Themistius: On Aristotle On the Soul 9781472552440, 9780715626597

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Themistius: On Aristotle On the Soul
 9781472552440, 9780715626597

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To the memory of Charles Schmitt

Conventions and Abbreviations Introduction and Notes Aristotelian works are abbreviated in the form standard in this series; see Wildberg, Philoponus: Against Aristotle on the Eternity of The World, 34-5. Browne = G. Browne, ‘Ad Themistium Arabum’, Illinois Classical Studies 11, 1986, 223-45. CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca; for the abbreviated titles used for editions of the Greek commentators, and for bibliographical details, see Wildberg, 12-15. DK = H. Diels (ed.), rev. W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., Berlin 1952. FHS&G = W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus of Eresus: sources for his life, writings, thought, and influence, 2 vols., Leiden 1992, Philosophia Antiqua 54: 1-2. LS = A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., Cambridge 1987. LSJ = H. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed., Oxford 1940. SA = Supplementum Aristotelicum; for the abbreviated titles used for editions and bibliographical details, see Wildberg, 15. SVF = H. von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig 1903-1905; reprinted Stuttgart 1964. TGAC = R.B. Todd (with F.M. Schroeder), Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, Toronto 1990, Mediaeval Sources in Translation 33. The Translation CAG page and line numbers are given in bold type at the beginning of every paragraph and these are coupled with Bekker line numbers (in parentheses, also in bold type) of Aristotle’s de Anima when Themistius is paraphrasing the text; CAG numbers stand alone when Themistius presents a more expansive digression. CAG page breaks are given in square brackets, in bold, within the text. Footnotes in the translation are continuously numbered in the paraphrase of each chapter of the de Anima. Cross-references will be signalled as ‘1.1, n. 1’; those within a chapter will not be signalled.


Conventions and Abbreviations

[] = Supplement to the English translation for which there is no corresponding equivalent in the Greek text. This does not usually apply to naturally understood terms (e.g. ‘object’, ‘capacity’). Readings marked [] in Heinze’s Greek text are left untranslated; further deletions are noted ad loc. and also not translated. = Supplement to the Greek text by emendation; all those subsequent to Heinze’s edition are identified and discussed in the notes. () = Used for punctuation, or to indicate a digression from the main exposition.

Introduction The paraphrase by Themistius (A.D. c. 317 – c. 388)1 of Aristotle’s de Anima is the most important and the most influential of this commentator’s works of Aristotelian exegesis. It offers successive paraphrases of each of the three books of the de Anima, and although these are subdivided into seven logoi or ‘discussions’ in many manuscripts, this was almost certainly done by Byzantine scholars rather than by Themistius himself.2 There is no reason to think that he originally gave a set of seven lectures on the work.3 These logoi are omitted in several Greek manuscripts, and, although retained in Heinze’s edition, have been omitted from the present translation. 1. Themistius and his predecessors Themistius’ paraphrase is the earliest extant commentary on the de Anima surviving from antiquity.4 It was preceded by a major commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200), but this no longer survives, and it is unclear whether Themistius made any use of it.5 What is, however, still extant is Alexander’s important essay in the reconstruction of Aristotelian psychology, also entitled de Anima,6 a treatise that Themistius knew well, and clearly used in his paraphrase.7 1 For a general introduction to Themistius, and his philosophical writings, with further secondary literature, see TGAC, 31-4. In an article to appear in Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum, vol. VIII, I shall offer another survey and deal with the transmission and influence of the Themistian corpus, particularly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 2 They are to be found in the description of the paraphrase in the tenth-century Byzantine lexicon, the Suda (see Downey et al., vol. 2, 135,21-2), but none of the manuscripts identify a ‘first logos’. I suspect that this division was suggested by Themistius’ use of the expression ‘make a new beginning’ at in DA 38,34-5; 58,19, and 98,9, all of which correspond to the termination of the second, third, and fifth logoi. 3 As we shall see in section 3 below, Themistius’ paraphrastic method does not have any rigid formality, and so it is unlikely that he would himself have imposed any such structure. 4 On the exegesis of the de Anima in antiquity see Moraux (1978). 5 On Themistius’ knowledge of this commentary see 1.1, n. 27 and 2.7, n. 14. On his knowledge of Alexander’s (extant) commentary on the de Sensu see 2.11, n. 2. At in An. Post. 1,2-7 (see below) Themistius notes that his paraphrases were not designed to compete with the major commentaries of his predecessors. 6 On it and other Alexandrian works on psychology see Sharples (1987), 1186 and 1202-14. See also Sharples (1992) and (1994) for annotated translations of several Alexandrian quaestiones dealing with Aristotle’s de Anima. 7 The Index of Passages will show the extent to which this work is relevant to Themistius’ paraphrase, but for its specific influence see in particular the following notes: 2.1, n. 9; 2.6, n. 2; 2.11, nn. 19 and 21; 3.2, n. 13; 3.3, nn. 27 and 29.



Themistius’ other predecessors in the exegesis of the de Anima were Neoplatonists. He in fact criticises Porphyry (A.D. 232-309) for his response to some Aristotelian texts in the paraphrase of Book One.8 He may also have been aware of the works of Plotinus (A.D. 205-269/70), in which the major themes of Aristotelian psychology are often reflected, since there is at least some Plotinian language in Themistius’ account of the Aristotelian noetic.9 But any such Neoplatonic elements are not overtly emphasised, and are vastly outweighed by discussions of Platonic texts, notably from the Timaeus.10 If these sometimes indicate an attempt to harmonize Plato with Aristotle,11 this programme is carried out far less elaborately and emphatically than in the later Neoplatonic commentators.12 2. The method of paraphrasing Themistius ran his own philosophical school at Constantinople between about 345 and 355, and there are indications that the paraphrase of the de Anima may have been used in his teaching,13 and been part of an extended course on Aristotle in which other works had already been covered.14 Themistius may not have pioneered the paraphrastic method,15 but he was self-conscious about developing it for instructional purposes. In an oration of 377 or 378 he recalled that in his youth he had ‘prepared some compositions (sungrammata) in which I set down and stored the legacy that I received from my elders. These compositions record nothing that is uniquely mine or anyone else’s, but try to clarify Aristotle’s meaning (nous), and to extract from it the expressions in which he encased and 8


See with accompanying notes in DA 6,11-14; 16,19-25; 18,19-20; 25,33-6. See also 3.5, n.

9 See TGAC, p. 34, n. 15; Ballériaux (1989) has presented the most emphatic case for Plotinian influence. See n. 55 below, and 3.4, n. 1. 10 See in DA 10,28-11,18; 19,17-24,12 (especially 19,17-20); 106.15-29. For other Platonic passages dealt with by Themistius see the Index of Passages. Photius, the ninth-century Byzantine scholar, includes in a list of Themistian works (at Bibl. Cod. 74, Henry [1959]) exêgetikoi ponoi eis ta Platônika (‘exercises in interpretation on Platonic topics’). He may be referring to digressions within commentaries, although for an alternative view see Vanderspoel. 11 Notably at 106,29-107,7. But a later Neoplatonic commentator, Simplicius, would remark that Themistius mostly adhered to Aristotle’s views; see in Cael. 69,9-10. 12 Indeed, as Prof. Sorabji has suggested to me, the claim that genera are thoughts (in DA 3,32) can be seen as anti-Platonic; see further 1.1, n. 28. 13 in DA 39,23 is the clearest evidence of this. Also, cf. 46,27-8 on the virtues of revision (cf. 40,4-5), suggestive of a pedagogical context. skholê at 32,23, and possibly 108,36 too, may mean ‘lecture’. 14 See in particular the references to the Physics (in DA 8,11; 8,24; 14,33-5; 16,27-9; 39,5-6; 41,29-30; 43,35; 50,28), and Categories (2,35; 58,13-14; 109,6), and indirect references to Posterior Analytics (95,9-19) and Metaphysics 12 (100,4-10; see 3.5, n. 9; 3.7, n. 12). Cf. also 1.1 n. 39. 15 See Blumenthal (1979a), 175, n. 28, and Ballériaux (1989), 199 with n. 1. The word paraphrasis does not appear in any Themistian text, but was used of his commentaries in antiquity; see Simplicius, in Cael. 188,30.



fenced it, without offering a survey for the completely uninitiated. These compositions, I thought, would never be useful to anyone else, nor be serious [scholarship]. I knew that they were not arranged elaborately and forcefully, but were a reminder and depository only for myself of what I had read, so that if ever something escaped my memory, I could withdraw it as though from a storehouse16 that was secure and unassailed by any lapse of memory.’17 This personal programme of paraphrasing yielded to one with wider goals. These are described to an anonymous dedicatee in the proem to the paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics when Themistius identifies a procedure for reviewing Aristotelian works, presumably used by his students: ‘I thought that for me to construct explications (exêgêseis) of Aristotle’s books in succession to so many great men was little short of futile ambition. Not much can be found that my predecessors omitted, and to attempt to construct exhaustive commentaries (pragmateiai)18 for the sake of some minor interventions would be like someone wanting to restructure the Athena of Pheidias because he thought that he could improve the tassle on her sandal.19 However, to extract the intentions of what is written in his books, and report it quickly in line with the conciseness of the Philosopher, as best I could, seemed both novel and quite beneficial. For I believed that revision by such a method would be convenient for those who had studied Aristotle’s [works] once, but who were unable to take them up again because of the length of the [major] commentaries (hupomnêmata).’20 To this general rationale Themistius adds a more precise account of his procedure with reference to the Posterior Analytics: ‘Many of Aristotle’s books seem designed to be cryptic,21 especially those before us, first, because of his usual brevity of speech (brakhulogia),22 but also because the sequence of the main sections is not separately identified. For this reason you must excuse me if I appear to interpret some matters at rather great length (it was impossible to state them more clearly in an equivalent number [of words]), and with others to make readjustments and rearrange16 tamieion; cf. Themistius, in DA 92,30 where the capacity of imagination is described as a storehouse of sense-impressions. 17 Or. 23 (89,20-90,5 Downey-Norman). In making this translation and the next, I have been greatly helped by a version prepared by my former student, Dr David Mirhady. 18 This is the term that Themistius uses to describe his own paraphrase at in DA 1,3 and 8,32; it seems to be the generic term for a commentary. 19 This respectful attitude does not prevent Themistius from sharply criticizing Alexander by name (unusual in ancient polemics) at in DA 76,16-21 and 120,17-21. In his critique of Alexander’s identification of the active intellect with the Aristotelian god, Themistius was, however, more circumspectly impersonal, as is typical of ancient polemics; see in DA 102,30-103,19. 20 in An. Post. 1,2-12. 21 eis epikrupsin memêkhanêsthai (in An. Post. 1,17). Elucidation (ekkalupsai) (literally ‘unveiling’) is the first element in exegesis that Themistius identifies at in DA 1,4. 22 This is often noted by ancient Aristotelian commentators. See, for example, Simplicius, in Phys. 112,30 and 1122,26.



