Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath 0815625510, 9780815625513

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Abbreviations
Preface
Note on Transliteration
1. The Age of Autocracy and Concessions
2. Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession
3. Iran Defies Russia and Britain
4. The General’s Mission
5. The Oil Nationalization Act
6. Forces at Work in Iran, Britain, and the United States
7. Iran Takes Over the Company
8. The Harriman and Stokes Missions
9. The Oil Cartel’s Stranglehold
10. British Plans for the Occupation of Abadan
11. The Oil Dispute Taken to the United Nations
12. Mossadeq’s Discussions in the United States
13. Britain Manipulates the World Bank
14. Judgment at the World Court
15. British Attempts to Overthrow Mossadeq
16. Qavam’s Prime Ministership and the Communist Threat
17. Churchill’s Games with Truman
18. Iran’s Oil-less Economy
19. Eden’s Games with Eisenhower
20. The Coup
21. An Oil Consortium Takes Over
22. The Coup’s Aftermath
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

OH, Power, and Principle

Contemporary Issues in the Middle East

M ostafa Elm

Oil, Power, and Principle Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath

Syracuse University Press

Copyright © 1992 by Syracuse University Press Syracuse, New York 13244-5160 All Rights Reserved First Edition 1992 92.

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi

239 . 48 - 1984 .(^ 0 )"

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Elm, Mostafa. Oil, power, and principle : Iran’s oil nationalization and its aftermath / Mostafa Elm. — ist ed. p. cm. — (Contemporary issues in the Middle East) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-8156-2551-0 (alk. paper) i. Petroleum industry and trade—Government ownership— Iran. 2. Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1951-1954. 3 . Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 1880—1967. 4. Iran—Politics and government— 1941—1979. 1. Title. 11. Series. H D 9576 . 162E46 1992 338 . 2 ' 7282 'o 955 — d c 20

91-12390

Manufactured in the United States of America

. . . could thou and I with Fate conspire To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire, Would not we shatter it to bits—and then Re-mould it nearer to the Heart’s Desire! OMAR KHAYYAM

To the memory of Mossadeq With the hope that Iran may yet weather the storms

O let me see our land retain her soul Her pride, her freedom, and not freedom’s shade J O H N KEATS

Contents

Tables Abbreviations Preface Note on Translitération

1. The Age of Autocracy and Concessions

ix xi xiii xvii

i

2. Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

23

3. Iran Defies Russia and Britain

44

4. The General’s Mission

65

5. The Oil Nationalization Act

81

6. Forces at Work in Iran, Britain, and the United States

94

7. Iran Takes Over the Company

107

8. The Harriman and Stokes Missions

124

9. The Oil Cartel’s Stranglehold

144

10. British Plans for the Occupation of Abadan

155

11. The Oil Dispute Taken to the United Nations

169

12. Mossadeq’s Discussions in the United States

183

13. Britain Manipulates the World Bank

194

14. Judgment at the World Court

208

15. British Attempts to Overthrow Mossadeq

215

16. Qavam’s Prime Ministership and the Communist Threat

234

• • •

vm

Contents

17. Churchill’s Games with Truman

248

18. Iran’s Oil-less Economy

267

19. Eden’s Games with Eisenhower

276

20. The Coup

292

21. An Oil Consortium Takes Over

310

22. The Coup’s Aftermath

332

Notes Bibliography Index

347 387 397

Tables

1. Iran’s Oil Production, APOC Profits, and Royalty Payments to Iran, 1912—31 2. Iran’s Oil Production, AIOC Net Profits, British Taxes, and Payments to Iran, 1932—50 3. Middle East Oil Holdings in 1950 4. Balance of Payments of Iran, 1949—54

18 38 109 273

Abbreviations

AGIP AIOC APOC ARAMCO BBC BP CAB CBS CFP CIA DEFE DMPA FEC FO FR-US GHQ HMG IEA IJC ILO IPC JCS MELF MI6 NATO NIOC NSC

Italian National Oil Company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Anglo-Persian Oil Company Arabian American Oil Company British Broadcasting Corporation British Petroleum Company Cabinet Columbia Broadcasting System Compagnie Française des Pétroles Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Staffs Committee (U.S.) Defense Materials Production Department First Exploitation Company Foreign Office Foreign Relations of the United States General Headquarters His or Her Majesty’s Government International Energy Agency International Court of Justice (World Court) International Labor Organization Iraq Petroleum Company Joint Chiefs of Staff Middle East Land Forces British Foreign Intelligence North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Iranian Oil Company National Security Council xi

Xll

OPEC PAD PREM RG Rls.

Abbreviations Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Petroleum Administration for Defense Prime Minister’s Office Records Record Group Rials

Preface

his book is an attempt to trace and analyze the remarkable events leading to the nationalization of British oil interests in Iran in 1951, the ensuing Anglo-American-sponsored coup that crushed the country’s nationalist government in 1953 and ended in reinstat­ ing the Shah, and the formation of an American-dominated oil consortium in 1954. It then demonstrates that the United States’ backing of an autocratic regime in Iran planted the seeds of the 1979 revolution in that country and contributed to further in­ stability in the Persian Gulf leading to the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the Gulf war. The 1951—54 episode contains all the elements of a powerful drama: kidnapping, political intrigues and assassinations, psycho­ logical warfare, riots by hired mobs, and covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency and the British Foreign Intelligence. Dominating the whole scene is the extraordinary figure of the na­ tionalist leader Mohammad Mossadeq. The study is based on extensive study of documents recently declassified in Great Britain and the United States as well as Iranian private and public documents. Furthermore, it draws on interviews with Iranian, British, and American officials directly involved in the events of 1951—54. The book could serve as an instructive case study of the rise of nationalism and the struggle for national independence and sov­ ereignty over natural resources by third world countries during the twilight era of British imperial power. It shows how the AngloPersian Oil Company—a small British oil concern—grew into a giant international corporation by the name of British Petroleum mainly by reaping exorbitant profits from Iranian oil at the expense of the producer country. It demonstrates how this development

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XIV

Preface

brought about a conflict between Iranian nationalists led by Mossadeq and a British oil company that had become a pillar of Britain’s economic and strategic power in the Middle East. It reveals how this dispute brought about a much wider conflict between the global interests of Britain, the United States, and international oil com­ panies, a conflict aggravated further by fears that it might involve Britain and the United States in a catastrophic war with the Soviet Union. In the midst of these conflicts, Britain succeeded in luring Presi­ dent Dwight D. Eisenhower to mount a CIA coup in Iran that crushed the national democratic government, reinstated the auto­ cratic Shah, and brought Iran’s oil resources under Anglo-American control. But these moves gave rise to a chain of disruptive events. The coup ultimately contributed to the 1979 revolt in Iran against the United States and the Shah. This in turn led to further instability in the Middle East. The study reveals how warped perceptions of national security and the pursuit of short-term gains gave rise to cataclysmic events that were detrimental to the West. Few instances in recent history have so intensely involved such a host of leading world figures as Iran’s nationalization of oil. Among the endless list of players in this drama, in which Mossadeq played the leading role, are Truman and Acheson, Attlee and Morrison, Eisenhower and Dulles, Churchill and Eden, while Stalin and Molo­ tov are mysteriously standing in the wings. There are also the leading figures of many other countries, the heads of major interna­ tional oil companies, and the chiefs of the intelligence services of the United States and Great Britain. And finally there is the active involvement of such major organizations as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the World Bank. The story of oil nationalization in Iran cannot be separated from Iran’s fight for constitutional rule, aimed at curbing the power of autocratic kings who, among other arbitrary practices, granted con­ cessions to foreigners for personal gain. To shed some light on the underlying causes of the Iranian dissatisfaction with local rulers and foreign concessions and to put the issues in proper perspective, the first three chapters deal with the internal and external forces at work in Iran in the perplexing period between 1870 and 1949 and the circumstances under which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company oper-

Preface

xv

ated in Iran. The remaining chapters deal with the events of 1950— 54 and throw light on the repercussions of the Anglo-Americansponsored coup in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. My work was greatly facilitated by the fact that I lived in Iran, witnessing for decades the rise of nationalism and later the trau­ matic events of the oil nationalization years, the angry demonstra­ tions in Tehran and the riots in Abadan, the heated arguments in the Parliament and the press. However, a true picture of events could not have been drawn without access to documents concerning se­ cret discussions in Tehran, London, Washington, and other world capitals and without knowing the views and recollections of those closely involved. In the course of my research I have had helpful advice from the staffs of many libraries and archives in the United States and Great Britain. My special thanks are due to the staff of the British Public Record Office, the U.S. National Archives, the Library of the Lon­ don School of Oriental Studies, and the Princeton University Li­ brary. I also wish to express my thanks to those who generously gave of their time, in the course of long interviews, to throw additional light on the contents of documents recently declassified. In fact, many were themselves the authors of the documents. Among some sev­ enty officials interviewed are former Iranian Cabinet ministers and members of Parliament, U.S. under secretaries of state, British and American ambassadors, and oil corporation presidents and consul­ tants, as well as intelligence and army officers. The names of most appear in the relevant notes, though some preferred to remain anonymous. My sincere thanks are also due to Albert Hourani, Emeritus Fellow, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, who, throughout the writing of this book, provided me with valuable suggestions and comments. Since the subject of the book involves various international bodies, each chapter dealing with a specific organization was critically read by one or more persons familiar with that organization. My thanks are due to Cyrus Ghani, a legal expert, for his comments on chap­ ters dealing with the International Court of Justice and the U.N. Security Council and for his assistance in identifying some of the obscure personalities involved in this drama. I am grateful also to

XVI

Preface

Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, a former governor of the Central Bank of Iran, and to Reza Moghadam, a former official of the Interna­ tional Monetary Fund, for their comments on chapters dealing with the World Bank and financial issues. However, I alone am responsi­ ble for the views expressed in this book. I am also deeply grateful to my wife, Mahin, for her support, encouragement, and patience over the nine years that I was engaged in this work. Finally I would like to thank my son, Nader, who acted as my secretary and word-processing expert, organized a multitude of photocopies of documents, notes, and papers, and typed the manuscript of this book with great enthusiasm. The typing of the text, he says, gave him an opportunity to find out what happened to his country before his birth and why his homeland is in the state it is now.

N ote on Transliteration

he system of transliteration adopted in this study is based on the way Persian or Arabic names are pronounced and not on the way such names appear in English-language writings on Iran, a point on which there is little uniformity. As an example, in British sources the name Mossadeq is generally rendered as Musaddiq but sometimes as Mossadak, Mossadiq, Mosadeq, or Mossaddegh. Ex­ cept in quotations, I have used the form Mossadeq, which happens to be the way the name generally appears in American writings and documents. In the rare case in which a form is uniformly used in Englishlanguage sources, such as Islam, I have used the accepted spelling even if it does not correspond to the Persian pronunciation. Readers will no doubt find certain inconsistencies, but such is the problem of transliterating names from one alphabet to another.

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XVII

Oil, Power, and Principle

SYRIA

1

The Age of Autocracy and Concessions

“ I f His Majesty were to affix his glorious and august name to this I Concession, he would, with one stroke of the pen, bestow upon this land and nation more glorious benefit and nobler existence than all the kings of Persia have done over the past thousands of years.” This is the final paragraph of a two-page report submitted in 1872 to Nasser ed-Din Shah, the autocratic ruler of Iran, by his sycophant ministers, giving their views on a concession demanded by Baron Julius de Reuter.1The concession concerned the exclusive right to the exploitation of practically every agricultural, industrial, and mineral resource in the country. Reuter, a successful operator of a commercial news service in his home country, Germany, had moved his business to London, where he became a British subject in 1857 and later bought the title of Baron. The Iranian minister in London, Moin ol-Molk, attracted by the title and wealth of this new British citizen, interested him in making investments in Iran and told him of the great potential for quick gains if only he could come to terms with Iran’s rulers.2 The days of great kings of Persia who ruled a vast empire had gone by. The country was ruled by ineffectual monarchs caught between the two great powers of the time, Britain and Russia. Britain, which had conquered next-door India, wanted Iran, the gateway to that colony, to be under her own sway. Russia had earlier taken the initiative by “steadily swallowing the Persian arti­ choke leaf by leaf,” as Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, put it.3 Britain had scarcely tried to halt Russian advances, but now felt the need to protect her vital interests. “Were it not for our possessing India,” Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary, observed, “we should trouble ourselves but little about Persia.”4 Thus it was neces­ sary for Britain to make sure that Russia did not swallow the i

2

Oil, Power, and Principle

remaining leaves of the Iranian artichoke, which separated Russia from India and the Persian Gulf. The Shah was indifferent to the condition of his subjects, most of whom lived in poverty. His main concern was to look for funds to support his lavish life-style. “The extravagance of the Shah was only matched by his desperation for money.”5 Thus he did not need any encouragement to accept Reuter’s proposal. He was badly in need of cash for a pleasure trip to Europe. Persian kings before him had never set foot outside the country except for foreign conquests. The last was Nader Shah, who invaded India in 1737, defeating a large Moghul army. The concession signed by Nasser ed-Din Shah on July 25,1872, gave Reuter the “exclusive and definitive right” for seventy years to construct railways and irrigation works in Iran as well as a monop­ oly on the exploitation of forests and uncultivated land throughout the country, the right to exploit most mineral resources (including oil), a first option on a national bank, and options on the con­ struction of roads, public works, factories, etc. According to Reuter, what enabled him to obtain such an unprecedented concession was the payment of £180,000 to the Shah and his courtiers.6 The British Foreign Office considered the terms of the concession to be extravagant. Even a colonial figure like Curzon described its terms as “the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished in his­ tory.”7 But Nasser ed-Din Shah, the self-styled “King of Kings” and “Shadow of God,” felt that he had struck a good bargain for personal gain. Having found some cash, the Shah left for a five-month trip to Europe in May 1873. At the courts of Tsar Alexander II and Queen Victoria, the Shah found that his hosts were not at all pleased with Reuter’s concession. The Russians suspected that the concession was a British plot to upset the balance of power between the two countries in Iran. The British, in their turn, were unhappy that Reuter had made an enormous deal with Iran without consulting them. Moreover, they had serious doubts about his loyalty to the British Empire and feared that he might renounce his acquired British nationality while auctioning off his concession to the Rus­ sians.8

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

3

On his return to Iran the Shah found that the nationalists and such disparate groups as the imperial harem, the princes, and the high mullahs all wanted the concession canceled. The monarch, being under great pressure, sent word to Reuter that since he had not taken any steps toward performing any part of his undertaking, the concession was considered null and void.9 Reuter realized that he had lost his concession because he had failed to obtain the support of the British government. With this lesson learned, he patiently won the confidence of Sir Henry Drum­ mond Wolff, the British minister in Tehran, who revived two major portions of the lost concession. In January 1889 the Shah granted him a new concession for the formation of a state bank for a period of sixty years with the exclusive right of note issue in Iran while ex­ empting him “from every kind of tax or duty.” At the same time the bank was given the right to exploit all mineral resources throughout the country with the exception of gold, silver, and precious stones. Iran’s share in mining was to be 16 percent of the net profits. The concession stipulated that if production did not start within ten years, his mining rights would be canceled.10 Baron de Reuter’s son, George, who conducted the negotiations, presented a “gift” of £20,000 to the Shah for having signed the concession and gave other “gifts” to the prime minister and others.11 Toward the end of 1889 the Imperial Bank of Persia was established under the Royal Charter. Soon after signing the bank concession, Nasser ed-Din Shah departed for Europe while Iran was in turmoil. On his return to Iran, the Shah’s thirst for cash and the British readiness to exploit his need prompted the beginning of a strong national movement against corrupt rulers who welcomed foreign exploitation for their own ends. In March 1890, a British entrepreneur by the name of G. F. Talbot, with the support of the British legation in Tehran, bought from the Shah a concession for the full control over the production, internal sale, and export of Iran’s tobacco for a period of fifty years. In return he undertook to pay the Shah or his govern­ ment a quarter of the annual net profits and an annual rent of £i5,ooo.12 The Talbot concession, which threatened the interests of various groups dealing with tobacco, triggered an uprising throughout the country, fueled further by a nationalist figure living abroad named

4

Oil, Power, and Principle

Seyyed Jamal ed-Din Assad-Abadi, known as Afghani, who was a powerful Iranian reformist and pan-Islamist with a large following. Afghani, who had been exiled from Iran for opposing the Shah’s autocratic rule, told Edward Browne, the well-known British orien­ talist, that “no reform was to be hoped for until six or seven heads were cut off,” adding that the first two must be those of Nasser edDin Shah and his prime minister, both of whom in fact were assassi­ nated later.13 Afghani, well aware of the great influence of Moslem religious leaders, wrote to Ayatollah Hassan Shirazi in Samarra to protest the Shah’s concessions to the British and the Russians. His letter calls the Shah “corrupt” and condemns him for having chosen as his prime minister Amin ol-Sultan, of whom he says: He hath sold to the foes of our Faith the greater parts of the Persian lands and the profits accruing therefrom, to wit the mines. . . . Also the tobacco . . . with the chief centres of cultivation.. . . Lastly there is the Bank [concession granted to Reuter]: and what shall cause thee to understand what is the Bank? It means the complete handing over of the reins of the government to the enemy of Islam [and] the enslaving of the people to that enemy. He finally warned the high ecclesiastic that if he did not rise to help his people, “the realms of Islam will soon be under the control of foreigners.” 14 The Ayatollah instantly issued a fatwa declaring the use of to­ bacco unlawful until the concession was canceled. The fatwa was fully obeyed in Iran, where there were violent uprisings against the Shah. The Shah yielded and canceled the concession, but was faced with a demand for compensation totaling £500,000. When the government could not come up with this amount, Britain’s Foreign Office instructed the British Imperial Bank to supply it in the form of a loan to the Iranian government. The bank obliged by providing a loan at an interest of 6 percent repayable in forty annual install­ ments while securing as collateral the customs receipts of Iran’s Persian Gulf ports. These losses were imposed on the Iranian peo­ ple, who were entirely ignored when the actual concession was granted. To quote Edward Browne: “And all this for the enrichment

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

5

of a few greedy English speculators and a handful of traitorous Persian courtiers and ministers.” 15 It is ironic that whereas the British Foreign Office talked from time to time of the need for reform in Iran, the British cultivated corruption by bribing the Shah and his courtiers to milk the country. By arranging a loan that saddled Iran with forty years of repay­ ment, the Foreign Office, as Geoffrey Jones put it, assisted the British Imperial Bank in establishing itself “as a permanent fixture in Persia” while using it “as a political instrument by the British gov­ ernment, a role which was to grow over the following three de­ cades.” 16 Thus Afghani, the Iranian nationalist figure, was not wrong in his forecast on what the British bank meant. In the early 1890s opposition to Nasser ed-Din Shah’s autocratic rule, spurred by nationalists, grew in momentum until he was shot dead on May 8, 1896, three days before the fiftieth anniversary of his reign. The assassin, a follower of Afghani, castigated the “cor­ rupt” Shah and the “scoundrels” around him, who, he said, had trampled on the rights of the people and had given concessions to foreigners. But the assassin was wrong in thinking that killing the Shah would bring justice and reform. On June 8, 1896, the son of the deceased Shah, Mozaffar ed-Din Qajar, was crowned and con­ tinued to rule more or less in his father’s fashion.17 These events did not shake the position of the Imperial Bank except for a short-lived drop in its shares. The bank sold its mining rights for £150,000 to a newly formed concern called the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation; George de Reuter was a member of the board. The corporation failed in its explorations for oil, and the concession, which called for profitable operation within ten years, came to an end in 1899.18 Meanwhile a French scientific team headed by Jaques de Morgan came to Iran, and the team’s geologists were led by chance to oil seepages at Chia Sorkh in the northwest, close to the Turkish fron­ tier. In 189z, after a detailed investigation of the area, they pub­ lished a favorable report on its probable oil resources in the French mining publication Annales des Mines. This was followed in later years by further reports in which de Morgan’s team maintained that geological formations confirmed the existence of oil. This led an Armenian named Antoine Ketabji Khan, the director of Iran’s Cus-

6

Oil , Power, and Principle

toms Administration, to secure the monopoly of oil rights through­ out the country. He then went to Paris where he contacted Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the former British minister in Tehran, and asked for his assistance in finding British financiers who might be inter­ ested in venturing on Persian oil. Wolff later introduced him to a William Knox D’Arcy, the son of an Irish solicitor who had gained wealth in gold mining in Australia.19 Edward Cotte, formerly Reuter’s agent, was sent as Ketabji’s representative to London, where he explained to D’Arcy’s men the findings of the French geologists. D’Arcy consulted Dr. Boverton Redwood, a leading petroleum expert, who proposed sending a well-known geologist named H. T. Burls to Iran for further surveys. Burls went to Iran, and on his return presented a favorable report on the possible existence of oil in Kermanshah and Khuzistan. His report put the wheels in motion. In January 1901, after a dozen meetings in Paris and London between D’Arcy, Ketabji Khan, Wolff, and Cotte, the four agreed on the percentage share each would obtain if, as a result of their efforts, an oil concession was secured. No one foresaw the exceptional financial gains to be made from the future concession, and those other than D’Arcy were later to regret having agreed to small percentages.20 D’Arcy did not take any step until he was assured of his govern­ ment’s diplomatic support, after which he appointed Alfred Mar­ riott, a cousin of his financial adviser, as his representative in Teh­ ran. The Foreign Office obliged by providing him with a letter of introduction to Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British minister in Tehran, who had been instructed to extend his assistance. The real job of paving the way in the Iranian capital, however, was undertaken by Ketabji Khan, who “secured in a very thorough manner the support of all the Shah’s principal ministers and courtiers, not even forget­ ting the personal servant who brings His Majesty his pipe and morning coffee.”21 Ketabji Khan met in April 1901 with Ali Asghar Amin ol-Sultan, the prime minister, “the Great Lord-Protector and Confidant of the Sovereign,” and discussed with him the draft agreement that had been drawn up in London. Hardinge, too, paid a number of visits to the prime minister urging him to support the draft agreement, which called for the formation of a company with exclusive rights for exploration and exploitation of oil throughout the country in

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

7

return for paying Iran 1o percent of annual net profits and 5 percent export taxes. After significant bribes were promised and partly paid by Ketabji Khan to the prime minister and other Iranian officials, the draft was passed on to Mozaffar ed-Din Shah. But on May 20, 1901, the Shah exclaimed that he would not sign it unless there were a down payment of £40,000 and another £40,000 on the formation of the company. Moreover, he indicated that Iran’s share of the net profits should be 16 percent rather than the 10 percent stated in the draft. Having delivered these views, he went off hunting.22 Meanwhile, the prime minister claimed to be concerned about possible Russian objections to such a concession. Ketabji Khan solved the problem by promising him a “gift” of another £5,000. This and other bribes were approved by D’Arcy, who told Marriott “Don’t scruple if you can propose anything for facilitating affairs on my part.”23 There was one more hurdle to overcome, and that was the Shah’s demand for 16 percent of the net profits. But Marriott had no difficulty in juggling the figures in the draft concession; he simply accepted the Shah’s demand and omitted the 5 percent export duty that was originally proposed to be paid to Iran. On May z 8 ,1901, the Shah signed the concessionary agreement on behalf of his government and Marriott signed on behalf of D’Arcy. Under the agreement, D’Arcy was granted, for a period of sixty years, an exclusive right to explore, exploit, and refine oil throughout the whole country with the exception of five northern provinces close to the Russian border. The concessionaire was al­ lowed to use free of charge all uncultivated land belonging to the state that might be necessary to his work. Imports of equipment and exports of oil and oil products were to be free of all taxes. The concessionaire was entitled to found one or several companies after giving prior notice to the Iranian government concerning their stat­ utes and locations. The first company was to be established within two years if the concession were not to become null and void. Upon the founding of the first exploitation company, the Iranian govern­ ment was to be paid £20,000 in cash and £20,000 in paid-up shares. The concessionaire also had to pay annually 16 percent of the net profits of any company or companies that might be formed. The Iranian government was to appoint a commissioner, who

8

Oil, Poweryand Principle

had to be consulted by the concessionaire and the directors of the companies to be founded. The commissioner was to undertake “such supervision as he may deem expedient to safeguard the inter­ ests” of the Iranian government. On the expiration of the conces­ sion in 1961, all physical assets were to become the property of the Iranian government free of charge. Disputes were to be submitted to a committee consisting of two arbitrators at Tehran, one appointed by each party, and an umpire appointed by the two.24 Strangely enough, the Iranian government appointed as its commissioner Antoine Ketabji, the very same man who had actively worked for D’Arcy to obtain the concession and had been rewarded by him with a share in it. Late in June 1901, when D’Arcy received the signed concession, he wrote to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, saying: I beg to offer your Lordship my sincere thanks for the great services you have rendered me . . . . I hope that this enterprise will prove advantageous to British commerce and to the influ­ ence of this country in Persia. I would therefore venture to ask for it the protection and countenance of His Majesty’s Govern­ ment in the hope that, if necessary, I may be allowed, as well as my Agents in Persia, to apply to the Foreign Office, and also to the Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of His Majesty in Persia to whose counsels I shall always endeavour to give effect.25 The Shah, too, pleased that the concession would bring him personal benefits, issued a royal decree announcing that he had granted D’Arcy and “all his heirs and assigns and friends, full powers and unlimited liberty for a period of sixty years to probe, pierce, and drill at their will the depths of Persian Soil” for oil, and that “all officials of this blessed kingdom” should do their best to assist him since he enjoys “the favour of our splendid court.”26 Iran at the time had no parliament, and negotiations on an agreement that was to influence the fate of the nation for decades to come had been kept secret from the people. Other governments, too, were kept in the dark. The Russians, however, found out about the concession and put intensive pressure on Iran to nullify or at least modify it, but to no avail.

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

9

With the concession in his pocket, D’Arcy looked for a man who could conduct drilling operations in Iran and found George Bernard Reynolds, a tough Royal Engineer who had previously drilled for oil in the Dutch East Indies. Reynolds left for Iran, where he employed a team of Polish drillers who had worked in the Russian oil fields of Baku. The equipment, provisions, and supplies took months to arrive in carts and wagons from England, and drilling finally started at Chia Sorkh in the autumn of 1902.27 In December of the same year Antoine Ketabji died and his son Vincent took over as Iran’s commissioner. Under the terms of the concession D’Arcy had to form the first company by the end of May 1903. But no oil was struck by then. However, a week before the deadline, D’Arcy formed the First Exploitation Company (FEC), with an issued capital of £600,000 in £1 shares. As required by the concession, he gave the Iranian gov­ ernment, or rather the Shah, £20,000 in shares and £20,000 in cash. In addition, he had other “debts of honour” to those “leading personalities” in Iran who had secured the concession, to whom he paid a total of £49,000, of which £19,000 was in cash and £30,000 in shares. Of these shares £20,000 worth went to the prime minis­ ter, the minister of mines, and the foreign minister, all of whom had received some cash before the signing of the concession.28 D’Arcy soon realized that his assets and those of the FEC might not meet the heavy cost of drilling in a far-off land. When he ap­ proached the British investors, they showed hardly any interest, but the French Baron Alfonse de Rothschild expressed willingness to consider the venture. When D’Arcy left for Cannes with the inten­ tion of selling the concession to Rothschild, the British government woke up to the idea that the concession was on the point of slipping out of British hands. Ernest Pretyman, the Admiralty secretary, accordingly wrote to D’Arcy urging him not to sell the concession.29 Sir John Fisher, who in 1904 became First Lord of the Admiralty, was eager to convert the Royal Navy’s fuel from coal to oil, and a committee headed by Pretyman was formed to look into the pros­ pects of bringing new oil resources under British control. In his capacity as oil consultant, Boverton Redwood told the committee of the Persian oil possibilities. But the government was reluctant to enter into substantial private ventures. Under these circumstances

IO

Oil, Power, and Principle

Pretyman looked for a respected figure in financial circles who could attract rich investors. He found his man in the person of Lord Strathcona, the founder and director of Canadian Pacific Railway and the Bank of Montreal, who in 1896 had taken the mantle of Canadian High Commissioner in London. The Admiralty along with Lord Strathcona encouraged Burma Oil Company to assist D’Arcy in his venture. Early in 1905 a concessions syndicate was formed with a share capital of £100,000, of which Burma took £95,000 and Lord Strathcona £5,000. The Admiralty thus suc­ ceeded in keeping the D’Arcy concession in British hands.30 Back in Iran a new problem cropped up in the south. When Reynolds and his men brought their drilling equipment to Masjid Sulaiman, the Temple of Solomon, they found themselves faced with local Bakhtiari tribesmen who would not honor the concession granted by the central government. They made it clear to the drilling team that they would not allow them to operate there unless their masters undertook to pay them 10 percent of the profits of any oil extracted in what they called their own territory. Instead of referring the matter to the Iranian government, the Foreign Office “loaned” John Richard Preece, the British consul general in Isfahan, to the D’Arcy group to help them resolve the dispute. Preece persuaded the Bakhtiari Khans to decrease their demands. On November 15, 1905, the Khans agreed to accept 3 out of every 100 ordinary shares of any company or companies formed that would deal with oil operations in the Bakhtiari area. They were also to be paid sums for providing guards for drilling and pipe-laying operations. The agree­ ment with the Bakhtiari Khans led to the formation of the Bakhtiari Oil Company as a producing concern.31 In 1906 the syndicate was faced with a new critical element. The nationalist sentiments that had lain dormant since the cancellation of the tobacco concession reemerged on the Iranian scene, taking the form of increased opposition to the autocratic regime of Mozaffar ed-Din Shah and strong demands for a constitution that would guarantee parliamentary rule. Under great nationalist pressure, the Shah agreed to the drafting of such a constitution. By the time it was drafted, he was on his deathbed. The clergy begged him to “remem­ ber that he was about to meet his God, and should strive to take with him . . . some deed of great merit which might counterbalance

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

ii

his sins.” This appeal moved him to sign the constitution on January i, 1907, which brought great rejoicing by huge crowds in the capital.32 A week later Mozaffar ed-Din Shah died and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Ali Mirza, who proved to be much less sympa­ thetic to the constitution than his father and was determined to exercise the same autocratic powers that his predecessors had en­ joyed. Meanwhile Russia and Britain, concerned with the impact on their interests of the constitutional struggles in Iran, set aside their rivalries and signed a treaty on August 31, 1907, in St. Petersburg dividing Iran into two zones of influence. By this treaty Britain undertook not to interfere with the interests of Russia in the north­ ern half of the country, and the Russians agreed not to interfere in the south and the Persian Gulf area, which were vital to British domination in the Near East and India. This agreement provided the nationalists with a powerful weapon with which to fight against the domination of its signatories.33 On the day this treaty was concluded in St. Petersburg, Amin olSultan, the all-powerful Iranian prime minister, was assassinated in Tehran. The assassin shot himself and died instantly. When the details of the Anglo-Russian agreement became known later in Iran, the assassin was venerated as a patriot. Those involved in the constitutional struggle did not challenge the D’Arcy concession. The nationalists were too busy with their endeavors in establishing the constitution to allow themselves to quarrel with the British. D’Arcy’s men went on drilling in the Masjid Sulaiman area. For their protection, the British government sent a detachment of twenty Indian troops under the command of a young lieutenant, Arnold Wilson, later to become Sir Arnold. Meanwhile, financing the oper­ ation became a critical problem. Early in 1908, in an effort to decide whether it was worth continuing the operation, Burma Oil sent an investigator to Iran who on his return reported that any further exploration would be unproductive. A cable was sent from London to Reynolds instructing him to stop work, dismantle the equipment worth the cost of transporting, and return home. Reynolds was greatly upset. So was Lieutenant Wilson, who noted with bitterness in his diary: “I am tired of working here for these stay-at-home businessmen . . . masquerading in top hats as

12.

Oil, Power; ¿«tí Principle

pioneers of Empire.” Reynolds, however, decided to keep drilling until the receipt of written confirmation of the cable telling him to stop. And he was well rewarded. At 4 a .m. on the morning of May 2.6, 1908, oil was struck at a depth of 1,180 feet and a gusher of some fifty feet shot into the sky. At the end of May D’Arcy received a telegram about this long-awaited oil strike. He was so delighted that he promised his wife, Nina, a £1,500 Rolls Royce automobile, one of the first few hundred models to be manufactured.34 British enterprise, along with a total capital expenditure of £400,000 over eight years, had led to the discovery of oil in Iran. When it became certain that commercial quantities of oil were available, concern over financial problems evaporated. The task was to design a proper company with adequate financing to run all aspects of the operation. After months of discussions and negotia­ tions between Lord Strathcona, D’Arcy, Burma Oil, bankers, tech­ nicians, and solicitors, the framework for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was drawn up. However, before the formation of such a company, D’Arcy, who was the owner of the concession and had spent much of his personal funds on its operations, had to be compensated. Late in March 1909 an agreement was reached between him and the Burma Group under which he agreed to sell his concession, along with his rights and shares in various related agreements, for £203,067 19s 6d in cash and 170,000 fully paid ordinary shares of Burma Oil. Thus D’Arcy not only recouped his outlay but made a “profit” of £895,000, this being the value of his Burma Oil shares. The transfer of the concession from D’Arcy to another party could not take place without the approval of the Iranian government; but luckily for D’Arcy, Vincent Ketabji was both the Iranian commis­ sioner and his partner. To obtain Ketabji’s consent, D’Arcy gave him 11,900 of the Burma Oil shares allotted to himself.35 The way was now clear for the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which on April 14, 1909, was incorporated with an authorized capital of £2 million, half in ordinary shares of £1 each and half in 6 percent preferred stock. The ordinary shares (com­ mon stock), allotted as fully paid, were transferred to Burma Oil (570,000), the concessions syndicate (400,000), and Lord Strath­ cona, who received 30,000 shares and was named chairman of the

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

13

company. The preferred stock was offered to the public in April and snapped up within half an hour.36 The company’s seven-member board, headed by Lord Strathcona, included D’Arcy and Sir John Cargill, who was also a member of the Burma Oil board and had been active in negotiations with the Admiralty concerning the formation of APOC. The company’s pro­ spectus noted that “substantial contracts for fuel oil may be con­ fidently looked for from the Admiralty,” while pointing out that the outlet of the APOC’s pipelines “will be at the head of the Persian Gulf, and so under British control.” Lord Strathcona for his part acknowledged at the company’s opening meeting “the valuable assistance received from the Foreign Office and the British Consul in Persia.” “So began,” remarks Elwell-Sutton, “the industry that was to see the Royal Navy through two world wars, and to cause Persia more trouble than all the political manoeuvrings of the great powers put together.”37 During the years 1908 and 1909, when oil was discovered and APOC incorporated, Iran was in the throes of a constitutional struggle. Although Mozaffar ed-Din Shah had signed the constitu­ tion, which enabled Iran to send elected representatives to the National Assembly (Majlis), his son and successor, Mohammad Ali Shah, hated any institution that challenged his absolute power. His opposition to constitutional rule led to a revolt against him by constitutional forces, which mainly consisted of two classes. One was the traditional middle class, whose interests were threatened by monarchs who left the country at the mercy of foreign exploitation. The other was a new professional middle class with Western ideas. This class “espoused not the divine right of kings but the inalienable rights of m an.. . . They venerated not the Shadows of God on Earth [kings] but the triumvirate of Equality, Liberty and Fraternity.” The driving force behind both groups was a number of reformists, writers, and journalists who considered constitutionalism and na­ tionalism vital for the establishment of a strong modern Iran.38 There were no political parties at the time. But those supporting constitutional rule had formed some one hundred political societies whose members met to exchange views and consolidate forces. These meetings resulted in the establishment of an intersociety “War Committee” to devise plans to fight against autocratic rule. A young

14

Oil, Power, and Principle

man in his mid-twenties by the name of Mohammad Mossadeq, at that time vice-chairman of Majma’e Ensaniat (Society of Human­ ity), became a member of this committee. Thus began the political life of the man who was to nationalize Iran’s oil industry some forty years later.39 Mohammad Ali Shah, determined to do away with the Majlis, instructed Colonel Vladimir Liakhoff, a Russian officer who com­ manded the Persian Cossack brigade, to wipe out the constitutional­ ists. Liakhoff and his men dutifully did so by shelling the Majlis and the adjoining square, killing several hundred constitutionalists. This prompted an uprising against the Shah throughout the country and rallied new adherents to the nationalist cause. In July 1909 na­ tionalist forces defeated the royalists and the Cossacks and oc­ cupied the capital. The Shah, finding himself in danger, took refuge in the Russian legation along with his family. After such a degrading flight he could not return to his throne. His twenty-year-old son. Prince Ahmad, left the sanctuary of the Russian legation on July 10,1909, and took his oath as a constitutional monarch. The dethroned Shah, accom­ panied by his wife, four children, ten women of the harem, and a number of other companions, departed for Odessa.40 The confusion in the capital hardly affected the southern areas of the country where oil was being produced. APOC confidently went on to plan for the construction of a pipeline to Abadan, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf, and for building a port and refinery there. The Abadan area was inhabited mostly by ethnic Arabs and governed by Khaz’al, known as the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who, although nominally under the Iranian government, exercised auton­ omy with British support. But the possible emergence of a constitu­ tional government in Tehran endangered the Sheikh’s autonomous rule. To remove his worries. Major Percy Cox, the British political resident in the Persian Gulf, in May 1909 offered the Sheikh “a guarantee that Britain would not allow the Persian Government to disturb the status quo of himself or of his heirs and successors.” The Sheikh had no reason to doubt his assurances, since the political resident was “the uncrowned King of the Gulf.”41 Major Cox’s next step was to obtain from the Sheikh, at an annual rent of £650, a square mile of land in Abadan that APOC

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

1 5

needed for the construction of a port and a refinery. This earned Cox the warm compliments of Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secre­ tary, and the APOC directors for his faithful defense of the com­ pany’s interests. With the arrangements made with the Sheikh and earlier with Bakhtiari Khans, the British government strengthened autonomy in APOC’s areas of operation against the authority of the central government. In fact Lord Strathcona, APOC’s chairman, said as much at the general annual meeting in 1911 : “As our part of Persia is within the Territories under the influence of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiyari chiefs . . . we are fortunately able to view the present political situation in Persia with perfect equa­ nimity. (Cheers.)” The Iranian government repeatedly objected to APOC about its business arrangements with the Sheikh and the Bakhtiaris, but to no avail. With Abadan leased at less than £13 a week, engineers, refinery artisans, and workers from many nations—Persians, Arabs, Chi­ nese, Burmese—poured in and built a refinery. The year 1912 was a banner year in the history of APOC as the pipeline between Masjid Sulaiman oil fields and the Abadan port and refinery was com­ pleted. The pipeline had an annual capacity of 400,000 tons, and 43,000 tons of crude oil were exported for the first time. By 1914, when World War I broke out, the export figure reached 274,000 tons. In that year the production of two wells alone, out of thirty drilled, was more than the pipeline could take. When the storage tanks were full, APOC set on fire the rest of the oil extracted and called a temporary halt to further drilling. One well, known as F.7, spouted 6.5 million tons of oil in its twelve-year life.42 As the Iranian oil fields developed, the British government be­ came aware of the tremendous resources at APOC’s disposal. In 1911, when Winston Churchill became the First Lord of the Admi­ ralty, he revived the idea of converting the Royal Navy’s fuel from coal to oil. To verify whether or not APOC was in a position to furnish adequate supplies to the Admiralty, a mission headed by Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, a former director of the Admiralty’s Intelligence Division, was sent to Iran. A member of this mission was John Cadman, petroleum adviser to the Colonial Office and professor of mining at Birmingham University (who later became

16

Oil , Power, and Principle

APOC’s chairman). The supply of oil in Iran was found to be abundant, and the mission recommended in 1914 that the Admi­ ralty secure control of APOC. As a result of this recommendation, Churchill urged that £2 million be spent to acquire 51 percent interest in APOC for the Ad­ miralty. Some members of Parliament were concerned that the ac­ quisition by the British government of a controlling interest in the company might provoke the Russians to occupy Iran’s northern provinces, but the measure was approved in spite of these objec­ tions. As it happened, approval came forty-eight days before the start of World War I, in the course of which the Allied armies, as Curzon put it, floated to victory on a wave of oil.43 APOC increased its ordinary shares by the £2 million the British government had injected, and began expanding production facili­ ties to meet the increasing fuel oil needs of the Admiralty. Mean­ while the British government appointed two members to the APOC board. To quote Dr. Ferrier, the British Petroleum historian: “It is undeni­ able that the government shareholding in the Company changed the spirit of the D’Arcy Concession and had a profound impact on its standing within the context of international relations. The Com­ pany, however much it proclaimed its independence, was considered to be no longer just a private organisation, but a national enterprise for a national purpose.” Thus many governments, including Iran’s, believed that “the hidden hand of the British Government was to be detected behind most, if not all, of the activities of the Company.”44 In May 1914 the Admiralty concluded a contract with APOC for the purchase of some 500,000 tons of fuel oil per year for a period of twenty years. The price was agreed to be 30s per ton f.o.b. Abadan, subject to rebates when the company’s profits were higher than 10 percent on ordinary shares. The minimum price, however, was to be no less than £1 per ton. It was also agreed that in times of war the Admiralty would have the first option to obtain all the oil it re­ quired, no matter how much that might be, on the same favorable terms.45 When World War I broke out, the Admiralty’s fuel oil require­ ments rose sharply. Thus the Abadan refinery increased its through­ put while gearing up to produce the highest possible percentage of

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

17

fuel oil, a figure that was to reach 6 5 percent. It was cheap Persian oil that fueled the British war machine during the war. Churchill estimated that the Admiralty contract produced within eight years a saving of about £7.5 million “on the purchase price of oil as compared with current prices.” To this figure he added three other major returns: £16 million for the appreciation in value of the government’s shares over its original investment; £6.5 million in government receipts of dividends, interest, taxes, etc.; and £10 million from other factors, including the reduced price of oil sup­ plied by other companies to Britain by reason of having to compete with APOC. In short, he concluded that the British government had gained, within a short period, a total of £40 million out of Iran’s oil. Churchill went on to point out that the realized and potential profits of the British government’s investment in APOC were such that “we may not unreasonably expect. . . to claim that the mighty fleets laid down in 1912,1913, and 1914, the greatest ever built by any Power in an equal period, were added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to the taxpayer.” Thus it is not surprising to find Churchill jubilantly saying: “Fortune brought us a prize from fairy­ land far beyond our brightest hopes.”46 What was Iran’s share out of her own fairyland? The total royal­ ties paid to Iran from 1912, when oil exports began, up to 1924 were £3.7 million (see Table 1). The amount is so small because APOC did its utmost to reduce payments to Iran so as to maximize profits and expand its operations worldwide. A major step by APOC to expand its overseas operations was the acquisition of the British Petroleum Company Ltd. (BP), a subsid­ iary of the European Petroleum Union of Bremen, which distributed Shell products in Britain. On the outbreak of World War I, BP and its associated firms were classed by the British government as enemy concerns because of their German connections. This helped APOC to purchase BP at a cost of £2 million, paid mainly in annual installments. The purchase included seven tankers, fifteen ocean installations, and hundreds of inland depots and railway tank wag­ ons. This acquisition, together with the formation of the British Tanker Company, with a capital of £3 million, enabled APOC to possess its own shipping fleet and to evolve its own marketing strategy.47Thus APOC joined the big league of oil companies, along

i8

Oil, Power; ¿md Principle TABLE I

Iran’s Oil Production, APOC Profits, and Royalty Payments to Iran, 1912-31

Year* 1 9 1 2 -1 3 1 9 1 3 -1 4 1 9 1 4 -1 5 1 9 1 5 -1 6 1 9 1 6 -1 7 1 9 1 7 -1 8 1 9 1 8 -1 9 1 9 1 9 -2 0 1 920-21 1 9 2 1 -2 2 1 9 2 2 -2 3 1 9 2 3 -2 4 1 9 2 4 -2 5 1 9 2 5 -2 6 1 9 2 6 -2 7 1 9 2 7 -2 8 Apr. 1 to Dec. 3 1 ,1 9 2 8 1929 1930 1931

Oil production, 000 long tons (1)

AIOC profits,6 £000 (2)

80 274 376 459 644 897 1,106 1,385 1,743 2,327 2,959 3,714 4,334 4,556 4,832 5,358

27 62 55 458 2,113 2,652 1,849 3,264 3,779 3,431 3,517 4,067 4,397 4,800 4,106

325c 469 585* 593 533 411 831 1,054 1,400 502

4,290 5,461 5,939 5,750

3,689 4,274 3,786 2,413

529 1,437 1,288 307'

Royalty to Iran, £000 (3 )

10

Sources: Col. (1), Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 274. Cols (2) and (3), APOC Annual Reports and Mikdashi, M iddle East O il Concessions, pp. 45-46.

‘From 1912 to 1928 the financial year ended on March 31. In 1928 the financial year changed to end on December 31. ^Profits after deduction of expenses, debenture and preferred stock interest, and royalty payments to Iran. 'The figure is the sum total of royalties paid to Iran during the six-year period 1913-14 to 1918-19. ‘H'he amount does not include payment of £1 million in partial settlement of past claims. ‘Under the 1933 Agreement this amount was adjusted to £1,339,132.

with Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey. Its distributing organiza­ tion soon spread to Europe, India, Australia, and South and West Africa, and later covered the whole world. The company’s expansion overseas was not confined to mar­ keting and transport facilities alone. In 1921 it formed National Oil Refineries Ltd., building refineries at Llandarcy in Wales and Grangemouth in Scotland. This was followed by the acquisition of refineries in France, Belgium, Italy, and Australia. Until 1914

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

1 9

APOC’s fixed assets were all in Iran, but the situation changed rapidly when internally generated funds were used to build a tanker fleet and refineries abroad.48 What made this great expansion possible was that Iran’s oil wells proved to be tremendously productive. In the APOC report for the year 1917, the chairman proudly revealed that the annual produc­ tion of 4 million tons of oil from fifteen wells of Masjid Sulaiman was made possible by an investment of £4 million only, whereas before the war some 2,000 wells in the Rumanian and Galician oilfields had produced less oil at an investment of £40 million. Nevertheless, APOC used every possible device to reduce Iran’s royalty payments. In February 1915, during World War I, Bakhtiari tribesmen (instigated by German agents) blew up the pipeline join­ ing the oilfields to the Abadan refinery. APOC declared that it considered the Iranian government responsible for the incident and lodged a claim for £614,489 3s id , of which £402,887 was claimed for the cost of repairs and the balance for the loss of production. Furthermore APOC announced that it would withhold royalty pay­ ments until the matter was settled. By giving so precise a figure, the company apparently wanted to impress the Iranians with its scrupu­ lousness in calculation. Yet, as shown later, both the amount and the nature of the claim were baseless.49 Under the terms of the D’Arcy concession of 1901 the Iranian government demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. The British minister in Tehran announced that APOC would not allow anyone to question either its right to damages or its right to withhold royalties. Meanwhile, APOC withheld the payment of royalties for 1916 and 1917, which totaled £44,347. Considering the large sum claimed for repairs and loss of production, it looked as if APOC, backed by the British government, intended not to pay any royalties to Iran for a decade or more; and the Iranian govern­ ment accordingly decided after the war to challenge the company’s claims. Late in 1919 Iran asked Sydney Armitage-Smith, her British financial adviser, to look into the matter. Armitage-Smith, a former assistant secretary to the British Treasury who had come to Iran under an agreement reached in August 1919 (see Chapter 2), em­ ployed William McLintock, a leading chartered accountant, to look into the company’s accounts.

20

Oily Power, and Principle

McLintock completed his report in February 1920. He found that the damage to the pipeline, which the company had assessed at £402,887, amounted to no more than £20,000. Moreover, he con­ tended that the damage was not the responsibility of Iran, which had declared neutrality in the war only to be invaded by the British, but was the work of Britain’s enemies, who knew the importance of the pipeline to the Royal Navy. McLintock also discovered that APOC, while claiming damages from Iran, had at the same time charged £10,000 a year for these damages as operating expenses, thus lowering its nominal profits and also lowering the royalties payable to Iran.50 McLintock’s job was also to find out whether the company in fact paid Iran 16 percent of the net profits as specified by the terms of the 1901 D’Arcy concession. He found numerous irregularities in APOC’s bookkeeping methods. The company had deducted each year a sum from its net profits, on which Iran’s royalties were based, for a sinking fund to which Iran was not obligated to contribute. It had also deducted yearly interest on debentures issued by its sub­ sidiaries while at the same time claiming that the Iranian govern­ ment had no right to share in the profits of such subsidiaries; this claim was in violation of Article 10 of the 1901 concession, which said that Iran had to be paid annually “a sum equal to 16 percent of the annual net profits of any company or companies that may be formed.” Another bookkeeping gimmick concerned First Exploitation Company (FEC), in which Iran was a shareholder. APOC reduced the profits of FEC by charging against it all the construction costs of the APOC organization as a whole. It also made FEC, as primary producer, sell oil below cost price to Bakhtiari Oil Company, which in turn sold it to APOC at normal prices. Also improperly deducted from royalties payable to Iran were the amounts APOC paid to Bakhtiari chiefs for protecting the pipelines, plus 3 percent of the profits of operations in their area. Yet another way that APOC reduced the sums due to Iran was by selling fuel oil at cut prices to the Admiralty.51 McLintock’s report upset APOC by revealing its “artificial” trans­ actions and bookkeeping methods. It not only rejected APOC claims but, in the words of Armitage-Smith, “disclosed certain undoubted

Age o f Autocracy and Concessions

21

errors and irregularities of accounting, which had resulted in under­ payment of royalty” to the Iranian government. An important point raised by McLintock was that Iran was “entitled to claim 16 percent on the profits of all the subsidiary companies of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company carrying on business outside Persia.” APOC chairman Charles Greenway, finding his company caught red-handed, did not reply to specific points raised in McLintock’s report. Instead, he wrote to Iran’s foreign minister, Nostrat od-Dowleh, dropping APOC’s claim for damages and offering to settle Iran’s claims up to March 1919 by making a lump-sum payment of £500,000. This amount was later raised to £1 million. He also resumed paying royalties to Iran. Although APOC, by offering a settlement, admit­ ted to its wrongdoing, it did not address the subject of Iran’s share in its subsidiaries.52 When Iran’s pressure on this point grew, APOC argued that the terms of the concession drawn up twenty years earlier had become irrelevant to changing circumstances. It threatened that if Iran claimed a share of profits in subsidiary companies, APOC would detach them from the parent body, thus nullifying Iran’s claims. Although this threat was farfetched, it helped pave the way for a compromise. In December 1920 Armitage-Smith and APOC con­ cluded a draft agreement that constituted a major revision of the D’Arcy concession. Under this agreement, the Iranian government was entitled to 16 percent of the profits from all operations carried out by APOC in Iran; but with regard to subsidiaries outside Iran its royalties were to be based only on that portion of profits “defined and calculated” by APOC as being associated with Iranian oil. Not only did this arrangement leave a lot to APOC’s discretion, but also it ignored the important fact that the subsidiaries had been formed with the profits from Iranian oil. Furthermore, large deductions granted to the company in calculating Iran’s share of the profits in the subsid­ iaries induced APOC to establish refineries outside Iran so as to reduce Iran’s share of the profits.53 Armitage-Smith, considering himself to be the full representative of the Iranian government, signed the agreement with APOC on December 20,1920. When the agreement was passed on to a firm of London solicitors to check its contents, they reported to Iran that

OUy Power; and Principle Armitage-Smith had exceeded his instructions by offering deduc­ tions to APOC in violation of the terms of the concession that called for a full 16 percent of the profits of APÖC and all subsidiary companies “formed for the purpose of working the Concession or any part thereof.”54 Representing as it did a substantial modification of the 1901 concession, the new agreement required ratification by the Majlis. This did not occur. Yet APOC, paying no heed to Iran’s objections, considered the agreement valid and adjusted its royalty payments according to its terms. Iran had little choice. After all, the company was much stronger than the Iranian government.

