Modern German Sociology 9780231886642

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Introduction
I. German Sociology: A Retrospective
1, Sociology in the Interwar Period: Trends in Development and Criteria for Evaluation
2. The Tragic Consciousness of German Sociology
3. The Social Sciences Between Dogmatism and Decisionism: A Comparison of Karl Marx and Max Weber
II. Approaches to Theory
4. Sociology as a Science of Social Reality
5. Recent Developments in the Relation Between Theory and Research
6. The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present
7. Modern Systems Theory and the Theory of Society
8. The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society
III. Diagnoses of Contemporary Society
9. The Crystallization of Cultural Forms
9. The Crystallization of Cultural Forms
10. Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?
11. Life Chances, Class Conflict, Social Change
12. The Poverty of Bourgeois Democracy in Germany
IV. Class, Bureaucracy, and the State
13. The Origin of Class Societies: A Systems Analysis
14. Modes of Authority and Democratic Control
15. Toward a Theory of Late Capitalism
16. Beyond Status and Class: Will There Be an Individualized Class Society?
V. Identity and Social Structure
17. Personal Identity as an Evolutionary and Historical Problem
18. Psychoanalysis as Social Theory
19. The Nature of Human Aggression
20. On the German Reception of Role Theory
21. Structures of Meaning and Objective Hermeneutics
The Editors
The Authors
Index

Citation preview

MODERN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY

European Perspectives: A Series of Columbia University Press

MODERN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY

Edited with introductions by VOLKER MEJA DIETER MISGELD NICO STEHR

New York

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

1987

Columbia University Press New York Guildford, Surrey Copyright © 1987 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Modern German Sociology Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Sociology—Germany (West)—History. 2. Social institutions. 3. Social structure. I. Meja, Volker. II. Misgeld, Dieter. III. Stehr, Nico. HM22.G2M63 1987 301'.0943 86-24519 ISBN 0-231-05854-3

CONTENTS Preface

ix

Introduction The Social and Intellectual Organization of German Sociology Since 1 9 4 5 VOLKER M E J A , DIETER M I S G E L D , AND N I C O STEHR

I. 1. 2.

German Sociology: A Retrospective

31

Sociology in the Interwar Period: Trends in Development and Criteria for Evaluation M. R A I N E R LEPSIUS

37

The Tragic Consciousness of German Sociology K U R T LENK

3.

4.

Approaches to Theory

6.

Recent Developments in the Relation Between Theory and Research RENE KÖNIG

119

138 150

Modern Systems Theory and the Theory of Society NIKLAS LUHMANN

8.

113

The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present NORBERT ELIAS

7.

76

Sociology as a Science of Social Reality H E L M U T SCHELSKY

5.

57

The Social Sciences Between Dogmatism and Decisionism: A Comparison of Karl Marx and Max Weber JÜRGEN K O C K A

II.

1

173

The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society JÜRGEN H A B E R M A S

187

vi III. Diagnoses of Contemporary Society 9.

213

The Crystallization of Cultural Forms A R N O L D GEHLEN

10.

Late Capitalism or Industrial Society? THEODOR W .

11.

218

ADORNO

232

Life Chances, Class Conflict, Social Change R A L F DAHRENDORF

12.

248

The Poverty of Bourgeois Democracy in Germany OSKAR NEGT

257

IV. Class, Bureaucracy, and the State 13.

273

The Origin of Class Societies: A Systems Analysis K L A U S EDER

14.

278

Modes of Authority and Democratic Control W O L F G A N G SCHLUCHTER

291

15.

Toward a Theory of Late Capitalism

16.

Beyond Status and Class: Will There Be an Individualized Class Society? ULRICH BECK

340

V.

Identity and Social Structure

357

17.

Personal Problem

Identity

as

an

CLAUSOFFE

Evolutionary

18.

Psychoanalysis as Social Theory

19.

The Nature of Human Aggression

Historical

HELMUT DAHMER

A L E X A N D E R MITSCHERLICH

20.

and

THOMAS LUCKMANN

324

363 383

402

On the German Reception of Role Theory FRIEDRICH H . TENBRUCK

4 1 0

21.

Structures of Meaning and Objective Hermeneutics ULRICH

OEVERMANN,

JÜRGEN KRAMBECK

WITH

TILMAN

ALLERT,

ELISABETH

KÖNAU

AND 436

THE EDITORS

449

THE AUTHORS

451

INDEX

461

ix

Preface Most contemporary sociologists are likely to agree that their discipline has become more international since the end of World War II. A n y a n thology emphasizing a particular national tradition is therefore bound to be selective since it must to a large extent abstract f r o m those features of the discipline w h i c h have resulted f r o m the increase in the range and intensity of international cooperation. Our collection is not primarily intended f o r the specialist in Germ a n sociology and its history, nor is it addressed to sociologists in Germany. It is rather aimed at readers of English interested in those German intellectual developments a n d orientations, especially in the Federal Republic, that have been widely discussed in English-speaking countries and have achieved a certain influence there. Most of our selections either belong a m o n g these developments or are critical responses to them. It is due to this particular emphasis that certain theoretical and historical discussions are predominant, a n d that m u c h highly specialized, yet significant recent research has been left aside. Certainly we recognize that in German sociology, just as elsewhere, there has been a strong tendency toward specialization. This specialization has led to a concentration of sociological inquiry and research in areas of practical importance f o r m o d e r n societies, such as the sociologies of education a n d work, of organizations, criminology, and policy research. But m u c h of this research, as well as some theory, has been inspired by methods a n d conceptions of inquiry originating outside Germany, especially in the United States. It is difficult to gauge h o w original German contributions are in these areas. We therefore have not attempted this task, w h i c h will be addressed in international gatherings and publications that concentrate on detailed discussion of highly specialized social scientific research. We have emphasized those aspects of German sociology w h i c h indicate a continued interest in a fluid conception of the boundaries of sociology, a n d w h i c h avoid distinctions between sociology a n d social theory, social philosophy and social psychology. Our introductory essay is designed to m a k e a case for this approach by arguing that a very distinctive feature of German sociology in its entire history is the importance of theory as well as of the critique of contemporary society (especially of German society). Indeed, we argue that theory and critique belong together (parts 2 and 3), w h e n regarded f r o m this point of view. For theory and critique to become cogent,

X

however, they must be shown to be applicable either to a society in its special organizational forms, or to social scientific discourse. We have chosen Class, Bureaucracy and the State (part 4) as a domain of substantive application, and the relationship between Identity and Social Structure (part 5) as an instance of a more method-oriented application. Part 1 discusses the history of sociology prior to 1945 as well as the classics which have played a particularly important role in German sociology, and thus allows the reader to measure the achievements of contemporary German sociology and social theory, particularly in regard to its self-reflectiveness, against its own tradition. While jointly responsible for the book, the editors adopted the following division of labor: Volker Meja substantially revised the introductions and several of the essays in this collection before editing the entire manuscript; Dieter Misgeld provided the basic draft of the general introduction and of the introductions to parts 2, 3, and 4; Nico Stehr wrote a first draft of the introductions to parts 1 and 4 and contributed to the critical apparatus for the general introduction. Translators' and major editors' contributions to the translations are acknowledged on the first page of each article. The suggestions of Judith Adler, Michal Y. Bodemann, David Kettler, Raymond Morrow, Gianfranco Poggi, Kurt H. Wolff, as well as those of a number of German scholars, including several contributors to our book, were often very helpful. Without Laura C. Hargrave's admirable textprocessing and typesetting skills and her competent advice in a number of editorial matters this book would have been completed much later. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada), the Memorial University of Newfoundland, the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, the University of Alberta, and the University of Munich. Volker Meja Memorial University of Newfoundland

Dieter Misgeld Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and University of Toronto

Nico Stehr University of Alberta

Introduction The Social and Intellectual Organization of German Sociology Since 1945 Continuity, the ability to establish and reproduce an identity across historical and social existence, helps individuals and societies ground their activities in a secure image of themselves. In some sense, this also applies to intellectual disciplines and to the professions. But what happens when there is a serious upheaval, a profound disruption of continuity, when it becomes highly problematic, even impossible, to take direction from the past? Certainly such a state of affairs, whether on the personal or societal level, deserves to be called a "crisis." And crises can be resolved productively or creatively, but they may also lead to disintegration. 1 The years from 1933 to 1945 constitute such a watershed for German society and for German sociology. Following the experiences of collapse, defeat, division, and slow rebuilding, the consciousness emerged during the years immediately after the end of World War II that nothing would ever again be as it once had been.2 Like all other academic disciplines, German sociology too had once openly articulated its commitments to national German traditions and culture. This commitment is shared by sociologists otherwise as different as Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Scheler, Hans Freyer, and Arnold Gehlen.3 But like other national cultures of Western Europe, Germany too had harbored intellectuals of a more cosmopolitan persuasion, especially in the social sciences, who had an uneasy relation to national traditions. Sociologists such as Karl Mannheim and Theodor Geiger, or social philosophers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, for example, built on traditions of thought highly prominent in the sphere of influence of German language and culture. But they also expressed their opposition to traditions of German nationalism in the clearest terms and often continued to do so even after World War II. The rise of National Socialism, the policies of brutal repression and genocide connected with Nazi rule, and the total defeat of German military power combined to produce a cultural and moral crisis of such profundity that every step in the postwar reconstruction of German culture could only be uncertain. And how much deeper had this

2

INTRODUCTION

uncertainty to be in the case of an intellectual field such as sociology, which even in the 1920s had barely succeeded in establishing itself as a recognized academic discipline; which only shortly thereafter, in 1933, had in fact for the most part been dissolved; and which had to realize that many of those intellectual conceptions which had informed it in the period of its initial consolidation had n o w fallen into disrepute. 4 One only needs to recall that most leading representatives of the field had been forced into emigration, and that after 1945 there were overt pressures f r o m the Western allies and their administrations to thoroughly reconstitute sociology on the basis of a ground plan quite u n f a miliar to the older practitioners of the discipline. 5 In sum, the reconstitution of German sociology during the first years after the war occurred in the face of considerable external and internal pressures. 6 One might be tempted to think that this situation would have led to a crisis of conscience and confidence, and to a f u n damental change of direction in German sociology. For sociology, after all, was a field to which a number of those returned w h o had been forced into exile (including Helmuth Plessner, René König, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and, very late, Norbert Elias).7 And sociologists w h o had stayed in Germany f r o m 1933 to 1945, and w h o had initially either actively supported National Socialism (Arnold Gehlen), or w h o had remained quiescent (Hans Freyer, Helmut Schelsky), might have felt compelled to explain their involvement in or lack of active opposition to morally and intellectually deeply discrediting events. But such a crisis of conscience and the possible renewal did not take place, at least not immediately. There were no major apologies or self-reflective analyses by those w h o had stayed in Germany during the period of National Socialism. Instead of the crisis of disciplinary conscience there prevailed mostly silence. And precisely this silence was later to become a topic of considerable criticism, especially among new generations of sociologists. Yet it must also be pointed out that since the mid-fifties 8 more empirical sociological studies have been produced in Germany than in its entire previous history and that sociology is n o w a well-established field in post-secondary institutions, and that there is a strong presence of German sociologists in international organizations. 9 In fact, West Germany is one of the very f e w countries in which sociology has a strong public presence, a developed profile as a discipline, and considerable influence on political discourse and decisions. Nonetheless, questions have frequently been raised not merely about the distinctive character of sociology as practiced in Germany, but also about the

G E R M A N SOCIOLOGY SINCE 1945

3

possibility and significance of sociology itself, including questions about the distinctive contribution of sociology in Germany and about its international merits. This situation leads us to a few preliminary observations about sociology in Germany: 1) German sociology in the postwar period has persistently monitored and evaluated its o w n development by reference to the development of sociology elsewhere. Instead of focusing on its o w n traditions, or on the general cultural traditions f r o m which it was derived, German sociology has treated American sociology in particular (see, as an example, essay 20), and to a lesser extent other sociologies, as a vantage point f r o m which to assess itself and its place in German society, and f r o m which to reappraise its relation to the foundational period of the discipline (see essays 4 and 5). This self-critical reflection, however, has had the consequence that comprehensive questions about society, which sociology had once raised in the period of its formation, once again resurfaced. In this case, they were applied to sociology itself (see essays 4, 6, and 10). But this also led to a vigorous reexamination of the place of sociology in German society, which had seemed quite secure in the period of its consolidation prior to 1967. Indeed, the role of sociology in society and culture became a focus for a debate which often reached beyond the discipline. 10 2) The distinguishing feature of contemporary sociology in Germany, then, is the intensity and persistence of its critical self-reflection and the fact that especially the most visible members of the discipline, for example Habermas and Luhmann, tend to engage in such self-reflective discourse. Self-criticalness, as we have k n o w n since Freud, can take the f o r m of inhibiting self-doubt and scrupulousness, of an obsessive preoccupation with oneself. This also is one of the characteristics of German sociology, which seems to indicate a lack of confidence of its practitioners in their ability to advance the discipline, and to confidently face future directions. Self-criticalness has also a n other side: Precisely because German sociology has never taken for granted its o w n legitimacy, orderly progress, and social efficacy, it has found it possible (and necessary) to raise questions about its o w n significance as a phenomenon of intellectual and political culture, and about its o w n location in the societal process. Is sociology, for example, an instrument of political and administrative domination, an aspect of cultural hegemony, or can it contribute to greater societal rationality?" One may note, therefore, that German sociology once again raises the issue of societal rationalization and modernity, thereby returning in

4

INTRODUCTION

one sense to its origins in the thought of Karl Marx and Max Weber (see essays 3 and 14).12 We therefore suggest: 3) that if there is something distinctive about contemporary German sociology, it is precisely its consciousness of societal crisis; and in this sense, contemporary German sociology has come full circle, being now once again firmly linked to the best sociology had to offer in its early period up to the Weimar Republic. One may even say that in Germany sociology is the science of crisis par excellence. It engages in the diagnosis of its time.13 The crisis consciousness of German sociology is of course linked to the attempt to understand the crisis of German society in the wake of Nazism, but sociology attains insight also into a possible general crisis of "postindustrial" or "late capitalist" societies. This deeper sense of societal crisis, too, underlies the major methodological debates14 with which much of postwar German sociology is internationally identified. But is there a German sociology in the first place? And how can it be distinguished from "sociology in Germany"? How can it further be distinguished from philosophy, social philosophy, economic history? As is also the case with the founders of sociology in France, Italy, the United States, and elsewhere, the early German sociologists came originally from other fields, especially philosophy or economics, history or law. Moreover, even among later generations of sociologists some continued writing nonsociological works or returned to them (including Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schelsky, and, of course, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jiirgen Habermas). They produced essays and books intended also for broader audiences — not necessarily in order to popularize sociology, but in order to address the significant issues of the day, both as sociologists and as intellectuals who believed they possessed the general intellectual capability, as well as the moral obligation, to speak to such issues. This attitude has remained unchanged from Max Weber to the conservatives Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schelsky, and Friedrich H. Tenbruck, from the politically engaged liberal Ralf Dahrendorf to the left-wing intellectuals of the Frankfurt School. It also characterizes the philosophers of social science associated with "critical rationalism" (Hans Albert, Ernst Topitsch) who have translated "critical rationalism" into a form of "Ideologiekritik," for which there is no parallel among members of Karl Popper's followers in other countries. The widespread participation of sociologists in public debates and disputes, which continues to this very day, indicates not only a particular and widely shared self-con-

G E R M A N SOCIOLOGY SINCE 1945

5

ception of sociologists as sociologists but also a receptivity to and an audience for sociological ideas and sociologically informed opinion which is considerably broader than in m a n y English-speaking countries." One must also note that sociology frequently has been taught, even in the postwar period, under the aegis of other disciplines (such as Wirtschaftswissenschaft or Staatswissenschaft), or in special educational institutes (for example, the Wirtschaftshochschule in Hamburg), or separate teaching and research institutes or faculties (which later became universities, such as the Wirtschaftshochschule in Mannheim), which were either distinct f r o m or not fully integrated into the classical university structure as conceived initially by Wilhelm von Humboldt. 1 6 Finally, German sociologists have given much attention to such questions as the professionalization of sociology, possible career paths for sociologists, and sociology's task within practical training below the level of post-secondary education. 17 However, the issue of professionalization is approached in German sociology not as a mere technical question: It is not just asked h o w obstacles to secure well-defined career-patterns for trained sociologists can be removed. On the contrary, professionalization itself is at issue. In particular the cult of specialization (Spezialistentum) is deplored as an intellectual and moral aberration f r o m a more broadly based cultural and social awareness (e.g. essay 4) the growing intellectual division of labor is regarded as a violation of a more principled commitment to the theoretical and critical comprehension of the society as a whole, a task which cannot be accomplished by sociology alone (e.g. essay 10). What, then, are the particular features of sociology as practiced in Germany? Much of postwar German sociology has not been essentially different in either method or theory f r o m other sociologies. This applies, for example, in particular to a vast body of empirical research in industrial sociology and to the study of public administration, of organizations, 18 class relations and social inequality, of public opinion research, and so on. There are differences in emphasis, to be sure, distinctive modifications and critiques of research practices followed by quantitative sociologists. Yet as late as 1959 Ralf Dahrendorf could claim that "foreign sociologists do not even open the publications of German sociologists with the expectation to find something which contributes to problems which matter to them." 19 The empirical social research carried out during the "consolidation" phase of West German sociology indeed is a kind of mainstream sociology. 20 It proved to be the basis of professional legitimation for that

6

INTRODUCTION

generation of sociologists w h i c h f o l l o w e d most directly the small group of G e r m a n sociologists w h o h a d been crucial in reestablishing the discipline in the 1950s a n d 1960s. The social research d u r i n g the emergence of the welfare state also is a reflection of the distinct sociopolitical climate of the time, in particular the broad consensus o n social, political, a n d economic matters in the era of reconstruction a n d therefore not merely the outcome of a n A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n of G e r m a n sociology. However, the situation has changed substantially since the late fifties. A u t h o r s such as A d o r n o a n d H o r k h e i m e r , Dahrendorf a n d Habermas, but also scholars of quite d i f f e r e n t theoretical orientations, such as T h o m a s L u c k m a n n , Norbert Elias, a n d , m o r e recently, Niklas L u h m a n n , Claus Offe, a n d W o l f g a n g Schluchter, are widely read abroad. Even A r n o l d Gehlen, a n austere f i g u r e of deeply conservative inclination, w h o s e t h o u g h t r u n s counter to the liberal traditions of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n a n d French social t h o u g h t , has received attention. 2 1 But often these writers are not read as sociologists, certainly not as "mainstream" sociologists, w i t h the exception of Dahrendorf a n d perhaps L u c k m a n n a n d , increasingly, L u h m a n n . They are perceived as philosophers or social a n d political theorists, 2 2 a n d therefore as concerned w i t h the ethical, philosophical, a n d methodological f o u n d a tions of social science, or they are seen as philosophical a n t h r o pologists. T h u s it becomes quite evident that D a h r e n d o r f ' s verdict is n o w dated. W h a t to Dahrendorf, René Konig, a n d others has appeared as a f o r m of provincialism, is not merely a consequence of the collapse a n d destruction of d o m i n a n t G e r m a n traditions prior to 1933 a n d of the separation of G e r m a n sociology a n d cultural life at large f r o m other Western societies in the Nazi period; it m a y also be the result of resistance to "Americanization," as Schelsky, f o r example, argues, 2 3 that is, a refusal to c o n f o r m to developments not merely in sociology but in A m e r i c a n society as a whole. Evidently, then, Schelsky continues to speak as a m e m b e r of a n older generation shocked by the successive w a v e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n (interpreted as Americanization) penetrating G e r m a n social life. But the more f u n d a m e n t a l issue of the relation of G e r m a n sociology to G e r m a n society has not vanished. It is t a k e n u p as a sociological critique of G e r m a n society, in w h i c h sociology becomes a f o r m of cultural criticism or, less directly, a critical reflection u p o n the developmental a n d rationalization potential of advanced industrial or late capitalist societies in general.

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Moreover, in the m e a n t i m e it has been possible f o r G e r m a n sociologists to d e v e l o p further w h a t they h a v e partly assimilated f r o m abroad. Niklas L u h m a n n , perhaps the most p r o m i n e n t sociologist (in a professionally restricted sense) in G e r m a n y at present, has refined Parsons' structural f u n c t i o n a l i s m a n d social systems theory into w h a t L u h m a n n himself calls "functionalist structuralism," a n d has m a d e it a f o r m a l l y more consistent theory. 2 4 Jiirgen Habermas has achieved a u n i q u e synthesis of philosophical analysis, social theory, and sociology by e m p l o y i n g a n d reorganizing materials p r i m a r i l y f r o m English-speaking countries. A n d Norbert Elias, w h o returned to G e r m a n y o n l y w h e n he w a s close to eighty years old, applies sociological, historical, a n d social psychological approaches to the theoretical and empirical study of long-term social processes. Ralf Dahrendorf's engaged liberalism, his c o m m i t m e n t to sociology as "applied e n l i g h t enment," f i n a l l y , suggests a greater degree of political e n g a g e m e n t t h a n is characteristic of A m e r i c a n sociology. It also arises more clearly f r o m a sociological theory of society than such conceptions as K a r l Popper's "open society," on w h i c h Dahrendorf to some extent relies. If there clearly are achievements, then, w h i c h are of major international significance, it is less clear to w h a t extent these are the result of a particular sensitivity to, or i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h , the peculiarities of the present G e r m a n situation, a l t h o u g h they are u n d o u b t e d l y l i n k e d to intellectual concerns deeply rooted in the G e r m a n tradition. N e w Forms of Rationalization: T h e "Conservative" Tradition The theme of rationalization, w h i c h Weber had introduced into sociology, constitutes one of the central a n d u n i q u e theories of c o n t e m porary G e r m a n sociology. It is connected w i t h a n o n g o i n g reflection a m o n g sociologists of different political a n d philosophical orientations on the societal consequences of technology and science as the disting u i s h i n g forces of a n e w social order. But because M a x Weber's theory of capitalist rationalization, w h i c h plays such a p r o m i n e n t role in Jiirgen Habermas' The Theory of Communicative Action, had a rather indirect i n f l u e n c e in G e r m a n sociology prior to the publication of Habermas' recent w o r k a n d of W o l f g a n g Schluchter's i n f l u e n t i a l studies of M a x Weber's sociology, u p o n w h i c h Habermas also relies, 25 its i n f l u e n c e manifested itself m a i n l y in the context of discussions c o n c e r n i n g the contribution of sociology to c o m p r e h e n s i v e theories of society. This is indeed the k i n d of sociology f o r e i g n observers expect f r o m G e r m a n sociologists, at least

8

INTRODUCTION

those observers w h o regard G e r m a n culture as deeply steeped i n Hegelian philosophy a n d historicism, a n d w h o assume that philosophies such as p h e n o m e n o l o g y , hermeneutic phenomenology (Heidegger), hermeneutics, a n d even critical social theory all carry f o r w a r d motifs f r o m this tradition. The d o m i n a n t figures in G e r m a n social t h o u g h t all s h o w a definite awareness of these cultural a n d philosophical origins. A n d they f r e quently interpret the t h e m e of "occidental" rationalism in this light. A r n o l d Gehlen, f o r example, singles out the t h e m e of "cultural crystallization," a term by w h i c h he w a n t s to designate "the state of affairs in a given realm of culture that occurs as soon as all the f u n d a m e n t a l potentialities contained w i t h i n it h a v e been developed" (essay 9). As a result, changes "in the premises" a n d in "basic views" become increasingly unlikely. This is true, according to Gehlen, f o r the period w h i c h began in the late n i n e t e e n t h century, after M a r x a n d Nietzsche, w i t h the f o r m a t i o n of the specialized social sciences, i n c l u d i n g sociology, a n d of specialized technologies, w i t h their consequent division of society into experts a n d l a y m e n . Helmut Schelsky m a k e s a s o m e w h a t similar point: "We produce scientific civilization not merely in the f o r m of technology [Technik], We also produce it perpetually a n d by necessity in a m u c h m o r e c o m prehensive sense as society a n d as soul [Seele]." A n d , he adds, "Man as a social being a n d as possessor of a soul has himself become a product of technological a n d scientific production." 2 6 Technological civilization carries this process f o r w a r d w i t h o u t regard or concern f o r traditional ideologies, a n d t r a n s f o r m s democracy in such a w a y "that the old f o r m s of d o m i n a n c e [Herrschaftsformen] are left b e h i n d like e m p t y husks." 27 A n d even w h e r e possible routes of escape, resignation, a n d opposition to this "iron cage" are m a p p e d out, w h e r e it is recognized that only ever renewed reflection can stimulate the necessary inquiries into the m e a n i n g of this process itself, does a spirit of amor fati in the tradition of Nietzsche prevail in the end, just as in the case of Weber. This m a y also be expressed i n Arnold Gehlen's characteristic terseness, that n o w a d a y s philosophers m i g h t as well heed a piece of practical a d vice a n d become engineers. Here one is reminded of the G e r m a n conservative writer Ernst Jünger, w h o m a n y decades ago wrote Der Arbeiter,211 w h i c h celebrated the industrial w o r k e r as the e p o c h - m a k i n g prototype of h u m a n a d a p tation to the n e w age of technological d o m i n a n c e . The w o r k e r a n d the m o d e r n engineer were celebrated since they lived the n e w ethos of technological mastery. This ethos w a s regarded as the one Nietzsche

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had praised as well as feared, but which he had anticipated as the only general cultural attitude adequate to the n e w conditions of civilization after the demise of Christianity and of traditional aristocratic culture. 29 Jünger, Gehlen, and Heidegger, it should be recalled, were opinion leaders. They were also conscious of the fact that they had been deeply implicated in the brief history of National Socialism. However, they neither repented nor apologized, but instead merely admitted to an "error": German Fascism, they claimed, was after all not the final a n d definitive realization of the will to gain conscious control of technological rationalization. It was rather a cataclysmic and deeply destructive consequence of the inescapable process of rationalization, living out its fate in blindness, confusion, and complete moral a n d political anarchy. Authors such as Gehlen, Heidegger, and Jünger (of w h o m only Gehlen is close to sociology, although the others influenced it) do not regard the Nazi era as a refutation of their interpretations of the fate of modernity (of Western rationalization). They rather regard it as a confirmation. In their o w n view, they were w r o n g in their initial positive response to National Socialism, not so m u c h because they erred morally, but because in a historical field in w h i c h morality, as Nietzsche insisted, can no longer provide guidance, they had erred intellectually: They had not only failed to realize that the n e w technological order could establish itself without resorting to brute physical force after all, but had also failed to correctly diagnose the historical trend toward refined systems of technological d o m i n a t i o n a n d control which can, on the whole, do without open use of brute force. 30 It is important to recognize that figures such as Gehlen in social theory and philosophical anthropology, 3 1 Heidegger in philosophy, a n d Jünger in literature, all belong to a generation which reached intellectual maturity in the 1920s. The case of someone like Helmut Schelsky in a more recent generation, however, is different. Although Schelsky builds on Gehlen, his work shows a more pragmatic, more political, less heroic, and more h u m a n e concern with the n e w f o r m s of domination, which he himself described as "instruction, supervision, and planning" (Belehrung, Betreuung, Beplanung).32 This is not to say that Schelsky is not old-fashioned enough to seek salvation in metaphysical terms: for he assigns to sociology the task of attempting an answer to the question of "how metaphysical positions are possible at all in a scientific civilization." 33 But he also recognizes that "depoliticization" and the dissolution of democracy are actual dangers a n d that the technical spirit of science must be transcended, not by relying on philoso-

10

INTRODUCTION

p h y or Weltanschauung, but f r o m w i t h i n the sciences themselves. 3 4 N o n e of this is altogether clear or i m m e d i a t e l y practicable since S c h e l s k y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s r e m a i n hesitant a n d h a p h a z a r d . 3 5 T h e relations b e t w e e n science a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n , the question of scientific e d u c a t i o n (Bildung), or the issue of the limits to the scientization of social practice h a v e , f o r e x a m p l e , been grasped m u c h m o r e clearly by Jiirgen H a b e r m a s in his n u m e r o u s papers o n these topics, as w e l l as in his m o r e systematic w o r k s . T h i s a p p l i e s e v e n m o r e to the issues of d e m o c r a c y (democratization) a n d d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n . E v e n s o m e o n e like A d o r n o w a s m o r e specific t h a n S c h e l s k y at times, f o r e x a m p l e w h e n r e c o m m e n d i n g w a y s to counteract the increase in u n c o n scious b e h a v i o r associated w i t h the systems of technological m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d estrangement. T h i s is, of course, e v e n m o r e c h a r a c teristic of the y o u n g e r sociologists a n d c u l t u r a l critics, o f t e n i n f l u e n c e d by A d o r n o a n d Habermas, especially i n s o f a r as they b e l o n g to the radically democratic, M a r x i s a n t left (see essays 12, 13, a n d 15). A n d it cert a i n l y h o l d s f o r Ralf D a h r e n d o r f ' s f r e q u e n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to political debate in the Federal Republic. N i k l a s L u h m a n n also b e l o n g s to the c o n s e r v a t i v e tradition a l t h o u g h in quite a d i f f e r e n t sense. 36 A n d , of course, h e p r i m a r i l y is a sociologist, not a c u l t u r a l or social critic, or a p h i l o s o p h e r or social t h i n k e r . But L u h m a n n is n o t just a sociologist either. M o s t of all, he is a sociological theorist, a n d as s u c h also a sociologist of s o c i o l o g y a n d of social theory. A sociology of s o c i o l o g y is central to his s o c i o l o g y . A l l his sociological i n v e s t i g a t i o n s are a c c o m p a n i e d by systematic reflection o n the status of the o b s e r v a t i o n s m a d e , o n the reasons w h y t h e y c a n be properly called sociological. One m i g h t say that i n s o f a r as societies are systems w h i c h reduce c o m p l e x i t y , by e n g a g i n g i n i n c r e a s i n g l y risk-burdened, s y s t e m - d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g actions, s o c i o l o g y has a central place i n the societal s u b s y s t e m of science. For s o c i o l o g y c o n s c i o u s l y represents the v e r y process of societal s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . It is the subsystem w h i c h theoretically articulates the process i n w h i c h subsystems are f o r m e d . I n s o f a r as it c a n take a n a c t i o n - g u i d i n g role, it c a n contribute to the process of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n by m a k i n g societal subsystems m o r e conscious a n d m o r e a w a r e of a l t e r n a t i v e possibilities, for example by i n t r o d u c i n g a d d i t i o n a l specifications, system d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of action systems. T h e c o n s e r v a t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e is b r o u g h t h o m e i n s o f a r as L u h m a n n (just like his predecessors A r n o l d G e h l e n a n d H e l m u t S c h e l s k y ) v i e w s the process of technical r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g n o r m a t i v e aspects, traditional values, or general p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l

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standards. But in contrast to Gehlen a n d Schelsky, L u h m a n n n o longer relies o n Nietzsche. Nor is there a n attempt to explore the f u t u r e by calling u p o n a pretechnological, preindustrial past a p p a r e n t l y richer in cultural possibilities (as Gehlen does). L u h m a n n is u n a b a s h e d l y m o d ern a n d contemporary, but not w i t h o u t a consciousness of history. In this he is comparable to his intellectual o p p o n e n t J ü r g e n Habermas, w h o is perhaps, a n d paradoxically, the o n l y real theorist of liberal democracy G e r m a n y has k n o w n in the t w e n t i e t h century. L u h m a n n makes n o concessions to conservative doubts about the process of rationalization. He liberates the legacy of G e r m a n conservatism in sociology f r o m its conservative ideology by unreservedly accepting the rationalizing potential of technology a n d science, a n d by i n t r o d u c i n g a f o r m of sociological consciousness to the process w h i c h he regards as adequate to it. But L u h m a n n ' s contribution reaches beyond the mere transf o r m a t i o n of a conservative legacy. M a n y of his investigations begin w i t h the contrast between the classical traditions of European social t h o u g h t reaching f r o m Plato a n d Aristotle to the n i n e t e e n t h century, a n d sociology itself as the theory of social systems. The older tradition placed concepts such as philia (friendship) a n d justice or koinonia (comm u n i t y , Gemeinschaft) at its centre. This tradition based its concept of society o n these notions, t h u s giving primacy to political society. It therefore m a d e the "political contingency of 'the good life' a p r i m a r y issue," as L u h m a n n says, rather t h a n the "social contingency of the world." 3 7 W i t h sociology as the theory of social systems, the social contingency of the w o r l d rather t h a n the political contingency of the ethically defined good life becomes the p r i m a r y issue. Political society can n o longer be the g u i d i n g system of society, n o r can concrete a n d substantive concepts such as values, goals, needs, a n d interests r e m a i n at the center of social theory. Sociology becomes radically functionalist. It inquires into the social f u n c t i o n of a n y structure, t h u s analyzing abstract m e c h a n i s m s f o r the generalization of values, beliefs, a n d attitudes, w h i c h give priority to their change. A n y direct reference to h u m a n n a t u r e or a n y other stable n o r m a t i v e conception is eliminated. The only criterion d e f i n i n g the increasing rationalization of society is that of a n increasing f u n c t i o n a l differentiation of society, i.e., the generation of m e c h a n i s m s " w h i c h h a v e to be m o r e abstract a n d m o r e situationally specific at the same time." 38 Clearly, L u h m a n n in the end has m u c h more in c o m m o n w i t h his teacher Parsons t h a n w i t h a n y G e r m a n sociologist. It is also a p p a r ent that social evolution f o r L u h m a n n is a directional process, to

12

INTRODUCTION

choose a formulation which the later Parsons employs in making reference to Weber. At the same time, one cannot fail to notice that societal rationalization is described by L u h m a n n much less in terms of an evolving "societal community" or as a "company of equals" than is true for Parsons. There is less emphasis in L u h m a n n on principles such as egalitarianism and rights or values, and hardly any emphasis at all on the "development of modern institutions of citizenship" 39 as a basis of social solidarity. In a sense L u h m a n n seems to read Gehlen's philosophical anthropology into Parsons' systems theory of modern societies. Gehlen regards philosophical anthropology, concerned as it is with the relation between institutions and instinctual m a k e u p of h u m a n beings, as foundational for sociology. He observes: "How is it that m a n achieves predictable, regular conduct . . . in the face of his openness to the world [Weltoffenheit], his instinctual deficiency, his plasticity and instability. . .? Raising this question amounts to posing the problem of institutions." H u m a n groups, Gehlen maintains, are kept together by "habits of thought, emotion, valuing and action, which solidify themselves in them and become automatic." 40 Like Gehlen, L u h m a n n thinks in terms of such "openness to the world," and he views the relation between h u m a n groups and environments as burdened by risks and uncertainty. But he does not seek to ground these claims in anthropological assumptions. Rather, for Luhmann those social mechanisms which ensure the stability of social action are central, even if in modern societies this stability can be found only in the increasing replaceability of one structural arrangement by another. L u h m a n n thus exorcises Gehlen's respect for the past (with its admiration for what Gehlen views as rigid, yet admirable institutional structures of primitive societies, and its disdain for the apparently arbitrary organization of the most advanced modern societies) and subordinates it to the future-oriented emphasis on modernization which is also typical of Talcott Parsons. Yet there remain common conceptions between Gehlen and Luhmann, in particular their shared notions of values and norms, a similar indifference to declarations of principles for political democracy, a similar preference for those institutions of the modern state which require professional qualifications and dedication to organizational goals as a criterion of membership, rather than electoral success. Further analysis of Luhmann's work cannot be provided here. But it is worth noting that the peculiarly German element in Luhmann's theory is perhaps the need to derive the system of society f r o m a f u n -

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damental relationship to the world as such, and to see questions of democratic values and norms as secondary to such issues as gains in power, mastery, flexibility, and competence, which are perceived as the real evolutionary gains for modern societies. So far we have described the conservative stream of German sociology. We have identified a concept of social theory and sociology which primarily exists in this form in Germany. But this is not to say that it is the dominant form of sociology and social theory in Germany. However, it does link contemporary German sociology to the ideological currents which precede and postdate the period of National Socialism. It represents a continuity of thought which is elsewhere difficult to find, a current of thought which once was deeply nationalistic and aristocratic, in Nietzsche's sense, even hostile, as in Gehlen's case, to pluralist democracy and to the rise of the intellectual and cultural critic as a figure of public influence. This current of thought is antagonistic as well to a concern with values or, following Nietzsche, it often prefers strength and institutional and national loyalty, in short, values of the counter-Enlightenment. It must be stated clearly, however, that with Luhmann this tradition has been transcended. Luhmann is immune to general ideological considerations, by virtue of his introducing a radicalized Parsonian framework into German sociology. Flexibility takes precedence over rigidity, and international culture and a global society take precedence over narrow conceptions of German culture and the German national state. We have discussed the "conservative" current of German sociology in detail in order to direct attention to what can be seen as the "deep structure" of German sociology. Readers will notice, for example, that only Kurt Lenk's comprehensive paper (essay 2) addresses similar considerations. Other contemporary historians of German sociology have been much more concerned to identify the detailed complexities of the classical theorists. They can be read as partial correctives to more comprehensive perspectives, such as the one we have proposed so far. We have already mentioned that a figure such as Ralf Dahrendorf definitely stands apart from the currents considered so far. If anything, Dahrendorf, in his commitment to a thoroughgoing liberalism of a humanist persuasion, radicalizes certain social and political commitments of distinctly British liberal traditions. This is perhaps the result of Dahrendorf's intent to remedy the suppression of Enlightenment traditions in Germany, in the hope of thus identifying the humanizing potentials of sociology as "applied enlightenment." Thus Dahrendorf is not merely an advocate of modernization in its value-free sense. In his

14

INTRODUCTION

book Life Chances, he uses sociology for the articulation of definite value commitments, such as the balance between the values of "equality of opportunity" and the securing of communal bonds (ligatures), thereby clarifying the notion of life-chances. 41 He expresses a certain skepticism toward unbridled modernization, which Habermas seems to share, but L u h m a n n would tend to dismiss. There also is, of course, a great deal of German sociology which has nothing in common with all this, especially in the various specialized fields of sociology, such as the sociology of industrial organization, of work, of social inequality, of public administration, of leisure (Bindestrichsoziologien, as German sociologists call them), of which it is hard to say h o w they differ, if at all, f r o m work in these fields done in other parts of the world. And there are developments such as phenomenology which, although they began in Germany, have in the recent past been more influential abroad than in postwar Germany and which have sometimes returned to Germany after they had been successful, and of course transformed, in the United States.42

New Forms of Rationalization: The "Critical" Tradition Our discussion has so far been primarily organized around the conflict between counter-Enlightenment and Enlightenment traditions. We have also emphasized developments in sociology which see in it more than a specialized social science, and we have emphasized its affinity to social philosophy and political thought, thus singling out certain features of sociology in Germany which have always been regarded as its special trademark. We therefore n o w turn to the Frankfurt School, or critical theory, as a development in social theory and sociology which has received more national and international attention than any other school of German sociology. 43 The members of the Frankfurt School must be regarded as opponents of the counter-Enlightenment traditions in Germ a n social thought. Without their influence neither Marx's work nor psychoanalysis would have been reintroduced as systematically and thoroughly into recent German sociology as has in fact happened f r o m the mid-1960s onward. Several of our selections represent these trends (see the contributions by Adorno, Habermas, Offe, Eder, Negt, Dahmer, and Oevermann). The recent discussions of the development of contemporary German sociology all acknowledge the influence of the Frankfurt School. Yet critical theory is nevertheless often regarded as a mixed blessing at best. Professional sociologists committed to sociology

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as a social science discipline frequently regard the methodological debates provoked by critical theory as sterile or as much too philosophical. This attitude is quite compatible with König's emphasis upon sociology as "nothing but sociology/ but not with the orientation of Schelsky or Gehlen, for example. Luhmann has usually ignored critical theory altogether, except, of course, for his well-known debate with Habermas, in which he appears to have participated more reluctantly than his opponent. Others have complained vigorously about the "negative image" critical theory has conferred upon sociology as a whole. It is said, for example, that the Frankfurt School unduly politicized German social science students of the late 1960s, thus alarming the public in general and employers in particular. Its emphasis upon theory and a critical attitude as a procedure of philosophical reflection is said to have distracted from sociology proper and from its necessary cognitive and institutional development toward professionalization, and turned sociology itself into a form of cultural and social criticism. Yet the Frankfurt School has successfully affected philosophical discourse in Germany and has had considerable impact in various fields, from psychology (and psychoanalysis) to political science, literary and art criticism, media studies, etc. This influence has occurred in two broad phases. The first phase is mostly associated with Theodor W. Adorno's enormous influence as a teacher and author, especially in the 1960s and until his death in 1969. Adorno drew the attention of intellectuals to the importance of the social sciences. His analyses ranged from those on Marx, psychoanalysis, research on industrial society, and studies of the formation of public opinion to critical examinations of the methods of empirical social science, cultural alienation and prejudice, and the effect of the Hitler period on German cultural consciousness.44 The second phase is largely linked to Jürgen Habermas' work, which is concerned with a reformulation of critical theory as a comprehensive theory of society. Habermas has systematically broken through a variety of barriers characteristic of conservative sociology and social thought in Germany as well as of the older tradition of the Frankfurt School. Together with Karl-Otto Apel and others he pioneered a critical reading of Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Searle, as well as of G.H. Mead and Talcott Parsons. More recently, he has brought within his compass the tradition of cognitive psychology from Piaget to Kohlberg, which led to new approaches in socialization theory (see essays 8 and 21 ).45 Habermas has also contributed to a renewal of inter-

16

INTRODUCTION

est in interpretive orientations in sociology, of both German and non-German origin, f r o m phenomenology and hermeneutics to ethnomethodology. In addition, there is the continuous reexamination of the classics, f r o m Marx to Freud and Weber, f r o m Mead and Durkheim to Parsons. Most recently, even Lukacs, Horkheimer, and Adorno have been placed among those classics w h o still deserve to be heard, but whose limitations must also be recognized. Several of the younger authors in our collection have worked with Habermas (Offe, Eder, Negt, Oevermann) and either been influenced by him or have been his collaborators. Habermas has also had a close working relationship with such psychoanalytic writers as Mitscherlich (essay 19), Lorenzer, 46 and Dahmer (essay 18). Our selections testify to at least one major consequence of this unique network of influence: Critical theory has become much less speculative today than it was in the generation of its founders. Both Offe and Eder, for example, treat their general theoretical frameworks as open to question, as in need of empirical, especially historical, confirmation. They have put considerable effort into the analytical clarification of theoretical concepts and have thereby moved away f r o m Horkheimer's and Adorno's Hegelian notions of conceptual knowledge. They no longer refer, for example, to knowledge of the society in its totality, as Adorno did in his essay "Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?" (essay 10). The same methodological and metatheoretical sophistication is also practiced by such psychoanalytically oriented authors as Alfred Lorenzer, and it is characteristic of the work of Helmut Dahmer as well. And even Alexander Mitscherlich, a generation older than Habermas, employed psychoanalysis more cautiously for purposes of social criticism than was ever true for Adorno. Marxists, such as Alfred Schmidt 47 or Oskar Negt (essay 12), w h o are closer to the early Horkheimer (Schmidt) or Adorno (Negt) than to Habermas, are clearly more concerned in their analyses with historical detail and with precise periodization, for example, of German social and political history. What is, broadly speaking, the position of the Frankfurt School on rationalization? And can its contribution to sociology and social thought be designed as a German contribution to sociology? One answer we can rule out in advance: that the Frankfurt School is "German" in the strict sense of committing itself to a specific national tradition. Its very intention is cosmopolitan, its style and attitude urbane, not merely reflecting German and Austrian but also French cultural sophistication (Adorno) and, at least since Habermas, it is influenced by

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Anglo-American philosophy and sociology as well. For Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas (not to speak of Marcuse), having been born, grown up, and worked in Germany or Austria meant little more than it meant to Karl Marx or Sigmund Freud. But what does this analogy to Marx (and Freud) suggest? German society, German cultural developments and attitudes, are a favored object of criticism f r o m the vantage point of a critique committed to social and political emancipation. In this sense, Horkheimer, Adorno, and also Habermas are radical Enlightenment theorists for w h o m emancipation always also means emancipation f r o m national and nationalistic preoccupations and prejudices, f r o m cultural provincialism and isolation. Germany is a favored object of criticism for the members of the Frankfurt School because Germany's fate also throws light upon the possible universal fate of all societies, namely the transformation of capitalist rationalization into a universal system of reification. The social thought of the Frankfurt School is significant for sociology in that it proposes to place the concept of a societal totality at the very center of sociological analysis. Adorno, for example, argues that empirical investigations must be linked with central theoretical questions. The system of society must be placed ahead of the procedures and facts of science, thus requiring of sociology that it f o r m a concept of the society and of the objectivity of social processes and structure. This has implications for the method of sociology. Sociological analysis has to become "immanent" analysis. Rather than letting the subject of social analysis be governed by the requirements of sociological methods, the methods themselves must be fashioned in a way adequate to the object. This entails an examination of the development of rationalization in terms of a dialectical theory still inspired by Marx. And here tension between the productive forces and the relations of production remains the issue. But this tension no longer points to a liberating resolution, because the dominance of the exchange of equivalents as a primarily economic mechanism of societal regulation has been transformed into a more universal form of authority relations: "industrial procedures and methods reach into the spheres of material production, administration and distribution, as well as into the sphere of 'culture.' They do so with economic necessity" (essay 10). Adorno's theory, then, is still located within a (broadly speaking) Marxist framework. However, it also lends support to those critics w h o find that Adorno's theory leaves unexamined the theory of surplus value, i.e., the central doctrine of "economist" Marxism and that it therefore constitutes a kind of hidden orthodoxy. This remains true.

