Democracy and Africanness: Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Democratization and Governance (Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development) 3031112474, 9783031112478

Table of contents :
Foreword
In Defence of Brutal Interrogation of Democracy and Its Place in Africa
Preface
Introduction
References
Contents
Contributors
Part I: Evolution of Democracy in Africa
Chapter 1: The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma of Constitutionalism
Introduction
The 1995 Constitutional Making Process and the Birth of Pseudo Democracy in Uganda
The 1995 Constitution as a Shield of Dictatorship in Uganda
Constitutional Amendments Used to Entrench Museveni’s One-Man Rule in Uganda
Conclusion
References
Chapter 2: Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems: Evidence from Pre-colonial Rwanda
Introduction
The Concept of Public Participation
Governance Structure in Pre-colonial Rwanda
The King, the Queen Mother and Abatware (the Chiefs)
Abiru (Royal Ritualists)
Judicial Administration at the End of the Pre-colonial Period
Gacaca
Umutware (the Chief)
King’s Court
Public Participation in Pre-colonial Rwanda
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored
Introduction
Democracy Contextualized
Democracy in Africa
Democracy in Africa: Prototype for Analysis
Moving Ahead: Where We Are in Africa
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness
Introduction
The Historical Origins of the African State System and Its Impacts
Democracy and Consensus: Governance in Africa
Examining Other Critical Governance Drivers in Democratic System
African Traditional Society in Promoting Africanness
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991
Introduction
The Political Management of the Republics in Mali Between Independence in 1690 and the Democratic Revolution of 1991
The Mali of the First Republic
Mali Under the Second Republic 1969–1991
Political Dynamism During the Transition
Democratic Evolution Towards the Third Republic in Mali
The Factors of the Democratic Transition in Mali
External Factors That Have Had an Impact on the Military Regime in Mali
Democracy and Security Management in the Third Republic in Mali
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic South Africa
Introduction
Historicization of South African Migration
Conceptualizing Ubuntu, Makwerekwere and Belonging
Theoretical Exposition: Identity Politics
From Communalism to Nationalism?
State-Styled Discrimination and Tabloid Negative Reportage
Denialism
Revival of Local Populism
Conclusion and Recommendations
References
Chapter 7: Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland Rangelands of Cameroon
Introduction
Methodology
Situation of Rangeland Conflicts
Governance Approaches to Rangeland Conflicts
Rangeland-Related Conflicts
Regulation of Cattle Movements
Regulation of Transhumance Activity
Indigenous Conflict Governance
The Agro-Pastoral Commission
Modern Courts Process
Ad Hoc State Responses to Conflicts
Non-state Governance Responses to Conflicts
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
References
Chapter 8: Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation of the Cameroonian Criminal Law Response
Introduction
Contextualising the Problem
The Offences: Uttering (Oral) and Written Threat Offences
Interpreting the Ingredients of the Offence of Threat
The Actus Reus
The Mens Rea
Issues with Social Media Content as Evidence
Admissibility of Electronic Documents
What Is a Document?
Burden of Proof of the Offence of Threat
Preliminary Inquiry: A Means of Establishing Evidence
Power to Order to the Locus-in-Quo and Carry Out Searches and Seizures
Power to Intercept, Record and Transcribe Correspondences
Power to Order for Expert Opinion
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament
Introduction
Deliberative Democracy and Women’s Voices in Parliament
Methodology
Women’s Voices and Deliberation in the Uganda Parliament
Conclusion
References
Part II: Electoral Democracy in Africa
Chapter 10: Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer Missions’ Agency in Determining the Credibility of Zimbabwe’s Elections
Introduction
A Theoretical Review of the Literature
The Constructivism Theory and the Norm Diffusion Model
Theory of Motivated Signalling
African Countries’ Contribution to Election Observation
African Governments’ Preparedness to Subject Themselves to Election Observation
Conclusion
References
Chapter 11: Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election
Introduction
Theoretical Framework for Elections and Domestic Peace
Methods
Findings and Discussion
Uganda’s Electoral Foundations and Influences on the 2021 Uganda Presidential Elections
Elections and Prospects for Domestic Peace in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election
Extent of Institutional Support for Peace in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election
Conclusions
References
Chapter 12: Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon: A Philosophical Appraisal
Introduction
Terminological Clarifications
Colonial and Postcolonial History of Multi-party Democracy in Cameroon
Indigenization of Cameroon Democracy
Categories of Political Regimes
Typology of Election Boycotts
Justification for Election Boycotts
Impact of Election Boycotts
Positive Effect of Election Boycotts on Democracy
Negative Impact of Election Boycotts
Deceleration of the Democratic Process
Election Boycotts and Single-Party State
Consolidation of Power by One Man
Election Boycotts and Tribalization of the Political Space
Election Boycotts and Rule by Inferiors
Towards a Credible and Independent Electoral Body
Conclusion
References
Part III: Arts, Culture and Democracy in Africa
Chapter 13: Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda
Introduction
How to Respond Wisely Through Art and Fully Exercise Individual Humanity
Art as a Social Process Through Creative Democracy
Cultural Democracy and the Arts
Participatory Democracy and the Arts
References
Chapter 14: Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda
Introduction
Theoretical Review on the Influence of Culture on Uganda’s Democratisation Processes
Methodology
Presentation of Findings and Discussion
Uganda’s Inherent Forms of Cultural Diversity and the Democratisation Processes
Strategies for Harnessing Democracy Amidst Cultural Diversity
Implications for Democratisation and Cultural Utilisation Frameworks
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Hannah Muzee Tata Emmanuel Sunjo Andrew Osehi Enaifoghe   Editors

Democracy and Africanness Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Democratization and Governance

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development Series Editors Diery Seck, CREPOL - Center for Research on Political Economy,  Dakar, Senegal Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-­ political dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed. The book series is indexed in SCOPUS.

Hannah Muzee  •  Tata E. Sunjo Andrew Enaifoghe Editors

Democracy and Africanness Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Democratization and Governance

Editors Hannah Muzee Centre for African Studies University of Cape Town Cape Town, South Africa

Tata E. Sunjo Faculty of Social and Management Sciences University of Buea Buea, Cameroon

Andrew Enaifoghe Faculty of Commerce, Administration and Law University of Zululand Empangeni, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

ISSN 2198-7262     ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic) Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development ISBN 978-3-031-11247-8    ISBN 978-3-031-11248-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

In Defence of Brutal Interrogation of Democracy and Its Place in Africa One common thread that runs through the literature on the place of democracy in Africa is the perfunctory treatment, or indeed, marginalization, of the relevance question of the governance form to the continent. Virtually all the works on democracy and democratization on the continent take off from the pedestal that liberal democracy is suitable for the continent. Indeed, so firm is this conviction that a rigorous conceptualization of democracy is hardly ever undertaken. Most pundits thus relate to the concept as if it does not admit of some degree of nuance. Yet, it does. In its original conception, democracy equated government by the ‘demos’ (people), implying that the most critical element to it, is the people, who by implication, constitute the fulcrum around which democracy runs. It is what gives meaning to the otherwise placid definition of same by Abraham Lincoln as ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’. In Robert Dahl’s conception, polyarchy (democracy) consists of popular participation in decision-making processes; open and fair competition within firmly and generally accepted rules of the game; and the acceptance of majority rule, respect for the rule of law, protection for individual and minority rights and the safeguard of the interest of disadvantaged groups. For Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset, emphasis is on competition, popular participation and liberty, as the constitutive elements of democracy. Claude Ake emphasizes the need for privileging principles over institutional forms, in conceiving what democracy is – such core principles being consent of the governed, widespread participation and public accountability. Yet, none of these efforts at nailing down the finer features of a concept that is centuries in evolution would seem to have placed the needed premium on popular cum social rights of citizens, over and above the widely preferred and more convenient underlying theme of competition. It is necessary to pursue this line in the democracy discourse, to wherever it would lead, as the social relevance of the governance form continues to be questioned by the very v

vi

Foreword

reality of living, of a preponderance of African peoples in particular, and the lowly in every society in general. This would require considerations of democracy’s essence as a system of government that is predicated upon some institutional, procedural and attitudinal thresholds dedicated to facilitating mass participation in decision-making processes, public accountability and promotion of the general, including material, well-being of the citizenry of a polity. An additional cause of concern requiring a great deal of scholarly attention too revolves around whether Africa is on the path to this broader and more relevant conception of democracy. As well, does extant befuddled engagement with democracy in Africa constitute a validation of the thesis popularized by Claude Ake that the principal challenge faced by the democracy project on the continent is that it is largely driven by anti-democratic forces? Doesn’t the pervasive vacation of presidential term limits across the continent fit into this – a picture in repackaging of authoritarianism by supposedly democratically elected leaders? How does Africa deal with this situation, in the assumed determination of its society, and not necessarily the state, to democratize? It is evident that the place of the state to the democracy project cannot be marginalized here, for, as Nzongola-Ntalaja had advised, no political economy can be appropriately apprehended and made intelligible without a full interrogation of the role of the state therein. Sticking out clearly from the foregoing is the notion that the interest of the mass of the people is basic to the conception of democracy, but this is how far the consideration goes. In the historical and scholarly era following the practice of direct democracy, the conception of democracy has transitioned to liberal democracy, defined by its commitment to a bouquet of bourgeois rights and freedom. Even so, to the extent that several of the rights guaranteed under liberal democracy do not easily lend themselves to activation, except by the privileged class of citizens, liberal democracy has invariably come to serve the purpose of the Marxian state, as an instrument of domination of one class by another. When taken in conjunction with its conceptual flipside, neoliberalism, it becomes obvious how far from its original conception as the stuff of the mass of the people – the majority, in utilitarian conception – democracy has become. For, the truth is that today, for many Africans, it is a question of ‘when would this democracy go away, just so that we could begin to live our normal, more beneficial and responsive lives again?’ All of these have implications for the institutions of democracy in Africa. It is, therefore, important that focus is placed on this distinction as well as the end-state of democratic governance, in any discussion of democracy and its place in Africa, a mission that can become befuddled in the gale of conceptual obfuscation. In addition, sensitivity to these nuances has made the nature of what needs to be done to bring back in, the relevance of democracy in several of the countries of the Global South, to which the embrace of liberal democracy may not have meant greater prosperity, something of an intellectual desideratum. As a matter of fact, the manner in which democracy tends to unleash centrifugal forces in many of these countries, and the fleeting benefits, if any, of its accompanying mantra of neoliberalism, raise questions as to whether liberal democracy or some alternative forms of democratic practice, with admixture of benevolent authoritarianism requisite for

Foreword

vii

throwing up – paradoxically – a strong democratic developmental state, may be what Africa needs. This is a state form, as I noted elsewhere, that is ‘capable of moderating the complex interactions of conflicting social forces, for the ends of inclusive and sustainable development’; which may actually be ‘the antidote to extant dysfunctionality of the (African) political economy’. Exploring these boundaries would bring into the discourse, a number of propositions, some of which were once highlighted by E.C. Houry. First is that no particular constitutional configuration is absolutely necessary to have democracy. This is the sense in Claude Ake’s thesis that democracy is better conceived in terms of its principles rather than in specific institutional manifestations. Yet, it would seem that much of Africa’s effort at democracy is directed at replicating what obtains in Western societies, even when the latter differ markedly, in deep cultural outlook, from African societies. The second proposition is that democracy, broadly conceived, is actually not a wholly Western concept and may not be so deemed. Indeed, the point is that as a system of government, democracy – as historically demonstrated – may actually prevail in a wide variety of political arrangements, even when it varies according to historical conditions. This provides the basis of the advocacy for a fuller interrogation of the pre-colonial governance patterns on the continent of Africa, with a view to distilling therefrom elements of democracy that may turn out to be appropriate for grafting onto what Africa currently does in terms of democratic governance. The third proposition is that a democratization programme may not inexorably lead to democracy, as the story of many failed efforts at transition to democracy (i.e. democratization) – several of them on the African continent – would attest to. The fourth point, which I had made elsewhere, is that democracy is a process. It is metaphorically a journey and not a destination, a continuum as it were, from authoritarianism to democratic consolidation, conceived by Larry Diamond as ‘the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down’. This is akin to Samuel Huntington’s ’two-turn-over rule’ – a situation in which ‘a government that is fairly defeated at the polls hands over power to its successor, and that government in turn hands over power to its successor when it is eventually defeated’. More precisely, democratic consolidation seeks to capture a situation in which democracy has become ‘the only game in town’. A key element in the contemporary world is actually the reversal of democratic ethos in the governance of many hitherto democratic societies, thus threatening the idea of democracy as ‘the only game in town’ therein. The concept of democradura, which speaks to the phenomenon of illiberal democracies, was once presumed to be synonymous with the nature of democratic practice in much of the Global South, and in particular, Latin America. The situation has since changed, however, with evident reversal of democracies manifesting even in the more democratic Western societies. Discussions on what is evidently a process of ‘democracy decay’ is actually dominating the discourse on this governance form. It is indeed, arguable, given the incipient but deepening constellation of forces in the global arena, that this pattern is not about to change. Rather, everything points to the possibility of the antidemocratic current moving stronger in the years ahead, especially in the face of the

viii

Foreword

new realities of engagement consequent upon at least three historical developments. There was the disruption in the global supply chain brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic from 2020 through 2021; and secondly, the war in Ukraine, in all its globally ramifying presentation. Both of these are preceded by the massive wave of migration across the world, which partly accounts for extant transformation in demographic configuration of not a few countries. Each and all of these forces profoundly impact on democracy, and in ways that are just evolving. In a recent review piece, Danielle Allen weighed in on ‘… how the United States can achieve a stable, inclusive, and egalitarian constitutional democracy in conditions of maximal diversity’, as the most critical contemporary challenge facing a once heavily profiled democracy, albeit glibly taken as more or less, quintessential. The triumph of populist currents, the anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies of some of which are only thinly veiled, in some hitherto wholly or substantially democratic states, underpins this type of incipient transition. Elsewhere, I conceived populism as a political construct that runs on the fulcrum of anti-elitism, rabid nationalism and intense suspicion of globalism. It is steeped in demonization of identifiable social categories or constituencies as the basis of the disadvantage suffered by people on the lower rungs of the social ladder, whose anger and frustration are often mobilized to the ends of political power acquisition and sustenance by power entrepreneurs, who do not necessarily share a vision of better life for the disadvantaged, which vision they nevertheless actively seek to approximate for the purpose of power. It in this regard, often carries a good dose of demagoguery. That such a tendency is in ascendance across much of the more advanced democratic states is noteworthy and deserving of more scholarly attention. As well, the manner in which strains in economic performance is making a determined populist push for power in much of the more advanced democratic states inevitably raises the question too, of the profile and fortunes of democracy in the Global South, and in particular, Africa. The implication is that the boundaries of discourse in Africa in the years ahead must of necessity revolve around the place of democracy in the aspirations of the continent for stability, greater inclusivity and advancement in the material condition of the mass of the people. Unless this is done, development scholarship in the manner in which we know it in Africa may soon become irrelevant. There is no single development that speaks more to this concern in Africa in recent times than the incipient pervasiveness of military coup d’états against constitutional governments on the continent. Whereas there was an average of four coups per year on the continent in the period 1960 to 2000, and just one in 2020, by the close of 2021, there had been six coups (two of them aborted) on the continent, and two successful ones in 2022. This has elicited the characterisation of the phenomenon as ‘an epidemic of coups’ by the UN Secretary General. What this demonstrates clearly is the inability of the democratic system to address the critical issues of importance to the peoples of these African countries. The more important of these are constricting economic opportunities, insurgency and terrorism, climate change, social exclusion, etc. It is thus understandable that virtually everywhere there is an announcement of a coup against constitutional democracy, there is an instant outpouring of support for

Foreword

ix

same, canalized in street demonstrations. This, at least in West Africa, has been the situation. What does this imply for the state of democracy in the region? The case of Sudan is a bit different; defined by sustained street protests against a new military rule after the sacking of long-ruling military dictator, Omar Bashir. What accounts for the differentiation in attitude to reversal to the democratic current in these two regions on the continent? Perhaps the more critical problematic is that unless democracy is positioned in a manner that makes it responsive to these social challenges – some of which are existential in nature – its whole essence would continue to be in jeopardy. It is, therefore, imperative that these compelling vistas for theoretical engagement requisite for advising on the right direction for praxis are explored. Even so, it is doubtful whether such a dissection of Africa’s orientation to democracy consequent upon this can be conducted basically in relation to current attitudes to same. Rather, a critical take off point must be a correct profiling of the nature of governance prevalent in several of the communities across the continent that had not only existed, demonstrated some credible degree of internal coherence and, indeed, delivered on the most important missions of a modern state – security and welfare – even while not being accorded the status of modern states. What exactly was the nature, for instance, of the Zulu political system, before its contact with Europe? How did the Yorùbá of Western Nigeria and much of the West African coast govern themselves before they came into contact with the intense foreign culture that eventually practically overwhelmed them? In an earlier study of the Yoruba pre-colonial monarchical system, I had concluded that while at first contact it may come across as a wholly dictatorial formation, evidence abounds that the pre-colonial Yoruba political system was as democratic as they come, especially where democracy is not equated with either mere electoralism, or the reification of Western electoral system and its elevation as the very epitome of democracy. The same question is applicable to the Shona, Kikuyu, Xhosa, Hausa, Baganda and several other ethnic nationalities spread across the continent. Is there any democratic basis to these rudimentary state systems? How relevant are some of them to the challenges of democratic governance being confronted by the modern state system on the African continent today? Are there nuances that need to be further investigated with a view to deciphering what could be factored into the modern (liberal democratic) governance system, which is no doubt globally regarded, but increasingly questioned in terms of its delivery capacity? Such efforts would of course be in consonance with the essence of decoloniality vis-a-vis activation of African indigenous knowledge systems, in this instance, in relation to reimaging some of its institutions of value. Former US President Barack Obama’s seminal proposition on the need for Africa to look beyond strong men and in the direction of nurturing strong institutions comes into focus here. To be sure, ‘institution’ is a synonym for deference to established procedures, rules and regulations; certainly not about physical structures. It is trite, therefore, that while institutions are the pedestal upon which modern governance should ordinarily be constructed, cognisance must be taken of the fact that ultimately it is individuals, indeed, very strong leaders, that cause institutions to be built and nurtured. I had put the same argument in context elsewhere thus: ‘for

x

Foreword

newer, weaker, and structurally disadvantaged social formations in a fundamentally skewed global system, the agency of strong, visionary, and patriotic leaders cannot be taken for granted; or wished away’. Such are surely needed to build and nurture institutions. That is why ‘the focus at the take-off of the development enterprise in such climes should be on getting the right leaders to chart the way, create and nurture institutions’. Where, ‘however, a country has big/strong leaders that are weak in vision, and short on integrity and patriotism, their nation atrophy, and the state they bestride like a colossus, (often end) up failing’. Thus, ‘at this stage of its development, what Africa requires are strong leaders, but of the right mix of qualities, through whom viable and enduring institutions get built, that are capable of moderating the complex interactions of conflicting social forces, for the ends of inclusive and sustainable development.’ This is why the democratic system, which perhaps more than any other governance form possesses the possibility of propelling such personalities of historical circumstance into office, and in an orderly manner too, deserves its place on the continent. The question of what African societies need do, therefore, to throw up the type of ‘strong men’ of the right vision, needed on the landscape of institutional construction needs to be constantly and rigorously examined. Even so, nobody should harbour any illusion whatsoever, and this is a fact attested to by history, that while it may be strong in its distributive mechanism, (popular) democracy may not be the most effective model for material production. The manner in which the hard authoritarian state across the East Asian belt transitioned from limited economic performance to massive industrial and social development within an unprecedentedly short period is enough demonstration of this. This is why the principal strength of democracy lies in its tendency at promoting inclusivity, even while suffering from the limitation of slowness in decision-making processes, and an often-convoluted distributive mechanism. It is also significant that for more than seven decades after the Second World War, and in consonance with the Democratic Peace theory, the leading democracies in the world have tended not to fight each other. When the nuance is fully taken, it becomes obvious that the sporadic armed engagements around the world, in the China-India border, or between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israeli wars, the wars in the Balkans and Caucuses, and indeed extant war in Ukraine, do not in any way invalidate the basic essence of this theory. For an African continent that is virtually paralysed by conflicts, from the Sahel, through the Lake Chad basin to the DR Congo-South Sudan-Ethiopia axis, etc., a consideration of the manner in which more democracy in governance could help stanch these conflicts and stave off new ones is of critical importance. Relevant here also is the penchant of transition to democracy to unleash hitherto latent forces for division and conflict, which also deserve rigorous interrogation. There is no end to the dimensions that are due for intellectual exploration in consideration of the nexus between African States and societies on the one hand, and democracy, on the other. It is quite significant that this compendium, from Hannah Muzee, Tata Emmanuel Sunjo and Andrew Osehi Enaifoghe on Democracy and Africanness: Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Democratization and Governance,

Foreword

xi

has broadened the scope of scholarship on this very important subject, by interrogating the varying, albeit linked dimensions and nuances to the democracy question in Africa. Of particular value is its unsparing questioning of extant scholarship on democracy and democratic transition on the continent, all of which make it a timeous and highly consequential intervention at these times of seismic changes, not just in the African political economy, but indeed the entire global system. Without doubt, such a brutal interrogation, which the volume approximates, is a needful shock therapy for a continent that needs to be awaken and lifted from its unenviable status in development discourses. Professor of Political Science Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife, Nigeria

N. Oluwafemi Mimiko

Preface

The introduction of democratic governance in many African countries more than 30 years ago has been replete with diverse results. Indeed, it can be considered that only a few African countries have made significant advances in building strong and democratic systems that go beyond the holding of free, fair and credible elections. The slow pace in the democratisation process therefore called for the need to deeply reflect on the uniqueness of the process in Africa. In other words, is there an ‘Africanness’ in the democratisation process in Africa which makes it different from those in other parts of the world and thus justifies the contrasting paces in the progression of the democratic process? Within this context, this book dives into contemporary democracy and governance issues in Africa. This has been based on recent events in the socio-economic, political and security landscapes. These range from the challenges in the evolution of democracy, constitutional issues, (un)democratic conflict governance, electoral democracy as well as the integration of arts and culture in the democratic process. This book consists of 14 chapters written by some renowned as well as emerging scholars with a focus on democracy and governance perspectives from different parts of Africa. The chapters are presented in three parts, namely, Evolution of Democracy in Africa, Electoral Democracy in Africa and Arts,  Culture and Democracy in Africa. Part I focuses on the Evolution of Democracy in Africa. Within this part which covers nine chapters, authors have addressed issues such as the dilemma of constitutionalism by critiquing Uganda’s 1995 Constitution as a tool for Dictatorship in Uganda. Furthermore, using evidence from pre-colonial Rwanda, authors have analysed public participation in African Indigenous governance systems. Other works have questioned if democracy in Africa is misrepresented or tailored, while others investigate a consensual democracy and the African traditional society as the promotion of Africanness; democratic transformation in Mali Republic since 1991; reinvigorating belonging in Democratic South Africa from Ubuntu to Makwerekwere; rangeland conflict governance (using perspectives from the North-western Highlands of Cameroon); an interpretation of the Cameroonian Criminal Law

xiii

xiv

Preface

response to social media threats in the context of the Anglophone crisis; and women and deliberative democracy in the Ugandan Parliament Part II of the book sheds light on Electoral Democracy in Africa. This part covers three chapters with the first one critiquing African and Western Election Observer Missions’ Agency in determining the credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections. The next looks at Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa by assessing peace opportunities in Uganda’s 2021 presidential Elections. The last chapter in this part provides a philosophical appraisal of the impact of election boycotts in the democratic process in Cameroon. Part III of the book dwells on Arts, Culture and Democracy in Africa. Using Uganda as a reference point, the authors have looked at art as a social process and form of democratic practices and the democratisation processes amidst cultural diversity. The book is a contribution to knowledge in modern political science studies and targets students and scholars interested in researching African political affairs. Besides, the book is a mirror to African leadership as it highlights the pitfalls in the African governance and democratic process and proffers policy recommendations on the way forward. It is also a working document for development organisations working to assist national, regional and continental institutions to develop policies that will effectively and efficiently address the democratic lacunae which go to undermine the pace of development in the continent. Buea, Cameroon

Tata E. Sunjo

Introduction

In Africa, the mention of democracy falls short of a misunderstood fad, but one purported as the magic bullet to Africa’s governance challenges. Democracy is looked at as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. To what end? An end of transparency, accountability, justice and respect of human rights among others? As argued by Lenin (1918) In actual life democracy will never be “taken separately” (emphasis in original); it will be “taken together” (emphasis in original) with other things, it will exert its influence on economic life as well, will stimulate its transformation; and in its turn it will be influenced by economic development and so on. This is the dialectics of living history.

Therefore, the democratisation process of Africa cannot be interrogated devoid of its History. More than often, the birth of Democracy has been traced to the Athenians where political decisions and participation were transformed to include the majority of the population. Through a deliberative forum known as ‘The Ekklesia’, which was open to people of the low class and slaves, participants debated policies. Here democracy was direct rather than the contemporary representative type prevalent in most governance systems. The Athenian democracy was, however, short-lived with the emergence of the Roman Empire and its annexation of Greece. It later emerged in England as a result of developments that can be traced from the abolition of slave trade, and the development of mercantilism and its evolution into capitalism. These economic events precipitated class struggles among other social classes and land owners. These contentions necessitated a resolving ground and hence the rise of parliament represented in the House of Commons and House of Lords. The birth of the so-called British democracy arose out of the need by different groups, the Aristocracy, bourgeoisie and trade union to influence policymaking in their favour and ensure a continuation of capitalism. This bicameral nature of the British parliament, with the House of Lords represented by the aristocracy and the House of Commons appointed through elections, is evident in many British former colonies and protectorates (Tiky, 2012). Thus, African governance systems tended to be moulded based on the image of their colonies, namely, Britain, France and the others. Their constitutions too were xv

xvi

Introduction

modelled after the Westminster model if not dictated by the coloniser for independence to be granted as was the case in Ghana (Nkrumah, 1963). The British democracy established on the basis of a Capitalistic liberal society was transferred to the Africans. This liberal form of democracy creates the illusion of an equality and freedom for all but, in essence, it is a government that belonged to a few who owned the capital and means of production; hence, whereas people seemed to have the right to choose, the power lay in the hands of the few, the monied, the educated or with some sort of affiliation to the government (Mohiddin, 1970). This is also explained by the flawed nature of constitutional democracy. In this volume on Democracy and Africanness: Contemporary Issues in Africa’s Democratisation and Governance, Robert Ojambo in ‘The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma of Constitutionalism’ describes how the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda has been used to promote personal rule, and systematically weaken the opposition. Ojambo uses the Black Man’s Rule theory that describes two types of leaders: the Prince who rules by right of birth and co-­ option and Autocrats who rule by domination, outmanoeuvring of opponents and buttressed by prophetic principles to create fear. The latter in Uganda has promoted patronage and created a situation where the state is ‘governed through the rule by law instead of by the rule of law’. This chapter discusses how, after independence, weak and dysfunctional governments consistently amended the constitution to consolidate their stay in power, serving as proof of the weak and unjust motive that was behind the framing of independence constitutions. Thus, when we look at the failure of constitutional democracy, it is imperative that history is put into perspective. Besides, contrary to Article 1 of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution that states that all power belongs to the people, in reality, it belongs to the President and a few with means to control the tide of power. Indeed, the mechanics of democracy thrive on the disparity in society, and class conflict. Liberal democracy, the popular version that creates an illusion of power to the masses instead combined with representative democracy, favours the political bourgeois and the middle class (Tiky, 2012). The degeneration of democracy in Africa is evident in the chapter by Mady Ibrahim Kante on ‘Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991’ that traces the democratisation process of Mali and points challenges to the initial failure of constitutionalism at the time of independence. The subsequent attempts at the democratisation process have left the country economically dysfunctional and vulnerable to alliances with European powers some of which have been active in keeping oppressive regimes in power, supporting corruption and mismanagement to their advantage. Anuoluwapo Durokifa in ‘Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored’ therefore argues that the current African style of democracy is a (mis) representation of Liberal democracy. The chapter describes how democracy in Africa is restricted to regular elections irrespective of the outcome and how they are used by leaders to navigate constitutional democracy and entrench authoritarianism; the pseudo-democracies consistently violate human rights and hardly accommodate diversity nor facilitate individual freedoms, and the separation of power is virtually non-existent in African governments, and the executive exerts more power over other organs of government. Similarly, John Mary Kanyamurwa, Juma Sultan

Introduction

xvii

Kakuba, Ronald Kaddu and Stanley Babalanda in their chapter on ‘Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election’ show how the removal of constitutional term limits by the 36-year-old regime precipitate electoral violence. The authors, therefore, argue that the restoration of presidential term limits, adherence to electoral laws and security reforms will deepen electoral democracy in Uganda, and to achieve domestic peace, free and fair elections, it is paramount that Presidential power is restricted. The prevalence of regular elections in Africa, often construed as the presence of democracy on the continent, is a flawed criterion. There are a number of examples where incumbents cling to power such as in the case of Uganda, Rwanda and Cameroon (Cilliers, 2016). Elections often serve as a tool of political accountability, but, unfortunately, the presence of authoritarianism has rendered their rationale empty (Chabal, 1998). The playing field is uneven, with manipulation of the masses, constriction of the political space and operation of political parties and the intimidation of the press. The choices for the people are limited by the prevailing political environment (Ihonvbere, 1997; Ott, 1996). For instance, Irene Dione Fokum Sama-­ Lang and Roland Djieufack in ‘Social media threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation of the Cameroonian Criminal Law Response’ present the challenges of dealing with modern technology, the use of social media and the prosecution of threat-based offences committed virtually. The issue of press repression has been extended from traditional media to include social media with many descendants facing prosecution resulting into the violation of right to freedom of expression. The authors’ argument presents the need for the law reform on the issue of cyber criminality, noting the uncertainty regarding the notion of social media threats in Cameroon and other African countries’ criminal laws. This presents the contemporary challenges that African governments have to constantly navigate in their democratisation process. The social media evolution that increased the proliferation of information has often proven to be a threat to authoritarian governments. Certainly, we cannot expect full democracy if people are uneducated, do not understand the function of institutions and do not participate in the functioning of democratic institutions. Where information is restricted, there is absence of equality hence splitting the society into haves and have-nots to the advantage of the former (Kaunda, 1964). The inclusivity and free political competition of all entities such as political parties are necessary for accountability and ensure that the government works in the interests of the populace (Bates, 2010). Consequently, Mziwandile Ndlovu in his chapter ‘Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer Missions’ Agency in Determining the Credibility of Zimbabwe’s Elections’ presents a change in tide where African governments are beginning to take centre stage on election observation and management of elections. He argues that this presents an avenue for a peculiar model of democracy key to Africa’s liberation, since many of the Western observation missions tend to have ulterior motives that are geared at controlling governance practices in African countries for their selfish economic ambitions. Lavngwa Moses Seemndze in his chapter ‘Impact of Elections Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon: A philosophical Appraisal’ examines the

xviii

Introduction

legitimacy of election boycotts by political parties as a justifiable tool to influence election outcome and regime change. He argues that despite their successes in other contexts, for the Cameroonian case, they have derailed the democratisation process. He further notes that ‘unequal participation in elections is more rewarding than boycotts’, although the credibility of the electoral body in upholding electoral democracy is underscored. Hence, the need for Africans’ active involvement in determining their democratic journey. The authors in this volume consistently argue for the need for an African contextualised democratic process. In this circumstance, democracy is not alien to African societies. Just like democracy was destroyed in the Athenian society by the Roman invasion, similarly, in Africa, democracy collapsed with colonialism. Seemndze acknowledges how the Cameroonian democracy consistently degenerated into ethnic conflicts due to the Western insistence on institutions that did not consider African indigenous cultural practices, where decisions were arrived at by consensus with representation from all sections of the community. The author maintains that the indigenisation of democracy requires ‘an eclectic approach which fuses African and Western values according to their cultural specificities’. A vivid example of democratic practices in Africa is described by Vedaste Ndizera, Raphael Nkaka and Safari Kambanda in ‘Public participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems: Evidence from Pre-colonial Rwanda’. Their chapter describes how precolonial Rwanda although run on a monarchical system was democratically organised and decentralised right down to the family level. The various administrative units of the Abatware and Abiru connected different publics’ right from the grassroots to the central level and ensured that even the common people were taken into consideration. The King although seen as God’s representative had no absolute powers; they were checked by the Queen Mother, the Abiru and other chiefs. However, the undemocratic nature of colonialisation abruptly halted the evolution of the Rwandan Kingdom under King Kigeli Mukobanya, with effects that have continually crippled current governance systems in Rwanda. Tata E. Sunjo in his chapter ‘Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland Rangelands of Cameroon’ shows that non-state approaches to rangeland conflicts were more effective. The centralised approach was ineffective due to its undemocratic nature that imposed administrative and judicial leadership on the community from the central government that was out of touch with the historical and cultural realities of the people. Therefore, successful resolution of conflicts hinges on community participation through dialogue. This is collaborated by Andrew Enaifoghe in ‘A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness’, where he argues that consensual democracy, contrary to majoritarian democracy, favours and protects the interests of minorities and allows for meaningful representation. Thus the African model of democracy needs to be anchored in inclusivity. He further notes that governments heavily reliant on foreign alliances and investment are less likely to forge stronger ties with citizens. Cilliers (2016) similarly contends that countries steeped in poverty with low levels of income are unable to develop democratically due to insufficiently developed institutions. It is therefore Ludicrous for Western and European powers to dictate

Introduction

xix

liberal democracy on African countries, yet they have been deprived of the economic strength and political changes that made democratic government possible (Chabal, 1998). This phenomenon, in many cases, explains the democratic fragility of countries like South Africa. Ekanade Israel in his chapter ‘From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic South Africa’ shows how the emerged South African democratic state suffers from vestiges of apartheid that left the Africans economically deprived hence exacerbating negative tendencies of xenophobia. In essence democracy, he argued, did not bring about justice in South Africa. Democracy, as argued by Peters (2002) is measured by the government’s ability to meet the needs of the population and the extent to which citizens are empowered to make their own decision and determine their destinies. Essentially, democracy entails an end to oppression, discrimination and misuse of power by the minority (Imam, 1992). Kaunda (1964) argues that Democracy is a means to minimise social and economic difficulties and adds that: The ideal of democracy today is still the never ending battle for better life, for better justice, for a brighter political, national, cultural, economic and social existence for the ever increasing masses of the world, where the enemies of democracy are hunger, poverty, ignorance. This battle has hardly yet begun. The staggering portion of the world’s population that still remains under the yoke of these spectres defies the hollow boost that the world has achieved the ultimate in civilisation. The ideal of democracy is still the continuation of the fight for a better society and as long as we maintain this ideal we can have faith in ourselves and in our society.

In the strive for a better and equal society, Hannah Muzee in her chapter ‘Speak to Be Heard’: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament’ uses the deliberative democracy theory to analyse the deliberative behaviour of women parliamentarians in Uganda. The chapter shows that despite the tenets of deliberative democracy such as equality, women legislators still face discrimination and have to consciously navigate patriarchy and misogyny inherent in parliamentary structures, norms and practices. The chapter shows the necessity for inclusivity in public deliberative spaces especially the accommodation of minority peoples in accordance with the principle of equality as propounded under deliberative democracy. Taking into consideration the diverse nature of society, Elizabeth Kyazike, John Mary Kanyamurwa and Babalanda Stanley interrogate the role of culture in the democratisation process in Uganda in ‘Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda’. Using the postcolonial theory, they examine the heterogeneous nature of the Uganda society and argue that cultural or ethnic diversity is not something that can be wished away, and hence the society should be educated for their accommodation and they should be deliberately considered in public policy formulation. Akin to diversity appreciation is the role of art in shaping individuals meaning with one’s environment. Justine Nabaggala in her chapter ‘Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda’ shows how art has been used to make meaning of different phenomenon in our society. She argues that the linked cultural art forms by arts contribute the elimination of intellectual invisible

xx

Introduction

colonialism necessary to establish intellectual independence, an aspect paramount to self-determination of Africa’s democratic journey. Therefore, the chapters in this edited volume depict a multiplicity of democratisation and governance challenges in Africa that stand in the way of Africa’s self-­ determination of its democratic journey. Western liberal democracy as transplanted and imposed on the continent needs to be rethought. Despite the prevalent challenges, African resilience is resolute to determine its destiny. The persistence of coups and the rise in populism are testaments that democratisation process is still under transformation. Notably so, democracy in Africa will have to be reborn from within and not without but dictated by the prevailing circumstances. Cape Town, South Africa

Hannah Muzee

References Bates, R. H. (2010). Democracy in Africa: A very short history. Social Research, 77(4), 1133–1148. Chabal, P. (1998). A few considerations on Democracy in Africa. International Affairs, 74(2), 289–303. Cilliers, J. (2016). The future of democracy in Africa (African Futures Paper 19). Ihonvbere, J.  O. (1997). Democratisation in Africa. Peace Review, 9(3), 371–378. https://doi. org/10.1080/10402659708426079 Imam, A. (1992). Democratisation Processes in Africa: Problems and Prospects. Review of Africa Political Economy, 54, 102–105. Kaunda, K. (1964). The Future of Democracy in Africa (No. 15; pp. 37–39). Indiana University Press. Lenin, V.  I. (1918). The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State & the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution (Vol. 25). https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/lenin/state-­and-­ revolution.pdf Mohiddin, A. (1970). An African Approach to Democracy (Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi e Documentazione Dell’Istituto Italiano per L’Africa e L’Oriente, pp. 298–304). Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa Must Unite. Frederick A. Praeger. Ott, D. (1996). Lessons learned on consolidating democracy in Africa. African Voices-USAID Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development, 5(2). Peters, B.  L. (2002). The Challenges of Democracy and Democratisation in Southern Africa (SA Yearbook of International Affairs, pp. 301–307). Tiky, N. (2012). The African Origins of the Athenian Democracy. NCOBPS 2012 Annual Meeting Paper.

Contents

Part I Evolution of Democracy in Africa 1

The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma of Constitutionalism��������������������������������������������    3 Robert Ojambo

2

 Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems: Evidence from Pre-­colonial Rwanda��������������������������������������   21 Vedaste Ndizera, Raphael Nkaka, and Safari Kambanda

3

 Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored ������������������������������   33 Anuoluwapo Durokifa

4

 Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: A Promoting Africanness����������������������������������������������������������������������������   45 Andrew Enaifoghe

5

 Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991 ������������������   57 Mady Ibrahim Kante

6

From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic South Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������   73 Israel Ekanade

7

Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland Rangelands of Cameroon����������������������������   89 Tata E. Sunjo

8

Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation of the Cameroonian Criminal Law Response��������  111 Irene Dione Fokum Sama-Lang and Roland Djieufack

9

“Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament ��������������������������������������������������������������������  127 Hannah Muzee xxi

xxii

Contents

Part II Electoral Democracy in Africa 10 Norm  Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer Missions’ Agency in Determining the Credibility of Zimbabwe’s Elections������������������������������������������������  143 Mziwandile Ndlovu 11 Elections  and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election������������������������  161 John Mary Kanyamurwa, Juma Sultan Kakuba, Ronald Kaddu, and Stanely Babalanda 12 Impact  of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon: A Philosophical Appraisal����������������������������������������������  177 Lavngwa Moses Seemndze Part III Arts, Culture and Democracy in Africa 13 Art  as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  197 Justine Nabaggala 14 Democratisation  Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  213 Kyazike Elizabeth, John Mary Kanyamurwa, and Stanley Babalanda Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  231

Contributors

Stanely  Babalanda  Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Roland  Djieufack  Department of Law, Higher Technical Teachers’ Training College, The University of Bamenda, Bamenda, Cameroon Anuoluwapo  Durokifa  School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Kyazike  Elizabeth  Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Andrew Enaifoghe  Faculty of Commerce, Administration and Law, University of Zululand, Zululand, South Africa Israel  Ekanade  Department of Political Science and International Relations, Trinity University, Lagos, Nigeria Ronald  Kaddu  Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Juma Sultan Kakuba  Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Safari Kambanda  Department of Governance and Public Administration, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Mady  Ibrahim  Kante  University of Legal and Political Sciences of Bamako, Bamako, Mali Peacekeeping School, Peacekeeping School  - Alioune Blondin Bèye of Bamako (EMP-ABB), Bamako, Mali Geopolitic, Mali War College, Bamako, Mali

xxiii

xxiv

Contributors

John  Mary  Kanyamurwa  Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Hannah Muzee  Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa Justine Nabaggala  Department of Visual Communication, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Vedaste  Ndizera  Department of Political Science and International Relations, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Mziwandile Ndlovu  African Institute for Development Policy, Lilongwe, Malawi Raphael Nkaka  Department of History and Heritage Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda Robert Ojambo  Department of History and Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda Irene Dione Fokum Sama-Lang  Faculty of Law and Political Science, Department of English Law, University of Bues, Bues, Cameroon Lavngwa Moses Seemndze  University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon Biaka University Institute of Buea, Buea, Cameroon Tata E. Sunjo  Faculty of Social and Management Sciences, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon

Part I

Evolution of Democracy in Africa

Chapter 1

The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma of Constitutionalism Robert Ojambo

Abstract  This chapter examines the interplay between the 1995 Constitution and the growing tendency of dictatorship in Uganda. The main argument is that whereas the drafting of the 1995 Constitution was seen by many as an attempt to promote democracy and good governance in Uganda, its implementation has often not appeared to point to that endeavour. Rather the 1995 Constitution has been used as a legal instrument for the promotion of Museveni’s political interests in the form of personal rule. The article, therefore, examines how Museveni using his position as president has continuously used the legislative processes as part of a strategic repertoire to portray a democratic picture to the international community while weakening political opposition, promoting patronage and hegemonic government in Uganda. Therefore, the 1995 Constitution has in the end created a semi-­authoritarian regime where symbolic importance of the legislature and relatively free media contend with fundamentally a dictatorship at the centre that survives through legal manoeuvres and violence against any opposition. The 1995 Constitution is, therefore, seen as a tool for Museveni’s dictatorship rather than the promotion of democracy in Uganda.

Introduction Despite the euphoria and excitement at independence in 1962, by 1985, Uganda was witnessing debilitating civil wars, causing a near-total collapse of the state (Gooloba-­ Mutebi, 2008). The then military government of Tito Okello was quickly blemished by insecurity, inflation, and lawlessness. As a result, the takeover by National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986 was seen by some people to have ushered in a tide of unprecedented hope for political transformation in Uganda (Asiimwe, R. Ojambo (*) Department of History and Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_1

3

4

R. Ojambo

2014: 21–46). Cognizant of all the above and the other problems that had bedevilled Uganda since 1966, the NRM leadership prescribed and adopted a Ten-Point Programme. The zeal to achieve this programme can be seen in a maiden speech by President Yoweri Museveni, whereupon he declared that “no one should think that what is happening today is just a mere change of guards, I think this is a fundamental change in the politics of our country” (New York Times, Jan 30th, 1986). On this occasion, Museveni also promised the restoration of constitutionalism and democracy in the country, which was to be enjoyed by all Ugandans (Ibid). However, it is now over 30 years and public debate does not exactly point to what Museveni promised then (Tayler, 2017). While Museveni’s regime has been accredited with a lot of economic development for the country, it has also been politically repressive, as he entrenched his patronized Movement System which became a de-facto political party in power for years, rooted in his personal rule of the country (Bussy, 2005: 1–23). In modern times a constitution is a foundation on which the democratization of any country is set (Nangiro, 2015). It establishes the character of any government by defining the principles and the terms through which the people are governed (Ibid). It is on such a background that the chapter examines the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, showing how it has been used by President Museveni as a tool and shield his personal rule and dictatorship in Uganda. Basing on Katz’s view that constitutionalism transcends textual and legalistic confines to encompass human worth, dignity, aspirations, and interests (Katz, 2009), as well as Okoth-­ Ogendo’s proposition that there can be a constitution without constitutionalism (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991), this chapter contends that in spite of the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, Uganda has to date been largely governed through the rule by law instead of rule of law. To ably do this, the chapter is structured into three sections. The first section examines the process through which the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda came into being. The second section looks at the implementation of the constitution by the NRM. The last section explores some of the constitutional amendment processes, analysing the motive and effect of such amendments. In all these, the chapter focuses on how the constitution has been used to promote and shield dictatorship by Yoweri Museveni, contrary to public perception of Uganda as a democratic country. A qualitative methodology using a historical approach was employed to investigate how the 1995 Constitution has been used to shield dictatorship in Uganda. This methodology entailed discovery, interpretation, and detailed explanation of the relationship between the 1995 Constitution and the growing dictatorship in Uganda. This chapter draws information from several sources, including newspapers and other public media with the view that they represent public opinion about the 1995 Constitution during the period of study. The study also depended a great deal on the literature available in academic documents such as journal articles and magazines. In addition, informal oral interviews were carried out with some key informants. These included politicians, government officials, and local leaders. A thematic analysis has been employed to analyse, sort, and categorize information into various themes. All information relevant to particular themes has been placed together to

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

5

form the various sections of the paper. This approach places this chapter into a wide debate on the democratization process in Africa and other parts of the world. The study adopts the Black Man’s Rule Theory, proposed by Jackson Robert and Carl Rosberg. The theory postulates nonexistence of functioning formal institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, with governments depending on personal rule. This happened after the independence of many African states, as the public realm shrunk, and the world of private power emerged (Jackson & Rosberg, 1984: 2). In this case, leaders are neither restrained by rules nor is power checked by existing institutions, but by their own power and ability to rule. Thus, the system of personal rule depends much more on the leader’s ability to govern, with attendant features of dictatorship and oppression. Therefore, rather than government institutions determining and working on the essential needs of the people, the ruler, seen as “the strong man”, takes centre stage in government to fulfil his/her interests (Kjaer, 1999: 93–113). In this theory, two types of leaders are emphasized. The first one is that of a prince who rules by right of birth and co-option. The second type of leadership is that of autocrats who rule by domination and outplaying the opponents. The autocrats are also buttressed by prophetic principles that enable them to rule by creating fear. The two leadership typologies above share the core features of clientelism, patronage, factionalism, and succession crises. There is limited prospect for institution action of governance as most of the power is bestowed upon the president. Presidentialism concentrates political power in the hands of one individual, the president. This system is sustained by clientelism which involves personal favours and patronage in return to loyalty and support between patrons and clients. The system enables the ruler to use state resources for political legitimization by buying favours through bribes (The Independent, 2019). Clientelism has permeated African societies from top to bottom, with a whole chain of patron-client networks that spread out from the centre to the periphery of the country (Thomson, 2010: 121). For instance, in Rwanda, state patronage is one of the major post-conflict characteristics of the state. “The political arena in Rwanda has been dominated by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), where the Tutsi(s) have had greater chances than the Hutu(s) to benefit from state service provision, because of their patronage network with political leaders” (Takeuchi, 2013: 56). The other manifestation of patronage is where most successful personalities in some of the African countries are ardent supporters of the ruling parties. Therefore, the theory of Black Man’s rule resonates with most political regimes in Africa. To entrench their rule, African leaders such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda have managed to govern through informal, personal channels “hiding” in the formal institutional structures such as a constitution (Vasher, 2011). This has been supported by a structure that depends on political and economic favours. The “Black Man’s Rule Theory in Africa” then becomes relevant in examining the way Yoweri Museveni has been using the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, as a tool for the promotion of patronage, clientelism, and dictatorship. This is ably summarized by Omach (2009), who argues that whereas Museveni’s government has not outlawed opposition, it has adopted a mixture of militarism, political co-option, and patronage that indirectly weaken the opponents and make the country a thinly authoritarian state.

6

R. Ojambo

 he 1995 Constitutional Making Process and the Birth T of Pseudo Democracy in Uganda The process of making and amending the constitution in Uganda has constantly tracked a ragged terrain (Nangiro, 2015). As such, all the four constitutions that Uganda has had since independence have not satisfied the needs and aspirations of the people (Odoki, 2001: 264). Instead, each succeeding government has used the constitution of its time as a tool to consolidate its stay in power through manipulations and autocracy (Ibid). Twesigye (2010) innovatively uses George Orwell’s Animal Farm story in the description of the pig’s dynamics and dictatorship to demonstrate how the leaders have cleverly manipulated the people to support their autocratic rule in Uganda. The result has been continuous manipulation of the constitutions to serve the leader in power and ruling elites around him. The 1962 Constitution favoured Buganda and their ally the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) government led by Obote, the 1966 Constitution only aimed at removing the Kabaka from the presidency while the Republican Constitution of 1967 targeted to destroy kingdoms in favour of a republic governed by Obote and his party the UPC. Thus, to comprehend fully the nature and content of the constitutional transition that has taken place in Uganda after 1995, and most importantly to gauge its impact on democracy, it is imperative to examine the broad context of the process through which the constitution was reached. This view is premised on the fact that one of the most important ways of interpreting the constitution is by looking at the intent of the framers and its adoption history. Such an interpretation entails an examination of the record of the NRM on constitutionalism. The sections also examine the response by the NRM to the critical constitutional issues that arose in its “interim” period of governance and how this have eventually evolved into the current political situation in the country. This is important for two reasons: the NRM was acting as both mother and mid-wife, from 1988 up to 1995 when the constitution was promulgated (Oloka-Onyango, 1995). The situation was even made worse by Yoweri Museveni remaining a major player in the implementation of the 1995 Constitution (Ibid). Therefore, the emphasis in this section is to critically examine the whole process through which the 1995 Constitution came to be and how it has been implemented. On 21st December 1988, the National Resistance Council (NRC) commenced the process of formulating the 1995 Constitution by enacting Statute No. 5 of 1988. This statute established the Uganda Constitutional Commission (UCC) led by Justice Benjamin Odoki, with the responsibility of collecting views from all parts of Uganda and drafting a constitution (Fombad, 2016). The establishment of the UCC and the whole process of the promulgation of a new constitution for Uganda reflects the dual-faceted nature of Museveni and his government through the NRM. On the one hand, there was clear ardour for constitutional reformulation in the country. On the other hand, the dynamics in the process raised serious questions about the commitment of the president to a genuine democratic transition in the country. This point is illustrated by several aspects of the process. In the first place, the process of selecting the members of UCC did not follow the requirements of the Uganda

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

7

Constitutional Commission Statute of 1988. Whereas Sect. 1.2 of this statute demanded that all the members of the commission be appointed by the president in consultation with the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, some members were appointed by the minister without approval by the president, while others were appointed by the president without the approval of the minister. To make matters worse, the chairman and the members of the commission were appointed by the president, without any open democratic process of consulting the masses (Furley & Katalikawe, 1997: 243–461). It has been argued that such a criticism was based on the mistaken understanding of the role of the commission as a technical committee of experts and specialists charged with the task of collecting the views of the people, analysing them, and drawing up proposals for the new constitution (Odoki, 2006). It was further argued that the commission’s role was to prepare a draft constitution, which was merely a proposal to the government and the country to accept or reject (Ibid). However, the reality of the matter is that, since the chairman and the members were appointed by the president and his cohorts, it attempted to assume control of all deliberations surrounding the constitution and was unsupportive of attempts by the media and other parties to enter the debate (Bussy, 2005). A situation that produced a one-sided document that only promoted what the president wanted. Nevertheless, the UCC produced a draft constitution that was later debated in the Constituent Assembly (CA). Two hundred and eighty-four delegates to the CA were elected from all constituencies of Uganda through the legal requirement of the CA Statute of 1993. The debate on the draft constitution commenced in the CA in April 1994. The analysis of the proceedings of this debate reveals two distinct flanks. On one hand, it shows that several CA delegates were committed to coming up with a durable national constitution. A document that was based on principles of unity, peace, equality, democracy, freedom, social justice, and progress. This means that there were lengthy discussions on every issue that were later adopted in the constitution. The CA debates took a period of 1 year and 3 months to come up with the final constitution. On the other hand, there were also several undemocratic features in this assembly. In the first instance, the process is said to have been so much influenced by President Museveni. The president is reported to have met some members daily to direct them on what decision to support on the floor and was really in control (Bwanika-Bbaale, a CA Delegate). Atubo, another former CA delegate, also confirms that Museveni did not only influence, but also created his own “false majority”, which he used to shoot down matters that he thought were not for his personal advantage or political interests (Omara Atubo, Interview, June 2018). In addition, the appointment of James Wapakhabulo, a cabinet minister, as chairman of the CA was partisan. This abused the principle of separation of power. According to Atubo “Why did we have a referee coming from the competing side...?” (Atubo, quoted in The Daily Monitor, July 30, 2017). All these point to one fact, that Museveni had an agenda of making a constitution that served his personal interests. It is on this basis that Furley and Katalikawe conclude that many of the undemocratic characteristics of the 1995 Constitution can be traced back to the undemocratic aspects of the constitution-making process which ensured that any member

8

R. Ojambo

who openly opposed what the president wanted did not have any chance to sit on the constitution commission (Furley & Karikawe, 1997: 243–261). In addition, the CA was characterized by jostling for advantage between the competing groups which included the movement supporters, the proponents of multi-partyism, and the traditionalists especially the Baganda loyalists. This in addition to the process of collecting views, dissemination of information and debate in the CA had given the people some initial confidence that the new constitution would act as a tool of democracy in Uganda as it tried to decentralize power down to the people. However, the process was immediately hijacked by Museveni’s “no-­ party” philosophy that later became one of the most dominant tendencies in the CA and the time thereafter. Obviously, the NRM leaning delegates in the CA embarked on the process of creating an executive-cantered and autocratic philosophy that affected the constitution. Such machinations later paved way for the dictatorship that led to the eventual complete abandonment of the notion of constitutionalism in Uganda that had been started in 1988. More troubling in this process was the near-­ sycophantic beliefs that characterized most of the NRM delegates at the CA. Most delegates believed in the “master is binding” notion that eventually influenced several provisions in the draft constitution. For instance, the adoption of the movement system, as a system of government at the expense of multi-partyism or any other form of government, was aimed at promoting Museveni’s “no party” philosophy without temperance or modification. It was also used as a strategy to provide for the foundation of Museveni’s personal rule in Uganda, under the camouflage of a constitution making process. The draft constitution that was being discussed in the CA also created a foundation on which the NRM was later to evolve into a monolithic organization that insulated itself with rigid structures that turned into a single party in all but name. The constitution also created a government with an administration that is highly personal and permeated with patronage and clientelism. The president has used the structures in the constitution to circumvent and even undermine respect for the constitutional mediation of power. Thus, despite several reforms that had been initiated, several people continue to argue that the constitution is not worth the paper on which it is printed (Oloka–Onyango, 1995). In addition, there also developed factions within the NRM itself during the CA. One of such factions was that of Col. Kizza Besigye; a veteran of the bush war and a former minister in the NRM cabinet who bitterly disagreed with his NRM colleagues during the CA debates (Makara et al., 2009: 185–204). He was one of the ten army representatives to the CA (The New Vision). Together with two other army representatives, he argued for NRM to consider a transitional arrangement. He also pushed the idea that the ban on political parties be lifted before the 1996 elections (Onyango-Obbo, 2001). This was not only rejected in the CA, but the NRM began to isolate members who harboured such views that were specifically contrary to what the president desired. In addition, there was the formation of the Ad hoc National Caucus for Democracy composed of mainly multi-party activists. These were mainly those delegates that were opposed to the movement government. Most of these were particularly not happy with Article 269, which proposed suspension of the activities of political parties. In the end, this group declined to endorse the

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

9

constitution. This was a clear sign of a lack of consensus among the delegates who discussed the draft constitution during the CA.  Despite these disagreements, the constitution was finally promulgated on the 8th of October 1995. This constitution has been seen differently by the various political players. While the NRM and its supporters viewed it as an excellent document which was to play a leading role in promoting democracy and good governance in Uganda. The opposition and critics of the NRM looked at it as a partisan document meant to protect NRM and its leader Yoweri Museveni. It is on such a basis that critics such as Serumaga (2019) argue that “Uganda does not have a constitution, it has a career–distributing patronage device, serving the important function of shielding the presidency from serious challenges of a historically very cantankerous and militant middle class”. It is a constitution that has created a system that favours the ruler, his allies, and clients, who use the said constitution to always silence the critics of the government. At the centre of the above machinations, and the fragility of the 1995 Constitution, is Yoweri Museveni as an individual, who is larger-than-life persona is both a boon and a bane to Uganda (Oloka-Onyango, 1998). Museveni today is reminiscent of the “founding fathers” of independent Africa in the 1960s, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor, and Julius Nyerere. These leaders exploited the legitimacy and mythology of their roles in the liberation struggle as a life-time endorsement of personal rule. Unfortunately, that mode of governance eventually degenerated into a dictatorship. In Uganda, there was a single-minded pursuit of the no-party philosophy, and the lack of opportunities for the development of alternative structures of political organization and democratic participation, that undermined the success of constitutional transition (Tsekpo & Hudson, 2009). Ultimately, the continuing reliance on overt and latent military force, coupled with a growing personality cult which considers Museveni indispensable, has only resulted in the reversal of the significant gains made by the NRM since its assumption of power in 1986 (Oloka-Onyango, 1995). In this way, Uganda will be consciously and tragically proving the old adage: history repeats itself, which in real sense is not true as the events are the ones that keep re-occurring in different epochs; the event of leaders exploiting the experience of the country to build personal rule is what has continued to re occur. Therefore, the 1995 Constitution that came from a process as discussed in the preceding paragraphs was a semblance of a naked and impotent illusory document (The Daily Monitor, September 23, 2012). Many of the provisions of this constitution are at best simply statements of aspiration aimed at pleasing those who care about constitutionalism, without any accompanying mechanisms of enforcement (Oloka-Onyango, op. cit.). For instance, Article 1 of the constitution which states that “all power belongs to the people” remains a fallacy, as in real sense, “all power belongs to President Museveni, who exercises this power through the armed forces” (Busingye, 2012, also see Mwenda, 2007). In the same way, the constitution does not have the supremacy it claims. It is not the ultimate source of power and authority in contemporary Uganda, but merely one of the tools that are used by the NRM stronghold to perpetuate and consolidate power. The constitution has then turned out to be a mere instrument of politics, manipulated by the president to promote his

10

R. Ojambo

political expedience. This view has been challenged by various commentators based on the regular elections that take place in accordance with the constitution (Al Jazeera, 29th April 2017). However, tenets of the Black Man’s rule theory, prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa verify constitutions in this part of the world are made by and for the benefit of those who have power over the state. Thus, whether election or referenda are organized by a regime that aims at consolidating itself in power, such elections cannot in the main, lead to results contrary to what the regime is determined to achieve. Indeed, dictators love elections as a tool to legitimize their regimes as the ultimate choice of the people (Golder & Wantchekon, 2004). Such leaders only sanction and participate in elections with a pre-determined outcome in their favour (Gentleman, 2016). The focus on regular elections may be unimportant and misleading, but the events between and during elections (Gebre & Mohammed, 2017). Many of these elections are driven by the motive to marshal enough political support to legitimize their rule (Kavuma, 2016; The Government of Uganda, 1992). For the case of Museveni and his NRM government, he extends material and political favours to his political supporters at all levels, in return for support to win elections (Gooloba-Mutebi, 2016; Mulondo & Nandutu, 2005). For example, in 2005, Museveni told voters in a local by-election that he owned the money in Uganda, thus warning voters against voting his opponents, which would deprive them of access to social services in their area (Monitor, 21 January 2015). This is in addition to securing electoral votes through presidential promises and creation of new political and administrative districts for areas that support him (Mwenda, 2007). On the contrary, those who oppose his government are harassed and purged. Such manipulations bring about election outcomes, with results that do not reflect the will of the people (Muhumuza, 2009). This illustrates Museveni as an uncompetitive authoritarian who operates a hybrid regime in which elections are artificial attempts to garner the legitimacy of constitutional democracy (Vokes & Wilkins, 2016).

The 1995 Constitution as a Shield of Dictatorship in Uganda According to World Book Encyclopedia, a dictatorship is a form of government in which an individual or a committee or a group holds absolute power. Dictators usually come to power under the condition of turmoil and confusion (Kashambuzi, 2010). Often the dictator seizes power by political trickery or military violence. Once in control dictators and their followers retain their positions through force or threats of force to those who challenge their authority. They abolish or closely control the legislature, and quickly suppress freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. They set up an elaborate secret-police system to detect opponents of the government. Those who object to the dictatorship are persecuted, while those who promote their interests are rewarded (Ibid). The above-enumerated features of dictatorship illuminate the Ugandan political environment. Many scholars have described the NRM regime in Uganda as a dictatorship disguised with in some

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

11

democratic prisms (Goodfellow, 2014). It is neither a democracy nor absolute dictatorship. Diamond (1999) has classified it as a Pseudo-democracy, while Tripp (2010) calls it a semi-authoritarian or hybrid regime. All these provide the basis for us to view Museveni’s regime as a clear case of a government with widespread democratic reforms but clawing them through various informal mechanisms of authoritarianism. Moreover, this dictatorship has strengthened its grip by disguising itself as a democracy through the 1995 Constitution. Since 1986, the army, police, and secret services in Uganda have remained under the full control of President Museveni who depends on the same to maintain his grip on power (Mutabazi, 2010: 19). The ruling dictatorship disguises as a democratically elected government that has sufficient majority in parliament and local government councils to rubber stamp the wishes of the dictator (Ibid). Dictators adopt some elements of democracy, although they effectively run government business through patronage, violence, and repression (Tripp, 2010). On this account, authoritarian African leaders accept some democratic principles such as elections to receive international acceptance (Muhumuza, 2009). Despite once being described as a “new breed of African leaders” alongside Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, and Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki by the former president of the United States, Bill Clinton, Museveni’s major weakness has been his greed for power (Oola, 2017). Over the years, he has manipulated the population and state institutions to keep himself in power, ascending into one of Africa’s classical dictators (Mutabazi, 2010). The president is a reminiscence of ancient African kings, who exercised political powers to their personal advantage (Tabaire, 2007). Museveni is a dictator, who has never believed in the constitution, but conveniently uses it to hoodwink the people (Matembe, Interview, Kampala, 2017). He has been described as a magical leader, who imagines what should prevail (The East African, 2012). As such, it is no longer tenable to remind people of the earlier achievements in the 1990s due to the growing tendencies of dictatorship, manifested in use of tear gas, intimidation, and brutal suppression of public displeasure (Busingye, 2013). Since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, the country has witnessed the progressive collapse of some of the key institutions of government. Well-known institutions and procedures have been replaced with ad hoc ones designed to fulfil personal and political interests of one individual, the president (The Observer, 2014). The situation was made worse by the duplication of offices. There are systematic attempts to undermine and dominate the institution of parliament. The parliament, with NRM majority members, exploit the power of numbers to achieve political goals, disregarding the wider common good and basic human rights and freedoms (Ibid). Initially hailed as a freedom fighter and liberator, Museveni has turned into an autocratic leader, bent on silencing the opposition and suppressing the media to maintain a firm grip on power (Mugabi, 2018). More often, Museveni’s government is quick to unleash military force upon peaceful demonstrators, yet slow at attending to emergency situations that need their attention (Ibid). The introduction of regular presidential elections by the 1995 Constitution changed Museveni from being a benevolent dictator, whose governance centred on meeting the social and economic interests of the country: to a malevolent dictator, with a major focus

12

R. Ojambo

on winning elections and retaining power. This has led him to appoint incompetent and corrupt ministers in exchange for loyalty from political constituencies. Loyalty then has become more important than prudence, a condition that has led to the growth of criticism against his government (Pike, 2019). In addition, Article 29(e) of the constitution guaranteed Ugandans the right to “freedom of association”, including freedom to form and join associations, trade unions, civic organizations, and political parties. Article 269 of the same constitution allowed parties to exist legally but banned them from engaging in all regular party functions (Yadav & Mukherjee, 2016). The parties were not allowed to recruit members, open local party branches, holding delegates’ conferences and sponsor policy platforms (Makara, 2009; Tripp, 2004). This provision was later employed by the government to draft a Movement Bill and a Political Parties Bill with the latter more restrictive than the former. These aimed to restrict political opposition on one hand and consolidate Museveni’s power on the other. These actions show that the regime’s commitment to genuine constitutionalism was suspect of turning into a dictatorship (Oloka-Onyango, 1995). From 1995 to 2005, all Ugandans irrespective of political conviction were presumed to be members of the “all-inclusive movement system” (Munyangabo & Katamirike, 2015). During this period the practice of “individual merit”; which emphasized personal abilities rather than the party that one belonged to became entrenched in the politics of Uganda. Other political parties and political organizations were in abeyance. In addition, the NRM government has enjoyed advantage emanating from the fusion of the party and the state institutions (Ibid). As a result, elections such as that of 1996 became a turning point at which the movement emerged as a de facto single ruling party with a lot of dictatorial tendencies. The other strong element of dictatorship in the 1995 Constitution is found in its concentration of power in the presidency. The president holds the highest office in the land, for which he enjoys enormous power and privileges. Article 98(1) of the constitution also designates the president as the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces and bestows on the presidency excessive disproportionate powers over the citizenry and other political competitors. This makes the president to often use the army to settle political disputes to retain power. For instance, Museveni has on several cases relied on the specialized units of the military, such as the Presidential Guard Brigade and military police to intimidate political opponents during elections (Mutabazi, 2010). On November 14, 2005, armoured personnel carriers and military tanks were used against supporters of opposition leader Kizza-Besigye while on a peaceful demonstration, leaving several people dead (Mwenda, 2007: 6). The 1995 Constitution in Article 98(4) further provides for immunity from prosecution of a serving president. This promotes impunity and authoritarian tendencies in the presidency. The stipulation that court proceedings can only be brought against former presidents does not only encourage impunity for the sitting president, but also make the serving president to hold onto power at all costs, in fear of legal reprisal upon vacation of the presidency (Sekindi, 2019). The checks and balances provided in the constitution against presidential abuse of power are difficult to implement, or easily disregarded by the president. A case in point is when the constitutional court

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

13

annulled the Referendum Act of 1999. President Museveni then had the constitution amended through suspension of parliamentary rules and intimidation of Members of Parliament to rush the enactment of the second Referendum (Political Party) Act 2000 (The New Vision, 25 June 1999; The Monitor 4 July 1999). Presidential powers are a dominant feature of the 1995 Constitution, through specific provisions that give exclusive authority to the president to appoint senior public officers. Such officers include Cabinet Ministers (Art. 111(3), Governor of the Central Bank (Art. 161(3), Inspector General of Police (Art. 213(2), Auditor General (Art. 163(1), Chairperson of the Electoral Commission (Art.60(1)), top judicial officers (Art 142(1), Head of Public Service (Art. 165(2) among many other high-ranking officers of government. In spite of constitutional provision for parliamentary approval of all the above appointments, it is effectively difficult for parliament to veto presidential appointees. It is only in rare instances that the Appointment Committee has rejected presidential nominees. The rejection only happens due to outstanding public integrity droughts or very glaring lack of requisite qualifications. For instance, in 2012 out of 43 officers that were sent to the Appointment Committee of Parliament, only two were rejected (Sekindi, 2015). These make the president to hold excessive constitutional power strands contrary to the principle of constitutionalism and distribution of power among the different organs of government. This is exacerbated with the “interest group representation system”, entrenched in Articles 30, 78, and 180 of the 1995 Constitution. While it has been claimed that at the global level that a representative gender quota system increases the level of democracy (Dahlerup, 2007: 80; Matland, 2006: 267–7), available evidence demonstrates that the constitution has been used to promote the dictatorship of the majority. A strong president such as the one in Uganda easily manipulates the quota system to ensure that legislative bodies are filled with the voice of the weak; but who support him, rather than the power of vital opposition (Muriaas & Wang, 2012: 309–338). As a result of this, the quota system has played a bid role of reinforcing the existing patronage structures and the NRM hegemony (Ibid).

 onstitutional Amendments Used to Entrench Museveni’s C One-Man Rule in Uganda The 1995 Constitution has been amended by parliament many times. This does not mean that the constitution should not be amended but the crucial questions are how, by whom, for what purpose, and for whose benefit is it amended (New Vision, 2018). The amendment of any constitution should offer good grounds to strengthen democracy. By allowing the people to exercise their power; the legislation should conform to the public good for the people. Instead, the 1995 Constitution has been amended to benefit Museveni: entrenching his personal power. That is why critics have argued that the NRM conference held at Kyankwanzi in March 2003

14

R. Ojambo

represented a turn towards dictatorship and manipulation to remove the presidential term limits from the constitution (Oloka-Onyango, 2006). This was essentially an extension of dictatorship that has become firmly entrenched in Uganda’s political space for a considerable period. Prior to 1994, most of the former presidents had utilized the military to entrench themselves on power, and in the overall discarded the constitutional order. With the introduction of the 1995 Constitution, President Museveni has been able to use the constitutional means to achieve the same objective. There have been several amendments to respond to the different circumstances of the day. In a bigger picture, there are other classic examples where other African leaders have manipulated the constitution to either extend their tenure in office or put in place conditions that safeguard their rule against any sort of challenge. In Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015 engineered a third term project which eventually resulted into his re-election as President of Burundi that was marred by violence and intimidation. In Rwanda, President Kagame in 2017 ran for an election after a referendum which amended the constitution not only to give him a third term but also changed the tenure of the president from 5 to 7 years. Namibia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Togo, Gabon, and Chad are among the countries whose presidents, between 1999 and 2005, manipulated the constitution to prolong their stay in power (Carbone, 2005). This clearly shows that in Africa rules are far too easy to change especially whenever despotic leaders want to extend their rule. In Uganda, Museveni has publicly faulted the constitution for being in his way to dispense his presidential duties. For instance, while addressing parliament on the controversial signing of oil deals between the government and Irish oil prospecting firm Tullow, Museveni said the constitution has made decision-making difficult and that it had increased political indiscipline (The East African, March 3, 2012). The first amendment of the 1995 Constitution was in 2000 with the Constitutional (Amendment) Act, Number 13 of 2000. This saw Articles 88 of the constitution repealed and replaced to make a provision in relation to the quorum in parliament and amended Article 89 of the constitution to provide for the number of ascertaining most votes cast on any question (Kiggundu, 2017). Article 90 was repealed and replaced to recognize the role of the committee of the whole house in the passing of bills and make provisions in relation to the functions of the committees of parliament (ibid). Article 97 was also amended to protect the proceedings of parliament without clearance of parliament and the insertion of a new Article 257A to ratify certain past acts relating to procedures (Mufumba, 2008). These amendments were viewed by some politicians as means of President Museveni using parliament to fulfil his interests as he wished as it was aimed to allow parliament to pass bills with or without the requisite quorum stipulated in the constitution. No wonder, these articles were later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In this case, the appellants contended that Act 13 of 2000 affected Article 41 of the constitution that provided for the right of access to information. It was also argued that the act had made parliament supreme over the constitution of 1995, yet the reverse was the position. The second amendment was the Constitutional (Amendment) Act No 11 of 2005. Among the 47 amendments made on this occasion was the removal of presidential term limits, which promoted the lifting of term limits.

