Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue 9781477301722

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Origins of the War with Mexico THE POLK-STOCKTON INTRIGUE

Origins of the War with Mexico THE POLK-STOCKTON INTRIGUE

By Glenn W. Price

University of Texas Press, Austin & London

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 67-27372 Copyright © 1967 by Glenn W. Price All Rights Reserved Printed in the United States of America by the Printing Division of The University of Texas, Austin Bound by Universal Bookbindery, Inc., San Antonio

"The souls of our fathers still throb in us for pains that have been forgotten, almost as the man who has been wounded feels an ache in the hand he has lost" Jules Michelet

Preface The United States declared war on Mexico in May of 1846 because, President James K. Polk said in his war message, Mexico "has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil." That was Polk's description of the hostilities which resulted from his sending American troops into the Mexican settlements on the left bank of the Rio Grande. The area had been claimed by the Republic of Texas but had never been under Texan control. A year earlier, just before Texas accepted the American offer of annexation, Commodore Robert F. Stockton had been sent to Texas by the Polk Administration and there he urged that troops be sent to the Rio Grande. President Anson Jones of the Republic of Texas charged later that President Polk's plan was to annex a war with Mexico when Texas was annexed; he would thus avoid the onus of initiating an aggressive war to acquire California and other provinces of Mexico. Former President Sam Houston of Texas referred to Stockton as a scoundrel, whose conduct would have been exposed except for respect for the President of the United States. The U. S. House of Representatives placed on record its disrespect for Polk by voting during the Mexican War that the conflict had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" begun by the President of the United States when he sent the Army into the Mexican settlements; and one member, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, later to be Vice-President of the Confederate States of America, coined the famous phrase "Polk the Mendacious," adding that the President was "a man whom none could believe." This is not, however, the interpretation which is given in histories of American diplomacy, or of the annexation of Texas and the beginnings of the War with Mexico. One historian, Richard R. Stenberg, published an article in 1935 entitled "The Failure of Polk's War Intrigue of 1845," in which he assembled some of the evidence to support the charge which President Jones had made; but it has not been very influential. Thus a well-known historian of American

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

diplomacy, Samuel F. Bemis, cites Stenberg's article and says that "friends of Polk" urged Texas to renew hostilities with Mexico, but asserts that "Polk himself and the government steered clear of such complicity."1 The matter is significant for the interpretation of that period of American diplomacy and warrants a serious attempt to establish the relationship of President Polk to Commodore Stockton's scheme in Texas during April, May, and June of 1845. This study undertakes that task. Since, under any interpretation, it was a sub rosa effort, one expects difficulty in discovering sufficient documentation to establish unquestionable responsibility for the conspiratorial activity which is a matter of record. In his American Diplomacy in Action Richard W. Van Alstyne writes that the conspiracy in Texas is not in doubt but "the documents do not so clearly define the trail" back to Washington.2 That trail was deliberately and carefully hidden. But sufficient documentation does exist, particularly in the correspondence of Commodore Stockton but also in the records left by several other men who were involved—of whom some knew of the conspiracy and some did not—to follow the track of the conspirators. This investigation is an effort to clear the debris from that trail, to open it, and to mark it. The study begins with an examination of the wider historical context of the problem, and of its importance for an understanding of the American experience, followed by a discussion of American-Mexican relations for the score of years prior to 1845, as those relations were shaped by American expansionism. During the winter of 18441845, just prior to the inauguration of James K. Polk as President, a United States consular official in Texas tried to set in motion a scheme which was remarkably similar to the Polk-Stockton intrigue, which followed hard after; an account of this premonitory effort brings the story to the point of Polk's assumption of power. The penetration of a conspiracy is aided by a knowledge of the conspirators; the historian has the advantage of being able to inquire into the whole range of their lives and activities, both before and after the particular events in question. One chapter is thus devoted to the 1 Richard R. Stenberg, "The Failure of Polk's War Intrigue of 1845," Pacific Historical Review, IV (March 1935), 39-69; Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 234. 2 Richard W. Van Alstyne, American Diplomacy in Action, p. 582.

Preface

IX

actions and the ideas and the character of Robert F. Stockton, a man who has not attracted the attention of historians; another discusses James K. Polk in American history, a President who was long denigrated by historians but who within the last generation has been the beneficiary of revised interpretations which have greatly improved his historical reputation. The study then turns to a close examination of the war scheme during the spring and summer of 1845, beginning with the testimony of President Anson Jones and including the relevant documentation from the British and the French diplomatic efforts in Texas. President Polk's ultimate resource, following the collapse of the conspiracy, was the use of the controversy over the Texas-Mexican boundary to initiate the War, a controversy which is the final chapter in the description of the origins of the War with Mexico. A concluding statement appraises the significance of this affair and of the treatment of this episode in American history by American historians. It is not a subject for self-congratulation in the profession. Since the completion of this study, two books have appeared which describe and analyze the actions of the United States in relation to Texas and Mexico in the 1840's. Frederick Merk (with the collaboration of Lois Bannister Merk), The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansion: 1843-1849 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), includes copious extractions from the correspondence of the principal figures in the affair in Texas and provides an excellent examination of the controversy over the boundary between the Republic of Texas and Mexico. Merk describes Stockton's efforts to initiate military action, but does not commit himself on President Polk's responsibility in the matter. Charles Sellers, James K. Polk, Continentalist: 18431846 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), the second volume of his projected three-volume biography of Polk, is certainly the best account to date of the political history of these years. Sellers believes that Polk was not a party to the war intrigue in Texas in the summer of 1845; on this matter, although frequently not on others, he accepts at face value the official statements of the Administration in Washington and writes that "Commodore Stockton fell in with the Texas imperialists in a scheme to precipitate a war." The study below argues that the evidence points in quite the opposite direction; but Sellers' book provides an excellent portrait of the unscrupulous, aggressively expansionist President. Both of these volumes turn away

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

from the nationalistic bias which has distorted the understanding of Americans on this period of our history.3 An historical investigation of this kind, probing into the hidden actions of men, long dead, who once controlled and directed the use of the power of the nation, would be a quite hopeless undertaking were there not institutions which preserve and make accessible the evidence which men inevitably create when they act. It would be a churlish historian who did not feel gratitude for the work, and respect for the integrity, of the librarians and archivists who assist one's search with both grace and dispatch in these centers of stored experience. In addition to published sources, this study is based upon materials in the following repositories: The National Archives, and the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, in Washington, D.C.; the Massachusetts Historical Society, in Boston; The New-York Historical Society, and the New York Public Library, Manuscript Division, in New York City; the Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, in Princeton, New Jersey; the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and the American Swedish Historical Museum, in Philadelphia; the Southern Historical Collection, Manuscripts Department, University of North Carolina Library, in Chapel Hill; and the Archives Division, Texas State Library, and the Archives Collection of The University of Texas Library, in Austin. Anyone who attempts to make the past more useful is engaged in a cooperative effort; he is dependent upon not only librarians, but upon other historians. The effect of many historians on this work is apparent in the pages below. Several historians have made a direct and personal contribution to my efforts to understand our past. I should like to express my particular appreciation to Professor Emeritus Gladdys E. Muir, of La Verne College, and Distinguished Professor of History Richard W. Van Alstyne, of Callison College, the University of the Pacific. GLENN W. PRICE

Sonoma State College

Santa Rosa, California 3

230.

See Merk's Chapter 6, "The True Boundary," pp. 133-160; Sellers, pp. 220-

Contents Preface List of Illustrations List of Abbreviations Used in Annotation 1. American Nationalism and Aggressive War: 1845-1846 2. The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico : 1825-1845 3. A Preliminary Design: The Duff Green Scheme . . . 4. Robert F. Stockton, American Nationalist 5. James K. Polk in American History 6. Annexation and Intrigue: The Account of President Anson Jones 7. Stockton's Effort To Finance a War 8. European Intervention in the Texas Game 9. The Collapse of the Polk-Stockton Intrigue 10. The Successful Use of the Boundary Question : The Acquisition of California 11. The Misuse of American Experience Bibliography Index

vii xii xiii 3 14 38 49 79 105 118 131 139 153 169 173 181

Illustrations (following p. 74) 1. President Polk, Portrait by Sully 2. Commodore Stockton, Portrait by Sully 3. James K. Polk, Portrait by Healy 4. Robert F. Stockton, Daguerreotype (p. 106) Map of Texas Border Region to the South and West in 1845-1846

Abbreviations Used in Annotation AHA—American Historical Association DAB—Dictionary of American Biography Ex. Doc.—United States Congress, Senate, Executive Documents, 1st Session, 29th Congress, Senate Document No. 2, Serial No. 480 LC—Library of Congress, Manuscript Division NA—The National Archives NDA—Navy Department Archives PL—Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections UT—The University of Texas Library, Archives Collection

Origins of the War with Mexico THE POLK-STOCKTON INTRIGUE

CHAPTER

ONE

American Nationalism and Aggressive War: 1845-1846

One hundred and thirty years ago a French writer who had been examining the character of American society closed a volume on that subject with a prescient observation about the developing structure of international relations. Alexis de Tocqueville said the Russians and the Americans had each suddenly placed themselves in the front rank of nations and, he wrote, "each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."1 Tocqueville's prediction is well known to historians; it is commonly cited for the purpose of discountenancing those who see Russian power and influence in the world today simply as the product of a conspiratorial ideology. What is not so well known or appreciated by American historians is the uneasiness and apprehension in Western Europe, only a few years after Tocqueville's forecast, over American aggression against Mexico. It appeared to many that the United States had indeed embarked on a headlong rush to achieve domination of half the globe; and not by the plowshare, as Tocqueville had specified, but by the sword. During the winter of 1845-1846 the foreign policy of the United States was frequently discussed in the French Chamber of Deputies. François Guizot, Prime Minister of the government of Louis Philippe and an eminent historian as well, said that of the four great powers of the world—France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States— only the last was aggressively expanding. The government of the United States had stated the strange doctrine that all European influence was to be excluded from the New World. Guizot thought the principle of the balance of power was not inappropriate to America, 1

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 452.

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

and he asserted that the prospective growth of American power was properly a matter of concern to France. 2 The Journal des Débats, Guizot's organ, was more explicit. Referring to President James K. Polk's address to Congress in December 1845, the paper said it was apparent "that Mr. Polk belongs to a new school and that the American democracy, of whose passion he seems to be the faithful exponent, has given itself up, since its seizure of Texas, to an ambition which may yet be fatal to it," and referred to the American "lust for conquest." The Journal said that the United States had ambitious plans for conquering all the American continent; it went further to give voice to its fear of future American power: "The conquest of Mexico would be a wide step towards the enslavement of the world by the United States." More soberly, Europe was warned that it might sooner or later be "wedged in" and oppressed by two giant powers: "Between the autocracy of Russia on the East, and the democracy of America, aggrandized by the conquest of Mexico, on the West . . . Europe may find herself more compressed than she may one day think consistent with her independence and dignity."3 It is significant that Guizot's paper speaks of the "conquest of Mexico" as a thing decided upon and virtually done, although the time of writing was a few months after the annexation of Texas had been peacefully accomplished and a half year before the beginning of the War with Mexico. But the French government had been in intimate contact with the diplomatic and military developments in Texas during the summer of 1845 and it had no doubt about the shape of things to come; one may add that France did not expect that Mexico would attack the United States. When war began, however, in the spring of 1846, President Polk asserted that it was caused by the armed forces of Mexico having "invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil."4 But in his war message and in other ad2

François Guizot's statement in the French Legislature, given in English translation under "Debate in the French Chamber of Peers," in Niles' National Register, LXX (14 March 1846), 25-28. 3 Quotations from the Journal des Débats appeared in English translation in an article entitled "California," in The American Review, III (January 1846), 82-99, reprinted in Norman A. Graebner (ed.), Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy, pp. 200206. 4 In President James K. Polk's Message to Congress of 11 May 1846, James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, IV, 437-443.

American Nationalism and Aggressive War

5

dresses through his term of office the President labored at such length both to support that statement and to provide other separate and additional justifications for the War that it appeared he did not himself accept Mexican "invasion" as an adequate explanation. A great many foreign and domestic observers, including a majority of the members of the House of Representatives, accepted none of Polk's explanations of the cause of the War. The determined effort of the executive leadership of a nation at war to disclaim responsibility for the initiation of the war is not unusual; on the contrary it is normal and quite predictable behavior. One may add that the historians of that nation, if they do not accept the government's explanations at quite face value, typically begin with the assumptions of their government and usually support the position which their government has taken. The fact is so commonplace and so universally recognized that it may not appear to have any importance; but it is, on the contrary, a significant fact, and this compulsive pattern should be recognized at the outset of an investigation of the origins of a war. In the perspective of the war-making habit of Western societies it points up a marked tension between a dominant cultural system of action on the one hand and the accepted ethical system on the other. That tension has had important consequences for the writing of history. It needs to be emphasized, and it has hardly been said, that our civilization is essentially warlike. William H. McNeill, in a recent important work concerned with the interrelationships of world cultures, notes that Western civilization has a history of extraordinary pugnacity, of the unrestrained use of force. Beginning near the close of the fifteenth century, European societies conquered and exploited other peoples all over the world; a relatively complex military technology and a population inured to a variety of diseases supported the attack upon both primitive societies and ancient civilizations, but the primary "talisman of power" was a deep-rooted pugnacity and recklessness. The evidence is found in the record of every European state as it thrust out into the non-European world. In the early period note the almost incredible brutality of such conquerors as Francisco Pizarro and Hernando de Soto, and the utterly ruthless violence of the Portuguese in the East. A significant indication of the Western addiction to violence is the disdain which the Franciscan Father Matteo Ricci expressed for the Chinese, whom he visited in the sixteenth century, because, as he complained, they lacked the martial virtues. They

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

were excessively civil, and they almost never engaged in violent combat; at most they scuffled without suffering wounds or causing bloodshed. In short, said this Christian cleric, they behaved "like women." The contrast with Christian culture was striking. The effective use of organized violence enabled Western Christendom, developing from the medieval feudal structure and building a commercial-industrialpolitical base on the North Atlantic, to achieve dominance over most of the world.5 Now one expects the value system of a society to support the institutionalized pattern of behavior in such an important area of the life of the community as that of war-making, but in Western civilization it has not done so; on the contrary, the system has been in opposition to the action. The Christian elements in Western culture have been most important in this regard, but secular humanism, with classical as well as Christian roots, has been a force in the same direction. No such contradiction has existed, or at least not on the same scale, in other cultures on the aggressive use of violence by the community to further its ends. The contrast may be seen in the Japanese and the Moslem civilizations. They have been somewhat militaristic, although it must be said that in neither of them has the pugnacity been characteristic of the society generally, as it has in the Christian West; the warriors have been a professional class with a life-style quite different from the remainder of the community, whereas in the West the aggressive use of force has been pervasive. But the Japanese and the Moslems have had very little difficulty with their ethical system as they engaged in aggressive war. They have not found it necessary to deny their aggressions; there has been a deep compulsion to do so in the West. In Western Christendom neither the ethical system nor the institutionalized behavior has altered significantly under the pressure of the contradiction. The historian must certainly be interested in that fact, as, one supposes, must the sociologist, the philosopher, and the theologian. There has not been a great deal of concern about the contradiction. A few intellectuals, to be sure, have complained that the values inculcated by the dominant religion—the virtues of humility, pity, and love for fellow man, including the enemy—have created a "cult of weakness" in the society which tends to unfit it for war. But such complaints smell of the lamp; it is an instructive instance 5 William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, pp. 569-570.

American Nationalism and Aggressive War

7

of the failure of intellectuals to understand or appreciate man's ability to rise above principle. The fascinating questions which this paradox raises in the areas of psychology and philosophy and religion are not our present concern. The interest here is in the consequences which this contradiction has had for the writing of history, and thus for our understanding of our past. The matter may be put hypothetically: Western culture might have been only moderately addicted to aggressive violence and it might have had a value system which would have justified aggression by the group. Had this been the case the histories each nation writes of its own experience would not attempt to prove that it had always resisted aggression in war, that it was never aggressive, and that all of its wars were defensive. But, to summarize, the fact is that the national states of Western civilization have made war on each other as a not-unusual act of international relations and they have been compelled by their ethical system to write the history of their wars as a form of apologetics. Neither the history of the United States nor the histories written by Americans of our wars is an exception to this rule. Indeed, although the record of the United States in war-making is the typical story of a Western nation, Americans have found it rather more difficult than other peoples to deal rationally with their wars. We have thought of ourselves as unique, and of this society as specially planned and created to avoid the errors of all other nations. We have conceived this to be the terminal society, in which the values of Western civilization are in fact adhered to; and this assumption has contributed to the distortion in our explanation of our national behavior. The record of American pugnacity is certainly unavoidable in our past. The settlers in the English colonies disposed of the aborigines with brutal violence. The attitude was similar to that of other European colonists, but some truth emerges from the rather too simplified comparison of the three major European incursions in North America: the Spanish tried to make Spaniards of the Indians, the French became Indians themselves, but the Anglo-Americans thought simply of eliminating the Indians. According to the frontier saying, the only good Indian was a dead Indian, and the Americans worked systematically on that basis toward the improvement of the native Americans. There was also, from the beginning, warfare among the colonists of the several European powers, and the English colonists were not

8

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

less aggressive than the Spanish or the French. Rather the contrary is true, and the Anglo-Americans moved increasingly to the attack as they were successful in these colonial wars. The history of the United States since the founding of the nation by a war against Great Britain has certainly been no more pacific than that of other countries. There was the aggression against the Spanish in the Floridas; the unsuccessful invasion of Canada during the War of 1812; the War with Mexico in 1846-1848 and the filibustering expeditions of Americans into Mexico and Central America and the Caribbean during the 1850's; the war against Spain and the brutal war against the Filipinos for several years thereafter; and in this century the use of American military power in small Latin American countries as well as American participation in two world wars. This is not a record which indicates a disinclination to resort to mass violence. Perhaps some nations of Western Christendom have been more aggressive, some less so; but it is quite impossible to make out the American experience as uniquely restrained in the use of force, or as resorting to force for defensive purposes only. The United States, however, has produced a rhetoric of peace which is unmatched by any other nation, and this continues to the present day. A typical current example of this prevailing American self-image is in a statement of McGeorge Bundy in July of 1965, when he was President Lyndon B. Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs. In an article defending American foreign policy he asserted that "a commitment to peace" is one of the "great strands" in "the operations of the United States in its relationships to the world." Bundy comes out of an American elite subculture, but the language he used demonstrates that on our basic national myths little difference is to be found between the intellectual community and the mass culture. He used the phrases in which generations of Americans have expressed such self-appraisals: "It is right to understand this country as a country of peace. It is a country built by people who came from struggle and strife in other countries." We have, Bundy granted, an "American tradition of battle" to be sure, but this has quite obviously been in the pursuit of peace, for "the inspiration of the nation, the purpose of its people, and therefore, by extension, the purpose of those who are elected by its people must be of peace." 6 These assertions can be assessed meaningfully only as judgments 6 McGeorge Bundy, "The Uses of Responsibility: A Reply to Archibald MacLeish," Saturday Review, XLVIII (3 July 1965), 13.

American Nationalism and Aggressive War

9

of the United States in comparison with other nations; and when that assessment is made one must state flatly that Bundy's generalizations on the American record are simply wrong, that his statements are untrue. But it is appropriate that these expressions of self-esteem, these distortions of the American war record, should issue from the office of the President in 1965; they are in the authentic tradition of the American rhetoric of peace. It demonstrates, if demonstration were needed, the continuing necessity for a candid historical analysis of our wars—and of our explanations of our wars. We have no more instructive experience in our past on this subject than the War against Mexico. It provides an extensive documentation of the unreconciled internal contradiction between professed values and patterns of action. The character of that war, in contrast to the American explanation of the War, is a classic form of the dilemma; this is at least partly because it occurred in a period when the faith in American virtue was wholly undiluted by sobering experience, when the belief in American uniqueness was still untouched by any felt ambiguities. The two men who played the chief roles in the war intrigue of 1845 were representative men. President James K. Polk and Commodore Robert F. Stockton expressed their faith in American righteousness in their actions, and they expressed the myth of American innocence in their writings and addresses. A display of the contents of their minds about the United States as a nation among nations is the appropriate beginning for an analysis of the historical record on their actions. In his Inaugural Address President Polk referred to the government of which he was assuming the executive leadership simply as "this most admirable and wisest system of well-organized self-government among men ever devised by human minds." This was not rodomontade for a ceremonial occasion; Polk was expressing the faith that was in him. Near the end of his term of office he wrote in his Diary that he had "filled the highest station on earth."7 The American mission, in Polk's mind, was literally a divine mission; he would have missed the sarcasm in the jibe that Americans thought of their nation as God's last, supreme effort to make a new 7 Inaugural Address, given on 4 March 1845, Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of Messages and Papers, IV, 375. The Diary entry was on Thursday, 2 November 1848, Milo Milton Quaife (ed.), The Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 177.

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

start in the history of mankind. Polk's addresses are punctuated with references to God and God's country. In his Third Annual Message to Congress he said: "No country has been so much favored, or should acknowledge with deeper reverence the manifestations of the divine protection. An all-wise Creator directed and guarded us in our infant struggle for freedom and has constantly watched over our surprising progress until we have become one of the great nations of the earth." 8 The United States, he said on another occasion, has achieved eminence painlessly. While "other nations have achieved glory at the price of suffering, distress, and impoverishment of their people," the people of the United States have won theirs "in the midst of an uninterrupted prosperity and of an increasing individual comfort and happiness."9 Polk's explanations of American foreign relations are classic formulations of the American illusion. In his Inaugural Address he complained that the United States was misunderstood by other nations: "Foreign powers do not seem to appreciate the true character of our government. Our Union is a confederation of independent States, whose policy is peace with each other and all the world. To enlarge its limits is to extend the dominions of peace over additional territories and increasing millions."10 During the War with Mexico the President informed Congress that it was "a source of high satisfaction to know that the relations of the United States with all other nations, with a single exception, are of the most amicable character." He followed this expression of gratification that the United States was engaged in only one war at the time with a statement of the American "spirit" on war and peace: "Sincerely attached to the policy of peace early adopted and steadily pursued by this government, I have anxiously desired to cultivate and cherish friendship and commerce with every foreign power. The Spirit and habits of the American people are favorable to the maintenance of such international harmony." 11 The conviction of righteousness, the assurance of perfect virtue while waging war against Mexico, is nowhere better displayed than 8 Third Annual Message, 7 December 1847, Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of Messages and Papers, IV, 533. 9 Fourth Annual Message, 5 December 1848, ibid., p. 629. 10 Inaugural Address, given on 4 March 1845, ibid., p. 375. 11 Second Annual Message, 8 December 1846, ibid., p. 472.

American Nationalism and Aggressive War

11

in a message which Polk sent to Congress, prepared by his Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker. In this document the Administration recommended the imposition of "burdensome" and "onerous" duties upon imports in Mexico through ports held by the armed forces of the United States; Polk thought this imposition would induce the Mexican people to seek relief from their suffering by forcing their rulers to accept the peace terms of the United States. The financial burden should be placed "upon our enemies, the people of Mexico, and not upon ourselves," the President explained, and then he communicated this remarkable formulation of American self-righteousness : "In the meantime it is not just that Mexico, by her obstinate persistence in this contest, should compel us to overthrow our own financial policy and arrest this great nation in her high and prosperous career."12 The President constantly spoke of the American devotion to peace. During the last months of the War against Mexico he said: "It has ever been our cherished policy to cultivate peace and good will with all nations, and this policy has been steadily pursued by me." 13 At the close of his term, when the United States had acquired half the area of Mexico as the fruit of the War, Polk began his address to Congress with high praise for American virtue. The representatives of the people had again gathered "under the benignant providence of Almighty God," he said, to "deliberate for the public good." He continued: The gratitude of the nation to the Sovereign Arbiter of All Human Events should be commensurate with the boundless blessings which we enjoy. Peace, plenty, and contentment reign throughout our borders, and our beloved country presents a sublime moral spectacle to the world.14 Polk was not a popular President. He was the first "dark horse" in the history of the office, and the experiment did not seem to be a success, either to his contemporaries or to historians for a half century and more following. During the last few decades, however, the President who acquired California by means of war against Mexico and thereupon announced that the United States presented a "sublime moral spectacle to the world" has been sharply upgraded by American historians. That curious revisionism has not been the consequence 12 13 14

Message given on 30 March 1847, ibid., pp. 525-529. Message given on 7 December 1847, ibid., p. 533. Message given on 5 December 1848, ibid., p. 629.

12

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

of new information; it is rather the product of a sufficiently self-advertised, tough-minded sophistication among historians in the United States in recent years. The current strength of the revisionist appraisal of Polk constitutes another reason for a more thorough analysis of the 1845 war intrigue in Texas. Commodore Robert F. Stockton, Polk's agent in Texas in 1845, is not a major figure in American history and his career and his ideas are not well known. It will be necessary to examine his life at some length in a later chapter; here it will be helpful to look at some of Stockton's views on the role of the United States in the world in the middle of the nineteenth century. A few years following the War with Mexico, Stockton was a United States senator from New Jersey. He spoke in the Senate in 1852 on the issue of "interventionism" by one nation in the affairs of other nations, an issue which had been raised by the unsuccessful effort of the Hungarians to establish their independence in 1848. That effort had been crushed by the intervention of the Russian army, and the "friends of freedom" in the United States welcomed Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian leader who had gone into exile. Most public men in America who spoke for the Hungarian cause attacked the Russian government for its intervention and asserted that it must be established as a principle of international law that no nation had the right to intervene in such a revolution under any conditions. Stockton did not agree. He said it would be a mistake for the United States to take that position "as long as there is a single despotic government existing whose people rise to demand the blessings of liberty." He described the situation in the world in the seventy-sixth year of the existence of the United States of America: Sir, when we cast our eyes over the world, everywhere, with the exception of America, we see the surface of the whole earth appropriated by absolute monarchs. The only country which enjoys Republican Government, and whose people adequately appreciate free institutions, is the United States. Those free institutions comprehend all that survives of free principles and political liberty. In them is concentrated all that is valuable of what man has ever achieved in qualifying himself for self-government. . . . We are, in truth, the residuary legatees of all that the blood and treasure of mankind, expended for four thousand years, have accomplished in the cause of human freedom. In our hands alone is the precious deposit. Before God and the world, we are responsible for the legacy. Not for our own benefit only, but the benefit of the whole family of man.

American Nationalism and Aggressive War

13

A man with that kind of vision of the unique value of his own society is not apt to hold himself to conventional rules and technicalities in the relations of men or of nations as he endeavors to preserve and enlarge a precious heritage. That "precious deposit" of liberty, Stockton said, should be developed and extended by war only under "peculiar circumstances," but it is apparent that he thought such circumstances would arise not infrequently. Since the "whole world, wherever you look," except for the United States was under monarchical governments, he desired to know "how the oppressed and fettered nations of the earth are to break their chains, and maintain themselves against the armies of despotism" if there should be a law of nations against intervention in their behalf. Stockton concluded that the United States had "an indisputable and perfect right to interfere [in another nation] whenever, by such interference, she can promote her own interests and advance the cause of liberty."15 During the Presidency of James K. Polk the United States did intervene in a neighboring country; it promoted its own interests, in Stockton's words, and in the language of President Polk, it "extended the dominions of peace over additional territories." An understanding of the origins of that intervention is not to be found on the eve of the action. An examination of Mexican-American relations for the score of years before the War is necessary to comprehend the forces operating in the Polk-Stockton intrigue. 15 [Samuel John Bayard], A Sketch of the Life of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, Appendix E, pp. 94-98.

CHAPTER

TWO

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico: 1825-1845

Wilson Shannon, the last American minister to Mexico prior to the break in relations which preceded the Mexican War, on 14 October 1844 presented a dispatch to the Mexican Minister of Relations, Manuel C. Rejón, which stated, in a remarkable display of open diplomacy, that the acquisition of Texas had been a cherished American policy for twenty years. The communication, written in accordance with instructions from John C. Calhoun, Secretary of State under President John Tyler, discussed the current effort of the United States to annex Texas, a province of Mexico which had revolted eight years earlier and had maintained its independence since that time, although still claimed by Mexico. The American minister said that while annexation was pending the United States could not permit any attempt by Mexico to reconquer Texas. Of the desire of his countrymen to secure Texas, Shannon wrote: "It has been a measure of policy long cherished and deemed indispensable to their [the United States'] safety and welfare, and has accordingly been an object steadily pursued by all parties, and the acquisition of the territory made the subject of negociation [sic] by almost every administration for the last twenty years." 1 These words initiated an acrimonious correspondence. Rejón rejected the communication in a reply of 31 October, which charged the American government with a history of devious intrigues in an 1 William R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, VIII, Mexico, 1831-1848, Document 3557, 644-649. This correspondence is discussed in George Lockhart Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, I, 667, and in James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, pp. 123124.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

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effort to obtain Mexican territory. He observed that Shannon's note "disclosed the perfidiousness with which Mexico has so long been treated," and he scored the American minister's attempt "to base on the security of the United States the right to seize a fertile and vast province belonging to a neighboring nation." Shannon's reply of 4 November demanded the withdrawal of that note on the ground that it was insulting to the United States: "The note repeatedly charges, in terms the most grossly offensive, the government and people of the United States with falsehood, artifice, intrigues and designs of a dishonorable character and with barefaced usurpation." Rejón responded with an added charge of "bad faith" by earlier United States administrations. He said he could have amplified "the facts which . . . show to the world that system of deceit which has been followed toward Mexico for the last twenty years, and which the American Legation's note of the 14th of October has just confirmed." The Mexican Minister said that the American government was trying to provoke a "breach" between the two nations, and asserted that the Mexican government would continue its efforts to prevent a conflict. Shannon replied with the threat that the United States "can and will correct the erroneous opinion" of Mexico "by means more efficient than any written refutation by the undersigned of the calumnies made and reiterated in the notes of Mr. Rejón, would be." He answered Rejón's charge that the American government had practiced deceit in regard to Texas with the statement that at no time during the whole period mentioned was the government of Mexico ignorant of the American desire to acquire Texas.2 Shannon closed this letter of 8 November with the comment that there could be no further intercourse between himself and the government of Mexico until his government in Washington had reviewed the correspondence and given him further instructions. On 12 November he wrote to Secretary Calhoun that in view of Mexico's stated intention of recovering Texas, and its failure to pay past-due installments to the United States under the agreement which had been reached earlier on American claims, it was no longer wise to exercise forbearance: ". . . it is time for Congress to begin to act, and vindicate the honor of the country as well as the just rights of our plundered citizens." On that same date Shannon sent a private note to Calhoun: 2 Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence, VIII, Mexico, Document 3559, 654-663; Document 3560, 663-664; Document 3561, 664-665; Document 3562, 666-675.

16

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

The insolence of this government is beyond indurence [sic] and if it is submited [sic] to in one case it will only give incouragement [sic] to its repitition [sic]. I think we should take high ground with Mexico and let her distinctly understand that She must retract her insults and do us justice in all matters of complaint which we have against her. I am fully convinced we can do nothing with Mexico as to the settlement of any of the difficulties we have with her until we either whip her, or make her believe we will do so I think we ought to present to Mexico an ultimatum.3 The Tyler Administration did not act directly on that advice. It continued to press for the annexation of Texas and in the last few days of its power acted to implement the congressional resolution providing for the accession; but it took no further diplomatic action in Mexico. The revolution which drove Santa Anna from power in early January 1845 led Shannon to think that the American objectives might be secured from the new government; but there was no basis for this hope, as he soon discovered. He remained in Mexico uselessly until Polk's Secretary of State, James Buchanan, called him home. On 8 May 1845 Shannon asked the Mexican government to provide him with a passport to enable him to leave the country.4 The Shannon-Rejón exchange of notes in the fall of 1844 represents in summary the character, the tone, and much of the substance of the diplomacy of the United States in Mexico from the time of the arrival of the first United States minister there in the summer of 1825. A review of that twenty-year encounter between the two republics is required to do justice to the Polk Administration. There is the danger, if one is ignorant of this background, of crediting Polk with far more originality and creativity in his aggressive designs against Mexico than is warranted. It is enough that he moved on from intrigue and threats to the direct use of force. In the spring of 1825 President John Quincy Adams sent Joel R. Poinsett as the first United States minister to the Republic of Mexico. Poinsett carried instructions requiring him to attempt to persuade the government of Mexico to sell the province of Texas to the United States. He was to use the argument with the Mexican officials that such 3

Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence, VIII, Mexico, Document 3563, 676-680. The private note is printed in J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 995. 4 Callahan, Mexican Relations, pp. 131-132; Shannon, 15 January 1845, to Duff Green, Duff Green Papers, LC; Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence, VIII, Mexico, Document 3580, 714.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

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a cession would have the beneficial effect of placing the capital city of Mexico more nearly in the center of the country.5 Historians who have noted this extraordinary diplomatic instruction have referred to it as "amazingly naive," as having been considered an insult by Mexican officials, and as having aroused suspicion of American intentions; but the document has not been used to throw light upon the preconceptions of American diplomacy of the period in relation to Mexico.6 This behavior is not simply absurd; it means something. The President who authorized that diplomatic instruction was not a provincial or naive American, as some chief executives of the United States have been. John Quincy Adams was an acute statesman, trained in diplomatic negotiation by experience as the United States representative to the major nations of Europe—The Netherlands, Russia, Prussia, France, and Great Britain. Secretary of State Henry Clay, who drafted the instruction, while by no means Adams' equal in diplomatic experience, had been an American representative at Ghent in the negotiation of the treaty with Britain which concluded the War of 1812, and he was an able and sophisticated politician. The diplomacy of the United States with Mexico reflected the prevailing judgment of the American people on Mexicans. The attitude was that there was very little difference between an Indian and a Mexican; serious and respectful diplomacy was out of place in either case. By the time of the Mexican War it was standard political rhetoric that the Mexicans were incapable of self-government; the argument turned on whether or not the United States should undertake to govern them. One argument ran that it would be a violation of American political principle to rule them as colonials and it would be destructive of the American government to allow the Mexicans to participate in governing. The other position, as put by the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1848, was that the Mexicans could be removed to reservations just as the Indians in the United States had been, and, as for voting, "the Indians had not gone up to vote that he knew of."7 5 William R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico, pp. 287-288. The letter of instructions was dated 26 March 1825, from Secretary of State Henry Clay. See discussion by Callahan, Mexican Relations, p. 33. 6 See, for example, Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, I, 580; or Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 237. 7 Quoted by Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation, pp. 165-166. The senator was Ambrose Sevier.

18

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

It is quite impossible to make sense of United States-Mexican relations in the period through the War and later without an understanding of this psychological factor, and it was in no way complex or subtle. One has always to keep in mind that United States actions issued from American conceptions of Mexico and of Mexicans; America was, as it has always been, a racist society. Thus President Adams could sit in the capital of his country on the Atlantic shelf and instruct his minister to Mexico to persuade the Mexicans that they should take advantage of the opportunity of getting their capital city nearer to the center of their territories by transferring Texas to the United States. If that is not understood, much else will not be understood. Forces and influences other than diplomatic were at work in Texas, as was to be the case in California somewhat later. At the very beginning of Mexican independence from Spain, Stephen F. Austin had obtained a concession from the Mexican government providing for the colonization of two hundred American families in one of the most fertile areas of Texas. In 1824 he was granted further privileges of colonization. By 1830, 20,000 people were there, slave and free. The Americans were growing restless under the rather unpredictable government in Mexico City, although in fact that government pursued a policy of neglect, which was salutary for the Americans but which stored up problems for the future. The discontent, indeed, was more an uneasiness at the prospect of things to come than a resentment at any present imposition. In 1829 slavery was abolished in Mexico, but the remonstrance in Texas was so vigorous that the province was excepted from the decree. The threat of the loss of their "chattel property" thenceforth hung over the heads of the Americans in Texas. Historians, intent upon disentangling themselves from the thesis of a conspiracy of the slavocracy in the Texas affair, have muted this note as a factor in the Texas Revolution; but there is no question whatsoever but that it played a part. 8 There were other causes of friction. Americans constantly tried, and not always unsuccessfully, to evade the payment of customs duty at the ports, and they regularly violated the immigration laws. They resented the Mexican army garrisons in Texas, a resentment in which the racial factor played no small role, for here were inferiors armed and clothed with authority. This antagonism increased with the increase in Ameri8

For the "slave power" interpretation see Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North Mexican States and Texas, II {The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, XVI), 90-93.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

19

can settlers, partly because in the early 1830's the frontier province became the refuge of restless and violent men from the Mississippi River towns and the Gulf Coast, men who assumed the lead in resisting the laws of the "foreigners" in whose land they lived. Poinsett discovered at the very beginning of his mission that the Mexican government was suspicious of American intentions toward Texas; within the first month of his arrival in Mexico City he wrote to Clay that it would be preferable to await the effects of American immigration which, by producing problems of government for Mexico, would make it less opposed to the cession of the territory. He kept the idea alive through his five-year mission, but he soon lost any expectation of success. In 1827 he was authorized to offer a million dollars for the territory north of the Rio Grande, but, finding it hopeless, he did not formally make the offer. When he privately hinted that the United States was prepared to offer a substantial money consideration he was told that neither the executive office nor the Mexican Congress would consent to the sale or dismemberment of Mexican territory, which, in fact, was prohibited by the Constitution.9 Poinsett was an able man, unquestionably the most competent American minister to hold that post prior to the War, an evaluation which does not constitute immoderate praise. But he made the cardinal error of becoming deeply involved in the politics of the country, particularly in connection with his work in establishing the York Rite Masonic organization in that Roman Catholic nation. These activities were not helpful in the attempt to purchase a portion of the country and in December of 1829 he was replaced by President Andrew Jackson's good friend, Anthony Butler. Butler traveled to Mexico by way of Texas and wrote to Secretary of State Martin Van Buren from San Antonio that the bankrupt condition of Mexico should assist in attaining "the object so interesting to our government—a retrocession of Texas." He was carrying a letter from Jackson with instructions for that negotiation. The President said it was "very important to the harmony and peace of the two republics" that the United States acquire Texas, because the nature of the population in Texas was calculated to create "jealousy" in Mexico: "Its inhabitants will make an effort to set up a free government the moment they have the power, and we shall be charged with aiding this movement altho all our constitutional powers may be employed to prevent it." 9

Callahan, Mexican Relations, pp. 50-53.

20

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

Jackson added a postscript advising a deceptive maneuver which he quite obviously regarded as shrewdly designed to manipulate the Mexican officials. A letter of general instructions for Butler would be sent to him in care of Poinsett in Mexico City. These instructions, said President Jackson, . . . you are at liberty to shew, very confidentially, and as a mere voluntary act of your own, to the President of Mexico, or other high functionaries of that Government. When you read them you will discover there is nothing said about the purchase of Texas—you are referred to the instructions sent out by you, to Mr. Poinsett, for your government on that subject, and being left out of your general instructions, nothing but good can grow out of confidentially showing to the President these general instructions as a mark of your own confidence in him. It is all important, that these instructions are shown to them of your own mere will, & begging at the same time that it may not be known to us—but in such a manner as to induce a belief that it must be kept a profund [sic] secrete [sic] from your own government, as on that event, it would destroy you. When you have read this P.S. and my private letter you will burn them both, first, if you please, taking notes from them—not being accustomed to diplomacy these might be stolen from you & made a handle against this government.10 This is a characteristic document of the period of American expansion for the thirty years prior to the Civil War. The sober, naive, and carefully ruthless officials of the American government betrayed the effects of the aggressive fever whenever they sought to use the power of the nation. They thought of themselves as adroit and shrewd, they habitually resorted to intrigue, and they never failed to be discovered. The Duc de La Rochefoucauld had marked the type in the age of Louis XIV: a habit of intrigue, he said, is the mark of a little mind, and "the surest way to be taken in is to think oneself craftier than other people." 11 Whether Butler tried Jackson's scheme does not appear; if he did, no good came of it. He schemed and maneuvered for six years, and no good came of anything he tried. In a cast of men who were not burdened with scruples, Butler was the most unscrupulous, personally as well as in his official capacity. He had invested in Texas land and had a per10 Butler, from "near Rio Nueces," 3 November 1829, to Van Buren. This is apparently Butler's letter-copy. Jackson, Washington, 19 October 1829, to Butler, Anthony Butler Papers, UT. 11 François, Duc de La Rochefoucauld, Maxims, p. 50.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

21

sonal financial interest in the transfer of the territory to the United States. His financial operations in Mexico City were notorious; he was accused of having lent three thousand dollars to an English grocer there at the "usorious interest of 2 2 % a month." He bullied officials of the Mexican government, threatened one with chastisement and sought a duel with him. He had a reputation for scandalous conduct socially. Such a man made no contribution to the maintenance of good relations, or to the amicable settlement of problems which arose between the two nations; yet Butler was retained in his post for six years.12 Butler conducted his pursuit of Texas in the same character as he did his personal affairs. On one occasion he suggested to Jackson that a loan be made to Mexico with Texas as security, observing that this gesture would be tantamount to buying the territory since Mexico would be unable to repay the loan. His usual and persistent practice, however, was to seek the goal through bribery. He promised an official of the Mexican government that if he could contrive the cession of Texas he would personally receive $200,000. He wrote President Jackson that he would expect to use $1,000,000 of any sum available for the purchase of Texas in purchasing men, and the remainder for the purchase of the country.13 Jackson in fact had authorized the use of part of the money for bribery. He wrote to Butler: Provided you keep within your instructions and obtain the cession it is not for your consideration whether the Government of Mexico applies the money to the purchase of men or to pay their public debt. It is not for you to inquire how they will apply the consideration for the cession which we shall pay—all we want is a good and unencumbered Cession of Territory.14 On another occasion Jackson wrote, "The five millions of dollars being 12

Justin Harvey Smith, The War with Mexico, I, 62. Several letters in the Anthony Butler Papers, UT: there is a copy of a letter from a citizen of Mexico to Secretary of State Edward Livingston, 15 February 1833, charging Butler with dishonorable conduct toward honorable Mexican young women; a copy of a letter from Butler, 15 August 1830, to the State Department, defending himself against accusations made for his quarrel with a General Tornei. 13 Drafts of letters, Butler, Mexico City, 10 February and 14 September 1833, to Jackson, Anthony Butler Papers, Archives Division, Texas State Library. In the letter of 14 September, Butler gave his opinion of the Mexican people: "Genl. St. Anna is ignorant, bigotted, and insincere. He is proverbially the most hypocritical and insincere of the whole Mexican Nation, and Heaven knows worse cannot be said." 14 Jackson, Washington, 30 October 1833, to Butler, marked "Private," Butler Papers, UT.

22

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

the consideration, it can be disposed of in the negotiation as the minister of Mexico appointed to confer with you, may deem proper." 15 Jackson, however, was not prepared for the kind of open diplomacy which Butler practiced. After receiving a report from Butler the President wrote that he had read the "confidential letter" with "care, and astonishment . . . astonishment that you would entrust such a letter, without being in cypher, to the mail." Butler's letter implied that authorization had been given to use some of the funds for the purpose of corrupting Mexican officials. Jackson said that "nothing could be farther from my intention than to convey such an idea." He warned Butler "to give these shrewd fellows no room to charge you with tampering with their officers to obtain the cession thro [sic] corruption." He concluded with the instruction: "The case is a plain & clear one—you are authorised [sic] to give five million dollars for the cession of Texas as far west as the grand Desert " 16 Butler felt ill-used by the President. He drew up a reply in which he said that more than two years earlier he had written to Jackson that "the best if not the only mode of procuring a transfer of T would be to apply a part of the sum designed as purchase money for the country to conciliate certain individuals . . . and that to insure success to such a negotiation . . . it would be necessary to employ money as the agent." Butler quoted Jackson's reply that "it was a matter of no consequence to the U.S. Government how the money was expended," and then Butler complained: Now I beg of you sir to weigh these expressions of yours and then say whether I could construe them in any other sense than as authority to make use of any part of the 5,000,000 in conciliating or corrupting if you please, influential individuals to aid me in the object contemplated, and without which I saw that a successful negotiation was out of the question.17 Butler added that he had planned to cover the bribes with a secret article providing payments to officials for supposed personal indemnities. A decade later opponents of the annexation of Texas discovered 15

Jackson, Washington, 14 February 1833, to Butler, marked "Private," ibid. Jackson, Washington, 27 November 1833, to Butler, ibid. The "grand Desert" refers to the barren country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Other references to this as the desirable boundary are made by American officials. This is significant in connection with the controversy over the boundary which developed in 1845-1846; see Chapter Ten below. 17 Butler, 6 February 1834, to Jackson, draft copy, Anthony Butler Papers, Texas State Library, Archives Division. 16

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

23

some of Butler's correspondence relating to bribery and they published attacks on him. He felt he was being charged with responsibility for methods authorized by his government, and that Jackson, then in retirement at The Hermitage, should defend him. He wrote to Jackson, 28 July 1843, reminding him that as early as May 1830 the President had told him "all Spaniards love money, and with the sum you have at command you may do much in securing the assistance of such as are necessary by appealing to their interest" Thereafter, he observed, Jackson had objected in writing to the idea of corruption, but when Butler returned to Washington to see him, in a private interview the President had assented "to my doing the very thing by which you had been so much startled," saying, "Settle it with Mr. Forsyth [the Secretary of State] and manage the affair as you please but do not let me know it." A year after Jackson's death Butler wrote to Joel Poinsett to complain of the treatment he had received. He said he had told Jackson that one of the President's letters "would greatly lessen his reputation in the estimation of the whole moral world if published."18 President Jackson had made an effort to keep the government, and himself, clear of any evidence of intent to bribe Mexican officials. On one occasion, when he received a letter from Butler referring to the use of money to "smooth the negotiations," he scribbled on the back of the letter, "A. Butler. What a scamp!" But Jackson's true position is made quite clear by the fact that he kept Butler in Mexico, engaged in these efforts, until the winter of 1835-1836, when the Mexican government asked for his recall.19 Powhatan Ellis, the next American minister, had no better success in the effort to secure some of the Mexican territory, but he was placed in a peculiarly difficult situation; he was given the appointment just a few months before the Texans rebelled and established their independence, and anything like normal relations between Mexico and the United States became very difficult to achieve during the following decade. Mexicans saw the hand of the United States government in the "Texas game" from the beginning: the movement of American settlers into Texas, many legally and under contract, but many others illegally; the stimulation of resistance to the Mexican government; the furnishing 18 Butler, Independence [Missouri?], 28 July 1843, to Jackson, photocopy from Andrew Jackson Papers, LC, in Anthony Butler Papers, UT; Butler, Owenborough, Kentucky, 8 July 1846, to Poinsett, typed copy, Anthony Butler Papers, UT. 19 Rives, US. and Mexico, I, 255; Smith, The War with Mexico, I, 63.