ments (metatithenai) so that each of the main sections can be clearly demarcated.23 Also, if I have summarized some items more concisely, that does not merit complaint. It was not worth my spending time on matters that received specialized investigation without their particularly focusing on the theory of demonstration, since my intention was to devise an easy way of acquiring useful knowledge.’24 The exegesis identified in this text essentially represents the classic notion of paraphrasis, as canonically defined by Quintilian.25 Themistius uses it throughout the bulk of his commentaries, and in doing so speaks in the voice of Aristotle, as it were, rather than in that of a detached commentator. 3. The method in the paraphrase of the de Anima The paraphrase of the de Anima represents a somewhat more ambitious project than that undertaken for the Posterior Analytics, probably because of the nature of the treatise rather than any evolution in Themistius’ exegetical method.26 At the outset (in DA 1,2-5) he says that his account of the work will involve four types of exegesis, but these are unfortunately described in generic terms that cannot be easily attached to the content of the paraphrase, and may well refer to overlapping procedures. Also, this terminology is not exploited in presenting material elsewhere in the paraphrase. He speaks first of ‘elucidation’ (ekkaluptein), a process that probably refers to the kind of paraphrasing descibed in the texts quoted above: i.e. the restatement, enlargement and rearrangement of texts, with some omissions of repetitive material, and the explication of terminology by glosses or substitutions.27 He next says that his account will involve a process that seems best identified as the ‘reconstruction’ (sunistasthai) of 23 cf. in DA 29,22-3 for a case where such rearrangements are eschewed in favour of presenting a text in its original order. Note also Simplicius, in Cat. 1,9-10 where Themistius’ goal (in his lost commentary on the Categories) is said to have been that of rearranging the text to make it clearer. 24 in An. Post. 1,16-2,4. Themistius’ modest goals in this paraphrase seem to have been realized; see the assessment by Moraux (1979), 3-4. 25 See Inst. 1.9.2-3 and 10.5.4-5. His definitions reflect the pedagogical tradition of the schools of rhetoric, and particularly apply to the paraphrasing of poetry. But his underlying idea, that paraphrasis is not interpretatio in the sense of mere restatement, is applicable to Themistius too. 26 cf. in DA 1,5-10 for Themistius’ description of the uniqueness of the de Anima. See Ballériaux (1989), 200-1 on the length of the in DA in comparison with that of the in An. Post. 27 This category is of particular interest, as it can lead to speculation about readings in Themistius’ manuscript. Thus at 43,14 he substitutes prisis (‘sawing’) for Aristotle’s tmêsis (‘cutting’) at 412b28, and both Ross and Siwek attribute it to his manuscript. I am not so sure, when there are a number of similar substitutions: e.g. 5,30 logikôs for dialektikôs (403a2); 37,11 apolipousês for exelthousês (411b8); 38,18 thaumaston for atopon (411b23); 38,35 eirêtai hikanôs for eirêsthô (412a2); 63,34 apopallêtai for apôsthêi (419b27); 70,2 hudati



ideas, by which he might be pointing to places where he presents Aristotelian ideas more schematically than in the text itself.28 Thirdly, he uses the verb ephisthanai (‘analyse’) to refer to another procedure, but this we can be fairly sure involves the presentation of solutions (luseis) to problems (aporiai).29 He finally mentions ‘elaboration’ (exergazesthai), a term that could apply to any discussion that goes significantly beyond a repetition of the Aristotelian text.30 But if the term has any specific reference, it could be to the lengthy reconstruction of the Aristotelian theory of the intellect in the paraphrase of DA 3.5, where a paraphrase is supplemented by a discussion of a set of interrelated topics and problems.31 ‘Elaboration’ could also cover some of the discussions of the Timaeus,32 or of material from Xenocrates, Andronicus of Rhodes, and Porphyry.33 In the present translation texts from the de Anima can usually be directly juxtaposed with a Themistian response (indicated at the beginning of every paragraph by a CAG page and line number, which corresponds to the traditional Bekker numbers of Aristotle’s texts); wider digressions are signposted by single CAG numbers at the beginning of separate paragraphs (without corresponding Bekker numbers), or under separate headings. The reader with a translation of the de Anima to hand will thus easily see how far Themistius has gone in transforming any given text; notes to the translation will also offer further guidance. Whatever Themistius is referring to in his tantalizingly brief account of his paraphrastic method at in DA 1.2-5, he is clearly not pursuing any formally defined exegetical –––––– for hugrôi (422a4). Rather than attribute any of these to Themistius’ manuscript, we might in the first instance think of him entering synonyms into his manuscript, or of using one already so glossed. See also 2.4, n. 13 below. In several cases, of course, he includes the Aristotelian original with the gloss: e.g. 24,14 dedôkuia de euthunas (407b29) kai exêtasmenê; 64,11 psathurou (419b35)  kai eudiairetou; 73,2 hoion humena (423a3) ê leptên othonên; 85,13-14 kekhôrismenois (426b17)  ê diestêkuiais allêlôn. 28 At 1,4 the use of sunistasthai with the dative case is not, as far as I can see, paralleled in philosophical texts. I am interpreting it from Themistius’ use of the related noun sustasis at 32,24 to describe Andronicus’ treatment of Xenocrates’ theory of the soul. Here it clearly identifies the way that Andronicus restated, or reconstructed, that theory, and so at 1,4 it could similarly refer to ‘reconstructions’, such as 30,24-8 (the distinction between thinking and discursive thinking), or at 75,28-76,2, where arguments about touch are schematized. (At 30,3 sustasis is used in another sense to mean ‘confirmation’, but that seems inappropriate to these other contexts). 29 I base this on the use of the cognate noun epistasis at 108,10, where it has this sense of a transitional form of reasoning leading to a solution of a problem (cf. Aristotle, Physics 196a36). Literally, it means ‘halting’, and thus an ‘attentive pondering’, over something; see LSJ, epistasis II.2. 30 The noun exergasia is contrasted with hupotupôsis (‘sketch’, ‘outline’) at Plotinus, 6.3 [44].7.22. 31 See 3.5, n.1 32 See n. 10 33 The Platonic tradition, it might be noted, is the focus of Themistius’ historical scholarship. He adds nothing, for example, to the doxography of Presocratic thought in his paraphrase of de Anima 1.2.



programme.34 The length and complexity of his response to a text is arbitrarily dictated by what he identifies as its inherent interest or difficulty, or its value as a basis for criticism, or reconstruction, rather than by any externally imposed structure for presentation. Themistius inevitably repeats some of the Aristotelian text that he is paraphrasing, but I have not tried to identify this language separately, as, for example, did Federigo Bonaventura (1555-1602) in his Latin translation of the paraphrase of DA 3.4-13.35 He put Aristotle’s text in bold-face, Themistius’ in italics. But such a distinction is not always easily drawn, and would need considerable supporting explanation, particularly where the paraphrase radically restructures an Aristotelian text. Also, a paraphrase, even by its modest ancient criteria (cf. n. 25), is not a set of linked quotations, but an independent restatement of a text, and in a modern translation should be allowed to stand as such. I have thus marked quotations only where Themistius himself indicates, or implies, that he is quoting from Aristotle. It is rather easier to define Themistian method than to evaluate its results in general terms. One modern scholar has noted that ‘[Themistius] looks closely at each section as he comes to it, and tries to make sense of it by relating it to other sections on a selective basis. But at each point we have only a partial account, and the parts do not add up to a coherent whole.’36 This verdict is to some extent fair,37 but it is worth stressing that there are some significant, if not empatically identified, connections between the different parts of this commentary. Thus in the paraphrase of Book One a number of texts are clearly preparing the way for the later treatment of the intellect in the paraphrase of Book Three.38 Also, Themistius was not trying to write the kind of magisterial synthesis that Alexander achieved in his de Anima, but was aiming at clarity and 34 For that kind of enterprise we need to look to later Neoplatonic commentators on both Plato and Aristotle who used formalized procedures for exposition and exegsis, and for the analysis of Aristotelian treatises. Among several modern studies of this material we can cite Festugière and Westerink. 35 Bonaventura’s translation was published posthumously in his Opuscula (Urbino 1627). 36 Huby (1991), 142, a judgment based on Themistius’ discussion of the intellect but applicable to the whole paraphrase. As a comment on the former, it should certainly be noted by those who would see the Themistian noetic as offering a systematically Neoplatonic reconstruction of the Aristotelian noetic. 37 The treatment of the intellect at 100,16-109,3 is certainly a rather episodic discussion, and its famous use of the model of illumination to explain the role of the active intellect at 103,32-4 could have benefited from more systematic development. Another telling example is Themistius’ treatment of the role of the heart in relation to sense-perception; see 2.8, n. 7 and 2.11, n. 20. Unlike Alexander (DA 94,7-100,17) he never pulls together the references to this organ in the de Anima (on which see Tracy [1983], 325-8) to create a coherent account of its status, despite his efforts to use the concept of pneuma as the single locus of the senses (see especially 64,17-18 with 2.8, n. 7, and 86,28-87,21). For other relevant Themistian passages see, with accompanying notes, in DA 27,25-8; 76,20-1; 120,5-7; 121,7-9. 38 See, with the accompanying notes, 1,22-3; 20,30-21,3; 23,3-6; 25,33-27,7; 29,22-31,1; from Book Two see 43,27-30; 49,4-6; 49,8-10.