18

INTRODUCTION

even t h o u g h Horkheimer's a n d A d o r n o ' s Dialectic of Enlightenment** h a d already generalized M a r x ' s conception of the reification of social relations (of c o m m o d i t y fetishism) into a critique of a p r e s u m a b l y u n i v e r sal a n d inescapable process of the reification of cultural consciousness, reaching f r o m Homeric Greece to the t w e n t i e t h century. Following Horkheimer, cultural studies based o n this conception h a v e been called "critiques of i n s t r u m e n t a l reason." Habermas, in his discussion of the dialectic of rationalization 4 9 characterizes these views as a construction a n d a retreat f r o m a m o r e broadly based a n d less speculative p r o g r a m of interdisciplinary research (essay 8). It is a retreat to the p h i l o s o p h y of history a n d t h u s f r o m sociology. He himself, in virtually all his publications since 1973, has attempted to reconstitute critical theory i n d e p e n d e n t l y f r o m "an objective teleology of history." 50 For h i m social theory becomes a v e h i cle f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n of far-reaching empirical hypotheses a n d of nontrivial — i.e., heuristically p o w e r f u l — conjectures about the potential f o r continued rationalization in c o n t e m p o r a r y societies a n d of possible crises brought about in this process w h i c h m u s t be creatively resolved. Habermas only employs p h i l o s o p h y in conjunction with sociological theory: The> rationality of social action a n d of societal rationalization processes are to be analyzed in their f u l l range. In his view, the reduction of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality to i n s t r u m e n t a l or purposive rationality (ZweckrationalitUt) m u s t be avoided. It comes as n o surprise, therefore, that Habermas has placed the tradition of critical theory squarely w i t h i n the context of the classical dispute o n the relation between M a r x a n d Weber (see essay 3), w h o are clearly the t w o leading figures of a specifically G e r m a n tradition i n sociology." N o w h e r e else has the history of sociology been so closely linked to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n of a n d the possible convergence between these t w o classical theorists.

Democracy and the History of Rationalization Habermas' interpretations of Weber a n d M a r x , w h i c h are based on his c o m m u n i c a t i o n theory of society, represent just o n e instance of the renewed interest in Weber a n d other classics of G e r m a n sociology, most notably a m o n g t h e m Georg Simmel. Other studies as well indicate a n interest either in Weber's theory of politics 52 or in Weber's studies of the history of Western rationalization, 5 3 w h i c h c a n n o t be separated, in contemporary West G e r m a n y , f r o m either a c o n f r o n t a tion w i t h M a r x ' s i n f l u e n c e or f r o m reflection o n democratic political processes. It is again Habermas w h o initially f o r m u l a t e d this constella-

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tion of questions. In Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Habermas began a review of the political tradition of Enlightenment social thought, which included Hegel and Marx, and he thus placed Marx squarely into the context of the development of liberal-democratic thought. 5 4 We find a similar concern for the fate of liberal democracy in Oskar Negt's "The Poverty of Bourgeois Democracy in Germany" (essay 12). While Habermas' historical studies are carried out primarily in order to gain insight into the conditions for the possibility of an increasing discursive (communicative) rationalization of social practice (which practically speaking, amounts to its democratization), Negt's essay is meant to remind a German public of a history in which liberal-democratic traditions were never fully realized. It is no coincidence that Negt has also contributed to studies of the public sphere, in his case with a strong emphasis on the possibility of a "proletarian" public." In both cases, however, sociology is integrated into a theory of politics and of publicly consequential communication. Many other sociologists, most prominently Luhmann, treat democracy as just one topic among others for sociology. Thus, there is an interest both in normative questions of democratic theory, to which sociological questions are subordinated, and in the organizational structures of democracies in general or those of the institutions of the Federal Republic in particular. We have also encountered Dahrendorfs intermediate position, which suggests the unique socially emancipatory function of sociology for democratic societies. Overall it can hardly be denied that German sociology has come a long way since 1945. Older positions, conservative or otherwise, committed to national cultural traditions or not, were based on a global theory of history and insisted that they themselves were exempt f r o m capitalist rationalization. 56 If one interprets either Gehlen's and Schelsky's, or Horkheimer's and Adorno's (as well as Marcuse's) theories as responses to Weber, they appear to be "progressive" transformations. For Weber's legacy was ambiguous: Capitalist rationalization was seen as simultaneously unavoidable and destructive. Many authors w h o have attempted to somehow resolve this ambivalent diagnosis were driven in the end to share Weber's attitude of stoic resignation or of impotent protest. In the meantime, a considerable body of sociology has developed in Germany in the "specialized sociologies," unencumbered by most of these problems, but influencing the generation of theorists which includes Dahrendorf, Habermas, and Luhmann. The younger German sociologists have also provided perceptive interpretations of the problems significant to the

20

INTRODUCTION

older generation, often by crossing barriers insurmountable for the latter. They no longer share the earlier pessimism, even if critical questions are asked about contemporary capitalism and state socialism, peace and war, science and society, the environment and industrial society, and about the future of democratic societies. The younger generation can discuss Marx and the history of Marxism, as well as the history of non-Marxist sociology and social theory, without being trapped by many of the past hostilities. We may therefore conclude that Enlightenment traditions of social thought have finally been accepted in Germany more thoroughly than ever before. They have become part of a reflection on the possibilities of further societal rationalization and of a searching reflection on the very meaning of this process. The crisis of the postwar period has led to a highly developed form of social and political self-reflection, and to a refinement in sociology of both foundational theory and questions of method. The resulting quest for a role of sociology (and of the social sciences in general) in the achievement of a rational society may constitute the most distinctive contribution of German sociology to the discipline at large. In this sense we may regard it as just as German as the works of Marx and Weber — and also as just as international. NOTES 1. It is i m p o r t a n t to p o i n t o u t t h a t t h i s v o l u m e deals f o r t h e m o s t part o n l y w i t h West G e r m a n sociology. T h e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t social, political, a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e G e r m a n Democratic Republic a r e n o t e x a m i n e d i n r e g a r d to t h e i r i m p a c t o n sociological activities a n d t h o u g h t . O u r restriction is s e l f - e x e m p l i f y i n g . T h e a t t e n t i o n paid in West G e r m a n y to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of sociology in t h e GDR is q u i t e l i m i t e d . By contrast, t h e critical a n d d i s t a n c i n g reception i n t h e GDR of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l d e v e l o p m e n t s t y p i c a l of West G e r m a n sociology h a s been persistent a n d s u r p r i s i n g l y lively. See, e.g., K u r t B r a u n r e u t h e r a n d H e l m u t Steiner, "Zur S i t u a t i o n der b ü r g e r l i c h e n Soziologie i n W e s t d e u t s c h l a n d , " in K u r t B r a u n r e u t h e r , ed., Zur Kritik der bürgerlichen Soziologie in Westdeutschtand (Berlin: Verlag der W i s s e n s c h a f t e n , 1962), pp. 9-85; K u r t B r a u n r e u t h e r , Ökonomie und Gesellschaft in der deutschen bürgerlichen Soziologie (Berlin: Verlag d e r W i s s e n s c h a f t e n , 1964); M i c h a e l T h o m a s , " K o n s e r v a t i v e Soziologie — k o n s e r v a t i v e Soziologiegeschichte," Deutsche Zeitschrift flr Philosophie (1984) 32:587-592. 2. O n e of t h e e n d u r i n g t h e m e s of c o n t r o v e r s y in p o s t w a r G e r m a n sociology is t h e q u e s tion to w h a t e x t e n t t h e r e is a c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n pre- a n d p o s t w a r G e r m a n society. H o w p r o f o u n d a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n h a s t h e r e in fact been, a n d i n w h i c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c u l t u r a l f o r m a t i o n s h a s it been m o s t e v i d e n t , especially in West G e r m a n y ? Such issues h a v e been t a k e n u p , at f i r s t s o m e w h a t h e s i t a n t l y b u t later m o r e deliberately. See Ralf D a h r e n d o r f , Bildung ist Bürgerrecht ( H a m b u r g : N a n n e n , 1965). See also Wolf g a n g Zapf, Beiträge zur Analyse der deutschen Oberschicht ( M u n i c h : Piper, 1964) a n d his Wandlungen der deutschen Elite ( M u n i c h : Piper, 1965).

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3. One of the strongest indictments of these intellectual and political commitments may be f o u n d in Georg Lukäcs' Die Zerstörung der Vernunft [1954], 2d ed. (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962) [The Destruction of Reason, P. Palmer, tr. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981 )]. Lukäcs sees m a n y sociologists wittingly or unwittingly supporting the destruction of reason through fascism. An enduring theme of postwar debates a m o n g sociologists in West Germany has been the question of the collaboration of sociologists w h o remained and were trained in Germany during the Nazi regime. A m o n g the major opponents in this debate are René König and Helmut Schelsky. See Helmut Schelsky, Ortbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie (Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1959); "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der bundesdeutschen Soziologie. Ein Brief an Rainer Lepsius," Kölner Zeitschriftßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie ( 1980) 32:417-456, and René König, "Über das vermeintliche Ende des deutschen Soziologie vor der Machtergreifung des Nationalsozialismus," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1984) 36:1-42; "Die alten Geister kehren wieder...Helmuth Plessner zum 90. Geburtstag," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1982) 34:538-548. The controversy between Schelsky and König extends also to the intellectual status of sociology in the last years of the Weimar Republic and the renewal of sociology after the war in West Germany. See also Dirk Käsler, Die frühe deutsche Soziologie in ihren Entstehungs-Milieus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984); Carsten Klingemann, "Soziologie im NS-Staat," Soziale Welt (1985) 36(3):366-387; and Helmut Berking, Masse und Macht. Studien zur Soziologie in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Autorenverlag, 1984). 4. The great majority of sociologists of the Weimar era emigrated (see René König, "Die Situation der emigrierten deutsche Soziologen in Europa," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1959) 11:113-131; Svend Riemer, "Die Emigration deq deutschen Soziologen nach den vereinigten Staaten," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1959) 11:100-112; M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die Entwicklung der Soziologie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1967," in Günther Lüschen, ed., Deutsche Soziologie seit 1945. Special issue 21 of the Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979), pp. 26 ff. ["The Development of Sociology in Germany after World War II (1945-1968)," International Journal of Sociology (1983) 13(3):3-87], Some w h o remained in Nazi Germany ceased to work as sociologists and a smaller group became advocates and practitioners of a new "German" sociology, e.g., Hans Freyer, Karl Valentin Müller, Karl Heinz Pfeffer, Max Rumpf, Andreas Walther; see Heinz Maus, "Bericht über die deutsche Soziologie 1933-1945," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1959) 11:72-99; Urs Jäggi et al., Geist und Katastrophe. Studien zur Soziologie im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Autorenverlag, 1983); and especially Otthein Rammstedt, Deutsche Soziologie 19ÌÌ-1945. Die Normalität einer Anpassung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986). 5. Our emphasis will be on w h a t may be called the "mature" phase of postwar sociology in Germany which, in our view, include its more recent intellectual accomplishments. All these matters have been discussed in Helmut Schelsky, Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie, as well as in "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der bundesdeutschen Soziologie. Ein Brief an Rainer Lepsius"; see also Günther Lüschen, ed., Deutsche Soziologie seit 1945, and in that volume especially Lepsius' "Die Entwicklung der Soziologie nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1967." See also H. Braun, "Die gesellschaftliche Ausgangslage der Bundesrepublik als Gegenstand der zeitgenössischen soziologischen Forschung," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1979) 31(4):766-795; Heinz Sahner, Theorie und Forschung. Zur paradigmatischen Struktur der westdeutschen Soziologie und zu

22

INTRODUCTION

ihrem Einfluss auf die Forschung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982); Johannes Weyer, Westdeutsche Soziologie ¡945-1960. Deutsche Kontinuitäten und Nordamerikanischer Einßuss (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984); and Sven Papcke, ed., Ordnung und Theorie. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Soziologie in Deutschland (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986). The development of postwar sociology in the Federal Republic may be divided into three phases: (1) the reconstitution of sociology in the immediate aftermath of the war in the years 1945-1949, (2) the consolidation of the discipline between 1950 and 1966 which led to the establishment of four major centers (Berlin, Frankfurt, Cologne, and Münster) of sociology teaching and research (see Lepsius, "Die Entwicklung der Soziologie nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1967" ["The Development of Sociology in Germany after World War II (1945-1968)*]), and (3) the contemporary period which commences with the student rebellion but also includes, of course, the unprecedented growth of sociology in higher education u p to the present w i t h its stagnation of employment opportunities for sociologists both in universities and elsewhere. The contemporary period of sociology in Germany sees a new generation of sociologists educated in the postwar era take the place of those w h o had determined the character of sociology during the 1950s and part of the 1960s, and the emergence of a broad diversity of perspectives instead of the dominance of a f e w centers during the previous phase. Among these perspectives (which cannot be considered here in detail) are also those which arise f r o m n e w social movements, such as the West German women's movement, the environmental and the peace movements (see Beck, essay 16; and Habermas, essay 8). They encompass a variety of historical, empirical, and critical sociological studies. These three distinct phases in the institutional development and character of sociology also correspond to d o m i n a n t intellectual themes and preoccupations of German sociology. 6. The revival of sociology immediately after the w a r was in large measure the work of an older generation of scholars born between 1865 and 1885 (Alfred Weber, Leopold von Wiese, Alfred von Martin, Alexander Riistow), w h o had their intellectual roots in the liberal traditions of the 1920s and w h o had remained in Germany. However, their i n f l u ence was essentially limited to initiatives leading to the institutional reestablishment of sociology Their impact on the intellectual development of postwar sociology was comparatively insignificant, (see Lepsius, "Die Entwicklung der Soziologie nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg 1945 bis 1967" ["The Development of Sociology in Germany after World War 11(1945-1968)"]. 7. Equally significant, of course, is the large n u m b e r of sociologists who, for different reasons, did not return to Germany or Austria to take u p posts in universities. A m o n g this group are Karl M a n n h e i m (who, however, died in 1947), Norbert Elias (who did not return until the 1970s), Alfred Schutz, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Karl August Wittfogel, Hans Speier, Theodor Geiger, and Paul Lazarsfeld. 8. The research centers which were responsible for these studies in the 1950s were frequently founded outside the universities, e.g., the Sozialforschungstelle in Dortmund created with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation. Some of the empirical social research carried out here can be counted a m o n g the classics of postwar German sociology. (See Heinrich Popitz, Hans P. Bahrdt, Ernst A. Jiires, and Hanno Kesting, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1957); Heinrich Popitz, Hans P. Bahrdt, Ernst A. Jüres, and Hanno Kesting, Technik und Industriearbeit (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1957).

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9. See Lepsius, " A n m e r k u n g e n zur E n t w i c k l u n g u n d z u m Praxisbezug der d e u t s c h e n Soziologie," in G ü n t h e r Lüschen, ed., Deutsche Soziologie seit 1945, pp. 4-9. 10. This debate w a s initially p r o v o k e d by t h e F r a n k f u r t School a n d especially by A d o r n o (essay 10). Most i n f l u e n t i a l h a s been t h e collection by T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o et al.. Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Neuwied: L u c h t e r h a n d , 1969) IThe Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: H e i n e m a n n , 1976)]. But his Soziologische Schriften I and II ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1972) are also s i g n i f i c a n t . See also t h e collection of t h e F r a n k f u r t Institute of Social Research, Aspects of Sociology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). A d o r n o ' s i n sistence t h a t t h e theory of society (in a c o m p r e h e n s i v e sense) m u s t h a v e p r i m a c y over sociology as a specialized discipline, h a s been indirectly rejected by Schelsky (essay 4) a n d directly criticized by König (essay 5). K ö n i g argues t h a t t h e "theory of society" is n o substitute f o r "sociological theory." See also René König, essay 4, a n d his "Einleitung," i n René König, ed., Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung (Stuttgart: Enke, 1962), 1:11-12. T h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase of G e r m a n sociology w a s characterized by e f f o r t s to construct sociological theories w h i l e theories of society h a v e become a p r e o c c u p a t i o n of sociologists in G e r m a n y since t h e mid-sixties. Theories of society, a c c o r d i n g to K ö n i g , are closer to ideological conceptions w i t h global i n t e n t i o n s , a specific political a g e n d a , a n d rarely subject to e m p i r i c a l analysis; w h i l e sociological theories aspire to be " n o t h i n g but sociology." See René König, Soziologie ( F r a n k f u r t : Fischer, 1958), p. 7; Soziologie Heute (Zürich: Regio, 1949); Soziologische Orientierungen (Cologne a n d Berlin: K i e p e n h e u e r & Witsch, 1965); see also Emile D u r k h e i m , The Rules of Sociological Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 141. For A d o r n o , of course, l i m i t i n g sociology to e m p i r i c a l a n d positive m e t h o d s of research a n d to t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g f o r m of t h e o r y - c o n s t r u c t i o n h a s as a consequence t h a t it r e m a i n s uncritical of ideologies. 11. The d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s of sociology as a n "oppositional" or "stabilizing" discipline echo, of course, H o r k h e i m e r ' s distinction b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n a l a n d critical t h e o r y , see M a x H o r k h e i m e r , "Traditionelle u n d kritische Theorie," Zeitschrift fiIr Sozialforschung (1937) 6(2):245-294 ["Traditional a n d Critical Theory," Critical Theory: Selected Essays, M a t t h e w J. O'Connell et al., tr. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972)]; are raised a g a i n by J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s in the early 1960s, see J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , "Von d e n kritischen u n d k o n s e r v a t i v e n A u f g a b e n der Soziologie," in Freie Universität Berlin, Universitätstage 1962 (Berlin: d e Gruyter, 1962); a n d become o n e of t h e central issues in t h e positivist dispute, see T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. 12. See W o l f g a n g M o m m s e n , Max Weber und die deutsche Politik (1890-1920) (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1974) as well as t h e first p u b l i s h e d v o l u m e of t h e M a x Weber Gesamtausgabe, Zur Politik im Weltkrieg. Schriften u n d Reden 1914-1918, vol. 15, W o l f g a n g J. M o m m s e n , ed. (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1984). 13. See, f o r e x a m p l e , J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vols. 1 a n d 2 ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1981) [The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, T h o m a s McCarthy, tr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984)]. In vol. 1 H a b e r m a s refers to sociology in its classical phase as a science of t h e crisis of m o d e r n societies (p. 4). A r n o l d G e h l e n ' s w o r k (see essay 9) consists to a considerable extent of a d i a g n o s i s of t h e times. See his Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter (Reinbeck bei H a m b u r g : R o w o h l t , 1957) [Man in the Age of Technology, P. Lipscomb, tr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)]. T h u s w e are a r g u i n g t h a t o n e can i d e n t i f y patterns of t h e m a t i c c o n t i n u i t y in G e r m a n sociology, w h i c h reach f r o m M a r x , Weber, a n d S i m m e l to Gehlen, Schelsky, a n d t h e F r a n k f u r t School. Here o n e m a y note that conservatives such as G e h l e n h a v e also expressed this respect f o r M a r x (and Simmel), a n d critical theorists h a v e learned f r o m Weber, but also f r o m Schelsky a n d

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INTRODUCTION

G e h l e n (this is m o s t clearly d o c u m e n t e d i n H a b e r m a s ' writings). A n d i n d e p e n d e n t f i g u r e s s t a n d i n g for u n d e r d e v e l o p e d liberal t r a d i t i o n s in G e r m a n y such as H e l m u t h Plessner or Ralf D a h r e n d o r f also address "crisis* themes, e v e n if t h e y m a y c o n c e n t r a t e o n G e r m a n society. Our a r g u m e n t suggests t h a t t h e question of a crisis of " m o d e r n i t y " h a s also been t h e topic of p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis a n d reflection f o r quite s o m e t i m e . For e x a m p l e , it is m a n i festly present in Heidegger's a n d J a s p e r s ' w r i t i n g s . T h e d i a g n o s i s of t h e t i m e s m o t i v a t e d by a consciousness of crisis m a y t a k e a h i g h l y speculative f o r m , as i n A r n o l d G e h l e n ' s a n d T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o ' s w o r k . Or t h e e f f o r t m a y be m a d e to o p e n it to scientific t r e a t m e n t . I n t h i s second i n s t a n c e it m a y c o m e close to a n a n a l y s i s of social policy. See t h e i n t r o d u c tion to Claus O f f e a n d Wolf-Dietrich Narr, Wohlfahrtsstaat und Massenloyalität (Königstein: A n t o n H a i n / M e i s e n h e i m Verlag, 1973), a n d Offe, "Die Sozialwissenschaften z w i s c h e n A u f t r a g s f o r s c h u n g u n d sozialer Bewegung," i n Ulrich Beck, ed., Soziologie und Praxis. Erfahrungen. Konflikte, Perspektiven (Göttingen: Otto Schwarz, 1982). On t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l principles at issue see J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). U n d e n i a b l y , t h e t h e m e of a "crisis of m o d e r n i t y " is n o t o n l y a d dressed in G e r m a n y . One m e r e l y needs to consider t h e i n f l u e n c e of French post-structuralism, a n d especially of M i c h e l Foucault's w o r k , in o r d e r to see this. For convergences b e t w e e n recent G e r m a n a n d recent French sociological t h o u g h t , see A x e l H o n n e t h , Kritik der Macht. Reflexionsstufen einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1985). We are a r g u i n g here t h a t t h i s h a s been a t h e m e w h i c h h a s been c o n s t i t u t i v e of t h e dev e l o p m e n t of G e r m a n sociology, in s o m e m a j o r respects, at least since M a x Weber's (and possibly Georg Simmel's) time. This h a d been o p e n l y a c k n o w l e d g e d in t h e 1920s, f o r e x a m p l e by Karl M a n n h e i m , w h o h a s also p o i n t e d to its origins i n t h e G e r m a n Hegelian a n d historicist-culturalist traditions. 14. These are, first (and m o s t p r o m i n e n t l y ) , "The Positivist Dispute" (Positivismusstreit) w i t h A d o r n o a n d Popper, Albert a n d H a b e r m a s as t h e m a j o r p r o p o n e n t s , a n d Ralf D a h r e n d o r f as c o m m e n t a t o r . The c o n f e r e n c e w h i c h w a s t h e occasion of t h i s d i s p u t e t o o k place in 1961; see T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Seco n d , t h e debate o n t h e occasion of t h e 16th Congress of t h e G e r m a n Sociologists o n "Late Capitalism or I n d u s t r i a l Society", also t h e title of T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o ' s i n t r o d u c t o r y lecture (see essay 10), in 1968; see T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , et al., Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft? (Stuttgart: Enke, 1969). T h i r d , t h e debate b e t w e e n H a b e r m a s a n d L u h m a n n (see J. H a b e r m a s a n d N. L u h m a n n , Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie — was leistet die Systemforschung? [ F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1971]), w h i c h w a s f o l l o w e d by several p u b l i c a t i o n s o n t h e debate a n d its i m p l i c a t i o n s . Since t h e n L u h m a n n ' s systems-theory h a s gained considerable currency a m o n g m a n y theorists, i n c l u d i n g H a b e r m a s , Offe, a n d Eder. There is also t h e collection by Karl-Otto A p e l et al„ Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1971) reflecting a debate initiated by H a b e r m a s i n h i s Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften [1967] ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1973). It p r i m a r i l y addresses f o u n d a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s of social t h e o r y a n d social science, especially t h e status of p s y c h o a nalysis as a c r i t i c a l / e m a n c i p a t o r y , as well as e x p l a n a t o r y or "objective" h e r m e n e u t i c e m ployed in social u n d e r s t a n d i n g (see O e v e r m a n n , essay 21). Major p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e K a r l Otto Apel, Hans-Georg G a d a m e r , a n d J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s . H o w e v e r , a h e r m e n e u t i c a l a p proach in t h e social sciences h a s so f a r n o t gained w i d e acceptance a m o n g G e r m a n sociologists. There a p p e a r s to be greater interest in h e r m e n e u t i c s in A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s t h a n in G e r m a n y , quite s i m i l a r to t h e greater A n g l o - A m e r i c a n interest in

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p h e n o m e n o l o g y . H o w e v e r , s o m e of T h o m a s L u c k m a n n ' s G e r m a n s t u d e n t s h a v e d e v e l oped his interest in A l f r e d Schutz's social p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a n d h a v e l i n k e d it, as is a l m o s t a l w a y s t h e case in N o r t h A m e r i c a a n d Britain, to e t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y a n d s y m b o l i c interactionism. 15. The c o m m e r c i a l success of m a n y w o r k s a d d r e s s i n g sociological questions, such as t h e w r i t i n g s by t h e F r a n k f u r t School theorists, a n d t h e extent to w h i c h sociologists, f o r e x a m p l e Ralf D a h r e n d o r f a n d H e l m u t Schelsky, h a v e w r i t t e n sociologically i n f o r m e d books of general appeal, is a n o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n of t h e success of sociologists in either setting t h e a g e n d a f o r m a j o r public debates or in i n t e r v e n i n g i n a n i n f l u e n t i a l m a n n e r in public discussion. As t h e political m o o d of these disputes changes, d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s of sociologists tend to t a k e t h e o f f e n s i v e or d e f e n s i v e i n these public debates. See D a h r e n d o r f , Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland ( M u n i c h : Piper, 1965) [Society and Democracy in Germany [1969) (New York: Norton, 1979)] a n d H e l m u t Schelsky, Die Arbeit tun die anderen. Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975). 16. This particular issue a n d e d u c a t i o n a l issues in general h a v e been a topic of considerable a t t e n t i o n a n d interest a m o n g sociologists. Bildungsforschung is a well developed field in G e r m a n sociology. It d i f f e r s considerably f r o m t h e sociology of e d u c a t i o n as practiced in N o r t h A m e r i c a , h o w e v e r . On t h e w h o l e , it is m o r e i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y i n its o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d it h a s also i n f l u e n c e d m a j o r debates a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d p u r p o s e of u n i v e r s i t y e d u cation as w e l l as p r i m a r y a n d secondary schooling, i n w h i c h several of t h e a u t h o r s i n o u r selection i n o n e w a y or a n o t h e r participated (Schelsky, D a h r e n d o r f , G e h l e n , König, A d o r n o , H a b e r m a s , O e v e r m a n n ) . See Ralf D a h r e n d o r f , Arbeiterkinder an deutschen Universitäten (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1965) a n d his Bildung ist Bärgerrecht ( H a m b u r g : N a n n e n , 1965). Also H e l m u t Schelsky, Abschied von der Hochschulpolitik oder die Universität im Fadenkreuz des Versagens (Bielefeld: B e r t e l s m a n n , 1969) a n d Ulrich O e v e r m a n n , Sprache und soziale Herkunft ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1972). On t h e classical G e r m a n u n i v e r s i t y see Schelsky, Einsamkeit und Freiheit ( H a m b u r g : R o w o h l t , 1963). 17. D u r i n g t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n p h a s e t h i s w a s a m a t t e r of concern in particular to R e n é König, o n e of t h e f o u n d e r s of p o s t w a r G e r m a n sociology a n d t h e intellectual initiator of t h e considerable e m p h a s i s o n e m p i r i c a l research n o w e v i d e n t i n G e r m a n sociology. Today, u n d e r very d i f f e r e n t circumstances — in p a r t i c u l a r s t a g n a n t u n i v e r s i t y budgets, a h i g h l y skewed age d i s t r i b u t i o n of sociologists t e a c h i n g at G e r m a n universities a n d r a t h e r poor e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r y o u n g e r sociologists — t h i s issue is of m o r e general concern. 18. Renate M a y n t z h a s been a n i m p o r t a n t pioneer of t h e sociology of o r g a n i z a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e second phase of G e r m a n sociology a f t e r t h e second w o r l d w a r . See R. M a y n t z , Soziologie der Organisation (Reinbek bei H a m b u r g : R o w o h l t , 1963) a n d Soziologie der öffentlichen Verwaltung (Heidelberg: C.F. M ü l l e r , 1978). N i k l a s L u h m a n n a n d W o l f g a n g Schluchter are a m o n g those w h o h a v e contributed to t h i s field d u r i n g t h e m o r e recent phase. See W o l f g a n g Schluchter, Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft [1972], 2d ed. ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1985), f r o m w h i c h essay 14 h a s been t a k e n . For i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t L u h m a n n ' s n u m e r o u s p u b l i c a t i o n s in t h i s area, see Niklas L u h m a n n , The Differentiation of Society (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1982), b i b l i o g r a p h y . 19. Ralf D a h r e n d o r f , "Betrachtungen zu e i n i g e n A s p e k t e n der g e g e n w ä r t i g e n d e u t s c h e n Soziologie," Kölner Zeitschriftßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie ( 1959) 11:139. 20. M a i n s t r e a m social research c o n t i n u e s to be carried o u t in West G e r m a n y a n d is f o r

26

INTRODUCTION

t h e most part u n a f f e c t e d by the m a j o r theoretical a n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l debates a n d perspectives in c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n sociology. 21. See Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter [Man in the A ge ofTechnology], 22. This h o l d s i n particular w i t h respect to t h e F r a n k f u r t School theorists. This e v a l u a tion m a y change, h o w e v e r , because of t h e response of sociologists i n N o r t h A m e r i c a a n d Britain to H a b e r m a s ' recent w o r k , especially The Theory of Communicative Action. On H a b e r m a s ' earlier w o r k see A n t h o n y Giddens, "Habermas' Social a n d Political Theory" a n d "Labour a n d Interaction," i n Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1982), as w e l l as o t h e r w r i t i n g s . A n interesting e x a m p l e of a recent e v a l u a t i o n is J e f f r e y C. A l e x a n d e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of H a b e r m a s ' The Theory of Communicative Action. In "The Parsons R e v i v a l in G e r m a n Sociology," i n R a n d a l l Collins, ed., Sociological Theory 1984 (San Francisco, W a s h i n g t o n : Jossey-Bass, 1984), h e refers to H a b e r m a s as a "critical P a r s o n i a n . " See also his r e v i e w essay o n " H a b e r m a s ' N e w Critical Theory: Its P r o m i s e a n d Problems," American Journal of Sociology (1985) 91(2):400-423. A n i m p o r t a n t G e r m a n collection o n H a b e r m a s ' book, w h i c h also c o n t a i n s a response of H a b e r m a s , is A x e l H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, eds., Kommunikatives Handeln ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1986). Claus O f f e is increasingly recognized as a political sociologist a n d political scientist. A l t h o u g h o r i g i n a l l y l i n k e d w i t h critical t h e o r y , h e n o w s t a n d s f o r a n e w o r i e n t a t i o n e m phasizing t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of t h e w e l f a r e state a n d a n analysis of systems p r o b l e m s f o r t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of late capitalist societies. Here h e is clearly i n f l u e n c e d by L u h m a n n . See essay 15, t a k e n f r o m his Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1972), a n d Leistungsprinzip und Industrielle Arbeit ( F r a n k f u r t : Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970) [Industry and Inequality (New York: St. M a r t i n ' s , 1977)1, a n d especially his collection of essays entitled Contradictions of the Welfare State, J. Keane, ed. a n d tr. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984) a n d Disorganised Capitalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985 ). 23. Schelsky, Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie, p. 27. 24. Niklas L u h m a n n , Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1984). The a p p a r e n t revival of P a r s o n i a n f u n c t i o n a l i s m i n t h e United States (see J e f f r e y C. A l e x a n d e r , "The Parsons Revival in G e r m a n Sociology," in R a n d a l l Collins, ed., Sociological Theory 1984) h a s f o u n d considerable intellectual s u p p o r t in G e r m a n y , as is especially e v i d e n t in t h e w o r k of Richard M ü n c h , w h o s e stature as a social theorist is g r o w i n g . See, f o r e x a m p l e , Richard M ü n c h , Theorie des Handelns. Zur Rekonstruktion der Beiträge von Talcott Parsons, Emile Dürkheim, und Max Weber ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1982) a n d his Die Struktur der Moderne. Grundmuster und différentielle Gestaltung des institutionellen Außaus moderner Gesellschaften ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1984). 25. See Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus (Tübingen: M o h r , 1979) [The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1981)]; a n d W o l f g a n g Schluchter, Rationalismus der Weltbeherrschung ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1980). 26. H e l m u t Schelsky, Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), p. 449.

(Cologne-Opladen:

27. Ibid., p. 460. In t h e early 1960s, Schelsky's thesis of t h e increasing d o m i n a n c e of technological r a t i o n a l i t y in m o d e r n society a n d t h e question of t h e extent to w h i c h political decisions are n o w c o n s t r a i n e d if n o t actually d e t e r m i n e d by t h e logic of t e c h n o l o g y p r o m p t e d t h e "technocracy* debate a m o n g G e r m a n social scientists (see H e l m u t Schelsky,

GERMAN SOCIOLOGY SINCE 1945

27

ibid.-,A r n o l d Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter [Man in the Age of Technology]; J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1968); Dieter Senghaas, "Sachzwang u n d Herrschaft," Atomzeitalter (1966) 3:366-370; H a n s Lenk, Philosophie im technischen Zeitalter (Stuttgart: K o h l h a m m e r , 1971). W i t h o u t question these issues w i l l be t a k e n u p a g a i n u n d e r v a r i o u s foci as is a l r e a d y e v i d e n t (e.g., Walter Bühl, Die Angst des Menschen vor der Technik (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1983); Leo Kofier, Beherrscht uns die Technik? Technologische Rationalität im Spätkapitalismus ( H a m b u r g : VSA-Verlag, 1983). 28. Ernst J ü n g e r , Der Arbeiter ( H a m b u r g : Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932). 29. This is r e m i n i s c e n t of Heidegger's sensitivity to these conceptions, of t h e "heroic n i h i l i s m " of Being and Time (1927), of t h e praise of t h e w o r k i n g collective a n d t h e p o w e r of i n d u s t r i a l labor in h i s controversial address in s u p p o r t of Hitler delivered as rector of t h e Universität Freiburg in 1933, a n d a b o v e all of h i s c a r e f u l a n d p e n e t r a t i n g r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Nietzsche's n o t i o n of t h e will to p o w e r as the "will to will" in his Nietzsche lectures in t h e 1940s. One s h o u l d not be surprised by t h e a f f i n i t y of t h i s t h i n k i n g to c u r r e n t s of t h o u g h t present a m o n g radically conservative, yet also a n t i - b o u r g e o i s a n d a n t i - M a r x i s t g r o u p s of intellectuals in the 1920s. Some of these c u r r e n t s p r o v i d e d a fertile g r o u n d f o r N a t i o n a l Socialism a m o n g some educated g r o u p s in G e r m a n society. 30. This analysis suggests a certain a f f i n i t y b e t w e e n c o n s e r v a t i v e social t h o u g h t in G e r m a n y a n d the position t a k e n by at least o n e m a j o r representative of critical social theory, T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o . For a detailed c o m p a r i s o n of A d o r n o w i t h Heidegger, see H e r m a n n M ö r c h e n , Macht und Herrschaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno (Stuttgart: K o h l h a m m e r , 1980). See also J. H a b e r m a s , Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2:385. O u r selection (essay 8) f r o m this w o r k indicates t h a t H a b e r m a s has dissociated himself f r o m this earlier phase in t h e history of critical social theory, w h i c h is d o m i n a t e d by H o r k h e i m e r ' s a n d A d o r n o ' s Dialektik der Aufklärung ( A m s t e r d a m : Q u e r i d o , 1947) [Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder a n d Herder, I960)]. For d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o positions, see the d i s p u t e between A d o r n o a n d G e h l e n included in F r i e d e m a n n Genz, Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1974). T h e debate is entitled "1st die Soziologie eine Wissenschaft v o m M e n s c h e n ? Ein Streitgespräch," pp. 223-31 1. The convergences as well as t h e differences b e t w e e n G e h l e n ' s a n d A d o r n o ' s positions are quite clearly revealed in t h i s debate. 31. Even if o u r discussion has placed m u c h e m p h a s i s o n A r n o l d G e h l e n ' s a p p r o a c h to p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y as a f o u n d a t i o n for h i s sociology, it s h o u l d be pointed out that Gehlen is n e i t h e r t h e o n l y n o r e v e n t h e first representative of t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n in Germ a n sociology. H e l m u t h Plessner a n d M a x Scheler p u b l i s h e d t h e first i m p o r t a n t w o r k s in p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y in 1928. See Plessner, Die Stufen der Organischen und der Mensch [1928], 2d ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965) a n d Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl, 1928). Plessner developed a theory of t h e preconditions of h u m a n life by b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e relation of h u m a n s to t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d . One of h i s basic t e r m s is t h e n o t i o n of t h e " h u m a n position of eccentricity," i.e., t h e idea t h a t h u m a n beings are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by their u n i q u e capacity f o r d i s t a n c i n g t h e m s e l v e s f r o m objectifying t h e w o r l d a n d f r o m t h e m selves. This basic f e a t u r e of t h e " h u m a n c o n d i t i o n " can e x p l a i n t h e social a n d historical variability of h u m a n attitudes a n d dispositions. Subjectivity (the capacity f o r self-reflection) a n d sociality are seen as c o m p l e m e n t a r y d i m e n s i o n s of h u m a n life. It is w i t h reference to these polarities t h a t Plessner addresses t h e concept of social role as well as sociological questions in general. His m e t h o d requires a n i n t e g r a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y w i t h the empirical sciences.