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

15

After the presidential elections in 2001, Museveni faced a constitutional impediment to re-election; the country’s two-term presidential limit which was enshrined in Article 105(2) of the constitution (Hitchen, 2017). Thus, as the country moved nearer to a next election which was scheduled to take place in 2006, it became clear that President Museveni was still interested in contesting for another term as president of Uganda (Al Jazeera News, 2018). This would have not been possible with Article 105(2) which only allowed presidents to run for only two terms. In a bid to circumvent this law, Museveni through some members of the NRM party launched a plan to remove the said term limits to allow him stand for the third time. In what was popularized as “Kisanja” (another term) project, a motion to remove term limits was moved in parliament in 2005. This motion received stiff challenge from mainly opposition and some liberal members of Parliament. Determined to achieve his objective, the president summoned all the NRM members of Parliament for a meeting in which over 70% members of parliament were each given Uganda shillings five million to “facilitate” their decision-making in this process (Tripp, 2010). Finally, the president and his allies successfully removed presidential term limits in the constitution. This amendment may in theory be argued to have been lawful but was not legitimate as it betrayed the popular view of the population (Opiyo et al., 2013: 10). This particular amendment specifically changed the leadership and governance architecture in Uganda by entrenching personal rule and dictatorship in Uganda. Otunnu figuratively stated that “...since the hunter needed more than 20  years to eat his animal, the presidential term limits imposed by the 1995 Constitution had to be removed…” (Ogenga Otunnu, 2017). This was albeit the fact that one of the major constitutional innovations that accompanied the transition from the authoritarian rule to more competitive and pluralistic modes of governance at the end of the twentieth century in Africa was the adoption of presidential term limits (Madalitso, 2011). Therefore, this meant that the constitution was only deemed useful while serving the president’s interests and promoting his grip on power in Uganda. To achieve this, the president has created fear among those who wish to challenge him for the highest office, with severe costs attached to opposition, yet credits a lot those in loyalty and collaboration and government into his personal business. For instance, he was quoted in early 2008 while responding to those who asked him to step down, “it’s me who hunted and after killing the animal, they want me to go, where should I go?” (The Daily Monitor, 14 February 2008). He was also quoted to have said during the 2006 presidential campaign, “You don’t just tell the freedom fighter to go like you are chasing a chicken thief out of the house”. Indeed, the signs were rife that Museveni was determined to stay in power for life (The Daily Monitor 4 May 2009). Then came Article 102 (b) of the 1995 Constitution, which stated that “a person is not qualified for election as president unless that person is not less than 35 years and not more than 75 years of age”. Museveni who in 2017 was 71 years old would not qualify to stand as president of Uganda in 2021. As a result, there came another popular push among NRM legislators to have the constitution amended to remove the age limit clause. This means that without term and age limits, President Museveni could stay in power until the grim reaper decides. All through the years, Museveni

16

R. Ojambo

had always said that the decision to remain in power was not for him to make but for the people through their representatives, the MPs. About the age limit debate, he said in March 2017 that he is only concerned about the future of Africa not “small things like age limit”. However, as day follows night, the constitution was finally amended on 20 December 2017. The removal of term limit and age limit in the constitution made it obvious for Museveni to rule the country as much as he wants, making the government more autocratic than it has ever been. This is due to the fact that the president personally intervenes in the affairs of state institutions, dispenses public resources, makes favours without following any rules and procedures, and takes major governmental decisions (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010: 31–49). Institutions such as parliament, the judiciary and the Electoral Commission have had their independence eroded in the face of Museveni’s desire for untrammelled power (Mugisha, 2004; Mwenda, 2007).

Conclusion Therefore, to understand the relationship between the 1995 Constitution and the growing tendency of dictatorship in Uganda, this chapter subjected the process and implementation of this constitution to some critical analysis. The evidence shows that like most African tyrants and autocratic “life presidents” such as Mobutu, Emperor Bokassa, Iddi Amini, and Robert Mugabe, Museveni has cleverly used the 1995 Constitution to promote his personal rule – a sort of “constitutional autocracy” in Uganda. In this analysis, it is seen that only those sections that facilitate NRM and Museveni to achieve the promotion of life presidency and one man’s rule in Uganda are the ones that were accepted in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. The continued interest by Museveni to stay and have monopoly of power has subverted the democratization process in the country. As a result, the Museveni regime in Uganda almost exclusively relies on patronage and coercion hidden into constitutionalism and democratic government. Behind its democratic institutions provided by the 1995 Constitution, the NRM under Museveni uses its incumbency and autocracy to shield itself from any form of genuine competition. This is what some commentators such as Yusuf Serunkuma call “autocracy of experts”. In sum, patronage, personalization, and coercion continue to be key in Museveni’s NRM government in Uganda promoted by the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda.

References Al Jazeera News. (2017, April 29). Al Jazeera News. (2018, January 2). Uganda enacts a law ending presidential age limits. Asiimwe, B. G. (2014). Of fundamental change and no change: Pitfalls of constitutionalism and political transformation, 1995–2005. African Development, XXXIX(2), 21–46.

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

17

Busingye, K. (2012, September 23). The 1992 constitution is nothing but an illusory law. The Daily Monitor. Busingye, C. (2013, February 4). NRM revolution is eating its own children. Uganda Correspondent. Bussy, E. (2005). Constitutional dialogue in Uganda. Journal of Law, 19(1), 1–23. Carbone, G. (2005). Populism visit Africa: The case of Yoweri Museveni and no party democracy in Uganda. Crisis sate Programmme, Working Paper. Dahlerup, D. (2007). Electoral gender quotas: Between equality of opportunity and equality of result. Journal of Repetitive Democracy, 42(2), 73–92. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Towards consolidation. The John Hopkins University Press. Fombad, M. C. (Ed.). (2016). The implementation of modern African constitution: Changes and prospects. Pretoria. Furley, O., & Katalikawe, R. (1997). Constitutional reform in Uganda: The new approach. African Affairs, 96(383), 243–461. Gebre, S., & Mohammed, O. (2017, October 16). Rising authoritarianism threatens democracy in East Africa. Business Day. Gentleman, J. (2016, February 17). Instead of democracy, Uganda moves towards dictatorship light. The New York Times. Golder, M., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Africa: Dictatorial and Democratic Electoral System since 1946, In Colomer, J. (ed). Handbook of Electoral System Design, London, Palgrave. Goodfellow, T. (2014). Legal manoeuvres and violence: Law making, protest and semi-­ authoritarianism in Uganda. Development Change., 45(4), 753–776. Gooloba-Mutebi, F. (2008). Collapse, war and reconstruction in Uganda: An analytical narrative on state-making (Crisis States Working Paper Series No. 2). MISR. Gooloba-Mutebi, F. (2016). The cost of politics in Uganda (Background Paper). Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Hitchen, J. (2017, March). Age is but a number: Museveni looks to 2021 and beyond Uganda. African Arguments Jackson, H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1984). Personal rule: Theory and practice in Africa. Comparative Politics, 16(4), 421–442. Kashambuzi, E. (2010, September 29). Uganda is a military dictatorship disguised as a democracy. “Why Museveni’s Global Star is Fading”. The Observer. Katz, S. N. (2009, April). Constitutionalism and civil society (The Jefferson Lecture). University of California at Berkeley. Kavuma, R. (2016, February 22). Uganda election marred by shambolic polls and claims of fraud. The Guardian. Kiggundu, E. (2017, December 4). Analysis: 65 articles of constitution amended since 1995. Nile Post. Kjaer, A. M. (1999). Fundamental change or no change, the process of constitutionalizing Uganda. Democracy., 6(4), 93–113. Mabasi, T. (2008, December 18). No term/third term politics to democracy and constitutionalism in Africa: A case study of Uganda. SSRN. Madalitso, B. (2011). Personal rule and presidential term limits in Africa. PhD dissertation, Michigan State University. Makara, S. (2009). The of building strong political parties for democratic governance in Uganda: Does Uganda still have a future? The East African Review, 41, 43–80. Makara, S., Rakner, L., & Svasand, L. (2009, March). “Turnaround” national resistance movement and the reintroduction of a multiparty system in Uganda. International Political Science Review, 30(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109102436 Matland, R. (2006). Frequency and effectiveness. In D. Dahlerup (Ed.), Women quotas and politics. Routledge Press. Mufumba, I. (2008, November 24). How much has 1995 constitution changed? Daily Monitor.

18

R. Ojambo

Mufutau, M., & Cherop, A. B. (2021, February 2). Tale of two farms: George Orwell’s animal farm and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s Uganda. Global Community Magazine. Mugabi, I. (2018, August 20). Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, from a liberator to a dictator. Deutsche Welle. Mugisha, A. (2004). Change in Uganda: Museveni’s Machination. Journal of Democracy, 15(2). Muhumuza, W. (2009). From fundamental change to no change: The NRM and democratisation in Uganda. The East African Review, 41, 21–42. Mulondo, E. (2004, December 15). NRM losers get appointments. Daily Monitor, p. 5. Mulondo, E., & Nandutu, A. (2005, July 21). House approves 20 more districts. Daily Monitor, p. 3. Munyangabo, J., & Katamirike, E. (2015). Political competition in a hybrid multi-party dispensation-­an inquiry into internal party democracy in Uganda (p. 2). Gliss. Muriaas, R.  L., & Wang, V. (2012, June). Executive and the politics of quota representation in Uganda. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50(2), 309–338. Mutabazi, M. (2010). The character of president Kaguta Museveni: An indictment of Uganda’s economic reform and renaissance. Paper prepared for Codesria Conference, Dar es Salaam. Mwenda, A. (2007). Personalizing power in Uganda. Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 23–37. John Hopkins University Press. Nangiro, P. (2015, January 9). Amending the Uganda constitution: Isn’t it time to rethink the process and the key issues? Kujenga Amini. New Vision. (2018, July 30). Uganda’s constitutional conundrums. New York Times. (1986, January 30). Ogenga Otunnu. (2017). Crisis of legitimacy and political violence in Uganda 1979–2016. Palgrave Macmillan. Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. (1991). Paradox of constitution without constitutionalism. In I. G. Shivji (Ed.), State and constitutionalism: An African debate on democracy. Harare. Oloka-Onyango, J. (1995). Constitutional transition in Museveni’s Uganda: New horizon or another false start? Journal of African Law, 39(2), 156–172. Oloka-Onyango, J. (1998). Uganda’s ‘benevolent’ dictatorship. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract=362118 Odoki, B. (2001). The challenges of constitutinal making and implementation in Uganda, In Oloka- Onyango, J. (ed), Constitutionalism in Africa: Creating Oppotunity facing Challenge, Kampala, Fountain Publishers Ltd. Odoki, B. J. (2006). A Guide to Criminal Procedure in Uganda, Kampala, Law development Centre. Oloka-Onyango, J. (2006). Dictatorship and presidential power in post Kyankwanzi Uganda: “Out of the pot into the fire” (Rights and Democratic Governance Working Paper, No. 3). Omach, P. (2009). Democratization and conflict resolution in Uganda. The East African Review (Online). Online since 7 May 2019, connection on 8 May 2019. http://journals.openedition. org/eastafrica/576 Onyango-Obbo, C. (2001, August 29). Inside the politics of Col. Besigye’s flight to America. Daily Monitor. Oola, S. (2017, September 26). Uganda’s age limit, removal: A perilous path to disaster. Peace Insight. Opiyo, N., et.al., (2013). Breaking the Conflict Trap in Uganda: Proposals for Constitutional and Legal Reforms. ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 58, Kampala. Pike, W. (2019). Combatants: A memoir of bush war and press in Uganda. Independently Published. Sekindi, F. (2015). A Critical Analysis of the Legal Construction of the Presidency in Post 1995 Uganda, A thesis submited for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Brunel University, London. Serumaga, K. (2019, May 2). Death by ink: How Uganda’s constitution has broken the country. Elephant. Tabaire, B. (2007). The press and political repression in Uganda: Back to the future (Reuters Fellowship Paper). Oxford University.

1  The 1995 Constitution as a Tool for Dictatorship in Uganda: An African Dilemma…

19

Takeuchi, S. (2013). Twin countries with contrasting institutions post-conflict state building in Rwanda and Burundi. In Y.  Mine, F.  Stewart, S.  Fukuda-Parr, & T.  Mkandawire (Eds.), Preventing violent conflict in Africa. Inequality and ethnicity. Palgrave Macmillan. Tangri, R., & Mwenda, A. (2010, January). President Museveni and the politics of presidential tenure in Uganda. Journal of Contemporary Studies, 28(1), 31–49. Tayler, M. (2017). Bit by bit, Uganda is laying the background for future unrest. International Stanley N.  Katz, Constitutionalism and Civil Society. The Jefferson lecture. University of California at Berkeley. April 2000 Crisis Group, December 13. The Daily Monitor. (1999, July 4). The Daily Monitor. (2008, 14 February). The Daily Monitor. (2009, 4 May). The Daily Monitor. (2012, September 23). The Daily Monitor. (2015, January 21). The East African. (2012, March 3). Museveni says constitution is blocking his way. The Daily Monitor, (2017, July 19). The Independent. (2019, October 14). The New Vision. (1999, June 25). The Observer. (2014, January 12). Uganda on the course to become a total dictatorship. Thomson, A. (2010). An introduction to African politics. London and New York. Tripp, A. M. (2004). The changing face of authoritarianism in Africa: The case of Uganda. Africa Today, 50(3), 3–26. Tripp, M. A. (2010). Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. Lynne Rienner. Tsekpo, A., & Hudson, A. (2009). Parliamentary strengthening and the Paris principles: Uganda case study. Overseas Development Institute. Twesigye, E. K. (2010). Religion, politics and cult in East Africa: God’s warrior and Mary’s Saint. Peter Land. Uganda Government. (1992). The report of the UCC: Analysis and recommendations. Uganda Government. Vasher, N. (2011). Museveni’s centralization of power: The political economy of development in Uganda. MA thesis presented to the Dean and Faculty of the Josef Korbrl School of International Studies, University of Denver. Vokes, R., & Wilkins, S. (2016). Party, patronage and coercion in the NRM’s 2016 re-election in Uganda: Imposed or embedded? Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10(4), 581–600. Yadav, V., & Mukherjee, B. (2016). The politics of corruption in dictatorship. Cambridge University Press. Robert Ojambo  is a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of History and Political Science, Kyambogo University, Uganda. He holds a PhD Degree from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He also studied at Kyambogo University and Makerere University, Kampala Uganda where he obtained a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Arts Degree respectively. He has been teaching at the University level for a period of 20 years. Ojambo is a recipient of the Next Generation Social Sciences Dissertation Completion Fellow 2014, African Humanities Program Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2012, and Next Generation Social Sciences Dissertation Proposal Development Fellowship 2011 Fellow. His research and writing cover topics in Economic History, Land, Conflict, Democracy and Higher Education. Specifically, Ojambo has written and published on the constitutional challenges to democracy in Uganda. He is currently the represented Academic Staff in the Kyambogo University Council.

Chapter 2

Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems: Evidence from Pre-­colonial Rwanda Vedaste Ndizera, Raphael Nkaka, and Safari Kambanda

Abstract  Pre-colonial Rwanda was governed through a monarchy system with the king and the queen mother at the helm. Contrary to the colonial view of African indigenous governance systems as backward and undemocratic, the pre-colonial Rwandan governance system was rationally organised and decentralised through chiefs of varying amount of power from the central to the nucleus family levels of society. Apart from the King who cumulated all powers, the chiefs held separate powers according to their domain namely the military, livestock, and agriculture. The system included mechanisms to ensure the voice of the common people is taken into consideration in the exercise of power and a justice system was in place to ensure respect of individual rights. Local organisation systems such as Abatware, and centralised advisory units such as Abiru, and the King’s court are some of the indigenous administrative units whose processes involved the public at both grassroot and central levels, which clearly show that democratic citizen participation was not alien to pre-colonial African governance systems. This study suggests that an inward-looking model of democracy based on traditional values could be more effectively adapted to most African socio-political contexts.

V. Ndizera (*) Department of Political Science and International Relations, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda R. Nkaka Department of History and Heritage Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda S. Kambanda Department of Governance and Public Administration, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, University of Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_2

21

22

V. Ndizera et al.

Introduction Though it is not fair to explain the past by comparing it to the present realities, it is nonetheless important to recognise the role of history in explaining present-day outcomes (Nunn, 2009; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013). That is what the authors are interested in doing in this chapter. The issue at hand in the chapter is not whether democracy is or is not an appropriate form of government for African societies, which has amply been dealt with by many scholars, but rather whether certain principles of democratic governance can be observed in historical African societies’ indigenous governance. Modernisation theories of development have sought to establish a link between industrialisation and democracy, thereby affirming that democracy came from western industrialised countries and spread throughout the world, including to Africa through colonisation (Zewde, 2010). While that conception might be partly accurate, it ignores local realities that could have been the foundation of improving governance and it has led to a situation where Africa (particularly Africa but also the whole of the so-called “global south” generally) and its indigenous governance systems have been systematically denigrated as not deserving any scientific attention (Stoddard, 1923). However, as DuBois (1965) and Thomson (2000) put it, at the time of European invasion of Africa, some African societies were indeed technically and socially more advanced than their European contemporaries. This is in sharp contradiction with the modern widespread assumption that when it comes to governance, Africa has nothing to offer, that she must learn from and follow the West. Therefore, this chapter is a review of the available historical evidence of pre-­ colonial democratic practices in Rwandan society with a special emphasis on public participation. Public participation is of particular interest to us because it is “paramount for the success of democracy” (Okiror, 2011: 12). This, however, is not an attempt to affirm that indigenous governance systems were flawless or fully democratic, notwithstanding the fact that democracy itself is sometimes conceptualised as only an ideal which is seldom fully realised (Dahl, 2000), but rather this chapter demonstrates that the democratic principle of public participation was not alien to African societies using the Rwandan historical experience as a case study, just as some other authors may have done another central aspects of democracy (Bentzen et  al., 2017; Sen, 2003) and constitutionalism (Sabetti, 2004), using experiences from elsewhere. This is done in full recognition that certain values and practices in pre-colonial African governance systems were diametrically opposed to the modern ideal of democracy. Some scholars have insisted that some characteristics of pre-­ colonial Africa do not lend themselves to democracy as we know it today. In African consensus politics, there was no tradition of an opposition, the individual was not at the centre of society, political succession and rotation in power were not peaceful and routine matters, and the traditional roles and responsibilities of women would be inconsistent with current concepts of democracy (Kpundeh, 1992).

2  Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems…

23

This study takes a historical comparative perspective. From an international relations perspective, it offers a theoretical discussion of the democratic principle of participation in Africa using the history of Rwanda as an example. The methodology consisted of searching from a corpus of available literature on Rwandan history, identifying sections that deal with various governance structures and analysing them using democratic participation models. This study departed from the postulate that there were germs of democracy in African indigenous governance systems and examines history for evidence of public participation in ancient Rwandan governance. Whereas in the European context, democracy is often described as the legacy of a long-term historical development (Jakobsen, 2010); it is often assumed that African countries owe any level of their democratic governance to European invasion and colonisation; the same colonisation, however, which was far from being democratic but rather attempted to destroy indigenous structures of traditional societies. Conversely, as Jakobsen (2010) contends, instead of the widespread idea that democracy dates to classical Athens in the fifth century BC, meaning that democracy was invented once for all, the idea is that democracy can be and indeed has been invented not just once in a specific place but in different places and at different times without necessarily any connection between these birthplaces. While Ross (1946) cited in Jakobsen (2010) had earlier argued the fact that democracy of the ancient world has no connection with democracy’s later developments, in his very brief history of democracy in Africa, Bates (2010) observed that without seeking to romanticise the past, one can note the democratic tendencies that infused pre-­ colonial societies in Africa.

The Concept of Public Participation Public participation has only recently (in the 1960s) come into a unified theoretical discourse on governance especially with Arnstein’s (1969) seminal work on the ladder of public participation. However, the phenomenon it refers to has certainly been in existence long before that time. Public participation is a means to ensure that citizens have a direct voice in public decisions. It is a process which provides the public (individually or through their interest groups and organisations) an opportunity to influence public decisions and has long been a component of the democratic decision-­ making process. Public participation was discussed by DeSario and Langton (1987) as part of public decision-making theory. Two broad decision-­ making structures are defined and analysed: the technocratic approach and the democratic approach. Thus, in a technocratic decision-making structure, trained staff (experts) is considered best suited to make complex technical decisions. In such a case, public opinion is often overlooked. On the other hand, democratic decision-­ making assumes that all that are affected by a given decision have the right to participate in the making of that decision. Participation can be direct in the classical democratic sense or can be through representatives in a pluralist-republican model

24

V. Ndizera et al.

(Kweit & Kweit, 1984). Campbell (2007) observed, in the context of Latin America, which is no less true in Africa, that for indigenous peoples, consultation, participation and consensus are of the greatest importance in relation to decision-­making – in order that the decision of the majority will prevail as a democratic principle. This process is based on a recognition that all human beings are equal and have the same rights and obligations. In addition, public participation is also understood by Cook (1975) as “a continuum of public involvement techniques ranging from passive to more active participation”. The continuum includes publicity (building public support), public education (disseminating information), public input (collecting information from the public), public interaction (two-way communication) and public partnership (securing advice and consent). Wilcox (1994) and the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2, 2003) proposed “four stages of people’s participation, namely: information, consultation, involvement and empowerment”. Furthermore, public participation is also often referred to in the literature as citizens’ participation, public/stakeholder engagement, or consultation, although these terms carry subtle nuances (Quick & Bryson, 2016). Studies of public participation also cover various levels, corporate (stakeholder engagement), local government entities (decentralised decision making), national government level and international level (Bernstein, 2011). Other studies have been interested in investigating the advantages of public participation in decision-making which can be summarised as legitimation of decision-making, enhancement of democracy and enlargement of citizenship (Pateman, 2012). Costs and benefits of public participation have also been discussed as an important issue because many agencies tend to avoid public involvement finding it too expensive (Burton, 2009; Wang & Bryer, 2012). Conversely, studies of public participation in African indigenous governance systems seem to be quasi-inexistent. Hence, this study is focused on finding out indications of public participation as part of a larger democratic process in pre-colonial Rwanda.

Governance Structure in Pre-colonial Rwanda Historically, Ayibiowu (2019) argues for the existence of an African cultural type of democracy containing cultural features which can compel African people and their rulers to comply with cultural laws. He goes on to state that the lack of cultural elements is a strong reason why Western-style democracy has led to distortions in Africa rather than progress, therefore, instead of replicating Western liberal democracy and their neoliberal reforms, Africa has a lot to learn from its culture. One aspect of democracy-public participation can be observed through the administrative structure of the pre-colonial Rwanda. The aim is to look for avenues for public participation in their own governance.

2  Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems…

25

The King, the Queen Mother and Abatware (the Chiefs) The pre-colonial Rwandan Kingdom state dates back to the fourteenth century and was preceded by a long period of confederacy. It evolved from regional clanic political entities to form a unified state-like kingdom around 1378 under King Kigeli Mukobanya (Kagame, 1959). That evolution has continued until colonisation abruptly stopped it towards the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed, Vansina (1990) found the whole region of equatorial Africa as exemplifying workings of a powerful endogenous process and a cultural tradition spanning many years and maintaining itself by perennial rejuvenation until it withered because of colonial conquest. Therefore, it should be borne in mind that these institutions have evolved over the years between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Administration of Rwandan Kingdom prior to the German colonialists’ take-­ over in 1897, which became officially effective in 1910, had reached such a level of organisation that colonial administration maintained much of it (Kagame, 1952). The King, Umwami, was the supreme head of the administration of Rwanda. The King was the crux for all Rwandans. However, according to D’Hertefelt and Coupez (1964), the queen mother shared the attributes of the king and always came from a different clan from the king’s. She was enthroned with her son during the induction ceremonies. Ritualists, Abiru, presided over the smooth running of monarchical institutions and rites which were supposed to ensure the prosperity of the kingdom. They were guarantors for the sacredness of royalty. This arrangement provided a mechanism for power-sharing. Thus, while it was widely claimed that the King’s power was absolute, especially due to the prevailing ideology that portrayed him as “God’s representative”, in practice, the king did not enjoy absolute power. Indeed, the royal hierarchy superimposed to the King a permanent queen mother with whom he shared power. The queen mother was chosen by the ritualists among the clans called Ibibanda who were the “matri-dynastic clans: Abasinga, Abakono, Abega, Abaha, Abazigaba and Abagesera” (D’Hertefelt & Coupez, 1964). In addition to that, there was the spiritual and political power of Abiru to reckon with. The power of the king was thus limited and sometimes challenges by those other organs with members coming from different clans and lineages. Therefore, Vansina (2004) is right in asserting that the Rwandan king was not an autocratic leader who would rule alone. Following the death of King Rwabugiri in 1895, Rwanda was divided into 24 districts “ibiti” of which 20, in whole or in part within the current limits of Rwanda. Each district was generally named by its chief town. Among these districts were those reserved for the king and others for his wives, Abamikazi. They were called Ingarigari. Two officials were appointed to lead each district: Umutware w’umukenke (the pasture chief) and umutware w’ubutaka (the Landchief). The first had authority over the owners of cows and the second, on residents without cows. The king could, however, invest a single person in two commands. Each district was divided into subdivisions called ibikingi. These fell into two categories. The first was immediately under the jurisdiction of the king’s court and was a basic administrative level.

26

V. Ndizera et al.

At the head of this administrative entity, the king appointed a civil servant known under the name of igisonga (assistant administrator). The second depended on the armies. This category did not constitute a unit of territorial administration but indicated plots of pasture allotted to herds of cows belonging to an army. It is important to note that the administrative organisation was mixed with that of organising war matters, so that all Rwandans had a unit of warriors in which they all met (Kagame, 1975). On an administrative level, within the army, the role of the Mutware w’ingabo (army chief), in addition to his function as warrior chief, was to appoint the ibisonga (administrative assistants) and to supervise the command of the Ibikingi belonging to the army herds. Such ibisonga (administrative assistants) were responsible for the distribution of pastures between these herds of cows. These plots were scattered without the administrative entities being considered. This means that nationals of the same administrative entity could belong to different armies. While the ibikingi system was in force in the current provinces of the South, East, and in the City of Kigali, the lineage constituted the basic administrative level in the current provinces of North and West. This district system covered exclusively the area controlled by the king and did not concern autonomous entities or “enclave districts”.

Abiru (Royal Ritualists) Abiru (royal ritualists) acted as guardians of the Kingdom’s esoteric code and played a central role in governance. These trustees were special advisers to the king regarding the rules and regulations of power retention and the behaviour of the king. These trustees kept, conserved, and narrated invaluable, confidential information which was transferred from father to son within their families (D’Hertefelt & Coupez, 1964). By virtue of their memorisation of poems detailing the procedures of the kingdom’s rituals, history and processes; they played a great role of unifying and stabilising the kingdom. According to Byanafashe and Rutayisire (2016), the institution of Abiru played a dual role in Rwanda’s political life. The college of Abiru was charged with appointing Rwanda’s future kings and queen mothers. The college also had another duty of transmitting the Kingdom’s official history. This institution’s function had a deeply positive impact on the state of conservation and development of the kingdom. Their recruitment was governed by strict rules.

Judicial Administration at the End of the Pre-colonial Period According to Kagame (1952), the judicial administration was divided into three levels: Gacaca, Umutware and the king’s court.

2  Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems…

27

Gacaca The parties first appeared before inama ya gacaca (gacaca council), which was made up of adult people from a lineage or from the community. However, one could also take into consideration young people not yet fully integrated who observed how the trials were decided. When one of the two parties was dissatisfied with the council’s decision, he would appeal to the Umutware.

Umutware (the Chief) If the person concerned was a farmer whose dispute related to land issues, he had to lay his charges before the mutware w’ubutaka, since the latter was responsible for all matters relating to the land property. If the person concerned was a cow owner and the object of the dispute related to cows and pastures, the case was brought before umutware w’umukenke. When the plaintiff was dissatisfied, he appealed to his army chief who presented him to the king’s court and defended him before that court. There were two ways to reach the king: the indirect route with the assistance of the army chief for private appeal trials; the direct route, to go to the king without intermediary and without the support of the army chief, when the plaintiff was directed against this same chief, with the possibility of a collective claim. To put any obstacle to this supreme and direct claim to the king was an attack against His Majesty.

King’s Court As the common father of his people, the king was to assure each member of society of his personal property, and have it returned to him if a stronger neighbour dared take it unjustly. Some goods that the king was to ensure the possession of each of his subjects were isambu (piece of land) for the cultivators and inka (cows) for the breeders. To easily ensure justice for his people, the king went through the organisation of the army. Therefore, the plaintiff lodged his accusation to the king accompanied by his army chief, Umutware w’ingabo. However, the king’s judicial authority could not be exercised in favour of the rebellious (abagome). The role of the army chief in the tribunal was to validate the plaintiff’s membership in his army and, therefore, to guarantee the plaintiff loyalty to the King (Kagame, 1952). The king was sovereign over all Rwandans in all justice matters. It is worth noting that indigenous court system continued during the colonial period. The king’s court in Nyanza was operational until 1959.

28

V. Ndizera et al.

Public Participation in Pre-colonial Rwanda As earlier detailed, most models of public participation (Arnstein, 1969; Cook, 1975; Wilcox, 1994; Bernstein, 2011; Bryer, 2013) include a continuum of increasing importance from building public support, disseminating information to the public, collecting information from the public, public interaction for consensus building and securing advice and consent. In pre-colonial Rwanda, avenues for public participation are observable in governance structure, practices and rituals. Pre-colonial Rwanda had a hierarchical administrative structure that included decentralised units that made it possible for citizens to get informed, enter consultations and partnership with their leaders to whom they were conscious of having delegated their power of representation. During war time, all Rwandans including women were mobilised and played a role in fighting against the enemy. While men went to war in their army units, women had a responsibility to light a fire in a public place and keep it burning by looking for dry grass (imbumbya) to put on that fire for the whole duration of the battle (Kagame, 1952). It was a taboo (forbidden) for Rwandans to have any conflicts among them or to go to chief and courts with complaints. This seemingly insignificant ceremony was important to keep the country cohesive and supportive of the king and his army during wartime. Before giving a reward to the bravest warrior, hearings (imihigo) of all claiming for a reward were conducted and in case of a tie, the King himself would hear and settle the matter in presence of the army (Kagame, 1952). This was an effort towards transparency in which people participated. Besides, the army could reject the army chief appointed by the King and require his replacement. Kagame (1952) observed that the warriors had the right to reject the chief authority. The military unit called Abashakamba rejected chief Rugaju for the benefit of prince Nkusi, son of King Yuhi Gahindiro during the first half of the nineteenth century. The military unit called Nyaruguru rejected Karama for the benefit of Nyantaba under the reign of King Kigeri Rwabugiri during the second half of the nineteenth century. The participatory function of the Abiru (royal ritualists) institution can be observed from the fact that members of their council belonged to various families and clans, though they were not elected but inherited their membership hereditarily from their fathers, there was a codified arrangement for the most notable Abiru lineages to belong to different clans, abakono, abatsobe, abatege, abaheka, abakobwa, etc. (D’Hertefelt & Coupez, 1964) which implied representation. The democratic function of Abiru can also be understood from their role as custodians of the Kings’ succession code and their advisory responsibility. This implies that it was not left to the discretion of the king to decide alone on who among his sons was going to succeed him. Their role gave them a great amount of power over the affairs of the kingdom that they provided checks and balances to the King’s power. Umuganura (ritual of first fruits), a ritual which aimed at promoting agricultural prosperity and symbolised the kingdom’s unity and the solidarity among Rwandans,

2  Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems…

29

was another ceremony in which Abiru played a great role. It took place first at the King’s residence and then at chiefdom and family levels and consisted of a series of ceremonies performed by the King and his entourage (D’Hertefelt & Coupez, 1964). During umuganura the Tsobe ritualist (umwiru w’umutsobe) acted as an intermediary facilitator between the King’s Palace and the inhabitants of Bumbogo, who were in charge of bringing the sorghum grain provisions, and their representative together with the king and the queen mother prepared the sorghum meal that was to be shared with the people waiting outside, (D’Hertefelt & Coupez, 1964) The festival-like series of rituals provided an opportunity for common people to meet and directly interact with the king. Indeed, Vansina (2004: 39) stated that “every year the sumptuous performance of the ritual of first fruits (umuganura) unified the whole population around the king through the participation of many people from all over the country”. Besides, annual participation in these rituals by all the chiefs and the formal prohibition of subjects from eating any fruit from the new harvest until the conclusion of the ritual, made clear in unmistakable manner who were the subjects of the kingdom and who were not. Participation in governance matters is more evident in the pre-colonial justice sector. The Gacaca court was a decentralised grassroot justice system in which all adult people participated to hear and rule on petty crimes. It is worth noting that young adults were systematically initiated to this system by allowing them participated as non-voting judges of the court which obviously contributed to instilling a sense of justice in them. The phenomenon of local councils administering justice at the grassroot levels can also be found in various other pre-colonial African societies. One such example is in Botswana, where the Palaver was a sort of consultation and consensus building council and Kgotla basically functioned like a judicial organ to resolve and hear cases and had the right to overthrow the chiefs (Kpundeh, 1992: 7). The provision for appeal procedure to the chiefs of varying degrees of power and jurisdiction upward until one could reach the King’s court with an appeal is also evidence that there were avenues for the king to hear and listen to the common people.

Conclusion In conclusion, the reading of the pre-colonial Rwandan history reveals clearly that indigenous political organisation was not devoid of democratic participation. Rwandan citizens were aware of their leadership and indeed participated in its political life through Gacaca councils, their army units and their voices could be heard and through the hierarchy of their leadership and representation. It is important to recall that the pre-colonial Rwandan political system was entwined with religious, social and military organisation of the society. Therefore, while looking for avenues for citizens’ participation in governance affairs, one needs to look at all those spheres. Indeed, the Rwandan kingdom was a sacred kingdom (Nkaka & Kabwete, 2020), and this implied that the king’s authority was viewed as coming from God,

30

V. Ndizera et al.

but also human life was sacred, and the king’s authority was to be exercised for the preservation of that sacred life. The fact that pre-colonial African societies had democratic potential has also been observed in many different African societies. Writing on the political history of pre-colonial Central Africa, Jan Vansina emphasised the republican nature of the lineage systems of government and the efforts they expended to elude domination by centralised states (Vansina, 1990, 1999). Besides, Kpundeh (1992) noted that, traditionally, popular participation was encouraged by using a process of consultation that allowed African leaders to reinvigorate their rule with community input. Traditional rulers in some African societies could not enforce obedience without the consent of their advisers and ultimately of the community itself. In the Rwandan case, the king was surrounded by different councils such as Abiru, and chiefs that advised the king on appropriate decisions or course of action to take. Diviners were also consulted on matters concerning national security. All these consultations carried the voice of ordinary people. Therefore, as Bentzen et al. (2017) observed an association between indigenous democratic practices with persistence of modern representative democratic institutions, we posit that pre-colonial Rwandan governance system, through its natural evolution process, would have kept improving itself within the context of local realities and would have attained a level of contemporary good governance standards if it had not been frustrated by the colonial rule, whose undemocratic nature has sufficiently been studied and demonstrated.

References Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224. Ayibiowu, D. A. (2019). Western style ‘democracy’ in Africa is just a way of pushing the neoliberal agenda: The region has its own rich democratic traditions to draw from. Accessed from https:// www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/western-­style-­democracy-­in-­africa-­is-­just-­a-­way-­ of-­pushing-­the-­neoliberal-­agenda/ on 20 Oct 2021. Bates, R. H. (2010). Democracy in Africa: A very short history. Social Research, 77(4), 1133–1148. Bentzen, J., Hariri, J. G., & Robinson, J. A. (2017). Power and persistence: The indigenous roots of representative democracy. The Economic Journal, 129(618), 678–714. Bernstein, S. (2011). Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance. Review of International Political Economy, 18(1), 17–51. Bryer, T. A. (2013). Designing social media strategies for effective citizen engagement: A case example and model. National Civic Review, 102(1), 43–50. https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.21114 Burton, P. (2009). Conceptual, theoretical, and practical issues in measuring the benefits of public participation. Evaluation, 15(3), 263–284. Byanafashe, D., & Rutayisire, P. (2016). History of Rwanda: From the beginning to the end of the twentieth century. National Reconciliation Commission. Campbell, M. S. (2007). The right of indigenous peoples to political participation and the case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law, 24(2), 499–540.

2  Public Participation in African Indigenous Governance Systems…

31

Cook, J. B. (1975). Citizen participation: A concepts battery. Columbia University of Missouri. D’Hertefelt, M., & Coupez, A. (1964). La Royauté sacrée de l’ancien Rwanda: Texte, traduction et commentaire de son rituel. Royal Museum for Central Africa. Dahl, R. (2000). A democratic paradox. Political Science Quarterly, 116(1), 35–40. DeSario, J., & Langton, S. (Eds.). (1987). Citizen participation in public decision making. Greenwood. DuBois, W. E. B. (1965). The world and Africa: An inquiry into the part which Africa has played in world history. International Publishers. IAP2. (2003). Core values for the practice of public participation. Foundations of Public Participation, International Association for Public Participation. Accessed from: http://www. iap2.org/corevalues/index.shtml on 17 Nov 2021. Jakobsen, U. (2010). Inventions and developments of democracy: The approach of conceptual history. European Political Science, 9, 316–327. Kagame, A. (1952). Le code des institutions Politique du Rwanda Pre-colonial. Institut Royal Colonial Belge. Kagame, A. (1959). La Notion de génération appliquée à la généalogie dynastique et à l’histoire duRwanda des Xe–XIe siècles à nos jours. Belgian Royal Colonial Institute. Kagame, A. (1975). Un Abrégé de l’histoire du Rwanda de 1853 a 1972, Butare: Editions Universitaires du Rwanda. Kpundeh, S. J. (1992). Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices, summary of three workshops. National Academy Press. Kweit, M. G., & Kweit, R. W. (1984). The politics of policy analysis: The role of citizen participation in analytic decision making. Policy Studies Review, 3(2), 234–245. Nkaka, R., & Kabwete, M. C. (2020). Sacred kingship and political power in ancient Rwanda. Rwanda Journal of Social Sciences, Humanities and Business, 1(1), 20–32. Nunn, N. (2009). The importance of history for economic development. Annual Review of Economy, 2009(1), 165–192. Okiror, G. (2011). Concepts and principles of democratic governance and accountability: A guide for peer educators. Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung. Pateman, C. (2012). Participatory democracy revisited. Perspectives on Politics, 10(1), 7–19. Quick, K.  S., & Bryson, J. (2016). Theories of public participation. In J.  Torbing & C.  Ansell (Eds.), Handbook in theories of governance. Edward Elgar Publishing. Sabetti, F. (2004). Local roots of constitutionalism. Perspectives on Political Science, 3(2), 70–78. Sen, A. (2003, October 6). Democracy and its global roots: Why democratization is not the same as westernization. The New Republic, 28–35. Spolaore, E., & Wacziarg, R. (2013). How deep are the roots of economic development. Journal of Economic Literature, 51(2), 325–369. Stoddard, L. (1923). The rising tide of colour against the white world supremacy. Charles Scribner’s Sons. Thomson, A. (2000). Introduction to African politics. Routledge. Vansina, J. (1990). Paths in the rain forest: Toward a history of political tradition in equatorial Africa. University of Wisconsin Press. Vansina, J. (1999). Beyond chiefdoms: Pathways to complexity in Africa. Cambridge University Press. Vansina, J. (2004). Antecedents to modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya kingdom. The University of Wisconsin Press. Wang, X., & Bryer, T. A. (2012). Assessing the costs of public participation. The American Review of Public Administration, 43(2), 179–199. Wilcox, D. (1994). The guide to effective participation. Delta Press. Zewde, A. (2010). Sorting Africa’s development challenge: The participatory social learning theory as an alternative approach. University Press of America, INC.

32

V. Ndizera et al.

Vedaste Ndizera  is a Lecturer at the University of Rwanda, Department of Political Science, and International Relations. He holds a Ph.D. in Governance and Regional Integration, an MBA/ Global Business, an MA in Tourism Management, and a BA in English with concentration on Translation and Interpreting. Dr. Ndizera has got extensive experience in teaching at higher learning institutions in Rwanda since 2008. He has done research on East African Integration, Governance, Tourism and Hospitality Management which led to presentations in national and international conferences and publications. His current research interests include Regional Integration in Africa, Governance, Pan-Africanism, and indigenous systems. Raphael Nkaka is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Rwanda, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, Development and Society, Department of History and Heritage Studies; and Deputy Dean of the School of Governance, Development and Society. His Ph.D. is on the grip of the racial logic on the Rwandan society, 1894–1994, and his research interest focus on “Pre-colonial History of Rwanda, Ethnicity/Racialogy”. He also did internship programmes in Netherland and USA.  

Safari Kambanda is a lecturer at the University of Rwanda, College of Arts and Social Sciences, School of Governance, Development and Society Governance and Public Administration The area of research is mainly leadership in organizations and institutions. Its Impact on the members of the organization, empowerment, and its public policy implementation Dr. Safari Kambanda has done research on mature women empowerment in different national universities, public and or private. This included the fact of boosting voice equity at the workplace and the implication of tertiary education on mature women’s work performance in Rwanda. Further, he looked at how to fight intellectual marginalization through critical thinking in improving individual and community lives.  

Chapter 3

Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored Anuoluwapo Durokifa

Abstract  Democracy in Africa has been continuously shaped by colonial and postcolonial experiences of different countries. Its adoption as a system of governance in Africa has remained questionable considering the impact on development and lack of dividends of democracy when compared with the experiences of many developed countries. This paper through a review examines the documented experiences of African nations and elsewhere to expatiate on “African Style of democracy as a (mis)representation of liberal democracy”. Further, the paper will provide the answer to the following questions: what are the factors militating against democracy in Africa? What are the challenges of democracy in Africa? Can the democracy in Africa be categorized as distinct or altered?

Introduction Since the early 1990s, there have been significant transformations in the political systems of many African countries as they drift from an era of colonialism and military dictatorship into an era of democracy. Ironically, many of these countries still struggle to deepen and institutionalize democracy which has become a great factor for the developmental glitches going on in Africa such as poverty, inadequate service delivery and other challenges that continues to affect Africa (Adejumo-­ Ayibiowu, 2019; Mbaku, 2020; Ndulo, 2003). According to Joseph (1997:363), “democracy is not supposed to happen in Africa as they have little of what seemed necessary for constitutional democratic polities”. Corroborating this, Campbell and Quinn (2021) in their article emphasized the expectations for democracy in Africa to be unrealistic considering the foundations A. Durokifa (*) School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_3

33

34

A. Durokifa

to sustain democracy in Africa have been weak for most of the postcolonial era. However, this stance has been opposed opined by Adejumo-Ayibiowu (2019) with the emphasis who emphasized that democracy has been an intrinsic part of African culture and that the Europeans knowing this had to first destroy the democratic kingdoms for their colonization project to be successful. Nonetheless, Adejumo-­ Ayibiowu’s submission is debatable considering Africa’s democratic operation in the twenty-first century which includes and not limited to “African governments suppressing opposition groups, postponing elections, eliminating term limits and abusing human rights to maintain power”. This assessment of democracy in Africa is the fulcrum in which the study is based. Academics and international experts have assessed this issue from different perspectives such as Onoge (1997:19), who argued that the Africa’s precolonial culture inhibited the political development in Africa through its uncivilized values and practices, hence serving as a bottleneck for democracy in Africa. Mafeje (2002) highlighted that democracy in Africa is a failure because it is a reproduction of Western model for democracy, a disagreement to Africa’s culture and tradition; and Van Hoek (1993) attributed the failure of democracy in Africa based on weak democratic structures. Thus, this study contributing to the literature and argument of democracy in Africa would be looking at the state of democracy in Africa. Using a wide range of printed and electronic literature, the paper would expatiate on whether the style of democracy in Africa is a misrepresentation of liberal democracy or a distinct style associated with the continent. To uphold this aim, the author would be answering the following questions: what are the factors militating against democracy in Africa? What are the challenges of democracy in Africa? Can the democracy in Africa be categorized as distinct or altered?

Democracy Contextualized Democracy is a fluid concept that has been defined by different theorists and scholars. The oft-quoted definition of democracy is that of the former US president, Abraham Lincoln, as “government of the people, by the people and for the people”. According to Adegboye (2013), this definition implies many factors such as: the government being responsible to its citizens in all ramifications; elections conducted are usually free and fair; people can impeach or reject a candidate through ballot or by recall; the larger percentage of the citizenry is involved in governance, etc. Appadorai (1974) sees democracy as a system under which the people exercise governmental power directly or indirectly through representatives. To Small and Singer (1976), democracy is a Nation that gives its citizens a determinant role on who leads the Nation. Doyle (1983) emphasized democracy to be one that has representative governments. Williams (2011) defines democracy as a form of government in which people have equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. This includes and not limited to participation in the proposal, development, formulation,

3  Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored

35

and implementation of legislation into law. It also encompasses social, economic, and cultural conditions that enable equal access. To Adegboye (2013), democracy is a form of government which undoubtedly ensures equity, fair play, and social justice in any society. While Rummel (2007) interchangeably using democracy with liberal democracy views democracy as where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections, where there is freedom of speech, religion and organization, and a constitutional framework to which the Government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights. Like Rummel, this paper would interchangeably use democracy with liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the kind of democracy practised in the West, adopted, and now practised in Africa. According to Tarr (2010), liberal democracy is a type of regime in which binding rules and policy decisions are made not by entire community but by representatives accountable to the community. In liberal democracy, citizens have the inalienable right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters, criticisms of officials, the government regime, socio-economic order, prevailing ideology, etc. (Potter, 2004). However, the situation in Africa has shown a contrary view towards democracy as it is not as participatory as it should be (Peters, 2003; Erunke, 2012; Uwizeyimana, 2012; Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019; Campbell & Quinn, 2021). Rather, democracy in Africa has been upheld with political assassination, godfatherism, elections malpractices, corruption, non-accountability, and autocratic manner. Thus, questioning the standing of liberal democracy, if it has not been able to dislodge the aristocratic, autocratic, and tribal anatomy of the continent. To analyse if Africa tailored liberal democracy to its own suitability or being twisted, the author used the following criteria to assess democracy: the act of holding regular elections, free and fair elections, exercise of human rights and separations of powers.

Democracy in Africa The African continent has roughly 54 independent states. Each of these independent states has a system of governance ranging from absolute monarchies to an autocratic way of ruling and equalizing it towards liberal democracy. The history of which can be dated back to the precolonial and colonial era in Africa. According to scholars (National Research Council, 1992; Bradley, 2011; Ezeanyika, 2011; Uwizeyimana, 2012; Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019), the precolonial era was monarchical in nature, cultural and oppressive, yet democratic. Evidence shows that the precolonial regime was authoritarian and exhibits cultures that were gravely against human right violation. Examples are the regimes of the Emperor of Ethiopia, the Kabakas and Nkore of Uganda, the Zulu of South Africa, and Ruanda (now Rwanda). They displayed authority that abhorred and rejected criticism. Yet, there were still majority territories that indirectly practised what can be termed as attributes of democracy. They displayed common characteristics of consent of the

36

A. Durokifa

people, checks and balances, and a balance between centralized and decentralized power to prevent the authority of power by one person (Osabu-Kle, 2000; Ezeanyika, 2011). For instance, the Yorubas of Western Nigeria and the Akan of Ghana traditional governance system was representative, participatory and have adequate checks and balances (Uwizeyimana, 2012; Adejumo-Ayibiowu, 2019); the Igbos of Eastern Nigeria had an indigenous political system that ensured the making, execution and adjudication of decisions, and its government was decentralized (Uchendu, 1965; Ejiofor, 1982; Ikejiani-Clark, 1995); and the Botswana Kgotla which served as a judicial organ to resolve and hear cases (NRC, 1992). Similar democratic scenarios were reported amongst Tanzania, Togo, Kenya, and Zambia (Onwubiko, 1973; Ezeanyika, 2007; Bradley, 2011). In this light, the Europeans who invaded Africa knew they had to destroy these traditional practices for their colonization project to work (NRC, 1992; Adejumo-­ Ayibiowu, 2019). The colonial era in Africa which could be placed between the 1880s and the 1960s was not ruled as a democratic but rather autocratic system. According to Mafeje (2002), the colonial state was a creation of the colonial powers for their purposes. As such, it does not exhibit characteristics of democracy even though the colonizers could be described as democratic. They instead use their autocratic apparatus of control as an instrument of exploitation throughout the era (Copson, 2001). By mid-1950s countries in Africa began to show disinterest in colonial leadership and began to clamour for independence. The process which was marred with violence, political turmoil, and widespread unrest saw countries gaining their independence from colonization (Hargreaves, 2014). The end of colonialism and the dawn of postcolonial era heralded a ray of hope among the colonized Africans (Kieh, 2018). According to Ramsay (1993:3) “Africans spoke of the resource-rich continent on the verge of a development take-­ off”. Unfortunately, the continent was greeted with what can be termed as a “struggle for survival” (Ramsay, ibid). This was because in countries like Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, Benin Republic, and Lesotho that were part of the second wave of independence that swept across Africa in the 1960s, the postcolonial state became a replica of its colonial progenitor. In essence, the new African ruling class simply replaced the colonial ones without transforming the state. There was no substantial change economically, socially, and politically. However, two countries in the Southern African Region, Mauritius and Botswana, set forth the motion for state transformation after independence. For Namibia and South Africa, they were in the throes of Apartheid and its associated political economy of racism, discrimination, exploitation, and plunder. Interestingly, when Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1975 and Zimbabwe in 1980, there were great expectations that these countries will join Botswana and Mauritius in serving as models of democracy (Ake, 1996). Ironically, these states joined the club of the emergent repressive states within the continent. By 1990, following the exasperation of Africans with authoritarian government and the poor state of human development particularly with the rejection of Nigeria’s military rule, collapse of the single-party dictatorship, the downfall of Samoe Doe in Liberia, Kerekou in Benin, and the end of apartheid in South Africa as good

3  Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored

37

testimonials, governments were faced with a more radical demand for democracy (Chengeta, 2021). In line with this new wave of democracy, there were constitutional amendments in various African countries to include provision of regular elections, freedom of speech and association, free will to participate in political system, checks and balances. To support democracy as well, the African Union came up with instruments like the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance whilst unconstitutional change of government was regarded as a crime against democracy. However, recent happenings in Africa particularly in Libya, Chad, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Cote D’Ivore and Algeria show that the wind of Democracy is still blowing in Africa. Despite many countries claiming to be democratic, plights of civil war, genocide, political unrest, insecurity, and corruption, amongst others still dot the path of many African states. Thus, arguments have been put forward with many scholars singling out liberal democracy as the culprit. However, as reiterated, this paper would analyse if Africa was not getting the democratic system right or we have indirectly created our own style of democracy.

Democracy in Africa: Prototype for Analysis As reiterated in the preceding sections, democracy is a free will of people having direct and active access in the decision-making process of their countries. In democracy, all eligible citizens remain the sovereign power, but political power is exercised indirectly through elected representatives. This is the core of liberal democracy. According to Tarr (2010), liberal democracy is a regime in which binding rules and policy decisions are made not by the entire community but by representatives accountable to the community. To achieve this, the holding of regular, free, and fair elections is a prerequisite. Other prerequisites are exercise of human rights, separation of powers, checks and balances. All these fundamentals will be used to analyse African democratic stance. Regular Free and Fair Elections  The holding of regular free and fair election is one of the basics of creating and sustaining a democratic regime (Uwizeyimana, 2012). In the western world, originators of liberal democracy, elections are to be held regularly and according to national standards (Pausewang, et al., 2002). This makes government accountable to the citizenry. In Africa, elections perform at least three important democratizing functions: (1) they help the continent build and sustain democratic institutions; (2) they provide the people with an effective legal tool to constrain and guide the government; and (3) they give citizens power to change their government and bring into power effective political leaders if they are not satisfied with the one in power. However, for these functions to be effective, elections must be regular, free, and fair. Thus, the whole idea of democracy in Africa has been linked to the regular holding of elections irrespective of how they are conducted or the outcome therein. According to

38

A. Durokifa

Onduko (2014), many Africans feel that elections in Africa serve the purpose of enabling self-seeking and greedy politicians to get job. Also, elections have been a medium for some African governments to navigate from a constitutional democracy to authoritarianism. Presidents of some African countries have used legislatures subservient to the president to change the constitution to their duration in power. Some, beyond the two-terms and some indefinitely. For example, Presidents Ginassingbe (Togo), Museveni (Uganda), Deby (Chad), Biya (Cameroon), Kagame (Rwanda), El-Sisi ((Egypt) and late Nkurunziza (Burundi), to mention a few. Former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, tried to constitutionally change the 2-term limit, but his plans were scuttled. It can be said that the absence of a democratic culture has facilitated the ability of incumbent’s presidents to manipulate the constitution (Mbaku, 2020). The offshoot is the rise in violent and intertribal/interethnic conflicts within African states. Exercise of Human Rights  Another criterion for democracy is the exercise of human rights. This includes freedom of speech, freedom of the media, right to protest, freedom of belief, and freedom of association, amongst others. Hilary Clinton in her speech at the African Union headquarters on 13 June 2011 stated “…creating the conditions that allow people and communities to flourish in a democracy cannot simply be a matter of holding elections; they are necessary but not sufficient conditions. Good governance requires free, fair, and transparent elections, a free media…”. According to the United Nations (2013), a democratic regime must inevitably focus on promotion and protection of human rights. For without this, there can be no democracy in any meaningful sense. A functional democracy accommodates diversity, promotes equality, and protects individual freedom. However, human rights have been an issue of concern in Africa thus questioning the democratic stance of the continent. From the conflicts going on in South Sudan, Sudan, Congo, and Somalia to the Sahel’s regions crisis with armed groups in Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Also, there is the restriction of movement and association, leading to citizen’s abuse and violence. For example, in Cameroon, the Rapid Intervention Forces have been linked to decades of abuse, including credible reports of torturing citizens between 2014 and 2017 (Akwei & Jammeh, 2020). In Nigeria, both the military and police have been linked to years of hideous and systemic violations of people’s right. According to a report by the Nigerian National Human Right Commission in April 2020, the department received and documented 105 complaints of incidents of human rights violations perpetuated by security forces in different parts of the country. Similar reports were also recorded in Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa (Akwei and Jammeh, ibid). Another key show is the harassment, assault and arrest of journalists, activists, and civil society leaders. For example, the arrest and torture of three ladies from the Government political party opposition in Zimbabwe following a protest done against hunger and the lack of a safety net for poor and marginalized communities during the COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 (The Guardian, 2020); in Madagascar, publishing director and journalist of Ny Valosa newspaper was arrested and detained (Akwei & Jammeh, 2020). Since 2017, media freedom in Somalia has been suppressed by the Government of Somalia’s authorities (Akwei and Jammeh, ibid);

3  Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored

39

while in Nigeria, authorities have carried out consistent attacks on journalists, activists and citizens through verbal and physical assault, indiscriminate arrest, torture and prosecution. The rights to protest have also been an issue of human right in Africa. Africans across the continent have exercised their right to protest on variety of issues, including modifications of constitutional term limits, corruptions, and insecurity. For example, in Cameroon, citizens protested the killing of civilians by government security forces in the country’s Anglophone Northwest Region; in Egypt, citizens protested what protesters continued government repression; and in South Sudan against brutality by soldiers (Mbaku, 2021). However, in most cases, some of these protests are met with violence as a reaction by the government. For example, the #ENDSARS protest, 2020 in Nigeria which led to the controversial death of some protesters. Separation of Power  Democratic government is characterized by separation of power. This principle divides the state into three branches: the legislature, executive and the judicial branch. Each branch is to act independently, yet they can all check the exercise of power by the other. Consequently, each branch of the system cannot become too powerful to control the system completely. The intention behind a system of separation of power is to prevent the concentration of power by providing for checks and balances. However, there has been controversy regarding separation of powers. According to Achenbach (2017), NCSL (2010) and Cameron (2002), no democratic system exists with an absolute separation of power. While contemporary democracies have elaborated characteristics of separation of power to be each branch operating independently and exercising power according to its rationality. In practice, the executive branch is occupying the centre of power in most constitutional democracies (Achenbach, 2017). In Africa, even though countries have incorporated the principle of separation of power into their constitution, the executive branch still exerts more power and thus interferes or overrides the other two branches. Corroborating this, Fombad (2019), in his article asserted that though African leaders adopted the principle of separation of power, African presidents still exercise excessive powers, and they use it to control and dominate the other two branches. For example, in December 1999, former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo as against the Nigerian constitution overrode the National Assembly (legislature) and went ahead to award a construction company, Julius Berger contract and paid them (Ogbu, 2005). Also, in Malawi, despite its constitutional mandate for separation of power and checks and balances, the president still has undisputable rights to override the other two branches of government [legislature and judiciary] (Hara, 2006).

Moving Ahead: Where We Are in Africa Scholars like Fayemi (2009), Tarr (2010), Gumede (2016) and Adejumo-Ayibiowu (2019) have argued that democracy in Africa has its own distinct style while scholars like Yaye (2018) attributed its democratic ways to African cultural values which

40

A. Durokifa

they argue is inimical to democracy. Schedler (2002) stressed that liberal democracy was alien to African people, thus causing a fraction towards its successful implementation. In Africa, the whole idea of democracy has been equated with the holding of periodic elections irrespective of how they are organized or the outcome. What matters is that a regime is democratically elected and placed in power. Onduko (2014) highlighted that most elections carried out in Africa have just been used to satisfy democratic legitimacy and not actually democratic. Schedler (ibid) pointed out that elections in Africa have been used as an instrument of authoritarian control as well as means of democratic governance. Corroborating this, Campbell and Quinn (2021) stated that more Africans live under fully or partially authoritarian states, yet disguise as democracy. More African leaders have moved the notion to undermine term limits or rig elections to remain in power. Just like the precolonial era, which was authoritarian, democratic, and monarchical, most African leaders find it difficult to leave power for other people to take over. For example, the former president of ZimbabweRobert Mugabe, President Paul Biya of Cameroon, President Pierre Nkuruzinza of Burundi, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, President Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, and President Idris Deby of Chad, while some anoint their sons as successors. For example, the president of Togo, Faure Gnassingbe whose family has ruled Togo for more than 48 years; the president of Congo, Joseph Kabila; and the president of Gabon. This shows that there is a lack of consonance between liberal democracy and the African way of life as well as its traditional practices. The cultural way of Africans still pierces through leadership regardless of the colonial era and the export of democratization. Gumede (2016) in his article stressed that most African leaders have only introduced aspects of democracy that benefitted them personally and this undermines the functioning of democratic institutions. Some leaders have under the democratic era invented new African cultures and traditions to cover up their misdeeds and shield them from criticism or to cover up their political base. While some have implemented only the aspect of democracy that favours them, and their political parties. For example, President Jacob Zuma said he must be judged by African culture while building a R280 million estate with taxpayers’ money while his supporters wallow in poverty (Gumede, ibid). This shows that liberal democracy has not been able to dislodge the cultural and tribal anatomy of the region. Rather, it appears Africa has customized liberal democracy.

Conclusion At independence, Africans looked to the future with hope, confidence, and a burning desire for change. However, the failures of Africa today have proven the contrary. The democratic practice in Africa is worrying for it does not exhibit a sense of independence that Africans had hoped for. As reflected, liberal democracy remains

3  Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored

41

a system that does not correspond to the African political landscape. Instead, there should be a contextualized form of democracy suitable for African situation. Moreover, esteemed developing scholar, Amartya Sen, has long debunked the notion that democracy is western or foreign to African culture. However, like Ake (1993:41) posits, for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable, it must be radically different from liberal democracy. So far, democracy in Africa has reflected that democracy is a no one size fit all but multiple forms and as such should be tailored to a specific country circumstance. As Abraham Lincoln said, democracy is the government of the people, for the people and by the people. This statement insinuates ownness and been culturally specific since cultures differ. Therefore, Africa must define democracy in its own way just like Botswana and Mauritius who adopted aspects of its culture and tailored it towards its democracy and has thus been regarded as countries with one of the best democracies in Africa (Gumede, 2016; Achenbach, 2017).

References Achenbach, J. V. (2017). Separation of powers and the role of political theory in contemporary democracies. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 15(3), 861–865. Adegboye, A. A. (2013). Consolidating participatory democracy in Africa: The challenges and the way forward. European Scientific Journal, 9(2), 241–251. Adejumo-Ayibiowu, D. (2019). Western style ‘democracy’inAfrica is just a way of pushing the neoliberal agenda. Retrieved September 20, 2021, from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/ western-­style-­democracy-­in-­africa-­is-­just-­a-­way-­of-­pushing-­the-­neoliberal-­agenda/ Adetula, V. (2011). Measuring democracy and ‘good governance’ in Africa: A critique of assumptions and methods. In K. Kondlo & C. Ejiogu (Eds.), Governance in the 21st century (pp. 10–25). Ake, C. (1993). The unique case of African democracy. International Affairs, 69, 239–244. Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and development in Africa. The Bookings Institution. Akwei, A., & Jammeh, A. (2020). Statement from Aiusa for Hfac hearing on democratic backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa. Amnesty International. Retrieved December 11, 2021, from https://www.amnestyusa.org/our-­work/government-­relations/advocacy/ human-­rights-­democratic-­backsliding-­in-­africa/. Appadorai, A. (1974). The substance of politics. Oxford University Press. Bradley, T. M. (2011). African perceptions of democracy. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 5(11), 456–464. Cameron, D. (2002). Quasi Democracy. In S.  McBride, L.  Dobuzinskis, M.  G. Cohen, & J.  Busumtwi-Sam (Eds.), Global instability. Social indicators research series (Vol. 13). Springer. Campbell, J., & Quinn, N. (2021). What’s happening to democracy in Africa? Retrieved November 11, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/article/whats-­happening-­democracy-­africa Copson, R. W. (2001) Africa Backgrounder: History, U.S. Policy, Principal Congressional Actions. CRS Report for Congress. Doyle, M. W. (1983). Kant, Liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235. Ejiofor, L. U. (1982). Igbo kingdoms, power and control. African Publishers. Erunke, C. E. (2012). Consolidating democratic governance in Nigeria: Analysis and suggestions. African Journal of Social Sciences, 2(2), 67–73.

42

A. Durokifa

Ezeanyika, S (2011). Can Western Democracy Models be institutionalized in Africa? Reviewing Contemporary Problems and Prospects. Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 36(2). Ezeanyika, S. E. (2007). Introduction to African politics. DESREG Publications. Fayemi, A. K. (2009). Towards an African theory of democracy. In thought and practice. A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, 1(1), 101–126. Fombad, C. (2019). Separation of powers in Africa constitutionalism. Oxford University Press. Gumede, W. (2016). Is culture an obstacle to Democracy? Democracy Works Foundation: https:// democracyworks.org.za/is-­culture-­an-­obstacle-­to-­democracy/ Hara, M. (2006). Presidential system of government versus separation of powers: The Malawi Experience in the Separation of Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa conference. Hargreaves, S. (2014). Extractivism, its deadly impacts and struggles towards a post-­ extractivist future. Ikejiani-Clark, M. (1995). Traditional Rulership and democratic governance in Nigeria: A case study of Igboland. University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Institute of African Studies Lecture Series, No. 11. Kieh, G. (2018). State collapse and democratic construction: Prospects for Liberia: Constraints to democratization in Africa. In J. Mbaku & J. O. Ihonvbere (Eds.), Multiparty democracy and political change. Routledge. Mafeje, A. (2002). Democratic governance and new democracy in Africa: Agenda for the future. Presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 26–29 April. Mbaku, J.  M. (2020). Threats to democracy in Africa: The rise of the constitutional coup. Brookings. Retrieved September 19, 2021, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ africa-­in-­focus/2020/10/30/threats-­to-­democracy-­in-­africa-­the-­rise-­of-­the-­constitutional-­coup/ Mbaku, J.  M (2021). Entrenching democracy in African countries: Policy imperatives for leaders in 2021. Brookings. Retrieved December 5, 2021 from https://www. brookings.edu/blog/africa-­i n-­f ocus/2021/03/18/entrenching-­d emocracy-­i n-­a frican-­ countries-­policy-­imperatives-­for-­leaders-­in-­2021/ National Research Council. (1992). Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/2041 NCSL. (2010). Post-Election Party Control of State Legislatures. Ndulo, M. (2003). The democratization process and structural adjustment in Africa. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10(1), 315–368. Ogbu, U.K (2005) Religion, History, and Politics in Nigeria. Onduko, S. N. (2014). Democratisation challenges in Africa and the role of the African Union. (Master’s thesis, University of Nairobi, Kenya). Onoge, O. (1997). The democratic imperative in Africa (Claude Ake Memorial Lecture Series No. 1). African Centre for Democratic Governance. Osabu-Kle, D.  T. (2000). Compatible cultural democracy: The key to development in Africa. Broadview Press. Onwubiko, K.  B. C. (1973). School certificate history of West Africa, Book Two. Africana Educational Publishers. Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, K., & Aalen, L. (2002). Ethiopia since the Derg: A decade of democratic pretension and performance. Zed Books. Peters, B. L. (2003). The challenges of democracy and democratisation in Southern Africa. SA Yearbook of International Affairs. Potter, D. (2004). Democratisation, “good governance” and development. In T. Allen & A. Thomas (Eds.), Poverty and development into the 21st century. Open University Press. (Chapter 17: pp. 365–382). Ramsay, H. (1993). Recycled waste? Debating the analysis of worker participation: A response to ackers et al. Industrial Relations Journal, 24(1), 75–80. Rummel, R. J. (2007). Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War. Retrieved from http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/. Schedler, A. (2002). The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13, 37.

3  Democracy in Africa: Misrepresented or Tailored

43

Small, M., & Singer, J. D. (1976). The war-proneness of democratic regimes. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 1(1), 50–69. Tarr, U. (2010). The challenges of democracy and democratisation in Africa and Middle East. Information, Society and Justice, 3(2), 81–94. The Guardian. (2020). Zimbabwean MDC activists ‘abducted and sexually assaulted. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/17/zimbabwean-­mdc-­activists-­ abducted-­and-­sexually-­assaulted 11/12/2021 Uchendu, V. (1965). The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. United Nations. (2013). Democracy and Human Rights: The role of the United Nations. Discussion paper. [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democracy-­ and-­human-­rights-­the-­role-­of-­the-­united-­nations.pdf 11/12/2021 Uwizeyimana, D. (2012). Democracy and pretend democracies in Africa: Myths of African democracies. Law, Democracy & Development, 16, 139–161. Van Hoek, F. (1993, March–April). Africa in search of institutional revival (The Courier No. 138, pp. 67–70). Williams, J. A. (2011). Man and his government. Kay & Kay Publishers. Yaye, C.O. (2018). Culture and democracy in Africa: A philosophical inquiry (Doctoral thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa). Anuoluwapo Durokifa works as a post-doctoral research fellow in the School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy. Her research interests include Sustainable development, public policy, monitoring and evaluation, gender equality, development administration and African leadership.  

