Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation Regimes : Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation Regimes [1 ed.] 9781614704485, 9781607411796

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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

NON-PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL SERIES

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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES

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NON-PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL SERIES

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Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles, and Actions for Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regimes Jorge Morales Pedraza 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-179-6

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

NON-PROLIFERATION, DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL SERIES

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

JORGE MORALES PEDRAZA

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Copyright © 2009 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Pedraza, Jorge Morales. Nuclear disarmament : concepts, principles, and actions for strengthening the non-proliferation regimes / Jorge Morales Pedraza. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN H%RRN 1. Nuclear disarmament. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation. I. Title. JZ5675.P44 2009 327.1'747--dc22 2009014710

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Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

CONTENTS Prologue

vii

Acknowledgment

xv

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Introduction

xvii

Chapter I

General Overview Arms Control and Disarmament Measures Pillars to Stop the Spread of Weapons and Arms Stockpiles

Chapter II

Current International Political Situation First Phase Second Phase Third Phase

19 22 23 23

Chapter III

Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Conventional Weapons Weapons of Mass Destruction

29 29

Chapter IV

Additional Concepts and Definitions Disarmament and Arms Control Security Defense and Collective Security Military Strategy Military Doctrines Structure of the Armed Forces

61 61 62 63 64 65 65

Chapter V

The Nonproliferation Regimes and its Main Components Components of the Nonproliferation Regime A. The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Regime and the NPT B. The Nonproliferation of Chemical Weapons Regime and the OPCW C. The Nonproliferation of the Biological Weapons Regime D. The Nonproliferation of Certain Types of Conventional Weapons Regime E. The Nonproliferation on Missile Technology Regime

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

1 1 3

67 67 68 103 110 127 130

vi

Contents

Chapter VI

Confidence Building and Verification Measures Confidence Building Measures

135 135

Chapter VII

Principles

151

Chapter VIII

Actions

159

Chapter IX

Plan for the Safe Destruction of all Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities: Principles and Elements to be Considered Main Principles

201 202

Some Elements for the Elaboration of a Convention on the Destruction of all Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon Production Facilities Preamble

211 213

Conclusions

255

Chapter X

Chapter XI Annexes

257

Annex 1

Information on the CWC Implementation

259

Annex 2

Information on the Chemical Substances Controlled by the CWC Schedule 1 Schedule 2 Schedule 3

261 261 261 261

Annex 3

Critical Biological Agent’s Categories for Public Health Preparedness

263

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References

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

265

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PROLOGUE The purpose of this book is to present a group of proposals, which could help to find definitive solutions to the current problems that the international community is facing in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control at multilateral level. These problems are affecting very seriously international peace, security, and stability and could provoke more wars and tensions between countries. Consequently, increasing injury, death,, and destruction in the future. A majority of the proposals included in this book have been prepared on the basis of a multifaceted analysis of the current international political situation, which is affecting almost all states, particularly those without a relevant military and economic power. Some of these proposals are new, while others have been carefully selected after studying different proposals. These proposals have been included in other documents prepared by specific states, groups of states, international organizations, and national and international experts in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control within and outside the United Nations system. The adoption of the ostensible “preventive wars” by the U.S. and by a select group of powerful military countries, in order to protect their territories and territorial waters from a military aggression, could be carried out by another state or group of states. In my view, this scenario could happen in reality in the fight against terrorist activities in other countries. The implementation of this policy has created a new international situation that is now directly affecting two specific countries; however is also indirectly affecting other countries and could affect several others in the coming years.1 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involving several countries and one military alliance2 are clearly examples of the implementation of the above-mentioned policy. The war in Iraq is carried by the U.S., with the support of several other countries, but without the explicit approval of the UN Security Council. This is creating a dangerous situation for international peace, security, and stability—while eroding the credibility of the UN. The U.S., with the support of NATO, invaded Afghanistan, and is now carrying out the so-called “pacification of the country and the destruction of all Taliban’s irregular forces.” However, the U.S. and NATO are very far from reaching this objective. The significant increase in military trade in the last ten years has augmented the military expenditures of many countries. Consequently, this has led to the unnecessary accumulation of weapons in several countries, the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands 1 Iran, The Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Syria, among others can be included in the list. 2 The North America Transatlantic Organization, NATO, in the case of Afghanistan. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

of eight or nine countries, and the continuation of several military conflicts at regional and national levels that are, among other things—dangerous. All of these “state of affairs” are symptoms of the fragile international situation the world has entered. This can be said without the fear of being mistaken that the world is now living in a state of wars in which many countries are involved in one way or another, forcing them to consume the limited resources they have to support their economic and social development. This book has been structured in such a way that all essential elements that need to be known, understood, or considered during the elaboration of a national, regional, and international policy and strategy3 in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control by any state or international organization, have been incorporated in different chapters and annexes. Chapter I - Chapter I contains a general overview of the current political international situation, characterized by the existence of nuclear, chemical and possible biological weapons5 in the hands of a limited group of countries, and by the existence of millions of conventional weapons in the military arsenals of all States. Information on the world military trade and how this unproductive trade increased from U.S. $ 762,000 million in 1998 to US$ 1,339,000 million in 2007, an increase of 175.7% in only ten years, are included in this chapter. Chapter I contains also the latest information regarding the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the status of the negotiations of the International Agreement on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Nuclear Explosive Devices (Cut-off Treaty) within the Conference on Disarmament (CD),6 the problems affecting the process of strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament at multilateral level, among others relevant issues essential for the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. The information included in this chapter will allow different readers to understand better the fragility of the current international political situation and the need to adopt, immediately , concrete actions to reverse this situation before it could be too late. Chapter II - In this chapter a brief description of the current political international situation is described in detail. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary

3

If necessary, a Action Plan to be implemented by interested countries could be also prepared and included in the mentioned policy and strategy. 5 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) already in force, prohibit the possession of biological weapons in all of its sStatesStatesStates parties. However, the BWC is not yet a universal international instrument and does not possess a verification mechanism that can confirm the absence of biological weapons or biological offensive military programs in all of its StatesStatesStates parties. 6 The Conference on Disarmament is the international organization in charge of the multilateral negotiations of treaties and agreements in the field of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. The CD has sixty-six members.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Prologue

ix

information to different readers as to the reasons why specific actions to be adopted and implemented by the international community. The main objective to be achieved with the elaboration of a national, regional, and international policy and strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control is to provide, to interested countries, with the adequate tools to participate actively in future negotiations of treaties and agreements in these fields and to identify very clearly, which are the issues that reflects better their national interest in defense and security matters and which are not during the negotiation process. One of the important elements included in this chapter is a proposal to break the current deadlock within the CD that is not only damaging the credibility and effectiveness of this important international forum, but affecting international peace and security as well. In addition, chapter contains a proposal on the different phases in which the process of the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly how nuclear weapons should be divided, in order to ensure the maximum security for all countries involved. Chapter III - Chapter III includes a brief description related to specific nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In my opinion, it is indispensable to know the main characteristics of the different types of weapons that are now in the military arsenals of all States , particularly WMD, their possible military use and the destructive power of these weapons, in order to understand better why it is so important to have a strong and effective nonproliferation regimes and to achieve, as soon as possible, not only nuclear disarmament but general and complete disarmament as well. One of the most important elements included in this chapter is the identification of the specific phases in how the process of nuclear disarmament should be divided, and the order of destruction of all types of weapons in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regimes and later on to achieve general and complete disarmament in a concrete period. This is the reason why chapter III includes brief information of the different types of WMD in the military arsenals of the main military powers, in addition to the types of conventional weapons considered by the international community as eminently offensive. A comparison between the military advantages and disadvantages in the use of these weapons in a military conflict is also included in this chapter. Chapter IV - This chapter contains a group of specific concepts and definitions in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control that need to be understood by different readers, in order to appreciate better the different proposals included in other chapters, particularly in the case of readers not very familiar with the work of the United Nations in the above-mentioned fields. For those readers that are familiar with the work of the United Nations in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, the study of chapter III could not be necessary. Chapter V - This is one of the most relevant chapters of the book. Five nonproliferation regimes are described in this chapter. In each description, the necessary information to understand the scope, structure, contents, and role to preserve international peace and security, as well as other relevant information on these regimes are included in this chapter. The Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), CTBT, BWC, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the Hague Code of

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Conduct), Australia Group, Zangger Committee, Wassenaar Agreement, and the London Club, among others regimes and groups are briefly describe in this chapter. In addition, it includes various proposals to stop the further deterioration of the NPT and of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and how to avoid the possible future collapse of these important international instruments for international peace, security, and stability. Another important topic included in this chapter is the preparation of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Several proposals are to be implemented after the conclusion of this conference and various others before the beginning of the next conference are to be presented for the consideration to the international community. Another important problem that is analyzed in chapter V is the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and how this situation can be reverted, if appropriate actions are adopted by the international community based on the different proposals included in Chapter VIII. The situation regarding the current implementation of the CWC is briefly discussed in this chapter. Particularly, the main outcome of the destruction process of all chemical weapons and their production facilities, and the possibility that the destruction process could not conclude by 2012 as foreseen in the Convention (due to the current slow trend in the destruction process). The difficulties to strengthen the BWC and its review process, chiefly the introduction of a verification mechanism, along with the outcome of the work carried out by the Australia Group, Zangger Committee, and Wassenaar Agreement, among others, are also briefly described in this chapter. Chapter VI - Before the adoption of new international instruments in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, it is indispensable to consider first first the adoption of a group of specific Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in order to increase trust and transparency in military matters among States. These measures should have, as its main objectives, not only to reduce tensions among States but to create the necessary conditions to allow the international community to move forward in its goals to achieve, as soon as possible nuclear disarmament, a reduction of the excessive accumulation of certain conventional weapons in some States and unstable regions, and a decrease in the level of military expenditures in all States—mainly those with the most powerful military machinery in the world. The importance of understanding the concept of verification and the need to adopt a concrete verification mechanism to verify how State parties of a specific treaty and agreement are observing all of its provisions, particularly in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control, are clearly explained in this chapter. Chapter VII - This is an important chapter in this book, It contains a nonexhaustive list of principles that should be taken into consideration during the preparation of a national, regional and international policy strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control by any States, or by any international organization dealing with these subjects. These principles are classified in four different groups: nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional principles. All principles included in this chapter were used as references for the identification of specific actions that need to be executed in order to move forward with nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues at multilateral level. These actions are included in chapter VIII.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Prologue

xi

Chapter VIII - Chapter VIII is the most relevant chapter of the book. It includes a group of specific actions that should be considered, adopted, and later, implemented in the framework of the execution of a national, regional, and international policy and strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control by interested States and by the competent authorities in relevant international organizations dealing with these subjects. Some of these actions are new; while others have been redrafted; and others have been copied, as they were included in other documents. The main objectives to be achieved by the implementation of these actions are, among others, the following:

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a) The destruction of all WMDs, particularly nuclear weapons, as soon as possible. b) The strengthening of the nonproliferation regimes—specifically nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and missiles technology nonproliferation regimes. c) The reduction of the possibilities to initiate unilateral preventive wars against other States, through the reduction of certain offensive conventional weapons and of the resources allocated to support military offensive activities in all States, but particularly in the most powerful States from the point of view of the military. Certainly without a doubt, if the majority of these actions are implemented, then nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional, and missile technology, nonproliferation and disarmament issues could move forwards at multilateral level, increasing international peace, security, and stability. Chapter IX - This chapter includes a collection of principles and elements that should be considered during the elaboration of a plan for the safe destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon facilities. The adoption of this plan is an indispensable step in the process of nuclear disarmament associated with the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. To be effective, the principles and elements included in this chapter should be adopted by all nuclear weapon States before the beginning of the negotiations of a plan for the safe destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons production facilities. However, if the proposal contained in chapter X related with the adoption of a new international instrument to achieve nuclear disarmament is accepted by the international community, then the principles and elements included in chapter IX should be taken into account during the discussion of this proposal. The verification mechanism associated with the proposed Convention should be prepared; thus, taking into account the main principles and elements included in chapter IX. Chapter X - This is an interesting proposal that should be considered, in due time, by interested NPT non-nuclear weapon sState parties during a future NPT Review Conference, or in any other pertinent forum, as an alternative or as a complement to the NPT. Why this proposal? The proposal to adopt a new international instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament should be considered when the international community is aware of the impossibility of implementing Article VI of the NPT. After thirty-eight years of trying to implement Article VI without success, several non-nuclear weapon States have the opinion that this Article will not be implemented by the majority of nuclear weapon States under the NPT.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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The proposed Convention could be presented by the same group of non-nuclear weapon States to the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly, the CD, or to any appropriate international forum, even knowing that nuclear weapon States will be strongly against this proposal. I have no doubt that the proposed Convention will be rejected by all or by almost all nuclear weapon States, unless they fear that their rejection of the proposed Convention and the lack of results in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT could force several nonnuclear weapon States to withdraw from this treaty in the future. This action could be considered as an extreme measure in order to chance, definitively, the current position adopted by a group of nuclear weapon States that are against nuclear disarmament at a multilateral level. The full text of Convention for the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities has been included in this chapter. The purpose of this Convention contains the following: a) 24 Articles. b) Verification Annex.7

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Two alternatives regarding the international organization that could be designated to supervise the implementation of the Convention’s provisions are included in Article VIII. In one of the alternatives, the IAEA assume this role. In the other, a new international organization is proposed to be established for this purpose. Chapter XI - When completing this book, you will understand the following main conclusions: 1. The international community is ready to force the destruction of all WMDs still in the hands of certain Statesss, particularly nuclear weapons in a concrete period. 2. To promote an important reduction of certain conventional weapons considered as eminently offensive by the international community in the coming years. 3. The support of a significant reduction of military expenditures in all States. 4. Increase the resources to fight against hunger, communicable diseases, poverty, lack of education and jobs, a possible energy crisis, climate change, and to adopt any other measures to increase trust and transparency in military matters among Statesss, independently of political, economic, and other considerations 5. Preparedness to face new wars and military conflicts in sensitive areas and unstable regions, and the destruction of more human lives and properties. 6. To combat the unproductive use of important resources that are urgently needed to support economic and social development in several Statess, without excluding the possibility of the complete destruction of the humankind. These “conclusions” that are listed should not be taken in a nonchalant manner—the choice is clear and ours to make for the survival of humankind and our planet.

