Michael of Ephesus: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10 with Themistius: On Virtue 9781350085077, 9781350085107, 9781350085084

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Contents
Conventions
Michael of Ephesus: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10
Introduction
Abbreviations
Textual Emendations
Translation
Notes
Bibliography
English-Greek Glossary
Greek-English Index
Subject Index
Themistius: On Virtue
Introduction
Abbreviations
Textual Emendations
Translation
Notes
Bibliography
English-Syriac-Greek Glossary
Syriac-English Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

Michael of Ephesus On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10 with

Themistius On Virtue

Ancient Commentators on Aristotle GENERAL EDITORS: Richard Sorabji, Honorary Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Oxford, and Emeritus Professor, King’s College London, UK; and Michael Griffin, Assistant Professor, Departments of Philosophy and Classics, University of British Columbia, Canada. This prestigious series translates the extant ancient Greek philosophical commentaries on Aristotle. Written mostly between 200 and 600 AD, the works represent the classroom teaching of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic schools in a crucial period during which pagan and Christian thought were reacting to each other. The translation in each volume is accompanied by an introduction, comprehensive commentary notes, bibliography, glossary of translated terms and a subject index. Making these key philosophical works accessible to the modern scholar, this series fills an important gap in the history of European thought. A webpage for the Ancient Commentators Project is maintained at ancientcommentators.org.uk and readers are encouraged to consult the site for details about the series as well as for addenda and corrigenda to published volumes.

Michael of Ephesus On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10 Translated by James Wilberding and Julia Trompeter

with

Themistius On Virtue Translated by Alberto Rigolio

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 Paperback edition published 2020 Copyright © James Wilberding, Julia Trompeter and Alberto Rigolio, 2019 James Wilberding, Julia Trompeter and Alberto Rigolio have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-­party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-3500-8507-7 PB: 978-1-3501-7091-9 ePDF: 978-1-3500-8508-4 eBook: 978-1-3500-8509-1 Series: Ancient Commentators on Aristotle Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters. Acknowledgements The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Divison of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW/GW); the Ashdown Trust; the Lorne Thyssen Research Fund for Ancient World Topics at Wolfson College, Oxford; Dr Victoria Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The editors wish to thank C.C.W. Taylor, Roger Crisp, Peter Lautner, Karen Nielsen, Lesley Brown and Sebastian Brock for their comments; David Robertson for preparing the volume for press; and Alice Wright, Commissioning Editor at Bloomsbury Academic, for her diligence in seeing each volume of the series to press.

Contents Conventions

vi

Michael of Ephesus: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10

1

Introduction

3

Abbreviations

15

Textual Emendations

17

Translation

21

Notes

115

Bibliography

161

English-Greek Glossary

167

Greek-English Index

187

Subject Index

203

Themistius: On Virtue

207

Introduction

209

Abbreviations

233

Textual Emendations

235

Translation

237

Notes

253

Bibliography

263

English-Syriac-Greek Glossary

268

Syriac-English Index

271

Subject Index

273

Conventions [. . .] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity. (. . .) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words.

Michael of Ephesus On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10 Translated by James Wilberding and Julia Trompeter

Introduction James Wilberding and Julia Trompeter

The life and works of Michael of Ephesus1 Almost nothing is known about the life of Michael of Ephesus, and what we do know is in large part inferred from his writings. His name indicates that he was a Christian, and this is confirmed by a number of passages in his commentaries (e.g. in EN 462,19ff.; 549,21ff.; 620,17ff.). His routine references to medicine also give us good reason to believe that Michael was a physician.2 It is only thanks to an offhand remark he makes in his commentary on EN 10 at 570,21–2 (and cf. in GA 149,19) about the Presocratic Heraclitus of Ephesus being a ‘fellow citizen’, that we may be certain that Michael was himself a native of Ephesus.3 Even the dates of Michael’s life were a matter of controversy until the appearance of ground-­breaking articles by Robert Browning and Sten Ebbesen.4 Previously it had been argued by Karl Praechter that Michael’s commentaries must have been written prior to 1040 AD because a certain anonymous summary of logic and the quadrivium, the oldest manuscript of which dates back to 1040 AD, already appears to incorporate material from Michael’s commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations.5 Browning, however, directed our attention to a hitherto neglected funeral oration on Princess Anna Comnena (1083–1153), composed by a certain George Tornikes, which established later dates for the composition of his commentaries by demonstrating that Michael’s commentary work was part of larger project directed by Princess Comnena in Constantinople – this location is confirmed in Michael’s in EN 10, 610,11ff. – to fill in the gaps left in the Aristotelian commentary tradition. Here Michael is described as being a professional philosopher working at the imperial court.6 Browning reasonably concludes that the period of production began with Anna’s commencement of the project after her retirement in 1118 and was ‘probably completed’ by 1138, when she turned her attention to the composition of her Alexiad, though H.P.F. Mercken is surely right to point out that Michael might have begun his commentary activity on his own before the commencement of this project and might have continued on his own afterwards.7 Sten Ebbesen buttressed this conclusion by defusing Praechter’s argument for an earlier dating, showing that both Michael and the anonymous summary were in fact drawing on a common tradition of earlier scholia.8 Despite the fact that we know so little about his life, Michael of Ephesus has the distinction of being one of the most wide-­ranging commentators on Aristotle ever to have lived. His surviving commentaries on Aristotle – there is no evidence that he

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composed commentaries on other authors – follow the standard Olympiodorian structure that first approaches a passage via a preface (dianoia) addressing its general import and then turns to discuss the details of the text (lexis), and the scope of his commentary work extends over the traditional divisions of philosophy to include logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics and ethics. Commentaries by Michael have been transmitted to us in some form on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia, On the Parts of Animals, On the Movement of Animals, On the Progression of Animals, Nicomachean Ethics 5, Nicomachean Ethics 9–10, Sophistical Refutations, On the Generation of Animals, Metaphysics 7–149 and Politics10 as well as the pseudo-Aristotelian De coloribus.11 Moreover, Michael appears to refer to a number of other commentaries, and some scholars have maintained that these commentaries were written but have not survived: Physics,12 Rhetoric,13 Topics,14 Prior and Posterior Analytics,15 On the Heavens,16 On Interpretation,17 On the Soul,18 History of Animals19 and a certain Peri hormês.20 Yet two caveats must be added here. First, not all scholars include all of the last group of works in their overviews of Michael’s writings (though these overviews are not always claimed to be exhaustive), and second, at least some of these inferences might need to be revised in light of Concetta Luna’s contention that Michael routinely refers to the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias as if they were his own.21

Neoplatonic influence on the thought of Michael of Ephesus One of the recurring issues in the scholarship concerns Michael’s respective commitments to Platonism and Aristotelianism, on which scholars have historically advanced conflicting views. Almost the entire post-Plotinian commentary tradition is characterized by a commitment to the harmonization of Plato and Aristotle, although the level of commitment does vary from commentator to commentator.22 And so it should come as no surprise that a first wave of scholars placed Michael securely in this tradition, aligning him closely (and in some cases identifying him) with the Byzantine Platonist Michael Psellus.23 But this was followed by a second wave that held Michael to be an exception to this general rule, maintaining that his commentaries represent a return to a form of commentating more or less untainted by Platonic influence, such as can be found in the pre-Plotinian commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias.24 Michael’s penchant for looking to Alexander for insight certainly speaks for this view, as does the fact that he refers to Aristotle as ho daimonios (in EN 10, 529,4; 589,36–7; in PA 16,13; etc.) and even addresses him at one point as theiotate kai philosophôn koruphaiotate (in GA 158,26–7) but never attaches such epithets to Plato. Further, as Praechter has pointed out,25 Michael also appears to stick to the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of four causes, instead of adopting the Neoplatonic doctrine of six causes, as his predecessor Michael Psellus had. Moreover, it is easy enough to find passages in Michael’s corpus where he criticizes Plato, even without being explicitly prompted to do so by Aristotle’s text, e.g. in GA 25,16ff. and in PA 36,33ff. There are also historical and cultural reasons for this view. For in 1082 AD John Italus, a disciple of sorts of Michael Psellus, was condemned for ‘propagating the erroneous views of Iamblichus and Proclus’,26 which at the very least included the doctrine of Platonic Forms and the

Introduction

5

transmigration of souls, as Anna Comnena herself reports in the fifth book of her Alexiad, and this might reasonably lead one to expect Michael to distance himself from Neoplatonic thought. To these and other such considerations it may now be added that Michael’s embryology shows little to no Neoplatonic influence.27 The scholars included in this second wave do acknowledge that Michael does at times refer to Plato and adopt Neoplatonic language,28 but they maintain that the degree of this influence is limited enough that it does not amount to a significant departure from Aristotle’s theory. Recently, a third wave of scholarship has been developing, which has the Neoplatonic influence on Michael’s thought running much deeper. This wave begins by taking more seriously the instances of Neoplatonic influence already known to the second wave and then adds to these some previously unidentified instances, while also accounting for the absence of Neoplatonism where it does not appear. Outside of Michael’s commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, this includes his heavy dependence on Syrianus in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 7–14.29 Dominic O’Meara has now shown30 that while Michael’s scholia on the Politics contain hardly any explicit references to Neoplatonism, there are even here certain important points of contact, e.g. regarding Michael’s admission of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of virtues (in Pol. 305,19–20) and the Platonic theory of Forms (in Pol. 310,12–15). Moreover, Sten Ebbesen has shown31 that while there are no ‘high flown Neo-Platonist speculations’ in his commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, this is simply because the older scholia that he was working with did not themselves include such speculations, so that the absence of Neoplatonism in his Sophistical Refutations commentary cannot be taken as evidence that Michael was refraining from engaging with this school of thought. Michael’s commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provide us with further evidence of a rather ambivalent attitude towards Neoplatonism.32 On the one hand, we find some clear cases where Michael is borrowing from Neoplatonic philosophers. He explicitly points to Plotinus as one who has commendably established the ineffability of contemplative pleasure,33 and as Carlos Steel has shown, Michael draws implicitly but demonstrably from Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades 1 in order to elucidate Aristotle’s claim that the one who contemplates is supremely god-­loved.34 Other nods to the Neoplatonic tradition are less obvious but not to be ignored. Aristotle’s god becomes for Michael a creator god (dêmiourgos) who bestows gifts upon humanity and guides the course of the universe.35 (In his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 he even adds that this god is a ‘substance that transcends substance’ – huperousios ousia).36 Likewise, when Michael describes the human intellect’s contemplative activity, he often invokes very Platonic terminology, including: ascent,37 separation,38 reversion,39 self-­reflection,40 immediate contact,41 union,42 illumination43 and participation.44 And although the moral psychology that we find in Michael’s comments on the Nicomachean Ethics does not appear to represent a major departure from Aristotle, his introduction of the so-­ called ‘attentive part’ of the soul in his comments on Book 9 is a clear case of Michael being influenced by the subsequent Neoplatonic commentary tradition.45 On the other hand, Michael’s rejects with the Neoplatonic ladder of virtues. To be sure, at one point he does acknowledge that he has had some exposure to the Neoplatonic scala, at least as far as the lower virtues are concerned, namely in in EN 10, 578,13–18, where he reports to us that ‘the Platonists’ – unlike the Aristotelians –

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distinguish between political virtues and virtues of character. But not only does Michael refuse to follow the Neoplatonists here,46 but he does not even engage with the higher levels of virtue in the Neoplatonic scala. For Aristotle’s contention that individual virtues such as justice and courage cannot be ascribed to the gods (EN 1178b7–24) offers Michael the perfect opportunity to engage with this scala. After all, the Neoplatonic scala was designed to explain precisely this – the special sense in which justice, courage, moderation and wisdom can be attributed to the gods. But Michael is instead content simply to repeat Aristotle’s reasons for rejecting any such ascription. Thus, it would seem that Michael was either not adequately acquainted with the higher levels of the scala – this is possible seeing that Michael never explicitly refers to purifying or paradigmatic or theurgic virtues – or else he simply had little interest in engaging with the Neoplatonists on this issue. At the same time, he seems all too keen to engage with the Neoplatonists when he comes to Aristotle’s comment that ‘a complete span of life’ is a prerequisite for happiness (EN 1177b24–5). For here Michael seizes on this as an opportunity to reject the thesis that happiness does not increase with time,47 and even if Michael does not reveal the identity of his opponent(s), there is some reason to think that his hypothetical objector is meant to represent Plotinus.48

Michael of Ephesus on the happy life According to Michael’s exegesis of Aristotle, it is the key enterprise of EN 10 to show that the true and happy man lives a life according to intellect. In this context (cf.  529,5–10), he emphasizes that ‘the happy man is two-­fold’ (529,7), on the one hand the political man, who needs good luck for actualizing his activity unimpededly, and on the other hand the contemplating man, who grasps ‘the real Beings’ (529,9). Michael mentions that the reason why Aristotle devotes book 10 exclusively to the life according to intellect is that Aristotle ‘has already said a great deal about the happy political man (529,10)’, and also later on he refers Aristotle’s elaboration of political happiness to book 1 (cf. 572,25–30). But this still does not say much about any different rating or value of the two kinds of happiness. In other passages this hierarchy is assessed with respect to pleasure. Michael rates the pleasure of contemplating as more valuable than that of virtuous practical action (cf. 529,19–20). But even though he clearly states this, Michael still puts much weight and emphasis on the relevance of practical action as such, being the basis and touchstone for a person’s credibility and virtue. One might even say that at some points Michael’s focus on practical action is stronger than Aristotle’s. For example, Aristotle only demands that words should be ‘in agreement with what is seen to happen’ (EN 1172b5–6), i.e. with the things one does, but Michael makes this remark more concrete by saying that deeds make assertions credible – and not the other way around.49 Deeds and practical actions generally play an important role in Michael’s interpretation of happiness. In his explanation of Aristotle’s statement that happiness should be ‘given a complete length of life’ (EN 1177b25), Michael adds that this is because during a whole life ‘we can engage in more noble practical actions’ than during a short period of time.50 What does that mean? This quantification of practical virtuous acts is not to be

Introduction

7

confused with the thesis that contemplative happiness is ‘more continuous’ and ‘longer-­ lasting’ than political happiness, because we can contemplate for a greater measure of time.51 Thus, the continuity of contemplative happiness depends on the continuity of contemplation. By contrast, the claim that we, in a greater measure of time, can engage in more practical actions does not mean that these actions are themselves continuous and long-­lasting like contemplation. During a longer life, we can engage in more practical actions. According to Michael, the continuity and duration of activities depends on the measure of time we can spend on one and the same activity, and this, again, has to do with the attainability of the object sought after. It is worth asking what that means for contemplation. After all, our everyday experience shows that, when it comes to engaging in an activity for a long time and continuously, i.e. without a break, this tends to be easier for us with other activities, e.g. playing video-­games or watching television, than with engaging in contemplation. While Aristotle does not give an explanation for the fact that contemplating is called most continuous, and more continuous than practical action (cf. EN 1177a21–2), Michael explains this thought with an interesting reference to Metaph. 1072a32–b14 – a passage he also comments on in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics: it is because the object of contemplation is structured in a special way that we can engage in the act of contemplation for a longer period than we can engage in other activities for. To put the matter succinctly, the object of desire and the good we seek in contemplation is defined as ‘the first cause of all things’ (581,26), and it is desirable by its own nature, lovelier and more longed for than other objects, because – since it is infinite in goodness and unattainable – the contemplating person necessarily remains insatiable with respect to it.52 We can add that virtuous practical action, by contrast, is limited because its attainable end and object lies in the action itself. In courage, for instance, the courageous action itself already is the end, and such an action is usually limited to a certain act, like fighting in a battle. That we can engage more or less continuously in playing video-­games is due to the fact that these games, too, do not have an attainable end insofar the attaining of this end (i.e. approaching an endless row of new levels) might be an endless enterprise, but there is a crucial difference in the goodness of the two ends. We cannot really compare the approaching of a new gaming-­ level to a metaphysical first cause that is desirable by its own beauty and nature. If the thought that contemplation can per se not achieve satisfaction, on the one hand, is taken to be serious, and if we take into account that, on the other hand, contemplation as well as happiness, which are so often identified,53 are said to be (most) self-­sufficient,54 and that, furthermore, the intellectual life is ‘lacking in nothing’ (582,17) and ‘wanting nothing’ (583,20), this causes a serious problem: how can contemplation per se escape satisfaction, when at the same time it is said to be most self-­sufficient, lacking in nothing, and even wanting nothing? One possible explanation is that the lack of satisfaction has nothing to do with frustration and that Michael rather sees it as a great advantage.55 For it is precisely because the desire for contemplation cannot be satisfied that we go on with this most pleasant activity without becoming tired of it: ‘There is satiety with respect to the other goods and the objects of desire and the apparent goods, and we pursue them up to the point where we attain them and achieve satiety with respect to them, but once we attain them and are

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filled by them, we desist and no longer want to be active with respect to them’.56 Here Michael would seem to be open to the criticism that this permanent activity of the contemplating person sounds rather exhausting, assuming it is even possible. Yet he reassures us that, although the contemplating person is permanently active, this activity is by itself full of leisure, and has nothing to do with being in a state of stress like the man of political happiness who ‘insofar he is keeping a careful eye on the day-­to-day matters of the city and is anxious to maintain as firm and enduring what is noble and advantageous both to the general public and separately to each individual, [. . .] is lacking leisure and in a state of turmoil’.57 Michael states that the ultimate end, which is identified with contemplative happiness, is found in leisure. It is thus necessary that the object of contemplation, i.e. ‘the first cause of all things’, may not be this ‘ultimate end’ because even if contemplative happiness is an ultimate end, the object of contemplation may not be such, since when it had been grasped as an ultimate end, the activity would stop – just as other activities do.58 Further, there are passages in Michael’s commentary suggesting that in the end he was more an advocate of an inclusive than of an exclusive understanding of happiness. Sometimes he says that it is the combination of moderate possessions, noble practical actions and being wholly committed to contemplation that makes our lives happy. Further, he does not see any contradiction in saying that the happy person can engage in the best practical actions and at the same time be wholly committed to contemplation. At one point, when he is aiming to show the importance of coherence between one’s statements and actions, he says: ‘For if someone says that the one who has moderate possessions and pursues the best [practical actions] is happy and, while saying [this], possesses no more than is necessary and performs the most noble and best practical actions and is wholly committed to contemplation, we should be persuaded by this man and say that both he and his claims are most true’.59 Here Michael offers a distinction that corresponds to the tripartite division of the soul: the attitude of moderation or modesty, which in Platonic terms could be seen as the virtue of the appetitive part of the soul, the virtue that consists in other practical actions, being probably attributed to the spirited part of the soul and its virtues and contemplation. The following remark lends credence to the assumption that Plato is clearly in the background here: The spirited part needs courage in order that it might confidently and fearlessly set upon the things it should and flee what it must; and the appetitive part needs temperance in order to enjoy the things it should and be pained when it should. If, then, the affections are lacking moderation and indeterminate and sources of agitation and disturbance, how could the man who is being dragged around by his irrational affections and being pulled from one thing to another and led around in circles engage in intellectual activity? Therefore, those who said that practical virtue and its end, happiness, are certain suitable conditions for the reception of contemplative happiness were correct.60

Moderation, confidence and fearlessness are subsumed under practical virtue and happiness which, again, are called suitable conditions for contemplative happiness. For

Introduction

9

in a soul, in which the irrational affections are not in control, these immoderate affections are irritations to the rational soul. Here we can see that Michael combines Platonic and Aristotelian ethical theory by interpreting practical happiness as having a certain control over the appetites which ensures the rational part’s freedom from that disturbance and agitation; at the same time, this freedom builds the first step and precondition for contemplative happiness. The end and goal of this freedom, as Michael says in his interpretation of EN 1177b27, is that that the person can live out his life insofar as something divine exists in him, and insofar as he has separated himself from his bodily life. That is to say, insofar as he is not ‘the human being composed of reason and the many-­headed beast of appetite and the lion-­like spirit together with the body’.61 The divine life is the intellectual (noeros) life and involves fleeing from the excitement connected to matter upwards to the intelligible summit. In other words, the real man can live an intellectual life, which is the activity in accordance with intellect and therefore, all by itself, more divine than the human life and its political happiness.62 The high value of contemplation is also mirrored in the value of pleasure. Pleasure is not only ‘perhaps’ but necessarily connected to human virtue: being not only a mere symptom or shadow supervening on it, but ‘properly connected to our kind’, pleasure necessarily belongs to virtue both by definition and substantially.63 Michael contrasts the view that pleasure is identical with the Good, as Eudoxus said, with the opinion that it is most base.64 According to Michael, those who maintain that pleasure is most base do this not because they are convinced by plausible arguments, but by mere observation: ‘Rather, it is because they have seen the masses sinking into pleasure and neglecting the most noble [activities] and because they wish to lead the masses away from the unchecked charge and advance into pleasure that they make pleasure appear to be one of the most base things, even if it is not most base’.65 Even if it is not right to despise pleasure as a whole, there are didactical reasons to condemn it, since a condemnation can be part of a helpful method of bringing some people’s enjoyment to the right mean and harmonious measure. In order to achieve this measure, these people first need ‘complete abstention from pleasure’.66 The masses have to be kept away from pleasure since they lack the experience and ability of discrimination (cf. 533,8–10). This is due to the fact that they were not brought up soundly. This lack of early education further leads to the bad consequence that they are immune to arguments or discourses and must be harshly reigned in. When he cites the famous thesis ‘contraries are cures for contraries’, Michael appears to be mixing together Aristotelian and Hippocratic ideas. The idea seems to be that we can moderate the enjoyment of pleasure best by inflicting very particular pains on the person who is indulgent. For Michael these pains to be inflicted are not random but consist in keeping the person away from his special objects of desire, e.g. keeping the wine-­lover from wine.67 Only ‘those who have been educated and habituated to keep away from what is bad, immediately run towards good things as soon as they hear discourses advising them to do so, whereas “discourses are unable to exhort the masses towards noble excellence” ’ (EN 1179b10).68 In the end, education and experience form the ability to distinguish between the varieties of pleasures properly. In order to achieve virtue, it is helpful to ‘know which of the pleasant and painful things turn out to contribute to virtue and which are impediments to it, and we must not irrationally hasten to everything pleasant and flee everything

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painful, [. . .] and thereby act without any discrimination’.69 When Michael says that contemplation is a valuable and divine activity, and therefore must be pleasant, this is because ‘it is simply not permitted to think that the life in accordance with intellect is unpleasant’, nor to assume that it is ‘full of agitation and disturbance and filled with unpleasantness’.70 As we saw above, Michael invokes Plotinus’ name to emphasize the ineffability of this kind of pleasure, remarking that only ‘those who have been engaged in this kind of activity know what sort of pleasure this is’ (529,21–2). The pleasure of contemplation must be experienced to be understood.

Acknowledgements We are very grateful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for its generous support of this project (WI 3873/2–1) over 30 months. During this time, large parts of Michael’s comments on EN 10 were taken up as the focus text of an Ancient Greek reading group at the Ruhr Universität Bochum, and we would like to express our gratitude to the participants in this group for their commitment to the project, and especially for their valuable comments and questions, from which this translation has certainly benefitted: Wolfram Adam, Daniel Recker, Jana Schultz and Giulia Weißmann.

Notes 1 The sections ‘The Life and Works of Michael of Ephesus’ and ‘Neoplatonic Influence on the Thought of Michael of Ephesus’ are by James Wilberding, and the section ‘Michael of Ephesus on the Happy Life’ is by Julia Trompeter. 2 See K. Praechter, ‘Review of Michael Ephesii In libros De partibus animalium commentaria’, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 168 (1906), pp. 861–907 at pp. 863–4 and K. Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations On Michael Of Ephesus’ Comments On Nicomachean Ethics X’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden: Brill 2009, pp. 185–202 at pp. 187–94. 3 See Praechter, ‘Review’, 902. 4 R. Browning, ‘An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 8 (1962), pp. 1–12, reprinted with revisions in R. Sorabji (ed.) Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990, pp. 393–406 and S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, Leiden: Brill 1981. 5 K. Praechter, ‘Michael von Ephesos und Psellos’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 31 (1931), pp. 1–12. 6 M. Trizio, ‘Byzantine Philosophy as a Contemporary Historiographical Project’, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 74 (2007), pp. 247–94 at pp. 291–2. 7 See H.P.F. Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, in R. Sorabji (ed.) Aristotle Transformed, pp. 407–44 at p. 437. Michael’s lament in his scholia on Aristotle’s Politics, which O’Meara has suggested was written after the Ethics commentaries (D. O’Meara, ‘Spätantike und Byzanz: Neuplatonische Rezeption – Michael von Ephesos’, in C. Horn and A. Neschke-Hentschke (eds) Politischer

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Aristotelismus. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Politik von der Antike bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler 2008, pp. 42–52 at p. 48), about being ‘a beggar’ (in Pol. 322,16–17, translated in E. Barker, Social and Political Thought in Byzantium from Justinian to the Last Palaeologus. Passages from Byzantine Writers and Documents, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957, p. 141) might indeed be an indication that his work is no longer being sponsored by Anna. See Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. Book 6 has often been attributed to Michael as well, but see P. Golitsis, ‘Who Were the Real Authors of the Metaphysics Commentary Ascribed to Alexander and Ps.-Alexander?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.) Aristotle Re-Interpreteted. New Findings on Seven Hundred Years of the Ancient Commentators, London: Bloomsbury 2016, pp. 565–89. Editions of all the previously listed commentaries are available in CAG. The scholia on the Politics have been collected in the edition of O. Immisch, Aristotelis Politica, Leipzig: Teubner 1929, pp. 293–327, though O’Meara, ‘Spätantike und Byzanz’, p. 47 suggests that this collection might still be augmented. A selection of these has been translated in Barker, Social and Political Thought in Byzantium from Justinian to the Last Palaeologus, pp. 136–41. See G. Wöhrle, Aristoteles. De Coloribus, Berlin: De Gruyter 1999, pp. 105–29. Michael refers to his commentary on the Physics in his in SE 163,14 and 178,7–8. This commentary is widely acknowledged by scholars. Michael refers to his commentary on the Rhetoric in his in SE 98,11–12. T. Conley, ‘Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” in Byzantium’, Rhetorica 8 (1990), pp. 29–44 at 38 has suggested that this is not lost and is in fact the anonymous commentary contained in H. Rabe (ed.) Anonymi et Stephani In Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria, CAG 21,2, Berlin: Reimer 1896, pp. 1–261. This commentary is widely acknowledged by scholars. Michael refers to his commentary on the Topics in his in SE 109,16–17 (cf. 177,8–9). This commentary is acknowledged by e.g. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 881; Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 186; Barber and Jenkins (eds), Medieval Greek Commentaries, p. xi, but not mentioned by L. Benakis, ‘Commentaries and Commentators on the Works of Aristotle (except the Logical Ones) in Byzantium’, in B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta (eds) Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters I, 2 vols, Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner 1992, pp. 45–54 at pp. 47–8 and L. Benakis, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries, pp. 63–70 at p. 65. Michael refers to his commentaries on the Prior and Posterior Analytics in his in SE 1,3–5; 10,9; 58,24–7; 140,2–4; 194,10–11; and in EN 5, 9,30–2. This commentary is acknowledged by e.g. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 881; Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 186; Barber and Jenkins, Medieval Greek Commentaries, xi, but not mentioned by Benakis, ‘Commentaries and Commentators’, pp. 47–8 and idem, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, p. 65. Benakis, ‘Commentaries and Commentators’, p. 47 and idem, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, p. 65 and Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 186 describe this as a ‘lost’ commentary, presumably on the basis of the number of Michael’s references to it (e.g. in EN 9–10, 541,31–2; 552,32–3; in PN 90,11; 137,20; etc.), but there is no pressing reason in my view to go beyond Praechter’s view, ‘Michael von Ephesos und Psellos’, p. 7n1 that Michael lectured on the De caelo but the lecture was never written down. Not mentioned by Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, p. 433. The alleged fragments are to be found in A. Busse (ed.) In Aristotelis De Interpretatione (Fragments), CAG 4,5, Berlin: Reimer 1897, pp. xlv–xlvii. This commentary is

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Nicomachean Ethics 10 acknowledged by K. Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), pp. 516–38, reprinted in R. Sorabji (ed.) Aristotle Transformed, pp. 31–54 at p. 51 and with the qualification ‘perhaps’ in Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, p. 433n82, not mentioned by Benakis, ‘Commentaries and Commentators’, pp. 47–8 and idem, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, p. 65; Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 186; Barber and Jenkins, Medieval Greek Commentaries, p. xi. Cf. in GA 88,6–8 and 85,28–9. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 880 takes this to be an independent treatise, distinct from the Peri hormês, but in idem, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, p. 52 he says this ‘was probably also a commentary’. This is not included in any recent catalogues of Michael’s works. References to the HA can be found frequently (e.g. in PA 88,23; in PN 134,29–30). There is also minimal evidence outside of Michael’s corpus of its existence. See Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, p. 52 and idem, ‘Review’, p. 864, who concludes: ‘verloren, falls er überhaupt existiert hat’. This is not included in any recent catalogues of Michael’s works. Michael refers to the Peri hormês several times in his commentary on De motu animalium (114,27–116,11; 117,16–17). Earlier scholars had taken this to be an original treatise by Michael (M. Hayduck (ed.) Michaelis Ephesii In Libros De Partibus Animalium, De Animalium Motione, De Animalium Incessu Commentaria, Berlin: Reimer 1904, ad 114,24; Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 882), but P. Donini, ‘Il De Anima de Alessandro di Afrodisia e Michele Efesio’, Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 96 (1968), pp. 316–23 has shown that this ‘treatise’ either refers to the chapter in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De anima dealing with impulse and appetite (CAG Suppl. 2.1, pp. 78,6ff.) or if it does refer to a treatise by Michael, it is taken over largely or even verbatim from Alexander. Not mentioned in: Benakis, ‘Commentaries and Commentators’, pp. 47–8 and idem, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, p. 65; Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 186; Barber and Jenkins, Medieval Greek Commentaries, p. xi. See C. Luna, Trois études sur la tradition des commentaries anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Leiden: Brill 2001, pp. 66–71. See G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006 and J. Wilberding, ‘The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, in F. Sheffield and J. Warren (eds) The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, New York and Oxford: Routledge 2014, pp. 643–58. See Praechter, ‘Review’, pp. 902ff. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 896; A. Preus, Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals, Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1981; R. Sorabji, ‘The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, in idem (ed.) Aristotle Transformed, pp. 1–30 at p. 3; and Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, pp. 407–44 have all advanced a view along these lines. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 906. C. Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus’, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 44 (2002), pp. 51–7 at p. 51. See J. Wilberding, Forms, Souls and Embryos. Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction, New York and Oxford: Routledge 2016, pp. 111–18. E.g. Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, pp. 434–6 and Praechter, ‘Review’, pp. 904–6.

Introduction

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29 Already demonstrated by Praechter, ‘Review’, pp. 892ff. and now more thoroughly by Luna, Trois études, pp. 191–2. See now also Golitsis, ‘Who Were the Real Authors’, pp. 565–89 who demonstrates Michael’s dependance on Asclepius. 30 D. O’Meara, ‘Spätantike und Byzanz’, pp. 46–50. 31 Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, p. 284. 32 For a fuller discussion of what follows, see Wilberding (in progress). 33 See in EN 10, 529,20–4. As discussed in the note ad loc., Michael’s source in this passage has been repeatedly misidentified and misunderstood. 34 See in EN 10, 603,8–604,10 with notes ad loc. and Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’. 35 See in EN 10, 557,16–17 and 579,28, with notes ad loc. 36 in Metaph. 600,25–7. 37 in EN 10, 529,14–15; 561,36; 579,14; 591,4.5.9; 580,14; 603,17.18.29. 38 in EN 10, 576,30–1; 580,17–18; 591,2.20.21; 594,21.22. 39 in EN 10, 561,27–8; 556,17–18 (cf. Vat. 269 [330r]); 591,9; 603,17. Cf. also in EN 9, 481,32 together with Proclus in Alc. 1 190,11–13. 40 See the references in the previous note and 561,35; 603,16.17.20. 41 Neoplatonists commonly use the term epaphê to describe the superior cognition of the intellect, see e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.2.6.12–13; Iamblichus De communi math. scientia VIII 33,19–20 Festa. Sometimes it serves as the preferred term for accessing what is even above the Intellect, e.g. Plotinus Enn. 5.3.10.42–3 and 6.7.36.3–4. Cf. also e.g. Hermias in Phaedr. 64,17 Couvreur (68,24 Lucarini and Moreschini) and 191,14 Couvreur (200,4 Lucarini and Moreschini). Michael employs the term three times in the in EN 10 commentary: in EN 10, 586,10; 589,19–20; 596,11. Cf. in Metaph. 714,21. 42 in EN 10, 579,4; 580,14; 591,3. 43 in EN 10, 580,20.21; 586,17; 591,3.4.26.27; 603,30–1. Cf. 585,11–12 and in GA 84,27–30. 44 in EN 10, 580,20.21, and cf. in Metaph. 721,32.33. 45 in EN 9, 517,14–18. I discuss this at great length in Wilberding (in progress). 46 That said, he does at one point appear to concede the terminological distinction is in fact Aristotelian. See in EN 10, 605,30–3. 47 See in EN 10, 589,31–590,29. 48 See notes ad loc., especially 395 and 396. 49 See in EN 10, 532,27–34. 50 See in EN 10, 590,21–4. 51 Cf. in EN 10, 581,12–20. 52 See in EN 10, 581,27, and cf. 581,11–30 and in Metaph. 695,36–9. 53 E.g. in EN 10, 539,39–40 and 578,12–13. Cf. EN 1099a29–31; 1100b9–10; 1101a14–15; 1102a5; 1102a17–18; 1144a6; 1153b10–11; 1169b29; 1177a9–13; 1177a16–17; 1177a22–5; 1177b23–5; 1178b7–8. 54 E.g. in EN 10, 573,16 and 582,5. 55 It is worth comparing this idea of an ‘unsatisfied self-­sufficiency’ with Gregory of Nyssa’s distinction between satiety and satisfaction in De beatitudinibus. He compares the pointless effort spent on the pleasures to a leaky jar and contrasts this with the attainment of virtue as an eternal good. God ‘promises satisfaction to those who hunger for these things [i.e. the virtues], a satisfaction which sharpens the appetite by fullness, and does not blunt it’. Comparable to Michael’s characterization of contemplation, Gregory of Nyssa describes the striving for virtue as a never-­ending process, since ‘being filled [. . .] does not lead to aversion, but to intensification of the appetite’. Cf. Beat. IV, GNO VII,2, 119–22 Jaeger.

14 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Nicomachean Ethics 10 in EN 10, 581,27–30. in EN 10, 586,27–30. See in EN 10, 581,26–587,2. in EN 10, 602,32–6. in EN 10, 578,29–579,1. See in EN 10, 590,35–591,1, and cf. Rep. 588C7–8; 589B1–2; 590A10; 588D2; and 588E7. See in EN 10, 590,35–591,10. See in EN 10, 530,1–30. See in EN 10, 531,19–30. in EN 10, 531,30–4. See in EN 10, 532,1–3. See in EN 10, 608,4–10. in EN 10, 606,6–9. in EN 10, 531,8–11. in EN 10, 529,15–16.

Abbreviations Cod. Coisl. Codex Coislianus (eleventh century) MSS

manuscripts

SVF

Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

Vat. gr.

Greek manuscript of the Vatican Library

Textual Emendations This translation follows the text printed in Heylbut (1892). We encountered a number of minor infelicities in this text, and it appears that Heylbut did not adequately incorporate Vat. gr. 269 into his edition. Thus, we frequently consulted Vat. gr. 269 as well as the excellent edition of Grosseteste’s Latin translation in Mercken (1991). This and other considerations led to a number of mostly minor emendations, listed below. 533,23: 533,24: 534,7: 534,31: 534,33: 535,2: 535,2: 535,14: 537,25: 537,26: 537,33: 537,35: 538,2: 539,36: 539,37: 540,19: 540,20: 540,21: 541,23: 542,13: 542,13: 542,14: 542,22: 542,24: 543,13: 544,11: 544,18: 545,15: 546,2: 546,12:

Reading hup’ for ap’ Reading haitines for hai tines Reading t’agathon for to agathon Reading ê for hê Reading ekeinon for ekeino Reading prostithemenên for protithemenên Reading poiein for poiei Placing a raised dot after legei Reading enistanto for anistanto Replacing the full-­stop with a comma Replacing the interrogative punctuation with a comma Replacing the full-­stop with interrogative punctuation Inserting mona after ta anoêta Reading ê for hê Reading haitines for hai tines Reading gar for kai Reading to ti ên einai hugieias for to ti ên einai hugieia Reading to gar hugieias for to gar hugieia Reading (mia gar esti kai hê autê), homoia for (mia gar esti kai hê autê homoia) Removing the comma after dunatai Inserting a comma after estin Reading menei for menein Reading aph’ hou for eph’ hou Reading men for Heylbut’s mer Adding a full stop after haima Changing the comma after touto to interrogative punctuation Changing anaplêsôsin to anaplêrôsin Reading epakolouthei autôn tais energeiais hêdonê for epakolouthei autais tais energeiais hêdonê Reading noêsantes for noêsantos Reading aisthêsesin for athlêsesin

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Reading pasai hairetai for pasai hai aretai Reading pasa hairetê for pasa aretê Reading kai to melan for to melan Inserting before poion ti Reading oikia for oikeia Reading heterou for heteron Reading hêdonên for aisthêsin Inserting prior to tês toiautês epistrophês Reading protaseôn for protaseôs Reading toutôn for toutois Placing a comma after aisthêtikon Deleting the comma after energeia(i) Reading hugieia for hêgieia Reading to hugiainein for ta hugiainein Reading ho before aisthêtikos Changing the comma after semnas to a full stop Reading tê(i) dianoia(i) for tên dianoian Reading hôste ei hai men for hôste ean mê hai Reading poteron poterou kharin for poterou kharin Removing the comma after energeian Changing the interrogative punctuation after hêdonên to a comma Changing the interrogative punctuation after energeian to a full stop Reading toutôn for toutois Reading esti tê energeia(i), de for esti, tê energeia(i) de Reading the dative hulê(i) for the nominative hulê Reading tais aretais for tais hêdonais Placing a raised dot after theôria Changing the raised dot after prosupakouein to a full stop Reading auta for autô Reading phutikôn for phusikôn Changing the comma after paidian to a raised dot Changing the raised dot after eudaimonein to a comma Reading epêgage kai malista tou aristou for epêgage kai malista tou aristou 577,32: Inserting apolausin after gar 580,15: Reading the dative energeia(i) for the nominative energeia 582,31–3: Removing the parentheses around 583,5: Inserting pros before tousde tinas 583,36: Reading eudaimosin for eudaimonias 584,11: Reading prôtê with a for prôtôn 585,11: Changing the comma to a full stop 585,31: Reading monê for monon 586,16: Deleting the ta prior to kata ta agatha 586,21: Reading ataraxia for apraxia 587,17: Changing the full stop after ginointo to a comma

550,7: 550,10: 550,23: 550,23: 551,33: 553,6: 555,16: 556,13–14: 556,19: 557,5: 557,14: 557,15: 557,27: 557,29: 558,16: 561,37: 562,3: 563,9: 563,16: 563,17: 563,17: 563,17: 563,33: 568,29: 569,21: 571,23: 572,25: 572,25: 572,27: 573,2: 575,25: 575,25: 577,31:

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Reading tis en skholê for an tis askholon Inserting after heteran Inserting a full stop after hairetê Deleting hoti Reading timiotêti for teleiotêti Reading kai for Heylbut’s pai Moving the second comma to after proteron Filling the lacuna according to Grosseteste’s Latin text (435,90–2) Reading de hautais for de autais Reading hôs for ho Inserting ouk prior to ousa Inserting a comma after esti Removing the comma after theôrousi Changing the full stop after eiê to a raised dot Reading hupo for apo Reading oud’ for ouk Deleting the comma before ho Anaxagoras Replacing the comma after biblia with interrogative punctuation Changing eiper to ei pôs Filling the lacuna with poiêsai de kalous kagathous dikha protrepein astheneis mallon kai adunatoi eisin. eipôn de hoti protrepsai kai parormêsai dunantai with Vat. gr. 269 (356r) 605,28: Inserting poiêsai before êthos 606,22: Reading hêdeiai for hêdonai 607,22: Inserting before antekhein 607,31: Inserting prior to pôs 608,32: Reading huieis for hugieis 612,21–2: Reading to aoriston for to ariston 614,7: Reading to kath’ hekaston for to katholou 614,7: Deleting the second an 614,13: Reading ho for hê 615,34: Reading touto eipôn epêgagen for touto epêgagen eipôn 616,17: Reading prosbibazei for probibazei 617,31: Reading estin hôsper an ei tis legei hoti hê Sôkratous kheir kai ho Sôkratês tauton ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê with the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) for Heylbut’s estin ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê 618,32: Reading a third dia prior to hidrôtôn 619,1–2: Deleting the second tois 619,18: Reading beltion for to beltion 588,18: 588,19: 589,26: 590,18: 591,29: 593,21: 593,35: 594,19: 595,15: 596,13: 599,11: 600,3: 600,4: 600,7: 601,20: 601,32: 602,20: 605,5: 605,13–14: 605,23:

(And cp. the final note on the alternative concluding lines in Vat. gr. 269)

Michael of Ephesus On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10 Translation

Michael of Ephesus on Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10

[Michael of Ephesus] on book 10 (K) of the same Ethics.1 The present book, which is the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics and customarily labelled by the Peripatetics with [the Greek letter] kappa, is the final book of this particular treatise. For the inspired Aristotle completed the present philosophical project in ten books. In this book he expounds who the true human being is and what the life (zôê) is that is fitting to him, namely that it is the way of life in accordance with intellect, which could also be called happiness in the strictest sense. For the happy man is two-­fold:2 There is both the political man, who stands in need of goods deriving from chance, too, if his activity is to be unimpeded,3 and the man who devotes himself especially to the contemplation of the real Beings.4 But [Aristotle] has already said a great deal about the happy political man,5 and in the present book [he discusses] the contemplative man. Now given that political happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue over a complete life with pleasure or not without pleasure, as we have learned,6 what should we suppose about the happiness connected to contemplation? Is it the case that some pleasure accompanies this intellectual life and our stretching upwards7 towards the things that are always the same and unchanging,8 or is it full of agitation and disturbance and filled with unpleasantness? It is simply not permitted to think that the life in accordance with intellect is unpleasant. Therefore, it is with pleasure or not without pleasure. For if pleasure accompanies our noble practical actions, this is much more the case when it comes to the best of the activities, namely the intellect’s occupying itself with the intelligible, and the pleasure that follows upon this activity will also be nobler to whatever extent that contemplation is itself more valuable than practical action. Since, then, this activity of intellect is even with pleasure – and those who have been engaged in this kind of activity know what sort of pleasure this is, as Plotinus says9 – pleasure, what it is and what sort of thing it is,10 must necessarily be examined beforehand, both for this reason and for the other reasons that Aristotle is going to introduce, and then we must go through the present [statements]. 1172a19 What comes next after these things is perhaps to discuss pleasure.

Either it is due to philosophical caution that Aristotle said ‘perhaps’, or it is because he is showing [the contingency of the topic’s relevance]: if, on the one hand, pleasure is a part of virtue, in the same way as non-­rationality is a part of horse, then one does not ‘perhaps’ discuss pleasure, rather one must necessarily discuss it; for it is necessary for

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those who want a correct understanding of what exactly the whole is to know the parts of which the whole is composed; if, on the other hand, [pleasure] is not a part but, as it were, a kind of symptom and shadow11 that happens to supervene on the most noble activities, then one should say ‘perhaps’ about [discussing] pleasure. Why ‘perhaps’? Because it is possible to come to understand the things that such symptoms accompany even apart from what happens to supervene [on them]. For it is possible to know a three-­day fever’s nature even without the symptoms that accompany it (vomiting bile, perspiration, etc.), and it is possible to know the substance of happiness apart from knowing what pleasure is, if pleasure is not a part of happiness but one of the accidents that belong to it. ‘For [pleasure] seems most of all to be properly connected to our kind’ (1172a19– 20). Through these words it appears that it was due to caution that Aristotle put down the word ‘perhaps’. For what he should have said is: ‘After these things it is necessary [to discuss] pleasure’. For Aristotle was wary of the masses’ contempt [for pleasure],12 and on account of this caution he put down ‘perhaps’ instead of ‘necessarily’. That it is necessary for the one who is discussing the virtues – both those of the non-­rational part of the soul and those of the rational part – to speak about pleasure is clear to those who are paying attention to what is being said.13 For if [pleasure] is proper to our nature and we all choose it and pursue it because it is proper, then it is no matter of ‘perhaps’; rather, it is necessary for us to know what exactly this is that is properly connected to our kind and is most proper to us in the sense that it is pursued and loved by us more than the other things that are properly connected to us. And thanks to this proper connection to and love of pleasure we hasten to educate our young by ‘steering [them] by pleasure and pain’ (1172a20–1), and ‘steering’ here means the same as ‘setting a course and navigating’. For just as ships are preserved by being turned around by means of their tillers towards their harbours and in this way set on the right course, so too are the young [preserved] in the virtues as if in a harbour by the means of pleasure. For getting them habituated to experience pleasure in what they should enjoy and to experience pain if they do not do what they should do is navigating them to harbour, that is, to virtue.14 Just as enjoying and being pained by things one shouldn’t is the road to vice, Aristotle says that ‘enjoying the things one should is most important to the virtue of character’ (1172a21–2), and by ‘virtue of character’ he means virtue itself, just as if he had said: ‘Enjoying the things one should and fleeing the things one should appear to contribute the most towards the acquisition of virtue of character’. And this has been shown earlier in the treatise.15 The statement ‘For these things extend throughout the whole life’ (1172a23) is equivalent to ‘These things, that is pleasure and pain, are coextensive with our life’. For it is not the case that we experience pleasure and pain in our childhood, let’s say, while in the other stages of life we are in a state of quiet, living out our lives without pain and without pleasure. Surely not this! Rather, as long as we are in the ‘perforated pot’,16 viz. the body, we partake in pleasure and pain, and it is necessary to examine what they are and not to skip over contemplating these things. ‘For these things extend throughout the whole life, having a pull and power towards virtue’ (1172a23–4).17 The expression ‘having power’ gives us the meaning of the expression ‘having a pull’. For the noblest of the pleasures, as well as the pains associated with not performing noble practical actions, these have the force to pull and to impel

Translation

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the life and way of life that leads to virtue and happiness. And if this is so, then we must know which of the pleasant and painful things turn out to contribute to virtue and which are impediments to it, and we must not irrationally hasten to everything pleasant and flee everything painful, as happens nowadays when men go after pleasant things and flee painful things and thereby act without any discrimination.

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1172a27 Especially as they are the subject of great dissent.

Aristotle says that it is necessary to consider pleasure both for the reasons mentioned and especially because of the dissenting arguments that arrive at contrary conclusions about it. For Eudoxus thought that pleasure is the same as the Good.18 For he posited [pleasure] as a formal principle and cause of all the goods in the same manner that those who champion the Forms [posit] the Living Thing Itself [as the formal principle and cause] of living things, Being Itself for beings, Human Being Itself for human beings, and Beauty Itself for beautiful things, yet others have maintained that pleasure is, on the contrary, most base. And those who maintain that pleasure is the same as the Good have asserted that it is such because they have been convinced by certain arguments, and the following are some of the arguments in question. Everything seeks pleasure, and what everything seeks is good; therefore, pleasure is good. [Here is the same argument] again: What all things seek and aim at for its own sake and not for the sake of something else is good, and [everything]19 aims at pleasure itself for its own sake; therefore, pleasure is good. For one chooses wealth for the sake of something else, e.g. as an instrument to engage in noble activities without impediment,20 but one also chooses surgery, cauterization and consuming medicine for the sake of health, and walls and a house for the sake of protection and shelter, but one chooses pleasure for its own sake. Therefore, pleasure is an end of the most final variety, and the end of all ends and the most final of these is the Good. Therefore, pleasure is the Good. There are many other arguments that plausibly establish that pleasure is the same as the Good Itself, and Aristotle will set out these arguments below. By contrast, those who maintain that pleasure is most base have maintained this without having been convinced by plausible arguments. Rather, it is because they have seen the masses sinking into pleasure and neglecting the most noble [activities] and because they wish to lead the masses away from the unchecked charge and advance (phora) into pleasure that they make pleasure appear to be one of the most base things, even if it is not most base. For it is necessary, they maintained, to lead bad men away from pleasure to its contrary, just as it is necessary to lead the over-­bold towards cowardice and the avaricious to refusing all gains and all of the others who exceed the mean and the harmonius measure. For in this way [the bad men] would reach the mean, that is, the harmonius measure. For when lovers of pleasure are led towards a total abstention from enjoyment they should reach the mean, which is to enjoy and take pleasure in the things one should; and when the over-­bold are drawn towards cowardice they should reach the mean, viz. courage, and the avaricious similarly will reach justice. But it would be impossible for anyone to lead the lover of pleasure away from pleasure or the avaricious away from gain without making pleasure or gain or over-­boldness appear as a thing most base. As a result, even if pleasure is not most base,

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he who is going to lead the lovers of pleasure away from pleasure must say that it is most base. 1172a33 But perhaps this is not the correct thing to say. For assertions concerning the sphere of affections and practical actions are less credible than deeds.

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Aristotle says that it is not correct to say that we should reproach and condemn as bad that to which we are inclined, if this is not in fact reproachable or bad. For it is not right to make what is not without qualification bad to appear indiscriminately to be such [i.e. bad] without qualification; rather, if [pleasure] is among those words that are said in many ways, we should be differentiating and teaching the number of ways in which it is said as well as which of the term’s meanings are good or beneficial and which are bad or harmful. [To apply this] directly to the case of pleasure: the pleasure of the men who are licentious and gamblers and addicted to alcohol and wantonness is bad and harmful, and this pleasure is not even pleasure in the strict sense but only appears [as such] to those who have never tasted true pleasure; but the pleasure that accompanies the activities in accordance with virtue and the contemplation of the Beings21 is best and good, and this we should welcome and pursue with serious interest. It is right [to say] this, but making it appear that there are no distinctions is wrong and not reasonable. For to reproach pleasure without qualification is to obstruct and to lead away from the noblest pleasures. And Aristotle provided the reason why it is not right to condemn as bad without qualification what is not without qualification bad. For we place greater credence in acts than in assertions. For it is actions that make assertions credible, and not assertions that make actions credible. For if one should say that love of money is bad but then is seen accumulating cash wherever and however one can, who would believe this person [when he claims] that love of money is something bad? Likewise, the person who says that pleasure is bad and then sinks into it, shows by his actions that pleasure is good and not bad (as he claims). Therefore, practical actions confirm one’s assertions, and not the other way around. Aristotle says that pleasure, pain, love and anger are affections,22 and that the activities that [arise] from them – acts of insolence, gain and honor – are practical actions, and he repeatedly discussed them in the preceding books.23 Whenever, then, our assertions are not in agreement with the observable facts, that is, with our actions, that is, the actions of those making these assertions, then these assertions are not taken seriously, and in addition to appearing unconvincing they even obscure the truth. For the one who says without qualification and indiscriminately that pleasure is bad and then is seen to incline towards and pursue it with serious interest, does away with the truth. For there truly is a kind of pleasure that is bad, and the one who says this is bad speaks the truth, but he appears to be speaking falsely because of those who claim that pleasure is bad and then, by their pursuing it, make it appear to be good. For the masses think the bad pleasure is good because they are not able differentiate the number of ways in which each [term] is said and they are focusing on the person who reproaches pleasure without qualification and indiscriminately and yet is impelled towards it. In cases of words that are said in many ways, then, one should not make them appear as if there were no distinctions, rather one should differentiate them, for example, that

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x, y and z are pleasures, and x is good pleasure, y is bad pleasure and z is pleasure that is neither good nor bad. For knowledge of the truth is intrinsically choiceworthy, but it also makes a major contribution to the correct manner of life for those who hear it. ‘For since they harmonize’ and are in agreement ‘with deeds, they carry conviction’ (1172b5– 6) and force those who hear them and are convinced by them to live as they command. After having said this, Aristotle adds ‘enough of discussions of this sort’ (1172b7) and turns to the views that have been made out about pleasure. And it is the arguments by which Eudoxus attempted to establish that pleasure is the Good that he puts first. 1172b9 Eudoxus, then, thought that pleasure is the Good because he observed all things are seeking it.

It is a convention among Platonists to indicate what they call24 ‘formal’ principles, which25 are in a primary manner that very thing that is said, by means of either adding the letter tau or adding the expression ‘Itself ’ (auto).26 By means of the tau [they indicate] the Good, which is nothing other than solely good and good in a primary manner, while other things (e.g. intellect, soul, knowledge and virtue) are said to be goods but not in a primary manner; rather, these are said to be goods because they participate in the nature of the Good.27 That is (kai), the intellect is a good, but it is not the Good. Likewise, knowledge, too, is a good, but it is in no way the Good. But pleasure [according to Eudoxus] is not a good but the Good. For the principle and source of goodness, that is the Good, is pleasure according to Eudoxus. In this way, by means of the letter tau they indicated the first principle and cause and root and center point, as it were, of all goods,28 and by means of the expression ‘Itself ’ they indicated the One Itself, the Living Thing Itself, and Being Itself. The One Itself is the principle and source of the henads and monads. For according to them henads and monads are different things.29 Yet the Platonists maintained that the One Itself and the Good are the same and not different things. For they called the most primary principle of all the One Itself and the Good Itself (to autoagathon) and the Good (t’ agathon), whereas they said Being Itself is [the] most primary principle of all beings, though second to the One Itself. For the One Itself is most primary of all, and then Being Itself, and then Life Itself, and then the Living Thing Itself.30 But it suffices to discuss these things as Aristotle himself does.31 Eudoxus attempted to establish that pleasure is the Good32 by observing that both those [living things] endowed with reason, that is the rational [living things], and the non-­rational ones seek pleasure. What all things choose and all things pursue is decent and good. And the most decent is most excellent, that is, a first principle and a first cause. If, then, pleasure is what is most decent, and if what is most decent is most excellent, and if what is most excellent is the most primary principle of all, and if the most primary principle of all is the Good; then pleasure is the Good. But how has it become clear that pleasure is what is most excellent? Well, he says, from the fact that all things move towards it and all things want to experience pleasure. For by nature each thing discovers what is good for itself and advantageous to itself, which is pleasant, ‘just as [each thing discovers its own] nourishment, too’ (1172b13–14). For in all things there is either intellect or some ray and illumination of intellect, as [Aristotle] himself has shown elsewhere,33 and as Hippocrates said, ‘natures of living things are untaught’.34

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‘For the arguments [of Eudoxus] have managed to convince more because of his virtue of character than by their own merits (di’ heautous)’ (1172b15–16). If the one who maintains that pleasure is the Good is someone licentious, he would not manage to convince, but since [Eudoxus] was temperate in the highest degree and seriously good in the highest degree he justly managed to convince when he claimed pleasure to be the Good. For he did not appear to be valuing and celebrating pleasure as a lover of pleasure nor as a slave to it, but because he truly believed that pleasure was such as he claimed. But it was not only from the fact that all things move towards it that [Eudoxus] made pleasure out to be a good, but also from its contrary, pain. For if pain, being the opposite of pleasure, is an evil, then pleasure is a good. That pain is an evil is clear from the fact that all men flee it and hate experiencing pain. In this way Eudoxus concluded that pleasure is generally a good, and in the following way [he concluded] that it is the Good. He says that what we choose for its own sake and not for the sake of something else is most choiceworthy and good to the highest degree. And pleasure is of this sort. For no one asks one who is experiencing pleasure why he is experiencing it in the way [that we do ask] one who is cleansing himself, or who wants to subject himself to blood-­letting or35 to take [cathartic] medicine why he is choosing each of these. For if someone should ask the one man why he is eager to consume medicine, perhaps he would say in order to be healthy, but if someone should ask the other man36 why he is pursuing pleasure, he would say for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. If we do indeed choose pleasure for its own sake, and if what is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else is good in the highest degree; then pleasure is good in the highest degree. But what is good in the highest degree and the Good are the same. Therefore, pleasure is the Good. His argument goes like this: Pleasure is choiceworthy for its own sake. What is choiceworthy for its own sake is choiceworthy in the highest degree. What is choiceworthy in the highest degree is good in the highest degree. What is good in the highest degree and the Good are the same. Therefore, pleasure is the Good. [Eudoxus] attempts to establish that pleasure is choiceworthy in the highest degree, that is that it is most choiceworthy, by means of [the premise] that pleasure, when added37 to anything choiceworthy, makes38 that thing more choiceworthy (1172b23–4). For just action with pleasure is more choiceworthy than just action without pleasure, but even contemplation with pleasure is more choiceworthy that contemplation without pleasure,39 and in general every practical action and every act of creation with pleasure is better than the practical action and act of creation without pleasure. And further, he says, it is clear that it is most choiceworthy because what occurs with it and is accompanied by it admits of augmentation. For acts of learning with pleasure are sooner augmented than those without pleasure or even with pain, and so are the activities in accordance with virtue and, in general, everything. This is the overall meaning of the present [lines of text].40 But in the phrase ‘indeed what is itself good (to agathon auto) is increased by it (autô[i])’ (1172b25)41 we should write the first pronoun with a short ‘o’ [viz. auto] and put a comma here and then add the second pronoun with a long ‘o’ [viz. autô(i)]. It would have been clearer if the feminine form autê(i) had been written instead of

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autô(i), like this: ‘indeed, what is itself (auto) good is increased by it (autê[i])’, that is by pleasure. This is what he is saying:42 and indeed, what is itself good, that is every (pan) good [thing], is increased by pleasure itself. For every (pan) good [thing], when it occurs or is done with pleasure is increased and extended. What is good, then, is increased by it (autô[i]), that is: every good [thing] [is increased] by pleasure itself. For the auto [viz. ‘itself ’] has been adopted in place of pan [viz. ‘every’].

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1172b26 This argument seems to make pleasure out to belong among the goods.43

The argument, he says, that maintains that when pleasure is added to something, for example to temperance, it makes temperance more choiceworthy than it is without pleasure, does not reach the conclusion that it purports to prove, but some other [conclusion]. For it does not prove that pleasure is the Good, but that it is among the goods, that is to say, that even it is a certain individual item among the goods and belongs to the nature of these goods and is of the same nature as they are – but surely not that it turns out to be these goods’ form (idea) and source and center point.44 ‘For everything [that is] more choiceworthy in combination with another good than in isolation ’ (1172b27–8),45 then, means something like this: If any good which is such as to be the Good,46 when added to something else, makes the combination of both greater and better and more choiceworthy, then [that good] would not be such, that is: would not be the Good. For instead of saying ‘would not be the Good’ [Aristotle] said ‘would not be such’. For example, if prudence, which is a good, is added to courage, which is a good, and the whole that arises from courage and prudence becomes a greater good than courage alone, then prudence would not be the Good but something good. If, then, when pleasure is added to prudence or to courage, it also renders the combination of pleasure and prudence or of pleasure and courage a greater good, pleasure would not be the Good. For saying that pleasure, while being the Good, when added [to something], makes the whole a greater [good], is like saying – if we must give a likeness – that the entire earth including the mountains in it and its manifold waters and seas and plants, when added to the ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet, has made the whole [arising] from this ten-­thousandth part and the entire earth heavier.47 For just as the whole earth is related to the ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet, so is the Good itself related to any one of the other goods, for example, to prudence, wisdom or any other [good]. To be sure, even this [likeness], which maintains that the Good’s relation to prudence is like the earth’s relation to the ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet, is false. For the superiority48 of the Good49 in relation to prudence is infinitely greater than that of the weight of the entire earth in relation to the weight of ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet. Just as, then, it is ridiculous to say that the weight of the ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet, when it receives the weight of the entire earth as an addition, has become heavier, it is still more ridiculous to say that prudence, when it receives the Good, i.e. pleasure, as an addition has become a greater good. But it surely does become greater; for prudence with pleasure is better than prudence without pleasure. But if it becomes greater (as indeed it does), pleasure is not the Good but something good.

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‘In fact it is with an argument like this that Plato does away with the view that pleasure is the Good’ (1172b28–9): the argument by which they, like Eudoxus’ followers, deduce that pleasure is the Good, Plato uses to show that pleasure is not the Good.50 Therefore, Eudoxos did not [really] conclude that pleasure is the Good but that it is something good. And the argument would go like this: Pleasure, when added to one of the goods, makes the resulting combination of both more choiceworthy; none of the goods is such that the Good, when added to it, makes the resulting [combination] more choiceworthy; therefore, pleasure is not the Good. And [Aristotle] made the first premise, which states ‘pleasure, when added to one of the goods, makes the whole more choiceworthy’, clear by saying: ‘For the pleasant life with prudence is more choiceworthy’ (1172b29–30), which is the same as saying: ‘For the life that results from a combination of pleasure and prudence is more choiceworthy than the life that results from prudence alone’. And [Aristotle] indicated the second premise, which states ‘none of the goods is such that the Good, when added to it, makes the resulting whole more choiceworthy’ by saying: ‘For there is nothing such that, when added to it, the Good51 becomes more choiceworthy’. (1172b31–2). If then, when one of the goods is added to pleasure – for we should also put it this way – the resulting combination of both turns out to be more choiceworthy, and if one of the goods, when added to the Good itself, does not make the whole more choiceworthy, then pleasure is not the Good. And I said that ‘for we should also put it this way’ because it amounts to the same thing, regardless of whether one of the goods is added to the Good or the Good is added to one of the goods. And this is why Aristotle, instead of saying ‘there is nothing such that the Good itself, when added to it, makes the whole more choiceworthy’, says: ‘For there is nothing such that, when added to it, the Good52 [. . .]’ (1172b31–2).53 What he means is this: when any of the other goods comes together with and is joined to the Good itself (autô tô agathô), that is the Good itself (tô autoagathô), in no way does the Good itself make [the resulting whole] more choiceworthy.54 For just as when the weight of the ten-­thousandths part of a grain of millet is added onto the weight of the whole world, it does not make the total weight heavier, neither will any of things that are good by participation in the Good itself, the transcendent55 source of the goods, when added to the Good itself, make the [combination] that results from both more choiceworthy. By contrast, when any of the goods is entwined with pleasure, it makes pleasure more good (agathôteran). Therefore, pleasure is not the Good itself. But this text in the premise ‘For nothing, when added to the (tô),56 the good itself [becomes more choiceworthy]’ contains a certain obscurity – both because something is missing and because it does not say ‘the Good itself ’ (auto tagathon) or ‘itself the Good itself ’ (auto to autoagathon) but states the words separately: ‘the good itself ’ (auto to agathon).57 But we should mentally supply [as follows]: to ‘for nothing’ (oudenos gar) we should supply ‘of the other goods’ (tôn allôn agathôn);58 to ‘when added to the’ (prostethentos tô) we should supply ‘Good itself ’ (autoagathô); and to ‘the good itself ’ †† ‘becomes more good’.59 In this way the completely filled-­in text would be like this: for none of the other goods is such that by being added to the Good itself, the Good itself becomes more good.

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1172b32 It is clear that neither could anything else that [becomes more choiceworthy] when taken together with any [of the things that are intrinsically good] be the Good.

Plato says60 that we cannot say that pleasure is the Good because when pleasure is added to any of the [other] goods the resulting combination of both becomes more choiceworthy, and that likewise nothing else that by coming together with any good thing renders the whole more choiceworthy than its part could be the Good either. Nevertheless, [pleasure or any other such thing] will be called a good, but it is a certain good and the kind of good ‘in which we, too, have a share’ (1172b34–5) – and this is the kind of good that virtues and sciences are. For every virtue and science is more choiceworthy with pleasure than without pleasure.61 And ‘for it is something of this sort that is sought’ (1172b35), is equivalent to [saying]: for the argument is inquiring about the kind of goods ‘in which we, too, have a share’ (1172b34–5), namely whether pleasure is one of these [goods], for example, whether pleasure is temperance or courage or prudence or any of the sciences. ‘But the [argument] that objects62 that it is not the case that what all [living things] seek is a good’ (1172b35–6). This syllogism [being objected to] has two premises. The minor premise states that all [living things] seek pleasure, and the major premise states that what all [living things] seek is the Good. Some men have objected63 to this major premise, claiming that it is false that what all [living things] seek is a good,64 and if it is not a good, it is still more the case that it is not the Good, either. He says, then, that the argument that objects that the major premise is not true is saying nothing at all, that is, it goes against what appears to be the case to everyone. For it is false, and what is false is not [the case], just as what is true is [the case], and accordingly the [argument] that states what is false states nothing at all. For how could one maintain a truth or say something more convincing than this conviction, that is, than this premise that states that what all [living things] seek is a good? For what could be so much more true than what appears to be the case to all human beings – laymen, the wise and those who are well-­versed in philosophy – that one could be moved by this to reject what appears to be the case to all, namely that what all [living things] seek is a good?65 For if saying ‘it is not the case that what all [living things] seek is a good’ were more credible and truer than saying ‘what all [living things] seek is a good’, the former statement would have appeared to everyone to be the case, and everyone would have affirmed this unanimously. But in fact, on the contrary, everyone affirms in unison that ‘what all [living things] seek is a good’, but that ‘it is not the case that what all beings seek is a good’ [is claimed by] perhaps one or two. Thus, he who maintains this is voicing false views. And further: if 66 ‘the unintelligent [living things] desired’ (1173a2) pleasure – meaning by ‘unintelligent’ the non-­rational [living things] (ta aloga) – then the one objecting to this [major] premise would have had a point. For it would not be universally true that what all [living things] seek is a good, though perhaps [it would be the case that] what all rational [living things], for example human beings, seek [is a good]. But if not only the non-­rational [living things] desire pleasure but also ‘the prudent ones’ (1173a3), that is, human beings, how could the one opposing this premise be right? At

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any rate, if it is because he is focusing on bad human beings who enjoy licentiousness and on their appetites that he says that it is not the case that what all [living things] seek is a good and consequently that pleasure is not a good, either, this has no bearing on the argument. For even in licentious people ‘there is some natural good’ (1173a4), namely their intellect,67 which by nature pursues pleasure in the strict and unqualified sense, and such pleasure is a good. For as has already been said,68 every intellect by nature pursues its proper good, and [the intellect] divines this good or dreams of it,69 but it falls into brutish and vulgar pleasures (which turn out not even to be pleasures in the strict sense) on account of a wretched upbringing and on account of the ignorance of true pleasure that necessarily follows from such an upbringing. For [the wretched upbringing] has blinded intellect, the judge of true pleasures and those which are not of that sort. For just as the one whose bodily capacity for vision has been crippled is unable to distinguish the threshed and treaded corn from the unthreshed and thorny, so too the one who was reared in a wretched and bad manner is not able to discern what true and real pleasure is – and this is also good [pleasure] – nor what is called pleasure but is not [really] pleasure.70 If, then, in the text that states: ‘Perhaps even in bad [living things] there is [some] natural [good]’ (1173a4)71 he means bad human beings, I may rest my case with the above remarks. If, on the other hand, it is the non-­rational living things, which he also called ‘unintelligent’ (1173a2), that are bad – if he means these are bad because he is focusing on the value of the rational soul [which these living things do not have] – he would be saying the following: not even on the assumption that only the non-­rational living things desired pleasure and they alone pursued it would the premise that states ‘what all [beings] seek is a good’ be false. For there is in all of them – to a greater or lesser degree – something divine, i.e. an illumination of intellect, by means of which [each of them] by nature seeks and discovers its own proper good, that is, its own proper end.72 For each attains this [end] by nature, and accordingly [each] welcomes pleasure, too, as conducive to the attainment of this [end].73 Regarding the reasons why [each] flees what is harmful and accepts what is beneficial – these topics have received their fullest and finest treatment by this philosopher in his treatises On Living Things,74 and whoever doesn’t shy from a little hard work is encouraged to read about these things in those works. 1173a5 The [argument about] the contrary would also seem to be not correctly put.

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The argument from the contrary that establishes that pleasure is good went like this: If pain, being the contrary to pleasure, is bad, then pleasure is good. Whence [do we derive the premise] that pain is bad? From the fact that all men flee it. Speusippus objected to this argument that establishes from the contrary that pleasure is good, saying: Just because pain is bad, it does not necessarily [follow] that the pleasure that is opposed to it is good; for not everything that is opposed to bad is good. For cowardice is opposed to over-­boldness, which is bad, and cowardice is not good but bad; and licentiousness is opposed to folly, which is bad, and this [licentiousness] is similarly bad; and avarice is opposed to wastefulness yet both are bad.

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Speusippus says: ‘There is an opposition, then, of bad to bad and of both to what is neither’ [1173a8], and that is to say, of both bad [things] to what is good. For he said that what is good is neither of the two. For the virtues, being means, are neither of the extremes.75 For courage is neither cowardice nor over-­boldness, and temperance is neither licentiousness nor folly, and similarly in the case of the other virtues.76 And these things he says correctly. For it is true to say that there is an opposition of bad to bad and of both bad [extremes] to what is good. This, then, they say correctly. But they77 are not correct to say that pleasure is opposed to pain as one bad [thing] is opposed to another. For pleasure is not opposed to pain as one bad [thing] is opposed to another, but as a good [thing] is opposed to a bad [thing]. For if pleasure were bad, it would be something to flee from and to hate, just as pain is. But in fact all things flee and turn away from pain as [something] bad, whereas they pursue and run after pleasure as [something] good.78 ‘But of the things that are neither [good nor bad], either neither or in the same way’ (1173a11). We all – [that is, either] all men or all [living things] – equally pursue the things that are good and delightful, and we similarly just about equally avoid and turn away from things that are bad and painful. And regarding the things that are neither, as they are neither bad nor good, [Aristotle says] ‘neither or in the same way’ (1173a11), that is, we neither avoid them nor pursue them; ‘or in the same way’, that is, we pursue them or avoid them equally. For our impulse to attain them is neither greater than nor less than our impulse to avoid them, rather we are in a kind of intermediate condition79 insofar as we have do not verge or have a tendency more towards one than the other. Therefore, if pleasure were one of the bad [things], we would flee from it; and if pleasure were one of the things that are neither good nor bad but rather one of those things that are neither, we would neither desire it nor pursue it. [In point of fact, we do not flee pleasure, and we do desire it.] Since, then, [pleasure] is neither [one] of the bad things nor [one] of the things that are neither [good nor bad], it follows that it is [one] of the good things. ‘But surely it is also not the case that, if pleasure is not a quality, it is also not one of the goods’ (1173a13–14). The argument that concludes that pleasure is not a good from the fact that it is not a quality, is a second-­figure syllogism that goes like this: Pleasure is not a quality, every good is a quality; therefore pleasure is not a good. But [Aristotle] finds fault with the premise that states that every good is a quality (poiotês) or a qualification (poion).80 For there are some goods that are not qualities or qualifications. Therefore, what is to prevent pleasure, too, from being a good, even if it is not a qualification or81 a quality? As to which goods are goods without being qualities, [Aristotle] provides [the answer]: the activities (energeias) according to virtue, which82 are goods, are not qualities,83 since an activity is an active (drastikê) motion (kinêsis) and a motion is not a quality. And happiness is an activity, as [Aristotle] has said and will say,84 surely not a quality, and it is good. 1173a15 And they say that what is good is determinate while pleasure is indeterminate

And this second-­figure syllogism reaches its conclusion in this way: Pleasure is indeterminate, every good is determinate, therefore pleasure is not a good. But in this

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syllogism [Aristotle] objects to the premise that states that pleasure is some indeterminate thing (pragma) and says: ‘If it is derived from the fact that experiencing pleasure’ (1173a18) is indeterminate – for some people experience pleasure more, others less, some are slow to feel any impulse towards pleasure, for others this inclination comes more quickly – ‘if it is derived from the fact that experiencing pleasure’ (1173a18) is indeterminate that they maintain that pleasure, too, is something indeterminate, they are evidently making a mistake. For they will have to bring this [same charge] against the virtues, which are goods, and against health and against the sciences. For in their case, too, one can see indeterminacy: for some people are healthier, and [some] are more literate, and [some] are more temperate and more courageous and participate more in the virtues, habitual states and the sciences, and others less so. Therefore, according to this argument it will turn out that each of the virtues and sciences as well as health will admit of degrees of more and less, because some people participate in them more or are more active according to them, and others less. Accordingly, it will turn out that these, too, are indeterminate and bad. If, on the other hand, they are predicating indeterminacy not of the experience of pleasure but of pleasure itself, here again the fallacy is obvious. For85 just as the form of health and the essence of health86 are one and the same thing that is determinate and does not admit of the more and less – for the of health and the essence of health cannot be increased or decreased. For each of these is just what it is and does not admit of any increase or decrease, just like courage, temperance and each of the sciences. It is rather among the things that are spoken of as qualified by them that degrees of more and less are observed – so, too, the form of pleasure and the essence of pleasure cannot be increased or decreased. And it is, therefore, determinate, and therefore a good. And by ‘unmixed’ pleasures (1173a23) [Aristotle] means the form of pleasure considered all by itself apart from any underlying substratum, as is generally the case for every other form, like whiteness, blackness, or health. And [Aristotle calls those pleasures] ‘mixed’ that are thought of together with an underlying substratum, for example, the pleasures that are in me and you and others. The mixed pleasures, then, are those that are in me and you and are set in the domain of increase and decrease and are filled with indeterminateness, whereas the forms themselves, like health and pleasure and the others, are established to be without increase or decrease, as has been said. Yet the mixtures of health make clear that the indeterminateness is great and that the indeterminateness in individuals is nearly incomprehensible. For if health is such-­and-such a mixture of the elements in us,87 and if the mixtures, i.e. (kai), the degree of more and less in the mixtures, is indeterminate, then it is clear that the [individual] healthy states that follow upon these [mixtures] are also indeterminate. And why am I speaking of the [various] mixtures of all [living things], given that even the health of one and the same person, e.g. Socrates, will, so to speak, experience seasonal fluctuations of increase and decrease? 1173a29 They posit88 that the Good is complete, but movements and comings-­tobe are incomplete

And this argument for [showing] that pleasure is not the Good was constructed within the first figure: pleasure is a movement and a coming-­to-be, every movement or

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coming-­to-be is incomplete; therefore, pleasure is incomplete. The argument then takes the conclusion that pleasure is incomplete, and by adding another premise that the Good is not anything incomplete, concluded that pleasure is not a good. [Aristotle] made this [premise], that the Good is not anything incomplete, clear with his statement: ‘they posit89 the Good is complete’ (1173a29). If, then, the Good is complete, what is incomplete is not a good. And he indicated the [claim] that pleasure is a coming-­to-be or a movement with his statement: ‘Every pleasure is a coming-­to-be, and every pleasure is a movement’.90 After establishing this, [Aristotle] immediately shakes [the credibility of] the premise stating that pleasure is a movement by saying: every movement is faster and slower (1173a32). For sometimes a man walks faster and sometimes more slowly, and the sphere of fixed stars moves faster, with each of the planets moving more slowly than it. If, then, faster or slower is entwined the fabric of movements, and if a pleasure is not faster or slower than a pleasure, then pleasure could not be a movement. For it is possible, he says, to have experienced pleasure (1173a34) more quickly or more slowly, which is to say that sometimes a person more quickly ceases experiencing pleasure, and sometimes more slowly. But pleasure itself is not faster and slower. But we should also put it in the following way: when someone is walking or running from one place to another, the parts of the walking or the parts of the running are not all equally fast; rather, some of them are quicker and faster, and others less so. But all the parts of pleasure, from beginning to end – if we should [even] be talking of ‘parts’ (for it is one and the same [pleasure]) – are alike;91 none is more intense and quicker than any of the others. Rather, the entire pleasure from beginning to end is, as we have said,92 uniform, since it admits of no additional increase or decrease in the time during which we are experiencing it. And after he said that ‘quickness and slowness appear to be proper to every’ motion (1173a32), he provided [the statement] ‘and if not in itself, as for instance that of the cosmos, [then] in relation to something else’ (1173a32–3).93 What he is saying is: although not every movement itself admits of [being] faster in itself, ‘as for instance the movement of the cosmos’94 (1173a33) – right now by ‘cosmos’ [Aristotle] means the sphere of the fixed stars (for it does not admit of fast and slow, because this kind of sphere is moved in a uniform manner, as he has shown in On the Heavens)95 – even so, if someone should compare it to the movements of the planets, he will discover that it is much faster than their movements. Such, then, is [Aristotle’s intended meaning].96 What was said at the beginning of this passage of text, [namely] ‘they try to make [pleasure] out to be a movement and a coming-­to-be’ (1173a30–1), is equivalent to ‘they try to make [pleasure] out not to be the Good’. For saying that pleasure is a movement or a coming-­to-be is the same as saying that pleasure is not the Good. In fact, as we maintain, pleasure is not a movement or a coming-­to-be, but here is what might have impelled them to say that it is a movement and a coming-­to-be. Surely (dê) they are saying: if ‘movement is the actualization (entelecheia) of the movable qua movable’, as is said in the third book of the Physics,97 that is, [the actualization] from potentiality into actuality (energeia(i)), and if the one who experiences pleasure changes into being active, it is clear that pleasure, too, is the actualization of the one

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who is able to experience pleasure qua such. And if this [is true], then pleasure should be a movement. But Aristotle says98 that what these men claim [about pleasure] is not the same as what happens when something is in movement. For in the case of movement, whenever what is being moved is changing and is moved from (a) the condition of suitability to (b) the condition into which it is able and suitable to change and be moved, the potentiality still remains in it.99 For example, whenever what is potentially white is changing from potentiality to actuality, it is said to be moved as long as the potentiality still remains in it;100 but whenever it relinquishes this potentiality and is just actually white, with its starting condition101 no longer present in it, then there is no longer a movement nor is it being moved; rather, it is in some state of being (en tini onti), for example, the state of being white (tô leukô). For as long as it is being whitened, there is some bit (ti) of blackness in it (if the change is going from black to white), and as long as there is some bit of blackness in it, it is potentially white and is being moved, as was said. But in the case of the man experiencing pleasure, there does not remain in him any bit (ti) of not-­experiencing-pleasure (from102 which he changes to experiencing pleasure), nor has he come to an end in relation to some end-­point (as in the former case where what is being whitened reaches the state of being white (eis to leukon). This is the reason, then, why pleasure could not be a movement.103 1173b4 And how could [pleasure] be a coming-­to-be? For it seems that not any chance thing comes to be from any chance thing.

After having said what impelled Plato to call pleasure a movement and having opposed him [on this count], now [Aristotle] also tells us how Plato was misled into calling pleasure a coming-­to-be. For pleasure, Plato says, is not an end but one of those things that are directed towards an end: a kind of route and a change.104 For just as recuperation is directed towards health and whitening is directed towards whiteness, so too is pleasure directed towards one’s natural restoration105 and well-­being.106 For pleasure, Plato says, is a perceived coming-­to-be into a natural state.107 For it leads, Plato says, our state that has been corrupted into an unnatural condition towards its natural good order. Or rather, it is not that pleasure itself is leading; but through pleasure – in the sense of through [a process of] coming-­to-be – bodies of living things return to their natural state. Since, then, [pleasure] is a coming-­to-be, and comings-­to-be are not ends but are among those things that are directed towards ends, pleasure is not of the same kind as its end. For in general, no coming-­to-be is of the same kind as ends. For house-­ building is not of the same kind as a house, nor is recuperation of the same kind as health. Neither, therefore, is pleasure. And ends are goods; therefore, pleasure is not a good. For it is not an end. For if the end is good, what is not of the same kind as the end is not good.108 But these sorts of arguments against pleasure have no force, as Aristotle has already shown and now shows by saying that nothing ‘seems to come to be from any chance thing’ (1173b5), rather what is now actually f comes to be from what is potentially f. For example, this flesh here, which at present is actually flesh, did not come to be from stone or wood or any chance thing but from that which was potentially flesh, and it was

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blood that was potentially flesh. If wood were potentially flesh, then flesh would have come to be from wood. This is why flesh does not come to be out of wood, but does come to be from blood, because blood is potentially flesh. Blood, in turn, came to be from bread. For this was potentially blood.109 And further, everything that comes to be, comes to be from that into which it is also able to be dissolved through the process of destruction (which is opposed to coming-­to-be). For example, plants come to be from the elements, into which they are also dissolved through the process of destruction (which is the opposite of their coming-­to-be), and [likewise for] all other things. If, then, pleasure, too, were a coming-­to-be, it would be a kind of route and a change from something to something, just as blackening is from white to black and falling sick is from health to sickness. But in the case of pleasure there is neither starting point nor endpoint. For there is neither anything that is transforming and changing and coming to be something through pleasure, nor is there any end-­point at which the pleasure comes to an end, just as recuperation [comes to an end] at health and heating [comes to an end] at heat. And this is reasonable. For [pleasure] is not a coming-­to-be but an activity, as he will show, and activities are ends and not routes to ends. We may come to understand that pleasure is an end and not a coming-­to-be from the following. For in the case of comings-­to-be, it is not the case that something is simultaneously coming to be and being while it is coming to be. For it is not the case that flesh is simultaneously coming to be and being while it is coming to be, nor is it the case that, at the time when the house is coming to be [a house] at that very time it [already] is [a house]. By contrast, in the case of activities, e.g. seeing, one simultaneously sees and has seen.110 In the case of pleasures, too, one simultaneously experiences pleasure and has experienced pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is an activity and not a coming-­to-be. And if it is an activity, it is also an end and not some kind of route and change to an end. For there is no part of the time during which pleasure is experienced in which the pleasure is not complete in the one experiencing it. And what is complete in all the parts of time, being a kind of entire whole, is not a coming-­to-be but an activity. For it is when what is coming to be is completed that a coming-­to-be is said to be and is complete, but as long as it is coming to be, what is coming to be is incomplete, and so is the coming-­to-be [itself]. And pleasure is immediately present as a complete whole in the first part of the whole time during which pleasure is experienced, and in the same way also in the next part and in the part after that and in general in all the parts of time, even the very shortest of them. Therefore, pleasure should not be a coming-­to-be but an activity. But even if [pleasure] were a coming-­to-be, it would be a change of some substratum that is potentially that into which it is changing, for example, haematogenesis, being the coming-­to-be of blood, is a change of, let’s say, bread, which is potentially blood. But there isn’t any [substratum] that, in the case of pleasures, changes from the form to which [the substratum] belongs (en hô estin) into some other form that [the substratum] prior to the pleasure was potentially but not actually, and yet which it afterwards has come to be actually through the pleasure, just as in the case of the bread. For prior to the coming-­to-be, that is, prior to the haematogenesis, this [bread] was blood potentially but not actually, and afterwards it has come to be blood through haematogenesis. What, then, do those who claim that pleasure is a coming-­to-be have to offer us that is

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analogous to the bread and the blood, which through the pleasure – in the sense of through a [process of] coming-­to-be – changed from what it was into what it was potentially but not actually? Will they say that it is the body or the soul that is analogous to the bread, and will they posit that [these] change when pleasure is present to them? Wouldn’t it be ridiculous to take this view completely seriously?111 Moreoever, just as falling sick destroys the end of recuperation, which is health, and recuperation destroys the end of falling sick, sickness, it would have to happen in the same way in the case of pleasure: what came to be through pleasure would have to be destroyed through pain, and what pain brought about would in turn be undone through pleasure. Just let them try to tell us what these ends are that pain and pleasure generate and destroy! 1173b7: And they say that pain is the lack of being in accordance with nature, and pleasure is its replenishment.112

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And through these [arguments] they attempted to show that pleasure is a coming-­tobe, and if it is a coming-­to-be, it could not be the Good. Indeed, they said: pleasure is a replenishment, replenishment is a coming-­to-be, therefore pleasure is a coming-­to-be. Further, pleasure is a coming-­to-be, a coming-­to-be is a change, change is incomplete, therefore pleasure is incomplete. And since pleasure is incomplete, it could not be the Good. For the Good is something wholly complete (panteleion) and not [something] incomplete. But why [do they think] it is clear that pleasure is replenishment? Well, they say, because pain, which is opposed to pleasure, is a lack, pleasure should be a replenishment. For if white is separating, black is compressing,113 and should pain be a lack, pleasure [should be] a replenishment. ([This is] the topos from contraries).114 And they established that ‘pain is a lack’ (1173b7) in the following way. If, they say, the living thing experiences pain when it is hungry or thirsty, hunger and thirst are pains; but surely hunger and thirst are lacks with respect to the natural state; therefore, pain is a lack. For, they say, whenever the body comes to be lacking dryness or moisture, it departs from the natural state; but when it departs [from the natural state] it experiences pain and desires replenishment; and when it desires, it eats and drinks; and when it eats and drinks, it is replenished. If this is true, lacking and filling are ‘affections of the body’ (1173b9); therefore, the body should also be what is experiencing pleasure and pain. For the body is what is being replenished. Therefore, the body is also what is experiencing pleasure. For if replenishment is in the body, and replenishment is pleasure, it follows that pleasure is in the body; and it is necessary that that to which pleasure belongs also be experiencing pleasure. But surely it is not the body that is experiencing pleasure. ‘Therefore, pleasure is not replenishment’ (1173b11).115 But how, they ask, does pleasure come to be? Just listen to how [it comes to be]!116 When the things that nourish the body – food and drink – enter the body at mealtimes and the nutritive soul is active in connection with the body in an unimpeded manner, we experience pleasure. For the pleasure that comes to be after the lack is an unimpeded natural activity of the nutritive soul. Or to put this more universally: every unimpeded natural activity is very pleasant. Certainly, the activity of the nutritive soul fills and

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restores [the body] to the natural state, and this activity is pleasant. It is the soul that is experiencing pleasure, and pleasure is its unimpeded activity. Aristotle says that pleasure is an activity – not in the sense of pleasure properly being an activity by definition, but in the sense that it has its being upon activity and cannot be separated from activity.117 Pleasure, then, is said to be an unimpeded activity of the soul118 because it accompanies an unimpeded activity of soul and is inseparably present with the activity upon which it comes to be. And just as pleasure follows upon (epakolouthei) virtue and knowledge, which are states (hexeis) of the soul, upon their activities119 (for the activities in accordance with virtue are pleasurable), in the same way the activities of the nutritive soul, too, are most pleasant when they are engaged in an unimpeded manner. And the nutritive soul is a state (hexis) of the body, and this soul’s activities are certain acts of completion (teleiotêtes tines) and acts of restoration (apokatastaseis)120 to the natural state. Yet it is that which is doing the restoring121 back to nature that is pleasant, and accordingly the pleasure is not a (process of) restoration (apokatastasis)122 but an activity of the nutritive power and state, or an activity of the nutritive soul, or however one wishes to call it. When this nutritive state is pleasantly active, then, the replenishment and the (process of) restoration to the natural state follows. For just as when the builder is active, for example, in building a house, the raising of the wall follows, and when we are pouring into the cistern, it happens that the cistern is filled; so too, when the nutritive state is active in connection with the things that nourish the body, the body is replenished. Therefore, there is a great difference between saying that pleasure is replenishment and saying that replenishement follows upon pleasure, that is, that replenishment follows upon the activity of the nutritive soul. And the nutritive soul is a state of the body, but pleasure is an activity of the state in connection to the things that nourish the body. And the replenishment that follows this activity, that is, that follows pleasure, is a coming-­to-be. For to be replenished is to come to be.