Chapter 4

A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness Andrew Enaifoghe

Abstract  The study examines contemporary democracy and consensus in African traditional society and the approaches to promoting Africanness. The study presents the arguments around consensual democracy as a “better means of the decision-­ making process than majoritarian democracy in traditional African life and governance”. The arguments are that consensus protects the interests of minorities while consensual democracy allows for meaningful representations. Contrary to popular opinion, this research contends that the issues or problems to representative democracy highlighted do not inherently undermine representative democratic governance and make the choice by consensus a viable form of decision-making in contemporary African society. The goal of this chapter is not to argue for majoritarian democracy as a viable position, the study is rather focused on a critical examination of the arguments for consensual democracy in Africa. The study contends that, at a given degree of discourse, the concept of consensus shares some characteristics with traditional or political democracy and faces similar limitations. The study concludes that theoretically, democracy and consensus are not inherently exclusive. However, the introduction of democracy throughout Africa faces the obstacles of political realities, the need for a step-by-step strategy, and, finally, a gap between formal democratic growth and social engagement. African democracy must be established within these contexts to promote Africanness. The study recommends that the African model of political democracy must be anchored in the tradition of an inclusive society characterized by several inequities to promote Africanness.

A. Enaifoghe (*) Faculty of Commerce, Administration and Law, University of Zululand, Zululand, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_4

45

46

A. Enaifoghe

Introduction Democracy in Africa is perceived to be under siege while authoritarianism is on the rise, in a process intricately entwined with the ecological catastrophe, expanding social inequality, and rising animosity. The implementation of democracy throughout the world faces three marketing obstacles: political conditions, the need for a step-by-step strategy, and, last, a gap between formal democratic growth and social engagement (Maduku & Enaifoghe, 2020; Cilliers, 2016). African democracy must be built amid these difficulties. This study contends that the African model of political democracy must be anchored in the tradition of an inclusive society, that is characterized by several inequities. Secondly, African democracy must adapt or assimilate, re-define, and begin utilizing Western experiences that are inextricably linked with its own cultural, social, and political realities. The continent has experienced three major historical antecedents before independenceIndependence, the first from colonialism Colonialism, the second from a despotic indigenous authority, and now something far more different (Lindberg, 2001), given the growing importance of governance in economic development and Africa’s desire to catch up. Contemporary governance in Africa, a scholar like (Maduku & Enaifoghe, 2020; Enaifoghe, 2019a; Crocker, 2019; Kurki, 2010), noted that the quality and qualities of governance proportionately affect the level of peace and stability, as well as the chances for economic development, as in any other region. There is no more crucial variable than governance, for it is governance that decides whether the state and the society it professes to control have long-term relationships (Crocker, 2019; Martin, 1995). The form of governance is critical because it influences whether authority is perceived as legitimately exercised. Legitimate authority, on the other hand, is founded on accepted laws and standards rather than the rulers’ arbitrary, uncontrolled power. Democratic governance has a significant regional dimension in terms of the institutional structures and norms that influence a region’s reaction to difficulties and help form its political culture (Crocker et al., 2011). This is notably relevant when considering Africa’s place in the emerging world, as this large region consists of 54 states—close to 25% of the U.N.’s membership (UNDP, 2016)—and has the highest number of landlocked states of any region, both of which have a significant impact on the political environment in which leaders make decisions. As a result, national and regional governance factors interact in real-time. Rocker Chester’s 2019 study examines the crucial role of political and economic inclusion in building peace and stability, as well as some of the key problems leaders confront when selecting how to manage inclusion: who to include and how to ‘pay’ for it. The study ends with a sobering observation on the difficulty of building a resilient government.

4  A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness

47

 he Historical Origins of the African State System T and Its Impacts At the beginning of the colonial period, the European cartographers defined most of the region’s states geographically. The current African state structure has been steadily Africanized, albeit on roughly the same territorial foundation that it began with after independence in the second part of the twentieth century. Less than 20% of Africa’s governments gained independence through insurrection or armed insurgency; the rest gained independence through peaceful transfers of authority from colonial officials to African political elites  (Acemoglu & James, 2012; Arusha, 1990). The first constitutions and legal systems were based on the final colonial era (William, 2012). Cold War geopolitics exacerbated the state-society divide in some respects, as global rivalry favoured African incumbents and frequently assured them of major aid from external countries wanting to create diplomatic ties with the new governments. This environment favoured an external orientation in African politics, in which Cold War reference points and prior colonial linkages ensured that African administrations frequently formed only a shaky sense of connection to their societies (Wiredu, 1995, 2001). Only in the last 25 years or so has the African state structure steadily evolved a stronger indigenous quality. Africa’s states are the world’s newest, and it can hardly be surprising that Africans define themselves in terms of multiple identities including regional, tribal, clan-based, and religious ones—in addition to being citizens of a relatively new state. (Crocker, 2019: 1)

For that and other factors, creating what is known as “the state-society gap”, which is at the heart of many states’ issues in contemporary Africa. Governments that rely heavily on foreign equivalents and foreign investment in natural resources for a large share of their budgets, rather than on domestic revenue, are more likely to have fewer ties to citizens and domestic social groups. This complicates the task of forging national identities; the ‘identity vacuum’ increases the possibility that political elites and social groupings may seize control of the state for narrower, self-­interested ends that erode, rather than promote, societal cohesion.

Democracy and Consensus: Governance in Africa In terms of democracy and consensus in Africa relating to governance, the geopolitical shifts were brought about by the Cold War’s end affected governance trends. Almost overnight, the connections between African governments and foreign powers, as well as significant sources of concessional money, were upended, while political liberalization in the former Soviet bloc contributed to global political shock waves  (Enaifoghe, 2019b; Benjamin, 1995). Space became available for African individuals and civil society movements while existing regimes could no longer rely on guaranteed support from former external partners. Furthermore, to investigate

48

A. Enaifoghe

the sources of legitimacy in African governing systems in greater depth (Hendriks, 2010; Lincoln, 1863). In the African setting today, according to Crocker (2019), there are five sources of government legitimacy that can be identified. The first sort of legitimacy is rights-­ based legitimacy, which is derived from rule of law, periodic elections, and political power alternation, and is typically endorsed by Western and certain African nations such as Ghana and Senegal (William, 2012). The second type, in contrast, is statist, performance-based legitimacy, which is often assessed in terms of economic growth and domestic stability, as well as government-provided services—legitimacy claimed by leaders in Uganda and Rwanda, among others. This definition of legitimacy may not be supported solely by leaders. A third, less commonly recognized source of legitimacy is referred to as ‘conventional African diplomatic legitimacy’, in which a government, however imperfectly established, is no more imperfect than the guidelines or norms recommended by its regional neighbours (Teffo, 1995). Regional governance is involved here, and precedents may be established and then ratified by regional or sub-regional organizations. For example, “the election day itself is more or less peaceful, the vote tabulation process is opaque or obscure, and the entire process is shaped by a pre-election playing field that is decisively skewed in favour of incumbents” (Crocker, 2019: 2). Now and then a precedent emerges because of these, namely, “pressure from outside the country, but with some internal support as well, for the formation of a transitional government of national unity” (Enaifoghe et  al., 2020). Such post-­ election pacts reflect the conclusion that stability trumps democracy. Another source of legitimacy in Africa is traditional political systems based on some form of kingship. Kingdoms that have existed for a long time, such as those in Morocco and Swaziland, are recognized national states (Sikuka, 2017). This type of rule is more commonly found at the sub-state level, as in the case of the emir of Kano or the Sultan of Sokoto in Nigeria, or the former Baganda (Uganda) or the Ashanti (Ghana). The ousted royals in the likes of Haile Selassie (Ethiopia) and King Idriss (Libya) may be replaced by self-anointed secular rulers who act like kings until they, too, are deposed. However, established, and recognized forms of the inherited rule should not be dismissed as ‘anti-modern’, especially when linked to an ethnic or tribal group’s identity and could be construed as a building block of legitimacy. It is worth remembering that historical kingships or dynasties were the most common form of rule in Europe, India, and China until modern times, and are still the most common form of the rule on the Arabian Peninsula. The Plantagenets and Tudors, as well as the Hapsburgs, Medicis, and Romanovs, were aware of the legitimacy based on successful predation and state capture, to say nothing of Genghis Khan’s Mughal descendants (Ayoob, 2007). Some African leaders operate essentially on patrimonial principles that Vladimir Putin can easily recognize (the Dos Santos era in Angola, the DRC under Mobutu and Kabila, the Eyadema, Bongo, Biya, and Obiang regimes in Togo, Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea, respectively) in this fifth model of imagined legitimacy (de Oliveira, 2015). Such regimes may attempt to perpetuate themselves by grooming wives or sons to succeed to power.

4  A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness

49

Predatory rule and political monopoly are unlikely to enjoy genuine common legitimacy, but they can linger for decades in the absence of effective counterbalancing institutions and power centres (Martin-Breen & Marty, 2011). Considering this, the question would be where is African governance heading? The key here is to identify the different factors that will influence its context. These different factors include macro variables such as educational access (particularly for women), the impact and mitigation of climate change, rates of development and income growth, demographic trends, internet access, urbanization rates, and conflict events. Aside from such macro factors, several less apparent factors appear to be crucial for the future democracy in Africa with the political and economic governance of the region. One of these occurs more commonly of the region’s leading states, as assessed by size, population, economic weight, overall political clout, and leadership prominence. If a critical mass of leaders—for example, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire, Algeria, and Egypt—move in the right direction, others will follow; of course, the opposite is also true. In 2015, the influential Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance noted that “overall governance progress in Africa is stalling”, and decided not to award a leadership award that year. “No award was made in 50% of the years since the program was launched in 2007; former Liberian president Ellen John Sirleaf won the award in 2017”, interestingly, small, and mid-­ size state leaders have won the award so far. (Crocker, 2019: 2)

The idea is that peer influence, examples, and precedents are especially crucial in a region with 54 states, many of which rely on good ties with their neighbours (Enaifoghe et  al., 2020). The African Union established the African Peer Assess Mechanism (APRM) to review and report on a variety of governance parameters because of the impact of past South African and Nigerian administrations (Wiredu, 1996). By 2016, 35 AU members had ‘joined’, but less than half had agreed to be evaluated. In terms of governance standards, African states are far from homogeneous: according to the Mo Ibrahim score, which is based on 14 governance categories and were published in 2015, 70 points on a scale of 100 separated the best from the worst performers (Stremlau, 2016). To put it differently, if term restrictions, neo-patrimonialism, and official kleptocracy become regionally accepted norms, it will be more difficult for better-­ governed states to resist the authoritarian tendency. If more leaders practice inclusive politics or are compelled to do so by the force of civil society, it could pave the way for improved political results in the region. While this appears evident, it is less clear which vectors and drivers will have the biggest influence on the outcome.

 xamining Other Critical Governance Drivers E in Democratic System In examining the critical drivers of governance in a democratic system, one of these drivers will be the importance and role of many powerful external actors. African political elites are more determined than ever to dictate their fate, and they are

50

A. Enaifoghe

succeeding. However, the framework in which their decisions are made is directly influenced by global political trends and the leeway afforded to nations and their leaders because of these trends. The growth of non-Western centres of power, as well as the resumption of global polarization among major nations, diminishes the presence and weight of Western influence  (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2017). This gives countries a lot of leeways to explore, to chart their path independent of Western values, but it can also push them to adopt authoritarian, state capitalist policies when it is necessary or convenient. Africans shape Africa’s geopolitical landscape to a large extent. However, it also displays the impact of Arab, Russian, Chinese, Indian, European, and American influence vectors who project their distinctions into African communities. The ramifications for governance are quite evident if African political elite opinion converges with those of key global voices in choosing stabilization over liberal peacebuilding agendas (de Oliveira & Verhoeven, 2018). Another driver of governance trends will be access to technologies that are transforming the global communications space by young and rapidly urbanizing populations. Relatively unfettered access to the internet via smartphones and laptops brings information—and hence potential power—to individuals and groups about all kinds of things: e.g., market prices, the views of relatives in the diaspora, conditions in the country next door, and the self-enrichment of corrupt officials. (Crocker, 2019: 2)

Corruption and transparency are likely to become focal points in African politics. As networked activists assert their ability to organize and take to the streets on behalf of many causes, the balance of power between official and non-official actors is likely to shift. Overthrowing regimes in Africa’s often weak states may become simpler, but this will not inevitably result in better governance. The same technological vectors can also be used to enhance criminal, trafficking, and terrorist networks, all of which pose risks to state sovereignty.

African Traditional Society in Promoting Africanness The system of governance that can promote Africanized democracy is nevertheless complex in Africa, it must be noted in this sense that many political leaders around the world face contradictory pressures. While on the one hand, they acknowledge the importance of strong, responsive state institutions; weak, unstable governments do not result in good governance (Rawls, 1996, 1987). However, except in the short run, political stability cannot be founded solely on governmental authority. Inclusion in the political and economic spheres is a prerequisite for a successful and legitimate government. The question then becomes, “How can we be inclusive?” Several African countries have decentralized their political decision-making structures, shifting authority from the centre to the province or municipal levels. The verdict on the efficacy of this approach is still out. According to the cases of Nigeria, Kenya, and South Sudan, each case must be judged on its own merits.

4  A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness

51

Decentralization has had significant budgetary and governance ramifications at times, including serving as a tool for co-option and corruption (Enaifoghe & Adetiba, 2019). Large countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are likely to face pressures against the centralized, autocratic, or one-party rule (whether accompanied by real elections or not). Traditional, tribal rulers may provide informed and truly recognized administration in some communities, provided they are not merely government appointees seeking decentralized self-enrichment. Due to the legal norms affect every element of economic and personal life, they are an essential part of the conversation about inclusion; this raises the fundamental question of whether individual rights or collective rights take precedence in the normative hierarchy. Inclusion of specific demographic cohorts is also an issue: women, youth, and migration from rural to urban regions (especially migrant women) all suffer exclusion issues that can have an impact on conflict and governance. Misguided national policies, paired with the cultural constraints that these socioeconomic groups face, may promote marginalization and sow the seeds of future disaster. The consequences for coping with state fragility and establishing better resilience can now be outlined considering this consideration of different sorts of inclusion. Some regimes appear to be robust due to their apparent staying strength, but the fact has a small (usually ethnic or regional) base of support. In this situation, the government seizes control of the state, co-opts the security apparatus, and dissolves civil society. When a frail regime is near the end of its life, it becomes clear that the state-society gap is a regime-society gap; the state withers and its institutions devolve into hollow shells used primarily to capture rents. The issues that African nations face are universal. However, African communities are particularly vulnerable to severe pressures, and governments must operate in an environment of high social demands and little resources and capacity to meet them. These circumstances can elicit an authoritarian impulse and the temptation to close ranks against any potential sources of resistance. As a result, the regime’s resilience is only temporary, with unstable political stability, diminishing cohesion, and eventual conflict or violent upheaval. The development of inclusive institutions may entail fights that allow political and societal actors to check entrenched rulers’ dominance and to break the power of entrenched rule-based participation in governance (Enaifoghe, 2019a). Such turning points, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, occur in distinct, one-of-a-kind historical circumstances that arise during the development of civilization. Improved governance to foster Africanized democracy, which appears to have been the fundamental donor demand for the disbursement of both bilateral and multilateral aid to African countries, has been characterized differently by many observers and actors involved in African development. Governance, according to the World Bank, is “how power is exercised in the administration of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1991). The World Bank’s definition goes beyond the public sector to the norms and institutions that establish a predictable and transparent environment for the conduct

52

A. Enaifoghe

of public and private enterprise. Accountability for economic and financial performance is also required (National Research Council, 1992). Many political scientists at the Namibia workshop felt compelled to point out that the concepts of democracy and governance were linked but not the same. They stated that good governance requires to enhance efficiency interdependence between rulers and the ruled, with this when it incumbent upon the rulers to be responsive to the ruled. While majoritarian democracy required broad agreement on ideals and procedures, participation in the selection of ruling elites, and accountability of the leadership to the population (Wiredu, 1996). However, both concepts were linked to societal dynamics in the framework of reciprocity. According to this study, the World Bank’s definition and debates of good governance were too restricted. Nonetheless, the summits concluded that African nations are in desperate need of governance reforms. Most African countries have found themselves in difficult situations and have chosen the easy way out. Foreign governments, too, did not push for good governance. Even when policies failed, support continued to flow. Only recently have donors raised the question of governance, relating it to help to ensure that the economy and politics are liberalized. Africans are increasingly demanding that such conditions should be linked to policy success rather than a specific blueprint for democracy to promote Africanness. The state’s dominance of the economy has severely hampered democracy in Africa; this has meant that the only way to grow rich has been through the political office, exacerbating the problem of corruption and motivating politicians to cling to political power. This has wreaked havoc on the economies of African countries. As a result, economic liberalization, which empowers regular producers, may well be beneficial to political democracy. Furthermore, in most African countries, a tiny number of powerful individuals have managed to undermine any sense of responsibility, legitimacy, democracy, and justice. This has been a source of great disappointment for planners, economists, and policymakers who want African nations to launch a realistic and coordinated attack on poverty, sickness, illiteracy, and other developmental difficulties. The deliberations of African democratic system to promote Africanization, a certain desperately needed elements of good governance, such as popular participation in governance. For accountability and transparency, the elimination of corruption, the protection of free information and human rights, and the decentralization and devolution of power, are identified to reflect Africanness. Despite widespread recognition that strong and effective governance systems are required in African countries, Olanipekun (2020) noted that scholars are unsure how African countries might move to build new governance models that reflect Africanness in a situation of decline and economic stagnation. To that end, people are unanimous in their belief that donors must address the interdependence of the economic and political reforms proposed to African countries, particularly in terms of compatibility and sequencing (Olanipekun, 2020). Participants discussed how economic reforms have resulted in severe despair, unemployment, and starvation, and have not been as successful as promised.

4  A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness

53

In this regard, it must be emphasized that many African countries are becoming more autocratic, not less, after accepting such economic aid conditions. For example, the Ghanaian government “was able to carry out its changes because it utilized force”. This study, therefore, believe and agreed that, rather than imposing requirements, governments should stimulate discussions and seek consensus through engagement with African governments in the future. To summarize, the digitalization of African politics presents genuine challenges to political leaders and has the potential to boost their drive to digitize their political control instruments.

Conclusion The study attempted to analyze and contrast consensual democracy with its majoritarian democracy equivalent, particularly as it relates to minority interests and greater representation. The study examines democracy and consensus in African traditional society and the approaches to promoting Africanness. The study presents the arguments around consensual democracy as a “better means of the decision-­ making process than majoritarian democracy in traditional African life and governance”. The arguments are that consensus protects the interests of minorities while consensual democracy allows for meaningful representations. Contrary to popular opinion, this research contends that the issues or problems to representative democracy highlighted do not inherently undermine representative democratic governance and make the choice by consensus a viable form of decision-making in contemporary African society. The goal of this chapter is not to argue for majoritarian democracy as a viable position; the study is rather focused on a critical examination of the arguments for consensual democracy in Africa. It is, however, too early to say whether such institutions may emerge in modern Africa because of slow tinkering with reformist agendas, as the legacy of wise leaders, or whether they can only emerge because of basic tests of strength between social and political factions. Afro barometer public opinion surveys have taught us a lot about what Africans desire and expect from their governments. There is a high need for jobs, improved economic management, less inequality and corruption, and outcomes such as health, education, and infrastructure. These outcomes necessitate the establishment of strong governing institutions. It is unclear whether such structures will arise regularly, beginning with reasonably well-governed nations like Ghana or Senegal, because of frequent, successful alternations of power, or if they will develop only when Africa’s systems of government rupture and are remade. If inclusion is the key element, it will be important to delve deeper into the resources available to leaders to ‘pay’ for including substantial support and demographic generations.

54

A. Enaifoghe

References Acemoglu, D., & James, A.  R. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Random House (Crown). Arusha. (1990). African charter for popular participation in development transformation. International conference on popular participation in the recovery and development process in Africa, 12–16 February. Ayoob, M. (2007). State making, state breaking, and state failure. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the dogs of war. USIP Press. Benjamin, M. (1995). The value of consensus. In R. E. Bulger, E. M. Bobby, & H. V. Fineberg (Eds.), Society’s choices social and ethical decision making in biomedicine. National Academic Press. Cilliers, J. (2016, October). The future of democracy in Africa. Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria) and Frederick S. Pardee Centre for International Studies (Denver). Data drawn from Jakkie Cilliers. Crocker, C.  A. (2019, January 14). African governance: Challenges and their implications. Hoover Institution, Winter Series, Issue 119. Available: https://www.hoover.org/research/ african-­governance-­challenges-­and-­their-­implications Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., & Aall, P. (Eds.). (2011). Rewiring regional security. USIP Press. de Oliveira, R. S. (2015). Magnificent and beggar land: Angola since the civil war. Hurst. de Oliveira, R. S., & Verhoeven, H. (2018, April–May). Taming intervention: Sovereignty, statehood and political order in Africa. Survival, 60(2), 7–32. Enaifoghe, A.  O. (2019a, March). Deliberative politics through citizens’ participatory democracy: A model for African political processes. Journal of Social and Development Sciences, 10(1), 11–21. Enaifoghe, A. O. (2019b, March). The decolonization of African education and history. African Renaissance, Special Issue, pp. 93–116. Enaifoghe, A. O., & Adetiba, T. C. (2019, June). Decentralization problem with citizenry participatory democracy in local municipal development in South Africa. AFFRIKA: Journal of Politics, Economics and Society, 9(1), 91–116. Enaifoghe, A. O., Maramura, T. C., Maduku, H., Ekanade, I. K., Muzee, H., & Tait, K. (2020). Africa’s under-development amidst global pressures: Is good governance attainable? African Journal of Development Studies, 10(4), 31–53. Hendriks, F. (2010). Vital democracy theory of democracy in action users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. In Vital democracy: A theory of democracy in action. Oxford University Press. Kurki, M. (2010). Democracy and conceptual contestability: Reconsidering conceptions of democracy in democracy promotion. International Studies Review, 12(3), 362–386. http://www.jstor. org/stable/40931113 Lincoln, A. (1863). The Gettysburg address. A Speech on the occasion of the dedication of the national cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 19 November 1863. Lindberg, S.  I. (2001). Forms of states, governance, and regimes: Reconceptualizing the prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa. International Political Science Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique, 22(2), 173–199. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601185 Maduku, H., & Enaifoghe, A. O. (2020, June). The quest for economic development and the nexus for democracy in Africa. African Journal of Development Studies, 10(2), 175–198. Mandela, N. (1994). Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela. Little Brown. Martin, B. (1995). The value of consensus. In R. E. Bulger, E. M. Bobby, & H. V. Fineberg (Eds.), Society’s choices social and ethical decision making in biomedicine. National Academic Press. Martin-Breen, P., & Marty, A. J. (2011). Resilience: A literature review (The Bellagio Initiative Background Paper). The Institute for Development Studies, The Resource Alliance, and the Rockefeller Foundation. http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/ 3692/Bellagio-­Rockefeller%20bp.pdf?sequence=1

4  A Consensual Democracy and the African Traditional Society: Promoting Africanness

55

National Research Council. (1992). Democracy and governance in Africa. In Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices. The National Academies Press. https://doi. org/10.17226/2041 Olanipekun, V.  O. (2020). Democracy and consensus in traditional Africa: A critique of Kwasi Wiredu. Inkanyiso: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 12(1), 3 Rawls, J. (1987). The idea of an overlapping consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1), 1–25. Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism. Columbia University Press. Sikuka, K. (2017, October 12). Is there a link between democracy and development in Africa? ACCORD.  Democracy, Development. Available: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-­trends/ link-­democracy-­development-­africa/ Stremlau, J. (2016). Africa’s democracies: Promises, progress and prospects (p.  23). Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. Teffo, L. J. (1995). Kingship and democracy in South Africa. In J. Malherbe (Ed.), Decolonising the mind. UNISA. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. (2017). 2016 democracy index, revenge of the “deplorables”. Available at: http://felipesahagun.es/wp-­content/uploads/2017/01/Democracy-­ Index-­2016.pdf. Accessed 17 Nov 2021. UNDP. (2016). Human Development Index (HDI). Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ human-­development-­index-­hdiíŸ. Accessed 17 July 2017. William, B.  D. (2012). Institutional change and legislative vote consensus in New Zealand. Legistlative Studies Quarterly, 37(4), 559–574. Wiredu, K. (1995). Democracy and consensus in Africa traditional politics: A plea for non-party polity. The Centennial Review, 39(1), 53–64. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural universals and particulars. Indianapolis University. Wiredu, K. (2001). Democracy by consensus: Some conceptual considerations. Philosophical Papers, 30(3), 227–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640109485087 World Bank. (1991). Managing development: The governance dimension (Discussion paper). Andrew Enaifoghe is a university lecturer, an enthusiastic researcher and presenter with strong research experience in social sciences and humanities. Through his research, he has learnt the ability to translate and contextualize complex research concepts and theories to a variety of audiences. His research interest is multidisciplinary, covering social sciences and humanities disciplines ranging from public administration, international relations, migration, participatory democracy, and good governance. He has multiple peer-reviewed articles in accredited journal publications, books, book chapters and conference proceedings. His teaching and supervision experience include the supervision of students at the Management College of Southern Africa (MANCOSA)  and the University of Zululand, South Africa.  

Chapter 5

Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991 Mady Ibrahim Kante

Abstract  The purpose of this study is to analyse the different political systems in Mali since independence (September 22, 1960) until the democratic evolution in 1991. It also aims to give an overview of the political situation in Mali since the beginning of democracy. This will allow us to make a sort of comparison between the two periods. Thus, to see the nexus between stability and democratic evolution. The peculiarity of Mali’s democratic evolution is linked to various phenomena, among them the security instability in the country and the presence of terrorism, which has jeopardized peace and security and all development initiatives. However, the question is whether there is a link between the insecurity that has pervaded Mali for more than 10 years and democratization in Mali. Looking at Mali’s democracy, we can see that Mali has not been able to escape political and security crises, despite being considered a positive example in the practice of democracy. That is always, interrupted by military coups that hinder the democratic development of the country. To validate or test this hypothesis, the first part describes Mali’s political regimes since independence. In the second part, the focus will be on the evolution of democracy and its link to insecurity in Mali.

Introduction The democratic evolution in Mali is part of the monitoring of democratic experiences in various fields on the African continent. The particularity of the democratic evolution in Mali is the security instability in certain regions of the country, as well as the geographical and strategic location of the country in West Africa, with its M. I. Kante (*) University of Legal and Political Sciences of Bamako, Bamako, Mali Peacekeeping School, Peacekeeping School - Alioune Blondin Bèye of Bamako (EMP-ABB), Bamako, Mali Geopolitic, Mali War College, Bamako, Mali © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_5

57

58

M. I. Kante

political, economic, and cultural relations with neighbouring countries. Beyond the case of Mali, it seems that there is a need for scientific studies by researchers and specialists in the political field, who can analyse and evaluate these phenomena in various areas on the continent. This evaluation should focus on the similarities and different aspects of African democracy. The present study analyses the political, economic, and social governance in Mali, from the first republic to the present. Thus, the state of the evolution of democracy in the country since 1991, after the coup d’état of March 26, 1991. It also provides an overview of the different political systems in Mali after independence (September 22, 1960) until 1991, knowing that the development of democracy in Mali lies within the same framework of democratic experiences on the African continent. The peculiarity of democratic evolution in Mali is linked to different phenomena, among which security instability in certain regions of the country and its geographical and strategic location in West Africa, which also determines its political, economic, and cultural relations with neighbouring countries. This study is divided into two main parts and the conclusion. The first part deals with the political management of the republics in Mali between independence in 1690 and the democratic revolution of 1991. The second part focuses on the results of the democratic revolution on the political and security level of the country, notably, the phenomenon of terrorism that has hindered the stability of Mali for more than a decade.

 he Political Management of the Republics in Mali Between T Independence in 1690 and the Democratic Revolution of 1991 Mali suffered political crises for long periods from independence to the present, and after independence, the country underwent a socialist system. President Modibo Keita adopted socialist ideology and worked with socialist leaders on the African continent, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah, in support of socialism in Africa. He announced the adoption of the one-party system, but internal conflicts and the deterioration of the economic situation from 1967 to 1968 prompted the president to issue an order to dissolve the Politburo, causing the issue to develop in late 1968 when the Mali Army launched a military coup led by Lieutenant Mousa Traore and removed the Keita regime.

The Mali of the First Republic Since the end of the Second World War, with the creation of the United Nations, the colonized countries decided to take their destiny in hand with the support of the UN.  Indeed, Mali was one of the African countries that gained independence in

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

59

1960. On September 22, 1960, Mali gained its independence. This country, which was formerly called French Sudan, separated from Senegal, and entrusted its destiny to Modibo Keita, a strong man who brought the country closer to the USSR and oriented it towards a socialist regime (Lacube, 2012). The new state was just born, however, it needed all the mechanisms of the state system to overcome all the challenges it faced. However, Mali asked for the evacuation of the French military bases on January 20, 1961, so that its new army could see the light of day, and thus be autonomous. At that time, the State had only a few senior officers who took the constitution and management of the army in hand. Indeed, the army of that time could have a great evolution with Soviet support. On the political level: The leaders opted for socialism. Indeed, the first regime to take the single-party system in Mali was the US-RDA, a party of socialist inspiration. Since Malian socialism was not atheistic and should, as its ideologists stressed, be inspired by African values. Malian policy during the First Republic was based on two axes: non-alignment and the progressive socialization of the economy. Mali, without breaking its relations with the former metropolis, turned more towards the countries of the socialist bloc, the USSR, China, etc., with which numerous technical and cultural cooperation agreements were signed. To train cadres quickly, the new Malian state sent many students to these countries. For cultural policy in Mali, it could be said that throughout Mali’s post-colonial history, culture has emerged as one of the fundamental means of promoting social transformation (Fougère, 2012). Economic: Under the leadership of Modibo Keita, Mali’s first president (1960–1968), the US-RDA launched a vast program of national development that included the creation of an independent economy, the training of African cadres and the development of national culture. Despite significant economic and social achievements, the Keita regime gradually managed to alienate important sectors of the population such as the peasants, the army, and the merchants (Amselle, 1985, 1992). Despite all the necessary plans initiated under the socialist regime in Mali, neither the State nor the Malian farmers benefited from these good performances because of the world market prices. Livestock farming, thanks to numerous vaccination campaigns and the digging of wells, experienced a real boom. Nevertheless, here too, the export of animals and hides, especially after the creation of the Malian franc in July 1962, caused the State to lose huge sums of money (Yattara, 2005).

Mali Under the Second Republic 1969–1991 The form of the state under Modibo Keita’s regime was one of the major weaknesses reproached to the public power. A large part of the population did not understand how the state functioned, especially with a socialist system that went against its culture and traditions. The captain (at the time of 1968) used these opinions to lead a coup against Modibo Keita. Indeed, on November 19, 1968, a military coup led by Moussa Traoré overthrew Modibo Keïta and set up a Military Committee for National Liberation (CMLN) (Le Monde, 1968), which was very limited to

60

M. I. Kante

lieutenants and captains.1 Then Moussa Traoré became its president and promised democracy and free elections, which never came. He proclaimed himself as president in 1969 and ruled the country until his removal in the 1991 coup.2 As for Moussa Traoré, he ruled the country for more than 22 years, combining the functions of president of the CMLN, head of state and government (The New  York Times, 1991). According to the explanations of the 1968 coup d’Etat, because of President Keïta’s poor economic record.3 However, the immediate causes of the coup were overwhelming financial and economic problems.4 The Second Republic was established, which lasted 23  years, in which Malians hoped for happiness, economic growth, and radical changes in their lives. Since the establishment of the new republic, the military regime has tried to open some doors of freedom; the pressure (of socialism) against traditional leaders is reduced. Religious leaders have regained their place in society, exiles have returned. Therefore, the regime had popularity at the beginning, with the opening found. The freedom lasted only a few years. The military regime turned to iron-fisted management. No one was spared the soldiers repressed the population. On the level of governance of public affairs, the regime had difficulties to realize the development initiatives, for the different plans: The political situation, the political activities are forbidden, former cadres imprisoned, socialist ideology has become a crime, no tolerance for a socialist, even though the country’s relationship will continue with socialist countries in the world (China, the Soviet Union, etc.). Indeed, the military without political experience and state management, very quickly understood that they had to listen to the country’s cadres to prepare the country’s future. However, the regime ended up using force, first against the opponents, then the companions and comrades of struggle who were imprisoned in turn, almost all of them died in prison. However, any political activity is prohibited, not even the creation of a political party, which was considered a crime against the republic. Thus, the regime has almost failed politically, relying solely on force. It should adopt good economic governance, to have the confidence of the average population. The economic situation, the socialism of the first president, which was seen as a way of development, was abandoned because it was considered to bring misfortune

 Dix lieutenants (Moussa Traoré, Baba Diarra, Youssouf Traoré, Filifing Sissoko, Tiécoro Bagayoko, Joseph Marat, Mamadou Sanogho, Cissema Toukara, Moussa Kone et Karim Dembele) et quatre capitaines (Yoro Diakité, Malik Diallo, Charles Cissoko et Mamadou Cissoko) ont formé le Comité militaire pour la libération nationale. 2  Houpert, Pierre, 2016, « Ce jour-là : le 19 novembre 1968, un coup d’État renverse le président malien Modibo Keïta – Jeune Afrique », JeuneAfrique.com, consulté le 30 août 2022, https://www. jeuneafrique.com/375154/politique/jour-19-novembre-1968-coup-detat-renverse-presidentmalien-modibo-keita/. 3  Idem. 4  South African History Online (1968). President Modibo Keita of Mali is deposed by the army: https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-modibo-keita-mali-deposed-army 1

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

61

to the Malians according to the putschists of 1968, but thanks to the determination of the executives, the companies and state enterprises were maintained. The economic situation, in which Mali found itself, with an external balance of more than five billion dollars, forced its leaders to ask for external aid. France was one of the first countries to come to their aid. Indeed, the most remarkable reform carried out by the military authorities was the creation of the ODR (Opérations de Développement Rural) by Ordinance No. 22 of the CMLN of March 24, 1972. Two years after the establishment of the second republic, a three-year program of economic and financial recovery (1970–1972) was launched, almost entirely financed by the outside world, by countries that wanted to keep the regime in place, to achieve their objective of keeping control over the regime. Thus, the country will be covered by some organizations whose effectiveness was not with the means deployed. With the devaluations and economic crises in the country, from 1972 to 1973, a serious drought broke out. The public authorities did not act until long afterwards; they collected part of the tax on livestock, while the European community had given its aid. However, the international community (world powers and world financial institutions) came to Mali’s aid in various forms. But the distribution of aid was not done as it should have been, corruption took its share, so a large part of the country did not see any aid, especially the northern regions, the regions most affected by the hunt. As a result, the rebellion of the 1990s was a consequence. This mismanagement triggered a strong popular mobilization against the military regime of Moussa Traore.

Political Dynamism During the Transition Following the overthrow of General Moussa Traoré by the military coup of March 26, 1991, a Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP), chaired by ATT, was entrusted with the task of running the country for the transition period, to organize credible and transparent elections. This provided the basis for the third republic, thus the beginning of democratic development in the country as was the case in almost all African countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Lacube, 2012). After the coup d’état of March 1991, the transition began with the establishment of transitional institutions. At the head was the Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP), with putschist leader Amadou Toumani Touré taking the presidency and the appointment of a civilian prime minister, who formed his transitional government. This transition prepared and organized the Third Republic, through the establishment of the democratic regime in 1992. This marked the beginning of the experience of democratic transition in Mali since its independence. The “Comité de transition pour le salut du Peuple (CTSP)”, which led this period, was composed of the army and civilians, and had important tasks to accomplish, notably, to amend the constitution, to put in place laws that would establish democracy in the country. In addition to holding the first presidential and parliamentary

62

M. I. Kante

elections considering Mali’s democratic experience.5 The committee (CTSP) was composed of 25 members: 10 militaries, 15 civilians; for the civilians, come from different political movements and student associations and civil society, as well as armed movements, which all participated in the revolution of 1991, against the military regime.6 The transition committee was faced with a state of political and security instability. As well as the economic crisis, that has brought the country to the ground. In fact, at the end of the 1980s, the government faced a rebellion in the north of the country, which was at war with the government because of the economic deterioration and the social situation in the northern regions. The population in the area felt marginalized and abandoned by the state. Certainly, one of the plans (the most important) of the transition committee was to unite all parties to work for the stability and development of the country. To do this, the main point was to identify the major problems, which are considered as blocking factors and hinder the development of the country. The war against the rebels continued in the north of the country. This led the committee to sign the Charter of National Reconciliation on April 11, 1992, in which all the northern rebel movements and the government were brought together to sign the peace agreement.

Democratic Evolution Towards the Third Republic in Mali From independence until 1990, when political pluralism emerged, Mali lived under two authoritarian regimes: one of a socialist type, under President Modibo Keita, and the other of a military type, under General Moussa Traoré. In the early 1990s, this logic reached its most successful form. Beyond the party, and more than the government, it was a small circle of relatives and friends who exercised the reality of power and guided the conduct of the country’s affairs. Worn out by the exercise of authority, Moussa referred important decisions to his trusted group before acting. He became more and more cut off from the realities of the country, and he did not perceive the profound changes in the country. His swan song came in 1988 when he assumed the presidency of the Organization of African Unity at the same time as celebrating the 20th anniversary of his assumption of power. Two years later, political associations launched demands for political openness. Impervious to the spirit of the times, deaf to the opinions in favour of a multiparty system that was emerging within his camp, Moussa Traoré missed historic opportunities to accept the opening. The bloody repression of the student march of March 22, 1991, sounded the death knell for his regime. Overthrown by the coup of March  République du Mali, (1991). L’avènement de la démocratie et de la troisieme republique au Mali, (Bamako, le 25 aout 1991), p. 6. 6  Centre d’études et de recherché pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social, (1997). “Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours” in Coalition Mondiale pour l’Afrique et Africa Leadership Forum, (Bamako: Edition Donniya, 1997), pp. 37, 38. 5

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

63

26, Moussa Traoré was sentenced to death in the “Blood Crimes” trial and the “Economic Crimes” trial (the sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment).

The Factors of the Democratic Transition in Mali The Malian people suffered under the military regime (1968–1991), President Moussa Traoré seized and monopolized power for many years, and insisted on staying and continuing this situation without competition. Power was absolute in the hands of the head of state, who prohibited all other political activities through constitutional decisions, which led to social inequalities and the deterioration of the state’s economy. The distribution and sharing of power among different political forces in a peaceful manner by adopting the democratic way became one of the things necessary to get out of this situation, which is to hold democratic elections. The most important internal reasons for the process of democratic transformation in Mali will be discussed as follows: Political factors: in 1968, the army launched a military coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, removed Modibo Keita from power, and the constitution was suspended. In 1974 a new constitution was promulgated, Mali became under one-party rule, the National Socialist Democratic People’s Party of Mali led by Traoré, and in 1979 a student demonstration was crushed with 12 students killed (Mara, 2010). The military monopolized all state institutions during their rule, the Military Committee for the Liberation of the Nation, was under their control, as well as the government and the judicial court, as they were the ones who led the coup, and power was divided between these institutions. Indeed, the Military Committee has become the sole responsible for the executive and legislative power (CMLN Ordre numéro 1, 1968). In July 1969, Declaration No. 37/CMLN was issued, which provided for the establishment of an advisory committee to assist the institutions of the state by expressing opinions on important issues. (La constitution de la république du Mali, juin 1974, Art. 78).7 During the coup d’état of 1968, the constitution was dissolved and replaced by the declaration of the Military Committee. Until June 2, 1974, the date of the constitutional referendum, the state returned to constitutional life, with the CMLN remaining the sole supreme authority. Indeed, the new constitution was amended, and the military committee and parliament changed the electoral laws several times. Nevertheless, this change in political life was not a real change. For the military regime monopolized power in its own way. The 1974 constitution placed power in the hands of one man, with the creation of a single party, the “Union démocratique du Peuple malien”, which became the only legitimate party in the country. The head of state was the head of government, controlling all state institutions and all the affairs of the country, and was elected by majority vote. He appoints ministers and

 The Constitution of the Republic of Mali, June 1974, Art. 78.

7

64

M. I. Kante

heads of institutions. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces. The constitution also authorized the power to amend laws for the head of state, as well as the right to dismiss the parliament, and under this constitution, control over the president was solely the responsibility of the party. Considering this constitution, legislative elections were held in 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988, when all parliamentarians were from the “Union démocratique du Peuple du Mali (UDPM)”. Moussa Traoré also won the presidential elections held in 1979 and 1985, as he was the only candidate entitled to run for president under the 1974 constitution. Thus, throughout the Second Republic, the nature of the political system in Mali was military and authoritarian, which did not allow for the existence of an opposition, and the unions and political parties that demanded pluralism in the 1980s. When the regime failed to establish effective political systems, separatist tendencies multiplied, leading to the rebel crises in the north of the country in the 1980s (Mara, 2010, pp. 65–67). These conditions pushed the associations and political parties that had disappeared under the socialist regime to act secretly. Since the early 1970s, the “Parti Malien du Travail (PMT)” began its political activities secretly to defend civil liberties and implement political pluralism in Mali, and many activists gathered around it. Politicians secretly engaged in various forms of activities on different fronts (Camara, 2007, p. 6). During this period, many opponents were arrested and imprisoned. As a result of these pressures, the “Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien, UDPM” and student movements began to demand pluralism and to organize free elections; however, several conferences were organized. Thus, seminars to discuss the issue of democracy, pluralism of parties. However, several political parties were created.8 Since the beginning of 1990, bloody demonstrations and strikes by students and teachers, as well as workers and employees, have begun as a natural consequence of the economic, social and security conditions the country is experiencing. The demonstrations and strikes continued against the ruling regime, which resorted to violence against the demonstrators, with the number of casualties in these clashes reaching 200, leading to the intervention of the army to stage a coup in March 1991 (Mara, 2010, pp. 65–67). On March 26, 1991, following the failure of the Malian political system to adequately respond to the demands of the Malian people. Amadou Toumani Touré decided to carry out a coup against Moussa Traoré. As a result, General Moussa Traoré’s 23-year military “dictatorship” in Mali ended. Subsequently, a transitional

 As “la Coalition pour la démocratie au Mali – le Parti africain pour la solidarité et la justice (ADEMA-PASJ)” and “la Conférence Nationale pour l’Initiative pour la Démocratie (CNID)” The Coalition for Democracy in Mali – African Party for Solidarity and Justice (ADEMA-PASJ) and the National Conference for the Initiative for Democracy (CNID); Centre d’études et de recherché pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social, (1997). “Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours” in Coalition Mondiale pour l’Afrique et Africa Leadership Forum, (Bamako: Edition Donniya, 1997), pp. 26, 27. 8

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

65

government took over the affairs of the country and began its work by proposing an amendment to the 1974 constitution. Indeed, the new constitution stipulated the need to adopt multipartyism, also determining the duration of the presidency, so it became 5 years renewable once while protecting all individual and collective freedoms.9 The country witnessed the implementation of the democratic experience in 1991 after a coup d’état led by Amadou Toumani Touré against the regime of Moussa Traoré. Economic factors: Mali is a poor country. More than three-quarters of its population works in agriculture and livestock, producing food crops such as millet, rice, sorghum, cassava, corn, and yams. The most important agricultural products are cotton and sugarcane. Indeed, most of the population in the south of the country depends on this sector. Nomads and semi-nomads gather large herds of cows, sheep, goats, and camels. Fishing is also considered an important economic activity and most of the production is carp, catfish, and river fish. Most fish stocks come from the Bani River, the Niger River, the Senegal River, and Lake Debot. The service sector, such as employment in public establishments, tourism, and businesses, absorbs 15% of the labour force in Mali, and most of them work in Bamako and the major cities. In terms of industry, textiles, food, and leather products are among the most important industrial activities in the country. Under the regime of Moussa Traoré “the second republic”, the government-owned all the large factories, but it tried to encourage individual investments with conditions for the interest of the single party. Sometimes the economic operators do not accept them. Most of the large factories were built with foreign aid, such as cement, sugar, canning, and textile factories. Moussa Traoré’s Mali faced many economic problems: the country is dependent on agriculture, although only one-fifth of its land is considered fertile and suitable for agricultural production at the time. As a result, the state has lost its credibility with farmers. The quantity of agricultural products is decreased, as for the prices of agricultural products burst. In addition, agricultural production is also faced with the risks of fluctuating rainfall, which can reach below-average levels, in addition to the fact that the natural pastures could sometimes recede considerably. Plantlife in the Sahel region was exposed in the 70s and 80s of the twentieth century to years of drought, that resulted in the destruction of vast areas of vegetation and the death of millions of cows, sheep, and goats. Declining cotton prices and rising oil prices on the world market also led to the severity of deteriorating economic conditions in the country.10 Indeed, economic performance continued to deteriorate throughout the period of military rule (1968–1991) and remained a phenomenon in Mali after independence. The country experienced growth rates ranging from 6% to 8% during the first decade. However, the economic situation has deteriorated since the mid-1990s, reducing the growth rate to 2.3%, and with the continuation of this deterioration, it

 La constitution de la République du Mali, (1992). promulguée par décret No. 92-073/P.  Statistiques-mondiales (2019). Mali, http://www.statistiques-mondiales.com/mali.htm

9

10

66

M. I. Kante

has reached zero. This has added a dangerous and vital dimension to the misery and human suffering of the Malian people. In addition to the continuous series of droughts and famines that the country has experienced since the late 80s, which has led to the bankruptcy of many national companies and institutions. As a result of the above, the issue of democracy became the focal point of the political development crisis in Mali, and the development strategies adopted by the governments of Moussa Traoré failed to accomplish the political tasks they had set themselves or to achieve economic development. On the contrary, they have reinforced material stagnation and deviation, the reason for its formation and preservation is due to the absence of democracy (Seyoum, 2022). Indeed, the economic degradation of Mali and the rate of population growth kept rising to about 22%. In addition to this, the external debt is raised from its interest of 55 billion CFA francs in 1968 to 715 billion CFA francs in 1991.11 Which increased the burdens and obstacles to economic development and helped to cause economic failure. This increased the burdens and obstacles to economic development and contributed to economic failure, as the demands of the population increased, although the improvement in the level of resources was not accompanied, which gave a new dimension to the crisis in Mali. Therefore, the government was not able to obtain the necessary support to cope with the situation, nor was it able to control the public sector. National companies and institutions were declared bankrupt because of the spread of corruption. This situation also provided an opportunity for donor countries and monetary institutions to set the conditions for obtaining funds and aid, including the need for democratic transformation and the adoption of capitalist policies, such as structural adjustment programs. As the military regime and the single party were unable to drive the locomotive of economic progress, the state needed change that led to the improvement of the economic situation (Kuépie et al., 2008). However, the regime tried to adapt “Structural Adjustment Programs” of the international community. The beginning of the first phase of implementation of the program did not give the expected results. On the contrary, the spread of poverty continued. Therefore, the financial communities have considered the economic crisis due to the negligence of the state, which did not execute the programs as it should be based on the social dimension: such as the construction of schools, hospitals, etc. The rapid privatization and abandonment of key strategic sectors by the state in favour of economic operators and businessmen also had many disastrous effects in Mali. In the late 1980s, all classes of society were affected by the economic crisis that engulfed the country, resulting from corruption, theft, and the monopolization of state wealth by the ruling class (Lô, 2003). In terms of security, between 1968 and 1991, Mali suffered a deterioration in the state of law and order, particularly with the increase in security problems, which affected the entity and sovereignty of the state, such as military coups and the

 Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement Mali, (2008). “L’audit citoyen de la dette du Mali”, (Bamako, Novembre 2008), p. 14. 11

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

67

problem of rebels in the north of the country, who opposed the regime of the time. Due to the marginalization of some regions in the north of the country, this led to the emergence of movements in the northern regions demanding people’s rights and development, such as: “Mouvement de la résistance Touareg”, “Mouvement populaire d’Azaouad”, and “Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad”.12 Indeed, the consequences of the problems were human rights violations, institutional deterioration, and failure of national integration policies, as part of the people felt abandoned by the regime. This continues under the third republic (Hincker, 2003). Since the mid-1990s, a group of rebels took up arms in the north of the country against the government. Therefore, the national army and policymakers had no choice but to confront these armed groups, who began to fight the regime. Then the clashes ended, and the conflicts were temporarily resolved by the conclusion of agreements between the government and the rebels, the most important of which was an agreement reached in Algeria on January 6, 1991 (Accord de Tamanrasset – le 6 Janvier 1991 Algérie).13 Socio-cultural factors: Ethnicity in Mali is divided into several different ethnicities,14 which are as for the religious aspect: Islam was 90% Sunni, Christianity 5% (one third are Roman Catholic and one third are Protestant), and 5% are local beliefs. Islam as a religion for most of the population, under the socialist regime of Modibo Keita, religious leaders were repressed, considered a threat to the state. On the other hand, with the arrival of the military in power, these religious leaders were pardoned; they were given all the favours of the regime, in contrast to their support for the regime. Many of them received free partials to build Medrassas, Koranic schools, mosques, etc. (Leclerc, 2009). The crisis of national integration becomes clear when the regime of Moussa Traoré seemed unable to build a national state, where the desire to live together is weakened among the people, who form the society as equal partners, which makes it difficult to apply the term “people” in Mali under the military regime. The introduction of the term “State” for this entity at that time was not adequate. The inability of political systems to manage this crisis in Mali, either because of regime corruption or because of their bias toward one part of the population or ethnic group over another. However, this has led to a weakening of their distributional capacity to meet – even minimally – the demands of the various other ethnic groups. Certainly, the expansion of Mali’s territories, and the dominance of the desert character, has prevented the regime from controlling all regions, even by force. Because of the underdevelopment of its methods and means of transport, either because of the interweaving of ethnic groups across the borders with neighbouring countries in a way that had the possibility of controlling the entire population or because of interventions by regional authorities. At the end of the 80s, with the

 The “Tuareg Resistance Movement”, “Popular Movement of Azaouad” and the “Arab Islamic Front of Azawad”. 13  Tamanrasset Agreement- January 6, 1991, Algeria. 14  Diany, N. http://www.nanadiany.com/indexphp?page=27 12

68

M. I. Kante

escalation of demands for democracy, multipartyism, human rights, justice, etc. in the world. In Mali, the preoccupation of the ruling party was with internal problems, even though informal associations and unions began to work for change.

 xternal Factors That Have Had an Impact on the Military E Regime in Mali The fundamental transformations have taken place in the world, since the late 1980s, including the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, especially the Soviet Union. However, the Western powers have demanded on the Third World countries the adaptation of democracy, to have the aid or debt. In addition, international organizations have made democratic development a condition for their aid and loans. Certainly, the rise of globalization was an important factor in imposing the capitalist ideology (political liberalism/market mechanisms) on African countries in what is now called good governance and structural adjustment. Since the 1980s, Western countries, particularly France, have begun to implement the new globalization program in most African countries, including Mali under the regime of Moussa Traoré. This is the neoliberal program “structural adjustment programs”, for the third world economies (underdeveloped countries), which were prepared by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to liberalize the economy. To move to a market economy, to weaken the role of the state and privatize profitable public enterprises to the benefit of large multinationals, and thus the transfer of surplus value to the major global centres. This has led to more impoverishment, deficits, and debt. This has increased its subordination to Western countries and large corporations. The departure of Moussa Traoré to the eastern camp led to tension in relations between Mali and France. While the Republic of Mali opened its doors to Chinese investment, all development projects were controlled by China. France had had enough of the Traoré regime, which showed its reluctance to deal with France (Kuhne, 1991). Another important factor was that France financed several opponents, especially those in exile abroad. France began to cooperate with them against the regime of Moussa Traoré. In the international (political) arena, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the emergence of the United States as a superpower. However, the new power and its allies in the international arena adopted a new agenda. That they sought to implement, democratic evolution, which became a condition for obtaining any aid from the United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, and as a result, the leaders of the regimes were forced to change with the new changes that occurred beyond their control in the international environment (Lô, 1991). Over time, France began to demand democracy in Africa, with the declaration of French President François Mitterrand (Mitterrand, 1990). In 1977, France was Mali’s main trading partner, in fact; its budget was based mainly on aid and trade relations with Western countries. Nevertheless, despite Mali‘s subordination to these French-led Western capitalist economies in Francophone Africa, the country

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

69

was closely linked to the Soviet Union. This relationship began during the time of Modibo Keita under the socialist regime. In addition, Moussa Traoré sought to strengthen the relationship with the West. However, it was difficult to maintain these two opposing relationships at the same time (François 1982). In the late 1980s, Moussa Traoré’s military regime strengthened its relationship with the West: in the economic sphere, it pursued free trade and privatization policies while Soviet influence faded.

 emocracy and Security Management in the Third D Republic in Mali In the discourse of Democracy and security management in the third republic in Mali, Alpha Omar Konaré became the first democratically elected president in the first presidential elections since the country’s democratic experiment began in 1992. Amadou Toumani Touré followed him through fair elections until the March 2012 coup, led by Amadou Haya Sanogo, who spent days in power before handing it over to National Assembly President Dioncounda Traoré, who organized the 2013 elections. Then Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won the elections, overthrown in turn by Colonel Assimi Goïta in August 2020. Since the beginning of the democratic transition in Mali, the state has faced security, institutional, and other challenges. The constitutional mechanism is one of the main challenges that may be faced by the state, which began the experience of democratic transition is the absence of a constitution, which explains the principles and foundations of democracy, so the state has recourse to the establishment of fundamental law to follow before developing a democratic constitution. In this topic, we will study the Fundamental Law and the first constitution after the beginning of the democratic transition process in Mali. Power grabs, rebellions against the central government and terrorist occupation have become a habit in Mali. Indeed, democratic development in Mali is accompanied by security instability and political crises. In Mali, for several years, political life has been deteriorating with the increase in impunity and corruption, as well as the increase in trafficking, particularly drug trafficking, across northern Mali. The Malian army was internally divided. But another reality must be emphasized: with 7350 soldiers (in 2012), the Malian army has a very small number of soldiers to ensure the security of a territory two and a half times the size of France, and to face rebel and terrorist groups that number 3000 to 5000 fighters, according to sources. Following the war waged in Libya against Gaddafi, with the dispersal in the region of part of the huge stocks of Libyan weapons and several thousand foreign mercenaries recruited by Gaddafi (Daou, 2011). Mali faced several attacks since mid-January 2012 by the National Movement, for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and other Tuareg rebels, including heavily armed men who had fought for Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. As a result, the Islamists and MNLA took all major cities in the North in the spring of 2012. This was followed by the coup d’état that was orchestrated against the then Malian

70

M. I. Kante

President Amadou Toumani Touré, by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. The armed groups took advantage of this chaos to take over the whole of northern Mali, as well as to move towards Bamako. In 2012, the war in northern Mali was in full swing and after bloody clashes with members of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the MUJAO took control of Gao on June 27, 2012, and committed serious human rights violations thereby applying sharia law. The fears were twofold. They would continue their activities as far as Bamako, especially since the Malian armed forces had fled in the face of the jihadists, thus demonstrating their inability to defend the southern part of Malian territory, after having deserted the northern part in the spring of 2012. In other words, to see them take the city of Sévaré and its international airport, a strategic element, which could make it very difficult for Malian and African forces to recapture the North (Bourgeois, 2013). It was following the observations that France decided to intervene militarily. The first airstrikes by Gazelle attack helicopters from Ouagadougou began on January 11, 2013, as part of Operation Serval. Considering these events, French military action could be considered necessary, although not without questions and criticisms, and subject to a surprising consensus (GRIP, 2013). The French intervention was legitimate to save the Malian state, as it helped stop the jihadist advance. The French operation Serval involved about 3000 French soldiers in Mali. The ECOWAS standby force was to play a leading role in the Malian crisis. Nevertheless, the ECOWAS forces ended up changing their helmets, to become part of the UN peace mission in Mali. The military intervention in Mali has had some successes, such as the seizure of major cities and the rescue of the weak transitional government in Bamako from the jihadists. However, the crisis has taken on the character of an ethnic conflict, in the Mopti region between Fulani and Dogon, Bambara and Fulani, in Timbuktu and Gao between Tuareg and Arab, and between Tuareg and Songhai. It is therefore unclear whether the “crisis in Mali” will end soon or will continue for a very long time.

Conclusion The study puts forward many results and some of the most important results are related to the process of the peaceful transfer of power, as well as the participation in the political life of the country, as it appears in certain indicators such as the increase of the rate of an election. The expansion of the political tolerance culture of the electorates as well as the nominates. There was no violence before or during the election or even after the election results, although the internal and regional atmosphere is potentially open to violence. Through the previous presentation, it is shown that Mali is somehow a positive example in the domain or practising democracy and elections in Africa. The country has experienced a peaceful handover of power from 1992 to 2012 and has organized new elections after a military coup in 2013. The last revision of Mali’s political situation shows that the country is taking steps backwards in the democratic experience,

5  Democratic Transformation in Mali Republic Since 1991

71

through continuing military coups. As well as the degradation of the security situation of the country, the terrorists are gaining ground day by day. Indeed, it has been 8 years of war in Mali, against the jihadists, with less visible and effective results on the ground. The study noted that the withdrawal of the army was declared by the French authority. On June 10, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron announced at a press briefing that he will end the Barkhane military operation against jihadists in the Sahel, according to a schedule and modalities to be specified in the coming weeks (Bourdillon, 2021). Moreover, in the event of the withdrawal being implemented, the first consequence would be the embarkation of the Russian force or the Wagner Company in Mali (Diallo, 2021). For the new Malian authorities, it is only natural for the Malian state, to find new partners to fill the void, because France has decided to significantly reduce its military presence fighting the terrorist cells in the north of the country. Which France has not been able to deal with in the end because the terrorists continue to spread to the rest of the country (Diallo, 2021)? Second, negotiation with the jihadists will be on the table. If the Malian state fails to confront Iyad, Amadou Koufa and the EI in Mali – which is the likely scenario, the Malian authorities will be faced with jihadists imposing their terms. However, negotiation will become the choice for the Malian government with Malian terrorists (Iyad Ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa).

References Amselle, J-L. (1985). Le Wahabisme à Bamako (1945-1985), Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, PP. 345–357. Amselle, J-L. (1992). La corruption et le clientélisme au Mali et en Europe de l’Est : quelques points de comparaison, Cahiers d’Études africaines, XXXII (4), 128 : 629–642. Bourgeois, A. (2013). Pourquoi la France intervient-elle au Mali? André Bourgeois, spécialiste de l’Afrique saharo-sahélienne. www.lemonde.fr, 15 Jan 2013. Camara, B. (2007). Le processus démocratie au Mali depuis 1991 (Bamako: l’ université de Bamako.) Centre d’études et de recherché pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social. (1997a). Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours. In Coalition Mondiale pour l’Afrique et Africa Leadership Forum (pp. 37–38). Edition Donniya. Centre d’études et de recherché pour la démocratie et le développement économique et social. (1997b). Le processus démocratique Malien de 1960 à nos jours. In Coalition Mondiale pour l’Afrique et Africa Leadership Forum (pp. 26–27). Edition Donniya. Coalition des Alternatives Africaines Dette et Développement Mali. (2008, Novembre). L’audit citoyen de la dette du Mali. Bamako, p. 14. Daou, B. (2011, novembre 22). Sécurité: Le Comité d’état-major opérationnel? Le Républicain. http://www.afriquejet.com/situation-­securitaire-­danslespace-­sahelo-­saharien-­ 2011112227825.html Diallo. (2021). According to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, last Saturday, September 25, on the sidelines of the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations. Diany, N. http://www.nanadiany.com/index.php?page=27 Fougère, P. (2012). État, idéologie et politique culturelle dans le Mali postcolonial (1960--1968) (Université de Sherbrooke, 2012), https://savoirs.usherbrooke.ca/handle/11143/5684. François, P. (1982, May). Class struggles in Mali. Review of African Political Economy. ROAPE, pp. 35–36.

72

M. I. Kante

GRIP. (2013, January 1). L’étonnant consensus autour de l’intervention française au Mali. Note d’analyse du GRIP, Bérangère Rouppert. Hincker, C. (2003). Developpement et democratie, Chronique de la situation des touaregs au Mali. Journal des anthropologies, 94–95, 2. Association francaise des anthropologues. Houpert, P. (2016). « Ce jour-là : le 19 novembre 1968, un coup d’État renverse le président malien Modibo Keïta  – Jeune Afrique », JeuneAfrique. com, consulté le 30 août 2022, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/375154/politique/ jour-­19-­novembre-­1968-­coup-­detat-­renverse-­president-­malienmodibo-­keita/. Kuépie, M., et al. (2008). Multiples dimensions de la pauvreté gouvernance et démocratie (p. 9). Développement Institutions et Analyse de long terme. Kuhne, W. (1991). L’Afrique et la fin de la guerre froide: de nécessité d’un ‘nouveau réalisme’. Érudit, 22(2), 290. Université Montréal. La constitution de la République du Mali. (1992). promulguée par décret No. 92-073/P. Lacube, N. (2012, mars 33). Le Mali depuis l’indépendance. La Croix. https://www.la-­croix.com/ Actualite/Monde/Le-­Mali-­depuis-­l-­independance-­_NG_-­2012-­03-­23-­781505 Le Monde. (1968). Le Comité Militaire De Libération Nationale. Consulté le 27 mai 2021. https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1968/11/21/le-­c omite-­m ilitaire-­d e-­l iberation-­ nationale_2488970_1819218.html Leclerc, J. (2009). L’aménagement linguistique dans le monde  – Mali. sur Trésor de la langue française au Québec, (27 mai 2009. Mis en ligne le 27 mai 2009). Lô, G. A. (2003). Démocratie et gouvernance en Afrique de l’ouest: quelques enseignements de la dernière décennie. à un Colloque tenue à. Bamako: Colloque. http://ufpweb.org/transition/ ce385/idees/gouv_ao.htm Mara, M. (2010). L’état au Mali. Bibliothèque nationale, 4ème trimestre 2010, pp. 65–67. Mitterrand, F. (1990). Discours du président français François Mitterrand sur la démocratisation en Afrique, 20 juin 1990. République du Mali. (1991). L’avènement de la démocratie et de la troisieme republique au Mali. Bamako, le 25 aout 1991, p. 6. Seyoum, H. (2022). Issues and dilemmas of multi-party democracy in Africa. West Africa Review. E-journal: Africa Resource Center. http://www.africaresource.com South African History Online. (1968). https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-­event/ president-­modibo-­keita-­mali-­deposed-­army Statistiques-mondiales. (2019). Mali. http://www.statistiques-­mondiales.com/mali.htm Tamanrasset Agreement. (1991, January 6). Algeria. The Constitution of the Republic of Mali. (1974, June). Art. 78. The New York Times. (1991). Mali’s dictator is overthrown in coup. The New York Times. consulté le 27 mai 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/27/world/mali-­s-­dictator-­is-­overthrown-­in-­ coup.html Yattara, El Mouloud (2005). Une histoire du Mali, p. 4. [PDF] https://www.onmali.org/joomlaa/__ GED/pdf/mali_independant.pdf. Yves B. (2021). Le président Macron annonce la fin de l’opération Barkhane au Mali, Les Echos, 10 juin 2021, https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/afrique-­moyen-­orient/ la-­france-­en-­passe-­de-­reduire-­son-­intervention-­militaireau-­mali-­1322584 Mady Ibrahim Kante holds Ph.Ds. from Cairo University Political Science in African Studies and the Pan African University Institute of Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences. He is currently a Board Member of the Scientific Committee of African Journal of Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, African Union. His research interest lies in the field of African Political Systems, international relations, African and International Organizations and conflict in Africa, as well as terrorism and other issues of Islamism. He is Expert of Thinking Africa - Research and Teaching Institute for Peace in Africa.  

Chapter 6

From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic South Africa Israel Ekanade

Abstract  The medieval age in Africa relates to communal beliefs or values commonly referred to as Ubuntu in South African parlance. This age-long practice has been passed from one generation to the other. Apartheid was depicted by acute and obvious racism where blacks were denigrated and relegated to the background in society. This era was characterized by camaraderie from sister states who vehemently resisted white minority rule. The attainment of true democracy in 1994 further heralded the need for more labour, because of the presence of a sophisticated and largely industrialized economy. This culminated into mass migrations from the SADC and elsewhere due to political instabilities and other allied challenges and the prospects of a brighter hope in South Africa. The resultant effect was a saturated labour market; unhealthy competition for scarce economic resources by locals and African foreign nationals; supposed astronomical increase in crime rates; proliferation of drug and human trafficking just to mention a few. These narratives have been responsible for the sequence of xenophobic attacks especially against fellow Africans and a few Asians residing in the country. Democracy has not brought justice to both locals and non-nationals in South Africa. What could be responsible for these ugly trends? Could it be hate speech, lack of political will, denialism, and insensitivity on the part of the government? This paper seeks to unravel these facts and make necessary policy recommendations to the state and relevant stakeholders.

I. Ekanade (*) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Trinity University, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_6

73

74

I. Ekanade

Introduction Communalism is an ageless practice spanning centuries. This notion depicts brotherhood, love, peace, and harmony. It operates on established principles of equality where community members look out for the well-being of each other and are ready to assist. For a community’s progress and possibly posterity, the instilling of these virtues cannot be overemphasized. From time immemorial, Africa has the values of communalism entrenched in the polity; little wonder acts of kindness and hospitality are replete in many communities across Africa. This medieval practice did not rule out the possibilities of war as ethnic groups battled for supremacy on the continent. To date, this age-long practice is still in vogue as people become their brothers’ keeper. The centrality of an African person in society cannot be overemphasized. Some form of unanimity seems to among intellectuals like Nyere, Nkrumah, Senghor, and others in this school of thought contend that apart from being a social being, man in the African context cannot be alienated from the community (Sogolo, 1993). Everyone, every person, creates a connection in a series of important forces, an existing link, vigorous and inactive, merged from above to the ascending line of his lineage and maintaining underneath him the line of his ancestors (Teffo, 1996). Ubuntu relates to social ethos and unifying vision. No doubt, African societies placed a high premium on human value, but humanism is the focal point in the community rather than the individualism associated with Western norms and values (Teffo, 1998). Jagers and Mock (1995) explained communalism as a recognition of the fundamental interdependence of people. They argued the attachment of a preponderant to social bonds and social relationships. Hence, one behaves in a manner that suggests that duty to a person’s social group is more significant than individual rights and privileges. Thus, sharing is encouraged because it validates the importance of social connectedness and therefore selfishness and individual greed are being resented. African culture gives the community priority over all else. This community goes beyond the political community. The African community in a way possess similar traits with Buddhist ideology of the human community as being a huge, accrescent net of spiritual, psychological, biological, and emotional relations. The African community, like the Buddhist one, shares the earth with the unborn, the living spirits of the dead, the earth, the mountain, and the sky (Higgs & Smith, 2002). African philosophy is a full one that highlights the importance of the human community and its position in the universe (Higgs & Smith, 2002). The individual that is born into the African community will always be part of the community. Interdependence, communalism, empathy, compassion towards others and caring for others are all aspects of ubuntu as a philosophy of life (Le Roux, 2000). The community and belonging to it is part of the core of traditional African life. Mbiti (1970) avers that anything that affects an individual affects the whole group, and whatever disturbs to entire group disturbs the individual. Ubuntu helps build useful human relationships aimed at improving human value, reliance, and dignity. This again culminates into social harmony and cohesion which begins first at the family level, then the cultural community and eventually the global community (Le Roux, 2000).