7 The Verification Annex is also available. This Annex has seventy-three pages and is not included in chapter X due only to space limitation. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Prologue

xiii

The main conclusion that can be reached after reading the book is the following: or the international community is ready to force the destruction of all WMD still in the hands of certain States, particularly nuclear weapons in a concrete period; to promote an important reduction of certain conventional weapons considered as eminently offensives by the international community in the coming years; to support a significant reduction of military expenditures in all States in order to increase the resources to fight against hunger, communicable diseases, poverty, lack of education and jobs, energy crisis, climate change and to adopt any other measures to increase trust and transparency in military matters among States, independently of political, economic and other considerations, or should be ready to face new wars and military conflicts in sensitive areas and unstable regions, the destruction of more human lives and properties, the unproductive use of important resources that are urgently needed to support economic and social development in several States, without excluding the possibility of the complete destruction of the humankind. The choice is clear. Annexes - This book contains the following three Annexes:

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1. Annex 1. Information on the CWC implementation. 2. Annex 2. Information on the chemical substances controlled by the CWC. 3. Annex 3. Critical biological agent’s categories for public health preparedness. I have no doubt that if the majority of actions included in chapter VIII are adopted and implemented by the international community, then the process of strengthening the nonproliferation regimes at multilateral level will move forward. Therefore, nuclear disarmament could be reached within a reasonable period of time and international peace, security, and stability will be reinforced. If, on the contrary, the majority of these actions are again ignored by some States, particularly States possessing nuclear weapons as they did in the past, then the possibilities of a future collapse of the NPT and of the nuclear nonproliferation regimes associated with it will increase considerably. Certainly this situation will have a negative impact on international peace, security, and stability for all States.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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I would like to say some words about the role of my family in this important period of my professional life. The book is a reality thanks to the valuable support of my lovely wife, Aurora Tamara Meoqui Puig; she assumed other family responsibilities in order to give me the indispensable time to work in the preparation of this book. My lovely daughter, MSc. Lisette Morales Meoqui, has been an extremely helpful assistant in collecting the necessary information and reference documents used by me in the preparation of this book, despite her own doctoral studies on economics and her work on her thesis. My son, MSc. Jorge Morales Meoqui, is also involved in doctoral studies on economics, but still found the time to provide me with important assistance in the preparation of the final version of the book. I always will be grateful to my two children, the capable professionals that they are, and for the time they spent in helping me prepare my book.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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INTRODUCTION The preparation of a book is always a great challenge for any author, no matter how deep is his or her personal experience and professional knowledge in the selected field. Nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues are of extreme importance for the international community, particularly for maintaining international peace, security, and stability. In the twentieth century, two world wars were fought in which an important number of countries from almost all regions were involved. These two wars alone completely destroyed several countries, and caused billions of in damage to most of Europe and the South Pacific. However, there are no exact figures on the lives lost, money spent, or property destroyed, we do know that these two wars, combined, killed more people, destroyed more property, disrupted more lives, and probably had more far reaching consequences than any other wars in history.Other conflicts, like the Korean Conflict and Vietnam War, just to mention two of the most deadly wars, occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, caused similar levels of material destruction and loss of human lives. All types of weapons, nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons, were used in these wars. The discovering of nuclear energy and its use in military conflicts changes the character and the outcome of a war. Now, some countries have in their military arsenals the types of weapons that can destroy the whole of humankind, not once, but several times, if they wish. Conversely, this type of energy can be used for several peaceful purposes, mainly for producing electricity. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, several hundred nuclear power plants were built in different countries, mainly in Europe, Asia, and North America, generating up to 17% of the world electricity. Two big accidents ocurred, one at the Three Miles Island Nuclear Power Plant in the U.S., and the other at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukraine. These two nuclear castrophes halted the construction of new power plants in several countries and reinforced the public opinion and concern about the use of this type of energy for generating electricity. Due to the increase in the price of oil, particularly during 2007 and 2008, the reduction of oil reserves in some important exporter countries, the climate changes, and the use of nuclear energy for producing electricity is once again increasingly drawing the attention of politicians and energy experts as a real alternative to the current energy crisis. But the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation is not risk-free. The use of nuclear materials and facilities for electricity generation could be also used, in some specific installations, for the production of the necessary fissile materials for nuclear bombs, which is the most deadly type of weapons produced thus far by human beings.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

This book is the direct result of twenty-eight years of diplomatic activities carried out by myself in the fields of nuclear, chemical and biological, nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, as well as in different activities related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As ambassador and permanent resident of my country to the IAEA during the 1980s, I had the opportunity to participate in several international conferences and expert meetings, in which the role of nuclear energy for economic development and the impact of the use of this type of energy for peaceful and military purpose alike were discussed in detail. The lesson learned was that the use of nuclear energy, including the use of this type of energy for electricity generation, cannot be excluded in any energy and economic development plans in several countries, but the use of this type of energy is not risk-free. For this reason, the international control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be an indispensable condition to be observed by all countries that wish to use this type of energy for its economic and social development. At the beginning of the 1990s, I was appointed as Special Adviser and Ambassador for Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control and Head of the Disarmament Office and Chairman of the Disarmament and Arms Control Interagency Committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my country. During this period, I had the opportunity to participate in several international conferences and expert meetings organized by the United Nations, and by specific countries, in with nuclear, chemical and biological, and conventional nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues were discussed. What did I learn during this period? I learned that if the international community’s wish to have a world without wars, then it has to have no other alternative that to adopt drastic measures with the purpose to stop: (1)the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; (2) to start nuclear disarmament negotiations at multilateral level without further delay; (3) to continue the process of chemical disarmament initiated in 1997, making all necessary efforts to destroy all chemical weapons by 2012 at the latest; (4) to continue prohibiting the possession and use of biological weapons initiated in 1972, making all necessary efforts to reach an agreement in the adoption of a verification mechanism to strengthen this Convention and in order to confirm the closure of all biological offensive military programs in all of its State parties; and (5) begin the reduction of certain conventional weapons classified as eminently offensive at multilateral level, as well as the reduction of military expenditures, increase the transparency on military matters, among other important measures in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control. In the 1990s, I prepared several proposals on theses issues that were included in an article titled “Disarmament after Bipolarism: A Programme for the 1990s,” published by the United Nations in the Disarmament Journal 17,No 2, 1994. Some of these proposals are still valid today. Some others have been already adopted. As ambassador and permanent resident of my country to the OPCW Preparatory Commission, and particularly in my responsibility as Chairman of Working Group A of the Preparatory Commission and its Expert Group of Program and Budget, I had the opportunity to participate, quite actively, in the constitution of the OPCW, and in the preparation of the international conditions to implement the CWC. During this period, I increased my knowledge and experience in a group of relevant issues associated with the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities and understand better how the verification of this process should be carried out, the role of the national competent authorities in the inspected States, and the right and obligations

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Introduction

xix

of the international inspectors, among other important matters. The supervision of the peaceful use of some chemical substances and facilities provide me the necessary knowledge and experience on the importance of this process for creating trust and transparency among States parties of the CWC. My work as Senior Manager in the IAEA Secretariat during the 1990s and 2000s, allowed me to complete my experience and personal knowledge related with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A regional program for the promotion of the cooperation among Latin American countries in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in addition to several other technical cooperation projects at regional and international levels, increased my experience in the use of this type of energy for economic and social development for many countries. The preparation of more than eighty technical documents on several areas related to the use of nuclear energy for economic and social development was of great importance to me from a professional point of view. As a result of this work, in the second part of 2000s I had the opportunity to prepare several articles and chapters of books on different subjects related with nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, as well as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in different economic sectors. More articles are waiting to be published in 2009. The activities mentioned above were carried out under different responsibilities that allowed me to better understand how important it is to find adequate multilateral solutions to problems that the international community is now facing, which are putting in danger international peace, security and stability, and the survival of the humankind. With this book, I have the intention not only to share my own experience with other diplomats, politicians, academics, military, experts in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, but to present possible multilateral solutions to a group of problems now affecting international peace, security, and stability. I have the hope that this book could become an important tool and reference for the preparation of national, regional, and international policies and strategies in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control in a group of interested States and relevant international organizations. The different content of the book could be used as a reference in diplomatic academies, pre- and post-graduate studies in the field of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, and for the United Nations institutions dealing with these issues. The main concepts, principles, and actions included in this book will be used in the preparation of a second book that will deal with the reform of the United Nations and its specialized international organizations and with the indispensable modification of some of the main treaties and agreements in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control already in force or for the preparation of new treaties and agreements in the above-mentioned fields.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Chapter I

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GENERAL OVERVIEW The current international political situation is considered by many politicians, diplomatic, and military and civilian experts as unstable, insecure, and dangerous. It is characterized, among other things, by the adoption of unilateral actions by the U.S. and others powerful countries from the economic and military point of view, with the purpose to impose their political will on the rest of the world. The U.S. creates the excuse, through the implementation of an alleged policy, a war against terrorism; ignoring even international laws, and the will of the international community. Due to the dangerous and explosive situation described above, the majority of States have no other choice if they want to feel protected from the aggressiveness of the most powerful countries. Consequently, countries must prepare militarily and economically, than to organize and adopt the most comprehensive and effective national, regional, international policy, and strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, in order to reflect their security and defense interests and policies. The elaboration of the above-mentioned policy and strategy is, without any doubt, a complex and versatile task that require the active participation of politicians, diplomats, academics, civilian, and military experts, whom posess great experience in military matters.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES Two important concepts in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control need to be clearly understood by any person involved in the consideration of these subjects. These concepts are 1) Arms control; and 1) Disarmament8. According to the definition of arms control included in Reference 32, “arms control measures place political or legal constraints on the deployment and/or disposition of national military means.” Their main aims is to reduce the risk of inadvertent war and improving the capacity of adversaries to formulate more accurate assessment of each other’s intentions and by restricting their range of available military options. “Disarmament measures seek to reduce the level of national military capabilities or to ban altogether certain categories of weapons already deployed.” 8 Other important concepts are the following: security, defense, military strategies, , military doctrines, and structures of the armed forces. Chapter IV includes brief descriptions of these concepts.

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

The disarmament approach to arms limitations is premised on the assumption that armaments in and of themselves are the main source of tension and war. What is foremost is “to preclude or at least to reduce the likelihood of military conflicts by depriving parties, in full or in part, of their military capabilities” [32, pp 7 and 8]. . The international community has been trying to outlaw different types of weapons, particularly WMD, in addition to certain conventional weapons that can cause enormous damage and unnecessary suffering with mixed results. “Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction” [37, pp 22]. The possibility that the international community promotes the destruction of complete types of weapons through the adoption of a treaty or agreement can be, in some specific cases, a realistic option that should be explored. The CWC is an example of a disarmament measure adopted by the international community through a specific treaty that outlawed a complete type of WMD (chemical weapons). In others, the adoption of nonproliferation and arms control measures under a specific treaty is a more realistic option in this particular situation. The NPT is an example of a nonproliferation measure adopted under specific situation by the international community through a specific treaty, in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, in some specific cases the adoption of nonproliferation and arms control measures should be used for the creation of the minimum trust and transparency among States, with the purpose to adopt specific disarmament measures in the future. The preparation of any national policy and strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control should take into account the political and military capabilities and will of a given country. The policy and strategy adopted should be used as reference during the negotiations of any new nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control treaty and agreement in these fields at all levels. The following are the main elements that should be considered during the preparation of a national policy and strategy: a) The security and defense interest of the country. b) The direct threats that the country is facing, or could be facing in the future. c) The possibilities and capabilities of the country to respond to different real or potential threats. d) The international situation in which the country could be involved. e) The regional or subregional conflicts and tensions in which a specific country could be involved. f) The need to strengthen the current nonproliferation regimes in order to ensure the complete elimination of all WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, as well as certain types of conventional weapons; to impede the production of new WMD; to impede the use or the threat with the use of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons against any other States; and to ensure that these types of weapons cannot falls in the hands of terrorist groups.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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g) The need to reduce, in a gradual manner, the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons with a clear offensive character in all States, particularly in the case of the most powerful States from the military point of view. h) The importance to reduce in time of peace, the number of military active units within the military forces of all States, beginning with the most powerful countries from the military point of view. i) The necessity to reduce the military budgets of all States, beginning with the most powerful States from the military point of view, in order to use the liberalized resources for economic and social development of the country itself, as well as for the support of the economic and social development of other States as well, under a fruitful international, regional, or bilateral cooperation. j) The importance to adopt by all States of a defensive military doctrine, in which the use of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, is explicitly prohibited under any circumstance, as well as the use of military force to solve bilateral dispute. k) The unilateral actions promoted by the U.S. and supported by other countries in the framework of the international fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. These actions are already affecting a group of countries from the political, military, and economic point of view and are creating, a very dangerous situation for other countries.

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l)

The necessity to support an international campaign to fight illicit trafficking of nuclear material, chemical and biological agents, and substances subject to international control, as well as of the corresponding equipment and technology sensitive from the proliferation point of view. m) The elimination of all illegal trade of conventional weapons, particularly small and light weapons at national, regional, and international levels. n) The elimination of money laundering. o) The crisis of confidence that the United Nations, the Security Council and other international organizations are now facing, due to the unilateral policy adopted by the U.S. and other powerful military and economic sStates in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control.

PILLARS TO STOP THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND ARMS STOCKPILES Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, the goal of containing the spread and growth of weapons and arms stockpiles has rested on the following three pillars: • • •

Norms Treaties Coercion

“One of the most powerful norms has been the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. Norms, not deterrence, have anathematized the use of nuclear weapons as unacceptable, Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

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immoral and possibly illegal under any circumstance — even for States that have assimilated them into military arsenals and integrated them into military commands and doctrines. Respect for this norm is evident in the fact that there have been many occasions since 1945 when nuclear weapons could have been used without fear of retaliation but were not, even at the price of defeat on the battlefield”[12, pp 17]. After the World War II several treaties and agreements in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control were adopted within the United Nations. This treaty has two main objectives: 1) to promote the exclusive peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its non-nuclear weapon States parties; and 2) the elimination of all nuclear weapons by its nuclear weapon States parties, but without any specific reference to when this process should start and end and how should be carried out. In the field of WMD the following treaties, among others, were adopted:

a) The Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). b) Several treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones in different regions of the world. c) The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which prohibit nuclear test on the ground, in the air and underwater. d) The CTBT, which was opening for signature on September 24, 1996, but has not yet entry into force, banning all nuclear tests in all of its State parties. e) The CWC, which oblige to the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities by its States States parties in specify period (between 1997 and 2012). f) The BWC, which oblige to the destruction of all biological weapons, but without a mechanism to verify if its State parties fulfilled or are fulfilling their commitments and obligations assumed under the BWC, and that there are no biological offensive military programs in any of these States. It is extremely important to understand that noncompliance with any treaty obligations by its States parties weakens the efficacy of the norm established by this international instrument. It defies history, common sense, and logic to believe that a group of countries, independently of their economic and military powers, can maintain a permanent monopoly on any class of weaponry, particularly when they have made promise after promise to disarmament, while others are not allowed the possession of such types of weapons for the same purpose. The international community is aware that arms control and disarmament agreements are negotiated outcomes among governments, with many compromises and negotiations over a protracted period of time. The international community is also well aware that “negotiation entails difficult technical and political judgments on reciprocity, mutuality and relative balance. Negotiators tend to exaggerate their own calculus of the balance of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, while downplaying that of their opponents. Arms control negotiations can also become hostage to cross-issue linkages and domestic political battles. Often, the attainment of arms control treaties flounders on the insistence of each country on its maximum preferred goal as its minimum irreducible position. By definition, a negotiated international treaty entails

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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compromises and accommodation of one another’s interests. Convinced of the moral rectitude of its principled position, a self-righteous country can wreck the prospect of a multilateral treaty”[12, pp 26.] This book has been prepared with the hope that it can serve as reference to politicians, military and civilian experts, as well as to diplomats, and academics with and without experience in military matters, during the preparation of a national, regional, and international policy and strategy on nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control. Authorities in charge of international organizations dealing with these subjects could be another target of the book. However, the international community should be aware that any progress in nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control matters depends mostly on the political will of certain powerful States, as well on the position of the majority of the international community, rather than on good and well prepared initiatives and proposals. The purpose to prepare a national, regional, and international policy and strategy in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control by a particular States, or by relevant international organizations should be, among others, the following:

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1. To identify, according with the political and military interest of each States, which are the new international instruments that the international community should discuss and adopt in the future in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control. The main purpose of any new international instrument in the abovementioned fields to be adopted by the international community in the future, should be to preserve international peace, security and stability, by prohibiting the possession of specific type of weapons and by enhance trust and transparency in military matters. During the identification of which are these international instruments, it is important to take into consideration the problem or problems to be solved, the scope, objectives, participants, impact and other characteristics associated with these new instruments. 2. To define the position of a country and, when relevant, of an international organization, in the consideration of specific issues associated with the elimination of all nuclear weapons, as well as the reduction and, if possible, the elimination of certain types of conventional weapons that normally were and still are used in military conflicts. The elimination, or at least the significant reduction of the possibility that a military conflict can be initiated between countries, or between groups of countries could be achieved, if the following actions are implemented: a) A systematic reduction by all States of their stockpiles in certain types of conventional weapons classified by the international community as eminently offensives.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Jorge Morales Pedraza b) A gradual reduction of the armed forces of all countries to a level that guarantee the security and defense of its territory and territorial waters, without representing, at the same time, a threat to other countries.9 c) A reduction of the resources allocated to support and carried out certain military activities in time of peace. d) The adoption of several CBMs in order to increase trust among countries, particularly among neighboring countries and to enhance transparency in military matters. 3. To define the position of the country, or the relevant international organization, about the necessity to include an effective verification mechanism either in current or in future nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control treaties and agreements.