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1173b13: This opinion seems to have arisen from the pains in connection with nourishment.123

[Aristotle] says that the opinion that pleasure is a replenishment came to them from the pains in connection with nourishment. For replenishment follows upon the nutritive soul’s unimpeded activity, which is pleasant, and because of this they thought that pleasure is a replenishment, thinking124 that which follows to be the same as that which is being followed. For the living thing is pained when it is lacking [something]. But when, once food has been obtained, the nutritive soul begins to be active in connection with the things that nourish the body,125 [the living thing] is no longer in pain because it is being replenished. To say, then, that the replenishment that follows the pleasure is pleasure is comparable to saying a thing and its shadow are identical. For just as a shadow necessarily follows the man who is walking in the open air and illuminated by the sun,126 so too does replenishment [necessarily follow] the unimpeded activity of the [nutritive] soul, that is, [it necessarily follows] pleasure. And the sense in which pleasure is said to be an activity has been discussed.127 But that replenishment is not pleasure but a symptom of pleasure or, if you prefer, a symptom of the activity upon which the pleasure [comes to be], [Aristotle] shows

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this by means of the other pleasures, [namely] those that [supervene] upon acts of contemplation and sensation,128 which are not followed by replenishments. For if, according to them, pleasure is a replenishment, and this replenishment comes to be after the pain that came to be upon the lack, no one who is without lack and therefore without pain should experience pleasure. For if, as they themselves maintain, pleasure and replenishment are the same, like the human being and the mortal [are the same], and for this reason the man who experiences pleasure and the man who is being restored are the same, how would it be possible for anyone to ever experience pleasure without being replenished? But surely those who live in contemplation experience even a great deal of pleasure, as do those who are listening to harmonious melodies and those who are experiencing the sensation of certain nice fragrances and those who are observing the most beautiful objects of sight, even though no replenishment is taking place in them. How are we sure that [these men] are not undergoing restorations? Well, from the fact that they experience pleasure without any preceding pain or lack. For since pain follows upon lacks, where there is no pain, there is also no lack; and where there is no lack, there is no replenishment, either; and where there is no replenishment, there is no pleasure, either, if pleasure and replenishment are the same, as they claim. This is the meaning of the present passage.129 The passage of the text [that runs] ‘it happens that when [we] become lacking and experience a prior pain, [we then] experience pleasure thanks to replenishment’ (1173b14–15)130 is expounding the opinion of those men who claim that pleasure is a replenishment. [The passage] is saying that those who have experienced a prior pain due to a lack experience pleasure when they are replenished. But if pleasure is simultaneous with replenishment and it is in tandem with replenishment that it is caused to exist, then replenishment is the same as pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is a replenishment. Aristotle objects to this by saying ‘but we also experience pleasure when we have remembered [something]’,131 and what, he asks, are these pleasant memories comings-­ to-be of? That is to say, what are they replenishments of? For, since replenishment is a coming-­to-be, instead of saying ‘What are the memories replenishments of?’ he said ‘What are they comings-­to-be of?’ (cf. 1173b19). But that the pleasures in memories are not replenishments is clear from the fact that there had been no prior lack, and that there had been no preceding lack is indicated by the fact that there had been no pain. Yet the memories of the most noble actions that one has performed and from which one has benefitted are pleasant. 1173b20 To those [people] who cite the reproachable pleasures [one] should reply.132

It is clear that the pleasures are of the same kind as the pleasant objects that they derive from. But if this is the case, and if there are bad objects of pleasure, then there are also bad pleasures. Therefore pleasure is not a good. This argument, however, does not [in fact] conclude that pleasure is not a good, but that there exist several kinds of pleasure and that they differ from each other in the same way that the pleasant objects from which they derive do. And just as some of these pleasant objects are good, some are

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bad, and some are neither [good nor bad], so too will the pleasures be differentiated into three kinds133 in a manner analogous to the pleasant objects, and it will not be the case that every pleasure is bad. But Aristotle did not provide this [objection] against these men, instead he immediately objected [to them] by saying that bad things are not pleasant, and the [experiences] that result from them are not pleasures. For the things that appear to be pleasant to wretched human beings are not truly pleasant; rather [these things] are pleasant to those people but not pleasant simpliciter. For just as the things that promote health in those having a fever do not promote health simpliciter, and the things that are bitter to those suffering jaundice are not bitter simpliciter but only to them, and just as the things that are white or black to those suffering from ophthalmia (1173b25) are not simpliciter such as they appear to those people, so too the things that are pleasant for those who are in a bad condition are not for this reason pleasant [simpliciter]. For to the queen of Lybia called Lamia,134 who cut up pregnant women and devoured their foetuses raw, such a ‘feast’ was pleasant – but it was pleasant to her, while being unpleasant simpliciter. ‘Or one could reply in this way that pleasures are choiceworthy, but surely not those deriving from these [objects]’ (1173b25–6).135 He says ‘deriving from these [objects]’ (1173b26) instead of ‘deriving from the reproachable objects’. And what [Aristotle] means is something like this: one should say that those pleasures deriving from objects that are truly pleasant (and the sciences and virtues are truly pleasant) are good and choiceworthy, whereas regarding those ‘pleasures’ that derive from reproachable objects of pleasure, i.e. those deriving from the sexual desire for males136 and other such things, one should not say that these are pleasures simpliciter, but that they appear to be pleasures but are not pleasures. For just as growing rich from farming is choiceworthy while [growing rich] from robbing temples or betraying one’s country is most wicked, so too is experiencing pleasure deriving from genuinely pleasant objects most noble, while [experiencing pleasure] deriving from reproachable objects is most wicked.137 Either, then, we must deny that reproachable things are pleasant and that the affections deriving from them are pleasures, or else, if we must follow custom and the opinions and labels of the masses by saying that reproachable things are ‘pleasant’ and ‘pleasures’, then we must say that pleasures differ in kind. For the pleasures of seriously good human beings and of those who are living in accordance with nature are different in kind from those of licentious and bad people. For whatever it is that distinguishes seriously good human beings from bad ones, this is also what distinguishes the pleasures they pursue and want to experience, and this will be shown through several arguments in the present book.138 That pleasures differ is clear from the fact that the unjust do not care to experience the pleasures of the just, nor do the just care to experience those of the unjust. For the activities of those who differ in kind are themselves different in kind, and accordingly the pleasures that come to be upon these activities are different in kind, too. 1173b31 And the friend, being different from the flatterer, seems to be evidence.

They also attempted to conclude on the basis of the flatterer that pleasure is not a good. For if the flatterer belongs to the class of pleasant things that are bad and reproachable,

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then the pleasure that results from him will also be bad. Therefore, pleasure is not a good. And Aristotle deals with this objection by effectively139 saying that the case of the flatterer does not show that pleasure is bad but that, because [the flatterer] differs from the friend, the pleasures resulting from them are also different, and the pleasure of the friend is different in kind from the pleasure of the flatterer. What difference, then, is there between the friend and the flatterer? A very big difference, and Aristotle talked about it in his discussion of the flatterer.140 But they also differ on account of the fact that the friend does not always say or do the things to his friend that promote pleasure; rather, there is a way in which he even causes pain, when he sees that by causing a bit of pain he is likely going to benefit his friend. By contrast, the flatterer is always aiming at what is pleasant, and this is his ultimate goal. And this is also the reason why the friend is praised for wanting the very best for his friend and [wanting it] for the friend’s own sake, while the flatterer is reproached. But it would not be the case that the former is praised while the latter is reproached, if there were no difference between them. And if they are different, the pleasures deriving from them [are different], too. They also differ on account of the fact that the flatterer has ulterior motives for his association,141 and his professed motives are not what he is [really] thinking (for he says one thing but is thinking something else). By contrast, what the friend says is in agreement with what his soul is thinking. ‘But nobody would choose to live having the [level of] rational thought of a child’ (1174a1–2).142 If, then, pleasure was a good, then every pleasant way of life (bios) and every pleasant life (zôê) would be good. But surely there are pleasant ways of life that are bad, and similarly there are pleasant lives that are bad. Therefore, pleasure is not a good. For this argument also reaches the [conclusion] that pleasure is not a good. But from what [consideration] is it clear that there are pleasant lives and ways of life that are not good? [Aristotle] says that the life and way of life of children makes this clear. For they are continuously experiencing pleasure, and their ways of life are not good. For who would ‘choose to live’ (1174a1) and think (phronein) like children? This is equivalent to asking: For who would choose to experience the pleasure of children? For whoever should choose to experience the pleasure of children is one who thinks (phronein) like they do, if we must say that children think (phronein). [Aristotle] has assumed this and has not opposed it because it is clear that not even by means of this thesis is pleasure shown to be something bad, but that there are different kinds of pleasure. ‘Nor would anyone enjoy doing any of the most shameful things’ (1174a3). They brought this forward as contributing towards the conclusion that pleasure is bad, and what Aristotle says is something like this: it is not that we take a serious interest in attaining what is good by one means but do not eagerly pursue it by another means, rather we choose every means by which we believe to be able to accrue what is good. And we do not say that what is good should be obtained by this means or by this action but should not be obtained by that one or the other one; rather, we take a serious interest in attaining what is good by every means, i.e. by every action and every activity from which it may arise. For example, if victory over our enemies is a good, and if it is possible for us to achieve victory not by openly waging war but by some form of

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trickery, then we will not discard this [trickery] and choose war! Rather, we will bid farewell to war and choose deception. And if things are the other way around and it is not possible by means of trickery [to achieve victory over our enemies] but it is possible by means of war, then we hasten towards war. And if both are possible means, then we will have an inclination in both directions. This, then, is also how it works in the case of pleasure. If [pleasure were] a good, then, and if it were possible for us to accrue it both through the most shameful and reproachable practical actions and through noble and praiseworthy ones, we would be performing all actions equally without being the least bit ashamed. But in fact, we do not perform the most shameful acts for the sake of pleasure, even though it is at times easier by these means to experience a great deal of pleasure than it is by means of noble practical actions and doings. Therefore, pleasure is not a good. For if pleasure were a good, we would hasten, as has been said, to experience pleasure by every means and to procure it from any such object of pleasure – both reproachable and praiseworthy – by means of which the attainment of pleasure was clearly either easier or at all possible. 1174a4 And there are many things that we would be eager for even if they bring no pleasure.143

After the argument that was just stated, which says that if pleasure were indeed a good, we would hasten to its attainment by every means (for it should not be the case that what is good is procured by one means but not acquired by another, but rather by every means by which it is possible for us to procure it), [Aristotle] introduces the present [considerations] on this point, which turn out to be rather impressive. The force of what he says is something like this: Just as we do not avoid everything that does not produce delight and pleasure, so too we do not welcome everything that is accompanied by pleasure. For who does not want to see or hear, even when [these activities] do not bring any pleasure? And if someone does not accept this, at any rate those who recall their acquisition of the virtues know that it is toilsome and a great deal of work. For the Lord of all that is says: ‘The road that leads away to life is hard and narrow’ (Gospel of Matthew 7:14). This acquisition of virtue, then, even though I myself maintain that it is unpleasant, has nevertheless been vitally connected to the most blessed end of all things holy, and we have approached [this end] by means of it;144 and we want to recall it, even if the recollections should turn out to be unpleasant. And if someone claims that we necessarily experience pleasure when we see and when we walk the road that leads us to the virtues and when we recall [this acquisition of virtue], Aristotle says ‘it doesn’t matter’ (1174a7). ‘For we would choose’ them even if it should bring no pleasure (1174a7). [And here is] an indication of this: those who have been enclosed in dark prisons, although they do not experience any pleasure when they see darkness, nevertheless choose to see, even if the darkness that they are seeing happens to be unpleasant. After having said these things, he concludes his discussion of whether pleasure is good or not by saying that it is ‘clear that pleasure is not a good and that not every pleasure is choiceworthy’.145 But the text is missing something, and the full passage could go like this: it is clear that if we should agree that the affections that arise from

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the reproachable activities are to be called ‘pleasures’, [then] neither is every pleasure a good nor is every [one] choiceworthy. And that they differ in kind and are not all of the same kind, this is also clear. 1174a13 What [pleasure] is (ti d’ esti) or what sort of thing it is (poion ti) should become clearer to us if we start from the beginning.146

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After having dislodged the arguments that maintain that pleasure is not a good, [Aristotle] here is inquiring what its nature and substance (ousian) is. For from its nature and substance we also shall be able to know whether it is good or bad. For in the case of time, too, it was by having discovered what it is that Aristotle discovered accordingly what sort of thing it is.147 Either then, what he is saying is something like this: we must first discover what [pleasure] is (to ti esti) and what its nature is, that is, its form (eidos) and essence (to ti ên einai), and then accordingly what sort of thing it is, for example good or bad. (For the arguments that were discussed [above] made it appear to be no more good than bad.) Or else the expression ti esti148 is said instead of ‘is one of the things that are simple and are thought of by themselves, like seeing and smelling or rather like white and149 black’, and [Aristotle] said ê150poion ti151 instead of ‘or one of the things that are necessarily thought of together with others’, such as the things that are in determined substrata, like snubness, like oddness and like breadthlessness. For we are able to think of white in separation from any determined substratum, but we cannot think of snubness divorced from nose, or oddness or breadthlessness in separation from number and line. We must, then, also examine whether pleasure belongs to the things that have their being in indeterminate substrata or to the things [that have their being] in a determined [substratum]. [Aristotle] will show that [pleasure] belongs to the things that have their substratum determined, and that its substratum is the activity of the soul. For natural activities are the conditions for pleasure’s being and not being. For this reason [pleasure] seems to be an activity, too; I mean by reason of [pleasure’s] being present or absent simultaneously with activities and because just as each activity is whole and complete in each moment of the interval of time, as we shall learn,152 so too is the pleasure. 1174a14 For seeing appears to be complete at any given time.

[Aristotle] called the durationless moment (to aplates nun) ‘time’ because it is something of time. For in each moment seeing is complete and actually existing. For if we see a definite thing (tode ti) in some [interval of] time, we are nevertheless totally seeing it in each of the parts of time and in the indivisible moment itself and sight does not receive anything in the subsequent moment that it did not [already] have in the previous moment. For [sight] is present as a simultaneous whole,153 and its being is not incomplete. And pleasure, then, is like sight. For pleasure is not a kind of build-­up or accumulation of many pleasures, nor does the subsequent pleasure, and the next one after that, supervene while the previous pleasure persists, with the preceding and subsequent parts being present simultaneously with it, as occurs in the case of a straight line being drawn, where the line is completed by the subsequent parts being established

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while the previous parts persist. Rather, in all of the moments [the pleasure] is wholly complete, and whatever it was like in the previous moment, this is also what it is like in the next moment, and in the one after it, and in the one after that one, and it is one and the same pleasure in all moments.154 Let these remarks be said as a clarifying prelude to what is about to be said. This is the inference [Aristotle] wants to make: Since pleasure is in a way an activity because it is established upon activities, and since activity is not a coming-­to-be, then neither is pleasure a coming-­to-be. But from what [consideration] has it become clear that an activity is not a coming-­to-be? It is from [the consideration] that whereas a coming-­to-be turns out to be incomplete as long as what is coming to be is coming to be, an activity is whole and wholly complete at each moment. For at no moment is anything lacking in sight that makes sight complete by being added to it later on; rather [one] is seeing the same thing in the same way now and before. For [the activity] exists always as a whole and complete. And it is the same way with pleasure, and whoever has paid attention to the experience (tô pathei) [of it] knows this. Consequently, pleasure, too, is in a way an activity and not a movement or a coming-­to-be. For ‘every movement’ and coming-­ to-be ‘is in time’ (1174a19) and proceeds from incompleteness to completeness. For when we walk from Thebes to Athens we are not walking the same walk we walked before when we walked from Thebes to Athens; rather, in the past we walked one walk, and now we are walking a different one. Nor does the walking from Thebes to Athens exist all together as a whole; rather, different parts of it [exist at different times]. For this is how all incomplete movements are. Further, all of the movements that proceed towards an end are incomplete. For consider house-­building: the house155 is finished as a whole over the course of house-­ building in its entirety; the parts of house-­building are incomplete, while the whole house-­building is complete. For just as the parts of the house are incomplete relative to the whole house, so too are the building of the foundation and the building of the wall and the building of each of the house’s parts incomplete relative to the whole house-­ building (over the course of which the whole [house] was finished and received its completion). All of these [partial activities], Aristotle says, are different in form from one another and from their whole (1174a22–3). For just as the foundation is different in form from the wall, and this is different from the house, so too is the coming-­to-be of the foundation different from that of the wall and both are different from the coming-­to-be of the whole house. By the rhabdôsis of the column (1174a24) [Aristotle] means the fixing the column lengthwise, which occurs when it is set up at right angles.156 And the coming-­to-be of the whole and wholly complete temple is complete and whole, while the comings-­to-be of its parts are incomplete. And triglyphs (1174a26) are the [pieces of] wood that are carved with three channels in their ends (most people call these moutla),157 and the movement or coming-­to-be of these triglyphs differ from that coming-­to-be over the course of which the whole temple received its completion. And [Aristotle] differentiates advancing motion into flying, walking and leaping (1174a31), as he did in On the Progression of Living Things.158 And he says that not only is walking different from flying, but even within walking each of its parts is made out to be different from the other (1174a32). For walking the third-­length of the race

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course is different from walking the half-­length, and this is different from walking the two-­thirds length, and these three are each individually separate from walking159 the whole length. Similarly, walking in a line in the theatre (for every line is in a place) is different from the walking that occurred in a line in the agora. And he says that he has discussed movement ‘in detail’ (1174b2) in the treatises On Motion, that is in the sixth, seventh and eighth books of the Physics,160 but we should be aware that he has derived (parestêsen) the differences and distinctions of the movements relative to each other from the difference of the parts with which we move, for example walking and flying from feet and wings (although [he did derive] leaping from the manner of the movement), and quite simply [he derived] the comings-­to-be from the difference of the parts and the whole. And [Aristotle] said that the manner in which they differ is not trivial, rather it serves to show that pleasures, too, differ in accordance with their activities, and the activities in accordance with the things performing the activities. And just as house-­ building is not separated from the house being built, rather there is simultaneously a house being built and house-­building (for it is impossible for there to be a house being built if there is no house-­building), so too is pleasure simultaneous with the unimpeded natural activity, and the unimpeded natural activity is simultaneous with pleasure. 1174b3 It seems that [movement] is not complete at every time, but that most [movements] are incomplete.

The word ‘most’ is added on account of circular motions. For these motions are always in completion, and [Aristotle] explained how so in the first book of On the Heavens.161 For the motion in a straight line is not complete at every time, rather the motions of the parts differ in form, and they are incomplete as compared to the whole [line]. For the motions of lines differ because the starting point from which what is moved began to move differs from the end-­point at which it came to rest. And if the starting point and the endpoint differ, it is clear that the part closer to the starting point is also different from the part further away from the starting point, and certainly different from the one at the end. The parts of motion [in a straight line], then, differ, and for this reason [this motion] is incomplete until all of its parts come to be. And the form of pleasure, as was said,162 is complete in all parts of time, and pleasure is something whole and complete and not anything that acquires its form and completion by the accumulation of one part after another.163 In the remark ‘And it is clear that they are different from one another’ (1174b6–7)164 [Aristotle] was talking about pleasure. He is saying: for it is clear that pleasure is different from motions and comings-­to-be. ‘This would also seem to be the case because it is impossible to be moved except in time’ (1174b7–8). [Aristotle] has said that the indivisible unit (to atomon) is not time but a moment (nun). In the sixth book of the Physics165 he has shown that in the partless and indivisible moment it is impossible for there to be any motion or rest, nor any coming-­to-be or destruction. If, then, it is possible to experience pleasure in the indivisible moment, that is, if pleasure is complete in a moment, but it is impossible for motion or coming-­to-be to take place [in a moment], then pleasure is not a motion or

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a coming-­to-be. If, then, someone persists in a state of excessive joy over one whole hour, and if something was coming to be during this hour, then what was coming to be was incomplete in all of the parts and moments of the hour, but the pleasure was whole and wholly complete. Therefore, pleasure is not a motion or coming-­to-be. This, then, is the intended meaning.166 In the passage of text: ‘For these are not said [of] everything’ (1174b10–11), the addendum kata is missing, which would give us: ‘[For] these are [not] said of everything’.167 With the term ‘these’ [Aristotle] means motion and coming-­to-be. For motion and coming-­to-be are not predicated of all things, but of ‘things that are divisible and not whole’ (1174b11–12). And those things are divisible and not whole that go from being incomplete to being complete by means of coming-­to-be and that do not have their being in its entirety in a moment. And neither pleasure nor seeing nor a point come to be in time, as a house does, but in a moment. Likewise, both the point and contiguity are and are not, and Aristotle has shown this, too, in his [arguments] On Motion.168 Aristotle’s claim, then, that there is no motion or coming-­to-be of either of these, [that is] of the point and the monad (1174b12–13), is equivalent to saying that these, too, do not go from not being to being by means of motion or coming-­to-be. This ‘sense’, (1174b14)169 that is, seeing, is an apprehension of an object of sight and is extended in time. For it is not the case that upon having seen something we immediately discontinue looking [at it]; rather there is an interval during which we persist in seeing what we initially saw in a complete manner in the indivisible moment. It is in this sense then – I mean insofar as we persist in seeing for a certain time – that the object of sight is in time and seeing is in motion. Time and motion, then, are superimposed in thought when ‘any sense is active in relation to its object of sense’ (1174b14)170 even though the seeing itself is complete in all parts of time. Perhaps, then, something is missing in the passage ‘of every sense that is active in relation to its object of sense’ (1174b14), and the missing bit would be ‘there is no motion nor coming-­to-be’. And we should correspondingly add this and mentally supply the negative particle ou and the conjunctive particle de to ‘sense’, thereby rendering the entire passage into something like this: ‘Nor of any sense that is active in relation to its object of sense is there a motion or coming-­to-be’.171 For there is no coming-­to-be of pleasure, as was said, nor of sense in actuality. Or else what is meant by ‘of every sense that is active in relation to its object of sense’ (1174b14) might be something like this: of every sense – not sense that is observed to be in a [mere] state [of potentiality] but sense that is in actuality and is already active in relation to its object of sense – there is a proper pleasure. For we must mentally supply ‘there is a proper pleasure’. For a proper pleasure is entwined with every sense that is in actuality and is active in an unimpeded and natural manner in regard to its proper object of sense. And the pleasure that is present together with seeing and the one present together with smelling and the one present together with tasting are all different. And we ought to write the conjunction dê instead of the conjunction de, e.g.: ‘In fact (dê), of every sense that is active in relation to its object of sense’ (1174b14). And [Aristotle] would effectively172 be saying something like this: It is certainly clear from what has been said that a certain pleasure is yoked together with every sense that is in actuality and active in an unimpeded manner. And since in each part of time and

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in each moment seeing is whole and complete, and pleasure likewise, the sense in actuality is in a way identical to the accompanying pleasure and is not separate from it. But if [the pleasure] is present together with it in an inseparable manner, it is clear that deriving from every sense that is active in relation to its proper object of sense there is a proper pleasure. And this is the interpretation that is in greater accord with the [material] that Aristotle brings forward next. 1174b15 And the [sense] that is in a good condition in relation to the most beautiful of the [objects] falling173 under the sense.

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Not all objects of sight are equally beautiful, nor does beauty and splendor appear in all things in the same way. For the orderly arrangement of the heavens, which is so very rounded off on all sides and has been rendered with all excellence in measure and order, and the golden or wooden sphere are not equally beautiful; nor are the light-­ bringing power of the sun that shines upon all things and fills them with its own splendor and the bright light coming from the moon beautiful in the same way; and neither are the peacock and the jackdaw [equally beautiful]; nor again do the spoken word – for there is a form of beauty in words, too – and the intervallic voice that is observed in all musical melodies and rhythms participate in the same beautiful nature and sublimity.174 And we will discover that this also holds in the case of the objects of taste, smell and touch. But if this is so, then it is evident that not all objects of sense draw [our senses] to themselves, nor do they all charm and move and delight our senses in like manner. Nor is someone who sees a body that has its parts in an harmonious relation to one another coupled with a healthy complexion175 and the body of the contrary kind gladdened in the same way. Rather, it is clear that from the most beautiful objects of sight there supervenes upon the activities a certain pleasure that is different from that deriving from inferior [objects of sight]. And similarly in the case of the objects of hearing. Further, [Aristotle] says that upon every sense in actuality – a sense is in actuality when it is already active in relation to its proper object of sense, for example the sense that is currently seeing the object of sight and tasting the object of taste – upon every sense in actuality there follows a pleasure, and that every sense experiences pleasure when it apprehends its proper object of sense, and that when [the sense] is active in a complete manner – it is the [sense] in a good condition that is active in a complete manner, and it is in a good condition when its proper sense-­organ is healthy – when [the sense] is active in a complete and unimpeded and natural manner it also experiences pleasure in a complete manner, and that it experiences the most pleasure when it apprehends the most beautiful of its proper objects of sense. For when the object being seen is the most beautiful of the objects of sight but sight does not apprehend it in a correct and irreproachable manner because it is not healthy, it will not experience pleasure in a complete manner; and when the sense is in a good condition but what is being seen is not most beautiful, in this case the pleasure will also not be complete. And [Aristotle] says that a complete 176 is the one that cannot admit of an increase. For just as what is extremely hot, e.g. fire, that is, that than which it is impossible for anyone to conceive of something hotter, is said to be

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completely hot, so too is a complete pleasure that than which there is no pleasure more intense and capable of producing more delight. This, then, is the intended meaning of what is being said.177 The passage of text that says ‘but178 complete activity seems [to be]179 especially something like this’ (1174b16–17) may indicate that the complete activity seems to be pleasure. And it not only seems [to be pleasure]; it really is pleasure. The incomplete [activities] do indeed contain pleasantness and are indeed pleasant, but they are not most pleasant; and yet, even if [the activities] are incomplete, however much activity is present at the time – and however much pleasure is [supervening] upon that activity – is nevertheless a certain whole and in a sense complete over all parts of that time.180 For just as a greater state comes to be from a lesser state and nevertheless both the greater and the lesser are – and are said to be – states, and in this very respect – [that is,] qua states – they are complete; so too both the lesser pleasure and the greater pleasure are observed to be in a sense certain wholes and in a sense complete for the time during which we are experiencing them. 1174b17 And it doesn’t matter whether we say that it is active or that in which it resides.

Since we, that is, the ones who are experiencing sensation and pleasure, are sense in actuality and pleasure in actuality, and since Aristotle said that it is sense that is active and experiencing pleasure, he says that it doesn’t matter whether someone says that sense itself is active and experiencing pleasure or the living thing in which the sense resides. For whenever the person who is seeing is in a state of well-­being with respect to this sense and is active in connection with the most beautiful objects of sight, he is completely active and completely experiencing pleasure. For the activities that derive from the most complete states and that arise in connection with the most beautiful of the sense-­objects falling under that sense are most complete and most pleasant. Regarding each [person] who is experiencing sensation, when they are in the best condition and a healthy state, and of course when the object of sense is best, the activity is best, and this best activity is most complete and is therefore most pleasant. For what is best is both most complete and most pleasant. Surely, then, the activity of this most complete state – [Aristotle] calls [that state] ‘most complete’ (teleiotatên) that is ultimate and wholly complete and allows no excess – when it arises in connection with the most beautiful object falling under that sense, is most pleasant and most complete. By contrast, the activity of the complete [state] – [Aristotle] calls [that state] ‘complete’ that is not yet the ultimate and most complete form; this is indeed a state, insofar as it possesses some form, yet it is a road to the complete state – is also pleasant, but it is not most pleasant. And the cases of rational thought and contemplation are like that of sensation. What he calls ‘rational thought’ (dianoia) would be scientific knowledge (epistêmonikên gnôsin), and ‘contemplation’ (theôria) would be intellectual life and activity (noeran zôên kai energeian). For even in these there are degrees of more and less. And some men are wholly complete in terms of these states, while others are inferior to them. As a result, [men] will also be active in accordance with either the superiority or the inferiority of their states. For the man who has set sensation aside

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and turned towards himself and 181 this manner of reversion has established himself among the intelligibles will be active in one way, and the man who is looking to the external world will be active in another way, and the man who is moving up from premises182 to conclusions will be active in yet another way.183 Accordingly, the pleasures of these men will also be different and not the same. And the intellectual life is most complete and most pleasant, while the other lives are complete and pleasant but in no way most pleasant. 1174b23: Pleasure completes the activity. But the way in which pleasure completes [the activity] is not the same as the way in which the object of sense and the sense complete [it], when they are both seriously good (spoudaia)

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‘The object of sense’ and ‘the sense’ are being used interchangeably. For Aristotle customarily calls the products of art ‘art’ and the objects of sense ‘senses’. He might be leaving [a second] ‘the sense’ out of the passage, in which case the full passage would go like this: ‘But the way in which pleasure completes the activity is not the same as the way in which the object of sense and the sense complete the sense’.184 But perhaps we need to write ‘the sense’ (tên aisthêsin) instead of ‘and the sense’ (kai hê aisthêsis), so that the passage would go like this: ‘Pleasure completes the activity. But the way in which pleasure completes [the activity] is not the same as the way in which the object of sense completes the sense’. If the passage goes like this, then nothing would be missing. But how does the object of sense complete the sense? Surely in that it leads the sense from potentiality to being active and renders it an activity, whereas before – prior to apprehending the object of sense – it was in a state of potentiality.185 For as it was shown in On the Soul,186 sense in actuality is identical to the object of sense in actuality, that is, it is identical to the form that is in the matter. For the sensitive soul is a faculty by means of which the possessor of the faculty is capable of judging the objects of sense by becoming like them through a kind of transformation (tinos alloiôseôs) by means of the activity directed at them. And just as the nutritive faculty requires nourishment in order to be active (for its activity is connected to nourishment), so too does the sensitive faculty require the objects of sense. For this faculty’s activity is connected to them and is capable of apprehending and judging these187 objects of sense. This is the reason why [the faculty] is not active if the objects of sense are not present, but it is [still] sense in potentiality and is analogous to those who are in possession of a certain knowledge but are not active with respect to it.188 For the way in which those men are knowers in potentiality is similar to the way in which the inactive sense, that is the living thing itself that is capable of sensation, [is sense in potentiality]. For just as the one who knows is himself the knowledge, so too is the one in whom the sense exists himself the sense. For he is the one who is active with respect to it. For in all things, it is the ones that have the faculties and the states that are active with respect to those faculties and states. Accordingly, saying that the object of sense leads the potential sense to activity is the same as saying that [the object of sense] makes the man who has the sense and is not active, though he is potentially sensitive, actually sensitive and completes him.189 The activity is a faculty’s end and, as it were, form. For it is for the sake of (dia)190 the activities that the faculties have been given to us by the Creator, in order that we might be active with respect to them.

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The object of sense is both external to the one who is experiencing sensation and being active and prior to the sense in actuality, but this is not how pleasure is related to activity. For [pleasure] is not external to activity nor prior to it, rather it both is and is not simultaneous with it, and cannot be separated from the activity upon which it exists. Pleasure is said to complete the activity in the sense of increasing it.191 For the pleasure that [supervenes] upon doing geometry increases one’s activities in geometry,192 and the [pleasure that supervenes] upon playing the lyre [increase] one’s activities in lyre-­ playing.193 For the physician, [Aristotle] says,194 and health are a cause of the living thing’s being healthy, yet the physician qua physician is external to the healthy [living thing] and prior. (For when the [patient] whose health had begun to be restored by the physician was still sick, the physician had [already] begun restoring the sick patient’s health, but the patient whose health had begun being restored was not [yet] healthy.) But health195 is not external to the healthy [living thing] but rather in it as a part or a state. For health and being healthy196 lies in the harmony of the humours in the living thing, and health is inseparably present together with the living thing, as long as it is healthy. In the same way, pleasure also exists together with the activity upon which it comes to be, for as long as the activity is maintained and exists. The way in which the physician is a cause of the living thing’s being healthy, then, is different from the way in which health [is a cause]. For the physician was a cause of health’s having supervened in the living thing, while health [is a cause] of [the living thing’s] being active in a natural and irreproachable manner,197 and the physician is separate from the healthy [living thing], while health exists together with it as a kind of state or form of it. For health is the form of the healthy [man] qua healthy [man], just as white [is the form] of the white [man] qua white [man]. For a white [man] divorced from white cannot be a white [man], and neither can a healthy man divorced from healthy [be a healthy man]. By the same token, the object of sense and pleasure do not complete the sense in the same way. Rather, the object of sense completes it in the sense of provoking it198 and leading it from potentiality to activity, being itself external to and prior to the activity connected to it. For [only] at that time does [the sense] become capable of apprehending and judging the object of sense. Pleasure, however, completes the activity in the sense of increasing and prolonging (suntêrousa) it and, as it were, persuading it to persist.199 No one, I think, fails to recognize that corresponding to (kata) each sense that is active in a natural manner and in relation to the most beautiful of the sense-­objects falling under that sense there follows a pleasure. And since the object of sense and the sense are opposed as relatives, where the sense is passive and the object of sense is active, it must be that when both are simultaneously present the object of sense is active and the sense is passive, and that means that200 it must be that the activity is most excellent and most pleasant. And it is common knowledge (tôn kathômilêmenôn) that there are two ways of being passive:201 one involves being destroyed and the other involves being led to a kind of completion and form and from potentiality to activity. And it has been said a thousand times that the former kind of passivity, the one that involves departing from one’s own nature and leads to destruction, is distressing and painful, while the other kind is pleasant and agreeable.

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Nicomachean Ethics 10 1174b31 Pleasure completes the activity, but not in the way that an inherent state does.

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It makes no difference whether we say ‘activity’ or ‘one exercising the activity’. For it has been said that knowledge is the knower, sensation is the one capable of sensation,202 and [the art of] building is the builder.203 Similarly, the one who is already sensing is sensation in actuality, and the one who is presently building is [the art of] building in actuality. But he says that pleasure does not complete the activity in the same way that health completes the one who is healthy and geometry completes the geometer and, in short, [in the way that] states complete the possessors of these states.204 Rather, the recipients of states already exist before the states supervene on them, like forms and completions of what is potentially [such], and by supervening on them the states make them [such] in actuality and get them ready to be active according to these [states].205 For when the [art] of playing the lyre came to be in the one who was potentially a lyre-­player,206 it made him a lyre-­player in actuality and enabled him to play the lyre accordingly.207 The same goes for geometry and the geometer, too, but also for sensation: once sensation, upon the formation of living things,208 has come to supervene on the humours that are potentially capable of sensation, it made what results from these humours actually capable of sensation. Thus, the [subjects] that are potentially lyre-­ players and geometers and capable of sensation are already present beforehand, and when the states supervene, like forms in matter, they complete them and make them be active according to these states.209 But this is not the case with pleasure. For when pleasure supervenes, there was no activity already present beforehand that was previously potentially pleasant and afterwards becomes actually pleasant. No, there is no way that the activity is already present beforehand and [then] the pleasure supervenes on it; rather, it simultaneously comes to be upon it. For these things – the builder, the lyre player and the man capable of sensation – each of which being a definite thing (tode ti), through transformation and change and coming-­to-be from potentiality have became actually what they were potentially, and [the states] completed the underlying substrata and ordered them and imposed a measure, just as forms [do] for the matter underlying them. This, then, is the way in which states and forms complete the things that underlie them, but pleasure completes the activity ‘as a kind of supervening end’ (1174b33). That is, in the sense that it comes to be upon the activity as a quasi-­end. For an end, too, is simultaneous with the activity, since the activity [is complete] in all the parts of time, and [Aristotle] says that just as sublimity (hôraiotês) supervenes upon the pinnacle,210 so too does pleasure [supervene] on the activity and complete it. For just as sublimity makes those bodies that are at their pinnacle more pleasing and more pleasant and more longed for and lovelier to behold,211 so too does pleasure render the activity more sought after and disposes us to fasten onto it more. As he says, as long as both the intelligible or sensible objects are most excellent and sought after, and sense and intellectual thought are in the same [excellent] condition – this condition is indicated by the passage ‘when [they] are related to each other in the same manner’ (1175a2)212 – and [thought] is thinking and [sense] is sensing, it is necessary that pleasure, too, be present upon the activities. For as long as the harmony of the parts and limbs to each other and to the whole is

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maintained,213 beauty and sublimity are present together with this harmony (for [beauty and sublimity] float upon this harmony like a kind of light or a bloom that shines or blossoms on the surface),214 and in the same way pleasure, too, is always present together with the activity – the most excellent activity, obviously. 1175a3 How is it, then, that no one experiences pleasure continuously? Well, we become fatigued.215

Having asked why we do not experience pleasure continuously, [Aristotle] provided an answer to his question, saying ‘Well, we become fatigued’. Indeed, this is the reason why we do not experience pleasure continuously, because we get exhausted. And this is further proof that pleasure comes to be upon natural activities. For if we do not experience pleasure in idleness, but we do experience pleasure in activities, it is clear that pleasure comes to be upon activities. How can that be? Don’t we experience pleasure when we turn from the exhaustion that results for us from the activity to being inactive? On the contrary, to say that we do not experience pleasure at such times goes against our conscious experience. For we are consciously aware of some pleasure. Or should we say that being at rest, too, is to be active? For if we are alive when we are at rest and life is an activity, as has been shown in the previous book,216 then even rest is an activity. In cases of rest, then, we do not experience the pleasure that accompanies the senses in activity, but we do experience the pleasure that accompanies the immediate return to the natural state. And we shouldn’t overanalyze Aristotle’s statements. For Aristotle’s inquiry about why we do not experience these pleasures continuously was directed at the pleasure that accompanies sensations and intellectual thoughts in activity. If, then, pleasures come to be upon activities, whatever can be active perpetually and continuously also clearly experiences pleasure continuously, like the intellectual natures. But those things whose activity is not continuous but episodic, these things’ experience of pleasure is also intermittent. We do not experience pleasure continuously, then, because we are not continuously active, and we are not continuously active because we become fatigued. And we become fatigued because sensations in these activities are carried out towards external things, i.e. towards the objects of sense, and a great deal of psychic pneuma is [thereby] evacuated.217 For the sensitive power is distributed and carried from the principle218 to the whole body and to the outside by means of something that is like a vehicle and for this reason called psychic pneuma. Whenever, then, we are active and a great deal of this pneuma flows out, the living thing becomes fatigued and is not able be active, and a great deal of this kind of pneuma is poured off when we are reading, listening, looking, running, walking and in general being active.219

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1175a6: Some things delight us when they are new, but later [do not delight us] in the same way.

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we are already exhausted must therefore surely have replied that it is false to say that exhaustion is the cause of our not experiencing pleasure in a continuous and non-­ episodic manner because it [supposedly] frustrates the activity that pleasure accompanies. (For we often see certain people who are active and enjoying themselves, even though they are fatigued, and there is no way that exhaustion can obstruct the activity or the enjoyment that comes to be upon the activity.) Since, then, [on this objection] exhaustion does not have the power to obstruct these men from their activity, rather they are active even though they are becoming fatigued, it is clear that the pull of exhaustion will not be able to lead anyone else away, either, from their activity. [Aristotle] encounters this objection by saying ‘some things delight us when they are new’ (1175a6). What [Aristotle] means will be clear to those who recall for us the beginning of his Metaphysics, which goes like this: ‘All human beings desire by nature to know. An indication of this is our love of our senses’.220 Since, then, we desire by nature to know and this longing to sense and to reason is naturally present to us, it is reasonable that whenever we have become fatigued we regain our strength in order to apprehend what we do not know. And what we do not know are the things that are ‘new’ and fresh. For there are things that we don’t know, and we desire by nature to latch onto them, or rather, to apprehend and know them. This manner of desire and longing alleviates the exhaustion and makes it weak and, as it were, unperceived, and it does not allow the exhaustion to lead us away from the activity directed at new things. I myself have even seen some men who were completely weakened and others who were downright exhausted from certain doings who walked without hesitation and with pleasure to go see the spectacle of lions.221 [That is to say], this was how things were at first; later on it is negligible. ‘At first, then’, (1175a7) that is, when things first appear,222 they are stimulated and drawn and hasten towards them – rational thought to the objects of rational thought, and sense to the objects of sense – but later on the intensity and excitement are gone and [the attraction these things hold] is weak and negligible, since they already have knowledge and apprehension of the things. ‘For this reason the pleasure, too, is dimmed’ (1175a10). For it has been said that the pleasures are like the activities upon which they come to be. 1175a10 Someone might think that all [living things] desire pleasure because [all living things desire] life, too.223

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Since it is impossible for pleasure to exist without activity, and since where there is pleasure there is necessarily also activity (and life is an activity), we desire pleasure by nature as something that brings activity, that is life, with itself. But we all know that soul is life. For we say that all those things are ‘alive’ (zên) that are of a nature to nourish themselves and generate things like themselves, whereas we say that those things that in addition to nourishing themselves and generating things like themselves also have sensation are ‘animals’ (zôa).224 But sensation and life derive from soul. Therefore soul is life. And one could show that soul – that is, life – is activity in the following way. We say that those things to which soul is present are alive, just as we say that those things to

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which soul is not present are dead and lifeless. But if this is so, soul and life are the same thing. But ‘soul is the first entelechy of a natural organic body that potentially has life’,225 but entelechy is activity; therefore, life is activity. But it also accords with the distinctive character of vitality (kat’ auto to zôtikon idiôma) that [life] is a certain activity. For [life] is a certain substance that is, as it were, boiling and always bubbling up vital powers, and this, as it were, boiling and bubbling up and sending up is derived from an activity.226 And because of this there are activities that are proper and natural to each of the animals, [namely] because their lives are different and their powers and activities derive from these lives. And there are certain activities of human beings that arise in accordance with human life and nature. These are: the inner reversion away from the excitement over external things and towards oneself,227 making oneself like the superior things, committing wholly to the things that always remain,228 living in an intellectual manner. Likewise, there are horse’s activities that arise in accordance with the horse’s nature, for example, intense and hearty running, and dog’s activities in accordance with the dog’s nature, and the same goes for the other animals. But once non-­human animals are living according to nature, they for the most part do not depart from these natural [manners of life], since [their] nature guides them to these and only these natural [manners of life] and to nothing else.229 By contrast, it is [only] if our reason is not distorted or ill-­treated but has remained unharmed and therefore verges towards itself and its own splendor, [only then] does our reason look up in contemplation at the form-­principles (logoi) of each of the Beings and exercise pure and holy activities.230 ‘And [each] is active about those things and in those things which he loves most, for example, the musician by hearing [is active] about melodies’ (1175a12–14).231 ‘A musician by hearing’ [Aristotle] calls the one who employs musical instruments without theory (every stage musician is of this sort) and enjoys the melodic tunes rendered by such sounds, but he calls ‘a studious [musician]’ the one who with his rational thought232 knows the harmonic principles,233 for example that this harmony is the one through four [voices] and this harmony the one through all [eight voices].234 There are, then, two kinds of musician: the one who knows the principles and the one who employs instruments.235 The musician by hearing, then, is active about these things, but the studious [musician] [is active] about the objects of study, but the arithmetician236 [is active] about the contemplation of numbers and the essential attributes of numbers, and quite simply each hastens to be active about that which he enjoys. And the accompanying pleasure, seeing that it is proper [to each activity], completes the activity and the life that they desire. For the musical [pleasure] completes the respective life – that of the man who seeks to live musically – and the geometrical life and activity is completed by the pleasure that comes to be upon it, and the best and happy life by the pleasure that comes to be upon it. And it is with this in mind that [Aristotle] introduces in advance these things in a preliminary way, in order that he might conclude through these things that the happy life, being an activity, is completed by its proper pleasure. How to live, then, is a matter of choice,237 whether that be, for example, musically or geometrically or happily. And the proper pleasure completes the respective life. And ‘completes’ (1175a17) means the same as ‘will increase and confirms and renders more enduring and longer lasting’.

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Nicomachean Ethics 10 1175a18238 As to whether we choose life because of pleasure or pleasure because of life, let us set this question aside.

There is a certain plausibility in saying that we choose life because of pleasure. For if life is an activity, and if pleasure completes this activity, and if we choose the things that are preliminary (pro) to the end because of the end rather than the end because of the things preliminary to it (for we choose medicine and cauterization and surgery because of health, which is the end, and we do not want to be healthy in order that we might take medicine and submit to surgery and cauterization); if, then, pleasure is life’s (that is, activity’s) end, it would seem that we choose life for the sake of pleasure. But [we do] not [choose] life because of pleasure! Against the above line of thought what needs to be said is this: if pleasure were the activity’s end in the sense that the house is the end of house-­building and health is the end of recuperation and blood is the end of haematogenesis and the child is the end of intercourse, then the activity, i.e. life, would be for the sake of pleasure, and we would choose life because of pleasure. But since pleasure is not an end (telos) but a quasi-­end (hoion telos), as has been stated,239 it turns out that we are not choosing life because of pleasure but rather pleasure because of life. And it is clear that pleasure is not an end without qualification. For ends supervene in a subsequent manner upon the activities and comings-­to-be whose ends they are, but pleasure is simultaneously present together with activity that is in accordance with nature. It is clear, then, that we do not choose life because of pleasure and in general activities because of pleasure. The following considerations should make anyone more (mallon) confident that we rather (mallon) pursue pleasure because of activities and because of life.240 First, there are considerations relating to virtuous activities. For even if these activities are as pleasant as can be, it is nevertheless not for the sake of pleasure that we take a serious interest in them. For we choose many virtuous activities, even though they are causes of pain and hardships, as is the case with courageous activities.241 But if we [really] did choose activities for the sake of pleasure, then we should hate these [courageous activities] and flee them, and by the same token we should engage in every activity which is accompanied by pleasure with very serious interest. But only a madman would submit to engaging in and performing those activities that are accompanied by the most shameful pleasures!242 Therefore, if     243 virtuous activities are choice-­worthy even when they are accompanied by pain, which is the contrary of pleasure, and those pleasures that accompany the contrary to virtue, which is vice, are never choice-­worthy, it is clear that we choose pleasures because of the virtuous activities.244 But since pleasure does come to be upon activities of this sort, in some way we do also choose the activities because of pleasure: for we primarily choose those [activities], but we accidentally also choose the pleasures coming to be upon them because of the [activities]. Moreover let us see what happens when we ask ourselves which of the two it is that nature gave to us, as soon as we were born, for the sake of the other,245 activity because of pleasure or pleasure because of activity.246 We would say that it is well known that pleasure is given to living things by nature because of the activities in order that they be

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preserved and persist. For our preservation is impossible if we do not nourish ourselves. It is, then, in order that we might nourish ourselves that we have gotten from nature this pleasure in nourishment, and it is because of this pleasure in nourishment that we seek nourishment when it is not present and consume it when it is.247 Therefore, we seek pleasure in order that we might nourish ourselves. But nourishing ourselves is being active. Therefore, we choose pleasure for the sake of activity. And it is wholly absurd to say that we nourish ourselves not because we will be preserved and remain alive, but for the sake of the pleasure in it.248 From nature, then, we have this pleasure in nourishment in order that we seek nourishment because of it, and [we have] nourishment in order that we nourish ourselves and by nourishing ourselves be preserved and live and be active. Moreover living itself is a kind of activity. Therefore, pleasure is because of activity and not the other way around. Moreover, if one examines, from the point of view of nature, the pleasure that supervenes upon sexual activities, one will discover that it has been implanted in us for the sake of nothing other than the production of offspring, so that living things, being led on by pleasure, will not shrink from mating, which is the cause of the continuation249 in kind for living things. But if in these cases250 pleasures clearly arise in living things for the sake of their activities, it is reasonable [to suppose] that it is also clearly so in the case of other natural activities.251 But [Aristotle] says ‘we should set aside’ (1175a19) this line of enquiry, but then ‘these things [viz. pleasure and activity] do appear to be yoked together’ (1175a19– 20),252 and neither is being active and living according to nature separated from pleasure nor is pleasure separated from them. ‘This is why (hothen) [pleasures] also appear to differ in kind. For we think that things that are different in kind are completed by different things’ (1175a21–3). When the activities are different in kind, it is necessary that the pleasures that complete them also be different in kind. He says ‘this is why’ (hothen) (1175a21), that is, because (ek) pleasures are yoked to activities and it is simultaneously with them that they exist and do not exist. And that things that are different in kind are completed by different things is evident. For everybody knows that the pleasure that the builder enjoys is different from the pleasure that the musician rejoiced in. And that there are also different activities, this too is already clear, since some activities are choice-­worthy and others are to be avoided, and the things that are choice-­worthy and to be avoided are different in kind. Further, the pleasures will have the same difference from one another. But if so, they are not the same in kind.253 After having stated that different things are completed by different things (1175a22–3), he corroborates this by [examples] drawn from both nature and art. For the end of the coming-­to-be of the plant and that of the coming-­to-be of the animal are different, because their comings-­to-be are also different. For plants are the end of the coming-­to-be of plants, and animals are the end of the coming-­to-be of animals, and the house is that of house-­building and health that of recuperation. Just as, then, the ends of the comings-­to-be are different, so too are the quasi-­ends254 of the activities different. For the pleasure of the intellectual life and that of actual sensation are different in kind.255

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Nicomachean Ethics 10 1175a29 This is also apparent from the fact that each pleasure is properly connected to the activity that it completes.

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That not all pleasures are of the same kind but that some are of different kinds from others, [Aristotle] says that this will also become apparent from the fact that pleasures are proper to the activities upon which they come to be. And proper things are necessarily differentiated in [a way] that corresponds to the things to which they are proper.256 If, then, activities are different and different in kind, the pleasures proper to them are also different and different in kind. And that to each activity there belongs some proper pleasure – one which also completes it – this is clear from the fact that the activities increase together with the pleasures. For pleasure in doing geometry increases the activity of geometry, and pleasure in lyre-­playing increases the activity of lyre-­playing.257 For example, if the activities are numerically different but the same in kind, the pleasures [taken in these activities] are clearly also numerically different but the same in kind; and if the activities are different both numerically and in kind, the pleasures are also different in both respects. And it is clear that pleasures increase their proper activities. For the man who enjoys geometry becomes more competent at geometry and the man who enjoys music becomes more musical than those who do not enjoy these activities. Accordingly, since pleasures increase their proper activities, they are properly connected to them. For what is not proper is painful, and what causes pain is of a nature to destroy and not increase. 1175b1 But this is still more apparent from the fact that activities are impeded by the pleasures from other activities.

Not every pleasure is proper to every activity, rather different pleasures are properly connected to different activities and for this reason the pleasures necessarily differ in kind from one another in a similar manner to the activities. [All of this] is clear, firstly, from the fact that it is impossible for the pleasure that comes to be upon any one activity to come to be upon any other activity.258 For the pleasure of being licentious does not supervene upon the man who, by virtue of his brand of activity, is living temperately and being active in accordance with temperance and performing temperate actions. For it is impossible for the man who is living temperately to have experienced the pleasure of the licentious man, and for the man who wholly abstains from intercourse with women259 [to have experienced] the pleasure of man who has intercourse with women. So, the pleasure that is properly connected to the activity of the temperate man is different from the pleasure of the licentious man. If, however, the pleasures were not different, as the activities are, but the same, then what would obstruct the temperate man from avoiding the activities of the licentious man (since they are to be avoided) but pursuing his pleasures (since [the licentious man’s] pleasures are identical and the same in kind as the pleasures of temperate men)?260 It is, then, firstly clear from this [consideration] that there is some particular pleasure (tis hêdonê) properly connected to each activity and that the pleasures differ from each other in a manner corresponding to the activities.

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Secondly, it is clear, as Aristotle himself also says, from the fact that the pleasures that come to be upon some activities impede the [pleasures] that come to be upon others.261 For lovers of flute, when they are listening to someone playing the flute, do not pay any attention to the man who is, let’s say, telling stories just then; not only that but they even avoid the pleasure provided by the man telling stories because it impedes the pleasure provided by flute playing, just as conversely the lovers of stories shrink from and are not pleasurably disposed towards the pleasure that comes to be from flute-­playing in those who enjoy it. If, then, the pleasure that comes to be upon flute-­ playing impedes the pleasure that comes to be upon narrating stories, and the latter impedes the former, it is clear that they are different and not of the same kind, just as [the activities of] flute-­playing and narrating stories upon which the pleasures [come to be]. But one should also gain some conviction that they are not of the same kind from the fact that they are mutually destructive. ‘And it happens similarly in other cases, too, when someone is simultaneously engaging in two activities’ (1175b6–8).262 And the man who is listening to a flute-­player and a story-­teller is engaging in two activities. For if there are presently any two men, the one playing the flute and the one narrating the story, and there is some distinct third man who is listening to both of them, this man who is listening is simultaneously engaging in two activities. But when someone is presently looking at this particular beautiful object and is simultaneously listening to a lyre-­player, this person, too, is simultaneously engaged in two activities.263 And in this case, if he is a greater lover of beauty than of music, the pleasure that comes to be in him from looking at the beautiful object ‘drives out’ (ekkrouei 1175b8) and expels the pleasure from the lyre-­playing; so the enjoyment that supervenes upon seeing is other than the enjoyment that supervenes upon lyre-­playing.264 And whenever the activities differ from another slightly, the pleasures that derive from them also differ slightly; but if [the activities] differ greatly, then the pleasures, too, will have a comparable difference. The more pleasurable activity, then, drives out the less pleasant one in such a way that the music-­lover does not want to focus on the object of [visible] beauty, and the lover of [visible] beauty does not want to listen to the one playing the lyre. And this happens in all cases because there is a pleasure properly connected to each activity and different pleasures are distinctive of different activities and one pleasure differs from another according to the activities upon which they supervene. ‘For this reason if we are enjoying anything intensely, we do not do much else’ (1175b10–11),265 because following upon activities that are different in kind are proper pleasures, and different pleasures are distinctive of different activities, in the sense that ‘capable of laughter’ [is a property] of human being and ‘capable of neighing’ [is a property] of horse. When someone enjoys doing geometry, he does not do anything else at all but is committed to doing only geometry. For when we desire a certain type of pleasure, we engage in no other activity than the one upon which we think that type of pleasure should necessarily follow. For just as this taste and this odour are distinctive of this body, while other flavors and other odours [are proper] to other bodies, so too is this pleasure properly connected to this activity and that pleasure to that activity. To repeat, then, when someone enjoys anything intensely, he does not

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want to do anything else. And if at some point he happens to be doing something else, his engagement in that activity is wholly indifferent. And what happens at chariot-­races shows that when someone is intensely enjoying anything, he does not want to do anything else. For none of the spectators does anything else while the chariot-­drivers are competing; rather they pay extra attention to those [chariot-­drivers] – because they intensely enjoy the horse-­races and the chariot-­drivers’ activities during this time. But once the first ones have finished the seven laps and are resting, and some poor ones are still competing (by which I mean the stragglers and such), then some [spectators] engage in conversation and others eat tragêmata (tragêmatizousin, cf. EN 1175b12). For they do not enjoy the competition among stragglers. (Tragêmata are chickpea-­ pancakes and other such things.)266 Thus, [Aristotle] says, ‘they do this then’ – that is, they eat tragêmata then – ‘when the competitors are poor’ (1175b12–13).267 1175b13 And since the proper pleasure hones the activities and renders them longer lasting and better.

Through this [line of text] Aristotle has made clear what ‘each pleasure completes each proper activity’ (cf. 1175a29–30) indicates. For what ‘completes’ (cf. 1175a30)268 indicates is ‘renders more firm and longer lasting and better’. If, then, the proper pleasures make these [viz. their activities] better and longer lasting, it is clear that since pleasures vary greatly in a manner analogous to the activities upon which they come to be, pleasures are also of different kinds, just as their activities are. For if the noble differs in kind from the shameful, it is clear that the noble activities are also different in kind, if all pleasures that derive from noble activities are pure and unmixed with pain and regret, while those pleasures that derive from shameful activities are full of pain and regret and remorse.269 The proper pleasure, then, hones and increases the proper activity, for example, the pleasure in doing geometry [hones and increases] the activity of doing geometry and likewise with the other [pleasures], ‘but the foreign [pleasures] do damage’ (1175b15) just as if they were causing pain. For the pleasure in doing geometry, since it is foreign to lyre-­playing, ruins lyre-­playing. For the person who enjoys geometry is contemptuous of the pleasure of lyre-­playing. ‘For foreign pleasures nearly achieve the same thing as proper pains’ (1175b16–17). The word ‘nearly’ (1175b16) is added because the proper pains are always and invariably ruinous to their activities, but [foreign] pleasures are not always [ruinous]. A proper pain is the pain that is opposed270 to the proper pleasure. For example, if writing or playing the lyre is pleasant to someone, then not writing or not playing the lyre is painful to such a person. If, conversely, not writing or not playing the lyre is pleasant, then writing and playing the lyre are painful. For the one, then, who enjoys not writing, writing is a proper pain, the very pain that even ruins the activity, viz. writing. If, then, foreign pleasures achieve the same thing that proper pains achieve, and if the proper pains are different from the proper pleasures, then foreign pleasures are different than proper pleasures, with the result that they are also not of the same kind. ‘Contrary effects for their activities result the proper pleasures and pains’ (1175b20–1). If being ruined is the contrary of being increased, and ruining is the

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contrary of increasing, then the proper pleasures and the proper pains achieve contrary effects for their activities. For the proper pleasures increase them and make them longer lasting, while the proper pains ruin and suppress [them]. And this should be said universally of pleasures: some of them are natural to those who experience them and others are unnatural. Natural are those pleasures that [human beings] experience when they are engaging in natural activities, and those pleasures are unnatural whose activities are also unnatural. For every living thing there are certain activities that are proper and in accordance with its nature. And there are in particular certain human activities that come to be in accordance with human nature, and [activities] of horses and dogs that [come to be] in accordance with the nature of horse or dog. And the pleasures of these [activities], too, should themselves be said to be in accordance with nature for those [living things]. For the pleasure that follows upon the activity that is in accordance with human nature is itself in accordance with nature for human beings. We should call these pleasures pleasures that are in accordance with nature for each [living thing], but those pleasures that supervene on the activities that some undertake not in accordance with their own proper nature should be called unnatural pleasures.271

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1175b24 And since activities differ due to their decency and badness.

It has been said and shown many times that pleasures are properly connected to the activities upon which they come to be. And for this reason they are differentiated in the same way as these. And the activities differ in kind, so that the pleasures also differ in kind and are not of the same kind. For if the pleasures of the seriously good activities are seriously good, and those of the bad [activities] are bad, and seriously good and bad are contraries, how could one claim that contraries are of the same kind? Therefore, the seriously good and bad pleasures differ in kind. And the decent and choiceworthy [activities] are the ones deriving from virtues and knowledge, while the bad [activities] are the ones deriving from vices, e.g. those of the licentious and of the robbers of graves and temples. Yet the necessary [activities] are neither [seriously good nor bad], e.g. sexual intercourse for the sake of reproduction and the like. But [Aristotle] also shows from considerations related to appetite that not all pleasures are the same in kind. For if appetite is a desire for what is pleasant,272 and it is agreed that some appetites are choiceworthy and others to be avoided, it is clear that273 the objects of pleasure of which the appetites are [desires] will be arranged in the same way as the appetites, and some of these objects of pleasure will be choiceworthy and others to be avoided; consequently, the pleasures that derive from them will also conform to their [respective] objects of pleasure: some will be choiceworthy and others will be bad and to be avoided. Therefore, they are not of the same kind, because what is choiceworthy and to be avoided is also not the same in kind. 1175b30 The pleasures in them [viz. the activities] are more proper to the activities than the desires.

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pleasure is also not the same as appetite but something different. And the argument by which this is shown goes like this: Appetite is prior to the activity, pleasure is not prior to the activity; therefore, pleasure is not appetite. And it is clear that appetite is prior in time to activity. For one has an appetite beforehand and thus sets out for the object of the appetite. And that pleasure is and is not, simultaneously with the activity upon which it comes to be, this has been said and shown many times.274 If, then, appetite is prior to activity, and pleasure is simultaneous with activity, what is simultaneously co-­ present is more proper than what precedes and does not co-­exist. Further, however much more removed that which is seeking and has an appetite for something and does not yet possess it is from that which possesses it and is present together with it, appetite is removed from its activity by the same measure in comparison to pleasure. For appetite is a longing for pleasure (for we seek the objects of pleasure because of the pleasure), but pleasure is present together with its activity; and pleasure possesses its activity (for it is present together with it), while appetite does not possess [it]. Therefore, pleasure is more proper to its activity than longing; indeed, it is so much more proper that there are disputes as to whether pleasure and activity are the same or different (cf. 1175b33), whereas in the case of appetite and activity there is no dispute as to whether they are the same or different. Be that as it may, if [pleasure] is most proper to the activity, and [appetite] is275 less proper, they are both different and not the same. ‘But pleasure surely does not seem to be rational thought’ (1175b34).276 By ‘rational thought’ (dianoia) [Aristotle] means the activity of rational thought, that is (hoion) rational thinking (dianoêsis). Aristotle means something like this: even if pleasure appears to be the same thing as rational thinking on account of their being properly connected, we should not accept this sort of appearance as true. For rational thinking and actual sensation are distinct from the pleasures that come to be upon them. For if activity and pleasure were the same, there would be no unpleasant activity; rather, all activities would be accompanied by pleasure. But in reality there are also many activities bereft of pleasure. For the activities of athletes are unpleasant and even accompanied by pain; and so are the activities of those trying to learn to read and write but who have not yet succeeded in doing so, and of those on the path to virtue who have not yet arrived. As a result, it is clear that pleasure and activity are not the same. For just as time and motion are not the same, even though time cannot exist without motion, so too pleasure and activity are not the same, even if they necessarily exist simultaneously. And since pleasures follow upon activities, however the activities are in terms of their goodness (to eu) and its contrary, the pleasures [that come to be] upon them are in the same way. 1175b36 Sight differs from touch by purity.

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Sight is capable of apprehending the forms themselves divorced from the matter, as was shown in the second book of On the Soul. For just as the wax takes only the seal in the golden ring without the underlying matter (for the wax would become gold, if it were to receive the seal together with the gold that underlies [the seal] as its matter), so too sight is capable of apprehending the forms without the matter that underlies them.

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Hearing and smelling, being more corporeal in form (sômatoeidês) and more subject to affection, take their objects of sense in together with the matter. For it is together with the air and along with the air (sound and odour being an affection of air) that [hearing and smelling] apprehend their proper objects of sense, that is, sound and odour. Therefore, sight is purer, since it is capable of apprehending immaterial [objects], whereas hearing and smelling take in their proper objects of sense with matter. And these are in turn purer than taste, insofar as what underlies sound and odour, [namely] air, is finer than the watery moisture, in which (as [its] matter)277 flavour exists. And these four senses differ greatly from touch by purity, since touch is in the whole body because its objects of sense have the four elements (fire, earth, water and air) as their underlying substratum, with the result that they are more material. And those things in which the material aspect dominates are less pure and less valuable than the more immaterial things. And everybody knows how much [the other four senses] differ from touch – the sense [operative] in sexual intercourse – by purity! For how could what fulfils this brutish generative need be of equal purity to sight and hearing and the other two, by which we have come to know the differences and common features of the objects of sense? For through sight we have apprehended the courses of the stars – their forward, retrograde and ‘stationary’ [motions]278 as well as their risings and settings. Since, then, these senses and the activities deriving from them differ in purity and value, the pleasures that [supervene] upon them should differ in the same way. Since the activities of intellect and rational thought differ in turn from the activities of the senses, the pleasures that [supervene] upon them will also be more valuable and purer, by whatever measure intellect is more valuable and more venerable than sense. This, then, is what Aristotle means by these [lines of text]. And [Aristotle] said ‘and both [differ] from each other’ (1176a3) about the pleasures of intellect and rational thought. For intellect is of two kinds – contemplative and practical – and their pleasures differ. And by whatever measure contemplation transcends (hupsêlotera) practical action, [its] pleasure also [transcends the corresponding] pleasure by the same measure. And he is speaking about these things ahead of time because he is already labouring to deliver his account about the intellectual life and its respective happiness.

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1176a3 And there seems to belong to each living thing a proper pleasure, just as [there belongs to each] a function.

A little above I said279 that some pleasures are natural to those who are experiencing them, and others are unnatural, and that the ones that come to be upon the activities that are in accordance with their nature are natural, while those that are contrary to nature are unnatural. For there belong naturally to each living creature proper activities, and the pleasures of these activities are also natural, and these are good pleasures and are true pleasures. If, then, this is correct, and if this is especially true of human beings, and if this sort [of human being] is the good [human being], then, the pleasures that especially seem and appear [to be pleasures] to the good [human being] will be pleasures that are in accordance with human nature. But there is a certain difference

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even among the pleasures that are in accordance with human nature because some of them are more proper to us (autois) and others are less proper. For the pleasures that come to be upon the virtuous activities are more proper – and even most proper of all – to human beings, while the [pleasures] that [come to be] upon the intercourse of men with women are less proper, except that even these are natural and not unnatural. This is the meaning of the present text. The meaning of the quotation of my fellow citizen Heraclitus of Ephesus,280 namely ‘Donkeys would choose sweepings over gold’ (1176a7; DK 22B9). By ‘sweepings’ Heraclitus means hay, which is naturally pleasant to donkeys. ‘The [pleasures] of [living creatures] that are different in kind differ in kind’ (1176a8–9). Human being, horse, ox and dog are different in kind. And since they are different in kind, their natural activities also differ in kind, as was said, as well as the pleasures that come to be upon them. And it is reasonable that in the case of non-­ rational living creatures the [pleasures] of those that are the same in kind are also the same in kind. For the same things are pleasant to all horses, since they are the same in kind, e.g. hay and barley; and for dogs – since they, too, are all the same in kind – [it’s] bones and meat; and for oxen [it’s] vetch. In the case of non-­rational living creatures, then, as was said, this thesis is true because they have only nature guiding them. But [this thesis is] also [true] in the case of seriously good human beings. For the same things are pleasant to all [human beings] living in an intellectual manner in accordance with virtue, whereas [what is pleasant] varies for the wretched. Yet even though this is the case, we ought not to say that all things are pleasant, nor that all things are noble and good, but that those things that seem to be such to the seriously good [human being] [are fine and good and pleasant]. And since ‘it is correctly said’ (1176a17) that what seems [to be good] to a seriously good [human being] is good, and that ‘virtue’ – that is, the virtuous and seriously good and ‘good [human being] qua’ good – ‘is the measure of each thing’ (1176a17–18) (for what the good [human being] should establish as a measure, that is, should determine and judge and maintain to be good, this is truly good), [then] clearly also the pleasures that seem [to be pleasures] to the good and excellent [human being] should be and should be called pleasures and those things [should be and should be called] truly pleasant that this [human being] enjoys and has rejoiced in. But let no one be surprised (cf. 1176a20) if the things that seem disagreeable to the good [human being] appear pleasant to some. For [these people] are ailing with respect to their true human being – their intellect – which is what is able to distinguish the real and true from the apparent and false. The things that [seem] disagreeable to the seriously good [human being], then, are not pleasant but they appear pleasant to ‘those in such a condition’ (1176a22), that is, to those who have been corrupted and are in a wretched condition. Having said this [Aristotle] adds: ‘We should not call those pleasures that are agreed to be shameful pleasures’ (1176a22–3),281 rather we should say that they are not pleasures in the strict sense and without qualification but they seem to be pleasures to those in a bad state. ‘But of those thought to be decent, what sort [of pleasures] or which [pleasures] should be declared to belong to human beings?’ (1176a24–5). Given that there are

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many decent pleasures, what sort of pleasure should we say – from [all] of these – is the human pleasure? And having posed this question, he answers it saying ‘it is clear from the activities’ (1176a25). For since [the pleasures] come to be upon the activities, whatever sort of activity the activity of a human being qua human being is – whether this activity be one or several – the pleasure that accompanies this activity (or the [pleasures] accompanying these activities) will be that human pleasure (or those human pleasures). And having said this, [Aristotle] proceeds to the discussion of happiness. For this is the human activity that we are seeking. And since happiness is two-­fold – there is the one that blossoms upon the virtues282 (we discussed this one in the first book)283 and the intellectual life (which [Aristotle] is about to discuss) – the human activity is also two-­fold, and as a result so is [human] pleasure.

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1176a30 After having dealt with the [issues] pertaining to the virtues and to friendship as well as to pleasures, it remains to deal with happiness in outline (tupôi).

‘In outline’ (tupôi)284 is equivalent to ‘not geometrically’ or ‘not necessarily’; and rather belongs to the domain of things that are said [to be the case] for the most part, and that appear [to be the case] either to everyone or to most people or to the wise. Although his stated purpose was to talk about happiness, he has discussed the virtues, and friendship and pleasure, too. [He has discussed] the virtues because so-­called practical and political happiness is the end of those virtues that are related to practical actions and character, whereas contemplative happiness is the end of all the virtues, both practical and contemplative. For this philosopher is of the opinion that human beings are two-­fold: one human being is [composed] of body and soul, the other is intellect285 – he calls the rational life, that is, the rational part itself of the soul, ‘intellect’ – and he posits this intellect to be a human being in the real and primary and superlative sense [of the term]. And so he discovers that happiness, too, is two-­fold: the one [kind] is intellectual and complete, and he calls this ‘contemplative’, and the other [kind] is brought into existence together with external [factors]. The ‘external [factors]’, [people] say, are the health of the body, material resources, noble birth and being blessed with children.286 And his saying this is both reasonable and consistent. For he who determines the human being [to be composed] of soul and body necessarily has to accept that the body’s state jointly completes human happiness. For surely the whole will never be happy if either of the whole’s parts is in a bad state. Thus, this two-­fold happiness is the end of the virtues, and that is why [Aristotle] went through the [issues] relating to both kinds of virtues – both the practical and the rational. And he discussed friendship because one [kind] of friendship, the one by which relatives naturally287 love each other and fathers love their children, belongs to the appetitive part of the soul; and another [kind of friendship], the one by which those engaged in an expedition or war together also naturally coalesce with each other, belongs to the spirited part; and another [kind of friendship], the one which is observed especially among seriously good human beings to bring the friends’ souls together by means of shared living-­well and contemplation, [this kind] belongs to the reasoning part of soul.288

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He discussed pleasure, again, because our end, which is happiness, is mixed of both intellectual life and pleasure. For the intellectual life bereft of pleasure does not suffice for happiness – for [this life] will not have anything worth seeking if it is not pleasant – nor again is pleasure divorced from this kind of life able to jointly complete and finish happiness – for [pleasure] will not be sufficient or self-­sufficient since it is lacking intellect and deprived of every cognitive activity.289 Now that we have dealt with virtue and friendship and pleasure, in which happiness lies, he says that we also have to discuss the happiness that lies in contemplation, for this is what we need to mentally supply.290 Because he is going to discuss this [contemplative happiness], he reminds us of what he said about political happiness in the first book. For this material291 is going to be conducive to our present [investigation]. 1176a33 We said that happiness is not a state; for then it would even belong to a person sleeping his whole life.

In the first book he said: all human beings who are led by truth itself posit happiness to be the highest end; and they in turn say that the highest end is living well and doing (prattein) well.292 If, then, happiness is the highest end, and such an end is living well and doing well, and living well and doing well is not a state but an activity, it follows that happiness is practical action (praxis) and activity. For who would call a person happy who has virtue but is not engaged in it or sleeps his whole life, like the stories they tell about Endymion,293 and lives the life of a plant? For the sleeping person is like a plant because, as it were, only the vegetative294 powers are active in him, just as in plants. Likewise, who would call the person happy who possesses the greatest goods over his whole life but is suffering?295 ‘But if this is not satisfying’ [1176a35–b1], and if it also does not seem to be right to call the sleeping or disengaged person happy, not even on the assumption that he should have each of the virtues to the greatest extent possible, we should not posit that happiness lies in a state, rather we should refer it back an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life, as has been said in the first book.296 1176b2 Some activities are necessary and choiceworthy because of other things, and some are choiceworthy in themselves.

People call the productive activities, like house-­building, medicine [and] foundry-­ work, necessary and choiceworthy because of something else, while they call the virtuous practical actions as well as the activities of contemplating and knowing what is choiceworthy in themselves. Since, then, there are two different kinds of activities, we must posit happiness, he says, to be a certain one of the activities that are choiceworthy in themselves, and not one of those that are choiceworthy because of something else. For if happiness is something self-­sufficient and without a lack, and what is self-­ sufficient and without a lack is choiceworthy in itself, it follows that happiness belongs to the things that are choiceworthy in themselves. After having stated that ‘all297 noble and seriously good [acts] belong to [the activities] that are choiceworthy in themselves’, he added ‘even the pleasant activities of

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amusement’ (1176b8–9) belong to [the activities] that are choiceworthy in themselves. ‘For [people] do not choose them because of something else’ (1176b9–10), in the way that [they choose] the [activity] of making sculptures because of the sculptures, and tactical [activity] because of victory, and medical [activity] because of health. All of those people who locate happiness in the life of indulgence and in taking pleasure in eating and drinking as well as in the amusements of children or licentious adults, these people choose pleasant amusements in the belief that they are conducive to happiness. After having stated that the pleasant activities of amusement are choiceworthy in themselves, he added the reason why, suggesting: ‘For they [viz. those who play at pleasant amusements] are harmed by them more than they are benefitted’ (1176b10–11). For those who spend their leisure-­time on amusements, for instance by playing dice or knucklebones, these people neglect exercise and their possessions and so they are harmed in both respects: in respect of their body and their possessions. Therefore, amusements are not to be counted among the [activities] that are choiceworthy because of something else. For the things that are choiceworthy because of something else are beneficial, like trading or selling; for our possessions are increased by both of these, whereas they are, conversely, diminished as a result of the amusements. Therefore, [amusements] do not belong to the [activities] that are choiceworthy because of something else, yet neither do they belong to those that are choiceworthy in themselves, even if it is the case that those who value the life of indulgence do to a great extent choose these [amusements] because of [the amusements] themselves. For if harmful things are unchoiceworthy, and amusements of this sort are harmful, it follows that they are unchoiceworthy and not choiceworthy.

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1176b12 But most of those who are called happy take refuge in such pastimes.

By ‘such pastimes’ he means the aforementioned amusements (1176b12). For most – or perhaps all – of those who locate and determine happiness to lie in indulgence and bodily pleasures proceed headlong and full of serious interest towards the pleasures of amusement. For this expression ‘[they] take refuge’ (1176b12) means ‘they are led towards them [viz. the pastimes] with zeal and quickness’. Or else by ‘such pastimes’ (1176b12) he means the company they procure pleasure from. For they long to pass their time and spend their days with those who are able to generate pleasure, of what sort so ever they are, whether these be flute-­players or jesters or dancers. And because of all people it is especially tyrants who locate happiness in pleasures and believe that being happy is nothing other than experiencing pleasure with all the senses, ‘witty people’ are ‘in good standing’ (1176b13–14) and valued by them [viz. the tyrants]. By ‘witty people’ here he simply means all of those people who are able to procure pleasures for them [viz. the tyrants] in any way whatsoever. They are ‘in good standing’ and serious objects of interest among them [viz. the tyrants] because ‘they make themselves pleasant regarding those things the tyrants seek’ (1176b15).298 For when the tyrants desire to enjoy themselves and to laugh and to listen to music of their liking, [these people] make themselves pleasant in these respects. For they say and sing and do those things the tyrants enjoy. For the one who does and says those things that the tyrant takes pleasure in, is invariably pleasant to the tyrant, just as the one who says and does

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those things that the seriously good human being enjoys, is pleasant to the seriously good human being. This, then, is the meaning of the present text. And the expression ‘and they need people like that’ (1176b15–16) might indicate that the tyrants do not need seriously good people – For how could they need those whom they hate and drive away? – rather they need actors and comedians. Therefore, it is reasonable that these people [viz. actors and comedians] are valued and in good standing by [the tyrants], as they are pleasant to them. 25

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1176b16 These things appear to be conducive to happiness.

According to the erroneous assumptions of the masses, things that make us laugh seem to be conducive to happiness. For since the masses think that tyrants and powerful people are happy, they also say that the things that tyrants and powerful people pursue and love are conducive to happiness, i.e. that these things are most proper to and distinctive of happiness. But wielding authority and doing what they want to do is neither ‘an indication’ (1176b17) nor a proof of the tyrants and the powerful being happy. ‘For it is not in holding power’ and in doing what they please by the force of their power that ‘virtue’ (1176b18) and political or contemplative happiness – and by ‘intellect’ (1176b18) Aristotle means this contemplative happiness – lie. If, then, tyranny and political power are not the same as happiness, if they are rather different things that are diametrically opposed to each other, then neither bodily pleasures nor the pleasant forms of amusement are conducive to happiness. Similarly, neither the activities nor the practical actions of tyrants belong to excellent human beings, rather best and most excellent are the activities deriving from the virtues and from intellect. How is it, then, that tyrants, who are far removed from other human beings in terms of their wealth and power, hasten towards bodily pleasures? Well, Aristotle says it is because they turn out to be ‘[people who] have never tasted pure pleasures’ (1176b19).299 And ‘pure’ pleasures, he says, are those which are not mixed with – or shortly thereafter followed by – pain and regret. And regarding these pleasures it was said above which ones they are.300 If, then, as we were saying, tyranny and happiness were the same thing, then those things that tyrants gape after and seek would be conducive to happiness. But since this isn’t the case, we should not make the pleasures that tyrants pursue out to be conducive to happiness. For just as the things that are ‘most excellent’ (1176b22) and valuable to children, such as tops and knucklebones and balls, are not without qualification valuable and seriously good, so too should the things valued by those who live by sensation [alone] not be without qualification best and most noble. And it is reasonable that just as some things seem pleasant and valuable to children and others to men, so too with decent people and bad people: [what is pleasant and valuable] appears to be not the same but different (cf. 1176b22–4). And it is what appears to be such to seriously good human beings that is truly valuable and noble, while what is supposed to be such by bad people has [only] the appearance [of being valuable and noble]. Just as, then, this is the case here, so too is ‘the activity in accordance with one’s own proper state most choiceworthy for each person’ (1176b26–7).301 For the one who is in possession of the state [of being trained in] music chooses to be active in music, and

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the one who is in a state of licentiousness hastens towards doing licentious things. By the same reasoning the seriously good human being, too, exults and rejoices in performing activities in accordance with the virtues. Happiness, therefore, lies in virtue and intellect,302 that is, in the intellectual life, and ‘not in amusement’ (1176b27–8), just because tyrants are running towards it on fleet feet. ‘For it is also absurd that the end is amusement’ (1176b28–9): if amusing oneself is being happy,303 and being happy is the end, then amusing oneself is the end. And it is also absurd and totally ridiculous to do everything and to subject ourselves to hardships for the sake of being happy, that is [on this interpretation] for the sake of amusing ourselves. For if we toil in order to end up being happy, and if being happy and amusing ourselves are identical, then we are suffering for the sake of our own amusement, and this is ridiculous. Since, then, toiling for the sake of attaining happiness is good, while amusing ourselves [for the sake of obtaining happiness] is not good, being happy and amusing ourselves could not be identical. Moreover, just as we choose many other things for the sake of something else, so too do we choose amusing ourselves [for the sake of something else]; but we do not choose happiness for the sake of something [else]; therefore happiness and amusing ourselves are not identical. But the expression ‘so to speak’ (1176b39) is added because we also choose the virtues themselves for their own sake, even if we are not likely to end up happy [by choosing the virtues].304 And many people pursue wealth for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. 1176b33 ‘Amuse yourself in order to be serious’, as Anacharsis puts it, appears to be right.

For just as waging war is praised for the sake of keeping peace, so too, we must not find fault with our inclination to amuse ourselves after having toiled on pursuits of the most noble kind. For amusement gives us rest and lightens our toils. ‘For it is like rest’ (1176b34), and rest restores the parts of the bodies that have grown weary towards the previous level of strength that we had before exhaustion. For if in our practical actions and activities our bodies were observed to be immune to toil, we would not have any need of rest – or for amusement, either, since it is like a rest; but since [our bodies] do grow weary, they stand in need of rest and amusement – not all types of amusement, though, but the type which is like rest – for recovering their strength and might so that we might perform practical actions and activities again and not be disengaged from practical actions and inactive. But if we choose amusement, which he has said is rest, for the sake of being active again, then amusement is not an end, and therefore it is not happiness, either. For happiness is an end and choiceworthy because of itself and not for the sake of something else. ‘And we say that the seriously good things are better than those causing laughter’ (1177a3–4). He invokes the conceptions (ennoias) that are common to and innate in (autophueis) human beings to establish the conviction that amusement is not happiness. For all people maintain by innate intuition (autophuôs) and not as a result of any education or instruction that ‘the seriously good things’, that is the virtues and the virtuous activities, ‘are better than the things causing laughter and involve amusement’

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(1173a3–4). But what is better is better than what is worse; and if amusement and the things causing laughter are worse, amusement could not be happiness. For happiness is not inferior to anything but the best and most noble of the things within our reach. ‘And that the activity of the better part and human being is always more seriously good’ (1177a4–5).305 He calls our intellect – I mean the rational part of the soul – ‘better part’ and ‘human being’. And you can see how [Aristotle] locates the human being that is really and especially a human being in the rational life and through these [words] reveals that human nature is two-­fold. One human being is composed of soul and body, and it is for the human being in this sense that living well and being happy consists in living in accordance with the virtues, as Aristotle says in the Magna Moralia as well as in the first book of this investigation here.306 The other human being is the primary and real human being – the intellect within it which he will be talking about below. ‘And it is when it is separated’ from the body ‘that it is its true self ’ (DA 430a22–3).307 And it is clear from these words that those who claim that Aristotle is of the opinion that the soul is mortal are mistaken. But he discusses these issues elsewhere.308 This is basically what is being said in the present lines of text. ‘The activity of the better part of the soul is better and more serious’ (cf. 1177a5–6). [Aristotle] is effectively saying309 what that activity – I mean [that] better and ‘more seriously good’ activity – of the part itself is: it is the seriously good activity that derives from virtue and is proper to the human being qua human being, not the activity that derives from vice. If, then, this activity of the soul is better than the activity of the worse part, and amusement is an activity of the worse part, amusement will not be happiness; rather, the proper activity of the superior part [will be happiness]. And the expression ‘more conducive to happiness’ (1177a6)310 is identical to ‘and we should say that this [viz. the activity of the better part], and not amusement, is happiness’.311 1177a6 Any chance person could indulge in bodily pleasures.

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It has been shown many times that happiness is the end of goods and the most complete end.312 But such an end belongs only to the seriously good people. For just as the one to whom life is present is alive, so too is the one to whom goodness and the end of goods are present good and complete. But this is not present to everyone, and not everyone participates in this. For then all people would be good and complete and happy, but they are not. Rather, most people are slavish and bad – people who happen [to be] especially [indulgent in] ‘bodily pleasures’ (1177a7) – and amusement is one of these bodily pleasures. And he is not saying that the bad people are not able to become happy; for they are able. If, after having fled their vices, they pursued the virtues, they would end up being in possession of these [virtues]. Rather, what he is saying is that we are able to indulge in bodily pleasures whenever we want, while it is not possible to be happy whenever we want. For it takes a lot of time and a lot of training, as well as many practical actions and activities of the noblest kind, to achieve that noblest and most complete end, happiness. ‘Any chance person’ (1177a7), then, is capable of indulging in bodily pleasures and amusement, that is, both the bad person and the person who is neither seriously good

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nor bad, be it a man, a child or a woman, but neither the bad person nor the person who is neither [seriously good nor bad] nor the child [enjoys] happiness, as he has said in the Magna Moralia.313 For the most complete end, happiness, is not of a nature to come to be in someone who is incomplete with respect to their maturity. For it is a cause for celebration if even at complete maturity happiness should come to one.314 For if happiness is an end of goods, that is, of all of the virtues, and if prudence is one of the virtues, and if no child is prudent; it is clear that [no child] is happy either. Having said that ‘even315 any chance person’ – that is, both the seriously good person as well as anyone who is not seriously good – ‘could indulge in bodily pleasures’ (1177a6–7), he added ‘and in a superlative manner (malista) in comparison to the best [person]’.316 For slavish people enjoy317 the bodily pleasures in a superlative manner, and bad people enjoy amusements more than seriously good persons. For he who enjoys amusements and bodily pleasures is able to indulge in such things more than one who does not enjoy them. Since, then, all human beings ascribe partaking in bodily pleasures and amusement to bad people, that is, [all human beings] agree that [bad people] enjoy [bodily pleasures] and amuse themselves, and since there isn’t anyone who denies that bad and slavish people pursue bodily pleasures and amusements and get excited about them, and since [all human beings] do not ascribe a share in happiness to them nor do they call them ‘happy’ – on the contrary they even call them ‘unhappy’ – amusement cannot be happiness, and neither can bodily pleasure. After having stated that ‘no one ascribes a share in happiness to the slavish person’ (1177a8–9)318 nor does he call such a person ‘happy’, he adds ‘unless [he ascribes to him a share] in life, too’ (1177a9), which is to say that he does not ascribe to him a share in the seriously good life either, since happiness accompanies the seriously good life – and not the pastimes of bad people. 1177a12 But if happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it be in accordance with the most excellent virtue, and this would belong to the best.