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

75

Historicization of South African Migration The history of migration into South Africa is traceable to the discovery of mineral resources in Kimberly in the 1860s and the Witwatersrand in the 1880s has massively influenced the migration trajectory into South Africa. Undoubtedly, labour migrants from neighbouring states were attracted by the booming mining sector (Crush, 2005; Kang’ethe & Duma, 2013; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). Agriculture also became technologically advanced, thus necessitating more workers which led to a surge of migration into the country. The mining and agricultural sectors were propelled by migrant labourers originating from the SADC bloc (Sibanda, 2008). Farm owners gave migrants jobs to augment the shortfall of labour supply (Chirwa, 1998). South Africa is still battling with racial discrimination and sectional administration despite being free from apartheid domination for almost three decades (Beetar, 2019). The apartheid era was typified by mass exodus of Europeans or Whites; a ploy to strengthen white minority rule. The Aliens Control Act of 1937, section 4(3)(b) was implemented to integrate European settlers into the former Union of South Africa (Segatti, 2011). The National Party (NP) consolidated its grip on power after 1961 by racialization and it was backed up with financial resources supported it with the necessary allowances. Christened the ‘two-gate system’, the front gate accepted multitudes of migrants from European and Western states, while the back gate attended to migrants who got temporary jobs based on bilateral accords entered with her neighbours, which forbids the issuance of permanent residence and family visits. South Africa bowed to the demands of the international community in 1986, leading to a drop in the incidence of racialism and the government was advised to incorporate racial groups from different parts in the country (Segatti, 2011). However, it was insignificant because racism was still rife in the polity (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006). The condemnation of apartheid incapacitated proper control of migration from the SADC states. The two-gate system failed after 1986 because it could not match rising economic realities or harbour non-economic migrants like refugees from war-torn countries like Mozambique. The only thing was the merger of all existing policy documents into one act of parliament in 1991. After steering the ship in 1994, rather than concentrating on immigration, the African National Congress (ANC) was primarily concerned with economic transition (Segatti, 2011). Afterwards, the perceived dividends of democracy were a mirage, thus creating illusion in the minds of the masses (Akinola, 2014). Mamabolo (2015: 145) elucidates that despite the scarcity of comparable data, poverty and unemployment have risen to unprecedented heights after 1994. Keeton (2014) suggests that South Africa is still confronted by pervasive poverty, poor service delivery and inequality despite the implementation of post-apartheid social welfare schemes and are noticeable along racial backgrounds. The post-1994 South Africa constitution supports inter-­ group relations but has succeeded in handling the menace of illegal migration, refugees, and deficiency of labour supply. The state reviewed immigration policies in 2002 and 2004, with the intent of accommodating highly skilled migrants. But the

76

I. Ekanade

amendments made to the immigration act in 2007 and 2011 made the hiring of skilled workers problematic (Nkomo, 2014), it also targeted irregular immigrants, stripping them of basic working rights applicable in other climes. The route of asylum-­seeking was explored by migrants, however, it was not without hiccups. Amit (2015) contends that the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in some cases become complacent when handling applications of asylum-seekers as a lot of them become unfortunate; they prefer staying behind in South Africa leaving them at the mercy of officials who discover their paperless state and prepare them for the return journey home. This lag in attending to applications dispossess many immigrants of identification means, inactive bank accounts, thus exposing them to engage in informal sector employment (Solomon & Kosaka, 2014). Mbembe (2015) describes it as “a kafkaian” situation because foreign students who entered the country with valid documents are now illegal because of new immigration laws. Making them unable to register at universities, depriving them access to money in their respective bank accounts. This method has made legal migrants paperless (Mbembe, 2015).

Conceptualizing Ubuntu, Makwerekwere and Belonging Ubuntu is an African interpretation that binds societies who embrace communalism as a way of life. By implication, one is not referred to as a human being except one takes into cognisance the well-being of others. One of the foremost features of ubuntu is communality or communal well-being. This principle derives from the Nguni saying: Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (A person is a person through other people). Letseka (2012) submits that ubuntu is founded on the civility of humanity, comprising of mutual care and recompense of kindness. Louw’s (2003) position on Ubuntu transcends being who you are through others; rather, ubuntu also includes relational associations amongst people. Louw’s notion of ubuntu underscores the pertinence of having a common understanding of how people treat each other. Ubuntu has different meaning to different audience, thereby informing scholars to define it to suit their school of thought. In this light, several authors have defined ubuntu as the ethic of care (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012); a theory of right action or a theory centred on morality (Letseka, 2000; Metz, 2007; Teffo, 1994); a didactic principle (Letseka, 2013) and as a principle that combines constitutionality and jurisprudence (Mahao, 2010; Mokgoro, 1998). As ubuntu concerns the way in which people treat each other, this article focuses mainly on the treatment of dark-­ skinned people from other African states resident in South Africa. Nyamnjoh (2021) posits that Makwerekwere is singular, amakwerekwere plural. The scholar argues that these disparaging terminologies have been in circulation in Southern Africa for many years. Although, he encountered it at first in Botswana in the 1990s. At the elementary stage, makwerekwere implies an individual having insufficient idea of indigenous culture and traditions, coupled with the ability tends to mumble some few words in the local dialects, and converses in an alien speech.

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

77

A good point of referral in the makwerekwere discourse in South Africa taking into cognisance its starta and manifestations is the novel Welcome to Our Hillbrow authored by Phaswane Mpe (2001). The interpretation of amakwerekwere and of margins between South Africans as eligible citizens and amakwerekwere as worthless outsiders is dexterously narrated by Mpe. Commonly, makwerekwere is a derogatory term employed to refer to a professed stranger who in most cases is erroneously thought to be one of us. However, an alien is sold out by his or her incompetence of being fluent in local languages that symbolize the feeling of being at home, warmly received, and in control. Mpe (2001) further examined the concept of the spatial politics understood in the mode of hospitality administered on black African migrants travelling into South Africa. The research accentuated the disputings, repudiation of hospitality towards African migrants, and by extension the diverse and multifarious spatial arenas portrayed in the text article investigated the text’s application of “you” and “we” as means employing the notion of linguistic tools. Tafira (2011) asserts the use of some derogatory language against black African migrants residing in South Africa. In Alexandra, a squalor settlement in Johannesburg which serves as a melting pot for locals and African foreign nationals, other Africans are labelled and given different types of names. Such labels have racial, ethnocentric, and xenophobic undertones. While some slurs are obvious; others are flippant but still repulsive. These labels are outcomes of cultural interaction, because of the presence of other ethnic nationalities. Each label has a value attached to it; all are pointers to the social and cultural ancestry of the carrier. Of these nomenclatures include ‘Makwerekwere’, one of the oldest labels which depicts poor mastery of South African languages by black immigrants. Another argot is Magrigamba often used to describe men of West African origin who allegedly migrated into South Africa penniless but returned home in affluence after a while. Makwerekwere connotes a wide range of meanings depending on the audience involved. However, in South Africa, the implicit notion surpasses the low level of language proficiency by a black African; it also denotes that Africans from elsewhere are coming from states that are economically and culturally backward in comparison to South Africans. Also, when civilization is in view, the Makwerekweres are assumed to be ‘bushmen’ or barbarians of these contemporary times. This terminology is being used to push the populism agenda in Southern Africa. Usually, the Makwerekwere are resented due to their skin colour; referred to as people possessing darkest skin colours amidst fellow blacks and are unexposed despite having better higher educational qualifications than fair-skinned South African blacks. A different assertion posits that Makwerekwere are migrants from highly remote areas in the very rural and secluded parts of the ‘Heart of Darkness’ especially the core north of Limpopo Province. Most South Africans have no idea of such rural environments and are not interested in travelling to such districts, except to embark on the ‘civilizing mission’ of ‘the Dark Continent’ instituted by European missionaries and colonialists in Southern Africa in the seventeenth century (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Walker, 1911 cited in Nyamnjoh, 2006).

78

I. Ekanade

The meeting point between the sociology of emotions and the sociology of power could be called the notion of Belonging. It also implies the collision path for identity and citizenship (Kannabiran et al., 2006). Yuval-Davis (2006) clarifies further by asserting that “belonging is about emotional attachment, about feeling ‘at home’ and … about feeling safe”. Belonging arises when individuality is tied emotionally to various objects or the giving of identity by other persons. Nevertheless, belonging could be constant, disputed, or transitory based on the situation at hand (Yuval-­ Davis, 2006). I define belonging as that which occurs when a person or group of persons are warmly received in a community other than theirs. It is the power of a host community to welcome migrants, regardless of their religion, tradition, custom, ethnic affiliation, or gender; hence, promising these migrants safety, a place they can confidently call home, void of harassment, shame, and dishonour while they far from their place of origin. Simply put, tolerating others is a pointer to develop a sense of belonging.

Theoretical Exposition: Identity Politics Identity politics is multifaceted in nature. Scholars have espoused the material (Sanchez, 2006), others tended towards socio-cultural, linguistic, technological, and religious factors (Sawyer, 2006). The significance of identity politics in the polity has attracted criticisms from different quarters on the globe. This debate is a progressive one, necessitating the evolution of different schools of thought on the topic. To some, identity politics is seen as the politics of ‘recognition’ (Brunt, 1989) and politics of ‘differences’ (Young, 1990) with the likelihood for ‘mutual’ acknowledgement of self and other and considering social, cultural, and ideological differences (Honneth, 1995). There are scholars who argued that identity politics is a ‘political space’ which stimulates the rise of a change agent that confronts hegemonic administration (Sanchez, 2006). However, a major one of its censure is that it possesses an opposing force which further triggers social divisions and social exclusions (Brown, 1995). Identity politics, an imported western busies itself with the study of culture from a local perspective; inclusive of historicization of traditional customs, social beliefs, and the prevailing conditions. The west boasts of buoyant economies and political processes, creating room for welfare, security, and a good life for its citizens. Here, the law makes provision for all citizens in her domain (Herring & Rangwala, 2006). Identity politics is a fallout of the contemporary insider-outsider relationship in South Africa culminating into a cycle of violence against migrant communities. The magnitude of identity politics is rife with locals becoming nationalistic these days calling on the state to expunge supposed ‘illegal migrants’ and give them jobs, instead of being excluded economically. The applicability of identity politics is evident in the South African scenario as locals (in-group) organize themselves against African foreign nationals (out-groups), and sometimes other races, because of scramble for scarce economic resources especially at the informal level. These

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

79

attacks took centre stage in 2008 through xenophobic orchestrated violence and to date, it has been a recurring decimal. Radkiewicz (2003: 5) states that ethnocentric patterns and xenophobia are similar, although having two distinct features: thoughts of national supremacy and hostile horrid disposition to outsiders. In the state-building process, identities are central, as individuals use social cohesion to develop trust and identify with each other in solidarity against foreigners residing in the community. Such comradeship is ubiquitous globally with identity construction, often placing migrants at the periphery of social relationships; reducing their influence, thus exempted from the decision-making process in the society to affirm their foreigner status. Identity construction could be attributed to a plethora of factors responsible for its popularity in South Africa, more importantly, during the apartheid rule as other nations embarked on solidarity on behalf of the black people, specifically those in the SADC regional bloc and other African nations as transnationalism was very evident at this material point in time. Labour for the mining sector was sourced from neighbouring African states and discrimination in form of Afrophobia was a rarity then due to the prevalence of communalism as blacks from diverse ethnic affiliations-built friendships. However, this culture of communal living seems to be a mirage in the post-2000 era as many indigent groups are agitating for better living conditions and accusing African foreign nationals, particularly, fellow black Africans for the surge in crime, unemployment, diseases, and other ills plaguing the last outpost of colonialism (Radkiewicz, 2003: 5).

From Communalism to Nationalism? Eliastam (2015) elucidates the eroding of Ubuntu values in postcolonial South Africa. The late Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu’s expectation of a ‘Rainbow Nation’ possessing the virtues of equality, egalitarianism and fairness in a society emanating from the rubble of racial discrimination and colonialism. Tutu (1999: 34–35) explains Ubuntu as one in which ‘a person is a person through other people’. It is different from the presumption or afterthought whereby a person assumes I am, rather, such a fellow is human because of his/her belonging to the society. The contemporary multicultural nature of the South African society not lived up to this billing, because the spirit of communalism seems absent due to uncontrolled violence against migrant communities despite the awareness of ubuntu, as ideology African migrants are largely perceived as the ‘other’. African foreign nationals seem to have been displaced because they are prime targets during crisis periods. However, the state ought to be commended for her role, but she has mediated often when the situation deteriorates. Such occurrences batter the image of the country; raising questions over the safety of lives of all who live in it. Xenophobia is often common in many squalor settlements and townships and is gradually moving to suburbs in city areas. Assaults are repeatedly executed against black migrants by locals who are at the same downtrodden economic level, sharing similar economically disadvantaged

80

I. Ekanade

state. In most cases, migrants are suspected of dealing in drugs, running child and sex trafficking cartels among other accusations (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Pineteh, 2017). Research suggests that both sending and receiving and sending states enjoy the gains that accrue from migration globally. Even with the level of some positive contribution to the growth and development of destination economies, migrants lose their sense of belonging due to profiling and bias against them since they are seen as outsiders. Violence is being employed to differentiate between migrants and locals. Such attitudinal behaviours are reinforced through the politics of identity because noticeable bio-cultural features betray migrants, making them detectable. In other situations, the South African Police Services (SAPS) have also been accused of carrying out extrajudicial killings against migrants of African origin. The unimaginable nature of the attacks speaks to the sudden execution of violence which can be prompted at any moment. The xenophobic violence between 2008 and 2020 (Amusan & Mchunu, 2017; Akinola, 2018; Beetar, 2019; Khoza et al., 2021) all indicate a progressive level of increased prejudice and expressions of anti-­immigrant views, isolation, frustration-aggression, and scapegoating. Traditional authorities, politicians, and indigenes often incite tension through their pronouncements (Pineteh, 2017). Since the basic ideologies of Ubuntu and Batho Pele have become ordinary rhetoric, the envisaged “Rainbowness” seems to be fading due to incessant and alarming violence magnitudes (Agyeno, 2019; Amusan & Mchunu, 2017). South Africa’s bullish economy draws migrants from sister states, but this does not in any way obfuscate the rejection, bias and harassment meted out to African migrants by locals. This situation has culminated into renewed calls for migrants to go back to their countries of nationality; foul statements and violence have complemented such mannerisms Declarations like: “We don’t want foreigners here. They must go back to their country”; “Phuma amakwerekwere, phuma!” (“Foreigners must go away!”); and “Go back to Zimbabwe!” reveal such common feelings (Hayem, 2013). Akinola (2018) while examining the anti-immigrant rally held on 24 February 2017 at Tshwane, because this was the first time such was convened by a South African civic movement. Anxious locals walked around the suburbs of the city of Tshwane, Atteridgeville, and Mamelodi. What started as a nonviolent march, which locals demanded illegal migrants to register their names with the state or return to their countries of origin; later snowballed into crisis as foreign nationals gathered weapons and ammunition in the outbreak of any eventuality. This further exacerbated the anti-foreigner feelings in the republic of South Africa. Akinola (2018) further explicates that local in Pretoria West ransacked and torched shops and homes belonging to Nigerians and Somalis, but Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani businesses also got same treatment. Vorster (2002) argues that the subject matter related to the idea of ‘foreigners go home’ could be classified as a human rights issue. The argument against xenophobia exceeds contestation for citizenship and belonging; it is based on social justice (one which makes immigrants contending for their self-respect and existence-socially and economically). Desai (2010) posits that migration should be a right, as challenging as it may appear to be regulated economically and socially by the locals, because it involves the battle for

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

81

basic survival. The politicization of basic services, evictions and modest accommodation leads to friction, a revisitation of radical prejudices ending up with threats to basic existence.

State-Styled Discrimination and Tabloid Negative Reportage Xenophobia seems to be a regular occurrence in South Africa as some government executives and departments effect acts of xenophobia against many migrants of African origin who have been disparaged at Home Affairs offices, hospitals, universities, and other public institutions. African foreign nationals travel to South Africa for various reasons, although many South Africans are oblivious to these reasons (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). The international community is concerned about this worrisome trend apparently because of South Africa of the supposed intolerant nature which locals portray towards other Africans negates the Ubuntu spirit as propounded by the founding fathers of the nation. As such, the incessant cases of human rights abuse against migrants subsists in the nation; with culprits not facing the justice system (Crush, 2001). Lately, toxic display of xenophobic attitudes is on the rise in post-apartheid South Africa, especially, in public healthcare facilities. Many health sector workers opined that undocumented migrant should not access treatment for the HIV/AIDS scourge, particularly those who consult and are placed on anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). These health professionals are of the opinion that undocumented migrants who are HIV-positive should be repatriated promptly (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). This view is a threat to the well-being and health of many African migrants residing in the country and negates the right to life. Likewise, other state employees in different parastatals like (refugee-determination officers and customs agents) in some cases have not been polite when attending to non-­ South Africans (Crush & Tawodzera, 2014). Cohen (1994), as cited in Crush and Tawodzera (2014), concurs that many government officials prefer that foreigners should be in their home countries and not South Africa. Simultaneously, South African nationals have differing views when the subject of welcoming foreign nationals into their country is being tabled or debated. There have been reported cases of demands for kickbacks by government employees or perhaps they have encouraged the corruption of African foreign nationals. Put differently, many government officials have become affluent through illicit wealth obtained while exploiting susceptible migrants and refugees. The treatment meted out to black immigrants by government officials, particularly, those who are undocumented and are like employees of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is often disheartening and miserable (Pugh, 2014). Immigrants become victims of abuse in the hands of government sector officials as they turn in their visa applications, to regularize their stay in a bid to eke a living. Umezurike (2012) argued that African migrants experience ill-treatment whilst interacting with DHA officials with the latter labelling the former as Makwerekwere, a derogatory

82

I. Ekanade

term which has been in use in South Africa since 1994. It would be unfair to conclude that the South African state is anti-immigrant; however, some of her state representatives saddled with responsibilities of immigration matters fall short of expectations as they trade away bias for professionalism. Both the print and electronic media massively covered the stories and scenes of xenophobic orchestrated violence, with some dailies dedicating a sizeable portion of their cover pages to it. While this is commendable, the activities of the media seem to have taken a detour from the founding tenets of the profession. Fairness, accuracy, and objective reporting have been discarded while political propaganda with the propensity to trigger protest marches and resentment have gradually become the new normal (Hadland, 2010; Mkandawire, 2016). Many African migrants have become victims of negative stereotypes, branded as illegal migrants by the media; descriptions of illicitness and delinquency are often tied to African foreign nationals. This trend has been somehow entrenched since the post-1994 era in both the print and mass media, internationally. These scary and gory pictures often continue to dominate the scenes and have been engaged in shaping the identity discourse for non-nationals residing in South Africa (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Danso & McDonald, 2000). Xenophobia is prevalent in South Africa, and it has been established that some migrants indulge in shady deals in the quest for survival, such miscreants have been apprehended by locals or even police operatives. Drug lords, harlotry, and dealing in counterfeit travelling documents and currencies are some of the illicit acts executed by migrants (Mpe, 2001; Matunhu, 2011). Research also indicates that some form of connivance exists between South Africans and migrants while some of these migrants entice security agencies and as such avoid prosecution. The police and immigration officials given to exploitation and compromise, particularly at border crossings have contributed to illegal migration scourge in the republic of South Africa (Landau & Segatti, 2009). A country’s reputation is of great significance, because it says a lot about her relations with other states and thus tries to define her prosperity. Since 2008, South Africa has witnessed a lot of xenophobic eruptions, leaving the state, its citizens, migrants and the international community with different views and inclinations. Xenophobia has a way of negatively affecting the career of public service officers. For example, the then African Union (AU) commission chairperson could not seek for a second term in office because of anti-immigrant sentiments which engulfed the South African state. Brand South Africa (2015) discusses the opinions of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma the then AU Commission chairperson who was a South African national. Dlamini-Zuma expressed dissatisfaction at the reaction of locals to the immigrant invasion into the country, referring to it as “unacceptable” and that it must stop. Regardless of what the country is experiencing, there is no justification for anti-foreigner violence. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma commended government efforts at maintaining sanity and stated that the violence occurred just before the Africa day commemoration; not forgetting the vital role played by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) during the reign of apartheid. The public servant further agreed that the existence of pervasive poverty and unemployment was an African conundrum

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

83

and not a South African one, because many African countries are experiencing a similar trend. The chairperson implored communities to exploit dialogue as a means of conflict resolution and address these challenges issues by finding peaceful solutions to the ensuing problems (Brand South Africa 2015). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) showed its displeasure by berating the Republic of South Africa for failing to contain the situation on time. The Presidents of Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe all condemned the management of the crisis by the South African state while Nigeria recalled her ambassador (Patel & Essa, 2015).

Denialism President Thabo Mbeki was an avid supporter of denialism as he argued that the supposed attacks were perpetrated by criminal elements which could not be attributed to xenophobic behaviours (Bekker et al., 2008; Tella, 2016). At an event conducted in honour of 62 persons who lost their lives in the famous 2008 xenophobic orchestrated violence, Mbeki averred: Everything I know about my people tells me that these heirs to the teachings of Tiyo Soga, J.G. Xaba and Pixley Seme, the masses who have consistently responded positively to the Pan-African messages of the oldest liberation movement on our continent, the African National Congress, are not xenophobic. These masses are neither antipathetic towards, nor do they hate foreigners. And this I must also say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia. I know that there are some in our country who will charge that what I have said constitutes a denial of our reality. (Everatt, 2011, p. 9)

Beetar (2019) asserts that denialism is a prevalent force that sporadically unifies xenophobia and racism. The political class hardly admits that xenophobia exists because it is underreported (Crush et al., 2013) suggestive of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic incidences. The denigration treatment of Emidio Macia in February 2013, in which he was tied to the back of a police van that was driven down the road. People voiced out their displeasure, accusing the state’s ineptitude in handling police. Even within the police community, xenophobia is not a trending topic this indicates its denial within the hierarchy of the SAPS (Steinberg, 2012). Despite the establishment of AU and UN committees that emphasized denialism as being misplaced in the extreme instead of the South African state to address issues of corruption, poverty, and inequality; she had allowed anti-immigrant sentiments to permeate through the polity (Crush et  al., 2013). This suggests that denialism is being employed as a tool of justification. Neocosmos (2010) argues that some have rights while others are deprived of the same, this calls for a thorough analysis into this nature of bias and the broader discourse of denialism which subscribes to a permanent state of exceptionalism or irregularity. Gordon (2020) discusses the modus operandi of xenophobic hate crime in South Africa, analysing the views of two former heads of state; Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma who refuted the existence of xenophobia at different points in time. The

84

I. Ekanade

media also criticized the South African state for resorting to the denialism propaganda in reaction to xenophobic outbreaks, evoking frictions when it is discussed. One may argue that Ramaphosa’s regime is friendly, accepting the existence of xenophobia and the attendant consequences. In March 2019, ministers at the national level in cabinet inaugurated the National Action Plan (NAP) to purely address issues arising from racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and associated prejudice by nipping them in the bud. The NAP is built on principles centred towards immigrant integration, professionalization of migration management, with intent of eliminating hindrances to accessing legal and constitutional rights. These findings are in concert with the results of the HSRC (2008) research which affirms the state’s position on denialism labelling the attacks as criminal acts, reinforcing locals in attacking African foreign nationals. President Mbeki repeated the same words when he reacted to the attacks referring to it as the efforts of criminal and anti-social elements citizens indicating their variance which implies such actions are not in any way connected to xenophobic attitudes (Crush et al., 2013). Mbeki reprimanded the media for reporting open criminal actions hiding under the facade of xenophobia (Mbeki, 2008). Denialism on the part of the political elite to accept and affirm the existence of xenophobia as a problematic, though it is obvious as it resurfaces frequently in erratic terms with its catastrophic attributes in contemporary South Africa. This presents a worrisome trend both globally, regionally, and locally (Crush et al., 2013).

Revival of Local Populism In recent weeks, Patriotic Alliance, ‘PutSouthAfricansFirst’ and Operation Dudula are civic movements lending their voice to unemployment, drugs, prostitution, violent crime, and other ills confronting the South African nation. They are supposedly believed to be against illegal or paperless migrants who steal away their jobs and other economic opportunities. There has been intense pressure on the state and the President was compelled to address the nation, he stated that jobs/employment opportunities ought to be the exclusive preserve of the private sector. Similarly, the labour laws are being reviewed particularly, the “quota system” of employment document. Police had to neutralize some agitators who were found in possession of deadly arms and ammunition.

Conclusion and Recommendations This chapter explains the friendly attitude of South Africans to other Africans during the years of apartheid hegemonial rule. However, this feeling of “Oneness” (Ubuntu) seems non-existent in contemporary South Africa going by anti-­immigrant sentiments and other measures taken by both locals and the state towards the plight

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

85

of African foreign nationals’ resident there. For citizens to enforce immigration laws looks absurd as the state relinquishes its power in addressing illegal migration, despite priding herself as a constitutional democracy in the twenty-first century. Xenophobia is on-going, although in different shades. However, it produces ill-­ feeling casualties being recorded during outbreaks of violent attacks. The state’s position has been that of denial, which does not augur well, as this is used as diversionary tactics instead of addressing issues of unemployment, pervasive poverty, and soaring levels of inequality. I recommend that the issue of illegal migration be fully addressed and that culprits be made to face the law since South Africa’s constitution is fully operational. The citizens ought to be informed and educated about the positive contributions made by other African states in the crusade against apartheid because some of the people involved in the anti-immigrant movement belong to the born-free generation. The issues of corruption, which has led to socio-economic and political crises in many African states, must be addressed at the national and regional levels. African states ought to make their economies stable as this would minimize forced emigration to South Africa. For Ubuntu to be reinvigorated, polarization or the use of derogatory words must be discouraged. Finally, African foreign nationals should not breach the rules of the South African state.

References Adjai, C., & Lazaridis, G. (2013). Migration, xenophobia, and the new racism in post-apartheid South Africa. International Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1), 192–205. Agyeno, O. (2019). Xenophobic violence and the African philosophy of Ubuntu in South Africa. African Journal of Democracy and Governance, 6(1), 24–44. Akinola, A. O. (2014). South Africa and the two faces of xenophobia: A critical reflection. Africa Peace & Conflict Journal, 7(1), 56–67. Akinola, A. O. (2018, June). The South African xenophobic question: A reflection on the complicity of state actors ubuntu. Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation, 7(1), 53–79. Amit, R. (2015). Queue here for corruption  – Measuring irregularities in South Africa’s asylum system. Lawyers for Human Rights and The African Centre for Migration & Society Research Report. Available at http://www.lhr.org.za/publications/queue-­here-­corruption-­ measuringirregularities-­south-­africa%E2%80%99s-­asylum-­system. Accessed on 28 Feb 2022. Amusan, L., & Mchunu, S. (2017). An assessment of xenophobic/Afrophobic attacks in South Africa (2008–2015): Whither Batho Pele and ubuntu principles? South African Review of Sociology, 48(4), 1–18. Beetar, M. (2019). A contextualisation of the 2008 and 2015 xenophobic attacks: Tracing South African necro politics. Current Sociology, 67(1), 122–140. Bekker, S., Eigelaar-Meets, I., Eva, G., & Poole, C. (2008). Xenophobia and violence in South Africa: A desktop study of the trends and a scan of explanations offered. University of Stellenbosch. Brand South Africa. (2015). African Union statement on xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Available at https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/south-­africa-­fast-­facts/news-­facts/african-­ union-­statement-­on-­xenophobic-­attacks-­in-­south-­africa. Accessed on 2 Mar 2022. Brown, W. (1995). State of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity. Princeton.

86

I. Ekanade

Brunt, R. (1989). The politics of identity. In S. Hall & M. Jacques (Eds.), New times: The changing face of politics in the 1990s (pp. 150–159). Lawrence & Wishart. Chirwa, W.  C. (1998). Aliens and AIDS in southern Africa: The Malawi-South Africa debate. Africa Affairs. Available at: http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/97/386/53.short. Accessed on 28 Feb 2022. Comaroff, L., & Comaroff, J. (1997). Of revelation and revolution: The dialectics of modernity of a South African frontier. University of Chicago Press. Crush, J. (2001). Immigration, xenophobia and human rights in South Africa (rep., SAMP migration policy series no. 22, pp. i–39). Southern African Migration Programme. Crush, J. (2005). Migration in southern Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 27(1), 1–2. Crush, J., & Tawodzera, G. (2014). Medical xenophobia and Zimbabwean migrant access to public health services in South Africa. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(4), 655–670. Crush, J., Ramachandran, S., & Pendleton, W. (2013). Soft targets: Xenophobia, public violence and changing attitudes to migrants in South Africa after May 2008 (SAMP migration policy series no. 64). Idasa. Danso, R., & McDonald, D. A. (2000). Writing xenophobia: Immigration and the press in post-­ apartheid South Africa (SAMP migration policy series paper no 17). Idasa. Desai, A. (2010). After the rainbow: Following the footprints of the May 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 37(1), 99–105. Eliastam, J. L. B. (2015). Exploring ubuntu discourse in South Africa: Loss, liminality and hope. Verbum et Ecclesia, 36(2), Art. #1427. Everatt, D. (2011). Xenophobia, civil society and South Africa. Politikon, 38(1), 1–5. Gordon, S. (2020). Understanding xenophobic hate crime in South Africa. Journal of Public Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2076 Hadland, A. (2010). Shooting the messenger: Mediating the public and the role of the media in South Africa’s xenophobic violence. Africa Development, 35(3), 119–143. Hayem, J. (2013). From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic violence and national subjectivity in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(1), 77–97. Herring, E., & Rangwala, G. (2006). Iraq in fragments. Hurst & Company. Higgs, P., & Smith, J. (2002). Rethinking truth. Lansdowne. Honneth, A. (1995). The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflict. Polity Press. Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC). (2008). Citizenship, violence and xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South Africa? In D. Hook & G. Egale (Eds.), Psychopathology and social prejudice. University of Cape Town Press. Jagers, R. J., & Mock, L. O. (1995). The communalism scale and collectivistic individualistic tendencies: Some preliminary findings. Journal of Black Psychology, 21(2), 153–167. Kang’ethe, S., & Duma, V. (2013). Exploring dimensions of post-apartheid xenophobic sentiments towards African immigrants in South Africa. Insight on Africa, 5(2), 157–168. Kannabiran, K., Yuval-Davis, N., & Vieten, U. (2006). The situated politics of belonging. Sage Publications. Keeton, G. (2014). Inequality in South Africa. Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, 74, 26–31. Khoza, H.  H., Mashele, R., & Mukonza, R.  M. (2021). The “butterfly effects” that emerged to xenophobic outbreaks in South Africa: Xenophobia, a timeless boom. African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 10(1). https://doi.org/10.31920/2634-­3665/2021/v10n1a5 Landau, L. B., & Segatti, A. W. K. (2009). Human development impacts of migration: South Africa case study. UNDP. Le Roux, J. (2000). The concept of ‘ubuntu’: Africa’s most important contribution to multicultural education? Multicultural Teaching, 18(2), 43–46. Letseka, M. (2000). African philosophy and educational discourse. In P. Higgs, N. C. G. Vakalisa, T. V. Mda, & N. T. Assie-Lumumba (Eds.), African voices in education (pp. 179–193). Juta. Letseka, M. (2012). In defence of Ubuntu. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31(1), 47–60.

6  From Ubuntu to Makwerekwere: Reinvigorating Belonging in Democratic…

87

Letseka, M. (2013). Educating for ubuntu: Lessons from Basotho indigenous education. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3(2), 337–344. Louw, D. J. (2003). Philosophy in Africa. Ubuntu: An African assessment of the religious other. University of the North. Mahao, N. (2010). O Se Re Ho Morwa “Morwa Tooe”: African jurisprudence exhumed. Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 43, 317–336. Mamabolo, M.  A. (2015). Drivers of community xenophobic attacks in South Africa: Poverty and unemployment. The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 11(4), 143–150. Matunhu, J. (2011). Re-visiting the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies, 5(1/2), 95–108. Mbeki, T. (2008). Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the national tribute in remembrance of the victims of attacks on foreign nationals, Tshwane. The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. Available at: www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=3330. Accessed 5 Mar 2022. Mbembe, A. (2015). Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive. Available at http:// wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20 and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf. Accessed on 28 Feb 2022. Mbiti, J. S. (1970). African religions and philosophy. Doubleday. Metz, T. (2007). Towards an African moral theory. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15, 321–341. Mkandawire, H. (2016). Media retaliation against the 2015 xenophobic attacks in South Africa: The case of the QFM Radio in Zambia. Global Media Journal: African Edition, 9(2), 191–216. Mokgoro, Y. (1998). Ubuntu and the law in South Africa. Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 15, 1–6. Mpe, P. (2001). Welcome to our Hillbrow. University of Natal Press. Neocosmos, M. (2010). From ‘foreign natives’ to ‘native foreigners’: Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. Codesria. Nkomo, M. (2014). The New Immigration Amendment Act of 2011 and Regulations. Craig Smith and Associates (blog). Available at http://www.migrationlawyers.co.za/news/uncategorized/ the-­new-­immigrationamendment-­act-­of-­2011-­and-­regulations/. Accessed on 28 Feb 2022. Nshimbi, C. C., & Fioramonti, L. (2014). The will to integrate: South Africa’s responses to regional migration from the SADC region. African Development Review, 26, 52–63. Nyamnjoh, F.  B. (2006). Insiders and outsiders: Citizenship and xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. CODESRIA/Zed Books. Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2021). Keynote address: Mobility, globalisation, and the policing of citizenship and belonging in the twenty-first century. South African Historical Journal, 73(2), 241–256. Patel, K., & Essa, A. (2015). No place like home. Aljazeera. From http://interactive.aljazeera.com/ aje/2015/xenophobiasouthafrica/index.html. Accessed on 2 Mar 2022. Pineteh, E. A. (2017). Illegal aliens and demons that must be exorcised from South Africa: Framing African migrants and xenophobia in post-apartheid narratives. Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1), 139–158. Pugh, S. A. (2014). Advocacy in the time of xenophobia: Civil society, the state, and the politics of migration in South Africa. Politikon, 41, 2. Radkiewicz, P. (2003). The national values as a concept helpful in explaining the development of nationalistic attitudes and xenophobia. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 34, 5–13. Sanchez, G. (2006). The role of group consciousness in political participation among Latinos in the United States. American Politics Research, 34(4), 427–451. Sawyer, K.  R. (2006). Explaining creativity: The science of human innovation. Oxford University Press. Segatti, A. (2011). Reforming South African immigration policy in the post-apartheid period (1990–2010). In A. Segatti & L. B. Landau (Eds.), Contemporary migration to South Africa: A regional development issue. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank.

88

I. Ekanade

Sibanda, N. (2008). The impact of immigration on the labour market: Evidence from South Africa. Master’s thesis. University of Fort Hare, Alice. Sogolo, G. (1993). Foundations of African philosophy. Ibadan University Press. Solomon, H., & Kosaka, H. (2014). Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, narratives, and recommendations. South African Peace and Security Studies, 2(2), 5–29. Steinberg, J. (2012). Security and disappointment: Policing, freedom, and xenophobia in South Africa. British Journal of Criminology, 52, 345–360. Tafira, K. (2011). Is xenophobia racism? Anthropology Southern Africa, 34(3&4), 114. Teffo, L. J. (1994). The concept of ubuntu as a cohesive moral value. Ubuntu School of Philosophy. Teffo, L. J. (1996). The other in African experience. South African Journal of Philosophy, 15(3), 101–104. Teffo, L.  J. (1998). Both/ubuntu as a way forward for contemporary South Africa. Word and Action, 38(365), 3–5. Tella, O. (2016). Understanding xenophobia in South Africa: The individual, the state, and the international system. Insight on Africa, 8(2), 142–158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087816655014 Tutu, D. M. (1999). No future without forgiveness. Rider. Umezurike, S. (2012). Perceptions of African immigrants in Pretoria on service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs. http://uzspace.uzulu.ac.za/handle/10530/1064. Accessed 1 Mar 2022. Vorster, J.  M. (2002). Racism, xenophobia and human rights. The Ecumenical Review, 54(3), 296–312. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-­6623.2002.tb00155.x Wa Kabwe-Segatti, A. (2006). Reformulating immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa: From the Aliens Control Act of 1991 to the Immigration Act of 2002. IFAS Working Paper Series, 8, 171–185. Waghid, Y., & Smeyers, P. (2012). Reconsidering ubuntu: On the educational potential of a particular ethic of care. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(Suppl. 2), 6–20. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton University Press. Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and feminist politics. European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(3), 193–209. Israel Ekanade holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Venda, South Africa. He is currently a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Trinity University, Lagos and Senior Fellow of the African School of Governance and Policy Studies, Pretoria South Africa. His niche areas are political economy of migration, corruption, ethnicity and belonging, resource politics and political Islam.  

Chapter 7

Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland Rangelands of Cameroon Tata E. Sunjo

Abstract  Natural resource utilisation has often resulted in conflicts of varying dimensions around the world. However, unlike other non-renewable natural resources such as gems that generate violent armed conflicts, conflicts arising from the use of natural resources such as rangelands continue to be neglected, yet they are the foundation for many large-scale conflicts in developing countries. Using a cross-­ sectional research design, this paper examines the governance of rangeland conflicts in the North-Western Highlands of Cameroon. Several drivers, namely, toxic relationships between resource users who are dissected on ethnic and religious lines, environmental changes and demographic pressure are responsible for the persistence of rangeland conflicts in the region. Various state (administrative and judicial) and non-state (involving amicable settlement, dialogue platform and alternative resolution mechanisms) approaches have been employed in conflict management and governance. Though limited in terms of legal space of operations, non-state approaches to rangeland conflicts are more effective than the state ones. The current centralised system of operation has contributed minimally to mitigating and managing these conflicts. Committed to embracing decentralisation in the hope of resolving the growing political differences and agitations rocking country, there are also expectations that this will create more space for non-state actors and approaches to significantly contribute to conflict governance in the region.

Introduction Rangeland biomes cover much of the area where pastoral livestock production is a major land use (Asner et al., 2004 cited in Mussa et al., 2016). Even though they cover 51% of the earth’s land area, they support 78% of the global grazing area. In Africa, pastoral areas occupy about 40% of Africa’s land mass which significantly T. E. Sunjo (*) Faculty of Social and Management Sciences, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_7

89

90

T. E. Sunjo

varies between countries (African Union, 2013). According to FAO (2012), livestock provide food and income to the majority of the 1.2 billion people living on less than $1 per day, and livestock demand is rising to unprecedented levels (Delgado et al., 1999; de Haan et al., 2001; FAO, 2008 cited in Mussa et al., 2016). Rangelands are important resources for grazing livestock to produce meat, fibre, hide (Ismail et  al., 2019), and manure for fuel and organic fertiliser. In Africa, livestock or livestock-­related activities contribute at least 50% of total value of marketed production and subsistence production consumed by an average pastoralist household (African Union, 2013). Despite the indispensable support of rangelands to food security, over the years, rangeland activities have generated a multiplicity of conflicts among pastoralists and between pastoralists and sedentary farming populations. These conflicts are very common in those parts of the world that rely on the extensive or free-range livestock grazing system (Fashir et al., 2015; Nalule, 2010; Swallow & Bromley, 1992). Unlike the rangelands of the Northwest and Adamawa Highlands of Cameroon that receive appreciable amounts of rainfall of over 1000 mm, most of the global rangelands constitute the dry lands with a semi-arid to an arid climate, characterised by erratic rainfall occurrence and high daytime temperatures (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). These natural climatic conditions make pasture and water availability for livestock highly seasonal resulting in resource scarcity, mobility, and conflicts among and between different groups of resource users. This is evident especially in the West African Sahel where farmer-herder conflicts have intensified because of observed changes in climatic conditions, demographic pressure and poor land use systems (Ajibo et al., 2018; Chikaire et al., 2018; Adisa & Adekunle, 2010; SWAC/OECD, 2007; Shettima & Tar, 2008). Moreover, the underlying causes of rangeland conflicts are often partly attributed to the fact that most of the forage and water resources in rangelands are shared by several individuals, households and village groups (Swallow & Bromley, 1992) which are deeply divided on ethnic and religious basis, characterised by insecure tenures in the face of growing environmental degradation and scarcities. In the East African grazing communities, conflicts involving resource users severed on ethnic lines have been reported in this respect. This is very visible in Africa given that the continent hosts more than half of the world’s 30 to 40 million pastoralists, with notable countries being Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia and Sudan (Swallow & Bromley, 1992). In addition, these areas are characterised by arid and semi-arid climatic characteristics that barely support the growth of grasses which, in turn, sustain extensive livestock grazing. The changing climatic conditions are reducing the carrying capacity of the existing rangelands through the scarcity of pastures and water resources, thus giving rise to nomadism and increasing competition for more resources (Hoste & Vlassenroot, 2009; Gaiballa & Karamalla, 2011; Reid et al., 2005; Thomas & Barton, 1995). Even though livestock grazing in Africa is traced as far back as 7000 BC, the introduction of livestock activities in much of the Western Highlands of Cameroon took place in the mid-to-late nineteenth century when the expansion of population cleared sufficient areas of tse-tse fly infestation to make it possible to reach them

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

91

without unacceptable levels of mortality from trypanosomiases (Ngalim, 2015; Blench & Sommer, 1999). Prior to the arrival of the herders, the landscape was colonised by sedentary crop farmers who had a more secure land tenure than the newcomers (pastoralists) that were received by the local leaders and sent to the hills which they considered as unproductive agricultural lands. The coming together of these two distinct groups of resource users (farmers and herders) made conflicts over land resources inevitable. This inevitability is driven by the three parameters which Coser (1956) identified as fundamental in society conflicts, namely, status, class and power. The complexities of both human and natural systems in sustaining natural resources therefore necessitate proper governance of natural resources (Ratner et al., 2013) to ensure fairness in exploitation and livelihood sustainability. This is critical in reducing competition and conflict that have been regularly reported in pastoral and farming communities. Unfortunately, in many pastoral lands in Africa such as East Africa, rangelands are poorly governed resulting in persistent conflicts (Davies et al., 2016; Atieno et al., 2015; Der Zwan, 2011). In Cameroon, even though the southern part of the country which occupies over 60% of the national territorial space do not support extensive grazing, the northern region and the Western Highlands remain the livestock kingdom of the country. This is accounted for by the environmental conditions of the latter which are ideal for the growth of herbaceous plant species which serve as pasture to support livestock (Pamo, 2008). The area enjoys a savannah to semi-arid climatic conditions favourable for free-range grazing. In this regard, the exploitation of common-pool resources such as rangelands, farmlands, forests and water constitutes the basis for the survival of millions of people in this part of Cameroon. Apart from securing livelihoods, the region’s rangelands provide multiple goods and services of invaluable economic, social, cultural and biological importance. Though a major livelihood opportunity to many in the region, contests over their access to and use have often given rise to both high- and low-intensity conflicts. In much the same way as in other African countries investigated, the Northwest Region of Cameroon is characterised by growing human and livestock numbers in the face of limited resources for their sustenance. As such, conflict over ownership and access to these resources have become pervasive. Effective conflict governance can significantly contribute to mitigating and managing conflicts and ensuring peace and security in the region. Given that most of the rangelands in this area are communally owned as it is the case with most pastoral lands of Africa (The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive, 2012; Gaiballa & Karamalla, 2011), the governance responsibilities lie in the hands of state and local authorities as well as community leaders (including representatives of the local populations of farmers and herders). However, there exist mistrust between the government and the governed. The dominantly modern state-system of governance which is characterised by the top-­ down approach is often applied to resolve resource-related conflicts. This form of governance, unfortunately, does not take into consideration the historical and cultural systems and values of the indigenous communities that make up this part of

92

T. E. Sunjo

Cameroon (Amungwa, 2011). The consequences of this are the persistence of rangeland conflicts which remains a serious security threat that, to a certain extent, has been manifesting during the current Anglophone crisis rocking the region. It is on this basis that this paper x-rays quality and challenges of governance responses to these conflicts in this part of Cameroon.

Methodology This study was conducted in the Western Highlands of Cameroon (Fig. 7.1). Unlike other pastoral lands of Africa characterised by scanty rainfall distribution, the rangelands in this part of Cameroon receive high amounts of rainfall of over 2000 mm (Neba, 1999; Tata, 2016). A combination of high population growth and intensive land use as well as high topography has limited the vegetation climax to herbaceous grass species which support large animal population. The highlands have moderate temperatures of 21 °C which contribute to making the area less humid thus making it ideal for free-range cattle grazing. Contrary to previous studies that have dwelt on similar conflicts in the region from a historical and largely qualitative perspective and with a focus on causes and effects (Ngwoh, 2013; Lambi et al., 2007; Ngwa et al., 2007; Nji et al., 2016), this study uses a cross-sectional design to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Data on trends were collected from secondary sources while information on the various conflict governance approaches and their level of effectiveness was gotten primary sources using semi-structured questionnaire (with a sample size of 385)

Fig. 7.1  Various mechanisms solicited by conflict parties to resolve

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

93

and interview guide administered in cattle growing areas including the transhumance corridors are regions. The study had three different groups of participants: herders, farmers (who are the main conflict parties) and local and state administrators. A semi-structured survey was developed to source information from conflict parties, while a topic guide was used to obtain information from state administrators (the Divisional Officers-Dos, judges at Courts of First Instance and High Courts at Divisional Levels and experts from the Divisional Delegations of MINADER and MINEPIA) and local administrators (councils, ardos and fons customary court judges). Secondary data on rangeland conflict drivers and effects were subjected to content analysis while primary data were analysed using descriptive statistics of frequencies, mean scores and proportions. The results are presented in tables and figures.

Situation of Rangeland Conflicts Rangeland-related conflicts pitting herdsmen and crop farmers are, unquestionably, an age-old problem in the Northwest Region of Cameroon. The driving factors are connected to access to and control of land and water resources. However, there are fundamental factors that continue to usher in new dimensions in terms of triggers, intensities and management approaches which vary from one area to another. In recent years, the growing human populations, climate change and the scramble for degrading natural resources by increasingly polarised groups of people are the main causative factors of rangeland-related conflicts. The phenomenal increase in human populations has given rise to contests over land resources which constitute the lifeline of the region’s economy. Based on the population statistics of Cameroon (National Institute of Statistics, 2014), the Western Highlands is one of the most densely populated areas in the country, with a population of over two million people and a population density of over 130 persons per square kilometre. Like in most developing societies whose economies rely significantly on extractive activities, about 80% of the population depends on the exploitation of natural resources such as croplands, rangelands and water for their livelihood. It should be remarked that the region has the highest percentage of rangelands (27.1%) in Cameroon, with a surface rangeland/savannah of 38,780 square kilometres (Pamo, 2008). In the North-western Highlands, rangelands equally make up a significant portion of the land surface as opposed to farmlands that are concentrated in river valleys, gentle slopes and plains. These land-use activities are carried out near each other, and so demand careful understanding and cooperation between resource users (farmers and herders). However, in many areas in the region, there is little understanding between these users, resulting in conflicts. While the herders are largely from the Mbororo-Fulani ethnic group who are mostly the males, the farmers are from the earlier settled Bantu ethnic groups, consisting of the Tikar, Chamba,

94

T. E. Sunjo

Widekum, Aghem and Furu-Awa (Ngwoh, 2013). Over 80% of farmers are women who are of the Christian religious background unlike the herders who generally practise the Muslim faith. These ethnic and religious diversities have played a critical role in the unending cycle of conflicts in the region. The frequent occurrence of these conflicts is equally linked to the deteriorating relationship between the users over the years. Three forms of relationships which determine conflict trend include patron-client, synergy and competition between the two main land resource users. The initial relationship was based on a patron-client relationship in which the leaders of the earlier settled farming communities gave the highlands to the Mbororo newcomers who were experts in pastoralism on a clientele basis. The political evolutions in post-colonial Cameroon have significantly altered the nature of this relationship. This followed the political dispensations provided for in the country’s 1976 Constitution, the 1992 Liberty Laws and the 2004 UNESCO Law on Indigenous peoples. These dispensations, rightfully, gave rise to the recognition and the respect of the rights of the Mbororo minority in this part of Cameroon. Having had this recognition and respect, it would seem there is growing resentment of the people due to the lack of collaboration in the utilisation of natural resources. This is equally driven by cattle destructions on farmlands especially along transhumant corridors and zones. Apart from changes in the quality of relationship between the conflict parties, several factors are responsible for the persistence of farmer-herder conflicts. Critical of conflict-causative factors surveyed in the field are: • The expansion of grazing activities into designated farmlands in some parts of the region, likewise the cultivation of crops in seasonal grazing lands and transhumance corridors. • Growing human and livestock population. • Poorly constructed paddocks to keep animals away from farmlands. • Limitations land tenure arrangements. • Inefficiency in the application of the transhumance law. • Climate variability. • Degradation of pastureland and the scarcity of pasture and water. • Land grab by elite. These drivers result in conflicts which manifest in various ways. The most common form of manifestation is the destruction of crops by grazing animals. This happens in cases where grazing lands are not protected with robust fences or when farmlands especially in dry season grazing sites are poorly protected. In some cases, crop damages by animals especially in the transhumant zones are attributed to the carelessness of the gainakohs (shepherds). These conflicts have given rise to a multiplicity of adversities which undermine social cohesion among conflict parties. The dominant effect on conflict parties is observed to be damages to crops and animals. This is often the immediate effect of conflicts. When crops are destroyed by animals (as reported by 46.49% of participant farmers), the response is often almost immediate from farmers by injuring,

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

95

killing, or impounding the animals owned by cattle herders (40.29%). Other effects include: • Killing of a family or friend or a community member. • Loss of property such as destruction of homes, cattle rustling, loss of farmland or grazing land. • Served a jail term and/or payment of fines, among others. The destruction of both crops and livestock remains a crucial effect that often affects food security in the region. Given that farming activities are largely done for subsistence purpose, the destruction of crops by animals often affect household food security as the affected farmers, who are mostly women and are equally breadwinners of families, are faced with hunger and starvation until the next farming season.

Governance Approaches to Rangeland Conflicts Several governance responses are employed to manage, prevent and resolve rangeland conflicts. The dynamic nature of these conflicts requires a sound governance framework to effectively manage them to avoid the escalation and the destruction of the delicate social cohesion in the region. Most of the governance efforts or reactions to these conflicts reflect the political history under which the region has undergone within the framework of the evolution of the state of Cameroon. This history spans from the pre-independence days (particularly from the creation of the former West Cameroon (present-day Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon)) to post-independent government trajectories of the country. It should be remarked that the creation of West Cameroon came with the arrival of the herders in the region in 1919 who came and met the earlier settlers or locals (Ngwoh, 2013). The governance of rangeland conflicts in the region is carried out by the government of Cameroon (through administrative and judicial mechanisms), civil society organisations/non-governmental organisations, traditional authorities as well as the conflict parties themselves. During field investigations, several governance responses by various stakeholders which are solicited by the study participants were surveyed (Fig. 7.1).

Rangeland-Related Conflicts A significant majority (41%) of sampled conflict parties solicit the amicable resolution mechanisms more than any other means of conflict resolution. They noted that this is, most often, the first step they will take when a conflict arises over agro-­ pastoral activities. The failure of amicable settlement option, however, often gives rise to conflict parties seeking other resolution mechanisms. This is mostly during

96

T. E. Sunjo

situations where significant damages such as human casualties, injury and extensive property damages (including crop and livestock destructions) are incurred. Some of these include the failure of amicable mechanism, the uncompromised nature of either one or all the conflict parties, impetuous or rash reaction of victims during the outbreak of the conflicts and an exacerbation of pre-existing tensions between conflict parties. The following section critically investigates other approaches to governing rangeland conflicts.

Regulation of Cattle Movements In the wake of the increasing environmental mutations in this highland region of Cameroon, the proper governance or regulation of pastoral activities such as mobility arising from these mutations is primordial in enhancing environmental security through the prevention and mediation of conflicts by ensuring sustainable resource exploitation practices. The seasonal and topographic characteristics of the Northwest Region do not favour all-year-round crop cultivation. Certainly, before the arrival of the Fulani cattle herders, the highlands were considered as rugged terrain subject to highly eroded soils that could not support large-scale farming activities. As such, farmers were mostly concentrated on gentle slopes, valleys and plains for their agricultural activities. The exiting environmental conditions cannot support all-year-­ round cattle rearing in the highlands. In this regard, organising transhumance should therefore be an indispensable aspect of overall governance conflict governance. The regulation of cattle movements is an administrative approach to conflict governance which aims at preventing conflict occurrence in the region. The movement of cattle amidst other land users especially farmlands often results in cattle intruding and destroying crops. To mitigate these conflicts associated with cattle movements, the state of Cameroon came up with Decree No. 76/420 of 14 September 1976, modified by Decree No 86/755 of 24 June 1986 to regulate cattle movement. The decrees classify cattle movements to include movement for rearing; movement for commercialization; and Transhumance movement. Based on Articles 1 and 2 of Decree No 76/420 of 1976, animals are allowed to freely graze on all designated grazing lands of the Northwest Region except in urban areas and by the roadside. Grazing can also be limited from some specified grazing lands by the Minister of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industry especially during disease outbreak. Generally, prior to cattle movements, the state, through the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industry (MINEPIA), has set aside specific conditions for movement execution. The general condition for all movements is that animals must be accompanied by a herdsman or herdsmen, and they must follow routes carved out by the concerned state ministry. For transhumance movements, the key required document is the transhumance card issued by the regional delegation of MINEPIA which must be signed at the point of departure and on return by the competent MINEPIA services.

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

97

The movement of grazing animals for rearing and commercialisation purposes follows cattle tracks spelt out by the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industry. Consequently, the following cattle tracks are designated in the Northwest Region as defined by Arrêté No 02/MINEPIA of July 20, 1988, modified and completed by Arrêté No 03/MINEPIA of August 9, 1989, by the concerned ministry. 1 . NW1 – (Nigerian border) Nwa, Kumbo 2. NW2 – Wum, Bafut, Bamenda 3. NW3 – Fundong, Bambui, Bamenda 4. NW4 – Mbengwi, Acha Tugi, Batibo 5. NW/W 1 – Sabongari, Foumban or Ndu 6. NW/W 2 – Jakiri, Foumban 7. NW/W 3 – Bamenda, Santa or Pinyin, Mbouda, Bafousam 8. NW/SW 1 – (Nigerian Border) Dumbo, Nkambe, Ndu, Kumbo, Jakiri, Sabga, Bamenda, Bali, Batibo, Widikum, Bachuo Akagbe, Nguti, Kumba, Muyuka, Mile 17, Mutengene, Limbe, Idenao.

Regulation of Transhumance Activity Transhumance pastoralism is an age-old and widely practised grazing system in rangelands in Cameroon. This often involves the mass movement of herds on semi-­ permanent basis to designated transhumance areas. The movement is regularly driven by the changing climatic and environmental conditions which bring about pasture and water scarcity in the traditional upland rangelands during the four-­ month-­dry seasons (November to February). This transhumance is normally directed towards designated areas such as valleys, riparian areas and wetland environments that, at the same time, serve as major food crop-producing areas of sedentary and semi-sedentary farming communities. Indeed, mobile pastoralism is economically efficient as it provides a safety net for pastoralism during the cyclical drought periods. This does not only help to sustain cattle productivity but also guarantees the livelihoods of the pastoralists in the region. However, given that transhumant areas are poorly designated alongside unprotected crop lands, mobile animals regularly destroy farmers’ crops, giving rise to conflicts. Indeed, transhumance pastoralism is the key movement amongst the other two (movement for rearing and for commercialisation) that promote the pervasiveness of conflicts in the Northwest Region. To regulate transhumance pastoralism as a preventive approach of conflicts between farmers and herders, the postcolonial administration created Decree No. 76/420 of 14 September 1976 regulating the movement of herders and their herds. Animals moving for transhumance must (as an ideal), accordingly, adhere to transhumance gorges (or routes) defined by the agro-pastoral commissions of the areas where the animals pass. As highlighted by Niamir-Fuller (2005), “the fundamental

98

T. E. Sunjo

Table 7.1  Respondents’ views on the challenges confronting the application of the 1978 Transhumance Law S/N Challenge 1 Poor land use classification and demarcation by the government 2 Early issuance of the transhumance permits prior to the stipulated date 3 Early departure of the rains thus necessitating early movements of animals 4 Late arrival of the rains resulting in long stay of animals in transhumant areas Total

Frequency Herder Farmer Total Percentage 110 84 194 55.27 54

18

72

20.51

24

27

51

14.53

19

15

34

9.69

207

144

351

100

design principles related to managing institutions for mobility are nested property rights, fluid boundaries, inclusivity, flexibility, reciprocity, negotiation and priority of use”. This is important in ensuring cooperation of the different common-pool resource users in the region. In order words, mobile pastoralism should be fairly applied and have the support of the principal resource users in the region. A critical look at the law on mobile pastoralism shows that its creation and implementation is replete with serious challenges as captured in the views of conflict parties (Table 7.1). Many of them (55.27%) indicated that the unfair application of the law and the limited successes in the efforts to address rangeland conflicts is attributed to government’s inability to classify and demarcate rangelands and other land uses in the area. This has reduced the efficiency of conflict governance efforts through transhumance. Apart from being costly, efforts to demarcate these lands have often been met with stiff resistance from the local population who see it as an alienation given that they leased the land to the Mbororo herders ever since their coming into the area in the second decade of the twentieth century (Ngwoh, 2013). The failure to demarcated land use in the area has thus resulted in the juxtaposition of incompatible land uses, giving rise to conflicts. Further, the unfair implementation of the transhumance law is the early issuance of permits by the delegations of MINEPIA to herders for transhumance. Thus, is attributed to the growing irregularities in the behaviour of climatic conditions especially the departure and sensation of the rains. The increasing variability in rainfall pattern driven by climate change and which is disrupting the agricultural and pastoral calendar has led to the overlapping of dry season period of farming and grazing activities. This explains why most of the conflicts surveyed in early studies were observed to be predominantly in the transition period from the dry to the wet season (Nchinda et  al., 2014; Tata et  al., 2013). Indeed, Hoste and Vlassenroot (2009) qualify the climate change effects on conflicts in Africa as the mother of all problems. Even though constrained by changing environmental conditions to issue the transhumance permit, the early issuance of transhumance permit is equally driven

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

99

by bribery and corrupt practices by some administrators. The recurrent fluctuations in climatic conditions especially the early departure of the rains present a challenge for cattle to stay in the hills till the stipulated period of movements into designated dry season grazing areas.

Indigenous Conflict Governance Traditional authorities are equally part of the conflict governance trajectory in the Northwest Region of Cameroon, even though their powers have been significantly reduced since the 1978 Decree that formed the Farmer-Herder Commission. Prior to the creation of the modern state of Cameroon especially during the period of imperialism, the governance structure of the region was organised into several powerful kingdoms or fondoms headed by chiefs or Fons who exerted power and authority over their subjects. However, the modern state, while initially maintaining these institutions, later concretised centralised state governance. At the time when traditional authorities were actively involved in conflict resolution, a major conflict governance instrument used was the 1974 Native Authority Cattle Control Rules which was to preserve grazing areas and prevent the pervasive nature of conflicts that were fast becoming a major economic and political crisis in the region. Even though their roles in handling conflicts were significantly reduced with the creation of the commission, they are still part of the conflict governance process. There are, nevertheless, varying views regarding the credibility of traditional authorities in resolving conflicts among conflict parties (farmers and headers). Based on the results in Table 7.2, most sampled conflict parties (29%) rated traditional authorities to be good in handling rangeland-related conflicts. This was the case especially in communities which included representatives of the herders alongside farmers’ representatives in the traditional councils. On the contrary, most of the herders (29%) rated traditional authorities in conflict settlement as very poor. They indicated that most often, the traditional councils are dominated by leaders of farmers who serve their interest rather than being objective.

Table 7.2  Respondents ratings of traditional authorities in resolving conflicts S/N 1 2 3 4 5

Rating Excellent Good Average Poor Very poor Total

Herders 4 (1.97%) 55 (27.09%) 44 (21.67%) 41 (20.20%) 59 (29.06%) 214 (100.00%)

Farmers 16 (9.09%) 45 (25.57%) 40 (22.73%) 30 (17.05%) 45 (25.57%) 179 (100.00%)

Total 20 (5.09%) 114 (29.01%) 84 (21.37%) 71 (18.07%) 104 (26.46%) 393 (100.00%)

100

T. E. Sunjo

The Agro-Pastoral Commission The Agro-Pastoral Commission is another administrative governance instrument used by the state to govern farming and grazing activities in the region. Unlike the administrative legal provisions which are geared towards preventing and mitigating conflict occurrence, the agro-pastoral commission is charged with the mandate of managing conflicts. The application of the transhumance law in regulating grazing activities is complimented by Decree No. 78/263 of 3 July 1978 to establish the terms and conditions for settling farmer-herder disputes and sets out the conditions to create a Local Commission headed by the local government administrator (the Divisional Officer). Commonly known as the Agro-Pastoral Commission, this commission exists the sub-divisional and divisional levels headed by the senior divisional and the divisional officers respectively. The composition of the farmer-herder commission as provided for by this law is made up of the Divisional officer who heads the Commission, a representative of the forces of law and order (including either the Police or Gendarme), representatives from the delegations of MINEPIA and MINADAR, representative of the farmers (local authorities), a representative of the herders (ardo or his representative) and the concerned conflict parties. The decisions of the agro-pastoral commission are rendered enforceable by prefectorial orders following reports forwarded to the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) by the head of the agro-pastoral commission at the divisional level. The functions of this commission are to: 1. Allocate rural areas to agriculture and grazing according to the needs of the inhabitants and demands of development. 2. Define the terms and conditions for using mixed farming areas. 3. Exercise permanent control over agricultural and grazing lands. 4. Settle farmer-herder disputes. A critical analysis of the terms of reference of this commission shows that the first three functions of the commission could be instrumental to handle the remote and fundamental drivers of rangeland conflicts. If the allocation of rural areas to agriculture and grazing according to the needs of the inhabitants and demands of development, defining the terms and conditions for using mixed farming areas, and exercising permanent control over agricultural and grazing lands were all applied by the commission, these conflicts would be significantly mitigated. These indeed help in mitigation of conflicts and reduce the amount of time and resources used in settling conflicts. On the contrary, there have been little, or no efforts put to implement these conflict preventive functions of the commission. The commission is observed to operate largely through the implementation of its fourth mandate which is limited to handling conflicts when they breakout. However, the conflict parties that solicit the commission’s conflict management platform had various opinions about its

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

101

Table 7.3  Respondents’ ratings of farmer-herder commission in settling conflicts Rating Excellent Good Average Poor Very poor Total

Proportion (%) of: Herders 1.96 20.59 24.5 12.25 40.69 100.00

Farmers 7.65 28.4 17.49 13.11 33.33 100.00

Total 4.65 24.29 21.19 12.66 37.21 100.00

Mean rating = 3.52, Std. Dev. = 1.322079

operation. A majority (37.21) of the sampled participants (including both the herders and farmers) indicated that these commissions are very poor in settling rangeland conflicts. While over 24% of them rated the commission’s activities in conflict resolution to be good, very few of them (4.56%) indicated that the commission is excellent in its handling of conflicts (Table 7.3). The inadequacies in the effective performance of the commission in managing rangeland conflicts are linked to several factors. The first factor advanced by the participants for the commissions’ poor resolution of conflict is linked to the corrupt nature of some of the members. According to them, some of the commissions’ members are interested in collecting bribes from conflict parties before investigating or giving a judgment on a conflict case. They noted that even after investigating the crisis, their evaluation of the damages either to crops or to livestock is often highly bias and determined by which party bribed provided them tips or inducements. This attitude of some administrators is captured by Fon & Ndaba (2014: 3) when they state that: ...the local administrators are so corrupt that their decisions are taken to the advantage of the person who offers highest. The end result is that the administrators rather create or encourage more farmer-herder disputes than to resolve the conflicts. As a result of their high illiteracy rate and far off settlements, the Mbororo herders end up paying more money and cattle wealth in farmer-herder disputes.

Further, there is a lack of trust in the commission by conflict parties due to the prohibitive financial demands needed for the commission to engage in investigating a conflict case brought before them. Participants explained that when they report a case of conflict to the commission, they (conflict parties) are the ones to sponsor the trip of the commission members to the conflict site for an assessment of the rate of damage caused. Most often, this sponsor involves payments for transportation/provision of fuel as well as entertainment (food and drinks). Given that at times, these costs outweigh the cost of the damages caused by a conflict party, some of the victims often find it easier and economical to solicit other resolution mechanisms, mostly the amicable settlement platform.

102

T. E. Sunjo

Modern Courts Process Formal court litigations in matters of rangeland conflicts are one of the resolution mechanisms solicited by some conflict parties. This is a judicial instrument used by the state to govern conflicts arising from rangeland activities. The intervention of the judiciary in handling these conflicts is often restricted to cases that have a criminal dimension, such as assault, human casualty/murder, cattle injury/poisoning, or, to a limited extent, cattle rustling. Overall, court litigation is not considered by agro-­ pastoralists as the best way of dealing conflicts. Only limited proportions of sampled herders and farmers (6% and 4% respectively) indicated that, sometimes, they take conflict cases to court as the last resort. Most often, court cases of conflicts are motivated by the herders given that Article 3 of Decree No. 76/420 of 14 September 1976 on transhumance pastoralism forbids the maltreatment or harming or killing of somebody’s animal. Maltreating means beating or wounding or even attaching dangerous objects to the animals. In many instances, such acts occur when the animals destroy/consume the crops of farmers. Contrarily, Article 8 of Decree No. 78/263 of 03 September 1978 on farmer-herder commission says that the agro-pastoral commission is competent to handle the case of crop destruction, while the case of maltreating the animals is handled by the law courts. The overt disregard of these legal instruments to adequately protect the livelihood sustenance activities of farmers unlike those of the herders’ accounts for why most of them do not see the courts as fair in the administration of justice (Table 7.4). The first major reason advanced for the lack of trust in formal courts in settling conflicts is linked to the lengthy due processes characterising court hearings. Over 32% of the study participants indicated lengthy due process as a discouragement in using the courts for conflict resolution. This usually involves waste of time and financial resources. The expensive nature of court procedures prevents afflicted parties from seeking justice from law courts. Table 7.4 Identified problems with the court decisions of rangeland-related conflicts by respondents S/N Problem 1 Lengthy due processes 2 Inabilities of the judges to understand local customs and traditions 3 Influence peddling by some political and economic elites 4 Connivance of lawyers and judges to delay judgments to attract inducements 5 Bribery and corruption (for example, wilful attraction of tips) Total

Herder 77 (34.68%) 45 (20.27%)

Farmer 54 (29.03%) 26 (13.98%)

Total 131 (32.11%) 71 (17.41%)

17 (7.66%)

13 (6.99%)

30 (7.35%)

10 (4.50%)

38 (20.43%)

48 (11.75%)

73 (32.88%)

55 (29.57%)

128 (31.38%)

222 (100%)

186 (100%)

409 (100%)

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

103

The second important reason advanced by respondents for their lethargy in soliciting the formal court to resolve conflict is linked to the bribery and corrupt nature of judges. Indeed, among the five main reasons advanced by the participants for their lack of confidence with formal courts, 31% of them believed that the judges in courts were highly corrupted. They indicated that taking cases to courts entails the payments of bribe, while 11% of them even believed that lawyers connive with some judges to delay the due process for them to continue extorting money from their clients.

Ad Hoc State Responses to Conflicts Despite the existing legal and institutional frameworks to govern rangeland conflicts, the complexity of certain conflict events has warranted peculiar governance reactions especially from the state. One of the crucial triggers of rangeland conflicts is the growing land grab by some political and economic elite as well as influential herders in the region. One of such cases relates to the large-scale land acquisition by the ELBA Ranch of Baba Ahmadou Danpullo in the Ndawara Highlands occupying part of Boyo, Mezam and Ngoketundjia Divisions. The establishment of the ELBA Ranch came with significant encroachments into other rangelands that are a source of livelihood to a good number of herders, resulting in serious land disputes and conflicts between the Mbororo Community and the ranch owner in the region (Cordes, 2013). The intensity of the disputes and problems created by the ranch led to national and international awareness raising by MBOSCUDA on the subjugation of the constitutional and international human rights of the Mbororos as indigenous peoples. Amidst the series of litigations and counter litigations, the state responded by creating an Inter-Ministerial Commission (The Jani Commission) on the conflict between Mbororo Community and Baba Ahmadou Dampullo in 2003 (Cordes, 2013; Ngwoh, 2013). Even though this commission had representatives from the conflict governance stakeholders especially the state, not all of them showed up for the commission’s activities. This is the case of the representative of a strategic ministry (the then Ministry of Territorial). Notwithstanding, the commission carried out interviews with parties and their witnesses, made field investigations in disputed sites, and had several working sessions with administrative authorities. Even though these activities were done as a team, the commission came up with two reports; one that was signed by the chairman of the commission and was considered as the minority report and the other which was produced by members of the commission and was considered as the majority report (Cordes, 2013). This discord in the final report of the commission reflects divergences of views which seemed to have been guided by alliances either on the business magnet or on the side of the Mbororo minorities whose rights are allegedly being suppressed by

104

T. E. Sunjo

the former. However, ever since the submission of the two reports to hierarchy, nothing concrete has been done by the state to ensure that justice is served to the parties concerned.