28

INTRODUCTION

Plessner's f a m o u s a n a l y s i s of t h e f a i l u r e of bourgeois liberal c u l t u r e i n G e r m a n y , provoked by t h e N a t i o n a l Socialists' rise to p o w e r a n d p u b l i s h e d as Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verßhrbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes (Zurich: M a x N i e h a n s , 1935), revealed his c o n cern w i t h the question of t h e s u r v i v a l of Western civilization. This question, Plessner argued, could be a d e q u a t e l y addressed o n l y by t h e n e w discipline of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n thropology, w h i c h is to d o c u m e n t t h e possibility of h u m a n f r e e d o m . Plessner's w o r k h a s been p u b l i s h e d as Gesammelte Schriften, 10 vols., G. D u x , 0 . M a r q u a r d , E. Ströker, eds. ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1980-1985). Plessner's w o r k h a s been c o n t i n u e d by t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y sociologist G ü n t e r Dux, w h o is also co-editor of Plessner's collected w o r k s a n d w h o a t t e m p t s to connect t h e n a t u r a l history of t h e h u m a n species w i t h its c u l t u r a l history. See D u x , Die Logik der Weltbilder ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1982), a n d "Toward a Sociology of Cognition," i n N. Stehr a n d V. Meja, eds., Society and Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives on the Sociology of Knowledge (New B r u n s w i c k , N.J. a n d L o n d o n : T r a n s a c t i o n Books, 1984). A n o t h e r y o u n g e r sociologist close to t h e position of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y is Wolf Lepenies w h o , h o w e v e r , refers to his o w n position as "sociological a n t h r o p o l o g y , " t h u s m o v i n g close to t h e French a n d A n g l o - A m e r i c a n t r a d i t i o n s of social a n t h r o p o l o g y . See W. Lepenies, Soziologische Anthropologie ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1971) a n d W. Lepenies a n d H. Nolte, Kritik der Anthropologie ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1971). See also W. Lepenies, Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1985). 32. Schelsky, Die Arbeit tun die anderen. 3 3. Schelsky, Der Mensch in der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation, p. 46. 34. Ibid., p. 459 35. Schelsky's sociology, even according to his o w n conception, u l t i m a t e l y evolves into a n anti-sociology, w h i c h represents a sociologically i n f o r m e d w a r n i n g against a certain k i n d of sociology, i n particular against t h e c u l t u r a l a n d political c o n c e p t i o n s associated w i t h critical theory. Such a w a r n i n g against sociology as a social a n d c u l t u r a l f o r c e is g e n erally shared by n e o c o n s e r v a t i v e sociologies. See H e l m u t Schelsky, Die Arbeit tun die anderen; Schelsky, Rückblicke eines 'Anti-Soziologen' (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981); Friedrich H. T e n b r u c k , Die unbewältigten Sozialwissenschaften oder die Abschaffung des Menschen (Graz: Styria, 1984). 36. See A l e x a n d e r , "The Parsons Revival in G e r m a n Sociology." A l e x a n d e r refers to a "strain of Realpolitik" i n L u h m a n n a n d to his relative c o n s e r v a t i s m (p. 403). 37. See L u h m a n n , essay 7. 38. L u h m a n n , The Differentiation of Society, pp. 248, 250, 251. 39. See Talcott Parsons, The System Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 1 3 9 , 9 4 , 2 2 .

of Modern

40. A r n o l d Gehlen, Studien zur Anthropologie 1963), p. 79.

Societies (Englewood

Cliffs, N.J.:

und Soziologie (Neuwied: L u c h t e r h a n d ,

41. Ralf D a h r e n d o r f , Life Chances (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). See essay 11. The prevailing perception a n d t h e r e p u t a t i o n of D a h r e n d o r f s theoretical stance, based o n his publication in the late 1950s, in particular Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikte (Stuttgart: Enke, 1957) [Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: S t a n f o r d U n i v e r sity Press, 1959)] a n d h i s critique of s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m , e.g., D a h r e n d o r f , Die angewandte Aufklärung. Gesellschaft und Soziologie in Amerika ( M u n i c h : Piper, 1963), is of

29

G E R M A N SOCIOLOGY SINCE 1945

course t h a t of a conflict theorist. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Marxists, especially o r t h o d o x M a r x ists, see h i m as a representative of a m o r e status q u o oriented sociology (e.g. B r a u n r e u t h e r a n d Steiner, "Zur Situation des b ü r g e r l i c h e n Soziologie in W e s t d e u t s c h l a n d , " pp. 41-47). 42. See Richard G r a t h o f f , "Der A n s a t z einer T h e o r i e sozialen H a n d e l n s bei A l f r e d Schütz," Neue Hefte für Philosophie (1976) 9:115-113; Richard G r a t h o f f a n d B e r n h a r d Weidenfels, eds., Sozialität und InterSubjektivität ( M u n i c h : F i n k , 1983); Fritz Sack et al., eds., Ethnomethodologie. Beiträge zu einer Soziologie des Alltagshandelns ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1976); A n s g a r W e y m a n n , ed., Kommunikative Sozialforschung ( M u n i c h : F i n k , 1976); A l f r e d Schütz a n d T h o m a s L u c k m a n n , Strukturen der Lebenswelt, I a n d II ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1979-1984); M a n f r e d A n w ä r t e r , Edith Kirsch, M a n f r e d Schröter, eds., Kommunikation. Interaktion, Identität ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1976). 43. Our use of t h e t e r m "school" does n o t i m p l y t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of t h e F r a n k f u r t School represent a tight k n i t intellectual n e t w o r k . On t h e c o n t r a r y , both i n t h e past a n d at present, t h e F r a n k f u r t School lacks m a n y of t h e social a n d intellectual traits associated w i t h a m o r e restrictive m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m "school." For f u r t h e r details see M a r t i n J a y , The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, B r o w n & Co., 1973) a n d J a y , Marxism and Totality (Berkeley a n d Los Angeles: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1984). See also H e l m u t Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisation und Erfahrung. Studien zur frühen kritischen Theorie ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1978) [Politics and Science (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1985)]. 44. The edition of A d o r n o ' s collected w o r k s by S u h r k a m p in 23 v o l u m e s (1982 to t h e present) testifies to t h e e n o r m o u s r a n g e of h i s p r o d u c t i o n . Here w e c a n n e i t h e r m e n t i o n n o r discuss t h e w i d e r a n g e of his studies i n p h i l o s o p h y , literature a n d m u s i c ( i n c l u d i n g t h e sociology of music). 45. See also R. Döbert, G. N u n n e r - W i n k l e r , J. H a b e r m a s , Entwicklung K i e p e n h e u e r & Witsch, 1977).

des Ich (Cologne:

46. E.g., A l f r e d Lorenzer, Sprachzerstörung und Rekonstruktion ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1970) a n d Zur Begründung einer materialistischen Sozialisationstheorie ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1972). 47. See Alfred Schmidt, Zur Idee der kritischen Theorie Elemente der Philosophie Max Horkheimers ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1974); Die kritische Theorie als Geschichtsphilosophie ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1976); History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). 48. M a x H o r k h e i m e r a n d T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o , Dialectic of Enlightenment. 49. J ü r g e n Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, especially vol. 1, ch. 2 ("Max Weber's Theory of Rationalization"), ch. 4 ("From Lukäcs to A d o r n o : R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n as Reification"), a n d vol. 2, ch. 8 ("Concluding Reflections: F r o m Parsons to Weber to Marx"). 50. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 555,561. 51. Even prior to t h e a p p e a r a n c e of The Theory of Communicative Action, W o l f g a n g Schluchter observed t h a t H a b e r m a s s t a n d s f o r a n i n t e g r a t i o n of M a r x w i t h Weber ( w h i c h m a y h a v e the consequence t h a t critical t h e o r y ' s l i n k s to M a r x become e v e n m o r e tenuous). See W. Schluchter, Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft, p. 299. 52. W o l f g a n g M o m m s e n , Max Weber und die deutsche Politik

(1890-1920).

53. W o l f g a n g Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History.

30

INTRODUCTION 54. Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962).

55. See Oskar Negt and A. Kluge, Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973). 56. Recent developments suggest also that the search for and the legacy of a German sociology which sees itself in conscious opposition to English, French, or American intellectual traditions is far f r o m dead. Parts of the neoconservative movement in philosophy and social science f i n d the uniqueness of German sociology precisely in those of its attributes which are connected with counter-Enlightenment tendencies, thereby continuing a tradition that was well analyzed by Karl M a n n h e i m in 1925 in a manuscript only recently published in full. See Karl M a n n h e i m , Konservatismus, David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr, eds. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984) [Conservatism, David Kettler a n d Volker Meja, trs. (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986)].

I German Sociology: A Retrospective Every social science discipline turns to its past for guidance, in particular at times of internal crisis and major social transformation. The history of sociology, which everywhere involves more than a widely acclaimed body of intellectual accomplishments and institutional successes, is consequently of special significance for the practice and the teaching of contemporary sociology. This is especially true in Germany, with its influential sociological tradition but also with its recent dark past in which many of these achievements were deliberately eradicated. The development of sociology in postwar West Germany reflects to a considerable extent the broader social trends of German society, which may be roughly divided into several periods: the immediate postwar period with its special problems, the period of reconstruction during which sociology was reestablished as an academic discipline, and, starting in the late 1960s, the period of the breakdown of social consensus. At present, West German sociology, by and large reflecting the contemporary sociopolitical and economic situation, is attempting to come to terms with a sense of resignation and self-doubt, of having failed to live up to the enormous promise which infused sociology in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This perception of partial failure is also linked to its stagnating institutional basis in the German academic system. It is precisely in such times of crisis that sociology tends to turn inward in order to find within its o w n traditions a new measure of hope, and a different orientation. The renewed interest in its o w n history represents an effort to gain a new sense of itself as a discipline and to prepare the ground for new intellectual departures. The first selection in this part of the book deals with the complicated history of post-World War I sociology. M. Rainer Lepsius (essay 1) provides a most informative review of German sociology in which he examines its social, political, institutional, and intellectual context by focusing upon the interwar period. Lepsius pays special attention to the interdependence of intellectual developments in social science, cul-

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tural history, and sociopolitical events. But he wants to do more than merely write an intellectual and institutional history of sociology. His analysis is also prescriptive, that is, he attempts to strengthen a particular perspective in contemporary German sociology. According to Lepsius, the interwar period is marked by the first successful establishment of a democratic political regime in Germany, the Weimar Republic, and its collapse, only fourteen years later, as a result of the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933. This period spanning some forty years witnessed World War I and its aftermath, the October Revolution, the economic depression in the 1920s, World War II, the Holocaust, the overthrow of National Socialism, the redrawing of European boundaries and the global redistribution of power. It is a period of fateful and rapid social change testifying to the best as well as to the worst possibilities of human action and imagination. But it is also an era which presents unusual difficulties for analysis, and not only because it tends even now to evoke strong emotional reactions. For a short time after the end of World War I sociology flourished in Germany. However, the National Socialist seizure of power led to the forced emigration of many of its most prominent representatives. Those who remained behind, if they did not go into what some of them later liked to call 'internal emigration," often busied themselves with dubious efforts to produce a sociological perspective in conformity with the regime's ideology. Thus, the truly productive phase of German sociology was limited to a brief creative period during the Weimar Republic, a political system ravaged by conflict and torn by crisis after crisis. But sociology, as has often been observed, may well be borne out of and respond to social conflict and crisis. Periods of crisis, at any rate, tend to heighten sociological self-reflection and self-criticism. As individual and public troubles explode in all seriousness and as political solutions are required ever more urgently, sociology seems to take up the challenge and attempt to provide a diagnosis. Yet the sociology of the Weimar Republic, observes Lepsius, did not achieve a shared diagnosis, a consensus on the causes of the social crisis. Such sociologists and sociologically oriented scholars and intellectuals as, for example, Karl Mannheim, Max Horkheimer, Ferdinand Tonnies, Leopold von Wiese, Emil Lederer, Alfred Weber, Werner Sombart, Karl Korsch, Rosa Luxemburg, Max Scheler, and Helmuth Plessner never agreed on a uniform method of analysis of the sociological causes of the crisis or on how the severe social, political, and economic problems of the period might be tackled. Not surprisingly, the

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33

Weimar Republic produced a highly differentiated but also fragmented sociological community still uncertain about itself and linked in m a n y ways to the more established academic disciplines such as jurisprudence, history, philosophy, and economics. Sociology was often seen, both by m a n y of its practitioners and by outsiders sympathetic to the sociological approach, as an integrative science which might be able to synthesize otherwise diverse approaches and even entire disciplines. It was also seen as a perspective with a certain moral and political claim, in addition to its scientific status. All of this gave sociology a highly ambivalent image. These features of German sociology during the Weimar Republic, furthermore, indicate that Max Weber's sociological program, including his methodological individualism and his call for a social science abstaining f r o m value judgments, had not yet gained a significant following at this point. Lepsius points out that important challenges and impulses for the development of sociology in the Weimar Republic often came f r o m external sources and contexts, for example, f r o m political events, f r o m innovations in education outside the university system, or f r o m the labor unions. This meant also that m a n y sociologists were quite prepared and even desired to work in positions outside academia. After the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933, nearly two-thirds of all sociology teachers lost their positions. Sociology as it had flourished in the Weimar Republic came to an abrupt halt. Certain traditions such as historicism, holism, idealism, and Social Darwinism continued to be accepted under the new regime but were quickly developed into what Lepsius calls a "partisan sociology." In general, however, National Socialism favored distinctly nonsociological conceptions of h u m a n existence, especially those which stressed inherited factors as determinants of the development of h u m a n societies. Only the exiled sociologists continued to work within those sociological traditions which, along with them, had been exiled as well. These traditions, in turn, gave rise to some of the most lucid and profound analyses of the emergence and the nature of German Fascism. Kurt Lenk (essay 2) attempts to show that sociology in the Weimar Republic, in spite of the great fragmentation of sociological approaches, may well have had a relatively similar understanding of history. Lenk identifies the shared sociocultural context and the milieus which he sees as constitutive for the approaches of sociological scholars as different as Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber, Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim, whose analyses and vision of society converge, beginning with the decline of the German Empire,

34

PARTI

t o w a r d a tragic consciousness a n d a shared conviction of the "tragedy of culture." In the case of Georg Simmel, it is the "philosophy of life" (Lebensphilosophie) w h i c h points to the increasing separation in m o d e r n society of h u m a n creations f r o m h u m a n needs. M a x Weber similarly points to the inescapable inversion of m e a n s a n d ends, w h i c h h e regards as a p e r m a n e n t a n d tragic attribute of m o d e r n life. According to Weber, sociology cannot, in the end, even h o p e a n y longer to grasp the f u l l complexity of social life in its t h o r o u g h g o i n g irrationality. The duality of reason a n d reality characteristic of m o d e r n society inevitably leads to a g r o w i n g gap between theory a n d social practice, w h i c h can n o longer be bridged. Lenk views M a x Scheler's sociology a n d philosophical a n t h r o p o l o g y in similar terms. Scheler's conception is tragic as well since Scheler sees history as a cruel process w h i c h constantly destroys h u m a n values or neglects to respond to t h e m in a n y way, a n d w h i c h is increasingly governed by "real" rather t h a n "ideal" factors, as a result of w h i c h convictions, values questions, a n d ethical conceptions are lost f r o m sight. Finally, Lenk analyzes Karl M a n n h e i m ' s sociological program a n d concludes that M a n n h e i m is engaged in a c o n t i n u a l intellectual struggle to overcome the tragic i m plications of the crisis afflicting society, w i t h its deep divisions of beliefs a n d social status a n d power position. However, Lenk considers the solutions to the crisis offered by M a n n h e i m as ultimately d o o m e d to fail, thereby f u r t h e r e x e m p l i f y i n g the p r o f u n d i t y of the tragic consciousness w h i c h f e w G e r m a n sociologists of the t i m e could escape a n d all h a d to respond to in some w a y or a n o t h e r . The tragic consciousness described by Lenk w a s not shared by all sociologists, of course. Those, f o r example, w h o f o u n d their m o r a l , political, a n d even scientific inspiration in Marxist t h i n k i n g were little affected by it. This too helps to provide a sense of the factionalized character of the G e r m a n sociological "community." The history of G e r m a n sociology has in a n y case a l w a y s been also a history of major controversies. Disputes about the n a t u r e of history, society, a n d the i n d i v i d u a l a n d o n the possible impact of the social sciences are quite regular features in G e r m a n social science. But some of the most vigorous a n d i n f l u e n t i a l controversies were carried out a m o n g factions of the sociological c o m m u n i t y in the f o r m of seminal disputes. Each generation of scholars appears to h a v e h a d its o w n dispute, as it were. There is the dispute on m e t h o d s (Methodenstreit) t o w a r d the end of the past century, the dispute on value-neutrality (Werturteilsstreit) at the beg i n n i n g of this century, i n v o l v i n g M a x Weber a n d Werner Sombart,

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35

the brief sociology of knowledge dispute (Streit um die Wissensoziologie) in the late 1920s stimulated especially by Karl Mannheim's version of the sociology of knowledge, and there is, most recently, the positivist dispute (Positivismusstreit) between such critical rationalists as Karl Popper and such critical theorists as Theodor W. Adorno. In addition to the particular social and intellectual events which may have set off each of these often polemical disputes among German sociologists, the philosophical and methodological claims of Karl Marx and Max Weber are invariably either directly or indirectly implicated in the debates. Each dispute has extended our knowledge about the particular methodological pitfalls and shortcomings of the philosophy of science conceptions of the various sociological traditions. Yet these debates have not been able to resolve the cognitive conflict once and for all. Close attention must be paid even n o w to the various alternative philosophical positions in social science. Jürgen Kocka, in his thorough discussion (essay 3) of the different philosophies of social science associated with the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber, has assimilated the results of the various disputes and aims at a new philosophy of social science beyond mere dogmatism and mere decisionism. Kocka argues that Max Weber's methodological position revolves around two dualities, not present in the work of Marx, which cannot be overcome — namely the dualities of reality and cognition and of reason and decision. Marx's historical materialism remains for Weber only one among m a n y possible theoretical perspectives. Final judgment among competing views, based for example on their object adequacy, is rendered impossible, according to Weber, by the unbridgeable gap between the standpoint of the investigator and the object to be investigated. For Marx, by contrast, reality is neither invariably estranged f r o m h u m a n understanding nor does h u m a n consciousness always approach reality with categories alien to its subject matter. In contrast to Weber, Marx's philosophy of science postulates that the right action can be, at least in the final analysis, deduced f r o m an adequate analysis of historical reality. The presupposition for such discourse is the Hegelian conviction not shared by Weber that there is an initial identity of the object of inquiry and the k n o w i n g subject. The accentuated confrontation of the two positions leads Kocka to an attempt at mediation since he considers either conception unsatisfactory for a workable philosophy of the social sciences. However, even such mediation has its limits. But Kocka is nevertheless convinced that the mutual reading and critique of Marx through Weber

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PARTI

and of Weber through M a r x can provide the foundation of a n e w applied philosophy of science. Kocka's essay clearly demonstrates that the history of sociology generally remains a fertile source for intellectual stimulation and inspiration, and that the history of German sociology offers a particularly rich resource. Sociology as it w a s practiced in the Weimar Republic, for example, not only gave rise to Karl M a n n h e i m ' s comprehensive and ambitious sociology of k n o w l e d g e program, but also to the critical theory of M a x Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and their associates, to the exemplatory empirical social research of Theodor Geiger and Paul Lazarsfeld, to the development of philosophical anthropology by Helmuth Plessner and A r n o l d Gehlen, and to the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz.

1 Sociology in the Interwar Period: Trends in Development and Criteria for Evaluation M .

RAINER

LEPSIUS

Interest in the history of the social sciences in Germany and Austria has grown in recent years, and this is especially so for the history of sociology between the end of World War I and the new beginning after 1945.1 This period, fruitful in its results and multifaceted when examined in terms of the history of science, for long met with only slight attention, and even today comprehensive, systematic presentations remain an exception.2 The sharp political ruptures, the complexity of the cultural atmosphere of the times, and the multitude of scientific approaches, as well as the close interpénétration of scientific developments, cultural and ideological history, and political events which are so characteristic for this period, makes its comprehensive and systematic analysis especially difficult. The history of sociology in the German-speaking Central Europe in the period between 1918 and 1945 is demarcated by several epochmaking political events: World War I and the Russian Revolution on the one side, World War II and the overthrow of National Socialism on the other. These events define a unique period of enormous political and cultural importance. Its significance is quite out of proportion to its short duration. In these thirty years or so, German-speaking Central Europe, as it had evolved prior to World War I, in the first instance had its sphere of influence restricted by the dissolution of the old Hapsburg Empire, was then slowly ravaged by authoritarian regimes, had its cultural integrity weakened by National Socialism, and was Translation, revised a n d updated f o r this v o l u m e by t h e a u t h o r , of "Die Soziologie der Zwischenkriegszeit: E n t w i c k l u n g s t e n d e n z e n u n d Beurteilungskriterien,* in M. Rainer Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich 1918-1945, Special issue 23 of t h e Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), pp. 7-23. Translated by Volker Meja o n t h e basis of a previous t r a n s l a t i o n by Iain Fraser published as European University Institute Working Paper 104 (Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute, 1984), pp. 1-35.

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finally broken up by the political division of Europe after World War II. The destruction of Central Europe as a multifaceted cultural region mediated through the German language is bound up with the annihilation of Central European Jewry, to which the social sciences in particular had been greatly intellectually indebted. 3 The close interpénétration of intellectual currents in the social sciences in Germany and Austria can be gleaned from the great controversies before the First World War — the Methodenstreit (dispute on method) between Gustav Schmoller and Carl Menger and the debates between Max Weber and Rudolf Goldscheid within the Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Soziologie (German Sociological Society) — as well as from the mutual exchange of scholars. For the interwar period we shall mention only Joseph Schumpeter, Emil Lederer, and Carl Grunberg, all Austrians who taught at German universities and who were very influential there, but especially Karl Mannheim who, like Georg Lukâcs and Arnold Hauser, thought of himself as Hungarian but published in German, taught in Heidelberg and Frankfurt, and was to become one of the greatest figures in German sociology. All this makes clear that the history of "German" sociology cannot be confined to the boundaries of a nation-state. 4 The sociology of the interwar period can be divided into three very different political and cultural constellations, each of them of only short duration: first, sociology in the period between 1918 (the end of the war) and the National Socialist seizure of power in Germany in 1933 and the suppression, in 1934, of socialism in Austria, a period of some fifteen years; second, sociology under National Socialism, a period covering some ten years and characterized by increasing restrictions on scientific work in the war years; third, sociology in exile, which existed as an independent variant since 1933 and continued into the 1950s. The development of German sociology is therefore highly fragmented. There was never a "zero hour"; and there are also continuities between these periods, though sociology's "organizational form as science" [Wissenschaftsgestalt] — to use an expression by Karl Mannheim — was in each case different. Even within these three periods, moreover, sociology lacked a uniform character. Neither the sociology of the Weimar Republic nor that in exile or that of National Socialism shared the same epistemological foundation, a similar understanding of the scientific nature of sociology, or similar lines of inquiry or "paradigms." The sociology of this period is consequently distinguished by a considerable complexity of its manifestations. In such a complex situation, trends of development and criteria for eval-

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39

uation are difficult to determine. They can be sketched out only provisionally and summarily, a task which will be attempted below. Sociology in the Weimar Republic begins with the death of Max Weber in 1920. Just shortly before his death, Weber had taken u p a chair again in Munich, and it is probable that he would have had considerable influence there. His death meant a definite weakening of his sociological research program [Erkenntnisprogramm]. Marianne Weber, to be sure, managed within the span of only a few years, to publish (by 1924) almost all of Weber's work, posthumously or in new editions, as well as to help preserve her husband's legacy with her o w n impressive biography on him published in 1926; but there was no circle of disciples that could have rapidly taken up and further developed Weber's work. In contrast to Emile Durkheim, Weber had no "school"; his scholarly acceptance was therefore both slow in coming and erratic. The program pursued by Weber of a sociology founded upon methodological individualism and the comparative analysis of social structures and cultural systems did not significantly influence developments in the 1920s.5 His death meant a decisive weakening of the opposition to holism and historicism at precisely a time when materialist, Social-Darwinist and idealist philosophies of history were being activated in an attempt to explain the culturally devastating experience of the lost war. Georg Simmel, w h o died shortly before the war ended in 1918, similarly met with practically no response in the 1920s. Along with Weber, he was among those w h o wanted to build sociology upon a theory of action and do away with the notion of essences derived f r o m philosophy of history. Simmel, like Weber, f o u n d an audience only after World War II. Of the founders of sociology prior to World War I, only Ferdinand Tonnies, Werner Sombart, and Alfred Weber remained influential in the Weimar period. None of them, however, came up with a systematic research program for sociology that might have been able to become a dominant influence. While Tonnies was the recognized Nestor of German sociology in the 1920s and the president of the German Sociological Society, the considerable personal esteem in which he was held must not be confused with his actual influence. After the war, Marxism finally gained admission to the universities, as is indicated by Carl Griinberg's and Karl Korsch's appointments to university chairs. Many social scientists were inclined toward socialism and support of the Social Democrats, in sharp contrast to the conservative majority of German university teachers w h o opposed the

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democratic Republic. But it was only toward the end of the Weimar Republic that the confrontation w i t h Marxism became significant in social science. Instrumental in this development were the publication of Marx's early writings in 1932, by J.P. Mayer a n d S. Landshut, as well as the w o r k of Karl Korsch and Max Adler, as well as the early writings of Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and other members of the Frankfurt Institut f u r Sozialforschung, but most especially Karl M a n n h e i m ' s transformation, after 1928, of the M a r x i a n critique of ideology into the sociology of knowledge. In the 1920s there was no d o m i n a n t figure in sociology, w h i c h evolved in a number of milieus with little c o m m o n direction. Even w i t h i n its local centers in the Weimar Republic there was practically no paradigmatic unity. This was the case in Berlin just as m u c h as in Vienna. 6 But even the more visible centers such as Heidelberg, Frankfurt, Cologne, and Leipzig were not scientifically homogeneous. In Frankfurt, sociology was represented until 1930 by Franz Oppenheimer and by Carl Grunberg's Institut fiir Sozialforschung, but in terms of its o w n history, sociology became significant only once Karl M a n n h e i m and Max Horkheimer were appointed to chairs in Frankfurt. Both had their o w n groups of disciples, between w h o m there was little overlap. In Cologne there developed, alongside Leopold von Wiese's analysis of interpersonal relations [Beziehungslehre], quite different orientations, such as those represented by Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Paul Honigsheim. Not even in Leipzig, where Hans Freyer had great personal influence, can one speak of a school in the strict sense. 7 Heidelberg was just as diversified. In addition to Alfred Weber, Emil Lederer worked there, both at a distance f r o m the legacy of Max Weber. Such younger scholars as Edgar Salin, Arnold Bergstraesser a n d Karl M a n n h e i m had little in c o m m o n . Outside these local centers a f e w sociologists worked in small circles, such as Ferdinand Tonnies in Kiel. In the early years of the Weimar Republic, sociology possessed no articulated self-image, and only a very f e w saw it as an empirical specialized science. The vague idea of a "sociological perspective" predominated, which was to permeate and complement the traditional sciences. Academic sociologists, in terms of their training and careers, were embedded w i t h i n the established disciplines, in particular philosophy and political economy. In connection with the postwar debate on German university reform, the by and large uncertain self-image of sociology played a significant role. C.H. Becker, the orientalist a n d later a Minister of

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Education and Cultural Affairs in Prussia, began the debate in 1919 when he called for synthesizing branches of study in the universities to overcome the specialization of research and teaching in the traditional disciplines. He thought that sociology would be particularly suited for this task, "since it consists solely of synthesis. And this makes sociology all the more important for us as a means of education. Chairs of sociology are an urgent necessity for all universities. By that is meant sociology in the broadest sense of the word, including political science and contemporary history. It is only by way of the sociological approach that a mental habit is created in the intellectual sphere which then becomes political conviction, w h e n transferred to the moral sphere." 8 This passage already contains all the elements of the then prevailing view of sociology: its interdisciplinary, synthetic character, its role in moral and political education, its significant role in establishing and disseminating a new political culture. Against Becker's call for the establishment of professorships of sociology as a way of achieving university reform, there came an immediate objection by the historian Georg von Below, w h o described a synthesizing "universal science" as mere dilettantism. The thoroughly justified sociological lines of inquiry, he argued, could best be pursued within the traditional specialized sciences, particularly since "every sociologist must always belong to one of the traditional disciplines, if he is not to lose firm ground f r o m under his feet." 9 Von Below's position also expresses the contemporary understanding of sociology quite well; a "general sociology" — this is the implication of his argument — possesses no specific object of knowledge and therefore cannot be pursued scientifically outside the traditional disciplines; if it nevertheless attempts precisely this, sociology turns, in Alfred Dove's famous phrase, into a Wortmaskenverleihinstitut, a mere "rental agency for verbal masks," or into political education. Ferdinand Tonnies, then the President of the German Sociological Society, reacted to these ideas with ambivalence. On the one hand he agreed with Becker's proposal to establish professorships in sociology, "because the academic philosophers as a rule are aloof f r o m sociology and fail to understand it"; on the other hand he saw sociology, within which he also counted political science, as a part of philosophy and therefore refused to distinguish between sociology in a broad or narrow sense: "thinking and working, imaginative thinking and methodical work — that is precisely what sociology like any other field needs, whether it is understood broadly or narrowly." 10 The situation of sociology in the early 1920s may be portrayed as a

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"cycle of misunderstandings" w i t h momentous consequences. Tne uncertain self-image of sociologists contributed to a lack of clarity in the v i e w of outsiders regarding the status of sociology as a science. Sociology was perceived as focused on pedagogical, political, and moral tasks that were rejected by the traditional sciences. A n x i o u s for recognition and institutionalization, sociology did not oppose these expectations f r o m outside, thereby reinforcing the uncertainty of its self-image. This "cycle of misunderstandings" is perhaps typical for the institutionalization of every n e w science, since f u n d i n g is decided by political bodies not guided by a scientific interest in advancing k n o w l edge, but rather by particular ideas about the desirable educational and vocational functions of universities. The discrepancy between self-image and perception by others is consequently significant for institutionalization processes in general. In the case of sociology, w h i c h neither had a u n i f o r m self-image nor was adequately institutionalized, this gap could not be bridged in the interwar period. 11 Sociology as a f o r m of political education, w h i c h C.H. Becker had still seen in the early Weimar period as a means of reinforcing democratic political culture, w a s claimed by Hans Freyer toward the end of the Weimar Republic for a very different political culture. 12 For both Becker and Freyer, sociology w a s a w a y of achieving a cognitive synthesis by w a y of w h i c h a (politically differently conceived) image of the present could be communicated, and thereby also commitment and experience. The "battle for sociology" (C.H. Becker) waged in public w a s in fact a struggle about the imposition of different "political cultures" by w a y of a politicized and pedagogically instrumentalized university. This battle had as such little to do w i t h sociology, w h i c h w a s focused upon only because it w a s readily available and not already staked out by a clear self-image of its practitioners. This indicates clearly enough that M a x Weber's attempt to establish sociology as an empirical and value-free science built upon methodological individualism 1 3 failed to gain a significant footing in the self-image of sociologists during the Weimar period. Holistic, historicist, idealist, and voluntarist ideas contributed to sociology's self-image as w e l l as to its perception by others much more strongly than did Weber's program. 1 4 Becker's assertion that "the battle for sociology is at bottom a battle about a n e w concept of science," 15 w h i l e entirely correct, must nevertheless not be understood as referring to a problem specific to sociology alone. What w e are dealing w i t h here is a general controversy on the function of the sciences in a period of heterogeneous political ideas and values. This con-

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troversy affected sociology just as much as the other sciences, but it was more explicitly argued out in it than in these other sciences. The first chairs for sociology were established in the newly founded universities after the war: in Frankfurt by special endowments, in Cologne by municipal initiative. The third new university, Hamburg, also received a chair for sociology, as did Leipzig and the Institutes of Technology (Technische Hochschulen) at Dresden and Braunschweig. The German Sociological Society made considerable efforts to introduce a major in sociology for its students, and also recommended sociology (especially to Institutes of Technology and Institutes for Trade and Commerce) as a supplementary subject in General Studies. This coexistence of sociology in the "narrow" and in the "broad" sense left room for virtually every sociological orientation. Ferdinand Tonnies argued that only the future development of sociology could justify its present institutionalization: Throw it in at the deep end and it would learn to swim. 16 This general discussion was pursued in 1932 with greater clarity. Karl Mannheim's speech at the Congress of German University Teachers

of

Sociology

[Tagung

reichsdeutscher

Hochschuldozenten

der

Soziologie] on February 28, 1932, decisively influenced that body. He there defines sociology in the "narrower sense" as a "specialized science" which studies the "conditions and forms of sociation" [Vergesellschaftung] in an "unhistorical, axiomatic," "comparative and typifying" and "historically individualizing" way. He adds the w a r n ing: "In Germany we must today primarily oppose the exaggerations of the historicists, w h o still under the influence of the traditions of the romantic and the historical school, make the conception of the essential uniqueness of the historical into a myth, thereby closing themselves off f r o m all those f r u i t f u l insights that comparison and generalization would be capable of bringing out." He distances himself f r o m all philosophers of history, and also f r o m that brand of cultural sociology which is a "theory of the general interconnectedness of happenings in the social and cultural domains." The connections between different areas of culture do not arise "because they are parts of some unattached spirit floating about somewhere, but because they are an expression of the life and fate of quite definite h u m a n groups." For Mannheim, sociology also includes empirical social research: A structural v i e w contains the inherent risk that o n e accustoms oneself to considering facts observed in compact interconnections as if they were precise data or else c o m b i n i n g purely hypothetical constructs w i t h o n e another. This finally leads to o n e hypothesis con-

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firming another and to building card houses that do not correspond to any reality. As a counterweight to the runaway growth of purely constructive thinking, adopting the method of precise description and the application of quantitative data are very desirable counters to these defects of speculative thinking.

Finally, he lists "contemporary analysis," as a "structural sociology" of the present, among sociology's areas of study, as a way to the "sociological orientation" of a democratic society, to prevent the transformation of a "democracy based upon reason" into a "democracy based upon emotional appeal" which can serve as the legitimation for dictatorship. From this comprehensive program M a n n h e i m develops three different curricula for the teaching of sociology: political and legal; economic and social scientific; and a philosophical orientation with an emphasis upon intellectual history. He does this cautiously, aware that "the constellation at the origin of a science shapes its subsequent character, and its pedagogical form generally works back upon its scientific form." Once codified, the "conceptual structure of a science will long determine what empirical matters can make their way into the sciences and what is bound to be obscured by these very conceptualizations." 17 Karl Mannheim's views have been set out at such length here because they typify the self-conception of sociology at the end of the Weimar Republic. Mannheim, w h o had gained a considerable reputation with his book Ideologic und Utopie (1929), is a typical representative of the younger generation of sociologists of the Weimar period, w h o saw in sociology a specific discipline and not just a mere perspective. Had this development, for which he was the leading spokesman, not been broken off in 1933, his views would almost certainly in the 1930s have had a decisive effect, and not only on the institutionalization process of German sociology. Among the sociologists of influence in the Weimar period w h o had not already emerged as significant figures prior to World War I, the most important are Leopold von Wiese, Hans Freyer, and Karl Mannheim. Von Wiese, though a tireless organizer, lacked intellectual fascination; Freyer was a brilliant intellectual, but took no part in the institutional development of the discipline; M a n n h e i m combined analytic precision with a sense of responsibility for the scientific development and political and educational function of sociology in a liberal and democratic society. He could have brought to fruition Max Weber's legacy of a comparative, antihistoricist and anti-idealist sociology. But all attempts to institutionalize sociology came to nought. Even

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45

though the Prussian parliament decided in 1929 to set up chairs for sociology at all universities, the economic crisis and subsequently National Socialism put an end to such endeavors. The decisive impulses for the development of sociology in the Weimar Republic came, not from the universities and from academic sociology, but from quite other contexts and practical orientations. Of particular importance was the popular education movement that took root after the war, especially the Deutsche Hochschule fur Politik in Berlin, founded in 1920, which became a center for political sociology and political science.18 Equally innovative and influential was the Schule der Arbeit in Frankfurt, 19 which was co-founded by Hugo Sinzheimer. The Volkshochschule movement met with great interest among younger sociologists and offered to many their first professional platform. Paul Honigsheim, for example, was director of the Volkshochschule in Cologne from 1919 to 1933, and Theodor Geiger worked as an administrator of the Volkshochschule in Berlin until he was appointed in 1928 by the Technical University of Braunschweig. The expansion of vocational institutes provided the younger sociologists with new fields of activity, as did the schools for social work and welfare. This entire branch of nonuniversity education has yet to be investigated in its importance for the development of sociology in the 1920s; this is also the case for the adult education activity of the parties, the trade unions, and the various branches of the youth movement. 20 Also important was the development of labor law and labor courts. Labor law opened a whole new field of sociological investigations. Hugo Sinzheimer is an influential example of this development. Trade unions and employer associations brought lawyers such as Ernst Fraenkel and Franz Neumann into the social sciences. When the universities became increasingly traditionalist and when antidemocratic ideas began to predominate among the professioriate, younger social scientists turned toward fields of activity outside the universities.21 "Thus what we call social and political science was largely carried on outside the universities," wrote Franz Neumann in retrospect.22 In this connection one should also mention the journals Die Gesellschaft, and Die Arbeit (the latter a publication of the socialist clerical workers' association), which provided a forum for the pedagogical and political interests of the younger generation of social scientists. The period after 1928 saw an extraordinary invigoration of sociology, in both its academic and nonuniversity manifestations. This de-

46

M. RAINER LEPSIUS

velopment has yet to be clearly brought out in any history of the sociology of the Weimar Republic. Important books were published, such as Ideologie und Utopie by Karl M a n n h e i m (Bonn: Cohen, 1929), Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft by Hans Freyer (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1930), as well as the Handwörterbuch der Soziologie, edited by Alfred Vierkandt (Stuttgart: Enke, 1931), the first systematic survey of sociology, which contains as its theoretical centerpiece Theodor Geiger's "Soziologie: Aufgaben, Methoden, Richtungen," an article on the tasks, methods, and approaches of sociology. In Frankfurt the leading positions in sociology were in 1930 inherited by M a n n h e i m (from Oppenheimer) and by Horkheimer (from Grünberg). Theodor Geiger had already been called to Braunschweig in 1928. The generation in their mid-thirties began to occupy chairs, redefining sociology and also turning to empirical and practice-oriented work on problems of contemporary social structure. Among this generation are: Theodor Geiger (born 1891), Albert Salomon (1891), Gottfried Salomon (1892), Karl Mannheim (1893), Max Horkheimer (1895). They faced a much older generation of notables in the field: Ferdinand Tönnies (1855), Werner Sombart (1863), Franz Oppenheimer (1864), Alfred Vierkandt (1867), Alfred Weber (1868), Richard Thurnwald (1869). There was a generation gap between them of almost thirty years; a generation molded by Bismarck's empire was replaced by one marked by World War I and by the postwar period. Leopold von Wiese (1876) was closer to the older generation; Hans Freyer (1887) to the younger. The new upsurge in sociology after 1928 was borne by the younger generation, and it was precisely they w h o after the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933 were by and large forced, at the age of about forty, to give up their academic work in Germany and go into exile. One manifestation of this new orientation, which had moved away f r o m the old philosophical and methodological positions of "metasociological" reflection and which understood sociology as a science of the present, are a great outpouring of sociological works, only some of which were still published in Germany prior to 1934. Among these writings are: Theodor Geiger's Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart: Enke, 1932), Rudolf Heberle's Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1963), previously published in an abbreviated English version under the title From Democracy to Nazism (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1945), Max H o r k h e i m e r et al.'s Studien über Autorität

und Familie (Paris: F. A l c a n ,

1936), Hans Speier's Die Angestellten vor dem Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977). Also emphasized in this

SOCIOLOGY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

47

context must be the revival of empirical research, especially the activities of the group of researchers under Paul F. Lazarsfeld in Vienna, whose Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1933)23 represents a milestone of empirical research which remains renowned even today. Finally it must be remembered that the foundations of the sociologies of Alfred Schutz and Norbert Elias, which did not gain general recognition until long after World War II, were already laid before 1933. There is no indication that the development of sociology would have ceased at the end of the Weimar Republic. On the contrary, it is precisely during the Republic's last years that sociology demonstrates, in its empirical research output and its institutionalization, a vigorous, wide-ranging development. 24 The National Socialist seizure of power is the cause for the rupture of this development. Only one distinct philosophical and sociological line of development did continue across the gap: philosophical anthropology. It was begun in the early 1920s by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner and pursued into the 1940s by Arnold Gehlen. 25 There has recently been a debate on the significance of the National Socialist seizure of power for the development of sociology in Germany and on the nature of sociology under National Socialism. This debate is characterized by a profound uncertainty in its criteria of evaluation. 26 It must above all be pointed out that some two-thirds of all full-time and part-time teachers of sociology had been expelled f r o m the universities by 1938 in consequence of the seizure of power. Furthermore, most of the new generation of younger sociologists also left the country. 27 The ensuing considerable weakening of the manpower potential of sociology must be directly attributed to the National Socialist seizure of power. National Socialism did not especially seek out sociologists for persecution as a group, since it rather concentrated on racially and politically discriminated groups. This policy, however, hit the social sciences particularly hard, and not coincidentally, since the social sciences pursued research programs that attracted intellectuals from particular sociocultural groups. If the emigration of social scientists is viewed not in terms of the loss in manpower potential but rather in terms of its consequences for the scientific nature of the sociology that remained in Germany, we can observe a systematic result: the exclusion of particular scientific traditions f r o m sociology. Political intervention produced a selection of academic orientations in favor of historicism, holism, idealism, voluntarism, and Social Dar-

48

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winism, and to the detriment of methodological individualism, historical materialism, structuralism, and analyses of social change as well as socialization theory. The former orientations have had a long tradition in the German humanities, which were molded by romanticism and idealism; Social Darwinism joined in later. National Socialism did not create these orientations but made possible their prevalence against those forces that had opposed these traditions since the end of the nineteenth century. The latter were also represented in sociology, if the thinkers favored after 1933 are to be reckoned as belonging in the history of German sociology: Herder, Hegel, Moser, Fichte, Riehl, Dilthey, Spann. If, by way of these traditions, the attempt is made to demonstrate the continuity of sociology in the period beyond 1933, it must at the same time also be shown that other traditions show no such continuity. If this is not done, the selection of traditions already determines the result of the investigation, viz., the assertion that sociology did survive after 1933. In every reflection on the spiritual roots of National Socialism the question always arises which elements f r o m a complex intellectual history are to be selected and brought into a causal relationship to National Socialism, and h o w those elements that show no affinity to it are to be treated. In principle it may be assumed that ideas and thinkers can be located for every conceivable political regime in a long, complex intellectual history and that these can, after the fact, be brought into a plausible affinity with the legitimation claims of the political regime. But this remains trivial as long as the criteria for selection and imputation have not been defined. The same holds true for inquiries into the continuity of sociology beyond 1933 and for discussions on the characteristics of sociology under National Socialism. That there was sociology both before and after 1933 is a trivial observation, as long as the criteria have not been justified on the basis of which only those elements to which continuity is ascribed and which characterize sociology under National Socialism are selected f r o m the complex history of sociology. Such purely nominalist argumentation cannot do justice to the facts and merely adds to confusion since it is quite obvious that the history of sociology includes diverse research programs and different methodological approaches. These differences must be taken into account together with the different conceptions of science that result. The question whether National Socialism spelled the end of sociology in Germany is therefore at the same time a question about what sociology in fact is, or, more precisely, h o w m a n y sociologies we want to distinguish, and

