Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa: The Quest for Political Transition (Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development) 3031352289, 9783031352287

Table of contents :
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Contents
Editors and Contributors
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Introduction
Introduction
Revisiting the Notion of Political Transition
Democratic Consolidation
Anti-democratic and Undemocratic Political Cultures
References
Military and Political Transition
Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military
Introduction
Methodology and Conceptual Underpinnings
The Role of the Military in the Breakdown of Democracy in Lesotho
Praetorian Militaries and Political Transitions
Conclusion
References
The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970s to 2018
Introduction
The Military, Professionalism, and Democracy
The Military and Zimbabwean Politics in the 1970s
Zimbabwe’s Military Under Robert Mugabe
Zimbabwe’s Inseparable Twins: Military and Politics (2000–2017)
The “Soft” 2017 Coup
Regional Implications
Conclusion
References
Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup. Change Without Change?
Introduction
Background to the New Dispensation
The Grievance Theory
Understanding the Role of the Security Sector in Zimbabwean Politics Under Mugabe
The Coup that Was not a Coup: What Really Transpired?
Civil–Military Relations in Zimbabwe Under the New Dispensation: Is There Any Difference from the Old Regime?
A Promising Start in Post-mugabe Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is Open for Business
New Government Makes Efforts to Re-Engage the West as Sanctions Continue to Haunt Zimbabwe
EU Observers Are Invited to Monitor Harmonised 2018 Elections
Urban Transport System is Revamped to Cater for the Poor
New Dispensation Appoints New Cabinet Ministers, Discards Old Wood
Political Actors Dialogue Formed to Co-Opt Opposition into Government but the Main Opposition Snubs the Call
A Veil of Taboo on Gukurahundi Removed as New Government Encourages Open Discussion
Leadership Change without Change as Earlier Deception is Revealed
Traditional Leaders Used to Manipulate Voters
Human Rights Violations and Constitutional Amendments Under the New Dispensation
Corruption Remains a Challenge Despite the Rhetoric Against It
Conclusion
References
Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition
Introduction
Theoretical Insights into Zimbabwe’s Political Crises
Elite Formation, Politicisation, and Militarisation of Politics
The Challenge of Non-governing Elite
Intra-Zanu-PF Factional Battles and Military Intervention
The Military Takeover of the Political Space
Conclusion
References
Political Transition and Anti-democratic Culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup
Introduction
Media and Political Transition: Current Trends and Perspectives
Theorising Political Culture
Methodological Discussion
Data Collection and Analysis
Legitimation
Personalisation: Boogey Men and Big Men
Normalisation and Silence
Concluding Remarks
References
Electoral Politics and Democratisation
Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy
Introduction
Elections in Malawi
Campaign
Institutions and Rules Governing Presidential Elections
Fresh Presidential Election
Implications
Conclusion
References
Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique
Introduction
Methods and Materials
Results
Actors, Places and Time
Patterns of Gender-Based Electoral Violence
Discussion
Conclusion
References
The Electoral System and Accountability in the Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform
Introduction
Overview of Democracy in South Africa
The Path to Democracy in South Africa
Evolution of Political Party Systems
Political Parties—Role and Functions
Electoral Systems in a Democracy
Proportional Representation System
Electoral Systems and Accountability
Conclusion
References
Electoral Systems, Political Party Coalitions and Political Polarisation in Local Governments: A Review of Service Delivery Challenges in South Africa
Introduction
Contextualising Service Delivery from a Politics-Administration Interface
Conceptualising South Africa’s Local Government Electoral System
Understanding Coalitions in South Africa
Conceptualising Political Polarisation
An Overview of Local Government in South Africa
Methodology
Electoral Systems on Service Delivery in South Africa
Political Polarisation on Service Delivery in South Africa
Coalition Governments on Service Delivery in South Africa
Conclusion
References
Constitutionalism, Governance and Transitional Justice
Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for Other African States
Introduction
Constitutionalism and Political Transition
Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African Context
Timeline on Leadership Renewal in South Africa Since 1994
Leadership Renewal and Its Relationship with Party and National Constitution
Conclusion
References
The Marginalised Majority—The Case of Botswana Women in Local Government (1999–2019)
Introduction
Background
The Case for Women’s Participation in Local Government—An Overview
Obstacles to Women Participation in Local Government Politics
Councillor Workload
Divided Loyalties
Organisation of Local Government
Lack of Finances
An Overview of Local Government in Botswana
Why Botswana Women in Local Government?
Methodology
Data Collection Methods and Instruments
Key Findings and Analysis
Appropriateness/Timing of Council Meetings
Divided Loyalties
Women Are Invisible and Only Feature as Mere Statistics
Patriarchal Attitudes Couched in Culture
Financing During Campaigns
Conclusion
References
The Role of the Church in National Healing and Reconciliation: The Case of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2009
Introduction
Theoretical and Conceptual Issues
The Political Context
Findings and Data Analysis
Analysis of Study Findings
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Tendai Chari Patrick Dzimiri   Editors

Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa The Quest for Political Transition

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development Series Editors Diery Seck, CREPOL – Center for Research on Political Economy, Dakar, Senegal Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-political dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed. The book series is indexed in SCOPUS.

Tendai Chari · Patrick Dzimiri Editors

Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa The Quest for Political Transition

Editors Tendai Chari Department of English, Media Studies and Linguistics University of Venda Thohoyandou, South Africa

Patrick Dzimiri Department of Arts and Social Sciences University of Venda Thohoyandou, South Africa

ISSN 2198-7262 ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic) Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development ISBN 978-3-031-35228-7 ISBN 978-3-031-35229-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to our families for providing all the moral support, love, comfort, and enacouragement during the editing of this collection.

Foreword

This book, Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa: The Quest for Political Transition, is both timely and refreshing as it reflects the current crisis around political transition in the subregion in general and Zimbabwe in particular. The account herein relates to the concept of transition in a broad sense in that, indeed, the societies of Southern Africa have yet to recover and transform themselves from the political economy of white settler colonialism, including the structural factors that inhere and continue to endure to this day. However, the new elephant in the room in this regard, and representing as it does the major impediment to the transition toward a truly democratic order, is militarization of the state or what I have characterized elsewhere as the “securocrat state” (Zimbabwe: The Political of the State, 2016; reflecting as it does on an earlier study of 30 years earlier, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, published by CODESRIA in 1986). For the requirements for a democratic dispensation remain the same if not universal in the current historical conjuncture: the separation of powers between an accountable executive, a vibrant legislature, and a fiercely independent judiciary. Therefore, securocracy and/or a state dependent for its survival—against the transition to a democratic dispensation—is by definition antithetical to democracy. The current situation in Zimbabwe is perhaps the best illustration of this state of affairs, and it is a theme which understandably dominates this book. Significantly, these are the features which account for Zimbabwe being the odd boy in the subregion notwithstanding that none in Southern Africa can be described as having yet completed the transition to a truly democratic dispensation. First, it is only in Zimbabwe in which the opposition has, since independence in 1980, been treated as an enemy of the state and therefore to be harassed throughout, mutilated, or even annihilated, if necessary. This was the fate of ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo, Edgar Tekere’s ZUM, Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC, and now CCC under Chamisa. Not to mention the systematic destruction of the MDC at the hands of the state in the period since the last disputed election of 2018, a scourge which led to the rebranding to CCC but leaves the latter still struggling to find its feet organizationally.

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Foreword

Second, and as a reflection of the extent to which the opposition is regarded as an enemy of the state, the military-security apparatus has been, since 2000 certainly, embedded in the electoral system, ensuring in every election ever since that the MDC would be denied victory at the polls or, as was the case in March 2008 when Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly won the presidential vote, prevented Mugabe from conceding defeat, contrived a runoff in which the opposition movement was so physically battered and threatened by the military (which had been deployed for the public) that the outcome was a foregone conclusion. In fact, Morgan Tsvangirai had fled the country to safety in Botswana, after the first round of the poll, to return a few months later on the back of the Thabo Mbeki brokered Government of National Unity (GNU) in September 2008. Whatever the merits or demerits of the latter arrangement that brought temporary relief to the political turmoil in Zimbabwe, the GNU represented simultaneously the intransigence of the ZANU-PF securocrat state and the failure of transition. Less than a decade later in 2017, the military expressed itself overtly as the power behind the throne and/or regime in the 15 November coup. Significantly, one of the motivations for the coup was the fear, on the part of Dominic Chiwenga and his military crew, that ZANU-PF would lose the next election in 2018. And so it was that Chiwenga and a number of his fellow generals became part and parcel of the ZANU-PF/state/military-security conflation—the securocrat par excellence. Third, and obvious given the foregoing, Zimbabwe is the only country in the subregion in which the state survives not only on the back of the military-security apparatus, but also a coup which is in dire need of a cure in order to restore constitutional rule. But what are the factors that underpin and explain the political transition problem in the current conjuncture in Southern Africa? These are to be found in the nature of the post-colonial state itself, its historical origins, the class structure in which the comprador bourgeoisie is the new and dominant feature, and the abuse, as in the case of Zimbabwe in particular, of the military-security apparatus as part of power retention and primitive accumulation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and reflect on the political economy of transition itself: the colonial state itself as the foundation of the authoritarianism that is by definition intolerant of dissent or even criticism; the African nationalist struggle itself, the extent to which it has emerged and morphed into the post-colonial state, with its demand for conformity at any cost and at the evident threat to formal “parliamentary democracy” (in which sham elections are now an institutionalized means to legitimize authoritarian incumbencies); the flirtations with the one-party one-leader (for life!) state, influenced by the crude interpretation of the “democratic centralism” of the former socialist bloc, and, especially, in the case of Zimbabwe where the nationalist struggle was waged in exile, devoid of a social/home context

Foreword

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in which would have developed the checks and balances that underpin democratic discourse, and in which militarism-dominated politics, and the extent to which the latter has imbued the state ever since independence until securocracy expressed itself so overtly through the coup of November 2017. Harare, Zimbabwe

Prof. Ibbo Mandaza

Acknowledgements

Editing this volume was an extremely rewarding experience we could have never imagined. There were many people without whose efforts this book could not have materialized. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all the contributors in this collection for their dedication, hard work, commitment, and sacrifice. We would also like to express our special gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of book chapters who helped in ensuring that we delivered a quality manuscript. The reviewers of our book proposal deserve special gratitude for their insightful comments and constructive criticism which helped in enhancing the quality of the manuscript. Without them this book would not have seen the light of day. Johannes Glaeser, the Editor of the Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development book series at Springer Nature, deserves special thanks for being receptive to our idea on a book on political transition in southern Africa, and for superintending the project and providing guidance throughout the publication journey. Selvaraj Vijay Kumar, the Project Coordinator at Total Service Book Production, also deserves special thanks for providing guidance and support during the final phases of the book project. Our since gratitude also goes to the production team at Springer Nature, for the instrumental role they played in steering the book project. Last, but not least, we are eternally grateful to our family members for all the support, encouragement, and comfort they gave us throughout the entire period of editing this book. Without them this book would not have been the reality that it has become.

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tendai Chari and Patrick Dzimiri

1

Military and Political Transition Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dylan Yanano Mangani and Edwin Yingi The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970s to 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gilbert Tarugarira

21 37

Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup. Change Without Change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington Mazorodze

53

Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patrick Dzimiri and Obinna Richard Iroanya

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Political Transition and Anti-democratic Culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Tendai Chari Electoral Politics and Democratisation Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa-Jamali Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Elísio Emanuel Muendane and Egídio Paulo Guambe

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Contents

The Electoral System and Accountability in the Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Anthony Tshwarelo Malapane Electoral Systems, Political Party Coalitions and Political Polarisation in Local Governments: A Review of Service Delivery Challenges in South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Lewis Edwin Chigova and Costa Hofisi Constitutionalism, Governance and Transitional Justice Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for Other African States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Nicholas Govo and Tasara Muguti The Marginalised Majority—The Case of Botswana Women in Local Government (1999–2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 David Mandiyanike The Role of the Church in National Healing and Reconciliation: The Case of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2009 . . . . 253 Joseph Muwanzi Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Tendai Chari is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and a National Research Foundation (NRF) C3 Rated Researcher at the University of Venda, South Africa. He holds a Ph.D. in media studies from the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Previously he lectured at several universities in Africa, including the University of Zimbabwe (where he was head of the media program in the English Department), the National University of Science and Technology and Fort Hare University (South Africa). Chari is widely published in the field of media and communication studies, and his research focuses on political communication with a broadened horizon on the interface between digital media and politics, media and conflict, media ethics and popular culture. His other publications have appeared in the Journal of African Media Studies, African Identities, Communicatio: South African Journal on Media and Communications, African Journalism Studies, and the Journal of African Elections. He is the Co-Editor of Global Pandemics and Media Ethics: Issues and Perspectives (Routledge, 2022 co-edited with Professor Martin N. Ndlela), African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives: The Legacy of FIFA 2010 World Cup (2014 Palgrave Macmillan; co-edited with Prof. Nhamo A. Mhiripiri) and Media Law, Ethics, and Policy in the Digital Age (2017 IGI Global Publishing; also with Prof. N. A. Mhiripiri) and Political Transition in Southern Africa: Democratic Consolidation or Change of Façade? He is a recipient of several grants and fellowships which include the African Peace Building Network Fellowship (2017), the African Peacebuilding Book Publishing Manuscript grant (2018), and the African Humanities Program (APH) of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) PostDoctoral Fellowship (2022). Chari is working on finalizing his single-authored book titled Diaspora Media and Homeland Conflict: Coloniality of Conflict Journalism in Zimbabwe (Routledge 2023).

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Editors and Contributors

Patrick Dzimiri is an Associate Professor in the Department of Arts and Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education at the University of Venda. He is a passionate academic with exceptional research and teaching expertise and 14 years of university lectureship experience. He has a proven history of engagement with higher education teaching and learning institutions. He has published in peer-reviewed journals and read papers at both international and national conferences. Having researched broadly on issues relating to global politics, governance, human rights, human security, and humanitarian affairs, of late, his research focus has slowly shifted more toward community-specific investigations, with the target of yielding tangible society and people-oriented research outcomes in areas of migration politics, electoral politics, and development politics as well as uncovering issues of inequalities in multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-ethnic social settings. Dzimiri’s research focus resonates with goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.

Contributors Tendai Chari Department of English, Media Studies and Linguistics, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa Lewis Edwin Chigova North-West University, Vanderbjilpark, Gauteng, South Africa Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa-Jamali Department of Management and Leadership Studies, University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi Patrick Dzimiri Department of Human Sciences, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa; Department of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa Nicholas Govo Department of History, Heritage and International Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe Egídio Paulo Guambe Center of Urban Studies of Mozambique, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, Mozambique Costa Hofisi North-West University, Vanderbjilpark, Gauteng, South Africa Obinna Richard Iroanya Department of Military Studies, School of Military Science, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia Anthony Tshwarelo Malapane Gauteng Provincial Legislature, Johannesburg, South Africa

Editors and Contributors

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David Mandiyanike Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana Dylan Yanano Mangani Department of History and Political Studies, School of Governmental and Social Sciences, Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa Washington Mazorodze Department of Peace Security and Society, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Elísio Emanuel Muendane Center of Urban Studies of Mozambique, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, Mozambique Tasara Muguti Department of History, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe Joseph Muwanzi Department of Peace and Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe Gilbert Tarugarira Department of History, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe Edwin Yingi Department of Political Science, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

Abbreviations

Chapter “Introduction”: Tendai Chari and Patrick Dzimiri ANC BTI DRC MCP MCZ MEC PR ZANU-PF

African National Congress Bertelsmann Transformation Index Democratic Republic of Congo Malawi Congress Party Methodist Church in Zimbabwe Malawian Electoral Commission Proportional Representation Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter “Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military”: Dylan Yanano Mangani and Edwin Yingi ABC BCP BNP BNP LCD LDF LLA ORL SADC SCAF ZANU-PF ZDF

All Basotho Convention party Basutoland Congress Party Basotho National Party Basutoland National Party Lesotho Congress for Democracy Lesotho Defence Forces Lesotho Liberation Army Operation Restore Legacy Southern African Development Community Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwean Defence Forces

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Abbreviations

Chapter “The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970s to 2018”: Gilbert Tarugarira ANC AU CIO COPAZ DC DRC ESAP FRELIMO G40 GMB GPA IG IGoZ JOC MDC MPLA NRZ RSF SADC SWAPO ZANLA ZANU-PF ZDF ZEC ZIPRA ZNA

African National Congress African Union Central Intelligence Organisation Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee Delimitation Commission Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Structural Adjustment Programme Mozambique Liberation Front Generation 40 Grain Marketing Board Global Political Agreement Inclusive Government Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe The Joint Operation Command Movement for Democratic Change The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola National Railways of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Security Forces Southern African Development Community South West African People’s Organisation Zimbabwe National Liberation Army Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Defence Forces Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army Zimbabwe National Army

Chapter “Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup. Change Without Change?”: Washington Mazorodze AIPPA CCC CIO EU G40 MDC MISA NDS

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act Citizen Coalition for Change Central Intelligence Organization European Union Generation 40 Movement for Democratic Change Media Institute of Southern Africa National Development Strategy

Abbreviations

NGO NSSA POLAD POSA SADC UN US ZANU-PF ZCTU ZDF ZEC ZHRF ZIDERA ZRP ZUPCO

xxi

Non-Governmental Organisation National Social Security Authority Political Actors Dialogue Public Order and Security Act Southern African Development Community United Nations United States Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Zimbabwe Defense Force Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum Zimbabwe Democratic and Economic Recovery Act Zimbabwe Republic of Police Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

Chapter “Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition”: Patrick Dzimiri and Obinna Richard Iroanya AIPPA AU BMATT CC DRC G40 GNU ICG JOC MDC NCA POSA RF ZADHR ZANLA ZANU-PF ZBC ZDF ZIPRA ZNA ZPS ZRP

Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act African Union British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) Constitutional Commission Democratic Republic of Congo Generation 40 Unity Government International Crisis Group Joint Military Command Movement for the Democratic Change National Constitutional Assembly Public Order and Security Act Rhodesian Forces Zimbabwe Association Doctors for Human Rights Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation Zimbabwe Defense Forces Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Arm Zimbabwe National Army Zimbabwe Prison Services Zimbabwe Republic Police

xxii

Abbreviations

Chapter “Political Transition and Anti-democratic Culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup”: Tendai Chari BCC MDC NPP ZANU-PF ZDF

British Broadcasting Corporation Movement for Democratic Change National People’s Party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Defence Forces

Chapter “Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy”: Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa-Jamali ANC AU CIO COPAZ DC DRC ESAP FRELIMO G40 GMB GPA IG IGoZ JOC MDC MPLA NRZ RSF SADC SWAPO ZANLA ZANU-PF ZDF ZEC ZIPRA ZNA

African National Congress African Union Central Intelligence Organisation Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee Delimitation Commission Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Structural Adjustment Programme Mozambique Liberation Front Generation 40 Grain Marketing Board Global Political Agreement Inclusive Government Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe The Joint Operation Command Movement for Democratic Change The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola National Railways of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Security Forces Southern African Development Community South West African People’s Organisation Zimbabwe National Liberation Army Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Defence Forces Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army Zimbabwe National Army

Abbreviations

xxiii

Chapter “Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique”: Elísio Emanuel Muendane and Egídio Paulo Guambe EMB FGD FRELIMO GPA ICT MDC MDM RENAMO SPSS ZANU-PF

Electoral Management Bodies Focus Group Discussion Front for the Liberation of Mozambique Global Peace Agreement Information Communication Technologies Movement for Democratic Change Mozambican Democratic Movement Resistancia Nacianal Mocambicana Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter “The Electoral System and Accountability in the Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform”: Anthony Tshwarelo Malapane ANC BCM CC CODESA IEC IFP MP NA NNM NP NRC PAC PR UDF

African National Congress Black Conscious Movement Constitutional Court Convention for a Democratic South Africa Independent Electoral Commission Inkatha Freedom Party Member of Parliament National Assembly New Nation Movement National Party National Recreation Centre Pan African Congress Proportional Representation United Democratic Movement

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Abbreviations

Chapter “Electoral Systems, Political Party Coalitions and Political Polarisation in Local Governments: A Review of Service Delivery Challenges in South Africa”: Lewis Edwin Chigova and Costa Hofisi ANC DA NDP PR

African National Congress Democratic Alliance National Development Plan Proportional Representation

Chapter “Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for Other African States”: Nicholas Govo and Tasara Muguti ANC COPE COSATU DA DRC EFF FRELIMO GNU GPA HRCCGE IEC MDC MMD NDP NPA SADC SWAPO ZANU-PF

African National Congress Congress of the People Congress of South African Trade Unions Democratic Alliance Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Freedom Fighters Front for the Liberation of Mozambique Government of National Unity Global Political Agreement Human Rights Commission on Gender Equality Independent Electoral Commission Movement for Democratic Change Movement for Multiparty Democracy National Democratic Party National Prosecution Authority Southern African Development Community South West African People’s Organisation Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter “The Marginalised Majority—The Case of Botswana Women in Local Government (1999–2019)”: David Mandiyanike BALA FGD

Botswana Association of Local Governments Focus Group Discussion

Abbreviations

IEC IPU NGO SDG SDGs UN

xxv

Independent Electoral Commission Inter-Parliamentary Union Non-Governmental Organisation Sustainable Development Goals Sustainable Development Goals United Nations

Chapter “The Role of the Church in National Healing and Reconciliation: The Case of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2009”: Joseph Muwanzi AIPPA BSA CCJP CSO EFZ ERBs FCSO GNU HODs MCZ MDC MDCA MDRA MP NAZ NGOA POSA PTSD TRC ZANU-PF ZCA ZCC

Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act Broadcasting Services Act Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice Civil Society Organisations Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe Ecumenical Religious Bodies Faith-Based Civil Society Organisations Government of National Unity Heads of Christian Denominations Method Church in Zimbabwe Movement for Democratic Change Movement for Democratic Change Arthur Mutambara Methodist Development Relief Agent Member of Parliament National Archives of Zimbabwe Non-Governmental Organisation Act Public Order and Security Act Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Truth and Reconciliation Commission Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe Christian Alliance Zimbabwe Council of Churches

List of Figures

Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 8 Fig. 9

Framework analysis. Source Authors’ compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Victims by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Profile of the victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perpetrators of violence by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Profile of the perpetrators by municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Place of occurence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time of occurence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patterns of violence against women in elections in Mocuba . . . . . . . Patterns of violence against women in elections in Chókwê . . . . . . .

152 153 153 154 154 155 156 157 157

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List of Tables

Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy Table 1

2020 Fresh presidential election results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

141

Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique Table 1

Breakdown of sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

151

The Marginalised Majority—The Case of Botswana Women in Local Government (1999–2019) Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

North-West district council—cllr profile by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . Central district council—cllr profile by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . South-East district council—cllr profile by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2019 Local government elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245 246 246 246

The Role of the Church in National Healing and Reconciliation: The Case of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2009 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

MCZ’s participation in reconciliation and healing . . . . . . . . . . . . . MCZ intervention platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peace-building strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Experienced challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

263 263 264 264

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Introduction Rethinking Political Transition in Southern Africa: Threats and Challenges to Democratic Consolidation Tendai Chari and Patrick Dzimiri

Introduction Democratic transformations are never simple, linear processes. The now established democracies of Europe and the United States have arrived at where they are having endured a tortuous process of partial transformations, conflicts, slow downs and even outright reversals. It should not therefore, come as a surprise to see many countries undergoing the same travails today. Despite the demise of socialism as a competing ideology, the road to democracy is proving as difficult as ever (Ottaway, 2000: 1).

The above quotation encapsulates the subtle and not so subtle manifestations of transition-related conundrums afflicting most Southern African countries. Despite meeting some, if not most of the requirements for democracy, these countries experience various forms of fragility, reversals and partial transformations inimical to democratic consolidation. In different ways, case studies in this book illuminate on the various degrees and symptoms of “stalled” transitions and/or “reversed”/ “regressed” democratic transitions, which find expression through military orchestrated/leadership changes such as those witnessed in Zimbabwe (see Mazorodze, Chap. Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup: Change Without Change, in this volume as well as Dzimiri and Roanya, Chap. Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition, in this volume) militarisation of politics (see Tarugarira, Chap. The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970–2018, in this volume) difficulties in leadership T. Chari (B) Department of English, Media Studies & Linguistics, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] P. Dzimiri Department of Human Sciences, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Chari and P. Dzimiri (eds.), Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4_1

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change and renewal (see Govo and Muguti, Chap. Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for Other African States, in this volume), challenges of electoral reforms as discussed by Malapane (Chap. The Electoral System and Accountability in Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform, in this volume). The volume also illuminates on transition-related challenges such as electoral violence (see Muendane and Guambe, Chap. Women and Electoral Violence: the case of Mozambique, in this volume) and marginalisation of certain sections of the population as explored by David Mandiyanike (Chap. The Marginalised Majority-the case of Batswana Women in Local Government, 1999–2019). While the Southern African region, and to some extent the African continent, has experienced leadership change in the past 20 years, this has not brought the much-anticipated dividend to the political sphere, as it has been more of elite circulation as amply illustrated by Dzimiri and Iroanya, in Chap. Military Orchestrated Leadership change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition. In an article titled “State of Democracy in Africa: Changing Leaders Doesn’t Change Politics”, published in the Conversation, professor of Democracy and International Development at the University of Birmingham, Cheesman (2020a) opines that: For the last few years, the African political landscape has been dominated by high profile changes of leaders and governments. In Angola (2017), Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political and economic direction. But do changes of leaders and governments generate more democratic and responsive governments? (Cheesman, 2020a).

In trying to answer this question, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Africa Report, 2020 (BTI) titled “A Changing of the Guards or a Change of Systems” (Cheesman, 2020b) cautions against too much optimism with regards to prospects for rapid political change in sub-Sahara Africa, further pointing out that there still exist threats to democratic consolidation and hence, “the more things change the more they remain the same” (Cheesman, 2020b). This is because the optimism generated by some of the political changes “is consistently tampered… by a weary recognition that while a number of long-standing leaders left power, some of the underlying political and economic challenges facing these challenges remained” (Cheesman, 2020b, p. 6, the emphasis is ours). The chapters in this volume consider the underlying manifestations of political transitions in a region that has been experiencing unprecedented political vibrations that could portend the birth of a new political culture. Some of the major political developments in Southern Africa include: the military coup which brought Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule to an abrupt end in Zimbabwe, the departure of Jose Eduardo Dos Santos in September 2017 in Angola after 38 years at the helm of the oil-rich nation and the “smooth” transfer of power in South Africa and Botswana. However, beneath the veneer of political change ushered through leadership alteration and the introduction of presidential term limits, are lingering elements of “stalled” and/or “flawed” transitions, “incomplete democratisation”, the emergence of fragile regimes, neopatrimonialism (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994) and other political habits emblematic of residues of authoritarianism (Lodge, 2014), which negate the

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substance and meaning of political transition. The region has been characterised by years of low-intensity violence and military activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), partially blamed on the incumbent, President Kabila’s refusal to relinquish power after the expiration of his term of office in December 2017, and recurring political instability in Lesotho, including an alleged coup in 2014 that resulted in three national elections within five years and raging power struggles within the military. Related developments include the volatile political situation and destructive politics in Madagascar following the 2009 violent coup and the false hope engendered by the 2013 elections, which ushered in the now troubled Rajaonarimampianin presidency. All these developments signal that Southern Africa is far from shedding the stigma of the old order. In South Africa, there was renewed optimism following the contentious recall of President Jacob Zuma in February 2018, whose tenure was dogged by allegations of corruption, state capture and personalisation of power, violent xenophobic attacks, wild-cat industrial strikes, service delivery protests and deep social inequalities, all of which are symptomatic of democratic fragility (Issacharoff, 2007). Zuma’s successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa, who rode on the crest of the promise of a “new dawn” reminiscent of the 1994 euphoria after the inauguration of the founding President of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela in 1994, in many ways echoes Zimbabwean President Emerson Mnangagwa’s so-called “new dispensation” and “second republic”, “Zimbabwe is open of business” mantra following the coup against Robert Mugabe. Ramaphosa’s administration is faced with both ethical leadership and legitimacy challenges linked to the “Phalaphala saga”, factional politics, and enormous challenges in redressing the legacy of apartheid epitomised by intensification of socio-economic inequalities, poverty and perennial service delivery protests compounded by a festering electricity crisis. This volume approaches the notion of political transition using a wider lens which challenges classical conceptions of political transition that view change as “a set of end-points” (Pickles & Smith, 1998). The book advances an understanding of political transition that goes beyond leadership or regime change by foregrounding the importance of substantive political cultural change as well as the subtle manifestations of threats and challenges which hinder democratic consolidation. Our conception of political transition transcends “journalistic labels” and constructions fixated on elite circulation whereby transition is delimited by the departure of an authoritarian regime and the inauguration of a new leader or the return of a popularly elected leader (Mainwaring, 1989). Thus, contributions in this book illustrate how certain residual political cultural practices enable or hinder political transition and democratic consolidation. They tackle issues such as military orchestrated leadership change, constitutionalism and leadership renewal, electoral reform and accountability, women and electoral violence, marginalisation of women, the role of the church in political transition, and (anti) democratic political engagement. The book further examines the dynamics and types of political transition in Southern Africa in order to broaden insights on the multiple trajectories of political transition, particularly, the nature, substance and real meaning of political change and its impact on the human condition. To varying degrees, chapters in this volume highlight the overt and covert ways in which the Southern African countries featured

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in this volume exhibit tendencies of “flawed” political transitions or residual, persistent habits, mentalities and other fossilised political cultural practices symptomatic of societies failing to consolidate their democracies.

