of the ‘reason why’, namely of the cause, by which a human being is logical; for the middle term is the definition of the logical being. 16. That a true conclusion is drawn from true premises is evident from this passage. And as a demonstration of what has been said, he takes A in the place of two premises as antecedent, whereas he takes B as conclusion and consequent; just as human being also is an antecedent, whereas living being is consequent. And just as if there is a human being, then by necessity

20 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

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t, XXXIIv

ὄντος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται, οὕτω καί, εἰ μὲν τὸ Α ἐστί, ἤγουν ἂν αἱ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Β, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, εἶναι ἀληθές· τοῦ δὲ Β μὴ ὄντος, τουτέστι τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ψευδοῦς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α, ἤγουν τὰς προτάσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς· εἰ ἄρα αἱ προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι. εἰ δέ τις ἐνίσταται λέγων ἐξ ἀληθῶν προτάσεων ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα γίνεσθαι, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ συμπέρασμα ἅμα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἤγουν καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψευδὲς εἶναι· ἀληθὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὴν ‘ὅτι ἐξ ἀληθῶν ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα συνάγεται’, ψευδὲς δὲ διὰ τὴν ἔνστασιν τοῦ διισχυριζομένου ἐξ ἀληθῶν ψευδὲς συνάγεσθαι συμπέρασμα:– [⇐ 15] 17. (53b16–23) 〈Μὴ – οὐχ ὑπάρξει.〉 εἰ δὲ καὶ εἶπον ὅτι τοῦ Α ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τὸ Β, μὴ ὑπολάβῃ τις ὅτι τὸ Α ἀντὶ ἑνὸς ὅρου ἢ μιᾶς προτάσεως ἔλαβον, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ δύο προτάσεων. εἶτα λαμβάνει ἀληθεῖς προτάσεις καὶ συλλογίζεται ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα· τὸ μὲν Α παντὶ ᾧ τὸ Β, ἤγουν παντὶ ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχει τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχει παντὶ ᾧ τὸ Γ, ἤγουν παντὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα ἀληθῶς ὑπάρξει παντὶ ᾧ τὸ Γ, ἤγουν // παντὶ τῷ Γ· καὶ οὐ δυνατὸν τοῦτο τὸ ΑΓ ψευδὲς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ᾖ καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψευδές· ἀληθὲς μὲν ὡς ἐξ ἀληθῶν συναχθέν, ψευδὲς δὲ κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὑπόθεσιν:– [⇐ 15] 18. (53b23–24) 〈Τὸ – συλληφθεῖσαι.〉 τὸ γοῦν Α τὸ ἕν, ἤγουν ὅπερ ἐλήφθη ὡς εἷς ὅρος, κεῖται ἀντὶ δύο προτάσεων:– [⇐ 15] 19. (53b24–25) Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερητικῶν συλλογισμῶν· ἐὰν αἱ προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ἐσται· οἷον ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ζῴῳ, τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ:– [⇐ 15]

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20. (53b27–28) Ταύτης δὲ οὐχ ὁποτέρας ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δευτέρας, ἤγουν τῆς ἐλάττονος· ἐὰν γὰρ ἡ μείζων πρότασίς ἐστι διόλου ψευδής, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων διόλου ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται ψευδὲς διὰ τὸ τὴν μείζονα περιέχειν τὴν ἐλάττονα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡ μείζων ἐστὶ διόλου ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων διόλου ψευδής, ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ἐὰν δὲ λαμβάνωνται

16. 11 post αὐτὸ add. καὶ ἓν D 16. 13 δὲ om. D 17. 1 lemma addidi 17. 8 ὡς om. D 18. 1 lemma addidi ἐλήφθην D

In Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b4 – 4, 57b17

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there is also a living being, and if there is no living being, then there will be no human either, just so, if there is A, or rather if the premises are true, then it is necessary also for B, namely the conclusion, to be true. Or rather, it is necessary for the conclusion to be true. If there is no B, that is to say if the conclusion is false, it is necessary for A also not to be false, or rather it is necessary for the premises to be false. If, therefore, the premises are true, it is then necessary also for the conclusion to be true. If, however, someone objects by saying that a false conclusion comes about from true premises, it will then follow for the same conclusion to be and not to be possible at the same time, or rather not only to be true, but also false. It would be true in accordance with the assumption ‘that a true conclusion is drawn from true premises’, and false because of the objection made by a person affirming that a false conclusion is drawn from true premises. 17. Even though I said that if there is A, then B will follow by necessity, one should not suppose that I assumed A in the place of a single term or a single premise, but in the place of two premises. Next, Aristotle takes true premises and infers a true conclusion: A is predicated of everything of which B is predicated, or rather the former truly belongs to all B, whereas B truly belongs to everything to which C belongs, or rather it is predicated of all C, and therefore A will truly belong to everything to which C belongs, or rather it is predicated of all C. And it is not possible for this AC to be false, in order that the same thing should not be both true and false; true since it was inferred from true premises, but false in accordance with your assumption. 18. A, then, the one thing, or rather exactly what was taken as a single term, is posited in the place of two premises. 19. And this happens similarly also in the case of privative syllogisms; if the premises are true, then the conclusion will also be true; e.g. stone is predicated of no living being, living being is predicated of every human being, therefore stone is predicated of no human being. 20. This cannot be either of the two premises, but only the second one, namely the minor premise. For if the major premise is altogether false, whereas the minor one is altogether true, then the conclusion will also be false for the reason that the major premise contains the minor one. If the major premise is altogether true, whereas the minor one is altogether false, then

22 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

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αἱ προτάσεις οὐ διόλου ψευδεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατά τι, κἄν τε αἱ δύο εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς κατά τι, κἄν τε ἡ μείζων ἐστὶ κατά τι ψευδής, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων διόλου ἀληθής, τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστιν ἀληθές· κἂν ἡ μείζων ἐστὶ διόλου ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων κατά τι ψευδής, καὶ οὕτω τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης λαμβάνει ψευδεῖς προτάσεις καὶ συνάγει ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα· ληπτέον δὲ ὅρους 〈ἐξ〉 ὧν συμπλεκομένων ψευδῶς ψευδὲς συνάγεται συμπέρασμα· οἷον ὁ λίθος παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ ἵππῳ, καὶ ὁ λίθος ἄρα παντὶ ἵππῳ:– [⇐ 15] 21. (54a4–5) Λέγω δὲ ὅλην ψευδῆ τὴν ἐναντίαν. ἐναντίως ἀντίκειται, ὡς ἔμαθες, ἡ ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐδείς’, ὥστε, εἰ ἀληθεύει ἡ ‘οὐδείς’, ὡς ‘τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ λίθῳ’, τὸ ‘παντὶ’ ψεύδεται· καὶ εἰ τὸ ‘παντὶ’ ἀληθεύει, ἡ ἐναντία, ἤγουν ἡ ‘οὐδείς’, ψεύδεται διόλου· ἡ δὲ γυμνασία αὕτη θεωρείσθω ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἀδυνάτου ὕλης· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ψεύδεται καὶ ἡ ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐδείς’· ὥστε, ἐὰν 〈ἡ〉 ‘ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ λευκῷ’ ψεύδηται, οὐκ ἀληθεύει τὸ ‘παντί’, ἀλλὰ τὸ ‘τινί’· εἰ δὲ λάβῃς ὅτι τὸ ζῷον παντὶ λευκῷ, ψεύδεται καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἡ ἐναντία, ἡ ‘οὐδείς’, ἡ δὲ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ ἀληθεύει:– [⇐ 15 || = U] 22. (54a31–32) Οἷον ὅσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους εἴδη μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα· ἤγουν, εἰ λάβῃς τὸ Β ἵππον, τὸ δὲ Γ ἄνθρωπον, ἅ εἰσιν εἴδη εἰδικώτατα καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τοῦ Α, ἤγουν τοῦ ζῴου:– [⇐ 15] 23. (54a38) Οἷον τοῖς ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἴδεσι τὸ ἕτερον γένος. ἡ μουσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ εἴδη εἰσὶν εἰδικώτατα ἄλλου γένους, ἤγουν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἤγουν 〈οὐ〉 τοῦ ζῴου:– [(23–24) D]

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24. (54b13–14) 〈Ἡ – θεωρητικῇ.〉 ἡ φρόνησις ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἕξει θεωρητικῇ, ἤγουν ἐπιστήμῃ τινὶ θεωρητικῇ. τῶν δὲ ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι πρακτικαί, ὡς αἱ ἠθικαί, αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ αἱ οἰκονομικαί, ἐφ’ ὅσων οὐκ ἀνάγκη γνῶναι μόνον ἃ διατάττονται περὶ ἀρετῶν, ἢ ἠθικῶν, ἢ πολιτικῶν, ἢ οἰκονομικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν αὐτά· θεωρητικαὶ δὲ ὡς ἡ γεωμετρία, ἡ ἀστρονομία, ἡ μουσική, ἐφ’ αἷς ἀνάγκη γνῶναι μόνον τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν διαταττόμενα, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαι ταῦτα· ὅτι γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς σφαιροειδής ἐστι ἢ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, γνῶναι μόνον ἀπαιτούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν ποιῆσαι ἢ οὐρανόν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν

20. 11 ἐξ addidi 21. 1 Λέγω – ἐναντίαν om. U 21. 2 ἀληθεύει UV : ἀληθὴς D 21. 3 ἀληθεύει UV : ἀλήθεια D ἤγουν om. D 21. 6 ἡ addidi ἀληθεύει UV : ἀλήθεια D 21. 7 τὸ1 om. D 22. 1–3 Οἷον – ζῴου iter. et cancell. V 23. 3 οὐ addidi cum β 24. 1 lemma addidi 24. 2 δὲ UV : γὰρ D 24. 3 αἱ2 V s.l. 24. 4 ἢ1 om. U 24. 5 αὐτά D : αὐτ’ V ἡ γεωμετρία, ἡ ἀστρονομία correxi : ἡ φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς, τὸ περὶ οὐρανοῦ, τὰ μετέωρα, ἡ γεωμετρία, ἡ ἀστρονομία UV : ἡ φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς, τὸ περὶ οὐρανοῦ, ἡ γεωμετρία, ἡ ἀστρονομία, τὰ μετέωρα D 24. 6 μόνον γνῶναι D 24. 7 τὸ1 post ὅτι add. μὲν D ἐστι om. D

In Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b4 – 4, 57b17

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the conclusion will be true for the same reason. If the premises are taken as not altogether false, but as partially false, even if they are both partially false, even if the major premise is partially false whereas the minor one altogether true, then the conclusion is true. Even if the major premise is altogether true, whereas the minor one is partially false, then the conclusion even in this way is true. And Aristotle takes indeed false premises and draws a true conclusion; one, however, must take terms from which a false conclusion is drawn in case they are falsely conjoined; e.g. stone is predicated of every human being, human being is predicated of every horse, therefore stone is predicated of every horse. 21. By wholly false I mean the contrary premise. ‘All’ and ‘no’ are – as you learned – contrarily opposed, so that, if ‘no’ is true, as for instance ‘living being is predicated of no stone’, then ‘to all’ is false; and, if ‘to all’ is true, then its contrary, namely ‘no’, is altogether false. And let this exercise be considered in the case of the necessary and impossible matter; concerning the possible matter, however, both ‘all’ and ‘no’ are false. Consequently, if the statement ‘stone is predicated of no white thing’ is false, then ‘to all’ is not true, but the ‘to some’ is. If you assume that living being is predicated of everything white, then both this statement and its contrary, ‘no’, are false, but ‘not all’ is true. 22. E.g. as such species of the same genus, which are not subordinate to the other; or rather, in case you assume that B stands for horse, whereas C stands for human being, which are both the narrowest species of A, namely of living being, and not subordinate one to the other. 23. E.g. a genus to the species of another genus. Music and medicine are narrowest species of another genus, namely of science, or rather they are not species of the living being. 24. Practical wisdom is the property of some theoretical skill, or rather of some theoretical science. Some of the sciences are practical, like ethics, politics and the study of household management. In the case of such sciences it is not only necessary to know the things which are classified with regard to either ethical, or political, or financial virtues, but also to practice them. On the other hand, there are theoretical sciences, like geometry, astronomy, music, for all of which it is necessary only to know what is classified within them, but surely not to practice them all: we demand that others know that the heaven

24 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

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τινῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐ χρεία φρονήσεως, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς φησι ‘νέον μὲν φιλόσοφον ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, φρόνιμον δὲ οὐ’· ἡ γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν πολλὰ πράγματα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς γέρουσι μᾶλλον ἡ τοιαύτη προσήκει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀστρονομίας θεωρεῖται ἡ φρόνησις ἐν τοῖς μετερχομένοις αὐτήν, διότι ἐκ πολλῶν παρατηρημάτων αὕτη συνέστηκεν· μυριάκις γὰρ ἰδόντες οἱ τὴν ἀστρονομίαν συστήσαντες τόνδε τὸν ἀστέρα ἑσπέριον ἀνατείλαντα εἴθ’ οὕτως δύσαντα περὶ μέσας νύκτας, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον ἀστέρα κατὰ τὸ μεσαίτατον τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνατείλαντα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἥλιος κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἔαρος ἐν τῷ Κριῷ ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀλλήλοις τὰς παρατηρήσεις ταύτας παραπεμψάμενοι οὕτως περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξαν:– [⇐ 23 || = U] 25. (55a14–15) Τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ ἀριθμῷ. ‘ἀριθμὸν’ νοητέον ἐνταῦθα μὴ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ πράγματα (ἔν τισι γὰρ τούτων θεωρεῖται τὸ ζῷον· ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ βοῦς ἀριθμοί εἰσιν ὡς ἀριθμητά), ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀριθμόν· δύναμιν γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τοῦ ἀριθμεῖν. ὥστε ἀριθμὸς λέγεται καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ πράγματα, καὶ ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος ὁ ἀριθμῶν καὶ μετρῶν τὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν πεφύκαμεν ἀριθμεῖν:– [(25–26 D) || = U] 26. (55a15) Λευκῷ δὲ τινί. ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ‘τὸ ζῷον οὐ παντὶ λευκῷ’ (ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς ‘οὐδεὶς’ καὶ 〈τῆς〉 ‘τὶς’ τὸ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ συνάγεται) εἶπε ‘τὸ ζῷον τινὶ λευκῷ’· ἡ γάρ ‘τὶς’ καὶ 〈ἡ〉 ‘οὐ πᾶς’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης ἰσοδυναμοῦσι:– [⇐ 25]

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27. (57a40–b1) Αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ δύο πρὸς ἄλληλα. διδάξας ὅτι ψευδῶν οὐσῶν τῶν προτάσεων ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθὲς συνάγεται συμπέρασμα, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδές, ἀληθῶν δὲ οὐσῶν τῶν προτάσεων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα συνάγεται, τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ψευδοῦς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἱ προτάσεις ψευδεῖς εἰσι, τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος ἀληθοῦς ὄντος ἐνδέχεται τὰς προτάσεις ἢ ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι, νῦν πειρᾶται εἰπεῖν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν, δι’ ἣν τοῦτο οὕτω γίνεται. ἡ δὲ αἰτία τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς προτάσεις ἐπέχειν λόγον

24. 10 ἔστιν UV : ἔσται D δὲ UV : δ᾽ D 24. 11 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ om. D post τοῦτο add. γὰρ D 24. 12 ἡ τοιαύτη om. D ἐπὶ UV : ἐν D 24. 14 μυριάκις γὰρ UV : πολλάκις δὲ D οἱ – συστήσαντες UV : οἱ ἀστρονόμοι D 24. 15 εἴθ’ οὕτως UV : καὶ D 24. 16 ἀστέρα om. D ὅτι UV : ὡς D 24. 17 καὶ om. V 25. 1 Τὸ – ἀριθμῷ om. U 25. 4 τοῦ om. D 25. 5 καὶ μετρῶν om. D 26. 2 τῆς addidi 26. 3 ἡ addidi cum β 27. 1 δ’ Arist. et V : δὲ D 27. 2 συμπέρασμα συνάγεται D 27. 3 post ἀληθὲς add. εἶναι D 27. 5 τοῦ – ὄντος V : ἀληθοῦς δὲ ὄντος D 27. 6 ἢ1 om. D πειρᾶται εἰπεῖν V : λέγει D 27. 7 ἡ δὲ – ἐστὶ V : αἰτία δέ ἐστι τούτου D 24. 10 cf. EN VI 9, 1142a12–13 27. 1–6 διδάξας – εἶναι ] cf. schol. 12

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is spherical or that a soul is immortal, but surely we do not demand that they also create a soul or a heaven. In the case then of some theoretical sciences, there is no need for practical wisdom, for which reason Aristotle says in the Ethics ‘one can know a young philosopher, but not a young man possessing practical wisdom’; for practical wisdom becomes incidental to a human being by having known many things, and, for this reason, such ability rather befits elderly individuals. In the case of astronomy, on the other hand, practical wisdom is observed among those who go in search of it, since the latter has been put together from many observations: for they have seen a certain star thousand times over rising in the evening or even so setting down around midnight, and moreover another star rising up in the very middle of the night, and that the Sun is in front of Aries at the start of spring. The founders of astronomy taught about these matters in this manner, and passed on these observations in turn. 25. Living being is predicated of no number. By ‘number’ one must not understand here the things that can be counted (for living being is considered as predicated of some of them; for a human and a horse and an ox are numbers since they can be counted), but the number in the soul; for we have in ourselves the capacity to count. Consequently, countable things and the uttered speech which counts and measures things, and the capacity of the soul, in accordance with which we are naturally disposed to count, are called number. 26. Predicated of something white. Instead of saying ‘living being is not predicated of everything white’ (for ‘not all’ is inferred from ‘no’ and ‘some’), he said ‘living being is predicated of something white’; for ‘some’ and ‘all’ are equivalent in the case of the contingent matter. 27. The reason is that whenever two things are in this way related to each other. Having taught that if the premises are false, then a true conclusion is drawn at one time and a false one at another, but when the premises are true, then the drawn conclusion is true out of necessity, and that if a conclusion is false, then the premises are out of necessity also false, but if a conclusion is true, it is then possible for the premises to be either true or false, he is now also trying to explain the reason for which this happens. And the reason for this

26 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

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ἡγουμένου, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα λόγον ἑπομένου, ὅταν δὲ δύο ληφθῶσιν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἡγούμενόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῷον· ἀνθρώπου μὲν γὰρ ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῷόν ἐστι, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ζῷον καὶ μὴ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ εἶναι ἢ ἵππος ἢ βοῦς, εἰσάγεται λοιπὸν καὶ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἄνθρωπος ληφθείη ξύλον ἢ λίθος, οὐκ εἰσάγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι· καὶ πάλιν, ζῴου ὄντος ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄλλό τι τῶν εἰδῶν, ζῴου δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ’ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται οὔτ’ ἄλλό τι τῶν εἰδῶν. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν τὰς προτάσεις καὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν προτάσεις εἰσὶν ὡς ἡγούμεναι, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ὡς ἑπόμενον:– [(27–28) V || (27–29) D || U-] 28. (57a40–b1) 〈Αἴτιον – ἄλληλα.〉 ὅταν δὲ οὕτως ἔχῃ δύο πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἡγούμενον τὸ δ’ ἑπόμενον, ἀνάγκη θατέρου ὄντος, ἤγουν τοῦ ἡγουμένου ὄντος, τῶν προτάσεων δηλονότι οὐσῶν // ἀληθῶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀληθές· τούτου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ἤγουν τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ψευδοῦς, οὐδὲ θάτερον ἔσται· τουτέστιν οὐδὲ αἱ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἀληθοῦς οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι θάτερον· τουτέστιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται ἢ ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι:– [⇐ 27] 29. (57b3–4) Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος, ἤγουν τῶν δὲ προτάσεων οὐσῶν ἀληθῶν ἢ ψευδῶν, ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, ἤγουν ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν αἱ προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, εἰ δὲ αἱ προτάσεις εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς συνάγεσθαι συμπέρασμα· λέγω δὲ οἷον, τοῦ Α ὄντος λευκοῦ, ἤγουν τῶν προτάσεων οὐσῶν ἀληθῶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ Β, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐστὶ ἀληθές· τοῦ δὲ Α μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ, ἤγουν τῶν δὲ προτάσεων οὐσῶν ψευδῶν, ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τὸ Β, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἢ ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψευδές:– [⇐ 27] 30. (57b6–7) Ὅταν γὰρ τουδὶ ὄντος λευκοῦ, τοῦ Α. εἰπὼν τὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ἀληθοῦς οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἀλη-

27. 8 ἡγουμένου V : ἡγούμενον D τὸ δὲ V : καὶ τὸ D 27. 9 δὲ V : δ᾽ D 27. 12 ληφθῇ V : ληφθείη D ἢ1 om. D 27. 12–13 τὸ – ἄνθρωπος V : τοῦτο D 27. 13 λίθος ἢ ξύλον D 27. 14 καὶ om. D ἢ ἵππον om. D 27. 14–15 ζῴου2 – εἰδῶν om. V ex homoeoteleuto 27. 16 τὰς – συμπεράσματα D : ἃ εἴπομεν περὶ τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος V 28. 1 lemma addidi 28. 3 ὄντος om. D 28. 4 καὶ om. D 28. 5 τουτέστιν V : ἤγουν D 28. 7 τουτέστιν V : ἤγουν D 29. 1 δὲ om. D 29. 3 ἐστὶ V : ἔσται D 29. 4 δὲ V : δ᾽ D 29. 7 ἐστὶ V : ἔσται D 29. 8 δὲ2 om. D 30. 2–3 ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν D

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is that premises serve as an antecedent and a conclusion as a consequent, whenever two terms, of which one is antecedent and the other consequent, are assumed; e.g. human being and living being. For if there is a human being, then there is also a living being. If there is not any human being, then there is not any living being out of necessity, but it is possible for a living being to exist or not to exist; for if what is not a human being is taken to be either a horse or an ox, then it is further admitted that there is also a living being. But should what is not a human being be taken as wood or stone, then it would not be admitted that there is also a living being. And again, if there is a living being, then it is possible for either a human being, or a horse, or any other species to exist. But if there is not any living being, then neither a human being, nor any other species will exist out of necessity. The reason that premises and conclusions are so is that premises are like a precedent, whereas a conclusion is like a consequent. 28. Whenever two things are related to each other in such way that the one is the precedent, whereas the other is the consequent, then it is necessary in case one of them is real – or rather in case the antecedent is real, that is to say if the premises are true – for the other thing, namely for the conclusion, also to be true out of necessity. If the latter is not a fact, or rather if a conclusion is false, then the former will not be factual in the first place. That is to say, the premises will not have been true in the first place. If a conclusion is true, however, then it is not necessary for the former to be true. That is to say, it is not necessary for the premises to be true, but it is possible for them to be either true or false. 29. But it is impossible for the same thing, or rather for the true conclusion, to necessarily be a fact both when that same thing is real and not real, or rather when the premises are true or false. Yet, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true out of necessity; but if the premises are false, then the conclusion is not true out of necessity for the reason that it is possible for either a true or a false conclusion to be drawn from false premises. I mean, for instance, if A is white, or rather if the premises are true, then B, namely the conclusion, is also true out of necessity. But if A is not white, or rather if the premises are false, it is then impossible to say that B, namely the conclusion, is true out of necessity, but rather that it is possible that is is either true or false. 30. For whenever if this thing, A, is white. After saying the cause for which the premises are not true out of necessity, in case a conclusion is true, but

28 | Sectio II, schol. 14–31

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θεῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται ταύτας ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ προτάσεων οὐσῶν ἀληθῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἅπερ ἄνωθεν φθάσαντες ἐτεχνολογήσαμεν, νῦν πειρᾶται δεῖξαι ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ ἐκ τριῶν συλλογισμοῦ. ἐκ τριῶν δὲ λέγεται συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐκ τριῶν ὑποθέσεων συναγόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ Α ὄντος λευκοῦ, ἤγουν ἀληθῶν οὐσῶν τῶν προτάσεων, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ τὸ Β, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, εἶναι μέγα, τουτέστιν ἀληθές· μεγάλου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ Β, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ἀληθοῦς, εἴ τις εἴπῃ τὸ Γ μὴ λευκὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἤγουν τὰς προτάσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει ἀδύνατόν τι, ἤγουν τὸ εἰ τὸ Α λευκόν, εἰ ἀληθεῖς δηλονότι εἰσὶν αἱ προτάσεις, τὸ Γ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, ἤγουν συμβήσεται τὰς προτάσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· συνήχθη δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἄτοπον ἐκ τοῦ ὑποθεῖναι ὅτι τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ἀληθοῦς ἀνάγκη τὰς προτάσεις ψευδεῖς εἶναι. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἄτοπόν τι συνάγεται ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ὑποθέσεως, καλῶς ἄρα ἔφθασεν διδάξαι ὅτι τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ἀληθοῦς ἐνδέχεται τὰς προτάσεις ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι:– 31. (57b9–11) Καὶ ὅταν δύο ὄντων θατέρου μὲν ὄντος, ἤγουν τῶν προτάσεων οὐσῶν ἀληθῶν, ἀνάγκη θάτερον εἶναι, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές· τούτου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ἤγουν τοῦ δὲ συμπεράσματος ψευδοῦς ὄντος, ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον μὴ εἶναι, ἤγουν τὰς προτάσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς. ὅτι δὲ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ψευδοῦς αἱ προτάσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς, ἀποδείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ ἐκ τριῶν συλλογισμοῦ καὶ φησί ‘τοῦ Β μὴ ὄντος μεγάλου, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος οὐκ ὄντος ἀληθοῦς, τὸ Α οὐχ οἷόν τε λευκὸν εἶναι, ἤγουν αἱ προτάσεις οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς· τοῦ δὲ Α μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ, ἤγουν τῶν δὲ προτάσεων οὐσῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶν, εἴ τις εἴπῃ ἀνάγκη τὸ Β μέγα εἶναι, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι, συμβαίνει ἀδύνατόν τι, ὅτι τοῦ Β μεγάλου μὴ ὄντος, ἤγουν τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὄντος ψευδοῦς, αὐτὸ τὸ Β, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐστὶ μέγα, τουτέστιν ἀληθὲς ἐξ ἀνάγκης. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀδύνατόν τι συνάγεται ἐκ τοῦ ὑποθεῖναι ὅτι τῶν προτάσεων οὐκ ἀληθῶν οὐσῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές, καλῶς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδίδαξα ὅτι τῶν προτάσεων οὐκ οὐσῶν ἀληθῶν ἐνδέχεται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς εἶναι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συναχθήσεται’:– [V ⇒ 33]

30. 4 ἐστὶ D : εἶναι V ἅπερ V : ἃ D 30. 5 ἄνωθεν V i.r. φθάσαντες om. D πειρᾶται δεῖξαι V : δείκνυσι D ante διὰ add. καὶ D 30. 9 εἴπῃ V : εἴποι D 30. 11 ante εἰ2 add. τουτέστιν D δηλονότι om. D εἰσὶν post schol. 30.11–12 προτάσεις transp. D 30. 12 post τὸ add. δὲ D 30. 14 εἶναι ψευδεῖς D 30. 15 ἔφθασεν V : ἔφθην D 30. 17 εἶναι post schol. 33.16 ἀληθεῖς transp. D 31. 1 θατέρου D : θατρ ´ V 31. 5 ἀποδείκνυσι V : δείκνυσι D 31. 9 εἴπῃ V : εἴποι D 31. 11 ἐστὶ correxi : εἶναι VD 31. 13 ἐστὶ V : εἶναι D 31. 16 συναχθήσεται V : συμβήσεται D 30. 4–5 ἅπερ – ἐτεχνολογήσαμεν ] cf. schol. 16 et 27 30. 14–17 καὶ ἐπεὶ – εἶναι ] cf. schol. 31.12–17 31. 12–15 καὶ ἐπεὶ – εἶναι ] cf. schol. 30.14–17

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it is possible for the premises to be either true or false, and if the premises are true then the conclusion is also true out of necessity, and the rest of the things that we have previously systematised above, Aristotle now attempts to show them through a syllogism from three terms. And a syllogism from three terms is called the one that is formed from three assumptions: for if A is white, or rather, if the premises are true, then it is necessary for this B, namely the conclusion, to be large, that is to say to be true. And if B is large, or rather if the conclusion is true, if someone says that it is necessary for C to be not white, namely for the premises to be false, then this results in something necessarily impossible. Or rather, that if A is white, that is to say if the premises are true, then C is not white; or rather this will result in the premises being false, which is absurd. And this absurdity was inferred by supposing that if the conclusion was true, then it was necessary for the premises to have been false. And since an absurdity is inferred from an assumption such as this, he did well therefore to teach earlier that if a conclusion is true, then it is possible that the premises are true or false. 31. And when there are two things and one of them is, namely when the premises are true, then it is necessary for the other thing to be, namely then the conclusion is true. But when the latter is not, namely when the conclusion is false, then it is necessary for the first thing not to be, namely it is necessary for the premises to be false. Aristotle demonstrates that the premises are by necessity false in cases when a conclusion is false through a syllogism by three terms and says, ‘if B is not large’, or rather if a conclusion is not true, ‘then it is not possible for A to be white’, or rather then the premises are not true. ‘And if A is not white’, namely if the premises are not true, ‘if someone says that it is necessary for B to be large’, namely that the conclusion is true, ‘this then results in something impossible, that even though B is not large’, namely even though the conclusion is false, ‘this same B’, namely the conclusion, ‘is large, that is to say true out of necessity. And since something impossible is inferred by the assumption that if the premises are not true, then the conclusion is by necessity true, therefore I myself, too, taught well that if the premises are not true, then it is possible for the conclusion to be true or false; for nothing impossible will be inferred from this assumption’.

30 | Sectio III, schol. 32–48

III Περὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως

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32. (57b18–58a12) [〈Τὸ δὲ – ὑπάρχειν.〉 δείξας ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πῶς ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων ἐγχωρεῖ συμπέρασμα ἀληθὲς συνάγεσθαι, νῦν ἑτέρας ὑποθέσεως ἄρχεται· ἡ γὰρ πραγματεία ἥδε εἰς διάφορα κεφάλαια κατακερματίζεται. διδάσκει οὖν περὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως· παρεμποδιστικὴ γὰρ αὕτη τῇ ἀποδείξει· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἄλλα ἔχει τὰ αἴτια καὶ ἄλλα τὰ αἰτιατά, τὰ μὲν κατηγορούμενα λαμβάνουσα καθολικώτερα, τὰ δ’ ὑποκείμενα μερικώτερα· ἡ δὲ κύκλῳ δεῖξις τὰ αὐτὰ λαμβάνει καὶ αἴτια καὶ αἰτιατά ἴσους ἔχουσα καὶ τοὺς κατηγορουμένους καὶ ὑποκειμένους, καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀντιστρέφοντας. ἔστι δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἀποδειχθὲν συμπέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων ἀντεστραμμένως, καὶ συμπεραίνειν τὰ λοιπά· νῦν μὲν τὴν μείζονα διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος, νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐλάττονα διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς μείζονος. κύκλῳ δὲ δεῖξις καὶ διάλληλος 〈οὐ〉 ταὐτόν ἐστι· κύκλῳ μὲν γὰρ δεῖξις λέγεται, ὅτε διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὰς προτάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν προτάσεων εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, διάλληλος δέ, ὅτε ἑκατέρα δι’ ἑκατέρων δείκνυται. ‘ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἀντιστρέφουσιν’ εἶπεν, ἵνα διαστείλῃ τὴν ἀληθῆ κύκλῳ δεῖξιν ἐκ τῆς ψευδοῦς· ὅταν γὰρ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφωσιν οἱ ὅροι, ψευδὴς ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις· οἷον εἰ λάβῃς οὐσίαν, ζῷον καὶ ἄνθρωπον· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἱκανὰ πρὸς διόρθωσιν τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως. ἔτι δὲ προσεπεξεργαζόμενος καὶ σαφηνίζων τὸ πρᾶγμα ἓξ ἡμῖν συνάγει συμπεράσματα τῇ κύκλῳ δείξει χρώμενος· ἓν μὲν γάρ, τὸ ΑΓ, διὰ μέσου τοῦ Β, ἕτερον δέ, τὸ ΑΒ, διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως ἀντεστραμμένης, καὶ τὴν ΒΓ τρίτον συμπέρασμα διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς μείζονος προτάσεως· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ΒΓ // ἀντεστραμμένως ἐδείχθη πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ΑΒ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἡ ΒΑ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ΒΓ συμπεράσματος, ἀποδείξεως αὗται δέονται αἱ ἀντιστραφεῖσαι προτάσεις· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ ὅτι τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἐδείχθη διὰ συλλογισμοῦ, οὐ μέντοι γε δὲ δῆλον ἂν καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Β παντί, ἤγουν τὸ Β τῷ Α· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνονται καὶ ἕτεροι δύο συλλογισμοὶ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τούτων καὶ ἀποτελοῦνται τὰ ὅλα συμπεράσματα πέντε· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν συμπερασμάτων ἀντιστροφὴ κατελήφθη ἀναπόδεικτος· ὅτι μὲν τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ, ἐδείχθη διὰ συλλογισμοῦ,

32. 17–32 οἷον – ἕξ ] cf. diagr. 6 32. 1–32 schol. 32 seclusi (cf. schol. 33.1 app. crit.) 32. 1 lemma addidi 32. 12 οὐ addidi 32. 30 κατελήφθην D 32. 4 διδάσκει – ἀποδείξει ] cf. schol. 1.17–18 5, 57b32

32. 15 ἐν – ἀντιστρέφουσιν ] cf. Anal. Pr. II

In Anal. Pr. II 5, 57b18 – 7, 59a31

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III On Circular Proof 32. [Having shown in what way it is possible to draw a true conclusion from false premises, Aristotle now begins another subject, for this work is cut up into various chapters. He then teaches about circular proof; for this one can impede a demonstration for a demonstration has quite different causes and effects by assuming that predicates are more universal, whereas subjects are more particular. A circular proof, however, assumes that both causes and effects are the same by holding both predicated‐terms and subject-terms as equivalent and as converting with one another. A circular proof involves assuming a demonstrated conclusion and one of the posited premises inversely, and concluding the rest: sometimes the major premise through the conclusion and the minor premise, sometimes the minor premise through the conclusion and the major one. Circular and reciprocal proof, however, are not identical. For a proof is called circular, when we come to the premises through the conclusion and when we come through the premises to the conclusion. On the other hand, a proof is called reciprocal, when each of the two premises is proved through each of the other two premises. He said ‘in cases of nonconvertible terms’ in order to distinguish a circular proof from a false one. For whenever the terms do not convert with one another, a circular proof is false, e.g. if you take the terms essence, living being and human being; indeed, these terms do not convert with one another. And these suffice for getting the circular proof straight. Moreover, while further elaborating on the matter and making it clear, he draws six conclusions for us by using a circular proof: one conclusion, the AC, through the middle term B; another one, the AB, through the conclusion and the converted minor premise; and the sentence BC as a third conclusion through the conclusion and the major premise. And since BC was proved conversely for the demonstration of the AB conclusion and BA was proved for the demonstration of the BC conclusion alike, these converted premises are in need of demonstration. That A belongs to all B and that B belongs to all C were proved through syllogism. It is not clear, however, whether C also belongs to all B, or rather whether B belongs to all A. And for this reason

32 | Sectio III, schol. 32–48

ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Α, οὔπω ἐδείχθη· γίνεται οὖν καὶ τούτου συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἀποτελοῦνται τὰ ὅλα συμπεράσματα ἕξ:–] [oV || D ⇒ 45]

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33. (57b18–21) 〈Τὸ1 – συλλογισμῷ.〉 ἐπεὶ ὁ σκοπὸς τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας ἐστί, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὸ διδάξαι τὰ παρεμποδίζοντα τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν συλλογισμόν, τούτου χάριν ἐδίδαξεν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συνάγεται ἀληθὲς συμπέρασμα, ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν τὸν ἀποδεικνύοντα ψευδεῖς προτάσεις, διότι ὁ ἀποδεικνύων τὸ ‘διότι’ ἀποδείκνυσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ἀληθῶν συνάγεται προτάσεων. αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς προτάσεις εἰ καὶ ἀληθές ποτε συνάγουσι συμπέρασμα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ‘διότι’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ‘ὅτι’, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μέσον αἴτιον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἄκρων συναχθῆναι τὸ ἀληθές. ἡ δὲ κύκλῳ δεῖξις παρεμποδίζει πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀποδεικτικὸν ἐξ αἰτίων συλλογίζεσθαι· αἴτια γὰρ τοῦ συμπεράσματος αἱ προτάσεις. ἡ δὲ κύκλῳ δεῖξις ἐξ αἰτιατῶν· λαμβάνει γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων καὶ ἀποδεικνύει τὴν ἑτέραν· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα αἰτιατόν ἐστι:– [⇐ 31 || U-] 34. Τὸ δὲ κύκλῳ δεικνύειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀλλήλων δείκνυσθαι, ἤγουν τὸ δείκνυσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τὰς προτάσεις ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος. γίνεται δέ, ὅταν λάβῃ τις τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν, ἤγουν καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων ἀντεστραμμένην καὶ ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν, ὥστε τὸ ὑποκείμενον λαβεῖν ὡς κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸν κατηγορούμενον ὡς ὑποκείμενον· καὶ οὕτως δείξει τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν, τὴν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ συλλογισμῷ κειμένην. δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν ὅρους ἀντιστρέφοντας, ἤγουν ἐξισάζοντας· οἷον ‘γελαστικόν’, ‘ἄνθρωπον’, ‘νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν’. ὅταν δὲ ἐξισάζωσιν οἱ ὅροι, τότε ἡ ‘πᾶς’ οὐ πρὸς τὴν ‘τὶς’ ἀντιστρέφει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑαυτήν· οἷον εἰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ γελαστικῷ, καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀντιστροφή ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λῆψις τῆς προτάσεως κατὰ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν (‘ἡ δὲ ἀντιστροφὴ κοινωνία ἐστὶ δύο προτάσεων κατ’ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς ὅρους’ καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς):– [U-] 35. (57b28–29) Ἄλλως δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων δεῖξαι, ἤγουν ἄλλως δὲ οὐ γίνεται ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ὡς εἴπομεν, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν τὸ συμ-

34. 1–9 τὸ δὲ – δεκτικόν ] cf. diagr. 7–12 33. 1 lemma addidi ante schol. 33 add. περὶ κυ ΄ D ἐπεὶ ὁ V (ὁ V s.l.) : ἐπειδὴ D 33. 2 ἐστί ante schol. 33.1 τῆς transp. D ὡς εἴπομεν om. D 33. 10 αἴτια UV : αἴτιαι D 33. 12 ἀποδεικνύει V : ἀποδείκνυσι D δὲ V : συναγόμενον D 34. 3 τὶς λάβῃ D 34. 4 κειμένων om. D 34. 5 τὸ V : τὸν D 35. 1 δὲ om. D 33. 1–2 ἐπεὶ – εἴπομεν ] schol. 1.17–18 34. 12–13 ἡ δὲ ἀντιστροφὴ – ὅρους ] cf. Alex. In Anal. Pr. I 46.5–6; Philop. In Anal. Pr. I 42.17–19, 22–23; Ital. λ΄.13–16

In Anal. Pr. II 5, 57b18 – 7, 59a31

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another two syllogism also come about in demonstration of the latter and the conclusions turn out to total five in number. And in all of these cases the conversion of the conclusions was understood as being undemonstrated. That A belongs to all C was proved by syllogism, but it was not yet proved that also C belongs to all A; its inference then comes about and all conclusions turn out to be six.] 33. Since the aim of the present treatise is, as we said, to teach about what impedes a demonstrative syllogism, he taught in favour of this that, even though a true conclusion is drawn from false premises, a demonstrator must not in any event assume false premises, because a demonstrator demonstrates the ‘reason why’ and the latter is inferred from true premises. Even though false premises lead sometimes to a true conclusion, still the latter is not related to the question of the ‘reason why’, but to the question of the ‘fact’, because the middle term is not the cause of the conclusion, but the true conclusion is drawn from the relation between the two extreme terms. And a circular proof is a hindrance to demonstration, because a demonstrator forms a syllogism from causes; premises are the causes of a conclusion. But circular proof is formed from effects; it takes the conclusion and one of the taken premises and demonstrates the other one. The drawn conclusion, however, is an effect. 34. A circular proof is a reciprocal proof, or rather the proof of a conclusion from its premises and then the premises from their conclusion. And a circular proof is formed whenever someone takes the conclusion and one of the two premises, or rather he takes one of the posited premises that has been converted and that has been done so inversely according to the predication, so as to assume the subject term as predicate and the predicate term as subject. Thus, one will prove the second premise, the one posited in the first syllogism. One must take, however, convertible terms, namely coextensive: e.g. ‘being able-to-laugh, ‘human being’, ‘being reasonable and capable of acquiring scientific knowledge. And whenever the terms are coextensive, ‘all’ is not convertible o ‘some’, but to itself: e.g. if human being is predicated of every being able-to-laugh, being able- to-laugh then is also predicated of every human being. This, however, is no conversion, but an assumption of the premise in the reverse order (‘conversion is an association of two premises concerning either terms’ and so on). 35. A reciprocal proof is not possible otherwise, or rather a circular proof is not formed any differently, except in the way we said, or rather by conversely

34 | Sectio III, schol. 32–48

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πέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων ἀντιστρόφως, καὶ οὕτως δεῖξαι τὴν ἑτέραν· εἰ δὲ γὰρ ἄλλον μέσον λήψεται, οὐ κύκλῳ δεῖξιν ποιεῖ· ὁ γὰρ μέλλων δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ Α ὑπάρχει παντὶ τῷ Β, εἰ λάβῃ μέσον τοῦ ΑΒ τὸ Δ, ἤγουν τὸ ‘ὀρθοπεριπατητικόν’, κύκλῳ δεῖξιν οὐκ ἐποίησεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἤγουν οὐδεμία τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, οὔτε τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ΑΒ ἔλαβεν. εἰ δὲ λάβῃ τι τούτων, ἤγουν μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, ἀντιστρόφως καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀνάγκη δεῖξαι τὸ ἕτερον, ἤγουν τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν, διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως. εἰ δὲ οὐ μίαν τῶν κειμένων πρότασιν λάβῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς δύο, τὸ αὐτὸ συνάξει συμπέρασμα, ὅπερ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἤγουν ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιστρέφοντας καὶ ἐξισάζοντας ὅρους λάβῃ, ἀλλὰ ‘ζῷον’, ‘λογικόν’, ‘ἄνθρωπον’, γενήσεται συλλογισμὸς καὶ συμπέρασμα τῆς ἑτέρας, ἤγουν τῆς μείζονος προτάσεως, ἐξ ἀναποδείκτου, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν τὴν ἄλλην πρότασιν ἀναπόδεικτον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι διὰ τούτων τῶν ὅρων, τῶν μὴ ἐξισαζόντων, δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ τρίτον ὑπάρχει τῷ μέσῳ ἢ τὸ μέσον τῷ πρώτῳ:– [U-] 36. (58a13–14) Ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ‘δείξεις’ εἶπεν ‘ἀποδείξεις’· ἡ γὰρ κύκλῳ δεῖξις ἀπόδειξιν οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὸ ἐξ αἰτιατῶν συλλογίζεσθαι:– 37. (58a15–16) Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, τοῖς ἐξισάζουσιν, αὐτῷ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ καὶ τῷ συμπεράσματι χρᾶσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἤγουν δεῖξιν:– 38. // (58a27–28) Ἡ γὰρ αὑτὴ πρότασις, τὸ Β μηδενὶ τῷ Α· ἤγουν ἀποφατικὴ καθόλου ἐστὶν ἡ πρότασις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ‘Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β’ ἐστὶν ἀποφατική:–

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39. (58a30–35) 〈Ἔστω – συλλογίζεσθαι.〉 οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἡ ΒΓ οὐ δείκνυται διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς προσλήψεως συλλογισμοῦ· οἷον, εἰ οὕτως εἴπῃς, ‘ᾧ τὸ Α οὐδενί, τούτῳ τὸ Β παντί, τὸ δὲ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα ἀνάγκη παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν’· ὥστε δέδεικται καὶ ἡ ΑΒ διὰ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς προσλήψεως συλλογισμοῦ· τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων ὅρων ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ συλλογισμῷ

35. 4 εἰ δὲ correxi : εἴτε VD 35. 5 λάβῃ D : λάβοι V 35. 7 οὐδὲ μία D 35. 8 ἔλαβεν om. V 35. 10 πρότασιν2 V : προτάσεων D 35. 14 μείζονος D : μιᾶς V 35. 16 τὸ τρίτον V : τῶ τρίτω D τὸ μέσον V p.c. : τῶ μέσω V a.c., D 35. 17 τῷ πρώτῳ V p.c., D : τὸ πρῶτον V a.c. 37. 1 καὶ Arist. (nABCHclgTu) et Magent. : om. Arist. (R) : deest in Arist. (Nd) ante ἐξισάζουσιν add. ἐξισάζειν, ἤγουν D 37. 2 χρῆσθαι fortasse V 38. 1–2 Ἡ – ἀποφατική iter. et cancell. V 38. 2 ἐστὶν1 om. D 39. 1 lemma addidi 39. 2 τοῦ post προσλήψεως transp. D ἐκ om. D 39. 3 εἴπῃς scripsi : εἴπς V : εἴπεις D 39. 4 παντὶ τῷ Γ Magent. Arist. (nABc) : τῷ γ παντὶ C 35. 16–17 τὸ τρίτον – τῷ πρώτῳ ] cf. Anal. Pr. II 5, 57b34–35

In Anal. Pr. II 5, 57b18 – 7, 59a31

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taking the conclusion and one of the posited premises, and by proving in this way one of them. For if someone takes a different middle term, he will not make a circular proof. For, if someone who is about to prove that A belongs to all B, assumes D, namely ‘walking erect being’, as middle term of AB, then he does not make any circular proof. For he assumed none of them, or rather he did not assume either the posited premises, or the conclusion towards the demonstration of AB. But if someone takes conversely one them, namely one of the posited premises, and the conclusion, it is then necessary to prove the other one, namely the other premise, through circular proof. If, however someone does not take one of the posited premises, but both of them, he will then draw the same conclusion, which was also drawn at the beginning, or rather that A belongs to every C. And if someone does not take convertible and coextensive terms, but terms like ‘living being’, ‘logical being’, ‘human being’, then the other premise, namely the major one, will be inferred and concluded from something undemonstrated, or rather by assuming the other premise as undemonstrated. For it is not possible to prove by means of these terms, the non-coextensive ones, that the third term belongs to the middle term or that the middle term belongs to the first term. 36. It is possible that demonstrations are formed. Instead of saying ‘proofs’ he said ‘demonstrations’. For a circular proof does not produce a demonstration because it forms a syllogism from effects. 37. And it turns out that even in the case of these, the coextensive terms, we use the very thing that is being proved and the conclusion in demonstration, namely proof. 38. For ‘B belongs to no A’ is a premise of the same kind. Or rather, the premise is a universal negative, just as ‘A belongs to no B’ is also a negative premise. 39. In this way then, BC is not proved by a circular proof, but by means of a syllogism from an additional assumption. E.g. if you say as follows: ‘B belongs to all of what A belongs to none of, A belongs to no C, it is therefore necessary for B to belong to every C’. Consequently, AB has also been proved by a syllogism from additional assumption. For since there are three terms in

36 | Sectio III, schol. 32–48

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ἕκαστος ὅρος συμπέρασμα γέγονε, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι ἐλήφθη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ Γ ἐλήφθη καὶ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι τῷ λέγοντι ‘τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ’, καὶ ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι τῷ λέγοντι ‘τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ’. κατὰ πρόσληψιν δὲ λέγεται ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμός, διότι προσλαμβάνεις τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ΓΒ προτάσεως· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κύκλῳ συλλογισμοῦ τρεῖς μὲν ὅροι λαμβάνονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ἕκαστος ὅρος γίνεται μέρος τοῦ συμπεράσματος· ἀλλ’ οἱ δύο ἄκροι συνερχόμενοι ἀπαρτίζουσι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὁ δὲ μέσος ὅρος μέρος τοῦ συμπεράσματος οὐ γίνεται:– 40. (58b6–7) Τὴν μὲν καθόλου πρότασιν, τὴν ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, οὐκ ἔστι δεῖξαι διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως, δι’ ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέχθη, ἤγουν δι’ ἣν εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ καθόλου, τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, ἐκ δύο καθόλου συνάγεται· ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα μερικόν ἐστι στερητικόν, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ ἡ ἐλάττων ὡσαύτως μερική ἐστιν, ἡ ‘τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β’· ἐκ δύο δὲ μερικῶν πῶς συναχθήσεται τὸ ‘οὐδενί’:– 41. (58b13–14) Οὐκ ἔστι δεῖξαι διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου, ἤγουν τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως:–

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42. (58b14–25) 〈Τὸ – τῷ B.〉 Τὸ μὲν καθόλου κατηγορικόν, τὸ ‘παντί’, οὐ δείκνυται, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις καθόλου καταφατικαὶ ληφθῶσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀδύνατον ληφθῆναι δύο καθόλου καταφατικάς· εἰ γὰρ μέλλομεν κύκλῳ δεῖξιν ποιῆσαι, δεῖ γε τὸ συμπέρασμα λαβεῖν καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων ἀντιστρόφως, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι ἀποφατικὰ συνάγονται τὰ συμπεράσματα· διὰ ταύτην γοῦν τὴν αἰτίαν τὸ ‘παντὶ’ διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως οὐ δεικνύεται ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δευτέρου τρόπου τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος δεικνύεται ὅτι τὸ Α ὑπάρχει παντὶ τῷ Β διὰ τῆς προσλήψεως· ᾧ γὰρ τὸ Γ οὐδενί, τούτῳ τὸ Α παντί· τὸ δὲ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα παντὶ τῷ Β· τὸ δὲ ‘Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Β’ ἔλαβεν ἀντιστρέψας τὸ ‘οὐδεὶς’ ἐπὶ τῆς προσλήψεως· ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου τρόπου τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος δείκνυται ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τῆς προσλήψεως. προέταξε δὲ τὸν δεύτερον τρόπον τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος τοῦ πρώτου τρόπου τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχήματος διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου, ἤγουν τοῦ δευτέρου, δεικνύεσθαι ὅτι τὸ

42. 7–11 ἀλλ’ – προσλήψεως ] cf. diagr. 13 42. 11–12 ὡσαύτως – προσλήψεως ] cf. diagr. 14 39. 7 ante τὸ1 add. καὶ D 39. 8 παντὶ τῷ Γ Arist. (nABHclgTu) et Magent. : τῷ Γ παντὶ Arist. (C) : om. Arist. (R) : deest in Arist. (Ndc) 39. 10 ΒΓ D κύκλῳ D : κυρίως V 40. 2 ἐλέχθην D 40. 3 καὶ πρότερον om. D τὸ2 V : τῷ D 40. 4 καὶ om. D 40. 5 ἡ2 V : ἤγουν D 41. 1 ante Οὐκ ἔστι add. δεύτερον σχῆμα D 42. 1 lemma addidi 42. 2 δύο om. V 42. 3 γὰρ D : γε V 42. 4 κύκλῳ V : κύκλου D γε scripsi : γὰρ VD 42. 7 οὐ δείκνυται D 42. 12 δεικνύεται D

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a syllogism such as this, each term has become a conclusion, or rather each term was assumed in the conclusion; and indeed C was taken not only in the conclusion saying ‘A belongs to no C’, but also in the conclusion saying ‘B belongs to every C’. And a syllogism such as this is called ‘in conformity with an additional assumption’, because you additionally take the conclusion that A belongs to no C with regard to the demonstration of the CB premise. In a circular syllogism, however, three terms are indeed employed, yet each term does not become part of the conclusion. Instead the two extremes complete the conclusion by being conjoined, and the middle term does not become part of the conclusion. 40. It is not possible to prove the universal premise that A belongs to no B by means of a circular proof for the reason which was previously mentioned, or rather for the cause which we mentioned just previously, that a universal conclusion, a ‘to no’, is inferred from two universal premises. But here, not only is the conclusion that A does not belong to all C a particular privative one, but even the minor premise ‘C belongs to some A’ is likewise particular; how will a ‘to no’ be inferred from two particular premises? 41. It is not possible to prove in this way, namely by means of a circular proof. 42. The universal positive ‘to all’ is not proved, unless both premises are taken as being universal affirmative ones. But in the second figure it is impossible to take two universal affirmative premises. For if we are about to make a circular proof, it is indeed necessary to assume the conclusion conversely and one of the posited premises. In the second figure, however, the conclusions are inferred as being negative; for this cause ‘to all’, then, is not proved in the second figure by a circular proof. Yet, in the case of the second mode of the second figure it can be proved that A belongs to every B by means of an additional assumption: A belongs to all of what C belongs to none of, but C belongs to no B, and therefore A belongs to every B. He assumed ‘C belongs to no B’ after converting ‘no’ in the additional assumption. Likewise, in the case of the first mode of the second figure it is also proved that A belongs to every C by an additional assumption. And he placed the second mode of the second figure before the first mode of the same figure, because in this mode, namely

38 | Sectio III, schol. 32–48

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Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου τρόπου δεικνύομεν μὲν διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Β, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος ἀντιστρέφοντες τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος:– [U-] 43. (58b25–26) Διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς μιᾶς προτάσεως· ἤγουν, εἰ λάβῃς τὸ συμπέρασμα τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος, ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν ἀντεστραμμένην, οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμός· ἤγουν οὐ δεικνύεται ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α. προσληφθείσης δὲ καὶ ἑτέρας, ἤγουν ἀντιστροφῆς δὲ γενομένης τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἤγουν εἰ προσλάβῃς καὶ ἑτέραν ἀντιστροφήν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β:– 44. (58b35) Συμβαίνει γὰρ ἢ ἀμφοτέρας 〈ἢ τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν γίνεσθαι ἀποφατικήν〉. μέλλων δεῖξαι ἀπὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘οὐδεὶς’ καὶ 〈τῆς〉 ‘τὶς’ ὅτι τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, φησὶν ὅτι ἐν μὲν 〈τῷ〉 δευτέρῳ σχήματι γίνονται αἱ δύο ἀποφατικαί, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ, εἴ τις πειρᾶται τοῦτο δεῖξαι λαβὼν τὸ Β οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ ἀντὶ τῆς ‘τίς’ (ἰσοδυναμοῦσι γὰρ αὗται ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης, ὡς ἔμαθες), γίνεται μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι ἔχων τὴν μείζονα ἀποφατικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν τὸ ‘οὐ παντὶ’ συνάγει. καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ‘τινί’, δείκνυμεν τοῦτο διὰ τῆς προσλήψεως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου τὸ ‘παντί’:– [V ⇒ 46 || = U] 45. (59a3–4) Ἐὰν δ’ ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἡ δ’ ἐν μέρει, ποτὲ μὲν ἔσται ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται. τὸ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται εἴρηται διὰ τὸ ‘τινί’· ὅταν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ΑΓ ‘τινί’, δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος, ὅταν δὲ ἡ μὲν ΑΓ ‘παντί’, ἡ δὲ ΒΓ ‘τινί’, οὐ δείκνυται τὸ ‘τινί’· δεόμεθα γὰρ καὶ ἑτέρας ἀντιστροφῆς εἰς δεῖξιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κύκλῳ δεῖξις δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς μιᾶς προτάσεως ἀντεστραμμένως· οὕτως δὲ οὐ λαμβάνομεν συμπέρασμα τὸ Β κατὰ τοῦ Γ, ὅπερ ἐμέλλομεν δεῖξαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ Γ κατὰ τοῦ Β· ὥστε οὐ δεικνύεται πῶς ἐστι τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, εἰ μή που ἀντιστρέψομεν καὶ εἴπωμεν ὅτι, εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ. πρὸς τοῦτο γοῦν εἴρηται τὸ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται· τὸ μὲν ἔσται, ὅταν μέν ἐστιν ἡ μείζων ‘τινί’, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων ‘παντί’ (τότε γὰρ δείκνυται ἡ ΑΓ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι)· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔσται, ὅτε ἡ ΑΓ ‘παντί’, ἡ δὲ ΒΓ ‘τινί’· τὸ

44. 2–9 μέλλων – ‘παντί’ ] cf. diagr. 15–16 42. 16 μὲν om. D 43. 3–4 οὐ δείκνυται D 43. 5 ἤγουν2 V : τουτέστιν D 44. 1 ἢ1 om. D 44. 1–2 lemma addidi 44. 2 ἀπὸ1 UV : ἐπὶ D 44. 3 τῆς addidi τῷ addidi cum Εβ 44. 7 ἀποφατικήν VD : στερητικήν U 44. 8 δεικνύομεν D 45. 6 οὐ λαμβάνομεν scripsi : λαμβάνομεν οὐ D 45. 7 δεικνύεται scripsi : δείκνυται D 45. 8 εἴπωμεν scripsi : εἴπομεν D

In Anal. Pr. II 5, 57b18 – 7, 59a31

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in the second one, it is proved that Α belongs to no C by a circular proof in the second figure. In the case of the first figure, however, we prove by means of a circular proof that A belongs to no B, but we prove this through the first figure by converting the conclusion of the first figure. 43. Through the conclusion, then, and one premise; or rather, a syllogism does not come about, if you take the conclusion of the second figure, that B belongs to no C, and one of the two premises after being converted. Or rather, it is not proved that A belongs to no B, but that B belongs to no A. If another premise is additionally assumed, namely when the conversion of the conclusion takes place, or rather if you additionally take another conversion of the conclusion, there will be then a syllogism to the effect that A belongs to no B. 44. For it turns out that either both or one of the premises becomes negative. When Aristotle is about to prove by means of a syllogism from ‘no’ and ‘some’ that A belongs to some C, he claims that the two negative premises take place in the second figure. But in the first figure, if someone attempts to prove this after assuming ‘B does not belong to all C’ instead of ‘some’ (for, as you learned, they are equivalent in the case of contingent matter), a syllogism that has a negative major premise indeed takes place in the first figure, yet it infers the ‘to all’ once more. And since there is not any syllogism of ‘belongs to some’, we prove the latter by means of an additional assumption, just as we also prove the ‘to all’ in the case of universal premises. 45. But if one premise is universal, whereas the other a particular one, then proof will sometimes be possible, sometimes not. Will be possible or will not be possible have been mentioned because of ‘to some’. For whenever AC is ‘to some’, then the latter is proved by means of the third figure. But whenever AC is ‘to all’ and BC is ‘to some’, then the ‘to some’ is not proved. For we also need another conversion with regard to its proof. A circular proof is proved through the conclusion and an inversely assumed premise. In this way, we do not assume B predicated of C as a conclusion, the very thing which we were about to prove, but rather C predicated of B. Consequently, the way in which ‘B belongs to some C’ is possible is not proved, unless we convert at some point the terms and say that if C belongs to some B, then also B belongs to some C.