‘Most excellent (kratiston) means ‘highest’ (akrotaton). And Aristotle says that the intellectual life is happiness and an activity that is most excellent and highest. After having shown that happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, since virtue is two-­fold – practical virtue, which the Peripatetics call both ‘political’ virtue and virtue ‘of character’ (for the Platonists say that the political virtues are different from the virtues of character);319 since, then, virtue is according to them (viz. the Peripatetics) two-­fold – virtue of character and contemplative virtue, for this reason happiness, too, is two-­fold. In the first book Aristotle discussed political happiness, by which the politically happy man orders the worse [parts of his soul] with his reason,320 and in this book he discusses contemplative happiness and the man who is happy according to it, and this is the primary and real human being and the true human being – the intellect within us, clearly – and this kind of happy man supervenes on the politically happy man. For it is impossible for intellectual life to come to be in

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anything that has not moderated its affections by means of the virtues of character and that has not achieved a life in accordance with political happiness. For the affections are, by their own nature, indeterminate and unstable and they are not able to set limits on their own activities. For just as fire is not able to impose a definite boundary on its own doings, rather in an indeterminate manner it heats everything that can be heated; in the same manner each of the affective parts [of soul] is impulsive and lacking moderation and in need of virtue in order that it might partake in orderly arrangement. The spirited part is in need of courage, and the appetitive part of temperance. The spirited part needs courage in order that it might confidently and fearlessly set upon the things it should and flee what it must; and the appetitive part needs temperance in order to enjoy the things it should and be pained when it should. If, then, the affections are lacking moderation and indeterminate and sources of agitation and disturbance, how could the man who is being dragged around by his irrational affections and being pulled from one thing to another and led around in circles engage in intellectual activity? Therefore, those who said that practical virtue and its end, happiness, are certain suitable conditions for the reception of contemplative happiness were correct. But there is more on them later. Aristotle himself says that since happiness is an activity of the soul, it is reasonable to say that it [obtains] most in connection with the soul’s highest activity. And its highest activity is union with the better [things] and ‘being made like God as much as possible’ for man, as Plato says (Theaet. 176B). For it is possible for human beings to acquire a good greater than political happiness. And if so, political happiness will not be our highest and most complete end; rather, what is greater than this [will be that end], contemplative happiness, [and this is] our entire activity and the whole measure (to holon metron) of human activity. For political happiness is the measure and end of virtue, but contemplative happiness [is the measure and end] of political happiness. For there is nothing else that is holier and more proper to human nature than this. For practical action in accordance with virtue is an activity proper to human beings, and political happiness is more proper; but contemplation is most proper as well as a measure and boundary and most complete end of our ascent,321 as it is an activity of the ‘best’ [part] in us, as [Aristotle] says (1177a13). And this best part in us is the intellect within us, i.e. the real and true human being. ‘Whether this be intellect or something else that seems to rule by nature’ (1177a13– 14). In the case of bad people who enjoy licentiousness, the worse [part] is ruling over the better [part], and this goes against nature. But in the case of seriously good people, the better [part], reason, is ruling over the worse, irrational life. Having said that happiness in accordance with intellect is an activity of the [part] in us that is best and of a nature to rule and control our inner rabble, the irrational part of the soul, he added ‘Whether this’ best [part] in us be ‘intellect’ (1177a13), [by which] he is effectively saying: ‘Whether’ we should call it ‘intellect’, (1177a13) which is the name I myself give it, or ‘rational life’, as Plato [calls] ‘that which’ (1177a14) is of the best nature, as I said, ‘to rule and’ (1177a14) in addition to this ‘to possess awareness (ennoia)’ (1177a15) and apprehension of there being noble [things] – some of these are truly noble, and others are apparently such – as well as of there being certain incorporeal substances that are separate from bodies and stand by themselves, and something prior to these that is by

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its very substance a cause of all things, a wholly complete activity that maintains and steers the entirety of things.322 Regardless of whether we should call the best [part] in us intellect, or whether [we should call it] something divine (1177a15) and a kind of divine dispensation and effluence, as this is what Plato says,323 or ‘whether [we should call it] the most divine [part] within us’ (1177a16), the activity of this [part] in accordance with virtue – namely, according to the intellectual life – will be the happiness that we are now seeking, and the one who lives in accordance with this life, the one most befitting of God, will be happy, [since] he will also have reached his own summit and complete end. For, as was said, political happiness is also an end, but not the most complete end. And Aristotle said ‘whether the most divine [part] within us’ (1177a16) because it is his custom to call even sensation and, quite simply, nature and all the works of nature [‘divine’]. For nature, as Aristotle himself says elsewhere,324 is not God but it is something divine and daimonion. Accordingly, sensation is divine but not most divine, while the reasoning [part] is divine and most divine. 1177a18 And [this] would seem [to be] in agreement both with what [was said] earlier and with the truth.325

The account that states that the activity of the most divine [part] within us according to its proper virtue is complete happiness and that political [happiness] is incomplete by comparison, is consistent both with what was said previously in the first book and with the truth. For since we determine the human being to be two-­fold326 – we say that our intellect is the human being who is really a human being in the highest and primary sense, while the human being [composed] of body and soul is [a human being] in a secondary sense – it is true and consistent with the truth to say that the activity of the real and primary human being is most excellent and complete and holier than political happiness, and it is better and more valuable by whatever measure that the subjects that its activity concerns itself with are established to be better than the subjects of political [activity]. For it belongs to political [activity] to introduce order to the secondary [human beings] and to impose order and boundary (and much has been said about these topics in the first book),327 but what belongs to this [contemplative activity] is stretching upwards328 to what is better as well as union [with] and knowledge (gnôsis) of the divine substances’ common features and differences,329 and when [this takes place] the intellect that has the potential to contemplate these things like this is also said to be an intellect in actuality.330 For even before it is able to be active in happiness in this intellectual and godly life, there is an incorporeal substance that is capable of separating itself from this living thing, which has been allotted to its guardianship.331 And at this point it is called potential intellect because it is capable of receiving what Aristotle calls the intellect ‘from without’,332 or rather the illumination of the intellect ‘from without’, and when it partakes of this illumination, it is said to be intellectual and a complete intellect and contemplatively happy and engaging in the height of activity and all the other [characterizations] that we have repeatedly mentioned. 1177a21 Further [it is] the superlatively continuous [activity]. For we are more able to contemplate continuously.333

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We must say that this is most excellent and highest and most complete both because contemplative happiness is an activity of the best and most divine [part] within us and because it is superlatively continuous. For it was said in the first book that we think happiness is enduring and difficult to take away.334 If, then, enduringness is a certain one of happiness’s elemental properties, then what is more enduring [will be] more characteristic of happiness. And it is what exists for a longer time that is more enduring, and it is what is more continuous and longer-­lasting that exists for a longer time. And contemplative happiness is more continuous and longer-­ lasting than political happiness. Therefore, it is better and more divine and for this reason also highest and most complete. Further, if what is more continuous is closer to the eternal (to aei) and what is not continuous and exists for a short time is farther removed [from the eternal], and if what is eternal is more complete and better than what is not eternal, then contemplative happiness, since it is more continuous and longer-­lasting, is closer to the eternal contemplation [that takes place] among the intelligibles, while political [happiness] is farther removed. Therefore, contemplative happiness is more complete and most excellent and highest. But it is clear that the longer and more continuous time is closer to the eternal than the shorter and less continuous time. And I maintain that the practical actions and activities themselves [exist] for a longer and more continuous time because their duration and brevity and their continuity and lack thereof are judged in terms of time. So if the knowledge of the divine things is contemplative happiness, and if this is determined by measures of time, just as practical actions are (for we speak of a practical action lasting an hour and a month and a year), and if the longer-­lasting practical action in accordance with virtue is better, e.g. the action lasting a month is better than the one lasting an hour; then contemplative happiness is also more complete than practical [happiness], because one can and does contemplate for a greater measure of time. Through these arguments, then, I suppose that it is clear to everyone that of the noble things the more continuous is better than what is not such. And that the man of contemplative happiness is able to be active in a more continuous manner than the man who is politically active will become clear through the following arguments. We know that every practical action and activity seeks some good, and that everyone who is performing a practical action or engaging in an activity, because he is being moved and drawn by some sought after object of desire, is moved and acts for the sake of attaining the object of his longing. If, then, every object of desire draws the subject seeking it to itself, as the magnet draws the iron, then what is a greater object of desire and what is by its own nature [desirable] should induce in the subject seeking it a greater motion to itself and to its attainment. And it is, as this man [viz. Aristotle] says,335 the first cause of all things that is desirable by its own nature, and it is more longed for and lovelier,336 and the person who has managed to contemplate is insatiable with respect to it. For there is satiety with respect to the other goods and the objects of desire and the apparent goods, and we pursue them up to the point where we attain them and achieve satiety with respect to them, but once we attain them and are filled by them, we desist and no longer want to be active with respect to them.

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And it is clear that there are (i) some things that are easy to attain and such that the enjoyment and filling that results from them occurs more quickly. The time of our activity in connection with these things is short, and we are not drawn to them continuously but rather after long intervals of time.337 And there are (ii) some things that are more difficult [to attain] and such that satiety with respect to them does not come about particularly quickly; rather, the more we indulge in them, the more we long for them. Our activity in connection with these things is measured by long periods of time, and our advancing towards these things arises [again] before long and intermittently.338 But there is also (iii) that of which satiety is never achieved, which one rather longs after and desires as long as one is indulging in it. In connection with this one will clearly be active continuously and always, and if ever it happens that due to some calamity he is torn away from his occupation with this object, he would not tolerate its absence long but would return to it as soon as possible. And all that is divine, i.e. (kai)339 our Creator, is of this sort. Therefore, the intellect’s activity in connection with this object – and this activity is contemplative happiness – is continuous in addition to the previously discussed attributes. And it follows that on account of this continuity it is most excellent, highest and most complete. Yet [this activity] is most complete and highest not only because it is most self-­ sufficient and continuous, but also because it is most pleasant. For it is possible for those who enjoy the most pleasant things to continue [engaging] with them for a really long time. For he who intensely enjoys musical melodies listens to them all day and night, so to speak, and he who [intensely enjoys] the pursuits of geometry or [Ptolemy’s] Great Treatise340 barely manages to tear himself away from these pursuits and promptly hurries back to them again. But if this is possible for those enjoying these things, what must we say about that which is most noble and best and most pleasant and desirable by its own nature? Contemplative happiness is, therefore, also most complete because it is most pleasant, and this type of activity is most pleasant because the object that it desires and seeks is most pleasant. And [Aristotle] indicated that contemplative activity is most pleasant when he said: ‘And we think that pleasure must be mixed into happiness’ (1177a22–3). For the happy life appears to everyone to be pleasant. For the life that is complete and lacking in nothing and self-­sufficient is best and highest, and so also most pleasant, and it is the intellectual life that is of this sort. For political happiness, too, is self-­sufficient and complete and pleasant, but real completeness and real pleasantness are found in the foremost form of life, and the foremost form of life is contemplative happiness. And after having said that the happiness found in contemplation and knowledge of the best [objects of knowledge] is best, [Aristotle] adds: ‘At any rate philosophy appears to bring with it pleasures that are wonderful due to their purity and value’ (1175a25–6).341 But everybody knows that philosophy is contemplation and intellectual life and accordingly most pleasant. The ‘due to their purity’ is added on account of what was just said above. For it was said that the activities of the purer and more immaterial senses are themselves purer.342 If so, then to whatever extent intellect is more immaterial and more valuable than the senses, its activity will also be [purer] than the activities of sensation to the same extent. And from these presuppositions [it follows that] to whatever extent the intelligibles surpass the sensibles in purity and

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value, intellectual thinking [will surpass] the activities of sensation to this same extent, as will contemplation practical action.343 Further, since the politically happy man is procuring happiness for his citizens (cf. 1177b13–14),344 and since it is impossible to produce [happiness] in the citizens apart from the order and arrangement that befits them, and this arises by honoring some citizens and punishing others,345 it can happen sometimes that he experience remorse and regret because he punished this individual or showed favour to a certain individual.346 But he who contemplates and examines the nature of the beings never ends up regretting that he did not know a certain individual’s nature because he lives in an intellectual manner. The pleasure, then, that belongs to contemplation is unmixed and pure for these reasons – it is clearly unmixed with pain and remorse – and it is valuable because the things that the contemplatively happy man, when he is thinking, is apprehending and is active in relation to are most valuable. 1177a26 Indeed,347 it is reasonable that the way of life of those who know is more pleasant than that of those who are seeking to know.

The practical matters that the politically happy man spends his time on happen to be unstable and indeterminate and vary over time. For if today it is advantageous to be friends with348 certain individuals and to serve as their allies or to have them serve as our allies, it is not always beneficial; and if we must presently wage war against these men, it is not always the case that we must wage war on them. If, then, these things are indeterminate, and what is indeterminate is unknowable, then the politically happy man is in a state of ignorance and inquiry. For he is inquiring whether it is necessary to wage war against these men or establish peace, and whether to serve as allies to these men or simply ignore them when they are in trouble, and whether to wage war on land or by sea, and whether to punish this individual or pardon him, and in general he is nearly always stuck in a state of ignorance and inquiry. The one, by contrast, who is active with his intellect is in a state of possession and of unerring knowledge of the corresponding object of knowledge. Therefore, the way of life [of this person], i.e. the contemplative life is more pleasant than the political life. For the one who is inquiring is ignorant, and the one who is ignorant is not experiencing pleasure. Contemplative happiness, then, is more complete than political happiness because it is self-­sufficient and because it is most pleasant and because it is continuous. For the desire for the most excellent end, since it obtains no satiety, is continuous and goes on indefinitely. ‘For both the wise man and the just man, and all the others too, require the things necessary for life’ (1177a28–9).349 [Aristotle] has now stated that the contemplative life is without lack and self-­sufficient. For the intellectual life is in the truest sense most self-­sufficient and wanting nothing. For the contemplatively happy man is in possession of the good corresponding to his own proper power in its entirety, and since he is indulging in this he pays no attention to secondary [goods] – except the necessary ones. For he does seek after these – not because he is looking to increase his intellectual life and needs them for that; rather, since he has been allotted guardianship over a body from the God of the universe,350 he requires the things that are necessary for the

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preservation of his body, and through these things he provides for himself without suffering affections. For the complete life of the happy man is without lack, whereas it is the life of the body that, because [it must maintain] its own good and its own completion, requires the necessary [goods]. For the happy man, then, the completion of the body is necessary and not a principally chosen good (proêgoumenon agathon). [As I was saying, Aristotle] has now stated that the contemplative life is self-­sufficient and that the political life is lacking, and [now] he states that everyone requires the necessary [goods] – ‘both the wise man and the just man’ (1177a29) – where he refers to the politically happy man as ‘just’ and the contemplative man as ‘wise’. Yet whereas other people require [these things] as principally chosen goods, the contemplative man [requires them] as [merely] necessary things.351 For when the body is utterly famished or severely ill, it gets in the way of contemplation, but the contemplative man pays no attention to the [other] secondary [goods], as has been said.352 But [even] when all of the secondary [goods] – I mean the virtues and the external goods – ‘are sufficiently supplied’ (1177a30) and obtain ‘for [human beings] of this sort’ (1177a30), that is, for good [human beings] which is to say for the politically happy,353 virtue alone is not self-­ sufficient for happiness (and this was shown by the commentator Alexander in one of his single-­volume works),354 nor is the presence of the external goods, even though [the politically happy men] are indeed lacking in [external goods], too. For, since they posit that political happiness, too, is an activity, they require the appropriate underlying [conditions]. For if every activity bears a relation and a connection to something, then those things are required in connection with which they will be engaging in activity. For in the absence of the [conditions] that set him in motion and draw him to activity, the practical actions and activities of the politically happy man are necessarily done away with. For just as he needs the instruments by means of which he may engage in activity, so too does he require the underlying [conditions] in connection with which [he may engage in activity]. And this is clear in all the other cases, too, but especially355 in the case of the virtuous. ‘For the just man requires the people that his just actions will relate to’ (1177a30–1). (For if justice is distributive of proportional equality to each, [the just man] will require the people to whom he will give what each merits. In the absence of these people, then, his activity, i.e. just action, will be done away with.)356 And the courageous man requires the presence of his enemies. (For in the absence of adversaries he cannot perform his courageous activities.) And the temperate man likewise requires the people that his acts of temperance will relate to. (They have need, then, of these [people], and furthermore of the instruments: the liberal man has need of possessions, the courageous man of armour, the just man of the things he is going to distribute.) And the prudent man has need of an end, or of some ends, in order that he may discover what contributes to the acquisition and possession of these ends. But the contemplative man does not have need of anything. For, as has been said,357 since he is in possession of the good corresponding to his own proper power in its entirety, he is wanting nothing and does not require anything else at all in order to be active in connection with this [good]. ‘And the wiser he is’ (1177a33) and the better he is in terms of his habitual state, the more he will be engaged in this activity. If, then, the political man requires certain things for his activity but the contemplative man does

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not require anything, then contemplative happiness is most self-­sufficient and most pleasant (by the very fact that it has no requirements) and most complete. 1177a34 But perhaps it is better [for him] to have358 contributors (sunergous),359 but he is nevertheless most self-­sufficient.

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Contributors – not in relation to his intellectual activity – rather, regarding his contemplation being undisturbed. For he needs the person who is going to stew his vegetables and bring him water and clean his clothes and, in general, the person who is going to take care of necessary matters. ‘Nevertheless’, he says, even if he should be deprived of this person, he is ‘most self-­sufficient’ (1174a34–b1) because he needs so very little. For he will draw water and stew vegetables himself. For if he required stewed partridges and pheasants and a full spread on the table, he would be lacking leisure and in need. But since he [requires only] bread and water, he will be most self-­sufficient, even if he is deprived of the people who would prepare these [for him]. Or else (ê), by ‘contributors’ Aristotle might mean one’s own friends. For he requires them because friends whet each other’s virtue, and they are engaged in virtuous action longer and more continuously [with friends] than alone. The ‘perhaps’ (1177a34) is added, in the first place, because those who are [concerned] with necessary matters are not suited for happiness itself per se nor are they contributing to its augmentation, rather they are [suited for and contributing to] the completeness of the body. If the true human being were identical to the body, they would be making a contribution to the happy man. But since they are not identical, we might say that they are ‘perhaps’ – that is, accidentally – contributing, but not without qualification. In the second place, [the ‘perhaps’ is added] out of a kind of respect for and consideration of his teacher Plato, who says that the true human being does not require any contributor.360 For when the intellect within his soul is itself in the act of illumination and the whole [soul] belongs to his intellect,361 what need is there of anyone else for living happily? And Plato discusses these things in the Republic and in the Laws.362 But that with friends happy men are both more and more continuously active was stated in the previous book, when [Aristotle] showed that the happy man requires a friend.363 ‘But this alone would appear to be loved for its own sake’ (1177b1–2).364 If what is choiceworthy for its own sake is more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy for the sake of something else, as has been stated365 (for health, being choiceworthy for its own sake, is more choiceworthy and complete than purgatives and blood-­letting – things that are not [choiceworthy] for their own sake but for the sake of health), and if political happiness belongs to the class of things choiceworthy because of something else (for [it is] for the sake of contemplative happiness and further to make the citizens and the city happy), and if the intellectual life itself is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, then this should be complete happiness. For health, too, is complete and a complete form, but in its relation to virtue it is incomplete. Virtue is yet again a complete form, but in its relation to political happiness it is incomplete. And in general, all subordinate [forms] are complete as far as their relation to their own nature and form is concerned, but they are said to be incomplete

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in their relation to higher and more venerable [forms].366 If, then, this is the case (and more true than any [alternative view])367 and contemplative happiness is the ultimate form and choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, then this should be the complete happiness. And that [contemplation] is the ultimate end and most complete and ‘alone loved for its own sake’368 (1177b1) and not for the sake of anything else, is clear from the fact that nothing else results for us from it. For victory results from courage, and from temperance freedom from agitation, and attaining the things that are conducive to some end [results] from prudence, and political happiness [results] from all of these taken together. And similarly from the other practical actions and acts of creation – from some more, from some less – for example, from trade wealth [results], from weaving a garment, from the medical art or medicine health, and from house-­building a house. But from contemplation nothing other than contemplation results [which is] both activity and end.

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1177b4 And happiness appears [to be found] in leisure.369

They say that those who are at leisure and beyond the reach of all agitation are happy, and every day we hear everybody, being led by Nature herself, saying: ‘Such a one is blessed and happy’. When asked why, they say: ‘Because he is continuously undisturbed and in leisure and continuously living out his life divorced from turmoil’. If, then, we say that those who are at leisure are happy, and if those living in an intellectual manner are exceedingly (mallon) at leisure,370 they are exceedingly (mallon) happy, and it is the life in accordance with intellect and the knowledge of and immediate contact371 with what is divine that is exceedingly (mallon) happiness, the very highest and complete happiness, not political happiness, which is lacking leisure in all kinds of ways. Further, [Aristotle] showed that everything that his predecessors and contemporaries thought about happiness belongs to contemplative happiness. For (i) if happiness is what is choiceworthy for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, as some have maintained, this belongs solely to the intellectual life and not to anything else; (ii) [if happiness is] an activity of soul, as other men have made it out to be, in accordance with372 the good things that have gone into it from the superior things – which is exactly what good things are – both the illumination from that source that reaches the contemplatively happy man as well as the knowledge (gnôsis), rooted in this illumination, of the first things, the second things and the subsequent things and of their common features and differences and the distinctive nature of each – this, too, is what is special and most distinctive of contemplation; (iii) [if happiness is] living well (euzôia) and feeling good (eupatheia),373 here, too, contemplation fits well; (iv) [if happiness is] leisure and lack of disturbance,374 as Epicurus insists, [Aristotle] shows that this, too, belongs to contemplation in the present passage, when he says ‘and happiness appears [to be found] in leisure’ (1177b4). For if happiness is the ultimate end, and if leisure, too, is an ultimate end, then happiness should be [found] in leisure. And that leisure is an ultimate end is a thesis that [Aristotle] advances from the starting point of political happiness – the happiness that is not [found] in leisure without qualification, but it is [found in leisure] in a way

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and in some respect. For [the man of political happiness] is at leisure insofar as all the neighbouring cities submit to him, but insofar he is keeping a careful eye on the day-­today matters of the city and is anxious to maintain as firm and enduring what is noble and advantageous both to the general public and separately to each individual, he is lacking leisure and in a state of turmoil. But from what [considerations] is it clear that leisure is an ultimate end? From the fact that bows are carved and armour is constructed and shields are fitted together for the sake of war, and war is chosen for the sake of peace, which is leisure. Accordingly, since peace is leisure, and peace is an end, leisure is an end of lack of leisure, that is, of the preparation of arms and of the other remaining preparations for war. But since even this leisure [viz. peace] is a kind of lack of leisure, as has been stated, and since every lack of leisure seeks some end and leisure, the end of this lack of leisure should be leisure. And the ultimate end – and this is contemplative happiness – is therefore [found] in leisure. 1177b6 The activities375 of the practical virtues, then, are [found] in political [affairs] or in war-­related [affairs].

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Having stated that happiness appears to be [found] in leisure, [Aristotle] shows through these [lines] that no other activity – whether war-­related or political or [even] political happiness itself – is [found] in leisure, but solely the activity in accordance with intellect – contemplative happiness. He is showing this when he says that ‘the activities of the practical virtues’ – that is, of the virtues of character – ‘are [found] in political’ affairs ‘or in war-­related [affairs]’ (1177b6–7), and that said activities – both those relating to war and those relating to the city – are lacking in leisure and full of anxiety and disturbance is known by everyone who has spent time in war-­related and political affairs. For the treasurers of the city’s assets are filled with turmoil, as they bear the anxiety of accounting for the assets that have gone in and out of the treasury; and those who police the men attempting to break the law are in a condition of [being afflicted by] all kinds of disturbances; and those who oversee the city’s trading and commerce so that these transactions take place in the fairest possible manner,376 are completely lacking in leisure. And what might anyone say about the prefects whom they call huparchoi? Every single one of these is lacking in leisure, and we mean those who are treasurers and prefects and the others similarly [employed], not those who in our parts [are known as] the ‘ravens’.377 Having stated that both political and war-­related activities are lacking in leisure, [Aristotle] first shows how it is that the war-­related activities are such, and he says ‘For no one chooses waging war for the sake of waging war’ (1177b9),378 rather we wage war in order to be at peace. If, then, we wage war in order that we might be at peace, and if peace is a kind of leisure, then we wage war in order that we might be at leisure. But everything that comes to be comes to be from its opposite or contrary, as was shown in the first book of the Physics.379 If, then, peace comes to be from war, and if peace is leisure, then war – as well as the practical actions [that are performed] in war – is lack of leisure. Having confirmed that we wage war for the sake of being at leisure, [Aristotle] added ‘For no one chooses waging war for the sake of waging war’ (1177b9), which is equivalent to saying ‘For no one chooses to forego leisure for the sake of foregoing

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leisure, but in order to be at leisure’. For the one who wages war in order to have wars is ‘murderous’ (1177b10) and ungodly and completely unjust. For if he chooses war in order to wage war, then once he has conquered all his enemies and put them under his thumb, who will he wage war against? Since he chooses waging war for the sake of waging war, it is clear that he will be at war against his friends, which is the stuff of ultimate injustice and murderousness. Therefore, we do not wage war in order to wage war, but in order that we may establish tranquil rest, which is equivalent, as has been stated, to saying ‘we forego leisure in order that we might be at leisure’. Therefore, the war-­related practical actions are lacking leisure, since their end, peace, is leisure. ‘But the politician’s activity is also lacking leisure, also (kai) in addition to political activity itself ’ (1177b12–13). The conjunction ‘also’ (kai) in the passage ‘also in addition to political activity itself ’ is not redundant; rather, it shows that it is not only when he is acting on political matters and spending time on this that he is foregoing leisure, but also when he is not active and yet considering which matters of necessity he has done and which he has left undone, and what he must do for next year and what he must not do. The passage would have been more congruent and more consistent with what is being said, if it had been something like: ‘also when he is not engaged in political activity he is lacking leisure’.380 But these things are presumably [to be understood] like this. But after having shown that the war-­related activities are lacking leisure, he shows that not even the political activities are free of turmoil and disturbance, but that these also turn out to be lacking leisure. For [consider] the man who is procuring honours and powers for himself and his city, and who is taking a serious interest in and fretting about maintaining his lordship over the neighbouring cities and being honoured – both himself and his fellow citizens – by all men and obtaining all of life’s [necessities] in abundance – how could anyone claim that such a man is at leisure?381 This is the meaning of the present segments of text. But the passage that reads ‘382 other than the political [happiness] which we are seeking, too’ (1177b14–15) must be read in inverted order: ‘that which we are seeking, too, being other than political [happiness]’. [Aristotle] is saying that the happy man [in question] is procuring power for himself and his fellow citizens, and that this kind of happiness is different from contemplative happiness, and it is this contemplative happiness that we are currently seeking. The conjunction ‘too’ (kai) is superfluous in the present instance. For the correct way [to write it] is like this: ‘that which we are seeking, being other than political [happiness]’.

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1177b16 If, indeed, of the practical actions in accordance with virtue, the political and war-­related ones . . .383

This is a kind of conclusion to his discussion of contemplative happiness, and what he says goes effectively like this. If the elemental features (ta stoikheia) of complete happiness are: being choiceworthy in itself and not for the sake of something else, being most pleasant, self-­sufficiency, involving leisure, and the activity’s being free of weariness and unyielding and enduring, to the extent that that is possible for a human being.384 If, then, these are the constitutive elements (ta sustatika stoikheia) of happiness,

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and if they belong only to contemplative happiness, then this should be the happiness that is primary and complete and most proper of human beings. And political happiness [should be] secondary and posterior to it and proper not to the real and true human being but to the human being composed of body and intellect. For if the nature of each thing is complete relative to385 that very thing that it is and yet is subordinate to the things that are situated above it and incomplete relative to these higher things, it follows that political [happiness] is also in this respect incomplete, that is relative to contemplative [happiness], even if it is complete in respect to its own nature.386 This is what [Aristotle] wants to say. Regarding the details of the text it must first be said that the apodosis of these [lines] is found in [the statement]: ‘this is complete happiness for a human being, if it is given a complete length of life’ (1177b24–5),387 and the rest has been inserted in between as a reminder of what has been said about happiness. Next, it must be said that to whatever extent the city differs from a single man, all of the practical political actions in accordance with virtue – the ones which [collectively] are political happiness – differ ‘in magnitude and nobility’ (1177b10)388 from a single practical action in accordance with virtue. For the [actions] from virtue and in accordance with virtue that are contributed and performed by all the citizens turn out to be sizeable and noble, and they greatly ‘exceed’ (1177b17) the virtue and practical actions of a single man. And the same goes for the case of war-­related practical actions. The practical actions in accordance with virtue and acts of bravery of the whole army greatly excel the accomplishments of a single soldier. So, even though these [practical actions] are sizeable and noble, they nevertheless do not have a claim to being leisurely; yet, in addition to lacking leisure, they also turn out to be choiceworthy not because of themselves but because of something else – because of victory, and the accumulation of assets and acquisition of land. But what is choiceworthy because of something else is incomplete and also not self-­sufficient. ‘But the activity of intellect’ – the apprehension of and immediate contact389 with the divine things – ‘appears to differ in serious goodness’ (1177b19), that is, by its high position and value. For the most valuable and highest activity of ours – and the supremely god-­loved – is the intelligible life. For the character-­related and practical [activities] are secondary and posterior to that. And in addition to this, it is most pleasant. For what is complete is most pleasant. But pleasure of this sort is complete because it is without remorse and does not admit of regret.390 And since it is complete and most pleasant, it also ‘will increase the activity’ (1177b21). But it is also self-­sufficient. For it is choiceworthy because of itself.391 And it is free of weariness and unyielding and impervious to slackening. For no one can persevere in his own proper practical actions for the longest time in the way that the man who is at leisure in contemplation does. 1177b25 [. . .] if it is given a complete length of life; for nothing belonging to happiness is incomplete.392

If what is everlasting is complete, what is closer to [being] everlasting is more complete than what is more removed. And the longer time is closer than the shorter time. As a result, the happiness that [obtains] over a longer time is more complete than the

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happiness that [obtains] over a shorter time. After having stated that the wholly complete [form] of happiness – that which really and primarily and especially belongs to a human being – is the life in accordance with intellect, [Aristotle] added ‘if it is given a complete length of life’ (1177b25), where he is stating the consequences that he himself finds agreeable. For this inspired man [viz. Aristotle]393 wants happiness to be jointly completed by the whole of virtue – both virtue of character and contemplative virtue – but political [virtue]394 both requires ‘external resources’ (1178a24) that are sufficient to provide for its virtuous activities and it requires a complete life for its entire good order or living-­well and doing-­well. For many changes and all sorts of chance happenings occur during one’s life, and as time progresses it becomes capable of exposing those who are truly happy and those feigning a happy life. For time is capable of exposing those with a nature to change easily [with their fortunes], or even those who seem to be something that they aren’t. Further, if happiness is complete, and what is more enduring is more complete, and what has been happy for a longer time is more enduring, and that is to say happier, then I should think it is clear to everyone that what has been happy for the shortest time is in a way nearly something that has not experienced happiness at all. Accordingly, happiness of this sort is incomplete. Therefore, it also requires a complete life. But another thing that people agree on is that having been engaged in intellectual activity for a long time is more befitting of God than having been engaged in the same activity for a short time, and is accordingly more complete. Therefore, a complete and long-­lasting life is required. Yet if someone objects395 and says that being happy is present as a whole and is wholly complete in the [present] moment (nun) and it admits of no addition by the extension of time,396 the person saying this is contradicting, firstly, our conscious experience and, next, the opinion of most or even nearly all human beings. For everyone says that the one who397 has been happy for a long time is much better than the one who has been living in the same manner for a short time. Accordingly, the extension of time will increase the happy life, even if both [lives] are active in the same manner in the present moment. Further, if we call the man who has proven himself through many noble deeds happier, and if it is possible to perform more noble actions in a greater period of time, then I should think it is clear to all that a long period of time and the complete length of life contribute to the completion of happiness. For in a short period of time it is not possible to perform very many great practical actions or to contemplate very many great [objects of thought],398 the very things that pre-­eminent happiness is seeking.399 It is clear, then, from these and many other [considerations] that it would be superfluous to put in writing, that a complete length of life is also required. Since, then, happiness is complete and nothing belonging to it is incomplete (cf. 1177b25–6), it is necessary that the time, too, be complete, lest happiness be incomplete in this respect. 1177b26 This sort of life would be superior to the human [kind].

By ‘human’ [Aristotle] means here the human being composed of soul and body. The present account says that the contemplative life (bios) and the intellectual life (zôê)

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transcend political happiness and the politically happy man, the man who succeeds in relation to things of secondary importance, being entwined with and occupied with them. For is not ‘insofar as he is a human being’ (1177b27) – the human being composed of reason and the many-­headed beast of appetite and the lion-­like spirit together with the body400 – that the one who lives in an intellectual manner ‘will be living in this manner’ (1177b27); rather he lives out his life in this manner insofar as something divine exists within him, that is, to the extent that he has separated himself from the living thing to which he has been tied together and united himself to the first Good and the illumination that emanates from it to him.401 For this is living in an intellectual manner: fleeing from the excitement connected to matter402 upwards to the intelligible summit. And, he says, ‘to whatever extent’ the intellect within us ‘differs from’ this ‘composite’ – the composite from soul and body – ‘to this extent its’ intellectual ‘activity also’ differs from political happiness (1177b28–9). For by ‘other virtue’ (1177b29) he meant political happiness. ‘If, indeed, intellect is divine relative to human being’: that is, if the intellect that is without relation and turned upwards403 is more divine than the [intellect] that is relational and sinking down to matter, then its life (bios) – the activity in accordance with intellect – is more divine than the human life (zôê) – political happiness. 1177b31 One should not follow those who say ‘As you are a human being, think human thoughts’

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Some say that this is the maxim of Theognis, others say of Solon.404 What [Aristotle] means is something like this. If the human being in the strict sense, the one that is especially and really a human being, were the one that is jointly completed by reason and the things present to reason,405 then it would be right to be persuaded by those who say that we must think human thoughts and remain at the level of political happiness. But since the true human being is not this composite but what is most divine within us – the intellect – we should not be persuaded [by these men] but should make ourselves immortal, that is, we should separate [the intellect] from passion relating to the mortal living thing and make it immortal and make ourselves like the immortal things, namely the intelligible and intellectual beings. For the happiness that befits the real human being is being made like God.406 But it is the one who has distanced himself from the things of this world and spends his time with the intellectual things who is made like God. Accordingly, we should ‘do everything’ that contributes ‘to living in accordance with intellect’, which is the highest and ‘most excellent’ and most divine ‘of the things in’ us (1177b33–4). It is, then, the one who is being illuminated all around by divine splendour and has overcome his interest in external things and has undone and liberated himself from the unchecked and ungovernable pull towards the body who is living in accordance with intellect.407 ‘For though it is small in bulk, it still greatly excels in terms of its power and dignity’ (1177b34–1178a2).408 ‘Small in bulk’ (1178a1) is equivalent to ‘without magnitude’. What is being said is something like this: we should not think of the most divine thing within us as if it were something that [just] happened [to belong to us] nor should we focus on its partlessness and overlook and denigrate [the intellect] itself as if it were

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trifling. For we must not determine its value and power in terms of its bulk and magnitudes, but rather in terms of its partlessness and incorporeality. For the intellectual and incorporeal substances are incomparably more valuable and more powerful than any bodily nature.

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1178a2 And it would seem that each [of us] even is this.409

Just as a city in the strict sense is, and is said to be, the ruling and leading [element], for example in the democratically ruled city it is the people, since the people are the authoritative [element] in this city, and again in the city ruled by a king the king is, and is said to be, the city, and in the tyrannically ruled city it is the tyrant, so too is the intellect in us the human being in the strict sense. And in the strict sense, Aristotle is Aristotle’s intellect, and Plato’s intellect is Plato, because the intellect in each individual is ‘what has authority’ (1178a3) in each individual and is what is ‘better’, (1178a3) i.e. best. If, then, this is true and our blessedness is seated in the intellect and in its activity of life (zôê), contemplation, why should we disregard our proper life – our proper good – and pursue ‘someone else’s’ (1178a4) life, e.g. that of the man of politics or the man of indulgence?410 ‘And what was said before will fit the present case, too. For what is proper to a nature is most excellent’ (1178a4–6).411 For it was said before in Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in the present book412 that what has been made proper to the nature of each is most excellent and best and most pleasant to each nature, and we said what we could about this topic there.413 But it is entirely clear that what is proper to the nature of horse is most excellent and dear to the equine nature. And similarly, what is most pleasant to the ox’s nature is both preservative and perfective of the ox’s nature. But I discussed these things elsewhere,414 and there is no need to repeat myself. Yet it is clear that what is proper to the nature of the true human being is also most excellent and best and most pleasant to it, and it is our job to seek and discover this, and once discovered, to carry on with this firmly and unwaveringly and to bid farewell to other [pursuits]. And we have heard repeatedly that for the true [human being], our intellect, it is the intellectual activity of life (zôê) and the contemplative life that are most proper. But if the life that is most proper to it is the contemplative life, then the one who is living in accordance with that is happiest, while the one who is living according to the character-­ related and action-­based [virtue] is second and posterior to the former one, because the activities in accordance with virtue of character, too, are human and belong to the politically happy man. 1178a10–14 For we perform just and courageous and the other virtuous actions in relation to one another.

After having said that ‘the activities in accordance with the character [virtues] are human’ (cf. 1178a9–10) (for they belong to the human being composed of soul and body), he establishes this through these [words], by saying that just actions and courageous actions and the other actions that lie ‘in dealings and transactions’ – ‘we perform these in relation to one another’ ‘by preserving what is fitting in our affections’

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(cf. 1178a10–14).415 But the affections, for example, pleasures and pains, belong to the composite of soul and body, and therefore the activities in accordance with the character virtues should also belong to the composite, since they are concerned with pleasures and pains, as we have learned,416 as they provide what is fitting to them [viz. pleasures and pains] and impose a boundary on them; therefore, they are also human. And that the character virtues moderate our affections,417 this we also learned before.418 For it is from courage that we have an impulse towards courageous [actions] and are bold in situations we should be bold in, and we avoid fearful things when we should and in the way we should, and in general, we moderate our fears and our boldness through it;419 while it is from temperance [that we moderate] our pleasures and pains [that arise] through touch,420 and we choose and pursue some of them, while we avoid others. And if we remember anything of what this philosopher said about liberality and magnificence,421 we know that liberality and magnificence moderate our practical actions, in which we are engaged through giving and receiving things.422 And we learned that the being of high-­mindedness and ambition consists in the choice of honours which is proportionate and accords to one’s worth.423 And in addition to these things, we also learned that mildness, on the one hand, is for the due proportion in what concerns anger,424 while justice, on the other hand, is able to preserve our community, since we are by nature political [animals].425 And if this is so, all of the virtuous activities and doings are human and426 second to the rational virtues. Further, if the good human being is said to be – and is – the one who is neither lacking moderation in their affections nor indeterminate in their practical actions related to the affections, then in this way, too, it should be clear that character virtue, by which427 we are called good, and virtuous practical actions are human – if indeed the affections belong to the composite, as has been said.428 1178a14–16 But some [of them] seem also to arise from the body, and virtue of character seems to be properly connected to the affections in many respects.

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And through these words he shows the same thing – I mean [that he shows] that the character virtues and the activities in accordance with the character virtues are human. For there are, he says, some people who are by nature temperate, courageous and just;429 and this belongs to them from their body, that is, from such-­and-such a mixture of the body and from how the elements of the body are combined and put together. Therefore, the activities that follow from them also belong to the composite.430 After having said ‘but some [of them] seem also to arise from the body’ (1178a14), he added ‘and virtue of character seems to be properly connected to the affections in many respects’ (1178a15–16). For it is not the case that every pleasure is properly connected to every activity, as was shown before,431 but rather, as the activities vary and differ in kind, so too were the pleasures that [supervene] on them shown to be different in kind. Likewise, different virtues are properly connected to different affections – pleasures and pains. For it is not every virtue that is properly connected to the pleasure that accompanies giving to whom we should, rather it is liberality; and the virtue proper to the pleasure that accompanies geometrically proportioned distribution is justice,432 and not temperance

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or courage. If, indeed, the character virtues are properly connected to the affections, and if the affections are human, it follows that the character virtues also belong to the composite and not to the real human being.

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1178a16–23 And prudence is yoked together with virtue of character, and this with prudence.

After having shown that the character virtues are human, he shows that prudence, too – for it might seem that prudence, being a virtue of the reasoning part of the soul, is a virtue of the intellect and not of the composite – he shows that this [viz. prudence], too, is not a virtue of the real human being but of the composite. What he is saying will become clear if we recall some of the things that have been demonstrated elsewhere. It has been shown that the virtues mutually entail each other;433 and that for the person in whom any single one of them is present the remaining virtues necessarily follow; and that it is not possible for someone who is courageous with respect to courage of character not to be also temperate and prudent and just, or for someone who is temperate not to be also just, courageous and prudent, or for someone who is prudent not to want and choose what is just as well as what is temperate and courageous; rather, whoever is prudent is automatically just and temperate ,434 and the just person is also prudent and courageous and temperate. Since, then, it has been shown that the virtues mutually entail each other; and since ‘prudence is yoked together with the virtue of character’ (cf. 1178a16–17) – that is, with character virtue – and character virtue with prudence, and both with each other, and it is not possible for them to be separated from each other; and since the character virtues are human, prudence should also belong to the composite. And this is the meaning of what is being said. As far as the text is concerned, after having stated ‘prudence is yoked together with virtue of character, and this with prudence’ (1178a16–17), Aristotle added the reason for this when he states: ‘since the principles of prudence are in accordance with the character virtues’ (1178a17–18). And by ‘principles’ he means the final causes for the sake of which we act and do certain things. For just as the physician’s final cause and that for the sake of which he acts and does everything that he acts and does, is health; and the final principle of the builder is the house, and that of the general is victory, and that of the temperate human being is the proportionate balance in the affections; so too, the correct goals given by the character virtues are the ends of prudence, as was shown when Aristotle discussed prudence,435 and the causes for the sake of which those things were done. For having correct opinions about the ends comes to us from character virtue. For correctly opining that this particular thing here is good (for example, not being unjust, honouring this person, doing what is advantageous to the city) and that this is advantageous and this is just and should be done, and that this is disadvantageous and unjust and should be avoided – having correct opinions about these things and not being mistaken, i.e. not supposing what is not good to be good, comes to us from the character virtues, while discovering the material and the

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instruments and the practical actions and doings, through which the correct goal and the end will come about, comes to us from prudence. Since, then, character virtue indicates the correct goals, while prudence discovers the things that contribute to the successful acquisition of these goals, they should be yoked together. That is how this [should be understood]. But the text that states ‘the correctness of the character virtues is in accordance with prudence’ (1178a18–19) contains some unclarity because something is missing, and the filled-­in [version of the text] would go like this: the correct end, which is known to us to be correct and good from character virtue (for from character virtue we know that [the end] is correct) – this correct end is in accordance with prudence, i.e. it is from prudence that we acquire it. For prudence shows us the things that lead to that end. Furthermore, the [meaning] of the text436 [that reads] ‘Since [the virtues] are tied together with themselves and with the affections [. . .]’ (1178a19–20)437 is something like this: since the virtues are yoked together with prudence, and prudence with the virtues, and since they are not only yoked together with each other but also with the affections, where the affections are human and belong to the composite; then these, too – both prudence and the virtues – should be human. ‘And the way of life’ (1178a21) and the life in accordance with the character virtues and with prudence are human. For they belong to the composite. But the way of life of the intellect belongs to the true and real human being, and the intellectual life is separate from the affections of the composite. Therefore, the true human being’s happiness in accordance with the intellectual life should be different from political happiness. And when Aristotle said: ‘going through this in detail is a greater task than the present one’ (1178a23)438 he was hinting that it is fitting for the theologian to discuss these things. For the intellect belongs to a class of correlated subjects – for it is intellect of the intelligibles (just as sensation is of the sense-­objects) – and the same science is set over correlated subjects, and discussing the intelligibles belongs to theology; therefore, discussing the intellect also belongs to that field [viz. theology].439 1178a23 For [the happiness of the intellect] might seem to stand in little need of external resources, or in less need than the [happiness] of character.440

He has indicated political happiness through ‘the [happiness] of character’. And saying ‘in little [need]’ (1178a24) is identical to saying that [the happiness of the intellect] stands in little need of external resources on the whole. But if, he says, [this person’s needs] are not in all aspects entirely negligible, nevertheless his need of external things is not equal to the politically happy person. This is what the phrase ‘or in less need than political happiness’ indicates.441 For the contemplative happiness does not need as many external things as political happiness does; rather, it stands in need of much less of such things. For both need ‘the necessary [resources]’ (1178a25) equally, as was already said (and I explained why there),442 ‘even though the political person might invest more hard work’ (1178a26–7) than the contemplatively happy person in the necessary [resources] (and whatever else is comparable to the necessary [resources]) and has not distanced himself from them. For the political person has just a slight inclination towards the excess of necessary [resources].

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With respect to the need of necessary [resources] they differ only slightly, while with respect to their proper activities they differ considerably – nearly as much as being differs from non-­being. For the contemplative person needs nothing in order to be active with regard to the intellect and to be occupied with the intelligibles. Just as the healthy eye has no need of anything, providing light is present, in order to see these letters – or no more than raising one’s eyelids, if they should happen to be closed – so too does the contemplative person have no need of anything in order to behold and have immediate contact with the intelligible order. But for the political person qua liberal there is need of money if he is going to perform liberal acts (cf. 1178a28–9); and similarly qua443 just he needs money, in order that he might give to each what they deserve. For it is from their practical actions that the just person and the liberal person are known, and surely not from their saying ‘I want to perform just and liberal actions’. But performing actions without the instruments proper to practical actions is infeasible, and the instruments proper to the just and liberal person qua just and liberal are money. And qua courageous he needs enemies to be present, and qua prudent he, in turn, needs other things. And after Aristotle said ‘for willings (boulêseis) are invisible’ (1178a30), he added the reason for this, saying ‘even those who are not just pretend that they want to act justly’ (1178a31), and we would not call these people just [simply] because they pretend to want [justice]. And that the temperate person also needs some things is clear. For he most of all is liberal. For it is not yet clear whether the one who is acting temperately by keeping away from the pleasures deriving from touch but doing so because he is under the control of an educator or of someone else whom he fears or respects, is really temperate.444

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1178a34 And it is disputed whether choice or practical actions are the more important factor (kuriôteron).

Aristotle said: the temperate person, the courageous person, the just person and the prudent person are known by their practical actions; [yet] because many people act temperately in order to, say, obtain a high position in the church, and others act justly in order to obtain political office, and still others [act temperately or justly] for some other reason, without truly being temperate or just, we were left with the remaining option which was that those who want [to perform] the courageous and temperate [actions] are virtuous; this [statement of the problem] all by itself is not sufficient, [and] it is rightly a matter of dispute. Some determine virtue by one’s act of will (boulêsis) and say that the person who wants (boulomenon) [to perform virtuous actions] is seriously good, while others [determine virtue] by practical action; we should combine both: ‘since virtue lies in both’ (1178a35–b1). For it is the one who wants and performs just actions that is really just, and the same goes for being temperate and courageous. If, then, virtue lies in both, and if performing practical actions requires money, then both the just person and the liberal person will stand in need of money, ‘and the greater and nobler’ (1178b2–3) their practical actions are, ‘the more’ (1178b3) of it is needed by them. But for the contemplative [happy person] not only does [money] fail to contribute anything to the activity, it rather turns out to be an impediment. For [this person] is not

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in need of it in order to be active according to his intellect, but since he is a human being, that is, since his body is still tied to him and he is living together with human beings, ‘he will stand in need of these things, too, in order to practice his humanity’ (1178b6–7),445 that is, in order to perform the appropriate acts towards those who come to him.446 1178b7 And that complete happiness is a contemplative activity of some kind should also be evident from the following.

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This is also proof that447 complete happiness consists in knowledge of the best things, and that the divine things are best is agreed by all. If, then, the greatest and most complete good for human beings is living in happiness, and if it has been shown448 (and will be shown by the present passages) that living in happiness lies in contemplation, then complete happiness should lie in the knowledge and contemplation of the best things, and not in practical and productive action, as political [happiness does]. And this he shows in the following manner. Whatever happiness and blessedness lie in for the divinity, they also lie in this for us – as far as this is possible. For God happiness and blessedness lie in contemplation, therefore happiness in the strict sense lies in contemplation for us, too. That God’s activity and blessedness lies in contemplation and not in practical and productive action, has been philosophically shown in book 12 of the Metaphysics, and Aristotle is showing it here, too, by means of endoxa, when he says ‘we have all been working on the assumption, and believe, that the divinity is living and in activity’ (1178b18–19).449 But each activity is either practical or productive or contemplative. If, then, the divinity is active but is not engaged in practical action or productive action, then the third [option] is left: contemplation (cf. 1178b20–1). But surely the activity of God is most excellent and best and highest, and therefore our activity that is akin to the activity of God is best and highest and complete, [and this is] contemplation. And that the activity of God consists neither in practical action nor in productive action nor in political happiness, but in contemplation, he shows when he says that all character virtues are moderations of the affections, as has been shown;450 yet there are no affections in God; therefore, the character virtues are not in God, either.451 Nor does God require them, and therefore it is not in terms of political happiness that He is happy. For what need would the divinity have of justice? For if justice is making exchanges and repayments in the proper proportions452 and giving back deposits, we would be making ourselves and God look ridiculous (cf. 1178b10–12): we [would be making ourselves look ridiculous] by assuming such things about God; and God [would be made to look ridiculous], if such things robbed Him of His leisure. And what need would He, for whom nothing is dreadful or fearful, have of courage (cf. 1178b12–13)? And what [need would He have] of liberality? For it would be absurd for someone to suppose He had anything to do with money and cash, and with giving these to those whom He ought to give them and receiving these from those from whom He ought to receive them (cf. 1178b13–15). And how is He temperate? Beneath Him and ‘vulgar is this praise’ (1178b16), that is, saying that God has appetites but is in control and is not

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led by His appetite. For this is a disgrace to God and not praise! For how would a God who behaved like this be any different from the [merely] continent and resistant [individuals] (cf. 1178b15–16)?453 When we, then, differentiate all the virtues and the virtuous activities, they appear to us to be trivial and unworthy of the divine nature. ‘But surely we say that the divinity is living and in activity; for we certainly do not say that the divinity sleeps like Endymion’ (1178b18–20).454 Therefore, contemplation is the activity of this divinity, differing in blessedness, value, and nobility from human activities, that is, from the activities of political happiness. And, therefore, [contemplation is] also the activity of the human being – of the true and real human being – which is the activity that is most akin to God’s activity, [being] most blessed and most complete and most constitutive of happiness; while the human, i.e. the political [activity] is second to this one and far down in the descending order.

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1178b24 An indication of this is also that other living things do not participate in happiness, since they are deprived of this sort of activity.455

By ‘this sort of activity’ Aristotle means contemplation, that is, the intellectual life and knowledge of the best and divine things. Once we have gathered together what Aristotle has omitted and what must be mentally supplied from outside the text, Aristotle is saying:456 according to the assumptions about happiness that other philosophers – Epicureans and the later Stoics457 – have made, one can grant a share of happiness to the non-­rational living things, too; yet according to me458 and Plato and all of us who set up happiness in the intellectual life, it is impossible for the non-­rational living things to be happy on this conception, since they are deprived of intellect and rational life.459 One might make a case for it being possible, as Epicurus’ students and the Stoics think, that even the non-­rational living things partake of happiness, by means of the following arguments.460 (1) If feeling good461 is, according to Epicurus, living well, and if living well is, according to Epicurus and the Stoics, the same as being happy, then to be happy is to feel good. And feeling good belongs to the non-­rational living things; therefore, being happy also belongs to them. (2) Again: if living life according to nature is, according to the Stoics, living well, and if living well is, both according to them and according to Epicurus, being happy, then to live life according to nature is to be happy. But surely living life according to nature belongs to the non-­rational living things from their birth to their zenith. Therefore, it is possible for the non-­rational beings to be happy. (3) And it is clear from the musical [non-­rational] living things that feeling good and, through their feeling good,462 living well belongs to the non-­rational living things. For if they were not living according to nature, they would not be fulfilling their proper function by singing in a superlatively continuous manner. For, since they are musical, their natural function is singing: by doing this, i.e. singing, they are living according to nature. And this was, according to the Stoics, living well and being happy. And the superlatively continuous activity [of singing] shows that this singing also belongs to those who are feeling good. For no living thing sings at all when it is in pain, let alone

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sings so continuously. For singing belongs not to those who are in pain but to those who are feeling good or living life according to nature. (4) Again:463 if being happy is, according to the Stoics, the ultimate [aim] of natural desire, in the reaching of which nature possesses its final cause and end, and, having achieved this, has no further longing except to hold onto this good that is proper to it and not to lose it; and if this belongs to non-­rational living things, too; then, non-­ rational living things also partake of happiness. But what is the end of natural desire? Clearly, it is the zenith, which does 464 belong to the development or the deterioration. Both of these – the development and the deterioration – are motions (kinêseis) and are opposed to each other: the development is, as it were, a beginning, and the deterioration is, as it were, an end, and the development, as it were, leads to being, while deterioration leads to non-­being. But surely with contrary motions there must be something in between – the state of rest that is unlike the motions in each of the two directions. For what is unlike the motions is a state of rest. And this state of rest which is in between development and deterioration is said to be the zenith of natural creatures and the end of nature, and once the nature responsible for producing the natural [creatures] has gotten hold of this, it attempts to preserve and hold onto it as its proper good. (By contrast, the underlying nature – matter – destroys the whole, because it does not retain the nature – form. For as we learned in the Physics,465 there is (i) nature, i.e. the underlying matter, and there is (ii) nature, i.e. form, and there is (iii) nature, i.e. the nature that transforms the matter and moves it to the acquisition of form.) Of this sort of happiness,466 then, as we say, even the non-­rational living things partake, but in no way do they partake of the happiness that is determined to lie in intellectual life and the knowledge of the most divine things. For of all living things on earth, only the human being is able to examine by himself the nature of the divine things and to grasp [them] and say what their substance is like, and through the intellectual thinking of them he acquires a kind of likeness467 to them. This is [the commentary] on the content [of this passage]. But we should also look at the text [of the passage]. After having shown that the activity of God is contemplation (cf. 1178b21–2) – for He is Himself what is thinking, is Himself what is being thought, [as] Aristotle says in book 12 of the Metaphysics468 – and after having added that ‘the activity most akin to this one’ (1178b23) also belongs to the real and true human being, he adds ‘an indication’ (1178b24) that the intellectual life, which is happiness, does not belong to the composite, [that is] the political [human being], but to the real and true human being: ‘an indication’ of this is that none of the non-­rational living things partake of this kind of happiness (cf. 1178b24). They do not partake [of this kind of happiness], because they do not partake ‘of this kind of activity’ (1178b25), that is, of intellectual activity. They do not engage in intellectual activity, because they have no share in intellect, which is the true human being.469 1178b25 For the gods their entire life is blessed, but for human beings [life is blessed] to whatever extent that [they have] some kind of likeness [of this kind of activity].470

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If blessedness lies in contemplation and knowledge of the best things,471 then for those who are always continuously contemplating [viz. for the gods] their entire life is always actually blessed, but as for human beings, their life is actually blessed when they are active [in contemplation] but potentially blessed when they are not contemplating.472 The expression ‘to the extent that [they have] some kind of likeness of this kind of activity’ (1178b26–7) [means] something like this:473 the divinity thinks itself and possesses itself. For the object of thought is possessed by the thinking subject and is itself the thinking subject and object of thought, both possessor and possessed. And the contemplatively happy person – the one who is already contemplating and already active – also thinks and possesses the divinity (auto), but not in the same way. For the contemplative person does not apprehend the divinity and intellectually think the divinity in the same way that the divinity intellectually thinks itself;474 accordingly, the contemplatively happy person’s thought and apprehension is ‘some kind of likeness’ (1178b27) and a reflection475 of God’s thought by which He thinks Himself. If so, then it is clear that the blessedness of the contemplatively happy person is also something like God’s blessedness, but it is not the same. ‘Happiness [extends] as far as contemplation extends’ [1178b28–9].476 Either what is being said here is that all living things that are endowed with reason – i.e. all living things in whom an intellect is present that is capable of living in an intellectual manner – are capable of being happy in the strict sense of contemplative happiness; while it is impossible for those living things that have been deprived of this kind of intellect to be happy in the sense of contemplative happiness. Or else, the passage might mean that contemplation and happiness are equal, and that because of this happiness extends over the same duration of time that the activity [of contemplation] extends over. For if happiness goes hand in hand with activity, and if one’s activity is of a duration of, say, six hours, then one’s happiness is also of such a duration – no more and no less. Accordingly, for those who are always active, their happiness will also be co-­ eternal with their eternal activity, while for everyone else their happiness will last as long as the time in which they are active. ‘Not kata sumbebêkos477 but in accordance with (kata) contemplation’ (1178b30–1). Through these words Aristotle is permitting us [to discern] some other meaning of kata sumbebêkos. This term sumbebêkos might mean ‘incomplete’ (atelos), and the meaning [of this entire remark] might be: not in accordance with incomplete happiness, [i.e.] political happiness or the [happiness] that lies in amusement (as it is determined by the powerful and tyrants and people like this who are called happy), ‘but in accordance with their contemplation’ (1178b31), that is, in accordance with happiness in the sense and without qualification. Alternatively, Aristotle might be saying ‘not kata sumbebêkos’ (1178b30–1) instead of saying ‘they will not be happy on account of (di’) anything else but on account of (dia) contemplation itself, i.e. because they occupy themselves with the things that are always the same’. For the one who has received the crown or who has gotten his maintenance at the public’s expense on account of his father’s virtue478 did not attain this honour on account of himself but rather on account of his father, i.e. kata sumbebêkos; whereas the [father] who had shown valour and had attained the crown was crowned on account of himself and not kata sumbebêkos, e.g. not on account of his son being someone who had shown valour. And in the same way,

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contemplation is by virtue of (kata) itself happiness, and the contemplative person is happy by virtue of (kata) this, and not on account of a noble birth or wealth or anything like that. 1178b33 But he will have need of external prosperity, too, since he is a human being.

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This is repeatedly indicated both because Plato says479 that the one who is not accidentally but truly happy is in need of nothing at all and because our body is in flux and easily affected. For it needs to be healthy. For who can be at leisure when he is ill and severely afflicted by an illness? And it needs nourishment, too. For our body is not a simple body. And I have already said what needs to be said about these matters,480 and there is no need to go on about it again. By ‘external prosperity’ (1178b33) Aristotle does not mean a multitude of slaves and money and numerous possessions, rather by ‘prosperity’ he means health and the ready availability of necessary goods, that is, whatever amount of these makes ‘practicing our humanity’ (cf. 1178b7) possible. This is, he says, ‘surely not many and great amounts’ (1179a1). For if it were impossible to live happily without multitudes and plenitudes of external goods, then he would be in need of such things, but since it is possible to live a blessed life even without an excess of these things, he has no need of lots of them. ‘For self-­sufficiency does not lie in excess, and neither does the judgment (1179a3– 4),481 that is, and neither should we judge self-­sufficiency on the basis of material excess. For whoever says that the one who has surrounded himself with a great deal of wealth is self-­sufficient is making dubious and erroneous judgments. Nor should one say that the practical actions performed by482 those possessing a multitude of wealth are conducive to happiness. For it is possible to use even modest means nobly and to perform noble actions from modest means, and in particular to engage in the best activities of the intellect. And it is clear that one can perform noble actions from moderate means (cf. 1179a5). ‘For the private individuals’ (1179a6–7) – these are the ones who possess moderate means and do not hold power or political office – perform more decent practical actions than the rich and the powerful. For they invite strangers into their houses (xenodokhousi) and care for the poor and spend their leisure-­time in temples and perform more acts of liberality. But if [this is true of] these men, then it is much more [so] with the contemplatively happy man, and he will live in an intellectual manner, even though he possesses moderate means, and from these means he will perform virtuous practical actions, when he is practicing his humanity. Aristotle says, then, ‘it is sufficient for this much to be present’ (1179a8), that is, it is sufficient for this much to be present to the happy man himself. For the presence of moderate means suffices for him. For he is able to perform the most noble practical actions even from these [modest means] and483 his blessedness will not be diminished on account of the modesty [of his means], since the determination of blessedness is not found in multitude, either. And for the view that living happily is not found in the multitude and plenitude of external goods but in the decent use of these goods, whether they be few or many, Aristotle even calls on Solon as a witness, who said that happy is not he who has multitudes and amounts [of goods] readily available but he [whose determination]

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is found in both of these things: possessing moderate means (cf. 1179a10–11) and performing the most noble practical actions (cf. 1179a11), while also living temperately (cf. 1179a12). And he said ‘temperately’ (1179a12) instead of ‘while also living in accordance with all the virtues’. 1179a13 Anaxagoras, too, seems to have assumed that the happy man is not rich, nor powerful.

It is Aristotle’s custom after his proofs to introduce both the opinions of the wise and the homegrown agreement of the masses in order to achieve greater conviction on these matters.484 For whenever the arguments on certain matters are in agreement with both the opinions of the wise about those matters and with what the masses say, the truth of the conclusions goes beyond what those [arguments] establish. After having shown, then, that happiness does not lie in the multitude and plenitude of external goods but in closeness to God, he added the opinions of the wise – both Solon and Anaxagoras – to achieve more persuasion. Anaxagoras says: it is not surprising if I am supposed by the many to be strange and unhappy (cf. 1179a14–15).485 The masses called Anaxagoras unhappy since he did not have many [external goods] readily available, even though he was supremely wealthy in terms of contemplation and in reality supremely happy. But since the masses dubiously locate happiness in massive amounts of money and they see Anaxagoras in the possession of moderate means, they defame him as someone unhappy and strange. One should not be surprised, Anaxagoras says,486 that the masses judge me to be unhappy. For they judge the happy in terms of external goods, as they are unable to see the real goods (cf. 1179a15–16). After having said this, Aristotle says: the opinions of the wise regarding happiness, of Solon and Anaxagoras, are consistent with my [that is, Aristotle’s] arguments, which maintain that happiness does not lie in the multitude and plentitude of external goods and that one should not judge the happy man based on these, rather one must specify him on the basis of the whole of virtue. ‘These sorts of things, then, also carry a certain conviction’ (1179a17–18). By ‘these sorts of things’ Aristotle means both the arguments (logoi) that establish that the happy life does not lie in ruling over nations or many cities or the immense sea, but in having moderate possessions and performing the most noble and best practical actions. By ‘these sorts [of things]’, then, he means both these arguments and the opinions of the wise. Indeed, both the arguments and the opinions of the wise have credibility, but the truth is judged on the basis of one’s deeds in the domain of practical action. For if someone says that the one who has moderate possessions and pursues the best [practical actions] is happy and, while saying [this], possesses no more than is necessary and performs the most noble and best practical actions and is wholly committed to contemplation,487 we should be persuaded by this man and say that both he and his claims are most true. But if he says this sort of thing while doing the opposite of what he says – gathering together from all sources gold and silver and still other possessions – this sort of person is revealed to be a liar and a cheat, as what he says is not in agreement with what he does. This is the force of what Aristotle is saying.

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And ‘we should assume to be words’ (1179a22) is equivalent to: we should assume to be empty chatter poured into the air and, if it is rather necessary to put it more clearly, inarticulate and completely unintelligible noise. 1179a22 The one who is active according to his intellect and who cultivates it and who is in the best condition seems also to be the supremely god-­loved.488

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Supremely god-­loved is he whom God loves. For the one dear (philos) to God (theô) is god-­loved (theophilês). Having shown that the contemplatively happy man is best and greatest and most self-­sufficient and all the other things that have been said, Aristotle [now] shows that he is also supremely god-­loved. He says that if the divinity cares for human beings and provides for them, as seems to be the case to those who are best at philosophy and as seems to be true, it is reasonable for God to take the greatest enjoyment in the best and most akin. And the best and most akin to God is our intellect. For the divinity is gladdened by all His creations, as they are exceedingly noble, but most of all by the intellect, since it is most akin. The intellect is akin not with respect to its substance but in the sense that it is able to verge towards itself and to have a vision of itself and by means of the reversion and convergence towards itself to raise itself up to the divinity that loves it and to make itself divine and as much as possible to become like [God].489 The intellect of each of us is, then, akin to God by virtue of the likeness of its activity. For God thinks Himself, and we think ourselves, whenever we come to rise above the faculty of representation.490 If, then, our intellect is akin to God, it is reasonable that God loves those who love and value that which is akin to Him and rewards them. And the one who loves the intellect that is akin to God is the one who has embraced the entirety of virtue; who has fled the many forms of desires and the connatural (suntrophous) senses, as these deceive rational thought, and the representations, as they involve sensible forms and are particular and introduce such an incredible amount of multifariousness;491 who has turned away from opinions, as they are themselves multifarious and lead us to the external [world] and are mixed together with sensation and representation – for every opinion acts with non-­ rational sensation and representation;492 who has ascended to knowledge and intellect, and after this to the intellectual life and the simple intuitions, and having come to be here receives the illuminations from there and is filled with immaculate light. But what is the reward with which the divinity rewards those who cultivate the intellect that is akin to Him? The clearer illumination of the light of its knowledge and the more perfect union (sunaphê)493 to it and the supreme vision (epopteia)494 of the intellectual orders. Therefore, the wise man is god-­loved. For if we love those who love our children and kin, how can it not be that all-­beneficent God loves those who love what is akin to Him? After having said that the wise man is god-­loved because he loves what is akin to Him, [Aristotle] clarifies what this valuing and love is by introducing ‘performing correct and noble practical actions’ (1179a29), as if he had said ‘loving the intellect is nothing other than doing good deeds and being active according to all the virtues, those in practical action and in reason’.

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‘That all of these [attributes] belong to the wise man is evident’ (1179a29–30).495 By 5 ‘all of these’ [Aristotle] means all the [attributes] that he mentioned about happiness: self-­sufficiency, freedom from weariness, caring for one’s own proper intellect, god-­ loved and all the other [attributes] he mentioned. Perhaps these belong to the politically happy person who lives according to virtue of character, but they belong most of all and indisputably to the one living in an intellectual manner. Consequently, the political man might be god-­loved and happy, but the contemplative man is supremely god-­ 10 loved and supremely happy. 1179a33 If, then, enough has been said about these [matters], i.e. (kai) (cf. 609,4), the virtues, and further about friendship and pleasure . . .?496

After having filled the entire discussion about the character and rational virtues with the present lines of text and their contents, he tries to persuade us to act according to these virtues. For bare words and the bare knowledge gained by means of their content are not able to render us happy, neither politically nor contemplatively; they are [in this regard] rather wholly inefficacious and without power. For words do have the power to exhort497 those young people who are liberal and have been reared and brought up correctly towards practical actions, but they are unable to lead [them] to happiness and its attainment. And those who spend their lives in an excellent city are reared and brought up correctly, and the city of this sort is the one that that uses the laws that are seriously good in the highest degree and that is governed by decent customs. And if the end – the best of the human goods – is living happily, and if it is impossible to acquire this without acquiring the virtues, and if it is impossible for someone who spends his life in a city that uses wretched laws and customs to acquire these [virtues] and become wholly seriously good, it is reasonable, if not necessary,498 to discuss which constitutions are flawed and which ones are governed correctly, as well as which of the correctly governed ones is the best one and which laws it ought to have. The entire goal (skopos) and objective (prohairesis), then, of the text from here on out until the end of the book is this, I mean, to show that after the treatise about all the virtues it is necessary to draft constitutions and discuss the laws – what kind of laws are fitting to what kind of constitution, i.e. what kind of laws are able to preserve it, and what kind can destroy it. Therefore, after these books it is necessary for the one who wants to become complete with respect to human philosophy, i.e. [who wants to become] a politically happy man, to read Aristotle’s Constitutions, which is what comes next. This, then, [is what I have to say] about [the meaning] of these lines. As for the details of the text, they might be as follows: ‘Here’s a question’, he says, ‘since enough has been said about [. . .] the virtues in outlines’ (1179a33–4),499 that is to say ‘in a general manner’ (katholou) and, as Aristotle said at the beginning of the book, ‘roughly’ (pakhulôs, 1094b20) – for he has been drawing conclusions from [premises] that are possible and that [obtain] for the most part500 – should we assume that [the investigation] ‘has reached an end’ (1179a34) and that in order to achieve happiness we need to do nothing other than read these books?501 On the contrary, ‘as is said’ (1179a35) concerning such discourses (logoi) whose end is not bare knowledge (as is the case with the discourse that shows that the sun is bigger than the earth) but rather practical

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action and deeds, understanding their contents is not sufficient; rather, one must also be committed to practical actions and works. If, then, in all the other cases where the end is not bare knowledge but practical action, we choose the discourses because of the practical action, and if the end of the discourses about the virtues is practical action, we should attempt to engage in practical action to whatever extent we have been instructed to do so. For what good (semnon) is knowing what courage or justice is, if one is not going to perform courageous and just actions? Such is the content [of these lines of text]; as for the text itself: ‘Or else we become good in some other way, if there is one’ (1179b3–4)502 has been added as if he were saying: ‘If it is by using the virtues that we become good, then we must use them; but if there is some other way [for us to become good], we must search for it; but in any case we must use those means by which we will be good’. 1179b4 If, then, discourses were sufficient by themselves for the production of decent persons . . .503

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If, then, listening to discourses and understanding their contents alone were sufficient ‘for (pros) noble excellence’ (1179b10),504 those who buy ethical treatises would bring and give ‘many and fat fees’, as Theognis says (cf. 1179b5–6),505 to those who write them. But in reality [discourses], as has been said,506 are able to exhort and to produce a kind of pull507 ‘towards (pros) noble excellence’ (1179b10), ,508 he adds whom [discourses] are able to motivate towards virtuous practical actions: not everyone but ‘those young people who are liberal’ (1179b8). And by ‘liberals’ here (1179b8) he means those who have not been enslaved by softness509 and licentiousness and who were, on the contrary, soundly brought up by educators or relatives,510 and who through this decent upbringing have become easily amenable and easily motivated towards practical actions in accordance with virtue.511 [Discourses] can certainly serve to exhort young people who fit this description, and, when coupled with practical action, they 512 their ‘character noble-­minded and truly loving of nobility’, in which case [their character] is ‘katakôkhimon by virtue’ (1179b9).513 And by ‘virtue’ here Aristotle does not mean the virtues in the strict sense – temperance, courage, justice – but the disposition or state in them that arises from their excellent upbringing and decent rearing, in accordance with which they were brought up by their educators, fathers or one of their relatives. The term ‘katakôkhimon’ indicates a state of fullness (to plêres), e.g. so-­and-so is full (katakôkhimon) of wisdom; it also [indicates] a state of possession and mastery, e.g. so-­ and-so is in possession of (katakôkhimon) the virtues; it also indicates a state of submission and amenability, and this is the sense of katakôkhimon that Aristotle has adopted here. And what he means is that the character that has arisen is easily led and easily amenable to following what is rightly said. And once [their character] has become such [viz. katakôkhimon] ‘from virtue’ (1179b9), that is, from a most sound upbringing, discourses are able to motivate them to practical actions and, together with the practical actions, and to render [their

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character] ‘noble-­minded’ (1179b8) and ‘loving of nobility’ (1179b9), i.e. to make it love what is noble and to hasten towards the acquisition of these things.514 For those who have been educated and habituated to keep away from what is bad immediately run towards good things as soon as they hear discourses advising them to do so, whereas ‘discourses are unable to exhort the masses towards noble excellence’ (1179b10).515 For these [people] are not easily amenable. For those who received a bad upbringing and have no ‘conception’ (ennoia) (1179b15) at all of what is noble, do not even submit to listening to those exhorting them towards what is noble, let alone be persuaded by them. For towards that which is completely unknown to us, we are either not drawn at all, or else only by [threat of] violence. That’s why those who were brought up soundly, having acquired a sense of shame from their sound upbringing, obey authority516 – for they are ashamed not to follow what is rightly said and not to keep away from what is badly said – whereas the masses, even if they do at times reject what is bad and verge towards what is noble, they are not doing this out of a sense of shame (aidos)517 but because of fear or punishments deriving518 from law (cf. 1179b11–13). For those who live in their passions have no sense of shame; rather, they shamelessly pursue passionate and brutish pleasures and avoid, as has been said many times,519 the contrary pains. For alcoholics (philoinoi) pursue the pleasures derived from drinking and avoid the pains that come from not drinking.520 And quite simply all bad people, on account of their ignorance of what is noble and truly pleasant, pursue bodily pleasures without any restraint. And it has been said many times over that virtuous activities are truly pleasant.521 Now, as regards those who are in such a bad condition and without any restraint pursue passionate pleasures, no one, Aristotle says, could ever use rational discourse to change the rhythm of their lives (metarruthmiseie, cf. 1179b16) and to lead them away from the pull towards what is bad. For to free people from vice who have been bound to bad customs for a long time is impossible, or not easy (cf. 1179b16–18). For even when ‘all those [conditions] are met’ (1179b18–19), e.g. a seriously good rearing, venerable upbringing, a sense of shame, [an act of] persuasion [by discourse], [it is] not at all easy to gain a share in virtue, and if we should attain virtue, we should rejoice. And what chance do we have to participate in virtue, when all the opposite conditions obtain? 1179b20 And some people think that we become good by nature, some by accustomation, others by teaching

Learning about the natures of the virtues and their common features and differences and further acquiring them by accustomation is genuinely in our power and belongs to our will (boulêsis) and power of choice, but becoming temperate, just [and] prudent by nature does not belong to us but is a gift from God, one most noble and valuable. ‘The contribution by nature, then’ (1179b21), does not belong to us but is a divine gift, yet it belongs to us to habituate ourselves to experience pleasure and pain where we should. And this kind of accustomation has the power to make us good. ‘Although argument and teaching do not have power in all cases’, (1179b23–4), as has been said,522 [it does have power] in the case of those ‘who have been prepared beforehand by

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customs’ (cf. 1179b24–5), which is to say, in the case of those who have been prepared by decent upbringing. We, then, must be prepared for the reception of verbal [instruction], ‘just like the earth’ (1179b26). For just as the earth bears fruit when it has been prepared beforehand, but when it has not been prepared beforehand, it bears thorns and destroys the fruit that had been sowed,523 so too, if our soul has not received its preparatory treatment and cast off false opinion, either it will not be receptive to the truth, or if it should perhaps happen to receive it, it will have been in vain. The wretched, then, will not submit to verbal instruction, but only to violence and force (bia kai anangkê). And you see how Aristotle, by these arguments, is hinting at what I was saying before, namely that it is necessary to draft constitutions that treat how the citizens living there are supposed to become good.524 ‘There should already be present beforehand the character that in a way is proper’ to the virtues (1179b29–30), that is, [a character] that is suitable for receiving the discourses about the virtues, and once it has received them, it should attend to them, just as some plot of earth, once it has been prepared beforehand [and received the seeds], should produce much fruit. And a character of this sort will come to be ‘from the correct upbringing’ (1179b31). But it is ‘difficult’ for someone who was not ‘reared under laws’ (1179b32) that are correct and under such a constitution to be brought up correctly. ‘For living temperately’ (1179b32–3) and not yielding to the pleasures to which one ought not yield, are not pleasant to the masses, but painful. For emancipating them from these pleasures is hateful for them. ‘That is why laws must be ordered’ (1179b34)525 that stipulate their upbringing from infancy onwards, one that will make their characters suitable for not experiencing any frustration in this emancipation from bad pleasures. And if this must be the case, then it is necessary to draft constitutions and laws. And after stating ‘That is why laws must be ordered’,526 Aristotle added ‘for what we become accustomed to will not be painful’ (1179b35–1180a1).527 For if they are forced by the laws and the enforcers of the law to perform noble actions and perseverance528 with respect to pleasure, this perseverance will not be painful to them, since they were already habituated to bear their lives nobly. For nothing that we become accustomed to is painful. 1180a1 But perhaps it is not enough that they get rearing and fosterage when they are young529

What Aristotle is saying is something like this: there is not only need for those laws which give instructions on the children’s upbringing, but also for laws that declare what things the ‘adults’ (1180a2) should do. For it is clear that some things are the right pursuits for the young and others for men, and still others for those who are past their prime. There is a need, then, both for such laws, and moreover [for laws] 530 how one must spend one’s whole life. ‘For the masses are obedient to authority more on account of force and penalty than on account of discourse’.531 That is why there is need of laws that force people by means of penalties to do good and avoid doing bad. And, he says, since the masses obey authority because they are penalized and punished, it is agreed, he says, that the legislators additionally write into law: ‘I order the citizens to

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perform these practical actions “for the sake of the noble” (1180a7) and for the sake of becoming seriously good, and if they should not abide, let them be punished: this punishment for this act of disobedience, and that punishment for that one. But whoever, even after having been punished, remains “incurable” (1180a9–10), is to be expelled from the city’. We should, then, he says, flog bad people like donkeys (for this is what Aristotle means by ‘beasts of burden’ (cf. 1180a12); for let the flog educate the one whom discourse cannot educate), and impose pains on them ‘that are contrary to the pleasures they love’ (1180a13–14). For ‘the contraries are cures for contraries’;532 for example, if someone enjoys insolent behavior, you must cause him pain, not by means of [corporal] punishment, but by preventing him from behaving in an insolent manner, and similarly you must cause the one who enjoys alcohol pain by keeping him away from wine.533

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1180a14 If, then, as has been said,534 the one who is to become good in the future must be reared in a sound manner . . .

And these are the things he says about it being necessary to lay down laws that exhort those who are easily amenable to virtue, while forcing the tough and defiant characters to keep away from what is bad and to be committed to what is best. And the apodosis of the argument is this: ‘the law has a power to force, being a speech-­act (logos) that derives from prudence and intellect’ (1180a21–2).535 And everything in between536 is concluding that there is a need to lay down laws for the upbringing of the children and of everyone else. And, to sum up, what he is saying in the present lines of text is something like this: since the ultimate end of human and political wisdom is that the citizens become good and live happily, and this comes to be from their ‘having been brought up’ and reared ‘soundly and doing nothing bad, neither voluntarily nor involuntarily’537 (for those who have been deceived by some bad peers and have been swept downhill do bad things involuntarily),538 and since a rearing which is sound in this sense comes about for those who accomplish their life in accordance with intellect (cf. 1180a18), we require intellect so that, by following its counsels and orders, we might live the most noble life. And it is customary for Aristotle to use the label ‘intellect’ for everyone who excels, be it in terms of art or prudence or experience or prognosis or discovery of what is noble and advantageous. We require intellect, then, in order to become noble and excellent. But the ‘paternal’ intellect, that is, each person’s father, is able to provide instruction in what is noble – unless, I suppose, he is a bad person and one of those who follow the herd – and [is able] to persuade those sons539 of his who are being brought up soundly to proceed to practical action, but as concerns [his sons with] bad characters, he is feeble and impotent, i.e. he does not possess ‘the threat of force’ (1180a19–20), that is, the threat of violence, as the law does. For his natural love [of his son] undermines his [impulse to do] violence against his son.540 And why are we talking about the father? For in general no one man is able to serve as a threatening force over all children of a whole city, unless, I suppose, he is

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a king or tyrant, and these are able to do this on account of an abundance of power. But since not all cities are ruled by a king or a tyrant, we need laws. For every ‘law has a power to force, being a speech-­act that derives from a certain prudence and intellect’ (1180a21–2), and here Aristotle has used ‘prudence’ and ‘intellect’ interchangeably. For prudence, i.e. the intellect that is concerned with practical actions, is accumulated from great experience,541 and when he discussed prudence,542 he said that we should accept the views of the old and experienced as our principles. For they have gained an ‘eye’ from their experience,543 and here by ‘eye’ Aristotle means prudence, by virtue of which they can anticipate what is advantageous. Human beings, then, obey the laws when they believe that the legislators have laid them down by virtue of this ‘eye’ that is able to anticipate what is noble and advantageous. 1180a22 And they hate those people who oppose their impulses . . .

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Having said that the command of a single human being does not carry the threat of violence (to biaion) and cannot exercise force (anagkazein), whereas the masses clearly do have the power to do this [with their commands], †† [the individual] to lead by persuasion towards better activities.544 For biazesthai545 in the strict sense is to be persuaded by words rather than by the flog and by all sorts of ill-­treatments.546 For those who are punished and ill-­treated in manifold ways surely do not yield, rather they resist and remain defiant. He said both this, and also that no one who does anything involuntarily or because he is being pained is actually doing what he truly ought to do, and that accordingly the one who did noble things under the threat of violence (bia) would never become good, whereas the one who has been persuaded by words that he should pursue virtue and perform virtuous acts and avoid the ill-­treatment of others, this person obviously will also be performing noble [acts] voluntarily and by doing so will be good.547 But why do ‘they hate those people who oppose their impulses’ (1180a22–3) and who prevent them from approaching the things that are pleasant to them? Well, because they were brought up badly and on account of their wretched rearing they think bad things are good, and so they assume that it is out of ill-­will or hate that those who oppose them are obstructing them [from their goals], and not out of some kind of affection and love. For no one who loves obstructs the one he loves and leads this person away from what is good.548 They hate the people who prevent and restrain them from advancing towards what is bad because they believe people bear ill-­will against them. The law, by contrast, is not burdensome for them for the contrary reason (cf. 1180a23–4). For it is impossible for them to suppose that the law orders these things because it bears ill-­will towards them or hates them. For how could a law that was established, say, five hundred years ago, [bear ill-­will towards someone today]? And this is why [in this case] people have a natural ability to think deductively and say: ‘Either the legislator has drafted these laws because he bears ill-­will towards us or hates us, or else because he is working with our best interests in mind. Well, it is certainly not because he bears any ill-­will.

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For how can he bear ill-­will towards people who have not even been born yet, given that he does not even know that they are going to be born? Therefore, [the legislator] drafted these laws with the best interests of all people in mind – both of those alive then and of those who will be born later’. This, then, is why the law is not burdensome (cf. 1180a23–4). 1180a24 Indeed, it is only in the city of Sparta, along with a few [other cities], that the legislator appears to provide fosterage . . .549

What [Aristotle] is effectively saying goes something like this: If laws were laid down in [our] cities that decree how we should foster the young in order that they might become noble and excellent, and if these laws had been laid down correctly and contained no flaws at all or no major flaws, there would be no need to seek any further; on the contrary, these laws would be sufficient. But since this is not the case and it is only in the constitution of the Spartans and a few other cities – Aristotle is going to tell us which ones in the third and fourth books of the Constitutions550 – since, then, ‘it is only in the constitution of the Spartans, along with a few other cities, that the legislator’ (cf. 1180a24–5) decrees how the children should be fostered, that is, how they should be educated, while in other cities this has been neglected, as is also the case in this city of Constantine the Great (viz. in Constantinople),551 and ‘each person lives as he wishes’ (1180a27–8) and brings up his own child as he pleases – [these people] not taking any account of laws,552 just like the Cyclopes in Homer’s Odyssey553 – ‘by governing’, that is to say, by ruling like a king ‘over children and’ wife (1180a28–9) – for their own will was said to be their law; since, then, the above is the case, we must discuss these matters and draft constitutions. For [even] the [constitution] of the Spartans and that of the Cretans and of others, as he will show in the Constitutions,554 are all flawed, and the laws laid down in these [constitutions] require no small correction. After having said this, he adds ‘it is most excellent’ (1180a29), i.e. best, to lay down laws that are correct and provide ‘public fosterage’ (1180a29) for the children, but if the ‘public fosterage’ has been neglected – either because laws that make this decree have not been laid down, or because they have been laid down but are disregarded due to the laissez-­faire attitude of the city’s rulers – it is fitting for each to eagerly foster his or her own children and friends, in order that they might be rendered noble and excellent. For he made this clear by saying ‘to contribute to virtue’ (1180a32). And the one who ‘contributes to virtue’, i.e. makes a contribution, this is the person who puts noble things in view and teaches them that this harms for this reason, and that that is beneficial, even if it does not seem so, for that reason. In addition, the person who, being in possession of virtue himself, gives to the person who does not have it what he needs to acquire virtue, both character and rational [virtue] – this person also is making a contribution to virtue. We should, then, he says, make our contribution [to virtue], but if this is not possible [at present], then we should choose and will to offer our help and to make our contribution in the future, should the possibility ever arise.

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1180a32 But from what has been said it would appear that someone who has become skilled in legislating is able to do this best.555

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By ‘skilled in legislating’ he means the person who possesses an intellectual understanding derived from theory (logos) and experience, and who is able to see in advance what is noble and just and advantageous for the whole city and for each individual considered in isolation. What he is saying is this: ‘from what has been said’ (1180a33), i.e. from what we have been saying, it has become clear to those who are able to understand what has been said that the person who can contribute [to the acquisition of virtue] for his own children (cf. 1180a31–2) is someone who is ‘skilled in legislating’ (1180a33). Alternatively, Aristotle might be saying that ‘from what has been said’ it is clear that whoever is ‘skilled in legislating’ (1180a33) is able to know what sort of laws should be established concerning the public fosterage and education of [all our] children, as well as what sort of laws [should be established] concerning the pursuits of those who have reached manhood and what sort of laws for our entire life, and which ones are advantageous to each person individually and which ones are for the benefit of all citizens, men and women. And that some [laws] are a good fit for the democratically ruled city, and others for the aristocratic city, and yet others for the timocratic city, and still others for the city ruled by a king, and which ones are which – Aristotle is going to tell us [all of this] in his Constitutions.556 And that those who live according to these laws become good from decent laws and bad from bad laws, this, too, is clear. Being able to distinguish which laws are decent and which are bad belongs to the person skilled in legislation, just as it belongs to the physician to separate what makes us sick from what makes us healthy. What he effectively means by saying this is that the laws make a major contribution to whether the citizens become good or bad. But this contribution has nothing to do with whether they ‘have been written down or are unwritten’ (cf. 1180a35–b1). For it is practical actions that are able [to lead] ‘towards noble excellence’ (1179b10) or vice, and not the fact that what must be done or not done has been written down or not. And our common customs would be unwritten laws. ‘Nor, indeed,557 whether one person or many are to be educated through them’ (1180b1–2). The decency and correctness of the laws makes some major contribution to whether citizens become seriously good persons, and our considerations should be directed at ending up with laws that are faultless. But considering, he says, whether the law that is able to make one person good can also render many such, and whether the law that is beneficial to many is also such to one – there is no distinction to be made here. For if [the law] is correct and altogether unerring,558 the result will be the same as with the other arts and sciences, and with the experts in these arts and sciences. For just as whoever is able to teach one person and make one person a finished musician or physician can also do so for many people, and conversely whoever can do this for many people can also do it for one, so too is the law that is able to render one person seriously good also able to render many people such, and vice versa.