Non-state Governance Responses to Conflicts Apart from state institutions and instruments governing rangeland conflicts, there are other stakeholder organizations that have been contributing to preventing and managing farming and grazing-related conflicts in the region. These include, among others, the traditional councils, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations working with conflicts such as the Mbororo Cultural and Development Association, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and Justice and Peace Commission of the Roman Catholic Church. The results obtained (Fig. 7.2) equally exhibit divergences in the views of respondents regarding conflict management efforts by these non-state actors. In terms of overall assessment of the quality of efforts using the five-point Likert measurement scale, the performance of traditional councils in handling rangeland-related conflicts was 3.32, meaning that they have an average performance, following the five-­ point Likert scale measurement. On the contrary, most of the respondents gave an overall rating of NGO activities as poor given the mean score of 2.26. The differences in opinions also vary between farmers and herders even though the trends are observed to be similar. Comparatively, while there are minimal variations in opinions on the quality of approaches in conflict management and resolution by traditional councils (Fig. 7.2a), there are significant rating differences on the activities of CSOs (Fig. 7.2b). Even though the overall opinion of the participants on the latter is that it is poor in handling conflicts, a significant percentage of both herders and herders (41.6% and 30.77% respectively) indicated that their activities are good. Regarding traditional councils in conflict settlement, the hierarchy of courts in Cameroon situates customary courts which are represented by these traditional councils at the base. However, due to their limited jurisdiction, they are only considered to assist regarding customary litigation matters. As such, they are widely perceived as lacking the legal basis to settle farmer-herder crisis. Therefore, they are mostly exploited by parties for amicable conflict resolution. The second major set of non-state conflict governance mechanisms involve the dialogue platform which is often encouraged and initiated by non-governmental and civil society organizations. This strategy is usually considered as an alternative to the agro-pastoral commission and even the judiciary in handling rangeland conflicts. These dialogue platforms, like traditional councils, are aimed at encouraging conflict parties to adopt amicable conflict resolution mechanisms. Consequently, the dialogue platforms initiated by these NGOs just like traditional councils are not legally binding. Furthermore, unlike the state conflict actors whose mandates are

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

a

35 30.84

30

Percentage (%)

105

27.57

26.82

25

20.56

20

22.35

19.16

15

0

16.76

8.94

10 5

25.14

1.87 Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Very poor

Rating Graziers

b 45

41.6

Percentage (&)

40 35

30.77

30 23.08

25 20

16 15.38

15 10

Farmers

16 17.31

20 13.46

6.4

5 0

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

Very poor

Rating Graziers

Farmers

Fig. 7.2  Participants’ ratings of the quality of non-state actors’ involvement in conflict governance. (a) Traditional councils; (b) NGOs/CSOs

specified to cover the rangelands of the region, activities of non-state actors are limited to areas, most likely due to logistics, financial and legal impediments. As opined by Nchinda et al. (2014), the importance of the dialogue platform as alternative to the existing legal agro-pastoral commission lies in the growing inefficacies of the latter in handling such conflicts over the years. The main institutional actors that have initiated and promoted the dialogue mechanism to these conflicts include MBOSCUDA and the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV). This

106

T. E. Sunjo

platform is “…a forum where farmers and grazers exchange on issues or problems of farmer-grazer conflicts in order to come out with amicable settlements” (Nchinda et al., 2014: 5). Despite the reported challenges including the resistance of the administration to accept the role of dialogue platforms, this approach has recorded several successes since 2006. Studies carried out by SNV show that this approach has led to a 40% decrease in farmer-grazer conflicts in Donga Mantung, Ngoketunjia and Menchum Divisions respectively. In addition to resolving farmer-grazer conflicts, the dialogue platform also takes preventive measures as it is a forum where the principal parties in conflict meet to seek solutions to their problems. Apart from MBOSCUDA and SNV, another civil society organization that has been contributing to resolving farmer-herder conflicts in the region is the Justice and Peace Commission of the Roman Catholic Church. The organization equally works to assist victims of these conflicts in seeking for legitimate means of justice. The activities of this organization are concentrated in the Diocese of Kumbo which covers two of the divisions in the Northwest Region, namely, Bui and Donga and Mantung Divisions.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations Cameroon has, over the years, used a dominantly centralised style running the state. This approach has proved ineffective in addressing differences faced by grassroots populations especially regarding resource conflict (Oyono, 2004). This has been the case with rangeland conflicts which continue to undermine peace and development in the north-western highlands of the country. The use of administrative and judicial technics of conflict resolution has been characterised by major challenges of bribery and corrupt practices, and lengthy due process amidst others that have failed to effectively address these conflicts. These approaches remain undemocratic given that the administrative and judicial personnel sent to the region like other parts of the country represent the central government and not the people they are serving. As many of them remain out of touch of the historical and cultural realities of the people, most of the decisions taken have been largely perceived by conflict parties as bias and undemocratic. From a positive perspective, the non-state responses in resolving farmer-herder conflicts, the amicable resolution approach has contributed significantly to reducing these conflicts. This has been valorised by civil society and non-governmental organisations through the initiation of dialogue platforms that bring together conflict parties to settle their difference harmoniously. Besides resolving farmer-grazer conflicts, the dialogue platforms assist in preventing conflicts given that they are also a medium through which conflict parties meet to seek solutions to their problems. This success is hinged on the fact that there is community participation in the pursuit of genuine and fair conflict resolution mechanisms. This indicates the importance of resolving these conflicts following the dialogue approach as both

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

107

parties separate without bearing resentments towards each other. This is contrary to the activities of the agro-pastoral commissions and the modern courts which, in most cases, leave conflict parties disgruntle with judgments leading to more resentments by them. This equally underscores the importance of decentralisation in the management of state affairs including rangeland conflicts. As the government of Cameroon is becoming committed in opting for decentralisation as a measure to resolve the general Anglophone crisis ravaging the region, it can only be anticipated that this will open the space for dialogue platforms which are community-driven to triumph and promote peace in the use of rangeland and other resources in the region.

References Adisa, R. S., & Adekunle, A. O. (2010). Farmer-herdsmen conflicts: A factor analysis of socio-­ economic conflict variables among arable crop farmers in North Central Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology (Delhi, India), 30(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2010.11906266 African Union. (2013). Policy framework for pastoralism in Africa: Securing, protecting, and improving the lives, livelihoods and rights of pastoralist communities. Department of Rural Economy, and Agriculture. Ajibo, H.  T., Onuoha, E.  C., Obi-Keguna, C.  N., Okafor, A.  E. O., & Oluwasanmi, I. (2018). Dynamics of farmers and herdsmen conflict in Nigeria: The implication to social work policy intervention. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 8(7), 157–163. https:// doi.org/10.30845/ijhss.v8n7p16 Amungwa, F.  A. (2011). The evolution of conflicts related to natural resource management in Cameroon. Journal of Human Ecology, 35(1), 53–60. Atieno, P. O., Mwangi, S. W., & Ngetich, K. (2015). An assessment of causes of conflicts over common pool resources among residents of lower River Nyando Floodplains, Kisumu County, Kenya. Journal of Studies in Social Sciences, 11(1), 50–67. ISSN 2201-4624. Blench, R., & Sommer, F. (1999). Understanding rangeland biodiversity (Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 121, (September), 51). Retrieved from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.617.8079&rep=rep1&type=pdf Chikaire, J. U., Ajaero, J. O., Ibe, M. N., & Onogu, B. (2018). Status of institutional arrangements for managing resource use conflicts among crop farmers and pastoralists in Imo State, Nigeria. Agricultural Research and Technology Open Access Journal, 19(1). https://doi.org/10.19080/ ARTOAJ.2018.19.556077 Convention on Biological Diversity. (2010). Pastoralism, nature conservation and development: A good practice guide. Convention on Biological Diversity. Cordes, K. (2013, September 19). Cameroon pastoralists fight for their way of life. Think Africa Press. Coser, L. A. (1956). The function of social conflict. Free Press. Davies; P. Herrera; J. Ruiz-Mirazo; J. Mahomed-Katere; I. Hannam; E.O Nuesiri; Caterina Batello; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, (2016). Improving governance of pastoral lands. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/a-­i5771e.pdf. Der Zwan, J.  V. (2011). Practice note 7: Conflict-sensitive land policy and land governance in Africa. In Strengthening the economic dimensions of peacebuilding. International Alert. 978-1-906677-58-9. FAO. (2012). The cross-border transhumance in West Africa: Proposal for action plan. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in collaboration with Economic Community of West African States.

108

T. E. Sunjo

Fon, R. N. & Ndaba, M. (2014) Access to Justice and promotion of Land Rights for the Mbororo Indigenous pastoralists of the North West Province of Cameroon. IASC http://iasc2008.glos. ac.uk/conference%20papers/papers/F/Fon_232401. Fashir, G. A., Mohammed, A. H. A., Salih, E. M. & Abdalla, N. I. (2015). Impact of open grazing system on socio – Economic and environmental aspects in El Dilling Locality – Sudan, International working paper series, paper n. 15/06. Gaiballa, B., & Karamalla, A. (2011). Natural resources, governance and pastoralism in Sudan (pp. 1–15). Feinstein International Centre. Hoste, J. C., & Vlassenroot, K. (2009). Climate change and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa: The mother of all problems? In International symposium on developing countries facing global warming: A post-Kyoto assessment. Royal Academy for Overseas Sciences, United Nations, Brussels, 12–13 June 2009, pp. 139–149. Ismail, M., Yaqini, R., Zhaoli, Y., & Billingsley, A. (2019). Rangeland resources management. Managing Natural Resources. Mountain Development Resource Book for Afghanistan, ICIMOD pp. 49–58. Lambi, C. M., Ndenecho, E. N., & Yenshu, E. V. (2007). Environment and inter-community conflicts in the Northwest Province of Cameroon: Reflections from the field. Journal of Applied Social Sciences, 7(1), 27–43. University of Buea, Cameroon, Unique Printers, Bamenda. Mussa, M., Hashim, H., & Teha, M. (2016). Rangeland degradation: Extent, impacts, and alternative restoration techniques in the rangelands of Ethiopia. Tropical and Subtropical Agroecosystems, 19, 305–318. National Institute of Statistics of Cameroon (2014). Characteristics of the Population. Statistical Yearbook of Cameroon. http://www.stat.cm/downloads/2016/annuaire2016/CHAPITRE4_ CARACTERISTIQUES_POPULATION.pdf. Nalule, A. S. (2010). Social management of rangelands and settlement in Karamoja. Food and Agricultural Organisation. Nchinda, V. P., Che, M., Ijang, T. P., Abubakar, S., & Chi, N. (2014, August). “In search of common ground” for farmer-grazer conflicts in the northwest region of Cameroon. https://doi. org/10.13140/2.1.1912.4163. Neba, A. (1999). Modern geography of the Republic of Cameroon (3rd ed.). Neba Publishers. Ngalim, A. N. (2015). Cattle rearing systems in the Northwest Region of Cameroon. Historical trends on changing techniques and strategies. Journal of Educational Policy and Entrepreneurial Research, 2(5), 175–189. ISSN: 2408-770X (Print), ISSN: 2408-6231 (Online). Ngwa, C.N., Ngalim, A.  N. & Kum, V. (2007) Farmer-grazier crisis and conflict resolution in Menchum Division of the Northwest Province of Cameroon: Reflections from the field, In Journal of Applied Social Sciences, 6 (1 & 2), pp. 234–250 University of Buea, Cameroon, Unique Printers, Bamenda. Ngwoh, V. K. (2013). The dynamics of farmer-herder conflicts across the Bamenda Grasfields, 1947–2006. PhD thesis. Department of History, University of Buea. Niamir-Fuller, M. (2005). Managing mobility in African rangelands (p.  26). https://doi. org/10.3362/9781780442761 Nji, M. B., Manu, I. N., Tarla, D. N., & Metoh, N. J. (2016). Assessment of the farmer-grazier dialogue platform promotion committees in Wum Central Sub-Division, Menchum Division, Northwest Region of Cameroon. Landmark Research Journals of Agriculture and Soil Sciences, 3(2), 9–17. ISSN: 3670-4291. Oyono, P. R. (2004). One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resource management decentralization in Cameroon. Journal of Modern African Studies, 4(2), 91–111. Pamo, E. T. (2008). Cameroon: Country pasture/forage resource profiles. FAO. Ratner, B. D., Dick, R. M., May, C., & Haglund, E. (2013). Resource conflict, collective action, and resilience: An analytical framework. International Journal of the Commons, 7(1), 183–208. Reid, R. S., Serneels, S., Nyabenge, M., & Hanson, J. (2005). The changing face of pastoral systems in grass-dominated ecosystems of eastern Africa. In Grasslands of the World (p.  535) Retrieved from ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/y8344e/y8344e00.pdf

7  Conflicts Governance in Africa: Perspectives from the North-Western Highland…

109

Shettima, A.  G., & Tar, U.  A. (2008). Farmer-pastoralist conflict in West Africa: Exploring the causes and consequencs. Information, Society and Justice, 1(2), 163–184. https://doi. org/10.3734/isj.2008.1205 SWAC/OECD. (2007). Transhumant pastoralism: A reality in animal production systems in the Sahel and West Africa (SWA). In Livestock in the Sahel and West Africa: Promoting and supporting change in transhumant pastoralism in the Sahel and West Africa, Policy Note No. 3. Swallow, B. M., & Bromley, D. W. (1992). Institutions, governance, and incentives in common property regimes for African rangelands. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00691679 Tata, E. S., Lambi, M. C., & De Bruijn, M. (2013). Agro-pastoral movements and conflicts in Bui Division, Cameroon. African Journal of Social Sciences, 4(3), 4–19. ISSN: 2410–3756 (Print). Tata, E. S. (2016). Climate Variability and Wetland Exploitation in the Bui-Ngoketundjia Divisions of Cameroon: Development Implications. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon. The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action. (2012). Land and conflict, toolkit, and guidance for preventing and managing land and natural resources conflict. The United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action. Thomas, D., & Barton, D. (1995). Livestock and the environment finding a balance. Coordination by: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations United States (U.S. Agency for International Development) and World Bank. Tata E. Sunjo lectures in the Department of Geography at the University of Buea where he has been a faculty member since 2015. He is equally a Governance and Regional Integration Fellow at the Nkafu Policy Institute with the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation in Cameroon. His research interests include climate change, management and use of natural resources, environmental politics and policy, and natural resources-related conflicts. He has published extensively in learned academic journals. He has participated in several international conferences and seminars. Dr. Sunjo is also an Associate Editor with the Journal of Resource and Environmental Management and the African Journal of Social Sciences in Cameroon. He is also a member of the Global Engagement Network on Internal Displacement in Africa (GENIDA).  

Chapter 8

Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation of the Cameroonian Criminal Law Response Irene Dione Fokum Sama-Lang and Roland Djieufack

Abstract  Today, a rapid technological change with a corresponding effect on the attitude of people brings new challenges to regulatory authorities. The social media is a mixed blessing, as it is hailed for giving impetus to economic, social, cultural, and political advancement on the one hand, while on the other it is a tool for cyber criminality. Social media threats, a form of this criminality, reached dire proportion during the raging Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. This is so despite the legal frameworks, regulating criminal conducts and criminal proceedings. This chapter primarily visits the controversial question of establishing evidence to the offence of threat committed through this medium pointing to the scanty legislative measures in addressing this contemporary issue. Adopting desk top review, it highlights the hurdles that beset the working application of the Criminal Procedure Code, considering the glaring difficulty on matters of proof connected to social media offences such as threat. It points to the need for a fundamental reform of the inquisitorial laws on matters of proof to maintain a higher degree of clarity to meet up with the current trend of technology and its effects.

I. D. F. Sama-Lang (*) Faculty of Law and Political Science, Department of English Law, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon R. Djieufack Department of Law, Higher Technical Teachers’ Training College, The University of Bamenda, Bamenda, Cameroon © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_8

111

112

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

Introduction The current rapid expansion of social media networks has been greatly remarkable. These virtual global platforms have revolutionised a wide range of fields, including journalism, communications, marketing, politics, civic engagement, education, teaching, learning and advocacy. The implication of this emerging technology presents a challenge to national criminal laws, which are only beginning to grapple with the effect. Cameroonians have joined the rush for the different media for their own personal pleasures, education, and economic and social development. It is unsurprising that with the amount of illicit money that is gotten from shady deals, criminal activities in these networks (Bamodu, 2004) cannot be gainsaid and have gained grounds in Cameroon (Djieufack & Ambe, 2019). The most common categories of criminality recognised are cyber criminality (Ngeminang, 2012), sexual offences, threats, and criminal harassment. The focus of this article is geared at examining how Cameroonian criminal law is responding to threats committed on major social media networks. While recent international scholarship has explored threats on social media networks (Whitehead, 2013), the Cameroonian legal literature has yet to examine how our criminal law is responding to this phenomenon. This dearth of literature can be explained by the fact that the legislator did not sufficiently envisage this kind of emerging crime which has mushroom in our community. Before the Criminal Procedure Code became the procedural law on Criminal matters in Cameroon, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance regulated criminal procedure in Anglophone Cameroon. The new Criminal Procedure Code 2005 (CPC) was introduced to give a uniform criminal procedure in the administration of criminal justice in the whole of Cameroon. This was necessitated by the fundamental differences that existed in the two criminal procedure laws that existed in the Anglophone Cameroon and Civil Law in the Francophone Regions. The French system of criminal procedure in Francophone Cameroon was ‘inquisitorial’ where system is a system of proof taking used in Civil Law, whereby the judge conducts the trial, determines what questions to ask and defines the scope and extent of the inquiry. On the other hand, the form of procedure based largely on the Anglo-American ‘adversarial or accusatorial system’ involving active and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before an independent decision maker who is not ‘actively’ involved in adducing of evidence. This was adopted in Anglophone Cameroon-Evidence Ordinance cap 62 of the revised law of Nigeria, 196. The new Criminal Procedure Code with a nationwide application retains both the adversarial elements of the English system and the inquisitorial pre-trial investigation of the French system (Tabe, 2007). In this regard, with the wave of threats by faceless individuals against unsuspecting Cameroonians, the question that begs for an answer is whether the new CPC and the revised Penal Code can adequately grapple with the intricacies of establishing evidence to punish this crime. Against this background, this paper primarily sets out to make a critical interpretative analysis of the provisions of the criminal laws on matters of threats as sanctioned by Sections 301 and 302 of the revised Cameroon Penal Code 2016. It firstly

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

113

considers whether the Cameroon Penal Code applies to social media threats at all. The second part of the paper examines the way in which the problems associated with the admissibility of evidence of social media threats is fraught with some major difficulties in the face of matters of proof addressed by the Criminal Procedure Code. This article begins to address this gap in the literature by identifying and contextualising the problem at stake.

Contextualising the Problem Although there is no single commonly acceptable definition of the ‘social media’, social media threats which can loosely be defined as a social engineering scheme which the anxieties and fears of individuals are exploited with the intention to get users to part with their money through theft or other means or even physical aggression and duress has been in Cameroon since the inception of new technologies. This however reached alarming proportions with the Anglophone Crisis that started in October 2016 as a protest by lawyers and then teachers in the Anglophone regions against the use of French rule in their courts and schools (Nkongho, 2018) thereby ignoring their cultural specificities amongst others (Nifi, (2014); Nkwi et al., 2011). These social media platforms are used by unknown gunmen and bandits to threaten and/or terrorise citizens with death, bodily harm on them or relation or destruction of their property should these targeted persons fail to comply with their dictates. Such threats have caused emotional distress and even psychological harm to the people against whom they are directed. Although in small pockets of areas such threats have existed, it reached fever stage during the raging what is now termed the Anglophone Crisis. Government workers especially university and secondary teachers, students and pupils, political leaders became targets under the guise that these persons were traitor – “black legs” (Tanda, 2018). Such threats became xenophobic when these faceless men of the underworld started targeting French-speaking inhabitants living in the North and Southwest Regions of Cameroon. These threats forced many of them to either flee the region or dole out huge sums of money to their social media attackers. Such moneys emboldened them and whetted their appetites for demand of huge sums of money.

The Offences: Uttering (Oral) and Written Threat Offences Section 302 of the Penal Code governs threats committed orally or by utterance or in writing. It states that: Whoever orally or by any writing or picture threatens another with force or interference, or with the destruction of any property, or with breaking into his residence, shall be punished with imprisonment for from 10  days to 3  years and with fine of from CFAF 5000 (five thousand) to CFAF 150 000 (one hundred and fifty thousand francs).

114

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

First, the uttering or oral threats offence as governed in the above provision of the Code functions as an incipient or inchoate offence. It is a preparatory crime that criminalises conduct preceding the commission of more serious offences that are articulated in the threat itself (e.g., murder1 and assault2). Indeed, the Law Reform Commission in Canada has described threat-based offences as “preventive crimes” that exist for the purpose of giving police the power to intervene before a physical offence occurs (Stuart, 1979). Second, an ancillary purpose of the threats offence in Section 302 (1) of the Criminal Penal Code could be to suppress threats of death or bodily harm because of their potential negative effect on third parties and society. It expressly provides that: 1. Whoever threatens another, expressly or by implication, with force or other interference in case of his failure to comply with any order or condition shall be punished with imprisonment for from 10 (ten) days to 6 (six) months and with fine of from CFAF 5000 (five thousand) to CFAF 25000 (twenty-five thousand). 2. Where the force or other interference would constitute a felony punishable with death or with imprisonment for life, the punishment shall be: (a) imprisonment for from 6 (six) months to 3 (three) years and fine of from CFAF 5000 (five thousand) to CFAF 70000 (seventy thousand) for verbal threats. (b) imprisonment for from 2 (two) to 5 (five) years and fine of from CFAF 10000 (ten thousand) to CFAF 250000 (two hundred and fifty thousand) for threats in writing or picture; and the Court may in addition impose the forfeitures described in section 30 of this Code. The above threats contained in our Penal Code, if left unsanctioned, may help normalise violence, sow social unrest, undermine the rule of law, and disturb the peaceful enjoyment of life in a free and democratic society. Although the commission of such offences today in Cameroon is rampant, the situation is compounded by the fact that the assailants are faceless necessitating considerable attention by the criminal laws in force. In this regard, this article does not only focus on the first form of this offence, namely, threats to destruction of property but is rather very much concerned with when such threats are followed with death or bodily harm. For this reason, a critical interpretation of this section is imperative as it is argued here that the essential elements of the offence of threats in 302 (1) and (2) of the Cameroonian Penal Code are not exhaustive in an event where the threats cause death or bodily harm to any person as is the case under Section 264.1 (1) of the Penal Code of the Canadian Criminal Code.

 Sections 275 & 276 of the Penal Code.  Sections 277, 279, 280, 281 of the Cameroon Penal Code.

1 2

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

115

Interpreting the Ingredients of the Offence of Threat The Actus Reus The actus reus usually means an act or an omission. Since proof of the actus reus in every offence includes all other elements of the given offence except the mens rea, the actus reus may not merely mean an act but a situation with a particular result. Certain offences like the case of simple threat under the Penal Code may not require any result unlike in the case of murder, where the act or conduct must result to death. In fact, the offence of simple threat under the Penal Code could be regarded as a conduct crime other than a result crime pertaining to murder. The prohibited act (actus reus) in the case of threat-related offences must prove that the accused, in any manner, uttered (as per Section 302 (1) of the Penal Code), conveyed or caused any person to receive a threat to cause death which could be Murder (Section 275), Capital Murder (Section 276, Assault Occasioning Death (Section 278) of the Penal Code or bodily harm to any person. Bodily harm could take different forms as governed by the Penal Code, namely, Assault Occasioning Grievous Harm (Section 279); Simple Harm (Section 280) and Slight Harm (Section 281). Whether the accused’s conduct constituted a threat of death or bodily harm is a question of law determined on an objective standard. Would a reasonable person fully aware of the circumstances have perceived them to be a threat of death or bodily harm? Notably, it is unnecessary for the complainant to prove that the intended recipient of the threat was ever made aware of it or, if they were aware of it, that they were intimidated or took it seriously. It is therefore imperative in any given instance of the act to establish the truth that the accused had the intention of carrying out the act. In fact, a nexus between the conduct of the act of the accused and the resultant consequences must be established. In other words, the act of threat must result to what forbidden by the law, namely, destruction of property, death, or bodily harm. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in Sections 301 and 302 of the Penal Code is the starting point for analysis.

The Mens Rea One major substantive issue in prosecuting social media threats is establishing mental fault. The general apprehension of the threat-based offence as contained in Sections 301 and 302 (1) & (2) of the Penal Code requires that the accused has intended to intimidate or be taken seriously. Speaking to some of the recipients of such threats in the city of Bamenda, Cameroon, it was noted that this high level of subjective mens rea has been difficult to establish simply because within the realm of Criminal law, they can be regarded as inchoate offences. In other words, the authors of such acts at times do not meet up with their promises to effect the harm/

116

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

injury. Even though the incessant persistence of such promises is made through anonymous callers under the cover of different titles commanding from different localities, such situations have caused a cross section of the population in the Crisis zone to quit their homes for fear of being brutally killed or their property being destroyed. The varied informal responses recorded to these threats committed via the social media platforms is an ongoing controversy that has coincidentally generated significant debate in other jurisdictions such as Canada (Perrin, 2013). With respect to mental fault (mens rea), the accused must have intended the threat to intimidate or to be taken seriously. According to them, it is unnecessary to prove that the accused intended the threat to be conveyed to the subject of the threat, or that the authors of such act intended to carry out the threat. This fact is supported from the point of view of recoded past circumstantial evidence of known cases whereby after a lapse of time the perpetrators of such threats are usually persistent in their threats. In fact, they appear to be nightmares in the minds of the victims insisting that they should comply with their litany of requests. Nevertheless, in making this subjective determination regarding the intent of the accused, inferences may be drawn from all the circumstances, including the perceptions of any witnesses and the alleged victim. In making this assessment, while testimony from people who witnessed or were the subject of the alleged threat may be considered in applying the reasonable person standard, they are not determinative. Again, social media postings often lack the detailed context of physical-world interactions, making it more difficult to engage in the contextual analysis that is necessary to determine whether what is objectively read as a threat of bodily harm was subjectively intended to intimidate or be taken seriously. At the same time, regardless of the intention of the accused, the effect about the threat (and others who may be exposed to it) may be the same. This suggests that while the criminal law has a role to play in addressing threats made on social media networks, it cannot and should not be expected to be a complete answer to threats of violence online. Other telecommunication regulatory institutions have a leading role to play in addressing online threats.

Issues with Social Media Content as Evidence One issue that has emerged with social media-related threats has been the difficulty in establishing documentary evidence. The hurdle has been the availability of information and the means of proving it. Discussions with some police officers reveal that most of the times the disclosure of threats allegedly committed on social media networks is usually destroyed by the alleged perpetrators. In other, the real identity of its perpetrator is not an easy evidentiary issue to handle. However, the Criminal Procedure Code directs all means to be used to uncover the traceability of issues at stake as it also commands preliminary inquiry to be conducted to ascertain the proof. The question which therefore needs to be addressed firstly is to know if

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

117

threats allegedly committed on social media can be considered as electronic documents for its admissibility in courts.

Admissibility of Electronic Documents It is always of great concern with social media litigation on how social media-based data, in whatever form, will be entered into evidence. There are often the usual kinds of admissibility concerns, for example, whether statements posted on twitter are hearsay, what inferences can be drawn from the manner or length of social media use to name a few. However, a major issue coming to light is at the authentication stage, concerning whether the electronic data itself is even capable of becoming part of the evidentiary record. Generally stated by the Article 30 (a) & (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, all means can be used or possible in proving a case. This comes in to add to the usual method of proving or disproving facts in courts by oral evidence of witnesses as provided for in Article 322 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On matters of documentary evidence, Article 30 (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code gives allowance for electronic evidence with the aid of electronic gadgets. This disposition of the Code is a recognition of the current trend of use of mass technological tools within the media. This explains therefore the fact that the legislator has made provision of the following instruments to establish evidence of a fact: recording tool to listen to telephone conversations, electronic gadgets, and surveillance cameras. This is a laudable effort as it is a great consideration of real evidence as applied in the Section 76 of the Evidence Ordinance which does not only require testimonial evidence or documentary evidence, but other material objects deemed to be produced for the examination by the court. As per Article 313 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the above material objects are considered as secondary documentary evidence as appose to primary documentary evidence  – Article 313 (2) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Despite the above points of law, the perplexing problem concerns the evidence of social media threats made particularly in writing with the aid of an electronic tool such as a phone. Could such a tool or gadget be considered as a document which requires documentary evidence?

What Is a Document? By virtue of Section 2 (1) of Evidence Ordinance cap 62 of the revised Law of Nigeria: Documents include books, maps, drawings, photographs and also include any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of these means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.

118

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

From the foregoing, it therefore implies that threats being manifested in writing through letters do fall within the interest of this study as Section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Code sanctions same. Even though the Code does not make specific mention of electronic documents, it is of dint reasoning to note that written threats via the social network is an evidence of documentary document. Its form and content are conceived and presented in writing by a private person whose objective is to cause harm to another person. This therefore explains as per Section 10 of the Evidence Ordinance that such a document could be categorised as a private document as opposed to a public document as defined in Section 109 of Evidence Ordinance. On the strength of the above reasoning, secondary documentary evidence is admissible under Section 314 of the Criminal Procedure Code to attest to this private document. If a party seeks to rely on the contents of a document to prove his case, he must according to section 94 of the Evidence Ordinance necessarily bring the contents of the document to the notice of the court. It follows therefore that reproduction of oral or written threats as evidence can be done by mechanical processes such as print or recording of the data with the view to ensure the accuracy of the contents compared with its primary source(s). The reasons for observing such evidence are well outlined in Article 314 (a–d) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the procedure to obtain primary evidence is most often fraught with some major difficulties as far as threats have been manifested via the media. It could be because the primary content has either been destroyed, or refusal of the offender to produce it, or impossibility to cause the displacement of the object containing the evidence.

Burden of Proof of the Offence of Threat The burden of proof is not a legal obligation, but by its legal nature, a duty. The duty represents an obligation to oneself and not to the other party in a contract. In practice, the often-crucial issue is the allocation of the burden of proof to establish that a threat was made orally or in writing. Logically, it is often no problem to complain that a threat was made which is against the law. What cannot be determined with the necessary certainty is whether the harm or destruction of property incurred by the victim emanate or inextricably linked to the act of threat. Nevertheless, a clear right of action has been imposed unto the victim to establish the offender’s responsibility for the offence of threat. This is the purport of Article 307 of the Code which suggests the fact that the burden to proof rests on the party who alleges a wrong. In other words, the Code establishes the relevant general principle that a party who asserts a right must prove the necessary preconditions for the existence of that right. It suggests that the burden of proof includes the burden of adducing the relevant evidence and the burden of persuasion. This comes into play with the reliance of the victim on the offender’s act because in practice the burden of adducing evidence is

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

119

sometimes placed on a party who simply has better access to evidence but who would not otherwise bear this burden on strict principles of the allocation of burden of proof. It is often referred to as ‘rule and exception-principle’ or using Roman terminology as the principle ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit non qui negator actori incumbit probatio. This can be explained by the fact that it can be deduced that each party must prove the factual prerequisites of the provisions upon which it wants to rely for its claim or defence. This rule is supplemented or modified by considerations of equity according to which each party must prove those facts which originate from its sphere. Consequently, the courts will presumably generally consider how close the victim is to the relevant facts at issue, that is, a party’s ability to gather and submit evidence for that point. In addition, it is also necessary to situate the role of preliminary inquiry by the Examining magistrate in establishing the veracity of the evidence of the victim.

Preliminary Inquiry: A Means of Establishing Evidence Under the Criminal Procedure Code, preliminary inquiries shall be obligatory in cases of felonies unless otherwise provided by law and shall be discretionary in cases of misdemeanours and simple offences. Section 142 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that these inquiries be carried out by an examining magistrate (juge d’instuction) who shall be a magistrate of the bench and such an inquiry can only be carried out if the State Counsel by a judicial act requests the examining magistrate to do so (Tabe, 2007). According to Section 154 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the object of the preliminary inquiry therefore is to discover the truth of the matter and to ensure that there is a case against the accused before the case is sent to the court for trial. As a rule, the burden of proof is on the accused. In fact, presumption of innocence, otherwise considered as the maxim ‘innocent until proven guilty’, is a legal right, which the suspect, the defendant, or the accused enjoys in a criminal trial in most civilized nations (Fuashi, 2007). This presumption holds that ‘no person shall be considered guilty until finally convicted by a court’. This is embedded in Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Cameroon. For the accused to enjoy this presumption, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which must convince the court that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The burden which the defence may sometimes incur is to adduce evidence which would tend to show that there is a doubt as to the guilt of the accused. In this light, it could be agreed to establish the evidence of social media threats as per the provisions of Sections 301 and 302 of the Penal Code, that the examining magistrates are empowered with certain powers during preliminary inquiry. The judicial act by which the state counsel seizes the examining magistrate is known as a holding charge and such a charge preferred by the state council must be

120

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

in writing and could be made against a known or an unknown person  – section 144(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It shall contain the statement of the offence committed and must mention the fact that prosecution has not been discontinued.

 ower to Order to the Locus-in-Quo and Carry Out Searches P and Seizures Locus-in-quo is the place where something is alleged to have occurred (Garner, 2009). The law permits the Examining Magistrate to carry out an inspection of the locus-in-quo. The main logic behind this exercise rests on the fact that an existing object cannot be produced or moved in court because of its size, the court may then decide to inspect it out of court if it is material to the proper determination to the question before the court. By Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the examining magistrate may visit any area within his jurisdiction to carry out all measures of investigation necessary for the discovery of the truth, and in particular conduct searches and seizures as per S. 178 and 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). A search is an investigative technique used at any time before or after an arrest of a suspect. According to section 16 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a search warrant shall be an order given to the judicial police officer by the state counsel, an examining magistrate, or a trial court to enter any public or private place and search it for the purpose of seizing any articles or documents used in committing an offence, or which appear to be the product of an offence. Such material evidence is in the criminal court during trial. The examining magistrate shall read all letters and other documents found on the premises of the suspect and he would decide on which articles and documents to seize as provided in S. 175 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Any person laying claim to the articles and documents seized may file his claim before the Examining Magistrate who, shall, after the submissions of the State Counsel, decide on it by ruling not subject to appeal and served on the parties. Two points need to be discussed about searches of social media using warrants. The first is that the extent to which a warrant will permit the search of social media information on a computer is not completely settled. Although the law on this is unsettled, it can be gleaned from above that with the case of social media threats, the examining magistrate as per provisions of Section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) can proceed to inspect the cell phone or computer of the suspect – the medium through which the threats were made. Since there will normally be a reasonable expectation of privacy, police authorisation from the State Counsel is often required to conduct such search. Typically, such will either be as a search incident to arrest if a cell phone is involved. The second is the question of reasonable expectation of privacy. What remains somewhat unsettled is whether, having been given the specific authority to search a

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

121

computer, police would be entitled to browse freely through a person’s accounts on various social media sites. The rationale here is that as per the provision of Section 179 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Examining Magistrate has an absolute imposing authorisation before engaging in the even greater infringement of privacy of looking through a person’s social media history to obtain the truth. Regarding searches incident to arrest of cell phones (to check text messages or other information) connected to the offence, there seems to be no problem in this regard. A cell phone is simply like any other object in an arrestee’s pocket and can be searched without restraint. Cell phones and other similar handheld communication devices in common use have the capacity to store vast amounts of highly sensitive personal, private, and confidential information – all manner of private voice, text and e-mail communications, detailed personal contact lists, agendas, diaries, and personal photographs. An open-ended power to search without a warrant all the stored data in any cell phone found in the possession of any arrested person clearly raises the spectre of a serious and significant invasion of the Charter-protected privacy interests of arrested persons. If the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the search of a cell phone seized upon arrest would yield evidence of the offence, the prudent course is for them to obtain a warrant authorising the search.

Power to Intercept, Record and Transcribe Correspondences One important concern with social media in the litigation context is how social media-based data, in whatever form, will be entered into evidence. There will, of course, be the usual kinds of admissibility concerns, for example, whether statements posted on Twitter are hearsay, what inferences can be drawn from the manner or length of social media use, etc. However, a major issue coming to light is at the authentication stage, concerning whether the electronic data itself is even capable of becoming part of the evidentiary record. Under Section 245(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Examining Magistrate is empowered to intercept record and transcribe all correspondences of the accused sent by means of telecommunication. Such an interception decision shall be under his authority and control. However, The Examining Magistrate cannot by virtue of Section 245 (4) (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code intercept the telephone lines of a barrister’s office or residence unless the President of Bar Council is informed. Furthermore, no interception can be affected on the telephone lines of members of the public who benefit from Immunity for prosecution. The decision to intercept shall be in writing and shall contain all the elements for the identification of means of communication to be intercepted, the offence which has led to this measure as well as its duration. The decision shall be taken for a maximum period of 4 months and may be renewed only under the same formalities and duration. In terms of authentication of electronic documents, the provisions codify the common law rule which places the burden on the party adducing the

122

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

document to provide “evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is that which it is purported to be” – anticipating that the trier of fact will make the ultimate decision on this point. In the era of social media, this point is even more important than it may appear to be – people often share the sign-in credentials and passwords for their social media accounts or stay logged in while they are away from their computers. This can create issues around proving that statements or actions are attributable to a specific person; not a new concern, perhaps, but one that is more “live” than it used to be. The most noteworthy aspect of these provisions is their recognition that electronic documents revive the concerns behind, if not the letter of, the “best evidence rule”, which had otherwise fallen into disuse. The traditional rule required a party to produce the original of a document or demonstrate that the use of a copy was necessary, to combat forgery. Electronic data raises similar concerns about its reliability, but often cannot be traced down to something like an “original,” particularly in a networked environment. In addition, as a matter of practice, it may be necessary either in civil or in criminal proceedings to prove that a document was signed, written wholly or partially by a particular person. When such is the case, the signature on the document or writing on it or the relevant part must be proven to be that person’s handwriting – Section 99 of the Evidence Ordinance. The distinction between “original” and “copy” is not of much use, because there is usually in practice no discernible difference between the original and the copy. Thus, the original is not likely to be more clearly reliable than a copy. The above situation raises some concerns in the social environment. The production of the original or certified copy of written threats which are sent via the internet or ordinary messages may pose a problem owing to its nature and medium of transmission. It could also occur where the accused is not the owner of the telephone (may be stolen or the sim card is not registered in his name) which he used to commit the act of threat. The traceability of his identity and systematic correspondences must be established by the telecommunication service provider (Tepi, 2011) upon instruction of the Examining Magistrate. Nevertheless, the production of evidence could be attested with the aid of sender’s Facebook page or WhatsApp account as secondary evidence to corroborate the fact in issue. The Examining Magistrate or the judicial police officer so commissioned may order the installation of an interceptive device by any qualified agent of a service or institution placed under the authority or supervision of the Minister in Charge of Telecommunications or any qualified agent of the operator of a telecommunication network or a provider of authorised telecommunication services. Furthermore, the Examining Magistrate can transcribe the correspondences, and correspondences in national or foreign languages shall be transcribed in English or French with assistance of a translator requisitioned for that purpose. The Examining Magistrate may by a ruling also direct the superintendent of the prison to send him all or part of the correspondences received or sent by a defendant except for those between the latter and his counsel – Section 244(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 245 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code requires any correspondence thus sent, after

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

123

censorship and reproduction, to be handed over to their addressees without delay unless the Examining Magistrate decides to seize it, in which case the defendant shall be informed thereof. He may also direct the post-master to send to him all or part of the correspondences addressed to or sent by the defendant who is released with or without surety or placed under judicial supervision – Section 244 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Power to Order for Expert Opinion By virtue of Section 2013 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Examining Magistrate is also mandated to order for expert opinion, where a technical problem arises during the preliminary inquiry. This, he may do by his own volition or on the application of any of the parties including the insurer of liability where necessary. Generally, an expert is a person who is specifically skilled in the field in which he is giving evidence and whether or not a witness can be regarded as an expert is a question for the judge to decide (Aguda, 1974). In the case of social media, this expert or person could be a computer or telephone engineer, who would detect or retrieve lost data, or decode a code or password in order to access a computer or cell phone. In such cases, opinions of such experts are regarded as relevant and therefore admissible when tendered in court. Several presumptions are set up to allow efficient proof of integrity, which can be established through proof that the storage medium was operating properly; proof that the document was recorded or stored or recorded and stored by an adverse party; or proof that the document was recorded or stored in the ordinary course of business by a party outside the litigation. This integrity can be proven by way of affidavit, though depending on the nature of the technology, expert evidence may be required. During the expert inquiry, Section 214 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code right to the parties to ask the Examining Magistrate to request the expert to carry out certain investigations or hear any person specifically named who is likely to furnish him with information of a technical nature. The expert at the end of his investigation, normally, submits his report to the Examining Magistrate, who may serve the parties with copies of the report – Section 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Conclusion The Cameroon Penal Code was enacted and revised in 2018, remarkably after the significant advances in communications technology which have resulted in diverse social networks. Since then, tremendous crime wave perpetrated via the social media in the Cameroonian communities nowadays is becoming an emerging challenge for our criminal laws, courts, and the judicial police to grapple with. One of such difficulties relates to the strenuous procedure to establish evidence of

124

I. D. F. Sama-Lang and R. Djieufack

threat-­based offences committed by anonymous or virtual perpetrators. It has been evident that the general issues of admissibility of evidence as governed by the Criminal Procedure Code could be useful by providing a wide approach to establish evidence. However, there is still some confusion and uncertainty regarding the notion of social media threats in our criminal laws. This suggests therefore that there is really a need for a law reform on cyber criminality in general to address specifically this subject with much clarity and precision.

References Aguda, A. (1974). The law of evidence in Nigeria (2nd ed.). Sweet and Maxwell. Bamodu, G. (2004). Information communications technology and E-commerce: Challenges and opportunities for the Nigerian legal system and the judiciary. The Journal of Information, Law, and Technology. [Online] Available: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/ellj/jilt/2004/2/ bamodu/. 8 Nov 2013 Coughlan, S., & Currie. (2000). R. J. Social media: The law simply stated. Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, 11, 229–251. Djieufack, R., & Ambe, H. A. (2019). Users of electronic banking in Cameroon within the CEMAC zone: The Cameroonian experience. Editions Universitaires Europeennes. Fuashi, N. T. (2007). The protection of the maxim ‘innocent until proven guilty’ by the Cameroon criminal procedure code. In E. Sone (Ed.), Readings in the Cameroon criminal procedure code (pp. 231–254). Presse Universitaires d’Afrique. Garner, B. A. (2009). Black’s law dictionary (9th ed.). Thomas Reuters. Ngeminang, A.  P. (2012). e-Government and the Cameroon cyber security legislation 2010: Opportunities and challenges. African Journal of Information and Communication Issue, 12, 157–163. Nkongho, S. A. (2018). ICT4D, Social media and small media use during the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, Master’s thesis, Malmo University, Greater Stockholm, Sweden, available at http://muep.mau.se Nfi, J. L. (2014). The Anglophone Cultural Identity in Cameroon 50 Years After Re-Unification, Int. J. of Adv. Res. 2 (Feb). 0] (ISSN 2320-5407). https://www.journalijar.com. Nkwi, P. N., Francis, B., & Nyamnjoh, B. (Eds.). (2011). Regional balance of national integration in Cameroon lessons learned and the uncertain future. Langaa RPCIG. Perrin, B. (2013). Social media threats: Examining the Canadian criminal law response. Canadian Journal of Law, and Technology, 16, 75–106. Stuart, D. (1979). ‘‘Working Paper on Homicide, Assault, and Threats (1st Draft)” Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1979). Tabe, S. (2007). A look at preliminary inquiry under the Cameroon criminal procedure code. In E. Sone (Ed.), Readings in the Cameroon criminal procedure code (p. 57). Presse Universitaires d’Afrique. Tanda Theophilus, “ Dialogue is Essential to Unite Cameroon’s Disparate Voices, International Crisis Group, 27th July 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org (last accessed on 21/4/2020). Tepi, S. (2011). L’avènement au Cameroun d’une Législation contre la Cyber Criminalité. Annals of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, 15, 119–138. University of Dschang. Whitehead, M. A. (2013). MySpace, whose space? The impact of semi-private social media on threats and the first amendment. New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement, 39(1), 193.

8  Social Media Threats and the Anglophone Crisis: An Interpretation…

125

Irene Dione Fokum Sama-Lang is an Associate Professor of labour and land rights with a bias for gender rights at the University of Buea-Cameroon, Faculty of Laws & Political Science. She is the current Head of the Department of Public Law & Public Administration. She has published single and co-authored over 21 articles in A rated peer-reviewed journal. She has equally authored a book on employment security. She is co-author of two published books on gender land rights. And is the author of a book on security of employment in the private sector. She enjoys multi-­ disciplinary research.  

Roland Djieufack is an Associate Professor of Law and the Head of the Law of Department at the Higher Technical Teachers’ Training College in The University of Bamenda in Cameroon. He is also a lecturer in the Faculties of Laws and Political Sciences in the Universities of Dschang and Buea, Cameroon. He is a visiting scholar at the Faculty of Law at Radboud University in The Netherlands. He is the author of three books and several peer-reviewed journal articles in national and foreign journals. His research interests are on Commercial and Consumer Laws.  

Chapter 9

“Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament Hannah Muzee

Abstract  While parliament and other political deliberative structures have always been the preserve of men, women have nonetheless slowly entrenched into the arena. Even then, they still face discrimination not only in their descriptive representation but also in their substantive participation. Even in pro-women legislation, the inequality in relation to women’s voices is evident during deliberations in parliament. This chapter therefore adopts a qualitative and descriptive research design that includes the content analysis of the Domestic Violence Bill 2010 and interviews with Ugandan parliamentarians who participated in the parliamentary era when the bill was deliberated upon. Using the deliberative democratic theory, this chapter studies and analyses the deliberative behaviour of women parliamentarians in the Uganda parliament. The findings reveal that whereas women parliamentarians used several strategies such as continuous education and capacity building to enhance their confidence and self-esteem during deliberative sessions, women’s voices are often silenced both passively and actively by powerful male voices, and women parliamentarians must constantly and consciously navigate the patriarchal attitude and androcentric nature of parliament to get their voice heard.

Introduction Uganda is among those African Countries acclaimed for championing a drastic increase in women’s political representation with the introduction of the affirmative action policy of reserved seats in 1989. This policy has seen women at higher levels of government such as the current Vice President, Prime Minister, Deputy Speaker of parliament and in various ministerial positions. Nevertheless, with a number slightly over the 30% globally advocated for threshold, women’s representation has

H. Muzee (*) Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_9

127

128

H. Muzee

stagnated and they still suffer deficiencies numerically (IPU, 2021). This influences their substantive representation and their ability to make meaningful contribution to policymaking and legislation in general. In deliberative spaces where numbers are of importance, male voices still marginalize women’s voices in deliberative political sessions (Simpson & Lewis, 2007). While in pre-colonial Ugandan societies, women’s voices in political affairs were limited, they were still visible and recognised. There was no glaring and discrete divide between the public and private spheres. Women freely operated across both spheres depending on their status, responsibility, and social relationship within the community. Thus, even when their voices were subtle since men tended to occupy core decision-making positions in the community, women were still able to influence political decisions as was the case with the queen mothers, the king’s classificatory sisters and in some places women warriors. However, with the advent of colonialism, the visibility and voice of African women experienced acute marginalization as men’s roles received more prominence in politics and public affairs (Tamale, 1999). Despite these repressive conditions including regimes that were not supportive of women’s political participation, women continued to shape Uganda’s political scene in their favour. Women’s efforts resulted in the formation of various organisations such as the Uganda Council of Women (UCW) in 1947, followed by other organisations such as the Uganda Association of University Women (UAUW) and the Uganda Association of women’s Organisation (UAWO). These, in addition to the Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association (UWOPA), served and continue to serve as avenues through which women could collectively campaign for women’s rights including the agitations for increased women’s representation (Muzee & Endeley, 2019; Tamale, 1999; Tripp, 2000). Women’s efforts were finally recognised in 1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) enacted proactive measures such as the institution of reserved seats for women. This saw an increase in women’s participation in both national and parliamentary politics. The affirmative action policy saw an increase in the number of women vying and joining parliamentary politics from approximately 19% in the 6th parliament of 1996–2001 to approximately 35% in the 10th parliament of 2016–2020 (UBOS, 2017). Nevertheless, the Affirmative action policy has increasingly been used as a political tool by the NRM government for legitimacy consequently tokenising the women, creating complacency and stifling women’s voices in the process (Musisi, 1992; Tamale, 1999). Besides, women in the Ugandan Parliament lacked sufficient debate and legislative skills affecting their performance during deliberative sessions (Cornwall & Goetz, 2005; Kadaga, 2013). The authors claim that the easy manipulation of women during legislative deliberations is attributed to deficiencies arising out of Women’s skewed and shallow political apprenticeship, lack of experience in public debate and deal-making. A deficiency in any of these skills and competencies makes women’s voices ineffective. Hence the need for the creation of institutions and policies that support women’s voices during the deliberative process (Bhalotra et al., 2015; Castilejo, 2009).

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

129

Deliberation according to Bohman and Rehg (1997) enables society to be more sensitive to and understand the interests of a broader portion of the population. In pluralistic environments like parliament, deliberation ensures the reconciliation of diverging interests concerning policy which necessitates that participants have an equal say in collective decision-making (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Tschentsher et al., 2009). Deliberation therefore attempts to create a just society where everyone’s views are heard. Liberal feminists such as (Tong, 1989) noted that a just society was one that comprised of equality in access to other opportunities such as education and speech which allowed for individuals to exercise their autonomy and fulfil themselves. However, while the deliberative democracy theory posits a just society where everyone’s voices are heard, for socially disadvantaged people like women it is far from reality since they do not have equal access to speech. Women have hardly been allowed the freedom to take charge of their own development and growth but are instead confined to the private spheres with limited access to public spaces (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Steiner et al., 2004; Tong, 1989). Moreover, these inequalities in society are further exacerbated by some informal rules, norms and practices that militate against women’s useful deliberations in parliament. These unspoken rules and customs covertly uphold male superiority and peg women as passive actors in society (Waylen, 2015). Thus, if women are to challenge male dominance and marginalization of their voices, they will need to participate as critical actors. Brody (2009) advocated for gender-sensitive governance that was committed to breaking down the existing gender norms that governance was a privilege of men. There is a need to emphasize the fact that the percentage of women in parliament is not a direct impact of, nor an indication of democracy but rather that the norm of gender equality is essential in the process of democratization (Inglehart et al., 2004). Thus, apart from increasing women’s numerical representation in parliament, deliberate efforts are necessary to remove barriers to women’s effective political participation because an increase in women’s numerical representation is not a one size fits all solution to gender inequality. The role and function of parliaments in enabling and constraining gender equality and how women engage with parliament is the basis upon which this chapter is centred on. This chapter therefore attempts to describe the factors that inhibited voice and how women enhanced their voices during political deliberations. I proceed with a discussion on deliberative democracy and women’s voices in parliament, methodology, a discussion of the findings presented in women’s voices and then a conclusion.

Deliberative Democracy and Women’s Voices in Parliament Deliberation is “a process whereby groups of people, often ordinary citizens, engage in reasoned opinion expression on a social or political issue in an attempt to identify solutions to a common problem and to evaluate those solutions” (Stromer-Galley, 2007). Deliberation requires that participants listen to, learn from and engage with each other regardless of their viewpoints to achieve consensus in a democratic

130

H. Muzee

decision-­making process (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008). Deliberation is an argumentative discussion that involves exchange of information and reason giving among participants, void of any form of coercion that might create a semblance of dominance of one group or person over the other (Harbermas, 1996). These definitions introduce the argumentative element of deliberation synonymous with parliamentary or legislative discussions. Deliberation is therefore characterised by collective opinion formulation resulting from reasoned argumentation, undistorted by inequalities in bargaining power and is not a mere aggregation of already given preferences (Manin, 2005). Deliberative politics consequently anchors in polarized beliefs; diverse views examined and strengthened more rationally because of disagreement and articulated perspectives. The element of diversity leads to a mutually benefiting solution. Diversity also ensures that the minority is given a fair hearing which eventually results in a reasoned argumentation that benefits the whole community (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008). Equality is an essential element of deliberation that requires that no participant dominates the conversation nor attempts to outrightly silence another. Equality requires consideration of the reasons of others based on their merit and not the participant’s characteristics (Tutui, 2015). The deliberative process hence results in legitimate, rational and just policy anchored in the principle of common good (Rosenberg, 2007). For Rosenberg, effective deliberation requires inclusive political space, freedom of expression, equal opportunity to speak among others. While these are ideals, they are however far from reality, some factors work against effective deliberation that stem from inequality either concerning gender, race, and class. While deliberation assumes a substantive notion of equal opportunity of political influence and presupposes that individuals must have equality of resources such as material wealth, education and capacity to advance persuasive claims, some minorities like women are disadvantaged (Bohman & Rehg, 1997). Women confront a glass ceiling as a result of the patriarchal nature of political system (Ahikire, 2004). In Uganda, Mushemeza (2009) argues that insufficient policy considerations in the areas of health, family life and education have a negative influence on women’s political participation. Inequalities are inevitable in deliberative settings especially where men have always held a privileged position in most societies (Siu, 2017). Women tend to find themselves constantly interrupted, speak for shorter times compared to men and are often ignored when they make submissions. Deliberation could as it is be assumed to favour those with a better standing socially and vocally. The fact that parliament and public deliberations were initially male dominated, they favoured male style of speech such as assertion and confrontational speech and were less accommodative towards exploratory speech usually associated with women. According to the difference critique, deliberative spaces tend to be biased towards characteristics of dominant groups which could be men as for the case of this study. The system excludes minorities such as women based on rationality and non-emotive discourse in the favour of the fact that men and women communicate differently. This political exclusion is a mirror of everyday life situations where

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

131

women are treated unfairly and as unequal in everyday encounters hence its replication in parliamentary spaces (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008). Moreover, the equality concern of deliberative democracy further advocates for equal access to the floor, based on the premise that everyone’s perspectives are given due attention and consideration. However, history has shown that in the eighteenth century, public deliberation excluded women because it recognized a style of speech that is usually associated with men thus labelling women as incapable of engaging in public deliberation. Therefore, merely including women into the deliberative arena didn’t solve the gender bias towards women’s political leadership and participation (Polletta & Chen, 2013). Thus, for minority groups like women facing a number of inequality hurdles such as resource ownership, this demystifies the equality necessity for quality deliberation even when there are favourable conditions that grant access to the floor of parliament (Mendelberg, 2013). Consequently, the feminization of public deliberative spaces ensures that women too are active and not just passive actors. In public deliberations, men tend to speak more often than women, for longer times and assertively interrupt other participants (Polletta & Chen, 2013). Childs (2004) too acknowledged that the deliberative style of both women and men were indeed different. In Child’s study in the British House of Commons, participants noted that women and men acted the way they did during deliberations because of the gendered nature of masculine and feminine gender roles in society. For generations, women were taught to speak less and listen carefully to what people around them said, but in deliberative environments, there was need to break away from this norm or else women politicians would run a risk of passivity during participation. A line needs to be drawn between listening carefully and silence and the emotive aspect commonly associated with women too requires moderate application (Boboc-Cojocaru, 2011). It is however important to note that emotions cannot be necessarily disassociated from deliberations because solutions in line with the common good element of deliberative politics require an emotional ability to identify what others want while, asking questions in a genuine, non-­ threatening but curious way. Thus, even when men and women do deliberate differently, the feminized style of deliberation has significant benefits and as concluded from Gilligan (1977), women tend to focus on goodness and non-violence and are given more to self-sacrifice for the good of others, a valuable aspect in deliberation. Even then women’s substantive representation depends on many factors that range from institutional context, the gender dynamics of the debate and individual equality of participants as mentioned earlier. A study by Chaney (2006) of the UK’s Devolution Programme showed that women tended to engage more in debates on women’s issues and equality topics compared to men. Women’s engagement was usually motivated by their life experiences which drove their passion towards pro-­ women policy issues. Hence the need for women to represent women (Mansbridge, 1999). However, in a functional democracy all citizens need to be represented proportionally. The equal representation of voices would ensure equality and in a plurality of opinions speech acts as a main instrument for reaching decisions that both

132

H. Muzee

link and separate citizens but while ensuring congruence towards a common cause (Urbinati, 2000). Voice requires that one is able to make their interests and grievances known, are able to make choices and decisions based on available information and can freely and confidently engage in lobbying and protestations (Bulgaria, 2008; Domingo et al., 2015; O’Neil et al., 2007). Hence, freedom of expression, speech and opinions are integral to a representative government (Mill, 1861). It is thus based on this background, that this chapter sought to examine the deliberative behaviour of Uganda Women parliamentarians.

Methodology This study utilized a qualitative research design to study the voices of Ugandan women parliamentarians during deliberations in parliament. The choice of research design was appropriate to describe the experiences of long-serving women and men parliamentarians who had served for a minimum of 10 years in the Ugandan parliament for approximately two eras of parliament. This chapter draws from a study that involved the documentary analysis of two debate transcripts of Uganda’s domestic violence bill 2010 and children’s [amendment] bill 2015. The recurring voices of women and men in the transcripts were interviewed and are thus represented in the succeeding section. Through the interviews, I hoped to find explanation for the observed women’s deliberative behaviour during the proceedings, to pick up on the challenges they faced.

Women’s Voices and Deliberation in the Uganda Parliament By voice in this study, I referred to women’s parliamentarians’ influence over policymaking, and their active participation during deliberations in the parliament. The participants attributed their voices during deliberation to the presence of a woman speaker. Besides the support of female speaker, the participants argued that the presence of favourable laws, and regulations in parliament such as those providing for women leadership in committees were instrumental in creating space for women’s voices during deliberation. Findings from Kanter's (1977) Men and Women of the Corporation showed that the numerical composition of a group did affect the behaviour of individuals. Situations where a group was found in minority for instance women contributed to their tokenism, and hence susceptible to stereotyping. Thus solving women’s under-representation without feminizing the legislature is futile, given that women’s political exclusion is exacerbated by male dominance in these political institutions (Childs & Lovenduski, 2012). Representation being part of the deliberative process enhances the voicing of a group’s interests during deliberation (Mansbridge, 1999). Undoubtedly, the presence of female politicians serves as a motivation to other women to become

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

133

politically active themselves (Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007). Quality deliberations are too judged based on their structure, processes, and outcomes, where structure refers to the representativeness. The principle of representativeness requires that the deliberative event is reflective of sections of the population that would be affected by the policy issue under consideration. It is portrayed either through demographic characteristics or participant characteristics such as political ideology, religious beliefs, etc.. Thus, inappropriate, and unfair representation would have a negative impact on the deliberative process. Structure also includes access to relevant information and time all needed to enhance voice in deliberative spaces (Goold et al., 2012). Similarly, a comparative study in the Switzerland and Germany Chambers showed that a high share of women in committees and plenary sessions led to a high level of respect (Tschentsher et al., 2009). The participants also noted that they partake in “continuous capacity building programs that continuously expose women…. they move to other countries and these learning experiences encourage them and has improved participation of women in decision-making in parliament”. In addition, the participants emphasised they needed to make sure they studied parliamentary procedure to fit in the role. “Most importantly make sure you read, research so that when you stand on the floor of parliament, you have researched information…listen because you must make interventions…. if you, don’t you may find that you may avoid something that would adversely affect people”. Moreover, the participants too noted lack of competence with formal debate procedures as significant impediment to women’s voices during deliberations. The participants noted that “Parliamentary environment is intimidating in itself…. there are many unfamiliar formal procedures which can intimidate you a bit and affect your performance but later people in the 2nd and 3rd year pick up….it takes time to learn the procedures and to be able to speak”. Successful participation in parliament deliberation required significant comprehension of the legislative functions, norms and rules of the game (both the written and unwritten) codes of legislative procedure (Ballington & Karam, 2005). Waylen (2015) acknowledged how informal rules, norms, and practices in legislatures such as the habit of catching the speaker’s eye for one to speak required aggressiveness and confidence. Thus, if one was less aggressive and confidence, the more likely the chance that they would be left out of a debate. These customs tend to act against women’s political participation and effectiveness, and for women to enhance their voice, they need to attain legislative power akin to clearly understanding the functions of the legislature and learning the rules of the game (Dysart, 1994; Markham, 2012). Regarding the apparent silence of women parliamentarians during deliberations, participants attributed participation to “experience and field of interest…. If I am interested in a bill, but I have not got a lot of information I can’t talk”. Even in pro-­ women bills, a participant attributed women’s silence “to the level of exposure to women issues and interest it generates…. those interested in women issues find it easy to push a women’s agenda; others do not see the relevance”. A study in the UK by Chaney (2006) showed that women tended to engage more in debates on women issues and equality topics compare to men. Concerning minimal information, the

134

H. Muzee

participant noted that academic excellence was not a yardstick for women’s ascension to political office. “So many people who are brought in have not been exposed to some of the things (Parliamentary debate procedures) and they take time to grasp them and by the time they do their term is over”. Although the participants claimed that speaking during plenary should not be the measure of someone’s productivity, since more than often the bill is discussed during the committee session and then during the plenary the chairperson speaks on behalf of the committee. Even then, the participants note that the silence of women in parliament is a gender issue. “There are male Members of Parliament (MPs) who do not speak, and they are the majority…. Because we are still grappling with the stereotype, when a woman keeps quiet it makes the loudest noise”. The numerical deficiency was also highlighted when participants noted that while men too did not always participate during deliberations, the fact that “women are few and when…the speaker is picking people to talk she may pick one woman and 10 men” revealed the glaring discrepancy. While the phenomenon of numbers is real for women, remedy hardly lies in an increase in numbers. Numbers are not synonymous with policy impact and thus represent more of a change in the environment. The characteristics of the participants would be of more significance. For instance, presence of a critical mass of feminists in addition to an increase in numbers in a majority rule system could have a substantial impact on the voices of women in parliament (Inglehart et al., 2004; Mendelberg, 2013; Mendelberg et al., 2014; Paxton et al., 2007; Refki et al., 2014; Studlar & McAllister, 2001). Thus, not any kind of woman would get the job done regarding pro-women legislations and policy outcomes (Vetten, 2016). It is then more important to have critical individuals too rather than critical mass. This is based on the argument that a “few good women” that are capable, and knowledgeable of the functioning of government are essential to women’s voices during deliberations in parliament (Celis, 2008). Therefore, parity in itself is not the answer, but a large number of women motivated to represent women’s interests, that way they would be able to overcome tokenism, form interactive and strategic partnerships within and outside the legislature to make their case stronger and heard (Ballington & Karam, 2005; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2014). Nevertheless, a higher number of women representation increases the likelihood of unity among women which in turn promotes women-friendly policy change (Childs & Krook, 2008). A study of board representation by Schwartz-Ziv (2015) showed that a board with at least three directors of each gender was 79% more active compared to those boards with a deficit in representation. The surge in performance is explained by the fact that women directors found it easy to be more active where there was a presence of critical mass of three or more women in attendance. Thus, affirming the fact that the minority gender or group may feel more comfortable expressing opinions if enough of the minority is present. The numerical deficiency of women in deliberative structures has a bearing on their status and voice. There is an apparent expectation that as the gender gap in deliberative settings decreases, the voices of women during deliberation are enhanced. Women are

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

135

thus evidently more confident in feminized settings (Karpowitz et  al., 2012; Schwartz-Ziv, 2015). However, it is important to ensure a fit of rules to numbers to create the necessary environment that supports conversational engagement that marginalized voices require. Thus, successful deliberation does not only depend on the representative aspect but also on the majority and minority rule concept in legislative assemblies. Studies by Mendelberg (2013) and Mendelberg et al. (2014) noted that “women are much less disadvantaged in groups that decide with majority rule and contain a vast majority of women as well as in groups that decide unanimously and contain a small proportion of women”. These environments encourage fluid interaction and unanimity ensures inclusivity and collaboration in decision-making whereas majority rule focuses on the power of numbers and consequently minority groups such as women are disadvantaged. The gender composition therefore has a bearing on women’s voices during deliberation in parliament (Karpowitz et  al., 2012; Mendelberg et al., 2014). By considering gender composition concerning women, the more women, then the more the likelihood for a feminized style of politics with a kinder and gentler style of debating. This makes it plausible to conclude that the higher the share of female politicians the more pleasant and less adversarial the deliberative sessions (Grunenfelder & Bachtiger, 2007). The participants also underscored the importance of counselling and mentorship of newcomers to improve their deliberative capacity. A participant argued that during “the first year, you learn from the old, how to debate. Unfortunately, those who should learn are never in parliament to learn because as soon as they are elected, they are thinking of the next election”. Instead of staying in parliament to “listen, consult from senior members about where to get information, look for a topic on the order paper, study it and decide to debate on it”. They claimed that the MPs were preoccupied with their constituency rather than their legislative duties. Additionally, women did need more affirmation in a supportive environment. This required that deliberators formed a discursive friendship that consequently shaped the members’ substantive representation during decision-making. Besides, supportive communication such as listening to another’s submission helped build the confidence of the speaker (Mendelberg et al., 2014). While the new entrants are timid, the participants also acknowledged the fact that parliament was a male-dominated space and women tended to “have an inferiority complex”. Notably so, the participants underscored the double burden that women face. It was difficult to balance between the private space (home and domestic life) and legislative spaces, and in most cases the home front won over parliament. Thus, if “she doesn’t want to look a fool, she keeps quiet”. Women’s double burden faced in both the private and public spaces reinforced by patriarchy and stereotypical gender norms, limited the time women commit to political engagements. Hence the need for reform and implementation of policies that enhance women’s voices (Markham, 2013).

136

H. Muzee

Conclusion As women therefore begin participating in parliament and other public deliberative spaces, they continuously grapple with patriarchal and gender stereotypes that seek to marginalize their voices during deliberations. Right from the style of speech normally characterised with elements such as storytelling, that are frowned on in deliberative spaces, to their minority status numerically, women are therefore torn between maintaining their femininity during deliberative sessions and adopting masculine forms of speech. The latter which more than often works to their detriment. Nevertheless, the women parliamentarians in Uganda, while maintaining legitimacy of their positions have ensured that parliament is not only feminized by maintaining and providing for the continued presence of women leadership of committees but encouraged one another to participate and partake in capacity-building activities, such as training in debate skills, public speech, reading and research and mentorship of new entrants into the legislature. Even then, women’s double burden of professional and domestic duties is a notable factor that impends women’s voices during deliberations in parliament. While it is important that concessions are made to accommodate and enhance women’s voices, a transformation of the gender norms of androcentric institutions such as parliament is essential as depicted in the Ugandan parliament case. In accordance with deliberative democracy, public deliberative spaces such as parliament should not only be accommodative but accepting of the different styles of speech for as long as the decision-making process, ensures free public reasoning among equals (upholding the principle of equality), mutual respect for all participants, and common good outcomes.

References Ahikire, J. (2004). Towards women’s effective participation in electoral processes: A review of the Ugandan experience. Feminist Africa, 3. Ballington, J., & Karam, A. (2005). Women in parliament: Beyond numbers. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Bhalotra, S., Clots-Figueras, I., & Iyer, L. (2015). Path-breakers? Women’s electoral success and future political participation. Boboc-Cojocaru, A. (2011). Contribution of feminism to the deliberative democracy concept of evolution. Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines, 1. Bohman, J., & Rehg, W. (1997). Deliberative democracy: Essays on reason and politics. MIT Press. Brody, A. (2009). Gender and governance: Overview report (pp. 1–82). Bulgaria, S. (2008). Accountability and voice for service delivery at the local level (UNDP regional training event developing capacities for accountability and voice) (pp. 1–27). United Nations Development Programme and IDL Group. Castilejo, C. (2009). Women’s political participation and influence in Sierra Leone (pp. 1–32). FRIDE. Celis, K. (2008). Substantive representation of women (and improving it) what it and should it be about? American Political Science Association, 1–24.