Revisiting the Notion of Political Transition There is an ever-growing body of scholarly works on political transition, to the extent that the topic has become some sort of cottage industry in the post-Cold War era, marking the beginning of democratisation and liberalisation (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994, 1997; Osaghae, 1995; Nifosi, 2005; Onslow, 2011; Sachikonye, 2017). The idea of political transition in the post-Cold War international system, discussed by Francis Fukuyama in his book, “The End of History and the Last Man Standing”, looks at transition in the context of the transition from a bi-polar system to a uni-polar era. Fukuyama talks about the embrace of capitalism, globalisation of democracy and fading away of Communism as marking some special kind of dispensation termed “the New World Order”. Huntington (1991) refers to this postCold War era of political transition as the “Third Wave” of democratisation. However, there is very little consensus on the application of the term “political transition” as it is prone to different interpretations. Most scholars define political transition as the process of replacing an authoritarian regime with a democratic one which entails “the erosion of the past and the construction of the future” (O’ Donnell cited in Osaghae, 1995, p. 183). This suggests a connection between political transition and democratisation or democratic consolidation (Valenzuela, 1990). O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 6) view political transition as the “interval between one political regime and another”. Such a definition is limited in scope because it focusses on the interval between the transfer of power from an authoritarian to a democratic regime at the expense of what happens after the transfer of power from one regime to the other. For O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), transitions are “delimited on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergency of a revolutionary alternative” (1986, p. 6). Typical evidence that a transition has begun is when authoritarian incumbents begin to loosen their grip on key levers of power and provide guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups that were formally under siege from the authoritarian regime. We find this definition inadequate because it implies that the process of political transition is unproblematic as it does not accurately reflect the complexity of political change in the developing countries of the global south. Some scholars argue that the concept of political transition is a useful lens to explain why some countries have succeeded in democratising while others have remained “flawed”/“defective democracies” (Keller, 1995, p. 224), “competitive authoritarian regimes”, (Levitsky & Way, 2002) “double-headed” or “hybrid regimes” (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Bogaards, 2009). For O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986, p. 6) transitions are delimited by, on the one side, the onset of the process

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of dissolving an authoritarian regime, and, on the other side, the introduction of a semblance of democracy, “the return to some form of authoritarian rule or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative”. This implies that during a political transition, authoritarianism may exist side by side with some form of democracy but not good enough to attain democratic consolidation which is the preferred “terminus ad quem” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p.10). Political transition thus becomes some sort of a “half-way house” between authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, meaning that there “might be democracy, but as long as it is not consolidated then we are still in a transitional phase”. Contributions in this volume illuminate the inadequacies of the mainstream perspective of political transition as a lens to understand the dynamics of social change in post-colonial states, the southern African region included. Pickles and Smith (1998, p. 2) observe that, the conventional and neo-liberal view on transition held by Western multilateral agencies, “relies on an undertheorized understanding of change”. Rather than looking at political transition as a one-way street of change from one hegemonic system to another, it should be seen as a complex, if not subtle process which entails negotiation of old social relations into new social relations. While the mainstream transition theory is premised on discourses and practices of liberalisation, some scholars have challenged such perspectives, preferring to situate transition within Foucauldian discourses where liberalisation is conceived as “technologies of the social body” or “a series of techniques of transformation, involving marketisation of economic relations, privatisation of property, and the democratisation of political life” (Pickle & Smith 1998, p. 2). Unlike the classical perspective, which views transition as a set of end-points, Pickle & Smith look at political transition as a holistic transformational process that seeks to demonopolise state power. The elusiveness of the concept of political transition means that many states that claim to be democracies are “works in progress” because they have not attained the consolidation stage. Given the experiences of democratic reversals experienced in many African states, questions that arise are: how long will it take for these countries to transition? To what extent are these transitions authentic and organic or will they lead to some perpetual reversals? What are some of the manifestations of this stunted transition in Southern Africa? Chapters in this volume respond to these and related questions in a manner that demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the concept of political transition and the dynamic ways in which it is circumscribed by history, culture and society.

Democratic Consolidation Just as the term “political transition”, the term democracy is slippery, and many scholars interpret it differently. Schumpteter (cited in O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 4) defines democratic consolidation as “institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Dahl (1989, p. 322) defines democracy

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as “the most reliable means for protecting and advancing the good and interests of all the persons subject to collective decisions”. For democracy to thrive, there must be effective participation and adult suffrage and citizens must have equal opportunities to understand civic issues, as well as “allow them to have control over the decisionmaking agenda” (cited in Coglianese, 1990, p. 1662). This means that the interests of all persons should have equal protection in decision-making by guaranteeing them equal participation. While Dahl’s argument that democracy and equality are necessarily linked, some critics have questioned the nature of this linkage and are concerned that Dhal does not consider the fact that inequalities in political resources among citizens could destabilise the democratic character of states (di Zerega, 1988). Formal equality alone, without substantive equality, is not sufficient to maintain political rule where there are significant socio-economic inequalities. Substantive equality among citizens is deemed an important yardstick for assessing the extent to which a nation has achieved democratic consolidation. Valenzuela (1990) identifies five broad conditions that facilitate or hinder democratic consolidation. These are (a) modalities assumed by the transition, (b) how political actors are organised (c) the various political institutions that emerge or re-emerge during the course of the transition, (d) the management of social conflict and (e) subordinating the military to democratic government. The overall change from an authoritarian to a democratic regime involves two transitions, namely, the inauguration of a democratic government, and the consolidation of democracy or effective operationalisation of a democratic regime (Valenzuela, 1990). Democratic consolidation thus, involves an affirmation and strengthening of certain institutions such as the electoral system, independence of the judiciary, respect for human rights and the revitalisation of new or recreated political parties. How the transition of a country first occurs is important while the attitudes of the principal authoritarian regime elites have towards democracy matters most because if an authoritarian regime is defeated or collapses there is a likelihood for consolidation rather than where “transaction” or “extrication”, whereby outgoing leaders have a relative ability to hold on to power for a considerable length of time before the onset of a transition (Valenzuela, 1990). Apart from the modalities of transition, negative experiences of the population, such as repression and economic failure under the authoritarian regime, have a bearing on democratic consolidation or lack thereof. The extent to which regime change elites validate the new regime by comparing it with the previous regime determines the extent to which the new regime can mobilise support for itself by pointing to real or exaggerated faults of the previous regime. Hence, cases of regime redemocratisation have significant advantages over those where an authoritarian regime is being reconstructed into a democratic regime. The ability of a state to moderate a political conflict also determines the ease with which it can achieve democratic consolidation. Conflicts impede consolidation because tensions in the streets, the legislature, state administration and among groups can result in zero-sum politics, which derail progress, thereby stalling democratic and constitutional processes as well as leading to policy stalemates or complete disregard of the rights of certain groups. This means that the greater the degree of consensus among political actors, the easier it would be to consolidate democracy.

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Distrust among political actors can lead to relentless attempts by incumbents to retain power by any means possible or in the worst-case scenarios may lead to coups or insurrections as expressions of distrust by powerful actors. Apart from the ability to moderate political conflict, the management of social conflict also determines the extent to which a state consolidates democracy. Thus, if a nation has the appropriate frameworks and competent institutions to resolve social conflicts, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is likely to be smoother. In addition, groups that were formerly suppressed by authoritarian regimes are likely to regain their ability to articulate their grievances or regain the capacity to organise under the new democratic regime. The fourth and final determinant of democratic consolidation is the ability of a state to subordinate the military to democratic government. The consolidation of democracy largely depends on the extent to which a country is able to create the appropriate institutions for channelling and resolving conflicts. This is because the transition to democracy often leads to the resuscitation of civil society groups that may have gone underground due to suppression and would want to take advantage of the new democratic dispensation (Valenzuela, 1990). However, the activities of these organisations may lead to conflicts as the way they articulate their grievances may undermine the authority of the new government and eventually derail its transformational programmes especially if civil society organisations assert themselves in a manner that results in political instability. The elimination of potential destabilising conflicts is particularly important because most of the states which suffer democratic reversal fail to achieve both democratic consolidation and polyarchy—defined as a modern form of democracy in which there is effective citizen participation, voting, equality, inclusive citizenship, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and associational autonomy, among other things (Dahl, 1982, 1997). While Svolik (2003) concurs with Valenzuela (1990) with regards to how the nature of an authoritarian past determines whether a country will achieve democratic consolidation or not, he identifies the level of economic development and the type of democratic executive as important determinants of democratic consolidation. The variety of determinants of democratic consolidation indicates that there is no consensus on its meaning as the concept is understood differently in various contexts. This volume canvasses a contextual approach to understanding political transition and democratic consolidation to illuminate these specificities. While scholars such as Dahl emphasise equality in terms of availing opportunities to participate in political processes, they ignore the importance of substantive equality (Dahl, 1997). Critics of contemporary liberal democratic politics argue that formal political equality does not necessarily guarantee the survival of a political rule. In fact, substantive equality in political resources is an ideal standard for measuring the extent to which a state is democratised (di Zerega, 1988) and thus, a clear indication that democracy and development are interlinked. The discrepancy between formal political equality and substantive equality has been amply demonstrated by Masipa (2018) who argues that despite the democratic project in South Africa making considerable steps to enhance the socio-economic welfare of society there are still various challenges associated with high unemployment, poverty and

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inequalities. This is clear evidence that South Africa, like other Southern African states, exhibits numerous symptoms of a botched transition. The perennial conflicts occasioned by service delivery protests (see Chigova and Hofisi, Chap. Electoral Systems, Political Party Coalitions and Political Polarisation in Local Government: A Review of Service Delivery Challenges in Southern Africa, in this volume), high levels of gender-based violence, xenophobic violence and escalating crime rates serve to dispel myths about South African exceptionalism (Zeleza, 2008). This is despite the semblance of “smooth leadership renewal” and “democratic renewal” in the country which resulted in a constitutionally sanctioned handover of power over the past two decades—an issue that has been explored by Govo and Muguti (Chap. 10, in this volume). Thus, despite the ability to hand over power democratically, South Africa’s failure to address the plethora of socio-economic challenges speaks to the difficulties of political transition. This failure resonates with the way its neighbours are struggling to stem political intolerance, marginalisation of women (see Mandiyake in Chap. 11), orchestrated military leadership change (see Dzimiri and Iroanya, Chap. Military Orchestated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition, in this volume, Tarugarira in Chap. The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970–2018 as well as Mangani and Yingi in Chap. Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military in this volume), lack of accountability (Malapane, Chap. The Electoral System and Accountability in Democratic South Africa: Call for Electoral Reforms, in this volume) and electoral violence (see Muendane and Guambe, Chap. Women and Electoral Violence: the Case of Mozambique, in this volume). The southern African countries featured in this volume share some affinities and are illustrative of the failure of democratic consolidation, “failed democracies” (Huntington, 1991) “premature democracies” (Lipset, 1959), “defective democracy”, “illiberal” or “semi-liberal” democratisation (Croissant, 2004), “blocked transitions”, “flawed transitions”, and “incomplete transitions” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994: 453). While previous studies tended to focus on why some political transitions failed and why others succeeded and the different trajectories to political transition followed by different states, our focus is on overt and covert manifestations of failure by states in the Southern African region to shed off traits of the old political order and the ability to attain democratic consolidation. As much as countries featured in this volume strive to tick the democratic boxes by, for instance, ritualistically conducting periodic elections, leadership or renewing leadership our view is that democracy has been more of a façade than reality because such minimalist approaches neither meet thresholds for democratisation nor polyarchy. Democracy aims at complete self-governance for freedom and equality for citizens while institutions of polyarchy are necessary but not sufficient to achieve democracy. For Dahl “To be fully democratic a state must also have effective participation, voting equality for enlightened understanding (i.e. adequate opportunities for citizens to understand the issues facing them and the state), final control of the agenda by the citizenry and inclusive citizenship (cited in Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003:107). Polyarchy does not ensure these conditions, although it does contribute to having them (Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003: 107). Inclusive citizenship, participation and the ability of citizens to

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understand issues and control the political agenda are not enough to guarantee democratic consolidation. Further criteria, which must be met, in addition to the polyarchy conditions, include the existence of democratic beliefs and culture, control of the military and police, limits to pluralism, the existence of the rule of law, judiciary independence and independence from foreign interference (Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003: 107). Thus, a democracy should be able to withstand extraordinary challenges if its citizens are deeply committed to democratic institutions. Where such democratic values are weakest or challenged by non-democratic beliefs, the polyarchy struggles to survive. In addition, it is difficult to transform authoritarian regimes into democratic regimes as simple constitutional reforms such as those discussed by Govo and Muguti (Chap. Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for other African Countries, in this volume) cannot eliminate residual anti-democratic attitudes and behaviours among the citizens—an issue also discussed extensively by Chari, (Chap. Political Transition and (anti)democratic culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup, in this volume). Apart from the entrenchment of a democratic culture, democratic consolidation cannot be attained in a context where the military and police cannot be brought under civilian control (see Tarugarira Chap. The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970–2018 Dzimiri and Iroanya, Chap. Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition and Chari, Chap. Political Transition and (anti)-democratic culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup, in this volume). Dahl (cited in Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003: 112) notes that on about fifty occasions in the twentieth century, authoritarian governments, including some very repressive ones, have replaced some democratic governments in a typical “democratic reversal”. Equally important, is the ability of a country to maintain its independence and wad off foreign interference from powerful states that are opposed to polyarchy. Democratic nations can lose their autonomy through military aggression from powerful states if their problems, whether of a military, economic, environmental or cultural nature, spill into the international arena (Bailey & Braybrooke, 2003: 112). In these circumstances, it may be difficult for such nations to chart their collective destiny and prospects for democratic consolidation become a pipe dream.

Anti-democratic and Undemocratic Political Cultures As much as most southern African countries have undergone various forms of “democratisation”, democratic consolidation remains elusive. Being the last colonial outpost, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region has not been spared by the “third wave” of democratisation (Huntington, 1991), which has been accompanied by liberalisation of the political space, electioneering and replacement of authoritarian regimes by popularly elected governments. In one way or the other, case studies in this book illustrate how residual undemocratic political cultural practices endure and manifest themselves in different forms despite claims

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of democratisation. This has given rise to “illiberal” or “defective” (Zakaria, 1997: 22) whereby citizen rights are routinely trampled upon despite the holding of successive and ritualistic elections that often result in the circulation of elite characters. For instance, in Zimbabwe, there is a perception that elections have become an instrument for elite circulation and legitimisation of the “illiberal” administration’s claim to power as evidenced by perennial allegations of “rigged” elections. This shows that although an essential ingredient of democratisation, political transition does not necessarily lead to democratic consolidation (Kelly, 1995: 224). Many societies in transition have advertently or inadvertently become incubators of undemocratic and anti-democratic practices, which are inimical to democratic consolidation. To a very large extent, these practices relate to what can be referred to as “diehard” residual attitudes “mindsets”, “mentality” or “orientations”, linked to political socialisation. It is such “mindsets” which could, for example, predispose the military to dabble in politics and motivate them to subvert constitutionally elected governments (see Tarugarira, Chap. The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970–2018, and also Mangani and Yingi Chap. Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military, in this volume). As Bailey and Braybrooke (2003) have pointed out, crafters of the United States of America’s constitution were aware of the importance of ensuring that the military did not encroach into civilian affairs. While many southern African countries have periodically held elections and implemented most of the region’s mandatory electoral protocols, the same cannot be said about security sector reforms, particularly the professionalisation of the military and the police to ensure impartiality. In Zimbabwe, for example, while the military has been viewed as the core of the problem during electoral contests on account of their utterances and execution of different forms of operations to thwart opposition members, the police have also been integral to the political survival of the ruling party, ZANU (PF) through their violent activities against the opposition (Mutanda, 2019). Mutanda argues that the police have been complicit to human rights violations through their silence on violence committed by the ruling party, targeting the opposition, ignoring cases of violence by the opposition and “carrying politically motivated arrets and alleged anti-ZANU (PF”) police officers” (Mutanda, 2019: 139), which are tactics similar to those used by the colonial government against the liberation political parties. The continuation of these after independence signal failure of the new black government to professionalise the security sector. Whether this was deliberate or unintentional, however, is a question for another day. Similar undemocratic and anti-democratic attitudes which are symptomatic of stalled democratic transition include the persistence of electoral violence and the marginalisation of women, an issue that is explored by Muendane and Guambe, Chap. Women and Electoral Violence: the Case of Mozambique, and Chikapa-Jamali, Chap. Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy, in this volume. It is widely acknowledged that election violence “challenges political transitions” (Stremalau & Price, 2009: 7) because it undermines democratisation and nation-building. As one of the key benchmarks for determining whether an election is credible or not, the existence of election violence during an

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election negatively influences public perceptions about electoral legitimacy or lack thereof (Chari, 2016, 2017). Political violence has been viewed as motivated by the acquisition of power through violent acts that lead people to harm others to gain that power, which according to De Los Rios (2004) is the common motive connecting all situations. This means that political violence and economic power are intertwined. The common and widely acknowledged “underlying” causes of political violence include historical grievances over resources such as access to land, weakening of government institutions and the gradual loss of monopoly of violence by the state which may result in the proliferation of militia gangs often used by politicians to secure electoral victory (De Smedt, 2009). An important dimension of political violence which manifests in stalled transitions is that women and men are affected differently by political violence and experience it differently. Cultural stereotypes linked with gender tend to be challenged during political crises with women taking up more active roles during political crises and conflict resolutions. This links up with Muendane and Guambe’s (Chap. Women and Election Violence: The Case of Mozambique, and Chikapa-Jamali, Chap. Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy, in this volume) observation that election violence reproduces the daily gender relations into the political arena as women become victims of symbolic forms of electoral violence during electoral contests. The status of women in society, particularly their capacity to participate in political processes, determines a country’s democratic credentials and its potential for democratic consolidation. This is such that the underrepresentation of women at all levels of governance (see Mandiyanike, Chap. The Marginalised Majority-the Case of Batswana Women in Local Government, 1999–2019, in this volume) becomes a form of symbolic violence and is symptomatic of “democratic deficit” or “stalled democracy”, which become incubators of undemocratic and anti-democratic practices. Chapters in this volume delve deeper into the subtle and not so subtle manifestations of undemocratic and anti-democratic practices and how they manifest in different contexts with a view to broaden understanding of the different contours of political transition. The volume comprises of 13 chapters organised into three parts. In Chapter 1, which is the introduction, Tendai Chari and Patrick Dzimiri unpack the problematic concept of political transition, highlighting how different southern African states exhibit various degrees of patrial, if not stalled political transition and difficulties in democratic transformation which find expression through stunted social and economic change, military orchestrated transfer of power, militarisation of politics, challenges in electoral reforms, marginalisation of social groups, electoral violence, undemocratic and/or anti-democratic cultures and other social and political challenges. Chari and Dzimiri posit that although there are prospects for authentic political change in southern Africa, lack of a fundamental change in political culture poses a threat to democratic consolidation, thereby signalling a scenario of “change without change”. Part I comprises of five chapters. In Chap. Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military, Dylan Yanano Mangani

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and Edwin Yingi explore the civilian–military problematique in Lesotho, a country plagued by political instability since gaining independence in 1966. Deploying the concept of “praetorianism”— as a situation in which the military subjectively determines political decisions made by civilian authorities, Mangani and Yingi illuminate how an oppressive military-backed rule in Lesotho has precluded the state from building enduring democratic and good governance institutions, resulting in an “illiberal democracy”, and how this merging of the military and civilian leadership has stifled genuine political transition in Lesotho. In Chap. The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970–2018, Gilbert Tarugarira examines the military–politics complex in Zimbabwe, another southern African state in which praetorianism has played itself in a poignant way. Tarugarira traces origins of the Zimbabwean military’s attitudes with regards to professionalism and involvement in politics. The chapter established that the military and political leadership’ socialisation and attitudes cultivated during the armed struggle shaped their orientation and disposition with regards towards politics and power. Chapter Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup: Change Without Change? Washington Mazorodze evaluates the substance of leadership change in Zimbabwe after the November 2017 military coup. Deploying Paul Collier’s greed model, Mazorodze asks whether the change of leadership after the coup has brought significant change to the country. He argues that despite the new administration’s efforts to construct itself as different from the previous Robert Mugabe government, the purported change after the military coup lacked any substance as the economic crisis remained unresolved, corruption, violations of political rights, persecution of opposition of political activists and impunity continued in the “new dispensation”—thereby signalling “change without change”. In Chap. Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition, Patrick Dzimiri and Richard Obinna Iroanya examine the “military orchestrated” leadership change in Zimbabwe in the wake of the November 2017 military coup. Building on extensive secondary and primary data the authors provide insights into how the political crisis in Zimbabwe was precipitated by the absence of a succession plan within the ruling ZANU (PF) party thereby triggering a military coup. The chapter further demonstrates how the lack of authentic political reforms by the military-installed leader signifies lack of substance and is a classic example of circulation of political elites. Chapter Political Transition and (anti)-democratic Culture in Zimbabwe: Press Discourses on the November 2017 Military Coup, by Tendai Chari, picks up on the notion of anti-democratic culture. Chari examines press discourses during the November 2017 military coup in Zimbabwe. Drawing on insights from Michel Foucault’s Discourse Theory and the concept of political culture by Almond and Verba (1963), Chari qualitatively explores the discursive construction of the coup in the state-owned newspaper, The Herald and the privately owned News Day. He found out that discourses, such as legitimation, silence, personalisation and normalisation, employed by both newspapers in reporting the coup were inimical to the entrenchment of a democratic culture and flew in the face of democratic norms, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. These anti-democratic and undemocratic practices typify societies failing to consolidate their democracies or suffering from threats of democratic reversals—the so-called “defective” democracies.

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Part II, which focusses on electoral politics and democratisation has four chapters. Chapter Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy, by Tiyesere Mercy Chikapa-Jamali examines implications of Malawi’s fresh presidential election on the country’s democracy. The fresh presidential election was held after the country’s main opposition party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) challenged and their subsequent nullification of the May 2019 election by the high court of Malawi, a decision which was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The chapter argues that despite outright refusal by the losing candidate to accept defeat at first, the consequent subtle acceptance of defeat reflects remarkable steps towards the change of political culture signalling democratic consolidation in Malawi. This democratic consolidation will be sustained through financial independence by the Malawian Electoral Commission (MEC) as well as ensuring that international and regional election observers are supported in their work to ensure that the country maintains high standards with regards to free, fair and credible elections. In Chap. Women and Electoral Violence: The Case of Mozambique, Elisio Muendane and Egidio Guambe revisit the problematic phenomenon of electoral violence in Mozambique, demonstrating how women electoral actors were victimised during election. Drawing from case studies in the country’s municipal districts, the chapter throws fresh light on patterns of electoral violence experienced by women during elections in Mozambique. The authors observe that electoral violence is experienced differently between women and men. While men are generally victims of physical violence, women experience other symbolic forms of violence such as economic and psychological violence. Muendane and Guambe posit that electoral gender-based violence in Mozambique is embedded in the neopatriarchal Mozambican culture marked by the “social control of the vote”, inter and intra-partisan asymmetric distribution of resources and patriarchal authoritarianism. The authors locate gender-based electoral violence within the framework of “stalled” democratic transitions where the culture of violence is a residue of authoritarianism. In Chap. The Electoral System and Accountability in Democratic South Africa: Calls for Electoral Reform, Anthony Tshwarelo Malapane discusses the influence of the electoral system and accountability systems on South Africa’s political transition. He posits that these systems play a critical role in political transition and democratic consolidation. Malapane argues that the Proportional Representation (PR) system used in South Africa has given birth to the “dominant” party phenomenon which has undemocratic features such as lack of responsiveness and lack of accountability. This has contributed to institutional weaknesses in national institutions such as the legislature, the Constitutional Court, judicial overreach and associated undemocratic practices which pose threats to democratic consolidation. Malapane argues that these institutional weaknesses indicate that South Africa needs electoral reforms. In Chap. Electoral Systems, Political Party Coalitions and Political Polarisation in Local Government: A Review of Service Delivery Challenges, Lewis Chigova and Costa Hofisi examine how electoral systems, political party coalitions and political polarisation affect service delivery by local government institutions. They argue that service delivery challenges emanate from the instability of electoral systems, coalitions and polarisation undermine local authorities’ ability to deliver services. They recommend

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putting in place regulatory frameworks that complement electoral systems to bring stability, leading to improved service delivery in municipalities. Part III focusses on constitutionalism, governance and transitional justice. The section opens with Chap. Constitutionalism and Leadership Renewal in the African National Congress: Lessons for other African Countries, by Nicholas Govo and Tasara Muguti who interrogate the constitutional leadership renewal in the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and how this potentially contributes towards a stable democracy and averts political conflicts in South Africa. While acknowledging this “smooth” transfer of power as a lesson worth emulating by other revolutionary political parties in the SADC region and the continent at large, the authors caution that the ANC government’s failure to decisively deal with a plethora of socio-economic challenges bedevilling the country poses a threat to the country’s political transition. Chapter The Marginalised Majority-The Case of Batswana Women in Local Government, 1999–2019, by David Mandiyanike delves into a phenomenon which typifies one of the challenges confronted by “blocked” or “incomplete” democratic transitions—the marginalisation of women in politics. Drawing on primary data collected through interviews and field study observations, Mandiyanike examines the participation of women in local government elections in Botswana and possible interventions for addressing gender balances in the political sphere. The chapter reveals that women are not only underrepresented in local government elections in Botswana, but also face hurdles during campaigns owing to the increasing feminisation of poverty. It argues that the limited involvement of women in local government politics signifies a democratic deficit and that, the array of individual and institutional obstacles that hinder Bastwana women from participating in politics are symptomatic of challenges faced by nations struggling to consolidate their democracies. Chapter The Role of the Church in National Healing and Reconciliation: The Case of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe, 1999–2009, by Joseph Muwanzi examines the role of the church in national healing and reconciliation using the efforts of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe (MCZ) as a lens to illuminate challenges faced by civil society organisations in peace-building in the context of state fragility. Deploying Ledercich’s peace-building model and utilising a sequential explanatory mixed-method research design, Muwanzi uncovers strategies used by the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe to promote national healing and reconciliation. Some of the challenges identified include lack of political will, financial constraints, lack of social justice mechanisms, partisan politics and fear—attributes which resonate with “defective” democracies. We hope that chapters in this volume will contribute towards a nuanced and broader understanding of the concept of political transition by spotlighting the diverse ways in which residual colonial and authoritarian practices endure even in the most liberal democratic societies in Southern Africa, specifically and Africa and the global South, broadly.

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References Almond, G. A., & Verba, A. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princetown University Press. Bailey, M., & Braybrooke, D. (2003). Robert a Dahl’s philosophy of democracy exhibited in his essays. Annual Review of Political Science, 6, 99–118. Bogaards, M. (2009). How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism. Democratization, 1;16(2), 399–423. Bratton, M., & Van de Walle (1994). Neo-patrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. World Politics, 46(4), 453–489. Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in a comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Chari, T. (2016). Press-citizen interface in a fragile society: Mapping press and citizen discourses on election violence during presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe, 2000– 2013. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Media Studies Department, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Chari, T. (2017). Electoral violence and its instrumental logic: Mapping press discourse on electoral violence during parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Elections, 16(1), 72–96. Cheesman, N. (2020a). A changing of the guards or a change of systems? BTI2020a regional report Sub-Saharan Africa: Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.aei.pitt.edu/ 103199/1/Regional-Report_NW_BTI-2020_Sub-Saharan-Africa-Report_A-Changing-of-theGuards-or-A-Change-of-Systems_2020.pdf. Retrieved November 26, 2022. Cheesman, N. (2020b). State of democracy in Africa: Changing leadership doesn’t change politics. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/state-of-democracy-in-afr ica-changing-leaders-doesnt-change-politics-144292. Retrieved July 15, 2022. Coglianese, C. (1990). Democracy and its Critics by Robert Dahl. Michigan Law Review, 88(6), 1662–1667. Croissant, A. (2004). From transition to defective democracy: Mapping Asian democratization. Democratization, 11(5), 156–198. Dahl, R. A. (1982). Dilemmas of pluralist democracy. Yale University Press. Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press. Dahl, A. R. (1997). Toward democracy, a journey: Reflections, 1940–1997. De Los Rios, C. (2004). Understanding political violence. Journal for the Study of Language, Literacy and Culture, 4(1), 29–43. De Smedt, J. (2009). “No Raila, No Peace!”: Big man politics and election violence at The Kibera Grassroots. African Affairs, 108(433), 581–598. Di Zerega, A. (1988) The Western Political equality, self-government and democracy: A critique of dahl’s political equality. The Western Political Quarterly, 41(3), 447–468. https://www.ber telsmannstiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Regional-Report_ NW_BTI-2020_Sub-Saharan-Africa-Report_A-Changing-of-the-Guards-or-A-Change-of-Sys tems_2020.pdf. Retrieved July 10, 2022. Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. Issacharoff, S. (2007). Fragile democracies. Harvard Law Review, 120(6), 1405–1467. Keller, E. J. (1995). Liberalization, democratization and democracy in Africa: Comparative perspectives. Africa Insight, 1; 25(4), 224–230. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65. Lodge, T. (2014). Neo-patrimonial politics in the ANC. African Affairs, 113(450), 1–23. Mainwaring, S. (1989). Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues (Working Paper#130 No1989). Kellog Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/130_0. pdf. Retrieved July 12, 2022.