continuity in an elementary exposition.39 Thus R.D. Hicks is perhaps unjust in remarking of one discussion that ‘Themistius characteristically passes over expressions which occasion great difficulty’.40 Such detailed analysis was more the task of those major commentaries with which Themistius was not trying to compete. We should, then, judge Themistius, as far as possible, by his own standards, and look for the virtues he shows in rationalizing difficult texts. We can acknowledge the way that he augments Aristotle’s sensitivity to the use and abuse of terminology,41 and even admire his penchant for metaphor.42 He also knew that while interpretation had to be faithful to the text, there was also room for reconstructing underlying ideas,43 and in his celebrated discussion of the intellect we see him at his most adventurous, and also of course his most controversial. Arguably this Themistian paraphrase can be legitimately compared to any elementary presentation of the de Anima. Certainly in the Renaissance Themistius’ paraphrases were the most widely published version of any of the ancient commentaries on Aristotle. The present work can hardly hope to restore that status, but it may show that this record of his encounter with the de Anima, while a document in the history of Aristotelianism, still has some abiding philosophical interest. 4. The translation and notes This is the second complete vernacular translation of this work; it has been preceded by a careful Italian version by Vittore de Falco (1965). There were two medieval translations, one into Arabic by Ish aq ibn H unain (d. 910) in the ninth century, another into Latin by William of Moerbeke (c. 1215–c. 1286) in the thirteenth century.44 The latter followed a method of word-forword translation against which in the late fifteenth century the Venetian humanist Ermolao Barbaro (1454-1493) reacted strongly in advocating a freer method of translation into more idiomatic classical Latin.45 The 39 Clarity is the reason given at 14,35 for quoting from Aristotle’s Physics, and at 29,22-3 a direct quotation from Aristotle is justified because in the case in question no rearrangements of the text are necessary for clarification. We can also note the numerous cross-references that Themistius introduces to create an added coherence, although these are typical of scholastic exposition in late antiquity; see Rubincam. 40 Hicks, 440; my italics. I should, however, note that Hicks’ commentary is remarkable for its extensive and critical use of Themistius and other Greek commentators, and has been invaluable in preparing the present work. His achievement is all the more remarkable for mostly having been accomplished after he became blind in 1900. 41 See, for example, in DA 20,24-34; 44,35-44,2; 52,16-18; 54,3-12; 56,1-3; 88,14-18. On ordinary usage (koinê sunêtheia) see 45,13-15. Cf. also 3.13, n. 2. 42 This is particularly evident in his use of exotic vocabulary from Platonic dialogues; this will be identified in notes and in the Greek-English Index. 43 See, for example, 1.2, n. 34. 44 See the editions by Lyons and Verbeke respectively. See also 3.3, n. 25. 45 This is argued most fully in one of his dedicatory letters, that to the translation of the



present translation aims to avoid the extremes of either a Moerbeke or a Barbaro, and while ideally it should be readable as well as accurate, the aim of making this work accessible, and serviceable, may at times conflict with that goal. In the translation of terminology, the English-Greek Glossary and Greek-English Index, and occasional notes, will explain and indicate reasons for choices and variations.46 Some of the choices might be noted here. Transliteration has been used for the notoriously difficult hexis and entelekheia, but justifiably since both these terms are defined by Themistius himself.47 The activities of the soul are called ‘capacities’, both when referred to by adjectives (aisthêtikon etc.) with a suffix carrying that implication, and when the term dunamis is used of them. In most cases this capacity is a potentiality for an activity, a notion that should be clearer in this translation than were the traditional term ‘faculty’ used. Some of Aristotle’s varied language for thinking is as much a challenge for the modern translator as it was for Themistius.48 The distinction between noein and theôrein (a versatile verb that has a strong association with theoretical reasoning, and thus with the thinking that is particularly associated with the intellect) has been maintained by ‘think’ and the traditional, but still serviceable, ‘contemplate’. In most cases the verb dianoeisthai can be rendered ‘think discursively’, which points sometimes to its association with practical reasoning, other times to a contrast with noein. thumos and thumousthai are ‘spirit’ and ‘show spirit’. ‘Affection’ for pathos maintains an important link with paskhein (‘be affected’). kinein and kinêsis are always translated as ‘cause movement’ and ‘movement’, even where the reference is to a change in colour;49 for the intransitive or passive kineisthai, ‘move’ or be moved’ is used as appropriate. Finally, the verbal noun ‘willing’ has been used for boulêsis.

–––––– paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics, first published with his translations of the other Themistian paraphrases at Treviso in 1481, and often reprinted over the next century. For a modern edition of the letter see Branca, vol. 1, 7-10. Barbaro’s method had its critics in the Renaissance, as I shall show in the forthcoming article referred to in n. 1 above. 46 Here I note that I have sometimes maintained consistency at the expense of natural idiom in order to keep less significant vocabulary identifiably distinct, particularly for secondary (i.e. non-technical) terms in methodology and epistemology: e.g. ‘consider’ (episkopein); ‘grasp’ (katalambanein); ‘inquire into’ (epizêtein, zêtein); ‘investigate’ (episkeptesthai); ‘posit’ (tithesthai) (cf. Barnes et al. [1991], 24); ‘assume’ (hupotithesthai); ‘reflect’ (phrontizein); and ‘understand’ (labein) (although often it just means ‘take [to be the case]’. ‘Opine’ (doxazein) is needed to keep it separate from ‘believe’ (hupolambanein); see Themistius at 90,18-20 below. ‘Think’ and ‘believe’ are used interchangeably for their more informal verbs dokein, oiesthai, and nomizein. Finally, I should note that I have made no distinction between antilambanesthai and aisthanesthai, and have translated both as ‘perceive’; these verbs, and their cognate forms, are interchangeable (see Todd [1974], 208-9). 47 in DA 39,16-24 should suffice to clarify the use of both terms. 48 in DA 88,14-18. 49 in DA 18,2.



Another problem in translating this author has been coping with pleonasm, a common feature of later ancient prose, and often attributed to the influence of rhetoric on education.50 At times it seems a gratuitous stylistic tic,51 but can often be explained as a pedagogical device, particularly when used to introduce synonyms for Aristotelian terms.52 The notes to the translation do not duplicate material readily available in modern editions of the de Anima. Themistius often leaves the Aristotelian text where it stands, and to comment on it in any detail would involve opening up issues in the interpretation of that text rather than of any exegesis of it. Special attention is given to Themistius’ major Peripatetic source, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ de Anima, but Themistius’ views are not compared and contrasted in detail with those of later ancient commentators, something, however, often done in editions and studies that will be cited. The section of the paraphrase that presents the greatest problems of interpretation, and the most controversy, is that dealing with Aristotle’s account of intellection in DA 3.4-8, and in particular the paraphrase of 3.5. My notes on this material are much less detailed than in an earlier publication.53 This is partly to avoid repetition, and partly because that translation was prepared for a somewhat different audience. Even so, a major reason for my translating the whole of this paraphrase has been to make the Themistian noetic accessible in its fullest immediate context, in the hope that this might facilitate further study of a topic on which perhaps unnecessarily dogmatic positions have been reached on the basis of selective evidence. The study of the entire paraphrase of the de Anima might also lead to more systematic attention being given Themistius’ other paraphrases, particularly his discussion of the Aristotelian god in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (L), a work surviving only in Arabic and Hebrew. Pinès has recently shown the parallels between the conception of 50 See Whittaker (1987), 89-94, and (1989), for a study of an analogous use of philosophical source material (in this case Platonic) by Alcinous. Themistian pleonasm ranges from minor phenomena typical of later Greek prose such as the redundancies in adverbs and particles like au palin, takha isôs, and dia touto oun, to oddities like prôton arkhômetha (4,28), or prôta stoikheia (32,31). 51 For example: dia thixeôs kai haphês (21,31), zei  kai anoidainei (27,16), and sunodeuein  kai mê makhesthai (91,1). For other examples see 7,22; 27,4, 20; 79,29; 87,7; 99,23. Redundancy in some of these cases may of course be in the mind of the reader, and I have not normally (although see 5,11 and 8,15) eliminated one of the components of these couplings. A passage such as 39,6-16 on as celebrated a text as 412a6-9 shows the system in full gear. Here Themistius can be seen hovering between explication and redundancy, like many a teacher of philosophy aiming at clarity. 52 See n. 27 above for some examples. It is often difficult to decide whether to translate the conjunction ‘and’ (kai) linking these as ‘i.e.’. In some cases it is also useful to translate it consequentially. For example the coupling thnêta kai en genesei (42,3) seems to mean ‘mortal, and so subject to coming into existence’. Often, however, Themistius leaves us in no doubt, with his prevalent use of toutesti (‘i.e.’), and parenthetical explanatory clauses introduced by legô (e.g. 68,13; 92,4-5; 98,5; 119,3). 53 See TGAC, 77-133, and also below 3.4, n. 1.