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‘For just as the laws and customs have power in cities, so too does what fathers say [have power] in households’ (1180b3–5).559 We must examine how, after Aristotle just stated above that paternal commands have no power (cf. 1180a18–21), he can now say that they bear a power equal to that of the laws and customs.560 To this we must reply that when he said above that [paternal commands] have no power, he was talking about the masses and those who live wretched lives, but here he is talking about people with a sound upbringing.561 Alternatively (ê), we must reply that above Aristotle did not say that [paternal commands] have no power at all but that they do not possess ‘a threat of power’ (1180a19), and by ‘a threat of power’ he meant ‘the threat of force and violence’ (to anankastikon kai biaion).562 For because of the natural affection [that the father feels for his son] no father exercises violence (biazetai) against his son and attempts to punish him in the way the law does; rather, the punishments that he brings to bear are much less [harsh]. Nor again does anyone cower before and fear his father as he does the law. Therefore, the father’s command has no power in the way that the law surely does. And [what Aristotle is saying] is something like this. And the present segment of text advises us not to entirely surrender the upbringing of our own children to public fosterage of children; rather, it advises that we, too, should ourselves take a serious interest in this matter and make [our children] ideally suited for and receptive to the public course of education, too. ‘Just as, then, the laws and the customs have power in cities, so too does what fathers say in the household’ have force with regard to [the child’s] apprehension of what is noble (cf. 1180b3–5).563 For the son is ashamed of not obeying his father, especially when his father is seriously good with respect to these things and a doer of noble deeds. And that is why, then, the father’s instructions (logoi) do have power: both ‘because of his kinship and because of564 [his father’s] acts of beneficence’ (1180b5–6). For everyone respects [their] benefactor. For no one experiencing this beneficence would suspect that it is out of ill-­ will and hate that his benefactor is leading him away from what appears noble but is not [really] noble. We obey, then, our relatives and benefactors because they love us. And of all people, our father is not only most closely related to us, but also most beneficent. For the greatest of the goods, our existence, we have from our fathers.565

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1180b7 And further the individual forms of education even excel the public ones

And through these [arguments] Aristotle exhorts fathers not to rely on public fosterage and to make their own contributions, too, and the force of what Aristotle is saying might be [as follows]. Fathers should compensate for the deficiency of the law. For the law is concerned with universals, while practical actions are concerned with individuals, where there is a great deal of indeterminacy.566 For just as in the medical art [the physician] does not always follow the universal [guidelines], but there are some cases in which he disregards [the universal guidelines], and in which the universal theory says one thing but the physician does something else on account of some particular experience; so too [in law:] what is prescribed by the law should not be applied universally. For the law says: ‘It is a capital offence for an alien to ascend the city wall while the city is being guarded on all sides by its enemies’. But no one in their right

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mind will kill the alien who has ascended the wall and fought heroically.567 Again, the law says that one should punish the thief, but only a madman would punish the one who did this out of great need and as a last resort, being neither able to work as a slave nor receiving any handouts from anyone. And again, medical theory universally maintains that all who have a fever resulting from putrefaction are benefitted by rest and refraining from eating (cf. 1180b9), but someone will nevertheless be found who is not benefitted by refraining from eating. It should come as no surprise, then, that the law also says that we should bring up and educate all children in a particular way and that yet some [children] are found who cannot bear the kind of upbringing and the kind of military training that the Spartans are recorded [to have legislated] – poking at each other with swords in the nude.568 Who, then, would attempt to subject these people to a thorough military education like this? Nobody, I think. Rather, by setting aside common law and public fosterage, [one] advances towards the fosterage that is commensurate and corresponds to their nature. And it is the one who knows the child’s nature who will arrive at this [commensurate] fosterage. And the father, if he is seriously good, knows what [his child] can be committed to, and for what kinds of lessons [his child] is naturally well suited,569 and what kinds of lessons the child is not suited for, including the size of the lessons. For example, if someone is able to recite thirty lines of Homer by heart and not more, [the father] cannot force him to deliver over thirty lines, and if fifty lines is his limit, then not over fifty. The individual approaches to education, then, are different from the public ones. And we should not only know what is universally the case – that this particular bit is advantageous to all children and that one must teach this particular bit to all children – but we should also know what is fitting for each child’s nature and what they are suited to, and it is in that direction that we should be leading the [child] whose education cannot conform entirely to the law’s universal decree. But who will be able to do that better than the father? And that not everyone should be subordinated to the universal is clearly illustrated by boxing trainers: ‘For not even the boxing trainer arranges the same fight for all of his boxers’ (cf. 1180b10–11),570 but for one [student-­boxer he arranges] a more intense fight – both more difficult and longer in duration – and for the other [student-­boxer he arranges] a fight that is less intense and shorter in duration. 1180b11 And it would seem that proficiency is best achieved571 in the particular case (to kath’ hekaston), if fosterage is individualized.572

He has said ‘the particular case’ (to kath’ hekaston) instead of ‘a particular individual’ (heis hekastos). And he says that a boxer, let’s say, should become more proficient, when he obtains individualized fosterage, that is, when he fights in fights commensurate to his [abilities] and that are fitting to his own nature. For especially the athletic trainer573 would better preserve the health of the [athlete] whom he trains in a measure commensurate [to that athlete’s nature] than would the trainer who orders much more or less exercise; and the [teacher] who orders [a student] to recite what he is capable of would render him more proficient in reading and writing than the [teacher] who

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orders much more or less [of him]; and surely the one who orders each person to engage in those virtuous activities that are commensurate to that person would better render that person good and seriously good. But the one who simply arranges the same fights for everyone or who assigns the same exercises or who forces them to recite [the same text], this person would never render all of these people – neither those who are boxing nor those who are doing exercises or learning – proficient in boxing or in reading and writing.574 And Aristotle is not saying anything like this: it should be the case with reading and writing that both those with natural talent and those who lack natural talent, by learning in a way that is commensurate to their own natures, will become equally proficient at reading and writing in the same amount of time. For it is clear that those who are naturally more talented should both achieve proficiency faster and become more proficient. Rather, Aristotle is saying something like this: the one who lacks natural talent, if he is being fostered as he should, should proceed towards proficiency and that level of perfection that his nature can bear, but if he should not attain the befitting fosterage, he might not attain such proficiency or perfection. Therefore we must know each person’s nature and provide what is proper to it.

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1180b13 But the best fosterage of the individual case (tou kath’ hena) is provided by a physician, and by an athletic trainer575

The text has been transmitted in two ways: one has ‘of the individual case’ (tou kath’ hena), and the other has ‘of the universal case’ (tou kath’ holou). After having said that the one who knows the individual case576 brings about proficiency, Aristotle adds that the one who knows the universal would provide the best fosterage for each individual.577 For when one proceeds from the universal, one is in the best position to know how – for the most part – the individual case will be, too. For the one who knows what is advantageous for every hot and dry nature also knows what is advantageous for this particular nature; and the one who knows which pursuit is advantageous to a child of any age, also for the most part knows which one is advantageous to each individual child. And this is what he might mean by the text: ‘But the fosterage of the individual case (tou kath’ hena) would be provided [. . .]’ (1180b13–14).578 And the passage ‘the one who universally knows what [is] for everyone’ (1180b14– 15) is incomplete.579 For it leaves out the word ‘is advantageous’, and we must mentally supply this word to render the whole phrase as follows: ‘the one who universally knows what is advantageous for everyone’. But all of us who pursue the sciences know that they teach what is common [to all cases]. For the medical [science] does not teach what is advantageous for Socrates but what is advantageous for every temperament that is like Socrates’, for example, for every hot and dry temperament; and [it teaches] what [is advantageous] for every old person and not what [is advantageous] for Parmenides.580 The one who knows the universal, then, would also provide fosterage in the individual case. Yet nothing prevents some individual who is ignorant of the universal

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from providing fosterage for some individual, if he knows from experience what is beneficial and what is harmful to this person (cf. 1180b16–18). There are even some people who help themselves more than physicians do because they know from experience what keeps them healthy. Therefore, the father who knows from experience what sort of exercises are beneficial for his son might also train him better than the athletic trainer. And such a person will differ from the one who knows the universal, insofar as the one who knows the universal could cure many people and could train many people in an irreproachable manner, whereas this person [could] only [cure or train] the person about whom he knows from experience that this person is benefitted by such and such and harmed by such and such. And the case of children’s upbringing, then, is just like the above cases. The one who knows the universal, that is, the law, could foster many [children], while everyone else [could foster] the one child for whom he knows what he responds well to and what he is directed towards in an unburdensome manner, and what he does not abide to and causes him discomfort, as well as by what discourses and practical actions he is naturally drawn to these things. The above pertains to the text that has ‘of the individual case’ (tou kath’ hena). As for the text that has ‘of the universal case’ (tou katholou), Aristotle might be saying: the one who knows the universal concerning children or those in the prime of life or even all citizens – a law – would provide universal fosterage for everyone. Therefore, ‘the one who wants to become skilled in a theory (theôretên), that is, skilled in an art (êtoi tekhnikon),581 must go to the universal’ (cf. 1080b20–1), that is to say, go to the accounts that teach the universal, for example, that this particular [remedy] is advantageous to everyone suffering a fever resulting from putrefaction.582 The one who wants to foster the whole city, then, must go to these universal accounts and to the laws. And the [passage] ‘and one must know as it is possible’ (1180b22)583 might mean that our understanding of these things must reflect that we should not always be acting according to what is stated in them but that [we should be doing so] for the most part, because their subject matter is also not always the same and unchanging.584 1180b23 And, perhaps, the person who wants to make [people] better by providing fosterage, whether many people or few585

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For just as the one skilled in reading and writing, the skilled boxer and the skilled physician are able to render both many and few [people] either literate, or skilled in boxing, or healthy, so too does the one who knows the universal, that is the laws that have been laid down correctly, have the power to render citizens good, both many and few. Therefore, the one who wants to render citizens good must attempt to become skilled in legislating (cf. 1180b24–5), and by ‘skilled in legislating’ he means someone who is able to lay down correct and unerring laws.586 And it is evident that the one who is able to do this is also able to distinguish between the best established laws and those laws that are not best. For ‘managing’ (diatheinai), that is judging (krinai)587 whether this law is sound or not, is not the

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task of any chance person but of the person with knowledge (cf. 1180b26–7).588 And by ‘the person with knowledge’ Aristotle means the one who is politically wise and wise in terms of human wisdom. And the person who fits this description, as he will tell us in the Constitutions,589 is the one who knows how many forms of constitutions there are, and which one is flawed, and which is the best constitution, and what things preserve or destroy each of them, and what kind of constitution, when destroyed, changes into what kind – for example, whether the destruction of democracy gives rise to timocracy or aristocracy. And this person, then, is the politician, and this same person is skilled in legislating, too. For the legislative [art] is a part of the political [art]. And the [passage] ‘just as in the case of the equestrian [art]’590 [means] something like this: just as the one who is in the possession of the equestrian art is able to render horses noble and excellent, so too is the one skilled in legislating able to make [people] good. 1180b28 Of course (ar’ oun), after this, we must examine whence and (ê) how one might become skilled in legislating

The [particle construction] ar’ oun (1180b28) is confirmatory (apophantikon).591 Aristotle is saying that since it is the task of the one skilled in legislating to render citizens noble and excellent, we must know which teachers we have to employ in order to become skilled in legislating, and ‘how’ (1180b29), that is from what kind of pursuits, we may become skilled in legislating. And having said this, Aristotle added592 that in the case of the [art] of legislation things are just ‘like in the other cases’ (1180b29–30). For just as we become literate and physicians and musicians from those with knowledge [in the corresponding art], we should likewise become skilled in legislation ‘from the politicians’ (1180b30). ‘Or does the case of the art of politics appear to be unlike the other sciences and abilities’ (1180b31–2)?593 (‘Abilities’ are what the ancients called the arts that attempt to prove contrary conclusions, e.g. rhetoric and dialectic, whereas the arts that are not like this, e.g. arithmetic, geometry and physics, they called ‘sciences’.)594 But he is not being serious when he says this. For he states himself in the Constitutions that legislating is the task of the politician.595 Rather, he is saying this as someone who is making fun of the sophists who call themselves ‘politicians’ and profess to teach politics (cf. 1180b35), though they have absolutely no idea what the art of politics is. And he might effectively be saying: it accords with the truth itself and with the nature and logic (akolouthia) of things that legislating be the task of none other than the politician; yet according to the sophists who proclaim themselves to be politicians – though they are not politicians but crowd-­huggers and mob-­flatterers – rendering people skilled at legislating is not the task of the politician. For those who are not skilled in politics are also not skilled in legislating, and those who are not skilled in legislating also cannot render [others] skilled in legislating; therefore, since the sophists are not skilled in politics, they could also never make [others] skilled in legislating.

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And [Aristotle] adds596 that the tribe of sophists597 is not skilled in politics and establishes [this thesis] from the sciences and abilities, saying [effectively]:598 the one who has knowledge in these [areas] simultaneously both teaches the art he knows and is actively engaged in his art; for example, the still life painter (zôgraphos) not only teaches but also paints still lifes (zôa graphei), and the rhetorician both teaches and delivers rhetorical speeches, and the physician both produces physicians and restores health, and quite simply everyone who has some knowledge both teaches what he knows and is actively engaged in his art. ‘But the sophists profess to teach politics’, but they do not practice [this art] at all (cf. 1180b35–1181a1); therefore, [we may infer that] they are ignorant. For if they had knowledge they would also be practicing [their knowledge]. However, [Aristotle’s] contemporaries working in politics,599 for example, Demosthenes and Aeschines, are engaging in activity, but not because these men know what the art of politics is, rather it is ‘by virtue of a kind of ability’ (1181a2), that is, by virtue of experience and theory-­free practice and not due to rational thought and the art of politics. 1181a3 For they neither write nor talk about these matters.600

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After having said that his contemporaries working in politics practice politics not by virtue of possessing political knowledge but by means of experience, he submits as confirmation (pistin) of this view [the fact] that they neither talk nor write anything about them, i.e. about political works. For if political [actions] are those that are really noble and really just and really advantageous, and if these are actions that are performed in accordance with virtue and from virtue, and if his contemporaries working in politics are ignorant of the nature of the [actions] that are – in the true sense of the word – noble and just and advantageous, as Plato, too, has shown in the Gorgias,601 [then] how can they talk and write about these things? ‘And yet’, he says, ‘it would be nobler’ to know these things than to write ‘forensic speeches and popular’ (1181a4–5), i.e. deliberative speeches.602 After having shown, then, through these [arguments] that they lack knowledge of political matters, he shows their ignorance also from the fact that they do not teach the art of politics to anyone, neither son nor friend. For the clearest indication that they have no knowledge of the science of politics is that they do not teach anyone and do not make anyone – neither son nor friend – skilled in politics (cf. 1181a5–6). For nothing else would be a greater good to the cities they left behind (cf. 1181a7) than their sons or friends having become skilled in politics. If, then, they had knowledge of politics,603 they would have taught it to their sons and friends. Yet they do not teach them. Therefore, they lack the knowledge. 1181a9 But experience surely makes no small contribution.

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whose end is not bare knowledge but that complete their work by means of theory and practice. After having said that experience makes a major contribution, he added the reason for this, saying: ‘For [otherwise] they would not have become more so through their familiarity with politics’ (1181a10–11).604 And what he means is something like this: if experience made no contribution to political practice, they would not have become more skilled in politics through their familiarity with politics. For those politicians who have theory and experience are more skilled in politics than those who have only the theory. But even those who have spent a lot of time in politics without theory and have gained a lot of experience in these matters are more skilled in politics than others who have worked in politics for less time and have accumulated less experience. Therefore, the one who seeks to become skilled in politics needs experience, too. Therefore, the class of sophists is not skilled in politics at all, being neither experienced in politics nor knowing what the science of politics is.605 ‘And the sophists who profess [to have knowledge] appear to be extremely far from teaching’ (1181a12–13). Whereas those who work in politics, then, are able to teach, within due limits (metriôs), the things they have discovered from experience, the sophists – e.g. Prodicus, Hippias, Gorgias, and all the others who corrupt our young606 – because they are deprived of even this [viz. experience],607 are extremely far from teaching. And that the sophists are ignorant of what the science of politics is, is clear from their saying that politics and rhetoric are the same thing, or arithmetic and mathematics.608 If, then, they knew what the [science] of politics is, they would neither say that it is ‘identical with rhetoric’ (1181a15), nor would they wrongly make legislating out to be easy (cf. 1181a16). For how hard is it, they ask, to lay down laws? ‘For it is easier’, on their telling, ‘to gather together those laws that are highly esteemed’ and from these ‘to select the best’ (cf. 1181a16–17). But, o Sophist, selecting what law is best and what law is next-­best and what law comes next [after that], requires great ‘acumen’ (1181a18) as well as real political knowledge, just as distinguishing melodies that are harmonious from those that are not [requires] musical knowledge. And [there are] ‘experienced people’ (1181a19) not only in music but also generally in all [areas], but when Aristotle uses the term ‘experienced’ here, he means the experts in the sciences and the arts ‘in each [respective area]’. In all [areas], then, ‘experienced people judge the works correctly, as well as the means by which and the manner in which they are brought to completion’ (1181a19–20).609 For it is the one who is a physician, and not any chance person, who knows what health is, and the medicine and regimen through which health results, as well as the manner of their use. And the painter likewise knows which picture is excellent and which one is flawed, and in which part, but it is impossible for those who are inexperienced and unskilled to create or to perform this work; for them ‘it is a cause for celebration’ to know whether [a work] has been soundly made or not (1181a21–2). So, too, those who are not skilled in politics would not be able to establish laws, but perhaps it will happen that they judge that this particular [law] is sound.

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1181a23 And laws are like political works.

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The law is nothing other than the legislator responsible for it, just as a legislator qua legislator is in turn the law. And this is why Aristotle called the legislator ‘law’ here. And he made this clear by immediately saying: ‘How, then, might [someone] become a legislator from them?’ (1181b1).610 And works are likewise those who produce them. For the picture is the painter himself, not qua human being but qua painter. And political works are likewise the one skilled in politics himself qua skilled in politics. Since, then, the laws are like political acts, and since these acts are soundly produced by political knowledge and experience, [these acts] are truly the person skilled in politics who has been equipped with political knowledge and experience. And accordingly, the person who gathers together the best laws – even if this is granted, that is, that selecting such laws without [political] acumen is possible – would not be skilled in legislating; rather, it is the one who possesses experience and the art of politics who is truly skilled in legislating.611 Just as we also see in the case of medicine, he says. For the person who has gathered together medical books and read them cannot practice medicine. To be sure, [those who have read the books]612 do tell us [many things]: that this person is sick; that every sick person suffers either from a homoiomeric sickness or an organic one;613 that he is not suffering from this sickness, e.g. organic sickness, on account of these and these reasons; that he therefore suffers from homoiomeric sickness; and that this [viz. homoiomeric sickness] is either this [variety], that [variety] or that [variety]; and that this person is certainly not suffering from this or that [variety of homoiomeric sickness] on account of these reasons; that [he is] therefore [suffering from] that [third variety]; that this [variety of homoiomeric sickness] is surely treated, let’s say, through evacuating the veins, through katharsis and perspiration.614 And once they have gone through [all of] this and stated the manner of treatment, they do not know what they should do – whether to perform blood-­letting or to induce perspiration or to empty the stomach. By contrast, the person who together with theory has experience, too, acts right away, because he knows what he ought to do and ought not to do in this instance (nun). And this differentiation of the [types of] sickness and of cures that we just discussed is beneficial to those who have both the theory and the experience,615 but it is of no use at all to those who have only read the books. And gathering together this kind of [data] is just as [useful] in the case of laws and constitutions as it is in the case of medicine (cf. 1181b7).616 For the accumulation [of laws and constitutions] would be useful for those who have more natural talent and who from experience have gained an eye617 that is capable of judging what of this written material is sound and what is not, but it is useless to those who are wholly inexperienced in political works, nor would they be able to make sound judgements about these things, except perhaps by some stroke of luck, as one can also discover treasure [by a stroke of luck]. 1181b12 Since, then, our predecessors left the subject of legislation uninvestigated618

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Since, he says, those before us have neglected to discuss the laws and constitutions, including obviously the best ones, we must ‘ourselves examine’ (cf. 1181b13) these things. And Aristotle is not saying that none of his predecessors drew up laws and drafted constitutions. For in his Constitutions619 he records many people who were legislators and who drafted constitutions, including even Plato himself. Rather, what he is saying is: since none of our predecessors dealt with these things in detail and since all of them rather failed to recognize the nature of the true and best constitution, we should try to discuss [these matters] ‘better’ (cf. 1181b14).620 And the term ‘perhaps’ (isôs, 1181b14) is added because it has not yet been shown that the constitutions and legislations drafted by Plato and others are full of many errors, but Aristotle will show this in his own Constitutions.621 He says: we must try to discuss ‘in a general manner, too’, what a constitution is622 and whether [the term] ‘constitution’ has one meaning or many, in order that human, i.e. practical, philosophy may, to the extent that my [viz. Aristotle’s] ability allows, he says, achieve its full completion (cf. 1181b14–15). For the [discussion of these things, understood as] extending up to and including my [viz. Aristotle’s] predecessors, is incomplete. 1181b15 First, then, if anything has been rightly said by our predecessors on a particular point, we should attempt to discuss [this].

You see how continuous the treatise about constitutions is with our present one. For now he gives us a preview of what that treatise reports and teaches, and the end of the present treatise is the starting point of that one. And once we have observed this, we will also see our man’s philosophical nature. For he did not say: ‘First, then, if anything has been said badly and not rightly, we must make corrections’; rather, he said: ‘if something has been rightly said’, we must embrace it (cf. 1181b16). He shows that it is not out of hate or self-­aggrandizement that he brings refutations of what has been said badly, but in order to preserve the truth, when he says: we must gather together the [work] ‘of our predecessors’, and once we have gathered together the constitutions drafted by them, we must see ‘what sort of things destroy and preserve’ each of these [constitutions] (cf. 1181b16–18). For he will show right away, when he examines Plato’s constitutions, that certain things that [Plato] claims come to be for the preservation of the city, do not preserve the constitution but rather are destructive of it.623 Then he says: after this we must contemplate which of the present constitutions are politically sound, and what sort [of constitutions are politically] bad. And having said this, he also adds what the benefit of such contemplation is, namely that it is learning what the ‘best constitution is and how each is ordered’ (1181b21–2), for example how the democracy is ordered,624 ‘and by employing what laws and customs’ it will be best (1181b22). For as he will show in the Constitutions,625 there are several forms of democracy, and some of them are better and some are worse. [He will show], then, by employing what sort of [laws and customs the democracy] will be best and indissoluble, and similarly what a monarchy must be like if it is to last forever, and similarly for an aristocracy and a timocracy.

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At this point the comments on book 10 reach their end. [I have produced] these [thoughts] according to my abilities, but if anyone [else] is able to speak [on this topic] in a better and finer manner, I welcome [them to do so]. And [such a one], o Lord and Creator, would be He who, out of His indescribable love of humanity, was crucified for our sake, and this most venerable [man] is, to me, the very best of friends and teachers. And let my [writings] be fuel for fire, but let His writings be nourishment eternal for souls, beauty-­loving and most god-­like.626

Notes 1 tou autou, literally ‘by the same man’, has been rendered as ‘Michael of Ephesus’. Heylbut has not included the subtitle contained in Cod. Coisl. 161 (‘B’ in Heylbut’s edition): ‘On Happiness Fitting to a Contemplative Man’. The Aldine edition (‘a’ in Heylbut) attributes this commentary to Eustratius, but Michael’s authorship is certain. 2 On the double nature of happy human beings, see also 571,23–572,12; 576,25–30; 578,17–25; 580,6–8; 588,34–6; 590,31–591,11; 591,18–19; 598,9–15; etc. 3 Cf. 531,24–5. 4 See below note 8. 5 Michael is presumably thinking of the account of happiness offered in book 1. 6 For the identification of happiness as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, see, e.g. EN 1098a16–18. Mercken sees a parallel here to Anonymous in EN 1, 453,38, where happiness is defined as ‘an activity of the soul with pleasure over a complete life’, but the definition is widespread. As Michael reports at in EN 9, 510,13–14 the claim that (political) happiness occurs either ‘with pleasure or not without pleasure’, is made repeatedly. See, e.g. EN 1098b22–5 and 1099a7–22. Aspasius explains that in the former case pleasure is a part of happiness, while in the latter pleasure is present without being a part (in EN 1, 22,20–2). 7 Cf. Damascius in Phaed. 1, §61, where Damascius describes anatasis eis to kreitton as a kind of positive death that amounts to the soul’s separating itself from the body, and in §121 he contrasts the life of purification with the life of contemplation, where the former prepares us for hê pros to anô anatasis, that is, for contemplation. And see Saffrey and Westerink’s note at Proclus Theol. Plat. 6.64,26. For other references to ascent, see Michael in EN 10, 529,14–15; 561,36; 579,14; 580,14; 591,4–9; 603,17–18; 603,29 with notes ad loc. 8 The phrase ta aei hôsautôs ekhonta (see also 600,33 and 615,6–7) has a strong Platonic ring to it, especially in connection with talk of an ascent, though it can also be found in Aristotle, e.g. Metaph. 1026b27–8. Elsewhere Michael describes the objects of intellection in other language that is reminiscent of the Forms. They are described as ‘intellectual’ (noeros: 559,36; 591,21–4; 592,2), ‘divine’ (theios: 598,19; 599,25; in PN 12,20), ‘intelligible’ (noêtos: 529,18; 556,18; 581,6; etc.), ‘the Beings’ (to onta: in EN 9, 481,37; 483,19–20; 509,19–20.27; 518,15–16; in EN 10, 529,9; 532,23; 561,36; 573,13; 582,35), ‘best’ (aristos: 582,22; 597,16–19; 600,3). 9 Heylbut, whom Mercken follows, refers us here to Enn. 6.9.9, where Plotinus offers a description of the soul’s life when it has completed its ascent, but since there is no explicit talk of the soul experiencing pleasure in Enn. 6.9.9, C. Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus’, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 44 (2002), pp. 51–7 at p. 54 is right to question the correctness of this reference. His own suggestion, however, is surely wrong. Steel wants this to be a reference to ‘the celebrated opening passage’ of Enn. 4.8.1.1–3, where Plotinus recounts one of his own experiences of ascent, yet the support for Steel’s suggestion rests on a faulty construal of Michael’s enêrgêkotes at

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Notes to pages 23–24 529,21, which is the perfect participle of energein (to be active) and not of egeirein (to awaken) and so cannot be a reference to Plotinus’ egeiromenos at 4.8.1.1. The correct reference must be to 6.7.25–30 and perhaps specifically to 6.7.30.23–5. In 6.7.25–30 Plotinus is offering his exegesis of Plato’s discussion of pleasure and its relation to intellection in the Philebus, and at 6.7.30.23–7 Plotinus concludes that Plato and others speak of the life of the intellect as being mixed with pleasure because they are simply at a loss for words to describe the experience. Interestingly, Philoponus also cites Plotinus making a similar point at in DA 2.16–17, where 6.7.30.23–7 is again a likely candidate for the reference. Michael himself makes a very similar point in his comments on Aristotle’s Metaph. 1072b14: ‘Whenever our intellect, which is the intelligibles potentially, becomes the intelligibles actually from the pinnacle of knowledge and the exceedingly good life (tês agan euzôias), then we are living the best and most blessed life beyond all pleasure, and this is inexplicable in words but it is known to those who are experiencing this blessed state’ (696,33–6). It is striking that in this last passage Michael in fact contradicts what he says here, by characterizing intellection as ‘beyond all pleasure’, which is strictly speaking Plotinus’ view. Cf. 1174a13. Aristotle himself calls pleasure a ‘sign’ (sêmeion) of one’s state of being (EN 1104b3). That pleasure is not the end but only a ‘symptom’ or ‘shadow’ of the end is a point that comes up frequently in the introductions to Aristotle’s Categories. See, e.g. Philoponus in Cat. 3,3–4; Olympiodorus Proleg. 5,16–18; Elias in Cat. 112,14–16. The distinction between symptoms and parts is fairly common in the commentators, e.g. Dexippus in Cat. 24,12–18. K. Ierodiakonou discusses this passage in ‘Some Observations On Michael Of Ephesus’ Comments On Nicomachean Ethics X’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden 2009, pp. 185–202 at pp. 188–90, where she inter alia suggests that Michael’s use of this medical example together with his use of the term episumbainein might be a sign that Galen is in the background here. Michael frequently employs medical analogies in in EN 9–10. To be sure, this is to be explained in part by the fact that Aristotle himself makes comparisons to medicine in EN (e.g. 1104a9; 1112b4; 1138a30–1; 1143a3; 1144a4; 1145a7–8; 1180b8). Yet, at least some of Michael’s examples seem rather unnecessarily specific, e.g. his reference to patients with fevers due to putrefaction (in EN 10, 612,31 and 615,2) and his description of a diagnostic procedure (618,25–32; and see, more generally, Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, pp. 187–94). This, coupled with his particular interest in Aristotle’s biological treatise and Michael’s own reported physiological observations (for examples, see K. Praechter, ‘Review of Michael Ephesii In libros De partibus animalium commentaria’, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 168 (1906), pp. 861–907 at pp. 863–4), has led some scholars to suspect that Michael might have been a physician, cf. H.P.F. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. 3, Leuven 1991, pp. 16–17; P. Frankopan, ‘The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries, pp. 45–62 at p. 50; and Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 187. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 864n2, however, does point out that at least one passage speaks against this suspicion, namely in GA 215,30. Perhaps Michael is attributing the view described at EN 1152b8–10 to the masses. Cf. EN 7.11, 1152b1–8, where Aristotle says it is necessary to discuss pleasure and pain. The metaphor of ‘piloting’ in connection to virtue also comes up in Aspasius who says that those who rule rightly have one kind of virtue, while those being ruled rightly

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have another kind of virtue. In this context Aspasius uses the example of a pilot (kubernêtês) ruling sailors (cf. Aspasius in EN 8, 177,9–14). Heylbut refers to the discussion of pleasure in book 7, beginning at 1152b1ff., but Mercken’s reference to EN 1104b8–13 appears more relevant. And cf. 1118b23–7. Cf. Plato Gorg. 493B and Rep. 586B3–4, as well as Michael in EN 9, 505,31. In Aristotle the passage reads ‘[. . .] towards both virtue and the happy life’. Michael leaves out te kai ton eudaimona bion. Below at 533,22–4 Michael explains that the Form of the Good is signalled either by the adding the letter tau, as in the t’ agathon (as opposed to to agathon), or by adding the locution auto (‘itself ’). Since Michael explicitly calls attention to the difference in sense between t’ agathon and to agathon, we have decided to preserve this distinction in the translation by translating the former as ‘the Good’ and the latter as ‘the good’ or (sometimes) as ‘what is good’. See also 537,5–6. Michael switches the verb form to third person plural, which could suggest that he has human subjects in mind here, but he frequently uses the third plural verb forms with neuter plural subjects. Cf. 529,8–9. See above note 8. See EN 1105b21–3, and cf. EE 1220b12–14; DA 403a17–18. Cf. Michael in EN 9, 472,22–473,4. Reading hup’ with the Aldine edition for Heylbut’s ap’ in 533,23. Reading haitines for hai tines in 533,24. Michael is referring to two ways of writing the word ‘the good’ in Greek, one in which the vowel of the definite article is contracted to result in the letter tau (t’ agathon) and one in which it is not (to agathon). Cf. 537,5–6. Michael is mistaken about the Platonists using the contracted definite article to indicate the highest principle. Cf. Michael [Pseudo-Alexander] in Metaph. 798,33–6 where Michael makes a comparable point, inspired in this case by Metaph. 1087b29–30. There he says that the Platonists distinguish between (to) auto and t’ auto, where the former is the contrary of allo and the latter of heteron. Here at 533,27 Michael has tou agathou instead of t’ agathou, but the context would seem to demand capitalization in the translation. See previous note and note 18 above. Plotinus famously likened the Good to the center of a circle, see, e.g. Enn. 1.7.1.20–4 and 4.4.16.23–4. One can find similar comparisons in later Neoplatonists, e.g. Proclus in Parm. 951,6–8 Steel. Michael’s text actually has tôn henôn (533,34) and ta hena (533,35), but presumably he means the henads, for which the Greek properly would have been tôn henadôn and tas henadas respectively. For a brief discussion of the difference between henads and monads in later Neoplatonism, see C. Steel, ‘Proclus’, in L. Gerson (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Cambridge 2010, pp. 630–53 at pp. 646–7. This reference to henads and monads seems out of place in a commenary on Aristotle’s Ethics, but it is perhaps to be explained by Steel’s conjecture that Michael was working with a Neoplatonic commentary on Plato’s Philebus – perhaps the commentary by Damascius (see Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, p. 54). Given the Philebus’ thematic focus on pleasure and hedonism, it would be reasonable for Michael to see a commentary on the Philebus as a valuable tool for his exegesis of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure, and the Philebus is the dialogue in which Plato famously employs the terms ‘monad’ and ‘henads’ (see Phileb. 15A–B). The distinction between monads and henads is addressed once – also very briefly – in Damascius’ commentary on the Philebus at 44,1–6.

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30 This brief account of the Platonists’ views tells us a few things about Michael’s understanding of Platonism. First, it should be noted that Michael does not think of himself as a Platonist. He refers to the Platonists here in the third person, and he uses the past tense (edêloun 533,31–2 and elegon 533,35). Second, the little he tells us here about Platonic theory is drawn from post-Plotinian Platonism. He mentions – though he does not explain – the distinction between henads and monads (see note 29), which is most prominently associated with Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius but which has been attributed even to Iamblichus (see J. Dillon, ‘Iamblichus and Henads Again’, in H.J. Blumenthal and G. Clark (eds) The Divine Iamblichus. Philosopher and Man of Gods, London 1993, pp. 48–54). And his summary of the Platonists’ metaphysical hierarchy also appears to be post-Plotinian. Rather than giving the Plotinian hierarchy as One-Intellect-Soul, Michael appears to be referencing the triad Being-Life-Intellect, which is also strongly associated with Iamblichus and post-Iamblichean Platonism. It is striking and somewhat puzzling, however, that the triad given to us by Michael replaces Intellect with ‘the Living Thing Itself ’ (to autozôon). In this connection it is noteworthy that Proclus argues that that the Living Thing Itself falls within this third principle (Intellect). See Proclus in Tim. 1.419,16–420,19 with J. Opsomer, ‘Deriving the Three Intelligible Triads from the Timaeus’, in A.-P. Segonds and C. Steel (eds) Proclus et la théologie platonicienne, Paris 2000, pp. 351–72 at pp. 360–2. Finally, Michael does not seem to think of Platonism as something developing in different directions over time, rather Eudoxus’ Platonism is simply identified with that of Proclus. 31 Perhaps kat’ auton phanai ton Aristotelên at 534,6 should be deleted, which would simply give us the translation: ‘But enough about these things’. 32 Reading t’ agathon for to agathon at 534,7. See above notes 18, 26 and 27. 33 There are two claims at issue here: (i) that intellect or reason (or something analogous) is found even among non-­rational animals, and (ii) that whatever quasi-­rational principle non-­rational animals have may be characterized as a ‘ray’ (augê) or ‘illumination’ (ellampsis) of intellect. While (ii) appears to be Platonic, (i) is more or less Aristotelian, even if it is not clear exactly which passages Michael has in mind. Heylbut cautiously suggests HA 8.1 (see his note ad 506,4–6), and he is followed by Konstan and Mercken. This suggestion finds some very limited confirmation in in EN 10, 538,23–33, where Michael returns to this issue and refers his readers to Aristotle’s biological treatises. Here one does find claims about certain animals having some natural capacity that is analogous to wisdom and understanding (see especially 588a29–31), and there is evidence that Michael was familiar with HA, though it is less clear whether he wrote a commentary on it (see in PA 88,23 and in PN 134,29–30, with K. Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), pp. 516–38 at p. 52 and idem, ‘Review’, p. 864. It is certainly possible to find other passages in the corpus where Aristotle credits at least some animals (e.g. bees) with something resembling intelligence (e.g. Metaph. 980b21–5; Protrepticus Fr. 1 and Fr. 9 Gigon (34,5–6 and 36,9–11 Pistelli)). Although Michael’s en allois (‘elsewhere’) indicates that he is thinking of some passages outside of EN, there are also some other passages within the EN that suggest something along the lines of (i), most notably at 1153b32 where Aristotle claims that ‘by nature (phusei) all things have something divine’ (ti theion). In his scholion on this passage the anonymous Byzantine commentator on book 7 paraphrases this ti theion as theian tina ellampsis (in EN 7, 455,15–18). Then again in 1073a4–5 Aristotle says that there is ti phusikon agathon even in tois phaulois. A scholion on the Parisian manuscript of the EN (cod. Parisiensis

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1854) interprets tois phaulois as non-­rational animals and also paraphrases ti phusikon agathon as nou tis ellampsis, though this ‘illumination’ is now identified as phantasia (J.A. Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, vol. 1, Oxford 1839, 231,1–7). Cf. Michael’s own paraphrase at 538,27–9: theion ti kai ellampsis nou. In fact, the language of illumination comes up repeatedly in the commentary, e.g. 580,20; 585,11–12; 586,17–18; 591,2–4; 603,30–4. See below notes 67–9 and 330. See the Hippocratic De alimento 39 (145,12 Joly = 9.112 Littré). In both Joly and Littré the text runs phusies pantôn adidaktoi (‘natures of all things are untaught’), instead of Michael’s phusies zôôn adidaktoi, nor is Michael’s version included in either critical apparatus. Yet one often finds Michael’s version of this Hippocratic aphorism in other authors of late antiquity, notably Galen De usu partium 1.5,16 Helmreich (3.7,13 Kühn) and De locis affectis 8.443,17 Kühn; Philoponus in Phys. 311,3 Vitelli and Opif. 258,2 Reichardt. Reading ê for Heylbut’s hê at 534,31 (presumably a typographical error). Cf. Grosseteste’s vel pharmacum bibere. Reading ekeinon for ekeino at 534,33 (cf. touton at 534,31). Reading prostithemenên at 535,2 with EN 1072b23–4 for Heylbut’s protithemenên, which is presumably a typographical error, as noted already by Mercken ad loc. Heylbut has the correct prostithemenên in his critical apparatus ad loc. (and cf. 535,20; 537,14; etc.). Reading poiein with EN 1072b24 for poiei at 535,2. This is required since our subject [hêdonên] prostithemenên is in the accusative case. At EN 1172b25 Aristotle gives two examples, doing just acts (dikaiopragein) and being moderate (sôphronein). Of Michael’s two examples, dikaiopragia and theôria, the second diverges from Aristotle. Perhaps Michael’s text of the EN had phronein for sôphronein, and Michael is paraphrasing this as theôria. The division between dianoia (or ennoia) and lexis is common in Michael. See C. Luna, Trois études sur la tradition des commentaries anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Leiden 2001, pp. 197–99. At EN 1172b25 Bywater’s text runs auxesthai de to agathon hautô (‘the good is increased by itself ’). Michael here offers auxesthai dê to agathon auto autô. Bywater has followed Ramsauer in changing the particle from dê, which he reports the manuscripts as having, to de. He also reports that one manuscript tradition has auto before hautô. Michael’s comments below make clear that he is not reading the dative pronoun as a reflexive pronoun. Placing a raised dot after legei at 535,14. Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘Est autem quod dicit:’ at 331,5. Michael’s text (eoike d’ houtos ho logos) diverges slightly from Bywater’s (eoike dê houtos ge ho logos). See the note ad 533,32–3. It emerges from the comments Michael offers below that his text of EN 1172b27–8 appears to have included a small addition that is not included in the texts or critical apparatuses of Bywater or Susemihl. Just after Aristotle’s pan gar meth’ heterou agathou hairetôteron ê monoumenon, Michael apparently read ouk an eiê toiouton (cf. 535,30). This same addition has been documented by Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 331 in the Latin tradition: aliud transcriptum habet sic: ‘omne enim cum altero bono eligibilius quam solitarium, non utique erit tale’. What is more, this addition appears to have been removed from 535,26 at some point in the

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Notes to pages 29–30 text’s history of transmission, perhaps in order to make it conform to the received text of the EN, or perhaps simply due to a scribal error caused by the repetition of toiouton (cf. ‘means something like this’ – toiouton estin). The argument that follows (and cf. 535,35–6) seems to demand that we capitalize ‘Good’ here (535,27) and at 536,7, even though Michael’s text has to agathon instead of t’ agathon. See notes above ad 531,15 and 533,27. Aristotle himself employs the concept of a ten-­thousandth part of a grain of millet to drive a point home in DS 445b31–446a1, though the context is different. And cf. Cat. 5b18–19. A case might be made for seeing EN 1097b18 as a possible source for this use of huperokhê, but it seems unlikely. There Aristotle speaks of huperokhê of goods and not of the Good, and the broader context there is whether happiness can be improved upon, which is not at issue here. It seems more like that Michael might be getting this language from a Platonic source. See, for example, the famous passage about the Good in the simile of the sun, where Plato describes it as: epikeina tês ousias presbeia kai dunamei huperekhontos (509B8–9 Slings), and cf. 536,39 below, where Michael – again in a Platonic spirit – calls the Good itself ‘the transcendent source of goods’. The topic at issue here – the Good’s surpassing the virtues – is also found in Neoplatonic texts, e.g. Proclus in Alc. 1 319,15–320,23. On Michael’s familiarity with Proclus’ commentary on Alc. 1, see below 603,24–34 and the notes ad loc. tou agathou. See note above ad 535,27. Cf. Grosseteste’s per se boni superexcellentia (333,50). See Plato Phileb. 20E–22B (and cf. 60A–61A). We capitalize here and at 536,36, even though Michael’s text has to agathon rather than t’ agathon. In fact, Bywater’s text has t’ agathon here, but that is clearly not what Michael’s text of the EN has. Below (537,5–6) Michael makes clear that this to agathon must be understood as t’ agathon. See above note 46. In Bywater’s edition the line in question (1172b31–2) runs oudenos gar prostethentos autô t’ agathon hairetôteron ginesthai, though he notes that in place of autô one manuscript offers auto, which is printed by Becker. Our text of Michael appears to offer conflicting versions of this line. In 536,26–7 and 536,34 Michael presents Aristotle’s text almost exactly as it is printed by Bywater. The full statement oudenos gar prostethentos autô to agathon hairetôteron ginesthai appears first at 536,26–7, and then at 536,34 Michael repeats the first part of it – oudenos gar prostethentos autô to agathon – again, and his comments that follow (cf. 536,36) make clear that the second part – hairetôteron ginesthai – is still on his mind. The only difference is that instead of t’ agathon Michael has to agathon, though his subsequent comments make clear that he would prefer to read t’ agathon and that we should nevertheless capitalize in the translation (see above notes ad 531,15; 533,27; and cf. 537,5–6). But in 537,3–10, where Michael addresses the lexis more specifically, we get something rather different. The first part now reads oudenos gar prostethentos tô auto to agathon, and the second part – hairetôteron ginesthai – seems to missing entirely. Given Michael’s complaint that this line is unclear (asapheian tina ekhei) and missing something, and given the pains he takes to explain it, it is possible that something like this version, odd though it is, is exactly what Michael had in front of him. Nevertheless, the tô at 537,4 is so odd that one is tempted to delete it. Perhaps it crept into the text somehow from his remark below en de tô prostethentos tô autoagathô (537,7). The problem with the missing second part has been partially addressed by Heylbut, who inserts to hairetôteron

Notes to pages 30–31

54 55

56 57 58 59

60 61

62

63 64 65

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ginesthai anti into the text at 537,8 (but leaves the text at 537,4 without hairetôteron ginesthai). Certainly, the tou at 537,8 suggests that something has gone wrong with the text here, though I think Heylbut’s addition is an inadequate solution. Note that Grosseteste appears to have bonum (334,94) where Heylbut prints tou; in fact, Grosseteste’s text appears to depart from Heylbut’s in many ways. At least Michael’s final paraphrase at 537,9–10 looks to be intact. The addition in brackets is justified by what follows. ‘Transcendent’ translates hyperousios, literally ‘beyond being’. Cf. above 536,7, where Michael speaks of the Good’s superiority (huperokhê), with the note ad loc. Both of these theses may be traced back to Plato’s famous characterization of the Good at 509B7–9 as beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) and superior (huperekhontos), which was then emphatically developed by the Neoplatonists. The hanging definite article is as odd in the Greek as it is in English, and it probably signals a problem in the text. See above note 53. See notes ad 531,15 and 533,27. The Greek ouden can be translated both as ‘nothing’ and ‘none’. On the difficulties of this text, see above note 53. If there is a lacuna, as Heylbut suspects, then his insertion is not enough to fix it. To paraphrase Heylbut’s suggestion, Michael is saying here: and in ‘the good itself becomes more choiceworthy’ Aristotle says ‘becomes more choiceworthy’ instead of ‘becomes more good’. Regardless of what went wrong with the text, Michael’s understanding of it at least may be safely inferred from the final paraphrase in 537,9–10. See above note 50. Michael’s use of the term anhêdonos is somewhat striking. Its use is not found at all in Aristotle or Alexander, yet it can be found in Neoplatonic discussions, notably in Damascius’ commentary on Plato’s Philebus (74,2; 86,4; 121,4; 124,2; 153,3) as well as in Plotinus’ discussion of the Philebus in Enn. 6.7.24–5. Michael has the singular ho de enistamenos for Aristotle’s plural hoi d’ enistamenoi at EN 1172b35–6. It is possible that Michael is thinking of a person here, but the repetition at 537,27 suggests that the implicit subject here is meant to be logos. In what follows Michael considers possible objections to the syllogism, following Aristotle’s discussion in 1172b35–3a5. First, Michael considers one who simply tries to reject the major premise out of hand, and he replies that this kind of objection is unsatisfactory, given the level of consensus on the matter (537,25–538,2). Next, he considers the possibility that this rejection of the major premise is grounded in the view that only the unintelligent or the non-­rational seek pleasure, with the result that the major premise would fail to obtain. Here he has to consider two possible interpretations of the objection, depending on whether the objector means unintelligent human beings (538,2–23) or non-­rational animals (538,23–33). Either way, Michael emphasizes that both non-­rational animals and unintelligent human beings possess a principle – intellect in the latter and an illumination of intellect in the former – that naturally pursues its own good, and that intelligent human beings also seek their own good. So one cannot object that only some living things are involved in this pursuit. It is striking here that Michael seems committed to the view that the desire for one’s own proper good – whether for human beings or for animals – can only be explained by positing some connection to intellect. Reading enistanto for anistanto in 537,25. Cf. enistamenos in 537,22 and 27. Replacing the full-­stop at 537,26 with a comma. Replacing the interrogative punctuation at 537,33 with a comma, and the full-­stop at 537,35 with interrogative punctuation.

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Notes to pages 31–32

66 Inserting mona after ta anoêta at 538,2. Cf. Heylbut’s report that the Aldine edition inserts mona after anoêta; Grosseteste’s sola at 336.37; and, finally, ta aloga mona at 538,25. 67 The integrity of the text in question, namely ti phusikon agathon at 1173a4, has been suspected by scholars. Bywater notes phusikon agathon fort. secludenda, and Stewart, Gauthier and Jolif share this suspicion. Irwin likewise deletes these words from his translation. Other scholars have suspected only agathon. Gauthier and Jolif report that agathon is rejected by Thurot, Susemihl (though it is restored by Apelt), Rackham and Dirlmeier. Gauthier and Jolif, however, also report that ‘Michel d’Éphèse ne semble pas avoir lu agathon’ (822). They are presumably thinking of 538,21–2, where we just get estin phusikon, but he would appear to be reading it here at 538,11. It also appears to be present in the scholia to the Parisian MS (Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, 231,4–5), where the scholiast interprets this ti phusikon agathon to be a reference to the phantasia, thanks to which each thing desires its own proper good. (The scholiast then characterizes this phantasia as an ellampsis nou. See note 68 and note 33 above). 68 See EN 9, 516,24–6, where Michael refers this view to EN 6 (or book 7 according the Grosseteste’s Latin translation), though scholars have had trouble locating these claims there. Heylbut (followed by Konstan) refers to 6.2, 1139b4, while Mercken reports that this is not to be found in either book but refers to 1141a25–8 and 1143a35–b14. And cf. the possible reference to EE in the next note (note 69). We should be careful to distinguish this claim that every intellect seeks its own good, which would seem to apply above all to humans, from the broader claim (made below at 538,28–9) that even in non-­rational animals there is some illumination of intellect that also seeks its own good. Cf. also in EN 9, 506,1–16. 69 At Rep. 505D–E Plato proposes that every soul pursues the good and that it can do so because it ‘divines that the good is something’ (apomanteuomenê ti einai), a proposal that is taken up and developed by Plotinus in Enn. 5.5.12, and there is some reason to think that Michael is being influenced by Plotinus’ discussion. Plotinus includes Plato’s remark about ‘divining’ in his discussion, saying that ‘all things desire’ the good ‘as if they divined (hôsper apomemanteumena) that existence without it is impossible’ (5.5.12.7–9). Then he develops this idea by maintaining that this grasp of the Good is not subject to recollection because we are always in contact with it, twice emphasizing that it is present to us even in our sleep: kai koimômenois paresti (5.5.12.12) and hoti koimômenois parest (5.5.12.14). The idea that man ‘divines’ (apomanteuetai) the Good is repeated in Plotinus’ examination of the Philebus in 6.7.24–30, specifically at 6.7.29.21–2, but there is no talk of dreaming or sleeping there. We have already seen that Michael appears to have been acquainted with Plotinus’ examination of the Philebus in these chapters (see above note 9). We would like to thank Philip van der Eijk for bringing to our attention both the possible parallels to EE 8.2 (7.14), 1148a26– 40 as well as the significant dissimilarity between this passage and what Michael is saying. Quite possibly Michael is thinking of MM 1207a35–b5, where Aristotle declares that there is ‘by nature’ (tê phusei) something in the soul whereby we ‘are impelled in a nonrational manner’ (hormômen alogôs) towards what befits us, an impulse which Aristotle likens to religious frenzy (enthousiazontes). 70 Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 139,8–14. 71 See above notes 33 and 69. 72 Michael already advanced a similar claim at in EN 9, 506,2–3 and at in EN 10, 534,12–17 (see the note ad loc. as well as note 68 above).

Notes to pages 32–35

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73 Cf. EN 1175a30–b1. 74 Commentators frequently refer collectively to Aristotle’s biological treatises as Peri tôn zôôn, which we have followed Heylbut in presenting as a proper title. The exact reference is unclear. Heylbut doesn’t offer any suggestion, and Mercken says only quibus locis nescio. See the note above ad 534,12–17 regarding HA 8.1. 75 Here Michael explains Speusippus’ position with reference to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean (cf. EN 1108b11ff.). On Speusippus’ argument, see also EN 1153b4–7 with C. Rapp, ‘Nicomachean Ethics VII.13–14 (1154a21): Pleasure and Eudaimonia’, in C. Natali (ed.) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, Oxford 2009, pp. 209–35 at pp. 211–13. 76 Whereas for Aristotle (e.g. 1108b21–2; 1109a3–5) temperance is a mean between licentiousness (akolasia) and insensibility (anaisthêsia), Michael replaces the latter extreme with folly (êlithiotês). This substitution can also be found in other commentators, e.g. Ammonius in Isag. 67,23; Philoponus in Cat. 188,13–14. 77 Michael’s switch to the plural here is somewhat disorienting. Presumably, he is thinking of Speusippus and his followers. Cf. his switch from Eudoxus to hoi peri Eudoxon at 536,16. 78 in EN 538,35–539,19 = Speusippos Fr. 79 Parente = Fr. 81 Tarán. 79 We owe this translation of mesê tini katastasei to R.W. Sharples (see Alexander Eth. Prob. 135,13–14). 80 As Porphyry notes (in Cat. 127,10–12) the term poion is at times used as a synonym for poiotês, and that appears to be the case here. We have followed Steven Strange’s translation (ad loc.) of ‘qualification’ for poion in this sense. 81 Reading ê for hê at 539,36, which is presumably a typographical error. Cf. Grosseteste’s vel at 399,24. 82 Reading haitines for hai tines at 539,37. 83 Cf. EN 1173a14–15. 84 Cf. 1099a29–31; 1100b9–10; 1101a14–15; 1102a5; 1102a17–18; 1144a6; 1153b10–11; 1169b29; 1177a9–13; 177a16–17; 1177a22–5; 1177b23–5; 1178b7–8. 85 Reading gar for kai at 540,19 with Vat. gr. (322v). 86 There are problems with the text in 540,19–26, and it is possible that Michael means to be identifying health with its form and essence. On our understanding, in these lines Michael is discussing unmixed health, i.e. its form and essence, and in 540,26–38 he discussed mixed health, i.e. the healthy states of composites. One problem concerns hugieia at 540,20. We read to ti ên einai hugieias for to ti ên einai hugieia at 540,20. Another concerns to gar hugieia kai to ti ên einai hugieias anepitaton kai ananeton estin at 540,21. If this text is to be retained, the to hugeia might be taken as a reference to EN 1173a24 and translated thus: ‘For “health” (1173a24), i.e. the essence of health cannot be increased or decreased’. But Michael’s usual epexegetic particle is êtoi. Therefore, we read to gar hugieias. Some support for both of these changes may be found in kai to eidos tês hêdonês kai to ti ên einai hêdonês at 540,25. 87 The traditional identification of health with a certain krasis of the elements or humours, already found in the Hippocratic De nat. hom. 4 (6.40 Littré), is not infrequent among the commentators, e.g. Alexander De anima 25,6–7 and Mant. 162,10–11; Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 80,8–9. See also below in EN 557,28–9. 88 Here (541,1) and at 541,8 Michael has the finite verb tithentai in place of Aristotle’s participle tithentes (1173a29). 89 See note ad 541,1. 90 Such a statement is not to be found in EN 1173a29–b4, but perhaps Michael is thinking of 1152b13.

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Notes to pages 35–38

91 The text here is difficult. Heylbut prints mia gar esti kai hê autê homoia in parentheses at 541,23, but it is difficult to make sense of it that way. Grosseteste also sees the parentheses as extending to homoia, but he appears to be reading mia gar esti kai heautê(i) homoia: una enim est ipsi similis (‘for it is one and similar to itself ’). A related remark at in EN 551,16 suggests, however, that hê autê is correct as it stands. One option would be to emend homoia to ousia (‘for [pleasure] is one and the same substance’), but we have attempted to preserve homoia and deal with this difficulty by closing the parentheses after hê autê, placing a comma there, and taking homoia as the predicate of ta merê. It must be conceded, however, that this solution makes the subsequent ouden oudenos difficult. 92 Cf. 540,25–6. 93 Michael (according to Heylbut’s text) has hoion to tou kosmou (541,27–8), instead of the hoion tê(i) tou kosmou (1173a33) printed by Bywater, who acknowledges that to is found in place of tê(i) in several manuscripts. Below at 541,29 Michael has hoion hê tou kosmou, which is much closer to Bywater’s text. 94 See above note. 95 The uniform nature of the movement of the sphere of fixed stars is the demonstrandum of DC 2.6, 288a13–289a10. 96 The touto at 541,33 appears to refer back to ho de legei in 541,28. The men-­de contrast here is marking the transition from dianoia to lexis in the comments. See Luna, Trois études, pp. 197–99, and cf. e.g. in EN 553,18–19 and 555,19–20. 97 Phys. 202a7–8, cf. also Phys. 202b25–6. 98 Perhaps Michael is thinking of 1173a33–4. 99 Removing the comma after dunatai at 542,13, inserting a comma after estin at 542,13, and reading menei for menein at 542,14. 100 The Greek term kinêsis can mean both (local) movement and, more broadly, change. Here the broader sense is really required, but we have continued to translate kinêsis and kineisthai with ‘movement’ and ‘to be moved’ respectively in order to allow the reader to better follow Michael’s arguments on pleasure and kinêsis. 101 Literally, ‘that from which [it] began to change’ (ekeinou, aph’ hou êrxato metaballein). 102 Reading aph’ hou for eph’ hou at 542,22. Cf. Grosseteste’s a quo at 344.57. 103 Heylbut’s mer at 542,24 is a typographical error and should be men. (This correction is already to be found in the TLG text.) The men signals that we have first dealt with the thesis that pleasure is not a movement. The thesis that pleasure is not a coming-­ to-be is addressed in the next section. 104 Heylbut directs us to Phileb. 53E5–7, where Plato does distinguish between means and ends, but Michael’s language (ou telos alla tôn pros telos; and cf. 542,36) strongly suggests that he is looking at Damascius in Phileb. §125 (tôn pros telos esti alla ou telos). This parallel recommends placing a raised dot after the second telos in 542,29. Cf. EN 1112b12 and 1113b3–4. 105 Cf. Phileb. 42D5–7. 106 At one point Damascius describes the neutral state as eupatheia (in Phileb. §190), but Michael seems to be thinking of eupatheia as a process synonymous with the natural restoration towards the neutral state. Cf. also Enn. 6.7.34–5. 107 See Phileb. 31D8–9; 51B6–7; 53C4–5; 54D1. 108 Michael might be taking over this argument from Aspasius in EN 7, 143,6–14. 109 Adding a full stop after haima at 543,13. 110 Cf. Aristotle Metaph. 1048b23. 111 Changing the comma after touto in 544,11 to interrogative punctuation, as in Grosseteste.

Notes to pages 38–39

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112 Changing Heylbut’s anaplêsôsin at 544,18 to Bywater’s (1173b8) anaplêrôsin (presumably a typographical error). Michael’s lemma leaves out the de after legousi at 1173b7, but this does not affect the sense. 113 Cf. Metaph. 1057b8–11. 114 Cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1397a7–19. 115 This paraphrase (ouk ara anaplêrôsis hê hêdonê) at 545,1 is so close to the original (ouk ara anaplêrôsis hê hêdonê, 1173b11) that our insertion of quotation marks seems justified. 116 In what follows Michael presents his understanding of Aristotle’s theory of pleasure, which involves a distinction between three things: (i) states, (ii) the activities of those states, and (iii) the processes of becoming that result from those activities, and he ultimately wants to connect pleasures with (ii) activities and thereby sets pleasures apart from (iii) processes of becoming. He illustrates this account primarily with reference to the pleasures of eating and drinking. There is first of all (i) the nutritive soul, which is a state of the body. When food or drink is present, the nutritive soul exercises (ii) its nourishing activity, and from this (iii) the process of the body’s being nourished follows. It is important to note that Michael strictly speaking does not identify activity and pleasure, rather he says that pleasure follows upon activity (545,9–14). Thus we must be careful to distinguish between process and pleasure here, even though both are said to ‘follow’ upon the activity. The difference between (ii) and (iii), which in the case of nutritive activities is apparently not simply reducible to a distinction between an action internal to the soul and an external action in the body, becomes even more important when applied to the domain of ethics. Here Michael again distinguishes between (i) the states of virtue and (ii) the activities of virtue, but he does not articulate what the ethical equivalent of the process of coming to be is. 117 Cf. EN 1175a18–21 and 1175b30–5. This appears to be an attempt to harmonize the book 7 account of pleasure with the book 10 account, and it is drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 143,29–144,1, as the italicized text highlights. 118 Cf. EN 1153b9–12. 119 Reading epakolouthei autôn tais energeiais hêdonê at 545,15 for Heylbut’s epakolouthei autais tais energeiais hêdonê, which is difficult to construe as it stands. Note that Grosseteste also appears to have read autôn for autais (ipsarum operationibus). The insertion of ê mallon would seem to be justified by the sequel, in which Michael repeatedly says that pleasure follows upon the activities. C.C.W. Taylor has suggested that Heylbut’s text might be translated as: ‘pleasure follows upon them [i.e. on states such as virtue and knowledge] in their very actualisations’. 120 Michael’s choice of words here is somewhat infelicitous. He is broadly working towards distinguishing between activities of states and the resulting processes of becoming (see above note 116), but in these lines he describes ‘restoration’ (apokatastasis) first as identical to the activity of the vegetative soul (545,18–19) but then as something that follows upon this activity, i.e. as a process of becoming taking place in the body (545,22–3). The translation, working on the assumption that this is not just a slip and that Michael does indeed want us to think of two different senses of restoration, translates these instances differently, namely as ‘act of restoration’ and ‘(process of) restoration’. 121 Note on to apokathistôn. One might think that, strictly speaking, it is the vegetative soul that is the agent doing the restoring, but Michael presumably means its activity here (see 545,6–8). Certainly, there is a sense in which the activity may be said to be what

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122 123 124 125

126

127 128

129 130

131 132 133 134

135 136 137 138

Notes to pages 39–41 restores. This might have been made clearer by using the infinitive apokathistanai rather than the participle. See above note 120. Michael’s lemma leaves out the final two words in 1173b14, namely kai hêdonôn, which would give us ‘from pains and pleasures [. . .]’. Reading noêsantes for noêsantos at 546,2. Cf. Grosseteste’s existimantes (350,17). In 546,4 Heylbut places the comma before to sôma, which would give us: ‘[. . .] in connection with the things that nourish, the body is no longer in pain [. . .]’. But in 546,2–3 we were told that the ‘living thing’ is in pain, not the body. Moreover, in his previous comment Michael used the expression ta trephonta three times, each time in conjunction with to sôma: ‘the things that nourish the body’ (545,3.26.30). Thus, we take to sôma as the object of trephonta here, and assume the living thing is still the subject of lupeitai. This example of the relationship between a shadow to a walking man is found a couple of times in the commentaries on the Categories to illustrate something that is very closely connected to another without being part of its essence (parakoluthêma; cf. above 545,13), e.g. Ammonius in Cat. 27,26–7 and Philoponus in Cat. 33,15–18. Of particular interest is a passage in David’s commentary on the Categories, which makes this same comparison of a shadow’s relation to a walking man to pleasure’s relationship to activity (in Cat. 112,11–16). Cf. 545,9–12. Reading aisthêsesin at 546,12 for Heylbut’s athlêsesin. As Heylbut notes in the critical apparatus, one manuscript has athlêsi crossed out with aisthêsesi written above it. The correctness of aisthêsesin may be inferred from Michael’s examples: akouontes, aisthanomenoi and theômenoi (546,19–20). This is also much closer to Aristotle’s text (cf. 1173b17–18). See note ad 535,9. There are a couple of differences between Michael’s text at 546,26–7 endeeis gar ginomenous kai prolupêthentas hêdesthai sumbainei tê anaplêrôsei and Aristotle’s text at 1173b14–15 endeeis gar genomenous kai prolupêthentas hêdesthai tê anaplêrôsei. The former difference is easily explained, and perhaps Michael’s text should be genomenous. The sumbainei probably crept up from 1173b16. This is not an actual quotation from Aristotle, though it is loosely derived from 1173b18–19. Michael’s text (eponeidistous hêdonas legoit’ an) diverges slightly from Bywater’s (eponeidistous tôn hêdonôn legoi tis an). Cf. in EN 533,10–13. in EN 1148b19–21 we read about a woman who slits open pregnant women and devours their children. Aristotle himself does not identify this person by name, but in the anonymous commentary on this passage (in EN 427,36–428,1) certain details are added. Namely, she is identified by name as Lamia, and she said to have lived near the Black Sea (which is presumably taken out of context from EN 1148b22). Moreover, the bizarre motivation for her actions is given: ‘because she lost her own children’. There is a slight deviation from Bywater’s text: legoit’ an (547,20) for legoi tis an (1173b25), and ou mên hai apo (547,21) for ou mên apo (1173b26). hai apo tês tôn arrenôn aphroditês could also be translated as ‘those deriving from the sexual desire of males’, but Michael’s target is presumably homosexual desire. Cf. 567,35–8. Cf. 571,1–6; 574,19–20; 575,21–2; 577,29–578,9.

Notes to pages 42–47 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

146

147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167

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For Michael’s use of dunamei with legein, see Luna, Trois études, pp. 204–5. Cf. EN 1121b5–10; 1159a12–25. Cf. 1173b33–1174a1. Heylbut’s text has t’ an at 548,23 for Bywater’s d’ an at 1174a1. Heylbut’s text has epipherei at 549,21 for Bywater’s epipheroi at 1174a5. The text here (especially sunezêse kai epedramen at 549,34) is difficult, and it is possible that Grosseteste’s convixit et accurrit is closer to the original. At 550,7 Heylbut’s text has pasai hai aretai where based on EN 1174a9 (pasa hairetê) we would expect something like pasai hairetai. Similarly, at 550,10 Heylbut prints pasa aretê. Encouraged by Grosseteste’s Latin translation, which has neque omnis eligibilis at both places, we read hairetai and hairetê respectively, which also make better sense of the entire passage. The above is one possible translation of the lemma, one which corresponds to the sense that Michael first examines in 550,14–20. At 550,20–34 he considers a second possible interpretation, one which he seems to find more appropriate and which would correspond to the following translation of the lemma: ‘Whether [pleasure] is a substance (ti d’ esti) or a some such (poion ti) should become clearer to us if we start from the beginning’. Perhaps Michael is thinking of Phys. 4.11–12. Cf. Philoponus in Phys. 702,14–16 Vitelli. Now to be translated as ‘is a substance’. See above note 146. Reading kai to melan with the Aldine edition for to melan at 550,23. Inserting ê before poion ti at 550,23. Now to be translated as ‘or a some such’. See above note 146. This is the topic of the comment on the following lemma (551,3–552,28). In contrast to movements, which are not present as simultaneous wholes. Cf. holê homou at in EN 551,30 and see Simplicius in Phys. 778,22 and 1139,7–8. Cf. in EN 541,23. Reading oikia for oikeia at 551,33. Cf. Grosseteste’s domus at 361,97. Michael appears to misunderstand the term rhabdôsis, which refers rather to the fluting of the column. This misunderstanding has already been noted ad loc. in Liddel and Scott. Heylbut refers to Vitruvius 4.1,2 mutuli (mutila). The reference is not clear. Heylbut refers tentatively to chapter 14, and Mercken – also tentatively – to chapters 14–15. Both also point to PA 639b2–3. Perhaps tês needs to be read for tou at 552,14, but presumably Michael has implicitly switched from hê badisis to to badizein, which would make no difference to the sense. Cf. 553,26–7. See DC 269a18–23 (cf. Phys. 265a13–b16). EN 1174a15–19. Reading heterou for heteron at 553,6. Michael’s text (dêlon de hôs hetera t’an eiê allêlôn) at 553,7 diverges slightly from Bywater’s (dêlon oun hôs heterai t’an eien allêlôn). Phys. 6.3 (233b33–234b9). See note ad 535,9. Michael’s (minor) point is that Aristotle’s text at 1174b10–11 (ou gar pantôn tauta legetai) should be ou gar kata pantôn tauta legetai. It is difficult to convey the difference in sense in English, but the kata conveys a stronger sense of predication, which he emphasizes below at 553,21 by switching from legesthai to katêgoreisthai.

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Notes to pages 47–50

168 The capitalization is in Heylbut’s text. Aristotle himself often refers to his ‘arguments on motion’, e.g. DC 272a30–1, 275b22, GC 318a3–4. As Michael indicates at in EN 552,17–18, he understands this as a reference to Phys. 6–8. Heylbut (followed by Mercken) refers to Phys. 6 with DC 280b26. 169 Michael seems to be thinking of the mention of aisthêseôs in 1174b14. This line of text is the focus of the rest of his comments in this section. 170 Pasês oun aisthêseôs pros to aisthêton energousês at 553,34–5 is not marked as a quote by Heylbut, but it is a very close paraphrase of EN 1174b14: aisthêseôs de pasês pros to aisthêton energousês. The translation requires pasês to be rendered as ‘any’ instead of ‘every’ (as it is translated below). 171 oude aisthêseôs pasês pros to aisthêton energousês esti kinêsis ê genesis (554,4). 172 See note ad 548,10. 173 Michael’s lemma has tôn hupo tên aisthêsin keimenôn at 554,24. The keimenôn is not included in Bywater’s text. 174 Cf. Ps.-Simplicius in DA 148,14 and Steel’s note ad loc. 175 Cf. 559,14–16 and the note ad loc. 176 Reading hêdonên for aisthêsin (‘sense’) in 555,16. 177 See note ad 535,9. 178 Michael has de at 555,20 for Aristotle’s gar at 1174b16. 179 At 555,20 Michael omits Aristotle’s einai prior to dokei at 1174b16. 180 There are at least two distinct conceptions of ‘completeness’ at work in EN 10.4. In the first half of the chapter (1174a13–b14), Aristotle is working with a conception of ‘completeness’ that applies equally to all activities (in contradistinction to movements and comings-­to-be). All activities are complete in this sense insofar as they possess the entire form at every moment. But starting in 1174b14 Aristotle begins to articulate another sense of ‘completion’, according to which some activities are more complete than others. Here completion depends on the excellence of the subject and object. In these lines Michael is invoking this distinction. If some activity a is not performed by an excellent subject and directed at an excellent object, it is not complete in the latter sense, but it is still complete in the former sense, since it is an activity. 181 Inserting dia prior to tês toiautês epistrophês at 556,13–14 with Vat. gr. 269 (330r). Cf. Grosseteste: per talem conversionem. 182 Reading protaseôn for protaseôs at 556,19, which appears to be what Vat. gr. 269 (330r) has. 183 This three-­fold division appears to correspond to the distinction between sensation (aisthêsis), rational thought (dianoia) and contemplation (theôria) at 556,11–12. The man who is looking at the external world is engaged in sensation, and the man who is engaged in contemplation has turned towards himself and established himself among the intelligibles. Michael’s characterization of dianoia, however, is somewhat ambiguous. He says that the person engaged in dianoia is ek protaseôs eis epiphoras epaniôn (556,19). In the translation above, this is taken as a reference to syllogistic reasoning, which fits with his characterization of dianoia as epistêmonikê gnôsis at 556,13, where epistêmonikê gnôsis would be understood to refer to the epistêmê of the Posterior Analytics: knowledge acquired by syllogistic deduction. This accommodates protasis in its usual sense of ‘premise’, and epiphora can certainly have the sense of conclusion (cf. e.g. Ammonius (?) in An. Pr. 68,13–14 Wallies: ho d’ hêmeis legomen sumperasma, ekeinoi epiphora kalousi). Moreover, dianoia is often understood as a kind of discursive reasoning that moves from premise to conclusion (e.g. Philoponus

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186 187 188

189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200

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in DA 2,2–3 Hayduck). The ambiguity stems from the fact that Michael’s epaniôn, which really means ‘to ascend’, is an odd choice to describe the movement from premise to conclusion. Possibly, then, Michael’s understanding of dianoia is more Platonic than the translation allows and could be picking up on the dianoia of Plato’s divided line, which serves as a means of ascent to the intelligibles. Cf. Grosseteste’s ex priori ad superlationem ascendens (369,16–17). That is, the way in which the sense-­object and the sensation complete the faculty of sensation. In this section Michael is concerned to show that the manner in which pleasure completes an activity is not comparable to the transition from the state of first actuality (or second potentiality) to second actuality. In the subsequent section of the commentary, Michael intends to show that it is also not comparable to the transition from first potentiality to second potentiality (or first actuality). See below note 204. DA 3.2. Reading toutôn for toutois at 557,5. The parallel passage in Michael’s in GA (see note below) also has toutôn at 84,5. Cf. Grosseteste’s horum sensibilium (370,14). The entire passage stretching from 556,37 to 557,8 is drawn verbatim from Alexander De anima 38,21–39,8 Bruns, of which Caston offers a helpful analysis in the notes to his translation (pp. 139–40). The same passage is found again with a few minor variations in Michael’s commentary on Aristotle GA 83,36–84,8. This translation changes the punctuation slightly by placing a comma after aisthêtikon at 557,14 and deleting the comma after energeia(i) at 557,15. Cf. Grosseteste’s propter operationes at 370.52. EN 1175a30–1. Cf. 1179b21. Cf. EN 1175a32–3. This entire sentence (557,22–4) is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 133,25–7. EN 1174b25–6. Reading hugieia for hêgieia at 557,27. Cf. Grosseteste’s sanitas (371,66). Reading to hugiainein for ta hugiainein at 557,29, which as Mercken notes ad loc. is presumably a typographical error. Cf. Grosseteste’s sanum esse (371,68). This notion of being ‘irreproachably healthy’ (amemptôs hugiainein) is Galenic. Cf. e.g. Galen Ars medica 293,8; 338,15; 359,11; 383,15 Boudon; Nat. Fac. 190,6 Helmreich; QAM 70,12–13 Mueller. On the role of sense-­objects ‘provoking’ (ekkaleisthai) the senses to activity, cf. Themistius Paraphr. in DA 17,28–9 and 92,1–4 Heinze and Porphyry Sent. §16. Cf. Ps.-Heliodorus Paraphr. in EN 216,30–2 Heylbut. In place of toutesti (‘and that means that’) at 558,6, Grosseteste has cum sensus sit potentissimus et ad potentissimum sensibile operetur 372,89–90), which is effectively a quotation of EN 1174b28–9: epeidan hê te aisthêsis ê(i) kratistê kai pros toiouton energê(i), which may be translated: ‘whenever the sense is best and is active in relation to such’, i.e. in relation to something excellent. Cf. e.g. Philoponus in DA 27,12–13; 275,4–5; 301,9–11 Hayduck; Elias (?) in Cat. 240,37–9 Busse; Sophonias Paraphr. in DA 124,20–2 Hayduck. Reading ho before aisthêtikos in 558,16. Cf. 494,13–17 and 556,25–6. Throughout this passage Michael is focusing on the case of a subject in a condition of first potentiality being perfected in the sense that it is brought to the second potentiality (or first actuality) by the acquisition of a state (hexis). That is, with

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Notes to pages 52–53 reference to Aristotle’s example of the boy becoming literate from DA 417a21–30, he is focusing on the case of the illiterate boy (first potentiality) becoming literate (second potentiality or first actuality) by the acquisition of the knowledge of how to read and write. That is to say, the state elevates the subject to the second potentiality (or first actuality), but the subject is not yet exercising that skill (second actuality). That is, potentially in the sense of first potentiality. That is, actuality in the sense of first actuality (or second potentiality). According to Galen (De semine 94,8–11 De Lacy), the Hippocratic author of De natura pueri makes the moment of the embryo’s full articulation, which is when the extremities are separated and hair and nails are formed, the point at which the embryo becomes a zôon, at which point it would have sensation and motion (cf. Nat. Puer. 21.1 Lonie). In Michael’s commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, he says that the sensitive soul comes to be present in the embryo at some point (in GA 83,13), and throughout the pregnancy this power then remains in a state of second potentiality, since there are no objects of sense in the womb (in GA 84,5–9). Only at birth is this power present qua second actuality (cf. in GA 83,31–2). Despite Michael’s use of the term energein (‘to be active’), he is still thinking of the second potentiality or first actuality. This refers to the infamously enigmatic analogy at EN 1174b33 (hoion tois akmaiois hê hôra), though Michael gives only a paraphrase: hôsper tê(i) akmê(i) epiginetai hê hôraiotês. Aristotle’s term hôra is sometimes translated with ‘the bloom of youth’, and this is also a possible translation of Michael’s hôraiotês. But at 554,32 Michael says that the spoken word and musical voice participate in hôraiotês, so ‘the bloom of youth’ does not seem to capture Michael’s intended meaning. Michael’s uncommon pairing of these two adjectives potheinotera kai erasmiôtera at 559,8 bears an uncanny resemblance to Plotinus Enn. 6.7.32.35–6: potheinotaton kai erasmiôtaton. Michael’s text (kai pros allêla ekhontôn ton auton tropon) at 559,12 differs from Bywater’s only by placing ekhontôn before ton auton tropon instead of directly after it. Cf. in EN 555,1–4. One frequently finds beauty defined in terms of the symmetry of a body’s parts (often in conjunction with good colouring), e.g. Alexander in Top. 134,18–19; SVF 2.278; 2.392; and 2.471–2; Galen Thrasybulus 45,1–2 Helmreich; Cicero Tusc. 4.31; Augustine De civitate dei 22.19; Simplicius in Phys. 1067,15–17; Syrianus in Hermog. 62,21–2. See also Plato Phileb. 64E6–7. Neoplatonists, however, emphasized that beauty was a higher cause than symmetry, see e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.6.1 and 6.7.22.24–6. Some of the language in 559,14–16 is very Neoplatonic. Neoplatonists often invoke the comparison of beauty to light, e.g. Hermias in Phdr. 185,12–13; 188,11–16 Lucarini and Moreschini; Plotinus Enn. 5.8.3.4–6; Porphyry Ad Marcellam §13; Proclus Theol. Plat. 1.108,23–5 Saffrey and Westerink. On the Neoplatonic use of the poetic term epinêkhesthai (‘to float upon’), see note 5 in Saffrey and Westerink’s edition of Proclus Theol. Plat., ad 1.108,18 (p. 158). On Michael’s appropriation of the Neoplatonic term anthos (‘bloom’), see Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, pp. 54–5. Bywater punctuates ê kamnei as a question, but Michael appears to take it as a straightforward answer, and Heylbut punctuates it here and at 559,20 as a statement. The reference is not entirely clear. Heylberg suggests ‘1169b31?’. Mercken refers to Michael’s comments on this passage at 511,33–512,1.

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217 This passage is strongly reminiscent of Galen’s discussion of vision in PHP 7, in which he describes the role that psychic pneuma plays in the distribution of visual power (see especially 454,5ff. and 460,28–33, and cf. 306,17–23 De Lacy). According to Galen, the pneuma is emitted from the eye, but he does not appear to connect this with exhaustion, as Michael does here. See also Nemesius’ summarizing appropriation of this material in Nat. Hom. §7 (57,16–62,25 Morani). This appears to be the only place where Michael refers to ‘psychic’ (psukhikon) pneuma (as opposed to ‘innate’ (sumphuton) pneuma). We would like to thank Philip van der Eijk for sharing his thoughts on this passage and bringing these passages of Galen and Nemesius to our attention. 218 This is presumably the heart, cf. in GA 223,11–17 and in PN 50,29–51,15. 219 This final general statement is somewhat misleading. In fact, Michael does not think that all activity involves the loss of pneuma, since he has already stated that pure intellectual activities do not give rise to fatigue. 220 Metaph. 980a21–2. 221 Cf. this report by the medieval Jewish traveller Benjamin Tudela, who visited Constantinople in 1161–2: ‘Close to the walls of the palace is also a place of amusement belonging to the king, which is called the Hippodrome, and every year on the anniversary of the birth of Jesus the king gives a great entertainment there. And in that place men from all the races of the world come before the king and queen with jugglery and without jugglery, and they introduce lions, leopards, bears, and wild asses, and they engage them in combat with one another; and the same thing is done with birds. No entertainment like this is to be found in any other land’ (M.N. Adler (trans.) The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela. Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, New York 1907, p. 21). See also K.N. Ciggaar, Western Travellers to Constantinople. The West and Byzantium, 962–1204. Cultural and Political Relations, Brill 1996, pp. 60–2). 222 ‘At first, then’ translates ta men oun prôta, which appears to be what Michael is reading for Aristotle’s to men gar prôton at 1175a7. Michael’s rephrasing is not as superfluous as it seems in English, since the Greek is somewhat more ambiguous. 223 Michael’s lemma has hapanta (‘all [living things]’) for Bywater’s hapantes (‘all human beings’) and leaves out the final hapantes ephientai (‘all human beings seek’). 224 Elsewhere we translate zôon with ‘living thing’ but in what follows Michael is interested in contrasting zôa with plants. 225 This definition of soul is taken almost verbatim from Aristotle DA 412a27–b1 and 412b5–6. 226 The connection between ‘life’ (zên) and ‘boiling’ (zein) is attributed to some Presocratics by Aristotle in DA 405b26–8. There the connection is certainly etymological, but Aristotle’s point is that some men took heat to be the foundation of life and that this is reflected in the etymology. Similar accounts that connect life and boiling via heat are reported by some Neoplatonists, e.g. Iamblichus DA §8 and Philoponus in DA 92,5–6. But more frequently one finds Neoplatonists appropriating this etymological connection between ‘life’ and ‘boiling’, but dropping the connotation of heat and making the emergence of a processional activity the salient point in the boiling analogy. See e.g. Plotinus Enn. 6.5.12.9 and 6.7.12.22–3; Damascius De principiis 2.144,25–6, and see the note by Westerink and Combès ad loc. for further references. Michael is also thinking of boiling in terms of its connection to activity. To this extent Michael’s employment of the metaphor might be said to be Neoplatonic, but he is not necessarily taking on the full Neoplatonic theory of life.

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233 234 235

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237 238 239 240 241 242

Notes to pages 55–56 He seems rather to be using this metaphor to capture Aristotle’s own theory of the emergence of soul in DA 2.1. What Michael says here seems to bear a strong resemblance to Simplicius (?) in DA 30,16–17, and cf. 98,13–14. Cf. in EN 481,32–7 and 591,4–5; Simplicius in Phys. 4,29–31 Diels. Cf. in EN 528,5–6 and 602,35. Cf. in EN 570,31–2. Cf. in EN 603,15–18. Heylbut places a comma after semnas (‘holy’) at 561,37, which I have changed to a full stop (following Grosseteste). With Heylbut’s punctuation ‘our reason’ would become the subject of energei (‘is active’), but it seems more likely that Michael is now simply turning to examine EN 1175a12–14. Hence I have supplied ‘each’ as the implicit subject, even though Michael does not include Aristotle’s hekastos at EN 1175a12. Michael also has en toutois (‘in these things’) at 561,37 for Aristotle’s toutois at 1175a13. The en initially seems awkward, given the tê akoê without en at 561,38 (and EN 1175a14), but as the sequel makes clear, Michael understands the tê akoê as a further specification of the kind of musician that is meant. The text here is difficult: philomathê de legei tên dianoian ton eidota tous harmonikous logous. One option would be to read tôn eidotôn for ton eidota (see Heylbut’s critical apparatus ad loc.), which would give us: ‘he calls “studious” the rational thought of those who know the harmonic principles’. This appears to be what Grosseteste is reading: amatorem autem disciplinae dicit mentem scientium harmonicas rationes. But Michael’s point appears rather to be that there are two kinds of musical men, one of whom is philomathês, so I think it is preferable to read tê(i) dianoia(i) for tên dianoian at 562,3 (with EN 1075a14). ‘Principles’ translates logoi, which could also be rendered ‘ratios’. Cf. Damascius in Phd. 2.51.4–5 Westerink. The distinction between two kinds of musician can also be found in, e.g. David Proleg. 64,20–2; Plotinus Enn. 6.3.16.23–4. Some details of this passage recall Plato’s discussion of the kinds of tekhnai in Phileb. 56A–57A. Although he does not distinguish there explicitly between two kinds of musician, he does distinguish between two kinds of practitioners of other tekhnai, and the discussion there begins with music and progresses upwards to arithmetic. (Cf. also the ascent in Rep. 525A–530B, where Plato does describe a kind of studious musician, but he is ranked higher than the arithmetician there.) Given that Michael has just distinguished two kinds of musician, the musician by hearing and the ‘studious’ musician, it would seem that ho de philomathês is meant to refer to the latter kind of musician. But now Michael introduces a third individual: ho de arithmetikos. It is grammatically permissible to translate this as ‘the arithmetic musician’, but that would conflict with the two-­fold division. Cf. EN 1175a17. Heylbut’s ‘1178a18’ is a typographical error. See above in EN 559,4 and cf. 564,14. The following discussion is heavily indebted to Alexander Eth. Prob. (Problem 23), especially 144,9–33, much of which is being taken over verbatim by Michael. Individual instances of this are indicated in italics below. This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,9–12. Alexander also makes a brief point about shameful pleasures: hêdonas de aiskras oudepote hairesthai eulogon (Eth. Prob. 144,12–13).

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243 Heylbut’s text has hôste ean mê hai at 563,9, but the negation cannot be right, as Grosseteste’s translation (qaure, si quidem. . .) corroborates. We read hôste ei hai men, following Bruns’ text of Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,13. 244 This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,13–17. 245 Heylbut’s text has poterou kharin at 563,16, but Grosseteste’s translation (utrum utrius gratia) suggests that this should be emended to poteron poterou kharin, which is also found in Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,18. The translation of these lines has been drawn from R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ethical Problems, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, London 1990, ad loc. 246 The punctuation in 563,17–18 has been changed to conform to Bruns’ text of Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,19–20. 247 This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,18–24. 248 This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,25–6. 249 Interestingly, Michael exchanges Alexander’s aidiotêtos (everlastingness) with diamonês (continuation), perhaps owing to Christian concerns about the everlastingness of the world and its contents. 250 Reading toutôn at 563,33 (with Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,31) for Heylbut’s toutois. 251 This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,26–35. The translation of these lines has been drawn in part from Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ethical Problems, ad loc. 252 Heylbut does not mark phainetai d’ oun sunezeukhthai tauta at 563,36 as a quotation, but it is very close to Aristotle’s sunezeukhthai men gar tauta phainetai at 1175a19–20. 253 The italicized text (564,5–8) appears to be drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,15–16. 254 See above in EN 559,4 and 562,32. 255 Cf. 1175a26–8. 256 Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,28–9; 124,28–9; 137,34–5. 257 Geometry is Aristotle’s own example (1175a32), but this passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 133,25–7. 258 This passage is found nearly verbatim in Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,24–7. The entire first argument appears to be drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,24–31, which invokes the contrast between the temperate and the licentious man, which is not found in EN 10.5. As Michael says below (565,14–15), only the second argument is articulated by Aristotle himself. 259 holôs ton mê prosomilounta gunaiki. Here we are taking the holôs to be modifying the negation mê in 565,7, since it is difficult to see how this could be intended as a generalization of the previous point. 260 This is effectively a paraphrase of Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,27–31. 261 As Michael says (565,14–15), this second argument is provided by Aristotle himself (at 1175b1–6), including the example of a conflict between a lover of flute and discussion. Nevertheless, Michael still seems to be writing with one eye on Alexander, who also transitions from the previous argument to this argument (Eth. Prob. 120,31–121,5). Whereas Aristotle speaks more generically of a conflict between flute-­playing and discussion (tois logois 1175b3–4; ton logon 1175b6), for Alexander (as with Michael) there is a conflict with ‘story-­telling’ (muthologein 121,3), and both introduce story-­telling with a qualification (Alexander pher’ eipein 121,3; Michael ei tukhoi 565,17). 262 Michael omits Aristotle’s touto (1175b7) after de at 565,25.

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263 Yet another example seems unnecessary, but Michael presumably wants to drive home the point that this competition between pleasures is not limited to cases of conflict between reason and the senses, rather it occurs even between the various senses. 264 Michael using two different words at 565,32 and 565,33: kitharisis and katharôdia, which technically have two distinct meanings, playing the lyre and accompanying the lyre in song, respectively. But I suspect that Michael intends them to have the same sense here, and so I follow Grosseteste in giving synonymous translations (citharizatione). Similarly at 565,38 (tou kitharôdountos). 265 Michael has hetera at 566,3 for Aristotle’s heteron (1175b11). 266 This sentence is not included in Grosseteste’s Latin translation. 267 Michael omits Aristotle’s malist’ at 1175a13. Michael’s inclination to take these lines to be about chariot-­racing (as opposed to stage acting) might well be due to the popularity of horse and chariot races in Constantinople’s famous Hippodrome. See above note 221. 268 Michael is presumably thinking of 1175a30, but cf. 1175a17 with his almost identical comment at 562,17–18. 269 This line appears to be inspired by Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,5–7 = Eth. Prob. 152,26–9. 270 Elsewhere enantios is translated as ‘contrary’, but in this case Michael’s examples make clear that he is thinking more along the lines of contradictories. The odd claim here is that taking intense pleasure in activity a means that one is pained by not doing a. This sounds like addiction, but Michael’s examples (e.g. writing) do not fit addiction. See also his example of philoinoi at 606,19–20 and the note ad loc. 271 567,17–27 is largely taken from Alexander’s Eth. Prob. 125,9–19, and the above translation follows Sharples’ translation of that passage in some respects. It is worth noting that Alexander in this passage goes somewhat further by suggesting that only natural pleasures are strictly speaking pleasures, with unnatural pleasures being called so ‘homonymously’. Michael omits this point. Cf. also 570,8–571,25. 272 At this point (Eth. Prob. 120,5–6) Alexander adds ‘and has its being in this’ (kai en toutô autê to einai). 273 These lines are drawn almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,4–7. Strikingly, although Michael appears to take the premises directly from Alexander, he chooses to formulate the conclusion himself. Perhaps this is because Michael thought Alexander did not sufficiently distinguish between pleasures and objects of pleasure. 274 Mercken points to 1174b31–1175a3. Michael has repeatedly stated this point above, see especially 550,31–4 and 564,1–2, and cf. 551,3–552,28; 558,33; 562,35–6. 275 At 568,29 we read ei dê hê men oikeiotatê esti tê energeia(i), de hêtton oikeia for Heylbut’s ei dê hê men oikeiotatê esti, tê energeia(i) de hêtton oikeia. Cf. Grosseteste’s Si utique haec quidem propriissima est operationi, haec autem minus propria (391,27–8). 276 Michael has eoiken hê at 568,30 for Aristotle’s eioike ge at 1175b34. 277 Reading the dative hulê(i) for Heylbut’s nominative hulê at 569,21. 278 That is, when the planets appear not to move as they transition between forward and retrograde motions. 279 See 567,17–27. 280 As Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 902 notes, that Michael is originally from Ephesus (though he is writing this commentary in Constantinople, as 610,11–12 shows) is also confirmed by the titles of several manuscripts and to some extent by in GA 149,19–20. See also the note ad 620,20.