SOCIOLOGY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

49

w h i c h a m o n g t h e m were d o n e a w a y w i t h by National Socialism a n d w h i c h not. It is precisely the scientific heterogeneity of the sociology prior to 1933 that requires such distinctions. If the history of sociology is seen as a n attempt to achieve a systematic analysis of the d e t e r m i n a n t s of h u m a n existence that are rooted in the fact that m a n is a social a n i m a l , t h e n the history of sociology i n volves the cognitive differentiation of m a n ' s perception of the world a n d of h u m a n existence. This program a i m s at a g r a d u a l d i f f e r e n t i a tion of social factors, structures, a n d processes f r o m biological factors on the one h a n d a n d f r o m cultural conceptions of order [Ordnungsideen] o n the other. I n d i v i d u a l action, as affected by social factors, emerges as the starting point f o r analysis. Right f r o m the beginning, there is considerable resistance to this cognitive differentiation in terms of intellectual history. The relativization of traditional perceptions a n d interpretations of h u m a n existence w h i c h accompanies the sociological outlook causes uncertainties. As a result, there are efforts to preserve traditional notions of order of a transcendental k i n d a n d to reconstruct these as philosophies of history that promise a satisfactory degree of reduction in complexity a n d w h i c h keep constant the perception a n d the m e a n i n g f u l interpretation of the conditions a n d the purpose of history. This reaction in intellectual history t o w a r d the sociological research program takes shape especially in historicism, holism, idealism, materialism, a n d Social D a r w i n i s m . A l t h o u g h e m ploying different strategies, all these attempts share a n interest in preventing the sociological perspective f r o m d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g itself, or at the very least to w a r d off those of its consequences w h i c h they see as threatening. Totalities grounded in essences [wesenhafte Ganzheiten] developing in accordance w i t h the l a w s of a philosophy of history (i.e. in accordance w i t h a cultural projection of a n d interpretation of h u m a n existence) keep reflection about the social d e t e r m i n a n t s of h u m a n existence at a level of abstraction not susceptible to empirical testing. The social variables, variously entangled in hypothetical orders of diverse construction, are thereby rendered incapable of being differentiated a n d isolated. This gives rise to sociologies a n d "anti-sociologies." Sociology u n d e r National Socialism is consequently distinguished by the fact that "anti-sociological" research programs gain prominence. In racial theory, the n a t u r e a n d n u r t u r e debate gives w a y to a r g u m e n t s in f a v o r of inheritance; social factors d e t e r m i n i n g h u m a n behavior, w h i c h can be demonstrated by scientific analysis, are simply excluded. In the theory of the people's [Volk] historical subjectivity, w h a t is elevated into the subject matter of social reflection is a m y t h i c a l "totality"

50

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which escapes sociological analysis. Through the idea that reality is constituted by the deed, the role of social determinants in the organization of society is replaced by a voluntaristic idealism. A desire to ward off modernization is revealed in the emphasis upon integration, synthesis, and "community." Faced with the manifestations of this modernization — capitalism, industrial society, urbanization and the dissolution of structurally homogeneous communities, pluralist interest formation and the institutionalization of conflict, differentiation of guiding social and moral ideas and new forms of solidarity — sociology under National Socialism shows preference for depreciating or for simply ignoring industrial society ("anticapitalism"), for straightforwardly celebrating socioculturally homogeneous patterns of settlement such as the village and rural areas ("anti-mass society"), for the devaluation of conflict institutionalization ("antidemocratism"), for retaining shared values ("anti-intellectualism"), for a reduction of expressions of solidarity ("antisociety"). Insofar as a very one-sided selection f r o m among the social factors of h u m a n existence goes along with these moral and political attitudes, sociology under National Socialism is indeed a partisan sociology. But before such an assessment can be made, it must first be demonstrated that sociological research was carried out in the first place, at least in a narrow sense. The mere fact that work was done on particular social problems and areas of social concern (for instance, town and country planning, work productivity and personnel management, folklore, population trends, etc.) is in itself not sufficient to demonstrate this. Sociology is distinguished not by a unique experiential subject matter but rather by its distinctive cognitive subject matter. Insofar as this latter could not be derived f r o m racial theory, it was taken over f r o m idealist and historicist social philosophy. It is for this reason that Arnold Gehlen's sociologically rather imprecise Institutionalism is the only doctrine which has been able to survive into the present. Sociology under National Socialism no longer encompasses the whole range of scientific approaches characteristic of German-language sociology in the 1920s; it is a partisan sociology. Even a number of those sociologists, furthermore, w h o did remain in Germany, either voluntarily ceased publishing sociological works or were forced to do so. They thereby effectively lost their influence under National Socialism. Alfred Weber and Alfred von Martin are examples. The German sociology in exile must not be forgotten w h e n discussing the history of German sociology during this period. Considered f r o m the standpoint of the history of science that would not be

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justifiable for several reasons. First, the sociology in exile continued fundamental intellectual traditions which under the rule of National Socialism in Germany (and also in Austria, following the imposition of the corporate state there) were politically persecuted or at least suppressed. The macrosociological structural analysis of industrial society, with its roots in Marxism, was perhaps the most prominent victim. Second, the majority of the representatives of the newer approaches which made their appearance after World War I, including Freudian social science, phenomenological sociology, the sociology of knowledge, and modern political sociology, were among the émigrés. For the emigration of social scientists meant not merely their by and large involuntary exile, but also the banishment of particular traditions, approaches, and topics of research. Only in exile did the scientific promise of the German-language sociology of the interwar period become evident, and only there did it emerge as a significant force in international sociology. The writings of Max Weber and Georg Simmel were largely taken up and developed further by émigrés w h o introduced these authors to international sociology (Hans Gerth, Reinhard Bendix, Lewis Coser, Kurt H. Wolff). It was not until long after the war that a systematic engagement with both Weber and Simmel could be witnessed in Germany. The modern theory of science, which had its beginnings in Vienna and Berlin, also made itself felt in German social science only after the war, by way of the emigré writings, especially those of Karl Popper. This is also the case for social psychology, and here especially for the work of Kurt Lewin. The significance of Paul Lazarsfeld for the development of empirical social research has already been pointed out. Finally, there is the further development of the sociology of knowledge, of the critique of ideology, and of the sociology of law in the work of Theodor Geiger, as well as the growing interest during the past two decades in the work of Alfred Schutz and of Norbert Elias, whose influence was delayed by their emigration. These few examples must suffice to indicate the promise of German sociology, which was already evident and on the verge of coming to fruition in the early 1930s, but which was ruptured by National Socialism. It was, finally, again émigrés w h o in their ambitious diagnoses of the "German catastrophe" reflected upon the intellectual, political, and moral collapse of Germany under National Socialism. Among these diagnoses are: Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941), Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklarung (Amsterdam: Querido,

52

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1944),28 Karl Mannheim, Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus (Leiden: A.W. Sitzhoff, 1935),29 Franz Neumann, Behemoth (London: V. Gollancz, 1942), Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (New York and London: Harper, 1942), Helmuth Plessner, Das Schicksal des deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche (Zurich and Leipzig: M. Niehaus, 1935), and Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York and London: Harper, 1942). It is in the works of the émigrés that the intellectual potential of German sociology — viz., to come to terms with the actual political reality — was in fact realized. Those sociologists who remained in Germany, by contrast, were unable, even after the war, to draw any sociological conclusions and achieve theoretical insights from their personal experience with National Socialism. NOTES 1. Apart f r o m R a y m o n d Aron's book La sociologie allemande contemporaine (Paris: F. Alcan, 1935 [German Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1964)], published in G e r m a n in 1953, and the t w o articles by Karl M a n n h e i m , "German Sociology (1918-1933)" in Politica (February 1934) 1:12-33, and Albert Salomon, "German Sociology," in Georges Gurvitch a n d Wilbert E. Moore, eds., Twentieth Century Sociology (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), the e x a m i n a t i o n of sociology in the i n t e r w a r period begins w i t h the following f o u r articles published in the Kölner Zeitschrift ftlr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1959) (11)1: Gottfried Eisermann, "Die deutsche Soziologie i m Zeitraum v o n 1918 bis 1933," pp. 54-71; Heinz Maus, "Bericht über die Soziologie in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945," pp. 72-79; Svend Riemer, "Die Emigration der deutschen Soziologen nach den vereinigten Staaten," pp. 100-112; René König, "Die Situation der emigrierten deutschen Soziologen in Europa," pp. 113-131. This period also saw the publication of review articles by W.E. M ü h l m a n n , "Sociology in Germany: Shift in Alignment," in H. Becker a n d A. Boskoff, eds., Modern Sociological Theory (New York: Dryden Press, 1957), and by René König, "Germany," in J.S. Roucek, ed.. Contemporary Sociology (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1958), as well as Helmut Schelsky's Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie (Düsseldorf-Cologne: Diederichs, 1959). [See essay 5.] In the 1960s the f o l l o w i n g publications appeared: Kurt Lenk, "Das tragische Bewusstsein in der deutschen Soziologie der zwanziger Jahre," Frankfurter Hefte (May 1963) 18(5):313-320 [a later version of Lenk's article is contained in essay 2]; Helmut Klages, "Zum Standort der deutschen Soziologie im ersten Jahrhundertdrittel," Jahrbuch flr Sozialwissenschaft (1964) 15:256-280; K. Braunreuther, Ökonomie und Gesellschaft in der deutschen bürgerlichen Soziologie (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1964); Ralf Dahrendorf, "Soziologie u n d Nationalsozialismus," in Andreas Flitner, ed., Deutsches Geistesleben und Nationalsozialismus (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1965); Bernhard Schäfers, ed., Soziologie und Sozialismus: Organisation und Propaganda. Abhandlungen zum Lebenswerk von Johann Plenge (Stuttgart: Enke, 1967). A n e w interest in detailed studies began in the late 1960s w i t h a n u m b e r of American publications on the significance of the social science emigration: Laura Fermi, Illustrious

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Immigrants (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); D o n a l d F l e m i n g a n d Bernard Bailyn, eds., The Intellectual Migration (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d University Press, 1969), w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , M a r i e J a h o d a , H. Stuart H u g h e s a n d Herbert Feigl o n t h e social sciences; H. Stuart H u g h e s , The Sea Change (New York: Harper & R o w , 1975). I n this c o n n e c t i o n , F r a n z L. N e u m a n n , "The Social Sciences," in The Cultural Migration ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : University of P e n n s y l v a n i a Press, 1 9 5 3 ) a n d Robert Boyers, ed., The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s o n H a n n a h A r e n d t , T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , Herbert Marcuse, Karl M a n n h e i m a n d Otto K i r c h h e i m e r , also deserve m e n t i o n . M a r t i n J a y ' s The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, B r o w n & Co., 1973) s t a n d s at t h e b e g i n n i n g of a n e x t e n s i v e literature o n t h e Institut f ü r Sozialforschung a n d its l e a d i n g figures. Other p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e H e l m u t Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1978); Ulrike M i g d a l , Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts flr Sozialforschung ( F r a n k f u r t : C a m pus, 1981 ); a n d M i c h a e l Wilson, Das Institut flr Sozialforschung und seine Faschismusanalysen ( F r a n k f u r t : C a m p u s , 1982). See also Paul K l u k e , Die Stiftungsuniversität Frankfurt am Main ( F r a n k f u r t : K r a m e r , 1971 ), w h i c h discusses t h e social sciences at t h e University of F r a n k f u r t a n d t h e Institut f ü r Sozialforschung. Also w o r t h y of m e n t i o n is S u s a n n e Pettra Schad, Empirical Social Research in Weimar Germany (Paris-Den Haag: M o u t o n , 1972). M o r e recently, a n u m b e r of studies, i n c l u d i n g Ph.D. theses a n d Habilitationen, h a v e been published, a m o n g t h e m Heine v o n A l e m a n n , "Leopold v o n Wiese u n d d a s Forschungsinstitut f ü r Sozial Wissenschaft in K ö l n 1919-1934," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1976) 28:649-673; Ursula Karger, "Deutsche Soziologentage in Perspektive," Sociologia Internationalis (1976) 14(l-2):7-21; A l f o n s Söllner, Geschichte und Herrschaft: Studien zur materialistischen Sozialwissenschaft 1929-1942 ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1979); Bärbel Meurer, "Vom b i l d u n g s b ü r g e r l i c h e n Zeitvertreib zur F a c h w i s s e n s c h a f t . Die deutsche Soziologie i m Spiegel ihrer Soziologentage," i n B. H e i d t m a n n a n d R. Katzenstein, eds., Soziologie und Praxis (Cologne: P a h l - R u g e n s t e i n , 1979); Sven Papcke, "Die d e u t s c h e Soziologie z w i s c h e n T o t a l i t a r i s m u s u n d Demokratie," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (May 17, 1980) B20:3-19; W a l t r a u t B e r g m a n n et al., Soziologie im Faschismus 1933-1945 (Cologne: P a h l - R u g e n s t e i n , 1981 ); see also t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n t h e a n t h o l o g y Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich 1918-1945 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), w h i c h is Special issue 23 of t h e Kölner Zeitschrift flr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, M. R a i n e r Lepsius, ed.; H e l m u t Schelsky, Rückblick eines 'Anti-Soziologen' (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981); R e n é König, "Uber das v e r m e i n t l i c h e E n d e der d e u t s c h e n Soziologie v o r der M a c h t e r g r e i f u n g des Nationalsozialismus," Kölner Zeitschrift flr Soziologie und Sozial psychologie ( 1984) 36:1 -42; t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s by Dirk Käsler, Erhard Stölting, T h o m a s H a h n , M a r g r i t Schuster, H e l m u t h Schuster, a n d J o h a n n e s Weyer o n t h e role of sociology u n d e r N a t i o n a l Socialism, in Soziale Welt (1984) 35:5-145; Dirk Käsler, Die frühe deutsche Soziologie 1909-1934 und ihre Entstehungsmilieus (Opladen : Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984). For Austria, see Leopold R o s e n m a y r , "Vorgeschichte u n d E n t w i c k l u n g der Soziologie in Österreich bis 1933," Zeitschrift flr Nationalökonomie (1966) 26(l-3):268-282, a n d J o h n Torrance, "The Emergence of Sociology i n Austria 1885-1935," Archives européennes de Sociologie (1976) 17:185-219. 2. W r i t i n g s w h i c h consider t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of sociology i n these decades in a b r o a d e r c u l t u r a l context include: René König, "Zur Soziologie der z w a n z i g e r Jahre," in L e o n h a r d Reinisch, ed., Die Zeit ohne Eigenschaften. Eine Bilanz der zwanziger Jahre (Stuttgart: K o h l h a m m e r , 1961); König, Studien zur Soziologie ( F r a n k f u r t a n d H a m b u r g : Fischer, 1971); Georg Lukâcs, "Die d e u t s c h e Soziologie der i m p e r i a l i s t i s c h e n Periode," i n Die Zerstörung der

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Vernunft (Neuwied: L u c h t e r h a n d , 1962) ["German Sociology of t h e Imperialist Period," in The Destruction of Reason, Peter P a l m e r , tr. (London: T h e M e r l i n Press, 1980)]; E d w a r d Shils, "Tradition, Ecology a n d I n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e History of Sociology," Daedalus (Fall 1976) 99(4):760-825. Wolf Lepenies, ed., Geschichte der Soziologie, 4 vols. ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1981 ) c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t are i n f o r m a t i v e f o r t h i s period. 3. See René König, "Die J u d e n u n d d i e Soziologie," in his Studien zur Soziologie ( F r a n k f u r t a n d H a m b u r g : Fischer, 1971) a n d , m o r e generally, Herbert A. Strauss, " J e w i s h E m i gration f r o m G e r m a n y . Nazi Policies a n d J e w i s h Responses ( 1 )," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XXV (London: Seeker & W a r b u r g , 1980), pp. 313-361; "Jewish E m i g r a t i o n f r o m G e r m a n y . Nazi Policies a n d J e w i s h Responses (2)," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XXVI (London: Seeker & W a r b u r g , 1981), pp. 343-409. 4. See R e i n h o l d K n o l l et al., "Der österreichische Beitrag zur Soziologie v o n der J a h r h u n d e r t w e n d e bis 1938," in M. R a i n e r Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland und Osterreich, pp. 59-101. Also W i l l i a m M. J o h n s t o n , The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1972), as well as t h e impressive account of t h e u n i q u e V i e n n a intellectual e n v i r o n m e n t a r o u n d a n d a f t e r t h e t u r n of t h e c e n t u r y by Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: K n o p f , 1980); A l l a n J a n i k a n d Stephen T o u l m i n , Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: S i m o n a n d Schuster, 1973); W i l l i a m J. M c G r a t h , DionysianArt and Populist Politics in Austria (New H a v e n : Yale U n i v e r sity Press, 1974). A f t e r t h e t u r n of t h e c e n t u r y , Budapest h a d a n intellectual m i l i e u of c o n siderable interest to t h e history of sociology. A "Social Scientific Society" h a d been f o u n d e d there in 1900, a n d s t i m u l a t e d m u c h sociological interest. See Zoltän H o r v a t h , Die Jahrhundertwende in Ungarn. Geschichte der zweiten Reformgeneration 1896-1914 (Neuwied: L u c h t e r h a n d , 1966); David Kettler, Marxismus und Kultur. Mannheim und Lukdcs in den ungarischen Revolutionen 1918/1919 (Neuwied a n d Berlin: L u c h t e r h a n d , 1967) ["Culture a n d Revolution: Lukäcs i n t h e H u n g a r i a n R e v o l u t i o n of 1918," Telos (Winter 1971) 10]; A r n o l d Hauser, Im Gespräch mit Georg Lukdcs ( M u n i c h : C.H. Beck, 1978). 5. See H e l m u t Fogt, "Max Weber u n d die d e u t s c h e Soziologie der W e i m a r e r R e p u b l i k : Aussenseiter oder G r ü n d e r v a t e r ? " i n M. R a i n e r Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland und Osterreich, pp. 245-272, a n d Gerd Schroeter, "Max Weber as Outsider: His N o m i n a l I n f l u e n c e o n G e r m a n Sociology in t h e Twenties," Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences (1980) 16:317-332. The a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y e v a l u a t i o n of Weber's i n f l u e n c e in these t w o articles results f r o m d i f f e r e n t criteria of e v a l u a t i o n . On t h e w h o l e it is p r o b a b l y correct to state t h a t it is u n l i k e l y t h a t Weber could h a v e g a i n e d w i d e r acceptance prior to t h e 1930s, since his collected w o r k s w e r e a v a i l a b l e o n l y a f t e r 1925 a n d are at a n y rate n o t easy to u n d e r s t a n d , l e a v i n g aside t h e w r i t i n g s a l r e a d y w i d e l y discussed before t h e w a r , in particular the v a l u e f r e e d o m postulate, t h e Protestant Ethic thesis, a n d t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l essays. Not before 1937 did t h e first c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n a l y s i s of M a x Weber's sociology a p pear, Talcott Parsons' The Structure of Social Action (New York a n d L o n d o n : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1937). W h a t is r e m a r k a b l e is not so m u c h t h i s r a t h e r late date, b u t t h e fact t h a t t h e first systematic t r e a t m e n t of M a x Weber's sociology s h o u l d h a v e c o m e f r o m a n A m e r i c a n . This is quite typical f o r t h e history of Weber's i n f l u e n c e i n t h e i n t e r w a r period. 6. See René König, "Soziologie i n Berlin u m 1930," pp. 24-58, a n d R e i n h o l d K n o l l et al., "Der österreichische Beitrag zur Soziologie v o n der J a h r h u n d e r t w e n d e bis 1938," o n sociology in V i e n n a , in Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich 1918-1945, pp. 59-101. 7. See H a n s Linde, "Soziologie in Leipzig 1925-1945," in Lepsius, ibid., pp. 102-130. 8. C.H. Becker, Gedanken zur Hochschulreform (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1919).

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9. Georg v o n Below, "Soziologie als Lehrfach* in Schmollers Jahrbuch ßr Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft (1919) 43(4):59-l 10. Also p u b l i s h e d as a b o o k ( M u n i c h a n d Leipzig: Duncker & H u m b l o t , 1920). 10. F e r d i n a n d Tönnies, Hochschulreform und Soziologie (Jena: S. Fischer, 1920), p. 33. 11. See M. Rainer Lepsius, "Gesellschaftsanalyse u n d S i n n g e b u n g s z w a n g , " in G ü n t e r Albrecht et al„ eds., Soziologie. René König zum 65. Geburtstag (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973). 12. See H a n s Freyer, Das politische Semester. Ein Vorschlag zur Universitätsreform (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1933); also his Herrschaft und Planung. Zwei Grundbegriffe der politischen Ethik ( H a m b u r g : Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933). 13. See W o l f g a n g Schluchter, "Wertfreiheit u n d V e r a n t w o r t u n g s e t h i k , * in his Rationalismus der Weltbeherrschung ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1980) ["Value Neutrality a n d t h e Ethic of Responsibility," in G u e n t h e r Roth a n d W o l f g a n g Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods (Berkeley, Los Angeles, L o n d o n : University of California Press, 1979)]. 14. See Dirk Käsler, "Der Streit u m d i e B e s t i m m u n g der Soziologie auf d e n d e u t s c h e n Soziologentagen 1910-1930," i n Lepsius, Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich, pp. 199-244 ["In Search of Respectability: The Controversy Over t h e Destination of Sociology d u r i n g t h e C o n v e n t i o n s of t h e G e r m a n Sociological Society, 1910-1930," Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture, Past and Present, vol. 4, R.A. J o n e s a n d H. K u k l i c k , eds. (Greenwich: J a i Press, 1982)]. 15. C.H. Becker, Vom Wesen der deutschen Universität (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1925), p. 41. 16. Stoltenberg, Soziologie als Lehrfach an deutschen Hochschulen (Karlsruhe: G. B r a u n , 1926), p. 19. 17. Karl M a n n h e i m , Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1932). The quotes c o m e f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g pages: 7 , 8 , 9, 11, 22, 24, 28, 31, 37, 33. 18. See Ernst J ä c k h , ed., Politik als Wissenschaft. Zehn Jahre Deutsche Hochschuleßr Politik (Berlin: H. Reckendorf, 1931); Ernst J ä c k h a n d Otto Suhr, Geschichte der Deutschen Hochschule ßr Politik (Berlin: Gebr. Weiss, 1952). 19. See Otto A n t r i c k , Die Akademie der Arbeit in der Universität Frankfurt a.M. (Darmstadt: E. Roether, 1966). 20. Leopold v o n Wiese h a d edited a v o l u m e entitled Soziologie des Volksbildungswesens ( M u n i c h : Duncker & H u m b l o t ) as early as 1921. A m o n g t h e professors at t e a c h e r - t r a i n i n g institutes were: Albert S a l o m o n in Cologne, Frieda W u n d e r l i c h in Berlin, Ernst K a n t o r o w i c z a n d K ä t h e Mengelberg i n F r a n k f u r t . Otto K i r c h h e i m e r a n d m a n y others w o r k e d in t r a d e - u n i o n a n d political a d u l t e d u c a t i o n . 21. See Herbert Döring, Der Weimarer Kreis. Studien zum politischen Bewusstsein verfassungstreuer Hochschullehrer in der Weimarer Republik ( M e i s e n h e i m : H a i n , 1975), Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d University Press, 1969). 22. Franz L. N e u m a n n , "The Social Sciences," in N e u m a n n et al., The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : T h e University of P e n n s y l v a n i a Press, 1953), pp. 21-22.

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23. Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal [1933], 2d ed. (Allenbach and Bonn: Verlag f ü r Demoskopie, 1960) [Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community, tr. by the authors with J o h n Reginall and Thomas Elsaesser (Chicago: Aldine, 1971)]. 24. On sociological research done in Germany prior to the National Socialist seizure of power, the results of which were for the most part published only in exile, see M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die sozialwissenschaftliche Emigration und ihre Folgen," in Lepsius, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich, pp. 461-500, and René König, "Über das vermeintliche Ende der deutschen Soziologie vor der Machtergreifung des Nationalsozialismus." The thesis that sociology was finished even before the National Socialist seizure of power is maintained by Helmut Schelsky in Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie, pp. 36 ff. 25. See Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, "Philosophische Anthropologie und die 'Soziologisierung' des Wissens vom Menschen," in Lepsius, ed., Soziologie im Deutschland und Österreich, pp. 160-198. 26. See Carsten Klingemann, "Heimatsoziologie oder Ordnungsinstrument? Fachgeschichtliche Aspekte der Soziologie in Deutschland zwischen 1933 and 1945," in Lepsius, ibid., pp. 273-307, and also the biographical references there. 27. See M. Rainer Lepsius, "The Development of Sociology in Germany after World War II (1945-1968)," International Journal of Sociology (1983) 13(3): 3-87. On the loss of an entire new academic generation, see also the surveys appended to the article by M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die sozialwissenschaftliche Emigration und ihre Folgen," pp. 487-500. 28. English: Dialectic of Enlightenment, J o h n Cumming, tr. (New York: Seabury, 1972). 29. See also the revised and considerably enlarged English translation by Edward Shils, Man and Society in an A ge of Reconstruction (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940).

2 The Tragic Consciousness of German Sociology K U R T LENK I f e a r that w e w i l l p r o t r u d e i n t o a n a l i e n f u t u r e l i k e the r e m n a n t of a n aristocratic culture. — Ernst Troeltsch

The German sociology of knowledge of the 1920s, as Gottfried Eisermann has aptly observed, unlike any other branch of sociological investigation, is both "in its origins," and "in its entire approach, an essentially German product of mind." 1 It can therefore hardly be regarded as a mere sociological speciality. To be sure, certain constituent elements can in fact be identified as belonging to such a more narrowly conceived sociology of knowledge, in contrast to its overall thrust as a general "philosophy of knowledge." 2 However, such a sociology of knowledge fails to grasp the basic impulses and intentions of both Max Scheler's and Karl Mannheim's more comprehensive orientations. If we want to spell out the significance of the sociology of knowledge in terms of cultural history by focusing on a number of its key concepts, it is first of all necessary to specify the sociocultural context and the particular milieu in which the sociology of knowledge approach initially arose. The general mood which permeates especially the writing of Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber, Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim finds its point of convergence in a tragic consciousness. Not unlike a concave mirror, this phenomenon gives focus to the leading themes of the social consciousness shared by a segment of the German intelligentsia from the beginning of World War I

Translation by V o l k e r Meja and Gerd Schroeter of "Das tragische Bewusstsein in der deutschen Soziologie," in Kurt Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie ( N e u w i e d : Luchterhand, 1972), pp. 9-41. Text abridged and notes revised f o r this book by the author. Earlier versions w e r e published

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^ one that is accessible to reflection). In it, the wish for Translation by Dieter Misgeld and Steven Roesch of "Zur Wesenbestimmung der Aggression," pp. 221-230 of Alexander Mitsrherlich, Gesammelte Schriften 5 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). Originally published as "Aggression und Anpassung," in Psyche (1956) 10:180-187.

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the parents' death is experienced w i t h guilt. Aggression has a definite direction here a n d even as f a n t a s y it leads to guilt feelings. Up to this developmental stage, aggression (whether u n i n t e n d e d or purposive) is a l w a y s experienced as hostile. But w e need to distinguish more carefully between aggression a n d activity, a n d in particular between destructive intervention (as aggression in the strict sense) a n d action. Activity is clearly instinctual: the o r g a n i s m provides the requisite tools w h i c h permit expression a n d release f o r the d i f f u s e inclination t o w a r d constant activity. There is n o need to introduce n e w basic concepts. But if w e w a n t to regard instinctual activity as aggression, it is h e l p f u l to emphasize the wider m e a n i n g of this concept. In the field of the other basic drive, sexuality, w e clearly distinguish between pregenital a n d genital sexuality. In a similar m a n n e r , incompetent a n d competent aggressiveness can be contrasted. The latter w o u l d refer to activity that is adequate to a goal or situation. Regressive acts, w h i c h are possible in the sphere of aggression just as m u c h as in that of sexuality, w o u l d t h e n signify retreats to earlier, u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f o r m s of action unsuited to present goals a n d situations but w h i c h once offered satisfactory release. After Freud h a d conceived of the death instinct, he h a d even less reason t h a n before to relinquish the n o t i o n of aggression, since aggression n o w signified all i n n a t e destructive tendencies. H o w the life instincts attain their goal r e m a i n s unclear, however, if o n e does not w a n t to ascribe to t h e m all the instinctual energy used in constructive, goal-directed action. But such a s h a r p separation of the concepts is not necessary for our model of instinctual d y n a m i c s a n d perhaps goes beyond w h a t this m o d e l can in fact achieve. For in everyday life w e cannot observe either sexuality or aggression in their pure state. "The t w o f u n d a m e n t a l instincts combine forces w i t h each other or act against each other, a n d t h r o u g h these c o m b i n a t i o n s produce the p h e n o m e n a of life." In a n y case, it is a p p a r e n t l y the case that "without this a d m i x t u r e of aggression, the sexual impulses r e m a i n u n a b l e to reach a n y of their aims." 3 A detailed analysis of aggression by w a y of p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d instinctual d y n a m i c s is a n endeavor quite different f r o m asking w h i c h combinations of instincts or f o r m s of m u t u a l support m u s t occur before the more differentiated instinctual drives can take the place of the less differentiated ones. If aggression is a necessary part of libidinal impulses a i m i n g at instinctual release, t h e n the libidinal character of cathexis must (as Freud has stressed) mitigate the aggressive impulses. Only a t w o f o l d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the instinctual object, as both aggres-

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sively active and libidinally motivated (in the sense of a sexual or sublimated attention to the object), provides that optimal tension appropriate to reality and to the experiences of the "other* which can lead to a release satisfactory to both the ego and the id. The same holds true for restraints upon aggression. The intolerable suppression of an individual's early, undirected, and yet unskilled expressions of activity do not leave his libidinal development unaffected. Reality is after all tested and its laws are experienced by means of activity. Lack of experience of reality as tested by such activity leads to a fixation of libidinal development in its primitive early stages — and the fate of libidinal impulses is equally dark. It is significant that an exaggerated dependency (as well as the ambivalence which comes along with it) can, for example, be caused by interference with the child's motor activities. It is also the case, furthermore, that a phobic avoidance of danger or the imposition of a rigid discipline which hinders a child's spontaneous motor development may in fact be merely a pathological cover for libidinal affection toward the child. The assumption of primary destructive tendencies seems quite justified if we look beyond the fortunes of an individual's childhood (in which his behavioral patterns are formed) and toward the general movement of history. Here, in the sphere of the "eternal return of the same," libidinal efforts are thwarted by aggressive tendencies, and collective outbursts of such destructive instinctual tendencies overwhelm all opposing desires and cathexes. The question arises whether this occasional predominance of purely destructive impulses is the result of an incomplete control over human instincts, since human instincts can never be completely standardized. The incessant transformation of man's environment requires the destruction of past achievements in order to make room for the new. In any case, the controversy that has existed among psychoanalysts ever since Freud conceived of the death instinct cannot be settled pragmatically — for example, by careful observation of the first sign of instinctual impulses. Not even psychoanalysis provides the key to the definitive understanding of humanity. Even what cannot be assimilated to our respective anthropological designs survives nevertheless as an empirical fact. Yet these remain open questions. What is certain is that a flexible response to the child and empathy with his needs (especially in the earliest period of life) will encourage competent activity. This activity is directed toward more subtle instinctual objects and will prevail over destructive aggressiveness charged with affect. Whether aggressiveness is always rooted in the death instinct is a question that can probably

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never be resolved. But it seems beyond doubt that the death instinct, when entwined with libidinal cathexes, can be placed into the service of Eros. The supra-individual task of culture lies precisely in developing "practices for mastering life" ["Daseinspraktiken" — H. Thomae] which strengthen this amalgamation of instincts. This means, first of all, that to a certain extent destructiveness must be tolerated without fear. Second, that the inevitability of causing frustration to a child must not unconsciously lead to the expression of independent aggressive and destructive tendencies. Frustrations are a necessary element of successful adaptation to reality. But they should be rationally justified; demands for their acceptance should not be emotionally charged. For psychoanalysis the great diversity of dynamic instinctual processes represents learned behavior. Thus the two modes of behavior mentioned reveal the fundamental weaknesses of the social formation of behavior in general. We are far from having achieved a level of ego strength or of consciousness which would make us relatively free of anxiety and permit us to control our destructive instinctual impulses. Socially necessary adaptation consequently means that we need to adapt to "mature" forms of life. But the entire process of adaptation cuts two ways, at least as long as adaptation means little more than to acquire mechanisms of defense against instinctual impulses, which are thereby divorced from the ego and from conscious experience, as well as to suppress anxiety in a similar manner. The alternative would be to develop ways of coming to terms with anxiety by way of an unambiguous understanding of reality. The result is an only partially successful socialization, in which unsocialized residue, rather than persisting in a natural state, as "pure id," is filled with energized contents which have been deformed by repression and obstruct communication of the id with the ego. A decisive adaptation limit is reached when the primary core of instinctual satisfaction becomes threatened. A lasting adaptation to the social code which enables the individual to resist frustrations as well as temptations can succeed only if the satisfaction of the basic instinctual drives remains culturally accepted. To dismiss every sexual and natural expression as worthless, hostile to values, and "vile" — such an exaggerated prescription of sublimation and neutralization of instinctual energy (as, for example, in Calvinism and Puritanism) has, of course, led to the emergence of collective neuroses destructive of life that are, furthermore, characterized by a veritable double standard. But it has also resulted in uncontrolled aggressiveness without genuine libidinal bonds. This development has undoubtedly stimulated the dy-

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namics of technical progress, but also a senseless pursuit of unfettered claims to ownership as well as cruel indifference in relations with weaker, "underdeveloped" partners. Intolerable frustrations and intimidations (which can be easily documented) have strongly encouraged aggression and the channeling of the innate tendency toward destruction against, for example, the earth, buffaloes, colonized peoples, or in the direction of child rearing. The great achievement of civilization — the incredible variety of cultural forms — has, as a result of aggression, been experienced in a cold, gloomy, and highly manic way. Another condition must be mentioned: isolation. Here the transformation of inhibited activity into aggression becomes especially clear. As an example of such "an accumulation of aggressive responses," Konrad Lorenz4 cites the isolation of small groups from "conspecific surroundings on which the dammed-up drives can be abreacted." A n example of this would be the crews of small ships on which "polar malady" erupts. In such situations "minor irritations can eventually have a ridiculously angering effect." There follows a "massive threshhold-lowering of the behaviour patterns of angry outbreaks." The obstruction of instinctual energy is accompanied by an increased capacity to master impulses, but apparently only until a turning point is reached; then the obstruction recedes in a jerky pattern. Viewed psychodynamically, this is a process of regression. In the frustration phase, the needs for activity are burdened with ever stronger affects. The more the primary pressure of the drive builds against the barriers blocking its release, the less reality oriented is its actual release, that is, it becomes less capable of sublimation or neutralization. The usual tolerance threshold is reduced, and a storm of primitive affects overpowers the control of the ego. When members of an animal species are removed from their usual surroundings, the isolation likewise releases absurdly destructive tendencies. Konrad Lorenz has shown this with reference to the behavior of a pair of cichlids which were held in isolation. "Following the absence of threatening conspecifics to chase a w a y from the family," the male will finally attack his mate and kill her. "This response pattern is particularly typical of Geophagus, and one can prevent this by placing a mirror in the aquarium for the male to abreact his aggression." 5 The foremost task of the contemporary analysis of culture is to identify the level of frustration which is acceptable in human societies. Severe renunciations do not inevitably lead to the release of aggression or to such detrimental psychic consequences as apathy, resignation, depression, and ultimately psychosis. But it can hardly be any longer

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denied that explosions of antisocial behavior and periods of psychic impoverishment as well as of emotional indifference result f r o m the particular organization of society at least as much as f r o m a genetically predetermined readiness to react. And as a consequence of psychoanalytic discoveries, attention regarding these matters has shifted ever f u r ther toward the first formative experiences of childhood and their consequences. Enormous changes in the entire social environment have greatly altered the situation into which a child is born and in which he spends his first years. Birth in a hospital; the mother without the support of kinship relations; restrictions of the toddler's sphere of action; less stimulation as a result of the diminishing opportunity for observing work outside the home as well as for observing animals and plants; premature relocations; the extensive absence of the father, and increasingly also of the mother; the organization of play areas with mechanically moving (or "performing") mass-produced objects — all this implies a thoroughgoing transformation of the child's world of experience which we must also consider w h e n speaking of frustration. 6 It may turn out that the affective stimulation which in the initial period of life is n o w provided ever more exclusively by the mother, the libidinal attention she is asked to provide, and the way she must set rules amount to a burden which goes beyond the abilities of the average person. Perhaps the entire range of stimuli which, proceeding f r o m the environment, arouses and progressively socializes the instincts has been focused too exclusively on a satisfying relationship between mother and child — and perhaps nothing can compensate for a deficiency in this area and make this frustration more tolerable. Behavior that is ruled more by frustrations than by conscious direction — "frustration behavior," as Norman Maier calls it — produces with increasing frequency clear signs of the "Kaspar Hauser" condition. Here a primary narcissism that lacks adequate environmental stimulation combines with a secondary narcissism that is imposed by means of inadequate stimulation and excessive intimidation. Affective sluggishness, learning blocks, inconsiderateness, and a reluctance to endure even small delays in instinctual gratification produce an inflexible behavior devoid of any goals. Such a person only pursues unsublimated and immediately attainable instinctual gratifications. This particular condition, of course, has been described often enough; its existence and increasing frequency have not been disputed. A change of the underlying conditions is urgently called for. As Konrad Lorenz writes: "The only means of eliminating a functional disruption of a system

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lies in causal analysis of the system a n d the disturbance." 7 Here the limits of psychological help become evident. M a n y factors contributing to the f o r m a t i o n of t r a u m a h a v e their roots in the "circumstances" created by society. Psychological analysis can only contribute to a n e x p a n s i o n of consciousness that t h e n m a y lead to a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the precariousness of social reality a n d of the u n r e a sonable a n d often intolerable n a t u r e of its d e m a n d s . It m a y also reveal the vicious cycle of s t i m u l u s a n d response, of r e n u n c i a t i o n s a n d their removal, a n d the psychological reactions w h i c h result. The apotheosis of the "well-balanced person" n o longer displaying a n y signs of suffering — this well-adjusted member of society is a n ideological f a n t a s y w h i c h serves the objective f u n c t i o n of concealment. 8 A closer look s h o w s that this peaceful prototype, w h o has reconciled himself to society, is a n attractive image for both the "free world" a n d f o r the world enslaved by dictatorships. W h e t h e r a society's d o m i n a n t values are m a i n t a i n e d w i t h tolerance or intolerance is in a certain sense mere superstructure. In both cases there prevails a suspicious need for order. This need a p pears to indicate little m o r e t h a n a defensive denial of reality. The psychic economy of a n actively craved c o n f o r m i t y in the one case, a n d a terroristically enforced c o n f o r m i t y in the other, m a y t h u s u p o n closer inspection both a m o u n t to a m a n d a t e f o r repression, by either i n h i b i t ing aggression or by relaxing libidinal constraints. The mobilization a n d specialization w h i c h a c c o m p a n y industrialization are complemented, as it were, by a standardization of psychic attitudes: the i n d i v i d u a l person, in order to be u s e f u l as consumer a n d as worker, is not to be subjected to excessive f r u s t r a t i o n . He is encouraged to enjoy a primitive sort of self-gratification, to resist impulses t o w a r d self-destruction, a n d to disengage himself libidinally f r o m the w o r l d to such a n extent that he can be m a n i p u l a t e d a n d "readied" f o r use. A d o r n o says of this sort of "well-balanced person" that he " w o u l d be c o n f u s i n g his psychic state . . . w i t h objective reality" a n d , f u r t h e r : "[h]is integration w o u l d be a false reconciliation w i t h a n unreconciled world, a n d w o u l d presumably a m o u n t in the last analysis to a n 'identification w i t h the aggressor.'" 9 A d o r n o ' s sociological perspective conf i r m s w h a t w e h a v e tried to describe psychologically as a defect w h i c h arises as a result of overtaxing the i n d i v i d u a l ' s capacity to w i t h s t a n d frustration and conformity. Psychoanalysis, w e should remember, is f o r b i d d e n in all dictatorships; the reason f o r this is n o doubt its characteristic claim that the i n dividual m u s t be liberated both f r o m the constraints w i t h i n his o w n n a t u r e as well as f r o m the latent ideological structure of society. A per-

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son of sufficient ego strength can thus resist becoming a "well-balanced person." He instead experiences in himself what is unhealthy beyond himself, in society. As the pressures toward conformity and toward denying these aspects of reality grow ever more powerful, an individual's road to recovery is increasingly marked by unavoidable suffering. And this fact alone is enough to unite all "conservative" forces against psychoanalysis and its therapeutic aims. NOTES 1. S i g m u n d Freud, "Jenseits des Lustprinzips?" Gesammelte Werke ( L o n d o n : I m a g o P u b l i s h i n g , 1940), 13:57. [ S i g m u n d Freud, "Beyond t h e Pleasure Principle," J. Strachey, tr. (New York: B a n t a m Books, 1959), p. 93). 2. A n n a Freud, "Notes o n Aggression," Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic (1949) 13:143-151 [The Writings of Anna Freud, vol. 4, 1948/49 (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Universities Press, 1968)1. 3. Ibid. [p. 67], 4. K o n r a d Lorenz, "Ganzheit u n d Teil in d e r tierischen u n d m e n s c h l i c h e n G e m e i n s c h a f t , " Studium Generale (1950) 3(9):481 ["Part a n d Parcel i n A n i m a l a n d H u m a n Societies," Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour ( L o n d o n : M e t h u e n , 1971), 2:163], 5. Ibid. 6. A l e x a n d e r Mitscherlich, "Der u n s i c h t b a r e Vater," Kölner Zeitschrift ftlr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1955) 7:188. 7. K o n r a d Lorenz, "Ganzheit u n d Teil in d e r tierischen u n d m e n s c h l i c h e n G e m e i n s c h a f t , " p. 504 ["Part a n d Parcel in A n i m a l a n d H u m a n Societies," p. 195], 8. T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o , "Zum V e r h ä l t n i s v o n Soziologie u n d Psychologie," in T h e o d o r W. A d o r n o a n d W a l t e r Dirks, eds., Sociologica ( F r a n k f u r t : E u r o p ä i s c h e Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 29 ("Sociology a n d Psychology II," New Left Review ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1968) 47:83], 9. Ibid.