2

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

he Russian Revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the Tsarist regime created an opportunity for Britain to look for absolute political and economic supremacy in Iran. Lord Curzon, who suc­ ceeded Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary in 1919, argued that

T

we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in the shape of oil fields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world. . . . [Persia’s] geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now . . . to disinterest ourselves from what happens in Persia. Curzon’s scheme was to put Iran’s civil and military administra­ tion under British direction. In 1919 he instructed Sir Percy Cox, then promoted to the rank of British minister in Tehran, to arrange the conclusion of an agreement that would bring Iran under full British control.1 Under the draft agreement prepared in London, Britain was to furnish Iran with military and administrative advisers “endowed with adequate powers” to equip and train the Iranian Army, to direct the country’s finances and customs, and to construct roads and railroads—all at Iran’s expense. Britain, however was to lend Iran £2 million secured by customs revenue and “other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government,” which meant oil. In brief, the suggested agreement put Iran under British tute­ lage—a tutelage that was to be financed by Iran.2 For a number of reasons Britain was certain the Iranian govern­ ment would approve this agreement. British forces were still in Iran after the European war. They had arrested Iranians unfriendly to 2-3

1 4

Oil, Power, and Principle

the British, and Ahmad Shah had been forced to appoint anglophile ministers. The British government paid the Shah a monthly subsidy of £5,000 to keep the ardent anglophile, Vosuq od-Dowleh, as prime minister, and it was with Vosuq and two other anglophile ministers that Cox would be negotiating.3 As a final precaution these three ministers were bribed £131,000 to arrange the conclu­ sion of the agreement, a sum quietly charged against the first install­ ment of the £2 million loan. The three ministers, who knew that the agreement would be unpopular and might cause them trouble, took the precaution of obtaining written guarantees from Percy Cox that they would be afforded “asylum in the British empire should neces­ sity arise.”4 The agreement was eventually approved by the Iranian Cabinet on August 9,1919. Britain, taking Majlis approval for granted, lost no time in sending military and financial advisers, among them Armitage-Smith, to implement the agreement. But British optimism proved to be premature. Iranian nationalists, supported by the general public, began a concerted attack on the government for having signed such an agreement. Severe criticism also came from other countries, including not only Russia but also the United States and France. The agreement was not ratified by the Majlis in spite of British pressure. Curzon could not have chosen a worse time for his scheme. It was precisely when Russia was trying to weaken European powers in Asia by supporting nationalist movements there. On January 14, 1918, Leon Trotsky had annulled the 1907 Anglo-Russian treaty that divided Iran into two zones of influence, “in view of its incon­ sistency with the freedom and independence of the Persian nation.” Furthermore, a Russian note to Iran on June 26, 1919, in which Tsarist Russia and Britain were accused of “devastation” and “op­ pression” in Iran, expressed readiness to compensate Iran “for losses incurred by Russia” while hoping that Iran would claim dam­ ages from “the English Imperialist Government.”5 Russia’s show of sympathy with Iran led to negotiations that ended in the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between the two. Britain, however, decided to strengthen her position in Iran while the British forces, under the command of Major General Edmond Ironside, were still in that country. In January 1920, Ironside ob-

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

25

tained the Iranian government’s agreement to refit the Persian Cos­ sacks, a force of 3,000 Iranians under Russian officers stationed near Qazvin. Ironside dismissed the Russian officers and put Reza Khan, an Iranian officer, in command, under the watchful eye of Colonel Henry Smyth, a British officer placed in charge of the Cos­ sacks’ administration and finance. Ironside wanted to use the force to oppose any attempt by the Russian Bolsheviks to attack the Brit­ ish forces in the course of their withdrawal or possibly to occupy Tehran and take over the government. On his choice of Reza Khan, Ironside noted in his diary: “He seemed to me a strong and fearless man who had his country’s good at heart.” Although he told Reza Khan “not to take or allow to be taken any violent measures to depose the Shah,” he despised Ahmad Shah as “a wretched specimen of a man in so great a position.” Iran, he wrote in his diary, “needs a strong man to bring her through.” In another entry he added: “In fact a military dictatorship would solve our troubles and let us get out of the country without any trouble at all.”6 As we shall see, the appointment of Reza Khan had a major impact not only on the history of Iran but on the future course of APOC. Having completed his mission in Iran, Ironside left for Bagdad. Meanwhile in Tehran an anglophile journalist, Seyyed Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, in cooperation with three members of the British lega­ tion, plotted a coup against the government to be carried out with the help of the Cossack Brigade. When Reza Khan and Colonel Smyth proved agreeable, Zia, backed by his friends at the British legation, obtained funds from the British Imperial Bank to pay off Reza Khan and the Cossacks.7 On February 20, 1921, Zia, along with Reza Khan and his Cossack forces, marched on Tehran, meeting hardly any resistance. Five days later Zia became prime minister and Reza Khan com­ mander of Iran’s armed forces. In Bagdad, Ironside noted in his diary: “I fancy that all the people think I engineered the coup d’etat. I suppose I did strictly speaking.”8 Colonel Smyth credited himself for the operation, saying that “he had organised the Cossack coup in Tehran . . . with the knowledge of British legation.”9 However, Herman Norman denied that he, as the British minister in Tehran, had been involved in any way.10

26

Oil , Power, and Principle

To make himself popular, Zia denounced the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement and on February 26, 1921, concluded the RussianPersian Friendship Treaty agreement which strengthened the hand of nationalists against British domination in Iran. In it the Soviet Republic declared null and void all previous treaties with Britain and other European powers that affected Iran and made her “a prey to the cupidity and tyranny of European robbers.” It also nullified all previous treaties and conventions between Tsarist Russia and Iran and renounced Russia’s rights to the repayment of loans granted to Iran.11 It was, however. Article 6 of this treaty that protected Iran from British territorial domination and at the same time exposed her to Russia. The article says that if a third party attacks Persia or seeks “to use Persian territory as a base for operations against Russia . . . and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace.. . Russia will have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out military opera­ tions necessary for its defence.” As we shall see, it was this article that prompted the United States to prevent Britain from occupying Abadan in 1951, after the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. Having denounced the Anglo-Persian agreement and signed the Russian-Persian Treaty, Zia lost the support of the British and his government soon fell. The Cabinet that replaced Zia’s in June in­ cluded three prominent figures who over the next twenty years were to play a crucial role in changing Iran’s relations with APOC. The new prime minister was Ahmad Qavam, an aristocrat. The other two, both chosen by Qavam, were Mohammad Mossadeq as fi­ nance minister and Reza Khan as minister of war. As minister of war, Reza Khan, with great skill and stamina, soon succeeded in restoring order and security throughout the country. His determination to strengthen the central government, however, clashed with Britain’s desire to support the autonomous Bakhtiari Khans and Sheikh Khaz’al, with whom APOC dealt directly (see Chapter 1). To calm British concerns, Reza Khan told Sir Percy Loraine, who had replaced Norman as British minister in Tehran, that it would be in the British government’s interest to support internal security in Iran. Loraine, who had great admiration for Reza Khan’s “personal vigour and his singleness of purpose and his

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

2-7

patriotism,” believed that he could be trusted to protect British interests.12He had developed friendly relations with Reza Khan; the two had frequent poker games at the legation, which Reza Khan engaged in to show his friendship with the British.13 As Reza Khan’s power increased, he tamed the Bakhtiari Khans and brought them under the control of his war ministry. Loraine, who knew that soon Sheikh Khas’al would also be brought under submission, advised the Foreign Office “to encourage internal se­ curity and to entrust the protection of British interests to the Impe­ rial [Iranian] authorities.” But some in London felt otherwise. The India Office suggested dispatching a gunboat to Mohammerah to support the Sheikh. Others doubted the wisdom of taking such action.14 Meanwhile Reza Khan, backed by the army, took advantage of Ahmad Shah’s weakness and made himself prime minister on Octo­ ber 29, 1923. The Shah left for Europe never to return. Britain, divided between giving protection to Sheikh Khaz’al and maintain­ ing good relations with Reza Khan, took no specific measures. Consequently in April 1925 Reza Khan’s forces captured Sheikh Khaz’al and took him to Tehran, thus ending the autonomous rule of a man to whom the British had given assurances of full protection and who had been invested for his services as a Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire (KCIE). He died in Tehran as a virtual prisoner in 1936.15 Reza Khan’s ambitions did not end with the premiership. He aimed at becoming head of state as president. When the clergy advised him against changing the institution of monarchy, he de­ cided to terminate the Qajar dynasty and crown himself king. To gain British support, he discussed his scheme with Loraine, who, after consulting the Foreign Office, told him that the British govern­ ment was determined “to leave Persia absolutely free to settle inter­ nal affairs,” adding that, “in return we did expect our questions to be taken in hand and settled as soon as possible.” Reza Khan gave his assurances.16 Meanwhile, by a mixture of solicitation and in­ timidation, he won over a majority of the deputies in the Majlis, whose approval was required for his takeover of the throne. In October 1925 the Majlis was presented with a bill terminating the Qajar dynasty and establishing the Pahlavi dynasty beginning with

28

Oil, Power, and Principle

Reza Khan. During the debate, Mossadeq, then a Majlis deputy, strongly opposed the bill. He considered such a move to be uncon­ stitutional, leading to dictatorship.17 In spite of his objections and those of three others, the bill was ratified by the Majlis, and less than six months later, on April 25, 1926, Reza Khan crowned himself as the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty. Lady Loraine assisted the new Shah in his coronation, and the British government was the first to recognize his regime. In Iran itself the change was welcomed by the majority of the people as promising an end to insecurity and disorder. The new Shah started a program for modernization of the coun­ try and its armed forces. To have a free hand in the affairs of state, he began a campaign to eliminate local and foreign privileges. He subdued the power of politicians, landlords, mullahs, and the tribes and then, to Britain’s surprise, concentrated on limiting the influ­ ence of the British and their institutions in Iran. Although he had come to power with Britain’s blessing, as king he considered it essential to liberate his country from Britain’s grip. In 1928 he founded Bank Melli Iran, the country’s national bank, and two years later he transferred to it the Imperial Bank’s right to issue notes. But APOC proved problematic. In Iranian eyes APOC represented “the epitome of foreign inter­ vention” as it controlled and exploited Iran’s greatest natural asset while giving her “a miserable pittance in return for the millions it took away.” 18This was unacceptable to Reza Shah. Furthermore he was unhappy that the British government had a majority share in the company while Iran had none. He was convinced that APOC’s worldwide position had its origins in Iranian oil and thus felt that Iran was justified in demanding her proper share in the entire operations of the company. In July 1928 Reza Shah sent Abdol-Hossein Teymurtash, his influential court minister, to London for discussions with Sir John Cadman, who was then chairman of both APOC and the newly established Turkish Petroleum Company, later to be called the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). In a series of meetings Teymurtash tried to convince Cadman of the need for a new relationship between APOC and Iran. He told him that if the Iranians were given a fair share of the business, they would extend every assistance in further-

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

29

ing the company’s development and progress. Teymurtash’s main proposal was for the Iranian government to receive 25 percent of APOC’s common stock free of charge and a royalty of is per ton on the quantity of oil produced. His aim was for Iran to earn an annual sum of £1 million.19 Cadman, unlike his predecessors, was sympathetic to the Iranian cause. He knew that many vocal critics in Iran resented that it was Britain that benefited most from Iranian oil. He also understood Iranian resentment of the fact that the British government was a majority shareholder in APOC while Iran—which owned the oil resources—was conspicuously absent as a shareholder. He believed that making Iran a partner in the industry’s fortunes would preserve the future of the concession.20 Meanwhile, Reza Shah sent a message to Cadman through Mostafa Fateh, APOC’s highest-ranking Iranian official, saying that “Iran can no longer tolerate watching huge oil revenues go into the pockets of foreigners while she is being deprived of them.”21 The Iranian press followed this up with a campaign against the com­ pany. One wrote that the 1901 D’Arcy concession was granted by a corrupt ignorant government bribed by unscrupulous financiers to swindle Iran.22 Cadman, after protracted discussions with his board, succeeded in obtaining approval of Iran’s participation in APOC as a share­ holder, provided that her shares be inalienable and nonvoting. With Cadman’s persuasion, Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, consented to the scheme. Cadman went to Tehran in February 1929 with a team of legal and financial advisers and presented the draft of a new agreement, which called for APOC to provide Iran with 20 percent of its common stock free of charge, to pay Iran 2s per ton on the quantity of oil produced, to reduce its area of the concession to 100,000 square miles, and in return to obtain a thirty-year extension of the concession. Although earlier negotiations with Cadman were conducted solely by Teymurtash, the Shah now instructed A. A. Davar, minis­ ter of justice, and N. D. Firuz, minister of finance, to join him. As a result, Teymurtash, in an effort to gain the Shah’s esteem, saw fit to take a very hard line with the British. He proposed that the Iranians receive 25 percent of the common stock, a guaranteed minimum

30

Oil, Power; and Principle

annual revenue, and all relevant taxes and duties, and that they retain their share and interest after the expiration of the concession. In return Iran would grant APOC a twenty-year extension.23 Cadman considered the Iranian demands exorbitant and returned to. London to discuss the matter with his board. Sir William Fraser and other board members who, out of respect for Cadman, had reluctantly agreed to giving Iran 20 percent of the stock, rejected the new proposals. Meanwhile the New York Stock Exchange collapsed and the price of oil fell sharply. Because of the resulting uncertainty, APOC was no longer interested in pursuing negotiations for Iranian participation. On August 7, 1931, Cadman wrote to Teymurtash saying that no settlement could at present be worked out owing to “an excessive difference between the views of the Persian Govern­ ment and the Company as to what is possible and equitable.” He added that “the whole question. . . can only be effectively discussed when . . . the present chaotic condition of the oil industry has disappeared.”24 There was a fleeting moment when all the elements needed for a fair settlement of the oil dispute were in place. Reza Shah, in full control of Iran, wanted an honorable settlement, and Lord Cadman was all for Iran’s partnership in APOC. The conclusion of an agree­ ment that made Iran a participant in the company’s interests would have dissipated, or at least delayed, the traumatic disputes that led to oil nationalization in 1951. But that fateful moment passed thanks to Teymurtash’s mistaken belief that Iran had time to bar­ gain for more. He had gambled for high stakes and Iran had lost. The Shah’s inconsiderate haste in military buildup and public works had put severe strains on the government’s finances. APOC was fully aware of Iran’s financial difficulties and knew that the Shah had no alternative but to come to a settlement. In September 1931 Teymurtash went to Switzerland to place Crown Prince Mohammad Reza in a school there. He met Cadman in Lausanne for further negotiations, which later continued in Paris and London. This time their discussions did not deal with Iranian participation in APOC, which the company was no longer ready to contemplate, but with providing a new basis for the payment of royalties and taxes. The negotiations led to the drafting of an agreement that raised APOC’s royalty payments from 16 percent to

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

3 1

20 percent of the net profits on all operations connected with Iranian oil conducted by APOC and its subsidiaries. The additional 4 percent was in lieu of Iranian taxes. After numerous amendments, a draft agreement was initialed on May 22, 1932, by Cadman and Isa Khan, Iran’s commissioner in London.25 Just as the scene was set for approval of this agreement in Tehran, Teymurtash learned that royalty payments for 1931 would be only £306,870, less than a quarter of the royalties of the year before and the lowest figure since 1917. Iran’s oil production, which in 1930 was 5.9 million tons and earned £1.3 million in royalties, had dropped by only 3.2 percent to 5.75 million tons in 1931; but the corresponding royalties had dropped by 76.2 percent (see Table 1, p. 18). The reason for such a disproportionate fall was that APOC had sharply reduced its royalty per ton in 1931. True, the depression had reduced the company’s profits by 37 percent but not by 76 percent. The Iranian press began a concerted attack against the company, alleging that it falsified accounts to defraud the Iranian Treasury. The government demanded that its representatives be allowed to examine the accounts and that APOC’s representatives come to Tehran for discussions over the draft agreement. The com­ pany’s response to both demands was negative. It used delaying tactics for months. Reza Shah, whose country was in the middle of a financial crisis, was furious. At a Cabinet meeting on November 26,1932, he told Teymurtash to bring in APOC’s file. When the file was given to him, “he threw it in the fireplace and told us not to leave until we have cancelled the Concession.”26 On the following day, H. Taqizadeh, who had replaced Firuz as finance minister, sent a note to T. L. Jacks, APOC’s resident director in Tehran, declaring the D’Arcy concession of 1901 null and void because it did not secure Iran’s interests. The note added, however, that if the company was pre­ pared to change its attitude by keeping Iran’s interests in mind, the government would not refrain from granting it a new concession. Three days later, to the joy of the public, the Majlis unanimously approved the cancellation of the concession.27 The British Cabinet and the APOC board were thrown into a state of frenzy. After consultations between the two, Sir Reginald Hoare, the British minister in Tehran, sent a strong note of protest

32

Oil, Power, and Principle

to the Iranian government. What followed bore a remarkable simi­ larity to what would occur later during the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. The British government took up APOC’s cause and declared that the cancellation of the concession was an in­ admissible breach of its terms. It demanded “the immediate with­ drawal of the notification” of cancellation.28 Meanwhile Hoare suggested that the Foreign Office stem the crisis instantly by sending units of the East Indies Squadron to the Persian Gulf, putting Indian troops in the area on alert, and giving both these moves wide publicity. His proposals were presented to the Cabinet. The military option was referred to the Chiefs of Staff, who noted that the fleet could move quickly to the area if needed.29 When the Iranian government refused to withdraw its notifica­ tion, Hoare wrote back on December 8, 1932, saying that the cancellation was a breach of international law and that his govern­ ment would refer the matter to the Permanent Court of Interna­ tional Justice at The Hague. The note added that in case of any damage to APOC’s interests, “His Majesty’s Government will re­ gard themselves as entitled to take all such measures as the situation may demand for that Company’s protection.” The Foreign Office knew that the Permanent Court dealt with treaties and conventions between governments and not with concessions granted to a private company; its purpose was simply to frighten Iran with a clear hint of military action. In a note of December 12, Iran’s foreign minister, M. A. Foruqi, deplored the British government’s “threats and in­ timidation.” Pointing out that the Permanent Court was not compe­ tent to deal with the matter, he added that the Iranian government would consider it “within their rights in bringing to the notice of the Council of the League of Nations the threats and pressure which have been directed against them.”30 The British Cabinet decided on December 14 to refer the matter to the League of Nations before Iran could do so. The feeling was that there were certain advantages in being the plaintiff rather than the defendant. Sir John Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who happened to be in Geneva, “hurried in person to the Secretary-General—Geneva gossip had it that he actually ran in order to be sure of getting there first—with a formal demand that the question should be placed on the agenda of the Council.”31

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

33

The proceedings before the Council started in January 1933. The Iranian delegation, headed by Minister of Justice A. A. Davar, told the Council that the 1901 D’Arcy concession had been obtained by devious means from an autocratic Iranian government that had no constitutional base. It contended that APOC had evaded proper payment of royalties and refused payment of Iranian taxes while using its “illegal” gains for enormous investments in other parts of the world. Furthermore, APOC had not permitted the Iranian gov­ ernment to inspect its accounts, had failed to employ Iranians ex­ cept as laborers and petty staff, and had refrained from training local staff, sending only two Iranians as students to Britain over the years. Davar stressed that the Armitage-Smith agreement was not valid, having never been ratified by the Majlis—yet APOC had based Iran’s payments on it. And finally, the Iranians pointed out that even if APOC was allowed oil free of charge and had to pay only the applicable local taxes and customs duties, the amount would have been £19 million instead of the £11 million so far received in royalties. The Iranian delegation concluded that since APOC had in every possible way failed to act according to the terms of the 1901 concession, the government’s only course was to cancel it.32 The British delegation, headed by Sir John Simon, denied all these points, calling them pure allegations. The cancellation of the con­ cession, Sir John said, was contrary to international law. If the Iranian government did not consider the Armitage-Smith agreement valid, he asked, why did it accept a settlement of £ 1 million based on that agreement? He considered the royalty payments fair and con­ tended, incorrectly, that the Iranian government had regularly ex­ amined APOC’s books.33 Britain was concerned that the matter might be referred to arbi­ tration, which would oblige the company to open its books for inspection. The Iranians, unaware of this worry, did not ask for arbitration, feeling that if they did so Britain would overwhelm them through her power and influence.34The Council, after hearing both sides, instructed Dr. Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia, who was appointed as rapporteur, to see if he could reconcile the two parties. Benes persuaded both parties to open direct negotiations for the purpose of drafting a “new concession.”

34

Oil, PoweTy and Principle

Early in April 1933, negotiations began in Tehran. APOC’s lead­ ing negotiators were Sir John Cadman, his deputy Sir William Fraser, and Dr. M. Y. Young, the company’s physician in Iran, now a deputy director. The Iranian team was composed of M. A. Foruqi, foreign minister; A. A. Davar, minister of justice; H. Taqizadeh, finance minister; and Hossein Ala, president of Bank Melli. Teymurtash, who had conducted the previous negotiations, was conspic­ uously absent. The Shah had become suspicious of him and had put him under arrest. Before leaving London, Cadman received a letter from Lord Greenway, his predecessor, in which he said, “With the [British] Government behind you, you will be in a strong position . . . and I have no doubt that you will be able to pull off a new agreement that will be in every way satisfactory to APOC.”35 Both the APOC board and the British government told Cadman to shake off his sympa­ thies for Iran and to press hard for maximum gains. To make sure that the board’s wishes were kept in mind, it sent William Fraser, a tough Scotsman, along with Cadman. In fact, Cadman, saying that he did not feel well, generally left it to Fraser to conduct the negotiations. By canceling the D’Arcy concession of 1901, the Shah stated, he wanted to “wipe out the slate clean and enable a new concession to be worked out” that would set a fair basis for Iran’s relations with APOC. The company, for its part, wanted to take advantage of the occasion to eliminate certain troublesome parts of the concession and replace them with new ones that would be more favorable to itself. Now that its operations were not confined to Iran but ex­ tended to the rest of the world, APOC’s intention was to avoid giving Iran a share in the profits of its subsidiaries, as the concession called for; rather, it proposed to base royalty payments only on the quantity of oil produced in Iran. Iran, however, wanted a mixed balance between the two and insisted on limiting the area of the concession and the cancellation of APOC’s exclusive right on laying pipelines to the Persian Gulf. With such contradictory demands, the two parties found that they were far apart.36 Cadman met the Shah and reminded him that in 1929, when Iran had rejected APOC’s offer of 20 percent shareholding, it had been agreed to reopen negotiations after the depression passed. Unfortu­ nately for the Shah, he could not wait that long; needing substantial

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

35

funds right away, he insisted on negotiations at a time when the company was in no mood to improve its terms. While expressing his unhappiness with the British government’s intervention in the mat­ ter, he asked Cadman “to assist him in opening a new page in Persian history and to start with a clean slate.” The Shah’s plea, however, did not move Fraser, who had taken charge of APOC’s negotiations and “was not prepared to meet any sort of compro­ mise.” The problem was aggravated by the fact that the Iranians, fearful of the Shah, did not dare to express their opinions. Cadman reported to the Foreign Office: “The atmosphere here is dreadful, the Persian ministers seem afraid for their necks and are almost terrified to speak to or be seen with me or any of my party.”37 When negotiations came to a stalemate, Cadman made a shrewd move. As he put it, he “had come to the conclusion that the only way to break the deadlock was to present the Shah with a shock decision.” He sent word that he intended to leave. The Shah, dis­ turbed, invited him to his palace and asked him to stay on. Cadman, who knew that in the Shah’s presence his ministers would lose every initiative, suggested that “the Shah should take the chair which could be the final attempt to resolve the deadlock.”38 The Shah agreed, and a meeting took place at the palace with him at the head of the table. Cadman’s astute strategy, the Shah’s authoritarian attitude, and the timidity of the Iranian team at the meeting were central to the atmosphere in which decisions on the 1933 agreement were reached. The Shah, opening the meeting, suggested that the differ­ ences between his ministers and APOC should be fully set out. Cadman, in his own words, “side-stepped this desire and suggested that the Company’s new terms should be considered first.” The Shah agreed. The ministers were “taken by surprise” but did not dare to contradict their sovereign and “sat in subdued silence.” Addressing his ministers, the Shah said “they were down on the ground and could not see very far beyond their own noses whereas he was placed on a pinnacle and could see the great world around him.” With these words from their absolute monarch, they knew that if they wanted to keep their heads they had to keep silent and let him make the decisions. The Shah listened only to APOC’s men and did not trouble to ask his ministers for their views.39 On April 25, when the two sides met again, there was only one

36

Oil , Power; and Principle

text on the table to discuss: the draft agreement prepared by APOC. Cadman, who had found his first shock treatment of the Shah effective, now tried a second. He suggested that the period of the new concession should be “at least seventy-five years to assure continuity.”40 The D’Arcy concession of 1901 was to terminate in 1961, but Cadman wanted a new one to run until the year 2008. The Shah, upset by such an unexpected demand, responded: “This is impossible. For thirty years we have cursed our predecessors for granting this [D’Arcy concession]. Do you want us to be cursed. . . by future generations?”41 However, faced with the persistence of the company team and his fear of British military intervention, the Shah finally agreed to give APOC a new concession for a period of sixty years, while the company agreed to reduce the concession area to 100,000 square miles. The Shah, almost the only one on the Iranian side to talk, raised only a few comparatively trivial points, one being that the people in the northern provinces “had no oil for their lamps. . . and they often had to burn tallow at night” ; he wanted APOC to supply them with kerosene. Ignorant as he was of the complicated issues in a sixtyyear oil agreement, he did not raise any essential questions, while his ministers, fearful of giving him advice, kept silent. APOC’s draft was finalized in no time with some modifications, among them the change of name from Anglo-Persian to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The Shah did not like Iran to be called Persia. On April 29, 1933, the new concession was signed by both parties.42 On Cadman’s arrival in London, letters of congratulation poured in. The British were jubilant that he and Fraser had pulled off a new agreement that would secure the company’s operations in Iran for the next sixty years with much higher benefits. But, as things turned out, their deal was too shrewd to last. True, Iran gained a reduction of the company’s area of operation from 500,000 square miles to 100,000 and the elimination of the company’s exclusive right to construct pipelines to Iran’s Persian Gulf coast. As to the financial gains, they were inconclusive. Whereas Iran’s royalties under the D’Arcy concession were 16 percent of the net profits of any company formed, the new concession based payments on a combination of tonnage royalty and profit-sharing. AIOC was to pay Iran royalties of 4s per ton based on the price of gold to cover against possible

Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession

37

sterling devaluation. The tonnage payment was on oil sold for consumption in Iran or exported. This meant that AIOC could use, free of charge, vast quantities of oil required in its Iranian operations and by its ocean tankers. As an example, in 1947 consumption for these purposes amounted to 1.5 million tons, which could have brought Iran a tonnage royalty of £300,000. Iran was also to have a share in AIOC’s overall profits around the world equivalent to 20 percent of dividends distributed among holders of common stock in excess of £671,250. But Iran had no means of ensuring whether AIOC, in calculating Iran’s share, had included all its subsidiaries. In fact the company’s statement of December 31, 1950, noted: “The accounts of fifty-nine subsidiary companies. . . have not been included in the Consolidated Accounts since your Directors are of the opinion that such consolidation would be misleading.”43 At the expiration of the concession the company also had to pay Iran 20 percent of the amount by which its general reserves ex­ ceeded the 1932 level. Iran, however, had no control over the allocation of net profits between dividends and reserves. In fact the British government set limits on the distribution of dividends during and after World War II. Most important of all, Iran was left at the mercy of the British government, which by increasing AIOC’s taxes decreased the company’s net profits and thus Iran’s 20 percent share in dividends and general reserves. In lieu of taxation, AIOC had to pay Iran annually 9 d per ton for the first 6 million tons and 6d o n every additional ton for the first fifteen years. These amounts were to be increased respectively to 15 d and 9

Oil, Power, and Principle

tee came to the conclusion that under the Constitution the Cabinet, not the Shah, had full responsibility over Iran’s civil and military affairs. But when Mossadeq asked the Majlis to put the committee’s resolution to a vote, the opposition, led by Jamal Emami, blocked it. On March 1,1953, the day after Mossadeq’s home was attacked, the CIA reported to Eisenhower that “the elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise might dissipate decisive events except in the unlikely alternative that the Shah should regain courage and decisiveness.” Although Kashani was a serious contender to replace Mossadeq, the latter was stronger and had a broader base of sup­ port than any of his opponents, including Zahedi, whose success the CIA deemed “unlikely.” 13 Determined to pursue the coup scheme in Washington, the British sent a team there soon after Eisenhower took over the presidency. To encourage American participation and get the CIA fully in­ volved, they suggested that any operation for Mossadeq’s over­ throw should be headed by Kermit Roosevelt. As the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, he had “a very prominent family name” ; moreover, they said, he was known to the Shah.14 To keep up the pressure, Eden went to Washington in March Ï953 with a team of Foreign Office and MI6 officials. While he tried to convince Eisenhower that Mossadeq was threatening AngloAmerican interests in the Middle East, the MI6 men met with the CIA and played on American fears of communism in Iran. Allen Dulles, the CIA director, Frank Wisner, head of CIA covert opera­ tions, and Roosevelt favored a coup against Mossadeq. But many others, including the CIA station chief in Tehran, were against such a move, which they thought smacked of colonialism.15 Before reaching an agreement on the coup, Eden wanted to reach an under­ standing with the Americans on Mossadeq’s replacement. Kashani appealed to him because he had turned against Mossadeq, had sided with the Shah, and possessed “the street machine”—meaning access to mobs. He told Henry Byroade and Walter Bedell Smith, the new Under Secretary of State, that Kashani had “less history behind him in the oil dispute and might for that reason perhaps be easier to conclude a deal with.” 16 George Middleton of the British embassy in Tehran had earlier noted that Kashani was a reactionary and difficult to work with. He

The Coup

2-97

classified Makki and Fatemi as reformists and felt that Makki “appeared to have the best chance of eventually being accepted as the national leader,” adding that the British would “find it possible to do business with him.” 17 But Alan Rothnie of the Foreign Office had little use for Makki as a leader, saying that “it has frequently been reported that he was willing to abandon the National Front if we would pay him.” 18 The British choice narrowed down to Kashani and Zahedi. The Foreign Office finally concluded that Kashani would be a change for the worse and that Britain and the United States would do better with Zahedi.19 Shortly after his return to London, Eden became seriously ill with gallbladder problems. In the course of surgery “the knife slipped” and his bile duct was accidentally cut. He was compelled to undergo two further operations and could not return to active duty for some seven months.20 He had activated the coup operation in Wash­ ington, however, and Churchill was pleased to follow it up. Immediately after the Washington discussions of March 1953 the CIA sent Roosevelt to Tehran, where he explored the possibilities of executing the coup with MI6 agents there. Until then the CIA’s work in Iran had been mainly concerned with monitoring Tudeh and So­ viet activities, with funding newspapers, right-wing organizations, and some religious leaders to denounce Tudeh, and with trying to influence people like Baqa’i and Makki to break ranks with Mossadeq, thus lessening extremist pressure on him and making it easier for him to accept a compromise settlement of the oil dispute.21 Following Roosevelt’s trip to Iran, the CIA studied “Operation Boot,” which had been originally initiated by AIOC and MI6, and found it too rigid and regimented for a clandestine operation. Don­ ald Wilber was given authority to prepare a more flexible plan, which he did, renaming it “Operation Ajax.” Wilber met Roosevelt in Beirut and they went over the plan with other agents. The plan was then taken to London, where it was finalized with MI6 in midJune 1953. Churchill, who enjoyed dramatic operations and had shown active personal interest in the scheme, gave his approval.22 Meanwhile Mossadeq continued to put pressure on the Shah not to interfere in government affairs. The Shah, who thought that the British had a hand in anything that happened in Iran, had come to believe that they were behind Mossadeq’s every action. He thought

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that British demands for the removal of Mossadeq were simply a camouflage. He even thought that the closing of the British embassy had been engineered by the British themselves in collaboration with Mossadeq.23 As to the prime minister’s pressure on him, the Shah, unaware of the Anglo-American coup plot, attributed it to Britain’s desire to “deprive him of his power and prestige.” He complained to Henderson that “the British had thrown out the Qajar Dynasty, had brought in his father and had thrown his father out. Now they could keep him in power or remove him in turn as they saw fit. If they desired he should stay.. . . If on the other hand they wanted him to go he should be told immediately so that he could leave quietly.”24 The Shah’s worries were communicated to Churchill, who sent him a personal message through Henderson saying that there were no such schemes and that “we should be very sorry to see the Shah lose his powers or leave his post or be driven out.” In reply the Shah, greatly relieved, “expressed gratification.” He told Henderson that the exchange of messages should be kept in absolute secrecy.25 But by asking the British to decide on his fate, the Shah had demon­ strated to Britain and the United States that he had no base at home. Henderson, who was to leave Tehran for Washington for discus­ sions on the coup, asked the Shah whether he would support Gen­ eral Zahedi to replace Mossadeq, though he refrained from men­ tioning anything about the impending coup plot. The Shah’s answer was that the general was neither “an intellectual giant” nor a man likely to carry out a successful military coup. He observed that the Amini brothers were much more powerful among the military and the politicians and could block Zahedi if they desired.26 The Americans tried the Amini brothers, but failed to win them over. According to Abol-Qassem Amini, then Deputy Court Minis­ ter, an emissary from “a foreign embassy” told him that the “em­ bassy” was prepared to pay $5 million to the Aminis in fees and expenses for Mossadeq’s overthrow. He refused the offer.27 The British continued to harass Mossadeq by all possible means. Late in April 1953 MI 6 Iranian agents kidnapped Major General M. Afshartus, chief of Iran’s police, and killed him. Their motive was to indicate that Mossadeq’s government was on shaky ground, and at the same time to eliminate an able officer who they felt would effectively oppose any coup attempt. Zahedi, along with Baqa'i and

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a number of retired officers, was implicated in this assassination. To avoid arrest, Zahedi, who had been released earlier, took refuge in the Majlis, where he could enjoy the cooperation of Kashani and other deputies opposed to Mossadeq.28 The assassination of Afshartus was meant to serve notice to the Americans that Mossadeq was not in control, and this led to fears that the communists might exploit the situation. On June 25 at a high-level meeting at the State Department attended by, among others, the Dulles brothers, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, Walter Bedell Smith, and Kermit Roosevelt, it was agreed to proceed with Operation Ajax. Henderson and Byroade, who attended the meeting, were neither for nor against the scheme. The prime mover was John Foster Dulles, who considered Mossadeq’s neutrality a sign of his weakness toward the communists. Eisenhower, who generally relied on Dulles’s and Smith’s judgment, approved the scheme.29 As to the possible Soviet reaction to the coup, it was felt that since Stalin had died in March and the new leadership in Moscow had not yet consolidated itself, the Soviet Union would avoid involvement in Iran. However, as an emergency measure, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on “the general composition of the forces which might be deployed to southern Turkey and to the vicinity of Basra, Iraq, in the event of a Tudeh coup in Iran.”30 The components of the Anglo-American coup plan were four: to start a political and propaganda campaign in which Mossadeq was to be portrayed as a crypto-communist, to encourage the opposition to create disturbances, to press the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq and appoint Zahedi as his replacement, and to obtain the support of military officers for Zahedi’s appointment. These activities were to be conducted by the CIA in cooperation with MI6, both of whom had employed Iranian agents. Wilber and Roosevelt prepared pro­ paganda material against Mossadeq, which was translated into Persian and passed on to the CIA. “Given high priority, it poured off the Agency’s press and was rushed by air to Tehran.”31 Meanwhile Zahedi and his men, backed by the Shah, prompted the opposition in the Majlis to intensify their attacks on Mossadeq. Government supporters, finding that Kashani was spearheading the aims of the opposition, voted him out of his position as speaker of the Majlis and replaced him with Abdollah Moazzami, a National

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Front supporter. This infuriated Kashani, who decided, with other opposition deputies, to block the approval of any bill that Mossadeq presented to the Majlis outside his emergency powers. Finding that the Majlis had come to a standstill, twenty-seven deputies of the National Front announced their resignation on July 14, 1953; they were followed by twenty-five from other caucuses. This left the Majlis with just over twenty deputies, and it could not function anymore. On July 22, vast demonstrations took place in Tehran urging the dissolution of the Majlis. What made these demonstrations signifi­ cant was the strength of the Tudeh crowd as contrasted with the weak showing of the National Front and its supporters. The British lost no time in contending that Mossadeq’s supporters were mainly communists. The fact was that Kashani and Baqa’i, who were skillful crowd organizers, did not favor dissolving the Majlis while Tudeh did. On July 27, in a broadcast to the nation, Mossadeq stated that some foreign powers were bent on overthrowing him to install their own supporters and that a group in the Majlis had assisted them in their schemes. He then announced that he planned to ask the people through a referendum whether or not they wanted the continuation of the current term of such a Majlis, adding that if they did he would resign. In the subsequent referendum the majority voted to dissolve the Majlis, leading to British and American accusations that Mossa­ deq had terminated the Majlis with communist support. When he held a meeting with the Soviet ambassador to discuss the expansion of trade with Russia, they accused him further of selling Iran to the Russians. Actually, he had earlier rejected a demand that Iran renew the Soviet concession in the Caspian fisheries. In the state of confusion and bewilderment in Iran over the assassination of Afshartus, the closing of the Majlis, and the divi­ sion in the ranks of National Front members, the CIA found the soil fertile for the execution of the coup. But the Shah had not yet been told of the coup plot and the need for his support. Henderson was away and the message had to be conveyed to the Shah by someone whom he fully trusted. Roosevelt decided to use the Shah’s twin sister. Princess Ashraf, who had been exiled for her subversive activities against Mossadeq’s government and lived in France.

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To pass the message to Ashraf, he felt he had to find someone who appealed to her. Roosevelt selected for the job an American officer “who regarded himself as the lady-killer of the twentieth century.”32 He and an MI6 officer went to Paris, where they asked the princess to go to Tehran and persuade her brother to cooperate in the execution of the Anglo-American coup plot. Ashraf agreed to do so after being promised that if the coup failed the United States would give her sufficient financial support to go on living abroad in the style to which she was accustomed.33 On July 25, 1953, Ashraf went to Tehran and told her brother about the contemplated plot. He could not decide whether or not to support the scheme. Meanwhile the princess, suspected of scheming against the government, was told to leave the country. To persuade the Shah to cooperate in the coup, the CIA director chose General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who had previously served in Iran as adviser to the Iranian Gendarmerie, the rural police force. Schwarzkopf, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and a for­ mer head of the New Jersey police, had gone to Iran as a colonel in 1942. During his six years of service in Iran, he successfully trained the Gendarmerie and internal security forces and was active in subduing communist infiltration, particularly in northern Iran. The reasons for using him in 1953 were that he knew the Shah well and that he had many friends among both the Iranian officers and the American military advisers stationed in Iran.34 Schwarzkopf arrived in Tehran on August 1 “armed with a diplo­ matic passport and a couple of large bags [containing] millions of dollars.” He met the Shah and assured him that America would give him full support if he cooperated in the coup. He also conferred with Zahedi, who was in hiding, as well as old Iranian and Ameri­ can friends in the military. These meetings paved the way for the execution of the coup, whose aim was to overthrow Mossadeq and reestablish the Shah’s authority so that he would in turn secure Western control over Ira­ nian oil.35 It is ironic that thirty-eight years later, in 1991, the gen­ eral’s son. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr., was in the same region commanding a huge force engaged in another oil war—this time to dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait so that Saddam Hussein would not become the arbiter of the supply and price of Arab oil.

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The elder Schwarzkopf met Roosevelt, who had earlier entered Iran under the name of James Lockridge, and reported to him on his visits with the Shah and others. He urged Roosevelt to meet person­ ally with the Shah and work out with him the execution of Opera­ tion Ajax. On midnight of August 1—2, by arrangements made through the Rashidians, Roosevelt met with the Shah in secret and discussed his plans, telling him that he represented both Eisenhower and Chur­ chill. The Shah did not take him seriously, particularly because he suspected that the Americans were on Mossadeq’s side. His doubts, however, were removed when Eisenhower stated at a conference in Seattle on August 4 that Mossadeq, in his drive to get rid of the Parliament, was supported by Iran’s communist party and that this was “very ominous for the United States” and the free world. Mossadeq’s effort “must be blocked now,” said Eisenhower.36 The coup plan that Roosevelt spelled out for the Shah included an alliance with some religious leaders, who had asked “huge sums of money” ; gaining the support of Iranian military officers; and a program of psychological warfare against Mossadeq. The Shah was told to issue firmans dismissing Mossadeq as prime minister and replacing him with Zahedi. Roosevelt assured the Shah that he had ample funds for the operation; his safe was “jam-packed with stacks of rial notes . . . the equivalent of about one million dollars.” He then met Zahedi, “who was concealed in a house in the American Embassy compound,” and informed him of his discussions with the Shah. Roosevelt reported his activities to Washington through the British relay in Cyprus.37 The Shah promised to sign two firmans on August 9 dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi, after which he would leave for his Caspian resort so that he would be away from Tehran during the operation. Instead he flew in panic to the Caspian with his wife, Soraya, before issuing the firmans. Roosevelt sent an Iranian agent to the Caspian to obtain the required firmans, and the agent re­ turned on August 12 with two sheets signed by the Shah and bearing the Crown emblem but otherwise blank. These sheets were filled in above the signature as Roosevelt instructed. On August 15 at about midnight, Colonel N. Nassiri, com­ mander of the Imperial Guards, escorted by three truckloads of

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armed soldiers and four armored cars, went to Mossadeq’s house to deliver the Shah’s firman dismissing him. The plan was to arrest Mossadeq while other officers of the Imperial Guards would arrest Cabinet ministers and the Chief of the Army Staff. But things did not work out that way. Mossadeq, finding it odd that someone should call on him at midnight, did ask the colonel in, and the officers in charge of guarding his house overwhelmed Nassiri’s forces and arrested them without a shot being fired. The other plotting officers managed only to arrest two Cabinet ministers and a National Front leader, who were released the following morning. The Imperial Guards were disarmed, fourteen officers suspected of collaborating with Zahedi were arrested, and the government of­ fered a reward to anyone who could locate Zahedi himself.38 Upon hearing the news of the abortive coup, the Shah panicked and fled with his wife on their private plane to Bagdad. The CIA drew up contingency plans to fly Zahedi, Roosevelt, and his chief Iranian collaborators out of the country on the U.S. military at­ tachée plane.39 In Tehran, the press berated the Shah, saying that his flight should be viewed as his abdication. The Tudeh party issued a statement demanding the proclamation of a republic. Mossadeq’s government announced that there was no intention of changing the regime, but this did not make Shah Mohammad Reza immune. On August 16 there were vast anti-court demonstrations during which Foreign Minister Fatemi, who had been released by the plotters earlier that day, addressed the crowd. The Shah, said Fatemi, had fled to Bag­ dad “to reach the nearest British Embassy.”40 In fact the Shah, on his arrival in Bagdad, was anxious to discuss his situation with the British ambassador. Not wanting to “compli­ cate matters” by meeting him in person, the Shah sent word to him asking what he should do. The reply he received was that the question would be put to the Foreign Office. Next the Shah, “tired and perplexed,” had a “clandestine meeting” with the U.S. ambas­ sador, from whom he wanted “urgent guidance.” The ambassador gave the routine reply that he would refer the matter to Wash­ ington.41 The Shah’s inability in 1953 to make decisions affecting his own fate and that of his country, and his requests that the British and

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American ambassadors decide for him, were an exact replica of his actions in 1978, twenty-five years later, when Ayatollah Khomeini fomented a rebellion against him. In that year, too, he wanted the ambassadors of Britain and the United States to tell him what to do. Having lost hope of regaining his throne, the Shah urged the American embassy to arrange the sale of his plane. But since the Iranian embassy wanted the Iraqi authorities to hand over the air­ craft to them, the Americans, as well as the British, avoided getting involved.42 Meanwhile there was confusion in London and Wash­ ington over what should be their advice to the Shah. At the Foreign Office, Assistant Under Secretary of State Reginald Bowker weighed the alternatives. Should he urge the Shah to abdicate or not to abdicate? Analyzing various options, he said: “It may be argued that the Shah by running away with so little dignity . . . cannot be relied upon at any future time to exercise effective leadership, [and thus] it is no use keeping him as a possible leader or focus of loyalty.” He felt, however, that Britain should follow the American recommendation, which was to have the Shah insist that he was Iran’s legal sovereign. Since he doubted that Mossadeq could be removed at any time soon, he suggested that the Shah be advised to remain somewhere in the Middle East for the time being.43 Not receiving a satisfactory answer from the British and Ameri­ can embassies, the Shah and his wife flew by British commercial plane on August 18 to Rome, where the Italian press talked of “the staffless, baggageless, moneyless royal couple.” On arrival, the Shah stated that he did not intend to ask Italy for political asylum, but the Daily Telegraph's Rome correspondent predicted, “He will proba­ bly join the small colony of exiled monarchs already in Rome.” The Shah told his queen that he might instead go to the United States, where his mother and one of his sisters were living.44 Meanwhile, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith told the British in Washington that the Americans were “inclined to make attempts to improve their relations with Musaddiq.”45 Further­ more, he sent a radio message to Kermit Roosevelt telling him to give up the scheme and get out. But since the flight of the Shah, Roosevelt had taken a series of measures to revive the coup and the prospects looked bright to him. The day after the Shah’s flight to Bagdad, CIA and MI6 local

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agents, assisted by Zahedi’s men, distributed vast numbers of copies of the Shah’s firman appointing Zahedi prime minister. They con­ solidated the opponents of Mossadeq, who consisted of retired army officers, some active officers loyal to the Shah, old-guard politicians who had lost their influence and power under Mossadeq, and a number of big businessmen whose profits had been badly hurt as a result of the oil embargo. They also contacted two leaders of the Qashqa’i tribe, who were Mossadeq’s allies, and offered to pay them $4 million provided the tribe led a revolt against Mossadeq and recognized Zahedi as prime minister. The two rejected the offer, saying that they were not prepared to stab Mossadeq in the back.46 Roosevelt knew that his most difficult problem was Mossadeq’s wide popularity. In an effort to discredit the prime minister, Roose­ velt’s men flooded Tehran with clandestine papers carrying articles that categorically described Mossadeq as a communist collaborator and a fanatic. In addition, with the help of the Rashidian brothers, he hired a large crowd of people at a cost of $50,000 and told them to act as if they were Tudeh members. On August 17, the “rented” crowd, shouting communist slogans, threw rocks at mosques and Moslem clergymen. The crowd, later joined by credulous Tudeh members passing by, tore down statues of the Shah and his father and denounced both of them.47 The author, who witnessed these events, was puzzled by them. But Roosevelt, who knew what was going on, enjoyed the potential impact of what his hired mob did. “I recognized,” he said, “that this was the best thing we could have hoped for. The more they shouted against the Shah, the more the army and the people recognized them as the enemy.”48 According to Richard Cottam, the “people we had under our control . . . were more than just provocators, they were shock troops.” What they did was to inspire fears of a communist takeover and create an atmosphere that compelled onlookers to choose be­ tween Mossadeq—who was portrayed as the one who had let the communists loose—and the monarchy, an established institution.49 The result was that Mossadeq’s popularity waned while hostility to the Shah turned into indifference. Mossadeq, unhappy at seeing the Shah’s statues torn down, in­ structed the police to suppress the Tudeh, thinking they were the real instigators. Furthermore, at the request of U.S. ambassador Loy

30 6

Oil, Power, and Principle

Henderson, who had flown back to Tehran after the Shah’s flight, Mossadeq ordered full protection for the Americans. He was aware of the coup plot, however, and of those Iranians, widely known to be British agents, who were working for his overthrow. Nur ed-Din Kianuri, the Tudeh party leader, who had learned about the impend­ ing coup through the party’s intelligence network, wanted Mossa­ deq to take countermeasures by appealing to the people and by providing arms to the Tudeh to stand against the plotters; but Mossadeq refused. He did not want people to risk their lives to keep him in power, nor did he want to rely on the Tudeh.50 This left the way open for Roosevelt, who was soon joined by General Robert McClure, chief of the U.S. military mission to Iran. McClure took up the task of dealing with the Iranian Army. In an effort to keep Brigadier General Taqi Riahi, Iran’s chief of staff, away from Tehran while a second coup was tried, McClure invited Riahi to join him for a few days of rest and fishing. When Riahi declined the invitation, McClure observed that since the U.S. ad­ visory mission was to the Shah’s court, he had no responsibilities toward Mossadeq, adding that they both had to support the Shah. Riahi rejected his suggestion, saying that they both had to serve Iran. McClure decided to contact army commanders personally. On August 16 he flew to Isfahan, where he asked General M. Davallu, commander of the Isfahan garrison, to distribute among his officers copies of the Shah’s decree appointing Zahedi prime minister. Fur­ thermore he bluntly instructed Davallu to send forces to Tehran to subdue the supporters of Mossadeq’s government, which he consid­ ered illegal. He said that he had already contacted Colonel Teymur Bakhtiar, commander of Kermanshah garrison, and that Bakhtiar had agreed to send forces to Tehran. Davallu replied that he was responsible to Prime Minister Mossadeq and the Army staff, not to an American officer. McClure ended the meeting by saying, “I will kick Mossadeq out of office.”51 McClure and his men had better success in Tehran, where they cooperated with retired officers to bring a number of active officers to the Shah’s side with cash and promises of promotion; among these were commanders of a tank battalion and two infantry regi­ ments. In addition, to prevent the police from opposing planned

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riots by hired mobs, Brigadier General M. Daftari, an officer close to Zahedi, talked Mossadeq into giving him command of the police force, claiming that he would faithfully serve him.52 With every preparation made by CIA and MI6 men, Kermit Roosevelt set the date of the second coup attempt for August 19, 1953. Since the outcome was unpredictable and the Americans did not know whether or not the Tudeh would play an active role against the coup, precautionary measures were taken in Wash­ ington. The National Security Council asked for recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on “courses of military action in Iran, in support of a non-communist Iranian Government” in case the Shah requested “some degree of military support.” Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs considered “the outline of possible emergency mili­ tary actions” in support of the Shah, and the exigency plans for the deployment of “ground, air, and naval forces to Iran.”53 On the morning of August 19, groups of paid thugs appeared in various sections of Tehran. They stopped all cars, giving the drivers pictures of the Shah to stick in their windows and telling them to put on their lights. If anyone resisted, he was beaten and the windows of his car were broken. Soon the center of Tehran was flooded with cars carrying the Shah’s picture. Meanwhile from the city center a large mob of weight lifters, wrestlers, and others equipped with clubs, chains, sticks, and knives, headed by Sha’ban Ja’fari, known as “Sha’ban the brainless,” marched toward Mossadeq’s house shout­ ing “Long live the Shah.” In front of the group were jugglers, tumblers, and bazaar barkers. The mob leaders had used CIA funds to provide “every entertainment that money could buy” so as to attract passersby to join the mob.54 The same mob that two days earlier had pretended to be commu­ nists demanding the Shah’s overthrow was now proclaiming its revulsion to those demands and asking for Mossadeq’s overthrow. Cottam concedes that it was “a mercenary mob. It had no ideology. That mob was paid for by American dollars.” And it was protected by truckloads of policemen and soldiers whose commanders were promised money and promotion to join the Shah’s supporters. When General Riahi sent a column to suppress the mob, Police Chief Daftari, who as we have seen was in fact on Zahedi’s side, told the officers of the army column: “We are colleagues and brothers

3°8

Oil, Power; ¿wd Principle

all faithful to the Shah and should not fire at each other.” ProMossadeq crowds began to move in but found that they were no match for armed mobs protected by the military. There were no signs of the Tudeh party, some of whose members had been clubbed by the police the day before at Mossadeq’s orders.55 The hired mob, now joined by some police and army units, set fire to the buildings of pro-Mossadeq and Tudeh newspapers and po­ litical parties that supported Mossadeq. Another group occupied the Tehran Radio Station. Zahedi moved out of hiding and was driven on a tank to the radio station, where he announced his take­ over. When a corps of the Shah’s Imperial Guards attacked Mossa­ deq’s house with Sherman tanks, bazookas, and artillery. Colonel E. Momtaz, who was in charge of the forces protecting the house, moved Mossadeq and his aides out over the back wall. His forces then began their counterattack. A long, bitter battle ensued in which some 300 people were killed. Among them were some members of the hired mob, in whose pockets were found 500-rial banknotes paid to them by the CIA men that morning for their participation. Mossadeq’s house was subsequently stormed and ransacked.56 On the same day Zahedi installed himself as prime minister. Mossadeq and his colleagues gave themselves up on the following day. Many government ministers. National Front leaders, and army officers loyal to Mossadeq, as well as a large number of Tudeh leaders, were arrested by Zahedi’s men, and those detained by Mossadeq during the abortive coup were released. General Zahedi’s son, Ardeshir, asked Ambassador Henderson if there was anything he wanted Zahedi to do. Henderson’s reply was that he wanted to make sure that no bodily harm came to Mossadeq. Zahedi in turn assured the press that “not a hair of his head would be harmed.”57 Zahedi and Roosevelt cabled the Shah in Rome, telling him to return. He flew back on August 23 on a chartered Dutch plane along with twenty foreign correspondents. As a precaution, his arrival was not previously announced, and the road leading from the airport to his palace was lined with tanks, armored cars, and troops. With an expenditure of $7 million,58 the CIA ended Mossadeq’s popular nationalist movement and with it the hopes of Iranians to

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manage their own affairs without the interference of foreign pow­ ers. The Americans thus performed with their own funds the job that Britain had been seeking ways to perform for over two years. The news of Mossadeq’s fall reached Eden while he was con­ valescing on a Mediterranean cruise, and he “slept happily that night.”59 The British press, which never even hinted that the coup had been plotted by Britain and the United States, gave the whole credit to the “royalists.” Mossadeq’s house was described as “for­ tified by a bunker-like structure built of steel and concrete,”60 a structure “reminiscent of Hitler’s last days.”61 That Mossadeq had an ordinary house with no fortifications is attested by the author, who then lived on the same street.62 The London Times, however, reminded its readers that General Zahedi, the new prime minister, had been kidnapped in 1942 by British officers in Iran at a time when “he was suspected of planning with the German high command a rising against the allied occupa­ tion forces in Persia.” Fitzroy Maclean, who during the war was in charge of this kidnapping and belittled Zahedi,63 now sought to make amends. In a broadcast over the BBC World Service on August 20, he said that in the course of the 194 z kidnapping he had “pressed a Colt automatic into the lower ribs of the prime minister of Persia.” Happily the general had not resisted; otherwise he would have had to shoot him, depriving Iran of “a charming . . . loyal and patriotic officer. . . [who] would not have been there to carry out the remarkable coup” against Mossadeq. Although Mossadeq “had put himself into the arms of the Russians,” he said, there was “no earthly reason to suppose that the Americans had anything to do with General Zahedi’s success.” At a British Cabinet meeting on August 25,1953, Churchill, who himself had had a major share in involving the Americans in the coup, showed concern about the consequences of their involvement. He said that now “it would be easy for the Americans, by the expenditure of a small amount of money, to keep all the benefits of many years of British work in Persia.”64 He was right to be con­ cerned: the Americans did indeed replace Britain in Iran after the coup. That was the price Britain had to pay for her impossibly high­ handed behavior during her years in Iran.