divine thinking in that work and some passages in the paraphrase of the de Anima, but this inquiry needs to be carried much further.54 As for the related issue of Neoplatonic elements in the Themistian noetic, I remain somewhat sceptical about the significance of parallels with Plotinus in the paraphrase of 3.4-8 that some have noted.55 Indeed, it is unclear why Themistius has to be thought to be dependent exclusively on Plotinian Neoplatonism. But this is one of the many problems that I hope the present translation might help address. 5. The Greek text The first edition of this work, the Aldine, by Vettore Trincavelli (14911593), was published in 1534, and was based on a single manuscript. The next, by Leonard Spengel (1803-1880) published in 1866, used the Aldine edition along with a manuscript at Munich (his M = Monacensis graecus 330, fifteenth century); it also drew on notes by the sixteenth-century scholar Piero Vettori (Victorius) (1499-1585), and an associate, in a copy of the Aldine edition at Munich, in the form either of emendations and conjectures, or of readings from another manuscript, Heinze’s Q (see below). The present translation is based on the text of the edition by Richard Heinze (1867-1929)56 at CAG 5.3. This superseded its two predecessors by being based on a larger number of manuscripts, yet it is not a particularly rigorous critical edition, and is disfigured by numerous typographical errors and incoherencies.57 I have had to introduce a number of minor changes, and to add several more important ones from the recent study of the Arabic translation by Gerald M. Browne.58 Heinze relied mainly on the earliest manuscript, Parisinus Coislinianus 386 (eleventh century) (his P), and a closely related manuscript (Laurentianus 87.25, thirteenth century, his Q),59 similar to the source of William 54 See Pinès (1981), 223-5, and more importantly (1987), 186-9. There could be no more important contribution to Themistian studies than an English translation of the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. 55 See, for example, TGAC, 34; 91, n. 71; and 110, n. 141. M. Ballériaux, the foremost exponent of Themistius Neoplatonizans, has chided me for my position in kindly sending me a copy of his 1989 article. 56 On Heinze see Neue Deutsche Biographie 8 (1969), 447-8. He is remembered mainly as a Latinist, and author of a still respected work on Vergil’s epic technique. His edition of Themistius seems to have developed out of his Habilitationschrift on Xenocrates (Heinze [1892]) for which the paraphrase of the de Anima was a source. 57 Heinze noted one (67,5) in his corrigenda. There are others at 6,7; 15,9; 15,11; 33,22 (question-mark omitted); 40,17; 44,18; 48,9; 48,17; 54,15; 56,1; 56,28; 58,8; 65,5; 84,28; 89,12; 90,21, and 122,33. In most of these cases the correct form is self-evident, but at 84,28 read kai for pai. For errors in the apparatus criticus see 66,36 and 110,22 where the wrong word is signalled. 58 I should stress that when I introduce these emendations as being ‘in the Arabic version’, I am referring to the reconstruction of the Greek from the Arabic by Browne. 59 This manuscript is now fully described at Moraux et al. (1976), 327-9.



of Moerbeke’s Latin version.60 Heinze suggested that most of the remaining manuscripts were derived from a single archetype that represented a Byzantine recension, and cited as a representative of this group Parisinus graecus 1888 (his C) (fifteenth century), because it contained true readings that may have been derived from a source independent of P. In an appendix Heinze listed numerous other manuscripts of which he generally had a superficial and second-hand knowledge. Heinze’s apparatus criticus indicates where Q and less often C deviate from P, and records readings from the Aldine edition (a)61 and from Spengel’s edition (s). His use of s is questionable where Q and s are jointly cited, since s represents the reading in M, a manuscript derived from Q. Heinze also claims (praef. vi) that the citations of C and s usually imply the agreement of C with the Aldine edition, but this filiation is not explored in any detail. Heinze also occasionally records variant readings in manuscripts of Aristotle’s de Anima, but this evidence has been superseded by modern critical editions of the de Anima, and Themistius’ relation to the Aristotelian text is now best reviewed in the apparatus critici in the editions of Ross and Siwek. (I have assumed that my readers will in the first instance be consulting Ross’ Oxford Classical Text [1956], and so have referred to it more often than other editions.) It is difficult to determine what text of the de Anima Themistius was using for this or any of his paraphrases. He of course had his own manuscript, or manuscripts, yet was composing an explication de texte in which deviations from Aristotle need not therefore reflect manuscript readings at all, but simply be created by his exegetical method. The indirect tradition is limited to references in later ancient commentaries on the de Anima by Simplicius, and by Philoponus and PseudoPhiloponus (Stephanus?).62 None are important for the text, and some are so imprecise as to have contributed to the view that they were based on a lost commentary by Themistius on the de Anima.63

60 See Verbeke lxvii-lxix. 61 His knowledge of this edition was based on Spengel; both these editors failed, for example,

to record the reading ara (interrogative) at 43,28; see Browne, 229. 62 See Simplicius, in DA 151,14; Philoponus, in DA 409,28-410,3 (cf. 410,1 and 35); 418,25-31; 450,9-19; 508,19-24; 514,29-31. On these see Blumenthal (1987), 102-3. The last three passages are in the third book of this commentary which, it has recently been argued (see Lautner [1992]), is not, as traditionally thought, the work of Stephanus of Alexandria but ‘probably of a disciple of Philoponus’ (Lautner [1992], 522). 63 See Steel, and the rejection of his view by Blumenthal (1979a). For a new interpretation of Photius’ report that Themistius wrote commentaries as well as paraphrases see Vanderspoel.


Introduction Acknowledgements

The following have assisted me in the translation: Fred Schroeder, my collaborator on an earlier published version of 3.4-8; Jacques Brunschwig and other readers of the manuscript, Sarah Broadie, Pamela Huby, Donald Russell, Rosemary Wright; also Richard Sorabji, Dolores Iorizzo and Anthony Price. Bob Sharples generously helped me on a number of points of interpretation. I was helped in other ways by research grants from the University of British Columbia Social Sciences and Humanities Grant Committee, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press kindly allowed me to reprint material first published by them in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect (Toronto 1990). I have dedicated this work to the memory of Charles Schmitt (19331987), always a supportive and encouraging friend, and a welcoming presence at the Warburg Institute. Themistius’ paraphrase of the de Anima was a potent influence on the Aristotelianism of the Renaissance, which Charles studied with such great distinction, and so I hope that he would have accepted this dedication. Postscript The following items can be added to the secondary literature: 189, n. 1: on Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia, P. Lautner, ‘Anazôgraphêma and related terms in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ notion of phantasia’, Scripta Classica Israelica 14, 1995, 33-41; and R.B. Todd, ‘Peripatetic epistemology before Alexander of Aphrodisias: the case of Alexander of Damascus’, Eranos 93, 1995 (in press). 194, n. 1: on the Themistian noetic, O. Ballériaux, ‘Themistius et le Neoplatonisme: le nous pathêtikos et l’immortalité de l’âme’, Revue de la Philosophie Ancienne 12, 1994, 171-200. 197, n. 29: on the Theophrastean noetic, D. Devereux, ‘Theophrastus on the Intellect’, in W.W. Fortenbaugh and D. Gutas (eds), Theophrastus: his psychological, doxographical, and scientific writings, New Brunswick and London, 1992, 32-43. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 5.

Themistius On Aristotle On the Soul Translation

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Book One of Aristotle On the Soul 1 1,2 In this treatise we must try to follow Aristotle on everything that can be systematically understood about the soul,2 and to elucidate, reconstruct, and analyse some [issues], and (if it is not tactless to say so) even fully elaborate still others.3 The treatise On the Soul in fact merits more respect than all of Aristotle’s numerous and remarkable compositions for the quantity of problems that his predecessors had not even managed to enumerate, for the ease with which he supplied their foundations,4 and for the methods with which he endowed the investigation of them, as will be clear from what we shall actually say.5 1,11 (402a1-4) Right at the start of the [opening] discussion6 he states that all insight and knowledge7 is fine and valuable, but that one type surpasses another, either in the accuracy of its demonstrations or in the [superior] value of its subject matter. This is the relation between geometry and astronomy, geometry being more precise, astronomy more fascinating because of the nature of the subject matter with which it deals, since its demonstrations are less rigorous because it deals mostly with very accessible [data].8 But only in knowledge about the soul do both these [features] necessarily coincide, and it triumphs in precision, since precision comes from the soul for other [bodies of] knowledge too, and in fascination because the nature of the soul permeates almost everything that exists, starting with the lowest9 vegetative soul up to the first, meaning the intellect,10 which is either a part, or capacity of the soul, or else by being of the same kind [as the soul] can be implanted11 in some other way.12 What could be more fascinating than this entity? 1,24 (402a4-7) Thirdly13 he also summons us to the present reflection that whereas the truth that we may learn about any other [subject] does not launch us14 towards everything else, any truth that we might grasp about the soul could be important equipment for the journey to the whole of truth. This is because [the soul] offers valuable foundations for every part of philosophy:15 [2] for the practical [part], because we could more easily establish the virtues or perfections of the [soul] if we first knew its essence; and for the investigation of nature, because [the soul] is the fount and source of all movement, perhaps for all bodies, but primarily for those of animals and plants. So if [the soul] knows itself,16 it is credible on other



[matters] too; but if misled about itself, on what else could it be considered credible? 2,6 (402a10-16)17 Such, then, is the utility of the present investigation. Yet the task is not very easy, but in fact of almost extreme difficulty. For first just to know what [the soul] is, and to supply its definition, is none too accessible or manageable [a task]. For even today it is disputed among philosophers what in general the method of definition is, and by what procedure it progresses, and not only among philosophers but also everyone else who teaches anything by means of argument.18 For everyone tries to use a definition, and yet some believe that there is a single method applying to everything of which we want to know the definition, just as demonstration is a single method applying to [properties] that in themselves belong [incidentally to subjects].19 But others [believe] that there is not a single [method], but that the ways of dealing with definitions differ in accordance with differences in things that exist. This increases the difficulty of the investigation. For it will then have to be understood what the special procedure is for each [kind of] existing thing. 2,18 (402a16-22) This [problem] crops up even if one concedes that there is a single way of dealing with definition, whether by division, as Plato held, or instead by combination, as Aristotle intends, or by some other procedure of demonstration. For even here special first principles will be needed for each [kind of thing] if we are going to master systematically the nature of the subject. Thus our discussion will again come round to the same difficulty: that there are different first principles for different [subjects], as, for example, for numbers and planes (although here the methods are of the same kind since both deal with quantity). 2,26 (402a7-10) So this is a sufficient statement that the investigation [into the soul] is at once essential and laborious. Next let us state the distinctions that anyone pursuing them systematically must draw. First, the nature and essence of the soul must be understood, next all its incidental [properties], some of which seem to be affections unique [to the soul], others to belong to animals too because of the soul. Thinking and contemplation are unique [to the soul], while pleasure, pain, sense-perception and imagination seem to accrue to animals also because of the soul. While the essence and incidental [properties] are the two objects of inquiry concerning the [soul], first we must understand everything that is useful for [defining] its essence. 2,34 (402a23-5) It is useful first to discover the highest genus of those exhaustively listed in the Categories in which the soul must be located, be it substance, quantity, or quality, and not only the highest [genus], but also the one that is more accessible and proximate. For when we define human being, we do not also adopt [the category] substance, but [the genus] animal. 2,38 (402a25-b1) Secondly, [there is a problem] when the genus is isolated, since each genus is spoken of in two ways, as ‘potential’ and as