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

137

Chaney, P. (2006). Critical mass, deliberation, and the substantive representation of women: Evidence from the UK’s devolution Programme. Political Studies, 54(4), 691–714. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-­9248.2006.00633.x Childs, S. (2004). A feminised style of politics? Women MPS in the house of commons. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, 3–19. http://www.web.pdx.edu/~mev/pdf/ Childs.pdf Childs, S., & Krook, M.  L. (2008). Critical mass theory and women’s political representation. Political Studies, 56, 725–736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-­9248.2007.00712.x Childs, S., & Lovenduski, J. (2012). Political representation. In The Oxford handbook of gender and politics (pp. 1–26). Oxford University Press. Cornwall, A., & Goetz, A.  M. (2005). Democratizing democracy: Feminist perspectives. Democratization, 12(5), 783–800. Domingo, P., Holmes, R., O’Neil, T., Jones, N., Bird, K., & Larson, A. (2015). Women’s voice and leadership in decision-making assessing the evidence. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Dysart, S. (1994, Autumn). Barriers to Women’s participation in parliament (pp. 12–14). Canadian Parliamentary Review. Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women’s conceptions of self and of morality. Harvard Educational Review, 47(4), 481–517. http://sfonline.barnard.edu/sfxxx/documents/gilligan.pdf Goold, S. D., Neblo, M. A., Kim, S. Y. H., Vries, R. D., Rowe, G., & Muhlberger, P. (2012). What is good public deliberation. Hasting Center, 24–26. https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.29 Grunenfelder, R., & Bachtiger, A. (2007). Gendered deliberation? How men and women deliberate in legislatures. Advanced Empirical Study of Deliberation, 1–27. Harbermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. MIT Press. Hickerson, A., & Gastil, J. (2008). Assessing the difference critique of deliberation: Gender, emotion, and the jury experience. Communication Theory, 18, 281–303. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-­2885.2008.00323.x Inglehart, R., Norris, P., & Welzel, C. (2004). Gender equality and democracy. IPU. (2021). Uganda Parliament. Inter-Parliamentary Union. Kadaga, A.  R. (2013). Women’s political leadership in East Africa with specific reference to Uganda. Commonwealth Secretariat. Kanter, R. M. (1977). Men and women of the corporation (1993rd ed.). Basic Books. Karpowitz, C. F., & Mendelberg, T. (2014). The silent sex: Gender, deliberation, and institutions. Princeton University Press. Karpowitz, C. F., Mendelberg, T., & Shaker, L. (2012). Gender inequality in deliberative participation. American Political Science Review, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000329 Manin, B. (2005). Deliberation: Why we should focus on debate rather than discussion. 1–23. Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes”. The Journal of Politics, 61(3), 628–657. Markham, S. (2012). Strengthening women’s roles in parliament. Parliamentary Affairs, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss024 Markham, S. (2013). Women as agents of change: Having voice in society and influencing policy (No. 5; Women’s voice, agency and participation research series) (pp. 1–20). World Bank Institute. Mendelberg, T. (2013). Political deliberation. In Oxford handbook of political psychology (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Mendelberg, T., Karpowitz, C.  F., & Oliphant, J.  B. (2014). Gender inequality in deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of interaction. Perspectives on Politics, 12(1), 1–27. https://doi. org/10.1017/S1537592713003691 Mill, J. S. (1861). Considerations on representative government. Parker, Son and Boum. Mushemeza, E. D. (2009). Contribution of women in influencing legislation and policy formulation in Uganda (1995–2005). Africa Development, XXXIV(3 & 4), 167–206.

138

H. Muzee

Musisi, N.  B. (1992). Colonial and missionary education: Women and domesticity in Uganda, 1900–1945. In African encounters with domesticity. Rutgers University Press.. Muzee, H., & Endeley, J. B. M. É. (2019). “Sister Robert, sister John”: Enhancing women’s voices and gendered membership of the Uganda Women Parliamentary Association. Agenda, 33(2), 22–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2019.1615781 O’Neil, T., Foresti, M., & Hudson, A. (2007). Evaluation of citizen’s voice and accountability: Review of the Literature & Donor Approaches Report (pp. 1–78). Paxton, P., Kunovich, S., & Hughes, M. M. (2007). Gender in politics. Polletta, F., & Chen, P. C. B. (2013). Gender and public talk: Accounting for WOMEN’S variable participation in the public sphere. Sociological Theory, 31(4), 291–317. https://doi. org/10.1177/0735275113515172 Refki, D., Abbas, D., Avic, B., Kim, E., Berger, L., Faerman, S., & Akullo, E. (2014). Mapping the substantive representation of women in the Ugandan parliament (pp. 1–32). Center for Women in government and civil society, Rockeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University of Albany, State University of New York, Nkumba University. Rosenberg, S. W. (2007). Rethinking the limits of democratic deliberation: The limits and potential of citizen participation. Polity, 39(3), 335–360. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300073 Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2015). Gender and board activeness: The role of a critical mass. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1–55. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1868033 Simpson, R., & Lewis, P. (2007). Voice, visibility, and the gendering of organisations. Palgrave Macmillan. Siu, A. (2017). Deliberation and the challenge of inequality. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 146(3), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_ Steiner, J., Bachtiger, A., Sporndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. (2004). Deliberative politics in action: Analysing parliamentary discourse. Cambridge University Press. Stromer-Galley, J. (2007). Measuring Deliberation’s content: A coding scheme. Journal of Public Deliberation, 3(1), 1–37. http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol3/iss1/art12 Studlar, D.  T., & McAllister, I. (2001). Does a critical mass exist? A comparative analysis of Women’s legislative representation 1949–1997. American Political Science Association. Tamale, S. (1999). When hens begin to crow: Gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda. Westview Press. Tong, R. (1989). Liberal Feminism. In Feminist thought: A comprehensive introduction (pp. 11–38). Westview Press. Tripp, A. M. (2000). Women & politics in Uganda. The University of Wisconsin Press. Tschentsher, A., Bachtiger, A., Steiner, J., & Steenbergen, M. (2009). Deliberation in parliament: Research objectives and preliminary results of the Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Deliberation Studies (BIDS). Legisprudence “Legislation and Argumentation”. Tutui, V. (2015). Theoretical models of deliberative democracy: A critical analysis. Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, 13(2), 179–205. UBOS. (2017). Women and men in Uganda facts and figures 2016 (p.  94). Uganda Bureau of Statistics. https://www.ubos.org/wp-­content/uploads/publications/06_2018women_and__ men_in_uganda_FF2016.pdf Urbinati, N. (2000). Representation as advocacy: A study of democratic deliberation. Political Theory, 28(6), 758–786. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591700028006003 Vetten, L. (2016). Political representation makes women’s voices heard? Lessons from South Africa. Feminist Dialogue Series. Waylen, G. (2015). Gender, institutions, and the quality of democracy: Engendering the “Crisis of Democracy”. Wolbrecht, C., & Campbell, D. E. (2007). Leading by example: Female members of parliament as political role models. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 921–939.

9  “Speak to be Heard”: Women and Deliberative Democracy in the Ugandan Parliament

139

Hannah Muzee is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa. She holds a Ph.D. in Governance and Regional Integration from the Pan African University, Institute of Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences, and the University of Yaoundé II Soa Cameroon, Hannah’s research focuses on deepening and exploring women participation in the public sphere and her research interests lie in Gender, Deliberative Democracy, Feminism, Human Resource Management, social media, Governance and Politics.  

Part II

Electoral Democracy in Africa

Chapter 10

Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer Missions’ Agency in Determining the Credibility of Zimbabwe’s Elections Mziwandile Ndlovu

Abstract  Election observation is one practice that is now a common feature in the electoral democracy realm of Africa, and it commenced with Zimbabwe’s 1980 independence elections. Two decades later, Zimbabwe gained notoriety for contested election outcomes manifesting in negative verdicts by election observer missions of all classes. At the forefront of these verdicts were mostly western missions and a perception also formed that African missions were lenient towards Zimbabwe and self-censored themselves to issue positive verdicts. Western missions came to be viewed as norm entrepreneurs while African missions are viewed as norm takers. The negative verdicts were entwined with the dramatic collapse of diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and western powers resulting in the later imposing sanctions on the former. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, this chapter examines the extent to which the practice of election observation can be regarded as an African practice. Drawing on the conventional constructivist logic contrasted against Acharya as well as Finnemore and Sikkink’s (2013, 1998) Norm Diffusion model logic, the chapter sets out to quantify the contribution that Africa has made to election observation while also determining the willingness of African governments to subject themselves to the practice. The chapter draws from registered voters, election observers, civil society, and legislators. The findings reveal that while it is relatively true that Africa makes little contribution to election observation and does it reluctantly to access aid and investment, it has also improved dramatically in its technical prowess.

M. Ndlovu (*) African Institute for Development Policy, Lilongwe, Malawi © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_10

143

144

M. Ndlovu

Introduction “By early 21st Century more people in more countries lived under political arrangements with some claim to the label ‘democracy’ than ever before in human history” (Haerpfer et  al., 2009). Elections became widespread as a legitimate means of establishing governments alongside other practices to strengthen electoral democracy. Ndlovu (2020) posits that election observation is one practice that was initiated to ensure that various local and external players participate in building confidence in national elections by way of pronouncing on their credibility. By 2005, the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (DOP) were enunciated to provide guidelines for the growing international practice. Inevitably, the democratic wave visited the shores of Africa too. “Competitive multi-party elections have become an established norm in African politics. Almost every African President now finds it necessary to wrap themselves in the legitimating mantle of elections” (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Because of the western and colonial origins of the culture of democracy, there has been debate about the extent to which it is an African practice or whether there is need for Africa to either originate its own norms or transform existing norms to be better suited to its circumstances. Cheeseman and Sishuwa (2021) say that leaders such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere argued that multiparty competition was “un-­ African”, and that the one-party state was a more suitable embodiment of traditional African values of community and consensus. Likewise, election observation became the subject of similar debate. According to Matlosa (2002), election monitoring and observation are tools to entrench both western hegemony in African states and interference in their internal affairs. Over the years, an impression arose in Africa about a distinction between the work of election observer missions from North America and Europe and missions from Africa when observing the elections of African countries. The impression is that Western missions are more likely to issue negative verdicts on African elections when the situation demands it than African missions that are reluctant to do the same and would rather go out of their way to issue a positive verdict even where elections are hardly credible. The impression goes on to insinuate that the western missions produce a better quality of work than African missions. Matyszak (2017) contends that Southern Africa Development Community’s Election Observer Mission (SEOM) has usually adopted a ghastly approach in their work regarding Zimbabwean elections. The impression has raised more questions such as how voluntarily African countries submit themselves to election observation, how much African countries contribute to the practice, if and why African countries are more eager to secure positive verdicts from western missions as well as the effect that the practise has on the sovereignty of African countries. Zimbabwe is an ideal country for these pertinent questions to be put to the test because of how the country has and continues to experience all the phenomena discussed above. It was in Zimbabwe that election observation began to be an international norm. Chan (2019) posits that the first large-scale election observation was of

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

145

Zimbabwe’s 1980 independence elections. It is after this success that international election observer missions (EOMs) like the Commonwealth replicated the model in Uganda later in the same year and to the rest of the continent thereafter. Two decades later, Zimbabwe became the international epitome of incredible elections. According to the Zimbabwe International Election Observer Mission (ZIEOM, 2018) jointly convened by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the United State of America (USA), the governing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front retained political muscle through fundamentally flawed elections in 2000, 2002, 2008, and 2013. Hove and Harris (2015) use tough language in characterizing some of Zimbabwe’s polls as “sham elections such as the 2008 and 2013 with contested election results”. All Zimbabwean elections after 2000, including the last poll in 2018, are contested. The passing of negative verdicts on the 2000 Parliamentary and 2002 Presidential elections by western missions immediately triggered the souring of relations between their countries and Zimbabwe leading to the European Union (EU) and the USA imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. Election observation was intrinsically linked to the decisions to impose of sanctions. SAIIA, (2002) posits that in the 2000 Presidential election delays and difficulties over observer accreditation disrupted the deployment of observers. The UN coordination secretariat withdrew in protest after the government reversed its decision to invite them to coordinate all international observer missions. A subsequent invitation for the UN to observe the election was turned down. Furthermore, several observer missions, including those from NDI, IRI and the International Commission for Justice and Peace, were refused accreditation. During the same period, the EU observer mission decided to withdraw its whole team after its head Mr. Peter Schori was denied accreditation and ordered to leave Zimbabwe. It is at this point that the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. “On 18 February 2002, EU officials announced ‘smart’ sanctions and the withdrawal of all their observers, including those from countries like France, Spain and Italy who had already been registered. The sanctions were targeted against the leadership of ZANU–PF and include a travel ban, assets freeze and a ban on arms sales” (SAIIA, 2002). The Americans had already imposed their own sanctions the previous year. Their sanctions included trade and travel restrictions on those on the sanctions list as well as a suspension of non-humanitarian government-to-government assistance. Furthermore, the US Congress crafted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which restricts US debt relief on Zimbabwe and compels US institutions to vote against Zimbabwe getting any new lending from international financial institutions. At the time of conducting the study, there were 143 Zimbabwean individuals and companies on the US sanctions list. As a result of this fallout, after the 2002 Presidential election, the Zimbabwean government stopped inviting western observers to its elections until Mugabe’s successor Emmerson Mnangagwa reversed the policy in 2018. Throughout the campaign period of the 2002 Presidential election, neo-­ colonialism (real or perceived) seemed to manifest in some way or the other. Then-­ President Robert Mugabe derided the opposition Movement for Democratic Change

146

M. Ndlovu

(MDC) candidate Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai as a stooge of the British government and invited the nation to rise against British colonialism. It is also important to note that at the time, according to the Judicial Observation Mission (2002), British Prime Minister Tony Blair, at a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) publicly implored the Commonwealth countries to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe and called upon the Zimbabwean electorate to support Tsvangirai at the polls. There is also a view that powerful western countries, in their role as global democracy promoters, use election observation as a mechanism to select countries that are ‘democratizing’ well and reward them with economic benefits. Spears (2007) illustrates this point well by emphasizing that democracy promoters distribute rewards for democratic polls and impose sanctions on governments that are not believed to be democratizing. He then describes a variety of costs that can be imposed on leaders or regimes who are caught stealing elections before citing Zimbabwe as a prime example. “Following the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe, which were strongly criticized by international observers, President Mugabe faced international economic sanctions, reductions in foreign assistance and trade, expulsion from the Commonwealth, and criticism from countries around the world for stealing the election and attempting to muzzle foreign and domestic media” (Spears, 2007). Based on this background, relying on a mixed methods research design, this chapter examines the extent to which the practice of election observation can be regarded as an African practice. The chapter, using Zimbabwe as a case study, also quantifies the contribution that African actors have made to the practice. In addition, the chapter also explores the extent to which African countries voluntarily subject themselves to election observation together with other motivating factors discussed together with relevant phenomena like neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism as well as the impact that election observation has on the sovereignty of African countries. The chapter uses the responses of 385 questionnaire respondents, selected using stratified random sampling among registered voters in five selected provinces and 15 purposively chosen key informants from election observers, civil society, and legislators. Content analysis was also used to review reports of EOMs from throughout the period under review. Most importantly, the chapter addresses these questions drawing on the conventional constructivist logic contrasted against Acharya as well as Finnemore and Sikkink’s (2013, 1998) Norm Diffusion model logic. In brief, with regard to international norms, the constructivist approach identifies norm entrepreneurs (observers) who originate and promote norms and well as norm takers (the observed) who simply take the norms as they are and internalize them. Acharya, Finnemore and Sikkink, on the other hand, apportion some agency to the norm takers (the observed) and argue that they do not just internalize norms as they are but rather play an active role in customizing them to their own peculiar circumstances before internalization. The chapter’s theoretical review also includes Hyde’s (2011) Motivated Signaling theory which argues that, far from being committed to genuine democracy, many African countries subject themselves to election observation as a signal to improve their chances of getting access to democracy-contingent benefits such as aid and

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

147

investment from western democracy promoters as a reward for ‘democratizing’. The chapter covers the period from 2000 to present as it is the period during which Zimbabwean elections have been contested.

A Theoretical Review of the Literature As briefly touched on in the background, there has been steady criticism of democracy building up over the years in Africa for various reasons. One of the criticisms is a feeling that western countries have paternalistic attitude to Africa and the Global South with regard to how to practice democracy. As Uday Mehta (2018) argues, the language of colonial rule was often one of “presumed infantilism”, in which Africans were viewed as children who needed schooling and civilizing before they could assume political rights and civil liberties. When the British government finally produced a report on introducing self-rule in 1960, after years of prevaricating, it was entitled “Democracy in backward countries”. A lot of the sceptics of democracy believe that this situation has not changed. Fisher and Anderson (2015) say that another realization is that international support for democratization has been inconsistent, and has, at times, been undermined by the provision of military and anti-terror support for authoritarian leaders. Another frustration echoed by Ake (1993) is that African democracy appears to follow the line of the least resistance to conventional Western liberalism, and it will only probably achieve the democracy of alienation. Imoedemhe (2015) asserts that the growing boldness of African governments and intellectuals is a positive development, especially in the wake of continuous global economic and knowledge inequalities, as well as the lack of consistency, and mostly outright duplicity, of Western states, which posture as being committed to democracy but often sacrifice it for other intentions. Bratton and Bhoojedhur (2019) concur and add that apparent disillusion with poor quality elections and dwindling satisfaction with democracy as it is playing out in practice have given rise to a marked decline in support for selecting leaders through elections since 2015. Despite the growing disenchantment with democracy, some voices believe that democracy is still the governance system of choice. Willis et al. (2018) argue that the fact that key democratic institutions, such as competitive elections, have become deeply embedded in African political practice is evidence of efficacy. Some scholars insist that democracy has been domesticated in Africa. They insist that despite the checkered progress of multiparty politics on the continent, and the efforts of some leaders to paint it as a foreign concept, democracy has become a key cornerstone for ordinary citizens and governments alike and is critical to the exercise of legitimate authority. “A range of more historical and anthropological studies have demonstrated how multiparty elections have been ‘domesticated’ and embedded within everyday political practices” (Cheeseman et al., 2020:173). They add that the strong support demonstrated for democracy as a system of government does not mean that African societies have uncritically swallowed a “Western” mindset. They even make

148

M. Ndlovu

the bolder emphasis that the notion that democracy has been imposed by external forces is in part a creation of authoritarian African leaders designed to make it easier for them to retain political control. In the maze of these divergent views about the ‘Africanness’ of democracy, there are equally distinct calls for peculiar strands of democracy for Africa to emerge. Karekwaivanane (2015) posits that by insisting on the value of “traditional” forms of authority and decision-making, Nyerere’s quest for a form of African governance, much like his quest for a form of African socialism, demonstrated a broader concern that colonial political and economic institutions should be Africanized. Cheeseman and Sishuwa (2021), drawing on survey data from across Africa, posit that most African societies favour a form of what they term “consensual democracy”, which is an approach to government that combines a strong commitment to multiparty elections and accountability with a concern for unity and stability. They also add that African societies prioritize “traditional” values and “survival”. On this basis, Ronald Inglehart (2006) suggests that self-expression norms and values are driven by economic development, with the value systems of affluent nations differing significantly from those of African countries. Cheeseman and Sishuwa (2021) also add that African communities are reluctant to trade off freedom for security and are more “post-materialist” where democracy is concerned than their level of socio-economic development would suggest. They posit that African countries’ desire to maintain unity manifests itself in a strong preference for a less confrontational political discourse, especially when it comes to the resolution of conflicts. The pair also emphasizes that this attribute feeds neatly into their concept of consensual democracy discussed earlier. The consensual form of politics is one in which political parties put aside their differences and work for the common good. This is predominantly because most people believe that competition between political parties often leads to violent conflict. Before proceeding to discuss how the above contestations extend to election observation, it is important to define and understand what the practice seeks to achieve in the first place. Pereira (2006) says that election observation belongs to a set of development policy initiatives thought to facilitate good governance and democratic institutions in states struggling with democracy. According to IDEA (2000) election observation is the purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process, and the making of informed judgments on the conduct of such a process based on the information collected, by persons who are not authorized to intervene in the process, and whose involvement in the mediation or technical assistance activities should not jeopardize observation responsibilities. Chigudu (2015) adds that election observation revolves around an obligation-based approach which emphasizes that a state has an obligation towards the international community to uphold its citizens’ political and civil rights to elect their governments and public representatives through a free and fair process. In practice, however, election observation is far more controversial than its definitions suggest. Before identifying and discussing issues of contestation regarding the work of EOMs in Zimbabwe, it is ideal to outline the relevant context during and after the 2000 and 2002 elections. On 20 June 2000, a press release was issued

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

149

stating that no further foreign observers would be accredited by government, insinuating that only a few hundred already accredited EU and Commonwealth observers would be allowed to do their work. However, as Dorman (2005) narrates, after much conflicting information, a collective of churches and the Congress of South Africa Trades Unions (COSATU) delegations were accredited on the eve of the plebiscite, but other missions such as NDI, IRI and Oxfam Canada were blacklisted. Dorman (2005) adds that a collective of observers financially supported by the UK were barred from entering the country and that on 7 June the government gazetted new regulations mandating the Elections Directorate to charge punitive fees to foreign observer missions (US$100) while locals paid a nominal fee. The pattern described above only continued to deteriorate and climaxed dramatically ahead of the 2002 Presidential poll. In January, as Dorman (2005) recalls, Mugabe announced that only the AU, SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (Comesa); the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the Commonwealth, excluding the United Kingdom; the joint ACP –EU delegation (excluding the UK) and led by the ACP; the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from the USA; individuals and countries to be invited in their own capacities include Nigeria. The ZCC/AACC/WCC church monitors were also allowed to observe, on condition that they excluded delegates from countries like Canada, USA, UK, Germany, Holland, Australia, and Denmark. A cursory look at these invitees shows an apparent desire to exclude the critical western nations. On the contentious issues of the work of election observers in Zimbabwe, the first element to consider is the timing of deploying the missions itself which is very interesting. Although the Commonwealth delegation to Zimbabwe’s 1980 elections is considered the first observer mission in Africa, giving Zimbabwe the longest history of election observation in Africa, observation did not re-occur until the violence towards white farmers began in 2000. This contributed, according to Dorman (2005), to the perception within Zimbabwe, and elsewhere in Africa, that international attention on Zimbabwe’s polls in 2000 and 2002 had less to do with the levels of violence and electoral malfeasance and much more concerned with the Mugabe government’s violent attacks on white commercial farmers and rhetorical confrontations with European donors. It is notable, as Dorman (2005) argues, that the Zimbabwe elections of 2000 and 2002 generated substantial and unprecedented coverage in the international media and were debated extensively in the UK Parliament, the US Congress, and the European Parliament. The EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe immediately after the head of its election observing mission was expelled from the country, and the Commonwealth also swiftly took the unprecedented decision to suspend Zimbabwe’s membership based on human rights abuses, yet similar debates and actions did not occur in response to dubious elections elsewhere in the region. Zambia and Tanzania had elections during the same period (1995–2000) that were condemned by the same election observer missions, but they did not receive the amount of attention from the western media and legislatures that Zimbabwe received neither were they slapped with sanctions. The second issue of consideration, thus, is the consistency

150

M. Ndlovu

of the observer missions. “The flaw in the international community’s approach to Zimbabwe is that we have failed to take election monitoring with consistent seriousness. The failure to insist on genuinely free and fair elections [in Tanzania and Zambia in 1995 and 2000] or even to find them reported in the world’s press is a major reason why all the fulminating against Robert Mugabe’s tyranny carried little conviction” (Steel, 2002, 11). The third issue of consideration is the expectation that certain observer missions that the missions will behave in a particular manner. Leading to the 2002 Presidential election, as Dorman (2005) narrates, in a debate in parliament, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa justified the banning of western observer missions by stating: that government could not allow people who are our enemies to come onto Zimbabwean soil. He said that missions who came to Zimbabwe with the prejudicial view that ZANU PF would not win elections should not be accepted. The opposition MDC on the other hand, through a senior official Paul Themba Nyathi, were adamant that the elections would not be credible and portrayed the international community sending EOMs as their allies. “Conditions for a free and fair poll don’t exist. Zimbabwe’s friends in SADC, the Commonwealth and EU should now concern themselves with two matters only: In the event of Mugabe bulldozing his way to victory should such an outcome be recognized? In the event of the MDC winning under such difficult circumstances, what package of quick-impact assistance will they be able to offer the people of Zimbabwe?” (Dorman, 2005, 167). Mugabe himself was particularly acerbic: “Shut your dirty mouths. We do not want to hear that [elections would not be free and fair] from you. You are not our judges. You are not our keepers. Leave us alone” Dorman (2005, 155). Considering the above contestations, Van Kessel (2000) argues that observers sent by donors are increasingly perceived as judges while Donge (1998) insists that they are viewed as referees upon whose decisions future aid depends. Nevitte and Canton (1997) insist that the politics of who observes is added to the conundrum of what they observe. Local NGOs often deploy much bigger numbers of observers on the ground, and longer-term and better-informed missions. While western observers are assumed to be neutral, they frequently reflect presumptions and the foreign policies of their sending nations. The Mugabe administration’s portrayal of itself as under siege by imperialistic interests divided the domestic politics that inspired African nations to participate in the election observing. Despite their significant influence over decisions by donors, and impressions of African nations and leaders, EOMs have no clear standards or guidelines. Reeler (2021) weighs into the above assertions by insisting that international observation is as good as domestic observation. He agrees that too often African countries rely on the fact that the EU of the US will be there to observe the election and they will provide the smoking gun. Calingaert (2021) added that it is riskier to rely on international observer missions because, in some cases, they genuinely call it as they see it while in other cases, they are making political calculations and giving one side or the other more leeway than is merited. Closely linked to the argument above, Doran (2005) reasons that the observers’ reports of the 2002 elections have been widely interpreted as reflecting a

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

151

north-south divide but would be too simplistic an analysis as several observer missions from the Global South have sharply criticized elections in Zimbabwe. In 2000, local church and election observation missions roundly condemned the poll as neither free nor fair and that resulted in a ban on churches and NGOs conducting voter education in the lead-up to the next plebiscite. It is also instructive that Levy Mwanawasa, Zambia’s late president, denounced Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections as a “sham” as did the JOM (2002) and Olusegun Obasanjo as head of the AU mission in the 2008 harmonized election. In summary, Zimbabwe’s elections are the best example of how politicized election observation remains. It has long been accepted that western countries’ attitudes towards democracy in Africa have largely been contingent on their foreign policy objectives.

The Constructivism Theory and the Norm Diffusion Model The Constructivist theory logic is largely attributed to Jean Piaget and it developed after the realist and liberal internationalism theories. Constructivism is an approach that can assist to explain how the identities of countries and interests are transformed during an integration process. Christiansen et al. (1999) conclude that the identity formation of a state during regional integration can occur on two separate levels. The first one postulates that regional integration can produce a distinct regional identity, whereas the process is also capable of reconstructing national identities. The second one focuses on how social learning and socialization can influence interest formation. What this means is that the participation in the decision-­ making processes at the supranational level can affect the interest formation of individual states. This implies that state interests are fluid. They can go through reconstruction during the integration process, which in turn means that the elements that influence the regional integration process on the national level can change during the process. The constructivist logic challenges the conventional inward-looking perspective of sovereignty and argues that individual countries have little to lose from surrendering some of their sovereignty to a supranational entity. Countries that have started integration processes with traditional perspectives have observed that the integration process also alters the regional system and the country’s own interests so that it needs even much less autonomy than ever before. Christiansen et al. (1999) add that in this kind of scenario, states tend to be willing to trade their autonomy even much further if they do not give it all away, lest they lose their individual identity. Wendt (1999) further points out that this unique attitude towards autonomy does not translate to erosion of the state. He argues instead that by transferring sovereignty to a regional level, nations stand to strengthen their capacity to address challenges. The relevance of the constructivist approach to this chapter is that it is put to the test by examining the extent to which opening its elections to the scrutiny of EOMs has assisted Zimbabwe to address its legitimacy issues of the governing

152

M. Ndlovu

establishment during the study period. The chapter also uses this logic to conduct a comparison between the perceptions of legitimacy when western international election observation missions were allowed to observe elections in Zimbabwe and when they were not invited. The study utilized the constructivist logic to determine whether the work of the different types of EOMs has resulted in a positive perception about the credibility of an election among the Zimbabwean citizens. The Norm Diffusion model is also important to interrogate within the realm of the Constructivism logic and how it relates to the chapter. Kelley (2010) intimates that Norm diffusion offers a suitable approach to engage with the rhetoric and actions of election observation missions, particularly the EU. Norms are essentially married to the practice of election monitoring/observation, as it is an interesting example of how global norms change and how the global order evolves despite entrenched opposition. The constructivist school of thought, which defines norms as the ‘standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ has largely influenced the fierce debate on various mechanisms of norm diffusion. There have been contemporary efforts to propound a new model of norm diffusion that is divorced from constructivist logic which introduces the phenomena of norm entrepreneurs and norm takers. The model, propounded by Acharya (2004; 2011), insists that emphasizing agency allows for the adequate analysis of the mutual engagement between observers and the observed. The theoretical argument is further developed by highlighting the weaknesses of constructivist models and scrutinizing traditional norm diffusion mechanisms. Re-thinking this process, a new model championed by Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) process of norms socialization is presented. Through this model one can determine the extent to which norm diffusion has been successful and assess it during EU-EOM’s periods of deployment. To put it more clearly, while constructivism has been influential in accounting for the increasing acceptance of human rights-related norms, it fails to incorporate those who receive norms or norm takers. Acharya (2004) argues passionately that norm diffusion is not a top-down process and that norm takers tend to adopt norms in a way that fits their local settings. According to constructivists, norm diffusion only takes place on the global front, when a country adheres to a new norm and ultimately internalizes it. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) add that this occurs because of evolving circumstances, which then sets off a three-stage process, namely norm emergence, cascade, and internalization. Facilitating the emergence of norms, norm entrepreneurs form the basis of Finnemore and Sikkink’s argument (1998), as norms are actively constructed by agents having profound notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their communities. They highlight that during the ‘norm life cycle’, socialization leads to norms cascades in which a critical mass of norm conforming states are accumulated. Acharya as well as Finnemore and Sikkink’s positions seem to suggest that the observed, in most cases African countries, play an active role in the observation though there has been limited evidence to that effect. There is little a country whose election is being observed can contribute to a poll besides inviting the EOM and giving them as much access as possible to all the facets of the poll that they want to observe. The host country does not make any input to the methodologies used by the

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

153

EOM and has no way of influencing the verdict that would be made. In fact, there is a higher likelihood that most African countries feel that opening their elections to scrutiny is a necessary inconvenience to improve their chances of receiving aid, foreign direct investment, and lines of credit from the countries sending the missions. African countries probably feel the power inequalities of these observation arrangements given that African countries are rarely invited to observe any elections in the wealthy western countries probably because any contribution to their democratic processes by African countries is viewed as mediocre. In further criticism of the constructivist theory, Wendt (1999) acknowledges that core members of groups, as social identity theory has shown, almost always show favouritism towards one another when dealing with members of the out-group. The interpretation of this is that, in the initial stages, of a state-to-state interaction, egoistic self-help behaviour is likely to be exhibited. Though enormous effort is made to create the impression of an international community in multilateral organizations, the reality is that there is a core group of democracy promoters who exhibit a paternalistic attitude on these platforms. The chapter put the behaviour of these democracy promoters under the microscope, particularly how their election observer missions impacted on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty.

Theory of Motivated Signalling Hyde’s theory states that election observation is an initiative of democratizing governments as it says that, in response to increased rewards associated with recognition as a democratizing state, election observation was initiated as a signal of a government’s commitment to democratization. The theory emphasizes that particularly for leaders of regimes that were not already established democracies, democracy contingent benefits created an incentive for incumbent leaders to identify a credible signal that they were, in fact, holding democratic elections. An essential component of the chapter was to determine the extent to which these democracy contingent benefits affect the sovereignty of the African countries whose elections are being observed. The theory also states that democracy promoters establish the extent to which they value democracy in other states before the incumbent makes any decision. This appears to be inaccurate as the extent of democracy is already stated in various guidelines and standards crafted on the platforms of international and multi-lateral platforms such as the DOP rather than before any national election. The standards are also binding on all countries and there are no special standards for countries. There are strong opinions in Zimbabwean political circles that the decision of the new administration to lift the ban on western EOMs was deliberately made to access democracy-contingent benefits like foreign direct investment without any desire to be fully democratic and thus they intended to commit electoral malfeasance subtly. These beliefs were put to the test in the chapter.

154

M. Ndlovu

Democracy promoters have a keen preference for collaborating with and rewarding democratic governments. It is important to know the actual actors that are referred to as democracy promoters. Hyde (2011) says democracy promoters include powerful, industrialized Western states, foreign investors, international and multi-lateral organizations, and any other actors with an enthusiasm for democracy and with the capacity to dispense international benefits. Given that conditions need to be met to access these benefits, the impression that is given is that these actors are dispensing patronage rather than legitimate benefits that all states should be eligible for ordinarily. Hyde adds that democracy promoters make international benefits available, but they do not need to apply pressure for any state to adopt election observation. Rather, through simply valuing and rewarding countries that they believe to be democratic, they put up incentives for other incumbents to find a legitimate signal of their own countries’ democratic credentials. This practice of putting up inducements that developing countries cannot realistically resist appears to be a subtle way that the democracy promoters use to determine the governance practices of other countries indirectly.

African Countries’ Contribution to Election Observation There was a very dominant view from the questionnaire respondents (65%) that Africa makes an inconsequential contribution to election observation. 20% of the respondents expressed neutrality while 15% were in opposition of the assertion (Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1  African governments’ contribution to the practice of election observation. (Source: Author’s Computation from Fieldwork, 2019)

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

155

In synthesizing the qualitative data, a civil society key informant with considerable experience in international election observation credited African EOMs with giving identity to election observation on the continent through generating African standards. He also praised the African missions for how they have improved on the technical competences of their work in the last couple of years. He, however, noted that the budgets of western EOMs are still significantly bigger and that African regional economic communities needed to avail more financial resources for their missions to curb the movement of African experts to western missions to seek better pay. Western EOMs seem to be more prominent in African elections than African missions, perhaps because of resource constraints. African EOMs, however, have given identity to election observation given that it is a practice that some have described as Eurocentric and not necessarily relevant to African politics. Having Africans watching other African conducting elections gives a lot of weight to strengthening electoral democracy on the continent because it eliminates the patronizing relationship between western EOMs and African EOMs. The introduction of African standards and guidelines for democratic elections has helped deepen electoral democracy. In the past it was easy to dismiss standards as they were brought by western missions like the Carter Centre. African stakeholders would insist that Africa has its own politics and history which were not necessarily relevant to international standards. There is also an influx of experts in the African EOMs of late such as media experts, legal experts and people from electoral commissions who have improved the technical competence of the missions. They have also adopted solid methodologies that have recently come up with new initiatives like pre-assessment missions rather than arriving days before the polls to observe. The AUEOM now also incorporates Long Term observers in its work. The assessments are now more technically refined. These initiatives need to be reciprocated with increased funding to close the gap between the competences of African missions and western ones, real or perceived. Budgets matter in what missions can achieve. African missions still lose out on recruiting more of their best experts who choose to join western missions because their budgets enable them to deploy earlier, pay better and have more refined methodologies. We have not seen a situation where SADC or the AU are actively increasing their contribution to their missions. The budgets of African missions are still between 70% and 90% donor-reliant meaning that the missions must beg for resources from the same countries that already have their own missions.

A key informant from an African EOM disclosed that her EOM had some recognition from some European countries to the effect that they had been invited to observe elections there. She advocated for more interaction between African and western EOMs so that the hierarchical way they are viewed is diffused. We have been invited to observe an election in Europe some time back and we sent a five-­ member mission. I believe that EOMs in Southern Africa are playing a role. They remain relevant and continue to observe elections. The problem that I see is of little interaction between African missions and western ones. I know that there is a lot of interaction between African missions. With increased interaction and collaboration of all missions, perhaps we can dispel the myth that there are missions that are better than others.

An opposition MDC MP key informant was very forthright that Africans are mere norm takers in the field of observing elections and that it is not necessarily bad thing. She said that copying good norms was a good thing and that African EOMs need to graduate to a level where they are not afraid to pass unsavoury verdicts.

156

M. Ndlovu

Of course, we are norm-takers, but election observation is a good norm. It is unwise to have the mentality that all things that are done by western countries are not good for us as Africans. We have some terrible cultures ourselves which we must do away with. They also have but we must use what is good for us. There is no need to re-invent the wheel. An obvious reason that may be hindering African contribution to the practice of election observation is the issue of resources. Normally EOMs either fund themselves or must rely on donors if they are unable. We all know that African missions largely rely on donors. If Boris Johnson (British Prime Minister) invited African missions to observe their polls, how many would be able to go without donor assistance? The EU countries observe each other. They are a big bloc, and they are truthful about each other’s elections. They are not like us where truth does not flourish, and we just endorse elections even where there is overwhelming evidence of fraud. They have a good precedence where EOMs have written adverse reports about a partner’s elections. That is what we should learn.

In examining the EOM reports on issues relevant to the effect of election observation on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, a discovery was made that the EU Election Observation Mission in 2000 made recommendations that included land reform. The recommendations also apportioned to the EU the responsibility of providing support and assistance in matters of rule of law. “The European Union should make effort during the coming weeks and months to monitor events in Zimbabwe closely; and to aid and support where appropriate. Special attention should be directed to the rule of law and the issue of land reform. The EU should invite the new government of Zimbabwe to open discussions on future cooperation.” (EUEOM, 2000).

 frican Governments’ Preparedness to Subject Themselves A to Election Observation Results from the questionnaire survey indicate an almost overwhelming consensus (64%) that election observation is a necessary inconvenience for most African governments to which they reluctantly subject themselves. 23% of the respondents were neutral whereas a negligible minority disagreed with the view (Fig. 10.2). From the interviews, most of the key informants across the institutions agree with the view that African governments reluctantly subject themselves to election observation save for the MPs from ZANU PF who were evasive and emphasized that some of the EOMs had a nefarious agenda and deviated from their mandate of observing. One civil society key informant said that there were examples in Zimbabwe’s history to depict government hostility to scrutiny. We have a history in which we have had particularly the 2008 election only observed by a few election observers. I want to conclude that if there was a way of evading election observation, the Zimbabwean government would do it. You can tell that they are doing just the bare minimum to open on electoral issues just because of the international obligations that they have and the desire to attract foreign investment and aid. They are just ticking the boxes.

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

157

Fig. 10.2  African governments’ reluctance to submit to election observation. (Source: Author’s Computation from Fieldwork, 2019)

An opposition MDC MP concurred with the view of government reluctance and emphasized that election credibility impacts on international relations. Of course, our government is half-hearted in opening fully to election observation but unfortunately, they have no choice because they are desperate for investment. If you want a lot from others, you also must give. It is important to acknowledge that international relations are based on legitimacy of an election process. If you are viewed as illegitimate, you are unlikely to receive any assistance or support from the international community.

His MDC colleague in the legislature weighed in supporting the view by adding the government’s contempt for election observation was expressed by the President of the country (now former). Robert Mugabe said in the past that he was unprepared to subject himself to election observation after describing them as imperialists that were coming here to support the MDC. And that was false. So, it is apparent that they are reluctant to be under scrutiny because they have been manipulating a lot of things over the years.

Conclusion The chapter set out to establish the extent to which election observation can be regarded as an African practice. From the findings, it emerges from the deliberations of the findings that there is a long-standing belief that Africans make very little contribution to election observation as a practice. However, the more enlightened disclosures of the key informants reveal that there have been pleasing improvements in the technical competence of African election observer missions in their work as much as African experts and political leaders and eminent persons are increasingly distinguishing themselves in western EOMs. The findings also strongly emphasize

158

M. Ndlovu

that African governments reluctantly subject themselves to the practice of election observation so that they can benefit from democracy contingent benefits as Dorman (2005) posits. It is also apparent from the findings that western observer missions overstep their mandate by involving themselves in political machinations that have little or nothing to do with elections as Calingaert (2021) argues. From the findings, it is apparent that African actors have ceased to be mere norm takers when it comes to the practice of election observation. The considerable improvements that have occurred now validate Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)‘s logic that apportion agency to Africans in customizing the norm for internalization. It can be argued that, because of the findings, in some respects Africans are also becoming norm entrepreneurs. The chapter also concludes that western missions have been able to dominate their status as norm entrepreneurs because of their ability to dispense democracy contingent benefits which essentially enables them to abuse election observation to advance political and foreign policy objectives. Because of the apparent consensus that local observation is just as good or better than international (western) observation, the chapter recommends that African missions need to be funded more extensively to enable them to become more prominent and push western missions to the back seat.

References Ake, C. (1993). The unique case of African democracy. International Affairs, 69(2), 239–244. Acharya, A. (2004). How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism. International organization, 58(2), 239–275. Bratton, Michael, and Sadhiska Bhoojedhur. 2019. “Africans want open elections—Especially if they bring change.” Afro barometer Working Paper No. 58. Calingaert, D. (2021, November 23). What needs to be in place for elections in 2023 to pass the Audit of Acceptability? Southern Africa Political Economy Trust. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=MnlzWgSPL0s Cheeseman, N., & Sishuwa, S. (2021). African studies keyword: Democracy. African Studies Review, 64(3), 704–732. Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G., & Willis, J. (2020). The moral economy of elections in Africa. Cambridge University Press. Chigudu, D. (2015). Foreign election observers in Africa: Towards an obligations-based approach. Mediterranean journal of. Social Sciences, 6(1 S1), 272. Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (1999). The social construction of Europe (special issue). Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4). Chan, S. (2019). Free and Fair?: Observation of Selected African Elections. Journal of African Elections, 18(1), 1–22. Conference (Policy Dialogue) Proceedings. Donge, J. (1998). Reflections on donors, opposition and popular will in the 1996 Zambian general elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(1), 71–99. Dorman, S. R. (2005). ‘Make sure they count nicely this time’: The politics of elections and election observing in Zimbabwe. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 43(2), 155–177. European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) (2000), Report of the EU Election Observation Mission on the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on 24th and 25th June 2000, EUEOM.

10  Norm Entrepreneurs or Norm Takers? African and Western Election Observer…

159

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. Annual review of political science, 4(1), 391-416. Fisher, J., & Anderson, D. M. (2015). Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa. International Affairs, 91(1), 131–151. Gleditsch, K. S., & Ward, M. D. (2006). Diffusion and the international context of democratization. International Organization, 60(4), 911–933. Haerpfer, C., Bernhagen, P., Inglehart, R.  F., & Welzel, C. (2009). Democratization. Oxford University Press. Hove, M., & Harris, G. (2015). Free and fair elections: Mugabe and the challenges facing elections in Zimbabwe. International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies, 3(2), 157–170. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r7_policypaper58_ africans_want_elections_especially_if_they_ bring_change.pdf. Hyde, S. D. (2011). Catch us if you can: Election monitoring and international norm diffusion. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 356–369. IDEA (2000). Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing dialogues(s) for Nation Paper No. 22 Maastrich ECDPM June 1997; available at, http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/wp22_gb.htm, 10 June 2003; (1997) Code of conduct for the ethical and professional observation of elections. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Stockholm. Imoedemhe, O. (2015). Unpacking the tension between the African union and the international criminal court: The way forward. African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 23(1), 74–105. Inglehart, R. (2006). Mapping Global Values. Comparative Sociology, 5(2–3), 115–136. Judicial Observer Mission. (2002). Report on the 2002 presidential elections of Zimbabwe. Judicial Observer Mission. Karekwaivanane, G. (2015). Lawyers, ‘Africanization,’ and political transition: Remaking the legal field in post- colonial Zimbabwe, 1980–1995. Politique Africaine, 2, 49–70. Kelley, J. (2010). Election observers and their biases. Journal of Democracy, 21(3), 158–172. Matlosa, K. (2002). Election monitoring and observation in Zimbabwe: Hegemony versus sovereignty. African Journal of Political Science., 7(1), 129–154. Matyszak, D. (2017). Back to the future: Legitimising Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. https://issafrica.org/research/southern-­a frica-­r eport/back-­t o-­t he-­f uture-­l egitimisingzimbabwes-2018-elections Mehta, U. S. (2018). Liberalism and empire: A study in nineteenth-century British Liberal thought. University of Chicago Press. Ndlovu, M. (2020). Election observation, sovereignty and election credibility in Zimbabwe (PhD thesis at the Pan African University 2020). Nevitte, N., & Canton, S.  A. (1997). The role of domestic observers. Journal of Democracy, 8(3), 47–61. Pereira, L. D. (2006). Free and fair: The politicization of election monitoring reports (Doctoral dissertation at the University of Saskatchewan 2006). Risse, T., Risse-Kappen, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (1999). The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change (Vol. 66). Cambridge University Press. Reeler, T. (2021, November 23). What Needs to be in Place for Elections in 2023 to pass the Audit of Acceptability? Southern Africa Political Economy Trust. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=MnlzWgSPL0s Spears, I. S. (2007). When good governments go bad: Leadership and the limits of intervention in Africa. International Journal, 62(2), 344–361. Steel, D. (2002, March 23). Why do we let the tyrants win time after time? (p.  11). The Scotsman (UK). Van Kessel, I. (2000). Stability or democracy: On the role of monitors, media, and miracles. In Election observation and democratization in Africa (pp. 50–75). Palgrave Macmillan. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press.

160

M. Ndlovu

Willis, J., Lynch, G., & Cheeseman, N. (2018). Voting, nationhood, and citizenship in late-colonial Africa. The Historical Journal, 61(4), 1113–1135. Zimbabwe International Election Observer Mission. (2018). IRI/NDI Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission Final Report October 2018. International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute. Mziwandile Ndlovu is a Research and Policy Analyst  working with the  African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP). He holds a doctorate in Governance and Regional Integration from the Pan African University at its Institute of Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences in Cameroon. His doctoral thesis focused on the influence of sovereignty on election observation’s ability to improve the credibility of Zimbabwean elections.  

Chapter 11

Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities in Uganda’s 2021 Presidential Election John Mary Kanyamurwa, Juma Sultan Kakuba, Ronald Kaddu, and Stanely Babalanda

Abstract  Substantial narratives have in recent years been woven around the role of electoral democracy, widely welcoming it as a symbol of Africa’s advancement towards nonviolent power transfer and political stability. Yet, such analyses have often overlooked the unswerving electoral effects on critical peace perspectives in individual African countries. Contributing to the broader discourse on electoral democracy and peaceful democratic upshots, this chapter uses Uganda’s 2021 presidential election, held under COVID-19 pandemic regulations, to assess the domestic peace prospects attendant to electoral democracy as per current studies. Accordingly, adopting exploratory qualitative methods, the paper makes several arguments. First, the introduction of major constitutional reforms which centrally provided for competitive electoral democracy starting from the early 1980s, on which the January 2021 presidential election was based, paved the foundations for domestic peace in the country. Secondly, in line with the study results, we maintain that the 2021 presidential election processes fundamentally undermined domestic peace opportunities. This perspective was particularly reinforced by the experiences of violence leading to unfortunate civilian deaths, abductions and citizen incarcerations following the short-lived arrest of one of the presidential candidates during the presidential campaign in late 2020. Third, the results underscored a perspective on how key electoral and state security institutions detrimentally shaped the 2021 presidential election, inauspiciously contributing to events that further progressively eroded domestic peace. For more enduring and even-handed domestic peace in the country, the paper recommends profound constitutional reforms focusing on checks and balances, more inclusive electoral laws and security reforms aimed at boosting domestic peace in the context of electoral democracy.

J. M. Kanyamurwa (*) · J. S. Kakuba · R. Kaddu · S. Babalanda Department of History and Political Science, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_11

161

162

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

Introduction Globally, elections are the strategic epicentre of opportunities for peace and stability in democratic societies. Scholars maintain that citizens use free and fair elections as an assessment tool to, without restrictions, to choose political leaders to form a legitimate government intensely reflecting quantitative-qualitative representation dimensions. In this regard, the 1990s’ and 2000s’ waves of increase in multiparty participatory politics in Africa have largely been interpreted as representing a phase in pursuance of peace opportunities. The latter view is validated by the backdrop of many Africans typified by waves of military coups, civil wars, and violent political repression across the continent during most of the post-independence period (Brosche et al., 2020; IPI, 2011). Within this understanding, different countries in Africa have used elections as a path to democratic governance advancement of domestic peace. For example, the post-election violence in Kenya formed the perceptive linkage between fair and free elections and domestic peace (Kiiza et al., 2006; Lynch et al., 2019). Accordingly, current scholarship emphasizes the character of fair elections as a conspicuous practice of democratization and democratic consolidation in Africa. Nonetheless, most of these studies hardly analyse elections in the perspective of domestic peace advancement on the African continent, and Uganda, in particular. In Uganda’s case, since independence elections have been a contestable threat to the growth and development of democracy in the country. This political reality is even though there has always been a constitution in place and several laws that govern election processes in Uganda (Kakuba, 2016; Svein-Erik & Rakner, 2017; Tripp, 2010). When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, it promised to restore and re-establish institutions that would ensure democratic governance after years of military and pseudo-democratic rule. Key among these institutions involved the national electoral commission for presiding over regular elections in which Ugandans would be allowed to elect leaders of their own choice (Svein-Erik & Rakner, 2017). Besides, the NRM pursued politics of inclusion to foster broad base support from different political divides and diverse ethnic groups, thereby reducing probable incentives to politically mobilize against its government (Diamond, 2008). Uganda held the first presidential and parliamentary elections under the NRM government under the stewardship of the Electoral Commission in 1996. The history of political party politics in Uganda dating back to 1980, which recent research has generally described as divisive, provided the justification for holding this election under the NRM political system (Willis et al., 2017). Popularly known as the “movement system”, the electoral arrangement was essentially typified by individual merit attributes for public office rather than endorsement by a political party (Blattman, 2009; Carbone, 2003; Kamp, 2010). The 2001 elections were held under a similar arrangement to the fore. Through a referendum held in 2005, Ugandans voted for an amendment of the constitution to restore multiparty democracy in the country.

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

163

Paradoxically, the reintroduction of multiparty democracy has further eroded peaceful electoral politics and increasingly turned into what is widely regarded as a chain of undemocratic practices that undermines the election process. As extant scholarship has demonstrated, due to enhanced political tension backed by political organizations and their allies, domestic peace is often undermined in highly polarized settings as well as new multiparty regimes (Daxecker et al., 2019; Goldsmith, 2015; Makara, 2007). Free, fair, and transparent regular elections have been identified as critical determinants in the maintenance of a peaceful democratic society. However, while the NRM political system introduced multiparty politics, gives the opposition a platform to participate in democratic processes, many of the attributes central to credible elections have not been observed in recent years (Carbone, 2003; Kiiza et al., 2006). Thus, despite the dominance of peace messages in the media during the 2021 Presidential election campaigns and its aftermath, the electoral conditions ultimately played a role in the levels of tranquillity and stability of the country. The electoral regulations for the general elections constituted another key element in the 2021 Presidential election. Held under the national lockdown instituted due to the Coronavirus Disease of 2019 (COVID-19), candidates and their supporters were supposed to observe the COVID-19 regulations that required them to keep social distance and avoid big rallies among other details. The main complaint of the opposition parties centred around irregular, unfair and unequal implementation of the COVID-19 regulations. Critics suggested that the COVID-19 regulations were fully implemented when it came to opposition candidates’ movements and election campaign rallies, with security forces often violently disbanding their potential voters. But by and large, elections were characterized by disbanding of opposition rallies, multiple violent arrests, harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detentions, and alleged deaths of opposition supports among others (Kakuba, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2021). Furthermore, major democratic institutions designed to establish, deepen, and protect democracy such as the electoral commission, civil servants such as resident commissioners and the police were widely perceived as partisan, a factor that undermined democratization and domestic peace. Thus, basing on the knowledge gaps in recent literature reviewed for this chapter, the contribution, illustrated in the central perspectives of this study, is threefold. The summary of these perspectives is presented in the research questions for the chapter: How did the electoral democracy foundations from the early 1990s influence the 2021 Uganda Presidential elections towards domestic peace expansion? In which respects did the 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda influence domestic peace opportunities? To what extent did state institutions promote domestic peace in Uganda’s 2021 presidential election?

164

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

Theoretical Framework for Elections and Domestic Peace This study was guided by the democratic peace theory. As part of the grand liberal school, the liberal peace thesis holds that democratic states seldom or never go to war against each other (Ngwu & Idama, 2016). The notion that liberal democracy provides therapy for violent internal and external conflict can be traced in the works of Emmanuel Kant, Thomas Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville, Dean Babst and other liberal scholars. The democratic peace theory is built on three pillars for peaceful interaction in societies. Principally, the theoretical paradigm suggests that democracy reduces military conflict, creates economic interdependence, and that democratic institutions and processes contribute to peace advancement (Ngwu & Idama, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016). To Paine and Kant, democratic members of a given society may behave more peacefully, especially towards one another compared to the nondemocratic ones (Thomas et al., 2016). The theory further assumes that citizens grounded in republican principles of democracy usually remain peaceful throughout contested interactions (Paine, 1776). In the scholar’s view, such peaceful conduct emanates from the democratic willingness to negotiate the discrepancies rather than letting regal pride swell into a rupture with other parties (Paine, 1791). Allowing the people to participate in decision-making builds confidence of avoiding the costs of war thus, choosing peace (ibid). Once individuals are given freedom from the burden of oppressive governments, they rapidly rise to form reasonable, just, and peace-­ seeking democratic regimes (Thomas et al., 2016). Contributing to the same theory, Kant (1795) proclaimed that if the consent of the citizens was required to decide the leadership of such a society, there was always going to be natural hesitation in embarking on violence which is so dangerous as it might bring to them all the miseries (Kant, 1795). In other words, the democratic peace theory proposes a mechanism for the selection of societal leadership to conserve peace in whose absence miseries would befall citizens. Further, although Kant did not believe that transitions to democracy and peace would be quick and easy, Paine (1791) believed that the emergence of liberal democratic practices in an enlightened society would contribute to peace. As a pillar of liberal democratic peace, liberal trade can explain the peaceful electoral process in diverse and heterogeneous societies like Uganda. Paine (1791) argues that liberal trade can reduce misunderstandings that might lead to violence. “Free trade creates a pacific system, operating to cordialize mankind, by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each other . . .If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war” (Paine, 1791). To these ideas, Kant (1795) adds that liberal trade may lead to peace because of shared interests of business societies and business actors. Kant (1795) adds that the fear of the negative impacts of violence on trade compels even states to promote the noble cause of peace. However, some critics have argued that excessive liberal enthusiasm for democracy can encourage military interventions to spread democracy (Thomas et al., 2016). These interventions are often cast as a core

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

165

aspect of the peace enforcement policy of republican states (Jahn 2012: 685). Paine (1791), a revolutionary liberalist, suggests military action to spread democratic peace. Nevertheless, while democratic rule is the core of liberal theory, spreading it through military intervention has been a longstanding source of disagreement among many liberalists. In democratic countries, social conflicts are resolved through voting, negotiation, compromise, and mediation (Rummel, 1983). Political decision-making is through competitive elections based on pressure from natural pluralism of democratic societies and the development of a democratic culture and norms. The latter attributes, which very often younger democracies might fall short of, emphasize rational debate, tolerance, negotiation of differences, conciliation, and conflict resolution (ibid). Assertive liberal democrats within the liberal democratic theory propose a radical approach to democratic peace that suggests developed democracies can export institutions and practices of market democracy to non-democratic societies that seem to be violent (Ngwu & Idama, 2016). This perspective of democratic peace theory has been witnessed from the early 2000s when the United States and her allies attacked Iraq, and later Afghanistan, to introduce democracy as an instrument of ‘peace’ in those countries, often with disastrous results for the citizens. Therefore, the nature of assertive liberalism can explain the peace prospects in many countries in Africa, including Uganda. Another perspective of the theory adds that through rationalism, liberal democracy is primarily the basis for peace because it leads to a slow, grinding progress toward democracy in a setting typified by disagreements over leadership. This assertion is rooted in another assumption that takes liberal people to behave rationally, and would thus opt for cooperation and transparency in matters of national security (Kant, 1784). This is yet another direction in which to explore key ideas of the democratic peace theory to understand electoral democratic contests in the twenty-first century. However, the assumption that perceives individuals as rational beings has limitations, especially in relation to electoral democratic contests for political power. In the literature on liberal democratic contests, the relative importance of contradictions and disagreements is debated (Flores & Nooruddin, 2012). While in majority of the liberal democratic countries, the partisan competition and the emerging tensions do not necessarily lead to electoral violence, in the young democracies of the developing world, violence is likely to occur notwithstanding the rationality attributes which the democratic peace theory assumes. The likelihood for electoral violence in a setting where democratic institutions are new might have critical attributes to handle disagreements, including weak systems, lack of experience and technological resource constraints. Thus, irrespective of the levels of perceived rationality that different politicians in different settings might possess, domestic peace is likely to face different prospects depending on which calculated political decisions the key actors make.

166

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

Methods We used a detailed explorative strategy, where we employed qualitative methods and techniques to analyse the main variables of the research. The major concerns of the chapter concentrated on elections and domestic peace as materialized in Uganda’s setting during the January 2021 Presidential election. The explorative design was found suitable for this study as it provided limitless possibilities to gain insight into the study relationships using the existing, rather enormous secondary data. The scope of the study considered the period 2016–2021, with the most pertinent factor in this choice being the tensions, electoral violence and the resulting risks and threats to domestic peace as experienced during the respective years up to 2021. The other election years were left out of focus because the sample of 5 years was adequate to study the relationship between elections and domestic peace. In terms of population considerations of items studied, we identified several local and international documents to help investigate the key issues of the chapter. At the local level, we selected all documents relevant to the 2021 Presidential elections. The key reason for the selection of these elections was the need to understand the electoral issues threatening peace, which ironically, is supposed to be an election outcome; previous had to be studied. The main sources for data on presidential election were obtained from the Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results in Uganda and the Inter-Parliamentary Union Data Base for Uganda as well as the Uganda electoral commission databases and reports. Additional relevant sources included local and international observer reports as well as media reports. We similarly used Google Scholar and Google Books search engines to secure scholarly materials on Ugandan presidential elections, where we analysed election and peace themes. We further searched SIPRI databases for peace resources, the Politics Resources Guide, the Electoral Risk Management Tool, and the international foundation for electoral systems. The SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database was also searched to strengthen the stock of international data sources since there is no boundary between knowledge sources on significant universal issues. From all the sources identified in this section, we purposively selected the most pertinent items to commence the data collection process. At the data collection stage, we documented all the appropriate themes of the study. Specifically, we identified all concepts and word groups related to the key study themes in the process of data collection. The concepts and sub-­ themes collected comprised those related to presidential elections, electoral democracy in Uganda, electoral processes, state institutions, independent electoral commission, police, army, local defence unit, domestic peace, resident district commissioner and presidential election. We also recorded key items related to electoral democracy foundations, election influence on domestic peace expansion, 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda, events in campaign period, 2021 nominations, 2021 election violence, 2021 campaign rallies, peaceful elections, violence in polls, NUP supporters arrested, election and domestic peace, state institutions and peace. With the end of the coding process, data analysis was guided by the frequency of themes and sub-themes in the data for the period immediately before the

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

167

presidential campaign period and the campaign period itself, to maximize analysis of the central study issues. Analysis was also undertaken specifically linking the 2021 presidential election period and peace as well as the voting day. Overall, analysis was conducted to ensure that all the research questions were adequately answered.

Findings and Discussion  ganda’s Electoral Foundations and Influences on the 2021 U Uganda Presidential Elections Electoral systems are more often a product of many political, socio-economic, technological, and cultural influences which essentially determine a country’s peace and stability. This is the essential justification for this chapter, which explores foundations for Uganda’s electoral process with the view to analyse the enduring electoral concerns likely to influence the direction of subsequent national elections, particularly the contribution to domestic peace. As key scholarship has emphasized, the underlying national political realities, often summarized in the key actors’ interests, will typically determine not only the election campaign issues, but the candidates also selected to run in an election, the tempo of the contestations and the overall implications for domestic peace (Conconi et al., 2014; Flores & Nooruddin, 2012; Makara, 2007). The 2021 Presidential election followed five other electoral contests held in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 at that level, but with only the last three being held under the multiparty dispensation. The foundations of electoral system reforms in Uganda date back to the 1980s, specifically from 1986 when the NRM took power in Kampala. In the opinion of scholars, the early political reforms in the NRM regime, along with specific reforms in the electoral systems, were incorporated in the 1995 national Constitution (Blattman, 2009). Prominent in the new reforms addressing elections included those providing for a directly elected president, electoral commission powers, widening of the political space to provide for women and minorities’ representation, no-party state, and decentralization. The significance of these reforms has been witnessed in the levels of violence in some of these races, but more so the presidential ones, just as manifested in the 2021 presidential elections. The point is that the electoral concerns that triggered off electoral violence during the presidential elections lay deep in the NRM regime’s politics and could have been addressed, but only with the NRM and government’s commitment to meaningful reforms. There were, however, more electoral reforms following the 2005 referendum which returned political parties as actors in Uganda’s political landscape, another window that could have potentially contributed to the sustainable journey towards building domestic peace (Kamp, 2010). Thus, the 2006 elections which were the first to be held under a multiparty arrangement since 1980 can be argued to have

168

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

been part of the political occasions that formed the foundation for the 2021 presidential elections. Similarly, the 2011 and 2016 elections form key political moments in the run up to the 2021 presidential elections, notably due to the levels of violence that seemed to increase from election cycle to election cycle. It is in this perspective that Namwase’s (2021) argument can be understood. The scholar emphasizes that the pre-election violence during the 2021 presidential campaigns was predictable, considering the trends of violence from previous election phases. The question why election violence that had been building up in the foundations of electoral instruments for several years was not addressed is answered by the NRM whose majorities in parliament did not support meaningful electoral reforms (Freedom House, 2015). In other words, while the 2021 Presidential elections in Uganda could have expanded the peace prospects in the country, the setting was less appropriate, with a long stretch of electoral violence deeply engrained in the electoral reforms which fell short of taking measures to address the peace disrupting incidents over many electoral cycles. Although there has been no detailed investigation of the relationship between elections and domestic peace focusing on Uganda, available studies identify the foundations of violence in the previous electoral system reforms, mostly deemed hardly comprehensive (Freedom House, 2015; Makara, 2007; Makara, 2010). For example, Makara (2010) explains that the challenges in Uganda’s electoral democracy lie in overreliance on the privileges of incumbency, removal of constitutional term limits on the presidency and unconstitutional use of public resources during elections. The latter have the effect of unbalancing the political landscape, itself a factor in the discourse on election and domestic peace. Consequently, the violence that was experienced in Uganda’s 2021 presidential elections was the manifestation of years of accumulated unfair elements in the electoral system dating back from the early 1990s, leading to a setting that simply undermined peace. However, there have also been contrary opinions in recent scholarship that have pointed out that the state firmly responded to organized criminal gangs that would have made the situation even worse. The latter arguments notwithstanding, building on the old contradictions in the electoral instruments, 2021 Presidential election increased the tensions and violence levels that undermined domestic peace in the country.

 lections and Prospects for Domestic Peace in Uganda’s 2021 E Presidential Election Although studies have investigated the linkages between peace and democracy in election settings, research has yet to systematically analyse respects how election processes influence domestic peace opportunities. Thus, aside from the underlying foundations of electoral concerns that lead to violence outcomes, damaging domestic peace opportunities, the real situations in election processes influence domestic

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

169

peace opportunities which need to analyse. Sisk (2012) describes peace because of the actualization of certain stated human desires, the latitude of freedom to pursue them, the relationships between state and non-state and the individuals therein, as one independently and mutually shares public spaces. Therefore, to understand the respects in which the 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda influenced domestic peace opportunities is to undertake a review of the 2021 electoral processes, identifying how the promoted or undermined peace. Presidential election processes started off with nominations administered by the Independent Electoral Commission in which presidential candidates were supposed to be escorted to not more than five persons. The nomination process further prohibited huge candidate rallies after the nominations, especially to observe the COVID-19 regulations which urged social distance, hand washing and masking of individuals in public. While this process appeared to have been peacefully conducted, the sight of one of the presidential candidates, Hon Patrick Oboi Amuriat of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) without shoes in the nomination grounds suggested relatively measured opportunities for domestic peace. The candidate was travelling to with a bigger convoy than permitted by the IEC regulations. In the scuffle with police, his shoes were lost. His allegations were that the security forces forcefully confiscated his shoes. Overall, for the purposes of the chapter, two observations are important in this regard. Firstly, since the earlier electoral processes such as display of voters’ registers had passed without event, this is perhaps one area where one could argue that the election managers’ arrangements promised an election that would contribute to domestic peace. Secondly, the appearance of a candidate for nomination without shoes was, in all fairness, a visible signal of the checkered potential for the 2021 presidential election to promote domestic peace. The candidate’s nomination for president was closely followed by the presidential campaign rallies. Studies and reports covering this area documented detailed experiences of events that translated into pre-election violence, thus, undermining the prospects for domestic peace. Leading electoral skirmishes in this phase were changed itinerary for the opposition around the country, blocked candidate’s rallies and changed or blocked venues for opposition candidates (Athumani, 2021; Kakuba, 2021; Patra, 2021). Analyses pertaining to disbanded opposition rallies, sometimes with deployment of teargas, arrested opposition presidential candidates and those candidates who slept in their vehicles due to blocked routes were other significant scholarly narratives which suggested increased intensity in violent electoral outcomes (Moffat et al., 2021). Most common in the factors for the violent interfaces between the state security forces and the presidential candidates with their potential voters rotated around violation of COVID-19 regulations. Analysing why the opposition candidates were more likely than President Museveni to found on the wrong side of the COVID-19 regulations, data suggested that there were major differences in campaign strategy. While the President chose to hold small, focused rallies with NRM leaders around the country, the opposition chose to hold mass campaign rallies regardless

170

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

of the COVID-19 government-mandated regulations. Data again indicates that while President Museveni chose to use small rallies, observing COVID-19 regulations to stop the spread of the disease, the opposition candidates largely argued that the COVID-19 regulations were simply a smoke screen to shield the President from opposition calls for change. Besides, the opposition argued that the COVID-19 regulations were discriminatory at the implementation level, with several lieutenants of President Museveni not being harassed after alleged COVID-19 regulations (Nanfuka, 2021). Critics state that the weeks leading up to the recently concluded 2021 presidential elections were characterized by widespread violence and human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Detailing the abuses in the 2021 Presidential elections, Human Rights Watch (2021) explains that these included unexplained killings by state agencies, arbitrary arrests and beatings of opposition supporters and journalists and a shutdown of the internet. These are factors that clearly undermined peace in the country, further chipping away from domestic peace opportunities in the country. The most extreme of the interfaces between the state agencies and the opposition presidential candidates during the presidential campaign period came with the arrest of one of the presidential candidates, sharply undermining any windows to the peace opportunities that might have been left. The most intense of the violence and tension-filled experiences followed the arrest and detention of Hon. Robert Kyagulanyi is one of the presidential contestants standing on the National Unity Platform (NUP) party. His offence was alleged wanton breaching COVID-19 regulations on 18th November 2020 while at a rally in Eastern Uganda. The aftermath of this violence led to the death of at least 54 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and arrests of opposition members; allegedly by state security forces (Athumani et al., 2021). However, extant data equally shows that in retaliation, suspected opposition leaders roughed up isolated security officers, attacked some security installations, undressed suspected NRM supporters in public and ransacked private property (The Independent, 2020). This is evidence of lost peace opportunities. The last phase of the presidential election, namely the Election Day and its aftermath suggested yet other implications for domestic peace originating from the 2021 Presidential election. Ugandans during the voting day were peaceful and this peace can be framed theoretically within the liberal peace explanation advanced by Paine (1791). To the credit of Uganda’s security agencies, by and large, voters cast their votes freely, raising confidence that they might would avoid the costs of violence and choose domestic peace. This view is supported by the IGAD report (2021). In central arguments, the report maintains that in Central Uganda and other parts of the country, citizens used their free will to vote for the National Unity Platform at both presidential and parliamentary levels. In the parliamentary race, the report adds, NUP secured 57 seats formerly held by the NRM despite the heavy security forces deployment (EC, 2021). Consequently, it might be argued that on the voting day, voters observed and promoted both ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative peace’. While the former concept means the support for multi-culturalism, multi-­ ethnicity, multi-ideological, multi-religious identities, minorities’ protection,

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

171

equality of rights, justice and guaranteed measured freedoms, the latter concept refers to absence of any mutually agreed hostility. This peace was, nonetheless, immediately undermined in the days following voting day. While the government explained this as a measure to put all internet resources to the successful conclusion of the election and to stop coordinated wrong elements from disrupting the country’s stability, this was a gross violation of human rights. The denial of right to information in a scientific election as termed by the EC through social media and internet blockage was structurally violent and an assault on peace mechanisms. The 13th of January 2021, a day before the presidential elections, the communications regulator in Uganda ordered all telecom firms to block access to social media and messaging apps and later, a complete shut-down of the internet (BBC, 2021). This was condemned by Amnesty International’s deputy regional director as a move to silence election observers, opposition, human rights activists, journalists, and bloggers from publishing the violence experienced during the electoral process (Kafeero, 2021). In this perspective, both the state coercive machinery and ordinary citizens can be understood to have, albeit in different proportions, contributed to undermine peace opportunities, often theoretically associated with elections. It can also be argued that in all those election incidents, the result was stopping voters from participation, in a sense, undermining domestic peace opportunities. Indeed, in his arguments, Kant (1795), inter alia, maintains that when citizens are allowed to democratically participate, they tend to rationally solve their differences which inadvertently increase peace opportunities. In other words, some of the respects in which the 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda influence domestic peace opportunities were through violent interfaces between opposition presidential and the security forces. This is the perspective that suggests violent rather than peaceful outcomes from the 2021 presidential elections.

 xtent of Institutional Support for Peace in Uganda’s 2021 E Presidential Election Within the larger debate on the relationship between elections and domestic peace in Africa, this section explores the extent to which state institutions promoted domestic peace in Uganda’s 2021 presidential election. The key state institutions discussed consist of the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, the judiciary, IEC, the police, army, and the Resident District Commissioners (RDC). Most influential in the 2021 Presidential elections were, however, the IEC, the security forces, the political parties, election observing institutions, media houses as well as the civil society organizations. The electoral processes are by law managed by several institutions whose mandate is to ensure smooth, free, and fair elections. During the 2021 general electoral processes, these institutions played a role in either promoting peace or violence and under some circumstances, both peace and violence.