21

An Oil Consortium Takes Over

he success of the Anglo-American coup delighted the British, who had longed for such an event for over two years. They were now eager to reach a favorable settlement with Zahedi’s govern­ ment but unwilling to help it financially. The U.S. government, however, decided to back the new prime minister by giving him $45 million in emergency aid, and Henderson suggested that further assistance be given.1 The British were not happy about this development. Dixon noted that “if he [Zahedi] can get money out of the Americans . . . he will be less inclined to come to a reasonable settlement of the oil dis­ pute.” Furthermore he was concerned that the Americans, as part of the process of giving aid to Iran, might take the initiative in solving the dispute and impose their terms on the British. Lord Salisbury, who in the absence of Eden was in charge of the Foreign Office, felt that “if we give the impression in Washington that we are only concerned with our oil to the exclusion of the necessity of keeping Persia in the anti-communist camp, we may lose all control over American action.” In spite of these considerations, British ambas­ sador Sir Roger Makins requested Secretary of State Dulles not to give any further aid to Zahedi lest the resulting financial relief cause him to relax his efforts to settle the oil dispute.2 With Mossadeq gone, AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser insisted that the company be permitted to return to Iran without delay. But Sam Falle, who had participated in the coup plot, observed: “The A.I.O.C. are capable of any bêtise. I trust it is fully and universally understood that the A.I.O.C. stink in Persia and any attempt to reinstate them, in whatever guise or form, is bound to fail.”3 The Foreign Office, too, felt that AIOC could never recover its monopoly and should instead make arrangements for participa-

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tion with American oil companies in exploiting Iranian oil; after all, it was the direct intervention of the United States in Iran that had brought about Mossadeq’s downfall. But Fraser worried that AIOC’s “prestige” would suffer if Americans were let in.4 Meanwhile the State Department looked for someone who could work out a solution to the oil problem. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade suggested Walter Levy, but Dulles himself chose Herbert Hoover, Jr., the son of a former U.S. president, who headed the Consolidated Engineering Corporation and had long experience in the oil business. He was appointed in mid-September 1953 as assistant to Dulles on the Iranian oil problem.5 Hoover argued that since Iran’s oil exports had been replaced by oil from other sources, the only way to export large quantities of Iranian oil was to get the cooperation of the entire petroleum industry. Furthermore, he contended that no reputable oil company would take part in such an operation without being given effective management control, and also that Iran should not expect to get better terms than other producers. Dulles was persuaded. He cabled U.S. Ambassador Henderson to say that the February proposals made to Mossadeq were no longer workable, and that he should see if Iran would agree to having a new operating concern owned by AIOC, Shell, and American companies with “title to or lease of all producing and refining facilities” for at least forty years, paying Iran 50 percent of the profits.6 Henderson cabled back that if such a settlement were imposed, “friends of the west in Iran . . . would consider that they had been deceived and betrayed by their British and American friends.” The general public would say that the “greatest danger to Iranian inde­ pendence was from direction of western imperialists who now in their moment of triumph were insisting that Iran agree for [a] period of another forty years to suffer under the yoke [of] foreign oil concessionaires.” Henderson thought it “not unlikely [that] Zahedi’s Government would resign at once” rather than sign such an agreement,” and that the “Shah in despair would abdicate.”7 Anthony Eden, who had returned to work after months of illness, sent a message to John Foster Dulles praising Henderson for “the admirable way in which [he] had handled matters” to Britain’s satisfaction and asking Dulles to let Henderson know “how grateful

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I am for the part he has played.” Eden added that the immediate aim should be for Britain to reestablish relations with Iran. That way the two countries could discuss things directly rather than through intermediaries, “however trusted and well briefed” they might be. In other words, he did not want the Americans to conduct negotia­ tions in the absence of the British. He then asked Dulles to tell Hoover to stop in London on his way to Tehran.8 Dulles did not want Hoover to be seen at the Foreign Office lest the Iranians suspect collusion between the Americans and the Brit­ ish. Instead Allen Dulles of the CIA arranged a clandestine meeting in Amsterdam between Hoover, Neville Gass, and Basil Jackson of AIOC. Hoover assured Gass and Jackson that he would not ignore AIOC’s interests and would make certain that Iran did not get better terms than other producers.9 Hoover went to Tehran late in October 1953 and met with various authorities there, giving them each a paper he had prepared in consultation with some U.S. oil companies that emphasized the world oil surplus and the need to bring in major oil companies to enable Iranian oil to flow back to world markets. The Shah agreed with this analysis but warned Hoover that the British and the Americans should not press the government to the “extent which would strengthen impression among Iranians [that] it is subservient to great powers of [the] West.” Zahedi felt the same way, telling Henderson that he did not wish his government to “appear to be a puppet of the United States and United Kingdom Governments.” 10 He told Hoover that any solu­ tion involving foreign control and equal division of profits would create difficulties for his government. Iran was different from other Middle Eastern producers, he said, because the capital invested by the British in Iranian oil had been recovered many times over through “exorbitant profits realised by the AIOC.” Furthermore, said Zahedi, if the goal was to settle on a 50-50 basis, he saw no reason for Iran to pay compensation.11 The Iranian government was against AIOC’s having a major share in a consortium of oil companies, and it was against foreign control. A note from Nasrollah Entezam, Iran’s foreign minister, informed Henderson that AIOC was hated in Iran. The government of Iran was prepared to negotiate “for the sale of oil” with a group

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of major international oil companies, but not a group in which the British oil companies had a major share.12 Secretary of State Dulles was delighted that the Iranians had rejected AIOC majority holding. He cabled Henderson that this was “absolutely best thing that has happened so far.. . . Fact that Iran took aggressive initiative [on AIOC] was of great psychological importance.” When Dulles informed Eden that he could not support an AIOC majority,13 Eden replied that AIOC’s minimum participa­ tion should be 51 percent, a figure clearly implying effective man­ agement control.14 On learning of this proposal, Henderson cabled Dulles that no U.S. company should be asked to run the risk of investing in a consortium in which 51 percent of the shares were British-owned.15 When the United States rejected AIOC majority participation, the British suspected that the American oil companies were intent on grabbing their oil interests in Iran. It was also suspected that Hoover and Byroade were in league with the American companies. D. Greenhill of the Foreign Office noted that “there can be little doubt that Mr. Hoover is persona grata with the [U.S.] oil boys.” 16 According to the Sunday Observer of October 19, 1953, Hender­ son, too, had been influenced by the oil lobby, and American diplo­ macy was working overtime to establish solid influence in Iran before diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain could be re­ sumed. The Americans, for their part, were suspicious of the British. According to Byroade, “many Persians. . . feared that HM Govern­ ment might work for the overthrow of the present Government if they could not extract a satisfactory oil agreement with them.” Eden, upset by this assertion, noted that “Byroade is either very stupid or mischievous.” 17 But Zahedi himself, who had been kid­ napped and imprisoned by the British during the war, could not help being suspicious of them. In an effort to create an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of relations with Britain and the conclusion of an agreement with a group of foreign oil companies, the Iranian government, funded by the United States, fed the press with articles criticizing Mossadeq’s past policies and tactics.18 One paper went so far as to claim that Mossadeq had nationalized the oil industry in collusion with Brit-

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ain: “beyond doubt, the British themselves forced nationalization on Iran as they did not need our oil or the Abadan refinery.” 19 Such statements did not go unchallenged. In an open letter to the prime minister, Makki called on the government not to distort facts and to proceed according to the oil nationalization law. He opposed the resumption of relations with Britain, warning that this would enable the British “to send their agents and spies back to Iran to pave the way for an oil settlement worse than the 1933 Conces­ sion.” Kashani, who had supported Zahedi’s rise to power and had been left unrewarded, stated in a broadcast message, “I shall not allow the revival of the former British oil company and of imperial­ ism in Iran.”20 Zahedi welcomed such statements, which helped him argue that the Iranian public could not accept the return of AIOC. In December 1953, Zahedi, who had by then tightened his grip over Iran, informed Henderson that his government was prepared to resume diplomatic relations with Britain provided that the British first showed their goodwill by such measures as lifting the oil em­ bargo; otherwise his action would appear to the public as capitula­ tion. On Henderson’s urging, Zahedi resumed relations without waiting for any sign of goodwill. However, he told Vice President Richard Nixon, who was in Tehran in the second week of Decem­ ber, that he had taken a “dangerous step” ; if the British remained intransigent, his government could not survive.21 While awaiting a decision on the choice of an ambassador to Iran, Eden sent Denis Wright to Tehran as chargé d’affaires. According to Eden, Wright had “acute intelligence and a considerable knowledge of economic matters, including the problems of the oil industry.”22 He had served as head of the Economic Relations Department at the Foreign Office. AIOC chairman Fraser was annoyed that Eden had not consulted him on this appointment. Wright arrived in Tehran late in December, fourteen months after the embassy was closed, with a team of fourteen people. He was followed several weeks later by Sir Roger Stevens, ambassador in Sweden, whom Eden chose as ambassador to Iran because of his economic knowledge. The day after Wright’s arrival, two emissaries of the Shah handed him a bout de papier from the sovereign, which said that all ques­ tions of high policy on oil should be cleared with him first. Wright promptly informed Iran’s foreign minister about this clandestine

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approach, thus gaining the confidence of Zahedi’s government. But the Shah was upset that he had been exposed as not trusting his prime minister.23 Wright soon found that “there is much latent support for Musaddiq throughout the country.” He informed Eden that although Za­ hedi’s “Government appear to be well in control . . . they lack popular support.” He added that AIOC “would be courting disas­ ter” if it returned to Iran. His advice was that Britain should gen­ uinely show her good faith to Iran and that “a reasonable settlement will do more than any words.”24 Meanwhile, Herbert Hoover, Jr., pursued his consortium idea, which ran against U.S. antitrust laws. In fact the U.S. Justice Depart­ ment on April 21,1953, had filed a civil complaint against some of the very same American oil companies that Hoover had in mind for his consortium. It was alleged that these companies “have un­ lawfully . . . monopolized trade and commerce in petroleum and products,” and that they had fixed oil prices while dividing world markets among themselves.25 There were ways to obtain antitrust immunity, however, by the use of such catchwords as “the threat of communism” and “the security interests of the free world.” Backed by President Eisenhower and the National Security Council, Hoover obtained clearance from Herbert Brownell, the U.S. at­ torney general, to proceed with the formation of a consortium to run Iran’s oil industry.26 He followed this up by holding discussions with some major U.S. oil companies, telling them that their cooper­ ation was considered essential by the National Security Council.27 Fraser, who had come to realize that AIOC could no longer operate alone in Iran, invited the presidents of seven major oil companies to London for discussions on the formation of a consor­ tium. As if he considered these corporation heads below his rank, Fraser’s invitation was signed by Eric Drake, his deputy.28 In mid-December, Hoover and the representatives of eight major oil companies—Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, Gulf, Socony-Vacuum, Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), Shell, and AIOC—met for three days in AIOC’s offices in London. Fraser, who opened the meeting, stated that in any future arrangement he wanted AIOC to have 50 percent participa­ tion; other companies desiring to have a share in Iran’s oil industry

3 i6

OU, Power, and Principle

should pay adequate compensation to AIOC for their participation. Hoover opposed AIOC having so large a share in the consortium, saying that it was politically unrealistic. Dulles strengthened his hand by hinting that “the present Persian government had been put in office by the Americans.”29 It followed that the initiative should remain in American hands and that Britain and AIOC would do better to keep a low profile. After much wrangling, AIOC agreed to accept 40 percent, leav­ ing 40 percent to U.S. oil companies and 12 percent to Shell. Fraser offered the remaining 8 percent to CFP, but the Americans objected; because the French company was subject to British domination, the proposed arrangement would give AIOC working control over the consortium. Agreement was finally reached at the end of March when CFP consented to take no more than 6 percent. This increased Shell’s share from 1z percent to 14 percent.30 The next step was to arrive at a financial deal with Fraser, which proved to be a formidable task. On March 12, 1954, Hoover and the representatives of the consortium met again in London, where Fraser divulged his thoughts on what he expected the other com­ panies to pay AIOC for their participation. He said one approach to the problem was to calculate how much AIOC had lost by being deprived of Iran’s oil reserves, which he estimated at 5.5 billion tons. Considering these reserves to be the property of his company, he stated that their value underground at 20 cents per barrel would amount to over $8 billion. Rather than ask for so much, however, he proposed that the companies pay AIOC 10 cents per barrel for a certain amount of production as well as cash totaling $1.267 bil­ lion, based on 100 percent participation. In addition he expected Iran to pay compensation “for rupture of agreement” by providing AIOC with 110 million tons of free oil over a 20-year period. At the then current price of $1.90 per barrel this came to $1.463 billion, an amount that Fraser did not consider “burdensome to Iran’s econ­ omy.” Fraser thus sought, in addition to 10 cents a barrel on oil produced by new participants, a total of $2.73 billion (on a 100 percent basis) as compensation for AIOC’s losses in Iran.31 It is worth noting that the company’s annual statement for 1951 had valued its installations in Iran at $94 million. The American oil companies and Shell submitted counterpro-

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posais arguing that any payments made to AIOC in consideration of its rights and interests in Iran should be based on the commercial value of those rights and not on Iran’s reserves. Furthermore, they argued that if AIOC sold its rights, it could not at the same time claim compensation of $1.463 billion in free oil from Iran. They suggested that payments to AIOC (on a 100 percent basis) should total $800 million.32 This was the amount that Walter Levy had estimated to be the total value of AIOC’s enterprise in Iran. When Fraser stuck to his proposal, Hoover cabled Dulles that if the consortium were to negotiate a 50-50 type arrangement with Iran, there was no reason for Iran to pay compensation to AIOC. Furthermore, he argued that AIOC, as a participant in the consor­ tium, would not be deprived of any future operating profits because it would be getting as much Iranian oil as it could market; thus “it is not giving up or selling out anything which would cut back its present business.” Hoover called Fraser’s proposals “absolutely un­ acceptable.”33 Henderson agreed, calling Fraser’s demand for pay­ ment of compensation by Iran “fantastic.” He pointed out that Iran had hundreds of millions of dollars of counterclaims, most of which were considered valid by French and Belgian jurists. In his opinion AIOC’s best course was to cancel these counterclaims by ignoring its own claims.34 Irritated by Fraser’s exorbitant demands, Dulles cabled Winthrop Aldrich, U.S. ambassador in London, asking him to tell Eden that unless Fraser drastically changed his attitude American companies would break off negotiations. He added: “Such a development would undoubtedly . . . force us to reconsider our whole attitude toward the Iranian oil question since it would appear impossible ever to obtain a reasonable solution to the Anglo-Iranian oil dis­ pute in the face of such obstacles. It might ultimately force us, with great reluctance, to review the whole scope of our Middle East relationships.”35 This was an ultimatum that Eden could not ignore. To calm nerves in Washington, he advised the State Department that if Iran accepted a 50-50 arrangement, all that AIOC would ask in compen­ sation would be “a net sum in the order of £100 million [$280 million]” and not the $1.463 billion worth of oil demanded by Fraser. With regard to payment by participants, Eden informed

3ï 8

Oil, Powery and Principle

Aldrich that he had told Fraser to find an acceptable medium be­ tween his figure and that of the American group. An agreement was finally reached on March 19, when AlOC reduced its claim to $1 billion (on a 100 percent basis). This meant that the five U.S. majors. Shell, and the French company had to pay to AIOC $600 million for their 60 percent participation. Of this amount, $150 million had to be paid in cash and the balance at the rate of 10 cents per barrel over twenty-four years.36 What remained unsettled was the sum of £100 million that Brit­ ain expected Iran to pay as compensation. Henderson cabled both Dulles and Hoover that paying compensation would cause Iran to receive less income per barrel than other oil-producing countries. Moreover, an agreement giving Iran no control over her oil indus­ try, dividing the profits equally between Iran and the consortium, and forcing the country to pay compensation as well “will generally be considered in Iran despite all face saving devices as national capitulation.” Byroade, too, considered it absurd for AIOC to claim anything from Iran. But the British insisted. To keep Iran in isolation and deprive her of U.S. support, the British government proposed that the amount of compensation be left to Britain to negotiate directly with Iran. Hoover and Aldrich yielded to this proposal when they found that the whole consortium deal would collapse if they did not.37 Early in April 1954, the London negotiations ended with a memo­ randum of understanding entitled “Basis for Settlement with AngloIranian.” The eight signers agreed to form an oil consortium com­ posed of AIOC with a 40 percent share, American companies 40 percent, Shell 14 percent, and CFP 6 percent. The five American companies, with a share of 8 percent each, were Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Socony-Vacuum, Texaco, and Gulf. Before the consortium representatives left for Tehran, Ambas­ sador, Sir Roger Stevens, sent Eden a report on the political situa­ tion in Iran. “Nationalistic principles remain sacred,” he told Eden, and the government “cannot afford an agreement which does not look presentable.” Mossadeq’s legacy, he said, could not be simply ignored; indeed, it would haunt the impending negotiations. He added:

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It will be no ordinary trial of wits. I should compare it rather to a meeting of co-executors of the estate of an elderly crank as troublesome in death as in life. He has left an eccentric will to which the settlement must outwardly conform, but the execu­ tors are really engaged together in a conspiracy to interpret the will liberally enough to enable the monies to be invested in such a way as to bring maximum profit to all the beneficiaries.38 The negotiators began their discussions in Tehran in mid-April 1954. The British government sent David Serpell of the Treasury and Angus Beckett of the Ministry of Fuel and Power to Tehran to monitor the negotiations. Beckett had an additional job: to “trail” Hoover and report on his every word and move. To this end he booked a room in the same hotel as Hoover and tried repeatedly to engage him in conversation. But he found little to report to his superiors about Hoover “except for an occasional crack at the British” and a tendency “to sneak off to bed.”39 To smooth negotiations with Iran after twenty-eight months of open hostility on the part of the British, Eden stated in the House of Commons on April 12 that Britain welcomed the establishment of the consortium and that his government’s policy was “to do all in their power to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Persia.” As we have seen, this was far from the truth. Moreover, not everyone in Britain was happy about a mixed consortium taking over oil opera­ tions in Iran. The Sunday Express wrote on April 18 : With Mosadeq . . . pushed out, you might expect our full legal rights to be restored to us. If you do you underestimate the power of American oil interests. After months of secret nego­ tiations, there is to be a “cut-up”. . . . The carve-up means that Britain will no longer have exclusive control over any oil terri­ tory in the world, except Brunei in Borneo.. . . The lion is not only having his tail twisted; he is being skinned. And the British Government. . . is acquiescing tamely in the skinning. Negotiations in Tehran were conducted by Orville Harden, chair­ man of Jersey Standard, on behalf of the U.S. oil companies; H. E. Snow, a director of AIOC; and John Loudon, president of Shell. F. R. Berbigier of CFP attended as an observer. On the Iranian side

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was a committee of three headed by Finance Minister Dr. Ali Amini, a French-educated economist who was an in-law of Mossadeq’s and had served briefly in his Cabinet. No less important was an Iranian subcommittee of four that dealt with technical and legal details and met with its counterparts from the consortium.40 For help in the negotiations Iran originally employed two consul­ tants, but Ambassador Stevens disapproved of both men and per­ suaded the Iranians to replace them with Torkild Rieber, a former president of Texaco, who had been suggested by Hoover. It is interesting to note that before making this suggestion Hoover con­ sulted Eden, who endorsed it but cautioned that his endorsement should not be made known to Iran.41 As Eden expected, Rieber and his assistant Wortham Davenport, an American lawyer, furthered the consortium’s aims rather than Iran’s. For example, when the Iranians asked the two men how much oil they might be able to sell without bringing in foreign oil companies, they replied, “As much as you can pour in your hat.”42 On behalf of the British government Stevens, Wright, Serpell, and Beckett attended the negotiations as observers. Other observers were Henderson and William Rountree of the U.S. embassy and the Dutch minister in Tehran.43 The consortium representatives began their negotiations with an effort at deception. They submitted a proposal that in reality gave the participating companies full managerial and operational control of the Iranian oil industry and yet “one which would not make it appear as though Iran Government had, contrary to nationalization law and deeply felt desire of Iran public, removed itself from control of industry.” The Iranians rejected the proposal, saying that they expected the consortium to function as an agent of NIOC. The consortium representatives argued that such an arrangement would encourage other oil-producing countries in which they operated to nationalize and ask for similar terms.44 Other differences became apparent among the consortium mem­ bers themselves. The British, as a matter of prestige as well as a desire to maintain maximum control, wanted the nationality of the consortium company and its managers to be British, its place of registration in London, and its location at AIOC headquarters in the British capital. The Iranians were “hysterically antagonistic” to

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U.K. registration and management. Shell and the American com­ panies opposed British management, preferring Dutch, and wanted the company’s location to be Iran so as to minimize British inter­ ference. Fraser opposed Dutch registration and management “un­ less they were purely ‘brass plate’ companies and steps were taken to ensure that the real business was controlled in London.”45 The consortium was intent on giving Iran 50 percent of the net profits, but the Iranian government feared that “undisguised 50-50 profit sharing” would lead the public to accuse it of capitulation. Furthermore, there was the question of the currency in which pay­ ments to Iran would be made. The British wanted payments to be in pound sterling so as to bring Iran’s foreign expenditures under British exchange controls. The five American oil companies, all of which had access to major oil supplies in the Middle East and elsewhere, had joined the consor­ tium “in the interest of the policy of the United States Government.” They were not prepared, however, to make any arrangement that was not beneficial to them. Thus, whenever AIOC tried to impose its will or Iran did not accept their conditions, the American com­ panies simply threatened to pull out.46 All these differences brought the negotiations to a stalemate, and the consortium representatives decided to leave Tehran for con­ sultations with their principals. In addition, the U.S. oil companies considered it essential to consult the U.S. administration. At a highlevel meeting in Washington on May 21,1954, attended by, among others, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Anderson, and the representatives of the five Amer­ ican companies, the company representatives made it clear that in their judgment any arrangement with Iran should be on a 50-50 ba­ sis, payments to Iran should be made chiefly in the form of Iranian income tax so as to exempt this money from American taxes, the duration of the agreement should be the same as that of the AIOC concession, and the consortium should have “full and effective management of all oil operations.” The U.S. government officials supported the companies’ position. They argued that “failure to achieve a settlement would not only threaten US commercial inter­ ests in the Middle East b u t . . . would threaten US national security,” which necessitated saving Iran from communist control.”47

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Meanwhile, in Tehran, Zahedi’s problems were not confined to the oil question. Hoping to remove him from office with American consent, the Shah asked Henderson who he thought should be prime minister if Zahedi failed to reach an oil agreement within the framework of the nationalization law. Henderson replied that a solution could be found within a “liberal interpretation” of the law, and that it was unwise to change the Cabinet in the middle of oil negotiations. Henderson asked the British, too, to advise the Shah against a change of government at this juncture, and the Foreign Office complied. As Aldrich noted, however, the British avoided “specific endorsement of Zahedi (regarding whom they evidently have some reservations).”48 All this time the British were pressing Iran on the question of compensation. In a note to the Iranian government, Ambassador Stevens said the consortium negotiations could not come to a suc­ cessful end until the compensation issue was settled. In a disingenu­ ous attempt to portray AIOC as magnanimous, Stevens’s note said that the company did not intend to claim compensation for the loss of future profits or for assets to be used by the consortium. It did intend to claim compensation for having been deprived of ioo million tons of Iranian oil between 1951 and 1954, during which time it had been “forced to incur abnormal expenditure” to pur­ chase oil for its customers from other sources. And it intended to claim compensation for the Kermanshah refinery, the Nafti-Shah oil field, and the internal distribution facilities that were to be left to the Iranian government. In the course of discussions, the British re­ vealed that all these claims added up to £263 million.49 The Iranians rejected AIOC’s pretense of magnanimity in over­ looking future profits and the cost of installations; plainly, they said, the company could not claim compensation from Iran for these interests and at the same time sell them to the consortium. They also rejected the claim that the company had been deprived of Iranian oil for three years, saying that Iran had repeatedly offered to sell oil and that AIOC had refused to buy it. They then enumerated in detail Iran’s counterclaims, which added up to more than £300 million. These included unpaid royalties and taxes, Iran’s share in AIOC’s reserves and dividends, and finally a sum of £50 million to repay damage attributable to the British oil boycott. In the course of

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eighteen sessions of hard bargaining, a settlement was reached at the end of July 1954 in which Iran agreed to pay a net compensation of £25 million in ten yearly installments of £2.5 million beginning in 1 9 5 7 , 5 0

Regarding the currency in which the consortium would pay Iran, Finance Minister Amini believed that the best arrangement would be for each member company to pay in the currency of its own country. The British, as we have seen, insisted on sterling, which would compel Iran to import items from the sterling area even when such items were not competitively priced. The French had earlier threatened to withdraw from the group if they were compelled to “pay for oil in sterling convertible only at the pleasure of the British who would be in [a] position [to] give British firms preference over the French.” Henderson, too, considered it unfair to give Britain a “whip hand over Iranian foreign trade,” and Secretary of the Trea­ sury Humphrey noted that such an arrangement would discriminate against U.S. exports. It was finally agreed that payments to Iran would be made in sterling, but that Britain would convert 40 per­ cent of Iran’s receipts from the consortium to other currencies needed in Iranian trade.51 The second round of consortium negotiations began on June 22, 1954. In this round the chief representative of the U.S. oil com­ panies was Howard Page, vice president and director of Jersey Standard, replacing Harden, who had taken ill. Page, who had joined Jersey Standard twenty-five years earlier, had shown his shrewd negotiating ability on various occasions. Furthermore, he had excellent credentials with the British for having wholeheartedly backed the Iranian oil boycott. During the course of negotiations, the Iranians continued to resist allowing the consortium to take full control of management and pay Iran 50 percent of the profits. But they were not in a strong position. The government, installed by an Anglo-American coup, could not stand against the companies supported by the coup makers. Amini’s only hope was to obtain terms that would not look humiliating to the Iranian public. In the opinion of John Loudon, president of Shell, who attended the meetings, “Amini was a good negotiator and was honest in his argumentation of Iran’s case,” but he knew that Iran was in a weak position and thus “did not try hard to bargain for

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more than 50% of the profits.” The other side, fully exploiting Iran’s weakness, made its offer and said “Take it or leave it.” As Amini recalled, “Whenever I pressed on for better terms. Page would say, ‘The U.S. Government has asked us to find markets for your oil; if you don’t like our terms we will go back home.’ ”52 By mid-July the problem had boiled down to “reaching agreement on language.” On the one hand, it was necessary to satisfy the demands of the consortium regarding the management and control of Iran’s oil industry; on the other hand, it was necessary to convince the Iranian public that Iran’s nationalization of oil had not been nullified. The legal counsel of the eight participating companies, in consultation with Iranian delegates, worked out the wording and on August 4 drew up a “Heads of Agreement” embodying the princi­ ples agreed upon. On the following day President Eisenhower sent a flattering mes­ sage to the Shah asking his support for the agreement. Although he knew that the Shah had hardly played a role in the negotiations, the president praised him for making “a valuable contribution” to their success. To the sovereign who had fled his country twelve months earlier, the president said, “I have watched closely your courageous efforts, your steadfastness over the past difficult years.” And now the oil settlement would be “a significant step in the direction of the realization of your aspirations for your people.”53 Delighted by the president’s message, which was publicized on the same day, the Shah urged the Majlis to approve the consortium agreement. The agreement in its detailed form was completed on August 29, 1954, and initialed by Amini and Page. To forestall legal problems the agreement was passed on to Attorney General Brownell, who assured President Eisenhower that it did not violate antitrust laws and would serve the national security interests of the United States. As we have seen, Brownell’s predecessor, James McGranery, had reported in January 1953 that the oil cartel’s domination of the world oil markets was “a serious threat to our national security.”54 Four days later “The Iranian Consortium Agreement and Related Documents” were signed by Amini and Morteza-Quli Bayat, man­ aging director of NIOC. The agreement gave NIOC nominal ownership of the Iranian oil industry’s assets. But it provided for the establishment of two oper-

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ating companies in Iran, one for exploration and production and the other for refining, both of them wholly owned by the consor­ tium and both given full powers on behalf of NIOC to manage and control all operations. Furthermore, these powers could not be revoked or modified by any “general or special legislative or admin­ istrative measures or any act whatsoever of or emanating from Iran.” The period of the agreement was for twenty-five years, and it could be renewed, if the consortium desired, for up to three five-year terms. This brought the total period to forty years ending in 1994, which more or less coincided with the termination of AIOC’s con­ cessionary agreement of 1933. Iran was to receive 50 percent of the net profits under a complicated formula designed to make the divi­ sion of profits appear more favorable to the Iranians. Payments to Iran were to be in the form of taxes to the Iranian government so that the companies could get tax credits from their governments against their payments to Iran.55 The consortium members were not prepared to sign the agree­ ment in Tehran lest doing so make any arbitration of differences between the signatories subject to the interpretation of Iranian laws. Thus copies of the agreement were flown by chartered plane to London, where they were signed on September 20 by AIOC, Shell, and CFP. On the same day they were flown to New York and signed by the chairmen of the five U.S. oil companies. The terms of the agreement were no more favorable than those of concessionary arrangements elsewhere, nor did Iran have any say in the management of her oil industry. But to give NIOC the appear­ ance of usefulness, it was allowed to be in charge of “non-basic” operations such as housing, health, and education. To overcome the differences concerning the nationality of the consortium and its management and location, a multinational creature was hatched whose organs were scattered in various countries. The two operat­ ing companies were incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands but registered in Iran. The shares of these companies were held by Iranian Oil Participants, a consortium holding company incorpo­ rated in London. The operating companies had a board of seven members, two of them Iranian; and the general management was Dutch.56 No less important was a secret agreement between the participât-

32 6

Oil, Power; and Principle

ing companies that established a scale for the amount of oil to be produced by each in Iran and tied this to production levels in other countries in which the consortium members operated. Thus Iran’s oil income was at the mercy of the consortium, which could limit her production if it so decided. By such monopolistic practices the cartel controlled the production of oil and consequently its price in world markets. On September 21, 1954, Amini presented a bill to the Majlis endorsing the agreement. Prime Minister Zahedi, who shared the fears of Loy Henderson and Denis Wright that any agreement perceived as invalidating nationalization would not be approved, had taken precautionary measures well in advance. Months earlier, Mossadeq and a number of other National Front leaders had been tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death or imprisonment (see Chapter 22). Furthermore, martial law had been imposed, and the military governor had arrested anyone thought likely to be critical of a consortium agreement. Among those arrested was Mostafa Fateh, a former senior executive of AIOC, who was most knowledgeable on Iranian oil. To eliminate any worries about the Majlis, Zahedi had taken the precaution of arranging for new elections in which the ballot boxes produced most of the government-sponsored candidates. In the words of one CIA official who was on the spot at the time, “Zahedi selected his own candidates and bulldozed the elections.”57 In addition, a long publicity campaign had been carried out to discredit Mossadeq’s handling of nationalization and to persuade the public that Zahedi’s government had achieved the same purpose through the consortium. Even so, National Front supporters in Abadan and Tehran staged demonstrations against the proposed agreement. Moreover, Mossa­ deq, who was then in jail, did not remain silent. Under the pretext of demanding a review of the military tribunal’s verdict, he wrote a twenty-nine-page petition of which twenty-seven pages concerned the oil dispute and the consortium deal. The petition, which was passed on to his lawyer and clandestinely distributed, said that the government, in open defiance of the Nationalization Act and the in­ terests of the nation, had agreed to place Iran’s oil industry in the hands of foreigners for another forty years while NIOC, which

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should have been in charge, was left with such trivial duties as housing and transportation in oil areas. Moreover, he said, the government had created an environment in which no one was allowed to criticize its “disastrous action.” As for the West, if it was serious about fighting communism, it should avoid greedy exploita­ tion of the weak. He concluded that it was now clear to all why he had been imprisoned: it was because he refused to compromise the sovereignty of Iran.58 The local papers did not dare to voice any criticism of the con­ sortium agreement. But Hassan Sadr, one of Mossadeq’s lawyers, published in his newspaper an article reproaching Britain and the United States for showing concern over communist threats to Iran while doing everything they could to force her into leaving her oil industry in their hands. “If they were genuinely interested in our independence,” he said, “was it not fairer to get compensation from us as they did in Mexico, and give us the freedom to run our oil industry?” This was the last issue of his paper. The next day Zahedi’s government stopped its publication.59 The Majlis began debating the consortium bill on October 10, 1954. The opposition was confined to five members, among them M. Darakhshesh, president of the Teachers’ Union, who was greatly upset when hundreds of his colleagues were arrested for opposing the bill. Darakhshesh stated that the agreement was clear evidence that Iran’s ruling class sought its selfish aims through collaboration with foreign interests. He criticized the agreement in legal and financial detail while stressing that it ran contrary to nationalization law and the long-held aspirations of the people. He revealed that his speech was based on materials dropped over the wall to his house by well-informed experts who feared arrest if they personally criticized the bill. His and others’ attacks on the bill had no impact. The Shah, pleased at having received the personal backing of President Eisen­ hower, put his weight behind the bill, telling deputies that he would regard a vote against it as a vote against his person. On October 21 the Majlis ratified the “Consortium Agreement” by 113 to 5 with 10 abstentions; a week later the Senate ratified it with 4 against and 4 abstentions. The Shah endorsed it on October 29.60 The consortium members, knowing in advance that the bill would

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be passed, had sent tankers to Abadan, and they began loading on the following day. The first tanker was AIOC’s—a symbolic gesture to demonstrate that the company was alive and active in Iran. As an added symbol of its power in Iran, H. E. Snow, one of its directors, was appointed general manager of Iranian Oil Participants. This holding company, which had been established in London by the consortium, was entrusted with overall policy decisions on Iranian oil. Not all problems, however, had been solved. The American inde­ pendent oil companies were angry at being excluded from the con­ sortium. Months before the agreement was concluded, a public relations firm wrote a letter on their behalf to John Foster Dulles saying that “the State Department is a party . . . to the creation of a monopoly in the sale and distribution” of Iranian oil. They accused the department of siding with AIOC against Iran’s nationalization by preventing the sale of Iranian oil to American independents, while assisting in the formation of a cartel to pull “England’s invest­ ment chestnuts out of fire.” They pointed out that AIOC as a partner in the consortium was the “de facto Foreign Office of the British Government where its own interests are involved.” Above all, they wanted to buy oil from Iran “without paying tribute to another Government or one of her agents.”61 Realizing that if the independents were left out they would create a major row, the State Department, “for no other reason than a desire to pay lip-service to free competition,” persuaded the five U.S. companies in the consortium each to relinquish, at cost, one eighth of their share to “qualified” U.S. independents. Their shares were accordingly reduced from 8 percent to 7 percent to make room for nine U.S. independents, who formed a group called Iricon with a 5 percent share in the consortium.62 In response to the ratification of the consortium agreement AIOC stock rose to about four times its level at the time of the 1951 oil crisis. In November AIOC changed its name to that of one of its subsidiaries, British Petroleum. At the same time the company gave its shareholders a bonus of 400 percent by providing four shares to the owner of each ordinary share, saying that this was done “in accordance with the growth and wealth of the Company and now that it is free from the uncertainty of Iranian involvement.” Four

An O il Consortium Takes O ver

3 29

months later, on February 15,1955, R. A. Butler, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the House of Commons that “the value of the Government’s holding [in the former AIOC] at the close of business yesterday was just over £233,000,000.” The British government had paid £5 million for these shares. In the words of John Strachey, Secretary of State for War in Attlee’s Cabinet, “this last British empire, the empire of oil, has ‘paid’ better than any other.”63 At the same time, however, AIOC’s excessive greed, as personified by its chairman. Sir William Fraser, made no small contribution to the decline of this empire. The British government, which had witnessed Fraser’s disastrous handling of the Iranian oil dispute, finally looked for some face-saving way of replacing him as the company’s chairman. Late in 1954 he was falsely acclaimed as the architect of the consortium deal, but in 1956 he was removed from the chairmanship while being honored with the title of Baron Strathalmond of Pumpherstone. The oil magnate Calouste Gulbenkian commented that he should have been called Lord Crude of Aba­ dan.64 Fraser died in April 1970. Iran paid heavily for going after a shadow of nationalization under the consortium agreement. All that was in fact nationalized and transferred to Iran was the country’s internal distribution facili­ ties, the Nafti-Shah oil fields, and the Kermanshah refinery, whose products were not exported. These were worth at most £10 million, yet in return for them Iran paid £25 million and was forced to waive over £100 million of indisputable claims.65 The sums Iran paid and the claims she waived, made her oil income consider­ ably less than the 50 percent envisaged in the consortium agree­ ment. Instead of going after the appearance of nationalization, Zahedi’s government would have done better to tell the Iranian people the truth: namely, that given the prevailing situation, Iran’s best course was to accept an equal division of profits and wait for a better opportunity in the future to nationalize her oil industry. Had the government chosen this course, it could have gained more than 50 percent of the net profits because under the 1933 concession it could also claim 20 percent of AIOC’s worldwide profits. In fact, in August 1951, when Lord Stokes tried his hand at settling the oil dispute, he was under instructions from the British government to

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try to get Iran to agree to a 50-50 split of the profits, and to settle Iran’s 20 percent interest in AIOC’s worldwide profits by offering “a down payment to buy them off.”66 Stokes never had a chance to make this offer because Iran at that point would consider nothing but nationalization. It is surprising, however, that during the consortium negotiations the Iranians never raised this claim as a bargaining point when they gave up the idea of nationalization. Apparently the obsession with achieving even the merest show of nationalization had been so powerful as to destroy their ability to distinguish between illusion and reality. In the United States and Britain there was jubilation at the settle­ ment of the oil dispute. Secretary of State Dulles praised Hoover for his “remarkable contribution” to the consortium negotiations. Brit­ ish ambassador Stevens lauded Howard Page for his “brilliant com­ bination of industry and imagination,” but had little praise for Hoover, whom he considered “affable, intelligent, forceful” but “unscrupulous and fundamentally dishonest.” He applauded the settlement as bringing “the return of AIOC to Persia as 40% mem­ bers of the Consortium and a revival of British prestige and influ­ ence all through this area.”67 Sir Eric Drake, AIOC’s general manager and later chairman of British Petroleum, believes in retrospect that AIOC could not have operated alone in Iran as before. “Things could have been delayed if the Company had settled the dispute earlier, but they could not be stopped altogether.” He believes that “the consortium agreement was to the Company’s benefit as it took the load off our back.” The load he refers to was the work of Fraser, who he concedes was shortsighted and narrow-minded.68 Mossadeq’s view, reflected in his memoirs, was that the govern­ ment’s acceptance of the consortium agreement was “an open and disastrous treachery to the nation.. . . As long as the Iranians have no control over their own oil industry they would not be able to achieve freedom and independence.”69 Other Iranian nationalists felt the same way. Some outside views are also of interest. Edith Penrose, known for her writings on the role of international firms, rightly states that under the consortium agreement, the Iranians were “in no better

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position to intervene directly in their price, offtake or investment arrangements than are the governments of other producing coun­ tries.” Jerald Walden agrees: the establishment of the consortium “represented a resounding triumph for the British and the Interna­ tional Petroleum Cartel and a catastrophic defeat for the national aspirations of Iran.” Anthony Sampson has written that the forma­ tion of the consortium marked “the apogee of the influence of the seven sisters [the seven major oil companies] both with the Middle East governments and with their own home governments.” David Painter believes that the consortium “helped the major oil com­ panies maintain their control over the world oil economy.” A. H. Frankel observes that “any stake in that [consortium] venture was like getting ‘a licence to print money.’ ” By contrast, the Iranian economist F. Fesharaki finds some conso­ lation for his countrymen. In his view, “Perhaps the most significant consequence of the nationalization was the creation of the N IO C . . . the first national oil company in a major oil producing country.” This company, by observing the operations of the consortium, grad­ ually obtained a great deal of experience and knowhow, which enabled it later to operate globally on its own.70 Few of these analysts make what might be the most important point of all: that the transition from an all-British monopoly to one in which U.S. companies owned a major share reflected the realities of American power— a power that was to play a major role in Iran for the following twenty-five years.