20 On the German Reception of Role Theory FRIEDRICH H .

TENBRUCK

By the late 1950s, the basic concepts of structural functionalism — position, role, expectation, and sanction — had deeply influenced Germ a n sociology. Even though the actual utilization of these concepts is still limited, they are no longer lacking in recognition. This is due partly to the good reputation enjoyed by American social science and partly to the impressive completeness of its terminology (which is not, upon closer inspection, so complete after all). It is a common observation that theories undergo change in the process of their reception. As Gordon Allport has shown, all psychological theories imported f r o m Germany acquired a dynamic aspect in the United States. Such a thoroughgoing alteration cannot be generally assumed, however, in the case of the German reception of role theory. Nonetheless, the definition and utilization of its concepts in German sociology occasionally presents certain dangers. Most importantly, these dangers, which do not exist in American sociology in the same way, tend to distort social reality. Among these dangers I do not count here the superficial application of concepts which we occasionally find in borderline areas of sociological inquiry. The distortion of concepts by vested interests must be regarded as unavoidable. At the most basic level, it should be said that the concepts of role theory, w h e n used merely as labels, do not constitute sociological understanding. At best, they point us in the direction of the distinctly sociological level of analysis. Astronomers, if they are to tell us anything at all, must go beyond the mere information that planets move in regular orbits to either the calculation of these orbits or the general explanation of specific mechanisms by an analysis of mass, movement, and attraction. In just this way, sociological understanding can only begin when, by way of the concepts mentioned above, specific roles become transparent or w h e n society can be Translation by Stephen Kalberg a n d Claudia Wies-Kalberg of "Zur deutschen Rezeption der Rollentheorie," Kölner Zeitschrift ftlr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1961) 13:1-40. Shortened f o r this book by the a u t h o r .

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understood as a n e n s e m b l e of roles. The latter task requires a systematic a p p r o a c h a n d necessitates the consideration of a d d i t i o n a l a n d m o r e c o m p l e x issues, such as a t y p o l o g y of social groups, socialization, social d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d stratification, a n d the distinction b e t w e e n structure a n d c u l t u r e o n the o n e h a n d a n d values, n o r m s , a n d institutions o n the other. T h e actual usage of these terms, it s h o u l d be e m p h a s i z e d , is not decisive here. Social reality c a n be described i n a v a r i e t y of w a y s , a n d sociological u n derstanding existed l o n g before "position," "role," "expectation," a n d "sanction" w e r e c o m m o n l y used. Nonetheless, the a d v a n t a g e of this v o c a b u l a r y lies not o n l y in its t e r m i n o l o g i c a l consistency. It also keeps us a w a r e of every society's basic reality a n d thereby p r o v i d e s us w i t h a m e a n s of i n q u i r y that alleviates the necessity to seek a n e x p l a n a t o r y f r a m e w o r k f o r e v e r y n e w case. Yet precisely because these concepts are invested w i t h a general sociological m o d e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a m o r e t h o r o u g h c o m p r e h e n s i o n of these terms m u s t not be absent.

The Misunderstanding It appears that the interpretation of these basic concepts itself occas i o n a l l y gives rise to a t e n d e n c y f o r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y at times c o n v e y the impression that society consists of m o n a d s . H a r m o n y bet w e e n these m o n a d s is a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l role requirements, over w h i c h , nonetheless, the s e l f - c o n t a i n e d m o n a d s reign. Either singly or collectively, these m o n a d s break out of their i s o l a t i o n o n l y in order to a v e n g e a w r o n g or to a p p l a u d a n a c h i e v e m e n t . In this w a y , each role is understood by the i n d i v i d u a l as isolated a n d discrete rather t h a n as e m b e d d e d w i t h i n active a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s that, t h r o u g h the sheer i m m e d i a c y of social action, p r o v e their v i a b i l i t y a n d r e n e w themselves. By selecting as a starting p o i n t the i n d i v i d u a l situated in a n abstract m a t r i x a n d oriented t o w a r d his role rather t h a n the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n role i n c u m b e n t s oriented toward each other, i n d i v i d u a l a n d role g r a d u a l l y a n d i m p e r c e p t i b l y g r o w apart in role t h e o r y until they stand i n antagonistic o p p o s i t i o n . Just this c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of social role as e x t r a n e o u s a n d e x t e r n a l to the i n d i v i d u a l seems to constitute the central f e a t u r e i n this t e n d e n c y t o w a r d systematic m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Precisely such a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is characteristic of Ralf D a h r e n d o r f ' s Homo Sociologies.1 Since it is d e v e l o p e d i n this b o o k into a p r o g r a m m a t i c statement w i t h r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r sociological theory in general, I shall f o c u s u p o n it i n the discussion that f o l l o w s . For D a h r e n d o r f , the sociological u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h u m a n beings

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runs into a pernicious conflict with human freedom. This is a theme that will be taken up later. It is first necessary, however, to consider how Dahrendorf views the sociological understanding of man. As is well known, for him this understanding is encapsulated in the gloomy idea of the alienation of man from himself. With the exception of a few less pessimistic passages, this notion runs as a pivotal line of orientation throughout his entire book. The general impression is unambiguous: fundamentally alien to individuals, social roles are cast upon them from the outside. Action in reference to roles implies a conformist surrender of the individual to the group and expresses the demands and expectations of others. Indeed, Dahrendorf can mean nothing more if he wants his reader to consider his real problem — the conflict between freedom and Homo sociologicus — seriously. Consistent with this focus, sanctions (especially negative sanctions) attain central importance in Dahrendorf's analysis. Although he considers in passing other mechanisms of social control, none influences his argument significantly. The general line of orientation is once again unambiguous: roles are performed because sanctions stand behind the expectations of others. The coercive character of the role corresponds with its tendency to alienate. In combination, they constitute the externality of the role and lead to the paradox of Homo sociologicus. On the other hand, socialization does not introduce a new understanding of role-oriented action. It ultimately means only "depersonalization, the yielding up of man's absolute individuality and liberty to the constraint and generality of social roles."2 Undoubtedly, role theory has acquired here a tone that it never possessed in American sociology. Nowhere in American sociology — and some may consider the distinctly American optimism implied here to be naive — do we find any suspicion that the understanding of individual action as role-oriented involves a conflict with individual freedom. What has happened here? Can we settle the matter by arguing that, in the course of its reception, role theory altered its form? Apparently this is indeed so. Yet we would still like to know exactly how and at what point this change took place. Why does Dahrendorf, even though there is not the slightest precedence for doing this in the American discussion of role theory, suddenly focus his attention upon "alienation," "the deprivation of society," and "depersonalization?" Exactly where and w h y is role theory altered? And, once this change and the reasons for it have been understood, what remains of the paradox of the Homo sociologicus?

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Structure and Culture Dahrendorf's m o d i f i c a t i o n of role theory consists in his treatment of roles as d e p e n d i n g u p o n expectations a n d concomitant sanctions. This will be discussed later in detail. Before d o i n g so, a very general comparison of D a h r e n d o r f ' s approach to A m e r i c a n role theory is in order. Immediately a p p a r e n t is his elevation of negative sanctions to a position of priority, even t h o u g h m u c h of A m e r i c a n sociology does not subscribe to this concept. As Arnold Rose writes: "Rewards are m u c h m o r e f r e q u e n t a n d effective in creating c o n f o r m i t y t h a n most of us are aware. . . . P u n i s h m e n t s are m o r e obvious, but it is likely that rewards are m o r e n u m e r o u s , m o r e pervasive, a n d in the long r u n m o r e effective." 3 Moreover, in bestowing e m i n e n t i m p o r t a n c e to legal institutions, Dahrendorf stands in diametrical opposition to A m e r i c a n t h i n k i n g . As A.W. Green writes in this respect: "American sociologists h a v e tended to argue that since compliance is largely secured by m e a n s of a threat to w i t h d r a w a p p r o v a l — w i t h i n the f a m i l y , w o r k group, a n d i n f o r m a l association — t h e n l a w , w h i c h threatens physical coercion, plays a secondary role in social control." 4 In general, the degree to w h i c h sanctions, a n d especially negative sanctions, are a significant aspect of roles r e m a i n s a n altogether unresolved issue. The v i e w that negative sanctions contribute to the satisfactory p e r f o r m a n c e of roles is by a n d large accepted w i t h o u t f u r t h e r ado. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that there are statements in the A m e r i c a n literature that come close to D a h r e n d o r f ' s interpretation a n d occasionally are even in complete agreement w i t h h i m . Yet such statements m u s t not be taken out of context. A m e r i c a n sociology's v i e w of society can hardly be reduced to a f e w definitions a n d scattered statements. Despite its remarkable theoretical d e v e l o p m e n t , this v i e w of society is also quite clearly rooted in a n a p p r o a c h to the subject m a r k e d by breadth a n d depth, by the flexible a n d creative use of concepts, by a sympathetic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of social realities, as well as by a w i d e spread a n d variegated use of illustrative materials a n d of d i f f e r e n t perspectives. Perhaps all these features can best be demonstrated by recalling that American sociology approaches social p h e n o m e n a not o n l y by w a y of the analysis of social structures, but also by w a y of culture a n d frequently also by w a y of the individual. This, at a n y rate, is the u n d e r standing of society presented in sociological textbooks, w h e r e structure a n d culture are indeed often so i n t e r t w i n e d that not even a n analytic

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separation is attempted (as in the term "sociocultural"). Culture is not simply eliminated even where such a conceptual separation does take place. Talcott Parsons, w h o more than perhaps anyone else has advocated a structural view of society, writes: "The cultural and social components must be mutually integrated, because each presents indispensable functional prerequisites of the other." 5 He does in no way believe that culture can be reduced to structure. In sum, the breadth and depth of American sociology, which originated primarily in its close historical and organizational association with cultural anthropology, 6 guarantees first that the structural conceptualization of society is understood as an abstraction f r o m the reality of society, of which culture is a part, and second that the notion of culture simultaneously enters structural functional theory. The latter point is evidenced in the customary emphasis upon norms and values in the secondary literature on the concept of role. 7 Although roles are often linked to the expectations of others, this does not mean that roles must be perceived as external and alien. "Expectation" does not carry the narrow connotation of an unreasonable demand, but delineates instead a range of action that reaches f r o m demands to unconscious desires and mere hints to action guided by consensus and sentiment. Not individual but complementary roles constitute the subject of investigation. As a result of this breadth and depth of the American approach, which interweaves the levels of culture, structure, and individual action in reference to roles, various participating elements are always involved. These cannot, however, be weighed out proportionately. In this manner, American sociology has developed an awareness that roles and role behavior can mean very different things, as well as an appreciation of the fact that the proportionate significance of internal and external controls, positive and negative sanctions, and laws and customs can scarcely be determined in a general way. Above all, this broad approach guards against any utilization of the basic concepts of role theory to reconstruct social reality in such a manner that sanctions would of necessity take over the role of the motor of social action. In light of all these considerations, it should be clear that an adequate reception in Germany of American sociology, and especially of role theory, need not focus primarily upon its sophisticated theoretical constructions as such. Rather, the major problems, content, and framework of these theories become comprehensible to the German audience only if it is familiar with the full breadth of general sociological knowledge in the United States. Those w h o neglect this point run the

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risk of c o n f u s i n g h i g h - l e v e l abstractions — all of w h i c h i n v o l v e prel i m i n a r y f o r m u l a t i o n s , i n c o m p l e t e theories, a n d necessarily one-sided statements — w i t h c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s . F u r t h e r m o r e , concepts i n tended to a n a l y z e certain aspects of society are c o n f u s e d w i t h content, a n d largely d e f i n i t i o n a l procedures w i t h the m e t h o d s of s o c i o l o g y . Every good a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e t e x t b o o k c a n serve as a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to A m e r i c a n sociology. O n l y f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h several s u c h textbooks, w h e n s u p p l e m e n t e d by p a t h b r e a k i n g studies i n s o c i o l o g y a n d c u l t u r a l a n t h r o p o l o g y , c a n assist G e r m a n s to u n d e r s t a n d recent A m e r i c a n t h e o retical d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d prepare t h e m to u n d e r t a k e a p r o g r a m of i n f o r m e d criticism. W i t h o u t such preparation, a n y c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h theoretical a d v a n c e s in A m e r i c a n s o c i o l o g y w i l l necessarily lead to a d a n g e r o u s n a r r o w i n g of its theoretical p o w e r a n d e v e n to sterility. T h e major reason f o r D a h r e n d o r f ' s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of role theory, it seems to m e , c a n be f o u n d in precisely s u c h considerations. W h e r e the structural o r g a n i z a t i o n of society is separated — a n d n o t just p r a g m a t i c a l l y a n d f o r certain a n a l y t i c a l purposes, but in reality — f r o m w i d e l y accepted ideas, values, a n d t e c h n i q u e s ("culture"), a n d w h e r e , therefore, social structure is seen as i n d e p e n d e n t a n d self-contained, the process of socialization degenerates i n t o a mere l e a r n i n g of role skills. Roles t h e m s e l v e s are c o n c o m i t a n t l y w e a k e n e d a n d perceived by i n d i v i d u a l s as m e r e claims placed u p o n t h e m by society. W i t h i n this c o n f i g u r a t i o n , sanctions indeed b e c o m e the center of society. W h e n e v e r the concepts of role t h e o r y a l o n e are required to f u l l y e x p l a i n social reality, they reveal their o w n n a r r o w n e s s a n d rigidity. T h e c o n c l u s i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l is alienated f r o m society seems to be the result of precisely such n a r r o w n e s s a n d one-sidedness.

Role and Sanction Let us n o w t u r n to o u r m a j o r t h e m e . W e c a n best begin by n o t i n g the point of departure f o r all theoretical a n a l y s e s of structure: w h e r e v e r society exists, social roles are l i n k e d to social positions. Here w e are d e a l i n g w i t h facts, a n d t h u s D a h r e n d o r f is m i s t a k e n w h e n he writes: " A l t h o u g h Homo sociologicus w a s u n t i l recently a mere postulate, a n idea w h o s e u s e f u l n e s s m a n y suspected but n o o n e h a d c o n c l u s i v e l y demonstrated, there w o u l d seem to be a c h a n c e t o d a y of testing the postulate by a p p l y i n g it to e m p i r i c a l problems." 8 H o w e v e r , to the e x tent that one correctly u n d e r s t a n d s action b o u n d to roles as i m p l y i n g s i m p l y a u n i f o r m i t y of b e h a v i o r patterns by i n c u m b e n t s of the s a m e position, it becomes o b v i o u s that this action c a n be directly observed

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and requires no confirmation through research studies. S.F. Nadel, a pillar of British social anthropology w h o m Dahrendorf fittingly cites as an authority, comes to the same conclusion: It should be stated, first of all, that the role concept is not an invention of anthropologists or sociologists but is employed by the very people they study. No society exists w h i c h does not in this sense classify its population into fathers, priests, servants, doctors, rich men, wise men, great men, and so forth, that is in accordance with the jobs, offices or functions w h i c h individuals assume and the entitlements or responsibilities w h i c h fall to t h e m . . . . What anthropologists and sociologists have done over and above recognizing the existence of this categorization has been to turn it into a special analytic tool.®

We turn n o w to a further structural fact. Expectations concerning the action of others exist in every society. In the absence of personal knowledge, w e can, w i t h i n certain limits, count upon the behavior of others simply as a result of k n o w l e d g e of their social position. A g a i n , this is an observable fact and not a hypothesis. It is also certain that these expectations cannot persist if action is not bound to roles. It f o l lows that role and expectation are complementary. The m a i n point here, however, is not to argue that such expectations directed toward others can become the cause of action; rather, the expectation implies above all only that actions of others can be relied upon. The eventual conjoining of sanctions w i t h these expectations means only that action conforming to a role w i l l be met w i t h differentiated reinforcement and that action deviating f r o m a role w i l l confront various punishments. It should be noted n o w that the concepts just discussed, including the complementarity of roles and expectations, do not by a n y means — and this simple fact seems to be forgotten time and again — constitute a sociological theory. This remains the case even though they solve, in a preliminary fashion, the c o n u n d r u m of h o w individual actions lead to social order: they call attention to preexisting role obligations and thereby to the calculability of role incumbents' actions. They leave completely open, however, the issue of h o w such action in reference to roles originates, the significance of expectations and sanctions, and the question of h o w the d y n a m i c of social action arises. In v i e w of these observations, it must be concluded that the concepts of role theory do not constitute a sociological theory; rather, out of the infinite diversity of occurrences and happenings, they delineate the immediate subject matter of sociology. By sensitizing us to the order and unity of this realm, they provide the science of society w i t h its distinct level of analysis. Nonetheless, it need not be denied that other comprehensive orders capable of providing the subject matter for

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sociology could be also articulated. A l t h o u g h the legitimacy of different approaches and procedures must be acknowledged, it seems — and here I agree w i t h Dahrendorf — that the r u d i m e n t a r y concepts of a theory of social structure constitute a natural point of departure for sociology: they alone comprehensively a n d realistically distinguish sociology's primary object of attention w h i l e also penetrating into all of the more complex social relationships. A specifically sociological theory, however, will evolve f r o m these concepts only w h e n explanations can be provided for the origins of action in reference to roles, w h e n a means is discovered to assess the degree to w h i c h expectations and sanctions become significant for action, a n d w h e n explanations can be offered for the ways in w h i c h role a n d expectation are f o r m e d and changed. This indispensable elaboration u p o n the structural concepts — a n elaboration that should not be a priori constricted in a n a r r o w sense to the realm of structure — r u n s a certain risk, as Arnold Rose has noted: "In any discussion of culture, especially of the non-material culture with w h i c h the sociologist is m a i n l y concerned, or of sanctions supporting culture, a n impression is almost unavoidably but incorrectly given of a tremendous social pressure a n d individual conformity. That is true of no culture." 10 In this passage, Rose summarizes the experience of all w h o have read a n introductory textbook in sociology based u p o n a theory of social structure. Unexpectedly, a n d w i t h a certain necessity, the reader acquires a mistaken impression. That impression arises as a result of the fact that expectations exist a n d are directed to role i n c u m bents in a variety of ways, that roles locate their origin in the expectations of others, and that these expectations impinge u p o n role incumbents, remaining external and alien to them. Observation of the fact that deviance is punished by sanctions becomes transformed into the belief that individuals perform their roles because they are threatened by negative sanctions or enticed by positive ones. In the process, the point of departure is, w i t h o u t explicit additional consideration, tacitly displaced to the level of individual motivation, a n d the objective correspondance of role a n d expectation is reduced to a clearly psychological causal relationship in w h i c h roles as the expectations of others are reified and expectations degenerate to the level of demands. Through this spurious procedure, concepts originally intended only to define more clearly the area of investigation for sociology become transformed into explanatory concepts. Individual and society conf r o n t each other "unavoidably but incorrectly," the role becomes dictated by the group, and the sanction becomes the motive of the role

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incumbent. For w h a t e v e r reasons, Dahrendorf's interpretation rests on this misunderstanding. Never justified, it is s i m p l y ordained that role and socialization i m p l y alienation as w e l l as depersonalization and that sanctions are the motor of society. It is s i m p l y assumed that individuals conceptualized by sociology are puppets. These puppets are then depicted through the creation of a n e w concept: Homo sociologicus.

Internal and External Controls But w h y does this use of concepts i n v o l v e a misunderstanding? The facts called attention to here do not exclude this interpretation; indeed, at first glance it seems quite plausible. It possesses, like all theories located on the pleasure-pain spectrum, a peculiar appeal. It appears that a simple a n d u n i f i e d principle has succeeded in explaining the existence of social order. Our desire f o r cognitive clarity is satisfied long before the need arises f o r a more detailed understanding of a particular behavior or of particular expectations. Not surprisingly, a clear and f a m i l i a r behavior model is utilized: the child w h o renounces an action in order to f u l f i l l parental expectations and retain parental love as w e l l as other advantages, the employee w h o acts according to the instructions of his supervisor in order to avoid the threatening consequences that w o u l d otherwise arise, and the resident of the small t o w n w h o considers churchgoing as a means to ensure his good social standing are all examples f o r a behavior model f a m i l i a r to us all f r o m our o w n experience — one w e frequently employ in order to e x p l a i n the behavior of others. Sociology w i l l not be able to relinquish it, if only because an abundance of such behavior exists. Indeed, to see the true center and behavioral model of society in this analysis seems quite logical since all breaches of social expectation are in fact punished. This last point contributes decisively to the "unavoidable but incorrect" impression that society as such is a coercive institution [Zwangsanstalt], It is certain, h o w e v e r , that punishment f o r role deviance does not logically lead to the conclusion that f u l f i l l m e n t of the role is caused by the threat of sanctions. Yet, f r o m a sociological perspective, the question remains w h a t m e a n i n g should be attached to this universality of negative sanctions if roles (or, at a n y rate, some roles or parts of roles) frequently are f u l f i l l e d w h e n such sanctions are lacking. A n extremely fictitious situation comes to m i n d : the case in w h i c h the performance of all roles is based solely upon internal controls.

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Even in this case a universal mode of punishment would be necessary simply because the inner controls, which consist not only of moral principles and values but also habit (the obviously right, the proven, and the useful), can, as a result of the interconnected character of action, only remain lasting and effective if they are universally valid. Deviance involves a weakening of the general effectiveness of inner controls that is in principle unbounded. Therefore, sanctions against deviants would be necessary even if the predisposition to deviate was originally only very limited. It is here, and not in the motivation of persons performing roles, that we must primarily look for the function of sanctions. Thus, logically, the universality of sanctions compel us to reject the assumption that lies at the very base of Dahrendorf's approach to social action. If this position is accepted, it follows that social roles present an array of options for their incumbents. In other words, it is assumed that, wherever sanctions provide the final explanation for action oriented to a role, the role is given to an incumbent in competition with other potential behavior and action. In essence, role incumbents appear as individuals w h o select between alternatives. In this sense, a number of roles are always available to be chosen, even though, in light of the consequences, decisions take place in accord with the expected role. Such decisions, then, involve renunciations of alternative behavior. Yet, if this indirect specification of action at a certain psychological level constitutes our single means to understand action, an anthropological reduction of enormous proportion is introduced into the sociological approach. The diverse possibilities for action, all of which are k n o w n to us f r o m personal experience as well as f r o m the concepts of cultural anthropology and sociology, are here reduced to a single possibility: rational choice. Even though this action can assume different degrees of consciousness, society becomes a compulsory institution in which persons select available roles as a result of more or less explicit considerations and choices are made with the awareness that failure to do so would result in various forms of sanctions. It is worthwhile to examine this narrowing of possible actionorientations somewhat more closely. It should be first noted that social roles, wherever this narrowing occurs, must be equated with external actions, if only because these alone can be coerced. Yet the role of father, for example, obviously involves not only external actions; indeed, these are, at least in modern Western society, the most variable aspects of this role. In addition, an entire complex of emotions, commitments, and identifications belong to this role. Since not capable of

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being coerced, these components must be spontaneous. Indeed, without them external actions remain either largely meaningless or do not even take place at all. It is also noteworthy that these noncoercive components of a role by no means remain a matter of personal discretion. They are fully expected, and just these expectations are crucial for the role. As William Goode observes: "Precisely because the appropriate emotional response in the role is the day-to-day working origin of our appropriate role performance — that is because people 'feel' the appropriate emotions, they do the appropriate things — role failure in this dimension arouses more disapproval than does mere failure in role activity."" Indeed, almost all roles demand some kind of identification with the role based in feelings, anticipations, and aspirations that succeed in spontaneously asserting themselves in typical situations and, in the process, make possible action oriented to roles. Even though this identification and involvement might be less conspicuous in the case of more strongly institutionalized roles and particularly unfocused in the majority of cases in highly organized societies (about which more later), they remain central components in almost all roles. Even the behavior of the banker, the policeman, and the president of a club is not the result of their knowledge of required role skills and the concomitant sanctions; rather, in each of these examples, a certain identification is required. Where this is lacking, and where roles in fact revert simply to external claims, their quick extinction can be predicted. All these considerations lead us to the conclusion that social roles in principle go beyond the modes of action that can be called forth by sanctions. In light of this conclusion, we can also unequivocally state that the role character of action can be reconciled with the individual spontaneity of action; indeed, it even assumes it. The individual acts within situations in which sanctions — depending upon the role — acquire a (more or less) weighty and (more or less) direct significance, yet the situation itself is not created above all and solely through expectations and sanctions. It is not by accident that Dahrendorf's interpretation of social roles omits mention of their common point of reference in "typical situations." This phrase, customary in American sociology, is employed to remind the reader that role incumbents do not simply act according to expectations and sanctions directed toward them, but in the context of a situation. It is similar with expectations. The role incumbent is not circumscribed by a comprehensive catalogue of role obligations. Rather, expectations are formed for every case in typical situations: in precisely

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those situations that usually create for role carriers the presuppositions for their identification with the role, or at least with parts or aspects of the role. Moreover, the character of the expectations is misperceived if they are considered as demands primarily addressed to the person. We are dealing first of all with expectations about the behavior of others, and this means that a certain behavior is counted upon as self-evident. Only the disruption of this normal situation leads to a conscious reflection upon expectations and their orientation as demands upon others. This is the case when the role is not sharply "defined" or of generally questionable validity, or when the role incumbent in a specific case causes (or has caused) a disruption of "expectations." Equating expectations and demands reduces social action to those roles (or parts of roles) that are, in one way or another, contestable. Finally, it should be also noted here that many expectations cannot attain the degree of consciousness assumed in respect to demands. This is the case for expectations that can be fulfilled in such an obvious and general manner that no friction or reflection occurs. More important are those cases in which expectations lack sufficient specificity. This takes place wherever roles change and newly formed expectations have not yet acquired a distinct form. In other ways as well a certain behavior can belong to a role and remain incapable of being expressed in the form of a demand. This can be explained by the fact that expectations relate not only to external actions, but also to the attitudes behind these actions. Certain expectations regarding appearance, clothes, language, gestures, and other external modes of behavior are part of the role of the youthful lover. These external aspects are also evaluated as symbols for general and more deeply rooted attitudes that are expected. Yet these expectations, because of their generality, cannot be expressed, even though they clearly exist and are effective. For this reason, they cannot become demands. This problem of the "formulation" (and not only verbal formulation) and communicability of expectations exists for many roles and even parts of roles. Indeed, an essential aspect of the pragmatic side of sociological work consists in making such roles or parts of roles objectively known. These remarks, which are neither exhaustive nor systematic, have aimed to outline the type of understanding assumed by the concept of social role. Role and expectation must be conceptualized much more broadly than does Dahrendorf, and the interwovenness of role, expectation, sanction, and action oriented to roles is much more complex than can be captured in the theoretical constructs he offers. Homo sociologicus subjects the facts of society to a deceptively clear mechanical analysis.

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Dahrendorf's D e f i n i t i o n of Role W e n o w turn to Dahrendorf's attempt, in the m i d d l e section of his book, to bring out the concept of role more clearly. He discusses t w o definitions w h i c h , in his o p i n i o n , are irreconcilable. One addresses the actual behavior of i n c u m b e n t s of positions, the other discusses the e x pectations directed t o w a r d these incumbents. This problem exists f o r Dahrendorf partly because he f a l l s v i c t i m to terminological c o n f u s i o n . It is w e l l - k n o w n that A m e r i c a n sociology distinguishes between role a n d role playing. The role of the Chancellor of the Federal R e p u b lic is characterized by explicit a n d implicit rights a n d duties, a n d rem a i n s independent of the occupant's personality. This distinction leaves open the possibility f o r every Chancellor to f u l f i l l his roles in specific w a y s as w e l l as, perhaps, to c h a n g e them. C o n f u s i o n arises because w e encounter w i t h i n A m e r i c a n sociology a m i n o r i t y t e r m i n o l ogy that uses the w o r d "role" f o r the same p h e n o m e n o n that the majority designate as "role play." This is o b v i o u s l y the case w i t h Kingsley Davis, w h o m Dahrendorf quotes a n d w h o s e d e f i n i t i o n of role he considers d e f i n i t i v e . If w e ignore Davis' d e f i n i t i o n , it becomes q u i c k l y clear that the r e m a i n i n g c o m m o n l y e m p l o y e d d e f i n i t i o n s are quite similar. But w h a t , after all, does "definition" m e a n in this context? Let us leave aside that, in m y o p i n i o n , at best a conceptual exposition is possible, a n d that a d e f i n i t i o n m i g h t conceptualize the v a r i o u s interpretations of the role concept at most at the conclusion of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e presentation. Instead, I w i l l s i m p l y ask w h e t h e r Dahrendorf intends to provide us w i t h a n o m i n a l or a real d e f i n i t i o n . Let us assume that he is concerned w i t h a n o m i n a l definition: a conceptual specification that permits a distinction between a particular object a n d other objects in such a m a n n e r that it w i l l be recognized a g a i n in reality. Such a d e f i n ition a l l o w s a delineation of the specific c o m p o n e n t s of concrete roles. Nonetheless, it can be easily demonstrated that Dahrendorf, if he is indeed operating w i t h reference to such assumptions, is needlessly upset w i t h the presumed irreconcilibility of the d e f i n i t i o n s w h i c h he encounters. This is the case if o n l y because both situations can be chosen as the point of departure f o r a n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n of social role. (It need not concern us here that neither situation is s u f f i c i e n t f o r the f o r m u l a t i o n of a n adequate definition.) Sociology must o b v i o u s l y begin w i t h the assumption that expectations and behavior are n o r m a l l y congruent. Thus, in principle, the components of a role can be deduced both f r o m the behavior of i n d i -

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viduals as i n c u m b e n t s of the same position as well as f r o m the expectations directed t o w a r d the i n c u m b e n t s of this position. W i t h i n the context of a n exposition of the concept of role, the complex case in w h i c h expectations a n d behavior are i n c o n g r u e n t can be discussed only after a consideration of social change, the exactness of the d e f i n i tion of social roles (which is d e p e n d e n t u p o n a society's structure a n d culture), a n d other related issues. Moreover, this situation of i n c o n g r u ence concerns less the issue of the social role t h a n certain of its m o d u lated a n d special f o r m s . Because there exists in this situation a partial or total a n o m i e in relation to roles, it is not possible here to decide in principle w h e t h e r the behavior or the expectations can be considered the valid criterion f o r the role. Let us reevaluate at this point D a h r e n d o r f ' s plea to attach roles to expectations a n d not to behavior f o r the case w h e n a "real" d e f i n i t i o n is desired (i.e., a d e f i n i t i o n that indicates in w h a t f o r m a role becomes real for the role incumbent). I h a v e already attempted to d e m o n s t r a t e in various w a y s that the role does not — a n d c a n n o t — become real primarily or only t h r o u g h the expectations of the group. Rather, f o r this to occur various expectations, emotions, dispositions, agreements, orientations, values, etc. m u s t be presupposed. I w a n t to take u p the issue — totally neglected by Dahrendorf — of a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r ordered expectations. The positive e x p l a n a t i o n is, of course, simple enough: expectations exist wherever roles exist. The expectations of A that define, according to Dahrendorf, the role of B are themselves just a n aspect of the role (or o n e of the roles) of A, a n d this situation is not f u n d a m e n t a l l y changed if the model involves more t h a n t w o role i n cumbents. It is clear, however, that a real d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h reduces the role of B to the expectations of A is circuitous, if only because A's expectations are a n aspect of his or her role a n d these are determined by the expectations of B. Most definitions of the role concept in sociology nevertheless begin in this m a n n e r . In spite of the diversity of definitions, it is c o m m o n l y understood that roles refer to a specific interdependent relationship a n d are complementary. This implies, first, that substantive c o m p o nents must c o m p l e m e n t each other, f o r otherwise action, since devoid of a f o u n d a t i o n , clutches at straws; second, that expectations m u s t be c o m p l e m e n t a r y (and this includes rather t h a n excludes the c o m m o n ality of basic orientations); third, that expectations a n d actions are respectively complementary; a n d finally, that a reciprocity of role i n cumbents exists a n d each is considered to be oriented t o w a r d the other. Thus, sociology assumes that the expectations of A, as a c o m p o n e n t of

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the situation, contribute substantively to the formation of B's role. These same expectations, however, as a component of A's own role, are dependent upon the expectations and the role of B. Dahrendorf's definition, whenever we ask for the foundation for expectations, also leads just to this state of affairs. That which for sociology exists as a specific form of roles — and for this reason can constitute the point of departure for the delineation of concepts — becomes, however, given the context of Dahrendorf's posing of questions, a definitional vicious circle. How does this occur? Dahrendorf seeks a point of reference that can anchor the role outside of the individual in such a manner that persons become role incumbents. He then asks which external forces coerce incumbents into their role. The answer is given by his reference to expectations, which reveal themselves as constant and regular, though nonetheless only as aspects of roles. We should be able, according to Dahrendorf, to define these roles through expectations and thus through the role of the original role incumbent. The vicious circle is obvious. As soon as one looks closely, it becomes clear that the definition already presupposes precisely what, in its actual reality, is to be established by the definition. Let us illustrate this by way of the example of the role of the married woman or, more specifically, of the part of this role that is oriented toward the husband. According to Dahrendorf, this role is constituted by the expectations of the husband. These expectations do not derive from the man's general sense of self, but from his awareness of himself as a husband. They are an aspect of this role. But the role of the husband is constituted — again according to Dahrendorf's analysis — by the expectations of the wife, thus leading to the conclusion that the expectations, originally constitutive of her role, in fact depend upon her already possessing this role. Nothing is changed if we substitute other examples, such as the manner in which the role of the married woman is determined by the expectations of other married women and the role of the married man is determined by the expectations of other married men. It is in principle possible for a wife to expect a certain behavior from every married woman toward her husband only if wives in general consider this behavior also obligatory for themselves in their relationships to married men. Thus, in a different way, we have discovered here as well that expectations cannot inherently constitute the role. Dahrendorf's definition thus collapses, revealing the impossibility of finding a fulcrum outside the individual on the basis of which roles as external entities can be firmly anchored. Thereby, the

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inadmissability of a n approach is demonstrated that understands roles, w i t h o u t l o o k i n g at t h e m more closely, as such external entities. Yet this is precisely Dahrendorf's position. Levels of Conceptualization T h u s far, in subjecting Dahrendorf's book to close scrutiny in a polemical w a y , w e h a v e been repeatedly led back to his conceptualization of roles as external a n d alien to the i n d i v i d u a l . Unless w e m o v e beyond polemics to understanding, h o w e v e r , such a critique w i l l not do justice to Dahrendorf's concern a n d his effort. H o w is one to e x plain the f u n d a m e n t a l error that permeates the entire book in a n o b v i ous m a n n e r a n d can be seen even in the author's oblique a n d u n p r o v e n basic assumptions? Dahrendorf is certainly not a n o v i c e as a sociological thinker. His questions a n d a n s w e r s d o not derive f r o m the shocks that f o l l o w the first confrontation w i t h sociological concepts. On the contrary, they h a v e crystallized out of a n intensive preoccupation w i t h a d v a n c e d approaches to theory. Since 1 d o not w a n t to assume that Dahrendorf f l a grantly misunderstands explicit theoretical tenets, I a m led to surmise that these tenets themselves — or at least s o m e of t h e m — even t h o u g h they d o not contain the s a m e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , nonetheless lead, i n a surreptitious m a n n e r , to misunderstandings. Indeed, this seems to be the case. W h a t I h a v e tried to expose in Dahrendorf's b o o k as a deep seated a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n of the m e a n i n g of sociological concepts ( w h i c h is apparent also i n other G e r m a n interpretations of role theory, t h o u g h in a f o r m less d a r i n g a n d systematic in intention t h a n Dahrendorf's) can be traced back as a potential danger to the w r i t i n g s of the theoretical a v a n t - g a r d e in sociology. Stated d i f f e r e n t l y : a permanent preoccupation w i t h the a d v a n c e d theoretical perspectives of sociology carries w i t h it the danger of professional distortion. Dahrendorf, it seems to me, has f a l l e n v i c t i m to this danger. This assertion should be, in a p r e l i m i n a r y m a n n e r , elaborated u p o n in general terms a l o n g the lines of a n a l o g y . Certain theoretical approaches are concerned w i t h a sharper conceptualization of i n d i v i d ual aspects of society. The type of w o r k i n v o l v e d here — w h i c h is i n dispensable — is necessarily characterized by a considerable isolation of the aspects under scrutiny a n d thus by a h i g h level of abstraction. Abstraction, of course, implies abstraction f r o m social reality a n d not the trivial notion that here, as is the case w i t h all concepts, parts of reality w i l l be left unconsidered. In the process of d e a l i n g w i t h such c o n -

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cepts, these abstractions unjustly acquire the appearance of reality and, in a manner scarcely detectable to the researcher, are viewed as elements of reality itself. The resulting misunderstanding, which I will now examine, is of this nature. Although not all sociological thinking must necessarily select it as a point of departure or definition of the problem, direct observation has led to a consensus on one matter: certain "positions" exist to which certain "roles" belong, and this fact must be always taken into account by sociologists. Thus far, these two concepts possess no technical meaning. Rather, they simply summarize the situation in reference to which the two notions define themselves: the incumbents of positions act in accord with this consensus and corresponding expectations exist which span the spectrum f r o m a strict counting upon the presence of a certain behavior to a desire about what ought to be done. As S.F. Nadel has noted, the achievement of role theory consists in understanding this fact through a conceptual development. Greater definitional precision has been hindered by certain f u n d a mental difficulties that have received little or no attention in sociological theory and practice. This circumstance need not be evaluated negatively, if only because the concepts need not be formulated more precisely than is required by the problems at hand. Nonetheless, we should be aware of these difficulties. Given the context of our questions, we are interested in the difficulty attached to the possibility of adequately understanding the general circumstance f r o m which role theory departs if two distinct conceptualizations of the role concept are utilized. On the one hand, this term can refer to the essentially direct and evident "duties" of a role incumbent. As shown previously, these can be observed just as well in expectations as in patterned behavior. This conceptualization, in the most narrowly defined case, will refer only to external actions. According to experience, a tendency exists w h e n roles are conceptualized in this manner to deemphasize role qualities and to hold to the real or expected role performance. On the other hand, the role concept can be defined more broadly. By doing so, the specific conditions that, as presuppositions or causes, belong to the performance of "duties" are brought into and are included in the role. In the first instance we direct our attention to the final result; in the second this result appears in the context of its concrete conditions. These two conceptualizations — and they, of course, indicate only the extremes within which an array of further conceptualizations is possible — are utilized side-by-side in the sociological literature.

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Indeed, depending upon the context, they are even commonly employed by the same sociologist in juxtaposition, a mode of procedure that makes good sense in certain circumstances. To Dahrendorf, these two conceptualizations constitute the "social psychological" and "objectivized" definitions of role, a distinction that is by no means, as he believes, congruent with that between the behavioral and expectational definitions. Dahrendorf errs also w h e n he considers these two conceptualizations irreconcilable. Apparently one can decide which usage to employ only pragmatically, so that the choice will not in any way influence reality. Whoever prefers to understand roles merely as "duties" in the more narrow sense is free to do so. Nothing is thereby said about how the performance of these "duties" is possible. Those w h o utilize the role concept in the broader sense must naturally deal with the possibility that the "condition" of the role incumbent as role incumbent can itself prove to be a decisive component of the role. However, it must also be acknowledged that this may not be the case and that the role is given strictly externally. Such questions cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by a decision on which definition to employ. It can be answered only empirically. Deciding between the two interpretations of the role concept is a purely conceptual and thus pragmatic matter. In dealing with m a n y sociological problems, especially those relating to the analysis of modern societies as well as certain theoretical questions, it has proven advantageous to employ the more narrowly defined role concept. This definition allows for a rapid and even highly comprehensive orientation. Moreover, a consideration of further aspects of the role is very often, f r o m a practical point of view, unnecessary. It can simply be assumed that these components exist, that they are produced regularly f r o m society, and that they create the final product implied by roles in the more narrow sense as a catalogue of duties. In this manner, this notion of role frequently emancipates itself f r o m unnecessary encumbrances. Unquestionably, it is important for sociology to k n o w how far it can develop if tied to a theory essentially based upon these aspects, especially since it is obvious that such a theory may prove to be particularly suitable for the analysis of social conditions in highly organized groups and societies. Nonetheless, it must be clear right f r o m the start that this abstraction f r o m social reality, because it has neglected certain aspects of this reality, should not attempt to deal with and cannot solve certain problems. Although some cases are self-evident, these problems cannot be generally k n o w n in detail. It is not possible, for example, by way of

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these concepts a n d this theory, to conceptualize social c h a n g e to the extent to w h i c h it is rooted in cultural rather t h a n structural causal factors. Furthermore, social c h a n g e based in behavioral changes c a n n o t be analyzed because behavior in this case is understood nominally as a product of expectations; that is, it cannot be explained if changes in expectations are lacking. A n d as f a r as social change f o l l o w s f r o m c h a n g i n g expectations, it is not possible to e x p l a i n these expectations w i t h o u t f u r t h e r additions to the theoretical level. But these a n d other restrictions do not in a n y w a y call into question the legitimacy of this type of theory construction. Yet one m o d e of procedure is n o longer acceptable: it can n o longer be asked h o w the i n d i v i d u a l relates to a particular role. This concept of role is a pragmatic-definitional d e t e r m i n a t i o n that is not only a n abstraction f r o m essential aspects of social reality, but also o n e that is carried out in principle w i t h o u t consideration of real conditions. Indeed, if reality is the yardstick, certain aspects are chosen arbitrarily. For this reason, this role concept m u s t forgo the claim of being able to conceptualize a n essential part of reality. It is a construction that, w i t h in the constraints noted, can be used to assess the behavior of persons as social beings, but it c a n n o t claim to grasp this behavior in its reality. It is permissible only to v i e w the role as a defined product of a catalogue of expectations. 1 2 This is a n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n that relocates the role n o m i n a l l y in the social e n v i r o n m e n t a n d separates it f r o m the i n dividual. It c a n n o t be simply assumed that this role exists in reality, that i n d i v i d u a l s relate to it as a n external entity, a n d that, in s u m , this conceptualization mirrors the real situation. Whoever does so e n d o w s the role w i t h a reality that, according to the logic of its m o d e of conceptualization, it c a n n o t possess. If one w a n t s to k n o w in w h a t w a y a role m u s t be understood in reality, t h e n the broader d e f i n i t i o n must be chosen as the point of departure. Moreover, empirical data must be brought to bear if w e are to indicate w h i c h of the aspects that in fact exist in reality produce — a n d in w h a t c o m b i n a t i o n — action that is oriented to roles. In sum, Dahrendorf's analysis blatantly reifies the n o m i n a l concept of role, yet the conviction that his d e f i n i t i o n is a real d e f i n i tion permeates his entire book. A n d this is just its overriding problem. He is driven by the question h o w the i n d i v i d u a l relates to these roles, namely, to the accumulated d e m a n d s of others w h o , f r o m the outset, r e m a i n external to the i n c u m b e n t . Dahrendorf creates unnecessary problems for himself because of his c o n f u s i o n of the levels of the concepts a n d his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a p r a g m a t i c - d e f i n i t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n

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as social reality. Role is not the only concept utilized by Dahrendorf that is based u p o n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . His conceptualization of the i n d i v i d u a l , w h i c h permeates the book as a n equally central focus, is also sociologically misleading. He speaks of the "absolute i n d i v i d u a l i t y a n d liberty of the single individual," 1 3 w h i c h is counteracted by socialization processes a n d even eliminated, as if this process were a real one a n d as if liberty a n d i n d i v i d u a l i t y existed prior to a n d i n d e p e n d e n t of socialization a n d society. He overlooks the fact that liberty a n d i n d i v i d u a l i t y presuppose a developed personality structure that is itself a product of socialization. In this same w a y he also speaks, if not w i t h o u t a certain discomfort, of "pure m a n " a n d of the"social tabula rasa of m a n devoid of roles"! He seriously considers it a speculative question "whether a n y o n e w o u l d be capable of s h a p i n g his entire behavior o n his o w n , w i t h o u t the assistance of society"! He emphasizes that the person devoid of roles "is a non-entity f o r society a n d sociology." 14 At this point, as a consequence of his n a r r o w l y conceived role concept, he underestimates the radical n a t u r e of sociological insights. He overlooks that both sociology a n d social psychology h a v e demonstrated — a n d f u l l y i n d e p e n d ently — that persons devoid of roles d o not a n d c a n n o t exist. He ignores as well the older a n d related insights f r o m historicism, cultural anthropology, a n d the w r i t i n g s of A r n o l d Gehlen, all of w h i c h h a v e called attention to h o w p r o f o u n d l y h u m a n beings are shaped by culture. I will resist here the temptation to s h o w that Dahrendorf basically m i s u n d e r s t a n d s elementary sociological concepts a n d theories. It is not only that i n d i v i d u a l concepts a n d facts h a v e been twisted a n d misperceived; they have been transposed, in their entirety, to a w r o n g level a n d placed w i t h i n a w r o n g f r a m e of reference.