24

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

of arms and men to fight the Mexican troops when the revolt began, and the incursion of American armed forces over the frontier line into Texas on one occasion during the rebellion of the Texans; and the long history of efforts of American representatives to secure the Mexican province by devious and corrupt methods. When, within a short time after Texas had expelled Mexican power from the territory, efforts began both in Texas and in the United States for the annexation and incorporation into the Union, the confirmation of all the charges of aggressive intrigue seemed complete. Although Mexico made no serious effort to reconquer Texas, she stubbornly refused to acknowledge the independence of the territory, just as, similarly, Spain refused for years to accept formally the loss of her one-time colonies in the Americas. Occasional clashes of small groups of armed forces erupted sporadically in the border regions of Mexico and Texas, more often due to Texan adventures than to Mexican initiatives. The continuing state of hostilities contributed toward keeping the Texas question a running sore in Mexican politics. Further complicating Mexican-American relations were the claims which United States citizens accumulated through the years against the Mexican government for injuries suffered or financial losses sustained by actions of that government and of Mexican citizens. The government was unstable, to put the best face upon it, and often failed to maintain an orderly society; and the frequent revolutions made life and property unsafe even in the major urban centers. Foreigners and Mexican citizens suffered impartially. Britain and France put what pressure they could on Mexico to obtain financial satisfaction for their citizens, the French resorting to a bombardment of Veracruz in 1838. But the United States urged its claims most aggressively over the years until in 1845 President Polk proposed to declare war against Mexico on that account if the government refused to settle the claims by transferring some of her territory. Mexico had from the beginning acknowledged her responsibility for losses suffered by Americans, a position which contrasted favorably with several state governments of the United States that had defaulted on their obligations to British and French investors. Mississippi, Michigan, Arkansas, and Florida had simply repudiated the bonds which had been sold to European investors. By 1842 state debts, mostly held in Europe, amounted to nearly $200,000,000. Mexico's financial delinquencies were comparatively insignificant. In 1837 the American government formally presented fifty-seven

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

25

cases to the government of Mexico and demanded redress. Mexico proposed arbitration by an international tribunal, and a convention for the purpose was executed in April of 1839. In 1842 the sum of $2,026,149 was awarded to the United States. In January 1843 an agreement was entered into providing for the payment of the sum, with interest, within five years in equal quarterly installments. Three payments were made and then Mexico defaulted; the government did not repudiate, but admitted its inability to pay.20 Prior to 1836 the effort of the American government to secure Texas had taken the form, as described above, of diplomatic activity in Mexico, with some unusual variations. During the decade following Texan independence the effort necessarily took the form of a political campaign in the United States and in the Republic of Texas. That campaign had favorable prospects from the beginning. If a substantial sentiment for the incorporation of Texas into the American Union was evident when Texas was a province of Mexico it is not surprising that after 1836, when Texas was a country of former Americans with all their ties running into the American states, that the movement for acquisition should gain greatly increased strength. What needs explaining is not the incorporation of the territory after a decade, but rather the delay in that predictable development. The process was delayed by the rising sectional controversy centering on the slavery issue and complicated by party politics in a period when political alignments were confused and party discipline slack; by the development of some independent "national" feeling in Texas, limited though it was pretty largely to political leaders there; and more directly by the circumstance that the President of the United States from 1837 to 1841, Martin Van Buren, was not himself an advocate of annexation and drew his support largely from constituencies which were lukewarm on the matter if not actively hostile to the project. The situation changed in the summer of 1841, when John Tyler became President following the death of William Henry Harrison. Tyler made the annexation of Texas his primary objective, an interest involving relations with Mexico because of the continual state of belligerency between Texas and that country. The boundary between Texas and Mexico also was a problem if any peaceful relationship was to be 20 The "claims controversy" is treated at length by Clayton Charles Kohl, Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War, and more briefly in the histories of the War and in diplomatic histories. Jesse S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, discusses the issues carefully.

26

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

established, whether with an independent Texas or with the United States enlarged by the acquisition of the former Mexican province. Tyler also sought to acquire all or part of another Mexican province, Alta California; with the pursuit of this objective, all of the counters were in play which led to the War with Mexico. It is important now to turn to a close, if necessarily brief, examination of the diplomacy of the United States with Mexico during the two or three years just prior to the Polk-Stockton intrigue. Early in 1842 President Tyler named Waddy Thompson to replace Powhatan Ellis as American minister to Mexico. Thompson was a Whig who had been congressman from his district in South Carolina from 1835 until 1841 and had been a vigorous advocate of the annexation of Texas.21 While he was negotiating the claims agreement with Mexico in the summer of 1842 he received a letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster suggesting that he "might take occasion to fall into conversation, if circumstances favor, with the Mexican Secretary, respecting Upper California." At year's end Webster wrote again at some length on the desirability of California, remarking that he presumed Thompson had not regarded it expedient to discuss the matter with the Mexican government earlier, but that the subject might well be opened at this time.22 Webster thus connected the subjects of the claims, California, and the Texas controversy, and a very close continuity of diplomatic policy was exacted from this time on to the beginning of the War in the spring of 1846. Tyler's primary objective was Texas, but had he had time to do so once Texas was secured he would undoubtedly have developed a drive for California much as Polk was to do. On the same date that his Secretary, Webster, wrote to Thompson about California, Tyler wrote the Minister to say: "The acquisition of California is a thing uppermost in the public mind. Do you think that it is possible to bring it about?" California was not, in fact, uppermost in the public mind; it had not become a public issue at that time, nor during the campaign of 1844, 21 The original appointment document and other documents relating to the negotiation of the claims agreement with Mexico are in the Waddy Thompson Papers, LC. An important letter to his wife, dated 27 April 1842 from Mexico City, describes Thompson's journey to the capital, his appraisal of the people, his hopes for his mission, and his judgment of his predecessor: "I find Ellis the late minister a well intentioned but very weak man" (Waddy Thompson Papers, University of North Carolina Library).

22 Webster, Washington, 30 December 1842, to Thompson, marked "Private and Confidential," Waddy Thompson Papers, U T .

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27

nor ever prior to its acquisition during the War. From the time of Webster's tenure as Secretary of State, however, the acquisition of California was an objective of the government in Washington, and it is not merely coincidence that Webster's constituency was deeply interested in the commerce of California, the Northwest Coast, and the Pacific area generally.23 Webster wrote directly to the point in his letter to Thompson dated 30 December 1842: The utility of a good port, on the Western end of the Continent, in those latitudes, to the Commerce & fisheries of the United States is sufficiently obvious. The Country, we suppose, is not at present, nor is soon likely to be, of any great value to Mexico. . . . There are not supposed to be more than three thousand inhabitants, in the whole country; nor is it probable, that under any Goverment [sic], a sudden & large increase of population would take place. . . . Its principal immediate value to the United States would be in its commercial advantages. Webster said he would be pleased if Thompson "should find an opportunity to feel the pulse of Mr. Bocanegra," the Mexican Minister of Relations, on the subject of California; Webster cautioned that "it must of course be done with great delicacy, & not with too much appearance of strong desire." The Secretary concluded his dispatch with a statement of what the United States had a right to expect of Mexico; it is a document of primary importance in its revelation of the American spirit in relation to its Latin American neighbor: The true policy of Mexico is quite obvious. It is, in the first place, to recognize Texas; in the second place, to let us take Upper California, for what it is fairly worth; &, finally, to give up projects of war, & aggrandisement [sic!], & turn her thoughts to peace, & the improvement of her own resources. Any man will do her a great favor, who can enforce these truths upon her Goverment [sic].24 At the same time, Thompson was receiving unofficial encouragement from Washington to try to secure California from Mexico. On 16 December 1842 W. B. Lewis, Jackson's close friend and an influential politician, wrote: 23

Tyler, Washington, 30 December 1842, to Thompson, marked "Confidential," ibid. 24 Webster, Washington, 30 December 1842, to Thompson, ibid.

28

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

If you can only obtain a cession of the port and Bay of St. Francisco to the U. States you will crown yourself with glory and lay your country under great additional obligations to you. Without that valuable and important Harbour, as a rendevouz [sic] for our Navy, it will be impossible for our Government to give an efficient protection to our commerce in the Pacific Ocean. But England will prevent any such cession if within her power. She wants that Harbour herself and is making, if I am not wrongly informed, great efforts to get it. You will, therefore, have to keep a bright look out.25 Thompson made no progress in the effort to persuade Mexico to "let us take Upper California"; nor, of course, did any other diplomat, in Mexico or in Washington; it was an objective which required a war for its accomplishment, a conclusion to which Polk was to be reluctantly driven. Abel P. Upshur, appointed Secretary of State following Webster's resignation, devoted his efforts primarily to the annexation of Texas. One of the objections argued by the opponents of annexation was the complications which must inevitably ensue due to the continuing desultory hostilities on the Texas-Mexican border. On 13 December 1843 Upshur wrote Thompson that the United States should demand of Mexico that she either reach a settlement with Texas or "show her ability with respectable force to prosecute the war." That was an unusual requirement to be laid upon Mexico by a third country, a nation presumably not involved in the matter. But of course it did have important significance in relation to the objectives of the American government.26 Upshur was killed by the gun explosion on Commodore Stockton's ship in February of 1844.27 Tyler appointed John C. Calhoun to replace him and that statesman pushed energetically, if not always diplomatically, for the acquisition of Texas. On his assumption of the office a letter came from Jackson urging haste in annexing Texas; and Jackson connected that objective with California in a unique fashion, basing his analysis on a conception which reflected his military experience on the frontier rather more than on a grasp of the realities of the foreign relations of the time. He wrote that "the present golden moment to obtain Texas must not be lost, or Texas must, from necessity, be thrown 25 Lewis, Washington, 16 December 1842, to Thompson, Waddy Thompson Papers, University of North Carolina Library. 26 Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Mexico, V (The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, XIII), 333. 27 See below, Chapter Four.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

29

into the arms of England and be forever lost to the United States." And if Great Britain controlled Texas, the former President asserted, that power could easily interpose a force to stop emigration of Americans to California. His argument reveals that Jackson, who even in retirement was probably the most influential man in the Democratic Party, confidently assumed that after Texas was secured another Mexican province was to be acquired by the United States.28 During these years just prior to the War, whenever the Texas issue moved from the narrow one of simple annexation to the means, or to the difficulties which stood in the way, or to the opportunities which the Texas objective opened up, the scope of the discussion seemed automatically to expand to include California. Americans in California were quite conscious of the extent to which the Texas negotiations affected the future of the Mexican province in which they were living. In the minds of these Americans who had gone beyond the American frontier was the settled calculation that all the western part of the continent would become part of the United States—Texas, Oregon, California, New Mexico; it was only a question of time and of the means to accomplish the change in sovereignty. The way in which these regions, under different sovereignties at the time but destined for United States ownership, were interrelated in the calculations of Americans is illustrated in a letter which Thomas Oliver Larkin, United States consul in Monterey, California, wrote to Robert J. Walker in August of 1844. Walker, soon to be Secretary of the Treasury in Polk's Cabinet, was one of the most vigorous advocates of American expansion—to the south, the west, and the north. Larkin asked for a copy of a Walker letter on the annexation of Texas which had appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin of 23 March 1844, as a "great favor to me and my countrymen living in the farest [sic] West, for we are far beyond what is known by the Tar West' in the States." Larkin referred to Walker as being the "oldest advocate" of extending United States jurisdiction over Oregon, and then added: By a New York paper I found a list of about twenty Senators of our Congress, who are determined not to part with an inch of the Origon [sic] unless the English Government can purchase degrees of California and exchange it for the same number of degrees North of the Columbia [sic]. The American who brings this arrangement into effect will deserve well of his country. As the Administrador of this Custom House observed to me, 28

323.

John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, VII,

30

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

that would be a Yankee bargain, outstripping all the Yankee's [sic] had ever done before in the way of trade (here we all pass for Yankees whether from Maine or Florida). Should this ever be accomplished, two more degrees South should be added to enclude [sic] all California, if agreeable to Mexico. Larkin, however, was not optimistic about the prospects for obtaining California from Mexico by purchase. He observed that "every Nation holds all its possessions valuable, and perhaps the more remote the land, the more strong the desire to retain it." He thought that California was in fact of "no service to Mexico"; the difference of feeling between the province and the government in Mexico City was "very great," and, he said, "although war is now expected between Mexico and the United States, respecting Texas, the Americans in California receive the usual respect from the Citizens of this country."29 By the summer of 1844 the annexation of Texas had become the major political issue in the presidential campaign; joined with the demand for all of Oregon, expansion became the dominant theme. California, on the other hand, although an objective of first importance to some influential men in Washington and in New England—a political and commercial power elite—was not in any real sense a public issue. The bulk of the evidence of the American desire for California is not to be found in political speeches in or out of Congress, but in the correspondence of the officials of the government and of those firms and individuals engaged in commerce on the Pacific Coast. A typical evidence of the commercial interest is a letter from Alfred Robinson to Larkin in June of 1844. Robinson had been resident agent in Santa Barbara for Bryant, Sturgis and Company in the 1830's, a Boston company engaging in the hide and tallow trade in California. Writing from Boston he told his friend Larkin that the Senate had "wisely rejected" President Tyler's treaty of annexation with Texas, the acceptance of which would have caused trouble with Mexico. Then Robinson suddenly brought California into his discussion, and he emphasized the 29 Larkin, Monterey, 4 August 1844, to Walker, George P. Hammond (ed.), The Larkin Papers, II, 181-183. Some Americans in California, however, were apprehensive for their safety because of the aggressive military posture of the United States; John Coffin Jones of Santa Barbara asked that a ship of war be stationed on the California coast, for although he did not "fear war with Mexico myself," it "looks strange that the American Army is on the borders of Texas and a fleet near Vera Cruz. Something may blow up yet" (Jones, Santa Barbara, 4 September 1844, to Larkin, in Monterey, ibid., 215).

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

31

province by underlining. He wrote that "a rumor is in agitation" to acquire the territory of Texas "as well as that of California by purchase"30 The continuity in the aggressive policy toward Mexico through the Tyler and Polk administrations has been emphasized above; it must be added that there was a considerable difference in intensity, in method, and in style. A lack of restraint in Polk's drive for territory was quite apparent—far more than in the earlier administration. And the diplomacy of Webster and Calhoun was more open and direct than that of Polk. The difference, indeed, went far beyond style. Calhoun was intent upon avoiding a war with Mexico and although he approved of Polk's objectives he refused to support Polk when the President forced the War; he denounced the request for a declaration of war against Mexico, and refused to vote for it. Referring to Polk's statement that "war exists by act of Mexico," Calhoun said it "was just as impossible for him to vote for that preamble as it was for him to plunge a dagger into his own heart, and more so." Prior to the War Polk talked to Calhoun on several occasions about Mexican policy, and the President recorded in his Diary that the Senator from South Carolina consistently urged a peaceful settlement. On 18 April 1846, less than a month before the declaration of war, Polk told Calhoun: "I saw no alternative but strong measures towards Mexico." His Diary entry continues: "Mr. Calhoun deprecated war and expressed a hope that the Oregon question would be first settled, and then we would have no difficulty in adjusting our difficulties with Mexico." Near the end of the War Calhoun stated the grounds of his opposition to the War in a speech in the Senate: I, then, opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue; but from high considerations of policy—because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions.31 30 Robinson, 30 June 1844, to Larkin, Hammond (ed.), Larkin Papers, II, 159. Robinson was critical of Tyler for what he considered a too aggressive military stance in the President's having ordered the Gulf Squadron to cruise off the coast of Mexico. 31 Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary of a President 1845-1849, p. 89 n; Milo Milton Quaife (ed.), The Diary of James K. Polk, I, 337; Richard K. Crallé (rd.), The Works of John C. Calhoun, IV, 396-397.

32

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue

It is, of course, possible that had Calhoun been responsible for the conduct of United States foreign policy subsequent to the annexation of Texas he might have moved on to the use of force against Mexico to secure additional territory. But in fact when he directed American relations with Mexico, as he did under President Tyler, he sought to use neither war nor the threat of war to obtain United States objectives. Calhoun's policy was expressed very well in a letter he wrote to William R. King, the United States minister to France, in August of 1844. The French government had been cooperating with the British in an attempt to prevent the United States annexation of Texas, and Calhoun thought it would lessen French opposition to annexation if they adequately understood the character of American expansion. Calhoun wrote that "it would be a great mistake to suppose that this government has any hostile feelings towards Mexico, or any disposition to aggrandize itself at her expense. The fact is the very reverse." Now that statement lacks something in accuracy and even more in candor; but Calhoun went on to say that although the United States was not a static power, its method of expanding its areas was unexceptionable. "It is our policy," he said "to increase, by growing and spreading out into unoccupied regions, assimilating all we incorporate: in a word, to increase by accretion and not, through conquest, by the addition of masses held together by the cohesion of force." On the immediate issue he wished the government of France to consider that: . . . if the annexation of Texas should be permitted to take place peaceably now, (as it would, without the interference of other powers), the energies of our people would, for a long time to come, be directed to the peaceable pursuits of redeeming, and bringing within the pale of cultivation, improvements, and civilization, the large portion of the continent lying between Mexico on one side, and the British possessions on the other, which is now, with little exception, a wilderness with a sparse population, consisting for the most part of wandering Indian tribes.32 Calhoun was content to see the expansion of the American people as a sort of natural force, pushing irregularly beyond the boundaries of the Union, and only in good time "ratified" by governmental action. The difference between this on the one hand and the program of aggressive expansion under Polk on the other may not have appeared to be very 32

Calhoun, 12 August 1844, to King, as printed in Niles' National Register, LXVII (21 December 1844), 247-248. Tyler had sent the letter to Congress as a document accompanying his Fourth Annual Message.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

33

substantial either to the Mexican government or to the French and the British. But if the general consequences were similar in the prospective destruction of any balance of power in the Americas (as the French government apprehended), the general spirit was different, and the methods rather more so. This becomes clear as one follows the Mexican policy of the government in transition from the Tyler-Calhoun Administration to the Administration of James K. Polk. In the spring of 1844 Calhoun negotiated an annexation treaty with Texas. One basis for objection to annexation was the possibility of an attack on Texas by Mexico during the process and before that territory had become de jure a part of the United States. Calhoun pledged the United States to defend Texas during the interim period, but neither then, nor later when he was again a senator from South Carolina observing Polk's handling of the accession, did he think such an attack at all likely. He agreed with the United States minister to Mexico, Wilson Shannon, on this judgment. Shannon, as demonstrated above, was bellicose and he advocated that the United States apply force or the threat of force; but he was sure that if there was to be war the United States would have to initiate it. Shannon wrote to Calhoun in October of 1844 : Neither Santa Anna nor Congress will think of renewing the war against Texas so long as it is believed that the U.S. will have to be encountered as well as Texas.... I see it is predicted in some of the papers in the U.S. that Mexico will declare war against the U.S.; there is as much possibility that the Emperor of China will do so.33 That judgment was sound, as the sequel proved. The difficulty in the success of the annexation movement was not in Mexico, nor in Texas; it was in the United States. A treaty of annexation was signed with representatives of the Republic of Texas on 12 April 1844, but it failed of ratification in the United States Senate on 8 June. The proponents of the measure then threw the question into the presidential campaign. The Whig nominee, Henry Clay, had early expressed his opposition to annexation, partly on the ground of the danger of war with Mexico as a consequence. James K. Polk was on record in support of the accession. The rejection of the treaty by the Senate seemed to indicate that 33 Calhoun, 11 April 1844, to J. P. Henderson and J. Van Zandt, ministers to the United States from the Republic of Texas, Anson Jones Papers, UT; Shannon, 29 October 1844, to Calhoun, Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of Calhoun {Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 981.

34 Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue the sentiment of the country was against the measure and that the Whigs were on safe ground in nominating a man who opposed it; but the Senate vote was deceptive, for as the campaign developed it became evident that there was strong support for Texas in the upper Mississippi and Ohio valley area, as well as in the South and the Southwest. Clay was moved by the indications of proannexationist feeling to revise his position. In July and August he said that he would be glad to see Texas annexed if the annexation could be achieved "without dishonor, without war, with the common consent of the Union, on just and fair terms." This statement won him little support in the annexationist camp, for Polk was quite clearly more thoroughly committed to Texas than was Clay, and it drove some Clay support to an antislavery party in the northeastern region. Polk won the election in a close contest. Clay would have been elected had he received a little more than 5,000 of the some 15,000 votes in New York state which went to James G. Birney, the nominee of the Liberty Party.34 Proponents of annexation asserted that Polk's victory was a mandate from the people for taking Texas into the Union. The election of an individual to office is rarely a certain mandate on any issue, but persuasive, usable fictions are important facts in human affairs, and Tyler and Calhoun were able to use the argument effectively in moving an annexation bill through Congress. Since it was still impossible to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate which was necessary to ratify a treaty, proponents turned to the device of a joint resolution by the Senate and the House providing for the incorporation of Texas as a state. Even that proved impossible to accomplish until an amendment was added providing for negotiation with the Republic of Texas, at the discretion of the President of the United States, to arrange mutually satisfactory terms for the accession. This sufficed to enlist the necessary support offivesenators, after they were persuaded that the executive would choose the method provided by the amendment. It was assumed that incoming President Polk would make the choice, since the bill was passed on 27 February 1845, and Tyler signed it on 1 March, leaving only three days in his term. But after an informal and unsuccessful effort to secure an opinion from Polk, Tyler proceeded with instructions to the United States chargé d'affaires in Texas: he was to ignore the amendment and simply seek acceptance by Texas of the offer of annexation. 34 McMaster, History of United States, VII, 388-389. For a detailed, pedestrian discussion of the campaign see Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography, pp. 248-283.

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

35

Such problems as the boundaries of Texas and the responsibility for the Texas national debt would be taken up later, after Texas had become a state in the Union.35 Tyler had appointed Andrew Jackson Donelson chargé d'affaires in Texas in September of 1844. Donelson was the nephew and namesake and formerly the private secretary of the former President. The selection was calculated to exploit Jackson's influence in Washington and in Texas, and it was particularly designed to be effective in enlisting the support of Sam Houston.36 Calhoun sent Donelson instructions on the night of 3 March, enclosing a copy of the joint resolution adopted by Congress and urging him to counteract the attempt "of one of the leading foreign powers against the measure." The reference was to Great Britain, with whom Calhoun had been carrying on a correspondence which had become notorious. The Secretary made slavery the central issue and argued that the annexation of Texas was essential to the defense of slavery in the United States in view of the efforts of Great Britain to eliminate the institution everywhere.37 When Polk assumed the office he wrote to Donelson asking him to await specific instructions, which would be forthcoming as soon as the Cabinet should be formed and have time to consider the matter. On 10 March 1845 Secretary of State James Buchanan instructed the Chargé to continue the efforts he had begun under Tyler.38 35

Justin Harvey Smith, The Annexation of Texas, pp. 234-381; McCormac, Polk, pp. 308-318. 36 Calhoun, 16 September 1844, to Donelson, Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of Calhoun {Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 614-615. That Donelson was active in Democratic politics in Tennessee and worked effectively for Polk in the summer of 1844 is evidenced in letters in the Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC: see Polk, 22 July, to Donelson, on Texas and politics; Buchanan, 17 July, to Donelson, on politics; George Bancroft, 6 July, to Donelson, on politics. Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer, discusses the relationship among Houston, Donelson, and Jackson (p. 144). 37 Calhoun, 3 March 1845, to Donelson, Ex. Doc., pp. 25-27. Calhoun's judgment has commonly been thought faulty by historians for his making the slavery issue the primary consideration in the Texas controversy. Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850, agrees that it was tactically unwise but writes, "Slavery . . . was the real stake in Texas, and he was fundamentally too honest to pretend it was anything else," since "American policy required the preservation of slavery, even as British policy required its destruction" (p. 171). 38 Polk, 7 March 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. Buchanan, 10 March 1845, to Archibald Yell and to Donelson, Instructions to Diplomatic Agents, Texas, State Department Archives, NA.

36

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

James K. Polk was now in control of the power of the United States government. In turning to an examination of his use of that power in his relations with Mexico it is essential to understand the status of the Texas question in March of 1845. The issue of Texas annexation had been the most important single issue in the presidential campaign of 1844, the campaign in which Polk had been elected. It therefore might seem to follow that the annexation of Texas was the most important business in hand when Polk assumed the executive leadership of the nation, and the matter which required his closest attention. That, however, was not the case. The struggle for the annexation of Texas had taken place before Polk's inauguration; the issue had been decided, the Congress had acted, there remained only the implementation of that action through the acceptance of the offer by the government and by the people in convention of the Republic of Texas. That acceptance was, in fact, no more than a formality, and it was known to be so by qualified observers in Texas during this period, as will become quite clear in the examination of the matter which follows. Some reluctance was evident on the part of certain Texas leaders, efforts to prevent annexation were made by representatives of the British and French governments, and the Mexican government felt badly used and was disposed to threaten and bluster; but none of this mattered. Such a large majority in Texas was for joining the Union that there was no possibility that Texas would refuse the offer extended by the Congress. Some Texan leaders had doubts about the adequacy of the terms of annexation, the lack of assurance on the boundary and on the public debt, but these reservations were brushed aside by the overwhelming pressure of public opinion in Texas. The acquisition of Texas, although it was completed in the first year of Polk's term, is properly attributed to the administration of John Tyler. Polk himself gave indirect agreement to this judgment when he formulated the objectives of his administration. George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy in Polk's Cabinet and a prominent historian, recorded much later that soon after Polk took the oath of office he listed the items in his program in a conversation in the White House office: " 'There are four great measures,' said he, with emphasis, striking his thigh forcibly as he spoke, 'which are to be the measures of my administration: one, a reduction of the tariff; another, the independent treasury; a third, the settlement of the Oregon boundary question; and, lastly, the acquisition of California'."39 39

James Schouler, History of the United States, IV, 498. The statement is

The Attempt To Purchase Some of Mexico

37

The annexation of Texas does not appear on the list because that was a settled matter. In Polk's correspondence with his agents in Texas, however, and in the records of the State Department during the spring and early summer of 1845 great anxiety is frequently expressed about the uncertainty of success in the effort to secure Texas. It is the contention of this study that through that first year of Polk's term, until the beginning of hostilities with Mexico in May of 1846, the problem was not the annexation of Texas, not the protection of Texas from attack by Mexico, and not the boundary of Texas—although these pseudo issues dominated the official pronouncements of the Administration. These matters were a "cover" to shelter the actual objective of President Polk. The problem, and the opportunity, as Polk saw it, was how to use Texas as a means of achieving one of the "great measures" of his administration—the acquisition of California. from a letter which Bancroft wrote to Schouler in 1887; there may well be some selective hindsight in this neat formulation, forty years after the event.

CHAPTER

THREE

A Preliminary Design: The Duff Green Scheme

I In the winter of 1844-1845, while President-elect Polk was selecting his Cabinet officers and developing plans for his administration, a prominent Democratic politician was in Texas engaged in a plot to detach the northern provinces from the Republic of Mexico. The effort failed because of the refusal of the government of Texas to cooperate in the creation of a "private" army to conquer and secure the region. In its methods and goals and in the character of the difficulties it faced, this scheme was similar to the secret operation which President Polk initiated in April and May of 1845, but with the major difference that it was not provided with covert support by the government of the United States. Duff Green had been one of the most influential men in the Democratic Party from the time of Jackson's first administration. He was editor of the United States Telegraph, printer to Congress, and a member of Jackson's "Kitchen Cabinet." When the break came between Jackson and Calhoun, however, Green followed Calhoun; there was a family connection—Calhoun's son had married Green's daughter. In 1840 he was influential in the selection of Tyler to run with Harrison on the Whig ticket, and when Tyler became President, Green had his choice of appointments. At his request he was sent to Britain and France as an unofficial representative of the United States. He was there in 1842 and 1843 and became alarmed at the openly expressed intention of high officials in the British government to work for the abolition of slavery in Texas and in the United States. His warning to Calhoun was in part responsible for the correspondence on the subject between Richard Pakenham and the Secretary of State. Green returned to the United States in January of 1844 and established a journal in New York which supported the Southern cause in the sectional contro-

A Preliminary Design

39

versy, and he was a strong advocate of the annexation of Texas. In September of 1844 Tyler appointed him United States consul at Galveston, Texas, but there had apparently been an understanding that he was to be free to engage in other activities. He went immediately from Texas to Mexico City to assist in the effort to acquire California and New Mexico, as well as Texas.1 On 28 October 1844 Green wrote to Calhoun from Mexico City that he was "convinced that it is impossible to obtain the consent of this government to the Cession to the United States of Texas, California, or any part of the public domain of Mexico whatever." He said the "state of public opinion is such that any party, being in power, and selling Texas or California to the United States, would be driven from office and .. . the chances are as ten to one that their doing so would be used as an argument for shooting them and confiscating their property." It is noteworthy that Green speaks here of Mexico's "selling Texas." This was almost a decade after Texas had established de facto independence, but the government of Mexico had charged from the beginning that the "Texas game" was a scheme of the United States to acquire the Mexican province. This comment by Green in 1844 would have seemed to Mexicans to support the charge. Green closed his letter to Calhoun by referring to a plan, which he did not wish to put in writing at the time, for the acquisition of the territories in question: "I believe that there is one way and but one in which all that our Government desire and much more than you ask can be had, but I am not now prepared to submit my Views to paper. I reserve them for personal explanation, and until after I have visited Texas."2 His plan, as became apparent a couple of months later when he tried to put it into operation in Texas, envisaged the addition to the United States of not only the Mexican provinces of New Mexico and Alta California in addition to Texas, but also another tier of provinces in northern 1 Fletcher M. Green, "Duff Green," DAB, VII, 540-541. The official appointment document for the consular post at Galveston is in the Duff Green Papers, LC. Green's vision of American expansion included the Caribbean area; during the War with Mexico he advocated the emigration of Americans to Santo Domingo for the stated purpose of acquiring it when an American community had been established. 2 Green, 28 October 1844, to Calhoun, J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 975-980. On the same date Green wrote a letter to R. K. Crallé, a close associate of Calhoun's and later to be the editor of Calhoun's writings, making many of the same points and stating that he did not expect to retain the consular office at Galveston (Duff Green Papers, LC).

40

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

Mexico. In his letters from Mexico City and later, however, he emphasized the value of California, which, he said, would "necessarily command the settlements on the Columbia." He warned that the British were scheming to take possession of Alta California. Green wrote another long letter to the Secretary of State before leaving for Texas in the middle of November. He flatly advocated a war against Mexico initiated by the United States. Green's analysis of the political forces in Mexico in relation to the objectives of the United States stands up rather well when measured by subsequent events. He thought Santa Anna might be overthrown, but that would be of no particular advantage to the United States, for it could be assumed that "such is the state of public opinion that any party coming into power on his down fall will be compelled to take as strong or stronger ground against the United States than he has done." Green said that Santa Anna preferred "angry negotiations" to settling the question of Texas. He did not think the annexation of Texas would lead to war "because Santa Anna knows that he cannot sustain himself in a war with us," but, he told Calhoun: "You cannot have peace with Mexico without a war. They have so long bullied, insulted and plundered us with impunity that they have lost all respect for us as a nation, altho they fear us as a people." It appeared to Green that the "Government of the United States have no alternative, that they cannot be content with the annexation of Texas." The United States must demand a withdrawal of the charges made by the Mexican government against the United States in relation to the Texas matter, and "an immediate adjustment of all our Claims against Mexico." Green said that "this will not be done and a war must be the consequence." The aggressive and combative spirit of American leadership in the 1840's, later to be given direction by President Polk, comes out clearly in Green's statement: "Indeed the time has come when we have no alternative but to punish Mexico and other nations into a proper respect for national character." Green argued the case for war: We have no means of regaining the trade of Mexico but by chastising them into decent behavior and the advantage of a war with Mexico will be that we can indemnify ourselves while by chastising Mexico, we will show other nations what we can and will do and command their respect also. If you could go abroad as I have done you would feel that we have lost caste and that nothing but a war can regain the position we have lost. A war with

A Preliminary Design

41

Mexico will cost us nothing, and reinstate us in the estimation of other nations.3 The statement was not just the notion of one irresponsible American politician; President Polk made precisely the same point in an address to Congress following the War with Mexico: increased respect from European nations was to be gained as a consequence of the demonstration of the will of the United States to fight, and the ability to do so aggressively and successfully. In his Fourth Annual Message, on 5 December 1848, Polk said: One of the most important results of the war into which we were recently forced with a neighboring nation is the demonstration it has afforded of the military strength of our country. Before the late war with Mexico European and other foreign powers entertained imperfect and erroneous views of our physical strength as a nation and of our ability to prosecute war, and especially a war waged out of our own country. . . . The events of the late war with Mexico have... undeceived them. The demonstration, Polk said, "will tend powerfully to preserve us from foreign collisions," and it would enable the United States "to pursue uninterruptedly our cherished policy of 'peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none'." 4 This opinion throws some light upon the American spirit of that age, but of course it was not central to the schemes in Texas. The education of European powers to a proper respect for the war-making capacity of the United States was a dividend in which an American leader could take satisfaction, but it was not a primary motivation either for Green in his efforts, which proved to be premature, or for Polk in the steps he took which led to war in 1846; the objective was more tangible. Green was in Galveston in late November and from there he wrote to Calhoun: "I do not believe that you can accomplish anything with Mexico unless you seeze [sic] upon Vera Cruz, and . . . this may be done with a very small force if it is done promptly." He added somewhat enigmatically, "If we take the town and fort they 3

Green, 12 November 1844, to Calhoun, Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of Calhoun (Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 991-995. 4 James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, IV, 631-633.

42

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

should not be given up, as they are the keys to the commerce of Mexico." 5 Green's judgment of the sentiment in Texas on annexation agreed with the estimate of others in Texas who were writing to Washington; he told Calhoun that it was "safe so far as Texas is concerned." Indeed, he was so certain about the disposition of Texans on the matter that he thought it would be perfectly safe for the government in Washington to use the issue with an eye to its political effect, delaying the consummation of annexation for that purpose: In the mean time I am by no means sure that it will be for the interest of the United States or of Texas that the question should be closed now. The effort of the opposition will be to organize the north against the south. Abolition—the tariff, and native Republicanism, against South Carolina. If the new administration keeps the Texas question as one of the measures for the new organisation [sic] of parties, it will give the administration strength, and the success of the measure will be an administration triumph which will go far to establish its power.6 In a letter to the United States representative in Texas, Donelson, Green expressed the same confidence in the desire of the Texans for annexation. He said that "the Whigs & Benton" would possibly unite to pass a bill for annexation on terms which would be rejected by Texas, and thus delay it. But, he said, there "is nothing to fear in Texas by deferring the question until next year." He noted that the British representative, Charles Elliot, was at the capital of Texas, promising that Britain would obtain the consent of Mexico to Texan independence if Texas would pledge herself against annexation, but Green said there was no ground for concern: "Elliot can do nothing here. Make yourself easy as to his movements."7 This was a sound analysis, as events within a half year proved; but Green had reasons which he did not mention to his correspondents for desiring a delay in the annexation of Texas by the United States. He needed time to work out his scheme, which required an "independent" Texan initiative. For Green's primary effort in Texas at this time was neither sending advice to United States officials nor 5 Green, 29 November 1844, to Calhoun, Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of Calhoun (Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 1003. 6 Green, Washington in Texas, 8 December 1844, to Calhoun, ibid., pp. 10061007. 7 Green, 20 December 1844, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC.

A Preliminary Design

43

fulfilling his consular duties at Galveston; he had an important project underway, the "one way," as he had told Calhoun, by which "all that our Government desire and much more" could be obtained. The project provided for the chartering of a corporation by the government of Texas, the "Del Norte Company," which private corporation would then conquer all of northern Mexico with an army composed of the Indians of the western plains of the United States. Thus when Texas should be annexed by the United States the transfer would include some two thirds of the territory of the Mexican Republic. As the British consul at Galveston put it, "Before the 'espousals' are perfected," Green "desired that the bride should bring a still more ample dowry."8 Green's work on this project soon brought him into conflict with the government of Texas. His attitude toward that government was the same as that of the agents whom Polk sent to Texas a few months later: the government of Texas should act as an arm of the United States government in measures against Mexico; any disinclination to do so, as Commodore Stockton later stated it, was an act of treason against the United States. Donelson attempted to defend Green against the most severe charges brought against him, but he had to acknowledge that Green was "out of his sphere, and not defensible as a Counsul [sic].'' In a letter to Secretary of State Calhoun, Donelson, clearly conscious as he wrote that he was reporting on the actions of a member of the Secretary's family, said of Green: He was full of zeal in the cause of annexation, and mistaking the sense in which the members of Congress of Texas heard his project for the defence of the Western frontier and the invasion of Mexico, approached the President too familiarly, but without a doubt of his disposition, if not to concur in his views, at least to consider them in a spirit of kindness. Whereas in truth his movements were watched with suspicion from the beginning, and before he was aware of it, he was involved in the responsibility of measures, contemplating a serious change in the policy of the Republic, employing the Indians of the U. States and Texas in the invasion of Mexico, and revolutionizing the country from the Rio Grande to the Pacific under the flag of Texas.9 It was the best possible face which Donelson could put upon the activities of a colleague, an official representing the United States government in the Republic of Texas. Green certainly had not be8

Herbert Pickens Gambrell, Anson Jones: The Last President of Texas, p. 381. Donelson, 27 January 1845, to Calhoun, Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of Calhoun (Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 1019-1020. 9

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come involved "before he was aware of it" in measures to change the foreign policy of Texas. When Donelson received an official complaint from the government of Texas on the behavior of Green, however, he was forced to be more candid in his comments. The complaint came from the Secretary of State ad interim, Ebenezer Allen (Secretary Ashbel Smith had gone on a special mission to London), who on 4 January 1845 wrote to Donelson enclosing a proclamation of President Jones that revoked the exequatur of "Duff Green, Esq., as Consul of the United States for Galveston." Green, Allen said, had fixed his residence at the capital of Texas when the Legislature met, and "has ever since been industriously occupied in endeavouring to procure the sanction of Congress to certain projected measures, in the consumation [sic] of which, he has manifested strong personal interest," trying to influence the members of the Legislature "in aid of his favorites [sic] schemes." One of these schemes was a bill to incorporate under a perpetual charter an institution to be styled "The Texas Land Company" to acquire and dispose of real estate to an unlimited amount, "together with the power and capacity to monopolize the exclusive and perpetual use of all our navigable streams." Allen continued: Another was a plan for the charter of the "Del Norte Company," so to be called, also projected by Mr. Green, and designed to become a law by the action of the legislature, but which has not as yet been presented to Congress; having in part for its object the conquest and occupancy in behalf of Texas, of the Californias, and the Northern Provinces of Mexico, by means of an army aided by some sixty thousand Indian warriors, to be introduced from the United States upon our Western frontier. Allen said that this consular representative of the United States had solicited the aid and influence of President Jones in his scheme on several occasions. On 30 December he had tried to induce this aid by an offer of portions of the corporate stocks of the projected companies; and by "a threat to revolutionize the country and overthrow the existing government [the government of Texas], in the event of His Excellency's refusing to accede to the proposal." Green had said that he could easily execute this threat amid the state of public opinion then in Texas.10 10 Allen's letter of 4 January 1845 and Donelson's reply of 6 January 1845 are in George P. Garrison (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas (Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), pp. 332-334, 335337.

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In his reply Donelson made an effort to separate Green's actions from his official position as United States consul. He was at pains to emphasize that in urging the scheme Green was not acting as a representative of the United States. Donelson said he had met Green "soon after his arrival here as the bearer of dispatches from Mexico," and when questioned about his consular duties Green had said that he was about to become a citizen of Texas, that he had appointed a viceconsul at Galveston, and that he would not continue in his position and "would perform no further official act." Donelson explained to the government of Texas that although Green was "within the range of responsibility imposed by an Exequatur from this Government," he was "practically only a new comer into Texas with the intention of acquiring the rights of citizenship." Thus, Donelson argued, as persuasively as the intractable facts would allow, "the objectionable conduct imputed to him, ceases to have any higher importance than what belongs to his individual, private, character." Donelson thought it necessary to disapprove explicitly the purposes and actions of Green and to disassociate himself entirely from him. Asserting that he had had no knowledge of the measures being taken by Green and had not participated in them either directly or indirectly, either as a public officer or as a private individual, he wrote: Indeed those measures conflict essentially with the course of policy which the undersigned, if consulted, would have suggested as the most expedient for Texas at the present time. As the friend of reannexation he certainly could not have thought of a step, the effect of which would be to countenance the idea that the country between the Rio del Norte and the Pacific ocean was to be invaded and severed by another revolution from Mexico.... Any policy which would raise new issues, which would entangle Texas in new enterprises calling for further aid in money or munitions of war, would be contrary to what the undersigned has supposed to be the wish and interest of Texas. One learns to look at such assertions of denial of official responsibility in diplomatic correspondence with very great skepticism, and such skepticism is never more appropriate than when examining the statements of representatives of the American government on the subjects of Texas, California, and Mexico in the 1840's. But Donelson's actions and his correspondence throughout these months support the interpretation that this was a candid, frank, and honest statement of

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

his own views and of his own performance in attempting to facilitate annexation without introducing any complicating factors. There is no slightest evidence that he had any ulterior personal motives of any kind, and he quite clearly did not seek to make annexation but one step in a process of a much greater expansion of the American nation. Selected by Tyler and Calhoun and retained by Polk largely because his relationship with Jackson gave him effective influence in Texas, the representative, as it happened, was able, conscientious, and straightforward. Donelson provided a respectable cover for the intrigues of unofficial representatives of the United States government, and, in instances of conflict of method and of substance, Washington gave Donelson public support. It does not follow that the agents were cast aside. Duff Green had been acting, so far as can be discovered from the records now, on his own initiative—albeit in basic congruence with that feverish expansionist drive which animated the men in control of American national power. Green had attempted to bribe the President of the Republic of Texas and other officials of that government to win their support for an attack upon the northern provinces of Mexico; he had failed in his scheme and his intrigue had become public knowledge, in Texas and in Washington. Criticism, of a partisan character primarily, was voiced in the United States Congress; a resolution of the Senate on 4 February 1845 requested the President to communicate to the Senate, if it was not inconsistent with the public interest, "whether Mr. Duff Green does now hold or has lately held any diplomatic or official station near the government of Texas, and, if so, what?" The query also concerned his date of appointment, his salary, and the instructions given him. Secretary of State Calhoun replied for the President that Green had been appointed consul at Galveston on 12 September 1844, that he had received the "ordinary printed instructions" from the State Department, that he had received no salary, and that "he neither holds nor has held any diplomatic or other official station near the government of Texas."11 Thus the government of the United States disassociated itself from Green's notorious scheme. But the judgment of the Polk Administration upon Duff Green and his work is revealed in the appointment given to him at the end of the War: he was selected as the commissioner to deliver to Mexico the fifteen million dollars which the United 11

Calhoun's letter to the Senate was dated 6 February 1845; the exchange was published in the National Intelligencer on 8 February 1845.

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States agreed to as compensation to Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.12 Before that war began, however, President Polk set in motion an intrigue in Texas which was in its basic design and purpose no more than a variation on the Duff Green scheme. The design was to initiate a war between Texas and Mexico prior to the completion of the annexation of Texas; the United States would then immediately come to the defense of the Texans and the responsibility for the war would not appear to rest with the United States. That war would enable Polk to accomplish one of the "great measures" of his administration, the acquisition of California. As will be seen, the intrigue failed. Polk was then driven to preparation of a declaration of war on Mexico on the grounds of Mexico's failure to pay American claims, a measure of desperation from which he was saved by the beginning of hostilities that followed upon the sending of a United States army into Mexican settlements on the Rio Grande. But efforts which failed are often as valuable in the light which they throw upon the character of men and societies in the past as are the successes; not infrequently such abortive efforts guide us to some understanding of "the mind of the past"—which, after all, is the center of our interest. And the failed designs of those who have held supreme power in a society provide an essential check against the strong tendency to accept the past at its own evaluation, which is to say, to see the past through the eyes and the interests of those who were in control of power. Much has been said in condescending criticism of the muckrakers in history, but the dominant approach of historians is quite otherwise; the knees of historians naturally bend before the bitch-goddess success. If the human enterprise were a remarkable success in its foundations and superstructure in the middle of the twentieth century, something could be said for an attitude of acquiescence before past power; but that is not our present condition. It is not useful to go on celebrating the past, as the past celebrated itself. In our present situation it is neither pleasant nor amusing; it is feeble-minded frivolity. The official document which marks the beginning of the Polk-Stockton intrigue is the order from Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft to Commodore Robert Field Stockton, commanding a squadron of 12

Green, "Duff Green," DAB, VII, 541.