Book One


‘actual’, as with an animal and a plant. For an egg and a seed are ‘potentially’ an animal and a plant, whereas a bird and a tree are ‘actually’ an animal and a plant. (We also say [instead of ‘in actuality’ (energeiâi)] [3] ‘in entelechy’ (entelekheiâi),20 and why we have this way of speaking will become clear subsequently.21) So if we discovered the essence of the soul, then in which of these distinct [senses] will it be isolated?22 Is it like an underlying potentiality and naturally disposed to [become] a substance, or is it more like an entelechy? There is also a duality to entelechies, as primary and secondary, the hexis23 being primary, the activity of the hexis secondary. 3,7 (402b1) [Thirdly], we must also investigate whether the soul is divided into parts, or is undivided. If it should be divided into parts, is it like a body [divided] into [separate] volumes, or like a craft or body of knowledge; for we speak of ‘parts’ of both medicine and philosophy.24 But if undivided, is it something entirely uncompounded and so an entity unmarked by plurality? Or is a quantity of parts not observed belonging to [the soul], but instead a variety of capacities? For the two ways do differ, in that while part varies from part according to substrate, capacity is distinguished from capacity by having different activities. That is why some judge the soul to be multi-capacitied within a single substrate, others (e.g. the Stoics25 and indeed Plato too)26 [judge] it to have multiple parts because they define the parts also by their locations. 3,16 (402b1-9)27 The fourth inquiry described is: is every soul in relation to every soul of the same kind, or not, and if they are under distinct kinds, are they also under a single genus? Take the soul of a human being and that of a horse: if they do not have the same kind of soul, is their genus even the same? Are a human being and a horse under [the genus] animal, although their souls are not under the single genus of soul? These problems cannot be decided without considering every soul, something earlier [thinkers] overlooked. For they seem to have reflected only on the human soul, while we must investigate its universal nature: [i.e.] is there a single definition [of soul], and is the essence of the whole of soul single, or are there different definitions for the soul of a human being and that of a horse? What I mean is that there is a universal definition of animal (‘ensouled substance capable of sense-perception’), and a separate one for human being too (‘a rational mortal animal’). So in inquiring into the definition of the soul should we be inquiring into what sort of [definition] applies to animal, or rather what sort applies to human being? This is the same as inquiring into whether we should inquire into the essence of a kind, as it were, that is proximate to individuals, as human being is to Socrates, Dion and Theaetetus, or [for the essence] of what is as it were a genus already divided into kinds. 3,31 The difference in the investigation is not insignificant. For the genus is a thought (ennoêma) without any real existence (anupostatos), given its general character from the obscure likeness between individuals,



and the genus is either absolutely nothing, or is far posterior to individuals.28 The species (eidos), on the other hand, has to be a specific entity and structure. The intelligible form (logos) of human being, for example, just needs matter, and then a human being ipso facto exists. For [a question] that by itself also justifies an investigation is whether the definitions of genera and species are definitions of thoughts (noêmata), [4] or of entities that really exist29 in individuals. For [definitions] seem to want to be of the thoughts that are amassed from the likeness between individuals, yet to drop off into individuals, and so into entities that really exist. For the thought of animal is not a substance with a soul capable of senseperception, nor indeed is the thought of human being a rational mortal animal, but the individual animals are substances with souls capable of sense-perception, and individual humans are rational mortal animals. It is clear from the fact that if as a hypothesis a single human being were left (as the myths do with Deucalion in the flood),30 then the intelligible form of human being would be circumscribed within the intelligible form of an individual human. But this [problem] belongs more to the investigation into genera and species. For now we have to address the list of possible inquiries concerning the soul. 4,12 (402b9-11) Now what also justifies considerable reflection is whether an animal must be posited as having more than one soul (i.e. a vegetative31 soul, one that can desire, and one capable of reasoning, in the case of those to whom these [three] belong); or whether, while several souls do not exist in each [animal] (for it would be absurd, as the god-like Plato says,32 for each of us to carry around several souls that occupy seats as though in a wooden horse), the parts of a soul that is itself a single whole are distinct. And if parts are posited for a single soul, it is difficult to define what kind they are, and how [they exist]. To take an obvious example: is the capacity for nutrition distinct from that for growth, and are both [distinct] from the capacity for reproduction, or [are they] different in definition, but identical in substrate? Also, are these three [parts] distinct from the capacties for sense-perception, imagination and desire? For between just these [two groups of capacities] there does also seem to be a distinction in substrate, in that they are separated from one another. For many [living things] are nourished, grow and reproduce, but do not have sense-perception, while [many others] have sense-perception but do not think. So if it is clear that some parts [of the soul] are distinct [from others], and how they are so, while others are identical, will it be clearer if we consider the whole soul prior to its parts? For in one way the whole would seem to be clearer; for example, in the case of [physical] magnitudes we do in a way perceive the whole prior to the parts,33 and with bodies of knowledge we start from the universals because they are clearer. Yet in another way the parts are prior, since the constituents [of a whole] are always prior, and a whole is derived from its parts. 4,29 (402b11-16) And if [the inquiry] seems to be about the parts, must

Book One


we expound their essences or their activities first? For in most cases the activities are clearer to us, since it is obvious that we are perceiving, but unclear what sense-perception is. If [we do expound] the activities [first], should we do so prior to the objects underlying the activities? For what is often clearer to us are the objects towards which the activities in the parts [of the soul are directed], just as objects of sight [are clearer] than [the activity of] seeing, and the objects heard than [the activity of] hearing, and perhaps also the objects of thought than thinking (nous). Indeed, the object of thought is ‘opposed’ to thinking, and the object of perception to senseperception, just like the relatives [in the Categories].34 [5] 5,1 The preceding [problems], then, complete in summary form the inquiries concerning the soul, and all are useful and essential for discovering its essence. 5,3 (402b16-25) But it does not only seem correct that it is what something is that is useful for investigating the [properties], if understood in advance for each thing, that in themselves are incidental to the thing. (This is particularly so in mathematics where if, for example, we understand in advance the essence of the straight and the curved [line], and of the triangle and the plane, we more easily learn the [properties] that in themselves are incidental to figures.) But also, conversely, understanding in advance the incidental [properties] is the correct way to make a major contribution to knowledge of the essence. I said ‘the correct way’ because it is not accompanied by a demonstration. For no incidental [property] can be tracked down through demonstration without the definition becoming known, but the [property] that is apparent [in sense-perception]35 is adequate [for doing so]. For [by contrast] those incidental [properties] that are detached and thus too extraneous to the nature [of something] will be no help to us in discovering definitions [of that thing]. It is just like someone having the goal of defining god and thinking that the existence of altars of the gods, and sacrifices, temples and shrines contributed to the demonstration of the essence [of god], as Chrysippus believed. For these [incidental properties] are too detached from the essence of the gods. The [properties] of being always self-moved, however, and of Apollo’s prophesying and Asclepius’ healing, are already an adequate prelude to the essence, i.e. that god is an eternal animal benevolent to mankind.36 5,19 (402b25-6) Definition, then, is the starting-point for all demonstration, yet it is like a circle. For just as the essence is manifest in the [properties] that in themselves are incidental, if [the essence] is correctly understood in advance according to the appearance, so too the [properties] that in themselves are incidental are indicated in advance in the essence. In some cases if you begin from definitions you progress more easily to the [properties] that are in themselves incidental (as happens particularly in mathematics), while conversely in others [you start] from the [properties] that are in themselves [incidental], as with virtually all natural [bodies]. 5,26 (402b26-403a2) Things go wrong both in selecting incidental



[properties], in cases where we are not helped at all towards a definition, and also in supplying definitions from which none of the incidental [properties] of a thing can be conjectured.37 Thus [definitions] supplied by such a procedure, [i.e.] so that no easy guess can even be made about the incidental properties that belong [to something], are obviously stated verbally and vacuously. 5,31 (403a3-10) So just as much as in the earlier [cases], the functions and affections of the soul must be distinguished to discover its essence, so that we can know whether they are common to the [soul] in relation to the body, and whether all belong to the animal combined from the soul and body, or whether some are common, while others belong exclusively to the soul. For this must be understood in advance, despite the difficulty. For while many claim that getting angry, being cheerful, having appetites, and perceiving in general belong to the soul, most of an animal’s affections appear to be common to the soul [6] and body, although thinking most of all seems unique to the soul. Yet if [thinking] is also a sort of imagination, or if it does not exist without imagination, then not even it could exist without a body, given that imagination comes from, and occurs through, sense-perception. 6,4 (403a10-12) So right at the outset a distinction must be drawn between [two conditionals]: (i) ‘If one of the functions and affections of the soul is unique to it, then it would also be possible for the soul to be separated from the body’. However, (ii) ‘If there is no [function] unique to it’ (i.e. not belonging exclusively to the soul), but [the soul] displays all its activities along with the body (be it the visible body or some other less manifest body, but at all events body) ‘then it would not also be possible for it to survive without a body’, given that nature creates nothing that is completely without a function, but some specific function is assigned to everything that exists. 6,11 The [critic]38 who objects to this argument, on the grounds that its proof is not valid, has quite misunderstood its meaning. For he says that someone adding into an argument39 the contradictory of the consequent must reject the antecedent, whereas [Aristotle], by adding [in (ii)] the contradictory of the antecedent is trying to reject the consequent. But the person criticising Aristotle for being ignorant of such commonplaces in logic seems to be ignorant himself of the fact that [the consequent of (i)] ‘it would also be possible for the soul to be separated’, does not involve a necessary implication in which the rejection of the consequent is thereby a rejection of the antecedent, but rather a possible implication in which the conclusion is the opposite; for the rejection of the antecedent [in (ii) as opposed to (i)] carries with it a rejection of the consequent. 6,19 To explain. ‘If Dion is going to sail, it is also possible for him to have a good voyage’ [= (i)]; and ‘If Dion is not going to sail, it is also impossible for him to have a good voyage’ [= (ii)]. But it is not the case [as the critic claims] that ‘If it is impossible for him to have a good voyage, it is also