Homunculus Sociologicus I h a v e sketched above a f e w of the central tenets of sociology's i m age of m a n . This should h a v e been e n o u g h to reveal the illusory c h a r acter of Dahrendorf's Homo sociologicus. Nonetheless, I w o u l d like to treat briefly those s u m m a r y statements w h i c h encapsulate for Dahrendorf the results of his analysis. We can read: "The sociologist describes m a n as a n aggregate of roles, a n d u n t h i n k i n g l y goes on to claim that h e has discovered the n a ture of man." 1 5 This is not the case. To begin w i t h , the sociologist does not u n d e r s t a n d the roles of a person as a n aggregate of unrelated

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actions. Important axioms and even entire theories and sociological specialties are founded upon this fact. Functionalism, the concept of culture, the approach to the study of social change, the notion of a "strain toward consistency," the concept of adaptation, and the various theories of equilibrium immediately come to mind. They all categorically presuppose that individuals take over roles not simply in an aggregate fashion. Obligations and relationships exist between roles, and these surely cannot become central if roles are perceived just nominally as catalogues of duties. Such roles do not constitute human nature, not even the nature of the role incumbent. The concept of role needs to extend its boundaries to the point where, on the one hand, it merges with the notion of structure and, on the other hand, with the concept of culture. If this is done, the full reality and possibility of roles, and thus the essence of the role incumbent, comes into view. Roles do not only have objective consequences. Basically, the incumbent of a role understands goals and meanings through which roles become intertwined in conditional contexts. The very existence of the concepts and theories mentioned above rest upon this premise. And to the extent to which this is so, the sociologist does not claim that he can ascertain the nature of the role incumbent by cataloguing role duties. The sociologist is also not of the opinion that Homo sociologicus can "neither love nor hate, laugh or cry."16 On the contrary, even the very description of roles presupposes knowledge about how people laugh and cry, hate and love. The sociologist must also not misunderstand such behavior as merely signifying external occurrences. Rather, he learns to understand it as necessary and spontaneous with reference to the real conditions specific to it. Nor can he afford to fall prey to a common and routine error: the observation that groups, within limits, display uniform behavior patterns leads some to conclude that actions cannot be produced individually. 17 Feelings are so intimately tied to roles that they form the very basis of role behavior, as William Goode (who certainly holds an extreme position among theorists of social structure), assured us above. Of course, for certain limited tasks, the sociologist can omit consideration of this and other aspects of roles and attend solely to the nominal concept that simply catalogues duties and rights. Good reasons even exist for the sociologist to shy away from analyzing the web of presuppositions that are the real basis of the external phenomena of action oriented to roles. As far and as long as possible, he can retain a focus upon visible actions and a nominal role concept. But such a procedure not only runs up against its o w n limits; its

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very possibility is based upon presuppositions that have always been conceded as valid in principle. There may not be a single proposition of sociology, or, more specifically, of the theory of social structure, that can be understood without these presuppositions, all of which usually are taken for granted. Even where conclusions are arrived at from the purely formal — and in the extreme case possibly numerical — conditions of a structural system, they are obviously based upon the human beings who live and act in this system and are influenced by and respond to its conditions. Whatever the subject of sociological statements may be (group or institution, structure or role), all can — and must — be capable of being transformed into statements about individuals. 18 Human beings formed by their cultures and living under the conditions of its structure can become role incumbents only because they understand actions according to their meaning and context and because of the cultural formation of their emotional, affective, volitional, and intellectual habit. All these factors, in addition to their concomitant psychological mechanisms, create, under certain structural conditions, at the very least a spectrum for action within which roles are fulfilled and may even themselves suggest distinct action. The whole individual is unquestionably and fundamentally a participant in this process, and we can discuss roles in a meaningful sense only in relation to him. With respect to this point, the historian, insofar as he talks about the serfs, the feudal lords, the peasants, or even the Renaissance man, cannot be distinguished from the sociologist. It would be an error, indeed one that would repeat Dahrendorf's misconceptions, if this basic insight is obscured as a result of the fact that sociology for quite some time now has paid little attention to these presuppositions of the nominal role concept and instead has concerned itself predominantly if not exclusively with very specific abstractions and problems. Whoever confuses such one-sided abstractions, however legitimate and extremely necessary they may be, with an inquiry into human nature, misrepresents both sociology and humanity. The Malaise of Sociology The uneasiness that permeates Dahrendorf's text is quite common in German sociology. The opinion is widespread that sociology either constructs or reveals a second and frightening form of reality which must be given boundaries. 19 To be sure, only Dahrendorf considers this task as hopeless and therefore pushes it aside. For him, hope lies in intellectual freedom rather than in sociology or science generally.

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I have tried to make plausible that this malaise originates in a reification of role theory's concepts. This attempt has unveiled the scientific locus of the misunderstanding, yet there are other reasons for it as well. A certain one-sidedness with regard to theme and method, which were determined and justified through certain advances in sociology, should be mentioned again. But if we had in West Germany a sociology of language and a sociology of knowledge that would explore not only the dependence of these phenomena upon social conditions but also their constituent significance for society; if culture, social change, and the realm of symbolic meanings and processes would receive as much attention in this country as, for example, industrial sociology; if an active interchange with cultural anthropology or history existed to warn constantly of the misunderstanding that occurs w h e n the peculiarities of modern society are viewed as characteristics of society in general; then a broad foundation would exist in the Federal Republic — one that, within American sociology, underpins all discussions on role theory — that would confront the temptation to confuse the echo of one's o w n voice resounding f r o m the forest as the voice of the forest itself. There is yet another difference between German and Anglo-Saxon sociology. The latter remains largely within the methodological boundaries delineated by logical positivism: 20 scientific concepts are considered pragmatic determinations that, while accounting for parts of a reality, do not claim to capture it in its entirety. Operational utility is all that is demanded. When Anglo-Saxon sociology entered Germany, these central tenets arrived as well. Dahrendorf insists emphatically that scientific and especially sociological concepts involve cognitive constructions and that science formulates a second reality. He then carries out exactly what, under these presuppositions, is no longer possible: he asks h o w these concepts relate to the whole h u m a n being and h o w this h u m a n being in turn relates to these concepts. A similar problem is at times evident in Helmut Schelsky's works. In sum, a profound insecurity regarding the levels of conceptualization and thus the validity of concepts has become almost an inherent aspect of the German reception of role theory. It is all the more important to clarify these matters because of the disastrous history of this insecurity in the German sociological tradition. 21 Another range of issues should be noted also. As a result of its complex structure and its high degree of organization, modern society creates the problem of alienation. Indeed, it is so common that popular

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literature lives off it a n d "angry y o u n g m e n " whistle it f r o m the rooftops. As a result, a n u m b e r of roles, considered in isolation, come close to Dahrendorf's description. Sociology has here a n i m p o r t a n t task to undertake. H o w did this separation between persons a n d roles come about? Of w h a t does it exactly consist? H o w has it developed historically? We cannot f i n d answers to these questions by regarding alienation as a constituent part of role in general a n d t h e n b l a m e society a n d sociology f o r this situation. We are clearly dealing here w i t h p h e n o m ena that occur only in a certain type of society. 22 H o w little relationship there is between alienation a n d role sanctions is already demonstrated by the extraordinarily large realm of i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m in m o d e r n society. Paradoxically, the feeling of alienation stems f r o m a n astonishing lack of identification rather t h a n f r o m excessive social pressures. A n d this brings us to the specifically G e r m a n situation. A tradition exists in G e r m a n y that separates the society f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l a n d sees in society a realm of alienation. One glance at G e r m a n literature a n d philosophy, not to m e n t i o n its political history, bears eloquent test i m o n y to this statement. Social traditions as well as intellectual a p proaches regarding social issues lead to precisely that m i s u n d e r standing as a result of w h i c h sociological concepts are inverted in their m e a n i n g . H e l m u t h Plessner 23 has recently once again called attention to this as well as to the disquieting public consequences of this tradition. It is plainly evident that in the present situation, w h i c h is characterized by a loss of sense of history a n d orientation, feelings of alienation are f u r t h e r encouraged. For this reason alone a n investigation of this p h e n o m e n o n is all the m o r e urgent. But to consider this actual feeling as the basis f o r sociological concepts t u r n s the entire situation upside d o w n . This cuts off discussion of the p h e n o m e n o n even before it has a chance to begin. A n d w h a t can be said in conclusion? Because h e has addressed questions that are not often analyzed, Dahrendorf deserves our gratitude. I a m in agreement w i t h his conviction that the sociologists m u s t not circumvent the m o r a l problems of their science. But it seems to m e that the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g exemplified by his book is actually grist f o r the mill of those w h o m o r e or less naively utilize sociological statements f o r the purpose of conjuring u p a distorted picture of social reality that corresponds to the m o d e r n feeling of alienation. But it is also true that a certain one-sidedness of the sociological analysis a n d a n i n clination t o w a r d reification, together w i t h the general discontent felt by individuals in m o d e r n society, h a v e led to a situation in w h i c h the

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relationship of sociological knowledge for the understanding of the human being has become obscured. Because it objectifies roles and thereby obstructs a direct identification by the role incumbent with a role, sociology itself promotes the feeling of alienation. This has been so ever since sociology, as a fashionable subject of general discourse, became a factor in the designs of bureaucratic planners. These facts may be viewed as indicative of the immorality of sociology. Yet this situation is in no way alleviated if sociologists are expected to cultivate a sense of tragic guilt. It should rather be the task of sociologists to make plain that this is a blatant misunderstanding. NOTES 1. Ralf Dahrendorf, Homo Sociologicus (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959) [Homo Sociologicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973)]. 2. Ibid., p. 38 [p. 39], 3. Arnold M. Rose, Sociology (New York: Knopf, 1956), p. 71. 4. A.W. Green, Sociology [1956], 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 514. 5. Alfred L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons, "The Concepts of Culture and of Social System," American Sociological Review (October 1958) 23(5):582-83. Note also Parsons' response to a critique of his work, "A Rejoinder to Ogles and Levy," American Sociological Review (April 1959) 24(2):248-250. 6. Reference to Lewis Henry Morgan should suffice for the historical connection. The organizational association is obvious in the fact that usually a department of anthropology and sociology unites scholars of both disciplines. 7. It should be remembered that for Parsons all role norms are not only attached to more general values, but also conceptualized as specifying them. 8. Dahrendorf, Homo Sociologicus, p. 46 [p. 49], 9. Siegfried F. Nadel, Foundations of Social Anthropology

(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,

1953), p. 71. 10. Rose, Sociology, pp. 84-85. 11. William J . Goode, "Norm Commitment and Conformity Obligations," American Journal of Sociology (November 1960) 66(3):257.

to

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12. The scientific nominalism of Anglo Saxon sociology is significant in this respect. See below. 13. Dahrendorf, Homo Sociologicus, p. 38 [p. 39], [Dahrendorf himself, in the English edition of his book, renders "die absolute Individualität und Freiheit des Einzelnen" as "man's absolute individuality and liberty." Eds.] 14. Ibid., pp. 37 f f „ 24, 39 [pp. 38 f f „ 25, 38]. [Dahrendorf renders "der 'reine' Mensch" simply as "man," and "soziale tabula rasa des rollenlosen Menschen" simply as "social tabula rasa (of man)." Eds.]

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15. Ibid., p. 56 [p. 611. 16./Md., p. 54 [p. 58], 17. T h a t fathers, w i t h i n certain s t r u c t u r a l limits, e x h i b i t identical b e h a v i o r m e a n s neither t h a t they do not love or hate, n o r t h a t these e m o t i o n s are not s p o n t a n e o u s a n d g e n u ine. 18. O n l y in this sense does t h e observation h a v e m e a n i n g — a r o u t i n e observation ever since S i m m e l a n d o n e t h a t a p p e a r s a g a i n w i t h D a h r e n d o r f — t h a t society consists basically o n l y of i n d i v i d u a l s . It s h o u l d also be noted t h a t all s t a t e m e n t s o n Homo oeconomicus, of course, can be deduced f r o m statements o n u n d e r s t a n d a b l e h u m a n action. T h e o r i g i n a l fear t h a t l a w s w o u l d coerce i n d i v i d u a l s h a s been p r o v e n to be u n f o u n d e d . 19. See H e l m u t Schelsky, Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie (Diisseldorf-Cologne: Diederichs, 1959), p. 107. A l t h o u g h Schelsky a v o i d s D a h r e n d o r f s mistake, h e occasionally also comes close to m i x i n g u p his c o n c e p t u a l levels. This is particularly clear w h e r e h e assigns to his t r a n s c e n d e n t a l sociology t h e task of a s c e r t a i n i n g "that w h i c h in i n d i v i d u a l s m a k e s t h e m a d h e r e to [!] their social roles." T h u s , t h r o u g h a process of sociological objectification, t h e role here h a s become, u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , a n object to w h i c h t h e person s h o u l d repeatedly a d h e r e . In this w a y , despite t h e gulf t h a t in t h e e n d separates t h e m , both books o n t h e one h a n d e m p h a s i z e t h e "constructed" character of t h e sociological u n d e r s t a n d i n g of role theory a n d , o n the other, u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y r u n t h e risk of seriously c o n s i d ering this u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a c o m p o n e n t of reality. J u s t such unexpected c o m m o n a l i t i e s indicate to us the need f o r a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l clarification. 20. The m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g is by n o m e a n s c o n g r u e n t w i t h actual sociological research. The latter is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a m u c h stronger sense of reality. F u r t h e r more, it seems that a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the s e l f - i m a g e of t h e theory of science is in t h e o f f i n g . See Robert Bierstedt, " N o m i n a l a n d Real D e f i n i t i o n s in Sociological Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium in Sociological Theory (Evanston, 111.: R o w , Peterson, 1959), pp. 121-144; a n d A. Edel, "The Concept of Levels in Social Theory," in ibid., pp. 167-195. 21. See Friedrich H. T e n b r u c k , "Die Genesis der M e t h o d o l o g i e M a x Webers," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1959) 11 (4):573-630. In this essay o n M a x Weber's m e t h o d o l o g y , 1 h a v e a t t e m p t e d to indicate t h e historical place w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m of t h e reality a n d validity of social science k n o w l e d g e a p p e a r s to h a v e d i s a p p e a r e d f r o m v i e w . The u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t h a s c o m e f r o m early t r e a t m e n t s of h o w o u r concepts relate to reality h a s been o n l y intensified by t h e a d o p t i o n of certain positions of t h e n o m i n a l i s t i c A n g l o - S a x o n p h i l o s o p h y of science. 22. See M e l v i n Seeman, "On t h e M e a n i n g of A l i e n a t i o n , " American Sociological Review (December 1959) 24(6):783-791. 23. H e l m u t h Plessner, Das Problem der Öffentlichkeit (Göttingen: V a n d e n h o e c k & R u p r e c h t , 1960).

und die Idee der

Entfremdung

21 Structures of Meaning and Objective Hermeneutics ULRICH O E V E R M A N N , WITH T I L M A N A L L E R T , ELISABETH K Ö N A U , A N D JÜRGEN K R A M B E C K

We shall attempt below to sketch a hermeneutic perspective on socialization theory, 1 which we regard as significant for sociology in general. Our approach has grown out of the empirical study of family interactions as well as reflection upon the procedures of interpretation employed in our research. For the time being we shall refer to it as objective hermeneutics in order to distinguish it clearly f r o m traditional hermeneutic techniques and orientations. The general significance for sociological analysis of objective hermeneutics issues f r o m the fact that, in the social sciences, interpretive methods constitute the f u n d a mental procedures of measurement and of the generation of research data relevant to theory. From our perspective, the standard, nonhermeneutic methods of quantitative social research can only be justified because they permit a shortcut in generating data (and research "economy" comes about under specific conditions). Whereas the conventional methodological attitude in the social sciences justifies qualitative approaches as exploratory or preparatory activities, to be succeeded by standardized approaches and techniques as the actual scientific procedures (assuring precision, validity, and objectivity), we regard hermeneutic procedures as the basic method for gaining precise and valid knowledge in the social sciences. However, we do not simply reject alternative approaches dogmatically. They are in fact useful wherever the loss in precision and objectivity necessitated by the requirement of research economy can be condoned and tolerated in the light of prior hermeneutically elucidated research experiences. Excerpted from "Die Methodologie einer 'objektiven Hermeneutik' und ihre allgemeine forschungslogische Bedeutung in den Sozialwissenschaften,* in Hans-Georg Soeffner, ed.. Interpretative Verfahren in den Sozial- und Textwissenschaften, pp. 352-432 (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1979). The selection, translated by Dieter Misgeld and Gerd Schroeter, consists of pp. 352-354 and pp. 378-387 of the German original.

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Despite the general applicability we claim for it, the explication of objective hermeneutics which follows builds upon the research context from which it arose.2 We do not believe that it is merely coincidental that our approach originates in the analysis of interaction and socialization. The methodology of objective hermeneutics has a special affinity with the sociological theory of socialization. Reconstructive explanations of the structural characteristics of interaction should make up the core of a theory of socialization, especially if they involve general claims about the social constitution of ontogenesis.3 Ontogenetic theories of the development of actors possess explanatory power only if the formation of structures by subjects is attributed neither to the direct causal effect of the external environment nor simply to the monological unfolding of innate capacities. Instead, structures must be seen as resulting from reconstructions which the actors themselves undertake by way of schemata of practical action, which they possess independently of their innate capacities.4 This general starting point corresponds to the empirical finding (based on the analysis of records of interaction) that children taking part in interactions display considerable capacities for the internal differentiation of objective structures of meaning. It is quite obvious (and also unproblematic for developmental psychologists) that these differentiations are not anticipated or intentionally produced by the child and that they cannot be completely decoded or deciphered subsequently. For the structures of meaning in question far exceed the interpretive capacities of the growing child at his particular stage of development. This is precisely where the usefulness of the study of interaction (and of socialization) lies. When systematically pursuing a sociological theory of socialization in the sense discussed, it will become obvious that its assumptions ought to be taken into consideration in every analysis of the social constitution of subjects and of their interactive competence. These assumptions are not valid for theories of socialization alone but possess general validity for the analysis of the actions of adult subjects. Where this is not the case, such analyses fall prey to psychological reductionism from the start. From this perspective, the theory of socialization is not simply a social psychological or a developmental psychological appendix to general sociology, as is the case, almost without exception, with socialization theories in sociological theory. It is rather a fundamental and independent component of a general structural sociological theory, in the sense that it is impossible to carry out a consistent structural analysis in sociology without considering this component. Our hermeneutic methodology is essential for a sociologi-

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cal tl-eory of socialization. It is, f u r t h e r m o r e , a research orientation applicable to sociology as a whole. The tangible objects of the procedure of objective hermeneutics are records of real symbolic social actions or interactions, either written, oral, visual, or i n v o l v i n g a c o m b i n a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t media. The actual f o r m of the records is merely a technical matter for the interpretive procedures of objective hermeneutics. For their interpretability is p r i n cipally dependent u p o n the fact that they can be understood as a l a n guage or that the interactively generated m e a n i n g recorded can be paraphrased by w a y of language. Under this condition, all recorded interactions, in w h a t e v e r m e d i u m a n d in w h a t e v e r technical f o r m a t , m a y be regarded as valid i n teraction texts, as long as they represent the essential object of interpretation. The reconstructive interpretation of interaction texts permits the discovery of rules w h i c h constitute interaction texts as objective structures of significance [Bedeutungsstrukturen], w h i c h reflect the latent structures of meaning [Sinnstrukturen] of interaction itself. The objective structures of significance of interaction texts ( w h i c h are prototypes of objective social structures in general) are real a n d h a v e some permanence. Analytically (though not empirically) they are i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y specific a n d conscious representation of the m e a n i n g of interaction on the side of the participating subjects. We m i g h t also say that a text, once produced, comprises a social reality of its o w n that must be reconstructed w i t h procedures adequate to it. It can be traced back neither to the disposition f o r action a n d the psychic conditions of the speaker nor to the psychic reality of the recipients. For this reason, it w o u l d be a basic mistake to try a n d infer the m e a n i n g of a text by deductions about the intentions of its producer or by w a y of a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of specific recipients. We also reject the c o m m o n social science practice of m a k i n g assertions about the psychic reality of actors, their motives, expectations, a n d value orientations, w i t h o u t a t h o r o u g h a n d well-defined hermeneutic reconstruction of the objective structures of significance of their interaction texts. To avoid m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we m u s t stress that the category of i n teraction as used here differs in t w o respects f r o m the w a y in w h i c h it is c o m m o n l y employed. On the one h a n d , w e are starting f r o m the premise that interaction is the most elementary u n i t of h u m a n action a n d also the smallest analytical u n i t of the theory of action. In this sense, i n d i v i d u a l action already represents a n abstraction. W i t h o u t being able to substantiate this m o r e f u l l y n o w , w e refer to the fact that

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the difference between behavior and action can be maintained conceptually only by adopting such an assumption. For that reason, the concept of interaction is in a certain sense in fact untenable and misleading because it presupposes the primacy of single, isolated actions, from which interaction is supposed to be built up as the smallest possible unit. On the other hand, we are not using the concept of interaction substantively in order to designate circumscribed changes and processes in the sense of concrete actions. We employ the concept more generally in order to identify meanings shared by actors within specific segments of time. From this general perspective, the category of interaction refers to a steady, uninterrupted temporal stream of events in a system of relationships, independently of whether in concrete terms these events signify constancy or change, rest or movement; we do not make the social scientific relevance of these events dependent upon the meanings intended by participants. Thus we proceed in terms of a less restrictive framework by emphasizing the objective importance of events. The latent structure of meaning of a single interaction or utterance (as the structure of situationally and contextually possible relations of significance) permits, as a rule, different "ways of reading." Participants in the original situation of action produce only segments of these readings intentionally. The distinction between latent objective structures of meaning and their intentional representation is decisive for objective hermeneutics. A perfect overlap between intentional representation and latent structure of meaning is possible in principle. But it represents an especially ideal case of fully self-reflective communication: having reconstructed their own interaction texts, the acting subjects grasp the full meaning of their actions. However, in the sociological analysis of interaction, latent structures of meaning have to be differentiated from their subjective and intentional representation and from the overall psychic reality of the participating subjects. Latent structures of meaning also have to be reconstructed before other operations of data analysis are brought into play. Only in a very ideal case can we achieve what are commonly considered to be unproblematic implications of procedures of interviewing and observation: i.e., to infer the actors' dispositions for action on the basis of their own statements, and to derive from them the structure of their action. However, even in this ideal case, we cannot make do methodologically without a concept of the latent structure of meaning: for without the prior reconstruction of latent structures we are unable to determine whether we are confronted with an ideal case.

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The constructions of objective hermeneutics imply a concept of significance, which, although sharply distinguished f r o m the behaviorist notion of external criteria of conduct, cannot be reduced to a concept of subjective intentionality. By adopting a specific interpretation of Mead's theory of significance, we begin with a concept of significance and of objective social structure as emerging f r o m interaction. Social structure in turn is to be treated as a prerequisite for the constitution of intentionality. Obviously, objective significance points to intentions and, just as obviously, it is impossible to think of the real emergence of significance f r o m interaction without referring to the intentionality of actors. In the tradition of Mead we might even say: intentions are logically equivalent to or synonymous with the rule-dependent objective significance of an interaction text. They are instances of intentions ascribable to an idealized, transcendentally constructed, generalized subject of the "universe of discourse." Here we have in mind Mead's notion of the absolute other, the "generalized other" in the system of rules constituting significance. Therefore, in following Mead, we are merely paraphrasing the concept of objective significance. The intentionality of a specific individual subject must be categorially distinguished f r o m it. In order to achieve a theoretically meaningful idea of the constitution of actors, it is necessary to assume — with Mead — that the constitution of objective patterns of significance has already been achieved in interaction. The concept of the objective significance of interaction must also be incorporated into an evolutionary theory in Mead's sense — a theory of the emergence of species as well as specific structures of interaction. The concept of the latent structure of meaning lays claims to a level of reality of its own, which must be sharply distinguished f r o m the reality of observable conduct relevant for the theory of behavior, as well as f r o m the reality of subjective projections of action possibilities, of definitions, and of constructions significant for action theory and symbolic interactionism. But our theory of the reality of objective structures also analytically transcends the concept of social reality f o u n d in Marx; in fact, it provides the foundation for Marx's concept. With the concept of the latent structure of meaning, real and objective possibilities of significance are introduced, whether the actors taking part in the interaction are aware of them or not. Objective hermeneutics is a method of interpretation which can decode this reality. For the time being we shall use the term "objective hermeneutics" (even though this may perhaps not be the most suitable

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choice), in order to illustrate our concern w i t h the painstaking, extensive explanation of the objective significance of interaction texts and of the latent m e a n i n g of interaction. Reconstructive methods of textual interpretation have nothing in c o m m o n w i t h an empathetic reconstruction of psychic processes, for example in the interpretation of questionnaire results or of answers obtained t h r o u g h projective tests. We remain convinced that reconstructive interpretations of the objective significance of interaction texts come first; only then can we turn to the internal realities of actors. We can conclude that, as a n empirical science of objective social structures, sociology has interaction texts as its central subject matter. It m a y also serve as a theoretical f r a m e f o r the sciences of action, such as the social and the cultural sciences, the humanities, and even economics. Perhaps surprisingly, we shall mention Karl Popper as a chief w i t ness for the approach of objective hermeneutics. We take this position even if a close u n i o n between behaviorist reductionism and critical rationalism is currently regarded as more compelling. Popper's conception of "world three" — the world of the structures of a r g u m e n t a t i o n and proof — corresponds to our concept of latent structures of m e a n ing. Popper applies it to empirical questions, in his historical reconstruction of science. The application of "world three" concepts permits a reconstruction of the original situation in w h i c h the problem arose and to w h i c h the sciences in question responded. Popper employs the methods of textual interpretation in the pursuit of these issues. This has nothing in c o m m o n w i t h the psychological analysis of mental processes. To give a n example: Popper reconstructs the situation of inquiry which underlay Galileo's argument. It is to be f o u n d in the context of a theory of tides, a theory w h i c h was already considered problematic in Galileo's o w n day. Popper demonstrates the strategic importance of Galileo's initial discoveries f o r the f u t u r e of science. In the past, Galileo's approach was erroneously assumed to be the result of his dogmatic personality. Thus Popper adopts an approach similar to objective hermeneutics: we have argued that theoretical concepts must be elucidated in the language of the "reconstructed case" itself. This example, furthermore, indicates that such constructs of psychological motives as "authoritarian" or "dogmatic" have n o independent explanatory power. They only illustrate the need for more complete explanations. Structural explanations formulated in the language of the case in question or of the historical event itself must always be the first step in a n y empirical analysis. This is so even for Popper, the criti-

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cal rationalist. They cannot be replaced by measurement operations supposedly required by the unity of science as a principle of inquiry. Cognitive representations of the world can be encountered only on a second level of reality which, as it were, lies beneath the level of latent structures of meaning. Cognitive representations are merely a segment of the reconstructed latent structure of meaning of an interaction text. Additional distinctions are needed here, such as distinctions between different mental/cognitive functions. Distinctions between subjective and intentional representations on the one hand, and collective patterns of interpretation on the other, belong to this second level of reality. Collective patterns manifest themselves only to a limited extent, but they control judgments about the appropriateness of action. These matters usually become thematic in critical discussions of behaviorism: for behaviorists never resort to an independently-structured psychic reality for purposes of explanation. They restrict themselves to observing and recording external, "meaningless" events. Even symbolic interactionism, with its central concept of the social definition of the situation (or the social definition of reality), is in danger, in the final analysis, of making social reality dependent upon the subjective-intentional achievement of meaning. Thereby objective structures of meaning disappear f r o m view. Even in daily life we can encounter analogies that correspond to the level of reality claimed by the concept of the latent structure of meaning and that recognize the subjectively intended meaning entailed by the concept. We implicitly recognize subjective meanings entailed by latent structures, for instance w h e n in the case of a misunderstanding we return to the original text and its significance. An example of such a misunderstanding is the breakdown of procedures for inferring the intentions of a speaker f r o m the implications of the spoken text. In the same manner we refer to an objective level of reality (having subjective implications) w h e n we want to ascertain the "actual" motives for a person's action: We interpret the person's interaction texts by relying upon the belief that they have a significance which is independent and separate f r o m the initial intentions of the "speaker." We also assume that the actor will reveal her real nature in these additional meanings. The psychoanalyst proceeds in an analogous m a n n e r when he regards neurotic symptoms, slips of the tongue, parapraxes, dreams, and free associations as structures of meaning. He treats them as texts, for the meaning of texts exceeds subjectively intended meanings. Only by using such methodological and theoretical assumptions can the psy-

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choanalyst draw empirically valid conclusions about unconscious motives revealing themselves in those texts. We also discuss these phenomena because in such cases the ego is not entirely successful in exercising censorship. Neurotic symptoms, slips of the tongue, parapraxes, dreams, and free associations can be regarded as texts appropriate for the reconstruction of unconscious motives. We have already pointed to the affinity between objective hermeneutics and the psychoanalytic method of interpretation, as well as to similarities in their understanding of the unconscious. In objective hermeneutics, for example, we look upon the representations of unconscious motives as repressed derivations of the latent meanings of childhood scenes which have subsequently been reinterpreted. They share the attribute of timelessness with latent structures of meaning; as structures they are independent f r o m the particular existential or historical moment of time in which they are decoded. Unconscious or latent meanings always manifest themselves behind the backs of the subjects. And quite apart f r o m the exceptional ideal case of complete self-knowledge achieved by way of communication, the difference between latent structures of meaning and their intentional representations in the actor's thought represents the standard empirical case. The difference can be caused by three distinct types of conditions: 1. During the child's primary process of socialization — in other words, until he takes on the roles typical of adult life or until puberty, depending on which theoretical criteria of development are relied upon — his capacity for the interpretation of meaning is limited by the level of development. As a result, the presuppositions for the full realization of the latent structures of meaning of interaction are, as a general principle, not yet met. While arguing the relevance of objective hermeneutics for socialization theory we recognize, of course, that the latent structures of interaction (and the ontogenetic structures of development) are for sociological theory nothing but the realm of objectively social phenomena, existing outside the actor. We also share the view that ontogenetic development depends upon interpretations of the latent structures of meaning by significant others, such as parents and teachers. Their interpretations take the place of the developing subject's o w n interpretations. In this way, objectively understandable motives for action can be transformed into subjective intentions. Interpretations such as these (substituting for the subjects' o w n interpretations of the objective meaning of their actions) do not occur only in the process of socialization. They are also typical of "resocializing" efforts made, for example, in therapy and in other pro-

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cesses of social control. Developmental shortcuts in the subjective-intentional realization of latent structures of meaning may, but need not have a distorting effect; rather, they essentially imply simplifications. The more elementary the stage of development, the less explicitly will the latent structures of meaning be realized. The difference between subjective-intentional representations of latent structures of meaning and the structures themselves is the result of ontogenetic development and consists in the degree of explicitness of structures of significance. We are now addressing problems belonging to a theory of the constitution of experience. Consequently we can take an important fact into account. Naturally, at an early stage in their development, children notice the significance of interaction for socialization only to a limited extent. They lack the interpretive competence and socialization required for differentiated constructions. However, they do perceive the natural, undistorted meaning of interaction, its "emotive truth," so to speak. Potential distortions in perception arise only later. They are caused by their acceptance of restrictive, ideological, or neurosisproducing social norms and interpretations. Pathological developments may originate in these distortions. We shall attempt to illustrate this point of view by way of the following example of the relationship between an overprotective mother and her child. At a very early stage of development the child will clearly "recognize" the latent meaning of interaction with her mother. This latent meaning can be interpreted as the projection of maternal needs onto the child, who is abused as a surrogate in the satisfaction of the mother's own, repressed needs. It also entails a tendency to smother the child with affection. The child will be aware of what is going on "intuitively," and will realize the truth emotionally — with her almost physical capacities for perception. The child will often feel unwell simply because the mother's behavior toward the child, intentionally represented by her as a sacrifice of her own needs, has in fact little relation to the child's needs. The mother's behavior meets the child's needs in only a "technical" sense: for example, she may rigidly adhere to child care instructions. Here the child's comprehension of the latent meaning of interaction is not yet distorted. The child merely simplifies the meanings. But once the mother has succeeded in getting the child to internalize, in a general way, the significance of her actions as sacrifice, the child, as the "victim," will be obliged to be grateful. And then the child will interpret the latent meaning of her interaction with her mother not only in a simplified, but also in a sys-

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tematically distorted manner. The subsequent process of becoming neurotic can then be corrected or undone during therapy. In this instance we assume that the condition of transference makes it possible for the therapist to reconstruct the latent meaning of the child's interactions with the mother and to offer alternative interpretations of the interaction and its structure. The above example represents a case of pathogenic socialization. A successful process of socialization (formulated in an idealized model) consists in making latent meanings more and more conscious. 2. The second type of condition has already been introduced while explaining the first type. As a result of pathological constraints, latent meanings may be represented on the intentional level as systematically distorted, fragmented, or displaced interpretations. At the level of individual biography we refer to these factors as neuroses or psychoses, at the level of history as ideologies, dogmas, myths, or whatever. In the example of interaction discussed above, these were the factors we dealt with. They are responsible for producing slips of the tongue, parapraxes, action compromises, and symptomatic actions, as well as for concealing the objective meaning of these distortions. However, their decoding is the prerequisite of a cure. Thus the model of actions resulting f r o m successful therapy is implied by the reconstructions of meanings latent in symptomatic behavior. It is implicit in the linguistic structure of interaction texts. Here we come upon the therapeutic potential of language. Once again we notice that it is the attitude acting subjects take toward latent meanings which may cause pathological deformations. But latent structures of meaning are not themselves pathological. Above all else, in the face of this fundamentally important distinction, we consider any talk about "damaged" or "destroyed language," or references to repression as "excommunication," to be muddled, if not in fact misleading. 3. Interpretive accomplishments and decodings of meanings naturally are also constitutive of the routine activities of everyday life. They are not a specifically scientific procedure. Objective hermeneutics, however, consists of a totally "impractical," detailed interpretation of the latent meaning of interaction texts. It involves the explication of "improbable readings" and of taken-for-granted assumptions. This is how the specific structures of interaction are made clear. In everyday life one proceeds in the opposite way: In interacting with others one attempts to make accurate conjectures about intentions and dispositions as quickly as possible. One responds to practical exigencies w h e n accounting for the motives underlying everyday behavior. One pro-

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ceeds s i m i l a r l y w i t h respect to objective s y m b o l s w h i c h represent i n tentions. A f t e r all, one w a n t s to a c h i e v e one's goals i n practical life. But objective h e r m e n e u t i c s is to e x p l i c a t e structures of action w i t h as m u c h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as possible. T h u s there are m e t h o d s in e v e r y d a y l i f e f o r q u i c k l y d e c o d i n g m e a n i n g s a n d f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g m o t i v e s . These procedures generate the most probable interpretations. For the t i m e b e i n g w e shall refer to these interpretive m e t h o d s of e v e r y d a y l i f e as features of practical action assuring its e c o n o m y a n d e f f i c i e n c y . W e i n c l u d e a m o n g these those basic systems of r e l e v a n c e that m a k e intersubjective u n d e r s t a n d i n g possible. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l tradition w i t h i n s o c i o l o g y h a s been particularly interested i n t h e m . These features of practical action g u a r a n t e e that, as a rule, the latent m e a n i n g s of practical action are decoded "correctly" a n d w i t h o u t distortion (at least u n d e r the most l i k e l y sociohistorical conditions). But it m u s t be t a k e n into a c c o u n t that the interpretive m e t h o d s of e v e r y d a y life responsible f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of e c o n o m y a n d e f f i ciency in action t h e m s e l v e s rest u p o n b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s . T h e y express the spirit of the age a n d the i d e o l o g y of a particular stage of social d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e y are deep-seated a n d historically specific patterns of interpretation, a n d in principle o p e n to criticism. But w i t h i n the sociocultural f r a m e of reference f o u n d o n a particular stage of social d e v e l o p m e n t , the features of practical action i n question assure that a n undistorted, essentially correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m e a n i n g of interaction is a c h i e v e d , albeit at a l o w level of e x p l i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e the u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a c h i e v e d in e v e r y d a y l i f e a n d w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of e p o c h a l a s s u m p t i o n s c a n n o t easily be criticized. Interpretations of action in e v e r y d a y l i f e occur m o r e or less n a t u r a l l y , w i t h o u t need f o r reflection. T h e y reach their l i m i t u n d e r u n l i k e l y conditions, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n e v e r actions h a v e to be understood i n a n e x c e p t i o n a l sense or w h e n e v e r the standard interpretations of action h a v e b r o k e n d o w n because the u n d e r l y i n g sociohistorical c o n d i t i o n s h a v e lost their v a l i d i t y . In a n y case, socialization also m e a n s the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of features of practical a c t i o n i n e v e r y d a y life, w h i c h p r o v i d e f o r its e c o n o m y a n d e f f i c i e n c y .

STRUCTURES OF MEANING

447

NOTES 1. The records of interactions discussed below originated in a research project on "Elternhaus und Schule (Home and School)," which was carried out at the Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung under the direction of Ulrich Oevermann, Lother Krappmann, and Kurt Kreppner. See Oevermann, Krappmann, and Kreppner, "Elternhaus und Schule," unpublished research proposal, Berlin 1968. The theoretical position advanced here is an elaboration of this earlier work. 2. On this point see the chapter by Ulrich Oevermann et al., "Beobachtungen zur Struktur der sozialisatorischen Interaktion," in M. Rainer Lepsius, ed., Zwischenbilanz der Soziologie. Verhandlungen des 17. deutschen Soziologentages (Stuttgart: Enke, 1976), pp. 274-295. 3. See Ulrich Oevermann, "Programmatische Überlegungen zu einer Theorie der Bildungsprozesse und zur Strategie der Sozialisationsforschung," in Klaus Hurrelmann, ed., Sozialisation und Lebenslauf (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1976), pp. 34-52. 4. Ulrich Oevermann, "Sozialisationstheorie. Ansätze zu einer soziologischen Sozialisationstheorie und ihre Konsequenzen für die allgemeine soziologische Analyse," in Günther Lüschen, ed., Deutsche Soziologie seit ¡945, [Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 21] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979), pp. 143-168.

The Editors born in 1940, studied sociology, economics, and philosophy in F r a n k f u r t and at Brandeis University, w h e r e he obtained a Ph.D. He is presently professor of sociology at the Memorial University of N e w f o u n d l a n d , St. John's, Canada, after h a v i n g previously taught in the United States. He is co-author, w i t h David Kettler a n d Nico Stehr, of Karl Mannheim (London a n d New York: Tavistock, 1984), and Politisches Wissen (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1987). His other publications include Wissenssoziologie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), Der Streit um die Wissenssoziologie, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1982). He is editor of the Newsletter of the International Society for the Sociology of Knowledge, and co-editor, w i t h David Kettler a n d Nico Stehr, of several previously unpublished manuscripts by Karl M a n n h e i m n o w published as Structures of Thinking (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) a n d Conservatism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). D I E T E R M I S G E L D , born in 1938, studied philosophy, law, psychology, and theology in Munich, Marburg, Bonn, a n d Heidelberg, w h e r e he obtained his doctorate in philosophy. He has taught in Canada since 1968 and presently teaches in the Department of Educational Theory, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and in the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto. A m o n g his publications are: "Critical Theory and Hermeneutics," in J. O'Neill, ed.. On Critical Theory (New York: Seabury, 1976); "Critical Theory a n d Sociological Theory," Philosophy of the Social Sciences (1984); "Education as Cultural Invasion: Critical Social Theory, Education as Instruction and the Pedagogy of the Oppressed," in J. Forester, ed., Critical Theory and Public Life (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1985), "Critical Hermeneutics versus Neoparsonianism?" New German Critique (1985), vol. 35; "On Gadamer's Hermeneutics," in R. Hollinger, ed., Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985). Nico S T E H R , born in 1942, studied sociology and economics at the Universities of Cologne and Oregon (where he received his Ph.D.). He is professor of sociology at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. In 1984-85 he was Eric-Voegelin-Professor at the LudwigMaximilians-Universität in Munich. His research interests center on the sociology and philosophy of the social sciences, the history of sociological thought, the use of social science knowledge and the "knowledge society." He is a f o u n d i n g editor of the Canadian Journal of VOLKER M E J A ,

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THE EDITORS

Sociology and has co-edited, with René König, Wissenschaftssoziologie: Studien und Materialien (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975); with David Kettler and Volker Meja, Karl Mannheim's Structures of Thinking (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) and Conservatism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); and, with Volker Meja, Society and Knowledge:

Contemporary

Perspectives on the Sociology of Knowledge

(New

Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Books, 1984). With David Kettler and Volker Meja, he is co-author of Karl Mannheim (London and New York: Tavistock, 1984). He has held visiting appointments in Europe and the United States.