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United States vessels in Hampton Roads, dated 22 April 1845. The letter was a cover for the secret mission of Stockton in Texas. It read: You will proceed with the vessels that have been placed under your command to the vicinity of Galveston, Texas, and lay as close to the shore as security will permit. You will take one of the vessels into the port of Galveston, and there display the American flag; or more if the bar will permit. You will yourself go on shore, and make yourself acquainted with the dispositions of the people of Texas, and their relations with Mexico, of which you will make report to this Department. After remaining at or off Galveston as long as in your judgment may seem necessary, you will proceed to join the squadron of Commodore Conner, off Vera Cruz.13 On the face of it, in view of the information which the government in Washington had been receiving from Donelson and others in Texas, this was a very odd assignment for a naval officer with a squadron of war vessels. But Commodore Stockton was not simply a naval officer; he was an influential businessman, one of the wealthiest men in New Jersey, a great landowner, an important public figure and politician, and a man with a reputation for flamboyant and unconventional and adventurous action. He was also, as described above, an expansionist and an extreme American nationalist. It was such a man who undertook a mission for President Polk in Texas in the spring of 1845, and before describing that mission it is necessary to examine the man and his career. 13 Bancroft, 22 April 1845, to Stockton, letter-copy, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA.

CHAPTER

FOUR

Robert F. Stockton, American Nationalist

The key figure in President Polk's war intrigue in Texas in 1845 has been known to history not for that abortive effort, but rather as the naval officer who was in command of United States forces in California during the crucial period of the occupation of the province in the Mexican War. He was often referred to thereafter as the "Conqueror of California," and the title was not entirely inappropriate. As a consequence of his California fame his name appears in many places on the map of the western United States: an army camp in Texas, now the town of Fort Stockton; streets in several towns and cities; and the name of the county seat of San Joaquin County in the Central Valley of California. But Robert F. Stockton was a prominent public figure in New Jersey long before the War with Mexico. The independent standing which this prominence provided, and his great personal fortune, had a marked effect upon his career as a naval officer; and it was not unrelated to his selection as the naval officer to attempt a diplomatic-military operation in Texas against Mexico. His career is important to an understanding of the Polk Administration's foreign policy on the eve of the War with Mexico. Stockton's nationalism could be said to be legitimate: he derived from a founding father of the nation. His grandfather Richard was a member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Another more influential leader in the movement for independence, Dr. Richard Rush, of Philadelphia, married Richard Stockton's daughter Julia.1 For three quarters of a century fol1 Alford Hoyt Bill, A House Called Morven: Its Role in American History, 1701-1954, p. 36. The Reverend John Witherspoon, the minister who performed the marriage ceremony of Dr. Rush and Julia Stockton in January 1776, was

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

lowing, the Stockton family was one of the most influential and one of the wealthiest families in New Jersey. This was certainly true during the period in the middle of the nineteenth century when Commodore Robert Stockton was head of the family. Richard died in 1781, but the Stockton home in Princeton which had been built in 1701 and is now the summer home of the governor of New Jersey, continued to be a center for national political discussion; George Washington was a friend of the family and visited there on many occasions. The son Richard, known as the "Old Duke," was a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County and a United States senator for a period, but he was a Federalist in a time of the increasing ascendancy of Jeffersonian Republicanism and was thus unsuccessful in his aspirations for the governorship of New Jersey and for other offices in his later life. Daniel Webster was a close friend of this Richard, as he was to be of Robert Stockton, and often visited the family on his journey between Massachusetts and Washington.2 Robert Field, the second son of the "Old Duke," was born in 1795. He attended the College of New Jersey but left without taking a degree in 1811 to enlist in the Navy. He was appointed a midshipman at that time and continued as a naval officer for almost forty years. For most of the period from 1823 to 1838 Stockton was on furlough from the Navy, managing the Stockton properties and developing new enterprises in New Jersey. He put a major part of his wealth and his effort into the development and operation of a canal and railroad company. The Delaware and Raritan Canal and Camden and Amboy Railroad Company had an effective monopoly of the public transportation business across New Jersey from the Delaware River to Raritan Bay below New York City, and although it was not simply a family enterprise, but a stock company, Stockton was from the beginning until his death in 1866 the dominant figure in the Company.3 also a member of the Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Witherspoon was president of the College of New Jersey, which became Princeton University; the institution was located on a portion of the Stockton estate. 2 Ibid., pp. 69-86 et passim. 3 A history of the Company and a list of officers in [Robert F. Stockton], Report of the United Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., and Camden & Amboy Railroad . . . April 28, 1869, pamphlet bound in Speeches, Reports, and Letters in Relation to the Delaware and Raritan Canal and the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company. See also [Robert F. Stockton], Appeal of Commodore R. F. Stockton to the People of New Jersey . . . , September 1849.

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The success of the Erie Canal, following its opening in 1825, stimulated canal building throughout the central and northeastern states of the Union. Railroad building on a significant scale began a little later and shared in freight and passenger transport through the 1830's and 1840's, although by the latter decade, and more completely during the 1850's, the canal business was taken over by railroads in most sections of the country. In 1829 the state of New Jersey issued a charter for the canal and at the same time for a railroad; both would serve for transport across New Jersey from the Delaware River and Philadelphia to the Atlantic Ocean just below New York City. The prospective competition made it impossible for those interested in the canal to secure funds. Stockton had invested $400,000 toward the construction of the canal and primarily through his efforts the two chartered companies were combined, a combination and monopoly that was authorized by the Legislature after an intensive lobbying effort by Stockton. He created a political machine for the purpose and, as the historian of the Stockton family wrote, "the enterprise had its less edifying side. . . . Headquarters for the companies were established at Trenton, in Snowden's hotel, and Apartment 10 became notorious as a place where tired legislators could refresh themselves with champagne and terrapin free of charge." When it was found impossible to raise sufficient funds to finance the construction of the canal and the railroad, Stockton went to London and sold enough stock there to complete the financing.4 The canal was completed by 1834, and in 1840 the railroad construction wasfinishedand the system in complete operation. The works had cost $6,000,000 but the Company had invested a little less than $3,000,000. The state of New Jersey had borrowed the difference and provided it for the construction. The state had the right to dissolve the railroad company thirty years after completion of construction, and the canal company after fifty years, but if the state assumed control it was obligated to pay the stockholders the value of their stock in the enterprises. The arrangement appeared to be very satisfactory for everyone, with the possible exception of the users of these public transportation facilities. The rates on the public transporta4 Many papers relating to the financing, operations, and management of the Company are in the Stockton Papers, PL. The story of the enterprise is told very briefly, and in terms very friendly to the Company, in A Sketch of the Life of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, published anonymously in 1856, but written by Samuel John Bayard, a family friend and an officer in the Company. See also Bill, Morven, pp. 93-94.

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Intrigue

tion monopoly were set at a level sufficiently high so that by 1840 the combined Company was paying annual revenues to the state sufficient to take care of all the expenses of the state government, and yet its profits were such that by that date $1,595,000 had been paid to stockholders in dividends.5 The Company was accused, for the whole period of its existence, of dominating and controlling New Jersey politics, and Stockton was often engaged in public defense of the enterprise. In 1849 he spoke against the agitation for the revocation of the charter and the operation of the transportation companies by the state. In an Appeal . . . to the People of New Jersey Stockton said that he had originally thought the state should build and operate the canals and railroads: I was always opposed to the present system. I said that the State had a valuable farm and ought to work it herself, and it was not until the people had deliberately, after years of agitation on the subject, determined in the first place to lease the right of way, and, in the second place, to give all necessary protection to secure the construction of her various improvements, that I came forward to give my aid to these well-settled principles and the people's wishes. Stockton said that he had spent "nearly twenty years of my life in doing all I could for the interest of the State as well as my own," and he pleaded: The State has had not only the use of my fortune, but of eighteen years' hard work, without paying me one dollar for either. And will you, fellowcitizens, after all this, permit socialists, speculators, or demagogues of whatever degree, to bring this matter into party politics, and to affix a foul blot on your fair fame, by plundering my family, my friends, and myself, in the name of the State?6 The threat was held off at that time, and again in 1854 when a committee of the Legislature was created to investigate the feasibility of acquiring the works of the combined Company. Stockton pointed out that the Company had been financing the state government, noting 5 [Robert F. Stockton], Report of the Joint Board of Directors, to the Stockholders of the Delaware and Raritan Canal, and Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Companies, on the Completion of their Works; with the Proceedings of the Stockholders at their Meeting on the 29th of January, 1840, pamphlet bound in Speeches, Reports, and Letters in Relation to Canal and Railroad Company. 6 [Stockton], Appeal of Commodore R. F. Stockton to the People of New Jersey, September 1849.

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that in 1853 the annual expenses of the government amounted to $90,000 and the payment from the canal and railroad company had been $91,000. 7 Stockton saw another threat to business interests in the effort of the federal government to regulate, in the interests of safety, the construction and operation of steamboats on inland waterways. A bill for that purpose was introduced in the United States Senate in 1852, while Stockton was a member from New Jersey. Steamboat operators had been notorious for their reckless disregard of elementary safety measures from the beginning of the use of these vessels. The effort to obtain maximum speed resulted in the taking of great risks in navigating and in building up steam in the boilers far beyond the point of safety. On western and southern rivers alone during the thirty-two months before the passage of the regulatory bill thirty-four explosions had occurred with the loss of 690 lives.8 The bill applied only to steamboats carrying passengers and it provided for tests of boilers, including inspection of the manufacture of the boiler plate, the limitation of steam pressure, the examination and licensing of pilots, requirements for life preservers and lifeboats (which were not carried by most of the steamboats at the time), regulations for passing other vessels, and other provisions of this nature. Stockton spoke in opposition, as he said, to "most of the details of the bill now under consideration." He referred to the attention being given to the many steamboat explosions, and complained: I think, sir, that under the influence of recent calamities, too much sensibility is displayed on this subject; and I am afraid, sir, that too many, and too strong efforts will be made forcibly to constrain individual liberty, and to control private business. When you are about adopting measures to save human life from destruction on board of steamboats, I would have you consider the value of a man's life compared with his happiness and his liberty, with the freedom and happiness of our race. Life is transient and evanescent, but liberty and equal rights, I hope, will endure long as truth shall endure. Stockton insisted that the travelers themselves were responsible for the loss of life, because they insisted upon traveling on the fastest boats. He asserted that vital principles of government were at stake 7 [Robert F. Stockton], Report of the Committee of the New Jersey State Legislature, on the Surrendering of Their Works to the State by the . . . Company. 8 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History, pp. 537, 541.

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as he argued against safety regulations; he told the senators that they had done too much already to shake the foundations of freedom: Look, for example, at your census laws. You have authorized Federal officers to go into the houses of your citizens and inquire into their number and condition, and when and where and how they were born. Again, sir, some of the States have laws authorizing their public officers to go into the houses of citizens and demand how much property they own and where it is, how much they owe and how much is owing to them, and other things equally offensive to the feelings of an independent freeman as it is injurious to his business. And now, sir, you want to control him in the investment and management of his property! Let me ask what will be left of human liberty if we progress in this course much further? What will be, by and by, the difference between citizens of this far-famed Republic and the serfs of Russia?9 Stockton's colleagues in the Senate, uninfluenced by his prediction that Americans would soon be as oppressed by government as were the people of Russia, passed the bill. By the following year the loss of life had been reduced to one fifth of the previous toll.10 Three years after Stockton had argued against any governmental regulation of safety measures for steamboats a train wreck on his Camden and Amboy line killed twenty-four passengers and injured over eighty, under conditions which clearly pointed to unsafe operating procedures by the Company. The regular procedure was for trains proceeding in opposite directions on the single-track line to "be on the lookout" for an engine coming toward them and to stop when they met; the train nearest to a spur or siding then would back up to that point to clear the track for the other train. In this case the accident occurred when the train was backing and struck a wagon on a road crossing, derailing several cars, which rolled down a steep embankment. There had been much criticism of the method of operation and demands for a double-track line in view of the amount of trafilc carried, or at least some improvement in methods of signaling and additional caution when traveling in reverse; there was some expectation that the accident would induce the Company to change its procedures. This was not forthcoming; two weeks after the wreck the Company issued 9 [Robert F. Stockton], Remarks of Mr. Stockton, of New Jersey, on the Steamboat Bill, Delivered in the Senate of the United States, August 28, 1852. 10 Hunter, Steamboats, p. 541.

Robert F. Stockton, American Nationalist

55

a report which justified the management completely and accepted no responsibility for the loss of life. The report increased the already strong criticism of the monopoly and of Stockton as the leading stockholder, officer, and spokesman. The controversy in New Jersey newspapers produced some lively copy, including a letters-to-the-editor exchange between Stockton and a Christian minister whom Stockton accused of being an "assassin of character" who was meddling in matters outside his proper sphere. Giving no ground, Stockton said that be the consequences what they might, he would not "quail" before the threatenings of the press. No effective regulation of railroads in the interest of safety was to be enacted for several decades.11 The railroad and canal enterprise was Stockton's major business interest, but much of his wealth was in land. The family holdings were in Princeton and in Somerset County in New Jersey, but Stockton invested in mining properties in Virginia and in agricultural land in Arkansas and in California.12 Although Stockton's tendency in business, as in military and political affairs, was to be adventurous if not clearly reckless, he apparently suffered no serious reverses. As indicated above, the Stockton family had been one of the most substantial in New Jersey from the middle of the eighteenth century, and it certainly remained so during the lifetime of Robert Stockton. As will become apparent below, his private fortune was significantly related to his role in the Polk Administration's scheme in Texas in 1845. Stockton's career as a naval officer covered two separate periods of about ten years each: the first began with his service in the War of 1812 and continued for a decade thereafter; the second began in the 11 The accident occurred on 29 August 1855; the Company's report was dated 10 September. Material relating to the accident was gathered and published in a pamphlet entitled Documents and Papers Relating to the Late Camden and Amboy Railroad Accident, at Burlington, N.J.: Containing . . . Correspondence between Commodore R. F. Stockton and C. Van Rensselaer, D.D. 12 He purchased 1,280 acres of land in the Red River district of Arkansas at five dollars per acre. He secured some land in Georgia, and some property in Virginia in the amount of over 350 acres, part of it being "mining land upon which is a gold mine." He acquired a ranch in California near San Jose. Documents, deeds, ledgers, and correspondence on business matters are in the Stockton Papers, PL. His correspondence gives evidence of a man engaged in large enterprises; for example, a letter to J. Andrews, of the United States Bank in Philadelphia, from Stockton, at Princeton, 24 July 1838, enclosed twenty thousand dollars and noted that Stockton had sent "by private hand," ten thousand dollars on the day previous, to be placed to his credit (Stockton Papers, The New-York Historical Society).

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Intrigue

late 1830's—when he was engaged in the development of a new design, method of propulsion, and armament for a warship—and continued through his activity in the War with Mexico. He served under Commodore John Rodgers on the U.S. Frigate President during the 1812 war, as well as on the Guerrière. As lieutenant and later as a captain he was in service with the Mediterranean Squadron from 1815 to 1819. During this period he fought two or three duels with British naval officers, supposedly because they had made a public display of their contempt for the United States and its flag. Apparently no deaths resulted from these encounters, nor was Stockton wounded in any instance, but they had some consequences in his naval career. He acquired the title of "Fighting Bob" Stockton and was thus known to the crews of his ships. The episodes are not unimportant in the effort to understand the man; they were an early demonstration of the flamboyant style which was characteristic of his behavior, and they were also an evidence of an Anglophobia which affected his judgment and actions on more important occasions later.13 As a naval officer, as well as in his political career, Stockton was not only directly involved in the dominant theme of United States foreign policy and foreign relations during the first half of the nineteenth century—the expansion of the nation over the continent—but also directly engaged in the major domestic issue, slavery. During the years 1819 to 1821 Stockton was one of the few American naval officers who made a determined effort to suppress the illicit trade in slaves off the African stations. Assigned the command of the U.S. Schooner Alligator with which to patrol the African shore, he discovered that no ship he approached would fly the American flag, and that the slavers carried false registration papers in order to be always prepared to assert a registry other than the nationality of the warship which intercepted them. Stockton determined to board any ship which appeared to be engaged in the trade, and if the evidence on board convinced him of its guilt, to dispatch it to an American port and there let the matter of valid registry of the vessel be settled in the courts. During the 1821 cruise Stockton captured four ships which he as13 Bill, Morven, pp. 142-143; [Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 32-36. See also, Address of Hon. Joel Parker on the Life and Character of Commodore Stockton, March, 1868. The source of the account of the duels, in every publication which has come to my notice, is Stockton himself, and the stories leave something to be desired as sober history.

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Nationalist

51

serted were engaged in the slave trade. The Jeune Eugénie was the celebrated case. Stockton captured it on 7 May 1821, put a small boarding party on it, and sent it to Boston. When the French minister to the United States, Baron de Neuville, was informed of the capture he filed a protest with the State Department and asked for the delivery of the ship. He assumed that it had been taken under a misapprehension as to its nationality, but when he discovered that the same officer had taken three other French vessels into custody he wrote of his "inexpressible astonishment" that Stockton had apparently not acted out of ignorance of their registry, but had thought he "ought to seize these French Schooners" He expressed the hope to the State Department that the responsibility did not rest higher in the government than this particular naval officer, and that "Captain Robert Stockton alone has outraged the Flag of the King, that he has transgressed or rather lost sight of his Instructions." The French minister claimed that the ships were engaged in lawful commerce and referred to the conduct of the officer as being "so strange that it compels prompt explanations . . . [to throw] light upon the unheard of acts of Captain Stockton."14 It happened that Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was in Boston when the Jeune Eugénie arrived, and he wrote to Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson on the matter. Adams said that the district attorney in Boston thought the evidence that the Jeune Eugénie was engaged in the slave trade was conclusive. But Adams called Thompson's attention to the fact that the minister representing France had made a "direct and severe charge against Lt. Stockton," and he suggested to the Secretary of the Navy that it might "be expedient to call a court of enquiry, upon the conduct of that officer; and to transfer the Command of that Vessel, the Alligator, to another, with instructions of caution against capturing vessels under any other Flag than that of the United States."15 14 Letter from G. Hyde de Neuville, Washington, 24 August 1821, to the Secretary of State, here taken from a translation sent to the Secretary of the Navy, African Squadron Letters, 1819-1823, NDA, NA. In a letter of 27 August 1821 to the State Department the Baron referred to the "unheard of violence of the Commandant [sic] of the Alligator," who had no right whatever to arrest, under any pretense, any French vessel (ibid.). 15 Letters of 28 August and 11 September 1821 from Secretary Thompson to Stockton, with enclosures from Adams, Letters to Officers of Ships of War, No. 14, NDA, NA. A letter of 11 September 1821 from Daniel Brant, chief clerk of the State Department, to Smith Thompson, enclosing an extract of a letter from Adams dated Boston, 6 September, is in African Squadron Letters, 1819-1823, NDA, NA.

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Stockton's conduct apparently was not the subject of a formal investigation, nor was the command of the Alligator taken from him; but Thompson warned Stockton for the future "against capturing vessels under the Flag of any other nation, unless you have very strong and almost conclusive evidence that the vessel is American, & the Flag of another nation used as a cover." Before Stockton left on another cruise a few weeks later Secretary Thompson, probably under pressure from the State Department, narrowed his scope of action even further. Until further orders, Stockton was to consider his instructions "limited to the seizure & search of Vessels under the American flag only, & not those under any foreign flag, altho concerned in the Slave trade and altho there may be strong grounds to suspect them to be American Vessels."16 In his subsequent cruise to the African coast Stockton avoided complications with foreign governments—and he made no progress in the effort to put down the slave trade. But he was engaged in another effort with officers of the American Colonization Society on that cruise —the establishment of a colony in Africa for "free persons of color" from the United States. And in fact Stockton selected and purchased the site where the nation of Liberia was established. In 1819 Congress enacted a law cumbrously entitled "An Act in Addition to the Acts Prohibiting the Slave Trade," which gave the government authorization for the expenditure of funds and the use of naval vessels to resettle Africans rescued from slaving ships in a colony to be located on the west coast of Africa. The President was empowered to "make such regulations and arrangements, as he may deem expedient, for the safeguarding, support, and removal" of these victims, and $100,000 was appropriated for the purpose.17 The men who had designed the bill and had been most influential in its passage were not as concerned about providing a place of deposit for Africans rescued from slaving ships as for the creation of a colony in Africa to which free Negroes in the United States could be sent. Three years before the passage of the bill the Reverend Robert Finley, of Princeton (the master of an academy in which Stockton had been a student), had organized the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color in the United States. Bushrod Washing16

Smith Thompson, 21 August 1821 and 15 September 1821, to Stockton, Letters to Officers, No. 14, NDA, NA. 17 P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement: 1816-1865, pp. 5051.

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ton, nephew of the first President, and an associate justice of the Supreme Court, was elected president of the society, and the vice-presidents were such influential national leaders as Henry Clay, John Taylor of Caroline, Andrew Jackson, and Richard Rush. Stockton was a vigorous supporter of the Society and of the colonization movement in the United States from this time through the Civil War. He agreed with the purposes of the effort as explained by Henry Clay in an address to the Society in Washington just after its organization. The free Negroes, said Clay, were in an anomalous condition in American society; they were not subject to the incapacities of slaves but they did not have the "immunities" of freemen. There could thus be "no nobler cause than that which, whilst it proposed to rid the country of a useless and pernicious, if not dangerous portion of its population, contemplated the spreading of the arts of civilized life, and the possible redemption from ignorance and barbarism of a benighted quarter of the globe."18 The first effort of the Society to establish a colony, in 1820 on Sherbro Island, on the southeastern boundary of British Sierra Leone, was a failure. The site was marshy and quite unsuitable; within a few months the leaders were dead and the colony reduced to a remnant. The managers of the Society determined to try again and in 1821 they persuaded the government to send Captain Stockton in the Alligator to select and purchase with Society funds an appropriate site for the colony. He was accompanied by Dr. Eli Ayres, the principal agent for the Society. On the coast southeast of Sierra Leone they found Cape Mesurado, site of the present city of Monrovia. They negotiated with the leader of the Bassa group, "King" Peter, who at first agreed to cede the region, but then changed his mind and withdrew into the interior. Stockton determined to force the matter. He said subsequently in a report to the Society that "procrastination and perfidy had already done too much mischief," and he and Ayres followed King Peter.19 After they found him, when Stockton demanded that the land be sold to the Society one of Peter's advisers objected and threatened the white men. Stockton's version of what happened, as it appears in the biography 18 Ibid., p. 28. Clay emphasized that colonization was for Negroes already free, not for Negroes then held in bondage in the United States. 19 Stockton, from the U.S. Schooner Alligator, Cape Mesurado, West Coast of Africa, 16 December 1821, to the Board of the Society, American Colonization Society Papers, 1819-1821, LC.

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by his friend and business associate Samuel J. Bayard, is melodramatic: With that clear, ringing and overpowering tone of voice . . . [Stockton] commanded silence. . . . Deliberately drawing a pistol from his breast and cocking it, he gave it to Dr. Ayres, saying, while he pointed to . . . [Peter's adviser], "Shoot that villain if he opens his lips again!" Then, with the same deliberation, drawing another pistol and levelling it at the head of King Peter, and directing him to sit silent until he heard what was to be said, he proceeded to say, in the most solemn manner, appealing with uplifted hand to God in heaven to witness the truth of what he said, that in all the previous conferences with King Peter and the other chiefs he had told them nothing but the truth; that they came there as their benefactors, and not as their enemies, to do them good and not evil. . . . that, well knowing, from the dispositions manifested, that if they did not agree to execute the treaty that they intended to kill him and his party, he had determined that King Peter himself should be the first victim, and that unless he agreed to execute the treaty on the following day his fate was fixed; and, moreover, if he again agreed to ratify the treaty and failed to perform his duty, he might expect the worst punishment which an angry God could inflict on him and his people.20 Following this confrontation a contract was drawn and was signed with an "X" by Peter and five other "kings." The land cost the Society goods in the amount of $300. The document did not mention the Society; the African leaders agreed to "forever cede and relinquish the above described lands . . . to Captain Robert F. Stockton and Eli Ayres, To Have and To Hold the said premises for the use of the said Citizens of America." 21 Stockton concluded his report to the managers of the society with the plea: Let Christians, and all the friends of Humanity, join heart and hand, and purse; let experience, and wise counsellors, direct; youth, energy, and integrity execute; all difficulties must vanish; and my sagacity upon it, that the Colony, founded by North American humanity and liberality, will not be second to any, in its contributions, to the happiness of man, and the glory of our God.22 20 21

[Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 43-46. The Fifth Annual Report of the American Colonization Society, as reprinted in R. Earle Anderson, Liberia: America's African Friend, pp. 67-68. 22 Stockton, Alligator, Cape Mesurado, 16 December 1821, to Board of Society. Stockton apparently made a lasting impression on the African leaders. They later threatened Dr. Ayres, but, he reported, "they had shown such great dread at the name of captain Stockton and of our shipping, that I was well con-

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Stockton's direct relationship with the colony and his activity in it were limited to the year of its founding, but as an influential citizen in New Jersey and later as a political figure in the state and in the United States Senate he continued to support the Society and colonization as the solution to the slavery problem. Some Americans supported the colonization effort because they felt that free Negroes were dangerous in the United States; they infected the slaves with discontent and were potential, if not actual, leaders of slave revolts, and they damaged the logic of some slavery apologists who were asserting that slavery was the natural condition of the Negro. Others, including Stockton, saw colonization as a means of gradually eliminating slavery in the United States. At a meeting in Princeton in 1824 Stockton stated flatly that the "first and great object" of the work was "a gradual abolition of Slavery."23 Another motivation for the colonization effort had Stockton's strong support. In the years after 1825 when the colony became securely established and began to expand along the African coast for some 150 miles, operating trading factories and dominating the African peoples in the region, talk began of the settlement as the beginning of an American empire in Africa. The Virginia Colonization Society was particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities. It asserted that "the great problem of a new empire is about to be solved," and one of the members in Virginia stated that "the germ of an American-African empire has been planted" and would "flourish and expand until it overshadows a continent." Others spoke of reversing the tide of empire; it would now move eastward and Americans would build an "empire more enlightened" than any in the past.24 Stockton took up the vision without reservation. At a meeting of the Society in New York City he gave an address in which he advised Americans that their destiny called them to this noble work. American shipping would link the continents as roads and canals linked the cities and rivers and bays within a continent. "You are invited to reclaim Western Africa," he said, and "open the resources of that immense continent to the enterprise of the civilized world."25 vinced they would not be the first to attack" (Ayres' letter in pamphlet To the Public: Address of the Board of Managers of the American Colonization Society, dated 29 August 1822, of which Ayres' report constitutes fourteen pages, African Squadron Letters, 1819-1823, NDA, NA). 23 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, pp. 85-86. 24

25

Ibid., p. 157.

Ibid., pp. 157-158.

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Stockton was to make his contribution to the American empire in western North America rather than in Africa, but he was intrigued with this idea of American empire-building in Africa by means of Africans who had become sufficiently Americanized to act as the agents of the aggressive American nation abroad, inadequate though they were for the rights and opportunities of American citizenship at home. They would make American dreams of foreign empire legitimate, for they were Americans, although Americans with a difference, and they would be inhabiting the land they conquered—conquered with the supporting power of the American nation, which was deporting them from its soil at home. The vision was not to become a reality. The potential empire builders did not prove willing agents of American empire; indeed, they persistently resisted the attempt to "Africanize" them, and they certainly never thought of themselves as Americanizing the African continent. But Stockton held to the idea longer than most leaders of the colonization movement. After his missions for President Polk in 1845 and 1846, when the War with Mexico was concluded and the enormous accession of territory had become the basis for a sectional crisis, Stockton explained his position on slavery explicitly and publicly in response to a request from Daniel Webster. At that time, in 1850, Stockton still saw colonization as the solution to the slavery controversy in the United States, and the solution for the American mission in Africa. In his famous Seventh of March Speech, Webster had argued for a compromise settlement of the conflicting positions on slavery in the territories acquired from Mexico. He sent a copy of his speech to Stockton, referring to him as "an old friend," and noting that the problem was "connected with the question of proper governments for those new territories which you had an important agency in bringing under the power of the United States." Webster's purpose in writing to Stockton was to build support for a compromise settlement, and his letter and Stockton's reply were published in the New York Herald. Stockton supported Webster's position and the proposed compromise, although without close or specific reference. He proposed three measures to, in his phrase, "dissolve" the Gordian knot: (1) a declarative act that the Constitution gave no power to the general government to act on the subject of domestic slavery, in the states, the territories, or the District of Columbia; (2) an efficient act to enforce the provisions of the Constitution in relation

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to fugitive slaves; (3) the admission of California without approval or disapproval of that part of her Constitution which related to slavery. Stockton asserted that slavery could not be considered a sin or an unmitigated evil, and he brought scriptural evidence to bear in support of his position; thus the men of the North should not feel under moral obligation to eradicate slavery. The burden of his argument, however, gave no support to the system; he made a point of emphasizing that "African slavery was introduced into this country by no act of ours. For its introduction the American people are in no just sense responsible." Great Britain had done it "while we were her colonies. She engrafted this system into our communities at a time when these communities (then in their infancy) were unable to make any effectual resistance." He asserted that "our ancestors" protested and remonstrated, all to no avail; it was considered an evil, an oppression to the colonists as well as to the slaves, but they were powerless to resist. Stockton then shifted the responsibility from Great Britain to God. The establishment of the American Republic was the work of "an unseen Power" in which the hand of Providence was to be seen. That Providence brought us into contact with the Indians, the race then in possession of the continent, a race which had been "faithless to its trust"; the red man had suffered wrongs but "the decree by which his race wastes away before the advancing footsteps of civilization is the fiat of Infinite Wisdom." Then the "same all-pervading Providence has brought us in contact with still another race—the African." The ultimate purpose of this contact was surely, Stockton reasoned, to regenerate Africa. The "probation of the African people now in bondage on our shores is to come to an end," and that end should come when the freed Africans could be returned to their African home. "Africa is a land to which civilization must be brought" Stockton asserted; the inhabitants had demonstrated that they could not, unaided, create a civilized society. White men could not live in Africa, but the work of civilization had to be done and that work was clearly the duty of the "descendants of the sons of that continent now in America." This was their duty; but, Stockton complained, the free African "clings to this country still, under all his disabilities, regardless of the claims of the land of his fathers upon him." How, then, was the Negro to be persuaded? He thought he had the answer: "May not slavery and the necessity of migration as the condition of his release be the appointed instrument to produce compliance?" He observed

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that other slaves in other times had required some coercion in their own interest; the Israelites of old, but for Divine intervention, would have "sacrificed their liberators in the wilderness and returned into Egypt." The colonization movement had failed to make any progress as even the beginning of a solution to the issue of slavery in the United States, but Stockton nevertheless looked to it as the solution. He concluded his letter: I firmly believe that the hour for the complete enfranchisement of the Southern Slave will be the hour of the complete preparation for the work of African redemption and civilization; and that hour will make itself known in the removal of all obstacles here and there, in the preparation of the workmen and the work; and I earnestly hope that guided by happier influences than seem now to pervade the country, the pulpit, the press, the people of the North and the South may give their thoughts and efforts to this subject in the spirit of Him whose mission on our earth was heralded by the proclamation of peace and good-will.26 Stockton's stand on this crucial issue of slavery placed him in a moderate position as the sectional conflict developed. In any situation in which there was an attempt to use federal power to affect the holding of slaves as property, Stockton stood with the South. He was a member of the Peace Convention in Washington in January of 1861 and was essentially in support of the South on the specific issues as they were raised. He said the only substantive issue was that of slavery in the territories and he asserted that the southerners had the right to go into any territory of the United States with their slaves. But in any event, he exclaimed, to both parties, "you can't destroy your country for that," you "won't dissolve the Union for such a cause." He was a nationalist and could not countenance secession; when the break came, he took a public stand for the Union.27 Stockton's political activity and his political principles are important, finally, in this appraisal of Polk's agent in Texas on the eve of the War with Mexico. He had moved naturally, almost automatically, into politics in New Jersey and then on the national scene, as the representative of a family which had been influential in political life 26 Stockton's letter, dated 25 March 1850, at Princeton, was published in the New York Herald together with Webster's, on 12 April 1850; as reprinted in [Bayard], Life of Stockton, Appendix E, pp. 69-79. 27 Lucius Eugene Chittenden, Notes of Debates in the Peace Convention of 1861, Chittenden Papers, LC.

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from the time of the founding of the nation. He first became active in politics in the 1820's, at the close of the Era of Good Feelings, that period when the United States was operating as a one-party state. His father was of the Federalist persuasion and as the division began which was to result in the development of two parties, Democratic and Whig, Stockton tended toward the latter, supporting John Quincy Adams in 1824. But apparently as a consequence of his father's having been denied a coveted political appointment by Adams, Stockton backed Jackson in 1828 and 1832, and he supported Martin Van Buren in 1836. In the election of 1840, however, he worked for the Whig candidates, Harrison and Tyler, and he had influence in the Tyler Administration, which came to power when Harrison died within a month of taking office. Tyler's Administration was more Democratic than Whig, and Stockton, with most of Tyler's supporters, returned to the Democratic Party and worked for Polk's election in 1844. His support of the Democrats, however, was not continuous; through the next decade and a half he often identified himself with the American Party, the so-called Know-Nothings, a nativist group whose primary principles were anti-Catholicism and antiforeignism.28 This record of changing party affiliation indicates that Stockton did not have a well-defined and strongly held political philosophy, and this was the case. On one issue in American politics, however, he was consistent and persistent. In that period of aggressive expansionist feeling and action Stockton was the prototype of the American nationalist. His speeches through the two decades before the Civil War— first as a private citizen active in politics in New Jersey, then as an officer-politician during the War with Mexico, and later as a United States senator, from 1852 to 1854, and an important political leader in New Jersey thereafter—are expressions of narrow, chauvinist, aggressive nationalism. An address which he gave on 24 September 1844 at New Brunswick, New Jersey, in support of Polk's candidacy provides an opportunity to examine his views. The two great issues of that campaign were the "re-annexation of Texas" and the occupation of "all of Oregon," and Stockton spoke for that full expansionist program, devoting more attention to Texas than to Oregon. He listed a number of advantages to be gained from the annexation of the former Mexican 28

Bayard, Life of Stockton, in giving his political history, always expresses admiration for Stockton's diverse and alternating political positions. Appendices contain several of Stockton's political speeches.

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province, but he placed major emphasis upon the urgent necessity to build up American power in order to defend free institutions in the world. In a passage which sounds not unlike much political oratory in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century (changing only the name of the nation which is said to be endangering free governments) Stockton made the case for American expansion: God and nature, and inevitable circumstances, destine the United States to be the only curb or check upon the ambition of Great Britain to rule the world. In every quarter of the globe, that haughty and grasping power, for the last century, has been augmenting her territory, and planting her standard upon all the commanding positions of the globe; and still her progress is onward upon the march to universal Empire. Not satisfied with her empire in Europe, Asia, and Africa, she has steadily looked to the arrest of the natural progress of these States on this Continent. She has already stretched her cordon of posts across this Continent, along our northern frontier, from Quebec to the Mouth of the Columbia. And to the possession of the West India Islands, she seeks still further to add to her empire in the Mexican Gulf, the Island of Cuba, the Isthmus of Panama, and the beautiful plains of Texas. Are we willing, looking forward to the certain struggle ere long to take place between us, that Great Britain should thus proceed, adding empire to empire, while we supinely disregard opportunities of strengthening ourselves for the contest which must sooner or later be upon us? Is this the course which American statesmen should counsel or abet? This question is of mightier magnitude than all local considerations, or party politics. It affects the progress, the glory, the grandeur, and the ultimate importance of our country in the great scale of nations. It involves our ultimate ability and comparative strength for contending with our gigantic opponent for the freedom of the seas—for the stability of the law of nations—for empire on this Continent—perhaps for the privilege of free representative government, as opposed to monarchy. Stockton concluded with the assertion that the President who should accomplish the annexation of Texas, as an important step in the growth of American power against that day when Americans would stand as protagonists of liberty against the forces of despotic monarchical governments, would "stand next to Jefferson in the grateful remembrance of his countrymen."29 Near the close of the War with Mexico, when Stockton had re29 [Robert F. Stockton], Speech of Capt. R. F. Stockton Delivered at the Great Democratic Meeting at New Brunswick, New Jersey, Wednesday, September 24, 1844, as reported by James Rees.

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turned overland from California to the East Coast, he was given a public reception and a dinner in his honor in Philadelphia. Following the toast, "Our country—may she ever be right—but right or wrong— our country," Stockton gave an address in which he asserted that the successes of the United States in war were due to the fact that "the spirit of our Pilgrim fathers is with us; it is because the God of armies and the Lord of hosts is with us." He said: ". . . in the providence of God we are placed or are likely soon to be placed, in a position where, by a fair and legitimate construction of the law of nations, the fate of Mexico and the peace of this continent, to a greater or less extent, will devolve upon the virtue, the wisdom, and the humanity of our rulers." It was appropriate that this should be so, for the United States was the greatest of all the nations of history; any "thoughtful observer," said Stockton, could not "fail to be impressed with the conviction that we enjoy a degree of happiness and prosperity never heretofore vouchsafed to the nations of mankind." 30 A few years later, at an 1851 Independence Day celebration at Elizabethtown, New Jersey, Stockton expressed the conviction that the expansion of the American people had not been concluded with the conquest and absorption of but half of Mexico: Already has the Anglo-Saxon avalanche descended the western slope of the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific shores. Hitherto the impulse has been westward, and westward chiefly has been the march of empire, until at last it has met resistance in one of those vast oceans which cover so large an area of the globe. Rebounding from the contact, it will and must naturally soon take another and more southern direction. I am only stating what I consider the law which governs the progress of the Anglo-Saxon race. I will not attempt to impeach or defend what I believe to be the inevitable destiny of my country and my race. . . . I am unwilling to say to my countrymen that you shall go no farther East or West, or North or South. I am unwilling that the Anglo-American race shall perpetually recoil from any given boundary, and that any portion of this continent not now in their possession shall forever be impenetrable to their civilization, enterprise, and industry. Any such exercise of authority would be as ineffectual as that of the Danish monarch over the Atlantic tides. . . . let us not attempt to prevent the peaceable progress of our countrymen over a continent which Providence seems to have designed for their occupation and civilization.31 30 [Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 170-178. Niks' National Register, LXXIII (22 January 1848), 335, reported the speech. 31 [Bayard], Life of Stockton, Appendix E, pp. 79-84.

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The man who considered that his "race" was required by some natural law, or by some unnatural Providence, to occupy the continent had not hesitated to assist such notoriously unpunctual forces by methods which, although surely righteous, were seemingly best to keep secret. This emphasis upon race, and on the peculiar destiny of the AngloSaxon, or Anglo-American, "race," was a note struck very frequently in nineteenth-century America, and was an important component of the aggressive American nationalism of the period of the War with Mexico. Stockton's speeches were studded with such sentiments, but beyond merely playing upon the prejudices of the American crowd in a general way, he aligned himself with a political party based upon pride in ancestry, upon exclusiveness, and upon a mythology of race characteristics. He had been associated with the "Native Americans" in Philadelphia as early as 1845, and he supported the program of the party consistently thereafter. A letter which he wrote in 1855 to a committee of the American Party of Trenton is a fair expression of his political views during and following the Mexican War. He began by associating himself with the principles of the Party, which he listed as: First, The Constitution with its Compromises. Second, The preservation of the Union at all hazards. Third, The naturalization laws should be abolished or essentially modified. Fourth, Americans alone should rule America. They only should be appointed to high and responsible offices under our Government. Stockton said that George Washington had been worried about "foreign influences," even though he "did not anticipate that, in half a century from his age, Europe would be brought within ten days' sail of America, or that within that period half a million of foreigners annually would come to exercise the prerogatives of American sovereigns." Had the Father of His Country and his colleagues anticipated that development, Stockton said, "it is more than probable that no power would have been granted by the people to the Federal Government to enact any laws of naturalization." The proper doctrine, he asserted, was that "Americans alone should rule America" Politically, the country was rapidly dividing into two parties, the American Party and the Foreign party. The Foreign party

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sought to "pander" to the foreign element and "its insolent ambition." The overriding issue, he cried, was "the safety and prosperity of our institutions" Stockton thought it was necessary to take an extreme position; "The evil is radical, and the correction must be equally radical."32 The Republican Party, with its demand that slavery be restricted to the states in which the institution was protected at the time, moved onto the national scene in the election of 1856. Its emergence as a major political party rapidly polarized the politics of the country on a different basis than that of antiforeignism, and that marked the demise of the American Party. Stockton, however, continued to talk as if the Party still existed as a significant political force. In 1859 he was influential in the assemblage of the remnants of the American Party at Camden, and in his address to the group he expressed his nativist principles. Stockton said that he was "an American—a straight-out American"; the Republican Party was a sectional party and the Democratic Party had been "rent in twain," leaving the American Party alone as truly national. He placed great emphasis upon religion in American life, as he had been doing for two decades. (The Stockton family had been Presbyterian, but Robert left that denomination and joined the Episcopal Church of the Anglican communion when he married into a family of that affiliation.) The American people constituted "one CHRISTIAN NATION," he said, and this was "a distinctive element of their nationality" Stockton asserted that the United States had been founded by men "deeply imbued with the fear of God and devotion to the cross of Christ." (The dominant religious cast of the founders of the nation had been deistic rather than Christian, but Stockton was only characteristic of evangelical America in his ignorance of that awkward fact.) He deliberately played upon religious feeling for his political purpose. The American Party had been created, he said, because of the "sentiment of infidel murmurings, which would have blanched the cheeks of our forefathers." There was a foul "spirit of infidelity and contempt of Heaven" in the air: "And when I tell you that there are now one hundred and fifty infidel newspapers published in the United States; and when I tell you that thousands of these foreigners are banded together in our Christian cities, for the purpose of destroying our Christian Sabbath, will you not say it is time for the American nation to rise up?"33 Stockton received the empty honor of the nomination for United 32 33

Ibid., pp. 207-210. [Robert F. Stockton], Speech of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, on the

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States senator from New Jersey by that 1859 convention of the American Party. It no longer had significant influence as a political group, but its racism, its chauvinism, its religiosity, and its claim of unique virtue for the "American way" were doctrines which had had great influence during and following the War with Mexico; and, indeed, these doctrines have never since that time been without force in American politics. It is apparent that Commodore Stockton, the naval officer whom the Polk Administration sent to Texas in April of 1845, was not simply an officer in the Navy; he was independently wealthy, was prominent in politics, and was at the head of great business enterprises. But it was ostensibly as a naval officer that Stockton was sent to Texas. He had been active in the Navy for a few years just prior to that time; not, however, in any ordinary duty, but as the initiator and superintendent of construction of the first propeller-driven warship ever constructed, the U.S.S. Princeton. Stockton had been on furlough for a decade when, in October 1838, he was given command of the U.S. Battleship Ohio with orders to sail to the Mediterranean to join Commodore Isaac Hull's squadron. But it was quite obviously a special and temporary assignment, for on 5 January 1839 he was granted two months' leave of absence from the Mediterranean Squadron to deliver dispatches to the American minister in London and from there he returned to the United States in August and was at once placed on furlough again.34 At Liverpool, Stockton met the Swedish inventor John Ericsson, known chiefly in American history for his construction of the iron-clad Monitor to combat the Confederate Merrimac during the Civil War. Ericsson had been working on an internal combustion engine in Sweden and continued this work in England, but at the time he met Stockton he was engaged in steam-engine design and on plans to drive a ship with steam engines using a screw propeller rather than side or rear paddle wheels. One important advantage would be to permit the placing of the engine below the water line, thus protecting it from enemy fire. The idea of the screw propulsion of ships, Ericsson was frank to say then and later, was not an idea of his own; it was in common currency at the Past, Present and Future of the American Party Delivered in the City of . . . Camden, New Jersey, August 4th, 1859. 34 Service Record, Robert Field Stockton, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, NDA, NA.

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time, but the Swedish inventor did the essential engineering work to apply the conception. Stockton later sought to take substantial credit for the invention, as well as for the promotion. He said: Prior to my acquaintance with Captain Ericsson I had proposed to the President of the United States and the Navy Department to construct a steam ship of war whose machinery should be entirely out of reach of shot; pursuing my inquiries on that subject a few years afterwards in England, I was informed . . . that a very ingenious mechanic by the name of Ericsson had been devoting much time and attention to the matter of submerged wheels. After the work had been done, Stockton consistently minimized the role which Ericsson had played; he commonly referred to him as a "mechanic," rather than as an engineer or inventor.35 In England in the summer of 1839, Stockton arranged with Ericsson for the construction of an "iron boat" of some seventy feet by ten feet, driven by steam power applied to a screw propeller, as an experimental craft. Ericsson designed it and supervised the construction and Stockton named it the Robert F. Stockton and displayed it by running it up and down the Thames River through London. He then had it fitted with sails and sent it across the Atlantic; he recovered his investment by selling it to his canal company.36 The small boat was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of this form of propulsion for a powerful warship, and it seemed to be a successful experiment. There is some question about the extent to which Stockton made definite arrangements with the inventor, but in any event Ericsson produced detailed plans for such a ship and brought his plans with him when he came to the United States in November of 1839.37 Stockton made no progress toward securing authorization from the government for the construction of such a warship until after the election of 1840; but he had particularly close relations with John Tyler, and the project received the approval of the Navy Department soon after Tyler acceded to the Presidency following Harrison's death. By acts of the Congress in 1841 and 1842 the government was authorized to build steam vessels "on such models as shall be most approved, ac35 William F. Durand, "John Ericsson," DAB, VI, 171-176; Stockton, at Princeton, 20 May 1844, to John Y. Mason, Secretary of the Navy, copy of letter, John O. Sargent Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 36 Bill, Morven, p. 104. 37 Durand, "Ericsson," DAB, VI, 173.