22

The Coup’s Aftermath

ith Mossadeq’s government overthrown and nationalist lead­ ers imprisoned, it remained for the British, with American backing, to make sure that there would be no popular challenge to General Zahedi’s government and its consortium deal. The Shah, humiliated by Mossadeq and others who had exposed his collabo­ ration with the British, was more than willing to help. To serve his own purposes as well as those of his Anglo-American allies, he subjected his imprisoned adversaries to a military trial. Zahedi’s government took every precautionary measure to en­ sure that there would be no public reaction to Mossadeq’s trial. The trial took place at a time when martial law was imposed, demon­ strations banned, newspapers sympathetic to the National Front suppressed, and nationalist and Tudeh leaders jailed. Indeed, many persons deemed hostile to the regime were summarily executed. Mossadeq’s trial began in the second week of November 1953. The Shah personally appointed General Nasrollah Mogbeli as chief judge and Major General Hossein Azmudeh as military prosecutor. As Mossadeq’s attorney the court appointed Colonel Jalil Bozorgmehr, who proved to be less tractable than expected. In his bill of indictment, Azmudeh accused Mossadeq of mali­ cious intent to traduce Iran’s constitution; it was alleged that he had sought to eradicate the monarchy and replace it with a republic. To this end he had disobeyed the Shah’s order for his dismissal and instigated the people against the Shah. Telling the court that Mossa­ deq’s actions constituted treason to the monarchy and the state, Azmudeh asked for the death penalty.1 Mossadeq rejected these allegations. What the people of Iran were witnessing, he said, was a trial staged by foreigners to serve their aims. Not only was he not against monarchy, but if anyone had

W

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demonstrated his disregard for the constitution it was the Shah, who had had no constitutional right to issue an order for his dis­ missal. In fact, said Mossadeq, he was still the prime minister, and if there were any allegations against him they should be raised in the civil court specifically set up for the trial of government officials. The prosecutor replied by attacking Mossadeq, calling him “a vile liar” and a man with “a doctoral degree in treachery and crime.” He went so far as to claim that Mossadeq, under the facade of fighting against colonialism, had exerted all his effort to derail the anticolonial movement pioneered by none other than the Shah. Worse yet, Mossadeq was the enemy of Islam and “does not believe in the day of divine creation and the day of judgement.” Mossadeq in turn denounced the prosecutor. To slander a consti­ tutionally elected prime minister, he said, was to slander the Iranian people who had elected him. As for the accusation of being irreli­ gious, was the prosecutor’s aim to arrange for someone to kill him and then simply say that the assassin was a religious fanatic? In response to the allegation that he had thwarted the Shah’s anti­ colonial movement, Mossadeq reminded the court that the sov­ ereign’s father had come to power with Britain’s blessing and that his own opposition to Reza Shah was well-known. A memorable scene at the trial, witnessed by the writer, occurred when Mossadeq stated that he disagreed with the Shah in cases where the monarch disregarded the constitution. To be sure, he said, disagreements between kings and prime ministers were nothing new; witness the differences between King Edward VIII of Britain and Stanley Baldwin. Before he could finish, the prosecutor shouted: “Shut up and sit down. How could a prime minister allow himself to disagree with his sovereign? This can in no way happen.” Mossadeq sat down and, as if wanting to take a nap, put his head on his attorney’s shoulder. After repeated demands by the judge to resume his defense, he told the court in a sarcastic tone, “Since I enjoy the statements of the military prosecutor, I prefer that he does all the talking.” As Elwell-Sutton put it, “the old man by sheer resourceful­ ness and audacity turned [the trial] into a complete farce.”2 Mossadeq’s trial took place during the consortium negotiations, which he was eager to derail. He repeatedly brought up the subject of oil, saying that it would be open treachery to ignore Iran’s

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nationalization law and conclude a contract on the basis of an equal division of profits, giving half of Iran’s oil revenues to the wealthiest companies in the world. He pointed out that when certain foreign powers had come to realize that he was not going to place Iran’s sovereignty and resources at their disposal, they had used every possible means to effect his downfall. He belittled the court for trying to condemn someone who had successfully defended Iran’s case at the U.N. Security Council and the World Court. He sharply contrasted the fairness of international tribunals with that of a “foreign” court at home. His most telling statement, one that sums up his political perception and the reasons for his downfall, was made in his final defense. He said: In the course of Iran’s constitutional history, this is the first time that a legally elected prime minister has been subjected to imprisonment and burdened with accusations.. . . Numerous sins have been attributed to me, but I know that I have com­ mitted no more than one, and that is that I have not yielded to the whims of foreigners. Throughout the course of my prime ministership I had only one objective in both domestic and for­ eign policy, and that was to have the nation command its own destiny___I have come to the conclusion that without securing freedom and independence it will not be possible for the Ira­ nians to overcome the numerous obstacles on their way to prosperity and greatness. I did the best I could in this regard.. . . It is a fact that [by treating me in this fashion] they want to give a lesson to others.. . . My only wish, however, is that the Iranian nation should fully realize the immensity and impor­ tance of its [independence] movement and that it should under no circumstances shrink from the pursuit of its honorable goal. . . . For over a century the destructive and fatal policies of foreigners have affected the fate of our homeland . . . [I refer] particularly [to] the political and economic interference of the British imperial power and the open and covert domination of its former oil company, which for half a century deprived us of opportunities of honorable revival. The way my colleagues and I are treated here . . . will demonstrate to the world that the magnitude and scope of the

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power which foreigners still wield in this country are much greater than was imagined.. . . . . . My trial is not dissimilar to that of Marshal Pétain.. . . Like him I am put on the stand of the accused in old age, and maybe I will be convicted like him. But. . . there is an outstand­ ing difference between the two cases, since Pétain was tried by the French for having collaborated with the enemy of France, whereas I am being tried by the agents of foreigners for having fought against the enemy of Iran.3 Throughout the course of the trial, Mossadeq defended himself with dignity, never deviating from his principles in an effort to buy himself acquittal. The Shah wished Mossadeq to be hanged for having panicked him into his humiliating flight to Bagdad and Rome. But this was beyond the Shah’s powers. Mossadeq was still popular at home and respected abroad for his determined stand against foreign domination. On the heels of his detention in August 1953 a number of foreign dignitaries, including representatives at the U.N. Security Council and judges of the World Court, had sent messages to Iran in Mossadeq’s praise; and U.S. ambassador Hen­ derson, speaking for the State Department, made it clear to Zahedi that Mossadeq’s life should be spared. Well before the end of the trial, the Shah decided that Mossadeq should be sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and revealed this decision to Kermit Roose­ velt.4 This was exactly the sentence imposed by the military court. When the chief judge announced the sentence, Mossadeq stated: “The verdict of this court indeed augments my honor in history.” The court also tried and convicted many of Mossadeq’s aides, among them his foreign minister, Hossein Fatemi, who was sen­ tenced to death. Before his execution by a firing squad, he told Azmudeh, “My death will be an honorable one, one that teaches the young generation to defend their homeland with their blood and not to let foreigners govern their country. . . . When I closed the doors of the British Embassy, I was unaware of the fact that while this royal court functions, Britain does not need an embassy here.”5 The Iranian drive toward freedom from foreign domination had been defeated. “For a brief euphoric moment Iranians had deluded themselves into believing that they could assert their independence,”

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but they soon realized that “this had been a dream and that the British once again, this time working through the Americans, had demonstrated their ability to turn back even thè strongest Iranian challenge.”6 Iranian liberals were particularly disillusioned. Before the coup, they had perceived the United States as heading up a new postwar world order that promoted the freedom of nations. Today as always relations between nations are governed chiefly by interest and power. Attempts are made to modify the thrust of power by establishing certain international legal principles, but when a dispute arises between the strong and the weak, it is power, rather than moral and legal principles, that determines the outcome. Ebrahim Khajenuri, an Iranian political writer, warned his country­ men long ago not to be fooled by the aura of righteousness and fairness exhibited by some foreign powers, but to be on the watch for the sort of tricky games they play in the name of politics.7 The question remains whether the American intervention in Iran was in the long-term interest of the United States. Few today would claim that it was. As George McGhee put it, the coup in Iran resulted “in a great loss of confidence in us by other nations,” particularly those struggling for freedom and independence.8 Na­ tions that looked upon the United States as the defender of freedom and democracy were disillusioned when America took the opposite course in Iran. As Justice William O. Douglas observed, “ [Mossadeq], whom I am proud to call my friend, was a democrat in the LaFollette-Norris sense of the term. We united with the British to destroy him; we succeeded and ever since our name has not been an honored one in the Middle East.”9 The United States destroyed Mossadeq, who had given his people a feeling of national dignity for the first time in decades and who had established the foundations of a constitutional democracy. Worse yet, the United States took the role of protector and guarantor of an autocratic Shah. Not until the Iranian revolution of 1978 did the United States come to see that this policy had been basically wrong. Today Paul Nitze is only one of many who believe that America made a “mistake” in tying herself to “Chiang Kai-Shek in China and the Shah in Iran.” 10 In his comprehensive study The Tragedy o f American-Iratiian Relations, James Bill rightly contends that the U.S. covert opera-

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tions of August 1953 crippled American credibility. It “alienated important generations of Iranians from America” and “left a run­ ning wound that bled for twenty-five years.” 11 The anti-American and anti-Shah revolution of 1978—79 showed that “the crises of today are often current outbursts of deep and enduring social or political tides from the past.” 12 The United States by her action inadvertently drove the national­ ists, among other groups, toward extremism and revenge. When Ayatollah Khomeini pioneered the fight against the Shah, calling him an American stooge, millions were attracted to the Muslim leader without considering what he stood for. The 1953 coup in fact planted the seeds of the later revolution.13There is no doubt that the Americans as well as the British bear a heavy responsibility for what is taking place in Iran today. What, then, did the United States gain from the coup? One might argue that the American oil companies obtained a 40 percent share in Iran’s oil industry and thus made billions in profits. But this did not require a coup, since Mossadeq had repeatedly urged McGhee and Henderson to encourage U.S. oil companies to come to Iran and run her oil industry, replacing AIOC, within the framework of nationalization. Britain, too, had more attractive options than a coup. Had she stopped treating Iran as a colony and immediately followed Aramco’s lead in contracting for an equal division of profits, the Iranians would not have been so keen to nationalize their oil industry. But Britain, having been a colonial power for over a century, was in no mood to accept nationalization, and the Iranians could see no other way to free themselves from British bondage. The resulting impasse led to Britain’s loss of the AIOC concession and the surrender of 60 percent of AIOC’s interests to other oil companies. This in turn resulted in the loss of over half of the revenues that AIOC would have received from 1953 to 1978, the year of the final expropriation of foreign oil interests in Iran. From late 1973 to 1978, the price of Persian Gulf oil ranged from $10 to over $30 per barrel, and Iranian production from the former area of the AIOC rose to 5.5 million barrels per day. Thus the $600 million that AIOC obtained for the transfer of 60 percent of its interests could have been recouped within a matter of weeks had Fraser agreed to a 50-50 division of

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profits in 1951. Even after nationalization there were a number of occasions when the company was offered the opportunity to oper­ ate as the sole purchasing agent for Iranian oil with 35 percent discount, but such chances were lost when the company and the British government held out for nothing less than full control. What Britain gained from the coup was an expanded trade with Iran and development contracts, which “the Shah personally con­ trolled.” Sir Anthony Parsons, the last British ambassador to Tehran before the 1978—79 revolution, writes, “we gambled on the Shah and, for many years, our gamble paid off.” 14 But these gains are dwarfed by the enormous loss of AIOC profits, some tens of billions of dollars, owing to the surrender of 60 percent of the company’s interests. Also to be considered are the losses due to the rapid decline of Iran’s economy after the 1978—79 revolution, which led to a sharp reduction in Iran’s imports from Britain, among other Western nations. The economic as well as political costs of the 1953 coup will live on for quite some time. C. M. Woodhouse of MI6, one of the main architects of the coup and later a member of Parliament, admits that the consequences of the British action were not fore­ seen. “At that time,” he says, “we were simply relieved that a threat to British interests had been removed.” 15 The cost of such a short­ term view has been very high for Britain. There were mistakes on the Iranian side, too. Mossadeq was an idealist who did not compromise with the realities of world power. With his Jeffersonian ideas on morality and politics, he believed that since there was nothing legally wrong with his oil nationalization drive, he could win his fight against the British by appealing to America’s moral values and her anticolonial stand. U.S. prodding had been a major consideration in the British postwar withdrawal from India, Burma, Malaya, and Palestine. Mossadeq felt that the United States, in the same spirit, would help free Iran from British economic exploitation, the more readily because such exploitation made the country’s deprived masses receptive to communism. But he underestimated the underlying strength of Anglo-American rela­ tions, the cohesion of the oil cartel, and the malleability of America’s moral values, the last having been repeatedly demonstrated in Latin America.

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Mossadeq also underestimated the role that the Shah, with British prompting, could play against him; nor could he imagine that the Shah would support British interests at the expense of his own peo­ ple. At the same time he overestimated the cohesion, endurance, and resilience of his own people in pursuit of their national aspirations. To mobilize these aspirations and to advance his ideals, Mossadeq needed a properly organized political party; instead, he stood above party politics. He relied primarily on popular support and second­ arily on the National Front, a loose coalition of parties and groups composed of such diverse classes as the intelligentsia, the clergy, and the bazaar merchants. Although these groups had certain common goals, their divergence on other aims and interests later led to fac­ tionalism, which was exploited by the British and their proxies. In the end Mossadeq had nothing to rely on but popular support. In 1945 the British military attaché in Tehran observed, “The Persian, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not re­ nowned for that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances.” 16 Mossadeq was not such a Persian. Against overwhelming odds, he remained faithful to his ideals and determined to free Iran from foreign domination. He knew that the British would give him no quarter. So, as Dean Acheson put it, “he took the declaration of a fight to the finish with dignity.” 17 Mossadeq’s policy was not dictated by real-politik. Instead he seemed to follow Max Weber’s dictum that “all historical experi­ ence confirms the truth—that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossi­ ble.” Weber in his time saw the main danger to his nation as coming from the emperor’s personal rule and his lack of political account­ ability. Mossadeq found the same faults with the Shah, who by meddling in Iran’s domestic and foreign affairs impeded his nation’s progress toward parliamentary democracy and freedom from for­ eign domination. Mossadeq’s great hope was “to establish a polity which would be impervious to corruption and would, therefore, enhance the credi­ bility of the government and ultimately give substance and meaning to citizenship and political participation.” 18 Without such a de­ velopment, he believed, Iran would continue to fall prey to local

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autocracy and foreign exploitation. Mossadeq was “a devoted pro­ ponent of Enlightenment values” ; he hoped to establish in Iran a system that was, “in its central particulars, the same system that Americans and western Europeans claimed as their own.” Thus it is “ironic in the extreme,” as Richard Cottam put it, that his “regime should be brought down by the self-proclaimed leaders of what they call the ‘free world.’ ” 19 Mossadeq could not have been brought down by an internal coup because his opponents had neither adequate power nor a popular base. The CIA itself had judged a Tudeh takeover unlikely. When Britain and the United States decided to stage a coup, they found it expedient to talk of an impending Tudeh coup and to call Mossadeq a crypto-communist; but neither government’s officials believed in these accusations. Kermit Roosevelt, who was the key figure in im­ plementing the coup, agrees with a State Department intelligence re­ port calling Mossadeq “strongly anti-communist.” Roosevelt adds that “the British were very stupid in negotiations with Mossa­ degh. . . . They did not make any gesture that he could accept” to avoid “this whole blowup.”20 George McGhee, the American who knew Mossadeq best, says that as a Western-educated aristocrat with a conservative back­ ground, he “had no reason to be attracted to socialism or commu­ nism.” He was “basically . . . a patriotic Iranian nationalist whose lifelong aim was to free Iran from what he perceived to be foreign domination,” whether British or Russian.21 Many others in the Tru­ man administration expressed similar views and approved whole­ heartedly of Mossadeq’s national movement. But when Eisenhower took over, his men took a different approach, and it was this view that led to the coup. The most important issue for the Eisenhower administration was that Mossadeq’s idea of oil nationalization might spread through­ out the Middle East and elsewhere, endangering the interests of American oil companies. Since it was politically impossible to say that Mossadeq’s government should be overthrown for the purpose of protecting Anglo-American oil interests, the United States found it expedient to join Britain on the pretext of preventing an imminent takeover of Iran by the communists. As we have seen, the British among themselves did not seriously

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accuse Mossadeq of communist tendencies, but they found other faults with him. Sam Falle, who was involved in the coup, blamed him for wanting to end the British domination of Iran. To Donald Logan such an intention, even today, looks unforgivable: “We had to use force to bring Iran to sanity.”22 Although Mossadeq was overthrown, his movement had a major impact on Iran and the third world. He succeeded in breaking AIOC control over Iran’s oil industry. Furthermore, the dissemination of his concepts on the sovereignty of nations and their right to control their national resources encouraged other third-world producers to disentangle themselves from the control of the Western oil cartel. This led in 1961 to the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose first Secretary General was Fuad Rouhani, Deputy Director of Iran’s national oil company. As OPEC’s membership grew from 5 to 13, it took under its control 90 percent of the world’s export of crude oil, while deciding on its own price and production levels dictated earlier by the oil cartel. After Gandhi, Mossadeq was no doubt the one who most pas­ sionately propagated the idea of eliminating foreign domination. Churchill and Eden, by their shrewd schemes, succeeded in over­ throwing Mossadeq, but they could not stop the spread of his concepts. Among those influenced by Mossadeq was President Gamal Ab­ del Nasser of Egypt in his drive to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956. The failure of Anthony Eden’s attempt to overthrow Nasser by arranging an Anglo-French-Israeli military attack on Egypt was followed by pressure for independence brought by colonial people on every continent. In the following decade, Britain “was hustled and harried out of most of her old colonies.”23 Soon afterward the West lost its control over the oil resources of third world countries, which formed their own producing cartel in OPEC and tamed the companies that had ruled over them. The last oilmen from the Anglo-American—dominated consortium left Iran shortly after Aya­ tollah Khomeini took power in early 1979. As for Mossadeq, after serving his three-year term in solitary confinement, he was placed under house arrest and watched by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, who allowed no one except close relatives to visit him. The National Front went underground in Iran,

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but intensified its activities in the West. Its lobbying in the United States during the Kennedy administration led in 1962 to American demands that the Shah extend some degree of freedom to his oppo­ nents. When the Shah complied, the National Front responded by holding demonstrations in which 100,000 participated calling for the return of Mossadeq. But soon their leaders were arrested for endangering the security of the state. Mossadeq, in poor health, confided to his relatives that he wished to be buried in the “cemetery of freedom” alongside those who had been killed by the Shah’s troops in the July 1952 uprising in his favor (see Chapter 16). When he died at the age of 85 on March 5, 1967, the government did not allow a funeral or honor his burial wishes. He was buried instead in the dining room of his house in Ahmad Abad, outside Tehran, and only his relatives were allowed to visit his grave. Years earlier, when Reza Shah forbade the public from visiting a certain grave, Mossadeq had remarked: “Dictator­ ship is so all-encompassing that it has to assert itself even over the dead.”24 On Mossadeq’s death the Iranian media, being under tight gov­ ernment control, were silent. The foreign press, however, paid him glowing tribute, praising him for his singlemindedness and devotion to democracy and freedom from foreign exploitation.25 Twelve years later, in March 1979, one million people from all over the country converged on Ahmad Abad to visit his grave on the anniver­ sary of his death. This was possible for the first time because the revolution had forced the Shah out of the country. Mossadeq’s “defence of Iran’s independence, his defiance of AIOC, his charisma and his overthrow with American and British support helped make him an enduring hero”26 and restored him “to the standing that only a man who is somewhat unworldly can attain.”27 “Seen in retrospect,” Albert Hourani writes, “the brief years of Musaddiq’s rule have had a deep and lasting significance. His was the most determined attempt to create a strong executive power in Iran, upheld by popular support, and to use it in order to obtain not simply an improved position within the [British] imperial system but complete independence.. . . Inside Iran, his memory remained as a symbol of independence.”28

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The 1953 coup was a tragic chapter in the history of Iran and the Middle East as a whole since it halted the march toward lib­ eral democracy in the area. Moreover, the assumption that reinstat­ ing the autocratic Shah, and arming him, would serve the strategic and energy interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf proved wrong. What the coup produced instead was the Iranian revolution, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism that abhorred the West, and the resulting American and Arab support of Saddam Hussein that led to his delusions of grandeur and his invasion of Iran and later Kuwait. Although the United States’ intervention in the Gulf war made her a friend of main Arab oil producers and thus a de facto member of OPEC with a say in the price and production of oil, this is an empty privilege in the absence of democracy and thus stability in the area. As a commentator observed after the Gulf war, “The region con­ tinues to be largely a horror show of autocracy and despotism pacified by state violence.”29 The two greatest democracies of the world aborted the birth of democracy in a distant land for what they wrongly conceived to be in their self-interest. By doing so, they helped to unleash a chain of traumatic events in Iran and the rest of the Middle East, while gravely damaging their own interests. All that can be said of such a tragedy is what Dean Acheson says in his book at the end of the chapter on Iran: “Once again one reflects on Oxenstierne’s ques­ tion: ‘Dost thou not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?’ ”30

Notes Bibliography Index

Notes

Complete authors’ names, titles, and publishing information on publications cited in short form in the Notes will be found in the Bibliography.

i . —The Age of Autocracy and Concessions 1. See E. Teymuri, A sré bi-K habari , 4th ed. (Tehran, 1363/1985), p. 106. 2. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia an d Britain in Persia, 1 8 6 4 —1914: A Study in Im perialism (New Haven, 1968), p. 103. 3. S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1 8 5 8 —1905 (Cambridge, U.K., 1965), p. 243. 4. R. L. Greaves, Persia an d the D efence o f India, 1 8 8 4 —1 8 9 2 (London, 1959)» P- 2 5 * 5. R. W. Ferrier, The H isto ry o f the British Petroleum C o m p a n y , Vol. I, The D evelopin g Years, 1 9 0 1 —1952 (Cambridge, U.K., 1982), hereafter cited as “Ferrier, B.P.,” p. 28. Ferrier is the B.P. historian. 6. Kazemzadeh, Russia an d Britain, p. 108. G. Jones, Banking an d E m pire in Iran: The H isto ry o f the British Bank o f the M iddle East, Vol. I (Cambridge, U.K., 1986), p. i i . 7. G. N. Curzon, Persia a n d the Persian Q u estion , Vol. I (London, 1892), p. 480. 8. Kazemzadeh, Russia an d Britain, p. 13. 9. Ibid., pp. 122, 127; Teymuri, A sré, p. 107. 10. Jones, Banking, pp. 22—23. F°r the text of the Bank Concession see Appendix I, pp. 341—54. 11. E’etemadol-Saltaneh,R u zn a m e h K h a te ra t (Tehran, 1356/1977), p. 616. 12. E. G. Browne, The Persian R evolution o f 1 9 0 5 —1909, new imp. (Lon­ don, 1966), p. 33. 13. Ibid., p. 45. On the character of Afghani see N. R. Keddie, S ayyid Jamal ad-D in “al-A fghani”: A Political B iography (Los Angeles, 1972). Also M. Tabataba’i, N am eh ayé A fghani (Tehran, 1349/1970). 14. Browne, Persian R evolu tion , pp. 18—19. 15. Ibid., p. 57. 16. Jones, Banking, p. 53. 17. Browne, Persian R evolu tion , p. 66. 18. Mostafa Fateh, Panjah Sal N a fté Iran, 2d ed. (Tehran, 1358/1979), p. 249; Teymuri, A sré, p. 211. 19. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il: A S tu dy in P ow er Politics (London, 1955), P- 13; Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 250—51.

347

348

Notes to Pages 6—24

20. Ferner, B.P., p. 252. 21. FO60/640, Hardinge to Lansdowne, May 12, 1901. 22. Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 254; Ferner, B.P., p. 38. 23. Ibid., quoted by Ferner from B.P. document H 17/47. 24. Ibid., pp. 640—43. 25. FO48/733, D’Arcy to Lansdowne, June 27, 1901. 26. See N. S. Fatemi, O il D iplom acy: P ow der Keg in Iran (New York, 1954), P- 357 27. W. Mineau, The G o D evils (London, 1958), p. 21. 28. Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 254. 29. Mineau, Go D evils , p. 32. 30. For details of the concessions syndicate see Ferner, B.P., pp. 70—71. 31. FO371/715, Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, Oct. 25, 1909. 32. Browne, Persian R evolution, p. 133. 33. Ibid., p. 150; Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 499. 34. Mineau, Go D evils, p. 39—47. 35. Ferner, B.P., pp. 103—4. 36. Ibid., p. 107. 37. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, pp. 19—20. 38. Browne, Persian R evolution, pp. 133—71; E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Tw o R evolutions (Princeton, N.J., 1982), pp. 50—101. 39. J. Bozorgmehr, Taqriraté M ossadeq D ar Zendan (Tehran, 1359/1980), pp. h —12. 40. Browne, Persian R evolution, pp. 321—26. 41. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, pp. 20—21. 42. Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 259—62; Mineau, Go D evils, pp. 59—62. 43. The Tim es (London), Nov. 22, 1918. 44. Ferner, B.P., p. 202. 45. FO371/91620, Admiralty to Kenneth Younger, June 15, 1951. 46. Winston Churchill, The W orld Crisis, 1911—1918, Vol. I (London, 1938), pp. 102-5. 47. Ferner, B.P., pp. 291-94, 217—19. 48. Ibid., pp. 230, 673. 49. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, pp. 26—27. 50. Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 274—78. 51. Z. Mikdashi, A Financial A nalysis o f M iddle Eastern O il Concessions, 1901—1965 (New York, 1966), pp. 18—19, 37—38; Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, pp. 28-33. 52. Ibid, (both citations). 53.Ibid. 54.Ibid.

2.—Reza Shah and the 1933 Concession 1. D ocum ents on British Foreign Policy, 1919—1939, Vol. IV, ist series (London, 1952), pp. 1119—21. 2. The abortive 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement is reproduced in Harold Temperly, “The Liberation of Persia,” part v of A H istory o f the Peace C on­ ference o f Paris (London, 1924). 3. The two were Sarem od-Dowleh Mas’ud, Minister of Finance, and Nos-

Notes to Pages 24—32

349

rat od-Dowleh Firuz, Minister of Foreign Affairs. See Denis Wright, The En­ glish A m o n g st the Persians D uring the Q ajar Period, 1 7 8 7 —1921 (London, 1977), pp. 178—80. Also Denis Wright, The Persians A m o n g st the English: E pisodes in Anglo-Persian H isto ry (London, 1985), pp. 193—94,105. 4. Ibid, (both citations). 5. See N. S. Fatemi, D iplom atic H isto ry o f Persia, 1 9 1 7 —192.3: A ngloRussian P ow er Politics in Iran (New York, 1 9 5 z ) , pp. Z 5 7 —5 8 . 6. Lord Ironside, H igh R o a d to C om m and: The D iaries o f M ajor-G eneral Sir E dm un d Ironside, 1 9 2 0 —1922 (London, 197z), pp. 15z—61. See also Wright, The English , pp. 181—8z. 7 . M. T. Bahar, Tarikhé M okh tasaré A h za b é Siassi , Vol. I (Tehran, 1323/ 1944), pp. 61—68,106—16. According to Bahar, Zia is quoted as saying that he distributed zo,ooo Tomans among the Cossacks, including their commander. Reza Khan, giving the latter an additional bonus of z,ooo Tomans. See also Y. Dowlat-Abadi, H ayaté Yahya , Vol. IV, 3d ed. (Tehran, 1361/1982), pp. Z Z 7 —z8. Dowlat-Abadi was at the time a member of the Majlis. 8. Ironside, D iaries , p. 117. 9. Donald N. Wilber, R iza Shah Pahlavi, The Resurrection a n d R econstruc­ tion o f Iran (Hicksville, N.Y., 1975), p. 48. 10. FO371/6403, Norman to Curzon, March 1, 1921. See also Nance Kittner, “Issues in Anglo-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1921—1933” (Ph.D. diss.. University of London, 1981), p. 35. This paper gives a well-documented account of relations between Reza Shah and the British. 11. Fatemi, D iplom atic H isto ry , text of Anglo-Soviet Treaty, pp. 263—66. 12. FO416/73, Loraine to Curzon, May 28, 1923. 13. FO371/8051, Loraine to Curzon, July 16,1921. G. Waterfield, P rofes­ sional D iplom at, Sir Percy Loraine o f Kirkharle, 1 8 8 0 —1961 (London, 1973), p. 82. 14. FO416/72, Loraine to Curzon, May 5, 1923; FO416/73, Loraine to Curzon, May 28,1923; FO416/9043, India Office to F.O., May 16,1923. 15. Wright, The Persians, p. 192. 16. Waterfield, Professional D ip lo m a t , p. 122. 17. Majlis Proceedings, Oct. 31,1925. 18. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, p. 67. 19. Ferner, B.P., pp. 596, 601—3. 20. John Rowland and Basil Cadman, A m bassador fo r O il: The Life o f John First Baron Cadm an (London, i960), p. 115; FO371/11498, Loraine to Oli­ phant, June i, 1926. 21. Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 286. 22. Setareh Iran, Nov. 25,1928. 23. Ferner, B.P., pp. 604—8; Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 287. 24. FO371/16933, Concession Revision and Royalty Payments, APOC, April 1929—May 1932. 25. Ferner, B.P., pp. 616—22. 26. M. Q. Hedayat, K haterat va K hatarat, 3d ed. (Tehran, 1361/1982), pp. 395—96. Hedayat was then Iran’s prime minister. 27. Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 292. 28. FO371/16078, F.O. to Hoare, Dec. 1,1932. 29. CAB23/73, Cabinet Conclusions 65(32)3, Dec. 7,1932.

350

Notes to Pages 32—41

30. FO371/16079, Opinion by the Law Offices of the Crown, Dec. 7,1932; Hoare to F.O., Dec. 13,1932. 3 1 . CAB23/73, Cabinet Conclusions 67(32)3, Dec; 14, 1932; FO371/ 16079, Minute by Rendel, Dec. 14, 1932; F. P. Walters, A H istory o f the League o f N ation s (London, 1952), p. 572. 32. League of Nations, Official Journal X I V (1933), Memorandum submit­ ted by Persian government to the League’s Secretary-General, Jan. 18, 1933, and Minutes of the Third Meeting, 17th Session, Jan. 26,1933, pp. 289—303. 33. League of Nations, Official Journal XIII (1932), Memorandum submit­ ted by the British government to the League’s Council, Dec. 19, 1932, pp. 2298—2305, and ibid., XIV (1933), pp. 198—204. See also FO371/16935, Minutes of the Council’s Third Meeting, 17th Session, Jan. 26,1933. 34. Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 295. 35. Rowland and Cadman, A m bassador fo r O il, p. 123. 36. Ibid., pp. 123—26; F. Rouhani, Tarikhé M elli Shodané San’a té N afté Iran (Tehran, 1352/1973), p. 65. 37. Rowland and Cadman, A m bassador fo r O il, pp. 126—28; FO371/ 16937, Cadman to Simon, Apr. 21,1933. 38. Rowland and Cadman, A m bassador fo r O il, p. 129. 39. Ibid., p. 130. 40. Ibid., p. 131. 41. See Majlis Proceedings, Taqizadeh’s statement, Jan. 27, 1948. 42. Rowland and Cadman, A m bassador fo r O il, p. 132. The text of the 19 33 concession is reproduced in the League of Nations Official Journal, No. 12, 77th Session, Dec. 1933, pp. 1653—60. 43. AIOC Annual Report and Accounts as at 31st Dec., 1950. 44. Fatemi, O il D iplom acy, pp. 159, 180; Ali Vossuq, Chahar Fasl dar Tafannon va Tarikh (Tehran, 1361/1982), p. 69; Rowland and Cadman, A m ­ bassador fo r O il, p. 121. 45. Majlis Proceedings, Jan. 27, 1948. 46. Mostafa Elm, “Governmental Economic Planning in Iran” (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1959), p. 10. 47. Ibid., pp. 236—82; K. Farmanfarmayan, “Social Change and Economic Behaviour in Iran,” E xplorations in Entrepreneurial H istory, IX, No. 3 (Febru­ ary 1957), p. 180. 48. Donald N. Wilber, Iran Past an d Present, 7th ed. (Princeton, N.J., I 97 5 )> P* I 3 I * 49. Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a M irror: M em oirs from Exile (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980), p. 39. 50. Wilber, Iran, p. 131. 51. H. Longhurst, A dventure in O il: The S tory o f British Petroleum (Lon­ don, 1959), p. 96; Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, p. 105. 52. Sir Reader Bullard, Letters from Tehran: A British A m bassador in W orld War II Persia (London, 1991), p. 69. 53. Longhurst, A dventure in O il, pp. 99—100. 54. Wright, The Persians, quoting from the diary of Oliver Harvey, private secretary to Anthony Eden, p. 213. 55. Ibid., quoting from the diaries of Amery and Nicholson, pp. 213—14; interview with Prince Hamid Qajar, London, Mar. 25,1985. 56. Wright, The Persians, p. 214.

Notes to Pages 42—52

351

57. Hossein Fardust, K haterat: Z o h u r va Soghuté Saltanaté Pahlavi, Vol. I (Tehran, 1369/1990), pp. 39—60. 58. For the Shah’s character see Marvin Zonis, M ajestic Failure: The Fall o f the Shah (Chicago, 1991). 59. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern A pproaches (London, 1949), pp. 165—75. The author explains in detail how he abducted General Zahedi with the assistance of John Gault, the British consul in Isfahan, Professor Laurence Lockhart, a Persian linguist, and a group of commandos. On dissatisfaction with the occupying forces see Barry Rubin, Paved w ith G o o d Intentions: The A m erican Experience in Iran (New York, 1980), pp. 20—21.

3.—Iran Defies Russia and Britain 1. For further details on the composition of the Majlis, see Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 199—224. 2. Majlis Proceedings, Oct. 29 and Dec. 2, 1944. 3. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., R o o sevelt an d the Russians: The Yalta C on ­ ference (Westport, Conn., 1970, ©1949), p. 175. 4. FO371/40241, Minute by C. F. Warner, Oct. 18,1944. 5. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 119. 6. For a detailed account see: G. Lenczowski, Russia an d the W est in Iran, 1918—1948: A S tu dy in Big P ow er R ivalry (Ithaca, N.Y., 1949). 7. FO371/52673, Memorandum by Howe, Apr. 16,1946. 8. Ibid., “Memorandum on Persia,” Apr. 13, 1946; FO371/52710, British Military Attaché, Tehran, to F.O., May 22, 1946; FO371/52706, Cabinet Conclusions, July 4,1946. 9. Conversation with Jahanshah Samsam, a Bakhtiari tribal chief, at the Police Headquarters detention center, Tehran, Oct. 28,1946. Samsam told me that he had discussed the Qashqa’i-Bakhtiari scheme for the occupation of southern Iran with John Gault, the British consul in Isfahan, before its execu­ tion. 10. Rubin, G o o d Intentions , p. 33. 11. Interview with Aga Khan Bakhtiar, then a Majlis deputy and confidant of Qavam, London, Oct. 5,1984. 12. See Majlis Proceedings, Oct. 22, 1947. The full English text of the act appears in Elwell-Sutton’s Persian O il, pp. 118—19. 13. See Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 385—86, on his discussions with the British ambassador. 14. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il, p. 102. 15.1 was in Abadan during this revolt and by chance witnessed the bloody clashes that occurred there. 16. FO371/39988, Minute by Hankey, Nov. 29,1943; FO371/52735, Min­ ute by Bevin, July 20, 1946. 17. Fateh, Panjah Sal. All through his book, Fateh blames the shortsighted­ ness of the company and British envoys in Iran as well as the corruption and timidity of Iranian officials who submitted to the company’s wishes. 18. A. Pahlavi, Faces in a M irror, pp. 89—90. 19. For a study of the Shah’s efforts to establish an authoritarian state, see H. Ladjevardi, “The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran,” Interna­ tional Journal o f M iddle E ast Studies, XV (1983), pp. 225—39. 20. For further details see Elm, “Governmental Economic Planning in Iran.”

Notes to Pages 53—62

352

z i . T h e te x t o f this m em orandum is given in M ajlis Proceedings, July 2 5 , 1949. 22. Iran claim ed that, under the con cessio n , the com p an y’s sterling p ay­ m ents sh ou ld be based on the real m arket value o f g o ld — then £ 1 1 .2 5 Per ou n ce— and n o t o n the “artificial” value o f £ 8 .4 0 set by the Bank o f England. 23. M ajlis Proceedings, July 2 5 ,1 9 4 9 . 2 4 . G olsh a’ia n ’s report to Sa’ed, June 8 ,1 9 4 9 , in Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 3 9 0 — 91

.

.

25. Ibid., M in u te by G olsh a’ian, M ay 1 0 ,1 9 4 9 , pp. 3 9 1 —9 2 . 2 6. Private letter from Fateh to Taqizadeh, June 1 4 ,1 9 4 9 . Fateh gave m e a p h o to co p y o f the letter. 27 . T h e m ain p o in ts o f the supplem ental agreem ent w ere briefly as follow s: (1) A IO C to increase royalties and taxes per ton to 7 /—as o f 1 9 4 8 ; (2) Iran’s 2 0 percent share in dividends and reserves be paid annually by A IO C as o f 1 9 4 7 w ith o u t subjecting these paym ents to the British govern m en t’s dividend lim ita­ tion and U .K . taxes; (3) annual p aym ents to Iran on these accoun ts to be n o less than £ 4 m illion; (4) A IO C to give a 2 0 percent d iscou n t on the price o f oil products sold for local con su m p tion . 28 . Cyrus G hani, Yaddashthayé Dr. Q assem Ghani, Vol. IX (L ondon, 1 9 8 2 ), q u otin g G olsh a’ian, pp. 6 2 1 —23. 29. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , G ass to Butler, M ay 8, 1 9 5 1 . 30. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , M inutes o f m eeting at F.O ., Jan. 16, 1 9 5 1 . 31. M ajlis Proceedings, July 2 3 —2 6 , 1 9 4 9 . 32 . F O 3 7 1 /7 5 5 0 0 , Bevin to Le R ou getel, O ct. 2 6 , 19 4 9 ; Sa’ed , L on don , to R oyal C ourt, O ct. 2 1 ,1 9 4 9 , in Fateh, Panjah Sal, p. 4 0 2 . 33 . H ossein M ak k i, K etabé Siah , Vol. Ill, Part I (Tehran, 1 3 6 0 /1 9 8 1 ), pp.

39 - 4 5 3 4 . Ibid. 35. For a detailed accou n t o f M o ssa d eq ’s life see: Dr. M oh am m ad M ossadeq, K haterat va Ta’allom at (Tehran, 1 3 6 5 /1 9 8 6 ); F. D ib a, M oham m ad M os­ sadegh: A Political B iography (L ondon, 1986); B. A frasiabi, M ossadeq va Tarikh (Tehran, 1 3 6 0 /1 9 8 1 ); B ozorgm ehr, Taqriraté M ossadeq. 3 6. M . M ossad eq , “ C apitulassion va Iran,” in M ossadeq va M asaléyé H oquq va Siassat, ed. Iraj A fshar (Tehran, 1 3 5 7 /1 9 7 8 ), p. 6 7 . 37 . G eorge M cG h ee, E n voy to the M iddle W orld: Adventures in D iplom acy (N ew York, 1 9 8 3 ), pp. 6 1 —7 9 . M cG h ee, w h o participated in m any o f the Shah’s m eetings in W ashington, gives an illum inating accou n t o f the Shah’s discussions. 38 . U.S. D epartm ent o f State, Foreign R elations o f the U nited States (here­ after cited as FR-US), 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, M em orandum o f conversation w ith H o s­ sein A la, Jan. 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 39 . For the U nited States—Iranian A greem ent o f O ct. 6 ,1 9 4 7 concerning the U.S. m ilitary m ission and its revisions and exten sion s in 19 4 9 and 1 9 5 0 , see “U.S. Treaties and O ther International A greem ents,” FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. I. 4 0 . M cG h ee, E nvoy, pp. 2 2 —24. 4 1 . FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, D iscu ssion s w ith A IO C officials, pp. 1 3 —15. 4 2 . M ajlis Proceedings, June 2 0 ,1 9 5 0 . 4 3 . FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, W iley to Secretary o f State, Jan. 3 0 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 4 5 9 - 6 3 , and M ay 2 6 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 5 5 8 —59-

Notes to Pages 63—71

353

4 4 . F O 3 7 1 /7 5 4 6 4 , M in u te by W right, Feb. 9 ,1 9 4 9 ; Le R ou tegel to Strang, N ov. i l , 1949. 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /8 2 3 1 3 , Shepherd to B evin, D ec. 17, 1 9 5 0 . 4 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 4 8 , Shepherd to B evin, R eport o f events in Persia in 1 9 5 0 , Feb. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 7 . “ Précis o f M essage sent to M r. N o rth cro ft by Prim e M in ister through Dr. J alali,” June 1 0 , 1 9 5 0 , in E. Ra’in, A sn adé K hané Seddott (Tehran, 1 3 5 8 / 1979)» P- 1 7 0 .

4.—The General’s Mission 1. M ajlis P roceedings, June 2 7 ,1 9 5 0 . 2. FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, M em o by R ichard F unkhouser to M cG h ee, Sept. 14» 1950» PP- 97 - 99 3. M cG h ee, E n vo y , p. 3 2 5 . 4 . FR-US , i9 5 0 ,V o l. V, G rady to Secretary o f State, July 1 3 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 5 5 6 — 57; Secretary o f State to U .S. E m bassy, L on d on , July 1 4 ,1 9 5 0 , p. 5 6 9 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /8 2 3 7 5 , M in u te by L. B arnett, A u g. 3 ,1 9 5 0 ; M in u tes o f m eetin g at F.O ., A ug. 2 ,1 9 5 0 . 6. M cG h ee, E n vo y , p. 3 3 3 . 7. FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, M em o from R ou n tree to M cG h ee, D ec. 2 0 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 6 3 4 - 3 5 . 8. Ibid., G rady to Secretary o f State, July 2 0 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 1 7 4 —7 5 . 9 . Ibid., U .S. D eleg a tio n at L o n d o n ’s Foreign M in isters M eetin g to A ctin g Secretary o f State, M ay 1 6 ,1 9 5 0 , p. 5 4 6 ; U .S. A m b assad or in L on d on to U .S. Em bassy, Tehran, A ug. 1 8 ,1 9 5 0 , p. 5 8 5 . 10. Ibid., G rady to U .S. E m bassy, L on d on , A ug. 1 5 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 5 8 1 —82; G rady to Secretary o f State, O ct. 2 1 ,1 9 5 0 , p. 6 0 7 . 11. Ibid., U .S. A m b assad or in M o s c o w to A ctin g Secretary o f State, Sept. 1 4 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 5 8 8 - 8 9 . 1 2. Ibid., M e m o from F unkhouser to M cG h ee o n “ D iscu ssio n s w ith British on A IO C ,” Sept. 1 4 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 9 7 —9 9 . 13. Ibid., “ M id d le E ast O il,” Paper prepared by Funkhouser, Sept. 1 9 5 0 , pp. 7 6 -9 6 . 14. Ibid., Inform al U S-U K d iscu ssion s, L on d on , Sept. 2 1 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 5 9 3 — 600. 15. Ibid., A ch eso n to B evin. N o v . 2 0 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 6 1 6 —17; in terview w ith G eorge M cG h ee, L o n d on , Sept. 1 8 ,1 9 8 5 . 16. FR-US , 1 9 5 0 , V ol. V, G rady to A ch eson , O ct. 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 6 1 2 —13; A ch eson to G rady, N o v . 1 8 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 6 1 3 —14. 17. A IO C , Tehran, to A IO C , L on d on , July 2, 1 9 5 0 , in Ra’in , A sn adé , pp. * 51- 5518. Ibid., A IO C In form ation O ffice, Tehran, to A IO C L o n d o n , pp. 2 7 3 —7 5 ; A IO C R eport o n the C o m p a n y ’s Public R elation s A ctivities in Iran, M ar. 1 4 , 1 9 5 1 , pp. 4 8 - 5 4 . 19. M cG h ee, E n vo y , p. 7 4 . 2 0 . FR-US , 1 9 5 0 , V ol. V, U .S. C hargé d ’A ffaires, L on d on , to Secretary o f State, D ec. 1 4 ,1 9 5 0 , p. 6 3 2 . 2 1 . M ajlis P roceedings, O ct. 19, 2 2 , 2 4 , an d 2 6 , 1 9 5 0 . See a lso R ou h an i, Tarikhé M ellt Shodané , p. 8 4 .

354

Notes to Pages 71—78

22. FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, M em o from R ountree to M cG h ee, D ec. 2 0 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 6 3 4 - 3 5 . 23. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 1 , Franks to F.O.; A ch eso n ’s m essage to Bevin, N o v . 2 9 , 1950. 24. Ibid., Shepherd to F.O ., D ec. 7, 1 9 5 0 . 25. Ibid., M in u te by Furlonge, D ec. 2 1 , 1 9 5 0 . 26. M ajlis Proceedings, D ec. 2 6 , 1 9 5 0 . 27. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 4 8 , Shepherd to Bevin, Feb. 19, 1 9 5 1 . 28. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 1 , Shepherd to Bevin, D ec. 2 9 , 1 9 5 0 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , Sir R. H ay, Bahrain, to F.O ., reporting on his trip to Tehran, Feb. 16, 1 9 5 1 . 29. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 1 , Shepherd to Bevin, D ec. 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 . 30. Ibid., B urrow s to Furlonge, Jan. 3, 1 9 5 1 . 31 . Tim e m agazine: “ Iran-Troubled O il,” Jan. 8, 1 9 5 1 . 32. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 7 5 9 , M em orandum by Fry o n “A nglo-A m erican R elations in Saudi A rabia,” Feb. 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 33. T h e n ation alization p rop osal, tabled earlier on N o v . 2 9 , 1 9 5 0 , w as signed by M o ssa d eq , H aeri-Z ad eh , Shayegan, Saleh, and M akki. It w as tabled again o n Jan. 11, 1 9 5 1 . 34. E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il , p. 2 0 4 . 35. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , R ecord o f m eeting at F.O ., Jan. 16, 1 9 5 1 . 36. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , M ilitary branch o f the Adm iralty to R oth nie, F.O ., Feb. 12, 1 9 5 1 . 37. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , R ecord o f m eeting held in Sir W illiam Strang’s Office w ith Treasury and A IO C officials, Jan. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 38 . E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il , p. 2 7 1 . 3 9 . M cG h ee, w h o held a B.S. degree in g eology from the U niversity o f O k lah om a and a d octorate from O x fo rd , w as em p loyed by various o il co m ­ panies in the early 1 9 3 0 s as a geo lo g ist. In 1 9 4 0 he established his o w n o ilp rod ucin g firm. M a x T hornburg w as form erly w ith Standard O il o f C alifornia and later petroleum adviser to the State D epartm ent. 4 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , British Em bassy, Tehran, to F.O., Feb. 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 3 , Fateh to E lkington, Jan. 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , M in ­ ute by L ogan, July 7, 1 9 5 1 . 4 2 . FR-US , 1 9 5 1 , Vol. V, C onference o f M id d le East C hiefs o f M ission , Istanbul, Feb. 14—2 1 ,1 9 5 1 , pp. 6 0 —7 1 . 4 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , Shepherd to F.O ., Feb. 10 and 1 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 4 . Ibid., Shepherd to F.O ., Feb. 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 3 , Shepherd to F.O., Feb. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , Shepherd’s confidential report to Bevin, Feb. 10, and to F.O ., Feb. 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 6 . Ibid., T ext o f prepared parliam entary q uestion and answ er, Feb. 2 1 ,

I 9 5 I* 4 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 3 , Shepherd to F.O., Feb. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 8 . Ibid., L. A . C. Fry, F.O ., to D . R. Serpell, Treasury, and V ictor Buder, M inistry o f Fuel and Power, M ar. 1, 1 9 5 1 ; Serpell to Fry, M ar. 1, 1 9 51; Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 9 . Ibid., English te x t o f Persian broadcast o f M ar. 4 ,1 9 51, entitled “ Persian O il N a tio n a lisa tio n — T he British V iew ,” said to be w ritten by D avid M itchell. 50 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , N o rth cro ft to G ass, M ar. 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 51. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , F.O. to British Em bassy, Tehran, Feb. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages y 8—86

355

52 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 3 , Shepherd to R azm ara, Feb. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 53 . Interview w ith A . H . Ebtehaj, L on d on , June 5 ,1 9 8 5 . 54 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 3 , Shepherd to R azm ara, Feb. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 55 . Ibid., Shepherd to B evin, Feb. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 56 . Ibid., Shepherd to F .O ., M ar. 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; R ecord o f m eetin g o n Persian oil at F.O ., M ar. 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 57 . Ibid., F.O. to Shepherd, M ar. 2, 1 9 5 1 . 58 . Ibid., British E m bassy, Tehran, to F.O ., M ar. 2 and 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 59. 1 w o rk ed in the A IO C In form ation O ffice in Tehran during 1 9 4 9 —51 and heard this o ften from so m e m em bers o f the British staff at the tim e. 60. O n e w h o m ade this claim w a s C o lo n el H . D ey h im i, then h ead o f the Shah’s M ilitary Bureau. A ccord in g to D eyh im i the royal cou rt k n ew a b o u t T ahm assebi’s assassin ation p lo t but w ere uncertain that it w o u ld succeed; thus A ssad ollah A lam , the Shah’s con fid an t, arranged w ith a sergeant to d o the job. See C o lo n el G . M ossavar-R ah m an i, Kohné-Sarbaz: K h ateraté Siassi va N eza m i (Tehran, 1 3 6 6 /1 9 8 7 ), pp. 3 5 3 —58. See a lso “ Interview w ith Dr. M . Baqa’i,” Iranian O ra l H isto ry C ollection (H arvard U niversity C enter for M id d le East­ ern Studies, 1 9 8 7 ).

5.—The Oil Nationalization Act 1. W illiam R oger L ou is, The British E m pire in the M iddle East, 1 9 4 5 —1951 (O x fo rd , 1 9 8 4 ), p. 6 4 9 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , B olton to M a k in s, q u o tin g W illiam Iliff, M ar. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. E lw ell-Su tton, Persian O il , p. 1 9 9 . 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , M in u te by P ym an, M ar. 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Shepherd to M o rriso n , M ar. 1 9 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 6 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Shepherd to F.O. (tw o co m m u n ica tio n s), M ar. 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 7. Ibid., F.O. to Tehran, M ar. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 2 4 , 1951. 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 9. Ibid., R ecord o f m eetin g h eld at F.O ., Top Secret, M ar. 2 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 0 , F.O. to British E m bassy, W ashington, M ar. 2 4 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 4 , Franks to F.O ., M ar. 2 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , M in u te by Fry givin g the v iew s o f N oel-B ak er, M ar. 3 1 ,

I 9 5 I* 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Franks to F.O ., M ar. 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , Shepherd to F.O ., Apr. 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , M in u te by R oth n ie, M ar. 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 0 , F.O. to British E m bassy, Tehran, Apr. 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 7 , M in u te by Strang o n his m eetin g w ith Fraser, Apr. 19, 1951. 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ar. 18, 1 9 5 1 . 19. M cG h ee, E n voy , pp. 3 2 6 —2 7 . 2 0 . FR-US, 1 9 5 1 , V ol. V, Secretary o f State to U .S. E m bassy, L on d on , M ar. 3 1 , 1951» P P - 196 - 97 2 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 0 , M eetin g at F .O ., Apr. 2 ,1 9 5 1 .

356

Notes to Pages 86—100

22 . M cG h ee, E n vo y, p. 3 3 3 . 2 3 . Ibid., pp. 3 2 9 —30. 24 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 0 , M orrison to Franks, Apr. 6 ,1 9 5 1 ; Franks to M orrison , Apr. 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 . 25 . Ibid., B ow k er to Strang, Brief for U .K . D elegation to W ashington, Apr. 6 , 1951. 26 . Ibid., Franks to F.O ., Apr. 1 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 27 . Ibid. 28 . N e w York Tim es, W ashington Post, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 29 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 1 , British Em bassy, W ashington, to Eastern D epartm ent, F.O ., Apr. 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; M cG h ee, E n voy , pp. 3 3 7 —38; Parliam entary D eb ates, H o u se o f C o m m o n s, June 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , Franks to F.O ., July 5, 1 9 5 1 . 3 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , C. E. Steel, British Em bassy, W ashington, to R oger M akins, F.O ., July 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 32 . Ibid., M in u te by M ak in s, July 5, 1 9 5 1 . 33 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , Shepherd to F.Ö ., Apr. 1, 1 9 5 1 . 34 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , M in u te by Fry on his con versation w ith Leggett, Feb. 6 , 1951. 35 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 7 , L eggett to Strang, Apr. 14, 1 9 5 1 . 36 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 2 1 , M ou n tb atten o f Burma to First Sea Lord, Apr. 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; Philip Z iegler, M ountbatten: The Official B iography (L ondon, 1 9 8 5 ), pp. 4 9 9 — 501. 37 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 6 , Strang to Shepherd, Apr. 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; Fergusson to Bridges, Apr. 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 38 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 8 , Shepherd to F.O ., Apr. 2 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 39 . For the full tex t o f tbe act see M ajlis Proceedings, Apr. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . English translation o f the act in E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il , pp. 2 1 6 —17.