172

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

The parliament of the Republic of Uganda can be credited for having appropriated funds for supporting the preparation and conducting of the 2021 general elections (Patra, 2021). With proper funding, institutional effectiveness is expected to act as a remedy for violent prospects during the electoral processes. By November 2020, the parliament had appropriated funds worth UGX 456.87 billion ($125.2 million) to be spent by institutions such as the Electoral Commission UGX 274.11 billion ($75.1 million), Uganda Police Force UGX 154.79 billion ($42.4 million) (Patra, 2021). Besides, by 2021, the total budget allocation to the various Ministries, Departments, and Agencies involved in 2021 general elections was UGX 1255.73 billion ($344.03 million) (Patra, 2021). To a liberalist, such funds would strengthen the institutional effectiveness of these electoral-related institutions to ensure that peaceful free and fair elections are conducted. However, the Uganda legislature can be blamed for having legislated laws including the Public Order Management Act, Preventative Detention Act, and Communication Act that seem to have been used as a basis by the state coercive institutions to violently crack down the opposition actors (Kakuba, 2021). The Electoral Commission as per Article 60 & 61 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda as amended tried to ensure efficient and effective implementation of electoral activities in major elections such as the Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Council elections in 2021. These elections were held successfully but characterized with violent actions from the state and the participants (Nanfuka, 2021). The electoral commission came up with electoral guidelines that were to be followed during electoral processes given the COVID-19 situation. However, critics have argued that these guidelines gave a blank check for the ruling NRM to utilize state coercion against the opposition claiming that they were faulting the guidelines and spreading COVID-19 (Nanfuka, 2021). It was also argued that the police and the Electoral Commission (EC) were cracking down on opposition candidates while turning a blind eye to NRM candidates even when they were branching COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The other institution that can be praised for having contributed to a relatively peaceful electoral process in Uganda is the Uganda communications commission UCC (Nanfuka, 2021). As a communication regulator in Uganda, the commission ensured that the use of communication platforms basically in mainstream and social media couldn’t result in electoral violence. It ought to be noted that the UCC guided media houses not to promote hate speech, and when social media was seemingly uncontrollable the UCC suspended Facebook and at its peak, the internet was switched off all in the name of having a peaceful electoral process (Nanfuka, 2021). However, the communications regulator (UCC) has been faulted for being partisan in favour of the National Resistance Movement against the opposition (Nanfuka, 2021). For instance, UCC had earlier asked Google to block 14 YouTube channels sympathetic to opposition candidate Kyagulanyi claiming that the channels were misleading the public and inciting violence as they were used to mobilize protests in November that left more than 50 people dead but Google declined since the request wasn’t accompanied by a court order. However, when some of the social media accounts of government officials and NRM supporters were suspended by

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

173

Facebook on similar accusations, Facebook was suspended and statement made by President Museveni that “We cannot tolerate this arrogance of anybody coming to decide for us who is good and who is bad” (Nanfuka, 2021). The Uganda police as by law is expected to maintain law and order to which it is believed to have done during the 2021 general electoral processes. The police and her coercive sister agencies cracked down to violent riots in November and even those that would try to engage in violence before, during and after elections as heavy deployment was made across the country (Namwase, 2021). This can be justified by the fact that on the voting day, almost no incident of violence was registered across the country. However, this was achieved at a very high cost of using excessive force and state violence against civilians. On 18th and 19th of November 2020, Uganda witnessed some of the most violent riots in a decade following the arrest of opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi over bleaching COVID-19 SOPs (Namwase, 2021). As a result, contingents of heavily armed police and the army responded with tear gas and live ammunition culminating in the death of at least 45 civilians and about 11 members of the security forces injured during the riots (Namwase, 2021). Therefore, although the Uganda police force managed to contain the rioters and restored peace, the lethal use of force to break up a riot was a violent electoral engagement fuelled by police.

Conclusions Our research sought to investigate the linkages between elections and domestic peace in Uganda’s context using the country’s 2021 Presidential Election as a case study. The research illustrated three fundamental election and peace realities on the diverse, nonetheless, related perspectives explored in this study. Firstly, in as far as how electoral democratic reform foundations influence the 2021 Uganda Presidential elections towards domestic peace extension, most results suggested a very close interface between the two sets of variables. The bedrock electoral contractions were found to be emerging from a series of challenges in the early 1980s political reforms which were later incorporated in the 1995 Uganda Constitution. Most controversial of these concerns located deep in the electoral reforms from the 1990s are the massive rights and freedoms which a sitting president continues to hold even during presidential election periods. Equally controversial was the undemocratic use of public resources during elections. Together, these ambiguities and the removal of constitutional term limits on the presidency in 2005 form a cradle for violence during elections. These dynamics partly explain why the 2021 Presidential election became violent, undercutting its potential to contribute to the expansion of domestic peace. Secondly, results in the chapter underscored the respects in which the 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda inspired domestic peace opportunities. Specifically, the respects in which the 2021 Presidential election processes in Uganda influence domestic peace opportunities were through violent interfaces between opposition presidential and the security forces. This is the perspective that

174

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

suggests violent rather than peaceful outcomes from the 2021 presidential elections did not contribute to domestic peace. The third major finding was that state institutions were, to a large extent, found to have failed to promote domestic peace in Uganda’s 2021 presidential election. While the non-state institutions were largely commended for their role, largely confined to the exposure of the state agencies let-­ downs during the 2021 Uganda Presidential election, they were ironically also partly seen as inadvertently funning the violent events that undermined domestic peace during elections. Based on the chapter findings and in line with the chapters underlying hypothesis that there were encouraging interfaces between elections and expansion of domestic peace, we recommended far-reaching constitutional and electoral reforms to drastically reduce the powers presidential powers in order to achieve enduring domestic peace as an outcome of free, fair and regular presidential elections.

References Athumani, H. (2021). Uganda Soldiers Enter Home of Opposition Leader After He Alleges Election Fraud Voice of America – English. Voice of America. Retrieved 09 November 2021. Athumani, Halima; Wroughton & Lesley (2021). 37 dead in Uganda protests after arrest of presidential candidate Bobi Wine. Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 2021-01-13. Retrieved 2021-01-10. BBC. (2021). Uganda elections 2021: Social media blocked ahead of poll. BBC News. 2021-01-12. Retrieved 2021-01-13. Blattman, C. (2009). From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda. American Political Science Review, 103(2), 231–247. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090212 Brosche, J., Fjelde, H., & Hoglund, K. (2020). Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia. Journal of Peace Research, 57(1), 111–125. https://doi. org/10.1177/0022343319884983 Carbone, G.  M. (2003). Political parties in a ‘no-party democracy’: Hegemony and opposition under ‘movement democracy’ in Uganda. Party Politics, 9(4), 485–501. https://doi. org/10.1177/135406880394004 Conconi, P., Sahuguet, N., & Zanardi, M. (2014). Democratic peace and electoral accountability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(4), 997–1028. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/90023404 Daxecker, U., Amicarelli, E., & Jung, A. (2019). Electoral contention and violence (ECAV): A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 56(5), 714–723. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318823870 Diamond, L. (2008). The spirit of democracy: The struggle to build free societies throughout the world. Times Books. Flores, T. E., & Nooruddin, I. (2012). The effect of elections on post conflict peace and reconstruction. The Journal of Politics, 74(2), 558–570. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001733 Freedom House. (2015). Uganda’s sham electoral reforms, Perspectives December 2, 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/article/ugandas-­sham-­electoral-­reforms Goldsmith, A. A. (2015). Elections and civil violence in new multiparty regimes: Evidence from Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 52(5), 607–621. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24557506 Human Rights Watch. (2021). Uganda: Elections marred by violence, investigate security force conduct; End repression; Ensure justice. January 21, 2021, 12:00AM EST. IPI. (2011). Elections in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-­content/ uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_elections_in_africa__2_.pdf accessed on 5/10/2021

11  Elections and Domestic Peace in Africa: Assessing Peace Opportunities…

175

Kafeero, S. (2021). Uganda has cut off its entire internet hours to its election polls opening. Quartz Africa. Archived from the original on 15 January 2021. Retrieved 09 November 2021. Kakuba, S. J. (2016). Political violence in plural democracies: A comparative study of Uganda and Kenya. In S. S. Erçetin (Ed.), Chaos, complexity and leadership 2014. Springer. Kakuba, S. J. (2021). State repression and democratic dispensation in Uganda 1996–2016. SAGE Open. https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211030638 Kamp, M. (2010). The challenge and Prospect of multiparty democracy in Uganda. In Y. Kiranda & M. Kamp (Eds.), The state of multiparty democracy in Uganda. Kampala. Kant, I. (1991/1795). Perpetual Peace. In H. Reiss (Ed.), Kant’s political writings (pp. 93–130). Cambridge University Press. Kiiza, J., Makara, S., Rakner, L., & (eds). (2006). Electoral democracy in Uganda: Understanding the institutional processes and outcomes of the 2006 multiparty elections. Fountain Publishers. Lynch, G., Cheeseman, N., & Willis, J. (2019, October). From peace campaigns to peaceocracy: Elections, order, and Authority in Africa. African Affairs, 118(473), 603–627. https://doi. org/10.1093/afraf/adz019 Makara, S. (2007). Uganda’s 2006 multiparty elections: Consolidating democracy and building peace? East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights, 13(1), 2007. https://doi.org/10.4314/ eajphr.v13i1.39343 Makara, S. (2010). Deepening democracy through Multipartyism: The bumpy road to Uganda’s 2011 elections. Africa Spectrum, 45(10). Moffat, C., Bennett, M., & Travesi, F. (2021). A recipe for violence: Uganda’s flawed elections subvert democracy. Justice Truth Dignity (ICTJ) Publications. https://www.ictj.org/news/ recipe-­violence-­uganda%E2%80%99s-­flawed-­elections-­subvert-­democracy. Accessed on 11/10/2021. Namwase, S (2021) Uganda: The unsurprising pre-election violence by security forces. The Africa Report. Available on: https://www.theafricareport.com/59129/ uganda-­the-­unsurprising-­pre-­election-­violence-­by-­security-­forces/ Nanfuka, J. (2021). Uganda’s 2021 election: A textbook case of disruption to democracy and digital networks in authoritarian countries. CIPESA. available on: https://cipesa.org/2021/01/ ugandas-­2021-­election-­a-­textbook-­case-­of-­disruption-­to-­democracy-­and-­digital-­networks-­in-­ authoritarian-­countries/ Ngwu, E. C, & Idama, S.I. (2016). Elections, democracy, and the Liberal peace: Paper presented at the 30th annual conference of Nigeria political science association (NPSA) held from Monday, June 27, to Tuesday, June 28, 2016, at the Ebitimi Banigo auditorium, University of Port Harcourt, Choba, Rivers State, Nigeria. Paine, T. (1992/1791). Rights of man, Ed. G. Claeys. Hackett Publishing. Patra, K. (2021). Bulk of government spending on 2021 elections went to the electoral commission and police. ACFIM.  Available on: https://www.politicalfinanceafrica.org/2021/03/10/ bulk-­of-­government-­spending-­on-­2021-­elections-­went-­to-­electoral-­commission-­and-­police/ Rummel, R. (1983). Libertarianism and international violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(1), 27–72. Sisk, T.  D. (2012). Elections in the wake of war: Turning points for peace? https://www.c-­r. org/accord/legitimacy-­and-­peace-­processes/introduction-­legitimacy-­and-­peace-­processes/ elections-­wake Svein-Erik, H., & Rakner, L. (2017). Impact of elections: The case of Uganda. In J. Gerschewski & C. H. Stefes (Eds.), Crisis in autocratic regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers. The Independent. (2020, October 6). Four NUP supporters arrested for assaulting an NRM supporter. Thomas, C., Walker, D., & Rousseau, L. (2016). Liberalism: A theoretical and empirical assessment from: Routledge handbook of security studies. Rutledge. Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2011.619255

176

J. M. Kanyamurwa et al.

Uganda Electoral Commission (EC). (2021). General parliamentary elections, 2021, election results. Available on https://www.ec.or.ug/ecresults/2021/MPS_RESULTS_2021.pdf Willis, J., Lynch, G., & Cheeseman, N. (2017). “A valid electoral exercise”? Uganda’s 1980 Elections. John Mary Kanyamurwa, Juma Sultan Kakuba, Ronald Kaddu & Stanely Babalanda are based at Kyambogo University Department of History and Political Science, where they conduct research and teach a diversity of Political Science disciplines ranging from Political Theory, International Relations, Public Administration, Security and Diplomatic Studies. The scholars have variously published extensively on Globalization, Citizenship Studies, International Relations, Security Studies, Global Terrorism, and other development-related subjects.  

Chapter 12

Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon: A Philosophical Appraisal Lavngwa Moses Seemndze

Abstract  Since the re-launch of multi-party politics in Cameroon in the 1990s, there has been an increasing incidence of election boycotts by opposition parties especially when the possibility of fair and free competition is ruled out. This chapter critically appraises the influence of election boycotts on the democratic process in Cameroon. The effort to indigenize democracy must trace its roots from the pre-­ colonial, colonial, and post-colonial era. On a positive note, election boycotts could be justifiable as a bargaining strategy to cajole the electorate, break down the electoral process, influence regime alternation and enhance democracy. No matter the reasons for election boycotts or voter apathy, the findings of this chapter reveal that election boycotts in Cameroon have decelerated the democratic process, instituted a single-party-state, facilitated the consolidation of power by one man and fanned ethnic politics. In fact, any form of exclusion from elections is a risky political strategy because as Plato intimates, one of the penalties for not participating in politics is that you end up being governed by idiots or your inferiors. This chapter employs a philosophical analytic style. It concludes that even an unequal participation in elections is more rewarding than boycotting which freely hands over victory to one’s political rival. Only a credible and independent electoral body that respects norms and principles can salvage Cameroon democracy from the long-term and destructive effects of election boycotts.

Introduction Changing patterns of political participation undermine democratic theory and practice. Democracy endures through active participation in the public sphere (Parvin, 2018). By Public sphere, we mean the domain of social life where public opinion is L. M. Seemndze (*) University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon Biaka University Institute of Buea, Buea, Cameroon © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_12

177

178

L. M. Seemndze

debated with attributes of equality, freedom of expression, separation from state authority and rationality (Harbemas, 1991). Whatever violates the right to participate in the public sphere is undemocratic. The public sphere has a direct relation to democracy and electioneering as an expression of public opinion (Gordji et al., 2018). Multi-party elections are an integral part of African politics and the democratization process (Nohlen et al., 1999). When conducted with integrity, elections allow citizens to have a voice in how and by whom they are governed (Halff, 2016). However, there is an increasing incidence of election boycotts in unconsolidated democracies. Neo-colonialism has remained a Western strategy to transpose democratic institutions to Africa without due consideration to specific realities. Yet, democracy remains alien as some countries are either electoral or liberal democracies while others run authoritarian regimes disguised as democracies (Smith, 2014). Africans are responsible for the failure or success of their democracies (Ngoh, 2001). Till date, Cameroonians still grapple with the problem of the indigenization of democracy. Cameroonians elect the president and legislators on a national level and councillors at the local level (Dibussi, 2009). From the post-electoral crisis of 1992, there has been voter apathy since the ruling party with its power and money continues to do everything, legal or illegal, to secure power. The problem facing Cameroon democracy is how to build public confidence among the citizenry. Even with pluralistic politics, the democratic train appears to move in the opposite direction. Democratic governance has failed due to political high-handedness (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004). International observers have concluded that multi-party elections have been flawed by irregularities, manipulation, intimidation, and violence (NDI, 1993). Also, Western powers preach democracy but tacitly support a single-party state and a strong presidency that suppresses the legislature and the judiciary. Legal instruments governing elections are devised to disfavour the opposition parties. Elections are held on government’s terms (Derrick, 1992). It is jokingly insinuated that before the polls open in Cameroon, the results are a foregone conclusion. Thus, election boycotts are a common phenomenon in Cameroon. Why contest when it is obvious that one’s vote won’t count? So, it seems rational to argue that boycott is justifiable. But should opposition parties continue to boycott as a strategy for regime alternation after 39 years of uninterrupted rule by one man? Does boycott not contravene logic and slow down the democratic process? When exactly is boycott justifiable as a bargaining strategy? Does it not confirm Plato’s thesis that the wise may end up under the government of inferiors (Plato, 1990)? Employing a philosophical analytic approach, this chapter critically appraises the influence of election boycotts on Cameroon democracy. Our main thesis is that election boycotts have decelerated Cameroon’s democratic process and only a credible and independent electoral body can resolve crisis and restore public confidence in Cameroon’s democracy. We focus on Cameroon not just because we have first-hand experience of her democracy, but more so because she is Africa in miniature with a melting pot of cultural diversity. Also, Cameroon has a durable one-party state ruled by two presidents since independence (Derrick, 1992).

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

179

In terms of structure, we shall clarify key concepts and trace the history of democracy and attempt to indigenize Cameroon democracy. An analysis of typologies of regimes and election boycotts is imperative. We will also deal with causes and effects of election boycotts on democracy and propose a credible and independent electoral body as a way forward for Cameroon democracy. It is our hope that this study will enhance the debate on democratic multi-party politics in Cameroon.

Terminological Clarifications According to Woolf (1981), to elect means to select or decide. An election is a formal decision-making process to ascertain the free will of the people regarding their government. A genuine election confers legitimacy to govern. It is successful when democratic principles of universal suffrage, equality, transparency, and fairness are respected (Halff, 2016). Election boycotts refer to the absence of citizens from the political process of choosing their government or when a political party that is eligible to contest organizes active non-participation (Beaulieu, 2006). Suffrage refers to the question of who is qualified to vote in elections. Election boycott is linked to ‘voter apathy’ which depicts a lack of interest to vote (Woolf, 1981). The word democracy comes from two Greek words demos meaning people and kratos meaning rule or power. Democracy is the rule of the mob or majority (Woolf, 1981). It is the government of the people by the people for the people (Bongyu, 2008). Democratization depicts the struggle to win, defend and protect the rights of voters. Political pluralism remains a conditio sine qua non for democracy. Without an opposition, there is no choice and people cannot exercise their right to rule (Dahl, 1989). How did democracy start in Cameroon?

 olonial and Postcolonial History of Multi-party Democracy C in Cameroon Under French mandate, East Cameroonians began active politics in 1946 with the institution of the Assemblée Représentative du Cameroun (ARCAM). In 1948, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) was formed. UPC began agitation for independence and the French suppressed it. Multi-party politics began in 1951 with the Bloc Démocratique Camerounais (BDC) and the Assemblée Territoriale du Cameroun (ATCAM) vying for seats in the French or local assemblies. France ‘granted’ independence on 01 January 1960 to La Republique du Cameroun (Monkam, 2012). Southern Cameroon under British mandate belonged to the Eastern House of Assembly in Nigeria and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC)

180

L. M. Seemndze

(Ngoh, 2001). After the conference of Southern Cameroons in 1953, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), Cameroons National Federation (CNF), Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC), the Kamerun People’s Party (KPP), the One Kamerun (OK), the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the Cameroons Peoples’ National Convention (CPNC) were formed. The KNC of E.M Endeley won the first multi-party elections (Ebune, 1992). In 1959, KNC lost the election to the KNDP of John Ngu Foncha. West Cameroon gained independence in 1961 by voting 70.49% to join La République du Cameroun and while North Cameroon remained with Nigeria (Tangwa, 2011). The Foumban conference of 1961 united the two Cameroons giving birth to the Federal Republic of Cameroon, with two federated states. Ahmadou Ahidjo became President while John Ngu Foncha became Vice-President (Ebune, 1992). In 1966, Ahidjo killed multi-partism by merging other political parties with the Cameroon National Union (CNU). In 1972, the ‘Federal Republic’ became ‘United Republic of Cameroon’. In 1982, Ahidjo handed over power to Paul Biya and by 1984, Biya reverted the name to La République du Cameroun. He transformed the CNU party to CPDM (Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement) in 1985 (Wanyande, 2000). Democracy was installed in Cameroon without democratic institutions to manage it (Dimi, 2007). This was intended to prolong metropolitan interests (Lavngwa, 2019). Government had to create Cameroon’s model of democracy known as ‘advanced’ – dominated by a single-party identified with the state despite the proliferation of political parties (Monkam, 2012). The SDF (Social Democratic Party) was born on 06 May 1990 and six people died due to government repression. The blood of those martyrs continues to water the tree of democracy in Cameroon. Multi-party parliamentary elections since 1964 took place in March 1992 and were boycotted by the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU). Twenty-nine contested and four won seats. The Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement won 88 seats out of 180 and merged with Movement for the Defense of the Republic (MDR) with 6 seats to have majority in parliament (Nohlen et al., 1999). The polls were marked by serious irregularities (NDI, 1993). On 11 October 1992, multi-party presidential polls took place with six parties. Paul Biya of the CPDM won with 39.9% while Ni John Fru Ndi of the SDF was runner-up with 35.9% (NDI, 1993). The presidential elections of 12 October 1997 were boycotted by the Social Democratic Front, the National Union for Democracy and Progress, and the Cameroon Democratic Union. Paul Biya won with an overwhelming 92.57% of the vote (Nohlen et al., 1999). People had hope in democracy, but opposition election boycotts signalled its diminishing returns and the domination of one-party. Till date, Cameroon remains bereaved of a democratic climate in which people’s voices are heard, and their choices respected. It seems as if democracy is apparently visible during elections. Was there democracy in Cameroonian in the pre-­ colonial era?

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

181

Indigenization of Cameroon Democracy Democracy is not an exclusive ‘western’ concept only realized with imperatives of global capitalism and consumerism (Lavngwa, 2019). Democracy existed in traditional Africa (Ngoh, 2001). Jacques Chirac’s opinion that democracy is a luxury for Africa is absurd because it questions its universality. It fails to admit that democracy can be traced from traditional culture where government was the concern of all, by all and for all (Monkam, 2012). To indigenize doesn’t mean Africa lacks democracy. It simply means we want to appropriate a democracy that fits our local realities. Democracy is failing in Cameroon because the Western insistence on alien institutions that don’t consider indigenous cultural practices. So, Cameroon politics degenerates into ethnic conflicts (Azevedo, 2000). European imperialists erroneously thought that pre-colonial political structures were autocratic and oppressive. The socio-cultural history reveals the democratic structure of socio-political and cultural heritages in the process of choosing leaders, principle of checks and balances, respect for rights and freedoms, and representational and participatory features of political and social ordering. Governance is monarchical yet it synthesizes autocracy and democracy (Tangwa, 2011). The family is the nucleus of the traditional system of government where every member has rights and duties. At meetings, issues concerning the family are deliberated upon. The family head exercises his judicial authority with other elders to settle disputes. The chiefs are chosen through consensual means. Decision-making is by consensus that doesn’t imply unanimity or total agreement (Tangwa, 2011). Such a method is democratic even if precolonial Cameroonians did not use the term! Through consensus, issues were discussed in solemn conclaves or under big trees until an agreement was achieved as an approach to social interaction, reconciliation and restoration of goodwill and confidence (Wiredu, 1995). Hence, consensus must characterize democratic discourse in Cameroon. Democracy is not imported to a country as one would import a car (Menang, 2006). Therefore, Cameroon democracy must appropriate traditional structures and rules of social organization and governance that involve the participation of rulers and the ruled (Ademola, 2009). Pre-conditions of older democracies may not prevail, yet we must consolidate democracy that is culturally oriented, and community-­ based. Local cultures must impact upon the way democratic values and systems are built and supported. It is erroneous to think that Cameroon cultures are inherently inhospitable to democratic values and institutions (Dimi, 2007). To indigenize democracy, we need an eclectic approach which fuses African and Western values according to their cultural specificities. Eclecticism literally means choosing “what appears to be best in various doctrines, methods or styles” (Woolf, 1981: 356). It is a cross-cultural dialectic of mutual enrichment and not just a fusion of retained values (Lavngwa, 2019). We cannot sacrifice one cultural value in favour of another. We need best practices to build our democracy. Hence, some caution is needed to avoid two extremes: a certain colonial pride which declares all African customs as primitive; and a naïve tendency to laud all

182

L. M. Seemndze

aspects of African culture as good (Lavngwa, 2019). We cannot completely jettison the western idea of democracy as if our cultural practices are sacrosanct. We must watch against a naive and unguarded decolonization that further plunges us into misery, alienation and anonymity. Cameroon democracy needs reform and renewal that fits its multi-ethnic, religious, ideological, linguistic, regional and cultural diversities. Our democracy must not follow all Western paradigms. The use of money, paid propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion on ‘democratic’ choices is not African (Tangwa, 2011). Therefore, an imported and imposed rigid democratic regime cannot work for Cameroon. It must be flexible to be concretized in our culture and history while avoiding an exclusive conformity to practices that hinder human flourishing. What is the typology of political regimes?

Categories of Political Regimes A political regime refers to rules guiding the political process. It differentiates one political regime from another (Smith, 2014). Which regime does Cameroon practice? Officially, Cameroon is a decentralized state. But Cameroon is a centralized presidentialist regime (Bayart, 1973). In democracy, there is constant alternation of power through free and fair multi-party elections. There are regimes that use elections to prove their legitimacy, but they are defective, semi, pseudo, illiberal, guided and near democracies. There are also competitive authoritarianism and exclusive republics (Smith, 2014). It is erroneous to argue that every regime running multi-­ party elections like Cameroon is democratic. Since Ancient Greece is the cradle of democracy, let’s revisit her political regimes. According to Plato’s The Republic, aristocracy which is the rule of the wise is the best regime because it is “rightly said to be good and just” (Plato, 1990). Bad regimes are: timocracy where the virtuous rule militarily; oligarchy where only the rich rule; democracy where excessive equal freedom is given to the mob; and tyranny where the autocratic leader dictates to the people (Plato, 1990). Democracy seems an acceptable regime, but Plato had low esteem for it due to its excessive freedom. It is like sailing a ship where the captain is freely chosen by uneducated men who know nothing about sailing. The captain may reject the counsel of experts and become a stargazer, a babbler, and a good-for-nothing person who may lead the ship to danger (Plato, 1990). Our focus is on electoral regime that occurs when there is a formal decision by the executive to hold de jure competitive and participatory elections. If there are no participation, regimes are considered closed authoritarians. Electoral regimes are liberal, community-based, deliberative, limited democracies, and authoritarian regimes (Smith, 2014). Liberal democracies encourage political and civil rights. They hold free and fair elections. They emphasize the value of institutions like government, parliament and councils (Gordji et al., 2018). Here, the candidates’ campaign, primaries hold and illicit practices like vote-buying start long before polling

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

183

day and beyond (Smith, 2014). Community-based democracy agrees on the formation of the collective identity of social groups. In deliberative democracy, special attention is paid to the role of the people and their free participation in political decisions (Gordji et al., 2018). In Electoral democracies, elections must be free and fair according to local and international observers even if no electoral process is perfect because of human and technical errors cannot alter the outcome. This criterion is true for electoral and liberal democracies. But electoral democracies fall short of providing the full extent of political rights and civil liberties (Smith, 2014). Most African states are electoral autocracies since they hardly fulfil the minimum criteria for electoral democracies (Smith, 2014). Polyarchy is a regime where power is invested in many people. It encourages elite competition and contestation with a broad electorate (Dahl, 1989). An electoral authoritarian regime allows for multi-party elections where parties can easily lose elections or ban parties that can menace regime survival (Lindberg, 2014). Here, the polls are unfair because the incumbent uses manipulation and persuasion to prevent the opposition from contesting. The regime has universal suffrage. It is competitive, pluralistic, and open with less fraud (Schedler, 2006). Cameroon being an ‘advanced democracy’ seems to fit in an electoral autocracy with the domination of a ‘single-party’. That’s why the phenomenon of boycotts is on the increase. Therefore, which typology of election boycotts applies to Cameroon?

Typology of Election Boycotts Most opposition parties in Cameroon boycott elections because of irregularities that directly or indirectly disenfranchise its members. Opposition parties decide to boycott when the incumbent sets up an orchestrated façade of elections (Beaulieu, 2006). For Lindberg (2014), boycott or participation is measured by three values: ‘near total boycotts’ when main opposition parties contest; ‘partial boycotts’ when some contest; and ‘all contest’ when all major political parties participate. Citizen participation prevents the rise of civil oligarchies that capture democratic institutions and exclude non-elites (Parvin, 2018). Beaulieu’s (2006) typology seeks to explain the causes, degree, and effect of a particular boycott. When many parties don’t participate, it’s a major boycott. Major boycotts or total boycotts depend on the level of unfairness of elections where an opposition cannot win despite its popularity. They can then press for reforms that will increase turnover and competition. For Lindberg (2014), the level of boycott is total or partial depending on the number of parties boycotting. Schedler’s (2006) four-part typology of boycotts identifies complete contestation, threatened boycott, partial boycott and full opposition boycott. At the other end of this axis is the minor boycott which consists of unpopular small parties that are typically ethnic, regional or anti-state/anti-system. They boycott because they are seeking side-payments from the incumbent regime by causing the elections to be

184

L. M. Seemndze

unfair (Beaulieu, 2006). Such small parties merge with the ruling party in Cameroon. Cameroon has hardly witnessed major or total boycotts. There are always parties to contest even when they are not sure of victory. Cameroon fits within the typology of minor boycotts. What then is the justifications for boycotting elections?

Justification for Election Boycotts The problem here is whether election boycott is a legitimate tool. At what time are the conditions for fair elections being violated for opposition parties to boycott? Boycott could be a legitimate tool and only democratic act when a fair election is impossible. In Cameroon, the absence of a level playing ground, fear of fraud, manipulation and intimidation, weak electoral laws and lack of opposition consensus account for most election boycotts (Ngwane, 2014). Furthermore, some voters have no alternative to vote for. Thus, it is clearly legitimate not to show up for the elections or cast a blank vote. In a functional democracy, they could present an independent candidate, but Cameroon Law only allows for that during presidential polls, and none has ever dared (Dibussi, 2009). Non-­ participation reduces turnout and can invalidate an election. The international pressure to democratize drives more incumbents to invite international observers to legitimize their stay in power. This desire leads to “prudent manipulation”, a fraudulent attempt to rig elections without being caught. In the face of prudent manipulation, opposition parties are likely to boycott when monitors are present in order to register their frustrations (Beaulieu, 2006). For Schedler (2006), opposition parties boycott elections for three reasons namely: an indicator of the diminished legitimacy of the incumbent after repeated election manipulations; the intention to shape the outcome of the electoral process; and, a feeling that boycott will weaken the incumbent’s manipulation. Those parties that prefer monetary benefits would boycott the polls (Beaulieu, 2006). Those who fear fraud will also boycott. Such boycotts represent an acceptance of defeat in the elections (Lindberg, 2014). No one boycotts an election if there is a chance of winning. As regards minor boycotts, the parties are not interested in fairness. They may unseat the regime by force but prefer peaceful boycott to disrupt the polling process. Minor boycotts are associated with small ethnic parties that lack voter base to win (Beaulieu, 2006). Again, minor boycotts can mask the weakness of the opposition parties. Weak parties may appear stronger in boycotts rather than face a shameful defeat by contesting against a popular government (Beaulieu, 2006). In such situations, the incumbent wins without serious competition. When government forces interfere through physical force, verbal intimidation or organized fraud, most opposition parties already know that the polls will not be free and fair. The only option is to boycott such polls. Thus, a boycott is a legitimate tool when the democratic rules are violated. Boycotts can be channels where opposition parties can strategize and mobilize for future elections.

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

185

Can opposition parties in Cameroon achieve success by boycotting from elections with the hope of breaking down the electoral process and impacting the democratic process? Put otherwise, are boycotts justifiable in Cameroon? Since 1990 when multi-party democracy was reintroduced, it is obvious that consistent boycotts have not succeeded to break down the electoral process or cause regime alternation. What then is the impact of election boycott on Cameroon democracy?

Impact of Election Boycotts The foregone section exposes the non-functionality of Cameroon democracy despite consistent boycotts. However, boycotts can lead to low turnout which can breakdown the electoral process, make government illegitimate or cause regime change. Thus, boycotts have a positive and negative or short-term and long-term impact on democracy. So, how do they enhance democracy?

Positive Effect of Election Boycotts on Democracy A logical outcome of major boycotts is a low turnout. Minor boycotts hardly reduce the turnout unless there is a violent disruption of the electoral process (Beaulieu, 2006; Lindberg, 2014). Electoral competition is reduced by boycotts (Schedler, 2006). But low turnout cannot affect election results in Cameroon because the winner does not require a two-third majority. In Cameroon, the major the boycott, the easier for the incumbent to continue to stay in power unopposed. Long-term effects for boycotts are more optimistic for democracy than short-­ term. Major boycotts lead to new democracies in conjunction with international assistance. The opposition uses boycotts to either threaten rebellion or undermine international or domestic support. This can force the incumbent to enact reforms that enhance fairness or to adhere to rules because of observers. So, boycotts do increase the likelihood of election reform, though neither of these factors significantly increase fairness or regime alternation (Beaulieu, 2006). For Lindberg (2014), boycotted elections that are not free and fair can lead to gradual democratization. But democratically oriented oppositions could extract concessions from the incumbent over time through boycotts (Beaulieu, 2006). Schedler (2006) argues that the opposition does not benefit by boycotting except in major boycotts that can unseat an incumbent. The short-term effect is for the opposition to unite and present a formidable force in the future (Smith, 2014). Evidence on boycotts may appear less optimistic, but it produces electoral turnover that indicates a positive step in democracy. They appear to be a low-risk option for opposition parties to enhance the process of democratization. Even if the ability to bring improvements beyond electoral turnover is questionable, there is no

186

L. M. Seemndze

sufficient evidence to point to election boycotts breaking down the electoral process (Smith, 2014). Yet, boycotts disrupt elections and make the incumbent to sit up. We may still ask: Does opposition boycott reduce voter turnout while decreasing the winning candidates’ votes and exposing him to illegitimacy? In a representative democratic system, popular participation is primarily exercised through voter turnout. It is an indirect measure of popular legitimacy. This justifies why boycotts and refusals to accept outcomes may further democratization. A certain level of competitiveness is central to the democracy but is likely to be low, or non-existent, in electoral autocracies (Smith, 2014). It means boycotts do work after all in the long run. Hence, it seems boycotts of elections can enhance democracy in the long-term as it reduces turnout and competition. When opposition parties refuse the results due to low turnovers, democracy develops, and authoritarianism is reduced. Boycotts have some benefits in real democracies. But how do boycotts negatively affect the democratic process in Cameroon?

Negative Impact of Election Boycotts Based on our findings, election boycotts have decelerated the democratic process due to outright manipulation, fraud and corruption, intimidation, and repression. Boycotts have instituted a single-party state and facilitated the consolidation of power by one man while at the time tribalizing Cameroon’s political space. In other words, election boycott is a bad strategy that leads to the political suicide of the opposition parties. Those who boycott the polls or remain indifferent to politics will regret it (Gordji et al., 2018). In fact, they will be ruled by their inferiors.

Deceleration of the Democratic Process Election boycotts slow down the democratic process in Cameroon. They encourage all forms of fraud, manipulation, corruption, intimidation and violence. The stuffing of ballot boxes or the inflation of vote tallies are undemocratic practices. The fact that the Head of State singlehandedly appoints election officials who must be loyal to him exposes serious shortcomings (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1997). When are conditions for a fair election violated for a boycott to be justifiable? This begins from the period of registration where there is proof that the polls will be a façade of democracy. Boycotts have a long-term damaging effect on democracy. They may affect legitimacy, but not results (Smith, 2014). Election boycotts weaken the internal functioning of opposition parties and further wanes their hold on the political landscape. There is no objective debate in parliament due to a weak opposition representation. Presently in Cameroon, the ruling party dominates the Senate with 87 of the 100 seats and the National Assembly

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

187

with 148 out of 180 seats. In this situation, vibrant and objective political debate cannot take place in parliament. This weakens the democratic process. In 2008 when Biya extended his term of office from 5 to 7 years and a two-term mandate limit was removed, violence ensued, and many lives were lost. The concept of ‘natural’ president emerged. Such violence and boycotts in African elections are positively related, with the prospect coinciding in 60% of elections (Lindberg, 2014). In Cameroon, violence and boycotts are responses or causes of perceived election unfairness. They are reactions to previous manipulative strategies of the incumbent rather than an innate feature of a boycott (Schedler, 2006). A bleak picture of near-term democratic reform is caused by violence and low turnout (Beaulieu, 2006). In Cameroon, even peaceful anti-government demonstrations are violently repressed. Those who feel cheated are hemmed in and immobilized. In 1992 and 2018, the runners-up in the presidential polls were placed under arrests for daring to challenge the results. Violence cannot build a robust democracy. The incumbent feels he has the divine right to stay in power and is ready to repress any opposition. Locke (1996) refutes the theory of divine rights because everyone is endowed with natural rights. A leader who cannot protect those rights can be removed by force. For fear of intimidation, open political debate is absent. The electorate is poorly informed. The electoral calendar is only privy to the executive. The national press gives priority to the ruling party. Freedom of speech is curtailed. Government forces shut down campaign headquarters of opposition parties and harass workers (NDI, 1993). Cameroon electoral process can be depicted as sham election that is just held purely for show with results showing a high voter turnout and support. It is jokingly insinuated that before the elections are held in Cameroon, the results are already known. Therefore, if democracy implies a regime with separation of powers where all citizens are guaranteed freedom of thought and expression; and the will of the majority holds sway on decision-making; and there is regular alternation of power, then it needs no arguing that Cameroon is undemocratic. If democracy implies multi-party politics, why is Cameroon a single-party state?

Election Boycotts and Single-Party State If democracy is reduced to the existence of multi-party elections, then we can argue that Cameroon has a semblance of a democratic regime. But democracy transcends political pluralism and electioneering. Constant boycotts enable the dominance one-­ party. The term ‘one-party state’ is a semblance of authoritarian states where a single party wields so much influence (Wanyande, 2000). This began in 1966 when Ahidjo merged political parties into one. Like other African leaders in one-party states, President Ahidjo sought to establish peace, harmony and living-together. But it is highly unlikely that this illusion of ‘living-together as members of the same nation can be enhanced due to the fact that one-party rule encourages tribal politics

188

L. M. Seemndze

that naturally disenfranchises members of other ethnic groups. In fact, One-party rule is simply the desire to remain in office. In 1990, the single-state party reluctantly accepted multi-party democracy but tailored it by consolidating the domination of the ruling party through adapted laws (Monkam, 2012). The change of the party name from CNU to CPDM in 1985 did not change the reality. Under pressure for a national conference in 1991, Biya rather convened a tripartite conference with the government, political parties and neutral personalities. For Eboussi-Boulaga (1997), independent personalities who dominated the forum were members of the ruling CPDM in cahoots with the government. The imposition of unique organizations and centralization of the state institutions despite the provision for decentralization in the 1996 constitution is undemocratic. The change from a federal to a unitary state was a logical consequence (Bayart, 1973). The centralized state directs, controls and imposes everything. No doubt, Biya can insinuate that when Yaoundé breathes, the whole country is doing fine. The state and party form a hegemonic alliance where dissent is prohibited (Derrick, 1992). The consolidation of the single-party state continues by urging other parties to form a coalition with the ruling party that decides everything about elections with no room for dialogue or consensus (Monkam, 2012). This strategy sustains the presidentialist regime under one single ruler.

Consolidation of Power by One Man Cameroon is a republic dominated by a strong presidency that has unfettered control over all government branches. This excessive arrogation of power began when Ahidjo merged all political parties into one – favouring the emergence of a personality cult. An ‘ethic of unity’ opposed to ethnic feeling became his modus operandi. He was referred to as father-of-the-nation, head of state, supreme commander of the armed forces and president of the party (Bayart, 1973). Cameroon president has personal power and personification of powers. He controls, concentrates and masters the state apparatus. His authority symbolizes and incarnates the nation, the state, the party, the executive, the parliament and the judiciary. These organs are not free from coercion, intimidation or pressure from the executive (Bongyu, 2008). The president has formed a ruling class which identifies and owes allegiance to him. He is generally seen as infallible. In a democracy, institutional relations are more favoured to personal relations, but in Cameroon the pre-­ eminence of the president is not counterbalanced by other powers (Derrick, 1992). The President appoints discretionarily. The Prime Minister is only responsible to the President and can be dismissed like other ministers. The Prime Minister begins every speech thus: ‘with high instructions from the Head of State’. It seems he has no mind of his own. The president appoints the executive and judiciary following subjective, partisan and discretionary appreciation (Derrick, 1992). The opposition

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

189

parties boycott elections when they could influence regime alternation. The adage ‘Biya must go’ is used at campaigns. And for 40 years, Biya has not ‘gone’. Monopolizing power by one man is too dangerous. Democracy is not the exercise of power; it is its limitation. Locke (1996) notes that power must be separated in a democracy. To avoid a situation where one branch of government has monopoly of power that results in arbitrary rule, the three functions should be kept entirely separate. The Legislative makes laws, the executive applies them and the judiciary adjudicates. In Cameroon, the executive power is endowed with vigour and splendour. The parliament cannot check the excesses of the executive (Derrick, 1992). Such excessive powers tend to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Without moral scruples, the ruler does wrong out of necessity to succeed (Marchiavelli, 1985). As the saying goes, if you want to test a man’s character, give him power. For such leaders, justice means doing good to friends and harm to enemies (Plato, 1990). Thus, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. It is morally justifiable to oppose such an autocratic regime through non-­ violent means. But such an attempt would be suppressed with utmost force. This insatiable quest for power makes the president to wield absolute power and share it with anyone as it pleases him at the expense of meritocracy. This favouritism has fanned ethnic politics as the opposition parties’ glory in election boycotts rather than working towards unseating the regime.

Election Boycotts and Tribalization of the Political Space Prior to colonialism, African tribes lived in harmony in their political structures. The colonial approach to cultural diversity varied between the British with indirect rule and the French with assimilation. Colonial masters marked arbitrary limits across ethnic lines irrespective of historic, linguistic, and cultural differences. At independence, nation-building became problematic because it was difficult to redefine the populace on ethnic lines. National identity was forged by moulding heterogeneous ethnicities into a nation – called Cameroon (Lavngwa, 2016). The tribalization of the political space in Cameroon is enhanced by election boycotts. This results in the multiplication of parties along ethnic lines, leading to a cacophony of civil strife (Tangwa, 2011). The 1991 ethnic crisis after the re-launch of plural politics and post-election crisis of 2019 went to extremes. The post-­election ethnic clashes between the Bulus and the Bamilekes in the South led to the destruction of businesses belonging to the Bamoums and Bamilekes. This tribalization of political space dates to when Ahidjo was president. He had given major positions undeservedly to the Nordistes. Biya set out to reverse the trend in favour of the Bulus and the Betis through secret massive recruitments into the civil service (Derrick, 1992). Till date, lofty posts are still enjoyed by a certain ethnic elite that seeks to tribalize and control the state to sustain their hold to power (Azevedo, 2000). This leads to profiteering from state coffers.

190

L. M. Seemndze

Political parties are formed on ethnic lines (Dimi, 2007). Most Bamilekes rally behind Maurice Kamto; the Ewondos and Betis behind Paul Biya; the Nordistes behind Bouba Bello or Issa Chiroma, while the anglophones may support Ni John Fru Ndi. Ethnic politics influences the decision to boycott elections. The state is reduced to a clan. This distribution of political power according to tribes is responsible for several tiers of ethnic barons on state politics (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004). Discipline of political opponents from different clans becomes arbitrary and tends to resort to selective repressive strategies. These political strategies weaken the state and its institutions and decelerate the democratic process. Ethnic identity and exclusive politics lead to social fragmentation (Awasom, 2001) with intolerant rhetoric traded between the tribes of rival leaders (Azevedo, 2000). Hence, the only way to calm ethnic tensions is for political leaders to defuse ethnic dynamics and political divisions. This inability to arrest the phenomenon of the tribalization of the political space gives the impression that government is either weak or we are under the rule of political dwarfs.

Election Boycotts and Rule by Inferiors Contesting in elections consolidates democracy more than mere political participation. The problem is that the elite political class shies away from partisan politics. Unlike ancient Greece where political offices were filled using lots, modern democracies use elections. Even then, Plato had argued that the penalty for refusing to participate in politics is that one ends up being governed by his inferiors or idiots (Plato, 1990). If good, honourable and intelligent men refuse to serve in government, they will be ruled by underperforming bad, dishonourable, and dumb rulers. Politics in Cameroon is the fight to the top of the pyramid to lord it over on others. The pyramid climbers are the inferiors who lack self-knowledge and knowledge of state management, yet they assume power out of greed. The pursuit of power ruins one’s soul. Power represents a primitive state of consciousness. Realizing that political power would corrupt his best character traits, Socrates boycotted politics and taught the youth directly. Like Socrates, many who are morally and intellectually qualified in Cameroon choose to boycott active politics and only criticize government. The philosopher should not withdraw from public affairs because incompetent men may ruin the ideal city (Plato, 1988), although a perfect state with a perfect ruler appears utopic and abstract. In the ancient city, Plato favours the rule of the better sort. He contends that there will be no end to human troubles, till philosophers become kings or political power and philosophy come into the same hands (Plato, 1990). The business of the philosopher among men is to be a statesman. One needs to be morally and intellectually endowed to lead because knowledge is connected to virtue and justice (Plato, 1990). Either the wise seize power, or the powerful acquire wisdom because aristocracy is the best and just type of regime (Plato, 1990). This is a meritocratic system in which

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

191

every leader is endowed with moral probity to work for society’s wellbeing (Tangwa, 2011). Therefore, voting in an election needs education for all citizens. The foolishness of democratic voters led to the death of Socrates. Once people have tasted freedom, they become drunk off it and act like idiots. So, if the wise boycott politics, they are punished by suffocating under the rule of the dumb (Plato, 1990). What then is the way forward for Cameroon democracy?

Towards a Credible and Independent Electoral Body The organization of elections in Cameroon has been flawed by electoral bodies that are appointed and controlled by the government that acts as an arbiter and player at the same time. The Ministry of Territorial Administration, the Constitutional Council, the election bodies, and appointed administrators are election stakeholders who use fraudulent means to create bottlenecks that restrict opposition voters. In so doing, they render service to the ruling party hoping for compensation. To salvage the situation, local and international bodies have requested for an Independent Electoral body. The government successively created the National Elections Observatory (NEO) and Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), to supervise and control elections. These bodies are neither independent nor credible. Their role is to organize, observe and announce election results on government terms. Those results have elicited diverse and controversial reactions from all and sundry. Due to loss of public confidence in the electoral process, opposition parties tend to boycott. The way forward is to create a credible and independent electoral body to develop and codify consistent election management procedures. Law enforcement measures must be strengthened, and more emphasis laid on punishing defaulters (Menang, 2006). Efficiency in election management demands that serious attention be given to norms regarding the status, membership, tenure, and mode of funding. Some characteristics have been outlined to guide these electoral bodies: Election bodies must be independent and not part of the formal government bureaucracy. The president cannot single-handedly appoint its members. Mozaffar (2002) identifies three types of electoral bodies: non-autonomous bodies are located within the formal government bureaucracy. Semi-autonomous bodies are in the formal government bureaucracy but are placed under the supervision of an autonomous body. The autonomous body is independent and located outside the formal government bureaucracy. The third option of Mozaffar is recommended for Cameroon. In addition, their members should be selected based on the individuals’ calibre, stature, public respect, competence, impartiality and their knowledge of elections and political development processes (SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2001). These qualities would eliminate any kind of foul play. Furthermore, members should be appointed after consultation with all election stakeholders and with the approval of parliament (Menang, 2006). This is to ensure

192

L. M. Seemndze

that any legislation to govern the conduct of elections must clarify and streamline the role of the election management body. Also, members’ mandates must be durable and secure, preferably entrenched in the constitution. The membership should be inclusive, that is, representative of both sexes and of all social and age groups. Here, the role of civil society and religious bodies cannot be over-emphasized. Again, an election body must be run by staff recruited and dismissed only because of lack of professionalism and competence. They should be efficient, neutral, objective, transparent and accountable to parliament rather than to government. This may be difficult in Cameroon since the parliament is controlled by the executive. It is ideal where is there is separation of power. In addition, the members of the electoral body should have autonomous budgets that are voted by parliament (Menang, 2006). The reluctance of Cameroon governments to relinquish financial control and to allow them complete financial autonomy is because the regime runs a centralized system. There is fear that such a body could be controlled by scrupulous people who are objective and maybe hostile to the state. Its efficiency and accountability must respect constitutional provisions. Such a body must make good use of information technology. It is unthinkable that election results in Cameroon take 2  weeks before they are proclaimed. This lapse gives room for suspicion, uneasiness and anxiety. With technology, results could be known shortly after the polls have closed. This can be facilitated by a single ballot paper and second-round balloting to increase its credibility. Finally, Cameroon must take drastic measures to reform the legal and practical provisions of the electoral process. Civil society and international bodies should assist in electoral reforms. But the government must initiate the process of reform by making use of tested norms and guidelines.

Conclusion In this chapter, we employed a philosophical analytic approach based on the presupposition that election boycotts have an impact on the democratic process in Cameroon. After clarifying some concepts, we traced the history of democracy and discussed the possibility of indigenizing Cameroon democracy. We examined the typologies of regimes and boycotts and tried to justify why boycotts are necessary. Despite a few long-term advantages, boycotts have slowed down the democratic process, instituted a single-party state and a one-man rule as well as tribalized the Cameroon political space. Those who boycott elections will be ruled by their inferiors. There are few cases of functional democracies where boycotts and rejection of results have enhanced democracy (Lindberg, 2014; Beaulieu, 2006; Smith, 2014). These cases are not generalized to justify election boycotts. It is true that the peaceful manner to acquire political power is through multi-party democratic elections. Thus, opposition parties will remain outside the political space if they persist in

12  Impact of Election Boycotts on the Democratic Process in Cameroon…

193

election boycotts. We can conclude that even an unequal participation in elections is more rewarding than boycotting which hands over victory to one’s political rival. A credible and independent electoral body is therefore an urgent necessity for Cameroon democracy.

References Ademola, K. F. (2009). Towards an African theory of democracy. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK). Premier Issue, New Series, 1(1), 101–126. Awasom, N. F. (2001). Autochthony and citizenship in postcolonial Africa: A critical perspective on Cameroon. Leiden. Azevedo, M. (2000). Ethnicity and democratization: Cameroon and Gabon. In O.  Nnoli (Ed.), Government and politics in Africa. A reader. AAPS Books. Bayart, J.-F. (1973). One-party government and political development in Cameroun. African Affairs, 72(287), 125–144. Beaulieu, A. (2006). Protesting the contest: Election boycotts around the world, 1990–2002. PhD dissertation, University of California. Retrieved on November 9, 2021 from https://escholarship.org/content/qt1h22t7g6/pdf Bongyu, G. M. (2008). Democracy in Cameroon during the monolithic period: A contradiction. Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights. Retrieved on November 22, 2021 from http://www.cjdhr.org Derrick, J. (1992). Political economy of Cameroon: One party, many parties, and the state. Africa Insight, 22(3), 165–177. Dahl, R. (1989). Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dibussi, T. (2009). Scribbles from the Den: Essays on politics and collective memory in Cameroon. Yaoundé. Dimi, C. R. (2007). Historicité et Rationalité de la Démocratie Africaine. l’Harmattan. Eboussi-Boulaga, F. (1997). La démocratie de transit au Cameroun. L’Harmattan. Ebune, J. B. (1992). The growth of political parties in southern Cameroons 1916–1960. CEPER. Gordji, M.  E., Askari, G., & Abdi, H. (2018). Why is a boycott of the elections a bad idea? Retrieved on September 20, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints08.0247.v1 Halff, M. (2016). Confidence in elections and the acceptance of results. Kofi Annan Foundation’s Electoral Integrity Initiative. Retrieved on October 23, 2021 from https://aceproject.org/ ero-­en/misc/ Harbemas, J. (1991). The public sphere. In C. Mukerji & M. Schudson (Eds.), Rethinking popular culture: Contemporary perspectives in cultural studies. University of California Press. Lavngwa, M. S. (2016). Politicization of cultural diversity and its impact on nation building in Cameroon: A political philosophical analysis. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 9(4), 158. Lavngwa, M. S. (2019). Plato and the institution of education: Critique of Cameroon education. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Dschang. Lindberg, S. (2014). Why do opposition parties boycott elections? Retrieved on November 3, 2021 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228161022 Locke, J. (1996). Two treatises on government. Oxford University Press. Marchiavelli, N. (1985). The prince. University of Chicago Press. Mbuagbo, O. T., & Akoko, R. M. (2004). Democratisation and social fragmentation in Cameroon. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 13(1), 1–12. Menang, T. (2006). Election management in Cameroon: Progress, problems and prospects. Journal of African Elections, 5(1), 60–73. Monkam, D. (2012). The search for a Cameroonian model of democracy or the search for the domination of the state party: 1966–2006. Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 23, 85–108.

194

L. M. Seemndze

Mozaffar, S. (2002). Patterns of electoral governance in Africa’s emerging democracies. International Political Science Review, 23(1), 85–101. NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs). (1993). An assessment of the October 11, 1992, elections in Cameroon. Library of Congress. Ngoh, V. J. (2001). Democracy and democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa: The case of Cameroon 1960–2000. Epasa Moto, 1(5), 4–47. Ngwane, G. (2014). Opposition politics and electoral democracy in Cameroon 1992 to 2007. Africa Development, XXXIX(2), 103–116. Nohlen, D., Krennerich, M., & Thibaut, B. (1999). Elections in Africa: A data handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parvin, P. (2018). Democracy without participation: A new politics for a disengaged era. Res Publica, 24, 31–52. Retrieved on October 1, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-­9382-­1 Plato. (1988). The laws (Saunders Jay, Trans.). Harper. Plato. (1990). Plato: Complete works (Cooper John, Ed.). Oxford University Press. SADC Parliamentary Forum. (2001). Norms and standards for elections in the SADC region. SADC Parliamentary Forum. Schedler, A. (2006). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36–50. Smith, I. O. (2014). Election boycotts and hybrid regime survival. Comparative Political Studies, 47(5), 743–765. Tangwa, G. B. (2011). Philosophy, democracy and development: History and the case of Cameroon. In L. Keita (Ed.) (2007), Philosophy and African development: Theory and practice. Senegal: CODESTRIA. Wanyande, P. (2000). Democracy and the one-party state: The African experience. In O.  Nnoli (Ed.), Government and politics in Africa. A reader. AAPS Books. Wiredu, K. (1995). Democracy and consensus in African traditional political politics: A plea for a non-party polity. The Centennial Review, 39(1), 53–64. Woolf, H. (Ed.). (1981). Webster’s new collegiate dictionary. Merriam Company. Lavngwa Moses Seemndze holds a PhD in Moral and Political Philosophy with a focus on Philosophy of Education. His research interests are in the field of moral and political philosophy, philosophy of education and African philosophy. He is the Head of Service in-charge of Programmes at the Office of Academic Affairs and Part-time Instructor in the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Buea-­Cameroon. He is also an adjunct Lecturer at Biaka University Institute of Buea-Cameroon.  

Part III

Arts, Culture and Democracy in Africa

Chapter 13

Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda Justine Nabaggala

Abstract  Historically, African communities were considered learning arenas for all. Folk-wisdom traditions and approaches to sustainable livelihood were transferred from generation to generation. These approaches to life created awareness of meaning of knowledge and skills to both society and individuals. Within the same communities there existed different art forms that contributed to contextualised meaning-making processes. In this case, culture plays a pivotal role in nurturing individual and community identities, ownership, and practices. Further, Art brings together people with unique cultural practices and helps them appreciate each other’s diversity, and understand the existing historical and cultural heritage therein. In the case of Uganda, there are various cultural communities with unique practices and values that help them understand their environments and who they are. Through Art there continues to be support for emotional and social independence during meaning-making processes in Uganda. During such engagements, there is strengthening of community participation and thus creating a sense of belonging, cultural documentation, advocacy for change and empowerment among individuals. In this chapter, through a globalised lens, I expound on the fundamental contributions of African Art as a form of social process through creative democracy, and cultural and participatory democracy towards meaning-making. I share both text and visual meanings voluntarily obtained through a narrative inquiry approach from participants in Uganda that have made contributions to material culture, social sustainability, and economic empowerment through Art, considering the space and time of occurrences. Linking cultural art forms in their works, artists’ advocacy of eliminating intellectual invisible colonialism and appreciation for the relevance of culture towards the development of contextualised knowledge and intellectual independence.

J. Nabaggala (*) Department of Visual Communication, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_13

197

198

J. Nabaggala

Introduction Communication Art is traced from the Paleolithic period commonly referred to as the Early Stone Age, to the fall of the Roman empire. During this time the artwork that was produced was representational of prehistoric human culture and people’s ability to use stone tools for utility and expressional purposes. Their aesthetic touch of the stone tools upholds the notion of any form of art as an aspect of work that contributes to creative, cultural, and participatory forms of democracy. This affirms the presumption that Art promotes freedom of assembly, association, and speech; its inclusive in nature and advocates for equality; a form of membership be it socially or economically; empowers an individual to exercise his/her rights to life and participation. Engaging in any form of art an individual is enabled to create a voice for the voiceless. Having participated in the production of utility objects in pottery, weaving spinning, and ceremonial rituals during the Middle Stone Age and New Stone Age contributed to African individuals’ exploitation of their creative abilities. Thus, a visual culture is established within various social contexts. Further, this experience has contributed to artistic generational contributions depicting the interplay between social practices and Art towards creating meaning in day-to-day life experiences. From an Afrocentric perspective, art, culture, and democracy are viewed through a “post-enlightenment” form of wisdom. Further, democracy is viewed beyond voting and elections (Reiter, 2021) and therefore considered as a process that involves maturing of an understanding and a continual unfolding of whoever we are. In this case, a spirituality process that is gradual and reflective in nature is linked to humankind experiences within various contexts (pre-determined or not). I find it so fascinating the way individuals recollect their souls with actions in life and how imperative it is to acknowledge the truth that lies within one’s spiritual maturing process during the production of an artwork. When engaged in art production, it is evident that there is an interplay between the soul and one’s life actions. Realising that what happens in individual’s spiritual life is not linear, this makes one appreciate the fact that “the unfolding of the human heart is artful and mysterious”. We can never identify the indicators of enlightenment unless we experience them in a sequence that is not clearly defined by us. This justifies the use of art as one of the components for African wisdom traditions to depict meanings of experiences that seem to be challenging to talk about. When freedom of expression is represented as a shift of identity through art, the self in individuals is linked to their souls and therefore this goes beyond our bodies and minds. Kornfield (2001) relates the truth to the way individuals learn by descent during which the truths obtained bring wholeness and humility in acceptance. Through art production, artists are being realistic to oneself and achieving a sense of success. Accepting the way life is and embracing the changing powers of life awakens the artistic minds and hearts and through this, artists can develop trust and visually embrace the full reality of the present.

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

199

 ow to Respond Wisely Through Art and Fully Exercise H Individual Humanity There is a need for artists to have an open and careful spirit when providing a visual response to something or a situation. Judgements should be made based on the “fearless moral inventory” that a person holds (Kornfield, 2001, p. 140). Being able to question cultural beliefs, community practices, and individual understandings enables us to realise and tell the difficult truth to ourselves and to one another through the spirit of compassion and in the knowledge of interconnection. When communities live in open acknowledgement of human needs and emotions, individuals may find certain ease in matters that affect them democratically. Although we should be aware of arising problems and being able to recognise them in whatever form of expression. What fascinates me is that visual enlightenment comes when artists recognise that both personal suffering, achievements, and awakening are in the service of a higher good. Recognising the truth within individual art practices (that is, not and having the ability to execute something within a given context) reflects on how wise we are and the way we embrace changes in our lives. What brings us back to the reality is when as artists we further recognise the ways in which we have expressed ourselves. It should be noted that as artists, visually witnessing the failures and successes individuals encounter in life comes with an understanding of being human. These experiences are linked to the extent to which human being exercise their powers within given time and space. This book chapter, therefore, addresses a personal understanding of the arts and culture’s contribution to democratic experiences within given time and space.

Art as a Social Process Through Creative Democracy From a sociological perspective, the arts have their ancient roots evolved within human history. This is evidenced from artistic photographs famously known in Drakensburg, South Africa, and to the cave paintings in Altamira, Spain, and Lascaux, France; to the works of such famous artists as Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) and Marc Chagall (1887–1985; Malouf & White, 1953; see also York et al., 1993). Further evidence is obtained from historical places within Uganda and East Africa. Engagement in creative democracy is reflected in the remnants of pottery and household utensils in many parts of the world and is evidence of human creativity over thousands of years. According to Dewey (1976/1939), creative democracy explores the different ways in which individual artistic creativity is shaped by democratic norms and practices. Experiences encountered in an individual’s way of life and moral consciousness evidently construct what is considered as Art. A form of act that has been created in the interplay between people, time, and space. This affirms to the notion that ‘all people are in position to make intelligent, reasoned judgements about the wider decisions that directly affect their lives in a positive manner

200

J. Nabaggala

(Vail & Hollands, 2013). From a professional point of view, my artistic impressions are generated beyond technical skills and during which feelings, pleasures, and anxieties are freely expressed visually. Creative democracy further influences the pedagogical strategies I use when mentoring upcoming artists. Students are met with a whole self that is drown towards a conscious and sub-conscious mind I would relate this to a form of dreaming and personal experiences during the teaching and learning of Art. Objective questions such as: what does it take to develop a student’s creativity within the fine arts? To what extent does the student pay attention to his/ her inner voice or values when making an artwork? Is there conflict between the predetermined elements and principles of art design within the formal education system and the sub-conscious self of the student that sees something differently? One of the universal philosophical principles that most African communities observe is the intuitive and symbolic contribution of art during making meaning in life engagements. Acknowledging that artistic activities are framed through social, cultural, political, and economic structures expounds on the defining of life itself. To Henri (1923/1984) art is integral to everyday life and when understood, unique personalities and representations are embraced within given contexts. Art, when really understood, is the province of every human being. It is simply a question of doing things, anything, well. It is not an outside, extra thing. When the artist is alive in any person, whatever his [sic] kind of work maybe, he becomes an inventive, searching, daring, self-expressing creature…He [sic] does not have to be a painter or sculptor to be an artist. He [sic] can work in any medium. He [sic] simply must find the gain in the work itself, not outside it. (p. 157)

Art, therefore, within a particular context and activity is considered an act of participation beyond its principles and elements. According to Haraway (1998) and Eisner (2002), imagery of vision positions all human beings to understand and see through their “personal mind’s eye” (p. 8). More so, it is through how, where and what an individual sees that his/her very being and social set up as well as establishment of the truth that one questions less about what or who he/she is. From one of my research projects’ experiences, participants were encouraged to visually define the meaning of their professional work. I found it fascinating how social practices and experiences, values, and norms guided their production processes. The artworks reflected their struggles as immigrants trying to fit in a context newly being considered as home influenced by their born originality of who, what, and why they are. Based on the participants’ contributions a personal artwork was produced reflecting an understanding that was derived from the physical and emotional experiences encountered during the interactions and written narratives shared (Fig. 13.1). The artwork produced draws us to the philosophy on aesthetics that refers art to a distinction between modes of being than modes of doing (Ranciére, 2004). In this case, any form of art concentrates on a specific form of sensory apprehension (p. 29) than the pre-determined principles of technical competences. Thus, visually sharing one’s personal truth that is contextualised and relevant within a given time. Therefore, Art is availed with an opportunity to be viewed as a “sensory form…heterogeneous to the ordinary forms of sensory experience” (Ranciére, p. 30). Further, Ranciére’s aesthetic unconscious is in line with Foucault’s (1982) contribution on

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

201

Fig. 13.1 Justine Nabaggala; a journey, mixed media (2014)

the inward significance of art to individuals or life. Having been born, raised, and continue to live within the post-colonial discourse, as an artist I still connect to the Afrocentric ideologies and perception on what is considered of value within the specific space and time when expressing personal thoughts. Through a sociological lens, most African communities are grounded on universal philosophical principles although dimensions may vary. In concurrence with the universality, Lajul (2013) asserts Although we have philosophical principles that could be universal to African philosophy in general, this does not eliminate differences relating to different African ethnic or cultural communities. African philosophy definitely has dimensions that are universal to Africa or to philosophy in general, while other dimensions are unique to particular African communities. (p. 9)

Magara (2015) observes that the uniqueness in the diversity of Ugandan culture considers the arts as means towards promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity, capturing and rewriting history of the cultural communities. My origin being from the Ganda community, production of functional artworks has been part of our lives

202

J. Nabaggala

and therefore a form of work from which community members have economically benefited and culturally preserved the heritage of its people. Therefore, work is considered an artistic activity that engages the hand, heart, mind, and body (Mjelde, 2006). Namuwonge Jenny, who is a Ugandan artist, specialises in the production of culturally oriented jewellery. It is some form of work that she links to the Ganda cultural values attached to the selected objects for production. By the artist utilising natural materials to produce crafts, culturally reminds her of the historical origin of who she is, socially her crafts call for peoples’ attention and it is a practice that economically empowers her. In Fig.  13.2, the artist produced a necklace using pieces curved out of a gourd and raffia used to create a strap onto which the developed shapes are joined to each other. A calabash is a hard shell got from some fruit in the gourd family. It is dried and hollowed out to be used for serving, storing food, and as musical instruments. The gourd and raffia are biodegradable materials that culturally and socially people relate with in their day-to-day life. Through using such materials from the environment reflects how rich the world around us is and further reminds us on how to repurpose while preserving and not destroying the natural surroundings within communities. It should be noted that when cultural forms are used in the work of art, we sometimes don’t need to describe or explain the works of art but instead let the audience establish a common ground for the artist’s and the viewer’s understanding. Devadason and Fenton (2013) advised, “Let your work talk about you. When you design, your design should speak your language, your thoughts, your ideas and about you” (p. 35). On the other hand, considering the work to talk about an individual in certain circumstances we sub-consciously suppress self-identity in favour of social identity. In this case the artist distances him/herself from the artwork

Fig. 13.2  A necklace; Jenny Namuwonge, 2021

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

203

produced. This does not refute the fact that we can nurture self-identity but conforms to Pestalozzi’s in Bruhlmeier (2010) conviction that “human nature is such that we cannot realise our true potential as human beings without the influence of other people” (p. 18). Through creative democracy, African artists have been and continue to be empowered in their works to build and, uphold both their personal and social identities. Putting into consideration that consciousness plays a role in constructing meaning, what factors facilitate that consciousness to construct the meaning of an artwork? Can meaning of an artwork be constructed within or outside the social context? How best can individuals establish truth to justify their reasons for living? In this case, Philosophers such as Voloshinov (1973) and Wittgenstein (1958) re-­ affirm to a personal standpoint on real-life understanding and argued that in ordinary social life, meaning is never abstract or generalised when it is separated from its real context; it is always particular and concrete (Wittgenstein, 1958). From Namuwonge’s creative contribution, appreciating the cultural relevance of the gourd in Buganda, this guided her production processes for a circular necklace that represents the value of togetherness and unity. In this case, she did not entirely think of how expensive the selected material chosen for the necklace production was but what cultural value it held and could visually be expressed through the adornment of the human body. Therefore, our visually subjective and cultural oriented meanings may often be derived at without an individual considering what comprises excellence and what does not.