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281 This paraphrase (tas men homologoumenas aiskhras hêdonas ou phateon hêdonas) is so close to Aristotle’s original text (tas men homologoumenôs aiskhras dêlon hôs ou phateon hêdonas, 1176a22–3) that the quotation marks seem justified. 282 Reading tais aretais with Vat. gr. 269 (338r) for Heylbut’s tais hêdonais at 571,23. Grosseteste’s text (delectationibus at 395,37) conforms to Heylbut’s text. 283 That is, Aristotle discussed this in EN 1. Cf. above 529,9–10 and below 576,25–30. 284 Michael’s remarks about the expression tupô – which appears to have puzzled Grosseteste, who simply transliterates it (398,90) – reflect that he is probably thinking back to Aristotle’s own use of the term in EN 1094b11–27, where we find Aristotle also explaining tupôi both in terms as what holds ‘for the most part’ (1094b21; cf. in EN 605,1–9) and with reference to a mathematician (cf. Michael’s geometer and EN 1098a29–32). 285 Michael repeatedly identifies the true or real human being with the intellect, cf. 576,29–30; 578,21–2; 579,15–16; 591,18–19. 286 For eugeneia and euteknia, cf. EN 1099b3. For tês hulês khorêgia, cf. tês ektos khorêgias at 1178a24, tois ektos kekhorêgêmenous at 1179a11 and tois toioutois hikanôs kekhorêgêmenôn at 1177a30 (and cf. in EN 590,1). 287 Aristotle repeatedly refers to the philia that parents have for their children as ‘natural’, cf. EN 1155a16–18 and 1163b24. 288 It is striking here that Michael interprets the three kinds of friendship in terms of the three Platonic parts of the soul. In EN 8.3–4 (1156a6–b32) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship in a somewhat different manner. One kind of friendship is based on the useful and beneficial and can be found mostly among older people and those who looking to their own advantage. A second one is transitory and based on pleasure and exists mostly among the young. A third one arises among those who resemble each other in excellence, and is long-­lasting and complete (cf. EN 1156a10– 1156b19). Michael’s association of familial love with the appetitive part of soul, and of utilitarian love with the spirited part is striking, to say the least. See also in EN 9 482,15–483,20. Note also that at 1156b18–19 Aristotle describes complete friendship as ‘bringing together’ (sunaptei) all the attributes that friends should have, not their souls, but cf. Simplicius in Epict. 37,275–7 Hadot (89,11–13 Dübner). 289 These lines are strongly reminiscent of Plato’s Philebus and especially its reception by the Neoplatonists. Cf. Michael’s hê noera zôê [. . .] anêdonos ousa [. . .] hê hêdonê [. . .] anous ousa kai pasês eperêmenê (572,19–23) with Proclus in Remp. 1.269,18–22: ho dê kai ho en tô Philêbô Sôkratês ezêtêsen te kai diêrthrôsen, apodeixas hôs oute hêdonê to agathon hêmôn estin oute nous, hê men anous ousa kai lêphtheisa pantelôs, ho de anêdonos kai houtos pantelôs. And cf. Damascius in Phileb. §6 and §74. 290 Changing the punctuation in 572,25 by placing a raised dot after theôria and changing the raised dot after prosupakouein to a full stop. 291 Reading auta for autô at 572,27. Cf. the Latin ipsa of Grosseteste at 399,27. 292 Heylbut punctuates this as a quotation, not because Michael is actually quoting Aristotle, but simply because the construction uses nominatives with finite verbs. Cf. EN 1095a18–21 and Aspasius in EN 9,14–17. 293 The text in italics is almost verbatim Aspasius in EN 10,24–6. As Konstan notes ad loc., Endymion is portrayed as living in a state of perpetual sleep. Cf. 1178b19–20 (and MM 1185a9–11) with in EN 598,10. 294 Reading phutikôn for phusikôn at 573,2. 295 The text in italics is almost verbatim Aspasius in EN 10,26–8. For these examples, cf. EN 1176a34–5 and 1095b32–1096a2.

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Notes to pages 66–71

296 Heylbut refers us to 1098a16–18; cf. 1100a4–5 and 1100a14–16. 297 Michael appears to be reading panta (573,18; cf. Grosseteste’s omnia at 400,55) for Aristotle’s prattein at EN 1176b8–9. 298 Michael’s perekhousin hautous hêdeis pros ekeina hôn ephientai at 574,15 is close enough to Aristotle’s hôn ephientai en toutois parekhousi sphas autous hêdeis at 1176b15 to justify the quotation marks. 299 Michael’s ageustoi tugkhanousin ontes eilikrinôn hêdonôn at 575,6–7 is close enough to Aristotle’s ageustoi houtoi ontes hêdonês eilikrinous at 1176b19–20 to justify the quotation marks. 300 Heylbut gives no reference. Mercken (ad 402,16) refers to 1173b16–20 with Michael’s comments at 546,18–38. 301 Michael’s hekastô hairetôtatê estin energeia hê kata tên oikeian hexin at 575,19–20 is close enough to Aristotle’s hekastô d’ hê kata tên oikeian hexin hairetôtatên energeia at 1176b26–7 to justify marking it as a quotation. 302 cf. EN 1176b18. 303 Changing the comma after paidian in 575,25 to a raised dot, and the raised dot after eudaimonein to a comma. 304 Aristotle actually says that we choose everything (hapanta 1176b30) except happiness for the sake of something else. Michael reduces this to ‘many other things’ (alla polla 575,32) and underlines Aristotle’s hôs eipein at 1176b30 in order to avoid any confusion about virtuous action also being an end in itself. 305 At 576,23 Michael’s text omits the kai after aei in Bywater’s text at 1177a4. This allows the remaining kai to be understood epexegetically, which better fits Michael’s comments that follow. 306 See MM 1184b27–31 and EN 1101a14–16. 307 Michael’s khôristheis de tou sômatos estin auto touth’ hoper esti at 576,30–1 is too close to Aristotle’s khôristheis d’ esti monon touth’ hoper esti (DA 430a22–3) to be a coincidence. In the following line Aristotle concludes that this intellect is ‘alone immortal and everlasting’ (430a23). 308 Presumably the reference is to DA 3.4–5. 309 Something appears to have gone wrong with the text here, as we have only the participle legôn with no finite verb, but the sense is clear enough. 310 Michael has the singular eudaimonikôteron at 577,6 instead of Aristotle’s eudaimonikôtera at 1177a6. 311 This is a heavy-­handed paraphrase. Michael’s concern appears to be that by calling the activity of intellect merely ‘more conducive to happiness’ Aristotle seems to be implying that this activity is distinct from happiness. That is to say, Michael wants to understand eudaimonikôteron not as ‘more conducive to happiness’ but as something like ‘more deserving to be called “happiness” ’. 312 There is certainly no shortage of passages in the EN where Aristotle says that happiness is an end (cf. 1097a30–4; 1097b20–1; 1101a18–19; 1176a30–2; 1176b30–1), but the expression ‘end of goods’ (telos tôn agathôn) might signal that Michael is thinking rather of MM, e.g. 1184a14 and 1184b9. Cf. Michael’s explicit references to MM at 576,28 and 577,25. 313 Cf. MM 1185a3. Interestingly, Michael refers to the MM rather than to EN 1100a1–3. 314 The phrasing of this sentiment bears a certain similarity to a common paraphrase of Plato Laws 653A7–9. Cf. David Proleg. 36,22–3; Elias in Isag. 17,12–13; Philoponus in DA 160,34–5; Philoponus (?) in DA 491,3–4; Proclus in Tim. 92,4–5; Simplicius in Cat. 193,24; etc.

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315 Michael adds kai before ho tukhôn in 577, 30. The kai is not present in the lemma, and Michael might not mean for it to be seen as part of the quotation. 316 Heylbut’s text reads epêgage kai malista tou aristou (577,31), but it appears to be missing something, even if this is not marked in Heylbut’s edition. We are following Grosseteste’s Latin translation here: induxit et bestiale non minus optimo, id est et maxime optimo (406,11–12). As Mercken plausibly conjectures, the gap in our Greek text might be due to homoeoteleuton. The kai malista tou aristou remains difficult, but the translation above appears to capture the sense of the comments that follow. 317 Inserting apolausin with Vat. gr. 269 (341r) after gar at 577,32, which is left implicit in Heylbut. 318 Michael’s oudeis metadidôsin eudaimonias tô andrapodôdei (578,6–7) is close enough to Aristotle’s eudaimonias d’ oudeis andrapodô metadidôsin (1177a8–9) to justify quotation marks. 319 The Neoplatonists developed a scale of virtues according to which each of the cardinal virtues could be instantiated at different levels. The differentiation of this scale begins with Plotinus Enn. 1.2, is then taken further by Porphyry Sent. §32, and receives even further elaboration by later Neoplatonists. Already in Plotinus we find an account of the ‘political’ or ‘civic’ instantiation of the virtues, which in fact refers not primarily to one’s actions in the city but to the relation of the three parts of soul (the tripartite soul being likened to a city, following the analogy of Plato’s Republic). Thus, the ‘political’ instantiation of virtues involves reason ruling harmoniously over the other two parts. For Plotinus and Porphyry the ‘political’ virtues were the lowest level of virtue possible. The level of virtues of character was a late (post-Porphyry) addition to the scale, which can be found, for example, in Damascius (in Phaed. §139) and Olympiodorus (in Phaed. 8, §2). The virtues of character were thought to stand one step below the political virtues, as they were a matter of mere habituation and right opinion and were found primarily in children and some animals. On the scale of virtues, see D. O’Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford 2003, pp. 40–9 and C. Wildberg, ‘Πρòς τó τέλος: Neuplatonische Ethik zwischen Religion und Metaphysik’, in T. Kobusch et al. (eds) Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens, München and Leipzig 2002, pp. 261–78. 320 In these lines (578,18–579,1) Michael appears to be thinking of political virtue primarily in psychological terms. One often finds Neoplatonists using the term ‘political’ to describe virtues relating to instilling the correct psychological order in the tripartite soul, presumably because they are implicitly invoking Plato’s analogy between the soul and city from the Republic (e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.2.1.15–21 and 1.2.2.13–20; Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 172,5–12; see previous note). This allows for a neat account of the relationship between political and contemplative virtue: the former provides the necessary psychology groundwork for the latter. Nevertheless, although Michael emphasizes the psychological aspect of political virtue here, elsewhere he makes clear that political virtue is not merely a psychological affair (e.g. 582,30–1). 321 Regarding Michael’s appropriation of the Platonic language of ascent, see note 8. 322 The phrase diakubernôsa ta sumpanta at 579,28 (diakurbernôsa is a typographical error) recalls Plato’s often quoted description of God as t’ anthrôpina diakubernôsi sumpanta (Laws 709B8). 323 See Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 5.13.88.2–3 (noun men en psykhê theias moiras aporrhoian hyparkhonta), who attributes this view to the Platonists. Just before this

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325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332

333 334

Notes to pages 73–74 (5.13.87) he attributes to Plato himself (along with Pythagoras and Aristotle) the view that theia(i) moira(i) ton noun eis anthrôpous hêkein, and cf. Theodoret Curatio 5.28 (130,4–5 Raeder). D. Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien, Berlin and New York 1983, pp. 283ff. discusses possible Platonic sources for these statements, though, as he sums it up, these statements are ‘schwierig [. . .] zu verifizieren’. H. Dörrie, Von Platon zum Platonismus. Ein Bruch in der Überlieferung und seine Überwindung, Opladen 1976, p. 85 and others have suggested Tim. 30B. Note that Vat. gr. 269 (342r) appears to have noeran for moiran. Heylbut refers us to EN 1153b32, and he is followed by Mercken, but there Aristotle says only that all natural things are divine. Perhaps Michael is also thinking of PN 463b14–15, where Aristotle states that nature is daimonion but not divine (hê gar phusis daimonia all’ ou theia). Michael’s lemma leaves out touto and einai (EN 1177a18–19), but this does not affect the sense. See note ad 529,7. See e.g. 1102a9–10, and cf. EN 1177b13–14 (with in EN 582,30–1) and 1180a14–18. See note on 529,15. Cf. Michael [Ps.-Alexander] in Metaph. 618,3–13; David in Isag. Reading the dative energeia(i) at 580,15 for the nominative energeia, which also corresponds to Grosseteste’s Latin operatione (though cf. Mercken’s apparatus ad loc.) and to dunamei nous at 580,19. This talk of the rational soul being ‘allotted’ the ‘guardianship’ over a body is reminiscient of Plato’s Myth of Er. Cf. 583,22–3. Aristotle GA 736b27–8 (and cf. 744b21–2). This redescription of Aristotle’s nous thurathen doctrine in terms of illumination (ellampsis) strikes a Neoplatonic chord (and cf. e.g. 591,26–8). In his commentary on Aristotle’s GA he touches upon this again, offering us this tantalizing remark: ‘For the best and most divine end comes to be in us when we have received the nous thurathen. Elsewhere I have discussed in greater detail what this [nous thurathen] is and where it comes from and when it shines (ellampei) upon us’ (in GA 84,28–30). Unfortunately, it is not clear what texts Michael means to be referring to, though the text immediately preceding this passage suggests a possibility. For at in GA 84,9 Michael begins his short discussion of the rational soul, and much of this discussion (84,12–26) is drawn verbatim from Alexander in DA 80,24–81,15. If we accept the proposal that Michael routinely refers to Alexander’s commentaries as if they were his own (see Luna, Trois études, pp. 66–71), Michael here might be referring us to Alexander’s commentary on DA. Alexander does not explicitly describe the nous thurathen in terms of ellampsis, though the analogy to light is already found in Aristotle DA 430a14–15 (also cf. Alexander DA 88,23–89,4 and Mant. 107,29–34; 111,32–6; 113,3–6. On Michael’s familiarity with Mant., see 584,2–3). Michael Psellus also understands Aristotle’s doctrine of the nous thurathen in terms of ellampsis. See Michael Psellus Schol. ad Joh. Clim. 30,9–12 Gautier, which is sometimes included among the fragments of Aristotle’s De philosophia: Fr. 15b Ross (not included by Gigon). The text of the lemma – eti sunekhestatê· theôrein te gar mallon dunametha sunekhôs (580,23–4) – differs slightly from Bywater’s text – eti de sunekhestatê· theôrein [te] gar dunametha sunekhôs mallon – but there is no difference in sense. For ‘enduring’ (monimon), cf. EN 1100b2–16, and for ‘difficult to take away’ (dusaphaireton), cf. EN 1095b26.

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335 Michael is presumably thinking of Aristotle’s discussion of the first principle in Metaph. 12. In his commentary on Metaph. 1072a32–b14, Michael writes: ‘But if the first cause, which is the first good, is infinite (apeiron), the [subject] that is seeking it would never attain the entirety of its goodness, as it does in the case of the particular goods. For this reason [the first cause] will always be inciting motion as an object of love that is unattainable (hôs erômenon akatalêpton)’ (in Metaph. 695,36–9). There Michael also describes the first cause as being intelligible and desirable ‘by its own nature’ (cf. 694,4–15). 336 Erasmiôteron kai potheinoteron. Cf. note ad 559,8. 337 In 581,31–582,2 Michael describes three kinds of activities in terms of increasing amount of time we spend in connection with them, where this amount of time is a function of the kind of object the activities are directed at. He is envisioning the time we spend in connection with them as a sum of two intervals: (a) the time we spend being drawn to it (phora, pheretai) which ends when we attain the object of desire (teuxis), and (b) the time we then spend enjoying, consuming and being filled by the object (apolausis, plêrôsis) which ends when we achieve satiety (koros). Although it is possible to say that this time (a + b), taken by itself, is long or short, Michael adds a further consideration for comparison and evaluation: (c) the time we spend neither being drawn to nor enjoying these things.   The first case (i) Michael describes is the most straightforward. He is presumably thinking of a rather quotidian object of desire such as food or drink. We (a) attain it easily (and thus quickly), and it (b) doesn’t take long to consume it and become sated. Moreover, once we are sated, there is (c) a fairly long interval (in comparison to the time to get food and eat it) before we feel the need to eat again. Such activities, that is, activities directed at such objects, are least continuous.   The second case (ii) is a bit murkier. He means to be describing activities that are moderately continuous insofar as a + b is rather long and c short, which seems clear enough. But he adds the qualification ‘the more we are enjoying them, the more we long for them’ (581,35–6), which is somewhat problematic, as it would suggest that there is never any satiety (but that is explicitly said to be the case only in (iii) – here satiety appears to be possible, followed by brief spells of relief from the desire), and because he says nearly the same thing of the object of case (iii). It is also not clear what sort of examples he has in mind, but what he says about mathematics and music in the following section (582,7–10) makes these likely candidates. These, in any case, would be good examples of activities where one’s enjoyment increases one’s interest in pursuing them. Moreover, since all of this is meant to support his claim at 581,18–20 that contemplative activity is more continuous than political activity, we must assume that (ii) includes political activity.   Finally, there is case (iii). Strikingly, he uses the singular relative pronoun here, suggesting that there is only one object of this type – god (ho dêmiourgos hêmôn 582,2, but see note ad loc.). We are told only that there is no satiety with respect to this object, that is, that b is endless, without comment on the exact duration of a, viz. the question of attainment (teuxis). So only contemplation is truly continuous, interrupted only briefly by various intrusions. 338 Kai hê ep’ auta phora kata brakhea ginetai kai ek dialeimmatôn. The Latin translation diverges from our text here: et ad ipsa latio secundum breve fit et non ex distantiis. 339 At 581,37 Michael uses a singular relative pronoun (hou de) to describe the third class of object of desire (see note 337 above). This suggests that he is thinking, here at least, of only one thing as being the focus of true continuous activity, namely God.

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340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351

352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362

Notes to pages 75–78 Hence, we have translated kai epexegetically here. Yet we should bear in mind that Michael at times describes contemplation as being directed at a plurality of intelligible objects, e.g. 580,14–16 and 586,17–19. See above note ad 529,15. Heylbut prints tê megalê suntaxei in lower case, but Michael appears to be referring to Ptolemy’s famous Almagest, which was also known by the titles Syntaxis Mathematika and Megalê Syntaxis (for the latter cf. e.g. Asclepius in Metaph. 359,32). Michael has tô timiô (‘and nobility’) for Aristotle’s tô bebaiô (‘and stability’). He also has ekhein hêdonas for Aristotle’s hêdonas ekhein, and kathariotêti for Aristotle’s kathareiotêti, but these two variations do not affect the sense. See above 569,8–570,5. Cf. below in EN 589,23–4. Cf. note ad 578,18. Removing Heylbut’s parentheses around 582,31–3. Cf. in EN 575,7–8, where Michael claims that Aristotle defines pure pleasures as those that neither are directly mixed with pain nor followed by pain or regret. See also 566,31–5, where Michael appears to be drawing this claim from Alexander. Michael has dê for Aristotle’s de. Inserting pros before tousde tinas in 583,5. Cf. the Latin amicitiam habere ad hos aliquos (415,46). Michael has ho sophos kai ho dikaios for Aristotle’s sophos kai dikaios in 1177a29. See also 580,18 and note ad loc. The distinction between ‘principally chosen’ (prohêgoumenon) and ‘necessary’ (anankaion) is found frequently, e.g. Alcinous Didask. 3.2; Plotinus Enn. 6.3.16.30–1; Simplicius in Phys. 249,19–22. And see J. Wilberding, ‘Automatic Action in Plotinus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008), pp. 443–77 at notes 39 and 82. See above 583,21–2, where we are told that the contemplative man pays no attention to the secondary goods except the necessary ones. Following Heylbut’s suggestion of reading eudaimosin for eudaimonias in 583,36. Cf. Grosseteste’s politicis felicibus (416,80). See Alexander Mant. §20, 159,15–168,21. Reading prôtê with a for prôtôn at 584,11. Cf. the Latin ‘et primo in virtuosis’. For this account of justice as the proportional (kata analogian) distribution according to merit (kat’ axian), see Aristotle EN 5.3, 1131a10–b24 and Michael’s comments (in EN 5, 18,1–24,22). 583,20–1. Michael has ekhein at 586,27 for Aristotle’s ekhôn at 1177a34. Given Michael’s explication of these sunergoi, it seems more accurate to translate it with ‘contributors’ rather than ‘collaborators’. Changing Heylbut’s comma to a full stop at 585,11. Michael’s text has kai holês ekeinou ousês at 585,12. Vat. gr. 269 (345r) appears to have kai holês ekeinês ousês, which could be translated as ‘and the [soul] is whole’. The references are unclear. Heylbut admits quos locos voluerit non scio, though he suggests Rep. 613A, and Mercken has nothing to add. Rep. 496C–E, where Socrates compares the true philosopher in a city to a man in the company of wild animals and urges philosophers to withdraw from society and ‘lead a quiet life and do their own work’ (cf. Odysseus’ choice of life as a private individual who does his own work at Rep. 620C), is perhaps a more likely point of reference. Plato was commonly thought to subscribe to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness and that, consequently, external goods make no contribution (e.g. Hippolytus Refutatio 20.5 and

Notes to pages 78–80

363 364 365 366 367 368

369 370 371

372 373

374

375 376

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Olympiodorus in Alc. 10,12ff.), though Plato’s actual views on the value of external goods are difficult to establish with certainty (cf. e.g. T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Study, 3 vols, Oxford 2007–9, pp. 1.89ff.). Cf. Michael in EN 10, 601,4–5. Heylbut refers to 1169b3, but see also the phutikôteron-argument beginning at 1170a13. Michael has doxeia d’ an at 585,16 for Bywater’s doxai t’ an at 1177b1. There is no significant difference in sense. Heylbut refers to EN 1172b20 (and cf. 534,34–9). Cf. 588,36–589,4. kai pantos mallon alêthestaton at 585,28 is difficult. We suspect that the text needs to be changed to either kai pantos mallon alêthes estin or kai pantos allou alêthestaton, cf. pantos gar allou mallon alêthes at 510,18. Reading monê for monon at 585,31. Heylbut reports that monon is what he sets for the manuscripts’ mê, but monê is more likely than monon to have shortened into mê, especially in light of Aristotle’s monê di’ heautên (1177b1), which Michael cites at 585,16–17. The lemma does not include Aristotle’s einai at 1174b4. Elsewhere Michael does use the comparative eudaimonesteros, e.g. 580,30 and 590,9 (and cf. eudaimonikôteros at 577,6). ‘Immediate contact’ translates epaphê, which is found inter alia in Neoplatonic descriptions of the superior cognition of the intellect, e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.2.6.12–13: ê sophia men kai phronêsis en theôria hôn nous ekhei· nous de tê epaphê and Iamblichus De communi mathematica scientia VIII 33,19–20 Festa: tas te gar ideas hoionei kat’ epaphên ekhein ho nous ta ontôs onta ousas, or even superior to that of the Intellect, e.g. Plotinus Enn. 5.3.10.42–3 and 6.7.36.3–4, where Plotinus also employs it in conjunction with gnôsis: hê tou agathou eite gnosis eite epaphê megiston. Cf. also e.g. Hermias in Phaedr. 64,17 Couvreur (68,24 Lucarini and Moreschini) and 191,14 Couvreur (200,4 Lucarini and Moreschini). The term reappears at in EN 10, 589,20 and 596,11. Cf. in Metaph. 714,21. Deleting the ta prior to kata ta agatha at 586,16. The ta does not appear to be in Vat. gr. 269 (345v). Heylbut’s eupatheia might seem suspect in connection with the activity of contemplation (cf. eupragia at 590,3) but is confirmed by a parallel passage in in Metaph. 699,33–6, where Michael also describes contemplation as euzôia and refers to those who have experienced it (tois to makarion touti pathousi pathos). This coupling of euzôia and eupatheia might be derived from Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1.5. For Michael’s familiarity with Enn. 1.4, see below 598,25–599,10 and notes ad loc. Vat. gr. 269 (345v) has a lacuna here, skipping from eite euzôia to hôs ho Epikouros. Heylbut prints apraxia, which is effectively a synonym for skholê: leisure or non-­ acting. But the Latin has imperturbation, which suggests that Grosseteste was reading ataraxia, which is in any case the Epicurean ideal. Also, in what follows Michael seems to thinking of skholê as a kind of freedom from disturbance (cf. tarakhê at 587,11.15 and the conjunction of askholos and tethorubêmenos at 586,30). Vat. gr. 269 (345v) is of no help here (see preceding note). Michael has the plural hai energeiai at 587,4 for Aristotle’s singular hê energeia at 1177b7. Changing Heylbut’s full stop after ginointo at 587,17 to a comma, which finds some corroboration in Grosseteste’s Latin translation (423,59).

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Notes to pages 80–82

377 all’ oukhi tous kath’ hêmas korakas. Something might have gone wrong with the text here. Diels has suggested reading kolakas for korakas, which would give us something like ‘not the flatterers among us’, but this strikes me as a marginal improvement at best. Perhaps the idea would then be that lack of leisure is a problem for those who take their civic jobs seriously, but not for those fraudsters who land these jobs but do not care about doing them well. Grosseteste has sed non eos qui secundum nos corvos (423,63). 378 Michael’s text is a very close paraphrase of EN 1177b9, and the gar shows that Michael is effectively presenting it as a quotation. Michael has oudeis gar to polemein hairetai kharin tou polemein for Aristotle’s oudeis gar hairetai to polemein tou polemein heneka. 379 See Aristotle Phys. 1.5, e.g. 188b21–3. 380 In contrast to Michael, modern scholars (e.g. Ross, Irwin, Broadie and Rowe) usually understand kai par’ auto to politeuesthai together with peripoioumenê. In other words, this phrase is not telling us that the political man is lacking leisure even when he is not acting, but that what he is trying to achieve in political action goes beyond the activity itself. 381 Heylbut’s text has pôs an ton houtôs ekhonta phêseian an tis askholon einai at 588,18, which would give us the question: ‘How could anyone say that such a man is lacking leisure?’ But this cannot be right, as is partly corroborated by the Latin qualiter utique sic habentem dicet utique aliquis vacantem esse (425,96–7). Perhaps euskholon – though this would be a hapax legomenon in Michael – or en skholê should be read for askholon. Given duplication of the particle an in the question (also found in Grosseteste’s utique . . . utique), we suspect that tis en skholê might have been corrupted into an tis askholon. 382 The participle ousan is missing at 588,19, but it is present in Michael’s inverted quotation at 588,20, so we have inserted it back here. 383 The lemma omits the men at 1177b16. 384 Michael is drawing his list of elemental features from 1177b20–1, which is itself a summary of the features discussed in 1177a19–b15. 385 Perhaps kata or pros should be inserted prior to auto in 589,1. Cf. 589,3 and 585,26. 386 Cf. 585,25–7. 387 Michael omits Aristotle’s dê prior to eudaimonia and has anthrôpô for Aristotle’s anthrôpou, but there is no significant difference in sense. Michael is reading 1177b24–5 as the apodosis of a long conditional beginning at 1177b16. Cf. his paraphrase of the conditional at 588,29–35, where his paraphrase of 1177b24–5 is the apodosis. 388 The word order is inverted, but Michael’s megethei kai kallei at 589,10 is effectively a quotation of kallei kai megethei at 1177b17. Michael’s hai kat’ aretên politikai praxeis at 589,9 is picking up on Aristotle’s tôn . . . kata tas aretas praxeôn hai politikai at 1177b16. 389 See note ad 586,10. 390 See above in EN 582,21–30. 391 Inserting a full stop after hairetê at 589,26. 392 Whether or not a longer life increases one’s happiness or not was a common topos in ethical discussions in antiquity. Plotinus even devotes a small treatise to it (Enn. 1.5). Michael here interprets Aristotle as subscribing to the view that one’s happiness does increase with time, which is striking for at least two reasons. First, this cannot be said without qualification to be a fair construal of Aristotle’s view. Happiness, like pleasure, is an activity for Aristotle, and as such it should be complete at every moment (EN

Notes to pages 82–84

393 394 395

396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403

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1174a17ff.). This would also appear to be the upshot of Aristotle’s argument that the good is no more made more good by duration than white is made more white by duration (EN 1096b3–5 and EE 1218a10–15). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s demand here that happiness be given ‘a complete length of life’ (and cf. EN 1098a18 [on which see Stewart ad loc.]; 1100a5; MM 1185a4–9) stands in stark contrast to the Stoic position that the person who is happy and virtuous for a moment ‘in no way falls short of someone who employs virtue for ever and lives blissfully in virtue’ (A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols, Cambridge 1987, 63I), and Michael is focusing on this difference here. Secondly, Michael’s interpretation gives us some insight into his relationship to Neoplatonism. Plotinus argued that happiness is an activity of our intellect and as such is in the domain of timeless eternity rather than time, so that duration can add nothing. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between the views of Aristotle and Plotinus, which many scholars do (e.g. R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000, pp. 240–1), Michael attributes to Aristotle a view that is directly opposed to that of Plotinus. See also in EN 10, 600,15–26 and the following notes 394, 395 and 399. Michael often refers to Aristotle as daimonios, e.g. in EN 5, 1,16; in EN 9, 529,4; in PA 16,13; in Metaph. 812,9–10 and 829,30. In contrast to the Platonists, who distinguish political virtues from virtues of character, Michael sees Aristotle and the Peripatetics as treating the two synonymously. See above 578,15–16 with the note ad loc. This hypothetical objector might be Plotinus. Not only does the focus on the present moment (en tô nun at 590,15; en tô nun tô enestêkoti 590,21) here resonate with Plotinus’ emphasis on the present moment in Enn. 1.5 (en tô paronti 1.5.2.10; en tô enestêkoti at 1.5.8.1–2), but Michael also twice invokes a locution reminiscient of Plotinus’ treatise (see next note). Moreover, immediately following this objection Michael introduces a final argument to the effect that more noble deeds are possible in a longer period of time (590,21–6), and this is an argument that Plotinus himself addresses in the final chapter of his treatise (Enn. 1.5.10). The view that Michael expresses here should be compared to in Metaph. 714,12–31 where he seems to adopt the very (Plotinian) position that he criticizes here. Here and at 590,20 Michael uses the locution ‘the extension of time’ (tês tou khronou parataseôs) which recalls the title of Plotinus’ treatise Ei en paratasei khronou to eudaimonein. See above note ad 589,30. We bracket hoti at 590,18, following Heylbut’s suggestion in the apparatus. In the expression pampolla kai megista prattein kai theôrein at 595,25 we understand pampolla kai megista as the object of both prattein and theôrein. Cf. Plotinus Enn. 1.5.10 and see above note 392. The tripartite psychology is Platonic, as is the characterization of the appetitive part as a ‘many-­headed beast’ (Rep. 588C7–8 and 589B1–2) and of the spirited part as ‘lion-­like’ (590A10, cf. 588D2 and 588E7). The content of 591,2–5 is very Neoplatonic. Cf. in EN 481,36 and 560,27. Michael’s use of the term anepistrophos here is a bit difficult. It is a Neoplatonic term that ordinarily bears negative connotations, with the prefix an- serving as an alpha primitive and a resulting meaning along the lines of ‘incapable of reversion’ (e.g. Proclus El. Theol. prop. 42 [44,20 Dodds] and 44 [46,4 Dodds]). It is possible that Michael is using anepistrophos here in the sense of being ‘unturned’ toward the sensible world (as opposed to ‘unturned’ towards the intelligible world or towards

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409 410

411 412 413 414 415 416 417

Notes to pages 84–86 oneself, which is its usual sense), but given Michael’s language of ascent in this passage (anaphugein 591,4; akrôreian 591,5; cf. katiousan 591,3 and rhepontos 591,10), it seems likely that Michael intends the an- here not as an alpha primitive but as a contraction of compositional preposition ana (upwards, back), which would give us the sense of ‘having turned upwards’. Cf. EN 1170a12 and 1179b6, where Aristotle refers to Theognis, and EN 1100a11–15 and 1179a9 where he refers to Solon. Stewart ad loc. concludes that ‘the saying was evidently proverbial’ after producing a number of credible references, including Aristotle Rhet. 1394b24 (where Aristotle is quoting Epicharmus Fr. 263 Kaibel) as well as Pindar, Sophocles, Antiphanes and a further anonymous source. One must suspect that Michael is deducing that Theognis and Solon are responsible simply from the proximity of this maxim to Aristotle’s references to each of them in 1179a–b. That is to say, the body and the non-­rational parts of soul. Note that Michael identifies intellect with reason (e.g. in EN 9, 482,19–20; in EN 10, 572,1–2), so the emphasis here is on the presence of these non-­rational elements. Plato Theaet. 176B. On the illumination by God, cf. 580,20 and note ad loc. Heylbut’s text varies slightly from Bywater’s. Compare ei gar tô onkô smikron esti, dunamei kai teleiotêti polu mallon huperekhei (591,28–30) with ei gar kai tô onkô mikron esti, dunamei kai timiotêti polu mallon pantôn huperekhei (1177b34–1178a2). Most significant here is Michael’s reading of teleiotêti (‘completeness’ or ‘perfection’) for Bywater’s timiotêti (‘dignity’), which is corroborated by the Latin perfectione (429,23), but as Heylbut already points out in the critical apparatus, in the brief discussion that follows Michael is explaining not the completeness or perfection but the dignity of the intellect (cf. to timion at 591,33 and timiôterai at 592,1). Hence, we read timiotêti with Aristotle for teleiotêti at 591,29. Michael has hekaston einai for Bywater’s einai hekastos, but there is no difference in sense. In his comments on book 9, Michael offers a somewhat different interpretation of tinos allou at EN 1178a4. There he says, meaning by tina allon the irrational part of the soul (in EN 9, 480,28–9), but here he is taking tinos allou to be a reference to the man of politics or the man of gratification. Michael’s text omits hekastô at 1178a5: ‘what is proper to each by nature’. The reference appears to be to 1176a3ff. Cf. 570,8–571,11 ad 1176a3ff. Cf. 570,8–571,11 ad 1176a3ff. Note that Michael changes Aristotle’s word-­order in a way that slightly alters the sense. Mercken refers to 1104b3–1105a13, and cf. 1106b18–23; 1121a3–4; 1172a19–23. The following discussion is heavily indebted to Alexander Eth. Prob. (Problem 24), especially 146,14–25. Individual instances of this are indicated in italics below. Here Alexander begins by formulating a problem: how we can say that we choose the virtues for their own sake, if they are in fact chosen in order to moderate the affections (146,14–16). He illustrates this problem by going through the virtues in the same order in which we find Michael going through them here: courage, moderation, liberality and magnificence, high-­mindedness and ambition, mildness and justice. Alexander solves this puzzle (146,29ff.) by emphasizing that the virtue chosen for the sake of some mean is itself identical to that mean, but Michael shows little interest in the solution.

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418 See especially 1106b16–28; and cf. 1104b13–14; 1109b30; 1119a11–15; 1121a1–3. Strictly speaking, Aristotle never says that the virtues ‘moderate’ (metrein) the affections – Michael appears to be drawing this from Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,16.20 – but Aristotle does come close. He repeatedly says that the virtues are concerned with (peri) the affections (cf. 1106b16.24; 1104b13–14; 1109b30), and he says that virtue is a kind of mesotês and that it is stokhastikê tou mesou (1106b27–8). Cf. also 1166a12–13. Michael refers back to this discussion at in EN 10, 597,32–3. 419 Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,16–17. Cf. Aristotle EN 1115a6–8 and 1115b17–20. 420 Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,17–18. Michael calls attention to Aristotle’s restriction of temperance’s scope to the subset of bodily pleasures connected to touch (1118a9– 1118b1, especially 1118a29–32). Cf. Michael’s characterization of touch at 569,21–5 as the least pure and least valuable of all of the senses, due to the domination of the material. 421 Liberality and magnificence are discussed in EN 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Michael appears to be suggesting here that these two virtues are concerned with practical actions as opposed to pleasures and pains, but see EN 1120a25–30. 422 Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,19–21. 423 Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,21–2. High-­mindedness is discussed in EN 4.3. Michael (following Alexander) appears to be using the term ‘ambition’ (philotimia) to refer to Aristotle’s nameless virtue of EN 4.4. For Aristotle himself, philotimia refers to the case of excess regarding this virtue, see 1125b21–3. 424 Mildness is discussed in EN 4.5. 425 Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,22–5. Justice is the subject of EN 5. Cf. Michael in EN 5, 7,31–2. For the characterization of the human being as a political animal by nature, see EN 1097b11 and Pol. 1253a7. 426 Reading kai at 593,21 for Heylbut’s pai, which is a typographical error. 427 The Latin translation has ex qua (431,88) for Heylbut’s hês at 593,24. 428 See above 593,4–5. 429 Iamblichus is usually credited with introducing natural virtue as the lowest rung on the Neoplatonic ladder of virtue, and it has been suggested that Aristotle was the source (see e.g. Westerink ad Olympiodorus in Phaed. 8.2–3 and O’Meara, Platonopolis, p. 46). The locus classicus of natural virtue in the Aristotelian corpus is EN 6.13, where Aristotle invokes a concept of physikê aretê that is supposed to stand in contrast to virtue proper. Aristotle’s remarks here and elsewhere reveal that he is in possession of some concept of virtue that is innate as opposed to inculcated (EN 1103a18–19; 1151a18–19; 1179b21–6; and MM 1197b36–1198a9). He describes human beings as in some sense possessing the virtues ‘directly from birth’ (1144b5–6), and he allows that such ‘natural states’ (physikai hexeis) belong not only to children but even to beasts (1144b8–9), accompanied by some brief discussions of the natural virtues of beasts (e.g. EN 1116b31–1117a1 and HA 608a11–21). Moreover, Aristotle’s understanding of good fortune (eutukhia), which he characterizes as a natural non-­rational impulse towards good things, also effectively amounts to a kind of natural virtue (MM 1207a35–b5 and EE 7.14). At EE 1247b24–5 he characterizes such people as naturally desiring what they ought, when they ought and in the manner they ought to desire. Yet it was the Neoplatonists, not Aristotle (though cf. 1154b11– 13), who explicitly connected natural virtue to the krasis of the body (e.g. Olympiodorus in Phd. 8.2.2–3; David Proleg. 38,32–39,9). It should also be emphasized that Aristotle did not think that natural ‘virtue’ should really count as virtue at all (see EN 2.1, and cf. MM 1185b38–1186a8 and EN 1116b31–1117a9). See also following note.

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430 The suggestion that some powers (dunameis), virtues and activities of soul depend on the mixtures of the body is reminiscient of Galen’s treatise Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur. That Michael had some exposure to QAM is clear from the fact that he points to it at in PN 135,28–30 and emphatically calls Galen polumathestatos. Shortly before that passage, Michael further notes that Alexander’s characterization of the soul given in his De anima is close to Galen’s by quoting De anima 1,2–4 (cf. in PN 135,25–8 with V. Caston, ‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’, The Philosophical Review 106.3 (1997), pp. 309–63 at p. 351). Galen repeatedly hints at the differences of small children which by nature, and that is to say by means of their mixture, tend towards different virtues or vices (cf. De moribus 25 and 29 Kraus and QAM 32,14–33,5 Müller). Character traits that pertain to children by nature cannot be changed to the opposite (cf. De moribus 28 Kraus). These character traits belong to us ‘first by nature, then afterwards by habit; habit is an acquired nature, a second nature, as it were’ (De moribus 47,15–17 Kraus, translated by Davies). But Galen seems to admit that these natural character traits only belong to the non-­rational parts of the soul (cf. De moribus 25 Kraus), while there is also a different kind of nobility of the soul coming from knowledge (cf. De moribus 44 Kraus) whose dependence on the mixure is not clear. 431 Moving Heylbut’s second comma in 593,35 to after proteron. Cf. EN 1175a29–b1 along with 564,16–566,23 and 567,30–568,8. 432 Cf. Aristotle EN 1131b12–13. And see Michael in EN 9, 462,26–8. 433 Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 142,22ff. and Mant. 153,28ff. 434 There appears to be a minor lacuna in the Greek text after sôphrôn at 594,19. Our insertion has been drawn from the Latin translation (435,90–2), regarding which Mercken notes ad loc.: per homoiotel. om. codd. 435 See Aristotle EN 1144a7–9. 436 For the construction to tês lexeôs, cf. Luna, Trois études, pp. 201–2. 437 Reading de hautais for de autais at 595,15. Note that Bywater’s text here has d’ autai at 1178a19. We have added ‘[. . .]’ because Michael’s exegesis that follows pertains also to the sequel. 438 Michael’s text has de at 595,24 for Aristotle’s gar at 1178a23. 439 This is the summary of a thought that Michael derives from Aristotle’s PA 641a36– b12 and which he comments on at in PA 6,38–7,15. The passage in PA begins by articulating a problem: if natural science is about soul in its entirety, including both sensation and intellect, then since intellect and the intelligibles are correlated subjects, there will be nothing left for philosophy to study. Aristotle solves this problem by defining the natural philosopher’s scope – at least within the context of PA – as limited to soul insofar as it is a cause of locomotion, and to noêtikon is, Aristotle notes, not the cause of locomotion (641b7). (That nous is in fact a source of heavenly motion in Metaph. 12 is not addressed here.) In his commentary ad loc. Michael faithfully presents Aristotle’s view, but as in our passage here, he does draw the further conclusion that the study of intellect and the intelligibles belongs to theology. 440 Heylbut’s text has gar at 595,29 for Bywater’s d’ an at 1178a24. 441 Here (595,35) Michael paraphrases the final words of EN 1178a24–5, replacing êthikês with politikês. Cf. 595,31. 442 Cf. 1177a28–9 and Michael’s explanation at 583,17–584,26: the contemplative man, on the one hand, only requires the necessary resources for the preservation of his body. Only those things that prevent his body from getting in the way of

Notes to pages 88–91

443 444

445 446

447 448 449 450 451

452 453 454

455

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contemplation by being famished or severely ill are necessary. By contrast, the political man requires people, adversaries and certain possessions in order to be active in accordance with his virtue. Reading hôs for ho at 596,13. Michael is equivocating here between two senses of the term ‘liberal’. He justifies calling the temperate person ‘liberal’ by appealing to the cultural sense of being suitable to a free man or gentleman: his prudent behaviour is free and not forced on him by external agents or laws. (Cf. 605,24–7 below where he calls ‘liberals’ those who have not been enslaved by softness and intemperance and who were soundly raised by their educators or relatives.) But when Michael insists that the temperate man’s liberality requires money, he is using ‘liberal’ in the very different sense of being generous. This is the sense in which Michael usually employs the term (cf. 539,7–8; 13–16; 584,17–18). This paraphrase is close enough to warrant the quotation marks. Michael has kai toutôn at 597,9–10 for Aristotle’s tôn toioutôn at 1178b6–7. ‘The appropriate acts’ translates ta kathêkonta, which is a term central to Stoic ethics. See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, §59, and note that they are translating the term as ‘proper functions’. This is the only occurrence of the term in Michael, and he gives us little reason to read Stoic theory back into his use of the term here. Cf. also Elias’ definition of justice at in Isag. 8,12. Perhaps more striking than Michael’s use of this term is what follows: pros tous phoitôntas eis auton (597,10–11). In order to practice his humanity, the contemplative man does not have to go out of his way to help people; he merely has to perform the appropriate acts towards those who come to him. For other instances of tou hoti, cf. e.g. in PN 8,16–17; 48,12–13; 94,10–11; in PA 19,4–5; in SE 29,30. Cf. the entire argument of EN 10.7 (1177a12–1178a8). This is only a paraphrase, but Michael’s use of the nominative case requires quotation marks. Cf. in EN 10 593,8–25. This remark should be compared to Michael in EN 5, 66,4–9, where Michael frames this issue as a doctrinal difference between Plato and Aristotle. Plato, he claims, attributes virtues to the gods, whereas Aristotle does not, since doing so would saddle the gods with the affections as well. Cf. Aristotle MM 1200b14 and EN 1145a25–7. What is interesting about these two passages in Michael’s commentary on the EN is just how swiftly Michael dismisses the suggestion that virtue, and in particular individual virtues such as justice and courage, could belong to God. After all, the Neoplatonic scala virtutum was designed to explain precisely this – the special sense in which justice, courage, moderation and wisdom can be attributed to the gods. So Michael has missed the perfect opportunity to discuss the higher virtues in the Neoplatonic scala. Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of justice in EN 5,3–5, especially 1132b31–3. Cf. above 594,4. On the difference between the continent and the resistant, see EN 1150a32–b1. Michael’s close paraphrase of 1178b18–20 has phamen for Aristotle’s hupeilêphasin, and Michael also understandably changes the plural autous, which refers to the gods, to the singular to theion. Also, for hôsper at 1178b19 Michael has hôs. Cf. the mention of Endymion made at 573,1. The adverb teleiôs (‘completely deprived’1178b25) is not included in the lemma (see below note 459). The entire section that follows here is devoted entirely to this one sentence.

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456 The following report (598,20–34) is included in SVF 3.17, but see below note 460. 457 We would like to thank Katerina Ierodiakonou for pointing out to us that Michael might not mean to be distinguishing between earlier and later Stoics, and that the alternative translation ‘and the subsequent Stoics’ might be preferable. Cf. also Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, 244,10–11 = SVF 3.376. 458 Presumably this refers to Aristotle and not Michael. 459 Recall, however, that Michael does not exactly see the non-­rational animals as being completely bereft of intellect. He repeatedly describes them as receiving at least an illumination of intellect, see 534,15–17 and the note ad loc. Hence, it is perhaps not merely an oversight that Michael’s lemma omits Aristotle’s teleiôs at 598,17. Cf. also 599,37–8. 460 There is wide agreement among scholars of Plotinus that Michael is drawing the following section (598,25–599,10) from Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1.1–15. See e.g. P. Kalligas, The Enneads of Plotinus. A Commentary, vol. 1, Princeton 2014, pp. 164–5; K. McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia. A Commentary on Ennead I.4, Oxford 2006, pp. 42–54; and W. Himmerich, Eudaimonia. Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen, Würzburg 1959, p. 163n2. The attribution of these arguments and positions to the Stoics and Epicureans, however, is not to be found in Plotinus and would appear to be a conjecture on Michael’s part. In light of this, qua testimonia on the Stoics and Epicureans Michael’s reports here ‘lack [. . .] any independent historical value’, as Kalligas points out, The Enneads of Plotinus, p. 165. In the passage that follows, Michael presents us with four arguments, and we have numbered these in the translation. Michael is not slavishly copying or paraphrasing these arguments from Plotinus, but there is a clear correspondence: argument 1 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.1–3 with 4–5), argument 2 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.1–3 with 3–4), argument 3 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.8–10) and argument 4 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.10–15). And see below note 472. 461 We translate eupathein with ‘feeling good’ rather than ‘feeling well’ since the latter is usually synonymous with ‘being healthy’ and eupathein here is probably meant to be something more positive than that. The term eupathein occurs in Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1 (see note 460 above), but the connection that Michael makes here between eupathein and Epicurus is not to be found in Plotinus and appears to be spurious. In the surviving works, we find only one instance of eupatheia, and this occurs in a context (Letter to Herodotus 64) that has nothing to do with happiness. Presumably, Michael is led to this connection because he understands eupathein along the lines of having a pleasant experience. In point of fact, eupathein – or at least eupatheia – would sooner be a piece of Stoic terminology (see McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia, p. 49). 462 The argument that immediately follows is concerned rather with living according to nature – not feeling good. Perhaps something has gone wrong with the text. In any case Michael does return to feeling good at 599,2. 463 The following report (599,6–10) is also included in SVF 3.17, but see above note 460. 464 Inserting ouk prior to ousa at 599,11, following Grosseteste’s Latin translation: non existens augmentationis et declinationis at 442,69. 465 Cf. Aristotle Physics 2.1. Michael’s focus is on (iii), cf. ‘the nature responsible for producing the natural [creatures]’ (599,19). 466 That is, the natural ‘happiness’ of achieving one’s zenith by becoming a healthy, fully mature adult. 467 Michael talks about tina homoitêta in anticipation of homoiôma ti in 1178b25.

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468 See Metaph. 1074b33–5 and 1075a3–5 (cf. 1072b21). The phrasing here echoes the last line of Michael’s comments on Metaph. 1174a28–b35: autos to nooun autos to nooumenon (in Metaph. 712,36). 469 Recall, however, that Michael does allow non-­rational animals to partake in an illumination from intellect. See above 534,15–17 and the note ad loc. 470 Michael’s lemma does not include the final words in 1178b27: tês toiautês energeias huparkhei, which we have supplied in brackets above. Cf. 600,6. 471 Inserting a comma after esti at 600,3 and removing the comma after theôrousi in the next line. 472 This application of the potential-­actual distinction to blessedness and happiness is striking. Cf. in EN 9, 512,2–5, where Michael employs this distinction in a similar manner to distinguish between the excellent (spoudaios) and the happy (eudaimôn) person: the spoudaios is someone who has complete virtue but, because he is not active, is only potentially happy. By contrast, the happy person is actually happy because she is active. Such an application of the potential-­actual distinction is not to be found in Aristotle, but it is found in Plotinus at Enn. 1.4.4.9–15, and we have already seen evidence that Michael has been consulting Enn. 1.4 (see above note 460). 473 Changing the full stop after eiê at 600,7 to a raised dot. 474 Here Michael appears to single out out self-­contemplation as the very activity that distinguishes the divine first intellect from the human intellect. Whereas God’s contemplation is directed at Himself, ours is directed at God. This God-­directed conception of contemplation fits with a number of other passages where Michael describes the highest human intellectual activity in terms of receiving an illumination from God, e.g. 580,19–22. But the present passage should be compared to 603,15–21, where Michael says that our contemplation is directed at our own minds, and that our likeness to God is to be explained in terms of self-­reflection (see note ad loc.), as well as to in Metaph. 698,34–699,25 (cf. Alexander Mant. 109,23–110,3), where Michael distinguishes human intellection from divine intellection in terms of the latter’s continuity compared to the former’s intermittent nature. Elsewhere, Michael often refers to other entities as the content of contemplation, though the exact identity of these entities is unclear (see above note 8). 475 The term indalma is Neoplatonic. Cf. Michael in Metaph. 697,8–11. 476 Michael proposes two exegetical options, and he appears to find both of them correct. The first takes Aristotle to be making a point about the scope of the two predicates’ extensions: the class of living things for which the one predicate obtains is the same as the class for which the other predicate obtains. The second options understands this ‘extension’-talk in temporal terms: happiness obtains for as long as one contemplates. Michael’s example here of ‘six hours’ is telling, as it reveals his conception of happiness to be intermittent. One is happy only in those moments when one is contemplating. Cf. Michael’s remark above (600,4–6) that one is only potentially happy when one is not contemplating, and see above in EN 10, 589,29–590,24. 477 The expression kata sumbebêkos is usually translated as ‘accidentally’ or ‘incidentally’. Michael is attempting to discern not just the exact meaning of sumbebêkos but also of kata. In this quotation we give the neutral translation of kata as ‘in accordance with’, but in what follows Michael appears to be proposing two different ways of construing kata. For the first proposal we have stuck with the neutral translation, but on the second proposal kata is clearly being construed as a synonym to dia, and so we have translated it there as ‘by virtue of ’.

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478 The verb stephanousthai need not have political connotations; it is used more generally of the bestowing of honors, e.g. on athletes (cf. EN 1099a2–4 and EE 1219b8–10). Nevertheless, it is a striking choice of example given that Michael has been commissioned to write this commentary by Princess Anna Comnena (see the introduction). For the second example, cf. Aristotle Pol. 1268a8–11, where Aristotle reports that in many cities the children of men who had fallen in battle were maintained at public expense. 479 Cf. Michael in EN 10, 585,9–14 and the notes there. 480 Mercken refers here to Michael in EN 10, 583,17–29. 481 Michael has krisis at 601,17 in place of Bywater’s praxis at 1179a3–4, though Bywater acknowledges that krisis is present in some MSS. 482 Reading hupo for apo at 601,20. 483 Reading oud’ for ouk at 601,32, as suggested by Heylbut in the critical apparatus. 484 Cf. Simplicius in Phys. 1318,10–13. 485 In Aristotle’s report Anaxagoras is not explicitly talking about himself but about ‘some’ (tis) happy person. Michael incorporates this tis below at 602,20: the masses see Anaxagoras as someone (tina) unhappy and strange. 486 Deleting the comma before ho Anaxagoras at 602,20. 487 Cf. Michael in EN 9, 528,5–6. 488 Michael’s lemma includes a final einai which is left implicit in Bywater’s edition, though it is in some MSS. 489 The thought here is thoroughly Neoplatonic: if A lies beneath B in the ontological hierarchy, A is not equal to B in terms of its substance, but A can become like B by virtue of its activity, that is, by turning towards B. The same thought is found, for example, in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum 6.2 (42,17–24 Kalbfleisch). It should be noted that Michael’s in GA provides us with good reason to think that he had been exposed to at least some of the Ad Gaurum (see J. Wilberding, Forms, Souls and Embryos. Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction, New York and Oxford 2016, pp. 111–18 and T. Dorandi, ‘Pour une histoire du texte du traité Ad Gaurum attribué à Galien’, in L. Brisson et al. (eds) L’embryon: formation et animation, Paris 2008, pp. 123–37 at p. 131), but Michael was likely to have encountered this thought in other sources as well (see below note 491). Here and elsewhere (556,18 and 561,27; in EN 9, 481,32) Michael describes the human intellect as engaged in self-­contemplation: it has a vision of itself and thinks itself. This should be compared to 600,7–15 above (and see note ad loc.). The ethical focus of becoming like God is central to Platonic ethics, with textual roots in Theaet. 176A–B; Tim. 90A=NE; and Symp. 207E–209E, but Michael is quite right about it also being found in the EN, especially at 1177b33: eph’ hoson endekhetai athanizein. See D. Baltzly, ‘The Virtues and “Becoming like God”: Alcinous to Proclus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004), pp. 297–321 and D.N. Sedley, ‘The Ideal of Godlikeness’, in G. Fine (ed.) Plato 2. Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul, Oxford 1999, pp. 309–28. 490 This fits well with what Michael has to say about the faculty of representation in his commentary on Aristotle’s PN. There he offers a discussion of Aristotle’s claim that thinking without representation is impossible (PN 449b31–450a1; cf. DA 427b15–17 and 432a8–9), which would seem to rule out the non-­representational thinking that Michael is insisting on here, but Michael distinguishes pure thought from representative thought, which he identifies with dianoia: hê gar dianoia ouden allo estin ê nou meta phantasias energeia (in PN 33,1–2). The faculty of representation prevents the intellect from thinking in a pure manner by importing magnitude and

Notes to pages 96–98

491 492

493 494

495 496

497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504

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extension into the thoughts (in PN 10,21–6), and in this way it obstructs intellect’s contemplation of the intelligible and divine objects of thought (in PN 12,19–22). Michael (in PN 10,21–6) associates this imperative to rise above phantasia with Plato, as does Philoponus (in DA 2,26–3,5) who refers specifically to the Phaedo. There appears to be a scholarly consensus that the reference is to Phaed. 66D, though the phantasia is not specifically mentioned there. The italicized section of text is drawn partly verbatim and partly by paraphrase from Proclus in Alc. 1 245,9–247,14. This passage is briefly discussed in Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, pp. 55–7. Here Michael adds something that is not in the Proclus text. Cf. Plato’s description of the sensible things as ‘what is opined by opinion with non-­rational sensation’ (Tim. 28A2–3). Plato does not explicitly link doxa and phantasia there, but Proclus does. Cf. note 490 on the connection between phantasia and lower forms of thought. On the union with the highest principle, see also 591,3 (henôsas heauton pros to prôton agathon); 579,4 and 580,14 (henôsis pros ta kreittô). The epopteia was the culminating act in the mysteries of Eleusis. See the note by Saffrey and Westerink ad Proclus Theol. Plat. 1.44,6 (p. 143n2). Presumably, Michael is thinking of a more general theological sense, such as is attributed to Plato by Clement of Alexandria Strom. 28.176.2, where epopteia is described as the fourth, theological division of philosophy. Michael omits malisth’ at 1179a20: ‘. . . belong most of all to the wise man’. But cf. the malista at 604,8. The question mark gives expression to the interrogative particle ar’. Michael’s lemma only gives the protasis and omits Aristotle’s te at 1179a33, which as Bywater reports is not included in all the MSS. Without the te, it seems right to take the kai epexigetically. Cf. 605,1–2. Michael use of protrepsasthai at 604,18 appears to anticipate Aristotle’s own invocation of protreptic at EN 1179b7. This seems to be the sense of this phrase hina mê legômen anankaion. Cf. anankaion at 604,30 and dei at 604,33. Aristotle’s hikanôs eirêtai tois tupois (1179a34) was omitted in the lemma at 604,11– 12. Here Michael also substitutes epeidê for ei. One use of the expression tois tupois, cf. note 284. Replacing the comma after biblia in 605,5 with interrogative punctuation, as in Bywater at 1179a35. Changing Heylbut’s eiper at 605,13–14 to ei pôs, as printed by Bywater at 1179b3 and as appears to be written in Cod. Coisl. 161 (162r). Cf. Grosseteste’s si aliqualiter at 453,62. Michael’s lemma omits pros to prior to poiêsai at 1179b4–5. In Aristotle the term kalokagathia refers to the totality of virtue (see EN 1124a1–4, where megalopsuchia is said to be the crowning achievement of virtue that is impossible with kalokagathia, and EE 1248b8–11). We translate kalokagathia with ‘noble excellence’ and the adjectives kalos k’ agathos as ‘noble and excellent’. Cf. Theognis Elegies 434. Plato also cites this line in the Meno at 95E6–7. See EN 1172b5–7. Cf. EN 1094a22–3 and 1172a23–5; with in EN 531,3–6. Heylbut marks a lacuna after dunantai at 605,23, but Vat. gr. 269 (356r) contains an additional line of text here that presumably was accidently omitted in the copying process due to the repetition of dunantai. The text in question, which we have

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Notes to pages 98–99 translated above in angled brackets, appears to read: poiêsai de kalous kagathous dikha protrepein astheneis mallon kai adunatoi eisin. eipôn de hoti protrepsai kai parormêsai dunantai. Cf. EN 1150b1–6. Although Michael does not mention the laws here, in 608,30–609,2 he will make clear that the laws also play a central role in education. Regarding some of the ambiguities surrounding Michael’s use of the term eleutherios, see above note 444. Inserting poiêsai before êthos at 605,28 with Vat. gr. 269 (356r). Cf. Aristotle’s poiêsai at 1179b9 and Grosseteste’s facere at 454,78, and see Michael’s apotelesai kai poiêsai at 606,5. Here and in what follows Michael has katakôkhimon for Bywater’s katokôkhimon at 1179b9. Despite the fact that Michael’s term katakôkhimon is better attested than katokôkhimon, it is the corrupted form. See J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols, Oxford 1892, ad 1179b9. Michael seems to have four stages in mind here. (i) The first stage is achieved via a sound upbringing. Those at this stage are said to be ‘liberal’ (605,24–5), and because they have some conception of what is noble (606,10) as well as a sense of shame (606,12–13), they are amenable to ethical discourses and exhortations. Further below Michael will add that this stage also involves the casting off of false opinions (607,5). He classifies this stage as a kind of ‘virtue’ – albeit not true virtue – and the young person at this stage may be characterized as katakôchimon ek tês aretês, i.e. made amenable by virtue – that is, by one’s sound upbringing – for the next stages (606,1–4). This kind of ‘virtue’ is comparable to the character virtues of the Neoplatonists (see above note 319). (ii) The next stage consists in listening to these discourses, which in turn lead to (iii) practical actions. And these discourses and practical actions together lead to (iv) noble-­mindedness (606,5–6), at which point we may speak of virtue in the strict sense (605,30). See also 608,20–7 below. Michael’s text has adunatei (606,8) for Bywater’s adunatein (1179b10). Heylbut has inserted pros tês kalês agôgês aidêmones ontes peitharkhousin into the text at 606,14 on the basis of the Aldine edition, but it is also present in Vat. gr. 269 (356r). Cf. also Grosseteste’s a bona ductione, verecundi existentes, oboediunt at 454,98– 455,99. On the concept of aidos in Michael, see G. Arabatzis, ‘Michael of Ephesus on the Empirical Man, the Scientist and the Educated Man (In Ethica Nicomachea X and In De Partibus Animalium I)’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries, pp. 163–84 at pp. 166ff. Vat. gr. 269 (356r) appears to have epagomenas after nomou in 606,16. See e.g. 1104b30–2. Mercken refers to 531,7–10. Cf. above 567,4–12 where Michael defines the pain opposed to activity’s proper pleasure as the pain one experiences when one is not engaged in the activity in question. This sounds like addiction, which fits well with Michael’s example here, but in 567,4–12 his examples include playing the lyre and writing, which are difficult to make sense of in this context. Possibly, he is thinking of someone who is so utterly passionate about writing that any time spent not writing is torture. If this is right, then Michael thinks that someone can also, conversely, be passionate about not writing. What is most striking about all of this is Michael’s implicit claim that there is no neutral state in these cases – only pain and pleasure – which appears to have interesing implications for his views on punishment (cf. 608,4–10).

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521 Reading hêdeiai with the Aldine edition and Vat. gr. 269 (356r) for Heylbut’s hêdonai in 606,22. Cf. Grosseteste’s delectabiles at 455,9. Michael’s language of there being true pleasures bears a closer affinity to Plato than to Aristotle, who prefers rather to talk of ‘natural’ or ‘per se’ pleasures (e.g. 1169b32 and 1170a1, but cf. Protrep. B92 Düring). 522 See EN 1095a2–13. 523 Cf. Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 173,4–8. 524 Cf. 604,28–35. 525 At 607,16 Michael has nomous for Bywater’s nomois and omits tên trophên kai ta epitêdeumata at 1179b34–5, which changes the sense considerably. 526 Once again, at 607,20 Michael has nomous for Bywater’s nomois and omits tên trophên kai ta epitêdeumata at 1179b34–5, which changes the sense considerably. 527 Michael has ginomena (with Susemihl) for Bywater’s genomena at1179b35–1180a1. 528 Inserting before Heylbut’s antekhein at 607,22, with Vat. gr. 269 (356v) and Cod. Coisl. 161 (163r). 529 The orthês at 1180a2 is omitted in Michael’s lemma (‘a correct rearing and fosterage’). 530 We insert prior to pôs at 607,31, cf. Schol. in NE (e cod. Paris. gr. 1854), 1160a22: toioutôn te khreia nomôn, kai eti tou pôs ton hapanta bion diodeuteon. Vat. gr. 269 (356v) appears to have eti to pôs. 531 Michael’s paraphrase at 607,31–2 is close enough to Aristotle’s 1180a4–5 to warrant the quotation marks. 532 When Michael writes ta gar enantia tôn enantiôn iamata at 608,7–8, he appears to be invoking Hippocratic doctrine, cf. De flatibus 92,8 Heiberg: ta enantia tôn enantiôn estin iêmata. Cf. Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 174,17–175,1. In this case the Hippocratic doctrine is understood to mean that we should not penalize people haphazardly but by denying them their most cherished pleasures. 533 Here Michael starts off by giving what looks like a rather literal interpretation of Aristotle’s comparison of the base person to ‘a beast of burden’ (1180a2): base people should be flogged like donkeys (and cf. 609,15–16). But then Michael switches to a more metaphorical (and much less brutal) interpretation, according to which the punishment consists simply of the pains that result from refraining from base activities. The implicit assumption in the background is once again that there is no neutral state between pain and pleasure (see above 567,4–12 and 606,19–20 and the notes ad loc.). 534 As Mercken (ad loc.) indicates, the reference is to 1179a31–1180a5. 535 At 608,17 Michael omits the tinos prior to phronêseôs at 1180a22: ‘. . . from a sort of prudence . . .’ . The tinos is included at 609,3. 536 Presumably Michael means 1180a14–21. 537 This paraphrase is close enough to Aristotle’s text 1180a15–17 to warrant being marked as a quote. 538 This is not the place for a full discussion of Michael’s views on the voluntary and involuntary, as there are only two very short passages in in EN 9–10 where instances of the terms ekôn and akôn occur: here and at 609,18–21. Michael has more to say about these concepts in his commentary on EN 5 (e.g. in EN 5, 49,21–50,3). 539 Reading huieis for hugieis at 608,32, cf. Mercken’s filios at 460,39. 540 Michael will come back to this thought in more detail in 611,31–612,2. 541 Cf. Eustratius in EN 6, 350,13. 542 Mercken refers to 1143b11–14. 543 At EN 1143b13–14 Aristotle describes older people as having an eye formed from experience. And again in 1114b5–12 he deals with a special kind opsis that one is

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Notes to pages 102–105 naturally endowed with and by which one correctly judges what is good. Cf. also the related discussion in 619,4–8. Even if we read agei for agein in 609,15 with the Aldine edition (and cf. Grosseteste’s ducit at 461,57), there appears to be a lacuna here. We have been translating biazesthai with ‘to suffer (or exercise) violence’ and bia with ‘(threat of) violence’. This is partly motivated by the wish to distinguish biazesthai and its cognates from anankazein (‘to force’) and iskhuein (‘to have power’) and their cognates, and partly by certain passages where ‘violence’ seems best to capture Michael’s meaning (e.g. 608,34–5). Yet as this remark shows, biazesthai can have the much broader sense of ‘to be forced’, which can also be said of one persuaded by an argument. See above note 533. See above note 538. Cf. 612,8–15. Michael’s lemma contains several divergences from Bywater’s text: it has dê at 610,1 for Bywater’s de; it omits the ê that Bywater inserts at 1180b25; it has poiêsthai (610,2) for pepoiêsthai (1080b26); and it does not include the final words trophês te kai epitêteumatôn (1080b26). As has been noted by W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford 1887, vol. 2, pp. ii–iii, Michael of Ephesus and Eustratius refer to Aristotle’s Pol. by the title Politeiai rather than Ta Politika, the Greek title now associated with the treatise. By way of explanation, Newman points us to a number of passages in the Pol. (1274b32; 1293b29; 1260b12; 1289a26) that describe the treatise as concerning itself with politeiai. In addition to books 3 and 4, Mercken directs us to Pol. 1269a29–1273b26, where Aristotle declares Sparta, Crete and Carthage to have the best constitutions. This passage is our evidence for Michael’s having written this commentary in Constantinople. See e.g. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 902. The plural ekhontes at 610,13 is grammatically difficult and perhaps needs to be changed to ekhôn. Cf. Od. 9.114–15. As Mercken indicates, see Pol. 2 and especially Pol. 1269a29–1273b26. Michael’s lemma has malista at 610,32 for Bywater’s mallon at 1180a32, though he does not seem to make much of the malista in the comments that follow. Cf. the note ad the lemma 1180b11. Mercken refers to Pol. 1279a22ff. plus books 4 and 6. See above note 550. The dê at 611,21 is not found in Bywater’s text. See also below 615,15 and note ad loc. Michael has iskuhei at 611,31 for Bywater’s eniskhuei at 1180b4. According to Bywater’s text, ta nomina kai ta êthê are operative in the city, while hoi patrikoi logoi kai ta ethê are operative in the household. Yet as he also reports in the apparatus, some MSS make ethê operative in the city and êthê in the household (and see Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ad loc.), and this appears to be what Michael’s text has, though Michael’s text might not even contain the final kai ta êthê. Michael repeatedly associates nomoi and ethê (611,21.32.34; 612,6; 620,10). The argument for reading ethê rather than êthê in connection with the city is that customs would seem to have the greater claim to being shared than characters, and that Aristotle himself connects the two at 1181b22. If êthê is correct, then it is in the sense of ‘national character’ (Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ad loc.). In what follows Michael offers two alternative solutions to a perceived tension between EN 1180b3–5 and EN 1180a18–21. On the first interpretation (611,34–6;

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cf. 608,30–5) in both passages the force in question is the soft power that the father has to influence his children, and the tension is alleviated by saying that the father’s sphere of influence is limited: only well brought-­up children are amenable to this soft power. On the second interpretation (611,36–612,2), the tension is alleviated by distinguishing between two kinds of power: here in 1180b3–5 Aristotle is granting that the father has soft power, whereas above in 1180a18–21 Aristotle was denying that the father has any hard power worth mentioning. This is effectively what Michael says in 608,30–5. Cf. 608,34–5. Michael’s paraphrase of EN 1180b3–5 at 612,5–7 is close enough to warrant the quotation marks. Michael’s second dia at 612,9 is not found in Bywater’s text. On the problem surrounding the suspicion of ill-­will, cf. 609,27–37. Given all the good that the father has provided for his children, the suspicion of ill-­will would be wholly anomalous. The remark at the end about true goods and apparent goods might recall Aristotle’s distinction between the friend and the flatterer (1173b31– 1174a1): the father is a friend, not a flatterer, because he has the genuine good of his children in mind, and not merely the appearance of good. On the asymmetric relationship between parents and children, cf. e.g. EN 1158b21–3 and Michael in EN 9, 470,13–29 and 473,7–474,3. Reading to aoriston with the Vat. gr. 269 (357v) for Heylbut’s to ariston at 612,21–2. This same example is found in Hermogenes Peri staseôn 40,11–14; 82,10–13 Rabe (and cf. Syrianus in Hermog. 194,2–195,5), and our translation owes a debt to M. Heath’s translation of Hermogenes, Hermogenes. On Issues. Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric, Oxford 1995, pp. 34 and 55. Michael also employs this case at in EN 5, 67,10–33, again as an example of a just exception to a universal law. See also Ps.-Heliodorus (on whose identity, see J. Barnes, ‘An Introduction to Aspasius’, in A. Alberti and R.W. Sharples (eds) Aspasius. The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berlin and New York 1999, pp. 1–50 at p. 13) in EN 109,11–14 (translated in W.M. Hatch, The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle, London 1879, p. 295). With this whimsical depiction of the Spartans’ well-­known practice of exercising naked (cf. Thucydides Hist. 1.6), Michael appears to be poking fun at the Spartans. Although Michael (following Aristotle) is prepared to acknowledge that Sparta is superior to many other constitutions, he still emphasizes that it is in need of serious correction (see above 610,1–19). In the EN Aristotle uses the adjective euphuês only three times (1114b8 and 12; 1144b34). In book 6 it turns up in the context of his remarks on natural virtue (1144b34), where he uses it to characterize the person who is naturally best suited for one virtue but not for another. (Note that while the virtues in the strict sense are mutually entailing, this is not the case with these so-­called natural virtues, on which see above note 429.) It is not clear whether the two instances in book 3 should be understood in precisely this sense. Michael’s own use of the term here might prima facie seem to be wholly a matter of natural intellectual talent and to have no bearing on ethical matters, but see below 613,23–614,2. Michael’s paraphrase is close enough to Aristotle’s text to justify the quotation marks. exakribousthai generally means ‘to be made more exact or more complete’. Above in the discussion of pleasure Michael (following Aristotle) talks of a pleasure exakribein an activity, which we translated as ‘honing’ the activity. In this discussion

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Notes to pages 106–108 of improving skills, ‘achieving proficiency’ seems best to capture what Michael is after with exakribousthai and the related adjective akribestês. Michael’s lemma has de for Aristotle’s dê (1180b11) and malista for Aristotle’s mallon (1180b11), though in his comments below Michael argues only for the comparative (cf. akribesteros at 613,17–18 and 32; mallon at 613,20, 22 and 24). Michael’s example anticipates Aristotle’s own example in the next lemma at 1180b14. Note that Grosseteste’s text here has circa pugilativam vel exercitativam vel grammaticam (467,17), to which Mercken notes that exercitativam vel is omitted in the Greek MSS due to homoioteleuton. Vat. gr. 269 (357v) supports Heylbut’s text. Michael’s lemma has men tou kath’ hena arista at 614,3 for Bywater’s men arista kath’ hen at 1180b13–14. Note that the men has been replaced by an at 614,12. Reading to kath’ hekaston with Vat. gr. 269 (358r) for Heylbut’s to katholou at 614,7. Heylbut’s text does have the support of Cod. Coisl. 161 (164r) and Grosseteste (468,29–30). Deleting Heylbut’s second an in 614,7. Heylbut’s text has epimelêtheiê an at 614,12 for Bywater’s epimelêtheiê men at 1180b13. Cf. above ad 614,3–4. Reading ho with Vat. gr. 269 (358r) for Heylbut’s hê at 614,13 (cf. ho at 614,14). Michael also has to katholou for Bywater’s katholou at 1180b14. On the uncertainty regarding the extent of Michael’s knowledge of medicine, see above note 11. It is perhaps surprising to see Michael identifying the theôrêtês with the tekhnikos, but Vat. gr. 269 (358r) confirms this in even stronger language: boulomenon tekhnikon kai theôrêtên genesthai – esti de to theôrêtikon t’auton tô tekhnikô. On the uncertainty regarding the extent of Michael’s knowledge of medicine, see above note 11. Michael appears to be reading kai gnôristeon where Bywater has ka’ keino gnôristeon at 1180b22. The text of the EN embedded in Cod. Coisl. 161 has ka’ keino gnôristeon (164v). On the expression aei hôsautôs ekhein, cf. 529,14–15 and the note ad loc. Michael’s lemma has beltious di’ epimeleias for Bywater’s di’ epimeleias beltious and elides Bywater’s de and the second eite. This remark about the laws being ‘unerring’ or perhaps ‘infallible’ (aptaistos) is prima facie in tension with Michael’s remarks about the deficiency that necessarily accompanies laws insofar as they are universal statements (see 611,22–8 and 612,20ff.) The latter view is clearly also Aristotle’s, see e.g. EN 5 where Aristotle states that all laws qua universals err in certain individual cases (1137b14–16) and that it is the responsibility of the ‘decent’ (epieikês) person to correct for these deficiencies (on this role of the decent person, see H.J. Fossheim, ‘Justice in Nicomachean Ethics Book V’, in J. Miller (ed.) A Critical Guide to Aristotle’s Ethics, Cambridge 2011, pp. 254–75 and C. Horn, ‘Epieikeia: the Competence of the Perfectly Just Person in Aristotle’, in B. Reis (ed.) The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, Cambridge 2006, pp. 142–66). In his commentary on this passage in EN 5, Michael faithfully paraphrases Aristotle’s views (see especially in EN 5, 67,4–68,5, where he once again employs the example of the alien ascending the walls [see above note 567]), and there is no attempt to save the laws from this critique. The translation of aptaistos as ‘unerring’ (rather than ‘infallible’) is an attempt to assuage this tension. Perhaps Michael only means to be saying that the law is unerring – not in the sense that it infallibly orders the just

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outcome in each particular case – but in the sense that its orders are reliable and consistent over all cases. Vat. gr. 269 (358v) has diakrinein for Heylbut’s krinai at 615,18, but there is little difference in sense. Cf. diakrinein at 615,16–17. A close but condensed paraphrase of EN 1180b26–7. Michael’s construal of Aristotle’s diatheinai at 1180b26 is particularly interesting. Mercken refers us to Pol. 1288b10ff. See above note 550. Given how frequently both Aristotle and Michael use medical examples in their respective ethical works (see above note 11), it is certainly surprising to see that Michael has hippikês at 615,26 for Aristotle’s iatrikês (1180b27). It is possible that something has gone wrong in the transmission of Michael’s text here, but hippikês is confirmed by Grosseteste (470,85) and Vat. gr. 269. If the transmitted text is sound, then perhaps this remark about the equestrian art is best understood with reference to Michael’s remark that the legislative art is part of the political art (615,25). The equestrian art is a more appropriate analogy than medicine insofar as it, like the legislative art, is clearly subordinated to a higher art, namely generalship (EN 1094a9–14). Indeed, if we follow Aspasius (in EN 1, 4,24–7) the esquestrian art is itself subordinated to politics. Heylbut follows Bywater in printing the interrogative particle ar’ (with a circumflex accent) both in the lemma (615,29) and in the comments (615,31), but the particle is given with an acute accent in both the lemma and the comments in Cod. Coisl. 161 (164v) and Vat. gr. 269 (358v), as well as in the text of the EN embedded in Cod. Coisl. 161. Michael is concerned that one might be tempted to read ar’ oun as an interrogative construction, because there should be no question that we should be doing these things next. Bywater’s text, however, is surely right. Reading touto eipôn epêgagen with Vat. gr. 269 (358v) for Heylbut’s touto epêgagen eipôn at 615,34. Michael’s text has kai for Bywater’s te kai at 1180b31–2. Aristotle defines rhetoric as a dunamis of persuasion in Rhet. 1355b25–6, and he distinguishes it from proper tekhnai by the fact that the former has a universal scope of application, whereas with the latter each has its own determined area. Yet it is not Aristotle that Michael refers to here by hoi palaioi. It seems likely that the Gorgias rather than the Politics is in the background here. See below 616,35 and note ad loc. As Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, vol. 3, 131 notes, the politician and the legislator are often mentioned in combination in the Pol., e.g. 1274b36; 1288b27; 1309b35; 1326a4. See E. Schütrumpf, Aristoteles. Politik, 4 vols, Berlin 1991–2005, ad 1274b36, who sees this as a ‘Gleichsetzung’ of the two and points out that it is already to be found in Plato (Polit. 309D; Laws 638D; 688A; 693A; etc.). Cf. 619,14–15. Reading prosbibazei for Heylbut’s probibazei at 616,17 with Vat. gr. 269 (358v) and Cod. Coisl. 161 (164v). Cf. 466,36 and 617,23–4. Heylbut marks what follows as a quotation, since Michael is speaking in the voice of Aristotle in these lines. Although no closing quotation mark is given in Heylbut’s text, it is clear that Michael is speaking in Aristotle’s voice until 616,28. This translates hoi nun politeuomenoi at 616,25 (also at 616, 29 and 34, and cf. hoi politeuomenoi at EN 1181a1), where Michael’s nun must be understood as referring to Aristotle’s time, as the examples make clear. See note ad 616,18. Michael’s lemma leaves out the final phainontai at 1181a4: ‘For they obviously neither [. . .]’.

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Notes to pages 110–112

601 Heylbut refers to Gorg. 484D, which Mercken rightly rejects. His own suggestion of Gorg. 517B–C and 518E–519A is certainly more plausible, but Michael might simply be thinking of Gorg. 465A2–6, where Plato distinguishes between tekhnê, which can provide a logos, and empeiria, which cannot. Note how Michael unpacks Aristotle’s dunamei tini (1181a2) as empeiria kai alogô tribê at 616,26–7 (cf. alogon pragma at Gorg. 465A6). This is in any case a passage that is frequently cited by the commentators and others, e.g. Ammonius in Int. 223,7–8; Anon. in Int. 104,17–18 Taran; Asclepius in Metaph. 5,23–4; Elias in Cat. 191,19–20; Galen De experientia medica 94 Walzer; Olympiodorus in Gorg. 12,2; Philoponus in DA 54,25–6; 57,12–13; 61,33–4; Psellus Theol. 68,63–5; Syrianus in Hermog. 6,13–14. Michael frequently makes reference to the Gorg. in his in SE. See also the note ad 617,25 below. 602 Michael appears to be interested in making Aristotle’s remark here conform to the latter’s three-­fold division of rhetoric (Rhet. 1358b6–7): forensic (dikanikon), deliberative (sumbouleutikon) and epideictic (epideiktikon). Thus, the ‘popular’ (dêmêgorikous) speeches are understood to refer to the ‘deliberative’ speeches. This distinction is frequently invoked by commentators, who sometimes substitute panêgurikon for epideiktikon and associate each with three goals: to kalon, to dikaion and to sumperon (though sometimes one of these is replaced by to agathon). E.g. Proclus in Alc. 1 183,21ff.; Hermias in Phaedr. 219,11–19; Elias in Isag. 21,18–23; Syrianus in Hermog. (passim); David Proleg. 72,3–25. Cf. 616,32. 603 We are translating Heylbut’s êdesan ta politika at 617,7 here. Vat. gr. 269 (359r) appears to have êdesan ta politika kai tên politikên epistêmên. 604 Michael’s text apparently diverges from Bywater’s in one and perhaps even two ways. First, he has mallon after sunêtheias at 617,16, which Bywater omits. As Bywater himself notes, the mallon is included in some MSS, and some scholars prefer to keep it (e.g. Irwin ad loc.). Second, Michael’s text might not include the final word politikoi (1181a11). At least this might be inferred from 617,16–18, where he appears to be explaining mallon as mallon politikoi. 605 Michael’s emphasis on the What-­is-F? question (cf. 616,9–10.26; 617,24.25.30.32; 619,21) seems to strike a Platonic chord. The basis in Aristotle’s text for posing this question is EN 1181a22: holôs gar oude poion ti estin ê peri poia isasin. Cf. Michael’s invocation of Plato’s Gorg. above at 616,35 and the note ad loc. 606 Cf. Plato Apol. 19E3–4. Note that the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) also includes Polus’ name. 607 Here the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) appears to have kai logou kai peiras for Heylbut’s kai tautês at 617,27–8: ‘deprived of both theory and experience’. 608 Reading estin hôsper an ei tis legei hoti hê Sôkratous kheir kai ho Sôkratês tauton ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê with the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) for Heylbut’s estin ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê at 617,31. 609 Our translation reflects that Michael’s text omits Aristotle’s suniasin at 1181a20–1. 610 Bywater’s tis at 1181b1 is omitted in Michael’s text at 618,16–17. 611 Cf. the discussion in the note ad 618,12. 612 Michael’s switch from the singular ‘person’ in 618,26 to the plural verb legousin at 618,27 makes it difficult to determine the subject. It is possible that Michael means for the implicit subject to be the medical books themselves (ta biblia), as he routinely uses plural verbs with neuter plural subjects. If that’s right, then he might be offering us a brief glimpse into the world of Byzantine medical texts. Yet the participles dielthontes and eipontes at 618,32–3 strongly suggest that people are the subject throughout this passage. On Michael’s medical background, see above note 11.

Notes to pages 112–114

159

613 The distinction between homoiomeric and organic disease is Galenic, see e.g. De methodo medendi 10.135 K. and De morborum differentiis 6.836–80 K., with B. Gundert, ‘Krankheit’, in K.-H. Leven (ed.) Antike Medizin. Ein Lexikon, Munich 2005, pp. 530–33 at p. 532. 614 These are three forms of evacuation: through the veins; through the mouth, colon and bladder; and through the skin. We are reading a third dia prior to hidrôtôn at 618,32 with Vat. gr. 269 (359r). 615 The text is difficult, and Vat. gr. 269 (359v) is no help here. Heylbut prints tois men empeirikois kai tois logikois hama ôphelimos (619,1–2), which must be understood as referring to two separate groups of people – those who have theory and those who have experience – saying that the division is at once useful to both groups. This seems unsatisfactory because it would have Michael conceding that some people can profit from this division even in the absence of experience. At the very least, the distinction between these logikoi and those who just read books would need more explanation. It might be possible to retain Heylbut’s text, if we read this as a reference to two schools of medicine: ‘. . . at once useful both to the rationalists and the empiricists’, i.e. the division is helpful regardless of your theoretical background, as long as you have experience, too. Still, it seems unlikely that Michael would use these terms in this academic sense, when he has just been discussing logos and peira in the ordinary sense. Therefore, we simply delete the second tois. The importance of experience for the physician is also underlined at in EN 5, 8,11–9,3. 616 Heylbut’s text here is difficult. Vat. gr. 269 (359v) has tois iatrikois for tês iatrikês at 619,3. 617 See Michael’s remarks on the ‘eye’ gained from experience at 609,7–10 (and see note ad loc.), where he identifies this eye with prudence. There is some tension between EN 1114b5–12 and 1143b11–14 as to whether this eye comes from experience or nature, which partially explains Michael’s euphuesterois here. 618 Michael’s lemma reverses Bywater’s word order of anereunêton and tôn proterôn at 1181b12–13 and omits Bywater’s to at 1181b13. 619 Cf. Pol. 1274a22–b28. See above note 550. 620 Reading beltion with Vat. gr. 269 (359r) for Heylbut’s to beltion at 619,18. 621 Cf. Pol. 2 (1260b27–1274b28) where Aristotle reviews ideal and existing constitutions and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. See above note 550. 622 On the What-­is-F? question, see above note 605. Cf. Pol. 1274b32–4. 623 Cf. Pol. 2.1–6 (1260b27–1266a30). 624 Heylbut’s hoion pôs hê dêmokratia takhtheisa, which he inserts on the basis of the Aldine edition, is also included in Vat. gr. 269 (360r). 625 Heylbut and Mercken refer us to Pol. 1291b30–1292a38. Cf. also Pol. 1309b35– 1310a2. 626 The MSS actually present us with two rather different conclusions to the commentary, one secular and one Christian in tone. The Christian conclusion given above is a translation of the final lines of Heylbut’s text (620,15–20), which correspond to the final lines of Cod. Coisl. 161 and, with some minor variations, to the final lines of the Vat. gr. 269 (360r). Vat. gr. 269, however, actually contains an additional (secular) conclusion, as has already been noted in G. Mercati (ed.), Codices Vaticani Graeci. Tomus I. Codices 1–329, Rome 1923, p. 354. The secular conclusion is given first as a seamless continuation of the commentary, and it reads as follows (following Mercati): hôde men oun telos ekhetô, kai hai eis to kappa skholai kai auto to kappa. tauta men emoi Mikhaêl tô Ephesiô, kai houtôs, ei de tis allos ekhoi kallion

160

Notes to page 114 legein, houtos ouk ekhthros all’ ho panaristos tôn emoi philôn esti. (‘Let the comments on book 10 and book 10 itself reach their end here. These things [have been written] by me, Michael of Ephesus, and [have been written] this way. But if someone else should be able to speak in a finer manner, this person is not hateful [to me] but my very best friend’.) The second, Christian, conclusion is appended below this one and separated off by crosses. (Mercati (ed.), Codices Vaticani Graeci, p. 354 says this is by the same hand that made other additions earlier in the MS, prior to the start of Michael’s comments on EN 10.) Two brief points may be noted here. First, it is clear from the amount of repetition that the two conclusions are meant as alternative endings. Second, the secular conclusion, if authentic, is the only place – putting the titles of his works aside – where Michael refers to himself by name and as being from Ephesus. There is only one other passage that offers evidence for Michael’s hailing from Ephesus, namely in EN 10, 570,21–2 (see note ad loc.).