6.—Forces at Work in Iran, Britain, and the United States 1. M a k k i, K etabé Siah , Vol. Ill, Part I, pp. 3 5 —4 4 ; A braham ian, Iran, pp. * 5 4 -5 5 2. A braham ian, Iran, pp. 2 5 3 —6 1 . 3. M ak k i, K etabé Siah, Vol. Ill, Part I, pp. 4 7 —53. 4. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 2 0 , Shepherd to Eden and its en closures, Jan. 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 7 , M id d leton to F.O. send ing B olland ’s report, A ug. 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 6. Interview w ith H enry B yroade, W ashington, Sept. 30, 1 9 8 5 . FR-US, 1 9 5 1 , Vol. V, C on clu sion s and R ecom m en d ation s o f the C onference o f the M id d le East C hiefs o f M ission at Istanbul, Feb. 14—2 1 ,1 9 5 1 , pp. 7 0 —7 2 . 7. C orrelli Barnett, The Pride an d the Fall: The D ream and Illusion o f Britain as a G reat P ow er (N e w York, 1 9 8 6 ), p. 3 0 4 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , N o te s on Persian o il, July 3 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 9. Ibid. A lso F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 8 , R eport o f the O fficial W orking Party on Persian O il, O ct. 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 10. State D epartm ent B ulletin, Apr. 2 4 ,1 9 4 3 . 11. The Tim es (L ondon), M ar. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . T h e an on ym ou s author o f the article, according to Professor R oger L ouis, w a s A nn L am bton o f the School o f O riental Studies, L on don University. 12. The E conom ist, Apr. 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 100—109

357

13. Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 1 0 2 —2 0 , 5 0 0 . 14. B altim ore Sun , June 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 , reporting o n the Senate hearings o f June 20 ; IJ.S. N e w s a n d W orld R ep o rt , Sept. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 15. W ashington P ost , Apr. 7 and June 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 16. N e w York T im es , N o v . 8, 1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 9 5 3 /1 1 6 3 , B. B urrow s, British E m bassy, W ash ington , to A m erican D epartm ent, F.O ., June 1 6 ,1 9 5 1 ; P. H . G ore-B ooth to F.O ., June 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 9 5 3 /1 1 6 3 , S lessor’s report to F.O ., “Spreading the British P oint o f V iew in A m erica,” M ay 15, 1 9 5 1 . 19. Ibid., M in ister o f State for Foreign Affairs to Slessor, M ay 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; G ore-B ooth to F.O ., June 2 0 ,1 9 5 1 . Interview w ith Sir O liver Franks, O x fo rd , Jan. 2 1 ,1 9 8 8 . 2 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 9 , Franks to Strang, Apr. 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , J. V. Kelly, M o sc o w , to F urlonge, A ug. 3 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 21 . Interview w ith Sir Eric D rak e, L on d on , O ct. 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , M in u te by L. A . C . Fry o n his con versation w ith L eggett, Feb. 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 22. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 2 8 , N o el-B ak er to B evin, N o v . 1 5 ,1 9 5 0 . 23 . Ibid., British L egation , Tel Aviv, to F.O. sen d in g the Jerusalem P ost article by Soleh B on eh , July 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 2 8 , N oel-B ak er to B evin, N o v . 15, 1 9 5 0 . 2 5 . A n th on y S am p son , The Seven Sisters: The G reat O il C om panies a n d the W orld They M ade (L on d on , 1 9 7 5 ), pp. 1 3 4 —3 5 . 2 6. T h e A IO C A nnual R eport for the year en d in g D ec. 3 1 ,1 9 5 0 . 2 7 . M cG h ee, E n voy, pp. 3 2 2 —2 6 . 2 8 . Joh n Strachey, The E nd o f E m pire (L on d on , 1 9 5 9 ), p. 1 7 3 . 29. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 7 , M in u tes o f m eetin g in Sir E dw ard Bridges’s ro o m , O ct. 23, 1951. 30. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 7 , R. S. C airey, R a n g o o n , to F.O ., June 16, 1 9 5 1 . 3 1 . FR-US, 1 9 5 1 , V ol. V, “N a tio n a l Intelligence E stim ate,” Jan. 8 ,1 9 5 1 , pp. 2 6 8 —7 6 . 3 2 . Ibid., R ichard F unkhouser on “ M id d le E ast O il,” Sept. 1 9 5 0 , pp. 7 6 — 96.

7.—Iran Takes Over the Company 1. A IO C A nnual R eport and A ccou n ts as at 3 i s t D ec. 1 9 5 0 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 1 , M in u te by Strang, “ Som e N o te s o n the Persian O il D isp u te an d its Im plica­ tio n s,” O ct. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 4 , “N o te s for Lord Privy Seal’s M issio n ” attached to M in u te by B erthoud, A ug. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 3 , C. E. L o om b e, Bank o f E ngland, to Eastern D ep artm en t, F.O ., Feb. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. FR-US , V ol. V, 1 9 5 0 , State D ep artm en t paper en titled “M id d le E ast O il,” Sept. 1 9 5 0 , pp. 7 6 —9 6 ; FR-US, V ol. V, 1 9 5 1 , “ N a tio n a l Intelligence E stim ate” prepared by C IA , Jan. 8 ,1 9 5 1 , pp. 2 6 8 —7 6 . A lth ou gh British d ocu m en ts gave Iran’s o il p rod u ction in 1 9 5 0 as 3 2 m illion to n s and the cap acity o f A b adan as 2 0 m illion to n s a year, the ab ove U .S. reports give Iran’s p rod u ction as 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 barrels a day (35 m illion ton s in 1 9 5 0 ) and A b ad an ’s cap acity as 2 7 m illion to n s in th at year. 4. Ibid, (both citation s). 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 1 , M in u te by M ak in s, N o v . 9 , 1 9 5 1 .

35

»

Notes to Pages 109—16

6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 8 , M inistry o f D efen ce to G H Q , M id d le East Land Forces, Top Secret, M ay 2, 1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 9 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ay 2, 1 9 5 1 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , Shepherd to F.O ., M ay 7 ,1 9 5 -1 . 9. F O 37 1 /9 1 5 3 3 , A ide-m ém oire handed to M orrison by Iran’s am bassador in L on d on , M a y 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 10. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , Shepherd to Furlonge, M ay 2, 1 9 5 1 . 11. T h e m em bers from the Senate w ere Dr. A hm ad M atin -D aftari, form er prim e m inister; M o rteza -Q o li Bayat, form er prim e m inister and finance m inis­ ter; A b ul-Q asem N a jm , form er finance m inister and foreign m inister; M o h a m ­ m ad Soruri, form er M inister o f the Interior and Justice; and Dr. R eza-Z adeh Shafaq, university p rofessor and often a delegate to the U nited N a tio n s. T h e m em bers from the M ajlis w ere A llahyar Saleh, form er M inister o f Finance and Justice; Dr. A b d ollah M oazzam i, P rofessor o f International Law, Tehran U ni­ versity, and form er m em ber o f the Suprem e E con om ic C ouncil; Dr. A li Shayegan, form er ed u cation m inister and a law yer; N asser-Q oli A rdalan, eco n o m ic expert; and H o ssein M ak k i, form er civil servant. 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , Shepherd to M orrison , M ay 12, 19 5 1 ; E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il , pp. 2 2 2 —2 3 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , F.O. to Shepherd, M ay 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , British Em bassy, Paris, to F.O ., M ay 15, 1 9 5 1 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , F.O. to British Em bassy, Tehran, Seddon to Varasteh, M a y 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 8 , Franks to F.O ., Apr. 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 3 , Franks to F.O ., M ay 12, 1 9 5 1 . 1 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , M in u te by M . R. Starkey, F.O ., recording his conversa­ tion w ith A ttlee, M a y 14, 1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , M orrison to Franks, M ay 18, 1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 8 , Shepherd to F.O., M ay 3 0 , 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 2 , Brit­ ish Em bassy, Tehran, to D . A. L ogan, Eastern D epartm ent, F.O., June 2,

I 9 5 I19. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 8 , Rem arks by A ch eson at his press conference on M ay 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; Brief for C abinet m eeting prepared by Furlonge, M ay 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 3 1 , B ow ker to Shepherd giving M o rrison ’s view s, M ay 5, 1 9 5 1 . 2 0 . H o u se o f C om m on s D eb ates, M ay 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 1 . F O 37 1 / 9 1 5 4 2 , T rum an’s m essage to M o ssad eq , M ay 3 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 4 3 , T rum an’s m essage to A ttlee, M ay 3 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 22 . M cG h ee, E n voy , pp. 3 8 9 —9 0 . 23 . Wall Street Journal, June 5, 19 5 1 ; D a d , June 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 24 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 0 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 1, 1 9 5 1 . 25 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 1 , A ttlee to W alter G ifford con veyin g his m essage to Presi­ d en t Trum an, June 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 6. “A snadé N a ft,” Iran’s Foreign M inistry P ublications (1 3 3 0 /1 9 5 1 ), M ossad eq ’s m essage to Trum an, pp. 1 1 6 —19. 2 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 0 , F.O. to Shepherd, June 2, 1 9 5 1 . 28 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 9 , B erthoud’s m inute on his con versation w ith Levy, M ay 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 , and F urlonge’s n otes on the sam e m inute. 29 . Wall Street Journal, June 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 0 . R ou han i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané, pp. 1 4 6 —4 7 .

Notes to Pages 116—22

359

3 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 19, 1 9 5 1 ; Fateh, Pattjah Sal, pp. 5 x 9 -3 0 . 3 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 0 , M o rriso n ’s statem en t in the H o u se o f C o m m o n s, June xo, 1951. 33 . The Tim es (L on d on ), June 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 34 . Interview w ith M eh d i Sam i’i, w h o accom p an ied the tw o Iranian m is­ sion s to A b adan , L o n d on , June 1, 1 9 8 5 . 35 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 11 , 1 9 5 1 . 3 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 4 , C apper to F.O ., June 14, 1 9 5 1 . 37 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 8 , F.O. to C apper, Fraser’s m essage to D rak e, June 2 0 , 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 8 , F.O. to Franks, June 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 0 , Franks to F.Ó ., June 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 . 38 . R ou h an i, T arikh éM e lliShodané, pp. 1 5 7 —59; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 1 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 1 , H .M .S . W ren to F.O ., M essa g e from D rake to Fraser, June 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 7 , R ecord o f con versation w ith Fraser at C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g , Top Secret, M a y 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 4 , British E m bassy, Tehran, to F .O ., from S ed don to G ass, July 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , F.O. to British E m bassy and S ed d on , Tehran, July

7 » 1951 4 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 4 , Shepherd to F .O ., July 2 and 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F.O. to Shepherd, July 5, 1 9 5 1 . 4 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 7 , C apper to F .O ., July 6, 1 9 5 1 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , Frigate Flamingo to A dm iralty, July 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 6 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 47. 1 w a s taken w ith so m e oth er translators from the d isso lv ed A IO C Inform ation O ffice to S ed d o n ’s residence to translate the co m p a n y ’s con fid en ­ tial papers in to Persian. 4 8 . Ra’in, A snadé, pp. 3 1 5 , 3 2 1 . 4 9 . Ibid., “ Précis o f m essage sen t to M r. N o r th c ro ft by the Prim e M in ister [A. M ansur] through Dr. Jalali,” p. 17 0 ; R ice to N o rth cro ft, M a y 2 , June 2 2 and 2 8 ,1 9 5 0 , pp. 2 6 0 —6 9 . See p. 3 1 8 o n guilds. 50. Ibid., N o rth cro ft to A IO C , L on d on , M ar. 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 , pp. 4 8 —54. 51 . Sheipuré-M arde-Em ruz, N o . 2 2 , reprinted in R a’in, A sn adé , pp. 3 0 9 — 12. 52 . M ajlis P roceedings, July 1 and 3, 1 9 5 1 . 53 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 54 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 4 , Parliam entary D eb a te, July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 55. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 7 , U .K . H igh C om m ission in India to C o m m o n w ea lth R e­ lation s O ffice, L o n d o n , June 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 6 , U .K . H igh C o m m issio n in India to British E m bassies in Tehran and W ash ington , July 1 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 56. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 8 , CBS broadcast, M a y 2 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 57. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , M in u te by R oth n ie, M a y 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , Brit­ ish L egation, A m m an , to M o rriso n , July 1 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 58. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , British E m bassy, Tehran, to F.O ., givin g the te x t o f Baqa’i’s sp eech , A ug. 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 59 . N e w York H erald Tribune, July 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 .

36o

Notes to Pages 124—32 8.—The Harriman and Stokes Missions

1. D ean A ch eso n , Present a t the Creation: M y Years in the State D epartm en t (N ew York, 1 9 6 9 ), pp. 5 0 5 —7. 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 3 , M u sad d iq ’s m essage to T rum an, June 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 ; F.O. to British Em bassy, Tehran, June 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. A ch eson , Creation, p. 5 0 7 . 4. Ibid., pp. 5 0 7 —8. 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , Franks to F.O ., July 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 6. Ibid., M essage from M orrison to A ch eson , July 7, 1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 0 , Franks to F.O., tex t o f T rum an’s m essage o f July 8 to M u sad d iq , July 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 37 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , M u sad d iq ’s reply to Trum an, attached to M in ute by Furlonge, July 16, 1 9 5 1 . 8. N e w York H erald Tribune , H om er Bigart’s report from Tehran on Shep­ herd’s press conference, July 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , F.O. to Shepherd, July 13, 1 9 5 1 . 9. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 1 , M orrison to Franks, m essage to A ch eson , July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 10. A ch eson , C reation, p. 5 05; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , Franks to F.O. giving the tex t o f H arrim an’s press statem ent, July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 11. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 1 , Jebb, N e w York, to F.O. givin g sum m ary o f conversa­ tion b etw een M id d leton and W ilk in son o f A siatic Petroleum C om pany on H arrim an’s talks w ith U .S. oil com p an ies, O ct. 13, 1 9 5 1 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , F.O. to British E m bassies in Tehran and W ashington reporting on G aitsk ell’s d iscu ssion s w ith H arrim an, July 14, 1 9 5 1 . 13. E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il , p. 2 4 4 . 14. C A B i2 8 /2 0 , C abinet C on clu sion s 52 (5 1 ) and 5 3 (5 1 ), July 16 and 19, 1951. 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 5 , H o u se o f C om m on s D eb ates, July 17, 1 9 5 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 4 , Shepherd to F.O., July 17, 1 9 5 1 . 17. Vernon W alters, Silent M issions (N ew York, 1 9 7 8 ), pp. 2 4 1 —6 3 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 6 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 18, 1 9 5 1 . 19. T h e five m em bers w ere M inister o f Finance Varasteh and four m em bers o f the M ajlis and the Senate: M atin -D aftari, R eza-Z adeh Shafag, Shayegan, and A llahyar Saleh. 20 . R ou han i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané , pp. 1 9 0 —9 1 . 21 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 22 . Ibid., Shepherd to F.O ., July 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 2 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 23 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , M in ute by Sarner on m eeting b etw een G ifford and Strang, July 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 0 , British Em bassy, Tehran, to F.O., July 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 24 . R ou han i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané, pp. 1 9 1 —9 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , Shepherd to F.O., July 2 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , F.O. to British Em bassies in Tehran and W ashington, July 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , F.O. to Shepherd, July 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 26 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 24 and 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 9 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 2 9 ,1 9 51 ; British Em bassy, W ashington, to F.O., July 2 6 ,

I 9 5 I* 27. B altim ore Sun, July 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 132-39

361

2 8 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 9 , F.O. to Shepherd, July 2 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 29 . N e w York Tim es, July 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 30 . C A B 1 2 8 /2 0 , C abinet C o n clu sio n s 5 6 (5 1 ) and 5 7 ( 5 ! ) , July 3 0 and A ug. i , 1951. 31 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , N o te s o f m eetin g held w ith Levy, July 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 7 3 , M in u te by Strang for M orrison , July 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 3 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , A IO C paper entitled “A genda for a W orking Basis o f C oop eration B etw een the Iranian G overn m en t and A n glo-Iran ian ,” sent by G ass to B ow ker, July 3 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 3 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 3 , M in u te by Strang for M orrison , July 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 4 . O ther m em bers o f the S tok es m ission w ere Dr. W. N u tta l, techn ical adviser o f the M inistry o f Fuel and Pow er, M . T. Flett o f the Treasury, P. R am sbotham o f the Foreign O ffice, and five A IO C representatives h ead ed by E. H . O . E lkington. 35 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 4 , “N o te s for Lord Privy S eal’s M issio n ,” attach ed to M in ­ ute by B erthoud, A ug. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 6 . Ibid. A lso F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , F.O. to Shepherd, Apr. 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , R ecord o f a m eetin g held b etw een the C h an cellor o f the E xchequer, Lord Privy Seal, and officials o f the M in istry o f Fuel and Power, the Treasury, and the Foreign O ffice, July 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 38 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 6 , R ecord o f con versation b etw een Lord Privy Seal an d Dr. M u sad d iq prepared by R am sb oth am , A ug. 5, 1 9 5 1 . 3 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , M in u tes o f the m eetin g by R am sb oth am , A ug. 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 0 . Ibid., Shepherd to F.O ., A ug. 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , Stokes to F.O ., M in u te by N u tta l, A ug. 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; E lw ellSutton, Persian O il, p. 2 5 0 . 4 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , F.O. to British E m bassy, Tehran, reporting C apper’s statem ent to the press, A ug. 6 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 8 , Shepherd to F.O ., A ug. 1 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 6 , C apper to F.O ., A ug. 1 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , C apper to F.O ., repeated for in form ation to M id d le East Air Forces an d War O ffice, A ug. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 4 , Shepherd to F.O. on m eetin g o f the Stokes m ission w ith the Iranian d eleg a tio n , A ug. 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 8 , M in u te by R am sb oth am o n the third m eetin g b etw een Lord Privy Seal and M u sad d iq , A ug. 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 6 , Lord Privy Seal to Secretary o f State, A ug. 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 5 , Lord Privy Seal to Secretary o f State, A ug. 1 2 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 3 , Shepherd to F.O. o n L evy’s v iew s, A ug. 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 8 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 8 , M em oran d u m o f the British d elegation , A ug. 1 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 9 . Ibid., Stokes to F.O ., A ug. 14, 1 9 5 1 . 50. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., A ug. 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 51 . A ch eson Papers, “ P rinceton Sem inars,” M a y 1 5 —16, 1 9 5 4 , p. 1 6 2 4 . 52 . Interview w ith W alter Levy, N e w York, Sept. 2 6 ,1 9 8 5 . 53 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , M eetin g o f Lord Stokes and Pym an w ith Sayyid Z ia at the British E m bassy residence in G u lh ak , A ug. 1 5 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 7 , Stokes’s n o te to Foreign Secretary, Top Secret, Sept. 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 54 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 9 , M in u te by Furlonge, A ug. 1 5 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , Shepherd to F.O. o n Lord Privy Seal’s m eetin g w ith K ashani, A ug. 1 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 55 . E lw ell-Su tton, Persian O il, p. 2 5 2 .

362

Notes to Pages 139—46

5 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 8 , Lord Privy Seal to F.O ., T ext o f the reply o f the Iranian d elegation , A ug. 19, 1 9 5 1 . 57. Ibid. A lso F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., from Lord Privy Seal, A ug. 14 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , M in u tes o f the 8th m eeting o f U .K .—Iran D elega­ tion s, A ug. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 58. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , R am sbotham to L ogan, A ug. 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 59. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 9 , Shepherd to F.O ., from Lord Privy Seal, A ug. 2 0 and 21, ï 95 ï . 60. M ajlis Proceedings, A ug. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 6 1. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , R am sbotham to L ogan, A ug. 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 9 , Shepherd to F.O ., from Lord Privy Seal, three com m u n i­ cation s, A ug. 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , Shepherd to F.O ., T ext o f M u sad d iq ’s m em orandum to Lord Privy Seal, A ug. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , F.O. to British Em bassy, Tehran, givin g the details o f m inisterial d iscu ssion s on Iran, A ug. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 1 , F.O. to Franks, M essage from A ttlee to Trum an, A ug. 23, 1951. 66. Ibid., Franks to F.O ., A ug. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 7 . W ashington Post, A ug. 2 7 , A ug. 2 8 , and Sept. 11, 1 9 5 1 . 6 8 . N e w York Tim es, A ug. 28 and Sept. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 2 , M in ute by M alcolm , A ug. 2 3 , 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , M in u te by B erthoud, A ug. 3 0 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 6 , M inute by Strang, Sept. 6 , 1951. 7 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , M in u te by Berthoud on his m eeting w ith Levy, A ug. 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 5 , R ecord o f m eeting b etw een V. Butler and Walter Levy, July 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 7 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 6 , M in u te by B erthoud, Sept. 1, 1 9 5 1 . 7 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 7 , Fergusson to Strang, Sept. 5, 1 9 5 1 .

9.—The Oil Cartel’s Stranglehold 1. C A B 2 1 /9 8 3 , M inistry o f Fuel and Power to C abinet, June 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 1 , U.K . d elegation . N e w York, to F.O ., o n conversation b etw een M id d leton and heads o f a num ber o f U .S. international oil com p anies, O ct. 13, 1 9 5 1 . 3. U.S. C ongress, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consor­ tium and U.S. N ation al Security, R eport prepared for Subcom m ittee on M u lti­ national C orporations (W ashington, 1 9 7 4 ), pp. 14, 1$. (H ereafter cited as

Cartel. ) 4 . Ibid., p. 15. 5. John M . Blair, The C on trol o f O il (L ondon, 1 9 7 7 ), p. 6 2 . 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 6 , A IO C n o te attached to m inute by L ogan, June 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 1 , E. G oad , M inistry o f Transport, to V. Butler, M inistry o f Fuel and Power, O ct. 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 8 , Logan to G ass, A IO C , M ay 28, 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 3 , L ogan to Secretary o f State, N o v . 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; N o te by Persian (Official) C om m it­ tee, N o v . 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 9. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 3 , T ext o f A IO C advertisem ent, Sept. 5, 1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 1 4 7 -5 4

363

10. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 5 , C apper to F.O ., from M a so n to Fraser an d S ed d on , July 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , F.O. to Franks, July 18, 1 9 5 1 . 11. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 3 , A I O C t o R o t h n ie ,N o v . 1 6 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 7 , A IO C to R oth n ie, D ec. 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 8 , Sir V. M a llet, British E m bassy, R om e, to F.O ., D ec. 2 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by Sarell on his d iscu ssion s w ith the Italian C hargé d ’Affaires in L on d on , Jan. 3 ,1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 3 , British E m bassy, L isbon, to F.O ., D ec. 8, 1951. 13. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 2 0 , F.O. to U .K . H igh C om m ission in India, Apr. 1 1 ,1 9 5 3 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 7 , British E m bassy, A nkara, to F.O ., Jan. 1 3 ,1 9 5 3 ; R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 0 , M em o o f con versation o f H enry A rn old and Rear Adm iral T h o m a s Kelly w ith W illiam B axter o f the O ffice o f G reek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, A ug. 5, 1 9 5 3 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 7 , F.O. to British H igh C o m m issio n in W ahnerheide, W est G erm any, July 2, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 9 , British H igh C o m m issio n , W ahner­ heide, to F.O ., July 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 8 , British H igh C o m m issio n , W ahner­ heide, to F.O ., D ec. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , F.O. to British E m bassy, Paris, M a y 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 5 3 , British Em bassy, R om e, to F.O ., June 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by B ow k er o n his con versation w ith Cafra o f AGIP, July 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 3 , C oldrick to Eden, N o v . 1 6 , 1 9 5 1 ; A n th o n y N u ttin g to C oldrick, N o v . 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 3 , British E m bassy, W ash ington , to F.O ., July 1 2 and 16, 1951. 19. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 4 , British E m bassy, W ash ington , to F.O ., July 1 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 4 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 1 , Pakenham to M o rriso n , Top Secret, July 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 2 . Senate P roceedings, Sept. 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 6 , Shepherd to F .O ., Sept. 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 4 . Ibid., Shepherd to F .O ., Sept. 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by Strang o n the d iscu s­ sio n s o f the W orking Party o n Persian O il, Sept. 8, 1 9 5 1 . 2 5 . F ateh, Pattjah Sal, pp. 5 6 5 —6 6 . 2 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , Franks to F .O ., Sept. 21 and 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 27. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , Shepherd to F.O ., Sept. 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 8 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 6 , M in u te by B ow ker, Sept. 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , Shep­ herd to F.O ., A ug. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , F.O. to Shepherd, Sept. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; M id d leto n to Sarner, Sept. 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 2 , Shepherd to A la, Sept. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 0 , W orking Party paper o n “A pproach to a N e w Persian G overn m en t,” Sept. 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 31 . Ibid., Shepherd to F .O ., Sept. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 0 , A ttlee to M a so n , A ug. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 33 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 0 , F.O. to Shepherd, Sept. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , Shep­ herd to F.O ., Sept. 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 4. FO 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 9 0 , F.O. to Franks, Personal m essage from A ttlee to T rum an, Sept. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , Franks to F.O ., Sept. 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 36 . Ibid. 37 . Ibid., T rum an’s reply to A ttlee, Sept. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 .

3 ¿4

Notes to Pages 134—63

38 . Keyban and Bakhtar, Sept. 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 39 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , F.O. to Capper, Sept. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 .

10.—British Plans for the Occupation of Abadan 1. FR-US, 1 9 5 0 , Vol. V, U .S.-U .K . Political-M ilitary C on versations, W ash­ in gton , O ct. 2 6 , 1 9 5 0 , pp. 2 3 3 —37. 2. Ibid., p. 2 3 6 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , B olton to M ak in s sending report dated Feb. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 , o f C. E. L oom be o n “ Persian T hreat to N a tio n a lise À .I.O .C .,” M ar. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Furlonge to M inistry o f D efen ce, M ar. 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 8 , M inistry o f D efen ce to G H Q , M id d le East Land Forces (M ELF), M ay 2, 1 9 5 1 ; G H Q -M E L F to M inistry o f D efen ce, M ay 3, 1 9 5 1 ; C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, M ay 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; G H Q -M E L F to M inistry o f D efen ce, M a y 8 ,1 9 5 1 . D E F E 4 /4 5 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, July 11, 1951. 6. C A B 1 2 8 /1 9 , C ab inet C on clu sion s 3 5 (5 1 ), M ay 1 0 ,1 9 5 1 ; C A B 2 1 /1 9 8 2 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eeting, M ay 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 4 , Franks to M orrison , M ay 17, 1 9 5 1 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , M orrison to Franks, M ay 18, 1 9 5 1 . 9. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; Philadelphia Inquirer, A ug. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 10. W ashington Post, June 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 11. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 8 , British Em bassy, W ashington, to F.O. reporting H ow ard K. Sm ith broadcast, M ay 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 9 , M in u te by Berthoud on his con versation w ith Levy, M ay 22, 1 9 5 1 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 7 , R ecord o f d iscu ssion s w ith Fraser at C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, M ay 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; C A B 2 1 /1 9 8 2 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eeting, M a y 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 8 , G H Q -M E L F, to M inistry o f D efen ce, M ay 21, 2 4 , and 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; M inistry o f D efen ce to G H Q -M E L F, M ay 18, 2 3 , 25, and 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; C A B 2 1 /1 9 8 2 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, M ay 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; Joint Plan­ ning Staff Paper, M ay 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 ; D efen ce C om m ittee M eeting, June 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 15. Ibid. A lso D E F E 4 /4 5 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eeting, July 1 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 1 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 8 , Fergusson to L ieutenant-G eneral Sir Kenneth M cL ean, June 18, 1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , N o te s o f m eeting to discuss Persia, June 2 7 , 1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 9 , C hurchill to T rum an, June 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 19. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 5 , British Em bassy, Tehran, to F.O. reporting Stew art Also p ’s interview w ith K ashani, N o v . 2 6, 1 9 5 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , M in ute by Fur­ longe, June 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 ; Logan to Bow ker, July 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; M illar to D ix o n , June 22, 1951. 20 . H erbert M orrison , An A u tobiograph y (L ondon, i9 6 0 ) , p. 2 81; C A B 21/ 1 9 8 2 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eeting, M ay 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; D E F E 4 /4 5 , A n n ex to M in u tes o f the M eetin g o f the C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee, July 1 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; K. O. M organ , L abour in Power, 1 9 4 5 —1 9 5 1 (O xford , 1 9 8 4 ), p. 4 7 1 . 21 . C A B 2 1 /1 9 8 2 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eeting, M ay 21 and 2 9 , 1951. 22 . F 0 3 7 i / 9 i 5 5 o ,M i n u t e b y Berthoud, June 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; C A B 2 1 /1 9 8 3 , C o n ­ clu sion s o f a m eeting o f the C abinet at 10 D o w n in g Street, June 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 163—71

365

2 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 1 , M in u te by Furlonge, Brief for Secretary o f State, M ay 3 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 9 , M orrison to Franks, June 8, 1 9 5 1 . 2 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 4 , M in u te by Strang o n his m eetin g w ith H o lm es, June 2 0 , 1951. 2 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 8 , M orrison to Shepherd, June 2 0 and 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 4 5 8 , G H Q -M E L F , to M inistry o f D efen ce, M ay 2 4 , 1 9 5 1 ; M inistry o f D efen ce to G H Q -M E L F , M ay 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; D E F E 4 /4 5 , C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, A ug. 1, 1 9 5 1 . 2 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 2 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 4 8 , M in u te by B erthoud o n his con versation w ith E lk in gton , A ug. 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 . 27 . C A B 1 2 8 /1 9 , C ab inet C o n clu sio n s 4 8 (5 1 ), July 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 8 . Ibid. 2 9 . Ibid. A lso F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 9 , M in u te by Strang o n d iscu ssion s o f A ttlee and M orrison w ith leaders o f the o p p o sitio n , July 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 0 . C A B 5 1 /2 0 0 , M em oran d u m by M o rriso n , July 11, 1 9 5 1 ; D E F E 4 /4 5 , A n n ex to C o n clu sio n s o f C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee M eetin g, July 11, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , Franks to M orrison , July 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 31 . C A B 1 2 8 /2 0 , C ab inet C o n clu sio n s 5 1 (5 1 ), July 12, 1 9 5 1 ; C A B 5 1 /2 1 2 , M em oran d u m by M orrison , July 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 3 2 . Ibid., C abinet C o n clu sio n s 5 3 (5 1 ), July 19, 1 9 5 1 . 33 . Ibid. A lso C ab inet C o n clu sio n s 5 4 (5 1 ), July 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 8 , M in u te by B ow ker, July 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 0 , F.O. to Shepherd, Sept. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; F.O. to Capper, Sept. 2 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 5 . C A B i2 8 /2 0 , C ab inet C o n clu sio n s 6 0 (5 1 ), Sept. 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 6 . L onghurst, A dven tu re in O il, pp. 1 4 3 —4 4 . 37 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 4 , M inistry o f D efen ce to G H Q -M E L F , Top Secret, O ct. 4 , 1951. 38 . The Tim es (L on d on ), O ct. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 39 . M o rg a n , L abou r in Pow er, p. 4 7 1 . 4 0 . F. W illiam s, A Prim e M inister R em em bers: The War an d Post-W ar M em oirs o f the R t. H on. Earl A ttlee (L on don , 1 9 6 1 ), p. 2 5 5 . 4 1 . K enneth H arris, A ttlee (L on d on , 1 9 8 2 ), p. 4 7 2 .

11.—The Oil Dispute Taken to the United Nations 1. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , M in u te by C. C. Parrot, July 6, 1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 2 an d 9 1 6 9 1 , F.O. to U .K . d elegation to the U n ited N a tio n s, N e w York, Sept. 27 and 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 2 , M orrison to Franks, Sept. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 . Ibid., Franks to M orrison , Sept. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 5. Ibid., Franks to M orrison , Secret, Sept. 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 ; M orrison to Franks, Sept. 3 0 and O ct. 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 8 , F.Ó. to Franks, M o rriso n ’s m essage to A ch eson , Sept. 3 0 , I 95 I 7. U .N . Security C ou ncil O fficial R ecords, 5 5 9 th M eetin g, O ct. 1, 1 9 5 1 . T he nonperm anent m em bers o f the Security C ou n cil w ere Brazil, Ecuador, India, the N eth erlan d s, Turkey, and Y ugoslavia. 8. Ibid. 9. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., Sept. 3 0 ,1 9 5 1 .

366

Notes to Pages 172—83

10. Ibid., Shepherd to F.O. from Seddon to Fraser, O ct. 3, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 9 8 , M in u te by R oth nie, O ct. 10, 1 9 5 1 . 11. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 2 , R. H . A rnold, A IO C , L on d on , to L. C. R ice, A I O C ,N e w York, O ct. i i , 1 9 5 1 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 7 and 9 1 5 9 8 , Shepherd to F.O ., O ct. 6 and 8, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 2 , Stokes to M orrison , O ct. 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 7 , British Em bassy, M e x ic o City, to F.O ., O ct. 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 14. Evening Standard (L ondon), O ct. 15, 1 9 5 1 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 2 , U .K . H igh C om m ission er in India to F.O ., O ct. 6 ,1 9 5 1 ; Keyhan, O ct. 4 and 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 4 , Jebb to F.O ., O ct. 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; M in ute by Furlonge, O ct. 5, 1 9 5 1 ; M ilitary Branch o f the A dm iralty to Furlonge, O ct. 9, 1 9 5 1 ; F.O. to Jebb, O ct. 10, 1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 2 , M orrison to Franks, O ct. 12, 1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 8 , A ch eson to M orrison , O ct. 5, 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 5 , M orrison to Franks, O ct. 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 19. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 7 , Franks to F.O ., O ct. 7 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 8 , Jebb to F.O ., O ct. 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 20. T h e m ain m em bers o f the Iranian d elegation accom pan ying M ossad eq w ere four m em bers o f the Joint Parliam entary O il C om m ittee: Dr. M atinD aftari and S. Bayat o f the Senate, A llahyar Saleh and Dr. Ali Shayegan o f the M ajlis. O ther m em bers from the M ajlis w ere Dr. M . Baqa’i, A bbas M as’udi, and M o sta fa M esb ah-Z ad eh ; the last tw o w ere ch ief editors o f leading papers. A lso in the d elegation w ere H ossein Fatem i, D epu ty Prime M inister and editor o f a leading daily; Karim Sanjabi, M inister o f Education; and Javad Bushehri, M inister o f R oads. 21 . R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 0 9 , “ M cG h ee-M osad eq C on versations” (hereafter cited by its title alon e), O ct. 8, 1 9 5 1 . T his exten sive paper con tains M o ssa d eq ’s d iscu ssion s w ith various officials during his stay in the U nited States. 22 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 2 , F.O. to Franks, Sept. 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 23. U .N . Security C ouncil O fficial R ecords, 560th M eeting, O ct. 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 24 . Ibid., 5 6 1 st M eetin g, O ct. 1 6 ,1 9 5 1 . Part o f M o ssa d eq ’s speech w as read by A llahyar Saleh. 2 5 . Ibid. 26 . U .N . Security C ouncil O fficial R ecords, 5 6 1 st, 562 n d , 563rd , 5 6 4 th , and 565 th M eetin gs, O ct. 16—1 9 , 19 5 I * T he statem ents m ade by various speakers are broken d o w n o n each issue and put together w ith the relevant replies. 27 . F O 37 1 / 9 16 0 3 , Jebb to F.O., O ct. 16, 1 9 5 1 . 28 . A ch eson , C reation , p. 5 1 0 . 29 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 0 , U .K . d elegation at the U .N . to Eastern D epartm ent, F.O ., O ct. 8, 1 9 5 1 . 30 . U .N . Security C ouncil O fficial R ecords, 565th M eeting, O ct. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 31 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 5 , Jebb to F.O ., O ct. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 6 , Shepherd to F.O., O ct. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 32. Financial Tim es (L ondon), O ct. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 .

12.—Mossadeq’s Discussions in the United States 1. Ivision S. M acad am , ed ., The Annual Register, 1 9 5 1 , p. 6 2 . 2. Ibid., C hurchill’s speech at G uildhall, p. 6 7 .

367

Notes to Pages 183—90 3. O ct. 4. 5.

F 0 3 7 i / 9 i 5 9 7 ,J e b b t o F .O ., O ct. 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 1 , Franks to F.O ., 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . M cG h ee, E n vo y, pp. 3 9 5 —9 6 . “ M cG h ee-M o sa d eq C o n v ersa tio n s,” O ct. 9 , 1 9 5 1 . 6. N e w York Tim es, O ct. 12, 1 9 5 1 . 7. M cG h ee, E n voy, p. 3 9 7 . 8. “ M cG h ee-M o sa d eq C o n v ersa tio n s,” M eetin g at Blair H o u se, O ct. 2 3 , 1951. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 1 1 . D a v id S. Painter, P rivate P ow er an d Public Policy: M u ltin ation al O il C orporation s an d U.S. Foreign Policy, 1 9 4 1 —1954 (L on d on , 1 9 8 6 ), pp. 1 8 2 — 83. 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 7 , Franks to F.O. givin g the State D ep artm en t’s calcu la­ tion s o n the b reak d ow n o f the price o f o il and a 5 0 -5 0 d ivision o f profits b ased on the data received from A m erican o il com p an ies, O ct. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . G ross profit w a s calculated as follow s: P roduction c o st per barrel Per barrel capital in vestm en t in oil fields Total c o st Posted price per barrel C o st per barrel as given ab ove G ross profit

25 cents 20 " 45 " $ 1 .7 5 .45 $ 1 .3 0

H a lf o f the gross profit, or 65 cen ts, w a s to be Iran’s share, to w h ich w a s added the 45 cents c o st per barrel because Iran h ad to bear such co sts. 13. “ M cG h ee-M o sa d eq C o n v ersa tio n s,” m eetin gs o n O ct. 24 and 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 7 , Franks to F.O ., T ext o f U .S. p rop osals, O ct. 3 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 15. Ibid., Paper by Persian O il W orking Party, F.O ., N o v . 1, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 6 0 9 , M in u te by R am sb oth am o n the N o v . 6 m eetin g o f th e Persian O il W orking Party, N o v . 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 9 and 9 1 6 1 1 , M in u tes by Strang, O ct. 2 3 , N o v . 1, and N o v . 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 9 , Prim e M in ister’s office to F.O ., N o v . 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 8 , M in u tes o f m eetin g held at E d en ’s office, N o v . 1 ,1 9 5 1 ; FO3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , Brief prepared by F.O. for p resen tation o f H M G ’s case by Eden at m eetings w ith A ch eson and H arrim an in Paris, N o v . 6 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , Fergusson to Eden, N o v . 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 9 , Sir H erbert W illiam s, M .P ., to A n th o n y N u ttin g , F.O ., N o v . 7 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , M in u te by F urlonge, N o v . 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 19. N e w York Tim es, N o v . 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 0 . A ch eso n , C reation, p. 5 1 1 . 2 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 8 , Eden, Paris, to F.O ., N o v . 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; A n th o n y E den, Full Circle: The M em oirs o f A n th o n y Eden (L on don , i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 2 0 0 —2 0 1 . 2 2 . R obert R h odes Jam es, A n th o n y Eden (L on don , 1 9 8 6 ), p. 3 4 6 ; F O 3 7 1 / 9 1 6 0 9 , C hurchill to Eden, Paris, N o v . 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 8 , F.O. to Eden, Paris, N o v . 6 and 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 24 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 9 , Eden to F.O ., N o v . 8 and 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 25 . M cG h ee, E n voy, p. 4 0 3 . A lso “M cG h ee-M o sa d eq C o n v ersa tio n s,” N o v . 8 and 9 ,1 9 5 1 .

368

Notes to Pages 191—99

z6 . “ M cG h ee-M osad eq C on versation s,” M em oran du m o f con versation be­ tw een M o ssa d eq and W arne, N o v . 9 ,1 9 5 1 . W illiam W arne w a s w ith the U.S. D epartm ent o f the Interior for sixteen years dealin g w ith w ater resources and w as A ssistant Secretary for W ater and Pow er in th a t departm ent for four years before being ap p oin ted to serve in Iran. 2 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , M in u te by D ix o n , N o v . 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 8 . See F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 1 , Franks to F.O ., N o v . 14, 1 9 5 1 . 29 . “ M cG h ee-M osad eq C on versation s,” N o v . 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 30. Ibid., N o v . 17, 1 9 5 1 . 31 . A l-A hram , N o v . 2 0 —2 4 , I 9 5 I * 32. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 4 , British Em bassy, C airo, to Eden, D ec. 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 33. Shahed, N o v . 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 .

13.—Britain Manipulates the World Bank 1. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , Franks to F.O., N o v . 10, 1 9 5 1 . See also E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il, p. 2 7 4 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , Franks to F.O. givin g te x t o f the W orld Bank m em oran­ dum , N o v . 17, 1 9 5 1 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , F.O. to Franks, N o v . 1 6, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 5 , British Em bassy, R om e, to F.O., N o v . 1 6, 1 9 5 1 . 4. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 4 , Eden to Franks, D ec. 7, 1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , Franks to F.O ., D ec. 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; Shahed , D ec. 2, 1 9 5 1 . 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , M in u te by M ak in s, record o f con versation w ith Black, D ec. 13, 1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 7 , Franks to Eden, D ec. 1 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; Eden to Franks, D ec. 17, 1951. 8. Ibid., Franks to Eden, D ec. 17, 19 5 1 ; Eden to Franks, D ec. 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 9. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , M id d leton to F.O ., D ec. 8 and 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 8 , M id d leton to F.O. o n his con versation w ith H en derson, D ec. 1 9 ,1 9 5 1 ; FO3 71 / 9 1 6 1 7 , F.O. to Franks, D ec. 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 10. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 9 , Franks to Eden, D ec. 29, 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 6 , M inute by M ak in s, D ec. 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 11. Ibid, (both citations). 1 2. Ibid., Letter from W orld Bank to Persian Prime M inister, dated D ec. 28, 1 9 5 1 , handed to him on Jan. 2, 1 9 5 2 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , M id d leton to Sarell, Jan. 7 , 1 9 5 2 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 6 , Letter from Persian Prime M inister to M r. Garner, Jan.

3» 195115. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , M in ute by R am sbotham , Jan. 14, 1 9 5 2 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 6 , F.O. to Franks, Jan. 5, 1 9 5 2 . 17. Letter to the L on don Tim es by L. S. Emery, a C onservative elder states­ m an, Jan. i , 1 9 5 2 . 18. “ O fficial C on versations and M eetin gs o f D ean A cheson , 1 9 4 9 —1 9 5 3 ,” in The Presidential D ocu m en t Series (M icrofilm D ivision , Princeton U niversity Library), Reel 5, June 2 3 , 1 9 8 3 . 19. Ibid. See also A ch eson , C reation, p. 599. 20 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , M in ute by M ak in s, Jan. 7 ,1 9 5 2 ; Franks to F.O ., Jan. 10, 1952.

369

Notes to Pages 200—206

z i . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 8 , R ecord o f m eetin g b etw een Eden and A ch eson at the State D epartm ent, Jan. 9 , 1 9 5 z . z z . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 6 , Eden to F.O ., Jan. 10, 1 9 5 z . Z 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 8 , R ecord o f m eetin g held in B ow k er’s room , F.O ., Feb. 19, 195z. Z 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 4 , Eden to Franks, Jan. z 6, 1 9 5 z . Z 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., reporting o n R ieber’s v iew s given to the U.S. Em bassy, Tehran, Jan. 18, 1 9 5 z ; M in u te by M ak in s, Jan. 2 9 , 1 9 5 z . z 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 5 , A ch eso n ’s m essage to E den, Feb. 8, 1 9 5 z ; Franks to F.O ., Feb. 5, 1 9 5 z . Z 7 . Ibid., Eden to Franks, Feb. 9 , 1 9 5 z . 28 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 8 , M eetin g at the State D ep artm en t regarding the W orld Bank m ission to Persia, Feb. 11, 1 9 5 z . Z 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 8 , B urrow s to R o ss, Eastern D ep t., F.O ., Feb. 9 , 1 9 5 z . 3 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , Franks to F .O ., D ec. i z , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 7 4 , M in u te b y M ak in s, Jan. Z 9 , 1 9 5 z . 3 1 . F O 37 1 /9 1 6 1 7 , M in u te by M ak in s, record o f con versation w ith E ugene B lack, D ec. 13, 1 9 5 1 ; Franks to F.O ., D ec. 17, 1 9 5 1 . 3 z . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , Eden to Franks, D ec. 1 4 , 1 9 5 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 7 , R ecord o f m eetin g o f Secretary o f State w ith E ugene B lack, D ec. 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by M ak in s, R ecord o f con versation w ith B lack o n his d iscu ssion s w ith the chair­ m an o f Standard O il o f N .J ., D ec. 13, 1 9 5 1 . 33 . Interview w ith Sir O liver Franks, O x fo rd , U .K ., Jan. 5, 1 9 8 8 . 34 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 8 , M id d leto n to R o ss o n his con versation w ith a M ajlis deputy, Feb. 1 1 , 1 9 5 z . 35 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 8 , U .K ./U .S . M eetin g held at F.O ., Feb. 1 4 , 1 9 5 z ; M in u te by Strang, Feb. 16, 1 9 5 z ; M in u te by R am sb oth am , Feb. 1 4 , 1 9 5 z . 36 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , M id d leto n to F.O ., Feb. 13, 1 9 5 z ; F.O. to Franks, Jan. 15» I 95 z * 37 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 8 , H en d erson to U .S. E m bassy, L o n d o n , Feb. 1 7 , 1 9 5 2 ; M in u te by R am sb oth am , Feb. z i , 1 9 5 z . 3 8 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 7 , M id d leto n to F.O ., Feb. 1 7 , 1 9 5 z . T h e price form ula p u t forw ard by the W orld Bank w as as fo llo w s: $ 1 .7 5 .5 8

•37 .3 0

I .2 5 O

•

O

Persian G u lf p o sted price per barrel o f crude 3 3 ‘/j percent rebate to bulk buyer 2 1 Vs percent to be k ep t in trust P roduction and in vestm en t co sts B alance to be p aid to Iran

39. Ibid., M id d leto n to F.O ., Feb. 13, 1 9 5 z ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 8 , H en d erson to State D ep artm en t, Feb. 17, 1 9 5 z . 4 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 8 , Strang to Eden through U .K . d elegation , N A T O , L isb on, Feb. z i , 1 9 5 z . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 4 9 , M in u te by B ow ker, con versation s w ith M r. G a m er at M inister o f S tate’s dinner, Feb. 2 8 , 195 z; F.O. to British E m bassy, Tehran, Feb. 2 9 ,1 9 5 2 . 4 2 . Ibid., F.O. to M id d leto n , M ar. 1 , 1 9 5 z . 4 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 5 0 , M id d leto n to F.O ., from P rudhom m e to A IO C , M ar. 1 1 ,

37°

Notes to Pages206—16

1 9 5 2 ; F.O. to M id d leton , from A IO C , L on d on , to P rudhom m e, Tehran, M ar. 1 2 ,1 9 5 2 . 4 4 . Ibid., M id d leto n to F.O ., M ar. 1 3 ,1 9 5 2 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 6 , M id d leton to F.O ., M ar. 11, 1 9 5 2 . 4 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 6 , C on versation b etw een Secretary o f State and the Persian am bassador, D ec. 11, 1 9 5 1 . 4 7 . R ou han i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané , p. 2 5 6 . 4 8 . 1 tried to arrange an interview in April 1 9 8 8 w ith Eugene Black, w h o w as then living in Florida. I sent him the con ten ts o f declassified docum ents sh o w in g that the W orld Bank w as n o t evenhanded in the Iranian oil dispute. Black declined to give an interview , saying that he did n o t rem em ber the 1 9 5 1 — 5 2 n egotiation s w ith Iran. H e sent m y inquiries to a form er colleagu e o f his, w h o se ex p lan ation s I found unconvincing.

14.—Judgment at the World Court 1. H assan Sadr, D efa’é Dr. M ossadeq az N a ft dar Z en dané Zerehi (Tehran, 1 3 5 7 /1 9 7 8 ), pp. 2 9 - 3 2 . 2. International C ourt o f Justice, T h e H agu e, IJC Pleadings, Anglo-lranian O il C om pan y Case ( U nited K ingdom v Iran), 1 9 5 2 , p. 4 2 7 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 2 , Shepherd to F.O ., July 12, 1 9 5 1 . 4. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 7 , M em orandum by Soskice, M ay 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 7 9 , M inutes by R othnie, Apr. 9 and M ay 17, 1 952. 6. E lw ell-Sutton, Persian O il, p. 2 6 5 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 0 , Butler to Eden, June 2 5 , 1 9 5 2 . 8. T h e W orld C ourt judges w ere from G reat Britain, El Salvador, the U nited States, Poland, N o rw a y , C hile, Egypt, C anada, the R epublic o f C hina, Brazil, Y ugoslavia, U ruguay, and France, plus an ad h oc judge from Iran. T he judge from the Soviet U n ion w as absent o w in g to illness. Sir Benegal Rau o f India cou ld n o t attend because he had earlier participated in the U .N . Security C ouncil debate o n the sam e dispute. 9. IJC Pleadings, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 4 3 7 —4 2 . 10. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 0 , Butler to Eden, June 2 5 , 1 9 5 2 . 11. IJC Pleadings, 1 9 5 z, pp. 4 4 5 —9 9 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 7 9 , M in ute by Beckett, M ay 19, 1 9 5 2 . 13. IJC Pleadings, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 5 0 9 —81. 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 0 , Beckett to Strang, June 24, 1 9 5 2 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 7 , M em orandum by Soskice, M ay 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 . 1 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 0 , Butler to Eden, June 2 5 , 1 9 5 2 . 17. International C ourt o f Justice, T he H ague, IJC R eports o f Judgm ents, A dvisory O pin ion s an d O rders, 1952, pp. 9 4 —114. 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 0 , M in ute by Beckett, July 2 3 , 1 9 5 2 .

