Negro Employment in the Maritime Industries: A Study of Racial Policies in the Shipbuilding, Longshore, and Offshore Maritime Industry 9781512820959

Table of contents :
Foreword
CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
Part One. THE NEGRO IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
CHAPTER I Introduction
CHAPTER II. The Shipbuilding Industry
CHAPTER III. Negro Shipbuilding Employment from the Colonial Period to i960
CHAPTER IV. Negro Employment Since i960
CHAPTER V. Determinants Of Industry Policy
APPENDIX A. Statistical Tables
Appendix B. CONSTITUTION AND RITUAL CLAUSES OF THE BOILERMAKERS UNION
Index
Frontmatter 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURE
Part Two. THE NEGRO IN THE LONGSHORE INDUSTRY
CHAPTER I. Introduction
CHAPTER II. The Longshore Industry
CHAPTER III. The Negro Struggle for Waterfront Jobs
CHAPTER IV. Concluding Observations
Index
Frontmatter 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
Part Three. THE NEGRO IN THE OFFSHORE MARITIME INDUSTRY
CHAPTER I. Introduction
CHAPTER II. The Offshore Maritime Industry
CHAPTER III. The Negro Maritime Tradition From Colonial Days to 1960
CHAPTER IV. Negro Maritime Employment Since 1960
CHAPTER V. Government and Union Policies
CHAPTER VI. Concluding Remarks
Appendix A. STATISTICAL TABLES
Index
Frontmatter 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Part Four CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

Citation preview

NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRIES A Study of Racial Policies in the Shipbuilding, Longshore, and Offshore Maritime Industries

The Wharton School's Industrial Research Unit has been noted for its "relevant research" since its founding in 1921. The IRU is now the largest academic publisher of manpower and collective bargaining studies. Major Industrial Research Unit Studies and monographs in special series, such as the Racial Policies of American Industry, the Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, and Manpower and Human Resources Studies, are published as research reports are completed.

Recent Industrial Research Unit Studies (Order from Industrial Research Unit, Vance Hall/CS, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 19174) No. 44

Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon R. Storholm, Restrictive Labor Practices in the Supermarket Industry. 1967. $7.50

No. 45

William N. Chernish, Coalition Bargaining: tics and Public Policy.

No. 46

Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan et al., Negro Employment in Basic Industry: A Study of Racial Policies in Six Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. I.) 1970. $15.00

No. 47

Armand J. Thieblot, Jr., and Linda P. Fletcher, Negro Employment in Finance: A Study of Racial Policies in Banking and Insurance. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. II.) 1970. $9.50

No. 48

Bernard E. Anderson, Negro Employment in Public Utilities: A Study of Racial Policies in the Electric Power, Gas, and Telephone Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. III.) 1970. $8.50

No. 49

Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan et al., Negro Employment in Southern Industry: A Study of Racial Policies in Five Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. IV.) 1971. $13.50

No. 50

Herbert R. Northrup et al., Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport: A Study of Racial Policies in the Railroad, Airline, Trucking, and Urban Transit Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. V.) 1971. $13.50

No. 51

Gordon F. Bloom, Charles R. Perry, and F. Marion Fletcher, Negro Employment in Retail Trade: A Study of Racial Policies in the Department Store, Drugstore, and Supermarket Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. VI.) 1972. $12.00

No. 52

Lester Rubin, William S. Swift, and Herbert R. Northrup, Negro Employment in the Maritime Industries: A Study of Racial Policies in the Shipbuilding, Longshore, and Offshore Maritime Industries. (Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. VII.) 1974. $12.00

No. 53

Charles R. Perry, Bernard E. Anderson, Richard L. Rowan, Herbert R. Northrup et al., The Impact of Government Manpower Programs. (Manpower and Human Resources Studies, No. 4.) 1974. $18.50

A Study of Union Tac1969. $7.95

NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRIES A Study of Racial Policies in the Shipbuilding, Longshore, and Offshore Maritime Industries

(Volume VII—Studies of Negro Employment)

by

LESTER RUBIN W I L L I A M S. SWIFT

and HERBERT R . NORTHRUP

INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH U N I T

The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania

P a r t One of this volume was prepared for the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, under contracts No. P1-MA70-499 and No. 2-36212. Since contractors preparing research under government sponsorship are encouraged to express their own judgment freely, P a r t One of this volume does not necessarily represent the Maritime Administration's official opinion or policy. Moreover, the author is solely responsible f o r the factual accuracy of all material developed in P a r t One.

Permission f o r quotation from P a r t One will be granted upon request, provided appropriate credit is agreed upon. Reproduction in whole or in p a r t of P a r t One permitted f o r the purpose of the United States Government. Copyright © 1974 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-80053 M A N U F A C T U R E D I N THE U N I T E D STATES OF AMERICA

ISBN:

0-8122-7678-7

Foreword In September 1966, the Ford Foundation began a series of major grants to the Industrial Research Unit of The Wharton School to fund a series of studies of the Racial Policies of American Industry. The purpose has been to determine why some industries are more hospitable to the employment of Negroes than are others and why some companies within the same industry have vastly different racial employment policies. Studies have proceeded on an industry-by-industry basis under the direction of the undersigned, with Dr. Richard L. Rowan, Professor of Industry, as Associate Director. As of June 1974, thirty-one industry studies have been published. This volume is the seventh in our series of books combining industry studies and analyzing the reasons for different racial policies and Negro employment patterns among various industries. The present volume includes studies previously published as Report Nos. 29 and 30, plus a revision and update of Report No. 17, and a final section analyzing and contrasting the black employment situation in these three retail industries. Volume I, Negro Employment in Basic Industry, published early in 1970, contains an introductory section which sets forth the purpose and hypotheses of the overall project and a brief overview of the position of the Negro in American industry. Volume II, Negro Employment in Finance, Volume III, Negro Employment in Public Utilities, Volume IV, Negro Employment in Southern Industry, Volume V, Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport, and Volume VI, Negro Employment in Retail Trade have also been published. A volume dealing with building construction is in the planning stage. The eight volumes and the various industry reports contain the most thorough analysis of Negro employment available in the United States. Lester Rubin, who is now employed by the federal government, wrote the original version of Part One (Shipbuilding), and also wrote most of Part Two (Longshore), and a draft of Part Four (Concluding Analysis). Parts One and Four were revised and rewritten and Part One also updated by the undersigned. Dr. Rubin did his work while serving as a Research Associate with the Unit. He received his Ph.D. degree in May 1973 from the University of Pennsylvania. v

Foreword

vi

William S. Swift, who is now employed in industry, wrote Part Three (Offshore Maritime) and assisted in the writing of Part Two (Longshore). He received his M.B.A. degree from the Wharton Graduate Division, University of Pennsylvania, also in May 1973. He also served as a Research Associate in the Unit. Many other persons contributed to this volume. Mr. Andrew E. Gibson, former Maritime Administrator and Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs, originally requested that we include the shipbuilding industry in our Racial Policies oi American Industry series, and was instrumental in providing a grant for that purpose. Both Mr. Gibson and his successor. Robert J. Blackwell, supported a second grant examining racial policies in shipbuilding. John M. Heneghan, Director, Eugene Heller, and other members of the staff, Office of Civil Rights, Maritime Administration, provided tremendous assistance and information involving all maritime industries studied. Other governmental agencies and many companies and unions were also very helpful. Many other persons were helpful, including, of course, the Ford Foundation which made the Racial Policies series possible. Dr. John R. Coleman, now President of Haverford College, made the initial grants possible when a staff member of the Foundation. Later, Mitchell Sviridoff, Vice-President, and Basil J. Whiting, Jr., Project Officer, assured continued Foundation interest and support. Mrs. Marie R. Keeney edited the original shipbuilding study, and Mrs. Ann C. Emerson edited its revision, plus the balance of the volume, assisted by Miss Elsa Klemp and Mrs. Kathleen G. Messina. Mrs. Emerson and Mrs. Messina also made up the indices. Mrs. Margaret E. Doyle, our Office Manager, took care of the various administrative and business details. The bulk of the manuscript typing was done by my secretary, Mrs. Veronica M. Kent. As in most previous reports, the data cited as "in the author's possession" have been carefully authenticated and are on file in our Industrial Research Unit library. Director Industrial Research Unit The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania

HERBERT R . NORTHRUP,

Philadelphia June 1974

CONTENTS Part One THE

NEGRO

IN

THE

SHIPBUILDING

INDUSTRY

by LESTER RUBIN Revised, and updated

by HERBERT R .

NORTHRUP

Part Two THE

NEGRO

IN

THE

LONGSHORE

by LESTER RUBIN and WILLIAM S.

INDUSTRY SWIFT

Part Three THE NEGRO INDUSTRY

IN

THE

OFFSHORE

MARITIME

by WILLIAM S. SWIFT

Part Four CONCLUDING

ANALYSIS

by HERBERT R . NORTHRUP and LESTER RUBIN

PART ONE

THE NEGRO IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY by

LESTER RUBIN

Revised and Updated by

HERBERT R. NORTHRUP

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. II.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION THE

SHIPBUILDING

1 INDUSTRY

Government Subsidies Government Structure of the Industry Industry Location The Ship Repair Industry The Navy Yards Manpower ....... Occupational Distribution Private v. Navy Yard Employment Regional Employment Comparisons Female Employment Wages and Hours ... ...Unionization Intraplant Mobility

2

.

The Industry—Final Note III.

3 3 7 8 9 9 11 12 12 13 15 17 22 22

NEGRO SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYMENT FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO I 9 6 0 ..

24

The Early Years

24

Employment Before World War I

26

World War I Expansion and Decline Postwar Employment Reduction Union Policies in the World War I Era The Impact of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 ...

27 29 30

The World War II Period Changing Union Posture 1UMSWA Metal Trades Department Independent Unions Other Factors Affecting Negro Employment

31 36 37 38 41 42

30

v

vi

Table of Contents

CHAPTER

PAGE

The Postwar Years, 1945-1960 ..... Gains to 1950 . Concentration in Urban Centers The Decade of the 1950's Were Whites Leaving Shipbuilding? Other Factors The Nixon Committee Growth in Pacific Shipbuilding IV.

43 43 47 47 50 53 54 55

NEGRO EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1 9 6 0

57

Census v. Sample Data Comparison with Earlier Census Trends

57 58

Occupational Characteristics and Analysis Officials and Managers Professionals, Technicians, and Sales Workers.. Office and Clerical Workers White Collar v. Blue Collar Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Service Workers Female Employment ..

59 60 62 63 63 64 64 65 66 66

Changing Employment Patterns New England Middle Atlantic Great Lakes and Pacific Regions Building Trades Relationships The South Newport News Shipbuilding and Company

66 69 72 73 75 78

Dry

Dock

81

Government and Equal Employment The Ingalls Situation

87 89

Barriers to Equal Employment Opportunity Labor Sources Methods of Recruitment .. Union Referrals — Promotions and Upgrading-Intraplant Mobility ...

90 90 93 94 94

Table of Contents

vii

CHAPTER

PAGE

Restricting Seniority The Supervisory Problem

.

Training Programs V.

98 99 101

DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY POLICY

105

Demand for Labor Nature of the Work Regional and Locational Factors Unionism, Seniority, and Supervision Government Policy Managerial Policy

105 106 106 107 108 109

APPENDIX

A. B.

INDEX

Statistical Tables Constitutional and Ritual Clauses of the Boilermakers Union

Ill 139 141

LIST OF TABLES TABLE

1 2 3 4 5 6

7

8 9 10 11

12 13

PAGE

Shipbuilding Industry, The Largest Companies Engaged in Shipbuilding, 1972

4

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Production Employment, Selected Years, 1935-1973 .

10

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution, 44 Establishments, United States, 1968

12

Shipbuilding Industry, Average Private and Shipyard Employment, 1969-1973

13

Navy

Shipbuilding Industry, Annual Employment by Region, 1969-1973 .

14

Shipbuilding Industry, All Manufacturing, Durable Goods, and Shipbuilding, Average Earnings and Hours, Production Workers, Selected Years, . .... 1935-1973

16

Shipbuilding Industry, Index of Straight Time Hourly Earnings, Selected Private Yards Engaged in Steel Vessel Construction, United States and Regions, 1961-1973

18

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment, 1930-1960

31

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region and State, 1940

32

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region and State, 1950.

44

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution of Total and Negro Employment, United States, 1950 .... -

45

Shipbuilding Industry, Weeks Worked by Male Operatives and Laborers by Race, 1949

46

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region, 1940-1960

48

ix

List of Tables

X

TABLE

14 15 16

17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24

25 26

27

PAGE

Shipbuilding Industry, Change in Negro Population, Selected Shipbuilding Counties, 1950-1960

49

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region and State, 1960

51

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution of Total and Negro Employment, United States, 1960

53

Shipbuilding Industry, Employment by Occupational Group and Race, 5 Establishments, 1960

55

Shipbuilding Industry, Comparative Data to Employment for Race and Sex, 1970 . .... .....

59

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment, 1930-1970 ...... ...... .......

59

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Negro Employment by Occupational Group, United States, Selected Years, 1964-1972 .

60

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution by Race, United States, 1964 and 1972

61

Shipbuilding Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region, 1950-1970

68

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Employment by Race and Region, Selected Years, 1964-1972

69

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Negro Employment by Occupational Group, New England Region, Selected Years, 1964-1972

70

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution by Race, New England Region, 1964 and 1972

71

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Negro Employment by Occupational Group, Middle Atlantic Region, Selected Years, 1964-1972 ... .. .

73

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution by Race, Middle Atlantic Region, 1964 and 1972 .

74

List of Tables TABLE

28

29 30

31

xi PAGE

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Negro Employment by Occupational Group, Pacific Region, Selected Years, 1964-1972 .

76

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution by Race, Pacific Region, 1964 and 1972

77

Shipbuilding Industry, Percent Negro Employment by Occupational Group, South Atlantic and Gulf Coast Regions, Selected Years, 1964-1972

79

Shipbuilding Industry, Occupational Distribution by Race, South Atlantic and Gulf Coast Regions, 1964 and 1972

80

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES

1 2

xii

PAGE

Shipbuilding Industry, Vessels Under Construction or on Order, January 1, 1974

23

Shipbuilding Industry, Hypothetical Lines of Progression in a Typical Shipyard

97

CHAPTER I

Introduction The shipbuilding industry provides an example of minority employment policies and practices in an industry that is both strongly influenced by government and almost entirely unionized. Factors affecting minority employment in shipbuilding include the historically fluctuating demands for labor, inaccessibility of many shipyards to inner city dwellers, patterns of discrimination built around past union restrictions, and the increasing size of the southern shipbuilding industry. Until recently, the level of capital expenditures in shipyards has been below investments undertaken in many other industries. This also has had an effect upon minority employment. Basic research, conducted from 1968 through the first six months of 1970, consisted of field interviews with shipyard management, data collection, a search of the literature, and extensive interviews with government officials. In 1973 and early 1974, this methodology was repeated in order to revise and to update the original study. In some cases, especially where census material is utilized, data reflect employment in boat building and repairing as well as shipbuilding and repairing. Only in rare cases did the Bureau of the Census break down standard industrial classification (SIC) 373 into its components, SIC 3731, shipbuilding and repairing and SIC 3732, boat building and repairing. Data developed for the current period, however, are more selective. The following chapter describes the industry and the factors therein which affect Negro employment. Later chapters analyze the historical position of Negroes in the industry, their current status, and the factors determining their employment, position in the seniority system, and future prospects in view of the increased government role provided by the policies of the Nixon administration and the impact of the energy crisis.

CHAPTER II

The Shipbuilding Industry The shipbuilding industry occupies a position of importance which can be measured in terms of national defense needs. It has become a matter of national policy to maintain a shipbuilding industry, and as such, it is not surprising to see that the federal government has become the largest customer, and the benefactor, of the American shipbuilding industry. The bulk of the industry's output is produced directly for the Navy or under government subsidy. Since the industry is thus attuned to satisfy government requirements, it has been natural for it to react positively pursuant to federal concern with equal employment opportunity. The industry is not, however, solely dependent upon national defense requirements. It also serves the nation's needs for commercial shipping vessels. This is underscored by the Nixon administration's push to modernize the American merchant marine. Dependence upon the federal government is not unique to shipbuilding. The aerospace industry also derives much of its workload from the government; yet it maintains a clear-cut position of supremacy when compared to other nations engaged in similar work, although the present decline of aerospace could lead other nations to challenge that supremacy.1 At least, however, until recently, the federal government, except in wartime, has not felt constrained to maintain the shipbuilding industry to the same extent as it has done for aerospace. In the periods between the two world wars, and in most years since, the level of support for shipbuilding has been both small and fluctuating. As a result, training programs until recently, and especially 1. See Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan et al., Negro Employment in Basic Industry, Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. I (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), Part Three.

2

The Shipbuilding

3

Industry

those designed to improve minority employment, were present only during wartime. GOVERNMENT

SUBSIDIES

The theory behind the payments of construction differential subsidies (CDS) covering the merchant fleet is grounded in the belief that in order to maintain a "ready" shipbuilding industry, American ship operators must be persuaded to purchase American-built ships. This necessiates the equalizing of construction costs between less costly foreign ships and American vessels. As a result, the Maritime Administration is authorized, under certain conditions, to subsidize up to 50 percent of construction costs of newly built American merchant ships. Labor costs in American shipyards comprise between 40 and 50 percent of the finished product, and are the major reason for the existence of the construction differential subsidy. The 1970 Congress enacted new legislation that has established target years for the gradual reduction of the percentage payments established under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The goal is a reduction to a maximum of 35 percent by fiscal year 1976. It is felt that more efficient production and less governmental interference in design make this goal realistic. The varying levels of CDS, however, contributed to the stagnation that gripped the American shipbuilding industry for many years by preventing competitive market forces from requiring it to be more efficient. The impact which this stagnation had upon Negro employment and related problems was mitigated somewhat by the labor-intensiveness of the industry. More recently, higher prices and wages abroad, devaluation of the American dollar, and increased demand have greatly brightened present business and future prospects of American yards. STRUCTURE

OF THE

INDUSTRY

According to Fortune, eleven companies engaged in shipbuilding and repair rank high among American industries. Of the eleven, however, ten are diversified conglomerates, Todd Shipyards being the exception. Table 1 presents financial data for these companies only a part of which relate specifically to shipbuilding. The largest single-plant employer of shipbuilding workers is the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, a newly

The Negro in the Shipbuilding

4 c 0)e .3 2 S

1JT

Q, P. 2 2 w w V

E 8

§

£

o o o 00 N

to CO o >

60 C o g o ^ §

o o 00 co

o o to

oo

00 »-H

f-i IN CD

O» o t> TT IO

CO Ci IO

CO (N

iO

CO 1-(

U1 tco IO to CO

TH TH

(N o CO CO TH IH CO

CO

O, 2 w

O o o o IN

CO IN iH 00 co oo

in t>

c o x> 1« g J 73 Ih «

o o CO © rH

>(4 of •t V -*-> u, o o. if

2; to IN

C ¡3 Cd " 3 a

00 03 C0 s

6l

to •>«•

00 l-O lO (N

ci CO CO r-l

IN CO !> ei tci

0

o

3 d

o

00 CO

r-i N

o o o

»-1 o o 00 CO

m lO oo 1/5 1-1

CT> CO o H U3

U3 OJ CO CO I o tj a) w OhQ

O H

CO

Ol CT1 CO o~ CO

c M S (1) u be ki 0>

CO oi T-l

rH rH

00

ui

CO oo

CO in rH

CO CO CO

00 CO N

rr CO

O) d OJ

o d o rH

o> Tf

00 •>t

CO -M

m

rH o 00 CO CO

00 Ol 00 aT

o o lO H 01 4> 5r

T-i

00 00

t>

CM CM

F-i to

c to CM

CM oi CM

00 to

r-H

i-i

oo 13

to 00

CO 13 tH

to CO CO

00 CO CM

to

OJ o CM

o o o iH

o>1 •a

00 o cm o

o> 00 to CO

©

to 00 o_ 13 UO

»be.2S 3 rt -u 4) S 2 is co fep O

Industry

13 CO to t> co

TO

to o to

co cm 13

a>

»-
s hi 2 I ' 3 ej >-

o H

CO CM

00 OI 00 o>

O lO CM CO

T3 C a)

3

o •c c rt T3 C OS Ho e W 60 «4>

it 41

c C

•S T3

c < £ 3 O w

30)

4> a) J

M

vIh O

5 © H a PH

C t-" ci »-I IM LO rH

o

m LO co to m

I co 1

o

to I-I

OJ to CO 00 LO CO o> LO co to 04 IM co oí

to OJ •«e LO tr^ o o rH rH

CT>

O

N to r-l^ ÍO

N oo tr- 00 co 00 lO ci co

Tf tr- IN LO rH LO rH O CO CO 00 rH O *H t> s i CO •

o

H

o rH

ca (M T—'

0 "M .5 ^ % v 09 ^ HO ^

T-H t> rH T-î" IN

IN

•>*

m

tD O (M

CJ o rH

N

o o CO

f-H

CO t> 00 in

•t1 o> CO

O» CO CO 1/3 00

T-H i-H IO

o> t-i N

CD CD T—1

Cl TH CO

IO 00 rH

m o ""t. rH

O rH 1/3 CD O rH

.§-

« P ai V >. a

S

M

W

S & M 0)

rH

lI

O & a> 55

M CD

I 1

o> c4

t TH

o Oi rH

O •>1« eo

t00 in

»H

t00 O

O o eo

rH

CO rH

m ca in •«t rH

ÊS Ol oo t-

o

H

L"3 00 CO

cd rH

CD in m CD

00 eo •>*

fia

CO CO m

CO 00 co o

t00

trio Ti r-î"

tIO oo

m ct> ai o o a

be

CD m oa o i-i CO

00 t>

CM c>

CO in rH

O O CO

o o o to rH

00 to to rH

m rH CO oo

CO CO

in

o •

1

eo 00 Ti eJ

o>

1M

aT o rH

to

in m

CO oo

t-" in

o CO eo

ei

W CO o to rH

00 in 00 to rH

T* iH CO T-i"

rH rH CO CO 00

O in rH CO rH rH

rH

Eh

Eh

rn O)

00 o in oo" in

rH O rH

rH IN i-H^ t-"

o> CO oo

a OJ

t oo 00 t> in

Ol TH Oi oo" rH

TJ< o> 1-i in

o p.

P. s o h O

V be

ctaa

•g 5

S T3 (3 (0

C

o

hi o

•5 3 a

>H

3

5 o Eh

2 a

Q

o Eh w§

The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry

114 c 2

g

u

CO

£ « & *

u bo a> o

5

«3 o CM

o H

C 0) u

a. 3 ©

•S s

b!

O ^ be 4)

co co

o t, be o>

CM CO CO

cin

oo as

in »-J

.8 ts I

©

N

O

•««a

w

os CO CO

&

I) Iv OS

o H

«

CM o oo

ao co

CO CO

© CO

© o r-i

00

CM ci CO

CO c4 CO

a> ai

CO

IN

t-

00 CM

CO •t

OS OS CO

CO

O CM

CM CM

m

CO CO 1—1

CO CO o

CO t>

o CO

00 CO o

in as IN

a; CO CM

•o; 00

o 00 00 00

tCO "i. in

CO CO CM~

m CO CO

CO

o CO c 00 f-H

f-H m CM r-T in

00 00

00 m

CO

as CO CO

t> CO m

l> © CO

CO 00 00 00

as CO

X CO CO ei

CO OS CO

cOs

00 o 00 •"i TH

c 00 T-l •»f

CM 00 CM T-
CO

r-l

OS m •«t 00 r-4

CO in T-H c-

CO T CM ci O

CO

rH

CM CM

O) to CO oi

U5 Oi

to 00 to CO

to uo to

rto CM

O 0»

ta rH

CM lO CM

t-

t^ CO

to

CO

to CM

N

M

Oi LO

CO o t-

CO t-

lO CO

£

O TH

rH rH

U5 rH

CO

a> to to CM

O P. u>

P. §

•a H

2«

T3

bo 01

c

aa a •o s

a

w n

.2

o e O

ts C o m m

**H £ PM

« S o "I B

X, v41 H

B )h V A! >4 o

•C

5

•3

£t

CO h 0) A!

o § O

o H

o *

o

E « O

CO h V

p. O

09 4) t. O

XI

15 I-)

»H o> •2 o •Ì

I0)

co

®

_

o 3 o H

5 (9 Q

H

§u CO

The Negro in the Shipbuilding

120 g

1 1

&

£®

o &

co

1 1

V 55

So

oo J O I

$o

•rf

CO

CO IM

»

C4 co

CO

1 1

1-H

r-t

LC CO

lO TH

TH CO

o oo

l-O in

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

rH o> c-

c-

ao

f-i

.H

t> i-i

N CO

Oi

o 00

lO

OJ

rH O 00

tH rH

t> o> to 00*

o CO T-H

IN CO CO

Tfl o N

IN t> 00 o

CO 00

O pi

IN CO

oo t> rH

o 00

rH

o to r-t

•»f U3

00 00 IN

o> M

CO rH

(N oo

IN CO c rH

oo

i-i"

O t> oo

lO O rH 05 rH

rH IO

cCO

co T-4

t-H

IN M

o (M

•»»>

IN

co

to oo iH

00 o oo ei

co lO

CO rH

lO rH

CO N

o 00

LO

iS525 o & V 55

H

o H

rH IN

o iH

© a

a S o

u O

in 0

t* *

uS> be aa 01

&

•E

•o

mQ E S rt

c

a

>H

®v o

:§ * o

u

Ph

is Si EH

S

u A! l-> O

pC

*

T3 C OS

jj W

3 01

e

o

C v o Eh

s

O

o.

O

o •J

O Eh

3 CD a

o Eh >H co

3

coO

121

Appendix A « £ Qj V S 01 Eb

2

1 1

v

o

1 1

CM

1 1

O &

1

4) S5

iH

I S>

8 g)

hJj 0)

1 S ^ •8 1

^ f s

°

w

IN

1—1 1—(

00 CM CM

•>*

§

as

CO

CO oi

1 1

1 1

1

1

1

co

1 1

rH

t-

CO to M

rH 00 CO

o IN

CO oo CO

•»i CO

CO

«O o

r-T

of

00 TH

IN CO

IN CO co

t-'

Tf iH O i-T

o 00 CO r-T rH

IO CO rH

CO CO N

o oo

1 1

IO

CO CO

1

CO TH

CO

r-H »-H

tIO IN

®

a

CO

TH

CO CO

Tf

CO

rH i-H

o CO IN

t> CO to bo

•1

o «4 bo

IH AS

bo a a A

6 C D

"5

IH V

" 3G

T3 C CA

G

2

.2 S

O >H

C I E->

Q> 73 M

€ o

TI A> .M

f

O EI

a >H O

O

1-i ®

IH O ,Q O)

I J

O H V CO

5 O H

03 4 H 4) D.

0«

O> 9

O *

3

3

ct

Q

0> U TN

3

O CO

The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry

126 « 8

2

a, &v

1 1

1 1

1 1

rH oo

CO tr-

1 1

1 1

1 1

CO

! > o "5. £ a

o L, be CD S5

f-t

^

Co

o Eh

T-H 00 CO Ui CO o Ol LO 115

T

V o

a

O. 3 o fcl O "3 c .2

d a 3 o u O

lH 9 b>e CD C

3

(4

•Si •a c as

o ft, a

w

-o m 01 V Ois c J" 03 £ V JS "3 O u

u vi 3 O W

The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry

1 3 0

«

2

CO

0

8

&

c4

t^

®

z

rH

in

o &

to

•0«

I 1

rH

rH

CO 1-1

I

O

I 1

1

00

CO o> rH

O rH

•«»I

ai

oo

CO

rH

O

10

t-

c* f-H

01

CrH

t>

00

OJ r-(

00

T-H

CO •«t

0 in

00

00

r

5 o

•fl 1 rH

00

Ei

c

0

8

&

•>* CO

00 CO

o>

N

CO

00 IN rH

t•>r

ei

ei

rH

rH

oi

CO

00 rH

O

CO

co

m CO CO

0 rH

00 IN

C-;

tr-

Ti

CO

IN IN

•0«

rH CO

oJ

CO

CO CO

CO 00

IN CO

Ph

t-; in IN

05 o & 0)

o

0,

2

- i

£ ©

05

§

O «5

© H

53 .§•

00 (M N

t00 OJ

CO

10

CO

CO

in

CO

«CO 00 IN

rH

CO

t00 N

CO

CO

00 t-

t>

0

rH

CO

1/5

CO

U5 00

CO

m

00

ci

t> rH

IN

O

in

00

N

rH CO

co IN rH

CO CO

CO t-

IN

m

rH

in

in in

tCO

rH

CO rH

CO

CO

0 OJ

in CO

CO

«i CO

co

CO

H

Sa

HO~

o

e OcJ

'•8 HO

2

8

&

Ph

I HO

1

rH

00*

N

CO

IN

rH

£

o In bs V

3 a" « p

3 ©

B

55

N

t> co w

rH

00 rH co

f 00

fl to

N

CJ

CO IN

z

o

Eh

g

a s

bO

o o &

o

HO

I

I CD

CO in

« 55

S O

•

O

-O

=

t>2

CO

«o Os «0 so

^ ^

s ta

S o

s

' I

5

o

IN to

to

a> to

lO N

oo C-Í

H

H

t h

tc ta in

t,

o

XI VS •J

3 o

5 O Eh

OS Q

Eh k 0) «3

3

O M

132

The Negro

g

fe

J? Ph

£ ~

in the Shipbuilding

Industry

I I I I I

bo

I I I I

o> S5

2o

00

00

Eh

> j s o. &

r g*

u

bo

P


o & « 55

m rH rH

1 rH 1 rH

Ci m O O c- rH IN Ci co uî o> CO O w IN

rH 00

5 o H

e* 00 o> co o o oo (M m rH co •«f co to rH

trio LO ci

CO

e

3 H

I

B5>

«g 2« ^Ph «¡5 ~

o, 3 O tn a

1h0 y60 (4 §

oo co 00 co co co rH Tf! rH

•>*

00 t> rH 00

rH rH CO 00 rH o» rH co rH rH

CO CO iH O rH

Oi

e« c cj 2 V fc H

0) h •a O c > 0) £ O

O A O 5 3 Cl]

a) o

a

€ o

ta

J3 •s o Ç-I

c«

sGO

«M 2 ft« ^ bo

TJ" IN 00 co 1I c- oIN

C O H H r 00 rn" o " H ei »H r eg &2 ctoi cJ — cu 0f0 O l co a fcc H v £ 5< W 2

oO 00 ct-ö O l CO r-t 11 O Ißl C o H r ö CO i-i H r

lo T i o CO CO cino H 11 O o rO Ml 01«0 O tc~ H r CO c> < N C H i -H i

H r o 00 CO 00 o in N o C 00J C O cec 1 00 H H r*

w h a> A 3o to et Ii pet O S eo 7C 3 CS

"u(3 a> 0> 0 '7C 4H ) 3 t.O •O C & 5) c n X ja O Ol W o € > H E-iu

l O LO cO oS or-s T inf O C D » 1 C O o o o -i" H 00 rn ei »rH r t. ses

o JS 4J

h at

"uo

Jt O u

00 1> 0) 3aJ uo 9 o Q 4) •t 5 H > h o X ' » a > o t,o H H a! t.i -O rt a & 4) 03 w §O C o. > OO J 2•§

"rt

138

The Negro in the Shipbuilding c g

g &

LO

t>

C0_ uj

05

Industry

C-; CO

CO

o Vi be 0)

Z 5 o H

CM

•0" CO

Z

rH

CO

Oi TJI

lo rH

N

rH IM

CO

$

to

o

o co

H

oo

oo

IM

CO

tCO

to

(N

uo oi

t-

Ci

CO

GQ « $ C

2 &

v

z

oo

(O rH

©

00 TJI

lO

PL, * *

o

& "S. E

4>

Z

oi

N

io

ai t-

CO TT CO

o

"tr

CO O t-

cc CO rH

co

w

o H

o. a

o

hi O "rt C o rt o, 3

CO CO CO

O rH CO

09 CN

-"t rH

IN CD CO

o oo

oo oo oo

d>

CO

o P.

Vt 0)

bo a) G rt

CI)

e ut a .2

•o 13 oj

' c o

u

Ao V H

0) Vi o •i

•C .2 o

v

C

r2 d

* 4)

I H

o e

Li V

5 2 £

u o &

c a) a)

>H o

C3 1H D O. O

a 3

$

o

H

rt a 5

3 o E-i

>H

V

w

9 C W

Appendix B CONSTITUTION AND RITUAL CLAUSES OF THE BOILERMAKERS UNION

The following are the first few lines, after the noted revisions, of Article 6, Section 1, "Qualifications for Membership" section of the Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America. Before 1937 1 Section 1. An applicant for member2 ship must be a free born male citizen of 3 some civilized country, 16 years of age . . . Revision of 1937 1 Section 1. An applicant for member2 ship must be a male citizen of some 3 civilized country between the ages of . . . Revision of 19UU 1 Section 1. An applicant for membership 2 shall be a citizen of some civilized country 3 who has reached the age of . . . Revision of 1957 1 2 3 4 5

Section 1. An applicant for membership shall be a citizen of some civilized country who has reached the minimum age prescribed by statutory laws, regardless of race creed, or color, or national origin . . . (italics supplied)

Line 3 Paragraph 3 of the ritual, which the Negro did not have to take since he was not a member of the International, reads as follows: You will not recommend or vote for anyone but a white person to become a member of the union.