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cording to the best advices they can obtain." Several appropriations were made for the purpose.38 On 27 May 1841 Stockton submitted a model for the "steamship of war" to the Secretary of the Navy, and on 1 June the Secretary replied with authorization for Stockton to report to the Navy Yard in Philadelphia for the purpose of preparing drafts of such a vessel. Through the fall and winter of 1841-1842 Stockton was in constant correspondence with Ericsson in New York regarding the details of construction and the selection of contractors. Construction began in 1842. The matter of Ericsson's compensation, which was later to cause so much ill feeling between the inventor and the promoter, came up several times in the correspondence. It is apparent that no definite arrangement was made; on one occasion Stockton made a payment of $1,150 to Ericsson, noting, "I will include it in the Princeton's expenses and repay myself for the advance in that way—if I can." 39 The ship was launched in the fall of 1843 and completed a satisfactory experimental trial run in early October. Permission had been secured from the Navy Department to place on board "such armament as you may think best adapted for the vessel," and Stockton ordered two twelve-inch guns, larger than any then in use. The two guns were formed of wrought iron, under Ericsson's supervision; one of them cracked near the base in early tests and Stockton wrote that he "hoped" the band which he had ordered put around the barrel would be made to stand "the 45 pounds of Powder." In August of 1843 Stockton wrote that he was "rejoiced to learn" that the gun would soon be finished and he referred to the necessity, or the "great object" as he said, of getting the "greatest velocity with the heaviest shot," although the distance carried would also be important in impressing officials of the government.40 On 5 February 1844, a week before bringing the Princeton to Washington for demonstrations, Stockton wrote to the Secretary of the Navy describing his accomplishment. The Princeton was both a sailing vessel and a steamship; the funnel was retractable, thus making it possible to 38 Summary of the history of governmental action on the ship in the brief of John O. Sargent, attorney for Ericsson, undated but apparently 1851 or 1852, John Ericsson Papers, American Swedish Historical Museum. 39 Stockton, Philadelphia, 2 February 1844, to Ericsson, copy of letter, Robert F. Stockton Papers, ibid. 40 David Henshaw, Secretary of the Navy, 16 October 1843, to Stockton, in Philadelphia, Letters to Officers, No. 35, and 21 November 1843, Letters to Officers, No. 36, NDA, NA; Stockton, Philadelphia, 20 February 1843 and 6 August 1843, to Ericsson, at Astor House in New York, copies in Stockton Papers, American Swedish Historical Museum.

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mislead an enemy into thinking that she had only sail to move by, for nothing in her external appearance indicated that she was propelled by steam, and since she burned anthracite rather than soft coal, she put out very little smoke (Stockton said "no smoke") and thus did not betray her motive power. Stockton claimed that the ship was the "cheapest, fastest and most certain ship-of-war in the world." As for the armament: The Princeton is armed with two long 225-pound wrought-iron guns and twelve 42-pound carronades. . . . The big guns of the Princeton can be fired with an effect terrific and almost incredible, and with a certainty heretofore unknown. . . . It is confidently believed that this small ship will be able to battle with any vessel, however large, if she is not invincible against any foe. The improvements in the art of war adopted on board the Princeton may be productive of more important results than any thing that has occurred since the invention of gunpowder. The numerical force of other navies, so long boasted, may be set at naught. The ocean may again become neutral ground, and the rights of the smallest as well as the greatest nations may once more be respected.41 This is an amusing and instructive example of the tendency to overrate the consequences of an advance in technology; it is less amusing to note that the promoter, in celebrating the novel features and qualities of the ship, makes no mention of the man who developed the ideas and applied them, the inventor Ericsson. Stockton steamed up the Potomac in the Princeton on 13 February and remained in Washington through the month. He gave several demonstrations of the vessel, including one of its use as an icebreaker in a channel near the Navy Yards. On 20 February he took on board a large delegation of congressmen and other Washington notables for a cruise down the Potomac and a demonstration of the firing of the big guns. He had named one of the guns the "Oregon," with reference to the dispute with Great Britain over that territory, and the other the "Peacemaker." 42 A newspaper reporter was aboard on the excursion, and his description provides a lively portrait of Stockton. As he prepared to fire 41 Stockton, Philadelphia, 5 February 1844, to David Henshaw, Secretary of the Navy, as printed in [Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 81-83. 42 Philip Hone, of New York, a man of conservative views, and contemptuous of the "Manifest Destiny" spirit abroad in the land, read of these weapons and observed in his diary that the Peacemaker was designed to "hurl defiance" at Great Britain, and surmised that Stockton was "the fire-brand which was to ignite the whole" (quoted by Bill, Morven, pp. 107-108).

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the Peacemaker, Stockton said: "Now, gentlemen of the House of Representatives, fellow-citizens, and shipmates, we are going to give a salute to the wisdom of this mighty republic (God bless her!) in Congress assembled. Stand firm, and you will see how it feels!" The gun was fired and the reporter wrote that in the smoke "we came near falling over the venerable Ex-President Adams": "Captain Stockton's voice rose high amid the din of the battle. 'It's nothing but honest gunpowder, gentlemen; it has a strong smell of the Declaration of Independence, but it's none the worse for that. That's the kind of music when negotiations fail. It has a little the ring of the earthquake, but it tells handsomely on salt water'." The company adjourned to a feast worthy of the "coronation-day of a South American Emperor" in the cabin on the middle deck, extending the whole length of the ship. The reporter stated that the "scruples of the friends of retrenchment will be appeased" when they learn that, Stockton being a man of wealth, the "magnificent feast prepared for the occasion was drawn, to the extent of the 'extras,' from the Captain's private resources." Newspaper readers were told that when the Peacemaker was fired the "solid balls of two hundred and thirty pounds skimmed the surface of the water for several miles with the lightness of an arrow." The reporter wrote that Captain Stockton "goes for Oregon," and quoted him as saying that "if the question is brought to the tug of war, he will undertake to defend the mouth of the Columbia with his single ship."43 This triumph was followed by the catastrophic explosion of one of the big guns on 28 February, an accident which killed two members of the President's Cabinet and thus an accident without parallel in American political history. President Tyler and his Cabinet, several senators, and other leading citizens of Washington, including James Madison's widow, Dolly, were on board. The account given by Stockton's business associate and biographer, Samuel Bayard, is quite clearly Stockton's own story of the matter: During her progress down the Potomac, the great guns on the Princeton had been again and again discharged, until public curiosity appeared to be satiated. The company had returned below, and at the festive board the voice of hilarity resounded through the decks of the proud ship.... Captain Stockton had risen to offer a toast complimentary to the chief magistrate 43

The newspaper account is printed in [Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 84-86, from the Ohio Statesman, with the story dated Washington, 20 February 1844.

1. President James K. Polk, by Thomas Sully, 1847. Courtesy University of North Carolina Photo Lab.

2. Commodore Robert F. Stockton, by Thomas Sully, about 1845.Courtesy The Art Museum, Princeton University.

The President and the Commodore, as painted by Thomas Sully.

3. George P. A. Healy, portrait of James K. Polk, about 1845-1848. In the collection of The Corcoran Gallery of Art.

4. Daguerreotype of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, about 1845-1850. Courtesy Chicago Historical Society.

The men of the Texas intrigue.

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of the republic. As he rose, with his wine-glass filled in his hand, an officer entered and informed him that some of the company desired one of the great guns to be again discharged. Captain S. shook his head, and saying, "No more guns to-night," dismissed the officer. He soon again returned, while Captain S. was speaking on the subject of his toast, with a message from the Secretary of the Navy expressive of his desire to see one of the big guns fired once more. This message Captain Stockton considered equivalent to an order, and immediately went on deck to obey it. He placed himself upon the breech of the gun, aimed, and fired. Feeling a sensible shock, stunned and enveloped in a cloud of smoke, for an instant he could not account for his sensations. But in a few seconds, as the smoke cleared, and the groans of the wounded and the shrieks of the bystanders who were unhurt resounded over the decks, the terrible catastrophe which had happened was revealed. Those killed were the Secretary of State, Abel P. Upshur; the Secretary of the Navy, Thomas W. Gilmer; Captain Beverly Kennon, of the Navy; Virgil Maxey, of Maryland, former solicitor of the Treasury and chargé d'affaires at Brussels; and David Gardiner, of New York, who was a personal guest of the President. Seventeen sailors were wounded. A Naval Board of Inquiry was appointed and found that Stockton had not been negligent in the construction or testing of the gun. It concluded that not only was "every precaution taken which skill, regulated by prudence and animated by the loftiest motives, could devise to guard against accident," but Captain Stockton had exhibited "due confidence" in placing himself in the most dangerous place at the time of firing.44 Although Stockton's name had been officially cleared, the accident left its mark upon him; the ship was in fact a successful experiment which demonstrated the feasibility of the design and motive power, and it set the pattern for the future, but the Princeton was always remembered in connection with the fatal explosion. Had Tyler remained in office Stockton would not have been engaged in an unsuccessful intrigue in Texas during the summer of 1845; presumably, he would have been cruising in the Mediterranean, displaying his revolutionary new warship. In the middle of February 1845 John Y. Mason, who had been appointed Secretary of the Navy following the death of Thomas Gilmer in the explosion, asked Stockton to come to 44

[Bayard], Life of Stockton, pp. 88-93. See also, John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, VII, 303. President Tyler, a widower, married the daughter of David Gardiner a few months later.

76 Origins of the War with Mexico: The Folk-Stockton Intrigue Washington. On 28 February, Mason issued orders for the cruise of a squadron under Stockton's command. He was to take the Princeton, the Saratoga, the St. Mary's and the brig Porpoise to the island of Madeira, where the Saratoga would be detached and would sail to Brazil. Stockton would take the others to Liverpool, where the Princeton would take on board a wrought-iron gun which was being manufactured for her there. The squadron would then go to the Mediterranean, where the St. Mary's would be detached to a separate command. Stockton in the Princeton, with the brig Porpoise, would visit the principal ports of the Mediterranean, as far as Constantinople, "for the purpose of exhibiting the peculiar construction of the Princeton to all such as may have the curiosity to visit her." Stockton was advised to "leave a favorable impression behind, at every place you may visit."45 President Polk's program did not permit the scattering of United States naval forces over the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In the summer of 1844 Stockton had been active in support of Polk, and of the expansionist program of the Democratic Party, as described above. He was probably Polk's most important and influential supporter in New Jersey, and when Polk won the election Stockton might well have anticipated some special attention. In any event, he received it. On 2 April, Stockton was given orders countermanding those of February. He was to report to Commodore David Conner, in command of the Home Squadron, comprising all the naval vessels in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time these vessels were concentrated just off the coast of Mexico, near the most important Mexican port, Veracruz. Stockton was told that further orders would be given to Commodore Conner. A copy of orders sent to Conner was enclosed, stating that Stockton would arrive with his four vessels, to be under Conner's command and at his orders. Stockton's instructions provided that if Conner should not be at Veracruz, or if he could not meet him elsewhere "and hostilities shall have been declared against the United States by Mexico," Stockton should carry on under his own authority.46 In the second week of April, Stockton took the Princeton to Philadelphia to receive on board a gun which had been delivered there for 45

Mason, 14 February 1845, to Stockton, Letters to Officers, No. 37, NDA, NA; Mason, 28 February 1845, to Stockton, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA. 46 John Y. Mason, Acting Secretary of the Navy, 2 April 1845, to Stockton, at Norfolk, and Mason, same date, to Commodore David Conner, "Commg. Home Squadron and U.S. Naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico," Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA.

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47

him. Back at Norfolk on 22 April, he received new orders from Polk's Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft. Two letters were addressed to Stockton: one contained his instructions, the other was a copy of the letter sent in his care to be delivered to Commodore Conner. In the letter to Stockton covering Conner's, Bancroft wrote: "You will receive herewith a letter, addressed to Commodore Conner, to be delivered when you shall fall in with him." The letter to Conner began: "This letter will reach you through Commodore Stockton, who is instructed to place himself and squadron at your disposition."48 Stockton did not, in fact, ever place himself and his squadron at the disposition of Commodore Conner; there is no indication that he ever intended to do so, and every implication that he expected to be otherwise engaged. The Department's letter to Conner did not reveal that Stockton had been given a broad and loose directive, in writing. He was to "go on shore" at Galveston and "make [himself] acquainted with the dispositions of the people of Texas, and their relations with Mexico," and remain there "as long as in [his] judgment may seem necessary."49 Those instructions undoubtedly followed discussions between President Polk and Stockton, together with Secretary Bancroft, although no record of such conversations has been found. When Stockton arrived in Texas he proceeded to do more than gather information on the disposition of the people. He acted in conjunction with another agent whom President Polk had sent, to attempt to manipulate the foreign policy of the Republic of Texas in a scheme to place a cloak of legitimacy over Polk's aggressive designs on Mexico's territory. And he reported his actions to the Department. As this survey of his career has demonstrated, Stockton was in full agreement with Polk's objectives; and he was willing to take the responsibility for the means to be used, as the President was not. He was even prepared to use his personal fortune to finance the beginning of a war. Robert F. Stockton was an agent, however, not the initiator of the scheme. The man responsible for the effort was just beginning his single term as President at the time, and he went on to more decisive use of the power of his office after the failure of thisfirstplan. President James 47

Mason, 1 April 1845, to Stockton, at Norfolk, ibid. George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, 22 April 1845, to Commodore David Conner, "Commanding U.S. Naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico &c &c Vera Cruz," David Conner Papers, New York Public Library. 49 George Bancroft, 22 April 1845, to Stockton, letter-copy, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA. The letter is given in full above at the close of Chapter Three. 48

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K. Polk was not a popular President; he was not regarded highly by his contemporaries in public life and for three quarters of a century thereafter American historians were very critical of the man and of his use of the nation's power. But in recent years Polk has been the beneficiary of a revisionist school of "tough-minded" historians. A brief review of Polk's career and of the changing appraisals of historians will make it possible to examine the 1845 affair with greater understanding than would otherwise be possible.

CHAPTER

FIVE

James K. Polk in American History

Arthur Meir Schlesinger conducted a presidential rating poll by fifty-five "outstanding authorities in American history" in 1948. Of the twenty-nine Presidents rated, six were classified "Great," four "Near Great," eleven "Average," six "Below Average," and two were "Failures." Those whom the historians designated "Great" were: Lincoln, Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wilson, Jefferson, and Jackson, in that descending order. The four to achieve the "Near Great" rating were: Theodore Roosevelt, Grover Cleveland, John Adams, and James K. Polk. The voting on Polk was as follows: two rated him "Great," twenty-seven said he was "Near Great," twenty-one placed him in the "Average" category, and five marked him "Below Average." 1 Schlesinger observed in his essay presenting the results that "Polk's name in this group [Near Great] will probably excite principal wonder, for he is undeservedly one of the forgotten men of American history." His position in the history of the country, Schlesinger said, has been unjustly neglected: His record in the White House was an exceptional one. A coldly practical and methodical man, Polk set himself certain precise objectives to be achieved while he was President, and achieve them he did during his single term of office from 1845-1849. He lowered the tariff, re-established the independent treasury system for public funds and completed the westward expansion of the country. To get Oregon and Washington he risked the threat of war with Great Britain. And he did go to war with Mexico to acquire California and most of the territory of the present states of the Southwest.2 1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The United States Presidents," Life, 2 5 ( 1 November 1948), 65-73; Arthur M. Schlesinger to the writer, letter, 29 September 1949. 2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, "A Yardstick for Presidents," Paths to the Present, p. 97.

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The "authorities" in American history cast their votes in the absence of any common criteria on "greatness": some were concerned almost wholly with the historical importance of the events which occurred during the term of office, with little or no reference to the particular leadership of the President at the time, while others gave primary place to the leadership qualities of the President; some used the term "great" to involve a value judgment on the character of the methods and the goals of the President, while others excluded completely any ethical content in judging the accomplishments of the executive—"great" meant to them simply the effect the man had in changing the shape of the future. Thus the poll had only the most imprecise meaning; as is common in such polling exercises, the results were more interesting than edifying.3 In presenting the results of the poll, however, Schlesinger gave a clue to his own criteria when he discussed the merits of the "Great" Presidents. He referred to Franklin Roosevelt's phrase describing the Presidency as "pre-eminently a place of moral leadership," and asserted that it was the exercise of moral leadership that won these men the lasting regard of posterity.4 Polk's elevation to near-greatness by this generation of historians, however, can not be understood to rest upon that basis. Whatever their judgment of Polk as President otherwise, historians have not attempted to show that Polk was successful in providing inspiring leadership, whether "moral" or not. It is clear that Schlesinger did not intend to apply the phrase to Polk in either its inspirational or ethical connotations, if one may judge by Schlesinger's historical work. His earlier work had cut strongly against that interpretation and in an essay entitled "The Martial Spirit," in the volume in which he presented the results of the poll, he made a very strong criticism of Polk's foreign policy. Polk "precipitated hostilities," he wrote, by marching troops into a strip of land claimed by both countries, and when the Mexicans resisted he blamed them for starting the War.5 Schlesinger gave just one basis for Polk's high rating among the Presidents: "By carrying the flag to the Pacific he gave America her continental breadth and ensured her future significance in the world. . . . Polk's aggressive course toward Mexico outraged moralists at the 3 An inquiry sent to each of the historians who participated in the poll, asking for the criteria used in judging "greatness," brought a response from slightly more than 50%, with the results indicated. 4 Schlesinger, "The United States Presidents," Life, 25 (1 November 1948), p. 73. 5 Schlesinger, "The Martial Spirit," Paths to the Present, p. 192.

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time and since, but no responsible person has yet proposed that his work be undone."6 One must assume, on the basis of his own work on the subject, that Schlesinger included himself among the "outraged moralists." And in the same essay Schlesinger emphasized the merits of a foreign policy of a quite opposite character. In justifying the award to John Adams of the rating of "Near Great," he wrote that Adams' credentials "consist largely of his achievement in withstanding his own party's demand for a full-scale war with France." He noted that Adams wished his epitaph to read: " 'Here lies John Adams who took upon himself the peace with France in the year 1800'."7 Such a rationale for judging presidential greatness is intriguing. The conjecture presents itself that if Adams, instead of resisting the war fever of his countrymen, had contrived to bring on a war with France and perhaps with Spain as well, and if the United States had acquired the Louisiana Territory as the fruits of that war, he would have found his niche in greatness equally secure in the hands of his nation's historians. Jefferson, however, would have been in danger of slipping to an undistinguished "Average," for Schlesinger stated that Jefferson's "Great" rating was based primarily upon his purchase of that huge area. Jefferson might possibly have saved himself by anticipating Polk in the acquisition of the then Spanish domains in the southwest, thus squaring off the nation's boundaries as the century opened. And had fate dealt such a blow at Polk, he would have found it most difficult to pull himself out of a "Below Average" position, short of engineering a war north or south to acquire yet more room for the American future— or, apparently with equal effect, by successfully resisting a strong desire by his countrymen for such a war. That presidential poll is not helpful or enlightening in a study of Polk in American history, except as the simple record of the end effect of efforts by revisionist historians working on the Mexican War and on Polk. To achieve an understanding of what has happened to the reputation of James K. Polk, and the meaning of it, and thus to gain a vantage point for an analysis of a significant episode in his career, it is necessary to briefly review the man's work and the appraisals made by historians since his time. 6

Schlesinger, "A Yardstick for Presidents," Paths to the Present, pp. 97-98. Ibid., p. 97. A second poll, in 1962, moved Polk still higher on the scale; he was placed ahead of John Adams and Grover Cleveland, and just following Theodore Roosevelt (Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," New York Times Magazine, CXI [29 July 1962], 12-13, 40-41, 43). 7

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James Knox Polk was born in 1795 in North Carolina and educated at the University of North Carolina, and entered into the practice of law after studying in the office of Felix Grundy in Nashville, Tennessee. In 1823 he was elected to the Tennessee Legislature, where he formed an attachment with General Jackson which he maintained throughout his career. In 1825 he was chosen to represent his district in Congress; not quite thirty years old, he was one of the youngest members of that body. He was re-elected continuously until 1839, when he resigned to run for the office of governor of Tennessee. A Democrat throughout his political life, Polk demonstrated in his speeches and actions a strict, almost fanatical party spirit. His opponents referred to his "slavish" subservience to Jackson during the Presidency of the General, but that is explicable, in part at least, by his intense party orientation rather than as simple opportunist bootlicking. During twenty-five years in politics Polk was remarkably consistent in his political views on the primary issues of that period: his strict construction of the Constitution in matters of internal improvements; his advocacy of a tariff for "revenue only"; his opposition to a United States bank of any kind; his belief in the Tightness and expediency of national expansion; and his contention that slavery was not a proper subject for discussion or action in the national Congress were all positions which he assumed during hisfirstyears in Washington. They were also, of course, the views of the dominant portion of his party. Polk was chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means in 1834 and 1835, and in that position led Jackson's fight in the House against the United States Bank. He was speaker of the House from late 1835 until 1839. In that year he was elected governor of Tennessee, and the next year there was an effort by Tennessee Democrats to give him the nomination for Vice-President, but it was not successful. In 1841 Polk was defeated for re-election to the governorship, and in 1843 he failed in another attempt at the office. Polk had thus been in political retirement for four years prior to the 1844 presidential campaign, but he had supporters who were again working to secure for him the second place on the ticket; with his political career in eclipse, he was eager for the nomination. Early in that year there was more discussion among Democrats on the candidates for the Vice-Presidency than for the Presidency, since it was assumed that Martin Van Buren would be given the presidential nomination. Colonel Richard M. Johnson, who had been Vice-President during the Van Buren administration of 1837-1841, seemed to have the advantage in the contest, but William R. King and Polk were also contenders.

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Van Buren's candidacy for President was never very popular in the South, and after he wrote a letter on 20 April 1844 opposing immediate annexation of Texas, a concerted movement began to prevent his nomination. On 23 April, without knowledge of Van Buren's public statement on the matter (but of course aware of the New Yorker's resistance to the Texan adventure generally), Polk replied to a request for his views on Texas with a statement in which he advocated "immediate re-annexation."8 Andrew Jackson, keeping a close watch on developments from his home The Hermitage, near Nashville, had been supporting Van Buren, but decided that the Democrats would have to select a candidate pledged to bring Texas into the Union. On 13 May 1844 Polk visited Jackson and reported to a friend that Jackson had given up Van Buren and had urged that he, Polk, was the "most available man."9 The former President exerted influence on Polk's behalf and a majority of the delegates went to Baltimore on 27 May determined to defeat Van Buren's bid for the nomination. This goal required some maneuvering since a large majority of the delegates had been instructed to vote for the New Yorker by the state conventions held before publication of his anti-Texas letter. Van Buren's opponents first succeeded in getting adopted a two-thirds rule for nomination, and then, when Van Buren failed to receive that percentage on thefirstballot, they felt free to vote for other candidates. During the first seven ballots Van Buren's plurality steadily decreased, with Lewis Cass, John C. Calhoun, James Buchanan, and other favorite sons receiving the deserters. The convention adjourned for the night and Polk's friends began to work for his nomination on the following day. Polk began to make a strong showing on the eighth ballot, and before the ninth had been completed his nomination had been made unanimous. Silas Wright, of New York, a close friend of Van Buren, was nominated for Vice-President, causing a prominent New York Whig to note in his diary the incongruity of "running Silas Wright subordinate to Gen. Jackson's chief cook and bottle washer, Col. Polk!" and to quote someone as saying, "the ticket is like a kangaroo—it goes on its hind legs."10 Wright declined the nomination and it was then given to George Dallas, of Pennsylvania. This description of Polk's nomination is necessary to an understanding of his presidential career and his reputation then and thereafter; he 8

Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography, p. 227. Polk's letter was printed in the Washington Globe, 6 May 1844. 9 McCormac, Polk, p. 232. 10 Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828-1851, II, 705.

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had long been in public life but had not been considered of presidential stature; he was the first man to receive a presidential nomination without having been previously prominently mentioned for that office. He was largely unknown to the people, and while he was not unknown to those active in national politics, he was not highly regarded. John Quincy Adams had said earlier that Polk was "just qualified for an eminent County Court lawyer."11 The Whig orator, Tom Corwin, of Ohio, developed a routine in the campaign in which he would ask: "And who have they nominated? James K. Polk of Tennessee?" And then, with a look of complete astonishment, he would say: "After that, who is safe?"12 Even the Democratic speakers and newspapers admitted that Henry Clay was a much more eminent man than Polk; the Democratic Review said that "our opponents are welcome to all their pride in their chief as a 'great man'—we are content with ours as a good one, and great enough for all practical purposes." 13 The Democrats worked to make the election turn on the issues rather than on the men, and were successful in a close election. Polk failed to carry his own state of Tennessee, however, and even lost his own precinct and that of Jackson. A judgment prevailed in Washington during Polk's term, it seems, that he was not in effective control of his own Administration. The evidence disproves this, however; Polk dominated his Cabinet. It must be said that the Cabinet which Polk formed was not an eminent one. James Buchanan became Secretary of State, and although he was a man who had the ability to transact business well enough, he had little force and left much to be desired both in that office and some years later as President. Near the end of his term Polk characterized Buchanan as a man who acts "in small matters without judgment and sometimes acts like an old maid."14 Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Treasury, was distrusted by many in his own party (including Jackson), because of his speculations in Texas land scrip and of other devious financial enterprises.15 William L. Marcy, of New York, became Secretary of War; John Y. Mason, of Virginia, Tyler's Secretary of the Navy, 11

Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary of John Quincy Adams, p. 446. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson, p. 439. McCormac, Polk, p. 250. 14 Milo Milton Quaife (ed.), The Diary of James K. Polk, IV, 355. 15 Jackson wrote: "I must say to you . . . that I regret that you put Mr. R. J. Walker over the Treasury. . . . surrounded by so many broken speculators, and being himself encumbered with debt" (Jackson, The Hermitage, 2 May 1845, to Polk, James K. Polk Papers, LC.) 12

13

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became Attorney General; and Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, a close friend of Polk, was made Postmaster General. The only member of intellectual distinction, and a man who played an important part in the 1845 Texas scheme, was George Bancroft, of Massachusetts, the historian, who became Secretary of the Navy. Bancroft had expressed a preference for a diplomatic post and after two years he was sent to London, with Mason shifting to the Navy Department. Although the Texan and Mexican diplomacy of the United States is the center of this study, Polk's diplomatic methods in the Oregon controversy with Great Britain, and his discussions with his Cabinet on that issue, provide useful information. Polk had been elected on a platform combining the demand for "reannexation" of Texas with the demand for the "reoccupation" of "all of Oregon." The treaty of 1818 with Britain had provided for joint occupancy of the Oregon Territory, defined as the territory west of the Rocky Mountains, north of 42° and south of 54° 40'. The agreement had been made for ten years, with provisions for renewal, and when Polk came to power the agreement was subject to cancellation by either party on one year's notice. Polk had campaigned on the slogan "All of Oregon," although, it is generally agreed, Great Britain had the best claim to some two thirds of the Territory, all that country north of the Columbia River, as did the United States to the area south of that river. On 12 July 1845 Polk acted against the position taken during the campaign; he instructed Buchanan to offer the line of 49° to the British minister in Washington, Richard Pakenham, on the ground that that compromise offer had been tentatively made by the previous administration. Pakenham rejected the offer without consulting his government; Polk then withdrew it and said that he would thereafter insist on the full claim. Buchanan thought it unwise to move toward conflict with Britain while at the same time taking steps leading toward war with Mexico. In a discussion in a Cabinet meeting, as recorded by Polk in his Diary, Polk said: [I] saw no necessary connection between the two questions; that the settlement of the one was not dependent on the other; that we should do our duty towards both Mexico and Great Britain and firmly maintain our rights, and leave the rest to God and the country. Mr. Buchanan said he thought God would not have much to do in justifying us in a war for the country North of 49°.

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A few months later Polk commented to a visitor that the "only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye."16 On 2 December 1845 Polk sent a message to Congress advocating that the one year's notice for the termination of the joint occupation of Oregon be given immediately, even though Lord Aberdeen, British Foreign Secretary, had told the American minister in London that he regretted that Pakenham had rejected the offer of 49°. The proposal generated a great deal of heat in Congress. Some Southern Democrats and many Northern Whigs opposed what they considered a reckless foreign policy that did not have the benefit of facts to support it. The old Missouri Democrat Thomas Hart Benton, expansionist though he was, said that in his opinion the American claim to territory north of the Columbia River was very tenuous and north of 49° absolutely untenable. But the Northwestern Democrats, led by Stephen Douglas, of Illinois, and Edward Allen Hannegan, of Indiana, fought against what they considered to be a brazen attempt of some of their fellow Democrats to dishonor the Baltimore platform. After months of debate, on 23 April 1846, Congress authorized Polk to give notice to Britain. The United States was soon thereafter involved in a war with Mexico, but the British government made no attempt to take advantage of that situation; in early June it made a direct offer to settle the controversy on the line of 49°. Polk was thereby placed in a dilemma. His Diary record makes it clear that he was satisfied at this time to settle on the British offer, but he was aware of the intense feeling in a section of the Democratic Party for "all of Oregon," and he knew that his earlier statements would be used against him. He escaped by submitting the British offer to the Senate for their "advice," without a recommendation, referring as he did so to a similar action by President Washington. The Northern expansionists fought fiercely against this "betrayal," but on 15 June, by a vote of more than four to one, the Senate advised Polk to accept the compromise. The President immediately did so and was then free to devote his entire attention to the Mexican War.17 Even those historians who have assisted in the improvement of 16

Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, I, 5-6, 155. For the congressional debates on Oregon see The Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Consult the index of the Globe for the numerous speeches and exchanges between members. For the opening of the controversy see the report for 30 December 1845, pp. 109-112. 17

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Polk's reputation in recent years have not claimed that his war leadership was very impressive. He began by being duped by one General Atocha, an agent of Santa Anna, the "strong man" of Mexico then in exile in Cuba. Atocha persuaded Polk that if the United States would assist Santa Anna in returning to Mexico, he would, in effect, sell out his country to the United States as soon as he should regain power. On 5 July 1846 Polk's agent in Havana, Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, told Santa Anna that Polk was desirous of ending the hostilities as soon as an honorable peace could be made and, believing Santa Anna was able and willing to make such a peace, "the President of the United States would see with pleasure his restoration to power in Mexico." Mackenzie made it clear that the Rio Grande must be the boundary of Texas and that the United States must have at least enough of California to give it the bay of San Francisco. According to Mackenzie's report, Santa Anna, after first asserting that the Nueces was the real boundary of Texas, agreed to such a treaty and volunteered some advice on military measures which General Taylor should take to effectively control the country.18 Secretary Bancroft instructed Commodore David Conner to blockade the Gulf ports of Mexico, but he enclosed a "private and confidential" order which read: "If Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports, you will allow him to pass freely." On 8 August, relying upon Polk's assurances, Santa Anna left Havana on board the British ship Arab, and eight days later landed at Veracruz, whence he soon went to Mexico City and assumed supreme power. He was at once the fiercest and most energetic foe which the United States faced in Mexico, and the ablest leader of that country against the invading armies. It was an instance of a crude and devious undercover operation with an enemy leader; President Polk had been made to play the part of a fool by an opponent whose methods were quite similar to his own; the consequence was wholly against the interest of the United States.19 The relations of the President with his military commanders during the War were undoubtedly the worst that have obtained in any war in American history. Polk frequently expressed his total distrust 18 Jesse S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, pp. 299-307. For Polk's record of his conversations with General (or Colonel) Alexander J. Atocha, see Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, I, 222-226 (13 February 1846), 227 (16 February 1846). 19 McCormac, Polk, p. 439.

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of General Taylor and charged him with political motivation and calculation in every move he made in his campaign in northern Mexico. The feeling was fully reciprocated. Taylor wrote to his son-in-law during the War that he had received a report of the death of the President, and said: "While I regret to hear of the death of any one, I would as soon have heard of his death if true, as that of any other individual in the whole Union." 20 Polk's relations with his other military commander, General Winfield Scott, were even less satisfactory. When plans were being developed in Washington to attack Veracruz and launch a force from there to Mexico City, Scott was in daily conference with the President, preparing to command the expedition. Scott said that Polk "lavished" upon him "every expression of kindness and confidence," and the President's "warmth and emphasis of his professions" won from the General "a cordial reciprocation of my personal sympathy and regard." A few weeks later, as he was preparing to embark with his force from New Orleans, Scott learned that during those planning days in Washington Polk had been urging Congress to create a rank of lieutenant-general, thus enabling him to appoint a man of his own party to supersede Scott and command the expedition. Scott was outraged; he said in his Memoirs that "a grosser abuse of human confidence is nowhere recorded." He never again trusted Polk, and referred to him as "Little Jimmy Polk of Duck River." Most of the officers in the field shared Scott's judgment of the Polk Administration. Robert Anderson, a captain of artillery, wrote to his wife: "I believe that the Govt. at Washington would do any honorable thing—may be that word is too short—to prevent Genl. Scott from conquering a peace." Polk gave commissions to some of his political associates and had them accompany Scott. Gideon J. Pillow, a Tennessee lawyer, caused a great amount of trouble for the army. Polk made him a brigadier general at once, although Pillow had no military experience, and soon promoted him to major general. (Earlier the President's brother had shot down a man on the street in Nashville and Pillow had got him off. ) On the road to Mexico City, Pillow quarreled violently with Scott, who made official charges against Pillow's conduct; but Pillow was not punished, and soon after Mexico City was taken Polk removed Scott from his command. The President said approvingly of Pillow that he was "one of the shrewdest men you ever knew"; Robert 20

Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, II, 236; McCormac, Polk, p. 532.

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E. Lee remarked that Scott had performed his task of leading the victorious army and now was "turned out as an old horse to die." 21 In the midterm elections, during a war which was continuously successful, the Administration lost control of the Congress. Before the War was over the popular branch of the Congress castigated Polk for "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" having started the War, and a Southerner in the Senate, Alexander Stephens, of Georgia, later to be Vice-President of the Confederacy, coined the bitter epithet "Polk the Mendacious" as "a fitting appelation [sic] in after times," noting the choice in a case at hand between believing General Stephen Watts Kearny or President Polk—"James K. Polk—a man whom none could believe."22 Throughout his term following the beginning of the War, Polk had to contend with the most searching criticism of his role in the origin of the conflict. Henry Clay, the leader of the opposition party, said that "no earthly consideration would ever have tempted or provoked him to vote for" the war bill, the preamble of which had "a palpable falsehood stamped upon its face" in its statement that the War existed by the act of Mexico. And Clay said: "All the nations, I apprehend, look upon us, in the prosecution of the present war, as being actuated by a spirit of rapacity, and an inordinate desire for territorial aggrandizement."23 The President made an attempt to defend his Mexican policy in his Second Annual Address. He began by remarking upon the prosperity of the country: The progress of our country in her career of greatness . . . is without an example in the history of nations.... The existing war with Mexico was neither desired nor provoked by the United States. On the contrary, all honorable means were resorted to to avert it. . . . Long before the advance of our army to the left bank of the Rio Grande we had ample cause of war against Mexico, and had the United States resorted to this extremity we might have appealed to the whole civilized world for the justice of our cause. . . . 21 Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary of a President, 1845-1849, pp. 171-173 n., quoting from Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, Written by Himself, II, 399-400; Robert Anderson, An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846-1847, p. 57; Justin Harvey Smith, The War with Mexico, II, 185-186, 188, 270; Alfred Hoyt Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 18461848, p. 27. 22 Congressional Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 95 (3 January 1848) and p. 912 (10 July 1848). 23 Carl Schurz, Henry Clay, II, 289.

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The war has been represented as unjust and unnecessary and as one of aggression on our part upon a weak and injured enemy.... A more effectual means could not have been devised to encourage the enemy and protract the war than to advocate and adhere to their cause, and thus give them "aid and comfort."24 The reference to giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy, a direct quotation from the constitutional definition of treason, stung his critics to reply with even more vigorous denunciation. And in his Third Annual Message Polk sought once again to demolish this treasonable opposition. He said the Mexican people would be forced to pay the cost of the operations of the American armies in their country: "The Mexicans having . . . shown themselves to be wholly incapable of appreciating our forbearance and liberality, it was deemed proper to change the manner of conducting the war, by making them feel its pressure according to the usages observed under similar circumstances by all other civilized nations." And Polk spoke of the fruits of the War. There had been talk, even among those who supported the War, of making peace without taking any territory, except for the contested boundary area. The President attacked such a policy, of course; it would have made the War meaningless. He said the policy would be an admission that the War was in its origin unjust: Mexico has no money to pay, and no other means of making the required indemnity. If we refuse this, we can obtain nothing else. To reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cession of territory would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war, bearing all its expenses, without a purpose or definite object.... The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and if sanctioned would be a public acknowledgement that our country was wrong and that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was unjust and should be abandoned—an admission unfounded in fact and degrading to the national character. It should be noted that it is impossible to reconcile this statement with an assertion which Polk made earlier in the same address explaining the cause of the War: "Though the United States were the aggrieved nation, Mexico commenced the war, and we were compelled in self-defense to repel the invader and to vindicate the national honor and interests by prosecuting it with vigor until we could obtain a just 24 Polk, Second Annual Address, 8 December 1846, James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, IV, 471-473.

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and honorable peace." Polk apparently reasoned that the peace would not be just and honorable unless Mexico was forced to transfer extensive territories to the United States, presumably to make the punishment fit the crime. In the end, however, the United States paid Mexico fifteen million dollars for the land. It was all very odd logic. Polk explained the choice of the territory to be taken from Mexico: The cession to the United States by Mexico of the Provinces of New Mexico and the Californias . . . would be more in accordance with the convenience and interests of both nations than any other cession of territory which it was probable Mexico could be induced to make. . . . The Bay of San Francisco and other harbors along the California coast would afford shelter for our Navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short period become the marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China and other countries of the East.25 In reply to that defense and apology for the War the House of Representatives voted that Polk had started the War unconstitutionally, and Congressman Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, spoke against the President's argument. Lincoln began by saying that he had thought when the War commenced that "all those who because of knowing too little, or because of knowing too much, could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the President in the beginning of it should nevertheless, as good citizens and patriots, remain silent on that point, at least till the war should be ended." But, he said, the President would not have it so. Lincoln proceeded with devastating effect to analyze Polk's labored defense of his conduct and concluded: I am now through the whole of the President's evidence; and it is a singular fact that if any one should declare the President sent the army into the midst of a settlement of Mexican people who had never submitted, by consent or by force, to the authority of Texas or of the United States, and that there and thereby the first blood of the war was shed, there is not one word in all the President has said which would either admit or deny the declaration. This strange omission it does seem to me could not have occurred but by design. And Lincoln challenged Polk to answer his "Spot Resolutions," regarding the situation where the War began: Let him answer fully, fairly, and candidly. Let him answer with facts and not with arguments. . . . But if he can not or will not do this—if on any pre25

Polk address, 7 December 1847, ibid., pp. 532-547.

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tence or no pretence he shall refuse or omit it—than I shall be fully convinced of what I more than suspect already—that he is deeply conscious of being in the wrong. . . . How like the half-insane mumblings of a fever dream is the whole war part of his late message! At one time telling us that Mexico has nothing whatever that we can get but territory; at another showing us how we can support the war by levying contributions on Mexico. At one time urging the national honor, the security of the future, the prevention of foreign interference, and even the good of Mexico herself as among the objects of the war; at another telling us that "to reject indemnity, by refusing to accept a cession of territory, would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war, bearing all its expense, without a purpose or definite object." . . . All this shows that the President is in nowise satisfied with his own positions. First he takes up one, and in attempting to argue us into it he argues himself out of it, then seizes another and goes through the same process. . . . As I have before said, he knows not where he is. He is a bewildered, confounded, and miserably perplexed man. God grant he may be able to show there is not something about his conscience more painful than all his mental perplexity.26 Perhaps the most famous speech in Congress on the subject was by Thomas Corwin, of Ohio. Ridiculing the contention that Texas or the United States had exercised authority over the territory which General Taylor had "defended," he asked: If there were a Texan population on the east bank of the Rio Grande, why did not General Taylor hear something of those Texans hailing the advent of the American army, coming to protect them from the ravages of the Mexicans, and the more murderous onslaughts of the neighboring savages? Do you hear anything of that? No! On the contrary, the population fled at the approach of your army. In God's name, I wish to know if it has come to this, that when an American army goes to protect American citizens on American territory, they flee from it as from the most barbarous enemy? Corwin's oratory rose to a peak with a phrase that was later used against him as constituting treasonable utterance. Observing that the War was being justified on the grounds that "we will be two hundred millions in a few years, and we want room," he cried: "If I were a Mexican I would tell you, 'Have you not room in your own country 26 Lincoln, speech in the House, 12 January 1848, Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, I, 431-442.

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to bury your dead men? If you come into mine we will greet you with bloody hands, and welcome you to hospitable graves'."27 Against the array of critics the Administration's friends made what defense they could. That defense was not grounded in the substance of the controverted issues; it rested on simple patriotism. Stephen A. Douglas was typical, in his declaration that "America wants no friends, acknowledges the fidelity of no citizen, who, after war is declared, condemns the justice of her cause or sympathizes with the enemy. All such are traitors in their hearts; and would to God that they would commit such overt act for which they could be dealt with according to their deserts."28 Although Polk was in constant trouble in the argument at home on the justification of the War, the Army was successful in the field, and Polk was successful in his war aims. His difficulties with his subordinates in the field reached a ludicrous climax with the representative in Mexico, sent to negotiate a treaty. Nicholas P. Trist, the chief clerk of the State Department, was sent in April of 1847 to accompany the Army toward Mexico City and to utilize every opportunity that presented itself to negotiate a treaty. Trist and General Scott immediately fell to quarreling in a dispute over their respective positions and authority, but shortly reconciled and became close friends. Polk lost confidence in his agent and when he removed Scott from command of the Army he also recalled Trist. But that gentleman, feeling that his information was superior to that of the government in Washington, continued negotiations with the Mexican government, determined if he could to make a treaty based on his original instructions, although he knew that Polk now wished to secure a larger portion of Mexican territory. On 6 December 1847 Trist sent the President a sixty-five page letter, in which he said, along with much free comment on the "weakness" of the presidential policies, that he had decided to save the Administration from a perilous position, and the country from disaster, by making a treaty with Mexico. Polk was furious, and he wrote in his Diary: His despatch is arrogant, impudent and very insulting to his Government and even personally offensive to the President. . . . It is manifest to me that 27

305.

Josiah Morrow (ed.), The Life and Speeches of Thomas Corwin, pp. 294,

28 Douglas, quoted by Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, I, 606-607.

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he has become the tool of Gen'l Scott and his menial instrument. . . . I have never in my life felt so indignant. . . . His despatch proves that he is destitute of honor or principle, and that he has proved himself to be a very base man.29 Still, when Trist succeeded in negotiating a treaty embodying Polk's minimum demands of a year earlier, the President felt unable to reject it. Should he do so he had to calculate that there might well be open rebellion in Congress, with a refusal to vote supplies for the Army; and it was also possible that with the Mexican government dispersed, if peace was not accepted now the War would degenerate into guerrilla warfare. Polk therefore sent Trist's treaty to the Senate with a recommendation of ratification, but he refused to authorize payment to Trist for his services and it was many years later before Trist's salary was paid. The ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was the high point of Polk's term of office. He had acquired California, and New Mexico also. He had said early in his term that he had no aspirations for re-election to another term, and he made no effort to get the Democratic nomination; it would have been a desperate undertaking in any event; his party was in disarray and he was without any substantial personal support. Zachary Taylor was nominated by the Whigs and elected. Polk left Washington on the day after the inauguration of Taylor, headed for Nashville and retirement. He journeyed through the lower South and before he arrived home he fell ill of chronic diarrhea. He lived but a few weeks at home, dying on 15 June 1849, in his fifty-fourth year. The brief review of Polk's administration contributes to an interpretation and evaluation of the evidence available on Polk's intrigue in Texas in the summer of 1845. The appraisals of Polk by historians during the century since his administration aids further in our understanding of that conspiracy. The evaluations of President Polk by American historians have turned largely upon his Mexican policy; more specifically, Polk's responsibility for the initiation of the War has been crucial in the historical judgment. The financial measures of his administration have not been ignored, but the judgment on Polk has turned basically upon his expansionist program. Thus a survey of judgments by historians 29 Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, III, 300-301. Trist's letter was addressed to Secretary Buchanan.