The purpose to have a verification mechanism associated to a specific nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control treaty or agreement, is to verify compliance with the obligations and commitments assumed by all of its States parties and to detect any possible violations of these obligations and commitments. For this reason, a verification mechanism should be: a) b) c) d) e)

Effective. Technically feasible. Economically viable. Nondiscriminatory. Less intrusive as possible.

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4. To define the position of the country on the establishment of an international organization, when necessary, to supervise the implementation of all treaty and agreement provisions by its State parties, as well as to supervise how these States complies with the commitments and obligations assumed by them. 5. To define the position of the country regarding the role that the United Nations and other specialized organizations should play, in the implementation of current and future international instruments to be adopted in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. 6. To define the position of the country, or of the relevant international organization, regarding the role and activities carried out by different export control groups established outside treaties and agreements already in force in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, with the purpose to clarify if these activities are undermining or not the goal and objectives associated with these international instruments in the preservation of international peace, security, and stability.

9

The level of active military forces in all States should depends on the size of the country, its population, its economic situation and, particularly, if there is a real or potential military threat to be faced by the country immediately or in the future.

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In my opinion it would be important to consider, by the international community, the adoption of new international instruments to cover the activities now carried out by some of these groups. This could be a realistic alternative that should be discussed by interested countries in an exhaustive, impartial, and in a nondiscriminatory manner in the future. In any case, interested States should have the right to become States party of any international instruments or mechanism in force that could be adopted in the future with this purpose either as exporter or recipient country. If this proposal could not be accepted under the current political international situation, then an alternative option could be to open the activities on these groups to all interested States. The tasks and responsibilities assigned to the current export control groups,10 established with a selective character of its memberships, and where the agreements adopted are not taking into account the concern of a important group of countries (some exporter and receiver countries) and are not mandatory for its members, are weakening considerably several nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control treaties and agreements already in force. In my opinion this situation should be changed as quickly as possible in order to increase the impact in the implementation of these international instruments.

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7. To protect legitimates security and defense interest of a States, during the negotiation of future nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control treaties and agreements. It is important to recognize that any new international instrument to be adopted in the future, in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control should exclude measures that limit unilaterally the defense capacity, or jeopardize the security of countries without powerful economic or military capabilities. At the same time, any new international instrument should not be used by the most powerful countries from the military point of view to increase its security without limitations, as well as to keep the monopoly of the possession of certain types of weapons not available to other countries. The NPT is a clear example of a treaty that gave the monopoly of the possession of nuclear weapons to five countries during unlimited time while deny, at the same time, the right to posses these weapons for the same purpose to other countries.

Today’s Global Treats The greatest danger of the Cold War was the confrontation between Moscow and Washington. However, after the conclusion of the Cold War, the greatest global threats have changed. Today theses threats are the following: a) The existence of nuclear weapons and the possible use of these weapons by more States in a military conflict than in the past, particularly by terrorist groups.

10

The main export control groups are the following: a) The Australia Group, compose by thirty-nine members; b) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (also known as the London Club), with forty-five members; c) The Zangger Committee with thirty-five members; d) The Missiles Technology Control Regime, with thirty-four members; and e) The Wassenaar Arrangement for the Export Control of Conventional Weapons and of Related Technologies and other Articles of Dual Uses, now with forty members.

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Jorge Morales Pedraza b) The possible use of chemical and biological weapons by certain States, particularly by terrorist groups. c) Climate changes and its negative impact in the environment. d) Hunger and poverty. e) Communicable diseases. f) Regional conflicts. g) Illegal immigrations. h) Illicit trade of conventional weapons, particularly small and light weapons. i) Drug trafficking. j) Energy crisis. k) The violation of human rights.

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In my opinion, the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of a limited number of States should be considered the greatest global threat to all State. The proliferation of such weapons increases the danger of mistaken and the accidental unauthorized nuclear launch, which could end up in a nuclear war, with devastating consequences to the whole world and not only for the countries directly involved. The possible use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the production and use of certain types of conventional weapons with clear offensive characteristics included in the military arsenals of a limited group of countries represents important threats to several States. If the international community really wants to move forward with nuclear disarmament, in addition to the general and complete disarmament at a multilateral level, then a number of measures should be adopted to reduce to the minimum the mistrust and fear among States. In chapter VI a group of CBMs is included with this purpose.

World Military Trade The end of the Cold War has not brought, as it was expected, a reduction of the world military expenditures, but just the opposite, particularly in the lasts ten years. Instead, it has led to an increase in the resources allocated by the most powerful countries from the economic and military point of view, to solve some of the most danger threats listed above; however, the trends in military expenditures in the last ten years show the contrary. After the end of the Cold War, the world military trade reached, in 1998, the amount of U.S. $ 762,000 million. Two years later this amount reached U.S, $ 800,000 million.11 In 2003, 2006, and 2007 the world military trade reached the amount of U.S. $ 900,000 million, U.S. $ 1,200,000 million and U.S. $ 1,339,000 million respectively. World military trade in 2007 represents a real-terms increase of 6% over 2006 and of 45% since 1998. This corresponds to 2.5% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and $202.00 for each person in the world. The military trade between 1998 and 2007 increased by 175.7%. “The sub-region with the highest increase in military expenditure over the period 19982007 was Eastern Europe, at 162%. It was also the region with the highest increase in 2007, at 15%. Russia, with a 13% increase in 2007, accounted for 86% of this regional increase. Other 11

It is important to stress that this amount could be inclusively higher since the military expenses of several countries, some of which were involved in armed conflicts in this period, were not included.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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sub-regions with 10-year growth rates exceeding 50% are North America (65%), the Middle East (62%), South Asia (57%), Africa and East Asia (both 51%). The sub-regions with the lowest growth in military spending over the past 10 years were Western Europe (6%) and Central America (14%). The U.S.’s military spending accounted for 45% of the world total in 2007, followed by the UK, China, France and Japan, with 4-5% each” [22, pp 10]. The U.S. has by far the largest military expenditure. U.S. military spending is now higher than at any time since World War II. Only in 2005, the U.S. was responsible for half of the world military expenditures, reaching more than a billon of dollars. What does this mean? This means that while the world spent around U.S. $170 per capita in military activities, the U.S. spent around U.S. $1,600 per capita—almost ten times more. In the following figure the evolutions of international trade on military equipment and weapons in the period 1998-2007 are shown. 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

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0

1998

2000

2003

2006

2007

Figure 1. International trade on military equipment and weapons 1998-2007. Note: Figures are in U.S. $ at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates Source: SIPRI 2008

The fifteen countries with the highest military expenditure in 2007 in market exchange rate terms are shown in the following table. The main factors driving increases in world military trade are the following: a) b) c) d) e)

Countries’ foreign policy objectives. Real or perceived threats. Armed conflicts. Strength of the military complex industries. Influence of the armed forces in national policy.

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Table 1. The fifteen countries with the highest military expenditure in 2007.

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Rank

Country

Spending ($ b.)

World share (%)

1

U.S.

547

45

2

UK

59.7

5

3

China

58.3

5

4

France

53.6

4

5

Japan

43.6

4

6

Germany

36.9

3

7

Russia

35.4

3

8

S.Arabia

33.8

3

9

Italy

33.1

3

10

India

24.2

2

11

S. Korea

22.6

2

12

Brazil

15.0

3.1

13

Canada

15.2

1

14

Australia

15.1

1

15

Spain

14.6

1

Note: Figures are in U.S. dollars at constant price (2005) and exchange rates. Sources: SIPRI 2008

Armed Conflicts The number of armed conflicts diminished during the 1990s. But wars and other military conflicts carried out during this period “continued to causes immense sufferings particularly in Africa and Asia.12 Armed conflicts that took place during the 1990s, claimed more than 5 millions lives, most of them civilians, and inflicted hardship on its survivors through injury,

12 Other conflicts occurred in the South of Europe (the Balkan’s region) as a consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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displacement and dispossession. Consequently,“the human and material costs of failing to prevent conflict are harsh and lasting” [34, pp 11]. Many of these people were wounded, or forced to move to other areas, in some cases very far from the original places where these people were living.13 “In 2007, 14 major armed conflicts were active in 13 locations around the world14. Over the past decade the global number of active major armed conflicts has declined over all, but the decline has been very uneven, with major drops in 2002 and 2004 and an increase in 2005. Three of the major armed conflicts in 2007 were not active in 2006 (i.e., had not started or had fewer than 25 battle-related deaths): Peru, the Philippines (Mindanao) and Somalia. Three conflicts in 2006 were no longer active in 2007: Burundi, Sudan and Uganda. Four of the 14 major armed conflicts that were active in 2007 increased in intensity compared to 2006: Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam), Afghanistan, Myanmar (Karen States) and Turkey (Kurdistan). In the latter three, battle-related deaths increased by more than 50%” [24, pp 4]. “Three major armed conflicts were fought between States during the entire period: • • •

1998–2007: Eritrea-Ethiopia 1998-2000). 1998-2003: India-Pakistan. 2003: Iraq versus the U.S. and its allies.

The remaining 30 major armed conflicts recorded for this period were all fought within States” [24, pp 5].

Conflicts in:

Asia Africa Europe Americas Middle East The bar graph shows the total number of conflicts

20

Number of conflicts

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Regional distributions and total number of major armed conflicts, 1998-2007

15

10

5

0

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Source: SIPRI 2008 Figure 2. Regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts 1998-2007. 13 In 2004, the number of military conflicts reached the amount of ninteen all of them intra-States. 14 In Africa: Somalia; In the Americas: Colombia, Peru, and in the U.S.; In Asia: Afghanistan, India (Kashmir), Myanmar (Karen States), Philippines (Mindanao), and Sri Lanka (Tamil Eelam); In Europe: Russia (Chechnya); In the Middle East: Iraq, Israel (Palestinian territories), and Turkey (Kurdistan).

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

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The Control of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons kill by the effects of heat, blast, radiation, and radioactive fallout. “The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki15 killed an estimated 200,000 people, virtually all civilians” [37, pp 32]. Taking into account the destruction and power of nuclear weapons and the consequences that last after a nuclear attack, the fact that this weapon was used in two occasions in 1945 and never again, and that these types of weapons are in the hands of a very limited number of States, the following question needs to be answered: Why has this WMD not been eliminated from the face of the earth? One of the reasons is the following: Nuclear weapon States do not want to initiate the negotiations for the destruction of these weapons, as acknowledged in Article VI of the NPT, because the possession of nuclear weapons transmits fear and restraint; accordingly, it prevents other countries from initiating a military attack against said countries. At the same time the possession of nuclear weapons transmits terror to other sStatess and in some cases limits the excesses of political and military ambitious of certain sStatess. The possession of nuclear weapons is also a signal of technological development of the country; and therefore, an indication of military power. After thirty-eight years of forced entry of the NPT, the multilateral negotiations foreseen in Article VI for the destruction of all nuclear weapons in the military arsenals of the current nuclear weapon States has not yet started. Furthermore, what is more worrisome, there is no indication that these negotiations will start in the near future. Despite all efforts carried out until now by the international community to achieve the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons, the number of this type of weapons in the hands of a selected group of countries is still very high. According to several estimates, more than 30,00016 nuclear weapons remains in the military arsenals of eight or nine countries. Many of them are on high-trigger alert [34, pp 16]. Several members of the international community have submitted in recent years a number of initiatives with the purpose to achieve the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons production facilities. The majority of current nuclear weapon States, rejected them all, in one way or another. The destruction of nuclear weapons carried out thus far by the current nuclear weapons State parties of the NPT has been applied through unilateral actions or bilateral mechanisms and without international supervision. The situation of the last two international instruments elaborated by the international community with the purpose to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime can be classified as frustrating and very disappointing. One of these instruments, the CTBT, was adopted in 1996, this means thirteen years have passed; however, it has not yet entered into force and there is no indication that the mentioned treaty will enter into force in the near future. The second, the Cut-off Treaty, is still under negotiations in the CD and the possibility to reach an agreement on its text in the near future is very small.

15

These are the only two military attacks carried out so far in which nuclear weapons were used. One in Hiroshima and the other in Nagasaki, both in Japan in August 1945. 16 According with Reference 37, page 17 nuclear weapon States have in their hands some 27,000 nuclear weapons. More than 95% of this amount belongs to the U.S. and Russia. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

General Overview

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The CTBT, although signed by 178 States and ratified by 144, has not yet entered into force17 for the following reason: Two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)18 have not yet ratified this treaty, and one of them, the U.S., has declared that it does not have any intention to ratify it in the near future. Without the ratification by the five permanent members of the UNSC, among others countries,19 the mentioned treaty cannot entry into force, impeding the strengthening of the nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons regime. This situation is very disappointing. The following table shows the number of nuclear tests that were carried out so far by the current nuclear weapon States. Table 2. Number of nuclear tests carried out by all nuclear weapon States.20 Country

Latest

Underground

Total

1992 1990 1996

In the atmosphere or underwater 217 219 50

USA USSR-Russia France

815 496 160

1,032 715 210

UK China India Pakistan Total

1991 1996 1998 1998 -

21 23 530

24 22 3 2 1, 522

45 45 3 2 2,052

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: SIPRI uses the definition of a nuclear test found in the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, which counts as a single event simultaneous tests of nuclear device at a specific location. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1998, appendix 12B, pp 562-563 Note

Despite the fact that there are at least two different proposals over the table regarding the possible text of the Cut-off Treaty, none of them seems to have the necessary support within the CD to be used as reference for the final negotiation of the treaty text. The failure to conclude the negotiations on the Cut-off Treaty has delayed the process of strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons regimes, leaving it in the hands of several countries that have enough fissionable materials to produce thousands of nuclear weapons and, increasing significantly the risk of proliferation. Despite the intensive work carried out within the CD to conclude the negotiations of the Cut-off Treaty, there are still some difficulties that need to be overcome in order to allow that these negotiations conclude successfully in the near future. These difficulties are described in detail in chapter V.

17 The information provided in this paragraph corresponds to January 2008. 18 These countries are China and the U.S.. 19 These countries are those that were member of the CD when the CTBT was adopted in 1996 and have nuclear power plants or nuclear research reactors in operation. 20 Nuclear tests carried out by Israel and the DPRK are not included in the table

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The Control of Chemical Weapons According to the definition included in Reference 37, chemical weapons “kill by attacking the nervous system and lungs, or by interfering with a body’s ability to absorb oxygen. Some are designed to incapacitate by producing severe burns and blisters. Symptoms can appear immediately or be delayed for up to 12 hours after an attack. Persistent agents can remain in a target environment for as long as a week” (37, pp 32). Chemical weapons were called the “WMD of the poor.” The production and use of this type of WMD are not so complicated, and for this reason can be produced by a significant number of countries. Taking into account this possibility, the international community decided, many years ago, to adopt an international instrument to force the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities in all of its State parties. The Convention also prohibited the production, possession, storage, acquisition, transfer, and the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances, and submits all relevant chemical facilities and substances to international control. What is the current situation of the destruction process of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities? In the last ten years, certain progresses have been achieved in the process to eliminate all chemical weapons from the military arsenals of a selected group of countries. The process has been initiated after the adoption of the CWC in 1993 and was accelerated after its entry into force in 1997. The CWC is the second international instrument to prohibit the production, possession, and use of a specific WMD, but is the first with a comprehensive verification mechanism to verify the destruction process, to ensure that certain chemical facilities and substances are used with exclusively peaceful purposes and with an international organization responsible with the supervision of the implementation of the Convention’s provisions. The CWC is an excellent example of a nondiscriminatory treaty in the field of WMD. For this reason it is a shame that this international instrument is the only one that can be presented by the international community as a concrete example of an effective international instrument in the field of WMD. The NPT and the BWC cannot be characterized as effective international instruments. Until January 2008, the CWC has been ratified by 184 State and signed by four States. The Six-Party States’ parties that have declared that chemical weapons must be destroyed over 8,670,000 items, including munitions and containers containing, totalling over 71,000 metric tons of extremely toxic chemical agents. The destruction process should end by 2012 after the extension of the initial deadline anticipated in the CWC (2007). However, it is necessary to stress that if the destruction process of chemical weapons follows the current pattern, then it is possible that the complete destruction of chemical weapons cannot be reached by 2012 as approved by the OPCW21. Additional information regarding the implementation of the CWC provisions, the problems that the nonproliferation of chemical weapons regime is now facing and possible solutions that could be considered to overcome these problems that are included in chapters V and VIII.