139

140

The Negro in the Shipbuilding

Industry

The following is the request of the executive council of the Boilermakers for authority to set up Negro auxiliaries. Originally, it was requested at the 1920 convention but it was turned down. The request was then repeated at the 1937 convention. . . . The Executive Council, therefore, recommends that this convention authorize the granting of separate charters to colored workers of our trade, such charters to be granted only at points where there are sufficient numbers of colored men employed to successfully maintain a local; that the membership of the colored men be confined to such separate locals . . . .14B

169. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Constitutional Convention (Kansas City, Missouri: The Brotherhood, 1937), p. 143. This union merged with the Blacksmiths and Forgers in 1952.

Index Aerospace industry, 2, 6, 11, 63, 75, 103, 104 "Affected class" concept, 86, 89-90 Affirmative action, 13, 62-63, 72-73, 84, 86, 88-89, 92, 95, 106, 108109 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 81, 85, 89 American Federation of Labor ( A F L ) , 17, 30, 38, in New Jersey, 29 Civil Rights Department of the AFL-CIO, 54 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 19-20, 37-38 Alabama Dry Dock and Shipping Co., 38, 79, 107 Alexander, Tom, 6n, 33n American Marine Corporation, 92 Apprenticeship training, 76, 82, 101 and c r a f t unions, 17, 19-20, 21-22, 36, 107 Negro exclusion from, 35, 39, 42, 64, 83 Negro participation in, 64, 84, 86, 101 Avondale Shipyards, 6, 6n, 8, 107 Negro employment at, 93 and unions, 107 Baldwin, Stephen E., 102n Bath Iron works, 72 Berg, Russell K., 21 Bethlehem Steel, 6, 7n, 19-20, 107 Negro employment at, 47 and unions, 42 Blackwell, Robert J., 11, 15n, 66, 69 Bloom, Gordon F., 41, 43 Blumrosen, Alfred W., 85n Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, F o r g e r s and Helpers, International Brotherhood of, 18-20, 20n, 21, 30, 35-36, 41, 43, 45, 54, 62, 76, 89-90, 107 exclusion of Negroes, 30, 35, 38, 40, 78, 107, 139 Negro auxiliaries, 39, 54, 140

See also Metal Trades Department of A F L Building trades, 75-78, 91-96, 106 Business Week, 83n, 85n California Supreme Court, 40 Carter, W. Richard, 37 Chapman, William, 89n Charlestown Navy Yard, 34, 42 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 94 charges under Title VII, 83, 93 Clark v. American Marine Corp., 92n, 93, 98-99 Compliance, 87-88 Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS), 2, 3, 31, 57 Containerization, 6, 22 Contracts, 7-9, 82-86, 90, 94 Crown Zellerbach case See United States v. Local 189 Daily Labor Report, 92n Delta Shipbuilding Co., 35 Dollar devaluation, 22 Douglass, Frederick, 26 DuBois, W. E. B., 25n Earl, Richard L., 7n Electric Boat Company, 19-20, 69-72 Negro employment at, 69-70 and unions, 42 See also General Dynamics Electrical machinery industry, 6 Electrical Workers' union ( I B E W ) , 18, 41 Employment seniority, 22, 42, 64, 66, 88-90, 9599, 106, 108 wartime demand, 23, 28-30, 33, 50 Energy crisis, 11, 22 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( E E O C ) , 12n, 22, 5758, 65, 84n, 85, 91, 98, 100 Executive Orders, 54, 88 Federal

Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 37 Female employment, 13, 15, 66 Ferguson, Homer, 27, 82 Firestone, Harvey, 82 Ford, Henry, 27, 82 Foreign competition, 3, 21-22

141

142 Fortune,

Index 3, 5n, 6n

General Dynamics, 6, 19-20, 69-72, 107 affirmative action, 72 racial employment policy, 47, 69-70 See also Electric Boat; Bethlehem Steel Government influence on employment, 9-12, 22, 54-55 purchases, 2, 6, 8, 57 subsidization, 2, 3, 31, 57 support of discrimination, 28, 42-43 on wages, 17, 28, 42-43 See also affirmative action; CDS; Merchant Marine Act; U.S. Green, John, 19 Greene, Lorenzo J., 25-26, 27n, 28, 29n Grievance procedures, 81 Hardy, A. C., 33n Haynes, George, 29 Higgins, president of Higgins Industries, 35-36 Hutchins, John G. B., 17n, 23, 26 Independent unions, racial policies of, 36, 41-42 Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America ( I U M S W A ) , 19-20, 20n, 21, 36-39 labor agreements, 79 racial policies of, 37-38, 107 Ingalls Shipbuilding, 6, 8, 13, 78, 8990, 98, 103, 107 affirmative action at, 89-90 See also Litton Industries James v. Marinship Job bidding, 22

Corp., 40

Kaiser Company, and Negro recruiting, 40 Korean conflict, 9 Labor-intensiveness, 3, 6-8, 11, 90 and Negro employment, 65 Lane, Frederic C., 35n, 36n " L e a r n i n g curve," 33 Litton Industries, 6, 78, 89-90 See also Ingalls Shipbuilding Litwack, Leon F., 26n Lockheed, 102 Machinists and Aerospace Workers, International Association of, 18-21, 30, 35-36, 41

elimination of racial restriction, 54 exclusion of Negroes, 35, 38 See also Metal Trades Department of A F L Manpower Development and Training Act ( M D T A ) , 101 Marshall, Ray, 30n, 54n Maryland Drydock Co., 38 McCormicks of International Harvester, 82 Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 3, 21, 30-31, 105 Mergen, Bernard, 19n Metal Trades Department of AFL, 17, 19-20, 30, 36-41, 107 Bulletin, 21n local councils, 89-90, 107 and Negro employment, 89 racial policies of member unions, 76 Mobile Area Committee for Training and Development (MACTAD), 78 Monthly Labor Revieiv, 29n, 33n Morrison-Knudsen Corp., 6n, 56 Myrdal, Gunnar, 34n National

Alliance of Businessmen ( N A B ) , 102 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, ( N A A C P ) , 54, 93 National Labor Relations Act, 40 National Labor Relations Board ( N L R B ) , 19, 41 Navy Yards, 3, 6, 9, 12-13, 17, 34 Negro employment 1800-1970 pre-Civil W a r , 23-26 Civil W a r to World W a r I, 26-27 World W a r I to 1940, 27-31, 38, 58 World W a r II, 31-44, 47, 58 1945-1950, 43-47, 58 1950-1960, 47-56 1960-1970, 57-104 by company size, 58 in deadend jobs, 22, 42 of females, 63, 90, 103, 107 in government yards, 12 by metropolitan area, 47 by region Great Lakes, 58, 67, 73-75, 107 Middle Atlantic, 7-8, 25-26, 29, 31, 36-37, 41, 47, 54, 66-67, 72-73, 75, 93, 96, 106-107

Index New England, 7-8, 24-26, 29, 3637, 41-42, 47, 54, 67-72, 93, 96, 107 Pacific, 36, 40-41, 43, 47, 54-55, 75, 94, 107 South Atlantic and Gulf, 25-29, 31, 34, 36-38, 43, 54-55, 58, 66-67, 75, 78-81, 93, 96, 106107 in ship repairing, 9 as strikebreakers, 26, 29 Negro occupational distribution, 28, 33-34, 45, 92 white collar jobs, 11, 43, 50, 59, 6063, 70, 86, 90 draftsmen, 62 office and clerical, 59-60, 63, 72, 92, 103 officials and managers, 60-62, 72 professionals, 62, 92 supervisors and quartermen, 62, 92, 99-101 blue collar jobs, 11, 59-60, 63, 90 apprentices, 39, 50, 64, 96 boilermakers, 45, 98 craftsmen, 11, 39, 62, 64-65, 72, 75, 78-79, 82, 86-87, 100, 106 helpers, 30, 39, 50, 64, 70, 92, 96, 98 101 laborers, 22, 30, 45-46, 50, 64-66, 70, 92, 95-96, 98-99, 101 operatives, 7, 11, 28, 31, 46, 50, 64-65, 78-79, 95 service workers, 22, 66 Sew Pittsburgh Courier, 84n New York Shipbuilding Corp., 19-20, 37 Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 3, 19-20, 53, 78, 8187, 89, 95, 107 affirmative action at, 84, 86, 100 apprenticeships at, 35, 42, 84 company representation plan, 82 Negro employment at, 26-27, 29, 30, 45, 108 charges of discrimination, 83-86 and unions, 37, 41, 82, 84 Wilmington, N.C., subsidiary, 41 Nixon Administration, shipbuilding plans, 8-11, 22, 57, 65, 101, 106 Nixon Committee See President's Committee on Government Contracts Norfolk Navy Yard, 34

143 Northrup, Herbert R., 2n, l l n , 17n, 18n, 19n, 28n, 30n, 33n, 35n, 36n, 37n, 38n, 39, 40n, 43, 63n, 82n, 83n, 103n Office of Civil Rights, Maritime Administration See U.S. Maritime Administration Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) See U.S. Department of Labor Ogden Corp., 6 See also Avondale Shipyards Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), 88, 102 Ozanne, Robert, 82n Palmer, Gladys L., 47 Peninsula Shipbuilders Association, 41, 82-83, 85 Penn Jersey Shipbuilding, 38n Petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, 78 Pinchbeck, Raymond B., 25n, 27 Plumbers' union, 18, 41 President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice ( F E P C ) , 39, 43 President's Committee on Government Contracts (Nixon Committee), 54-55 Racial employment policy, 67, 75, 101, 104-105 discriminatory initial assignment, 96, 105 employment attitudes, 72, 90-92, 99101, 107-108 of government, 43, 87-90, 107-108 pressure on Newport News, 8384 at American Marine, 92 labor demand effects, 90-93, 105-106 of management, 35-36, 42, 55, 69-72, 87, 90-93, 105, 107-108 of supervisors, 72, 93, 99-101 union discrimination, 11, 21, 30, 35, 43, 56, 79, 89-90 construction trades influence, 7578, 91-96 referral system, 75, 94-98 seniority provisions, 42, 72-73, 7981, 92 Racial-occupational segregation, 28, 35-36, 90-91 and apprenticeship, 35, 42, 50, 67, 76, 82, 101

Index

144 entry-level jobs, 95 Negro departments, 35-36, 85 at Newport News, 81 Racial-occupational segregation segregated lines, 28 Recruitment, directed at Negroes, 63, 90, 93-94, 101-104 discriminatory methods, 93 "Rightful place" doctrine, 92 Rowan, Richard L., 2n Ruchames, Louis, 34 Seattle-Everett SMSA, 102 Seniority, departmental, 95-99, 108 "bumping rights", 99 and limited double seniority, 79-81, 99 and Negro departments, 72-73 top-out, 96 transfer policy, 22, 65-66, 81, 84, 87-90, 92, 95 Sheet Metal Workers Union, 18 Shipbuilders Council of America, 13n, 14n, 18n, 33n, 43n Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment board, 28, 42 Ship repair industry, 8-9, 58, 91 Ships destroyers, 89 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Contract, 86 Liberty ships, 35 liquified natural gas carriers, 72 non-seagoing vessels, 92 nuclear aircraft carriers, 86 nuclear submarines, 6, 72 tankers, 11 Shipyard location, 7, 8, 13, 17 regional definitions, 15 Shipyard sample, 67 Shipyard Weekly, l l n , 15n, 66n Slichter, Sumner H., 54n Strikebreaking, by Negroes, 26, 29 Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 7, 19-20 Negro employment at, 36 Taft-Hartley Act, 85 Tampa Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., 35 Tenneco Corp., 6, 87 See Newport News Shipbuilding Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co., 40n Todd Shipyards, 3, 6 Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, 38 Top-out, 96 Training programs, 22, 62, 64-65, 73, 78-84, 101-104, 106 and building trades, 75

and contracts, 7-8 Transfer policy, 22, 39, 66, 81, 84, 8790, 92, 95 Turnover, 15, 76 Unions, 17-22, 28, 30, 36-42 closed shop, 35, 40, 43 craft orientation, 17, 19-22, 36, 107 independent, 36, 41-42 and Negro occupations, 21 Negro attempts to form, 29 racial policies of, 11, 21, 30, 35, 43, 56, 79, 89-90 referral system, 75, 94-95 restrictive work rules, 21 United States Bureau of the Census, 1, 9n, 27n, 52, 57-58 Bureau of Labor Statistics, lOn, 15n, 16n Census of Population, 31-32, 44-46, 47n, 49, 52-53, 54n, 59, 68 Congress, 17 Department of Labor, 78, 87 Office of Federal Contract Compliance ( O F C C ) , 87-88 District Court, New Orleans, 92 Maritime Administration, 3, 5n, 7-8, 67, 86-89, 94, 98 Office of Civil Rights, 22, 65, 7879, 81, 87-88, 90-91, 93, 98, 108 Maritime Commission, 34-36, 43 Merchant Marine, 2, 9, 11 Navy, 2, 8-9, 12, 86-87, 89 Shipping Board, 28 Supreme Court, 41 See also Executive Orders, President's Committees United States v. Local 86, International Association of . . . Ironworkers, 75 United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 86 Urban league, 35, 88, 93-94 U.S. Steel, 19 Vietnam war, 9, 12, 57 Washington Post, 89n Weaver, Robert, 35, 38, 56 Williams V. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 40n Woodson, Carter G., 26, 27n, 28, 29n World War I, 17-18, 20, 27-31, 82, 105, 107 World War II, 13, 15, 17, 19-20, 3243, 47, 72, 82-83, 91, 105-108

PART TWO

THE NEGRO IN THE LONGSHORE INDUSTRY by LESTER RUBIN

and WILLIAM S . SWIFT

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE FOREWORD

iii

CHAPTER I. II.

INTRODUCTION

1

T H E LONGSHORE INDUSTRY

3

The Nature and Structure of the Industry

3

Firms in the Industry Work Volume Major Ports of the United States Nature of the Work The Gang Structure Unionization Colonial Period to 1800 19th Century: Growth of the Unions Knights of Labor 20th Century and the ILA The West Coast Situation The Shape-up and Union Corruption Decasualization The Casual Port The Effects of Decasualization Productivity and Technological Change Innovations Union Response to Innovation

III.

3 6 8 9 11 13 13 14 17 18 19 20 22 22 25 27 29 30

Summary

31

T H E NEGRO STRUGGLE FOR WATERFRONT JOBS

33

Boston New York

43 51 v

vi

Table of Contents PAGE

Early New York Longshoremen 1900 to World War II World War II to 1970 Effects of Technology and Declining Employment-... Passenger Liner Work and Its Decline Clerks, Checkers, and Hiring Bosses New York—Final Comment Philadelphia Pre-1900 Longshoremen 1900 to World War I—the IWW 1930 to the Present Baltimore 1800 to 1920 The Rise of the ILA 1930 to 1960 Government Pressure for Merger Hampton Roads Negroes and Unions : 1880 to World War I 1920 to the Present

51 55 59 64 67 68 69 70 70 71 72 76 76 78 80 81 84 84 86

South Atlantic

91

New Orleans

96

1850 to 1900 1900 to 1930: Destruction of Unions 1930 to the Present The Situation in the 1970's New Orleans—Final Comment Mobile and Eastern Gulf Ports

97 99 101 106 112 112

The Texas Ports

118

Early Unionism: The Galveston Screwmen 1900 to 1930 1930 to the Present The West Coast The Early Industry: 1850 to 1933 1934 to 1960: Harry Bridges and the ILWU

118 121 125 135 136 140

Table of Contents

vii PAGE

IV.

The 1960's Seattle Portland San Francisco Los Angeles/Long Beach

144 145 145 148 150

CONCLUDLNG OBSERVATIONS

153

Demand for Labor

153

The Nature of the Work

154

The Time and Nature of the Industry's Development . 155 The Mores of the Community Consumer

Market Orientation and Concern

Image

INDEX

155 with 155

The Impact of Technology

156

Locational Factors

156

Union Structure and Influence

157

Government Policies

158

Final Comments

159 161

LIST OF TABLES TABLE

PAGE

1 Longshore Industry, United States Waterborne Commerce, 1947-1970

7

2 Longshore Industry, Waterborne Commerce by Major United States Ports, 1950, 1960, 1970

9

3 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Region, 1910-1970 34 4 Longshore Industry, Percent Distribution of Total and Negro Employment by Region, Selected States, 19101970 38 5 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment for United States and Selected States, 1910-1930 41 6

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment by Race for United States and Selected States, 19401960 42

7 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment for United States and Selected States, 1970 44 8 Longshore Industry, Percent Distribution of Total and Negro Employment by Region, Selected States, 1970 44 9 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, Massachusetts, 1910-1970 49 10 Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Massachusetts, 1966 and 1969 50 11 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, New York, 1910-1970 58 12 Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, New York City SMSA, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1970 63 13 Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, New Jersey, 1966, 1969, 1970 66 ix

x

List of Tables

TABLE

14 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Pennsylvania, 1910-1970

PAGE

Employment, 73

15 Longshore Industry, Estimated Negro Membership in Philadelphia Longshore Locals, 1970 76 16

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Maryland, 1910-1970

Employment, 79

17 Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, Virginia, 1910-1970 18 19 20

21

88

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Virginia, 1966, 1969

90

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 1910-1970.-

93

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 1966, 1969

95

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Louisiana, 1910-1970

Employment, 102

22

Longshore Industry, Percent Distribution of New Orleans Longshore Work Force by Hours Worked, 1956-1963 106

23

Longshore Industry, Racial Composition and Jurisdiction of New Orleans International Longshoremen's Association Locals, 1970 107

24

Longshore Industry, Number and Percent of Regular Gang Members by Race in Deck and Wharf Jobs, New Orleans, Nine Representative Companies, Four Periods, 1965, 1970, 1972 110

25

Longshore Industry, Percent Distribution of Gross Earnings, Local 1419, New Orleans, Week Ending March 26, 1973 112

26

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, Alabama, 1910-1970 114

27

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Mobile, Alabama, SMSA, 1966, 1969, 1970 116

List of Tables TABLE

xi PAGE

28

Longshore Industry, Union Membership by Race, Selected Gulf Coast Locals, 1973 117

29

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, Texas, 1910-1970 124

30

Longshore Industry, Approximate Membership by Race, Texas International Longshoremen's Association Locals 129

31

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Texas, 1966, 1969, 1970 131

32

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Houston, Texas, SMSA, 1966, 1969, 1970 132

33

Longshore Industry, Total and Negro Employment, California, 1910-1970 139

34

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Seattle, Washington, SMSA, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 146

35

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Portland, Oregon, SMSA, 1966-1971. 147

36

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, San Francisco, California, SMSA, 1967-1970 149

37

Longshore Industry, Employment by Race and Occupational Group, Los Angeles/Long Beach, California, SMSA, 1967-1971 151

FIGURE

PAGE

1 Longshore Industry, Racial Composition and Jurisdiction of South Atlantic International Longshoremen's Association Locals, 1971 96

CHAPTER I

Introduction Although modern equipment and methods such as containerization have brought changes to the docks, the loading and unloading of ships remains a highly labor intensive industry that depends upon the labor of the longshoremen more than any other factor. Of special significance for the Racial Policies of American Industry series, is the fact that Negroes have always been represented among dockworkers and today are increasing their proportion in this work despite a net decline in the number of longshoremen which has occurred in recent years. Important too for this analysis is the great strength of unionism in this industry and the fact that black workers have played prominent roles in such unions for over a century. Information for this study was collected from field interviews, court and administrative law cases, and from an examination of the generous literature. The Census of Population statistics provided the basic data base, with supplementary data coming from figures compiled by other government agencies and local and state port organizations. The data developed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which has been so valuable for other monographs in this series, proved to be of only minor use in this study because of the small size of the firms, the casual nature of the work, and the inappropriateness of the EEOC classifications of longshore work. As in other monographs in the series, Chapter II discusses the key structural aspects of the industry which impact upon black employment: the nature of the work, employer size and numbers, employment and manpower characteristics, union organization, and industry location. The chapter that follows will, unlike previous monographs, be organized on a geographic basis rather than on a time basis. Each port in the United States has its own characteristics and its own employment history. Similarities can be noted on a regional basis, but there are great differences over a larger geographical area. Therefore, after a discussion of the general picture, the employment status of blacks will be analyzed

2

The Negro in the Longshore Induitry

in each of the country's major ports. In the final chapter, we shall again return to a general examination, summarize the determinants of racial policies, and predict the future course of black employment in the industry.

CHAPTER II

The Longshore Industry The term "longshoremen" is a contraction of "alongshoremen." Spelled for a time " 'longshoremen," the "a" has been dropped for most of this century. However, the function of the men who work along the shore—or on the docks—has remained the same: to load and to unload ships. Despite some mechanization and methods of improvement, the longshoremen occupy today, as they have for many years, a strategic position astride the crossroads of commerce. The strength of their unions and their wages are symptomatic of their power to halt ocean commerce. Yet, the work remains largely heavy and unskilled, a fact which has contributed to the large black representation in most ports. It may well have been more accurate in this study to refer to the industry as the "stevedoring industry" rather than the longshore; whereas longshoremen do the loading and unloading, they are employed either by stevedoring concerns—middlemen who contract with ship concerns to provide manpower for loading and unloading—or by those ship concerns who perform their own stevedoring function. Most longshoremen do not have permanent jobs, working for one stevedore or one ship operator. THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY In the following sections the structure of the industry and the nature of the work itself are described, with special emphasis placed upon the growth of the longshore unions, noting their profound impact on the industry and its racial policies. Firms in the Industry A stevedore is either a person or a firm contracting with a ship operator to load or unload a ship in port. This contractor, in essence, agrees to become the middleman between the ship 3

4

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

operator and the supply of longshoremen who perform the actual cargo handling. A direct parallel therefore can be drawn between a stevedore and a building trades contractor: each is in business to supply needed labor, yet each maintains a very small permanent work force. Typically, a stevedoring firm hires longshoremen, usually on a daily basis, from the labor pool of union members. As a result, a firm's labor force varies directly with the amount of work the firm contracts to perform. This, in turn, is a function of port activity. At any given time, a firm may be working several ships or none at all. Therefore, longshoremen are hired as needed by the firm and discharged upon completion of the contract. The longshore industry closely approximates the economist's concept of perfect competition. Contractors tend to be small in size, large in number, with very little to differentiate one from another. The product sold by the contractor, cargo handling services, is relatively homogeneous since the workers are all drawn from a common labor supply. The technical knowledge required by the industry is gained mainly through actual work experience on the docks and, in most cases, the contractor performs his work using publicly-owned pier facilities furnishing only a small amount of machinery, generally forklifts and the like. Because of the technical knowledge readily available and the small capital investment required, new firms are able to enter the industry with relative ease. These characteristics create a highly competitive, low-profit stevedoring industry. In principle, firms submit competitive bids on individual contracts, with contracts awarded to the lowest bidders. In practice, all bids are very similar since they are based on the cost of labor, a given variable for each firm in a given area. Contract awards, therefore, tend to be based on long-standing working relationships between ship operators and particular stevedores rather than on pure economic grounds. Generally, a contractor will work for one or, at most, a few shipping lines and operate in only one port or one section of a large port. The number of competing firms operating in a particular port is determined almost entirely by port size and the amount of waterborne commerce moving through the port. In discussing the longshore industry on the West Coast, Hartman noted: The number of firms offering cargo-handling services varies with port size. Small ports typically have only one or two stevedoring or terminal companies. The larger ports may have from five to fifteen privately

The Longshore Industry

5

owned firms engaged in loading and unloading ocean cargoes or providing various dock services. . . . A small number of companies do business in more than one port. 1

It is also interesting to note that although Negroes have a long history of work in the longshore industry, references cannot be found in the literature attesting to the possibility that Negroes owned and operated stevedoring firms. There are two types of cargo, general and bulk. As a rule, longshoremen handle only general cargo which is either dry cargo packaged in containers or liquid cargo shipped in barrels. Bulk cargo, on the other hand; is usually dry, uniform, unpackaged cargo, such as ores and grain, and liquid cargo, such as oil and petroleum products. Bulk cargoes require special equipment for loading and unloading and are generally handled outside the port area by industrial employees. Some of the larger stevedoring firms operate publicly-owned marine terminals under a lease agreement with local or state governments and provide cargo-handling services for the ships using these facilities. In addition to loading and unloading the vessels, these terminal operators sort and store various cargoes and move them between ship and ground transportation. These added functions require a somewhat larger investment in equipment, however, the major capital outlay for land, buildings, and specialized cargo-handling equipment is made by government. Some of the more important stevedoring firms are those operated by the shipping companies themselves. These companies provide cargo-handling services for their own vessels with some offering their services to other lines. Matson Terminals, a subsidiary of Matson Navigation Company, and Sea-Land are two examples of major shipping companies performing their own stevedoring function. In general, most larger shipping companies maintain their own dock facilities and terminals in at least one port. The smaller companies, however, do not generate sufficient cargo volume in any one port to justify the acquisition of private dock facilities. Although technological change and its impact upon the longshore industry will be discussed in a following section, it is important to note that the shipping companies who do their own cargo handling have had the greatest impact on the longshore industry because they have been leaders in the introduction of 1. Paul T. Hartman, Collective Bargaining and Productivity University of California Press, 1969), p. 12.

(Berkeley:

6

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

new and more efficient cargo-handling methods. It is, therefore, apparent that smaller companies would not be in a position to make the large capital outlays required for the development of, or acquisition of, specialized cargo-handling equipment. Work Volume As noted above, the amount of work in the highly labor intensive longshore industry depends entirely on the amount of cargo passing across the docks. This amount of cargo is a function of the level of waterborne commerce which, in turn, is related to the level of activity in the economy. Of course, the level of Negro employment in any port is also a function of these same variables. In addition, Negro employment will be influenced by any changes in the relative importance of each port since Negroes are in the majority of the longshore work force in some ports and in the minority in others. Table 1 shows annual tonnage figures since the end of World War II for United States waterborne commerce. With some minor fluctuations, the total amount of cargo handled annually has grown steadily increasing from 767 million short tons in 1947 to 1,532 million short tons in 1970. The domestic portion, i.e. cargo shipped between two ports in the United States, accounted for about two-thirds of the total in 1970, a decrease from 75 percent in 1947. Foreign shipments, on the other hand, have grown at a rapid rate over the same period and are becoming increasingly more important. These figures do not reflect substantially the actual amount of cargo handled by longshoremen. General cargo, which is the only cargo handled by longshoremen, makes up less than onethird of all United States waterborne commerce. Whereas, bulk cargo, which requires special loading and unloading equipment and is not handled by longshore crews, makes up the remaining two-thirds, with the crude oil and petroleum products imported from the oil-rich Middle East countries providing much of the foreign commerce. As will be discussed later, technology has substantially reduced the amount of longshore labor required in the loading and unloading of general cargo. In particular, containerization has eliminated much of the work previously available to longshoremen by substituting capital for labor or by moving the loading of containers away from the docks. Despite the annual growth in waterborne commerce, the amount of work available to long-

7

The Longshore Industry

£ o

c-r-teoiHootooieoiHaoc-iH t - C — t - t - C — OOOOOOOOOOCiCi

Q

& o fa

o H

oicoNiooooa'»*t-tooiNoo n c O M B M ^ ' i ^ ' t O l l J l l )

o O O 1-H

oo co t- CO tIN o s) 113 to to tO to to to to to to to tOS C5 Oi O OS O) Oi 05 0> Oi

t-aJ CO § is

s o

OS O uO IH M c- uj t- co to Lil to to

to

to to

CI to

R c ti B o fa

00 CO 00 to

OJ IN lO O CO CO CO

-3 o H

t-eoi-ii-iTjic-coootoeO'-im tOOS^INCvJOOIMtOTHOlCOO C-C-t-OOOOOOJOOOOiHO

Ih at a>

t-00C>Oi-lC lO 1/5 U3 lO lO U5 jg A B< Q. A O, p, o .. . - . .. . o J1 H ffl M t- H o us o to -"f co to t- 00 00 00 Oi w V V 4) V A) t 09 3 3 3 3 3 3 s a] oft eg ca as a3 H H H H H H t o xf X M III 00 N X LO m to to to cOl Oi 0> CI Ci Ci

s

8

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

shoremen remained relatively stable before declining over the past decade. The advent of containerization and the decasualization of the longshore work force have had serious impacts on the job opportunities available to black and white longshoremen. Longshoremen handle general cargo carried both by American and foreign-flag vessels. With American ships carrying only a small portion of our international commerce, foreign shipping plays an important part in providing work for the longshore industry. Nonetheless, coastwise shipments, which by law are reserved for American vessels, still make up about two-thirds of the total waterborne commerce making American shipping the largest customer of the longshore industry. Major Ports of the United

States

Table 2 gives the tonnage figures for waterborne commerce received or shipped by major ports in the United States during 1950, 1960, and 1970. The total tonnage handled in these ports is roughly one-half the total commerce of the United States as indicated in Table 1. As mentioned earlier, much of the waterborne commerce consists of bulk cargo, therefore, the figures in Table 2 tend to distort the relative importance of various port areas to the longshore industry. For example, the Great Lakes ports are important in terms of total commerce, although all but a small portion of the total tonnage handled in these ports is bulk cargo intended for industrial use. Consequently, these ports employ few longshoremen. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the amounts of bulk and general cargo handled when discussing longshore activity as it relates to total waterborne commerce. The longshore industry is concentrated in a relatively small number of ports. In terms of the amount of general cargo handled and the number of longshoremen employed, the Port of New York is the most important American port. New Orleans is the main Gulf port, and San Francisco is the leading port on the West Coast. The longshore forces in these and the other major ports will be discussed on an individual basis in later chapters. The concentration of the longshore industry, however, does have significance for Negro employment. Excluding the Great Lakes ports, Negroes are in a majority of the longshore work force in eight of the thirteen ports listed in Table 2. More important is that the job opportunities available to Negroes appear high, since a majority of the waterborne commerce mov-

The Longshore

9

Industry TABLE 2. Longshore Industry Commerce by Major United States 1950, I960, 1970

Waterbome

Port Atlantic Coast Boston, Mass. Port of New York, N.Y. Delaware River Ports Baltimore, Md. Norfolk, Hampton Roads, and Newport News, Va. Gulf Coast Tampa, Fla. New Orleans, La. Houston, Tex. Beaumont, Tex. Port Arthur, Tex.

Ports'

1950

1960

1970

17,645 86,603 53,444 24,302

17,996 101,626 82,310 33,727

25,032 111,947 98,503 36,674

20,092

42,587

59,139

6,504 17,788 27,778 17,794 16,191

12,544 27,905 36,820 19,529 24,486

29,797 63,622 39,443 19,843 15,854

West Coast Long Beach, Calif. Los Angeles, Calif. San Francisco Bay Area, Calif.

5,004 19,282

8,932 21,807

21,035 21,652

24,098

34,330

39,651

Great Lakes Chicago, 111. Cleveland, Ohio Detroit, Mich. Duluth-Superior, Minn. Toledo, Ohio

19,906 17,757 22,388 63,126 33,947

20,714 17,564 27,226 42,667 33,685

26,890 22,737 30,936 42,758 31,540

Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1952: Tables 652, 653, pp. 538-539. 19C2: Tables 817, 818, pp. 595-596. 1972: Tables 949, 950, p. 574.