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Masipa, T. (2018). South Africa’s transition to democracy and democratic consolidation: A reflection on socio-economic challenges. Journal of Public Affairs, 18(4), 1–6. Mutanda, D. (2019). Security sector reform in Zimbabwe: scrutinizing the rationale for police reform. African Security Review, 28(2), 139–156. Nifosi, I. (2005). A new conceptual framework for political transition: A Case study of Rwanda. I’afrique des grands Iacs. Amuaire, 2004–2005. Retrieved from https://docplayer.net/87575437A-new-conceptual-framework-for-political-transition-a-case-study-on-rwanda.html. Retrieved May 15, 2021. Onslow, S. (2011). Zimbabwe and political transition. Strategic Update. Retrieved from https:// www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/updates/zimbabwe. Retrieved July 16, 2022. Osaghae, E. (1995). The study of political transition in Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 22(64), 183–197. Ottaway, M. (2000). Democratic reversal. George Town Journal of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2000/07/01/democratic-reversals-pub-763. Retrieved September 20, 2022. O’Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. C. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. The Johns Hopkins University. Pickles, J., & Smith, A. (1998). Theorising transition: the political economy of communist transformations. Routledge. Sachikonye, L. (2017). The protracted democratic transition in Zimbabwe. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 117–136. Stremlau, N., & Price, M. (2009). Media, elections and political violence in Eastern Africa: Towards a comparative framework. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/asc/_papers/ 723. Retrieved September 20, 2022. Svolik, M. (2003). Authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation. The American Political Science Review, 102(2), 153–168. Valenzuela, S. J. (1990). Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: Notion, process, and facilitating conditions (Working Paper #150). Retrieved https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/ files/old_files/documents/150_0.pdf. Retrieved July 11, 2022. Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43. Zeleza, P. (2008). Racialized complexes of xenophobia. Pambazuka. Retrieved from https://www. pambazuka.org/human-security/racialized-complexes-xenophobia. Retrieved June 22, 2020.

Tendai Chari is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and a National Research Foundation (NRF) C3 Rated Researcher at the University of Venda, South Africa. He holds a PhD in media studies from the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Previously he lectured at several universities in Africa, including the University of Zimbabwe (where he was head of the media programme in the English Department), the National University of Science and Technology and Fort Hare University (South Africa). Chari is widely published in the field of media and communication studies, and his research focuses on political communication with a broadened horizon on the interface between digital media and politics, media and conflict, media ethics and popular culture. His other publications have appeared in the Journal of African Media Studies, African Identities, Communicatio: South African Journal on Media and Communications, African Journalism Studies, and the Journal of African Elections. He has co-edited several books, including, Communication Rights in Africa: Emerging Discourses and Perspectives (co-edited with Professor Ufuoma Akpojivi, Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2023), Global Pandemics and Media Ethics: Issues and Perspectives (Routledge, 2022 co-edited with Professor Martin N. Ndlela), African Football, Identity Politics and Global Media Narratives: The Legacy of FIFA 2010 World Cup (2014 Palgrave Macmillan; co-edited with Professor Nhamo A. Mhiripiri) and Media Law, Ethics, and Policy in the Digital Age (2017 IGI Global Publishing; also with Professor N.A Mhiripiri), Military, Politics and Democratisation in Southern Africa: The Quest for Political Transition (Springer Nature, Forthcoming 2023, co-edited with Dr Patrick Dzimiri). Chari is a recipient

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of several grants and fellowships which include the African Peace Building Network Fellowship (2017), the African Peacebuilding Book Publishing Manuscript grant (2018), the African Humanities Program (APH) of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) Post-Doctoral Fellowship (2022). Chari is working on finalizing his single-authored book titled Diaspora Media and Homeland Conflict: Coloniality of Conflict Journalism in Zimbabwe (Routledge, forthcoming 2023). Patrick Dzimiri is an Associate Professor in the Department of Arts and Social Sciences- Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education. He is a passionate academic with exceptional research and teaching expertise and 14 years of University lectureship experience. He graduated with a PhD in International Relations from the University of Pretoria and has a proven history of engagement with higher education teaching and learning institutions at the national and regional levels. He has vast expertise in teaching international relations and development studies. Dr Dzimiri has graduated both Masters and PhD candidates in the area of international politics. He has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals, including book chapters and read papers at both international and national conferences. Dr Dzimiri is an experienced scholar who has supervised at Masters and PhD levels. Having researched broadly on issues relating to human rights, human security and humanitarian affairs, of late, his research focus has slowly shifted more towards community-specific investigations, with the target of yielding tangible society and peopleoriented research outcomes in areas of migration politics, governance and development, sustainable livelihoods, inequalities in multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-ethnic social settings. His research focus resonates with goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals that aim to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.

Military and Political Transition

Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Lesotho: A Critique of the Lesotho Military Dylan Yanano Mangani

and Edwin Yingi

Introduction Since its independence in 1966, Lesotho has been plagued by political instability, conversely impacting sustainable political transitions and democratic development. The first elections in the newly independent tiny kingdom came in January 1970 and were won by the opposition-Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). However, the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) declined to concede defeat and carried out a coup detat by declaring a state of emergency, suspending the constitution and dissolving parliament. This marked the beginning of the BNP’s 16 years of authoritarian rule, which ended with another military coup in 1986 (Letsie, 2018). The military junta lasted seven years, from 1986 until 1993 when democratic governance was restored. However, the return to democracy was short-lived as the country was plunged into succession cataclysms from election disputes, tensions within the state’s security apparatus and internecine fights within the military. Until recently, Lesotho had remained politically unstable because of the ‘civilian-military problematique’, which took the form of successive coups, failed coups, political assassinations and disputed elections. What remains to be seen is how the military would continue to position itself in the current democratic dispensation in Lesotho. Since the 1970s, the military has been a proactive actor, either as the power behind the premiership or the guarantor of civilian dictatorships. Periodic elections are

D. Y. Mangani (B) Department of History and Political Studies, School of Governmental and Social Sciences, Nelson Mandela University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] E. Yingi Department of Political Science, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Chari and P. Dzimiri (eds.), Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4_2

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acknowledged as a benchmark and hallmark of democracy, peace and political transition. However, Lesotho has had more elections than many countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, but the transition to democracy has been elusive. For example, between 2012 and 2017, the tiny landlocked country witnessed three elections in one electoral cycle (Allison, 2017). Lesotho held three elections during this period, resulting in fractious coalitions and turbulent political processes. A coalition formed following the elections of 2012 was beginning to unravel in 2013. However, sensing an imminent vote of no confidence, the Prime Minister of the coalition government, Thomas Thabane, suspended parliament in June 2014. This led to a chain of events that culminated in the calling of an early election in 2015, scheduled for 2017. It is important to note that post-colonial African state has been typified by electoral disputes whose bearing has produced turbulent and often violent political trajectories (Matlosa, 2008). A military coup transpired in Ghana in 1966, less than a decade after its independence; Nigeria was plunged into a civil war in July 1967 and many others. In fact, between 1960 and 1969, there were 25 successful military coups across the African continent (Baldo, 2018). In the case of Lesotho, the country has had coups, attempted coups, assassinations, election disputes and political instability, which have become part of the national political psyche since 1966 (Vhumbunu, 2015). This, by all accounts, warrants systematic research as it may imply political transitions, which is the subject matter of this chapter. The political transition of Lesotho can be summed in three phases: (1) repressive military rule from 1966 to 1993; (2) the period of the first multiparty elections in 1993, running up to 2002; and (3) 2002–2018, a period characterised by election rigging, coups and attempted coups and motions of no confidence (Kabemba, 2003). The transition from colonial rule to majority rule in Lesotho was preceded by general elections, which the BNP won. In the first post-independence elections, the BNP lost the majority to BCP, but the BNP declared the elections null and void (Monyane, 2005). Using the army, the BNP suppressed the opposition, especially the BCP. From 1970, Lesotho was under de facto military rule, with the BNP as the civilian face of the regime. However, in 1986 the army grabbed power and removed the civilian face of the regime BNP from power. The army was in power until 1993 when it handed over power following an election won by the BCP with a landslide victory. In essence, the common denominator in the three phases of political transition in Lesotho is the military which has been part of Lesotho’s political transition landscape and succession trajectory since independence. When the army handed over power in 1993, this was not the complete end of military intervention in politics. Within a year, the army detained cabinet ministers and assassinated Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo in 1994. In August 2014, Prime Minister Motsoahae Thabane survived what looked like an assassination attempt and attempted a coup when the army stormed his official residence. The prime minister, in an interview with journalists in South Africa, confirmed that the military had seized power in a coup and that he had fled to South Africa. A few days later, the Prime Minister returned to Lesotho under the guard of South African security and remained so until he left office in 2015 (Letsie, 2018). Because of this,

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examining the army’s role in Lesotho politics is essential, focussing on its contribution towards democratic rule or its negation. In democratic systems, the army is supposed to be subordinate to civilian rule. This, however, has not been the case with the Lesotho army, whose history is fraught with mutinies, resistance to civilian control and involvement in coups and attempted coups.

Methodology and Conceptual Underpinnings A qualitative secondary research methodology informs this chapter. This desktop approach analyses secondary data to interrogate the research problem (Mohajan, 2017). Data was obtained from academic books, journals and archival material on praetorian militaries and studies on Lesotho. The concept of military praetorianism dates to the Roman Praetorian Guard, a unique section of the military that became consequential in determining political transitions (El-Shimmy, 2016). In contemporary times, military praetorianism bears resemblances, finding expression as unique political actors whose capacity subjectively determine political outcomes or control political decisions taken by civilian authority asymmetrically. Nodlinger (1977) defines military praetorianism as a rising situation in which military officials become praetorian when they use brinkmanship or force to enter the political arena. On the other hand, El Shimmy (2016 p. 2) defines military praetorianism as ‘a political system where civilians serve in government at the pleasure (and by permission) of the army’. There is an emphasis on the self-assuming role of the military in controlling civilian authority as a critical variable. Further, in praetorian states, the military allows a civilian head of government but continues to wield much power over government through the ‘ruling but not governing’ formula (King, 2008). This is defined as the ‘military enclave’ in which a symbiotic relationship is forged, in which the military and civilian allies benefit from the state at the expense of the population (Matisek, 2019). Feaver (1996) and Perlmutter (1981) maintain specific conditions for a praetorian political system. These conditions are (i) ineffective civilian regimes, (ii) the illegitimacy of civilian governments, (iii) a deteriorating political system and (iv) a tendency of military–political interventionism in times of political crisis where regimes are incapacitated or at their lowest. The military becomes a proactive actor that is invested in political events. This is demonstrated by political trajectories in Egypt in February 2011 and in Zimbabwe in November 2017. In these case studies, the military was neither a bystander nor a neutral observer but rather a locomotive in the momentous political changes obtaining in these countries. Following the 2011 Arab Spring, Egypt descended into socioeconomic and political unrest. Among other things, protestors demanded socioeconomic and political reforms. In response, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the highest decision-making body of Egypt’s security apparatus, issued a press statement. Where shortfalls were identified, the Egyptian army blamed the country’s socio-economic crisis on the Hosni Mubarak regime. Ultimately, the

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army’s press statement depicted a vote of no confidence in the regime and an indictment on Mubarak’s leadership, leading to his forceful resignation on 11 February 2011 (Ottaway & Ottaway, 2019). In Zimbabwe, on the 15th of November 2017, the military addressed the nation on the state broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). In the address, the military announced the commencement of ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ (ORL), a ‘so-called’ interventionist programme of action. On the surface, the ORL was an altruistic measure to address the national question resulting from the unprecedented socio-economic crisis. Symbolically, it sought to uphold the ethos of the liberation struggle by preserving the legacy of President Mugabe, whom the military depicted as their liberation struggle patron. The evidence thus far demonstrates that the ORL was a ruse for the self-assuming role military to control Zimbabwean civilian authority following the dismissal of their preferred civilian leader, then-Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Accordingly, Mangani et al. (2022) argue that though there are various interpretations on whether ORL was a coup, the undeniable facts are as follows: (1) ORL was and remained a Zimbabwean military project; (2) ORL removed President Robert Mugabe from office, and (3) former leaders of the Zimbabwean military assumed critical positions in Zimbabwe following Mugabe’s resignation and (4) a military enclave situation is visible in which a civilian leader, Emmerson Mnangagwa became the president deputised by a former military commander General Constantine Chiwenga in 2017. The Zimbabwean and Egyptian case studies also proffer critical lessons that, in praetorian states, the military allows a civilian head of government but continues to wield much power over government through the ‘ruling but not governing’ formula (King, 2008). This is defined as the ‘military enclave’ in which a symbiotic relationship is forged, in which the military and civilian allies benefit from the state at the expense of the population (Matisek, 2019). Discussions on the military’s political involvement are controversial in the postCold War era. This is because of the liberal assumption that military rule does not share comparable justifications to civilian rule (Gursoy, 2017; Perlmutter, 1969). Thus, the futility of military-political interventionism is found in military coups in Latin America, Asia, and Africa during the Cold War era. In these case studies, it has been demonstrated that military governments have a limited chance of survival and therefore tend to be short-lived. Be that as it may, there has been a growing gravitation towards ‘illiberal democracies’ in which non-military figures have coalesced with the military in stifling meaningful and sustainable political transitions. This has culminated in discussions on praetorian armies and their role in political transitions, particularly in developing regions. As discussed earlier, Feaver (1996) and Perlmutter (1981) maintain specific conditions for a praetorian political system. These conditions are (i) ineffective civilian regimes, (ii) the illegitimacy of civilian governments, (iii) a deteriorating political system and (iv) a tendency of military-political interventionism in times of political crisis where regimes are incapacitated or at their lowest.

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Some of these conditions have comparable justifications in the Lesotho case study. The country’s political independence in the 1960s had a significant bearing on the state’s capacity to build strong institutions of democracy and good governance, resulting from an oppressive military-backed rule from 1966 to 1993 and after 2012 (Leshoele, 2021). The political crisis of this period indicated an arrested political transition characterised by an alliance between the military and civilian political formations. Consequently, to reproduce their political power, the BNP, the BCP and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) forged a symbiotic alliance with the military at different critical moments. (Motseki et al., 2020). In the scholarship on Lesotho politics, the attention, for example, has been the instrumental role played by the military in momentous political changes that gravitate towards “illiberal democracy”. In 1970, then-BNP leader and Prime Minister of Lesotho Jonathan lost elections to the BCP. Instead of conceding, the military ensured that Jonathan held on to power. In 1991, Prime Minister, Lekhanya was removed from power in a military-assisted transition. These two examples constitute what Feaver (1999) refers to as the concept of ‘civilian-military problematique’ in which militaries, as institutions built to protect society, accumulate significant power to become a threat to society. Contextually applied, the case of Lesotho demonstrates that military praetorianism finds expression in (i) structures of a state. It has been demonstrated that societies where civil society is underdeveloped mainly create a vacuum in which the military becomes the most critical component within the state and (ii) the subjective control of the military in which the army adopts a self-assuming role of controlling civilian authority.

The Role of the Military in the Breakdown of Democracy in Lesotho In 1966, Lesotho attained its political independence from British colonial rule. Since then, its military has been critical and decisive in governance and political affairs. This has been achieved through two main strategies: direct military involvement, including staging coups and attempted coups and indirect military involvement, including fighting political battles on behalf of politicians and assassinating politicians (Leshoele, 2021). Consequently, a military enclave has always been visible in which the Lesotho military coalesced with one political party against the other. Beginning with the BNP from 1966 to 1986 to the LCD from 1986 to 2017, the army has been oscillating in its allegiance to political parties. The repressive militarybacked rule of the BNP continued from 1970 until 1986 (Khabele, 2008). To break this alliance, the BCP sought the backing of the apartheid regime in South Africa to fight the BNP. With the help of the apartheid government in South Africa, the BCP launched the Lesotho Liberation Army to wrestle control of the BNP. This resulted in a coup that ousted the government in 1986, and the army, which was aligned with factions of the BNP, ruled Lesotho until 1993 (Kabemba, 2003). The army agreed

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to relinquish power to civilian authority, which paved the way for the 1993 democratic elections. However, a ruling but not governing formula became evident. The party that won elections governed the country taking instructions from the Lesotho military. This demonstrates the praetorian nature of Lesotho politics. Disagreements arose between the government and the security forces over ‘failed efforts to integrate the LLA into the national army as well as disagreements over army compensation’ (Kabemba, 2003 p. 6). This shows how the Lesotho military wielded much power as a vested actor in the country’s governance (Leshoele, 2021). The 1998 elections did not inspire confidence as the military became involved in this momentous suffrage. A nascent political party, the LCD, won the elections, yet the BCP and the BNP contested the results. Without strong state institutions, there is a tendency towards military–political interventionism. The electoral dispute created fertile grounds for junior officers in the Lesotho military to stage a mutiny. It was not until the LCD-led government’s plea for South Africa and SADC’s intervention that a coup was foiled. Though SADC responded by deploying South African and Botswana forces to quell the coup detat, there is an overreliance on South Africa’s military intervention that has eroded Lesotho’s sovereignty. This overreliance is explained in natural resources terms by Benyera (2017), who unpacks South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in Lesotho tied to Pretoria’s need for Lesotho’s water. Water is a natural resource that motivates South Africa’s interest in Lesotho’s political outcomes. With the help of SADC, the LCD was reinstated to power and ruled until 2012, when it lost elections to the All-Basotho Convention party, a coalition led by Thabane (Leshole, 2021). The most recent military involvement in Lesotho’s civilian affairs was a coup attempt in 2014. A chain of events was triggered by the suspension of parliament by Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, who, by this act, attempted to prevent a looming vote of no confidence. This began a series of political uncertainties that culminated in a military response when the army surrounded the police headquarters, the premier’s residence and shut down the radio station on 30 August 2014. The events that led to the attempted coup emanated from events within the Lesotho Defence Forces. SADC instituted a commission of enquiry to investigate the affairs of the coup. It found that it was caused by the alleged promotion of junior officers at the expense of senior officers (Phumaphi Commission, 2015). Those demoted were said to be behind the attempted coup that forced the prime minister into exile. The military tussle and its footprints in the political turbulence in Lesotho is a recurring story in the country’s history. Though the country has transitioned to democracy, there is a strong suspicion that the underlying structures of the previous system endure, especially in the security sector. This has happened elsewhere. For example, in Sudan, the security sector’s ownership of everything from parastatals to banks to restaurants in the civilian economy is not easily disentangled (Baldo, 2021).

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Praetorian Militaries and Political Transitions The most incisive literature on praetorianism is found in the scholarly work by Amos Perlmutter titled Egypt: The Praetorian State (1974). Perlmutter defines a praetorian state as one with a military that: Has the potential of dominating the political system. Its political processes favour the development of the army as the core group and as a political ruling class… In praetorian states, an army interferes in government affairs and effects and sustains particular constitutional provisions (Perlmutter, 1974 p. 6).

In this definition, the potential of the army to dominate a political system and become the core of a ruling political class is instructive in conceptualising a praetorian military as neither a bystander nor a neutral observer but rather a locomotive in the momentous political changes in a country. Augmenting the potential of dominating a political system is the notion that military praetorianism often assumes shape when the army has become a decisive political actor that influences the socio-economic and political correlation of forces in a state (Esen, 2020; Nordlinger, 1977). Therefore, a regime constitutes a praetorian even when military figures have turned into civilian leaders if (i) a military coup brought them into power, (ii) critical governmental officials have previously served in the military, and (iii) civilian leadership tends to reproduce its political power through the military. This suggests the civilian façade of a praetorian state. This observation shares a comparable justification with the Zimbabwean experience. In November 2017, the Zimbabwean Defense Forces announced the ORL. This led to the eventual resignation of then-President Robert Mugabe and the ascension to power of Emmerson Mnangagwa. Various interpretations account for the military’s involvement in the momentous political changes of 2017, yet available evidence points to the Zimbabwean military as the largest beneficiary of ORL (Mangani et al., 2022). This is based on the undeniable fact that the ORL was and remained a military project, the army ousted a sitting and constitutionally elected leader, and former members of the Zimbabwean military hold critical positions in Mnangagwa’s government. In states that emerged from protracted armed liberation struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America, material, ideological and political conditions embedded in the Marxist-Leninist socialist template of ‘state capture justify the existence of a praetorian state. The theoretical foundations of state capture in socialist terms rests on the notion that attaining political independence is insufficient for a genuine social transformation (Mangani, 2019). The argument here is that groups of individuals, political parties or the military responsible for independence constitute what is referred to as the ‘vanguard party’ or the ‘modernising agent’ whose role is to raise political consciousness in the state to preserve the gains of the armed struggle. Cadre deployment to essential state institutions, organs and sectors is vital to attain this. This explains the prevalence of former freedom fighters, the military and nationalists in several African and Latin American states’ civil services (Southall, 2013). El-Shimy (2016) supports this observation by stating that the transformative role of the military may pave the way to a politicised military prone to militarise politics.

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The Zimbabwean, Egyptian and Pakistanian case studies demonstrate that praetorian armies are purposive and rational. In the Egyptian experience, before the ouster of then-President Hosni Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the highest decision-making body of Egypt’s security apparatus, demonstrated a purposeful and emotive symbolic status in a press statement read on the 10th of February 2011. In the statement, the council reiterated its support for the unrest in the country as reflective of the citizens’ genuine concerns. It would deliberate on protecting the Egyptian nation (Ottaway & Ottaway, 2019). In the case of Zimbabwe, in the presence of the Joint Operations Command, the supreme organ for the coordination of state security, then-Zimbabwe Defense Forces Commander General Chiwenga held a presser on the 13th of November 2017 critiquing the political crisis in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) at the time. Effectively, the political squabbles in ZANU-PF were read from the perspective of national security concerns in which Chiwenga warned: ‘Those behind the current treacherous shenanigans that when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in’ (Kamete, 2019, p. 157). Contextually applied to the present case study, the political turmoil in Lesotho in 2014, leading to the ouster of Prime Minister Thabane after his sacking of the military commander General Kamoli reinforces the previous observation that praetorian armies are purposeful in their objectives. To consolidate his political power, in 2014, Prime Minister Thabane sacked General Kamoli in favour of General Mahao, effectively disrupting the status quo of Lesothon’s military enclave. The Prime Minister’s actions had a bearing on a symbiotic relationship forged between civilian authority and the military establishment. Cognisant of the Egyptian and Zimbabwean case studies where the military passed a vote of no confidence in the civilian leadership of the time, the purpose of the military intervention in Lesotho spoke to a rise in systemic political shifts resulting from the dismissal of General Kamoli. The army’s response to the Prime Minister’s ouster demonstrates the Lesotho military’s capacity to circumvent political decisions taken by a civilian government. In the Pakistani experience, the military coup of October 1999 that ousted thenPrime Minister Nawaz Shariff was intended for the common good, preventing Sharif’s ‘elective authoritarianism’. Consequently, the military outlined a developmental approach in a seven-point programme to restore national unity through accountability, investor confidence, and re-energising political will in grassroots political bodies (Khan & Akhtar, 2022; Tabot, 2002). It can be deduced from the three case studies that praetorian armies’ objectives are not limited to narrow military institutional concerns and project a national appeal in the realm of socio-economic and political concerns. Second, it can be concluded that unlike military coups elsewhere, praetorian armies make joint decisions that enjoy the support of most generals, as demonstrated in the Egyptian and Zimbabwean case studies. In theoretical analysis, these case studies fit well with Samuel Huntington’s thesis of weak political institutions and their proclivity towards praetorianism. Egypt, Zimbabwe and Pakistan are emerging democracies characterised by the absence of a vibrant civil society, civic values, political institutions and legitimacy. These deficiencies created conditions for military praetorianism

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The Lesotho case study fits into this matrix based on the reasons for the 2014 intervention. According to the Institute of Security Studies’ analysis of Dr Dimpho Motsamai, (in Al Jazeera 2014), altruistic motives can be denoted in the Lesotho army intervention to circumvent possible terrorist activities (Al Jazeera, 2014). Al Jazeera claims that the Lesotho police had planned to provide resources by arming the Under The Tree Army (UTTA), a youth militia aligned with the Lesotho government, to destabilise the country. Consequently, just like the Egyptian, Zimbabwean and Pakistanian case studies, the Lesotho army presented its operation outside narrow military institutional concerns. Instead, circumventing possible terrorist activities assumed a nationalist appeal. The notion of a praetorian system is not uniform. Situational circumstances, political opportunities and the extent of cooperation or competition between the military and civilian leadership determine the type of praetorian system. Three praetorian systems exist the ruler, guardian, and moderator. In terms of its power extent, a praetorian moderator system exercises a ‘veto’ power. Arising systemic shifts in the balance of power within a political system often result in the military exercising its veto power to nullify or legitimise the incumbent regime (El Shimmy 2016). Under this praetorian system, the military does not hesitate to manipulate politics informed by maintaining the status quo as its primary socio-economic and political objective. The second type of a praetorian system is the ‘guardian’ type, also known as an ‘arbitrator’. According to Perlmutter (1974), this is apolitical and non-ideological and professional in that its extent of power is to control the levers of government power. A guardian praetorian system emerges following a lack of trust in civilian administration and therefore becomes a ‘trustee and guardian of civilian authority and political stability… If the conditions for the return of a civilian regime are not fulfilled, an arbitrator army may eventually become a ruler army’ (Perlmutter, 1974, p. 8). An existential threat to the praetorian system’s pillars may necessitate taking charge of all the levers of power, including political decision-making and policy implementation. The primary socio-economic and political objective is to maintain the status quo while correcting the deficiencies of civil regimes. The ‘ruler’ type of praetorian system power is aimed at regime dominance. This is achieved by establishing an autonomous and self-serving political organisation whose potential and capacity dominate the socio-economic and political correlation of forces in a state. According to El-Shimy (2016), the socio-economic and political objective of this type of praetorian system is to alter the political conditions in a state to align them with the interests of a praetorian military. Such an organisation seeks to become an agent of social change through an effective and coherent political ideology that promotes a veneer of legality within society and the international community. Such is a ruse for military dictatorship. History is awash with notable examples such as the ‘Green Revolution’ underpinned by the Jamahiriya political philosophy espoused by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi when he seized power in Libya in 1969 (Ogun et al., 2020). Another example is the Egyptian military’s political ideology against political Islam following the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.

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The case of Lesotho is an interesting study in broadening our understanding of military praetorianism. Lesotho’s protracted history of militarised politics, sporadic periods of civilian rule and a constitutional monarch created preconditions for the proliferation of a praetorian state. In 1970, the BNP leader and Prime Minister of Lesotho, Joseph Leabua Jonathan, lost elections to the BCP. Instead of conceding, Jonathan turned to the military, declared a state of emergency, incarcerated leaders of the opposition, and subsequently established a one-party state (Kali, 2022). This became the first and visible sign of a ‘military enclave’ state which would appear to be an entrenched feature of Lesotho politics in the following decades. The enclave set the motion for the military to constrain civilian authority and democratic consolidation. Between 1970 and 1986, a symbiotic relationship existed between the military and Prime Minister Jonathan. The former reproduced the political power of civilian politicians under authoritarian conditions and utilised the military for self-serving political purposes. Existing literature attempts to account for the recurrent military–political interventionism in Lesotho as a case of the coloniality problem—the British colonial legacy and Lesotho’s continued economic dependency on South Africa. It also tends to present the military problem in Lesotho through unconstitutional, repressive, and intolerant political climate lenses fuelled by a post-colonial mentality in which the Lesotho military continues to perceive citizens as subjects (Benyera, 2017; Kali, 2022; Leshoele, 2021; Motseki et al., 2020). The literature overlooks civil–military relations as another way to account for a symbiotic alliance between the military and civilian leaders, and the guardianship role played by the military in critical and momentous political changes in Lesotho’s history. In civil–military relations, the focus is on integrating the military into societies and the political question of their inherent and normative roles. This leads to the civil– military problematique in which the role of militaries has the potential to produce two opposite outcomes-protecting its citizens from potential enemies and not becoming too powerful to influence civilian authority. If civilian authority often relies on the military for political solutions, it can become susceptible to predation from the institution. Though Prime Minister Jonathan successfully stifled the opposition and thus consolidated his political power, the civilian–military alliance struck the capacity of civilian rule in Lesotho. This is centred on the argument that between 1970 and 1993, the Lesotho military demonstrated its praetorian characteristics (Gebremichael et al., 2019). Arising systemic shifts in the balance of power resulting from the 1970 election resulted in the military reinstating the incumbent. At this stage, Lesotho’s state institutions had proven weak and incapacitated to create conditions for sustainable political transitions. Instead, these preconditions created fertile grounds for the germination of praetorian states (Perlmutter, 1981). By 1986 it had become more apparent that military-political interventionism was a banner of Lesotho’s politics. This led to the ouster of Prime Minister Jonathan by a military faction that supported the BCP and with the military support of apartheid South Africa in the same year (Leshoele, 2021). Though this reinforces the complexities of the post-colonial African state and its overreliance on the instrumentalisation of military solutions to political problems, this also demonstrated the praetorian characteristics of the Lesotho military.