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on Polk is at the same time a survey of historical appraisals of the origins of the War with Mexico. In 1921 Edward Channing introduced his discussion of Polk and the Mexican War with the comment that Polk "has suffered severely at the hands of contemporaries and historians."30 That was a truism, but a meaningful one, and the revisionists have had the burden of trying to explain why the judgment of contemporaries and of historians for so many years following were so much in error. Some of the earliest published accounts of the Polk administration were by men who had been active in government during the time of the events of which they wrote. Thomas Hart Benton was an expansionist, but he had opposed the aggressive policy toward Mexico, and a decade after the War he published an account of his career in government, with this statement on Polk's conduct of that affair: It is impossible to conceive of an administration less warlike, or more intriguing, than that of Mr. Polk. They were men of peace, with objects to be accomplished by means of war; so that war was a necessity and an indispensability to their purpose; but they wanted no more of it than would answer to their purpose. They wanted a small war, just large enough to require a treaty of peace, and not large enough to make military reputations, dangerous for the presidency. Benton said that the advance of United States troops into the Rio Grande area could be looked upon by the Mexicans only as an aggression; and the War had been determined upon before the advance of those troops; the advance was a maneuver to bring it on: "Without that event [the spilling of blood] it would have been difficult—perhaps impossible—to have got Congress to vote it; with it, the vote was almost unanimous." 31 Ulysses S. Grant, a lieutenant of infantry in the Mexican War, in his Personal Memoirs, published in 1885, was very critical of Polk's war. He asserted that the occupation, separation, and annexation of Texas was part of a conspiracy, and added that "even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot." Grant said he regarded the War as "one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation."32 30

Edward Channing, History of the United States, V, 546-547. Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 679-680. 32 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, I, 53-55. 31

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The first professional historian to investigate Polk's use of presidential power was Hermann von Hoist, who in 1881 published a description and analysis of Polk's administration. The revisionist writers of the last generation thought they discovered that Polk, far from being a nonentity, had been in firm control of the government. That discovery had been made a long time before. It is true that Polk's contemporaries had doubted that he gave direction to his own Cabinet, but this first study by an historian emphasized Polk's grip on power. Von Hoist wrote: "The party could count on him, beyond question; but he wished to be the party's head, not merely in name and by right, but in fact . . . [if he had a program] it certainly was advisable for those who presumably would not like it, to rub their eyes and to keep their hands in readiness to obstruct his way, before it was too late." So much for the execution of his designs; but von Hoist was very critical of Polk's policies. His judgments are expressed in his chapter titles: "Polk Weaves the Warp of the Mexican War"; "The Double Game against England and Mexico.—Against England the Strong, a Warlike Policy with the Sword in the Scabbard"; "The Double Game against England and Mexico. For Weak Mexico a Peace Policy with a Drawn Sword"; and " T h e War of Polk, the Mendacious'." Of Polk's war message von Hoist wrote: "The President uttered no direct falsehood, but he passed over in silence half of what it was essential to know in order to form a clear conception of the actual course of events, and what he did say he said in such a form and introduced in such a connection that all the essential facts appeared reversed." Von Hoist called Polk's assertion that war existed by act of Mexico a plain falsehood. It was appropriate, he said, that the originator of the War, successful though it was, was by no means a popular man; people were repelled "by the reticences, perversion of fact, and ambiguities, in which the President had moved from the beginning."33 The first full history of Polk's administration was influential for a generation. Von Hoist, however, had made the slave-conspiracy thesis central to his explanation of the origin of the Mexican War, and with the alteration of general viewpoint among historians on that thesis, the work came to be regarded as passé by the turn of the century. But other historians writing in the latter part of the nineteenth century supported the interpretation of Polk given by von Hoist. Hubert Howe Bancroft, dealing with the matter many times in his many vol33 Hermann von Hoist, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States, III, 21-22, 239, 336.

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umes on the Western United States and on Mexico, said that it was "a premeditated and predetermined affair, the war of the United States on Mexico." In a summing up of his impressions some years later in a book entitled Retrospection, H. H. Bancroft made a didactic damnation of Polk: "James K. Polk and his Mexican war, the man inhumane and void of integrity, the measure an injustice practised upon a weaker neighbor." James Ford Rhodes, writing during the same years, said that Polk was "deservedly unpopular" because of "a deep-seated conviction that the war had been unjustly begun."34 James Schouler's comprehensive history of the United States, which was published in the 1890's, reflected the use of Polk's Diary—which had just been made available to historians by Polk's widow—in the emphasis upon Polk's determination and firmness. Schouler supported von Hoist's assertion on Polk's authority and said he was "the master of his own cabinet, and not ruled by the ablest of his advisers." But the appraisal of Polk was the one which had long prevailed; Schouler was very critical of the Mexican War President: "His mind was incapable of taking in the broader relations of things. What he went for he fetched. . . . One trait. . . was his power of secrecy. . . . In private life he was pure and upright, honest as the day (for men will be thus scrupulous who are ready to take advantage in their official relations)." Schouler said that this was the man to lead the "ravenous" national appetite—Democracy shouting "Make way for liberty!" and rushing simultaneously upon British domains and upon Mexico. Schouler's statement of the war program was a succinct formulation of an appraisal which had prevailed for half a century: To provoke this feeble sister republic to hostilities, at the same time putting on her the offence of shedding the first blood, was the step predetermined if she would not sign away her domains for gold. This was the program: to let loose the demon of war, and under the smoke of defending the fourth part of Mexico we had just snatched from her to despoil her of another Polk, in fine, had limitations as a statesman and greater ones as a political manager; but experience had given him confidence in affairs. . . . He was not fastidious; he was not thoughtful of the rights of other peoples, other races, other political parties than his own. . . . His motto for Americans and white men was to keep what they had and catch what they could; and upon 34

Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Mexico, V {The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, XIII), 307; Bancroft, Retrospection, p. 211; James Ford Rhodes, A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, I, 83, 89, 91.

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that theory of public achievement he brought things to pass. Ideality and the highest sense of honor were wanting to such a policy; and while our people accepted his benefits they had too much good feeling to commend his craft or reward him with their gratitude.35 Some historians were soon to attempt to reward Polk with gratitude for the enlargement of the Union. John W. Burgess, of Columbia University, published a history in 1897 which attempted to defend Polk's diplomacy with Mexico and stated flatly that the War was "a defensive war at the outset." But his work was without supporting evidence for such contentions, and the key to his interpretation is found in his prefatorial remark that he had been "repelled" by the delight taken by foreign critics of that period of our history, in representing the professions of the "Free Republic" to be canting hypocrisy.36 A somewhat more serious attempt to defend Polk was made by George P. Garrison in a volume of The American Nation series, published in 1906. His book showed the influence of Frederick Jackson Turner's theory of the influence of the frontier in American history. Expansionism, said Garrison, was to be understood as a forward movement of aggressive and adventurous people, and to suppose "that this expansion was due simply to a desire for territorial aggrandizement . . . is to misinterpret all American history." When the expansionist tide encountered "weak and distracted Mexico" the troublesome question was where to fix the "limit of forbearance." In a history of Texas published three years prior to this volume Garrison had said that Polk was "mistaken" in asserting that the blood of American citizens had been shed on American soil, but in his 1906 work he attempted a defense of Polk's military move into the Rio Grande area. Finding it impossible, however, to challenge fundamentally the prevailing view of Polk, he concluded by resting the case for the President on the beneficial results—that is, on the vast expansion of the Union: That Polk himself really considered the advance of Taylor to the Rio Grande as an invasion of Mexico is not to be believed. The status of Santa Fe is the principal difficulty in the way of Polk's attitude on the boundary. Polk seems, indeed, to have had that cast of mind in which political dogma finds too easy lodgment. . . . The stern integrity and strength of his character, as reflected in the pages of his diary, take away all force and 35 36

James Schouler, History of the United States, IV, 519, 525-526; V, 126. John W. Burgess, The Middle Period: 1817-1858, pp. 331, vii, ix.

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point from the epigrammatic characterization by Stephens—"Polk the mendacious"—caught up and made prominent by Von Hoist. Such men as he rarely catch an historical perspective or see the whole truth that lies in any group of facts; and they are often involved in painful struggles by their own unconscious inconsistencies. No paralyzing scrupulosity or forecast of possible danger holds them back; and woe to the land if they be misguided, for they do things. But there are few in this day, even of those who condemn the methods of Polk, that would be willing to see his work undone.37 Garrison's appeal in extremis to justification by results was one of the first in what came to be a standard procedure of many American historians when defending Polk's Mexican diplomacy. The studies which made a serious and sustained attempt to rehabilitate Polk were not written until after the First World War and during the decade prior to that time other critical works appeared. One of the important ones was by Jesse S. Reeves, of Dartmouth, whose American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, published in 1907, assembled more evidence against Polk. "It is commonly said," Reeves wrote, "that the Mexican War was the result of the annexation of Texas, but the two were separate episodes which had no necessary connection. If Polk had had no ulterior designs upon Mexico, the Mexican War would not have taken place." Reeves pointed to the fact that Polk had "coveted California from his entrance into office," and said that to "Polk belongs the glory, if glory it be, of the Mexican War and the conquest of California."38 The only other important work to appear prior to the publication of revisionist writings on the subject was a two-volume work by George Lockhart Rives on the relations of Mexico with the United States from the time of Mexican independence from Spain through the war of 1846-1848. Rives made it clear that Polk had tried to use the boundary dispute of Texas as "a lever which might serve to move the Mexican government to make territorial concessions." General Taylor's act in blockading the Rio Grande before hostilities commenced was one "which war alone would justify," he said, but he thought that the President had hoped to gain his objectives by pressure, not by war. Polk, however, had formed an incorrect judgment of the Mexican people and government; Rives quoted an Undersecretary of the British 37

George P. Garrison, Westward Extension: 1841-1850, pp. 3-4, 21, 206207; Garrison, Texas: A Contest in Civilizations, pp. 263-264. 38 Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, p. 189.

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Foreign Office in the statement that "the Mexican is like a mule—if you spur him too much he will back off the precipice with you." Rives stressed Polk's deficiencies as a leader; he was "a man without wide culture or knowledge, wholly devoid of imagination, untravelled, unacquainted with either the Spanish or the Mexican character, and with little experience in the conduct of foreign affairs." But Polk had "a strong intelligence" and "a dogged strength of will, such as few of his contemporaries possessed; and with all the obstinacy and persistence of his nature he desired to acquire California." Few of the histories of the War have devoted any attention to the events in Texas during the annexation crisis of 1845, but Rives did note the charge of President Anson Jones that Commodore Stockton of the United States Navy had instructions from Washington to "manufacture" a war between Texas and Mexico before Texas was annexed. Rives rejected the charge so far as it connected Polk with the scheme. He admitted that Stockton did "seem" to have tried to persuade the Texans to seize Matamoros, offering to help with his ships, but he said the notion that the American government was then trying to "manufacture a war" is absurd. "What they wanted was to buy off Mexico."39 Rives apparently did not search for evidence on the problem. The foundation for the stand of the revisionist school on the Mexican War and on James K. Polk was laid by two authors: Justin Harvey Smith, in his two-volume work The War with Mexico, and Eugene I. McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography. Smith's work was published in 1919 and McCormac's in 1922, and they complemented each other nicely. Smith attempted a complete justification of the United States in the origin of the War, but he made little if any improvement in the accepted evaluation of Polk; McCormac, on the other hand, found it impossible to mount a defense of the Administration in the origin of the War, but he marshaled all of the available evidence to support an appraisal of Polk as a conscientious, dedicated, effective, and successful President. Smith's work has been much the more important of the two studies in subsequent writing on the subject; his history of the War was the first thorough and exhaustive investigation of the primary sources and it stands even now as the only detailed history of the Mexican War. For the present purpose it will be sufficient to note Smith's general 39 George Lockhart Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, I, 718719; II, 140, 133-134, 130; I, 57-58.

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position and his conclusions on the most important disputed issues.40 Smith said that he had been unable to derive any benefit from work previously done on the War because of the partisan, personal, or national bias of the writers. His own approach, he informed his readers, was influenced by no such prejudice. He had taken the point of view which "coincided substantially" with the critical analysis prevailing among historians, a fact which he thought it particularly necessary to emphasize because of the results of his study: "As a particular consequence of this full inquiry, an episode that has been regarded both in the United States and abroad as discreditable to us, appears now to wear quite a different complexion." This result, Smith presumed, "will gratify patriotic Americans, but the author must candidly admit that he began with no purpose or even thought of reaching it."41 Smith's subsequent handling of the material on the origins of the War forces one to mark that prefatorial statement as simply an interesting pretension. That he was one of those who were "gratified" by his conclusions appears not only in his labored and biased special pleading on the important issues, but even in frank and open statement. When, for example, he undertook to defend the disorderly and violent behavior of American troops in Mexico, he wrote: "Conquering soldiers in a foreign land, especially when the enemy is deemed cowardly, treacherous and cruel, are not likely to be angels; and we may count upon meeting here with disagreeable as well as complimentary facts." But, Smith urged, "we must face these as brave and honest men who love the truth, believe in our country, and are not foolish enough to expect perfection of human nature."42 The Mexicans were a "difficult" people: they were forced to recognize their incapacity and "many prayed for some respectable despot; many for a foreign prince; and some of the more thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate." But the suggestions of the more thoughtful were not acted upon and the War came to pass "as logically as a thunderstorm": At the beginning of her independent existence our people felt earnestly and enthusiastically anxious to maintain cordial relations with our sister republic, and many crossed the line of absurd sentimentality in that cause. Friction was inevitable, however. The Americans were direct, positive, 40 See Chapter Ten, below, for comment on Smith's position on the boundary question. 41 Smith, The War with Mexico, I, ix. 42 Ibid., H, 210.

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brusque, angular and pushing; and they could not understand their neighbors on the south. The Mexicans were equally unable to fathom our goodwill, sincerity, patriotism, resoluteness and courage; and certain features of their character and national condition made it far from easy to get on with them.43 This is the historical work which is the primary support of the revisionist interpretation and which has provided the basis for the reevaluation of the Mexican policy of James K. Polk. In Smith's account, the United States was only "sharing" in the disputed Rio Grande area when General Taylor was sent there, and "in short, Polk told only the truth when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it."44 In his appraisal of Polk, however, Smith did little to improve the reputation of the man. He described Polk as "very wanting in ideality, very wanting in soulfulness, inclined to be sly, and quite incapable of seeing things in a great way." He "deceived men or permitted men to deceive themselves," but in reality "he was not Polk the Mendacious, but simply Polk the Mediocre." He was "certainly religious, and no doubt—though blind to the beauty of uprightness and unresponsive to the delicacy of honor—he fully believed that he was conscientious." As a President, Smith wrote, Polk was no leader; he came to be a partisan without a party. He was uninspired and uninspiring, and "tossing out a plump lie now and then would have given less offence than continual secretiveness and evasion caused."45 Nevertheless, Polk's critics had been the opponents of the War, "virtual enemies of their country," and Smith said that "however little we feel inclined to go into raptures over Polk, we can admire his traducers even less." In explaining Polk's lamentable reputation Smith said that the President was "essentially a local politician from Tennessee," who "became the dog with the bad name, for which any stick or stone was good enough. Other men in public life could misrepresent the facts . . . but if Polk . . . allowed men to draw inferences from their wishes . . . he was promptly denounced as a villain."46 It is ironic that Polk's elevation in American history was the result of 43

Ibid., I, 28, 56, 58; II,310. Ibid., I, 155. Ibid., I, 129; II, 270. 46 Ibid., II, 314-315. 44 45

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a study which, in its direct evaluation, damned him with that kind of faint praise. McCormac's biography, as indicated above, was far more favorable to Polk. McCormac said that his pages would "show Mr. Polk to have been a constructive statesman—a statesman possessed of vision, sound judgment, and unusual executive ability." In concluding his description of the talents which Polk brought to his office and the difficulties which he encountered and successfully surmounted, McCormac said that "if we except the coercion of Mexico, upon which there is still a difference of opinion, it is the verdict that his policies were both praiseworthy and sound." Such a statement defaulted on the crucial factor in the evaluation of Polk as President, and McCormac's account of the "prelude to the Mexican War" leaves a strong inference in favor of the "prevailing opinion" that Polk was guilty of direct aggression in his diplomacy and military moves against Mexico.47 Subsequent to the publication of this biography, American historians had readily available the evidence that Polk had dominated his administration and had shaped its course. But McCormac chose not to seriously contest the prevailing opinion of Polk as an unscrupulous aggressor against Mexico, and this default on the charge most damaging to Polk's reputation would have resulted in the book's having very little beneficial effect for his subject had not Smith's volumes, resting upon the most exhaustive study of that affair, been there to lend Polk strength where it was most needed. Smith's work, in all its argument that pertained to the origins of the War, was simply preposterous as history; it was an extraordinary case of special pleading which suggested what was false and attempted to suppress what was true; but it was the comprehensive and thorough account of the War and it was there to be cited in its judgments by those who desired such an interpretation. In the work of the forty years since the appearance of the books by Smith and McCormac, the judicious blending of the two studies produced one of the most striking re-evaluations in American history. Not all historians have accepted the Smith-McCormac interpretation of Polk and of the policy toward Mexico which he pursued; indeed, the profession is rather evenly divided on the subject, judging by an examination of the literature produced in the 47

McCormac, Polk, pp. v, 35, 391, 406, 411-412, 414.

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last decade or so. But even that draw in opinion represents a remarkable improvement in Polk's reputation. Having viewed Polk's political career and the interpretations and evaluations of that career over a century of historical work, we return to a close examination of the activity which President Polk was directing in Texas immediately following his assumption of office in 1845.

CHAPTER

SIX

Annexation and Intrigue: The Account of President Anson Jones

In the spring of 1845 Andrew Jackson Donelson, the official representative of the United States in Texas, was confidently looking forward to Texan acceptance of the terms of annexation offered in the joint resolution of the United States Congress. The President of the Republic of Texas, Anson Jones, was widely regarded by those who were most frenetic in the drive for annexation as opposing their efforts and working to maintain Texas in her status as an independent nation. Several years after the event Jones complained about the abuse he had suffered for his "supposed 'opposition to Annexation'," and asserted that he had been "the architect of Annexation & [had] labored diligently, faithfully, zealously, efficiently & successfully for its accomplishment, & [had] accomplished it. This the national record will prove" This was protesting too much; in 1845 Jones was clearly not enthusiastic about annexation, but he acquiesced in response to the popular will. Donelson took a philosophical view of the matter. At the beginning of April he wrote to Secretary of State Buchanan expressing confidence in the outcome, and remarking that it was only natural that high officials in a government should want to continue in their positions. He observed that if such officials interposed no obstacles to the free exercise of the people's will no more could be expected of them.1 There was an attempt to exert pressure on President Jones. Memucan Hunt, formerly minister from the Republic of Texas to the United States, was working for annexation with a group which regarded Jones 1 Jones, 29 September 1857, to Ashbel Smith, Anson Jones Papers, UT; Donelson, 1 April 1845, to Buchanan, 29th Cong., 1st. Sess., Ex. Doc.

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as virtually a traitor. Hunt conferred with former Governor Archibald Yell, of Arkansas, who had just come from conversations with Polk and Buchanan, and wrote to his friend Robert J. Walker, Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, to say that he and Yell were combating "what is termed the British party in Texas." Hunt's correspondence with Walker reveals that Walker had arranged to finance a public-relations campaign in Texas; in an earlier letter Hunt had asked for $10,000 to employ "some half dozen able speakers," and $5,000 for printing and transmitting publications throughout the country. Following his conversations with Yell, Hunt wrote that he was going to the capital to tell the President that if the people were not allowed to vote on annexation very soon "a convention will be called by the people" themselves. Hunt said: "I have just assured Dr. Smith [Ashbel Smith, Jones's Secretary of State] that I shall not use any exertions whatever to prevent the people from taring [sic] and feathering President Jones if he does not act immediately, and in good faith; & that the members of his cabinet would be very apt to meet with a similar fate." After describing his vigorous methods of political pressure to Walker, Hunt apparently reflected that such exuberant proceedings might not be approved in the effete East, and he added a postscript: "Do not infer from what I have said that I encourage or recommend

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violence on the person of Pres't Jones, on the contrary, I am very desirous to see everything accomplished amicably."2 At the same time, Donelson was expressing his full confidence. On 10 April he wrote to his wife: "I begin to see the end of the Texas question. It is safe. This Congress is to be convened on the 16th of June. They will accept our law, and the people will approve it."3 He wrote to Calhoun on 24 April that he thought it a virtual certainty that annexation would be consummated before the United States Congress met again. He had presented the offer as "containing the ultimatum of President Polk in which he had the concurrence also of President Tyler." The people of Texas were holding public meetings throughout the territory and "expressing their approbation of the terms offered to them by the United States with a unanimity which no other debated question has ever received."4 The overwhelming sentiment in Texas in favor of annexation, and the knowledge of that fact by the Polk Administration through March, April, May, and June of 1845, must be constantly kept in mind if Polk's actions are to be understood. When the matter came to a vote by the Congress of Texas on 18 June, that vote was unanimous for annexation. But it is not necessary to merely assume that Polk should have been able to foresee this; he was constantly being told, both by Texans and by Americans who were reporting to him from Texas, that there was no question on the matter. Polk asked Charles H. Raymond, of the Texas Legation in Washington, if he had "any doubts about the acceptance by the Government and people of Texas of the proposition for annexation now before them," and Raymond reported to his government: "I told him frankly and unhesitatingly that I entertained none whatever." One of Buchanan's informants wrote from Galveston to assure him that "nine tenths of all the people of Texas are in favor of annexation immediately."5 Polk's ostensible reason for sending Stockton to Texas was concern over the acceptance of the 2 Hunt, 24 March 1845, and 8 April 1845, to Walker, Robert J. Walker Papers, LC. 3 Donelson, 10 April 1845, to his wife, addressed to The Hermitage, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. 4 Donelson, 24 April 1845, to Calhoun, J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun {Annual Report of AHA for 1899, II), 10291032. 5 Charles H. Raymond, 19 May 1845, to Ebenezer Allen, Secretary of State of Texas ad interim, George P. Garrison (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas (Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), p. 377; J. Prentiss, 19 April 1845, to Buchanan, James K. Polk Papers, LC.

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United States offer; to accept that reason as the actual motivation for the mission would be very difficult, even in the absence of explicit documentation for another interpretation. The squadron under Commodore Stockton's command arrived off Galveston on 12 May. It was the first extensive cruise for the Princeton and Stockton was intent upon demonstrating her worth: he instructed the captains of the other three vessels to make their own way to Galveston, and he put on all steam in an attempt to establish a new speed record, but the Sloop of War St. Mary's arrived twelve hours before the steamer.6 On the thirteenth Stockton sent a letter to the mayor of Galveston, and the style reveals the man: This morning I hoisted my Pendant on board the U.S. Brig Porpoise, & have come with that vessel into the harbour to pay the compliments of the squadron as well as my own personal respects to the authorities & people of Texas. A national Salute of Twenty one Guns will be fired from the Porpoise if it will be returned "Gun for Gun."7 The Commodore was received with ceremony, and a week later the community honored Stockton and his officers at a "Great Ball." 8 At Galveston, Stockton met Charles A. Wickliffe, who had been there since 2 May. Wickliffe, a Kentucky politician, had been a member of the House of Representatives for ten years, then lieutenant governor of Kentucky for three years and governor for the year 18391840, following the death of the governor. He was a Whig, but an anti-Clay Whig, and strong for the annexation of Texas. Appointed Postmaster General by President Tyler in October 1841, he had remained in Tyler's Cabinet through that administration. Wickliffe had been sent to Texas by President Polk. At the end of March, Polk wrote to Donelson, in a letter marked "Private and unofficial," with double underlining for emphasis, telling him that Wickliffe would deliver a dispatch to him. He said that Wickliffe had taken "a very active part in negotiating the treaty—last year, and will be able to give 6 The National Intelligencer, in Washington, published an unsigned letter on 14 June 1845 from the "U.S. Ship St. Mary's, off Galveston, May 13, 1845," which referred to the "trial of speed among the ships." The letter expressed surprise that the St. Mary's had bested the Princeton. 7 Stockton, 13 May 1845, to James M. Allen, Mayor of Galveston, letter-copy, Officers Letters of Every Grade and Description, Supplementary file, 18441845, NDA, NA. 8 E. A. Rhodes, Galveston, 22 May 1845, to A. J. Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC.

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you valuable information," referring to the treaty of annexation which had been rejected by the United States Senate in the summer of 1844. Polk sought to make it appear on the record that Wickliffe's trip to Texas was at his own initiative, and for personal reasons, saying the "Hon. Charles A. Wickliffe . . . designs visiting Texas—with a view to emigrate to it." This, of course, was not the case; Wickliffe left Texas as soon as the scheme failed that summer, and nothing indicates that he had ever intended to settle there. Polk did write correctly and to the point, however, when he said to Donelson, "He [Wickliffe] has my confidence and will be entitled to yours."9 Archibald Yell wrote Polk on 5 May that Wickliffe had arrived, and then he implied that further agents were unnecessary. He told Polk, "You may now rest assured, that nothing but a Providential interference can prevent annexation—so far at least as Texas is concerned." Yell praised Donelson for his effective work, and his manner and "address," and he emphasized the valuable effect that his relationship to Jackson had upon Houston, "the Power behind the Throne greater than the Throne itself." Houston was now "safe," Yell said.10 Donelson confirmed Yell's conclusion, writing Polk that he had been "greatly vexed at the course of Houston who has controlled the President and his cabinet," but, he said, "in my judgment no serious obstacle can hereafter arise."11 Donelson felt so certain that Texas would accept annexation that he took a trip to New Orleans. There, on 14 May, he wrote again to Polk, noting that Yell had left for Washington a few days before and that he would satisfy Polk that "annexation is safe beyond the possibility of defeat." He said that "neither Houston, nor the executive of Texas, nor all the Diplomacy of Europe can throw a moments [sic] doubt about the decision of the people in its favor, congress and the people in convention will ratify our proposals without the change of a letter."12 Stockton made the same judgment in his first letter from Galveston to the Administration. On 21 May he wrote to Bancroft: "The ques9 Robert S. Cotterill, "Charles A. Wickliffe," DAB, XX, 182-183; Polk, 28 March 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. Cotterill explains Wickliffe's mission to Texas by saying that Polk commissioned him as a special agent to "ferret out and oppose the designs of France and England in Texas." 10 Yell, Galveston, 5 May 1845, to Polk, James K. Polk Papers, LC. 11 Donelson, 11 May 1845, to Polk, ibid. 12 Donelson, 14 May 1845, to Polk, ibid.

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tion of annexation under the resolutions of Congress is in my opinion settled. In truth seven eights of the people are in favor of it; and every man in the Republic seems to despise the threats of Mexico & to spurn all European interference in the matter." Having come to that conclusion, Stockton, it would appear from the written instructions Bancroft had given him, should have taken his squadron to join Commodore Conner at once. That his actual purpose in Texas was not merely to go on shore and become acquainted with the dispositions of the people became apparent immediately not only in his actions but in his statements in this first report to Washington. He said that the Mexicans were "crossing the Rio Grande del Norte and taking possession of an immense and valuable portion of the Territory on the East side of that river," for the purpose, he presumed, of being "in sole possession of the river and territory at the time of annexation." The Mexicans, of course, had been in sole possession of the river, including the east side of it, from the time of the first settlements in the region; the Republic of Texas had never had jurisdiction there. Stockton may or may not have known the true status of the area which Texas claimed on no valid basis whatever. In any event, he said that the Mexicans "certainly, in my judgment, ought to be driven back to the other side at least [emphasis added] of the Rio Grande del Norte before annexation takes place." And then Stockton said: "Mr. Donaldson [sic] is not here and I am told President Jones cannot be trusted. I will do the best I can." He closed with the comment: "I will send the Brig or one of the ships to Vera Cruz with the letters for Commodore Conner, as it will be impossible for me to go there and at the same time give the necessary attentions to the important interests in Texas." 13 If no other evidence were extant, this letter alone would be sufficient to demonstrate that Polk had sent Commodore Stockton to Texas on a mission which went far beyond that specified in his written orders. What Stockton proceeded to do was first described in some circumstantial detail by Anson Jones in a book published posthumously in 1859. In his Memoranda and Official Correspondence Relating to the Republic of Texas, Its History and Annexation, the former President of Texas wrote: 13 Stockton, 21 May 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA.

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In May, 1845, Commodore Stockton, with a fleet of four or five vessels, arrived at Galveston, and with him Hon. C. A. Wickliffe, ex-Postmaster General of the United States. These gentlemen had various interviews with Major Gen. Sherman, the chief officer of the militia of Texas, the character of which is not precisely known to me; but the result of which was active preparations at Galveston for organizing volunteer forces, the ostensible (and no doubt real) object of which was an invasion of Mexico. A party [Jones thus seems to refer to President Polk], it appears, was anxious that the expedition should be set on foot, under the auspices of the MajorGeneral and Com. Stockton; but these gentlemen, it appears, were unwilling to take so great a responsibility: it was therefore resolved that the plan should be submitted to me and my sanction obtained—(quere [sic], forced?) indeed such, as afterwards became apparent, were the Commodore's instructions; and the organizing, &c, had been gone into for the purpose of forcing my assent to the proposed scheme. On the 28th May, Gen. Sherman for himself and associates in the militia, and Dr. Wright, surgeon of the steamer Princeton, and secretary of the Commodore, (as he informed me) took three days in unfolding to me the object of their visit. Dr. Wright stated that he was sent by Com. Stockton to propose that I should authorize Major Gen. Sherman to raise a force of two thousand men, or as many as might be necessary, and make a descent upon the Mexican town of Matamoras, and capture and hold it; that Com. Stockton would give assistance with the fleet under his command, under the pretext of giving the protection promised by the United States to Texas by Gen. Murphy; that he would undertake to supply the necessary provisions, arms and munitions of war for the expedition, would land them at convenient points on our coast, and would agree to pay the men and officers to be engaged; that he had consulted Gen. Sherman, who approved the plan, and was present to say so; and, besides that, the people generally from Galveston to Washington [the city in Texas] had been spoken to about it, that it met their unanimous approval; and all that was now wanting was the sanction of the Government to the scheme. Gen. Sherman confirmed what Dr. Wright stated, said he had had various interviews with Com. Stockton, and hoped I would approve the expedition.14 Throughout the intrigue, according to Jones, Dr. Wright was Stockton's spokesman in the attempts to reach an agreement with the President of Texas. Stockton's reports from Texas do not acknowledge such a role for Dr. Wright, but in the fall of 1845, when Stockton was preparing to leave in the U.S.S Congress for the Pacific Coast, he 14

Anson Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence Relating to the Republic of Texas, Its History and Annexation, pp. 48ff.The account by Jones which follows is from this source.

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wrote to Secretary Bancroft to ask that Dr. Wright accompany him: "He was with me in Texas and I think he is fitted in a remarkable manner to aid me in the duty of information and conciliation"15 In his interviews with President Jones, Dr. Wright had need of the ability to conciliate as he informed. It was apparent that Stockton had instructions to initiate an attack upon Mexico, instructions which could be given in such a matter to a naval officer only by the President of the United States. Jones pointed out to Dr. Wright that such an action was a very grave matter, and he said he needed some written evidence of Commodore Stockton's part in it; he asked if Stockton had sent any communication to him: As I expected, he replied in the negative, but that if I wished, Com. Stockton would visit me in person, and give me the same assurances in person. I asked him if the Minister of the United States [Donelson] was cognizant of the matter. He then stated to me that the scheme was raher a confidential and secret one, that it was undertaken under the sanction of the United States Government, but that the President did not wish to be known in the matter, but approved Com. Stockton's plan;—that as an evidence of that to me, Mr. Wickliffe was associated with the Commodore; that the President of the United States, satisfied that annexation was in effect consummated, wished Texas to place herself in an attitude of active hostility towards Mexico, so that, when Texas was finally brought into the Union, she might bring a war with her, and this was the object of the expedition to Matamoras, as now proposed. He further stated that Com. Stockton was known to be, individually, very wealthy; that he had means of his own sufficient to support and carry on the expedition; and that it was desirable it should appear to the world as his individual enterprise, while at the same time I was given to understand that the Government of the United States was, in reality, at the bottom of it, and anxious for its accomplishment and for the reasons stated. According to Jones, the proposed expedition against the Mexican forces on the Rio Grande was not designed to occupy the area between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, the land claimed but not occupied by the Republic of Texas; it was designed as an attack upon the Mexican city of Matamoros, on the right bank of the Rio Grande. The purpose of the action was not to protect Texas; it was not to defend her territory, however conceived; it was to begin a war. Jones put the question to Dr. Wright and General Sherman in the most direct and unambiguous form: "I then said, smiling, 'So, gentle15

Stockton, Norfolk, 5 October 1845, to Bancroft, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

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men, the Commodore, on the part of the United States, wishes me to manufacture a war for them'; to which they replied affirmatively." General Sherman, in a subsequent private interview with Jones, urged him to assent to Stockton's proposal, asserting that it was "extremely popular among the people, and that he would have no difficulty in obtaining the requisite number of men, upon the assurances of Stockton that they should be provisioned and paid." Jones said he was "indignant at the proposition," but concealed his feelings and temporized for fear that Sherman, who was a popular leader, would concert with Stockton to take advantage of the hatred of Mexico and the desire for revenge among the people to start a movement against the government, resulting in anarchy and bloodshed. Jones adds that he was expecting within a few days the return of British Minister Elliot from Mexico, "with propositions of peace, and an acknowledgement of Texan independence." He calculated that such an offer from the Mexican government, even if conditional and therefore not acceptable to the Texans, would put a halt to any movement for an attack upon Mexico. Since he could "say nothing openly in regard to these expectations," he "answered Commodore Stockton [through Dr. Wright] that [he] would take a few days longer to reflect upon the matter." Jones gave as specific grounds for his hesitation the fact that Congress would soon convene (on 16 June) and he would seek the advice of that body on the matter. This delay gained him "breathing time." When Elliot returned from Mexico a few days later with the preliminary treaty and acknowledgment of Texas independence, Jones was able to "declare my independence of Com. Stockton, and Mr. Wright, Gov. Yell, Major Donelson, Mr. Polk, and Mr. Buchanan." President Jones issued a proclamation announcing the Mexican offer and declaring a state of peace with Mexico until such time as the government of Texas should act on the matter. General Sherman and Dr. Wright were on their way back from consultations with Stockton at Galveston when they saw his proclamation; Sherman turned about, concluding that now no possibility remained of developing the attack, but Dr. Wright came on. Jones records, with evident satisfaction, his meeting with Wright: "One word settled Com. Stockton's business, and I assurred [sic] him I never had the least idea of manufacturing a war for the United States. Soon after which he left our waters and sailed for the Pacific in search of the same unpacific object which had brought him to Texas, as I suppose." Jones says he could have been very popular if he had sanctioned

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the "war scheme," and probably could have received great rewards from the United States government if he had agreed to "involve the country afresh in a war with Mexico." To leave no doubt that Stockton's plan was in fact President Polk's design, Jones writes that he had "the direct and positive assurance of the Texan chargé at Washington City in September, 1845," that "this scheme had the sanction of the United States." The war which began the following year was, in the interpretation of President Jones, a consistent and logical development of United States policy. The United States "made the war ostensibly for the DEFENCE of Texas; but, in reality, to consummate views of conquest which had been entertained probably for many years, and to wage which, the annexation of Texas afforded a pretext long sought and wished for." Polk kept insisting upon forcing "protection" upon Texas, and finally "brought down an army and a navy upon us, when there was not a hostile foot, either Indian or Mexican, in Texas; not (as afterwards became apparent) to protect Texas . . . but to insure a collision with Mexico." The government of Texas, Jones grants, had indeed asked for protection while in the process of accepting the offer of annexation, but "the protection asked for was only prospective and contingent," while the protection which the government of the United States had in view "was immediate and aggressive" Jones makes the flat charge that President Polk forced the war on Mexico. The Mexican government, "though she might bluster a little, had not the slightest idea of invading Texas either by land or water; and . . . nothing would provoke her to (active) hostilities, but the presence of troops in the immediate neighborhood of the Rio Grande, threatening her towns and settlements on the southwest side of that river." That, indeed, was precisely the situation which existed when the War began in April of 1846, and Jones makes an explicit statement of the motivation of President Polk: . . . I am bound to say, the war between the United States and Mexico grew directly out of annexation; that it was the "foregone conclusion" of Mr. Polk when he came into office, to have that war with Mexico; that, failing in his most cherished scheme of inducing me to the responsibility of provoking and bringing it about, he blundered into it by other means. . . . The war was begun without law, and in like manner ended without law; and a feeble, distracted, and imbecile nation, by it were [sic] divested of an immense ter-

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ritory, which, as a component part of Mexico, never could have been of use to her or anybody else, but which, in the possession of the United States, may and probably will become of incalculable importance to that country and the world—if it does not unfortunately dissolve the Union. This account of President Polk's attempt to "annex a war," as told by the President of Texas, has been available to historians for over a century. If it had been accepted as an authentic and valid account the interpretation in American histories of the origins of the War with Mexico would have been significantly different; to portray Polk as being basically intent upon a peaceable solution of the financial claims and the boundary question would have been impossible. But the report of these events by President Jones has either been ignored, or denied and rejected in its essential points by all but a few American historians. Of three histories of American diplomacy and foreign relations which are currently most widely used as texts for the subject, those by Thomas A. Bailey and by Julius W. Pratt 16 treat the annexation of Texas and the beginning of the War with Mexico without mentioning the Polk-Stockton intrigue. Samuel F. Bemis refers to the activities of Stockton without naming him, but denies that the plot had the support of the United States government: Friends of Polk visited Texas and urged that Texan troops move into the disputed territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, thus renewing hostilities with Mexico before annexation; then the American President, under authority of the resolution of annexation, could dictate a final peace and boundary. Polk himself and the Goverment steered clear of such complicity.17 The most recent history of the Mexican War, by Otis A. Singletary, a volume in the Chicago History of American Civilization, makes no mention of the affair.18 The two most thorough and comprehensive investigations and treat16

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (7th ed.; 1964); Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (2nd ed.; 1965). 17 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (5th ed.; 1965), p. 234. Bemis has changed his interpretation in recent years; in the 1942 edition of this history he wrote that "Polk hoped . . . that Texas would come into the Union still at war with Mexico." And he said flatly that Polk "sent agents to Texas to urge that government to occupy with its own troops all territory up to the Rio Grande" (p. 234). 18 Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War, 1960.

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ments of diplomatic and military history in Texas in 1845 and 1846, both by Justin H. Smith, give information on the Stockton effort but deny that it was any part of American policy. Smith's work has been influential on these matters, and it will be well to note his treatment before turning to the record of Stockon's intrigue. In his Annexation of Texas, Smith refers to Duff Green's activities in Texas—"eager to extend her territory at the expense of Mexico"— and writes: Stockton, in command of an American fleet, was at Galveston; and he, a man of great energy and somewhat less discretion, seems to have been playing a zealous part of a similar kind. Yell remained in Texas, exerting himself in the cause, for about six weeks; Wickliffe, recently Tyler's Postmaster General, had been commissioned as a confidential agent to oppose the apprehended efforts of England and France, and had begun operations about the first of May; and ex-President Lamar, who had come over to the side of annexation, was now on the ground at work. Jones was urged, says Smith, to send a military expedition to the Rio Grande "and perhaps beyond it," and "Wickliffe, Stockton, Green and presumably Y e l l . . . in concert with General Sherman, the Texan commander-in-chief, exerted their utmost endeavors, it would appear, to force the wished-for campaign upon the President." Smith tells of the visit of General Sherman and Dr. Wright to Jones at the end of May, and of Jones's temporizing, and then interprets the events: Jones admitted that Donelson held aloof from this affair; and in fact the American chargé cautioned Stockton, telling him that it was highly important the squadron should "so act as not to alter the general character of the defence" which the United States intended to interpose for Texas—that is to say, she was to be defended after, but not before, the annexation proposal should have been accepted; and instead of advocating an attack upon Mexico, he took the ground that it would be preferable to let the hostilities be commenced by her. No less correct was the conduct of our Executive. Buchanan wrote to Donelson that the government would "studiously refrain from all acts of hostility" towards Mexico unless these should become "absolutely necessary in self-defence," and that orders to this effect were given Stockton. . . . Consequently, though Jones's resentment against Wickliffe and Stockton was extreme, he could not hold the United States responsible for their proceedings; and Donelson was able to report that however little the measures of these gentlemen were "calculated to conciliate the support of the Government," no harm had actually been done.19 19

Justin Harvey Smith, Annexation of Texas, pp. 447-448.

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Jones, of course, did hold the United States responsible for the activities of Wickliffe and Stockton, and Smith made no attempt in his work on the annexation of Texas to analyze Jones's charges adequately, or, apparently, to search for Stockton records—that is, for the correspondence of the Commodore. In his major work on the War with Mexico, Smith took up the matter again. He wrote that "the confidential orders of the government [of the United States] were emphatically unwarlike in tone," quoting in support of that judgment the following: " 'Take special care,' the department said to Stockton, who had a few vessels on the Texas coast, 'to avoid every act that can admit of being construed as inconsistent with our friendly relations' with Mexico." In a lengthy note Smith discusses Jones's charges against Polk: Jones also asserted that agents of Polk urged him to send the Texas militia against Mexico in the spring of 1845 in order to bring about a war; but this is misleading.... The confidential orders given to Conner and Stockton of the navy and the correspondence between the state department and Donelson prove that Polk's administration had not the least intention of adopting at this time an aggressive course toward Mexico. Smith attempts, finally, to dispose of President Jones's account by an ad hominem argument: "When Jones wrote his book he was a ruined man in consequence of the general and well-founded belief that he had tried to prevent the incorporation of Texas in the United States, and was very bitter against Polk. Not long afterward he committed suicide. His book, apparently prepared as a defence of himself, is often untrustworthy."20 Smith's history of the War of the United States against Mexico is one of the most flagrantly biased works in American history, but some of his comments above are relevant to the problem. The fault lies in the failure to undertake a serious investigation to determine what Stockton's relationship to the Polk Administraion actually was. The statements by the President of Texas, based largely on his direct involvement in the matter and his conversations with some of the participants, do not settle the matter. But Jones's account, together with other public evidence, should have resulted in efforts by historians to get to the bottom of the controversial issue. 20

Justin Harvey Smith, The War with Mexico, I, 131, 445-446.

CHAPTER

Stocktons

SEVEN

Effort To Finance a War

In a letter to Secretary Bancroft dated 21 May 1845 at Galveston, Stockton wrote: "War now exists and as any & every man here fights on his 'own hook,' the Texians ought therefore in my opinion to take possession and drive the Mexicans over the other side of the river before the meeting of Congress." Otherwise, he said, the situation might be a pretext for Jones to delay the action on annexation, or a large territory might be lost. He said he planned to leave the next day with the squadron for the Rio Grande and Matamoros, in the hope that such a show of force would induce the Mexican General Arista to "order a counter march." He added that if he could not stop the Mexicans in that way, he would try something else: "In my opinion they should not be permitted to proceed and if I can prevent it I will."1 Stockton did not leave Galveston for his cruise south along the coast until another week had passed. On the evening of the twenty-first the Great Ball was given in his honor, and on that evening and the next day he was in consultation with Wickliffe and General Sherman. Following that discussion, Wickliffe wrote to Secretary Buchanan to charge President Jones with trying to defeat annexation. He said that the "genl in chief," Sherman, would not "accompany us" on the trip to the Rio Grande, but nowhere in the letter did he refer to Stockton by name; he apparently assumed that the Secretary of State would know the person he was working with, which supports the assumption that Wickliffe had been sent to Galveston to assist Commodore Stockton. It will be recalled from the account by President Jones that Dr. Wright had said that Wickliffe's association with Stockton was evidence of the 1 Stockton, Galveston, 21 May 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters of Every Grade and Description, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA.

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fact that, although President Polk did not wish to be known in the matter, he "approved" Stockton's plan. Wickliffe explained to Buchanan that General Sherman would go to see President Jones rather than go with them to the Mexican border; Sherman's purpose was to "apprise" Jones "of the probable danger and obtain if possible his cooperation in any measure which it may be precedent to adopt if Mexico contemplates an invasion."2 This was deliberately vague language. Stockton, writing to Secretary Bancroft on the same date of 22 May, revealed a little more. He said that he had seen the Major General of Texas, "for whom I sent some days since. He has consented to call out the troops, to clear and protect the boundary—he is to leave this place to morrow to advise with the President of Texas on the subject." This statement supports the account by Jones on Sherman's position on the matter, and on his intentions. Stockton then made a request of Bancroft: "I will want more provisions and powder, that [sic] I expected when I left the United States. I will send to Pensacola for them, and if not there to New Orleans. Please to send the necessary orders to let me have what I shall deem necessary for the Squadron under my command."3 This letter is another document which makes it impossible to believe that Stockton's orders of record, to observe and report, were in fact the reason for his presence in Texas. One notes not only Stockton's actions but, perhaps even more significant, the character of his reports to the government in Washington. In this report Stockton said that he had "sent for" the Major General in charge of the military forces of the Republic of Texas and that the officer "has consented to call out the troops." Had Stockton been acting on his own initiative it is very difficult to believe that he would have reported his action in that casual fashion to Secretary Bancroft. And he followed this report with a request for more provisions and powder, although he had used no powder at the time of the request and he gave no reason for it. On receipt of Stockton's letter Bancroft replied, "Orders will be given to furnish powder and supplies at Pensacola on your requisitions."4 2 Wickliffe, Galveston, 22 May 1845, to Buchanan, James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 3 Stockton, Galveston, 22 May 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA. A copy of this letter is in the Stockton Letter Books, 1843-1847, Stockton Papers, PL. 4 Bancroft, 2 June 1845, to Stockton, Confidential Letters No. 1, NDA, NA.

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Intrigue

On that same date, 22 May, Stockton wrote to Commodore David Conner that he had come to Galveston "under private instructions," which changed his original orders to report to Conner off Veracruz. He said he would be kept in Texas, he feared, longer than he wished, and he gave as the reason for his detainment that Chargé Donelson had returned to the United States and thus he would "be compelled" to remain there "until after the action of the Texian Congress upon the resolutions of the Congress of the United States." However, he told Conner, he would be at his side as soon as possible if war should be declared.5 Donelson was in New Orleans at this time, but he soon became aware of the plans for an attack upon Mexico. A general feeling of aggression against Mexico was growing in the United States during this summer of 1845, and that feeling was very strong in the Southwest. Donelson may have seen the article in the New Orleans Jeffersonian which was reprinted by the National Intelligencer on 21 May, advocating United States military action on the Texas-Mexican border: The United States should obtain the permission of Texas, and march an army immediately to the Rio Grande! And the moment that Mexico issues the first letter of marque or reprisal, that army should be marched on Durango, Chihuahua, and California. The mines of Nothern Mexico, the rich grain growing valleys, and the countless herds of cattle, sheep, and oxen, would soon repay us for the depredations on our commerce, and a trade, of which New Orleans would be the centre, would spring up from those fair provinces greater and richer than the world has ever known.6 Donelson was obviously worried that his government might take precipitous military action in Texas in a movement toward the Mexican border. On 24 May he wrote to Buchanan urging that no United States military forces be introduced into Texas. The greatest caution should be observed, he said, "so as to give not the slightest pretext for the assertion that either the Government or the people of Texas were influenced by the presence of our armed force." He wrote that after the Texas government had accepted annexation American troops could be properly sent to the Rio Grande—and then he struck out "Rio Grande" Bancroft included a paragraph in this letter on the necessity of acting in a manner consistent with the friendly relations of the United States with Mexico. 5 Stockton, Galveston, 22 May 1845, to Conner, copy in Stockton Letter Books, 1843-1847, Stockton Papers, PL. The letter was sent on the St. Mary's to Conner. 6 This story probably appeared in the New Orleans paper about the tenth or eleventh of May.