"Thousands of short tons (2,000 lbs.). ing through those thirteen ports is handled in the ports containing the black longshore majority. Nature

of the

Work

In essence, longshore w o r k consists of loading and unloading ships, and has been further defined as "all handling of cargo in

10

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

its transfer from vessel to first place of rest, and vice-versa, including sorting and piling of cargo from vessel to railroad car or barge, or vice-versa." 2 The entire cargo-handling operation is somewhat more complicated, however, and it is appropriate first to differentiate the various jobs performed by longshoremen from those done by other laborers working in the port area, and secondly to describe the job functions within the longshore gang. This can be accomplished by tracing the movement of cargo through the loading process. It should be noted, however, that the occupational structure in the industry varies somewhat from port to port. Generally, cargo arrives on the pier by truck or by railroad car several days prior to its scheduled loading aboard ship. When the cargo is delivered to the terminal, it is separated, grouped, and stored in the marine terminal adjacent to the dock loading area. Once placed in temporary storage, the cargo is said to be in its "last place of rest." Up to this point, the work is generally performed by truck drivers, helpers, and warehousemen, although in some ports it is feasible for longshoremen to perform these functions. Typically, longshore work begins with the movement of cargo from this "last place of rest," combining the efforts of three separate units of dock, deck, and hold gangs, which comprise the larger longshore gang. In the storage area ashore, dock workers place the cargo on pallets in preparation for loading. Tractor or forklift operators move these pallets from the warehouse to dock side and place them within reach of the ship's cargo handling gear. At this point, checkers, who are not part of the regular longshore gang, are assigned to check and record the cargo being loaded or unloaded. As will be noted later, the checker position historically has been closed to Negroes in most ports. Cargo ships have several large hatches, which permits access to the ship's hold, and separate equipment for each hatch— usually masts and booms or a rotating crane. At dock side, frontmen or slingmen attach the hoisting gear to the cargo which was left near the ship's hold. In most ports, these functions are considered part of deck work, but on the West Coast, ship work begins with the attachment of the slings. Once aboard ship, the 2. Pacific Coast Longshore Agreement, 1956, as cited in Maritime Cargo Transportation Conference, Longshore Safety Survey (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1956), p. 13.

The Longshore Industry

11

hoist is operated by a winch driver who transfers the cargo from the dock to the hold of the ship. Since his position at the controls does not allow him an unobstructed view of the cargo throughout the transfer operation, a hatch tender positions himself near the hatch opening and serves as the "eyes" of the winch operator as the cargo is lowered into the hold. The hatch tender uses hand signals to transmit instructions to the winch driver. Generally, the gang foreman serves as the hatch tender and directs the entire cargo loading operation. These two jobs of winch operator and hatch tender comprise the deck work and require special training and experience in the operation of the equipment. A distinguishing feature of Negro employment in the longshore industry is that there is a long history of Negro foremen. In some instances, Negroes have served as heads of "mixed" gangs, containing both Negroes and whites. Inside the ship's hold, the hold gang receives the cargo, removes the sling, and moves the cargo to the wings of the hold where it is stowed for transport. The hold gang may also be responsible for the lashing and bracing of cargo in order to prevent damaging shifts during sea transportation. During loading operations, some of the more experienced men in the gang will be assigned to the hold since the placement of cargo is critical to the stability of the ship. Work in the hold of the ship is difficult, tiring, and unpleasant, and in some ports was often assigned to Negroes. The less experienced men in the longshore gang are usually assigned to dock work. Mainly through experience and on-thejob training, they acquire the knowledge required for work in the hold and/or the skills necessary to operate the winch. Experience and specific skills, such as winch or crane operation, tend to create more job security for a longshoreman because dockworkers are generally not skilled. The Gang StructureOne of the most important features of longshore work is the gang structure requiring the coordinated efforts of men working in the hold, on the deck, and on the dock. Gang members have always been required to work closely together for long and continuous periods of time. Since cargo handling requires a team effort and emphasis has always been placed upon fast ship turnaround time, employers are primarily interested in keeping the gangs intact throughout the job rather than hire others unfa-

12

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

miliar with the ship and the other members of the gang. On the other hand, because the longshoreman does not know when the next ship will arrive or if his gang will be chosen to work, he prefers to work as long as the job lasts with little regard for time off. The resulting system of work relationships and patterns benefits both the employer and the employees. For the longshoremen, the permanent gang system increases his job prospects and for the employers, it increases efficiency and safety. In several of the major ports, gangs are hired rather than individual longshoremen. Usually, a gang boss or foreman, is selected for a job, and he either assembles his regular gang or chooses from among his following of longshoremen. In either case, the composition of the gang does not vary greatly from day to day. When a regular member of a gang is absent, the gang boss selects an "unattached" longshoreman to fill in on a temporary basis. As Professor Northrup noted, ". . . working in gangs demands close comradeship and understanding, which appears to be more easily obtainable among homogeneous groups." s These homogeneous groups provided the cohesion necessary for the efficient operations of the gang, especially during periods of long and continuous work. Historically, the gangs have usually been made up of members of one ethnic or racial group,4 although racially mixed gangs have been a feature of the New Orleans waterfront since 1937. As replacements were needed, the men were usually chosen from the same group to preserve the ethnic composition of the gang. Newly arrived immigrants became attracted to longshore work because of the minimal skill requirements and because they felt comfortable working with others of the same background already employed on the docks. Negroes also became attracted to longshore work finding employment with all-black gangs in most ports. In contrast is the fact that an Irish gang would often work on the same pier as a German gang, but rarely would a gang consist of both German and Irish workers. All men in the labor force performed the same or similar tasks, but in most ports it was rare to find men of different nationalities or races working together out of the same hold. Although employees preferred 3. Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro Kraus Reprint Co., 1971), pp. 142-143. 4. This phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter III.

(New York:

The Longshore

IS

Industry

working with persons of similar backgrounds, employers found it more efficient to use labor of one nationality or color. UNIONIZATION Unions have played a major role in the development of the longshore industry, and Negroes, in many cases, have been actively involved with the establishment of the union structure. This section attempts to present a brief overview of the historic development of the role of the longshoreman, the factors leading up to the organization of unions, and some of the major unions in each port. Colonial Period to 1800 Since the colonial period, men have been employed on the docks of the Atlantic ports to load and unload the valuable cargo which was considered the supportive life-lines between the struggling new world and Europe. At first, ships arrived intermittently, but as commerce grew, the colonies became recognized as a potential world maritime and trading power. "By the time of the American Revolution stevedoring was one of the struggling nation's major fields of employment." 6 The characteristics and nature of the longshoreman and his work has not changed substantially since those early days. "[L]ongshoring . . . ceased to be only the parttime occupation for men hastily called from their plows or blacksmith shops." 8 Gradually, skills based upon the various techniques necessary to stow the different types of cargo developed, and physical strength became the primary requirement for these men. The physical nature of their work, the long and erratic working hours, the physically poor conditions of both ship and dock, which were generally located in unsavory neighborhoods, weakened the reputation of these early longshoremen. Because of the "hurry up and wait" nature of the work, longshoremen were often found in dockside taverns waiting for work or their pay which were constantly in a state of flux.T 5. Maud Russell, Men Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History York: Brüssel and Brüssel, Inc., 1966), p. 8. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., p. 9.

(New

14 19th Century:

The Negro in the Longshore Industry Growth of the Unions

There is little doubt that during these early years of the new nation a "professional class" of longshoremen emerged, however, little information concerning their early development can be found. "Except when [longshoremen] struck little appeared in newspapers, diaries, or government records. This silence, this absence of the slightest interest in the men of the docks continued for two centuries."8 But by the 1830's, dock workers began to realize their plight and began forming societies to help alleviate many of their problems.9 It is most interesting to note the temper of this period of history. Russell writes that [ i ] t was a time of unrest—a period of great flexing of strength by the common people. President Andrew Jackson was in the last year of his "reign," which the conservatives of the time dubbed the rule of "King Mob." Such early reformers as Horace Mann and William Lloyd Garrison were agitating for change. 10

Indeed, this era of discontent and social change affected the future of the longshore industry. On the east coast this discontent over poor working conditions and fluctuating wages, reached strick proportions bringing the New York harbor to a near standstill and reaching riot proportions in Philadelphia. The longshoremen realized that in order to effectively fight against these conditions they must reorganize their groups and societies into unions. Russell notes that the earliest waterfront unions were benevolent and social societies, organized for cultural and educational purposes, but also sought to increase the longshoremen's wages.11 The earliest, viable organization of longshoremen was the Boston Longshoremen's Provident Union founded in 1847 by a state charter.12 Barnes claims that this was originally " . . . a benevolent organization, but it gradually became a regular labor union, —the first longshore union in the country." 1S 8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 13. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 17. 12. Charles B. Barnes, The Longshoremen (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1915), p. 183.

13. Ibid., p. 184.

The Longshore

15

Industry

By 1853 the Alongshoremen's United Benefit Society was founded in New York City. It too was initially a benevolent society but campaigned against low earnings and irregular employment. Typical of many organizations founded during this period, it did not survive, but rather gave way to the Alongshoremen's Union Protective Association in 1864. This association was later incorporated as the Longshoremen's Union Protective Association, No. 2 (LUPA) in 1866," which was considered the first true union organized on economic grounds, "regulating the time and manner of employment." 15 During this period, the South also witnessed the rise of similar organizations. Most 19th century longshore unions in these ports were composed primarily of Negroes. The Longshoremen's Protective Union Association, whose membership was entirely Negro, was organized in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1867 and in Port Royal, Georgia, in 1874.16 The Charleston group was known then as "the most powerful organization of the colored laboring class in South Carolina." 17 Gulf and West ports also saw the rise of union organizations. In 1850, the Screwmen's Benevolent Association was founded in New Orleans by those "who 'screwed' the cotton with hand screws and stowed it aboard ships." 18 "Enlistments in the Confederate Army during the Civil War so thinned the ranks of the Screwmen's Association that it was almost destroyed. However, it managed to survive and . . . to play a leading role on the New Orleans waterfront for more than seventy years." 19 Because of the difficulty of the work and the high level of skill required, the screwmen of New Orleans found themselves in a good bargaining position and received their wage demands without striking. 14. Ibid., p. 95; and Charles P. Larrowe, Shape-up and Hiring (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 7.

Hall

15. Ibid. 16. Northrup, op. cit., p. 147. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 149. 19. Herbert R. Northrup, "The New Orleans Longshoremen," Science Quarterly, Vol. LVII (December 1942), p. 527.

Political

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

16

Negro longshoremen, in 1872, organized the Longshoremen's Protective Benevolent Association in order to cooperate with the all-white screwmen's union. One short year later, both white and black workers accused each other of monopolizing the longshore work, and as a result, "[t]he white screwmen sought to control the competition of the Negroes by assisting the colored men to form the Screwmen's Benevolent Association, No. I (colored), in 1875." 20 The ports of Texas, Galveston and Houston in particular, have been organized for well over one hundred years. Following the lead of the New Orleans screwmen, the white cotton handlers in Galveston formed the Galveston Screwmen's Benevolent Association (GSBA) in 1866. Also fearing competition from the Negro, the GSBA resolved not to work for anyone who employed Negroes aboard ship.21 The first Negro union in Galveston was, therefore, formed in 1870. Negro Longshoremen's Benevolent Association, which imitated the Galveston all-white association previously organized in 1869, restricted its members' work to the dock area.22 The next decades saw white and black locals working rather peacefully under the work-sharing agreements. Unions of the West Coast longshoremen existed almost as soon as the West Coast region was settled. There was a strike in 1851,28 but as with the New York strike of 1836, records cannot be found of any formal organization. In 1853, the stevedore and ship-riggers in San Francisco founded the Riggers' and Stevedores' Union Association.24 During the 1880's, the West Coast longshore industry organized the Longshore Lumberman's Protective Association and the Steamship Stevedores' Protective Union, which was formed to protect the rapidly increasing group of unskilled workers.25 20. Ibid., p. 528. 21. F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 65. 22.

Ibid.

23. Betty V. H. Schneider and Abraham Siegel, Industrial Relations in the Pacific Coast Longshore Industry (Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1956), p. 4. 24.

Ibid.

25.

Ibid.

The Longshore Industry

17

The Knights of Labor The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was started by Uriah S. Stevens among the meat cutters of Philadelphia in 1869.24 Stevens envisioned that workers should be "united not by common trades or crafts but by the mere fact that they were wage earners." 27 The "fraternity," created to organize, educate and direct "the power of the industrial masses," spread to all branches of labor and by December 1886 total membership was reported to be between 500,000 and 600,000.28 Longshore branches of the Knights of Labor appeared in every major port city. The eastern ports were organized under District Assembly No. 49 in 1884, but because the assembly served all trades and crafts the waterfront members formed the Ocean Associations and the Maritime Associations.29 Russell points out that [t]he first longshore Knights of Labor were men from the coastwise lines—a curious fact, for until that time there had been no organization whatever among these workers. All the union and protective associations previously described were exclusively for foreign commerce men. Coastwise dockers had always remained outside unionism; they were the lowest paid and most oppressed of all harbor employees. 30

The Knights rapid success and growing popularity was further bolstered by the New York City streetcar strike in 1885. By 1885, the Knights of Labor phenominal and rapid growth resulted in over-organization. [t]he leaders felt constrained to check the initiation of new members. So huge and so sudden was the growth that they were inadequately prepared to handle the numerous labor disputes that arose among the many trades represented.31

This failure of the strike leadership affected the longshoremen in 1887. A disagreement which initially arose in the port of New York developed into the "Big Strike of 1887." 32 The strike 26. Russell, op. cit., p. 31. 27.

Ibid.

28. Barnes, op. cit., p. 101.

29. Russell, op. cit., p. 32. 30.

Ibid.

31. Barnes, op. cit., p. 102. 32. Ibid., this strike will be discussed more fully in Chapter III, pp. 53-55.

18

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

produced tremendous solidarity among all port longshoremen, however, because of its length and the inadequate Knights leadership they lost all their demands—wages and all fringe benefits. This was a total disaster and dealt a final blow to unionism.33 One year after the strike there were no longshore organizations left 3 4 20th Century and the 1LA Between 1886 and 1896 longshoremen were subjected to the mercy of shipowners.35 The memory of the "Big Strike" ruined many attempts to reorganize the industry. In 1896, the Dockers' Union of England sent Edward McHugh to New York with the intention to organize all waterfront workers and seamen. Under the guidance of Bolton Hall, James R. Brown, Henry George, and McHugh the American Longshoremen's Union, known popularly as the McHugh Organization, was founded in 1896. The union achieved much during its short life. It restored the confidence of the longshoremen and secured better treatment from dock foremen. This lasted only a short time until Frank Devlin embezzled thousands of dollars, bankrupting the union and causing its ultimate downfall a mere two years after its organization.38 The officials of the ALU quickly claimed bankruptcy thereby terminating the organization. They then formed another union under the old Longshoremen's Union Protective Association (LUPA) name, previously established in 1864.37 The International Longshoremen's Association, first organized in Chicago in 1877 by Dan Keefe, was formally named at the Detroit convention in 1892.33 The ILA gradually extended its way from the Great Lakes down the East Coast, and then throughout the ports of the country. It affiliated with the AFL and, in turn, won affiliation from many of the local unions which had existed in the various ports for many years. It was greatly 33. Ibid., p. 108. 34. Russell, op. eit., p. 41.

35. Barnes, op. eit.., p. 108. 36. Russell, op. cit., p. 51; and Barnes, op. cit., p. 116.

37. Ibid., pp. 113, 95. 38. Russell, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

The Longshore

Industry

19

assisted in achieving hegemony during World War I when it was officially recognized by the United States government as an official spokesman for longshoremen. It took over rival groups in the Port of New York and elsewhere during this period. Also during World War I, longshoremen in New York, who have since that period always been the largest single local group within the ILA, achieved dominance in the organization and the top officers of the union ever since have been from that port. The ILA has always admitted blacks without discrimination and it was one of the first unions to have a black vice president. On the other hand, the ILA has generally accepted the status quo affiliating separate unions of blacks and refusing to interfere with racial practices in any ports. The Port of New York, as well as in other ports, ethnic groups have also had locals confined exclusively, or almost exclusively, to that ethnic group. The West Coast

Situation

Although the ILA has continued to be the longshore union with the largest membership throughout this century, it lost its grip on the West Coast in the 1930's. In 1898, most of the West Coast longshore unions affiliated with the ILA.39 A long series of lost strikes, however, caused unionism to again virtually disappear from West Coast docks. During the strikes of 1901, 1916, and 1919, Negroes entered the port of San Francisco as strikebreakers. 40 The strike of 1934 revived unionism and also witnessed the rise to power of Harry Bridges. One of Bridges' first actions was to insure that Negroes could gain entrance to the union— they were again used as strikebreakers in 1934 41 —but several of his local unions continued to exclude blacks. Three years later, Bridges led the West Coast longshoremen out of the ILA to form the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,42 which first affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and then in 1949, was disaffiliated from the CIO for communist domination. The union is still an independent and still run by Harry Bridges. 39.

Ibid.

40. Northrup, Organized 41. Ibid., p. 153. 42. Ibid., p. 152.

Labor and the Negro, op. eit., p. 152.

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

20

The Shape-up and Union Corruption Although the ILA survived to become one of the strongest unions in the country, it was not without racketeering and corruption. Some of the fault can be traced to the ILA in New York in 1916 when the first port-wide agreement was negotiated. This agreement contained provisions for wage increases and hiring preferences for union members, but it was silent on the need to limit the supply of labor and the need to regularize employment. This inaction may have planted the seeds of the corruption, which later grew within the union, since improved wages attracted a greater number of casual workers to the industry, with no corresponding increase in job opportunities. Primary responsibility, particularly in New York, can be attributed to the prevalent hiring method known as the "shape-up." This system required that longshoremen assemble in a sort of half-circle in front of the pier where they hoped to find work. The hiring boss, walking among them, would choose those men who would be hired for the current work shift. This process would be repeated at each pier in the port, at least twice daily and often at concurrent times. According to Northrup, . . [the shape-up] gives the stevedore or hiring foreman tremendous power over the employment opportunities of longshoremen, with the consequence that job-selling and bribery and corruption of all sorts become quite common."43 In addition to increases in the wages of longshoremen, the only significant gain registered by the ILA during the period 1916-1946 was a setting of three fixed times for daily shape-up.44 Previously, a shape-up could be held at any time of the day requiring longshoremen to spend many idle hours near the piers waiting for work. By fixing the times of the shape-ups, the ILA eliminated this problem; however, it preserved the hiring procedure which spawned the corruption. Unchecked, corruption seems to breed more corruption. In the 1930's, and quite possibly earlier, the ILA was infiltrated by gangsters and ex-convicts.45 Joseph Ryan, who succeeded to the ILA presidency after Anthony Chlopek retired in 1927, was elected to a life term as president in 1943. Because he also served 43. Ibid., pp. 139-140. 44. Larrowe, op. eit., p. 15.

45. Ibid., p. 20.

The Longshore Industry

21

on the New York State Parole Board, he was in a position to funnell ex-convicts into the industry. The union leadership proved reluctant to institute any reforms; therefore, it could be concluded that these leaders were profiting for the corruption. Finally, in 1952 in response to allegations of corruption in the ILA dating as far back as 1914, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York . . instructed the New York State Crime Commission to make a thorough investigation of waterfront crime, with special emphasis on the relationship between the shape-up, racketeering, and diversion of cargo from the port." 46 The commission found the union steeped in crime and corruption and suggested basic reforms designed to abolish the shape-up, which was felt to be the heart of the problem. It is also important to note that the commission heard considerable evidence that blacks were especially victimized by the situation at several New York City locations. The final report produced remarkably speedy action by the New York and New Jersey state legislatures and the U. S. Congress, with the recommendations becoming law in less than three months.47 In due course, the shape-up was replaced with employment centers operated by the Bi-State Waterfront Commission, a government agency jointly operated by New York and New Jersey to police the Port of New York. The new hiring procedure and its decasualizing effect on the labor force are discussed more fully under the heading "Decasualization" in this chapter. Interestingly enough, New Orleans, which remained a casual port during this period, was relatively crime free. Embarassed by the crime commission's findings, AFL President George Meany issued an ultimatum to Ryan to either eliminate the criminal element in the ILA or face the association's expulsion from the AFL. Following Ryan's failure to institute effective reforms, the AFL finally expelled the union in September 1953, and set up its own rival union, but the ILA won the representation elections conducted by the NLRB in 1954. Immediately following this defeat, the AFL gave up any further organizing efforts in the Port of New York. Five years later, in 1959, the ILA reaffiliated with the AFL-CIO. Although the ILA still had not met the requirements for reinstatement set down in 1953, the possibility of the ILA joining the Teamsters appar46. Ibid., p. 41. 47.

Ibid.,

pp. 44-46.

22

The Negro in the Longshore

Industry

ently caused the AFL-CIO to waive some of the requirements. Ryan, in the meantime, had retired. DECASUALIZA TION In terms of strengthening the attachment of men to the longshore industry, the most important development has been the decasualization of the major ports. Decasualization can be described as the process whereby an oversupply of labor to an industry is reduced so that those remaining will have a more stable employment pattern and higher total earnings. In the longshore industry, the basic institution through which the decasualization process has been achieved is the central hiring hall. It is important to note that decasualization is responsible for a large decrease in the longshore work force. Concomitantly, decasualization is responsible for a decrease in the number of jobs available to black longshoremen. The data to be presented in later chapters, however, indicate that decasualization did not cause any changes in the relative position of Negro and white longshoremen. In other words, there were no significant shifts in the black percentage of total employment in any of the ports that were attributable to decasualization. The general history of the longshore industry can be divided into two periods: one preceding decasualization and one beginning with decasualization. The process, however, did not occur at the same time nor to the same extent in each port. For example, Seattle became the first major port to decasualize when employers established a central hiring hall in 1921. On the other hand, the Port of New York, the largest in the country, did not attempt decasualization until 1953, doing so only after the New York State Crime Commission investigations and recommendations were presented. Although each port is unique in the way it has formalized the hiring process, the general characteristics of the change have been similar. The Casual Port Prior to decasualization, the longshore industry had all the main elements conducive to a casual labor market: the demand for labor varies from day to day, depending upon the number of ships in port at a given time. Furthermore, the demand is highly unpredictable and cannot be forecast more than a day or two in advance.

The Longshore

Industry

23

In addition to . . . irregularity in the arrival and departure of ships, the shipping industry as a whole is seriously affected by cyclical trends, by seasonal fluctuations, by changes in tariff regulations, by the weather, and by the vagaries of the individual shipping companies. As a result it is wellnigh impossible to plan or gage the demand for longshore labor in the port for any considerable period of time. 48

The industry is also characterized by a large number of employers each interested in maintaining a labor supply large enough to meet peak demands, which may be three times as great as normal demand. Many longshoremen maintained a tenuous attachment to the industry since the work was usually of short duration and few of the employers provided permanent jobs. There is some evidence to indicate that in some ports, Negroes comprised a greater percentage of the casual work force than of the "permanentlyattached" work force. Longshore work, albeit hard labor, never required special skills; therefore, anyone with a strong back could enter the work force. Consequently, in addition to the workers who earned their livelihoods as longshoremen, the waterfront attracted many men who were looking only for a few hours of employment. The net effects of having a casual labor force were that, on the average, many more men were attached to the industry than were needed, few achieved more than a subsistence earnings level, and the power to hire or not to hire rested in the hands of the hiring foremen. As noted earlier, the shape-up, common in most ports prior to 1950, required that men looking for work line up at the base of the pier in hopes the hiring foreman would select them when work became available. The contracting stevedores doing the work of discharging and loading ships are seldom in a position to know in advance how long the actual work of loading or discharging will last and how many men they will need for this work. Hence there has developed a system of hiring longshoremen by the hour and hiring them only when and where actually needed. Every pier in port, every dock, becomes a hiring station, and the average longshoreman never knows whether or not he will be employed at a given pier or when hired how long he will remain on the job. 49

A longshoreman seeking work on the waterfront is often forced to spend many idle hours not far from the docks. If he is not 48. "Employment Conditions and Unemployment Relief," Monthly Review, Vol. XXXVII (December 1933), p. 1300. 49. Ibid.

Labor

24

The Negro in the Longshore

Industry

chosen during the first shape-up he must "wait around" for a ship to arrive since prior notice of arrivals was not available. There is required at all times a great deal of hanging about awaiting the arrival of ships or frieght. This is a matter not of minutes but of hours; sometimes of whole days. Longshoremen, except while at work, are not allowed on the piers. They can not go to their homes for fear they will not be on hand when wanted. Consequently, they must stand on the sidewalks, in doorways, or on street corners. . . .',0

From the employers point of view, the pool of idle men create the large supply of labor needed to meet peak demands when many ships were in port and had to be loaded and/or unloaded as fast as possible, and the shape-up created a total supply far in excess of what was needed on any particular day. In addition, it also created shortages on some piers and oversupplies on others with no means of matching supply and demand throughout the port area. To be sure, employers rarely needed as many men as were "attached" to a pier, but in the event the need arose, suitable labor was available. As will be discussed below, the shape-up allowed hiring foremen to exercise an extreme amount of power over the lines of longshoremen. In many instances, this power was manifested in the exclusion of Negroes. Having an oversupply of labor also made it easier to recruit strikebreakers, and blacks often served in this capacity. The supply side of the labor market is usually glut. The work is essentially unskilled. The extremely high turnover—perhaps 50 percent per day—is evidence of the large amount of daily hiring. Large numbers of unemployed or casually employed persons capable of doing the work are attracted by the reasonable probability of a job, however brief. Occasional success in actually getting a job strengthens the attachment to the industry of even the grossly underemployed. The employers collectively are interested in maintaining a labor force at least sufficient to meet peak period demand, but this interest usually requires little more than hiring the fringe worker just often enough to keep him coming to the docks. 51

One of the factors that attracted fringe workers to the waterfront was the possibility of a few days of work and then a few days off. This type of employment had particular appeal for men who were not interested in a steadier job. The industry also offered part-time employment to those out of work elsewhere, 50. Barnes, op. eit., p. 18. 51. Hartman, op. eit., p. 26.

The Longshore Industry

25

perhaps on lay-off or strike. In short, the hard work of longshoring was suited to those not capable of steady employment elsewhere. The Effects of Decasualization With the introduction of new technology in cargo handling, the manpower requirements of the industry decreased. In order to prevent fringe workers from siphoning off employment opportunities and income from the basic work force and also to insure the hiring of experienced men, employers and unions in the major ports developed methods whereby longshoremen were to be hired from central hiring halls. Longshoremen were required to register with the hall in order to become eligible for employment. Furthermore, longshoremen were requird to work a minimum number of hours per month to avoid being dropped from the register. Decasualization schemes . . . concentrate on manipulating the longshore labor supply in an effort to adjust the supply to the changing demands of the shipping industry. The employer has to relinquish the right to hire longshoremen from anywhere but the central office, where the register of longshoremen is kept. . . . A decasualization program has the effect of eliminating the power of the hiring agent, as well as the abuses and the nepotism that generally accompany it.. It gradually reduces the total number of longshoremen in a port to a level that is close to the needs of the market. One result is that average earnings are raised for those men who are left in the the register. 52

The basic work force is generally defined as those longshoremen who work a minimum of 700 to 800 hours per year. This minimum is usually the number of hours required to qualify for union pension benefits. Using this minimum, a 1964 study of ten Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor indicated that, in the majority of the casual ports, less than one-half of the men hired during the previous year worked more than the minimum number of hours.53 In contrast, the study also showed that in the Port of New York, which has been 52. Hosseine Morewedge, The Economics of Casual Labor: A Study of the Longshore Industry (Berne, Switzerland: Herbert Lang & Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 113. 53. U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Utilization-J ob Security in the Longshore Industry: Boston (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1964), pp. 9-10.

The Negro in the Longshore

26

Industry

decasualized since 1953, over four-fifths of the longshoremen worked more than 700 hours per year.54 As a result of decasualization, however, the number of longshoremen in the Port of New York declined from 50,000 in 1953 to 23,000 in 1967." With a reduction in the number of "part-time" longshoremen has come a rise in the income level and increased employment opportunities for those remaining in the industry. Most important, however, is that many of the evils attendant to the shape-up have been removed through the use of hiring halls. The effects of decasualization upon Negroes varies from port to port. In southern ports, Negroes continued to maintain their numerical majority; however, in northern and eastern ports charges of discrimination continued to be brought against the ILA.56 These charges stemmed from the days of the shape-up when hiring was strictly controlled by foremen and exclusion was a common practice. Although hiring was taken out of the hands of foremen, most gangs remained intact and working relationships continued to operate, excluding Negroes from many longshore jobs. In 1959, the Urban League of Greater New York charged that "the only Negroes with relatively permanent employment on the waterfront were in gangs performing the most 'arduous and least desirable work.' " 57 In addition, the League noted that "[h]undreds of casual longshoremen were hired, but Negro longshoremen were repeatedly ignored during the shapeup." 58 It is apparent that racial problems were not solved and that racial employment patterns were substantially unaltered by the advent of decasualization.

54.

Ibid.

55. Joseph P. Goldberg, "Modernization in the Maritime Industry: LaborManagement Adjustments to Technological Change," in Harold Levinson et al., Collective Bargaining and Technological Change in American Transportation (Evanston, 111.: Transportation Center, Northwestern University. 1971), p. 264. 56. Ray Marshall, The Negro and Organized Labor (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 286-289. 57. 76wf.,p. 287. 58.

Ibid.

The Longshore

27

Industry

PRODUCTIVITY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

The nature of longshore work has changed little since colonial times. Until the recent introduction of containerization, the longshore industry has been slow to make any changes designed to improve productivity. The reluctance on the part of employers to make use of new cargo-handling methods stems from a lack of sufficient economic incentive. Furthermore, strong forces, including the longshore unions, have a vested interest in preserving the labor intensity of the industry and have traditionally opposed any technological changes which would reduce the size of the labor input. Any proposed changes in cargo handling would place the employer in direct conflict with the union. Essentially, stevedores bill ship operators on a "cost plus" basis. The stevedores submit estimates based on the productivity of longshoremen, their wages, and any penalty fees to be paid to workers for handling certain cargoes. Overhead, insurance, and profits comprise the remainder of the estimate. In 1955, the Pacific Maritime Association estimated profits at 30 percent of straight-time wages and 10 percent of overtime wages. 59 If, for some reason, the estimate falls short of the actual cost, the ship operator generally pays the difference. For example, a union negotiated wage increase automatically raises an estimate. Since the stevedore still receives his profit, he is under no economic pressure to cut costs. As noted earlier, stevedoring firms tend to be highly competitive, exhibit little differences between estimates submitted by different firms for the same contract, and incur man-hour labor costs that do not vary from firm to firm since contract negotiations between the employers and the longshore union set wage rates and penalty fees that apply to all firms throughout a given port area. Productivity, therefore, is also uniform because longshoremen are hired through a central union hiring hall on a rotating basis. Individual employers generally do not have permanent work crews and will employ a different longshore gang for each contract. Consequently, over a long period of time, productivity will be the same for all employers. Competition in the industry eliminates excess profits but still allows each firm a fair return. 59. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Study of Hwrbor Conditions in Los Angeles and Long Beach, Hearings (October 19-21, 1955), 84th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1955), pp. 101-102, as cited in Hartman, op. cit, p. 13.

28

The Negro in the Longshore

Industry

An additional factor limiting the introduction of new technology is that few stevedores own marine terminal facilities. Generally, the facilities are government-owned with stevedores supplying only the cargo handling services. Since they do not own the facilities, stevedores cannot be expected to make any of the major capital improvements that are necessary for increased productivity. However, the largest obstacle to technological change has been union resistance. Since increased productivity is usually associated with fewer jobs or fewer man-hours per job, technological innovation threatens the job security of union members. To preserve the number of jobs available to its members, the unions have opposed any change that substitutes capital for labor. In most cases, the stevedoring firms have been too small or too fragmented to fight successfully the union on this issue. Most of the improvements introduced to the industry have come from the initiative of the larger steamship lines that provide their own cargo handling services. The impetus for innovation stems from increasing competition from foreign operators that forced American carriers to search for ways to reduce costs. Since cargo handling costs account for almost one-half of total freight costs,00 they became the prime target for reductions resulting in new cargo-handling methods that increased productivity and, at the same time, reduced labor requirements. These new methods allowed the steamship lines to realize additional savings as a result of faster ship turnaround time; however, they reduced the job opportunities available to Negro and white longshoremen. The large shipping lines are in a better position to innovate for several reasons. First, they maintain their own marine terminal facilities and can make major capital improvements. Secondly, the larger lines can obtain the financing necessary for large capital expenditures and for new cargo handling equipment. Thirdly, by providing cargo handling services for their own ships, these lines can realize large cost savings through greater utilization of new equipment; and finally, the steamship lines are better able to withstand union opposition. Interestingly, the successful introduction of new cargo-handling methods by the larger steamship lines have usually been followed by similar improvements made in government-owned facilities. 60. Organization for Economic Co operation and Development, Ocean Freight Rates as Pwrt of Total Costs, 1968, as cited in Goldberg, op. cit., p. 261.