21

The CWC initially established the period 1997-2007 to achieve the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical production facilities in all of its State parties, but the destruction process was carried out so slowly that has forced the OPCW to extend the deadline to 2012.

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General Overview

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The Control of Biological Weapons Biological and toxin weapons are defined, according to the definition included in Reference 32, as a weapon that “kills by using pathogens to attack cells and organs in human bodies, although they can also be used to target crops and livestock on a massive scale”. “Some are contagious and can spread rapidly in a population, while others, including anthrax and ricin, infect and kill only those who are directly exposed. Toxins are poisons produced by biological organisms. Some (e.g., botulinum toxin) are lethal even in microscopic amounts” ([37, pp 32).] The production and use of this type of WMD is simpler than the production of chemical weapons, but are not as effective as a weapon in military conflicts. Biological weapons can be produced by a significant number of countries. This possibility and its lack of effectiveness in a military conflict encouraged the international community to adopt, several years ago, an international instrument to force the destruction of all biological weapons and the prohibition of their production, possession, storage, acquisition, transfer, and use. The BWC is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production, possession, acquisition, retention, and use of an entire category of WMD. It builds on the ban on the use of such weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Convention of 1925). The BWC entered into force in 1975. Until January 2008, 183 States ratified the BWC representing 98% of the total world population. The BWC is a nondiscriminatory international instrument but without the strength of the CWC, due to the lack of an effective verification mechanism and the absence of an international organization responsible with the supervision of how State parties fulfill their international commitments and obligations with the mentioned Convention. Article III of the BWC stated the following: “Each State party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention” [27, Article III]. At the same time, the BWC necessitates the destruction of all biological weapons and delivery systems by all of its future State parties, before the Convention entry into force for the country concerned. What are the main differences between the BWC and the CWC? The BWC, in its current form, lacks a legally binding verification mechanism with concrete regulations, reporting requirements, on-site activities, and an international organization with oversight functions, as the CWC does, in order to ensure that State parties comply with their international obligations and commitments. In other words, the BWC does not have any mechanism to verify that its State parties have destroyed all biological weapons and that its State parties are not carrying out activities prohibited by the Convention. The BWC does not oblige any State party to report the quantity of biological weapons destroyed before the Convention entry into force for the country concerned. The BWC embodies the principle known as the “general purpose criterion” under which all relevant activities are prohibited unless they can be justified for the peaceful purposes permitted under the Convention, including justifications relating to types and quantities of materials being used for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.

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Other problems that the BWC is now facing and some possible solutions to these problems are analyzed in detail in chapters V and VIII.

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The Control of Conventional Weapons Traditionally the majority of States have entrusted their security to the possession and use of conventional weapons. These weapons are normally used to resist a military attack, or to discourage other countries to initiate such attack. However, the accumulation of certain type of conventional weapons, particularly those considered as eminent offensives by the international community, could be a signal of the aggressiveness of the behavior of certain States, forcing other countries to follows a dangerous arms races with the purpose to try to keep a military balance. In most of the cases, this situation may end up in a military conflict, involving all or several of States making such conflicts more destructive should it occur. “The unrestricted deployment of conventional weapons can trigger destabilizing arms races, which in turn can be a major cause of war”[32, pp 5] Therefore, the accumulations of certain types of conventional weapons could exacerbate tensions among States and can contribute to the outbreak of armed conflict between them. It is important to know that identical military capabilities in conventional weapons, particularly in those that can be used for defensive or offensive purposes alike, the growing accumulations of these types of weapons under certain circumstance and an increase of the political tensions among States, could be taken by one of them as evidence of an aggressive intent of the others. “As tensions mount and the perceived likelihood of war increases, States are more likely to decide in favor of pre-emptive attack, especially if prevailing circumstances such as existing military technologies or a temporary position of superiority are thought to reward offensive action. In addition to contributing to armed conflict, arms races can create conditions that threaten to raise drastically the scale of violence associated with war”[32, pp 5]. There are an abundance of examples that can confirm what has been said in the previous paragraph. For this reason, and in order to alleviate problems associated with the uncontrolled deployment of certain types of conventional weapons, States have adopted and should continue adopting specific measures that further restrict the unilateral accumulation of certain types of arms in regions unstable from the political point of view and with a history of wars and military conflicts. However, these measures are sometime not enough. There should be no doubt that certain countries have a military force and an accumulation of all kind of weapons that the country alone represents a real threat to many other countries and may be cause of fear and mistrust to others. As a matter of principle, no country should have a military force and capabilities that could be used to initiate alone a full conventional war against any other country without the explicit approval of the UNSC, and without the participation of other countries. The adoption of this principle could be an effective manner to stop the unilateral initiation of an unjustified war by any StateStatesStates against any other, in a clear violation of the United Nations Chapter. However, the world is not in a position, for the time being, to adopt this important principle.

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General Overview

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Measures for the limitations of certain types of conventional weapons at multilateral level are not frequently discussed and adopted. In the last fifty years, two regions of the world, Europe and Central American, adopted important agreements to limit the accumulation of certain types of conventional weapons in all of its States. The objective was to decrease tensions among States, enhance trust and transparency in military matters, and to reduce the minimum possibility that another destructive war be initiated between countries within these regions, particularly in Europe. Antipersonal mines are used in an irresponsible way and without any control by some countries and non-State combatants have continued affecting the population that lives in one third of the countries in the world. Due to the different measures adopted in recent years within the United Nations system to reinforce the implementation of the Conventional Weapons Convention, and bearing in mind the entry into force in 1999 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Uses, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), the international community has practically stopped the production and trade of antipersonal mines. However, the world is not yet free of antipersonal mines. Each day many victims are still injured or killed due to irresponsible uses of these types of weapons by some countries involved in military conflicts in the past. In May 2008, for the second time in the last to years, an important international agreement prohibiting the possession and use of certain types of conventional weapons called “cluster munitions” was adopted. The international instrument, adopted by 111 State22 is the purported “Convention on Cluster Munitions” (CCM). Despite of the advances achieved in recent years in the implementation of measures that restrict the unilateral accumulation of certain types of conventional weapons, there is still an urgent need to continue given high priority to achieve the universality of the following international instruments: a) b) c) d)

The Ottawa Convention. The Conventional Weapons Convention. The Protocols of Geneva Convention. The Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The illicit trade of small and light conventional weapons posses’ great challenges to international peace and security. According to United Nations document A/56/326 (see Reference 34), “small arms are legally produced by more than 600 companies in at least 95 countries, with the value of global small arms production estimated at over than U.S.$ 1.4 billion and that of ammunition production at 2.6 billion. An estimated 500 million of small and light weapons are available around the world”[34, pp 17 and 18]. Several initiatives at regional and international levels to stop the illicit trade of conventional weapons have been presented by some countries with very limited results. Some concrete proposals with the objective to stop the illicit trade of small and light weapons are included in chapter VIII.

22

The U.S. was against the adoption of the CCM on the basis of the importance given by the U.S. . military establishment to the use of this type of munitions in certain military operations.

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

The Control of Missile Technology

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There is no formal treaty or agreement adopted within the CD to stop the nonproliferation of missile technology for military purpose. However, on November 25, 2002 several countries adopted the “International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” (ICOC). This Code is a politically binding arrangement adopted with the purpose to promote the prevention and curbing of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, particularly nuclear weapons; to develop relevant norms to be follows by its State parties in order to stop the proliferation of missile technology for military purposes; and to promote confidence regarding missile and space launch vehicle activities with peaceful purposes. In addition to the adoption of the ICOC, the international community perhaps could consider in the future the possibility to initiate negotiations of a specific verifiable international instrument that will force the destruction of all intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 5,000 km and above, particularly those that have been designed to carry out any WMD, specifically nuclear weapons, and the exclusively peaceful uses for outer space and other celestial bodies by its State parties, including the Moon. Additional propose actions in the field of nonproliferation of conventional weapons and missiles technology for military purposes are included in chapter VIII.

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Chapter II

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CURRENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION With the end of the Cold War and the increase in the number of nuclear weapon States from five, to perhaps even nine States the fight against terrorism, the adoption of the so-called preventive wars policy to combat terrorism, hunger, poverty, unemployment, AIDS and other contagious diseases, the lack of education and health care affecting millions of people all over the world, the illicit trafficking of conventional weapons, including small and light weapons, drugs trafficking, money laundry, illegal immigration, the crisis of confidence in the United Nations system, and in particular, in its Security Council, among other factors, are important elements that need to be taken into consideration when the current international scenery is analyzed in order to try to find multilateral solutions to these problems. Many efforts have been carried out to free the world from the threat of the use WMD, particularly biological and chemical weapons. It is fair to say that some limited progress has been achieved to free the world of nuclear weapons. However, the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth continues to be an intangible objective to be reached by the international community. Despite the end of the Cold War eighteen years ago, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. Some States have failed to comply with their nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments and obligations, and terrorist groups have emerged as a new threat to international peace and security recognizing no restraints. A worrisome event occurred in September 2005 when the United Nations World Summit organized to evaluate the implementation of the United Nations Millennium report agree on several issues affecting the international community but not on a single recommendation in the fields of disarmament and nonproliferation. This outcome is a reflection of the fragile and dangerous situation that the international community is now facing in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, which is affecting international peace and security, as well as the stability of many countries. It is time for all States to wake up and to face the reality in which old threats continue to be present in today’s life, in addition of new ones that have emerged complicating even further the difficult situation the world is passing through. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through specific Conventions, but these international instruments need to be universally accepted and fully implemented in order to achieve the goals for which were adopted. It is time to recognize that in the field of chemical weapons, the international community is closed to achieve this

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important goal for international peace, security, and stability, but we are not yet there in case of other WMD. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed, but this appears to be a very far-off objective to be reached by the international community. Responsible countries cannot wait and see how the nuclear nonproliferation regimes collapse due to the behavior of certain nuclear weapons States and of a very limited number of non-nuclear weapons State parties of the NPT. The first because of their refusal to initiate a fair negotiation for the destruction of all of its nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons production facilities, as foreseen in Article VI of the mentioned treaty. The second is due to the development of clandestine nuclear military programs, in violation of previous commitments and obligations assumed as non-nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT. It is understandable that the process for the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities cannot start immediately and without taking into account a number of important elements associated with this delicate process from the military and security point of views. What are these elements? What the international community should do while nuclear weapons are part of the military arsenals of certain countries? In my opinion new initiatives should be adopted with the purpose to at least reduce significantly the number of nuclear weapons still in the hands of all nuclear weapons States, particularly Russia and the U.S. ., in addition to the threat posed by them to the rest of the international community. It is also equally urgent and important to adopt new initiatives to prevent terrorists from acquiring any WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. “The possible acquisition by terrorist groups of nuclear weapons or material is a growing threat to the international community. It adds a disturbing new dimension to the more well established concern about proliferation among States. During the Cold War, the most probable targets of a nuclear attack were the nuclear weapon States themselves, who targeted each other’s military installations and even cities. Today, the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons or material, including by terrorist and sub-State groups, has become a serious threat to the international community. Even the most powerful country in the world, the U.S., is now vulnerable to such threats”[25, pp 12] . For the aforementioned reasons, measures already adopted by the international community, including by the nuclear weapon State themselves in order to reduce the danger of a nuclear war among them, or to avoid the use of this weapons in a military conflict, are not enough. The reason to support this conclusion is the following: military doctrines in force all nuclear weapon States anticipate the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions, but without defining what these conditions are. This is unacceptable situation that is impeding the initiation of a fair negotiation among all nuclear weapon States for the destruction of all of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the fight against terrorism has won a strong support within the international community, although not all countries have the same vision on how to carry it out. Despite the fact that this topic is now a high priority within the international agenda, it is important to single out that the fight against terrorism has been a battle carried out by the international community long before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Within this high priority, the possibility to carry out preventive war against countries that have the intention to possess, or have the capacity to produces nuclear weapons or other

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Current International Political Situation

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WMD, has became a dangerous and sad reality of today’s life. The policy of preventive wars adopted by the U.S. has forced many countries to assume an active position in defending its own security and defense interests at regional and international levels and increase the purchase of sophisticated weapons with the purpose to increase their security. In some extreme cases, the development of a clandestine WMD programs, particularly clandestine nuclear weapons programs, were and are carried out by some non-nuclear weapon States as a response to the adoption of this dangerous and destabilizing policy, which is by the way not new. By developing clandestine nuclear weapon programs these countries are trying not only to have a type of weapons that can be used to defend the country from an unjustified military aggression that could be carried out by the most powerful countries from the economic and military point of view, almost all of them in possession of nuclear weapons. The possession of WMD by these countries gives them the possibility to block the unilateral introduction of the security and defence interest and policies of the most powerful countries from the military point of view in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control in different international forums, including the CD. The delays in the entry into force of the CTBT, the failure to adopt a verification mechanism for the BWC, and the impossibility to conclude the negotiations of the Cut-off Treaty in the near future, are clearly examples of what has been said in previous paragraphs. On these issues, the position of the most powerful military States and the rest of the international community are very different, and there are any indications that these positions could come closer any time soon. It is important to recognize that some of the nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control problems that the international community are now facing at multilateral level is not going to stay for ever. After years of stagnation and disagreements in almost all issues in the abovementioned fields, there is now a little hope that this dramatic and dangerous situation could change in the coming years. The new U.S. administration, taking into account the negative effect that its current nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control policy has in world affairs, and in the behavior of other States, now, has the opportunity to change this situation by adopting a new policy in these fields. Which is the new situation that supports this hope? First is the election of a new president in the U.S. . Second is the possibility that arms control policy debate raise to new and interesting levels. “One points to increasing concerns about threats to and the potential collapse of long-standing arms control and nonproliferation agreements and understandings. The other points to new and emerging opportunities for more effective arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament steps” (7, pp 2). Some of these opportunities will be discussed in this chapter and others in chapter VIII. The international community is fully aware of the difficult situation that the NPT, the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, is now facing. After thirty-eight years since it entered into force treaty has failed to fully implement Article VI, and has not impede the development of clandestine nuclear military weapon programs in a limited number of its State parties. All measures presented until now by different countries, or group of countries, with the objective that nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT initiate without further delay the negotiations foresee in article VI, has been ignored or rejected by this group of States. The position adopted by nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT clearly violate their commitments and obligations freely assumed by them with the NPT and had pushed some non-nuclear weapon States to try to produce nuclear weapons in a clandestine manner. Until

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now four non-nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT have developed clandestine nuclear military programs affecting seriously the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT23. Taking into account this dangerous situation the question to be answered is very simple: What can be done to change this perception and to move forward nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues at multilateral level? Different ideas and proposals are included in chapter VIII that could help to achieve this objective. These ideas and proposals need to be implemented in an organized manner and should ensure to all States involved in their implementation, that their security and defense interest will not be jeopardized by this process. How to give this assurance? One possibility is to divide the implementation process in different phases. These phases could be the following:

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FIRST PHASE During this phase all WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, should be definitively outlawed by the international community. The conversion of the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC into universal treaties24 should be one of the main objectives to be achieved in this phase. Before the first phase ends the CTBT should entry into force and the Cut-off Treaty adopted by the CD. The universality of both international instruments should be also achieved within this phase. Because of this phase, all WMD will be outlawed and all States will be parties of all relevant international instruments related with the prohibitions of WMD. During the implementation of the first phase, the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities should continue to be carried out by a limited number of State parties of the CWC, as well as the process of strengthening the BWC. At the same time the negotiations foresee in Article VI, or the implementation of a new international instrument to guide the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities should be initiated. Several informal and formal discussions should be carried out at regional and international levels, with the purpose to reach an agreement on the reduction or limitation in the possession of certain types of conventional weapons, particularly those weapons that have an exclusively offensive character.25 The objective to be achieved with these discussions is the identification of certain measures that need to be adopted in the future in order to reduce the possibilities of the initiation of new unilateral wars and military conflicts initiate by individual States without the explicit approval of the UNSC. During the implementation of the first phase, a group of CBMs should also be adopted with the purpose to enhance trust and reduce tensions between States. 23

These four States are the following: Iraq, Libya, DPRK, and presumably Iran. This last country has strongly rejected this accusation. 24 If NPT State parties consider that the NPT will not guarantee the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities, then the preparation and negotiation of a new international instrument that ensure the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons production facilities should be considered as a possibility to break the current deadlock on this subject. Under this new international instrument all nuclear weapons should be destroyed and the process supervised by the international community. A propose text for this new international instrument is included in chapter X.