40 | Sectio IV, schol. 49–64

οὐκ ἔσται εἶπε διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὀρθοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν κύκλῳ δεῖξιν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ δέεσθαι προσλήψεως, ἤτοι ἀντιστροφῆς:– [⇐ 32 || oV || D ⇐ 33]

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46. (59a13) Τούτου δὲ ληφθέντος, ἤγουν ἀντιστραφέντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος τοῦ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι, οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμός, ἤγουν οὐκ ἀποδεικνύεται ὅτι τὸ Β ὑπάρχει τινὶ τῷ Γ ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν ἀντεστραμμένην· ἀλλὰ ἡ κύκλῳ αὕτη δεῖξις ἀτελὴς οὖσα τελειοῦται διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος:– [⇐ 44] 47. (59a28–31) 〈Ἐὰν – συλλογισμός.〉 ᾧ τὸ Α οὐ παντί, τούτῳ τὸ Γ τινί, τὸ δὲ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β· οὐκ ἔδει δὲ δεῖξαι τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, ἀλλὰ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ‘τὶς’ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτήν, εἰ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ἀνάγκη εἶναι:– [U-] 48. Ἰστέον ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως τὴν μίαν πρότασιν ὀφείλεις λαμβάνειν ἀντεστραμμένην καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, καὶ ἀποδεικνύειν τὴν ἑτέραν:– [= U] IV Περὶ τῆς ἐν συλλογισμῷ ἀντιστροφῆς

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49. (59b1–3) 〈Τὸ1 – τελευταίῳ.〉 τριττή ἐστι ἡ ἀντιστροφή· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὅροις θεωρεῖται, περὶ ἧς ἐδίδαξεν ἐν ταῖς Kατηγορίαις λέγων ‘ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος’, καὶ ‘ὁ πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πατρὸς υἱός’· ἢ ἐν προτάσεσι, περὶ ἧς ἐδίδαξεν εἰς τὰ Τρία σχήματα λέγων ‘εἰ τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τινὶ ζῴῳ’, καὶ ‘εἰ ὁ λίθος οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδενὶ λίθῳ’· ἢ ἐν συλλογισμῷ, περὶ ἧς ἐνταῦθα διδάσκει. ἐτάχθη δὲ ἡ ἐν συλλογισμῷ ἀντιστροφὴ μετὰ τὴν κύκλῳ δεῖξιν ὡς κοινωνίαν ἔχουσα πρὸς αὐτήν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως λαμβάνομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης λαμβάνομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, καὶ συλλογιζόμεθα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως, διότι ἐπὶ ταύτης ἀντεστραμμένην λαμβάνο46. 1 ante Τούτου add. σχῆμα γ´ D 46. 4 δεῖξις αὕτη D 47. 1 lemma addidi 47. 2 post δεῖξαι add. τοῦτο D 48. 2 post ἑτέραν add. schol. ἰστέον ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ γ΄ σχήματος τὸ παντὶ οὐ δείκνυται διὰ τῆς κύκλω δείξεως· διότι τὸ παντὶ δείκνυται ἐκ δύο καθόλου καταφατικῶν· ἡ δὲ κύκλω δεῖξις γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ μιᾶς προτάσεως ἀντεστραμμένης· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἐστὶ μερικὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δείκνυται D Tit. sect. IV Περὶ – ἀντιστροφῆς om. V 49. 1 lemma addidi 49. 2 ante Κατηγορίαις add. δέκα D 49. 5 παντὶ iter. D 49. 11 ἀντεστραμμένην UV : ἀντεστραμμένως D 48. 1–2 ἰστέον – ἑτέραν ] cf. schol. 33.10–11, 34.3–6 49. 2–3 cf. Cat. 7, 6b29–30; Magent. In Top. ρϟϚʹ.3 49. 3–4 cf. Metaph. IV 15, 1021a23–24 49. 5 ‘εἰ τὸ – ζῴῳ ] cf. Anal. Pr. I 2, 25a25–26 49. 5–6 εἰ ὁ λίθος – λίθῳ ] cf. Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b31–32

In Anal. Pr. II 8, 59b1 – 10, 61a16

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Will be possible or will not be possible then have been mentioned in reference to the following. The former case is mentioned whenever the major premise is ‘to some’, whereas the minor premise is ‘to all’ (for this is when AC is proved in the third figure). The latter case is mentioned when AC is ‘to all’, whereas BC is ‘to some’. He said will not be possible because here a circular proof does not take place directly, but it is in need of an additional assumption, namely a conversion. 46. But if this is assumed, or rather, if the conclusion is converted in the first figure, then no syllogism is formed, or rather, it is not demonstrated that B belongs to some C from assuming the conclusion and a premise after converting the latter. Yet, since this circular proof is incomplete, it is completed by conversion of the conclusion of the first figure. 47. C belongs to some of what A does not belong to all of, and A does not belong to all B: It is therefore necessary for C to belong to some B. One, however, should not prove that C belongs to some B, but that B belongs to some C; and since ‘some’ converts with itself, if C belongs to some B, it is then necessary that B also belongs to some C. 48. It must be made known that in the case of a circular proof you are obliged to assume a converted premise and the conclusion, and to demonstrate the other premise. IV On the Conversion in a Syllogism 49. Conversion is threefold for it is considered with respect either to terms (which Aristotle taught in the Categories by saying ‘a master is the master of a slave’ and ‘a slave is the slave of a master’ and ‘a father is the father of a son and a son is the son of a father’), or to premises (which he taught in the Three Figures by saying ‘if living being is predicated of every human being, then human being is also predicated of every living being’ and ‘if stone is predicated of no human being, then human being is also predicated of no stone’), or to syllogism (which he teaches here). Moreover, the conversion with respect to syllogism was placed after the circular proof, since the former has something in common with the latter. For just as we take the conclusion and one of the posited premises in a circular proof, so we assume the conclusion and one

42 | Sectio IV, schol. 49–64

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μεν τὴν πρότασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς οὐκ ἀντιστρέφομεν τὴν πρότασιν· καὶ ὅτι ἐπ’ ἐκείνης οὐκ ἀντιστρέφομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς, εἰ ‘παντί’ ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀντιστρέφομεν τοῦτο καὶ μετατιθέαμεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ‘οὐδενὶ’ ἢ εἰς τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’· καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως λαβόντες τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων κατασκευάζομεν τὴν ἑτέραν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς λαμβάνομεν τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν τὴν ἑτέραν:– [= U] 50. (59b4) Ἀντιστραφέντος· ἤγουν μετατεθέντος ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίως ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον· οἷον εἰ τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι ‘παντί’, ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον λάβῃς αὐτοῦ, τὴν ‘οὐδείς’, ἢ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον, τὴν ‘οὐ πᾶς’:– [(50–53) D]

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51. (59b5) Εἰ γὰρ ἔσται, ἤγουν εἰ οὐκ ἀνῄρηται ἡ πρότασις, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται, ἤγουν καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται μὴ ἀντιστραφὲν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἀντιστραφῇ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ ληφθῇ καὶ μία τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναιρεθήσεται καὶ ἡ λοιπὴ πρότασις. γίνωσκε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων πρότασις διὰ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος ἀναιρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων διὰ τοῦ δευτέρου:– [⇐ 50] 52. (59b7–8) 〈Οὐ – ἀντιστραφέντος.〉 οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ γίνεται συλλογισμός, ἤγουν οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ συνάγεται συμπέρασμα ἐν τῷ ἀντιστραφῆναι τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἑκατέρως, ἤγουν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίως ἀντιστραφῇ, γίνεται καὶ ὁ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συλλογισμὸς καθόλου· εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον, γίνεται ὁ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συλλογισμός, ὁ ἀναιρῶν τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν, μερικός:– [⇐ 50] 53. (59b8) 〈Δῆλον – ἑπομένων·〉 ὡς δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν ἑπομένων, ἤγουν τῶν ἐφεξῆς ῥηθησομένων:– [⇐ 50 || D ⇒ 55] 54. (59b8–9) Λέγω δ’ ἀντικεῖσθαι· ἤγουν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικεῖσθαι:– [D ⇒ 56]

49. 14 μετατίθεμεν D 49. 15 λαβόντες UV : λαμβάνοντες D 49. 17 τὸ2 om. V 50. 1 τὸ ἐναντίως V : τὴν ἐναντίαν D 50. 2 τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον V : τὴν ἀντιφατικὴν D 50. 2–3 τὸ ἐναντίον V : τὴν ἐναντίαν D 50. 3 λάβῃς D : λάβς V τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον V : τὴν ἀντιφατικήν D 51. 2 post μὴ ἀντιστραφὲν add. καὶ μετατεθὲν D 51. 3 αὐτῷ ἀντικείμενον D 52. 1 lemma addidi 52. 3 ἐναντίον D : ἐναντίως V 52. 5 τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον V : τὴν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένην D 53. 1 lemma addidi ἔσται V : εἶναι D

In Anal. Pr. II 8, 59b1 – 10, 61a16

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of the posited premises in a conversion as well and we form a syllogism. A conversion, however, differs from a circular proof, because in the latter we assume a converted premise, whereas in a conversion we do not convert any premise. Moreover, because in a circular proof we do not convert the conclusion, whereas in a conversion, if the conclusion is ‘to all’, we convert the latter and interchanged it with either ‘to no’, or ‘not to all’; and because in a circular proof we establish one of the two premises after assuming the conclusion as well as one of the posited premises, whereas in a conversion we assume the contrary or the contradictory opposite to the conclusion and assume one of the posited premises, and we reject the other one. 50. In case the conclusion has been converted. Or rather, in case the conclusion has been interchanged with either a contrary, or with a contradictory opposite statement. E.g. if the conclusion is ‘to all’, you should then assume either its contrary, a ‘no’, or its contradictory opposite, a ‘not all’. 51. For if there is a premise, or rather if the premise is not rejected, then there will also be a conclusion, or rather, there will also be a conclusion if it was not converted to its contrary or contradictory opposite. For if the conclusion is converted and one of the posited premises is also taken, then the remaining premise will also be rejected out of necessity. Know, however, this too: that a major premise is rejected always by means of the third figure, whereas a minor premise is rejected by means of the second figure. 52. And the same syllogism does not come about, or rather the same conclusion is not drawn by converting a conclusion in either way, namely by converting it either into its contrary, or into its contradictory opposite. But, if a conclusion is converted into its contrary, then a syllogism in the second figure becomes universal, whereas if a conclusion is converted into its contradictory opposite, then a syllogism in the second figure – the one rejecting the minor premise – becomes particular. 53. This will, thus, be made clear by the following, namely by what will be mentioned afterwards. 54. And I call opposition; or rather contradictory opposition.

44 | Sectio IV, schol. 49–64 55. (59b9–11) 〈Τὸ1 – ὑπάρχειν.〉 ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ τὶς’ εἰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἕτεραί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ δυνάμει ταὐτά εἰσι. καὶ λέγεται μὲν ‘οὐ πᾶς’, ὅτε μάχεται πρὸς τὴν ‘πᾶς’, ‘οὐ τὶς’ δέ, ὅταν μάχηται πρὸς τὴν ‘τίς’:– [⇐ 53 || D ⇒ 54 || = U]

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56. (59b39–40) 〈Ὅταν – καθόλου.〉 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν, ὅταν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντιστραφῇ ἐναντίως, οὔτε ἡ μείζων πρότασις ἀναιρεῖται οὔτε ἡ ἐλάττων· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου συλλογισμῶν ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ μείζων καὶ ἡ ἐλάττων ἐν τῷ ἀντιστραφῆναι τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, οὕτω γίνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου 〈λαμβάνομεν〉 τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι· οἷον εἰ τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι ‘παντί’, τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου ἐστὶ καθόλου, ‘οὐδείς’· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν, εἰ συνάγεται συμπέρασμα, ὅτι τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου ἐστὶ μερικόν, τὸ ‘οὐ τίς’:– [⇐ 54 || (56–58) D] 57. (59b39–60a1) 〈Οὐ – ἀναιρεῖν.〉 τὸ δὲ ἐλλείποντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘μερικοῦ ληφθέντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος’ νοητέον· τὸ γὰρ ‘τινί’, εἰ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μέλλει μετατεθῆναι, εἰς τὸ ‘οὐ τὶς’ ἀντιστραφήσεται. εἶπε δὲ τὸ μερικὸν ‘ἐλλεῖπον’, διότι ἐλλείπεται τοῦ καθόλου κατὰ τὸ ποσόν· ἡ γὰρ ‘οὐδεὶς’ τὰ πάντα ἀναιρεῖ· οἷον τὸ ‘οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός’ δηλοῖ μηδένα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λευκόν· τὸ δὲ ‘οὐ τὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός’ δηλοῖ τὸ λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι τινί:– [⇐ 56 || = U] 58. (60a7) Ἀλλ’ οὔπω ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἤγουν ὅτι τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἀπὸ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ ‘οὐ τινί’· ἡ γὰρ ‘τὶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ τὶς’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης συναληθεύουσιν· ἐνδέχεται γάρ τινα εἶναι λευκὸν καὶ μή τινα εἶναι λευκόν:– [⇐ 56]

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59. (60a15–17) Ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι τὴν μὲν μείζονα πρότασιν, ἤγουν τὴν ΑΒ, οὐκ ἔστι ἀνελεῖν ἐναντίως, ἤγουν ἐκ τοῦ συνάξαι τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον τῇ ΑΒ προτάσει· τὸ γὰρ Α παντὶ τῷ Β ἐστί· ὥστε ἀδύνατον τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν ἀναιρεθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ ἐναντίον ταύτῃ· ἀναιρεῖται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ταύτῃ ἀντικείμενον. ὁποτερωσοῦν τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς γινομένης· ἤγουν κἄν τε τὸ ἐναντίον λάβῃς τῷ συμ-

55. 1 lemma addidi ante ἡ1 add. ἰστέον ὅτι U 55. 1–2 ἕτεραι UV : ἕτερα D 55. 2 ὅτε μάχεται UV : ὅταν μάχηται D 56. 1 lemma addidi 56. 1–9 ἐπὶ – οὐ τίς iter. et cancell. V 56. 2 ἐναντίως V : εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον D 56. 6 λαμβάνομεν addidi 57. 1 lemma addidi 57. 2 τοῦ συμπεράσματος om. UV νοητέον UD : ληπτέον V εἰ om. D 57. 4 τὸ om. D 57. 6 τινί om. D 58. 1 Ἀλλ’ – ἀρχῆς om. V 59. 1 ante Ἐν add. σχῆμα δεύτερον D 59. 2 ΑΒ V : πᾶς D 59. 3 ἐναντίον V : ἐναντία D 59. 6–7 τῷ συμπεράσματι D : τοῦ συμπεράσματος V

In Anal. Pr. II 8, 59b1 – 10, 61a16

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55. Even though a ‘not all’ and a ‘not some’ differ in terms of wording, they are nonetheless identical in terms of meaning. And a statement is called ‘not all’, when it is in contradiction with an ‘all’. Whereas it is called ‘not some’, whenever it is in contradiction with a ‘some’. 56. Concerning particular syllogisms, whenever the conclusion is converted contrariwise, neither the major premise nor the minor one is rejected. As regards particular syllogisms, it does not happen just so, as it does so in the case of universal syllogisms where both the major and the minor premise are rejected by converting the conclusion to its contrary. In the case of universal syllogisms, we assume what is contrary to the conclusion. E.g. if the conclusion is ‘to all’, its contrary then is universal: a ‘no’. If, on the other hand, in the case of particular syllogisms, we draw the conclusion that A belongs to some C, then its contrary is a particular statement, the ‘not all’. 57. The phrase when the conclusion falls short should be understood as ‘when the conclusion is assumed as a particular statement’. For ‘to some’ will convert to ‘not some’, if it is about to interchange with its contrary. He called the particular statement ‘falling short’, because it falls short of a universal statement in relation to quantity, for ‘no’ denies everything. E.g. the statement ‘no human being is white’ makes clear that not even one human being is white, whereas the statement ‘some human beings are not white’ makes clear that white is not predicated of some human beings. 58. But the original premise, namely that B belongs to some C, has not yet been rejected by inferring the ‘not to some’. For ‘some’ and ‘not some’ are both true as regards the contingent matter. For it is possible for someone to be white and for someone not to be white. 59. In the second figure it is not possible to reject the major premise, namely the AB, contrariwise, or rather by inferring the ‘to no’, which is exactly the contrary of the AB premise. For A belongs to every B, therefore, it is impossible to reject the major premise by inferring what is contrary to the latter. It is rejected, however, by inferring what is contradictory opposite to it. Whichever form the conversion may take, or rather, the major premise

46 | Sectio IV, schol. 49–64

περάσματι, κἄν τε τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον, διότι ἡ ΑΒ ἀναιρεῖται διὰ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος· τοῦτο δὲ μερικὸν συνάγει συμπέρασμα:– [U+] 60. (60a27) Ἡ μὲν ΑΒ ὁμοίως δειχθήσεται· ἤγουν ἐκ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς αὐτῇ ἀντικείμενον:– 61. // (60b8) Κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν συλλογισμῶν· ἤγουν ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν) οὐδεμία πρότασις ἀναιρεῖται, εἰ λάβῃς τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι:–

t, XXXVr

62. (61a3–4) 〈Ὥστ’ – προτάσεις.〉 ὥστε ἐκείνως μέν, τουτέστιν εἰ λάβῃς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἀναιροῦνται καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος, οὕτως δέ, ἤγουν εἰ λάβῃς τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι, οὐδεμία πρότασις ἀναιρεῖται:–

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63. (61a5–11) 〈Φανερὸν – ἐσχάτου.〉 σημείωσαι ὅτι ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι ἀντιστροφῆς γινομένης, εἰ μὲν λάβῃς τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἡ μὲν μείζων πρότασις ἀναιρεῖται διὰ τῆς ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένης αὐτῇ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων ἀναιρεῖται διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίως ἀντικειμένου αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντιστραφῇ, ἀντιφατικῶς ἀναιροῦνται καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις διὰ τῶν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένων αὐταῖς:– 64. (61a11–16) 〈Ἐν – μέσου.〉 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐναντίον λάβῃς τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἡ μὲν μείζων πρότασις ἀναιρεῖται διὰ τοῦ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένου αὐτῇ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίως ἀντικειμένου αὐτῇ· εἰ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντιστραφῇ, ἀντιφατικῶς ἀναιροῦνται καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις διὰ τοῦ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένου αὐταῖς. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθόλου συλλογισμῶν, εἰ λάβῃς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἀμφότεραι αἱ προτάσεις διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίως ἀντικειμένου αὐταῖς, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι, οὐδεμία ἀναιρεῖται· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν μερικῶν συλλογισμῶν, εἰ λάβῃς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι, καὶ αἱ δύο ἀναιροῦνται διὰ τοῦ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένου αὐταῖς, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον λάβῃς τῷ συμπεράσματι, οὐδεμία ἀναιρεῖται αὐτῶν:– 59. 8 τοῦτο – συμπέρασμα V : ὅπερ μερικὰ συνάγει συμπεράσματα D 60. 2 αὐτ῀ V 61. 1 ante Κατ’ add. σχῆμα τρίτον D 61. 2 οὐδὲ μία D 62. 1 lemma addidi 62. 3 post εἰ add. δὲ D 62. 4 οὐδὲ μία D 63. 1 lemma addidi σημείωσαι V : Cη ´ D ante πρώτῳ add. τῶ D 63. 2 τῷ συμπεράσματι scripsi cum K : τοῦ συμπεράσματος VD 63. 3 τῆς – αὐτῇ V : τοῦ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένου αὐτοῦ D 64. 1 lemma addidi 64. 3 αὐτῇ V : αὐτοῦ D 64. 4 αὐτῇ V : αὐτοῦ D 64. 5 αὐταῖς V : αὐτοῦ D 64. 7 post ἀντικείμενον cancell. αὐταῖς· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος V (cf. schol. 64.5–6) τῷ συμπεράσματι D : τοῦ συμπεράσματος V

In Anal. Pr. II 8, 59b1 – 10, 61a16

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is not rejected, even if you assume a statement contrary to the conclusion, even if you assume what is contradictory opposite to the latter, because AB is rejected by means of the third figure. The latter draws a particular conclusion. 60. The AB premise will be proved similarly; namely, by inferring what is contradictorily opposite to it. 61. In any of the syllogisms; or rather, no premise is rejected in the third figure (concerning both universal and particular syllogisms), if you assume a statement contrary to the conclusion. 62. Consequently, in that way, that is to say, if you take what is contradictory opposite to the conclusion, both premises in the third figure are rejected. Whereas, in this way, or rather if you assume what is contrary to the conclusion, no premise is rejected. 63. Note that if a conversion takes place in the first figure, if you assume a statement contrary to the conclusion, then the major premise is rejected by a premise contradictory opposite to the latter in the third figure. Whereas the minor premise is rejected by what is contrariwise opposed to the latter. However, if the conclusion is converted, then both premises are contradictory rejected by means of what is contradictory opposite to them. 64. As regards the second figure, if you assume a statement contrary to the conclusion, then the major premise is rejected by means of what is contradictory opposite to the latter in the third figure. Whereas the minor premise is rejected by means of what is contrariwise opposed to the latter. However, if the conclusion is converted, then both premises are contradictorily rejected by means of what is contradictory opposite to them. Concerning the third figure regarding universal syllogisms, if you assume what is contradictory opposite to the conclusion, then indeed either of the premises is rejected by means of what is contrariwise opposite to each. Whereas if you assume what is contrary to the conclusion, then none of the premises is rejected. And in the case of particular syllogisms, if you assume what is contradictory opposite to the conclusion, then either premises are rejected by means of what is contradictory opposite to each. Whereas, if you assume what is contrary to the conclusion, then no premise is rejected.

48 | Sectio V, schol. 65–79

V Περὶ τῆς δι’ ἀδυνάτου δείξεως

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65. (61a18–31) 〈Ὁ – ἀντικείμενον.〉 κοινωνεῖ ἡ δι’ ἀδυνάτου δεῖξις τῇ ἀντιστροφῇ, καθὸ καὶ αὕτη διὰ τοῦ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένου τῷ προβλήματι καὶ μιᾶς προτάσεως ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. διαφέρει δὲ καθὸ ἡ ἀντιστροφὴ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι λαμβάνει καὶ μίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ κειμένων προτάσεων, καὶ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ἑτέραν· γενομένου γὰρ πρῶτον συλλογισμοῦ καὶ συναχθέντος συμπεράσματος ὕστερον ἡ ἀντιστροφὴ γίνεται, ἡ δὲ εἰς ἀδύνατον δεῖξις μὴ γενομένου συλλογισμοῦ, ἀλλὰ προτεθέντος προβλήματος· οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον· εἴ τις ἀντιλέγει ‘μὴ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον’, λαμβάνει μόνον τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ προβλήματι, ὅτι οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, καὶ προσλαμβάνει καὶ ἔξωθεν μίαν πρότασιν ἀληθῆ, ὅτι τὸ ζῷον παντὶ λογικῷ, καὶ συλλογίζεται ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι ‘τὸ λογικὸν οὐ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ’· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ λέγειν μὴ πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λογικόν (πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι λογικός· τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον συνήχθη ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποθεῖναι μὴ πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῷον), ἀληθὲς ἄρα τὸ πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῷον. τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τῷ προβλήματι οὐ λαμβάνει· οἷον εἰ τὸ πρόβλημά ἐστι ὅτι πᾶν λευκὸν ζῷόν ἐστι, εἴπῃ δέ τις οὐδὲν λευκὸν ζῷον εἶναι, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ λευκῷ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν παντὶ κύκνῳ, τὸ ζῷον ἄρα οὐδενὶ κύκνῳ· τοῦτο δὲ συνήχθη τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποθεῖναι τὸ ζῷον οὐδενὶ λευκῷ. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης οὐχί, εἰ ψεύδεται τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, ἀληθεύει τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ ‘παντί’· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς ὕλης συμψεύδεται· ἐπεὶ γὰρ σκοπὸν ἔχει ἡ εἰς ἀδύνατον δεῖξις τὸ μὴ μόνον συνάξαι συμπέρασμα ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατασκευάσαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς προτεθέν, ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο μόνον τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον λαμβάνει, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον:– [(65–67) D || = U] 66. (61a35–37) 〈Τὸ – οὐ δείκνυται.〉 σημείωσαι ὅτι τὸ καθόλου καταφατικὸν οὐ δείκνυται ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον δείξεως, ἀλλ’ ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ ἐν τρίτῳ· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς λαμβάνομεν τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ ‘παντί’, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’· τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’, εἰ μέλλει ληφθῆναι ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, ἢ μείζων πρότασις ληφθήσε-

65. 5–6 γενομένου – συμπεράσματος ] cf. diagr. 17 65. 8–12 εἴ τις – ἀνθρώπῳ ] cf. diagr. 18 65. 1 lemma addidi 65. 2 αὕτη UV : αὐτὴ D 65. 3 διαφέρει UV : διαφέρ D post ἡ add. μὲν D 65. 4 τὸ UV, D p.c. : τῶ D a.c. 65. 6 πρῶτον D : πρώτου V : δὲ U 65. 9 post ἄνθρωπον add. εἶναι D 65. 13–14 συνήχθην D 65. 14 ἀπὸ UV : ἐκ D 65. 15 ζῶον εἶναι D 65. 16 εἴπῃ UV : εἴποι D 65. 17 post κύκνῳ add. καὶ D 65. 19 post οὐχί add. εἶναι U ἀληθεύει iter. U 65. 20 τὸ UV : τῷ D συμψεύδεται UV : συμψεύδονται D 66. 1 lemma addidi σημείωσαι UV : cη´ D τὸ UV : τὶ D

In Anal. Pr. II 11, 61a17 – 14, 63b21

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V On Proof by Impossibility 65. A proof by impossibility has something in common with the conversion in so far as the former also rejects an assumption by means of what is contradictory opposite to a given thesis and one of the premises. A proof by impossibility, however, is different in so far as a conversion assumes what is either contrary, or contradictorily opposite to the conclusion, as well as one of the posited premises in a syllogism, and then rejects the other premise. For a conversion comes about afterward, after a syllogism has first taken place and after its conclusion has been drawn. Whereas a proof leading to an impossibility does not come about after a syllogism has taken place, but after a thesis has been proposed. E.g. every human being is a living being. If someone disputes ‘not every human being is a living being’, he assumes only what is contradictory opposite to the thesis, that not every human being is a living being, and takes, furthermore, a true premise from outside, that living being is predicated of every logical being, and infers in the second figure ‘logical being is not predicated of every human being’. And since it is impossible to say that not every human being is a logical being (for every human being is logical; the impossibility was inferred from supposing that not every human being is a living being), it is therefore true that every human being is a living being. He does not assume, however, what is contrary to the thesis. E.g. if the thesis is that everything white is a living being, but someone says that nothing white is a living being, one must assume then that living being is predicated of nothing white and that white is predicated of every swan, therefore living being is predicated of no swan. This impossibility was inferred from supposing that living being is predicated of nothing white. As regards the contingent matter, if ‘no’ is false, then its contrary, ‘all’, is certainly not true; for contraries concerning this kind of matter are both false. For since a proof by impossibility has as its aim not only to draw an impossible conclusion, but also to establish from the latter what was initially proposed, that it is true. For this reason then, he assumes only what is contradictory opposite, but certainly not what is contrary. 66. Note that a universal affirmative thesis is not proved in the first figure through a proof by impossibility, but in the second and in the third one. For if we assume what is contradictory opposite to ‘to all’ as regards a reduction to the impossible, then this is the ‘not to all’. This ‘not to all’, then, if it is about to be assumed in the first figure, it will be assumed either as a major premise,

50 | Sectio V, schol. 65–79

ται ἢ ἐλάττων· ἑκατέρως δὲ ληφθεῖσα ἀσυλλόγιστον τὸ σχῆμα ποιεῖ· ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι συνάγεται τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’· εἰ γοῦν τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’ ἀναιρεθῇ ὡς ἀδύνατον, εἰσάγεται τὸ ‘παντί’:– [⇐ 65 || = U]

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67. (61b39–40) Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παντὶ ἀλλὰ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν ὑποτεθῇ. εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποτεθῆναι τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ἀδύνατόν τι συναχθῇ ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ‘τίς’, ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ἀδύνατον συνήχθη, οὐκ εἰσάγεται τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’, ἀλλὰ τὸ ‘οὐδενί’· τοῦ δὲ ‘οὐδενὶ’ εἰσαχθέντος ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ ‘τίς’. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ‘τὶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ συναληθεύουσιν, ἀναιρεθήσεται καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’· ὥστε οὐχ ὑποθετέον τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β εἰς κατασκευὴν τοῦ ‘οὐ παντί’:– [⇐ 65 || = U] 68. (62a4–5) Ἔτι οὐ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν συμβαίνει τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν δεῖξαι τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’, εἰ λάβωμεν τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ, ἤγουν τὸ ‘τινί’, διότι ἡ ‘τίς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ συναληθεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ΓΑ ἀληθής, ἐξ ἀληθῶν προτάσεων ἀληθὲς συναχθήσεται συμπέρασμα καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδὲς καὶ ἀδύνατον ἦν, ἦν ἂν καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ὅτι τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, ψευδής· νῦν δὲ συναληθεύει καὶ τὸ ‘Α τινὶ τῷ Β’ καὶ 〈τὸ〉 ‘οὐ παντί’:– [= U] 69. // (62a36) Εἰ δ’ ὑποτεθῇ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ἤγουν, εἰ δὲ λάβῃς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ‘τινί’, τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’, ἀδύνατόν τι οὐ συναχθήσεται· οὐδ’ ἀναιρεθήσεται τὸ ‘τινὶ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’· ἡ γὰρ ‘τὶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ συναληθεύουσιν:– [= U]

t, XXXVv

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70. (62b8–9) Εἰ δ’ ὑποτεθῇ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν· ἤγουν, εἰ δὲ λάβῃς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ‘παντί’, τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, συλλογισμὸν μὲν ποιήσεις καὶ εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγήν, οὐ μὴν δὲ δείξεις τὸ ‘παντί’· εἰ γὰρ εἴπῃς ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, συνάγεται μὲν ἄτοπον ὅτι τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ, τοῦτο δὲ συνήχθη ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος προτάσεως, τῆς ‘ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β’, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἤδη ἀναιρουμένης τῆς ‘οὐδενὶ’ εἰσάγεται τὸ ‘παντί’· ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὕλην ἐνδεχομένην ἀναιρουμένης τῆς ‘οὐδενὶ’ εἰσάγεται τὸ ‘παντί’, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης τὰ ἐναντία συμψεύδεται· ὁ δὲ κανὼν οὐκ ὀφείλει ἐπὶ τῆσδε μὲν τῆς ὕλης σῴζειν, ἐπὶ ἄλλης δὲ μὴ σῴζειν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης ὀφείλει εἶναι ὁ αὐτός. ὥστε τοῦτό ἐστι σκοπὸς τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει διδάξαι ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι

66. 8 παντί UD : oὐ παντί V 67. 1 Ἐὰν – ὑποτεθῇ om. V 67. 1–2 ὑποτεθῆναι UV : ὑποθεῖναι D 67. 3 συνήχθην D 67. 4 τίς1 VD : οὐ πᾶς U δὲ – οὐ πᾶς VD : γὰρ ἡ οὐ πᾶς καὶ ἡ τὶς U 67. 5 ἀναιρεθήσεται – οὐ πᾶς VD : ἀναιρετικὴ δὲ ἡ οὐδεὶς τῆς τὶς καὶ τῆς οὐ πᾶς ἄρα U ὑποθετέον UV : ὑποθετ ´ D 67. 6 post οὐ παντί add. ἀλλὰ τὸ παντί D 68. 1 Ἔτι – ἀδύνατον om. UV 68. 2 αὐτοῦ UD : αὐτ῀ V 68. 5 καὶ2 om. D 68. 6 τὸ addidi cum β 69. 1 Εἰ – μὴ ὑπάρχειν om. U 70. 4 Γ U : Β VD συνήχθην D 70. 6 γὰρ U : om. VD 70. 8 συμψεύδεται UV : συμψεύδονται D

In Anal. Pr. II 11, 61a17 – 14, 63b21

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or as a minor one. In case, however, it is assumed in either way, it then makes a non-syllogistic figure. ‘Not to all’, however, is inferred in the second and the third figure. In fact, if ‘not to all’ is rejected as impossible, ‘to all’ is then introduced. 67. And if it is assumed to belong to some rather than to all. If, from supposing that A belongs to some B, something impossible is inferred after ‘some’ – from which an impossibility was inferred – has been rejected, then the ‘not to all’ is not introduced, but the ‘to no’. And if ‘to no’ is introduced, then ‘some’ is also rejected. Since ‘some’ and ‘not to all’ are both true, ‘not to all’ will also be rejected. Consequently, one must not assume that A belongs to some B in establishing the ‘not to all’. 68. Furthermore an impossibility does not result from the assumption. It is not possible to prove the ‘not to all’, if we assume its contrary, or rather the ‘to some’, because ‘some’ and ‘not all’ are true together. And since CA is also true, a true conclusion will be drawn from true premises and nothing impossible will be drawn. For if the conclusion were false and impossible, then the assumption that A belongs to some B would also be false; but now both the assumption ‘A belongs to some B’, and the ‘not to all’ are true together. 69. But if it is assumed that it does not belong to some or rather, if you assume the contrary of ‘to some’, the ‘not to all’, then an impossibility will not be inferred. ‘To some’ will not be rejected from inferring ‘not to all’ either, for ‘some’ and ‘not all’ are true together. 70. But if it is assumed that it belongs to none, or rather, if you assume the contrary of ‘to all’, ‘to no’, you will then make a syllogism and a reduction to the impossible, but you will surely not prove ‘to all’. For, if you say that A belongs to no B and C belongs to all B, then the absurdity that A does not belong to all B is inferred, but the latter is inferred from the major premise that ‘A belongs to no B’. Yet, since ‘to no’ is not actually rejected, ‘to all’ is introduced. Here, ‘to all’ is introduced for the reason that no contingent matter is possible in case ‘to no’ is rejected, but, as regards contingent matter both contraries are false. And this rule ought to be maintained as regards this kind of matter, whereas in another case it ought not to be maintained. But it ought

52 | Sectio V, schol. 65–79

ἐπὶ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ προβλήματι ὀφείλεις λαμβάνειν καὶ μίαν πρότασιν ἀληθῆ, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ προβλήματι:– [= U] 71. (62b27) Δείκνυταί πως τὸ καταφατικόν, ἤγουν τὸ ‘παντί’· τὸ πῶς εἶπε, διότι ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι τὸ ‘παντί’ οὐ συνάγεται. δείκνυται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ συναχθῆναι ἐν συλλογισμῷ τι ἀδύνατον, οὗ ἀναιρουμένου καὶ ψευδοῦς φαινομένου εἰσάγεται τὸ ‘παντί’:– [(71–73) D || = U]

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72. (62b35–37) Καὶ ἔνθα μέν, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ δεικτικῇ δείξει, οὐκ ἔστι γνώριμον ὅτι τὸ μέλλον συναχθῆναι συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ἐστι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἤγουν ψεῦδος· οὐδὲ προϋπολαμβάνειν, ἤγουν οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ συναχθῆναι τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι προγνῶναι ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς συμπέρασμα συναχθήσεται· ἔνθα δέ, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ δι’ ἀδυνάτου δείξει, ἀνάγκη προγινώσκειν ὅτι τὸ μέλλον συναχθῆναι συμπέρασμα ἐκ τῆς ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένης προτάσεως τῷ ἀληθεῖ προβλήματι ψευδές ἐστι καὶ ἀδύνατον:– [⇐ 71 || = U] 73. (62b37–38) 〈Διαφέρει – ἀμφοῖν.〉 εἴτε δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα φάσις 〈ἢ ἀπόφασις〉 ἐστίν, ἤγουν καταφατικὸν ἢ ἀποφατικόν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἤγουν κατ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἡ δεικτικὴ δεῖξις καὶ ἡ δι’ ἀδυνάτου κατὰ τὸ καταφατικὸν καὶ 〈τὸ〉 ἀποφατικὸν συμπέρασμα· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ταῖς δείξεσι καὶ καταφατικὰ καὶ ἀποφατικὰ συνάγονται συμπεράσματα:– [⇐ 73] 74. (62b41–63a2) 〈Ὅταν – μέσῳ.〉 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι διὰ τῆς δι’ ἀδυνάτου δείξεως γένηται, τὸ ἀληθές, ἤγουν ὁ δεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς ὁ τὸ ἀληθὲς συνάγων, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἔσται:–

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75. (63a7–11) 〈Ἔστω – ἀδύνατον.〉 ἔστω γὰρ δεδειγμένον διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς τὸ Α μηδενὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ τῷ Β. οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ὑπόθεσις, ἀφ’ ἧς συνήχθη τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἦν ὅτι τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, [/V] τὸ δὲ Γ ἐλαμβάνετο ἐπὶ τοῦ δεικτικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἐγίνετο ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὁ συνάγων τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἐκ τοῦ δεῖξαι δεικτικῶς ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν λαβεῖν τὸ ‘τινί’:– [U-]

71. 1 ἤγουν – παντί VD : om. U 71. 2 τὸ παντί D : om. UV 72. 3 ψεῦδος UV : ψευδές D οὐδὲ Arist (nABCHclgTu) et Magent. : οὐ δεῖ Arist. (R) : deest in Arist. (Nd) 73. 1 lemma addidi δὲ om. D 73. 1–2 ἢ ἀπόφασις addidi (cf. Anal. Pr. II 14, 62b37) 73. 4 τὸ addidi 74. 1 lemma addidi 75. 1 lemma addidi 75. 3 ἐλαμβάνετο V : οὐ λαμβάνεται D 75. 4–5 post ἀδύνατον add. τὸ Α μηδενὶ V i.r. 75. 6 post τινί add. εἰ ψεύδεται D

In Anal. Pr. II 11, 61a17 – 14, 63b21

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to be the same concerning every kind of matter. Consequently, Aristotle’s aim here is to teach exactly this, that as regards a reduction to the impossible you are obliged to assume what is contradictory opposite to a thesis, as well as one true premise, but surely not the contrary of the thesis too. 71. An affirmative conclusion, namely ‘to all’, is proved in a way. He said ‘in a way’, because ‘to all’ is not drawn in the second and in the third figure. The latter is proved nonetheless by inferring in a syllogism something impossible, after the rejection and false disclosure of which ‘to all’ is introduced. 72. Also in the former case, or rather in the case of an ostensive proof, it is not known that the conclusion to be drawn is true or not true, namely false. Nor to suppose beforehand, or rather nor is it possible, before drawing a conclusion, to know beforehand whether a true or a false conclusion will be drawn. In the latter case, or rather in a case of a proof by impossibility, it is necessary to know beforehand that the conclusion about to be drawn from a premise that is contradictory opposite to a true thesis is false and impossible. 73. It makes no difference at all whether a conclusion is an affirmation or a denial, namely affirmative or negative. Or rather, an ostensive proof and a proof by impossibility do not differ from one another concerning an affirmative and a negative conclusion. For both affirmative and negative conclusions are drawn in both proofs. 74. For whenever a syllogism is formed in the first figure by means of a proof by impossibility, then the truth, namely an ostensive syllogism inferring a true conclusion, will be formed in the middle figure. 75. Let it be proved by reduction to the impossible that A belongs to no B or not to every B. Therefore the assumption, from which the impossibility was inferred, was that A belongs to some B, whereas C was assumed in the case of the ostensive syllogism. For a syllogism inferring an impossibility was formed as follows: from ostensive showing that A belongs to no B and hence by assuming ‘some’.