The Longshore

Industry

29

Innovations Until recently, the tools of the trade for a longshoreman were a strong back and a "cotton hook," the symbol of longshore work. Even as late as the 1930's, longshoremen relied on their muscle to get the job done. Cargo was transferred between the hold of a ship and dock on lift boards or sling boards that were nothing more than wide planks used in conjunction with rope slings. In the late 1930's and during World War II, pallets, which are raised wooden platforms, came into widespread use. Once loaded on a pallet, cargo may be moved within the ship, transferred to the dock, and warehoused as a single unit. This relatively simple innovation was instrumental in substituting machine power for muscle power in longshore work. Containerization simply extended the concept of a unit load to larger units. Nonetheless, it represented a major technological innovation for the industry, impacting upon every facet of longshoring including manpower. As originally conceived, the containers were metal boxes of varying proportions, superseded in the mid-1950's by larger containers which could be transferred directly between ship and either truck or railroad car. Developed by Sea Train, Sea-Land, and Matson containerization successfully substituted capital for labor, both Negro and white, in cargo-handling operations and greatly increased productivity. "With 20 to 25 tons loaded by container in 2*4 minutes, as against 18 to 20 manhours required for break-bulk handling, increased output per manhour was early projected at least in the range of 13 to 18 times, with further gains from faster ship turnaround in port." 6 1 From the point of view of the steamship companies, the only drawback to containerization was the substantial capital outlay for specialized handling equipment and the containers themselves. The impact of containerization extends in many directions. In addition to savings in freight costs that accrue as a result of reduced handling, reduced turnaround time in port f o r a ship means faster shipment and, therefore, more voyages per ship. The use of containers reduces packaging costs, pilferage costs, and damage to the goods during shipment. The popularity of this concept has virtually revolutionized the shipping business. 61. Goldberg, op. tit., p. 269.

30

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

Containerization has had other revolutionary effects on the longshore industry. Most important is that the role of the longshoreman has shifted from handling palletized cargo to operating the crane that lifts the containers. In addition to the crane operator, the only labor required in the operation is a man to attach the slings and a man to remove the slings and secure the container to its new platform. This reduction in the amount of labor required has had a strong impact on the industry's employment and continues to reduce the number of jobs available for longshoremen. An interesting aspect of containerization in the Port of New York has been its beneficial impact on black employment. Containerization had led to a transfer of work and a shift of jobs from Manhattan to Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey, primarily because of the need for space for trucks and containers. In this New Jersey area, large numbers of blacks live and find employment; in Manhattan, the longshore labor force has been overwhelmingly white. This is thus one of the few occasions where shifts of employment because of technological change has benefited blacks. Union Response to

Innovation

Technology, in the form of handling equipment and ship design, continually reduces the number of men required to work a particular ship, but the unions, to a large extent, have always been able to mitigate the detrimental effects. For example, the cotton screwmen of the South continued to enjoy high wages, steady employment, and almost complete job control for many years after the high density cotton press was invented and introduced on the waterfront. The existence of the cotton press rendered obsolete the screwmens' specialized skill, but strong union organization helped the screwmen maintain job control in New Orleans and the Texas ports. The development of pallets and palletized cargoes during World War II did little to reduce the size of longshore gangs since bargaining power greatly favored the union. In the 1960's, containerization was countered by negotiated royalty payments to the union for each container handled and a negotiated right, under certain conditions, to pack or re-pack containers at dockside. Under pressure for increased productivity, however, industry employment has, in fact, declined and job functions have

The Longshore

Industry

31

changed, but the longshore unions have coped with this problem of change in various ways. For example, on the West Coast, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) anticipated the need for change, and through negotiations with employers, sought to soften the impact of this change in the work force. In contrast, however, the ILA attempted to deal with the problem only after it could no longer be ignored. SUMMARY There are a few factors concerning the nature and structure of the industry and the longshoremen themselves that become apparent. First, the work has been and, to a large degree, still is unskilled labor; however, to those employed in longshoring, it was the only work available and therefore worth protecting. As will be noted in the next chapter, the protection took the form of exclusion of other people not sharing in the dominant nationality or color on the pier in question. Fierce competition between Irish and Italians or Irish and Negro, often in the form of violent attack, has been an integral part of the history of the waterfront. Negroes, however, have always worked in the industry either as strikebreakers—later permanent waterfront workers—in the Northeast and on the West Coast, or as original longshoremen and union members in the South and along the Gulf Coast. On the West Coast the ILWU negotiated a contract permitting the introduction of labor saving machinery in return for a substantial benefit package. The so-called mechanization and modernization agreement resulted in a substantial improvement in productivity which came at a time of the expansion of these ports partly attributable to the Vietnam war. This expansion greatly increased employment opportunities including those for Negroes.62 On the East Coast, however, a series of strikes erupted as the union fought technological change, but they gradually reduced and improved methods accepted. Here again mechanization did not cause any special adverse effect on blacks particularly because of the fact that expansion occurred in the Port of New York on the New Jersey side where a larger percentage of blacks worked, and contraction occurred primarily in the Manhattan area which was largely white. Contraction was particularly strong in the 62. Hartman, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

32

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

passenger ship berths along Manhattan as the jet powered air plane took over the work formerly done by the large passenger ships. Negroes have not suffered disproportionately in this decline. Important also is that manpower requirements have diminished greatly over the years. The primary causes of the decrease in longshore job opportunities have been the effects of decasualization, which removed the large number of casual workers who were perpherally tied to the industry, and the introduction of such advances as containerization, which reduced the number of men necessary to load and unload the ships. Unionism in longshoring predates organization in most other segments of the economy. Although there were many organizations on the waterfront in the 1800's, most organized longshoremen came under the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) by World War I or shortly thereafter. The racial policies of the ILA were not at all typical of early unions in the United States. In the 1940's, Northrup wrote: From its inception in 1892, the ILA has officially opposed racial discrimination. Negroes compose a large portion of its membership, and today four of its fifteen vice-presidents are colored. No less an authority than William Green, president of the AFL, has declared that the ILA applies the Federation's "cardinal principle" of non-discrimination "more religiously" than any of its other affiliates. Actually, however, Negro-union relations vary considerably from port to port. In many instances, strong local unions had been in existence for years before they affiliated with the ILA, and their racial policies were developed without regard to those of the national union. 63

The most important function of the union, however, is that the hiring process is under its close control. Although the shapeup has been eliminated for the most part, the hiring halls and the dispatchers are administered entirely by either the union or the union in joint cooperation with the employers. This procedure is present in all major ports except New Orleans where the hiring hall is employer controlled. The longshore industry, even in New Orleans, operates under an arrangement which guarantees that only union members will become permanently attached to the waterfront work force. It is important to reemphasize that the union structure in the longshore industry has allowed for the development of a strong cadre of black union officials who exercise more influence over the economic well-being of their constituents, and themselves, than can be found in any other industry. 63. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro, op. eit., p. 141.

CHAPTER III

The Negro Struggle for Waterfront Jobs In the South Atlantic and Gulf ports, Negroes have always performed longshore work. Slaves loaded the tobacco barrels and cotton bales, and after the Civil War blacks continued to dominate the work. Relatively high wage rates and the need for special skills in loading materials, especially before mechanical contrivances were developed, brought whites to the job in some ports also. There resulted a system of separate gangs by race and thence in some ports, separate union locals. Although these locals divided the work, whites often received a larger share of the jobs than blacks and the latter were assigned less favorable work. In the Northeast, longshore work became the province of the various ethnic groups who came to this country in the great immigration waves. Negroes in many cases won longshore work only after being utilized as strikebreakers, however, blacks in the South were early participants in both the formation of unions and in strikes. In the North, also, sections of ports and types of work were frequently controlled by one ethnic group, and gangs are still often composed of a single ethnic strain or race. On the West Coast, few blacks found their way to dock work until the 1930's, and even as late as 1960, Portland, Oregon, and Los Angeles/Long Beach, California, dockworkers excluded Negroes from their midst. In disregard of a union policy favorable to integration, this discriminatory treatment was not ended until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Despite the long history of black employment in the industry, the job of checker in all ports has remained a white man's preserve. Even today, only a few blacks enjoy this semi-white collar position. This chapter will look at black employment in the nation's principal ports, treating each port as a separate entity, after first examining overall national and regional employment trends.

33

The Negro in the Longshore Industry

84

§2

o

hbe V

oo to in i-t oo t -

co eo o

5s

in co

o Eh

z*

$

o

CO CO lii Tf O OS OS eg N * is a 00 in

m O O tCO

H

y-l

00 iH O CO i-H

00 IM

eg ^ co

e^ c i os O 10 i-t oo co

eg H OS. CO

CO o o eg co

to tco eg

CO O »-i eg oo oo o o o h oo

C o t?5 I,

CO OS US CO o eg oo ¡a th

OS ECO CO

CCO 00 Cg

00 CO OS 00 CO i f «

t> o 1» i j ih eg

to T)< CO CO •Wf CO

a) >7 Ph

(In ^ o tH be v

2

8 »

t - C- lO •-1 oo co

" >2 V 55 P-I be 0)

U5 «5 O -cf ® t - CO co o

1-1 OS

2 btl o 55

18 bo £

o h

OS ©

V o

« c

CO w

o

c 0 01 05

53 5

£

-5

5

5 Z

o M

o o M 55

£

1-1

The Negro Struggle for Waterfront

Jobs

35

N oo LO O •«f rH CO CO ö CO (M CO eg c- IO

ai

to M CO IO i-I

CD lO 00 CO O M »H co CO CO CO CO o Iß I-i ci

o> co ci

o co IO ci 1-1

•>*

co oo 00 IO

i -2

(4 E

o

3 s

I

S

00 00 co o t— cIO o> co oo

CO to O)

3 J2 • IO co

i-1

m

oo o i-I oò 00 i-3 cò CO T)> N

C .0

'3

"o X V a> x

O) co 00 IO IO o tM o> 1-1 o 00 N rH_ rH 1—1 co oo 1-1 oT co IO t rH

">. Ci m C e O

Cs

Ih O

i*

° 3 JM O W

JD

« ' S J! ^ g S »Ä ÖS

'E -t-> c

a

3 *«» «

. > > V " « 1-1 W M 1-H l-H

$a

I H

tu 2 ti V

«

•S.

-o C9 U •S a» J3 -C c 5 V t h 3 3 O O O o — Z W W

.2 Ì Ì 3 >.

01 3 -O «in

CI o IO t - o ov r - re O) 1-1 co co CTI oo

rH CO

in t> o 00

© co

o in rH

IO

•f • co t>

0 01

CO o rH

o o o rH

rH eo

CO OJ

00 rH N

CO §

CO Ol

m Ol in

t IN

o © o iH

rH

1 l

n.a.

38

o

q rH

CO 00

ia

CO

o t-

o c5 o rH

TH Ol

CO CO

^

a> (X, p g w

o

OJ

Pi

o H -*->

G a> o tH

a)

Oi 2

be H 4) PH

,, C3

o H

OJ o © o

00 ai t—

rH

rH IO US tH

in o CO in 00

© tin o>

©

CO

CO

© o rH

rH

1»

Ol trco CO rH

tco 00 oi

00 CO

© o o rH

oo

tr^ CO rH

OJ oi eo

IM CO

©

o rH

CO rH oo IN CO

rH CO CO rH

00

"6 01 «

CO o iH

00 O rH oT

iH CO

i 1

rH

OJ o

•O" " CO

CO

+7 W

-—-

-g

3 V

•n

"t OS

CO CO

rH

00 CM o>

Ol CO IN IN

CO Ol m IN

o

13 1> o

•S 3 o

CO oi

tco CO CO

oa rH o> CO

o crH

IN CO o ci

00

IN CO rH

t-; T-i

t-; CO rH

CO IN q_ o rH

o 00 o rH

rH 00

q

m o

q o o rH

rH CO

ei

CO o o IN CO

to

00 CO

CO OJ

t>

o o o

TH

rH

Ol c-

CO 00

o Ol

CO

00

o ©

OJ CO co

I

d


}1 ot H N o" c i e i r H

H ( 0 « I O C j T f « | l l ^ H t - ^ l i M O N - ^ N o o e o o q c o CO " "o o i r i co"

co

©

o

o

co

01 iö lS a —. Ö S

È5 6

o £ g cs ^

J®
i

CO oi

T-H

to IN rH

CO

Ol

lO

cr W a> 3

"c3 0

03

« a

o ot* -cc * al (O a> _4¡ u

i-H

«3 00 r-i"

to

• f1 •O o

C a; « £

3o H

1 1

|1

I 1

fH 00

o in IO

1 1

I 1

I 1

to t-

•

»H 00 o fH

I 1

1 1

1 !

I 1

ttò to

CM CM

1 1

°2 CM N

q CM CM

I 1

1 1

I 1

I 1

I 1

CO tlO

co clO

C4

t o IO CM

Ol

I

I

I

1

1

•w IO

O) to IO

to

11

1

CO IO

to

i-H to

o "p.

e

w

fi. I

C

"3

§

•«•3 o. 3 u

The court, however, refused to grant a merging of the locals, feeling that the rights of those who have worked on the waterfront might be jeopardized if welfare plans, pension funds, unequal property holdings, and nonuniversal seniority structures were medged. The court noted that the inequities found to exist could be eradicated without ordering a complete merger. In line with its findings, the court ordered the parties to meet and draft an agreement acceptable to all and in keeping with 344. United States v. International 976 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 345. Ibid.

Longshoremen's

Ass'n. 334 F. Supp.

The Xegro in the Longshore

135

Industry

the court's conclusions. 3 " The court did not, at this time, enter an order or decree. The parties did meet, but could not settle their differences. In the fall of 1972, the government petitioned the court to enter an order. At a hearing held in May 1973, the court gave the unions three months to develop an acceptable plan or, failing that, the court would enter an order granting all requested relief. 347 It is important to note here t h a t since no order has been entered, no appeal has been made. The decision of the Court in the Texas case is in sharp cont r a s t to the ruling handed down in Baltimore. Although the same form of union organization and racial segregation and discrimination existed in both Baltimore and the Texas ports, the Baltimore locals were ordered to merge, leaving only the segregated gangs as remnants of past practices. In Texas, the court took cognizance of the identity and strength of separate black locals and sought to retain them. It may be t h a t the potential of white dominance, and a concomitant reduction in influence and employment opportunity f o r blacks, which could result from the Baltimore decision, has been avoided in the Texas case. It is also possible that if the locals in Texas continue to block the elimination of discriminatory practices, the Court may have no choice but to impose a merger upon them. The judge in the Texas district court noted that he was convinced that Congress did not intend for black union locals to lose their identity and strength when it passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The actions of the Texas locals, including the black groups, make it appear as if they are at odds with the court's interpretation. THE WEST

COAST

Although the ports on the West Coast do not have a history comparable in length to those in the East or in the South, the West Coast longshore industry has grown in importance over the years and currently occupies a position of m a j o r significance in the industry. The history of unionism on the West Coast is unlike that in the remainder of the industry and the role of blacks in West Coast longshoring does not follow the model 346. Interview, June 1973.

347. Ibvl.

The Negro in the Longshore

136

Industry

developed elsewhere. As will be noted below, blacks were introduced into the industry long after unionization had occurred. The Early Industry:

1850 to 1933

The earliest appearance of economic activity among West Coast longshoremen was a strike that occurred in 1851.3

CO

AS CM M

1 0 R CO

AS C CD

« I

0be

H

§

E

G

CO

00 O

S

(N

Industry

H

C AJ O

£

Q) BE

®

H

Q

C -

>0

O ^ B£

O

O>

CO

CO

be

be

i—i IO

rH

CO eg OS CO

CO N eg •«Ì r-i CO* eg

r-i

t-;

•«!< CD Cl eg o -T

© ceg

Ci o t-

li5 CO eg IO in rH rH

e o u

o

A

o u

ifi be a) « IO fc US

3 ho «

c «

S 1)

o

o O

c .

E

V a

>»

o

0) Oh

c. O

•a e « S CJ IV i-< c .

s

i5

w •e «

.5 ^

>. «

2 * 73

t s a I ë 8 e >-»p. a P J c

H

s oj

E-i

a

« ê E>

£

o

3

S

at

o

I

I c

Ph

-biS

1 Eh fc

*o T3 C O « G 0 T3 00 1

o »1 3 O w

a>

E

o M

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

17

TABLE 7. Offshore Maritime Industry New Vessels under Construction or on Order (Ships of 100 g.r.t. and over) Country

1969 »

1970*

United States Norway United Kingdom Japan West Germany Italy France

1,511.5 2,304.4 5,063.4 21,036.8 4,284.7 2,398.4 4,414.4

1,684.1 3,564.6 5,027.1 29,357.2 5,388.3 2,873.0 4,954.4

World Total

59,831.7

78,301.0

Source: a

Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, Marine Transport 1971 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 1972), p. 140. Figures are in thousands g.r.t.

States must maintain at least a minimum number of merchant vessels in operation to insure the transport of foreign commerce and for logistical support during future national emergencies, direct subsidies are intended to fund the cost differences between vessels of American and foreign registry. The objective of government maritime policy is stated in the Act as follows: It is necessary f o r the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce a t all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities f o r ship-building and ship repair. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine." 9. Merchant Marine Act of 1970, Public Law 91-469.

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry

18

In addition to the aforementioned objectives, a merchant marine contributes to a favorable balance of payments by earning foreign exchange as the price for transporting foreign trade. In the same vein, payments by domestic shippers to foreign carriers hurt the balance of payments; hence, the government is understandably anxious to stem this flow of funds. In providing construction subsidies, the government, after approving the building of a vessel, agrees to pay the difference in cost between construction in an American and in a foreign shipyard up to a given percentage of total cost. The 1970 Act sets the construction support ceiling at 45 percent in 1971 with successively lower figures reaching 35 percent for 1976 and beyond. This reduced level is deemed reasonable on the basis that the Act encourages more efficient production and promises reduced governmental interference in ship design.10 Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which subsidized up to 50 percent of the construction costs, the annual amount of the subsidies fluctuated from a low of $28 million in 1958 to a peak of $122 million in 1961, averaging over $80 million between 1958 and 1967." Operating subsidies are intended to equal the difference between American and specified foreign operating costs. The largest cost differential results from the higher wages and greater benefits received by American seamen. Between 1958 and 1967, operating subsidies paid to dry cargo liners grew under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 from $141 to $261 million,12 and the 1970 Act will raise this figure substantially because it extends subsidies to bulk cargo carriers and tramps. It is interesting to note that with the exception of France, Italy, and Japan, the United States is the only country which provides direct operating subsidies to its merchant marine.13 Nevertheless, these vast subsidies have not stemmed the industry's decline. 10. Lester Rubin, The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry. Racial Policies of American Industry, Report No. 17 (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 4. 11. Barker and Brandwein, op. cit., p. 33. 12.

Ibid.

13. John J. Clark and Margaret T. Norton, "The Merchant Marine: sidies and Competition," Proceedings of the United States Naval tute, Vol. XCIII (January 1967), p. 79.

SubInsti-

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

19

The government also provides indirect subsidies to American carriers in the form of cargo preferences. As the largest single shipper in the world,14 government shipping policies most certainly have a great impact on the maritime industry. The Chief Cargo Preference Act of 1954 requires that: 'at least 50%' of the gross tonnage of certain government-generated cargoes (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners and tankers) shall be transported on privately-owned U.S. flag commercial vessels. It covers, in scope, procurement by the United States for its own account and the furnishing of equipment, materials, or commodities for the account of any foreign nation. The commodity source may be from either within or without the United States. 15

The Act also makes provision for rate-preference privileges, which allow American carriers to bid above competitive world rates and still attract government cargoes. Over the ten-year period, 1958 to 1967, Barker and Brandwein estimate the indirect subsidies paid under rate-preference programs totaled approximately $600 million.16 American carriers have become increasingly dependent on government cargoes, which have gradually displaced commercial trade. Tramps depend almost exclusively on government-sponsored cargoes for their outbound business and often make the return voyage in ballast. The dependence of liners on government cargoes varies greatly from one company to another, but, as a group, liners derive over one-half of their gross freight revenues from government shipments.17 Combined with the direct subsidies paid to dry cargo liners, cargo preferences have not strengthened the merchant marine although they have succeeded in slowing the decline of some sectors of the industry. Flags of Convenience The decline of the United States merchant marine belies the actual participation of American shipowners in foreign trade. During the postwar years, rising construction and operating 14. Barker and Brandwein, op. tit., p. 32. 15. Labor-Management Maritime Committee, The U.S. Merchant Marin« Today: Sunrise or Sunset? (Washington, D.C.: Labor-Management Maritime Committee, 1970), p. 61. 16. Barker and Brandwein, op. eit., p. 34. 17. Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping: Policies and. Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 179.

20

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry

costs prevented American carriers from acquiring a share of the new market created by expanding world trade, and government operating subsidies were available only to dry cargo liners. Many American shipowners found it economically expedient to register vessels under foreign flags, especially those flags which promised the greatest cost advantage over operations under United States registry. The growth in popularity of the socalled "flags of convenience" has been a direct function of attempts by American shipowners to remain competitive on the world market in the face of rapidly rising costs of operation under United States registry. With operating subsidies available only to dry cargo liners, bulk carriers have been particularly sensitive to rising costs. During the twenty-year period following World War II, bulk commodity shipments increased prodigiously as industrial and commercial needs throughout the world expanded. Trade in oil, bauxite, iron ore, sugar, and grain has grown at a substantially faster rate than general cargo movements. In the postwar years, the United States changed from an exporter to an importer of oil, as oil consumption exceeded domestic production. The temporary closing of the Suez Canal caused Europe to rely on the United States to satisfy its oil requirements using sources in the Western Hemisphere. To supply the raw materials required by industry at a competitive price, American shipowners have shifted their operations to registery under "flags of convenience," with the result that nations with no inherent claim to maritime prominence register several of the world's largest merchant fleets. Registeries in Panama, Liberia, and, to a lesser extent, Honduras (PanLibHon) have been particularly attractive to American shipowners. The Liberian merchant fleet is the world's largest, and Panama ranks ninth among maritime nations. Crews on such ships are usually a polyglot group, but Americans, black or white, are generally not included. Wages, of course, are far below the American union rates. The basic reason for registry under a foreign flag is economy. As Table 4 indicated earlier, a vessel costs at least twice as much to operate under American registry as under foreign registry, with the largest single factor being the higher salaries paid to American seamen. Under a foreign registry, American shipowners may choose a crew of any or various nationalities and pay only the wage rate set by the world market. "More-

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

21

over, it is not simply the labor changes which are higher (on American ships) but the whole array of operating costs—depreciation, repairs, overhead, stores and provisions, and insurance." 18 Thus, by registering vessels abroad, American shipowners are able to compete on the world market without need of government subsidies. PanLibHon registry offers an additional economic inducement to American owners in the form of deferred taxes. Laws enacted by the United States and most other maritime nations during the 1920's exempted from income taxation the earnings of ships registered in foreign countries. Shipowners, however, still continue to pay taxes to the documenting country, but if the documenting country imposes no income tax of its own, a carrier enjoys a distinct economic advantage. This is precisely the advantage offered by Liberia and Panama and accounts for the popularity of these registries among American shipowners. Prior to 1959, Honduras was equally popular, but subsequent changes in its maritime laws, especially those relating to tax provisions, resulted in a migration of registries to more agreeable economic climes.19 The earnings of a foreign subsidiary of an American based company are not taxable until distributed to the parent corporation. Taxes are, therefore, deferred rather than avoided. Nevertheless, postponement of tax payments allows the use of funds, which would otherwise be paid to the government, and permits additions to investment funds, resulting in higher earnings.20 The United States government has condoned the use of foreign registries by American companies under the doctrine of "effective control." The "flags of convenience" countries exert a minimum of control over the operations of foreign-owned shipping and permit the owners to enter into special agreements making their vessels available to other countries during wartime or national emergency. Conditioned on such agreements, the United States has allowed the transfer of over 300 vessels from American to PanLibHon registry during the period 1951 to 1968.21 A large number of American owners of ships originally registered in 18. J . J. Clark, "Flags of Whose Convenience?", Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. XCIV (October 1968), p. 53. 19. Labor-Management Maritime Committee, op. cit., p. 11. 20. Clark, op. cit., p. 54. 21. Labor-Management Maritime Committee, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

22

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

TABLE 8. Offshore Maritime Industry PanLibHon Flag Ships Owned by Foreign Affiliates of United States Companies (as of December 31, 1968)

Country of Registry

Freighters

a

Bulk and Ore Carriers

Total

Liberia

107

—

53

160

Panama

84

—

4

88

Honduras

—

10

—

191

10

57

Total Source: a

Tankers

10 258

Labor-Management Maritime Committee, U.S. Merchant Marine Today: Sunrise or Sunset? (Washington, D.C.: Labor-Management Maritime Committee, 1970), Table 6, p. 13.

Reefers.

PanLibHon countries voluntarily entered into similar agreements, and in June 1970, the "effective control fleet" numbered 400 vessels.22 As shown in Table 8, foreign affiliates of United States companies operated 258 vessels under PanLibHon registry. With the exception of the ten refrigerator ships, which fly the Honduras flag, all carry bulk commodities, and most are tankers owned and operated by the major United States oil companies. Included among these tankers and dry bulk carriers are some of the largest and most modern vessels in the world. Table 6 indicated that 41 percent of Liberia's merchant fleet and 18 percent of Panama's are 9 years of age or less, providing a sharp contrast to the aged American flag fleet. Maritime labor unions have bitterly opposed the "flight from the flag" of American shipowners, who register their vessels abroad and hire foreign crews. In the union view, each American owned ship, whether transferred from United States to foreign registry or originally registered abroad, represents an irretrievable loss of jobs; the "effective control" doctrine provides no consolation either to the unions or to the men displaced by foreign seamen. Unions have argued that under the Taft-Hartley Act, American owned ships engaged in American 22. Lane C. Kendall, "Capable of Serving as a Naval and Military Auxiliary . . ." Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. XCVII (May 1971), p. 216.

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

23

commerce are subject to unionization, and the unions have employed pickets and boycotts to gain this end. A 1963 Supreme Court decisions,23 however, denied the right of the National Labor Relations Board to exercise jurisdiction over these crews thus effectively ending American union potential to organize them. Subsequent union efforts have succeeded only in transfers of registry to foreign countries other than Liberia and Panama. In trying to reverse the trend and encourage the return of ships to American registry, unions have taken an increasingly softer stand on issues relating to manning and working conditions. In testifying before the House of Representatives Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee in 1971: Paul Hall, President of the Seafarer's International Union, stated that maritime labor was ready ". . . to work out acceptable agreements . . ." on crew sizes to bring about a revival of the U.S. bulk liquid and dry cargo fleets. Competitive manning schedules, reasonable work rules, pension and welfare arrangements, abrogation of work stoppage clauses and wage agreements would have to be worked out to the satisfaction of both management and labor before ship transfers, if any, would be affected.1'4

A primary objective of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 is the phasing out of foreign flag operations of American shipowners over a twenty-year period. The extension of direct operating subsidies to bulk carriers and tramps is the principal incentive for this transfer to American registry, but the Act lacks the positive economic benefits necessary to encourage a transfer. At the present time it is doubtful if the Act will have any impact on transfers because American shipowners now enjoy under foreign registry all the advantages promised under the Act.25 Thus, it is not expected that the Act will expand Negro employment potential significantly. Shipboard Employment,

1940-1970

The level of shipboard employment varies directly with the number of vessels in service and the amount of participation of 23. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) and Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963). 24. Labor-Management Maritime Committee, The Growing Energy Crisis and the U.S. Tanker Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Labor-Management Committee, 1971), p. 36. 25. Ibid.

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry

24

Offshore Maritime Industry Average Monthly Employment Aboard Merchant Ships,* 19b0-1970

TABLE 9.

Year

Men Employed

Year

Men Employed

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

50,975 50,225 47,650 76,800

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962

57,192 61,059 51,515 50,223 49,153 46,130"

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 Source:

125,755 158,755 127,175 110,820 80,250 71,970 61,550 84,300 79,650 72,750 63,850 57,507 U.S. Bureau of States: 1952: Table 1963: Table 1971: Table

47,346 47,996 47,979 48,273 >> 51,889 54,584 54,150 47,464 37,580

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

the Census, Statistical

Abstract

of the

United

648, p. 534. 834, p. 605. 914, p. 566.

» For vessels of 1,000 d.w.t. or greater. b

For September 30; other figures are for June 30.

American flag carriers in foreign trade. Table 9 shows the average number of seagoing jobs for the period 1940 to 1970, and indicates that the prewar employment level was approximately 50,000 but this figure dropped slightly following the entry of the United States into World War II as a result of ships lost in action. The massive shipbuilding effort during the war expanded shipboard employment to three times its prewar level in the space of only three years. All men with any seagoing experience whatsoever were used to augment the maritime labor force, but when these sources were exhausted,

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

25

the War Shipping Administration's Recruitment and Manning Organization (RMO) undertook an ambitious nationwide recruitment drive to fill the remaining jobs. In the early days of the war, the Navy restricted Negro enlistments to the stewards branch,26 but the RMO, unimpeded by tradition, pursued a policy of nondiscrimination in job assignment," and its campaign for volunteers most probably had particular impact on Negro communities. With the addition of new recruits, the seagoing labor force swelled to 250,000.28 The newcomers received intensive training before being shipped aboard merchant vessels, where they acquired practical experience under the tutelage of career seamen. By the end of the war, most were seasoned sailors, and although many returned to civilian work, many others chose to remain in the industry. When hostilities ceased, the War Shipping Administration controlled a fleet of approximately 4,300 merchant vessels and provided jobs for more than 150,000 men. Following the war, the return of peacetime activity was slowed by the shipments of large amounts of food and aid to be used in rebuilding Europe, Asia, and others. Since much of the world merchant fleet had been destroyed during the war, the American fleet assumed the predominant role in the carriage of international commerce. This importance declined as other maritime powers rebuilt their fleets and employment aboard American ships gradually returned to its prewar level. By July 1948, the number of American vessels had decreased to 1,800 and reached 1,150 in 1950; employment fell below one-half of the wartime peak. As jobs became scarce, seamen, especially those recruited during the war, were forced out of the industry and had to find work elsewhere. Negroes also abandoned the industry but in a smaller proportion than whites. Faced with fewer shoreside opportunities, many Negroes opted to remain in the industry and compete for the slowly decreasing number of jobs. The outbreak of the Korean Conflict temporarily revised the declining trend in employment, as the number of jobs jumped from 61,550 in 1950 to 84.300 in 1951. Over 200 ships in the reserve 26. Peter Olsen, "The Negro Maritime Worker and the Sea," History Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV (February 1971), p. 40.

Negro

27. Goldberg, The Maritime Story, up. cit., p. 211. 28. War Shipping Administration, The U.S. Merchant (1946), p. 55, as cited in, ibid., p. 185.

Marine at

War

26

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

fleet were activated to support Korean military operations. With the cessation of hostilities, the ships were returned to the reserve fleet and employment continued its downward trend. American foreign aid shipments and periodic world crises such as the temporary closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 slowed and interrupted the long-term decline in the number of jobs, but by 1959, employment had returned to its prewar level of approximately 50,000 men. During the early 1960's, employment leveled off just below 48,000 as the cargo tonnage carried in American vessels remained low but fairly constant. Intense competition from foreign carriers on the world market forced American carriers to rely more and more heavily on government-impelled shipments, onehalf of which are guaranteed to American carriers under the Cargo Preference Act of 1954. Less dependent on the vagaries of international commerce, the concentration on American government cargo maintained a relatively stable level of activity and employment and provided a dependable source of revenue. Beginning in mid-1965, increased shipments to Vietnam required the reactivation of 51 ships in the reserve fleet29 and stimulated shipboard employment. By 1967, the number of jobs had jumped by 14 percent to a level of more than 54,000. The decreased American involvement in the ground war in Vietnam, however, caused a decrease in government shipments and a return to the employment level of the early 1960's. Employment fell sharply between 1969 and 1970 as substantial operating losses forced several American carriers finally to abandon passenger service. The superliner United States was retired from service in 1969, and the sailing of the PrudentialGrace Lines ship Santa Rosa in January 1971, tolled the end of regularly scheduled American flag passenger service on the Atlantic Coast. In all, ten passenger ships were retired from service during the period 1969-1971. Four American passenger liners still continue to operate, but these sail from ports on the West Coast. 30 The service-oriented nature of employment aboard a passenger liner requires a large complement mainly in the stewards department, and the retirement of a liner impacts heavily on industry employment. Negroes, in particular, are 29. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 87. 30. "The Last Voyage," American p. 111.