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SECOND PHASE During this phase, all WMD should be destroyed. Competent international organizations should supervise the destruction process in all States possessing WMD and should confirm the complete destruction of these types of weapons and weapon production facilities in all States involved in this process. It is expected that some of the informal or formal discussions started in the first phase on the elimination of certain conventional weapons ends successfully, in order to start, during the implementation of the second phase, the negotiations process to destroy several of these types of weapons, particularly those considered as imminently offensive by the international community, or to achieve a significantly reduction in the possession of these weapons in all States. What kind of conventional weapons should be included in these negotiations? The following are a nonexhaustive list of this type of weapons: intercontinental ballistic missiles and long range cruise missiles capable to carry out WMD, particularly nuclear weapons; aircraft carrier; large battleships; large range bombers capable to carry out WMD, particularly nuclear weapons; attack submarines; and large range artillery capable to launch a WMD munitions, particularly nuclear munitions.

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THIRD PHASE During this phase, negotiations should be carried out at regional and international levels in order to reduce the excessive accumulation of certain types of conventional weapons and the military budget in all States. The objective to be achieved is that each has the armed forces that guarantee the defense of its territory and territorial waters, but without representing a threat to neighboring countries or to any other States. It is important to ensure that during the implementation of these three phases any or group of States, independently of its economic and military power, increases its security by downgrading the security of others, or that any feel that its security and defense interest is under threat. I am aware that the aforementioned objective could be, at the present stage, very difficult to be achieved, inclusive it could be seen by many as an utopia, since we are living in a world in which the uses of force prevails in the international relations between States. Under these conditions is understandable that any that wishes to reduce its armed forces and renounce to the possession of certain weapons in order to ensure the defense of its territory and territorial waters. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that the current international situation cannot stay forever, because it is the result of the behavior of a limited powerful countries from the economic and military point of view and not of the entire international community. These 25

The most powerful countries from the military point of view, including all nuclear weapon StatesStatess, should be the first to participate in these negotiations.

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countries are doing all what they can to try to impose their national interests and policies, particularly in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control to the rest of the world, but the immense majority of other countries are hopefully starting to reject this dangerous behavior. The public opinion of the most powerful countries from the military and economic point of view are also starting to wake up and to see that this position is not improving its own security and of course is not improving the international security situation as well, and for this reason are demanding the destruction of all WMD, including nuclear weapons. It is important to stress that the international situation described above should not limit any , or group of States, to try to change it as quick as possible, taking into account that if this situation lasts for a long period, it could jeopardize not only international peace, security, and stability but even the existence of several countries. It is difficult to justify the vast disparity that exists between the armed forces (including its military arsenals) of the most powerful States from the military point of view, particularly the U.S. , and the armed forces (including its military arsenals) of the rest of the States. Some States are not ready to exclude any type of weapons from their military arsenals, unless they consider that a particular weapon is not anymore suitable to achieve its military policy objectives. In this case, this type of weapon is presented as very dangerous for international peace and security, and for this reason should be removed from the military arsenals of all States, or be subject to certain arms control measures at national, regional and international levels. The adoption of the CWC for the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities in a concrete period, the lack of similar instrument to ensure the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities in a specific period, and the elimination or reduction of certain types of conventional weapons in the hands of a limited group of States, like the so-called “cluster munitions, incendiary weapons and antipersonnel landmines”, are just a few concrete examples of what have been said before. It is not difficult to probe that there is any unified policy and strategy at international level that force the destruction of all WMD in all States in a specific period and under international supervision. For example, there is one international instrument (CWC) that ensures the destruction of a specific type of WMD (chemical weapons) by all of its State parties and under strict international supervision. But, at the same time, there are two international instruments regarding the elimination of nuclear and biological weapons that are quite different from the CWC. These international instruments (NPT and BWC) lacks a concrete verification mechanism to ensure the destruction of these two types of WMD (nuclear and biological weapons); however, there is an international organization similar to the OPCW with the responsibility to supervise the destruction process of nuclear and biological weapons as well as nuclear and biological weapon production facilities; and there is any specific period in which the destruction of nuclear weapons should be initiated and concluded at multilateral level. Why the adoption of a unified policy at international level for the elimination of all WMD is so important? The answer can be found in the following paragraphs. Nuclear weapon States consider the possession of nuclear weapons and of certain conventional weapons is indispensable weaponry for guaranteeing their security and the defense of their territories, including its territorial waters and, in some cases even the defense of its allies. At the same time, these same countries are of the opinion that the possession of

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nuclear weapons, and of certain type of conventional weapons by any other country represents a direct treat not only to them, but to international peace and security as well. This position is unacceptable, discriminatory, cannot be sustained from any point of view and must be rejected by the majority of . The international community should only accept the principle that all WMD, including nuclear weapons should be outlawed, and all international instruments prohibiting all WMD should be monitored by an international organization responsible for the enforcement of its provisions. This enforcement should be carried out through the use of a verification system that ensures that no State party is carrying out activities prohibited by these international instruments. The international community should explore which are the political, legal, technical, and procedural options that can be used with the purpose to achieve these objectives within a reasonable period, particularly when the new US Administration take office. As can be clearly stated from recent documents on nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control adopted within the United Nations, or discussed in other appropriate international forums, some issues associated with these fields have lost its relative importance in comparison with the following issues:

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a) The fight against terrorism. b) The fight against drugs trafficking. c) The elimination of illicit trade of certain conventional weapons, particularly small and light weapons. d) The fight against illegal immigration. e) The respect of human rights. f) The fight against money laundry. There should be no doubt that these are important issues that the international community should deal with as a matter of urgency. But at the same time, it is also extremely important for international peace, security, and stability to adopt additional measures to push forward the destruction of all nuclear weapons at multilateral level and to strengthen nuclear, chemical and biological nonproliferation regimes. Regrettably there are two different points of view regarding what the international community should do to reinforce the nonproliferation regimes. Which are these views? Nuclear weapon States, considered as the first wave of proliferation, give high priority to the discussion of specific actions in order to impede other countries to obtained or produce a nuclear weapon (the so-called horizontal nuclear nonproliferation). However, the destruction of all nuclear weapons already in the hands of a limited number of countries (the so-called vertical nuclear nonproliferation) is an issue that the nuclear weapon States do not want to discuss in depth in any international forum, even during the NPT Review Conferences. Nonnuclear weapons States parties of the NPT, with is the immense majority of the international community, have a different position. The CD, the sole multilateral disarmament forum, remains deadlocked despite a growing need for the adoption of new international instruments in the fields of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, particularly to establish an international control of the production and possession of certain type of conventional weapons, the production and current stock of fissile materials and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I am just

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mentioning three of the most important issues that needs to be addressed by the international community with the purpose to preserve international peace, security and stability. This stalemate has raised serious concern within the international community about the effectiveness of the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, and how this machinery has being adversely affected by the position of some States. The opinion is that the CD is no longer anymore an effective international instrument for the discussion of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues is a feeling that is growing within the international community. For this reason, something needs to be done as soon as possible to change this tendency, before is too late. To overcome these difficulties, the structure and procedures of the CD should be subject to a deep revision in the coming years. The current working procedures and the artificial interconnections of items to be included in its agendas, among other issues, are under fire due to the lack of progress in the work of the CD, which is impeding the consideration of new treaties and agreements in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control. Some States, very disappointed with the work of the CD, are indicating their position very clearly: multilateral treaties do not have to be negotiated within the CD. They can just be negotiated at diplomatic conferences called specifically for this purpose, like the diplomatic conferences that discussed the Ottawa Convention and the CMC, just to mention only two recent examples. This is a trend that could lead to the future elimination of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control.26 Other components of the United Nations disarmament machinery, like the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should be also thoroughly reviewed, in order to improve their effectiveness and the impact of their work. In my opinion, the First Committee should concentrate its work each year in a limited number of issues. For example, in the first year, the work of the First Committee should be devoted to discussing issues related with the elimination of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; another year should concentrate on their work in the discussion of issues related with the strengthening of chemical and biological nonproliferation regimes; in another year, the work of the Committee should be devoted to discussing issues related to the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons and the excessive expenditure on military activities, and so forth. The Disarmament Commission should concentrate its work each year to discuss a limited number of topics, in order to present concrete recommendations to the UNGA. For example, if the First Committee will discuss in a particular year nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues, then the Disarmament Commission should discuss the year before some of the main topics selected in these fields, in order to present concrete recommendations for the consideration of the First Committee. With this proposal, a closed relationship could be established between the works of these two important organizations of the United Nations disarmament machinery. At the same time, a decision to have an international conference every five-ten years to discuss nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues, could be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in one of its next meetings. Despite of the current deadlock in all international forums dealing with nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues, certain developments could offer a foundation for 26

The last treaty adopted in the CD was the CWC in 1993, this means fifteen years ago and there are no signs that the current deadlock situation within the CD could be changed in the near future.

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future progress. More than half of the nuclear weapons deployed at the height of the Cold War have now been dismantled. The overwhelming majority of States have fully complied with their legal obligations concerning WMD. Instances of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and UNSC resolutions are rare and do not signify a global trend, at least for the time being, despite the alarm that this situation could provoke in some countries. Efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons have gained new strength from the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which found unanimously that “no threat or use of nuclear weapons should be made unless it is compatible with the requirements of international law applicable in armed conflict”, and that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control” [34, pp 16]. How to break the current impasse in no-proliferation, disarmament and arms control deliberations at international level? In my opinion the best manner to break this impasse is to convince all countries that they do not need this kind of weapons to ensure its own defense and security and, at the same time, convince those that do have these weapons to walk back and destroy them, without further delay and exception. There is no other alternative. It is difficult to achieve this goal? In my opinion no, if nuclear weapons States have the political will and the courage to do so. For the time being there are no indications that this group of countries will change their position and support disarmament issues at multilateral level in a sincere manner, unless these countries feels that there is real threat to the nonproliferation regime if they do not show political will to move forward nuclear disarmament at multilateral level in the coming years. There are some questions that do not have realistic and objective answers: What is the purpose to have a weapon that was used only two times in 1945 and never used again in any other military conflict? What is the purpose to have a weapon that if it is used massively in a military conflict can destroy all countries involved and perhaps several others not directly involved in the conflict? What is the purpose to have a weapon that is not only very costly to be produced but also to maintain, without any real possibility to be used in a military conflict or fall in the hands of terrorist groups, unless the destruction of all countries involved in one of the military objectives to be achieved or to cause fear to the civilian population? Why certain States defend their rights to have this type of weapons, ignoring the position of the rest of the international community, while deny this right to other countries? The only objective answer to this last question is that these countries are looking for pride, show of power, and demonstration of technological superiority, among other things. All initiatives that have been presented at international level in the field of nonproliferation by the most powerful countries from the economic and military point of views in the last few years have, as its main objective, not to destroy all WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, or the reduction or destruction of some conventional weapons considered as eminently offensives by the international community, but to preserve their right to possess all kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons, to be used in defence of their territories and territorial waters, including friends and allies, against any unrealistic threat, or military aggression coming from an unknown force or form one States or group of States. The curiousness of this position is that at the same time, the same group of countries denies the right of other State to possess the same type of weapons for similar purposes. This

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unrealistic and discriminatory position is extremely difficult to be defended from the legal, political and moral point of view. The international, peace, security, and stability cannot be guaranteed on the base of such unfair and discriminatory position. Nuclear nonproliferation should contribute to the preservation and, if possible, to the improvement of regional and international security and stability. For this reason, it is important to insist that all concerns related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be addressed preferably through political and diplomatic means and within the framework of existing international laws. The use of force in order to solve problems associated with the development of clandestine nuclear military programs in non-nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT should be explicitly authorized by the UNSC under Article VII of the United Nations Chapter, when all other diplomatic and political options have failed. Military actions should be authorized only in case that there is a real and imminent threat that nuclear weapon or other WMD could be used to solve regional or bilateral dispute between States, putting in danger not only international peace, security, and stability but the existence of countries involved in the dispute or even the own humankind. Measures to maintain international and regional peace, security, and stability, should be, at the same time, conducive to strengthening the international nonproliferation regime rather than undermining it. The case of Iraq is an example of a unilateral military action carried out by a group of States without the explicitly authorization of the UNSC. This kind of action seriously undermines not only the authority of the UNSC in its role of maintaining international peace and security, but also undermines the NPT as the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, as well as the CWC and the BWC. Under the prevailing political conditions in today's world, many countries do not have other alternative that to adopt an independent position during the consideration of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues at regional and international levels. For this reason, it is very important that these countries, normally very weak from the economic and military point of view, identify the following: a) What are the most important issues that for these countries should be included in future agendas of regional and international meetings dealing with nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control subjects? b) Which are the main difficulties that the international community is now facing that impede that the nuclear disarmament process at multilateral level move forward, and which are the possible solutions to these difficulties acceptable to the international community and not to a reduce group of States? c) Which are the positions that need to be adopted by the international community to ensure that the interest in security and defense matters of all States are taken into consideration during the negotiations of new treaties and agreements in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control?

d) What kind of treaty and agreement should be negotiated within the United Nations in the future, in order to achieve nuclear disarmament in a concrete period? The answers to these and other questions will be found in the following chapters.

Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

Chapter III

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

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Associated with the process of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control, as well as with general and complete disarmament is a group of definitions and concepts used within the United Nations disarmament machinery, which are important to be well understood by the readers of the book. Among these concepts and definitions are the following: • • • • • • • • • • •

Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, WMD). Conventional weapons. Nonproliferation. Disarmament. Security. Defense. Military strategies. Military doctrines. Structures of the armed forces. CBMs. Verification measures.

Some of these concepts and definitions will be described shortly in this Chapter while others in chapter IV.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION According with Reference 32, “prior to the Second World War, arms limitations were primarily related to the rules of war and reductions in aggregate military capabilities.27 Since then, however, arms limitations have been addressed mostly in terms of weapon categories. 27 Before World War II, the main goals of the negotiations on military matters were the adoption of certain rules on the use of specific types of weapons with the purpose to avoid unnecessary suffering of the military personnel and not to stop the accumulation of weapons or the destruction of such weapons. The emphasis was on the humanitarian character of future wars and military conflicts and not on disarmament.