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The military adopted a carrot-and-stick approach to maintaining its influence in the BCP-led regime. While broadening its political base by aligning with influential political figures from the BNP, the military also criminalised and misrepresented the opposition, shrinking the political space for alternative voices. This demonstrated the failure of Lesotho’s political parties to institutionalise themselves (Benyera, 2017). Failing to establish themselves in a way that produces coherent political behaviour has led to Lesotho’s political parties becoming subservient to the military. Such is the case with BNP political figures aligned with the military after the coup that ousted Prime Minister Jonathan. Consequently, the military became instrumental in setting momentous political changes and influencing their outcomes. An example is a mutiny in 1994 over integrating the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) into the national army and compensation. The period between 1998 and 2012 was earmarked by civil–military friction, the degree to which the military is willing to demonstrate its opposition to momentous political changes, such as the election of the LCD in 1998. This resulted in an attempted military coup which was foiled at the behest of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention led by South Africa and Botswana. The SADC intervention also spoke to some of the liabilities of piecemeal regional measures focused solely on elections as yardsticks to measure democracy and governance. This approach has broader implications for Lesotho’s stability as it gave South Africa the pretext of continued interference in Lesotho’s politics while projecting its foreign policy objectives-securing the Lesotho Highlands water project (Vinti, 2022). Regarding sustainable political transitions, the SADC-led intervention did not address the root causes of military praetorianism; instead, it confirmed the legitimacy of the incumbent, thus allowing an unabated military influence and South Africa to secure its permanent interests in Lesotho. This created conditions for the continued militarisation of politics in years to come. The All Basotho Convention (ABC) electoral win in 2012 and its governance style led by Prime Minister Thabane became an opportunity to analyse the role and place of the military in Lesotho’s society. To broaden his political base, Prime Minister Thabane weakened the military hierarchy by promoting one faction against the other by promoting Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao to the rank of lieutenant general and then-commander of the Lesotho Defense Forces (LDF). This speaks to establishing the military enclave in praetorian states, where a symbiotic role is forged between a civilian leader and the military. Effectively, the rise of General Mahao led to the demotion of Lieutenant General Kamoli, thus demonstrating the civil-military problematique in Lesotho’s politics (Pherudi, 2018). This is to say that civilian authority in Lesotho’s political objective is to seek protection from the military and, at the same time, seek to contain the military itself. The systemic shift in the military’s balance of power had a bearing on Lesotho’s politics, as demonstrated by General Kamoli’s defiance of civilian authority and decisions. Instead of vacating his post-General Kamoli staged a military coup against the Prime Minister in 2014. In military praetorian states, the military may intervene following systemic shifts in the balance of power. An existential threat to the praetorian system’s pillars may necessitate taking charge

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of all the levers of power, including political decision-making and policy implementation. The primary socio-economic and political objective is to maintain the status quo while correcting the deficiencies of civil regimes. On the 30th of August 2014, the army staged a military coup which led to the ouster of Prime Minister Thabane, commanders of the LDF and Police, and other government officials and their subsequent forced exile in South Africa. These momentous political events resulted in the SADC mediation efforts led by then-South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. Progressively, the mediation resulted in Lesotho holding elections in 2015 and the subsequent return to power of former prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili. Mosisili sought to maintain the status quo by appointing General Kamoli as the commander of the LDF. There are reasons why Mosisili reinstated General Kamoli even though he had been elected. Firstly, in praetorian states, normative and liberal democratic cultures, such as elections, do not translate into political power. While a civilian regime may govern, it does not rule. Therefore, Mosisili sought to consolidate his power by forging a symbiotic relationship with the dominant and powerful military faction that had effected a coup in 2014 (Gebremichael et al., 2019). This also included characterising Thabane’s dismissal of Kamoli as the commander of the LDF as unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal. Such characterisation of the events leading to the military coup in 2014 was crucial in justifying the military’s actions and, at the same time, consolidating Mosilili’s political power. The military enclave forged between Mosisili and Kamoli further consolidated the entrenchment of a praetorian military in Lesotho’s politics. Between 2015 and 2017, the military adopted a ruling but not governing formula, exerting its influence on the government’s policy direction, implementation and political appointments. The military was also instrumentally used to stifle political opposition. This led to the incapacitation of state institutions. Such culminated in the Lesotho parliamentary vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Mosisili, the subsequent elections and the return to power of former prime minister Thabane through a coalition arrangement in 2017.

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter examined the military’s role in political succession in Lesotho. The chapter argues that a proactive and entrenched praetorian military has primarily influenced the outcomes of political transitions in Lesotho. While there are debates on whether Lesotho constitutes a military dictatorship, the incontrovertible facts are that at several intervals, a military enclave, in which a symbiotic relationship is forged between the military and civilian leadership, rendered the country an ‘illiberal’ democracy. Apart from stifling sustainable political transitions and democratic consolidation, the Lesotho military has been a decisive political actor influencing the state’s socio-economic and political correlation of forces. The evidence gathered attests that the military played a distractive and sustaining role in Lesotho’s democratisation trajectory. Therefore, the chapter utilised the concept of military

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praetorianism to assess the interventionist approach used by the Lesotho military in the wake of an existential threat to the political system. The interventionist approach has taken various forms, such as reproducing the political power of incumbents and therefore maintaining the status quo, vetoing the incumbent leading to military coups or changes in governments and resisting civilian authority. Consequently, the broader international and regional implications manifest in the prolonged political interference of South Africa. This has also weakened Lesotho’s state institutions which have proven incapacitated to create conditions for sustainable political transitions. Instead, these preconditions create fertile grounds for the germination of praetorian states.

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Dylan Yanano Mangani is in the Department of History and Political Studies at Nelson Mandela University, South Africa. He has ten years research experience in African nationalist politics, specifically focusing on elections, electoral systems, prefigurative movements, organic crises and the BRICS. He is a member of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), the Institute for Local Government Management of South Africa (ILGMS), the South African BRICS Youth Association (SABYA) and the CoP BRICS Research Forum for 2023–2024. Over the years,

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Dr Mangani has contributed to social sciences research output. He has published research articles in accredited journals and presented papers at local and international conferences. Most recently, Dr Mangani has contributed a book chapter on China-Africa health diplomacy relations in a project by the SARChI Chair (Innovation & Development), Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa; UM; UM North-South Research Centre, University of Malaya, Malaysia and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China. Edwin Yingi is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of South Africa. He is a governance scholar who specializes in public sector governance, democracy, peace and security in Africa. He prefers examining these themes using the lenses of peace, conflict, and social inequality as organising frameworks for both historical and contemporary case studies. He is also interested in the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa, especially in conflict situations. Edwin has published several articles in international peer reviewed journals.

The Military and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1970s to 2018 Gilbert Tarugarira

Introduction The pivotal role of the military in the political evolution of society in precolonial Africa has not been given prominence in contemporary studies and yet possession of a strong army was cardinal to the creation, development, and expansion of states. When Europe colonized Africa, political power also grew out of the barrel of the gun. Armies were instruments used to conquer, expand, and consolidate their hold on territories. On attainment of independence, various African states either inherited colonial armies or integrations of multiple armies which thereafter formed the nucleus of national armies. It is no surprise, therefore, that those who have inherited that monopoly of arms have used the military to serve their political ends. The intimacy of the relationship between the political elite and the military in Zimbabwe has attracted a sophisticated debate that has engaged the minds of scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006), Mazarire (2011), Tendi (2014, 2020) and Moyo (2014) among others. The general tone clobbers on the startling military influence on national political affairs and its more visible role in the exercise of power. By peeping inside the “black box” of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) liberation war history and post-independence experiences, this chapter exudes the folly of the porous distinction between removing the military from politics and removing politics from the military. The true character of the Zimbabwean military was or has been obscured by other, at times simplistic, categorizations where military officers have been depicted as nonpolitical by definition. If the distinction between military and political elites relates to formal and public participation in formal organizations such as political parties,

G. Tarugarira (B) Department of History, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Chari and P. Dzimiri (eds.), Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4_3

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it is meaningless in Zimbabwe. Only the naïve can accept the thesis of neutrality or abstention on the part of the military. This chapter addresses the reconfiguration of Zimbabwe’s army after independence, highlighting obstacles to military professionalism in a presumed democratic polity. The strong bond between ZANU-PF nationalist leadership and military forces fractured the national pursuit for democracy, which was at the core of the anti-colonial philosophy. Sketching a typology of army leadership in Zimbabwe shows that, the country’s army is a pro-praetorian force as opposed to a political army. Meisel (1966 p. 175) defines a praetorian force as “a force which is prepared to intervene in the political process, threatening or actually resorting to force, on behalf and in the service of a political faction.” Although the Zimbabwean government had a glaring opportunity to build a new military outfit, diametrically opposed to the inherited colonial army, its entire security sector remained partisan. Thus, the chapter discusses the nexus between the military and politics, weaving a consistent thesis that the military has always been part of politics during and after the liberation struggle.

The Military, Professionalism, and Democracy The most profound prerequisite for building a professional military is the allegiance of the military to the nation. The military has to observe an ethical culture that embraces, among other expectations, accountability of military leaders for their actions, and an obdurate demonstration of impartiality, coupled with the capability in dealing with security matters. It is morally binding and obligatory that, along with proper training, soldiers defend society’s interests before their own. Such ethos is crucial for building and maintaining a professional military. The notion of military professionalism as noted by Finer (2002 p. 62) “must embody basic values such as nonpartisanship in the political process and the defense of individuals’ human rights.” The extent to which the Zimbabwean military has measured up to these values is brought under scrutiny, against a checkered transformative phase of the army at the dawn of independence. Arguably, the professional development of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) since integration should have entailed changing the military’s behavior and ideas by creating a break with past liberation war experiences. The promotion of new norms and standards of behavior was hoped to be commensurate with the transition to democracy. However, like other liberation movements, when ZANU-PF came into power, office bearers were often shaped by military mindsets (Melber, 2009). Dahl (1991 p. 210) avers that “without the military elites’ commitment to democratic rule and support for neutrality, the process of democratic self-correction and consolidation becomes difficult.” Kohn also intimated that: …civilian [democratic] control requires a military establishment trained, committed and dedicated to political neutrality, that shuns under all circumstances any interference with the constitutional functioning or legitimate process of government, that identifies itself as

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the embodiment of the people and the nation, and that defines into its professionalism unhesitating loyalty to the system of government and obedience to whomever exercises legal authority’ (Kohn, 1997 p. 144).

Clearly, the potential power of the gun is historically a disturbing reality in most parts of Africa. Between 1960 and 1966, there were military coups or mutinies in fourteen African states, and by 1975, twenty-one out of the forty-one independent states were being ruled by military or civilian-cum-military groups. In countries such as Ghana, Congo Brazzaville, and Nigeria, the military intervened ostensibly in order to displace governments that were notorious for their corruption and inefficiency (Arifalo, 1982). The purpose of the Ghanaian coup of 24 February 1966 was to “banish privilege, overlordism, political opportunism, wasteful pompousness, and incompetence” thereby restoring to the people of Ghana, the blessing of “liberty, justice, and human dignity” (Ankrah, 1966 p. 45). In Benin (which recorded the largest number of coups since it became independent in 1963), the military became involved in politics for reasons which included corruption in the civil service and other government agencies, regional and conflicting ethnic interests, notorious inefficiency, and unpardonable incompetence in the handling of state affairs. Upon assuming office as President of Zaire in 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko said that the army intervened to save the country from anarchy and chaos. Mobutu Sese Seko disliked politicians and saw the army as the last hope for the country (Wrong, 2001). The Ugandan situation in 1970 was similar to that of Zaire in the sense that the Ugandan army was a result of Idi Amin’s belief that its corporate existence was being threatened. Similarly, the revolt by the army in Zaire in 1960 bordered on the fear that its position as a corporate body was being threatened. Faced with abject poverty, deterioration of social amenities, unemployment in urban areas, unprecedented inflation, and declining food production, African governments reacted by silencing critics, ignoring and violating their national constitutions. Such governments were kept in power by the use of armed forces. The professional military’s belief in this manifest deems that corrupt or incompetent civilian authorities undermined national interests. The question begging for an answer is the extent to which the Zimbabwean military has captured the historical values of military professionalism. Tendi (2014 p. 831) argues that the professionalism of the Zimbabwean military could not be guaranteed given “Mugabe’s control over the military elites as the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) Commander- in-Chief, his high position in ZANU-PF’s 1970s nationalist hierarchy and the ideological commitment of sections of the military elite to ZANU-PF.”

The Military and Zimbabwean Politics in the 1970s During the armed liberation struggle in the early 1970s, ZANU-PF (then known as ZANU) was ever entangled in the struggle for positions of leadership, what Mayowe (2015 p. 124) termed “makore endwiraukuru” (years of the struggle for leadership).

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A military take over of ZANU by the High Command in terms of its composition and conduct after the election of Josiah Tongogara as Chief of Defense in 1973, is believed to have signaled the power of the gun over politics. “ZANU’s first internal rebellion in the army led by Thomas Nhari in 1974, was contained initially by demotions and then by military executions in which the politicians had little say” (Mazarire, 2011 p. 572). The secret execution of the rebels in 1975 not only caused a great deal of friction between political and military leaders, but also confirmed the supremacy of the gun in restoring order. In this case, the military adopted rough survival strategies and techniques, a culture that took root and got permanently nurtured. According to Mayowe (2015 pp. 125–126), a serious rift developed in 1976 between soldiers and politicians in Mozambique. Soldiers who were based in Chimoio, namely Dzinashe Machingura, Rex Nhongo, Tendai Pfepferere, and David Thodhlana had disowned Mugabe’s presence as the leader of ZANU at the Geneva Conference. After the Geneva Conference, Mugabe not only won the support of the army but was complicit in making it more powerful. According to Tendi (2014 p. 836), Enos Nkala, a veteran nationalist politician and ZANU-PF founding member admitted that Mozambican President Samora Machel, helped ZANU to bring sanity among misbehaving and ambitious soldiers. However, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) observed, ZANU never lost its military attributes as it became a party of civilian nationalist politicians and armed nationalist indoctrinated guerillas. Mazarire’s (2011) study on discipline among the ZANLA forces in the 1960 and 1970s, established that although there was a thin line dividing the party and its army, the relationship was punctuated by irreconcilable differences. Bratton (2014) contends that the liberation war seemingly gave birth to a coalition in which civilian and military elements were in periodic tension over political leadership. Fascination with the power of the gun stirred internal power struggles that marred the movement, even during times when a strong will was required, to maintain control in the party. Mazarire (2011) amply demonstrated how the ZANU High Command gained the capacity to determine the management of discipline and the administration of punishment, a practice that transcended to the “use of the gun to guide the party.” For Mazarire: Although ZANU’s ideology was firmly rooted in the principle of ‘Democratic Centralism’ in which the military was subordinated to the political goals of the party, the structure of the relationship between ZANU’s Supreme Council, the Dare (an elected body of political functionaries) and the Military High Command (an appointed body that participated in the elections of the Dare) however tipped the balance in the military’s favour (2011p.572).

Thus, the tense atmosphere of the liberation struggle encouraged a polarized outlook among leaders. Mandaza (2007) argues that from 1977, ZANU’s military achieved political ascendancy while political leadership became an appendage that was confined most of the time to the party headquarters in Maputo. An analysis of the structural changes and rhetoric of the party from the Chimoio Congress in August 1977 points to an increased militarization of ZANU. Following the Chimoio meeting’s proclamation of Robert Mugabe as President of the party and Commander-in-Chief of ZANLA,

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violence became a standard operating procedure in a distrustful environment that was conducive to factionalism, splits, and purges. For Melber (2009 p. 40) “revolutionary violence was seen as a liberating act.” The gun, Mazarire (2011 p. 587) states, “was now viewed as a weapon of liberation just as it was a weapon of internal control of the party.” In a scintillating biography of General Solomon Mujuru or Rex Nhongo, Tendi (2020) captures the deep-rooted symbiosis between the military and political history of Zimbabwe spanning from the 1970s into the post-independence era. Mujuru, a freedom fighter and the first black commander of Zimbabwe’s national army “played kingmaker in Mugabe’s ascension to power in Mozambique between 1976 and 1977” (Tendi, 2020 p. 239). Such a development was to be cardinal in the forging of a supportive alliance between Mugabe and Mujuru which would guarantee the former’s political survival under the military armpits of the latter. The next section discusses the nexus between politics and the military in Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s rule, against a background where the tension between the two sections was a permanent feature.

Zimbabwe’s Military Under Robert Mugabe At the inception of Zimbabwe’s independence, the urgent assignment which emerged from the compromise at Lancaster House was the integration of the belligerent forces, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) meticulously handled the challenges which the integration exercise encountered. Ndlovu-Gatsheni noted that the integration exercise unfolded within a context of suspicion and tension in the country among the military units. The RSF believed that ZANLA and ZIPRA were poorly trained terrorists while ZANLA and ZIPRA expected to reap the benefits of the liberation struggle having defeated the imperialist forces. While the amalgamation of the different military forces into a single national army was an insurmountable task, this is a development that the Zimbabwean government could have capitalized upon to instill and consolidate military professionalism. However, at the formation of the ZNA, the categorization of former ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian Forces crept into the barracks. Clashes between former ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants in the Assembly Points of Chitungwiza, Connemara, Ntabazinduna, and Entumbane desertion from the camps and building of arms caches ignited Gukurahundi atrocities. Violence was, therefore, interwoven with the creation of the new state, and by the same token, it became the ineradicable handmaiden of the nationalist leaders. Mugabe’s famous assertion of having “degrees in violence” became a standard reference in describing the political culture of violence which ensued. He carved out an important role for the security sector to maintain order and to keep his regime intact by unleashing the notorious North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to crack down on opposition, killing thousands of civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002), a political problem was subjected to a military

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solution. The formation of Gukurahundi also marked the beginning of the politicization of the Zimbabwean military forces. By operating outside the rank and file of the ZNA, the Fifth Brigade was more of a vigilante group for ZANU-PF. Referring to the Fifth Brigade, Mugabe stated, “they were trained by the North Koreans because we wanted one arm of the army to have a political orientation which stems from our philosophy as ZANU-PF” (Stiff, 2000 p. 93; Tendi, 2020 p. 203). Centralization of authority and consolidation of power hinged on the military muscle and this explains why the Fifth Brigade reported directly to Mugabe. To that end, Ndlovu-Gatsheni advances that: ZANU-PF used the strategy of Gukurahundi from as early as 1979 to discipline those considered to be wavering. It was used as a strategy for dealing with opponents in 1979, a year that was described as Gore reGukurahundi…in political terms, Gukurahundi has a revolutionary goal of destroying the white settler regime, the internal settlement puppets, the capitalist system, and all other obstacles to ZANU-PF ascendancy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002 p. 4)

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002 p. 62) asserted “the ZANU-PF government readily assumed the resilient colonial and equally military oriented structures left by the retreating Rhodesian settler state with serious implications for democracy, human rights, and human security.” It is not unusual though for a new regime to quickly resemble an old one or have the new political systems as mere spare parts of the old colonial engine. ZANU-PF inherited a state bend on wealth accumulation, and political oppression and never contemplated building it for democracy. Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 and the unregulated economic activities transformed the military into politicomilitary entrepreneurs who exploited opportunities offered by the Congolese war to further expand their economic and political power. The military’s capacity to mobilize networks to get access to the vast economic resources was pivotal in cementing relations between politics and the military on the basis of military entrepreneurialism or military commercialism. Dietrich (2000 p. 4) describes military commercialism as “an increasing use of national militaries as tools for private financial gain by the political elite.” Based on Robert Mugabe’s remarks on the occasion of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Day on 12 August 2001, it was clear that entrepreneurial considerations were cardinal in the military deployment. Mugabe unequivocally stated: The business community should not look at the peace that was created by your Defence Forces in the DRC as an end in itself. The business community must now make aggressive followups and open up business ventures in that country in areas like mining, road construction, agricultural development, food supplies, and several others (2001 p. 47)

Many leading figures in the military struck business partnerships with civilian leaders and ended up accumulating a lot of wealth. The alliance or marriage of convenience between political and military elites with roots in the days of the war of liberation, the expeditionary resource accumulation strategy that mixed civilian and military business in the DRC, had to be relived in the invasion of Zimbabwe’s Chiadzwa diamond fields by the military in 2008.

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ZANU-PF encountered an unprecedented electoral challenge by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which emerged in 1999. The poor socioeconomic conditions born of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) punctuated with unemployment, crumbling social amenities, and political mismanagement worked in the favor of the MDC. As political power shifted away from Robert Mugabe after losing the 2000 referendum, his regime became more violent. Zimbabwe’s democracy was irrevocably “in the intensive care unit” (Muvingi, 2008 p. 78).

Zimbabwe’s Inseparable Twins: Military and Politics (2000–2017) The launch of the National Youth training program in August 2001 increased ZANUPF’s propensity toward the use of militia to silence its critics. Initially conceived as a developmental “peace corps,” the graduates (locally labeled Green Bombers) from various training camps (known as Border Gezi camps) were soon transformed into the Zimbabwean equivalent of a militant “red guard” or “storm troopers” (Bratton, 2014 p. 199). These youths were “docile bodies compelled to operate under the techniques, speed and efficiency the regime wished” (Tarusarira, 2016 p.8). The brainwashed, indoctrinated militia became a potent tool for ZANU-PF in dispensing terror as they became one of the most commonly reported violators of human rights. Accusations against them included murder, torture, rape, and destruction of property (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003). On the electoral front, military officials were deployed to take charge of electoral bodies like the Delimitation Commission (DC) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). The run-up to the 2002 Presidential elections witnessed an escalation of political violence perpetrated by the army and the green bombers. Vitalis Zvinavashe, then overall Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), flanked by other Commanders of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Airforce, Police, Prison Services, and Directors of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) released a cautionary political statement: “Let it be known that the highest office in the land (the presidency) is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We [the military] will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty” (Tendi, 2020 p. 244). The political statement with a rich military flavor was in support of the ZANU-PF presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe who at the time faced stiff competition from the 2002 MDC opposition presidential candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai. The rank and file of Zimbabwe’s securocrats were and remained largely military men, most of whom participated in the liberation struggle for independence. They had been appointed to their positions of authority by a partisan official, at the time, Robert Mugabe. In and out of uniform, openly as well as behind closed doors, securocrats uttered, what amounted to, treasonous political statements surrounding Mugabe’s

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invincibility in the face of the opposition. Tendi’s (2014 p. 829) critical analysis of the origins of Zvinavashe’s 2002 statement, demonstrates how “‘some military elites’ allegiance to Mugabe and ideological commitment to ZANU-PF rule must be seen as unstable and contradictory.” However, equally important is that some of the speeches were relevant to political issues which swayed public opinion during the 2002 Presidential elections. Zimbabwean military men entered the political arena and became controversial such that even when they were not explicitly in politics, they continued to be attacked politically. Huntington (1957 p. 62) illuminated the underlying problem that “the task of keeping presumed nonpolitical elites out of politics, is compounded by the ability of all sorts of social forces and groups (to become) directly engaged in politics.” In a similar fashion, they used the sacrifices of the guerilla fighters under the adage “we died for this country” as the ultimate justification for their own political and economic entitlement (Bratton, 2014). Threatening a military take over if ZANU-PF lost elections also confirms that there existed an unbreakable union between ZANU-PF nationalist elites and the military. The attitude and actions of Zimbabwe’s securocrats provided a clear testimony that the military had not reconciled itself to the norm of political subordination to noncombatant politicians. As politics got into the military, the military got deeper into politics. A deduction can also be made that the military was being made political on one hand by civilian default, and on the other, by civilian criticism of military remarks. Thus, the so-called professional development of the army did not depoliticize the military. Instead, it aroused the military’s interest in politics. In February 2002, with the country’s treasury already bankrupt, Mugabe awarded security forces (police, army, and war veterans) a 100% pay rise (The Herald, 5 February 2002). This corresponded with Bretton (1973 p.185)’s observation that “the African experience was such that salary and pay requirements of the troops alone tended to orient military leaders toward whoever disburses funds and beyond.” In Zimbabwe, pay increases for the army were sometimes surreptitiously effected, and at the same time, military officers were entitled to their bonuses before any other government sector. During cash shortages, the soldiers were entitled to their full pay in cash through selected banks as an added privilege. While the care and feeding of the goose that lays the golden egg are not taught at military academies, the special favors extended to the military by Mugabe had a very strong bearing in shaping the ideological posture of the command echelons in the armed forces. From the foregoing, it is highly impractical and improbable that the military could conceivably be insulated from aligning itself with the political whims of the master. Worth noting though is that personal supervision and control of the military by Mugabe in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces did not starve off the eventual coup. Mugabe mandated the army to assume the handling and logistics of ballot papers in the 2008 Presidential elections. Sensing defeat, he issued a warning against people voting for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), declaring that the pen would never be mightier than the gun. Mugabe rattled, “Our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote…shall have been the product of the gun.

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The gun, which provides the votes, should remain its security officer, its guarantor” (Meredith, 2003 p. 88). The publicized arrival of sophisticated riot control equipment which included tanks, water cannons, gas masks, and microscopic laser guns from Israel, indicated that the government was drawing battle lines. Consistent with its military junta style, ZANU-PF deployed soldiers, youth militias, and state security agents to drum up support for Mugabe in the June 2008 presidential run-off. This belief in the “justice of the gun,” clearly demonstrated that ZANU-PF would never relinquish power through the ballot. The Joint Operation Command (JOC) made up of the army, intelligence, police, and prison service and chaired by Robert Mugabe, unleashed violence on innocent civilians to secure Mugabe’s victory (Bratton, 2014). Involvement of the security sector in the violence following the March 2008 harmonized elections, code-named Operation Wakavhotera papi? (Whom did you vote for) demonstrated ZANU-PF’s intransigence in the use of force to realize its political agenda. As Moyo (2014 p. 71) has argued, the symbiotic and hierarchical relations “where Mugabe was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Head of State and Government, President and First Secretary of the ruling party privileged him in the Executive –military relations….” After the 2008 elections, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Constantine Chiwenga (who had succeeded Zvinavashe as the ZDF commander in 2003) became pillars of Mugabe’s presidency. According to Tendi (2020 p. 258), they “worked in sync towards protecting Mugabe’s presidency and ZANU-PF rule from the political threat posed by the MDC in the power-sharing government.” Developments were characteristic of commercial militarism which featured in October 2008, when the government deployed heavily armed soldiers from 3 Brigade in Mutare under Operation Hakudzokwi (Operation no return) to crack down on illegal diamond miners. The army seized the diamond fields and transformed them into an “impenetrable garrison surrounded by roadblocks and armed guards” (Bratton 2014 p. 202). The military escapades spread to the residential areas in Mutare where armed soldiers abducted anyone they suspected of having anything to do with Chiadzwa diamond activities. Such operations were marked by human rights abuses, corruption, extortion, and smuggling. Top military leaders were deeply and intimately concerned with the production and distribution of diamonds as syndicated looting with illegal miners flourished. New avenues were being sought to sustain the security sector’s access to resources. Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (End of Panning) saw the army being deployed in the diamond-rich area of Chiadzwa to drive out illegal miners. The operation: …afforded key units of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) access to riches at a time when the country was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy (Mambo &Manayiti, 2017 p. 4).

Military officers took part in the diamond trade, selling to middlemen and engaging in international smuggling (Bratton, 2014). Military institutions were structurally refurbished and arms were purchased using mineral revenue. The interconnection

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between military occupation and economic enterprise in Chiadzwa was a reinforcement of the existing dynamics of the alliance between politics and the military, backdated to the days of the war of liberation and an indictment of the DRC involvement. Parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) as well as other government institutions were placed under the management of retired army officers or war veterans. The placatory moves were not only meant to give longevity to Mugabe’s rule but also pacify military men who had become indispensable to the country’s survival. It was Mugabe’s technique of “co-opting military officers into the civilian sphere which allowed them to articulate their corporate and private interests” (Moyo, 2014 p. 74). With this background, it is not surprising that in Sect. 13 (1) of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara (Principals of the GPA) made it clear that “State organs and institutions (including the army, police, and intelligence services) do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties” (Civil Society Magazine 2011 p. 7). The GPA even advocated for the inclusion in the training curriculum of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law, and statute law to gain an understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system. The depoliticization of the security sector was pertinent given the “triangular historical relations, emanating from the liberation struggle, amongst the security sector, ZANU-PF party and the government” (Mubaiwa, 2011 p. 7). A review of the performance of the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe (IGoZ) observed that violence, intimidation, and political intolerance continued to threaten political stability. From a multifaceted analysis, it was clear that the performance of the Inclusive Government (IG) was not on track in terms of implementing the GPA. A repressive and polarised environment reminiscent of 2008 was engendered by the army, war veterans, youth militia, traditional leaders, and party activists. ZANU-PF designed Operation Vhara Muromo (Shut your mouth) to suppress dissenting voices during the Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) outreach programs. The then war veterans leader, Jabulani Sibanda, went on a rampage in the Zaka district of Masvingo province, Chiredzi, and Hwange harassing and intimidating people as well as forcing them to make contributions that were deemed sympathetic to the ZANU-PF position on the constitution (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2010). An upscaling of violence was also witnessed in the Gutu district of Masvingo province where soldiers, war veterans, and youth militia victimized MDC-T party youths and supporters. The IGoZ failed to manage the GPA roadmap in a non-partisan way largely because security structures including the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) stubbornly remained out of range of shared control or oversight. Despite the requirements of power-sharing, military commanders resisted civilian control. In late 2010, Police Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri categorically stated,

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“This country came through blood and the barrel of the gun and it can never be recolonized through a simple pen, which costs as little as five cents” (Idasa, 2010 p. 2 in Bratton, 2014 p. 202). Chihuri’s utterance was just a reincarnation of Zvinavashe’s 2002 political statement which confirmed that Zimbabwe’s politicized security had contempt for elected civilian leaders.