Book One


impossible for him to sail’.40 The same applies to walking and performing an action, and to every case where the implication is possible, but not necessary. So also ‘If the thing approaching at a distance is an animal, it is possible for it to be a horse’ [= (i)]; but ‘If it is not an animal, it is also not a horse’ [= (ii)].41 But it is not the case that [as the critic claims] ‘If not a horse, then also not an animal’. For what is implied as possible becomes without qualification a part of the antecedent, if, that is, it sometimes holds [true] of it and at other times does not, and in these cases the rejection of the whole carries with it a rejection of the part. 6,28 The conditional [= (i)] ‘If there is some function unique to the soul, then it is possible for [the soul] to be separated [from the body]’ must not be disproved since it is not necessarily [true]. For what if there is a function unique to the soul, but [that function] is not separated, as with the eye and the hand? But the rejection of the antecedent also necessarily carries with it a rejection of the consequent: [i.e.] ‘But if there is no [function unique to the soul], then [the soul] would not be separated’ [= (ii)]. For a self-evident axiom ‘that nothing comes into existence through nature without a function’,42 reinforces the implication [in (i)] [that there is a function unique to the soul]. 6,34 (403a12-19) How then do we speak of the soul as ‘loving’, ‘hating’ and ‘getting angry’? How do we speak of the straight line ‘touching’ the sphere at a point? For it [does so] not because the straight line exists in itself (for it is nothing), but because the rod is straight, nor because it touches the sphere in and of itself, but because it touches the bronze sphere. For both straightness and the [circular] shape are inseparable from the wooden rod and the bronze sphere, and contact at a point, in fact contact in general, is of compound with compound. [7] This is also how all the affections of the soul seem to exist in common with the body: showing spirit, calming down, fearing, being cheerful and rejoicing, and also loving and hating. For the soul cannot produce any of these without dragging in43 the body on which it also clearly supports its activities. For people do blush, blanch and quake, and poets do not miss this: ‘his eyes were like flashing fire’; ‘paleness gripped his cheek’; ‘through his mouth came the chatter of his teeth’.44 7,8 (403a19-24) What reveals with particular clarity that these affections are common to the soul and the body is the fact that (a) sometimes animals encounter a cause sufficiently powerful to provoke them to anger or to instill fear, without their becoming irritated or afraid; whereas (b) at other times, where the causes are slight and undefined, the animal is moved to excess, as where it lacks food, or is bothered by certain humours. This is especially manifest in the case of melancholy people who, although nothing frightening is happening, are often in states in which they are affected (en tois pathesi) like frightened people because of their bodily temperament, and so they fear what is not frightening. All such affections seem to follow the temperaments of the body, and to be intensified and



remitted as the quality [of the temperament] varies.45 The body does not obey such affections like an organ, as the sense organs do the capacity for sense-perception; instead, the body’s affinity with the affections is greater than that of the organs with the sense. For when these organs are in an unnatural state, they just impede the activities of perception, whereas a degenerate temperament in the body, far from impeding affections, arouses and intensifies them, since they are more closely attached to the nature of the body. 7,23 (403a24-b3) If this is how these [affections] occur, it is clear that these affections, and all other similar [affections of the soul] are enmattered rational principles (logoi enuloi),46 since they have their being in matter. Hence those who define each of them do not detach them from the underlying matter, as in the definition of anger as ‘boiling of the blood in the heart47 because of a desire for revenge’. This is why the natural philosopher has to be concerned in his investigations with the kind of soul that implicates matter in its functions or affections. But the natural philosopher and the dialectician would define each [affection] differently. The dialectician would define [anger] as ‘desire for revenge’, while the natural philosopher would define it as ‘boiling of the blood in the heart’, the one stating the form, the other the matter. For although the rational principle (logos) of anger is desire for revenge, this formal account must come to exist in matter of a specific sort. 7,33 (403b3-14) It is the same with a house, where one person assigns48 the form, i.e. the rational principle49 (‘a covering that can prevent destruction from winds, rain and heat’), another the matter (‘stones, bricks and wood’), while a third conjoins the two [in the definition] ‘a specific kind of covering [made] from a specific kind of matter’. So which of these is the natural philosopher? Is it [8] the one exclusively concerned with the rational principle, but ignorant of the matter, or the one who reflects only on the matter while oblivious to the rational principle? Is it not rather the one who formulates a rational principle on the basis of both?50 So who is each of them [taken separately]? Now the one who defines the form in itself, although it does not naturally exist in itself, is the dialectician, so that what this person says may often turn out to be vacuous. But the one who deals more with the matter and with the affections inseparable from matter can only be the natural philosopher; for this person deals with all the functions and affections of matter. So while also admitting the form, this person will never detach it from matter, nor if the rational principle could be [detached from matter] will he concede this. For this person always needs matter, and unlike the mathematician, will not [for example] attend to the definition that defines the straight line without matter, although [the line] does not need the addition of the underlying matter. 8,11 We must recall the general [principle] that some of the affections and functions of bodies are natural, while others accrue to it from outside.51 Natural are hot, cold, dry, and moist, and [the activities] of nutrition,

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growth and decline; accruing from outside are the [properties] that crafts supply either in elaborating matter, or in correcting its deficiencies.52 Metal-working and carpentry [for example] elaborate matter, while medicine and farming come to the aid of its deficiencies. 8,17 (403b14-16) Yet there is still another form that is inseparable from the natural body, yet belongs to it not insofar as it is a natural body. This one might wish to call either an affection,53 or an incidental [property], e.g. being straight, curved, triangular, concave, convex and everything else that mathematics investigates when it eliminates all of the natural affections and examines only limits and dimensions, and nowhere in its reasonings adds an understanding of matter or natural qualities. 8,24 So we must take up again [the view] that there are many ways of investigating form, and that form is either natural, mathematical or artificial.54 Now the natural philosopher and the dialectician investigate natural form, but the dialectician does so without matter, while the natural philosopher always does so along with matter. Those dealing with specialised bodies of knowledge,55 as well as craftsmen, investigate the remaining [forms]: the [specialists] just investigate them, whereas the [craftsmen] work on them in [the context of] matter. That is also why the first of these [investigates] without matter, the second along with it. Superior to them all is the one who deals with what are really forms, the ones completely separated from matter both in definition and in real existence (hupostasis),56 namely the first philosopher. This will do as an excursus to define [issues] that are none too irrelevant to the present treatise.57 8,33 (403b16-19) But we must return to where the argument began. We said58 that the affections of the soul were inseparable from the natural matter of animals, and that anger and fear could not be detached from their underlying matter as could a line and a plane [be detached] in definition [from a body]. Instead, their definitions must be combined with the affections of the body. 1 8,38 (403b20-4) Now that we have drawn these preliminary distinctions, let us deal2 next with the investigation into the soul. Before that we must survey the doctrines of earlier [philosophers], and [9] enlist as partners in the inquiry3 those who made any claims about it, so that we can adopt their correct claims, and guard against their false ones. 9,3 (403b24-31) Now since what has a soul is distinguished from what does not have a soul primarily by two [properties] – that of being selfmoved, and that of having sense-perception – earlier [thinkers] were doctrinally divided between these two properties with no further qualification. Some, [that is, defined the soul] primarily on the basis of movement, others on the basis of sense-perception, with movement [being the definition] in the case of Democritus and Anaxagoras, and indeed also Plato:



these [thinkers] added what they took to be implied, [i.e.] that whatever is not itself moved cannot cause anything else to move, and [therefore] claimed that the soul was one of the things that moves.4 9,9 (403b31-404a8) Hence Democritus says that the soul is fire and heat. For since the shapes that he adds to the atoms are infinite in number, he makes their whole ‘seed-bed’ into the elements of the whole of nature, and their spherical [shapes] into [the elements] of the soul, since this shape more than any other pervades the whole body, and causes everything else to move when it itself moves.5 There is nothing odd [here] about the soul being invisible despite being a body. In fact according to them ‘aerial motes’, which are visible in sun-rays through doors, would not be seen without the sun’s illumination, yet [normally] the air seems to us to be completely empty, although filled with solid bodies. In comparison with [motes] he believes that atoms, and particularly the spherical ones from which the soul comes, are much smaller and faster-moving. 9,19 (404a8-16) This is why he also says that the mark of being alive is respiration. This is because the surrounding world compresses the bodies of animals, and through such compression forces out the spherical shapes inside them, which cause movement in animals by always being moved. Thus an animal benefits from the entry from without during inhalation of other atoms of the same kind, and a sort of compensatory process occurs6 between the atoms dispersed by exhaling and those attracted by inhaling.7 He also says that an animal lives just as long as it can attract and expel these spherical atoms. 9,27 (404a16-25) Perhaps, says Aristotle, certain Pythagoreans (I do not know which specific ones he is referring to as making this claim) also slipped into such a doctrine concerning the soul, with some claiming that the soul was identical with the actual bodies moved in the air,8 others that it was the cause of their movement, since they are never at rest, even if there is complete tranquillity. Also, those who characterize the soul by its self-movement believe that causing movement is quite unique to the soul. For they all seem committed to the view that movement most of all belongs to the soul, and that while other things are moved by the soul, it alone is moved by its own agency.9 9,35 (404a25-b6) Similarly Anaxagoras too says that the principle that causes movement is the soul, as does anyone else who has claimed that intellect causes the universe to move. Yet he differs from Democritus. He [Democritus] thinks that there is no distinction between intellect and soul, since truth is what is apparent to sense-perception, which also comprises intellect, and he believes that thinking (phronein) is identical with perceiving, and brings in Homer as a witness [10] for correctly depicting Hector when prostrate without sense-perception as prostrate ‘without thought’ (allo-phroneôn).10 Now [Homer] does not use ‘intellect’ in distinction from ‘sense-perception’, and as a capacity directed to the truth, but he does identify intellect and sense-perception, i.e. soul and intellect. On this