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English–Greek Glossary ability: dunamis absence: apousia accompany, to: hepesthai accomplish, to: dianuein accumulation: episunthesis achieve a life, to: zên achieve full completion, to: telein achieve victory, to: nikan acquisition: ktêsis, epiktêsis act justly, to: dikaiopragein act of beneficence: euergesia act of creation: poiêsis act of disobedience: apeitheia act of learning: mathêsis act temperately, to: sôphronein active (adj.): drastikos active, to be (v.): energein activity (n.): energeia actuality: energeia actualization: entelekheia admit, to: epidekhesthai advancing (motion): phora affection: pathos, storgê afflicted, to be: enokhleisthai age: hêlikia agitation: okhlos agreed, to be: homologeisthai agreement: sunkatathesis air: aêr alcohol: methê alien: xenos alive, to be: zên amusement: paidia analogous: analogos anger: orgê animal: zôon anxious, to be: phrontizein appetite (n.): epithumia appetitive (adj.): epithumêtikos appetitive part (n.): epithumia apprehension: antilêpsis, katalêpsis

168

English–Greek Glossary

appropriate, to be: kathêkein aristocracy (n.): aristokrateia aristocratic, to be (v.): aristokrateisthai arithmetic: to arithmêtikon arithmetician: arithmêtikos armour: hoplon arrangement: kosmos, eukosmia, diakosmêsis art: tekhnê ascend, to: anatrekhein, anerkhesthai ascent: anodos ashamed, to be: aiskhunesthai ask, to: erôtan asset: khrêma assume, to (v.): hupolambanein assumption (n.): hupolêpsis athletic trainer: gumnastês at leisure, to be: skholazein attend to, to: têrein augment, to (v.): epididonai augmentation (n.): epidosis avoid, to: pheugein awareness: ennoia bad: kakos bear anxiety, to: phrontizein bear fruit, to: karpophorein bear ill-­will, to: phthonein beast: thêrion beast of burden: hupozugion beautiful (adj.): kalos beauty (n.): kallos become fatigued, to: kamnein become like, be made like, to: homoiousthai become weary, to: kamnein befit, to: prepein begin, to (v.): arkhein beginning (n.): arkhê behave in an insolent manner, to: hubrizein being (n.): zôon being able to preserve (adj.): sôstikos being combined (n.): sundromê being made like God (n.): hê pros theon homoiôsis beneficial (adj.): ôphelimos benefit, to (v.): ôphelein bereft of, to be: khôrizein black (adj.): melas blackness (n.): melania blessedness: makariotês blood: haima

English–Greek Glossary bloom (n.): anthos blossom, to (v.): epanthein boldness: tharros born, to be: gennan boundary: horos bring to, to: komizein bring to completion, to: epiteleisthai brutish: zôôdês buy, to: exôneisthai call, to: apokalein, onomazein call happy, to: eudaimonizein capable of exposing: elenktikos capable of judging: kritikos capable of laughing: gelastikos capable of sensation: aisthêtikos capacity for vision: opsis care for, to: epimeleisthai cash: nomisma cause (n.): aitia, aitios cause pain, impose pain, to: lupein causing laughter (adj.): geloios cauterization: kausis caution: eulabeia centre-­point: kentron chance: tukhê change (n): metabolê change, to (v.): metaballein change the rhythm of one’s life, to: metarruthmizein character: êthos child (n.): pais childhood (n.): to paidikon choice (n.): hairesis, proairesis choiceworthy (adj.): hairetos choose, to (v.): haireisthai, proaireisthai citizen: politês city: polis class: genos clear: enargês come to an end, to: teleutan (come to) understand, to: manthanein command (n.): prostaxis commensurate: summetros commentator: exêgêtês common (adj.): koinos common feature (n.): koinônia common knowledge: kathomilêmenos company (n.): sunôdos compensate, to: anaplêroun

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complete (adj.): teleios complete, to (v.): telein composed, to be: sunkeisthai conceive, to (v.): epinoein conception (n.): ennoia conclusion: epiphora condemn as bad, to: ekphaulizein condition (n.): katastasis condition of suitability (n.): epitêdeiotês conducive to happiness: eudaimonikos confirm, to (v.): pistoun confirmation (n.): pistis conscious experience: sunaisthêsis consider, to (v.): skopein consideration (n.): eulabeia constitution: politeia contain flaws, to: diamartanesthai contemplate, to (v.): theasthai, theôrein contemplation (n.): theôria, theôrein contemplative (adj.): theôrêtikos contempt: nemesis contiguity: haphê continuation: diamonê contrary: enantios convention: ethos conviction (n.): pistis convince, to (v.): peithein corporeal: sômatoeidês correct: orthos correction: diorthôsis correctness: orthotês corroborate, to: pistoun corrupted, to be: diaphtheiresthai cosmos: kosmos counsel: hupothêkê country: patris courage (n.): andreia courageous (adj.): andreios cowardice: deilia Creator: dêmiourgos creature: gennêma credibility: pithanon crown (n.): stephanos cultivate, to: therapeuein cure (n.): iama cure, to (v.): iasthai custom (n.): sunêtheia custom, customarily (n.): ethos cut up, to: anatemnesthai

English–Greek Glossary dead: nekros dear: philos death: thanatos deceived, to be: exapatasthai decency (n.): epieikeia decent (adj.): epieikês decree: prostaxis deed: ergon defame, to: dusphêmein deficiency: elleima delight, to: terpein delight our senses, to: euphrainein deliver, to: ekpherein democracy: dêmokratia depart from, to: ekpiptein desire (n.): orexis desire (v.): oregesthai destroy, to (v.): apollunai, phtheirein destruction (n.): phthora determine, to (v.): horizein determined (adj.): hôrismenos development: epidosis devour, to: ekrophein dialectic: dialektikos difference (n.): diaphora difference (n.): heterotês different (adj.): diaphoros differentiate, to (v.): diairein differentiation (n.): diairesis direct consideration: skopein disadvantageous: asumphoros discern, to: dioran discover, to (v.): heuriskein discover(y) (n.): heuresis disgrace: mômos dispensation: moira dispose, to (v.): diatithenai disposition (n.): diathesis distinguish, to: diakrinein distorted, to be: diastrephesthai distribution: dianomê disturbance: tarakhê divine: theios do exercises, to: gumnazesthai do geometry, to: geômetrein do good (deeds), to: eupragein do in an inherent way, to (v.): enuparkhein doing (n.): poiêsis, praxis doing bad (n.): kakopragia

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doing-­well (n.): eupragia dominate, to: epikratein donkey: onos draft, to: graphein duration: khronos, mêkos eagerness: prothumia earth: gê easily motivated: eukinêtos educate, to (v.): paideuein educated, to be (v.): exameleisthai education (n.): paideia, paideusis educator: paidagôgos emancipation: apotukhia employ, to: khreisthai empty: kenos enable, to: apergazesthai endowed with reason: ellogos enemy: ekhthros engaged (in activity), to be: energein engage in conversation, to: dialegesthai enjoy, to (v.): khairein enjoyment (n.): khara entelechy: entelekheia entwined, to be: sumplekesthai erroneous, to be (v.): hamartanesthai error (n.): hamartêma establish, to: sunistanai eternal: aidios ethical: êthikos examine, to: episkeptesthai excel, to: huperekhein excellence in measure: eumetria excellence in order: eutaxia excess: huperbolê excitement: diatasis, ptoia exercise, to: gumnasion exercise violence, to: biazesthai exhausted, to be (or get) (v.): kopian exhaustion (n.): kopos exhort, to: protrepein experience: empeiria, pathos experience pleasure, to: hêdesthai experience sensation, to: aisthanesthai expound, to: exêgeisthai extend, to (v.): diateinein extension (n.): paratasis eye: omma, opsis

English–Greek Glossary faculty: dunamis falling sick (n.): nosansis familiarity: sunêtheia farm, to: geôrgein father: patêr fear: phobos fee: misthos feel, to: horman feel good, to (v.): eupathein feeling good (n.): eupatheia feign, to: hupokrinesthai foetus: embruon fight (n.): makhê fight, to (v.): makhesthai fight heroically, to: aristeuein figure (n.): skhêma fill, to (v.): plêroun filling (n.): plêrôsis final (adj.): telikos, teleutaios find, to: heuriskein fire: pur firm: bebaios fit, to: prepein flatterer: kolax flavour: khumos flawed, to be: hamartanesthai, diamartanesthai flee, to: pheugein flesh: sarx flog (n.): mastix flog (v.): mastizein flute-­playing (n.): aulêsis follow upon, to: hepesthai, epakolouthein folly: êlithiotês forego leisure, to: askholeisthai form (n.): eidos, idea formal: eidêtikos formation: diaplasis foster, to (v.): epimeleisthai fosterage (n.): epimeleia freedom from agitation: aokhlêsia friend: philos friendship: philia fruit: karpos fulfill, to: apoplêroun function: ergon gain (n.): harpagê gain a share, to: metekhein

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gape after, to: khaskein garment: huphasma general (n.): stratêgos generally: katholou generate, to (v.): gennan generate pleasure, to (v.): hêdein generative (adj.): genesiourgos geometer: geômetrês geometry: geômetria get in the way of, to: parempodizein gift: dôron give rise to, to: metabainein giving (n.): dosis gladdened, to be: epigêthein goal: skopos God: theos god-­loved: theophilês gold: khrusos golden: khrusinos good: agathos good order: euthêmosunê grain of millet: kenkhros grasp, to: dialambanein guard, to: têrein habitual state: hexis habituate, to: ethizein haematogenesis: exaimatôsis happy (adj.): eudaimôn, eudaimonôs happy, to be (v.): eudaimonizein happiness (n.): eudaimonia harbour: limên hardship: ponos harm, to (v.): blaptein harmful (adj.): blaberos harmonic (adj.): harmonikos harmonious (adj.): enharmonios, euôdês harmony (n.): harmonia, summetria hate (n.): misos hate, to (v): ekhthrainein, misein have a share, to: koinônein have (an) appetite(s), to: epithumein have an impulse, to: horman, aphorman have an inclination, to: klinein have in mind, to: skopein have the power to, to: iskhuein have the right opinions, to: orthodoxein have knowledge, to: eidenai (have) need, to: khrêzein

English–Greek Glossary having theory (adj.): logikos hay: khortos health (n.): hugieia healthy, to be (v.): hugiainein heaven: ouranos help, to: boêthein, ôphelein high-­mindedness: megalopsukhia hold power, to: dunasteuein holy: hagios, semnos homegrown: autophuês homoiomeric: homoiomerês (act of) honor: timê hour: hôra human (adj.): anthrôpikos, anthrôpinos human being (n.): anthrôpos humour: khumos hurry back, to: anatrekhein ignorance: agnoia ignore, to: paridein illness: nosos ill-­treated, to be (v.): kakousthai ill-­treatment (n.): kakôsis ill-­will: phthonos illuminate, to (v.): ellampein illumination (n.): ellampsis immediate contact: epaphê immortal: athanatos impede, to: empodizein impelled, to be: horman impulse: hormê in a state of quiet, to be: atremizein in agreement, to be: homologeisthai in general: katholou in outline: en tupoi in the right mind, to be: phronein in trouble, to be: kinduneuein in unison: homophônôs incline, to: apoklinein incline (towards), to: apoklinein incomparably: asunkritôs incorporeal: asômatos increase (n.): epitasis increase, to (v.): auxein, epiteinesthai indeterminacy (n.): to aoriston indeterminate (adj.): aoristos indicate, to (v.): hupodeiknuein, mênuein indication (n.): sêmeion indifferent: êmelêmenôs

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indivisible: atomos indulge in, to (v.): apolauein indulgence (n.): apolausis inexperienced: apeiros inferiority: huphesis injustice: adikia innate: autophuês inquiry: zêtêsis insolence: hubris inspired: daimonios instruction: parangelia instrument: organon intellect (n.): nous intellectual (adj.): noeros intellectual thinking, thought (n.): noêsis intellectual understanding (n.): nous intelligible (adj.): noêtos intensity: suntonia intercourse: homilia interpretation: exêgêsis intervallic (adj.): diastêmatikos introduce, to: epeisagein intuition: epibolê invest hard work, to: diaponeisthai invite strangers into the house, to: xenodokein involuntarily: akôn involve sensible forms, to: morphôtikos judge, to (v.): krinein judgement (n.): krisis just (adj.): dikaios just action (n.): dikaiopragia justice (n.): dikaiosunê, dikaion justly (adv.): dikaiôs keep away from, to: apeirgein keep healthy, to: sôzein kind: eidos, genos king: basileus kinship: oikeiôsis, sungeneia know, to (v.): eidenai, epistasthai knowledge (n.): epistêmê, gnôsis knucklebone: astragalos lack (n.): endeia lack, to (v.): endein lack of disturbance: ataraxia lack of natural talent: aphuês lacking (in) leisure: askholos

English–Greek Glossary lacking moderation: ametros lacking or lack of leisure: askholia laissez-­faire attitude: ameleia land: khôra lap: diaulos laugh, to: gelan law: nomos, nomimos learn, to: manthanein leave behind, to: katalimpanein legislate, to (v.): nomothetein legislation (n.): nomothesia legislator: nomothetês leisure: skholê length: mêkos lesson: mathêma letter: gramma liberal (adj.): eleutherios liberality (n.): eleutheria, eleutheriotês liberate, to (v.): eleutheroun licentious (adj.): akolastos licentiousness (n.): akolasia life: bios, zên light: phôs like, to be: eikein likeness: homoiôma, homoiotês limb: melos line: grammê lion: leôn live, to: bioun, zên live together with, to: sundiagein living: zên living thing: zôon living-­well: euzôia long after, long for, to (v.): pothein longing (n.): ephesis look up in contemplation, to: anatheôrein lose, to: apollunai love (n.): philia, philtron love, to (v.): philein love of humanity: philanthrôpia love of money: philarguria lovely: erasmios lover: philos mad, to be: mainesthai made proper, to be: oikeiousthai magnificence: megaloprepeia maintain, to (v.): sôzein, diakratein maintenance (n.): trophê

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English–Greek Glossary

make a contribution, to: sunergein make a judgement, to: krinein make a mistake, to: sunergein make appear, to: apophainein make like, to: exomoioun make out to be, to: apophainein many-­headed: leontôdês massive amount: plêthos material (n.): hulê mathematics: mathêmatikê (tekhnê) matter of choice (adj.): hairetos mean (n.): meson, mesotês meaning: dianoia measure (n.): metron medical (adj.): iatrikos medical art (n.): iatrikê (tekhnê) medicine (n.): iatrikê (tekhnê) medicine (n.): iatreusis melodic (adj.): emmelês melody (n.): melos memory: mnêmê mildness: praotês mislead, to: anapeithein missing, to be: elleipein mixed, to be (v.): paramignusthai mixture (n.): krasis moderation: metrêtos monad: monas monarchy: basileia money: khrêma mortal (adj.): thnêtos motion: kinêsis movement: kinêsis multitude: plêthos narrate, to (v.): diêgeisthai narrating (n.): diêgêsis naturally well suited, to be: euphuôs ekhein nature: phusis navigate, to (v.): kubernan navigating (n.): kubernêsis necessary (adj.): anankaios need (n.): khreia neglect, to: amelein nobility (n.): kallos nobility of children: euteknia noble (adj.): kalos noble birth: eugeneia noble excellence: kalokagathia

English–Greek Glossary noble-­minded: eugenês non-­rational: alogos nourish, to (v.): trephein nourishment (n.): trophê nude (adj.): gumnos obey, to: peitharkhein object of appetite: epithumêton object of rational thought: dianoêtos object of sight: horatos object of study: mathêma object of taste: geuston objection: enstasis obscurity: asapheia observe, to: theasthai, theôrein obstruct, to: kôluein occupation (n.): diatribê occupied, to be (v.): askholeisthai, endiatribein occupying (n.): diatribê odour: osmê office: arkhê old (adj.): gêraios old person (n.): gerôn One Itself, The: autohen opinion: doxa opposed (adj.): enantios opposite (adj.): enantios order (n.): kosmos, taxis, diakosmos order, to (v.): epitattein over-­bold (adj.): thrasus over-­boldness (n.): thrasutês overanalyze, to: diasparattein overcome, to: huperphronein oversee, to: episkeptesthai own (adj.): oikeios pain (n.): lupê painful (adj.): lupêros paint, to: graphein part: meros partake, to: metekhein, merizesthai participate, to (v.): metekhein participation (n.): methexis particle: morion passage: lexis passion (n.): pathos, empatheia passionate (adj.): empathês passive, to be (v.): paskhein pastime: diagôgê

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English–Greek Glossary

pay no attention to, to: huperoran peace: eirênê penalty: zêmia perfect: teleios perforated: tetrêmenos perform (an activity or action), to: energein perform just actions, to: dikaiopragein period of time: khronos persist, to: menein persuade, to: peithein philosophical project: theôria philosophy: philosophia physician: iatros picture: eikôn pinnacle: akmê place: topos plant: phuton plausible: pithanos play knucklebones, to: astragalizein play the flute, to: aulein pleasant (adj.): hêdus pleasing (adj.): arestos pleasure (n.): hêdonê point: stigmê political (adj.): politikos political office: arkhê political power: dunasteia possession: khrêma, ktêma, ktêsis possible (adj.): dunatos potentiality (n.): dunamis pour, to: ekkhein poured off, to be: apokheisthai power (n.): dunamis, dunasteia powerful (adj.): dunastês, dunatos practical (adj.): praktikos practical action (n.): praxis practice (n.): praxis practice humanity, to: anthrôpeuesthai praise (n.): epainos praised, to be (v.): epainesthai praiseworthy (adj.): epainetos predicate, to: katêgorein premise: protasis preparation: paraskeuê present, to be: prokeisthai preservative (adj.): sôstikos preserve, to (v.): diasôzesthai, phulattein, sôzein prevent, to: kôluein principle: arkhê

English–Greek Glossary produce delight, to: terpein productive action: poiêsis profess, to: epangellesthai prognosis: prognôsis promote health, to: hugieinos proof (n.): apodeixis proof (adj.): deiktikos proper (adj.): oikeios properly connected, to be (v.): oikeiousthai, sunoikeiousthai proportioned: analogos prosperity: euêmeria protection: phulakê provide fosterage, to: epimeleisthai prudence: phronêsis prudent: phronimos psychic: psukhikos public: koinos pull (n.): rhopê pull, to (v.): diaspan punish, to (v.): kolazein, timôrein punishment (n.): epitimêsis, kolasis, timôria, zêmia purity: kathariotês pursue, to (v.): diôkein, epidiôkein, meterkhesthai pursuit (n.): epitêdeuma putrefaction: sêpsis quickly: ôkeôs quite simply (adv.): haplôs quotation: lexis race course: stadion raise, to: auxein rational (adj.): logikos rational thinking (n.): dianoêsis rational thought (n.): dianoia ray: augê reach, to: diaperainesthai ready availability (n.): euporia rearing (n.): trophê reason (n.): aitia reason, to (v.): logizesthai reasoning (adj.): logistikos recall, to: mimnêskein, mnêmoneuein receive handouts, to: eleousthai receiving (n.): lêpsis reception (n.): hupodokhê recuperation: hugiansis reflection: indalma refrain from eating, to: asitein

181

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English–Greek Glossary

refutation: elenkhos regimen: diaita regret (n.): metanoia rejoice in, to: gêthein record, to: historein relate, to: diaprattein relating to character (adj.): êthikos remain, to: menein remember, to (v.): mimnêskein reminder (n.): anamnêsis remorse: metameleia rendered, to be: apergazesthai replenish, to (v.): anaplêroun replenishment (n.): anaplêrôsis representation: phantasia reproach, to (v.): psegein reproachable (adj.): eponeidistos resource: khorêgia rest (n.): hêsukhia, stasis rest, to (v.): hêsukhazein restoration: apokatastasis, katastasis restore health, to: hugiazein, iasthai result, to: epigignesthai reversion: epistrophê rhetoric: rêtorikê tekhnê rhetorical: rhêtorikos rhetorician: rhêtôr ridiculous: geloios right (adj.): kalos, orthos, dikaios road: hodos route: hodos ruin, to: phtheirein rule, to: arkhein ruled democratically, to be: dêmokrateisthai rule like a king, to: basileuein run, to: trekhein running (n.): dromêsis satiety: koros science (n.): epistêmê scientific (adj.): epistêmonikos sea: thalassa seasonal: kath’ hôran seeing (n.): horasis seek, to: ephiesthai, epizêtein seem, to: eikein self-­sufficiency: autarkeia sense, to (v.): aisthanesthai sense, sensation (n.): aisthêsis

English–Greek Glossary sense-­organ (n.): aisthêtêrion sensitive (adj.): aisthêtikos separate (adj.): khôristos separate, to (v.): khôrizein serious, to be (v.): areskein, spoudazein serious goodness (n.): spoudê serious interest (n.): spoudê seriously good (adj.): spoudaios setting (n.): krupsis sexual desire: aphroditê sexual intercourse: sunousia shadow: skia shake, to: diaseiein shameful: aiskhros shared: koinos shine, to: epilampein show (n.): endeixis show favour to, to: kharizesthai show valour, to: aristeuein sickness: nosos, nosêma sight: opsis, horasis simple: haplous skilled in politics: politikos slave (n.): doulos slavish (adj.): andrapodôdês sleep, to: katheudein son: huios sophist: sophistês soul: psukhê sound: êkhos source: pêgê speak falsely, to: pseudesthai specify, to: kharaktêrizein spectator: theatos spend leisure-­time, to: skholazein, enaskholeisthai spend life, to: diatribein spend time, to: diatribein spirit (n.): thumos spirited (adj.): thumoeidês spirited part (n.): thumos splendour: aglaia, aiglê stage of life: hêlikia starting point: arkhê state: hexis stomach: gastêr story: muthos strength: iskhus stretching upwards (n.): anatasis stroke of luck: tukhê

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sublimity: hôraiotês submit, to: komizein substance: ousia substratum: hupokeimenon suffer, to: kakopathein suffer jaundice, to: ikterian sufficient, to be: arkein suitable: epitêdeios suited: epitêdeios summit: akrotês superiority: huperokhê supervene, to: epigignesthai surgery: tomê surprised, to be: thaumazein syllogism: sullogismos symptom: sumptôma take a serious interest in, to: spoudazein take pleasure in, to: enêdesthai, hêdein take seriously, to: enthumeisthai taste (n.): geusis taste, to (v.): geuesthai teach, to: didaskein teacher: didaskalos teaching (n.): didakhê tear away, to: apoklinein temperament: krasis temperance (n.): sôphrosunê temperate (adj.): sôphrôn temple: naos term: onoma text: graphê text: lexis theatre: theatron theologian: theologos theology: theologia thing: khrêma think, to: dianoeisthai, noein, oiesthai, phronein thirst (n.): dipsa thirsty, to (v.): dipsan time: khronos timocracy: timokratia toil (n.): ponos toilsome (adj.): epiponos touch (n.): haphê trade: emporia train, to: gumnazein tranquil rest: hêsukhia transcendent: huperousios

English–Greek Glossary transformation: alloiôsis treat, to: dialambanein, therapeuein treatment: therapeia tribe: phulon trickery: dolos truly (adv.): katorthôs truth (n.): alêtheia turned upwards (adj.): anepistrophos tyranny: turannis tyrant: turannos unable, to be: adunatein unchoiceworthy: anairetos unclarity: asapheia underlie, to: hupokeisthai underlying substratum: hupokeimenon understand, to: noein, sunienai unhappy: kakodaimôn unimpeded: anempodistos union (n.): henôsis unite, to (v.): henoun universal(ly): katholou unjust: adikos unknowable: agnôstos unknown: agnôstos unpleasant (adj.): anêdonos unpleasantness (n.): aêdia unskilled: atekhnos untaught: adidaktos unworthy: anaxios upbringing (n.): agôgê use, to (v.): khreisthai use (n.): khrêsis useful (adj.): khrêsimos using (n.): khrêsis value, to (v.): timan vehicle: okhêma venerable: semnos vice: kakia victory: nikê view: episkepsis violence: bia virtue (n.): aretê virtue of character: êthous aretê virtuous (adj.): enaretos vital: zôtikos voluntarily: hekôn

185

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English–Greek Glossary

wage war, to (v.): polemein wantonness: aselgeia war (n.): polemos wary, to be: eulabeisthai water: hudôr wax: kêros way of life: diagôgê wealth: ploutos welcome, to: aspazesthai well being: eupatheia well off, to be: eumoirein wield authority, to: enexousiazein wife: gunê will (n.): boulêma, boulêsis willing (n.): boulêsis wine: oinos wisdom (n.): sophia wise (adj.): sophos wish, to: ethelein with natural talent (adj.): euphuês without (a) lack (adj.): anendeês without impediment (adj.): anempodistos without pain (adj.): alupos without qualification (adv.): haplôs woman: gunê work (n.): ergon work as a slave, to: douleuein work on the assumption, to: hupolambanein world: gê wretched: mokhtêros write (down), to: graphein year: khronos young (adj.): neos zenith: akmê

Greek–English Index References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text (indicated in the margins of the translation). adidaktos, untaught, 534,17 adikia, injustice, 588,1 adikos, unjust, 548,2.3; 595,2; 587,31 adunatein, to be unable, 538,17; 604,20; 606,8 aêdia, unpleasantness, 529,15 aêr, air, 569,15.20.23; 603,4 agathos, good, passim; ta agatha, good things, 586,16.17; to agathon, the Good, 531,15.28; 533,19.25–31; 534,1– 12.19.20.28.36–9; 535.23.29–36; 536,4–11.14–21.25.29–32; 537,5.11– 15.25.27; 541,1.3; agathôteros, more good, 537,2.8.10; to autoagathon, the Good itself, 531,30; 534,2; 536,33.36.39; 537,2–10 aglaia, splendour, 554,26; 561,35 agnoia, ignorance, 538,15; 583,8.11; 606,20; 617,2 agnôstos, 606,12; unknowable, 583,7; unknown, 606,12 agôgê, upbringing, 538,15; 605,27.32; 606,4.13.27; 607,2.13.17.28; 608,18; 612,3.35; 614.28 agraphos, unwritten, 611,18.20 aidios, eternal, 589,31; 600,24 aiglê, splendour, 554,30; 591,27 aiskhros, shameful, 548,36; 549,11.14; 563,9; 571,12; 566,31.34 aiskhunesthai, to be ashamed, 606,13 aisthanesthai, to sense, to experience sensation, 546,19; 555,33; 556,2; 557,18; 558,18; 559,13; 560,27; 561,15 aisthêsis, sense, sensation, passim; ta kata tên aisthêsin, the observable facts, 533,2 aisthêtêrion, sense-­organ, 555,10 aisthêtikos, sensitive, capable of sensation, 556,37; 557,4.9.14.15; 558,16.26–8.34; 560,6

aitia, cause, 531,16; 533,32; 557,24.32.33; 563,5; 594,28.33; reason, 529,23; 531,13; 573,24.25; 594,27; 596,20; 617,14.15 aitios, cause, 534,10; 557,32.33; 560,16; 563,33; 579,27; 581,26; 594,29 akmê, pinnacle, 559,5; zenith, 598,34; 599,11.18 akolasia, licentiousness, 538,8; 539,6.12; 575,21; 579,17; 605,25 akolastos, licentious, 532,20; 534,19; 538,10; 547,34; 575,21; 565,7.11; 567,37 akôn, involuntarily, 608,23; 609,18 akrotês, summit, 579,33 alêtheia, truth, passim; kata alêtheian, truly, 596,31 alloiôsis, transformation, 557,1; 558,34 alogos, irrational, 578,34; 579,19.21; non-­rational, 530,17; 534,8; 538,3.6.23.25; 570,27.31; 598,22.24.26.29.33–5; 599,9.10.24.35.36; 603,29; theory-­free, 616,27; to alogon, nonrationality, 530,3 alupos, without pain, 530,37; 546,15 ameleia, laissez-­faire attitude, 610,22 amelein, to neglect, 531,32; 573,27; 610,21 ametros, lacking moderation, 578,29.33; 593,22 anairetos, unchoiceworthy, 573,33; 574,34 analogos, analogous, 544,7; 544,9; 547,9; 557,6; 565,33; 566,30; proportioned, 594,3 anamnêsis, reminder, 589,7 anankaios, necessary, 529,21; 530,4.15; 531,2; 573,9.11; 583,17.22–7.30.33; 584,31; 585,5; 596,1–5; 601,11.12; 602,34; 604,26.30; 607,19; to anankaion, (the threat) of force, 608,33.34

188

Greek–English Index

anapeithein, to mislead, 542,28; to persuade, 558,2; 604,14 anaplêrôsis, replenishment, 544,20–546,36, passim anaplêroun, to compensate, 612,20; to replenish, 544,20–546,36, passim anatasis, stretching upwards, 529,15; 580,14 anatemnesthai, to cut up, 547,19 anatheôrein, to look up in contemplation, 561,36 anatrekhein, to ascend, 603,29; to hurry back, 582,10 anatrophê, rearing, 605,32; 606,27; 609,24 anaxios, unworthy, 598,8 andrapodôdês, slavish, 577,14.32; 578,2.7 andreia, courage, 532,5; 335,30–5; 537,21; 539,11; 540,23; 578,30; 585,33; 594,4.16; 598,1; 605,12.31 andreios, courageous, 540,13; 563,5; 584,14.18; 593,2.9.30; 594,15.17.18.20; 596,18.28.32; 597,3 anêdonos, unpleasant, 529,16; 535,5; 537,19; 549,32.33.35; 550,5; 568,36.37; 572,21 anempodistos, unimpeded, without impediment, 529,8; 531,25; 545,5.6.12.13; 546,1.8; 552,27.28 anendeês, not in need, 597,8; without (a) lack, 546,14; 573,15.16; 583,18.26 anepistrophos, turned upwards, 591,9 anerkhesthai, to ascend, 612,25.27 anodos, ascent, 579,14 anthos, bloom, 559,16 anthrôpeuesthai, to practice humanity, 597,10; 601,12.29 anthrôpikos, human, 592,29.33; 593,7.21.24.29; 594,5.9.24; 595,17.18.20; 598,11.15 anthrôpinos, human, 572,8; 579,8.11; 591,11.12.17; 604,22.33; 608,20; 615,19; 619,23 anthrôpos, human being, passim; people, 609,11 antilêpsis, apprehending, 560,28.30; 569,8.13.17; apprehension, 553,30; 612,7 aokhlêsia, freedom from agitation, 585,33 aoristos, indeterminate, 540,1.4.6– 9.17.33.36.37; 550,28; 578,33; to

aoriston, indeterminacy, 540,11.18; 612,22 apatheia, separation of intellect, 576,30.31; 580,16–18; 591,2; 591,18–22; 595,20–3; 597,33 apeirgein, to keep away from, 608,9 apeiros, inexperienced, 618,9; 619,6; ep’ apeiron, indefinitely, 583,17 apeitheia, act of disobedience, 608,3 apeithein, to not abide, 608,2; 614,31 apergazesthai, to be rendered, 554,28; 610,24; to enable, 558,24 aphorizein, to determine, 572,7; 574,4; 580,6 aphorman, to have an impulse, 539,25 aphroditê, sexual desire, 547,25 aphuês, lack of natural talent, 613,30.33 apodeixis, proof, 574,30, 602,7 apokalein, to call, 578,4 apokatastasis, restoration, 545,18.23 apokheisthai, to be poured off, 560,9 apoklinein, to incline (towards), 533,5; 576,4; to tear away, 581,40 apolauein, to indulge in, 577,8.18.22.30.34; 581,35.38; 583,21 apolausis, indulgence, 574,3 apollunai, to destroy, 599,20; to lose, 599,9 apophainein, to make appear, to make out to be, 531,20; 532,7–8.16.25; 533,7.11.18; 534,23.24; 535,19; 542.1; 550,20; 552,11; 575,11; 576,26; 586,15–16; 617,33; to reveal, 603,1 apoplêroun, to fulfil, 569,27; 598,36 apotukhia, emancipation, 607,18 apousia, absence, 582,1 areskein, to be agreed, to find agreeable, 589,36; 607,34; to be serious, 616,6 arestos, pleasing, 574,32 aretê, virtue, passim aristeuein, to fight heroically, 612,27; to show valor, 600,36.37 aristokrateia, aristocracy, 615,24; 620,13 aristokrateisthai, to be aristocratic, 611,10 aristos, best, 529,18; 532,23; 562,12; 575,3.14; 576,22; 579,15.20.22.25.29; 580,26; 582,11.17.21.22; 592,16.23; 597,14.19.28.30; 598,19; 600,3; 601,22; 602,33; 603,7.9.12.13; 604,23; 614,3; 615,17.36; 617,36; 618,23; 619,12

Greek–English Index aristos, ho, excellent person, 578,11 arithmêtikê (tekhnê), arithmetic, 616,5; 617,31 arithmêtikos, arithmetician, 562,7 arkein, to rely on, 612,18; to be sufficient, 572,20; 596,33; 605,7.19; 610,6 arkhê, (political) office, 596,30; 601,24; principle, 531,16; 533,24.30.32.34; 534,2.3.9.11.12; 541,22.24.34; 560,6; 594,27.28.31; 609,7 arkhein, to begin, 605,2; to be queen, 547,18; to rule, 579,17.18.20.24; 592,5; 602,28 asapheia, obscurity, 537,3; unclarity, 595,8 aselgeia, wantonness, 532,20 asitein, to refrain from eating, 612,32 asitia, refraining from eating, 612,32 askholeisthai, to be occupied, 590,34; to forego leisure, 587,30; 588,3.8 askholia, lacking leisure, lack of leisure, 586,11.34.36.37; 587,27 askholos, lacking (in) leisure, 584,35; 586,30 587,11.17.18.21; 588,3.5.11.14.18 asômatos, incorporeal, 579,26; 580,17; 592,2; to asômaton, incorporeality, 592,1 aspazesthai, to welcome, 532,24; 538,30; 549,28 astragalizein, to play knucklebones, 573,26 astragalos, knucklebone, 575,13 asumphoros, disadvantageous, 592,2 asunkritôs, incomparably 592,2 ataraxia, lack of disturbance, 586,21 atekhnos, unskilled, 618,9 athanatos, immortal, 591,21 atomos, indivisible, 515,6; 553,10.11.13.32 atremizein, to be in a state of quiet, 530,37 augê, ray, 534,16 aulein, to play the flute, 565,16.19.20.21.26.27; 574,9 aulêsis, flute-­playing, 565,23 autarkeia, self-­sufficiency, 601,17 autohen, The One Itself, 533,33.34; 534,1.2.4 autoon, Being Itself, 531,17 autophuês, innate, 576,16.17; homegrown, 602,8 auxein, to increase, 535,10.14.16.17; 562,17; 564,33; 567,14.16; 573,30; 583,22; to raise, 545,24

189

basileia, monarchy, 620,13 basileuein, to rule like a king, 592,7; 609,2; 610,14; 611,11 basileus, king, 592,7; 608,36 bebaios, firm, 566,27; 586,29 beltiôn, better, 535,5; 536,12; 566,28.29; 576,16–34; 577,1.3; 580,10; 581,2.5.14– 18.23; 584,23.27; 590,19; 592,11; 609,15; 615,8; 619,18; 620,11 beltistos, best, 556,3–5; 592,11; 602,30.35; 603,9; 605,32; 608,15 bia, (threat of) violence, 606,12; 607,7; 608,35; 609,20 biazesthai, to exercise violence, 609,15; 611,38 bios, (way of) life, passim bioun, to live, 591,1 blaberos, harmful, 532,19.21; 573,34; 574,33 blaptein, to harm, 573,25.27; 610,27; 614,27; ta blaptonta, what is harmful, 538,31; 614,21 boêthein, to help, 610,30 boulêma, will, 610,15 boulêsis, will, willing, 596,19.33; 606,34 daimonios, inspired, 529,4; 579,38; 589,36 deiktikos, proof, 559,21; 597,14 deilia, cowardice, 531,36; 532,4; 539,5.6.11 dêmiourgos, Creator, 557,16; 582,2; 620,17 dêmokrateisthai, to be ruled democratically, 592,6; 611,10 dêmokratia, democracy, 615,23; 620,9.11 diagôgê, pastimes, 574,3.7; way of life, 529,6; 531,7; 578,9; 583,2.13 diairein, to differentiate, 532,17; 533,8.11; 552,9; 598,7 diairesis, differentiation, 619,1 diaita, regimen, 618,6 diakosmêsis, order, 596,11; orderly arrangement, 554,26 diakosmos, order, 603,34 diakratein, to maintain, 579,28 diakrinein, to distinguish, 538,18;571,8; 611,14; 615,16; 618,1 dialambanein, to grasp, 599,27; to treat, 607,9 dialegesthai, to engage in conversation, 566,20

190

Greek–English Index

dialektikê (tekhnê), dialectic, 616,5 diamartanesthai, to contain flaws, 610,5; to be flawed, 615,21 diamonê, continuation, 563,33 dianoeisthai, to think, 548,22 dianoêsis, rational thinking, 568,31.32.34 dianoêtos, object of rational thought, 561,3 dianoia, meaning (opposed to lexis), 535,9; 546,26; 553,19; 555,20; 570,21; 574,21; 588,18; 594,25; rational thought, 548,24; 556,12.13; 561,2; 562,3; 568,30.31; 569,33; 570,1; 603,25; 616,27 dianomê, distribution, 594,3 dianuein, to accomplish, 608,26 diaperainesthai, to reach, 535,22 diaphora, difference, 552,19.22; 564,7; 565,35;569,28; 570,16; 580,15; 586,19; 606,33 diaphoros, different, 548,35 diaphtheiresthai, to be corrupted, 571,11 diaplasis, formation, 558,26 diaponeisthai, to invest in hard work, 596,3 diaprattein, to relate, 584,17 diaseiein, to shake, 541,10 diasôzesthai, to preserve, 530,26 diaspan, to pull, 578,35 diasparattein, to overanalyze, 559,31 diastêmatikos, intervallic, 554,33 diastrephesthai, to be distorted, 561,34 diatasis, excitement, 561,3 diateinein, to extend, 530,34; 531,3; 600,15.20 diathesis, disposition, 605,31 diatithenai, to dispose, 559,10 diatribê, occupation, 581,40; occupying, 529,19; 600,33 diatribein, to spend time, spend life, 587,12; 588,8; 604,25; 617,20 diaulos, lap, 566,18 didakhê, teaching, 606,31.38 didaskalos, teacher, 585,10; 615,32; 620,18 didaskein, to teach, 532,17; 610,26; 611,28; 614,15.16; 615,1; 616,9.19.20.22.23; 617,3.4.7.26.27.28; 619,28 diêgeisthai, to narrate, 565,22 diêgêsis, narrating, 565,23 dikaiopragein, to act justly, perform just actions, 584,11; 596,21.30 dikaiopragia, just action, 535,3; 584,14

dikaios, just, 548,2; 583,18.31; 584,11.18; 593,2.30; 594,4.16.17.18.19.20; 595,1; 596,13–17.20.21.29.31; 597,1.2.4; 605,13; 606,34; 611,1; 616,32.34; right, 591,17; to dikaion, justice, 532,5 dikaiôs, justly, 534,20; rightly, 596,33 dikaiosunê, justice, 584,12; 593,19; 594,3; 597,35.36; 605,12.31 diôkein, to pursue, passim dioran, to discern, 538,19 diorthôsis, correction, 610,19 dipsa, thirst, 544,29 dipsan, to be thirsty, 544,28 dolos, trickery, 549,7 dôron, gift, 606,35.36 dosis, giving, 593,14; 594,1; 598,3 douleuein, to be a slave, to work as a slave, 534,21; 605,25; 612,29 doulos, slave, 601,10 doxa, opinion, 545,33; 547,32; 590,18; 602,8.10.13.23.31; 603,27.28 drastikos, active, 539,38 dromêsis, running, 541,20 dunamis, ability, 616,3.18.26; 619,22; 620,16; effectively, 548,10; 554,15; 576,34; 579,22; 588,29; 610,3; 611,16; 616,10; faculty, 556,37; 557,2.4.11; 557,15.17; force, 549,26; 603,3; 612,20; potentiality, 542,7.14.15.16.21; 556,33; power, 531,4.5; 545,20; 554,29; 560,7; 561,22.25; 573,2; 575,6; 583,20.21; 584,21; 608,16; 609,1.3; dunamei, potentially, in a state of potentiality, passim dunasteia, (political) power, 574,34; 588,15.22 dunastês, powerful, 574,28.31; 601,25; 602,5 dunasteuein, to hold power, 574,31; 601,24 dunatos, possible, 530,7; 530,9; 549,6.19; 579,4.5; 588,32; 590,23; 597,21; 598,25; 601,21; 603,18; power(ful), 592,1.2 dusôpoumenesthai, to be ashamed, 549,13 dusphêmein, to defame, 602,20 eidenai, to know, to have knowledge, 529,21; 530,4; 549,30; 560,25; 561,13; 562,3.5; 583,1; 614,6.7.9.10.11.13.15.19. 20.25.27.29.33; 615,13.19.21; 616,1.18.19.22.24; 617,4.7.24; 618.5.35

Greek–English Index eidêtikos, formal, 533,23 eidos, form, kind, passim eikein, to be like, 573,2; 576,6.9.10; 618,13.20; to seem, 568,30 eikôn, picture, 618,8.17 eirênê, peace, 586,33.34; 587,23.24.26.27; 588,4 êkhos, sound, 562,3 ekhthrainein, to hate, 609,11.22 ekhthros, enemy, 549,6 ekkhein, to pour, 545,25 ekklinein, to incline, 539,26; 596,5 ekphaulizein, to condemn as bad, 532,14 ekpherein, to deliver, 616,21 ekpiptein, to depart from, 561,32 ekrophein, to devour, 547,19 elenkhos, refutation, 619,32 elenktikos, capable of exposing, 590,5.7 eleousthai, to receive handouts, 612,30 eleutheria, liberality, 601,27 eleutherios, liberal, 584,18; 596,12.13.15.16.17.18.22; 597,4; 604,18; 605,24.25 eleutheriotês, liberality, 593,13.15; 594,2; 598,2 eleutheroun, to liberate, 591,27 êlithiotês, folly, 539,6; 539,12 ellampein, to illuminate, 585,12 ellampsis, illumination, 534,16; 538,28; 580,20; 586,17; 591,4; 603,31.33 elleima, deficiency, 612,20 elleipein, to be missing, 537,4; 556,32 ellogos, endowed with reason, 534,7; 600,16 embruon, foetus, 547,19 êmelêmenôs, indifferent, 566,13 emmelês, melodic, 562,3 empatheia, passion, 591,20 empathês, passionate, 606,17.23 empeiria, experience, 608,28; 609,4; 616,26.30; 617,9.12.14.17.22 empodizein, to impede, 565,15.18.21 emporia, trade, 573,29; 585,36 enantios, contrary, 531,14.19.35; 534,24.25; 537,37; 538,34.35; 539,2; 544,27; 555,2; 567,13.14.34.35; 563,10.11; 569,6; 587,25; 599,15; 602,37; 608,7.8.18; 609,29; 616,4; opposed, 567,5; opposite, 602.37 enaretos, virtuous, 571,2; 584,11; 596,32

191

enargês, clear, 617,4 enaskholeisthai, to rob of leisure, 598,1; to spend leisure time, 601,26 endeia, lack, passim endein, to lack, 551,22 endeixis, show, 552,23 endiatribein, to be occupied, 596,8; to spend time, 583,3; 591,24 enêdesthai, to take pleasure in, 532,4 energeia, activity, passim; energeia(i), kat’ energeian, (in) actuality, 542,7.15; 554,5.8.10.15.18 energein, to be active, to be engaged (in an activity or action), passim; to perform (an activity or action), 552,24; 584,15; 601,22; 604,3 enexousiazein, to wield authority, 574,31 enharmonios, harmonious, 546,19 ennoia, conception, 576,16; 606,10; awareness, 579,24 enokhleisthai, to be afflicted, 601,7 enstasis, objection, 560,22 entelekheia, actualization, 542,6.8; entelechy, 561,19.20 enthumeisthai, to take seriously, 544,11 enuparkhein, inherent way of doing, 558,13 epainesthai, to be praised, 548,17.19; 576,3 epainetos, praiseworthy, 549,12.15.18 epainos, praise, 598,4.6 epakolouthein, to follow upon, 529,19; 545,15; 546,23 epangellesthai, to profess, 616,8.23; 617,25 epanthein, to blossom, 559,16; 571,23 epaphê, immediate contact, 586,10; 589,20; 596,11 epeisagein, to introduce, 603,26 ephesis, longing, 560,27.31; 568,23.26; 581,22 ephiesthai, to seek, passim epibolê, intuition, 603,30 epidekhesthai, to admit, 540,23; 541,29; 555,16 epididonai, to augment, 535,8 epidiôkein, to pursue, 530,22; 533,8; 592,13 epidosis, augmentation, 535,6; development, 596,11.12.13.14; 599,15 epieikeia, decency, 567,28; 611,23

192

Greek–English Index

epieikês, decent, 534,8.9.10.11; 567,36;571,14.15; 575,16; 601,25.34; 604,22; 605,18.26.32; 607,2; 611,13.15 epigêthein, to be gladdened, 555,1; 603,14 epigignesthai, to result, 559,24; 585,33; 618,6; to supervene, 551,10; 555,3; 557,33; 558,21.26.29.31.33; 559,3.6; 562,35; 563,30; 565,5; 578,22 epikratein, to dominate, 569,24 epiktêsis, acquisition, 589,18 epilampein, to shine, 559,16 epimeleia, fosterage, 607,25; 610,2.20.21; 611,6; 612,3.19.38; 613,16.18.35; 615,8; epeimeleian poieisthai, to foster, 615,4 epimeleisthai, to care for, 601,26; 603,10; 604,6; to foster or provide fosterage, 610,4.10.23; 613.33; 614,3.7.12.19.20.29.34 epinoein, to conceive, 555,18 epiphora, conclusion, 556,19 epiponos, toilsome, 549,30 episkepsis, view, 533,17 episkeptesthai, to examine, 529,22; 531,2; 582,35; 619,12; 620,4; episkepteon, one must examine, 615,29; to oversee, 587,16 epistasthai, to know, 613,1 epistêmê, knowledge, 533,26.29; 545,14; 557,7.9; 558,16; 567,37; 603,29; 616,30; 617,11; 618,1.22; science, 537,18.22; 540,11.14.15.24; 547,24; 595,27; 611,27; 614,15; 616,3.5.18; 617,4.25 epistêmonikos, scientific, 556,13 epistrophê, reversion, 556,17; 603,17; to epistrephein, reversion, 561,27 episunthesis, accumulation, 551,9; 553,6 epitasis, increase, 540,22.31; 541,25; 555,16 epitattein, to order, 613,25 epitêdeios, suitable, suited, 542,13; 585,5; 607,11.17; 613,9; epitêdeiotatos, ideally suited, 612,4 epitêdeiotês, condition of suitability, 542,12; 578,37 epitêdeuma, pursuit, 614,10; 611,7; 615,33 epiteinesthai, to increase, 540,38 epiteleisthai, to bring to completion, 618,5 epithumein, to have (an) appetite(s), 568,16.21; 598,5 epithumêtikos, appetitive, 572,13 epithumêton, object of appetite, 568,17

epithumia, appetite, passim; appetitive part, 578,30.32 epitimêsis, punishment, 611,39 epizêtein, to seek, 537,19; 537,20; 610,6 eponeidistos, reproachable, 546,39; 547,22.29.30.32; 548,8; 549,11.16; 550,9 erasmios, lovely, 559,8; 581,26 ergon, deed, 532,13; 533,15; 590,22; 602,32; function, 570,7; 598,37; 599,1; work 579,37; 605,8; 616,31; 617,13; 618,5.9.13.17.19; 619,6 erôtan, to ask, 586,6 ethelein, to wish, 531,32; 545,21 êthikos, of character, relating to character, 530,32; 571,33; 578,15.16.17.24; 587,9; 589,22; 590,1; 592,28.29.33; 593,5.8.24.28; 594,4.5.9.22.23.28.33.34; 595,3.6.9.11.19.30.31; 597,32.34; 604,8; ethical, 605,21 ethizein, to habituate, 530,27; 606,6–7.36; 607,23 êthos, character, 530,31; 605,28; 606,2; 607,10.13; 608,15.33; hê tou êthous aretê, virtue of character, 534,18; 593,27.35; 594,7.21.26 ethos, convention, 533,22; custom, customarily, 529,3; 556,25; 579,35; 602,7; 604,22.26; 606,25.26.30; 607,1; 608,27; 611,21.32.34; 612,6; 620,10 eudaimôn, happy, passim eudaimonein, to achieve happiness, 605,5; to be happy, 573,3; 575,25.27.28.31.35; 576,27; 577,16; 590,9.10.15.18; 598,24.28.29.30.32.34; 599,2.6; 600,17.19; 602,12.25; to eudaimonein, happiness, 572,24; 575,23; 582,31; 597,20.22; 600,24 eudaimonia, happiness, passim eudaimonikos, conducive to happiness, 573,2; 574,25.26.28; 575,2.10.11; 577,6; 601,19; constitutive of happiness, 598,14 eudaimonizein, to call happy, to be happy, 578,7; 586,8; 590,22; 600,30 eudaimonôs, happily, happy, 562,16; 585,12; 590,5; 601,13.34; 602,28; 604,23; 608,21; in happiness, 597,17 euêmeria, prosperity, 601.3.10.11 euergesia, act of beneficence, 612,10 eugeneia, noble birth, 572,5; 601,2

Greek–English Index eugenês, noble-­minded, 605,29; 606,5 eukinêtos, easily motivated, 605,27 eukosmia, arrangement, 582,33 eulabeia, caution, 530,2.14.16; consideration, 585,10 eulabeisthai, to be wary, 530,15 eumetria, excellence in measure, 554,27 eumoirein, to be well off, 586,21 euôdês, harmonious, 546,19 eupatheia, feeling good, 586,20; well being, 542,31 eupathein, to feel good, 598,27.29.30.34.35; 599,3.5 euphrainein, to delight our senses, 555,1 euphuês, with natural talent, 613,29; 613,31; 619,4 euphuôs ekhei, naturally well suited, 613,2 euporia, ready availability, 601,12 eupragein, to do good (deeds), 604,3; 607,33 eupragia, doing-­well, 590,3 eutaxia, excellence in order, 554,27 euteknia, nobility of children, 572,6 euthêmosunê, good order, 542,34; 590,3 euzôia, living-­well, 572,17; 586,20; 590,3 exaimatôsis, haematogenesis, 543,40; 544,4.6; 562,30 exameleisthai, to be educated, 610,11 exapatasthai, to be deceived, 608,24 exêgeisthai, to expound, 529,5; 546,27 exêgêsis, interpretation, 554,21 exêgêtês, commentator, 584,2 exomoioun, to make like, 561,28; 591,21; 603,18 exôneisthai, to buy, 605,21 gastêr, stomach, 618,34 gê, earth, 535,37; 536,3.5.8.10; 569,23; 599,26; 605,7; 607,3.12; world, 536,38 gelan, to laugh, 574,16 gelastikos, capable of laughing, 566,5 geloios, causing laughter, making laugh, 574,27; 576,16.19.20; ridiculous, 536,9; 544,10; 575,29; 597,37; 536,10 genesiourgos, birth, 598,33; generative, 569,26; genesis, coming-­to-be, passim; reproduction, 562,30 gennan, to generate, 561,14; 561,15; gennasthai, to be born, 609,34

193

gennêma, creature, 599,18 genos, kind, 530,13.21; 573,14; class, 617,24 geômetrein, to do geometry, 557,22.23; 564,24; 566,6.36.38 geômetrês, geometer, 558,19.25.28 geômetria, geometry, 558,19.25; 564,24.30; 566,7; 567,1; 582,8; 616,5; kata tên geômetrian, geometrically, 594,3 geôrgein, to farm, 547,27 gêraios, old , 609,6 gerôn, old person, 614,18 gêthein, to rejoice in, 564,4; 571,6; 575,22 geuesthai, to taste, 554,12; 555,7 geusis, taste, 569,19 geuston, object of taste, 554,34; 555,7 gnôrizein, to know, 595,12; 596,14.28; 614,8 gnôsis, knowledge, 533,13; 556,13; 560,30; 561,4; 573,13; 580,14; 581,12; 582,21; 583,12; 586,10.18; 597,15.18; 598,19; 599,25; 600,3; 603,33; 604,16; 605,6.9; 617,13 gramma, letter, 596,9; manthanein grammata, to learn to read and write, 568,38 grammê, line, 550,27; 551,13; 552,15.16 graphê, text, 614,5.12.32 graphein, to draft, 604,31; 609,33.36; 610,16; 611,18.19.20; 619,5.15; to paint, 616,20; to write (down), 535,11.13; 554,13; 556,29; 567,5.6.7.8.9; 570,19; 590,27; 605,21; 616,28.31.36; 617,1 gumnasion, exercise, 573,27; 613,21.26; 614,23 gumnastês, athletic trainer, 613,20; 614,4.24 gumnazein, to train, 613,21; 614,24.26; gumnazesthai, to do exercises, 613,27; gumnasia gumnazein, to assign exercises, 613,26 gumnos, nude, 612,36 gunê, wife, 610,15; woman, 565,7; 570,19; 577,24; 611,9 hagios, holy, 549,34 haima, blood, 543,10.12.13.40; 544,1.5.6.7; 562,30 haireisthai, to choose, passim hairesis, choice, 593,17 hairetos, choiceworthy, passim; matter of choice, 562,15

194

Greek–English Index

hamartanesthai, to be flawed, 604,27; 610,18; 618,8; to be erroneous, 574,26 hamartêma, error, 619,18 haphê, contiguity, 553,26; touch, 569,7.21.22.25; 593,12; 596,24 haplôs, (quite) simply, 552,21; 562,8; 574,13; 579,36; 606,20; 613,25; 616,22; without qualification, passim haplous, simple, 550,21; 603,30; 601,8 harmonia, harmony, 562,4 harmonikos, harmonic, 562,4 harpagê, gain, 532,7.36 hêdein, to generate pleasure, 574,9 hêdesthai, to experience pleasure, passim; to take pleasure in, 574,19 hêdonê, pleasure, passim hêdus, pleasant, passim hekôn, voluntarily, 608,23; 609,21 hêlikia, age, 614,10; stage of life, 530,36.37 henôsis, union, 579,4; 580,14 henoun, unite, 591,3 hepesthai, to accompany, to follow upon, passim; ta hepomena merê, subsequent parts 551,11 hêsukhazein, to (be at) rest, 559,27; 566,19 hêsukhia, (tranquil) rest, 559,29.30; 588,2; 612,32 heterotês, difference, 552,19 heuresis, discover(y), 595,4; 608,28; 619,8 heuriskein, to discover, 534,15; 538,28; 541,33; 550,16.17.18; 554,35; 563,31; 572,3; 584,20; 592,24; 617,27; to find, 612,32.34 hexis, habitual state, 540,13; 584,23; state, passim historein, to record, 612,36; 619,14.28 hodos, road, route, 530,29; 542,29; 543,17.23.30; 549,32; 556,10 homilia, intercourse, 568,1; 570,19 homoiôma, likeness, 600,2.6.12 homoiomerês, homoiomeric, 618,28.29 homoiôsis: hê pros theon homoiôsis, being made like God, 579,4; 591,23 homoiotês, likeness, 599,28; 603,20 homoiousthai, to become like, to be made like, 557,1; 591,23 homologeisthai, to be agreed, to be in agreement, 568,3; 571,12; 579,40 homophônôs, in unison, 537,38

homophuês, of the same nature, 535,24 hoplon, armour, 586,34; 584,18 hôra, hour, 553,15.16.17; 600,22; kath’ hôran, seasonal, 540,38 hôraiotês, sublimity, 554,32; 559,6; 559,7; 559,14 horasis, sight, seeing, 550,22.35; 553,25.30.34.36; 551,7.8.22; 554,17; 555,14; 565,33; 569,27 horatos, object of sight, 553,30.34; 554,25; 555,3.7.13.36 hôrismenos, determined, 550,24.25.28.29 horizein, to determine, 539,41; 540,4.20.26; 571,4; 581,13; 591,33; 596,34; 600,25.30; 601,33 horman, to feel an impulse, to have an impulse, 539,24; 540,8; 593,9; to be impelled, 533,10; 542,4.27 hormê, impulse, 609,12.23; pros hormên, to impel, 531,6 horobos, vetch, 570,30 horos, boundary, 578,26; 579,13; 580,13; 593,7 hubris, insolence, 532,36 hubrizein, to behave in an insolent manner, 608,8.9 hudôr, water, 536,1; 569,23; 584,30.33.35 hugiainein, to be healthy, 534,33; 540,12; 557,24; 557,29; 557,30; 557,32; 557,25; 557,28; 557,35; 557,36; 557,37; 562,25; 596,8; 601,6 hugiansis, recuperation, 542,30; 543,2.21; 544,11.13; 562,29; 564,13 hugiazein, to restore health, 557,26.27; 616,21 hugieia, health, passim hugieinos, promote health, 547,13; make healthy, 611,16 huios, son, 600,37; 608,32.35; 611,38; 612,7; 614,23; 617,3.5.6.7 hulê, matter, passim; material, 595,4; hulês khorêgia, material resources, 572,5 huperbolê, excess, 556,7; 601,15.16.18 huperekhein, to excel, 589,14; 591,29; 608,27 huperokhê, superiority, 536,7; 556,15; huperokhê tês eudaimonias, pre-­eminent happiness, 590,26 huperoran, to pay no attention to, 583,21.34

Greek–English Index huperousios, transcendent, 536,39 huperphronein, to overcome, 591,27 huphantikos, weaving, 585,37 huphasma, garment, 585,37 huphesis, inferiority, 556,16 hupodeiknuein, to indicate, 595,6 hupodokhê, reception, 578,37; 607,2 hupokeisthai, to underlie, 559,2; 569,11.12.13.19; 584,5.10; 599,20.21; hupokeimenon, (underlying) substratum, 540,27.29; 543,39; 550,24.26.28.29; 558,36; 559,1; 569,23; presuppositions, 582,28; subject (matter), 580,11; 615,7 hupokrinesthai, to feign, 590,5 hupolambanein, to assume, to work on the assumption, 597,25.38; 602,6; 609,25 hupolêpsis, assumption, 574,26; 598,21 hupothêkê, counsel, 608,26 hupozugion, beast of burden, 608,5 iama, cure, 608,8; 619,1 iasthai, to cure, 614,25; to restore health, 557,26 iatreusis, medicine, 573,12; 585,37 iatrikos, medical, 612,31; 614,16; 618,26; iatrikê (tekhnê), medical art, 585,37; 616,22; medicine, 573,21; 617,12; 618,25; 619,3; ta iatrika, medicine, 618,27 iatros, physician, 557,24.25.26.32; 594,29; 611,29; 612,24; 614,3.22; 615,10; 616,1.21; 618,5 idea, Form, 531,17; form, 535,25; 554,32 ikterian, to suffer jaundice, 547,15 indalma, reflection, 600,13 iskhuein, to have the power to, 560,21; 606,37.38; 609,14; 611,31–7; 612,1.6; 615,13 iskhus, strength, 576,7.11 kakia, vice, 530,29; 563,12; 567,37; 577,3.17; 606,26; 611,19 kakodaimôn, unhappy, 578,5; 602,15.19.21 kakopathein, to suffer, 573,4; 575,29 kakopragia, doing bad, 607,33 kakôs, bad, 547,17; 572,9; 606,23; badly, 606,14; 609,24; 619,32 kakos, bad, passim; kakistos, most wicked, 547,28.29

195

kakôsis, ill-­treatment (of others), 609,16.21 kakousthai, to be ill-­treated, 561,34; 609,17 kallos, beauty, 554,26.32; 559,14; nobility, 589,10; 598,11 kalokagathia, noble excellence, 605,20.23; 606,8; 611,19 kalos kagathos, noble and excellent, 608,30; 610,4.24; 615,27.32 kalos, noble, 529,17.19; 530,6; 531,5.6.25.32; 532,26; 546,38; 547,29; 549,12.15; 566,31.33; 570.35; 573,17; 575,14.17; 576,4.22; 577,20.21; 579,25; 581,17; 582,11; 586,29; 589,12.16; 590,22.23; 597,5; 601,22.23.31; 602,2.29.34; 606,6.10.11.13.15.21.35; 607,22; 608,2.29.31; 609,10.19.22; 610,26; 611.1; 612,7.8.12; 616,32.34.36; beautiful, 531,18; 554,25.28.30; 558,3; 565,29.31.37; fine, 603,15; 620,16; right, 532,16.24.27; sound, 606,4.13; kallistos, very best, 548,18; most beautiful, 546,20; 554,23; 555,3.12.13.15.36; 556,1.7–8; 558,3; most noble, 608,27; to autokallos, Beauty Itself, 531,18 kamnein, to become fatigued, to become weary, 559,20.28; 560,2.3.8.18.21.28; 576,6.10 karpophorein, to bear fruit, 607,3 karpos, fruit, 607,4.12 katalêpsis, apprehension, 561,4; 579,25; 589,20; 600,12 katalimpanein, to leave behind, 617,6 katastasis, restoration, 542,31; condition, 539,25 katêgorein, to predicate, 540,18; 553,21 kathariotês, purity, 569,7.22.26.31; 582,23.24.29 kathêkein, to be appropriate, 597,10 katheudein, to sleep, 572,29.37; 573,1.5; 598,10 katholou, universal(ly), 538,4; 567,17; 612,21.22.23.31; 613,7.10.11; 614,7.13.14.19.20.25.28.33.35; 615,1.3.13; generally, in general, 543,1; 605,2; 618,2 kathomilêmenos, common knowledge, 558,9 katorthos, truly, 609,19 kausis, cauterization, 531,25; 562,24.26

196

Greek–English Index

kenkhros, grain of millet, 536,2.4.5.8.9.37 kenos, empty, 603,4 kentron, centrepoint, 533,32; 536,37 kêros, wax, 569,10.11 khairein, to enjoy, to take enjoyment in (oneself), 530,28.30.31.33; 532,4; 538,8; 548,35; 560,18; 562,2.8; 564,4.30.31; 565,20; 566,3.6.12.14.17.21; 567,1.8; 574,16.18.20; 577,34; 578,1.32; 579,17; 582,7.10; 603,12; 608,8–9; ean kharein, to bid farewell, 549,8; 592,25 khara, enjoyment, 560,19; 565,33 kharaktêrizein, to specify, 602,26 kharizesthai, to show favour to, 582,35 khaskein, to gape after, 575,10 kheirôn, inferior, worse, 576,20.22; 577,3.4; 578,19; 579,18.19; 620,12; pros ta kheirona, downhill, 608,24 khôra, land, 589,18 khorêgia, resource, 572,5; 590,1; 595,29.32 khôristos, separate, 579,26 khôrizein, to be bereft of, 568,3; to separate, 545,12; 552,24; 554,19; 557,20.34; 563,37; 576,30; 580,18; 591,2.20; 594,23; 595,21; 611,16 khortos, hay, 570,23.29 khreia, need, 569,27; 577,21; 584,17; 585,12; 596,5.9.11.12; 601,16; 607,27.20 khreisthai, to use, to employ, 536,16; 562,1.5; 563,22; 601,21; 604,22.26; 620,10.12; khrêsteon, 605,15–16; 615,32 khrêma, asset, 587,12; 589,18; money, 596,12.13.18; 597,3.4; 598,3; 601,10; 602,18; possession, 584,18; thing, 594,14; tês tôn khrêmatôn huperbolês, material excess, 601,17 khrêsimos, useful, 619,5 khrêsis, use, using, 601,35; 605,15; 618,7 khrêzein, to (have) need, 576,9; 584,9.21.30.33; 595,34.35; 596,2.8; 605,4; 610,28 khronos, time, passim; duration, 613,14; period of time, 581,36; year, 609,31 khrusinos, golden, 554,28; 569,10 khrusos, gold, 569,11.12; 570,22; 602,37 khumos, humor, 557,29; 558,27; flavour, 566,10; 569,21 kinduneuein, to be in trouble, 583,10 kinêsis, movement, motion, passim

klinein, to have an inclination, 549,10 koinônein, to have a share, 537,17.20 koinônia, common feature, 569,28; 580,15; 586,19; 606,32; community, 593,19 koinos, common, 576,16; 611,21; 612,38; 614,15; public, 610,20.21; 611,6; 612,3.5.17.18.38; 613,6; koinê, general public, 586,28; shared, 572,17 kolasis, punishment, 608,3 kolax, flatterer, 548,6.7.8.10.12.13.14.16.19.21 kolazein, to punish, 582,33.34; 583,10; 607,34; 608,2; 609,17; 611,39 kôluein, to obstruct, 532,26; 560,20; 565,10; 609,25.26; to prevent, 539,35; 608,9; 609,27; 614,20 komizein, to bring, 584,30; to submit, 616,30 kopian, to be exhausted, to get exhausted, 560,15; 559,20 kopos, exhaustion, 560,13.14.16.19.20.22.24.32; 576,7 koros, satiety, 581,27.29.30.34.38; 583,16 kosmos, cosmos, 541,28.29; order, 580,12; kosmou kai taxeôs, orderly arrangement, 578,29 krasis, mixture, 540,34.35; 593,31; temperament, 614,17 krinein, to judge, to make a judgement, 557,2; 571,4; 581,10; 601,17.18; 602,21.25.32; 615,18; 618,4.11; 619,7 krisis, judgement, 601,17 kritikos, capable of judging, 557,5.41; 619,4 krupsis, setting, 569,30 ktêma, possession, 601,10 ktêsis, acquisition or acquiring, 530,32; 549,30; 573,27.28.30; 604,24; 606,6; 610,29; possession, 603,1 kubernan, to navigate, 530,25; 617,10 kubernêsis, navigating, 530,29 leôn, lion, 560,35 leontôdês, many-­headed, 590,36 lêpsis, acquisition, 584,20; 595,7; 599,23; receiving, 598,3; 593,14 lexis, text, passage, 537,3.9; 538,21; 541,34; 546,26; 550,8; 553,19.37; 554,3, 555,20; 556,27.30; 576,33; 586,22; 588,6.10.19; 589,5; 594,25; 595,9.14; 597,18; 599,30;

Greek–English Index 604,14; 605,1.13; 608,19; 614,12; quotation, 570,21 limên, harbour, 530,26.27.29 logikos, rational, 530,18; 534,8; 538,24; 572,12; 576,24.26; 579,23; 593,21; 598,25; 604,13; 610,29; having theory, 619,2 logistikos, reasoning, 572,16; 594,10 logizesthai, to reason, 560,27; 579,39 lupê, pain, passim lupein, to cause pain, to impose pain, 548,15.16; 566,37; 608,6.8 lupêros, painful, 531,8.10.11; 539,21; 558,11; 564,33; 567,6.7; 607,20.24 mainesthai, to be mad, 563,8; ei mê mainetai, only a madman, 612,30 makariotês, blessedness, 597,21.22.23; 598,11; 600,15; 601,33 makhê, fight, 613,13.19.25 makhesthai, to fight, 613,19 manthanein, to learn, 529,13; 550,34; 568,38; 593,6.8–9.16; 599,22; 606,32; 613,27.30; 620,8; to (come to) understand, 530,5.8; 543,24 mastix, flog, 608,6; 609,16 mastizein, to flog, 608,5 mathêma, lesson, 613,2; object of study, 562,7 mathêmatikê (tekhnê), mathematics, 617,31 mathêsis, act of learning, 535,7; 576,18 megaloprepeia, magnificence, 593,13.15 megalopsukhia, high-­mindedness, 593,16 mêkos, length, 552,4; 589,6.29.35; 590,24.27; duration, 581,10 melania, blackness, 540,28 melas, black, 542,19.20; 544,26; 547,16; 550,23 melos, (musical) melody, 546,19; 554,33; 561,38; 574,16; 582,7; 618,2; limb 559,14 menein, to remain or persist, 542,14.15.22; 551,10.12; 558,2; 561,29.35; 563,19; 608,4 mênuein, to indicate, 536,26 merizesthai, to partake, 531,1 meros, part, passim; kata meros, particular, 619,25 meson, mean, 532,1.2.3.5

197

mesotês, mean, 539,10 metabainein, to give raise to, 615,24 metaballein, to change, 542,8.12.13.15.17.22; 543,40; 544,1.8.10; 590,6; 615,23 metabolê, change, 542,20.30; 543,17; 543,30.39.40; 544,22; 558,35; 590,4 metameleia, remorse, 566,35; 582,38 metanoia, regret, 566,34; 575,8; 582,34.36; 589,24 metarruthmizein, change the rhythm of one’s life, 606,24 metekhein, to participate, 533,27; 540,13.16; 554,31; 577,13; 598,16; 606,29; to partake, 580,20; 598,26; 599,9.24.35.36; to gain a share, 606,28 meterkhesthai, to pursue, 614,16 methê, alcohol, 532,20; 608,9 methexis, participation, 536,39 metrêtos, moderation, 597,33 metron, measure, 558,36; 571,2; 579,8.9.13; 581,12.16 mimnêskein, to recall, 549,30; to remember, 546,32; 593,15 misein, to hate, 534,26; 563,6; 574,22; 609,28.30.32 misos, hate, 609,25; 812,11 misthos, fee, 605,20 mnêmê, memory, 546,32.34.35.38; 549,35 mnêmoneuein, to recall, 549,34; 550,1 moira, dispensation, 579,30 mokhtêros, wretched, 538,14.18; 547,13; 570,34; 604,25; 607,7; 609,24 mômos, disgrace, 598,6 monas, monad, 533,34.35; 553,28 morion, part, 543,30; 552,20.22.25; 572,9; 576,23.24; 577,1.3.4.5; 578,28; particle, 554,3 morphôtikos, involve sensible forms, 603,25 muthos, story, 565,22.23.26 naos, temple, 552,5; 552,8; 601,26 nekros, dead, 561,18 nemesis, contempt, 530,15 neos, young, 530,24.27; 604,19; 605,24.28; 607,25.29; 610,4 nikan, to achieve victory, 549,6 nikê, victory, 549,6; 573,20; 585,33; 589,18; 594,31

198

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noein, to think, 540,29; 546,2; 550,21.24.26; 559,13; 582,39; 600,7.8.9.10.11.13; 603,20; to understand, 611,3 noeros, intellectual, 529,14; 556,13.20; 559,36; 564,14; 570,4; 571,24; 572,3.19.20; 575,23; 578,13.23; 579,31; 580,17.21; 582,18.24; 583,19.22; 585,22; 586,14; 589,22; 590,32; 591,5.7.22.24; 592,2.25; 595,21.22; 598,18.23; 599,25.33.36; 601,28; 603,30.34 noêsis, intellectual thinking, thought, 559,11; 582,30; 599,28.33; 600,12.13 noêtos, intelligible, 529,18; 556,18; 559,10; 581,6; 582,29; 591,21; 595,26.27; 596,8.11 nomimos, law, 611,32 nomisma, cash, 532,31; 598,3 nomos, law, passim nomothesia, legislation, 617,33; 619,10.19 nomothetein, to legislate 609,9; 616,7.11; 618,14 nomothetês, legislator, 607,34; 609,32.39; 610,10; 618,14.15; 619,14 nosansis, falling sick, 543,18; 544,12 nosêma, sickness, 618,28; 619,1 nosos, sickness, illness, 543,18; 544,12; 601,7 nous, intellect, passim; intellectual understanding, 610,34 oiesthai, to think, 529,16; 531,15; 533,9.20; 546,1; 558,4; 561,8; 566,8; 574,27; 580,28; 582,15; 606,30; 612,38 oikeios, proper, passim; own, 554,29; 558,10; 583,27; 585,2.26; 589,4; 604,6; 610,12.15; 612,3.19; 613,19.30; 614,2; oikeioteros, more proper, 568,9.20.26.27; 579,11.12; oikeiotatos, most proper, 530,21; 568,29; 570,18; 574,29; 579,13; 588,34; 592,26 oikeiôsis, kinship, 530,23 oikeiousthai, to be properly connected, 564,32; 593,36; 594,2.4–5; to be made proper, 592,15 oinos, wine, 608,10 ôkeôs, quickly, 574,5 okhêma, vehicle, 560,5 okhlos, agitation, 529,15; 578,33; 586,4; 578,33

omma, eye, 609,7.8.9; 619,4 onoma, term, 532,18 onomazein, to call, 572,1; 547,18; 579,23; to use the label, 608,29 onos, donkey, 570,23; 608,5 ôphelein, to benefit, to be beneficial, 538,31; 548,16; 573,25; 614,14.21.27; to help, 614,22 ôphelimos, beneficial, 532,19; 573,29; 583,6; 610,27; 611,26; 619,2; to ophelimon, benefit, 611,9 opsis, sight, 569,7; 569,8.12.17.29; eye, 596,8; capacity for vision, 538,17; hup’ opsin, in view, 610,26 oregesthai, to desire, 538,3.6.25; 544,32; 560,25.26.31; 561,8; 566,7; 581,38 orexis, desire, 560,31; 568,2.10; 583,16; 599,7.10; 603,24 organon, instrument, 531,24; 562,1.6; 584,9.17; 595,5; 596,16.17 orgê, anger, 532,35; 593,18 orthodoxein, to have the right opinions, 594,35 orthos, correct, 588,24; 594,33; 595,5.6.9.10.11.12; 607,13; 611,26; 615,15; right, 552,4 orthotês, correctness, 611,23 osmê, odour, 566,10; 569,16.17.20 ouranos, heaven, 541,31; 552,32; 554,26 ousia, substance, 530,11; 550,15; 561,22; 579,26.28; 580,15.17; 592,2; 599,28; 603,16 paidagôgos, educator, 596,23; 605,26.33 paideia, education, 612,16; 613,6; paideias tugkhanein, to be educated, 610,11 paideuein, to educate, 530,23; 606,6; 608,6; 611,21; 612,34 paideusis, education, 611,7 paidia, amusement, passim paidikos, childhood, 530,36; pasê paidikê hêlikia, child of any age, 614,10 pais, child, 548,24.28.30.31.32; 572,14; 575,12.15; 577,24.25.29; 603,36; 607,28; 608,18.36; 610,10.13.14.21.24; 611,4.6; 612,3.33; 613,7.8; 614,11.28.34 paramignusthai, to be mixed, 582,15 parangelia, instruction, 576,18 paraskeuê, preparation, 586,35

Greek–English Index paratasis, extension, 590,16.20 parempodizein, to get in the way of, 583,34 paridein, to ignore, 583,9 paskhein, to be passive, 558,5.6.7; eu paskhein, to benefit, 546,38 patêr, father, 572,14; 600,34.35; 605,33; 608,30.35; 611,40; 612,1.8.9.14.15.20; 613,1.10; 614,23 pathos, affection, 532,12.35; 544,33–44; 547,31; 550,9; 569,15; 578,24.25.33.34; 593,4.8.22.25.27.34.38; 594,4.5.32; 595,15.17.22; 597,32.33; experience, 551,25; passion, 606,17 patris, country, 547,28 pêgê, source, 533,30.34; 535,25; 536,39 peira, experience, 609,7; 610.34; 614,20.22.23.26; 617,18.20.22.27; 618,21.22.25.35; 619,5 peitharkhein, to obey, to be obedient to authority, 606,13; 607,32.34 peithein, to persuade, to convince, 531,20.31; 591,17.19; 602,35; 606,11; 608,32; 609,16.20; to obey, 609,8; 612,7.12 phantasia, representation, 603,21.25.28.29 phaulos, bad, passim; phaulotatos, most base, 531,19.33.34; 532,9 pheugein, to flee, to avoid, 530,33; 531,10.11; 534,26; 538,31; 539,1.18.21.23.24.27; 549,27; 563,6; 565,11.18; 577,17; 578,31; 593,10.13; 603,24; 606,18.19; 607,33; 609,21; to expel, 608,4 philanthrôpia, love of humanity, 620,17 philarguria, love of money, 532,30; 530,31 philein, to love, 572,14; 574,28; 603,8.18.35.36; 606,5; 609,26.27; 612,13 philia, friendship, 571,26.31; 572,12.24; 604,12; philian ekhein, to be friends with, 583,5; love, 532,35 philos, dear, 592,19; friend, 548,5.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18; 572,18; 585,2.14.16; 587,34; 603,8; 610,24; 617,3.5.6.7; 620,18; lover, 534,21 philosophia, philosophy, 537,33; 582,22.23; 603,12; 604,33; 619,23 philtron, love, 608,34 phobos, fear, 593,11; 606,16 phora, advancing (motion), 531,33; 552,9; 581,37; 609,28

199

phôs, light, 559,16; 596,9; 603,31.33 phronein, to think, 548,30.32.33; 591,12– 13.17; eu phronein, be in the right mind, 612,27 phronêsis, prudence, 535,31.32.33.34; 536,5.6.7.11.13. 23.24.25; 537,22; 577,29; 585,33; 594,7–10.21.22.24.26.27.32; 595,4.7.10.13.16.18–19.20; 608,17.28; 609,3–8 phronimos, prudent, 538,6; 577,29; 584,19; 594,16.17.19.20; 596,19.29; 606,35 phrontizein, to be anxious, to bear anxiety, 587,13; 586,29 phtheirein, to destroy, to ruin, 544,12.14.16.33; 558,8; 566,38; 567,9.14.17; 607,4; 615,22.23 phthonein, to bear ill-­will, 609,28.29.32.34 phthonos, ill-­will, 609,25; 612,11 phthora, destruction, 543,14.15; 558,10; 615,23 phulakê, protection, 531,26 phulattein, to preserve, 613,20 phulon, tribe, 616,17 phusis, nature, passim phuton, plant, 543,15; 536,1; 564,10; 564,11.12; 573,1.3 pistis, conviction, 537,31; 576,16; 602,7.26; confirmation, 616,30 pistoun, to corroborate, 564,9; to confirm, 587,28 pithanos, plausible, 531,31; to pithanon, credibility, 602,32 plêrôsis, filling, 544,34; 581,32 plêroun, to fill, 545,7.25; 554,29; 603,31; 604,13 plêthos, multitude, 601,10.14.20; 33; 602,12.24; massive amount, 602,18 ploutos, wealth, 531,24; 575,5.36; 585,36; 600,2; 601,19.20 poiêsis, doing, 549,15; 578,27; 593,21; 595,5; productive action, 597,19.24.31; act of creation, 535,5; 585,35 poiotês, quality, 539,30–40 polemein, to wage war, 576,3; 583,10; 587,4.6. 10.22.23.24.28.29.32.33.34; 588.2; 589,13; polemêteon, one must wage a war, 583,7 polemos, war, 549,6.7.8.9; 583,6.9; 586,32.35; 587,10.12.26.27.31.32; 588,1

200

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polis, city, 578,27; 585,21.35; 586,28; 587,11.13; 588,16; 589,8; 592.5.7; 594,36; 602,28; 604,21.25; 608,4.36; 609,2; 610,1.3.8.10; 611,1.10.23.31; 612,5.26; 615,4; 617,6.10; 620,5 politeia, constitution, 604,27.31; 607,9.14.19; 610,7.9.13.16; 615,22; 619,3.15.17.19.21.22.28; 620,3.4.6.7.9 politês, citizen, 570,22; 582,31; 585,17.21.22; 589,11; 607,9; 608,1.21; 611,9.17.22; 614,34; 615,12.14.32 politikos, political, passim; skilled in politics, 616,16.17; 617,5.6.18.19.21.23; 618,11.19; politikos eudaimôn, politically happy, passim; politikos sophos, politically wise, 615,19; ho politikos, politician, 588,5; 615,24; 616,2.7.8.12.13.14; 618.19; hê politikê tekhnê, art of politics, 616,3.10.26.27; 617,3; 618,21.25; ta politika, politics, 616,9.23.29; 617,7.20.24; political matters, 617,2; politikê epistêmê, political knowledge, 616,30; 617,11; 618,1.20–2; science of politics, 617,4.24.25.30 ponos, hardship, toil, 563,5; 575,27; 576,4.5 pothein, to long after, to long for, 581,36.38 praktikos, practical, 570,2; 571,32.34; 572,12; 578,14.36; 581,16; 587,3.8; 589,22; 597,26; 619,23 praotês, mildness, 593,18 praxis, practical action, passim; doing, 560,34; practice, 617,14.17 prepein, to fit, to befit, 591,22; 593,4.6; 613,8.19 proaireisthai, to choose, 610,30 proairesis, choice, 596,27; 606,34; objective, 604,29 prognôsis, prognosis, 608,28 prokeisthai, to be present, 529,23; 535,9; 546,25; 570,20; 572,28; 574,21; 576,33; 586,22; 588,19; 591,16; 595,24; 597,17; 604,14; 612,2 prostaxis, command, 609,13; 611,33; 612,1; decree, 613,10 protasis, premise, 536,21; 537,3.28.31; 538,4.26; 539,34; 540,5; 541,6.11; 556,19 prothumia, eagerness, 574,5 protrepein, to exhort, 604,18; 612,18; 605,22.28; 606,9

psegein, to reproach, 532,14.25; 533,10; 548,19 pseudesthai, to speak falsely, 533,6; to make a mistake, 540,9 psukhê, soul, passim psukhikos, psychic, 560,4.5 ptoia, excitement, 561,27; 591,5 pur, fire, 555,17; 569,23; 578,26 rhêtôr, rhetorician, 616,20 rhêtorikos, rhetorical, 616,21; rhêtorikê tekhnê, rhetoric, 616,4; 617,31.32 rhopê, pull, 531,3.5.6; 560,22; 591,28; 605,22; 606,24 sarx, flesh, 543,8.9.10.11.12.26 sêmeion, indication, 546,37; 550,3; 560,25; 574,30; 598,16; 599,33.34; 617,3 semnos, holy, 561,37; 579,11; 580,9; venerable, 569,35; 585,27; 606,27; 620,18; ti semnon, what good, 605,11 sêpsis, putrefaction, 612,31; 615,2 skhêma, figure, 539,32; 540,3; 541,4 skholazein, to spend one’s leisure-­time, 573,26; to be at leisure, 586,4.7; 587,24.28.31; 588,3; 589,28; 601,7 skholê, leisure, 586,3.8.21–37; 587,1.2.5.7.24.27; 588,4 skia, shadow, 530,6; 546,6.7 skopein, to consider, to direct consideration to, 531,13; 588,8; 611,23.24; to have in mind, 609,35 skopos, goal, 594,33; 595,5.6; 604,29 sômatoeidês, corporeal, 569,14 sophia, wisdom, 536,5; 605,34; 608,20; 615,20 sophistês, sophist, 616,8.12.16.23; 617,24.25.27.30.36 sophos, wise, 537,33; 571,30; 583,31; 602,8.10.13.23.31; 615,19.20; ho sophos, wise man, 583,17.30; 603,35.37; 604,4; sophôteros, wiser, 584,23 sôphrôn, temperate, 540,12; 565,8.11.12; 584,16; 593,30; 594,16.17.19.20.22. 25.28.31; 596,31; 597,2; 598,4; 606,34; sôphronestatos, temperate in the highest degree, 534,20 sôphronein, to act temperately, 596,23.29

Greek–English Index sôphrosunê, temperance, 535,20.21; 537,21; 539,11; 540,23; 565,4; 578,30.32; 585,33; 593,11; 594,4; 605,30 sôstikos, preservative, 592,20; being able to preserve, 593,19 sôzein, to maintain, to preserve, 557,31; 559,15; 563,19.20.25.28; 599,19; 604,32; 615,22; 620,3.5; to keep healthy, 614,22 spoudaios, seriously good, passim; spoudaioteros, more seriously good, 576,23; 576,34; 577,1; spoudaiotatos, seriously good in the highest degree, 534,20; 575,3–4; 604,21 spoudazein, to take a serious interest in, 548,38; 549,5; 563,3–4; 588,15; 612,4; to be serious, 576,1.15; spoudazesthai, to be a serious object of interest, 574,15 spoudê, serious interest, 532,24; 533,5; 563,7; 574,7; serious goodness, 589,20 stadion, race course, 552,12 stasis, rest, 599,15.17 stephanos, crown, 600,36 stigmê, point, 553,25.26.27 storgê, affection, 609,26; 611,38 stratêgos, general, 594,31 sullogismos, syllogism, 537,23; 540,3 summetria, harmony, harmonious relation, 557,29; 559,15.16; en têi summetriai, proportionate, 593,17; due proportion, 593,19; 594,32 summetros, commensurate, 612,38; 613,19.24.30 sumplekesthai, to be entwined, 537,1; 541,14; 554,11; 590,34 sumptôma, symptom, 530,6.9.10; 546,10.11 sunaisthêsis, conscious experience, 559,26; 590,17 sundiagein, to live together with, 574,8 sundromê, being combined, 593,32 sunergein, to make a contribution, 610,26.28.30.31 sunêtheia, custom, 547,31; familiarity, 617,16.18 sungeneia, kinship, 612,9 sunienai, to understand, 605,7 sunistanai, to establish, 535,1; 538,25; 539,2; 544,28; 551,18; 593,2; 616,18 sunkatathesis, agreement, 602,9 sunkeisthai, to be composed, 588,36

201

sunôdos, company, 574,8; sunôdos einai, to harmonize, 533,15 sunoikeiousthai/sunôkeiôsthai, to be properly connected, 530,13.21.22; 564,16; 565,1.8.13; 566,1.11; 567,30; 568,32.33; 593,27.34; 594,1 sunousia, sexual intercourse, 569,25 suntonia, intensity, 561,4 tarakhê, disturbance, 529,15; 578,33; 587,11.15; 588,14 taxis, order, 580,13; 582,32; kosmou kai taxeôs, orderly arrangement, 578,29 tekhnê, art, 556,26; 573,20; 585,37; 608,28; 611,27; 615,27; 616,4–619,8; (kata) tên tekhnên, skilled, 615,10 telein, to complete, passim; in a complete manner, 553,32; to achieve full completion, 619,22 teleios, complete, passim; perfect, 603,34 teleutaios, final, 529,3 teleutan, to come to an end, 542,23; 543,21; thanatôi teleutatôi, it is a capital offence, 612,26 telikos, final, 594,28.29.31; telikôtatos, most final, 531,27.28 têrein, to guard, 612,26; to attend to, 607,11 terpein, to delight, to produce delight, 555,19; 560,11.15.23; ta terponta, delightful things, 539,20 tetrêmenos, perforated, 530,38 thalassa, sea, 536,1; 602,29 thanatos, death, 612,26 tharros, boldness, 593,11 thaumazein, to be surprised, 571,7; 602,20 theasthai, to observe, 546,20; 619,30; to contemplate, 581,27 theatos, spectator, 566,15 theatron, theatre, 552,15 theios, divine, 541,12; 579,29.38.39; 580,12.15; 582,2; 586,10; 589,20; 591,1.8.27; 597,15; 598,9.19; 599,27; 606,36; theioteros, more divine, 581,2; 591,11; theiotatos, most divine, 579,31.35.38.39; 580,3.26; 591,19.25.31; 599,25; to theion, divinity, 597,20.26.27.35; 598,9; 600,7.11; 603,11.14.18.32 theologia, theology, 595,27