54 | Sectio VI, schol. 80–92

76. (63b12–15) 〈Φανερὸν – ὅροις.〉 φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν προβλημάτων δείκνυται καὶ δεικτικῶς καὶ δι’ ἀδυνάτου διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον δι’ ἀδυνάτου ἔστι δεῖξαι καὶ δεικτικῶς καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἐν τοῖς εἰλημμένοις ὅροις, ἤγουν διὰ τῶν εἰλημμένων ὅρων:– [(76–79) D] 77. (63b15–16) Ἡ ἀντικειμένη πρότασις· ἤγουν ἡ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένη:– [⇐ 76]

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78. (63b17) Τοῖς διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς λαμβάνομεν τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι καὶ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν τὴν ἑτέραν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα λαμβάνομεν τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι καὶ ἔξωθεν πρότασιν ἀληθῆ, καὶ συνάγομέν τι ἀδύνατον, οὗ ἀναιρουμένου εἰσάγεται τὸ ἀληθές:– [⇐ 76 || = U] 79. (63b18–21) 〈Δῆλον – ἕτερον.〉 καὶ ἀδύνατον δειχθῆναί τι δεικτικῶς, ὃ οὐχὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δειχθήσεται:– [⇐ 76] VI 〈Περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων συλλογίζεσθαι〉 80. (63b22) 〈Ἐξ ἀντικειμένων.〉 ἀντικείμενα λέγει καὶ τὰ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενα καὶ τὰ ἐναντία· γένος γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον διαιρούμενον εἰς τὰ πρός τι, εἰς τὰ ἐναντία, εἰς τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, καὶ εἰς τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν:– [(80, 82) D || D ⇒ 82]

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81. (63b26–27) 〈Κατ’ – τρεῖς.〉 τρεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τῶν ἀντικειμένων· μία μὲν ἐναντία, ὡς ἡ ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐδείς’, καὶ δύο ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμεναι, ἡ ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘οὐ πᾶς’, καὶ ἡ ‘οὐδεὶς’ καὶ ἡ ‘τίς’. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν τῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἓξ γίνονται αἱ συζυγίαι τούτων καὶ αἱ συμπλοκαί· ἢ γὰρ ἡ μείζων πρότασίς ἐστι καθόλου καταφατική, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων καθόλου ἀποφατική· ἢ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ‘οὐδεὶς’ καὶ ‘πᾶς’· ἢ ἡ μείζων ‘πᾶς’, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων μερικὴ ἀποφατική· ἢ ἡ μείζων ‘οὐδείς’, ἡ δὲ ἐλάττων ‘τίς’· ἰδοὺ τέσσαρες συζυγίαι συλλογιστικαί· αἱ δὲ ἕτεραι δύο συζυγίαι (μία μὲν ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος ‘τίς’, τῆς δὲ ἐλάττονος ‘οὐδείς’·

80. 1–4 ἀντικείμενα – ἀπόφασιν ] cf. diagr. 19 76. 1 lemma addidi 78. 1 Τοῖς – ἀντιστροφῆς om. U 78. 2 ἀντικείμενον ἀντιφατικῶς D 78. 5 τὸ U, V p.c., D : τὶ V a.c. 79. 1 lemma addidi Tit. sect. VI Περὶ – συλλογισμῶν addidi cum SFE 80. 1 lemma addidi post λέγει add. ἐνταῦθα D 81. 1 lemma addidi cum SP τρεῖς VD : ἰστέον ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν U 81. 2 post δύο add. αἱ V 81. 3 ἡ1 UV : om. D οὐδείς … τίς UD : τίς … οὐδείς V 81. 4 τούτων συζυγίαι D αἱ2 om. D 81. 5–6 ἢ τὸ – καὶ πᾶς om. D

In Anal. Pr. II 15, 63b22 – 64b27

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76. It is then evident that each of the theses is proved by means of the same terms not only ostensively, but also by means of an impossibility. Similarly, it is also possible to show what is being proved not only by an impossibility, but also ostensively and vice versa with the taken terms, or rather by means of the assumed terms. 77. The opposite premise; namely the contradictory opposite one. 78. With those formed by means of conversion. For, just as in the case of a conversion, we assume what is contradictory opposite to the conclusion, as well as one of the posited premises and then we reject the other premise, so we assume here too what is contradictory opposite to the conclusion, as well as an additional true premise, and we infer something impossible, after the rejection of which a true conclusion is introduced. 79. And it is impossible to ostensively prove something, which will surely not be proved through an impossibility. VI On Syllogism from Opposite Premises 80. He calls opposites both the contradictory opposite and the contrary premises. For an opposite is a genus when it is divided into relatives, into contraries, into things in relation to privation and possession, and into things in relation to affirmation and denial. 81. The oppositions of opposite premises are three in number: one contrary (thus ‘all’ and ‘no’) and two contradictory opposites (‘all’ and ‘not to all’, as well as ‘some’ and ‘no’). And since the oppositions are three in number, then their combinations and conjunctions add up to six in number. For either the major premise is a universal affirmative, whereas the minor one is a universal negative, or it happens the other way around: ‘no’ and ‘all’. Or the major premise is ‘all’, whereas the minor one is a particular negative. Or the major premise is ‘no’, whereas the minor one is ‘some’. Behold, four syl-

56 | Sectio VI, schol. 80–92

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ἢ τῆς μείζονος μερικῆς ἀποφατικῆς, τῆς δὲ ἐλάττονος καθόλου καταφατικῆς) εἰσὶν ἀσυλλόγιστοι:– [⇐ 82 || D ⇒ 83 || = U] 82. (63b38–39) 〈Αὗται δ’ οὐκ ἀντίκεινται.〉 αὗται δὲ αἱ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι προτάσεις οὐκ ἀντίκεινται ἀλλήλαις:– [⇐ 80 || D ⇒ 81]

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83. (64a36) Ὅπερ οὐκ εἴωθε λανθάνειν· τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἀσύνετος, ὡς δοῦναι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἐπιστήμην σπουδαίαν δοῦναι καὶ μὴ σπουδαίαν; ἵνα γοῦν λανθάνωμεν, οὐ δεῖ φανερῶς προφέρειν τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ’ ἐπικρύπτειν ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐναλλάσσειν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (οἷον ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, ἡ χαρὰ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ταὐτά, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν) ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀμείβειν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κατηγορουμένου (οἷον ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀτελὴς κίνησις, τὸ ἀτελὲς οὐχ αἱρετόν, τὸ οὐχ αἱρετὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστι):– [⇐ 81 || D ⇒ 85 || = U] 84. (64b11–12) Καὶ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους ὅρους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι· καὶ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους ὅρους ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἀντικειμένως λαμβάνεσθαι· οἷον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡδονή:– [⇐ 86 || D ⇒ 90]

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85. (64b13–15) 〈Δῆλον – περιττόν.〉 παραλογισμοὺς ἐκάλεσεν τοὺς ἐξ ἀντικειμένων συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἀεὶ ψεῦδος συνάγοντας· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις συλλογισμοῖς, τοῖς ἐξ ἀντικειμένων, οὐδὲν κωλύει συνάγεσθαι ἀντίφασιν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προβλήματος. καὶ ὑποθέσεως ἀληθοῦς ὑποτιθεμένης, οἷον // ὅτι ὁ τρία περιττός, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν ἀντίφασιν αὐτοῦ συνάξαι, ὅτι ὁ τρία ἄρτιος:– [⇐ 83 || (85–86) D || = U] 86. Ὁ παραλογισμὸς ἐγένετο τοῦ δειχθῆναι τὸν τρία ἄρτιον ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν πάντα ἀριθμὸν εἰς ἶσα διαιρούμενον ἄρτιον εἶναι· ἐκεῖνος δέ ἐστι ἄρτιος ἀριθμός, ὁ εἰς ἴσους ἀριθμοὺς διαιρούμενος, ὡς ὁ ἓξ εἰς τρία καὶ τρία· ὁ δὲ εἰς τρεῖς διαιρούμενος μονάδας εἰς ἀριθμοὺς οὐ διαιρεῖται· ἡ γὰρ μονὰς ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ:– [⇐ 85 || D ⇒ 84 || U-]

81. 10 ἀσυλλόγιστοι εἰσίν U 82. 1 lemma addidi cum S 83. 1 Ὅπερ – λανθάνειν om. U 83. 7 post κίνησις add. καὶ D 84. 1 τοὺς αὐτοὺς Arist. et V : τὰ αὐτὰ D 85. 1 lemma addidi 85. 2 καὶ UV : ὡς D 85. 5 αὐτοῦ UV : αὐτῷ D 86. 4 post τρεῖς add. ἀριθμοὺς V μονάδας διαιρούμενος D 86. 4–5 ἡ – ἀριθμοῦ ] cf. Iambl. 1.1–8

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logistic combinations! The other two combinations, however, (a combination of a major premise ‘some’ and a minor premise ‘no’, or a combination of a major particular negative premise and a minor universal affirmative premise) are non-syllogistic. 82. And these premises in the first figure are not opposite to one another. 83. This does not usually escape notice. For who would be so witless as to propose that pleasure is both good and not good, or to propose both that science is worthy of serious attention and that it is not worthy of serious attention? In order, then, that we escape notice, it is necessary to not conspicuously cite opposite statements, but disguise them either by exchanging the name of the subject term (e.g. pleasure is good, joy is not good, but joy and pleasure are the same, therefore good is not good) or by changing the name of the predicate term (e.g. pleasure is good, pleasure is an incomplete movement, what is incomplete may not be chosen, what may not be chosen is not good, therefore good is not good). 84. Also because the subject terms are either the same; also because the subject terms are assumed oppositely in a syllogism; e.g. every good thing is pleasure and no good thing is pleasure. 85. He called fallacies the syllogisms that come about from opposite premises and that always infer a false conclusion. For in such syllogisms, that is to say in syllogisms from opposite premises, nothing acts as a hindrance when inferring a contradiction concerning the same thesis. And even if we assume a true assumption, e.g. that the number three is odd, nothing prevents us from inferring the contradiction of the latter, that the number three is even. 86. The fallacy of proving the number three to be odd was formed from assuming that every equally divided number is even, and an even number is one divided into equal numbers, just as the number six is divided into three and three. A number divided into three units, however, is not divided into numbers; for a unit is not a number, but the origin of a number.

58 | Sectio VI, schol. 80–92

87. (64b16–17) 〈Ἐὰν – ἀντίφασις.〉 ἐὰν οὖν λάβῃ τοιαύτας, ἤγουν ἀντικειμένας προτάσεις, συνάξει τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ἤγουν τὴν ἀντίθεσιν· οἷον ὅτι ὁ τρία καὶ περιττὸς καὶ ἄρτιος:– [⇐ 83 || (87, 89, 91) D || D ⇒ 89] 88. (64b22) 〈Τὴν ἀντίφασιν.〉 ἀντίφασιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν ἀντίθεσιν νοητέον· αὕτη γὰρ γένος ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένων:– [⇒ 92 || D ⇒ 87] 89. (64b24) 〈Οἱ ἔλεγχοι.〉 ἐλέγχους λέγει τοὺς παραλογισμούς, ἤγουν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς τοὺς συνάγοντας τὴν ἀντίθεσιν:– [⇐ 87 || D ⇒ 91] 90. Ἔλεγχός ἐστι συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως:– [⇐ 84 || oV || (90, 92) D || D ⇒ 92 || U+] 91. (64b25) Ὥστε δ’ εἶναι ἐναντία· ἤγουν, ἐὰν δεῖ εἶναι τὰ εἰλημμένα, ἤγουν τὰς ληφθείσας προτάσεις, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐναντία, ἐξ ὧν συνάγεται συμπέρασμα ἔχον τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἢ δύο συλλογισμοὺς ὀφείλεις ποιῆσαι ἔχοντας προτάσεις ἀντικειμένας ἢ ἕνα, οὗ ἡ μείζων πρότασις ἔχει τὰ ἀντικείμενα:– [⇐ 87 || D ⇒ 93] 92. (64b26) Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ τοῦτον, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ ἐκ δύο συλλογισμῶν συμπεραίνεσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἢ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐν τῇ μείζονι προτάσει:– [⇐ 90 || D ⇒ 88]

87. 1 lemma addidi cum P 87. 3 καὶ1 om. D 88. 1 lemma addidi ἀντίφασιν ἐνταῦθα V : ἰστέον ὅτι ἐνταῦθα ἀντίφασιν D 89. 1 lemma addidi 91. 2 ἐναντία V : ἐναντίας D 92. 1 ante Οὐκ ἔστιν add. ἢ ἐκ δύο συλλογισμῶν D (Anal. Pr. II 15, 64b25) ἐν τῷ om. D 90. 1 Ἔλεγχός – συλλογισμῶν ] Soph. El. 6, 168a37

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87. If then someone takes such premises, namely opposite premises, he will then infer a contradiction, or rather an opposition; e.g. that the number three is both odd and even. 88. By the term contradiction, it is necessary to understand here the opposition; for the latter is the genus of both contrary and contradictory opposite premises. 89. Aristotle calls fallacies refutations, that is syllogisms that infer an opposition. 90. A refutation is the inference of a contradiction. 91. But to assume them so that the assumptions are contraries. Or rather, if what is taken, namely the assumed premises, must really be contraries, from which a conclusion that has opposite terms is drawn, then you are obliged to form either two syllogisms that have opposite premises, or one syllogism, of which the major premise contains opposite terms. 92. There is no other way than this, namely by concluding opposites from two syllogisms, or by placing opposite terms in the major premise.

60 | Sectio VII, schol. 93–111

VII Περὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι

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93. (64b28) 〈Τὸ – λαμβάνειν.〉 Τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστι, ὅταν τι δείκνυται δι’ ἑαυτοῦ πεφυκὸς δι’ ἄλλου δείκνυσθαι· οἷον ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, διότι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστι· τὸ προκείμενον γὰρ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν, τοῦτο πάλιν λαμβάνομεν ὡς πρότασιν εἰς κατασκευὴν αὐτοῦ ἢ πολλάκις λαμβάνομεν πρότασιν δοκοῦσαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τοῦ προκειμένου, οὖσαν δὲ τὴν αὐτήν· οἷον ἡ ἡδονὴ αἱρετόν, τὸ αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτά εἰσι:– [⇐ 91 || ≈ U] 94. (64b28–32) 〈Ὡς – πρότερον.〉 γένος τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι· εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ τρόποι τοῦ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι· οὐκ ἀποδεικνύομεν γὰρ καὶ ὅτε οὐ χρώμεθα ὅλως συλλογισμῶ, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀσυλλογίστως λέγομέν τι, καὶ ὅτε ἀσυλλογίστῳ συζυγίᾳ κεχρήμεθα, καὶ ὅτε ψευδέσι προτάσεσι, καὶ ὅτε ἐξ ἀντικειμένων συλλογιζόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τὰ πρῶτα δεικνύομεν (οἷον 〈ὅτι〉 ἡ σελήνη ἀντιφράττεται ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς, διότι ἐκλείπει· ἢ ὅτι ἡ σελήνη σφαιροειδής, διότι ποικίλως φωτίζεται· ἢ ὅτι ἡ γυνὴ τέτοκε, διότι γάλα ἔχει· πρὸ γὰρ τριῶν ἡμερῶν τοῦ τοκετοῦ ἄρχονται οἱ μασθοὶ τῆς γυναικὸς ῥεῖν γάλα), ἢ ὅταν ἀσαφές τι διὰ ἀσαφεστέρου δεικνύωμεν ἢ δι’ ὁμοίου ἀσαφοῦς (οἷον 〈ὅτι〉 ἡ ψυχὴ πλῆθος μονάδων ἢ στιγμῶν, ἢ ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ γένεσις ὀρθοῦ λόγου). ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστιν· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύειν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστι ὡς γένος ἐπὶ πλέον εἴδους· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι κυρίως γένος, διότι τὸ γένος καταφατικῶς ἐκφέρεται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀποφατικῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ γένος εἶναι ἀπόφασιν, τὰ δὲ εἴδη καταφάσεις· καταχρηστικῶς δὲ εἴρηται γένος:– [D ⇒ 97 || ≈ U]

Tit. sect. VII Περὶ – αἰτεῖσθαι om. V 93. 1 lemma addidi Τὸ om. D τι om. V 93. 2– 3 διότι – ἐστι om. D ex homoeoteleuto 93. 4 πολλάκις V : πάλιν D 94. 1 lemma addidi 94. 1–2 post μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι add. τὸ προκείμενον V s.l. 94. 3–4 οὐ χρώμεθα – ὅτε1 V i.m. : om. D ex homoeoteleuto 94. 6 ὅτι addidi 94. 8 τέτοκε – ἔχει U : γάλα ἔχει διότι τέτοκε VD 94. 8–9 μαστοὶ V p.c. 94. 9 ὅταν V : ὅτι D ἀσαφεστέρου V : τοῦ σαφεστέρου D δεικνύομεν D 94. 10 ὅτι addidi 94. 15 post γένος add. schol. ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ γένεσις καὶ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου, ἤγουν τοῦ κρίνοντος τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ γνωστὰ ὡς ἔχουσι φύσιν, μὴ παρατετραμμένης τῆς ἀληθείας ὑπό τινος πλάνης. ἡ ψυχὴ πλῆθος μονάδων, καθόσον ἐστὶ τριμερὴς ἢ πλῆθος στιγμῶν· ἀμερὴς γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀμερεῖς εἰσίν· ἀμερεῖς δὲ καὶ αἱ στιγμαί· οἱ πυθαγορικοὶ γὰρ συμβολικῶς τὰς οὐσίας ἔλεγον ἀριθμούς· καὶ διὰ μὲν τῆς μονάδος ἐδήλουν τὰ εἴδη· ἀμερῆ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἐκεῖνα· διὰ δὲ τῆς δυάδος τὴν ὕλην· ὡς γὰρ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς διχῆ τὴν διαίρεσιν δέχεται, οὕτως καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος ἔστι διαιρετὸν διὰ τὴν ὕλην D 94. 6–7 ἡ – ἐκλείπει ] cf. Alex. In Top. 16.10–12 94. 7 ἡ σελήνη – φωτίζεται ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. I 168.26–28; schol. 96 94. 8 τέτοκε – ἔχει ] cf. Anal. Pr. II, 26 70a12–13; Rhet. I, 2 1357b15–16; Anon. In Anal. Pr. II 188a21–23; schol 212. 10–12; 215.5–6; Pedias. I 85.9 94. 10–11 ἡ – λόγου ] cf. schol. 95.1–2 94. 12–13 γένος – εἴδους ] cf. Top. IV 1, 121b3–4

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VII On Begging the Point at Issue 93. To beg the point at issue happens whenever something is proved through itself, even though it is normally inclined to be proved by means of another thing; e.g. that pleasure is good, because pleasure is good. For we assume once more the very thing that is proposed in regard to demonstration as a premise for establishing the former; or we often assume a premise that seems to be something other than what is proposed, albeit it is the same. E.g. pleasure is a thing that may be chosen, a thing that may be chosen is good; for what may be chosen and what is good are indeed the same. 94. The genus of begging the point at issue is the failure to demonstrate. There are, however, many ways to fail at demonstrating. For we fail at demonstrating when we do not employ syllogism at all, but we simply and nonsyllogistically say something; and when we have used a non-syllogistic combination of premises; and when we have employed false premises; and when we form a syllogism from opposite premises; and when we prove what is prior from what is posterior (e.g. that the moon is blocked by the earth, because the former experiences an eclipse; or that the moon is spherical, because it is illuminated in many ways; or that a woman has given birth, because she has milk – for three days before childbirth a woman’s breasts start producing milk); or whenever we explain what is uncertain by means of what is more or equally uncertain (e.g. that the soul is a multitude of units or points, or that virtue is a becoming of the right sense). Yet, none of these is begging the point at issue. For failing to demonstrate is of wider denotation than begging the point at issue, just as a genus is of wider denotation than a species. And failing to demonstrate is not a genus in the proper sense, because a genus is produced affirmatively, not negatively; for it is impossible for a genus to be a denial, and for species to be affirmations. Nonetheless, it is called genus because of misuse of language.

62 | Sectio VII, schol. 93–111

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95. (64b31) 〈Καὶ – ἀγνώστων·〉 οἷον εἰ βουληθείην δεῖξαι ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ εἴπω οὕτως· ἡ ἀρετὴ γένεσίς ἐστι ἐν τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ, ἡ γένεσις ἡ ἐν τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη· ἰδού, σαφέστερόν ἐστι μᾶλλον τὸ συμπέρασμα τῆς προτάσεως τῆς λεγούσης ‘ἡ ἀρετὴ γένεσις ἐν ὀρθῷ λόγῳ’:– [oD] 96. (64b32) 〈Εἰ – πρότερον.〉 οἷον εἰ λέγω οὕτως· ἡ σελήνη σφαιροειδής, ὅτι τοιῶσδε φωτίζεται· ἢ ἀντιφράττεται, ὅτι ἐκλείπει· τὸ ἐναντίον γάρ· ἡ σελήνη, ἐπεὶ ἀντιφράττεται, ἐκλείπει, καὶ ἐπειδὴ σφαιροειδής, τοιῶσδε φωτίζεται:– [oD]

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97. (65a4–5) 〈Ὅπερ – γράφειν.〉 δείκνυσιν ὁ Γεωμέτρης ὅτι αἱ ἐναλλὰξ γωνίαι τῶν δύο εὐθειῶν, τῆς τε ΑΒ καὶ τῆς ΓΔ, ἤγουν ἡ ἐκτὸς τῇ ἐντὸς καὶ ἀπεναντίας, ἶσαί εἰσι καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἐντὸς γωνίαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μέρη τῶν ῥηθεισῶν εὐθειῶν ἶσαι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ δεῖξαι ταύτας τὰς εὐθείας παραλλήλους. εἴ τις δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν δείξει, ὅτι αὗται αἱ εὐθεῖαι παράλληλοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐναλλὰξ γωνίας ἴσας εἶναι ἀλλήλαις ἢ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας ἴσας εἶναι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς, ἔδειξε τὰς εὐθείας ταύτας παραλλήλους εἶναι δι’ ἑαυτῶν καὶ αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α δεικνύεται διὰ τοῦ Β, τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ πέφυκε διὰ τοῦ Α δεικνύεσθαι, τὸ Α δείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ Α καὶ αὐτὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ δείκνυται:– [⇐ 94 || D ⇒ 99] 98. (65a6–7) 〈Τῶν παραλλήλων.〉 παράλληλοί εἰσιν εὐθεῖαι, αἵτινες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὖσαι ἐπιπέδῳ 〈καὶ〉 ἐκβαλλόμεναι ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα μέρη ἐπὶ μηδέτερον συμπίπτουσιν ἀλλήλαις:– [⇐ 99 || D ⇒ 102] 99. (65a7–8) Ἕκαστον εἶναι λέγειν, ἐάν ἐστιν· ἤγουν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν, διότι ἐστὶ γελαστικόν:– [⇐ 97 || D ⇒ 98]

95. 1–5 οἷον – ἐπιστήμης ] cf. diagr. 20 97. 5–10 εἴ τις – δείκνυται ] cf. diagr. 25

97. 1–5 δείκνυσιν – παραλλήλους ] cf. diagr. 21

95. 1 lemma addidi cum P 96. 1 lemma addidi 97. 1 lemma addidi cum P 97. 2–3 ἀπεναντίας V : ἀπέναντι D 97. 5 αἱ om. D 97. 9 δείκνυσι V : δείκνυσθαι D 98. 1 lemma addidi cum P 98. 2 καὶ addidi (cf. Eucl. Elem. I, Def. 23.2) 98. 3 συμπίπτουσιν V : ἐμπίπτουσιν D 95. 2–3 ἡ ἀρετὴ – ἐπιστήμη ] cf. schol. 94.11 96. 1–4 ἡ – φωτίζεται ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. I 168.26–28; schol. 94.6–7 97. 1–4 αἱ – εἰσιν ] cf. Eucl. Elem., Dem. 28–29 98. 1– 3 παράλληλοι – ἀλλήλαις ] Eucl. Elem., Def. 23

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95. E.g. if I should wish to prove that virtue is scientific knowledge and say as follows, that virtue is a becoming with respect to right sense, that a becoming with respect to right sense is scientific knowledge, therefore that virtue is scientific knowledge. Behold, the conclusion is rather clearer than the premise that claims ‘virtue is a becoming with respect to right sense’! 96. E.g. if I say as follows, that the moon is spherical because it is illuminated in such way, or that the moon is blocked, because it experiences an eclipse. For the contrary actually happens, the moon experiences an eclipse, after it is blocked. And since it is spherical, it is illuminated in such way. 97. The Geometer proves that alternate angles of two straight lines (both AB and CD, or rather the external angle with reference to the interior opposite angle) are equals and that the same side interior angles of the aforementioned straight lines are equal to two right angles, since these straight lines were proved to be parallel. Had someone, however, proved the opposite, that these straight lines were parallel because the alternate angles are equal to one another or because the interior angles are equal to two right angles, he would then have proved these straight lines were parallel by themselves and would then have begged the point at issue. For if A is proved by B and B by C, and if C is naturally proved by A, then he proves A by A and the same thing is proved through itself. 98. Parallel lines are straight lines which, since they are in the same plane and since they are produced to infinity in both directions, meet with one another in neither one of them. 99. To say that each thing is, if it is. Or rather, say that a human being is a being able to laugh, because it is able to laugh.

64 | Sectio VII, schol. 93–111

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100. (65a10) Εἰ οὖν τὶς ἀδήλου ὄντος. ἀνατρέχει πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνῦναι ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ὡς γένος ὂν αὐτοῦ· οὐκ ἀποδείκνυσι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους, οὓς εἴρηκε. προσέτι, καὶ ὅταν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν προβλήματος ἀσαφοῦς λάβῃ προτάσεις ἀσαφεῖς, οὐκ ἀποδείκνυσι μέν, οὐ μὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται· οὐ γάρ ἐστι ἀρχὴ καὶ πρότασις ἀποδείξεως ἡ πρότασις ἡ ἄδηλος ὁμοίως τῷ συμπεράσματι:– [⇐ 102 || (102, 100) D || V ⇒ 102] 101. (65a14) Εἰ μέντοι τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Γ οὕτως ἔχει· ἤγουν εἰ λάβῃς ὅρους ἐξισάζοντας ἢ τὸν μὲν μέρος, τὸν δὲ ὅλον (οἷον χαρὰν καὶ ἡδονήν), τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ποιεῖς:– [⇐ 102, 103 || (101, 103) D || V ⇒ 103]

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102. (65a14) 〈εἰ – εἶναι.〉 τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι γίνεται, ὅταν τὶς αὐτὸ τὸ προκείμενον λάβῃ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτοῦ· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ δεικνύναι ἐστὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρότασιν καὶ συμπέρασμα. ἐπικρύπτοντες δέ τινες τὸ δοκεῖν δεικνύειν τὸ αὐτὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ λαμβάνουσιν ὅρους ἢ ἐξισάζοντας, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γελαστικόν, ἢ ἑτέρους μὲν τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ, ταὐτοὺς δὲ τῇ δυνάμει, οἷον ἡδονὴν καὶ χαράν, ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀθάνατον· οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάσῃ χαρᾷ, ἡ χαρὰ πάσῃ ἡδονῇ, // τὸ ἀγαθόν ἄρα πάσῃ ἡδονῇ· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ ὅροι εἰσὶν ὑποκείμενοι, πολλάκις δὲ τὸ ταὐτὸν τῶν ὅρων δείκνυται ἐν τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετόν· ὁ γὰρ λέγων ‘τὸ ἀγαθὸν παντὶ αἱρετῷ, τὸ αἱρετὸν πάσῃ ἡδονῇ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα πάσῃ ἡδονῇ’ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται [καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λεπτομερὲς ταὐτά εἰσιν]:– [⇐ 98, 100 || V ⇒ 101 || D ⇒ 100 || ≈ U] 103. (65a16–17) Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὅτι τῷ Β τὸ Α ὑπάρχει· ἤγουν καὶ γὰρ δείξεις ὅτι τὸ Α ὑπάρχει τῷ Β δι’ ἐκείνων, ἤγουν διά τε τῆς μιᾶς προτάσεως καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως· αἰτεῖται γὰρ καὶ αὕτη τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ δεικνύεις τὸ αἴτιον, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ κύκλῳ δεῖξις καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ταὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὖν διαφέρουσι, καθὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ κύκλῳ δείξει πάντα διὰ πάντων δείκνυται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι κἂν ἓν δειχθῇ (οἷον τὸ συμπέρασμα διὰ μιᾶς προτάσεως καὶ αὕτη διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οἷον τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ γελαστικῷ, τὸ ζῷον ἄρα παντὶ γελαστικῷ),

102. 3–5 ἐπικρύπτοντες – τὸ γελαστικόν ] cf. diagr. 23–24 102. 5–8 ἢ – ὑποκείμενοι ] cf. diagr. 25 102. 8–11 πολλάκις – αἰτεῖται ] cf. diagr. 26 103. 7–17 οἷον – μερικήν ] cf. diagr. 27 100. 2 ὡς V : καὶ D 100. 5 καὶ om. D 101. 1 post εἰ add. δὲ D 102. 1 lemma addidi 102. 8 δεικνύεται D 102. 11 καὶ – εἰσιν seclusi 103. 2 τῆς om. D 103. 4–6 οὕτω – εἶναι V : καὶ ταὐτὰ εἰσίν D

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100. If then one should assume, when it is uncertain. He returns again to what he said from the beginning and explains that failing to demonstrate is of wider denotation than begging the point at issue, since the former is a genus of the latter. For someone fails even to demonstrate in the many ways, which he has said. Besides, even when someone takes uncertain premises in the demonstration of an uncertain thesis, he does not demonstrate the latter, but he does not beg the point at issue either; for the uncertain premise – similarly to the conclusion – is not the initial point and premise of a demonstration. 101. If however B is in this way related to C. Or rather, if you take coextensive terms, or if you assume one of them is whole, whereas the other is a part (e.g. delight and pleasure), then you beg the point at issue. 102. Begging the point at issue occurs whenever someone assumes exactly what is proposed in the demonstration of the latter. Proving the same thing through itself, however, is to assume the same thing not only as premise, but also as conclusion. By concealing that they seem to prove the same thing through itself, some people assume either coextensive terms, such as human and being able to laugh, or terms different in reference to uttered speech, but identical in reference to their meaning, such as pleasure and delight, incorruptible and immortal. E.g. good is predicated of every delight, delight is predicated of every pleasure, therefore good is predicated of every pleasure. And these terms are subject terms, but the identity of the terms is often shown in the predicate terms, e.g. good and what may be chosen. For a person saying ‘good is predicated of all of what may be chosen, what may be chosen is predicated of every pleasure, therefore good is predicated of every pleasure’ begs the point at issue [both fire and what is composed of small particles are identical]. 103. For one might also prove that A belongs to B. Or rather: for you will also prove that A belongs to B through those terms, or rather through one premise and the conclusion, which is precisely what happens in a circular proof. For a circular proof also begs the point at issue; for just as in the case of begging the point at issue you prove a cause through its effect, so in this manner too you prove with regard to a circular proof. Even though the circular proof and begging the point at issue seem to be same, at any rate they differ in so far everything as regards a circular proof is proved through everything, in the case of begging the point at issue, even if one thing is proved (e.g. the con-

66 | Sectio VII, schol. 93–111

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ἀλλ’ οὖν καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι γίνεται. ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως· εἴ τι γὰρ τῇ κύκλῳ δείξει δείκνυται, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστιν· οὐ μήν, εἴ τι δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τῆς κύκλῳ δείξεως δειχθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτούμενος οὐ πάντα διὰ πάντων δείκνυσιν· ὁ γὰρ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι τὸ ζῷον παντὶ γελαστικῷ διὰ μέσου τοῦ Β τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ᾐτήσατο· καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως· ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ γελαστικῷ, οὐ δείκνυται διὰ τὸ τὴν μείζονα γίνεσθαι μερικήν:– [⇐ 100, 101 || U+] 104. (65a22–23) Ἢ τῷ ἕπεσθαι τῷ Β τὸ Α· ἤγουν ἐν τῷ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ὅλον, τὸ δὲ μέρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ἤγουν διὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ αἰτιατὸν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ αἰτίου:– 105. (65a23–29) 〈Τὸ2 – ὑπάρχειν.〉 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαί ἐστι τὸ δι’ ἑαυτοῦ δεικνύναι τὸ μὴ δι’ αὐτοῦ δῆλον, ὃ γίνεται ἢ τῷ ταὐτὰ τῷ αὐτῷ λαμβάνειν ἢ τῷ ταὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς. εἶτα ληπτέον ‘τὸ δὲ μὴ δεικνύναι τοῦτο ἐστί’:–

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106. (65a29–33) 〈Ἐν – αἰτεῖσθαι.〉 ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος καθόλου ὄντων τῶν συλλογισμῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται· μερικῶν δὲ ὄντων τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘οὐδεὶς’ καὶ ‘τὶς’ τὸ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεται, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν ‘οὐ πᾶς’· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐ 〈γίνεται〉 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ συμπέρασμα. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος καθόλου ὄντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἀποφατικοῦ καθόλου τὸ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεται ἐξ ὀρθοῦ, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ συμπέρασμα· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α· μερικοῦ δὲ ὄντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘οὐ πᾶς’ καὶ ‘πᾶς’ τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν

103. 12 δείκνυται V : δείκνυσθαι D 103. 14 συλλογισάμενος V : συλλογιζόμενος D 104. 1 τῷ1 Arist. et V : τὸ D post ἕπεσθαι add. ἢ D 105. 1 lemma addidi 106. 1 lemma addidi 106. 5 τοῦ om. D 106. 8 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ V : τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ D γίνεται addidi cum Sαβ 106. 11–12 ἀντιστρέφειν D : ἀντιστρέψαι V 106. 13 καὶ om. D 105. 3 cf. Anal. Pr. II 16, 65a27

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clusion through one premise and the latter through the conclusion; e.g. living being is predicated of every human being, human being is predicated of every being able to laugh, therefore living being is predicated of every able to laugh being), begging the point at issue, at any rate, occurs once more. Begging the point at issue is of wider denotation than circular proof. For if something is proved by a circular proof, then this will also be begging the point at issue; if something is proved by begging the point at issue, then it will surely not be proved by means of circular proof. For a person begging the point at issue does not prove everything through everything; for a person inferring that living being is predicated of every being able to laugh through the middle term B begs the point at issue. And that living being is predicated of every human being is proved through the conclusion and the minor premise. Whereas the thesis that human being is predicated of every being able to laugh is not proved for the reason that the major premise is formed as a particular. 104. Or because A follows B. Or rather, because the latter signifies the whole, whereas the former signifies the part for the same reason, namely for taking an effect in the demonstration of its cause. 105. Begging the point at issue is to prove what is not evident by itself through itself, which thing is formed either by assuming identical predicates on the same subject, or the same subject for identical predicates. ‘Failing to prove is this’ should be grasped next. 106. In the second and in the third figure it is possible for begging the point at issue to be formed in either way: the same subject is denied of identical predicates and identical predicates are denied of the same subject. Yet, as regards the second figure, in case the syllogisms are universal, it is possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates and for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject. And in case the syllogisms are particular – as regards the syllogism from the conjunction of ‘no’ and ‘some’ – it is possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates, but it is not possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject, for the reason that ‘not all’ is not convertible. And, as regards the syllogism from the conjunction of ‘all’ and ‘not all’, it is possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject, but it is not possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates for the reason that ‘not all’ is not convertible. As regards the third figure, however, in case a syllogism is universal and es-

68 | Sectio VII, schol. 93–111

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γίνεται, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’:– [VD ⇒ 108]

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107. Σημείωσαι· ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου σχήματος ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν καθόλου συλλογισμῶν καὶ ἄμφω δείκνυνται, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. σημείωσαι δὲ ὅτι ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι, ἐπὶ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ‘πᾶς’ καὶ ‘οὐ πᾶς’ ἔστι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μόνον:– [(109, 107) D || VD ⇒ 110] 108. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου σχήματος, εἰ μὲν εἴπω ‘ἡ λύπη οὐδεμιᾷ ἡδονῇ’, ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ ἀντιστρόφως εἴπω ‘ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐδεμιᾷ λύπῃ’, γίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συλλογισμῶν, τῶν τὸ καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συναγόντων:– [⇐ 106]

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109. (65a31–35) 〈Ἐν2 – συλλογισμούς.〉 ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου κατηγορικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γίνεται καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰ ἀντιστρέψεις τὸ συμπέρασμα· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον παντὶ γελαστικῷ, καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν τινὶ ζῴῳ. ἀποφατικοῦ δὲ ὄντος συλλογισμοῦ μερικοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεται, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ ‘οὐ παντί’· καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ κατηγορικῷ ἀμφότεραι αἱ προτάσεις γίνονται, ἤγουν τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν // καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· οὕτω δείκνυνται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ μερικοῦ ἀμφότερα, ἤγουν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ μερικοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐ γίνεται:– [⇐ 107 || VD ⇒ 107]

107. 1 Σημείωσαι scripsi cum S : Cη ΄ V : om. D 107. 3 δὲ om. D 108. 1 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 108. 2 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 109. 1 lemma addidi 109. 5–6 τοῦ – γίνεται V : τῶν αὐτῶν οὐ γίνονται D 109. 10 οὐ γίνεται V : οὐ γίνονται D

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pecially in case it is a universal negative, it is possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates directly, whereas it is possible for identical things to be denied of the same subject by conversion of the conclusion. For if A belongs to no B, then also B belongs to no A. And since the syllogism from the conjunction of ‘not all’ and ‘all’ is particular, it is possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates, whereas it is not possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject for the reason that ‘not to all’ is not convertible. 107. Νote: as regards the second and the third figure both cases are equally proved in each and every one of the universal syllogisms. Both the same subject is denied of identical predicates and identical predicates are denied of the same subject. Note, however, that as regards a syllogism from ‘all’ and ‘not all’ in the second figure, it is possible to prove only that identical predicates are denied of the same subject. 108. And as regards the second figure, if I say ‘grief is predicated of no pleasure’, it is then possible to prove that the same subject is denied of identical predicates. But, if I conversely say ‘pleasure is predicated of no grief’, then it is possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject. And it happens similarly both in the case of the third figure and in cases of other syllogisms leading to a universal negative conclusion. 109. As regards the third and the first figure, in case a syllogism is positive, is it possible for both the same subject to be affirmed of identical predicates and identical predicates to be affirmed of the same subject, if you converse the conclusion. For if living being is predicated of every being able to laugh, then able-to-laugh being is also predicated of some living being. In case, however, a particular syllogism is negative, it is possible then for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates, but it is not possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject for the reason that the ‘not to all’ is not convertible. And both premises are not formed just as in a positive syllogism, namely it is not possible for the same subject to be affirmed of identical predicates and for identical predicates to be affirmed of the same subject. Both cases are proved in this way as regards a negative particular syllogism too, namely it is possible for the same subject to be denied of identical predicates and for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject; yet, as regards the same negative particular syllogism, it is not possible for identical predicates to be denied of the same subject.

70 | Sectio VIII, schol. 112–125

110. (65a32–33) 〈Ὅταν – αὐτοῦ.〉 ὅταν δὲ ἀποφατικῶς μερικῶς, ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οὐ γίνεται:– [⇐ 107 || (110–111) D || V ⇒ 107]

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111. (65a35–37) 〈Ἔστι – δόξαν.〉 ἔστι δὲ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι εἰς τὰ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ὥστε ἀληθῶς εἶναι ταὐτά· τὸ γὰρ λεπτομερὲς καὶ τὸ εὐκίνητον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἀληθῶς εἰσι ταὐτά· ὁ γοῦν συνάγων τὸ πῦρ εἶναι κοῦφον ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι λεπτομερές (τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς εὐκίνητον, τὸ εὐκίνητον κοῦφον) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται. ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι ἐμφαίνεται εἰς τὰ κατὰ δόξαν· τινὲς γὰρ ἐδόξασαν τὸν πλοῦτον εἶναι εὐζωίαν, τὴν δὲ εὐζωίαν καὶ τὴν τρυφὴν ἀγαθόν· κατ’ ἐκείνους οὖν ταὐτόν ἐστίν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ἤγουν ὁ πλοῦτος, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν:– [⇐ 110 || = U] VIII 〈Περὶ τοῦ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’〉

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112. (65a38) 〈Τὸ1 – ψεῦδος.〉 Τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ γίνεται, ὅταν τις τὸ ἀναίτιον θείη ὡς αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· ψευδῆ γὰρ συνάγει συμπεράσματα καὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τούτου διδάσκει, ἵνα ἀποδεικνύοντες μὴ τοῦτο λαμβάνωμεν. συνίσταται δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ δεικτικῷ συλλογισμῷ, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ ἐπ’ εὐθείας δείξει, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῇ· ψεῦδος γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον συνάγει καὶ τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’, ὡς ὁ δι’ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμός. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ ἐπ’ εὐθείας δείξει οὐ συνίσταται, διότι αὕτη ἐκ δύο προτάσεων σύγκειται ἢ ἀληθῶν καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμά ἐστι ἀληθές· ἢ ἡ μία ἐστὶ ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ψευδής, καὶ ἀνάγκη συναχθῆναι τὸ ψεῦδος παρὰ τὴν ψευδῆ πρότασιν καὶ οὐ δύνασαι εἰπεῖν μὴ παρὰ ταύτην συναχθῆναι· ἢ πολλάκις καὶ αἱ δύο εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἀμφότεραι αἴτια τοῦ ψεύδους· ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν τῷ δι’ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμῷ συνίστασθαι τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δι’ ἀδυνάτου λαμβάνεις τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει καὶ μίαν ἀληθῆ πρότασιν καὶ συνάγεις ψεῦδος, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ λαμβάνεις τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει καὶ δύο προτάσεις, καὶ συνάγεις ψεῦδος· πλὴν οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει συνήχθη τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ μίαν τῶν κειμένων προτάσεων, ἐν δὲ τῷ δι’ ἀδυνάτου διὰ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει συνήχθη τὸ ψεῦδος. καὶ ὅτι ὁ δι’ ἀδυνάτου ἐκ δύο προτάσεων συνίσταται, ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς, τὸ δὲ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ ἐκ τριῶν προτάσεων, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς ἀντικειμένης τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει καὶ ἑτέρων δύο. καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ

110. 1 lemma addidi 110. 2 τοῦ αὐτοῦ V : τῶν αὐτῶν D 111. 1 lemma addidi 111. 4 κοῦφον ἐστί U δὲ om. D 111. 8 ἤγουν – ἀγαθόν VD : καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος U Tit. sect. VIII Περὶ – τοῦτο addidi cum Sβ 112. 1 lemma addidi 112. 3 ἀποδεικνύοντες μὴ scripsi : μὴ ἀποδεικνύοντες VD 112. 4 τῷ om. D 112. 5 ψεῦδος V : ψευδῆ D ἀδύνατον2 V : ἀδύνατα D 112. 6 post ὡς add. καὶ D 112. 11 αἴτια V : αἰτίαι D

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110. And whenever the syllogism is particular negative, whenever identical predicates are denied of the same subjects, it is not possible to beg the point at issue. 111. In demonstrations the point at issue is begged as regards terms really related in the way described, so as to really be identical. For what is composed of small parts, and what can be easily moved, and what is light really are identical. In fact, a person inferring that fire is light from being composed of small parts (what is composed of small parts can be easily moved, what can be easily moved is light) begs the point at issue. In dialectical arguments, on the other hand, begging the point at issue is manifested as terms related to opinion. For some people thought that wealth is welfare and that both welfare and luxuriousness are good. According to them, then, good life, namely wealth, and good are identical. VIII On the ‘This Is Not The Reason Why’ 112. The objection ‘this is not the reason why’ comes about whenever someone reckons what is not the cause of a falsehood is the cause of the falsehood; for this objection leads to false conclusions too, for which reason Aristotle also teaches about this objection in order that we do not employ ‘this is not the reason why’ while demonstrating. And this objection is not put together in an ostensive syllogism, namely in a direct proof, but in a reduction to the impossible. For ‘this is not the reason why’ infers falsehood and impossibility too, just as a syllogism through an impossibility. And this objection is not put together in a direct proof, because the latter consists of two premises both of which are true, and then the conclusion is true. Or one premise is true and the other one is false, and it is necessary to infer a falsehood because of the false premise, and you cannot say that the falsehood was not inferred because of the latter. Or both premises are often false, and they are both causes of a falsehood. It is, therefore, necessary for the ‘this is not the reason why’ to be put together in a syllogism by an impossibility. For just as in a syllogism through an impossibility you take what is contradictory opposite to the true assumption and one true premise from both of which you then infer a falsehood, just so in the case of the ‘this is not the reason why’ you take what is contradictory opposite to a true assumption and two premises and then you infer a falsehood. Except that the falsehood was not inferred because of what

72 | Sectio VIII, schol. 112–125

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δι’ ἀδυνάτου ψευδοῦς συναχθέντος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποτεθείσης ψευδοῦς ὑποθέσεως ἀναιρεῖται αὕτη, εἰσάγεται δὲ ἡ ἀληθής· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ τοῦτο μόνον δείκνυται, ὅτι οὐ παρὰ τὴν ὑποτεθεῖσαν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ψεῦδος συνήχθη. ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ γοῦν ἐστιν, ὅταν καὶ οὔσης τῆς ὑποτεθείσης ὑποθέσεως καὶ μὴ οὔσης τὸ αὐτὸ συνάγεται ἄτοπον· οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὑπόθεσίς ἐστι ὅτι ὁ μετὰ δεῖπνον περίπατος ὑγιεινός· εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ μὴ εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, κινεῖται, ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκατέρως ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γάρ, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, δύναται κινηθῆναι (ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστι, ἵσταται) οὔτε, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι, κινηθήσεται· πῶς γὰρ δύναται κινηθῆναι, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι τόπῳ; ὥστε κίνησις οὐκ ἔστι· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἄτοπον γίνεται, κἂν ὁ μετὰ δεῖπνον περίπατος ὑγιεινὸς ὑποτεθῇ, εἴτε μή:– 113. (65a39–b1) Πρῶτον μέν ἐστι ἐν 〈τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοῖς, ὅταν πρὸς ἀντίφασιν ᾖ τούτου ὃ ἐδείκνυτο〉 τῇ εἰς ἀδύνατον. εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοὺς καλεῖ πάντας τοὺς ψευδῆ συνάγοντας. φησὶν οὖν ὅτι τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο 〈συμβαίνειν τὸ〉 ψεῦδος’ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσι συλλογισμοῖς ἐστι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς δι’ ἀδυνάτου· δι’ ἀδυνάτου δ’ ἐστίν, ὅταν τὸ ψεῦδος, ὃ ἐδείχθη δι’ ἀδυνάτου, ἀντίφασίς ἐστι, ἤγουν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντίκειται τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει:– [VD ⇒ 115 || = U] 114. Δι’ ἀδυνάτου γίνεται, ὅταν τὸ ἀδύνατον συναχθῇ παρὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ἤγουν διὰ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ληφθὲν τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει:– [oV || D ⇒ 119] 115. (65b1–2) Οὔτε γὰρ μὴ ἀντιφήσας. τὴν αἰτίαν λέγει, δι’ ἣν ἐν τῷ δεικτικῷ, ἤγουν τῇ ἐπ’ εὐθείας δείξει, οὐ συνάγεται τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’· καὶ φησὶν ὅτι τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον ἢ ἐναντίον τῇ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει μὴ λαβών τις οὐ δύναται εἰπεῖν ὡς ‘οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο’ συνήχθη· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγομεν ἐν τῇ δι’

112. 21 δι’ om. D ψευδοῦς1 V : ψεύδους D 112. 22 δὲ D s.l. 112. 27 πᾶν V : πῶς D 112. 31 ὑποτεθῇ D : ὑποτεθήσεται V post εἴτε cancell. καὶ V 113. 1–2 Πρῶτον – ἀδύνατον1 om. U lemma τοῖς – ἐδείκνυτο addidi 113. 2 τῇ εἰς Arist. et UV : τῶ εἰς τὸ D 113. 2– 3 εἰς2 – συλλογισμοὺς U : εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμὸν V : ἀδυνάτους συλλογισμοὺς D 113. 4 συμβαίνειν τὸ addidi 114. 1–2 Δι’ – ὑποθέσει om. V ex homoeoteleuto 115. 3 post ὅτι add. ἐπειδὴ V : ἐπεὶ D ἐναντίον V : ἐναντίως D 115. 4 τῇ V : τῶ D 112. 26–30 οὐκ ἔσται – τόπῳ ] cf. Phys. VI 8, 239a23–26; schol. 119.25–29; 119.2–6; 120.3–6

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is contradictory opposite to the true assumption, but because of one of the posited premises. In a syllogism through an impossibility, on the other hand, the falsehood was inferred because of what is contradictory opposite to the true assumption. And a syllogism through an impossibility is put together from two premises, a true and a false one, whereas the ‘this is not the reason why’ from three, one premise opposite to the true assumption and another two. And as regards a syllogism by impossibility, in case a false conclusion is drawn from the assumed false assumption, then the latter is rejected and a true one is introduced. But as regards the ‘this is not the reason why’ only the following is proved, that a falsehood was not inferred because of the assumed assumption. ‘This is not the reason why’ then happens whenever the same absurdity is inferred, both when the assumed assumption is true and when it is not. E.g. a true assumption is that a walk after dinner is healthy; if someone says that it is not healthy, then there will not be any motion; for everything that is in motion, is set in motion either in that, in which it exists, or in that, in which it does not exist. Yet, this is in either way impossible; for neither what is in motion can be set in motion in that, in which it exists (for it stands still in that, in which it exists), nor will it be set in motion in that, in which it does not exist. For how can it be moved in that, in which it does not exist? Consequently, there is no motion. And this absurdity is formed irrespective of whether a walk after a dinner is assumed to be healthy or not. 113. The objection is formed first in syllogisms leading to an impossibility, whenever it is formed as the contradiction of that which was proved by means of a reduction to the impossible. He calls syllogisms leading to an impossibility all syllogisms inferring false conclusions. He says then that ‘this is not the reason why the result is false’ is raised in the case of false syllogisms, yet not in all of them, but in the syllogisms through an impossibility. And a syllogism through an impossibility is formed whenever the falsehood, which was proved by an impossibility, is a contradiction, or rather whenever the falsehood is contradictory opposite to the true assumption. 114. A syllogism through an impossibility comes about whenever an impossibility is inferred because of a contradiction, or rather because of what was assumed as being contradictory to the true assumption. 115. For unless someone has contradicted. He states the cause, for which ‘this is not the reason why’ is not brought about in an ostensive syllogism, namely by means of a direct proof. And he says that, unless someone takes what is contradictory opposite or contrary to the true assumption, he cannot

74 | Sectio VIII, schol. 112–125

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ἀδυνάτου, ὅτι οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ληφθεῖσαν ὑπόθεσιν ἀληθῆ συνῆκται τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῇ. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ἤγουν τῶν ἐπ’ εὐθείας συλλογισμῶν· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀντικειμένων συνήχθη τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ λέγομεν (ἐπὶ τοῦ δεικτικοῦ τοῦ ψεῦδος συνάγοντος) ὡς μία πρότασις εἴληπται ψευδής. ὅτι δὲ τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ οὐ λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ δεικτικοῦ, τοῦ τὸ ψεῦδος συνάγοντος, δῆλον· οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀληθῆ πρότασιν ἐροῦμεν αἰτίαν τοῦ ψεύδους (οὐ δύναται γὰρ τὸ ἀληθὲς αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ ψεύδους), οὐδὲ μὴν διὰ τὴν ψευδῆ ἐρεῖ τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ (διὰ γὰρ ταύτην τὸ ψεῦδος συνήχθη):– [⇐ 113] 116. (65b4) Ἔτι ὅταν ἀναιρεθῇ τι δεικτικῶς. δεικτικὸν ἐνταῦθα συλλογισμὸν νοητέον τὸν δι’ ἀδυνάτου διὰ τὸν κατηγορικὸν συλλογισμόν· ὡς γὰρ εἴπομεν, ὁ δι’ ἀδυνάτου περαίνεται διὰ δύο ὑποθετικῶν καὶ ἑνὸς κατηγορικοῦ:–

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117. Ὅταν ἀναιρεθῇ τι δεικτικῶς, ἤγουν διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου, οὐκ ἐροῦμεν τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συναχθῆναι τὸ ἄτοπον ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ληφθείσῃ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει. τὸ δὲ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ λέγομεν, ὅταν τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀναιρεθείσης οὐδὲν ἧττον συνάγεται ὁ συλλογισμὸς καὶ τὸ ἄτοπον· οὐκοῦν τρεῖς προτάσεις ἔχομεν, δύο τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἑτέραν τῆς ὑποθέσεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ψευδοῦς ὑποθέσεως οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συνάγεται:– 118. (65b14–16) Ὅτε ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποθέσεως // ἀσύναπτος ᾖ· ἤγουν ὅτε ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσις ἀσύναπτος ᾖ καὶ κεχωρισμένη τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦ συνάγοντος τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων, ἤγουν τῶν αἰτίων· ἢ οὕτως τὸ ‘ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων’ νοητέον, ἐπειδή, εἰ συνάπτοιτο ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσις τῷ ἐπιφερομένῳ συλλογισμῷ, ἢ κατὰ τὸν ὑποκείμενον ὅρον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι συνάπτεται (οἷον ὁ κόραξ ἢ ὁ Αἰθίοψ παντὶ ζῴῳ), ἢ κατὰ τὸν κατηγορούμενον (οἷον ὅτι τὸ χρῶμα παντὶ λευκῷ):– [D ⇒ 114]

115. 6 αὐτῇ scripsi cum Sαβ : αὐτ῀ V : αὐτοῦ D ἀδύνατον V : οὐ δυνατὸν D 115. 7 ἀντικειμένων correxi : κειμένων VD 117. 1 supra ὅταν add. εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ V 117. 7 συνάγεται V : supra συνάγεται varia lectio συμβαίνει V : συμβαίνει D 118. 1 : ἀσύναπτος V : ἀσύνοπτος D 118. 2 ἀσύναπτος V : ἀσύνοπτος D 118. 4 ἐπιφερομένῳ V : ἐπιφαινομένῳ D 118. 5 συνάπτεται V : συνάπτοιτο D 116. 1–3 δεικτικὸν – κατηγορικοῦ ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Pr. I 246.16–18 116. 2–3 ὡς – εἴπομεν ] schol. 113.5–6, 114

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say that ‘this is not the reason why’ is brought about. For we say this in the case of a demonstration through an impossibility, because the falsehood is not inferred because of the true assumption taken initially, but because of what is opposite to the latter. This is, however, impossible to say in cases of ostensive, namely direct, syllogisms; for a falsehood is inferred by opposite premises, but there (in an ostensive syllogism inferring a falsehood) we say rather that a premise has been taken to be false. And it is evident that ‘this is not the reason why’ is not said with regard to an ostensive syllogism inferring a falsehood. For we shall neither call the true premise a cause of the falsehood (for it is not possible for a truth to be the cause of the falsehood), nor will anyone raise ‘this is not the reason why’ because of the false premise (for the falsehood was inferred because of the latter). 116. Besides, whenever something is rejected ostensively. As ostensive syllogism one must understand here a syllogism through an impossibility because of the categorical syllogism. For as we said, a syllogism through an impossibility is concluded through two hypothetical syllogisms and through a categorical one. 117. Whenever something is rejected ostensively, namely by a syllogism through an impossibility, we shall not raise the objection ‘this is not the reason why’ for having inferred out of necessity an absurdity by taking what is contradictory opposite to the initially taken true assumption. However, we raise the objection ‘this is not the reason why’ whenever the syllogism and its absurdity are nonetheless concluded, even though the initial assumption has been rejected. Therefore, we have three premises; two belonging to the syllogism, and another one belonging to the assumption. As regards a syllogism through an impossibility nothing impossible is concluded when the false assumption is rejected. 118. When it is independent of the assumption. Or rather when the initial assumption is independent of and separated from a syllogism inferring an impossibility from the middle terms, namely from the causes. Or one must understand ‘from middle terms’ in this way, since, should the initial assumption be connected to the syllogism that follows, it would then be connected in relation to either the subject term in the conclusion (e.g. raven or Ethiopian are predicated of every living being), or the predicate term (e.g. that the colour is predicated of everything white).