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This shift was due mainly to the advent of nuclear weapons which brought to the fore the distinction between the so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ defined by the United Nations as “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical or biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”[32, pp 9]. Why WMD worry so much to the international community? According with the report of the “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms Commission” (see Reference 32), “there are a number of major reasons why the present general standstill in global talks is unacceptable and why governments must refocus on WMD and revive efforts to achieve disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and compliance:

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a) The development of chemical science and industry as well as the rapid expansion in biotechnology and life sciences create opportunities for important peaceful uses, but also for the production of chemical weapons and horrific uses of viruses and bacteria as weapons.28 b) The terror attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 11, 2001, demonstrated to the world in a flash that, if terrorists succeed in acquiring WMD, they might use them. c) The 1968 NPT, while recognizing the first wave of five nuclear-weapon States, succeeded in attracting a vast number of adherents, it did not, however, prevent India, Israel and Pakistan from forming a second wave of proliferation, and was violated by Iraq, Libya, and North Korea29 in a third wave. If Iran and North Korea do not reliably renounce nuclear weapons, pressure could build for a fourth wave of proliferation of nuclear weapons. d) Thirty-six30 years after the entry into force of the NPT, the five nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty have failed in their duty to achieve disarmament through negotiation.” There is currently a risk for a new phase in nuclear arms competition through the further modernization of weapons. Many non-nuclear-weapon State feel cheated by the nuclearweapon States retreating from commitments made in 1995 in order to get the treaty extended to unlimited duration. e) The IAEA safeguards system, created to verify that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses, proved inadequate to discover the Iraqi and Libyan violations of the NPT. Iran failed for many years in its duty to declare important nuclear programs.31 f) The know-how to make nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and weaponsusable material – enriched uranium or plutonium, modified viruses, and precursor chemicals – is available to a widening group of States and non-State actors. 28 The so-called “biological weapons.” 29 The Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK). 30 Thirty-eight in 2008. 31 The Iranian’s government declared several time the peaceful character of its nuclear program. The IAEA and the UNSC have requested several time solid probe of this statement. The UNSC have adopted until now several economic sanctions against Iran due to its failure to probe the peaceful character of its nuclear program.

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g) Rapid changes in the life sciences influence the availability of the information and expertise required to make toxins and genetically modified viruses and other pathogens. h) The existence of an illicit private global market where WMD expertise, technology, material, and designs for weapons could be acquired, is a special threat at a time of active worldwide terrorism. i) The expansion expected in the use of carbon-dioxide-free nuclear power will lead to the production, transportation and use of more nuclear fuel, increasing the risk that enriched uranium and plutonium might be diverted to weapons. Radioactive substances or nuclear waste not under full control might be acquired by terrorists and be used in dirty bombs – devices that disperse radioactive material to contaminate target areas or to provoke terror” [37, pp 23 and 24]. In addition to the above, the following elements should be also considered: • •

•

The destruction power of nuclear weapons, the only weapon that can destroy the live in the whole world in several minutes, if it used in a massive military attack. The level of destruction that chemical and biological weapons can produce in a military conflict, including the contamination of extends areas far from the conflict zone. The great damage that the use of certain nuclear, chemical and biological substances can produce, if they fall in the hands of terrorist groups and used against any specific civilian and military targets or civilian population.

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Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that are based on nuclear reactions. According to the definition of nuclear weapons included in Reference 32, “nuclear weapons consist of nuclear explosives and the means for their delivery. Nuclear explosives are based on selfsustained nuclear reactions, which transform the nuclear structure of atoms and in the process release great bursts of energy”. How many types of nuclear reactions could be expected? “Two types of nuclear reactions are used in the construction of nuclear weapons: fission reactions and fusion reactions”32 [32, pp 73] Nuclear explosives can be delivered by a wide range of systems. Among these systems are aerial bombs, ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery shells, naval mines and torpedoes, and landmines. “Long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads are commonly called strategic nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons meant to be used in close proximity on the battlefield are generally referred to as tactical nuclear weapons” (32, pp 74). According to United Nations documents, between 27,000 and 30,000 nuclear warheads are in the possession of eight or nine nuclear weapons States. Between 12,000-17,500 of these 32

Until now fission reaction is the most common type of nuclear reaction available in the world. Fission reactions are used in many fields, particularly for the generation of electricity. However, many experts consider that fusion reaction will prevail in the future, if the current difficulties facing the production of this type of reaction can be overcome.

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warheads are considered operational. The rest are in reserve or retired and awaiting dismantlement. The estimate number of nuclear warheads built since 1945 worldwide is 128,000. The US. .and the former USSR, now Russia, are responsible for the production of 98% of these nuclear warheads (U.S. 55%, and the former USSR now Russia 43%). Since the Cold War ended, more and more warheads in U.S, and Russian stockpiles are being moved from operational status into various reserve, inactive, or contingency categories, due to the implementation of several unilateral measures and bilateral treaties adopted between the U.S. and the former USSR, and now Russia33. It is important to stress, in the case of nuclear weapons, the following: “The explosion of a nuclear weapon causes damage through intense thermal radiation, a blast wave and nuclear radiation from the fireball and radioactive fallout. The effects of a major exchange of nuclear weapons, or even a more limited exchange, would not be confined to those States directly involved in a nuclear conflict. On the contrary, the consequences of nuclear war would stretch beyond the immediate destruction, and into nonbelligerent States and the lives of future generations, through fallout, widespread contamination of the environment, and possible genetic damage. The survivors of a major nuclear war would face extraordinary difficulties, especially in reconstruction, and the restoration of domestic and international order. A major nuclear war or exchange would make this sort of recovery immensely difficult and for some perhaps impossible” (. [25, pp 7 and 8)] The main reason why all nuclear weapons should be eliminated from the face of the earth as soon as possible and before is too late is the following: “Governments possessing nuclear weapons can act responsibly or recklessly” [37, pp 60]. Governments with a responsible international behavior may change over time. The idea that nuclear weapons in the hands of democratic governments is a guarantee that they are not going to be used in a military conflict, and in the hands of other governments represent a threat to international peace, security and stability, is a groundless idea. The U.S., , classified as a democratic government, used nuclear weapons twice in one single month at the end of World War II. For this reason, the position that nuclear weapons in the hands of some pose no threat, while in the hands of others place the world in mortal jeopardy34 is unfounded and should be strongly rejected by the international community. In order to better understand the current situation regarding the status of strategic nuclear weapons in the military arsenals of all nuclear weapons States brief information on this subject is described in the following paragraphs:

A.United States of America35 The U.S. has produced some 70,000 nuclear warheads of 72 major types since 1945. Around 60,000 nuclear warheads have been dismantled (more than 12,000 of them since 1990), representing 85.7% of the total warheads produced by this country. The total number of warheads at all levels of readiness stands today at 9,962. At the beginning of 2007, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was composed of eight types of nuclear warheads (in thirteen variant modes) that are operationally deployed, with an estimated count of 5,736 active stockpile warheads. 33

These treaties are: SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), INF (Inter-medium Nuclear Forces), START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), and SORT (Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty) 34 See Reference 37, pp 60. 35 U.S. Nuclear Weapon Enduring Stockpile, August 31, 2007. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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For the first time the “2007 Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty” (see reference 1) listed the aggregate number of US operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which as of 31 December 2006 stood at 3,696.36 However, if one assumes that ICBMs have 95% availability, 66% of SLBMs are on patrol, and 90% of bombers are on-duty with their full combat load, then this tally exactly matches the official operational count. “There are also 589 warheads of two types that are inactive, these are not kept in operational condition and one of these warheads (the W84) is slated to be completely dismantled” [35, pp 1].

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Figure 3. B-2 bomber dropping a B61-11 bomb during test.

Figure 4. Ohio-class (Trident) SSBN.

“Current plans are to completely retire and dismantle the oldest warhead in the U.S. arsenal, the W62 carried by the Minuteman III missile. Retirement of the W62 began in October 2006, and is being replaced by W87 warheads that have been in storage since they were removed from Peacekeeper (MX) missile upon its retirement. Five other deployed warheads (the B61-3, B61-4, W76, W78 and W80-1) will be reduced in number to bring the count down to 2,200. This will require removing 3,759 of these five warheads from deployment (given that 553 W87s are being returned to duty); together they number 4,302 of 36 No official breakdown of this number is available.

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the currently deployed force. Actual production of new warheads halted in 1989. In January 1997, the first new weapon modification since the production shutdown entered service - the B61 Mod 11 (B61-11) ground penetrating (bunker busting) bomb. This was a modification of B61 Mod 7s that were already in the stockpile. Remanufacture and updating of subsystems of existing weapons is on-going as part of a stockpile Life-Extension Program (LEP)” [35, pp 2 and 3].

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Figure 5. B-2A Spirit.

Figure 6. LGM- 30 Minuteman III ICBM.

Figure 7. Air cruise missile.

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Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Conventional Weapons

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Figure 8. Patriot cruise missile.

Figure 9. Trident II submarine intercontinental missile.

The U.S. has an estimate of 5,000-6,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads.

Figure 10. Minuteman III intercontinental land-based missile. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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The Bush Administration has modernized U.S. nuclear policy and strategy, as enunciated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy. As part of this process, the U.S. is moving away from the high yield city-obliterators of the Cold War and seeks to develop smaller, tactical nuclear weapons, such as deep penetrating bunker busters or mininukes, which are regarded as more flexible and usable. If significantly new designs are employed, such weapons would require to be tested, and pressure has continued to mount from some sectors of the Bush administration for the U.S. to revoke its signature on the CTBT and resume nuclear testing in Nevada. This pressure has impeded until today the ratification of the CBTB by the U.S. government.37 However, if the CTBT does not entry into force in the near future, then this situation will have a devastating impact within the nuclear nonproliferation regime as well for international peace, security and stability. Reaction to try to reach a strategic balance at least from one nuclear weapon States will not take long. Although the SORT (Moscow Treaty) and revised nuclear posture together imply a reduction in sole reliance on nuclear weapons for U.S. strategic offence and deterrence, there appears to be an attempt to lower the threshold for use. The aim of some key U.S. officials is to make nuclear weapons more useful, a tool in the defense arsenal rather than a concept for deterrence that they do not really trust. An example of the “John Bolton” approach to the NPT was revealed in Geneva, when Ambassador Jackie Sanders resurrected the apparent Article VI link between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament that the 2000 Review Conference had severed: “we must also not forget that Article VI further requires NPT parties to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (10, pp 3). According with SALT I treaty adopted in 1972, the U.S. cannot have more than 710 launchers of ballistic missiles based on submarines and no more than 44 submarines with modern ballistic missiles. The START I treaty, adopted in 1994, allowed the U.S. to have no more than 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 6,000 nuclear warheads distributed between ground-based and submarines-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The START II treaty force the U.S. to a further reduction of nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250 for its offensive nuclear strategic weapons. The SORT treaty (Moscow treaty) foresees that the U.S. should reduce its nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. The number and power of all nuclear weapons in today’s nuclear arsenals of the U.S. . can destroy the world completely not once but several times. After 2012 this situation will not change.

B. Russia Since 1949 has been estimate that the Soviet Union/Russia could had produced around 55,000 nuclear warheads. The United States Defense Department and CIA estimate that Russia dismantled slightly more than 1,000 nuclear warheads per year during the 1990s, so that its remaining stockpile of intact nuclear warheads may be around 18,600. The destruction of Russian’s nuclear weapons represents around 66.2% of the total nuclear warheads produced by this country. Only around 8,600 of these are thought to be operational. As many

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The international community expects that the new U.S. administration change the current U.S. position on this subject and proceed with the ratification of the CBTB in 2009.

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as 10,000 nuclear warheads are believed to be in nonoperational status: in reserve for possible redeployment, or retired and awaiting dismantlement.

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Figure 11. The Topol intercontinental ballistic missile. This missile has a range of 10,500 km, and a payload of 1,000 kg. It is armed with a single 550 Kt warhead with an accuracy (CEP–circular error probability) of 200 m.

Figure 12.Typhoon SSBN (Type 941 Akula).

Figure 13. Tu-95 bomber "Bear-H" (TU-95MS6/16). Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

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“Russia retains a sprawling nuclear arsenal comprising enough strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over. Despite this power, press reports from Xinhuanet dated February 18, 2004, quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin saying “that the military will be equipped with new strategic weapons and Russia may begin building its own missile defence system.” Putin then went on to say that “the new strategic weapons would be capable to hit targets deep inside continents at hypersonic speed and change the altitude and direction of their flight.” This was followed by an Associated Press report stating that “Russia had successfully tested a hypersonic anti-Star Wars weapon capable of penetrating any prospective missile shield. Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, told a news conference that “the prototype weapon proved it could manoeuvre quickly enough to make any missile defence useless”(10, pp 3). According to the SALT I treaty adopted in 1972, Russia cannot have more than 950 launchers of ballistic missiles based on submarines and no more than 62 submarines with modern ballistic missiles. The START I treaty allow Russia to have no more than 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 6,000 nuclear warheads distributed between groundbased and submarines-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The START II treaty force Russia to a further reduction of nuclear warheads to 3,800 - 4,250 for its offensive nuclear strategic weapons. The SORT treaty foresees that Russia should reduce its nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by 2012. After 2012 Russia will have sufficient power to destroy the earth several times.

C.United Kingdom38 The country has produced approximately 1,200 warheads since 1953. Its current nuclear stockpile is thought to consist of some 160 strategic and substrategic warheads on Vanguardclass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The destruction of nuclear warheads represents around 86.7% of the total nuclear warheads produced by the UK. In November 2006, the UK announced plans to extend the life of its Trident nuclear-weapon system, underlining the need to retain an independent British nuclear deterrent. At the same time, it announced a 20% cut in its 200 nuclear warheads arsenal to a total of 160 warheads. The British nuclear arsenal peaked in the 1970s at 350 warheads. The UK deterrent has the following three technical components: • •

•

The Vanguard-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), of which the UK has four, HMS Vanguard, Victorious, Vigilant, and Vengeance. The Trident D5 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile, manufactured in the USA by Lockheed Martin. Under the Polaris Sales Agreement (modified for Trident), the UK has title to 58 missiles, of which it has now used 8 in tests. Each missile is capable of carrying 12 warheads, but since the 1998 Strategic Defense Review, the number of warheads per missile has been limited to 3 warheads (and 48 warheads in total per submarine). The nuclear warhead is designed and manufactured in the UK at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, and Burghfield in Berkshire.

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Figure 14. The vanguard-class submarine.

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“UK is now the smallest of the nuclear weapon State parties of the NPT, having brought its nuclear arsenal down to one system (Trident submarines) and no more than 160 nuclear warheads. “Her Majesty's Government also directed the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston to conduct research into verifying nuclear disarmament, the fruits of which have been presented at various meetings since 2000” (10, pp 4).

D.France France has produced more than 1,260 nuclear warheads since 1964. The country maintains approximately 350 nuclear warheads, down from 540 in 1992. The destruction of nuclear warheads represents around 72.2% of the total of nuclear warheads produced by France. Both the Navy and Air force deploy nuclear capable aircraft. France developed a new nuclear capable fighter-bomber, the Rafale, and has four nuclear capable submarines, two of the Triomphant class, one L'Inflexible class and one Redoubtable class. Two more Triomphant class submarines are currently being built. France dismantled its 18 land –based intermediate range missiles from 1996-98. The nuclear testing facilities at Moruroa and Fangataufa were closed following France's accession to the CTBT. France ceased production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in 1992 and 1996 respectively.

Figure 15.The Triomphant SSBN (SNLE-NG). 38

See “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent,”

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

Figure 16. Fighter-bomber Rafale.

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Despite stopping the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, there are no signs that France will begin the destruction of all of its nuclear weapons in the near future. . On the contrary, France has announced that its current nuclear systems will remain robust for at least the next three decades. “It is safe to say that France is not planning to dismantle those systems early to comply with the 13 steps of the NPT Plan of Action for nuclear disarmament in a timely manner. The full implementation of Article VI, by French calculations, seems to exist in a very far distant future, if at all (10, pp 4).