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and wrote "frontier," for he was not then or later in favor of the use of force to assert the Texan claim to the Rio Grande boundary. He was later to argue at length against sending troops into the Mexican settlements north of the Rio Grande. 7 Donelson found direct references in the newspapers to Stockton's project in Texas, and he wrote another letter to Buchanan on 24 May expressing his concern. He said he was returning to Galveston and he indicated his anxiety about Stockton: You will observe from the papers that Captain Stockton is there, and was to sail, it is said, to the Brazos de Santiago, intending to cooperate with General Sherman of the Texan militia, should there be a belligerent movement on that frontier on the part of the Mexican troops. There is no probability that such a movement is yet to be expected from Mexico. Such an idea is contradicted by all the reports received here from that government. Donelson concluded with the statement that "it is not to be supposed" that President Jones would sanction "any but strictly defensive measures," and he hoped that "the use of the force under command of Captain Stockton will be so directed as not to disturb this posture of affairs."8 Donelson clearly hoped that the State Department would ask Secretary Bancroft to restrain Stockton's activities. It is apparent at this point, as on other occasions in this affair, that Donelson was not a party to the Polk Administration's effort to use Stockton in Texas for "larger" purposes. He probably later suspected the connivance of the government in Stockton's scheme, but even then he continued to argue against it. Had Donelson been privy to Stockton's conversations and correspondence, he would have been rather more nervous about the prospects than he was on the basis of rumors and newspaper stories. Stockton continued to delay his trip to the Rio Grande; and he continued to concert plans for the sending of an armed force to the Mexican border. On 25 May he wrote to Secretary Bancroft to say, "annexation is more certain now, than ever," and, on his plans: "I expect to leave for 'Corpus Christi' tomorrow—to ascertain if I can what is actually doing on the frontier along the Del Norte." 9 That explanation of his current 7 Donelson, New Orleans, 24 May 1845, to Buchanan, Incoming Letters, Texas Legation, No. 2, State Department Archives, NA. 8 Donelson, New Orleans, 24 May 1845, to Buchanan, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc., p. 47. 9 Stockton, Galveston, 25 May 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA. A penciled notation on the letter reads: "Rcd. June 9, Stockton, May 24 [sic], Con file."

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activities in Texas was deliberately misleading in its implications. It could have been made public without revealing the intrigue; but at the same time, the government in Washington would be able to interpret it in terms of Stockton's actual mission in Texas. Two days later Stockton allowed himself the indiscretion of writing a letter to his government which laid bare the essence of the plot. This letter was not included in the correspondence sent to Congress when the negotiations with Texas were a subject of inquiry the following year; no copy was made of the letter by Stockton for his files—or if a copy was made it has not survived; and the original was not filed by the Navy Department, either in the Officers Letters file or in the Confidential Letters file. Bancroft kept the incriminating document, and it came to rest in his personal papers. Stockton inscribed the admonition "Private" with double and triple underlinings, on the cover of the letter and above the salutation, and with reason. The letter reads in full: My Dear Sir Since my last letter I have seen Mr. Mayfield late Secretary of State— who says that if the people here did not feel assured that the Boundary line would be the Rio Grande three fourths and himself amongst the number would oppose the annexation— But I need hardly say another word on that subject; its importance is apparent— But it may perhaps be as well for me in this way to let you know how I propose to settle the matter without committing the U. States— The Major Genl will call out three thousand men & "R. F. Stockton Esq" will supply them in a private way with provisions & ammunition— Yours [Signed] R. F. Stockton10 This letter confirms precisely and completely the statement by President Jones on Stockton's proposal as revealed and explained by Dr. Wright. The facts are incontestable: an officer of the United States Navy in command of a squadron sent to Texas by the United States government, an officer who was at the same time a wealthy and influential businessman and politician, was attempting to initiate an attack upon Mexico by an army which he would finance secretly from his personal funds. The only question which remains at this point is the extent to which the plot was developed in detail in Washington. Stockton certainly would not have written in the way he did in this letter and others 10

Stockton, Galveston, 27 May 1845, to Bancroft, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. This letter has been published in full by R. W. Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire (1960), p. 138.

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if the objectives at which he aimed had not been authorized by President Polk; the particular methods he used, however, might have been at his own initiative. But it must be emphasized that although Secretary Bancroft wrote to Stockton with conventional advice regarding the peaceful relations between the United States and Mexico, the significant fact is that Stockton was not recalled. Indeed, Bancroft's letter of 2 June to Stockton began with the comment: "The President is much pleased at the promptitude with which you have thus far executed the orders of the Department, in reaching Galveston and exhibiting the American flag in the harbor." On the face of it that is simply a silly statement; it can only be understood as designed to let Stockton know that the President approved of the actions reported in Stockton's letters of 21 and 22 May, for Bancroft connected his report on the President's pleasure with the notation that he had received those letters from Galveston.11 It will be recalled that one of Stockton's letters of 22 May had reported General Sherman's consent to call out the troops and clear the boundary. Polk continued to assume the official posture that there was great danger that Texas would reject the annexation proposal, in the face of all the reports to the contrary. On 26 May, Jackson wrote to Polk, "Texas comes into the Union with a united voice," with the help of General Houston. "I knew British gold could not buy Sam Houston," Jackson exulted; "all safe & Donelson will have the honor of this important Deed." But on that same day Polk was writing to Donelson that he feared the Chargé was "too sanguine" about the assent of Texas, even though, as he admitted, Governor Yell had arrived in Washington and concurred with Donelson's judgment. Polk warned of the danger of being lulled into a false sense of security: "There can be no doubt that the combined efforts of the British, French & Mexican authorities will continue to be exerted to prevent it [annexation], as long as there is the slightest hope of success."12 The President was careful to make no reference in his letters to any unorthodox use of governmental power, even after the military adventure planned by Stockton, Wickliffe, and General Sherman had become public knowledge, although in garbled form, through the newspapers. The New Orleans Republican published a story which was picked up and reprinted by Niks' Register on 7 June, on the arrival of Commodore Stockton with his squadron at Galveston. Two days after his 11

Bancroft, 2 June 1845, to Stockton, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA. Jackson, 26 May 1845, to Polk, James K. Polk Papers, LC; Polk, 26 May 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. 12

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arrival, the story reported, word was received that a Mexican force on the Rio Grande would attempt to occupy and maintain "the line of the Nueces, at the moment of the completion of annexation." When this news was communicated to the Commodore, Stockton "advised an immediate occupation of the line by the Texan troops, offering his cooperation by sea." The account said that Stockton would sail down the coast to obtain intelligence on the matter, accompanied by C. A. Wickliffe, "late postmaster general of the United States," Colonel Love, Colonel McKinney, and Samuel Williams. In the meantime: Major General Sherman is to visit the executive and ask his approval and co-operation. Should he refuse, Sherman contends that he is empowered by the general terms of an existing law to act independently of the president, and he will do so. He will call three thousand men into immediate service to rendezvous at Corpus Christi, and the call will be promptly obeyed. Things here are in a great ferment.13 This story was published before General Sherman and Dr. Wright had consulted with President Jones. It indicates that Jones's refusal to countenance the attack upon Mexico was anticipated; a further probable indication is that Wickliffe, Stockton, and Sherman were attempting to exert maximum pressure on Jones by a public announcement that General Sherman was prepared to defy the President. Indeed, the secret intrigue was becoming general public knowledge in its broad outlines during the last week in May and the first week of June. Stockton's activities were reported in the major newspapers in the East. The National Intelligencer of 9 June, for example, referred to a "report of Mexican troops approaching the Rio Grande," and noted that Commodore Stockton was on a cruise to Corpus Christi, Brazos de Santiago, "and perhaps other points on the coast," with Mr. Wickliffe, the "late Postmaster General." The paper commented: "It is supposed that Com. Stockton's visit to Corpus Christi and that vicinity has something to do with this business," that is, with the report of Mexican troops.14 The prospects for an early march on the Mexican settlements appeared very favorable at the end of May, but within a few days the project collapsed. President Jones, aided by the most opportune Mexican offer of the recognition of Texas independence, managed to keep control of events, and Donelson supported Jones in frustrating the plans of Stockton, Wickliffe, and Sherman. 13 14

Niles' National Register, LXVIII (7 June 1845), 213. National Intelligencer, XLV, 9 June 1845.

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The trip down the coast to the Rio Grande to "gather information" was cut short. Stockton sailed from Galveston with Wickliffe and several Texan friends on 27 May, but by 2 June they were back in Galveston. Wickliffe wrote to Polk that they had encountered very heavy head winds and he and "the gentleman upon whom I relied to obtain information from the Rio Grande" became "so extremely sick" that Stockton thought it necessary for their safety to return. It appears that Wickliffe had selected a spy to go among the Mexicans on the lower Rio Grande, but both he and Wickliffe turned out to be poor sailors. The National Intelligencer reported that "the cause of the sudden return to Galveston of the Gulf Squadron [sic], without having accomplished the purpose for which it sailed from that place on the 27th ultimo—viz. a cruise of observation along the Mexican coast—was the illness of Mr. Wickliffe, the late Postmaster General, who was on board the Princeton."15 Writing to President Polk on 3 June, Wickliffe said that a captain in the Texas revenue service had agreed to proceed to the Rio Grande and return to Galveston with any information he might secure. Wickliffe added that Chargé Donelson had arrived in Galveston on 31 May, and "we will be governed in this matter by his advice."16 Donelson had met with Wickliffe and Stockton and certainly made an attempt to govern their actions in future. He wrote to the State Department on 2 June from Galveston: I adverted in my last despatch from New Orleans to the presence of Captain Stockton's squadron here, and to a rumor that he had sailed to Santiago, to cooperate with General Sherman of the Texan militia in defending the occupation of the Rio Grande. This was not correct. Captain Stockton weighed anchor at this port, a few days ago, for the purpose of examining the coast; but he has since returned, and has taken no step susceptible of construction as one of aggression upon Mexico, nor will he take any unless ordered to do so. His presence here has had a fine effect, and operates, without explanation, as an assurrance [sic] to Texas that she will receive the protection due to her when she comes into the Union. It is clear that Donelson had talked to Stockton with vigor and authority and had warned him against involvement in military action against Mexico. One can only speculate about the defense which Stockton made of his project, under this kind of pressure from Donelson. If he revealed or intimated the covert support of President Polk in his 15 16

Ibid., 18 June 1845. Wickliffe, Galveston, 3 June 1845, to Polk, James K. Polk Papers, LC.

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scheme, it was ineffectual. Donelson held the stronger hand; he had specific, written authority and instructions, while Stockton had no written authorization for the diplomatic and political and military plans he had been developing in Texas. It is significant that Stockton made no mention of this conversation in any of his subsequent dispatches to Washington. Regarding the situation on the border, Donelson referred to the belief that Mexico was concentrating troops on the Rio Grande, where, he took pains to emphasize, "Texas has, as yet, established no posts." Obviously very skeptical about the excitement which had been raised on the subject, Donelson told Buchanan that if it proved true that Mexico was concentrating military forces "it is possible that Texas may send a force there to remove intruders." But Donelson said that "such a movement, if made, will be independent of the United States. Capain Stockton will not cooperate with it, but he will remain here until the meeting of Congress [of Texas], ready after that event to act as circumstances may require." 17 At the time of this meeting with Donelson, Stockton and Wickliffe were awaiting the return of General Sherman and Dr. Wright from their interview with President Jones. Had they secured the approval or the acquiescence of the government of Texas in the project, Stockton, there seems little doubt, would have supported the campaign as he had engaged to do, despite Donelson. Wickliffe began to doubt the success of the affair before Stockton did. In his letter of 3 June, Wickliffe wrote that they had not heard from General Sherman, but he anticipated that Jones would not cooperate with them. "It is my opinion," he wrote, "that Prest Jones will discountenance the movement, under the impression that the United States will have the right and will be bound to remove the Mexican military from east of the Rio Grande after annexation takes place." And Wickliffe asked, naively but most pertinently: "Would not this be an act of War upon Mexico by the United States?" Exactly, and visibly; the purpose of the scheme was to make it possible for the United States to appear to be acting in defense of the newly acquired state of Texas. A few hours after Wickliffe wrote that letter to Polk, General Sherman arrived in Galveston to report on his interview with President Jones. In a long, hastily scribbled, almost illegible letter dated 4 June, Wickliffe told Polk of the mounting difficulties with which they were 17 Donelson, Galveston, 2 June 1845, to Buchanan, 29th Cong., 1st. Sess., Ex. Doc., No. 26.

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faced. Wickliffe said that at the first interview the President had "concurred in the propriety of moving the Mexicans west of the Rio Grande" but later he had hedged. On the second day of the discussions word had arrived from Captain Hays of the Texas Rangers that some 7,800 Mexican troops had arrived in northern Mexico, counting those in Monterrey and along the Rio Grande, and that a body of Mexican soldiers numbering about 100 had marched to a point on the Nueces. Captain Hays intended to start the next day with 50 men to give battle. This purported "information" was designed to force Jones's hand. Captain Hays was one of those who had joined with Stockton in Galveston in the preparation of the scheme. But there was no attack by the Mexican Army on the settlements on the Nueces River, and no counterattack by Hays and his Texas Rangers. When General Sherman urged the President to direct him and the Texas militia to march at once upon the Mexicans, according to Wickliffe's account, Jones said he could not give this direction without violating an understanding he had with Captain Charles Elliot, the British minister to Texas. He said that he must await the return of Elliot from Mexico, whence he had gone in an effort to secure an agreement from that government to recognize the independence of Texas. Sherman then told Jones that he, as major general in charge of the Militia, had authority by the act of Congress to call out the forces to defend the county without the orders of the President. Jones replied that he was aware of that power held by General Sherman, "but that he would esteem it as a personal favor if he would not act" at the present time. Jones said he would communicate with him in a few days. While en route to Galveston from the conference with President Jones, Sherman had met Elliot in Houston.18 The British Minister was traveling in great haste, planning to stay on the road all night so that he might meet with President Jones as soon as possible. Sherman reported that Captain Elliot . . . did not hesitate to speak of the object of his visit to Mexico, to the citizens of the Republic. Said that he had obtained their Independence but only to learn upon his return that a majority of the people were for annexation and that he felt for them who opposed it. That Mexico would declare war instantly. The United States would Blockade the ports of Mexico but that the British Government would not submit to it consequently there 18

The National Intelligencer of 16 June 1845 reported the event: "Elliot reached Galveston on the evening of the 30th ultimo in a French brig, bringing 'overtures from Mexico' for acknowledgement of Texan independence."

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would be a war for 20 years and he would advise his friends in Texas to leave the country. Wickliffe commented: "This is modest I admit in the Representative of Great Britain, certainly kind if not respectful to the Government and people of Texas!" One can only conjecture about the possible mixture of fact and calculated distortion in General Sherman's report of the British Minister's comments in Houston. Elliot might have been half-seriously attempting to arouse some apprehensions among Texans regarding the course they were taking; however, as will be seen, his correspondence at this time indicates that he had decided there was no point in further resistance to the annexation "fever." Wicklifïe told Polk that these facts proved that the suspicions which had been entertained in regard to President Jones were correct: that he had entered upon a scheme to defeat annexation; that he was pledged to Elliot to prevent all military operations by Texas on the frontier until the results of his mission should be known; and that no call of Congress would be made until its regular session in November. Wicklifïe concluded that Elliot would now inform General Arista in Monterrey that Mexico's offer would be rejected by Texas, and that "immediately" the "whole force of Mexico on the Frontier will cross the Rio Grande and invade this Republic before they have decided to accept the terms" of annexation by the United States. Wicklifïe questioned whether it would be right and just for the United States to stand by and witness this consequence. He told Polk that he could believe that "the people of Texas are ready to do what is required of them to defend their homes but they have very few resources save their indomitable courage. They have the guns without powder, and pockets without money."19 In his letter to Polk, Wicklifïe made no mention of the fact that Stockton's representative, Dr. Wright, had accompanied General Sherman to see President Jones, although Stockton's secretary, according to Jones, had played the more important role in the conversations. Stockton wrote to Bancroft on that same date of 4 June and he also conspicuously avoided any reference to Dr. Wright's visit to negotiate with the President of the Republic of Texas. This attempted suppression of a most significant event is both consistent with the scheme and an evidence of the covert character of this intrigue of President Polk in Texas. It is further apparent from Stockton's letter that he had not at this 19

Wickliffe, Galveston, 4 June 1845, to Polk, James K. Polk Papers, LC.

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point given up on his scheme, even in the face of Donelson's admonitions and of President Jones's quite obvious opposition. Of the official representative of the United States in Texas, Stockton said only: "Major Donelson arrived on Saturday [31 May] and is now here." He said nothing of Donelson's advice or instructions. Of the lengthy conversations of General Sherman and Dr. Wright with Jones, Stockton merely wrote: "I have just heard from the President of Texas on the subject of the army of occupation. He approves the plan suggested by me and I hope he will prosecute it." This was an extraordinary conclusion to draw from the encounter between his emissaries and Jones; it is an indication of the difficulty Stockton had in accepting defeat; it enables one to understand the verbal violence which accompanied Stockton's forced recognition of failure a week later. He gave no explanation for his sudden return to Galveston. He had informed the Department that he would go to the Rio Grande, but on 4 June, three days after his return, he said only: "I have the honor to inform you of my return here from a short cruise down the coast." Unless Stockton sent President Polk or Secretary Bancroft private letters which were destroyed (which is possible but unlikely in view of the character of the letters which he wrote as official dispatches), the government had to rely upon information from Donelson and Wickliffe and other agents in Texas for any substantial description of developments there, including information on Stockton's own activities. This letter of 4 June is important, however, as the last statement by Stockton before he gave up on his project; it is useful in the attempt to unravel the whole scheme. He referred to the arrival of Captain Elliot on 30 May and said that the British Minister had proceeded immediately to the capital of Texas. Then Stockton gave his analysis of the situation in Texas in relation to Mexico at the moment: I am informed that there are seven thousand Mexican troops on the Rio Grande del Norte ready for invasion. No provision has been made to meet such an exigency, but that which I am & have been since my arrival here endeavoring to get the authorities of Texas to adopt. The Government and people of Texas do most unfortunately entertain the expectation that the Government of the United States can and will protect them from any and all Mexican aggression, from the moment that the Congress of Texas shall accept the resolutions of the congress of the United States. This has caused among the people an apathy on the subject of the necessary defences which ought to be in my judgment alarming. The Mexicans are ready to inflict a blow on the Territory of Texas as

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soon as they shall hear the result of Capt. Elliots [sic] mission. The United States troops cannot (if it were right to do so), cannot be here to resist them. The Texians must be aroused to a proper sense of their own danger and my advice to this Government has been to call the Texian volunteer army into the field, to defend themselves from aggression, to regulate the Boundary and to be prepared to hand over to the United States and [sic] undisturbed and undisputed territory when the U.S. may be (of right) ready to occupy it. It hardly needs pointing out that the whole burden of this letter is incompatible with the written instructions which Stockton had received from the Department, to "make yourself acquainted with the dispositions of the people of Texas, and their relations with Mexico." Stockton candidly reported that he was engaged in the effort to arouse the people to "a proper sense of their own danger," and since his arrival he had been trying to persuade the authorities of Texas to adopt his plan, involving military action against Mexico. Stockton concluded with a statement about the future disposition of the ships under his command which makes it quite clear that from the beginning of the assignment he had had no intention of reporting to Commodore Conner: The prolonged uncertainty of our relations with Mexico begins to create in my mind some doubt as to the proper destination of the other vessels of the squadron when I shall return to the United States. They will by that time require a supply of provisions &c, and it is my present purpose, when I leave this place to send them to Pensacola to fill up, where orders from you can if you see fit meet them in time to prevent any unnecessary delay.20 On that same date, 4 June 1845, President Jones issued his proclamation of peace between Texas and Mexico, based upon a preliminary and conditional treaty of peace which the British minister, Charles Elliot, had brought from the capital of Mexico. That treaty had been negotiated with the Mexican government by representatives of the British, with the cooperation of the government of France. It is necessary at this point to examine the British and French initiatives in the Texas affair because of the relationship of that European diplomacy with the efforts of the President of the United States in the Republic of Texas. 20 Stockton, Galveston, 4 June 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementaryfile,1844-1845, NDA, NA.

CHAPTER

EIGHT

European Intervention in the Texas Game

The account which President Anson Jones gave in his Memoranda of the Polk-Stockton effort to initiate war on the Rio Grande is vulnerable to the criticism that it was written long after the event. This time lapse weakens its authority as evidence, even though it is a statement by a participant in the affair. But if a record of Jones's relationship with the Stockton project and with Stockton's emissaries should exist which dates from the event itself, it would be a very important document on this matter. If that document should be a report by a third party who recorded at the time an account by Jones which is consistent with the account given in the Memoranda, the latter statement would be very greatly strengthened as historical evidence. A contemporary report of that character does exist: a letter written by the British minister in Texas, Charles Elliot, to his counterpart in Mexico, Charles Bankhead, dated 11 June 1845. Elliot had returned from Mexico City to Galveston at the end of May and had gone immediately to see the President; his conversation with Jones followed by one or two days the discussions which had been held between Jones and Stockton's representatives, Dr. Wright and General Sherman. Elliot wrote a few days later to Bankhead: I should tell you that I learnt as soon as I landed from a source of information entirely to be depended upon that Commodore Stockton was using every effort to induce the President to issue a Proclamation calling out Volunteers for the purpose of occupying the Country to the Rio Grande at once. The President frankly admitted to me that such was the case, and told me (I use his own words as nearly as I can remember them) that he said to those parties "I see not one single motive for Annexation if it is not for security and protection, or if we are to do our own fighting, and I tell you

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plainly that I will not be made the scape goat in such an affair as you have proposed to me. The United States Government must take all the responsibility, and all the expence and all the labour of hostile movements upon Mexico. I will issue no Proclamation of the kind you wish, and authorize no movement unless Mexico makes a movement upon us. Somebody else must break up the state of peace. It shall not be me."1 This statement by President Jones, made when the scheme was being pressed by Stockton, that President Polk was trying to make the government of Texas the "scape goat" in "hostile movements upon Mexico," is the strongest kind of confirmation of his later detailed account of the affair. The fact that the statement was made to the representative of Great Britain in Texas, and the continuous activity of Britain and France in this international incident preparatory to the war of the United States with Mexico, suggests that an examination of the European appraisal of the efforts of the United States government in Texas in 1845 might throw additional light upon the intrigue. The ministry of Sir Robert Peel, which came to power in September 1841 and remained in office until June of 1846, was a government primarily interested in domestic reform. Peel entrusted foreign policy to the Earl of Aberdeen, who made a series of sacrifices in the interest of peace. He compromised in 1842 with the United States over the boundary of the state of Maine, and he did so in 1846 on the Oregon question. In the matter of Texas, where British interests were not so directly involved, it was not to be expected that a disposition to resort to war would develop if diplomacy proved ineffectual; nor did such a disposition exist.2 Great Britain and France, however, did make a serious effort short of force to restrain the United States from its aggression against Mexico in the 1840's. It should be kept in mind that distrust of the United States pervaded Western Europe. The Polk-Stockton war intrigue of 1845 was precisely the kind of international behavior which those governments found typical of the United States. The comment of a London newspaper on the Mexican policy of the United States, made in the winter of 1844-1845, is a fair statement of representative European opinion: 1 Ephraim Douglass Adams (ed.), British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas, 1838-1846, pp. 501-502. 2 Justin Harvey Smith, The Annexation of Texas, in Chapters 18 and 19 (pp. 382-431), tries to demonstrate the contrary.

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As far as we are able to form a judgment the feeling is universal, that if ever a case occurred which would justify the interference of the European powers to prevent the oppression of a weak state by a stronger one, it is that of Mexico and the United States. There is no mistake about the intention of a large party in the states, and, from what we know, there is no doubt about their being altogether unscrupulous about the means of attaining their object.3 Representatives of the Republic of Texas assigned to European capitals were constantly forced to recognize this feeling. Ashbel Smith found in 1842 that "the cause of Texas is not regarded with favor at this time in England. I have been several times assured that the public sympathy is with Mexico."4 The support which Texas received abroad was based largely upon the desire to check the growth and power of the United States; the opposition which the Republic of Texas found in Europe was based upon the assumption that it was an arm of United States aggrandizement. This was an attitude not limited to the great powers. When William Henry Daingerfield was sent to The Hague in 1843 to negotiate a treaty with the Dutch he reported that while Texas was little known there, "in the minds of those to whom its history and position were not entirely unknown, there existed a prejudice against it." He said that this prejudice was based upon "our supposed connexion" with the United States, "a country disliked for its republicanism, envied for its immense prosperity and hated for the defalcations on the part of the States, in the Stocks of which the Dutch had largely dealt."5 The apprehensions of Europeans deepened with Polk's election in 1844. Of that event the London Times said that with the single exception of the tariff question "his election to this important office is the triumph of every thing that is worst over every thing that is best in the U. States of America." The influential paper concluded that Polk's victory was "a victory gained by the south over the north—by the slave states over the free—by the repudiating states over the honest ones— by the partizans of the annexation of Texas over its opponents—by the adventurous and unscrupulous democracy . . . over the more austere 3 The London Standard of 31 December 1844, as printed in Niles' National Register, LXVII (8 February 1845), 356. 4 Ashbel Smith, London, 3 June 1842, to Anson Jones, George P. Garrison (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas {Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), p. 961. 5 Daingerfield, The Hague, 8 November 1843, to Ashbel Smith, Paris, where Smith was then chargé of Texas, ibid., p. 1474.

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and dignified republicanism of New England." 6 The French Journal des Débats said that at best Polk was a "remarkable mediocrity," and that the result of his election would be "to give the ascendant to the radical party: that is to say to a party which its very essence renders unfit for the reestablishment of order" in a society which was very much in need of it.7 An exchange of letters between G. W. Terrell, minister of the Texas Republic to Great Britain, and the Earl of Clarendon, at the exact time that Stockton was engaged in his efforts to initiate an attack on the Mexican border, is representative, and it provides the basis for understanding the diplomatic intervention of Britain and France in the Texas annexation crisis. Writing in May 1845, Terrell said his attention had been directed to a paragraph "in a speech of your Lordship" made in the House of Lords on 4 April. The paragraph referred to the threat to the peaceful relations of Britain with the United States if there should be afforded to "the restless and encroaching people of Texas an opportunity of gratifying their tastes for establishing a boundary quarrel, and thus creating a cause of war with Mexico which must be viewed with interest in this country." Terrell said this statement did the people of Texas such an injustice that he felt called upon to vindicate them. The Earl replied that Terrell's information on the speech was incorrect: What I did say (in speaking of the annexation of Texas announced in the address of the President of the U States) was that "it need not be expected that the restless and encroaching people by whom it appeared Texas was henceforth to be inhabited would be long without indulging their national taste for a boundary quarrel or establishing a cause of war with Mexico." The Earl said that he was speaking of a Texas no longer independent, but "incorporated with the United States and peopled by American Citizens." This was a transparent gesture of diplomacy; he knew very well that Texas had been largely peopled by United States citizens, but he protested his respect for the people of the Republic of Texas. But, he said: With regard to Texas however in its future position as a frontier State of the Union, I cannot admit that the expressions used by me were either unjust 6

London Times, 25 November 1844, reprinted in Niles' Register, LXVII (4 January 1845), 280. 7 Journal des Débats, reprinted in Niks' Register, LXVII (4 January 1845), 281.

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or misapplied when I consider what has been the course pursued by the United States in respect to the Indian Tribes, to the Canadian Frontier, to the Oregon Territory, and that according to a recent declaration made by the highest authority, it has, for the last 20 years been the settled policy of the American Government to gain possession of Texas.8 The Earl's argument rested solidly upon the history of aggressive expansion by the United States; it was quite impossible for an American, or a Texan, to hold ground against that argument. The government of Great Britain had settled on a course of action on the Texas matter by the early summer of 1844, and François Guizot, Premier in the government of Louis Philippe, had pledged French cooperation. The action of the United States Congress on annexation was considered unpredictable; but it was assumed as certain that the proannexation forces in the United States would continue to press their cause if they suffered a defeat in the Senate, and the British government saw no way of using its influence directly in the contest in the United States. Richard Pakenham, British minister in Washington, discouraged his government from any remonstrance to the government of the United States as "quite insufficient to arrest the evil intentions of this Government" unless accompanied by at least the intimation of decisive measures of resistance—which the British were not prepared to give.9 The alternative was an attempt to dissuade Texas from accepting an offer of annexation, when and if made. This might be accomplished, in the view of Lord Aberdeen, if Mexico could be induced to recognize the independence of Texas and agree on a mutually satisfactory boundary, and if the British and French governments should enter into commercial treaties with Texas granting the products of that country great advantages. The initiative was carried by the British throughout the effort; a year earlier, in the summer of 1844, Ashbel Smith reported to Anson Jones, then Secretary of State of Texas, from London: "Lord Aberdeen observed that France will be guided in this matter by the counsels of England." A few weeks later Smith reported from Paris: "The French Gov desire that annexation may not take place, but they care much less about it than do the British Gov." But the French gave steady support to the British moves in 8 G. W. Terrell, 5 May 1845, to the Earl of Clarendon, and reply from the Earl, 10 May 1845, Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence {Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), pp. 1187, 1192-1193. 9 Smith, Annexation of Texas, p. 388.

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Texas and in Mexico, and American officials resented it intensely. Near the conclusion of the effort, William R. King, United States minister to France, wrote to Secretary Buchanan: This government has acted most deceptively on the subject of Texas, still denying that there exists any concerted action with England with respect to it; which all the world must know to be false. Tis wisely said "put not your faith in kings." Fortunately the firmness of the Texas people will defeat the intrigue, and leave to this Government nothing but the consciousness that she has degraded herself; and alienated a friendly people.10 From May of 1844 to March of 1845 efforts were continued to secure an offer from Mexico of Texan independence conditioned upon the pledge of that Republic to retain its independent status. On 29 March 1845 President Jones accepted a plan presented by Elliot for the British government and Comte de Saligny for the French. Texas agreed not to accept annexation for a period of ninety days, while considering the terms of a settlement with Mexico based on independence. Elliot then left for Mexico and on 20 May secured the formal offer from the Mexican government; he was back in Texas, as noted above, on 30 May. The offer which Elliot brought to the government of Texas was announced in a proclamation to the people by President Jones on 4 June, with the statement that the Congress and the people of Texas would have the choice between accepting the Mexican offer of peace based upon recognition of Texan independence, and the United States offer of annexation. In the meantime, President Jones stated, no hostile action would be undertaken against Mexico. The terms of the proposed agreement were constructive and reasonable, with the exception of the limitation upon the freedom of action of Texas which prohibited her consenting to any change in her sovereign status. Under the heading "conditions preliminary to a treaty of peace between Mexico and Texas" were the following items: (1) Mexico consents to acknowledge the independence of Texas; (2) Texas engages that she will stipulate in the treaty not to annex herself or become subject to any country whatever; (3) Limits and other conditions to be a matter of arrangement in the final treaty; (4) Texas 10 Smith, London, 24 June 1844, to Jones, Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence (Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), p. 1155; Smith, Paris, 31 July 1844, to Jones, ibid., p. 1159; King, Paris, 30 June 1845, to Buchanan, James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. See also, Smith, Annexation of Texas, pp. 408-431.

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will be willing to remit disputed points respecting territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires. 11 It was apparent, however, that the proposed treaty with Mexico had no chance of acceptance by Texas; the decision which would be made by the people of Texas was by this time not in doubt. The government of Britain had concluded that the effort had failed. Ashbel Smith wrote from London on 3 June: I think I may safely assert that this Government regard annexation as certain, that they will not use any efforts to prevent its consummation, nor take any exception to it afterwards. A principal objection to annexation on their part is alleged to be the increased danger to Mexico which will arise from this approximation of the Union to the inhabited districts of that country; and they think Mexico showed a great want of wisdom in not listening to their friendly counsels and in not recognizing our independence long since.12 The British government understood very well the propensities of the American people in relation to Mexico, and more particularly the plans of the Polk Administration. British diplomacy, at the least, had contributed to the failure of Polk's plans. President Jones probably would not have given his assent to the raising of an army for a march to the Rio Grande even had he not been engaged in the effort to secure recognition from Mexico. Without the President's authorization General Sherman might or might not have gone ahead on his own authority to form an army financed by Stockton. But it is certain that the proclamation of peace with Mexico pending the action of the Congress destroyed the basis for the attack on the border; a military movement against Mexico following that proclamation would have been a revolutionary movement against the government of Texas, and there was no general support for a military measure since the President opened the way for the decision on annexation in the same proclamation. And this was the fruit of British diplomacy. The credit for the frustration of the Polk-Stockton scheme must therefore be shared by Anson Jones and Sir Robert Peel's ministry. Charles Elliot departed from Texas a few days before the Congress met to decide on annexation, because he did not think it proper to 11 The statement of conditions, President Jones's letter of transmittal to the Congress of Texas, and correspondence on the matter were included in an eightpage pamphlet, copy in the Duff Green Papers, LC. 12 Smith, London, 3 June 1845, to Ebenezer Allen, Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence (Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), p. 1199.

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Intrigue

remain in the country during those deliberations. Just before leaving Galveston he wrote to Bankhead in Mexico on the current situation in Texas and the prospects for the future. His perceptive comments and his recommendations illustrate the high quality of the British Foreign Service. He said that President Jones's proclamation "is a heavy blow to the violent partizans of Stockton's scheme here," and that Donelson would "probably enough disavow Stockton." At Galveston, Elliot noted the presence of Stockton's squadron, and remarked: "Their main business here is to spend money or as they have it in the U.S. to 'log roll'." He correctly guessed that "Stockton's force here has a large supply of arms and ammunition ready for distribution amongst this people." The best hope of avoiding an American attack upon Mexico, thought Elliot, rested upon very careful and cautious behavior by the government of Mexico. He suggested that it would, . . . be very unwise of Mexico to take the initiative in hostile or onward movements. That step should be left to the Government of the U.S. which will find it no easy or irresponsible affair during the recess of Congress and in the entirely altered attitude of Mexico as respects Texas, with a closely divided state of parties in their own Country upon the subject, and indeed serious divisions in their own ranks in regards to it. He recommended that the Mexican government "forthwith issue a Proclamation declaring that no onward movements would be made whilst none were made by the Texians, or U.S. troops." 13 Within a year President Polk was to demonstrate that no amount of restraint by Mexico would prevent his forcing a war to obtain California. And as commander-in-chief of all United States forces in California during the conquest Stockton was to play the most important role in the military action in that Mexican province. But in June of 1845 he had to accept the failure of the political-military scheme for which Polk had sent him to Texas. 13 Elliot, Galveston, 11 June 1845, to Bankhead, Adams (ed.), British Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 501-502.

CHAPTER

NINE

The Collapse of the Polk-Stockton

Intrigue

The possibility that Stockton might yet engage in some overt military action against Mexico gave Donelson continuous concern until the Commodore left Galveston for Washington on 23 June. Donelson tried to keep in close touch with Stockton, as the best insurance against an aggressive military adventure. On 4 June, Donelson wrote to Buchanan that "Captain Stockton, as stated in my last despatch, is here, and will be kept advised of all that occurs, in order that he may be in the best position to sustain the views and interests of his gov't." In response to Donelson's earlier communication to the State Department on the subject, Buchanan wrote to the Chargé on 3 June to say that the government of the United States would "studiously refrain from all acts of hostility toward that Republic [Mexico] unless this should become absolutely necessary in self defence. Orders have been transmitted to Captain Stockton in accordance with this declaration."1 President Polk nevertheless held to his plan of instigating a military movement, ostensibly Texan, to the Mexican border. Upon receipt of Wickliffe's letters of 3 and 4 June to himself, and Stockton's of 4 June to Bancroft, Polk had the Department of State and the Department of the Navy send dispatches by personal messenger to Texas with instructions to urge the Texans to attack the Mexicans in the contested border area. It is useful to examine closely this direct intervention by the President. Ten days were required for mail posted at Galveston to reach Washington; the letters from the agents in Texas presumably reached the Administration on 14 June, a Saturday. Wickliffe's letter emphasized 1 Donelson, 4 June 1845, to Buchanan, 29th Cong., 1st. Sess., Ex. Doc., p. 55; Buchanan, 3 June 1845, to Donelson, ibid., p. 122.

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the refusal of President Jones to fall in with Stockton's project; Stockton asserted that Jones approved of his "army of occupation" and reported on his efforts to induce the authorities "to call the Texian volunteer army into the field." On Sunday, 15 June, Polk and his secretaries were at work writing instructions to Donelson and to Stockton. Polk's letter to Donelson was marked ''Confidential,'" with double underlining, and was sent for the asserted purpose of making it clear that the President was determined to "stand by Texas—and defend her in this crisis to the utmost of my constitutional power." Of the boundary he said: "Of course I would maintain the Texan title to the extent which she claims it to be, and not permit an invading army to occupy a foot of soil East of the Rio Grande." This definition of the boundary included not only the communities of Mexicans north of the Rio Grande, but also the larger part of New Mexico; Texas claimed that region and Polk was thus pledging to drive the Mexican military forces from all that portion of Mexico.2 Polk emphasized the importance he placed upon the instructions to his representatives in Texas by the means that he used to have the dispatches delivered in the shortest possible time. He said in his letter that General Besançon would personally carry the instructions to Donelson, together with other messages. A letter of that same date to General L. A. Besançon, in Washington, appoints him to bear to Commodore Stockton and Mr. Donelson such letters as the Secretary of State should entrust to him. The necessity for great speed was stressed: "You will proceed to Galveston with the utmost despatch. At New Orleans, if you find no steamer about to run to Galveston, you will charter one on as reasonable terms as possible; and draw on this Department for the cost."3 Polk said nothing in his letter of advising or instigating the Texans to military action before annexation, but he had both Buchanan and Bancroft advocate precisely that course of action; it is a fair sample of his methods. But Buchanan, throughout his long career in political office, always sought to assume the least possible personal responsibility for any action, and he began his letter to Donelson with the statement that he wished to present Polk's views on the action that 2 Polk, 15 June 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. A copy of the letter is in the James K. Polk Papers, LC 3 Bancroft, 15 June 1845, to Besançon, both men in Washington, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA.

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should be taken if Mexico should "take possession of the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, or come still further East within the Texan territory." Although this seemed to place the recommendation for action on a contingency footing, that was not in fact the case; Mexico was in possession of some of the country specified; she had never been driven from that possession by the Republic of Texas; and that fact was perfectly understood by the Polk Administration. In those supposedly conditional circumstances, Polk advised an attack upon the Mexicans. Buchanan formulated Polk's views in this way: "There are many reasons why it is preferable that Texas should drive the intruders from her territory until after the convention shall have accepted the terms of our Joint Resolutions. Of her ability and her will to perform this service, no man acquainted with her history can doubt." Buchanan said that the President viewed the Texans as brave citizens who were acclimated to the region and thus could endure the marching through heat and sand. He said that "the expenses of such an expedition must eventually be borne by the United States," and added that the moment the Congress of Texas accepted annexation "Captain Stockton will be ordered, with the fleet now under his command (and other vessels of war will be attached to it), to . . . [transport] the American troops to the positions where they shall, in your opinion and that of these authorities, be most required."4 Secretary Bancroft's letter to Stockton is the most significant of these dispatches of 15 June in providing evidence on Polk's method of conducting his scheme. Bancroft began by acknowledging receipt of Stockton's letter of 4 June. In that letter Stockton had elaborated upon his effort to initiate an attack upon the Mexican border; in response Bancroft said: "The Department is glad to learn that you have pursued your enquiries respecting any impending invasion of Texas, and that you have scrupulously preserved the relations of neutrality and peace with the Government of Mexico." Thus Polk assured Stockton that his efforts to instigate and finance a war were approved by his government. Bancroft instructed Stockton to defend Texas "against aggressions as promptly as you would defend any of the States," as soon as the Texas Congress and the Texas Convention had accepted annexation. 4

Buchanan, 15 June 1845, to Donelson, Instructions to Diplomatic Agents, Texas, State Department Archives, NA. Also in 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc., p. 135.

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Intrigue

Furthermore, if "any foreign power" should invade Texas "with a view to interrupt and prevent or disturb the deliberations of its Conventions" Stockton was to regard such an attempt as an aggression on the United States and "act accordingly, after consulting with Mr. Donaldson [sic]." But "in the interim," Bancroft wrote, "should any foreign power invade Texas, the Texans themselves should be encouraged to repel the invasion." In his rough-draft copy, which Bancroft preserved in his private papers, he wrote first: "the Texans themselves should repel the invasion." He then inserted "be encouraged to," and in the letter sent to Stockton he underlined "encouraged" Thus the Polk Administration, far from being critical of Stockton's efforts to send a Texan army to the Rio Grande, was encouraging Stockton to greater exertions to provoke hostilities : for as Polk knew very well, the citizens of a "foreign power" were occupying a portion of Texas, according to the claims of the government of Texas. In his letter of 22 May, Stockton had said that he would need more provisions and powder, and although Bancroft had agreed to the request in his reply of 2 June, he felt it appropriate to repeat: "The Superintendent at Pensacola has orders to furnish on your requisition, powder and ammunition generally and provisions." In his rough draft Bancroft had written: "The Department has confidence that you will use them [word illegible] & will be careful not to compromise the present neutrality of the United States." This entire sentence was crossed out; no such cautionary comment was included in the letter as it was sent to Stockton. The letter also instructed Stockton to cooperate in the defense of Texas if, after annexation, there should be an invasion by "a foreign power." In that event he should use his vessels to transport troops from the mouth of the Sabine "to such other point as may be deemed most expedient by the General in command." Bancroft closed with the order: "You and Commodore Conner will retain those vessels of your squadron previously destined for the Mediterranean and Brazil. They cannot at this time be spared from the Gulf of Mexico."5 Commodore Conner was still hanging off the coast of Veracruz with his squadron, as he had been doing for several months; the government's purpose here, as in ordering Commodore John D. Sloat to station himself off the Mexican port of Mazatlán in the Pacific, 5

Bancroft, 15 June 1845, to Stockton, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA. The same letter in rough draft, with strike-outs and deletions which are significant, is in the George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

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was to threaten and intimidate the Mexican government. Conner, however, was wholly outside the plot in which President Polk was using Stockton, and when on 1 June he finally received word from Stockton, he was indignant and felt badly used by the Department. To Stockton, Conner wrote on 3 June that he regretted he had not received a copy of "the instructions under which you say you are acting at present," as he then would have been in a better position to dispose of the United States naval forces in the area in the event of an emergency. Conner implied that Stockton was violating the Department's orders; not being privy to the conspiracy, and seeing no signs of any disposition on the part of Mexico to initiate hostilities, he did not suspect the Administration's real intentions. To Stockton he wrote scornfully: "Unless there is some foundation for the rumour you mention, of the Mexicans invading Texas, which I very much doubt, I see little cause to apprehend immediate hostilities."6 On that same date of 3 June, Conner wrote to Bancroft to say that the St. Mary's had brought a communication from Stockton at Galveston, together with three letters from the Department. Conner said Stockton had informed him that "he had gone to that place under private instructions," but, said Conner, "no such instructions as those mentioned have reached me." He concluded his letter to Bancroft, as he had the one to Stockton, with a judgment on the attitude of the Mexican government that made no contribution to Polk's scheme; he said he doubted that there was any foundation for the rumor which Stockton reported from Galveston, that the Mexicans were "about invading Texas." The actions of the Mexican government during the following months proved Conner's judgment to be correct; but it was not what Polk wanted to hear, either then or later.7 Commodore Conner did not let the matter of Stockton's irregular assignment drop at this point. As he reflected on the fact that Stockton had been operating with a squadron for several weeks in the area of command assigned to himself, and that he had not been informed, he felt increasingly ill-used by the Department. On 19 June, before he could have received a reply from his letter of 3 June, he wrote 6

Conner, from the U.SS. Potomac, "Off Vera Cruz," 3 June 1845, to Stockton, Officers Letters of Every Grade and Description, Supplementary file, 18441845, NDA, NA. Conner's salutation, "My dear Commodore," was not his usual opening, and appears to have been deliberately condescending. 7 Conner, off Veracruz, 3 June 1845, to Bancroft, Letters from Commanders of Squadrons, Commodore David Conner, Home Squadron, 1844-1845, NDA, NA.