The “Soft” 2017 Coup Factionalism within ZANU-PF pitting Generation 40 (G40) (originated by Jonathan Moyo for Grace Mugabe’s political intentions) and Lacoste led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, drew dividing lines between combatant and non-combatant members of the ruling party. Emmerson Mnangagwa was backed by the military and war veterans associated with Christopher Mutsvangwa and Victor Matemadanda. The expulsion of the former Vice President of Zimbabwe, Joyce Mujuru from the ZANU-PF party, followed by Christopher Mutsvangwa who had been Mugabe’s Minister of War Veterans Affairs prompted the military Chief General Constantine Chiwenga to warn Robert Mugabe over the targeted purging of former liberation fighters in the ruling ZANU-PF party. In an unprecedented move, Mugabe hinted that ZANU-PF was never going to succumb to any threats by the military. He described Chiwenga’s conduct as an “outrageous violation of professional soldiership which suggested treasonable conduct” (BBC News 14 November 2017). The chain of events leading to Mugabe’s downfall points to the infiltration of the political web by non-combatant ZANU-PF officials who lacked an understanding of the history between politics and the military during the war of liberation. Mugabe finally came down against the military and its political allies when he fired his Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, a close ally of the military. The firing of Mnangagwa created a power vacuum that Grace Mugabe was destined to fill. With Mugabe under house arrest, the civilian officeholder’s authority over the military evaporated. Like other military takeovers in other African countries, the military intervention in Zimbabwe was considered to be a cleansing experience, a rite of purification, or an act of self-sacrifice and deliverance by dedicated military men. The country needed command and control, a position that even opposition political parties also welcomed. However, given that ZANU-PF has always equated a potential loss of power with the recolonization of the country, “the military leadership justified its coup as an operation to restore the legacy of the liberation struggle” (Aeby, 2018 p. 6). While the past elections such as those in 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2013 were characterized by allegations of violence, the July 2018 elections which were the first since the end of Mugabe’s rule in 2017 were punctuated by the militarization of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which managed the elections. What had turned out to be relatively peaceful elections were marred by disputed results and post-election violence which left people dead (Human Rights Watch, World Report

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2019). The shooting and killing of the people by soldiers not only demonstrated the persistence of election-related violence but came as a reminder of the persistent involvement of the military in politics.

Regional Implications Following the November 2017 military coup, the leadership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) called on Zimbabweans to peacefully resolve the nation’s political challenges. SADC leaders welcomed Mugabe’s decision to resign under military pressure. The African Union (AU) initially condemned the military takeover but welcomed Mugabe’s resignation. The region’s anti-imperialist defence reaction, was exploited by Zimbabwe and other regimes to incapacitate SADC from offering effective protection for human security. While in governmental office, there has been a tendency by liberation movements in Southern Africa such as The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), ZANU-PF-Zimbabwe, South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, to think along militaristic dichotomy of friend–foe in their relationship even with opposition political parties (Melber, 2009). Dissenting voices born of disillusionment with post-colonial developments are discredited as part of an imperialist conspiracy designed to sabotage national independence. In 2009, the SADC suspended Madagascar from the bloc’s community institutions and organs for unconstitutional change of government. The AU also suspended Madagascar’s membership, denouncing the change in the government as a coup and giving the country six months to hold a general election. Though SADC stressed that neither the AU nor SADC would tolerate an unconstitutional change of government, “the thin veneer of constitutionality that veiled Zimbabwe’s coup d’état was enough to ensure that SADC and the international community acquiesced to the military coup that compelled Mugabe to resign thereby consolidating holding on to power by ZANU-PF military hardliners responsible for most of the human rights abuses of the post-colonial era” (Aeby, 2018 p. 7). By recognizing the de facto coup, SADC not only displayed its impotence in relation to the Zimbabwean securocrats but also set a dangerous precedent, “signaling that the community would tolerate unconstitutional changes of government and military meddling, just as long as they were thinly dressed up in constitutional clothing” (Aeby, 2018 p. 7). The dominance of liberation–party governments and SADC’s limited capacity to enforce its principles in non-compliant regimes mean that stability and sovereignty tend to take precedence over democracy. How political elites perceive their interests within Southern Africa merits attention for a better appreciation of the nature of the commitment behind regional policy decisions and their implementation.

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Formal regional agreements appear substantive on paper but pragmatically void. Both the AU and SADC have clear guidelines and principles on the conduct of democratic elections, the need to comply with constitutions, and the rule of law when effecting the change of government. However, implementation arrangements are often not in place or lagging behind because of complications and inconsistencies born of conflicting obligations and divided commitments. The two bodies endorsed very contentious and controversial elections that were held in Zimbabwe in 2000, 2002, 2008, 2013, and 2018. The campaign periods leading to the elections were always characterized by atrocities such as murder, torture, abduction, illegal arrests, and beating up of opposition supporters as well as repressive laws that made the electoral playing field grossly tilted in favor of the ruling party. The AU and SADC saw nothing wrong and declared them free and fair. Endorsing and praising the military removal of a government has set a very dangerous precedent that could ignite coups throughout the region in a continent that already has an unenviable history of coups. The big challenge for Africa in general and Southern Africa, in particular, is whether, in the face of the AU and SADC, militaries will not intervene under the guise of preserving the legacy of the liberation struggle in the event that liberation movements lose elections. Until the removal of Mugabe from power, SADC had sided with him (Robert Mugabe) in moments of crisis due to his standing as a liberation hero and the solidarity among liberation parties in government. SADC’s reluctance to take a strong position against the military in Zimbabwe was in sync with its practice of bending backward to protect a liberation party, ZANU-PF.

Conclusion The study has demonstrated that civilian nationalist–military relations are underpinned by historical and ideological imperatives. The mindset of the political elites born of war-related commando-style of governance and militaristic culture has resulted in the active involvement of the security sector in civilian affairs and party politics. It is beyond reasonable doubt that political and military elites who dedicated their lives to the armed struggle against imperialism have developed a sense of entitlement to power and privilege making the involvement of Zimbabwe’s securocrats akin to what American warlord, General Mark Clark, called the “buddy system”—a political man and a military man rolled in one (Mills, 1956). Continuation of the liberation solidarity of the Frontline states within the former liberation movements: ZANU-PF, SWAPO, FRELIMO, MPLA, and the ANC have equally compromised efforts to keep the military out of politics. Liberation parties simply took over the oppressive instruments of the old colonial regimes and have continued to use these to crush opponents, consolidate their power, and accumulate wealth. In light of the above, it can be reasonably speculated that Zimbabwe might be heading toward a new civil-military arrangement in which civilian supremacy becomes a euphemism for the military’s formal and active participation in matters of

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war and peace. In other words, this would constitute a situation in which the military does not seize direct power but formally insinuates its non-democratic privileges into the functioning of democracy. The twin challenge which Zimbabwe continues to encounter is to depoliticize the military and demilitarize the polity.

References Aeby, M. (2018). Peace and security challenges in Southern Africa: Governance deficits and lacklustre regional conflict management. Policy Note No 4. The Nordic Africa Institute (NAI). Ankrah, J. A. (1966). The future of the military in Ghana. African Forum: A Quarterly Journal of Contemporary Affairs, Volume II(1), 5–16. Arifalo, S. O. (1982). The military in contemporary African politics. In R. Olaniyan (Ed.), African history and culture (pp. 150–158). Longman. BBC News. (2017). Army Chief accused of treasonable conduct. Retrieved September 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425?piano-modal Bratton, M., & Masunungure, E. (2018). Public attitudes toward Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: Downbeat yet hopeful? Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 47. Bratton, M. (2014). Power politics in Zimbabwe. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bretton, H. (1973). Power and politics in Africa. London Group. Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism. (2011). Annual review of the performance of the inclusive government of Zimbabwe February 2010-February 2011. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. (2010). Jabulani Sibanda on war path again. Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/100928ciz.asp?sector= hr&year=2011&range_start=1021 Dahl, R. (1991). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press. Dietrich, C. (2000). The commercialization of military deployment in Africa. African Security Review, 9(1), 3–17. Finer, S. E. (2002). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. Transaction Press. Huntington, S. (1957). The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations. Belknap Press. Kohn, R. (1997). An essay on civilian control of the military. American Diplomacy, Retrieved February 6, 2018 from, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl3/kohn.html Mambo, E., & Manayiti, O. (2017). Marange: Raw brutality of Operation Hakudzokwi inflicted lasting scars. Zimbabwe Independent. Mandaza, I. (2007). Edgar Tekere and Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence. SAPES Books. Mayowe, J. G. (2015). Rega Zvipore. Midlands State University Press. Mazarire, G. C. (2011). Discipline and punishment in ZANLA: 1964–1979. Journal of Southern African Studies, 37(3), 571–591. Meisel, J. H. (1966). Counter-revolution: How revolutions die. Atherton Press. Melber, H. (2009). On the limits to liberation in Southern Africa. In C. Saunders (Ed.), Documenting liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Selected papers from the Nordic Africa documentation project workshop. The Nordic Africa Institute. Meredith, M. (2003). Our votes. Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe. Public Affairs. Mills, W. C. (1956). The power elite. Oxford University Press. Moyo, G. (2014). Understanding the Executive–military relations in Zimbabwe: Beyond Mugabe’s redistributive nationalist rhetoric. Journal of African Union Studies, 3(3), 69–86. Mubaiwa, B. L. (2011). Lest we forget: The imperative of security sector reform in Zimbabwe. Civil Society Magazine, 2, 7–27. Mugabe, R. G. (2001). Inside the third chimurenga. The Department of Information and Publicity.

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Muvingi, I. (2008). The politics of entitlement and state failure in Zimbabwe. The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 40(1), 77–101. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2002). Putting people first: from regime security to human security: A quest for social justice in Zimbabwe, 1980–2000’. In Paper presented at the 7 th OSSREA conference on 14 December 2002. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2006). Nationalist-military alliance and the fate of democracy in Zimbabwe. AJCR 2006/1. Retrieved from accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/nationalist-military-alliance-and–thefate-of-democracy-in-Zimbabwe/ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008). Patriots, puppets, dissidents and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Zimbabwe. Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, XXIV (1), 81–108. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2010). Beyond the drama of war: Trajectories of nationalism in Zimbabwe, the 1890s to 2010. In J. S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & J. Muzondidya (Eds.), Redemptive or grotesque nationalism? Rethinking contemporary politics in Zimbabwe (pp. 29–45). Peter Lang. Solidarity Peace Trust. (2003). National youth service training–shaping youths in a truly Zimbabwean manner. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/sites/refliefweb.int/files/resorces/9F2AD499B 637D0174925D9C001C8758-spt-zim-5sep.pdf Stiff, P. (2000). Cry Zimbabwe: Independence: Twenty years on. Alberon. Tarusarira, J. (2016). Subject formation, fundamentalism and instrumentalist nationalism in Zimbabwean Politics. Peace and Conflict Studies, 24(1), Article 3. Available at: https://nsuworks.nova. edu/pcs/vol24/iss1/3 Tendi, B. (2014). Ideology, civilian authority and the Zimbabwean military. In J. Alexander, J. McGregor & B. Tendi (Eds.), Politics, patronage and the state in Zimbabwe (pp. 829–844). Weaver Press. Tendi, B. (2020). The army and politics in Zimbabwe. mujuru, the liberation fighter and kingmaker. Cambridge University Press. Wrong, M. (2001). In the footsteps of Mr. Kurtz living on the brink of disaster in Mobutu’s Congo. Harper Collins Publishers.

Gilbert Tarugarira holds a PhD in History and is a Senior Lecturer at the Midlands State University, Gweru-Zimbabwe. He has published extensively in internationally recognized journals. His research focus is on the Military and Political History of Zimbabwe and the Development of Politics in Africa.

Political Leadership in Zimbabwe in the Aftermath of the Military Coup. Change Without Change? Washington Mazorodze

Introduction This chapter looked at the change of leadership in Zimbabwe in November 2017. The chapter discussed whether there was real change in substance or it was just a change in personnel. Paul Collier’s greed model was used to explain the motivation behind the leadership change in Zimbabwe which saw Robert Mugabe who had ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years being toppled by his former right-hand man, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Despite promising a new trajectory for Zimbabwe when he took over, Mnangagwa disappointed many supporters and admirers who supported him to take over from Mugabe. The chapter concludes that the change that was purported in Zimbabwe lacked substance as the new dispensation resembled the old dispensation in many respects.

Background to the New Dispensation There was jubilation and celebration across the whole country when Mugabe resigned on 22 November 2017. A new era beckoned for Zimbabwe. The streets in all major towns were pregnant with people celebrating the fall of a ‘dictator’ who had ruled Zimbabwe for 37 years (Molloy et al., 2017). During those 37 years, Zimbabwe witnessed ups and downs with the formative years of independence witnessing economic boom, which saw the country emerging as a Southern African economic giant competing with South Africa. The country became the bread basket of Southern Africa and also participated in a number of regional, continental and international W. Mazorodze (B) Department of Peace Security and Society, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Chari and P. Dzimiri (eds.), Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4_4

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peacekeeping operations. Mugabe was hailed as a great statesman and received many international awards for his great leadership. However, things took a nosedive in the late 1990s when the country’s leadership implemented a controversial land reform programme which was hugely condemned by the Western world (Petroff, 2017). This resulted in Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth group of countries and ‘targeted’ economic sanctions imposed on the country’s leadership by the US and EU which coincidentally saw the country’s economy heavily affected and regressing (Sunder & Oliver, 2002). Industries closed and unemployment levels reached an all-time high of more than 90% (Mlambo, 2017). Mugabe and his government were accused of ruining the country’s economy through their inept economic policies and mismanagement which at independence was regarded as the jewel of Africa (Petroff, 2017). The ouster of Mugabe in November 2017 by his close lieutenant was welcomed by many people who had suffered from his economic and political blunders as a relief to the country’s host of socio-economic and political challenges (Molloy et al., 2017). At his inauguration, the new Zimbabwean President, Emmerson Mnangagwa promised the dawn of a new era and that Zimbabwe was open for business as well as his willingness to engage with the Western world, whom Mugabe had made sworn enemies. He promised a new trajectory for the country where corruption and incompetence would be dealt with decisively, while promoting foreign direct investment. It is more than five years since his great inspiring speech but there is a general perception that his inspiring inauguration speeches were high sounding nothings. Opposition Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) Co-Vice President, Welshman Ncube once told his supporters at a rally that nothing had changed under the new administration. He added that the people had managed to remove Mugabe but did not manage to remove Mugabeism which is still intact (Newsday, 2018). Whether there is a change or not will be discussed in great length in the subsequent sections of this chapter. The following section discusses the theoretical framework that informs this chapter.

The Grievance Theory In their study on the causes of rebellion in West Africa, Collier and Hoeffler proposed two models, the greed and the grievance models. According to the greed model, the initial cause of rebellion is the economic calculus of the relative military advantage, the sale of primary commodity exports and the cost of rebel recruitment on the part of rebel leaders. Rebel leaders initiate rebellions based on these considerations but the main objective is to serve their own selfish objectives and greediness (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 564). They further noted that under the grievance model, the cause of rebellion is not an economic calculus but the existence of real and objective grievances such as repression, lack of development, ethnic and religious victimisation, corruption, politics of exclusion, among other factors. Grossman models rebellion as an industry that generates profits from looting so that the insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates. Such rebellions are motivated by greed,

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hence the incidence of rebellion is explained by circumstances that generate profitable opportunities (Herschel, 1999: 269). In this chapter, it will be argued that the ‘coup’ that removed Mugabe from power was a rebellion by a factional group within the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) which called itself ‘Lacoste’. It comprised the former vice President Mnangagwa who is now the President, war veterans and the army top brass who felt that opportunities for them were being threatened by young ZANU PF members who were so- called ‘Generation 40’ (G40) in ZANU PF factional fights. The ‘G40’ in ZANU PF was backed by Mugabe’s wife who became a threat to the ambitions of the former Vice President Mnangagwa to replace Mugabe. The argument here is that the ‘Lacoste’ faction staged a ‘coup’ on the allegations of state capture by the ‘G40’ faction and criminals around the president (which were used as grievances) but the main agenda was to access state power which appeared to be slipping out of their hands following the dismissal of the then Vice President Mnangagwa and war veterans opposed to Mugabe from both the party and government. As their economic opportunities appeared to have been threatened, they went into haste and staged a ‘coup’ based on spurious grievances but the main agenda was to promote their selfish economic agendas that came with access to state power (the greed model). They managed to manipulate and appeal to the broader majority of Zimbabweans who were undergoing economic hardships to successfully remove Mugabe from office so that they could enjoy the benefits of state power. This bearing in mind that in Africa political power and economic power are intricately connected. According to Collier and Hoeffler, most coup leaders try to find justification in carrying out their rebellions which might appear genuine but it will simply be a scapegoat. The real objective will be to serve their own selfish objectives (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 269). In the Zimbabwean scenario, the coup plotters camouflaged their intentions by arguing that they did not want to wrestle power from Mugabe but they were removing bad elements around Mugabe which were causing untold suffering to the masses of the population. In the early stages of the coup that toppled Mugabe in November 2017, one of the chief coup plotters, the late General SB Moyo went on television and said, We wish to assure the nation that his Excellence the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence forces, Comrade R.G Mugabe and his family, are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice… To both our people and the world beyond our borders, we wish to make it abundantly clear this is not a military takeover of government. What the ZDF is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country, which if not addressed may result in a violent conflict (Rogers, 2019: 91).

When Mugabe finally tendered his resignation on 22 November 2017 and Mnangagwa came in, the latter promised Zimbabweans that it was not going to be business as usual and his government was ushering in a new dispensation, which was completely different from the previous Mugabe government. However, evidence on the ground points to the opposite direction as it appears guns are leading politics as protesters and opposition supporters have been abducted, arrested, beaten up and

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killed. Following the resignation of Mugabe, ZANU PF members claimed that political power belonged to them, pre-empting any preconceived ideas that opposition members might have of forming a unity government, thereby excluding other political parties who had helped them remove Mugabe. Analysts believe that if the new government was inclusive like what it promised people when it removed Mugabe, it could have formed an inclusive government with opposition members. All the hopes for unity government faded when ZANU PF announced that it was their thing (chinhu chedu) which resembled the greedy theory. On the other hand, rebellion occurs when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest. Such grievances include high inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic or religious divisions in society (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 563). This too can be applicable to the ‘coup’ that occurred which removed Mugabe from power in November 2017. The Lacoste faction and the army took advantage of people’s economic and political suffering to push Mugabe out of office. People came into the streets in numbers to support the ‘coup’ because they had grievances against Mugabe and his political allies. They supported the ‘coup’ because they perceived something better after Mugabe would come out of the ‘coup’. However, a few years after the ‘coup’, the majority of Zimbabweans are regretting the move to ‘rebel’ against Mugabe. One citizen who was interviewed commended that, Life under Mugabe was far much better than under the new government. When the new government came into power they promised us good life different from Mugabe era, but we are far much worse than under Mugabe. The cost of living is higher than under Mugabe. People are killed by soldiers under broad daylight. Although Mugabe killed he did it nicodemously. But the new government kills in broad daylight while the whole world is watching. It started in August 2018 and it happened again in January 2019 when people protested’. People are now living in fear just like under Mugabe regime (Interview with a Harare Resident, Makanaka, 15 March 2022).

It can be argued therefore in this chapter that the ‘coup’ was generated by both greediness and grievances on the part of the ‘coup’ plotters who included ZANU PF members who belonged to the Lacoste faction in which some of their members had been purged including the current president Mnangagwa who had been removed by Mugabe from the position of Vice President of the country. They staged the ‘coup’ to sustain their political careers which were now hanging in the air. But to better understand this there is need to understand the role of the security sector which is an important actor in Zimbabwean politics in both the old and the new dispensation.

Understanding the Role of the Security Sector in Zimbabwean Politics Under Mugabe The security forces in Zimbabwe have always had an interventionist approach in Zimbabwean politics since independence, but in a subtle way. The security forces have always been used as an extension of the ZANU PF regime. As with other countries, the Zimbabwean constitution made the president of the country the commander

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in chief of the security forces. Section 89 of the Zimbabwean constitution states that, ‘the President is the Head of State and Government and the Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces’(Constitution of Zimbabwe, Sect. 89, 2013). He appoints army commanders, police commissioner-general, correctional services commissionergeneral and central intelligence services director-general. This gives the president complete control and authority over security forces. By default all security forces are loyal to the President and ruling party (Alao, 2012: 60). There is no clear boundary between the security forces and the ruling party. One opposition party member once complained about the partiality of the security forces and noted that the security bosses behaved as if they were ruling party politburo members. This was after one of the security chiefs had publicly announced that he would not allow any leader who did not have liberation war credentials to assume power, in which he was making reference to opposition leaders whom he accused of being puppets of the Western countries (Zulu, 2011). The security chiefs openly supported ZANU PF even if Sect. 208 of the constitution does not allow them to publicly declare their allegiance to any political party (Constitution of Zimbabwe, Sect. 103, 2013). Together with their rank and file members, they play an active role in Zimbabwean politics in which they harass, torture, abduct and allegedly kill opposition members to maintain ZANU PF in power. They always maintain that the gun leads the politics. They view the opposition as puppets who serve Western interests. Former Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri once said that he would not recognise a victory by Tsvangirai, the late former opposition leader and was quoted saying, This must serve as warning to puppets. We will not let any puppets to take charge (McGreal, 2008).

As if it was not enough, then Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander, now Vice President Chiwenga weighed in and stated that, The army will not salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during and after elections (McGreal, 2008).

From the above statements, it can be noted that the security forces in Zimbabwe have always intervened in politics in Zimbabwe supporting ZANU PF. Bratton and Masunungure further highlighted the security force’s interference in the governance of the country when they noted that pervasive military presence cuts across all spheres of Zimbabwe’ state institutions creating a complex web designed to outlast Mugabe’s political career (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). It came as no surprise when the army intervened and toppled Mugabe in November 2017 as the military justified their intervention in ZANU PF internal squabbles as protecting the gains of the liberation war. The only difference was that in 2017, they intervened in ZANU PF internal politics. Such intervention tactics were revealed when, on 13 November 2017, thenZimbabwe Defence Forces Commander-General Chiwenga held a press conference and berated Mugabe saying that the army would intervene and stop Mugabe’s wife and her cohorts from seizing power. He said, Ladies and gentlemen, we remain committed to protecting our legacy and those bent on hijacking the revolution will not be allowed to do so (Rogers, 2019: 80).

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This statement clearly showed that the gun always led politics in Zimbabwe and underlined the security sector as a key actor in Zimbabwean politics, which could determine who leads the country. In this instance, they were threatening military action after Mnangagwa was dismissed by Mugabe in November 2017 as vice president of the government of Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa was subsequently installed with the help of the security forces as the successor to Mugabe. The following section analyses the role of the security sector in the coup that removed Mugabe from power.

The Coup that Was not a Coup: What Really Transpired? As the factional fights within ZANU Pf intensified, then-President of the country Mugabe on 6 November 2017 wrote a letter in which he unceremoniously fired the first Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa from his position for allegedly trying to remove him from power. The letter stated that, In accordance with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, … his Excellency has exercised his powers to relieve honourable Vice- President Emmerson Mnangagwa of his position with immediate effect. The Vice President has consistently and persistently exhibited traits of disloyal, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability (Rodgers, 2019: 14)

Having read the letter, Mnangagwa responded to Mugabe by expressing his gratitude for the manner in which Mugabe mentored him over the years since the liberation struggle. He promised to remain loyal to Mugabe who had played an important role in his political life, to the party and the revolution. However, fearful that his life could be in danger and risking arrest for crimes allegedly committed while he was still a high-ranked ZANU PF member as is the norm, a day later Mnangagwa skipped out of the country and went to South Africa through Mozambique. His political rivals within ZANU PF celebrated Mnangagwa’s demise. While in South Africa, Mnangagwa released a letter to Mugabe saying, The party is now controlled by undisciplined, egoistical and self – serving minnows … this party is not a personal property for you and your wife to do as you please… You and your cohorts will leave ZANU PF by the will of the people and this we will do in the next coming weeks … Zimbabweans now require new and progressive leadership that is not resident in the past and refuses to accept change…We will very soon control the levers of power in our beautiful party and country… I will be communicating with you soon and shall return to Zimbabwe to lead you (Rodgers, 2019: 69).

On the 12th of November, Chiwenga returned from China and a day later, on the 13th of November, he addressed the nation and said that, It is with humility and a heavy heart that we come before you to pronounce the indisputable reality that there is instability within ZANU PF and anxiety in the country at large. There are counter revolutionaries in the party who have infiltrated the party and whose agenda is to destroy it from within. The purging and cleansing process within ZANU PF seems to be targeting war veterans. We must be reminded that those behind the current treacherous shenanigans that when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in (Rodgers, 2019: 79).

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On the 14th of November, ZANU PF youth league dismissed Chiwenga’s threats as empty. It was on that day that the military was unleashed and tanks were rolled out from the barracks into the streets. On the 15th of November, the military took over the country’s broadcast and announced that the situation in the country had moved to another level. The late General SB Moyo went on television and said, To both our people and the world beyond our borders, we wish to make it abundantly clear this is not a military takeover of government. What the ZDF is doing is to pacify a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country which if not addressed may result in a violent conflict (Rodgers, 2019: 91).

The following day, members of the G40 were arrested, including ZANU PF Youth League leader Kudzai Chipanga who appeared on National television apologising for the statement he had made challenging Chiwenga’s press conference on 13 November as a non-event. In his apologetic message, Chipanga had this to say, I kindly request General Chiwenga to please accept my apologies on behalf of the Youth League and myself. We are still young people and still growing up, we learn from our mistakes and from this big mistake we have learned a lot (Rodgers, 2019: 93).

On the 16 and 17th November, the military assured regional leaders and the continental body that they had not taken over power in Harare and that President Mugabe remained the leader of the country. On the 18th of November, with the support of the military, people matched on the streets of Harare demanding the resignation of Mugabe (Rogers, 2019: 97). Every race and political persuasion joined the march. No stone was thrown, no window broken, no shot was fired, no one was killed and no one rioted. Despite the demonstration against him, Mugabe did not resign. On the 19th of November, the ZANU PF central committee met and expelled Mugabe and several members of the G40 from the party. The party gave Mugabe a 24 hour ultimatum to resign or begin impeachment proceedings against him. On the 21st of November, Mugabe held a press conference in which he was expected to resign but he did not, much to the disappointment of the people who expected him to resign. On the 22nd, impeachment proceedings against Mugabe began in parliament and Mugabe finally succumbed to the pressure and tendered his resignation. The Speaker of parliament read the message from Mugabe which said, Following my verbal communication with the Speaker at 13:53 Hours…. I, Robert Gabriel Mugabe… formally tender my resignation as the President of the President of Zimbabwe with immediate effect (Rogers, 2019: 110).

The whole country erupted into celebration and jubilation. The man who had ruled the country for 37 years, and whom every Zimbabwean loathed for causing the country’s economic crisis had gone and a new Zimbabwe was on the horizon. A new dispensation which turned out not to be so new began, which some people believe was simply the continuation of the old dispensation which was ushered in by the ‘coup which was not deemed a coup’.

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Civil–Military Relations in Zimbabwe Under the New Dispensation: Is There Any Difference from the Old Regime? One of the most striking things that occurred when Mugabe was removed from power was the way in which the ordinary people and the security forces, especially the army united in removing Mugabe from office. Mugabe had always relied on the army for his support and often used it to intimidate people into voting and supporting him especially in rural areas. Mugabe used to deploy the army to the rural areas to intimidate people into voting for ZANUPF before every election (Muleya, 2016). Since independence, the army has always had a frost relationship with the general population having been involved in the Gukurahundi in the early 1980s where more than 20 000 civilians are said to have been killed by the army in Matabeleland (Muleya, 2016). In the subsequent years, relations between the security forces and civilians worsened with the abduction and killing of opposition supporters as well as the corruption which became the defining feature of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. Many who dared to challenge the Mugabe regime disappeared and their whereabouts remain a mystery to this day, who include Itai Dzamara, among others (Human Rights Watch, 2006). However, that fear subsided for a moment and for the first time since independence, civilians and the security forces marched together in solidarity against the long rule of Mugabe on 17 November 2017. The security forces became the darling of the people as they were credited for removing Mugabe from office. Many envisaged the beginning of a new era, a new dispensation where civil–military relations were cordial. For the first time, civilians embraced soldiers holding guns and in uniforms in the streets of Harare. This was a rare moment in the history of the country. Was this a sign of good relations between the security forces and the civilians to come? The answer came a few months down the line. Less than a year later, this unholy alliance was doomed when the army shot and killed six protesting civilians on 1 August 2018 (Burke, 2018). This followed opposition supporters’ protests over delays in releasing presidential election results. They became violent and in the process destroyed property and looted shops in town. The response of the security forces was heavy-handed, resulting in the death of six civilians (Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019). For many, this event dashed all the hopes that Zimbabweans had of the new dispensation. Parallels began to be drawn with Mugabe’s regime. For many, the new regime had exceeded Mugabe’s brutality as Mugabe had never shot protesters in the open with the whole world watching the way the new regime did. Relations between security forces and civilians took a nosedive. If the shooting of civilians by the army on 1 August 2018 was not enough to convince people about the new regimes’ heavy-handedness, it was not long before the security forces again pounced on civilians who protested against the high cost of living on 14 January 2019, leaving at least 17 people dead and several injured and missing (Human Rights Watch, 2019). A new chapter in the relations between civilians and security forces under the new dispensation had been opened in which the security forces became once again an enemy of the people. Certainly, the security

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forces and the new dispensation had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing from the old regime. The old relations between security forces and civilians characterized by fear, harassment and brutality were renewed which prompted some analysts to conclude that nothing had changed from the old regime to the new dispensation. The next section discusses what went wrong after a promising start in the new dispensation.