E.China China is thought to have produced some 600 nuclear warheads since 1964. Today the country has an estimate arsenal of around 400 nuclear warheads, down from 435 in 1993. The destruction of nuclear warheads represents around 33.3% of the total of warheads produced by China. “China is known to be proceeding with an ambitious modernization program started in the last decade, including MIRVing its warheads and building more sophisticated nuclear weapons delivery systems”(10, pp 3 and 4).

Figure 17. DF-5 missile. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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Figure 18. Julang-1 missile.

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F.India and Pakistan These are the world's two newest declared nuclear weapon States. According to expert estimates, they have fewer than 100 nuclear warheads between them, most of which are not yet operationally deployed. Its been estimated that India could have produced enough fissile material for the production of 45 to 95 nuclear warheads but may have assembled only between 30 and 35. Pakistan has sufficiently produced fissile material for the production 30 to 52 nuclear weapons but has assembled between 24 and 48 warheads. Both countries are thought to be increasing their stockpiles. G.Israel This country has neither confirmed nor denied possession of nuclear weapons. Although U.S. intelligence has reported for many years that Israel is a de facto nuclear weapons States. Some unofficial reports estimate Israel's nuclear arsenal to have as many as 200 nuclear warheads, which was first assembled in 1967. H.The Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK) The government of the DPRK had declared the possession of nuclear weapons and had announced the test of nuclear warheads. However, there is no official announcement of how many nuclear warheads have been produced. In any case, the number of nuclear warheads in the possession of the DPRK should be very small, taking into account the limited amount of fissile materials produced. The following table summarized the information on the number of nuclear weapons and their status contained in previous paragraphs:

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Jorge Morales Pedraza Table 3. Situation of the current nuclear weapons stockpile.

Country

Nuclear weapons produced

Nuclear weapons in active or operational

Nuclear weapons inactive or nonoperational status

Nuclear weapons dismantled

Nuclear weapons in all levels of readiness

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status U.S.

70,00039

5,736

-

60,00040

9,962

Russia

55,00041

8,60042

10,000

36,400

-

France

1,26043

350

-

910

-

China

60044

400

-

200

-

UK

1,20045

160

1,040

-

Israel

20046

-

-

-

-

India

45-9547

30-35

-

-

-

Pakistan

30-5248

24-48

-

-

-

DPRK

Unknown

-

-

-

-

The Destruction Power of a Nuclear Weapon The most deadly type of nuclear weapon now in the hands of a very limited number of States is the so-called “strategic nuclear weapons.”49 “Nuclear weapons have devastating effects, and may be employed against both military and civilian targets. Against military targets, they can be used at the tactical level to wipe out 39

Approximated figure. Approximated figure. 41 Approximated figure. 42 Estimate figure. 43 Approximated figure. 44 Approximated figure. 45 Approximated figure. 46 Approximated figure. 47 Approximated figure. 48 Approximated figure. 49 Other types of nuclear weapons with less destruction power are the so-called substrategic and tactical nuclear weapons. 40

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entire military formations and infrastructures, or at the strategic level to attack enemy nuclear weapons and vital command and control posts deep inside enemy territory. The most terrifying use of nuclear weapons is against civilian targets. Against civilian targets, nuclear weapons can be used to level entire cities within moments and leave behind virtually no survivors” (32, pp 75). The purpose of such attacks is to terrify the population of an entire country forcing the government to an unconditional surrender. The nuclear bombs dropped by the U.S. over two Japanese cities in August 1945 have the objective to force the Japanese government to an unconditional surrender, with the purpose to avoid the invasion of the country by U.S. troops. “No effective defense exists against the effects of nuclear weapons, and no target can withstand a determined nuclear attack. Because of their tremendous destructive power, nuclear weapons are considered as distinct from other kinds of weapons and their advent has led to the emergence of special nuclear military doctrines”. For this reason, “nuclear weapons can be attractive to those that seek an assured mass destruction capability. Because they are significantly more destructive and predictable in their effects than either chemical or biological weapons, nuclear weapons tend to be regarded as more reliable and possibly more credible than the former” (32, pp 75 and 76). Taking into account the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, the majority of countries consider the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon destruction facilities, as the highest priority within the disarmament agenda at multilateral level. However, despite of the international efforts to initiate the destruction of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities as soon as possible, the negative position adopted so far by nuclear weapon States to initiate such negotiations in good faith is creating an extremely difficult situation, and is damaging the credibility of the NPT and of the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Chemical Weapons One of the most deadly WMD, yet in the military arsenals of 6 countries,50 is the socalled “chemical weapons.” These types of weapons make deliberate chemical substances to inflict death or harm and can be used against military as well as civilian targets.51 According to the definition contained in Reference 32, “chemical weapons consist of toxic chemicals (and their precursors), and the devices used to deliver these to target”. To be suitable for use as a weapon of war, “a chemical substance must be sufficiently toxic to induce the desired effects when applied in small quantities, be reasonably easy to produce in large quantities, and be stable enough to preserve its toxicity during storage and survive the process of dissemination” (32, pp 54). 50 These following states are: Albania, India, Libya, U.S., Russia, and South Korea. Another eleven countries indicated that old and abandoned chemical weapons are located in their territories. Russia and the U.S. possess some 70,000 tons of chemical agents that should be destroyed in a period of ten years. With approximately 40% of the U.S. chemical weapon stocks destroyed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has reported that “destruction would be completed in 2012 at the earliest. U.S. delays are partly due to environmental and safety concerns.” The figures for Russia are even less satisfactory. Only approximately 4% of the former Soviet Union’s 40,000-tons stockpile has been destroyed. 51 Militarily, chemical weapons are most likely to be used in tactical situations. Against civilian targets, chemical weapons are probably best suited for terrorist attacks.

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Chemical weapons are considered by many as the “weapons of the poor,” this means a weapon that can be produced by a very large number of countries, independently of their economic and technological development and military capabilities. In the past, chemical weapons were produced by several countries in order to have a deterrence weapons to be used in case of an attack carried out by the most powerful military countries, some of which have at least nuclear weapons in their military arsenals. “Toxic chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons may be classified according to several criteria such as for instance their volatility or military use. Most commonly, however, they are grouped according to their effects into: blood agents, blister agents, choking agents, nerve agents, incapacitating agents, harassing agents, and toxins” (32, pp 54 and 55) It is important to single out that some of the toxic chemicals are used for riot control and are not considered to be chemical weapons. For this reason, their use is not prohibited by the CWC. However, according with Reference 37, the term “non-lethal weapons in the context of the CWC usually refers to riot control agents, such as tear gas and CS gas, and substances that can incapacitate by putting a person to sleep, often referred to as ‘knock-out’ gas. Yet the term non-lethal is misleading, since all of these gases can be lethal, if the concentration is sufficiently high and the time of exposure sufficiently long. Similarly, substances that cause unconsciousness may be lethal in concentrations used to affect a large number of people simultaneously. The use of riot control agents is specifically and explicitly prohibited in the CWC as a method of warfare. It may at first be difficult to understand why it is a violation of international law to use tear gas against combatants in war, but not necessarily a violation to use it against a civilian population in peacetime. The reason is that tear gas is used for riot control in peacetime to avoid the use of firearms, while riot control agents have a history of being used in wars to force combatants out of foxholes or bunkers to be exposed to lethal arms or explosives. Furthermore, any use of riot control agents risks provoking retaliation or an escalation in the choice of chemical agents. States still say that they might need to use riot control agents for purposes other than warfare (e.g., a riot in a prison). International regulations relevant to such use are not laid down in the CWC but are found in the framework of human rights and international humanitarian law” [37, pp 132]. However, the problem is not the legal use of riot control agents by certain governments in specific situation and in order to avoid the use of firearms. The problem is that now some of these governments would like to have a more flexible interpretation of the CWC rules on the use of some incapacitating agents. “There is an increasing interest among some governments to adopt a more flexible interpretation of the CWC rules on the use of incapacitating chemical weapons, even as a method of warfare, in order to be able to use them in diverse situations”. Such an interpretation “would constitute a dangerous erosion of the fundamental ban on chemical weapons that the authors of the Convention intended. If accepted, it might allow for use in armed conflict of substances such as fentanyl, a derivative of which was used in Moscow in 2002 when terrorists held hostages at a theatre and law enforcement units used the opiate to facilitate their attack. The opiate killed about one-fifth of the hostages. States parties and the OPCW should reaffirm that an interpretation of the CWC allowing the use of such substances in armed conflicts would not be consistent with the Convention”(37, pp 132). The international community should adopt a firm position supporting this view and reject any flexible interpretation of the CWC’s provisions on this subject.

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The effects of chemical weapons depend on several factors including effective dissemination, meteorological conditions, and the level of defense available in the country and in the zone attacked. Proper dissemination is crucial for chemical weapons. Unless the toxic substances are efficiently distributed over the target, their direct impact will likely be negligible. “Broadly speaking, there are three main types of chemical weapons munitions: explosive munitions, thermal munitions and spraying munitions. Explosive munitions employ highexplosives to distribute the chemical substance over the target. They are not particularly efficient since most of the substance is likely to be incinerated by the initial explosion, and since they are unable to control for particle size. They are, however, easy and inexpensive to produce, since they are adapted from common conventional weapons. Thermal munitions rely on pyrotechnics to aerosolize and disseminate the toxic substance. They are more effective than explosive munitions in that they are better able to control for particle size; however, most toxic substances are quite sensitive to heat and tend to degrade quickly if overexposed. Spraying munitions employ aerodynamic stress to disperse a toxic chemical in aerosol form. They have the advantage of offering very good control over particle size, and are particularly well suited for area-coverage dissemination. However, unless employed at low altitudes, the fine aerosol droplets produced may simply evaporate or be carried away by the wind before they have the chance to reach their target” (32, pp 56). One of the factors that need to be considered very carefully during a possible use of chemical weapons in a military conflict is the meteorological conditions in the area of the attack. “Meteorological situation will have a significant impact on the effect of chemical weapons. Unfavorable weather conditions can frustrate a chemical weapons attack, independently of the type of chemical weapons used. Bad wind may blow the substance offtarget or may disperse it before it can take effect, while rain may render it ineffective. As a WMD, chemical weapons can be attractive to State and non-State actors seeking a weapons capability. Compared to nuclear weapons, they are significantly easier and cheaper to develop, produce and maintain. However, their unreliable effects and their other drawbacks outlined above, make them inferior to nuclear weapons from the military point of view52. The level of protection available to the target will also be determinant in deciding the impact of chemical weapons. In the absence of protection, chemical weapons can have devastating effects. However, timely detection and adequate personal and collective protection equipment can to a large extent vitiate these. The most common chemical weapon defense is the gas mask” (32 pages 57 and 58). Some chemical weapons structures are shown in the following figures:

52

Chemical weapons can be very effective in supporting conventional military activities. In offensive operations, surprise attacks of short duration but high intensity with nonpersistent substances can be used to weaken enemy defenses along and to the rear of areas slated for penetration, while persistent agents can be used to secure the flanks against counter-attack or to hinder the withdrawal of enemy forces. In defensive operations, non-persistent agents can be used to disrupt enemy staging areas, command posts, and fire-support emplacements, while persistent agents can be used to channel enemy forces into defense traps (32, pp 58).

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Jorge Morales Pedraza

Figure 19. Molecular structure of sarin. Source: National Library of Medicine.

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Figure 20. Molecular structure of hydrogen cyanide. Source: National Library of Medicine.

Figure 21. Smokescreen produced by the M825 WP projectile, which releases 116 WP-saturated wedges.

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A summary of the information regarding the process of the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities carried out by the OPCW can be found in the following bullets53: • • • • •

A hundred percent of the declared chemical weapons production facilities have been inactivated. All are subject to a verification regime of unprecedented stringency. A hundred percent of the declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been inventoried and verified. Sixty-one of the 65 chemical weapons production facilities declared to the OPCW by 12 State parties have been either destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes. One-third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the CWC have also been verifiably destroyed. Over one-third of the 71,000 metric tones of chemical agents have been verifiably destroyed.

The comprehensive prohibition of the acquisition, production and use of chemical weapons has been until now a success. However, a number of challenges remain to be solved. They are listed in one document and two plans of actions that were adopted by the 2003 CWC Review Conference. The main challenges are the following:

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a) A failure to meet CWC deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. A major problem in the implementation of the CWC has been and remains the slow rate of destruction of the vast chemical weapon arsenals built up by the U.S. and by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, as well as of those abandoned by Japan in China during World War II. The high cost of destruction and the environmental and safety concerns of local populations have contributed to these delays. b) Several States still have not joined the CWC. c) A continued interest among States in the development of non-lethal chemical weapons, such as incapacitants. d) Shortcomings in verification and inspection activities. e) Limited applicability to non-State actors (terrorists). f) Uneven implementation among State parties. “Only the complete destruction of all stockpiles of chemical weapons will ensure that these weapons cannot be used by States or terrorist groups and that there can be no accidental releases” (37, pp 129).

53

The information corresponds to March 2008.

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Biological Weapons

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Biological weapons are weapons that make deliberate use of pathogenic materials to inflict death or harm in humans, animals, or even plants. This type of weapons can be used against military as well as civilian targets. According with the definition contained in Reference 32, “biological weapons consist of biological agents and the munitions, equipment, or means employed in their delivery”. Most biological weapon agents are living organisms that can reproduce and multiply following dispersion. This quality allows them to actually multiply their effect over time. Furthermore, some agents can cause contagion, which means that they can spread disease from one contaminated organism to another. Agents causing contagious diseases have the potential to trigger an epidemic, especially if local sanitation conditions are poor. “Biological weapons can be subdivided in several ways. One way is to consider the type of agent that causes disease, such as bacteria, viruses, or toxins. Another is to look at the types of effects, such as a disease that can be transmitted between humans (contagious) or only affects those directly exposed to the biological agent. A third way is to look at symptoms – for example, some diseases might normally lead to death while others might incapacitate their victims or lead to changes in behaviour” (37, pp 113). “From a warfare point of view, the above agents are evidently more valuable, because they have the potential to inflict the greatest amount of damage. Other inherent features, which influence the suitability of biological agents for warfare purposes include: infectivity, virulence, toxicity, incubation period, lethality and stability. Biological agents suitable to be used as a biological weapon are typically classified into five categories: bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi, and toxins. Biological agents may be dispersed by a variety of explosive, spraying, or dispenser munitions” (32, pp 40 and 41). Some biological agents are shown in the following figures:

Figure 22. Electron Micrograph of Bacillus anthracis spores. Source: CDC Public Health Image Library (ID # 2267).

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Source: CDC Public Health Image.

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Figure 23. Microscopic image of C. botulinum Library Image (ID # 2107).

Figure 24. Microscopic image of F. tularensis. Source: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) Laboratory of Intracellular Parasites, Tularemia Pathogenesis Section.

Figure 25. Electron micrograph of Ebola virus. Source: CDC Public Health Image Library (ID # 1181).

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Another type of specific biological weapons is the so-called “toxins.” Toxins are “poisonous substances produced or derived from animals, plants or micro-organisms. Unlike the other kinds of biological agents, toxins are not living organisms and hence are unable to reproduce. Some toxins may be produced artificially. Toxins utilizable in biological weapons include alfatoxins, botulinum, toxins, ricin, staphylococcus aureus toxins and saxitoxin” (32, pp 40 and 41). “Although the exact production process is agent-specific, the manufacture of biological agents generally follows four steps: • •

•

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•

Step 1: Selecting the microorganisms to be used either from a natural source or from culture collections maintained for medical or research purposes. Step 2: Culturing the micro-organisms by seeding the appropriate growth media (in the case of toxins, extracting the culture from an appropriate plant or animal source) until the desired quantities are obtained. Step 3: Concentrating the culture to increase its potency and make it suitable for warfare purposes. Step 4: Stabilizing the culture to protect it from degradation either during storage or usage” (32, pp 41).