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[relationship] Anaxagoras is the more obscure, for while he frequently speaks of intellect as the cause of what is right and correct, since it is more god-like than the rest of the soul, he also conflates [intellect and senseperception] with equal frequency when he says that intellect and soul are identical. For he posits intellect as existing in all creatures great and small, whatever their relative value, and would in that way be speaking of sense-perception as intellect, since [sense-perception] is present in virtually all animals. For what is not present in the same way in all animals, perhaps not even in most human beings, is what is called intellect in accordance with intelligence (phronesis). 10,12 (404b7-15) Those, then, who looked at the [property] of having a soul from the perspective of being self-moved believed that the soul had the greatest capacity for causing movement since it caused an animal to move. Those who, by contrast, did so from the perspective of its knowing and perceiving existing things say that the soul is [identical with] the first principles. Some who made these principles more than one did the same to the soul, while others made it a single thing. For [they thought] it was by being combined in this way from the first principles that it apprehended those [first principles] themselves and what came from them, as with Empedocles who thought that the four elements plus love and strife were the first principles of all things, and produced the soul and senseperception from the same [source]. For he says that ‘we see earth by earth, and water by water’.11 He also posits each of these [elements] as the soul on the grounds that [the soul] would not perceive external things except by means of what is like [them]. For these [philosophers] also share the doctrine that like is known by like. 10,23 (404b16-18) For this reason Timaeus12 too similarly produces the soul from the elements when he says13 that it is blended as a mean ‘from the undivided nature’,14 which is completely non-material and incorporeal, and from ‘the [nature] divided in bodies’. Now one might instead try and infer the basic idea in ‘the undivided and non-material [nature]’. As regards [qualities] divided in bodies, if he were speaking of the primary qualities, such as wetness and dryness and their partners, these would not be divided in bodies, but in matter. But if he were speaking of the vegetative soul, this would be divided in bodies, since it makes use not of matter that is completely without structure but rather of the elements, and it combines and segregates these, and is divided in [reference to] them. Why could we not say that the capacities for sense-perception, appetite, and spiritedness are like this too? For they all [exist] in bodies (i.e. [are present] in them),15 whether they are completely non-rational or obey reason. But if he said that all these [capacities] were divided in bodies, he would make only the rational soul a mean between the undivided [nature] and that divided in bodies [11], and have it combined and blended from them, although using ‘being blended’ in what is not its strict sense.16 For the soul does not of course come into existence by the divided [nature] being



destroyed along with the undivided, and by [each] destroying its inherent capacity (dunamis) in combining to produce a uniquely defining quality in the blend. Rather, it is because the nature of the rational soul is inferior to the intellect, but far superior to the non-rational capacities, since it has an affinity with both, as also do things that are blended in relation to the elements from which they were blended. For that reason [he says that] he uses two capacities to grasp things that exist: that of the same and that of the different.17 For when [the soul] groups the genera and species together, it captures sameness, but when it also adds an understanding of the differences, it discovers difference. As for [the capacities] that it also collects from the elements, that of the same is from the undivided nature, that of the different from the divided. In this way, then, Timaeus too ‘makes the soul from the elements’ (404b16-17), and perhaps not, as has been claimed, the whole soul, but just the rational soul, which would also be the soul of the universe. For he says that the secondary gods, the demiurges of mortal animals, later on ‘weave in’ the affective capacities.18 But it is certainly clear that he also needed the elements to constitute the soul, so that it could get to know like things by like things. 11,19 (404b18-21)19 Similarly too in the [books] On Philosophy the animal-itself is defined as existing from the form of the one-itself, plus the primary length, breadth and depth, and the other [souls]20 in the same way.21 11,20 For those [philosophers]22 believed that while incorporeal nature was entirely remote from continuous magnitude, since it did not exist in a [corporeal] volume, it still belonged to the divided [nature]. For they basically assumed that plurality really existed for that nature too, since the latter was a combination of real units, not the kind of units that we employ in the case of bodies, none of which is precisely one but is more than one, indeed infinitely numerous. That is why they also called this number ‘eidetic’ in that it was combined from forms (eidê), and they posited those numbers as forms of existing things [as in the saying] ‘And everything is like number’.23 So they made the elements of the animal-itself (i.e. of the intelligible cosmos)24 the primary among the eidetic numbers: the forms of [respectively] the one, the first dyad, the first triad, and the first tetrad. For since the first principles of the perceptible cosmos must always coexist in the intelligible cosmos, and since the perceptible cosmos is duly derived from length, breadth and depth, they claimed that the first dyad was the form of length, since length [extends] between two single entities (i.e. between two points). At the same time they claimed that the first triad was the form of length and breadth, since the triangle is the primary plane figure. And they claimed that the first tetrad was the form of length, breadth and depth, in that the pyramid is the primary solid. (All this can be understood [12] from Xenocrates’ [book] On Nature.)25 So they produced the animal-itself (i.e. the intelligible cosmos) from the first principles, and its [individual] parts from subordinate [principles]. For the relation of

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objects of perception to one another parallels that of their forms to one another. 12,5 (404b21-7) They also pursued this same argument in still another way. For since the soul employs more than one capacity to grasp existing things (intellect, knowledge, opinion, sense-perception), they defined it as having the intellect from the form of the one, and knowledge from the first dyad. For knowledge also [extends] between two single entities, in that it [extends] from the premises to the conclusion. Opinion came from the first triad, inasmuch as it is also the number of the plane [figure]; for once there is opinion, truth and falsity belong to it from the premises. Sense-perception came from the first tetrad, from which the form of solid body also comes, since it is that kind of body that is the object of sense-perception. For the forms and the eidetic number are the first principle of all existing things, while the one and the indefinite dyad, which they posited below the one in order to bring the plurality of numbers into existence, are the elements of number-itself. For nothing else could be created from the one-itself, if it really were one, whereas for plurality, which exists in the forms, another nature is required to underly the one, and plurality comes from this [nature], which they called indefinite dyad. It is a dyad because it is divided into parts and is thereby capable of producing plurality. It is indefinite because it does not have a definition of its own, but the definition for each form is supplied to it from the one, and with this nature existing alongside the one, the eidetic number is thereby pluralized, and the matter present in bodies is a likeness of it, just as the form that is in matter is [a likeness] of the one. [They held], therefore, that the soul was combined from the same principles as the eidetic number, and was combined not by being mixed but by having an intermediary position, while it [itself] was creating the divided nature in bodies. So since it was combined from the same principles as eidetic numbers, it was reasonable for the soul to know existing things. 12,28 (404b27-30) In this way, then, both Timaeus in Plato, and Plato himself,26 explained our grasp of existing things through the soul’s affinity with the first principles.27 But there were others who also combined the two [properties] of causing movement and having knowledge to define the soul, like the [philosopher] who claimed that the soul was a self-moving number;28 he indicated its capacity for knowledge by means of number, and its capacity for movement by the fact that it moved itself. All, however, who posited knowing as belonging to the soul and thereby constituted it out of the first principles, also differed as a group about the soul as they did about the principles. 12,36 (404b30-405a13) They differ with one another not only about what the first principles are, but also about their number, and to differing degrees on each of these [points]. Those who make the first principles corporeal differ more with those who make them non-corporeal, while those who mix the principles by claiming that there are some of each kind,



differ less with [both] these [groups]. Again, [13] on quantity, those [positing] a single [first principle differ] more with those [who posit] an infinite number, while those [who posit] more than one [differ] less with each of these two [groups]. They also derive a definition of the soul from their assumptions about first principles, and this implication followed particularly for those who believed that what belonged most of all to the soul was knowledge of all things, and who for this reason also made the soul out of the first principles. Not that those who basically assumed that causing movement was an innate power of the soul did not also reasonably claim that it was of the same kind as the first principles too. For them it was in fact reasonable, and more than plausible, to classify the cause that produced movement among the first principles. Hence some believed that the soul came principally from fire because fire is the most rarefied and non-corporeal [body], and seems to cause its own movement, and to cause whatever other things it approaches to move. Democritus demonstrated each of these [features] even more ingeniously. Minuscule corpuscularity explained the cause of movement, and shape explained [things] being moved, for he thought that both [properties] belonged to the spherical atoms from which he constituted fire as well as the soul. 13,14 (405a13-19) Anaxagoras, as we also said earlier, does not make it clear whether he posits intellect and the soul as identical or different, but he does say that intellect is the first principle of virtually all existing things. It is certainly the only thing that he calls ‘uncompounded’ and ‘unmixed’, while positing the homoiomerous bodies as matter in subordination to it. He does, however, think that both knowing and causing movement are essential to the soul. He is quite explicit about causing movement (‘all things were together and intellect on its approach segregated them’),29 while knowing is above all unique to intellect. 13,21 (405a19-25) Thales seems to believe that the soul is something with a capacity for causing movement, if indeed he said that iron was attracted by the Heraclean stone just because that stone has a soul. Similarly both Anaximines and Diogenes, and all who say that the soul is air, try to maintain that it causes movement because it is rarefied, and has knowledge because it is posited as a first principle. 13,26 (405a25-b1) Heraclitus posits just the same first principle (namely fire) for existing things as he does for the soul. For the exhalation from which he constitutes other things must be believed to be simply fire, and this is both non-corporeal and ‘always flowing’. Like the majority of [early thinkers] he too thought that all existing things were in a process of movement. Alcmaeon, the natural philosopher from Croton, similarly says that the soul is immortal because in its perpetual movement it most resembles immortal [bodies]; that is because the divine30 [bodies] (sun, moon, stars and heavens) are also in continuous movement. 13,33 (405b1-8) Hippo and those like him held the crude belief that the soul was water because the seed for everything is moist, and crude too were