15.—British Attempts to Overthrow Mossadeq 1. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 4 , Shepherd to F.O., M ar. 18, 1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 9 , Shepherd to Furlonge, M ay 6, 19 5 1 ; Shepherd to M or­ rison, M ay 2 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 9 , Furlonge to M orrison , Apr. 29, 1 9 5 1 . 4. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 9 , Shepherd to M orrison , M ay 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 8 , M in u te by B erthoud, June 1 5 , 1 9 5 1 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 5 0 , M in ­ ute by B erthoud, June 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 217—23

371

6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 9 , M in u te by Furlonge, M ay 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 6 4 , Shepherd, “A C om p arison B etw een Persian and A siatic N a tio n a lism in G en eral,” O ct. 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 4 , Shepherd to M orrison , M ar. 15, 1 9 5 1 . 9. Ibid., Shepherd to M orrison , July 2, 1 9 5 1 . 10. A ch eso n , C reation , p. 5 0 9 . 1 1 . A s related to m e by Sir G eorge M id d leto n in the cou rse o f an interview , L on d on , Jan. 2 9 , 1 9 8 6 . 12. L ou is, The British E m pire , pp. 6 5 8 —59. 13. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 2 , Shepherd to B ow ker, M ay 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 J /9 1 5 4 7 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 18, 1 9 5 1 ; Shepherd to M orrison , June 18, 1 9 5 1 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 5 9 , Shepherd to Furlonge, F.O ., M ay 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 15. G eorge M cG h ee, “ R eco llectio n s o f Dr. M o h a m m a d M u sa d d iq ,” in Jam es A. Bill and W m . R oger L ou is, ed s., M usaddiq, Iranian N ationalism , an d O il (L on don , 1 9 8 8 ), pp. 2 9 7 —9 8 . 16. A s related by o n e o f his colleagu es at the British em b assy in Tehran. See also L ouis, “M u sad d iq and the D ilem m as o f British Im perialism ,” in Bill and L ouis, ed s., M usaddiq, N ation alism , p. 2 3 6 . 17. C. M . W o o d h o u se, Som ething Ventured (L on d on , 1 9 8 2 ), p. h i ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , Shepherd to F.O ., A ug. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 6 , M in u te by Strang, June 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 19. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 3 , Shepherd to F.O ., A ug. 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 1 , Shepherd to F.O ., June 2 6 , i 9 5 i ; P . O . to Shepherd, June 28, 1951. 21 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 6 2 , M in u te by Pym an, Sept. 8, 1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by Jack son , D ec. 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 2 2 . F O 2 4 8 /1 5 2 4 , M in u te by Shepherd, Sept. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 2 4 8 /1 5 3 1 , M in ­ ute by Pym an, Jan. 1 7 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 3 . F O 2 4 8 /1 5 3 1 , M in u te by Z aehner, June 1 9 5 2 . 24 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 5 , M in u te by G eorge R ogers o n h is m eetin g w ith Shafía, June 2 i , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 0 , M in u te by Barclay, F.O ., o n his con versation w ith C lem ent D avis a b ou t h is d iscu ssion s w ith H orace Em ery, July 4 , 1 9 5 1 . 2 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 1 , M in u te by L ogan o n his con versation w ith H a ig G alustian, June 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . Interview w ith Sir G eorge M id d leto n , L on d on , Jan. 2 9 , 1986. 2 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 1 , B urrow s, British E m bassy, W ashington, o n his con versa­ tio n w ith Dr. Berger V oesendorf, to Eastern D ep t., F.O ., M a y 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 27 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , F.O. to Shepherd, Sept. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 3 , Shep­ herd to F.O ., Sept. 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 28 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , M id d leto n to Sarner, Sept. 18, 1 9 5 1 . 29 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , Lord Privy Seal N o te on Tehran talks, A ug. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 0 , Lord Privy Seal N o te s o n Iranian o il situ a tio n , Sept. 2 2 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , Stokes to Younger, Sept. 2 4 ,1 9 5 1 . 30. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 2 , G ord on W aterfield, BBC, to F urlonge, en clo sin g E lw ellS u tton ’s statem ent o f July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 , o n Persian o il dispute, July 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 7 , L eggett to Strang, Apr. 14, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , Sir R alph G lyn, M .P ., to Eden en closin g a letter from L eggett, O ct. 2 4 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 2 , M in u te by L. A . C. Fry, Feb. 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 32 . C A B 1 2 8 /2 0 , C abinet C on clu sion s 5 1 (5 1 ), July 1 2 ,1 9 5 1 . 33 . Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1 9 5 1 .

372.

Notes to Pages 224—3 0

34 . F O 9 5 3 /P G 1 4 5 3 7 , P. H . G ore-B ooth , British Em bassy, W ashington, to F.O ., June 15 and 2 0 ,1 9 5 1 . 35 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 4 7 3 , Shepherd to Strang, Sept. 11, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 6 , Shepherd to M orrison , O ct. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 3 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 5 , Shepherd to Furlonge, M ay 14, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 4 , Shepherd to Furlonge, June 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 37 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 7 , Franks to F.O. on his con versation w ith M cG hee, M ay 25 and 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 38 . FR-US, 1 9 5 1 , Vol. I, M em oran du m by Special A ssistant to Secretary o f State A ch eson , July 3 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 39 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , Franks to F.O ., Sept. 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 9 1 5 9 2 , Franks to F.O ., Sept. 2 9 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 9 1 , Franks to F.O ., Sept. 2 6 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 1 . Ibid., Shepherd to F.O ., Sept. 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 2 , M in ute by B ow ker, A ug. 2 5 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 6 , Shepherd to F.O ., O ct. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 4 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 0 , M in u te by B erthoud, June 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 3 . Ibid. In 1 9 0 7 Britain and R ussia signed an agreem ent dividing Iran in to tw o zon es o f influence. 4 4 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 4 , Shepherd to F.O., A ug. 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 0 , Shepherd to Furlonge, July 2, 1 9 5 1 . 4 6. Ibid., Furlonge to Shepherd, July 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 1 , M id d leton to F.O ., A ug. 1, 1 9 5 1 . 4 8 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 0 , M in ute by Bow ker, June 2 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 9 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 6 , Shepherd to F.O ., Sept. 6 and 10, 1 9 5 1 . 50. Tolu , A ug. 2 9 , Sept. 6, and Sept. 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 ; D a d , Sept. 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 51. Shahed, Sept. 6 and 18, 1 9 5 1 ; Keyban, A ug. 3 0 , Sept. 6, and Sept. 18, 1951. 52. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 5 , Franks to F.O. givin g a survey o f U.S. press, N o v . 2 0 , 1951. 53. U.S. N ew s and W orld R eport, “A n Interview w ith the Prime M inister o f Iran,” July 2 5 , 1 9 5 1 . 54. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 8 9 , Shepherd to Younger, Sept. 15, 1 9 5 1 . 55 . N e w York Tim es, Sept. 2 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 5 6. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 7 , M in u tes o f m eeting in Sir Edw ard Bridges’s room , O ct. 2 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 57. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , N o te s o f a m eeting at the H o u se o f C om m on s on Persia attended by A ttlee, M orrison , C hurchill, and Eden, June 2 7 ,1 9 5 1 . 58. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , Sir R alph G lyn, M .P ., to Eden, sending L eggett’s letter o f O ct. 17, 1 9 5 1 , O ct. 2 4 , 19 5 1 ; A n thon y N u ttin g to G lyn, N o v . 5, 1 9 5 1 . 59. F O 37 1 /9 1 6 0 8 , M inutes o f a m eeting chaired hy Eden at the Foreign O ffice, N o v . i , 1 9 5 1 ; L ogan to R. J. W. Stacy, Board o f Trade, sending a report o f the O fficial W orking Party on Persian O il con tain in g Shepherd’s view s, N o v . ï , 1951. 6 0 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 0 9 , M in ute by Berthoud on his conversation w ith L am bton, N o v . 2 ,1 9 5 1 . Britain’s Special O perations E xecutive (SOE) w as the equivalent o f the A m erican O ffice o f Strategic Services (OSS). 6 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 4 0 , Shepherd to F.O., June 4 , 19 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 0 , Shep­ herd to F.O ., M ay 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 2 5 , M in u te by Pym an, M ar. 1 4 ,1 9 5 1 ; F O 2 4 8 /1 5 1 4 , M inutes by Pym an, A ug. 28 and 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 .

Notes to Pages 23 0—3 9

373

6 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 4 , British E m bassy, R om e, to Eastern D ep artm en t, F.O ., June 2 9 , 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , British E m bassy, R o m e, to B ow ker, F .O ., June

19» 19516 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 6 , M in u te by Furlonge, M ay n , 1 9 5 1 . 6 4 . F. B ostock and G . Jon es, Planning a n d P ow er in Iran: E btehaj an d E conom ic D evelo p m en t under the Shah (L on d on , 1 9 8 9 ), pp. 1 0 7 —8. 6 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 3 6 , O liver H arvey, Paris, to F urlonge, M ay 18, 1 9 5 1 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 5 , British Em bassy, Paris, to B ow ker, June 2 8 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 6 . E lw ell-Su tton, Persian O il, p. 2 0 0 . 6 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 8 , M in u te by Sarell, Jan. 2 2 , 1 9 5 1 . 6 8 . Ibid., UK-US m eetin g at F.O ., Feb. 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . British participants: R oss, Sarell, R am sb oth am , R oth n ie, and C orn w allis. A m erican participants: N itz e and Linder o f the State D ep artm en t and Palm er o f the U .S. em bassy, L on d on . 6 9 . Ibid., F.O. to M id d leto n , Feb. 1 5 ,1 9 5 2 . 7 0 . Ibid., M id d leto n to F.O ., Feb. 17, 1 9 5 2 . 7 1 . Ibid., L ogan, W ashington, to F.O ., Feb. 11, 1 9 5 2 . 7 2 . Ibid., M in u te by Strang on N itz e ’s m eetin g w ith British m inisters, Feb. 16, 1 9 5 2 ; F.O. to Franks, Feb. 19, 1 9 5 2 .

16.—Qavam’s Prime Ministership and the Communist Threat 1. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 6 5 , M in u te by G eorge R ogers on his d iscu ssion s w ith Shafía, June 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 9 , M orrison to C hurchill, July 3 ,1 9 5 1 ; M in u te by B ow k er on his m eetin g w ith C on servative M Ps Fitzroy M a clean , C hristopher S oam es, and Julian A m ery, July 5 ,1 9 5 1 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 0 , A m ery to B ow k er en clo sin g letter o f O ct. 2 8 ,1 9 5 1 , from Shafia to C o lo n el M av rod i, N o v . 6 ,1 9 5 1 . 4. F O 2 4 8 /1 5 1 4 , M in u te by Z aehner, N o v . 10, 1 9 5 1 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , M id d leto n to F.O ., Secret, N o v . 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 . 6. K habar, N o v . 1 1 ,1 9 5 1 . 7. F O 3 7 1 /9 1 6 1 2 , M in u te by L ogan, N o v . 1 9 , 1 9 5 1 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 9 1 6 1 3 , M in u te by M a tth ew s, N o v . 1 3 ,1 9 5 1 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 3 , M id d leto n to Sarell, Jan. 7 ,1 9 5 2 . 9 . Ibid., A n th on y N u ttin g (in the absence o f Eden) to J. A m ery, Feb. 1 9 , 1952. 10. Ibid., K enneth de C ou rcy to A n th on y N u ttin g , Feb. 1 3 ,1 9 5 2 . ii.I b id . 12. Ibid., A m ery to S elw yn L loyd, M ar. 2 5 , 1 9 5 2 ; Interview w ith Prince H am id Q ajar, L on d on , M ar. 2 5 , 1 9 8 5 . 1 3 . Ibid. 14. Ibid., M in u te by R o ss, Apr. 5 ,1 9 5 2 . 15. Ibid., N o te by Eden, Apr. 1 1 ,1 9 5 2 . 16. Ibid., B ow k er to M id d leto n , Apr. 16, 1 9 5 2 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 8 , Franks to F.O ., Apr. 10 and 1 6 ,1 9 5 2 . 18. F O 2 4 8 /1 5 3 1 , M in u tes by Falle, Apr. 28 and June 3 0 , 1 9 5 2 . 19. Ibid., M in u te by M id d leto n , June 1 1 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 0 . Ibid., M in u te by Z aehner, June 2 3 , 1 9 5 2 . 21 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 6 , M id d leto n to F.O ., M ar. 1 1 ,1 9 5 2 .

374

Notes to Pages 239—48

22 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 1 5 , John W alker, British Em bassy, Tehran, to F.O. on talks w ith the Shah, M a y 1 9 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 3 . Interview w ith H enry B yroade, W ashington, Sept. 3 0 ,1 9 8 5 . 24 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 9 , M id d leton to F.O ., M ay 14, 1 9 5 2 . 25 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 0 , Brief for Eden by R oss, June 2 3 , 1 9 5 2 . 26 . Shahed, O ct. 29 and N o v . 5, 1 9 5 1 . 27 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 7 3 1, W. E. T h om as, British Em bassy, Tehran, to Sir G . M yrddin-E vans, M inistry o f Labour, D ec. 1 7 ,1 9 5 1 , and Feb. 4 ,1 9 5 2 ; F. C. M ason to M yrddin-E vans, Jan. 16, 1 9 5 2 ; M in u te by M a so n , Jan. 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 28 . RG 59, B o x 5 5 0 9 , “ M cG h ee-M osad eq C on versation s,” N o v . 5, 1 9 5 1 . 29 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 1 5 , M in ute by R oss, M ar. 2 4 , 1 9 5 2 . 30 . F O 2 4 8 /1 5 3 1 , M in u te by Falle, July 13, 1 9 5 2 . 31 . F O 3 7 1 /1 5 3 1 , M in u te by L ogan, M ay 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 32 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 1 , M id d leton to R oss, July 2 1 , 1 9 5 2 . H assan Arsanjani, “ Y addashthayé S iasié-m an,” Bam shad , June 1 i - N o v . 2 6 , 1 9 5 6 , pp. 4 5 —4 6 . 33 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 1 , M in ute by Fergusson, July 1 8 ,1 9 5 1 , w ith n otes by Eden o n the m argin. 34 . Ibid., M in u te by M ak in s, July 1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 3 , Fergusson to M akins, July 1 9 ,1 9 5 2 , w ith n otes by Eden on the m argin. 35. Ibid, (both citation s). 36 . G. R. N ejati, Jon besh éM e lliS h odan éS an ’a té N afté Iran (Tehran, 1 3 6 4 / 1 9 8 5 ), Q a v a m ’s statem ent o f July 18, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 2 1 8 —19. 37. Keyhan , K ashani’s statem ent, July 18, 1 9 5 2 . 38 . N eja ti , Jonbeshé, pp. 2 2 1 —22; Keyhan, July 21 and 2 2 , 1 9 5 2 . R eports on the num ber o f dead and w ou n d ed ranged from 6 0 to 8 0 0 . 39. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 1 , M id d leton to F.O., July 27, 1 9 5 2 . 4 0 . Ibid., M in u te by R oss, July 27, 1 9 5 2 ; M id d leton to F.O ., July 2 7 , 2 8 , and 2 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 2 , H enderson to State D ep t., A ug. 2, 1 9 5 2 . 4 2 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 7 , Secret report by B olland, A ug. 4 , 1 9 5 2 . 4 3 . Shahed, O ct. 29 and N o v . 5, 1 9 5 1 . 4 4 . E ttela’at, q u otin g Tabari, Feb. 19, 1 9 8 5 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 8 3 , de C ourcy to N u ttin g , Feb. 13, 1 9 5 2 . 4 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 5 0 , M in ute by Berthoud, June 2 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 4 7 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 1 , Franks to F.O., July 2 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 4 8 . Interview w ith G eneral M . Jam , w h o w as a m em ber o f the com m ittees in charge o f purging the Iranian army, L ondon, Feb. 1 8 ,1 9 8 8 . N ejati, Jonbeshé, pp. 2 2 4 —25. 4 9 . A braham ian, Iran, pp. 2 7 2 —7 3 . 50. M o ssa d eq , K haterat, p. 2 1 1 .

17.—Churchill’s Games with Truman 1. T he am ou n t claim ed by Iran w as £ 4 9 ,9 8 7 ,4 4 0 , w hich consisted m ainly o f unpaid balances o f Iran’s 20 percent share in A IO C ’s general reserves and adjustm ents o n royalties under the 19 4 9 Supplem ental A greem ent. T he sum in fact w as ap proxim ately equal to the am ou n t set aside for Iran in reserves carried in the A IO C statem ent o f D ec. 3 1 , 1 9 5 1 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 1 , M id d leton to F.O ., July 27 and 2 8 ,1 9 5 2 . 3. Ibid., Franks to Eden, July 3 1 ,1 9 5 2 .

Notes to Pages 2 4 9 -5 8

375

4 . Ibid., E den’s m essage to A ch eso n , A ug. 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 3 , Franks to Eden, Secret, A ug. 1 2 ,1 9 5 2 ; RG 5 9 , B ox 5 5 0 9 , “An A cco u n t o f the Iranian O il C on troversy” (hereafter cited as “ O il C o n tro ­ versy” ), Vol. II, p. 14. 6. Interview w ith Sir O liver Franks, Jan. 4 , 1 9 8 8 . 7. “ O il C on troversy,” Vol. II, M id d leto n ’s d iscu ssion s w ith M o ssa d eq o n A ug. 14, 1 9 5 2 . 8. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -6, Personal and Secret M essage from C hurchill to Trum an, A ug. 1 6 ,1 9 5 2 . 9. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -7, Personal and Secret M essage from Trum an to Chur­ ch ill, A ug. 1 8 ,1 9 5 2 . 10. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -8, Personal and Secret M essage from C hurchill to T rum an, A ug. 2 0 , 1 9 5 2 . 1 1 . Ibid., A p p en d ix B -9, C h urch ill’s draft o f a joint m essage to M o ssa d eq , A ug. 2 0 ,1 9 5 2 . 12. Ibid., p. 17. 13. Ibid., A p p en d ix B - io , Trum an to C hurchill, A ug. 2 1 ,1 9 5 2 . 14. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -1 1 , C hurchill to T rum an, A ug. 2 2 ,1 9 5 2 . 15. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -1 2 , Join t T rum an-C hurchill P roposals handed to M o ssa d eq o n A ug. 2 7 , 1 9 5 2 . 16. Ibid., p. 20. 17. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -1 7 , Trum an to C hurchill, A ug. 2 8 ,1 9 5 2 . 18. The Tim es (L on d on ), Sept. 6 , 1 9 5 2 , Letter to the E ditor from R. R. Stokes, H o u se o f C o m m o n s, dated Sept. 5 ,1 9 5 2 . 19. M ajlis P roceedings, Sept. 16, 1 9 5 2 . 20. “ O il C on troversy,” V ol. II, A p p en d ix B -2 0 , M o ssa d eq to C hurchill and T rum an, Sept. 2 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 1 . Ibid., A p p en d ix B -2 1 , C hurchill to T rum an, Sept. 2 9 , 1 9 5 2 . 2 2 . Ibid., A p p en d ix B -2 3 , A ch eson to M o ssa d eq , O ct. 5, 1 9 5 2 ; A p p en d ix B -24, Eden to M o ssa d eq , O ct. 5 ,1 9 5 2 ; A p p en d ix B -2 5 , M o ssa d eq to A ch eso n , O ct. 7 ,1 9 5 2 ; A p p en d ix B -2 6 , M o ssa d eq to E den, O ct. 7 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 3 . Ibid., A p p en d ix B -2 7 , British govern m en t’s n o te to the Iranian govern ­ m ent, O ct. 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 4 . C A B 1 2 9 /5 5 , Q 5 2 ) 3 4 1 , C ab inet Paper dated O ct. 17, 1 9 5 2 , b ein g M id d leto n ’s report to F.O ., O ct. 1 3 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 5 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 2 1 , M id d leto n to F.O ., O ct. 1 8 , 2 1 , and 2 2 , 1 9 5 2 . 2 6. “ O il C on troversy,” Vol. II, A p p en d ix B -2 8 , N o te from Iran’s Foreign M inister to British C hargé d ’A ffaires, O ct. 2 2 , 1 9 5 2 . 27 . Eden, Full Circle , p. 2 0 8 . 28 . Frankfurter N eue Press , O ct. 1 7 ,1 9 5 2 . 29 . A ch eso n , C reation , pp. 6 8 1 —8 2 . 30 . Ibid. 31 . “ O il C on troversy,” V ol. II, M em oran d u m o f C on versation s, O ct. 8, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 3 0 —31 ; Painter, P rivate P ow er, pp. 1 8 5 —8 7 . 32 . U .S. C ongress, Cartel, 1 9 7 4 , pp. Ill—IV. 33 . N S C 1 3 6 , Statem ent o f Policy, N o v . 6 , 1 9 5 2 . 34 . N S C 1 3 6 /1 , Statem ent o f Policy, N o v . 7 ,1 9 5 2 . 3 5 . “ O il C ontroversy,” Vol. II, p. 3 4 .

37¿

Notes to Pages 258—65

3 6. Ibid., A p p en d ix B -31, British paper handed to U.S. Em bassy in L on d on , N o v . 18, 1 9 5 2 . 37. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 3 , B urrow s to B ow ker on d iscu ssion s w ith B ohlen, July 3 0 , 1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 7 0 3 , Sir G lad w yn Jebb, N e w York, to F.O. reporting Eden’s discussions w ith A ch eson , N o v . 2 1 , 1 9 5 2 . 38. Ibid., G reenhill, F.O ., to Flett, Treasury, en closin g a paper on the con clu ­ sio n s o f Persia (official) C om m ittee, N o v . 2 8 ,1 9 5 2 . 39. D w ig h t D . E isenhow er, The W hite H ouse Years: M andate fo r Change, I 9 5 3 ~ I 95^ (N e w York, 1 9 6 3 ), p. 57. 4 0 . FR-US , 1 9 5 2 —54, Vol. I, M em oran du m by the Secretary o f State o f a m eeting betw een President Trum an and G eneral E isenhow er on N o v . 1 8 ,1 9 5 2 , pp. 2 2 —27. 4 1 . “ O il C ontroversy,” Vol. II, A ppendix E -4, U.S. G overnm ent Statem ent o f D ec. 6, 1 9 5 2 . 4 2 . A ch eson , C reation , p. 6 8 4 . Interview w ith H enry B yroade, W ashington, Sept. 3 0 ,1 9 8 5 . Interview w ith Paul N itz e , W ashington, M ay 8 ,1 9 8 4 . Byroade and N itz e accom p an ied A ch eson at these m eetings, alon g w ith D avid Bruce, U nder Secretary o f State. 4 3 . F O 3 7 1 /9 8 7 0 4 , F.O. to British Em bassy, Paris, for Eden, D ec. 1 2 ,1 9 5 2 . 4 4 . Ibid., British Em bassy, Paris, to F.O ., D ec. 15, 1 9 5 2 . 4 5 . Ibid., Steel to F.O ., D ec. 18, 19 5 2 ; Eden, Paris, to Steel, D ec. 1 9 ,1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 5 2 , Franks to F.O ., N o v . 10, 1 9 5 2 . 4 6 . F O 37 1 /9 8 7 0 4 , Steel to F.O ., three com m u n ication s, D ec. 16, 1 9 5 2 . 4 7 . Ibid., Steel to F.O ., D ec. 2 3 , 1 9 5 2 . 4 8 . C A B 1 2 9 /5 8 , C ( 5 3 ) i, N o te by Eden on a report received from U.S. Em bassy, L on d on , o n H en d erson ’s d iscu ssion s w ith M ossad eq , Jan. 1, 1 9 5 3 . 4 9 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 6 , U.S. Em bassy, L ondon, to F.O ., on H en d erson ’s discus­ sion s w ith M ossad eq , D ec. 31, 1 9 5 2 , and Jan. 2, 1 9 5 3 . 50. Ibid., M em orandum from B yroade to D ix o n alon g w ith tw o draft agree­ m ents, Jan. 3, 1 9 5 3 . 51. Ibid., M in ute by R oss, Jan. 3, 19 5 3 ; C A B 1 2 9 /5 8 , C (5 3 )6 , M em oran ­ dum by Eden o n “M u sa d d iq ’s P osition ,” Jan. 6, 1 9 5 3 . 52. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 6 , H en d erson ’s m em orandum , Jan. 4 ,1 9 5 3 ; H en d erson ’s m essage to B yroade, Jan. 6, 1 9 5 3 . 53. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 7 , F itzm aurice’s n ote on “ Proposed Terms o f R eference o f Arbitral T ribunal” w ith com m en ts by R oss, Jan. 1 ,1 9 5 3 . 54. Ibid., H enderson to State D ept, and U .S. Em bassy, L on don , Jan. 9 and lU

1953-

55. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 8 , A cheson to Byroade, L ondon, Jan. 13, 19 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 / 1 0 4 6 0 9 , M in u te by Fitzm aurice, Jan. 13, 1 9 5 3 . 56. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 8 , H enderson to State D ept, and U .S. Em bassy, L ondon, Jan. 13, 1 9 5 3 . 57. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 2 , Letter to M usaddiq signed by Eden and dated Jan. 16, Ï 9 5 3 , w h ich w as never sent. 58 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 0 , F.O. to British representatives in Bagdad, C airo, Bah­ rain, Jedda, A m m an, D am ascu s, Beirut, Jakarta, R an goon , and C aracas, Jan. 17, 1953 59. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 8 , Eden to C hurchill, Jan. 14, 1 9 5 3 . 6 0 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 9 , Letter from Eden to W alter G ifford en closin g tw o draft agreem ents, Jan. 14 , 1 9 5 3 .

Notes to Pages 166—73

377

6 1.

Ibid., U .S. Em bassy, L on d on , to F.O. givin g the details o f H en d erso n ’s d iscu ssion s w ith M o ssa d eq , Jan. 15, 17, and 1 8, 1953 61. Ibid., U .S. Em bassy, L on d on , to F.O ., Jan. 19, 1 9 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 0 , M in u te by R oss, Jan. 16, 1 9 5 3 .

18.—Iran’s Oil-less Economy G . W. S tock in g, The M iddle E ast O il: A S tu dy in Politics a n d E conom ic C on troversy (N ash ville, T enn., 1 9 7 0 ), p. 154. i . F O 3 7 1 /9 0 4 6 1 7 , “T h e R ose M ary C a se,” D ec. 3 1 , 1 9 5 2 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 8 , M in u te by R oss for M in ister o f State, Feb. 3 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 7 , Treasury to F.O ., Jan. 2 8 ,1 9 5 3 . 5. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 2 0 , D ix o n ’s brief for Eden, M ar. 3 0 , 1 9 5 3 . 6. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 2 5 , R ecord o f con versation at F.O. b etw een D ix o n , B ow ker, and Signor del B alzo o f the Italian Foreign M inistry, June 2 4 , 1 9 5 3 . 7. Ibid., N o te by C hurchill for E den, M ar. 2 7 , 1 9 5 3 . 8. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 3 8 , M in u te by Fitzm aurice, June 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 9. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 2 0 , British E m bassy, T ok yo, to F.O ., Apr. 13, 1 9 5 3 . 10. R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , A m erican E m bassy, Tehran, to State D ep t., June 2 7 , i.

1953i i . Ibid., H en derson to State D ep t., M ar. 14, 1 9 5 3 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 2 , M ak in s to F.O ., Feb. 10, 1 9 5 3 ; State D ep t, to U .S. Em bassy, L on d on , Feb. 11, 1 9 5 3 ; F.O. to British Em bassy, W ash ington , Feb. 1 8 ,1 9 5 3 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 5 1 6 5 , D ix o n to M a k in s, Apr. 2 ,1 9 5 3 . 14. Ibid., M in u te by R am sb oth am , “T h in k P iece” o n future p o licy regard­ ing the Persian o il p rob lem , Apr. 1 4 ,1 9 5 3 . 15. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 5 1 6 6 , M em oran d u m by R am sb oth am o n “ O il P olicy,” June 2 4 , 1 9 5 3 ; Shell M em oran d u m on “ C urrent M id d le E ast Political S itu a tio n ,” June 2 6 , 1 9 5 3 . 16. E ttela’a t , articles by H assib i, Feb. 12 and Apr. 3 0 , 1 9 5 3 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , Secret Security In form ation, M em oran d u m on “Scope o f Sale o f Persian O il,” M a y 12 , 1 9 5 3 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 2 7 , Bank M elli Iran to Bank o f E ngland, N o v . 15, 1 9 5 1 ; Eden to C h ancellor o f the E xchequer, Jan. 2 2 ,1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 2 7 , J. W alker, British C om m ercial C ou nselor, Tehran, to M . H ed d y-M iller, Treasury, Feb. 11, 1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 3 4 , British E m bassy, Tehran, to R oth n ie, July 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 18. E ttela’at, June 3 0 ,1 9 5 2 . 19. M ajlis P roceedings, D ec. 1 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 2 0 . “ O il C on troversy,” V ol. II, p. 4 4 . 2 1 . International M on etary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. VIII, N o . i (Jan. 1 9 5 5 ), p. 1 5 5 . 22 . Ibid., V ol. VII, N o . 7 (July 1 9 5 4 ), pp. n o —11. 23 . For further details on Iran’s eco n o m y under M o ssa d eq , see Julian Bharier. E conom ic D evelo p m en t in Iran, 1 9 0 0 —1970 (L on don , 1 9 7 1 ), chap. 3; H om a K atouzian , “ O il B o y co tt and the Political E conom y: M u sad d iq and the Strategy o f N o n -o il E co n o m ics,” in Bill and L ou is, ed s., M ussadiq, N a tio n a l­ ism , pp. 1 0 3 —2 7 ; R ou h an i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané, chap. 27; and Fateh, Panjah Sal, pp. 6 4 3 —4 6 .

378

Notes to Pages 274—86

24. H ab ib Ladjevardi, “ C on stitu tion al G overnm ent and R eform under M u sa d d iq ,” in Bill and L ouis, ed s., M usaddiq, N ationalism , pp. 6 9 —9 0 .

19.—Eden’s Games with Eisenhower 1. R obert H . Ferrell, ed .. The E isenhow er D iaries (L ondon, i 9 8 i ) , p p . 2 2 1 — 24; Stephen E. A m brose, Eisenhow er, Vol. II (N e w York, 1 9 8 4 ), pp. 1 9 —21. 2. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 7 , Eden to M ak in s, Jan. 2 0 , 1 9 5 3 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 1 0 4 6 1 0 , Eden to M ak in s, Jan. 2 3 , 1 9 5 3 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 1 , M in ute by R am sboth am , Jan. 31, 19 5 3 ; M in u te by A. D . M . R oss, Jan. 2 6 , 1 9 5 3 . 4. Ibid., M in ute by R oss, Jan. 28, 1 9 5 3 . 5. Ibid., M em oran du m by Fitzm aurice, Jan. 27, 1 9 5 3 . 6. Ibid., H enderson to State D ep t., Jan. 28 and Feb. 3, 1 9 5 3 . 7. E ttela’at, interview w ith H assib i, Feb. 5 and 2 5 ,1 9 5 3 . 8. Francis W illiam s, A Prim e M inister Rem em bers: The War an d Post-W ar M em oirs o f the Rt. H on. Earl A ttlee (L ondon, 1 9 6 1 ), letter dated 14 Sept. 1951 from Lord Stokes to Prime M inister C lem ent A ttlee, pp. 2 4 9 —51. 9. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 2 , M in ute by R am sbotham on his telep h on e conversation w ith G utt, Feb. 13, 1 9 5 3 . 10. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 2 , State D ept, to U.S. Em bassy, L on don , Feb. 11, 1 9 53; H en derson to U.S. Em bassy, L on d on , Feb. 15, 1 9 5 3 . 11. Ibid., Eden to M ak in s, Feb. 18, 1 9 5 3 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 3 , D raft C om p en sation A greem ent and H eads o f G overn­ m ent A greem ent, Feb. 2 0 , 1 9 5 3 . 13. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 2 , M ak in s to F.O., Feb. 18, 19 5 3 ; F.O. to M ak ins, Feb.

19, 1953 14. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 3 , H enderson to State D ep t., Feb. 20, 1 9 5 3 . 15. Ibid., M in u te by R oss con tain in g n otes by D ix o n , Feb. 2 1 , 1 9 5 3 . 16. Ibid., M ak ins to F.O. on H en d erson ’s discussions w ith M ossad eq , Feb. 23 and 24 , 1 9 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 4 , M akins to F.O., Mar. 4 , 1 953. 17. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 0 8 , M in ute by John C olville, Jan. 6 , 1 9 5 3 ^ 0 3 7 1 / 1 0 4 6 1 0 , M ak ins to F.O ., Jan. 2 6 , 1 9 5 3 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 4 , M inisterial visit to the U.S.: R ecord o f m eeting w ith President E isenhow er, M ar. 6 , 1 9 5 3 . 19. Ibid. A lso Eden, Full Circle, pp. 2 1 2 —13. 20 . Eden, Full Circle, pp. 2 1 2 —13. A lso Jam es, Eden, p. 3 6 0 . 21. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 4 , State D epartm ent Statem ent o f M ar. 6 ,1 9 5 3 ; C om m u ­ niqué o n U nited States—U nited K ingdom Political Talks, M ar. 7 ,1 9 5 3 . 22. D ad, Apr. 5, 1 9 5 3 ; Jebhé-Azadi, M ay 5, 1 9 5 3 . 23. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 4 , H en d erson ’s discussions w ith M ossad eq , M ar. 9 ,1 9 5 3 . 24 . Ibid., H en d erson ’s d iscu ssion s w ith M ossad eq , M ar. 18, 1 9 5 3 . Inter­ view w ith Loy H en d erson , W ashington, Apr. 26, 1 9 8 4 . 25 . Ibid., R oss’s brief on “Line C hosen for N e w s D epartm ent” on M o ssa ­ d eq ’s forth com ing speech, M ar. 19, 1 9 5 3 . 26 . M o ssa d eq ’s broadcast on Tehran R ad io, Mar. 2 0 , 1 9 53. 27 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 5 , H en d erson ’s m eeting w ith M ossad eq , Apr. 4 ,1 9 5 3 . 28 . Ibid., M in u te by D ix o n , Apr. 9, 1 9 5 3 . 29 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 3 6 , G ass to B ow ker sending the draft o f the A IO C annual statem ent w ith n otes by R oth nie and R am sbotham , Apr. 9 , 1 9 5 3 .

Notes to Pages 286—94

379

3 0 . Ibid., J. H . C los to W alter Bedell Sm ith, M ay 5, 1 9 5 3 . 3 1 . Ibid., M em oran d u m o f con versation b etw een F. M cC o llu m and J. J. C osgrove o f C on tin en tal O il and B yroade, N itz e , and A kins o f State D ep t., M ay i i , 1 9 5 3 . 32 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 5 , M ak in s to F.O ., Apr. 2 3 , 1 9 5 3 ; Jebb to F.O ., Apr. 2 2 , 1 9 5 3 ; F.O. to M a k in s, Apr. 2 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 33 . Ibid., Personal m essage from Butler to H um phrey, M ay 5, 1 9 5 3 . 3 4 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 6 , M in u te by D ix o n , M ay 15, 1 9 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 /1 0 5 1 6 6 , M in u te by R am sb oth am , M ay 2 0 , 1 9 5 3 . 3 5 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 3 , British E m bassy, Paris, to F.O. on d iscu ssion s w ith Pierre C harpentier, U nder Secretary for E co n o m ic Affairs at Q u ai d ’O rsay, Feb. 14» 1953 36 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , Petroleum A dm inistration for D efen se (PAD) to Lin­ der, Feb. 4 , 1 9 5 3 . 37 . Ibid., U .S. Em bassy, Tehran, to State D ep t., June 5, 1 9 5 3 . 38 . Ibid., R ichards, O ffice o f G reek, Turkish, and Iranian A ffairs, G T I, to B yroade q u o tin g H en d erson , June 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 39 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 3 5 , British E m bassy, Bern, to F.O ., M ar. 7 , 1 9 5 3 ; M in u te by D ix o n , M ar. 1 0 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 0 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , A m erican E m bassy, B on n, to Secretary o f State, M ar. 2 6 ,1 9 5 3 ; State D ep t, to A m erican E m bassy, B onn, M ar. 2 7 , 1 9 5 3 . 4 1 . R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 0 , R. L. T aylor to the President, July 3 1 ,1 9 5 3 ; G ord on M a ttiso n , U .S. Em bassy, Tehran, to State D ep t., June 2 6 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 2 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , L yndon J o h n so n to State D e p t., June 2 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 4 3 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 1 A , Levy to Joh n F. Fergusson o f Policy P lanning Staff, State D ep t., M a y 2 5 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 4 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 0 , M em oran d u m o f con versation b etw een Levy and Jem eg a n , July 2 1 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 5 . R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 0 9 , M o ssa d eq to E isenhow er, M a y 2 8 , 1 9 5 3 . 4 6 . Ibid., M em oran d u m o f con versation at M a tth e w ’s office. State D ep t., June 19, 1953; 4 7 . Ibid., E isenh ow er to M o ssa d eq , June 2 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 4 8 . Interview s w ith Dr. A li A m ini, Paris, M a y 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 ; Shapur Bakhtiar, Paris, M a y 2 5 , 1 9 8 3 ; L oy H en d erson , W ashington, Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 8 4 ; M . H . Q ash q a’i, L on d on , Apr. 1 5 , 1 9 8 5 ; G eorge M cG h ee, L o n d o n , Sept. 18, 1 9 8 5 .

zo.—The Coup 1. T h e three R ashidian brothers w ere nam ed S eyfollah , A ssad ollah , and Q od ratollah . 2. W oo d h o u se, Som ething Ventured , pp. 1 1 6 —18. 3. Ibid. 4 . D o n a ld N . W ilber, A dventures in the M iddle East: Excursions a n d Incur­ sions (Princeton, N .J ., 1 9 8 6 ), pp. h i , 1 5 7 . 5. Brian L apping, E n d o f E m pire (L on d on , 1 9 8 5 ), p. 2 1 8 . 6. R obert Scheer, “ H o w CIA O rchestrated ’53 C ou p in Iran.” L os Angeles Tim es , M ar. 2 9 , 1 9 7 9 . 7. W oo d h o u se, Som ething Ventured , pp. 1 2 1 —23; L apping, E nd o f E m pire, p. 2 1 5 .

380

Notes to Pages 294—299

8. Interview w ith M . H . Q ash q a’i, L on d on , Apr. 1 6 , 1 9 8 5 . Q ashqa’i, then a M ajlis deputy, sp ok e to M ossad eq ab ou t K ashani’s dem and for funds. 9 . Interview w ith C olon el M . M atin , L on d on , Jan. 4 ,1 9 8 4 . In 1953 M atin w as adjutant to the com m ander o f Isfahan garrison. 10. B ozorgm ehr, Taqriraté M ossadeq, pp. 1 2 8 —31. 11. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 5 6 2 , F.O. to Secretary o f State, M ar. 3, 1 9 5 3 . 12. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 3 , M id d leton to F.O ., A ug. 2 8 ,1 9 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 6 , Brit­ ish Em bassy, W ashington to F.O ., D ec. 2 4 ,1 9 5 2 . 13. R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 0 9 , Secret Security Inform ation, M em orandum for the President o n “T h e Iranian S itu ation ,” M ar. 1, 1 9 5 3 . 14. Kermit R o o sevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle fo r the C on trol o f Iran (N ew York, 1 9 7 9 ), p. 121. 15. M ark G a sio ro w sk i, “T h e 1953 C ou p D ’Etat in Iran,” International Journal o f M iddle E ast Studies, X IX (Aug. 1 9 8 7 ), pp. 2 6 1 —86. 16. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 4 , Eden, W ashington, to F.O ., M ar. 9, 1 9 5 3 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 6 , N o te o f an inform al m eeting betw een M id d leton and the representatives o f four C om m on w ealth governm ents, N o v . 25, 1 9 5 2 . 18. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 5 6 1 , N o te by R othnie for D irector o f M ilitary Intelligence, Jan. 1 9 5 3 . 19. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 1 5 , Brief for the M inister o f State, Apr. 20, 1 9 5 3 . 20 . Jam es, Eden, pp. 2 6 2 —6 3 . 21 . G a sio ro w sk i, w h o has interview ed several form er CIA officers then active in Iran, says that the CIA bribed Baqa’i and M . T. Falsafi. See his article “T he 1953 C o u p ,” p. 2 6 9 and fo o tn o tes 4 2 and 4 5 . 22 . R oosevelt, C ountercoup, p. 155; interview w ith D on ald W ilber, Prince­ ton , O ct. 1 5 ,1 9 8 5 ; W ilber, A dventures, pp. 1 8 7 —89. W ilber considers him self the principal planner o f op eration A jax. O n p. 8 o f his b o o k he reproduces a letter o f Jan. 3 0 ,1 9 5 4 , from A llen D ulles com m en d in g him for his “ou tstan d ­ ing con trib u tion ” to the op eration . 23 . F O 2 4 8 /1 5 3 1 , M in u te by Z aehner, June 4 , 19 5 2 ; F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 0 5 , M id ­ d leton to F.O ., O ct. 2 2 , 1 9 5 2 . 24 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 5 9 , M ak in s to F.O. relating H en d erson ’s m essage to the State D ep t., M ay 2 1 , 1 9 5 3 . 25 . Ibid., F.O. to M ak in s sending C hurchill’s m essage to the Shah for trans­ m ission through the State D ep t., M ay 2 8 , 1953; M ak ins to F.O. on H ender­ so n ’s audience w ith the Shah, June 2, 1 9 5 3 . 26. Ibid. T he A m ini brothers w ere the son s o f Princess Fakhr o d -D o w leh , the daughter o f M ozaffar ed -D in Shah. Brigadier G eneral M ahm ud A m ini, a Saint-C yr-educated officer, headed the G endarm erie. Ali A m ini had previously held m inisterial p osts. A b ol-Q assem A m ini w as at the tim e A cting C ourt M inister. 27 . Bakhtaré-Em ruz, July 19 7 8 issue, q u otin g from a w ritten statem ent m ade by A b ol-Q assem A m ini on June 15, 1 9 6 1 . 28 . Keyhan, Apr. 2 6 ,1 9 5 3 . 29 . Separate interview s in W ashington w ith Kermit R oosevelt and Loy H en ­ derson o n Apr. 2 6 ,1 9 8 4 , and w ith H enry B yroade on Sept. 3 0 ,1 9 8 5 . 30 . R G 2 1 8 , C C S 092 Iran (4 -2 3 -4 8 ) Sec. 8 S.O ., M em orandum by Lieut. G eneral F. F. Everest, USAF, D irector, Joint Staff, to Secretary o f D efen se, June i 9 , 1953 31 . W ilber, A dventures, pp. 1 8 8 —89.

Notes to Pages 301—8 32. 33. 34 . 35. 3 6.

381

R o o sev elt, C ounter coup, p. 145. G a sio ro w sk i, “T h e 1953 C oup, ” P- 2 73 A . Pahlavi, Faces in a M irror , pp. 1 3 4 —4 0 . R o o sev elt, C ou n tercou p , pp. 1 4 7 - 4 9 .

Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the U nited States: D w ig h t D . Eisen­

hower, 19 5 3 (W ashington, 1 9 5 4 ), p. 5 4 1 . 3 7 . L apping, E nd o f E m pire , pp. 2 1 9 —20; R o o sev elt, C ounter cou p, pp. 1 6 3 —6 6 . 38 . N eja ti, Jonbeshé, pp. 3 6 3 —8 5 . N eja ti, w h o interview ed m o st o f the officers in vo lv ed in the abortive cou p o f A u gu st 15, gives a d etailed a cco u n t o f events. 3 9 . The Tim es (L on don ), A ug. 17, 1 9 5 3 ; G a sio ro w sk i, “T h e 195 3 C o u p ,” p. 2 7 3 . 4 0 . B akhtaré-E m ruz, A ug. 16, 1 9 5 3 . 4 1 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 5 9 , British E m bassy, B agdad, to F.O ., A ug. 1 7 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 2 . Ibid., A ug. 19 , 1 9 5 3 . 4 3 . Ibid., B ow k er’s internal n o te, A ug. 19, 1 9 5 3 . 4 4 . D a ily Telegraph (L on d on ), A ug. 1 9 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 5 9 , M ak in s to F.O ., A ug. 1 8 ,1 9 5 3 . 4 6 . Interview w ith M . H . Q ash q a’i, L on d on , Apr. 16, 1 9 8 5 ; in 1 9 5 3 Q ash q a’i w as a M ajlis deputy. D rew Pearson, “ CIA C h ief N e x t to K ennedy in Pow er,” W ashington Post, Jan. 2 9 ,1 9 6 2 . 4 7 . G a sio ro w sk i, “T h e 195 3 C o u p ,” p. 2 7 4 . 4 8 . R o o sev elt, C ountercoup, p. 1 8 0 . 4 9 . L apping, E nd o f E m pire, p. 2 2 0 . 50 . B essuyé-A yandeh, A ug. 9 ,1 9 5 3 ; F. M . Javanshir, Tajrobeyé 28 M o rd a d (Tehran, 1 3 5 9 /1 9 8 0 ), p. 3 1 2 ; L apping, E nd o f E m pire, p. 2 1 5 . 51 . Interview w ith C o lo n el M . M a tin , L on d on , Jan. 4 , 1 9 8 4 . M atin at­ tended the m eetin g b etw een G eneral D avallu and G eneral M cC lu re. N eja ti, Jonbeshé, relating his interview w ith R iahi, p. 4 0 4 . 52 . N eja ti , Jonbeshé, p. 4 1 3 . 53. R G 2 1 8 , C C S 0 9 2 Iran (4 -2 3 -4 8 ) Sec. 9 , A rthur W. R ad ford , C hairm an, Joint C hiefs o f Staff, to G eneral T w ining, G eneral R id gw ay, and Adm iral Carney, A ug. 1 9 ,1 9 5 3 . 54. N eja ti, Jonbeshé, pp. 4 0 9 and 4 1 8 ; L apping, E nd o f E m pire, p. 2 2 1 . 55. N eja ti, Jonbeshé, pp. 4 0 9 and 4 1 8 . 56. Ibid. For N e ja ti’s interview s w ith m o st o f the officers in volved o n b oth sides o f the cou p , see Jonbeshé, pp. 4 0 7 —2 9 . 57 . Interview w ith L oy H en d erson , W ash ington , Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 8 4 . 58. Kerm it R o o sev elt says th at he had $1 m illion at his d isp osal for the co u p op eration , but sp en t o n ly $ 7 5 ,0 0 0 and gave the rest later to the Shah ( L os Angeles Tim es interview w ith R o o sev elt, M ar. 2 9 ,1 9 7 9 ) . In his b o o k , C ounter­ coup, R o o sev elt gives the sam e lo w figure o f $ 7 5 ,0 0 0 so as to give the im pres­ sion that a sp o n ta n eou s uprising in favor o f the Shah rendered further CIA financing unnecessary. (It is k n o w n th at the Shah’s m en read the m anuscript o f R o o sev elt’s b o o k before p u b lication and m ade m od ification s in the Shah’s favor.) H en d erson , by con trast, says th at m illion s o f dollars w ere paid by the CIA to arm y officers, m ullahs, and m ob leaders (interview w ith H en d erson , W ashington, Apr. 2 6 , 1 9 8 4 ). A m o n g the exp en d itu res w a s $ 2 m illion paid to G eneral Z ah ed i ( B akhtaré-E m ruz, July 1 9 7 8 , q u o tin g A b o l-Q a ssem A m ini,

382

Notes to Pages 3 09—15

A ctin g C ourt M in ister in the first h alf o f 1 9 5 3 ). N ik k i K eddie, w h o interview ed parties in volved in the coup, believes the cost o f the op eration totaled “several m illion dollars” ; see her R o o ts o f R evolution: An Interpretive H istory o f M odern Iran (N e w H aven , 1 9 8 1 ), n o te 69 o f chap. 6. 59. Eden, Full Circle , p. 2 1 4 . 6 0 . The Tim es (L ondon), A ug. 2 0 ,1 9 5 3 . 6 1. D aily Telegraph (L ondon), A ug. 2 0 ,1 9 5 3 . 6 2 . A t the tim e o f the coup, I lived h alf a m ile north o f M ossad eq . 6 3 . M aclean , Eastern A pproaches , pp. 2 6 3 —7 6 . 6 4 . C .C .5 o (5 3 ), C ab inet C on clu sion s, A ug. 2 5 ,1 9 5 3 .