Heritage,

Vol XXII

(August

1971),

The Offshore

Maritime

Industry

27

hard hit by this development because the majority of the jobs eliminated are in the stewards department where Negroes traditionally have enjoyed their greatest employment opportunities. Shipboard

Occupations

The majority of shipboard occupations are grouped into three departments: the deck, engine, and stewards departments. The deck department has responsibility for navigating the ship as well as maintaining the hull and deck equipment. Personnel in the engine department operate and maintain the ship's power plant. The stewards department prepares the food served aboard ship and performs general housekeeping duties. In addition to the three departments, all ships carry a radio officer, and passenger ships include a staff officer. Shipboard personnel are further classified as either licensed or unlicensed. A ship's officers are licensed personnel who serve as supervisors aboard ship and would be labeled as white collar supervisory workers. Unlicensed personnel, on the other hand, are considered blue collar workers and have limited supervisory responsibilities. An officer must hold a license from the Coast Guard to qualify for a particular position aboard ship. He obtains this license by demonstrating a knowledge of maritime law, ship construction, navigation, and marine engineering commensurate with his desired position. Advancement to a higher position requires an upgrading of the license. Most licensed personnel are graduates of the Naval, Coast Guard, or Maritime Academies, or graduates of one of the state maritime academies. Some licensed men, however, have acquired the requisite knowledge by serving an apprenticeship period in an unlicensed rating. Unlicensed personnel qualify for their positions by obtaining Coast Guard seamen's papers, which are gained after passing an examination testing their competence to perform specific shipboard duties within their department. Unlicensed seamen serve in all departments, and the stewards department is composed entirely of unlicensed personnel. An additional distinction in employment occurs between watchstanders and nonwatchstanders, or "day workers." Watchstanders, whether unlicensed personnel or officers, primarily attend to the routine operation of the vessel while nonwatchstanders perform the duties required to maintain the physical condition of the vessel. This distinction is important in terms of the

28

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

number of hours worked each week. A watchstander works a 56-hour week or seven eight-hour days while a nonwatchstander's normal week is 40 hours. Watchstanders receive additional compensation for the additional 16 hours of work. Members of the stewards department do not stand routine watches per se, although they certainly are part of the routine operations and regularly work a 56-hour week. Figure 2 shows the lines of progression within each of the three shipboard departments with the entry-level positions normally being ordinary seaman, wiper, or messman-utilityman. Following initial entry, advancement occurs within the particular department and is limited by Coast Guard requirements of experience in the currently held position and a demonstrated mastery of skills required by the next higher position. Advancement to the ranks of ships' officers requires licensing by the Coast Guard and allows the successful applicant to move from virtually any level in the deck of engine department to fourth mate or fourth assistant engineer respectively. Further movement requires experience and an upgrading of the license held. Graduates of maritime academies enter the industry as either a fourth mate or fourth assistant engineer because of their education and their sea experience aboard training ships. Above entry-level positions, lateral movement between departments is essentially nonexistent because experience in one department is not transferable to another, and qualification to hold a position is based on the practical knowledge gained by working in all subordinate positions. The line of progression in the stewards department does not extend into the realm of licensed personnel, and a seaman entering this department cannot hope to become an officer since his advancement ends at chief steward, and his skills are not transferable to either of the other departments. Most Negro seamen work in the stewards department, and the absence of officers in this craft line is an important factor in accounting for the small number of Negro officers in the merchant service. Advancement Within Departments Advancement to higher level jobs is similar in all three departments, but for discussion purposes movement up the ranks of the deck department will be used. After sailing for two years

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

c a> E

t,

E

al a. a> «

•o M £f 1 M 1H ® 2 o

* 8 O f «M ® 2 o

S -3 l i "S 8 o

n i l « S S -e • a - a - a g>

c a> E •e «o .

m

* W H

t»

s S C H

«

s

¿c

M

K ry> r i £ o ' P

S3 " Mg

al w

2 i s

I

..

«m ©

«

o "C £ n

g

O

C Oo

Cu, ^

u S

&

o«

fc S

S

5

§ *

0) s

- 3 JH «

•n

*

•3 S

-S « 3

38

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

two confederations of unions have evolved. The allegiance of individual unions, however, can shift rapidly depending on the course of bargaining and how one union fares in relation to other unions. The fragmented structure of unionization and the infighting among various unions have created highly volatile labor-management relations within the industry and have been responsible for many long and crippling strikes against shipowners as well as growing uncertainty of employment for union members. The major unions representing unlicensed seamen on the East Coast are the National Maritime Union (NMU) and the Atlantic and Gulf Districts of the Seafarers' International Union (SIU). On the West Coast, all unlicensed personnel are represented by the Pacific District of the SIU, which is made up of three autonomous unions, each representing the seamen in a particular department. The Sailors' Union of the Pacific (SUP) represents deck personnel, the Marine Firemen's Union (MFU) organzies engine department personnel, and the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Union (MCS) bargains for the stewards department. In contrast, the unions representing licensed personnel are organized on a national basis. These unions are the Masters, Mates and Pilots (MMP), Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (MEBA), the Brotherhood of Marine Officers (BMO), the American Radio Association (ARA), and the Radio Officers' Union (ROU). The only licensed unions bargaining on a coastal basis represent the pursers. These are the Marine Staff Officers (MSO) and the Staff Officers Association (SOA). Table 11 describes the principal unions and gives the approximate membership of each. This list, however, is not exhaustive as many other unions also represent seafaring personnel but do not play significant roles in collective bargaining in the industry. Typically, these unions represent the seamen employed by a single company, especially the oil companies operating their own tanker fleets. Of the 55,000 shipboard jobs manned by approximately 96.000 seamen as of December 31, 1968, about 90 percent are covered by collective bargaining agreements between management firms or steamship companies, and 13 principal maritime anions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. The other 10 percent of the jobs were covered by agreements with 15 independent associations. 37 37. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Seafaring Guide ani Directory of Labor-Mayiagement Affiliations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 11.

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

39

The unionization of seafarers dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century when marine engineers on the Great Lakes formed a union in 1854 to resist threatened wage cuts. The organization proved effective, but success turned the engineers apathetic, and the union was disolved three years later.38 Several other attempts at unionization were made in the following two decades, but these were local in nature and lacked the continued support necessary for survival. Despite these unsuccessful attempts, depressed wages and poor working conditions in the industry made the organization of seamen inevitable. The earliest continuing unions were established on the West Coast and included the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders, and Wipers' Association of the Pacific, established in 1883; the Sailors' Union of the Pacific in 1885; and the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Union of the Pacific in 1901.39 Several unique factors were present on the West Coast to facilitate organization, but the prime motivating force was increased competition for jobs from foreign workers. Orientals were displacing American seamen by accepting lower wages, and the main objective of the unions became the exclusion of foreign labor. Once this was accomplished, the unions would be in a position to negotiate wage rates and working conditions.40 Despite adverse pressure from shipowners, the unions grew, and the SUP, in particular, rapidly increased its membership and power. The unions' early interest in excluding Orientals established a discriminatory policy which would later be directed against other racial groups. The success of the Pacific Coast unions in organizing and obtaining higher wages provided added incentive for labor organization on the East Coast. Following this example, the Atlantic Coast Seamen's Union was established in 1888; the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertender, and Wipers' Union of the Atlantic in 1902; and the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Association of the Atlantic in 1901. Additional obstacles to organization existed on the East Coast, and, even after the establishment of labor unions, these factors prevented the emergence of 38. Charles P. Larrowe, Maritime Labor Relatio-ns on the Great Lakes (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1959), p. 24. 39. Goldberg, The Maritime Story, op. cit., p. 16. 40. Jerold S. Auerbach, "Progressive at Sea: The La Follette Act of 1915," Labor History, Vol. II (1961), pp. 344-360.

4U

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry

centralized, effective organizations. The competition of foreign labor was more intense because of a larger volume of foreign trade and increased opportunities for foreign seamen to find work on American vessels. Also, American seamen on the East Coast were a relatively heterogeneous group and varied greatly in terms of race and national origin. The larger number of ports on both the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts hindered the formation of a strong alliance among local unions and severely impaired their effectiveness. Realizing its own limitations and seeking to strengthen its position, the Atlantic Coast Seamen's Union aligned itself with the SUP and the Lake Seamen's Union (organized in 1878 on the Great Lakes) to form the National Seamen's Union in 1892, which later became the International Seamen's Union (ISU). 4 1 In contrast to the early unions which were concerned mainly with fraternal activities, the first officers' unions were initially organized as professional societies. Formed in 1875, the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association devoted itself to legislative matters involved with the safety of operation of the steam engines then in use on the more "modern" vessels. Originally named the Marine Engineers' Association, the word "beneficial" was added in the early 1900's as a reaction to radical tendencies in one of its locals. The Maters, Mates and Pilots was created in 1920 to succeed the American Association of Masters and Pilots of Steam Vessels, a group that was formed in 1887 as a result of growing concern for needed legislation related to navigation aids, manning levels, and safety requirements. Although collective bargaining was a secondary consideration, the union did succeed in negotiating its first contract in 1907.42 Between 1900 and the outbreak of World War I, the unions made only modest gains in power and influence. The severe labor shortage during World War I placed the unions in a substantially stronger position, and they were able to negotiate their first collective bargaining agreement in August 1917, thereby gaining a measure of recognition from private ship operators.43 Increasing employment and a bright outlook for the shipping industry in 1919 and 1920 combined to boost the memberships 41. Goldberg, The Maritime Story, op. cit., pp. 16-19. 42. Kuechle, op. cit., pp. 53-58. 43. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Guide . . . , op. cit., p. 10.

Seafaring

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

41

of unlicensed unions to new heights and further increase union influence. By 1921, however, business conditions had taken a turn for the worse, and the shipping industry entered a period of depression. Shipowners attempted to regain complete control over the industry, and in the ensuing strike, the ISU suffered a severe defeat. Although the unions continued to exist, they had lost most of their members, and the industry became virtually unorganized. With a large labor surplus, ship operators were able to dictate the conditions of employment, and working conditions deteriorated rapidly.44 Maritime labor had lost its hard-fought gains of the previous thirty years and had returned to the preunion status of the nineteenth century. With the enactment in 1933 of the National Industrial Recovery Act giving workers the right to organize and bargain collectively through unions of their choice, the government gave new life to the maritime unions. The long dormant ISU took the lead in negotiations with shipowners, and subsequent agreements provided substantial wage increases and much-improved working conditions. The leadership of the ISU, however, was not willing to take the hard line desired by the members in dealing with the shipowners, and the membership became increasingly dissatisfied with the "conservative" policies of its leaders. Following a wildcat strike which failed to gain approval of the union's leadership, a large portion of the rank and file, led by Joseph Curran, broke with the ISU in May 1937, and formed a new union, the National Maritime Union (NMU). 45 By July, two months after its formation, NMU membership had increased to 35,000, and the union was challenging the ISU for representation rights in many major companies. At its first convention, the NMU members voted to affiliate with the Committee (later Congress) of Industrial Organizations (CIO) both on ideological grounds and because the union wanted a complete split with the ISU, which was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). 4 « When originally formed, the NMU was organized along craft lines into three divisions, each representing one of the shipboard departments, and geographical branches were given complete autonomy in conducting their affairs. Realizing that greater unity 44. Goldberg, Collective Bargaining, 45. Goldberg, The Maritime 46. Ibid., p. 166.

op. cit., p. 296.

Story, op. cit., p. 153.

42

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

was required, the union reorganized on an industrial basis in 1939 and assumed direct control over its branches, which were located in the important ports along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and in the Great Lakes. This development was significant in that the NMU was the first seafaring union to eliminate craft divisions and operate as an industrial union.17 Previously, any seaman who decided to work in a different department was required to change his union affiliation, and this served to lock a seaman into one department, thereby limiting his job mobility. This development had particular importance for Negroes who had previously been limited, by and large, at least since the turn of the century, to working as cooks and stewards. Organization by department tended to institutionalize this employment practice. One of the stated goals of the NMU was the organization and unification of all seamen "without regard to race, creed, and color." 48 This was a marked departure from the Jim Crow attitudes prevalent in the United States during the 1920's and helped Curran to rapidly organize a large portion of the East Coast seamen, especially Negroes and other ethnic groups. Based on its own policy of nondiscrimination both in membership and the operation of its hiring hall, the NMU actively sought to impose a similar policy on companies with whom it maintained contracts. Nondiscrimination aboard all NMU ships became a firmly established practice. Viewing with alarm the rapid growth of the NMU, which had affiliated with the CIO, the A F L sought to reestablish its position in the industry and counteract the growing influence of the CIO. The Seafarers' International Union of North America (SIU) was created by the A F L in 1938 to replace the crumbling ISU whose charter had been revoked a year earlier. The A F L entrusted the administration of the charter to Harry Lundeburg, the leader of the SUP. Previously, the SUP, fearing that affiliation with the CIO might eventually lead to subordination to the larger NMU, had chosen to affiliate with the A F L and thereby ensure its autonomy.49 Lundeburg, in turn, issued a charter to the A F L Seamen's Group, a group of 2.000 East 47. Ibid., pp. 166-167. 48. Bernard Raskin, On a True Course (Washington, D.C.: Inc., 1967), p. 41. 49. Goldberg, The Maritime Story, op. cit., p. 163.

Merkle Press,

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

Coast seamen who were opposed to the ideology of the NMU as well as to the leadership of the ISU. This group became the Atlantic and Gulf Districts of the SIU in 1938,50 and the SUP became the autonomous Pacific District of the SIU. The SIU was organized along industrial lines just as the NMU had been, but its ideological basis differed sharply. While the NMU emphasized social welfare, political activities, and the elimination of racial discrimination, the SIU initiated an aggressive organizing campaign directed against these policies. By the time the SIU was formed, the NMU had already organized all but one of the large subsidized carriers operating out of East Coast ports, so the main thrust of the SIU's organization campagin was directed toward the unsubsidized companies. While the NMU tried to break the color barrier aboard ship, the SIU sought to maintain the status quo by preserving the color lines and to use racial discrimination as an organizing device." Membership in the SIU grew to 15,000 by October 1939," as the union succeeded in organizing many unsubsidized carriers, particularly those operating out of Gulf Coast ports. The racial policies of the two unions have no doubt served to draw their respective members closer to their union, since members of one union may not be welcome in, nor would some care to belong to the other union. The SIU was not the only seafaring union which practiced discrimination during this period. As Dr. Northrup noted in 1944, unions excluded Negroes in several ways. The Masters, Mates and Pilots was the only maritime union with a provision in its constitution explicitly excluding Negroes from membership, but the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders, and Wipers' Union, Pacific Coast (MFOWW), as well as the SIU, habitually excluded Negroes by tacit consent." In either case, exclusion from membership in a union was tantamount to exclusion from the jobs controlled by the union because these jobs were filled through the union's hiring hall. The MMP was the only union representing deck officers at this time, and although few Negroes were qualified to hold licensed positions, the union effectively excluded 50. Ibid., p. 169. 51. Raskin, op. dt., p. 56. 52. Goldberg, The Maritime

Story,

op. tit., p. 173.

53. Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor Harper & Brothers, 1944), pp. 2-4.

and the Negro

(New York:

44

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Negroes from these jobs and removed the primary incentive for advancement beyond the unlicensed deck ratings. Similarly, the MFOWW was the only union on the West Coast representing unlicensed personnel in the engine department, and its discriminatory policy prevented Negroes from entering this department. Furthermore, since Negroes could not gain practical experience working in the unlicensed engine ratings, they could not qualify to become licensed engineering officers. Thus, the engine departments aboard West Coast ships were essentially segregated. Craft unionism played an important part in the early exclusion of Negroes from many seagoing jobs, and the discriminatory policies of the MMP and the MFOWW were typical examples of craft unions in all industries. Aside from the personal views of the union members, discrimination served an economic purpose by limiting the labor supply. As a method to preserve as much work as possible for its members, unions found the exclusion of Negroes to be both convenient and effective. Besides differences in racial attitudes, communism was also a factor in the rivalry that developed between the NMU and the SIU. As a result of deplorable working conditions and a predilection toward violence, seamen were particularly receptive to the Communist philosophy. When Joseph Curran led a revolt of the rank and file against the ISU leadership, he received strong support from Communist and other left-wing elements. Throughout its early history, the union was attacked as being Communistinspired, and a Communist faction within the union gained substantial influence. The SIU was vehemently opposed to communism, and this became an important issue in the organizing campaign carried out by the SIU. Constant internal struggles between factions in the NMU placed Curran in a precarious position, and his leadership was in jeopardy until a series of "purges" in the late 1940's ousted the leftist elements and left him in firm control of the union.64 World War II provided a cooling-off period in the struggle between the NMU and the SIU, but following the war the rivalry was resumed in full force as both unions attempted to organize new sectors of the shipping industry and thereby expend their influence. The wartime shipping needs of the United States had caused union membership to mushroom as young 54. Goldberg, The Maritime Story, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

45

men were recruited to crew the ships of a rapidly expanding merchant marine. With reduced shipping activity in the postwar years, jobs became scarce, and the unions directed their efforts toward controlling more jobs in the industry and providing more work for their members. Handicapped by internal conflicts, the NMU lost ground to the SIU, which was able to organize Isthmian Lines and the Cities Services Tanker Fleet as well as many smaller companies.46 Later SIU scored a major success by organizing Sea-Land, now the countries major offshore carrier. After winning representation rights in essentially all the organizable sectors of the industry, the rival unions turned on one another and directed their efforts toward dividing and controlling the declining number of shipboard jobs. Rather than expanding into new areas, the unions now struggled among themselves, and a gain by one union usually came at the expense of another. Conflicts arose over "raiding" attempts and jurisdictional disputes, and the gulf between the NMU and the SIU widened as each sought to control more jobs. Important in the power struggle between the unlicensed unions was the allegiance of the licensed unions, because an unlicensed union could use this relationship to extend its own influence to ships already under contract to an allied licensed union. In return, the licensed unions strengthened their own positions by aligning themselves with one of the powerful unlicensed unions. The result was the formation of two coalitions, one headed by Joseph Curran of the NMU and the other headed by Paul Hall, the President of the SIU. At present, the NMU coalition includes the MMP (deck officers), MEBA (engine officers), and the ARA (radio officers), while the SIU coalition consists of the ROU (radio officers) and several nonmaritime unions.60 These alliances, however, are somewhat unstable and will shift depending on how a particular union can best reach its objectives. Several developments in recent years evidence a growing trend toward unity among the maritime unions. The NMU and the SIU have issued statements on national maritime unity, and 55. Ibid., pp. 226-227. 56. Edward B. Shils, "Union Fragmentation: A Major Cause of Transportation Labor Crisis" in Richard L. Rowan (ed.), Collective Bargaining: Survival in the '70's? Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, Report No. 5 (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1972), pp. 260-261.

46

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Joseph Curran has indicated that the NMU would consider a merger with the SIU." The bitter competition between the two unions may have given way to a growing concern over the decline in shipboard employment, which is eroding the influence of all seagoing unions. In March 1971, the MMP and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) agreed to a merger whereby the MMP would become a division of the larger ILA. 88 Such mergers may become more common in coming years as union income declines with diminishing membership. Besides seeking closer ties with other unions, both the MMP and MEBA have made efforts to organize shoreside personnel in the shipping industry although their attempts thus far have met with limited success. Since the resurgence of unionism in the 1930's, the maritime unions have exercised absolute control over the hiring process through the operation of hiring halls, and this is an important factor in understanding the racial makeup of the seagoing labor force. By centralizing the hiring process, the union largely eliminates both time-consuming scouting for jobs by individuals and uneconomical searches for labor by ship operators. Also, by providing this employment service, the union gains direct control over the supply of labor in the industry. Moreover, the policies of the unions, not the firms in the industry, have determined the extent of Negro employment aboard ship. Those seagoing unions which had discriminatory policies have since eliminated all formal racial bars to membership and the use of the hiring hall, but the present racial composition of unions, especially the unlicensed unions, reflects past practices. Among the licensed unions, stringent licensing requirements probably played a more important part than discrimination in the exclusion of minorities. The hiring process and the requirements for union membership will be discussed more fully in later chapters. Declining shipboard employment in the maritime industry has made the seagoing unions increasingly more job conscious. In raising the wages of seamen to shoreside levels, the unions have also sought to block efforts by the steamship companies to substitute capital for labor and recover the increased labor costs through increased productivity. In the short run, unions 57. Ibid., p. 265. 58. Lucretia M. Dewey, "Union Merger Pace Quickens," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XCIV (June 1971), p. 68.

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

47

have preserved jobs for their members, but the long-term result has been an inefficient American merchant marine unable to compete with foreign carriers, and employment in the industry has declined steadily since World War II. In the past, unions have opposed technological change that reduced the size of the crew, but more recently, the unions have come to realize that technological change is necessary to the continued operations of American merchant vessels and a possible future rejuvenation of the industry. Obviously, to the extent that these policies affect employment generally, they also impact on opportunities for black workers. TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Technological change in the shipping industry has had a mixed effect on employment opportunities for American seamen. While automation and increasing ship size have succeeded in reducing required manning levels aboard ship, improved cargo handling methods have opened up profitable new areas for several steamship companies, and the subsequent growth and expansion of these companies have created new jobs. Blacks, as well as whites, have been hurt in the short run by reductions in crew sizes. Increasing operating costs, largely a result of union demands, have forced the financially able steamship companies to adopt new technology designed to increase productivity and offset rising labor costs. These changes take many diverse forms but share a common objective: each is aimed at reducing the operating costs per ton of cargo. In areas where the changes have generated new profits, new ships have been added to the fleet, and the long-term effect has been an increase in the number of shipboard jobs. The most conspicuous technological change has occurred in the size of ships. Although the optimal size of conventional break-bulk freighters has not increased substantially, bulk carriers, particularly tankers, enjoy increasing returns to scale. The T-2 tankers of World War II were 15,500 d.w.t., but tankers of 225,000 d.w.t. are now under construction in the United States, and larger tankers are being constructed abroad. Dry bulk carriers have also increased sharply in size although the optimal size remains smaller than that for tankers.59 The major limiting factor on the size of bulk carriers 59. Organisation or Economic Co-operation and Development Marine Transport 1970 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1971), p. 89.

48

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

has been the inability of most ports to accommodate deep draft vessels. Vast increases in size, however, have necessitated only small increases, if any, in crew size. Furthermore, cargoes previously carried by several smaller ships are now consolidated and transported in one voyage of a large ship operated by a crew similar in size to that of smaller vessels. Because of this, job opportunities have declined accordingly. Increased speed has reduced the durations of voyages and similarly reduced the labor costs per voyage. In addition, the operator can provide the same frequency of sailings with fewer vessels,®0 and fewer ships mean fewer jobs. Automation aboard ship has been a major factor in reducing the required manning level for a vessel. In the engine department, a centralized console monitors the operation of the ship's power plant and allows direct control by deck personnel on the bridge. Fewer watchstanders are required in the engine room. Several functions previously performed by deckhands have now been mechanized, and special protective coatings for the hull and deck machinery have significantly reduced needed maintenance and repairs. More efficient operations in the galley have similarly reduced the need for cooks and stewards.61 Improved cargo handling has been significant in reducing the operating costs of shipowners by reducing the turnaround time for vessels. Several new techniques have been developed for more efficient loading and unloading, but the most impressive, by far, has been containerization. Extensively developed by SeaLand Services, Inc. in the 1950's, containerization has revolutionized break-bulk operations through the use of easily loaded standardized containers which can travel by truck or rail as well as by sea. Even more important, containerization has restored the ability of American carriers to compete successfully on the world market without need of government subsidies. In a generally declining industry, containerization has enabled several companies to expand their operations and increase both shipboard and shoreside employment. Thus, technological change, which has normally led to a reduction in the number of jobs, can also create increased employment through the expansion of profitable 60. Goldberg, Collective Bargaining,

op. cit., pp. 265-266.

61. C. Tangerini, E. Dillan, and C. Fixman, Mechanization in the Maritime Administration Cargo Ship Replacement Program, paper, October 17, 1964.

The Offshore Maritime

Industry

49

sectors of the industry. These sectors hold the greatest promise of future employment for Negroes as well as whites. Modifications of the container concept has resulted in the development of the LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) and the SEABEE (sea barge). These ships carry fully loaded barges which may be loaded and off-loaded with the shipboard equipment. Dockside facilities are not required. Off-loaded barges may then be towed to shallow-draft ports for subsequent unloading. These concepts, which have already proven successful, may serve to stimulate the industry and thereby increase employment. FIRMS IN THE

INDUSTRY

Shipping companies are heavily dependent on the government for survival. The typical firm in the offshore maritime industry is quite small and generally operates only one ship, which is either chartered to the government or engaged in tramp operations carrying government cargoes. A 1969 Maritime Administration publication i2 lists 726 owners and/or operators of marine vessels maintaining collective baragaining agreements, and the number of active merchant vessels was only 1,104 in 1968.®* As was shown earlier in the chapter, over 50 percent of these vessels are 25 years of age or older. The notable exceptions in the industry are the 14 directly subsidized companies, which operate some 300 vessels in liner trade on Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific routes. Sea-Land and Seatrain, both or whom are engaged in containerization, are the only large companies not receiving direct subsidies. Since World War II, the shipping companies have produced increasingly poor returns on investment. Even the returns of the subsidized companies, which performed well during the postwar years, have lately fallen off. Most companies have suffered losses on their operations during recent years, and operating differential subsidies have been responsible for the modest profits of the subsidized carriers. Unsubsidized carriers have sustained substantial losses.64 The general lack of profits in the industry has prevented the replacement of old, slow ships by newer, faster 62. U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Guide . . . , op. cit. 63. Goldberg, Collective Bargaining, op. cit., p. 254. 64. Ibid., pp. 259-260.

Seafaring

50

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

vessels, and shipping operations have grown increasingly inefficient. As the vessels are gradually retired, their replacement is highly doubtful, and most shipping companies, especially the small, unsubsidized firms, face an uncertain future. Concurrently, the retirement of these vessels, many of which are already obsolete, will mean a permanent loss of jobs for seamen, both black and white. A WORD ABOUT THE

FUTURE

Other factors notwithstanding, the level of Negro employment is linked directly to the number of available jobs in the industry, and this depends, in turn, on the success of the steamship companies. In the past, shipping operations, in general, have not been profitable, and the industry has shown a long-term decline. Employment opportunities for Negroes have decreased with the overall reduction in jobs. For some sectors of the industry, particularly tramp and break-bulk liner operations, indications point to a continuation of the downward trend in future years. Although several carriers, principally those receiving direct subsidies, have managed to carve out a profitable niche in the industry, most are experiencing financial difficulties. As the World War II vessels now in use are retired, their replacement with newer vessels is highly doubtful, and many of the smaller steamship companies may cease operations altogether. In contrast, technological change and new legislation have created a bright future for other sectors of the industry, and these sectors hold the promise of increased employment opportunities. Intermodalism, which includes the LASH and SEABEE concepts as well as containerization, has resulted in new profits for several carriers and has stimulated growth and expansion. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970, which extended government subsidies to bulk carriers, has facilitated the expansion of the American fleet in a new direction. Growing needs for fuel in this country have created new requirements for bulk carriers. The Alaskan pipeline, which seems certain now, will move an estimated two million barrels of oil per day from the North Slope to the Port of Valaez. Some 41 tankers ranging in size from 30,000 to 250,000 tons will be required to transport the oil to the West Coast,®5 and cabotage laws require these 65. James J. Reynolds, President, American Institute of Merchant Shipping:, speech, August 22, 1972.

The Offshore Maritime

51

Industry

tankers to be American flag vessels carrying American crews. Besides a growing need for oil, the United States is also experiencing a shortage of natural gas, and the domestic supply must be supplemented by imports of liquid natural gas (LNG) from other parts of the world. At the present time, only the United States, Spain, and France have the technology necessary to construct an LNG tanker. 66 Six LNG tankers are currently under construction in the United States,67 and it is predicted that 100 LNG tankers will be needed within 10 years.88 Many of these will fly the American flag and carry American crews. Expanded bulk carrier operations by American carriers will provide new jobs, but it remains to be seen if the increase in employment in this area will offset the general decrease in other areas. The result will be a primary factor in determining the future level of employment for Negroes. INDUSTRIAL

LOCATION

Offshore shipping employs its workers in the major ports of the country. These are also the cities in which the black population has become increasingly concentrated. Location, therefore, has not been a serious impediment to black employment in this industry, and is not likely to be in the future. SUMMARY The maritime industry is not only a small one but its potential for decline appears greater than that for growth. In succeeding chapters, we shall examine the role played by blacks prior to 1960 and in the current period.

66. Personal interview with E. P. Spector, Research Director, National Maritime Union, November 11, 1972. 6T. Wall Street Journal, October 2,1972, p. 2. 68. Reynolds, op. cit.

CHAPTER III

The Negro Maritime Tradition From Colonial Days to i960 The Negro has a long and proud history of working in the maritime industry. Although a discussion of his historical involvement does not bear directly on his present status and opportunities, it does show the evolution of a maritime tradition among Negroes and aids in understanding the historical basis of the attitude and feelings Negroes bring to the industry. This chapter describes the role of the Negro from colonial times to 1960 and attempts to spotlight the market forces which have determined the level of his employment. With few exceptions, Negro job opportunities in the maritime industry vary directly with the level of activity in the industry and inversely with the supply of available labor. The thesis of "last hired and first fired" has less importance here than in other industries, but it is relevant nonetheless because Negroes have made the greatest gains in employment when white labor was in short supply. In all fairness to the industry, maritime employers have been more objective in their hiring than any of their shorebased counterparts, but racial discrimination has still appeared during periods of labor surpluses. Information concerning the Negro's involvement in the maritime industry prior to Reconstruction is sketchy and depends heavily on naval records, however, these records do not give a full picture of his participation because information on crew members aboard ships generally does not make note of a man's color. It is mainly through diaries and correspondences that the racial makeup of a ship's crew is known, and it is difficult to extrapolate this information to show trends in the industry. Nevertheless, these documents do indicate that the Negro was very much a part of both the Navy and the merchant service throughout the history of the United States. 52

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960 THE COLONIAL

PERIOD

TO

53

1860

Early industry in the thirteen colonies centered mainly about the supplying of raw materials and foodstuffs to England and the British West Indies. Under the protection of the British navigation laws, both the colonial shipping and shipbuilding industries prospered by providing the means of supply. With the raw materials close at hand, shipbuilders in New England enjoyed a cost advantage over their English competitors. Using capital readily available from England, colonial merchants purchased vessels particularly suited to colonial commerce and combined these with entrepreneurial ability to create a highly profitable industry. The shippers manned their vessels with colonial seamen, and this then was the beginning of the American maritime tradition. Although the early shipping industry served all the original colonies, New England evolved as the center of commerce. In the southern colonies agriculture absorbed virtually all available capital and manpower resources whereas in New England, where conditions were not so conducive to farming, attention focused on commerce and rudimentary manufacturing. Shipping began as a decentralized industry serving the many dispersed population centers along the Atlantic coast. As the cities grew, shipping became more centralized, and Salem, Boston, Newport, and Philadelphia emerged as the main colonial ports. Throughout the colonial period, ships were the predominant means for transporting raw supplies and finished goods because of the absence of railroads and the slow development of good roads. Trading was carried on by small, unspecialized vessels operating on irregular schedules and making numerous port calls. As yet, the volume of commerce would not support any semblance of liner service, the ships were either tramps or private traders. There were no economies of scale, and the vessels were privately owned. In describing the shipping industry, Hutchins notes: Entry into the business was comparatively easy, for only a small amount of capital was necessary to purchase one of the small schooners, sloops or brigantines which were continually offered on the market. The shipping industry during the period of merchantilism consisted, therefore, primarily of a large assortment of small firms engaged in various trading, peddling, and tramping operations. 69 69. John G. B. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 160.

54

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

In the years prior to the Revolution, New England suffered from a labor shortage in virtually every industry. Wages were relatively high in the shipping industry to attract what free labor was available. As Negro slaves were brought to New England to supply general manpower needs, many were employed on the fishing, whaling, and trading ships.70 This then was the beginning of the American Negro maritime tradition. According to Greene: from the seventeenth century on, Negroes were employed on all sorts of New England vessels. . . . The fitness of Negroes for such work is further attested by the fact that they actually were solicited for service aboard ships, and in some instances ship captains hired slaves as seamen. . . . So great was the need of crews to man the sailing vessels of New England that shipmasters often encouraged Negroes to run away to sea. All too frequently captains whose vessels were undermanned impressed slaves into service aboard their ships. So serious did this practice become that all the New England colonies found it necessary to enact legislation, forbidding captains to take slaves and servants aboard their vessels without permission. 71

Because of the tight labor market existing in colonial times, Negroes were actively recruited for ships' crews, but data on the actual number of Negroes employed in the maritime industries are unavailable. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that Negroes frequently found employment as seamen and that it was not uncommon to find several Negroes in a ship's complement performing general shipboard labor. Early Naval

Involvement

With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the colonists formed the Continental Navy. Accompanying the problems of acquiring naval vessels was the acute manpower shortage and the ensuing difficulties in finding men for the ships' crews. Negroes were actively sought by the Navy, and many slaves were promised freedom in exchange for service. According to Nelson: the Navy desperately needed men. Impressment was not exclusively a British practice, and service afloat was synonomous to brutality, tyranny and almost unendurable living conditions. Mass desertion and mutiny 70. Lorenzo J. Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 100-101. 71. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

55

were not uncommon, and ship commanders were often forced to rely on Negroes to help man the ships. Aside from the normal patriotic motives, freedom was an obvious motivation to the Negro in service. Many of the thirteen original states promised emancipation, and there were additional inducements—bounties of money and land.72

In addition to regular seamen, Negro pilots were in great demand because they had extensive knowledge of the coastal and inland waterways. 73 "The Virginia Navy, largest of the state navies in the South, outstripped all others in the use of Negro pilots. Negroes were 'accustomed to the navigation of the River,' as one official put it." 74 Enlisting for as many as ten or eleven years and serving in virtually all capacities aboard ship, Negroes established distinguished war records, and many were cited for individual acts of courage.15 It is ironic to note that following the War for Independence some Negro slaves serving in the Navy were reclaimed by their masters.7® Post-Revolutionary

Merchant

Marine

Following the end of the Revolution, the American shipping industry no longer enjoyed protection under the British navigation acts and was actually excluded from British trade. As a confederation, each state reacted by passing laws imposing various levels of restriction on all foreign commerce. With the ratification of the Constitution and the formation of a centralized national government, these laws were combined into and superseded by laws passed in 1789. Under these acts, discriminatory duties were placed on all cargoes imported in foreign vessels. Foreign ships were required to pay port taxes every time they entered an American port whereas domestic vessels paid a reduced rate and gained use of a port for the entire year. In addition, special taxes were levied on certain goods such as tea imported from 72. Dennis D. Nelson, The Integration of the Negro into the United Navy (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Young, 1951), p. 1.