202

Greek–English Index

theologos, theologian, 595,25 theophilês, god-­loved, 603,8.34.37; 604,6.9; theophilestatos, supremely god-­loved, 589,22; 603,7.8.10; 604,10 theôrein, to contemplate, 580,16.23; 581,17; 582,35; 590,25; to theôrein, contemplation, 582,37; to observe, 554,7.33; 555,29; 572,17 theôrêtikos, contemplative, 529,10; 570,1; 571,33.34; 572,4; 574,33; 578,17.20.37; 579.7.10; 580,25; 581,1.5.7.12.15.19; 582,3.12.14.18.20.29.31; 583,13.14.32; 584,20.24.25; 585,20.28; 586,13; 587,1.8; 588,23.28;33; 589,3; 590,1.32; 592,26.27; 595,36; 596,2.7.10; 597,6.12.27; 600,11.18.19; 601,1; 604,1 theôrêtikôs, contemplatively, 580,21; 582,39; 583,20; 586,17; 600,9.12.14; 601,27; 603,9; 604,16 theôria, contemplation, 529,13.29; 531,3; 532,23; 535,4; 546,12.18; 556,12.13; 562,8; 570,2; 572,25.27; 573,13; 579,14; 581,6; 582,21.24.30; 583,34; 584,30; 586,1.2; 589,28; 592,12; 597,17.18.22.23.28.30.32; 598,10.18; 599,30; 600,3.15.20.26.31.33.37; 602,17.35; 620,8; philosophical project, 529, 5 theos, God, 579,4.37; 583,23; 591,23; 597,21.23.29.30.31.33.38; 598,14; 599,30; 600,13.15; 602,13; 603,8.14.19.21.22.23.36; 606,35; hoi theoi, the gods 600,1 therapeia, treatment, 618,33 therapeuein, to treat, 618,31; to cultivate, 603,6.32 thêrion, beast, 590,36 thnêtos, mortal, 576,31; 591,20 thrasus, over-­bold, 531,36; 532,4 thrasutês, over-­boldness, 532,8; 539,5.11 thumoeidês, spirited, 572,14 thumos, spirited part, 578,30; 578,31; spirit, 590,36 timan, to value, 534,21.22; 573,33; 574,13.24; 603,22; to honour, 582,33; 588.15.16; 594,36 timê, (act of) honour, 532,36; 588,15; 593,17; 600,35; valuing, 604,1 timokratia, timocracy, 615,24; 620,13

timôrein, to punish, 608,4; 612,28 timôria, punishment, 606,16 tomê, surgery, 531,25; 562,24.25 topos, place, 541,19; 552,15; topos, 544,27 trekhein, to run, 541,20; 560,9; 575,24; 606,8 trephein, to nourish, 545,3.26.30; 546,4; 561,14; 563,20.23.25.27.28; trephesthai, to be reared, 538,19; 604,18.20; 607,14; 608,12.22; to trephesthai, rearing, 608,25 trophê, nourishment, 534,15; 545,34.36; 557,3; 563,21.22.23.26.27; 601,8; 620,19; maintenance, 600,34; rearing, 607,25 tukhê, chance (happening), 529,8; 590,4; stroke of luck, 619,8 tupos, en tupoi, in outline, 571,27.28; 605,2 turannis, tyranny, 574,34; 575,9 turannos, tyrant, 574,11.18.19.22.27.30; 575,3.6.11.24; 592,8; 600,30; 609,1 xenodokein, to invite strangers into the house, 601,26 xenos, alien, 612,25.27 zêmia, penalty, 607,32; punishment, 608,8 zên, to live, 533,16; 547,32; 548,24.30; 561,32; 562,15; 563,28.29; 572,32.34.35; 575,14; 576,27; 579,32; 582.37; 585,13; 586,9; 590,19.35; 591,4.25.26; 592,27; 597,17.26; 598,9.27.28.31.35.36; 599,1.2; 600,17; 601,13.15.28.34; 602,3; 604,8.9; 608,21; 610,12; 611,13.35; to be alive, 559,27; 561,13.17; 563,25; to achieve a life, 578,24; life, 602,28; to zên, living, 604,23; 607,15 zêtêsis, inquiry, 563,35; 583,8.11 zôôdês, brutish, 538,13; 569,26; 606,18 zôon, living thing, 531,17; 534,17; 538,23.32; 542,35; 544,28; 546,3; 552,9; 555,35; 557,9.25.33; 560,8; 563,19.32.33.34; 567,20; 570,6.11.27.31; 580,18; 591,2.20; 598,16.24.26.22.29.33.34.36; 599,4.10.24.26.36; 600,16; animal, 561,16.24.25.31.32; 564,11.12; autozôon, The Living Thing Itself, 531,17; 533,33; 534,5; being, 598,36; zôa graphein, paint still lifes, 616,20 zôtikos, vital, 561,22; to zôtikon idiôma, the distinctive character of vitality, 561,21

Subject Index References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text. Aeschines, 616,25 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 584,3 affections, 532,12.35; 544,33.34; 547,31; 550,9; 569,15; 578,24–34; 593,4–595,22; 597,32.33 amusement, 573,18–578,6; 600,29 Anacharsis, 576,1 Anaxagoras, 602,5–23 Aristotle, 529,4; 534,6; 536,32; 542,10; 545,10; 546,31; 547,10; 548,10; 556,26; 559,32; 565,15; 576,31; 580,19; 592,9; 602,7; 608,27; 613,29; Magna Moralia, 576,28; 577,25; Metaphysics, 560,24; 597,24.25; 599,31; Physics, 542,6; 552,18; 553,11; 587,26; 599,22 art, tekhnê, 556,26; 573,20; 585,37; 608,28; 611,27; 615,27; 616,4–619,8 Constantine, 610,12 contemplation (activity of intellect), 580,14–22; 586,17–19; 589,19–28; 599,30–8; 600,2–601,2; 603,8–604,10; chosen for its own sake, 585,16–586,2; (intellectual) life of, 529,6–16; 556,13; 556,20.21; 561,29; 570,33; 571,24; 575,23; 578.13; 578,24; 582,18; 583,19; 585,22; 586,8.9; 589,35; 590,32; 591,26; 598,19.24; 599.25; 604,9; and leisure, 586,4–587,2; 585,28; objects of, 529,9–18; 532,23; 561,35–7; 573,13; 579,25–8; 580,15; 581,3; 582,35–9; 586,18.19; 589,20; 590,25; 592,2; 595,26; 596,10–12; 597,15.19; 598,19; 599,25–9; 600,3–33; and pleasure, 529,13–24; 535,3.4; 538,16; 546,11–19; 556,11–21; 559,10–36; 562,7–10; 564,14.15; 569,32– 570,5; 571,15–25; 582,5–39; 583,3–15; and political virtue, 597,6–11; 601,27–9; virtue of, 571,34; 578,17; 590,1;

self-­sufficiency of, 583,14–584,26; 595,36–596,12; 603,9 contemplative (intellectual) happiness, 529,13; 570,4.5; 571,33; 572,24–8; 574,33; 578,18–584,25; 584,23; 585,20–9; 586,14; 587,1; 588,28–589,4; 592,11–30; 595,36; 597,14–598,15; 601,27–9; as the end of all virtues, 571,34–5; 577,27–8; supervenes on political happiness, 578,22–3 constitutions, 604,27–35; 607,8–19; 610,7–19; 611,12; 615,20; 616,7; 619,3–620,14 democracy, 592,6; 611,10; 615,23; 620,9.11 Demosthenes, 616,25 discourses, 532,14–533,19; 604,17–608,10; 614,31 disturbance, 529,15; 578,33; 584,30; 586,4–24; 587,11.15; 588,14 dreams, 538,13 Endymion, 573,1; 598,10 Epicurus, 586,21; 598,21–32 Eudoxus, 531,15; 533,1.20.31; 534,6.27; 536,16.17 experience, empeiria/peira, 608,28; 609,4–10; 610,34; 614,18–27; 616,26–619,8 eye, 596,8–10; 609,4–10; 619,4–8 fathers, 600,35; 605,33; 611,31–613,14; 614,23; and natural affection, 608,34; 609,26; 611,38; cf. 572,12–18; paternal intellect, 608,30–5 force, 531,5; 533,16; 574,32; 607,7–609,14; 611,37–612,12; 613,4.26 friendship, 548,5–23; 572,12–18.24; 583,5; 585,2.14–16; 588,2; 610,24; 617,6.7; 620,18

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God (divinity), 579,37; 582,2; 583,23; 590,12; 602,13; 606,35; as creator, 557,16; 582,2; 620,17; intellection and, 579,20–33; 597,21–35; 598,9–15; 599,30; 600,3–15; intellection of itself, 600,7–15; likeness to, 579,4; 591,22–4; 599,30–8; 600,3–15; 602,13; 603,7– 604,9; as Lord, 549,31; 620,17; no affections or character virtues in, 597,33–598,9 god-­loved, 589,22; 603,7–604,10 Good, the: as complete, 541,1–10; Platonist conception of, 533,22–534,6; pleasure is not, 537,13–18; whether pleasure is, 531,15–30; 533,19; 534,6–39; 535,22– 537,10; 542,2.3; 544,19–23 Gorgias, 616,35; 617,29 happiness: of children, 577,24–9; as choiceworthy in itself, 573,14–17; 576,14.15; 585,28; 586,14; 588,30; 588,28–589,26; duration of, 580,25– 582,5; 583,15–17; 589,31–590,29; 600,19–26; and external goods or conditions, 572,4–6; 583,17–584,26; 595,31–597,11; 601,4–603,5; not a state, 572,29–573,8; and pleasure, 529,16– 531,11; 556,20.21; 559,10–17.34–6; 562,12–15; 564,14.15; 569,32–570,5; 572,18–24; 582,5–39; 583,13; 584,25; 588,30.31; 589,23.24; 592,21–30; political, 529,10–12; 517,32; 572,26.27; 578,18–591,18; 592,30; 595,23–36; 597,30–5; 598,12; 600,29; 604,7–35; two-­fold distinction (political and contemplative) of, 529,7; 571,23–572,12; 576,25–30; 578,17–25; 580,6–8; 583,3–584,26; 588,34–6; 590,31–591,11; 591,18.19; 592,11–30; 595,22.23; 597,18.19; 598,9–15; 599,30–8; 604,16; whether non-­rational living things have, 598,18–599,38; whether there is an increase with duration of, 589,31–590,29 harmony, 532,1.2; 533,15; 546,19; 555,2; 557,29; 559,14–16; 562,4; 618,1 Heraclitus, 570,21–3 Hippias, 617,28 Hippocrates, 534,17 Homer, 610,14; 613,4

human being: the composite in a secondary sense is the, 571,35; 590,31–591,7; natural activity of a, 561,25–37; 571,15–25; two-­fold, 571,34; 576,26–31; 580,6–8; 590,31–591,11; 591,15–19; 592,25–30; 594,5–6; 595,14–23 intellect, 529,19; 533,26–8; 538,11; 574,33; 575,4; 578,34; 582,24–30; 584,29; 597,8; 609,4; 610,34; and degrees of intellection, 556,14; as the divine part, 579,30–580,3; 580,25.26; 591,1–31; illumination of, 534,16; 538,28; 579,29.30; 580,20; 585,11.12; 586,17; 591,3.4.26.27; 603,30.31; 608,26; potential, 580,19; and the pursuit of good, 534,14–17; 538,11–29; in theology, 595,23–8; as true human being, 571,8; 571,35–572,2; 576,22–33; 578,21.22; 579,15–39; 580,6–7; 591,19; 592,8.25; 595,20.21; 599,33.34; two kinds (practical and contemplative) of, 570,1.2 intellect, separation of, apatheia, 576,30.31; 580,16–18; 591,2.18–22; 595,20–3; 597,33 Lamia, 547,18 laws, 604,20–33; 606,16; 607,8–608,4; 608,13–609,10; 610,3–612,15; 614,29– 615,4; 615,10–25; 617,34–619,14; 620,10–14; as concerned with universals, 610,34–613,14; as not burdensome, 609,29; as relative to constitution, 604,32; 611,10–12 legislation, the art of, 609,29–37; 610,34– 612,15; 615,14–616,17; 617,33; 618,14–25; 619,9–24 leisure, 573,26; 586,3–589,28; 601,7 liberality (liberal), 584,18; 593,13–15; 594,2; 596,12–597,4; 598,2; 601,27; 604,18; 605,24.25 licentiousness, 532,20; 534,19; 538,8–10; 539,6.12; 547,34; 565,6–11; 567,37; 573,23; 575,21; 579,17; 605,25 light, phôs, 559,16; 596,9; 603,31.33 masses, the, 530,15; 531,31.32; 533,8; 547,31.32; 574,26.27; 602,8.16–21; 606,8.15; 607,15.31–3; 609,14; 611,35

Subject Index mean, the, to meson, 532,1–5; 539,10 means, 549,1–25; 601,23–602,2; 602,19; 605,13; 618,4–7 medicine, 530,9.10; 547,14–17; 557,24–32; 573,12.21; 585,37; 594,29; 608,8; 611,15.16.29; 612,22–31; 614,3.16–25; 615,2.10; 616,1.21.22; 617,12; 618,5–7; 618,25–619,3 motion, 539,38.39; 541,9–542,24; 551,26–31; 552,9–554,22; 569,2; 581,23–5; 599,11–17 One, the, 533,33–534,5 Parmenides, 614,18 Peripatetics, 529,3; 578,15 Plato, 536,15–17; 537,13; 542,27–33; 579,5–30; 585,10–13; 592,9.10; 598,23; 601,4; 616,35; 619,15–19; 620,4; Laws, 585,14 Platonists, 533,22.35; 578,16 pleasure, 529,11–571,21; and beauty, 554,25–555,29; and completeness, 541,3–10; 551,2–555,29; 556,25–558,12; different activities proper to different kinds of, 547,3–548,4; 550,10.11; 554,9–13; 555,32–556,21; 562,9–13; 563,38–571,25; and duration, 551,2– 552,28; 559,19–561,7; 566,26–567,28; and indetermination, 540,1–38; natural, 567,17–27; as only a quasi-­end, 559,4; 562,21–563,35; 564,13.14; pure, 566,32.33; 569,11–570,6; 575,7–9; 582,25–39; two-­fold, 571,15–25; whether a coming-­to-be, 541,3–542,24; 542,27–546,38; 551,17–554,5; whether (a) good, 533,29.30; 534,23.24; 537,13–38; 548,7–550,34; whether the Good, 531,15–30; 533,22–538,33; 541,3–542,24; 544,19–23; whether a replenishment, 544,19–546,38; whether most base, 531,30–532,10 Plotinus, 529,21 pneuma, 560,4–8 Prodicus, 617,28 prudence, 535,31–538,6; 577,29; 584,19– 585,33; 594,7–596,29; 606,35; 608,17– 609,8; and the character virtues, 594,7–595,20; discovers how to achieve

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goals, 594,34–595,9; synonymous with ‘intellect’, 609,4–10 Ptolemy, 582,9 punishment, 582,33; 583,10; 606,16; 607,7; 607,19–608,10; 609,13–22; 611,36–40; 612,28 reason, 538,24; 548,24; 556,12.13; 560,27.28; 561,2.34–7; 562,3; 568,30–5; 569,34; 572,1.16; 576,24.25; 579,19–39; 590,35; 591,16; 594,10; 598,25; 600,16; 603,25; 604,4; 616,27 reversion, 529,14; 556,17; 561,27–35; 580,14–16; 591,5–10; 603,15–20 self-­sufficiency, 572,22–573,16; 582,5– 585,1; 588,31–589,26; 601,16–19; 603,9; 604,6 sensation, 538,17.18; 546,12–25; 549,28; 550,1–5; 551,4–25; 553,30–561,7; 561.15.16; 564,14.15; 568,33–5; 569,11–570,6; 575,14; 579,36; 582,26.27; 595,26; 596,8–10; 603,27–9 Socrates, 540,38; 614,17 Solon, 591,14; 601,35; 602,14.23 sophists, 616,8–617,36 soul: and activity, 561,10–562,18; appetitive part of the, 572,12–14; 578,30–2; 590,36; as the entelechy of body, 561,19.20; mortality of the, 576,31–3; 591,18–22; non-­rational part of the, 530,17; 579,19–21; and representation, 603,28.29; sensitive, 556,37–557,4; 560,6; spirited part of the, 572,15; 578,30.31; 590,36; vegetative (nutritive) faculty of the, 545,3–546,10; 557,2.3; 573,2 Sparta, 609,38–610,17; 612,36 Speusippus, 539,3–8 Stoics, 596,21–31; 599,2–6 Theognis, 591,14; 605,20 tyranny (tyrants), 574,3–575,36; 592,7.8; 600,30; 609,1.2 universal and particular cases, 612,20– 615,14 upbringing (education, fosterage, rearing), 538,17; 604,18–615,7; public

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(universal) vs. individually tailored, 612,2–614,2 violence (threat), 606,12; 607,7; 607,19– 608,10; 608,33.34; 609,13–22; 611,36–40 virtue: and the definition of happiness, 529,11.12; 571,21–4.31–3; 572,10–573.8; 576,27.28; 577,27.28; 578,10; 579,10; 580,3.4; 584,2; 585,25; 589,36–590,1; degrees of, 540,14–25; difficulty of acquisition of, 549,29– 550,2; 569,1; 606,27.28; natural, 593,29–33; 606,31–607,2; 613,2; and pleasure, 530,2–531,9; 532,22.23; 535,7–9; 537,18.19; 545,14–16; 547,24; 549,29–550,2; 563,2–16; 570,17–19.33; 593,35–594,4; 606,22; political, 578,15.16; two-­fold (character and contemplative), 578,16.17

virtues of character (practical virtues): belong to the composite human being, 592,3– 593,26; 594,4–595,21; distinguished from dispositions to acquire character virtues, 605,30–3; indicate goals, 594,33–595,8; moderate the affections (causes of order), 578,19; 578,23–35; 580,12–14; 593,8–21; 597,32.33; mutually entail each other, 594,13–25; not self-­sufficient for happiness, 584,2–20; 590,1–3; as prerequisites of intellectual virtue, 578,23–579,1; 603,23.24; 604,2–4.23.24; as secondary goods, 584,1; 589.22–23; 590,34 virtues of intellect (rational or contemplative virtues), 572.11.12; 578,17; 593,21; 604,13; 610,29 will (act of will), 596,14–597,33; 606,34; 610,15–30

Themistius On Virtue Translated by Alberto Rigolio

Introduction Alberto Rigolio

The On Virtue is a philosophical oration by Themistius. The original Greek text has been lost, but it was translated into Syriac in around the fifth or early sixth century, and this translation is the subject of the present work.1 The structure and tone of the On Virtue resembles that of many private orations by Themistius, and it will thus be unsurprising to find a less academic approach to philosophy here than in Themistius’ paraphrases of Aristotle. The On Virtue is best understood within the tradition of philosophical orations, and its author may have been aware of Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Maximus of Tyre and emperor Julian. In addition, Themistius’ teaching activity and experience is reflected in both the structure and contents of the On Virtue, which, however, more closely resembles a philosopher’s showpiece than an ordinary lecture on philosophy. As will be shown in the section Overview and structure, the subject of the On Virtue is broad and ambitious in that the author describes and contrasts three major philosophical traditions (the Epicurean, the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Cynic) and makes a case in favour of Cynic philosophy. Themistius’ view on Cynicism will be addressed in the section Philosophical contents, and the possible reasons and circumstances behind his decision to take such an unexpected stance in favour of Cynic philosophy will be addressed in the sections Historical context and A hypothesis of chronology. There follow a Note on the Syriac translation and an English translation with commentary notes.

Overview and structure The opening words of the On Virtue reveal that the oration was addressed to an audience ‘already introduced to the wisdom of Plato and Aristotle’, in all likelihood Themistius’ own pupils or disciples, but it is not necessary to conclude that the audience was limited to such individuals (1–3, 10). Themistius sets for himself the roles of guide (2) and teacher (3); and, in addition, traces of school practice may be identified in the three ethopoeias (16–23) and two personifications (34, 44). Following the initial address, Themistius introduces an extended allegorical tale in which three major philosophical traditions – the Epicurean, the Aristotelian and the Cynic – are symbolically depicted as three roads presenting various obstacles and challenges to their travellers (1–9).2 This

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allegorical image representing different educational curricula as alternative roads strikes the reader as a widely attested paideutic notion common to philosophical and rhetorical education.3 In the On Virtue, the alternative roads represent different philosophical traditions, in a way similar to a passage from Themistius’ Or. 20, according to which different philosophical schools are ‘like side roads that, though they break away and deviate from a wide and long highway, nonetheless all reach the same point in the end, however much they wind about’ (Or. 20, 236AB trans. Penella, dated to autumn 355). Yet, the On Virtue adds that, since the study of Plato and Aristotle presents its students with many difficulties, Philosophy offers them an alternative road altogether, which is ‘simple and direct’. As soon becomes clear, this road is the shortcut to virtue (and thus happiness), the suntomos hodos of the Cynic tradition.4 The allegorical tale proceeds with symbolical descriptions of the Epicurean ‘road’ (4–6), the Aristotelian ‘road’ (7) and, lastly, the Cynic ‘road’, which, allegedly, Socrates first found and was later trodden by Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates (8–9). Themistius also claims that he can act as a guide on all three roads since he has already walked them (3–4), but it soon becomes clear that he favours the Cynic road despite his claim not to be walking it (9–10). In fact, each of the three roads can be beneficial in some respect, and Philosophy makes use of each of them in the same way as doctors use different medicines according to the condition of the sick whom they are treating. The Epicurean road is useful for those who disregard virtue and believe that pleasure is the highest Good, while the Aristotelian road is useful to show that virtue is the highest Good to those who still esteem virtue as much as they esteem health, wealth and fame (12). After a short excursus on the Stoics Zeno and Cleanthes (13), Themistius maintains that the Cynic road shows that virtue is the only Good and that all the rest is unstable and changeable (14). At this point, Themistius launches on an especially remarkable virtuoso performance made up of three ethopoeias. He calls in three fictitious speakers who each pronounce a speech in favour of one of the three roads so as to see which one will gain the victory, as though engaged in a lawsuit (15–16). The end of the third and last speech (23) marks the beginning of the second half of the On Virtue, in which Themistius openly takes a stance in favour of Cynic philosophy. Themistius follows up on the third speech by arguing that virtue is the only Good since it is the only thing that cannot be snatched away from its possessor (26–7). Unlike animals, human virtue lies exclusively in the soul rather than in the body, and, for this reason, human beings have complete control over virtue. They can make it flourish and thus achieve happiness, as quotations from Antisthenes’ lost works illustrate (28–32). From this point onwards, Themistius makes more and more use of anecdotes, such as on Socrates and Xerxes (34), on emperor Nero (35), on sculpture (37) and painting (40), on the citharist Amoebeus (39), on Heraclitus (46), on Crates and physical exercise (47), on Diogenes and free speech (48), on Diogenes as ‘the dog’ (52), on Crates as the ‘door-­opener’ (53), on an unidentified Lysimachus (54) and again on Crates (55). At the same time, Themistius does not renounce familiar rhetorical devices such as the report of imaginary objections by the audience (38, 41), two personifications of Socrates and Virtue respectively (34, 44) and the inclusion of a fable by Aesop (52), as he did in at least three other surviving private orations (Or. 21, 22 and 32).

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Themistius also insists that vexations and pleasures are equal for the truly virtuous person (37) and that virtue itself cannot be affected by external circumstances such as poverty or disease (38–40). In the final section of the text, Themistius focuses on the ideal conduct of the philosopher and his engagement with society. When circumstances demand it, the philosopher should not spare words of admonition as long as his goal is to help his addressees, nor should he be afraid to speak out by taking Diogenes’ frank criticism as his model (48–55). The philosopher’s criticism, however, will be effective only as long as his own conduct is free from blemish and he is concerned with virtue alone as Diogenes himself was (50–2). As some anecdotes about Crates and Lysimachus show (53–4), under these and similar conditions the philosopher can benefit society at large through his behaviour and his teaching, as long as he does not seek to increase somebody else’s wealth or honour. The philosopher should show by example that, first, poverty is not a bad thing and, second, that the role of the ruler is best entrusted to him who exercises power with wisdom (55–6).

Philosophical contents It is a useful exercise to relate the On Virtue to the works of those Greek imperial authors, such as Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Epictetus, the authors of the Cynic Epistles, Lucian of Samosata, Maximus of Tyre, Julian and Gregory of Nazianzus, who showed interest for ancient Cynicism but faced the challenging task of retrieving a philosophical tradition that was more widely known from anecdotes about its adherents than from systematic accounts of its philosophical underpinnings. The imperial authors who, like Themistius, endeavoured to retrieve this bare philosophical tradition had at their immediate disposal a salmagundi of anecdotes, whose considerable diffusion had something to do with their use at school and with the role that they could play in defining what types of behaviour were (and, crucially, were not) appropriate for Roman gentlemen living under the empire. The rarity of authentic philosophical literature on Cynicism meant that these authors were often involved in the reception, rethinking and rewriting of Cynicism in literary more than philosophical terms. Their works on Cynicism, which reveal radically different reinterpretations of this tradition, were often configured as primarily literary reformulations of existing traditions about Cynic philosophy and about its adherents, and were intended for an audience of members of the Roman Imperial elites more than for an elusive Cynic philosophical classroom. The On Virtue does not escape this scenario in that the literary and rhetorical concerns guiding its author are clearly visible, even in its Syriac translation.5 Despite the literary and rhetorical concerns of its author, however, the On Virtue is also unusually rich in philosophical content when compared with texts on Cynicism that have survived from the Imperial period. Like other imperial authors, Themistius drew on selected aspects of the Cynic tradition, but, as Brancacci argues, he was also well-­informed on ancient Cynic literature, and on Antisthenes’ works in particular. The extent to which the philosophical articulation of Cynicism as expressed in the On Virtue goes back to the ancient Cynics goes beyond the scope of the present work, but it is nonetheless worth pointing out three significant aspects of Themistius’

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understanding of Cynicism. Firstly, not unlike Diogenes Laertius, Themistius presents Cynicism as a philosophical school, a ‘road’ such as that of Epicurus and that of Aristotle; and this view is instantiated by the succession of Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates (8) – although it has been argued that this succession was initially propagated by the Stoics.6 Secondly, Antisthenes, whose works are mostly lost but from which Themistius quotes (32 and, possibly, 34), appears as an important point of reference for the theoretical underpinning of Cynicism as expressed in the On Virtue. According to Brancacci, Antisthenes was also at the root of the philosophical roads and shortcut imagery that Themistius adopted in this speech.7 Thirdly, and most importantly, the On Virtue emphasizes the Socratic origins of Cynicism (8), even if the modern reader would have very much benefitted from a more comprehensive treatment of this point. As will be shown below, the question of whether Themistius actually attributed to Cynicism (as it is presented in the On Virtue) any aspect of Socratic doctrine is in need of an answer.8 The On Virtue argues that the superiority of Cynic philosophy lies in the fact that it rightly recognizes Virtue as the only Good. Virtue is, accordingly, the necessary and sufficient condition for happiness (10, 27, 43–4) – a view that may well derive from Antisthenes.9 According to this argument, there is no good besides virtue, and whatever is not stable or can be snatched away from its possessor, whether by fortune or by other cause, cannot be considered good. According to the On Virtue, this Cynic view is preferable to that of the Stoics, who likewise maintain that virtue is the Good but nonetheless believe that, among the other things, a few are superior (proêgmena) to others and should thus be preferred (13, and the same view on the Cynics in relation to the Stoics is reported in D.L. 6.105). The Stoics, however, are not credited with an autonomous road within the allegory, as they began to walk the Cynic road but later went astray and found themselves ‘between Aristotle and Diogenes’ (8).10 Next down the hierarchy come the views of Plato and his followers, who maintained that ‘other things too are good, but that the highest Good is virtue, and virtue is perfected in happiness by all the other things, as a solo singer is perfected by co-­singers and by him who leads their choir’ (13); and a similar view is that attributed to Aristotle, who maintained that virtue is the chief Good but that some material goods are also necessary to follow the road to happiness (12). Last of all comes the view of Epicurus, who disregarded virtue and believed that pleasure alone is the Good (12). The On Virtue further develops the identification of virtue as the only Good by maintaining that virtue11 alone is what men truly control and cannot be snatched away, since virtue cannot be influenced by external circumstances such as poverty or disease (25–7, 40). Again, this view may well derive from Antisthenes, and from his Heracles in particular – in all likelihood the same text from which Themistius quotes a few paragraphs below (32).12 In addition, by invoking human nature (as opposed to the natures of animals), Themistius claims that virtue lies in the soul (30) and intellect (31) of man and not at all in his body.13 In a remarkable development of the argument, which according to Brancacci depends on Antisthenes, Themistius is thus able to focus on the human soul and intellect as the place where virtue actually ‘sprouts’ and ‘flourishes’ without the need of anything else from outside (30–31). Therefore, wisdom, which is not clearly defined in the text but should presumably be understood as the use

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of human reason and intellect (31), becomes central to the discussion of virtue since wisdom is fundamental to achieving virtue and, in turn, happiness. Themistius here (32) reports a quotation from Antisthenes according to whom the wise person, unlike animals, is concerned with ‘things higher than man’ – a quotation interpreted by Prince as ‘the clearest surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ conception of a transcendent object of knowledge’.14 There follows Themistius’ dramatic description of the human intellect’s inquiry into the universe and ‘the spaces that are even above it; (man) investigates hidden things, and he wants to know the king of the universe’ (33). The concept of wisdom, in its several shapes (34), is central to the rest of the On Virtue given its fundamental role in achieving happiness (38, 39, 42). The most effective expression of the argument is perhaps in ch. 43, where Themistius maintains: We believe that, if it is possible to live happily by behaving righteously, and, if this is so because wisdom is sufficient for behaving righteously, wisdom can also be sufficient for living happily.

According to this view (and again 44), wisdom is the only necessary ingredient for achieving happiness, and the anecdotes that follow are meant to illustrate wisdom and exemplify its importance. The reflection on wisdom’s all-­important role thus tinges the final chapters of the text, and the question remains whether Themistius might have seen the central role of wisdom in achieving happiness as the Socratic pedigree of Cynic philosophy (25–7 and 43). In particular, one wonders whether Socratic intellectualism may provide some sort of counterpart to the self-­standing and central understanding of wisdom in the On Virtue. Another striking aspect of the On Virtue is the conspicuous absence of a Platonic ‘road’. Despite Themistius’ use of Antisthenes, it remains difficult to determine whether the absence of a Platonic road in the On Virtue ultimately depends on Antisthenes’ genuine ‘anti-Platonic polemic’ based on philosophical grounds.15 At any rate, Plato is mentioned few times (1, 13, 52, 55), but mostly in relation to Aristotle (1, 13), and, crucially, his view on virtue is assimilated to that of the Stagirite (13). A harmonised understanding of Plato and Aristotle is not unexpected from Themistius (e.g. 20, 235C–36B, fall 355) – nor from Julian (e.g. Or. 5, 162C, written in 362) –, and it thus does not surprise here.16 Conversely, however, Plato’s dialogues resonate in the On Virtue as they appear as an important source for its imagery and language, as is indicated in the notes to the text (e.g. 1, 8, 25, 52); and, in a similar way, the imagery found in Ps.-Diogenes’ Ep. 37.4–5 is used in the depiction of the Cynic road (8–9). As far as Epicureanism is concerned, it remains difficult to decide whether the On Virtue uses authentic Epicurean literature or not, since, on one occasion, Themistius may actually be quoting from Epicurus (18) while, on another occasion, he seems instead to depend on literature hostile to Epicureanism (19). However, the presence of the Epicurean ‘road’ in the oration may not be as far-­fetched as a superficial reading might suggest. In fall 355, Themistius had pointed out that his father Eugenius, also a teacher of philosophy, used to teach Epicurus to his elementary students, but he removed it from the curriculum soon afterwards (Or. 20, 236A). Two attacks to

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Epicurus, and in particular to his refusal to engage in public life, are found in Themistius’ Or. 26, 324A (late 350s?) and in Julian’s Letter to Themistius 255BC (prob. 355);17 and a contemporary of Themistius, the teacher of rhetoric Himerius, structured his scholastic Or. 3 as an accusatory speech against Epicurus set in a courtroom.18 In his overview of the hostility to Epicureanism during Late Antiquity, Criscuolo points out that Plotinus used to read passages from Epicurus in his lectures, and that, in a fragment preserved by Eusebius of Caesarea (PE 15.5), the second-­century Platonist Atticus brings together Aristotle and Epicurus within his criticism of the concept of divine providence according to peripatetic philosophy, but eventually compares Epicurus favourably to the Stagirite.19 The attention given to Aristotle seems at first sight more limited (7, 13, 21). The On Virtue reveals awareness of concepts expounded in Nicomachean Ethics (7, 11–12) and, perhaps, in the De anima (19); but there is also the possibility that Aristotelian philosophy underpins the overall philosophical construct of the oration. One of the most fascinating aspects of the On Virtue is its fundamental view that different ‘roads’ of philosophy can benefit different sorts of men (12): [. . .] since many things are practiced as good because of lack of knowledge, philosophy shows what the true Good is, and acts like the doctors. For the doctors too do not use one medicine and one nourishment for all bodies, but to the infirm in the stomach they give poultices and delicate foods, and to those who are thence closer to recovery they confidently give robust foods and medicines. So too Philosophy, when it has seen that a man is subdued to desires and believes that pleasure alone is the Good, persuades him through Epicurus that he should not disregard virtue and be led foolishly by desires [. . .]. Conversely, when Philosophy has seen another who praises virtue but does not praise it more than he praises health, wealth and fame, it persuades him through Aristotle and shows that virtue is the chief Good and superior to all goods that are useful to the body and are found in the royal palaces.

Outside the medical allegory, the reference can perhaps be stretched to indicate actual philosophical teaching, which was Themistius’ own profession. The presentation of philosophy as medicine is pervasive in ancient literature, and in Epicurean literature in particular, but it should be noted that both the theoretical foundation for preferring a particularised education and its allegorical presentation in medical terms are found in the close of the Nicomachean Ethics (10.9), where Aristotle discussed the need for a good education.

Authorship No scholar so far has made a case against the attribution of the On Virtue to Themistius as the manuscripts report. In 1872, Bücheler, who argued that the Syriac De exercitatione is unlikely to have been written by Plutarch as the Syriac manuscripts report, accepted instead that the On Virtue was originally authored by Themistius, and this view has

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been followed by the editors for Teubner and by recent scholars. The only differing position is that of Maisano, who writes of ‘problematica attribuzione’ for all works and fragments that, apart from the paraphrases, have not been transmitted within the main corpus of Themistius’ orations, and they have thus been excluded from Maisano’s volume of orations. Maisano cites the diversity in form and content between the corpus of the orations and the Peri phronêseôs, the Peri psukhês, the On Virtue, the De re publica gerenda and the Pros basilea as arguments against a Themistian authorship of these works. Recent studies, however, have not been as hyper-­critical, and have put forward more articulated views taking into account the considerable variance among these works transmitted under the name of Themistius. As far as the On Virtue is concerned, apart from Maisano all scholars accept Themistius’ authorship.20 The present translation follows the work of the Teubner editors and the recent publications, for example, by Conterno, Kupreeva and Brancacci, in accepting the Themistian authorship. It is nevertheless hoped that this translation, coupled with further analysis on the techniques of translating Greek texts into Syriac, will contribute to scholarly discussions on the On Virtue and its authorship. Recently, Conterno has identified additional elements in favour of Themistius’ authorship, namely the reference to previous philosophical teaching that fits Themistius’ career, the reference to accusations of incoherence that may be brought forward against the author, and the imagery of alternative philosophical roads that resounds with other orations by the same author. Further elements bring the On Virtue closer to Themistius’ surviving rhetorical output, and to the private orations in particular. Several images, expressions and anecdotes found in the On Virtue reveal a considerable degree of affinity with other orations by Themistius.21 In addition, the use of a fable by Aesop in the On Virtue (51) is in common with at least three surviving Themistian orations (21, 262B; 22, 278C; 32, 359BC), as is the use of an extended allegorical tale or simile stretching on for few paragraphs (2–9 with 23, 283C–84C; 27, 339B–41A; 32, 357A–58A). Further similarities between passages of the On Virtue and other orations are pointed out in the notes to the text.

Historical context The On Virtue does not provide any straightforward indication of chronology, and its date remains uncertain. Some internal elements, however, help narrow down the plausible chronological bracket. According to Bücheler, the reference to the ‘outmost borders of Pontus’ (54) indicates that the On Virtue must have been delivered in Constantinople like many of Themistius’ private orations; also, the references of the On Virtue to previous philosophical teaching (1) and to the author himself (2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 45, etc.) make it likely that Themistius was an established figure when he wrote this speech. In Bücheler’s view, who maintains that the On Virtue is one of the best products of Themistius’ rhetorical art, the most plausible chronological bracket is 350 to 380, probably closer to 380, on account of the quality of the oration. Similarly, Scholze considers the On Virtue one of the most accomplished orations by Themistius. According to him, the confidently instructional tone of the text indicates that Themistius must have written it as an experienced man in the latter part of his life.

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According to these two scholars, therefore, it is unlikely that the On Virtue was pronounced any earlier than the 350s.22 Although not compelling, this reconstruction can be taken as a plausible working hypothesis, and further analysis bolsters Bücheler’s and Scholze’s arguments. It is striking that the On Virtue presents a similar, but at the same time more developed imagery than Themistius had used in two orations composed in the 350s. Firstly, the opening image of traditional philosophical schools as different roads is already found in Or. 20, but in a less developed form. As mentioned above, in Or. 20, 236B, Themistius simply spoke of traditional philosophical schools ‘like side roads that, though they break away and deviate from a wide and long highway, nonetheless all reach the same point in the end’. In the On Virtue, however, the imagery and symbolism is considerably more detailed, and, in addition, the oration features Cynicism as an entirely alternative road to the others. It is plausible, then, that the On Virtue was pronounced after Or. 20, which is dated to 355, rather than earlier. Secondly, the comparison between philosophy and medicine in the On Virtue (12) appears in a similar form also in Or. 26, which, according to Penella, was composed in the late 350s. In Or. 26, Themistius pointed out that, unlike the art of medicine that ministers to bodies (with their own peculiar illnesses) individually in the privacy of their own beds, philosophy ministers to the souls, which ‘generally have maladies in common, and the soul’s nature is such that it can be treated anywhere’ – by which Themistius ultimately means that philosophy has a place in the public assembly (26, 320C). In the On Virtue, philosophy and medicine are again brought together, but possibly even more closely. Themistius explains that, as the doctors who ‘do not use one medicine and one nourishment for all bodies’ but treat each patient according to his own condition, so also philosophy treats the diseases of the soul according to its individual needs (12). The On Virtue appears to develop the simile between the action of philosophy and that of the doctors (compare Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 and 10.9), and it is thus plausible that the On Virtue was pronounced after Or. 26 rather than vice versa.23 The possible circumstances in which Themistius may have proposed a different view on how philosophy can act as a medicine for the soul (and the inclusion of Cynicism, possibly depending on Julian’s Or. 7) will be addressed in the next section. There is also the possibility that the road imagery presented in the On Virtue should be connected to another oration by Themistius, Or. 5, which similarly makes use of the symbolic imagery of alternative roads that nonetheless reach the same one destination eventually (5, 69A: hodon d’ ep’ auton ou mian ferein). The subject of Or. 5 is not competition in the field of philosophy, but it is, instead, a plea for religious plurality pronounced in front of emperor Jovian on January 1, 364: thus you realise that, while there exists only one Judge, mighty and true, there is no one road leading to him (hodon d’ ep’ auton ou mian pherein), but one is more difficult to travel, another more direct, one steep and another level. All, however, tend alike towards that one goal and our competition and our zealousness arise from no other reason than that we do not all travel by the same route. If you allow only one path, closing off the rest (tas loipas), you will fence off the broad field of competition (Or. 5, 68D–69A, trans. Heather).

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As is pointed out by Heather, it may be a calculated strategy that Themistius leaves it deliberately ambiguous which road is difficult and which road is direct to allow both pagan and Christian audiences to identify whose road is each. Although there is no compelling evidence to conclude that the road imagery in Or. 5 depends on previous road imagery such as that of the On Virtue, again, it seems plausible that, when composing Or. 5, Themistius was in fact readapting an existing image to the discussion of religious pluralism. Indeed, while in the On Virtue each one of the three roads represents a specific philosophical school and each obstacle stands for a specific challenge that each philosophical tradition presents, it would be difficult to account for the exact identification of the different roads and the challenges they presents only on the basis of Or. 5 (dusporôteran . . . euthuteran . . . tracheian . . . homalên). It is plausible that, in this passage from Or. 5, Themistius readapted more complex imagery, such as that of the On Virtue, to the different context of a discussion on religious pluralism.24 Whether the road imagery of these two orations depended, in turn, on the Or. 7 by emperor Julian, pronounced in March 362, is a question that will be discussed below. Despite their similarities, however, the link between the On Virtue and orations 20 (355), 26 (late 350s) and 5 (364) is not cogent and cannot be taken as a conclusive indication of dependence. Along with the considerations based on the reuse of similar imagery, however, it is worth inquiring into the historical context of the On Virtue. More precisely, it is worth investigating under what circumstances Themistius may have made a case in favour of Cynic philosophy even at the cost of (apparently) relegating Aristotelian philosophy, his own speciality, to a lower rank. A view in favour of Cynic philosophy strikes one as unusual within the Themistian corpus, and Themistius makes it clear that Cynicism was not his own road, for, as he points out, ‘perhaps, you will ask me why I am praising one road while I am walking another’ (10).

A hypothesis of chronology: the spring of 362? The historical moment in which Themistius may have felt the need to take a half-­ hearted stance in favour of Cynicism against Aristotelian philosophy remains one of the most intriguing questions that the On Virtue raises. Within the career of Themistius, however, there were at least two moments when discussions on Cynic philosophy leave prominent traces in the historical record. On both occasions, the best sources are surviving orations and the setting is Constantinople, where Themistius was based. One occasion is the spring of 362, when emperor Julian pronounced two orations attacking Heraclius and other Cynic philosophers who, in his view, did not meet the standards of Cynic philosophy proper. Another moment is the winter 379–80, when Gregory of Nazianzus pronounced a panegyric oration for the Christian philosopher Maximus the Cynic, who, however, soon afterwards turned out to be part of a plot against Gregory.25 It is important to emphasize, however, that other historical moments between c. 350 and c. 380 may be equally plausible settings for the On Virtue.26 It will be suggested here that the spring of 362 provides a plausible chronology for the On Virtue, as is shown by some overlaps in content and argumentation between this speech and the two orations on Cynicism composed by Julian. This does not imply

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that the two orations by Julian and the On Virtue were performed in front of the same audiences or that they responded directly to one another, for, as has been shown, the On Virtue contains indications of a scholastic (or mixed-­scholastic) audience and should probably be understood as a philosopher’s showpiece. It will be suggested instead that common elements make it plausible to believe that Julian and Themistius were aware of each other’s work, and that it is possible to conceive of a sort of dialogue between the On Virtue and Julian’s two orations. In addition, to accept Constantinople during the early months of 362 as the setting for the On Virtue may also account for the unexpected philosophical stance of the speech, which is (at first reading) at odds with the rest of the Themistian corpus. In fact the few months between Julian’s triumphal entry in Constantinople on December 11, 361, and his departure eastwards in June 362 must have been an especially uncomfortable time for Themistius, who had reached political prominence under Constantius and whose tension with Julian dated from at least the time of Julian’s Letter to Themistius (prob. 355).27 Julian’s direct and passionate involvement in the life of the Constantinopolitan Senate certainly brought the emperor very close to Themistius’ own domain, and, moreover, the new emperor took immediate action to prune the Constantian court, of which Themistius was a close associate. The accession of a new young emperor with a strong philosophical and religious sensibility meant new and unique career opportunities for young philosophers and rhetoricians, such as Nymphidianus, the brother of Maximus of Ephesus, who was made Magister Epistolarum Graecarum in 361 (PLRE 1 Nymphidianus; Eunapius VS 497), Sallustius, the Iamblichan philosopher author of the treatise On the Gods and the World (PLRE 1 Sallustius 1 and 5),28 who was made praetorian prefect of Gaul in late 361 and consul in 363 and Celsus, a student of Libanius who was appointed as governor of Cilicia in summer 362 and then governor of Syria (PLRE 1 Celsus 3). The new appointments infringed on the ambitions of already established figures such as Themistius and, of course, of his followers.29 In this period, there were also several Cynics at court (Chytron, Heraclius, Serenianus, Asclepiades, the philosopher ‘with blonde hair’ mentioned in Julian Or. 7, 224D and perhaps Maximus the Cynic), and possibly also the Iamblichan philosopher Eustatius and the Christian Aristotelian Aetius.30 The fact that Themistius may have been Julian’s teacher (sometime in the period 348–51 before Julian discovered theurgic Neoplatonism that would become so important to him) might not have served Themistius much during the early months of 362.31 It is in these months that Julian arbitrated a philosophical debate between Themistius and Maximus of Ephesus (Julian’s past mentor and teacher in Ephesus in c. 351),32 but, thanks to Julian’s involvement in the matter, the debate resulted in Themistius’ humiliating defeat in one of his philosophical specialities, Aristotelian logic.33 Julian did not shun involvement in philosophical affairs, and his role as a philosopher was a feature of the public profile that he chose for himself, as is shown in honorary inscriptions and on coins’ iconography. At the same time, as a relatively young emperor, he was ready to react strongly against any patronising attempt, for instance by established philosophers, as is attested in his seventh and sixth orations.34 Themistius, a successful statesman from the regime of Constantius who had benefitted from the Christians’ support and had been the most prominent teacher of philosophy

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in the capital, was one of those individuals whose ground was threatened by Julian’s accession.35 For these reasons, he may have been willing to do his best to avoid trouble, and, if necessary, to try new radical strategies. The three months between Julian’s Or. 7 to the Cynic Heraclius, which he pronounced in Constantinople in March 362, and his Or. 6 to the Uneducated Cynics, which he composed in June 362 just before or after his departure for the East, provide a plausible setting for Themistius’ On Virtue.36 Or. 7 was Julian’s response to a lecture delivered by the Cynic philosopher Heraclius, who presented himself to the emperor asking permission to deliver a speech, perhaps in a misguided attempt to gain his favour.37 By accepting, Julian gave a display of his philia, but was shocked at the blasphemous words of Heraclius, who made up an allegorical tale featuring the god Pan as a symbolic representation of Julian, and no less than Zeus as a symbolic representation of Heraclius himself. Julian was furious, but he made use of this situation for a more ambitious enterprise, and the following day he delivered Or. 7, a response to Heraclius structured as a full-­length lecture.38 Julian attacked Heraclius and strongly condemned the use of myth outside specific didactic settings within religious teaching which he outlined in some detail in the oration. In addition, Julian argued that the Cynic Heraclius did not meet the standards of Cynic philosophy, and of Diogenes in particular, who, according to Julian, was an especially pious and religious man (211A–12D). Julian’s attack soon extended to the Cynic philosophers of his time, who resembled the ‘impious Galilaeans’ (224B) and did not follow Cynicism proper (224A–25D). In this context Julian brought up the image of the Cynic ‘shortcut to virtue’ (225CD) that is found in the On Virtue: [Contemporary Cynics] say that they are travelling the short and ready road to virtue (tên suntomon hodon kai suntonon epi tên aretên). I would that you were going by the longer! For you would more easily arrive by that road than by this of yours. Are you not aware that shortcuts usually involve one in great difficulties (megalas tas khalepotêtas)? For just as is the case with the public roads, a traveller who is able to take a shortcut will more easily than other men go all the way round, whereas it does not at all follow that he who went round could always go the shortcut, so too in philosophy the end and the beginning are one, namely, to know oneself and to become like the gods (trans. Wright).

The image that Julian presented was that of a standard and longer road (tên makran) and of a shortcut that reached the same destination but, like all shortcuts, presented its travellers with great difficulties (megalas tas khalepotêtas).39 This image appears as a possible point of contact with Themistius’ use of the allegorical imagery of different ‘roads’ of philosophy in the On Virtue. What is perhaps more surprising, however, is that, after the tirade against the Cynics of his time, Julian moved on to present a positive image of Cynic philosophy proper and explained how a real Cynic should behave (225D–26C). Within this positive take on Cynicism, Julian used the same image of the shortcut to explain what authentic Cynicism was (226BC):

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Now, the shortcut (hê suntomos hodos) is this. A man must come out of himself and recognise that he is divine, and not only keep his mind untiringly and steadfastly fixed on divine and stainless and pure thoughts, but he must also utterly despise his body, and think it, in the words of Heracleitus, ‘more worthless than dirt’ (trans. from Wright).

Moreover, a few paragraphs below, Julian went as far as to use the image of the shortcut to describe his own philosophical training and initiation (235D): I have had the benefit of right training, and have not travelled by the short road (tên suntomon) as you (Heraclius) say you have, but have gone all the way round (tên kuklôi). Though indeed I call the gods to witness, I believe that the road I took was really a shorter road (suntomôteran) to virtue than yours (trans. Wright).

The shortcut image was thus pervasive in the oration. Further below, Julian emphasised that he had ‘nothing but friendly feelings for the really virtuous Cynics’ – presumably those who understood Cynicism as Julian did, especially in a religious sense, ‘if indeed there be any such nowadays’ (236B). Setting aside the attack on contemporary Cynics, Julian’s take on Cynicism proper was positive in this oration, and he made positive use of the imagery of a longer road and a shortcut involving great difficulties before reaching the same destination. This allegory may well be at the origin of Themistius’ choice of the road symbolism presented in the On Virtue. In addition, in the closing part of the seventh oration (227C–34C), Julian provided an example of how myth could be used in a righteous and pious way (unlike that in which Heraclius used it). He narrated an allegorical tale that had his family and his ascent to power as its subject. Here too it is possible to see a precedent for the On Virtue. The central part of Julian’s autobiographical tale, his religious conversion and initiation, was ultimately derived from the myth of the choice of Heracles, in which Julian gloriously replaced the main character of the story, Heracles, with his young self (229C–31B). As De Vita shows, there is the possibility that Julian’s autobiographical tale was more programmatic and propagandist than a superficial reading suggests. The fact that Julian made use of the first oration by Dio Chrysostom (Or. 1.59–84) in the section about himself seems to suggest that, in Julian’s view, Dio could indeed be an appropriate model to imitate when addressing the emperor on formal occasions (as Heraclius failed to do). It might not be a mere coincidence that Julian chose Dio’s first oration as the model for this occasion, since the oration was probably delivered before Trajan in Rome soon after he became emperor in 98, and Dio himself had adopted the persona of the wandering Cynic philosopher as a way of articulating his relation with Trajan.40 It is, however, the symbolic imagery used by Julian in the section about his own initiation under the guide of Hermes that again strikes the reader in its similarity to the imagery of the On Virtue (230CD): Then Hermes [. . .] said, ‘follow me, and I will guide thee by an easier and smoother road (leioteras kai homalesteras hodou) as soon as thou hast surmounted this winding and rugged place where thou seest all men stumbling and obliged to go

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back again’. Then the youth [i.e. Julian] set out with great circumspection, carrying a sword and shield and spear, though as yet his head was bare. Thus relying on Hermes, he went forward by a road smooth, untrodden and very bright, and overhung with fruits and many lovely flowers such as the gods love, and with trees also, ivy and laurel and myrtle (trans. Wright).

The allegory of fruit and flowers is similarly employed in the On Virtue (4), and so is the image of the Cynic (and best) road, whose beginning ‘is difficult and rugged, but, after a little, a bare and broad plain come upon its travellers’ (9). The similarity in symbolism between Or. 7 and the On Virtue does not imply dependence, of course, but it is worth noticing that both the positive reference to the Cynic shortcut and the description of a rugged road that soon becomes smooth appear again in the On Virtue. In Or. 7, Julian seemed to imply that Dio Chrysostom might be a suitable model to imitate when addressing the emperor on formal occasions, and he brought up and endorsed elements of Cynic philosophy as he could read in Dio, as long as they were understood in religious terms. If the On Virtue was indeed composed after Julian’s Or. 7 as is conjectured here, Themistius was careful not to impinge on Julian’s positive take on Cynicism. This could explain why Themistius unexpectedly set aside alternative philosophical traditions (the Epicurean, the Aristotelian and the Stoic, who started on the Cynic road but later went astray) and endorsed Cynicism despite admitting he was not a Cynic philosopher himself. In addition, the author of the On Virtue went beyond the Cynic traditions that he could find in Dio Chrysostom (34) and showed an awareness of literature more closely aligned with Cynicism. Examples of this included Antisthenes’ Heracles (32) and (according to Brancacci) Antisthenes’ Archelaus (34), the Cynic Epistles which we now know as spurious (8, 9; or lost Cynic texts that were used by the Epistles’ anonymous authors) and perhaps Ps.-Plutarch’s Life of Crates (30). The Socratic origin of Cynic philosophy (On Virtue 8) does not contradict Julian’s view on the subject as expressed in Or. 7, 238D–39A, as Julian would develop further in Or. 6 (181AB, 187A, 191AB).41 While praising Cynicism, however, Themistius can be seen as putting forward a broader framework in which to understand, and more importantly justify, the existence of different philosophical traditions. By arguing that every philosophical tradition has some practical use, it is conceivable that he was attempting to safeguard a spot for himself and likeminded philosophers in the new syncretistic world that Julian publicly presented in Or. 7 and in which ‘religious Cynicism’ was so prominent.42 It is worth dwelling further on the tentative scenario according to which the On Virtue was composed soon after Julian’s performance of Or. 7. The idea that each of the three roads represents a different philosophical tradition is not found in Julian’s Or. 7 and may well be Themistius’ own expansion of the imagery of Or. 7, possibly with awareness of the Choice of Heracles myth (Xenophon Mem. 2.1.21–34), which Themistius reported in Or. 22, 779D–82C. In this tentative scenario, the author of the On Virtue endorsed Julian’s positive take on Cynicism but, at the same time, inserted it into a broader and more diverse philosophical world. In response to Julian, the author of the On Virtue pointed out the existence of other established philosophical traditions that, although imperfect, have nonetheless some use according to the circumstances of

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each individual (12). Also, it seems relevant that the closing part of the On Virtue vindicates the role of the philosopher in society (48–55) and accordingly emphasises that the philosopher should not spare words of admonition, as long as his ultimate goal is to help others according to the need of each person (48). The philosopher should not be afraid to be outspoken since he can benefit society at large through his behaviour and his teaching, not least by showing that the role of the ruler is best entrusted to him who exercises power with wisdom (55–6). In addition, a performance of the On Virtue following Julian’s praise of cynicism in Or. 7 could explain the contrast with the social role that Themistius had credited to philosophy in Or. 26 (late 350s), as pointed out above. In Or. 26, 320C Themistius had claimed that philosophy, i.e. Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics, is superior to medicine since a single ethical message could cure the entire city: What I am doing is getting philosophy accustomed to not just benefiting one person at a time, as medicine does, but also to helping the people as a whole, to the best of her ability. [. . .] Philosophy does not minister to bodies, which generally have their own peculiar illnesses and require their own rooms and beds. Philosophy is the soul’s helper. Souls have generally maladies in common, and the soul’s nature is such that it can be treated anywhere (trans. Penella).

This contrast between medicine and philosophy is omitted in the On Virtue, where, conversely, the fundamental view is that philosophy can treat different diseases of the soul in different ways just like medicine, or, in the metaphor, that different ‘roads’ of philosophy can benefit different sorts of men (12). In the On Virtue, Themistius drops the distinction between medicine and philosophy, and this may be precisely because Julian has now added Cynicism alongside the unitary viewpoint of Plato and Aristotle. Not only does the tentative chronology of spring 362 provide a plausible setting in which to understand Themistius’ half-­hearted celebration of Cynicism, but it also gives the chance to read some arguments of Julian’s Or. 6 To the Uneducated Cynics (composed in June 362, no more than three months after Or. 7 was delivered, in March 362) as a response to specific points raised by the On Virtue. Or. 6 consists of Julian’s reply to another Cynic philosopher of whom little is known besides the Cynic’s Egyptian provenance, his criticism of Diogenes and his Christian sympathies (181A, 192D).43 Once again, while openly attacking the Cynic philosopher, Julian did not miss the chance to deliver a full-­fledged philosophical lecture, and, on this occasion, one even more ambitious in scope than he gave in Or. 7. In addition to attacking the Cynics of his time for not adhering to the standard of past Cynic philosophers and for disregarding religion, Julian put forward a demonstration of the fundamental unity of all philosophy (184CD). Julian ultimately argued that all philosophical schools – and more precisely the Stoics (185C–86B), the Cynics (especially 188AB) and Plato (188CD), but also Pythagoras, Socrates and the Peripatetic philosophers (188C) – are in harmony as long as they are rightly understood, and all philosophical traditions ultimately emanate from the same divinely-­inspired Delphic precept ‘know thyself ’ (183B, 191B). For this reason, the broader approach of Or. 6 marks the distance from the earlier Or. 7, which was primarily concerned with Cynic philosophy, and appears

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instead closer to the approach of the On Virtue, which deals with the Epicurean, the Aristotelian, the Stoic (although without a road of its own) and Cynic traditions. While Julian did not question Cynic philosophy as long as it was rightly understood, his perspective in Or. 6 was more overarching than that of Or. 7. Julian began by presenting Cynicism merely as ‘a branch of philosophy (eidos ti philosophias), and by no means the most insignificant or least honourable, but rivalling the noblest’ (182C, trans. Wright). When introducing the argument in favour of the substantial unity of all philosophy, however, Julian made use of an imagery that appears surprisingly similar to the On Virtue: Therefore, I say, let no one divide philosophy into many kinds or cut it up into many parts (eis polla), or rather let no one make it out to be plural instead of one. For even as truth is one, so too philosophy is one. But it is not surprising that we travel to it now by one road, now by another (kat’ allas kai allas hodous). For if any stranger, or, by Zeus, any one of her oldest inhabitants wished to go up to Athens, he could either sail or go by road, and if he travelled by land he could, I suppose, take either the broad highways or the paths and the roads that are short cuts (tais plateiais khrêsthai leôphorois ê tais atraptois kai suntomois hodois).44 And moreover he could either sail along the coasts or like the old man of Pylos, ‘cleave to the open sea’.45 And let no one try to refute me (mê de touto tis êmin propheretô) by pointing out that some philosophers in travelling by those very roads (kat’ autas tas hodous) have been known to lose their way (apeplanêthêsan), and arriving in some other place have been captivated, as though by Circe or the Lotus-Eaters,46 that is to say by pleasure or opinion or some other bait, and so have failed to go straight forward and attain their goal. Rather he must consider those who in every one of the philosophic sects (tôn aireseôn) did attain the highest rank, and he will find that all their doctrines agree (184C–85A, trans. Wright).

In the passage, Julian’s view that philosophy should not be divided or cut up into many parts (mêde eis polla temnetô) would make sense as a response to views such as that of On Virtue 15, according to which ‘it has been shown to you that philosophy itself is divided into three parts and [that it] offers to the minds of men its medicines’. In addition, the imagery Julian used to express the fact that different philosophical traditions did not undermine the unity of all philosophy was that of alternative roads (including shortcuts) which reach the same destination eventually: this image is remarkably similar to the allegorical tale presented in the On Virtue, as is the assertion that individuals have the possibility of travelling ‘now by one road, now by another’. Another similarity with the On Virtue is that past philosophers travelled these roads, and sometimes lost their way on account of distractions found on the journey. While in the On Virtue it was the Stoics who lost their way (8), according to Julian there was no point in remarking which past philosophers got lost, but one should instead consider who excelled in each of the philosophical traditions. It might not have been mere coincidence that Julian immediately moved on to deal with the Stoics (185CD), arguing that their tradition was also part of the one syncretistic Philosophy.47

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In the main body of Or. 6, Julian drew from literary traditions about Diogenes and ancient Cynics, and mentioned the Life of Crates attributed to Plutarch that the author of the On Virtue may also have used (200B). The close of the oration is, however, perhaps less expected. Here, Julian addressed the behaviour of what he considered the proper Cynic philosophers. He argues that he, ‘who wishes to be a Cynic philosopher, [. . .] freedom of speech he must not employ until he have first proved how much he is worth, as I believe was the case with Crates and Diogenes. [. . .] [Frank criticism] was not the chief end and aim of those Cynics, but as I said their main concern was how they might themselves attain to happiness [. . .]’ (201AC, trans. Wright). A downsizing of the role of frank criticism strikes as unusual in this description of Cynicism, and its emphasis in the closing part of the oration dealing with the Cynics of the time may perhaps have expressed a real concern on Julian’s part. If Or. 6 was pronounced after the On Virtue, this section may be taken as a rejoinder to those who, like Themistius and the Cynic from Egypt, thought frank criticism was indeed a central tenet of Cynic philosophy. In the closing chapters of the On Virtue, Themistius expressed the view that the philosopher should not spare words of admonition as long as his ultimate goal was to help his addressee, and he should not be afraid to speak out by taking Diogenes’ frank criticism as the model to imitate (48–9) as long as he is concerned with virtue alone (50–2). To sum up, the On Virtue does not provide any clear indication of chronology, and the circumstances of its composition remain subject of speculation. Bücheler’s suggestion of the chronological bracket 350–80 is plausible, although the possible re-­ elaboration of imagery used in Or. 20 (355) and Or. 26 (late 350s) might perhaps push the terminus post quem to the late 350s. The unusual subject of the On Virtue, which makes a case for Cynic philosophy, remains the most puzzling aspect of this speech and deserves an explanation. A possible solution may come from analysing the historical circumstances in which Themistius half-­heartedly endorsed Cynicism; and it has been conjectured that Constantinople between March and June 362, i.e. between Julian’s Or. 7 and 6, may be a plausible setting for the composition of the On Virtue. In this tentative scenario, the author of the On Virtue seems to have adopted Julian’s positive take on Cynicism while simultaneously providing a broader philosophical framework in which there was also room for other philosophical traditions besides Cynicism, including the Plato-Aristotelian. A passage from Julian’s Or. 6, 184C–85A, addressed to an Egyptian Cynic but nonetheless arguing for the unity of all philosophical traditions, may reveal awareness of the allegory of alternative philosophical roads as expressed in the On Virtue. The On Virtue could therefore add a facet to our understanding of the much discussed political career of Themistius. If the text was composed in spring 362, Themistius would appear to make an effort to accommodate to Julian, at least from a philosophical point of view. The question remains on whether, and if so to what extent, this philosophical accommodation went hand in hand with accommodation at a political and ideological level, an issue arising from his imperial panegyrics, in which he regularly praised living emperors; unfortunately, the only known panegyric that Themistius wrote for Julian has not survived.48 In contrast, the philosophical accommodation to Julian’s interest in Cynicism could have been at least attempted in an intellectually honest way, if Themistius truly believed in the many ‘roads’ of

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philosophy and acknowledged that, though praising Cynicism, he nonetheless walked on another ‘road’ himself.

Note on the Syriac Translation It is necessary to appreciate that we are dealing with an ancient translation and, before approaching the text, it is a useful exercise to ask what sort of textual transformation may have been involved in the transmission from Greek into Syriac. How did the translator operate? How faithful to the original should one expect the translation to be? In what respects should one expect the Syriac text to differ from the original? Unlike earlier scholarship on the text of the On Virtue,49 we now have a better understanding of the techniques involved in rendering Greek texts into Syriac. Furthermore, a comparison with the Syriac translation of Themistius’ De amicitia, where the original has survived, and with the Syriac translations of other pieces of Greek secular literature that survive in the same manuscript (Plutarch’s De capienda ex inimicis utilitate and De cohibenda ira, and Lucian’s De calumnia) proves particularly useful in gaining a picture of the translation process the On Virtue underwent.50 Sebastian Brock has shown that the translation technique into Syriac developed over the centuries towards a greater degree of faithfulness to the Greek originals. The Syriac translations of Themistius, as well as of Plutarch and Lucian, are likely to have been produced during the fifth or early sixth century, and they do not attest the developments towards greater faithfulness that late sixth and seventh century translations usually show.51 As far as the translations of Plutarch, Lucian and Themistius are concerned, the comparison with the Greek originals shows that the translation unit can be as large as the sentence. Within this group of translations, Lucian’s De calumnia is the most faithful to the original, while the De cohibenda ira is the least faithful, for the translation unit can occasionally be as large as the paragraph. Themistius’ De amicitia must fall somewhere in between these extremes. One might therefore reasonably expect the On Virtue to be a relatively free translation, with a translation unit that could be as large as the sentence, and perhaps occasionally larger. Whenever the originals survive, the comparison of the Syriac translations of Plutarch, Lucian and Themistius with the Greek reveals another important feature. The translations present some textual changes that appear to have been carried out deliberately and consistently on the texts and match certain identifiable criteria, of which I shall outline the two most conspicuous.52 A first concern arises from the references to pagan religion that are found in these texts. The Greek texts contain references to a plurality of gods, to Zeus and to the Muses, and these were systematically omitted or, if possible, replaced with the word ‘God’. Although there is no positive evidence for the phenomenon given that the original is lost, the absence of references to pagan religion in the On Virtue is compatible with the hypothesis of a Christianising intervention in this text.53 A second concern revealed by the translations of Plutarch, Lucian and Themistius’ De amicitia relates to the selection of the anecdotes contained in the text. The comparison of the Greek originals and their Syriac translations shows that, on some occasions, entire anecdotes were omitted. In particular, the anecdotes based on

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mythological figures, such as Achilles, Agamemnon and Athena (as well as other references to Greco-Roman mythology) were frequently left out of the translations. In contrast, anecdotes based on historical personalities were only rarely omitted. Again, the absence of anecdotes based on mythological figures in the On Virtue suggests that, if the original text contained any reference to Greco-Roman mythology, these references are likely to have been omitted. The same corpus of translations also displays a peculiar rendering of some proper names in the text. On some occasions, the proper names of the characters of the anecdotes are replaced by anonymous titles in translation. So, for instance, ‘Xerxes’ becomes, in Syriac, ‘a Persian king’, ‘Pindar’ becomes ‘a wise man’, and the Pontifex Maximus ‘Spurius Minucius’ becomes ‘the judge’. It appears that the process was intended to make the anecdotes more generic, simpler and more easily reproducible. In the Syriac On Virtue, in contrast, this phenomenon is rare, and seems to occur only once (in 34,12), where it is likely that the name of Xerxes is translated as ‘the great king of the Persians’. An additional feature of these Syriac translations is that they render the moralizing anecdotes separated from their context within the argumentation, possibly in order to make them ready to be reused in different contexts. This practice may account for the relatively bare argumentative structure in the last chapters of the On Virtue.54 In addition, on a number of occasions, the Syriac text of the On Virtue presents hendiadys, the juxtaposition of two words with a similar meaning that usually responds to a concern for style rather than content. In the first paragraph, for instance, it is possible to read ‘gloom and fog’, ‘unburdened and not distracted’ and ‘simple and direct’. These juxtapositions are common throughout the text and are indicated in italics in my translation. It would be useful to determine whether or not this stylistic feature was introduced by the Syriac translator, because it would help identify the translator and help get closer to the original Greek. Unfortunately, this is rarely possible. On the one hand, Themistius, not unlike other late Roman prose writers from Plutarch to Libanius, often used hendiadys; on the other, the Syriac translator of the De amicitia, the original of which has survived, sometimes rendered a hendiadys with two words, sometimes with only one, and sometimes he rendered a single word with a double or periphrastic translation. It is thus difficult to decide whether, in these instances, the translator was rendering the Greek text in a faithful manner or whether the use of hendiadys was a stylistic feature of this particular Syriac translation.55 Unless otherwise indicated, the present translation follows the edition of the text by Sachau (with corrections in the reviews by Nöldeke and by Hoffmann), which is based on BL Add. 17209 23v–39r (ninth century; henceforth BL).56 Four excerpts from the On Virtue are reported in the anthology contained in Sin. Syr. 14 130r–130v (tenth century; henceforth Sin), which was not known to Sachau.57 The correct rendering of the name Heraclitus (41,6 and 41,16) and the correct readings at 35,5 and, possibly, at 41,15 show that Sin cannot simply be a copy of BL but must derive readings from another manuscript. English words in square brackets are my additions to the translation, while Greek and Syriac words in round brackets represent loanwords from Greek that are found in the Syriac text. For the transliteration and vocalization of the

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Syriac text, I use a simplified transcription following the conventions of J.F. Coakley, Robinson’s Paradigms and Exercises in Syriac Grammar, Sixth Edition, Oxford 2013.

Notes 1 Besides the annotated Italian translation available in M. Conterno, Temistio orientale, Brescia 2014, the On Virtue has figured only marginally in modern scholarship: see R.J. Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’, in R.C. Fowler (ed.) Plato in the Third Sophistic, Boston 2014, pp. 102–28; I. Kupreeva, ‘Themistius’, in L.P. Gerson (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Cambridge 2010, pp. 397–416 at pp. 398, 416n37; A. Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, Elenchos 21.2 (2000), pp. 381–96; R.J. Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, Berkeley, CA 2000, p. 5; J. Vanderspoel, Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius, Ann Arbor, MI 1995, p. 228; G. Dagron, ‘L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle et les traditions politiques de l’Hellénisme. Le témoinage de Thémistios’, Travaux et Mémoires 3 (1968), pp. 1–242 at p. 17. 2 Extended allegorical tales are not uncommon in Themistius and are found in three private orations (Or. 23, 283–4; 27, 339–40; 32, 357–8). 3 R. Cribiore, ‘Lucian, Libanius, and the Short Road to Rhetoric’, GRBS 47 (2007), pp. 71–86 and eadem, The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch, Princeton 2007, pp. 174–96. A remarkably similar image is found in Lucian’s The Teacher of Rhetoric, a satirical essay in which an imaginary student of rhetoric is confronted with the choice between a traditional rhetorical education consisting of many years of strenuous training depicted as an uphill and perilous road and a new, shorter and easier road to rhetoric that is most pleasant and in total shade. However, the literary pedigree of the road allegory goes back at least to Hesiod (Op. 286–92) and Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.21–34 on the myth of the choice of Heracles), and is also found in the Tabula of Cebes, which Lucian used in his essay, and in Dio Chrysostom Or. 1, for which see below. 4 See S. Prince, ‘Antisthenes and the Short Route to Happiness’, in P. Bosman (ed.) Ancient Routes to Happiness, Pretoria 2017, pp. 73–96 and V. Emeljanow, ‘A Note on the Cynic Shortcut to Happiness’, Mnemosyne 18.2 (1965), pp. 182–4 and the notes to the text. 5 M. Billerbeck, ‘The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian’, in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds) The Cynics. The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, Berkeley, CA 1996, pp. 205–21; D. Krueger, ‘The Bawdy and Society. The Shamelessness of Diogenes in Roman Imperial Culture’, in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds) The Cynics, pp. 222–39; M. Schofield, ‘Epictetus on Cynicism’, in T. Scaltsas and A.S. Mason (eds) The Philosophy of Epictetus, Oxford 2007, pp. 71–86 for Epictetus; see also M. Sirois, The Early Cynic Tradition: Shaping Diogenes’ Character, diss., Princeton 2014 and M. Trapp, ‘Cynics’, in R. Sorabji and R.W. Sharples (eds) Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC–200 AD, 2 vols, London 2007, vol. 1, pp. 189–203. 6 R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000, p. 197; A.A. Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics’, in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds) The Cynics, pp. 28–46; A. Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici e la κοινωνία tra cinicismo e

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9 10

11 12 13 14

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17 18 19 20

On Virtue stoicismo nel libro VI (103–105) delle Vite di Diogene Laerzio’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 2.36.6 (1992), pp. 4049–75 at p. 4055. A. Brancacci, ‘Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione Sulla regalità di Dione Crisostomo: Dione e l’Archelao di Antistene’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 2.36.5 (1992), pp. 3308–34 and idem, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, Elenchos 21.2 (2000), pp. 381–96 at p. 386 for the road imagery; see now Prince, ‘Antisthenes and the Short Route to Happiness’. Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, p. 396n37 with R. Maisano, Discorsi di Temistio, Turin 1995, p. 33 and S. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens. Texts, Translations, and Commentary, Ann Arbor, MI 2015, p. 15, and Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, p. 28n97 for the possible links between Themistius’ Or. 26 (late 350s) and Antisthenes. D.L. 6.10–12 with Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition’, p. 32; Ps.-Diogenes, Ep. 37.4–5 Malherbe; G.R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy. A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen, Oxford 2001, pp. 7–8 for virtue according to the Cynics. Compare D.L. 6.105: ‘(The Cynics) hold further that “Life according to Virtue” is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life. [. . .] Whatever is intermediate between Virtue and Vice they, in agreement with Ariston of Chios, account indifferent’ (trans. Hicks); Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici’, pp. 4068–9. See the notes to the relevant section of the text and to the Glossary for the varying use of ‘virtue’ and ‘excellence’. D.L. 6.105: ‘(The Cynics) hold, further, that virtue can be taught, as Antisthenes maintains in his Heracles, and when once acquired cannot be lost’ (trans. Hicks); Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici’, pp. 4067–8. Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition’, pp. 34–5 relates both arguments to Diogenes. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens, pp. 330–31. For the distance between Antisthenes’ philosophy and the anti-­intellectualistic views by later Cynics see Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici’, pp. 4062–3 and idem, Oikeios Logos: la filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene, Naples 1990, pp. 85–118. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens, pp. 14–15. Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’. However, Themistius’ philosophical stance in relation to Plato and to Aristotle has been subject of much discussion: for a recent overview see A. Zucker, ‘Themistius’, in A. Falcon (ed.) Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden 2016, pp. 358–73. S. Swain, Themistius, Julian, and Greek Political Theory under Rome, Cambridge 2013, pp. 53–91 for the circumstances of the Letter to Themistius. R.J. Penella, Man and the Word: The Orations of Himerius, Berkeley, CA 2007, pp. 171–6 for the English translation. U.M. Criscuolo, ‘Aspetti della polemica antiepicurea nel tardoantico’, in M. Gigante (ed.) Storia poesia e pensiero nel mondo antico. Studi in onore di Marcello Gigante, Naples 1994, pp. 149–67. Maisano, Discorsi di Temistio, p. 48. In favour of Themistius’ authorship see Conterno, Temistio orientale, pp. 71–2; Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’, p. 107; J.W. Watt, ‘Themistius and Julian: Their Association in the Syriac and Arabic Tradition’, in A.J. Quiroga Puertas (ed.) The Purpose of Rhetoric in Late Antiquity, Tübingen 2013, pp. 161–76 at p. 172; Kupreeva, ‘Themistius’, pp. 398, 416n37;

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Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, pp. 383–4, 395–6; Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, p. 5; Vanderspoel, Themistius and the Imperial Court, p. 228; G. Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis and Socraticorum reliquiae, Naples 1990, 4.312–13; Dagron, ‘L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle’, p. 17; G. Downey and A.F. Norman (eds), Themistii orationes quae supersunt, 3 vols, Leipzig 1965, vol. 3, p. vii; J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 27 (1872), pp. 438–62; idem, ‘Pseudo-Plutarchos, Peri askeseos’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 27 (1872), pp. 520–38. 18,10 with 24, 302B on Themistius acting like the doctors; 29,1 with 25, 334C on Homer’s preference for Achilles (on the basis of Il. 2.576 and 2.685); 34,1 with 26, 327C on the celestial bodies’ retrograde motions as a subject of philosophical teaching; 34,5 with 1, 3A and 26, 327CD on the image of going beyond the visible portion of the sky; 34,19 with 2, 36C; 7, 96D; 10, 132D; 19, 226B; 22, 264C on Xerxes’ bridge; 34,24 with 13, 166B on Xerxes’ golden plane-­tree; 35,10 with 2, 36C; 11, 143A; 1, 7BC; 7, 99AB on Cambyses’ insanity; 35,10 with 18, 219A on Nero as a citharist; 35,19 with 13, 173B on Nero falling from the chariot; 36,10 and 13, 164AB both quoting Euripides fr. 641N; 45,10 with 27, 332C on a reference to the borders of Pontus, i.e. Themistius’ homeland; and 46,20 with 7, 95B on the same anecdote about Plato befriending an enemy. In addition, Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’, p. 107 points out that Themistius uses the metaphoric language of the meadow and the garden to describe Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy in Or. 4, 54B; 15, 185A; and 32, 357A. Gildemeister and Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, p. 439; H. Scholze, De temporibvs librorvm Themistii, diss., Göttingen 1911, p. 79; Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, pp. 1–9 for Themistius’ life. Penella, The Private Orations of Themistius, pp. xiii, 28–31, and notes to ch. 12 of the On Virtue. Alternatively, one could of course think of the different settings and purposes of the two works to explain the variance. P. Heather and D. Moncur, Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century. Select Orations of Themistius, Liverpool 2001, p. 168; contrast Basil Ep. 5.2 and Symmachus Rel. 3.10; for the origin of Themistius’ take on religious plurality in this passage see Vanderspoel, Themistius and the Imperial Court, pp. 24–6; Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’, p. 114 for the suggestion of linking this passage on religious plurality to Themistius’ treatment of different schools of philosophy. Julian Or. 6 and 7 with P. Athanassiadi, Julian. An Intellectual Biography, London 1992, pp. 131–41, R. Smith, Julian’s Gods. Religion and Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate, London 1995, pp. 49–90 and A. Marcone, ‘The Forging of an Hellenistic Orthodoxy: Julian’s Speeches against the Cynics’, in N. Baker-Brian and S. Tougher (eds) Emperor and Author: The Writings of Julian the Apostate, Swansea 2012, pp. 239–50; Gregory of Nazianzus Or. 25 and 26; Carm. 2.1.11.735–1045 (De vita sua) with C. Moreschini, ‘Gregory Nazianzen and Philosophy, with Remarks on Gregory’s Cynicism’, in C.A. Beeley (ed.) Re-­reading Gregory of Nazianzus, Washington, DC 2012, pp. 103–22 and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, Cynisme et christianisme dans l’Antiquité, Paris 2014. One could of course conceive alternative historical settings for the On Virtue. That it was a speech exclusively intended for the school, in which Themistius may have taken up the defense of an extreme position for didactic purposes, remains a possibility, and so also the hypothesis that the On Virtue might have been composed after Julian’s death, whether in the context of the affair of Maximus the Cynic or earlier, for instance under Valens, when non-­arian Christians might have wanted to use Cynicism as a

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On Virtue disguise for disagreement with the imperial religious policy. It is hoped that the present translation will contribute to the analysis of this text and further the study of its historical setting. E.J. Watts, The Final Pagan Generation, Berkeley, CA 2015, pp. 116–18, 124–5 finds supporting evidence in the prickly tone of Libanius’ letters to Themistius; Swain, Themistius, Julian, and Greek Political Theory under Rome, pp. 53–91 for the circumstances of the Letter to Themistius and Themistius’ life in Constantinople under Julian; and S. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome, Berkeley 2012, pp. 88–114. The identification of the author of the On the Gods and the World has been discussed, see PLRE 1 Sallustius 1. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 88–90, 106; D. Hunt, ‘Julian’, in A. Cameron et al. (eds) The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 13, Cambridge 1997, pp. 44–77; G.W. Bowersock, Julian the Apostate, Cambridge, MA 1978, pp. 66–78; Dagron, ‘L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle’, pp. 70n206, 234. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 106–7; Bowersock, Julian the Apostate, pp. 63–4; Julian Or. 7, 224D, for the Cynic philosophers. For Maximus the Cynic see M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, ‘Qui était le philosophe cynique anonyme attaqué par Julien dans son discours IX?’, Hermes 136 (2008), pp. 97–118. Julian Letter to Themistius 257D and 259BD with Vanderspoel, Themistius and the Imperial Court, pp. 118–19 and T. Brauch, ‘Themistius and the Emperor Julian’, Byzantion 63 (1993), pp. 37–78 at pp. 81–2; S. Elm, ‘Hellenism and Historiography: Gregory of Nazianzus and Julian in Dialogue’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33.3 (2003), pp. 493–515 at p. 500; J. Bouffartigue, ‘La lettre de Julien à Thémistios: histoire d’une fausse manœuvre et d’un désaccord essentiel’, in A.F. Norman et al. (eds) Mélanges A.F. Norman, Paris 2006, pp. 113–38 at p. 114 points out that this is not certain. For the relationship between Julian and Maximus of Ephesus see Eunapius VS 473–78. Swain, Themistius, Julian, and Greek Political Theory under Rome, p. 62; Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 90–1, 107; C.P. Jones, ‘Themistius after the Death of Julian’, Historia 59.4 (2010), pp. 501–6 at p. 505; Bowersock, Julian the Apostate, 28–9; Dagron, ‘L’empire romain d’Orient au IVe siècle’, p. 235; M. Rashed, ‘Boéthos entre méréologie et quantification: édition, traduction et commentaire du traité de Thémistius en réponse à Maxime et Boéthos sur la réduction de la deuxième et de la troisième figure à la première’, in idem (ed.) L’héritage Aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée, Paris 2016, pp. 55–149 contains the edition, French translation and commentary of Themistius’ Against Maximus Concerning the Derivation of the Second and Third Figures of the Syllogism, which survives only in Arabic translation; for the setting of the debate with Maximus under Julian, see the witness of Ammonius in An. Pr. 31,17–22 Wallies: ‘Themistius the paraphrast was of an opinion contrary to that held by Aristotle. For these two, Maximus and Themistius, who entertained contrary (opinions) about the subject and alleged, as they believed, what seemed appropriate to them emperor Julian arbitrated on the (matter) and gave his vote to Maximus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Boethus’. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 106–18; G. Agosti, ‘Paideia greca e religione in iscrizioni dell’età di Giuliano’, in A. Marcone (ed.) L’imperatore Giuliano. Realtà storica e rappresentazione, Milano 2015, pp. 223–39 especially pp. 226–7 on I. Iul. 26, 28 and 34; F. Guidetti, ‘I ritratti dell’imperatore Giuliano’, in A. Marcone (ed.) L’imperatore Giuliano, pp. 12–45 for the coinage; Jones, ‘Themistius after the Death of

Introduction

35 36 37 38 39 40

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Julian’, pp. 501–6 for Themistius’ references to Julian after his death; Julian Or. 7 as a response to the Cynic Heraclius, for whom see R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds), The Cynics, p. 395; and Or. 6 as a response to an anonymous Cynic from Egypt, whom Goulet-Cazé, ‘Qui était le philosophe cynique anonyme attaqué par Julien dans son discours IX?’, pp. 97–118 identifies as Maximus the Cynic. For a recent assessment of Themistius’ early career under Constantius see A. Skinner, ‘Violence at Constantinople in A.D. 341–2 and Themistius, Oration 1’, Journal of Roman Studies 105 (2015), pp. 234–49. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, p. 136 and Athanassiadi, Julian. An Intellectual Biography, pp. 131, 137n60 for chronology. R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds), The Cynics, p. 395, and see Eunapius Chronicle fr. 31 Müller (= 34.3 Blockley) about Heraclius’ approach to the usurper Procopius and Julian Or. 7, 223D, for Heraclius and Constantius. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 107–8. See also Or. 7, 227B. C.M. De Vita, ‘Giuliano e l’arte della “nobile menzogna” (Or. 7, Contro il Cinico Eraclio)’, in A. Marcone (ed.) L’imperatore Giuliano, pp. 119–41; S. Swain, Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250, Oxford 1996, p. 190; C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, Cambridge, MA 1978, pp. 115–23; compare Themistius Or. 5, 63D. Interestingly, the choice of Heracles myth is also found in Themistius Or. 22 (De amicitia), 280A–82C, of uncertain chronology, where Themistius similarly depends on Dio’s first oration (Maisano, Discorsi di Temistio, 770n62; Scharold, Dio Chrysostomus und Themistius, Berghausen 1912, pp. 32–40). For the origin of this tradition see the note to the relevant passage of the text. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, pp. 106–7 for the several philosophers, including Cynics, who were in Constantinople in spring 362; Billerbeck, ‘The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian’, pp. 216–20 for the Neoplatonic component of Julian’s Cynicism. Goulet-Cazé, ‘Qui était le philosophe cynique anonyme attaqué par Julien dans son discours IX?’, pp. 97–118 for the identification with Maximus the Cynic. Compare Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 30 Malherbe for the reference to travelling to Athens. Heraclitus fr. 80. If a mythological reference of this sort was present also in the On Virtue, it is likely to have been omitted: see below: Note on the Syriac translation. For the quoted passage (184C–85D), neither J. Bouffartigue, L’emperor Julien et la culture de son temps, Paris 1992 nor D. Micalella and C. Prato, Giuliano imperatore. Contro i cinici ignoranti, Lecce 1988, pp. 63–4 provide alternative explanations or suggest possible parallel passages. Conversely, Penella, ‘Plato (and Others) in the Orations of Themistius’, pp. 113–14 suggests a link to Themistius Or. 20, 236AB. In a similar way, see the possible use of Themistius fr. 5 (Peri phronêseôs) in Julian Or. 7 as by Bouffartigue, L’emperor Julien et la culture de son temps, p. 555n38. The Stoics do not have their own road in the On Virtue, and Themistius’ orations show some variance in his take on Stoicism (20, 235C for a positive take, 22, 276BC for a negative one). In the Letter to Themistius 255D–56C, however, Julian expressed some reservations on past Stoic philosophers who underestimated the role of fortune (R. Chiaradonna, ‘La Lettera a Temistio di Giuliano imperatore e il dibattito filosofico nel IV secolo’, in A. Marcone (ed.) L’imperatore Giuliano, pp. 149–71 at p. 153), but see also his view in the Caesars.

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48 Heather and Moncur, Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century, pp. 24–9. 49 Gildemeister and Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’. 50 BL Add. 17209 23v–39r (ninth century). Conterno, Temistio orientale, pp. 72–3; A. Rigolio, ‘From Sacrifice to the Gods to the Fear of God: Omissions, Additions and Changes in the Syriac Translations of Plutarch, Lucian and Themistius’, Studia Patristica 64 (2013), pp. 133–43. 51 S. Brock, ‘Towards a History of Syriac Translation Technique’, in R. Lavenant (ed.) Symposium Syriacum III, Rome 1980, pp. 1–14. 52 A fuller treatment is in Rigolio, ‘From Sacrifice to the Gods to the Fear of God’, and M. Conterno, ‘Retorica pagana e cristianesimo orientale: la traduzione siriaca dell’orazione Peri Philias di Temistio’, Annali di Scienze Religiose 3 (2010), pp. 161–88 for the De amicitia. 53 As far as Themistius is concerned, however, the references to a plurality of gods are rare, and, when compared to Plutarch, Themistius’ texts did not require conspicuous editing with a Christian audience in view. The three references to the divine in the On Virtue would not have been problematic for Christian readers (11, 33 and 38). 54 A. Rigolio, ‘Syriac Translations of Plutarch, Lucian, and Themistius. A Gnomic Format for an Instructional Purpose?’, in P. Gemeinhardt et al. (eds) Education and Religion in Late Antique Christianity, London 2016, pp. 73–85. 55 See the text (E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca, Halle 1870); S. Brock, ‘Diachronic Aspects of Syriac Word Formation: An Aid for Dating Anonymous Texts’, in R. Lavenant (ed.) Symposium Syriacum V, Rome 1990, pp. 321–30 at p. 322 points out that the juxtaposition of two nouns as a translation of a noun is a common feature in fifth-­ century translations. 56 Reviews of the text of Sachau: T. Nöldeke, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.), Inedita Syriaca’, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 25 (1871), pp. 282–7; G. Hoffmann, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca’, Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen (1871), pp. 1201–36. On the basis of the edition of Sachau, a German translation was published in Gildemeister and Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, pp. 438–62, a Latin translation by R. Mach, in G. Downey and A.F. Norman (eds) Themistii orationes quae supersunt, and an Italian translation in Conterno, Temistio orientale, pp. 71–94. 57 An overview of the manuscripts and full bibliography can be found in A. Rigolio, ‘Some Syriac Monastic Encounters with Greek Literature’, in M. Doerfler et al. (eds) Syriac Encounters. Papers from the Sixth North American Syriac Symposium, Duke University, 26–29 June 2011, Leuven 2015, pp. 295–304; a full list of variants is available in S. Brock, ‘Review of M. Conterno, Temistio orientale’, Bibliotheca Orientalis 73 (2016), pp. 179–83. Sin contains the four passages on 130r–130v as follows: 34,11–14, 35,3–9 and 20–23 are reported at 130r l. 27 to 130v l. 11; 40,22–41,16 is reported at 130r l. 11–27; 44,7–21 is reported at 130v l. 11–22; 45,9–46,5 is reported at 130v l. 22 to 131r l. 3.