A Promising Start in Post-mugabe Zimbabwe It is commendable that when the new administration came to power, it tried to distance itself from the previous regime. It was a good and promising start when, during his inauguration, the new President Mnangagwa announced that he would serve all citizens regardless of colour, creed, religion, tribe, totem or political affiliation (Chronicle, 2017). The new president exhorted ZANU PF members to be servants of the people. He implored his new cabinet to set targets and a 100-day target for change was instituted. The new government promised to implement changes to show the whole world that it was different from the previous regime. Mnangagwa appealed to the world as a listening, people-centred and servant leader. He announced the dawn of a new era.

Zimbabwe is Open for Business When the new Zimbabwean President came to power in November 2017, he struck a conciliatory tone in the months leading up to the elections. He declared that Zimbabwe was open for business and amended a law requiring 51/49 local–foreign ownership of diamond and platinum mines. He signaled his intent to end farm seizures and vowed to sell off failing state enterprises (Feldstein, 2018: 10). Moreover, the new dispensation also promised to compensate white commercial farmers who had lost their land during the land reform programme spearheaded by his predecessor (Southall, 2017: 79). He reassured foreign investors that their investments were safe in Zimbabwe. He did this to attract badly needed foreign direct investment to revive the failing Zimbabwean economy. This, at face value, was a major climb down and an achievement by the new administration in trying to correct the mistakes of the old dispensation. Moreover, ZANU PF Political Commissar, Victor Matemadanda, in December 2017 outlined a culture change where he announced that those who disliked ZANU PF would be given an opportunity to sit down with the new dispensation and understand their concerns (Sunday Mail Reporter, 2017). This was a radical shift from the past when ZANU PF labeled opponents sellouts, puppets of the West and imperialist lapdogs as well as using violence against opponents. Whether or not the new dispensation kept its promises will be discussed later in this chapter.

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New Government Makes Efforts to Re-Engage the West as Sanctions Continue to Haunt Zimbabwe At his inauguration, the new President also pledged to re-engage the Western countries who had imposed sanctions on Mugabe’s regime since 2001. He announced that, Zimbabwe was ready and willing for a steady re- engagement with all the nations of the world (BBC News, 2017).

Moreover, in line with its re-engagement policy, the new government showed willingness to build bridges with the western world something which many commentators applauded. Zimeye reported that the new administration took huge steps towards greater cooperation with the United States when Harare agreed to a pact for the extradition of criminals between the two countries (Zimeye, 2018). The move by the new administration showed a policy shift to normalise relations which had been strained since 2001 when USA imposed sanctions through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) against Mugabe’s regime for alleged human rights abuses. The Mugabe regime sat on the extradition treaty for 21 years and this came to an end when the new President of Zimbabwe signed the extradition treaty which paved way for smooth transfer of offenders between the two countries. According to the Extradition (Designated country) United States of America Order 2018, the treaty is bound by the mutual desire to provide for more effective cooperation between the two states in the suppression of crime (Zimeye, 2018). An international relations, peace and governance academic Dr Darlington Mahuku was quoted by Zimeye commented that, US policy towards Zimbabwe since the late 1990s was very acrimonious as it partnered opposition political parties in Zimbabwe. So if then there is a will power to cooperate in the extradition of criminals, it shows that there is a thawing of relations and this is a positive sign for the new dispensation in Zimbabwe, a clear sign of leadership change in Zimbabwe (Zimeye, 2018).

Mahuku’ sentiments showed that the new administration was taking a different trajectory from the old administration to some extent in which the latter was hostile to western countries. Moreover, the new government has also stressed the need to remove sanctions by the EU and US which it believed were illegal and hampering their efforts to fulfill its promises to the people. For instance, it argued that they could not borrow money from international institutions due to the sanctions imposed on the government of Zimbabwe. They refuted the contention by the EU and US that the sanctions were targeted against the elite but were meant to hurt the ordinary people so that they could revolt against the government and institute regime change. The government often argued that ZIDERA instructed US executive Directors of all international financial institutions to oppose and vote against the following on Zimbabwe; (a) the extension of any loan credit to the government of Zimbabwe (b) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the government of Zimbabwe

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to the United States or any international financial institution (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), Public Law 107-99-December 21, 2001). Magaisa, a Human Rights lawyer, likewise supported the new government’s view on the impact of sanctions on ordinary people when he noted that it is the weak members of the society that are hit by the effects of the sanctions. Democracy cannot flourish in poverty. It needs stable economic foundations (Magaisa, 2005). He added that the impact of sanctions on civilians is similar to those produced by warfare. Machadu highlighted that Zimbabwe’s ability to manage its own economy has been severely hampered by sanctions and no country in the globalised world can stabilise its economy without support. Zimbabwe has been surviving in a globalised world without international financial support for two decades and Zimbabweans have paid a heavy price (Machadu, 2014: 11). However, critics have dismissed this sanctions narrative by the new dispensation and argued that the major problem affecting the country was corruption by the elite and lack of political will by the leaders to fight corruption as they were also involved in corrupt deals. Even President Mnangagwa himself highlighted that the government could not continue to cry over sanctions but needed to be responsible for its failure to improve people’s lives (SABC News, 2018). Some commentators have further argued that the new president’s addresses to UN General Assembly since taking over power in 2017 were much different from Mugabe which showed that the new government was offering new and renewed relationships with the world. The new president called for dialogue with those who had imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. Unlike his predecessor who always had harsh and unkind words for the Western world, the new president appealed to the Western world to kindly consider lifting sanctions in a conciliatory approach rather than a confrontational approach adopted by his predecessor (Interview with a Harare Resident, Tapiwa, 30 March 2022).

EU Observers Are Invited to Monitor Harmonised 2018 Elections For the first time in close to two decades, the new administration also invited American and European election observers to observe the 2018 harmonised elections (Noyes, 2020: 8). This marked a new era for the country as the new administration sought to convince the international community that Zimbabwe was on a new political trajectory marked by re-engagement with the rest of the world, some of whom previously had an acrimonious relationship with the Zimbabwean government owing to its bad human rights record. Further to this, to show the whole world that a new era had dawned upon Zimbabwe, the democratic space was also opened to the opposition political parties to freely campaign in former ruling party strongholds which were mostly rural areas (Noyes, 2020: 8). Previously, under Mugabe these areas were no go areas for the opposition. The new leadership further appealed to its supporters to

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be tolerant to opposition views and supporters. As a result of this, the level and extent of violence during the 2018 harmonised elections was relatively low as compared to the Mugabe era. This was even confirmed by post-election reports by both Western and non-western election observers who noted that the election environment was characterised by peace and non-violence, although the playing field was not level. This was the first time since independence where elections in Zimbabwe were said to be highly peaceful. This argument has been used by supporters and proponents of the new administration as evidence that there has been indeed a real change of political leadership in Zimbabwe which was tolerant to diverse political views. However, as the country heads for the 2023 harmonised elections, the true nature of the new dispensation has been revealed as it banned opposition CCC from holding rallies. There have been many instances where opposition activists have been attacked by the ruling party supporters at the instigation of their leaders, which shows that the new dispensation is less tolerant to the opposition as much as the old dispensation, hence change without change. There are also doubts if the new dispensation will invite western observers for the 2023 harmonised elections given recent events in which the EU and US have renewed sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Urban Transport System is Revamped to Cater for the Poor It is notable to highlight that the new administration also introduced policies, which were meant to cushion the poor. It reintroduced the defunct urban public transport system through the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) in January 2019. ZUPCO provided relatively cheap transport to and from town to different residential suburbs throughout all major towns in the country as compared to private transport players. In announcing the introduction of ZUPCO, the Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Monica Mutsvangwa noted that in line with the government’s transitional stabilisation programme’s thrust to modernise the country’s transport system, the government through ZUPCO was launching an affordable and efficient urban mass transportation system to complement the existing commuting system (Staff Reporter, 2019). For instance, most urban routes ZUPCO charged USD 0.5 cents whereas private players charged fares between USD 1 and USD 2 for similar journeys (Interview with Harare Commuter, Memory, 30 January 2020). This was, however, a reactive move after violent demonstrations by urban citizens citing the unabated economic challenges they faced which included the rising transport costs which many people were failing to meet. The introduction of ZUPCO managed to calm the highly sensitive environment but there are concerns about the sustainability of the programme as many such previous programmes collapsed due to lack of recapitalisation by the government and mismanagement. There are also concerns about the capacity of ZUPCO to cater for commuters as in most cases people arrive late at work waiting for these ZUPCO buses. While the introduction of ZUPCO was a noble idea by the new government to cater for the poor, it appears that it was just a window-dressing measure which did not meet the needs of the

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commuters as the ZUPCO buses were few and people having to spend hours in queues waiting for ZUPCO buses. This followed a government directive banning all private transporters from ferrying people to and from work, a move which has put many private operators and their employees who survived from ferrying people into deep poverty. The government has since lifted the ban on private transport to operate but under strict conditions.

New Dispensation Appoints New Cabinet Ministers, Discards Old Wood The appointment of a cabinet with relatively new faces in which some big wigs fell by the way side was another sign that the new administration wanted to be different from the previous administration although it did not meet people’s expectations. The announcement of a new cabinet gave people hope that if given a free mandate to implement their ideas, Zimbabwe could be headed for political change. Notable appointments included the Minister of Finance Mthuli Ncube who was regarded as a technocrat (an economics professor) and relatively young who would bring in new ideas if allowed to operate without interference from the party. Others were Engineer, the late Biggie Matiza to head the Transport and Infrastructural Development Ministry, Fortune Chasi, a Lawyer by profession was tasked to lead the Ministry of Energy and Power Development (Msipa, 2018). People expressed hope that the new ministers were suitable for their jobs and would bring stability and improvement to the struggling economy. However, these hopes were dashed when it was revealed that the old guard who had been relieved of their ministerial positions would operate from the party’s headquarters providing oversight to the newly appointed ministers. This was seen by analysts as duplication of functions and waste of resources, given that the old guard received similar perks with what the sitting ministers received. It showed that the appointment of new ministers was only done to please the public but the old guard were still calling shots from the background. Therefore, what appeared to be genuine reforms by the new dispensation were merely cosmetic. It later showed that the newly appointed ministers had no freedom to make decisions without interference from the party. Fortune Chasi whom the majority of the people believed had improved the electricity situation in the country was soon relieved of his duties for allegedly failing to follow president’s directives, one of which was to drop investigations and suspension of Zimbabwe Electricity Authority board chair Sydney Gata on corruption charges (Voice of America News, 2020). Gata was alleged to be related to the President. Like before, political allegiance had triumphed over efficiency. Again it was hoped that the new president could also reach out to the opposition and appoint some opposition members into his cabinet in the spirit of inclusivity. People expected that the new president would create a government of national unity with the opposition and extend an olive branch to the then-largest opposition MDC Alliance which is now Citizen Coalition For Change (CCC). The MDC Alliance had a total of 111

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members of the legislature which comprise both members of parliament and senators (Veritas, 2018). However, the new dispensation continued with the old regime’s selfish ‘chinhu chedu’ (power is ours) mentality which is a ‘winner takes all’ philosophy and excluded opposition members from government.

Political Actors Dialogue Formed to Co-Opt Opposition into Government but the Main Opposition Snubs the Call In the aftermath of the harmonised 2018 elections which were disputed by the biggest opposition, MDC Alliance, the new dispensation tried to reach out to the opposition through the creation of a dialogue platform code-named Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD) which was a dialogue platform formed under the terms of the new government. There were conditions set for parties to enter the platform. One of the conditions was that parties should recognise President Mnangagwa as legitimately elected President of Zimbabwe. However, the platform was boycotted by the country’s major political party MDC Alliance which alleged that the presidential election results had been rigged in favour of the incumbent President Mnangagwa. The refusal by the main opposition in Zimbabwe to acknowledge Mnangagwa as legitimately elected created a political crisis of legitimacy in Zimbabwe. Secretary for Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Nick Mangwana, on the other hand heaped praise on the President for the formation of POLAD when he argued that, President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s domestic policy on the political front has been that of rapprochement and it gave birth to the POLAD platform which was launched in February 2019. POLAD brought together 18 political leaders and parties that participated in the harmonised 2018 elections to share ideas on how best to move the country forward (Agere, 2020).

Some analysts concluded that the new dispensation did not do enough to reach out to the main opposition to resolve the political crisis which ironically claimed to be holding keys to the country’s socio-economic development. The new dispensation chose to be arrogant and put conditions for dialogue with the main opposition, which the latter rejected. This continued posturing negatively affected the ordinary people who continued to suffer from the negative effects of the struggling economy. The new government supporters also hailed the appointment of former MDC Member of Parliament for Mabvuku—Tafara, James Maridadi as Zimbabwe’s ambassador to Senegal, as a sign of inclusivity by the new dispensation (Shumba, 2019). However, the appointment was not recognised by the opposition MDC Alliance as Maridadi had ceased to be a member of their party by the time he was appointed ambassador by the new dispensation government. Maridadi was ridiculed by the opposition as a mole who had sold out the opposition to the ruling party and was always a ZANU PF project within the opposition (Shumba, 2019). He was criticised by opposition

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supporters as a sellout. Ultimately the appointment of Maridadi as ambassador was deemed to be a non-event as well as the political actor’s dialogue, which was viewed as an enriching scheme comprising small and inconsequential opposition political parties which were pampered with top-of-the-range cars by the new dispensation.

A Veil of Taboo on Gukurahundi Removed as New Government Encourages Open Discussion One of the improvements that the new dispensation achieved when it got into power in Zimbabwe was to allow people to speak freely about Gukurahundi with the aim of finding closure to the issue which has divided the country’s two major ethnic groups Shona and Ndebele. Gukurahundi was a mass execution of mostly Ndebelespeaking people in the Southern part of the country by the government’s North Korean-trained 5th Brigade in the 1980s. During the tenure of Mugabe, any discussion of Gukurahundi was criminalised but when Mnangagwa took over from Mugabe, he encouraged people to openly discuss about it so that the victims could find closure. The new Zimbabwean government Information Publicity and Broadcasting Services secretary Ndabaningi Nick Mangwana also highlighted that since taking over power in 2017, President Mnangagwa has been opening lines of mutual dialogue with victims of Gukurahundi traditional leaders, civil society, churches, political parties, the media and industry. He added that, President Mnangagwa began a process of broaching arguably the most unpleasant of taboos of our young nation- the Gukurahundi issue that had long been spoken of in hushed tones. Part of the change in Zimbabwe’s political approach under President Mnangagwa was him opening discussions about Gukurahundi and related subjects such as marginalization, an act which will open the way for national discourse and introspection as well as a healing process that will ensure that the country is at peace with itself (Herald Reporter, 2019). Mangwana further noted that after his inauguration, President Mnangagwa met a group of civil organisations under the banner of Matabeleland Collective in which he facilitated the acquisition of identity documents by the victims of Gukurahundi, legal exhumations of the victims upon request from families, open discussion on Gukurahundi and the provision of medical assistance to Gukurahundi victims (Herald Reporter, 2019). It was also reported that the President had appointed a group of chiefs in Matabeleland to deal with the Gukurahundi issue and help with re-burials of some Gukurahundi victims in line with their local tradition. This according to new dispensation supporters was a milestone achievement by the new dispensation which shows that it was different from the old dispensation which tended to sweep the issue under the carpet. The section above discussed some of the changes brought by the new dispensation in its attempt to disassociate itself from the old dispensation. The following section discusses the arguments that the new administration was not different from

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the old regime and was an extension of the old regime despite the early successes and promises noted in the above section.

Leadership Change without Change as Earlier Deception is Revealed There are many reasons why people believe that the new dispensation managed to remove Mugabe but Mugabeism remained rooted in Zimbabwe’s political landscape. The manner in which the 2018 post-election period was handled left many scars and with people reminiscent of the brutality experienced under Mugabe’s regime. When opposition activists demonstrated against what they believed was a delay in announcing presidential results on the 1st of August 2018, they were met with an unprecedented and uncompromising military action which left six people shot dead (Burke, 2018). There was an outcry from the international community which called for restraint and immediately the US extended their economic sanctions against the new government. This event tainted the achievements which had seen the elections held in a peaceful environment where the opposition was allowed to freely campaign in the ruling party strongholds (rural areas), something that the new administration was applauded for. The President disowned the soldiers and professed ignorance of the unleashing of the soldiers on the people. This was viewed by people as trying to evade responsibility because it is the president according to the constitution who has the authority to mobilise and order the soldiers to maintain public order. Section 110 (2 g) notes that, The president is responsible for deploying defence forces and must inform parliament immediately (Constitution of Zimbabwe (Sect. 110), 2013). It is therefore debatable that if the president professed ignorance about deploying the military to deal with protesting opposition members who then did? Some theories have argued that it was Vice President Chiwenga who by then was the Minister of Defence who ordered the soldiers into the streets to confront opposition supporters. It is such incidences which gave people the perception that the President had no control of the government but there was an invisible hand behind the president, notwithstanding violation of the constitution (Sect. 214) by deploying army and failing to report to the parliament for such actions. This is supported by Mandaza who argued that most sources of power in Zimbabwe are hidden or invisible and this was the case with Mugabe and it remains the case with Mnangagwa (Mandaza, 2016: 21). The brutality of the security forces against protesters led many people to believe that the new administration had many striking similarities with the previous Mugabe regime than was thought which gives the perception that nothing had changed. Human rights watch Southern Africa’s former Director, the late Dewa Mavhinga, while addressing United States Committee on Foreign Relations noted that since the military takeover in Zimbabwe in November 2017, the military had not returned to

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the barracks, but instead was now involved in policing the streets (Pindula News, 2017). This was the same military which was implicated in human rights violations against the general population during Mugabe’s tenure. The new president assumed office with military backing and appointed a number of former military personnel to cabinet. This raised concerns about the new president’s autonomy from the armed forces which suggests further entrenchment of the military in civilian affairs. Dhewa further expressed fear that if the military influence is not checked it would affect future election results where the general population would be intimidated into voting for the ruling party with the fear of military backlash (Pindula News, 2017). Moreover, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum highlighted that some political writers such as Masunungure had alluded that Zimbabwe was a predatory state (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019) and was also termed a securocracy by Mandaza (Mandaza, 2016: 7). This typology according to the Human Rights NGO Forum, not only applied to the Mugabe rule but it remains the defining character of the post-2017 coup state. It further argued that the only feature that has changed since the removal of Mugabe is personal rule but a predatory coalition remained.

Traditional Leaders Used to Manipulate Voters Another important development which gave people the belief that the new dispensation was similar to the previous regime was the purchasing and distribution of vehicles to traditional chiefs a few days before 2018 harmonised elections (Zimeye, 2018). This feat was repeated ahead of the 2023 harmonised elections when 38 newly installed chiefs were given new top-of-the-range cars in Bulwayo when the president met chiefs at an annual chiefs conference (Zimeye, 2023). Chiefs were also promised access roads to their homestead, medical aid cover, clean water and solar energy. This was viewed as political expedience by observers at a time when the country was experiencing an economic crisis, but the leadership saw it as wise to purchase vehicles for traditional leaders. Many people viewed the new administration as an extension of the previous Mugabe regime which used the same modus operandi to win elections. Vehicles were used as carrots to entice traditional leaders to threaten their subjects to vote for the ruling party which they did. Such were Mugabe tactics and the new administration used the same methodology with perfection rendering the two intractably connected. This occurred at a time when there was no basic medication in public hospitals, health personnel were leaving the country for greener pastures citing poor working conditions and poor remuneration. However, the president justified the awarding of cars to chiefs when he said that it was part of his promise he had made to them when he took over the reigns of power from Mugabe and added that chiefs deserved to be respected by having decent transport to effectively carry out their activities in their areas of jurisdiction (Zimeye, 2018). Humanitarian and food aid continued to be abused by the ruling party and distributed on party lines a few days before elections, which prompted the EU observer team to conclude in its post-election report that while the election period was peaceful,

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the playing field was not level, citing the abuse of state resources by the ruling party to tilt votes in its favour. Interestingly this is exactly what the previous government under Mugabe did with perfection. One person interviewed noted that, We simply changed the driver of the train but the engine is still the same (Interview with a Harare Resident, Everjoy, 15 October 2022).

The statement above showed that the system of governance and leadership under the new dispensation was still the same despite changing the leaders. There are other many instances and events which pointed to the fact that nothing of substance had changed in terms of leadership in Zimbabwe despite some piecemeal and cosmetic changes recorded.

Human Rights Violations and Constitutional Amendments Under the New Dispensation The constitutional rights of people to peaceful demonstrations as enshrined in the Zimbabwean constitution continued to be violated under the so-called new dispensation as it was in the old regime despite arguments by the new dispensation that it had amended draconian pieces of legislation such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA) to allow people the freedom to demonstrate. The constitution of Zimbabwe Sect. 58 states that, Every person has the right to demonstrate and present petitions, but these rights must be exercised peacefully (Constitution of Zimbabwe (Section 58), 2013).

However, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, Nick Mangwana defended the new dispensation and argued that the country was in the right direction in terms of media reforms through the repealing of AIPPA. He added that, AIPPA was repealed, it is not partially gone, its gone, journalism is no longer criminalized (Political Editor, The Herald, November 3, 2020).

However, in reality, journalism has been criminalised under the new dispensation just as in the old dispensation. Journalist Hopewell Chin’ono has been arrested several times allegedly for peddling falsehoods and others have been dragged through the courts for similar offences. Analysts have intimated that there is freedom of speech but there is no freedom after speech under the new dispensation. In October 2018, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organised a peaceful demonstration against failure by the new government to improve the economic situation in the country. As required by the draconian piece of legislation, POSA to apply for permission from the police to hold a demonstration, the ZCTU applied for permission but their application was rejected by the police citing the continued government efforts

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to fight the outbreak of cholera and therefore discouraged people to convene in large numbers (News24, 2018). This was despite the fact that the ruling party, ZANU PF had been allowed to hold its gathering in the city centre, Harare a few weeks earlier. ZCTU members saw this rejection as a violation of their right to peaceful demonstration which is enshrined in the constitution. Hence, the ZCTU defied government and police directives barring their demonstration. They posted messages encouraging their supporters that the demonstration was going ahead as planned. The following morning on the 11th of October 2018, the police raided ZCTU offices and arrested their leaders before they could go into the streets (Political Editor, The Herald, November 3, 2020). There was widespread condemnation of the police and new government across the human rights fraternity which felt that the new government was not different from the old regime which had in the past barred people from demonstrating peacefully and selectively applied the law in its favour. To support the argument that the new dispensation was not different from the old regime, Human Rights NGO Forum argued in its report that major political changes that had taken place since the ushering in of the new dispensation was that state-sponsored violence had increased significantly and it was fair to say that the new dispensation was more violent than the old regime and the violence had been targeted against civilians by state security (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019). It also added that the military had become much more involved in violent events than at any time since 1998. This was diametrically opposed to what the new government promised Zimbabweans when it was inaugurated in November 2017, which gave an impression that members of the new dispensation were concerned about their own political survival than serving the people which arguers well with Collier’s greed model. As if that is not enough, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), published a story where a freelancer journalist Violet Gonda was harassed and beaten up by central intelligence organization (CIO) members when she was covering an event at statehouse in which the new president was engaging business leaders on 28 October 2018. It was reported that Violet Gonda’s phone was confiscated by state agents while she was harassed and detained for live streaming her interviews (Media Institute for Southern Africa, October 29, 2018). Critics condemned this behavior, which they argued was a continuation of the old regime which saw independent journalists harassed and sometimes detained as they were deemed to be enemies of the state who published false human rights violations. However, the Ministry of Information defended the actions of state agents on this occasion and put blame on the journalist arguing that she might have trespassed leading to her detention. The Ministry of Information stated that, We are getting more information over a reported incident involving a journalist at statehouse. This is a high security area, whose perimeter, grounds and buildings are highly protected. Like all such institutions elsewhere taking footage can be subject to restrictions (The Staff Reporter, The Zimbabwe Mail, October 30, 2018).

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However, some analysts argued that even though such areas are security risk areas, this did not justify harassment and detention of journalists. Feldstein noted that even as the president cited the importance of human rights and invited international observers to monitor Zimbabwe’s harmonized elections, he was methodically working with allies to lay a repressive groundwork that would ensure he stays in power as the standard bearer of the ruling ZANU PF party. Feldstein further noted that after the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced his victory in the 2018 harmonised elections, Mnangagwa reacted in a classic authoritarian fashion by deploying the security forces to repress street protestors, driving would be challengers into hiding. In his concluding remarks, Feldstein summed up by arguing that Mnangagwa and his allies did not force the ailing Mugabe out of office to transform Zimbabwe’s political system but rather to ensure their continued control over the nation (Feldstein, 2018: 10). This argument is in line with Paul Collier’s greed model. Economist Robertson weighed in and argued that the new dispensation promised by the new Zimbabwean government when it was ushered into power seems like a pie in the sky with each growing day. In the aftermath of the elections, Robertson initially wrote a piece of work expressing his confidence in the new dispensation when he wrote, In the election, all the major discouragements to investors were targeted for reform. And by correctly identifying their causes, improvements to prospects were placed within reach (John, 2019).

Policy documents that were put forward by the new government were critical of the past government and no one can fault Robertson for having so much optimism in the new administration. But, a few months down the line the situation worsened. There are economic and political challenges bedeviling Zimbabweans, civil servants and health personnel were on strike for the better part of the last two years over cost of living adjustments negatively impacting the education and health sectors. In the month of January 2019, there were bloody protests which left more than 14 people dead and several others injured, while hundreds were arrested. Having come face to face with the new reality, Robertson swallowed his words and said, On the contrary, the viability of many businesses is in doubt and the formal economy is in a fragile state. All of these have called into question the government’s frequently repeated claims that the new dispensation is going to drive the country in a new direction (John, 2019).

Responding to the heavy-handedness of the state security against the protesters in January 2019, British Minister of State in the Foreign Office Mark Field had this to say, One of the most chilling aspects of the violence in Zimbabwe was the statement of the President’ spokesperson that the crackdown on protesters was just a forestate of things to come. This is deeply disappointing to all of us in this house. We all celebrated the demise of Mugabe regime, feeling and hoping that a new chapter of Zimbabwe history was commencing (The Insider, 2019). The brutality of the new regime against demonstrators left some former admirers of the regime with eggs in their faces. For example, the British government, through

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its Minister for Africa Harriet Baldwin which appeared to be favourable to the new regime noted that given the brutal manner in which the new Zimbabwean regime had responded to January 2019 stay away, Britain would support wider European Union sanctions against the Zimbabwean government and that Britain would no longer back Harare’s bid for readmission into the Commonwealth. With regards to the financial bailout from Britain, Baldwin noted that the chances were slimmer now in the wake of violent crackdown on demonstrators by the Mnangagwa government (Samaita, 2019). On the contrary, SADC expressed hope that the new administration was doing enough to address the socio- economic challenges in Zimbabwe and as usual, in the spirit of regional brotherhood, SADC blamed NGOs supported by external forces for continuing to destabilise the country. This is the brotherly approach of looking out for their own brother that SADC always adopted even when Mugabe was still in power and came as no surprise when they chose to justify the new regime’s heavy-handedness against protesters and refused to condemn the attacks on civilians. Analysts have further argued that the new regime continued with the opulent old regime life style and human rights violations but this time cloaked up in words democracy, peace and freedom of speech. Just like the old regime, political rivals and critics under the new regime also quickly and quietly disappeared in the middle of the night or were kidnapped from their homes, tortured and then left for dead in ditches or at roadsides with the regime claiming ignorance about these events. Behind the regime’s rhetoric lay signs that the regime just like its predecessor would do anything to cement its stay in power at any cost. Human rights groups reported countrywide voter intimidation in rural areas where the government deployed plain clothes security forces to remind people to vote for Mnangagwa in the run up to the 2018 and 2023 harmonised elections (Feldstein, 2018: 10). This was despite the 2018 harmonised elections deemed to have witnessed no incidences of violence. As the country geared up for the 2023 harmonised elections, the country’s major opposition party CCC had its rally disrupted by the ruling party supporters, the police refused to clear their requests to hold rallies, its members arrested for conducting unsanctioned rallies and some of its members victimised and brutalised by ruling party members. Some analysts have argued that CCC is a literally banned party in Zimbabwe. Job Sihkala, CCC member of assembly for Zengeza West is currently incarcerated for more than two hundred days for allegedly inciting violence. His bail application was denied several times despite the state failing to substantiate its case against him. As in the Mugabe era, the opposition was denied access to rural areas to campaign in the run up to the 2023 harmonised election. These areas were deemed to be no-go areas for opposition. As if that was not enough, Zimbabwe’s only state-controlled television dominated pro- Mnangagwa electoral messages. Opposition parties were only allocated piecemeal time on national television and radio stations. Television and radio charges were also hiked to prevent opposition parties more time to spread their electoral messages to their supporters, depriving voters the freedom of choice of leaders as enshrined in the constitution. Hence, the purported reforms were cosmetic and not real. It has also been argued from the beginning when the army removed Mugabe and replaced him with Mnangagwa, that they changed nothing of substance and

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their continued backing of ZANU PF merely inaugurated an era of Mugabeism without Mugabe (Maromo, 2017). These sentiments appeared to have been vilified with the way that the new dispensation was run which left many people convinced that there was really no difference between the two administrations and that the socalled new dispensation was simply an extension of the old dispensation. Melber was also convinced that the collapse of the Mugabe dynasty in Zimbabwe did not translate into democracy (Melber, 2017). The new president has also been battling to change the constitution to allow him to appoint judges without consultation with the Judiciary Service Commission and Legislature as enshrined in the constitution, something which critics perceive is meant to control the judiciary and use it to stifle individual rights as well as suppressing the opposition in the country. The proposed constitutional amendments seek to return the country to the old (amended Lancaster House) constitution by, Widening scope of presidential powers, undermining of democratic accountability and burgeoning size of central government (Hofisi Tinashe, 2020).