States

73. Ibid. 74. Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., and Benjamin Quarles, The Negro American: A Documentary History (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1967), p. 53. 75. John Hope Franklin, A History Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 138.

of Negro Americans

(New York:

76. Lerone Bennett, Jr., Before the Mayflower: A History of the Negro in America (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1962), p. 59.

56 American

Year

The Negro

in the Offshore

Maritime

Industry

TABLE 1 2 . Offshore Maritime Industry and Foreign Tonnage Entered at United States 1789-1812 (Thousands of Tons)

American

Foreign

Percent American

1789

124

110

53

1791

364

241

60

1794

526

83

86

1797

608

77

88

1800

644

124

82

1803

787

164

83

1806

958

91

91

1809

576

99

85

1812

656

47

93

Source:

Ports

John G. B. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 250.

China. This policy of discrimination greatly encouraged the use of American vessels, and the Registry Act of 1789 limited American registry to those ships built in America and those already owned by Americans. As a result, the government succeeded not only in protecting the shipping industry but also in providing added stimulus to domestic shipbuilders.77 As a large, neutral carrier during the European wars, the American shipping industry entered a new era of high profits and rapid expansion. Despite the discriminatory legislation of other nations and the risks associated with the wars, America became a major supplier of raw materials to Europe, and shippers reaped the benefits of premium rates for their cargoes. Table 12 shows tonnage figures entered at United States ports for selected years between 1789 and 1812. These figures show the rapid growth of American shipping, and the percentage of tonnage carried in American vessels shows the increasing domination of the domestic industry over foreign competition during this period. Notable is the nearly eightfold increase in tonnage between 77. Hutchins, op. cit., pp. 249-250.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

57

1789 and 1806 and the increase in percentage of tonnage carried by American vessels from 53 percent in 1789 to 93 percent in 1812. Traditionally, in rapidly expanding industries, qualified Negroes have been offered increased employment opportunities and discriminatory bars to employment have been lowered. The shipping industry during this period was no exception. One historical source indicates that Negroes were not only actively engaged in the maritime industries but made excellent seamen.78 As Langley notes, "At the end of the Revolution the Continental Navy was disbanded and the ships sold. . . . it seems reasonable to assume that [Negro sailors] continued to serve on merchant vessels."79 In the face of evidence presented in Table 12 on the rapid growth of the industry, it also seems reasonable to assume that many new shipboard jobs were available to Negroes and that they were a primary source of needed manpower. Once again, figures on the actual number of Negroes employed are unavailable, and it is doubtful if any were kept. An indication of their total participation, however, can be gained from Greene's description of Negro employment in the whaling industry, which was important in New England at this time. In some cases nearly half of the whaling crew were Negroes. As late as 1807 it was reported that the larger whaleships carried "twenty-one men, of whom nine are commonly blacks;—the smaller—sixteen men; of whom seven are blacks." The crew of the whaler, Lion, in that year carried three officers, eight white men, a boy and nine Negroes. 80

This account leads one to reason that Negroes were significantly involved in other phases of maritime industry as well. Notable during this period is the existence of a Negro ship owner and merchant. Born in 1759, Paul CufFe began carrying cargoes between New Bedford, Massachusetts, and Nantucket Island in 1779 using a boat he built with his brother's help. By reinvesting his profits, he eventually acquired several vessels and carried on trade along the Atlantic coast from Georgia to Newfoundland and between the United States and Europe. According to Sherwood, ". . . [in 1806] he was possessed of one ship, 78. William Johnston, Slavery in Rhode Island, 1755-1776, reprinted from Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society (Providence, 1894), p. 127, cited in Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, op. eit. 79. Harold D. Langley, "The Negro in the Navy and Merchant Service— 1789-1860," Journal of Negro History, Vol. LII (October 1967), p. 276. 80. Greene, op. cit., p. 116-117.

58

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

two brigs, and several smaller vessels . . ." 8 1 Cuffe was ail extraordinary man by any standard and not typical of the Negroes of his day, but his example shows that Negroes were both employers and employees in the early maritime industry. Discrimination

in the Navy

In April 1798, the United States Navy was established to put an end to interference with United States commerce by the Algerian pirates and the French. With commerce prospering as a result of the European wars, manpower shortages again became a problem, and Negroes were actively recruited for duty in the Navy- Several months later, the first indication of racial discrimination by the Navy occurred. As Langley describes it: Building a naval force in the midst of an undeclared war with France was a challenging feat. One would assume that the crisis would not permit the Government to be too choosy about its manpower. Yet it is in this period that we find the first indications of a policy of discrimination against colored men. In March 1798 an order was issued forbidding the enlistment of Negroes, mulattoes or Indians in the Marines. Later, in August 1798, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert sent out an order that Negroes or mulattoes were not to be enlisted in the Navy. 82

Ostensibly, the reasons for this policy were unfounded reports of impending Negro invasions,81 but the underlying cause was more likely a basic distrust of the patriotism of nonwhites. Despite these orders, Negroes served on Navy ships during the following years. Langley cites several historical sources indicating that it was common to find Negroes among the crews of naval vessels.84 By 1812, the policy toward the enlistment of Negroes must have been completely relaxed. According to Nelson, the Negro played a significant role in the Navy during the War of 1812. The War of 1812 was largely a naval war, and during this struggle the tradition in the Navy of employing Negro seamen was continued. Negroes were to be found aboard American naval vessels in all ratings, and they formed approximately one-sixth of the total naval personnel 81. Henry N. Sherwood, "Paul Cuffe," Journal of Negro History, Vol. VIII (April 1923), p. 159. 82. Langley, op. eit. 83.

Ibid., pp.

275-276.

84. Ibid,, pp. 276-277.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

59

of the period. . . . About one-tenth of the crews of the American fleets that sailed the Upper Lakes to co-operate with Colonel George Crogan at Macinac in 1814 were Negroes.85

Nelson goes on to discuss acts of heroism by Negro sailors and cites a letter written by Oliver Hazard Perry in which .. he wrote in great detail of the valor of his Negro seamen and of his appreciation for their services." 86 In short, there is ample evidence to indicate that the Negro served his country well during the War of 1812. It is interesting to note that in spite of the stated discriminatory enlistment policy of the Navy, the personnel records are "colorless" and make no mention of a man's race. Existing evidence seems to indicate that racial prejudice was not present aboard ship. Langley notes that ". . . the small size of Navy and merchant ships made segregation impractical. The nature of surviving evidence suggests that they [Negroes] lived and worked without difficulty alongside their white comrades."87 Langley also states: Virtually all of the sailors who wrote about their non-white shipmates referred to them as Negroes, colored, or blacks. Almost without exception the term "nigger" is used only when a sailor is quoting an officer.88

The foregoing is hardly absolute proof that no prejudice existed among crew members, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the relationships between Negroes and whites were generally amicable. Nelson cites the observations of a Navy medical officer: And several years later, Surgeon Ushur Parsons, USN, wrote as follows: "In 1816, I was Surgeon of the Java under Commodore Perry. The white and Negro seamen messed together. About one in six or eight were Negroes. "In 1819, I was Surgeon of the Guerriere under Commodore Mac Donough, and the proportion of blacks was about the same in her crew. There seemed to have been an entire absence of prejudice against the blacks as shipmates among the crew. What I have said applies to the crews of the other ships that sailed in squadrons upon this Lake." 88 85. Nelson, op. cit., p. 2.

86. Ibid., p. 3. 87. Langley, op. cit., p. 274.

88. Ibid., p. 282. 89. Nelson, op. cit., p. 3.

60

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Declining Merchant Marine, 1815-1830 Following the War of 1812, the portion of the American maritime industry engaged in foreign trade entered a period of decline. With an end of the European wars, which had provided such a strong stimulus to American shippers, came the reappearance of foreign competition on trade routes which had previously been monopolized by American vessels. This was accompanied by a decrease in the demand for American exports. In addition, British naval activity during the war had taken a heavy toll on merchant vessels; the United States lost 1,407 vessels, and despite the number of vessels taken from the British, American tonnage decreased sharply.80 Several years were required to rebuild the merchant fleet, but because of foreign competition and a lessened demand for American exports, the fleet employed in foreign trade did not even approach its prewar tonnage until 1828. In contrast, the coastwise fleet showed dramatic gains during this period. Protected initially by port dues levied in 1789, this portion of the industry enjoyed a complete navigation monopoly following legislation passed in 1817. Combined with the development of the South and West and the general business conditions in the country, the coastwise fleet grew from 475,666 gross tons in 1815 to 842,906 gross tons in 1828. Although American export and import shipping made little progress, coastwise shipping grew rapidly, and the industry as a whole continued to expand.81 Presumably, the number of seagoing jobs increased in direct proportion to industry growth. Considering the ever-increasing demand for labor in other sectors of the economy as a result of the development of agriculture and industry and the rise of the railroads, it is reasonable to assume that the maritime industry continued to be faced with a tight labor market and was not in a position to discriminate massively against employees because of race. As is generally the case, records of the actual numbers of Negroes employed in the maritime industry are unavailable. An incident, which occurred in South Carolina in 1822, however, gives some insight into the racial composition of the crews of merchant ships. In that year, Denmark Vesey, an ex-slave 90. Henry Hall, American op. cit., p. 228.

Navigation

91. Hutchins, op. cit., p. 228-229.

(1880), p. 46, cited in Hutchins,

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

61

serving on a merchant vessel, allegedly conspired to lead a slave uprising. Following his capture, trial, and conviction, South Carolina and several other southern states passed legislation forbidding free Negroes employed on merchant vessels to leave their vessels while in port in these states.' 2 In describing this incident Aptheker states: Late in 1822, South Carolina stimulated by the Vesey conspiracy, passed a law forbidding free Negro seamen to leave their vessels while in her ports. In the ensuing years several other slave states passed similar laws. These evoked many protests from Negro individuals and groups, not only because of the attack this represented against their rights, but also because maritime occupations were among the most important followed by Negroes. 93

Largely because of strong Negro protests in New England over a period of many years, ". . . in 1844 Massachusetts appointed agents at Charleston and New Orleans to look after the rights of her colored seamen citizens in these ports." 94 This incident seems to indicate that Negroes were found on merchant ships in large enough numbers to compel legislation to be used as a weapon against them. Information on the number of Negro seamen in the New York area is contained in the records of the American Seamen's Friends Society, an organization created in 1826 to improve the general welfare of the seamen. One function of the society was to provide clean, reasonable priced boarding houses for sailors in port cities, and in New York the society established a boarding house specifically for Negro seamen. According to Langley: [The Negro boarding house] began its operations in 1839, and that first year 425 Negro seamen stayed there. For the next ten years it had an average of 450 boarders a year. According to the records of the Society, the Colored Sailor's boarding house was established to provide for the needs of approximately 2,000 colored seamen who sailed in and out of New York each year. 85 92. Philip M. Hamer, "Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848," Journal of Southern History, Vol. I (1935), pp. 3-28. 93. Herbert Aptheker (ed.), A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States (New York: The Citadel Press, 1968), p. 221. 94. Langley, op. eit., p. 284. 95. Ibid., p. 286.

62

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Other records from the society indicate that in the year 1846, 2,200 black seamen sailed from New York. Although the figures fluctuate drastically from year to year, a report issued by New York State indicates that 26,000 crewmen entered the Port of New York in 1846.96 Assuming that both figures are reasonably accurate, then 8.5 percent of the crewmen were Negroes. Although the accuracy of the figures is open to question, and it is not known how many of these seamen were actually Americans, they do indicate not only that Negro seamen existed in large numbers but also that they accounted for a significant portion of all seamen. The Boom, 1830-1860 The three decades between 1830 and 1860 saw a great boom in the shipping industry. The textile industry in England had matured and created a virtually insatiable demand for cotton. Agriculture in the South had expanded to meet this demand, and American shippers provided the means of transportation. As industry grew in the North, population centers expanded and created more centralized markets for ships' cargoes. In 1818, liner service was initiated between New York and Liverpool, and by 1830 numerous competing liners were well established. New markets were opened in California as a result of the gold rush of 1849, and the traffic in people and supplies provided strong stimuli both to the shipping and shipbuilding industries. The American vessel tonnage rose from 1,190,000 tons in 1830 to 5,350,000 tons in I860.97 Definitive figures on total Negro employment in the industry are not available, but according to Wesley: it was estimated that one-half of the American seamen in 1850 were colored men. The total number of seamen was said to be 150,000 including the naval and merchant service, the whale, cod, and mackerel fisheries. Twenty-five thousand were Americans, and the colored population was estimated as one-half of this number by Captain Thomas B. Sullivan. 98

Langley notes that, " . . . as commerce increased, the competition for sailors grew, and many a ship had to sail with inexperienced 96. Robert G. Albion, Rise of the New York Port (New York, 1939), p. 398. 97. Hutchins, op. ext., p. 259. 98. Charles H. Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States, 1850-1925 (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927), p. 49.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

63

hands." 09 In an industry expanding at this rate it is quite reasonable to assume that free Negroes enjoyed increasing employment opportunities. American shippers operated at a significant competitive advantage when compared with foreign shippers. Despite paying higher wages to seamen, the total cost of labor on American ships was lower. Technological advances in ship design required fewer men to operate the ships. As a result of increasing foreign competition, the ships' officers reduced this number still further by working their crews harder and for longer hours. Gradually, American seamen chose to work on shore rather than endure the harsh working conditions at sea. These native-born seamen were replaced by newly arrived European immigrants who could not find more attractive jobs on land.100 Presumably the better and more competent seamen were the first to leave the ships because their opportunities for employment elsewhere were greater. As these men were replaced with less competent individuals, the productivity of labor decreased. Hutchins marks this as the first stage in the decline of the efficiency of American shipping.101 This trend in employment would favor the firing and retention of native-born Negroes because no language barrier existed, and their attractiveness to land-based employers was not as great as it was for white American seamen. The Negro's foothold in maritime employment strengthened. FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR I During the Civil War, the Union blockade of southern ports temporarily ended the export of cotton to Great Britain. The loss of the cotton trade severely disrupted the shipping industry and contributed to the loss of the economies of large-scale enterprise, which had accured over the previous three decades. This, in turn, caused the less efficient firms to abandon the industry. As a result, a large number of merchant vessels were sold in foreign countries, especially Great Britain. "The total sales for the five-year period, 1861-1865, totaled 801,301 gross tons, compared with 247,042 gross tons during the active years 99. Langley, op tit., p. 286. 100. Hutchins, op. cit., pp. 306-307. 101.

Ibid.

64

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

1854-1858."102 The loss of the cotton trade, however, merely intensified other forces contributing to the decline of American shipping. Increased operating costs of American vessels and keen competition from foreign shippers would have produced similar results over a longer period of time. The Civil War hastened the industry's decline and attracted government attention away from the problem. Protective legislation may possibly have prevented the decline. By 1863, the American industry surrendered its monopoly role in the carriage of United States foreign trade. In that year less than 50 percent of the foreign commerce (as measured by value) entering and leaving domestic ports was carried in American vessels.103 With the decline in the industry came a reduction in seagoing employment on merchant vessels. The Civil War, however, created enormous manpower needs, and the Union and Confederate forces quickly absorbed all available men, especially unemployed sailors who could be used aboard war ships. Despite the great manpower need, military policy initially restricted Negro enlistment. An order dating back to 1820 prevented the enlistment of Negroes in the United States Army, and this ban remained in effect until 1862 when necessity caused its removal. The Navy, on the other hand, had maintained a liberal recruiting policy with only one limitation; an order issued by the Navy Department in 1839 restricted Negro enlistment to five percent of the total enlistment during any weekly or monthly period.104 Necessity also caused the removal of this limitation. Nelson described the situation: In the Civil War, as in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, it was military necessity that gave the Negro the right to do his share of the fighting. . . . The Navy Department, as early as September 1861, authorized the enlistment of Negroes "when their services can be made useful under the same forms and regulations applying to other enlistments." 105

Nelson and other historians note that Negroes were used as pilots, gunners, and loaders aboard naval vessels and also cite several instances of heroism. Bennett summarizes Negro participation in the Union Navy as follows: 102. Ibid., p. 323. 103. Ibid., p. 324. 104. Langley, op. ext., p. 280. 105. Nelson, op. ext., pp. 4-6.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

65

One out of every four Union sailors was a Negro. Of the 118,044 sailors in the Union Navy, 29,511 were Negroes. At least four Negro sailors won Congressional Medals of Honor.10*

Reconstruction and

Segregation

Following the end of the Civil War and the disbanding of the Union Navy, the problems of American merchant shipping came to the forefront. The marked decline in the industry was strongly felt, and the tight labor market for seamen no longer existed. Under these conditions racial discrimination gained a foothold in the industry. Prior to reconstruction, whites and Negroes were shipped indiscriminately aboard the same vessel. As the demand for labor decreased and the supply increased, however, a surplus of manpower developed, and a man's ability to do the work was no longer the only criterion for employment. A man's color became an important factor, sometimes outweighing all others. Shipping masters and boardinghouse keepers who supplied labor determined not to mix the races on the same vessel. Occasionally the crews openly opposed integration. Harry Ranials, the British Consulate in Baltimore, explained that the change in manning procedure was a reaction to the conduct of the Negroes in the South during the Reconstruction.107 In a sense, the black seaman was a victim of an early white backlash. Undoubtedly this intensified any tendency toward racial discrimination, and the existing economic conditions allowed many to express their feelings in this way. An incident demonstrating this neAV manning procedure occurred in 1867 when several of the crew aboard the British ship R.B. Mulhall deserted while the ship was in port in Baltimore. Of the crew remaining with the ship, one man was a Negro. The shipping masters in Baltimore refused to ship a white crew on the vessel as long as the Negro remained. In order to complete the voyage, the Negro was discharged.108 This incident serves also to emphasize the power shipping masters 106. Bennett, op. cit., p. 345. 107. Letter from Harry Ranials, British Consulate, Baltimore, November 11, 1867, to Right Honorable Lord Stanley, London, England, in Herbert G. Gutman, "Documents on Negro Seamen During the Reconstruction Period," Labor History, Vol. VII, No. 3 (Fall 1966), p. 308. 108. Ibid.

66

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

and boardinghouse keepers had over hiring procedures, because the captain of the R.B. Mulhall had little choice in the matter. During this period, segregated employment in the maritime industry, as well as in many other industries, became common. White seamen sailed "white" ships, and black seamen sailed almost exclusively on "black" ships. A few vessels, known as "checker-board" ships, carried both black and white crew members, but the Negroes worked only in the galley and occupied segregated quarters.109 Although figures on the numbers of "black" and "white" ships are unavailable, it can safely be assumed that "white" ships greatly outnumbered "black" ships. Whereas, virtually any Negro seamen could find work prior to the Civil War, overall shipboard employment declined during the Reconstruction period with opportunities for blacks decreasing at an even greater rate. A Declining Industry, 1870-1900 The declining trend in the industry continued through the end of the nineteenth century as American vessels became less efficient and less able to compete with foreign vessels. Americans were slow to grasp the technological advances which foreign shippers were employing to their advantage. Iron and steam were rapidly replacing wood and sail on the lucrative trade routes between the United States and Europe during the 1870's and 1880's, but at the turn of the century, most United States vessels were still under sail.110 Steamships, with their large cargo capacity, enjoyed increasing returns to scale and required fewer crewmen per ton of cargo; hence, they had lower operating costs and could underbid the cargo rates of the less efficient wooden vessels. As a stopgap measure in an effort to remain competitive, American shippers manned their vessels with skeleton crews, but the cost advantage of the larger steamships proved too great, and the wooden ships were forced into less profitable trade areas. In addition, the unavailability of capital limited the American shipper's ability to exchange his wooden ships for iron vessels. The opening of the West provided highly attractive investment opportunities, and the declining shipping industry was not in a 109. Bernard Raskin, On A True Course (Washington, D.C.: Merkle Press, Inc., 1967), p. 45. 110. Hutchins, op. cit., p. 371.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from, Colonial Days to 1960

67

position to compete for capital. Thus, while other nations invested heavily in their shipping industries and gained a decided competitive advantage, Americans took advantage of greater opportunities at home and allowed their shipping industry to decline still further. Working Conditions As competition from foreign shippers increased and as a result of crew sizes, American seamen bore additional burdens on their vessels. Ship captains substituted harsh discipline and demanded long, arduous hours of work from their crews to compensate for the dangerously low manning levels. As Goldberg points out that, "ships of 1,200 tons should have been carrying a crew of 34; but British ships were carrying 26, while American ships were carrying 23."111 Labor relations aboard ship approached that of master to slave; brutal treatment and unbearable living conditions became the rule rather than the exception. A United States Marine Hospital surgeon reported that, "no prison, certainly none of modern days, [is] so wretched [that] life within its walls is preferable, on the score of physical comfort, to the quarters and the life of the sailor on the vast majority of merchant vessels." 112 Seamen were mercilessly driven and treated more as an expendable commodity than as human beings. Boardinghouse keepers and shipping masters, or "crimps" as they were called, provided seamen for vessels and exercised strong control over the hiring of seamen. By forming associations, they forced ships' captains to deal with them as the only means of obtaining a crew. In this way the crimps controlled the sailor market and were able to exploit seamen and charge them exorbitant rates for "services rendered." When men were scarce, the captains were forced to pay "blood money" to the crimps in exchange for crews. Hutchins described the situation: Ship captains became dependent on the boarding-house masters, who were the operators of numerous low resorts in the principal seaports, and who for the sake of a month's advance wages normally paid them, not by the ship but by their victims, agreed to get the requisite number of men drunk, the articles signed, and the men aboard just before sail111. Joseph P. Goldberg, The Maritime Story: A Study in Labor-Management Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 12. 112. Paul S. Taylor, The Sailors' Union of the Pacific (New York: The Ronald Press, 1923), p. 24.

68

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

ing. It was then up to the mates to get the men to work, establish discipline, and make sailors of the "shanghaied" landlubbers, a task which was usually accomplished with the aid of heavy-booted toes, fists, and brass knuckles. Manhandling ability, indeed, soon became a more valuable quality in an officer than seamanship. 113

In 1884, American shipowners were responsible for legislation which permitted the signing on of crew members in foreign ports and effectively allowed foreign workers to be hired at lower wages to compete with American seamen. This law encouraged the abuse of American seamen on ships used in foreign trade because foreign seamen could be used to replace men who deserted the ship in a foreign port. Also, shipowners felt that there was no particular skill requirements for workers on board steam vessels and that any physically able man was capable of performing the work. The competition of foreign labor reduced the wage rate for seamen to the level set by worldwide competition. Deplorable working conditions and low wages combined to force American seamen, both white and black, to seek jobs on land. During the decade of the 1890's, only about 30 percent of the seamen on American ships were American citizens.114 In the view of Andrew Furuseth, Secretary of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific: The seamen must in the coastwise and in foreign trade meet the world. The Japanese, the Chinese, the Malay, the European, all may come and need bring no previous training. . . . These men from everywhere, with any or no kind of skill or experience, set a wage for which sailors and firemen must work or they must seek other employment. Our merchant marine is therefore manned by the residuum of the population, not only of our country and race, but of all countries and races.115

During this period, Negro employment in the industry varied in response both to economic and social forces acting within the industry. With the decline of the industry came decreased seagoing employment and fewer job opportunities. Expansion and industrialization in other sectors of the economy gradually absorbed unemployed seamen, but a labor surplus generally prevailed. Under these conditions Negro employment would be expected to decline at a faster rate than total employment 113. Hutchins, op. cit., p. 427. 114. Commissioner of Navigation, Annual Report (various years). 116. Andrew Furuseth, "Subsidies in Relation to Sea-Power," Federationalist, Vol. VII (April 1900), p. 94.

American

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

69

because racial discrimination would become a factor. Poor working conditions and low wages, however, served to counteract this tendency by making land-based jobs more attractive. Negroes did not enjoy the same opportunities as whites for employment elsewhere; hence, the attraction was not as strong, and Negro movement from the industry was slower. Seagoing employment opportunities remained somewhat constant for Negroes despite a general decline in jobs. Unions and Discrimination

Prior to World War I

Poor working conditions and low wages, which forced many seamen to seek shoreside employment, also encouraged the formation of unions by those who remained with the industry. Following several unsuccessful attempts, the earliest continuing unions were established on the West Coast. These included Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders, and Wipers' Association of the Pacific, established in 1883; the Coast Seamen's Union, which was founded in 1885 and later became the Sailors' Union of the Pacific (SUP); and the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Union of the Pacific, formed in 1901. These unions enjoyed only limited success, however, in bettering working conditions and increasing wages. In response to union demands, shipowners hired Orientals who would accept lower wages, and gradually, Orientals were replacing the Americans aboard ship. Seeking to preserve seagoing jobs for their members, the unions directed their efforts toward the exclusion of foreign labor from the industry. In particular, the SUP, led by Andrew Furuseth, spearheaded the campaign against alien seamen,116 and this union's emphasis on the exclusion of Orientals established a race prejudice, which would later be directed against other racial groups. The successful formation of unions on the West Coast lent added incentive for unionization on the East Coast. The Atlantic Coast Seamen's Union was established in 1888; the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders, and Wipers' Union of the Atlantic in 1902; and the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Association of the Atlantic in 1901. Competition from foreign labor was more intense on the East Coast as a result of the large volume of foreign trade and increased opportunities for foreign seamen to find work 116. Jerold S. Auerbach, "Progressives at Sea: The LaFollette Act of 1915," Labor History, Vol. II (1961), pp. 344-360.

70

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

aboard American vessels. The large supply of nonunion labor frustrated early attempts by the unions to gain better working conditions and increased wages for their members. In addition, the large number of ports on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and the diverse ethnic backgrounds of American seamen shipping out of these ports prevented the formation of strong, centralized unions. Instead, the locals remained relatively autonomous and had only limited power over shipowners. Seeking to overcome these limitations and strengthen its bargaining position, the Atlantic Coast Seamen's Union joined with the SUP and the Lake Seamen's Union (organized in 1878 on the Great Lakes) in 1892 to form the National Seamen's Union, later the International Seamen's Union (ISU). 117 Without exception, at the time of their founding, the early unions excluded Negroes from membership. Within a few months of its establishment, however, the SUP opened its membership to Negroes and accorded them full rights and privileges within the union.118 Presumably, this allowed American seamen on the West Coast to present a more unified front in their crusade against Oriental labor and prevent the shipowners' use of Negroes as strikebreakers. The number of Negro seamen on the West Coast was small relative to the total seagoing labor force, therefore, the change in policy did not significantly affect the racial makeup of the union. In contrast, the leaders of East Coast unions were much slower to admit Negroes, and even after allowing admission, they refused membership on equal terms. Negroes represented not only a large segment of the seagoing labor force on the Atlantic Coast, but also a major source of competition for organized white seamen; early labor organizers realized that an effective organization of seamen must include Negroes. In their view, ". . . organizing the approximately 3,000 Negro sailors, who were carried on 75 percent of the coastwise schooners and were receiving $5 less than the union scale, was essential in order to protect organized sailors on the Atlantic." 119 Five dollars represented a considerable wage differential because union wages in most East Coast ports during this period ranged from $40 to $45 per month." 0 117. Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 16-19. 118. Ibid., p. 18. 119. Ibid., p. 34. 120. Taylor, op. cit., p. 49.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

71

In 1908, the Marine Cooks and Stewards' Association of the Atlantic took the first effective step toward organizing Negroes by opening a branch office exclusively for Negroes. The union stated that . . in establishing this branch, every right and privilege which the colored man could justly claim has been fully considered, anticipated, and most generously provided for by their white comrades . . . no arrangement could be more genuinely fraternal in conception, nor more generously liberal in execution." 121 During its convention in 1907, the ISU resolved to organize Negroes into separate branches, but it was not until 1911 that the Atlantic Coast Seamen's Union registered its first Negro members and then, by a referendum vote, the union members themselves denied the Negroes further membership. The Negro branch of the Marine Cooks and Stewards provided the only means for Negro seamen to remain organized.122 A parallel situation existed in the railroad industry during this period. Organized white labor faced competition from unorganized Negro workers, and employers were using Negroes to fight the unions and depress wages. As Risher points out that, ". . . union wage demands had to remain restrained to avoid the replacement of white union members with Negroes who would accept lower wages." 123 The railroad unions had two alternatives in meeting the competition of Negroes. One was to accept the Negro into the unions and thereby present a unified front in their dealings with management; the other alternative was to use various means to exclude Negroes from employment on the railroads. The railroad unions held a strong position in the labor market and chose the latter. In contrast, the maritime unions occupied a tenuous position because of competition from foreign labor and had to follow the former cause in their efforts to gain strength. Aside from the attitudes of the leaders on the East Coast, union organizers faced an additional problem in overcoming the antiunion feelings of Negroes. Those feelings resulted from the segregation practices of unions in other industries and efforts 121. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 34. 122.

Ibid.

123. Howard W. Risher, Jr., "The Negro in The Railroad Industry" in Herbert R. Northrup et a I, Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport. Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. V (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania), Part I, p. 37.

72

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

by the white community to restrict the better jobs to white workers. Shipowners encouraged these feelings and used Negroes and other minority groups to advantage in their struggle against unionization. A typical example occurred in 1912 when shipowners in New York employed Negro and Mexican strikebreakers to frustrate a union attempt to block sailings.121 The attitudes of both Negroes and union leaders, combined with the attempts of employers to frustrate unionization, effectively helped to prevent the organization of a substantial portion of maritime labor until the late 1930's. Lloyd-La Follette Act Impact Since their foundings, the maritime unions worked to exclude foreign competition and thereby strengthen their positions. Union efforts, and especially those of Andrew Furuseth, finally bore fruit when Congress passed the Seamen's or Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1915. Partly to promote safety at sea and partly to increase the shipboard employment of Americana, the law required that 75 percent of the crew in each department of a ship must be able to understand any order given by an officer. Since the officers were generally American, it essentially meant that 75 percent of each crew were required to be English-speaking.126 The immediate impact of the bill would seemingly be to reduce severely the labor supply by excluding a majority of the Asiatic workers on the West Coast and a large number of Europeans on the East Coast; American seamen would see a sharp increase in the demand for their services. This effect, however, did not materialize. As Table 13 shows, of those seamen signing on before shipping commissioners, the percentage of American citizens remained quite constant for the years following the passage of the act. The outbreak of World War I and the enormous need for merchant seamen prevented strict enforcement of the language test. On the West Coast, ship captains circumvented the language requirement by giving orders to the Orientals in "pidgin English" and supplying them with Chinese-English sailors' dictionaries.'2® Although the percentage of seamen who were American citizens changed little during this period, an increasing number of native124. Goldberg, op. ext., p. 39. 125. Auerbach, op. ext. 126. Taylor, op. cit., p. 122.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

73

TABLE 13. Offshore Maritime Industry Percentage of American Seamen Signing On Before Shipping Commissioners, 1915-1923

Source:

Year

American Citizens

1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923

43.5 43.2 42.9 41.9 47.6 50.5 48.3 47.6 50.2

Commissioner of Navigation, Annual Reports Government Printing Office, 1915-1923).

(Washington, D.C.:

born Americans took jobs in the merchant service. "The ratio of native born to naturalized advanced from less than 2 to 1 in 1910, and slightly over 2 to 1 in 1914, to over 4 to 1 in 1920, and over 3 to 1 in 1922." 527 This increase reflected the number of jobs created by wartime commerce and the ability of the merchant service to draw labor from other sectors of the economy during a national emergency. Departmental

Segregation

During the period prior to World War I, the role of Negroes aboard merchant vessels evolved from one of general service toward one concentrated in the stewards department. Foreign seamen served mainly in the deck and engine departments whereas Americans, and especially Negroes, found work as stewards. In 1916, Americans on merchant vessels numbered 9,178 or 45 percent of the total labor force. "Of these the largest number was employed in the steward's department, due to the fact that colored waiters are employed in considerable numbers by some of the main coastwise steamship lines." 124 127. Ibid.., p. 123. 128. Commissioner of Navigation, Annual Report ernment Printing Office, 1916), p. 37.