76 | Sectio VIII, schol. 112–125

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119. (65b16–21) 〈Τὸ – ἀρχῆς.〉 ἡ ὑπόθεσις οὐ συνεχής ἐστι τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ‘εἰ ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρός ἐστι τῇ πλευρᾷ, κίνησις οὐκ ἔστιν’. ἐδείκνυεν ὁ Ζήνων μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν οὕτω· πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον μέγεθός τι κινεῖται καί, εἰ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοῦ κινηθῆναι, καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ ἡμίσεως· καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ὡς εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἄπειρον· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ κινούμενον διιέναι τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄπειρα ἡμίση, οὐκ ἄρα κίνησίς ἐστι:– [⇐ 114] 120. (65b19–21) 〈Οὐδαμῶς – ἀρχῆς.〉 ‘φάσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς’ νοητέον τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἤγουν ὅτι ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος τῇ πλευρᾷ, ἣν λέγει μὴ συνάπτεσθαι τῷ συλλογισμῷ τῷ συνάγοντι κίνησιν μὴ εἶναι· τὸ γοῦν ἄτοπον συνήχθη, ὅτι κίνησις οὐκ ἔστιν, [οὐ] παρὰ τοῦτο, ἤγουν διὰ τὸ ὑποθεῖναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀσύμμετρον τῇ πλευρᾷ· κεχώρισται γὰρ αὕτη τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦ τὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγοντος, ἀλλὰ συνήχθη τὸ ἀδύνατον, ὅτι κίνησις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐκ τοῦ λαβεῖν ὅτι δύναται τὸ μέγεθος ἐπ’ ἄπειρα ἐνεργείᾳ τέμνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰσὶν ἄπειρα ἡμίση ἐνεργείᾳ:– 121. (65b21–66a2) 〈Ἄλλος – ψεῦδος.〉 φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ συναχθὲν ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὲν συνεχίζεται τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅροις, ἤγουν ἢ τῷ Α, εἰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός (ὅτι τὸ Α τῷ Δ οὐδενὶ ἢ παντί), ἢ εἰ τὸ Β, ὁ ἔσχατος ὅρος, συνεχίζεται τῷ Ζ, εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω γένηται ὁ συλλογισμός (ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων σχημάτων ἐστὶ γνῶναι τὸ λεγόμενον), παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν συνήχθη τὸ ἀδύνατον· εἰ δὲ οὐ συνεχίζεται τὸ ἀδύνατον ἢ τῷ μείζονι ὅρῳ ἢ τῷ ἐλάττονι, οὐ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν συνήχθη τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ γίνεται τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’:– 122. (66a2–3) Ἢ οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀεί. τοῦτο ἔνστασίς ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ῥηθέν· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἀδύνατον συνεχίζεται τοῖς ἄκροις, ὡς εἴπομεν, ἀεὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν συμβαίνει τὸ ἀδύνατον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ ἡ ὑπόθεσις καὶ ἑτέρα τεθῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνει καὶ αὖθις τὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ Β, τεθῇ δὲ ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ Κ, πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συναχθήσεται, ὃ συνήγετο καὶ τοῦ Β κειμένου· εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν συνήχθη οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τοῦ

119. 1 lemma addidi 119. 2 ἀσύμμετρός correxi (cf. Anal. Pr. II 17, 65b17; schol. 120.2, 5) : σύμμετρος V : ὡς σύμμετρος D 120. 1 lemma addidi cum P 120. 2 ἀσύμμετρος V a.c. : σύμμετρος V p.c., D (cf. schol. 119.2) 120. 3–4 συνήχθην D 120. 4 οὐ seclusi 120. 5 ἀσύμμετρον correxi (cf. schol. 119.2) : σύμμετρον VD 121. 1 lemma addidi 122. 1 οὐδ’ Arist. et V : οὐχ D ἀεί Arist. et D : αἰέν V 122. 3 συμβαίνει V : λαμβάνει D 122. 5 ἀντ’ αὐτοῦ V : ἀντὶ τοῦ D συναχθήσεται correxi : συναχθῇ VD 122. 6 συνήχθην D 119. 2–6 ἐδείκνυεν – ἐστι ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 458.5–8; schol. 112.25–30; Pedias. I 80.8–20 120. 2–8 ἡ – ἐνεργείᾳ ] cf. schol. 112.25–30 122. 2 ὡς εἴπομεν ] cf. schol. 121

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119. The assumption has no connection with the syllogism, as in the theorem that ‘if the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side, then there is not any motion’. Zeno showed that there is no motion in this way: everything that is in motion, is set in motion in respect of some size and, if this happens so, it is then necessary for the half of the latter and for the half of the same segment before that to have been set in motion; and that this goes on ad infinitum, as far as the infinite actually exists. It is, however, impossible for what is set in motion to go through an actually infinite number of half-segments. Therefore there is no motion. 120. As ‘initial assertion’ one must understand the initial assumption, namely that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side, about which Aristotle says that it is not connected to the syllogism inferring that there is no motion. The absurdity that there is no motion would be then inferred because of the initial assumption, namely because of having assumed that a diagonal is incommensurate with the side. For the latter assumption has been separated from the syllogism that infers an impossibility, but the impossibility that there is no motion would have been inferred from having assumed that it is possible for a size to be divided into an infinite number of segments, and, for this reason, there is actually an infinite number of half-segments. 121. It is evident then that if the inferred impossibility is connected with the initial terms, namely either with A, if the syllogism is formed downwards (because A belongs to either no, or all D), or if B, the minor term, is connected with F, if the syllogism is formed upwards (as it is possible to discern what is explained from the registered figures), then the impossibility is inferred because of the assumption. If, on the other hand, the impossibility is neither connected with the major term, nor with the minor one, then the impossibility is not inferred because of the assumption and the objection ‘this is not the reason why’ is raised. 122. Or even so, then always. This is an objection to what was stated above. For as we said, if the impossibility is connected with the extreme terms, then the impossibility does not always result because of the assumption. For, if this assumption is excluded and another one is posited, then an impossibility is nonetheless inferred again. For if B is removed and K is posited in its place, then the same impossibility, which was also inferred when B was posited, will

78 | Sectio IX, schol. 126

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Β, τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν συνάξεις διὰ τοῦ Κ· οἷον τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐδενὶ μετακινουμένῳ ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ μετακινούμενον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ παντὶ ζῴῳ, τὸ ζῷον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ· [/V] ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγεσθαι διὰ διαφόρων ψευδῶν ὑποθέσεων:– 123. (66a8) Ἢ τὸ ‘μὴ ὄντος τούτου’. τοῦτο λύσις ἐνστάσεως. καὶ φησὶν ὅτι τὸ ‘μὴ ὄντος τούτου’ οὐ τοῦτο δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς ψευδοῦς ὑποθέσεως, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ἀδύνατον, θήσεις αὖθις ἑτέραν ψευδῆ (πάντως γὰρ ἑτέρας ψευδοῦς τεθείσης οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συναχθήσεται), ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ‘μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο’ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ἀδύνατον δοκεῖ συναχθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν καταληφθεισῶν προτάσεων, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον συνάγεται:– [U+] 124. (66a12) 〈Ἄτοπον.〉 τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ τέσσαρα ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις τόποις ὄντα κινοῦνται τὴν κατ’ εὐθεῖαν κίνησιν οἴκοθεν· ἢ ἄνω ἢ κάτω. τὴν δὲ πλαγίαν κίνησιν μόνα τὰ ζῷα κινοῦνται, τὴν καὶ προαιρετὴν καλουμένην:– 125. (66a13–15) 〈Εἰ – δυεῖν.〉 τοῦ τριγώνου ἡ ἐκτὸς γωνία μείζων μέν ἐστι ἑκάστης γωνίας, ἤγουν τῆς ὑπὸ Α καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ Β, τῶν δὲ δύο ὁμοῦ ἴση. καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου αἱ ἐντὸς τρεῖς γωνίαι ἶσαι εἰσι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς γωνίαις, οὐ μὴν πλείους, ἤγουν μείζους:– IX Περὶ ψευδοῦς λόγου 126. (66a16) Ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος, ἤγουν ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς συλλογισμός, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον ψεῦδος, ἤγουν παρὰ τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν ψευδῆ οὖσαν, εἴ γε ἡ ἑτέρα ἐστὶ ἀληθής· ἢ πολλάκις εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις:– [(126– 130) D]

122. 7 post οἷον add. ὅτι D 122. 8 δι’ ἑαυτοῦ2 post παντὶ ζῴῳ transp. D 123. 1 post λύσις add. τῆς D 123. 3 πάντως V : πάλιν D 124. 1 lemma addidi 125. 1 lemma addidi Tit. Περὶ – λόγου add. V2 i.m. : om. VD 126. 1 λόγος – ψευδὴς om. D ex homoeoteleuto 126. 2 πρῶτον Arist. (nRACHlgu) et Magent. : om. Arist. (Bc) : add. Arist. (B2 s.l., c2 s.l.) : deest in Arist. (Nd)

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be inferred once more; for if sense‐perceptive being is inferred by B to belong to no human being, you will then infer by K the same thing once more: e.g. sense‐perceptive being is predicated of no shifting from one place to another being, shifting from one place to another being is predicated of every living being, living being is predicated of every human being, sense‐perceptive being is predicated of no human being. For it is possible for the same impossibility to be inferred by different false assumptions. 123. Or the ‘even if it is not so’. This is the resolution of an objection. And he says that the ‘even if this is not so’ does not mean that after removing the false assumption, from which the impossibility was inferred, you will again posit another one (for, even if another false supposition is posited, the same impossibility will be nonetheless inferred at all events), but rather that the objection ‘this is not the reason why’ is raised whenever the same impossibility is inferred after removing the supposition, from which the impossibility seems to have been inferred from the assumed premises. 124. While belonging in other places, the four elements are set in motion in a straight line by their own nature; either upwards, or downwards. Only living beings are set in sideways motion, the one also called voluntary motion. 125. The exterior angle of a triangle is greater than each of the two angles, namely angle A and angle B, but equal to both of them together. And the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, not however to more than that, namely greater than two right angles. IX On False Argument 126. A false argument, namely a false syllogism, is formed by the first falsehood, or rather by the major premise being false, if really the other premise is true. Or both premises are often false.

80 | Sectio X, schol. 127–133

X 〈Περὶ τοῦ μὴ κατασυλλογίζεσθαι〉

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127. (66a25–29) 〈Πρὸς – λεγόμενον.〉 ἐπεὶ τὸ κατασυλλογίζεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων γίνεται (ἢ καὶ τῶν δύο ἢ τῆς μιᾶς, ἤγουν τῆς μείζονος, εἰ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων ὁ συλλογισμὸς γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων, ἀνάγκη παρὰ μίαν τούτων τὸ ψεῦδος συναχθῆναι), δίδωσι τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ μεθόδους, πῶς ὀφείλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐλεγχθῇ. εἰ γοῦν ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἐρωτᾷ προτάσεις διαφόρους, οὐκ ἐπάγῃ δὲ καὶ τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν, ἵνα λάθῃ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον τὸ σπουδαζόμενον παρ’ αὐτοῦ συναχθῆναι (δι’ ὅπερ καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἐρωτᾷ τὰς προτάσεις, ἀλλὰ διεσπαρμένως· οἷον, εἰ πρόκειται δειχθῆναι ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐρωτᾷ ‘ἡ ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ ἡδονὴ λυσιτελής· τί δὲ ἡ ἡδονὴ αἱρετόν, τί δὲ διωκτόν; τὸ αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν), δεῖ γοῦν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον προσέχειν, ἵνα μὴ δὶς συγχωρήσῃ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον· εἰ γὰρ οὐ δὶς συγχωρήσει, οὐκ ἂν ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἰσχύσῃ συλλογίσασθαι ἐκ προτάσεων ἀσυναρτήτων· τὸ γὰρ σχῆμα, ἤγουν ὁ συλλογισμός, κοινωνία ἐστὶ δύο προτάσεων καθ’ ἕναν ὅρον· εἰ δὲ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων ὁ ἐρωτῶν μέλλει συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἀρκτέον· οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν:– [(127–128.2 προσδιαλεγόμενον) V || ⇐ 126 || U+] 128. (66a29–32) 〈Ὡς – λόγον.〉 ἐνταῦθα δὲ παραδίδωσι μεθόδους τῷ ἐρωτῶντι, πῶς ὀφείλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἵνα λάθῃ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον παρατηρεῖν ἐν ποίῳ σχήματι τὸ πρόβλημα μέλλει συναχθῆναι· καὶ εἰ μὲν καθόλου ἦν καταφατικόν, μὴ συγχωρεῖν καθόλου πρότασιν καταφατικήν· εἰ δὲ ἀποφατικὸν καθόλου (ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συνάγεται), εὐλαβητέον δοῦναι ἀποφατικὴν καθόλου· εἰ δὲ μερικόν, // σπουδαστέον κωλύσαι αὐτὸν μὴ λαβεῖν καθόλου πρότασιν· χωρὶς γὰρ καθόλου προτάσεως συλλογισμὸς οὐκ ἔσται:– [⇐ 126]

Tit. sect. X Περὶ – κατασυλλογίζεσθαι addidi cum Sβ 127. 1 lemma addidi 127. 2 post ἢ2 add. καὶ D 127. 3 post εἰ1 add. καὶ D 127. 4 παρὰ U : περὶ VD 127. 6 ἐπάγει D καὶ om. D προσυλλογισμῶν D, cf. schol. 129.1, 2, 3; 130.3–4; Anal. Pr. II 19, 66a35–36 Arist. (RACclu μὴ προσυλλογίζωνται, nHg μὴ προσυλλογίζονται) : προσσυλλογισμῶν V ut Arist. (B μὴ προσσυλογίζωνται, T μὴ προσσυλογίσωνται) : deest in Arist. (Nd) 127. 10 λυσιτελές D διωκτόν V : διωκτικόν D 128. 1 lemma addidi ἐνταῦθα D : ἐν ταὐτῷ V μεθόδους V : μέθοδον D 128. 4 ἦν correxi : ἐστὶ VD συγχωρεῖν D : συγχωρητέον V 128. 5– 6 εὐλαβητέον V : εὐλαβεῖται D 128. 6 σπουδαστέον V : σπουδάσαι D 128. 7 προτάσεως D : προτάσεων V 128. 1–2 παραδίδωσι – προσδιαλεγόμενον ] cf. schol. 127.4–7

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X On Not Being Defeated With a Syllogism 127. Since being defeated with a syllogism and being refuted come about from false premises (either from both premises, or just from one of them, namely from the major premise, if the syllogism is formed from two premises; if, on the other hand, the syllogism is formed from more premises, it is then necessary for the falsehood to be inferred because of one of them), Aristotle offers to the person being questioned a method on how he ought to respond in order not to be refuted. In all events, if the questioner submits different premises, but does not induce the conclusions of the preliminary syllogisms too, in order that what the disputant attempts to infer escapes his own notice (for which reason the questioner does not submit the premises one after the other, but in a scattered manner; e.g. if it is proposed to be proved that pleasure is good, he asks ‘pleasure is in accordance with nature, pleasure is useful; but why is pleasure something that may be chosen and why is it to be pursued? What may be chosen is good, therefore pleasure is good’), the person questioned then must pay attention in order that he does not grant the same term twice. For, should he not grant the same term twice, the questioner would not prevail in forming a syllogism from incoherent premises. For a figure, namely a syllogism, is a communion of two premises concerning one term. And if a questioner is about to form a syllogism from two premises, he must begin from the middle term: e.g. what is in accordance with nature is good, pleasure is in accordance with nature, therefore pleasure is good. 128. In this passage he presents to a questioner means on how he ought to question so that he escapes the notice of a disputant. And the person questioned must observe in which figure the thesis is about to be inferred. Should the thesis be a universal affirmative one, then he would not grant a universal affirmative premise. If, on the other hand, the thesis is universal negative (since the latter is brought together in the second figure), then one must be aware of granting a universal negative premise. And if the thesis is particular, then one must be eager to prevent an opponent from assuming a universal premise; for without a universal premise, there will not be any syllogism.

82 | Sectio X, schol. 127–133

129. (66a35–36) 〈Ἐὰν – ᾖ.〉 εἰ μὴ προσυλλογίζονται καὶ λαμβάνουσι τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν, ἵνα λαμβάνοντες καὶ τὰς προτάσεις τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν οὐ δήλας ποιῶσι τὰς προσεχῶς συναγούσας τὸ συμπέρασμα:– [⇐ 126, 127] 130. (66a36–37) 〈Ἔτι – ἄμεσα.〉 εἴ τις μὴ ἐρωτᾷ τὰ προσεχῶς συνακτικὰ τοῦ συμπεράσματος (οἷον ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐφετόν, τὸ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν), ἀλλὰ τὰ πόῤῥω (οἷον ἡ ἡδονὴ λυσιτελές) καὶ ἁπλῶς, καὶ τὰς τῶν προσυλλογισμῶν προτάσεις:– [⇐ 126]

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131. (66b5) Φανερὸν καὶ πότε ἔσται. νῦν διδάσκει πῶς ἐστι μὴ γίνεσθαι ἔλεγχον· παραδίδωσι γὰρ μεθόδους, δι’ ὧν ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καλῶς ἀποδιδοὺς οὐκ ἂν παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἐλεγχθήσεται ὡς τἀναντία δοξάζων τοῦ προδιομολογηθέντος παρ’ αὐτοῦ. ἔλεγχος δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τις συνάξει τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῇ προκειμένῃ ἀληθεῖ ὑποθέσει· οἷον εἰ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, συνάξεις δὲ ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ θνητή, ἐποίησας ἔλεγχον, ἤγουν παρελογίσω. ἔστι δὲ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ ἐλέγχου· πᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός, οὐ πᾶς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἔλεγχος:– 132. (66b6–15) 〈Πάντων – ἔλεγχον.〉 πάντων συγχωρουμένων καταφατικῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου ἢ τῆς μιᾶς, τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας ἀποφατικῆς, ἔσται ἔλεγχος· ὥστε, εἰ τὸ κείμενον, ἤγουν ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς προτεθεῖσα ἀληθὴς ὑπόθεσις, ἐναντία ἐστὶ ἢ ἀντικειμένη τῷ συναχθέντι συμπεράσματι, γέγονεν ἔλεγχος. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν συγχωροῖτο καταφατικὸν καθόλου, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀποφατικὰ δίδωσιν ἢ μερικά, ἔλεγχος οὐκ ἂν γένηται, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ μερικῶν μόνων ἢ ἀποφατικῶν μόνων γίνεται:– [(132–133) D] 133. (66b16) Ἐν ὅλῳ λέγει τὴν καθόλου πρότασιν:– [⇐ 132]

129. 1 lemma addidi μὴ προσυλλογίζονται D (cf. schol. 127.6) 129. 2 προσσυλλογισμῶν V (cf. schol. 127.6) 129. 3 προσσυλλογισμῶν V (cf. schol. 127.6) 130. 1 lemma addidi συνακτικὰ V : συνεκτικὰ D 130. 3 λυσιτελής V 130. 3–4 προσσυλλογισμῶν V (cf. schol. 127.6) 131. 3 ἐλεχθήσεται D 131. 4 δὲ om. D 131. 5 προκειμένῃ om. D 131. 6 post θνητή add. ἐστίν D 132. 1 lemma addidi 132. 3 ἡ om. D

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129. That is to say, if they do not form preliminary syllogisms and assume the conclusions of preliminary syllogisms, in order that, in the process of assuming, they also do not make the premises, which lead directly to the conclusion, clear. 130. That is to say, if someone does not inquire what is able to directly lead to a conclusion (e.g. pleasure is desirable, desirable is good, therefore pleasure is good), but what is remote (e.g. pleasure is useful) and general as well as the premises of preliminary syllogisms. 131. It is clear when it will be possible. Now he is teaching how it is possible for a refutation not to be formed. For he presents the means, by which the person who gives an answer renders a good account of the submitted questions, will not be refuted by his opponent, because the former holds opinions contrary to what was previously admitted by him. And a refutation is formed whenever someone infers what is opposite to the proposed true assumption. E.g. if the proposed thesis is that the soul is immortal, but you are going to infer that the soul is mortal, then you make a refutation, or rather you reason falsely. A syllogism, however, is of wider denotation than a refutation, for every refutation is a syllogism, but not every syllogism is a refutation. 132. A refutation will be possible, whether all premises assumed by the person being questioned are granted as affirmative, or whether one of them is granted as affirmative, whereas the other is granted as negative. Consequently, if what is posited, namely the initially proposed true assumption, is contrary or opposite to the drawn conclusion, then a refutation is possible. Should, on the other hand, no premise be granted as universal affirmative, but all were granted as negative or particular, then a refutation would not be possible, since a syllogism comes about only from particular or only from negative premises in the first place. 133. By universally he means a universal premise.

84 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

XI Περὶ τῆς καθ’ ὑπόληψιν ἀπάτης

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134. (66b18) Συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνίοτε, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ θέσει. διδάξας ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀναλύσεως ὅπως ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐκ τῆς θέσεως τῶν ὅρων (ἀπατώμεθα γὰρ λαμβάνοντες ὅρους τὰς ‘ἕξεις’ ἀντὶ τῶν ‘ἑκτῶν’ ἢ λαμβάνοντες τὰς προτάσεις ἀπροσδιορίστους οἰόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι οἰόμενοι μηδὲν διαφέρειν πρὸς γένεσιν συλλογισμοῦ τὸ τὰς προτάσεις λαμβάνειν προσδιωρισμένας εἴτε ἀπροσδιορίστους), νῦν διδάσκει πῶς ἐστι τὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς. τὸ δὲ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα γίνεται ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτούς. καὶ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα γίνεται τριττῶς· ἢ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις ἀγνοῶμεν (οἷον ὅταν θεασώμεθα ζῷον μήκοθεν, νομίσωμεν αὐτὸ ἡμίονον εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ ἰδόντες αὐτὸ ὠγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα νομίσωμεν ὅτι ἔγκυόν ἐστι καὶ συλλογισώμεθα οὕτως· ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ὤγκωται τὴν γαστέρα, πᾶν ὠγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα ἔγκυόν ἐστι, ἥδε ἄρα ἡ ἡμίονος ἔγκυόν ἐστι)· ἢ ὅταν τὸ καθόλου γινώσκοντες τὸ μερικὸν ἀγνοῶμεν (γινώσκομεν γὰρ ὡς πᾶσα δυὰς ἀρτία ἔστι· εἴ τις οὖν ἔροιτο ὡς πᾶσα δυὰς ἀρτία ἐστί, ἐροῦμεν ναί· τί δὲ ἥδε ἡ δυάς, ἡ ἐν τῇ χειρί μου κεκρυμμένη, ἀρτία ἐστί; ἐροῦμεν οὔ· εἶτα συνάγει ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ οἴδατε καὶ οὐκ οἴδατε, δείξας ἣν εἶχεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ δυάδα· οὐκ ἀπεκρίθημεν δὲ ὅτι ἥδε ἡ δυὰς ἀρτία οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ᾔδειμεν εἰ δυὰς ὅλως ἔστι· τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τριγώνου γενήσεται σόφισμα)· ἢ ὅταν τὸ μερικὸν γινώσκοντες τὸ καθόλου ἀγνοῶμεν (οἷον γινώσκομεν ὅτι ὅδε ὁ ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει, οὐ μὴν καὶ εἰ πᾶς ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει· καὶ οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἥδε ἡ θριδακίνη ψύχει· εἰ δὲ καὶ πᾶσα 〈ψύχει〉, ἀγνοοῦμεν)· οὕτως οὖν ἐστι φρονεῖν ἐναντία τῷ πράγματι. ἐναντία δὲ ἑαυτοῖς δοξάζομεν, ὅταν τὸ ἐναντίον διὰ συλλογισμοῦ συνάξωμεν, ὃ καὶ ἐσχάτης ἀποπληξίας ἐστί· δοξάζομεν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ ζητήσομεν τὰ ἐναντία τῷ αὐτῷ συνάξαι ἢ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέσου ἢ δι’ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου· ἑκατέρως δὲ ἄτοπον· καὶ διὰ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέσου, ὅτε καὶ πρόδηλός ἐστιν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, οὕτως· ἡ ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν. δι’ ἄλλου δὲ καὶ ἄλλου μέσου δοξάζομεν τἀναντία οὕτως· ἡ ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡ-

Tit. sect. XI Περὶ – ἀπάτης D i.m. 134. 12 ἔγκυος D 134. 15 δὲ V : οὖν D 134. 16 post χειρὶ add. μου D 134. 17–18 ᾔδειμεν V : οἴδαμεν D 134. 18 post αὐτὸ add. δὲ D 134. 20 ἐλέβορος1 V ἐλέβορος2 V 134. 21 ψύχει addidi 134. 22 ἐναντία φρονεῖν D 134. 26 πρόδηλον D 134. 1–2 Διδάξας – ὅρων ] cf. Anal. Pr. I 34, 47b38–48a28 134. 8–31 καὶ – ἀγαθόν ] cf. Schol. in Luc., 130.4–131.2 134. 18 τὸ αὐτὸ – σόφισμα ] cf. schol. 150, 153.5–8, 154.10–17

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XI On Error Because of Belief 134. And sometimes it happens, just as in the case of the position of terms. After teaching in the chapter On Αnalysis how an error occurs from the position of the terms (for we make an error when we assume the term ‘states’ in the place of the term ‘qualities’ or we think that we form a syllogism by assuming indefinite premises, because we think that assuming definite or indefinite premises makes no difference towards the formation of a syllogism), now he is teaching how it is possible to mistakenly hold contrary opinions regarding the same thing. And to mistakenly hold contrary opinions about the same thing happens in reference to either the matter in question, or ourselves. And the former occurs in three ways. Either whenever we are ignorant of both premises (e.g. whenever we see an animal from afar, we consider it to be a mule. Moreover, we may consider it to be pregnant after seeing that it has a swollen belly, and we may form a syllogism in the following way: this female mule has a swollen belly, everything that has a swollen belly is pregnant, therefore this female mule is pregnant); or whenever we are ignorant of what is particular, while we know what is universal (for we know that every dyad is even. In fact, should someone ask whether every dyad is even, we would reply ‘yes’. But what about the specific dyad, the one hidden in my hand? Is it even? We shall reply ‘no’. Then, after showing which dyad he has in his hand, your opponent proves both that you know and that you do not know the same thing. We did not, however, respond that the specific dyad is not even, but that we had not known whether there was any dyad at all. The same sophism will be formed as regards a triangle); or whenever we are ignorant of what is universal, while we know what is particular (e.g. we know that the specific hellebore purges, not however whether every hellebore purges as well; and we know that the specific lettuce refreshes, but we do not know whether every lettuce refreshes as well). To think what is contrary to the matter in question is in fact possible in these ways. And we hold contrary opinions whenever we infer the contrary opinion by means of a syllogism, which

86 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

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δονὴ ἄρα ἀγαθόν· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀλυσιτελές, τὸ ἀλυσιτελὲς οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἀγαθόν:– [≈ U] 135. Συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνίοτε, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ θέσει. τοῦτο τὸ θεώρημα χρήσιμον ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν διαλεκτικὴν καὶ σοφιστικήν. καὶ καθ’ ὑπόληψιν καλεῖται ἀπάτη· διδασκόμεθα 〈μὲν〉 γὰρ δι’ αὐτοῦ ἀπατᾶν, ἐκφεύγειν δὲ τὸ οὕτως ἀπατᾶσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου:– [V a.c., D ⇒ 141] 136. (66b20) Πλείοσι πρώτοις, ἤγουν ἀμέσως:– [⇒ 147 || (136–137) V a.c. )] 137. (66b22) Καθ’ αὑτά, ἤγουν ἀμέσως:– [⇐ 136 || (137–139, 141) D] 138. (66b23) Καὶ ταῦτα τῷ Δ παντί. προεκτίθεται ὅπως αἱ προτάσεις ἀληθῶς κατηγοροῦνται, εἶτα ἐκλαμβάνει αὐτὰς ἀντικειμένως:– [⇐ 137] 139. Ὡσαύτως, ἤγουν ἀμέσως:– [⇐ 137 || V a.c., D ⇒ 141] 140. (66b26–27) 〈Πάλιν – συστοιχίας.〉 σύστοιχα λέγει τὴν οὐσίαν, τὸ ζῷον, τὸ ἔμψυχον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ὄντα ἀπὸ διαιρέσεως μιᾶς κατηγορίας, ἤγουν τῆς οὐσίας:– [V a.c. ⇒ 150]

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140. 1–3 Σύστοιχα – οὐσίας ] cf. diagr. 28 134. 30 ἀλυσιτελές D : ἀλυσιτελής V 135. 1 ante Συμβαίνει add. εἰς τὸ αὐτό V καθάπερ – θέσει om. D 135. 2 ἀπάτη καλεῖται D 135. 3 μὲν addidi ἐκφεύγει D οὕτως V : μὴ D 136. 1 Πλείοσι – ἀμέσως cancell. (f. 282v) et ἤγουν ἀμέσως supra versum arist. (f. 280r, v. 1 ab imo) transp. V 137. 1 Καθ᾽ – ἀμέσως cancell. V 138. 1–2 Καὶ ταῦτα – ἀντικειμένως cancell. (f. 282v) et transp. (f. 281r) V 139. 1 Ὡσαύτως – ἀμέσως cancell. (f. 282v) et ἤγουν ἀμέσως supra versum arist. (f. 281r, v. 3) V 140. 1 lemma addidi 140. 1–3 Σύστοιχα – οὐσίας cancell. (f. 282v) et transp. (f. 281r) V 141. 1 lemma addidi 141. 3 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 141. 4 ἔχων post αὐτοῦ transp. D 141. 5 μάχεται1 om. D 141. 5–6 post συλλογισμοῦ add. μείζονα D 141. 1–19 Ὁ – πλατυφύλλῳ ] cf. schol. 142

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is indeed a sign of uttermost madness. And we hold contrary opinions, if we seek to infer a contrary opinion for the same thing either by the same middle term, or by another one and then another one. This, however, is absurd in either way. And we infer by the same middle term – in which case the opposition is just obvious – in this way: pleasure is in accordance with nature, what is in accordance with nature is good, therefore pleasure is good; and contrariwise, pleasure is not in accordance with nature, what is not in accordance with nature is not good, therefore pleasure is not good. And we hold a contrary opinion by another middle term and then another one in this way: pleasure is in accordance with nature, and this is good, therefore pleasure is good; and again, pleasure is useful, what is useful is not good, therefore pleasure is not good. 135. And sometimes it happens, just as in the case of the position of terms. This theorem is useful to us in regard to dialectical reasoning and sophistry. And it is called error because of hasty judgement, for on the one hand we are taught through this to deceive, on the other to escape being deceived in this way by another person. 136. To more than one subject primarly, namely immediately. 137. In virtue of themselves, namely immediately. 138. And these belong to every D. He first presents the manner in which premises are actually predicated, then he selects them oppositely. 139. Likewise, namely immediately. 140. He calls terms in the same series the essence, the living being, the inanimate body, the human being as beings deriving from the division of one predication, namely the essence. 141. A person drawing opposite conclusions by syllogism, e.g. that shedding leaves is predicated of every grape-vine through the middle term ‘curdled sap’, and that shedding leaves is predicated of no grape-vine through the middle term ‘broad-leaved plant’, this person is in contradiction to himself since he holds contrary opinions about the same thing, he is not however contradicting the matter in question too. Nonetheless, a person assuming one

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t, XXXVIIIv

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ὀπῷ, καὶ πάλιν τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδενὶ πλατυφύλλῳ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ εἶπον ἀντικείμενα τῷ πράγματι· δυνάμει γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν ὑπάρχει πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ οὐδεμιᾷ, ἐμαυτῷ δὲ οὐκ ἀντικειμένως ἐδόξασα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐξεφώνησα τὰς προτάσεις πάσας τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐνεργείᾳ· οἷον ὅτι ὁ πηγνύμενος ὀπὸς ὑπάρχει πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τὸ πλατύφυλλον πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ· καὶ πάλιν, εἰ εἴπω ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀτελής, τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐδόξασα τῷ πράγματι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμαυτῷ· δυνάμει γὰρ εἶπον ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξεφώνησα τὰς μείζονας προτάσεις ἑκατέρου συλλογισμοῦ· οἷον ὅτι τὸ ἀτελὲς οὐκ ἀγαθόν καὶ ὅτι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν. ὡσαύτως οὐ μάχομαι πρὸς ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἰ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὲν συλλογισμοῦ εἴπω ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις, οἷον ὅτι τὸ // φυλλοῤῥοεῖν παντὶ πηγνυμένῳ ὀπῷ, οὗτος δὲ πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου συλλογισμοῦ ἐρῶ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν, ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδενὶ πλατυφύλλῳ:– [⇐ 135, 137, 139 || V a.c., D ⇒ 143 || ≈ U] 142. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ποιοῦντες καὶ συνάγοντες τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, ἤγουν τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν, κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, τῆς ἀμπέλου (δηλονότι διὰ συλλογισμῶν ὅτι καὶ πάσῃ τῇ ἀμπέλῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ οὐδεμιᾷ), οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὰ ἐναντία τῷ πράγματι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μαχόμεθα. εἰ δὲ ἀφ’ ἑκατέρου συλλογισμοῦ λάβῃς τὴν μίαν πρότασιν, τὴν μείζονα, τὰς δ’ ἐλάττους ἐάσεις (οἷον ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν παντὶ πηγνυμένῳ ὀπῷ καὶ οὐδενὶ πλατυφύλλῳ), περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιήσεις ἐναντίωσιν· ὅπως δὲ γίνεται τοῦτο θεωρήσωμεν· ὁ γὰρ δοξάζων ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν παντὶ πηγνυμένῳ ὀπῷ, δυνάμει παρεισάγει ὅτι καὶ πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ ὑπάρχει· καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδενὶ πλατυφύλλῳ δυνάμει παρεμφαίνει καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀμπέλῳ· ὁρᾷς ὅπως ἐναντίας ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόξας περὶ ἓν πρᾶγμα, τὴν ἄμπελον, ἔχομεν. ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ ἐναντίωσις γίνεται, ὅταν τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς συλλογισμοῦ τὰς δύο προτάσεις λαβὼν συνάξῃς τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν πάσῃ ἀμπέλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου συλλογισμοῦ τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν μόνον λάβῃς, ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδενὶ πλατυφύλλῳ· ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ψευδοῦς

141. 9 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 141. 12 post ἡδονὴ1 add. καὶ D 142. 3 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 142. 10 οὐδὲ μιᾶ D 142. 14 μόνον correxi cum t : με ´ D 142. 1–17 Οὕτως – ἀμπέλῳ ] cf. schol. 141

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premise from one of the two syllogisms contradicts the matter in question. E.g. that shedding leaves is predicated of every curdled sap, and again shedding leaves is predicated of no broad-leaved plant. For in the latter case I mentioned opposite things with regard to the matter in question. For I said that shedding leaves can be predicated of both every and no grape-vine, but I did not contradict myself, nor did I declare all premises of the syllogisms actualities, e.g. that the curdled sap is predicated of every grape-vine and that the broad-leaved plant is predicated of every grape-vine. And again, if I say that pleasure is according to nature and that pleasure is incomplete, I hold opinions opposite to the matter in question, but certainly not opposite to myself too. For I said that pleasure can be predicated of both good and not good, I did not also declare the major premises of each syllogism actualities, e.g. that what is incomplete is not good and that what is according to nature is good. Likewise, I am not contradicting myself, but the matter in question, if I mention both premises of the one syllogism, e.g. that shedding leaves is predicated of every curdled sap and the latter is predicated of every grape-vine, but I will mention only one premise of the other syllogism, that shedding leaves is predicated of no broad-leaved plant. 142. By doing so and by bringing together the same predicate, namely the shedding of leaves, with the same subject, namely the grape-vine (that is to say, by inferring through syllogisms that shedding leaves is predicated of every grape-vine and of no grape-vine), we do not believe things contrary to the matter in question, but we contradict ourselves. But if you take one premise from each syllogism, namely the major one, whereas you leave the minor premises (e.g. that the shedding of leaves is predicated of every curdled sap and of no broad-leaved plant), then you will produce a contrariety regarding the matter in question. Let us see in what manner this is formed. A person holding the opinion that the shedding of leaves is predicated of every curdled sap, potentially admits that the former is predicated of every grape-vine too; and the deceived person suggests that the shedding of leaves is predicated of no broad-leaved plant, and the falsehood that the shedding of leaves is predicated of no grape-vine. You see how we hold contrary beliefs and opinions regarding one thing, the grape-vine. In the same manner, a contrariety about

90 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

δόξης εἰσάγεται δυνάμει τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ πράγματι, ὅτι τὸ φυλλοῤῥοεῖν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀμπέλῳ:– [oV || D ⇒ 150]

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143. (66b34–35) Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος. μέσον λέγει τὸ Α ὡς κατηγορούμενον καὶ τοῦ Β καὶ τοῦ Γ· ἐπὶ γοῦν τούτου οὐκ ἐκχωρεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἤγουν ἐναντίας δόξας ἔχειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαμαχόμεθα, εἰ λάβωμεν καθ’ ἑκάτερον τῶν ὅρων ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις, οἷον καὶ ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Δ, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ καὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Δ· οὐ μόνον γὰρ διὰ συλλογισμῶν συνάγομεν τὸ Α καὶ παντὶ τῷ Δ ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐδενί (ὅπερ ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαμάχεσθαι, καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν), ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Δ ὑπάρχουσι, γίνεται τὸ τρίτον σχῆμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξισάζουσιν οἱ ὅροι, συνάγεται τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ ἀντιστραφήσεται, καὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει· ὥστε, εἰ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β, συνάγεται τὸ Α οὑδενὶ τῷ Β· ἦν δὲ καὶ παντί, ὃ ἀδύνατον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξισάζουσιν οἱ ὅροι, συνάγεται τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Γ τινὶ τῷ Β (ἀντιστρέφει γὰρ ἡ ‘τὶς’ πρὸς ἑαυτήν)· καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τοῦτο δὲ τινὶ τῷ Β, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β· ἦν δὲ καὶ παντί. οὕτως οὖν ποιοῦντες διαμαχόμεθα πρὸς ἑαυτούς, οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα:– [⇐ 141] 144. (66b38–40) 〈Συμβαίνει – πρότασιν.〉 πρώτην πρότασιν λέγει τὴν ‘ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β’, ἥτις ἐστὶ ἢ ἁπλῶς καὶ καθόλου ἐναντία τῷ συμπεράσματι τῷ συνάγοντι τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντία, ἤγουν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένη τῷ ‘οὐ παντὶ’ συμπεράσματι· καὶ οὕτως οὖν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαμαχόμεθα:– [(144, 146, 148–149) D || D ⇒ 146]

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145. (66b40–67a5) 〈Εἰ – ἐστίν.〉 πάνυ σκοτεινῶς πέφρασται τὸ ῥητὸν τοῦτο πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἐλλιπὲς εἶναι· διὸ δεῖ προσέχειν τοῖς λεγομένοις. εἰ, ᾧ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Δ παντί, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα· πάλιν, εἰ, ᾧ τὸ Γ, παντὶ τὸ Α μὴ ὑπάρχειν οἴεται, τὸ δὲ Γ τῷ Δ παντί, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῷ Δ. λοιπὸν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τρίτῳ δεῖ σχήματι πλέκειν ὅτι τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Δ ὑπάρχει· οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Β ἢ παντί, εἰ ἐξισάζοιεν οἱ ὅροι, ἢ τινί, εἰ μὴ ἐξισάζοιεν· εἰ δὲ τὸ Γ τῷ Β

142. 16–17 οὐδεμιᾷ correxi : οὐδενὶ D 143. 4 ἑκάτερον V : ἕτερον D 143. 8 ἐνεργείᾳ V : ἐνεργεῖ D 143. 11 ὑπάρχειν V 143. 16 οὐ V : καὶ D 144. 1 lemma addidi πρώτην V et Arist. (n2 s.l., RABCHclTu, g2 s.l.) : om. D et Arist. (nAg) : deest in Arist. (Nd) 145. 1 lemma addidi 144. 1–2 cf. Anal. Pr. II 21, 66b37

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the matter in question is also formed whenever you infer that the shedding of leaves is predicated of every grape-vine, after assuming the two premises of the one syllogism, whereas you assume the major premise of the other syllogism only, that the shedding of leaves is predicated of no broad-leaved plant. For what is contrary to the matter in question is potentially introduced from this false opinion, that the shedding of leaves is predicated of no grape-vine. 143. In the case previously mentioned. He calls A the middle term, since it is predicated of both B and C. In this case, then, it is not possible to form a belief, or rather to hold contrary opinions and contradict the matter in question. But we contradict ourselves, if we assume either premise with reference to each of the term, e.g. if we assume both that A belongs to every B and B belongs to every D, and again that A belongs to no C, and that C belongs to every D; for we not only infer that A belongs both to every D and to no D (which is indeed a matter of uttermost folly to contradict ourselves and to actually both know and be ignorant of the same thing with reference to itself), but since both B and C belong to every D, then the third figure is formed. And if the terms are coextensive, then it is inferred that B belongs to every C, and the latter is converted, and C belongs to every B. Consequently, if A belongs to no C, and C belongs to every B, it is then inferred that A belongs to no B. A belongs nonetheless also to every B, which is impossible. If, on the other hand, the terms are not coextensive, then it is inferred that B belongs to some C, so as C also belongs to some B (for ‘some’ converts to itself); and since A belongs to no C, and the latter belongs to some B, then A will not belong to all B, it belongs nonetheless also to every B. By doing so then, we contradict ourselves, but we do not contradict the matter in question. 144. Aristotle names first premise the premise ‘that A belongs to every B’, which is either wholly and universally contrary to the conclusion inferring the ‘to no’, or partially contrary, namely contradictory opposite to the ‘not to all’. Even in this way, then, we contradict ourselves. 145. This statement has been phrased quite obscurely in addition to being deficient. Therefore it is necessary to turn one’s attention to what is said. If A belongs to what B belongs, and B belongs to all D, then A also belongs to all D. Again, if he thinks that A does not belong to all of that to which C belongs, and C belongs to all D, then A also belongs to no D. It remains after this to devise in the third figure that C and B belong to D, and accordingly that C would belong

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παντὶ ἢ τινί, ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ Α τῷ Γ μηδενί, ἔσται τῷ Β τὸ Α ἢ μὴ παντὶ ἢ μηδενί· καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἔδει συμπεράνασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν, λοιπὸν ἦν δὲ ‘τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β’· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα τῷ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ἔσται ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα παρασιωπήσας καὶ μὴ συναγαγὼν τὸ Α τῷ Β μὴ παντί (διὰ μέσου γὰρ τοῦ Γ αὐτό ἐστι συμπερᾶναι) συνάγει τὸ ἑπόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ συμπεράσματι· οἷον, ᾧ τὸ Β τινί, μὴ οἴεσθαι τὸ Α, ἦν δὲ καὶ παντί· καὶ συνάγεται τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐπί τι ἐναντίον. σημειωτέον δὲ ὅτι τὸ ‘ἁπλῶς’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ ‘ᾧ τὸ Β τινί’· εἰ γάρ τινι τῷ Β, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐπί τι συνάγεται· ἀλλὰ τὸ ‘ἁπλῶς’, ὅταν ‘παντὶ τῷ Β’ λάβωμεν, ὡς ἐπὶ ἐξισαζόντων:– [oD] 146. Ὥστε, εἰ τὸ Α ὑπάρχει παντὶ ᾧ τὸ Β, ἤγουν παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Δ, ἔσται τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Δ· τὸν δὲ ἕτερον συλλογισμὸν ὡς φιλοσύντομος παρέλειψε, καὶ ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ πολλάκις λέγειν τὰ αὐτά· οἷον ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ παντὶ τῷ Δ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Δ· καὶ συμβαίνει οὕτως τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν μάχεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς· καὶ πάλιν, εἰ τὸ Α οὐδενί, ᾧ τὸ Γ, ἤγουν οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, οἴεται ὑπάρχειν, ᾧτινι τῷ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχει τὸ Γ, ὡς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ σχήματι δέδεικται, οἴεται τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ Α τὸ οἰόμενον παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ᾧ τὸ Β, ἤγουν παντὶ τῷ Β, οἴεσθαι πάλιν μὴ ὑπάρχειν (ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ‘μὴ ὑπάρχειν’ δέδωκεν ἄδειαν ἐννοεῖν ἢ τὸ ἁπλῶς, ἤγουν τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, ἢ τὸ ἐπί τι, ἤγουν τὸ ‘oὐ παντί’ ἐναντίον εἶναι) [καὶ] ὑπεμφαίνει τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διαμάχεσθαι:– [⇐ 144 || V a.c., D ⇒ 148 || = U] 147. (67a3–5) 〈Τὸ2 – ἐστίν.〉 τὸ Α τὸ οἰόμενον τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχειν παντὶ τῷ Β οἴεσθαι μὴ υπάρχειν πάλιν ἐναντίον ἐστί· τὸ δὲ ‘μὴ οἴεσθαι’ εἴληπται ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘οὐδενὶ’ ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘οὐ παντί’ [τῷ Β]:– [⇒ 149 || V a.c., D ⇒ 136] 148. (67a5–6) Οὕτω μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπολαβεῖν τὰ ἐναντία τῷ πράγματι, ἀλλ’ οὕτω ποιοῦντες καὶ τὰς προτάσεις πάσας τῶν δύο συλλογισμῶν λαμβάνοντες ἐναντιούμεθα πρὸς ἑαυτούς:– [⇐ 144, 146]

145. 7 τῷ Β τὸ Α correxi cum P : τὸ β τῶ α V 146. 1 Ὥστε om. U : ante Ὥστε add. εἰς τὸ αὐτό V post εἰ add. γὰρ U 146. 4 καὶ3 om. D 146. 6 τῷ Β … τὸ Γ U : τῶ Γ … τὸ Β V : τῶ Γ … τῶ Β D 146. 6–7 ὡς – ὑπάρχειν VD : ἀντιστρέφει γὰρ ἡ τὶς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὡς εἴπομεν· τούτω τῶ Β οὐ παντὶ οἴεται τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν U 146. 9 μὴ V s.l. 146. 10 καὶ seclusi 147. 1 lemma addidi 147. 1–3 τὸ Α – οὐ παντί cancell. (f. 282v) et transp. (f. 281v i.m.) V 147. 2 ἐναντίον V : ἐναντία D 147. 3 τῷ Β seclusi 148. 1 ὑπολαβεῖν Arist. (nRABCHclgu) et Magent. : ὑπολαμβάνειν T : deest in Nd 148. 2 ποιοῦντες correxi cum SPK, fortasse FE : ποιοῦντ V : ποιοῦντα D δύο τῶν D

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either to all B, should the terms be coextensive, or to some B, should the terms not be coextensive. And if C belongs to all or to some B, and if also A belongs to no C, then A will belong to either all B, or no B. And one ought to conclude and say in this manner, while ‘A belongs to all B’ would remain to be shown. The same thing, therefore, will be contrary to the same thing either wholly, or partially. Aristotle, however, after omitting mention of all these and not inferring that A does not belong to all B (for it is possible to conclude the latter through the middle term C) infers what necessarily follows the conclusion, i.e. A should not be believed to belong to some of that to which B belongs, it would then also belong to everything to which the latter belongs; and it is inferred that the same thing is in contradiction to the same thing either wholly, or partially. And one must note that ‘wholly’ is not said in reference to ‘to some of that to which B belongs’. For if A belongs to some B, then it is not inferred that the same thing is wholly contrary to the same thing, but partially. But ‘wholly’ is said whenever we assume ‘belongs to all B’ as regards coextensive terms. 146. Consequently, if A belongs to everything to which B belongs, namely to all B, and B belongs to all D, then A will belong to all D. He omitted the other syllogism, since he liked brevity and in order that he should not seem to say the same things many times, e.g. that A belongs to no C, and C belongs to all D, so that also A belongs to no D. It turns out in this way not only to both know and be ignorant of the same thing, but also thenceforth to contradict ourselves. And again, if he thinks A belongs to none of that to which C belongs, namely to no C, B belongs to some of that to which C belongs, as it has been proved in the third figure, he thinks then that A does not belong to all B. But to think of A, which is believed to belong to everything to which B belongs, namely to all B, that it does not, in turn, belong to all B suggests selfcontradiction (by having said ‘does not belong’ Aristotle has made it safe for us to understand that these beliefs are either wholly, or partially contrary, namely either ‘to no’, or ‘not to all’). 147. It is contrary to think of A, which is believed to be predicated of some human beings, that it belongs to all B, and again that it does not. ‘That it does not’ has been assumed either in the place of ‘to no’, or in the place of ‘not to all’. 148. In this way then it is not possible to believe the contraries in respect of the matter in question, otherwise by doing so and by assuming all the premises of both syllogisms we contradict ourselves.

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149. (67a6–8) 〈Καθ’ – Γ.〉 καθ’ ἑκάτερον δὲ συλλογισμὸν 〈οὐδὲν κωλύει〉 τὴν μίαν παραλιπεῖν πρότασιν, ἤγουν τὴν ἐλάττονα, καὶ εἰπεῖν τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β καὶ τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ· ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἤγουν τοῦ ἑνὸς συλλογισμοῦ, τὰς δύο προτάσεις εἰπεῖν, οἷον τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Δ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου εἰπεῖν τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὴν δὲ ἐλάττονα παραλιπεῖν· οὐδὲν κωλύει πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα οὕτως ἐναντιοῦσθαι· τῆς γὰρ ἐλάττονος προτάσεως καταληφθείσης τοῦ ἑνὸς συλλογισμοῦ οὐ δυνάμεθα συνορᾶν τὸ ἐκ τούτων συναχθησόμενον:– [⇐ 144 || V a.c., D ⇒ 147] 150. (67a12–14) Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀγνοεῖν τὸ Γ ὅτι ἔστι, 〈οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν Α δύο ὀρθαὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐφ’ ᾧ Β τρίγωνον, τὸ δ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ Γ αἰσθητὸν〉 τρίγωνον. τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι πᾶν τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας, oὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι, ἤγουν ἡ καθόλου πρότασις ἡ ‘πᾶν τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας’ δύο γνώσεις παρεισάγει· τὸ μέν, ἤγουν μίαν μέν, ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τὴν καθόλου γνῶσιν, τὸ δέ, ἤγουν ἑτέραν δέ, ἐν τῷ ἔχειν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ἕκαστον γνῶσιν, ἤγουν τῶν μερικῶν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῷ γινώσκοντι πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχειν τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ τὰ μερικὰ τρίγωνα πάντα τοιαῦτα εἰσίν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν μερικῶν εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐστί, οὐδὲ τὸ καθόλου ἀκριβῶς γινώσκει. οὕτω μὲν οὖν, ἤγουν κατὰ τὴν καθόλου γνῶσιν καὶ τὸν καθόλου λόγον, οἴδαμεν ὅτι τὸ Γ, ἤγουν τὸ μερικὸν τρίγωνον τὸ ἐν τῇ χειρί, ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας, ἐν δὲ τῇ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ κατ’ αἴσθησιν καὶ μερικῇ γνώσει, ἀγνοοῦμεν ὡς μὴ ὁρῶμενον ἡμῖν· ὥστε ὁ γινώσκων τὸ Γ, ἤγουν τὸ τρίγωνον τὸ μερικόν, κατὰ τὸν καθόλου λόγον, ὡς δὲ μερικὸν ἀγνοῶν, ἕξει τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ οὔ· πῶς γὰρ ἐναντιωθήσεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν γινώσκων τὸ Γ, κατ’ ἄλλο δὲ ἀγνοῶν:– [⇐ 140, 142 || (145–153) D || = U] 151. Τὸ ΓΕΗΙ τετράγωνον τέσσαρα τετράγωνά εἰσιν, ἅ εἰσι τετραπλάσιον τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου. τὸ δὲ Α〈Δ〉ΖΘ τετράγωνον, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀναγραφόμενον τῆς ΔΑ, ὃ καὶ ἀπαρτίζεται διὰ τεσσάρων τριγώνων, διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου, τοῦ ἐκ δύο τριγώνων συνισταμένου· τὰ γὰρ τέσσαρα τρίγωνα διπλάσιόν ἐστιν τῶν δύο τριγώνων:– [⇐ 150]

150. 2–17 τὸ – ἀγνοῶν ] cf. diagr. 29

151. 1–5 Τὸ – τριγώνων ] cf. diagr. 30

149. 1 lemma addidi ἑκάτερον V : ἕτερον D οὐδὲν κωλύει addidi (cf. Anal. Pr. II 21, 67a7; schol. 149.5–6) 149. 3–4 καὶ τὸ Α – παντὶ τῷ Β om. D ex homoeoteleuto 149. 5 τὴν δὲ ἐλάττονα D : τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν et s.l. ἤγουν τὴν ἐλάττονα V 150. 1–2 Ἀλλ’ – τρίγωνον2 om. U lemma οἷον – αἰσθητὸν addidi 150. 3–5 οὐχ ἁπλοῦν – γωνίας om. D ex homoeoteleuto 150. 6 post δέ2 add. ἤγουν V 150. 12 post τῇ2 cancell. καθ’ ἕκαστον V 151. 1 γεηθι V τετραπλάσιον correxi : τετραπλάσια VD 151. 2 Δ addidi cum β 151. 1–5 Τὸ – τριγώνων ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. I 15.16–18; schol. 157.26–29

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149. But concerning each syllogism, nothing prevents us from omitting one premise, namely the minor one, and from saying A belongs to all B, and A belongs to no C; or from mentioning both premises of one, namely of the one syllogism, i.e. A belongs to all B, B belongs to all D, and from naming the major premise of the other syllogism, that A belongs to no C, while omitting the minor one. Nothing prevents us from being in contradiction to the matter in question in this way. For after the minor premise of one syllogism has been repressed we are not able to detect what is inferred from them. 150. But nothing prevents him from being ignorant that C exists; e.g. if A is two right angles, and B stands for a triangle, and C for a perceptible triangle. For knowing that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles is not simple. Or rather, the universal premise ‘every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’ introduces two kinds of knowledge: one, namely one kind of knowledge, with respect to possessing universal knowledge, and one, namely another kind of knowledge, with respect to possessing the knowledge of things in their particularity, or rather the knowledge of particular things. For it is necessary for a person who knows that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles to know that also all particular triangles are similar. For the person who does not know whether a particular thing is such does not exactly know what is universal in the first place. In this manner then, or rather according to universal knowledge and the general account of things, we know that C, namely the specific triangle to hand, has three angles equal to two right angles. But according to the knowledge of particular things, or rather according to perceptual and particular knowledge, we are ignorant of the triangle since it is not seen by us. Consequently, a person who knows C, namely a particular triangle, in a general sense, but is ignorant of it as a specific thing, will hold opinions contrary to the matter in question, but not to himself. For how will a person who, in a sense, knows C, but in another sense is ignorant of it contradict himself? 151. The square CEGI is four squares, which is four times the square ABCD. And ADFH, the square described on diagonal line DA, which is also made complete by four triangles, is double the ABCD, the square put together by two triangles. For four triangles are double the two triangles.