The constitutional amendment number 2 eventually prevailed and was signed into law by the president on 7 May 2021 (Veritas, 2021). The law amended Sect. 180 of the constitution to permit the president to appoint and promote judges of the supreme court and high court in consultation with the judicial service commission without having to undergo the usual selection process laid down in the section. The amendment also made changes to Sect. 186 of the constitution relating to the continuation of judges in office after reaching the age of 70, with the president’s approval. Chief Justice Malaba’s term was extended and this drew wide criticism from the civil society as it was expected that Justice Malaba would retire. The extension of his term was perceived to be based on political grounds and expediency. There are already allegations that the judiciary is captured by the executive, judging by the manner in which it has delivered some judgements in favour of the ruling party. Opposition activists have been denied bail on numerous occasions without any justifiable explanation. Some who include CCC Deputy Organising Secretary, Jacob Sikhala and others have spent almost a year in remand prison without trial, only to be released without any charges placed on them. This again draws similarities with Mugabe who enjoyed such powers to appoint judges who were favourable to him and who would deliver favourable judgements in times of need. Thus, there is a general belief that the new dispensation, just like the old regime had captured the judiciary.

Corruption Remains a Challenge Despite the Rhetoric Against It In 2019, Zimbabwe was ranked 158th most corrupt nation out of 180 countries (Transparency International, October 6, 2020), a grading that is extremely high. Since independence in 1980, the ruling party, ZANU PF has established a deep-rooted patronage network that has intensified the economic crisis which plunged the majority

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of Zimbabweans into poverty (Pan Africanism Today Secretariat, August 12, 2020). Due to political corruption and economic mismanagement, many Zimbabweans have been placed in positions of extreme poverty as they cannot secure employment, access basic healthcare, food, clean safe water and education for their children. Interestingly, when the new dispensation came into power, one of its major policy pronouncements was the fight against corruption. The fight against corruption died a natural death as some of the esteemed members of the new government were fingered out in corruption scandals. Opposition and civic society activists who protested against corruption were suppressed through arbitrary arrests and detentions, abductions and continued surveillance by state security agents. For example, in early to mid-2020, civic and political activists including Hopewell Chin’ono and Jacob Ngarivhume were arrested and detained for several months without trial for mobilising citizens to protest the country’s systemic corruption (Pan Africanism Today Secretariat, August 12, 2020). Hopewell exposed a USD 60 million COVID-19 medical supplies procurement fraud leading to the false arrest and resignation of the Minister of Health, Obediah Moyo and other government officials (Transparency International, October 6, 2020, Al Jazeera July 8, 2020). Obediah Moyo was alleged to be a close ally of the presidium. Chin’ono mobilised Zimbabweans to protest such corruption and was arrested for inciting public violence, yet those fingered out in corruption were not arrested, which reflected selective application of the law. Chitsike argued that there are states that tolerate and facilitate impunity by, Deliberately creating laws, such as clemency orders, that protect perpetrators and pardon people liable to prosecution; not taking action against perpetrators and effectively allowing them to go free; and passing token sentences and limiting punishment for gross violations of human rights (Chitsike, 2012: 8).

Moreover, Priscilla Mupfumira an ally of ZANU PF leaders and former minister who was accused of record corruption was released on health grounds after serving a short jail term having been convicted of corruption involving millions of dollars the NSSA (Chifamba, 2020). At the same time opposition members and those assumed to be critical to the new dispensation were arrested for alleged corrupt activities. These included Harare Mayor Jacob Mafume who languished in remand prison for alleged corruption in which he was accused of corruptly awarding a residential stand to his sister, a few days after he assumed the position as Harare Mayor. His arrest was suspected to be politically motivated to prevent the opposition from running the city of Harare. As if that is not enough, the President of the Mines Federation Henrieta Rushwaya was caught at the Robert Mugabe International airport trying to smuggle six kgs of refined gold with an estimated value of USD 300 000 (Vinga, 2020). Ironically, Rushwaya was said to be closely related to the presidium which gave the impression that the precious mineral belonged to the presidium. She was remanded out of custody at the same time political activists were denied bail. The fight against corruption which the new dispensation preached at its inception seemed to have died a natural death. Chin’ono was again arrested in January 2021 together with Jacob Sikhala where they spent three weeks in remand prison for spreading falsehoods. They were charged under Sect. 31 of the Criminal Law (Codification

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and Reform) Act which deals with publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state. However, their arrest and incarceration was criticised by human rights defenders because the law under which they were being charged with was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2014, in a matter that was brought by two Zimbabwe Independent newspapers. At the time of writing this chapter Job Sikhala had again been arrested and had spent close to a year in remand prison allegedly for inciting violence, obstructing and defeating the course of justice and hindering police investigations in the murder of Moreblessing Ali, an alleged oppostion CCC political activist and the subsequent violence that occurred in Nyatsime area.

Conclusion The new leadership in Zimbabwe under the so-called new dispensation is similar to the previous regime in many respects despite the rhetoric that it was different. The new leadership tried hard to disassociate itself from the previous regime despite evidence on the ground that shows there is no difference. It promised much at its inauguration but achieved little change. Corruption and impunity by politically exposed persons which characterised the previous regime continued unabated, harassment and imprisonment of opposition political activists continued, the economic crisis but since worsened and industry operating at less than 20% of its capacity. Public hospitals became death beds with no basic medication, ordinary people continue to suffer in poverty, exacerbated by COVID-19, while the country’s leadership continued to globetrot in search of medical services, neglecting their own domestic medical services and in the process squandering the little foreign currency resources that could be used for productive purposes. Monthly inflation continued to haunt the economy hovering around more than 300%, civil servants’ salaries have been eroded, teachers and health personnel have been on strike for the greater part of 2019, 2020 and 2021. While the new regime has made anti-corruption rhetoric policies, the rhetoric has not been matched by action. There is no political will to fight corruption. However, it will be an injustice to totally dismiss the new leadership as having learnt nothing from the failures of the previous regime and changed nothing since it came into office. Change is a process, not an event and it takes time to implement change in any given context. There might not be visible leadership change in Zimbabwe under the new dispensation but the new dispensation made efforts to change and improve on some of the things that plagued the previous administration, though the pace is painfully slow. It tried to open up some freedom of speech where people could discuss some sensitive issues which were taboo under the previous administration, such as Gukurahundi. Police corruption and harassment of motorists at roadblocks were dealt with. There is some good measure of infrastructural development, an example being the Beit Bridge—Harare highway, though the pace is slow. The new dispensation also came up with an economic blueprint,

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the Transitional Stabilisation programme (2018–2020) and the National Development Strategy1 (2021–2025). The Transitional Stabilisation programme was aimed at taming inflation, reducing government expenditure and stabilising the local currency. It managed to introduce the local currency though it is still volatile as measured against other currencies such as USD. The Transitional Stabilisation programme was replaced by the National Development Strategy I, which sought to spearhead devolution, entrenchment of democracy, constitutionalism and rule of law (Muchagoneyi, 2020). On the whole, the changes that have been carried out by the new dispensation are therefore window dressing and far outweighed by the lack of improvement from the old regime which prompt people to conclude that what was removed in November 2017 was an individual called Mugabe but the system Mugabeism remained intact within the so-called new dispensation. The coup plotters were guided and are still guided by greediness for power which was increasingly slipping through their hands. They organised a ‘coup’ merely to save their political careers which were on the line than to improve people’s conditions. There is still a long way before there can be real accountable leadership change in Zimbabwe that the new dispensation promised. What is obtaining is the continuation of the previous regime and it is this whole system which needs to be dismantled for there to be real leadership change in the country. Lack of change in Zimbabwe under the new dispensation could be summed up by Paulo Freire quoted in Gramsci who noted that some of those who challenge oppression as freedom fighters become the next oppressors (Gramsci, 1971) Politicians and political parties are in the business of seeking power. They are known to use promises of change in order to persuade followers and when they attain power, they use it to serve parochial interests and the new dispensation in Zimbabwe is not an exception. Despite the country having changed leadership from Mugabe to Mnangagwa, there were no changes in terms of governance systems and structures, something which echoes the continuation of the status quo, hence change without change.

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Interviews Interview with a Harare resident, Makanaka, 15 March 2022. Interview with a Harare Resident (Tapiwa), 30 March 2022. Interview with Harar Commuter, Memory, 30 January 2020. Interview with a Harare Resident, Everjoy, 15 October 2022.

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Washington Mazorodze holds a PhD in Public Administration (Peace Studies) from Durban University of Technology in South Africa. He is also a holder of an Msc in International Relations, Honours Degree in Politics and Administration from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently a Temporary Full- time Lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe in the Department of Peace, Security and Society (Faculty of Arts and Humanities). His research interests include domestic, regional and international politics, governance, national and human security, leadership, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution and transformation. He recently authored a book chapter on targeted sanctions in Zimbabwe and the failure of regime change agenda in Zimbabwe. Before that he had published another book chapter on the dilemmas of African leaders in the global political economy. He recently published a book chapter on the impact of covid-19 on informal traders in Harare, Zimbabwe. He also published a journal article in 2022 on human (in) security challenges posed by government’s monopoly on public transport in Harare, Zimbabwe. He lectures both undergaduates and post graduates in the areas of public policy, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, leadership, research methods, natural resources and security as well as international relations.

Military Orchestrated Leadership Change in Zimbabwe and the Quest for Political Transition Patrick Dzimiri

and Obinna Richard Iroanya

Introduction November 2017 will remain significant in Zimbabwe’s political history. It marked the end of Mugabe’s 37 years’ rule. Zimbabwe paddled on a de facto one-party model for 37 years as no opposition political party succeeded in dislodging the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) grip on political power. The situation has stayed the same. The absence of an orderly internal mechanism for the transition of power plunged ZANU-PF into a bloody power contest towards the tail end of Mugabe’s rule. Factional conflicts between ‘Generation 40 (G40)’ (people with non-revolutionary credentials) and the ‘Lacoste generation’, or the so-called custodians of Zimbabwe’s liberation war, played a significant part in the removal of Mugabe from power. The tides of change wracked Zimbabwe when Mugabe fired Emerson Mnangagwa from being the country’s First Vice-President on 6 November 2017. The decision to fire Mnangagwa triggered military intervention by members of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces led by General Constantine Chiwenga with the support of the veterans of the country’s war of liberation, henceforth war veterans. The military elite, composed of individuals from the ‘Lacoste’ generation, which dominated the elite governing group of Zimbabwe, acted against one of their own to retain the party’s grip on power. While some pundits have described the event as a military coup (Mandaza, 2014; Meila, 2019; Magaisa, 2017; Tendi, 2019), others, such as the International Crisis

P. Dzimiri (B) Department of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] O. R. Iroanya Department of Military Studies, School of Military Science, University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Chari and P. Dzimiri (eds.), Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4_5

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Group (2017), have characterised the developments as a military-assisted power transition. This chapter settles for military-orchestrated leadership change based on an analysis of the outcome of political developments following the ousting of Mugabe. The term coup refers to a violent or non-violent overthrow of a legitimate government by armed forces members (Ikome, 2007; Powell, 2012; Powell & Thyne, 2011). Usually, the coupists seize and directly exercise political power. In some cases, they share power with civilian members of the ruling elite (Ikome, 2007). In Zimbabwe, a soft or non-violent coup occurred. Seemingly, the ‘coupists’ did not cease power for themselves but restored a former vice president to power. Thus, a critical component of the coup needed to be improved and diluted. Again, Zimbabwe’s judicial institution provided legitimation and legal justification for the event as it was consistent with maintaining law and order. In this regard, the concept of military-orchestrated leadership change is consistent with the objectives of the chapter. Zimbabwe’s unparalleled military-orchestrated power transition is evidenced by the military’s involvement, which allowed elite circulation of power confirmed by Emerson Mnangagwa’s takeover. The military’s involvement marks a significant epoch in the post-independence era where intra-party power politics has been resolved through the barrel of a gun. The development has attracted varying interpretations and labelling, with some describing it as a military coup (Tendi, 2019), ‘soft coup’ (Beardsworth et al., 2019), and ‘military mediated power transition’ (International Crisis Group, 2017). For purposes of this chapter, the alternative description is that of military orchestrated leadership change because the coupists, resented the temptation of taking overpower themselves, possibly because they feared the regional and international backlash of the takeover of power. Similarly, the military aberration has generally become anachronistic within the contemporary African context, as many countries have moved away from it and resorting to use elections as a democratic means to assume power. Mugabe’s rule was marked by an international ostracisation and this made the military takeover to be viewed with limited resentment in Zimbabwe. While the coupists implicitly admitted that democracy remains a veritable alternative to Zimbabwe’s political transition, by allowing Mnangagwa to take over the reins of power, his role remains the subject of discussion in this chapter. On numerous occasions, Mugabe accused Mnangagwa of having an insatiable appetite for power and plotting to remove him unconstitutionally. The 2004 Tsholotsho Declaration where Mnangagwa and the former Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, alleged convened an illegal meeting to oust Mugabe is an example (Mandaza, 2014; Tendi, 2016). As a matter of fact, Mugabe justified firing Mnangagwa because of his treacherous plots. Mnangagwa fervently denied these allegations with Mugabe’s suspicion vindicated when Mnangagwa took over the mantle as the new President of Zimbabwe. The chapter further argues that, while the development illustrated the undesirability of military rule in post-independence Africa, as evidenced by allowing a civilian Mnangagwa to take over power, the development has not yielded a significant political transition in Zimbabwe. This is because of the elite circulation dimension in the military orchestrated leadership change.

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This chapter offers an insight into Zimbabwe’s political crises characterised by a lack of succession plan, which culminated in a military-orchestrated leadership change. The chapter’s central argument is that military aberrations in Zimbabwe’s politics were the climax of systemic failure in governance and social engineering. Given the uniqueness of the event in the twenty-first-century politics of southern Africa, this chapter further discusses the implications of military mediated transitions for regional peace and security. In this regard, the chapter relies on Vilfredo Pareto’s (1848–18,923) analytical schema of elite circulation to explain the absence of succession mechanism within ZANU-PF and the militarisation of socio-politics life in Zimbabwe. The conceptual nature of the study compelled us to employ a qualitative methodology characterised by an extensive review of primary and secondary data sources on political developments in the pre-and post-Mugabe dispensations. Data collected from documentary reviews were systematically analysed using an evaluation research approach in order to sustain several arguments regarding the military-orchestrated leadership change in Zimbabwe. The evaluation research approach appealed to this study as it allowed for appraising a socio-political phenomenon using some theoretical benchmarks. This context is considered ideal for analysing the militaryorchestrated leadership change in Zimbabwe and its implications on political transition in the country.

Theoretical Insights into Zimbabwe’s Political Crises Scholars have explained political developments in Zimbabwe from various theoretical prisms. This chapter draws on insights from Vilfredo Pareto’s (1848–18,923) circulation of the elite theory that proffers a socio-political explanation of heterogeneous societies (Delican, 2000). Pareto considers the elite as a small number of individuals who have achieved significant success by reaching the pinnacle of their professions or different spheres of human endeavour in any society (Scott, 2018; Welty, 2016). As propounded by Pareto, the elite are those in society who wield some significant degree of influence and have reached the higher echelons of every sector of human undertaking (Delican, 2000). The elite circulation theory acknowledges the existence of a class of mighty masses described as a non-governing elite. However, the theory underlines that not all elites exercise direct governance or political power. For example, business, intellectual, military, and traditional or cultural elites do not exercise direct political power. The governing elite is the stratum with power, control, and influence (Bartoszewicz, 2019; Best & Higley, 2010). As concisely explained by Femia (2006: 70), the governing elite is an amalgamation of powerful political, economic, and social groups within the government institutions. In contemporary parlance, Pakulski (2017: 12) views elites at the national level as ‘networks of individuals’ wielding more power and influence in decision-making. Thus, societies, such as the Zimbabwean, are divided into two—the governing elite and non-governing elites.

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Whereas governing elites are directly and indirectly involved in controlling, managing, and distributing state resources, non-governing elites are not involved in controlling, managing, nor allocating state resources. However, by occupying critical positions in societies, the non-governing elite exercises considerable influence on the governance or leadership of the state (Best & Higley, 2010). Both governing and nongoverning elites move up and down the governing and non-governing categories over time in what Marco (2014: 1) pronounces as ‘the principle of elite circulation’. Thus, the non-governing elite can move up into governing elite category with governing elite also able to move down to the non-governing elite category. Therefore, societies thrive through gradual and orderly replacement of governing elites (leaders) with differential leadership or governing capabilities through socially and constitutionally accepted means. Delican (2000: 328) regards this as the ‘law of circulation of elites’. However, the governing elite often overtly and covertly manipulate political processes to cling to power and perpetuate their superiority over other groups in the society (Delican, 2000). The elite act as gatekeepers by obstructing the ambitions of non-governing elites to move into the elite governing category. The essence of all this is to prevent non-governing elites from influencing or altering the social, political, and economic status quo in ways and manners that can dislodge the governing elite’s stronghold on political power (Higley & Pakulski, 2012). The main argument presented in this chapter is that the dominant ruling elite archetype of ZANU-PF resonates with Pareto’s elite circulation principle. The ZANU-PF succession politics revealed an elite that shares the same political ideology and revolutionary ethos competing for power. Under such circumstances, the rhetoric that the G-40 was constituted by the young Turks who lacked revolutionary credentials stands out as a political ploy used by the gatekeepers within the Lacoste faction of ZANU-PF. The preceding view is based on the observation that the young Turks in the G-40 faction were supported by some of the liberation heavyweights, including Mugabe himself, who was celebrated as a liberation icon. The young Turks were socialised in the same political ethos that the Lacoste faction claimed to be preserving. As discussed later, the derogatory labels and shaming marshalled against the G-40 were strategies for delegitimising the faction and, as such were propelled by the lack of a clear succession policy within the party. Therefore, the real struggle within the intra-party hostilities in ZANU-PF was marked by a struggle between elites trying to outdo each other to gain power. Both elite factions were vying for power for its sake and not saving the situation in the country. Pareto explains that interest, residues, derivations, and heterogeneity constitute the general mechanism of every society (Delican, 2000; Higley & Pakulski, 2012). These variables are not mutually exclusive but must remain in equilibrium to ensure societies’ stability and progress. The most critical of these mutually interdependent variables to the Zimbabwean discourse are residues and derivations. As Pareto notes, residues and derivations shape the work and role of elites. Residues are mainly the reasons, sentiments, and instincts, which are relatively constant and greatly determine or influence human behaviour or actions (Adams & Sydie, 2001; Delican, 2000; Higley & Pakulski, 2012). Residues are further divided into five classes: Residues of Combinations; Residues of Persistence and Aggregates; Residues of Manifestation

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of sentiments through external activities; Residues of Sociability; Residues of the Integrity of Personality; and Residues Regarding Sex (Higley & Pakulski, 2012). The residues that apply to our discussion are those of combinations and residues of persistence and aggregates. These residues determine evolutionary and revolutionary social changes in societies. Derivations simply attempt to justify actions carried out through sentiments and instincts (residues of combinations). Adams and Sydie (2001) opined that derivations are the pretexts or justification for embarking on specific behaviour. These are designed to mask the governing elite’s fundamental objectives, intentions, or purposes of actions. In this regard, derivations include circumstances, needs, and norms often cited by governing elites to explain the meaning or logic of their actions. The governing elite manipulates and controls the masses by fraud or force, depending on their dominant characteristics. Residues of combinations are the characteristics of elites who employ fraud to manipulate and control their masses. These elites are predisposed to flexibility, innovation, experimentation in changing circumstances, and being inclined towards material possessions rather than idealistic goals (Adams & Sydie, 2001; Delican, 2018). However, these elites are grossly unprincipled and employ emotional and deceitful strategies to manipulate and control the masses of their societies. Conversely, governing elites, who use brutal force to control and manipulate their masses, are characterised by persistence and aggregates. Peculiar to the ZANU-PF intra-party elite’s characterisation here being conservative in orientation, exercising blind faith or ideology, placing a high value on group loyalty, dogmatism, and solidarity, and using force at will. This explains why those perceived as deviating from the party’s dogma become labelled as sell-outs or vatengesi in the Shona language (Dzimiri et al., 2014). The elite, characterised by residues of persistence and aggregates, aim to maintain an inter-group social, political, and economic order and intra-elite stability. By aggregates, Pareto refers to issues that include group norms, tradition and culture, codes of conduct, ideas, rules, and practices developed during specific historical periods and circumstances, which may have outlived those periods and their relevance to contemporary times. These are, for example, the formation and operation of ZANU-PF as a political and armed liberation movement during Zimbabwe’s independence struggle and its metamorphosis into a ruling party after independence. Pareto theorised that the failure of society equates to the failure of the governing elite. This failure arises from a combination of excesses of self-belief, unchecked personality traits, mentalities, idiosyncrasies, and actions. The governing elite maintains a stronghold on power and enforces self-relevance in society by truncating elite circulation through exclusionary and dogmatic measures. In the process, however, the governing elite becomes prone to monumental and cumulative mistakes that eventually result in degeneration or a decline in leadership quality. The consequence of the degeneration in leadership is a severe socio-political crisis marked by a demand for change or a rise in violent opposition (Delican, 2018 ). Elite circulation of power takes place in two ways. Firstly, through the socially and constitutionally mediated process by which the non-governing elite moves into governing elite class and vice

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versa against the backdrop of innate capabilities and merit, and secondly, through revolutionary means or a violent overthrow of the governing elite. There are two possible implications of this theory for Zimbabwean society. Firstly, Zimbabwe’s heterogeneous governing elite comprises individuals characterised by residues of combinations and residues of persistence and aggregates. Elites of residues of combinations defined the early years of the independence struggle and formation of ZANU. These elites appeared predisposed to flexibility, innovation, and experimentation in changing circumstances in addition to being inclined towards material possessions and attaining democratic goals. However, the party and the struggle became hijacked by elites characterised by residues of persistence and aggregates. Thus, the governing elites became grossly ill-disciplined, unprincipled and employed emotional sentiments and deceitful strategies to manipulate and control Zimbabwean masses during colonial times and post-independence (Alexander & McGragor, 2013; Powell & Chacha, 2019). When systematic manipulation and invocation of revolutionary rhetoric and promises of a better life could no longer provide desired effects on the masses, the governing elite resorted to the use of force (residues of persistence and aggregates) to truncate elite circulation and compel obedience to their rule (Dzimiri et al., 2014; Makumbe, 2009). The elite also introduced harsh measures, such as military governance, and several repressive pieces of legislation that include the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (Chitiyo, 2009; NdlovuGatsheni, 2007). Thus, democracy, a socially and constitutionally accepted means of elite circulation, became nearly impossible or difficult to achieve in the country. Secondly, degeneration in the quality of leadership among Zimbabwe’s governing elite, entrenched a patronage system, and dangerous politicking for power deepened intra-elite squabbles within ZANU-PF and cumulated in the overthrow of Mugabe’s government.

Elite Formation, Politicisation, and Militarisation of Politics The military-assisted power transition in Zimbabwe presented a semblance of a military solution to complex political algebra, on the one hand, while on the other, confirmed military members of the country’s governing elite class. As NdlovuGatsheni (2007) alludes to, the enduring military–politics nexus in Zimbabwe shows a two-way traffic of military politicisation and militarisation of politics. As Tendi (2017), Mazarire (2011), Chung (2006), and Sithole (1999) have pointed out, military involvement in Zimbabwean politics is not an entirely new development. However, what is new is the military’s instrumental role in removing a sitting president. Mazarire (2011) provides valuable insights into understanding the military-politics linkage in Zimbabwe. His insightful analysis shows that the military has never been separated from politics in Zimbabwe since the liberation struggle, even though this was not the original intention of the Movement’s founders. ZANU was formed as a people’s party with clear political goals (Mazarire, 2011). In this regard, ZANU’s

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military wing- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was subordinated, from its inception to party rules and principles because the party, not the military, was and still is regarded as ‘the vanguard of the revolution’ (Mazarire, 2011: 574). The party’s slogan is boldly pronounced, ‘the party guides the gun’ (Mazarire, 2011: 254). A clear superiority of politics over the military institution was therefore instituted within the ruling ZANU at formation. From its formative stages, the party equally recognised the critical role of the discipline of members of the Movement to maintain the separation of the military from politics. Thus, during the struggle for national independence, ZANU emphasised discipline as the key to the revolution’s success. The liberation struggle was directed and controlled by the Revolution Council or Dare Chimurenga, while the military was managed by the Chief of Operations, who was answerable to the High Command, a conglomeration of civilian and military structures (Mazarire, 2011; Tekere, 2007). ZANU’s stipulations and principles show the intention of clear boundary demarcation between politics (party) and the military in post-independence Zimbabwe. Thus, politics was to provide the country’s governing elites, while the military was to form part of the non-governing elite of the society as defenders and protectors of state territorial integrity. The principle of democratic centrality was conceived as needful to instil discipline within the party structures (Sithole, 1999). This also implied that the party’s military wing would not act as kingmakers, and no civilian elite (leader) within the party could personalise party politics as witnessed in the twenty-first-century politics of Zimbabwe. However, the blurring of the demarcation between politics and the military in the Zimbabwean political landscape arguably began in the 1970s. Sithole (1999), as well as Mazarire (2011), have traced this development to the formation of the Joint Military Command (JOC) following the merger between ZANLA and ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Arm), the military wing of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) in 1972. While well-intentioned, the merger of both military wings produced unintended structural changes within the liberation movement with broader implications felt in the politics–military relations in post-independent Zimbabwe. Notably, ZANLA members began to dominate party structures and eventually usurped and exercised political and military powers in ways and manners that paled democratic centrality into insignificance (Mazarire, 2011). The dominance of party structures by ZANLA had both implicit and explicit ethnic undertone, amplified with time. This was not surprising as different ethnic groups struggling to control the soul of Zimbabwe were dominated by ZANLA and ZIPRA. The ZANLA allegedly focused on dominating the ZIPRA at all costs. The rise of Josiah Tongogara as Chief of Defence in 1973 presented a clear illustration of a dangerous mix of ethnicity, politics, and military adventurism. Under Tongogara’s leadership, ZANLA began operating as a semi-autonomous organ of the Movement, no longer subordinated to the central command (Sadomba, 2011a; Sithole, 1999). Tongogara’s leadership strategy of intimidation and expulsion of dissenting voices would survive the liberation struggle days rise to prominence in post-independent Zimbabwe under President

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Robert Mugabe. The preceding discussion shows that integral members of the military echelon in Zimbabwe’s governing elite took root during the liberation struggle days and continued into post-independence. The merger between ZANU and ZIPRA and consequent ZANLA’s dominance in the party structures had further implications for leadership succession in postindependent Zimbabwe even though, in principle, succession to leadership positions was to be guided by clear rules. At the formation of the ruling party, leadership was, determined through periodically conducted electoral processes. Thus, Mazarire (2011) and Sithole (1999) maintain that from the inception of the struggle, the party was meant to be answerable to the people, with consultation and consensus decisionmaking being religiously observed. While the merger and inclusion of armed wings of the liberation movement marked the beginning of military politicisation in Zimbabwe, the Badza-Nhari Rebellion of 1974 remains a historical illustration of the militarisation of ZANU and, by implication, that of Zimbabwean politics. In 1974, Thomas Nhari, Noel Mukono and Simpson Mutambanengwe allegedly rebelled against ZANU’s High Command in Lusaka by deviating from the Maoist principle of simple living to lavish lifestyles while junior officers on the battlefront in Chifombo (border between Zambia and Mozambique) were struggling (Chung, 2006; Huni, 2016; Mazarire, 2011). Thus, a disciplinary committee chaired by Herbert Chitepo tried the officers in 1975 and recommended that Nahri and the co-accused be demoted and sent to the front line in Mozambique. However, Tongogara, as commander of the ZANLA, boldly objected to the recommendations of the Movement’s political wing and instead had Nhari and his co-accused executed (Chung, 2006; Mazarire, 2011). That indicated that ZANLA was no longer subordinated to the central political command of ZANU. It demonstrated that ZANLA had usurped political power from ZANU, entrenched the culture of violence, and silenced critical voices through accusations of treason, prosecution, and killing in extreme circumstances. Resentment of Tongogara’s authoritarian approach and assassination attempts on his life provided further proof of the militarisation of internal politics during the liberation struggle (Huni, 2016). These events resulted in tainting of the relations between the political and military wings of the liberation movement. Further evidence of the militarisation of political life during the liberation struggle is reflected in the 1976 incident when Mugabe assumed leadership of ZANU (Tendi, 2017). ZANLA members, notably Wilfred Mhanda and Dzinashe Machingura, refused to salute civilian authorities of the party, especially those who had returned from prison. The belief that the gun is sovereign over politics, as promoted by Tongogara, obliterated both the philosophy of the party as the vanguard of the revolution and idea of leadership succession through democratic elections. The militarisation of political life, which became visible during the liberation struggle, was amplified in post-independent Zimbabwe as implicated in the lack of professionalism in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Attempts were made in the immediate post-independence years to professionalise the army following the reintegration of ZIPRA, ZANLA, and the Rhodesian Forces (RF) to form the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the efforts did not yield a good result (Chitiyo & Rupiya,

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2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2010; Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). The ZNA under General Solomon Mujuru (liberation name Rex Nhongo) sought assistance from the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) in an attempt to create an educated, professional, non-partisan, and disciplined national force (Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). The whole idea was Political developments in post-independent Zimbabwe later proved that the more things changed, the more they remained the same. The idea of professionalism in the army lost credence between 1983 and1985 when ZANU used the 5th Brigade, a North Korea-trained military organ of the ZNA, to thwart alleged dissident activities in the Matebeland Operation called Gukurahundi (Raftopoulos, 2019; Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Several scholars have described Gukurahundi as state-sponsored political killings targeting the Ndebele ethnic people in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005; CCJP & LRF, 1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Stiff, 2000). Over 20,000 Ndebele-speaking people were massacred in genocide-oriented killings (CCJP & LRF, 1997). A political power contest between the two revolutionary icons, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of ZANU, saw Mugabe reverting to the old style of using violence and military prowess to resolve political problems (Masunungure, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). Despite Mugabe’s admission that the killings displayed a moment of madness in Zimbabwe’s political trajectory, the motive and army’s role leave much to be desired. Critics are convinced that Prime Minister Mugabe had conspired with Perence Shiri. Commander of the Fifth Brigade and Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of Defense and in charge of the intelligence, to resolve adversity with ZAPU through military means (Masunungure, 2011; Mazarire, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Thus, the Gukurahundi killings provide a conspicuous military–politics nexus in the governance of Zimbabwe. The militarisation of politics has been ZANU-PF’s defining strategy for silencing dissent since 2000. As alluded to by Tendi (2020a, 2020b, 2020c), Mugabe is blamed for politicising the militarisation of the army and politics. The trade-off characterising the relationship between the governing elite and the military has been granting access to the sectors of the country’s economy in exchange for loyalty. The army’s access to both the blood diamonds of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the 1998 war in that country and the Marange Diamonds in Zimbabwe post-2006 reveal some transactional relationships that existed between Mugabe and the state security clusters (Moyo, 2016; Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; Towriss, 2013). Politics of patronage allowed the military to plunder the country’s economy to the detriment of the general populace. As Powell and Chacha (2019) advanced, Mugabe managed to prolong and sustain his stay in office by rewarding the loyalty of the liberation veterans and the armed forces. The preceding is a clear indication of the predominance of residues of persistence and aggregates in Zimbabwe’s elite circulation from our theoretical proposition.