(Washington, D.C.: Gov-

74

The Negro

in the Offshore Maritime

THE WORLD

Industry

WARS

During the period between the Civil War and World War I, the Navy pursued a policy of enlisting Negroes on a fully integrated basis. Existing Navy records show virtually no racial distinctions or policies, and there is no evidence to indicate that the policy was not successful. Nevertheless, this policy yielded to growing racial discrimination throughout the country, and in the years prior to World War I, the Navy began to limit the role of the Negro. As Nelson describes the situation: At the beginning of World War I, the Navy still permitted mixed crews aboard its ships, and Negroes were eligible for all ratings, but for several years it had been obvious that segregation was becoming a part of the Navy's policy—in practice if not on paper. . . . in fairness to the Navy it should be stated that reaction and discrimination in the service were but a reflection of the national social pattern.1-"

The Navy in World War I The new racial policy took shape as the limitation of the Negro to one rating—messman. Those Negroes who enlisted prior to World War I continued to work in other ratings, but no new recruits were assigned to general service ratings. ". . . of the 10,000 Negro Navy volunteers, all but a few were assigned to the messman branch." 130 With their activities confined to the spaces below decks, Negroes no longer had opportunities for valorous service, and examples of heroism, which distinguished Negroes in previous wars, never took place in World War I. Following the end of the war and the return to peacetime manning levels, the Navy discontinued active recruitment of Negroes. Although the messman branch formally remained open to Negroes, the Navy recruited only Filipinos to fill positions in this branch during the years 1919-1932. Thus the Navy's integration policy, which had proved successful for half a century, turned about-face and now effectively excluded the Negro from service. After 1932, the Navy once again began actively recruiting Negroes for the messman branch, but it was not until 1942 that Negroes were assigned to other ratings. 129. Nelson, op. cit., p. 7. 130. Ibid., p. 8.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960 Effects of Navy Policy on the Merchant

75

Marine

Limiting the Negro to the messman branch in the Navy had a strong impact on Negro involvement in the merchant service, because in previous periods, Negroes who gained experience at sea while in the Navy later sought jobs in the merchant service where they could use their training to advantage. Serving exclusively as messmen in the Navy, Negroes could only hope for work as stewards in the merchant service, and their opportunities were limited to but one of the three departments aboard merchant vessels. The Shipping Boom of World War I Before the outbreak of World War I, American shippers confined their operations almost exclusively to coastwise and intercoastal trade, leaving international trade in the hands of foreign shippers. With the advent of war in Europe, the belligerent nations withdrew their merchant fleets from international trade and created a serious problem for United States foreign commerce. In response, the government enacted two pieces of legislation to increase the merchant fleet. The first was a statute liberalizing the terms under which American owners could transfer vessels registered abroad to the safety of American registry. The result was a transfer of 250,000 tons of United States-owned shipping to American registry within a few months. Even this increase could not satisfy the enormous need for shipping capacity, and following United States entry in the war, Congress authorized an emergency shipbuilding program to be administered by the newly created Shipping Board. The Board authorized the construction of more than 3,000 vessels, and at the conclusion of the program in 1922, merchant shipping capacity had increased to more than five times the prewar level. More than one-half of this enormous capacity was owned by the government and controlled by the Shipping Board."1 The prewar level of seagoing personnel was totally inadequate to man the many new vessels, and foreign seamen were needed by their own countries. To fill the positions, the government recruited inexperienced men from all parts of the country and received the cooperation of both shipowners and seamen in training the new recruits. Experienced seamen agreed to allow 131. Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 39-40.

76

The Negro

in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

40 percent of the deck crews to be composed of new sailors and to work earnestly in teaching them seamanship. The Shipping Board undertook the initial training of the new recruits in January 1918, and eventually succeeded in placing on board American ships 9,523 seamen, 9,053 firemen, and 5,333 stewards and cooks.132 Information concerning the number of Negroes included in this massive training effort is unavailable, but United States Census data for 1910 and 1920 indicated that the number of Negro sailors and deck hands increased from 6,503 to 7,232 over the ten-year period.133 Prior to World War I, the American shipping industry was declining in importance, and the increase in employment was apparently a direct result of increased shipping needs during World War I. Post-World

War I Shipping

Conditions

Increasing employment and a bright outlook for the shipping industry in 1919 and 1920 combined to boost the union membership of unlicensed seamen to new heights. Membership in the ISU swelled to 115,000 in 1920 with the most dramatic increase in membership occurring on the East Coast where membership grew from 4,500 in 1915 to 81,000 in 1920. Impressive, but less spectacular, was the increase on the West Coast from 7,300 to 12,600 during the same period. Union membership also showed the return of native Americans to the industry as the proportion of native American members increased from 30 percent in 1917 to 50 percent in 1920. During this period, the only union on the East Coast which recruited Negroes continued to be the Marine Cooks and Stewards. Union leaders came under increasing pressure, however, to include Negroes and thereby strengthen their bargaining position with the shipowners. The influx of Negro seamen and stewards during the war years provided shipowners with a sizable source of unorganized labor, which could be used to avoid hiring union members. Union leaders of the Eastern and Gulf Sailors' Association eventually yielded to this pressure in 1920 and established a segregated Negro branch. According to Goldberg: 132. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 134-137. 133. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1910, Occupations, Vol. IV, Table VI, p. 411; and 1920, Occupations, Vol. IV, Table V, p. 351.

The Negro Maritime

Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

77

As a result of complaints regarding the failure to organize Negro sailers, as well as Negro cooks and stewards, a Negro branch of the Eastern and Gulf Sailor's Association was established to act in "close cooperation with the colored branch of the Marine Cooks and Stewards." 134

The union was willing to organize Negroes but only to eliminate competition for jobs from nonunion workers. The creation of an all-Negro branch served this end without extending the rights and privileges of full membership to Negroes. By 1921, business conditions had taken a turn for the worse, and the shipping industry entered a period of depression. Employment, which varied directly with business activity, suffered a similar decline, and wages, which had risen significantly during the war years when labor was in short supply, were now subject to downward adjustments. By and large, the unions were willing to accept wage reductions in exchange for nonmonetary concessions—namely, union recognition by the shipowners and union preference by ships' crews. The shipowners, however, led by the Shipping Board, realized they held the stronger position and intended to determine unilaterally wage rates and working conditions. The unions, in a show of solidarity, voted to strike on May 1, 1921. The ensuing strike was marked by numerous acts of violence along the waterfronts and several cases of sabotage of vessels, but the unions were fighting a losing battle. "Slack shipping conditions, the hostility of the government, and the existence of a large surplus of war-trained sailors willing to fill the places of the striking seamen foredoomed the seamen's efforts to failure." 135 Negroes represented a significant portion of this surplus of sailors; the reluctance of the unions to include Negroes in their membership must be counted as a factor in their defeat in 1921. With the loss of the strike, ISU membership decreased by more than half by 1922 and continued to decrease for the remainder of the decade, sinking to 10,000 by the mid-1920's and to less than 8,000 by 1929.13S The shipowners regained complete control over the hiring process, and the "crimp" system became active once again. Shipowners also dictated working conditions 134. Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 96-97. 135. Taylor, op. cit., p. 140. 136. Raskin, op. cit., p. 11.

78

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

and wage rates, keeping the pay level just high enough to compete with shore-based jobs. With mass unemployment during the Depression years, wages were sometimes little more than three meals a day and a place to sleep. Deteriorating conditions drove Americans from the industry, and, eventually, "fewer than 35 percent of the crews of the dwindling [number] of American flag ships were native Americans." 137 Maritime labor had suffered a crippling defeat. The Rebirth of Unions and Their Racial Policies The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 institutionalized collective bargaining and the closed shop. The ISU, which had a history of racial discrimination, gained new life and led the movement to organize seamen and negotiate with shipowners. Subsequent contracts provided increased wages and improved working conditions for ISU members, but as a result of the union's discriminatory membership policy, Negroes did not receive their fair share of benefits. In those companies where the ISU had won representation rights, the closed shop restricted shipboard jobs to union members and excluded nonunion labor. Denied full membership rights, Negro seamen had fewer job opportunities as the ISU expanded its influence in the industry and control over jobs. Growing dissatisfaction with the leaders of the ISU led to a revolt by the rank and file in 1937 and the formation of a new union, the National Maritime Union (NMU). Led by Joseph Curran, the founding of the NMU marked the beginning of pressure for changes in the industry's traditional employment patterns. Learning from the mistakes of earlier maritime unions, particularly those of the ISU, the leaders of the NMU endeavored to organize both white and black seamen on an equal basis. In this respect its organizational policies resembled those of the early CIO unions which for practical reasons opened their doors to Negroes. During its first convention in July 1937, the NMU dedicated itself to organizing all seamen on all waters ". . . without regard to race, creed, and color." 138 According to Raskin, "[NMU leaders] knew prejudice against race and nationality had been exploited to block the building of a strong union of 137.

Ibid.

138. National Maritime Union, Proceedings

First

Convention

(1937).

The Negro Maritime

Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

79

seamen." 139 Thus, the fight against discrimination became a prime objective from the start, and the principle of nondiscrimination became a prime objective from the start, and the principle of nondiscrimination was built into the various parts of the union's structure.140 Quite understandably, the reversal of traditional union policy on discrimination met with some reluctance on the part of many of the white union members. Realizing this, the union leaders undertook a program designed to educate the rank and file about the real costs of discrimination and to show how such discrimination had hurt them all in the past. The rapid growth of the union and the success of its policy of nondiscrimination demonstrated the effectiveness of this education. Having apprised its membership of the value of nondiscrimination, the union went on to challenge discrimination in its dealings with shipowners and aboard the ships. Many employers resisted union pressure for integration aboard ship and continued to maintain either all-white crews or hire Negroes only for the stewards department. By retaining the right to refuse to hire a man sent by the hiring hall, shipowners could hold the color line and still avoid a confrontation with the union. Later testimony in Congressional hearings indicates that this resistance in many cases was attributable to the fear that integrating departments and having black and white seamen occupy the same quarters would cause resentment among the white sailors and could result in sailing delays."1 Consequently, significant changes in racial employment patterns did not occur until World War II. Having revoked the charter of the ISU, the AFL sought to regain its former position in the maritime industry and check the rapid growth of the NMU, which had affiliated with the CIO. As a result, the AFL created the Seafarers' International Union (SIU) to replace the defunct ISU. The SUP became the autonomous Pacific District of the SIU, and the Atlantic and Gulf Districts of the SIU were formed to compete directly with the NMU. The SIU and the NMU differed radically in ideology, 139. Raskin, op. dt., p. 46. 140. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 163. 141. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies Pursuant to H. Res. 102, 78th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (1943-1944), pp. 2005, 2009.

80

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

particularly in terms of racial discrimination. Reflecting the antiNegro bias of the AFL craft unions, the SIU sought to preserve existing segregation aboard the few vessels under its contracts. The union used this policy as an organizing device in areas where racial prejudice was strong.142 Rather than changing attitudes, the SIU exploited racial bias in appealing to seamen disenchanted with the ideology of the NMU. World War II In the early days of the war, the American merchant fleet consisted of 900 vessels, many of which were seized or requisitioned at the war's start. Enormous defense needs made this number wholly inadequate, and Congress authorized an ambitious shipbuilding program which resulted in the construction of 5,777 ships by American builders.143 The large number of new ships greatly increased the demand for seamen, and between 1941 and 1945, the number of seagoing jobs increased from 55,000 to 200,000.144 Union hiring halls continued to operate throughout the war and served as the primary means of channeling available seamen into shipboard jobs. The seagoing labor force increased from about 75,000 to a peak of 250,000;115 since most of these men were assigned work through the union hiring halls, the unions had ample opportunity to increase their membership. As an example, membership in the NMU swelled from 35,000 following its founding in 1937 to more than 100,000 during the war.146 The increase in the demand for maritime labor had a strong influence on the racial policies of employers and unions and greatly enhanced the position of the Negro in the industry. Traditionally, Negro employment has s h o w its greatest advances during periods of manpower shortages. With the aid of the 142. Raskin, op. eit., p. 56. 143. Lester Rubin, The Negro in the Shipbuilding Industry. Racial Policies of American Industry, Report No. 17 (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1970), p. 43. 144. Herman M. Sturm, "Merchant Seamen During the Reconversion," Social Security Bulletin (February 1947), p. 20, as cited in Goldberg-, op. cit., p. 207. 145. War Shipping Administration, The U.S. Merchant (1946), p. 55, as cited in Goldberg, op. cit., p. 207. 146. Raskin, op. eit., p. 65.

Marine at

War

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

81

nondiscriminatory policy of the War Shipping Administration's Recruitment and Manning Organization (RMO), qualified Negro seamen were hired on an equal basis with white seamen in all unlicensed capacities. The NMU found that its efforts to encourage nondiscriminatory hiring had far greater impact during the war years than during the high unemployment years previous to the war. Upon request from an employer, the NMU hiring hall dispatched the desired number of seamen. The selection of men was done without regard to race or color. The employer retained the right to reject a man sent by the union, and some employers used this right to maintain segregation aboard ship. An incident which occurred in 1942 illustrates the refusal practice and the reaction of the NMU. In hiring a crew for the transport John Ericson in New York, the United States Lines requested that the NMU provide approximately 100 men. All the men had valid Coast Guard endorsements for the jobs which they had been assigned, but the company rejected 25 of them as being unqualified. It was obviously no coincident that all 25 were Negro. Joseph Curran, President of the NMU, intervened personally and insisted that if the Negroes were not hired, the ship would not sail. The company capitulated and hired the men. Immediately afterward, Curran sent a telegram to President Roosevelt describing the incident. He concluded that: Companies are thus impeding the war effort because they want to maintain discriminatory hiring. We ask you as Commander-in-Chief of the nation's war effort to help us in our efforts to keep all ships sailing by making the companies understand their responsibilities. 1 4 7

In responding, President Roosevelt wrote: Questions of race, creed, and color have no place in determining who are to man our ships. The sole qualifications for a worker in the maritime industry, as well as in any other industry, should be his loyalty and his professional or technical ability and training." 8

The NMU used this response as a basis for attempts to incorporate a nondiscriminatory hiring clause in agreements with employers. In 1943, the NMU argued the issue before the War Labor Board, which had wartime power over collective bargaining. Receiving a favorable judgment, the NMU made a nondiscriminatory clause a standard part of its contracts. 147. Ibid., p. 48. 148.

Ibid.

82

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Negro licensed officers, although few in number, also encountered strong obstacles to employment despite the desperate need for experienced personnel in the merchant marine during World War II. The experiences of Captain Hugh N. Mulzac demonstrate the barriers that had to be overcome. Educated in Great Britain, Captain Mulzac became an American citizen in 1918 and gained his masters license shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, because he was a Negro, he was unable to obtain even an unlicensed deck job on an American vessel. The only seagoing employment he could obtain was in the stewards department. Finally, in 1942, more than 20 years after he received his master's license, Captain Mulzac was made the skipper of the Liberty ship S.S. Booker T. Washington, and in one day he was promoted from chief cook to captain.149 His selection as the first Negro skipper of a Liberty vessel was the result of a long and hard fought campaign against racial prejudice in the maritime industry. Beecher, writing in 1945, described the struggle: Eventually, it required all the pressure that the National Negro Congress, the National Maritime Union, the national CIO, and the Negro press could muster to break the chains of discrimination which were keeping not only Captain Mulzac but many other qualified Negro ship's officers idle on the beach. The intervention of President Roosevelt himself, and of his Committee on Fair Employment Practices, was finally required before the situation was resolved.150

Beecher goes on to describe how Captain Mulzac's victory opened the doors for other Negro officers: When the S.S. Booker T. Washington was commissioned at Los Angeles on October 15, 1942, most of her officers were Negroes for the reason that there were so many on the beach, and this was their first chance at a ship. Her unlicensed personnel, however, were about evenly divided between white and Negro. After the success of the Booker T. Washington, three other ships sailed with Negro captains, and the barriers fell elsewhere, so that many Negroes are now sailing as mates, engineers, pursers, and radio operators on ships where they may be the only members of their race among the officers. 1 "

A primary function of the RMO was to supply on request qualified seamen both to union hiring halls when shortages of 149. Alden Whitman, "Hugh N. Mulzac, Mariner, Dies," New February 1, 1971, p. 34.

York

Times,

150. John Beecher, All Brave Sailors: The Story of the S.S. Booker T. Washington (New York: L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 1945), p. 86. 151. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

The Negro Maritime

Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

83

union members occurred and to employers with no union ties. The RMO pursued a strict policy of dispatching seamen on a rotary basis without regard to race or color. In contrast, the SIU actively sought to maintain color barriers aboard its vessels by shipping Negroes only in the stewards department and only on ships where all members of the stewards department were black. Since crew members shared their quarters with others in the same department, the SIU reasoned that segregated departments aboard ship were a necessary condition for harmonious operations. In requesting men from the RMO to fill vacancies aboard ship, the SIU specified the color of a man as well as his qualifications. The SIU strongly objected to the RMO's nondiscriminatory policies and rejected a man referred by the RMO when his color did not agree with that requested by the union. Furthermore, the SIU charged that the RMO was misusing its authority by seeking to impose "social-reformist theories" during a time of national emergency.142 As a result of several charges of discrimination filed against the SIU, the newly created President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) initiated hearings and found the union guilty of operating segregated hiring halls and shipping Negroes only in the stewards department despite an acute shortage of qualified seamen in the deck and engine departments. Following two years of consideration, the FEPC concluded that opposition to mixed crews lay mainly with shoreside personnel and not with white seamen. Consequently, the Committee issued a cease-and-desist order requiring an end to the union's discriminatory practices. The SIU did not respond.143 The FEPC's life was terminated soon thereafter; hence, the SIU suffered no penalties. Publicity generated by the decision of the FEPC, the continuing efforts against discrimination by the NMU, and the acute shortage of qualified seamen during the war were all important factors in changing the tradition of segregation aboard ships. Although some mixed crews did exist prior to the war the shipping of Negroes in all three shipboard departments became common procedure during the war despite SIU policy. As a result, this period had a lasting impact on racial employment patterns in the industry. 152. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 211. 153. Fair Employment Practice Committee, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 22.

84

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

The Navy in World War II Prior to 1942, the Navy enlisted Negroes for assignment to the messman branch exclusively. "It was the Navy's attitude at this time that 'the enlistment of Negroes (other than as mess attendants) leads to disruptive and undermining conditions.' " 1M Public protest against this attitude caused President Roosevelt to effect a change in policy, and in April 1942, the Navy announced that it would accept Negro volunteers into general service ratings. The Navy went on to state that Negroes would receive training in segregated units and would only receive assignments to shore installations and harbor craft. The Navy's "experimental" policy did not extend to commissioning Negroes as officers. Two years later, the Navy Department took a more definite step toward integration by assigning Negroes to 25 auxiliary ships and integrating them into all shipboard departments. The only restriction was that no ships have more than 10 percent Negroes in its complement. This step resulted in the assignment of more than 500 Negro sailors with various general service ratings to seagoing naval vessels in the South Pacific. In April 1945, less than a year later, the Navy extended assignments to all auxiliary vessels, retaining only the 10 percent of complement limitation. With the end of the war approaching, the number of recruits being trained by the Navy decreased, and the inefficiency of operating segregated facilities became obvious. Consequently, the Navy completely integrated all training programs, assigning Negro recruits to companies and barracks on an equal basis with whites. Finally, in February 1946, the Navy removed all restrictions on general service assignments. In so doing, the Navy ordered that: Effective immediately all restrictions governing types of assignments for which Negro naval personnel are eligible are hereby lifted. Henceforth, they shall be eligible for all types of assignments in all ratings in all activities and all ships of the naval service.155

These steps did much to elevate the position of the Negro in the Navy, but actual change and a significant flow of Negroes into general service ratings was considerably slower. By August 154. Nelson, op. cit., p. 13. 155. U.S. Navy Circular Letter 48-46, dated 27 February 1946, as cited, ibid., p. 21.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

85

1945, the number of Negro enlisted men exceeded 165,000, but 95 percent of these men served in the messman branch. The Postwar

Navy

With the sharp reduction in personnel following World War II, the number of Negroes in the Navy dropped to just over 10,000 by the beginning of 1946. Within a few months, the level rose to 20,000 and remained approximately at this level for several years. Figure 3 shows the number of Negroes serving on the stewards branch and compares it to the number serving in all other branches. With the personnel level held somewhat constant, the increase in the number of Negroes in general service ratings other than steward consists of new recruits and transfers from the messman branch. The trend shows the percentage of Negro personnel in general service and in the messman branch approaching parity at the rate of one-half of one percent per m o n t h . B y 1950, the total number of Negroes had fallen to 15,000 but 43 percent held general service ratings." 7 In July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which created the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces. This committee, popularly known as the Fahy Committee, spent two years examining the "non-discriminatory" policies of the armed forces and their actual effect on Negro personnel. Although the committee was particularly critical of the large percentage of Negroes serving as cooks, stewards, and stewards' mates, it also acknowledged the great progress the Navy had made in the space of five years by moving from a policy excluding Negroes from general service to one of complete integration in all ratings.148 Further developments in the Navy's racial policy will be examined in detail in later chapters. POSTWAR

MERCHANT

SHIPPING

At the end of World War II, the War Shipping Administration controlled approximately 4,300 vessels and provided jobs for upwards of 150,000 men. The end of hostilities shifted the 156. Nelson, op. cit., p. 23. 157. Ibid., p. 22. 158. Ibid., Chapter XI.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960

87

function of the merchant marine from military support to the supply of food and aid to be used in rebuilding Europe. Since European shipping, decimated during the war, required several rebuilding years, American shipping enjoyed a new position of importance in world trade. The importance was shortlived, however, because with the revival of the European fleets came renewed competition for foreign commerce and a return to the prewar position of American shipping in the world market. By July 1948, the active American fleet had decreased to 1,800 ships, and to 1,150 in 1950. In 1951, the Korean Conflict temporarily reversed this declining trend in shipping and the number of active ships grew to over 1,400 as several hundred ships in the reserve fleet were activated to meet the shipping demands of the war. Following the war, these ships were returned to the reserve fleet, and by 1956 the active fleet consisted of 1,100 ships. This level was consistent with the findings of a Presidential advisory committee in 1947, which recommended that the United States maintain an average minimum level of slightly over 1,000 ships with a capacity of 11 to 12 million deadweight tons. This recommended level was essentially the same that existed in 1939, although the increased size and speed of the newer vessels effectively increased carrying capacity by onethird."9 During the postwar years, the level of shipboard employment varied directly with the number of ships in service and ranged from over 150,000 at the end of the war to under 50,000 in 1960. Employment on merchant ships declined steadily with the exception of the Korean Conflict period where employment increased from 61,550 in 1950 to 84,300 a year later. Aside from the decrease immediately following each war, the declining shipboard employment reflects the general decline in the shipping industry. Throughout the postwar period, the seagoing labor force has been characterized generally by growing unemployment; only during the Korean Conflict did a labor shortage occur. With the decrease in total industry employment has come a reduction in the number of shipboard jobs available to Negroes.

159. President's Advisory Committee on the Merchant Marine, Report pp. 52-54, as cited in Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

(1947),

88

The Negro NEGRO

MARITIME

in the Offshore EMPLOYMENT,

Maritime

Industry

1940-1960

Census data provide a valuable source of information concerning Negro employment in the maritime industries largely because they are objective and readily available. Although these data gives a good overall picture of employment, they are somewhat inadequate in describing the position of the Negro worker in various phases of the maritime industry. Data up through 1940 give employment totals for major occupational groups within the industry such as sailors and deck hands; captains, masters, mates, and pilots, boatmen, canalmen, and lockkeepers; and longshoremen and stevedores. Beginning in 1950, the census data eliminated the category for captains, masters, mates, and pilots and the category for boatmen, canalmen, and lockkeepers. The main thrust of this study is directed toward Negro employment in the offshore maritime industry, but with the deletion of these categories, the census data do not lend readily to this use. Nonetheless, a relatively good measure of employment in this area may be derived from the figures for employment in the larger area of water transportation. Water transportation includes offshore maritime transportation; inland water transportation, which is mainly river and canal traffic; local water transportation, such as tugboat and ferry operation; and cargo handling services, which are largely provided by longshoremen and stevedores. By far, the largest subset within water transportation is cargo handling services, and by subtracting the employment figures for longshoremen and stevedores, a relatively good measure of employment in the shipping industry is obtained. Although these derived figures include inland as well as offshore shipping and include office workers as well as shipboard personnel, the data appears to provide a valid base for analyzing employment in the shipping industry as a whole. Table 14 shows these figures for the years 1940, 1950, and 1960 and for each of four regions of the country. The totals for these three particular years should be especially valuable in analyzing the long-term employment trends in the industry, since employment in these years is relatively unaffected by short-term emergencies, namely World War II and the Korean Conflict.

The Negro Maritime Tradition from Colonial Days to 1960 « 2

g fc

V

z o

H

t©

«5 cö

CI »H CO

IN

CO tO rH

Ol

¡o

rH rH

t> t>

«bo

IO oo IO

1O o C0

IO -t

00 to

eo o t-^ ei

rH_

t> lO O rH

co C4 O to

iH N

E-i

5 o H

c01

O H

Tf rH

rH

t¿ rH

r-T

t-

IO eo

to 1960

Fi o ••s 5 O ü > Ah o O O T f IO to Ol O» Ol rH

ci C o

'S) 0) M

CÖ 0> fi o

z

fi o

5 o E-i 3 O «2

« s

s

CG

TH

rH

94

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

Industry TABLE 16. Offshore Maritime Negro Male Sailors and Deck Hands as Percentage of All Negro Maritime Employees, 1940-1960

All Negro Offshore Maritime Employees Negro Sailors and Deck Hands Source:

1940 Total Percent

1950 Total Percent

1960 Total Percent

6,149

100.0

8,879

100.0

8,960

100.0

2,703

43.9

4,269

48.2

3,400

37.9

See Tables 14 and 15.

On the West Coast, Negro employment was remarkably sensitive to the level of total employment. A small rise in industry employment between 1940 and 1950 caused an eightfold jump in Negro employment, a similar decrease in total employment caused Negro employment to fall by nearly one-half. These changes would tend to indicate that Negro sailors and deck hands occupy a marginal position on the West Coast and act as a reserve supply of labor to be used in times of increased demand. In the North Central states, Negro employment dropped sharply between 1940 and 1950 despite an increase in total employment. By 1960, total employment had fallen to the 1940 level, but Negro employment had essentially reached a floor and decreased only slightly. Of the Negroes employed in the maritime industry, census data for 1940, 1950, and 1960 indicate that a large percentage worked as sailors and deck hands. Table 16 shows the number of Negroes employed in the industry and the number employed as sailors and deck hands. The percentages show the predominance of Negroes in this occupational group and indicate that a large proportion of those Negroes hired are employed in the deck department aboard ship. This concentration of Negro seamen on the lower rungs of the occupational ladder ties Negro employment strongly to the number of shipboard jobs, which in turn is a function of the number of ships in operation and depends on general maritime industry activity. Directly linked to the number of ships in operation, Negro employment will decline sharply only when ships are taken out of service, whereas total employment will be sensitive to smaller changes in market forces.

CHAPTER IV

Negro Maritime Employment Since i960 In the 1960's not only Negroes but also other minority groups, particularly Spanish Surnamed Americans and Orientals, played an important part in the work force in the industry. For this period the data base is different. In the preceding discussion of Negro employment up to 1960, the analysis was based primarily on data published by the Bureau of the Census. The analysis in this chapter begins with the most recent Census data but relies mainly on data and information gathered in personal interviews with many of the steamship companies and the seagoing unions. The tables presented in Appendix A contain the basic data used in this chapter. The figures describe employment in Standard Industrial Classifications 441 (Deep Sea Foreign Transportation), 442 (Deep Sea Domestic Transportation), and 443 (Great Lakes Transportation). SIC 444 (Transportation on Rivers and Canals) and 445 (Local Water Transportation) were excluded, and 446 (Longshore) will be analyzed in a separate study. Employment

in the 1970's

As was shown in Table 9 (p. 24), overall employment aboard ship remained fairly constant during the first half of the 1960's and then rose in 1966 and 1967 as a result of increased government shipments to South Vietnam to support our ground forces. By the end of the decade, the level of employment began to fall sharply as government shipments declined and all but two steamship companies abandoned passenger liner service. More recent figures indicate that employment has continued to decrease as additional ships are being removed from service. The data utilized in the analysis of this chapter are for the period when the level of overall employment was relatively stable in comparison with the drastic fluctuations of prior decades. Yet the shipping industry continues to be one of feast or famine, depending almost entirely on government policies, government 95

96

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

subsidies, and government shipments. During wartime, American ships carry large quantities of government cargo, and the demand for seamen exceeds the supply. A subsequent decline in government shipping idles a large portion of the seagoing labor force. The stepped-down military activity in Vietnam has shown this to be true once more. Seagoing v. Shoreside

Personnel

In the offshore maritime industry, a dichotomy exists in the labor force between seagoing and shoreside employees. The seagoing employees operate the vessels while the shoreside employees are generally the office staff and administrators of the steamship companies. As much as possible, each group will be examined separately since the companies have, with some exceptions, direct control over shoreside employment, but the maritime unions exert a far greater influence over seagoing personnel. The level of shipping activity is the common link since this determines the level of shipboard employment and, in turn, the office staff required to support that level of activity. BLACK EMPLOYMENT

IN 1970—THE

OVERALL

PICTURE

Table 17 shows the Census figures for employment by race and sex in waterborne transportation (excluding longshoremen and stevedores) for 1950, 1960, and 1970. Table 18 gives similar employment figures for sailors and deck hands. As evidenced by the figures for 1970, the trends noted in Chapter III continued unabated in the 1960's. Despite the overall decline in employment in waterborne transportation, Negro participation in the industry has grown. Total employment fell by some 13 percent between 1960 and 1970, and black employment decreased from 8,960 to 8,918. However, the proportion of Negroes rose from 6.6 percent to 7.5 percent. In terms of geographic regions, which are defined in Table 19, the South continues to lead all others in employment and was the only region registering an increase in employment over the decade. Black employment in the South showed even greater gains. Total employment in the Northeast fell sharply as did black employment, but the proportion of blacks employed in the region still continued to rise. Apparently, blacks have been able to gain a stronger foothold in the industry as overall employment declines.

Negro Maritime Employment Since 1960 oo t>

o> C4

T-l co ei

o 1-1

o ti a> >7

00 Ti

v te

ei

Sbe a) z

co m •«i

oo 00 o r-T iH

C g c O)

t-

«

55

t00 00 r-Ì

O o co «o iH

IO 1-1 IO ei CO

CO Ti

Ti"

1-ï"

lo

U3 tO

t-

Ci 00 o i-H

00 o

o>

o 00

M co LO

o

o o Ti co

(£>

LO c-

M

c00 (N

O

LO 00

tS

co co IO cT co

fi o o o « lûtotÇ j 3> O Oi v

«

§ § Ci

¡>3

h 4J G V U

o

55

X t o

Ol LO

rH •>11

oo 00 IO T-T

oo t-

8 5> « Z p ho

LO o o LO

S

o H 3 O 03

£

HHH

Negro Maritime Employment Since 1960

99

TABLE 19. Offshore Maritime Industry Definition of Regions by State for Census Data Northeast

North Central

South

West

Connecticut

Illinois

South

West

Maine

Indiana

Arkansas

Arizona

Massachusetts

Iowa

Delaware

California

New Hampshire

Kansas

District of Columbia

Colorado

New Jersey

Michigan

Florida

Hawaii

New York

Minnesota

Georgia

Idaho

Pennsylvania

Missouri

Kentucky

Montana

Rhode Island

Nebraska

Louisiana

Nevada

Vermont

North Dakota

Maryland

New Mexico

Ohio

Mississippi

Oregon

South Dakota

North Carolina

Utah

Oklahoma

Washington

South Carolina

Wyoming

Wisconsin

Tennessee Texas Virginia West Virginia

The changes in the employment figures for sailors and deck hands show a trend similar to that of waterborne transportation. Total employment dropped by over 25 percent, and the number of blacks also fell, but the proportion of Negroes still increased somewhat. The South produced the only gains in employment and in the number of blacks employed while the Northeast showed a sharp drop in both areas. EMPLOYMENT

PATTERNS

The data presented in Tables 20 through 23 represent regional figures for both seagoing and shoreside personnel in the employ of steamship companies. These figures are based on the reports prepared since 1966 by many of the major employers in the industry for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and in 1964 for predecessor federal agencies. Comparison be-

100

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime

Industry

tween EEOC and Census data are difficult to make because the two bodies of data differ in several respects. First, Census data are based on the responses by individuals to Census interrogators and questionnaires, subsequently, an individual's perception of his job may differ from his employer's perception of the same job. In contrast, the EEOC data are compiled by employers and reported to the Commission. Second, the EEOC data were obtained directly from a limited number of steamship companies representing only a sample of the industry's total employment. In theory, the Census data include all employees. Third, the EEOC data include only SIC Codes 441, 442, and 443, while the Census data also include Codes 444 and 445. Thus, the Census data include additional sectors of waterborne transportation. Another difference between the two bodies of data lies in the way the data were separated into geographic regions. The Census data were reported according to state, and each state was assigned to the appropriate region of the country. The EEOC data, however, were reported by company location, and employment tended to center in a few metropolitan areas: New York City, New Orleans, and San Francisco, and the Great Lakes cities of Duluth, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Buffalo. For this analysis the data are regionalized according to the major operating areas of the steamship companies: Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific Ocean, and Great Lakes. The biggest difference between these regions and those used for the Census data occurs on the Atlantic Coast. The Northeast region extends from Maine to Pennsylvania and the South region from Maryland to Texas. The Atlantic region includes the Northeast region and approximately one-half of the South region. This appeared proper because the number of Atlantic region employees actually stationed in the upper South was quite small, and they were controlled by policies established for the Northeast region or, in fact, New York City. A final difference in EEOC and Census data is that the former applies only to companies employing 100 or more persons. This, however, is not likely to be serious here because nearly all steamship companies have more than 100 employees. In gathering the data and ideas presented in this chapter, interviews were conduted with most of the major companies in the shipping industry. As noted in Chapter II, the majority of the firms are small and own and/or operate only a few vessels.