96 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

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152. (67a21–22) 〈Ὁμοίως – ἀνάμνησις.〉 καὶ γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος τοῦ Μένωνος οὐδαμοῦ προηπίστατο τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἤγουν τὸ μερικὸν τοῦτο θεώρημα, (τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀναγραφόμενον τετράγωνον καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς), κἂν κατὰ τὸν καθόλου λόγον τοῦτο ἐγίνωσκεν ἡ τούτου ψυχή, τὸ ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀναγραφόμενον τετράγωνον διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ τετραγώνου, οὗ ἐστὶ ἡ διάμετρος, οὗ καὶ λήθην ἔσχηκεν ἐμπεσοῦσα τῷ σώματι:– [⇐ 150 || ≈ U] 153. (67a23) Ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, ἤγουν τῇ αἰσθήσει· ἤγουν ἅμα τῷ ἰδεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον τετράγωνον καταγεγραμμένον παρὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους εὐθὺς ἔσχηκε καὶ τὴν μερικὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ 〈τὴν καθόλου〉 γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀναγνωρίσας αὐτὸ τὸ μερικὸν ἐν τῷ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν καθόλου γνῶσιν τοῦ τοιούτου θεωρήματος· ἔνια γάρ, ἤγουν τὰ μερικά, εὐθὺς ἴσμεν ἅμα τῷ ἰδεῖν· οἷον τὸ τρίγωνον τὸ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ κεκρυμμένον μὲν ὂν ἠγνοοῦμεν, εἰ τρίγωνον ὅλως ἐστί· ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἀναπτυχθῆναι καὶ θεαθῆναι εὐθὺς ἔγνωμεν ὅτι ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἤγουν τῆς ἡμιόνου· τὰ γὰρ ἐν μέρει, ἤγουν τήνδε τὴν μερικὴν ἡμίονον, θεωροῦμεν καὶ γινώσκομεν ἄτοκον εἶναι ἐν τῇ καθόλου ἐπιστήμῃ, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ εἰδέναι ὡς πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος· ἐν δὲ τῇ οἰκείᾳ γνώσει, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ κατ’ αἴσθησιν καὶ μερικῇ γνώσει, οὐκ ἴσμεν τὴν μερικὴν ἡμίονον ἄτοκον· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀπατηθῆναι ἔγκυον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τὴν γαστέρα ἐξωγκωμένην λαβόντες ὡς πᾶν τὸ ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα ἔγκυόν ἐστι καὶ τίκτει· ὥστε ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς τὸ καθόλου γινώσκοντας, ὡς πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος, ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μερικὰ διὰ τὸ ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχειν τὴν γαστέρα, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως· ἤγουν οὐκ ἐναντιούμεθα πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἔχοντες γὰρ τὴν καθόλου γνῶσιν ἀπατώμεθα περὶ τὴν μερικὴν καὶ τὴν κατ’ αἴσθησιν γνῶσιν, ὅπερ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων, ἤγουν τοῦ τετραγώνου καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου· ἡ γὰρ ἀπάτη ἡ κατὰ τὸ μέσον, ἤγουν ἡ ‘ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα ἄτοκόν ἐστι’, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ γνώσει, τῇ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἐπιγενομένῃ ἡμῖν, τῇ ‘ὅτι ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἄτοκός ἐστι’ (ποία γὰρ ἐναντιότης θεωρηθήσεται τῇ ὑπολήψει καὶ γνώσει, τῇ ‘oὐδὲν ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα ἄτοκόν ἐστι’, πρὸς τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν, τὴν ‘ὅτι ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἄτοκός ἐστι, διότι καὶ πᾶσα ἄτοκός ἐστι’;), οὐδὲ ἡ ὑπόληψις ἡ καθ’ ἑκάτερον τῶν μέσων (οἷον ‘ὅτι πᾶσα

152. 1 lemma addidi cum P 153. 2 παρὰ UV : περὶ D Σωκράτους UV : σώματος D 153. 3 τὴν καθόλου addidi 153. 3–4 ὥσπερ ὁ ἀναγνωρίσας correxi : ἀναγνωρίσας ὥσπερ VD 153. 6 ἠγνοοῦμεν V : ἀγνοοῦμεν D 153. 18 μερικὴν καὶ τὴν V : κατὰ μέρος καὶ D 153. 21 ἐναντία V : ἐναντίον D 153. 23–24 post ἐστι2 cancell. ἐναντίως ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἕτεραι γὰρ ἀλλήλων εἰσί V (cf. schol. 153.26) 153. 24 τὴν2 om. V διότι – ἐστι om. V ex homoeoteleuto 153. 25 οἷον om. D 152. 1–6 καὶ γὰρ – τῷ σώματι ] cf. schol. 157.1–11 αὐτοῦ 152. 1 ὁ – Μένωνος ] cf. Meno, 85B 152. 2–3 Philop. In Anal. Post. I 14.23–24 153. 8–34 ἤγουν – οὐκ ἔστι ] cf. schol. 134 153. 18–19 ἐπὶ – τριγώνου ] cf. schol. 150–152

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152. And Meno’s slave never had any foreknowledge of this particular thing, or rather this particular theorem (‘the square described on the diagonal line’ and so on), even if his soul knew this in a general sense, that every square described on the diagonal is double the square whose diagonal it is. This theorem the soul has indeed forgotten once it fell upon the body. 153. In the process of induction, namely by means of perception. Or rather, when Meno’s slave saw a square such as this outlined by Socrates, he had at once both the particular and the general knowledge of the square, just as a person who has recognised a particular square by going through the general knowledge of the respective theorem. For we know some things, namely the particular things, when we see them. E.g. we do not know whether the triangle hidden in our hand is a triangle at all, but when we spread out our hand and view the triangle, we know at once that it has three angles equal to two right angles. And this is similar concerning all other examples too, namely concerning the example of the female mule. For we observe and know that according to universal knowledge, namely by knowing that every female mule is sterile, the particulars or rather this particular female mule is sterile. But in the case of proper, or rather perceptual and particular knowledge, we do not know whether a particular female mule is sterile. For it happens that we are deceived into thinking that the latter is pregnant by its having a swollen belly, since we assume that everything that has a swollen belly is pregnant and gives birth. Consequently, even though we know a universal fact, that every female mule is sterile, it is possible to be deceived concerning the respective particulars for the swollen belly, yet not contrariwise, or rather we are not contradicting ourselves, but the matter in question. For, even though we have universal knowledge, we are deceived concerning particular and perceptual knowledge, which is also exactly what happens as regards the examples mentioned before, namely the square and the triangle. For the error with respect to the middle term, namely ‘that nothing that has a swollen belly is sterile’, is not contrary to the understanding and knowledge acquired by us

98 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

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ἡμίονος ἄτοκος’ καὶ ‘ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχον τὴν γαστέρα ἄτοκόν ἐστι’ ἐναντίως ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας· ἕτεραι γὰρ ἀλλήλων εἰσί). τί γὰρ κωλύει τὸν εἰδότα ὅτι τὸ Α ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει τῷ Β καὶ τοῦτο τὸ Β ὑπάρχειν τῷ Γ παντί (ἰστέον ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν Δ εἶπε Γ), οἰηθῆναι αὐτὸν ὅτι τὸ Α οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταται τὸ Α τῷ Γ· οὐκ ἀκριβῶς οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ Α οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχοντι τὴν γαστέρα, μὴ συνθεωρῶν καὶ συμμιγνύων τὸ καθ’ ἑκάτερον, ἤγουν μὴ συλλαβὼν καὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν, τὴν ‘ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἐξώγκωται τὴν γαστέρα’, καὶ ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν τὰς δύο ταύτας προτάσεις ἐνεργείᾳ συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἄτοκος οὐκ ἔστι:– [⇐ 150 || ≈ U] 154. (67b5–8) 〈Ὥστε – τοσαυταχῶς.〉 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ τὸ μέν, ἤγουν τὸ καθόλου, γινώσκει τις, τὸ δέ, ἤγουν τὸ μερικόν, μὴ οἶδεν, ἀπατηθήσεται μέν, ἤγουν ἀπάτη γίνεται, οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὅπερ ἔχουσιν αἱ καθόλου ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ γνώσεις πρὸς τὰς μερικὰς ἐπιστήμας· γινώσκοντες γὰρ τὸ καθόλου τὸ μερικὸν ἀγνοοῦμεν· ἰδόντες γὰρ ἐλλέβορον οὐδὲ οἴδαμεν ὅλως εἰ ἐλλέβορός ἐστι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔξω τῆς // αἰσθήσεως ἡμῶν γενόμενον ἴσμεν, κἂν τυγχάνωμεν ᾐσθημένοι καὶ γινώσκοντες αὐτό· οἶδα γὰρ τὸν μουσικὸν Κορίσκον· εἰ δέ τις ἐπικαλύψει αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτήσει με εἰ ὁ ἐπικεκαλυμμένος ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος ἐστί, ‘πάντως’ ἐρῶ ‘οὒ’ ὡς μὴ γινώσκων τίς ἐστι ὁ κεκαλυμμένος· ὥστε τὸ μερικὸν πόῤῥω τῆς αἰσθήσεως γενόμενον ἀγνοεῖται ὡς τὸ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ τρίγωνον, εἰ μή που εἴπῃ τις γινώσκεσθαι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ καθόλου καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην, ἤγουν τὴν κατ’ αἴσθησιν γνῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἤγουν ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκεται τὸ μερικὸν τρίγωνον ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ 〈τῷ〉 συλλογίζεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀγνοῶ εἰ τὸ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ τρίγωνον τρίγωνόν ἐστι, πῶς ἐστι λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγνοούμενον καὶ συλλογίσασθαι οὕτως, ὅτι τόδε τὸ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ τρίγωνον τρίγωνόν ἐστι, πᾶν δὲ τρίγωνον ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας. ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τριχῶς λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη· ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ καθόλου γνώσει ἐπίσταμαι, τὸ δὲ μερικὸν ἀγνοῶ· ἢ ἐν

153. 30 ἐξωγκωμένον V 154. 1 lemma addidi 154. 5 ἐλλέβορον scripsi cum SP : ἐλέβορον VD 154. 6 ἐλλέβορός scripsi cum SP : ἐλέβορος VD 154. 8 ὁ om. D 154. 12 κατ’ αἴσθησιν scripsi (cf. schol. 154.19) : τοῦ καθόλου V : καθόλου D 154. 14 τῷ addidi 154. 15 λαβεῖν om. V 154. 16 post δὲ add. τὸ D 154. 17 γὰρ V : γοῦν D

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through syllogism, that ‘this female mule is sterile’ (for what kind of contrariety would be considered with regard to the belief and knowledge that ‘nothing that has a swollen belly is sterile’ against the true opinion ‘that this specific female mule is sterile, because every female mule is also sterile’?). Nor is a belief with respect to each of the middle terms contrary to knowledge (i.e. ‘that every female mule is sterile’ and ‘that nothing that has a swollen belly is sterile’ are contrary to one another, for they are different from one another). For what does prevent a person who knows that A belongs to the whole of B, and that this B belongs to all C (one must know that instead of saying D, he said C), from thinking that A does not belong to all C? For he does not know that A belongs to C. He does not know exactly that A is not predicated of what has a swollen belly, unless he considers and combines what is related to each of the two, or rather unless he assumes the minor premise ‘this female mule has a swollen belly’ too. And once he has assumed these two premises, he infers that the specific female mule is not sterile. 154. Consequently, it is evident that, if someone knows the one, namely the universal, while he does not know the other, namely the particular, he will then be incorrect. Or rather, the error concerns not himself, but the matter in question, which is precisely a feature of universal sciences and general kinds of knowledge in relation to particular sciences. For although we know the universal, we are ignorant of the particular; for even if we saw a hellebore, we would not know in the first place whether there is a hellebore at all. For we know none of the perceptible things when it is beyond our perception, even if we happen to have perceived the former and recognised it. For I know the musician Coriscus, but if someone shrouds him and asks me whether the shrouded person is the musician Coriscus, I shall say ‘certainly not’, since I do not know who the shrouded person is. Consequently, we are ignorant of the particular when it takes place far off perception, just as a triangle in the hand, unless someone perhaps says that a triangle is known according to universal knowledge and by having proper scientific knowledge, namely perceptual knowledge, but not known by actualising this knowledge; namely the particular triangle is not known by by actualising it and forming a syllogism. For since I do not know whether the triangle in the hand is a triangle,

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τῇ οἰκείᾳ, ἤγουν ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει, γινώσκω τι ὡς τὰ μερικά, τὸ καθόλου ἀγνοῶν· ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἤγουν ἐν τῷ συλλογίζεσθαι:– [(154–156) D] 155. (67b5–9) 〈Οὐδὲν – ἐπιστήμην.〉 οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἰδέναι καὶ ἠπατῆσθαι, πλὴν οὐκ ἐναντίως ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πράγματι (τὸ γὰρ κεκρυμμένον τρίγωνον, ὅτι ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας, κατὰ μὲν τὸ καθόλου γινώσκω, ὡς δὲ μὴ ὁρώμενόν μοι ἀγνοῶ). ὅπερ τὸ ἐναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα συμβαίνει τῷ εἰδότι ἑκατέραν πρότασιν (τὴν μείζονα ἐκατέρου συλλογισμοῦ), καὶ μὴ ἐπεσκεμμένῳ, ἤγουν μὴ συλλογιζομένῳ καὶ λαμβάνοντι ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προτάσεις τῶν δύο συλλογισμῶν· ὁ ἰδὼν γὰρ μερικὴν ἡμίονον ἐξωγκωμένην ἔχουσαν τὴν γαστέρα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὴν κύειν ἠπάτηται ὡς οὐκ ἔχων τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ 〈τὸ〉 συλλογίζεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· εἰ γὰρ συνελογίσατο ὅτι ‘ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἐστι, πᾶσα δὲ ἡμίονος ἄτοκος, ἥδε ἄρα ἡ ἡμίονος ἄτοκός ἐστι’, οὐκ ἂν ἠπατήθη ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως:– [⇐ 154] 156. (67b10–11) Oὐδ’ αὖ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν· ἤγουν διὰ τὸ ὑπολαβεῖν τήνδε τὴν ἡμίονον κύειν ὡς ἐξωγκωμένην κατὰ τὴν γαστέρα, εἴπῃ τις τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπάτην καὶ ἄγνοιαν, τὴν κατ’ αἴσθησιν, ἐναντίαν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τῇ καθόλου, τῇ ‘ὅτι πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος’. συλλογισμὸς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντία ἀπάτη τῇ καθόλου· ἤγουν ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἄγνοια ἡ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ ἐναντία τῇ καθόλου γνώσει, συλλογισμός ἐστι, ἤγουν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ γίνεται. εἰ δέ τις ἁπλῶς καὶ χωρὶς συλλογισμοῦ ἀπατηθῇ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἄν τις ἐρεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπάτην καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἐναντίαν τῇ καθόλου ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ γνώσει:– [⇐ 154] 157. Ὁ Πλάτων βουλόμενος δεῖξαι ὡς αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἰσί, παράγει τὸν Σωκράτη ἐρωτῶντα τὸν Μένωνα· ‘ἆρα ἡ ἀρετὴ διδακτόν ἐστι; καὶ τί ἐστι ἀρετή; οἶδα γὰρ σὲ παρὰ τοῦ Γοργίου’, φησίν, ‘ἀκριβῶς περὶ ταύτης μα-

155. 1 lemma addidi 155. 2 ἐναντίως V : ἐναντ D 155. 3 ἴσας om. V 155. 5–6 ἐκατρ συλλογισμ῀ V 155. 9 τὸ addidi 155. 10 ἡμίονος1 iter. V 155. 11 ἠπατήθην D 156. 2 εἴπῃ scripsi : εἴποι VD 156. 4 ἀπάτη Arist. et V : τῆ ἀπάτη D 157. 1 Ὁ om. D 157. 1–2 παράγει V : παρεισάγει D 157. 2 ἡ – διδακτόν scripsi cum Ua (cf. Meno, 70A 1–2) : ἡ ἐφετὸν διδακτὸν V : ἡ ἀρετὴ διδακτή D 157. 1–33 cf. Meno, 70A, 71D–E, 72C, 74A, 79A, 80D, 81D, 82A, 84D; Philop. In Anal. Post. I 14.12–16.25; Anon. In Anal. Post. I xiii.19–xiv.12; schol. 151

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how then it is possible to assume what is not known and form a syllogism as follows, that the specific triangle in my hand is a triangle and every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. For just as scientific knowledge is said in three ways, so is error. For either I know by universal knowledge, but I am ignorant of the particular; or I know by proper knowledge, or rather by perceptual knowledge, something as the particulars, while I am ignorant of the universal; or I know by actualising something, namely by forming a syllogism. 155. In this way nothing prevents one from knowing and from being mistaken about the same thing; except that this occurs not contrary to ourselves, but in the matter in question (for I know according to universal knowledge that a hidden triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but I am ignorant of this triangle, since I cannot see this). Contradicting the matter in question is precisely what happens to a person who knows each premise (the major premise of each syllogism) separately and who has not carefully considered the question, or rather to a person who does not does not form a syllogism and assumes both premises of the two syllogisms. For a person who sees a particular female mule that has a swollen belly and believes that she is pregnant, is in error, since he does not possess actualised and inferred scientific knowledge. For had he formed the syllogism that ‘there is this specific female mule and every female mule is infertile, therefore this specific female mule is infertile’, he would not then be deceived by his perception. 156. Nor indeed as a result of his belief. Or rather, for believing that a specific female mule is pregnant since it is swollen in the belly, someone may call this an error and lack of knowledge such as the one concerning perception contrary to the universal knowledge ‘that every female mule is infertile’. For the error contrary to universal knowledge is a syllogism. Or rather the error and the lack of knowledge caused by a perception, the error contrary to the universal knowledge, is a syllogism, namely is formed through a syllogism. Should, however, someone simply and without any syllogism be mistaken concerning his perception, then he would not call such error and lack of knowledge contrary to universal science and knowledge. 157. While wanting to prove that acts of learning are recollections, Plato portrays Socrates asking Meno: ‘Is then virtue something that can be taught? And what is virtue? For I know’, he says, ‘that you studied it in every detail

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θόντα’. ὁ δ’ ἀπεκρίνατο· ‘ἀρετή ἐστι τῆς μὲν γυναικὸς τὸ οἰκουρεῖν, τοῦ στρατάρχου δὲ τὸ στρατηγεῖν’· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔφη· ‘νὴ Δία, Μένων, πολλάς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἶδας ἀρετάς· τί ἐστιν, εἰπέ, ἀρετή’· ὁ δέ· ‘ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, σοφία καὶ φρόνησις’· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης· ‘οὐκ ἠρώτησα’, φησί, ‘πόσαι εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι ἀρετή. οὐκοῦν, εἰ ζητήσομεν, εὑρήσομεν’· ὁ δὲ Μένων· ‘οὔτε εὕρεσίς ἐστι οὔτε ζήτησις· ἢ γὰρ οἶδέ τίς τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐ ζητήσει, ἢ οὐκ οἶδε καὶ περὶ οὗ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον τινὰ ζητεῖν’. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης παράγει τὸν ἀκολουθοῦντα τῷ Μένωνι δοῦλον ἐρωτώμενον παρ’ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν τι θεώρημα, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἤδει, λέγω δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἀναγραφόμενον τετράγωνον διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ τετραγώνου, οὗ ἐστιν ἡ διάμετρος· ἀναγράφει γὰρ τετράγωνον τὸ ΑΒΓΔ καὶ ἄγει τὴν ΑΔ διαγώνιον διάμετρον· καὶ ἀναγράφει ἐκ τῆς ΒΔ πλευρᾶς τετράγωνον τὸ ΒΖΔΕ, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ΑΒ τετράγωνον ἕτερον τὸ ΑΗΘΒ, καὶ ἐκ τῆς ΒΘ ἕτερον τὸ ΒΖΘΙ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἴση ἐστὶ ἑκάστη τῶν πλευρῶν τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου τετραγώνου, τοῦ ΒΖΔΕ· ὁμοίως πάλιν ἴση ἐστὶ ἑκάστη τοῦ ΑΒΗΘ ἑκάστῃ τοῦ ΒΖΘΙ. καὶ ἵνα συντόμως εἴπω, περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τετράγωνον, τὸ ΑΒΓΔ, περιτίθησι γνώμονα, ἄγει δὲ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τετραγώνῳ διαγωνίους διαμέτρους, λέγω δὴ τὴν ΑΘ, τὴν ΘΖ, τὴν ΖΔ καὶ τὴν ΔΑ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ ΓΕΗΙ τετράγωνον τετραπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου· τρία γὰρ τετράγωνα αὐτῷ ἶσα περιετέθησαν· τὰ ἄρα τέσσαρα τετράγωνα ἶσα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν τετραγώνου τετραπλάσιά εἰσι· τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀναγραφέντων τεσσάρων τετραγώνων εἰς δύο ἶσα τρίγωνα αἱ διάμετροι τέμνουσιν, ὀκτὼ ἶσα ἀλλήλοις τρίγωνα γίνονται· ὥστε το ΓΕΗΙ τετράγωνον διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΑΔΖΘ τετραγώνου· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ΑΔΖΘ τετράγωνον περιέχει τέσσαρα τρίγωνα· τὸ δὲ ΓΕΗΙ τετράγωνον τετραπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου, τὸ ἄρα ΑΔΖΘ τετράγωνον, ὅπερ ἀνεγράφη ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΔ διαμέτρου, διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ ΑΒΓΔ τετραγώνου. οὕτως οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης διὰ τῶν ἐρωτήσεων τούτων ἐποίησε τὸν δοῦλον τοῦ Μένωνος εὑρεῖν ὅπερ οὐκ ᾔδει θεώρημα, ἀπό τινων προωμολογημένων ἐν-

157. 26–29 ἀναγράφει – τετραγώνου ] cf. diagr. 31 157. 5 δὲ1 addidi ut Ua : om. VD 157. 6 ἀνδρία V et Arist. (H; C 70b32, 34; c 70b34; T 70b15, 34) : ἀνδρεία D et Arist. (nRABdg; C 70b15; c 70b15, 32; T 70b32) : deest in Arist. (N) 157. 9–10 καὶ2 – οὐκ οἶδεν om. D ex homoeoteleuto 157. 11 δοῦλον D : λόγον V 157. 13 γὰρ V : δὲ D 157. 14 καὶ2 om. D 157. 17–19 τετραγώνου1 – ΑΒΓΔ om. D ex homoeoteleuto 157. 18 ἑκάστη – ΒΖΘΙ correxi (cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. I 15.1) : ἡ ΑΒΗΘ τῇ ΒΖΘΙ VD 157. 19 ἑκάστῳ V : ἑκατέρῳ D 157. 22 ἶσα αὐτῶ V 157. 24 ἐναργείας V : ἐνεργείας D 157. 26–28 διπλάσιόν – τετράγωνον om. D ex homoeoteleuto 157. 27 ΑΔ ΖΘ V 157. 13–29 τοῦτο – τετραγώνου ] cf. schol. 151 157. 30–33 οὕτως – ἐπιγίνεται ] cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. I 12.6–8, 14.9–12

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under Gorgias’. And Meno replied: ‘A woman’s virtue is to keep the house, whereas the virtue of an army commander is to lead the army’. Socrates then said: ‘By Zeus, Meno, you know, it seems, many virtues! Explain what virtue is!’ Meno: ‘Bravery, prudence, wisdom and practical intelligence’. Socrates: ‘I did not ask’, he says, ‘how many virtues there are, but what virtue is. In fact, if we investigate this question, we shall discover an answer’. Meno: ‘There is neither a discovery, nor an investigation. For either someone knows something and will not investigate it, or does not know anything and it is impossible to investigate that, which he does not know’. Socrates then introduces a slave who follows Meno and is asked by him to devise a theorem, which the slave had not previously known. That is to say, that the square described on the diagonal is double the square whose diagonal it is. For Socrates describes square ABCD and draws from angle to angle the diagonal AD; and from side BD he describes square BFDE, and from side AB another square AGHB, and from side BH another square BFHI. It is evident, then, that each of the sides of square ABCD is equal to the sides of the other square BFDE. Similarly, again, each of the sides of ABGH is equal to each of the sides of BFHI. And to say it briefly, he places a gnomon around the first square, ABCD, and then draws in each square diagonal lines from angle to angle, that is to say AH, HF, FD and DA. It is evident, then, that CEGI is a square four times the square ABCD; for three equal squares were placed around it. By being equal, therefore, the four squares are four times one of them. The slave admits this by this manifest fact. And since the diagonals cut each of the described squares into two equal triangles, then eight triangles equal to one another are formed. Consequently, the square CEGI is double the square ADFH, since this ADFH square contains four triangles. And the square CEGI is four times the square ABCD, therefore square ADFH, the very square which was described on diagonal AD, is double the square ABCD. This is then the way Socrates made Meno’s slave devise

104 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

άγων αὐτὸν εἰς γνῶσιν τοῦ ζητουμένου· διὰ ζητήσεως ἄρα καὶ γνῶσις ἡμῖν ἐπιγίνεται:– [(157–158) D || ≈ U]

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158. (67b12) Ὁ δ’ ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι 〈κακῷ εἶναι〉. ἔτι ἀπατηθήσεταί τις καὶ δοξάσει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ κακόν, εἴ γε ὑπολάβῃ τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς ἀνδρίας ὡς κακοῦ καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ταύτης ὡς ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ τῆς ἀνδρίας (ὁρισμὸς τῆς ἀνδρίας ὡς ἀγαθοῦ ‘ἕξις περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἀγαθοῦ περιποιητική’· ὡς δὲ κακοῦ ‘ἕξις περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ κακοῦ περιποιητική’):– [⇐ 157] 159. Ὁ δ’ ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθῷ, ἤγουν τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, κακῷ εἶναι, ἤγουν ταὐτὸν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τῆς ἀνδρίας ὡς κακοῦ, συμβήσεται ὑπολαβεῖν τὸ αὐτό, ἤγουν τὴν ἀνδρίαν, δεκτικὴν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ τῶν ὁρισμῶν· καὶ ἐκ τούτου συμβαίνει οὐ μόνον ταὐτοὺς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ κακόν:– [(159–161) D] 160. (67b14–15) Πάλιν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἤγουν ἡ ἀνδρία, ἐφ’ οὗ Γ ἐπεὶ οὖν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνει εἶναι τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ, ἔσται καὶ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Β εἶναι ταὐτά· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ // ὁρισμὸς τοῦ κακοῦ κατηγορεῖται τῆς ἀνδρίας, ἔσται τὸ ὁριστὸν ταὐτὸν τῷ ὁρισμῷ· καί, εἰ ὁ ὁρισμὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατηγορεῖται τῆς ἀνδρίας, ἔσται ταὐτὸν τῷ ὁριστῷ ὁ ὁρισμός· τὰ δὲ κατηγορούμενα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται ταὐτά· οἷον τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β ἔσονται ταὐτά, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία ἔσται καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν:– [⇐ 159] 161. (67b15–17) 〈Ἐπεὶ – Α2 .〉 εἰ οὖν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνει τις τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ, ἤγουν τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρίας, ὑπολήψεται τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Β

158. 1 lemma addidi cum P 158. 2 εἶναι post κακόν transp. D 158. 3 ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6) κακοῦ V p.c., D : καλοῦ V a.c. 158. 4 ἀνδρείας1 D (cf. schol. 157.6) ἀνδρείας2 D (cf. schol. 157.6) 158. 5 περιποιητική V : ποιητική D 159. 2 ταὐτὸν V : ταὐτῷ D ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6) κακοῦ V p.c., D : καλοῦ V a.c. 159. 3 ἀνδρείαν D (cf. schol. 157.6) 159. 4 τῶν ὁρισμῶν V : τὸν ὁρισμόν D 159. 5 ἀνδρείαν D (cf. schol. 157.6) 160. 1 τὸ ἀγαθὸν Arist. (T) et Magent. : τὸ ἀγαθῷ Arist. (nRABCcu) : τῶ ἀγαθῶ Arist. (Hl) : deest in Arist. (Ndg) ἀνδρεία D (cf. schol. 157.6) Γ Arist. (nABCHclu) et Magent. : ante Γ add. τὸ Arist. (R) : deest in Arist. (Ndg) 160. 2 Β² om. D 160. 3 ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6) 160. 4 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ supra κατηγορεῖται V ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6) 160. 6 ἀνδρεία D (cf. schol. 157.6) 160. 7 καὶ3 om. D 161. 1 lemma addidi καὶ om. D 161. 2 ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6)

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through these questions exactly that theorem, which he had not known. By leading him from things granted beforehand to the knowledge of the subject under investigation. Therefore, our knowledge is incidental to investigation and discovery. 158. But he who believes that the essence of good is the essence of bad. Furthermore, someone will be mistaken and will think that the same thing is both good and bad, if he believes that the definition of manliness as bad and its definition as good are equally predicated of manliness (the definition of manliness as good is ‘skill able to do good concerning things regarded with fear’, whereas its definition as bad is ‘skill able to cause harm concerning things regarded with fear’). 159. A person who believes that the essence of good, or rather the definition of good, is the essence of bad, namely identical with the definition of manliness as bad, will turn out to believe that the same term, namely manliness, is suitable for receiving the definitions of both good and bad. And from this, it results not only that the definitions of good and bad are identical, but also that manliness is both good and bad. 160. And let C again stand for the essence of good, namely for manliness. Since then he believes that B and C are identical, it will also be possible for both C and B to be identical. For since the definition of bad is predicated of manliness, then the definable is identical with the definition. And, if the definition of good is predicated of manliness, then the definition is identical with the definable. And the predicates of the same subject will be equally identical to one another too, i.e. A and B will be identical, and manliness will be both good and bad. 161. If then someone believes that B and C, namely the definitions of bad and manliness, are identical, he will then believe that C and B are identical,

106 | Sectio XI, schol. 134–164

εἶναι ταὐτά, καὶ τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Α ὡσαύτως ταὐτὰ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐπίσης οἴεσθαι τῆς ἀνδρίας κατηγορεῖσθαι. ὥστε καὶ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Α ἔσονται ταὐτά:– [⇐ 159]

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162. (67b18) Ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἦν ἀληθές. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἀληθῶς κατηγορεῖτo τὸ Β καθ’ οὗ τὸ Γ, ἤγουν κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, καὶ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β, ἀληθὲς ἦν συμπεράναι καὶ τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν· ἤγουν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ ὑπολήψεως, εἴχομεν ἂν δοξάζειν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ Α κατὰ τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ἤγουν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις, οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ δόξαι καὶ οἱ ὑπολήψεις· ὡς αἱ δόξαι ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ πράγματα:– [(162–164) D] 163. (67b20–22) 〈ταὐτοῦ – ὁμοίως.〉 ταὐτοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ Γ καὶ τοῦ Β πάλιν ἔσονται ταὐτὰ τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Α· ὥστε καὶ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Α ταὐτὰ ἂν εἶεν· ὡς γοῦν ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης:– [⇐ 162]

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164. (67b22–23) Ἆρ’ οὖν τοῦτο μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ἤγουν τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὴν ἀνδρίαν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, εἴ τις δώσει τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῆς ἀνδρίας ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ταύτης ὡς κακοῦ ὡσαύτως κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τῆς ἀνδρίας; ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μέν, ἤγουν τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τινὰ τὸ εἶναι κακῷ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθῷ (ἤγουν τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ) ὡσαύτως κατηγορεῖσθαι τῆς ἀνδρίας, ψεῦδός ἐστι, εἰ μή τις δώσει θάτερον, ἤγουν τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ κακοῦ, κατηγορεῖσθαι τῆς ἀνδρίας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν, καὶ κακοπαθεῖν, καὶ τραυματίζεσθαι· καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ὑπολάβῃ τις τὴν ἀνδρίαν εἶναι κακόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορεῖται τῆς ἀνδρίας· ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρία καθ’ αὑτόν ἐστι περιποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ἤγουν εὐκλείας καὶ δόξης:– [⇐ 162 || = U]

161. 4 ἀνδρείας D (cf. schol. 157.6) 162. 1 εἰ2 om. D 162. 1–2 κατηγορεῖται D 162. 6 ἕξουσι V 162. 7 ἕξουσι V 163. 1 lemma addidi 164. 1 ἄρ’ D 164. 2 ἀνδρείαν UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 2–3 ἀνδρείας UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 3 ταύτης UV : ταυτ ` D 164. 4 ἀνδρείας UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 6 ἀνδρείας UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 7 ἀνδρείας UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 9 ἀνδρείαν UD (cf. schol. 157.6) 164. 11 ἀνδρείας UD (cf. schol. 157.6) ἀνδρεία UD (cf. schol. 157.6) καθαυτ D

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and that B and A are equally identical because of the assumption that they are equally predicated of manliness. Consequently, both C and A will be identical. 162. For just as if it were true. For just as if B were true of what C is true, namely of every C, and A were true of every B, it may then be also true to conclude that A is predicated of C, just as happens with regard to a belief. Or rather, with regard to both an opinion and a belief, we could think that A is true of C. And similarly happens with regard to reality too, namely with regard to the matters in question. For both opinions and beliefs are related just as words and premises are. As regards the matters in question, it happens just as it happens with regard to opinions. 163. For if C and B are identical, B and A will then be again identical. Consequently, both C and A would be identical. As regards the matter in question it happens just so, as it happens in fact with regard to opinion. 164. Is this then necessary, namely the belief that manliness is both good and bad, if someone grants the first point, that the definition of manliness as good and its definition as bad are equally predicated of manliness? But the latter, namely that someone believes the essence of bad and the essence of good (namely the definitions of good and bad) are equally predicated of manliness, is false, unless someone grants that one of the two, namely the definition of bad is accidentally predicated of manliness, because it happens that a courageous man not only stays awake, but also suffers and gets wounded. And someone may believe that manliness is bad in many ways, yet this occurs accidentally. The definition of good is in itself and essentially predicated of manliness, for manliness is in itself able to produce something good, namely good repute and glory.

108 | Sectio XII, schol. 165–186

XII Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι γινομένων ἀντιστροφῶν 165. (67b27) Ὅταν δὲ ἀντιστρέφῃ. ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωσι θεωρήματα διάφορα πρὸς πολλὰ λυσιτελοῦντα:– [(165, 167) D || D ⇒ 167] 166. Τὸ παρὸν θεώρημα περὶ ἀντιστροφῆς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι δεικνύμενον· φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ καθόλου καταφατικὸν ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἀνάγκη δι’ ἀντιστρεφουσῶν προτάσεων γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέψει:– [oD]

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167. Περὶ ἀντιστροφῆς διδάσκει, ἥτις ἐν πρώτῳ μόνῳ σχήματι δείκνυται. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς, περὶ ἧς ἔφθη διδάξαι, διότι ἐπ’ ἐκείνης ἐλαμβάνομεν τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι καὶ μίαν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀνῃροῦμεν τὴν ἑτέραν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντεστραμμένως καὶ μίαν πρότασιν τῶν κειμένων καὶ κατασκευάζομεν τὴν ἑτέραν. τῆς δὲ κύκλῳ δείξεως διαφέρει, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταύτης οὐ λαμβάνομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντεστραμμένως, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ δείκνυμεν τὴν ἑτέραν:– [⇐ 165] 168. (67b27–28) Ὅταν δὲ ἀντιστρέφει τὰ ἄκρα, ἤγουν εἰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντιστρέφει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν μέσον ὅρον ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς ἄμφω, ἤγουν τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Β:– [D ⇒ 174]

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169. (67b32) Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὡσαύτως. ἰστέον ὅτι τέτταρσι διαφοραῖς διαφέρει ὁ πρῶτος τρόπος τοῦ δευτέρου (φημὶ δὴ τοῦ καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν συνάγοντος)· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐν τῷ καταφατικῷ πάσας ἐδείκνυμεν τὰς προτάσεις ἀντιστρεφούσας, νῦν δὲ μόνην τὴν ἀποφατικήν (τὴν γὰρ καταφατικὴν οὐκ ἔστι συμπερᾶναι· ἀποφατικὸν γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐπειδὴ μία ἐστὶ ἀποφατική)· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι ἐκεῖ μιᾷ ἀντιστροφῇ κεχρήμεθα, νῦν δὲ δυσίν (οἷον, εἰ τὴν μείζω θέλομεν ἀντιστρέψαι, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχήματος)· καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη δευτέρα διαφορὰ πρὸς τὴν πρώτην· ἔπειτα δὲ ὅτι ἀντιστρέφομεν τὰς δύο προτάσεις μέσον λαμβάνοντες τὸ Γ (εἰ γὰρ τὸ Γ τῷ Β παντὶ καὶ τῷ Α οὐδενί, συνάγεται οὐδενὶ τῷ Α τὸ Β)· τέταρτον δὲ ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν

Tit. sect. XII Περὶ – ἀντιστροφῶν V : Περὶ ἀντιστροφῶν D 165. 1 Ὅταν – ἀντιστρέφῃ om. V ἀντιστρέφῃ scripsi cum Arist. : ἀντιστρέψη D 166. 3 εἰ – οὐδὲν correxi : ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ V 167. 1 σχήματι μόνω D 167. 3 τὸ ἐναντίον om. D 167. 7 οὐ ante λαμβάνομεν transposui : ante ἀντεστραμμένως οὐκ V : om. D 168. 1 ἀντιστρέφει Magent. : ἀντιστρέφῃ Arist. (nABCHcluT) : ἀντιστραφῇ Arist. (R) : deest in Arist. (Ndg) εἰ V : εἰς D 168. 2 ἀντιστρέφει D : ἀντιστρέει V τὸν μέσον ὅρον Magent. : τὸ μέσον Arist. (deest in Ndg) ἀντιστρέφειν Arist. (n, R p.c., ABCHclTu) et Magent. : ἀντιστρέφη Arist. (R a.c.) : deest in Arist. (Ndg) 168. 3 post Β add. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποφατικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ D 169. 6 κεχρήμεθα D : ἐκχρήμεθα V 169. 10 τῷ1 correxi : τὸ V

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XII On Conversions Taking Place in the First Figure 165. Whenever they convert. Here he presents various theories which are useful towards many things. 166. The present theorem on conversion is shown in the first figure. For he says that when a universal affirmative conclusion converts with itself, it is necessary for this to come about by means of converting premises. If not, then there will be no conversion. 167. He teaches about conversion, which is shown only in the first figure. And this one is different than the conversion about which he taught previously, because in the latter we assumed what is contrary or contradictory opposite to the conclusion and one premise, and then we rejected the other one. Here, however, we do no such thing, but we assume the conclusion conversely and one of the posited premises, and we establish the other one. A conversion, however, is different than a circular proof, because in the latter we do not assume the conclusion conversely, but assume a premise, and we prove the other one. 168. Whenever the extremes are convertible, or rather if the conclusion is convertible, it is then necessary for the middle term also to convert with both, namely B with A and C with B. 169. And similarly in the negative case. One must know that the first mode of the first figure (I mean the one that infers a universal affirmative conclusion) differs from the second mode in four ways. Firstly, that in an affirmative syllogism we showed all premises we showed all premises to be convertible, whereas now we show only the negative premise to be convertible (for it is not possible to conclude the affirmative statement; for the conclusion is negative, since one premise is negative). Secondly, that in the first mode we used one conversion, but we now use two (e.g. if we wish to convert the major premise, this does not indeed happen first through the same figure); and this is the second difference other than the first one, and then that we convert the two

110 | Sectio XII, schol. 165–186

ἦν ἡ δεῖξις τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ἀνάγκῃ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ περιττή (ὡς γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἔχομεν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀντιστρέφουσαν):– [V ⇒ 174 || oD] 170. (67b33–34) 〈εἰ – ὑπάρξει.〉 τὸ ΒΓ οὐ δείκνυται διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς δύο ἀποφατικάς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δεικνύει τὸ ΒΓ ἀντιστρέφων:– [VD ⇒ 172 || ⇒ 176] 171. (67b35–36) 〈ἔστω – Α.〉 ἔξωθεν εἴληπται τὸ Β, εἰ τὸ Β ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ Α:– [(175, 171, 173, 176) VD || VD ⇒ 173] 172. 〈ἔστω – ὑπῆρχεν.〉 ὅτι δὲ τὸ Γ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ Α, οὐ δύναται δειχθῆναι διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐλάττονα ἀποφατικήν:– [⇐ 170 || VD ⇒ 177] 173. (67b36) Οὐδ’ ἄρα τὸ Γ· ἔσται καὶ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Α:– [⇐ 171 || VD ⇒ 176] 174. Οὐδ’ ἄρα τὸ Γ· ἤγουν καὶ τὸ Γ ἔσται οὐδενὶ λίθῳ:– [⇐ 169 || (174–175) D] 175. (67b37) 〈Καὶ1 – ἀντιστρέψει.〉 καὶ εἰ τὸ Γ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ Β, ἀντιστραφήσεται καὶ τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Α:– [⇐ 171, 174 || VD ⇒ 171]

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176. (67b37–68a1) 〈Καὶ1 – οὐχ ὑπάρχει.〉 και εἰ τὸ Γ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ Β, καὶ τῷ Α ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Β. τὸ δὲ καθ’ οὗ γὰρ ἂν παντὸς τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ Γ τοῦτο δηλοῖ, ὅτι τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Γ ἐξισάζουσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀντιστρέφουσι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, καὶ τὸ Γ παντὶ τῷ Β. καὶ εἰ τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Β ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Α ἀντιστρέψει. λείπει δὲ τοῦτο· ᾧ γὰρ τὸ Β, ἤγουν παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει τὸ Γ· ᾧ δὲ τὸ Α, ἤγουν οὐδενὶ τῷ Α ὑπάρχει τὸ Γ:– [⇐ 171, 173 || VD ⇒ 170]

170. 1 lemma addidi 170. 2 ἀντιστρέφων V : ἀντιστρέφειν D 171. 1 lemma addidi 172. 1 lemma addidi ἀντιστρέφει V : ἀντιστρέψ D 173. 1 τὸ2 V p.c., D : τῶ V a.c. 175. 1 lemma addidi ἀντιστρέφει V : ἀντιστρέ D 176. 1 lemma addidi 176. 2 ἂν παντὸς Arist. (nRHTu, B2 p.c.) et Magent. : ἅπαντος Arist. (NA, B a.c., Ccl) : deest in Arist. (dg) 176. 4 B2 : Α V 176. 5 ἀντιστρέψει V : ἀντιστρέ D 176. 6 Α2 Arist. (N, A p.c., B p.c., H, c p.c., l, T p.c.) et Magent. (D s.l.) : Γ Arist. (nR, A a.c., B a.c., C, c a.c., T a.c.) : deest in Arist. (dg)

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premises by taking C as the middle term (for if C belongs to all B and to no A, then it is inferred that B belongs to no A). And fourthly, that the proof of the conversion in the first mode was necessary, whereas here it is redundant (for we take it as an axiom that a universal affirmative premise converts with itself). 170. BC is not proved because both premises are formed as negatives. Αnd for this reason he does not prove BC by converting. 171. B is addiditionally assumed, if B is convertible with A. 172. It is not possible to be proved through the first figure that C is convertible with A, for the reason that the minor premise is formed as negative. 173. Neither C then; C will also belong to no A. 174. Neither C then; or rather C will also be predicated of no stone. 175. And if C converts with B, then B will also convert with A. 176. And if C converts with B, then B also converts with A. The for of that of all of which B may be said, C may also be said shows this, that B and C are coextensive terms and, for this reason, convertible with one another. For if B belongs to all C, then also C belongs to all B. And if C converts with B, then B will also convert with A. And what remains is this: for it belongs to that to which B belongs, or rather C belongs to all B; and it belongs to that to which A belongs, or rather C belongs to no A.