The Authors A D O R N O (1903-1969) studied philosophy, music, psychology, a n d sociology at the University of F r a n k f u r t , took his doctorate degree in 1924 a n d his Habilitation w i t h a thesis o n Kierkegaard in 1931. A d o r n o w a s a n early m e m b e r of the F r a n k f u r t Institut f ü r Sozialforschung, f o u n d e d in 1925. He w a s forced to leave G e r m a n y in 1933. Having returned f r o m the United States to West G e r m a n y in 1949, A d o r n o h a d a strong impact on G e r m a n sociology, especially in the 1960s w h e n critical theory w a s widely discussed a n d embraced by students. Together w i t h M a x H o r k h e i m e r a n d Herbert Marcuse, A d o r n o is one of the f o u n d e r s of critical social theory. He w a s director of the Institut f ü r Sozialforschung u n t i l his death. Publications by A d o r n o available in English include: The Authoritarian Personality, co-author (New York: Harper, 1950); Prisms: Cultural Criticism and Society (London: Spearman, 1967); Dialectic of Enlightenment, with Max Horkheimer (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972); The Jargon of Authenticity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); Philosophy of Modern Music (London: Sheed & Ward, 1973); Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life (London: New Left Books, 1974); Introduction to the Sociology of Music (New York: Seabury Press, 1976); In Search of Wagner (London: New Left Books, 1981); Against Epistemology: a Metacritique (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); Aesthetic Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). A d o r n o ' s w o r k s h a v e been published in his Gesammelte Schriften, 23 vols. (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1970 ff.). THEODOR W .

U L R I C H B E C K , born in 1944, studied sociology at the University of M u nich. He became professor of sociology at the University of M ü n s t e r in 1979 a n d , since 1981, has taught at the University of Bamberg. Beck is editor of Soziale Welt. His fields of interest include the theory of m o d ernization, especially developments in labor relations a n d occupations, as well as f o r m s of inequality in m o d e r n society. His publications i n clude: Objektivität und Normativität. Die Theorie-Praxis-Debatte in der modernen deutschen und amerikanischen Soziologie (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1974); Soziologie der Arbeit und der Berufe (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1980); Soziologie und Praxis, ed. (Göttingen: Schwartz & Co., 1982); Risikogesellschaft — Auf dem Wege in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1986). HELMUT

DAHMER,

born

in

1937,

is professor of sociology at

the

452

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Technische Hochschule in Darmstadt. He is editor of the psychoanalytic journal Psyche. His publications include: Politische Orientierungen (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1973); Analytische Sozialpsychologie, ed., 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980); Libido und Gesellschaft. Studien über Freud und die Freudsche Linke ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1973), 2 n d . rev.

ed. 1982; Zwischen Freud und Marx (forthcoming, 1987); Leo Trotzki, Schriften, ed., 10 vols, (forthcoming, 1987 ff.). R A L F DAHRENDORF was born in 1929 as the son of a leading Social Democratic Reichstag deputy. He received his doctorate in philosophy and classical philology f r o m the University of Hamburg and a Ph.D. degree f r o m the University of London, becoming professor of sociology at the University of Constance in 1966. He has also taught at the Universities of Saarbrücken, Hamburg, and Tübingen as well as at Columbia, Harvard, and the University of Oregon. After a political career in the 1960s and early 1970s, initially as an FDP deputy in the West German parliament, Dahrendorf was appointed Director of the London School of Economics, which he left after a ten-year term in order return to the University of Constance. Dahrendorfs main publications are: Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Gesellschaft und Freiheit (Munich: Piper, 1961); Die angewandte Aufklärung.

Gesellschaft und Soziologie in Amerika

( M u n i c h : Piper, 1963);

Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969); Homo Sociologicus (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975); The New Liberty: Survival and Justice in a Changing World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); Life Chances (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); On Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Reisen nach innen und aussen: Aspekte der Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1984); Law and Order (Boulder: Westview, 1985). born in 1 9 4 6 , studied sociology and political science at the universities of Erlangen, Frankfurt, and Paris. He received his doctorate in 1976 f r o m the University of Constance with a thesis on the origins of state-societies, and his venia legendi in 1985 f r o m the University of Düsseldorf with a study of the development of political modernity in nineteenth-century Germany. He is presently Privatdozent at the University of Düsseldorf and holds a research post at an institute for social research in Munich. Eder works on aspects of of social evolution in the tradition of critical theory, conceiving the problems of legitimization and rationalization in late capitalist societies as evolutionary processes to be analyzed with respect to their implicit rationality or pathology. His publications include: Die Entstehung von K L A U S EDER,

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453

Klassengesellschaften, ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973); Die Entstehung staatlich organisierter Gesellschaften. Ein Beitrag zu einer Theorie sozialer Evolution ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1976); Genese und Struktur einer gesellschaftlichen Pathologie. Zur Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte

politischer Modernität in Deutschland (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985). N O R B E R T E L I A S was born in 1897 and worked, until 1984, at the Institute of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of Bielefeld (where he received an honorary degree). He studied medicine, philosophy (with Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Richard Hönigswald), and psychology, and did postgraduate studies with Alfred Weber in Heidelberg. He taught in Frankfurt, where he was Karl Mannheim's assistant. After his forced emigration in 1933, he had a rough time in Paris, and later went on to posts at the London School of Economics and the University of Leicester. He also taught at the universities of Ghana, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Constance, and others. In 1977 he received the Adorno Prize of the city of Frankfurt. Elias' h u m a n science applies sociological, historical, and social psychological approaches to the empirical and theoretical study of long-term social processes. He is best k n o w n for his books The Civilizing Process, 2 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979-1982), which was originally published in 1939, and The Court Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). Other publications available in English include: What Is Sociology? (London: Hutchison, 1978); "Knowledge and Power," in N. Stehr and V. Meja, eds., Society and Knowledge:

Contemporary

Perspectives on the Sociology of Knowledge

(New

Brunswick, N.J. and London: Transaction Books, 1984); The Loneliness of the Dying (Oxford: Black well, 1985); Involvement and Detachment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). He has also published Über die Zeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), Humana Conditio (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), and he is presently working on a book on the power balance between the sexes. A R N O L D G E H L E N (1904-1976) studied philosophy at Leipzig and Cologne, and was an assistant of Hans Freyer. He became a professor at the University of Königsberg (1938) and at the University of Vienna (1940). After World War II, Gehlen taught at Speyer and in Aachen. While his work on philosophical anthropology, sociology, and philosophy remains controversial, he is nevertheless an important figure in postwar German academic discourse. His writings focus upon the institutions constructed by h u m a n s in coping with a lack of inherent instincts that would guide their conduct. Institutions are seen by Gehlen as essential for stable and predictable social conduct. His publications include: Der

Mensch, seine Natur und seine Stellung

in der Welt [1940] ( B o n n : A t h e -

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THEAUTHORS

n a e u m , 1958), E n g l i s h edition f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press; Urmensch und Spätkultur (Frankfurt: A t h e n a e u m , 1956); Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter (Reinbek: R o w o h l t , 1957), also p u b l i s h e d i n English as Man in the Age of Technology ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980); Moral und Hypermoral (Frankfurt: A t h e n a e u m , 1969); Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie ( N e u w i e d : L u c h t e r h a n d , 1963). His collected w o r k s h a v e been p u b l i s h e d i n the Arnold-Gehlen Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: K l o s t e r m a n n , 1978 ff.). JÜRGEN HABERMAS, born i n 1929, studied p h i l o s o p h y , history, G e r m a n literature, a n d e c o n o m i c s at the universities of G ö t t i n g e n , Zurich, a n d B o n n . He acquired his doctorate w i t h a dissertation o n Schelling's p h i l o s o p h y i n 1954 i n B o n n a n d his venia legendi in M a r b u r g in 1961 w i t h Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit ( N e u w i e d : L u c h t e r h a n d , 1962). A f t e r w o r k i n g at the Institute f o r Social Research i n F r a n k f u r t he b e c a m e professor of p h i l o s o p h y i n Heidelberg (1964) a n d w a s later a p p o i n t e d to M a x H o r k h e i m e r ' s c h a i r i n F r a n k f u r t as professor of s o c i o l o g y a n d p h i l o s o p h y (1971). F r o m 1971 to 1983 he w a s director (jointly w i t h the p h i l o s o p h e r K a r l Friedrich v o n Weizsäcker) of the M a x - P l a n c k Institute i n Starnberg. He is n o w professor of p h i l o s o p h y i n F r a n k f u r t . Habermas has been a v i s i t i n g professor at a n u m b e r of universities i n the United States, i n c l u d i n g the N e w School f o r Social Research, Princeton University, the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a at Berkeley, a n d Boston College. He has also lectured at the Collège de France. H a b e r m a s is the l e a d i n g representative of the p o s t w a r g e n e r a t i o n of critical t h e o rists. His w o r k h a s been w i d e l y c o m m e n t e d u p o n i n N o r t h A m e r i c a a n d Britain, a n d his b o o k s h a v e been translated i n t o several l a n g u a g e s . P u b l i c a t i o n s by H a b e r m a s a v a i l a b l e i n E n g l i s h i n c l u d e : Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974); Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976); Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: B e a c o n Press, 1979); Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: B e a c o n Press, 1979); Philosophical-Political Profiles (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1983); Observations on the Spiritual Situation of the Age (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1985); The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984-1987). JÜRGEN KOCKA, b o r a i n 1941, is professor of history a n d social history at the University of Bielefeld, w h e r e h e is also director of the Center f o r Interdisciplinary Studies. He w a s a f e l l o w at H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y (1969), v i s i t i n g m e m b e r of the Institute of A d v a n c e d Studies, Princeton (1975-1976), a n d v i s i t i n g professor at the U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o (1984) a n d at the H e b r e w University J e r u s a l e m (1985). His p u b l i c a t i o n s i n -

THE AUTHORS

455

elude: Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1963); Unternehmer in der deutschen Industrialisierung (Göttingen: V a n d e n h o e c k & Ruprecht, 1975); Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977); Die Angestellten in der deutschen Geschichte, 1850-1980 (Göttingen: V a n d e n h o e c k & Ruprecht, 1981); Lohnarbeit und Klassenbildung. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland 1800-1875 (Berlin: Dietz, 1983). His English publications i n clude: White-Collar Workers in America, 1890-1940 (London/Berkeley: Sage, 1980) a n d Facing Total War: German Society 1914-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). He is co-editor, since 1975, of Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Zeitschrift fllr Historische Sozialwissenschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). born in 1 9 0 6 , has h a d a strong impact o n G e r m a n postwar sociology. After studying philosophy, psychology, ethnology, a n d R o m a n a n d Islamic languages he received his doctorate in Berlin in 1930. In 1937 he emigrated to Switzerland, w h e r e h e t a u g h t at the University of Zurich, r e t u r n i n g to West G e r m a n y in 1949 as professor of sociology at the University of Cologne. He has been visiting professor at several universities, including the University of California at Berkeley a n d the University of Arizona. König has d o n e w o r k in the sociologies of the f a m i l y , c o m m u n i t y , a n d social development, a n d became a leading proponent of empirical sociology d u r i n g the phase of the reconstruction of sociology in West G e r m a n y . His publications i n clude: Soziologie (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1958); Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung (Stuttgart: Enke, 1962); Soziologische Orientierungen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965); Emile Durkheim zur Diskussion. Jenseits von Dogmatismus und Skepsis (Munich: Hanser, 1978); Leben in Widerspruch. Versuch einer intellektuellen Autobiographie (Munich: Hanser, 1980); Menschheit auf dem Laufsteg. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Mode ( M u n i c h : Hanser, 1985). He is a n editor of the Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. RENÉ KÖNIG,

born in 1 9 2 9 , studied political science a n d sociology in F r a n k f u r t a n d Marburg, receiving his doctorate in 1956. Since 1972 he has been professor of political science at the Technische Hochschule in Aachen. Lenk attempts to c o m b i n e historical-genetic a n d systematic approaches a n d , in the tradition of the F r a n k f u r t School, conceives of political studies as critical inquiry. His publications include: Ideologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1961); Marx in der Wissenssoziologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1972); Politische Soziologie (Stuttgart: K o h l h a m m e r , 1982). M A R I O RAINER LEPSIUS, born in 1 9 2 8 , studied economics, sociology, a n d history a n d received his doctorate in 1955 at the University of M u n i c h . KURT LENK,

456

THE AUTHORS

From 1963 to 1981 professor of sociology at the University of M a n n h e i m , he is n o w at the University of Heidelberg a n d served as President of the German Sociological Society f r o m 1971 to 1974. Lepsius' influence on German sociology is based on several contributions to general sociology, the sociology of sociology, industrial a n d political sociology, social stratification, and historical sociology. He is a n editor of the collected works of M a x Weber. His publications include: Zwischenbilanz der Soziologie, ed. (Stuttgart: Enke, 1976); Soziologie in Deutschland und Österreich 1918-1945, ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981); Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983). A m o n g his publications in English are: "From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover," in J u a n J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1978); "The Development of Sociology in Germany after World War II (1945-1968)," International Journal of Sociology (Fall 1983) 12(3). born in 1 9 2 7 , studied in Austria a n d in the United States (with Alfred Schutz). For almost ten years he taught at Hobart College and at the New School for Social Research. After his return to Germany in 1965 he became professor at the University of F r a n k f u r t . In 1970, he moved to the University of Constance. L u c k m a n n ' s research interests are in the sociology of religion, the relation between language, culture, a n d socialization as well as in the social construction of knowledge. With Alfred Schutz, whose unpublished The Structures of the Life-World (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973) he has completed, L u c k m a n n is generally concerned w i t h the f o u n d a t i o n s and applications of a Weberian "interpretive" sociology. His other publications include: w i t h Peter Berger, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966); The Invisible Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Phenomenology and Sociology, ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); Life World and Social Realities (London: H e i n e m a n n , 1983); Strukturen der Lebenswelt, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , THOMAS LUCKMANN,

1973-1984).

born in 1 9 2 7 , is professor of sociology at the University of Bielefeld. He studied l a w at the University of Freiburg and sociology and public administration at Harvard University. Adopting a functionalist approach to social organization, his m a i n concern is the complex nature of modern society and the role of social institutions in ordering and controlling this complexity. A m o n g his m a i n publications are Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisationen (Frankfurt: NIKLAS LUHMANN,

THE AUTHORS

457

Suhrkamp, 1973); Soziologische Aufklärung [1970], 3 vols. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975); Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik [1980], 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981); Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981); Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984). His publications in English include: Trust and Power (New York: Wiley, 1979); The Differentiation of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); "The Differentiation of Advances in Knowledge: The Genesis of Science," in N. Stehr a n d V. Meja, eds., Society and Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives on the Sociology of Knowledge (New Brunswick, N.J. a n d London: Transaction Books, 1984); Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Society (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen, 1984); Love as Passion (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985); A Sociological Theory of Law (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH ( 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 8 2 ) studied history a n d philosophy, medicine a n d psychology at different European universities. He was professor at the universities of Heidelberg (1948-1967) and F r a n k f u r t (1967-1973) and, in the postwar period, emerged as the leading psychoanalytic social thinker in Germany. Until his death he w a s director of the Sigmund-Freud Institute in Frankfurt. Mitscherlich's research focused on the influence of institutions o n the individual, on aggression, on cruelty, and on tolerance. His pathology of modern societies points to the psychological costs of socialization in industrial society and to the resulting f o r m s of emotional impoverishment. His publications include: Die Unfähigkeit zu Trauern (Munich: Piper, 1967); Die Entfaltung der Psychoanalyse. Das Wirken Sigmund Freuds in die Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett, 1969); Die Idee des Friedens und menschliche Aggressivität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970). His publications in English include: Society Without the Father (New York: Aronson, 1974) and, w i t h Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove, 1975). His collected works have been published as Gesammelte Schriften, 10 vols. (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1983 ff.). born in 1 9 3 4 , studied in F r a n k f u r t and Göttingen. He w a s a visiting professor at Vienna, Berne, Milwaukee, and Madison, Wisconsin, before he became professor of sociology at the University of Hannover (1970). Negt's research interests, influenced by the F r a n k f u r t School, include education, trade unions, political behavior, and M a r x ism. His publications include: Soziologische Phantasie und exemplarisches Lernen. Zur Theorie und Praxis der Arbeiterbildung (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1968); Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , O S K A R NBGT,

458

THEAUTHORS

1972); w i t h Alexander Kluge, Geschichte und Eigensinn (Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins, 1981); Lebendige Arbeit, enteignete Zeit. Politische und kulturelle Dimensionen des Kampfes um die Arbeitszeit ( F r a n k f u r t a n d N e w York: Campus, 1984). born in 1940, w a s a n assistant of J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s (1964-1970). Since 1977 h e has been professor of sociology at the University of F r a n k f u r t . O e v e r m a n n ' s w o r k has p r i m a r i l y been in the area of sociolinguistics, socialization (especially patterns of f a m i l y interaction), a n d the sociological d i m e n s i o n s of d e v e l o p m e n t a l processes (including educational development). Best k n o w n are his proposals f o r a qualitative methodology, a n d a n objective hermeneutics, w h i c h h e has discussed in contributions to various volumes. His publications i n clude: "Role Structure of the Family a n d its Implications f o r the Cognitive Development of Children," in M a t h i a s Matthijssen, ed., Education in Europe (The Hague: M o u t o n , 1968); "Schichtenspezifische Formen des Sprachverhaltens u n d ihr Einfluss auf kognitive Prozesse," in H. Roth, ed., Begabung und Lernen (Stuttgart: Klett, 1971); Sprache und soziale Herkunft (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1972); "Beobachtungen zur Struktur der sozialisatorischen Interaktion," in M. Rainer Lepsius, ed., Zwischenbilanz der Soziologie. Verhandlungen des 17. deutschen Soziologentages (Stuttgart: Enke, 1976); "Programmatische Überlegungen zu einer Theorie der Bildungsprozesse u n d zur Strategie der Sozialisationsforschung," in Klaus H u r r e l m a n n , ed., Sozialisation und Lebenslauf (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1976); "Sozialisationstheorie. Ansätze zu einer soziologischen Sozialisationstheorie u n d ihre Konsequenzen f ü r die allgemeine soziologische Analyse," in G ü n t h e r Lüschen, ed., Deutsche Soziologie seit 1945, Special issue 21 of the Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979). CLAUS O F F E , b o r n in 1940, has been professor of political science a n d sociology at the University of Bielefeld since 1975. He received his doctorate in sociology at the University of F r a n k f u r t in 1968. He has worked o n political institutions, democratic theory, a n d sociopolitical aspects of labor markets. His publications include: Berufsbildungsreform (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1975); Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1975); a n d Arbeitsgesellschaft ( F r a n k f u r t a n d New York: Campus, 1984). Apart f r o m a large n u m b e r of essays, he has published the f o l l o w i n g books in English: Industry and Inequality (New York: St. Martin's, 1977); Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984); Disorganized Capitalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985). ULRICH OEVERMANN,

WOLFGANG

SCHLUCHTER,

born in 1938, studied at the universities of

459

THE AUTHORS

Tübingen, Munich, and Berlin, where he received his doctorate in 1967. He received his second doctorate (Habilitation) f r o m the University of Mannheim in 1972 and was professor of sociology at the University of Düsseldorf f r o m 1973 to 1976. Since then he has been professor of sociology at the University of Heidelberg. Schluchter's work on sociological theory concentrates on bureaucracy, domination, rationality, state theory, and democracy, and is mainly devoted to a reconstruction and development of Max Weber's approach. His publications include: Entscheidungßr den Rechtsstaat (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1968); Aspekte bürokratischer Herrschaft (Munich: List, 1972), 2d ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985); Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus.

Eine

Analyse

von

Max

Webers

Gesellschaftsgeschichte

(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1979). His English publications include: with Guenther Roth, Max Weber's Vision of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and The Rise of Western Rationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). (1912-1984) was one of the most influential German postwar sociologists. His philosophical position was derived f r o m the tradition of philosophical anthropology, hermeneutics and conservatism, as represented by his teachers Hans Freyer, Theodor Litt, and Arnold Gehlen. After World War II, Schelsky was among the first social scientists attempting to reconstruct German sociology and to stress the need for empirical social research. He became professor of sociology at Hamburg in 1949. Twenty years later, Schelsky became co-founder of Germany's largest sociology department at the University of Bielefeld. In the years before his death, Schelsky retreated f r o m social science and criticized sociology f r o m an "anti-sociological" perspective. His publications include: Die skeptische Generation (Düsseldorf-Cologne: Diederich, 1957); Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie (DüsseldorfH E L M U T SCHELSKY

Cologne: Diederich, 1959); Einsamkeit und Freiheit. Die deutsche Universität und ihre Reformen ( H a m b u r g : R e i n b e k , 1963); Die Arbeit tun die anderen. Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen (Opladen:

Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975); Rückblicke eines 'Anti-Soziologen' (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981). FRIEDRICH H . T E N B R U C K , born in 1919, wrote his dissertation on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1944, and shifted his interests f r o m philosophy and history to sociology during his post-doctoral studies at the University of Virginia. After research and teaching periods at Hobart and Smith Colleges, Freiburg, and Frankfurt he became professor of sociology at the University of Tübingen in 1967. Throughout his work, he emphasizes the importance of an adequate understanding of European

460

THEAUTHORS

history for the sociological analysis of the spiritual condition of the present age. In this sense, studies in the history of sociology, in the sociologies of science, religion, and culture, but also analyses of role theory and of social change are according to Tenbruck always more than specialized efforts within an intellectual division of labor. They must be regarded as steps toward a sociologically and anthropologically informed explanation of the function of science, of rationality, and of religion in modern society. Tenbruck is k n o w n for his work on Max Weber, on the theory of action, and on the sociology of religion. He is presently working in the area of the sociology of science. His publications include: "Uber Kultur im Zeitalter der Sozialwissenschaften,"

Saeculum.

Jahrbuch

ßr

Universalgeschichte

(Freiburg: Alber, 1963); Zur Kritik der planenden Vernunft (Freiburg: Alber, 1971); "Das Werk Max Webers," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (1975); "Der Fortschritt der Wissenschaft als Trivialisierungsprozess,"

Kölner

Zeitschrift

ßr

Soziologie

und

Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 18 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975); "Glaubensgeschichte der Moderne," Zeitschrift ßr Politik (1976); "Wahrheit und Mission," in H. Baier, ed., Freiheit und Sachzwang (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977); "Zur Anthropologie des Handelns," in H. Lenk, ed., Handlungstheorien — interdisziplinär, vol. 2 (Munich: Fink, 1978); "Die Aufgaben der Kultursoziologie," Kölner Zeitschrift

ßr

Soziologie

und

Sozialpsychologie

(1979)

31;

"Deutsche

Soziologie im internationalen Kontext. Ihre Ideengeschichte und ihr Gesellschaftsbezug," Kölner Zeitschrift ßr

Soziologie und

Sozialpsychologie,

Sonderheft 21 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979); Die unbewältigten Sozialwissenschaften (Graz-Vienna-Cologne: Styria, 1984).

Index Abendroth, Wolfgang, 272 Action, administrative, 224; analysis of, 437; capitalist rules of, 103; class, 249; communicative, 194, 198-199,210-211; consensual, 194; control of, 178-179; criminal, 392; economic, 122-123; freedom of, 310, 333; individual, 49, 64, 66, 130, 372, 375, 412, 414, 416, 438; meaning of, 439; norms of, 93-94, 106, 395; organizational, 308; political, 77, 96, 146, 215, 277, 352; practical, 437, 446; rational, 64, 67, 117, 190, 384; revolutionary, 145-146, 261; science of, 441; social, 12, 18, 62, 64-65, 101, 117, 122, 126-136, 274, 277, 328, 352, 358, 375, 379-380, 411, 414, 416, 419, 421, 438; structure of, 188, 311, 446; theory of, 39, 151, 438, 440; theory of communicative, 188, 195-196, 198, 204, 206, 208, 210; value-related, 83 Adams, Robert McCormack, 290 Adler, Max, 40, 73, 104 Adorno, Theodor W„ 1-2, 4, 6, 10, 1419, 23-25, 27, 29, 35-36, 51, 53, 108-109, 111, 114-115, 118, 120, 139, 142-149, 174, 187, 196-197, 213-217, 232-247, 358, 361, 408409,451 Albert, Hans, 4, 24,102,111, 3 20 Albrecht, Günter, 55 Alemann, Heine von, 53 Alexander, Jeffrey, 26, 28 Alienation, 60, 63, 69, 76, 189, 192, 331-332, 343, 359-360, 378, 412, 418, 432-434; cultural, 15; dialectic of, 396, 399; theory of, 59, 71; universal, 69 Allert, Tilman, 436-447 Allport, Gordon, 410 Althusser, Louis, 107

Americanization of German sociology, 6 Analysis, causal, 408; class, 338, 342, 361; comparative, 189, 335; comprehensive, 54; conceptual, 61, 207; critical, 66-67, 76, 131, 135, 358; empirical, 23, 94, 127-129, 441 ¡functional, 101, 128, 178, 335; genetic, 68; levels of, 364; Marxian, 215, 238; mechanical, 421; organizational, 315; phenomenological, 359; philosophical, 7, 24, 359; political, 274; program, 197; psychological, 408, 441; scientific, 49, 94, 105, 123; social, 17, 96; of social conditions, 427; of social developments, 324; of social processes, 251; sociological, 17, 50, 129, 132, 135, 273-274, 410, 433, 436; structural, 51, 178, 437; systematic, 49; systems, 278-290; theoretical, 117; see also Functionalism Anomie, 192-193,216, 289,423 Anthropology, 139, 248, 362, 393, 434; cultural, 414-415, 419, 429, 432; philosophical, 9, 12, 27-28, 34, 36, 47, 68, 139, 359-360; social, 28, 280,416; sociological, 28 Anti-sociology, 28,49 Antrick, Otto, 55 Anwärter, Manfred, 29 A pel, Karl-Otto, 15, 24, 399,401 Arendt, Hannah, 53 Arensberg, Conrad, 289 Aristotle, 11, 121, 173,250-251 Arndt, Adolf, 267 Aron, Raymond, 52,73 Ashby, W. Ross, 176 Aulard, Alphonse, 249 Authority, 251, 274, 376; analysis of functional, 298, 304; bureaucratic, 291; functional, 274, 291-299, 301,

462 Authority, corit.. 304-306, 313, 316-318, 320; official, 274, 291-295, 304-306, 313, 316-318; paternal, 193-194, 196; professional, 291; relations of, 63; structural, 292; structures of, 344, 375; technical, 318 Avineri, Shlomo, 107 Bacon, Francis, 147 Badura, Bernhard, 355 Bahrdt, Hans P., 22 Bailyn, Bernard, 53 Banton, Michael, 289 Barlach, Ernest Heinrich, 223 Barnard, ehester I., 318 Barnes, S.H., 199,211 Beck, Ulrich, 22, 24, 276-277, 340-355, 451 Beck-Gersheim, Elisabeth, 353-354 Becker, Carl Heinrich, 40-42, 54-55 Becker, Howard, 52 Bekker, Konrad, 107 Below, Georg von, 41,55 Bendix, Reinhard, 51 Benn, Gottfried, 219,227 Berdahl, Robert M., 355 Berelson, Bernard R., 211 Berger, Bernard, 353 Berger, Peter, 318-319, 3 5 3,456 Bergmann, Waltraut, 53 Bergstraesser, Arnold, 40 Berking, Helmut, 21 Bernfeld, Siegfried, 401 Bernstein, Basil, 347 Bierstedt, Robert, 435 Bismarck, Otto von, 46,72, 218 Bloch, E.Marc, 107-108 Boettcher, Erik, 136 Bolte, Karl Martin, 352 Boris, Dieter, 75 Bosetzky, Horst, 321-322 Boskoff, Alvin, 52 Bottomore, Thomas, 106,149 Bourdieu, Pierre, 353 Boyen, Hermann von, 263 Boyers, Robert, 53 Bracht, Manfred, 72 Braun, Hans H., 21

INDEX Braunreuther, Kurt, 20, 29, 52,103 Brecht, Bertolt, 235 Breuer, Dieter, 383 Brinkmann, Carl, 120 Brückner, Peter, 271 Bühl, Walter, 27 Bureaucracy, 60, 63, 111, 117, 190, 193, 237, 260-263, 273-277, 294, 366, 371 Bureaucratization, 192, 211, 274-275, 291, 300, 306-312, 314-317, 378 Burke, Edmund, 249 Burns, Thomas, 320 Capitalism, 20, 50, 61, 63, 90, 98, 103, 110, 189-190, 192, 199, 203, 214215, 220, 232, 237-238, 244-245, 262, 269, 275-276, 324-328, 330335, 337-338, 342, 345-346, 378, 394; crisis of, 252; critique of, 232; identity of, 326; industrial, 345346, 378; late, 214, 216, 232-247, 276, 324-339; mature, 103; spirit of, 103; theory of, 333; theory of late, 275, 324-339 Caplow, Theodore, 321 Carlyle, Thomas, 249 Change, historical, 125, 249, 331, 340; logic of, 331; revolutionary, 252; social, 32, 48, 156, 183, 248-256, 265, 341, 362, 423, 428, 430, 432; structural, 160, 170, 183, 302, 305; theory of, 249, 251; theory of social, 361 Childe, Gordon V., 165, 172, 290 Clark, Grahame, 382 Class, 233, 249, 273-290, 333; analysis of, 251; bourgeois, 258-260, 264; economic, 160, 260; formation of, 346; history of, 349; identity of social, 349; merchant, 262; political, 261; reality of, 340; reproduction of, 276; social, 147, 235-238, 276, 333, 341-342, 346-350, 353, 355, 391; status, 350; struggle, 91, 152153, 220, 327, 345, 383; theory of, 338 Clausen, J o h n A., 357 Collins, Randall, 26

INDEX Commercialization, 302, 321 Comte, Auguste, 62 Conceptualization, 44, 81, 148, 164, 367, 411, 414, 425-429, 432; reified, 67; scientific, 145 Conflict, analysis of, 254; analysis of class, 249, 276, 338; class, 198, 215, 248-256, 275-276, 329, 332, 338, 391; institutionalized, 199; m a n agement of, 154; organizational, 313; power, 169; religious, 341; social, 32, 183, 244, 254, 275, 329, 334; sociopolitical, 332; structural, 158; theory of, 254 Consciousness, bourgeois, 331; class, 232, 235-236, 329; cultural, 15, 115; of crisis, 4, 24, 70; critical, 144, 147; false, 86, 89, 361, 399400; history of, 288; national, 262; philosophy of, 195; rational, 76; reification of cultural, 18; self-, 58, 95, 135, 175, 264; social, 57, 115, 288; structure of, 370-371; tragic, 34, 57-75, 360 Control, democratic, 275, 277, 291323; means of, 152; scientific, 127; social, 180, 196-197, 242, 274, 303, 331, 348, 376,412-413,443; of violence, 154-157, 172 Cooley, Charles Horton, 358, 370, 373, 382 Coser, Lewis, 51 Count, Earl W„ 382 Counterrevolution, 258, 262, 264-265, 267 Cranach, Mario von, 381-382 Crisis, 1, 20, 24, 31-32, 34, 58-59, 61, 70-71, 190, 192-193, 194, 225, 258, 265, 270, 276, 284, 332, 338, 377, 384-385; of conscience, 2; cultural, 1, 390-393; economic, 45, 189, 243, 258, 276, 327, 338, 350-352; energy, 252; individual, 351; m a n agement of, 276; moral, 1; natural, 264; political, 276; science of, 4, 23; social, 4, 32, 351; societal, 70; steering, 190-192; structural, 335; theory of, 338 Cromwell, Oliver, 263

463 Crystallization, cultural, 8, 215, 218231 Culture, 1-3,8-9, 13, 17,43, 59, 68,7172, 83, 97, 99, 105, 110, 124, 177178, 182, 187-188, 192, 195-197, 204-207, 214, 220, 226, 238, 241, 258, 260, 287, 314, 342, 345, 348, 350, 359-362, 364, 367, 370, 372, 379, 383, 385-394, 405, 411, 413415,417,423,429-432; analysis of, 406; aristocratic, 57; bourgeois, 28, 187, 204; capitalist, 346; crisis of, 392; history of, 219, 393; historical, 215; industrial, 225; intellectual, 3; interpretation of, 124, 213; mass, 118, 194, 196-198; material, 99, 105, 110; modern, 60, 99, 196, 204, 213, 216, 218; occupational, 306-307; organizational, 306-307; political, 3, 41-42, 189, 196, 214, 217; scientific, 225; sociology of, 68, 70; Sumerian, 165; technological, 225; theory of, 100, 110, 361362, 385-386; tragedy of, 34, 59-63 Dahme, Hans Joachim, 73 Dahmer, Helmut, 14, 16, 358, 360361, 383-401,451-452 Dahrendorf, Ralf, 4-7, 10, 13, 19-20, 24-25, 28, 52, 214-217, 248-256, 260, 270, 320, 322, 357, 411-413, 415-435,452 Dalton, Russell J., 199,211 Darwin, Charles, 220, 363 Darwinism, 222; social, 33, 39,47-49 Davis, Kingsley, 422 Debureaucratization, 291, 304, 306, 312-313,315,317 Decisionism, 35,76-111 Deformalization, 311-312, 323 Democracy, 8-10, 18-20, 44, 62, 183, 189, 198, 214, 217, 248, 266-267, 269, 291, 295, 307, 342; bourgeois, 257-272; council, 317; liberal, 11, 19, 214, 260-261; mass, 342; parliamentary, 258; pluralist, 13; political, 12; representative, 268; social, 263-264; Western, 72 Democratization, 10, 19, 162, 168,

464

INDEX

Democratization, com., 275, 292, 299, 304-307, 312-318 Demonology, 6 4 , 6 7 Depoliticization, 9-10,71 Deprofessionalization, 302, 304 Descartes, René, 123 DeVore, Irven, 381 D'Hondt, Jacques, 272 Dialectic, 105, 142, 144-145, 147, 240, 244,250, 310 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 48 Dirks, Walter, 409 Discourse, 115; philosophical, 15; political, 2; self-reflective, 3; universe of, 440 Dobb, Maurice, 333, 339 Döbert, Rainer, 29 Domination [Herrschaft], 8-9, 157, 175, 189, 196, 237, 240, 243, 251, 260261, 265, 280, 283-285, 291, 295298, 305, 318-320, 332-333, 344, 386, 390, 392-393; administrative, 3; bureaucratic, 274-275, 291, 294295, 317; forms of, 274, 284; institutionalization of, 285; legal, 295; legitimate, 297; political, 3, 175, 178, 245, 288; sociology of, 297; structures of, 280, 283, 344; system of, 280, 283, 288; technological, 9 Döring, Herbert, 55 Duality, doctrine of, Factors, ideal; real Dubiel, Helmut, 29, 53 Dunn, Judy, 382

71;

see

also

Dürkheim, Emile, 16, 23, 39, 64, 207, 255, 353, 385 Dux, Günther, 28 Easton, Loyd, 103-104, 106-107, 109 Ebbecke, Ulrich, 382 Eckermann, Walter, 102 Economics, 4, 33, 87, 115, 119-126, 130, 133, 136-137, 140, 164-168, 171, 189-191, 193-194, 203, 210, 219, 228, 236-238, 243-244, 249, 268, 3 2 4 , 3 7 1 , 4 4 1 Economy, bourgeois, 91-92; capitalist, 190, 331; market, 190, 237, 243;

political, 40, 88, 115, 119, 121-123, 126, 136, 209, 249, 254, 328, 333334, 361, 370, 399; research, 436; theory of, 122 Edel, A., 435 Eder, Klaus, 14, 16, 24, 273-275, 278290,452 Education, 33, 41, 45, 80, 119, 127128, 133, 193, 199, 223, 233, 239, 250, 294, 341, 344-345, 347, 353, 355, moral, 41; political, 41-42, 55, 137, 239; post-secondary, 5, 22, 25, 229; scientific, 10; sociology of, 25, 117, 136 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaus, 363-366, 381382 Einstein, Albert, 223 Eisermann, Gottfried, 52, 57, 72 Eldridge, J o h n E.T., 74 Elias, Norbert, 2, 6-7, 22, 47, 51, 114115, 118, 150-172, 260, 270, 353, 453 Emancipation, 17, 152, 161, 200, 234, 240, 277, 345, 361; political, 17, 258; social, 17, 352 Engels, Friederich, 103-105, 109, 239, 262-263, 339 Epistemology, 6 6 , 7 7 , 1 0 1 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 3 Erhard, Ludwig, 247 Ethics, 84, 204-205, 220, 231, 248, 298, 300-301, 302-303; anti-Christian, 219; Christian, 231; professional, 298, 300-303; of responsibility, 215; work, 90 Ethology, 359, 363, 365 Ethnology, 119 Etzioni, Amitai, 294, 318-319, 321, 323, 353 Evolution, 87, 181, 183-184, 279-281, 283-287, 329, 365-367, 369-372; cultural, 343, 365; physiological, 368; social, 11, 212, 273, 286, 322, 343, 385; theory of, 183-184; theory of social, 273; see also Theory, evolutionary Existentialism, 123 Factors, ideal, 34, 68-71; real, 34, 6871; social, 49-50, 67; unreal, 69; see

INDEX also Duality, doctrine of Fascism, 9, 21, 33, 227, 252, 265-266, 268; see also National Socialism Feigl, Herbert, 53 Fenichel, Otto, 394,401 Ferenczi, Sandór, 400 Fermi, Laura, 52 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 80-81, 85, 104, 144-145,240, 393 Fichte, J o h a n n Gottlieb, 48,123,401 Fleischer, Helmut, 104 Fleming, Donald, 53 Flitner, Andreas, 52 Fogt, Helmut, 54 Foppa, Klaus, 381-382 Forde, Daryll, 290 Formalization, 307-316, 322-323 Foucault, Michel, 24 Fox, Robin, 381 Franco, Francisco, 269 Fraenkel, Ernst, 45, 51 Frankfurt School, 4, 14-17, 23, 25-26, 29, 111, 360 Frantz, Constantin, 257 Freud, Anna, 400,402,409 Freud, Sigmund, 3, 16-17, 65, 74, 135, 195, 220, 246, 360-361, 383-387, 389, 391-396,400-404,409 Freyer, Hans, 1-2, 21, 40, 42, 44, 46, 55, 119,453,459 Fried, Morton, 283-284, 289 Fromm, Erich, 51 Fuchs, Werner, 353 Function, 23, 130-131, 134, 164, 174; administrative, 159; conflict m a n agement, 154; economic, 154-156, 168, 172, 375-376; educational, 44; elementary, 153-154, 157; kinship, 375-376; legitimating, 295; moral, 390; objective, 385; organizational, 313-314; political, 44, 281, 375-376; primary, 314, 322, 377; relief, 307; religious, 284, 375-376; secondary, 322; social, 11,61, 127, 154, 156, 158, 160, 164, 209, 326, 377, 390, 399; survival, 154, 157, 161; systemic, 311; violence control, 154-156, 172; see also Conflict, management of

465 Functionalism, 26, 116, 128, 174, 178, 184, 186, 198, 273, 364, 430; structural, 7, 28, 117, 178, 410, 414; see also Parsons Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 24 Galileo, 152,441 Gallie, Duncan, 355 Garrelli, Paul, 172 Gaudet, Hazel, 211 Gehlen, Arnold, 1-2,4, 6,8-13, 15, 19, 23-28, 36,47, 50, 75, 120, 129, 132, 139, 148, 213-231, 359, 361, 429, 453-454,459 Geiger, Theodor, 1, 22, 36,45-46, 51 Genz, Friedemann, 27 Gerth, Hans, 51,74 Giddens, Anthony, 26, 355 Glaeser, Bernhard, 72 Godelier, Maurice, 289, 328, 330, 339 Goethe, J o h a n n Wolfgang, 258-259, 270 Goldscheid, Rudolf, 38 Goldthorpe, J o h n H., 354 Good, Paul, 75 Goode, William, 420,430,434 Goslin, David A„ 382 Gouldner, Alvin, 300, 319, 321 Grathoff, Richard, 29 Green, Arnold Wilfred, 413,434 Griewank, Karl, 271 Groh, Dieter, 355 Gross, Llewellyn, 435 Grosser, Alfred, 266, 272 Grotius, Hugo, 175 Grünberg, Carl, 38-39,46 Guddat, Kurt, 103-104, 106-107, 109 Gurvitch, Georges, 52, 73, 139, 142, 144, 145, 148 Habermas, Jürgen, 3-4,6-7,10-11,1419, 22-27, 29-30, 108-111, 114, 117-118, 187-212, 289, 322, 358, 362,454,458 Hahn, E., 102 Hahn, Thomas, 53 Hall, R., 321 Hamann, J o h a n n Georg, 123 Hamburg, David A., 382

466 Hamilton, Peter, 72 Handl, Johan, 352 Hardenberg, Friedrich L., 262-263 Hartmann, Heinz, 295-298, 319-321 Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, 353 Hauser, Arnold, 38, 54 Heberle, Rudolf, 46 Hegel, G.W. Friedrich, 19, 48, 58, 69, 72, 77, 89, 92, 94-95, 105, 107-109, 119, 123, 142, 147, 161, 241, 244, 254, 258-260, 270-271, 394 Heidegger, Martin, 8-9, 24,27 Heller, Hermann, 264,271 Henning, Leopold von, 272 Henrich, Dieter, 102, 105-106, 110 Herder, J o h a n n Gottfried, 48,123 Herwig, B„ 319 Hermeneutics, 8, 16, 24, 181, 206; objective, 361-362,436-447 Hildebrandt, Kai, 199,211 Hintze, Otto, 262 Hintze, Paul von, 263 Hirsch, Joachim, 212 Historicism, 8, 33, 39, 42-43, 47, 49, 58-59, 68, 70, 145, 329, 360,429 History, concept of, 78; consciousness of, 11; cultural, 28, 31, 37, 57, 214; determinism of, 69; economic, 4, 67; evolutionary, 220; ideological, 37; intellectual, 44, 48-49, 271; interpretation of, 63-64, 71, 79; laws of, 60, 80, 87; logic of, 109, m e a n ing of, 70, 254; natural, 28, 104, 370-371; philosophy of, 18, 39, 49, 65,69,75,77, 80, 92, 110, 117-118, 187-188, 204, 220; political, 16, 214, 433; practical, 80; social, 16, 67, 122; theory of, 19, 188, 240, 330, 396; world, 226 Hobbes, Thomas, 60, 178 Hobsbawm, Eric J., 353 Hof m a n n , Werner, 108 Holm, Kurt, 318 Homer, 170 Hondrich, Karl Otto, 352 Honigsheim, Paul, 40,45 Honneth, Axel, 24, 26 Horkheimer, Max, 1-2,4,6, 16-19, 23, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40, 46, 51, 108-109,