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again to Secretary Bancroft to complain. This letter and Bancroft's reply are more evidence of the intrigue in which the government in Washington was engaged. The full letter reads as follows: Herewith is enclosed the copy of a letter I had the honour to address to you, while at La Vera Cruz. [Conner had moved his squadron north along the Mexican coast.] The original has probably not yet reached the Department. I would remark that the St. Mary's returned to Galveston on the 5th instant. My official communications from the Department gave me reason to believe that any additional force sent into the Gulf, would have joined me at La Vera Cruz. At that point it would have been in readiness to act in case of emergency. Besides, the appearance of so considerable an armament would no doubt have had a favourable effect in maintaining peaceable relations with Mexico. The Department has so recently expressed such entire confidence in me to command the naval forces required on this station, that I could not be otherwise than surprised, to find a junior officer, though apparently under my orders, acting independently of me; and within the limits of my command. I believe that no arrangement of this kind has hitherto occurred in our service—it must appear unfavourable and injurious to me, and would seem to imply a distrust in my capacity and judgment to direct the operations, already so confidently intrusted to me by the Department8 To that communication containing strong implicit criticism of the Department, Secretary Bancroft replied on 14 July in a letter which was very deficient in candor. Bancroft sought to make it appear that the squadron under Stockton had been dispatched for the purpose of supplementing Conner's force and that he was merely to touch at Galveston en route. No copy of Stockton's instructions was furnished to Conner at the time, Bancroft said, because "when Commo: Stockton was ordered to join you" it was presumed that he would deliver those instructions in person. Nor was it anticipated that his stopping at Galveston would have detained him "more than a few days." In the light of the correspondence through May and June between Bancroft and Stockton, this letter to Conner can only be regarded as deliberately deceptive. Bancroft enclosed a copy of the instructions to Stockton dated 22 April, the official document which, as noted earlier, had been devised to cover Stockton's real purpose in Texas. Conner presumably had received a copy of this letter in the packet delivered to him when the St. Mary's had arrived on 1 June, and it was hardly 8

Conner, "At Sea," 19 June 1845, to Bancroft, ibid.

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calculated to answer his complaint; it had given Stockton permission to remain "at or off Galveston as long as in your judgment may seem necessary" before joining Conner's squadron off Veracruz.9 At the time—in the middle of July—that Bancroft was trying to give an explanation for the Department's irregular operations, Stockton was at Philadelphia arranging for the command of the Princeton to be given another officer, who, finally, was to report with that vessel to Conner.10 Bancroft told Conner that Stockton's return to the United States had not been expected by the Department, and this statement seems to have been true. The re-enforcement of Conner's squadron was the "cover" purpose for Stockton's appearance at Galveston, and the plan called for Stockton to join Conner following his work in Texas unless the success of his scheme provided a justification for another disposition of the ships under his command. But inherent in covert operations by governments is the impossibility of exercising perfect control over the agents to whom the work must be entrusted; and this is especially the case when the agent is a man of substance and position and not a mere creature of the governing power. Quite clearly Stockton had accepted the assignment in April only because of the opportunity for engaging in an important intrigue which involved military, political, and diplomatic operations in the interest of American expansion. He had never had any intention of accepting an assignment as a subordinate officer in the squadron commanded by Commodore Conner. Stockton left Galveston, "disgusted with Texian diplomacy," as he said, after President Jones's proclamation of 4 June destroyed all hope of the success of his plot with General Sherman. In a letter of 12 June to Bancroft, Stockton commented at some length on the situation there at that time and on his efforts since his arrival in Texas. He was in such despondency from the collapse of his scheme that, he said, "I really wish I could avoid writing to you on the subject altogether." But he noted that in view of his earlier letters, "it seems to be necessary that I should make this last communication on the subject, to explain as well as I can my own conduct and that of President Jones." He may well have had in mind his letter of 27 May, in which he had imprudently reported his intention of financing an army of 9 Bancroft, 14 July 1845, to Conner, David Conner Papers, New York Public Library. 10 Stockton, from U.S.S. Princeton at Philadelphia, 14 July 1845, to Bancroft, George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.

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Texans for a march on the Mexican border. In the letter of 12 June he made no mention of that plan, or of his plotting with General Sherman. He now reported his entire effort in Texas as an endeavor to persuade President Jones to take the action necessary to establish a clear title to the border region, and thus be able to transfer it unencumbered to the United States in the act of annexation. Stockton began by saying that the proclamation of President Jones "will no doubt be a surprize to you as it was an utter astonishment to me. I hardly know how to characterise it or what to say about it other than it is a good practical definition of treason." It is not clear whether Stockton thought Jones was guilty of treason against the Republic of Texas, or against the United States; perhaps both. The statement was absurd, of course, and reveals his emotional response to this effective blocking of his carefully planned scheme. Stockton discussed President Jones at some length: Although himself opposed to annexation, the universal sentiment amongst the people in its favor constrained the President to call a meeting of Congress and a convention: although it was believed that he would not hesitate to throw every obstacle in the way of its final consummation that he could, consistently with his own personal safety, still it was supposed by the best informed that he would not have the temerity to do any public acts which would thwart the wishes of the people. Stockton said that the first difficulty Jones intended to create was "in relation to the boundary between Mexico and Texas." He left the whole frontier unprotected and seemed "to invite an invasion of the Territory, between the Nueces and the Rio Grande by the Mexican forces." It was supposed that the President of Texas meant to defend this "dereliction of duty" on the ground of the promise that United States troops should be sent to repel hostile action by Mexico, and also "upon the ground of a want of means on the part of the Texian Government to supply the troops." In this summary report on his work in Texas, Stockton said that after he had ascertained that Mexican forces were gathering on the frontier, and that since he thought United States troops could not possibly be sent into Texas before annexation had taken place, he "believed it to be necessary that something should be done to counteract these projected schemes of the President": To avoid therefore all difficulty which might arise from any pretended disappointment that might be urged in consequence of the absence of a

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military force from the U.S., I sent a message to the President to apprize him that inasmuch as the troops of the U.S. could not be expected to cross the line till after annexation had been agreed upon by the Texian Congress and convention, it was indispensible that the volunteers of Texas should be permitted (the two countries being at war) to march to the frontier and to defend themselves against the threatened hostilities. That this was not only necessary to a proper reasonable defence of the Republic, but equally important to the honor and integrity of the Texian Government, to enable them to give to the U.S. quiet and undisturbed possession & not oblige the Government of the United States to do any act for the purpose of recovering a portion of the Territory occupied by the Mexicans, which might be construed into an aggression upon Mexico & thereby place the U.S. in the position of violating the laws of nations. In thus explaining the reason for a march to the Rio Grande by a Texan military force, Stockton was very probably repeating the rationale and the grounds for the action which had been given him by President Polk when the mission had been tendered to him in April. Polk could be in no doubt of the consequences of such an attack; active war would develop on the frontier, and there would be overwhelming public support in the United States for the launching of an army to the rescue of Texas; the prosecution of the war until his territorial aims should be satisfied would then be a matter which could be very easily managed by the executive. Stockton said that President Jones agreed with his suggestions but required a few days' delay because of pledges which he had given against any immediate move. This statement was assumed to refer to the arrival of Captain Elliot, which it did, for after Elliot had arrived and had had an interview with the President, the proclamation was issued: "by which you will see that I am not only disappointed but that the Republic is bound hand and foot to be delivered over to the Mexican forces (if disposed to take possession) should Congress dare accede to the proposition of annexation." He reported that the people were indignant, but, whatever the result, "I hope and think it cannot seriously interfere with the subject of annexation, however baneful its influence may be on the matter of Territory & boundary." Stockton concluded that he had "done the best and all I could do without offence against our own neutrality to protect the interests of Texas and the U.S." Then he again revealed that his actual orders were not the written ones of 22 April, which had instructed him to ob-

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serve and report and proceed to join Commodore Conner. He said: "Believing that I can be of no service here after the meeting of Congress I intend to return to the U.S. with the resolutions of the Texian Congress." Stockton acted upon this stated intention before the Department had time to disapprove, if indeed Bancroft would have had the temerity to directly cross such an officer; Stockton left Galveston for Washington in the Princeton on 23 June carrying the news of the action of the Congress of Texas, its unanimous acceptance of annexation. Finally, the proposal in this letter to the Department to disperse the ships in his squadron indicates that Stockton's frequent expressions of an expectation of attack by Mexican armed forces did not represent his true appraisal of the situation. He said that he would send the ships to Pensacola to fill up with provisions and that then they would proceed to "their respective stations—the St. Mary's to the Mediterranean & the Porpoise to Norfolk and the Saratoga to Brazil, unless other instructions from the Department shall be received by them at Pensacola." Had Stockton in fact expected an attack by Mexico he hardly would have been thinking of sending two of these war vessels away from the prospective scene of action.11 Bancroft's letter of 15 June which instructed Stockton to continue encouraging the Texans to engage the forces of Mexico and to retain his vessels which had previously been destined for the Mediterranean and Brazil did not reach Stockton prior to his departure. Nor did a letter which Donelson wrote from the capital of Texas on 22 June, warning him against taking any action which could not be construed as purely defensive. Donelson clearly had no expectation that Stockton would be leaving Texas at this time, and he seemed to fear that war was possible. He said that it was "highly important" that Stockton's squadron should "so act as not to alter the general character of defense." Donelson continued: "I have no idea that you would otherwise employ the squadron under your command; but for greater caution, and to have certain evidence in our possession that the action of our forces within the limits of Texas will be strictly defensive, I have thought it right to make these observations."12 11 Stockton, from U.S.S. Princeton off Galveston, 12 June 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA. 12 Donelson, from the Legation of the U.S. at Washington, Texas, 22 June 1845, "to Capt. Stockton commanding a U.S. Squadron near Galveston," Incoming Letters, Texas Legation, No. 2, State Department Archives, NA.

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It is quite apparent that Donelson was apprehensive, and had no confidence that Stockton would refrain from aggressive action. He sent a copy of this letter to Buchanan on the day following: "I send you a letter, which I have this day forwarded to Captain Stockton, for the purpose of cautioning him against any aggressive movement with his squadron, until Mexico makes it necessary." And Donelson added: "It is the policy of those who are on the side of Mexico in the present crisis to throw upon the United States the responsibility of a war for the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande" with the further comment that neither country had held it all—Texas had settlements on the banks of the Nueces and Mexico in the region just north of the Rio Grande. Donelson was doing what he could to guard against war; in a letter to his wife he said that he trusted the threats of Mexico would "end in threat." He wrote that both Texas and the United States were preparing for battle, "but there will be no war, in my judgment, if there is nothing rash attempted."13 Stockton had the satisfaction of being the first to arrive on the East Coast with the news of the action taken by the Texas Congress on annexation. He left Galveston on 23 June and arrived at Annapolis on 3 July. In his report to Bancroft on the day of his arrival, Stockton placed as much emphasis upon the speed of his steamship as on the acceptance of annexation by Texas: "This passage of the Princeton from Galveston is perhaps unequalled in the History of the Atlantic navigation; if it can be equalled any where. It was made in nine days by the use of 93 tons of Coal." He immediately sent Dr. Wright to Washington with a certified copy of the joint resolutions of the Congress of Texas accepting annexation by unanimous vote. He also sent a copy of President Jones's message with the memoranda of the conditions preliminary to a treaty of peace between Texas and Mexico, with the information that the treaty had been rejected unanimously by the Texas Senate. In his letter to Bancroft covering the documents Stockton for the first time in a communication to the government identified his representative in the negotiations with President Jones: "Doctor Wright was sent by me to Washington [Washington-on-theBrazos, then capital of the Republic of Texas] during the recent session of the Congress of Texas, as well as on a previous occasion. You 13 Donelson, 23 June 1845, to Buchanan, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc., p. 74. Donelson, Washington, Texas, 21 June 1845, to his wife Elizabeth, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. He said, "War will be prevented if my diplomacy can prevail."

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will find him an intelligent gentleman, well acquainted with recent occurrences in Texas."14 Dr. Wright arrived in Washington, D.C., that same day of 3 July. The news was taken to President Polk, probably by Bancroft, accompanied by Dr. Wright, and then Bancroft wrote a letter to Stockton in which he said that the President wished to express his "extreme satisfaction" at the "agreeable tidings" and his "gratification at the astonishing despatch with which you have brought" the news. This is the first record in this affair of a direct communication from Polk to Stockton, so careful was the President to work through others and thus avoid creating any evidence of his responsibility for the actions he directed. It was apparent at this time, however, that new plans would have to be made; the annexation crisis had failed to provide the means of forcing a general settlement with Mexico which would result in the acquisition of California. The controversy over the TexasMexico boundary still appeared to be the key which would open the lock. For future operations the President needed full information on the plan which had failed. Bancroft told Stockton that he had "leave to come to this city," for "the President would be pleased to converse with you on the events of your cruize."15 Apparently no record exists of a meeting of President Polk with Stockton, or with Dr. Wright. In all probability none was made. Polk did not begin to keep a diary until late in the following month, but even if he had been keeping a daily record at this time it is not likely that he would have included an account of these discussions; the famous Diary is by no means a complete and candid record of Polk's operations. There is little doubt that Stockton and Dr. Wright did meet with the President. That Stockton was in Washington a few days later is certain, for on 7 July Bancroft wrote a letter to him bearing the notation "now at Washington."16 The following month Stockton was given 14 Stockton, from U.S.S. Princeton off Annapolis, 3 July 1845, to Bancroft, Officers Letters, Supplementary file, 1844-1845, NDA, NA. A copy is in the Stockton Letter Book, 1843-1847, Stockton Papers, PL. Stockton's departure from Texas with the news of the action of the Texas Congress was noted by Memucan Hunt in a letter to Polk, 25 June 1845, James K. Polk Papers, LC, and by General S. A. Besançon to Buchanan, 29 June 1845, James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 15 Bancroft, 3 July 1845, to Stockton, at Annapolis, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA. 16 Bancroft, 7 July 1845, to Stockton, Confidential Letters, No. 1, NDA, NA.

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the command of the U.S.S. Congress, and in October he sailed for the Pacific. After delivering two members of the diplomatic corps to the Sandwich Islands, Stockton sailed to California and there took over the command of United States forces in the War with Mexico in that province. He had clearly not suffered any displeasure from the President for his attempt, while a Commodore of the United States Navy, to finance an army for the purpose of an attack upon Mexico. A cat's-paw pays a price in reputation, however, and Stockton did not escape criticism in Texas, where his efforts were soon well known. A representative judgment was made by the greatest leader which Texas produced in its early period, Sam Houston—military hero, twice President of the Republic, and later senator and governor of the state. He wrote to Donelson in late 1845 to compliment him on the manner in which he had conducted his responsibilities during the summer. In doing so, Houston paid his disrespects to Wickliffe and Stockton: Had you been a two penny fellow, such as Gov. Wickliff [sic], or Commodore Stockton, you would have forfeited the respect of all but such as the clique of this place. . . . Wickliff and Stockton stood forth, in the first ranks of [the] political menagerie! They were the "big beasts," and as for the small ones, and monkeys, there was ready material at all times. Such men, such scoundrels, ought to be repudiated, or abated as nuisances. Nothing but respect for the President Polk has prevented the exposure of their conduct.17 Sam Houston was very perceptive and was an excellent judge of character; Charles Elliot, perhaps the ablest of all the actors in the annexation crisis in Texas in 1845, referred to Houston as "a fellow of infinite resource."18 Houston probably had no direct evidence of President Polk's scheme to manipulate the situation in Texas to serve his large purposes; but he watched Wickliffe and Stockton and drew the logical and correct conclusions as to the prime mover. As he said, respect for the President, for the office rather more than for the man, inhibited those who had information on the intrigue from "exposing" A copy is in the George Bancroft Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, as well as a reply from Stockton two days later, 9 July 1845, then at Norfolk. 17 Houston, Galveston, 9 December 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. 18 Elliot, 11 June 1845, to Bankhead, Ephraim Douglass Adams (ed.), British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas, 1838-1846, p. 503.

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the affair. Also, many of these men, if not ail of them, approved of the objectives of the scheme and thus were not moved to public criticism of the methods the government used. In the same way, United States historians have approved of Polk's eventual success in his objective of acquiring California and have had no great motivation to uncover a plot which Polk had covered as best he could. Stockton's return to Washington in July marked the end of his participation in the President's effort to use the Texas boundary quarrel to detach California from Mexico. But Polk persisted in his course and did in fact trigger the War by sending an army into the Mexican settlements north of the Rio Grande. A brief examination of that boundary controversy, and of Polk's use of it in 1846, is required for an appraisal of the intrigue of the summer of 1845.

CHAPTER

TEN

The Successful Use of the Boundary Question: The Acquisition of California

The Texas and American boundary claims provided the means by which the War with Mexico was initiated, but it should be noted at once that the responsibility for starting the War does not hinge on the question of the validity of those claims. The first indisputable act of war was an act of the United States, when its naval forces blockaded the Rio Grande on 12 April 1846. Even had the land on the left bank of that river been within the limits of the United States, to blockade the river, which in that case would have been the international boundary, was an act of war. That conclusion needs no supporting argument, but it may be of interest to point out that the United States government was on record as stating that any attempt by Mexico to close the river to American traffic would justify hostilities. Instructions given General Zachary Taylor by the Department of War stated that "the Rio Grande, in a state of peace, may be regarded as equally open to navigation of the U.S. & Mexico," and should this "reciprocal right be resisted by Mexico," Taylor was at liberty to force it open by military power.1 The first military encounter took place on 25 April; it pleased Polk to describe that action as the shedding of American blood upon the American soil. Two weeks before that event, it bears repeating, the United States had committed an act of war against Mexico. Nevertheless, the pretension of the Republic of Texas to the Rio Grande boundary, a claim taken up by the government of the United 1

Instructions, undated, sent to General Zachary Taylor by Secretary of War William L. Marcy, for the occupation of the territory up to the left bank of the Rio Grande; copy in the William L. Marcy Papers, LC.

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States after annexation, provided the ground upon which Polk was able to initiate the War in the spring of 1846, as it had provided the rationale for the scheme which Stockton had tried to develop in the summer of 1845. If the claim was valid, or even if it was based upon substantial considerations which would give it a reasonable basis for a judicial inquiry, the design to occupy the region would stand on a different footing than if it were a wholly unwarranted claim. President Polk and Commodore Stockton would still be subject to criticism for the use they had tried to make of the situation; but, in any case, they could be seen as working for a legitimate interest of Texas and of the United States. The substance of the claim to the Rio Grande boundary is therefore pertinent to an evaluation of President Polk's intrigues. Most American historians have avoided formulating a clear statement on the disputed matter. An exception is found in the notable text by Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager; they forthrightly state that when Polk sent the United States Army to the Rio Grande he "attempted to force the solution of a boundary controversy. That is the important point. It also happens that his view of the controversy was wrong."2 Samuel F. Bemis, on the other hand, avoids criticizing the United States' claim by making a statement that is simply nonsensical: "The district of Texas when a part of the Mexican state of Texas and Coahuila had not extended beyond the Nueces River," he writes; "but the Texans after their Revolution had asserted their boundary to be the Rio Grande—without being able to establish real authority there, particularly on the upper reaches of the river in the region of Santa Fe and Taos." 3 Texas, of course, had been unable to establish her authority anywhere along the Rio Grande; she had no more authority, "real" or otherwise, in Santa Fe, than she had in Mexico City. Julius W. Pratt, in his History of United States Foreign Policy, says simply that the "soil in question was claimed with at least equal right by Mexico."4 Thomas A. Bailey writes that it was "soil to which Mexico perhaps had a better technical claim than the United States." 5 2 Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, 4th ed., I, 590. 3 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A. Diplomatic History of the United States, 5th ed., p. 236. 4 Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., p. 130. 5 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 7th ed., p. 257.

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Such formulations by historians reveal a recognition of the impossibility of defending the American claim joined with a disinclination to state clearly that the claim was indefensible. No one has seriously tried to support the claim since George P. Garrison, sixty years ago, argued that although "it has been the commonly accepted view of American historians that Texas did not extend west of the Nueces," the treaty with Santa Anna, made when he was a prisoner following his capture at the battle of San Jacinto, provided for that boundary, and thus "there is much to be said in favor of its validity, and hence of the Texas claim to the Rio Grande subsequent to 1836." 6 Garrison said "American historians have generally accepted the Mexican argument." Let this curious statement stand as the interesting result of the attempt to produce an "American argument" on the issue. No one takes it seriously. One of the more interesting, one of the more influential, and certainly one of the most indefensible of the presentations of American historians on this subject is that by Justin Smith in his War with Mexico, over forty years old but still the most comprehensive work on the War. The study won a Pulitzer Prize, and Smith's peculiar treatment reveals a great deal about the inadequacies and disabilities of American historical work on the origins of the Mexican War. He begins: It was a thorny subject. In 1834 Mexico herself did not feel sure about the line; and according to the chief technical officer in our state department, sole commissioner to negotiate the treaty of peace with Mexico, if an official demarcation had existed, the war between Texas and the mother-country had rubbed it out. The former now claimed the territory as far as the Rio Grande, but she did not establish her title by occupying completely and effectively the region south of the Nueces. This, says Smith, was the situation so far as it concerned the Republic of Texas, but for the United States, there was more to be said: Down to 1819 to our government had insisted that Louisiana extended to the Rio Grande. In other language, since the southern part of Louisiana was called Texas, the official view was that Texas bordered on that stream. Such, then, was in effect the contention of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Pinckney, Livingston and Clay, who represented three administrations in upholding the claim. By the treaty of 1819 [the treaty with Spain which fixed the border on the Sabine, giving up all claim to Texas] we did not withdraw from our position, but merely arranged to 6

George P. Garrison, Westward Extension 1841-1850, pp. 205, 106.

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"cede" whatever possessions we had west of the Sabine for certain valuable considerations. From 1819 to 1845, Texas, considered under its geographical and historical aspects as a district of old Louisiana, appeared to border on the Rio Grande not less truly than before, for no other line became established. Hence it seemed evident from this point of view, that by annexing Texas we revived our old claim, our old official view, and the testimony of all those eminent statesmen. Our government so held. . . . Polk, as the head of our government, could not well repudiate, simply on his own authority, the solemn declarations of Presidents and other high officials, in which through a term of years the nation had acquiesced. The fact that for a considerable time the Texans, asserting the Rio Grande line, had maintained themselves against Mexico perhaps had some confirmatory value; and Polk was further bound, not only by his apparently sincere belief in our old claim, but by the pledge he had given to Texas and the pledge our official representative had given her, expressly to promote the cause of annexation, that he would maintain the claim as President. These were grips of steel. Thus Smith defends the claim in his text; it is unnecessary to dismantle that flimsy argument, it falls of its own weight. The remarkable fact is that Smith himself does not accept his argument. He accepts the claim fully in his narrative, but in the footnote to that argument, and the footnotes are at the back of the volume, he writes: "The aim in this paragraph is to bring out the essential (for the present purpose) points of a matter that it would require a long article to discuss fully, and many things have to be left unsaid. Personally the author regards the American claim and all conclusions based upon it as unsound. His aim is to show how the matter appeared to Polk."7 Bernard DeVoto once characterized this work by Smith—this standard, authoritative work on the Mexican War—as the most "consistently wrongheaded book in our history," and one which "freely cites facts in support of judgments which those facts controvert," and that is a temperate appraisal.8 But in this instance Smith was unable to convince himself by his own argumentation; so he compromised by taking the "American position" in the narrative and running away from it in his note. The difficulty which historians have had in treating the Rio Grande border claim is very easily explained: it is impossible to make Polk's military and diplomatic moves in relation to Mexico appear to have 7 8

Justin Harvey Smith, The War with Mexico, I, 138-139, 449. Bernard DeVoto, The Year of Decision: 1846, p. 510.

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a just and reasonable and "peaceable" character unless some case can be made for the American claim to the Rio Grande border; and it is impossible to make even the shadow of a case. The Republic of Texas was the product of a revolution; since Texas lacked an agreement on the boundary with the former mother-country, the only basis for claim was that established by presence, occupancy, control and extension of government. The boundary then, was not difficult to determine: The Republic of Texas was bounded on the south and southwest essentially by the Nueces River, but had settlements in that river valley on the right bank—including the town of Corpus Christi—and for a short distance beyond; on the west very indefinitely, for much territory was occupied or controlled neither by Texas nor by the Mexicans in New Mexico, but the line of the onehundredth parallel north to the Red River encroached on the settlements of neither. Indeed, a no-man's-land, of approximately two hundred miles in width, lay between Texas and Mexico from the Gulf of Mexico west and north; there were Mexican settlements in the Rio Grande Valley from the source of the river, above Taos, to the Gulf; on the lower river the settlements were spread over the delta north of the mouth of the river; on the upper river, above El Paso, the Rio Grande was the heart of the province of New Mexico, with extensive settlements on the east side.9 The First Congress of Texas, on 19 December 1836, resolved that the boundary ran from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the source of that river and thence due north to the forty-second degree of north latitude and thence along the United States boundary line to the mouth of the Sabine. That resolution cast some light upon the state of mind of the Texans, and revealed something of their ambitions, but it had no more effect upon the matter of establishing an international boundary than if they had declared that Texas was composed of a half dozen other states of Mexico. In fact the Congress of Texas did just that in 1842, by a joint resolution to include portions of the states of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Durango, Sinaloa, and all of Chihuahua, New Mexico, Sonora, and Upper and Lower California—some five hundred million acres of land; the resolution represented the decision of 100,000 Texans to govern some 2,000,000 Mexicans. The President of Texas 9 See Joseph Milton Nance, After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841 (1963), and his Attack and Counter-Attack: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1842 (1964), for a detailed discussion of the borderland in these years. A third projected volume in the series will carry the story to 1845.

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at the time the measure was introduced, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, had supported the bill; in his inaugural address of 10 December 1838 he had referred to the boundaries of Texas as "stretching from the Sabine to the Pacific and away to the South West as far as the obstinacy of the enemy may render it necessary for the sword to make the boundary." But Sam Houston was President when the bill came to the executive desk and he vetoed it as "visionary."10 Texans went on indulging themselves in such fantasies even after they were a state of the United States. On 11 February 1850 a joint resolution of the Legislature asserted that "all that territory which lies east of the Rio Grande, and a line running north from the source of the Rio Grande to the forty-second degree of north latitude and west and south of the line designated in the treaty between the U.S. and the late republic of Texas, of right belongs to the state of Texas."11 That included the Santa Fe region of New Mexico and much else, and Texas had never had the shadow of a claim to any of that territory. So much for the territorial claims of the Texans; it is hardly relevant to an examination of the status of the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande in 1845 and 1846. There is no doubt now, as there was none then, that the established boundary ran through the uninhabited region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. During the Mexican War, in a discussion of the origins of the War in the House of Representatives, Abraham Lincoln showed that Polk's argument on the matter was the "sheerest deception." He ridiculed the President's implication that since the territory of Texas and the United States extended beyond the Nueces it therefore extended to the Rio Grande. He observed that after all "it is possible to cross one river and go beyond it without going all the way to the next, that jurisdiction may be exercised between two rivers without covering all the country between them."12 Lincoln's analysis of the several aspects of the boundary question, and his appraisal of President Polk's responsibility for the initiation of the War in that address in the House, is superior to the treatment in any histories of the Mexican War now available. 10

Nance, After San Jacinto, pp. 541-543. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North Mexican States and Texas, Ü (The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, XVI), 399 n., citing Texas General Laws, Vol. III, Pt. I, pp. 207-208. 12 Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives on the War with Mexico, 12 January 1848, in Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, I, 437. See also, Chapter Five, above. 11

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The United States government had taken a more reasonable and logical view of the appropriate boundary when it had been attempting to purchase Texas from Mexico prior to the Texas Revolution. On 25 August 1829, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren wrote to Joel Poinsett in Mexico: The territory of which the cession is desired by the United States, is all that part of the Province of Texas which lies East of a line beginning at the Gulf of Mexico, in the centre of the desert of Grande Prairie which lies West of the Rio Nueces, and is represented to be nearly two hundred miles in width, and to extend north to the mountains, the proposed line following the course of the centre of that desert or prairie, north, to the mountains; thence, with a central line on the mountains dividing the waters of the Rio Grande del Norte, from those that run eastward to the Gulf, and until it strikes our present boundary at the 42nd degree of North latitude. Van Buren said that this line might be considered too extensive by the Mexican government, since it included the "Spanish" settlements of La Bahía and San Antonio de Béxar. But he said this line would be the most desirable "to us," since it would constitute a natural separation of the resources of the two nations. "It is the centre of a country uninhabitable, on the Gulf; and, on the mountains, so difficult of access, and so poor, as to furnish no inducements for a land intercourse."13 As it happened, the revolution in Texas and subsequent development in that Republic did not affect in any significant way the situation which Van Buren described; the arguments for that line in 1829 were fully applicable in 1845 and 1846. In the few years before the annexation of Texas the governments of both Mexico and Texas, in principle, had accepted the boundary as established by occupancy and control. In the summer of 1841 General Arista issued a proclamation to take alive or dead known enemies of Mexico who might be found operating below the Nueces, which was the historic Spanish-Mexican boundary of the former province of Texas. Some Texans owning ranches fifteen miles south of the Nueces, however, were assured by Arista that they would not be molested.14 In 1842 Ashbel Smith, the Texas minister to France, when he requested French assistance in mediating a peace between Texas and Mexico, said that Texas had nothing to gain from further prosecution 13 14

Van Buren, 25 August 1829, to Poinsett, Anthony Butler Papers, UT. Nance, After San Jacinto, pp. 445-446.

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of war against Mexico, since Texas possessed "her territory entire, and has done so without interruption" since 1836. He said that Mexico had not succeeded in "regaining any portion of the Texian soil or in preventing the full exercise of Sovereignty in all its attributes by the Texian authorities."15 The government of Texas certainly could not have been referring to any territory farther south and west than these settlements on the right bank of the Nueces, and it was thus implicitly accepting the Nueces as the boundary. The political dynamics were aimed in the direction of expansion of demands, however, not of moderation and accommodation to reality; this was true both in Texas and in the United States. Senator Thomas Hart Benton's amendment to the joint resolution for annexation provided for negotiations with Texas on the boundary, as well as on other matters, and Benton proposed the between-the-rivers boundary: the boundary, he proposed, was "to be in the desert prairie west of the Nueces, and along the highlands and mountain heights which divide the waters of the Mississippi from the waters of the Rio del Norte, and to latitude forty two degrees north."16 The Tyler Administration ignored the Benton amendment and Polk never had any intention of moderating the untenable demands of the Texans; on the contrary, it was in the interest of his schemes to encourage excessive territorial claims. Not that the Texans needed encouraging: sentiment in Texas was almost unanimous for the Rio Grande border; what Texas had not been able to establish in a decade of independence, the United States, it was assumed, would now successfully assert. So much public discussion of the vexed question of the boundary between Texas and Mexico had raged that President Polk could not simply publicly promise the government of Texas that he would accept their position and act on the boundary claim as Texas defined it, but he did so unofficially. On 6 April 1845 Samuel Houston wrote to Donelson insisting that the Rio Grande must be the boundary if Texas accepted annexation, and he wrote to Polk on the subject in May. 15 Ashbel Smith, from the Legation of Texas in Paris, 15 August 1842, to François Guizot, George P. Garrison (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas {Annual Report of AHA for 1908, Vol. II, Pt. II), pp. 11871188. Note also that G. W. Terrell, Texas minister to Britain, indicated to Lord Aberdeen that Texas was prepared to negotiate the boundary with Mexico if Mexico would acknowledge her independence (Terrell, 9 May 1845, to Ashbel Smith, ibid., p. 1191). 16 Senator Thomas Hart Benton, "A Bill to Provide for the Annexation of Texas to the United States," as printed in Niks' National Register, LXVII (14 December 1844), 240.

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In response to this pressure from the most influential individual in Texas, Polk replied in a letter of 6 June: "You may have no apprehensions in regard to your boundary. Texas once a part of the Union & we will maintain all your rights of territory & will not suffer them to be sacrificed." Polk said it would be his duty and his pleasure "to guard your interests in that respect with vigilance & care."17 And Anson Jones said in December of 1845 that Polk had pledged to him, through Governor Yell—who had been instructed to give him the message verbally but not to put it in writing—that the government of the United States would establish the Rio Grande boundary.18 Andrew Jackson Donelson, the official representative of the United States in Texas, stood for mediation, moderation, reason, and accommodation on this matter, as he had on all controverted questions during his mission in Texas. He encouraged the Texans in the belief that the United States government would "in good faith maintain the claim," and he said he had reason to believe that the claim could be supported successfully. Such a statement was the minimum required to hold support for annexation. But he constantly emphasized in his communications with his government that the boundary was a disputed question, and he argued strongly against military occupation of the contested territory.19 But President Polk gave orders early in 1846 for American troops to march into the Mexican settlements north of the Rio Grande. When he gave the order he expected the consequence would be war. It was. On 28 June, Donelson wrote to General Taylor, at Fort Jesup in Louisiana, to say that the Texan Congress had unanimously accepted annexation and that the Texan Convention, which would meet on 4 July, would certainly give consent. Taylor should therefore prepare to move his Dragoons to San Antonio and the other troops to Corpus Christi, which, Donelson said, "is the most western point now occupied by Texas." The move should be "distinctly understood" to "be strictly defensive" and aimed at the protection of Texas. Donelson was at pains to labor the point: "The occupation of the country be17 Houston, Montgomery, Texas, 6 April 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC; Polk, Washington City, 6 June 1845, to Houston, Nashville, Tennessee, copy in James K. Polk Papers, LC. 18 Anson Jones, Barrington (near Washington, Texas), 20 December 1845, to Honorable Jesse Grimes, copy in the Anson Jones Papers, UT. 19 As long as he remained in Texas, Donelson argued this position. He returned to Washington in September 1845, and in the spring of 1846 was given the post of U. S. minister to Prussia.

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tween the Nueces and the Rio Grande you are aware is a disputed question. Texas holds Corpus Christi, Mexico holds Santiago near the mouth of the Rio Grande." And, more pointedly still: "I would by no means be understood as advising you to take an offensive attitude in regard to Mexico without further orders from the Government of the U.S." 20 General Taylor replied that he agreed on the line to be occupied: "The line from the mouth of the Nueces river to San Antonio covers the settlements." He said he had instructions from the Secretary of War "not to interfere with any Mexican establishments on this side of the Rio Grande as long as our friendly relations with Mexico continue." 21 Following the final acceptance of annexation by the Texas Convention on 4 July, Donelson wrote a long (fifteen-page) letter to the State Department on the boundary question. He observed that the government of Texas had designated a point on the Rio Grande for occupation by United States troops, but Donelson thought this should not influence the government of the United States; he argued strongly against any movement of troops into the Mexican settlements near the mouth of the Rio Grande. Donelson pointed out that the President of Texas had "but a few weeks before issued a Proclamation suspending hostilities between Texas and Mexico, the practical effect of which was to leave the question precisely as it stood when our Joint Resolution passed, Mexico in possession of one portion of the Territory and Texas of another." One of Donelson's arguments against military occupation of the Mexican area was that it would excite the population to war. Another was that Texas also claimed more than half of the province of New Mexico, a claim which was without any substance; the United States quite clearly could not accept all of the boundary claims of Texas and act on the assumption that there was an obligation to enforce them; the responsibility rested upon the United States, not upon Texas, and the government should not feel under pressure to accept Texan demands.22 Such advice was reasonable and in the interest of the United States, 20 Donelson, 28 June 1845, to Taylor, Incoming Letters, Texas Legation, No. 2, State Department Archives, NA. A draft of this letter is in the Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. 21 Taylor, from "Hd. Qrs. 1st. Mily. Dpt., New Orleans, La.," 20 July 1845, to Donelson, Andrew Jackson Donelson Papers, LC. 22 Donelson, 11 July 1845, to Buchanan, Incoming Letters, Texas Legation, No. 2, State Department Archives, NA.

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but it was not a policy which Polk could accept; it made no contribution to his objective of acquiring California. Advice which was compatible with that objective was given to Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Walker, in August 1845. Thomas Jefferson Green, a relative of Duff Green and a Texan who had been a member of the Texan Congress in 1838, wrote to Walker on 12 August complaining that even the friends of the Administration in Washington were advocating that the President should merely protect the Texan population from attack by Mexico. What would be the consequence of that? Why, said Green, "Mexico will maintain armed possession of the east bank of the Rio Grande and your troops cannot go a stone's throw from the Nuesses [sic]; for Corpus Christi is the only settlement of the Anglo Texans in the disputed ground." Thus Mexico would remain in possession of the Rio Grande valley. His advice was, that your troops advance west to the Rio Grande. Let one division strike that river at Laredo 140 miles south west from San Antonio, making the latter place head quarters. Let another division strike lower down the river. . . . These movements may be strictly defensive as the President please, but they will certainly provoke offence from the Mexicans. The bandit soldiery of Mexico will commence the game by plundering your commisariat [sic], stealing your cavalry horses, and murdering small parties. In such case, even the "National Intelligencer," will say to you "play the game out."23 That was the plan which Polk followed in the ensuing months although he made the action even more provocative, and more certain to result in conflict, by sending the troops directly into Mexican settlements rather than to uninhabited areas across the river from Mexican communities, as Green seemed to recommend. The action succeeded, and it provided support for Polk's war, but Green was mistaken in thinking that even the National Intelligencer, the highly respected, conservative, Whiggish paper in Washington, would thus be coerced into supporting the War. It opposed every move Polk made against Mexico; in August of 1845 it asserted that Polk would be "quite indefensible" if he sent United States troops beyond the Nueces; to move to the Rio Grande would be "offensive war, and not the necessary defence of Texas." The President would be making war on his own authority. In May of 1846, after war had been declared, the Intelligencer pub23

Thomas Jefferson Green, New York, 12 August 1845, to Robert Walker, draft of letter in Thomas Jefferson Green Papers, University of North Carolina Library.

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lished a letter from an American soldier in camp on the left bank of the Rio Grande to make the point that "West of the Nueces the people are all Spaniards" and they were "actuated by a universal feeling of hostility toward the United States."24 Indeed, a very considerable opposition to the President, and a very clear understanding of his design, was apparent, but his control of the armed forces and the boundary claim which provided a surface justification for his throwing the Army into the Mexican settlements kept the control of events in his hands. It does not follow that he wanted war; rather, he was determined to have the fruits of war. Polk would have preferred paying the Mexican government to dismember that nation, and he recognized that this would require giving money to certain Mexican officials so that they would perform that operation on their country. In March of 1846 he thought it would be necessary to give General Paredes, who had overthrown the civilian government, a half million or a million dollars to "pay, feed, and clothe the army, and maintain himself in power," between the time when the General should sign a treaty with the United States and the subsequent ratification of that treaty by the United States Senate. The President talked to Calhoun at this time about the boundary which the United States should secure in such a treaty, and the exchange, as Polk recorded it in his Diary, makes it clear that the President's objectives required a war. Calhoun, he wrote, concurred with me in the great importance of procuring by a Treaty with Mexico such a boundary as would include California. He said he had contemplated, when Secretary of State, as a very desirable boundary a line running from a point on the Gulf of Mexico through the desert to the Northward between the Nueces & the Del Norte to a point about 36° or 37° and thence West to the Pacific so as to include the Bay of San Francisco, and he said he would like to include Monterey also; and that for such a boundary we could afford to pay a large sum, and mentioned ten millions of dollars. This boundary would have excluded the Mexican settlements on the lower Rio Grande and the settled portions of New Mexico; Polk was not prepared to be so considerate of foreign populations. I told him that I must insist on the Del Norte as the line up to the Passo in about latitude 32°, where the Southern line of New Mexico crosses that River, and then if practicable by a line due West to the Pacific; but if that 24

National Intelligencer, 7 August 1845, 18 May 1846.

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could not be obtained then to extend up the Del Norte to its source, including all New Mexico on both sides of it, and from its source to the source of the Colorado of the West and down that River to its mouth in the Bay of California.25 President Polk appears to have had a rather uncertain grip on the geography of the Southwest—a condition he shared with many other politicians in Washington—but he had a firm, not to say convulsive, hold on his objectives: Upper California first, and New Mexico in addition, although the latter was always a secondary goal. His purpose in discussing the territorial objectives with Calhoun, as also with Senators Thomas Hart Benton, William Allen, and Lewis Cass, was to enlist support for an appropriation to be made giving the President a million dollars or more to be used in the negotiation of a treaty. Calhoun opposed it on the ground that in spite of the utmost care to prevent it, the object of the appropriation would become known. Polk gave up the attempt. By this time, in any event, Polk had concluded that neither money nor the threat of force, nor the careful mixture of the two, would suffice; force would be required. He failed, however, to avoid direct and personal responsibility for the forcing of the War, as he had long tried to do. General Taylor was first encouraged to take the responsibility for the march to the Rio Grande. A dispatch from Secretary of War Marcy to Taylor, dated 30 July 1845, supposedly directing him in the disposition of his troops, appears to have been deliberately designed to encourage the General to march to the Rio Grande while at the same time placing the burden of responsibility on him for that move: The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary . . . and up to this you are to extend your position, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof, which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces.... It is expected that you will approach as near the boundary line—the Rio Grande—as prudence will dictate.... The President desires that your position . . . should be near the river Nueces.26 General Zachary Taylor was not very perspicacious, but Polk was 25 Milo Milton Quaife (ed.), The Diary of James K. Polk, entries for 28 March and 30 March 1846, I, 306, 311-312. 26 Quoted by Richard R. Stenberg, "The Failure of Polk's War Intrigue of 1845," Pacific Historical Review, IV (March 1935), 66.

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so well known for devious and underhanded maneuvers that his scapegoats were forewarned. Taylor declined to march south from his Corpus Christi camp without specific orders; these came to him on 3 February 1846, having been issued by Polk on 13 January on the receipt of a dispatch from John Slidell, who was in Mexico trying to purchase territory. The refusal of the Mexican government to receive Slidell and to negotiate with him, convinced Polk that he must take the responsibility for moving the Army to the Rio Grande.27 Taylor began the advance on 8 March and arrived on the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros on the twenty-eighth. The Mexican inhabitants had fled across the river on the approach of the American Army, many of them setting their buildings on fire before leaving. Two weeks after arriving at the river Taylor committed the first act of war (if the invasion of Mexican territory was not), by blockading the mouth of the Rio Grande. Another two weeks, 25 April, and the clash of arms took place on the left bank of the river. The blood was shed which Polk referred to in his war message as "American blood on the American soil." News of the encounter did not reach Washington until 9 May and Polk's patience snapped just before that information arrived. He had been expecting for several weeks to hear that hostilities had begun; he had told his Cabinet on several occasions that the United States should "take redress for the injuries done us into our hands." On 21 April he said that he was thinking of preparing a message for Congress asking for authorization to wage war on Mexico; on 25 April Buchanan "concurred" with the President, and said he should recommend a declaration of war; on 28 April the Cabinet agreed that a message should be sent to Congress, but Polk kept delaying. On 6 May he noted the receipt of dispatches from General Taylor with news up to the fifteenth of April, and he commented in his Diary: "No actual collision had taken place, though the probabilities are that hostilities might take place soon." Finally, at a Cabinet meeting on Saturday, 9 May, Polk brought up "the Mexican question" again: 27 See Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk: A Political Biography, Chapter XVII; Smith, War with Mexico, I, Chapter VII. Polk's Diary is a very useful source of information, but it is by no means a complete and candid record; Polk's decision of 13 January was one of the most important he made in his term, but his Diary entry says nothing of it, reading only; "Despatches from Mexico, which had been received last evening, were read & considered" (Quaife [ed.], Diary of Polk, I, 164).

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All agreed that if the Mexican forces at Matamoras committed any act of hostility on Gen'l. Taylor's forces I should immediately send a message to Congress recommending an immediate declaration of War. I stated to the Cabinet that up to this time, as they knew, we had heard of no open act of aggression by the Mexican army, but that the danger was imminent that such acts would be committed. I said that in my opinion we had ample cause of war, and that it was impossible that we could stand in statu quo, or that I could remain silent much longer; that I thought it was my duty to send a message to Congress very soon & recommend definitive measures.28 Polk then polled the Cabinet on a declaration of war; Buchanan said he would be better satisfied if the Mexican forces should commit any act of hostility, but he supported a demand for war; Bancroft alone dissented. The decision was made for war. They adjourned at 2:00 P.M., and at 6:00 P.M. dispatches arrived from General Taylor with information of the fight of 25 April. The American government's decision for war was not changed by news of that event; but the argumentation, the justification for war was altered. Polk had been prepared to call for a declaration of war against Mexico on the ground that she had defaulted in payments due to citizens of the United States; now he asserted that the United States had been attacked. He spent 10 May, a Sunday, writing the war message—and remarked in his Diary that he "regretted the necessity which had existed to make it necessary for me to spend the Sabbath in the manner I have." 29 The message went to Congress on 11 May. Polk asserted that, after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil.. . . As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country.30 Congress passed the war bill after two days of discussion and Polk signed the measure on 13 May. On that same date the President decided that his Secretary of State was so obtuse as not to understand the point of the War. In a Cabinet meeting Buchanan read the draft 28

Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, I, 343, 354, 363, 380, 384. Ibid., pp. 389-390. 30 James D . Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, IV, 442. 29

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of a dispatch which he had prepared to be sent to the United States ministers at London, Paris, and other foreign capitals, announcing the beginning of the War against Mexico and providing the reasons for it, for their communication to the several governments. Polk recorded in his Diary: "Among other things Mr. Buchanan had stated that our object was not to dismember Mexico or to make conquests, and that the Del Norte was the boundary to which we claimed; or rather than in going to war we did not do so with a view to acquire either California or New Mexico or any other portion of the Mexican territory." It is small wonder that Polk was, as he said, "much astonished at the views" Buchanan expressed. He enlightened his Secretary: I told Mr. Buchanan that I thought such a declaration to Foreign Governments unnecessary and improper; that the causes of the war as set forth in my message to Congress and the accompanying documents were altogether satisfactory. I told him that though we had not gone to war for conquest, yet it was clear that in making peace we would if practicable obtain California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expenses of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries had forced us to wage. When Buchanan said that if the United States did not make it clear to Britain and France that there was no intention on our part to take California they almost certainly would join Mexico in the War, Polk replied that before he would pledge not to acquire California in this war he "would meet the war which either England or France or all the Powers of Christendom might wage, and that I would stand and fight until the last man among us fell in the conflict."31 Polk thus clarified, finally and definitively, his position on a subject that needed no clarification: the acquisition of California. Two years later, with the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States acquired the Mexican territories along the lower Rio Grande, and New Mexico, and California. 31 Quaife (ed.), Diary of Polk, I, 396-399. Buchanan was timid and vacillating; before the War was over he was advocating the acquisition of all the northern states of Mexico and hinting at taking all of Mexico.