112 | Sectio XII, schol. 165–186

177. (68a1) Καὶ μόνον τοῦτο· ἤγουν τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν δείκνυμεν, ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ἀντιστρέψαντες τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ λαβόντες τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἤγουν τὸ Γ, ὅθεν καὶ συλλογιζόμενοι ἀρχόμεθα:– [⇐ 172 || (177–178) VD]

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178. (68a2) Τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐχ ὁμοίως· δεικνύντες γὰρ τὸ Γ οὐδενὶ τῷ Α τὴν μείζονα μόνην πρότασιν ἀντιστρέφομεν, ὅτι τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἤγουν τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀντιστρέφομεν μόνον, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σχήματος ἡ δεῖξις γίνεται:– [⇐ 177] 179. (68a3–4) Πάλιν εἰ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ ὡσαύτως. δύο λαμβάνει ἀντιθέσεις, ἤγουν ἀντιφάσεις (ὡς βούλει γὰρ λέγονται), καὶ ἕπεται θάτερον τῆς μιᾶς ἀντιθέσεως θατέρῳ τῆς λοιπῆς, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ ἕπεται· οἷον ἔστω ‘γενητόν - ἀγένητον’, ‘φθαρτόν - ἄφθαρτον’. εἰ οὖν ἔστιν τι ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον καὶ ἔστιν τι ἀγένητον ἄφθαρτον, δῆλον ὡς ἔστι τι γενητὸν φθαρτὸν καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τῷ γενητῷ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἕπεται, ἔσται τι καθ’ αὑτὸ γενητόν. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἢ φάναι ἐστὶ ἢ ἀποφάναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ γενητῷ, τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἕψεται· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ γενητῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον ἄρα συναληθεύσει αὐτῷ, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκοῦν ἀληθὲς ὡς τὸ γενητὸν τῷ φθαρτῷ ἀντιστρέφει. ἐντεῦθεν ἐλέγχονται οἱ τὸν κόσμον λέγοντες γενητὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄφθαρτον· εἰ γὰρ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀγένητος, καὶ ἡ ἀντίφασις συναληθεύσει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον:– [(179, 180) D] 180. (68a11) 〈Δύο – σύγκεινται.〉 δύο συλλογισμοὶ δι’ ἀδυνάτου πλέκονται· τοῦτο δὲ ἐκληπτέον πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ῥηθέν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ. τὸ B φημὶ ἀντικεῖσθαι // τῷ Δ· εἰ δὲ μή, συναληθεύσει τὸ Β τῷ Δ καί, καθ’ οὗ λέγεται τὸ Β, ῥηθήσεται καὶ τὸ Δ· λεγέσθωσαν οὖν ἄμφω κατὰ τοῦ Ε· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Α ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Δ, κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Γ κατὰ τοῦ Ε καὶ συνα-

177. 1 μοῦνον D 178. 1 δεικνύοντες D 178. 2 καὶ om. D 179. 1 A … B D : B … A V 179. 2 λέγονται V : λέγεται D 179. 3 θατέρῳ scripsi cum Sβ : θατέρας V : θατερ(ον) D 179. 4 γενητόν scripsi cum β : γεννητόν VD ἀγέννητον1,2 D 179. 5 ἔστιν … ἔστιν … ἔστι correxi : εἰ … εἰ … εἰ VD ἀγένητον scripsi cum β : ἀγέννητον VD 179. 6 γενητὸν scripsi cum β : γεννητὸν VD γεννητῶ D 179. 7 γενητόν scripsi cum β : γεννητόν VD 179. 8 γενητῷ scripsi cum β : γεννητῶ VD 179. 9 γεννητῷ D ἀγένητον scripsi cum β : ἀγέννητον VD ἄρα om. D 179. 10 τὸ V, D p.c. : τῶ D a.c. γενητὸν scripsi cum β : γεννητὸν VD τῷ V, D a.c. : τὸ D p.c. ἀντιστρέφει D : ἀντιστρέει V 179. 11 γενητὸν scripsi cum β : γεννητὸν VD 179. 11–12 ἀγένητος scripsi cum β : ἀγέννητος VD 180. 1 lemma addidi ante δύο add. καὶ D 180. 3 Δ1 V : Γ D συναληθεύσει V : συνακολουθήσει D 180. 3–5 καί, καθ’ οὗ – τῷ Δ om. D ex homoeoteleuto 179. 11 οἱ – ἄφθαρτον ] cf. Cael. I 10, 280a28–30; Simpl. 304.3 180. 2 schol. 179.3

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177. And this alone. Or rather, we prove the major premise, that B belongs to no A, after converting the conclusion and assuming the subject of the conclusion, namely C, from which point we start forming the syllogism. 178. Whereas the others are not similar. For, by proving that C belongs to no A, we convert only the major premise, that B belongs to no A, just as in the case of a positive syllogism, or rather as regards the first figure. For indeed, in the latter case we convert the conclusion alone as well, and the proof is formed in the same figure. 179. Again if A and B convert, C and D do so equally. He assumes two oppositions, or rather contradictions (for you may name them as you wish). Αnd one part of the one opposition results from the counterpart of the remaining opposition, and the other part results from what remains. E.g. let the two oppositions be ‘created - uncreated’, ‘corruptible - incorruptible’. If then something incorruptible is uncreated, and if something uncreated is incorruptible, then it is evident that something created is corruptible and the latter converts. For if what is corruptible does not result from what is created, then the former would be created through itself. And since it is possible either to affirm, or to deny in all cases, if what is corruptible does not result from what is created, then what is incorruptible will do so. Αnd if what is incorruptible results from what is created, then what is uncreated will be true at the same time with the latter, which is absurd. It is true, therefore, that what is created converts with what is corruptible. As a consequence, those who declare that the universe is created and incorruptible are refuted. For if the universe were incorruptible and uncreated, then its contradiction would also be true, which is absurd. 180. Two syllogisms are bound together by a syllogism through an impossibility. And one must understand the latter in the sense of what has been mentioned above, that and the other part results from what remains. I say that B is opposite to D, otherwise B will be simultaneously true with D, and D will be spoken of that of which B is said; let either then be said of E. And since A

114 | Sectio XII, schol. 165–186

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ληθεύσει ἡ ἀντίφασις· εἷς μὲν οὗτος συλλογισμὸς συνάγων τὸ 〈συναληθεύειν〉 τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ἤγουν τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Γ συναληθεύειν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ε· ὥστε τὸ Β τῷ Δ ἀντίκειται. ἕτερος δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τὸ Α ἀντίκειται τῷ Γ, εἰ δὲ μή, συναληθεύσουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Β ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ Α καὶ τὸ Δ τῷ Γ, τὸ Δ καὶ τὸ Β συναληθεύουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Β καὶ τὸ Δ ἀντίφασις, ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συναληθεύειν, λοιπὸν ἄρα τὸ Α ἀντίκειται τῷ Γ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ Β ἀκολουθεῖ παντὶ τῷ Δ, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ Α τῷ Δ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ Γ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ Α, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ Γ τῷ Δ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον:– [⇐ 179 || U+] 181. (68a11–12) Ἕτερον θεώρημα, τὸ πάλιν εἰ παντὶ μὲν τὸ Α ἢ τὸ Β ἀντικείμενον τῷ προτέρῳ, φωτίζεται δὲ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ παραδείγματος. καὶ φησὶν ὅτι, ἐάν εἰσι τέσσαρά τινα, πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιστρέφονται· οἷον ἀγένητον τὸ Α, γενητὸν τὸ Β, ἄφθαρτον τὸ Γ, φθαρτὸν τὸ Δ· καὶ ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Α, καὶ τὸ Δ πρὸς τὸ Β· ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἀντιφατικῶς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ ἀντιφάσκειν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ Γ, τὸ ἄφθαρτον, ἀντίκειται τῷ Δ, ἤγουν τῷ φθαρτῷ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α, ἤγουν τὸ ἀγένητον, ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ Β, ἤγουν τῷ γενητῷ· εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἀντίκειται, συναληθεύσει τὸ γενητὸν καὶ 〈τὸ〉 ἀγένητον ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἤγουν τοῦ Κ· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἀγένητον συναληθεύει τῷ γενητῷ, συναληθεύσει ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον τῷ φθαρτῷ, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· οὐκοῦν τὸ ἀγένητον ἀντίκειται τῷ γενητῷ:– 182. (68a16) Ὅταν δὲ τὸ Α ὅλῳ τῷ Β καὶ τῷ Γ· ἕτερον θεώρημα. εἰ ἕν φησι κατηγορούμενον, οἷον τὸ ζῷον, κατηγορεῖται κατὰ δύο ὑποκειμένων, τοῦ Β καὶ τοῦ Γ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου, κατηγορεῖται δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, οἷον τὸ Β τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α, τὸ ζῷον, ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ Β ὡς ἐξισάζον αὐτῷ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ μόνων τοῦ Β καὶ τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖται, κατηγορεῖται δὲ τὸ Β καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Α ὡς ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ Γ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ Β κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τοῦ Α παντὸς πλὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Α, ἤγουν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Α κατηγορηθήσεται· τὸ ‘πλὴν’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘καί’, ἤγουν, εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β κατηγορεῖται

180. 6 συναληθεύειν addidi 180. 9 Δ1 … Γ V p.c., D : Γ … Δ V a.c. 180. 10 Θ V a.c., D : αὐτοῦ V p.c. Β2 … Δ D : Δ … Β V 180. 11 τὸ Α om. V 180. 12 ἀκολουθήσει V : ἀκολουθεῖ D 180. 13 ἀκολουθήσει V : ἀκολουθή D 181. 1 τὸ3 V, D p.c. : τῶ D a.c. 181. 3 ἀγένητον scripsi cum β : ἀγένvητον VD 181. 3–4 γενητὸν scripsi cum β : γεννητὸν VD 181. 5 τούτων V : τούτω D 181. 6 Γ correxi cum R : Β VD 181. 7 ἀγένητον scripsi cum β : ἀγένvητον VD 181. 8 γενητῷ scripsi cum β : γεννητῶ VD οὐκ om. D συναληθεύσει V : συναληθεύει D γενητὸν scripsi cum β : γεννητὸν VD τὸ addidi 181. 9 ἀγέvητον1 scripsi cum β : ἀγένvητον VD ἀγέvητον2 scripsi cum β : ἀγένvητον VD 181. 9–10 γενητῷ scripsi cum β : γεννητῶ VD 181. 11 ἀγένητον scripsi cum β : ἀγένvητον VD γενητῷ scripsi cum β : γεννητῶ VD 182. 1 τῷ2 D : τὸ V 181. 2 τῷ προτέρῳ ] cf. schol. 179 182. 8 πλὴν – καὶ ] cf. Anal. Pr. II 22, 68a21

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results from B, and C results from D, then both A and C will be predicated of E, and both contradictories will be simultaneously true. And this is one syllogism leading to the inference that both contradictories will be simultaneously true, or rather that A and C are both true of the same E. Consequently, B is opposite to D. Another syllogism is that A is opposite to C, otherwise they will be at the same time true for H. Since B results from A, and D from C, D and B will be simultaneously true for H. And since D and B are a contradiction and it is impossible for both contradictories to be simultaneously true for the same thing, then it remains the case that A is opposite to C. For if B does not result from every D, then A will result from D. And since C results from A, then C will also result from D. However, this is impossible. 181. Again if A or B belongs to everything is another theorem, opposite to the previous one, but it is illustrated by means of the same example. And he says that, if there are four things, they are convertible with one another. E.g. A stands for uncreated, B for created, C for incorruptible, D for corruptible. And C is convertible with A, and D with B. One of the two, however, is opposed to its counterpart contradictory, and it is necessary for what remains to contradict what remains. For if C (what is uncreated) is opposed to D (namely what is corruptible), then it is necessary for A (namely what is uncreated) to be opposed to B (namely what is created). For if they are not opposed, then what is created and what is uncreated will be simultaneously true as regards the same thing, namely J. And if what is uncreated is simultaneously true with what is created, then what is incorruptible will also be simultaneously true with what is corruptible, which is precisely absurd. What is uncreated, therefore, is opposed to what is created. 182. Whenever A belongs to the whole of B and to C is another theorem. He says that if one predicate, e.g. living being, is predicated of two subjects, B and C, and of no other, and if one of the two is predicated of the other, e.g. B of C, it is then necessary for A, the living being, to be convertible with B, since the former is coextensive with the latter. For if A is predicated of B and C alone, and if B is predicated of both this A itself – since the latter converts with the former – and C, it is then evident that B will be predicated of every A, except A itself. Namely it will be predicated also of A itself. ‘Except’ is used in

116 | Sectio XII, schol. 165–186

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κατὰ πάντων, καθ’ ὧν τὸ Α λέγεται, ἤγουν κατὰ τοῦ Γ (τοῦ λογικοῦ φημι καὶ ἀλόγου), κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τοῦ Α:–

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183. (68a21–22) Πάλιν ὅταν τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β· ἕτερον θεώρημα. καὶ ἔστω τὸ Α ζῷον, τὸ Β γελαστικόν, τὸ Γ ἄνθρωπος· εἰ γὰρ τὰ δύο, τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β, κατηγοροῦνται κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀντιστρέφει δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἤγουν τὸ Γ, πρὸς τὸ Β καὶ κατηγορεῖται τούτου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ Α κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ, ἤγουν τοῦ Β· ἡ δεῖξις διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος:–

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184. (68a25–39) 〈Ὅταν – φευκτόν.〉 εἰ δύο εἶεν ἀντιθέσεις καὶ ἑκατέρας τὸ μὲν ᾖ φευκτόν, τὸ δὲ αἱρετόν, οἷον ‘ὑγεία - νόσος’, ‘πλοῦτος - πενία’, ᾖ δὲ τῆς μιᾶς τὸ αἱρετὸν μετὰ τοῦ φευκτοῦ τῆς λοιπῆς, οἷον ἡ ὑγεία μετὰ τῆς πενίας, αἱρετώτερον τῶν λοιπῶν, ἤγουν τοῦ πλούτου μετὰ τῆς νόσου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἱρετόν, ἤγουν τὴν ὑγείαν, αἱρετωτέραν εἶναι τοῦ αἱρετοῦ, ἤγουν τοῦ πλούτου· ἢ γὰρ μεῖζόν ἐστι, ἢ ἶσον, ἢ ἔλαττον καὶ οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα. εἰ μὲν μεῖζον, ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦ φευκτοῦ αἱρετώτερον τοῦ λοιποῦ αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερόν ἐστι· εἰ δὲ ἶσον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αἱρετὸν ἶσον τῷ αἱρετῷ, καὶ τὸ φευκτὸν ἶσον ἔσται τῷ φευκτῷ· οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ αἱρετὸν μετὰ τοῦ φευκτοῦ ἶσον ἔσται τῷ αἱρετῷ μετὰ φευκτοῦ, ἤγουν τὸ ὅλον τῷ ὅλῳ, ὑπέκειτο δὲ μεῖζον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ τὸ φευκτόν, μεθ’ οὗ ἦν μεῖζον, ἤγουν ἡ νόσος, ἔλαττόν ἐστι· τῷ γὰρ ἐλάττονι αἱρετῷ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἀντίκειται καὶ τῷ μείζονι μεῖζον· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος μετὰ νόσου αἱρετώτερος τῆς ὑγείας μετὰ πενίας, λοιπὸν καὶ ἡ πενία κακόν ἐστι μεῖζον τῆς νόσου· ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζον ἐκλεγόμεθα αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον φευκτόν, ἔσται γοῦν καὶ ἡ ὑγεία ἔλαττον αἱρετόν, ἀλλ’ ὑπέκειτο καὶ μεῖζον· ἔσται ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μεῖζον αἱρετὸν καὶ ἔλαττον, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· ἀληθὲς ἄρα τὸ τὴν ὑγείαν εἶναι μεῖζον αἱρετόν:– [≈ U]

184. 1–17 εἰ δύο – αἱρετόν ] cf. diagr. 32 182. 9–10 καὶ ἀλόγου cancell. V 183. 3 ἀντιστρέφει V : ἀντιστρέ D 183. 5 ἡ δεῖξις D : εἰ δείξεις V 184. 1 lemma addidi 184. 5 τὴν om. D αἱρετωτέραν D : αἱρετώτερον V 184. 6 παρὰ D : περὶ V ἄλλα correxi : ἀλλ’ VD 184. 13 γὰρ V : δὲ D ante νόσου add. τῆς D αἱρετώτερος D : αἱρετώτρ V 184. 14 ante πενίας add. τῆς D

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the place of ‘and’, or rather, if B is predicated of everything of which A is said, namely of C (I mean rational being and irrational being), it will then also be predicated of A. 183. Again, whenever A and B. This is another theorem. And let A stand for living being, B for being able-to-laugh, C for human being. For if both A and B are predicated of every C, and if the subject, namely C, converts with B and is predicated of the latter, it is then necessary for the remaining A to be predicated of what remains, namely of B. The proof is formed by means of the first figure. 184. Should there be two oppositions and one part of each opposition may be avoided, whereas the other part may be desirable, e.g. ‘health - sickness’, ‘wealth - poverty‘, and should the desirable part of the one opposition along with the part to be avoided of the remaining opposition, e.g. health with poverty, be preferable to the other part, namely to wealth with sickness, it would then be also necessary for what is desirable, namely health, to be preferable to what is desirable, namely to wealth. For something is in comparison, either more or equally or less preferable, and there are not any other possibilities beside these. In the first case, we have what is sought for, that what is preferable along with what is to be avoided are preferable to the rest of what is desirable. And in the second case, since what is desirable is equally preferable to what is desired, then also what is to be avoided will be equally preferable to what is to be avoided. Therefore, what is desirable along with what is to be avoided will be equally preferable to what is desirable along with what is to be avoided. Or rather, a whole will be equally preferable to a whole, whereas it was supposed for the one to be more preferable than the other, which precisely is absurd. And in the third case, what is to be avoided, namely sickness, to which health was more preferable, is also less preferable. For the lesser evil is opposed to what is less desirable, and the greater evil is opposed to the greater good. And if wealth along with sickness is preferable to health along with poverty, it also remains to say that poverty is a greater evil than sickness. Since we always select what is more desirable and what is to be avoided less, then health will be in fact less desired too, but it would also be supposed as being more desired. The same thing, then, will not only be more, but also less desired, which is precisely impossible. Therefore, it is true for health to be what is more desirable.

118 | Sectio XIII, schol. 187–194

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185. (68a34–35) 〈Τὸ2 – ἀντίκειται.〉 τῷ μείζονι ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον κακὸν ἀντίκειται, εἰ μὴ περιέχοιτο καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὑπὸ τοῦ μείζονος. οἷον, εἰ καὶ ἡ εὐεξία μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τῆς ὑγείας ἐστί, ἀλλὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῇ ὑγείᾳ, ἡ νόσος, μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀντικειμένου κακοῦ τῇ εὐεξίᾳ, ἤγουν τῆς καχεξίας ὡς ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου περιεχομένης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ὑγεία ὑπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας (εὐεξία γάρ ἐστι ἐπίτασις ὑγείας):– [≈ U] 186. (68a39–b5) 〈Εἰ – ἕνεκεν.〉 ἐντεῦθεν ἐπανακύπτει θεώρημα, ὅτι ὁ ἔρως τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐστι μᾶλλον, παρὸ τοῦ συνεῖναι καὶ τῆς συνουσίας (ὅπερ τὸ θεώρημα καὶ πόρισμα λέγεται). τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ βούλεσθαι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χαρίζεσθαι, ὃ σημεῖόν ἐστι φιλίας καὶ προδηλωτικὸν τῷ ἐρῶντι, αἱρετώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ δύνασθαι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι χαρίζεσθαι; τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι χαρίζεσθαι σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἤγουν τῆς συνουσίας. κρεῖσσον ἄρα ἡ φιλία τῆς συνουσίας ὡς καὶ τέλος οὖσα τοῦ ἔρωτος· φθείρει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἡ συνουσία τὸν ἔρωτα, ὅθεν καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀποσπερμῆναι ὁ ἔρως μαραίνεται· εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰς συνουσίαν ὁ ἔρως ἔλθῃ, διὰ τὴν φιλίαν ἔρχεται· ἢ ἵνα ποιήσῃ καὶ ἐκπληρώσῃ αὐτήν, ἢ ἵνα πιστώσηται· ὥστε ὁ ἔρως τέλος ἔχει τὴν φιλίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν συνουσίαν:– [U+] XIII Περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς 187. (68b9–14) 〈Ὅτι – ἐπαγωγῆς.〉 δείξας ἐν τῷ Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων ὡς πᾶς συλλογισμὸς δι’ ἑνὸς τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων γίνεται, νῦν δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, καὶ ἁπλῶς πᾶσα πίστις, ἤγουν δεῖξις, διὰ τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων δείκνυται:– [U+] 188. (68b12) Καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον· ἤγουν τέχνην καὶ ἐπιστήμην:– [(188–191) D] 189. (68b16) Τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἤγουν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ὅρου τοῦ Γ, δεικνύειν τὸ ἄκρον τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν τῷ μέσῳ τῷ Β ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν τὸ Γ μέσον ὅρον ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι:– [⇐ 188]

185. 1 lemma addidi 185. 2 τοῦ V : τῆς D εἰ2 om. D 186. 1 lemma addidi 186. 2 συνεῖναι Arist. (nR, N2 p.c., ABCHclgTu) et Magent. : συνιέναι Arist. (N) : deest in Arist. (d) 186. 5 καὶ – χαρίζεσθαι om. D ex homoeoteleuto 186. 6 προαιρεῖσθαι scripsi (cf. Ps.-Philop. 472.5) : ποιεῖν VD 186. 7 καὶ ὡς D 186. 8 μετὰ V : κατὰ D Tit. sect. XIII Περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς om. D 187. 1 lemma addidi

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185. A greater evil is opposed to a greater good, unless a lesser evil should be contained in the greater one. E.g. even though vigour is a greater good than health, yet an evil opposed to health, sickness, is greater than an evil opposed to vigour, namely ill-disposition, since the latter is contained in sickness, just as health is also contained in vigour (for vigour is an increase in health). 186. As a consequence, the theorem re-emerges that love rather than associating with others and having sexual intercourse is a matter of affection (therefore a theorem is also called corollary). For who does not know that the wish to grant a favour and the inability to grant a favour, which is a sign of affection and a form of signalling for a lover, is preferable to the ability to grant a favour and the unwillingness to grant a favour? For the ability to grant a favour is a sign for a preference, or rather a sign for sexual intercourse. Affection, therefore, is better than sexual intercourse, since the former is also the end of love. For sexual intercourse rather spoils love, wherefore love is quenched after the emission of semen. And even though love results in sexual intercourse, it does so because of affection, either to express and complete the latter, or to confirm it. Consequently, love has affection – but not sexual intercourse – as its end. XIII On Induction 187. After showing in the chapter On Finding Suitable Premises that every syllogism is formed by one of the three figures, now Aristotle shows that both the induction and the example, and absolutely every kind of persuasion, namely proof, are proved by means of the three figures. 188. From whatever discipline. Namely, art and science. 189. To prove by means of the other extreme, namely by means of the minor term C, that extreme A belongs to the middle term B by assuming C as middle term in the third figure.

120 | Sectio XIV, schol. 195–200

190. (68b21–22) Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ Γ· ἤγουν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ Γ καταγεγραμμένα εἰσὶ μακρόβια:– [⇐ 188] 191. (68b24–28) 〈Δέδεικται – συγκείμενον.〉 καὶ τὸ ἄκρον, ἤγουν τὸ Γ, ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς θάτερον κατηγορούμενον, // ἤγουν τὸ Β· δηλονότι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ἤγουν τὸ Α, ὑπάρξει παντὶ τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι, ἤγουν τῷ Β, πρὸς ὃ ἀντεστράφη τὸ Γ:– [⇐ 188]

t, XXXXIr

192. (68b28–29) 〈Ἡ – πάντων.〉 ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων τῶν μερικῶν γίνεται· καὶ εἰ μὲν πεπερασμένα εἶεν, πάντα διέξιμεν· εἰ δ’ ἄπειρα, τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα διερχόμεθα, ἀξιοῦμεν δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ οὕτως ἔχειν:– 193. (68b30–31) Τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως. ἐπειδὴ λαμβάνομεν ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἔστιν ὅτε προτάσεις ἀμέσους, εἰ μέλλομεν αὐτὰς ἀποδεῖξαι, δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς ἀποδείξομεν:–

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194. (68b35–36) Φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος. ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ διὰ μέσου τινὸς καθόλου καθόλου συνάγομεν συμπέρασμα, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν συλλογισμὸν γνωριμώτερον τῇ φύσει· τὰ γὰρ καθόλου τῇ φύσει γνώριμα, ὥσπερ ἡμῖν γνώριμα τὰ μερικά· γνώριμος δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ὡς καὶ τῶν μερικῶν ἐμπιπτόντων τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθήσει, δι’ ὧν πιστοῦται καὶ δείκνυται αὕτη:– [= U] XIV Περὶ παραδείγματος

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195. (68b38–40) 〈Παράδειγμα – ὑπάρχον.〉 παράδειγμά ἐστιν ὅταν τὸ ἄκρον, ἤγουν τὸ Α, δειχθῇ ὑπάρχον τῷ Β διὰ τοῦ Δ ὁμοίου ὄντος τῷ τρίτῳ ὅρῳ, ἤγουν τῷ Γ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἤγουν τὸ Β, τὸ ὑπάρχον τῷ τρίτῳ, ἤγουν τῷ Γ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἤγουν τὸ Α, τὸ ὑπάρχον τῷ Δ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τῷ τρίτῳ, γνωριμώτερα εἶναι καὶ ἄμφω τῆς ΑΒ προτάσεως:– [(195–197) D]

191. 1 lemma addidi 191. 2 δῆλον ὅτι D 192. 1 lemma addidi διὰ πάντων scripsi cum Sαβ : δι’ ἁπάντων VD μερικῶν V : μερῶν D 194. 1 πρότερος UV et Arist. : πρότρ D γνωριμώτερος UD et Arist. : γνωριμώτερα D 194. 2 καθόλου2 om. D 194. 3 γνωριμώτερον UD : γνώριμον V 194. 6 αὕτη UV : αὐτή D Tit. sect. XIV Περὶ παραδείγματος om. D 195. 1 lemma addidi 195. 2 ante τὸ add. ὅταν V 195. 3–4 δεῖ – τρίτῳ Magent. : δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ Arist. (nRAB, C i.m., Hclgu, T2 i.m.) : om. Arist. (T) : deest in Arist. (Nd) 195. 4 γνωριμώτερα V : γνωριμώτερον D

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190. For every C. Namely all terms registered in C are long-lived beings. 191. And the extreme, namely C, converts with the one predicate, namely with B. That is to say, the other predicate, namely A, will also belong to all that is convertible, namely to B, to which C was converted. 192. An induction proceeds through enumeration of all particular cases. Should they be finite, then we would go through all of them; should they be infinite, then we would go through most of them, whereas we would postulate that the rest of them are the same. 193. Of a primary and immediate premise. Since in a demonstration we sometimes assume immediate premises, if we are about to demonstrate the latter, we demonstrate them by means of induction. 194. By nature, then, it is prior and more familiar. Since in a syllogism we draw a universal conclusion through some universal middle term, for this reason he says that a syllogism is more familiar by nature. For universals are familiar with reference to nature, just as particulars are familiar with reference to us. And induction is familiar with reference to us, just like when particulars, through which our perception is confirmed and proved, become objects of the latter. XIV On Example 195. There is an example whenever the extreme term, namely A, is proved to belong to B by means of D resembling the third term, namely C. It must, however, be more familiar than the premise AB, both that the middle term, namely B which belongs to the third term, namely C, and that the first term, namely A which belongs to D which resembles the third term.

122 | Sectio XIV, schol. 195–200

196. (69a4–5) 〈Τούτου – ὁμοίων.〉 τούτου δὲ πίστις καὶ δεῖξις, ἤγουν τῆς ΑΒ προτάσεως, γίνεται ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἤγουν τοῦ Δ:– [⇐ 195] 197. (69a12) Διὰ πλειόνων ὁμοίων· οἷον ἡ ΑΒ πρότασις δείκνυται [(ἤγουν ‘τὸ κακόν’, ‘διδόναι φυλακὴν σώματος’)] διὰ πλειόνων ὁμοίων, ἤγουν τοῦ Δ καὶ τοῦ Ε· ταῦτα γάρ, τὸ Δ καὶ τὸ Ε, εἰσὶν ὅμοια καὶ ἐπίσης γνώριμα τῷ Γ:– [⇐ 195]

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198. (69a14–15) 〈Οὔτε〉 ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον, ἤγουν ὡς ἡ ἐπαγωγή (αὕτη γὰρ πιστοῦται τὸ ὅλον, ἤγουν τὸ καθόλου, ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν), οὔτε ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος, ἤγουν ὡς ὁ συλλογισμός (οὗτος γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου δείκνυσι τὸ μερικόν), ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος (καὶ γὰρ τὸ μερικὸν δείκνυσι διὰ τοῦ μερικοῦ τὸ παράδειγμα)· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παραδείγματος ἄμφω τὰ μερικά, ἤγουν τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ, εἰσὶ γνώριμα· γνωριμώτερον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἤγουν τὸ Δ:– [(198–199) D] 199. (69a15) 〈Ὅταν – ταὐτό.〉 καὶ ἀμφότερα, τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ Δ, εἰσὶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτό, ἤγουν τὸ Β· ὅμοροι γάρ εἰσι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Θηβαίοις, καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι:– [⇐ 198] 200. (69a18) Καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄκρον οὐ συνῆπτε τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἤγουν ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ὁ συλλογισμός, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὐ συνάπτει τὸ Α πρὸς τὸ Γ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ Β· τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα τὸ Α συνάπτει πρὸς τὸ ἄκρον, ἤγουν τὸ Δ:– [(200–201) D || U+]

199. 1–3 καὶ – Φωκεῦσι ] cf. diagr. 33 196. 1 lemma addidi 197. 1–2 ἤγουν – σώματος seclusi 197. 3 post Γ add. οὐ δεῖ διδόναι Διονύσω φυλακὴν σώματος, ἤγουν φύλακας, ἵνα μὴ βοηθὸς αὐτοῖς χρησάμενος τυραννήση D (cf. schol. 197.1–2) 198. 1 Οὔτε addidi 198. 2–3 ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος Magent. : ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον Arist. (deest in Nd) 198. 6 γνωριμώτερον V : γνωριμώτερα D 199. 1 lemma add. ἀμφότερα scripsi cum Sαβ ἀμφοτρ VD 200. 1 οὐ συνῆπται D συλλογισμόν V : λογισμόν D 200. 3–4 τὸ ἄκρον – Δ om. D 197. 2 cf. Alex. In Anal. Pr. I 43.19–22 68b41–69a10

199. 2–3 ὅμοροι – Φωκεῦσι ] cf. Anal. Pr. II 24,

In Anal. Pr. II 24, 68b38 – 69a19

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196. Persuasion and proof concerning this, namely premise AB, is obtained by means of similar things, namely by D. 197. Through several similar cases. E.g. the premise AB is proved by several similar things, namely by D and E. For these, D and E, resemble and are equally known as C. 198. Neither as part to whole. Namely, like an induction (for the latter forms a persuasion concerning a whole, namely a universal, by means of particulars). Nor as whole to part. Namely, like an inference (for the latter proves a particular by means of universals). But as part to part (for indeed an example explains a particular by means of a particular). For with regard to an example both particulars, namely C and D, are known. Of them, however, the second one, namely D, is more familiar. 199. And both C and D are subordinated to the same thing, namely B. For not only are the Athenians neighbours to the Thebans, but also the latter are neighbours to the Phocians. 200. And induction does not connect the inference to the extreme. Or rather, as regards an induction, the inference, namely the conclusion, does not connect A to C, but to B. An example, however, connects A to the extreme term, namely D.

124 | Sectio XV, schol. 201–204

XV 〈Περὶ ἀπαγωγῆς〉

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201. (69a20–26) 〈Ἀπαγωγὴ – ἄδηλον.〉 ἡ ἀπαγωγὴ ἐν προτάσει θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν προβλήματι. ἀνάγεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη ὑπὸ ἓν τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις, ἡ ΒΓ, δείκνυται διὰ προσυλλογισμοῦ, ὁ δὲ προσυλλογισμὸς ὑπὸ τὰ τρία σχήματα ἀνάγεται. ἡ ἀπαγωγὴ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν συνίσταται· γίνεται δέ, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις ἄδηλος ᾖ ὁμοίως τῷ συμπεράσματι ἢ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ γνωριμωτέρα. ἀπαγωγὴ δὲ εἴρηται διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἄγεσθαι εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ταύτης. εἰ γοῦν ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις ὁμοίως ἐστὶ πιστὴ τῷ συμπεράσματι καὶ γνώριμος ἢ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ γνωριμωτέρα, δείκνυται δὲ καὶ δι’ ἑνὸς μέσου ἢ δύο, ἀπαγωγὴ γίνεται· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὰ μέσα εἰσίν, ἀσαφὴς καὶ ἄδηλος γίνεται ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις καὶ κρύψις μᾶλλον τοῦτό ἐστι· εἰ δὲ ὀλίγα ἔχει τὰ μέσα, τότε ἐγγυτέρα γίνεται τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἤγουν τῆς διὰ συλλογισμοῦ γνώσεως ἡμῖν γινομένης· ἡ γὰρ ἄμεσος πρότασις ἐπιστημονική ἐστι καὶ ἀποδεικτική, ἤγουν ἁρμόζουσα τῇ ἀποδείξει, περὶ ἣν πρότασιν ἀπαγωγὴ οὐ γίνεται. εἰ δὲ 〈καὶ〉 τὴν δικαιοσύνην οὗτος ὅρον ἔλαβεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ληπτέον· αὕτη γὰρ ἀμφιβάλλεται, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστι:– [⇐ 200 || U+] 202. (69a28) Ἐγγύτερον γὰρ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι, ἤγουν σαφέστερον γίνεται τὸ ΑΓ συμπέρασμα καὶ γνώριμον διὰ τῆς ΒΓ προτάσεως· σαφὴς γὰρ ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις, ἣν καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἶπε διὰ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ γνώριμον. εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ, τί δὲ οὐ δεόμεθα καὶ τῆς μείζονος σαφοῦς εἶναι, φαμὲν σαφὴς μὲν καὶ αὕτη καὶ γνώριμος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὡμολογημένην καὶ ἀξίωμα οὖσαν παρῆκε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν:– [(202–203) D] 203. (69a29) Τὸ πρότερον οὐκ ἔχοντας ἐστὶν ὅτι τὸ ΑΓ, ἤγουν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὃ οὐκ εἴχομεν γνώριμον πρὸ τοῦ διὰ τῶν προτάσεων κατασκευασθῆναι, γίνεται γνώριμον ὕστερον διὰ τῆς ΒΓ προτάσεως, ἣν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς εἴπομεν:– [⇐ 202] 204. (69a33) 〈Μηνίσκων.〉 μηνίσκός ἐστι τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς πλευρᾶς τοῦ τετραγώνου ἀναγραφόμενον ἡμικύκλιον. ἐπειράσαντο μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ τετραγωνίσαι

Tit. sect. XV Περὶ ἀπαγωγῆς addidi cum SP 201. 1 lemma addidi 201. 1–2 ἡ ἀπαγωγὴ – τῶν om. D 201. 3–4 προσσυλλογισμοῦ V (cf. schol. 127.6) 201. 4 προσσυλλογισμὸς V (cf. schol. 127.6) 201. 7 ἄγεσθαι V : ἀνάγεσθαι D 201. 11 κρύψις V : κ ψις D 201. 12 ἐγγυτέρα scripsi cum α : ἐγγτρ ´ V : ἐγγυτέρω S : ἐγγύτερον Dβ 201. 13 ἡ V : ἢ D 201. 15 καὶ addidi 201. 16 διδακτόν U : διδακτικόν VD 203. 1 post Τὸ add. oὖν D 204. 1 lemma addidi 204. 2 γὰρ om. D 201. 14–16 εἰ – ἐστι ] cf. Ps.-Philop. 476.17–22

203. 4 ὡς εἴπομεν ] schol. 201.3

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XV On Reduction 201. A reduction is considered in respect of a premise, not of a thesis. It also refers, however, to one of the three figures. For, as regards a reduction, the minor premise BC is proved by means of a preliminary syllogism, and the preliminary syllogism refers to the three figures. And a reduction associates with the minor premise; a reduction comes about whenever the minor premise is unclear similarly to the conclusion or more familiar than the latter. And it is called reduction because we are forced to be led from the minor premise towards its demonstration. If, in fact, a minor premise is equally persuading and familiar with the conclusion or more familiar than the latter, and if it is proved by means of just one intermediate term or two, then a reduction is formed. And if the intermediate terms are many, then the minor premise becomes uncertain and unclear, and this is rather a concealment. And if a reduction has few intermediate terms, then it becomes nearer to knowledge, or rather to the knowledge formed in us through syllogism. For an immediate premise, concerning which a reduction is not formed, is capable of knowledge and demonstrative, namely appropriate for demonstration. Even though he assumed justice as a term, but virtue must be assumed, for it is disputed whether it can be taught. 202. For it is closer to knowledge. Or rather, the conclusion AC becomes clearer and familiar through the premise BC. For the minor premise, which he also called knowledge because of its clarity and familiarity, is clear. And if someone asks, why we do not need the major premise to be clear as well, we reply that the latter is also clear and familiar. But since the major premise is granted and functions as an axiom, Aristotle omitted to mention this. 203. Being previously without it signifies that AC, or rather the conclusion, which we did not know before establishing it through premises, becomes familiar afterwards by means of the premise BC, which, as we said, he called knowledge. 204. A lune is a semicircle described on the side of a square. Many people tried to square the circle, but they were not able to do it; Hippocrates, how-

126 | Sectio XVI, schol. 205–211

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τὸν κύκλον, οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν δέ· ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἔδοξε μὲν τετραγωνίσαι τοῦτον, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἐτετραγώνισεν. ὁ γὰρ Ἱπποκράτης ναύκληρος ὢν καὶ λῃστευθεὶς τὴν ναῦν, συλλαβόμενος τοὺς λῃστὰς ἀπήνεγκεν Ἀθήνησι δώσοντας δίκην. κατὰ τύχην δὲ ἐνέτυχε γεωμέτραις καὶ ἔσχεν ἔρον γεωμετρίαν μαθεῖν· καὶ μαθὼν ταύτην καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐφήψατο ζητημάτων:– XVI 〈Περὶ ἐνστάσεως〉

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205. (69a37–b1) 〈Ἔνστασις – συλλογισμοῖς.〉 εἰκότως μετὰ τὴν ἀπαγωγὴν διδάσκει περὶ ἐνστάσεως· κοινωνοῦσιν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι ἀλλήλαις, καθόσον συνίστανται περὶ ἀμφιβαλλομένην πρότασιν ἐν συλλογισμῷ. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀπαγωγή ἐστι προσυλλογισμὸς ἀμφιβολίας ἀναιρετικός, ἡ δὲ ἔνστασίς ἐστι 〈πρότασις〉 διὰ συλλογισμοῦ συνάγουσα ἢ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ προκειμένῃ ὑποθέσει ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον. τὴν δὲ πρότασιν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ληφθῆναι μερικήν (ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου συλλογισμῶν τοῦτο ληπτέον· ἐπ’ αὐτῶν γὰρ καὶ αἱ δύο προτάσεις καθόλου) ἢ λαμβάνεται ἡ μερικὴ πρότασις οὐκ ἐν τοῖς κα//θόλου συλλογισμοῖς:– [U+] 206. (69b19–29) 〈Ἁπλῶς – τοὐναντίον.〉 ἁπλῶς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι τὸν ἐνιστάμενον καθόλου ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, ἤγουν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ συνάξαι τὸ ἀντιθετικῶς ἀντικείμενον τῇ προτεθείσῃ προτάσει· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ καθόλου τῶν προτεινομένων ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘πρὸς τὴν καθόλου προτεθεῖσαν πρότασιν’ ἐκληπτέον· τὴν δὲ ἀντίφασιν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως λάβε· γένος γὰρ αὕτη τῶν τε ἐναντίως καὶ τῶν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένων. οἷον, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ μηδεμίαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνιστάμενος πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα πρότασιν ὡς πάντων τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἤγουν τῶν ἐναντίων, μία ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἀνάγκη ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι αὐτὸν συλλογίσασθαι· μέσον γὰρ λαμβάνει ὅρον τὸ καθόλου, ἤγουν τὸ καθολικώτερον τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κειμένου ἐλάττονος ὅρου ἐν τῇ προτάσει· ἐλάττων δὲ ὅρος ἔκειτο ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ ‘ἐναντία’, ὧν καθολικώτε-

204. 4 γὰρ V : δὲ D 204. 5 λῃστευθεὶς V : ληστρευθεὶς D 204. 6 γεωμέτραις V : γεωμετρ ´ D ἔρον ἔσχεν D 204. 7 ἐφήψατο V : ἐψηφίσατο D post ζητημάτων add. συμβαίνει τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἤγουν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι· ἐπιστήμη τὴν βγ D (cf. schol. 202, 203) Tit. sect. XVI Περὶ ἐνστάσεως addidi cum Sβ 205. 1 lemma addidi 205. 4 προσσυλλογισμὸς V (cf. schol. 127.6) 205. 5 πρότασις addidi 205. 8 ἡ V : ἢ D 206. 1 lemma addidi ἅπασι Arist. (RCT) et Magent. : πᾶσι Arist. (nABdΗclgu) : deest in Arist. (N) 206. 1–2 ἐνιστάμενον Arist. (RCΗlgTu) et Magent. : ἐνισταμένων Arist. (nABdc) : deest in Arist. (N) 206. 4 τῶν προτεινομένων Arist. (RClgT, u2 p.c.) et Magent. : τῷ προτεινομένῳ Arist. (nABdΗc, u a.c.) : deest in Arist. (N) προταθεῖσαν V 206. 6–7 μὴ δὲ μίαν D 206. 10 κειμένου V : προκειμένου D 206. 11–12 καθολικώτερά V : καθολικώτερον D 204. 3–7 ὁ – ζητημάτων ] cf. Philop. In Phys. 31.3–9 206. 3–4 Anal. Pr. II 26, 69b22

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ever, seemed to have squared it, but in reality he did not. Being a shipowner and after his ship was stolen, Hippocrates brought the pirates to Athens to be punished after arresting them. Accidentally then, he met with geometers and had a desire to learn geometry; and after learning the latter he touched even on hard to solve topics. XVI On Objection 205. Aristotle reasonably teaches about the objection after the reduction. For they both have something in common with one another, in so far as they associate with a disputed premise in a syllogism. They differ, however, because a reduction is a preliminary syllogism rejecting doubt, whereas an objection is a premise that leads by means of a syllogism to either what is contradictory opposite to a proposed assumption, or to what is contrary to the latter. And either it is not possible to assume the premise as particular at all (but it is necessary to assume this in the case of universal syllogisms; for, as regards the latter both premises are universal), or the particular premise is assumed not in universal syllogisms. 206. In general, it is necessary for a person raising a universal objection to state his opposition in a total sense. Namely, to infer by means of a syllogism what is contrarily opposite to the proposed premise. For with reference to the universal of the terms proposed must be assumed in the sense of ‘with reference to the proposed universal premise’. And assume contradiction in the sense of ‘opposition’. For the latter is the genus of both contrary and contradictory opposite premises. E.g. if someone claims that contraries are not subjects of any science, when objecting to a person who has proposed the premise that all opposites, namely contraries, are subjects of a single science, it is then necessary for the former to infer by means of the first figure. For he assumes as middle term a universal, namely a more universal term than the

128 | Sectio XVI, schol. 205–211

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ρά ἐστι τὰ ‘ἀντικείμενα’. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων μίαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ἐν μέρει τις ἐνσταίη λέγων ὡς οὐ πάντων, ληπτέον μέσον ὅρον ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι τὸ μερικώτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγνωστον· πρὸς ὃ μέσον καθόλου ἐστὶ κατηγορούμενος ὁ ἐλάττων ὅρος, ἤγουν τὰ ἐναντία· καθ’ οὗ ἐλάττονος ὅρου, ἤγουν καθ’ ὧν ἐναντίων, λέγεται ἡ πρότασις, ἤγουν κατηγορεῖται ἐν τῇ προτάσει ὁ κατηγορούμενος, ἤγουν ‘ἡ μία ἐπιστήμη’. γίνεται δὲ ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὕτως· τοῦ γνωστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀγνώστου μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ἤγουν μηδεμίαν, εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία κατηγορείσθωσαν καθόλου πρὸς ταῦτα, ἤγουν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγνωστον, καὶ συναχθήσεται ὡς οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν:– [U-] 207. (69b23–24) Μέσον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἤγουν πρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλάττονα ὅρον κείμενον ἐν τῇ προτάσει ἔστι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ὧν καθολικώτερά εἰσι τὰ ἀντικείμενα· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀντίθεσις γένος τῶν τε ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικειμένων. οἷον, εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐνίσταται 〈μὴ〉 οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων μίαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, ληπτέον μέσον τὰ ἀντικείμενα:– [VD ⇒ 211] 208. (69b29–31) 〈Διὸ – συλλογισμοί·〉 ἐξ ὧν γὰρ συλλογισμῶν συλλογιζόμεθα τὴν ‘πᾶς’, ἤγουν ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, ἐξ ἐκείνων καὶ τὴν ‘οὐδείς’· καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὴν ‘τίς’, ἤγουν ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι, ἐξ ἐκείνων καὶ τὴν οὐ πᾶς’:– [oD] 209. (69b32–34) 〈Ἔτι – Γ·〉 εἰ γὰρ γένηται συλλογισμὸς ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι καὶ οὐ συγχωρήσει τις τὸ συμπέρασμα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ ΑΓ ἀξιόπιστον (τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη· ἀντικείμενά εἰσι), δεόμεθα ἀντιστροφῆς:– [oD]

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210. [Τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐκ ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη· οἷον εἰ μὴ δοίη τὸ Α τῷ Β διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτῷ τῷ Α τὸ Γ· ἤτοι οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τὰ ‘ἀντικείμενα’ ἀποφάσκονται τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ὧν μία ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ γεωμετρία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Α, ἤγουν τὸ ‘μία ἐπιστήμη’, ἀποφάσκεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ἐναντία ὄντα ἔχουσι μίαν ἐπιστήμην

206. 14 τὸ3 Arist. (ABcu) et Magent. : om. Arist. (nRdCΗlgT) : deest in Arist. (N) 206. 16 τὰ ἐναντία Arist. (RC) et Magent. : τοὐναντίον Arist. (nABdΗclgu) : τὸ ἐναντίον Arist. (T) : deest in Arist. (N) 206. 19 μὴ δὲ μίαν D 207. 2 πρὸς V : πρὸ D 207. 3 τε om. D 207. 5 μὴ addidi 207. 6 εἶναι μίαν D 208. 1 lemma addidi 209. 1 lemma addidi 209. 2–3 τῶν ἐναντίων correxi (cf. schol. 210.1) : ἤτοι τὸ ὂν V 210. 1–7 schol. seclusi (cf. lemma Tῶν – ἐπιστήμη et schol. 209.2–3)

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minor term originally stated in the premise. And ‘contraries’, in relation to which ‘opposites’ are more universal, were posited in the premise as minor term. But if someone objected to a person who said that all contraries are subjects of a single science, by saying that this is not always the case, then one should by means of the third figure assume what is more particular than the contraries, e.g. knowable and unknowable, as middle term. In relation to this middle term, the minor one, namely the contraries, is universal when predicated of it. The premise is stated in relation to the latter minor term, namely the contraries, or rather the predicated term, namely the ‘single science’, is predicated in the premise in relation to these contraries. And the syllogism is formed as follows: let knowable and unknowable not be subjects of the same science, or rather of any science; and let contraries be universally predicated in relation to these, namely in relation to known and unknown. And it will be inferred that not all contraries are subjects of a single science. 207. For the term which is universal in relation to the original subject becomes the middle term. Or rather, the contraries, concerning which opposites are more universal, are placed in relation to the original minor term in the premise. For opposition is the genus of both contraries and contradictory opposites. E.g. if someone claims that contraries are not subjects of the same science, and objects that this is not so to a person who said that all contraries are subjects of a single science, then one must assume opposites as a middle term. 208. For we infer ‘no’ from those syllogisms, from which we also infer ‘all’, namely in the first figure. And we infer ‘not to all’ from those syllogisms, from which we also infer ‘some’, namely in the third figure. 209. For if a syllogism is formed in the second figure and someone does not grant the conclusion for the reason that he does not consider AC credible (contraries are not the subject of a single science, they are opposites), then we are in need of a conversion. 210. [Opposites are not the subject of a single science. E.g. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B, because C does not follow the same A. For if the term ‘opposites’ is denied of the line and the surface, which are subjects of a single science, the geometry, it is truly then necessary also for A, namely ‘single science’, to also be denied of contraries in the first place; for

130 | Sectio XVI, schol. 205–211

τὴν ταῦτα γινώσκουσαν, τὴν περὶ χρωμάτων δηλονότι. ἢ νοητέον ἐπιστήμην τὴν γνῶσιν· τῶν γὰρ ἀγνώστων ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι:–] [V ⇒ 212 || oD]

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211. (69b38–70a2) 〈Ἐπισκεπτέον – λαβεῖν·〉 ἡ ἔνστασις ἀναιρεῖ τὴν πρότασιν ἢ ἐναντίως ἢ ἀντιφατικῶς, καὶ ἢ ὑποθετικῷ συλλογισμῷ ἢ κατηγορικῷ. καὶ ἐὰν ὑποθετικῷ συλλογισμῷ, ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. διὰ μὲν τοῦ ὁμοίου, ὡς ὅταν τινὸς εἰπόντος τὸ σημεῖον μέρος εἶναι τῆς γραμμῆς φαίημεν ‘οὐδαμoῦ’· ὡς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον πρὸς τὴν γραμμήν (πέρας γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστιν), οὕτω καὶ αὕτη ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια πρὸς τὸ σῶμα (πέρατα γάρ εἰσιν· ἡ μὲν γραμμὴ τῆς ἐπιφανείας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ σώματος)· οὔτε δὲ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια μέρος τοῦ σώματος, οὔτε ἡ γραμμὴ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον μέρος τῆς γραμμῆς· || πάλιν, εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη, ἐροῦμεν· εἰ τῶν ἐναντίων μία αἴσθησις ἀντιληπτική, ὁμοία δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις τῇ ἐπιστήμη (ὡς γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τὸ ἐπιστητόν), λοιπὸν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων μίαν ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστί, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἄρα τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστί. διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου οὕτως· εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν· εἰ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, ἡ λύπη ἄρα κακόν (εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον)· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ λύπη κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. διὰ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ ἢ πρὸς δόξαν ἢ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν· καὶ εἰ μὴ πρὸς δόξαν, ἢ ἐναντίως ἢ ἀντιφατικῶς. ἐναντίως μὲν οὕτως· εἴ τις ἐρεῖ λόγου χάριν ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ἀντικείμενα, τῶν δὲ ἀντικειμένων οὐκ ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· εἰ δὲ εἴπῃ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι πάντων· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἀντικείμενα, τῶν δὲ ἀντικειμένων μία ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἄρα μία ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δὲ ἀντιφατικῶς, εἰ μὲν τὸ ‘παντὶ’ ἐρεῖ τίς, τὸ ‘οὐ παντὶ’ ἐροῦμεν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ‘οὐδενί’, τὸ ‘τινί’· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ‘oὐ παντὶ’ καὶ τὸ ‘τινὶ’ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι συνάξομεν. [/V] εἰ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, οὕτως· εἰ τυχὸν ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐρεῖ ὅτι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἠλιθιότης, ἐνιστάμεθα πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ψεύδεται· πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὅτι ἡ 〈σωφροσύνη〉 ἠλιθιότης οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ δοκοῦν πᾶσιν ἀληθές· πάλιν 〈ἐνιστάμεθα〉, εἴ τις ἐρεῖ τὴν ὑγείαν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν (οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐτε κακόν ἐστι, ἐπεί ἐστιν αὐτῇ χρήσασθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντως εὖ· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ὑγεία ἀγαθόν)· πρὸς ὅν φαμεν ψεῦδος

211. 1 lemma addidi 211. 2 ἢ1 V p.c., D : εἶναι V a.c. καὶ ἢ om. V 211. 3 ἐὰν V : ἂν D 211. 5 οὐδαμoῦ : οὐδαμῶς D 211. 19 οὐδενὸς scripsi cum Sαβ : οὐδν ` V 211. 28 σωφροσύνη addidi cum β (P s.l., R i.m.) 211. 28–29 ἐνιστάμεθα addidi 211. 15–16 εἰ – ἐναντίον ] cf. Top. II 9, 114b14–15; Alex. In Top. 135.8–9 211. 26–28 εἰ δὲ – ἀληθές ] cf. Alex. In Top. 530.7–9

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white and black, even though they are contraries, have a single science that discerns them, namely the science of colours. Or one must think of knowledge as science; for there is not any science of unknowable things.] 211. An objection rejects a premise either contrarily, or contradictory; and either by a hypothetical syllogism, or by a categorical one. And in the former case, either by a similarity, or by a contrariety. And we object by means of a similarity, just as whenever we might reply ‘in no way at all’, in case someone says that a point is part of a line; for just as a point is related to a line (for the former is a limit of the latter), so the latter is related to a surface, and a surface to a body too (for they are limits; a line is the limit of a surface, and the latter is the limit of a body). But neither a surface is part of a body, nor a line is part of a surface, therefore a point is not part of a line in the first place. Again, should someone say that contraries are not subjects of a single science, we shall reply: if there is a single perception able to comprehend contraries and perception resembles knowledge (for just as perception is said in reference to what is perceptible, so is knowledge in reference to what is knowable), it remains then for contraries to be subjects of a single science. But of course the perception of contraries is one, therefore there is also a single science of contraries. And we object by means of a contrariety as follows. Should someone say that pleasure is good, we shall reply to him: if pleasure is good, then grief is bad (for if a contrary follows a contrary, then a contrary also follows a contrary respectively); but of course grief is not bad, and therefore pleasure is not good either. And we object by means of a categorical syllogism either with respect to an opinion, or not. And in the latter case either contrariwise, or contradictory. And we object contrariwise as follows: if someone says, for instance, that contraries are subjects of a single science, we shall reply that none of the contraries is subject of a single science. For if contraries are opposites and if opposites are not subjects of a single science, then contraries are not subjects of any single science in the first place. And if he says that none of the contraries is subject of a single science, we shall reply that there is a science of all contraries; for contraries are opposites and opposites are subjects of a single science, therefore contraries are also subjects of a single science. And if we object contradictory, this happens as follows. If someone says ‘to all’, then we shall reply with ‘not to all’. And in case he says ‘to no’,

132 | Sectio XVII, schol. 212–215

συνάξαι· πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ αὕτη ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ πᾶσι δοκοῦν ἀληθές. [/V] πάλιν, εἴ τις ἐρεῖ ὅτι πολλοὶ κόσμοι εἰσίν, ὡς ὁ Δημόκριτος, ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ψεῦδος· οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ τῷ Πλάτωνι γνωρίμῳ ὄντι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν:– [⇐ 207 || V ⇒ 208] XVII Περὶ σημείου καὶ εἰκότος [oD]

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212. (70a2–3) 〈Εἰκὸς – σημεῖον.〉 διδάσκει περὶ εἰκότος καὶ σημείου οὐ δι’ ἑαυτά, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ὕλαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ προτάσεις ταῦτα λαμβάνονται. ἔστι δὲ τὸ σημεῖον καθολικώτερον τοῦ τεκμηρίου καὶ τοῦ εἰκότος. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ σημεῖόν ἐστι ἐξισάζον τῷ στοιχείῳ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ἑπόμενον, λέγεται τεκμήριον· οἷον ὁ καπνὸς σημεῖόν ἐστι τῆς φλογός, καὶ εἰ φλόξ ἐστι, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ καπνὸν καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· καὶ τοῦ πυρετοῦ σημεῖόν ἐστι ἡ παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις τῆς φλεβὸς καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ δὲ τὸ σημεῖον ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶ ἢ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ, λέγεται εἰκὸς καὶ ἔστιν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ εἶναι· παράδειγμα τοῦ ἐπὶ πλέον· πᾶς ὁ τυραννῶν ὅπλα κατασκευάζει, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ὁ ὅπλα κατασκευάζων ἤδη καὶ τυραννεῖ· καὶ πᾶσα γυνὴ τίκτουσα, ἢ τετοκυῖα, ἢ τέξουσα γάλα ἔχει, οὐ μὴν δὲ πᾶσα γάλα ἔχουσα τίκτει, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρθένοι καὶ γραῖαι γάλα ἔχουσι· καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἐρῶν φιλεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἐρώμενος φιλεῖ τὸν ἐρῶντα (πολλοὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἀπέκτειναν μίσει). παράδειγμα τοῦ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον τὸ ‘πᾶς δειλὸς ῥήτωρ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης δειλὸς ἅμα καὶ ῥήτωρ’· οὐ πᾶς δὲ ῥήτωρ δειλός· ἐπ’ ἔλαττον γὰρ ὁ δειλὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἐστί· καὶ πάλιν ‘πᾶς λῃστὴς νύκτωρ πλανᾶται’· ἐπ’ ἔλαττον δὲ ὁ νύκτωρ πλανώμενός ἐστι καὶ λῃστής. [τεκμήριον δέ ἐστι τὸ ‘ἔνθα πῦρ ἀνάγκη καὶ τέφραν εἶναι, ἢ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ γεγονέναι’· καὶ ‘ὅπου τέφρα, ἐκεῖ ἢ πῦρ ἦν, ἢ ἐστί, ἢ ἔσται’· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐξισάζει]:– [⇐ 210 || oD]

212. 1 lemma addidi 212. 17–19 τεκμήριον – ἐξισάζει seclusi (cf. schol. 212.3–7) 212. 10–12 πᾶσα – τίκτει ] cf. Anal. Pr. II, 26 70a12–13; Rhet. I, 2 1357b15–16; Anon. In Anal. Pr. II 188a21–23; schol. 94.7–8; 215.5; Pedias. I 85.9

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we reply with ‘to some’. But we shall also infer both ‘not to all’ and ‘to some’ in the third figure. And if we object with respect to an opinion, this occurs as follows: if Callicles perchance says that practical wisdom is a silliness, then we object to his lying. For it seems to all people that the contrary happens, that practical wisdom is not a silliness; and that which is a common opinion is true. Again we object with respect to an opinion, if someone says that health is not a good thing (since it is neither good, nor bad; since it is possible to experience health in both a good and a bad way; however, it is not possible to experience something good in both a good and a bad way, but always in a good way. Therefore health is not a good thing); we reply to him that he inferred a falsehood, for it seems to all people that health is a good thing, and that what is a common opinion is true. Again, if someone says that there are many worlds, as Democritus did, we shall reply that this is a falsehood. For this is not the opinion of Plato who was well acquainted with philosophy. XVII On Sign and Probability 212. He teaches about probability and sign not for their own sake, but for the enthymeme; for they are assumed as matters and premises of the latter. A sign, however, is more universal than evidence and probability. And if a sign is coextensive with an element and results from the latter out of necessity, then it is called evidence. E.g. smoke is a sign of fire, and if there is fire, then it is necessary that there is also smoke and vice versa; and a sign of fever is the irregular motion of a blood-vessel and the latter two converse with one another. But if a sign has wider or narrower denotation than what is signified, then the former is called probability, and it is possible for it to be contingent, and for it not to be. Example concerning wider denotation include: every tyrant forges weapons, but not every person who forges weapons is actually a tyrant. And every woman who gives birth, or has given birth, or who will give birth has milk, but not every woman who has milk gives birth, since both virgins and old women have milk; and every lover regards his beloved with affection, but not every beloved regards with affection his lover (for many killed their lovers because of hatred). An example concerning narrower denotation is ‘every coward is a rhetor, since Demosthenes is both a coward and a rhetor’. Not every rhetor, however, is a coward. For a coward is seldom also a rhetor. And again ‘every robber wanders by night’. A man wandering by night, however, is seldom also a robber. [And evidence is the statement ‘there where is fire, it is necessary to also be, or will be, or to have been ashes’; and ‘at that place where there are ashes, there either was, or is, or will be fire’. This is indeed coextensive.]