INDEX 118, 120, 149, 187, 196, 209, 212, 246,451,454 Horvath, Zoltan, 54 Hradil, Stefan, 352 Hsu, Francis L.K., 290 Hufnagel, Gerhard, 103,105,110 Hughes, Everett, 321-322 Hughes, H. Stuart, 53 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 5, 263 Hurrelmann, Klaus, 447,458 Husserl, Edmund, 68,175, 453 Hyper-empiricism, dialectical, 142 Idealism, 33,47-50, 66, 115,240,260 Ideals, bourgeois, 62, 71,187; cultural, 387-389, 391; liberal, 62; political, 152; social, 151-152 Ideal types, 64, 67, 79, 110, 189, 234, 302 Ideas, 48, 59, 69-71, 83, 86, 103, 132, 153, 205, 209, 215, 219, 221-222, 225-228, 311, 395-398, 415, 440; biological, 364; critical, 241; history of, 123, 215, 227; moral, 50; political, 42, 61; revolutionary, 228; social, 50, 61; socialist, 220; system of, 222; universe of, 72 Identity, 95, 195, 202, 215, 245, 257, 260, 263-264, 277, 310, 330, 349351, 357-447; capitalist, 325; class, 341, 349; collective, 192, 202-203; cultural, 276, 348; ego, 384; evolution of personal, 368; national, 260-263; personal, 202-203, 357360, 363-382; philosophy of, 109; political, 344; rational, 357, 359; social, 277, 344, 348-351 Ideology, 8, 11, 23, 32, 59, 70, 72, 78, 126-127, 130, 135, 146-147, 194, 215-216, 225, 227, 229, 231, 244, 246, 301, 330, 351, 361, 385, 445446; critique of, 40, 51, 61, 67, 117, 187, 204,399 Individualism, bourgeois, 344; methodological, 33, 39, 42, 48, 6268 Individualization, 171, 276, 341-354, 367, 369 Industrialization, 169, 201, 218, 232,

467

INDEX 236, 354,408; history of, 303 Inequality, 162, 277, 292, 299, 304305, 316, 322, 340-343, 349-353, 388-390; analysis of social, 273; economic, 388; political, 388; power, 157; social, 5, 14, 158, 276277, 282, 340-341, 343, 346-347, 349, 351-352, 392-393; theory of social, 345 Inglehart, Ronald, 199, 211 Institutionalization, 42-44, 47, 50, 114, 179-183, 185, 189-190, 198199, 202, 204, 228, 275, 280-281, 284, 288, 292-293, 298, 315-316, 318, 335, 337 Integration, 50, 118, 139, 152, 163164, 169, 181, 188, 198, 215, 228, 236, 241, 245, 283 285-286, 314, 331, 337, 357, 359, 365, 367, 369, 379, 408; personal, 60; political, 283; social, 118, 189, 191, 193, 199, 202, 207-208, 239, 278-280, 283286, 308, 389, 395; sociopolitical, 337; system, 193, 273, 278-282, 286, 288, Intelligentsia, 57, 213, 258-260, 263, 270, 355 Interaction, 195, 197-198, 203, 210, 283, 345, 347-348, 361-362, 367, 397,436-447; analysis of, 4 3 7 , 4 3 9 ; meaning of, 438, 441, 444, 446; significance of, 441; social, 343, 362, 365-366, 369-370, 372-375, 377; socializing, 196; structures of, 4 4 0 , 4 4 3 , 4 4 5 ; symbolic, 25 Internalization, 1 9 4 , 1 9 6 , 4 4 6 Interpretation, 49, 65, 77, 102, 104, 106, 109-110, 114, 123-124, 128, 132, 136, 180-181, 204-205, 210, 219-220, 233, 268, 274, 279, 286288, 304, 309, 328, 330, 337, 349, 362, 383, 385, 398, 411, 413, 418, 422,425,427,436,438,440-446 Irle, Martin, 319 Jäckh, Ernst, 55 Jäggi, Urs, 21 Jahoda, Marie, 53, 56 Janik, Allan, 54

Janoska-Bendl, Judith, 103,110 Jaspers, Karl, 2 4 , 1 2 3 , 4 5 3 Jay, Martin, 29, 53 Jay, PhyllisC., 381 Jelinek, J a n , 381 Jerison, Harry J., 382 Joas, Hans, 26, 358 Johnston, William M., 54 Jolly, Alison, 381 Jonas, David A., 382 Jonas, Doris F., 381-382 Jones, Robert Allan, 55 Jünger, Ernst, 8-9, 27 Jüres, Ernst A„ 22 Jurisprudence, 33, 224, 228; see also Law Kaase, Max, 199,211 Kaelble, Helmut, 354 Kant, Immanuel, 72, 123, 254-255, 258-260, Kantorowicz, Ernst, 55 Karger, Ursula, 53 Käsler.Dirk, 21,53, 5 5 , 7 4 Katz, Elihu, 211 Kautsky, Karl, 104 Kellner, Douglas, 211 Kellner, Heinrich, 353 Kelsen, Hans, 66 Kern, H„ 353 Kesselring, T., 212 Kesting, Hanno, 22 Kettler, David, 30, 5 4 , 4 4 9 - 4 5 0 Keynes, J o h n Maynard, 239 Kirchheimer, Otto, 53, 55 Kirsch, Edith, 29 Kitchener, Robert F., 212 Klages, Helmut, 52 Klein, Josephine, 355 Kleist, Heinrich von, 258, 270 Klingemann, Carsten, 21, 56 Kluge, Alexander, 30, 2 1 1 , 4 5 8 Kluke, Paul, 53 Knapp, P., 382 Knoll, Reinhold, 54 Knowledge, abstract, 228; conceptual, 16; control, 169, 172, 243; distribution of, 298, 380; empirical, 66, 79, 8 3 , 9 3 , 127; factual, 135;faith and.

468

INDEX

Knowledge, cont., 297; f u n c t i o n of, 156, 303; historical, 126, 367; interpretation of, 126; intuitive, 188, 208; learned, 157; magic-mythical, 156, 162, 171; m o n o p o l i z a t i o n of, 171; partial, 83, 89, 93, 99; personal, 416; philosophical, 58; p h i l o s o p h y of, 57; practical, 95; prescriptive, 94; production of, 162, 171; secularized, 167; scientific, 77, 79, 83, 99, 110, 135, 162, 172, 228; sociological, 66, 129-130, 414, 434; sociology of, 35-36, 40, 51, 57-59, 61, 66, 68-72, 74-75, 117, 126, 361, 432; specialized, 294, 297-298, 313, 316, 318, 380; technical, 228, 279, 318; tree of, 92; theory of, 86, 207; universal, 122 Kocka, Jürgen, 35-36, 76-111, 355, 454-455 Kofler, Leo, 27 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 15, 212 Kon, IgorS., 107 K ö n a u , Elisabeth, 436-447 König, René, 2, 6, 15, 21, 23, 25, 52-54, 56, 114-115, 118, 129, 138-149, 450,455 Kornhauser, A r t h u r William, 320-322 Korsch, Karl, 32, 39-40,106 Krambeck, J ü r g e n , 436-447 K r a p p m a n n , Lother, 447 Kreckel, Reinhard, 355 Kreppner, Kurt, 447 Kris, Ernst, 401 Kroeber, Alfred L„ 434 K u g e l m a n n , Ludwig, 104-105 Kuklick, Henrika, 55 K u m m e r , Hans, 381-382

302,

Labor, compulsory, 387; division of, 5, 60, 105, 116, 130-131, 165, 201, 206-207, 209, 212, 286, 288, 303, 312, 316, 320, 342, 373, 378, 386; historical, 95; industrial, 27; m e a n s of, 327; organization of, 287; organized, 200; productivity of, 392; rationality of, 90; social,

86, 194; u n i o n s , 33; wage, 88, 328329, 334, 342, 349; see also Trade unions Laicization, 298, 302 Lancaster, Chesley Stephens, 381 Lancaster, J a n e B., 381 L a n d m a n n , Michael, 73 Landshut, Siegfried, 40, 105, 108-109, 272 L a n d w e h r m a n n , Friedrich, 319 Language, phenomenological, 358; philosophy of, 118, 362; sociology of, 361-362, 432; theory of, 117, 181 Lapierre, J e a n - W i l l i a m , 283,289-290 Lasch, Christopher, 194, 211, 353 Law, economic, 89, 327; of existence, 220; f u n d a m e n t a l , 219; general, 64, 89; labor, 45, 350, 354; n a t u r a l , 80-82, 104-105, 119, 175; philosophical, 80; police, 271; private, 330; social, 233, 327; sociology of, 51, 117; structural, 233; theory of, 205; theory of n a t u r a l , 119; u n i versal, 60, 63; see also Jurisprudence Lazarsfeld, Paul F„ 22, 36, 47, 51, 53, 56,211 Leach, E d m u n d , 285, 290 Lederer, Emil, 32, 38,40 Lee, Richard B„ 381 Lefévre, Wolfgang, 102, 109-110 Legitimation, 5, 44, 48, 144, 191-192, 288, 296-298, 314, 318-319, 351, 391-393 Leibniz, Gottfried W i l h e l m , 123 Lemieux, Vincent, 289 Lenin, Vladmir, 106, 250, 265, 271 Lenk, Hans, 27 Lenk, Kurt, 13, 33-34, 52, 57-75, 360, 455 Lepenies, Wolf, 28, 54, 381 Lepsius, Mario Rainer, 21-23, 31-33, 37-56,352,447,456 LeVine, Robert, 289 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 287 Lewin, Kurt, 51 Lieber, H a n s - J o a c h i m , 72 Life-world, 64, 117, 188-199, 201-204,

INDEX 208, 210-211, 342, 346, 349, 353 Likert, Rensis, 323 Linde, Hans, 54 Litwak, Eugene, 323 Looser, Marcel, 211 Lorenz, Konrad, 363,406-407,409 Lorenzer, Alfred, 16,29,211 Löwenthal, Leo, 22, 193, 211 Löwith, Karl, 102 Lowther, Gordon R., 381 Lübbe, Hermann, 75 Luckmann, Thomas, 6, 25, 29, 318319,358-360, 362-382,456 L u h m a n n , Niklas, 3, 6-7, 10-15, 19, 24-26, 28, 114-118, 173-186, 273, 289, 307-311, 319-320, 322-323, 362,456-457 Lukäcs, Georg, 16, 21, 38, 53, 107-108, 144,149,331,339,401 Lüschen, Günther, 21,23,447 Luther, Martin, 258-259, 270 Luxemburg, Rosa, 32 Maciejewski, Franz, 289 McGrath, William J„ 54 Mackenroth, Gerhard, 120,136 Maetze, Gerhard, 74 Maier, Norman, 407 Mair, Lucy, 289 M a n n , Michael, 355 Mann, Thomas, 219 Mannheim, Karl, 1, 22, 24, 30, 32-36, 38, 40, 43-44, 46, 52-53, 55, 57-59, 61, 69-70, 72-75, 119, 126-127, 137,449-450,453 MaoTse-Tung, 271 Maquet, Jacques, 72 Marcuse, Herbert, 1, 17, 19, 22, 40, 53, 107-108, 118, 187,394,401,451 Marquard, Odo, 28,401 Marshack, Alexander, 382 Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, 322 Martin, Alfred von, 22, 50 Marx, Karl, 4, 8, 14-20, 23, 29, 35-36, 40, 59-61, 76-109, 119, 144-145, 148, 150, 154, 156, 158, 161, 189, 204, 209-210, 212, 214, 217-218, 220, 232-234, 236-241, 244, 249255, 261, 263, 265, 272-273, 275-

469 276, 317, 325-328, 331, 337, 339, 345-346, 349-350, 360, 395,440 Marxism, 17, 20, 39-40, 51, 77-82, 87, 96, 102, 106-109, 144, 193, 198, 214, 220-221, 230, 237, 249-255, 321, 326-327, 330; see also Theory, Marxian Materialism, 49, 206; dialectical, 234; doctrine of, 104; historical, 35, 48, 63, 68, 77-79, 82, 85, 92, 95, 103, 161, 188,212, 273 Matthes, Joachim, 211, 352-353 Maus, Heinz, 21,52 Mauss, Marcel, 142 Mayer, A. von, 319 Mayer, Jacob Peter, 40 Mayntz, Renate, 25, 321, 323 Mead, George Herbert, 15-16, 195, 207, 358, 362, 370, 382,440 Meaning, analysis of, 362; boundaries of, 177; cohesiveness of, 379; congruence of, 376; contextures of, 66, 88, 176; cultural, 99, 110, 279; ethological, 365-366; interconnected, 399; interpretation of, 127, 443; latent, 358, 443-446; objective, 378, 443, 445; religious, 377; social, 341, 358, 362; sociological, 425; structure of, 361, 376, 436447; subjective, 442; symbolic, 361, 432; technical, 426 Media, 189-190, 196-197, 199, 202, 438; electronic, 196, 198; mass, 118, 128, 196-198, 211, 243, 351, 379; reified, 60; steering, 189, 197, 203 Medicus, F., 401 Meillassoux, Claude, 289 Meinecke, Friedrich, 58,62,72-73 Meja, Volker, 1-30,449-450 Mengelberg, Käthe, 55 Menger, Carl, 38 Menne, Klaus, 211 Merton, Robert K„ 114, 139-142, 148, 245 Metaphysics, 63, 69, 75, 79, 82, 89, 92, 123, 142-143,175 Methodenstreit, 34, 38 Methodology, 65-67, 78,79,87-88, 90,

470

INDEX

M e t h o d o l o g y , cont., 101, 109-110; interpretive, 436, 446 Meurer, Bärbel, 5 3 Michelet, Jules, 249 Migdal, Ulrike, 53 Mills, C. W r i g h t , 7 4 , 2 1 1 Mills, Donald, 320-322 Misgeld, Dieter, 1 - 3 0 , 4 4 9 Mitscherlich, A l e x a n d e r , 16, 358, 360-361 4 0 2 - 4 0 9 , 4 5 7 M o d e r n i t y , 3, 9, 115, 190, 204-205, 215; crisis of, 24; c u l t u r a l , 190, 204; pathologies of, 118 t h e o r y of, 117, 2 0 4 , 2 1 0 M o d e r n i z a t i o n , 6, 12-14, 50, 114,116-

N e u m a n n , S i g m u n d , 52 N e w t o n , Isaac, 204, 252 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 8-9, 11, 13, 27, 58, 60, 135, 215-216, 219, 221-222, 227, 237, 247 Nolte, H e l m u t , 28 N o m i n a l i s m , 64, 74, 2 3 4 , 4 3 4 Norms, 12-13, 61, 64, 77, 93-94, 97, 132-133, 178, 224, 252-253, 279280, 293, 303, 346, 370, 372, 374376, 384, 395, 411, 414, 434; e t h i cal, 58; legal, 249, 274; social, 361, 392,400,444 N u n b e r g , H e r m a n n , 394,401 N u n n e r - W i n k l e r , G e r h a r d , 29

117, 189-190, 204, 334 Moersch, Emil, 211 Mogey, J o h n , 355 M o h r , Hans, 102 M o k , Albert, 303-304, 322 M o m m s e n , W o l f g a n g , 23, 29, 110, 222

O e v e r m a n n , Ulrich, 14, 16, 24-25; 358-359,361,436-447,458 Offe, Claus, 6, 14, 16, 24, 26, 275-277, 322, 324-339,458 O'Malley, J o s e p h , 272 Ontology, 6 1 , 1 2 3 O p p e n h e i m e r , Franz, 4 0 , 4 6 Order, democratic, 266; l a w a n d , 160, 248, 258; political, 122, 189; social, 7, 58, 60, 62, 70, 122, 126-127, 129, 180, 222, 228, 240, 246, 270, 305, 333, 377-379, 416, 418; t e c h n o l o g ical, 9; u n i v e r s a l , 127-128 Organization, analysis of social, 298; bureaucratic, 63, 70, 273, 275, 294, 301-302, 306-307, 311, 315, 321; c o m p l e x , 307, 316; c u l t u r a l , 381; democratic, 306-307; e c o n o m i c , 261, 314-315, 337; f o r m a l , 309, 311, 323; i n d u s t r i a l , 14; i n s t i t u tional, 135; i n t e r n a l structure of, 305; labor, 169; m a r k e t , 337; m i l i tary, 260; occupational, 169; political, 127, 261, 263, 269, 281, 314, 337; principles of, 285, 300; professional, 299, 302, 306-307; rational, 313, 377; scientific, 225; social, 1-30, 78, 91, 250, 274, 284285, 298, 318, 365-367, 369-370; societal, 189; sociology of, 25, 291, 307, 313; state, 165, 167, 172; theory of class, 251; t h e o r y of c o m plex, 315

Moore, Barrington, 271, 355 Moore, Wilbert E„ 52, 320-321 Mooser, Justus, 353 M ö r c h e n , H e r m a n n , 27 M o r f , Otto, 106-108 M o r g a n , Lewis H e n r y , 434 Moser, Justus, 48 M ü h l m a n n , W i l h e l m E„ 52 M u h s , Karl, 136 Müller, Karl V a l e n t i n , 21 M ü n c h , Richard, 26 M u r d o c k , George P., 290 Musil, Robert, 219 Nachtigall, Horst, 290 Nadel, Siegfried F., 4 1 6 , 4 2 6 , 4 3 4 Narr, Wolf Dietrich, 24 Naschold, Frieder, 323 N a t i o n a l Socialism, 1-2, 9, 13, 27, 3233, 37-38, 45-53, 56, 213; see also Fascism Negt, Oskar, 14, 16, 19, 30, 211, 214215,217,256-272,457-458 N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , 66, 6 8 , 8 9 Neopositivism, 109 N e u m a n n , F r a n z L„ 45, 52-53, 55

INDEX

Osterland, Klaus, 211 Palleske, Emil, 270 PapckeSven, 22, 53 Papousek, Hanus, 382 Papousek, Mechthild, 382 Pareto, Vilfredo, 65,135,215,226 Parsons, Talcott, 7, 11-12, 15-16, 28, 54, 117, 127, 137, 151, 177-179, 186, 314, 319-320, 323, 358, 414, 434 Pearson, Harry W., 289 Peirce, Charles Saunders, 15 Pfeffer, Karl Heinz, 21 Phenomenology, 8, 14, 16, 25, 36, 51, 68, 362, 403; hermeneutic, 8; social, 25 Philosophy, 4, 9, 17-18, 27, 29-30, 33, 40-41, 80, 95, 107, 115, 119-121, 123-126, 144-145, 204, 206-207, 212-213, 219-222, 225, 228, 258, 395, 433; existential, 123; Hegelian, 8, 95, 107; hermeneutic, 208; idealist, 72, 119; of life [.Lebensphilosophie], 34, 58-60, 61-62, 72, 360; moral, 186; political, 330; social, 4, 14, 50, 116, 124, 173-174, 213 Piaget, Jean, 15, 207 Pietism, 90 Plato, 11,121 Plessner, Helmuth, 2, 4, 24, 27-28, 32, 36, 40, 47, 52, 120, 135-136, 271, 359, 368, 372,381,433,435 Ploog, Detlev, 381 Pluralism, 142, 148, 198, 215, 234, 379 Poggi, Gianfranco, 320 Polanyi, Michael, 281,289 Pollard, Sidney, 353 Popper, Karl, 4, 7, 24, 35, 51, 111, 114, 145, 149,254-255,441 Popitz, Heinrich, 22 Positivism, 68, 111,432 Positivismusstreit, 24, 35 Power, balance of, 169, 172, 244, centres of, 216; concept of, 292; corporate, 216; cultural, 388; distribution of, 156, 172; economic, 71, 158, 288; institutionalized,

471 292-293; labor, 202-203, 287, 325, 327, 333; legal, 325; means of, 292; national, 72; political, 71, 237, 249, 264, 283, 391; redistribution of, 32; revolutionary, 263; royal, 282, 288; social, 71, 156; structural, 286, 306; structure of, 171; struggle for, 250 Practice, rationalization of social, 19 social, 10, 34, 76, 85-87, 94-97, 126-130, 135-136, 212, 223-224, 394; sociological, 426 Predohl, Andreas, 136 Premack, David, 382 Presthues, Robert, 321 Production, capitalist, 81, 338; conditions of, 386; control of, 337; economic, 243; forces of, 59, 187, 238243, 245, 250, 252-253, 286, 326, 328-329; forms of, 280, 287; industrial, 238, 250, 302; material, 238; means of, 61, 90, 156, 158, 168, 190, 233, 235, 280-283, 286287, 325, 333, 386; mode of, 189, 210, 250, 252, 260, 273, 280-281, 286-287; relations of, 17, 78, 92, 233, 238-246, 249, 252-253, 326, 328-329, 334, 345; scientific, 8; social, 379; socialization of, 326-327; technological, 8,239 Professionalism, 299, 301, 305 Professionalization, 5, 15, 221, 274275, 291, 299-300, 303-307, 312317 Protestantism, 63,67,97 Psychoanalysis, 14-16, 24, 193, 220221, 357, 360-362, 383-401, 404405,408-409 Psychologism, 68 Psychology, 15, 126, 212, 220, 222, 227, 357, 360-362, 366, 383-385, 394-395, 399; applied, 384; cognitive, 15; group, 385; social, 7, 51, 71, 360,429 Pufendorf, Samuel, 175,262 Puis, Dirk, 355 Puritanism, 90,405 Rammstedt, Otthein, 21, 73

472 Rapaport, Roy A., 290 Rationalism, 189; critical, 4, 111, 441; occidental, 8,189 Rationality, 65, 76, 87, 94, 105, 117, 122, 190, 194, 203-207, 214; communicative, 18; exchange, 190; purposive, 18; societal, 3, 102; technological, 26; theory of, 117, 204,206-207 Rationalization, 6-20, 63, 65, 74, 117, 189, 194-195, 204, 275, 288, 291, 294-295, 298, 302, 304-307, 312, 315-318, 334, 337, 360, 392; capitalist, 17, 19, 117; dialectic of, 18; history of, 18-20; societal, 3, 12, 18, 20, 198; technical, 10; technological, 9; theory of capitalist, 7; Western, 9,18 Reality, analysis of, 84; appearance of, 426; conception of, 83, 238; consciousness of, 115, 133-134; definition of, 442; dominant, 391; historical, 35, 69, 77, 84-87, 90, 9395, 97, 110, 343; interpretation of, 374; knowledge of, 94, 100, 144; nature of, 375; objective, 79, 87, 110, 371,408; political, 52, 72, 123; psychic, 438-439, 442; science of, 130; science of social, 119-137; social, 66-69, 83, 99, 118, 123-124, 130-132, 135, 343, 349, 379-380, 391, 393, 400, 408, 410-411, 413415, 425, 427-428, 433, 438, 440, 442; structure of, 77, 83-84, 106; testing, 129-136, 394,404 Reductionism, behaviorist, 441 Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, 56 Reification, 17-18, 60, 67, 188, 192193, 195, 197-199, 234, 331, 432433 Reigrotski, Erich, 139, 148 Reinisch, Leonhard, 53 Relationism, 70 Relations, abstract, 88; analysis of interpersonal, 40; causal, 83, 99; class, 5, 89, 274, 281-283, 288-289; communicative, 192-193; dialectical, 89, 187; economic, 60, 79, 86, 88, 249, 280; exchange, 282, 327;

INDEX feudal, 250, 345; historical, 89; interpersonal, 195; kinship, 285; labor, 354; labor market, 350; political, 249; power, 292, 296297; property, 273, 281; reification of social, 18; social, 60, 80, 86, 8889,93, 122,215,232-233,240, 249250, 275, 281-283, 292, 297, 299300, 305, 307, 314-315, 317-318, 323, 327, 348-349, 367, 369-370, 372, 374, 379, 386, 395, 399; symbiotic, 121; trade, 262; value, 83, 93, 100; work, 343 Relationship, causal, 103; class, 236, 238; entrepreneur-consumer, 302; market, 103; master-servant, 386; means-end, 63, 76,87; power, 292; professional-client, 302; social, 61, 242, 279, 348, 376-377, 380, 417; therapeutic, 396; system of, 439 Relativism, 58-59,70; historical, 126 Relativity, 59 Religion, 60-61, 144, 220-222, 227, 229, 234, 371, 376, 387, 390-392, 396; critique of, 385, 393; history of, 219; philosophy of, 61; sociology of, 60, 78, 117 Remmling, Gunter W„ 72-73 Reproduction, cultural, 191, 199; m a terial, 190-191, 199, 279-280; social, 87, 276; symbolic, 191 Research, anthropological, 273; antisociological, 49; behavioral, 136; communications, 197; empirical, 5, 22-23, 25, 36, 43, 47, 51, 64, 97, 113-114, 118, 124, 126, 128, 131, 140, 143, 146, 148, 152, 172, 187, 216, 233-234, 342, 358; historical, 100, 115, 273, 342, 354; interdisciplinary, 18, 117, 188, 204; international, 355; market, 242; nuclear, 224; organization of, 120; practical, 110; psychoanalytic, 195; public opinion, 5; scientific, 91, 96; social, 6, 22, 25, 36,43, 51, 114, 118, 143, 274, 334, 341, 436; socialization, 357; sociological, 39, 49-50, 56, 64, 66, 113, 115116, 118, 120, 125, 129, 131, 140,

INDEX 143, 147, 152, 172, 354, 435; survey, 228 Restoration, 134, 257-259, 265, 269271; political, 258 Revolution, 62, 144, 166, 169, 226, 232, 236, 244, 250, 252, 257-267, 270-271; French, 249, 251, 258260, 265, 270; ideas of, 264; industrial, 232, 236, 249-250, 253; intellectual, 72; managerial, 237; neolithic, 286; October, 32; peasants', 258; political, 146; Russian, 37; silent, 199; social, 350; technological, 350; theory of, 61; theory of social, 391 Rheingold, Harriet, 382 Rickert, Heinrich, 105 Riehl, Alois, 48 Riemer, Svend, 21, 52 Riesman, David, 228, 353 Ringer, Fritz K„ 55 Ritualization, 364-366 Roerig, Fritz, 271 Role, concept of, 357-359, 414, 423, 425, 428, 430; definition of, 422425,427; emancipatory, 212; f u n c tional, 326; institutionalized, 420; membership, 308-311; occupational, 193; organizational, 309, 312; political, 284; professional, 302, 313, 320; secondary, 413; sex, 343; social, 27, 203, 359, 362, 375, 377-378, 380, 411-412, 415, 419423, 435; specialized, 377-378; theory of social, 359 Rosdolsky, Roman, 104-105, 107 Rose, Arnold, 413,417,434 Rosenmayr, Leopold, 53 Roth, Guenther, 55, 74, 102, 108, 318, 459 Roth, Roland, 212 Rothacker, Erich, 75 Roucek, Joseph S., 52, 148 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 72, 227 Rubel, Maximillian, 149 Rude, George, 249, 255 Ruge, Arnold, 108 Rumpf, Max, 21 Rustow, Alexander, 22, 120

473 Sack, Fritz, 29 Sahlins, Marshall D„ 285, 289-290 Sahner, Heinz, 21 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 269 Salin, Edgar, 40, 120 Salomon, Albert, 46, 52, 55 Salomon, Gottfried, 46 Schaaf, Julius, 74, 102 Schad, Susanne Petra, 53 Schäfers, Bernhard, 52, 352 Schaller, George B„ 381 Scharnhorst, Gerhard J.D., 263 Scheler, Max, 1, 27, 32-34, 40, 47, 57, 61, 64, 68-70, 72, 74-75, 119, 123, 126,219,360-361 Schelling, Thomas C., 58,123 Schelsky, Helmut, 2, 4, 6, 8-11, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25-26, 28, 52-53, 56, 108, 114-116, 118-137, 139, 148, 213, 432,435,459 Schelting, Alexander von, 102 Schiller, J o h a n n Christoph Friedrich von, 258-259, 270 Schiller, Karl, 137 Schleiermacher, Fredrich, 123 Schluchter, Wolfgang, 6-7, 25-26, 29, 55,74, 110, 213, 274-275, 277, 291323,459 Schmidt, Alfred, 16, 29, 104-108 Schmidt, Gustav, 111 Schmölders, Günter, 136 Schmoller, Gustav, 38 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 58, 65, 247 Schorske, Carl E„ 54 Schroeter, Gerd, 54 Schröter, Manfred, 29 Schumann, Michael, 353 Schumpeter, Joseph, 38, 52, 119 Schuster, Helmuth, 53 Schuster, Margrit, 53 Schutz, Alfred, 22, 25, 29, 36, 47, 51, 208, 359,456 Schwank, Karl-Heinz, 247 Schwarz, Heinz, 271 Science, analytic, 135; applied, 122, 128-129, 133-134, 225, crisis of, 4, 23; cultural, 87, 441; economic, 125; empirical, 27, 40, 42, 87, 94, 123, 127, 207, 441; function of.

474 Science, cont., 108; history of, 37, 50, 116; h i s t o r y of social, 37; integrative, 33; m e d i cal, 224; n a t u r a l , 62, 85, 123, 143, 171, 220, 224, 229; o r g a n i z a t i o n of, 125; p h i l o s o p h y of, 35-36, 77, 84, 94, 97-98, 100-102, 110-111, 435; p h i l o s o p h y of social, 35, 7677; political, 15, 41, 45, 119, 324325; practical, 131; social, 1 , 4 , 6 , 8, 14-15, 20, 24, 30-31, 33-35, 38, 40, 45, 47, 51-53, 64-65, 67, 76-102, 114, 118, 121-122, 125, 128, 135, 143, 145, 151, 163, 170, 173, 188, 204, 217, 232, 248, 324-326, 360, 363-365, 410, 436, 438, 441; syst e m of, 320; theory of, 51, 78, 205, 435; value-free, 42 Secularization, 162, 170-171, 182, 220, 303 Seeman, M e l v i n , 435 Seiffert, H., 102 Sellnow, I r m g a r d , 289 Senghaas, Dieter, 27 Sennett, Richard, 353 Service, E l m a n R., 284, 289-290 Shils, E d w a r d , 54, 56 S i m m e l , Georg, 18, 23-24, 33-34, 39, 51, 57, 59-61, 63, 65, 68-69, 73, 119, 126, 358-360,435 S i m o n , Herbert A., 318 Sinzheimer, Hugo, 45 Smelser, Neil, 320 Smith, A d a m , 209-210, 386 Smith, G o r d o n , 353 Socialism, 20, 38-39, 63, 126, 193, 217, 264, 269, 324; bureaucratic, 189190; history of, 63 Socialization, 118, 191, 193-195, 199, 208, 314-315, 325, 328-329, 337, 357-359, 361-362, 372, 374-376, 378, 383, 385-386, 388, 393, 395396, 405, 411-412, 415, 418, 429, 437, 443-445, 446; f a m i l y , 193196; pathogenic, 445; p r i m a r y , 378-380, 443; secondary, 378-380; theory, 15, 48, 357, 436-437, 443; theory of, 195, 383, 399,437-438, Society, a n a l y s i s of, 117, 122-123,

127-128, 274, 283, 427; bourgeois, 64, 76, 91-92, 110, 189, 210, 215, 244, 253, 261, 264, 395; capitalist, 59, 82, 91, 105, 117, 119, 189, 192, 261, 326, 328, 332, 334, 337; civil, 173-174, 180; class, 273-274, 278290, 334, 340-355, 388-389, 391, 393; classless, 350; democratic, 1920, 44, 46; d i a g n o s i s of, 135; evol u t i o n of, 188, 285; history of, 116; industrial, 6, 15, 20, 50-51, 60, 119, 152, 156, 163, 213-214, 222, 224, 232-247, 274, 291, 298, 322, 324, 340, 359, 370, 375, 378-380; k n o w l e d g e of, 113, 122; late c a p i talist, 4, 6, 26, 199, 275-277; liberal, 44, 119; m o d e r n , 12-13, 23, 26, 34, 76, 89, 91, 113, 116-117, 119, 136, 188-189, 202, 210, 214216, 223, 274-275, 295, 305, 343, 359-360, 375-380, 419, 427, 432433; n a t u r e of, 241; o p e n , 7, 214, 248; o r g a n i z a t i o n of, 50, 217, 219, 239, 241, 407, 415; political, 11, 174, 180; postindustrial, 4, 275, 325; postliberal, 118, 187, 189-193, 196; p o w e r of, 389; p r i m i t i v e , 12, 375-379; r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of, 11; relations of, 386; science of, 416; socialist, 82, 190, 193; sociology of, 126; structure of, 235, 242, 408; system of, 12, 17, 177,233; systems theory of, 116; theory of, 7, 15,23, 113-118, 122, 138, 142-148, 152, 156, 173-186, 207-208, 210, 215216, 233-234, 237, 255, 275, 357, 361-362, 383, 399; t h e o r y of civil, 119; Western, 6, 199, 419; see also Theory, social; R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , societal; Democracy Sociology, academic, 45; A m e r i c a n , 3, 7, 127, 129, 140, 3 5 8 - 3 5 9 , 4 1 0 , 4 1 2 4 1 5 , 4 2 0 , 4 2 2 , 4 3 2 ; c u l t u r a l , 43, 59, 74; e m p i r i c a l , 114, 126, 239; f u n c tion of, 19; historical, 126; history of, 18, 31-32, 34, 36-38, 48-49, 54, 213; i n d u s t r i a l , 5, 135, 140, 432; interpretive, 101, 105; o r g a n i z a tional, 135; political, 45, 51, 324;

INDEX structural, 44; theory of, 185; u n i versal, 126 Solheim, Wilhelm G., II, 290 Söllner, Alfons, 53 Sombart, Werner, 32, 34, 39,46,119 Southall, Allan, 289 Spann, Othmar, 48, 119, 145 Specialization, 5, 41, 60, 63, 128, 130, 154-172, 197, 222-223, 294, 297, 371,378, 380,408 Speier, Hans, 22,46 Spencer, Herbert, 363 Spengler, Oswald, 62, 123,219 Spinoza, Baruch, 60 Stammer, Otto, 110 Stark, Werner, 72 Staude, J o h n Raphael, 75 Stehr, Nico, 1-30,449-450 Stein, Freiherr vom, 263 Stein, Lorenz von, 119 Steiner, Helmut, 20, 29 Stephenson, George, 249 Stoltenberg, Carl H„ 55 Stölting, Erhard, 53 Strachey, James, 400 Strauss, Herbert A., 54 Strauss, Leo, 108 Ströker, Elizabeth, 28 Structuralism, 48; functionalist, 7 Structure, analysis, 415; analysis of social, 251, 413; bureaucratic, 306; capitalist, 325, 335; class, 237, 346, 353; communication, 194, 196198; core, 89; economic, 331; formation of, 437; interpretation of social, 342; kinship, 279, 285; knowledge of essential, 93; latent, 439, 442; meaning, 185; objective, 99, 233, 440; occupational, 300, 320; organizational, 301, 311, 315; political, 281, 283, 285, 377; power, 158; rationality, 188; role, 284; social, 39,46, 49, 78, 143, 204, 237, 249-252, 255, 273-274, 304, 325-327, 335-336, 350-351, 357447; socioeconomic, 282-283; symbiotic, 190; system, 178; theory of social, 417,431 Subjectivism, 144, 213

475 Suhr, Otto, 55 Sussman, Margarete, 73 Synthesis, cultural, 70,74 System, action, 10, 178-179, 186, 190, 202-204; capitalist, 215, 232-233, 325, 327, 332, 335, 337-338; crystallized, 226; cultural, 39; economic, 189-190, 193-194, 202-204, 210, 245; ethical, 222; evolution of political, 283-286; evolution of social, 117; function of, 178; ideological, 227; industrial, 230; knowledge, 206; late capitalist, 275; legal, 207; Marxian, 220, 222; occupational, 380; ontological, 175; organic, 278; political, 173, 180-181, 186, 203, 238, 243, 274, 279, 283-286; scientific, 230; social, 117, 173-174, 176, 178-180, 185-186, 193, 204, 233, 245, 278279, 308, 322, 324-326, 331, 369, 375, 379, 389; socioeconomic, 280283, 326; sociological, 127, 129, technical, 230; technological, 279, 286; theoretical, 142; theory of open, 175, 179; theory of social, 11, 139, 173-175, 185; universal, 126; vertical, 304 Szondi, Peter, 72 Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe, 249 Technology, 7-8, 11, 26, 133, 196, 213, 216, 218-219, 228, 239-240, 246, 253, 287, 326-327, 335, 337-338, 367 Tenbruck, Friedrich, 4, 28, 103, 105106, 108-109, 111, 357-361, 410435,459-460 Terray, Emmanuel, 290 Theory, class, 232; comprehensive, 114, 118, 139; critical, 8, 14-18, 23, 26-29, 36, 109, 111, 117-118, 187212, 233, 238, 241, 273, 360, 396, 399; cybernetics systems, 176; of defense mechanisms, 195; democratic, 19; dialectical, 17, 233-235, 238; economic, 122, 220, 236; empirical, 207; equilibrium, 175,430; evolutionary, 440; function of.

476 Theory, cont.. 114, 140; Hegelian, 58; history of, 207; M a r x i a n , 93, 96-97, 215, 233, 236-237, 249, 251, 326, 330; m e d i a , 117; of t h e m i d d l e range, 114, 139, 141; m i m e t i c , 106; of n a ture, 396; n o r m a t i v e , 113; of politics, 18-19; political, 248; psychoanalytic, 384-385, 391, 394, 396, 398-399, 402; racial, 49-50, 85; role, 359-360, 375, 410-435; scientific, 151-152, 248; social, 711, 13-14, 18, 20, 24, 27, 113-115, 118, 176, 188, 205, 209, 212, 248, 360-361, 383-401; social science, 68; of social processes, 217, 248; sociological, 18, 23, 113-114, 116118, 122, 138-139, 142-148, 151152, 155, 411, 416-417, 426, 437, 443; of s t r u c t u r a t i o n , 362; systems, 7, 12, 24, 116-117, 173-186, 273, 276, 278-290, 364; of validity, 207; see also M a r x i s m ; Society, t h e o r y of T h e r n s t r o m , Stephen, 354 Theunissen, Michael, 109 T h o m a s , Michael, 20 T h o m a s , W.I., 358 T h o m a e , Hans, 405 T h o m p s o n , E d w a r d Palmer, 355 T h o m p s o n , V., 319 T h u r n w a l d , R i c h a r d , 46 Tiger, Lionel, 381 Tonnies, F e r d i n a n d , 32, 39-41, 43, 46, 55, 119 Tomberg, Friedrich, 102 Topitsch, Ernst, 4, 102 Torrance, J o h n , 53 T o u l m i n , Stephen, 54 Touraine, A l a i n , 353 Toynbee, A r n o l d , 253, 255 Trade u n i o n s , 45, 55, 224, 301-302, 306; see also Labor u n i o n s T r e v a r t h e n , C o l w y n , 382 Troeltsch, Ernst, 1, 33, 57, 59, 62, 70, 73-74, 108 T s c h a y a n o f f , A l e x a n d e r , 289 Uexkiill, J a c o b v o n , 363

INDEX

Value, cultural, 62; f r e e d o m , 54, 6364, 67, 74, 84, 93, 296; l a w of surplus, 215, 233; neutrality, 34, 70; surplus, 17, 215, 236, 330; t h e o r y of, 236; theory of surplus, 17,236 Veblen, Thorstein, 241 V i e r k a n d t , A l f r e d , 46 Vollmer, H o w a r d , 320-322 Voltaire, 222 Walther, A n d r e a s , 21 W a s h b u r n , S h e r w o o d L„ 381 Weber, A l f r e d , 22, 32, 39-40, 46, 50, 119,453 Weber, M a r i a n n e , 39 Weber, M a x , 1, 4, 7-8, 12, 16, 18-20, 23-24, 29, 33-36, 38-40, 42, 44, 51, 54, 57, 62-68, 73-74, 76-103, 105111, 117, 1 19, 126, 139, 150-151, 178, 189, 198, 204, 207, 218, 264, 271, 273-276, 291-292, 294-297, 306, 315-319, 321, 342, 345-350, 353, 355, 360, 394, 435, 456, 459460 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 352-353, 355 Weidenfels, B e r n h a r d , 29 W e i m a r Republic, 4, 21, 32-33, 36, 384 0 , 4 2 , 4 4 - 4 7 , 58, 62, 72, 213, 347 Weingart, Peter, 320 Weippert, Georg, 120 Wellmer, Albrecht, 104, 108-109 Weltanschauung, 10, 78, 93; see also World v i e w Werturteilsstreit, 34 Weyer, J o h a n n e s , 22, 53 W e y m a n n , Ansgar, 29 Whyte, W „ Jr., 321 Wiese, Leopold v o n , 22, 32, 40, 44, 46, 55, 119, 126 Wilensky, Harold, 306-307, 320-322 Wilson, Michael, 53 W i n k e l m a n n , J o h a n n e s , 7 4 , 1 1 0 , 318 Wittfogel, Karl A u g u s t , 22 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 15 Wittich, Claus, 318 W o l f f , Kurt H., 51,73 World v i e w , 58, 74, 130, 204, 206-207, 215, 220-222, 236, 279, 287, 302,

INDEX 372, 374-376, 378-380, 383; see also Weltanschauung Wright, Gary H„ 290 W u n d e r l i c h , Frieda, 55 Zapf, W o l f g a n g , 20, 352 Zeisel, Hans, 56 Ziegler, H e l m u t , 318-319 Ziegler, Klaus, 149 Zola, Emile, 237

477