Cultural Democracy and the Arts Cultural democracy recognises inclusiveness and when emerged with the arts everyone is actively engaged in deciding what constitutes as culture, where it happens, who makes it, and what experiences are encountered. The type of art produced is unique in nature; be it individually or communally produced, and its purpose of deeper participation is therefore achieved in the end. From an artistic and Afrocentric point of view, art and culture are considered borderless, in this case not confined to specific activities. All life experiences be it informal or formal are embraced artistically. Everyone is believed to being creative, a contributor to positive change and view the world uniquely while developing a sense of belonging. Ugandan artists such as Katarikawe, J; Masembe, G; Kanuge, JB; Sserunjogi, P; Mutebi, F; Musoke, T; Tumusiime, A; Kakande, A; Kyeyune, G; Nakazibwe, V; Kwesiga, P; Nabulime, L; Kekimuri, J; Kizito-Maria, K: Mayanja, W; and Kirumira, N, R. continue to demonstrate the link between wisdom traditions and the understanding of democracy as a concept through the visual arts. Their engagement in the production of art embraces the African aesthetics system that considers the practicality and meaningfulness of an artwork and also regards its beauty as secondary. In this case, beauty is achieved in an artwork if it serves its purpose within a given context. Kabito (2010) asserts:

204

J. Nabaggala

Images do not represent what they are, but instead represent something else of immediate importance. If images do not…then the immediate thing of importance to the prospective knower, by some means, should be accessible in accordance with ganda context of art appreciation. (p. 87)

In relation to the above, meaning in Buganda is rooted in its oral culture in which objects and beliefs provide a diversified symbolic interaction of experiences encountered (Masembe, 2002). Further, Kaggwa (1952) applauds the artistic cultural practices for having kept the Buganda kingdom united and progressed socially, economically, and politically. In this case within structures of society there is evidence of interaction with nature that expresses one’s relationship between the body and material existence. I believe that the visible and invisible values obtained through the arts embrace the inclusion of experiences that are deeply felt. Dialoguing is one common practice of cultural democracy, and it is used by most African communities as well artists to visually present its relevance to community cohesion and responsibility. Through dialogue democratic discussions on social, economic, and political aspects were held and continue to be recognised in this era. Ownership on a decision made recognises that there is continuity and interaction, which are considered key factors in establishing one’s experience, mutual agreements that continue to contribute to a collective social organisation. In Fig. 13.2, the artist uses soot to produce figurative images of people engaged in a form of dialogue on a canvas. The artwork affirms the argument by Shusterman (2010) that, “Art is an embodied, expressively refined excretion of natural energies” (p. 28) exhibited by the individual participating in the production. Furthermore, this agrees with John Dewey’s notion as quoted by Shusterman “the work of art operates to deeper and to raise to great clarity the sense of an enveloping undefined whole that accompanies every normal experience” (pp. 36–37). The artist has and continues to participate in such dialogues and the impart to create change is left for the audience and artist to experience uniquely. Establishing desire, purpose, and exercising freedom of thought through art is an activity that enables one to avoid separating the inner self (internal) from the physical aspects of human interaction. What I still find fascinating is that individuals make various aesthetic judgements to appreciate art as a product and process, but what links all viewers is the visual connection. The relationship between the artist and the artworks might differ from that of the viewer. The truth in this sense holds, based on the context in which the artwork is created and for what purpose, as Ranciére (2004) and Benjamin (1968) affirmed in their theories of aesthetics. We do not view art in the sense of beauty, which is relative, but in the sense that we are able to communicate visually through various media to establish the meaning of contextualised experiences. Expressing the realities inform of shapes, colour, and involvement in the production of the artwork portrays the artist’s “altered state of consciousness” (Andrews, 2005, p. 27) linked to his African cultural orientation. Furthermore, Andrews (2005) identifies this type of consciousness as “creative imagination or imaginative cognition” and highlights that:

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

205

Creative imagination, or imaginative cognition, is the key to opening the doors to true spiritual awareness, energies, and beings. Energy from the more ethereal realms must take the form of images for us to recognize them and work within them. The imagination should not be confused with unreality. Through imagination we create a new awareness of realities in form, color, sound etc., that surround us. (pp. 27–28)

In view of imaginative cognition’s contribution to creating meaning, one’s engagement in the production of an artwork continues to reflect on a critical question of ‘art as for what purpose’. The quest for ‘truth’ as existing by itself and depiction in Fig. 13.2 highlights, its uniqueness of being as eternal and shared through multiple forms of communication. The strength of an artwork and its role in society is contended by Leavy (2009) when a picture is “worth a thousand words” (p. 215). This saying consolidates the notion that I personally espouse as an artist: I do not speak; the work speaks for me, and if it speaks to the viewer, then we are unconsciously connected regardless of the viewer’s interpretation of the work. Bell hooks’ (1995) framework of representation, recognition of the familiar, suggests that art can “depict aspects of how people differentially located in the social order experience social life or how they image life” (p. 203). Figure 13.3 includes plates of the personal work that I produced in 2018 that represent my understanding of and responses to some contemporary issues within the then community that was living in. The artworks produced depicted the social issues in the community at that time and linked to the people’s values as well as their influence on others in various communities, while exploring possible alternative print-making surfaces. My creative works offer readers some of the personal understandings that I have elicited through art. Using coffee beans, footsteps in big and small sizes, and arrows in a heroic movement as an artist helped me to envision the social, economic, and political systems in Uganda and, how collective responsibility contributes to the fulfilment of both individual and community aspects of life. For example, a coffee bean among the Baganda communities is considered more of a social item that brings members

Fig. 13.3  The dialogue. Mayanja Richard Weazher, 2021

206

J. Nabaggala

together, a cultural sign of brotherhood, wealth, and form of identity. As a result of the Industrial Revolution, coffee was transformed into a widely cultivated and traded commodity that once led to Uganda’s position as one of the top (ten)10 Robusta coffee-growing countries. The second print depicting corruption in society as a form of generational effect reflects the extent to which socio-cultural learning practices influence behaviour or action; be it good or bad in nature. The young learn from the elders through an imitation process and later mastering the act which is guided by ‘learning by doing’ concept (Dewey, 1938). The arrows used in the third print culturally symbolise leadership. Be it the head of family or leaders in communities was required to have an arrow or spear in his possession. The reason behind this was that they always had to be prepared to always defend themselves and their communities. When misused within a given context, violation of human democracy is evidenced through the effects experienced by the people therein. These artworks therefore depict prosperity if human beings form a sense of togetherness, identity formation, skills transformation, influence of good or bad actions, and a means of establishing value about what is worthwhile. Individual moral consciousness of what one does has a great deal to do with the actions in which he/she engages while framing personal social identities. The artistic interpretations in Fig.  13.4 suggest that our visual representations can hold meanings about our understandings of life. The cultural meaning as well as usage of the items contributes to the development of the forms used to construct a contextualised meaning. Further, the works of art relate to what Henri (1923/1984) considered moments in our lives, such as moments in a day when we seem to see beyond the usual, which becomes telepathic and reaches into reality. I believe that, as individuals, at times understanding or envisioning certain aspects of life varies from time to time; such situations I refer to as meditation or a form of enlightenment. Kornfield (2001) stated: There are certain truths we can learn only by descent, truths that bring wholeness and humility in surrender. In the times of our heart’s greatest vulnerability, we come close to the selfless mystery of life. We need periods of fecund time, fallow time, of being drawn closer to the humus of the earth. It is as though something in us slows down, calls us back. And out of that time a deepened knowledge and beauty can emerge... Life offers us just what it

Fig. 13.4  Plates of personal work 2018

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

207

offers, and our task is to bow to it, to meet it with understanding and compassion. (pp. 131–134)

I presume that during such times one is engaged in a subconscious form of thinking, and the brain reconfigures a person’s thoughts into visual interpretations. Henri further postulated that such are the moments of our greatest happiness and wisdom. Interpreting my thoughts through visual art helps me to portray what is of importance to me, and I feel a sense of satisfaction that my audience might or not think about and understand the purpose of my artworks. My interpretation of the artworks involves hidden understandings of the contemporary issues within my context in relation to certain meanings of the cultural artefacts that I have depicted in both Figs. 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4.

Participatory Democracy and the Arts Activism is one form of participatory democracy through which artists envision their purpose to society. In Uganda, poets, cartoonists, and singers continue to voice their dissatisfaction in the current authoritarian political regime. Regardless of the attempts to silence the modes of art used during political activism, Ugandans still gain access through radios, online platforms such as twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube to expand their political thoughts and action through the arts. Exhibiting existing democratic processes through the various artistic modes of communication is usually considered difficult to take out of context. Such artistic experiences are considered as forms of social activism (Zinggl, 2001). It should be noted that social activism while applying the arts does not necessarily portray the reality but individual interpretations of what really it is or was. For example, in Fig. 13.4, Sumy Sarduni a photographer based in Uganda produced digitalised artwork of a feminist scholar and activist’s analysis on personal experiences through a memorised story for us to understand her contribution as one of Uganda’s political critics. As an artist, I related the artwork to persons within a community that are voiceless and overwhelmed by uncertainty. And regardless of not having the right to verbally speak, there are other forms of voices one can use to communicate pertinent issues to society. It should be considered that the arts associated with popular culture are often considered more of entertainment than serving a variety of social functions in life. There is more than the artistic beauty to this type of art or any ordinary object that enhances our day-to-day lives (Love & Mattern, 2013). The digitalised artwork provides an interpretive meaning of her struggle to freely express through writing on criticisms of the failures, violations, and excesses of Museveni’s dictatorship. The artwork further highlights her deep desire and determination to “write herself to freedom, even during a repressive regime that penalises free expression” in the image the female activist is holding her two books of poetry of which one was published while she was serving her sentence in prison for having written a poem that

208

J. Nabaggala

offended the Country’s President. Through this piece of art, there is a constructive development process of knowledge that is hermeneutically being interpreted in relation to the activist’s experiences within a given context and therefore, we continue to understand the existing cultural norms and behaviour patterns from which meaning was derived. Through the same photograph, the subjective interpretation from an artist’s perspective is in focus as a form of exercise and psychoanalysis process for self-­ reflection of the activist. She is using art to enable her to generate some form of dialogue with the artist and targeted audience. In this case art is viewed as a political companion that has been in use within cultural settings in Africa. Although it is the activist’s body being depicted in the photograph and not the actual trauma that she went through, there is a representation of the role of an African woman participating in democratic processes that are linked to her memorisation of experiences previously encountered. There is a question being asked on whether history is repeating itself as far as Uganda’s political history is concerned. The photograph further reminds us to consistently question the extent to which art is creating multiple platforms for the voiceless within the political arena. On the other hand, artists in Uganda have become environmental activists and spearheaded advocacy in climate change and environmental conservation through recycling materials into functional and educative objects. Artists such as Bruno Ruganzu and Reagan Kandole use recycled materials to produce artistic objects or structures collaboratively with various Ugandan communities that could taste the record of time. Their artistic contribution in communities is in line with what Pitchai and Akilandeeswari (2013) asserts of creative art having to change according to the prevailing or changing situation within given contexts. For example, Kandole as an ECOaction activist participated in a project during 2020 as presented in Fig. 13.5. Himself and other community members produced and installed a 3.5 m elephant

Fig. 13.5  The voiceless; Sumy Sarduni 2021

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

209

structure that was made from collected recyclable waste within the metropolitan areas of Fort Portal in Uganda. As much as the community members were creating something beautiful within a given space, they were democratically participating in processes that reminded them of the endangered wildlife in Uganda. Through this form of activism in ECOaction has initiated public awareness, critical commentary, and local action on the impacts and effects of waste on these animals and environment in general. The ECOaction movement in Uganda works with communities to advocate for waste management and its contribution to various forms of sustainability. In this case, the ECOaction movement considers waste as useful material not to be destroyed and contributes to environmental degradation in Uganda that could potentially affect the existing climate conditions. The youth from various contexts are encouraged to participate in such advocacy to provide them with learning opportunities in skills-oriented training and developing an understanding for the use of eco-friendly alternatives to waste in a culturally meditated way (Fig. 13.6). In view of the arts’ contribution to society, the exploration of recycled materials reflects on an existing relationship between social art practices and, sustainability, advocacy as well as social identity. It is during such artistic engagements that art is used to restore and preserve historical knowledge and valuable art forms. Using art in a sustainable approach potentially contributes to some form of economic development and culture recognition within various communities. Ebewo et al. (2014) confirmed that art was being used as a sustainable practice within the African creative industry. Further, Graham (2018) concurs with the use of art in community

Fig. 13.6  The elephant in the room, Kandole Reagan 2020

210

J. Nabaggala

projects to increase participation, knowledge creation and nurture unique creativity abilities among people in different communities. Community sustainability through art practices promotes development and culture recognition from the grassroots during which social and collective responsibilities are democratically practised and recognised by all. This therefore acts as a drive towards social change, management, and awareness channel of diversity in ways that community members learn, inspire others, create a unique form of identity, and enormously contribute to possible as well as achievable social systems (Blanc & Benish, 2017). When we artistically engage in participatory democracy, the construction of whom we want to be is evident and there is always a tendency to experiment with various attributes that come to mind. During this time, we begin to develop and adapt to the current environments that define the prevailing social experiences. By appreciating and understanding our experiences within the discarding and adaptation stages, as artists we achieve a sense of truthfulness, rationality, significance, uniqueness, maturity, absorption, or any other attributes. More, we tend to produce artworks that relate to what we associate with. In conclusion, based on the contributions made in this chapter, it is evident that art has been created in the interplay between people and the environment. Art’s purpose to human beings in exercising any form of democracy contributes to their personal meaning derived at. This is ascribed to a unique form of sensory apprehension; thus, re-affirming the property of distinction between modes of being and modes of doing. Appreciating that our consciousness plays a role in constructing meaning both at personal and community levels, one is intrigued to continuously appreciate the interrelationship between art and the social, physical, and emotional aspects in meaning-making of life experiences encountered within contextualised settings. Taking ownership of the visual positions derived at through art reflects the existing knowledge emancipation, social acceptance and environmental sustainability within the cultural orientation’s individuals are identified with. The production of artworks exhibits the relationship between consciously and unconsciously defined attributes and values that establish unique interpretations through the creative process. The creative process establishes personal worth, and recognition. As artists, we establish networks that test our potential and influence our view of life. Understanding the impact of personal actions reconnects us to the ‘Why?’ question of existence. The power of the hand – the applicability of ideas, the heart – the soul/ emotional attachment, the body – the physical, and the mind – cognitive connection – being in the moment of logical reasoning – in interactions results in awareness of the self and in relation to the other. We not only network, but we do so with purpose, and each experience is unique to everyone within the African communities.

13  Art as a Social Process and Form of Democratic Practices in Uganda

211

References Andrews, T. (2005). How to meet and work with spirit guides. Llewellyn Publications. Benjamin, W. (1968). The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (pp. 214–218). Fontana. Blanc, N., & Benish, B. L. (2017). Form, art, and the environment: Engaging in sustainability. Taylor & Francis. Bruhlmeier, A. (2010). Head and hand education in the spirit of Pestalozzi. Sophia Books. Devadason, R., & Fenton, S. (2013). Power, reflexivity and difference multinational corporation. Ethnicities, 13(4), 475–493. Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and education. The Macmillan Company. Dewey, J. (1976/1939). Creative democracy: The task before us. In J.  Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953 (Vol. 14, pp.  224–230). Southern Illinois University Press. Available at https://chipbruce.files.wordpress.com/2008/11/dewey-­creative_dem.pdf. Accessed on 22/05/2012. Ebewo, P., Stevens, I., & Sirayi, M. (Eds.). (2014). Africa and beyond: Arts and sustainable development. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Eisner, E. (2002). The arts and the creation of the mind. Yale University Press. Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. In H.  L. Dreyfus & P.  Robinow (Eds.), Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (pp. 779–796). Harvester Wheatsheaf. Graham, R. (2018). The global state of the art in engineering education. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Report. Haraway, D. (1998). The persistence of vision. In N.  Mirzoeff (Ed.), Visual cultural reader (pp. 191–198). Routledge. Henri, R. (1984). The art spirit. Harper and Row. Hooks, B. (1995). Art on my mind: Visual politics. New Press. Kabito, R. (2010). Meaning making in visual culture: The case of integrating Ganda indigenous knowledge with contemporary art practice in Uganda. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Art & Design. Kaggwa, A. (1952). The customs of Buganda. London. Macmillan & Ltd. Kornfield, J. (2001). After the ecstasy, the laundry: How the heart grows wise on the spiritual path. Bantam Books. Lajul, W. (2013). African philosophies: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Leavy, P. (2009). Method meets art: Arts-based research practice. Guilford Press. Love, S.  N., & Mattern, M. (2013). Doing democracy: Activist art and cultural politics. State University of New York Press. Magara, C. E. (2015, August). Emerging opportunities in the creative and cultural economy in the EAC for exploitation. The JAMA festival in Nairobi 2015. Malouf, C., & White, T. (1953). Kutenai calendar records: A study of Indian record keeping. Montana Magazine of History, 3(2), 34–39. Masembe, H. (2002). Engero Zaffe. Fountain Publishers. Mjelde, L. (2006). The magical properties of workshop learning. Peter Lang. Pitchai, C. R., & Akilandeeswari, S. V. (2013). Innovation: A panacea for cooperatives in India with particular reference to the state of Tamilnadu, innovative cooperative ventures/initiatives. In Proceedings and papers of 30th annual national convention (pp. 62–73). Dominant Publishers and Distributors Pvt Ltd. Ranciére, J. (2004). The distribution of the sensible: Politics and aesthetics. In G. Rockhill (Ed. and Trans.), The politics of aesthetics (pp. 22–23). Continuum. Reiter, B. (2021). The African origins of democracy. Academia Letters, Article 414. https://doi. org/10.20935/AL414 Shusterman, R. (2010). Dewey’s art as experience: The psychological background. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 44(1), 26–43.

212

J. Nabaggala

Vail, J., & Hollands, R. (2013). Creative democracy and the arts: The participatory democracy of the Amber collective. Journals of Cultural Sociology, 7(3), 352–367. https://doi. org/10.1177/1749975513480958 Voloshinov, V. N. (1973). Marxism and the philosophy of language. Seminar Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations. Macmillan. York, A., Daly. R., & Arnett, C. (1993). They write their dreams on the rock forever: Rock writings in the stein river valley of British Colombia. Vancouver, BC: Talonbooks. Zinggl, W. (2001). Wochenklausur: Socio-political activism in art. Springer. Justine Nabaggala is an academic staff at Kyambogo University in The Department of Visual Communication. She holds a PhD in Secondary Education from the University of Alberta, Canada; a Master of Arts in Fine Arts from Makerere University, Uganda; a Master’s in Vocational Pedagogy from Akersus University College, Norway and a Postgraduate Diploma in Management from Uganda Management Institute, Uganda. As a double practitioner (artist and teacher trainer) she is interested in the collaboration between the World of Work and Vocational Institutions of Training. She also expresses and communicates her reflective thoughts through visual art. She has participated in multidisciplinary research projects as a Principal or Co-researcher; conducted and mentored in skills development trainings at both national and international level. To her, there is nothing of relevance when a person fails to understand his/her true self through their personal cultural indigenous knowledge systems. She enjoys music, dancing and travelling.  

Chapter 14

Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda Kyazike Elizabeth, John Mary Kanyamurwa, and Stanley Babalanda

Abstract  Uganda attained independence on the 9th of October 1962 with a diverse cultural spectrum. Yet current analyses hardly interrogate the role of culture in the country’s democratisation processes. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the linkages between cultural diversity and democratisation processes in a heterogeneous society. While this is not a fundamentally unique discourse, the case of Uganda is quite interesting and warrants investigation. Using the cultural theory of democracy, the chapter investigates the various forms of cultural diversity that shape Uganda’s democratic processes, the strategies used to harness democratic aspirations amidst diversity and the implications of the strategies on Uganda’s democratisation drive. To achieve these objectives, an explorative design is utilised. This entails the use of the qualitative approach and techniques for data collection, specifically focusing on documentary review methods. A thematic analysis is utilised to examine the democratisation contradictions within existing debates in the context of culture-based analytics and the cultural framework. The findings of this chapter reveal the cultural diversities that have shaped Uganda’s democratic practices, democratic harnessing strategies and how these aspects have affected the democratisation processes of Uganda. This partly explains why Uganda has one of the biggest parliaments and cabinet despite its size and population. The chapter recommends profound analysis of cultural considerations to guide decision-makers on the direction and pace for democratisation reforms as guided by the nexus between democracy and culture.

K. Elizabeth (*) · J. M. Kanyamurwa · S. Babalanda Department of History, Archaeology and Heritage Studies, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Kyambogo University, Kampala, Uganda e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5_14

213

214

K. Elizabeth et al.

Introduction There is a growing body of knowledge that recognises the centrality of cultural diversity in the developing world’s democratisation processes, in part because cultural considerations run deep in African politics. Consequently, the debate on the fundamental drivers of democratisation has raged on, with several studies suggesting perspectives that provide a powerful platform for clarifying the intricate linkages between political consensus and cultural diversity in Africa (Babayan & Risse, 2016; Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2015a, b; Chinyeaka et al., 2015; Young, 2000; Skinner, 1998). Nonetheless, contemporary studies scarcely analyse this theoretical node for the majority of African countries, Uganda inclusive. While democratisation prospects in Africa have faltered in the years since the end of the Cold War in 1991, a cultural diversity dimension to democratisation puzzles as Geddes (1999) describes them. The democratisation puzzle provides a fresh angle to explain the underlying dynamics. A large part of the literature conceptualises democratisation as the process by which civil liberties, human rights, citizen sovereignties and political rights are progressively attained in each society (Lopez, 2021; Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2021; Babayan & Risse, 2016; Muhumuza, 2009). On the other hand, the notion of cultural diversity is framed as the existence of a variety of cultural clusters within a society. Often referring to many varied features, cultural diversity as a double-edged concept entails gender, age, infirmity, health variations, education attainments, nationality, ethnicity, origin, religion, traditional ties, language, sexual opinions, class, geographical location, cuisine, belief systems, values, norms, behaviours, and the arts (Barker, 2004; Austin & O’Neill, 2000). Fundamental to the conceptual portrayals of democratisation  presented here and the sophisticated relationships between them, evidence suggests a crucial scholarly nexus, notwithstanding its limited usage to examine African political realities in many dimensions. First, while scholars such as Dahl and Tufte (1973) discuss developed polities’ “democratic political culture”, arguing that they were more prone to democratic practices than the developing ones, profound autocratic tendencies abound the world over. Dahl  (1998) advances another view about cultural homogeneity and smallness of polities as relevant attributes for democratic survival. Whereas these two notions are pertinent to this chapter, both have come under heavy criticism with recent scholarship appearing to challenge their sensitivity to countries in the developing world (Harell & Stolle, 2010; Austin & O’Neill, 2000; Von der Muhll, 1977). Nonetheless, despite the insightful additions to current debates, the intellectual allusion to Africa’s central democratic processes as influenced by cultural diversity factors remain light. Second, scholars have set out to argue that cultural values fundamentally characterise the foundation of any democratic predispositions, notably in African authoritarian societies (Chinyeaka et  al., 2015). This research adds that as a direct consequence of the consensual cultural diversity imbedded in any democratic processes (and non-democratic ones), the direction of institutional shifts away from autocracy is set. These analyses argue that most of the democratisation processes

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

215

are accomplished through collective action such as revolution, elite revolt, demonstrations, civil disobedience action, and war (Mengisteab, 2020; Gerring et al., 2018). Third, most recent empirical discourse on the determinants of democratisation centres on whether and in what manner income growth shapes people’s political aspirations and the quality of governance. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2021), for example, advance arguments on the role of culture on democratisation. Classically, these scholars raise the possibility of culture being a double-edged sword that either facilitates or undermines the democratisation processes. Often inclined to present cultural diversity as a strong force in democratic governance, studies further indicate that although culture is a foundation of countless inherent socio-economic developments, its role has largely been ignored in assessing empirical political dynamics. Evidently missing in democratisation studies has often been the puzzle on what strategies and how they have performed in the in deeply fractious African political settings (Gebeye, 2021; Mengisteab, 2020; IDEA, 2018; Yacouba & Emmanuel, 2017; King & Hickey, 2017). Fourth, in frequently emphatic expressions, further theoretical claims have been made about the powerful cultural diversity elements which not only establish the direction and pace but also patterns of democratisation in hybrid regimes. The latter systems have been described by scholars as presenting both democratic and authoritarian features (Gerring et al., 2018; Geddes, 2013; Tripp, 2010). Glaringly absent in these arguments is the place of cultural utilisation frameworks in the analysis of objective conditions for a country’s democratisation processes. Thus, while expounding on the interconnections between politics and culture, this chapter explicitly analyses how cultural diversity influences the nature of democratisation processes, the composition of public institutions and practices. In investigating this notion, the goal of the present chapter is to examine the link between democratisation and cultural diversity considering extant evidence to guide state-led reforms. Thus, to address the gaps in the nexus between democracy and cultural diversity from a cultural theory as a theory of democracy (CTTD) standpoint, we investigated three interrelated questions: (a) To what extent have Uganda’s central democratic processes been influenced by inherent forms of cultural diversity? (b) How have the strategies through which the democratisation processes are executed performed amidst the country’s cultural diversity? (c) In which ways do the implications for the democratisation processes as understood in the cultural utilisation context determine the pace and direction of the country’s democratic prospects?

 heoretical Review on the Influence of Culture T on Uganda’s Democratisation Processes In the history of democracy, culture has been thought of as a key dynamic that influences other related societal elements. The most central of these aspects are explored by the cultural theory as a theory of democracy (CTTD). Evidence suggests that the

216

K. Elizabeth et al.

elements of the CTTD as put forward by Ney and Molenaars (1999) essentially match up the notable pathways of organising social collaborative arrangements that define political and socio-economic systems. This is the fundamental feature that spells out why this theory remains relevant among the intellectual frameworks for explaining the relationship between  the democratisation processes and cultural dynamics (Gerring et al., 2018; Swedlow, 2011). The CTTD makes a multiplicity of assertions that inform our analysis in this chapter. Ney and Molenaars  (1999) argue that, recent shifts in the labour market, new forms of socio-economic collaborations, political partnerships, alliances, and the vastly cumulative changes in lifestyles had weakened the relevance of many socio-­ political structures central to major capitalist-oriented societies. The scholars add that emergent communal heterogeneity had given rise to the concerns of what organised or informal interest groups represented (Randall, 2017). The latter view explains why this scholarship further maintains that the intellectual methods used to study democratic institutions, irrespective of society, had become progressively inept to provide a framework for shedding light on current institutional political behaviour (Tilly, 2000). In this light, the available methods essentially ignored the fact that democratic structures were also a product of cultural attachments and socio-economic elements in society. Thus, the extant theories had, in their view, not only overlooked the cultural elements of society but also the collaborative capabilities among society’s key actors (Voinea & Neumann, 2020). With this backdrop, and in view of the key weaknesses of theoretical approaches to democratisation processes, the CTTD make several theoretical arguments central to the thesis of this chapter. One, CTTD exponents state that historical epochs essentially presented accounts of cultural struggles and core beliefs which had ensued, often on legitimate grounds, highlighting the supreme ideas of the time. The CTTD in this framework suggests that the aftermath of the cultural battles were ultimately shaped by the leading forces in those contests, the results of which were signed in treaties at the conclusion of those cultural wars (Lopez, 2021). Two, consistent with some of the key arguments of the chapter, CTTD adds that the legal expressions which eventually find themselves in national constitutions, legal and institutional frameworks, enabling legislative laws and political practices have their foundation as the peoples’ cultural diversities (Ney & Molenaars, 1999). Thus, Ney and Molenaars  (1999) scholarship suggests that the legal and institutional structural elements are themselves an indication of the cultural legacies, unsurprisingly structured to advantage contemporary cultural and political combatants in most African countries, Uganda inclusive. Three, in a correspondingly robust character, the CTTD analysis suggests that public policy making was a pretentious idea-based contest between diverse, “incommensurable socio-cultural frames at the centre of society”. The theory, thus, coherently argues that central representatives of each actor in the public arena participated in policy-making observing the dominant policy frame in society (Ney & Molenaars, 1999). In the final analysis, therefore, democratic institutions, the direction and pace of democratisation processes are primarily structured consistent with the prevailing socio-cultural, economic, and ideological elements that characterised society at a

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

217

given time. While some of the CTTD thinking does not adequately address the concerns of this chapter, overall, the theory generates debate that guides this study. The theory notably does not copiously address the effects of inherent forms of cultural diversity on Uganda’s democratisation, the political strategies adopted in recent decades, why these were adopted and the implications to the current democratisation processes. The evidence on the linkages between democratisation and cultural diversity also attempts to address the gaps identified in the chapter. Using several indicators of democracy, previous studies have reported that voting patterns might provide reliable data on the measurements of democracy (Harell & Stolle, 2010; Vanhanen, 2000). These studies, accordingly, identify citizen political rights and civil liberties (free speech, free assembly, and human rights) as part of the core democracy indicators. Together, these indicators represent some of the drivers for democratisation movements irrespective of country or regime type (Gerring et al., 2018; Pemstein et al., 2010; Barzilai, 2003; Wonkeryor, 2000). Studies further show the importance of cultural diversity in democratisation processes. Operationalising cultural diversity in terms of religious and ethnic identities, scholars argue that diversity entails the total number of different group identities in a population and the variety separating the most divergent groups (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2021; Okediji, 2005). In addition, diversity is further measured in terms of the share belonging to the largest group (homogeneity), the degree to which diversity cleavages align to create equally sized groups (polarisation) and the overall distribution of groups (fractionalisation) as they influence politics (Randall, 2017; Chinyeaka et al., 2015; Okediji, 2005). However, the usefulness of these measures does not simply come in terms of the relationship between democratisation practices and cultural diversity but also in terms of answering the key research questions for the chapter. Several studies have again documented the applicability of cultural diversity variables in explaining  the democratisation processes. In this perspective, Wildavsky  (2006) advances the centrality of cultural aspects to public processes that effectively respond to contemporary diversity challenges. This is a central perspective also shared by significant scholarship, comprising Alava and Ssentongo (2016), Hofstede (2001) as well as Coyle and Ellis (1994). A considerable amount of literature has been published on the prominence of cultural diversity in public realm outputs. Consistent with these studies are those that emphasise the existence of a thin line between powerful cultural themes and politics as well as legal outcomes as issues that freely feed into democratisation processes or not (Chigudu, 2019; Gerring et  al., 2018; Hughes & Lamont, 2018; Austin & O’Neill, 2000; Beetham, 1993).

218

K. Elizabeth et al.

Methodology Adopting an explorative design, the chapter employs entirely qualitative methods, essentially relying on secondary evidence to systematically investigate the linkages between the democratisation processes and cultural diversity in Uganda. The reason for this methodological decision was primarily informed by the need to conduct deeper insight into the chapter’s concerns. The research adopted a rational scope covering the post-independence, casing the period 1962–2021 to comprehensively examine the central variables of the study. This is the period when the country faced tumultuous events consisting of tension-filled democratic elections, military coups, civil wars, cultural shifts, major ethno-political alliances, cultural and religious coalitions as well as religious diversities that undoubtedly influenced the democratisation process (Lwanga-Lunyiigo, 1987). To study the chapter’s relationships within the CTTD theoretical framework, we adopted a research approach that heavily depended on qualitative data consistent with the sampling procedure adopted for the chapter. Extant scholarship addressing relevant variables examined in the chapter was identified for more profound investigation. Thus, using a search strategy that considered a multiplicity of academic databases and exploration engines, we identified the major scholarly works relevant to the chapter concerns. Significant among the search engines and record bases utilised involved Archive Grid, Google Scholar, JSTOR and Research Gate. This search technique was principally to guarantee that all significant and trustworthy scholarly sources were effectively identified for a comprehensive data collection process. We used editorial references for further exploration of extra appropriate journal articles and additional scholarly materials to expand the search process to the extent possible. Consequently, the most significant scholarly items selected in the data collection process covered academic materials general, African, and Uganda-specific items. Most vital among the articles collected included those addressing the post-­ independence democratic processes, forms of cultural diversity, linkages between democratisation and cultural diversity, strategies for democratisation processes, execution of democratisation strategies in diversity, implications for democratisation processes, cultural utilisation contexts and democratic prospects. Subsequently, we obtained a sample population of 136 study items for the purpose of this chapter. The number of book and journal articles that we finally selected from this global sample of items as the actual sample size was 49. Purposively selected, the final articles fitted the criterion of most ‘relevant item’ to produce appropriate qualitative data for this chapter. Using the content analysis method to guide the data analysis process, we identified the chapter themes under which appropriate information was placed before the writing process began, as presented in the sections below.

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

219

Presentation of Findings and Discussion  ganda’s Inherent Forms of Cultural Diversity U and the Democratisation Processes While there are several dimensions within which the linkages between cultural diversity and democratisation processes have been investigated, recent scholarship appears to have majorly emphasised four interrelated angles of these. First, from a conservation and advancement of diversities of cultural interests’ perspective, pertinent issues have been analysed in recent years. In this dimension, it has been perceived that although Uganda is not yet a signatory to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, she has several other instruments that promote cultural diversity. The instruments are both national and international in focus. At the local level, the supreme law is the 1995 Ugandan constitution as amended in 2005 and 2018, but without undermining the constitutional provisions for cultural diversity. Most relevant in this regard is political objective 11 which states that the State shall be governed by democratic principles (Uganda, Rev.2005, p.15). Building on this constitutional provision, the 2006 Uganda culture policy similarly recognises the country’s forms of cultural diversity, just like the 1967 Historical and Monuments Act. The overall significance of these constitutional and Parliamentary Acts is to underscore the country’s prominence of her cultural heritage. These findings from the study mirror the key arguments of the CTTD theoretical framework and key studies used in the study. For example, the CTTD argues that national legislations and policies are simply a reflection of the cultural diversity of a society (Ney & Molenaars, 1999). On the other hand, contemporary evidence mainly suggests that the evolution of cultural diversities was essentially one of the routes for societal democratisation strides (Lopez, 2021). What we found new in these arguments is that Uganda’s cultural diversity provided the rationale for the size of the national legislature, the Parliament. With the affirmative action undertaken by Uganda to increase women’s participation in politics from the local councils to the national level, there has been an increase in women’s participation in politics, thus, enhancing women’s political representation amidst gender diversity. In addition, due to the cultural domination of women in the country that largely kept them out of the public realm, the new 1995 Constitution (and as amended) specifically provided for affirmative action for women’s representation from the village up to the national levels (Mukasa et al., 2019; Ahikire, 2004). Second, in another dimension, findings further suggest that internationally, Uganda, like many other African countries, adheres to the 1948 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights that also provides for the protection and promotion of conventions”. Most applicable in this regard is the “2005 UNESCO Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” (CCFU, 2014, p. 5). This finding, therefore, implies that the respect for cultural diversity constitutes a central part of the democratisation process that principally observes the country’s cultural diversity as

220

K. Elizabeth et al.

understood in Gordon’s (2016) perception. An equally opposite view repeatedly encountered in the data analysis for this chapter underscored the relationship between the democratisation process and Uganda’s cultural diversity outcomes. Consistently relevant were data which suggested that the 1995 constitution as amended in 2005 and 2018 strengthened the relationships studied in the chapter. Thus, in line with this analysis, the 1995 Constitution of Uganda states that “Every effort shall be made to integrate all the peoples of Uganda while at the same time recognising the existence of their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity” (National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, III). This is additional evidence which solidifies the central claims of the chapter as captured by Alava and Ssentongo (2016) in their arguments on religious forms of diversity and politics in Uganda. Third, ethnicity as one of the critical inherent forms of Uganda’s diversity is addressed by key scholarship in the chapter’s findings. The centrality of ethnicity in the discourse on democratisation and cultural diversity in Uganda is prominently captured in the debate involving the number of ethnic groups in the country. Much of the data collected for this chapter suggested that while the 1995 Uganda Constitution recognised 52 ethnic groups, this number had increased to 62 by the 2005 amendments (Lancaster, 2012; Cox, 1994; Kasfir, 1976). The latter cultural diversity reality alone would perhaps indicate not only the dynamism with the country’s ethnic identities, but also the eagerness with which all the national stakeholders take the democratisation processes. To emphasise this viewpoint on ethnicity in Uganda’s politics, Lancaster (2012, p. 1) maintains that ethnicity is distinct from the ‘tribe’ as captured in the following debate: It is of paramount importance not to confuse ethnicity with the term ‘tribe’, which can ‘promote a racist conception of African ethnicities as primitive and savage’… The term ethnicity, however, has no concrete definition, and among other things, can refer to nationality, provincial identity, community, village, chiefdom, or kin-group… the term ethnicity will be used to describe the different communities of Uganda, separated mainly by region and culture, that are defined in almost all secondary literature as separate ethnic entities or groupings (Lancaster (2012, p. 1).

This excerpt is a further indication of the forms of cultural diversities in Uganda. Besides, this is conceivably, as well, an indication of the nature of challenges the country has gone through addressing numerous ethnic diversities in terms of their unique interests as it took strives towards its democratisation journey from 1962. Dominant among the ethnic groups are the Baganda who have tended to dominate Uganda’s politics through what has been described by scholars as ethnic nationalism that has compromised national unity to some extent (see Apter, 1997). However, other ethnic groups have also had their own interests that have equally had a mark of the country’s democratisation processes. In other words, current data stresses the nature of ethnicity as an element of cultural diversity and how it influenced the movement towards societal democratisation in Uganda. The fourth dimension among the relevant elements of cultural diversity in Uganda is religion. Also prominently discussed in the debate on Uganda’s democratisation processes and cultural diversity, religion is presented as a double-edge

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

221

sword. Foremost, data indicated that Uganda has diverse religious denominations that fall within the major religions. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), the main religions include Catholic (37.1%), Anglican (31.1%), Muslim (13.7%), Pentecostal (8.3%), Seventh Day Adventist (1.6%), and others (8.2%), who follow no specific religion (UBOS, 2018). While the Uganda constitution recognises religious pluralism through Chap. 1 Article 7 that emphasises the “non-­ adoption of a State Religion”, there have been democratisation challenges funned by religion. Evidence suggested that there were religious wars slightly before the colonial era and tensions among the major religions whose effects continued to be felt during the post-independence period. As political parties emerged towards Uganda’s independence, religion became a rallying point in the formation of diverse political platforms. For example, the Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) political parties which emerged as the leading vehicles for democratisation, championed Catholic and Protestant religious interests respectively (Henni & Ssentongo, 2016). Accordingly, the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) initial adoption of a no-party system of government in 1986 is partly understood a significant policy response to minimise the negative effects of the religious-­ based political parties on national unity. In general, while there were more key forms of cultural diversity that have influenced the country’s democratisation processes; national and international obligations for recognition of diversities as well as ethnicity and religion have dominated recent discourses.

 trategies for Harnessing Democracy Amidst S Cultural Diversity As suggested by CTTD theory; social, collaborative arrangements that define political and socio-economic systems ought to follow democratic norms, institutions, and practices as ways of expressing to achieve inclusiveness of all humanity (Green, 2011). With its cultural diversity, Uganda has taken various strategies to democratisation, through strict adherence to national and international laws protecting human rights and cultural interests while meeting the basic needs of all citizens. As key studies demonstrate, these strategies have included constitutional restructuring, local governance reforms, national gender political representation frameworks, introduction of multi-party politics, economic reconstruction and the choice of liberal economic policies, socio-economic recognition, and distribution networks. These strategies have mostly been adopted to respond to disparities as well as the restoration of traditional cultural institutions headed by traditional leaders (Green, 2011; Uganda, 1995). Foremost, constitutional restructuring and local governance reforms were the leading strategies undertaken early in the life of the NRM regime. Most studies maintain that as far as constitutional reforms were concerned, the architects’

222

K. Elizabeth et al.

strategy was to remove the political participation constraints for all citizens by making provisions addressing the foundation of political power in the country. Accordingly, the first article of the 1995 Uganda Constitution provides that all power belongs to the people (Uganda, 1995). Thus, irrespective of cultural diversity, the constitution empowers all citizens to participate in the power politics of the country (Hughes & Lamont, 2018). In equal measure, the 1995 Uganda constitutional reforms as a strategy in the democratisation of the country were aimed at making deliberately inclusive provisions for elected local government officials and the restoration of cultural institutions in the governance of the country (Perrot et  al., 2014; Muhumuza, 2009; Uganda, 1995). Indeed, Uganda’s constitution recognises the restoration of all cultural entities, specifically in those parts of the country where they were cherished. The latter was a measure taken to ensure that the strategy taken to restore traditional and hereditary monarchies did not come with new divisive contradictions. Thus, amidst cultural diversity, Uganda embarked on democratisation reforms as an all-embracing strategy for nation-building that recognises national all diversities. The basis of this strategy was further to ensure that all cultural barriers to democratisation, such as multi-ethnic and multi-religious spheres of influence, were positively incorporated in the body politique of the country. Related strategies were those in the socio-economic realm of the country. These specific strategies were informed by the realisation that if political and economic power-sharing and distribution questions capture both majority and minority communities, the democratic dispensation is seen to be inclusive of all interests beyond the political landscape becomes very easy (Carvalho, 2016; Mamdani, 1996). The other principle that guided Uganda in her choice of strategies to embrace cultural diversity in its drive to achieve an inclusive democratisation process was to embark nation-building based more on comprehensive and democratic civic territorial lines rather than special ethnic-genealogical considerations only (Green, 2013). As an effort to nation-building in the context of the strategies embrace all formal and informal cultural diversities in respect to linguistic interests, Uganda also moved to maintain English and Kiswahili as the major two unifying national languages. Recent scholarship also recognises this strategy as a mechanism for forging nationalism as all ethnicities, religious factions, gender, regions, and people of different philosophical subscriptions were perceived to easily understand one another and embrace democratic principles through at least English or Kiswahili without arousing ethnic-cultural dominance (Nyombi & Kaddu, 2015; Mukasa et  al., 2019). However, at lower primary setting, Uganda tolerated local native ethnic-based languages as agents of socialisation which is counterproductive to forging national unity for democratisation as many people continuously identify their political affiliations with the native language they speak (Nsibambi, 1971). Besides, after nearly 20 years of no-party politics, the NRM government introduced multiparty politics in 2005 as part of the strategic package to bring on board all shades of political opinions into the country’s democratisation drive. The first decade since the promulgation of the constitution (1995–2005) was run under no-­ party political system in which all ethnic, religious, gender, and philosophical

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

223

underpinnings would actively participate and compete from within the movement system. However, following the 2005 referendum in Uganda, multiparty political system was adopted and implemented in the 2006 general elections (Perrot et al., 2014). Thus, political pluralism introduced through multiparty politics was a way of accommodating the existing divergent socio-economic and political-cultural diversities. The strategy was in way embraced not only to further democratise the country but also to recognise the centrality of those national interests that deemed themselves not catered for in the national political landscape. The strategic political decisions made in 2005 were clearly intended to forge national unity as a prerequisite for democratisation of the country. Regardless of the arguments that donor pressure was the main reason why multiparty politics were adopted in 2005, the strategy taken allowed the revival and emergence of various political parties and groups which as of September 2020 were 26  in the country (Kjær & Katusiimeh, 2021). All these political parties have been formed along the diverse political-cultural composition of Uganda that Ugandans affiliate themselves with. For instance, in the 2021 general elections, most of the central region (Buganda) and some parts of the Eastern Region (Busoga) subscribed to the National Unity Platform while the Western region which tribes such as the Banyankore, Bakiga, Batooro, Banyoro, Bafumbira, Bahima, and others voted more for the National Resistance Movement NRM (Wilkins et al., 2021). While some scholarship has questioned this voting trend as informed by ethnicity, other evidence argues that ethnicity as part of cultural diversity elements is clearly a political issue that also determines who gets elected or not (Perrot et al., 2014). The bid to produce multicultural citizens through the education system has been one of the best ways for attaining democratic values amidst cultural diversity the world over, Uganda inclusive. It is globally consented that multicultural citizens can fit into the national and global context than the local settings (Goh, 2012). In Asia and the Pacific nations, this is translated through citizenship curriculum or classroom pedagogy and interdisciplinary exchanges to enhance intercultural competence from other disciplines and the domain of citizenship education (Goh, 2012). In Uganda, the education system has equipped teachers with the ability to lead and teach with cultural intelligence to create future Ugandans that are multicultural and can look at themselves from the national and international perspectives (Langole & Monk, 2020). Beginning with the upper primary curriculum, through the lower secondary level curriculum and the higher secondary level curriculum to the tertiary institutions and university curricula, the scope of what is taught covers more of national, regional, and international issues than the localised native philosophies based on identity and individuality differences. As a strategy, education in Uganda is designed to address sharp cultural identities’ definition of political affiliation, religious denominations, and other affiliations. For instance, the current membership of the Democratic Party in Uganda is a mixture of all religious affiliations than it was before the 1990s when most of them were Catholic Baganda from Masaka District (Langole & Monk, 2020). Therefore, Uganda’s strategies for addressing cultural diversity questions in the democratisation processes have clearly embraced a multiplicity of political and

224

K. Elizabeth et al.

policy interventions. The overall principle has been to deliberately embark on a process to promote a spirit of flexibility, adaptability, tolerance, and accommodation of diversity among the country’s multitude of cultural elements. However, as society evolves further, Uganda will need to further introduce new strategies focussing on new cultural diversities that emerge since cultural interests are dynamic elements of society. Together these results on strategies for cultural diversity accommodation at the national level provide important insights into what the country needs to expect as future initiatives and implications as discussed in the following section.

I mplications for Democratisation and Cultural Utilisation Frameworks The strategies adopted by the country to respond to her cultural diversities have several implications for Uganda’s democratisation process. The cultural utilisation framework assumes that counties essentially take cultural diversities as driving forces in the democratisation processes. As a way of promoting democratic values in Uganda, the multiplicity of strategies adopted as discussed in this chapter allude to several pertinent issues in the debate on democratisation and cultural diversity. The political, policy, and legal initiatives undertaken to respond to the sharp interand multicultural divisions based on cultural diversities range from ethnic, gender, religious, philosophical, and racial. The implications of these public interventions to the democratisation process are largely new areas that current scholarly information hardly addresses. To begin with, leading in the implications in the discourse on democratisation drivers and Uganda’s cultural diversity is the weight of democratic representation of the different shades of opinion in the country. While this chapter has partly argued that the cultural battle of ideas that occurs from time to in the democratisation process defines the dominant ideas of society, for Uganda, these ideas imply a heavy democratic price to pay. Today, numerous stakeholders are represented right from the grassroots of society to the national level, that is, village/cell, parish/ward, sub-­ county at the local governance level. The county or equivalent in urban areas (city division/municipality) is represented in parliament and cabinet, with each of the 135 functional districts, as of July 2020, represented by a female parliamentary representative. The challenge with most of the female representatives is twofold. First, with the establishment of the affirmative district woman Member of Parliament position, the female politicians were expected to use this position as a training ground for ably competing with their male counterparts on the directly elected positions, which largely not happened. Second, female politicians have become stuck on the affirmative action positions, not giving room for the upcoming younger female politicians, raising a question on the country’s democratic prospects from a gender perspective. For clarity purposes, central in the diverse actors represented in parliament

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

225

comprises the elderly, disabled, women, youth, the army, and workers, all making a massive total representation of 529 in a country of approximately 43 million. The biggest tension arises from the size of the public administration bill to support the salaries and emoluments of these public officials in a poor and heavily indebted republic! At another level, the adoption of liberal economic policies that supported the development of a free market in Uganda economy as a basis for promotion of tolerance and accommodative political culture among the heterogeneous population has had key implications for the country’s democratisation. Unlike Ney and Molenaars (1999)’s CTTD where the state is assumed to organise social collaborative arrangements that define political and socio-economic systems, George (2019) advances the view that neo-liberal states like Uganda and most of Africa have instead suffered deprivations of democracy. In his analysis, the challenges of autocratic majoritarianism, mobocracy, kleptocracy, prebendalism and neo-patrimonialism rather than democratic values, abound, as a result (George, 2019). Liberal economic policies have not yet made Ugandans ideologically oriented and politically established to tolerate cultural differences and focus on the market relevance of one another in participating in politics (Holford, 2016). Liberal economics has instead worsened political divisions along cultural divisions. Besides, many Ugandans have blamed the liberal economic policies for worsening the capitalistic exploitation of some cultural aspects, a fact that undermines the democratisation process. With limited or complete withdrawal of the state from production in some sectors, those with control of factors of production have tried to use the market forces to maximise profits which have exposed those without exploitation (Sample, 2021). Many Ugandans have claimed that there is an unequal distribution of control over factors of production to the Western region of the country at the expense of others. There is a claim that the ethnic groups from this part of the country were unfairly benefiting from the neoliberal policies in the country. A related implication is derived from the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections in January 2021. In these general elections, the National Unity Platform elected a total of 59 Members of Parliament of which majority are from Buganda where the party has its strongest base, bolstered by open support from some Catholic clergy from the greater Masaka. On the other hand, the NRM banked much on the vote from Western, Northern, and the West Nile regions of the country (Wilkins et al., 2021). Therefore, such divisions aligned along cultural diversities are because of the efforts to promote democratisation but also paradoxically openly displaying the challenges for democratisation emerging from the country’s diverse cultural space. The discourse on women representation in politics shows how much the affirmative action is still lacking in addressing the gendered cultured gaps between the males and females in the Ugandan journey to democratisation. In summary, for the implications of democratisation discussed in this section considering the scope of cultural diversity in Uganda, the chapter highlights the key policy issues the country should address. The conclusions presented in the following section aim to discuss a framework within which to improve the country’s democratic prospects.

226

K. Elizabeth et al.

Conclusion This chapter has analysed the state of the linkages between democratisation processes and the significance of cultural diversity in the Uganda’s political landscape. The unfolding debates and range of inherent forms of cultural identity, the strategies for democratisation adopted and their logical implications to Uganda’s democratisation indicate the extent of the country’s political stability and the emerging policy challenges. These dimensions have been investigated within the wider context of Africa’s political and socio-economic contradictions, acknowledging, and fully discussing their overall influence on the journey to democratisation. The analysis suggests that the centrality of cultural diversities has assumed increasing major significance both at informal and formal governmental policy interventions in the drive to democratisation. Consequently, there is an increasing body of logical policy, legislation and governance interventions essentially addressing the need to keep Uganda and Africa in general on the road to democratisation. Yet, the range of cultural diversities and their enduring character suggest the difficulty levels in this endeavour. It is in this light that cultural diversities should be perceived as centrally entrenched into the permanently extant and ongoing debate on the critical elements of an enduring drift towards democratisation in Uganda and the African continent. For improvement of the country’s political and socio-economic stability, the authors call for a pattern shift in the relationship between democratisation and cultural diversity policy landscape. Specifically, the chapter recommends policy modifications from the practices that embolden the current political culture of basic symbolic effort in democratisation interventions. The chapter proposes concrete public policy actions that involve civic preparation focusing on cultural diversities as key drivers in Uganda’s democratisation processes since they cannot just be wished away.

References Ahikire, J. (2004). Towards ‘women’s effective participation in electoral processes: A review of the Ugandan experience. Feminist Africa. Accessed on: http://www.agi.ac.za/sites/default/files/ image_tool/images/429/feminist_africa_journals/archive/03/fa_3_feature_article_1.pdf Alava, H., & Ssentongo, J.  S. (2016). Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10(4), 677–692. Apter, D. E. (1997). Political violence in analytical perspective. In The legitimization of violence (pp. 1–32). Palgrave Macmillan, London. Austin, D., & O’Neill, M. (2000, January). Introduction: democracy and cultural diversity. Parliamentary Affairs, 53(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/53.1.1 Babayan, N., & Risse, T. (Eds.). (2016). Democratisation special issues: Democracy promotion and the challenges of illiberal regional powers. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623160 Barker, C. (2004). The sage dictionary of cultural studies. Sage. https://doi. org/10.4135/9781446221280 Barzilai, G. (2003). Communities and law: Politics and cultures of legal identities. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.17817 Beetham, D. (1993). Liberal democracy and the limits of ‘democratisation’. In D.  Held (Ed.), Prospects for democracy: North, South, East, West. Polity Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/ blau17412-­075

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

227

Carvalho, A. S. (2016, May–October). Power-sharing: Concepts, debates, and gaps. JANUS.NET e-Journal of International Relations, 7(1), 19–32. Chigudu, D. (2019). Politics and constitutionalism: Entrenching the rule of law in Africa. India Quarterly, 75(3), 285–302. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419860931 Chinyeaka, J. I., Ngizi, E., & Agbodike, F. (2015). Culture and its role in promoting democracy and good governance in Africa: Finding the missing link. Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review, 3(1), 74. https://doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v3i1.76 Cox, T. (1994). Cultural diversity in organisations: Theory, research & practice. Berrett-Koehler. Coyle, D. J., & Ellis, R. J. (Eds.). (1994). Politics, policy, and culture. Westview Press. Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda. (2014). Managing diversity: Uganda’s experience. Kampala: Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda. Dahl, R. (1998). On democracy. Yale University Press. Retrieved February 2, 2020 from yalebooks.yale.edu Dahl, R.  A., & Tufte, E.  R. (1973). Size and democracy. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-0834-0. Gebeye, B.  A. (2021). Global constitutionalism and cultural diversity: The emergence of jurisgenerative constitutionalism in Africa. Global Constitutionalism, 10(1), 40–71. https://doi. org/10.1017/S2045381720000350 Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratisation after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 115–144. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 Geddes, B. (2013). What causes democratisation? In The Oxford handbook of political science. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0029 George, K. M. (2019). Market fundamentalism and the ethics of democracy in Uganda. Journal of Research in Philosophy and History, 2(2). https://doi.org/10.22158/jrph.v2n2p172 Gerring, J., Hoffman, M., & Zarecki, D. (2018). The diverse effects of diversity on democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 283–314. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600003X Goh, M. (2012). Teaching with cultural intelligence: Developing multiculturally educated and globally engaged citizens. Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 32(4), 395–415. Gordon, B. (2016). The universal declaration of human rights in the 21st century: A living document in a changing world. Open Book Publishers. ISBN 978-1-783-74218-9. Gorodnichenko, Y., & Roland, G. (2015a). Are there cultural obstacles to democratisation? Retrieved from: https://voxeu.org/article/role-­culture-­democratisation. 14 May 2015. Gorodnichenko, Y., & Roland, G. (2015b). Culture, Institutions and democratisation (CEPR Discussion Paper 10563). http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/ dp.php?dpno=10563(application/pdf) Gorodnichenko, Y., & Roland, G. (2021). Culture, institutions, and democratisation. Public Choice, 187, 165–195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-­020-­00811-­8 Green, J. M. (2011). Cultivating pragmatist cosmopolitanism—Democratic local-and-global community amidst diversity. In Pragmatism and diversity (pp. 55–83). Palgrave Macmillan. Green, E. (2013). Explaining African ethnic diversity. International Political Science Review, 34(3), 235–253. Harell, A., & Stolle, D. (2010). Diversity and democratic politics: An introduction. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, 43(2), 235–256. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/20743148 Henni, A., & Ssentongo, J.  S. (2016). Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 10(4), 677–692. https://doi.org/10.1080/1753105 5.2016.1270043 Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviours, and organisations across nations (2nd ed.). Sage Publications. Holford, J. (2016). The misuses of sustainability: Adult education, citizenship, and the dead hand of neoliberalism. International Review of Education, 62(5), 541–561. Hughes, L., & Lamont, M. (2018). Cultural rights and Kenya’s new constitution. African Studies, 77(2), 159–170. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2018.1452852

228

K. Elizabeth et al.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). (2018). Three decades of democratic transition in Africa: What are the dividends for citizens? Cotonou Regional Dialogue, 10–12 Nov 2017. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/three-­decades-­ of-­democratic-­transition-­in-­africa.pdf Kasfir, N. (1976). The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and ethnicity in African politics, with a case study of Uganda. Univ of California Press. King, S., & Hickey, S. (2017). Building democracy from below: Lessons from western Uganda. The Journal of Development Studies, 53(10), 1584–1599. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022038 8.2016.1214719 Kjær, A. M., & Katusiimeh, M. W. (2021). Nomination violence in Uganda’s national resistance movement. African Affairs, 120(479), 177–198. Lancaster, A. (2012). The divisive nature of ethnicity in Ugandan politics, before and after independence. E-International Relations. ISSN 2053-8626, p.  11/27. Accessed on: https:// www.e-­ir.info/2012/05/25/the-­divisive-­nature-­of-­ethnicity-­in-­ugandan-­politics-­before-­and-­ after-­independence/ Langole, S., & Monk, D. (2020). Background to peace and conflict in northern Uganda. In Youth, education, and work in (post-)conflict areas (p. 16). Globalisation Studies Groningen. Lopez, I. E. J. (2021). Culture, democracy and democratisation: Cultural values and democracy values. Journal of the Academy of Business and Emerging Markets, 1(1), 63–75. https://www. abem.ca/journal Lwanga-Lunyiigo, S. (1987). The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict in Uganda. Kampala: Makerere Institute of Social Research Working Paper available at: http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/ opendocs/ Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton University Press. Mengisteab, K. (Ed.). (2020). The crisis of democratisation in the greater horn of Africa: Towards building institutional foundations (NED-New edition). Boydell & Brewer. doi:https://doi. org/10.2307/j.ctvxhrkpm. Muhumuza, W. (2009). From fundamental change to no change: The NRM and democratisation in Uganda. The East African Review, 41, 21–42. https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/578 Mukasa, B., Kabonesa, C., & Martin, A. (2019). Gender and diversity situational analysis for C: AVA and GLCI projects: Uganda country report. Gates Open Research, 3(81), 81. Ney, S., & Molenaars, N. (1999). Cultural theory as a theory of democracy. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 12(4), 489–509. https://doi.org/10.108 0/13511610.1999.9968622 Nsibambi, A. (1971). Language policy in Uganda: An investigation into costs and politics. African Affairs, 70(278), 62–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/720157 Nyombi, C., & Kaddu, R. (2015, August 15). Ethnic conflict in Uganda’s political history. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645055 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2645055 Okediji, T. O. (2005). The dynamics of ethnic fragmentation. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 64(2), 637–662. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-­7150.2005.00382.x Pemstein, D., Meserve, S.  A., & Melton, J. (2010). Democratic compromise: A latent variable analysis of ten measures of regime type. Political Analysis, 18(4), 426–449. http://www.jstor. org/stable/25792023 Perrot, S., Makara, S., Fouéré, M. A., & Lafargue, J. (2014). Elections in a hybrid regime: Revisiting the 2011 Ugandan polls. Fountain Publishers/IFRA. 978-9970-25-341-8. ⟨halshs-01136941⟩. Randall, B. L. (2017). The cultural proficiency manifesto: Finding clarity amidst the noise. Corwin Press. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781071801093 Sample, E. (2021). An assessment of the risk of mass atrocities in Uganda. Stimson Centre, Connecticut. Skinner, E. P. (1998). African political cultures and the problems of government. African Studies Quarterly, 2(3). http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v2/v2i3a3.pdf Swedlow, B. (2011). A cultural theory of politics: ‘Editor’s introduction: Cultural’ theory’s contributions to political science. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44(4), 703–710. https://doi. org/10.1017/S1049096511001314

14  Democratisation Processes Amidst Cultural Diversity in Uganda

229

Tilly, C. (2000). Processes and mechanisms of democratisation. Sociological Theory, 18(1), 1–16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/223279 Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2011.619255 Uganda. (1995). The constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995. Uganda Government Printer. Uganda 1995. (Revision 2005). The 1995 Ugandan Constitution. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and ICF. (2018). Uganda demographic and health survey 2016. UBOS and ICF. https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR333/FR333.pdf Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810–1998. Journal of Peace Research, 37(2), 251–265. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343300037002008 Voinea, C. F., & Neumann, M. (2020). Political culture: A theory in search for methodology. An editorial. Quality and Quantity, 54, 335–360. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-­019-­00942-­1 Von der Muhll, G. (1977). Robert A. Dahl and the study of contemporary democracy: A review essay. The American Political Science Review, 71(3), 1070–1096. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960108 Wildavsky, A. (2006). Cultural Analysis, ed. Brendon Swedlow, dennis Coyle, Richard Ellis, Robert Kagan and Austin Ranney (New Brunswick: Translation), 1. Wilkins, S., Vokes, R., & Khisa, M. (2021). Briefing: Contextualizing the Bobi Wine factor in Uganda’s 2021 elections. African Affairs, 120(481), 629–643. Wonkeryor, E.  L. (2000). American democracy in Africa in the twenty-first century? Africana Homestead Legacy Publishers. Yacouba, C., & Emmanuel, T. (2017). Common behavior in the practice of democracy in Africa. Open Journal of Political Science, 7, 17–24. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2017.71002 Young, C. (2000). Africa: democratisation, cultural pluralism, and the challenge of political order. Macalester International, 9, Article 7. http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/ vol9/iss1/7 Kyazike Elizabeth is an Associate Professor in the Department of History, Archaeology and Heritage Studies at Kyambogo University. Elizabeth is also the Dean, Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Kyambogo University. She has a PhD in archaeology and Heritage Studies from the University of Dar es Salaam and a Master of Arts (History) from Makerere University. Elizabeth’s research interests are in the areas of cultural studies. She is the leading cultural heritage assessment specialist for many of Uganda’s development projects which has enabled her to gain wider experience concerning Uganda’s cultural diversity. She is also the principal investigator in the project examining the management of cultural diversity at Uganda’s higher Education Institutions in Uganda. It is against this background that she presents the contradictions of multi ethnic democracy as the case is in Uganda.  

John Mary Kanyamurwa is currently the Head of the Political Science and Public Administration Department at Kyambogo University. He teaches Political Theory and Political Economy. His research interests are in the areas of local governance, decentralisation, peace and conflict, resource governance and electoral democracy. He has recently published in most of these areas. His latest article, “Citizens’ Political Knowledge and the State of Local Governance Interest Determination in Uganda” has appeared in the Journal of Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 6(No. 1, 2022).  

Stanley Babalanda is currently a student undertaking a Masters of International Relations and Diplomatic studies at Makerere University. Stanely holds a Bachelor of Arts in Social Sciences of Kyambogo university where he also served as a Teaching Assistant. He is now a teaching assistant at the Islamic University in Uganda. His research interests include international relations, diplomatic studies, democracy and security studies.  

Index

A Activism, 207, 209 African, 5, 11, 14, 16, 22–24, 29, 30, 33–41, 46–53, 57–59, 61, 62, 68, 70, 74–85, 90, 91, 127, 128, 144–150, 152–158, 162, 178, 181–183, 187, 189, 198, 200, 201, 203, 204, 208–210, 214–216, 218–220, 226 African governments, 34, 38, 47, 53, 147, 154, 156–158 Afrocentric perspective, 198 Agro-pastoral activities, 95 Anglophone crisis, 92, 107, 113 Apartheid, 36, 75, 79, 82, 84, 85 Art, 13, 63, 198–210 Artwork, 198, 200–207 B Boycotts, 177–193 British colonialism, 146 Buganda, 6, 203, 204, 223, 225 C Cameroon, 38–40, 48, 90–97, 99, 104, 106, 107, 112–115, 119, 123, 177–193 Cattle movements, 96 Clientelism, 5, 8 Colonial/colonialism, 25, 27, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 47, 79, 128, 144, 147, 148, 179–182, 189, 221

Communalism, 74, 76, 79 Communication, 24, 50, 112, 121, 123, 135, 171, 172, 198, 205, 207 Communities, 27, 30, 35, 37, 38, 50, 51, 61, 66, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81–83, 90, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 103, 106, 112, 123, 128, 130, 144, 148–150, 152, 153, 155, 157, 181, 199–202, 204–210, 220, 222 Conflict governance, 91, 92, 96, 98, 99, 103 Consensus, 9, 22, 24, 28, 29, 47, 53, 70, 129, 144, 156, 158, 181, 184, 188, 214 Constitution, 4–16, 38, 39, 47, 59, 61, 63–65, 69, 75, 85, 94, 162, 167, 172, 173, 188, 192, 216, 219–222 Constitutionalism, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 22 Constitutional reforms, 221, 222 Constructivism theory, 151–153 COVID-19, 38, 163, 169, 170, 172, 173 Criminal procedure code (CPC), 112, 113, 116–124 Cultural democracy, 203–207 Cultural diversity, 178, 182, 189, 201, 214–226 Cultural theory as a theory of democracy (CTTD), 215–219, 221, 225 Culture, 24, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 46, 59, 70, 74, 76, 78, 79, 144, 156, 165, 181, 182, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 207, 209, 210, 214–217, 219, 220, 225, 226 Cyber criminality, 124

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Muzee et al. (eds.), Democracy and Africanness, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11248-5

231

232

Index

D Decentralisation, 107, 188 Deliberation, 7, 52, 128–136, 157 Deliberative democracy, 129, 131, 136, 183 Deliberative politics, 130, 131 Democracy, 4, 6–11, 13, 22–24, 33–41, 46–53, 58, 60, 61, 64, 66, 68–70, 75, 85, 129, 131, 144–148, 151, 153, 154, 158, 162–165, 168, 177–193, 198–203, 206–210, 215–217, 221–223, 225 Democratic practices, 22, 30, 40, 164, 209, 214 Democratic process, 7, 24, 153, 163, 177–193, 207, 208, 214, 215, 218 Democratisation, 214–226 Denialism, 83, 84 Dictatorship, 4–6, 8–16, 33, 36, 64, 207 Domestic peace, 162–174

Independence, 3, 5, 6, 16, 36, 40, 47, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 145, 162, 178–180, 189, 221 Indigenous conflict, 99 Indigenous democracy, 23, 181 Indigenous systems, 21–30, 36 Insecurity, 3, 37, 39

E Election body, 191, 192 Election observation, 144–146, 148, 149, 151–158 Elections, 8, 10–12, 14, 15, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 48, 51, 60–64, 69, 70, 135, 144–158, 162–174, 177–193, 198, 218, 223, 225 Electoral democracy, 144, 155, 163, 166, 168, 183 Electoral politics, 163 Electoral systems, 166–168 Electoral violence, 165–168, 172 European, 22, 23, 34, 36, 47, 50, 61, 75, 77, 145, 149, 155, 156, 181 Evolution, 25, 30, 57–59, 68, 78, 94, 95, 219

M Majoritarian, 52, 53 Makwerekwere, v, xv, 73–85 Mali, 38, 57–59, 61–71, 90 Military coups, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66, 70, 71, 162, 218 Multi-partism, 180 Multiparty democracy, 162, 163 Multiparty politics, 147, 163, 222, 223

F Feminization, 131 Formal court, 102, 103 Freedom, 189 G Governance, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 22–24, 26, 28–30, 34–38, 40, 46–53, 58, 60, 68, 91, 92, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 129, 147, 148, 154, 162, 178, 181, 215, 221, 222, 224, 226 I Identity politics, 78 Immigrants, 76, 77, 80–82, 84, 200

L Leadership, 4, 5, 15, 29, 36, 40, 49, 52, 59, 64, 131, 132, 136, 145, 164, 165, 206 Legislation, 13, 35, 128, 134, 192, 219, 226 Liberal democracy, 24, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 164, 165, 178, 182, 183 Liberal democratic countries, 165 Liberal economic policies, 221, 225 Life presidency, 16 Livestock grazing, 90

N National Resistance Movement (NRM), 3, 4, 6, 8–13, 15, 16, 128, 162, 163, 167–170, 172, 221–223, 225 Neo-colonialism, 145, 146, 178 Non-state conflict governance, 104 Norm diffusion model, 146, 151–153 O Offence of threats, 114, 118 One-party state, 144, 178, 187 Oral threats, 114 P Parliament, 11, 13–16, 63, 64, 75, 127–136, 149, 150, 168, 171, 172, 180, 182, 186–189, 191, 192, 219, 224, 225 Participatory democracy, 207–210 Patriarchy, 135 Patronage, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 154 Penal code, 112–115, 119, 123

Index

233

Personalization, 16 Political deliberations, 129 Political participation, 128–130, 133, 177, 190, 222 Political regime, 5, 182, 183, 207 Political representation, 127, 219, 221 Pre-colonial, 22–25, 28–30, 40, 128, 180, 181 Presidential elections, 11, 15, 64, 69, 145, 146, 150, 162–174, 180 Presidentialism, 5 Public participation, 22–24, 28

South Africa, 35, 36, 38, 49, 75–85, 149, 199 Substantive representation, 128, 131, 135

R Rangeland, 89–93, 95–107 Religion, 35, 67, 78, 214, 220, 221 Representation, 13, 28, 29, 53, 127–129, 131–134, 162, 167, 186, 200, 205, 206, 208, 219, 224, 225 Republic, 4, 6, 16, 36, 51, 58–61, 64, 65, 67–69, 80, 82, 83, 171, 172, 180, 182, 188, 225 Rule of law, 4, 48, 114, 156 Rwandan, 22, 23, 25–30

U Ubuntu, 74, 76, 79–81, 84, 85 Uganda, 3–16, 35, 38, 40, 48, 127, 128, 130, 132–136, 145, 162–174, 199, 205–209, 214–226

T Traditional authorities, 80, 95, 99 Traditional practices, 36, 40 Transhumance pastoralism, 97, 102 Transition, 6, 9, 15, 61, 62, 69, 75, 98, 164 Tribalization, 189, 190

W Women’s voices, 128, 129, 132–136 X Xenophobia, 79–85

S Single-party state, 178, 186–188, 192 Social media, 112, 113, 115–117, 119–124, 171, 172

Z Zimbabwe, 36, 38, 80, 83, 144–158