134 | Sectio XVIII, schol. 216–220

213. (70a6–7) 〈Σημεῖον – ἔνδοξος.〉 τὸ δὲ σημεῖον, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον λέγεται, πρότασίς ἐστι ἀποδεικτικὴ καὶ ἀναγκαία (τὸ ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘καὶ’ ληπτέον) καὶ ἔνδοξος τοῖς πᾶσι δοκοῦσα ἤ τισιν:– [(213–215) V || oD] 214. (70a7–9) Oὗ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ 〈οὗ〉 γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονεν τὸ πρᾶγμα· τὸ γέγονεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘γενήσεται’ ληπτέον:– [⇐ 213 || oD]

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215. (70a9) Τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι· ἢ γὰρ παρούσης τῆς φλογός ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον, ἤγουν ὁ καπνός· ἢ παρωχηκότος τοῦ πράγματος, ἤγουν τοῦ πυρός, ἐστὶ καὶ μένει τὸ σημεῖον, ἤγουν ἡ τέφρα· ἢ μέλλοντος γενέσθαι τοῦ πράγματος, ἤγουν τῆς νόσου, προηγεῖται τὸ σημεῖον, ἤγουν οἱ κόποι (‘αὐτόματοι γὰρ οἱ κόποι φράζουσι νόσους’ καθ’ Ἱπποκράτην)· καὶ τὸ γάλα σημεῖον ὂν τοῦ τίκτειν προηγεῖται τοῦ πράγματος:– [⇐ 213 || oD] XVIII Περὶ ἐνθυμήματος [oD]

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216. (70a10) 〈Ἐνθύμημα – ἀτελής.〉 τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστι ἀτελής· ὁ δὲ ἀτελὴς συλλογισμὸς ἢ δι’ ἀντιστροφῆς τελειοῦται ἢ διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς. κατ’ οὐδενὸς δὲ τούτων τὸ ἐνθύμημα λέγεται τελειοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς καταληφθείσης προτάσεως· ἢ γὰρ τὴν μείζονα ἐῶμεν ἢ τὴν ἐλάττονα, ὅθεν καὶ ἐνθύμημα λέγεται· ἐῶμεν γὰρ αὐτὴν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι· οἷον ‘ὁ δεῖνα καλλωπιστής, μοιχὸς ἄρα’· κατελήφθη ἡ ‘πᾶς καλλωπιστὴς μοιχὸς’ μείζων πρότασις· καὶ πάλιν ‘πᾶς ὁ τοῖς οἰκείοις πονηρὸς καὶ μισότεκνος οὐ καλός ἐστι, ὁ Δημοσθένης ἄρα οὐ καλός ἐστι’· λείπει ἡ ἐλάττων, ὅτι ‘ὁ Δημοσθένης πονηρὸς καὶ μισότεκνος’:– [oD] 217. (70a29–35) 〈Ὁ – λύσιμος.〉 ἀληθὲς μὲν συμπέρασμα συνάγομεν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς τοῖς γινομένοις διὰ σημείου, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι ἄλυτος, ὁ δὲ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ πρόχειροι εἰς ἀνασκευὴν διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν συγκεῖσθαι (τὸν δεύτερον), τὸν δὲ τρίτον ἐκ δύο μερικῶν:– [oD]

213. 1 lemma addidi 213. 2 καὶ … τὸ ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ ληπτέον καὶ Magent. : supra ἢ1 add. ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ Arist. (R) : ἢ … ἢ Arist. (nCHclT) : supra ἢ1 add. καὶ Arist. (C2 ) : ἢ1 om. Arist. (ABgu) : ἢ1 add. d s.l. : deest in Arist. (N) 213. 3 τοῖς πᾶσι correxi : ὡς πᾶσα V 214. 1 lemma οὗ addidi 216. 1 lemma addidi 216. 2 ἀτελὴς συλλογισμὸς Magent. : ante συλλογισμὸς add. ἀτελὴς Arist. (Β2 s.l.) : post συλλογισμὸς add. ἀτελὴς Arist. (n2 s.l.) : Arist. (C i.r.), cancell. Arist. (T) : συλλογισμὸς ἀτελὴς Arist. (Rcg) : συλλογισμὸς Arist. (nABdΗclu) : deest in Arist. (N) 216. 7 καὶ scripsi cum Sαβ : fortasse (καὶ) V 217. 1 lemma addidi 217. 1–2 πᾶσι scripsi : ἅπασι V 215. 5 cf. Hip. 2.5 215. 5–6 τὸ – τίκτειν ] cf. Anal. Pr. II, 26 70a12–13; Rhet. I, 2 1357b15–16; Anon. In Anal. Pr. II 188a21–23; schol. 94.7–9; 212.10–12; Pedias. I 85.9

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213. The sign, which is also called evidence, is a demonstrative premise both necessary and reputable by everyone or by some people (one should assume or in the place of ‘and’). 214. For whatever is such that if it is, a certain thing is, or if it came into being, then the matter in question would have come into being earlier or later. One should assume would have come into being in the place of ‘will come into being’. 215. This is the sign of having come or coming into being. For either when there is a fire, there is a sign, namely smoke. Or when the matter in question is over, namely the fire, its sign, namely the ashes, exists and remains. Or when a thing, namely sickness, is about to happen, its sign, namely fatigue, precedes the latter (‘for spontaneous fatigue indicates disease’ according to Hippocrates). And milk, since it is a sign of giving birth, precedes the matter in question. XVIII On Enthymeme 216. The enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism. And an imperfect syllogism is made perfect either by conversion, or by reduction to an impossibility. An enthymeme, however, is said to be made perfect not by means of the latter two, but by the addition of a repressed premise. For we dismiss either the major premise, or the minor, whence it is called an enthymeme, for we let the audience ponder on the repressed premise. E.g. ‘a certain man is a dandy, therefore he is an adulterer’; the major premise ‘every dandy is an adulterer’ was repressed. And again: ‘everyone who is knavish towards relatives and hates children is not good, Demosthenes therefore is not good’. The minor premise, that ‘Demosthenes is knavish towards relatives and hates children’, is omitted. 217. We draw a true conclusion in all syllogisms formed by a sign. These differ, however, because a syllogism in the first figure is irrefutable, whereas syllogisms in the second and in the third figure are easy to reject for the former kind (the second) is composed of two affirmative premises, while the third kind of syllogism is composed of particular premises.

136 | Sectio XIX, Schol. 221–227

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218. Εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι συλλογίζεται· οἷον ‘ὁ Περικλῆς ὅπλα κατασκευάζει, πᾶς μελετῶν τυραννῆσαι ὅπλα κατασκευάζει, ὁ Περικλῆς ἄρα τυραννῆσαι μελετᾷ’· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὗτος λύσιμος ὡς ἐκ δύο καταφατικῶν γενόμενος. εἰ δὲ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον, ἐν τρίτῳ· οἷον ‘ὁ Δημοσθένης ῥήτωρ, ὁ Δημοσθένης δειλός, πᾶς ἄρα ῥήτωρ δειλός’· καὶ οὗτος λύσιμος, διότι αἱ προτάσεις μερικαὶ καὶ καθόλου τὸ συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ ἐξισάζει τὸ σημεῖον τῷ σημειωτῷ, ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι συλλογίζεται· οἷον ‘ὡδὶ καπνός, ὅπου καπνὸς καὶ φλόξ, ὡδὶ ἄρα φλόξ’· οὗτος ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἄλυτός ἐστι:– [oD] 219. (70b1) 〈Τούτων – μέσον.〉 μέσον λέγει τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτου κατ’ εὐθεῖαν καὶ κυρίως μέσως τὸ μέσον κεῖσθαι:– [oD] 220. (70b3–4) 〈Τὰ – ἄκρων.〉 ἄκρα λέγει τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον σχῆμα διὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ μέσον εἰς ἄκρον κεῖσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ὑπέρκειται ἢ ὑπόκειται:– [oD] XIX Περὶ τοῦ φυσιογνωμονεῖν [oD]

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221. (70b7–9) 〈Τὸ – παθήματα.〉 ἐπεί τινες πίστιν καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ποιοῦνται φυσιογνωμοῦντες (οἷον σημείοις τισὶ κεχρημένοι), εἰκότως μετὰ τὸ σημεῖον διδάσκει περὶ τοῦ φυσιογνωμονεῖν. τρία δεῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τὸν φυσιογνωμονοῦντα· ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἕπεται καὶ συμμετατίθεται τοῖς πάθεσι τοῦ σώματος, καὶ αὖθις τὸ σῶμα τοῖς πάθεσι τῆς ψυχῆς· συμμεταμορφοῦται γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὀργῇ καὶ λύπῃ καὶ θυμῷ, ἃ πάθη ψυχῆς εἰσίν. οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσι τῆς ψυχῆς συμμεταμορφοῦται τὸ σῶμα· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς χωριστοῖς τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ· οἷον, ὅτε διανοεῖται ἢ τῷ Θεῷ συνάπτεται· αὗται γὰρ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῆς ψυχῆς χωρὶς σώματος γίνονται· ὧν γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι χω-

219. 1 lemma addidi 220. 1 lemma addidi 221. 1 lemma addidi

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218. If a sign has a wider denotation than what is signified, then one forms a syllogism in the second figure. E.g. ‘Pericles forges weapons, everyone attempting to become a tyrant forges weapons, therefore Pericles is attempting to become a tyrant’. And this syllogism is refutable since it is formed from two affirmative premises. And if a sign has a wider denotation than what is signified, then one forms a syllogism in the third figure. E.g. ‘Demosthenes is a rhetor, Demosthenes is a coward, therefore every rhetor is coward’; this syllogism is also refutable, because the premises are particular and the conclusion is universal. And if a sign is coextensive with what is signified, then one forms a syllogism in the first figure. E.g. ‘there is smoke; where there is smoke, there is fire; therefore there is a fire’. This syllogism is irrefutable. 219. He calls the first figure the middle term, for in this case the middle term is placed on a straight line and is exactly in the middle. 220. He calls the second and third figure the extreme terms, for in these cases the middle term is placed on an extremity. For the middle term is placed either above, or under the other two terms. XIX On Judging Characters from Physical Features 221. Since some people form their beliefs and demonstrations by judging a character from physical features (e.g. by having inquired of some signs), Aristotle reasonably teaches about character judging from physical features after the chapter on the sign. A man who judges characters from physical features must assume and grant three things. He must assume and grant that the soul follows and changes together with the affections of the body, and, in turn, that the body follows and changes together with the affections of the soul. For the body is transformed together with the latter by wrath and grief and anger, which are affections of the soul. The body, however, is not

138 | Sectio XIX, Schol. 221–227

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ρὶς σώματος, τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἤγουν ἀσώματος:– [(221–222) V || oD || U+] 222. (70b13) 〈Πάθος.〉 πάθη τοῦ σώματος ἴδια τὸ τέμνεσθαι, τὸ πάσχειν, τὸ καίεσθαι· τεμνομένου γὰρ ἢ καιομένου τοῦ σώματος ὀδυνᾶται καὶ ἡ ψυχή:– [oD || ⇐ 221] 223. (70b22) 〈Ἓν – ἦν.〉 ἓν δὲ σημεῖον ἑνὸς πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἑνὸς ἢ ἓν πολλῶν, εἰ μή τι διὰ μέσων εἴη πολλῶν· τοῦ γὰρ θυμοῦ πολλὰ σημεῖα· ἡ τοῦ σώματος ζέσις, ἡ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθρότης καὶ τῶν προσώπων:– [oD] 224. (70b23–26) 〈Καὶ – φυσιογνωμονεῖν.〉 τοῦ ἄφρονος σημεῖον τὸ μεγάλας ἔχειν κόρας, τῆς δειλίας τὸ τὰ βλέφαρα συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ὑποχαλᾶσθαι ταῖς κόραις, τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος τὸ χαροποὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, τῆς δὲ πανουργίας τὸ μικροὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ὦπας ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄφεως καὶ τῆς ἀλώπεκος:– [oD]

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225. (70b26–32) 〈Εἰ – ἀνδρίας.〉 εἰπὼν ὡς δεῖ παραβάλλειν πρὸς ἄλλο εἶδος (οἷον ‘ὁ μικροὺς ἔχων ὀφθαλμοὺς πανοῦργος’· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὄφις μικροὺς αὐτοὺς ἔχει), ἀπορεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν· ‘καὶ εἰ ἔστι τι εἶδος καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ὡς ὁ λέων, ἔχει δὲ καὶ δύο σημεῖα τούτων, οἷον ἀκρωτήρια μεγάλα καὶ γλαυκοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, πόθεν νοήσομεν ποίου πάθους θάτερόν ἐστι σημεῖον’; φησὶ γοῦν λύων τὸ ἄπορον ὅτι ‘λάβε ἄλλα εἴδη, ὧν θάτερον τὸ ἓν ἔχει τῶν δύο παθῶν, καὶ ἴδε ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ποῖον σημεῖον ἔχει τοῦ πάθους δηλωτικόν· οἷον “εὑρίσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἐλευθέριος καὶ ἔχει γλαυκοὺς ὀφθαλμούς”, καὶ πάλιν “εὑρίσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ἔχει μεγάλα ἀκρωτήρια”· καὶ εἰπὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λέοντος τοὺς μὲν γλαυκοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς σημεῖον τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα ἀκρωτήρια σημεῖον τῆς ἀνδρίας’:– [V ⇒ 227 || oD] 226. (70b26) 〈Γένος.〉 γένος δὲ ἄτομον λέγει τὸ εἶδος τὸ εἰδικώτατον ὡς μὴ δυνάμενον εἰς εἴδη τέμνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἰς μερικά:– [oD || = U] 227. (70b36–38) ᾯ δὲ 〈τὸ Β, τὸ Α παντὶ καὶ οὐ πλείοσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ δὲ μή,〉 οὐκ ἔσται· ἤγουν εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξισάζει τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β, οὐκ ἔσται φυσιογνωμονεῖν:– [V ⇒ 226 || oD || ⇐ 225]

222. 1 lemma addidi 222. 2 ὀδυνᾶται V p.c. : οὐ δύναται V a.c. 223. 1 lemma addidi 224. 1 lemma addidi 225. 1 lemma addidi 226. 1 lemma addidi δὲ om. U 227. 1–2 lemma τὸ1 – μή addidi 222. 1–2 τὸ τέμνεσθαι – καίεσθαι ] cf. Cat. 4, 2a4

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transformed together with the soul in all cases of the latter’s affections; for this never happens in the case of things separable from the body. E.g. when the soul contemplates or when it connects with God. For these actualities of the soul come about without a body. For the essence of these things, of which capacities and actualities exist without body, is separable from the body, namely incorporeal. 222. Peculiar affections of the body are being cut, suffering, being burnt. For if the body is cut or burnt, then the soul suffers too. 223. There is one sign of one affection, and not many signs of one affection, or one sign of many affections, unless something should be through many middle terms. For there are many signs of anger: body seething, redness of the eyes and the face. 224. The sign of a fool is to have big pupils. The sign of cowardice is to close the eyelids and to lower the eyes. The sign of generosity is to have flashing eyes. The sign of knavery is to have small eyes as in the cases of serpents and foxes. 225. After saying how one should compare one species with another (e.g. ‘a man who has small eyes is villainous’; for indeed a serpent has small eyes) he also wonders: ‘if there is some species both as generous and brave as the lion and it has two signs for these two, e.g. large extremities and gleaming eyes, how are we to understand which of the latter two is the sign for which affection’? While resolving this difficult issue, he says ‘assume different species, of which one has one of the two affections, and see which sign denotes an affection as regards this species. E.g. “a generous man is found and he has gleaming eyes” and again “a brave man is found and he has large extremities”. And label, also in the case of a lion, the gleaming eyes a sign of generosity and the large extremities a sign of bravery’. 226. He calls genus the lowest species, since it cannot be divided into species, but into particulars. 227. But A belongs to everything to which B belongs, and not to more, yet it converts; if it does not, however, then there will not be any single sign of any single thing. Or rather, if A and B are not convertible with one another, then there will not be any judging of characters from physical features.

Index nominum Ἀθῆναι, 204.5 Ἀθηναῖοι, 199.2 Αἰθίοψ, 118.6 Ἀλέξανδρος (Aphrodisiensis), 1.13 Ἀριστοτέλης, 1.22, 4.2, 4.5, 20.9, 24.9, 32.1, 70.10 Γεωμέτρης (= Εὐκλείδης), 97.1 Γοργίας, 157.3 Δημόκριτος, 211.33 Δημοσθένης, 212.15, 216.8–216.9, 218.5 Ζεύς, 157.5 Ζήνων, 119.3 Θηβαῖοι, 199.2

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Ἱπποκράτης (Chius), 204.3–204.4 Ἱπποκράτης (Cous), 215.5 Καλλικλῆς, 211.26 Κορίσκος, 154.8–154.9 Μαρῖνος, 1.8 Μένων, 152.1, 157.2, 157.5, 157.8, 157.11, 157.31 Περικλῆς, 218.2–218.3 Πλάτων, 157.1, 211.34 Πρόκλος, 1.2 Σωκράτης, 153.2, 157.2, 157.5–157.7, 157.10, 157.30 Φωκεῖς, 199.3

Index verborum ἀληθῶς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός ἀντιστροφή, 3.18, 3.22, 3.24, 3.27, 3.32, 4.8, 4.11, 5.9, 7.3, 32.29, 34.11–34.12, 43.5–43.6, 45.4, 45.13, 46.5, 49.1, 49.7, 49.12–49.14, 49.17, 59.6, 63.2, 65.1, 65.3, 65.7, 78.1, 166.1, 167.1–167.2, 169.6, 169.11, 209.3, 216.2 ἀξιόπιστον, 209.2 ἀπαγωγή, vid. συλλογισμός ἀπάτη, 134.2, 135.2, 153.19, 154.3, 154.18, 156.3, 156.5, 156.7 ἀποδεικτική, vid. μέθοδος ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός ἀπόδειξις, vid. συλλογισμός ἄπορον, 204.7, 225.6 ἄτοπον, 30.13–30.14, 70.4, 112.25, 112.30, 117.2, 117.5, 120.3, 134.25, 179.9, 179.12, 181.10, 184.11 γένος, 22.1, 23.1–23.2, 80.2, 88.2, 94.1, 94.12–94.15, 100.2, 206.5, 207.3, 226.1 γυμνασία, 21.4 δεῖξις, vid. συλλογισμός διάλληλος δεῖξις, vid. συλλογισμός διαλεκτική, vid. μέθοδος διαλεκτικός, 1.11, 2.7 διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός εἶδος, 2.20, 27.14–27.15, 94.13, 94.15, 225.1, 225.3, 225.6, 226.2 – εἰδικώτατον, 22.2, 23.2, 226.1 – ὑπ’ ἄλληλον, 22.1–22.2 εἶδος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, vid. συλλογισμός εἰκός, 212.1, 212.3, 212.8 ἔλεγχος, 89.1, 90.1, 131.1, 131.4, 131.6–131.8, 132.2, 132.4 ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι, 1.10, 1.19, 93.1, 94.1, 94.11–94.12, 97.8, 100.2, 100.5, 101.2, 102.1, 102.10, 103.3–103.5, 103.7, 103.10–103.13, 103.15, 105.1, 106.2, 111.1, 111.5–111.6 ἔνστασις (term. log.), 205.2, 205.5, 211.1 ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός ἐπαγωγή, vid. συλλογισμός θεώρημα, 135.1, 152.2, 153.5, 157.11, 157.31, 165.1, 166.1, 181.1, 182.1, 183.1, 186.1–186.3 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-003

κατασυλλογίζεσθαι, 127.1 κατηγορία, 34.5, 140.2 κατηγορικὸς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός κρύψις, 201.11 κύκλῳ δεῖξις, vid. συλλογισμός μέθοδος, 1.7, 3.9–3.10, 3.14, 127.4, 128.1, 131.2, 188.1 – ἀποδεικτική, 1.13 – διαλεκτική, 1.9, 1.13, 135.2 – σοφιστική, 2.9, 135.2 – συλλογιστική, 1.15–1.16, 2.2 μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο, 112.1, 112.6, 112.12, 112.14, 112.19, 112.22–112.24, 113.3, 115.2, 115.4, 115.9, 115.12, 117.2–117.4, 121.7, 123.5 ὁρισμός, 15.1, 15.8, 158.3–158.4, 159.1–159.4, 160.3, 160.5, 161.2, 164.2–164.3, 164.5–164.7, 164.10 ὁριστόν, 160.3–160.5

παράδειγμα (term. log.), 187.3, 195.1, 198.5, 200.3, 212.9, 212.14 παραλογισμός, 85.1, 86.1, 89.1 Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν, 3.13, 134.1 Περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων, 1.7, 3.7, 3.8, 187.1 πίστις, 187.3, 196.1, 221.1 πόρισμα, 186.3 πρόβλημα, 2.15, 3.10–3.11, 65.2, 65.8, 65.9, 65.15–65.16, 70.11–70.13, 72.7, 76.1, 85.4, 100.4, 128.3, 201.2 πρόσληψις, vid. συλλογισμός προσυλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός σημεῖον (term. log.), 1.20, 186.4, 186.6, 212.1, 212.3–212.7, 213.1, 215.1–215.5, 217.2, 218.1, 218.7, 221.2, 223.1–223.2, 224.1, 225.4–225.7, 225.10–225.11 σημειωτόν, 212.8, 218.7 σόφισμα, 134.18 σοφιστής, 2.9 σοφιστική, vid. μέθοδος σοφιστικὸς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός συζυγία; συμπλοκή, 81.4 – ἀσυλλόγιστος, 81.10, 94.4 – συλλογιστική, 81.7

144 | Index verborum

συλλογισμός – ἀληθῶς, 14.5 – ἄλυτος, 217.3 – ἀπαγωγή, 201.1, 201.3, 201.6, 201.14, 205.1, 205.4 – ἀποδεικτικός; ἀπόδειξις; ἀπόδειξις δεικτική; δεικνύειν δεικτικῶς; δεικτικός σ.; δεῖξις δεικτική; σ. τοῦ ‘διότι’, 1.18, 1.24, 2.3–2.4, 2.28, 14.3, 16.2, 32.4–32.5, 32.23–32.25, 32.28, 33.9, 35.7, 36.1–36.2, 37.2, 39.10, 45.4, 73.3, 74.3, 75.4–75.5, 76.2–76.3, 79.1, 93.3, 100.4–100.6, 102.2, 104.2, 111.1, 112.4, 115.1, 115.8–115.10, 178.4, 183.5, 193.2, 201.8, 201.14 – ἀτελής, 216.1 – διαλεκτικός, 2.3, 2.30 – διάλληλος δεῖξις, 32.12, 32.14 – εἶδος τοῦ σ., 1.3, 2.3 – εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον, 65.1, 65.7, 65.21, 66.2–66.3, 70.2, 70.11, 72.5, 73.3, 74.2, 75.2, 75.4, 76.2, 112.5–112.6, 112.11–112.12, 112.17–112.18, 112.21, 113.2, 113.5–113.6, 115.4, 116.1–116.3, 117.1, 180.1 – ἐπ’ εὐθείας, 112.4, 112.7, 115.2, 115.7 – ἐπαγωγή, 1.10, 1.19, 153.1, 187.3, 192.1, 193.3, 194.4, 198.1, 200.2 – κατηγορικός, 109.2, 116.2–116.3, 211.2 – κύκλῳ δεῖξις, 1.19, 32.4, 32.6, 32.8, 32.12–32.13, 32.18, 33.9, 33.11, 35.2, 35.4–35.6, 35.10, 36.2, 39.2, 41.1, 42.4,

42.6, 42.15–42.16, 45.5, 45.12, 48.1, 49.7–49.8, 49.11, 49.15, 103.3–103.6, 103.11, 103.13, 167.6 – ἀληθής / ψευδής, 32.15 – ἀτελής, 46.4 – λύσιμος, 218.4, 218.6 – πρόσληψις, 39.2, 39.5, 39.8, 42.8, 42.11–42.12, 44.8, 45.13 – προσυλλογισμός, 127.6, 129.2–129.3, 130.3, 201.3, 205.4 – σοφιστικός, 2.4, 2.33 – τοῦ ‘ὅτι’, 15.2, 33.7 – ὕλη τοῦ σ., 1.6 – ὑποθετικός, 211.2–211.3 – ψευδής, 126.1 συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ‘διότι’, vid. συλλογισμός συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ‘ὅτι’, vid. συλλογισμός συμπλοκή, vid. συζυγία σύστοιχος, 140.1 τεκμήριον, 1.20, 212.3–212.5, 212.17, 213.1 ὕλη, 70.9 – ἀναγκαία καὶ ἀδύνατος, 21.5 – ἐνδεχομένη, 26.3, 44.6, 58.2, 65.19–65.20, 70.7–70.8 – τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, vid. συλλογισμός ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλον εἶδος, vid. εἶδος ὑποθετικὸς συλλογισμός, vid. συλλογισμός ὑπόληψις, 135.2, 142.11, 153.23, 153.25, 156.1, 162.4, 162.7 φυσιογνωμονεῖν, 221.3, 227.3 φυσιογνώμων, 221.2, 221.3

Glossarium terminorum technicorum Graeco-Anglicum ἀγνοεῖν: to not know, to be ignorant ἄδηλος: uncertain ἀδύνατον: impossibility ἀδύνατος: impossible αἰτιατόν: effect αἴτιον: cause ἄκρον: extreme ἀληθής: true ἄλυτος: irrefutable ἀναγκαῖος: necessary ἀνάγκη: necessity ἀναιρεῖν: to reject ἀναπόδεικτος: undemonstrated ἀνασκευάζειν: to establish ἀντεστραμμένως: inversely ἀντικείμενον: opposed, opposite ἀντικειμένως: oppositely ἀντικεῖσθαι: to be opposed ἀντιστρέφειν: to convert ἀντιστρέφον: convertible ἀντιστροφή: conversion ἀντιστρόφως: conversely ἀντίφασις: contradiction ἀντιφατικῶς: contradictorily, contradictory ἀξιόπιστον: credible ἀξίωμα: axiom ἀπαγωγή: reduction ἀπατᾶν: to deceive ἀπατᾶσθαι: to be deceived, to be incorrect, to make an error ἀπάτη: error ἀποδεδειγμένος: demonstrated ἀποδεικτικός: demonstrative ἀποδεικτικός: demonstrator ἀπόδειξις: demonstration ἀπόφασις: denial ἀποφάσκειν: to deny ἀποφατικός: negative ἀσαφής: uncertain ἀσυλλόγιστος: non-syllogistic ἀσυλλογίστως: non-syllogistically ἀσυνάρτητος: incoherent ἀτελής: incomplete ἄτοπον: absurdity https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-004

ἄτοπος: absurd γένος: genus δεικνύειν: to prove, to show δείκνυσθαι: to be proved δεικτικός: ostensive δεικτικῶς: ostensively δεῖξις: proof διαλεκτική: dialectical reasoning διαλεκτικός: dialectical, dialectician ‘διότι’: ‘reason why’ δόξα: opinion δοξάζειν: to hold an opinion δυνατός: possible εἰδικώτατον (εἶδος): narrowest (species) εἶδος: kind, species εἰκός: probability εἰσάγειν: to introduce ἐλάττων: minor ἐλέγχεσθαι: to be refuted ἔλεγχος: refutation ἐναντίος: contrary ἐναντίως: contrariwise ἐνδέχεσθαι: to be possible ἐνδεχόμενος: contingent ἐνθύμημα: enthememe ἔνστασις: objection ἕξις: possession ἐξισάζειν: to be coextensive ἐξισάζων: coextensive ἔξωθεν: from outside ἐπάγειν: to induce ἐπαγωγή: induction ἐπιστήμη: science ἑπόμενον: consequent ἡγούμενον: antecedant θεώρημα: theorem ἰσοδυναμεῖν: to be equivalent καθόλου: universal κατασκευάζειν: to refute κατασυλλογίζεσθαι: to be defeated with a syllogism κατάφασις: affirmation καταφατικός: affirmative κατηγορία: predication

146 | Glossarium terminorum technicorum

κατηγορικός: categorical, positive κατηγορούμενον: predicate κύκλῳ δεῖξις: circular proof λαμβάνειν: to assume, to employ, to receive, to take λῆψις: assumption λόγος: argument λύσιμος: easy to reject λύσις: resolution μέθοδος: method μείζων: major μερικός: particular μέσος: middle μετατιθέναι: to interchange μὴ ἀντιστρέφον: non-convertible ὁρισμός: definition ὁριστόν: definable ὅρος: term ‘ὅτι’: ‘fact’ παραλογισμός: fallacy παρεμποδίζειν: to impede περαίνεσθαι: to be concluded περιεχόμενον: subordinated περιοχή: content πιθανός: plausible πίστις: belief, persuasion πρόβλημα: thesis προκείμενον: proposed πρός τι: relative πρόσληψις: additional assumption προσυλλογισμός: preliminary syllogism πρότασις: premise σημεῖον: sign, geometric point σκοπός: aim σόφισμα: sophism σοφιστής: sophist σοφιστική: sophistry

σοφιστικός: sophistical στέρησις: privation στερητικός: privative συγχωρεῖν: to grant συζυγία: combination συλλογίζεσθαι: to form a syllogism, to infer συλλογισμός: syllogism, inference συλλογιστικός: syllogistic συμπεραίνειν: to conclude συμπέρασμα: conclusion συμπλεκόμενος: conjoined συμπλοκή: conjunction συνάγειν συμπέρασμα: to draw a conclusion συνάγειν: to bring together, to infer συναληθεύειν: to be simultaneouly true σύστοιχον: in the same series (of predication) σχῆμα: figure ταὐτός: identical τεκμήριον: evidence τέλος: end τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι: begging the point at issue τὸ ἐξ ἀλλήλων δείκνυσθαι: reciprocal proof τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι: failure to demonstrate τὸ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο: ‘this is not the reason why’ ὑπ’ ἄλληλον: subordinate ὑπόθεσις: assumption ὑποθετικός: hypothetical ὑποκείμενον: subject ὑπολαμβάνειν: to believe, to suppose ὑπόληψις: belief ὑποτιθέναι: to assume φάσις: assertion φυσιογνωμονεῖν: to judge characters from physical features ψευδής: false ψεῦδος: falsehood ψευδῶς: falsely, mistakenly

Anglo-Graecum absurd (adj.): ἄτοπος absurdity: ἄτοπον additional assumption: πρόσληψις affirmation: κατάφασις affirmative: καταφατικός aim (n.): σκοπός antecedant (n.): ἡγούμενον

argument (n.): λόγος assertion: φάσις assume: λαμβάνειν, ὑποτιθέναι assumption: λῆψις, ὑπόθεσις axiom: ἀξίωμα begging the point at issue (n.): τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι

Glossarium terminorum technicorum |

belief: πίστις, ὑπόληψις believe: ὑπολαμβάνειν bring together: συνάγειν cause (n.): αἴτιον circular proof: κύκλῳ δεῖξις coextensive, be (vb.): ἐξισάζειν coextensive: ἐξισάζων combination: συζυγία conclude: συμπεραίνειν concluded, be (vb.): περαίνεσθαι conclusion: συμπέρασμα conjoined (adj.): συμπλεκόμενος conjunction: συμπλοκή consequent (n.): ἑπόμενον content (n.): περιοχή contingent (adj.): ἐνδεχόμενος contradiction: ἀντίφασις contradictorily, contradictory (adj.): ἀντιφατικῶς contrariwise: ἐναντίως contrary (adj., n.): ἐναντίος conversely: ἀντιστρόφως conversion: ἀντιστροφή convert (vb.): ἀντιστρέφειν convertible (adj., n.): ἀντιστρέφον credible (adj.): ἀξιόπιστον deceive: ἀπατᾶν deceived, be (v.): ἀπατᾶσθαι defeated with a syllogism, be (vb.): κατασυλλογίζεσθαι definable: ὁριστόν definition: ὁρισμός demonstrated (adj.): ἀποδεδειγμένος demonstration: ἀπόδειξις demonstrative: ἀποδεικτικός demonstrator: ἀποδεικτικός denial: ἀπόφασις deny (vb.): ἀποφάσκειν dialectical (adj.): διαλεκτικός dialectical reasoning (n.): διαλεκτική dialectician: διαλεκτικός draw a conclusion: συνάγειν συμπέρασμα easy to reject: λύσιμος effect (n.): αἰτιατόν employ (vb.): λαμβάνειν end (n.): τέλος enthememe: ἐνθύμημα equivalent, be (vb.): ἰσοδυναμεῖν error (n.): ἀπάτη establish: ἀνασκευάζειν

147

evidence (vb.): τεκμήριον extreme (adj., n.): ἄκρον ‘fact’: ὅτι failure to demonstrate: τὸ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι fallacy: παραλογισμός false (adj.): ψευδής falsehood: ψεῦδος falsely: ψευδῶς figure: σχῆμα form a syllogism: συλλογίζεσθαι from outside (adv.): ἔξωθεν genus: γένος geometric point: σημεῖον grant (vb.): συγχωρεῖν hold an opinion: δοξάζειν hypothetical: ὑποθετικός identical (adj.): ταὐτός ignorant, be (vb.): ἀγνοεῖν impede (vb.): παρεμποδίζειν impossibility: ἀδύνατον impossible (adj.): ἀδύνατος in the same series (of predication): σύστοιχον incoherent (adj.): ἀσυνάρτητος incomplete (adj.): ἀτελής incorrect, be (v.): ἀπατᾶσθαι induce: ἐπάγειν induction: ἐπαγωγή infer: συλλογίζεσθαι, συνάγειν inference: συλλογισμός interchange (vb.): μετατιθέναι introduce: εἰσάγειν inversely: ἀντεστραμμένως irrefutable: ἄλυτος judge characters from physical features: φυσιογνωμονεῖν kind (n.): εἶδος major (adj., n.): μείζων make an error: ἀπατᾶσθαι method (n.): μέθοδος middle (adj., n.): μέσος minor (adj., n.): ἐλάττων mistakenly: ψευδῶς narrowest (species): εἰδικώτατον (εἶδος) necessary (adj.): ἀναγκαῖος necessity: ἀνάγκη negative (adj.): αποφατικός non-convertible (adj. n.): μὴ ἀντιστρέφον non-syllogistic (adj.): ἀσυλλόγιστος non-syllogistically: ἀσυλλογίστως

148 | Glossarium terminorum technicorum

not know (vb.): ἀγνοεῖν objection: ἔνστασις opinion (vb.): δόξα opposed (adj.): ἀντικείμενον opposed, be (vb.): ἀντικεῖσθαι opposite (adj.): ἀντικείμενον oppositely: ἀντικειμένως ostensive: δεικτικός ostensively: δεικτικῶς particular (adj., n.): μερικός persuasion: πίστις plausible (adj.): πιθανός positive (adj.): κατηγορικός possession: ἕξις possible (adj.): δυνατός possible, be (vb.): ἐνδέχεσθαι predicate (n.): κατηγορούμενον predication: κατηγορία preliminary syllogism: προσυλλογισμός premise (n.): πρότασις privation: στέρησις privative (adj.): στερητικός probability: εἰκός proof (n.): δεῖξις proposed (adj.): προκείμενον prove (vb.): δεικνύειν proved, be (vb.): δείκνυσθαι ‘reason why’ (n.): ‘διότι’ receive (vb.): λαμβάνειν reciprocal proof: τὸ ἐξ ἀλλήλων δείκνυσθαι reduction: ἀπαγωγή

refutation: ἔλεγχος refute (vb.): κατασκευάζειν refuted, be (vb.): ἐλέγχεσθαι reject (vb.): ἀναιρεῖν relative: πρός τι resolution: λύσις science: ἐπιστήμη show (vb.): δεικνύειν sign (n.): σημεῖον simultaneouly true, be (vb.): συναληθεύειν sophism: σόφισμα sophist: σοφιστής sophistical: σοφιστικός sophistry: σοφιστική species: εἶδος subject (n.): ὑποκείμενον subordinate (adj., n.): ὑπ’ ἄλληλον subordinated (adj., n.): περιεχόμενον suppose: ὑπολαμβάνειν syllogism: συλλογισμός syllogistic (adj.): συλλογιστικός take (vb.): λαμβάνειν term (n.): ὅρος theorem: θεώρημα thesis: πρόβλημα ‘this is not the reason why’ (n.): τὸ μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο true (adj.): ἀληθής uncertain (adj.): ἄδηλος, ἀσαφής undemonstrated: ἀναπόδεικτος universal (adj., n.): καθόλου

Index locorum ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS – In Anal. Pr. I – 43.19–22: 197.2 – 46.5–6: 34.12–34.13 – In Top. I – 16.10–12: 94.6 – In Top. II – 135.8–9: 211.15 – In Top. XVIII – 530.7–9: 211.26–211.28 ANON. (Appendix D.I) – Prooemium ad Anal. Pr. II: 1.8–1.11, 1.13–1.15 ANON. (Appendix D.II) – Prooemium ad Anal. Pr. II: 1.17–1.18 ANON. (Appendix D.III) – Prooemium ad Anal. Pr. II: 1.13–1.15, 1.24 ANON. (Brandisii) – In Anal. Pr. II – 188a21–23: 94.7, 212.10–212.12, 215.5–215.6 ANON. (CAG 21.1) – In Anal. Post. I – xiii.19–xiv.12: 157.1–157.32 ARISTOTELES – Anal. Pr. I – 25a25–26: 49.5 – 42b5: 127.6 – 44a22–23: 127.6 – 44b6–24: 3.6 – 46b40–46: 3.13 – 47b38–48a28: 134.1–134.2 – 51b5: 3.13 – Anal. Pr. II – 53b31–32: 49.5–49.6 – 57b32: 32.15 – 57b34–35: 35.16 – 59b1: 167.2 – 62b37: 73.1 – 64b25: 91.2 – 65a27: 105.3 – 65b15: 118.3 – 65b17: 119.2 – 66a35–36: 127.6 – 66b37: 144.1–144.2 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-005

– 66b39–40: 144.1 – 67a7: 149.1 – 68a21: 182.8 – 68b4, 5: 186.2 – 68b39–40: 195.3 – 68b41–69a10: 199.2 – 69b19, 20: 206.1 – 69b22: 206.3–206.4 – 69b28: 206.14–206.15 – 70a10: 216.2 – 70a12–13: 94.7, 212.10–212.12, 215.5–215.6 – Cael. I – 280a28–30: 179.11 – Cat. – 2a4: 222.1–222.2 – 6b29–30: 49.2–49.4 – EN VI – 1142a12–13: 24.10 – Metaph. IV – 1021a23–24: 49.3–49.4 – Phys. VI – 239a23–26: 112.26–112.30 – Rhet. I – 1357b15–16: 94.7, 212.10–212.12, 215.5–215.6 – Soph. El. – 168a37: 90.1 – Top. II – 114b14–15: 211.15 – Top. IV – 121b3–4: 94.12 – Top. VI – 148b8: 127.6 – Top. VIII – 156a7–8: 127.6 EUCLIDES – Elementa I – Def. 23: 98.1–98.3 – Dem. 28–29: 97.1–97.4 HIPPOCRATES – Aphorismi – 2.5: 215.5

150 | Index locorum

IAMBLICHUS – Theologoumena arithmeticae – 1.1–8: 86.4–86.5 JOANNES ITALUS – Quaestiones quodlibetales – λ΄.13–16: 34.12–34.13 JOANNES PEDIASIMUS – In Anal. Pr. II – 80.8–20: 119.3–119.6 – 85.9: 94.7, 212.10–212.12, 215.5–215.6 JOANNES PHILOPONUS – In Anal. Post. I – 12.6–8: 157.30–157.32 – 14.9–12: 157.30–157.32 – 14.12–16.25: 157.1–157.32 – 14.23–24: 152.2 – 15.16–18: 151.1–151.5 – 168.26–28: 94.7, 96.1–96.4 – In Anal. Pr. I – 1.19–2.24: 2.17–2.34 – 3.23–25: 2.36–2.40 – 42.17–19, 22–23: 34.12–34.13 – 65.20–22: 2.11–2.16 – 246.16–18: 116.1–116.3 – 378.26: 127.6 – 379.8: 127.6 – 380.1: 127.6 – In Phys. II – 31.3–9: 204.3–204.7 LEO MAGENTINUS – In Soph. El. – δ΄.24–25: 14.5

– 280.12–20: 1.20–1.24 – In Top. II – 112.75–113.102: 1.20–1.24 LEO MAGENTINUS (?) – Prooemium ad Anal. Pr. I: 2.2–2.10, 2.11–2.16, 2.17–2.34 MARINUS – Prooemium ad Anal. Pr. II: 1.8–1.11 OLYMPIODORUS – Prolegom. – 8.21–27: 1.20–1.22 PLATO – Meno – 70A, 71D–E, 72C, 74A, 80D, 81D, 82A, 84D: 157.1–157.33 – 85B: 152.1 PS.-JOANNES PHILOPONUS – In Anal. Pr. II – 387.6–7: 1.13–1.15 – 387.8–11: 1.2–1.6 – 391.26–392.14: 14.1–14.14 – 392.20–28: 16.1–16.14 – 458.5–8: 119.3–119.6 – 472.5 sqq.: 186.6 – 476.17–22: 201.14–201.16 SCHOLIA IN LUCIANUM – 130.4–131.2: 134.8–134.31 SIMPLICIUS – In Cael. – 304.3: 179.11

| Part III: Appendices

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD) diagr. 1 Α

B

Γ οὐδ

τ οὐ π

diagr. 2 ἄνθρωπος

ζῷον οὐ π π

diagr. 3 οὐσία Α

ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικόν λογικόν¹ ἄνθρωπος Γ Ε Β Δ π

π π

π π

π π

λογικόν

1 ζῷον V : om. D https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-006

π π

154 | A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 4

οὐδ

π

μαγνῆτις Δ

λίθος Β

αἰσθητικόν ἀναίσθητον ἀψυχον Α Γ Ε π

π

οὐδ οὐδ οὐδ diagr. 5 οὐδ

π

ζῷον²

λίθος

οὐδ

B ἄψυχον

π

οὐδ

π

οὐδ

αD ζῷον D σωκράτης D γεωμέτρης D

Γ ἄνθρωπος⁴ γραμματικός⁵ Δ

ἄνθρωπος οὐδ Γ

B

2 3 4 5

Ε λογικόν

Α³

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 6 Β ζῷον Γ ἄνθρωπος

A οὐσία π

π π

diagr. 7; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5, 58a3–4 γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης Β

Α

Γ π

π π

diagr. 8; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5, 58a10–12

Γ

Β⁶

νοῦ καὶ⁷ ἐπιστήμης Α

π

π π

diagr. 9; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5, 58a22-23

λίθος

νοῦ καὶ⁸ ἐπιστήμης ἄνθρωπος A Β Γ⁹ οὐδ

π οὐδ

6 7 8 9

Β ut vid. D νοῦ καὶ ut vid. D νοῦ καὶ ut vid. D Γ ut vid. D

| 155

156 | A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 10; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5; 58a25–30 νοῦ¹⁰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης λίθος Β Α οὐδ

ἄνθρωπος Γ οὐδ

diagr. 11; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5; 58a30–32 λίθος Α

ἀνθρωπος νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης Γ Β οὐδ

π οὐδ

diagr. 12; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5; 58b37–38 […] νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης Γ Β

[…] A π

π π

10 νοῦ ut vid. D

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 13 οὐδ

λίθος

γελαστικόν Α

ἄνθρωπος

π

οὐδ

B

Γ

οὐδ

diagr. 14* V γελαστικόν Α π

οὐδ B λίθος Β

ὁ Α΄ τρόπος του δευτέρου σχήματος

Γ γελαστικόν Γ οὐδ

ἄνθρωπος Α π

οὐδ οὐδ

| 157

158 | A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

D ἄνθρωπος

π

οὐδ λίθος

γελαστικόν

οὐδ

λίθος Β

γελαστικόν Γ οὐδ

ἄνθρωπος Α π

οὐδ οὐδ diagr. 15 Β τ

οὐδ οὐ π Α

Γ

diagr. 16* λίθος Α τ

οὐδ B γελαστικόν

οὐ π

Γ λίθος

λίθος

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

| 159

diagr. 17 […]

[…]

[…]

π

diagr. 18 ζῷον Α οὐ π

π λογικόν Β

Γ ἄνθρωπος

οὐ π

diagr. 19* ἀντικείμενα

πρός τι

στέρησιν

ἕξιν

ἐναντία

καταφάσιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν

diagr. 20 ἐπιστήμη Α

ἀρετή Β π

ἀνδρεία Γ π

160 | A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 21* Ε Α

Β

Γ

Δ Ζ

diagr. 22*

αἱ εὐθεῖαι παράλληλοί εἰσίν

αἱ ἐναλλὰξ γωνίαι ἶσαι ἀλλήλαις¹¹

Α

Β

αἱ¹² ἐντὸς καὶ αἱ¹³ εὐθεῖαι ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ παράλληλοι μέρη δυσὶν εἰσίν ὀρθαῖς ἶσαι Γ Α

diagr. 23* ζῷον

11 διὰ τὸ τὰς εὐθείας ἐναλλὰξ […] D 12 διότι αἱ D 13 διότι αἱ D

γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 24; cf. p. 415.17–18 γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος

ἄψυχον Α

Β οὐδ

Γ π

οὐδ diagr. 25; cf. Ps.-Philop. p. 415.18 ἀγαθόν

γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος

Α

Β π

Γ π

π diagr. 26 ἀγαθόν

ἐφετόν

ἡδονή

Α

Β

Γ

τὸ ταὐτὸν κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ diagr. 27

τ ζῷον π Α

π ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν π Β Γ

π π

|

161

162 | A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 28* οὐσία Α

ἔμψυχον

ζῷον

ἄνθρωπος

Β

Γ

Δ

diagr. 29* παντὸς τριγώνου αἱ τρεῖς γωνίαι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἶσαι εἰσίν δύο ὀρθαί τρίγωνον αἰσθητὸν τρίγωνον Α Β Γ

ὥστε ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς καθόλου, ἐπεὶ μὲν οἶδεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τρίγωνον ἔχει τὰς δύο ὀρθάς· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τριγώνου διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν εἰ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν ἀπό diagr. 30*; cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. comm.: CAG XIII 3, p. 15 Η

Α

Γ

Θ

Β

Δ

Ι

Ζ

Ε

A Diagrams Attached to Leon Magentenos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 31*; cf. Philop. In Anal. Post. 15 Θ

Η

Α

Ι

Β

Γ

Δ

Ζ

Ε

diagr. 32* ὑγεία Α

νόσος Β

πλοῦτος Δ

πενία Γ

diagr. 33*

κακόν Α

Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Θηβαίους πρὸς Θηβαίους πρὸς Φωκεῖς ὁμόρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον πόλεμον πόλεμον Β Γ Δ

Θηβαίους πρὸς Φωκεῖς

|

163

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD) diagr. 1; cf. Cat. 8, 8b25–29; diagr. Magent. 3–4 οὐσία Α

ποιότης Γ π

διάθεσις Ε π

π

π

ἐπιστήμη Δ

ἕξις Β π

π π π

diagr. 2*; cf. Anal. Pr. I 45, 50b18–20 ἄνθρωπος Α

π Β

ὁ δεύτερος τρόπος του δευτέρου σχήματος οὐδ Γ ζῷον

οὐδ

diagr. 3*; cf. Anal. Pr. I 45, 50b18–20 γελαστικόν Α

π ἄνθρωπος Β

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-007

οὐδ

οὐδ

Γ ζῷον

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 4; cf. Anal. Pr. I 45, 50b20–21 ἄνθρωπος¹ Α

π

οὐδ

γελαστικόν Β

Γ λίθος

οὐδ

diagr. 5; cf. Anal. Pr. II 1, 53a34–40 ζῷον

ἄνθρωπος

ἔμψυχον

Α

Β

Γ τ

π τ diagr. 6; Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b30–36 ζῷον

λίθος

ἄνθρωπος

Α

Β

Γ

οὐδ π

π οὐδ

πάντη ἀληθής οὐδ π

1 γελαστικόν D

| 165

166 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 7; Anal. Pr. II 2, 53b36–54a1 πάντη ψευδής

πάντη ψευδής

ζῷον

ἄνθρωπος

λίθος

Α

Β

Γ

οὐ π οὐδ

π οὐδ

οὐδενὶ ἀληθές

π πάντη ψευδής diagr. 8; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a1–2 ψευδής

ἐπί τι ψευδής

ἄνθρωπος λευκόν Β Γ π οὐδ π

Α

π πάντη ἀληθής diagr. 9; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a6–11 πάντη ψευδής

πάντη ἀληθής

ζῷον Α

ἄνθρωπος

Β οὐδ π

Γ π

π πάντη ψευδής

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 10; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a11–15 ψευδής πάντη

πάντη ἀληθής

ἔμψυχον

ζῷον

ἄνθρωπος

Α

Β

Γ

π οὐδ

π οὐδ π

diagr. 11; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a19–23 ἐπί τι ψευδής ζῷον

κύκνος

λευκόν Β

Α π

Γ π

π

diagr. 12; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a26–28 ἐπί τι ψευδής ζῷον