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The Challenge of Non-governing Elite From our theoretical position, societies thrive through the orderly replacement of governing elites (leaders). In reality, however, governing elites, especially in Zimbabwe, often manipulate political processes to perpetuate their stay in power (Powell & Chacha, 2019). They maintain their superiority over others by acting as gatekeepers and obstructing the ambitions of non-governing elites to move into the elite governing category. The obstruction is based on the fear that non-governing elites if allowed to move up, will radically alter the social, political, and economic status quo in ways that will deprive governing elites of their power and privileges accounts for the obstructions (Higley & Pakulski, 2012). Militarisation of politics, control, and use of instruments of violence (the military) to intimidate, kill and harass political opponents are some measures employed by the governing elites in Zimbabwe to truncate elite circulation. Thus, Zimbabwe continues to witness implicit and explicit military involvement in governance. The formation of the Movement for the Democratic Change (MDC) is thus far regarded as the most potent challenge by non-governing elites to the dominance of ZANU-PF and the governing elites of Zimbabwe (Dzimiri, 2019; Masunungure, 2011). During the 2000 constitutional referendum, the MDC working with the Civil Society Organisation under the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) defeated the vote ‘Yes’ campaign championed by the Constitutional Commission (CC) ZANUPF. What followed the referendum defeat was the massive militarisation of politics in what Rupiya (2005:117) described as ‘governance through military-style’. This was galvanised by the formation of the Joint Operation Command (JOC), involving the leadership of the Army, Air force, Prison, Intelligence, and police, as ZANU-PF’s shadow politburo (Chitiyo, 2009; Dzimiri, 2019; Masunungure, 2011). The JOC has played a significant role in the electoral affairs of the land and the militarisation of the elections. In the presidential election of 2002, military leaders who were part of the revolution in Zimbabwe decreed that they would not salute a leader with no revolutionary credentials (Southhall, 2017; Masunungure, 2011; Tendi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). This was reminiscent of the 1976 incident when Mugabe assumed leadership of ZANU, as previously pointed out. In addition, since the dawn of the century, state security clusters have not hidden their political stance and involvement in several ZANU-PF human rights waves of abuse, including Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order), which involved the destruction of dwellings of the urban opposition party supporters in 2005 (Dzimiri & Runhare, 2012; Mlambo, 2008). The unprecedented violence of 2008 before and after the run-off elections showed that the military remains a critical stakeholder in ZANU-PF politics. As Masunungure (2011: 85) observes, the soldiers demonstrated that they are ‘politicians in uniform’ and at the service of ZANU-PF. Once again, the political impasse between the MDC and ZANU-PF in the March 2008 harmonised elections, which led to the June 2007 run-off, was decided militarily. To scare off the opposition and tilt the election outcome in favour of Mugabe, the military, working with War Veterans and ZANU-PF youth militia (both non-statutory military wings of ZANU-PF), unleashed violence

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against the opposition party leaders and their supporters (Dzimiri, 2019; Masunungure, 2011; Raftopoulos, 2019; Tendi, 2019). An aggressive campaign displayed by the state security forces to win the election for Mugabe forced the late MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai to give up the race and save Zimbabwe from persecution (Dzimiri, 2019). Although the formation of the Unity Government (GNU) in 2009 de-escalated violence, the fact remains that the militarisation of elections thwarted all efforts towards the entrenchment of democracy in Zimbabwe. The discussion on the opposition challenge and the military factor in Zimbabwe’s politics demonstrates that the governing elites have always resorted to violence whenever there is a severe challenge to their stronghold on power. The socioeconomic crisis and political quagmire that the country experiences are linked with poor elite circulation in the face of leadership degeneration. More importantly, a piecemeal attempt at professionalising the army in the early post-independence dispensation licensed both the politicisation of the army and militarisation of politics and the creation of factional groups within the ruling party. Factional conflict within the ZANU-PF party became intense as Mugabe aged and degenerated in terms of leadership quality, leaving Zimbabwean governance needing reinvigoration. Acts of delegitimising each other between the Lacoste faction and the G-40 group showed the challenges caused by the need for a clear succession policy. Seemingly, each faction considered itself to hold the most proper claim to the throne in the perceived post-Mugabe dispensation, which alone demonstrated the elites’ poor circulation.

Intra-Zanu-PF Factional Battles and Military Intervention The military intervention, which led to the unceremonious departure of Robert Mugabe in November 2017, was precipitated by intra-party factional conflict fermented by a lack of a succession policy and plan within ZANU-PF. The conception of factionalism presented by Köllner and Basedau (2005) shows some group dynamics marked by a group acting within and usually against the larger body or polity. In that sense, the struggle for power as a group or a collection of members constitutes factors for factionalism (Köllner & Basedau, 2005: 8). Also, members of a faction must share a common identity and purpose. They should be organised towards achieving a particular goal. Hine (1982) reinforces that, in general, factionalism reveals deeply rooted fractures and goal incompatibilities within a larger group. The preceding observation concurs with the postulation by Köllner and Basedau (2005: 6) that if not adequately managed, factionalism has the propensity to undermine political parties’ stability, legitimacy, and efficiency. Applied to the Zimbabwe situation, the size of the governing elite class contracted as more and more elites were removed through sacking from positions, outright expulsions from party, and implicated in criminal or treasonable offences. These contractions were products of fierce competition between factions within ZANU-PF, namely, the ‘G-40 and the Lacoste groups’. Both factions trumped-up charges against one another in their bitter

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rivalry and junketing for position and power. The Mugabe government was complicit in this politics of bitterness and, in the process, authored his downfall. A profiling of Mugabe’s leadership style offers a platform for comprehending factionalism within ZANU-PF, which invariably gave birth to military intervention in Zimbabwe. Studies by Raftopoulos (2019) and Tendi (2016) traced the root of intraelite squabbles in ZANU-PF to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle years. The scholars argue that controversies and factional tensions along tribal and ethnic lines started manifesting during the struggle and were not adequately resolved as the revolutionary leaders thought tackling these would derail the liberal agenda of decolonising Zimbabwe. What is unique about Zimbabwe’s twenty-first-century factional battles is that Mugabe was primarily responsible for exporting the same problems to the postindependence dispensation. Mugabe consistently used ethnicity, partisan attitudes, and racism and targeted people with different views as enemies of the state to consolidate his power base (Dzimiri et al., 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). A reflection on twenty-first-century succession tensions within ZANU-PF shows that Mugabe, on several occasions, outwitted his party members by playing them against each other. A good example is the rise and fall of Joyce Mujuru between 2004 and 2014. Literature shows that the death of Simon Muzenda in September 2003 created factional tensions within ZANU-PF when Joyce Mujuru pitted herself against Emmerson Mnangagwa over g the vacant position of vice president created by the death of Muzenda (Matyszak, 2014; Raftopoulos, 2019). The late General Solomon Mujuru allegedly pushed for his wife Joyce to succeed Muzenda, and with the support of the ZANU-PF Women’s League, they pushed the gender-equity agenda as a trump card to outwit Mnangagwa (Matyszak, 2014). Another development that militated against Mnangagwa’s ambitions for the vice presidency is the Tsholotsho Declaration of 18 November 2004, masterminded by Professor Jonathan Moyo, the then Minister of Information and Publicity. The Tsholostho meeting sought to discuss Mugabe’s succession, which was construed as a ‘coup’ since the President had not sanctioned it (Matyszak, 2014). These developments angered Mugabe and created mistrust between Mugabe and Mnangagwa. Mugabe reacted by purging most of Mnangagwa’s allies who had participated in the meeting, with Mnangagwa himself losing his position as the party’s Secretary of Legal Affairs to Didymus Mutasa, a member of the Mujuru faction (Mandaza, 2014; Tendi, 2016). Since then, Mnangagwa’s position in ZANU-PF affairs has become marginal and feeble. Mugabe’s dismal performance in the 2008 Harmonised Elections against Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC became a game-changer. Mugabe’s larger-than-life role in Zimbabwean politics and his influence on institutions resulted in the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) taking almost a month to release the election outcome (against the constitution of the country), with reports maintaining that he was ready to concede defeat to the MDC (Human Rights Watch, 2008). However, the Mnangagwa faction worked with the securocrats and seized the opportunity to win back Mugabe’s favour. The scheduling of the 2008 election run-off for June 27 was followed by the securocrats’ militarisation of the whole election campaign and excessive violence

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against the opposition supporters (Chitiyo, 2009; Dzimiri, 2019; Masunungure, 2011). The resultant displacement, torture, rape, and human rights abuses suffered by the peopled, mostly from the opposition, forced the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai to give up the race. ZANU-PF, with the military, went ahead with the election, and Mugabe was declared the winner (Chitiyo, 2009; Dzimiri 2019; Masunungure, 2011; Zimbabwe Association Doctors for Human Rights, 2008). Some important lessons can be drawn from the 2008 run-off election campaign. The militarisation of the run-off election campaign revealed Mnangagwa’s history of working with the military, dating back to the liberation war and the Gukurahundi killings in the 1980s. The intense wave of election violence in the 2008 run-off campaign that forced Tsvangirai to give up the race was equivalent to a ballot coup (Beardsworth et al., 2019). Of significance here is that the run-off was used by Mugabe as his ‘win’ and a cheap bargain that enabled him to retain the presidency. In addition, Mnangagwa regained his proximity to Mugabe. Previously, the Tsholotsho Declaration of 18 November 2004, allegedly masterminded by Professor Jonathan Moyo, the then Minister of Information and Publicity, had pitted Mnangagwa against Mugabe and witnessed the purging of most of Mnangagwa’s allies who had participated in the meeting. Since then, Mnangagwa’s position in ZANU-PF affairs has become marginal and feeble. He only bounced back following the militarised election campaign that prolonged Mugabe’s longevity in power. What can be gleaned from the outcome of the June 2008 run-off is that there are neither permanent friends nor enemies in politics, with interests always take precedence. It was apparent that with the run-off victory, Mugabe was compelled to shift allegiance and work with the Mnangagwa faction. Therefore, it can be argued that there have been several ‘coups’ before the coup in November 2017. The 2002 election is synonymous with the 2008 run-off campaign since the military generals tore the a-political line by pronouncing the country’s political direction. The pronouncement by the JOC that they would not salute any leader who had no revolutionary credentials can be argued as indicating the military leadership’s going beyond their call of duty as per the constitution of the country and the defence forces Act that obligates them to be a-political. That alone received wide condemnation and was tantamount to an act of coup. The Mnangagwa faction reclaimed its place in Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. They started devising strategies to weaken the Mujuru faction with the mysterious death of the retired General Solomon Mujuru during a fire in which he was burnt beyond recognition viewed as the first step towards paralysing Joyce Mujuru (Matyszak, 2014; Tendi, 2016). General Solomon Mujuru was the power behind Joyce Mujuru, and his death exposed her. Another factional move adopted by the Mnangagwa camp was to convince Grace Mugabe to join politics. Working with the ZANU-PF Women’s League, it is alleged that Oppah Muchinguri, the then Women’s League Chair, controversially supported Grace in the leadership post. Grace had neither political experience nor served in any ZANU-PF structures, but the Mnangagwa faction seized the opportunity to get closer to Mugabe.

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What is peculiar about Grace Mugabe’s political career was how she played to contain Joyce Mujuru’s increasing influence as Vice President. Grace Mugabe conspired with the Mnangagwa faction in attacking and undermining Vice President Mujuru’s authority at several political rallies. Major allegations against Mujuru include gross incompetence, corruption, witchcraft, and plotting to assassinate the President (Mandaza, 2016; Tendi, 2016). The assassination allegations eroded Mugabe’s neutrality on the matter, who then embarked on a crusade of purging Mujuru’s allies and pushed for a no-confidence against Mujuru during a Politburo meeting before the December 2004 ZANU-PF Congress (Tendi, 2016). Mujuru was expelled from the party, allowing Mnangagwa to bounce back as vice president. The turn of events became the end of history for Joyce Mujuru, who has not been admitted back into ZANU-PF and not to mention that she was never charged or tried for the allegations levelled against her. What is so striking about Mugabe’s leadership style was that factionalism and expulsion of members became a permanent mark for conducting business within ZANU-PF. Former ZANU-PF political heavyweights such as Ray Kaukonde, Kudakwashe Bhasikiti, and Didymus Mutasa lost their value and got expelled from ZANUPF (Magaisa, 2017). The sudden turn of events showed that the alliance between Grace and Mnangagwa was merely a political ploy meant to neutralise the Mujuru faction. Raftopoulos (2019) posited that factional battles that continued unabated plunged ZANU-PF into a unique political trajectory. Without a proper succession plan, two opposing camps within ZANU-PF pursued mutually and exclusively incompatible goals as they sought to outmanoeuvre each other. Grace Mugabe working with Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuwawu, and Oppah Muchinguri, ignited another factional fight against deputy president Mnangagwa but failed to convince the President to give them influential positions in the government. Interestingly, they decoupled and only worked with members of the G-40 in removing Mujuru and later returned to the Lacoste group after breaking ranks with members of the G-40. Grace Mugabe working with G-40, started a political slur against Mnangagwa similar to the Mujuru faction saga. Interestingly, many G-40 members with political experience chose to play a back-bench role and fronted Grace with no political experience. Melia (2019) noted that the strategy was merely to use Grace’s proximity to Mugabe to secure favours (Melia, 2019). The use of proximity to Mugabe as a strategy had a long history. Mujuru, through her husband, Mutasa, and Mnangagwa, used it as well. The Mujuru faction, mainly through Mutasa—a longtime confidante of Mugabe—was using his proximity to Mugabe to push through Mujuru. However, the G40 fronted Grace Mugabe as a mere strategy for their ends. What is peculiar about the factional battles and the goal incompatibility is that the G-40 miscalculated the extent of militarisation of factional battles and for them, the future seemed to have arrived so early.

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The Military Takeover of the Political Space Theoretically, societies thrive through a gradual and orderly replacement of governing elites (leaders) with differential leadership or governing capabilities through socially and constitutionally accepted means. In Zimbabwe, a mismatch of values and ideas occurred as the G-40 advanced a reformist stance of bringing younger, nonrevolutionary elements of the ZANU-PF membership into the top echelon of the governing elite category by the elite circulation theory. These developments were unorthodox and incongruent with the desires of the conservatives or the Lacoste faction, who firmly upheld the belief that revolutionary credentials should inform party leadership. The general suspicion among the Lacoste faction was that the G-40’s move was an attempt to turn Mugabe against them and marginalise them politically (Tendi, 2019). Overall, the political environment within ZANU-PF was characterised by fear, mutual suspicions, and hostilities. There was no way the Lacoste and G-40 factions could co-exist as binary opposites. Mugabe’s declining authority and ailing health fueled tensions and gave Grace Mugabe better leverage over her adversaries (Southall, 2017; Tendi, 2019). Grace Mugabe launched a blitz to torpedo Mnangagwa’s presidential ambitions (Tendi, 2019). On several interface rallies, Grace ventilated her frustration at and hate of Mnangagwa using inflammatory language. Grace lamented that Mnangagwa is a ‘liquidator’ and a ‘raptor’ and that she is well aware of his deceitful plans to topple Mugabe (Mathope, 2017). GraceMugabe’s further attacks were that Mnangagwa was behind the Tsholotsho declaration meant to topple Mugabe (Daily News, 2017). On one occasion, Grace denigrated Mnangagwa as ‘nothing but Mugabe’s employee’ (Chipunza, 2017). The alleged ice cream poisoning of Mnangagwa at the Gwanda rally is another incident that intensified resentment for Mnangagwa. The allegation was that Mnangagwa claimed that poisonous ice cream came from the Gushungo Dairy Farm (Nyoka, 2017). Although Mnangagwa denied the claims, Robert Mugabe did not take the allegations lightly because he believed Mnangagwa wanted to use the poisoning allegations for political expediency. These developments led to the intensification of the isolation and marginalisation of Mnangagwa in the Mugabe-led government, and it became evident that the factional conflict had reached its apex. A well-cited example was the period between 2015 and 2016 when Mugabe took his annual leave; because of fear and mistrust, he preferred another vice president, Phelekezela Mphoko, to stand in as acting President (Mungwari, 2018). Considering the seniority of Mnangwagwa to Mpoko, the message was clear that Mnangagwa was downgraded to an alien within the Mugabe-led government. Feelings of frustration surged among the Lacoste faction when Mugabe started purging those who were with him in the 1970s (Raftopulos, 2019; Tendi, 2019). The purging was perceived as an assault on the liberation war ethos. Fear, betrayal, and uncertainty became common among the Lacoste group. The uncertainty was

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propelled by Mugabe’s allegiance switching and acting on the advice of the G40 (International Crisis Group, 2017; Raftopouos, 2019). A more worrying development was that Grace’s growing power and influence allowed her to attack the party’s top leadership with no consequence. This development forced a group of War Veterans led by the Minister for Welfare Services for War Veterans, War Collaborators, Former Political Detainees, and Restrictees, Chris Mutsvangwa, to write an open letter denouncing Mugabe for fomenting factional fights as a strategy for holding on to power (International Crisis Group, 2017). As expected, Mugabe expelled Mustvanga, the outspoken War Veteran Victor Matemadanda, and other Mnangagwa apologists from ZANU-PF (Raftopoulos, 2019; Tendi, 2019). The aggressive reaction exhibited by Mugabe expressly demonstrated his deepening hate and displeasure over the Mnangagwa faction. Thus, Grace Mugabe’s unprecedented meddling in the politics of the land and the intensification of factional battles indicated that the centre would not hold for too long. Mugabe was caught between loyalty to the party and his family (his wife). At last, he took decisive action to the satisfaction of his wife. Thus, on 9 November 2017, Mugabe shocked the whole country when he announced the firing and expulsion of his deputy and longtime ally, Mnangwgawa (International Crisis Group, 2017; Raftopoulos, 2019; Southall, 2017; Tendi, 2019). In his firing speech, captured in both print and electronic media, Mugabe cautioned that: ‘there is no shortcut to being the leader of the people [and that] just as there was no shortcut to our independence’. ZANU-PF would move to discipline Mnangagwa’s ‘co-conspirators’ (Dube & Zulu, 2019; Southall, 2017). Knowing Mugabe’s modus operand, Mnangagwa was forced to escape for his life. The constant purging within ZANU-PF and the firing of Mnangagwa prompted the Zimbabwe Defense Forces General Constantine Chiwenga to remind the President and his allies that politics in ZANU-PF is sustained through the barrel of the gun and not party structures. Thus, on 13 November, Chiwenga issued a stern warning that ‘the army will intervene against any threat to the integrity of the revolution that led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980’ (Pigou, 2017; Raftopoulos, 2019). As significant stakeholders of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, Chiwenga vowed the ZDF would decisively take to task all those perceived as ‘counter-revolutionaries’ seeking to destroy ZANU-PF. Chiwenga adopted what Raftopoulos (2019) calls a ‘rule-based approach’, citing Sect. 212 of the Zimbabwe constitution that mandates the ZDF to protect its people, national interests and national security and the territorial integrity of the country. A deeper reading into the meaning of Chaweng’s words shows that the alliance between Mugabe and the army was over. Despite being reproached by the then ZANU-PF’s spokesperson Simon Khaya Moyo that Chiwenga had overstepped beyond his call of duty and that his utterances were treasonous, in a unique preemptive move, the army deployed in Harare the following day, 14 November 2017 (Pigou, 2017; Raftopoulos, 2019). The army controlled strategic government institutions, including the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation. Chiwenga’s pre-emptive move was partial, triggered by rumours that Mugabe’s second move after expelling Munangagwa was to arrest the ZDF Commander (International Crisis Group, 2017).

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The Lacoste Team had settled to resolve the factional problem through military means. As is the tradition of ZANU-PF governance through military style, the military deployment was code-named, ‘Operation Restore Legacy (International Crisis Group, 2017; The Herald, 2017). In the words of Brigadier Subusiso Moyo, the operation’s goals were ‘targeting criminal elements surrounding Mugabe that was causing the suffering of the people’ (The Herald, 2017; The Times, 2017). The human security dimension infused in operation seemingly appealed to many Harare residents, including the MDC party supporters who participated in the ‘Mugabe Must Go’ march on 8 November 2017. The military cleverly adopted a political conclusion to the coup by taking the revolution to the people. At face value, the development renewed hope for improved civil–military relations in Zimbabwe as people collectively marched, calling Mugabe to step down. Over the years, Zimbabwe was characterised by an estranged relationship between the army and the people as they were serving Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. The factional fight was appended by some retributive behaviour typical of Mugabe style when the army arrested Grace Mugabe’s allies within the G-40 faction. The then Finance Minister, Ignatius Chombo, ZANU-PF Youth leader, Kudzai Chipanga and the Intelligence Director, Albert Ngulube, were arrested. At the same time, the Minister of Higher Education, Jonathan Moyo, Local Government Minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, and Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, allegedly escaped after receiving some tip-off (International Crisis Group, 2017; Tendi, 2019). Mugabe was placed under house arrest while forced behind the scenes to give up power. The military coup assumed political complexion when the army involved the people in the anti-Mugabe march and later, on 19 November 2017 the ZANU-PF Central Committee staged a motion of no confidence against Mugabe (Raftopoulos, 2019: 6). The ‘constitutional veneer’ attached to the coup dealt a tremendous blow to Mugabe and the G-40 faction when Mugabe himself lost his position as both the first secretary of the party and Head of State (Raftopoulos, 2019). Grace Mugabe was also expelled from both the party and leadership of the ZANU-PF women’s league. Mugabe’s defiance and refusal to concede to pressure compelled the ZANU-PF Parliamentary Committee to consider the impeachment process (Robyn, 2017). Major allegations marshalled against Mugabe were that he was increasingly becoming a liability to the party because of ill health and age since he was longer able to discharge his official duties. Another concern was that Grace Mugabe was wielding more power and controlling important government institutions. There is unanimity among scholars that the political process of instituting an impeachment forced Mugabe to relinquish power on 21 November 2017 (Magaisa, 2017; Raftopoulos, 2019; Tendi, 2019). The decision to institute the impeachment process politically weakened Mugabe before his adversaries. The immediate reinstatement of Mnangagwa and his nomination in absentia to lead ZANU-PF permanently brought Mugabe’s 37 years in power to an end. What can be gleaned from the political developments in Zimbabwe is that the military-mediated power transition was not necessarily an attempt to resolve sociopolitical challenges in Zimbabwe but a calculated attempt by the military segment of

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Zimbabwe’s governing elite to prevent a mass-led revolution. Therefore, the militarymediated power transition temporarily solved intra-elite squabbles within ZANU-PF and allowed the ruling party time and space to restrategise on maintaining political power and allowing one set of the elite to replace the elite other within ZANUPF. Another interesting deduction is that the factions within ZANU-PF were along elite lines, with one camp espousing a reformist agenda while the other espousing the revolutionary maxim of the old order. Thus, the system of circumventing and precluding an upward movement of non-governing elites into governing elite class, especially outside of ZANU-PF, has continued. The military intervention allowed the winner group (Lacoste) in the intra-elite squabble of ZANU-PF to push downward and out rightly banish segments of the governing elite, the G-40, who lost out in the power tussle out of the political reckoning. The military-mediated transition has not and will not likely resolve the complex, structurally defective mechanism for succession within ZANU-PF. Already, there are rumours of bad blood and a power tussle between Mnangagwa and his deputy, Retired General Constantine Chiewenga. Soon their rumoured cleavages and wrangling will resurface within the ruling party following the country’s realignment of political forces and cumulative socio-economic woes.

Conclusion The chapter discussed the military-orchestrated leadership change that authored Mugabe’s downfall in the context of the succession battle within ZANU-PF. Mugabe’s personalisation of the revolution is primarily to blame for the coup developments in Zimbabwe. It emerged that the succession battle within ZANU-PF got complicated by the militarisation of factionalism. The chapter utilised insights from Pareto’s theory of elite circulation to argue that the removal of Mugabe by the military did not herald any form of political transition but rather a mere power play of one elite replacing each other. Moreover, the ousting of Mugabe through a military intervention that paved the way for Mnangagwa’s ascension to power resonates with the wisdom of circulation of power, which saw the rise of the new elite and its displacement of the old elite structure. The observation reinforces that the military’s interference was merely one of ZANU-PF reconstituting itself. In the absence of a clearly defined succession policy, the regional leadership endorsed military involvement in the country’s politics as it promised to resolve the succession fight that has further plunged the country into turmoil. Consequently, Zimbabwe has seemingly s matured into a military state. The fact that the military leadership who orchestrated leadership change has assumed political roles in the country means that the political transition towards complete and democratic rule remains a nightmare. Zimbabwe’s political landscape reverberates with what Levitsky and Way (2015: 45) call a ‘democratic recession’.

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The chapter also revealed an essential lesson that poor elite circulation accounts for Zimbabwe’s lack of political transition. This has been argued within the context of the ruling party’s need for a clear succession policy. Another deduction is that Mnangagwa’s lack of reform shows that it is the character of the elite to seek power for self-actualisation rather than for the public good. That explains why Zimbabwe’s social, economic, and political problems are power based. Things have not changed since Mugabe’s unceremonious departure from office. Therefore, it can be argued that political transition in Zimbabwe should not be centred on changing individual office bearers but on changing political culture and values. What can be learnt from Mnangagwa’s ascension to power is that if the political elite within ZANU-PF continues to adhere to the same culture of violence and predatory politics, the political transition in Zimbabwe will remain an enigma. There is an imperative to institute value change and not figures to allow transiting from selfishness and violence. As it stands in Zimbabwe, the culture of political entitlement dictated by revolutionary credentials will continue to eclipse positive political transition.

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