21.—An Oil Consortium Takes Over 1. R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 1 A , H enderson to Secretary o f State, Sept. 2 1 , 1 9 5 3 . 2. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 5 7 7 , M in u te by D ix o n , A ug. 2 1 , 19 5 3 ; M in ute by Salisbury, A ug. 2 2 , 1 9 5 3 . R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 1 A , M em orandum o f conversation betw een M ak in s and D u lles, Sept. 4 ,1 9 5 3 . 3. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 5 8 4 , Falle to Baker, A ug. 2 6 , 1 9 5 3 . 4. F O 3 7 1 /9 8 6 9 5 , M in u te by B ow ker on his con versation w ith Fraser, A ug. 26 , 1 9 5 3 . 5. R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 1 A , B yroade to D u lles, Sept. 5, 1 9 5 3 ; D u lles to H ender­ so n , Sept, i i , 1 9 5 3 . 6. Ibid., D ulles to H en derson, Sept. 2 3 , 1 9 5 3 . 7. Ibid., H en derson to Secretary o f State, Sept. 2 5 , 1 9 5 3 . 8. Ibid., E den’s m essage to D u lles, O ct. 7 , 1 9 5 3 . 9. Ibid., D u lles to H en d erson , O ct. 7 ,1 9 3 3 ; F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 4 2 , Beeley, W ash­ in gton , to D ix o n , O ct. 19, 1 9 5 3 . 10. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 5 8 5 , M in u te by G andy, O ct. 13, 19 5 3 ; R G 59, B ox 5 5 1 1 A , H en derson to State D ep t., O ct. 2 2 and 29, 1 9 5 3 . 11. Ibid., H en derson to State D ep t., O ct. 2 9 , 1 9 5 3 . 12. Ibid., N o te in Persian handed by Entezam to H enderson and H oover, N ov. i , 1953. 13. Ibid., D u lles to U.S. A m bassadors in Tehran and L on d on , N o v . 9 ,1 9 5 3 . 14. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 4 3 , M in u te by D ix o n , N o v . 13, 1 9 5 3 . 13. R G 5 9 , B ox 3 5 1 1 A , H enderson to Secretary o f State, N o v . 6, 1 9 3 3 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 4 3 , M in u te by G reenhill, N o v . 17, 1 9 3 3 . 17. F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 4 3 , N o te s by Eden on Foreign O ffice cable to British Em ­ bassy, W ashington, N o v . 14, 19 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 /1 0 4 6 4 4 , M in ute by D ix o n on “ Persia,” Secret, D ec. 8, 1 9 3 3 . 18. Interview w ith A li A m ini, Paris, M ay 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 . R G 5 9 , B ox 3 3 1 1 A , H en derson to State D ep t., O ct. 2, 1 9 5 3 . 19. A za d , N o v . 7 , 1 9 5 3 . 20. Shahed , pub lishing M a k k i’s op en letter; K ashani’s m essage broadcast on R adio Tehran, N o v . 3, 1 9 5 3 . 2 1 . R G 5 9 , B ox 3 3 1 2 , H en derson to State D ep t., D ec. 9 and 11, 1 9 3 3 . 2 2 . Eden, Full Circle, p. 2 4 0 . 23 . Interview w ith Sir D enis W right, B uckingham shire, E ngland, July 3, 1 9 8 5 . F O 3 7 1 /1 1 0 0 5 9 , W right to Eden, Jan. 7, 1 9 3 4 . 24 . Ibid., W right to Eden, Feb. 13, 1 9 5 4 . 25 . U.S. C ongress, C artel , pp. 3 5 —4 6 .

Notes to Pages 3 15—24

383

2 6 . RG 5 9 , B o x 5 5 11 A , M em oran d u m o f con versation b etw een H o o v er and the A ttorney G eneral, N o v . 12, 1 9 5 3 . 2 7 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 2 , M em oran d u m o f con versation b etw een H o o v er and legal staff m em bers o f Socony-V acuum and Standard O il o f N .J ., N o v . 2 4 ,

19532 8 . Ibid., D rak e’s letters to seven o il com p an ies, D ec. 3, 1 9 5 3 . 2 9 . Ibid., U .S. Em bassy, L on d on , to State D ep t., D ec. 18, 1 9 5 3 ; F O 3 7 1 / 1 1 0 0 4 7 , M ak in s to D ix o n , Jan. 2 2 , 1 9 5 4 . 30 . R G 5 9 , B o x $ 5 1 2 , John Foster D u lles to U .S. E m bassies, L on d on and Tehran, Feb. 2 4 ,1 9 5 4 ; U .S. Em bassy, L on d on , to State D ep t., M ar. 1 2 ,1 9 5 4 . 31 . Ibid., U .S. E m bassy, L on d on , to State D ep t., M ar. 13 and 15, 1 9 5 4 . 32. Ibid., H o o v er to State D ep t., M ar. 13 and 15, 1 9 5 4 . 33 . Ibid., H o o v er to State D ep t., M ar. 1 6 ,1 9 5 4 . 34 . Ibid., H en d erson to State D ep t., M ar. 16, 1 9 5 4 . 3 5 . Ibid., D u lles to A ldrich, L on d on , and H en d erson , Tehran, M ar. 1 7 ,1 9 5 4 . 3 6 . Ibid., A ldrich to State D ep t., M ar. 1 8 ,1 9 5 4 ; M em oran d u m o f con versa­ tion b etw een the officials o f the British E m bassy and State D ep t., M ar. 1 9 ,1 9 5 4 . 37 . Ibid., H en d erson to Secretary o f State, M ar. 2 0 ,1 9 5 4 ; M em oran d u m o f con versation at the State D ep t., M ar. 2 2 , 1 9 5 4 . 38. F O 3 7 1 /1 1 0 0 6 0 , Stevens to Eden, M ar. 1 3 ,1 9 5 4 . 3 9 . F O 3 7 1 /1 1 0 0 6 3 , Stevens to Fry, M ay 12, 1 9 5 4 . 4 0 . T h e other tw o m em bers o f the Iranian com m ittee w ere S. Bayat, M a n a g ­ ing D irector o f Plan O rgan ization , and F. N uri-E sfandiari, m em ber o f the Plan H igh C ou n cil. T h e m em bers o f Iran’s o il su b com m ittee w ere F. R ou h an i, A. E ttehadieh, F. N a fici, and R. Fallah. 4 1 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , “ O il C on troversy,” V ol. Ill, p. 17. 4 2 . R ou h an i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané, pp. 4 2 6 —3 7 , and Z en degié Siasié M ossadeq (L on d on , 1 3 6 6 /1 9 8 7 ) , p. 5 9 3 . 4 3 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 2 , H o o v er to Secretary o f State, M ar. 3 1 , 1 9 5 4 . 4 4 . Ibid., H o o v er to Secretary o f State, Apr. 2 6 ,1 9 5 4 . 4 5 . F O 3 7 1 /1 1 0 0 6 5 , M in u te by B elgrave, June 1 2 ,1 9 5 4 ; R G 5 9 , B ox 5 5 1 2 , Jem egan to M urphy, M a y 15, 1 9 5 4 . 4 6 . PR E M 1 1 /7 2 6 , M ak in s to E den, Feb. 1 9 ,1 9 5 4 ; M ak in s to C accia, M ar.

13» 1954; 4 7 . Ibid., M em oran d u m o f con versation at the State D ep t., M ay 2 1 ,1 9 5 4 . 4 8 . Ibid., H en d erson to State D e p t., M a y 2 9 ,1 9 5 4 ; A ldrich to State D ep t., M ay 3 1 ,1 9 5 4 . 4 9 . Ibid., H en d erson to Secretary o f State, Apr. 3 0 ,1 9 5 4 . 50 . R ou h an i, Tarikhé M elli Shodané, pp. 4 8 6 —5 0 2 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 0 9 , “ O il C ontroversy,” V ol. Ill, pp. 4 1 —4 7 . 51 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 2 , H en d erson to State D e p t., M ar. 21 and M a y 4 ,1 9 5 4 ; D ulles to A ldrich and H en d erson , Apr. 7 , 1 9 5 4 ; B utterw orth to State D e p t., M ay 2 0 ,1 9 5 4 . 52. Interview w ith John L ou d on , L on d on , N o v . 2 7 , 1 9 8 6 ; in terview w ith A m ini, Paris, M a y 2 2 ,1 9 8 3 . 53 . “ O il C on troversy,” V ol. Ill, A p p en d ix D -8 , Letter from the President to the Shah, A ug. 5 ,1 9 5 4 . 54. U .S. C on gress, C artel, R eport o f the A ttorn ey G eneral to the N a tio n a l Security C ou n cil, pp. 2 9 —3 3 .

384

Notes to Pages 3 25—3 2

55. “ O il C ontroversy,” Vol. Ill, pp. 6 1 —6 5 . 56. Ibid. See A ppendices B-11 to B -14 for details o f the consortium agree­ m ent. 57. Interview w ith a CIA official w h o w ish es to .remain an on ym ou s, W ash­ in gton , N o v . 8 ,1 9 8 4 . 58. Sadr, D efa’é M ossadeq , pp. 4 4 —7 3 . 59. Q iatné Iran, A ug. 2 3 , 1 9 5 4 ; the article is reproduced in Sadr, D efa’é M ossadeq, pp. 8 3 —87. 6 0 . M ajlis Proceedings, O ct. 1 0 —12, 2 1 , 1 9 5 4 . R G 5 9 , “ O il C ontroversy,” Vol. Ill, p. 57. 6 1 . R G 5 9 , B o x 5 5 1 3 , E. S. Akers o f the public relations firm o f Ernest L. K lein, representing U.S. independents, to John Foster D u lles, June 2, 1 9 5 4 . 6 2 . O n April 2 9 , 1 9 5 5 , the five U.S participants each relinquished on eeighth o f their hold in gs in the con sortiu m , allocatin g them to the fo llo w in g U.S. independents: R ichfield 25 percent; A m erican Independent O il C o., a consor­ tium o f ten U.S. independents, 1 6 .6 6 percent; G etty, A tlantic, Signal, H an cock , Standard o f O h io , T idew ater, and San Jacinto each 8.3 3 percent. Later m ergers changed this co m p o sitio n . 6 3 . Strachey, End o f Em pire, p. 173. 6 4 . Sam pson, Seven Sisters, p. 1 4 8 . 6 5 . R ouhani believes that Iran, by paying £ 2 5 m illion , by w ip in g o u t its indisputable claim s, and by b eing forced to pay a disproportion ate share o f the depreciation o f assets, in fact paid £ 1 4 6 m illion in com p en sation . H e argues further that Iran, as the ow n er o f the oil resources, and n o t A IO C , should have received $ 6 0 0 m illion for granting seven new com p anies a share in the co u n ­ try’s oil w ealth . See R ou h an i’s Tarikhé M elli Shodané, pp. 5 0 2 —4, and Zendegié Siasié M ossadeq, pp. 6 0 2 —4. See also Benjam in Shw adran, The M iddle East, O il an d the G reat Powers, 3d ed. (N ew York, 1 9 7 3 ), p. 148. 6 6 . F O 3 7 1 /9 1 5 7 4 , “N o te s on Lord Privy Seal’s M issio n ” attached to m in­ ute by B erthoud, A ug. 3, 1 9 5 1 . 6 7 . Q u o ted from Stevens Papers, Stevens to his parents, A ug. 2, 1 9 5 4 , by W illiam R oger L ouis in “M u sad d iq , O il and the D ilem m as o f British Im perial­ ism ,” paper presented at the C onference on Iranian N a tio n a lism and the International O il Crisis o f 1 9 5 1 —54 at the U niversity o f Texas, A ustin, Sept. 2 6 —27 , 1 9 8 5 . 6 8 . Interview w ith Sir Eric D rake, L on d on , O ct. 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 . 6 9 . M o ssa d eq , K haterat, pp. 3 9 6 - 9 7 . 7 0 . Edith T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in D evelopin g Coun­ tries: The International Petroleum Industry (L ondon, 1 9 6 8 ), pp. 2 1 5 —16; Jerald L. W alden, “T h e International Petroleum Cartel in Iran: Private Power and the Public Interest,” Journal o f Public L aw , X I (Spring 1 9 6 2 ), pp. 5 1 —52; Sam pson, Seven Sisters, p. 151; Painter, Private Pow er, pp. 1 9 7 —98; Paul H . Frankel, M attei, O il an d P ow er Politics (N ew York, 1 9 6 6 ), p. 9 6 ; Fereidun Fesharaki, D evelopm en t o f the Iranian O il Industry: International and D om es­ tic A spects (N e w York, 1 9 7 6 ), pp. 5 9 —6 0 .

22.—The Coup’s Aftermath i . For a detailed accou n t o f M o ssa d eq ’s trial see Jalil Bozorgm ehr, M ossa­ deq dar M ahkam eyé N eza m i in tw o volu m es (Tehran, 1 3 6 4 /1 9 8 5 ). For a study

Notes to Pages 333—43

385

o í M o ssa d eq ’s reflections in jail, see B ozorgm ehr, Taqriraté M ossadeq dar Zendan (Tehran, 1 3 5 9 /1 9 8 0 ).

2. Elwell-Sutton, Persian O il , p. 315. 3. B ozorgm ehr, M ossadeq , Vol. I, pp. 166—67. 4 . R o o sev elt, C ou ntercou p , p. 2 0 0 . 5. N e ja d , Jonbeshé, p. 4 4 5 .

6. Richard Cottam, N ationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1979), p. 231. 7. Ebrahim K hajenuri, Bazigarané A sré Tala’i: D avar, Teym urtash e t al., n ew ed. (Tehran, 1 3 5 7 /1 9 7 8 ), pp. 6 0 —6 1 . 8. G eorge M cG h ee, “ R ecollection s o í Dr. M u h am m ad M u sa d d iq ,” in Bill and L ouis, ed s., M ussadiq, N ationalism , p. 3 0 4 . 9. W illiam O . D o u g la s, “T he U .S. and R e v o lu tio n ,” in K. E. B ou ld in g et al., The U.S. an d R evolu tion (Santa Barbara, C a lii., 1 9 6 1 ), p. 10. 10. Paul H . N itz e , “A m erica: A n H o n e st B roker,” Foreign Affairs (Fall 1 9 9 0 ), p. 71 1 . Jam es A . Bill, The Eagle a n d the Lion: The Tragedy o f Am erican-Iranian R elations (N e w H aven , 1 9 8 8 ), pp. 8 5 —9 1 . 12. W illiam Pfaff, “A m erican Leaders O u g h t to R ead H isto ry ,” Interna­ tional H erald Tribune, D ec. 4 , 1 9 8 6 . 13. Bill, The Eagle a n d the L ion, pp. 9 1 —9 5 . 14. A n th on y Parsons, The Pride a n d the Fall: Iran, 1 9 7 4 —1 9 7 9 (L on d on , 1 9 8 4 ), pp. 1 4 0 - 4 1 . 15. W o o d h o u se, Som ething Ventured, p. 1 3 1 . 16. F O 3 7 1 /4 5 4 5 8 , British M ilitary A ttach é, Tehran, to F.O ., D ec. 2 1 ,1 9 4 5 . 17. A ch eso n , C reation, p. 5 1 1 . 18. F. A zim i, Iran: The Crisis o f D em ocracy, 1 9 4 1 —1953 (L on d on , 1 9 8 9 ), P - 334 19. R ichard C o tta m , “N a tio n a lism in T w endeth C entury Iran,” in Bill and L ouis, ed s., M ussadiq, N ation alism , pp. 2 3 , 35. 2 0 . L os Angeles Tim es, M ar. 2 9 ,1 9 7 9 . 21 . M cG h ee, “ R eco llectio n s,” in Bill and L ou is, ed s., M ussadiq, N a tio n a l­ ism , p. 3 0 2 . 2 2 . E nd o f Em pire: Iran, G ranada T elevision Series, 1 9 8 5 . 2 3 . B. Porter, The L io n ’s Share: A Short H isto ry o f British Im perialism , 18j o —1970 (L on d on , 1 9 7 5 ), p. 3 3 5 . 2 4 . D ib a, M ossadegh, pp. 1 9 3 —9 5 . 2 5 . N e w York Tim es, M ar. 5, 1 9 6 7 ; D aily Telegraph, M ar. 6, 1 9 6 7 ; L e M on de, M ar. 7 ,1 9 6 7 ; Frankfurter A llgem eine, M ar. 6 , 1 9 6 7 . 2 6 . L apping, E n d o f E m pire, p. 2 2 4 . 2 7 . K eddie, R o o ts o f R evolu tion , p. 1 4 1 . 2 8 . A lbert H ou ra n i, “ C o n clu sio n ,” in Bill an d L ou is, ed s., M usaddiq, N a ­ tionalism , p. 3 3 9 . 29 . R am i G . K ouri, “ For a C o m m o n Arab and Sem itic H o m e ,” N e w York Tim es (IH T , A ug. 3 ,1 9 9 1 ) . 3 0 . A ch eso n , C reation, p. 6 8 5 .

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1971-

Newspapers and Weeklies T he dates o f issue o f papers and w eek lies con su lted are given in the n otes.

A l-A hram (C airo) B akhtar (Tehran) B akhtaré-E m ruz (Tehran, later M unich)

B altim ore Sun B am shad (Tehran) Bessuyé-Ayandeh (Tehran) D a d (Tehran) D aily Telegraph (L ondon) The E con om ist (L ondon) E ttela’a t (Tehran) Evening Standard (L ondon) Financial Tim es (L ondon) Independent (L ondon)

International H erald Tribune (Paris) Keyhan (Tehran) L os A ngeles Tim es N e w York H erald Tribune N e w York Tim es Philadelphia Inquirer Setareh Iran (Tehran) Shahed (Tehran) T im e (N e w York) The Tim es (L ondon) U.S. N e w s a n d W orld R ep o rt (N e w York)

Wall Street Journal (N e w York) W ashington P ost

Index

Abadan, 1 4 - 1 5 ,1 6 - 1 7 , 5°> 96, 108, 357n.3; British naval presence in, 47, 157; British plans to occupy, 26, 1 2 8 ,1 5 5 -5 6 ,1 6 0 —6 1 ,1 6 3 —64; World War II occupation of, 40—41 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 122 Acheson, Dean, 60, 62, 87, 8 9 ,1 0 2 , 343; and American oil company fears, 105; and arbitration proposals, 248, 249, 251, 254; briefing of Eisenhower by, 259—60; and British com plaint to United N ations, 1 7 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 1 ; and British schemes to oust M ossadeq, 224, 239, 294; and Churchill’s visit to the United States, 1 9 8 ,1 9 9 ; and economic assistance to Iran, 6 9 ,1 9 9 , 203, 248; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 153—54; and H arrim an mission, 124— 2 6 ,1 2 7 ; and joint Trum an-Churchill message, 251, 254; lump-sum com pen­ sation proposal of, 2 5 7 -5 8 , 2 6 0 -6 1 ; mediation attem pts by, 1 7 4 ,1 8 4 ,1 8 5 86, 188—90, 191; opinion of M ossadeq, 246, 339; opinion of Shep­ herd, 218; opposes use of force, 158, 165; recognizes Iran’s right to national­ ize, 8 5 , 11 2 ,113; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 66, 72; w arning to Eden, 258—59; World Bank proposal of, 200— 201 Aden, 267—68 Adenauer, Konrad, 288 Admiralty, British, acquisition of AIOC shares by, 15—17; Iran’s demands for disclosure of AIOC sales to, 6 5 ,7 4 ; presence of its naval forces off Iran, 47, 8 4 ,1 5 7 ; proposed intervention of tankers by, 146. See also Navy, British Afghani. See Assad-Abadi, Seyyed Jamal Afshartus, M ., 298—99 AGIP. See Italian N ational Oil Com pany Ahmad Shah, 14, 24, 25, 27,41

AIOC. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Com pany Ala, Hossein, 34, 3 9 ,1 3 8 ,1 5 2 , 218; and expulsion of AIO C’s British staff, 171; as prime minister, 8 1 ,8 2 , 83, 91; resig­ nation of, 92, 215 Alam, Assadollah, 81, 230, 355n.6o Aldrich, W inthrop, 317, 318 Alexander II, Tsar, 2 Aliabadi, M . H ., 209 Amery, Julian, 236—37, 238 Amery, Leopold, 41, 237 Amini, Abol-Qassem, 298, 38on.26 Amini, Ali, and oil consortium negotia­ tions, 320, 323—24, 326, 38on.26 Amini, M ahm ud, 38on.26 Amin ol-Soltan, Ali Asgar, 4, 6 ,1 1 Anderson, Charles, 321 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936), 193 Anglo-Iranian Oil Com pany (AIOC), 138, 221, 242, 3 7 4 n .i; American com ­ panies’ cooperation with, 103,190, 223, 260; and American proposal to World Bank, 200—201; and American settlement proposals, 1 8 6 ,1 8 7 , 257— 58, 262—64, 265, 266; assets of, 100, 107—8; and boycott, 144—4 5 ,1 4 6 —47, 267—68, 269; British criticism of, 90— 9 1 ,1 0 2 —4, 310; and British interests in Iran, 83, 87, 9 9 ,1 0 4 - 5 ,1 0 8 —9; and consortium agreement, 325, 328—29; and consortium negotiations, 286, 3 1 2 -1 3 , 3 1 5 -1 8 , 319, 321; coup p ro ­ posal from, 293—94, 297; dispossession of, 116—19; distrust of American oil companies, 75; exports of, 144,145, 270; expulsion of British staff of, 149— 5 1 ,1 5 2 —5 4 ,1 6 6 —6 8 ,1 7 1 , 226; finan­ cial position at time of nationalization, 107—9; and H arrim an mission, 125, 1 3 0 ,1 3 2 —33; illusions of, 81; intercep­ tion of N IO C communications by, 146—47; interference in Iranian politics

397

398

Index

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (cont.) by, 120—2 1 ,1 7 6 , 240; internal crit­ icism of, 75—76, 222; Iranian demands for disclosure from, 65, 68, 74; labor policies of, 49—51, 5 3 ,1 0 3 —5, 210; loss of profits of, 337—38; M cGhee’s advice to, 61, 85—86; Majlis’ criticism of, 5 2 -5 4 , 70—71; and M ossadeq’s re­ jection of World Bank proposal, 197, 198, 206; M ossadeq’s wish to retain British staff of, 1 1 8 ,1 3 5 ,1 4 0 ; N a­ tionalization Procedures Act provisions regarding, 9 2 -9 3 ; 1947 Majlis bill con­ cerning, 4 8 ,4 9 ; N IO C seizure of docu­ ments from, 11 9 -2 1 ; position on 50-50 profit-sharing, 7 4 ,7 6 - 7 7 ,7 8 ,7 9 ,1 0 4 ; postcoup position of, 310—11, 315; postnationalization negotiations with Iran, 114—16; and the press, 89, 9 9 1 0 0 ,1 0 3 -4 , 227; profits of, 38(table), 1 0 9 ,179; proposed United N ations purchase of stock in, 184; reduction in living allowances by, 8 4 -8 5 ,1 5 6 —57; response to calls for nationalization, 81; safety of British staff of, 164; staff applications to N IO C, 148—49; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 54—56, 61, 65, 6 6 -6 7 , 6 8 -6 9 , 352n.27; taxes paid by, 37, 38(table), 105, 108,109, 253; terms of 1933 concession to, 3 6 38; and Tudeh party, 9 6 ,2 4 5 ; and U. S. interests in Iran, 8 5 -8 6 , 9 8 , 101; and United N ations case, 1 7 1 -7 2 ,1 7 7 -7 8 , 1 7 9 -8 0 ; violation of the concession by, 52—54; and World Bank proposals to Iran, 1 9 4 ,1 9 5 ,1 9 6 ,1 9 9 , 202, 204; during World War II, 39—4 0 ,4 1 . See also Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Ar­ bitration; British Petroleum Company Ltd.; Compensation Anglo-Persian Agreement (1919), 2 3 -2 4 , 26, 58 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), for­ m ation of, 12—17; expansion of, 17— 19; Iranian disputes with, 1 9 -2 2 , 2 8 33; and negotiation of 1933 concession, 3 4 -3 6 , 54. See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC); D ’Arcy concession Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), 11, 24, 246 Antisabotage bill, 118 A ntitrust laws, U. S., 144—45, 260, 2 7 0 ,3 1 5 ,3 2 4 APOC. See Anglo-Persian Oil Company Arabian American Oil Company

(Aramco), 108, io9(table), 186; agree­ ment with Saudi Arabia, 67, 6 9 ,7 2 , 73, 85,104 Aramco. See Arabian American Oil Company Arbitration, Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 33, 54; and American draft agreements, 262— 64, 265, 266; British position regarding, 148, Z49, 2 5 4 -5 5 , *5^, 261, 263— 64; joint Truman-Churchill mes­ sage regarding, 2 5 0 -5 2 ; M ossadeq’s proposals for, 249, 2 5 3 -5 4 ; and re‘ vised draft agreements, 280, 281. See also Compensation Ardalan, Ali-Qoli, 171 Ardalan, Nasser-Qoli, 136, 358n.11 Argentina, 269 Armitage-Smith, Sydney, 19, 2 0 -2 2 , 24 Armitage-Smith agreement, 2 1 -2 2 , 33 Army, Iranian, 232, 241, 243, 244; M ossadeq’s purge of, 2 4 6 -4 7 ; support for coup in, 3 0 6 -7 Ashraf Pahlavi, Princess, 4 0 ,4 2 , 51, 3 0 0 301 Assad-Abadi, Seyyed Jamal (Afghani), 4, 5

Attlee, Clement, 1 0 4 - 5 ,112 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 4 , 229; Churchill’s opinion of, 183,199; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 153; and H arrim an mission, 126,127, 128; opinion of M ossadeq, 222—23; and proposed use of force, 161,164, 1 6 5 ,1 6 6 —6 7 ,1 6 8 ; and Stokes mission,

133>M i-42

Austerity program under M ossadeq, 271— 74

Azad, M aulana, 122 Azmudeh, Hossein, 332, 333, 335 Bahrain Petroleum Company, 108, i09(table) Bakhtiar, Teymur, 306 Bakhtiari Oil Company, 10, 20 Bakhtiari tribe, 1 0 ,1 5 ,1 9 , 26, 27, 3 5 in .9 ; and Qavam, 47; revolt by, 295 Balance of payments, Iran, 8 7 ,1 0 5 ,1 4 4 , 272, 273(table) Bank Melli Iran, 28, 78, 273 Bank of England, 152,156, 270 Bank of France, 148 Baqa’i, Mozaffar, 9 5 ,1 2 2 , 209, 221, 366m 20, 3 8 o n .2 i; and assassination of Afshartus, 298—99; and calls for dis­ solution of Majlis, 300; opposition to M ossadeq, 291, 294

Index Barnett, Correlli, 98 Baruch, Bernard, 276 Bayat, M orteza-Q uli, 324, 358n.11 Bayat, S., 366n.20, 3830.40 Bazargan, M ehdi, 9 5 ,1 1 8 ,1 3 6 BBC, 7 7 -7 8 ; campaign against M ossadeq by, 2 2 4 -2 6 , 228 Beckett, Angus, 319, 320 Beckett, Sir Eric, 146, 209, 212, 214 Beeley, H arold, 264 Behbahani, M oham m ad, 295 Benes, Eduard, 33 Berbigier, F. R., 319 Berliner Handelsgesellschaft Bank, 288 Berthoud, Eric, 1 3 4 ,1 4 3 , 216, 224—25, 246 Bevin, Ernest, 50, 8 3 ,9 0 ,1 0 4 ; and Sup­ plemental Oil Agreement, 56, 66, 72 Black, Eugene, 1 9 5 ,1 9 9 , 201, 2 0 3 -4 , 261, 37on.48 Bohlen, Charles, 67, 258 Bolland, Edwin, 97, 245 Bolton, Sir George, 156 Bowker, Reginald, 151—52, 219, 226, 234, 238, 304 Boycott of Iranian oil, 144—50; and blockage of tankers, 145—46, 213, 267—68, 269; Iran’s damages from, 2 5 3 -5 5 , 3 Z1'>technicians and, 148— 50; and U. S. antitrust laws, 144—45 Bozorgmehr, Jalil, 332 Bradley, Om ar, 1 5 4 ,1 5 5 ,1 9 9 , 257 Brazil, 213—14 Bridges, Sir Edward, 228 British Bank of Iran and the M iddle East, 256 British Coal N ationalization Act, 262, 263 British Foreign Intelligence (M 16), 219, 292, 295; and assassination of Afshartus, 298—99; and coup plans with CIA, 283, 296, 297, 299, 307 British Petroleum Com pany Ltd. (BP), 17, 328—29. See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company British Tanker Company, 17 Brittain, Sir H ., 83 Browne, Edward, 4—5 Brownell, H erbert, 315, 324 Bullard, Sir Reader, 41 Burls, H. T., 6 Burma C orporation, British interests in, 105 Burma Oil Company, 1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 0 5 , 117

399

Burrows, Bernard, 73, 202, 221 Bushehri, Javad, 238, 36611.20 Butler, Richard, 188, 281, 286, 329 Butler, Sir Neville, 209—10, 213 Butler, Victor, 55, 68 Byrnes, James, 4 6 ,1 0 0 Byroade, Henry, 239, 2 6 1 -6 2 , 263, 296, 299; and consortium negotiations, 311,

Cadm an, Sir John, 1 5 -1 6 , 28, 29, 30, 54; and negotiation of 1933 concession, 34,

, Callaghan, James, 91 35 36,38

Capitulations and Iran (M ossadeq), 58 Capper, C. F., 1 1 9 ,1 3 6 ,1 6 1 Cardenas, Lazaro, 172 Cargill, Sir John, 13 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 108, 340, 3 8 o n .2 i, 381—82n.58; British ap­ proaches to, 283, 292—94, 2 9 6 -9 7 ; coup planning by, 297, 299; and failure of first coup attem pt, 303; incitem ent of mobs by, 304—6, 307—8; obtains Shah’s support for coup, 300—302; recruits army support for coup, 306—7 CFP. See Compagnie Française des Pé­ troles Chia Sorkh, discovery of oil at, 5 ,9 China, People’s Republic of, 269 China, N ational Republic of, 1 7 0 ,1 8 0 Churchill, W inston, 2 9 ,1 8 7 ,1 8 9 , 218, 259, 265; advocates use of force, 161— 62; and Alton Jones, 281; and breaking of blockade, 268; and British Navy ac­ quisition of APOC shares, 1 5 ,1 6 ,1 7 ; and coup, 297, 302, 309; election of, 183, 229; joint message with Trum an, 250—52; response to M ossadeq’s coun­ terproposals for arbitration, 254; and Shafia, 234; and Shah’s distrust of Brit­ ish, 298; at Tehran conference, 43; visits to United States by, 198—99, 2 7 6 -7 7 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency Cities Service Company, 249 Clos, Jean Henri, 286 Communism, 8 9 ,1 0 1 ,141—42, 200, 274; and military preparations, 155—56, 158; nationalism as barrier to, 9 8 ,1 2 9 , 223; poverty and imperialism as causes of, 68, 7 6 ,1 3 7 , 226; and U. S. support for M ossadeq, 189,191, 245—46, 248— 49. See also Soviet Union; Tudeh party Com m unist party. See Tudeh party

400

Index

Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), 3 1 5 ,3 1 6 ,3 1 8 ,3 1 9 ,3 2 5 Com panion. See O peration M idget Com pensation to the British for AIOC, 192, 211, 284, 288, 291, 3840.65; Acheson’s lump-sum proposal for, 257—58, 260—61; American draft agreements regarding, 262—64, 265, 266; and consortium negotiations, 316—18; and damages for cancellation of concession, 248, 250, 251, 252, 263, 285; for future profits, 278—79, 285, 322; and Iran’s counterclaims, 2.53—55, *322; and joint Truman-Churchill mes­ sage, 2 5 0 -5 2 ; Levy’s proposal for, 289—90; M cGhee’s suggestion regard­ ing, 88; M ossadeq’s offer to consider lump-sum, 278, 279—80; M ossadeq’s proposals for arbitration of, 249, 2 5 3 54; M ountbatten’s suggestion regard­ ing, 90; and revised draft agreements, 280, 281, 284, 285; settlement of, 322— 23; Stokes’ proposal for, 1 3 7 -3 8 ,1 4 3 Concession of 1901, see D ’Arcy Conces­ sion Concession of 1933, negotiations for, 3 4 36; terms of, 3 6 -3 8 ; AIOC violations of, 5 2 -5 4 , 7 0 -7 1 ; AIOC efforts to treat it as treaties, 146, 209, 210—11, 212, 213; British claims for post­ nationalization validity of, 248, 250, 252, 263, 285; British com plaint to UN regarding dispute with Iran on, 1 6 9 182; British com plaint to World C ourt on cancellation of, 208—214. See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; D ’Arcy Concession; N ationalization Condom inium Agreement of 1899,193 Conservative party (Great Britain), 168, 183, 229, 234, 236. See also Churchill, W inston; Eden, Anthony Consolidated Engineering Company, 311 Consortium , Iranian Oil: agreement es­ tablishing, 324—27; AIOC participa­ tion in, 3 12 - 13 ; assessments of, 3 2 9 31; effect on AIOC of, 3 2 8 -2 9 ; meetings of oil companies regarding, 315—18; M ossadeq’s opinion of, 3 2 6 27, 33°> 333—34; negotiations with Iran concerning, 319—21, 323—24; pro­ posals for, 286—87, 288, 3 11, 312,

315-17

Constitution, Iranian, 10—1 1 ,1 3 —14,42., 44, 82, 333; Majlis committee to study, 247, 295—96; pow er to dissolve Majlis

under, 51—52; Senate provisions of, 57, 256 Continental Oil, 286 C orruption, 3, 5, 70, 221, 222, 234; and Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, 24; British tactlessness regarding, 138; and CIA coup, 298, 301, 302, 305, 3 8 1 8 m .58; and 1921 coup, 25; and D ’Arcy concession, 7 ,9 ,1 2 ; N ational Front opposition to, 8 9 ,9 5 ; Razmara’s pledge to eliminate, 62 Cottam , Richard, 293, 305, 307, 340 Cotte, Edward, 6 Countercoup (Roosevelt), 3 8 1 ^ 5 8 Coup d ’état: army support for, 306—7; British proposals for, 283, 2 9 2 -9 4 , 296—97; and CIA incitement of mobs, 3 0 4 -6 , 3 0 7 -8 ; cost of, 308, 3 8 1 8 m .58; failed attem pt at, 302—4; long­ term impact of, 3 3 6 -3 8 ; press reports regarding, 309; Shah’s support for, 3 0 0 -3 0 2 Cox, Sir Percy, 14—15, 23, 24 Creole Oil, 53, 67, 68 Crossman, Richard, 89 Currency, foreign, 52, 5 5 -5 6 , 99, 272, 321, 323; and British economic sanc­ tions, 1 4 1 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 9 ,1 5 2 , 248, 270—71 Curzon, Lord, 1, 2 ,1 6 , 23, 24 Czechoslovakia concludes barter agree­ ment with Iran, 272 Daftari, M ., 307—8 Darakhshesh, M ., 327 D ’Arcy, William Knox, 6, 7, 8, 9 ,1 7 2 ; and form ation of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 12,13 D’Arcy concession, discussions on, 6—8; execution of, 9—12; and form ation of APOC, 1 2 -1 3 ; Iran’s disputes with APOC under, 19—22, 28, 31. See also Anglo-Persian Oil Company Davallu, M ., 306 Davar, A. A., 29, 33, 34, 39 Davenport, W ortham, 320 Davies, Ernest, 77 Davis, Elmer, 102 De Courcy, Kenneth, 236, 246 Defense M aterials Production D epart­ ment (DMPA), 262, 265 Defense Production Act, 258 Devotees of Islam. See Fada’iyané-Islam Deyhimi, H., 3 5 5 ^ 6 0 Dixon, Sir Pierson, 268, 270, 280, 287, 310

401

Index DMPA. See Defense M aterials Production D epartm ent Dodge, Joseph, 176 Douglas, William O., 336 od-Dowleh, N ostrat, 21 od-Dowleh, Princess Fakr, 38on.26 od-Dowleh, Vosuq, 24 Drake, Sir Eric, 1 1 7 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 0 ,1 6 4 ,3 1 5 ,

330 D rum m ond, David (alias for Prince H am id Q ajar), 41, 236 Dulles, Allen, 283, 2 9 3 -9 4 , 296, 299, 312, 38on.22 Dulles, John Foster, 261, 286, 299, 310, 328; and British negotiating position, 277, 280, 282, 283; Churchill’s opinion of, 259, 276; and H oover negotiations, 3 1 1 ,3 1 2 ,3 1 6 ,3 1 7 ,3 3 0 Eastern Europe, possible sale of oil to, 1 9 5 ,1 9 6 ,1 9 9 . See also Soviet Union East Texas Oil Association, 289 Ebtehaj, A. H ., 78, 230 Economic assistance, 1 9 0 -9 1 , 245, 252, 257; British objections to, 6 9 ,1 9 9 — 200, 203, 261; Eisenhower’s denial of, 290—91; to Zahedi government, 310 Economic development, 39, 52, 273 Eden, Anthony, 45—4 6 ,1 4 7 , 242, 259, 297; and American draft agreements, 263, 264, 265; attem pts to discredit M ossadeq, 189, 248—49, 283; and Brit­ ish pressure on Shah to remove M ossa­ deq, 239; and consortium negotiations, 313, 317—18, 319, 320; and coup, 229, 292—93, 296, 309; and economic assis­ tance to Iran, 199—200; four principles for negotiating with Iran, 277—78; meetings with Acheson, 188—9 0 ,1 9 1 , 258—59; meetings with Eisenhower and Dulles, 281—83; and M inisterial Com ­ mittee, 1 8 7 ,1 8 8 ; and Nasser, 168, 341; and postcoup British-Iranian relations, 311—12, 314; and Prince H am id, 41, 237; and proposed terms for arbitra­ tion, 248, 249, 254—55; and Qavam , 236, 237—38; rejects lump-sum com­ pensation proposal, 260—61, 280; and World Bank proposals, 1 9 4 ,1 9 5 ,1 9 8 , 200—202,205 Egypt, 193,341 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 285, 288, 290— 91, 315, 324; and Acheson, 259—60, 261; and coup, 296, 299, 302, 340;

meetings with Churchill and Eden, 276—77, 281—83 Elections, 4 4 ,4 8 , 59—60, 61, 207; British m anipulation of, 239—40; Shah’s m a­ nipulation of, 56—57; and voting re­ form, 274. See also Majlis Elkington, E. H. O., 7 5 ,1 6 4 , 3610.34 Elwell-Sutton, L. P., 13, h i , 139, 222,

*31,333

Emami, Jam al, 7 2 ,9 2 , 227, 296 Embargo. See Boycott of Iranian oil Emery, H orace, 220 Entezam, N asrollah, 312 EPIM, 267 Esfandiari, Soraya. See Soraya, Queen Eskandari, Abbas, 52, 216, 235 Ettehadieh, A., 3830.40 European Petroleum Union of Bremen, 17 Export-Im port Bank, 66—67, *>9> 199, 261 Exports, 1 5 ,11 7 ,1 1 8 —1 9 ,1 4 4 ,1 4 5 , 272; effect of boycott on, 270 Fada’iyané-Islam, 8 0 ,9 6 Fakher, Sardar (Reza H ekm at), 220 Fakr od-Dowleh, Princess, 3800.26 Fallah, R., 3830.40 Falle, Sam, 97, 240, 292—93, 341 Falsafi, M . T., 3800.21 Fardust, Hossein, 41—42 Farouk, King (Egypt), 193 Fateh, M ostafa, 29, 50—51, 54—5 5 ,1 1 5 — 16, 326; advice to AIOC from, 75—76 Fatemi, Hossein, 95, 255, 297, 303, 335 Fawzia, Queen, 42 FEC. See First Exploitation Com pany Fergusson, Sir D onald, 8 3 ,1 3 4 ,1 4 3 ,1 6 1 , 189, 242 Ferrier, R. W., 16 Fesharaki, F., 331 First Exploitation Com pany (FEC), 9, 20 Firuz, N . D., 29, 39 Fisher, John, 9 Fitzmaurice, G. G., 263, 268, 278 Flett, M . T., 3610.34 Foruhar, D ariush, 72, 73, 7 4 ,9 5 Foruhar, Golam-Hossein, 69,121 Foruqi, M . A., 32, 3 4 ,41 France, 2 4 ,1 8 1 , 287; Bank of, 148; bar­ ter agreement w ith, 272 Frankel, A. H ., 331 Franks, Sir Oliver, 84, 87—8 8 ,1 1 2 ,1 1 7 , 151, 246; on American public opinion, 8 9 ,1 0 2 —3; and consideration of use of force, 1 5 5 ,1 5 8 ,1 6 3 ,1 6 5 ; and Eugene

402

Index

Franks, Sir Oliver (cont.) Black, 261; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 153 ,1 5 4 ; and H arrim an mission, 125; as m ediator between Acheson and Eden, 249; and oil boy­ cott, 146—47; and press campaign against M ossadeq, 227; seeks American support for schemes to oust M ossadeq, 223—24; and United N ations resolu­ tion, 169—7 0 ,1 7 3 ; and World Bank proposals, 1 9 4 ,1 9 5 ,1 9 8 , 200, 203 Fraser, Lord, 162 Fraser, Sir William, 3 0 ,1 0 3 ,1 0 5 ,1 2 2 , 228; and appointm ent of Wright, 314; and attem pts to discredit M ossadeq, 171, 172; and consortium negotiations, 315, 316, 317, 318, 321; and deposit of royalties in Bank Melli, 78; exploita­ tion of labor by, 50, 8 4 -8 5 ,1 0 4 ; Levy’s criticism of, 143; and negotiation of 1933 concession, 34, 35, 36; and plans for use of force, 159—60; and post-coup position of AlOC, 310, 311 ; and Qavam , 242; replacement of, 329; re­ sponse to nationalization by, 8 4 -8 5 , 117, 1 1 8 -1 9 ; response to 50-50 profitsharing proposal, 74, 85, 86; and Stokes mission, 133; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 54, 55, 56, 66, 69 Free Worker (Kargar-i-Azad), 240 Fry, L. A. C., 222 Funkhouser, Richard, 67—6 8 ,1 0 5 -6 Furlonge, Geoffrey, 72, n o , 113,216, 230; and BBC campaign against M ossadeq, 225; and consideration of use of force, 1 5 6 ,1 6 2 ,1 6 3 ; and Stokes mission, 139; and Walter Levy, 114—15 Gaitskell, Hugh, 1 2 6 ,1 2 7 ,1 2 8 ,1 5 7 ,1 6 4 Galustian, Haig, 221 Garner, Robert L., 1 9 1 ,1 9 4 -9 5 ,1 9 6 -9 7 , 199, 201, 2 0 2 -6 Gass, Neville, 1 1 5 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 4 ,1 8 7 , 312; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 54, 55, 56; and World Bank, 1 9 5 ,1 9 6 ,1 9 9 , 202, 204 Gault, John, 35111.9, 59 George VI, King (Great Britain), 183 Germany, Federal Republic of, 148, 272, 288 Gide, André, 95 Gidel, Gilbert, 5 2 -5 3 Gifford, Walter, 1 3 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 8 Gold guarantee clause, 53 Golsha’ian, Abbas-Qoli, 54, 55, 56

Gore-Booth, P. H ., 101,102 Grady, Henry, 7 4 -7 5 ,1 1 3 ,1 1 8 ,1 5 2 , 172; and AIO Cintransigence, 65—66, 6 7 ,6 9 ; opinion of M ossadeq, 115, 223 G reat Britain, 49; acceptance of national­ ization by, 112 , 113, 133-34» 137» 139,181, 212, 254, 285; and Acheson’s settlement proposals, 186—91, 257, 258, 260—61; and AIOC position after coup, 310—i i , 315; and American draft agreements, 2 6 3 -6 5 , 266; Ameri­ can opposition to use of force by, 125, 156, 1 5 8 -5 9 ,1 6 1 -6 2 ,1 6 6 ; American position on United N ations draft reso­ lution of, 169—7 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 0 ; and Amer­ ican pressure to negotiate, 113—14; and American response to N ationalization Act, 86—87; and American response to schemes to overthrow M ossadeq, 223— 24, 231—33; and Anglo-Persian Agree­ ment of 1919, 2 3 -2 4 , 26, 58; and as­ sassination of Afshartus, 2 9 8 -9 9 ; assessment of post-Qavam political sit­ uation by, 243—44, ¿45» attem pts to gain American support by, 87—89, 141—4 2 ,1 9 8 —99, 2 8 5 -8 6 ; attitude to­ w ard nationalism, 5 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 9 , 217; attitude tow ard Shah’s autocratic rule, 5 1 ,5 2 ; and boycott of oil technicians, 148—49; Cabinet debates on use of force by, 157, 1 6 5 -6 7 ; and cancella­ tion of D ’Arcy concession, 3 1 -3 3 ; con­ gruence of interests with AIOC, 83, 87, 99, 104—5, 108—9; and consortium agreement, 328, 330; and consortium negotiations, 313, 3 1 7 -1 8 , 319, 320; and consortium proposals, 286—87, 312; control of D ’Arcy concession by, 9 - 1 0 ,1 3 ,1 5 - 1 7 , 29; and 1921 coup, 2 4 -2 5 ; coup proposals from 283, 2 9 2 94, 2 9 6 -9 7 ; criticism of AIOC from, 9 0 - 9 1 ,1 0 2 - 4 ,3 1 0 ; debate on draft United N ations resolution of, 170—72, 174—80; differences with United States over Iran policy, 100—103, 254, 258— 59, 287—88; and draft profit-sharing resolution, 79; economy of, 9 8 -9 9 , 104—5, *08, i 14,12.8,198; and Eden’s four negotiating principles, 2 7 7 -7 8 ; enables confidential communications by AIOC, 119—20; expectations of Eisenhower adm inistration, 259, 276— 77; and expulsion of AIOC’s British staff, 1 4 9 -5 1 ,1 5 3 -5 4 ,1 6 6 - 6 8 ,1 7 1 , 226; and failed coup attem pt, 3 0 3 -4 ;

Index Fateh’s criticism of, 7 5 -7 6 ; fears of rev­ elations to United N ations, 1 7 1 -7 2 ; foreign policy options of, 3 3 7 -3 8 ; and H arrim an mission, 1 2 5 -2 7 ,1 3 0 —31; imperialist attitudes of, 89, 9 8 -9 9 , 1 0 1 - 2 ,1 3 6 ,1 6 2 -6 3 ; imposes eco­ nomic sanctions against Iran, 128,141, 270—71; international response to threats of force by, 1 7 2 -7 3 ; Iran’s breaking of diplom atic relations with, 2 5 5 -5 6 ; and joint Trum an-Churchill message, 250—52; Labour C abinet’s consideration of overthrow of M ossadeq, 222—23, 2.28-29; m anipulation of Iranian elections by, 239—40; military preparations by, 1 5 5 -5 6 ,1 5 7 -5 8 , 1 6 0 -6 5 ; and M ossadeq’s nationalism , 58, 59; M ossadeq’s protest against covert operations by, 150, 227—28; motives for coup, 3 4 0 -4 1 ; objectives of, 9 8 -9 9 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 5 , 287—88; and oil boycott, 1 4 4 ,1 4 5 -4 8 , 213, 267, 268, 2 6 9 -7 0 ; opposition to schemes to oust M ossadeq in, 221—23; position on ar­ bitration, 248, 249, 254—55, 2 58, 2.61, 263—64; possibility of Iran’s partition with collaboration of Soviet Union, 47, 1 5 8 ,1 6 0 , 236, 246; and postnational­ ization negotiations between AIOC and Iran, 1 1 4 -1 6 ; presentation of case to World C ourt by, h i , 208—9, 210—11, 212; and press attacks against M ossa­ deq, 226—27, 245> 313—14; press de­ fense of AIOC in, 99—100; pressures Shah to remove M ossadeq, 215, 216, 219—20, 221—22, 238—39, 299; propa­ ganda campaign of, 252—53, 299; psy­ chological w arfare against M ossadeq, 219; and Q avam , 192, 215, 216, 2 3 4 38, 241—42, 246; reaction to American aid to Zahedi government, 310; reac­ tion to M ossadeq’s election as prime minister, 215—16; reaction to M ossa­ deq’s international popularity, 193; re­ action to World C ourt’s interim ruling, 122—2 3 , 1^7y 2.08—9; reply to Ameri­ can World Bank proposals, 200—202; response to calls for nationalization, 7 7 -7 9 , 81—82; response to M ossadeq’s counterproposals for arbitration, 254— 55; response to M ossadeq’s settlement proposals, 151—52; response to N a­ tionalization Act, 82—8 4 ,9 0 —92; re­ sponse to strikes in Abadan, 8 4 ,1 5 6 — 57; response to success of coup, 309;

403

resum ption of relations with Iran, 311— 12, 314; and Reuter concession, 2, 3; and revised draft agreements, 280—85; and Russia, 1—2 ,1 1 , 24, 246; search for alternative candidates for Iran’s prime minister by, 2 1 5 -1 7 , 2 3 4 -3 8 ; and settlement of com pensation issue, 322, 323; Shah’s distrust of, 2 9 7 -9 8 ; sources of inform ation to, 2 3 0 -3 1 ; and Soviet attem pt to gain oil concession, 45—4 6 ,4 9 ; and Soviet occupation of Iran, 47; strategy of, 288; and Supple­ mental Oil Agreement, 56; support for Razm ara, 60, 6 2 ,6 3 ; and Talbot con­ cession, 4 - 5 ; taxes paid by AIOC to, 37, 38(table), 1 0 5 ,1 0 8 ,1 0 9 , 253; U. S. criticism of prenationalization policy of, 6 5 ,6 6 - 6 9 ,7 1* 76; and U. S. eco­ nomic assistance to M ossadeq’s govern­ ment, 203, 251, 252, 2 9 0 -9 1 ; United N ations defeat of, 180—82; World Bank as tool of, 202—6, 261 ; and World Bank proposal to Iran, 1 9 4 ,1 9 5 -9 6 ,1 9 7 , 1 9 8 ,1 9 9 ; World C ourt decision against, 213—14, 243, 260; during World War II, 40—4 1 ,4 2 —43. See also Navy, British; Stokes mission G reat Depression, 30, 31 Greenhill, D., 313 Greenway, Charles, 21, 34 Grey, Sir Edward, 15 Griffiths, James, 164 Gross, Ernest, 1 7 4 ,1 8 0 G uerrero, Jose Gustavo, 210 Gulbenkian, Calouste, 329 Gulf Oil, 203, 315, 318 Gulf war, 343 G utt, Camille, 271, 279 Hajir, Abdol-Hossein, 52, 56—57, 59 Hall, Viscount, 9 0 ,9 1 H am id, Prince. See Q ajar, Prince H am id Ham zavi, A., 230 Hankey, R. M . A., 50, 256 H arden, Orville, 319 H ardinge, Arthur, 6 H arrim an, Averell, 125, 1 3 5 ,1 8 8 ,1 9 8 , 223; advice to British ministers, 142— 43; and eviction of A IO C’s British staff, 153—54; and joint Trum an-Churchill message, 251; meetings in Iran, 125— 32; meetings in London, 1 3 2 ,1 3 3 —34; opposition to schemes to oust M ossadeq, 224; and Stokes, 138—40, 141