χιών

λευκόν Β

Α οὐδ

Γ π

οὐδ

| 167

168 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 13; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a28–35 πάντη ψευδής

πάντη ἀληθής ζῷον

ἄνθρωπος

ἵππος

Α

Β

Γ

π

π π

diagr. 14; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54a35–b2 πάντη ψευδής

πάντη ἀληθής ζῷον

μουσικόν

Α

Β

ἰατρικόν Γ

οὐδ

π οὐδ

πάντη ἀληθής diagr. 15; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54b1–9 πάντη ἀληθής

ἐπί τι ψευδής

ζῷον ἄνθρωπος εἶδος πεζόν Α

Β π

Γ π

π

λογικὸν διαφόρως

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 16; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54b9–16 ἀληθής πάντη

ἐπί τι ψευδής

φρόνησις θεωρητικὴ ἕξις

ζῷον Α

Β

Γ

οὐδ

π οὐδ

πάντη ἀληθής diagr. 17; Anal. Pr. II 2, 54b21–27 πάντη ψευδής

ἀληθής

ζῷον

χιών

Α

Β π οὐδ

λευκόν Γ τ

τ ἀληθής diagr. 18*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a6–10 ζῷον Α

π κύκνος τ μέλαν οὐδ Β Γ

τ

diagr. 19*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a14–18 ζῷον οὐδ ἀριθμός τ λευκόν οὐδ Α Β Γ

οὐ π

| 169

170 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 20*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a20–26 ζῷον Α

π λευκόν τ μέλαν οὐδ τ Β Γ

τ

diagr. 21*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a26–28 ζῷον οὐδ λευκόν τ μέλαν οὐδ τ Α Β Γ

οὐ π

diagr. 22*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a32–35 ζῷον Α

π ἀριθμός τ λευκόν οὐδ οὐδ Β Γ

τ

diagr. 23*; Anal. Pr. II 2, 55a38–b1 ζῷον οὐδ κύκνος τ μέλαν οὐδ π Α Β Γ

οὐ π

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 24*; Anal. Pr. II 3, 55b17–23 ζῷον Α οὐδ π ἄνθρωπος Β

π Γ

οὐδ

ἵππος

diagr. 25*; Anal. Pr. II 3, 55b17–23 Α π Β

οὐδ Γ

οὐδ

diagr. 26*; Anal. Pr. II 3, 55b24–29 ζῷον Α οὐδ τι λευκόν

Β

π Γ

οὐδ

diagr. 27; Anal. Pr. II 5, 58a22–23 λίθος Α

οὐδ

γελαστικόν Β

π

οὐδ

Γ ἄνθρωπος

κόραξ

| 171

172 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 28; cf. Anal. Pr. II 5, 58a23–32

λίθος

γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος

Α

Β οὐδ

Γ οὐδ

π

diagr. 29*; Anal. Pr. II 5, 58b2–6 τ

γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος A B

λευκόν Γ τ

π τ diagr. 30; cf. Anal. Pr. II 6, 58b30–31 ἄνθρωπος Α

π γελαστικόν Β

οὐ π

οὐ π

Γ λευκόν

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 31*; cf. Anal. Pr. II 6, 58b32–33 γελαστικόν² Α

π ἄνθρωπος³ Β

οὐ π Γ λευκόν⁴

οὐ π

diagr. 32*; cf. Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a6–14

τ

Α

Β τ

π

Γ diagr. 33*; Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a15–17 τ Α

Β

τ

π

Γ

2 ἄνθρωπος V 3 γελαστικόν V 4 ζῷον V

| 173

174 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 34*; Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a17–18 τ Α

Γ

τ

π

Β diagr. 35*; Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a20–22 οὐ π Β

Α

π

οὐ π

Γ diagr. 36*; Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a22–23 οὐ π Α

Γ

π

οὐ π

Β

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 37*; cf. Anal. Pr. II 7, 59a26–28 οὐδ Α

Β λευκόν

τ

οὐ π

Γ ἄνθρωπος diagr. 38; cf. Anal. Pr. II 8, 60a1

τ

π τ diagr. 39; cf. Anal. Pr. II 8, 60a2–3

Β

Α

τ

Γ diagr. 40; cf. Anal. Pr. II 9, 60a21–32 Β π

οὐδ Α

οὐ π τ

οὐδ

Γ

| 175

176 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 41; cf. Anal. Pr. II 9, 60a35–38 Α οὐδ οὐ π

Β

Γ

diagr. 42; cf. Anal. Pr. II 9, 60a35–b5 Α π

οὐ π οὐ π

Β

Γ

diagr. 43; cf. Anal. Pr. II 9, 60a35–b5 Α π Β τ

οὐ π οὐ π

Γ

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 44; cf. Anal. Pr. II 9, 60a40–41 ἀσυλλόγιστον:– Α

Β

τ

Γ diagr. 45; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b9–11 τ Α

Β

π

π

Γ diagr. 46; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b9–11 τ Α

Β

π

Γ diagr. 47*; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b9–25 Α

π

οὐδ Β

οὐδ

Γ

| 177

178 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

τ οὐ π οὐδ

Α

π

Β

Γ π

π

Γ diagr. 48; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b11–13 Α

Β

Γ

οὐ π

π

diagr. 49; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b13–14 ἀσυλλόγιστος Α

π

οὐ π Β

Γ

diagr. 50; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b14–15

οὐ π

τ

Α

Β τ

π Γ

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 51; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b13–14 Α

π

οὐ π Β

Γ

diagr. 52; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b20–21 Α

Β οὐδ

Γ τ

οὐ π diagr. 53; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b20–21 Α

Β οὐδ

Γ τ

οὐδ diagr. 54; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b21–22 Α

Β οὐδ

Γ π

οὐδ diagr. 55; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b21–22 Α

π

οὐδ Β

οὐδ

Γ

| 179

180 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 56; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b23–24 Α

Γ

Β οὐδ

τ οὐ π

diagr. 57; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b23–24 Α

Β οὐδ

Γ τ

οὐ π diagr. 58; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b24–25 Α

π

οὐδ Β

Γ

οὐδ

diagr. 59; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b26–27 οὐ π Α

Β

π

οὐδ

Γ

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 60; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b30–31 Α

Β τ

Γ π

diagr. 61; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b24–25 Α

τ

οὐδ

Β

Γ

diagr. 62; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b34–35 Α

Β π

Γ π

π diagr. 63; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b35–36 Α

π Β

οὐδ

οὐδ

Γ

| 181

182 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 64; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b37–38 τ Α

Β

τ

π

Γ diagr. 65; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b39–41

π

οὐ π

Α

Β τ

οὐδ Γ diagr. 66; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 60b41–61a1

Α

π

οὐδ

Β

Γ

οὐδ

diagr. 67; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 61a1–2 Α

Β τ

Γ τ

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 68; cf. Anal. Pr. II 10, 61a2–3 Α

τ

οὐδ

Β

Γ

diagr. 69*; Anal. Pr. II 11, 61b11–22 ζῷον Α

αἰσθητικόν

ἔμψυχον ἄνθρωπος Β Γ οὐδ τ

π

π οὐδ

diagr. 70; cf. Anal. Pr. II 17, 65b28–31 λογικόν

πτηνόν Α

ζῷον Ε π

π

Β π

ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω

π diagr. 71; cf. Anal. Pr. II 17, 65b35–36 πτηνόν Α

ζῷον Γ

λευκόν Β π

π

ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω

π ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω

π π

ζῷον Β

[…] Α

Δ

λευκόν Γ π

Δ π

π

| 183

184 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 72*; Anal. Pr. II 21, 66b27–28 ζῷον Α

πεζόν Β

οὐσία Α

ἔμψυχον Β

ὑπόπουν ἄνθρωπος Γ Δ

ζῷον Γ

ἄνθρωπος Δ

diagr. 73*; Anal. Pr. II 21, 66b37–38 ζῷον Α

πεζόν Β

ὑπόπουν ἄνθρωπος Γ Δ

diagr. 74*; Anal. Pr. II 21, 67b13–22 ἀγαθόν Α

κακόν Β

ἀγαθόν Γ

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 75*; Anal. Pr. II 21, 67b17–24

Α

Β

Γ

π

π

π π

diagr. 76*; Anal. Pr. II 22, 67b28–32 Α

Β π

Γ π

π diagr. 77*; Anal. Pr. II 22, 67b32–34 Α

Β οὐδ

Γ π

οὐδ

| 185

186 | B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 78; Anal. Pr. II 25, 69a20–36 διδακτόν Α

ἐπιστήμη δικαιοσύνη τετραγωνίζεσθαι εὐθύγραμμον κύκλος Β

Δ

Γ

Ε

diagr. 79*; Anal. Pr. II 25, 69a24–30 ἐπιστήμη δικαιοσύνη

διδακτόν Α

Β

Γ

diagr. 80*; Anal. Pr. II 25, 69a30–32 τετραγωνίζεσθαι εὐθύγραμμον κύκλος Α

Β

Γ

diagr. 81*; Anal. Pr. II 27, 70a13–16 κύειν Α

γάλα ἔχει

γυνή

Β

Γ

Z

B Diagrams Attached to the Aristotelian Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 82*; cf. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70a16–18 σπουδαῖοι

Β σοφοί

Α

Γ Πιττακοί diagr. 83*; Anal. Pr. II 27, 70a20–24 ὠχρά Α

γυνή Β

Γ γάλα

diagr. 84*; Anal. Pr. II 27, 70b34–35 ἀνδρεῖος ἀκρωτήρια μεγάλα ἔχει λέων Α Β Γ

| 187

C Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD) diagr. 1; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 389.2–7 τ

Α

Γ π

B π

π τ

Α

B

Γ τ

π τ οὐδ

Α

Γ οὐδ

π οὐδ

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-008

B

C Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 2; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 389.19–27 ζῷον ἄνθρωπος Σωκράτης Ε Γ Β

λίθος οὐσία Α οὐδ π

π

π

π οὐδ π οὐδ diagr. 3; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 389.20–21 ζῷον π

π π diagr. 4; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 389.20–23 ζῷον Α

ἄνθρωπος Γ

Β π

π π

diagr. 5; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 418.23–25 Α¹

Β² οὐδ

τ οὐ π

1 […] D 2 ἄνθρωπος D 3 λευκόν D

Γ³

| 189

190 | C Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 6; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 418.30–31 Α

Β

τ

οὐ π

Γ diagr. 7; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 418.30–31 ᾧ τὸ Α παντί, τούτῳ τὸ δὲ Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β τινί

καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα ἔσται τινὶ τῷ Γ

diagr. 8; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 452.7–8 ἄψυχον

γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος

Α

Γ

Β οὐδ

π οὐδ

τὸ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν diagr. 9; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 452.20–22 τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος ἔμψυχον ἀρετή Α

Γ

Β τ

π τ

C Diagrams Related to Ps.-Philoponos’ Text (Mss. VD)

diagr. 10; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 452.24–25 […] Γ

τὰ Β

τὸ αὐτὸν κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν diagr. 11; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 452.25 ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν

[…]

diagr. 12; cf. Ps.‐Philop., 452.26–27 γελαστικόν αἰσθητικόν ζῷον Α

Γ

Β τ

π τ

τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν

| 191

D Prolegomena to Anal. Pr. II Prooemion I Ambr. L 93 sup. is one of the codices vetustissimi of the Anal. Pr. It bears the siglum ‘n’ in the editions of the Organon (see p. LXXXIV). The scholion detailing the purpose of Anal. Pr. II was copied by a later scribe on f. 148v, right after the chapter list. D. Reinsch dated this hand to the twelfth/thirteenth century and assigned the siglum ‘b’ to it.1 This same copyist is denoted in the apparatus under the edited text below with ‘nb ’.

5

10

15

Περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου λόγου πολλὰ ἠπόρησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τοῦ γνῶναι περί τινος ὁ σκοπός ἐστι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐνταῦθα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἄλλα εἰρήκασιν. Πρόκλος μὲν γάρ φησι περὶ τῆς ὕλης τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ διαλαβεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ἐνταῦθα, ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐστι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὕλη δὲ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα, αἱ δὲ ἕνεκά του. ἐδίδαξε δὲ ἡμᾶς περὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ, ἀναγκαίως νῦν ἥκει διδάξων ἡμᾶς καὶ περὶ τῆς ὕλης· φημὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν προτάσεων πλοκῆς. ἐπιστάμενον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων Ἀναλυτικῶν· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ λόγῳ διδάσκει περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἐποιήσατο. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρός φησι ὅτι τὰ λείποντα τῷ καθόλου συλλογισμῷ ἥκει νῦν ἀναπληρώσων. Μαρῖνος δὲ πάντων ἀληθέστατα λέγων φησὶ ὅτι νῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς σοφιστικῆς καὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς παραδίδωσιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸ πρώτον ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἀποδεικτικήν, οὕτως καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν διαλεκτικὴν καὶ σοφιστικήν· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα συνάγον σύμφωνόν ἐστι ἀποδείξει, τὸ δὲ νῦν προκείμενον διαλεκτικῇ ἁρμόζει θεωρίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ διδάσκει τί συνάγεται ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων:–

1 ante Περὶ add. lemma (Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38) ἐν πόσοις μὲν οὖν σχήμασι nb 8 πρώτῳ ] α΄ nb 9 δευτέρῳ ] β΄ nb 12 πρώτον ] α΄ nb 13 πρῶτον ] α΄ nb 14 διδάσκει ] συνάγει nb

8–

2–9 Πρόκλος – ἐποιήσατο ] cf. schol. Magent. 1.2–8 9–10 ὁ – ἀναπληρώσων ] cf. schol. Magent. 1.12–15 10–15 Μαρῖνος – προτάσεων ] cf. schol. Magent. 1.8–13 ¹See the online description of the CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-009

D Prolegomena to Anal. Pr. II |

193

Prooemion II The second text derives from Hieros. Patr. 150 (third quarter of 14th c.).2 The scribe Malachias (known until recently as Anonymus Aristotelicus as named by Dieter Harlfinger)3 copied the main text and the commentaries that surrounded it. On f. 49rv, in the interval between the Aristotelian text and the anonymous commentary, the copyist inserted excerpts (Anal. Pr. II 1, 52b38 – 2, 53b22) of a second commentary. Here we edit the prooemion of the latter work; the manuscript bears the siglum ‘H’ in the apparatus.

5

Σκοπός ἐστι ἐνταῦθα τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει προομαλίσαι καὶ οἷον προκαθαρεῖν τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ὁδόν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ δῆλα τιθεὶς ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν παρεμποδίζοντα· οἶον τὸ ἐκ ψευδῶν προτάσεων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὴν κύκλῳ δεῖξιν, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ λοιπά, περὶ ὦν ἐνταῦθα διδάσκει, οὐχ ἵνα τούτοις χρώμεθα ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι, ἀλλ’ ἵνα εἰδότες ταῦτα ἀποφεύγωμεν καὶ μὴ παρακρουώμεθα παρὰ τῶν πειρωμένων παρακρούειν τὸν ἀποδεικνύοντα. περιαιρῶν οὖν, ὡς εἶπον, πάντα τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν σκῶλα καὶ ἐμπόδια καὶ οὕτως ἀνακαθαιρῶν τὰς ἡμῶν ἀκοὰς εἰσβάλλει εἰς τὰς ἀποδείξεσι:–

1 προκαθαρεῖν ] προκαθαρ H 1–8 Σκοπός – ἀποδείξεσι ] cf. schol. Magent. 1.17–20 ²See the digitised copy of LOC (link on p. XXII); Moraux 1976 et al., 385–387; online description in the CAGB Database (link on p. XXIII). ³Harlfinger 1971, 55–56; Mondrain 2000, 19–20; Mondrain 2004, 278–292; Martínez Manzano 2019.

194 | D Prolegomena to Anal. Pr. II

Prooemion III The third excerpt is transmitted by two manuscripts of the thirteenth century: Par. gr. 1917, f. 160 i. m. inf. – 160v i. m. sup.4 and Vat. gr. 245, f. 66v i. m. sup./int.5 In the Vatican manuscript (= J) the scribe copied around the main text a collection of prooemia to Anal. Pr. II before adding a fragmentary commentary on the Aristotelian work. The same collection can be found in the Parisinus (= P), inn the margins of the beginning of Ps.‐Philoponos’ commentary on Anal. Pr. II.6 We cannot draw any conclusion with regard to the stemmatic relation of the two textual witnesses, since in both cases the text (besides interpunctuation) is identical.

5

10

Σκοπός ἐστι τῷ Φιλοσόφῳ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας, ὡς μέν τινες λέγουσι, τὸ διδάξαι περί τινων ἐλλειπομένων πρὸς τὴν διδασκαλίαν τῆς ἀποδείξως. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Τρισὶ σχήμασιν ἐδίδαξε περὶ ὅρων καὶ προτάσεων καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ μέσου συλλογισθήσεταί τι ἀναγκαῖον (ἐν δὲ ταῖς μίξεσι τὴν μίξιν αὐτῶν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ εὐπορίας προτάσεων τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνάλυσιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν), ἐνταῦθα δὲ περί τινων λυσιτελούντων ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι· οὐκ ἐν τῷ χρᾶσθαι τούτοις, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ἀποφεύγειν αὐτὰ καὶ συλλελογισμένον ποιεῖν τὸν συλλογισμόν. τὸ γὰρ λυσιτελοῦν διττῶς εἴρηται· τὸ μὲν τὸ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μετουσίᾳ ἐμποιοῦν τὴν ὠφέλειαν, τὸ δὲ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀποφυγῇ μὴ ἐπάγον βλάβην· οἷον τὸ φάρμακον καὶ τὸ δηλητήριον· εἰδέναι γὰρ ὀφείλει καὶ ἑκατέρων τοὺς λόγους ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ τῷ μὲν φαρμάκῳ χρᾶσθαι πρὸς περιποίησιν ὑγείας, τὸν δὲ ἐλλέβορον καὶ τὸ δηλητήριον ἀποτρέπεσθαι πρὸς φυλακὴν τῆς ὑγείας. οὕτως καὶ ὁ Φιλόσοφος διδάσκει ἐνταῦθα τινὰ χρησιμεύοντα ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· οὐ τῇ χρήσει τούτων, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀποφυγῇ:–

11 τὸν ] τὸ JP

12 ἐλέβορον JP

1–7 Σκοπός – συλλογίζεσθαι ] cf. schol. Magent. 1.13–15 1.20–24

7–14 οὐκ – ἀποφυγῇ ] cf. schol. Magent.

⁴Omont 1888, 162–163; digitised copy of Gallica (link on p. XXII). ⁵Mercati - Franchi de’ Cavalieri 1923, 317–319; digitised copy of the DVL (link on p. XXII). ⁶Agiotis 2014, 14–15.

E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations For the following five groups of scholia see p. LXXIII–LXXIV. Each scholion starts with a bracketed citation of the respective Bekker page and folio in U. Orthography, accentuation and punctuation of the manuscript have been kept.

Group 1 (59a28; f. 163v i. m. ext.) 47. 1–2 ᾧ τὸ Α – τῷ Β2 ] τούτω τὸ Γ τινί ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ Α οὐ παντὶ τὸ Β

ὧ τὸ Α οὐ π τὸ Γ ἄρα τινὶ τῶ Β

|| 2 οὐκ ἔδει δὲ ] εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔδει || 3 καὶ ] ἀλλ’ (64b13; f. 177r i. m. ext.) 86. 1–5 Ὁ παραλογισμὸς – ἀριθμοῦ ] εἰς ἄνισα εἰς δύο καὶ περιττός διαιρεῖται ἓν διαιρεῖται π

π

εἰς ἶσα εἰς τρεῖς μοδιαιρεῖ- νάδας διαιρεῖται ται

ὁ γ΄ ἄρτιος π

ὁ γ΄

π

Group 2 (52b38; f. 147r i. m. ext.) 1. 1–16 Ἐν πόσοις – παρέλειψεν om. || 17 ἡμεῖς – παραδίδωσι ] ἰστέον ὅτι σκοπὸς ἐνταῦθα τῶ ἀριστοτέλει παραδοῦναι || 20 καὶ1 om. || τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον ] τὸ τεκμήριον καὶ τὸ σημεῖον || 23 ἃ εἴπομεν post πραγματεία transp. (57a36; f. 158v i. m. ext.) 27. 1–10 Αἴτιον – ἐστι om. || 10 δὲ ] γὰρ || 13–17 καὶ πάλιν – ἑπόμενον ] ὥσπερ οὖν λέγομεν ἐξ ἀνἀγκης εἶναι τὸ δεύτερον μὴ ὄντος τοῦ προτέρου (57b18; f. 159r i. m. inf.) 33. 1 ante ἐπεὶ add. ἄλλως || ὁ om. || 2–3 post συλλογισμὸν add. ἓν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κύκλω δεῖξις || 3–9 ἐδίδαξεν – ἀληθὲς ] διδάσκει καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς (57b19; f. 159r i. m. ext.) 34. 1–10 Τὸ δὲ κύκλῳ – ἑαυτήν om. || 10–11 οἷον – ἐστιν ] καλῶς τοῦτο φησί. οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστροφή ἐστι κυρίως τὸ εἰπεῖν εἰ ὁ ἀνθρωπος παντὶ γελαστικῶ, καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν παντὶ ἀνθρώπω || 12–13 ἡ δὲ – ἑξῆς om. (57b28; f. 159v i. m. ext.) 35. 1 ἄλλως1 – δεῖξαι om. || 2 ἤγουν ] τουτέστιν || 4 εἰ δὲ ] εἴτε || 12–17 εἰ δὲ – πρώτῳ om. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-010

196 | E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations

(58b14–25; f. 161v i. m. ext.) 42. 1–12 Τὸ μὲν – προσλήψεως om. (63a11; f. 173r i. m. ext.) 75. 1–4 ἔστω – συλλογισμοῦ om. (64b11–12; f. 177r s.l. 2–3) 84. 1–2 Καὶ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους – λαμβάνεσθαι om. (69b23–24; f. 189v i. m. ext.) 206. 1–9 ἁπλῶς – συλλογίσασθαι om. || 10 αὐτῇ ] αὐτῶ || 12–13 πρὸς – εἶναι om. || 13 λέγων – πάντων om. || 16–21 καθ’ οὗ – ἐστίν om.

Group 3 (64b28; f. 177v i. m. sup. et ext.; verba scholiorum 93, 102 atque 94 unum scholium formant) 93. 1 Τὸ om. || 1–2 δείκνυται – δείκνυσθαι ] δι’ ἑτέρου πεφυκὸς δείκνυσθαι δι’ ἑαυτοῦ δείκνυται || 4–5 ἢ πολλάκις – οἷον om. Deinde sequitur textus scholii 102 ab τὸ προκείμενον. 102. 2 δὲ ] γὰρ || 3 λαβεῖν ] λαμβάνειν || 4 post ἐξισάζοντας add. s.l. καὶ πάντη ταυτοὺς, ὡς τὸ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν || 4–5 ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος om. || 9–11 τὸ ἀγαθὸν – εἰσιν om. Deinde sequitur iterum textus scholii 93. ab 5 ἡ ἡδονὴ 93. 6 post ἀγαθόν add. τὸ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖται. Deinde sequitur textus scholii 94. 94. 1 γένος – ἐστι ] ἔστι μέντοι τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖσθαι γένος || 2–3 ἀποδεικνύομεν ] ἀποδείκνυμεν || 8 post τέτοκε add. figuram γάλα ἔχει ἥδε ἡ γυνή

τέτοκεν π

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρῶτον || 8–9 πρὸ – γάλα om. || 9 post δεικνύωμεν add. i.r. οἷον ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀριθμός ἐστι αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ πρότασις ἀσαφεστέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος τοῦ, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοκίνητος et figuram ἀριθμός ἐστι αὐτὸς ἑαυαὐτοκίνητος τὸν κινῶν

ἡ ψυχὴ

π

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγνωστοτέρων τὸ ἄγνωστον || 10 post ἢ1 add. ὅταν || post ἀσαφοῦς add. δείκνυται τὸ ἀσαφὲς οἷον ὅτι οἱ ἐν ἴσοις ἡμικυκλίοις ὄντες ἀστέρες, ἶσοι ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ πρότασις, ἀσαφής ἐστι ἐπίσης τῶ συμπεράσματι τῶ, οἱ ἐν ἴσοις ἡμικυκλίοις ὄντες ἀστέρες συντεθέντες ἄρτιοι εἰσίν· ὡσαύτως γὰρ ἐν δευτέρω καὶ τοῦτο κἀκεῖνο et figuram

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συντιθέντες ἶσοι ἀλλήἄρτιοι εἰσίν λοις εἰσίν

οἱ ἐν ἴσοις ἡμικυκλίοις ὄντες ἀστέρες

π

ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίως ἀδήλων, τὸ ἄδηλον || 10–11 οἷον – λόγου om. || 14 post γένος add. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀριστοτέλης ἐκόλασεν αὐτὸ· εἰπὼν ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν. (66b18; f. 182r i. m. ext. et inf.; verba scholiorum 134 et 141 unum scholium formant) 134. 1 Συμβαίνει – θέσει om. || 6–8 δοξάζειν – ἑαυτούς ] δοξάζοντά τινα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι· γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτούς || 8 ante καὶ add. καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς || 8 τριττῶς ] δὲ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ τἀναντία περαίνεται ἤτοι τὸ παντὶ καὶ τὸ οὐδενί Deinde sequitur textus scholii 141. 141. 1 post Ὁ add. γὰρ || 4 post αὐτοῦ add. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐναντίως γίνεται πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα (καὶ2 – πρᾶγμα s.l.). Deinde sequitur iterum textus scholii 134. 134. 21 οὕτως οὖν ] ὅτε καὶ || post ἐστι add. εἰ μέντοι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς· γίνεται δὲ χωρὶς συλλογισμοῦ || post πράγματι add. τριττῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα γίνεται ἡ ἀπάτη. Deinde sequitur textus scholii 134 ab 8 ἢ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρας. 134. 8–9 τὰς προτάσεις om. || 9 post ἀγνοῶμεν add. τό τε καθόλου καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος || 9–13 ὅταν – ἐστι ] εἰ πᾶσα μαγνῆτις ἕλκει τὸν σίδηρον· καὶ ἐὰν αὕτη μαγνῆτις ἐστί || 15 ἡ δυάς om. || 17–18 οὐκ ἀπεκρίθημεν – ὅλως ἔστι om. || 20 καθαίρει om. || 21 post ἀγνοοῦμεν sequitur iterum textus scholii 141 ab 5 μάχεται2 . 141. 4 δὲ ] γοῦν || 7–8 post ἀντικείμενα add. μὲν s.l. || 8–9 δυνάμει – ἐδόξασα ] ἐμαυτῶ δὲ οὐκ ἀντικειμένως ἐδόξασα· εἰ γὰρ καὶ δυνάμει εἶπον ὅτι τὸ φυλλορροεῖν ὑπάρχει πάση ἀμπέλω || 9 οὐδὲ γὰρ ] πλὴν ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ || 10 ἐνεργείᾳ ante ἐξεφώνησα transp. || 11–16 καὶ πάλιν – ἀγαθόν2 om. (67a21; f. 183v i. m. sup., ext. et inf.; verba scholiorum 157 et 152 unum scholium formant) 157. 1 Ὁ Πλάτων – εἰσί ] νῦν ἑτέρω παραδείγματι κέχρηται δηλῶν ὅτι πολλάκις γινώσκομεν τὸ καθόλου μὴ εἰδότες τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα· καὶ φησὶ ὅτι τοιοῦτο ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῶ μένωνι τῶ διαλόγω τοῦ πλάτωνος ὑπὸ τοῦ σωκράτους εἰρημένος λόγος· ἐν ἐκείνω γὰρ βουλόμενος ὁ πλάτων δεῖξαι τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις || 2–10 τὸν Μένωνα – ζητεῖν om. || 11 ἐρωτώμενον παρ’ αὐτοῦ om. || 14 καὶ ἄγει – ἀναγράφει ] εἶτα || 19–20 ἄγει – τὴν ΔΑ om. || 24 post ἐναργείας add. ἔχων οὖν κατὰ τὸν καθόλου λόγον ὅτι τὸ τοῦ τετραπλασίου ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑποτετραπλασίου· λαβὼν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὁμολογούμενον ὅτι αἱ διάμετροι δίχα τέμνουσι τὰ τετράγωνα, ἄγει ἐν ἑκάστω τετραγώνω διαγωνίους διαμέτρους || 26 post τετραγώνου add. ὡς ἐκ τριγώνου ὁκτὼ συνιστάμενον || 29 post τετραγώνου add. τοῦ ἐκ β΄ τριγώνων συνιστάμενον· τὰ

198 | E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations

γὰρ δ΄ τρίγωνα, διπλάσια εἰσὶ τῶν β΄ τριγώνων || 32 post ζητουμένου sequitur textus scholii 152. 152. 1 post καὶ add. γὰρ || 4–6 τὸ ὅτι – διάμετρος ] ὅτι τὸ τοῦ τετραπλασίου τινὸς ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑποτετραπλασίου || 6 post σώματι add. συμβαίνει γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις λαμβάνειν, μήτε ζήτησις εἶναι, μήτε εὕρεσις· ὁ γὰρ εὑρίσκων ἢ ζητῶν, ἢ γινώσκει τοῦτο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο ζήτησις· οὐδὲ εὕρεσις ἀλλ’ ἀναγνώρισις. ἢ οὐκ οἶδε τοῦτο, καὶ πῶς ἂν εὑρὼν τοῦτο, διὰ τῆς ζητήσεως ὅλως γνωρίσειεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ ζήτησις οὐδὲ εὕρεσις. ὁ οὖν ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ ὅτι ἐστὶ καὶ ζήτησις καὶ εὕρεσις. οὐχ’ ὡς ὁ σωκράτης ἔλεγε κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν· ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ζητεῖ κατά τι μεν εἰδέναι κατά τι δὲ ἀγνοεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ μανθάνομεν καὶ ταῦτα ζητοῦντες εὑρίσκομεν: ἃ πῶς μὲν ἴσμεν πῶς δὲ οὐ τῶ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου ἴσμεν καθ’ αὑτὰ δ’ ἀγνοοῦμεν· πᾶσα γὰρ διδασκαλία, ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως· οὔτε οὖν ὃ ἴσμεν ἐνεργεία μανθάνομεν, οὔτε ὃ πάντη ἀγνοοῦμεν· ἀλλ’ ὃ κατά τι εἰδότες πῶς οὐκ ἴσμεν, αὐτὸ μανθάνομεν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τὸ καθόλου εἰδέναι εὑρόντες, γνωρίσομεν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀγνοοῦντες, ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἕξομεν τοῦτο εὑρόντες διὰ τῆς τοῦ καθόλου ἀναγνωρίσεως:– (cf. 157.2–10) (68a25; f. 186r i. m. sup., ext. et inf.; verba scholiorum 184 et 185 unum scholium formant) 184. 1–6 εἰ δύο – πλούτου ] μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν ὑγεία Α

μᾶλλον φευκτὸν νόσος Β

Γ (Δ m. rec.) Δ (Γ m. rec.) πλοῦτος πενία ἧτἧττον τον φευαἱρετόν κτόν || 8 ἐστι om. || 13 γὰρ ] δὲ || 17 post αἱρετὸν add. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι. Deinde sequitur textus scholii 185

Group 5 (60a15; f. 165v i. m. ext.) 59. 8 post συμπέρασμα add. ὅρα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων ἐκθέσεως τὸ λεγόμενον:–

E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations | 199

ζῶον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ζῶον οὐ π οὐ π Α Β Α Β

ζῷον Α π ἄνθρωπος Β

οὐ π

οὐδ οὐ π Γ λίθος

π Γ λίθος

οὐδ

τ Γ λίθος

(64b24; f. 177r i. m. int.) 90. 1 post ἀντιφάσεως add. ἤγουν ἐκ δύο συλλογισμῶν: (65a14; f. 178r i. m. inf. – 178v i.m. sup.) 103. 1 Καὶ – ὑπάρχει om. || 2 ὑπάρχει post Β transp. || 5–6 εἰ – διαφέρουσι ] ἴσως δ’ ἂν τις κακίσαι προήχθη τὸν φιλόσοφον ὡς ἑαυτῶ τἀναντία φάσκοντα· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς κύκλω δείξεως εἰπὼν λαμβάνειν ὅρους ἐξισάζοντας, νῦν φαίνεται κακίζων τοὺς ἀντιστρέφοντας τοὺς ὅρους· καίπου τὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸν ἀντιτείνοντα προφέρων, φησὶ ὡς οὐχ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κύκλω κακίζεται δείξεως. ἀλλὰ νῦν τοὺς ὅρους, ἡ ἀπόδειξις κωλύει τοὺς ἀντιστρέφοντας· ἐδιδάχθημεν γὰρ διὰ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς μὴ ἐν ταῖς κυρίως ἀποδείξεσιν, τῆ δι’ ἀλλήλων χρῆσθαι δείξει· εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος γίνεται· τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα εἶναι; κωλύει τοῦτο ἡ τοιαύτη μέθοδος, τὸ δι’ ἀλλήλων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς δείξεις. ἀλλ’ οὐχ’ ὁ τρόπος τῆς διαλλήλου ἤτοι τῆς κύκλω δείξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀποδείξεως κωλύει ἡμᾶς· ἡ δὲ μέθοδος τῆς κύκλω δείξεως οὐ κωλύει ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον παραινεῖ· διαφέροι δ’ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖσθαι τῆς κύκλω δείξεως || 8–9 οἷον – γελαστικῷ2 om. || 10 post πλέον add γὰρ || 15 ᾐτήσατο ] αἰτεῖται || ἀνθρώπῳ ] νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῶ || 16 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ] τὸ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν || 17 post μερικὴν add. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ, διαφέρει ἡ κύκλω δεῖξεις τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῆ αἰτεῖσθαι· ὅτι ἐπ’ ἐκείνω μὲν, οὐ πάντως ἄδηλα ἦν τὰ δεικνύμενα· ἐπὶ τούτου δὲ, ἄμφω ἄδηλα:– (66a8; f. 180r i. m. ext.) 123. 1 Ἢ – τούτου om. || 2 post τούτου add. ἤτοι τὸ τὸ μὴ παρὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος || 3 ψευδῆ om. || 4 ψευδοῦς τεθείσης || 7 post συνάγεται add. ὥστε καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρους εἴγη τὸ ἀδύνατον· ἐκβεβλημένης γὰρ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀφ’ ἧς τὸ ἀδύνατον· καὶ μὴ ἀντεισαγομένης ἑτέρας; οὐ συνάγεταί τι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ τῶν καταλειφθησῶν προτάσεων:– (66a25; f. 181r i. m. ext. et inf.) 127. 2 καὶ om. || 2–3 ἤγουν τῆς μείζονος om. || 6 post δὲ add. καὶ || 14–16 εἰ – ἀγαθόν ] καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καθόλου παρατηρητέον εἰ δυνατὸν κατὰ μέρος δέ φησὶ; πρὸς ἕκαστον συμπέρασμα διαφόρως παρατηρεῖν τὸν μερικόν, ὅπως μὴ ληφθῆ. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσομεν, γινώσκοντες τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ, ταύτη ἀντικείμενον βούλεται συναγαγεῖν· ἐὰν οὖν τύχη μερικὴν ἀποφατικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπόθεσιν· εὖ ειδότες ὅτι καθόλου καταφατικὴν βούλεται συναγαγεῖν ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τηρήσωμεν ὅπως μὴ ληφθεῖεν καὶ αἱ β΄ προτάσεις καταφατικαί· οἷον βούλεταί τις ἡμᾶς ἐλέγξαι· τουτέστιν εἰς ἀντίφασιν ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι πᾶς σκύθης ποιότης ἐστί; καὶ φησὶ οὕτως· πᾶς σκύθης λευκός· εἶτα ὑπερπηδᾶ τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν· καὶ λαμβάνει ἑτέραν πρότασιν ὅτι πᾶν χρῶμα ποιότης ἐστί· καὶ τοῦτο δια δόαμεν· εἶτα ὑποστρέφει ἐπὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ φησὶ ὅτι πᾶν λευκὸν χρῶμα; καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἐνιστάμεθα πρότασιν λέγοντες αὐτὴν εἶναι ψευδῆ· εἰ γὰρ δῶμεν καὶ ταύτην εἶ-

200 | E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations

ναι τὴν πρότασιν ἀληθῆ λαθόμενοι τῆς παρατηρήσεως, ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον καὶ τιθεὶς τὰς προτάσεις κατὰ τάξιν, ἐρεῖ· πᾶς σκύθης λευκός· πᾶν λευκὸν χρῶμα· καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ δέδωκεν· πᾶν χρῶμα ποιότης· καὶ συνάξει ὅτι πᾶς σκύθης, ποιότης· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶ ἡ μέση πρότασις πρότασις ψευδής. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν ὁμώνυμον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ λελευκασμένον σῶμα; καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χρῶμα· ὁμοίως κἂν ἦ καθόλου ἀποφατικὸν ὃ βούλεται συναγαγεῖν ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος, τηρήσωμεν ὅπως μὴ ληφθῆ ἀποφατικὸν καθόλου. εἰ δὲ μερικόν; σπουδαστέον κωλύσαι αὐτὸν καθόλου λαβεῖν πρότασιν· χωρὶς γὰρ καθόλου πρότασιν, συλλογισμὸς οὐκ ἔσται:– (cf. 128.3–8) (68a3; f. 185r i. m. inf.) 180. 1–3 δύο – Δ1 ] δεύτερον κεφάλαιον· ἐν ὧ παραδίδωσι γεωμετρικὸν θεώρημα οὗ ἡ πρότασις· ἐὰν δ΄ μεγέθη ἀνάλογον ἦ, καὶ ἐναλλὰξ ἀνάλογον ἔσονται· φησὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀντιστρἐφει ἀλλήλοις τὸ ΑΒ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ΓΔ ἀντιστρέφει ἀλλήλοις· ὡς εἶναι τὰ ΑΒ ΓΔ ἀνάλογον· τὸ δὲ Α πρὸς τὸ Γ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε θάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ’ ἀνάγκης παντὶ ὑπάρχειν. ἄμφω δὲ τῶ αὐτῶ μηδέποτε ὑπάρχειν, ὡσαύτως ἕξει καὶ τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Δ· ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τὸ ΑΒ ἀντιστρεφόντων καὶ τῶν ΓΔ, ἡ Α πρὸς τὸ Γ εἶναι ὡς εἴρηται· λέγω ὅτι ὁμοίως ἕξει καὶ τὸ Β πρὸς τὸ Δ ὥστε παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν. ἄμφω δὲ οὔ || 3 δὲ ] γὰρ || 6 post μὲν add. οὖν || 8 ἀντίκειται post Γ transp. || 12–13 εἰ – ἀδύνατον om. (68a39; f. 186r i. m. inf. – 186v i. m. sup.) 186. 6 προαιρεῖσθαι ] ποιεῖν || 7 post ἔρωτος add. δύο γὰρ οὐσῶν ἀντιθέσεων· τῆς μὲν, βούλεσθαι χαρίζεσθαι τὸν ἐρώμενον καὶ μὴ βούσθαι χαρίζεσθαι· τουτέστιν φιλικῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐραστὴν ἢ ἀπεχθῶς· ὧν ἔστω τὸ μὲν Α: τὸ δὲ Β τῆς δὲ, χαρίζεσθαι τε καὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι, ὧν τὸ μὲν, ἔστω Δ· τὸ δὲ, Γ· πᾶς ἐραστὴς ἕλοιτ’ ἂν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐρώμενον ὡς βούλεται χαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶ. μὴ χαρίζεσθαι δὲ κωλυόμενον ὑπό τινος; ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μὲν μὴ βουλόμενον δὲ χαρίζεσθαι ἀλλ’ ἔχθρῶς ἔχοντα· ὕτως δὲ ἔχοντα, αἱρετώτερον ἂν, εἴη τὸ Α μετὰ τοῦ Γ, τοῦ Δ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Α καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦ Δ αἱρετώτερον· ὅπερ ἐστι τὸ βούλεσθαι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ φιλικῶς ἔχειν τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὸς τὸν ἐραστὴν, τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι· εἰ δ’ αἱρετώτερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου, εἴη ἂν, ὁ ἔρως ἐπιθυμία τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ συνουσίας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτου μᾶλλον· οὐδὲ μᾶλλον καὶ οὗ μάλιστα ἕκαστον ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ αὐτῶ; εἴη ἂν, καὶ τοῦ ἐρῶντος τέλος, φιλία· καὶ ὁ ἔρως, φιλίας χάριν ἀλλ’ οὐ συνουσίας· ἡ δὲ συνουσία, ἢ οὐδόλως ἐστὶ || 8–10 εἰ – πιστώσηται ] ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀναφορὰν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς πίστις οτῦτο τοῦ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, τοῖς ἐρασταῖς διὰ σπουδῆς ἐστιν; ἢ ὡς ποιητικὸν φιλίας: || 11 post συνουσίαν add. figuram

E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations |

θέλειν χαρίζεσθαι Α

μὴ θέλειν χαρίζεσθαι Β

Δ δύνασθαι χαρίζεσθαι

Γ μὴ δύνασθαι χαρίζεσθαι

201

(68b9; f. 186v i. m. inf.) 187. 4 post δείκνυται add. τριττὴ γὰρ ἡ πίστις· ἢ ἐκ τοῦ καθόλου τὸ μερικὸν συνάγουσα οἵα ἐστὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μερικοῦ τὸ μερικὸν οἵα ἡ διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος· ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μερικοῦ τὸ καθόλου οἵα ἡ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς: ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ, διὰ πάντων τῶν μερικῶν γίνεται. καὶ εἰ μὲν πεπερασμένα εἶεν, πάντα διέξιμεν· εἰ δ’ ἄπειρα, τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα διερχόμεθα· ἀξιοῦμεν δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ οὕτως ἔχειν:– (69a16; f. 188r i. m. ext.) 200. 1 Καὶ – ἤγουν ] διαφέρει τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τὸ παράδειγμα ὅτι ἡ μὲν, ἐκ τῶν πάντων τῶ μέσω τὸ μεῖζον ἄκρον ἐδείκνυεν ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα ἐκ μερικοῦ τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων· καὶ ὅτι || 4 ἤγουν τὸ Δ om. (69a20; f. 188r i. m. inf. – 188v i. m. sup.) 201. 7–15 διὰ – ἐστι ] διότι ἀπάγειν δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ἀπ’ ἄλλου προβλήματος, ἐπ’ ἄλλο· τότε δὲ λέγεται ταύτη κεχρῆσθαι τις, ὅταν τῶν δεικτικῶν τινὸς δύο προτάσεις ἡ μὲν μείζων, φανερὰ εἴη· ἡ δὲ ἐλάσσων, ἄδηλος μὲν· τὸ δὲ πιστὸν ὁμοίως ἔχουσα τῶ συμπεράσματι· εἰ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἄδηλον εἴη ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις· καὶ ταύτην ἐπιχειροίη διὰ προσσυλλογισμοῦ δεικνύναι, οὐ λέγεται ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀπαγωγῆ κεχρῆσθαι· ἀλλ’ ὑπαλλαγῆ καὶ τῆ ἐπὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον πρόβλημα μεταβάσει· οὐ μόνον δέ φησι ἀπαγωγὴ λέγεται ἐφ’ ὧν ἡ ἐλάττων πιστοτέρα ἐστὶ τοῦ προκειμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ’ ὧν ὀλίγα ἐστὶ τὰ μέσα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ὅρου. τουτέστι δι’ ὧν ἡ πρότασις δείκνυται. καὶ τότε γὰρ ἀπαγωγὴ λέγεται ἅτε συντόμως δεικνυμένης τῆς προτάσεως· καὶ τοῦ μὲν προτέρου τρόπου τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς παράδειγμα τίθεται, τρεῖς ὅρους· διδακτόν. ἐπιστήμην· ἀρετὴν· προκειμένου γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ διδακτόν ἐστι· καὶ δεικνυμένου διὰ μέσου τῆς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς μείζονος φανερᾶς οὔσης τῆς, πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διδακτόν· ἐὰν ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις ἡ πάσα ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη· μὴ ὁμοίως ἠ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἐστὶ πιστὴ, ἀπαγωγή ἐστι τὸ δεικνύναι ταύτην· ἐγγύτερον γὰρ φησὶ γινόμεθα τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ταύτης δειχθείσης· διὰ τὸ ὡς φανερὰν προλαμβάνειν τὴν ΑΒ προτέραν μὴ ἔχοντες ἐπιστήμη τοῦ συμπεράσματος:– (70b7; f. 191v i. m. ext.) 221. 3–10 τρία – ἀσώματος ] καὶ φησὶ ὅτι τριῶν τινῶν δοθέντων, δυνησόμεθα φυσιογνωμονεῖν· ἑνὸς μὲν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πάθεσι τῆς ψυχῆς, συμμεταβάλλεται τῆ ψυχῆ τὸ σῶμα· πάθη δὲ φυσικὰ ψυχῆς, ὀργή· λύπη· δειλία θράσος· καλῶς δὲ φυσικοῖς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀπό διδασκαλίας πάθεσιν οὐ συμμεταβάλλεται· οἷον

202 | E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations

εἴ τις ἐξ ἀμούσου γίγνετο μουσικὸς, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτου συμμεταβάλλειν τῆ ψυχικῆ ἕξει τὸ σῶμα· ἑτέρου δὲ, ὅτι ἑκάστου ἓν ἑνὸς ἐστὶ σημεῖον· καὶ τρίτου πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ δυναίμεθα τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου πάθους εἶδος εὑρεῖν:–

Group 6 (67a22; f. 183v i. m. inf.) 153. 1 ante Ἅμα add. ὁ μὲν ἀλέξανδρος οἴεται τοῦτο εἰρῆσθαι πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ, τὰς μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σωκράτης διὰ τῶν αἰσθητων καὶ κατὰ μέρος, ἔδειξει τῶ μένωνι ὅτι τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου διπλάσιόν ἐστι τοῦ τετραγώνου· φησὶν οὖν ὁ ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι τὸ κατὰ μέρος οὐ προεπιστάμεθα· ὥστε μανθάνοντες οὐκ ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα· ἀλλὰ γνωρίζομεν· μήποτε δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ πλάτωνος, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιλαμβάνεται· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ προεπιστάμεθα τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα. καὶ ἀνεγείρομεν τοὺς καθόλου λόγους: || δὲ ] οὖν || ἤγουν1 ] τουτέστιν || 3 ὥσπερ post 3–4 ἀναγνωρίσας transp. Scholium novum incipit ab 153. 8 ὁμοίως. (67a26; f. 183v i. m. inf. – 184r i. m. sup., ext) 153. 11 post ἄτοκον add. εἶναι || 17 ἀλλὰ – πρᾶγμα om. || 18 μερικὴν ] κατὰ μέρος || 19–27 τοῦ τετραγώνου – εἰσί ] ἐφ’ ὧν δύο γίνονται οἱ μέσοι ὅροι καὶ μὴ ὑπάλληλοι· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντία ἑαυτῶ ὑπολαμβάνει ὁ ἀπατώμενος εἴτε κατὰ μὲν θάτερον τῶν μέσων τὰς δύο προτάσεις ὑπολαμβάνει κατὰ θατέρου δὲ τὴν μίαν· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ ἡ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἀπάτη κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστήμη· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ εἰ καθ’ ἑκατέρου τὴν μίαν, ἐναντία αὑτοῖς φρονούμεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδήλωσεν διὰ τοῦ οὐδ’ ἡ καθ’ ἑκάτερον τῶν μέσων ὑπόληψις· ἐνδέχεται δὲ φησὶ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἀπατᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀφυεῖς συμβαίνειν· εἰκὸς γὰρ εἰδὲναι τινὰ ὅτι πᾶσα ἡμίονος ἄτοκος· καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡμίονος ἐστι· καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνάπτειν ἄμφω τῶν λεγόντων τὰς προτάσεις, θεασάμενοι ἡμίονον ὑπὸ πλείονος τροφῆς ὠγκωμένην τὴν γαστέρα, εἰπεῖν ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἡμίονος κύει || 27 τὸν om. || 28 ὑπάρχειν om. || παντὶ om. || post ἰστέον add. δὲ || 30 ante οὐκ add. ἤγουν || 33 ταύτας om. || post ἔστιν add. ὥστε φησὶ εἰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐπισταμένους ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀπατᾶσθαι πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὸ καθόλου μὲν ἐπισταμένους τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀγνοοῦντες ἀπατᾶσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ μέρος καὶ αἰσθητὰ, διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γνώριμα· καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἴσμεν ἐνεργεία μὴ ὑποπίπτον τῆ αἰσθήσει. οὐδ’ ἂν τύχωμεν τούτου ᾐσθήμενοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῶ ἔχειν τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶ διὰ ταύτης δυνάμει τῶ ἔχειν τὴν μερικὴν γνῶσιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐνεργεία· εἰ γὰρ κατ’ ἄμφω ἐννοήσομεν τό τε καθόλου καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν, οὐκ ἔσται ἀπάτη ἐν ἡμῖν· ἀλλ’ ἡ κυρίως ἐπιστήμη· τριττῆς γὰρ φησὶ οὔσης τῆς γνώσεως τῆς μὲν, καθόλου μόνον· τῆς δὲ, μερικῆς· τῆς δὲ συναμφοτέρας· καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἑκατέρου ἐνεργείας· τριχῶς καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην γἰνεται συμβαίνειν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου μόνον ἐπιστάμεθα, περὶ τὸ μερικὸν ἀπατώμεθα· εἰδότες γὰρ ὡς πᾶς ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει· ὅταν δὲ μερικόν τι ἐπιστάμεθα τὸ καθόλου ἀγνοοῦντες, περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἀπατώμεθα· εἰ γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι οὕτος ὁ ἐλλέβορος δοθεὶς ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ καθαίρει· οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ ὅτι πᾶς ἐλλέβορος καθαίρει· ἐλλέβορον τινὰ ἕτερον θεασάμενοι, ἀπατώμεθα ἀγνοῦντες ὅτι καθαίρει· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνεργῶμεν δὲ

E Recensio Urbinatis: Collations |

203

κατ’ ἄμφω, πάλιν ἀπατώμεθα· ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμιόνου πλὴν οὐ τἀναντία δοξάζομεν ἑαυτοῖς· οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τῆ φαντασία φησὶ ἐσχηκὼς τὴν ἀπάτην ἤδη ἑαυτῶ ἐναντιοῦται· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἐστι, ὅταν τὴν ἀπάτην διὰ συλλογισμοῦ πλέξη· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πλέξει, οὐκ ἐναντιωθῆ ἑαυτῶ:– (69a37; f. 188v i. m. inf.) 205. 6 post ἐναντίον add. διαφέρει δὲ αὕτη καὶ τῆς ἀνασκευῆς, τῶ τὴν ἀνασκευὴ τῶ συμπέρασμα μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν αὐτό. τὴν δὲ ἔνστασιν, τῆ προτάσει τῆ λαμβανομένη εἰς κατασκευὴν τοῦ προβλήματος· ἀνασκευὴ οὖν ἐστι κατασκευὴ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῶ συμπεράσματι· ἔνστασις δὲ, κατασκευὴ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῆ προτάσει· ἔνστασις δὲ εἴρηται, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱστᾶν προϊόντα τινὰ καὶ συλλογίσθαι μέλλοντα:– atque divisio ἡ πρότασις ἔνστασις

πρότασις

Scholium novum incipit ab 205. 6 τὴν δὲ. (69a37; f. 189r i. m. ext.) 205. 6 ὅλως post 7 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται transp.

F Plates (Ambr. D 54 sup.)

Plate I: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Ambr. D 54 sup., f. 191r. The beginning of Leon’s commentary on Anal. Pr. II.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110703481-011

F Plates (Ambr. D 54 sup.) | 205

Plate II: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Ambr. D 54 sup., f. 203r. The ending of Leon’s commentary on Anal. Pr. II and Alexios Solymas’ colophon.