Compared to nuclear weapons, they are significantly easier and cheaper to develop, produce, and maintain.54 However, their unreliable effects and other drawbacks, make them inferior to nuclear and chemical weapons from the military point of view, and even could affect the military troops of the country that use them in a military conflict. The use of biological weapons has been prohibited since 1925 by the Geneva Protocol.55 The development, production, possession, and use of biological weapons have been prohibited since 1972 by the BWC. “The effects of biological weapons are influenced by many factors including the type and quality of agents used, effective dissemination, environmental conditions and the susceptibility of the target. Different types of agents induce different results”56 (32, pp 42) A list of possible biological agents is included in Annex 3. However, according with the BWC no biological weapons as such should be in the military arsenals of any of its State parties. However, the BWC allow its State parties to possess small amount of biological agents for preservation, protection, or for other peaceful purposes.

54 55

56

These characteristics of the biological weapons make them very attractive to terrorist groups seeking to acquire WMD capabilities. From the military point of view, biological weapons are not so effective. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices; prohibits also the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, and commits the parties to exert every effort to induce other States to accede. Biological agents are most effective when disseminated as aerosols. In this case, about 40-60% of the agent is expected to survive the initial dispersion process. Using explosives dissemination, it is expected that only about 1-5% of the agent is likely to survive.

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Conventional Weapons It is very difficult to make a clear distinction between what should be considered as a “defensive or as an offensive conventional weapons”, since this character depend of the context in which these weapons is used, as well as other intrinsic properties.57 All efforts carried out up to now to arrive to a understanding of these two concepts acceptable to the international community have failed, due to the position assumed by some of the most powerful countries from the military point of view against to accept any kind of a clear definition of these concepts. Nevertheless, most countries classify the following conventional weapons as eminently offensives: • • • • • • • • •

Heavy tanks. Long range artillery systems. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, including cruises missiles with a range over 5,500 kilometers but incapable to carry out WMD. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including cruises missiles with a range between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers but incapable to carry out WMD. Strategic bombers. Airplanes and attack helicopters. Aircraft carriers. Large battleships. Attack submarines.

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Some of these weapons are shown in the following figures:

Figure 26. B-1 strategic bomber (U.S.).

57

All WMD are considered as an offensive weapon.

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Figure 27. TU-160 Blackjack strategic bomber (Russia).

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Figure 28. Aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (U.S.).

Figure 29. Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov (Russia).

Figure 30. Aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (UK). HM

HM

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Figure 31. M1A2 tank (U.S.).

Among conventional weapons classified as “eminently defensive” are the following: • • • • •

Antitank weapons. Air defense weapons. Antitank mines.58 Middle and short range artillery systems, including mortars. Small and light weapons.

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Small Arms and Light Weapons According with Reference 19, “the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons, and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels” (19, pp 7). Small arms and light weapons have been defined in various ways in different forum. According with the definition contained in Reference 20, small arms and light weapons will mean “any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas”59. “In no case will antique small arms and light weapons include those manufactured after 1899: b) Small arms are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. b) Light weapons are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel 58

Antipersonnel mines are prohibited under the Convention on the Prohibition of the USE, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (The Ottawa Convention) of December 1997. One of the new elements introduced by this international instrument is the following: For a party involved in armed conflict, withdrawal of this Convention takes effect only after the end of the conflict.

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Jorge Morales Pedraza and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres” (20, pp 7).

The purposes of the international community in adopting an international instrument on the control of small and light weapons are the following: • •

To enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. To promote and facilitate international cooperation and assistance in marking and tracing and to enhance the effectiveness of, and complement, existing bilateral, regional and international agreements to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

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It is important to stress that this international instrument “does not restrict the right of States to acquire, manufacture, transfer, and retain small arms and light weapons for their self-defense and security needs, as well as for their capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations, in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations” (20, pp 7). “Small arms and light weapons are illicit if: a) They are considered illicit under the law of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the small arm or light weapon is found. b) They are transferred in violation of arms embargoes decided by the UNSC in accordance with the United Nations Chapter. c) They are not marked in accordance with the provisions of international instrument in force on this subject. d) They are manufactured or assembled without a licence or authorization from the competent authority of the StatesStates where the manufacture or assembly takes place. e) They are transferred without a licence or authorization by a competent national authority” (20, pp 8). Since the end of the Cold War, the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons has posed and continues to pose a major threat to international peace and security, as well as the stability of countries and regions. In virtually all military conflicts that have erupted since 1990, small arms and light weapons have been the type of weapons most commonly used by all parties involved. Armed conflicts that took place during this period caused the dead of more than 5 millions of peoples, civilians most of them, and were the main factor responsible for the great sufferings and penalties of the survivors.60

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Antique small arms and light weapons and their replicas will be defined in accordance with domestic law. For more information see Reference 24 pp 3 and 4.

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Many millions of small arms are in existence in almost all countries in the world. Many thousands of this type of weapons is manufactured each day in a selected group of countries, not all of them considered as developed country. Some developing countries, with important socio-economic needs are also producing this type of weapons for national use, or for exporting them to other countries. Inexplicable five developing countries are among the world fifteen countries with the largest military expenditures (see Table 1) The vast majority of casualties resulting from armed conflicts have been the result of the use of small arms and light weapons, far and away above those caused by any other kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons. One of the major problems that the international community is now facing is the increase in illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This illicit trade “sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law and impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism. There is a “close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals, and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” (19, pp 7 and 8). This link stress the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective. At the same time it is important to recognize the right of self-determination of all people, particularly the situation of people still under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and the right to use small arms and light weapons to expel foreign troops from their soil. This struggle cannot be classified as terrorism activities. Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, but international cooperation and assistance, including financial and technical assistance as appropriate, are needed in order to facilitate efforts carried by governments at local, national, regional and international levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

Intelligent Weapons61 The development of certain types of conventional weapons with a high level of precision and destructive power, transforms these weapons in very dangerous military hardware. The production of the so-called “intelligent weapons” by the U.S. and other military powers, make more feasible the initiation of an armed conflict, since the use of these weapons can reduce considerably the number of civilian casualties, and limit the level of destruction in the attacked countries, particularly civilian industrial facilities if these indicators are compared with the same one in past wars. The advances in science and technology and their application in the military field have allowed the main military powers the production of conventional weapons to be more precise and difficult to be detected by their potential enemies. Thus, transforming these weapons into a serious threat for the security and defense of several countries, in particular, for those that are very weak from the military point of view, or are considered as potential or real enemies. 61 Also called “smart weapons.”

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With the purpose to stop, or at least to significantly reduce the use of important amount of resources in the research of new intelligent weapons and in the production of this type of weapons, the international community should support the adoption of specific measures at national, regional and international levels in order to achieve this goal. Some of these measures are included in chapter VIII.

Cluster Munitions One of the most danger conventional weapons is the so-called “cluster bombs or munitions.” Cluster munitions are, in accordance with the definition adopted by the CCM, “conventional munitions that is designed to disperse or release explosive sub-munitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive sub-munitions.”62 The above definition of cluster munitions does not include the following: a) “A munition or sub-munition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role. b) A munition or sub-munition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects. c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded sub-munitions, has all of the following characteristics:

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• • • • •

Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive sub-munitions. Each explosive sub-munition weighs more than four kilograms. Each explosive sub-munition is designed to detect and engage a single target object. Each explosive sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism. Each explosive sub-munition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature” (31, Article 1)

Cluster munitions are deployed from the air and from the ground and release dozens or hundreds of smaller submunitions, often called “bomblets,” if dropped from the air, and “grenades” if delivered from the ground by the artillery or rockets. The CCM was negotiated and adopted at the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on 30 May 2008 by 111 States. It is a legally binding international treaty that prohibits the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions, and is in accordance with international human rights and international humanitarian law. The Convention was open for signature in Oslo on December 3, 2008, and was signed by 111 States. The Convention will enter into force six months after the thirtieth country has deposited its instrument of

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The definition makes certain clarifications for weapons that have sub-munitions but are not considered cluster munitions, such as weapons with submunitions designed for smoke, flare, and electronic counter-measures. Also falling outside the definition are weapons that have sub-munitions but that do not cause the indiscriminate area effects.

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ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations, who will be the depositary for the treaty.63 The treaty requires States, in accordance with national regulations, “separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction; to destroy64 or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State party”65 (31, Article 3). The Convention obliges “each State party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows: Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date; b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants” (31, Article 4).

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a.

The obligations relating to victim assistance are groundbreaking. Under Article 5, each State party “with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights laws, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion,” to all victims of the use of cluster munitions (31, Article 5). The above-mentioned article demands the full realization of the rights of people affected by cluster munitions and require States to implement effective victim assistance measures. State parties must develop a national action plan to implement victim assistance activities and designate a national focal point within the government for coordination matters on this important subject. All State parties in a position to do so are required to provide technical, material and financial assistance to State parties affected by cluster munitions in order to assist them with clearance, risk education, stockpile destruction, and victim assistance, including social and economic recovery.

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The U.S. was against the adoption of this agreement on the basis of the importance given by the U.S. military machinery to the use of this type of bombs in certain military operations. According with public information, during 1964- and 1973 the USA dropped against Laos, the country most affected with the use of these weapons, around 260 million of cluster munitions, but less than 400,000 were retired, and 11,000 persons have died in this period.

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The destruction methods should comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment (31, Article 3) 65 An extension of this period up to four years can be considered, if a specific States cannot destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions in the period established by the Convention. Pedraza, Jorge Morales, and Senior Staff IAEA. Nuclear Disarmament: Concepts, Principles and Actions for Strengthening the Non-proliferation

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State parties are obligated to report to the United Nations, no later than 180 days after entry into force and on an annual basis by April 30th each year thereafter, on the status of their treaty implementation, including national implementation measures; the type, quantity and technical characteristics of cluster munitions and sub-munitions stockpiled; the status and progress of stockpile destruction programs; the conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities; the size and location of areas contaminated by cluster munitions; the status and progress of cluster munitions clearance programs; measures taken to provide risk education; the status and progress of implementation of the treaty’s victim assistance provisions; the amount of national resources allocated for clearance, stockpile destruction and victim assistance; and the type, quantity, and destination of international cooperation and assistance provided. The Convention obliges State parties to take all appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures to implement it, including penal sanctions. The Convention also urges all State parties to enact comprehensive new national legislation in order to ensure the implementation of all Convention’s provisions. Until 2008 at least fourteen countries have used cluster munitions.66 Billions of submunitions are stockpiled by some seventy-six countries. A total of thirty-four States are known to have produced over 210 different types cluster munitions. More than two dozen countries have been affected by the use of cluster munitions.67 The destruction of all cluster munitions will be a complex and expensive task that should be carried by at least thirty-four States, if all States that produced in the past this type of munitions became party of the CMC. Why is it so important for the adoption of the CMC in the international community? Airdropped or ground-launched cluster munitions cause the following two major humanitarian problems and risks to civilians: First, they cannot distinguish between military targets and civilians. For this reason alone, the humanitarian impact can be extreme, especially when cluster munitions are used in or near populated areas. Second, it is very common that many submunitions fail to detonate on impact. In these cases, these submunitions become de facto antipersonnel mines killing and maiming people long after the conflict has ended. For all of the above reasons, cluster munitions stand out as the conventional weapon that poses the gravest dangers to civilians since antipersonnel mines were banned by the international cmuunity in 1997. Israel’s massive use of cluster munitions in Lebanon in August 2006, resulted in more than 200 civilian casualties in the year following the ceasefire and served as the catalyst that has propelled governments to attempt to secure a legally-binding international instrument prohibiting the production, storage, possession, adquisition and use of this dangerous type of conventional weapons.

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These countries are the following: Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Israel, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia (USSR), Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, UK, U.S., and FR Yugoslavia. These countries are the following: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Vietnam, as well as Chechnya, Falkland/Malvinas, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.

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Antipersonnel Land Mines According with the definition contained in Reference 32, antipersonal mines or land mines are an “explosive device emplaced below, on the surface, or just above the ground, designed to detonate on contact or in the proximity of a target for the purpose of killing, destroying, injuring, or incapacitating it. Broadly speaking, landmines are divided into two categories: “antipersonnel mines” and “anti-vehicle mines.” Antipersonnel mines are designed “to kill or injure persons, while antivehicle mines are designed to destroy or damage tanks and other sorts of armoured vehicles” (32, pp 32). . Antipersonal mines were used in the past in an irresponsible manner and without any control by some countries and non-State combatants, affecting the population that lives in one third of the countries. To stop the irresponsible use of antipersonnel land mines the international community adopted in 1999 a multilateral treaty banning the use, production, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of this kind of weapons. The treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction, also known by the Ottawa Convention.68 State parties to this Convention are obligeds to clear existing minefields69 within ten years following the entry into force of the Convention, and to destroy all antipersonnel mines in their possession. State parties are also urged to assist any other country in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention. The Ottawa Convention has no verification mechanism as such. The implementation of the Convention’s provisions “is verified through annual declarations submitted by the parties to the Secretary-General of the United Nations detailing the fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention and through provisions for clarification requests and fact-finding missions. The Landmine Monitor, an annual report compiled by an international collection of civil society groups and individuals, also contributes to verifying that parties are complying with their obligations. The Convention entered into force on March 1, 1999, it is of unlimited duration and withdrawal requires six months prior notification. For a party involved in armed conflict, withdrawal takes effect only after the end of the conflict” (32, pp 21 and 22). .

Delivery Systems (Missiles) According with the definition contained in Reference 32, are “unmanned, disposable, rocket-powered, or air-breathing vehicles, which are guided to rather than aimed at a target. Missiles can have various ranges extending from a few hundred meters to several thousand kilometers, and can carry various types of conventional and WMD ordnance. They can be air, land, or sea-based, and can be fired from either static or mobile launchers. Missiles are divided into two categories: Ballistic missiles and Cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles follow a ballistic (i.e., parabolic) flight path. Comprise a launcher, propulsion system and payload and guidance system. Cruise missiles are “small unmanned guided vehicles that use propulsion 68 Since the Ottawa Convention entered in force more than 32 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed and humanitarian mine-action activities have significantly increased around the world. (26, pp 10). 69 According with Reference 32, pp 21, minefields are “those areas under the jurisdiction or control of a party in which mines are known or suspected to exist. Such areas must be marked, monitored and protected until all landmines are removed and destroyed.”

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and aerodynamic lift in order to overcome gravity and drag. Cruise missiles can be launched from a number of air, land and sea-based platforms. Comprise a propulsion system, payload and guidance system” (32, pp 118, 119 and 120). The international community gave special importance to the control of missiles technology and the need to avoid an arms race on this type of technology. Why the control of the missiles technology is so important for the international community? The reasons are as follows. First, missiles are indispensable delivery systems for a group of conventional weapons and WMD. Without the use of missiles as delivery system these weapons cannot be delivered to targets. Second, with the use of missiles you can avoid the contact with the enemy, because it can be launched hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from the enemy lines, cities, or military targets. There are no military human casualties involved in a missile launching from one of the side in the military conflict. Third, missiles are not so easy to intercept and destroy. Fourth, is a terrifying weapon for the civilian population, particularly in case of countries without adequate air-defense and civil protection forces and the correspondent infrastructure in wartime. For these and another reasons missiles, as indispensable delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, were the main focus of the Cold War arms control treaties ands agreements, including the SALT I and SALT II agreements, START I and START II treaties, SORT treaty, and INF treaty. On the other hand, “missiles are easier to count and destroy in a transparent manner than are nuclear warheads; control of the missiles was therefore seen as an efficient way to limit the nuclear arms race” (37, pp 142) If missiles capable to carry out WMD are not available in the military arsenal of any State, then this type of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, are extremely difficult, for not to say almost impossible, to be used in a military conflict. “Around 40 States are known to have acquired or developed ballistic missiles, but most have only short-range (