Negro Maritime Employment

Since 1960

® 00 Ji ej E

»

bo a>

55

o

Eh

too o

§ 2 e

§>

ou

«be

55

3 o

H

3 g

00 m

io 00 © r-T i-H

r-t O to

Tjl CO so 1—1

2 be

« £ Dh V £ p. g

»

2•a V

55

o H

o M a> «

o> Oi CO

S bo E «

o

be

V

6

0) Cu

o

ti

o to

o>

155 be

o cCT5 CTS CO C aiO CÌ

IO ©

107

CTI I CO o o co 1 co O ci CI IO

CTSr-i ci

t- co •«i

1 CT» co 1I co ci IO 1 ci rH N rH IO

rH rH

CO I IO I1 C O 1 aó t- r-i

4) (X. co CO o» •«t C oO »

©

rH

CT)

rH oo I1 I1 1I O co rH rH rH

o c-

CO C> CO t-; CI ti H t> o «

a> co

"91 rH » CO O rH IO io CI CTI rH t> r-i ci © co CO o ci CO O rH C rH C I i-i rH O CT)

CT>

CT)

at S CO CO 00 cC oO © © ci

a> co co o co IO tco rH aó IrO o>I r-i O H ci co C Ci IrH •*(•

t> °ì IO N CT) io o rH co C O ©co d O Ó CT» «i rH rH rH •

rH © CO C oO > ci H ci

o to>

co e; ca co r-i © t>

ci

CT) CO lc > o> CT) r-i "E g CO w O

•s

t> C r-tO

00 t-; o ci

io r-i

co ci

CT)

m tri

ai «w m 8 o Ai

o c J5 o V H

co CTI co CO oó • r-iI rH «f ci oó C rH 09 N

CO CT> IO N IO IO rH r-i co C Oo O rH co aoó CT) rH C rH h a ?CI

se

j

o.

s

W

iri

oo •

iOI

XI

as

p. ou3

o

H

«be G

C5

E •u c ed a [3 '3 e

o

(h o

c

2

PL,

£

Q>

x •a §

u m u a> "3 e M

o

o

fri

t*

o I

I

e

5 e s t4 « jo CO.cS O O >J

it

a

3

o E-i V

w

So

H

•O C w o.

CO o

127

1960

I

I

I

I

I

I

CO Ol

to

o o

o o o

Ol o

o © o

o o o

00 CO

o to>

m r-
IS PÌ 00

o

©

CO

CJ LO co

tcó rH

00 00 Ti

(M oi

-"Jl t> co

CO

01 u "3 £ M O

"3 0 .2

B

1

M

1 H

P al U o

«

£ P« o

I 'E « in

ai

3

3

o

5 o H

•a c 01 p. be u ® 3 Sh

^

Since 1960

N ©

t®

e*

IO CO

if

to oo

to H

co è

co H

ei N

-«*
rH

|

1 1

1 1

li rH

Ti »H

-i (M co C4 fH

to «o tH

O io to rn

I to 1 tH

1 co 1 00

ai o>

ai •»i t-

co ci

1 rH 1 ci

t> rH

to

vo (À rH

o Ti

fH •O1 OJ

1 rH 1 Ti

M M rH

Ti o co M 00 U5 Ti (N r-l 00 co trH

o> Cl

(M

co

co

to O rH t-

CO IN 00 00 to ci to

co ti» •t. Ti

00 o> Ti ci

to o

fi*

sbe

« 55

3o H

E « « fc

£

21 1 1 g .5

I

«»

8

bo w ¡3 t© o> s « s

I

s a S i rfi « to„ "S jfc, » © § KJ «û Û5

00

*-
4 0)

Sf e a E

•o C a)

E

iS

-5 (A C o m

2 o E O

3 "w 2 CL,

(-> o

c X u

V "3 a>

•c ® T3 C cS

e

o

rH

IO IO co oT rH

o co rH ci co

o là

co IO

•oco

IO IO co oo ci 1 be o> £

co

«

(M 1—l

t-

| 1

O

(M C5

Ti IO rH

Ol Tf CO

o IO co

"f IO rH

to co rH

Ol 05 CO rH*

o ai «H rH

CO Ol r-^ fi

1M rH

O 00 rH

rH CO O IO

CCD io rH

tco

os Ti oo rH

00 00 CO

rH

g o

ë

g

x

o E-i

c V

a

a. O

5 es ,-1

>H «S S 8 «

S3

5 o H

E

S

O t>

W

o Q. n Th O 3 at

"3 o H

Sm

O

3 O w

Appendix

185

A

« S I «bo 55 o H

§•

ïg bSo mZ fri

o t.

8 «be 55

S

s

11

II

11

I1

11

1I OrH

IH T-î

(I

O

oó

eo t11 CÒ oò co

O rH

I1

00

11

I1 O S rH

rH

OS

ao r-i

OS rH

O io 11 CO C o trH o rH

O

OS Ö

es 00

co MO ce *-H

1o Ol 00

OS OS

ci

t-

00 rH

1I

•f TT

I1

to

TÎ 00

io oö

11

co CJ o

to rH

c> 11 tU 3

M o m IM 00 CO ci

OS 00 rH

«

00

os

OS

O

rH

O rH

N

to 00

< N IrHN

to

a»

oi

00 r-i

IOSO

to

rH rH

rH

IO

IO

CO C Ö O C O Mci Ol

rH OS

OS t-;

OS IO rH

C O rHCO eIO N C1 ai

.-ti X,

¡t

•C

e ci

E

c ,C £ Eh

(E o

M u

— *

®fi

o H

S

o Z

E

Ct

>1

0)

jï

P.

O

es

.-)

•S

2®

«

•3 H

e V co

_ "3

«

o

o

H

« E 3

S

Appendix

A

187

c g 8 & J?

C4

Z U T-I

lO CO

1 1

CO o CO

o o

co CO

oo co CO

to rH

00 o rH

1 1

o rH

co

rH

•f rH

CO 00 rH rH

CM t-

1

|

CO CO

to

00

N

to

CO

Z

o be

A ©

ci

©

(H

CO

rH

rH

•»f O eq

oa CO rH

00

CM N to

U5 to W

rH rH

to Oi

to 00

oo t>

tt-

©, rH*

55

0 1

S

3 o

0

01

0

01 CM

00

(N I-L

00

o>

00

t-

to o 00

ta c-

tlO Ht

oo

o lO rH

1A o CM

to

00 IO

T-t

O CT> to CO

rH

CO c>

10

CO ai rH

rH M

o> o

00 rH

CO o rH

00 to CM

00 •§ fti VJ ^ !ZJ to „ 00 . X fti S CO

3

3

S

s *

ft s

!§

S

S

OH,

^

to U5 ©

8 BFL £ « 4» I Z

£ bo

ID *-
H

e a)

O

rM

"o o

^in •G 0} jaj

£*

OS U

6

e

lO U5 oi"

o p. CO

o

2 p BO OL

A> 09 1«

ci

a

u o

2

£

* V 0

1 V co

s

8 V 3 CO % EH

l H

-8 « Q t. 3 o co

The Negro in the Offshore Maritime Industry

188 « S S

-a § O

S u> 4)

o h bo 0

I H

p. s o

2 g o faC

•+0 e

be 4>

O O O TH

0 0 0 t-
i-î

1-1 r-t

os

i-T

«s

o I

H «

© .Sì

H

.0

3

«

s

g

co N IN

t00 0 iH

CM (M O)

US O IM i-T

00 O

CM c4

O 1/3

"5 Tf 1—1

00 co'

ia

0 co

CO

tC4

i-l tH

0 CO 1-1

co Ci os

t0 1-1

t-

O

00 rH

CO

Ti l-H IO co

T-l O CO

• S CD «O tì ûî "s;

u C fi25

60 «

co

^

00 r-J

I 1

1-1 iH

a>

•f

1 1

iH CO co

eo *

" us

Ci

CO

T-t

cs t-

1 1

1-1 lO

I-

HJ1 OS lO

o> rH rH

CO CO OS

IN

rH

CO eo t-

O CO H* ei

CO 00 CO rH

rH rH t-

c-

"i to

CO »O

CO lO CO

tCO

rt

CO co

CO CO rH

a> to

OS rH rH

g i

be a>

H

8. 3 ©

o (h he

00 oo Hjl

OS oo rH

•er 1> CO

o to CO

CO co OS

N

00 rH

o 00 00 T-T

!

o

§ H o -si c*> so Cd

V

b SM rt) u ta £h £V

a» -h ~ § I s § ••S o « •g

09 I O

o

o H a. s © v.

I

Industry

»

«

to iH

to o

c- IO ci pi

1 O 1 t> IN

°î rH »-H

ai

< 35 rH rH

1 1 IO t•»

'S. E W

o bo v

o Eh

a 3

2

u

00

©

CO CO Ol

CO CO 00 00 IN rH OS IN tt rH CJ Iß

•o c J 1 CO .2 * a> Jjj . o "3 Ji e ® as o H CO 2 aj

2

o -f o

oo oo co IO IQ Ol N Tf ta eg eo

CO eo co

co co

tl 1« o 3 ii o H

c

4) &

bi a 41 OB a 4 V D. I u O

2 i-, o •i t

4)

a) 3 5 o H

5 o H

o a. o X -*-» 3 « 5 ce

«

3 o W

198

The

Negro

in

the

Offshore

Maritime

Industry

b 2 e ti 2 jf

« "3 &

I

V fa

I

I

I

I

O co

o

Eh

g 2

to ^ O N

ï * S*

»

"3 8

O

2

o H P. 3 o l-l O "3 § 3 ca

a 8o

eo co

co §cj co oo CO CO tH

B s> bo cS c 1 g« tj §

.2 o .8

€ £ o

oo "i1 iH O) 04 IN

too oo »4 « a o

e

4)

•G V

15 T) o C it aj a a 8 -a €

CO

o

i 6

Eh

o io oo ci

>4 S c » a ^ "K a

o

• s 5 B Ks & I o J

I Eh

o I E ¿8

I Eh

5

eg o t-

CO TH tH o c^ to CO

t00 eg to to 00

eg tao o o> rH

m eg oo r-T o o rH

C~ ers o co" •>t r-T rH

CO t~ CO CO rH OS oo rH

eg to

•»t

oo HJ
H be v Z

5 o H

„

oT Ieg

ceg o t-^ too lO

to rH

be v £

TJ"

1A 1A o>

o tH 00 o" eg c-^ CO

& bo

6 Z, &


_a

3 «M rt t, O

o) >H 4) ft O

E o _o ci iJ

o *

V 3 3

nO

H 3 o Eh

£ 4) w

Negro Employment

4 TABLE 2. Percent

Shipbuilding

Negro

in the Maritime

and Offshore

Employment

Maritime

Industry

Industries

by Sex and Occupational

Group

United States, 1970 » Shipbuilding Occupational Group

Offshore Maritime

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Officials and managers

3.6

3.6

—

2.3

2.3

1.5

Professionals

1.7

1.5

7.3

1.9

1.9

—

Technicians

3.9

3.8

5.1

7.2

7.3

—

0.6

0.7

—

9. fi

9.8

9.5

7.7

8.2

7.3

4.4

3.7

9.1

4.8

4.3

6.9

Craftsmen

17.3

17.3

13.0

23.2

23.3

—

Operatives

36.9

37.0

10.0

12.0

11.9

23.3

Sales workers

—

Office and clerical Total white collar

—

Laborers

56.7

56.8

31.8

31.5

31.5

50.0

Service workers

30.7

29.5

62.2

20.6

21.7

2.0

23.9

23.9

32.3

20.0

20.1

9.9

18.1

18.4

9.9

13.7

14.3

7.1

Total blue collar Total Source:

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1970 and data in authors' possession.

»Data cover 28 establishments in shipbuilding and 69 establishments in offshore maritime. T h e number of black officials and managers in shipbuilding

is

significantly higher than the national average and reflects the movement of blue collar craftsmen into the leaderman and f o r e man categories. as late as

This movement is a recent phenomenon

1964 the black

participation

stood at 0.9 percent of total.2

rate in

this

since

category

The low participation of

blacks

in this category in the offshore maritime industry is a function of historical barriers to black employment and traditional company

policies

of

promoting

from

employed, none could be promoted.

within.

If

no

plays a role also but this will be discussed below. 2. See Part One, Appendix Table A-l.

blacks

were

Declining total employment

Concluding Analysis

o p*

The number of black female office and clerical workers in the shipbuilding industry is at a record level and reflects the achievements of current affirmative action policies and plans. As recently as 1968, the black participation rates in this category were only 3.8 percent of total.' The figures for the offshore maritime industry show that black participation in the office and clerical category approximates the national level. In the longshore industry there are few actual white collar positions except management, but the job of clerk and checker has come to be the top position in the industry and the longshoring equivalent of an hourly paid white collar occupation. The number of clerks and checkers in each port is relatively limited compared to the number of longshoremen, but only recently have blacks won any of these jobs. Moreover, few blacks serve as foremen or in other supervisory positions. One must conclude that, relative to industry generally, blacks are underrepresented in "white collar" or managerial positions in the longshore industry. In the offshore maritime industry, the shipboard occupations are divided between jobs requiring a license and those not requiring a license. The unlicensed occupations include deck hands or ordinary sailors, engine room personnel, and stewards. The licensed personnel constitute the white collar group aboard ship and function as supervisors or foremen. The licenses are issued by the United States Coast Guard. Blacks are very underrepresented in these licensed positions. Blue Collar

Positions

The shipbuilding industry, and to a lesser extent the offshore maritime industry, is characterized by a high degree of labor intensity. More than 80 percent of shipbuilding jobs are in blue collar areas while in offshore maritime, approximately onehalf of all jobs are blue collar. As such, it is to be expected that black participation in this area would be higher than in the white collar area. The 1970 data bear this out. As can be seen, the participation rates for black males in both industries exceed the national level in most blue collar categories especially the craftsmen group. Those in the craftsmen rating earn more than others and are in line for promotion to supervisory positions. 3. See Part One, Appendix Table A-3.

6

Negro Employment in the Maritime THE DEMAND

FOR

Industry

LABOR

The opportunities available to blacks in the maritime industries have undergone significant change over the years and currently black participation in all of them is higher than ever. In the longshore industry, i.e. that segment of the maritime industry concerning the loading and discharging of cargo aboard ship, the black percentage of the total work force in 1970 stood at approximately 36 percent, ranking this industry very near the top in terms of overall minority representation. Historically, blacks have always been well represented in longshoring, but in recent years this percentage has steadily risen. In the offshore maritime industry, on the other hand, blacks comprised approximately 14 percent of the total work force in 1970; a figure very close to 1950 and 1960 percentages but somewhat higher than previous totals. Historically, blacks have faced limited opportunities for shipboard work being relegated to lower status, unlicensed functions. The shipbuilding industry, unlike longshoring and offshore maritime, is not a service industry but a durable goods manufacturing one. Nevertheless, in shipbuilding also the proportion of black workers has been increasing and, at present, the black percentage of the total work force exceeds 20 percent. On an historical basis, however, blacks have been severely limited in upward mobility in the industry and have had to overcome entrenched institutional barriers to their employment and occupational mobility. A fundamental hypothesis of the Racial Policies of American Industry series is that "Improvement in the economic status of Negroes . . . is likely to depend upon a rising demand for labor." * Obviously, the experience of these industries demonstrates that blacks can increase their share of employment also when the demand for labor lessens. All three maritime industries have suffered sharp cutbacks in employment in the post-World War II years, but black employment relative to white employment has been increasing. The explanation for this phenomenon is found in the nature of the work, the efforts of the federal government, and, of course, the general economic situation which provided ample alternative jobs for whites. 4. Northrup, op. eit., p. 741.

Concluding Analysis

7

THE NATURE OF THE WORK In general, work in the maritime industries cannot be termed "desirable" by modern standards, in terms of the occupational mix, the character of the work, or the patterns of occupational progression. Such a generalization is, of course, subject to many caveats, and there are many differences among the three industries. The Occupational Mix Of the three industries, longshore is most heavily manual and blue collar. As education has improved among blue collar groups, such work, even though well paid, has lost its attractiveness. Given the lower educational levels attained by blacks, it is not surprising to see whites looking elsewhere for work, or to find that longshore work has one of the highest proportions of black labor of any industry. Offshore maritime has jobs for which considerable education and training is involved—the licensed personnel—but the bulk of employees are semiskilled or less. Again, these are jobs which lose their appeal as education increases. Shipbuilding, with its large proportion of craftsmen, is the most attractive of the three, to the more educated blue collar worker. Such craftsmen often move between this industry and construction. Higher wages in construction plus many years of construction expansion limit the comparative attractiveness of shipbuilding for such employees. In terms of managerial, sales, or professional employees, the opportunities in all three maritime industries are relatively meager and certainly not especially attractive in comparison with other industries in terms of the character of the work. Although these top jobs have historically been almost completely white, greater opportunities for blacks have increased recently and are likely to expand in the future as a higher percentage of blacks qualify educationally and professionally. Character of the Work The work in all three maritime industries has several other unattractive features. Longshore work is heavy, hard, dangerous, and intermittent. The only offsetting features are the high wages and the greater ease of labor as containerization spreads, but

8

Negro Employment in the Maritime

Industry

containerization also reduces labor needs. Offshore maritime is also dangerous, involves long absences from home, intermittent work, and for blue collar employees, work under difficult conditions. The American merchant marine's decline also has meant considerable unemployment. Shipbuilding, like construction, involves intermittent work, and work out in the elements. Employment also varies because of the vagaries of government procurement and national policy. When all these factors are combined with declining employment in peacetime, and sharp buildups in wartime, it is not surprising that, with a booming economy elsewhere, the proportion of Negroes has been expanding despite a reduced labor demand. As was noted in Volume I of this series: The tendency of unpleasant or physically hard work to attract a disproportionate number of Negroes is not easily ended, a l t h o u g h the extent may lessen. Especially in full employment periods, those who can find work elsewhere will do so—and whites, because of better education and training, are more likely to avoid the unpleasant jobs whereas Negroes for the opposite reason, and because discrimination is by no means wiped out, are less able to do so. 5

Pattern

of Occupational

Progression

"The manner in which employees move from one job to another is largely determined by the industrial structure." 6 Historically, the three maritime industries have provided relatively little opportunity for upward mobility. Longshore have little opportunity to aspire higher, given the small number of supervisory and clerk-checker jobs. Declining employment has, of course, reduced even these opportunities. In offshore maritime, upward mobility ceases at the top of the unlicensed seaman's rank. To go farther requires education and a license and few unlicensed seamen overcome these barriers. In shipbuilding, the occupational progressions move within craft lines. For a laborer to enter a progression is now easier than heretofore because of government affirmative action policies, but upward movement remains neither simple nor rapid. Shipbuilding craftsmen do, however, have much greater supervisory potential than do longshoremen or unlicensed seamen. But great opportunity for advancement remains limited. 5. Ibid., p. 729. 6. Ibid.

Concluding Analysis Nature of Work—Final

9 Comment

The nature of the work in the maritime industries thus encourages those with alternative opportunities to look elsewhere, and those with greater opportunities to do so include a disproportionate number of whites. We conclude also that, given past discriminatory practices which confined Negroes to particular jobs or areas of work, and because of their disadvantaged educational attainments, training, and industrial experience, the nature of the work in the maritime industries is a major factor why the proportion of blacks has increased while the demand for labor has declined. TIME AND NATURE

OF INDUSTRY

DEVELOPMENT

All three maritime industries have existed since the founding of the country. All three industries, therefore, existed at a time when it was common practice, and profitable, to employ both slaves and free Negroes. There is no doubt that the Negro tradition of service in all three industries is, in part, responsible for the comparatively high levels of black employment during recent years. In particular, the longshore industry in the South began as an almost all-black industry continuing as such in many ports throughout its development. The job of regular longshoreman came to be defined as a Negro position reducing the number of whites who might otherwise seek employment in the industry. On the other hand, the position of clerk or checker early became a white occupation. This waterfront division of labor survived hundreds of years of tradition and practice. A similar phenomenon occurred in the offshore maritime industry. The tradition of blacks serving in the stewards department has existed for many years. Although there have been instances where blacks have served as riverboat captains and pilots, restrictive admissisons policies into merchant marine academies, the lack of proper education, and discriminatory licensing procedures have reserved for whites the more prestigious licensed shipboard occupations. In shipbuilding, the traditional practices of confining blacks to the lowest rated jobs were common. Moreover, shipbuilding became a metal trades industry following the Civil War. Blacks were often denied training in these occupations, thus further excluding them from the craft positions.

10

Negro Employment in the Maritime Industry COMMUNITY MORES

Equally important as the time of industrial development are the habits, attitudes, and customs of the community in which a particular industry develops. In longshoring, community mores have dictated an all-white waterfront in some areas and an allblack waterfront in other areas. In Boston, the longshore industry began as an Irish-dominated occupation and has continued to be so. In New York also, the Irish dominated the waterfront, but Italians became influential in the late 1800's. In both cases, blacks participated only as strikebreakers. The jobs were identified as white occupations by the community and above the capabilities of blacks. In the South, however, just the opposite occurred. In the early days of the industry, waterfront work in most ports became known as Negro work and, therefore, below the level of whites. The exceptions were in New Orleans and the Texas ports. There a special skill, that of the screwman, gave prestige to the job and established a tradition of white longshore participation that has remained through the present, although it is now waning. Thus each port's racial makeup remains in part the result of the area mores and customs. INDUSTRIAL

LOCATION

As is the case in most other industries, the "accident of location" impacts heavily upon the racial policies of the maritime industries. There are shipyards located within centers of black population and, as such, it is to be expected that these yards would have high percentages of black participation. Under the assumption that no other employment barriers exist, transportation to these yards is not difficult and does not obstruct greater black representation. Conversely, some shipyards are located further away from center city dwellers and transportation does present an employment barrier. Most major port areas in the United States are within larger urban areas and, as would be expected, the manpower pool contains a sizable proportion of blacks. The black participation rate in the industry reflects in part these population concentrations. Regional considerations are not as important in the offshore maritime industry as they are in shipbuilding and longshoring.

Concluding Analysis

11

In essence, the ship becomes home to employees for the duration of a voyage so that transportation and manpower availability within certain locales are not of prime concern. Nevertheless, location is, at the beginning of a voyage, a key factor even though this is controlled by the unions through the hiring hall. It is important to note, also, that the movement of firms to suburban areas, common in many other industries, is not likely to be a factor for the maritime industries. It is not practical to have shipyards built in suburban locations and it is even less likely that any new ports will be established away from existing centers of black population. Business movements both within and among port areas in recent years have actually aided blacks. Thus, containerization has moved the locus of activity in the Port of New York from Manhattan and Brooklyn to New Jersey. Given the relative population concentrations, this has meant more jobs for blacks. Similarly, the rise to first place of the Gulf shipyards has opened up many jobs to blacks, especially as it occurred at a time when the federal government was carefully enforcing increased minority employment standards on shipyards. Thus, industrial location factors are likely to continue to aid black employment in these industries. NATURE

OF UNION

ORGANIZATION

A key aspect of racial policies in all three maritime industries has been the nature and development of union organization. Every major shipyard in the country, except one, is unionized, as are longshoremen in every port, and nearly all offshore maritime employees. With few exceptions, the unions have tended to institutionalize an unfavorable status quo of black employment until forced off positions by government intervention. In view of the vast control of these unions—including control at the source of employment—union organization has been truly significant in determining job opportunities for blacks. In the longshore industry, the ILA has always welcomed blacks into membership in southern and Gulf Coast ports, but in North Atlantic ports blacks were often excluded from the union and, therefore, from the work force. It was only when blacks presented a serious threat to ILA security, in the form of strikebreaking activities, that they were recognized and offered some employment as union members. In all ports, North and South,

12

Negro Employment in the Maritime Industry

blacks were confined in particualr jobs, or to a certain share of the work. The ILA not only agreed to this procedure, but bitterly resisted change. It took state and federal legal action to open up clerk and checker jobs in New York and to move toward a fair share of the work in Baltimore and the Texas ports. Job improvement for blacks in longshore cannot be attributed to ILA policies of avoiding agreement for change. The ILWU, like the ILA, has always admitted blacks without discrimination, but it has gone farther in attempting to open up jobs to blacks. Its greatest success came in San Francisco, but the ILWU in effect countenanced for many years the exclusion of blacks in the ports of Seattle and Los Angeles/Long Beach despite its official posture against such practices. Only recently have Negroes effectively broken the barriers in these two ports. The dominant, craft-oriented unions in the shipbuilding industry—the Boilermakers and the Machinists—have a long history of racial exclusion and discrimination. Strict union practices effectively barred black employment in shipyard trades in past years and were relaxed only under the severe manpower shortages created by World Wars I and II. A competing union, the International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America (IUMSWA), was more hospitable to black workers, but even its organizing tactics in the South took into account local "tastes" for discrimination. The independent union at the huge Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company has taken a passive role, leaving racial policies to the employer. Another significantly adverse factor concerning shipbuilding unionism has been its organization on a craft basis in most yards. This inhibits intraplant mobility by adding a union barrier to a craft one. Since Negroes are disproportionately concentrated in the lowest jobs, craft unionism adds to their difficulties in moving upward. Since the mid-1960's, effective government administration of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of executive orders has caused management and the unions to reconsider institutionalized employment practices and policies and has overcome many barriers to increased black participation in the shipbuilding industry. In the offshore maritime industry, union organization dates back to the mid-1800's. Since the unions involved in this industry exercise almost absolute control over the hiring process,

Concluding Analyst»

13

it is obvious that they also exercise a high degree of control over the racial policies and practices of the industry. The high degree of fragmentation in the union structure and the control of the hiring halls, giving the unions an effective closed shop, have allowed the unions to restrict worker mobility, to dictate wage policies and, therefore, to impact heavily upon job opportunities for blacks. The Seafarers' International Union was historically a strong advocate of racial exclusion and segregation, as were several of the licensed officers' unions. Recently, the SIU has altered its policies and the licensed officers' unions will accept blacks who achieved officer rank. The Sailors' Union of the Pacific and the Marine Firemen, Oilers, Watertenders, and Wipers, both constituent divisons of SIU, have not significantly altered their past discrimination. Moreover, the craft organization of SIU on the West Coast tends to keep blacks confined to the stewards' department. Most liberal in racial policies of the maritime unions has been the National Maritime Union. Moreover, its industrial structure aided upward mobility. NMU, however, has lost the bulk of its membership in the decline of the American merchant marine whereas the SIU has been able to organize the stable and expanding sectors of the industry. Moreover, both unions, by lack of bargaining restraint and insistence on rapid wage increases and restrictive work practices have contributed to the decline of the merchant marine and the loss of jobs for blacks and whites. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY The impact of technology has had significantly adverse effects on black employment in many industries because it tends to replace the unskilled labor in which blacks are often concentrated. This occurred in the offshore maritime industry when the jet airplane doomed the North Atlantic and Trans-Pacific passenger liners. Among the job losers have been a sizable number of blacks employed as stewards on these ships. On the other hand, containerization, by furthering the movement of ships in the Port of New York from New York City to New Jersey, increased the job opportunities for blacks. On the West Coast, the acceptance by the ILWU of a no-bar to

14

Negro Employment in the Maritime Industry

progress position expedited the expansion of ports there and opened up new jobs, many of which have gone to blacks. Technological progress is also likely to be beneficial in shipbuilding because it involves a substitution of an approach to assembly line work from craft jobs. This eases job entry, simplifies training, and reduces craft union control, all of which are certain to aid blacks. Thus, in the maritime industries, technological change has been at worst mixed, and probably, overall helpful in its impact on black employment. ROLE OF

GOVERNMENT

The influence of the federal government has been felt in the maritime industries for many years. In shipbuilding, government policies were, at different times, responsible for both increases and decreases in the level of black employment. In the past, the withholding of construction awards may have been responsible for the loss of many potentially black jobs because a new yard was never built. Government sanctioned union elections resulted in the loss of black jobs in a southern shipyard during World War II. More recently, however, the government's enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246 has resulted in substantial progress in black employment extending over most occupations in the shipyard structure. It may be that the model of administration developed by the Maritime Administration is generalizable to other industries where progress has not been as rapid. Certainly, few agencies of government have as effective a record for enforcing equal employment as has the Office of Civil Rights of the Maritime Administration. In longshoring, the Justice Department has won court decisions in Baltimore and the Texas ports that promise to change institutionalized union and employer practices. The extent to which these changes will benefit black longshoremen is, as yet, to be fully determined. Prior to this, New York State litigation began the opening of clerk and checker jobs to whites. The government efforts in the offshore maritime industry have been generally confined to shoreside personnel and to admissions policies at the merchant marine academies. The strength of the seagoing unions and the decline of the industry may preclude effective government intervention at this point. As was noted earlier, the efforts at the merchant marine academies, again by the

Concluding Analysis

15

Maritime Administration, have begun to produce meaningful changes while changes in the racial composition of shoreside personnel have already occurred. THE ROLE OF

MANAGEMENT

Management policy in longshore and offshore maritime has been difficult to discern. With employment, training, and lower supervision union controlled in most areas, management policy has not been dominant. In areas, such as white collar employment, one sees evidence of change by management made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but initiative is difficult to discern. Management in these industries has not been forced to respond to community crises for the most part, nor are these industries' sales responsive to, nor affected by, consumer pressures since they do not ordinarily sell to consumers. As will be noted below, the rising significance of conglomerates may alter this situation. In shipbuilding, again, management appears to act in response, in this case, to government pressure since government is the basic customer and often partial underwriter as well, as it is in the merchant marine. The great exception has been the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, a great innovator in the utilization of black labor and still today the largest employer of blacks in the industry. Although this company's record in Negro labor utilization has varied, it was an early user of blacks in skilled jobs. Discrimination later became institutionalized but, more recently, it has again come to the forefront as an employer of blacks and their utilization throughout a shipyard. Other shipyard employers who are now expanding their upgrading employment of blacks include General Dynamics, Avondale, and Litton. One may expect a continued concern in the future by all management as a result of the enforcement policies of government, and the rising influence in all these industries of such industrial giants as R. J. Reynolds, Tenneco, and, as noted, General Dynamics and Litton. Such companies have learned to practice affirmative action as a matter of course, and are used to doing so in other industries. Activities led by management are likely to increase as these industries are brought more into the mainstream of American industry.

16

Negro Employment in the Maritime FINAL

Industry

COMMENT

There is every reason to believe that the maritime industries will continue to be a key source of employment for blacks. The shipbuilding industry has made considerable progress in equal employment opportunities in recent years and the expansion of the industry, taking place currently, holds the promise for more black job opportunities. The longshore industry has always employed large numbers of blacks and, if current government efforts to remove discriminatory union arrangements and work practices are successful, it is probable that the black influence in the industry will become stronger. The promise for improved job opportunities for blacks is bleakest in the offshore maritime industry. The industry has experienced sharp contractions in the recent past. Blacks may find only temporary employment in this industry, filling the gap left by whites seeking work in more lucrative and secure industries. Given the nature of the work in the maritime industries, the proportion of black employees will remain large and probably increase whether employment expands or contracts. Few industries studied have yielded similar results.7

7. Of the thirty-one industries studied, only urban transit clearly has demonstrated an increased black proportion in the face of a sharp employment decline. See Phillip W. Jeffress, "The Negro in the Urban Transit Industry," in Herbert R. Northrup et al., Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport, Studies of Negro Employment, Vol. V (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1971), Part Four.