CHAPTER

ELEVEN

The Misuse of American

Experience

Edward Gibbon had a keen appreciation for those episodes in history which were, as he said, at once amusing and instructive, and it is a mark of his unusual qualities as a historian that he so frequently discerned ironic incongruities in human affairs. For historians tend to be humorless, and American historians writing about their own nation, singularly so. The historian has the extraordinary advantage of being able to examine mankind from that distance and elevation and detachment which so often reveals, as it is designed to reveal, the gulf between pretension and performance. Far too commonly he makes an unsolicited and unnecessary sacrifice of his position; he remains sober (and shallow) and takes the men of the past at their own evaluation. He is not serious and therefore does not find the past amusing; and missing the irony, he is not instructed and his history is accordingly not instructive. Surely among the most instructively amusing activities in American history are those of the sober little men who were in charge of the government of the United States in the 1840's. Not that their work or their accomplishments were trivial. It was an important event in international as well as in national history when a leading nation, by the calculated, purposeful use of its military power, after a series of failures to achieve its objectives by methods other than war, secured an immense territory in North America, including ten degrees of latitude of enormous commercial and strategic value on the west coast of the continent. It has been said, and well said, that the author of a great work of literature is a great writer.1 It is not true, however, that the accom1 Said by a literary critic against Thomas Babington Macaulay's statement that James Boswell's biography of Samuel Johnson was the greatest biography

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plishment of objectives of great importance in the history of a nation by the executive leader means that he is a great man. It is quite impossible to think of James K. Polk as a great man after reading his letters and his Diary and his addresses, and studying his actions. But it is valuable instruction to study Polk and his associates. These officials were conscious of their engagement in great affairs, and they maintained an extraordinarily pretentious tone in their official communications. We have noted above a striking example. Before the War had lasted a year, Polk's Secretary of the Treasury complained that it was unjust of Mexico to obstinately persist in the contest, and thus to place such a financial burden on the United States as to "compel us to overthrow our own financial policy and arrest this great nation in her high and prosperous career."2 A government which could make that kind of solemn public pronouncement, wholly unaware of the savage self-satire, is certain to provide instruction for those interested in exploring the character and condition of man by an examination of his conduct of his affairs. It therefore may seem surprising that American historians have not demonstrated any remarkable interest in the political and diplomatic and military schemes of President Polk as he worked toward his objective of adding the Mexican province of Alta California to the United States. One notes, by way of contrast, the historical investigations of the schemes of the German Chancellor, Prince von Bismarck, in the expansion of German power, the exposing of such pseudo events as the doctored "Ems dispatch." One of the reasons for the lack of investigation, no doubt, is the tendency—implicit if not explicit in most of the writing on the subject —to view the acquisition of California as at bottom the simple consequence of the westward movement of the American people, and therefore to see a natural force in operation producing a natural result and requiring no further explanation. It need only be said that this kind of history is "as if" history; a natural cycle might have been the cause, but it was not. The "natural force" was not given time to operate in California. A more general inhibiting factor has perhaps been more important. Historians writing about their own nation have been restrained in treatwhich had ever been written, and it had been written by one of the smallest men who ever lived. 2 See Chapter One, above.

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171

ing this period of feverish and aggressive expansionism by emotional and quasi-intellectual influences welling up from mass and mid-culture—nationalism, the Monroe Doctrine syndrome, the Turnerian frontier concept in its most diffuse and generalized form. Closely related to this attitude, finally, is the fact that the national, the internal frame of reference, the provincial historical approach, has tended to emphasize the national consequences of the acquisition and to depreciate both the international significance which it had and the importance of the diplomatic and military methods used. It is as if American historians have as a base assumption that the acquisition of foreign territory by the United States was simply a domestic concern. As one reads these national histories the odd impression grows that the government and people of Mexico were somehow at fault for paying so much attention to the growth of the United States; there was a kind of impertinence in the Mexican concern when Texas, the Southwest, and California became part of the United States. And the attempt of other nations to place some restraints upon the American drive for empire could only be explained by the malevolence which despotic governments naturally felt toward the American Republic. In our histories of these events, as in the official pronouncements of the time, there is an unmistakable tone of irritation at the presumption of European powers. When President Polk discussed the annexation of Texas in his First Annual Message, he remarked indignantly that the addition had been secured "in despite of the diplomatic interference of European monarchies," and went on to observe smugly that Europeans should learn from this "how vain diplomatic arts and intrigues must ever prove upon this continent against that system of self-government which seems natural to our soil, and which will ever resist foreign interference."3 Polk had discovered how vain diplomatic arts and intrigues could be. To secure California he had tried to bribe Mexican officials; he had sought to encourage revolutionary forces in that Mexican province; he had used the threat of force to frighten Mexico into selling the territory; and, as this study has shown in some detail, he had sought to initiate a war by proxy in order to achieve his ends without assuming the responsibility for aggressive war. Here was no fine Italian hand nor astute Prussian practitioner of Realpolitik; here was a determined, clumsy amateur whose every maneuver failed. The last resort was to 3 James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908, IV, 388.

172 Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue begin the War by throwing American troops into Mexican settlements, having naval forces poised to occupy California as soon as the Mexican government should respond. Having resorted to the use of force, having openly cast the die for aggressive war to conquer the territory of Mexico and absorb it into the Union, Polk found that there was one appropriate international consequence. When the War was over, he told the Congress that as a result of that war the United States had a "national character abroad which our country never before enjoyed." We had convinced "all nations that our rights must be respected." Before the War, he told his countrymen, "European and other foreign powers entertained imperfect and erroneous views of our physical strength as a nation and of our ability to prosecute war, and especially a war waged out of our own country."4 This was American hubris. The gods of the Greeks would have struck down such unbridled arrogance; the historians of the Americans have waited long to undeceive them. We could have used a Gibbon. He would have made a note when Commodore Stockton said that in American hands alone was the precious deposit of all that is valuable of what man has achieved in government and freedom. He would have made another when President Polk concluded his Presidency, with that modest statement: "Peace, plenty, and contentment reign throughout our borders, and our beloved country presents a sublime moral spectacle to the world." Gibbon would have found those men amusing, and he would have instructed us. One hundred years after the event, most American students of our War with Mexico remain largely uninstructed. That is a judgment upon American historians. 4

Ibid., IV, 587, 631.

Bibliography I. PRIMARY MATERIALS

A. Manuscripts 1. American Swedish Historical Museum, Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania

Ericsson, John. Papers. Stockton, Robert F. Papers. 2. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Buchanan, James. Papers. 3. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, District of Columbia (cited as LC) American Colonization Society Papers, 1816-1908. 1820-1822: Materials on the colony in Liberia. 1819-1821 and undated file: Letter of Robert F. Stockton from Cape Mesurado and a statement of the Episcopal Church of Maryland. Chittenden, Lucius Eugene. Notes of Debates at the Washington Peace Convention, 16-21 February 1861. Chittenden Papers. Donelson, Andrew Jackson. Papers. Green, Duff. Papers. Marcy, William L. Papers. Polk, James K. Papers. Thompson, Waddy. Papers. Walker, Robert J. Papers. 4. Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston Bancroft, George. Papers. Sargent, John O. Papers. 5. The National Archives, Washington, District of Columbia (cited as N A ) Navy Department Archives (cited as N D A ) . African Squadron Letters: 5 January 1819 to 8 December 1823, 5 vols. Captains' Letters to Department: 17 March 1845 to 30 April 1845. Confidential Letters, No. 1: 12 September 1843 to 28 February 1849. Letters from Commanders of Squadrons, Commodore David Conner, Home Squadron: 1 January 1844 to 29 December 1845.

174

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

Letters to Officers of Ships of War: No. 14: 7 May 1820 to 28 May 1823. No. 34: 9 December 1842 to 16 May 1843. No. 35: 17 May 1843 to 31 October 1843. No. 36: 1 November 1843 to 16 June 1844. No. 37: 17 June 1844 to 10 March 1845. No. 38: 11 March 1845 to 6 December 1845. No. 39: 8 December 1845 to 30 September 1846. Officers Letters of Every Grade and Description, Supplementary file: 1844-1845. Record of Letters to the Agents Appointed under the Act of Congress Passed 3 March 1819, "In Addition to the Acts Prohibiting the Slave Trade." Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. State Department Archives. Incoming Letters, Texas Legation, No. 2: 25 July 1842 to 11 October 1845. Instructions to Diplomatic Agents, Texas: 21 May 1837 to 7 August 1845. 6. The New-York Historical Society, New York City Ericsson, John. Papers. Stockton, Robert F. Papers. 7. New York Public Library, Manuscript Division, New York City Conner, David. Papers. 8. Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton, New Jersey (cited as PL) Bayard, Samuel John. Papers. Stockton, Robert F. Papers. 9. Texas State Library, Archives Division, Austin Butler, Anthony. Papers. Jones, Anson. Papers. 10. University of North Carolina Library, Manuscripts Division, Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill Green, Duff. Papers. Green, Thomas Jefferson. Papers. Thompson, Waddy. Papers. 11. The University of Texas Library, Archives Collection, Austin (cited as UT) Butler, Anthony. Papers.

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Jones, Anson. Papers. Thompson, Waddy. Papers. B. Published Documents, Addresses, Diaries, and Correspondence Adams, Ephraim Douglass (ed.). British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas, 1838-1846. Austin: The Texas State Historical Association, 1918. Address of Hon. Joel Parker on the Life and Character of Commodore Stockton. Reprinted from the Northern Monthly, Newark, New Jersey, March 1868. Pamphlet, PL. Basler, Roy P. (ed.). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 8 vols. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953. Crallé, Richard K. (ed.). The Works of John C. Calhoun. 6 vols. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854-1861. Garrison, George P. (ed.). Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas. Vol. II, Part II, and Vol. II, Part III, of Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1908. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911. Graebner, Norman A. (ed.). Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Hammond, George P. (ed.). The Larkin Papers. 8 vols. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1951-1962. Jameson, J. Franklin (ed.). Correspondence of John C. Calhoun. Vol. II of Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900. Manning, William R. (ed.). Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, Vol. VIII, Mexico, 18311848. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937. Morrow, Josiah (ed.). The Life and Speeches of Thomas Corwin. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson & Co., 1896. Nevins, Allan (ed.). The Diary of John Quincy Adams. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1928. . The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828-1851. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1927. . The Diary of a President, 1845-1849. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929. Quaife, Milo Milton (ed.). The Diary of James K. Polk. 4 vols. Chicago: A. C. McClurg Co., 1910. Richardson, James D. (ed.). A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1908. 11 vols. N.p.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908.

176

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[Stockton, Robert F.]. Appeal of Commodore R. F. Stockton to the People of New Jersey in Relation to the Existing Contracts between the State and the United Delaware and Raritan Canal and Camden and Amboy Railroad Companies. September 24th, 1849. Princeton, New Jersey: Printed by John T. Robinson, 1849. Pamphlet, PL. . Documents and Papers Relating to the Late Camden and Amboy Railroad Accident, at Burlington, N.J.: Containing an Account of the Accident; the Verdict of the Coroner's Jury; the Company's Report; a Review of the Company's Report, by "A Burlingtonian"; and the Correspondence between Commodore R. F. Stockton and C. Van Rensselaer, D.D. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, 1855. Pamphlet, PL. . Interesting Correspondence: Letter of Commodore Stockton on the Slavery Question. New York: S. W. Benedict, Printer, 1850. Pamphlet, PL. . Remarks of Mr. Stockton, of New Jersey, on the Steamboat Bill, Delivered in the Senate of the United States, August 28, 1852. Washington, D.C.: Printed by Jno. T. Towers, 1852. Pamphlet, PL. . Report of the Committee for the New Jersey State Legislature, on the Surrendering of Their Works to the State by the Delaware and Raritan Canal and Camden and Amboy Railroad Company; Answer of Robert F. Stockton in Behalf of the Joint Board to the Committee. Trenton, New Jersey: Printed at the True American Office, 1854. Pamphlet, PL. . Speech of Capt. R. F. Stockton Delivered at the Great Democratic Meeting at New Brunswick, New Jersey, Wednesday, September 24, 1844. James Rees, Reporter. New York: Printed by Jared W. Bell, 1844. Pamphlet, PL. . Speech of Commodore Robert F. Stockton on the Past, Present and Future of the American Party Delivered in the City of Camden, New Jersey, August 4th, 1859. Camden, New Jersey: J. H. Jones, Printers, 1859. Pamphlet, PL. . Speeches, Reports, and Letters in Relation to the Delaware and Raritan Canal and the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company. Two volumes of pamphlets bound together: Vol. I, 1817-1840, 26 items; Vol. II, 1831-1871, 11 items. PL. United States Congress. The Congressional Globe. 29th Congress, 1st Session. 30th Congress, 1st Session. . House. Executive Documents. 2nd Session, 29th Congress, House Document No. 19, Serial No. 499 (cited as Ex. Doc.). . Senate. Executive Documents. 1st Session, 29th Congress, Senate Document No. 2, Serial No. 480 (cited as Ex. Doc.).

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National Intelligencer. Washington, D.C. 8 February 1845; 21 May 1845; 9 June 1845; 14 June 1845; 16 June 1845; 18 June 1845; 7 August 1845; 18 May 1846. Niles' National Register. Baltimore, Maryland. 14 December 1844; 21 December 1844; 4 January 1845; 8 February 1845; 7 June 1845; 14 March 1846; 22 January 1848. B. Articles Bundy, McGeorge. "The Uses of Responsibility: A Reply to Archibald MacLeish," Saturday Review, XLVIII (3 July 1965), 13-14. Cotterill, Robert S. "Charles A. Wickliffe," Dictionary of American Biography, XX, Dumas Malone (ed.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Durand, William F. "John Ericsson," Dictionary of American Biography, VI, Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. Green, Fletcher M. "Duff Green," Dictionary of American Biography, VII, Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931. Rippy, J. Fred. "Waddy Thompson," Dictionary of American Biography, XVIII, Dumas Malone (ed.). New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Schlesinger, Arthur M. "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," New York Times Magazine, CXI (29 July 1962), 12-13, 40-41, 43. . "The United States Presidents," Life, 25 (1 November 1948), 65-73. Sioussat, St. George Leakin. "James Buchanan," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928. . "John Caldwell Calhoun," The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Samuel Flagg Bemis (ed.), V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928. Stenberg, Richard R. "The Failure of Polk's War Intrigue of 1845," Pacific Historical Review, IV (March 1935), 39-69. . "Jackson, Anthony Butler and Texas," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XIII (December 1932), 264-286. . "President Polk and the Annexation of Texas," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XIV (March 1934), 336-356.

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Anderson, R. Earle. Liberia: America's African Friend. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952. Anderson, Robert. An Artillery Officer in the Mexican War, 1846-1847. New York: G. P. Putnam's Co., 1911. Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. 7th ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Bancroft, Hubert Howe. History of Mexico, V, 1824-1861. Vol. XIII of The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, 39 vols. San Francisco: The History Company, 1887. . History of the North Mexican States and Texas, II, 1801-1889. Vol. XVI of The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, 39 vols. San Francisco: The History Company, 1889. . Retrospection. San Francisco: The Bancroft Company, 1912. [Bayard, Samuel John]. A Sketch of the Life of Commodore Robert F. Stockton. With an Appendix, comprising His Correspondence with the Navy Department Respecting his Conquest of California; and Extracts from the Defence of Col. J. C. Fremont, in relation to the same subject; together with his Speeches in the Senate of the United States and his Political Letters. New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856. Beard, Charles A., and Mary R. Beard. The Rise of American Civilization. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1930. Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. 5th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965. Benton, Thomas Hart. Thirty Years' View. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854-1856. Bill, Alfred Hoyt. A House Called Morven: Its Role in American History, 1701-1954. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954. . Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 1846-1848. New York: History Book Club, 1947. Burgess, John W. The Middle Period: 1817-1858. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897. Callahan, James Morton. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Macmillan Co., 1932. Channing, Edward. History of the United States. 6 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1905-1920. DeVoto, Bernard. The Year of Decision: 1846. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1943. Friend, Llerena. Sam Houston: The Great Designer. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954. Gambrell, Herbert Pickens. Anson Jones: The Last President of Texas. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948.

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Garrison, George P. Texas: A Contest in Civilizations. New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1903. . Westward Extension: 1841-1850. Vol. 17 of The American Nation: A History, Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), 27 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906. Graebner, Norman A. Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1955. Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York: C. L. Webster & Co., 1885-1886. Henry, Robert Selph. The Story of the Mexican War. New York: BobbsMerrill Co., 1950. Hoist, Hermann Eduard von. The Constitutional and Political History of the United States. Trans. from the German by Alfred Bishop Mason. 7 vols. Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1876-1892. Hunter, Louis C. Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949. Jones, Anson. Memoranda and Official Correspondence Relating to the Republic of Texas, Its History and Annexation. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1859. Kohl, Clayton Charles. Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War. New York University Series of Graduate School Studies, No. 2. New York: New York University Press, 1914. Leopold, Richard W. The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. McCormac, Eugene Irving. James K. Polk: A Political Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922. McMaster, John Bach. A History of the People of the United States. 8 vols. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1910. McNeill, William H. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Manning, William R. Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916. Merk, Frederick. Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963. . The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism: 1843-1849. With the collaboration of Lois Bannister Merk. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Morison, Samuel Eliot, and Henry Steele Commager. The Growth of the American Republic. 4th ed. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Nance, Joseph Milton. After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963.

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. Attack and Counter-Attack: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1842. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964. Pratt, Julius W. A History of United States Foreign Policy. 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965. Reeves, Jesse S. American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1907. Rhodes, James Ford. A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850. 7 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1893-1906. Rives, George Lockhart. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848. 2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913. Rochefoucauld, François, Duc de La. Maxims. Translated with an Introduction by L. W. Tancock. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Paths to the Present. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Age of Jackson. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1948. Schouler, James. History of the United States. 6 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1880-1899. Schurz, Carl. Henry Clay. 2 vols. New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1887. Scott, Winfield. Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, Written by Himself. 2 vols. New York: Sheldon & Company, 1864. Sellers, Charles. James K. Polk, Continentalist: 1843-1846. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Singletary, Otis A. The Mexican War. Chicago History of American Civilization series, Daniel J. Boorstin (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. Smith, Justin Harvey. The Annexation of Texas. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1941 (1st ed., 1911). . The War with Mexico. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1919. Staudenraus, P. J. The African Colonization Movement: 1816-1865. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Translated by Henry Reeve, revised by Francis Bowen, edited by Phillips Bradley. 2 vols. New York: Vintage Books, 1959. Van Alstyne, Richard W. American Diplomacy in Action. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1944. . The Rising American Empire. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960. Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study in Nationalist Expansionism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935. Wiltse, Charles M. John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951.

Index Aberdeen, Earl of: on Oregon, 86; and British foreign policy, 132; and the annexation of Texas, 135 accident: train, on Stockton's railroad, 54-55; gun explosion, on the U.S.S. Princeton, 74-75 Adams, John Quincy: and diplomacy with Mexico, 16, 17; suggests naval inquiry into Stockton's conduct, 57; rated by historians, 79, 81; appraises Polk, 84; mentioned, 65, 155 Allen, Ebenezer: on Duff Green's schemes, 44 Allen, William: and Polk, 165 Alligator, U.S. Schooner: and suppression of slave trade, 56 America: balance of power in, concern to France, 3-4 American: foreign policy, McGeorge Bundy on, 8; innocence, myth of, 9; government habit of intrigue, 20; spirit, in expansion, 27, 41; hubris, in War with Mexico, 172 American Party: supported by Stockton, 65, 68-70 Americans: in Texas, 19; in California, 29 Anderson, Robert: criticizes Polk, 88 Anglophobia: of Stockton, 56 Anglo-Saxon race: Stockton on, 67 Annapolis, Maryland: U.S.S. Princeton arrives at, 149 annexation of Texas: cause of delay in, 25; Calhoun negotiates treaty of, 33; in election of 1844, 34; Stockton on, 66; Texans in favor of, 105-107. SEE ALSO Texas

Arab, H.M.S.: returned Santa Anna to Mexico, 87

Arista, General Mariano: 118, 128, 159 Arkansas: and repudiation of bonds, 24; Stockton land in, 55 n. 12 arrogance: of American leadership in era of Manifest Destiny, 172 Atocha, General Alenxander J.: dupes Polk about return of Santa Anna to Mexico, 87 Austin, Stephen F.: 18 Ayres, Dr. Eli: agent for Colonization Society, 59-60 Bailey, Thomas A.: 115, 154 Bancroft, George: in election of 1844, 35 n. 36; on Polk's four great measures, 36 and n. 39; orders Stockton to Texas, 47-48, 77; and Santa Anna's return to Mexico, 87; authorizes munitions for Stockton, 119, 142; on military action in Texas, 141, 142; deceptive reply of, to Conner, 144-155; against war based upon claims, 167; mentioned, 85, 112, 118, 121, 122, 123, 150 Bancroft, Hubert Howe: 96-97 Bankhead, Charles: 131-132, 138 Bayard, Samuel John: 51 n. 4, 60, 74 Bemis, Samuel F.: viii, 115 and n. 17, 154 Benton, Thomas Hart: on Oregon, 86; on Polk, 95, 165; on the TexasMexican boundary, 160 Besançon, General L. A.: 140 Birney, James G.: 34 Bismarck, Otto Edward Leopold, Prince von: 170 blockade: of Rio Grande, 153, 166 Bocanegra, José María: 27 bands: repudiation of: 24

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

boundary: between Texas and Mexico, 22, 146-147, 153-165 Brazil: 76 Brazos de Santiago: 121, 124 bribery: attempts by Anthony Butler, of Mexican officials, 21-23; by Duff Green, 46; and Polk, 171 Britain: and California, 28, 29-30; on slavery and Texas, 35; on slavery in U.S., 63; Stockton on future war with, 66; efforts and influence of in Texas, 106, 123, 127, 130, 132, 137; apprehensive of U.S. aggression on Mexico, 132-133, 137; mentioned,

chauvinism: 65 Chihuahua, Mexico: 120, 157 China trade: 91 Christian nation: Stockton on, 69. SEE ALSO God; religion

claims: of U.S. against Mexico, 24-25 Clarendon, Earl of: 134-135 Clay, Henry: and Mexican diplomacy, 17; on Texas annexation in 1844 election, 33, 34; on Colonization Society and Free Negroes, 59; on Polk's war bill, 89; on Texas-Mexican boundary, 155 Cleveland, Grover: 79 3, 24. SEE ALSO England Coahuila, Mexico: 157 Bryant, Sturgis, and Company: 30 Colonization Society (American Society for Colonizing Free People of Buchanan, James: on peaceful U.S. actions in Texas, 139; protects himself Color: 58, 59, 60 against Polk, 140; urges Texan mili- Colorado of the West: 165 tary action, 141; concurs with Polk Columbia River: 74, 86 on war, 166; states that War not for Commager, Henry S., and Samuel E. aggression, 167-168; mentioned, 16, Morison: 154 35, 83, 84, 105, 107, 113, 126, 136 Congress, U.S.S.: 111, 151 Congress, United States: enacts war Bundy, McGeorge: 8-9 bill, 167. SEE ALSO United States Burgess, John W.: 98 Senate; United States House of Butler, Anthony: 19-23 Representatives Calhoun, John C : opposed to War Conner, Commodore David: relationwith Mexico, 31 ; on U.S. expansion, ship of, to Polk-Stockton intrigue, Texas, and Mexico, 32, 33; on slav76, 130, 143, 144, 145; and Santa ery and Texas, 35 and n. 37; on Anna's return to Mexico, 87; off California, 164, 165; on boundary Veracruz with squadron, 142; on between Texas and Mexico, 164; report of Mexican invasion of mentioned, 14, 15, 28, 39, 46, 83 Texas, 143; mentioned, 77, 110, 148 California: acquisition of, as Polk's conquest: war of, 90 objective, 11, 36, 37, 91, 152, 165, Corpus Christi, Texas: and Stockton, 168; Webster and Tyler on, 26-28; 121, 124; and boundary question, and Texas, 29, 157; Duff Green on, 157, 162, 163; General Zachary 39; and Stockton, 55 and n.12, 138, Taylor at, 166 151; Calhoun on, 164; Buchanan Corwin, Thomas: 84, 92-93 on, 168; acquisition of, by U.S. as natural process, 170; mentioned, 30, Daingerfield, William Henry: 133 31, 120, 150 Dallas, George: 83 Camden and Amboy Railroad Com- Débats, Journal des: 4, 134 pany: 54-55 Delaware and Raritan Canal and Cass, Lewis: 83, 165 Camden and Amboy Railroad ComCatholicism: American Party on, 65 pany: 50-55 Channing, Edward: 95 Del Norte Company: 43-46

Index Democratic Party: 69 Democratic Review: 84 De Soto, Hernando: 5 DeVoto, Bernard: 156 diplomacy, U.S.: character of, with Mexico, 17-18 diseases: importance of, in European conquests, 5 Donelson, Andrew Jackson: to Texas, 35; and Duff Green's scheme, 4 3 46; and Polk-Stockton intrigue, 4 5 46, 121, 124, 139, 148; confident of annexation of Texas, 105, 107, 109; Archibald Yell on, 109; on Sam Houston, 109; on military action, 120, 125-126, 149 and n. 13, 162; on the Texas-Mexican boundary, 120-121, 126, 149, 161-162; Jackson on, 123; mentioned, 113, 116, 138, 161 n. 19 Douglas, Stephen A.: 86, 93 Durango, Mexico: 120, 157 Elizabethtown, New Jersey: 67 Elliot, Charles: Duff Green on, 42; and Anson Jones, 113, 127; on diplomacy with Mexico, 127-128, 136; confirms Jones' charges against Polk and Stockton, 131-132; letter of, to Bankhead on Stockton's scheme, 138; on Sam Houston, 151; mentioned, 130, 137, 147 Ellis, Powhatan: 23, 26 n. 21 El Paso, Texas: 157 empire, American: Stockton envisions in Africa, 60-62; in North America, 66 Ems dispatch: 170 England: efforts of, in Texas, 109 n. 9; Polk willing to fight, for California, 168. SEE ALSO Britain

Episcopal Church: Stockton joins, 69 Ericsson, John: 70, 72-73 Erie Canal: 51 Europe: between Russia and the U.S., 4 European powers: Polk on respect of, for U.S. military power, 41, 172

183 expansion of U.S.: Polk on, 10, 82; in Ohio Valley, 34; Stockton on, 66 foreigners: Stockton on, 68 Forsyth, John: 23 Fort Jesup, Louisiana: 161 Fort Stockton, Texas: 49 France: bombardment of, of Veracruz, 24; efforts of, against U.S. in Texas, 109 n. 9, 123, 130, 132; Polk willing to fight, for California, 168; mentioned, 3 French investors: lost investment in U.S. states, 24 Galveston, Texas: Duff Green appointed consul to, 39; and Stockton, 48, 118, 125, 131, 139; and Charles Elliot, 127 and n. 18, 138; mentioned, 43, 140, 144 Gardiner, David: 75 and n. 44 Garrison, George P.: on Polk and the War with Mexico, 98-99; on the boundary between Mexico and Texas, 155 geography of the West: Polk confused about, 165 Gibbon, Edward: 169, 172 Gilmer, Thomas W.: 75 God: and sanctioning of the U.S., 10; Stockton on, 63, 67, 69; Polk on, regarding Oregon, 85, 167. SEE ALSO religion government regulation: Stockton opposes, 53-55 Grant, Ulysses S.: 95 Great Britain, SEE Britain; England "Great" Presidents: historians' poll indicating, 79-81 Green, Duff: background of, 38-39; on buying Texas and California, 39; advocates acquisition of Santo Domingo, 39 n. 1; scheme of, to acquire California and northern Mexico, 39, 43-46, 116; advocates war on Mexico and seizing Veracruz, 40, 41; on annexation of Texas, 42; on Charles Elliot, 42; Polk appoints as com-

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Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

missioner to Mexico, 46; mentioned, 163 Green, Thomas Jefferson: 163 Grundy, Felix: 82 Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of: 94, 168 Guerriére, U.S. Frigate: 56 Guizot, François: 3-4, 135 Hannegan, Edward Allen: 86 Harrison, William Henry: 25 Havana, Cuba: 87 Hays, Captain John C : 127 historians: national bias of, 5; on U.S. wars, 7, 115; on slavery and Texas, 18; celebrating the past, 47; rating Presidents, 79-81; on Polk and acquisition of California, 98-104, 152, 170; on boundary between Mexico and Texas, 154-157; lack of detachment of, 169; provincial approach to American history of, 171-172 history: value of examining failures in, 47; American, instructively amusing events of, 169; international, and U.S., 171 Hoist, Hermann von: 96 Hone, Philip: 73 n. 42 honesty: Polk's questioned, 89 Houston, Sam: on Stockton and Wickliffe, vii, 151; Archibald and Yell on, 109; Jackson on, 123; Elliot on, 151; and Texas boundaries, 158, 160 Houston, Texas: 128 Hull, Commodore Isaac: 70 Hungarian Revolution of 1848: 12 Hunt, Memucan: 105-107 Indians, American: not given franchise by U.S., 17; and Duff Green scheme, 44; Stockton on, 63 innocence, American myth of: 9 intrigue: Duc de La Rochefoucauld on habit of, 20 invasion: by U.S. army of Mexican settlements, 91, 166

invention: of propeller-driven steamship by Ericsson, 70 Jackson, Andrew: on acquiring Texas to prevent trouble with Mexico, 19; intrigues of with Anthony Butler to acquire Texas, 19-23; on the "Spanish" character, 22; on the boundaries of Texas, 22 and n. 16; on Texas, Britain, and California, 28-29; and Duff Green, 38; and Polk, 82, 83; on Houston and Donelson, 123; mentioned, 59, 65, 79 Japanese civilization: less militaristic than Western, 6 Jefferson, Thomas: 79, 81, 155 Jeune Eugénie: French ship captured by Stockton, 57 Johnson, Cave: 85 Johnson, Colonel Richard M.: 82 Jones, Anson: charges of, against Polk and Stockton, vii, 110-113, 114; Duff Green threatens, 44; asserts he was architect of annexation, 105; Stockton's comments on, 110, 118, 119, 129, 146; issues proclamation of peace with Mexico, 113, 130, 136; Justin Smith on, 116-117; and Charles Elliot, 132, 138; frustrates Polk-Stockton scheme, 137; on Polk and the Texas boundary with Mexico, 161; mentioned, 100, 135 Jones, John Coffin: 30 n. 29 Journal des Débats: 4, 134 Kearny, Stephen Watts: character of, compared with Polk's, 89 King, William R.: 32, 136 Know-Nothing Party: 65 Kossuth, Louis: 12 La Bahía, Texas: 159 Lamar, Mirabeau Buonaparte: 116, 157-158 Larkin, Thomas Oliver: 29-30 Lee, Robert E.: 88-89 Lewis, William Berkeley: 27-28 Liberia: 58

Index Liberty Party: 34 Lincoln, Abraham: rated by historians, 79; criticizes Polk's war, 91-92; on the boundary of Texas and Mexico, 158 Livingston, Edward: 155 London Standard: comments on U.S. oppression of Mexico, 132-133 London Times: comments on Polk's election, 133 Louisiana Purchase: and boundary question, 155 Love, Colonel Hugh: 124 Mackenzie, Alexander Slidell: 87 Madison, James: 155 Maine: boundary dispute, 132 Marcy, William L.: in Polk's Cabinet, 84; orders General Taylor to occupy disputed territory, 165 Mason, John Y.: 75, 84 Masonic order: and Joel Poinsett's mission in Mexico, 19 mass culture: influence of, on writing U.S. history, 171 Matamoros, Mexico: 111-112, 118, 166 Maxey, Virgil: 75 Mazatlán, Mexico: 142-143 McCormac, Eugene I.: 100, 103 McKinney, Colonel Thomas F.: 124 McNeill, William H.: 5-6 Merk, Frederick: ix Mesurado, Cape: site of Colonization Society project, 59 Mexicans: and U.S. racism, 17-18; Polk on failure of to appreciate U.S. forbearance, 90; flee from U.S. army north of the Rio Grande, 92 Mexico: Europeans concerned at U.S. aggression against, 3; persistence of in the War thought unjust to U.S., 11, 170; U.S. effort to secure Texas from, 14; armed forces of, 18, 124, 167; Congress of, could not sell Texas, 19; refuses to acknowledge independence of Texas, 24; fails to make payments to U.S., 24, 25;

185 Webster advises to let U.S. take California, 27; Duff Green plan to punish and dismember, 40, 44; fate of, in U.S. hands, says Stockton, 67; Polk on causes and purpose of the war with, 90, 168; Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with, 94, 168; attack on urged, 111-113; Polk on attempt of, to prevent Texas annexation, 123; British diplomacy with and advice to, 135, 136-137 and n. 11, 138; mentioned, 16, 33, 120, 171 Mexico City: 19, 39-40, 88 Michelet, Jules: on the persistence of the past, v militarism: and Western culture, 6 Monitor, U.S.S.: 70 monopoly: by Stockton of transportation in New Jersey, 50 Monroe, James: 155 Monroe Doctrine: 171 Monrovia, Liberia: site selected by Stockton, 59 Monterrey, Mexico: 128 Morison, Samuel E. and Henry S. Commager: 154 Moslem civilization: less militaristic than Western, 6 Murphy, General W. S.: 111 Nashville, Tennessee: 82 National Intelligencer: on Duff Green scheme, 46; on military action in Texas, 124; on Stockton and Wickliffe, 124, 125; on Charles Elliot, Mexico, and Texas, 127 n. 18; opposes Polk's moves toward war, 163 nationalism: and Stockton, 65-70; in American historical writing, 171 Native Americans: racist political party, 68 Naval Board of Inquiry: clears Stockton in gun explosion, 75 "Near-Great" Presidents: historians' poll indicating, 79 Negroes: removal of from U.S., 61-64 Neuville, Baron de: and captured French slave ships, 57

186

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

New Jersey: 49, 50, 51 New Mexico: U.S. acquisition of, 29, 39, 91, 165; Texas claims area of, 140, 157, 162; Buchanan asserts not to be spoils of war, 168 New York Herald: published letters on slavery by Webster and Stockton, 62 New Orleans, Louisiana: 109 New Orleans Bulletin: published Robert P. Walker letter on Texas, 29 New Orleans Jeffersonian: advocates U.S. advance to Rio Grande, 120 New Orleans Republican: on Stockton's plans, 123-124 Niks' Register: on Stockton's plans, 123-124 North American continent: designed for Americans, says Stockton, 67 North Carolina: 82 Northwest Coast: U.S. interest in, 27 Nueces River: and Texas boundary, 22 n. 16, 112, 124, 127, 141, 149, 154, 157, 159, 160, 162, 165 Ohio, U.S. Battleship: Stockton in command of, 70 Oregon: Americans in California expect U.S. to acquire, 29-30; and Polk, 36, 85-86; in 1844 campaign, 65; and British diplomacy, 132 Pakenham, Richard: and Texas, slavery, and Calhoun, 38; on Oregon, 85-86; on U.S. intentions in Texas, 135 Paredes y Arrillaga, General Mariano: and proposed bribery of Mexican officials, 164 patriotism: used to defend Polk on Mexican War, 93 Peace Convention of 1861: 64 "Peacemaker" (gun on U.S.S. Princeton) : explosion of, 73-75 Peel, Sir Robert: and foreign policy, 132; helps frustrate Polk-Stockton intrigue, 137 Pensacola, Florida: naval station at,

furnished supplies for Stockton, 130, 142, 148 Peter, "King" of Bassa group in Africa: 59-60 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 51, 76 Pillow, Gideon J.: 88 Pinckney, Thomas: 155 Pizarro, Francisco: 5 Poinsett, Joel R.: attempt of, to purchase Texas, 16-17, 19; and Anthony Butler, 23; and Martin Van Buren on Texas boundary, 159 politics: and annexation of Texas, 42; and Stockton, in New Jersey, 51-53 Polk, James K.: resorts to war to secure objectives, vii, 24, 31, 114, 138, 147, 161, 163, 165, 166-167, 168, 171; and justification of War with Mexico, 5, 11, 41, 89-91, 164; religiosity of, 9-11, 167; charges Mexicans with being unjust to U.S., 11; appraisals of, 11-12, 78, 79-81, 94-104, 133, 134, 158, 170; on annexation of Texas, 33, 34, 36, 107108, 123, 150; objectives of, as President, 36 and n. 39; methods of, 37, 119, 128, 140, 150, 164, 166 n. 27, 170, 171; background of, 8294; on Oregon, 85-86; and British and French interference, 86, 123, 137, 171; relations of, with Taylor, Scott, and Pillow, 87-89; and the Mexican-Texas boundary, 140, 156157, 161, 164-165; mentioned, 16, 40, 47, 109, 113, 124, 125, 132, 139, 151, 154 "Polk the Mendacious": epithet coined by Alexander H. Stephens, 89 Porpoise, U.S. Brig: 76, 108, 148 Pratt, Julius W.: 115, 154 President, U.S. Frigate: 56 presidential rating poll: 79-81 and n.7 Princeton, New Jersey: 55, 58 Princeton, U.S.S.: construction of, 7073; explosion of gun on, 74-75; to Philadelphia, 76; to Galveston, 108 and n. 6; 145, 148

Index

187

racism: in U.S., 17-18; expressed by Stockton, 63, 67, 68 Raymond, Charles H.: 107 Red River: 157 Reeves, Jesse S.: 99 Rejón, Manuel C : 14-15 religion: and U.S. claim of divine sanction, 9-11; Stockton on, 60, 64, 67,

69;

Polk on,

85. SEE ALSO

Christian nation; God Republican Party: 69 revisionism: on Polk in U.S. history, 11-12 revolution: to acquire California, 171 Rhodes, James Ford: 97 righteousness: U.S. conviction of, 10 Rio Grande: and Mexican-Texas boundary, 22 n. 16, 154-164; Stockton plan to go to, 118-122, 124-125; blockade of, 153, 166; mentioned, 19, 110, 112, 141, 142, 147, 149, 152, 165 Rives, George Lockhart: 99-100 Robert F. Stockton (steamboat): 71 Robinson, Alfred: 30-31 Rochefoucauld, Duc de La: 20 Rodgers, Commodore John: 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 79 Roosevelt, Theodore: 79 Rush, Richard: 49, 59 Russia: 3, 12, 54 Sabine River: 142, 155, 157 St. Mary's, U.S. Sloop of War: 76, 108 and n. 6,143, 144,148 Saligny, Comte de: 136 San Antonio, Texas: 19, 159, 161 San Francisco, California: 27-28, 91 San Joaquin County, California: county seat of, named for Stockton, 49 San Jose, California: 55 Santa Anna, Antonio López de: overthrown in revolution, 16; Wilson Shannon on, 33; Duff Green on, 40; Polk helps return to Mexico, 87; on Mexico-Texas boundary, 155 Santa Fe, New Mexico: 154

Santiago, Mexico: 125, 162 Saratoga, U.S. Sloop: 76, 148 Schlesinger, Arthur Meir: 79-81 Schouler, James: 97-98 Scott, General Winfield: 88-89 Sellers, Charles: ix settlements in Texas: in relation to boundary question, 162, 163-164 Sevier, Ambrose: 17 and n. 7 Shannon, Wilson: 14-16, 33 Sherbro Island: 59 Sherman, Major General Sidney: urges Anson Jones to attack Mexico, 111-113; Justin Smith's account, 116; consults with Stockton, 118119; asserts power to act independently, 124, 127; reports to Wickliffe, 126-127; mentioned, 131, 137 Sierra Leone: 59 Sinaloa, Mexico: 157 Singletary, Otis A.: 115 slavery: in Texas and Mexico, 18; Calhoun on, 35 and n. 37; Stockton on, 56-58, 62-64; Polk on, 82 Slidell, John: 166 Sloat, Commodore John D.: 142-143 Smith, Ashbel: on British attitude toward Texas, 133, 137; on French attitude toward Texas, 135; on the boundary question, 159-160; mentioned, 44, 106 Smith, Justin Harvey: defends Polk in initiation of war, 100-103, 116-117; bias of, in his history, 101-102, 117; on Mexico-Texas boundary, 155156 Sonora, Mexico: 157 Spot Resolutions: by Abraham Lincoln, on origin of War, 91 steamboats: safety measures on, 5 3 54; John Ericsson, Stockton, and, 70-73 Stenberg, Richard R. : vii Stephens, Alexander H.: vii, 89 Stockton, Julia: 49 Stockton, Richard (grandfather of Robert F.) : signer of Declaration of Independence, 49

188

Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue

Stockton, Richard (father of Robert F.): the "Old Duke", 50 Stockton, Robert Field : and intrigue in Texas, vii, 47-48, 110, 112-113, 116-122, 129-131, 138-140, 145, 146, 148, passim; criticized by Sam Houston, vii, 151; general character of, 9, 48, 56; nationalist, 12-13, 49, 54, 61-62, 69, 172; navy career of, 49, 50, 55-58, 72-73, 75, 138, 149, 151; business career and holdings of, 50-55 and n. 12; in politics, 51, 6470; on slavery, the slave trade, the Colonization Society, and Liberia, 56-58, 59-60 and n. 22, 61, 62-64; on annexation of Texas, 65-66, 109110, 121, 147; mentioned, 28, 108, 125, 137, 141, 150, 154 Stockton, California: 49 Tamaulipas, Mexico: 157 Taos, New Mexico: 154, 157 tariff: Polk's policy on, 36, 82 Taylor, John, of Caroline: 59 Taylor, General Zachary: and Polk, 88, 165-166; marches to Rio Grande and blockades the river, 153, 166; on the area of settlement by Texans, 162 Tennessee: Polk's political career in, 82 Terrell, G. W.: 134 Texas: U.S. attempts to purchase from Mexico, 14-23 and passim; boundary of with Mexico, 22 and n. 16, 146-147, 153-165; the "Texas game," 23-24, 39; annexation of by U.S., 25, 29, 33-34, 35 and n. 37, 37, 42, 65, 66, 105-107, 135-136, 149, 162; and Duff Green scheme, 38-46; British and Dutch attitude toward, 133-134; Mexican offer of independence of, 136-137 and n. 11 Thompson, Smith: 57-58 Thompson, Waddy: 26-28, 26 n. 21 Tocqueville, Alexis de: 3 treason: Polk charges against critics of the War, 90

Treasury, Independent: political objective of Polk, 36 Trist, Nicholas P.: 93-94 Turner, Frederick Jackson: 171 Tyler, John: on annexation of Texas, 25, 34; aggressive policy of toward Mexico, 31 n. 30; and Stockton, 71; on Mexican-Texas boundary, 160; mentioned, 14, 65, 108 United States: European opposition to aggression of, 3, 4, 137; wars of, 7-8; and rhetoric of peace, 8; myth of innocence of, 9-11; Polk on character of, 10-11; Stockton on, 12, 66-67; diplomacy of, with Mexico, 14-15, 17-18; as racist society, 17-18; claims against Mexico, cause of war, 24-25, 167; claim that the War increased European respect for, 40, 41; begins war with Mexico, 153; expansion, 169. SEE ALSO historians

United States Bank: and Stockton, 55 n. 12; Polk opposed to, 82 United States House of Representatives: votes that Polk began the War unconstitutionally, vii, 89 United States Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations, on Mexicans, 17; rejects treaty of annexation of Texas, 33 United States Telegraph: 38 Upper California: SEE California Upshur, Abel: 28, 75 Van Alstyne, Richard W.: viii, 122 n. 10 Van Buren, Martin: on Texas and boundary with Mexico, 19, 82-83; and Stockton, 65; and Democratic Convention of 1844, 82-83 Van Rensselaer, Rev. C : 55 n. 11 Veracruz, Mexico: 41, 88, 142 Virginia: 55 and n. 12 Virginia Colonization Society: 61 Walker, Robert P. : says Mexico is un-

Index just to U.S., 11; on acquisition of Texas and Oregon, 29-30; selected by Polk and criticized by Jackson, 84 and n. 15; finances annexation campaign in Texas, 106; letter to, from Thomas J. Green on initiating war, 163 war: in Western culture and in U.S. history, 5-8; effect of, upon writing of history, 7; and U.S. advice to Mexico, 27; Calhoun deprecates, 31; Shannon says Mexico will not declare, 33; to be manufactured by Anson Jones for the U.S., 112-113 War with Mexico: in effecting respect for the U.S., 41, 172; Grant on, 95; initiated by boundary quarrel, 154; Polk alters justification for, 167; histories of, uninstructive, 172 Washington, Bushrod: 58-59 Washington, George: 79, 86 Washington, D. C , 139, 150 Washington-on-the-Brazos, Texas: 149 Webster, Daniel: desires California, 26-27; diplomacy of, with Mexico, 27, 31; friend of Richard (the "Old Duke") Stockton, 50; and Robert F. Stockton, 62

189 westward movement: U.S. acquisition of California seen as natural product of, 170 Wickliffe, Charles A.: agent for Polk in Texas, 108-109; in Anson Jones' account, 111; in Justin Smith's account, 116-117; works with Stockton, 118, 124-125; reports to Polk on failure of the intrigue, 126-128, 139-140; criticized by Sam Houston, 151 Williams, Samuel: 124 Wilson, Woodrow: 13 Wiltse, Charles M.: 35 n. 37 Witherspoon, Rev. John: 49 n. 1 Wright, Dr. John H. (secretary to Stockton) : conveys Stockton's scheme to Anson Jones, 111-113; delivers Texas annexation resolution to Bancroft, 149-150; mentioned, 124, 126, 131 Wright, Silas: 83 Yell, Archibald: agent for Polk in Texas, 106, 161; confident that Texas will accept annexation offer, 109, 123; mentioned, 113, 116