404

Index

H arrim an mission, 1 3 5 ,1 3 9 —4 0 ,1 4 1 ; meetings in Iran, 125—32; meetings in London, 132—34 H arris, Owen, 149 Harvey, Sir Oliver, 230 Hassibi, Kazem, i n , 129, 270; and com­ pensation to AIOC, 192, 278—79, 291 Heald, Sir Lionel, 209, 212 H ekm at, Reza (Sardar Fakher), 220 Henderson, Lord, 83 Henderson, Loy, 152, 232, 238, 240, 278, 322; and American differences with G reat Britain, 254, 259, 2 8 7 -8 8 ; and breaking of Iranian-British diplomatic relations, 255; and consortium negotia­ tions, 311, 313, 317, 318, 320, 326; and coup, 290, 298, 299, 300, 3 0 5 -6 , 3 8 in .5 8 ; and draft agreements, 262, 263, 264, 265; and economic assistance to Zahedi government, 310; Eden’s praise of, 311—12; and M ossadeq’s safety, 308, 335; and possible sale of oil to Soviet bloc, 269, 279; and resump­ tion of British-Iranian relations, 314; and revised draft agreements, 2 8 0 -8 1 , 284—85; support for M ossadeq, 2 4 4 45, 2 4 8 -4 9 ; and World Bank proposal, 196,197, 205 H oare, Sir Reginald, 3 1 -3 2 Holmes, Julius, 163 Hoover, H erbert, Jr., 311, 312, 313, 319, 3 30; meetings with oil companies, 315, 316, 317, 318; and Rieber, 320 H ourani, Albert, 342 Howe, Robert, 47 Humphrey, George, 276, 286—87, 321, 323 Hungary concludes barter agreement with Iran, 272 Hurley, Patrick, 101 Hussein, Saddam, 301, 343 Idemitsu Kosan, 268—69 Iliff, William, 203 ILO. See International Labor Organiza­ tion IMF. See International M onetary Fund Imperial Bank of Persia, 3 ,4 , 5, 25, 28 Imperialism, 86, 9 8 -9 9 ,1 3 6 ,1 7 4 , 226; and Anglo-American relations, 89, 101—2, 223; and British tutelage scheme for Iran, 23—24, 26, 58; and threatened use of force, 162—63; U. S. opposition to, 49, 68, 223. See also Nationalism

Im port substitution, 272 India, 121—2 2 ,1 4 7 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 0 , 223 International Bank for Reconstruction and Develçpment. See World Bank International C ourt of Justice, m - 1 2 , 171, 2 0 8 -1 4 , 335, 37on.8; British and Iranian arguments before, 210—12; de­ cision of, 213—14, 243, 260; interim ruling of, 122—2 3 ,I 2 6, 167, 169, 2.08— 9. See also A rbitration; Compensation International Labor Organization (ILO), 178 International law: and cancellation óf D ’Arcy concession, 32; legality of na­ tionalization under, 8 2 -8 3 , 99, n o , m - 1 2 , 165,175, 211, 260; on use of force, 1 4 6 ,1 6 5 —6 6 ,1 6 7 International M onetary Fund (IMF), 272,

273 IPC. See Iraq, Mosul & Basra Petroleum Companies Iranian Oil Participants, 325, 328 Iranian revolution of 19 7 8 -7 9 , 336, 338, 343 Iranization of AIOC, 76 Iran party, 95 Iraq, Mosul & Basra Petroleum Com ­ panies (IPC), 2 8 ,1 0 8 ,10 9 (table) Iricon, 328 Ironside, Edmond, 2 4 -2 5 Isfahani, Habibollah, 194 Islamic fundamentalism, 4 ,9 6 , 343 Ismay, Lord, 198 Italian N ational Oil Company (AGIP), 148 Italy breaks British blockade, 268; con­ cludes barter agreement with Iran, 272 Jacks, T. L., 3 1 Jackson, Basil, 1 1 5 ,1 2 7 ,1 3 0 ,1 3 1 ,1 3 4 , 312; terms of proposal made by, 116 Ja’fari, Sha’ban, 307 Japan, 2 6 8 -6 9 Jebb, Gladwyn, 1 7 0 -7 1 , i7 4 , * 7 7 ,1 7 8 7 9 ,1 8 0 ,1 8 1 —82; and naval presence in Gulf, 173 Jessup, Philip, 155,156 Johnson, Lyndon B., 288—89 Joint Oil Committee, 9 2 -9 3 ,1 1 1 ,1 1 6 ,

, Jones, Alton, 2 4 9 -5 0 , 281, 282 117

135-36

Jones, Geoffrey, 5 Kargar-i-Azad (Free Worker), 240 Kashani, Ayatollah Abol-Qassem, 51, 61,

Index 162, 229, 243; British assessment of, 196, 297; calls for nationalization, 74, 81, 82; opposition to M ossadeq by, 291, 294, 295, 299; and Q avam , 241, 242, 244; replacement as speaker of the M ajlis, 2 9 9 -3 0 0 ; and Society of M oslem W arriors, 96; and Stokes, 139; and Zahedi, 314 Kavtaradze, Sergei, 45 Kazemi, Baqer, 164 Keating, Geoffrey, 1 7 1 -7 2 Keddie, Nikki, 3 8 2 ^ 5 8 Kelly, J.V ., 103 Kelly, Thom as, 148 Kennedy adm inistration, 342 Kermanshah, 6 ,1 8 7 , 322, 329 Ketabji, Vincent, 9 ,1 2 Ketabji Khan, Antoine, 5—6 ,7 , 8 ,9 Keynes, John M aynard, 98 Khabar, 235 Khajenuri, Ebrahim, 336 Khaz’al, Sheikh, 1 4 -1 5 , 26, 27 Kheradju, Qassem, 117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 294, 304, 337,341 Khonsari, Ayatollah M oham m ad Taki, 74 Khuzistan, 6 ,4 7 ,4 9 , 50 Kianuri, N u r ed-Din, 306 Korean war, 1 0 0 ,1 8 5 , 250 Kuwait, 343 Kuwait Oil Company, 1 0 8 ,1 0 9 (table) Labor, 49-51» 53» 9*. 1 0 3 -5 , n o , *4°; and AIOC reduction in living allow­ ances, 8 4 - 8 5 ,1 5 6 - 5 7 Labour party (Great Britain), 1 6 8 ,1 8 3 , 189, 228, 229, 234. See also Attlee, Clement; M orrison, H erbert Lacoste, Francis, 181 Lam bton, Ann, 216, 226, 229, 356n.11 Lang, Sir John, 83 Lansdowne, Lord, 8 League of N ations, 3 2—3 3 Leathers, Lord, 189 Lee Factors, 149 Leggett, Sir Frederick, 9 0 ,1 0 3 , 222, 229 Lend-Lease Agreement, 9 8 ,1 0 0 Le Rougetel, John, 51,63 Levy, Walter, 1 1 4 -1 5 9 *59» 2 8 9 -9 0 , 311, 317; and H arrim an mission, 1 2 8 ,130, 1 3 2 -3 3 ,1 4 2 ,1 4 3 ; and Stokes, 137, 1 3 8

Liakhoff, Vladimir, 14 Lie, Trygve, 184, 209 Linder, H arold, 8 7 ,8 8 ,2 0 4

405

Lloyd, Selwyn, 242 Lloyds Insurance, 268 Lockhart, Laurence, 3 5 1 ^ 5 9 Lockridge, James (alias for Kermit Roose­ velt), 302 Logan, D onald, 221, 232, 235, 341 Longhurst, Henry, 167 Loombe, C. E., 8 3 ,1 5 6 Loraine, Lady, 28 Loraine, Sir Percy, 2 6 -2 7 Loudon, John, 319, 323 Lovett, Robert, 251, 257 M i 6. See British Foreign Intelligence M cCarthy, Joseph, 293 M cClure, Robert, 306 M cGhee, George, 66, 6 7 ,7 5 , 227, 240, 3540.39; and AIOC intransigence be­ fore nationalization, 61, 68, 69, 76, 104; and British rejection of American settlem ent proposals, 190; and British response to nationalization, 85—87, 88, 8 9 ,1 3 1 ; on coup, 336; 1949 fact­ finding mission to Iran, 60—61; and H arrim an mission, 125; meetings with M ossadeq, 1 7 4 ,1 8 3 —8 4 ,1 8 5 ,1 8 6 , 191—92; opinion of M ossadeq, 183, 218—19, 340; opposition to schemes to oust M ossadeq, 224; reaction to M ossadeq’s settlem ent proposals, 151 M cGranery, James, 257, 324 M aclean, Fitzroy, 309 M cLintock, W illiam, 19—20 M cN air, Sir Arnold, 210, 214 M aitland, Com m ander, 121 Majlis (Iranian N ational Assembly), 13, 1 4 ,4 6 ; and AIOC violations of 1933 concession, 52—54; and Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919, 24, 58; antisabo­ tage bill in, 118; and Armitage-Smith agreement, 33; British calls for dissolu­ tion of, 83, 8 7 ,1 5 6 , 215; and British schemes to remove M ossadeq, 200; calls for nationalization in, 71—72, 73— 74, 76, 81; and cancellation of D ’Arcy concession, 31 ; cancellation of elections to, 59—60; committee on constitutional powers in, 247, 295—96; and consor­ tium agreement, 326, 327; elections to, 4 4 ,4 8 , 56—57, 61, 207, 2 3 9 -4 0 ; end­ ing of Senate term by, 256; and estab­ lishment of Pahlavi dynasty, 27—28; Kashani’s replacem ent as speaker of, 299—300; 1947 oil concession bill in, 4 8 ,4 9 ; opposition to M ossadeq in.

40

6

Index

Majlis ( 95; on postcoup relations with G reat Britain, 314 M ansur, Ayatollah Ali, 61, 62, 63—64, 120, 230 M arriott, Alfred, 6 ,7 M artial law, 51, 84, 326, 332 M asjid Sulaiman, 1 0 ,1 1 ,1 5 ,1 9 M ason, Alick, 119,146 M ason, F. C., 240 M as’udi, Abbas, 366m 20 M atin-D aftari, Ahmad, 205, 358n.11, 3 6 o n .i9 , 366n.20 M atthews, Freeman, 125, 224 MELF. See M iddle East Land Forces Mexico, 72, 8 8 ,9 9 ,1 7 2 , 260, 289 M iddle East Land Forces (MELF), 155, 157,160 M iddleton, George, 221, 225, 232, 2 5 5 56, 295; assessment of Iranian opposi­ tion leaders by, 296—97; and M ossadeq’s arbitration proposal, 248, 249; and Qavam, 235, 2 3 8 -3 9 , 2 4 3 44; and World Bank negotiations, 1 9 5 96, 205, 207 Millar, Sir Hoyer, 162 Mills, G. H .,8 3 M illspaugh, Arthur, 52 M oazzami, Abdollah, 299—300, 358n.i 1 M odernization. See Economic develop­ ment Mogbeli, Nasrollah, 332

M oham m ad Ali Shah, 1 1 ,1 3 ,1 4 M oham m ad Hassan Qajar, Prince, 41 M oham m ad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 45, 81, 156, 232, 247, 338; and American op­ position to schemes to oust M ossadeq, 224; appoints M ossadeq prime minis­ ter, 92; and Bakhtiari revolt, 295; and breaking of diplomatic relations with G reat Britain, 255; and British pressure to remove M ossadeq, 215, 216, 2 1 9 20, 221—22, 238—39, 299; character of, 41—42; and CIA financing of coup, 3 8 in .5 8 ; CIA-instigated dem onstra­ tions against, 305; and consortium agreement, 217, 324; constitutional powers of, 5 1 -5 2 , 57, 296; distrust of British, 297—98; endorses M ossadeq’s settlement proposals, 151 ; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 153; and failed coup attem pt, 3 0 3 -4 ; and H arrim an, 128—2 9 ,1 3 9 ; inability to avert na­ tionalization, 82, 85; and M ansur, 61, 62—63, 64; and M ossadeq’s Cabinet, 110; and M ossadeq’s resignation and reelection, 2 4 0 -4 1 , 243; and M ossa­ deq’s trial, 332., 333, 335; M ossadeq’s underestimation of, 339; persuaded to cooperate in 1953 coup, 3 0 0 -3 0 2 ; po­ litical drawbacks of, 97; political re­ pression by, 5 1 -5 2 , 97, 3 4 1 -4 2 ; and profit-sharing proposal, 77; and Qavam , 2 3 7 -3 8 , 243; return of, 308; and Senate, 57, 256; and Stokes, 135, 138; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 54, 55» 5*>> U. S. assessment of, 60— 61, 62; and World Bank proposals, 206; and Zahedi, 3 1 4 -1 5 , 322 M oham m erah, Sheikh of. See Khaz’al, Sheikh M oin ol-M olk, 1 M olotov, V. M., 45 M om taz, E., 308 M ontesquieu, Baron de, 95 M organ, Jaques de, 5 M organ, Kenneth, 163 M orgenthau, Henry, 184 M orrison, H erbert, n o , 1 3 3 ,1 3 7 ,1 8 2 , 216, 218; advocates use of force, 83, 9 1 ,1 5 4 ,1 5 7 ,1 6 7 ; Attlee’s opinion of, 168; calls for removal of M ossadeq, 150, 2 2 3 -2 4 ; colonial outlook of, 98; and H arrim an mission, 126,127; opin­ ion of McGhee, 86—87, 89; and plans for military intervention, 160,164; re­ fuses American offer of mediation, 174;

Index and U. S. opposition to use of force, 1 5 8 ,1 6 2 ,1 6 3 ,1 6 5 ; and U. S. position on nationalization, 112,113 ; and United N ations resolution, 1 6 9 -7 0 , 173; and World C ourt case, 2 0 8 -9 M ossadeq, M oham m ad, 44, 6 3 ,9 8 , 99, 251, 340—41 ; advocacy of nationaliza­ tion by, 73—74; on AIOC’s interference in Iranian politics, 121, 240; and Amer­ ican draft agreements, 262, 264, 2 6 5 66; American response to British schemes to overthrow, 2 2 3 -2 4 , 2 3 1 33; and antisabotage bill, 118; appoint­ ment as finance minister, 26; arbitra­ tion proposals of, 249, 2 5 3 -5 4 ; austerity program of, 2 7 1 -7 4 ; and Bakhtiari revolt, 295; BBC campaign against, 224—26, 228; becomes prime minister, 92, 2 1 5 -1 6 ; and boycott of oil technicians, 148; breaks diplom atic relations with G reat Britain, 255—56; British assessment of strength of, 129, 207, 229; British contem plate schemes to oust, 2 2 1 -2 3 ; British pressure on Shah to remove, 215, 216, 219—20, 221—22, 238—39, 299; and British re­ jection of American settlem ent p ro ­ posals, 190; British search for alterna­ tive to, 215—17, 234—38; Cabinet of, 1 0 9 -1 0 ; career of, 58—59; on consor­ tium agreement, 326—27, 330, 333— 34; conversations with Keating, 171— 72; death of, 342; dem ocratic reforms of, 274; discussions in the United States, 1 7 4 ,1 8 3 - 8 6 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 1 - 9 2 ; Eden’s attem pts to discredit, 189, 2 4 8 49, 283; in Egypt, 193; emergency powers of, 294; and establishm ent of Pahlavi dynasty, 28; and expulsion of AIOC’s British staff, 1 5 0 ,1 5 2 —5 3 ,1 6 6 , 171, 226; and failed coup attem pt, 303; and form ation of N ational Front, 57— 5 8 ,9 4 ,9 6 ; and H arrim an mission, 126, 1 2 9 ,1 3 9 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 1 ; house arrest and im prisonm ent of, 51, 59, 218, 335, 341, 342; idealism of, 338, 3 3 9 -4 0 ; im pact of, 341, 342; international pop­ ularity of, 121—2 2 ,1 8 0 —8 1 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 4 , 193; invitations to American oil com ­ panies by, 337; invitation to foreign employees of AIOC, 118—19; Labour C abinet’s consideration of overthrow of, 222—23, 2-2.8—2 9 ;on legality of na­ tionalization, 99, n o , i n —1 2 ,1 7 5 ; M cGhee’s opinion of, 183, 2 1 8 -1 9 ,

407

340; and 1952 Majlis elections, 200, 207; mistakes of, 338—39, 340; and na­ tionalization procedures resolution, 91; offer to consider lump-sum com pensa­ tion, 278, 279—80; opportunists’ schemes to overthrow, 220—21, 234— 35; opposition to, 244, 246, 291, 294, 295» 2.99-300; overthrow of, 308; in postnationalization negotiations with AIOC, 1 1 5 -1 6 ; press attacks on, 2 2 6 27, 235, 245, 3 1 3 -1 4 ; press support for, 1 0 1 ,1 7 2 ,1 8 2 ,1 8 8 ,1 9 3 , 226; p ro ­ paganda campaign against, 2 5 2 -5 3 , 299, 305—'6; protests against British covert operations, 150, 227—28; psy­ chological w arfare against, 219, 302; on public opinion, 117; purge of army by, 246—47; questions American inten­ tions, 287; reaction to appointm ent of Razm ara, 65; and referendum on dis­ solution of Majlis, 300; resignation and reelection of, 240—41, 243; response to joint Trum an-Churchill message, 252, 253—54; response to revised draft agreements, 281, 283—85; seeks alter­ native m ediator, 288; settlem ent pro­ posals of, 151 ; and Shah’s distrust of British, 297—98; Shepherd’s opinion of, n o , 217, 218, 274; and Soviet Union, 4 5 ,4 8 , 2 4 5 -4 6 , 279, 282, 284, 300; and Stokes mission, 134—35, x37> 138, 1 3 9 ,1 4 0 ,1 4 1 ; Stokes’ opinion of, 221— 22; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 61—62, 70, 71; trial of, 332—35; and T rum an’s call for negotiations, 113, 114; and U. S. economic assistance, 191, 203, 245, 252, 290; U. S. support for, 1 1 5 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 1 , 244—46, 248—49; at United N ations, 1 7 1 ,1 7 3 —7 4 ,1 7 5 —77; and “War Com m ittee,” 14; and World Bank proposal, 194—9 5 ,1 9 7 —98, 204, 206, 207; and World C ourt case, 123, 126, 208, 209—10, 213 M ountbatten, Earl, 90—91 M ozaffar ed-Din Shah, 5, 7 ,1 0 —1 1 ,1 3 , 57, 38on.z6 M urrow , Edward R., 102 M usaddiq. See M ossadeq, M oham m ad N ader Shah, 2 Nafti-Shah oil fields, 322, 329 Nasser, Gam al Abdel, 168, 341 Nasser ed-Din Shah, 1, 2—3 ,4 , 5 Nassiri, N ., 302—3 N ational Assembly. See Majlis

4o 8

Index

N ational Front, 6 5 ,1 0 9 ,1 2 0 , 232, 241; advocacy of nationalization by, 71—72, 73— 74; American opinion of, 223, 244—45; and British interference in Majlis elections, 239, 240; and British schemes to oust M ossadeq, 221; after coup, 326, 332, 3 4 1 -4 2 ; election of, 59, 6 1, 207; factionalism in, 244, 294, 2 9 9 -3 0 0 , 339; founding of, 5 7 -5 8 , 9 4 -9 5 ; indictm ent of AIOC by, 7 0 -7 1 ; and Majlis vote on nationalization, 82; popularity of, 132, 222; press of, 8 9 90, 95, 332; Shah’s position regarding, 85, 97; Shepherd’s reports regarding, 217; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 62; and Tudeh party, 245 N ational Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 93, h i , 185, 269, 331; AIOC intercep­ tion of communications with, 146—47; AIOC staff applications to, 1 4 7 -4 8 ; and American settlement proposals, 187, 262; breaking of blockade by, 267—68, 270; and consortium , 320, 3 2 4 -2 5 ; dispossession of AIOC by, 116—19; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 152—53; seizure of AIOC docu­ ments by, 119—21; and Stokes mission,

i35-36> 137 Nationalism , 4 4 ,4 9 , 59, 8 9 -9 0 ,1 2 9 , 232; American attitude tow ard, 49, 7 4 - 75, 98, 223; British attitude to ­ w ard, 5 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 9 , 217; and constitu­ tion, 10—i i , 1 3 -1 4 ,4 4 ; effect of U. S. foreign policy on, 337; and opposition to British tutelage, 24; and opposition to concessions, 3 -4 , 5 ,1 1 ; political parties espousing, 94—96. See also Im­ perialism N ationalist Party of Iran, 95 Nationalization: Aden Supreme C ourt case regarding, 267—68; AIOC’s finan­ cial position at time of, 107—9; AIOC’s negotiations with Iran regarding, 1 1 4 16; American position regarding, 98, 112, 254; and British foreign policy op­ tions, 337; British recognition of, 112, 113,133-34* 137* 139* 181, 212, 254, 285; consortium agreement as illusion of, 3 2 9 -3 0 ; international support for, 172; and Iran as model for other coun­ tries, 105, 2 6 4 -6 5 , 340; labor support for, 104; legality of, 82—8 3 ,9 9 , n o , i n —1 2 ,1 6 5 ,1 7 5 , 2 1 1, 260; N ational Front advocacy of, 7 1 -7 2 , 73—74; Oil Committee recomm endation for, 81;

passage of, 81—82; Razmara’s report on, 79—80; Shah’s position regarding, 97; as subject for arbitration, 248, 250, 251, 252; Tudeh party position regard­ ing* 97; and United N ations jurisdic­ tion, 1 7 0 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 6 ,1 7 7 . See also Compensation; H arrim an mission; In­ ternational C ourt of Justice; Stokes mission; United N ations N ationalization Act, 81—8 2 ,1 9 4 ; Ameri­ can response to, 8 5 -8 7 ; British re­ sponse to, 8 2 -8 4 , 9 0 -9 2 ; validity of, as subject for arbitration, 248, 250, 2 5 1,252 N ationalization Procedures Act, 9 1 ,9 2 93, h i , 1 1 6 -2 1 ,1 3 0 N ational Oil Refineries Ltd., 18 N ational Security Council (NSC), 257— 58 * 3 0 7 ,3 1 5

NATO. See N orth Atlantic Treaty O rgani­ zation Navy, British, 9, 53, 83, 87. See also Ad­ miralty, British N ehru, Jaw aharlal, 122 Netherlands, the, support British position, 181 Nichols, H. P., 289 Nicolson, H arold, 41 Nikpey, E’ezaz, 230 NIOC. See N ational Iranian Oil Com ­ pany Nitze, Paul, 1 2 5 ,1 8 5 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 2 , 260, 336; and British schemes to overthrow M ossadeq, 231, 2 3 2 -3 3 ; and World Bank proposals, 201, 202, 204, 205 N ixon, Richard, 314 Noel-Baker, Philip, 8 4 ,1 0 4 ,1 6 4 N orm an, Herm an, 25 N orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 147,162 N orthcroft, E. G. D., 6 3 - 6 4 ,7 4 ,7 6 - 7 7 , 79, 8 4 ,1 2 0 -2 1 N ostrat od-Dowleh, 21 NSC. See N ational Security Council N u, Thakin, 105 Nuri-Esfandiari, F., 3830.40 N uttal, W., 3 6 m .34 N utting, Anthony, 236 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 293 Oil: conflicting British and American pol­ icies regarding, 100—101; exploration for, 5—6 , 9 , 11—12; Iranian dependence on, 271; negotiations on price of, 184, 1 8 6 ,1 8 7 ,1 8 8 , 205, 3 6 7 ^ 1 2 , 3690.38;

409

Index pipelines, 1 4 ,1 5 ,1 9 —20, 34; price of, 30, 53, 269, 270, 287, 337; production of, i8(table), 19, 38(table), 4 0 ,1 0 8 , 3 5 7 ^ 3 . See also Concessions; N a­ tionalization; Oil companies, Ameri­ can; Oil technicians; Royalties for oil; Tankers Oil cartel. See Boycott of Iranian oil; C on­ sortium ; Oil companies, American Oil Committee (of Majlis), 7 0 ,7 4 ,7 6 , 81, 9 1 ,9 2 -9 3 Oil companies, American, 1 0 0 ,1 3 4 ,1 4 9 , 337; British suspicion of, 7 5 ,1 3 8 -3 9 , 250, 313; independent, 269, 328; na­ tionalization as threat to, 1 0 3,105, 127; reluctance to buy Iranian oil, 190, 203, 260, 284; and U. S. antitrust laws, 1 4 4 -4 5 ,1 5 7 -5 8 , 260, 270, 315. See also Boycott of Iranian oil; Consor­ tium ; and specific companies Oil technicians, 1 1 3 ,1 1 8 -1 9 ,1 8 4 ,1 8 9 , 204, 239; boycott of, 1 4 8 -5 0 ; expul­ sion of, 1 4 9 - 5 1 ,1 5 2 - 5 4 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 7 6 8 ,1 7 1 , 226; Jones’ plan to send, 249—50, 281, 282; and World Bank proposals, 201, 204—5, 106 OPEC. See O rganization of Petroleum Ex­ porting Countries O peration Ajax, 297, 299, 3800.22 O peration Boot, 294, 297 O peration M idget, 1 6 0 -6 1 ,1 6 3 -6 4 O rganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 341 OSS. See Office of Strategic Services

Packenham, Lord, 1 4 9 -5 0 PAD. See Petroleum Administration for Defense Page, H ow ard, 323, 324, 330 Pahlavi Shahs. See M oham m ad Reza Shah Pahlavi; Reza Shah Pahlavi Päinter, David, 331 Pakistan, 9 8 ,1 2 1 —2 2 ,1 9 4 Palmer, Joseph, 278 Parker, Sir H ., 83 Parsons, Sir Anthony, 338 Pasha, N ahas, 193 Penrose, Edith, 330—31 Permanent C ourt of International Justice,

31

Perron, Ernest, 292 Persian Bank M ining Rights C orporation,

5 Persian Cossacks, 14, 25, 3490.7

Petroleum Administration for Defense (PAD), 287 Petroleum Development Ltd., 108,109 (table) Pipelines, 1 4 ,1 5 ,1 9 -2 0 , 34 Plan Y, 160,161 Poland concludes barter agreement with Iran, 272 Political parties, Iranian, 1 3 ,9 4 -9 6 . See also N ational Front; Tudeh party Political societies, 13—14 Preece, John Richard, 10 Press, the, 79, 8 9 - 9 0 , 1 0 1 ,1 0 2 ,1 4 2 ,1 9 3 ; on AIOC, 78, 99—1 0 0 ,1 0 1 ,103—4; AIOC interference w ith, 1 2 0 ,1 2 1 ; on American settlement proposals, 261— 62; coverage of World C ourt case by, 209, 210; on flight of Shah, 304; free­ dom of, 274; on joint Trum anChurchill message, 252; on M ossadeq’s death, 342; N ational Front, 89—9 0 ,9 5 , 332; reaction to eviction of A IO C’s British staff in Iranian, 154; support of and attacks on M ossadeq in, 226—27, 235, 245, 313—14; on threatened use of force, 1 5 9 ,1 7 2 —73; on T rum an’s call for negotiations, 113—14; on United N ations proceedings, 1 7 1 ,1 8 2 ; Z ahedi’s suppression of, 327, 332 Pretyman, Ernest, 9—10 Profit-sharing (50-50 principle), 5 5 ,1 8 6 , 1 8 7 ,1 8 8 ; A IO C’s position on, 7 4 ,7 6 — 7 7 ,7 8 ,7 9 ,1 0 4 ; as alternative to na­ tionalization, 82, 85, 86, 88; American oil com pany interest in, 9 8 ,1 2 7 , 260; Aramco agreem ent on, 67, 69, 7 2 ,7 3 , 8 5 ,1 0 4 ; and consortium agreement, 317, 321, 325, 329—30; and Iran as model for other countries, 265; Levy’s advice regarding, 133; profits from, 337- 38, 3 ¿ 7n. 12 Provisional Board, N IO C , i n , 11 6 ,1 1 7 , 118 Prudhom m e, Hector, 1 9 6 ,1 9 7 , 202, 2 0 5 -

6 Pyman, Lancelot, 81—82, 219, 220

Q ajar, Prince H am id, 41, 236, 237 Q ajar, Prince Salar-ed Dowleh, 221 Q ajar kings. See Ahmad Shah; M oham ­ m ad Ali Shah; M ozaffar ed-Din Shah; Nasser ed-Din Shah Q ashqai tribe, 4 7 ,4 8 ,9 7 , 305, 35U1.9

4

1

0

Index

Qavam-ul-Saltaneh, Ahmad, 2 6 ,4 8 —49, 220, 242—43, 246; British support for, 192, 215, 216, 234—38, 241—42 Quevedo, Antonio, 180 Rafidain Oil Company, 119 Railways, Iranian, Allied use of during World War II, 43; British payments for the use of, 7 8 ,1 1 0 ; construction of, 39 Ram sbotham , Peter, 1 3 9 -4 0 , 198, 270, 287, 3 6 1 ^ 3 4 Rashidian brothers, 230, 292, 294, 302, 305,37911.1 Rau, Sir Bengal, 1 8 0 ,1 8 1 -8 2 , 37on.8 Razmara, General Ali, 64, 7 0 ,7 4 , 80, 81, 96; AIOC control over, 1 2 0 -2 1 ,1 7 2 ; attem pts to amend Supplemental Oil Agreement, 65, 67, 68; becomes prime minister, 64; British and American sup­ p ort for, 6 0 ,6 2 , 63; and Majlis* rejec­ tion of Supplemental Oil Agreement, 72, 73; and profit-sharing proposal, 76, 77, 7 9 -8 0 Redwood, Boverton, 6 ,9 Reporter, Shapur, 292 Reuter, George de, 3, 5 Reuter, Julius de, 1, 2, 3 Reuter concession, 1 - 3 ,4 Reynolds, George Bernard, 9 ,1 1 ,1 2 Reza Khan. See Reza Shah Pahlavi Reza Shah Pahlavi, 3 9 -4 0 , 65, 333, 342, 349n.7; abdication of, 42; concession negotiations by, 2 8 -3 1 , 3 4 -3 5 , 36, 38, 39; Ironside’s support for, 25; jailing of M ossadeq by, 59, 218; rise of, 25, 2 6 2 8 ,1 7 6 ; and Tudeh party, 96 Riahi, Taqi, 295, 306, 307 Rieber, Torkild, 195,196, 201, 202, 204, 320 Riots. See Coup d ’état; Labor Rodgers, George, 234 Rolin, Henri, 209, 210, 2 1 1 -1 2 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4 3 ,9 9 ,1 0 0 ,101, 186 Roosevelt, Kermit, 299, 335, 340, 3810.58; and British proposals for coup, 293—94, 296, 297; and failed coup attem pt, 304; and second coup at­ tempt, 305, 306, 307, 308; and Shah’s support for coup, 300, 302 Ross, Archibald, 2 3 7 -3 8 , 239, 244, 263, 264,278 Rothnie, Alan, 234, 297 Rothschild, Alfonse de, 9 Rouhani, Fuad, 341, 3830.40, 3840.65

Rountree, William, 71, 8 7 ,1 2 7 -2 8 ,1 5 1 , Ï99, 320 Rousseau, Jean, 5.2—53 Rowan, Sir Leslie, 188,189, 228—29 Royal Dutch Shell. See Shell Oil Royalties for oil, 75, 7 8 ,1 5 2 , 221, 352n.27, 3 7 4 n .i; am ounts paid by AIOC, 52, 5 3 ,1 0 8 -9 ,1 7 9 ; APOC’s underpaym ent of, 17, 18(table), 1 9 22; and cancellation of D ’Arcy conces­ sion, 33; Reza Shah’s negotiations re­ garding, 2 9 -3 1 ; under terms of 1933 concession, 3 6 -3 7 Rumanian oil, 196 Russell, Bertrand, 95 Russia, 1—2, 7, 8, 23; and Anglo-Russian Convention, 11, 24, 246. See also So­ viet Union Russian-Persian Friendship Treaty Agree­ ment, 26 Sacor, 147 Sadchikov, Ivan, 47 Sadr, Hassan, 3 27 Sa’ed, M oham m ad, 54, 55, 56, 59—60 Saleh, Allahyar, 209, 290, 358n.11, 3 6 o n .i9 , 366m 20; United Nations statements of, 1 7 7 -7 8 ,1 7 9 —80 Salisbury, Lord, 1, 310 Samii, Mehdi, 117 Sampson, Anthony, 331 Samsam, Jahanshah, 35111.9 Sanjabi, Karim, 95, 36611.20 Sarell, Roderick, 231 Saudi Arabia, Aramco agreement with, 67, 6 9 ,7 2 ,7 3 ,8 5 , 104 SAVAK holds Mossadeq under house ar­ rest, 341 Schwarzkopf, H. N orm an, 301, 302 Schwarzkopf, H. N orm an, Jr., 301 Seddon, Richard, 61, h i , 1 1 9 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 2 , *45

Senate, Iranian, 5 7 ,171, 205, 220, 3 5 8n. 11 ; confirmation of Mossadeq by, 215, 240; and consortium agreement, 327; passage of nationalization law by, 82, 92; term of, 256 Serpell, David, 319, 320 Seven-Year Development Plan, 5 2 Shafaq, Reza-Zadeh, 358n.11, 360m 19 Shafia, Ali, 220, 2 3 4 -3 5 Shah, Yagub, 194 Shahrokh, Bahram, 7 0 ,1 2 0 Shawcross, Sir Hartley, 267

Index Shayegan, Ali, 95, 209, 35811.11, 36011.19, 36611.20 Shell Oil, 1 7 ,1 8 ,4 4 -4 5 ,1 0 5 * 170; and consortium negotiations, 315, 3 1 6 -1 7 , 318, 319, 323; signing of con­ sortium agreement by, 325 Shepherd, Sir Francis, 63, 7 4 ,1 1 3 ,1 3 8 , 17 1, 238; on Aramco agreement, 85; assessment of M ossadeq’s support, 129, 229; attitude tow ard Americans, 114, 182, 223, 224; and BBC campaign against M ossadeq, 225, 226, 228; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 1 4 9 5 1 ,1 5 3 ; and H arrim an, 126-27,12.9, 1 3 1 -3 2 ,1 4 3 ; ignorance of, 143, 2 1 7 18; on Iranian public opinion, 116—17; and Iranian seizure of AIOC docu­ ments, 11 9 ,121 ; on Joint Committee members, 111 ; opinion of M ossadeq, n o , 217, 218, 274; and plans for mili­ tary intervention, 8 4 ,1 6 3 ; pressures Shah to remove M ossadeq, 215, 216, 219—20, 221; protests nationalization, 9 1 - 9 2 , 110; and Razm ara’s report on nationalization, 79, 80; response to calls for nationalization, 7 7 ,7 8 —79, 81, 82; and Supplemental Oil Agreement, 65» 7 2>73 Shinwell, Emanuel, 1 2 6 ,1 5 7 ,1 6 0 ,1 6 3 , 164,165 Shirazi, Ayatollah Hassan, 4 Simon, Sir John, 32, 33 Slade, Sir Edmond, 15 Slessor, Sir John, 102 Slim, Sir William, 160,1 62 Sluszny, M arcel, 209 Smith, Walter Bedell, 280, 286, 293, 296, z 9 9 >3 0 4

Smyth, Henry, 25 Snow, H. E., 195, 328 Snyder, John, 154, 203, 257 Society of Humanity. See M ajm a’e Ensaniat Society of M oslem W arriors, 96 Socony-Vacuum, 148, 315, 318 Soheili, Ali, 151—52, 207, 230, 242 Soraya, Queen, 42, 292, 302 Soruri, M oham m ad, 358n.11 Soskice, Sir Frank, 165—66, 209, 213 Soviet Union, 24, 26, 9 7 - 9 8 ,1 0 5 - 6 ,1 8 5 , 282; attem pt to gain oil concession by, 45—4 7 ,4 8 —49; and British consider­ ation of use of force, 1 5 6 ,1 5 8 ,1 5 9 , 161—6 2 ,1 6 5 ; Iranian fear of, 225; Ira­ nian trade with, 70, 300; M ossadeq’s

411

opposition to, 58, 5 9 ,1 3 5 , 2 4 5 -4 6 ; oc­ cupation of Iran by, 46—48; possibility of collaboration with Britain on parti­ tion of Iran, 4 7 ,1 5 8 ,1 6 0 , 236, 246; possible oil sales to, 279, 284; after Sta­ lin, 299; and Tudeh party, 4 5 ,4 9 ,9 6 — 97, 245, 246; in United N ations, 170, 18 0 ,1 8 2 ; during World War II, 4 0 ,4 2 , 43. See also Eastern Europe; Russia Spirit o f Laws (M ontesquieu), 95 Stalin, Joseph, 4 3 ,4 6 ,1 0 6 , 299 Standard Oil of California, 3 1 5 ,3 1 8 , 354n-39 Standard Oil of N ew Jersey, 18, 53, 203; and consortium negotiations, 3 1 5 ,3 1 8 , 3 I 9>323 Stevens, Sir Roger, 314, 318—19, 320, 322>33° Stocking, George, 267 Stokes, Lord Richard Rapier, 1 3 1 ,1 3 4 — 3 9 ,1 4 0 —41, 221—22; on com pensation for capital investments, 279; defense of Iran’s position by, 253 Stokes mission, 1 3 1 ,1 3 3 —43, 2.19, 2.21— 22; British proposals, 136—38; failure of, 1 4 0 -4 3 ; instructions to, 134, 329— 30 Strachey, John, 105, 329 Strang, Sir William, 83, 9 0 ,1 0 7 ,1 3 1 , 163; response to American settlement proposals, 187; on Shah’s failure to re­ move M ossadeq, 219; and Stokes mis­ sion, 133 Strathcona, Lord, 1 0 ,1 2 —13, x5 Strikes, 84—85, 242—43. See also Labor Sudan, 193 Suez Canal, 1 6 8 ,1 8 4 ,1 9 3 , 341 ol-Sultan, Ali Ashgar Amin, 4 ,6 ,1 1 Supor, 268 Supplemental Oil Agreement, 54—5 6 ,6 1 , 63, 352n.27; Iran’s attem pts to am end, ^5—7 °; M ajlis’ consideration of, 56, 6 2 ,6 5 ,6 7 ,7 0 —73,1 2 1 Tabari, Ehsan, 246 Tabatabai, Seyyed Zia ed-Din, 138, 220, 238; British support for, 8 3 ,1 3 9 ,1 4 3 , 215—16, 230, 234; coup by, 25—26, 349n-7 Taheri, H adi, 230 Tahmassebi, Khalil, 80, 3550.60 Tajol M oluk (Queen M other), 238 Talbot, G. F., 3 Talbot concession, 3—5

412.

Index

Tankers, blockade of, 145—46, 213, 2 6 7 68, 269 Taqizadeh, S. H ., 31, 34, 39, 54, 55, 220 Taxes, oil, 39, 5 3 ,2 7 1 , 272,35211.27; am ounts paid by AIOC, 37, 3 8(table), 1 0 5 ,1 0 8 ,1 0 9 , 253; and consortium agreement, 321, 325; under D ’Arcy concession, 7 ,1 7 , 30, 31, 33 Taylor, Robert Louis, 288 Tedder, Lord A rthur William, 155 Tehran Conference, 43 Texaco, 203, 315, 318 Teymurtash, Abdol-Hossien, assassina­ tion of, 39; oil negotiations with Cadman, 28—30, 34 Teymurtash, M anuchehr, 230 Thom as, W. E., 240 Thornburg, M ax, 75, 3540.39 Times (London), 9 9 ,1 6 8 , 253, 309 Tin Syndicate, British interests in, 105 Tobacco and the Talbot concession, 3 -5 Toilers’ party, 95 Tragedy o f American-Iranian Relations, The (Bill), 3 3 6 -3 7 Trans-Iranian railway. See Railways Trotsky, Leon, annuls 1907 AngloRussian Convention, 24 Trum an, H arry S., 4 7 ,6 0 , 99, 264, 266; and Acheson’s settlement proposal, 257—58; and Alton Jones, 2 4 9 -5 0 , 2 8 1; and British advocacy of force, 161,162; calls for negotiations, 1 1 3 14; and Churchill’s visit to the United States, 198,199; and eviction of AIOC’s British staff, 153; and H am man mission, 126; and Iranian loan re­ quest, 190, 191 ; joint message with Churchill, 250—52; M ossadeq’s meet­ ing with, 185; and proposals for coup, 294; response to Attlee’s request for support, 142; support for nationalist movements, 98 Truman-Churchill message to M ossadeq, 2 5 0 -5 2 ; M ossadeq’s rejection of, 252,

* 5 3 -5 4 Trum an Doctrine as source for U. S. de­ velopment aid, 190 Tsiang, Ting-fu, 170,180 Tudeh party, 49, 232, 243; and coup, 300, 303, 305, 306, 308, 340; and opposi­ tion to N ational Front, 96—97; and So­ viet Union, 45, 245, 246; suppression of, 5 1 ,9 6 , 332 Turkey, 9 8 ,1 0 5 ,1 4 7 -4 8 , i73 Turkish Petroleum Company, 28. See also

Iraq, Mosul & Basra Petroleum Com­ panies Unions. See Labor United N ations, 4 6 ,1 6 5 ,1 6 6 ,1 6 7 ,1 6 9 — 82, 335; British defeat in, 180—82; M orgenthau’s proposal to, 184; M ossadeq at, 175—76; presentation of British case in, 1 7 0 -7 1 ,1 7 4 ,1 7 7 ,1 7 8 ; presentation of Iranian case in, 175— 7 8 ,1 7 9 -8 0 ; U. S. position on British com plaint to, 169—7 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 0 United States: and Acheson’s setdement proposals, 1 8 6 -9 1 , 2 5 7 -5 8 , 260—61; and American oil company interests, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ,1 0 5 ,1 2 7 ,1 3 8 -3 9 ,1 4 0 , 1 4 4 -4 5 , 3 X3* 340; anti-imperialism of, 49, 68, 223; antitrust laws of, 144—45, 2 5 7 - 58, 260, 270, 315, 324; assess­ ment of post-Qavam political situation by, 244—45; attitude tow ard Shah’s au­ tocratic rule, 5 1 ; and boycott of oil technicians, 149; and breaking of Iranian-British diplomatic relations, 255, 256; British attem pts to gain sup­ port from, 87—8 9 ,1 4 1 -4 2 ,1 9 8 —99, 2 8 5 -8 6 ; and British draft United N a­ tions resolution, 1 6 9 -7 0 ,1 7 3 ,1 8 0 , 182; and British proposed terms for ar­ bitration, 248, 2 4 9 ,2 5 4 ,2 5 8 ,2 6 4 ;and British response to N ationalization Act, 83—84; change in adm inistration in, 259, 2 7 6 -7 8 ; considers economic assis­ tance to M ossadeq’s government, 190— 91, 203, 245, 251, 252, 2 9 0 -9 1 ; con­ siders loan to Iran, 66—6 7 ,6 9 ,1 9 0 , 19 9 -2 0 0 , 257, 261; and consortium agreement, 330; and consortium nego­ tiations, 3 1 7 -1 8 , 321, 323, 328; and consortium proposals, 286—87, 3 11* 312, 315, 316, 317; cost of coup to, 3 0 8 -9 ; criticism of British prenational­ ization policy by, 65—6 9 ,7 1 ,7 6 ; denies aid to Shah, 6 0 -6 1 ; differences with British policy in Iran, 100—103, 254, 2 5 8 - 59, 2 8 7 -8 8 ; draft agreements prepared by, 262—66; economic assis­ tance to Zahedi, 310; and failed coup attem pt, 3 0 3 -4 ; incitement of mobs by, 304—6, 3 0 7 -8 ; and joint TrumanChurchill message, 250—52; on legality of nationalization, 112; long-term in­ terests of, 336—37, 343; M ossadeq’s discussions in, 1 7 4 ,1 8 3 —8 6 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 1 92; M ossadeq’s faith in, 124, 283—84, 338; and M ossadeq’s sentence, 335;

Index objectives in Iran, 9 8 ,1 0 0 —1 0 1 ,1 0 5 6 ,1 4 5 ; offer to Amini brothers, 298; and oil em bargo, 1 4 7 ,148, 2 6 9 -7 0 ; opposes British-Soviet partition of Iran, 47—48; opposes British use of force, 1 2 5 ,1 5 6 ,1 5 8 - 5 9 ,1 6 1 - 6 2 ,1 6 6 ; op­ position to British tutelage by, 24; and planning for coup, 283, 2 9 2 -9 4 , 2 9 6 97, *99; press attacks on, 227; pressure on British to negotiate, 1 1 3 -1 4 ; and Q avam ’s selection as prime minister, 241, 242; and Razm ara, 62, 63; re­ cruits Iranian support for coup, 300— 302, 306—7; response to British schemes to overthrow M ossadeq, 2 2 3 24, 2 3 1 -3 3 ; response to M ossadeq’s settlement proposals, 151 ; response to N ationalization Act, 85—87; and re­ vised draft agreements, 280—85; and Russian-Fersian Friendship Treaty Agreement, 26; and Soviet occupation of Iran, 46—48; support for M ossadeq by, 11 5 ,1 8 9 ,1 9 1 , 2 4 4 -4 6 , 2 4 8 -4 9 ; support for nationalism by, 4 9 ,7 4 —75, 98, 223; unilateral negotiations with Iran, 259—66; w arning to G reat Brit­ ain, 258—59; and World Bank pro­ posals, 200—202, 204, 205; in World C ourt, 213; during World War II, 43. See also Central Intelligence Agency; H arrim an mission Varasteh, M . A., 115, 3600.19 Venezuela, 6 7 ,6 8 ,1 1 4 —15 Victoria, Queen (Great Britain), 2 Walden, Jerald, 331 W aldock, C. H. M ., 209 Walters, Vernon, 1 2 7 ,1 2 9 ,1 8 5 “War Com m ittee,” 13—14 W ame, W illiam, 190—91, 3680.26 Wheeler, Geoffrey, 219, 226 Wilber, D onald, 293, 297, 299, 3800.22

413

Wiley, John, 6 0 ,6 2 W illiams, Sir H erbert, 188 Wilson, Arnold, 11—12 W ilson, Charles, 276, 299 Wisner, Frank, 296 Wolff, Henry D rum m ond, 3, 6 W oodhouse, Christopher, 219, 227, 3 3 8 ; schemes to remove M ossadeq, 292—93 World Bank: American proposals to, 200—202; as British tool, 202—6, 261; M ossadeq’s response to proposal from, 1 9 7 -9 8 , 204—5, 2.06-7; proposal to Iran, 1 9 1 ,194” 97> i9 9 World C ourt. See International C ourt of Justice World War 1, 1 5 ,1 6 World War II, 40—4 1 ,4 2 —4 3 ,9 8 , 216— i 7 j

3 ° 9 >3 *3 >3 5 i n -59

W right, Sir Denis, 314—15, 320, 326 W right, Sir Michael, 62—6 3 ,6 8 Young, M . Y., 34 Zaehner, Robin, 216, 219, 220, 227, 235, 292 Zahedi, Ardeshir, 308 Zahedi, Fazlollah, 128, 240, 256, 294, 305; and assassination of Afshartus, 298—99; and Bakhtiari revolt, 295; British support for, 244, 255, 292, 297; economic assistance to, 310; and failed coup attem pt, 302, 303; and M ossa­ deq’s trial, 332, 335; and plans for coup, 296, 299, 301, 302; rejects for­ eign control of oil, 312; and resum ption of relations w ith G reat Britain, 314; Shah’s attitude tow ard, 298, 314—15, 322; take-over by, 308; World War II kidnapping of, 42—43, 216—17, 309, 313,

35in.59

Zia, Seyyed. See Tabatabai, Seyyed Zia ed-Din

4

Oil, Power, and Principle was composed in 10.5 /1 3 Sabon with Futura display by Keystone Typesetting, Inc., Orwigsburg, Pennsylvania; printed and bound over binder’s boards in ICG Arrestox by Braun-Brumfield, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan; w ith dust jackets printed in 2 colors by Braun-Brumfield, Inc.; designed by Kachergis Book Design, Pittsboro, N orth Carolina; and published by Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N ew York 13244-5160.

Contemporary Issues in the Middle East T h is w e ll-e s ta b lish e d series c o n tin u e s to fo c u s p rim a rily o n tw e n tie th cen tu ry d e v e lo p m e n ts th a t h a v e cu rren t im p a c t a n d sig n ific a n c e th r o u g h o u t th e en tire r e g io n , fro m N o r th A frica to th e b o rd ers o f C en tra l A sia . R ece n t title s in th e series in clu d e:

The A ra b -lsra e li D ile m m a . 3rd ed . Fred J. K h ou ri The C o m m u n ist M o v e m e n t in E g y p t, 1 9 2 0 —1 9 8 8 . T areq Y. Ism ael a n d R ifa ’a t E l-Sa’id

E g yp t's O th e r W ars: E p id e m ic s a n d the P o litics o f P u blic H ea lth . N a n c y E liza b eth G a lla g h e r

F am ily in C o n te m p o ra ry E g y p t. A n d rea B. R u g h H y d r o p o litic s o f the N ile Valley. J o h n W aterb u ry Islam a n d P olitics. 3rd ed . J o h n E sp o sito L a w o f D esire: T em p o ra ry M a rria g e in S h i’i Iran. S h a h la H a e r i The M id d le E a st fro m the Ira n -C o n tra A ffa ir to the In tifa d a . R o b e r t O . F reed m a n , ed .

The P rison Papers o f B o z o r g A la vi. D o n n é R a ffa t The R u sh d ie File. L isa A p p ig n a n e si a n d Sara M a itla n d , e d s. The S eco n d M essa g e o f Islam . M a h m o u d M o h a m m e d T aha; A b d u lla h i A h m e d A n -N a ’im , tra n s.

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