Abbreviations Abbreviations of titles of ancient Greek works follow the conventions of H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford 1843 and subsequent editions. BL

British Library Add. 17209 (ninth century)

GRBS

Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies

PLRE

A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale and J. Morris, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, Cambridge 1971–92.

Sin

Sin. Syr. 14 (tenth century)

Textual Emendations B G H M N S

S. Brock, ‘Review of M. Conterno, Temistio orientale’, Bibliotheca Orientalis 73 (2016), pp. 179–83. J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 27 (1872), pp. 438–62. G. Hoffmann, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca’, Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen (1871), pp. 1201–36. R. Mach in G. Downey and A.F. Norman (eds) Themistii orationes quae supersunt, 3 vols, Leipzig 1965. T. Nöldeke, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.), Inedita Syriaca’, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 25 (1871), pp. 282–7. E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca, Halle 1870.

Below are the variations from the text edited by Sachau. 19,19 20,5 20,11 20,21 24,8 25,8 29,8 30,4 31,12 31,18 32,1 32,11 32,17 32,18 32,20 35,5 35,10 35,20 35,21 37,20 41,6 and 41,16 41,15 42,23 43,4 43,8

Reading šūlt.ānā with G Reading b-ʼawāwnēh with BL G N Reading neqpūnāh for nepqūnāh with G Reading mezdawwdīn for mezdawzēn with G Reading netyattar with N Reading ʽnānē for ʽaynē with N Reading men lbar yāteh with H Reading l-ʼeškāpā with N H Reading da-­b-šentā with M Reading w-­dālh.īn with G Reading d-­sūsāyā wa-­d-kalbā with N Reading šāwh.ān with the anonymous reviewer Reading h.zīrtā with H Reading h.azzārā w-­mārāh with N H Reading mšallat. with N H Deleting b- with Sin G Reading saggīʼē with N H Reading bīš with N H Reading hālēn melē with Sin Deleting b- with G Reading with Sin H B Reading b-­lā zaynā for b-­zaynā with Sin B Reading mezdayyh.īn for mezdaynīn with G Reading neh.t.on for nah.t.on with G Reading l-­eh for l-āh

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45,8 Reading b-šetqā with H 45,9 Reading tašʽītā with N 46,4–5 Reading praš ba-šlāmā. w-ʼeškh.at lbībūteh d-­pīlāsūpā hānā sūʽrānā kuleh l-­madʽākū with Sin 47,10 Reading l-ʽamā with G 47,16 Reading myattrūtā with N

Themistius On Virtue Translation

Themistius On Virtue

Discourse by the philosopher (philosophos) Themistius on virtue (aretê) that is the excellence1 of the soul [1] They who believe that there is something superior to virtue (aretê), which is the excellence2 of the soul, should cleanse their hearts of this opinion as [though it were] dirt, and follow my words! On another occasion I have already introduced you3 to the wisdom of Plato and of Aristotle insofar as you were able to understand, [but] many things were beyond your understanding, and the road leading to them was long, full of many turns, uphill, and hidden in gloom and fog.4 It is not easy for anybody to walk on [this road], not even when one is unburdened and not distracted by many things, but if one has acquired wisdom through much toil, he will be able to walk on it. But Philosophy, since it is friendly to men, shows those who are [too] feeble to walk a long road, or are hindered from walking by reason of old age or youth, another road, which is simple and direct.5

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[2] Today, then, if you follow me, I shall be for you – as I said – a guide6 on [this road], for it is not easy and simple to walk a [road] like this. For I will not have to speak about [philosophical] teaching,7 if I speak clearly about the road that – I say – is simple. For I say that this road is simple, full of blessings and prosperity, [and] on it no chariot, no mules, no supplies that wear out the travellers and hinder their eagerness are necessary. But that you may follow me easily while I show how many differences there are between this road and those that were trodden8 by ancient philosophers (philosophos) leading, as it were, to a port (limên) of happiness, I wish to temper the beginning of my discourse with a pleasant example, as doctors do when giving a strong medicine by smearing honey and wine on the brim of the cup.9

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[3] Oh travellers who [are about to walk] on this road! Listen to me, who have [already] walked these roads, that I may teach you what each one of them is, and how he who travels them ought to be equipped.

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to walk it, it also seemed marvellous to me, and my heart was filled with joy when I thought it possible that, while rejoicing, taking pleasure and fulfilling [my] desires, [I] could reach an inn filled with blessings. [5] When I began walking, however, Subjection and Self-­denial went ahead of me, and Regret and Wretchedness came after me. Of all these good things filling the road, it was not possible to sample even a little without expense. For the innkeepers demanded much silver and gold, [and] even the shade of the trees was sold for a price; nor [could] the songs of birds [be] heard without expense, and the treasures of the Lydians12 would have been too small not to vanish immediately. Also, my mount was beginning to grow lean, since there was no hay to feed it and it was necessary to buy grapes13 for a considerable price and feed it in this manner. Also, the noise from robbers who held and dwelled on a hill [on the road] could be heard – terrible, savage and cruel men.14 On [the hill] there were two fortresses,15 [of which] one was called ‘Power’16 and the other was called ‘Change’.17 From these fortresses robbers suddenly flow out and descend and snatch the provisions for the journey, and how often do they leave the traveller destitute and desolate, and how often do they also seize his mount or drive [it] away! [6] When I heard and saw these [things], I retraced my steps. If you are wise, then beware of walking this road, where a man [can]not rely on himself but trembles and fears for his animal and for his chariot. Do not be fooled by the fact that many go on it and it is full of travellers for, you see, they are confused, they wander hither and thither as though in the desert, and visions appear to them in the inns on the [road]18 which make them doubt the way forward, and [a guide who may] direct them cannot be found.19 If someone wants to take their animal and their money, they are not able to confront or resist him with courage, but they immediately bow their heads towards the ground and for their feebleness they bewail like people who have fallen down and cannot cleave to20 the road that they have entered. [7] The road that Aristotle has shown is agreeable; it entails carrying burdens, and I praise it also to some extent. For it is not filled with tumult and suspicion, nor is it exposed to misfortune. But he who treads this [road] likewise needs a robust chariot and money [that is] enough for somebody who does not [intend to] feast on the road.21 But wherever some or much money is necessary, that road will obviously breed robbers. [Robbers] thus fall upon them who tread this [road], but often [travellers] are able to avoid their attacks because they are not loaded down22 with belongings. Sometimes, however, they are [nonetheless] reached by [robbers] and lose their means of safety23 since either their mount has lost [its] horseshoes or their provisions have been taken away altogether. They turn to go [away], grieved and irritated, since they [have to] fight and drive away those who come upon them and, because of the fear that entered them, they look both ahead and behind. It is rare to see that one of them comes to an inn without having shed [some] blood. [The road] is also full of adversities, many vexations and vain labour, and the one who walks it must be equipped with the wisdom24 of the poets and the rhetoricians to go through with confidence.25

Translation

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[8] But follow me, friends and companions, for, since with our discourse we have ascended to [this] place, a road has become visible [to us] as though from a viewpoint26 [and that road] is shiny, plain, pleasing and easy! As it is said, Socrates found [this road] first, and, after him, Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates trod [it], [all of] whom glorified it and made it renowned.27 Conversely, Chrysippus, Zeno and Cleanthes began to walk [this road] but went astray and found themselves in the middle between Aristotle and Diogenes.28 [9] The beginning of this road is difficult and rugged, but, after a little while, its travellers come upon a bare and broad plain.29 Calm weather, clear sky and tranquillity dwell in it, and the land puts forth by itself the provisions that are necessary for those who go on it. Their animal does not annoy them, for it is not alarmed, nor does it shy or drag them after itself, but they lead it wherever they want and feed it in flourishing meadows beside the boundary of virtue.30 They proceed intrepid and rejoicing, enjoying goods on which the hands have not toiled. The noise of beating silver [coins] is, therefore, not heard [on that road], nor does gold shine in their cargo, and these travellers alone are not grieved by the fear of robbers.31 Change and Power do not descend on them from the fortresses, and, even if they did, they would turn back with shame at having fallen upon men whom nothing can subdue. [10] The example and the allegory of what I want to say has thus reached an end. Perhaps, however, you will ask me why I am praising one road while I am walking another. I shall give you an answer not in allegory but openly, but do awake yourselves and listen, for you shall not hear vain things! I intend to teach you, if I am able, the many and various ways of this manner of life so that each one of you may choose for himself the one that he can accomplish and may thus live according to his strength as it is best for him. This you shall learn: that philosophy, although it teaches that man follows and seeks one thing, happiness and blessing,32 has not prepared one road for men but many. We have already mentioned three of them, which are renowned above [all] the others. [11] First, then, it is necessary that we show that the soul of men was created by God to incline to desire the Good, and, once this has been gained, it will rejoice.33 From evil, however, it [was created to] turn aside and flee without turning back.34 If it is taken by [evil], it is in grief and distress, and it attempts to escape very quickly. [It is] for this [reason that, although] men cannot write until they learn to write, or play the lyre (kithara) until they learn from citharists (kitharôidos), yet they do not seek teachers about the Good35 or what is best for them, but think they know it for themselves and do not need a teacher. For this reason the peasant ploughs the land, the sailor travels on the sea, the hired soldier goes to war, and everybody [does] what he does, but he would not do it unless he were very desirous to know that it is best for him, for his suspension of this knowledge would harm him in fact and not in words.36 [12] Since many things are practised as good because of lack of knowledge, philosophy then shows what the true Good is, and acts like the doctors. For the doctors too do not use one medicine and one nourishment for all bodies, but to those whose stomach (stomakhos) is infirm they give poultices and delicate foods, and to those who are closer

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to recovery they confidently give robust foods and medicines.37 So too Philosophy, when it has seen that a man is subdued to desires and believes that [pleasure] alone is the Good, persuades him through Epicurus that he should not disregard virtue (aretê) and be led foolishly by desires ‘lest you, by going too far, end up, on the contrary, in what terrifies you: griefs, pains and miseries’.38 Conversely, when [Philosophy] has seen another who praises virtue (aretê) but does not praise it more than [he praises] health, wealth and fame, [it] persuades him through Aristotle and shows that virtue (aretê) is the chief Good and superior to all goods that are useful to the body and found in the royal palace[s].39 [13] As the soul is superior to the body, and the body [is superior] to riches, so it is necessary that the love of wisdom shall surpass the love of the body, but also that [the love of] the body shall surpass40 [the love of] the riches. We should not confuse the order (taksis) or make last what should come first. It is possible to see that many worry about the least important thing as though it were the most important one, and because of money they destroy not only the body but also the soul. This, however, must not be so. Plato and his followers said that other things too are good, but that the highest [Good] is virtue (aretê) and [virtue] is perfected in happiness by all the [other things], as a [solo] singer is perfected by [co-]singers and by him who leads the choir.41 Zeno and Cleanthes also agree with them to some extent, although they surpass Aristotle [in that] they limit the name of ‘Good’ to virtue (aretê) alone. In their view, however, the other things are not [all] equal, and, when there is an investigation of them, they do not reckon them as equal to those that oppose them [i.e. they are not all adiaphora], but they [are] superior in their view [i.e. some of them are proêgmena]. [They argue that this is so] not because Good is superior to Evil and because what man has to choose is superior to what he has to avoid, but because those are useful by nature, and the others are not.42 [Zeno and Cleanthes, then,] have to be reckoned among those [mentioned] before them [i.e. Plato and his followers]. [14] He who is ready to practice self-­control in the soul and in the body shall then listen to Crates and Diogenes who do not make up names or act cunningly with words43 but say clearly that virtue (aretê) alone is capable of doing good things. The rest of the things are full of confusion: at times they lean towards good, but at times [they lean] towards bad, and there is nothing in them that is stable but they change more than the clouds44 and do not remain with those who possess them. [15] Since it has been shown to you that philosophy itself is divided into three parts45 and [that it] offers its medicines to the minds of men, allow me now to pronounce before you a speech on each of these three parts, and to say and find out how many within our gathering obey each of the three. Come, all of you who love virtue (aretê) above the other goods! Come, all of you who extol virtue (aretê) alone! Which of these utterances do most of you obey in your minds? For my part, I say that, even if you do not acknowledge [it], most [of you] obey pleasure. For few [of you], virtue (aretê) is superior to the rest of the good things, and barely one or two put it above everything. But I agree with the latter [opinion], and [I hope that] none of the wise will blame me

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for praising something that I do not do! The reason why I do not do it is not because I find fault with it, but because I am not able to endure [it]. For, even if I went to Olympia, I would marvel at the voracity of Milo46 but I would eat [only] as much as was sufficient for me. Do not be surprised, then, that I rightly praise those men who did not place virtue (aretê) below fickle and vain things.

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[16] If you are at leisure, I shall lay before you, as in a lawsuit, the people and the discourses that speak in favour of these three opposing roads of philosophy, and we shall see which of them receives the victory.47 [17] Let, then, the person who praises pleasures enter in front of us! He has now entered, having crafty arguments ready and leading a multitude of followers. He is boisterous and, secretly, he trusts that the judge will not be so sagacious as to not grant him victory from the first word and as to reject the good that he is about to show in front of him as the Good. He, then, begins from high above to praise pleasures with lengthy eulogies saying: [18] ‘[Pleasures] are the beginning and the end of the blessed life of human beings.48 I do not [simply] say these things in words, but nature shows [them] with facts. As midwives, mothers and nurses witness, as soon as infants are born, they shrink from sufferings as from a hostile thing, but they seek pleasures with their hands, with their mouths and with their entire small bodies. [Pleasure] is dear to them when it is present, and they seek it when it departs.49 This happens not only among men, but also among animals. Indeed, neither the foal nor the calf waits for teachers to instruct them to avoid pain and seek pleasure. Neither the offspring of stags or of wolves, nor whelps50 of lions need this, but their instruction comes by itself, it develops in them from their being and their nature leads them to it. In the same way, good things and bad things are also known. They are perceived and known not through the art and the twists of wisdom but through the concourse of the senses. For it would be absurd [to argue] that, while we distinguish hot and cold and white and black through the senses, we should not learn and know Good and Evil, which one has to distinguish most of all to avoid the latter and choose the former, from birth and immediately when we need [it], and that we learn what is good and what is evil after a long time through instructors and writers’.51 [19] After praising pleasures as the mother-­city (mêtropolis) of Goods,52 he then brings in Virtue (aretê) as though to the banquet of a luxurious woman. He introduces [Virtue] in the same way (skhêma) as [one of] the handmaids [who are] in the service of his friend [i.e. the luxurious woman], who is Desire [and] whom he extols. This is the duty of Virtue (aretê), that she may be a servant to the one who feasts and that she may increase her pleasures through cooks, bakers and foods that are superior to any other. For her only service is that there may be pleasure for the body [of Desire], lest [Desire] is afflicted in any way.53 [20] [Now,] let the person who is more sober than the one who went out enter in front of us, and, because of his modesty, he seems to deserve [our] trust. For he says:

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[21] ‘The life of men is in a middle [position], above the animals and below spiritual beings. Therefore, [man] is in need of many things, for sufferings and anxieties surround him, and he resembles a ship sailing on the sea. For those who are about to sail favourably, the helmsmen (kubernêtês) and the sailors are more important than any art; after them [in importance come] the winds that are useful for their journey, good weather (aêr) and a calm sea. As long as all these things come together, the journey of the helmsman (kubernêtês) will succeed according to his will, but if one of them has come short or a storm has arisen ahead in the sea, the ship will need great skill to escape and to proceed to the harbour (limên). In like manner, the life of man needs many things to be able to advance happily’.54 [22] Since this [person], in few words, has also completed his defence, let the third person enter, that he may show there is a higher good than those for which the previous [speakers] have argued. He says:55

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[23] ‘I reckon that the Good of man is his own, and I do not regard what he has acquired from outside as such. I regard [man] as blessed in this [i.e. in what is his own], and if this is not so, we shall understand from other things. Whom do you call ‘healthy’? The one whom the effort of moderation is sufficient to keep healthy, or the one who needs medicines and many remedies [to stay healthy]? Again, whom do you reckon [is] faster, the one who overtakes runners on his feet, or the one who [overtakes] horsemen [by riding] a horse? Why did Homer say that Achilles was stronger than Agamemnon? For one hundred ships accompanied the latter, while [only] forty accompanied the former. [It is] indeed because Achilles was in himself stronger than Agamemnon!56 Why then, my friends, do you not think this of the goods, that he who has the Good in himself without having acquired it from outside57 is blessed?’58 [24] But what should we call the ‘a manʼs own’? That which another may snatch from him, or that which he [alone] controls? Do you, then, control your fields (agros), your servants, or the fact that your body dwells in pleasure? You control none of these things. Why? For your fields (agros) are seized by tyrants, ravaged by enemies, or the clouds overwhelm them with floods, or their fruit is hit by frost in winter59 or they are burnt by heat in summer. Likewise, your servant dies or flees, your body lapses in fever or disease, and you may even be captured by robbers and sold into slavery.60 [25] What is it, then, that I can truly control? It is not one thing, our friend, or a small one, but many great things! Benevolence, humility, righteousness – so that your mind may be noble and you may not fail –,61 wisdom, knowledge, upright discernment, quietness and modesty. The hand of robbers does not go [anywhere] near these treasures, for they dwell in a secure place, [and] are not idle but [ready] for use. For the cobbler,62 if he has no hides, must to cease work, and [so must] the weaver, if he has no wool, and the blacksmith, if he has no iron; but this art alone does not [have to] wait for what it needs to come from outside. The will of [this art] is bound to this [alone]: by avoiding what is to [be avoided] and by choosing what is to [be chosen], it forges and composes whatever it wants. [It has] within itself [both] the skill and what is required,

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and [it has] no fear that what is necessary63 might be wanting, for both things spring from the same root, the art and what is necessary to the art.64 [26] Stilpo was a man of Megara, and Megara had been destroyed by Antigonus. After the city had been destroyed, however, Antigonus ordered Stilpo to take back everything that had been pillaged from him. But Stilpo answered saying: ‘From what belongs to me, nothing was pillaged, for I have not seen that any of your armed soldiers took away my knowledge!’65 Therefore, when someone says that there is something good among things that are found outside virtue (aretê), whether wealth, glory, or anything else that can quickly be snatched away from someone, do not trust him but recognise that he who gives the wrong name to the wrong thing is foolish.

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[27] It is also necessary that, since the Good is a great thing and should be chosen like a friend, so also it will be trustworthy and secure to the person who has acquired it. Now, if this [quality] is removed from [the Good], the other positive things fail, and the [Good] becomes like a shadow or deceitful vision without stability or duration. From all these [arguments] it becomes clear that there is no Good other than virtue (aretê), and it is a [true] possession only the one which is not affected by misfortune and does not leave its possessor. Honour, wealth, power, primacy, beauty and health are volatile and quickly slip away from the hands of those who hold them; and they who possess them [can] rely on them much less than those who, during sleep,66 trust in their dreams.67

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[28] Now, many philosophers (philosophos) seek the excellence68 of man and put it outside man himself. They mix up things such as these [e.g. the excellence of man] with things that do not belong to us, and they do not allow the springs that we ourselves possess to flow clearly and purely, but they mix into them streams whose flow is not trustworthy or reliable and they disturb69 them. [29] Let us examine the animals, whose actions are not equal [in value] and which possess excellence in different ways. Some of them excel in their bodies alone, while others [excel] in both their bodies and in their souls – but for men excellence is stored in their souls alone. The excellence of pigs, of goats and of fowl is that they are fat and fertile, and, for this reason, whenever you want to buy one of them, you weigh it either alive or butchered. But the excellence of the horse and of the dog70 is not only in the[ir] body but also in the[ir] soul. You require from a dog that it be strong and healthy but also swift and tempered, and again from a horse that, when he runs, he is tame and has a mouth easy [to control]. [30] But where shall we seek the excellence of man: in the soul, in the body, or in both? He does not dominate and prevail over all the animals by the swiftness of his feet, the force of his hands, or the vision of his eyes, but by wisdom, intellect and sagacity. His excellence, therefore, lies there where his power is. Indeed, these things, which I said, sprout forth71 in his soul, and for this reason, Agesilaus of Sparta was not diminished in fortitude because he was crippled and lame, nor again was Crates inferior to Glaucus of Carystus because he was emaciated in body.72 All the excellence of man

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is therefore gathered and placed in his soul, and without it his body flutters [without a lead].

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[31] So the sow73 has no control over her own excellence, but the butcher, the swineherd, and her owner74 [have control over the excellence of the sow]. Over that excellence which is infused in the bodies of the dog and of the horse, the dog-­keeper and the herdsman have control,75 and [they] can harm the swiftness of their feet and abate their temper with hunger. But nobody has control over the excellence of man, for it flourishes76 in his intellect, and man can be blessed if he takes care of it.77 This is what Diogenes used to do. Cleanthes used to say that man should live as it fits his nature.78 For the nature of man inclines towards reason and an excellent and seemly intellect, but he who is immersed in desire and lust for glory and serves them like a slave has done away with his honour, since he has taken for himself intractable mistresses.79 [32] But if you truly want to know that reason is an excellent thing, it is not Plato or Aristotle80 that I call as witnesses, but the wise Antisthenes, he who trod this road. Indeed, he said81 that Heracles told Prometheus:82 ‘Your toil83 is utterly worthless, for you are concerned with things of the world and you have left the preoccupation with what is greater than this. You will not be an accomplished man84 until you learn things that are higher than men. If you learn these, then you will also learn the things of men, but if you learn only the ones of here, you will be wandering like wild animals’. He, then, whose care is for worldly things and has imprisoned the reason of his intellect85 and his sagacity within those mean and narrow things, is not wise – as Antisthenes said – but resembles an animal that finds a dunghill agreeable.86 For all the celestial things are high, and we ought to have a high opinion of them. [33] If, however, you are not persuaded by this man, lift your gaze to the sky and think at how much space there is from here to there. One grasps that large space with the intellect, examines the Sun, the Moon and the rest of the stars in silence, and marvels at their courses and at their ranks, their rising and setting, their height and magnitude, their straight and orbicular courses.87 One then dares to go higher than these celestial beauties, and audaciously pursues the wonder. Perhaps his sight has shown him these things of which I have spoken, and he needed [only] the pupils [of his eyes to see them],88 but he [now] runs further and leaves behind the senses to press upon the edge of the space of the sky.89 He pursues spaces that are even above it, he investigates hidden things and he wants to know the king of the universe.90 [34] Socratesʼ words, then, are not deceitful. When somebody asked Socrates whether, according to him, [Xerxes] the great king91 of the Persians was blessed, he answered: ‘I do not reckon him to be a blessed man, for I am not persuaded that he is concerned with wisdom’.92 ‘What do you say, wise Socrates? Are you not even aware that he dispatched more than a thousand ships on the sea, that he produced as many myriads of armed men as he wanted and brought them with him, that for him alone it was easy to construct a bridge over the sea and cross [the sea] on foot, and to cause the sea to flow into the earth and to travel by ship on the land,93 that all the plains of the Egyptians and

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Assyrians were cultivated for him, that Arabia Felix is dubbed ‘Felix’ because of him? But you, it seems, have not even heard of the golden plane-­tree that he possesses,94 or of his bakers and cooks (mageiros), or that men lie down on the ground before him and worship him insanely!’ ‘I know and I have heard all these things, but I do not reckon that beatitude or the excellence95 of man is in them’. ‘In what, Socrates, do you reckon it is?’ ‘In knowledge, in righteous discernment, in truth and in the fact that one should know what he can control and what he cannot, and [that he should know] what he has to take care that it may happen and what he has to labour over so that it may not happen’.96 [35] If much gold, many lands, and many97 men were enough to make the Good, Cambyses would have won, as well as Nero who ruled over the Romans, but the former was insane in his intellect98 and the latter used to sing songs.99 The cause of [their defeat] was that they were not expert in the art of ruling well, and the more they possessed the more their weakness became evident. Nero, indeed, sought to govern a horse-­chariot as he would have held command over men, but when he fell from the chariot he stood up again whereas when he fell from command he did not and was removed miserably from life.100

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[36] Since the Athenians could not stand Socrates saying these words,101 like boys who find the occasion and the moment to harm their pedagogue (paidagôgos), they removed him from their midst with poison. [37] Accordingly, vexations and pleasures are equal for him who knows [how] to govern himself, for he deals with each one of them in due season, and his art is not diminished by dropping one [pleasure or vexation] and taking on another, but in each one of them he shows his skill. As it is [just as] easy for him who makes statues (andrianta) to make [them] from ivory or from clay, and he is more celebrated when he makes them from clay – for one does not attribute the beauty of his work to the elegance of ivory, but marvels at his art [even] more for he could force the nature of the clay to acquire a beautiful grace –, so also virtue (aretê) is celebrated both in wealth and in poverty, sickness and health.102 [38] ‘But if wealth were good in its nature and poverty were bad in its nature, why did God not give wealth to the good and poverty to the evil?’ We see that wealth generates tyranny and poverty gathers wisdom.103 ‘How, then, is Evil generated from Good, and Good from Evil? Again, if poverty is bad, how does it not make bad those who possess it? If wealth is good, why does it not make good those who possess it?’ But we call them good things [only] because the body needs them. [39] ‘Perhaps virtue (aretê) is diminished because of these changes? As the story goes, there was a citharist (kitharôidos), Amoebeus by name, who always gathered an audience in the theatre (theatron) and [was able to charge] a talent [as a] fee for [listening to] his songs. Once, however, it happened that the other citharists from the town asked that another cithara (kithara) should be given to him with which he should sing, [to see] whether he really relied on his art. When this was done, Amoebeus left

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deprived of the wreath [of victory], for he began to sing with the other cithara (kithara) and his art was impaired by the disgrace of th[at] cithara (kithara).104 May it be, then, that wisdom is impaired in the same way? Does it diminish if one replaces poverty with wealth? Or is it enfeebled if one offers it reproaches instead of praises – that which increases more when it scorns praises?’105 [40] We assert that [virtue] uses everything skilfully in due season. The painters, when they paint [the pupils of] the eyes, leave aside all the pigments of their colours and paint them with ink, or when they want to paint snow they use white: by painting everything in the right way they are praised since they show that their art is equal in the use of every colour.106 So it is that, for virtue (aretê), wealth and poverty, pleasures and vexations are equal. They are equal not because they are not opposites, but because they are [just equal] for [virtue]. [41] ‘But in vain you say that virtue (aretê) is enough to provide anybody with a life full of good things – [a life] in which there are all those things that provide happiness107 to him who possesses [virtue]. We have reported how many things [Virtue] needs: she needs the senses, eyes and ears and the rest of the other things, all or some of them, and it is necessary that her senses are healthy, lest they deceive her and lead her astray as children lead astray the blind, and that they teach her accurately the way things are, so that, since their meaning is accurately accumulated in the stores of the mind, [virtue] may not act foolishly in anything. She needs, if not delicate pleasures, at least the simple ones; if not excellent wines, at least water; if not silk, at least an ascetic attire’.108 [42] There would be many things for you109 to say [in addition to this list], for they all spring from one cause: that man needs all that is necessary, and it is not difficult to say that he also needs other things that are higher than these. For he needs the Earth, the Sun, the Moon and the stars, [and this is] because man is a bodily [creature]. But, wise men, you missed the measure by which we said that virtue (aretê) is sufficient. We did not say that it is sufficient for life, but we were showing that it is sufficient for a good life. Nor is our nature such that we should suppose ourselves capable of doing what can be done without food, sleep and breath, and of thinking what we ought to think, and the rest of the things in turn,110 as if we [could] walk without feet because of the wisdom that is in us or speak without a tongue because of the virtue (aretê) that is in us! This is insane to say or [even] to think! [43] We believe that, if it is possible to live happily111 by behaving righteously, and, if this is so because wisdom is sufficient for [behaving righteously], [wisdom] can also be sufficient for [living happily].112 We [can]not live a calm life outside life according to nature, and [there is] no [possibility to] practise113 good things outside practice itself. [If] you applied [your] reckoning to rhetoric (rhit·rūta), it would be [like saying] that you doubt one could speak swiftly at the disputes in town, because, you ask,‘How can rhetoric (rhit·rūta) make men speak swiftly, if it cannot give us voice, tongue, or mouth?’ But it is insane to say this! All that is likewise said [to be] the cause of something is not said to be [the cause] of the very thing, but [it is said to be the cause] of something that is in the

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thing. So fulling is not the cause of the nature of the garments, but it is the cause of the beauty of the garments. Also, tanning is not the cause of hides, but [it is the cause] of the processing114 of the hides. He who says that virtue (aretê) is sufficient to make life happy does not therefore say that [virtue] can make life itself and happiness in it, but that it makes life a happy life. If this is not so, then nothing is sufficiently the cause of anything, because you say that the cause of something must also be the cause of what does not come from that thing. According to what you say, it would not be possible [for anything] to [actually] be a cause, since it does not have [the place] where it may show its force. [If this were so,] we would not even affirm that fire is [the cause of] the combustion of wood, because it does not make the wood; but, if we affirm this, we shall also affirm that virtue (aretê) is enough to make a happy life, even if it does not itself produce life.

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[44] But let us hear from Virtue (aretê) herself! ‘Whom do you wish to give happiness?’ ‘Clearly to man! Give me a man, and I shall give him happiness.115 You said that I am sufficient for [happiness]. I do not promise food, drink and clothing, nor nostrils and eyes, but [I promise] that [he] shall use all of them righteously’. Again, he who is deprived of [virtue] and is in folly cannot be without adversity even if a river of gold and silver flows towards him, and the earth is pressed by his sheep, his herds and the servants that he owns, but, when all these things have increased,116 his evil appears [even] more, as a disease [appears more] in the body when it takes [too] much food.117

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[47] The philosopher (philosophos) must train himself in physical exercise, for in this way he gains the health of the body and [can] bear easily things by which others are quickly conquered, for they [rather] weigh down their bodies by drinking and eating until late. Instead they should imitate Crates, who used to run set routes every day saying: ‘I am running for my spleen, for my liver and for my belly’.123 He who imitates [Crates] and does exercise shows that the body which is constantly in exercise possesses health and is not enslaved to pleasures. [48] But if the circumstance[s] demand that [the philosopher] should say a word of derision while making an accusation,124 he shall not take pains about how to ridicule so much as how to help by concealing an admonition under a word of jest, as with the words of Diogenes, in depths of which aid lay hidden, beneath the cover of a jest. He did not rebuke by looking at somebodyʼs wealth, family, or power, but he would offer [a person] a remedy according to his own disease. For, while the physicians of the body look at the diseases – and, accordingly, how often do they cauterise the wealthy, operate on them and make them fast while they heal the poor with bread, delicate foods and honey? –, it would be very foolish for the physicians of souls to look at something other than the sicknesses [themselves], and [thus] miss something that is vital for the healing of him who is a [common] man or of him who is [held] in honour. [49] Even if he advises in affairs of minor importance, then, [the philosopher] must not feel shame [when advising], for why should he, who is a [philosopher], refuse to be outspoken? If he does not consider anything else besides virtue (aretê) to be a good thing, what desire can beguile him and what fear can make him afraid? More than anything, then, he should take care to use that strength, which he trusts and of [which] he is proud, against those who are armed and are celebrated125 among men, for he is guarded by [that strength] and will not seem in any [respect to be] deprived of it, weak, or held by praise, money, or desires. [50] To kings and princes, their rank provides the power to punish the wrong-­doers; to philosophers (philosophos), the fact that they do not err126 gives them the power to chastise the wrong-­doer. But if his soul is held in the passions, the trust in him abates and his fortitude grows cool, which should be a companion for him127 like a sword, sharp and hanging from his heart. [51] When he intends to rebuke somebody, [first] he should look at his own person and say: ‘Am I also like one such?’128 Once he has examined himself and found his soul to be removed from passions, [only] then shall he apply himself to healing others, lest that fable by Aesop shall be told to him: ‘The animals told the frog who declared itself to be an expert in medicine: “How can you attempt to heal others, when your own complexion is greenish?”129 The [philosopher]ʼs blemishes, however small, do not lie hidden, and he shall consider that, if he, though alone, sets his mind on the rest of men, all the more so the rest of men shall set [their] mind[s] on him who is one; and [this is] even more so since [the philosopher] does not have a house or a household, but produces everything by himself with [his] hands and is [visible] to all as though [he were acting]

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in a theatre (theatron). When one looks [closely], on what statue (andrianta) can he not find a blemish? [52] As the philosopher (philosophos) has to be healthy in every respect, he must also guard humility and severity within himself, both of which are excellences130 of the soul, so that he may bestow humility on the humble and severity on the evil. The people of the Athenians dubbed Diogenes ‘dog’ because his couch was on the ground and he used to spend the night on the streets in front of their door[s]. Diogenes, however, liked this appellation for he saw that it resembled his deeds. You know what Plato relates about the nature of the dogs. [He relates] that they wag their tail and love those whom they know, but they rage at those whom they do not know; and they set apart enemies and friends not by the fact that they are good or bad towards them, but by whether they know or do not know somebody.131 The philosopher (philosophos), then, must not love the person who gives him a present or hate the person who does not, but he must regard as a friend the person in whom he sees virtue (aretê), and he shall perceive [that a person] is a stranger on account of the fact that he sees evil in him. Indeed, to the dog [the faculty] was given to recognise friends through customary sight, but to the philosopher (philosophos) the intellect was given in addition to [his] eyes so that, having set apart friend from enemy, [he may] draw the latter near to himself and set the former further away, not to fulfil his anger or to bite, but to conquer him and heal him through admonition, and remove the hidden blemishes through his admonition as through a bite and lay them in the open. [The person] who acts like a dog in this way does not merely guard a house or the person who feeds him; but he is a guard to all men, not lest they lose their possessions, but lest righteousness and concord are pillaged from them. [53] For this reason the Athenians honoured Crates greatly. The story relates that Crates [used to] go from house to house where there was tumult and irritation, and he did not leave until he had produced concord among the people.132 [54] How would it not be an injustice to omit133 Lysimachus? His story will help the [present] discourse.134 [Lysimachus] was persecuted by a tyrant (turannos) who could not endure135 his admonition. Yet, when he came to a certain fortress that had been built by the Romans on the outmost borders of Pontus136 because of strife137 with the barbarians, he settled with the guards of the fortress without any problem. One day it happened that he went out from the fortification and the outer wall and wandered away, [and] saw two [armies] getting ready to assail each other in a battle with foot-­soldiers and horsemen. Soon the factions came closer to each other138 to shoot arrows and meet [in battle], but [Lysimachus] wore his robe (stolê), took hold of his staff, and entered and walked cheerfully, calmly and courageously between the two ranks.139 With a [mere] sign of his hand he calmed the [soldiers] down. The barbarians were dazed and obeyed him, they were filled with wonder, they quenched [their] anger, and they desisted from the battle without [shedding] blood;140 and [so the two parties] made a deal with each other and then separated in peace. The courage of a philosopher (philosophos) was able to turn so great a situation into peace!141

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On Virtue

[55] As [the philosopher], then, must stir up his anger if the circumstance demands that he rebukes and heals a person, so also must he quench his anger if he has to endure an insult.142 Nicodromus the citharist (kitharôidos) was obdurate and unskilled (idiôtês) in playing the lyre (kithara), but his sense143 was even more confused than his own strums. To Crates, who sought to correct him, he repaid the favour with a blow of the hand, and the folly of the citharist (kitharôidos) became known from the mark on Cratesʼ face. Crates did not take vengeance on him with a staff or with a stone, nor did he shout on the square, but he merely wrote on his own face [the name of the person] who had struck him, following the custom of inscribing on statues (andrianta) [the name of] their sculptors.144 Socrates, when Aristocrates kicked him, did not repay him or correct him with anything other than saying to the passers-­by: ‘This man is sick of the disease of the mules!’ Plato [sic], when a person threatened him saying: ‘I will kill you!’, turned back and warned him: ‘I reconcile with you!’145 When [Plato]ʼs servant offended him, he drew nigh to strike him, but once he lifted his hand [to strike] the blow, he bridled his anger and, keeping [his hand] up, he said: ‘Look at man, how he hangs between anger and peace!’146 [56] But the benefit and the good that the philosopher (philosophos) offers does not consist of increasing wealth or honour147 for somebody else. It would be foolish if he took pains to enable others to win the things that he despises [and] who would not use them fittingly. [It would likewise be foolish] if he had to toil for these things [and he] took trouble and stood at the door of the rulers who drive him away and cast him out of the doors, as usually happens to those who go, without money, to [join] the hungry band of those who follow the rulers and drive the people148 from in front of them with staffs. Instead of bestowing riches on the person who asks him, then, he shall teach him that poverty149 is not a bad thing, and to the person who strives for power150 he shall show that it is not useful for just anybody to be a ruler, but [only] for him who exercises power with wisdom. The discourse by Themistius on virtue (aretê) that is the excellence151 of the soul has ended.152

Notes 1 If the word myattrūtā, which I translate with ‘excellence’, is simply an equivalent of the Greek aretê as it seems (see the note in the Glossary under ‘excellence’), the second part of the title (‘that is the excellence of the soul’) is likely to be an addition by the translator. 2 See the note on the title and on ‘excellence’ in the Glossary. 3 ‘You’ is plural. 4 In the Republic, Plato writes of the road leading to the knowledge of the Good as ‘a longer road’ (504A: makrotera periodos and 435D) that ‘does not require less effort in learning than in physical exercise’ (504C: kai oukh hêtton manthanonti ponêteon hê gumnazomenôi). Compare also the intricate and winding road that, in the Phaedo myth, leads to the afterworld (108A: nun de eoike skhiseis te kai triodous pollas ekhein). 5 This road, as will become clear below, is the suntomos hodos of the Cynic tradition, the shortcut to virtue (Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 37.4–5 Malherbe; D.L. 7.121 about the Stoic Apollodorus; S. Prince, ‘Antisthenes and the Short Route to Happiness’, in P. Bosman (ed.) Ancient Routes to Happiness, Pretoria 2017, pp. 73–96; V. Emeljanow, ‘A Note on the Cynic Shortcut to Happiness’, Mnemosyne 18.2 (1965), pp. 182–4; G. Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, 4 vols, Naples 1990, vol. 4, pp. 526–7; A.A. Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics’, in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (eds) The Cynics. The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, Berkeley, CA 1996, pp. 28–46 at p. 38n25); compare Plutarch Mor. 759D: suntonon homou kai suntomon heurêke tên poreian ep’ aretên and Julian Or. 7, 225C: tên suntomon hodon kai suntonon epi tên aretên, both of whom refer to the Cynics. The image of different philosophical schools as different roads, whose ultimate pedigree is presumably Hesiod (Op. 286–92) and the myth of the choice of Heracles (Xenophon Mem. 2.1.21–34, which is also reported in Themistius Or. 22, 779D–82C with awareness of Dio Chrysostom Or. 1), is found in Themistius in Or. 20, 236B: oudemia gar philosophia porrô apôikistai kai makran aposkênoi tês heteras, all’ hoion eureias hodou kai megalês mikrai diaskhiseis te kai aponeuseis, hai men pleion, hai de elatton perielthousai, eis tauton homôs peras suntheousin. The philosophical short cut may be compared with the rhetorical short cut depicted by Lucian (Rhetorum praeceptor), for which see R. Cribiore, The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch, Princeton 2007, pp. 174–96 and eadem, ‘Lucian, Libanius, and the Short Road to Rhetoric’, GRBS 47 (2007), pp. 71–86; also, the rhetorical short cut is depicted by the author of The Tabula of Cebes, and it appears to be a paideutic notion common to philosophical and rhetorical education. 6 The formulation strikes one for its similarity to Hermesʼ words in Julianʼs remake of the myth of Heracles at the crossroads in Or. 7, 230C: deuro, eipen, hêgemôn soi esomai leioteras kai homalesteras hodou. 7 The word , which appears as a loanword from Greek, is not attested in this form. J. Gildemeister and F. Bücheler, ‘Themistios Περὶ ἀρετῆς’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 27 (1872), pp. 438–62 interpret it as a transcription of skholê and translate it

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Notes to pages 239–240 as ‘school’, and are followed by R. Mach in G. Downey and A.F. Norman (eds) Themistii orationes quae supersunt, 3 vols, Leipzig 1965 and M. Conterno, Temistio orientale, Brescia 2014. However, the form normally attested for the accusative plural skholas is ʼeskūlas (R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, Oxford 1879–1901, s.v.), and, accordingly, for Margoliouth instead suggested to read ‘Aeschylus’ (J.P. Margoliouth, Supplement to the Thesaurus Syriacus of R. Payne Smith, Oxford 1927, s.v.): if Margoliouth is right, there is the possibility that the previous sentence contains (or contained) a quotation from Aeschylus. As in 18,18, 21,14 and 33,8, the translation ‘to tread’ seems the most appropriate given the pervasiveness of the road imagery. The same simile is used at the beginning of Or. 24, 302b, where Themistius likewise compares his teaching to this practice of doctors. The image is common in Epicurean literature (M. Erler and M. Schofield, ‘Epicurean Ethics’, in K. Algra et al. (eds) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 642–74). I do not follow the correction by Gildemeister, op. cit. into zmārā d-­pārah.tā ‘the voice of birds’. For the road of Epicurus, compare Cicero Fin. 1.18.57: ‘Here is a magnificent road to happiness: open, simple, and direct!’ (O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et simplicem et directam viam!) and Lucretius 6.27–28. For the imagery see the road of Vice in the Choice of Heracles myth (Xenophon Mem. 2.1.23–25), although here Themistius may also be evoking Epicurusʼ garden. Conversely T. Nöldeke, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca’, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 25 (1871), pp. 282–7 at p. 287, n. 1 corrects into d-­lūdāyā ‘of the Lydian (Croesus)’, which I do not follow. Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects into ʽesbē ‘grass’, which I do not follow; contrast this with the Cynic road (8–9) and relevant notes. This could be related to the savage men of fiery aspect described in the Myth of Er as the punishers of tyrants and private individuals who committed great crimes: entautha dê andres, ephê, agrioi, diapuroi idein, parestôtes kai katamanthanontes to phthegma, tous men dialabontes êgon (Plato Rep. 615E). Whether the two fortresses have anything to do with the two peaks of Dio Chrysostom Or. 1.66–68 is unclear. Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects into šūlt·ānā ‘power’, which seems to be a translation of arkhê. Gildemeister, op. cit. understands šūh.lāpā as a translation of metabolê. As in the manuscript with Nöldeke, op. cit. and Gildemeister, op. cit.; conversely E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca, Halle 1870 corrects into b-ʼawāwnayhēn ‘in their inns’. Plato Phaed. 79C reports that, when it uses the body to make an inquiry, the soul ‘is dragged by the body to things that never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man’ (trans. Fowler). The same passage from the Phaedo would form the basis of the criticism of the Epicureans who are unable to see the metaphysical world in Boethius Cons. 3.2.13: ‘though their memory is clouded, their minds none the less are trying to rediscover their proper good, but like a drunkard they do not recognise the path which would bring them back home’ (trans. Walsh). The manuscript has nepqūnāh ‘leave the road’, but I follow the correction of Gildemeister, op. cit. into neqpūnāh ‘cleave to the road’. I.e. a modest amount of money; Aristotle EN 1.8, 1099A30–B6; conversely A. Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, Elenchos 21.2 (2000), pp. 381–96 at p. 385, n. 7 links the passage to Aristotle Protrepticus fr. 1 (= Stobaeus Ecl. 4.32.21).

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22 I follow the correction of Gildemeister, op. cit. of mezdawzēn ‘they are swollen’ into mezdawwdīn ‘they are loaded’. 23 Given what follows, I am not convinced that h.ayē should be translated here with its common meaning of ‘life’, and it seems more likely that it is instead a translation of sôtêria ‘safety, means of safety, safe return, security’; see Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, s.v. 24 One would perhaps expect ‘expertise’. 25 This might be a reference to Aristotleʼs Poetics and Rhetoric. 26 This may be a translation of hôsper apo skopias or similar; compare Plato Rep. 445BC: epeiper entautha elêluthamen, hoson hoion te saphestata katidein [. . .] deuro nun, ên d’ egô, hina kai idês [. . .] hôsper apo skopias moi phainetai [. . .]. 27 Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 30 about Diogenes Ep. 37 about Antisthenes (A.J. Malherbe (ed.) The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition, Missoula, MT 1977). In Or. 26, 317D–18C, Themistius argues that Socrates did not walk on the older and well-­trodden path of philosophy. For the philosophical succession of Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates and Zeno, which ultimately connected Zeno with Socrates and was propagated by early Stoics, see Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition’, pp. 28–46. 28 As becomes clear in 13, this has to do with the Stoic doctrine of things indifferent. 29 Compare the words that Hermes pronounces in Julian Or. 7, 230CD: ‘Follow me, and I will guide thee by an easier and smoother road as soon as thou hast surmounted this winding and rugged place’ (trans. Wright). 30 Compare Ps.-Diogenes Ep. 37.4–5: ‘These things I learned to eat and drink, while being taught at the feet of Antisthenes, not as though they were poor fare but that they were superior to the rest and more likely to be found on the road leading to happiness, which should be regarded as the most esteemed of all possessions. [In a very secure place and precipitous place, one road, steep and rugged, is laid out.] And so, because of its ruggedness, an individual, stripped for action, would barely be able to ascend this road. And if a person were carrying something with him and were weighed down with trouble and obligations, he would not be saved, nor would the person pursuing something “necessary”. Then, too, a person would have to make the grass or cresses along the road his food and common water his drink, and these especially where it would be necessary to proceed most expeditiously’ (ed. and trans. Malherbe). For this reason, the Syriac text ‘the boundary of virtue (aretê)’ might not be fully satisfactory, and one would instead expect ‘next to the edge of the road’: this reading, however, encounters the difficulty of explaining the change of ʼūrh.ā ‘road’ into ʼerat·a ‘virtue’. 31 The noise is what prompts the actions of the savage men of fiery aspect described in the Myth of Er as the punishers of tyrants and private individuals who committed great crimes: entautha dê andres, ephê, agrioi, diapuroi idein, parestôtes kai katamanthanontes to phthegma, tous men dialabontes êgon (Plato Rep. 615E). 32 As below in 43, kahīnūtā seems to be a translation of eudaimonia, while, given the context, ·tūbā ‘blessing’ is likely to be an addition by the translator. 33 Plato Tim. 90A (and perhaps Plato Rep. 611–12); ·tābtā ‘the Good’ may be a translation of to agathon. 34 Literally: ‘and flees a flight that has no returning’. 35 I follow the correction of G. Hoffmann, ‘Review of E. Sachau (ed.) Inedita Syriaca’, Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen (1871), pp. 1201–36 of ·tābātā ‘good things’ into ·tābtā ‘the Good’. 36 The paragraph is unclear, but a parallel may be Plato Ap. 22CE and Aristotle EN 10.9.

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37 Compare Aristotle EN 1180b5–15: ‘Further, particularised education is actually superior to communal education, just in the case of medicine. For while rest and abstinence from food are in universal terms advantageous for a feverish patient, for a particular patient, presumably, they might not be, nor does a boxing instructor prescribe the same style of fighting for everyone. It would seem, then, that a particular care is treated with exactness when there is individual supervision, since each person is more likely to get what suits him’ (trans. Reeve); see also EN 1181b1–10. 38 Conterno, Temistio orientale has rightly identified this as a quotation. 39 Themistius Or. 26, 319B–20A points out that the same drugs and food do not benefit both healthy and sick and should be administered according to the condition of the patient to explain the variance in the circulation of the exoteric and the esoteric works by Aristotle. The concept that Philosophy acts like a doctor by applying different remedies according to the condition of the patient is also used by Boethius Cons. 1.5.11–12. 40 Nöldeke, op. cit. rightly corrects into netyattar. 41 I have followed here the translation by Conterno, Temistio orientale, which does not require the addition as in Gildemeister, op. cit. 42 Cicero Fin. 4.72 and 5.90; Stobaeus Ecl. 2.6.6 (144–48, 2.41–43 Meineke); in Stoic terminology adiaphora ‘indifferent’, i.e. neither good nor bad, and proêgmena ‘promoted, advanced’, i.e. things neither good nor bad but promoted or advanced above the zero point of indifference. Compare D.L. 6.105: ‘(The Cynics) hold further that “Life according to Virtue” is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life. [. . .] Whatever is intermediate between Virtue and Vice they, in agreement with Ariston of Chios, account indifferent’ (trans. Hicks); A. Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici e la κοινωνία tra cinicismo e stoicismo nel libro VI (103–105) delle Vite di Diogene Laerzio’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 2.36.6 (1992), pp. 4049–75 at pp. 4068–9. 43 This may still be a reference to the Stoics mentioned above: see Plutarch De Stoicorum repugnantiis especially 18–19 for this critique to Chrysippus. 44 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrected ʽaynē ‘eyes’ into ʽnānē ‘clouds’. 45 The text is tlāt mnawān ‘three parts’. Compare Julian Or. 6, 184C: ‘Therefore, I say, let no one divide philosophy into many kinds (eis polla) or cut it up into many parts (eis polla), or rather let no one make it out to be plural instead of one’ (trans. Wright). 46 Milo of Croton. 47 See Maximus of Tyre 36.3–5 for a similar format: e.g. 36.3: tini dômen ta nikêtêria pherontes? 48 Literally: ‘of the goods of human beings’, but see Epicurus Ep. Men. 138: Kai dia touto tên hêdonên arkhên kai telos legomen einai tou makariôs zên. 49 This is known as the ‘cradle argument’, see Erler and Schofield, ‘Epicurean Ethics’, pp. 649–50. 50 The word does not seem to be the usual plural form. 51 Cicero Fin. 1.30; D.L. 10.31–4; the opposite argument is found in Plato Phaed. 64A–E. 52 The expression mêtropolis pantôn tôn kakôn ‘mother-­city of all evils’ is an expression used by Diogenes of Sinope in reference to the love of money as reported in D.L. 6.50. 53 Cicero Fin. 2.69 reports that, in order to portray Epicurean hedonism, the stoic Cleanthes, in his lectures, used to describe a painting of Pleasure represented as a luxurious queen sitting on a throne whom Virtues would serve as handmaids and act

Notes to pages 243–245

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as her slaves; and the same allegory is used in Augustine Civ. 5.20. Themistius must derive this passage from literature hostile to Epicurean philosophy. It is noticeable, however, that here the woman represents ‘desire, cupidity’ (regtā presumably epithumia), while she should represent ‘pleasure’ (in all likelihood hêdonê, which is normally translated as nyāh.ā) if one follows the account of Cicero Fin. 2.69 (voluptas) and a quotation on the same subject from Epicurus in Athenaeus Deipn. 12.546 (hêdonê). I wonder whether the presumable change of hêdonê into epithumia might ultimately reveal awareness of the terminological distinction between ‘pleasure’ and ‘desire’ in Aristotle DA 414b4, on which Themistius commented in in DA 47,7. For epithumia see also Julian Or. 6, 197B. As in 43, this seems to be a translation of eudaimonia. I read as a present. Il. 2.576 and 685, where Achilles is said to have fifty ships. A remark on Homerʼs preference for Achilles over Agamemnon is found in Themistius Or. 25.5, 334C. Hoffmann, op. cit. corrects into men lbar yāteh. According to other translators, this is the end of the speech by the Cynic speaker. Sachau, op. cit. corrects into b-­satwā men glīdā. An analogous form of argumentation is attributed to Antisthenes by Diogenes in an anecdote that was in turn reported by Epictetus (Arrian Epict. 3.24.67–9): ‘Listen to what Diogenes says: “(Antisthenes) taught me what was mine (ta ema), and what was not mine (ta ouk ema). Property is not mine; kinsmen, members of my household, friends, reputation, familiar places, converse with men – all these are not my own (allotria). What, then, is yours (son)? Power to deal with external impressions (khrêsis phantasiôn)” [. . .]’ (trans. Oldfather). As will become clear as the text proceeds (25–33), however, Themistiusʼ answer to this question will be virtue/excellence, which is gathered in the soul (30) and flourishes in the intellect (31): according to Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, 390–1, Themistiusʼ reasoning on this subject depends on Antisthenes (D.L. 6.1.12–15). I suspect that this was not in the original text. Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into l-ʼeškāpā. I suspect that (ʽ)āhen is a translation of epitêdeios on the basis of Plato Euthyd. 280C. Although the text may have been abbreviated (it is not obvious what ‘this art alone’ refers to: perhaps knowledge, or wisdom, given what follows?), it appears nonetheless that 25–7 somehow make a case for the identification of the knowledge (of the Good) with virtue/excellence. Themistius writes above that Socrates first found the (Cynic) road (8), and here it may be Socratic intellectualism that provides the foundation for Cynic ethics: true knowledge corresponds to virtue/excellence. It is remarkable that, when he deals with this subject, Socrates uses the same analogy of a carpenter who needs both wood and knowledge to be successful (Plato Euthyd. 280B–81E). Here, however, this analogy is twisted in that it is argued that knowledge of the Good is superior to other tekhnai since it does not need anything from the outside (see also 27). Links are often suggested between the detachment from material things in both Socrates and Diogenes and between the ethical behaviour heedless of convention of the two philosophers (Long, ‘The Socratic Tradition’, pp. 28–46; see also the anecdote that reports that to Plato Diogenes seemed to be Socrates gone mad, in D.L. 6.54 and Aelian VH 14.33, and the report that, according to Antisthenes, virtue needed nothing else other than ‘the strength of a Socrates’, in D.L. 6.11). Here, however, Themistius may be suggesting a more fundamental link between Socrates and Cynicism, underpinned by a similar understanding of the knowledge of the Good (see again below 43).

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65 D.L. 2.115, and also Plutarch Demetr. 9; Mor. 5F–6A and 475CD; and Seneca Ep. 9.18 and Const. 5.6. In fact, the king was Demetrius I Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus I Monophtalmus. It is not necessary, however, to hypothesise a problem in the manuscript, and the confusion can be explained by a misreading in the process of translation of Dêmêtrios ho Antigonou, as the name appears in D.L. For the Cynic philosopher Stilpo of Megara see Bracht Branham, op. cit., pp. 403–4. 66 Mach, op. cit. corrects into da-­b-šentā. 67 D.L. 6.105; Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici’, pp. 4067–8. 68 From this point until 34, the subject of inquiry is myattrūtā ‘excellence’ rather than ʼerat·a ‘virtue’. After 34 (with only one exception in 52) the subject will again be ʼerat·a ‘virtue’. As is suggested in the note to the glossary, it seems unlikely that this distinction is meaningful, and both words must have originally rendered aretê. 69 Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects into w-­dālh.īn. 70 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into d-­sūsāyā wa-­d-kalbā. 71 The text has the problematic , and I have accepted the anonymous readerʼs emendation into šāwh.ān. 72 D.L. 6.91–2, who relies on Zenoʼs Aphorisms, remarks on Crates as a hunchback (kurtôn) with a crooked body (kuphos), while here the meaning is ‘emaciated, meagre’. Plutarch (or Ps.-Plutarch) composed a biography of Crates (now lost), which may be the source here; this Life ‘was used in late Roman times as the standard textbook for what we might call a philosophical “course” on cynicism’ (L.E. Navia, Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study, London 1996, p. 121); Julian referred to this life in Or. 6, 200B, and Sopater of Apamea epitomised it (Photius Bibl. cod. 161). Glaucus as paradigmatic of a strong body is mentioned by Lucian Pro imaginibus 19. 73 Hoffmann, op. cit. corrects into h.zīrtā. 74 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into h.azzārā w-­mārāh. 75 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into mšallat·. 76 According to Gildemeister, op. cit., this is a translation of euthalei comparing with Themistius Or. 27, 339C. 77 Compare Plato Rep. 10, 617E: ‘Virtue has no master: as he honours or dishonours it, so shall each of you have more or less of it’ (trans. Reeve). 78 The attribution of this view to the Stoics is found in D.L. 7.87–9. If this was indeed the original text and was not abbreviated, however, the attribution to Cleanthes is problematic, for D.L. 7.89: ‘By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual’ (trans. Hicks), but see also R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000, p. 97n28. 79 See 19 and note on Cleanthes. 80 It is likely that the passage above contained material derived from the two philosophers. 81 Literally: ‘he used to say’. 82 While the Syriac manuscript has ‘Prometheus told Heracles’, the emendation into ‘Heracles told Prometheus’ argued for by Giannantoni (ed.) Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, vol. 4, pp. 312–17 (see Dio Chrysostom 6.29 and 8.33) has been accepted here, although is not followed by S. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens. Texts, Translations, and Commentary, Ann Arbor, MD 2015, pp. 329–31. 83 Presumably ponos: see Prince, Antisthenes of Athens, p. 331.

Notes to pages 246–247

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84 According to Prince, Antisthenes of Athens, p. 331, gabrā gmīrā ‘accomplished man’ is a translation of sophos, but, in my view, this remains just a possibility since h.akkīmā would have been the more obvious translation of sophos. 85 The construct mlīlūt hawneh ‘the reason of his intellect’ strikes one as unusual. 86 The quotation derives from Antisthenesʼ Hêraklês ho meizôn ê peri iskhuos: see D.L. 6.18; Gildemeister, op. cit., p. 450, n. 1; F. Decleva Caizzi (ed.) Antisthenis fragmenta, Milan 1966, p. 32 and pp. 94–7; Giannantoni (ed.) Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, vol. 2, pp. 176–7; M. Luz, ‘Antisthenesʼ Prometheus Myth’, in J. Glucker et al. (eds) Jacob Bernays. Un philologue juif, Villeneuve dʼAscq 1996, pp. 89–103. Prince, Antisthenes of Athens, pp. 330–1 writes: ‘This is the clearest surviving evidence for Antisthenesʼ conception of a transcendent object of knowledge’. 87 Themistius Or. 26, 327C makes the fact that some celestial bodies do not proceed with the movement of the sky but advance in the opposite direction (eis toumpalin) into a topic of instruction by a philosopher. 88 Themistius Or. 1, 3A, possibly depending on Plato Theaet. 186B; Plato Tim. 47AC. 89 Themistius Or. 26, 327CD uses a similar expression in a similar context (ouranou anôteron). 90 Perhaps the Divine? Compare Julian Or. 5, 175C (summer 362): ‘(god) thereby enjoins that we turn our eyes towards the heavens, or rather above the heavens (huper ton ouranon)’ (trans. Wright, who ad loc. adds ‘to the intelligible world and the One’). 91 The manuscript has the gloss . 92 Dio Chrysostom 3.1–2; Julian Or. 2, 79AC. 93 Dio Chrysostom 3.29; Julian Or. 2, 79AC; Cicero Fin. 2.112; the anecdote is used in Themistius Or. 2, 36CD and Or. 22, 264C, in both of which Xerxes is mentioned by name. Conterno, Temistio orientale, p. 51, n. 2, has suggested that the present passage may have been at the origin of the addition to the Syriac translation of Themistius Or. 22, 264C. 94 Herodotus 7.31. The golden plane-­tree of the Persians (khrusê platanos) is mentioned by Themistius in Or. 13, 166B and 27, 339B. 95 Gildemeister, op. cit. deletes the preposition b-, and I follow this reading here, which is confirmed by Sin. 96 Two sections of this anecdote are also attested in Dio Chrysostom 3 and Julian Or. 2, 79AC, but the text here contains additional material. A. Brancacci, ‘Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione Sulla regalità di Dione Crisostomo: Dione e lʼArchelao di Antistene’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 2.36.5 (1992), pp. 3308–34 and idem, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, pp. 392–4 has argued that Dio Chrysostom, Julian and Themistius depended on a common source that should be identified in Antisthenesʼ lost dialogue Archelaus or On Kingship, for which see Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, vol. 4, pp. 350–4. 97 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into saggīʼē. 98 Cambyses is mentioned as Kambusês ho mainomenos in Themistius Or. 2, 36C and 11, 143A, and as Kambusou mania in Themistius Or. 1, 7BC; Themistius Or. 7, 99AB mentions tou Kambusou tên paroinian. 99 This may simply be the translation of kitharôideô ‘to sing to the cithara’ with defamatory value as in Themistius Or. 18, 219A (Nerôni kitharôidounti). 100 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into bīš. The entire point of this paragraph is not clear and does not seem to fit the overall argument (see below). The closing anecdote, which is found in Suetonius Nero 24, is mentioned in Themistius Or. 13, 173B: Toigaroun tês arkhês eksepesen athliôteron ê tôn armatôn ‘Therefore, then, he fell from command

260

101

102 103

104 105

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

117 118 119

Notes to pages 247–249 more miserably than from the chariot’. Themistius Or. 7, 92B mentions the anecdote about Nero rearranging the Olympic games (Suetonius Nero 23). I follow the reading of Sin hālēn melē ‘these words’, while BL reads hālēn ‘these’. If hālēn melē refers to the anecdote above about Nero, this would be a major anachronism. Gildemeister, op. cit., p. 452, n. 1, suggested that we understand hālēn as a translation of toiauta ‘such as these’. I would be inclined, however, to consider the remark on Nero as a simple digression from the story about Socrates (unless the entire section on Cambyses and Nero has been either abbreviated too much to enable us to understand its context or has simply been added to the text by an interpolator). Alternatively, given the moderate degree of faithfulness that one can expect from the translation, it is conceivable that either the text contained other anecdotes about Socrates that the translator omitted or it read ‘since Socrates was saying words that the Athenians could not stand’ or something similar. The reference to statues of ivory may indicate that this an ancient anecdote. The same point is made in Themistius Or. 13, 164AB, where the two fragments by Euripides are likewise quoted: hubrin te tiktei ploutos and peniê sophian elakhe (fr. 641 N.). Here, however, the text, which is clearly corrupted, reads: ‘wealth generates tyranny and poverty gathers money’. The anecdote is not otherwise attested. A similar one about Zeno and Amoebeus is found in Plutarch 443A; see also Plutarch 1029E; Plutarch Arat. 1034E; and Athenaeus 14, 623D. The point made here was probably in line with D.L. 6.105: ‘(The Cynics) hold, further, that virtue can be taught, as Antisthenes maintains in his Heracles, and when once acquired cannot be lost’ (trans. Hicks); Brancacci, ‘I κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα dei Cinici’, pp. 4067–8. Literally: ‘all the use of their colours is equal for their art’. Gildemeister, op. cit. deletes the preposition b-. Literally plural. Literally plural. This seems to be a translation of kata meros (Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, s.v.). The noun kahīnūtā, as below in the same paragraph, seems to be a translation of eudaimonia. See above 25–7 and notes. Themistius might be making a case for some form of Socratic intellectualism as the foundation of Cynic ethics (Plato Euthyd. 280B–81E). According to Gildemeister, op. cit., pūlh.ānā translates ergasia. The word is again pūlh.ānā as in 38,24. In the close of her speech to Heracles, in the Choice of Heracles myth Virtue promises him eudaimonia (Xenophon Mem. 2.1.33). As noticed by Gildemeister, op. cit. the text is corrupt but the sense is clear. The possibly original d-ʽap (third person plural perfect feminine) could have been transcribed as d-ʽepat if misunderstood as in agreement with the following singular feminine noun, and then it could have corrupted into . Compare Plato Euthyd. 280B–E. This might be a reference to the Seven Sages, who were known for their Laconic brevity (Plato Prot. 342E–43B and Rep. 600A), whom Themistius discusses in Or. 26, 317AB. Gildemeister, op. cit. instead corrects parrāšē ‘horsemen’ into pārsāyē ‘Persians’, and, although the anecdote as such is not found in Herodotus, he suggested a link between this event and the Greco-Persian wars.

Notes to pages 249–252

261

120 The name of the character varies in BL ( and ), and Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 1221, corrects into , but it is correctly in Sin. 121 I follow Sin; BL reads instead ‘once they won with weapons’. 122 A strangely different version of the anecdote is found in Plutarch 511BC. 123 A similar anecdote is in D.L. 6.91. 124 The manuscript has the gloss possibly ‘provoking laughter’. 125 Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects mezdaynīn ‘are armed’ into mezdayyh.īn ‘are celebrated’, since the repetition seems meaningless. 126 Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects nah.·ton ‘they cause to err’ into neh.·ton ‘they err’. 127 I correct l-āh into l-­eh. 128 The anecdote is reported in Plutarch 88E referring to Plato. 129 Aesop 287 Hausrath (= 78B Halm). 130 I have again respected the Syriac by translating myattrwātā as ‘excellences’, despite the fact that, in all likelihood, the Greek had aretai ‘virtues’; see S. Brock, ‘Review of M. Conterno, Temistio orientale’, Bibliotheca Orientalis 73 (2016), pp. 179–83 at p. 180. 131 Plato Rep. 2, 375E. 132 D.L. 6.86; Apuleius Flor. 22; Julian Or. 6, 201BC. 133 Hoffmann, op. cit. corrects into b-šetqā. 134 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into tašʽītā. 135 The first two lines of the page (f. 38a) are damaged. 136 Themistius Or. 27, 332C uses the expression en têi eskhatiai tou pontou to designate the place in which he was educated, and in Or. 20, 239C he refers to the tomb of Anytus near Heraclea Pontica which was allegedly extant at his time. 137 BL ‘strives’, Sin ‘strife’. 138 This is the reading in BL; Sin. reads ‘the ranks lined up (in battle array)’. Neither reading seems fully satisfactory. 139 Sachau, op. cit. corrects into sedrē. 140 Sin. ‘and blood was not shed’. 141 This is the reading in Sin.; BL appears instead problematic: ‘So great a deed the courage of a philosopher (philosophos) attained with this power!’ and Mach, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 68, proposed instead h.ayleh d-­hānā kuleh. This anecdote is not attested elsewhere and gave origin to some speculation. Porphyry Plot. 3 and 20 mentioned a Stoic philosopher Lysimachus who refrained from writing and could be a candidate for the present anecdote. However, there is the possibility that Lysimachus, meaning ‘he who ends the strife’, could be a made-­up name, and Gildemeister, op. cit., p. 460, n. 1, has related the passage to similar instances in Aristophanes Lys. 554 and Pax 992. Whether this anecdote should be related to Themistius himself, given the reference to ‘the outmost borders of Pontus’ (see note ad loc.), remains hard to tell. 142 This sentence stands out as an aphorism. 143 I wonder whether tarʽītā may be a translation of dianoia. 144 D.L. 6.89; Plutarch 10C. 145 The anecdote is reported in Themistius Or. 7, 95AB, in which Socrates is referred to instead. 146 Seneca De ira 3.12.5–7. 147 Literally: ‘desire for honour’, but I suspect that reh.mat šūbh.ā translates philotimia. 148 Gildemeister, op. cit. corrects into l-ʽamā. 149 Sachau, op. cit. corrects into meskinūtā. 150 Literally ‘magistracy’.

262

Notes to page 252

151 Nöldeke, op. cit. corrects into myattrūtā. 152 I am grateful to Anna Marmodoro and Neil McLynn who organised the Themistius Seminar held in Oxford in 2015, where I presented a preliminary paper on the On Virtue, and to Christian Wildberg, who organised a seminar on Cynicism in Princeton in 2016. I am also indebted to the Princeton University Society of Fellows in the Liberal Arts, which provided me with the necessary respite to work at the introduction; and for discussions on different aspects of the text, I would like to express heartfelt thanks to the audiences of the two seminars as well as to Gianfranco Agosti, Alice Borgna, Glen Bowersock, Sebastian Brock, Peter Brown, Maria Conterno, Christopher Jones, Billy Kennedy, Robert Penella, Alexander Petkas, Richard Sorabji, Simon Swain, David Taylor, Irini-Fotini Viltanioti and the anonymous reviewers.

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English–Syriac–Greek Glossary art beginning body change desire desire for honour end example excellence the Good happiness intellect means of safety mind nature pain passion pleasure power reason road sense soul toil virtue what is necessary wisdom

ʼūmānūtā šūrrāyā pagrā šūh.lāpā regtā reh.mat šūbh.ā šūllāmā tah.wītā myattrūtā ·tābtā kahīnūtā hawnā h.ayē reʽyānā kyānā ʼūls.ānā h.ašā nyāh.ā šūlt·ānā mlīlūtā ʼūrh.ā tarʽītā napšā ʽamlā ʼerat·a (ʽ)āhen h.ekmtā

tekhnê arkhê sôma metabolê epithumia1 philotimia telos paradeigma2 aretê3 to agathon eudaimonia nous sôteria nous phusis algêdôn pathêma hêdonê arkhê logos hodos dianoia psukhê ponos aretê epitêdeios sophia

30,7 26,16 32,6 (25,2: gūšmā) 19,19; 36,22 27,20; 42,18 47,3 26,16 18,11; 22,7 17,2 22,24 18,11 32,23; 33,2; 33,17; 44,19 20,22 38,2 26,17 27,3 43,6 26,15 19,19 33,6; 33,17 17,10 46,11 32,6 33,10 17,2 30,11 38,23

English–Syriac–Greek Glossary

269

Notes 1 See note at 27,20. 2 Or perhaps apodeiksis? 3 The text shows variance in the use of ʼera·ta ‘virtue, excellence’, a (relatively uncommon) loanword from Greek, and myattrūtā ‘virtue, excellence’, a genuine Syriac word with overlapping meaning. Whether or not this distinction is meaningful is hard to say, but it seems to me unlikely (so also Brock, ‘Review of M. Conterno, Temistio orientale’, p. 180). Although I have respected the Syriac text by translating the two nouns with ‘virtue’ and ‘excellence’ respectively, there is no apparent difference in their use in the On Virtue (‘excellence’ appears once in the title, several times in the section 28–34, and once in 52), and it is possible that the underlying Greek had aretê in both cases (similarly see Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, s.v.); if this is correct, the second part of the title (‘that is the excellence of the soul’) and the same gloss in the opening paragraph should be understood as additions by the translator. This reconstruction is coherent with the Syriac translation of Themistius’ Or. 22 De amicitia, which normally renders aretê with myattrūtā ‘excellence’ (266A = Syr 49,24; 272A = Syr 56,4 as a plural; though once with ·tābtā ‘the Good’, in 270C = Syr 55,3 and 55,4, where, however, it is a simplification of the Greek original carried out by the translator; the word aretê is instead omitted in 270A, 280A and 280B). For analogous inconsistencies in the rendering of the same term in the Syriac translation of Themistius’ De amicitia see M. Conterno, ‘Retorica pagana e cristianesimo orientale: la traduzione siriaca dell’orazione Peri Philias di Temistio’, Annali di Scienze Religiose 3 (2010), pp. 161–88 and, for instance, eadem, La versione siriaca del ‘Discorso sull’amicizia’ di Temistio: rilettura di uno scritto greco in contesto cristiano, unpublished thesis, University of Padua 2007, pp. 115–18 for the different renderings of the term philia ‘friendship’. Similarly Brock, ‘Review of M. Conterno, Temistio orientale’, p. 180 takes myattrūtā as a translation of aretê, while, conversely, Brancacci, ‘Temistio e il cinicismo’, p. 384 takes it as a translation of iskhus.

Syriac-English Index References are to the page numbers of the Syriac text (indicated in the margins of the translation). ʽābed ʼūrh.ā, traveller, 18,15 (ʽ)āhen, what is necessary, 30,11 ʼakes, he rebuked, 43,9 ʽamlā, toil, 33,10 ʽāqā, adversity, 21,7 ʼardī, chastise, 43,5 ʽazzīzūtā, severity, 43,25 bassīmūtā, benevolence, 29,22 bhīlūtā, quietness, 30,1 būyyānā, discernment, 29,23 dīleh, his own, 28,20 dīnā, lawsuit, 26,7 dūwānā, wretchedness, 19,7 ʽelltā, cause, 39,17 ʼerat·a, virtue, 17,2 gayyāsā, robber, 19,20 gūh.kā, derision, 42,1 gūšmā, body, 25,2 h.ašā, passion, 43,6 hawnā, intellect, 32,23 h.ayē, means of safety, 20,22 h.āylā, strength, 22,16 h.ekmtā, wisdom, 29,23 h.ūssākā, self-­denial, 19,6 īdaʽtā, knowledge, 29,23 kahīnūtā, happiness, 18,11 karyūtā, distress, 23,1 kīnūtā, righteousness, 29,22 knīkūtā, modesty, 28,2 kraz, he pronounced a speech, 25,12 kūwwānā, admonition, 40,21

kyānā, nature, 26,17 makkīkūtā, humility, 29,22 marnītā, anxiety, 28,6 masbrānūtā, opinion, 17,7 masklānā, evil-­doer, 43,3 mlīlūtā, reason, 33,6 myattrūtā, excellence, virtue, 17,2 nakpūtā, modesty, 30,1 napšā, soul, 32,6 nyāh.ā, pleasure, 26,15 pagrā, body, 32,6 pegʽā d-­regšē, concourse of the senses, 27,8 peletā, allegory, 22,11 pqaʽtā, plain (n.), 21,19 pūršānā, difference, 18,8 qirsā, misfortune, 20,15 regtā, desire, 27,20, 42,18 reh.mat šūbh.ā, desire for honour, 47,3 reʽyānā, mind, 38,2 rhit·rūtā, rhetoric, 39,4 rūh.ānā, spiritual being, 28,4 šagūštānūtā, suspicion, 20,14 samā, medicine, 23,15 saybar, he practiced self-­control, 25,3 saybartā, provision, nourishment, 21,20 s.būtā d-(ʼ)nāš, a manʼs own, 29,8 ʽseq, difficult, 21,18 šetqā, silence, 40,21 šgūšyā, tumult, 20,14 šūʽbādā, subjection, 19,6 šūh.lāpā, change, 19,19 šūllāmā, end, 26,16

272

Syriac-English Index

šūlt·ānā, power, 19,19 šūrrāyā, beginning, 26,16

·tūrrāpā, vexation, 21,7 twātā, regret, 19,7

·tābtā, the Good, 22,24 tah.wītā, example, 18,11, 22,7 ·taksā, order, 24,9 tarʽītā, road, 46,11 tʽāšā, labour, 21,7

ʼūls.ānā, pain, suffering, 27,3 ʼūmānūtā, art, 30,7 ʽūmrā, manner of life, 22,1 ʽūqqābā, investigation, 24,21 ʼūrh.ā, road, 17,10

Subject Index Numbers in bold refer to the paragraph of the English translation, while numbers in regular type refer to the pages of the introduction. Achilles, 23, 226, 229n21, 257n56 Adiaphora, 13, 256n42 Aelian, 25n, 257n64 Aesop, 51, 51n, 210, 215, 261n129 Agamemnon, 23, 23n, 226, 257n56 Agesilaus of Sparta, 30 Allegory, 10, 212, 214, 220–21, 224, 227n3, 256n53, 271 Amoebeus, 39, 39n, 210 Animals, 6, 9, 18, 21, 29, 30, 32, 51, 210, 212–13 Antigonus, see Demetrius Poliorcetes Antisthenes, 8, 9n, 24n, 25n, 32, 32n, 34n, 39n, 210–13, 221, 228n8, 228n10, 228n12, 228n14, 255n27, 255n30, 256n42, 257n60, 257n64, 259n86, 259n96, 260n105 Archelaus, 221, 259n96 Heracles, 212, 221, 228n10, 228n12, 256n42, 260n105 Apollodorus, Stoic, 1n Apuleius, 53n, 261n132 Arabia Felix, 34 Aristocrates, 55 Aristophanes, 54n, 261n141 Aristotle, 1, 7, 7n, 8, 12, 12n, 13, 19n, 32, 209–10, 212–14, 222, 228n16, 230n33, 254n21, 255n25, 255n36, 256n37, 256n39, 256n53 Aristotelian logic, 218 Assyrians, 34 Athenaeus, 19n, 39n, 256n53, 260n104 the Athenians, 36, 36n, 52, 53, 260n101 Audience, 209–11, 217–18, 232n53 Augustine, 19n, 256n53 Authorship, 214–15

Body, 6n, 12, 13, 14, 19, 24, 29, 30, 30n, 38, 44, 45, 47, 48, 210, 212, 214, 220, 254n19, 258n72, 268, 271 Boethius, 6n, 12n, 254n19, 256n39 Cambyses, 35, 35n, 229n21, 259n98, 260n101 Cause, 35, 42, 43, 45, 212, 261n126, 271 Celsus, 218 Change, 5, 9, 39, 225, 255n30, 256n53, 268, 271 Chariot, 2, 6, 7, 35, 35n, 229n21, 259n100 Christianity, 232n53 Chronology, 215–25 Chrysippus, 8, 14n, 31n, 256n43, 258n78 Cicero, 4n, 13n, 18n, 19n, 34n, 254n11, 256n42, 256n51, 256n53, 259n93 Citharist, 11, 39, 55, 210, 229n21 Cleanthes, 8, 13, 19n, 31, 31n, 210, 256n53, 258n78–79 Constantinople, 215, 217–19, 224, 230n27, 231n35, 231n42 Constantius, Emperor, 218, 231n35, 231n37 Crates, 1n, 8, 8n, 14, 30, 30n, 47, 53, 55, 210–12, 224, 255n27, 258n72 Cynic Epistles, 211, 221 Cynicism, 1n, 13n, 25n, 32n, 210–25, 228n10, 228n25–26, 231n42, 256n42, 257n64, 258n72 as a philosophical school, 211–12, 216–17, 219–21 Julian’s ‘religious’ Cynicism, 220–21 Socratic origins of, 211–12, 257n64 superiority of, 211–12 Desire, 4, 11, 12, 19, 19n, 31, 49, 56n, 214, 256n53, 261n147, 268, 271

274

Subject Index

Demetrius Poliorcetes, 26, 26n, 258n65 Dio Chrysostom, 1n, 5n, 32n, 34n, 209, 211, 220–21, 227n3, 253n5, 254n15, 258n82, 259n92–93, 259n96 Diogenes of Sinope, 1n, 8, 8n, 14, 19n, 24n, 25n, 31, 48, 52, 210–12, 219, 222, 224, 228n13, 255n27, 256n52, 257n60, 257n64 Diogenes Laertius, 1n, 13n, 18n, 19n, 24n, 25n, 26n, 27n, 30n, 31n, 32n, 39n, 47n, 53n, 55n, 212, 228n9–10, 228n12, 253n5, 256n42, 256n51–52, 257n60, 257n64, 258n65, 258n67, 258n72, 258n78, 259n86, 260n105, 261n123, 261n132, 261n144 Dog, 29, 31, 52, 210 Dream, 27

Heraclitus, 46, 231n45, 226, 210 Heraclius, Cynic, 217–20, 230n34, 231n37 Herodotus, 34n, 46n, 259n94, 260n119 Himerius, 214 Homer, 23, 23n, 229n21, 257n56

the Earth, 42 Egyptians, 34 Ephesians, 46 Ephesus, 46, 218 Epictetus, 24n, 211, 257n60 Epicureanism, 213–14 hostility to, 213–14 Epicurus, 4, 4n, 12, 18n, 19n, 212–14, 254n11, 256n48, 257n53 Ethopoeia, 209–10 Eunapius, 218, 230n32, 231n37 Evil, 11, 13, 18, 19n, 38, 44, 52, 256n52 Excellence, see Virtue

Knowledge, 1n, 11, 12, 15, 25–26, 25n, 32n, 34, 213–14, 225, 253n4, 257n64, 259n86, 271

Frank criticism, 222, 224 Glaucus of Carystus, 30, 30n, 258n72 God or gods, 11, 33n, 38, 219-21, 225, 232n53 the Good, 1n, 11, 11n, 12, 13, 17, 23, 25n, 27, 35, 212, 214, 253n4, 255n33, 255n35, 257n64, 268, 272 Gregory of Nazianzus, 211, 217, 229n25 Happiness, 1n, 2, 4n, 9n, 10, 13, 41, 43, 44, 210, 212–13, 224, 254n11, 255n30, 268, 271 Heracles, 1n, 2n, 4n, 13n, 32, 32n, 39n, 44n, 220–21, 227n3, 231n40, 253n5–6, 254n11, 258n82, 260n15

Inn, 4–7, 6n, 254n18 Jovian, Emperor, 216, 224 Julian, Emperor, 1n, 2n, 9n, 15n, 19n, 30n, 33n, 34n, 53n, 209, 211, 213–4, 216–24, 229n25, 229n26, 230n27, 230n30, 230n31–34, 231n37, 231n42, 231n47, 253n5–6, 255n29, 256n45, 256n53, 258n72, 259n90, 259n92–93, 259n96, 261n132 Letter to Themistius, 214, 218, 228n17, 230n27, 230n31, 231n47

Lawsuit, 16, 210, 271 Libanius, 218, 226, 230n27 Lucian, 1n, 30n, 211, 225, 227n3, 232n50, 252n5, 258n72 the Lydians, 5, 5n, 254n12 Lysimachus, 54, 54n, 210–11, 261n141 Man, 6, 10, 12, 13, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 31n, 32, 33, 34, 42, 44, 46, 48, 55, 212, 214 Manuscripts, 225–26, 233 Maximus of Ephesus, 218, 230n32 Maximus of Tyre, 16n, 209, 211, 256n47 Maximus the Cynic, 217–18, 229n26, 230n30, 230n34, 231n43 Medicine, 2, 12, 12n, 15, 23, 48, 51, 210, 214, 216, 222–23, 256n37, 271 Milo, 15, 15n, 256n46 Money, 5–7, 7n, 9, 13,18n, 38n, 49, 56, 254n21, 256n52, 260n103 Moon, 33, 42 Myth, its use outside didactic settings, 219 Necessary, what it necessary, 25, 42, 268, 271 Nero, 35, 35n, 36n, 210, 229n21, 259n99–100, 260n101

Subject Index

275

Nicodromus, 55 Nymphidianus, 218

Proêgmena, 13, 13n, 212, 256n42 Prometheus, 32, 32n, 258n82

Olympia, 15 Own, one’s own, 23, 24, 257n60, 271

to Rebuke, 48, 51, 55, 222, 224 Religious plurality, 216–17, 229n24 Rhetoric, or Rhetorician, 1n, 7, 7n, 43, 210–11, 214–15, 218, 227n3, 253n5, 271 Road, 1–10, 1n, 2n, 4n, 5n, 6n, 9n, 25n, 16, 32, 209–10, 212–17, 219–25, 227n3, 228n7, 231n47, 253n4–5, 254n8, 254n11, 254n13, 254n20, 255n29–30, 257n64, 268, 272 Robbers, 5, 7, 9, 24, 25 the Romans, 35, 54

Pan, 219 Persians, 34, 34n, 46n, 226, 259n94, 260n119 Philosopher, 2, 28, 33n, 47–52, 54–56, 54n, 209, 211, 217–24, 230n30, 231n42, 231n47, 257n64, 258n65, 258n80, 259n87, 261n141 Philosophy, 1, 10, 12, 15,15n, 16, 45 divided into three parts, 15, 209–10, 223 in comparison with medicine, 210, 216, 222 Photius, 30n, 258n72 Plato, 1, 1n, 5n, 6n, 8n, 9n, 11n, 13, 18n, 25n, 31n, 32, 33n, 43n, 44n, 45n, 51n, 52, 52n, 55, 209–10, 212–13, 222, 224, 228n16, 229n21, 253n4, 254n14, 254n19, 255n26, 255n31, 255n33, 255n36, 256n51, 257n63–64, 258n77, 259n88, 260n112, 260n117–18, 261n128, 262n131 Pleasure, 4, 12, 15, 17–19, 19n, 24, 37, 40, 41, 45, 46, 47, 210–12, 214, 223, 256n53, 268, 271 Plutarch, 1n, 14n, 30n, 39n, 46n, 51n, 55n, 209, 211, 214, 224–26, 232n53, 253n5, 256n43, 258n65, 258n72, 260n114, 261n122, 261n128, 261n144 Pontus, 54, 54n, 215, 229n21, 261n141 Porphyry, 54n, 230n33, 261n141 Poverty, 37–40, 38n, 56, 211–12, 260n103 Power, 5, 5n, 9, 24n, 27, 30, 48, 50, 54n, 56, 211, 220, 222, 254n16, 257n60, 261n141, 268, 272 Ps.-Diogenes, 1n, 8n, 9n, 213, 228n9, 231n44, 253n5, 255n27, 255n30 Ps.-Plutarch, Life of Crates, 221, 224, 258n72

Sallustius, 218, 230n28 Seneca, 26n, 55n, 258n65, 261n146 Sense, 55, 268 Senses, 18, 33, 41, 271 Shortcut, 1n, 210, 212, 219–21, 223, 253n5 Sirens, 4 Sky, 9, 33, 33n Socrates, 8, 8n, 25n, 34, 36, 36n, 55, 55n, 210, 212, 222, 255n27, 257n64, 260n101, 261n145 Sopater of Apamea, 30n, 258n72 Soul, 1, 6n, 11, 13, 14, 24n, 29, 30, 48, 50, 51, 52, 210, 212, 216, 222, 253n1, 254n19, 257n60, 268, 271 Spiritual beings, 21, 271 Stars, 33, 42 Stilpo of Megara, 26, 26n, 258n65 Stobaeus, 7n, 13n, 254n21, 256n42 Stoics, 8, 8n, 13, 13n, 14n, 19n, 31n, 54n, 210, 212, 221–23, 228n10, 231n47, 253n5, 255n27–28, 256n42–43, 256n53, 258n78, 261n141 Suetonius, 35n, 259n100 Sun, 33, 42 Syriac translation, 225–27 Editing of the, 225–27 Faithfulness to the Greek, 225–27 Teacher, 11, 18, 209, 213–14 Themistius’ teacher of Julian, 218 Theatre, 39, 51 Toil, 1, 9, 32, 56, 268, 271 Traveller, 3, 5–7, 9, 209, 219, 221, 271

276

Subject Index

Vexation, 7, 37, 40, 211, 272 Virtue, (and Excellence), 1, 1n, 9, 9n, 12–15, 13n, 19, 19n, 24n, 25n, 26–31, 28n, 31n, 34, 37, 39–44, 39n, 44n, 49, 52, 52n, 210–14, 219–20, 224, 228n9–12, 253n1–2, 253n5, 255n30, 256n42, 256n53, 257n60, 257n64, 258n68, 258n77, 260n105, 260n115, 261n130, 268, 269n3, 271 as the only Good, 212–13

Wisdom, 1, 7, 13, 18, 25, 30, 34, 38, 39, 42, 43, 56, 209, 211–13, 222, 257n64, 268, 271 Xenophon, 1n, 4n, 44n, 221, 227n3, 253n5, 254n11, 260n15 Xerxes, 34, 34n, 210, 226, 229n21, 259n93 Zeno, 8, 8n, 13, 13n, 30n, 39n, 210, 228n10, 255n27, 256n42, 258n72, 260n104 Zeus, 219, 223, 225