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those like Critias [who believed that the soul was] blood. For he believed that sense-perception was the soul’s main possession, and that it had this because of the nature of blood, since bloodless [parts], like bones, nails and teeth lack sensation. Yet the [14] sinews which are bloodless are certainly very sensitive. 14,1 (405b8-10) So all the elements acquired a partisan, except for earth. Nobody laid claim to it, except where someone claimed that the soul was composed from, or identical with, all the elements. 14,4 (405b11-23) This body of information shows that [these thinkers] propose investigating [only] movement and knowledge in the soul, yet, as if unintentionally, slide towards a further third thing, incorporeality. For those who posit the soul as the most rarefied and thereby most easily moved [body] seem to dream up this reality, the incorporeal nature I mean. But it is still clear that all of them refer the soul back to the first principles, some as the cause of movement, others as what knows all things because of its affinity with them. Only Anaxagoras eliminates this affinity from the soul, and by agreeing that all existing things are known by it says that the intellect is completely ‘unmixed’ (i.e. uncompounded), and is like none of the things that it gets to know. He did not state, nor is it evident from his statements, what else causes it to have knowledge. 14,14 (405b23-9) All the other [thinkers] do not eschew the first principles; in fact those who posit an opposition [of qualities] in the first principles also constitute the soul from opposites. Empedocles, for example, by endowing the elements31 with the qualities of hot, cold, wet and dry, endows the soul too with these pairs of opposites. ‘For’, he says, ‘we see earth by earth, and water by water’.32 Thus all who posited the soul as one of the elements also added to the soul the quality exclusive to that [element], whether fire’s heat (as with Heraclitus), or water’s moistness (as with Hippo). That also led them to play cleverly on the names that common usage employs with reference to the soul, some calling it ‘heat’ (to thermon) because ‘living’ (zên) is a paronym from ‘boiling’ (zein),33 others [calling it] ‘cold’ (to psukhron) because ‘soul’ (psukhê) is derived from it, since the ‘chilling’ (kata-psuxis) caused by inhaling ensures an animal’s survival. 14,25 (405b29-30) We have, then, gone through the body of information about the soul that has been handed down to us. We have adhered in some cases to what was said, in others to what was probably meant.34

14,28 (405b31-406a4) We must first investigate those who posit movement as what most of all belongs to the soul, and who believe that the soul is itself moved because it causes movement, so that they even define it as ‘the soul is that which moves itself or can move itself ’ (for that is how Plato also [defines it] in Book 10 of the Laws).1 [We shall investigate this



doctrine] because it may not only be false that the soul causes movement because it is moved, but also [because it is] in general impossible for movement to belong to it. So while several [arguments] in the Physics have demonstrated that not everything that causes movement must also be itself moved, here too a few of them must be paraphrased2 from it for clarity’s sake. (1)3 If everything that causes movement is also moved, then it must either be moved by itself or by something else. But it is not necessary that it be moved by something else, since the reasoning will then proceed to infinity. Yet it is impossible for it to be moved by itself, since anything self-moved either causes movement in [15] one [part] of itself, while being moved in another, or [does so] in the same [part]. Now if in another [part], there will be some [part] of it that only causes movement but is not moved, something the [Platonists] think impossible. Also, it would then no longer be precisely self-moved, but the [part] of it causing movement would be distinct from the [part] that is moved. That way there is nothing to stop animals and plants being called ‘self-moved’, for they too are moved by the vegetative soul when being nourished and growing. (2)4 But if it is as a whole that [the soul] moves itself and is moved, one could not even infer the basic process by which it would simultaneously change place and cause change of place, and be altered and cause alteration, so that [for example] it would teach and learn simultaneously, and cure and be cured in respect of the same state of health. (3)5 These [consequences] are indeed absurd, but clearly more absurd is that everything that is moved is still potential insofar as it is moved, whereas everything that causes movement is actual insofar as it causes movement. Thus if something self-moved is itself moved by itself as a whole, it would be simultaneously potential and actual in relation to the same thing, and so simultaneously imperfect and perfected. Thus at one and the same time it would be already-hot and not-yet-hot, and be not-yetthinking and already-thinking. Now these [arguments] are, as I have said, fully elaborated in the Physics and, if anyone does not find that those stated here stand on their own, the rest must be taken from that work. But we shall go on to demonstrate what we proposed earlier:6 that it is in general impossible for the soul to be moved. 15,18 (406a4-10) Everything that is moved is moved in two senses: either in respect of itself or in respect of something else. We say that whatever [is moved] in respect of something else is moved by being in things that are moved, as with the ship and the sailors. For while the ship is moved in itself, the sailors are moved in respect of something else; for assume them placed at rest in the ship, and not moved with the movement unique to a human being. 15,22 (406a16-21)7 In the same way you could also speak of the [properties] incidental to bodies (e.g. being white, black, and two and three

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cubits long) being moved, but in respect of something else, because they exist in what is being moved. But it is impossible for things that are moved in this way either to be bodies, or in themselves to need the addition of a place. 15,26 (406a10-12) So since ‘being moved’ has two senses, we shall consider in the case of the soul, whether it is naturally moved in itself, and in this way shares in movement, given that since it is in a body that is moved, we too could concede that it is moved incidentally and in respect of something else. 15,29 (406a12-16) Now since there are four movements, [namely] movement in respect of place, alteration, decline and growth, the soul will be moved with one, or more than one, or all of these. But it has been demonstrated that everything that is naturally moved non-incidentally in respect of any of these four movements is always in a place and in a body. But clearly those who also attach [the soul’s] essence to movement do not make it move incidentally. Now if the soul is a body, clearly it will also have its own place. So what is this? For the soul will move into it naturally, and when in it will be at rest naturally. 15,36 (406a22-7) If the theory concedes this, it must also concede that some movements and states of rest in the soul are enforced, [16] since what it is moved into naturally is what it will also be moved out of by force. But it is not easy, even if you wish, to fabricate the kinds of movements and states of rest in the soul that will be enforced. For while we see the ensouled body often moved by force and contrary to nature when it is pushed [laterally] or hurled upwards, these cannot be spoken of as enforced movements of the soul, since their opposites would then be natural to it. 16,6 (406a27-30) But perhaps they will eliminate from the soul movement that is contrary to nature, yet say that it is moved in accordance with nature in all its movements, including opposite ones. But we do not see any of those elements from which they make the soul (some from a single one, others from more than one) moved in this way. Instead fire always [moves] upwards, earth downwards, and the remaining [elements] in between. 16,10 (406a30-b5) Again, if they think that the soul’s being moved is necessary just because it causes the body to move (granted that its causing the body to move cannot occur unless it is first moved itself), then it would indeed be a reasonable consequence for the soul to be moved, and to cause the body to move, with just the same kind of movement. But if this follows, clearly the converse – that the soul is moved in the same way as the body – is also true. But the body is moved in respect of place; so too then is the soul when it changes position either as a whole, or in respect of its parts. But that entails that even after exiting [the soul] re-enters [the body]. And that [entails] that dead animals rise up again. 16,19 A critic8 of Aristotle’s [arguments] objects to his assumptions. For he says that [the soul] does not also cause the body to move with the



movements with which it itself is moved. For the soul moves by discerning [objects] and giving assent, but the body moves in respect of place. Also, the converse is not necessarily true, since the movement with which the body is moved is not always the same as that with which the soul is also moved. For wood is dragged by people, but the people are not dragged [by the wood], and the sun draws exhalations upwards in a straight line, while itself revolving in a circle. 16,25 Now [this critic] first has to show that acts of discernment and assent are movements, at least if he is maintaining the assumptions as a consequence of which we thought of movement as continuous and extended in time, and not composed of partless movements, and also as progressing from potentiality to actuality while still preserving potentiality.9 He seems to be completely oblivious to these [assumptions], although he has published a summary of what Aristotle said about movement.10 Also, people who drag wood, and the sun that moves in a circle, are themselves also moved with the movement that they cause, since they cause movement, and are moved, in respect of place. Were it with a movement different in number, or even in kind, that would not affect the argument when at this point [Aristotle] has proposed only that if what causes movement in respect of place causes movement because of being moved, then it too will be moved in respect of place. 16,36 But [the critic] says that it is not even necessary that if the soul moves in respect of place, then after exiting [the body] it also re-enters. For not even those who claim that the soul is pneuma11 and endow it with locomotion would, [he says], concede that it re-enters after exiting. 16,39 Then, my very good [friend], they are wrong, and inconsistent with the [17] assumption that they uphold. For if the soul exits as a body from the body, why will it not also re-enter? We see this elsewhere, e.g. with objects that are in a place as their container. Yet some defence is left for Zeno [the Stoic], since he claimed that the soul was blended with the body, and did not make it exit without the compound being destroyed.12 But Aristotle claims that this absurd consequence [of re-entering a body] follows [only] for those who posit the soul as surrounded by the body as its place, and as if in a container [rather than permeating it]. These would be Democritus and his followers, and anyone segregating the soul as fire or as water. 17,9 (406b5-11)13 But perhaps they will say that the soul is moved incidentally with these corporeal movements by existing in the body, because there is nothing to prevent it also being moved by something else with these movements. Indeed, when an animal is pushed by force, the soul has to be involved in this enforced movement. But they will say that [here] it is moved by its own agency with the movements of the soul, and insofar as these belong to the soul, and that these movements come from the soul’s essence, and that it cannot be moved by something else with these movements, since they depend on the internal nature [of the soul].

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So let them clearly instruct us on what these [movements of the soul] are. For sense-perception is moved when, as it were, its door is knocked upon by objects that are external to it, while desire is drawn by the objects of desire, and acts of reasoning depend on perceptions, assuming that they never exist without imagination. But if [these movements occur] in and of themselves, yet are not continuous even in time, they are not even movements. So if it is by other objects that the soul is moved with these [movements] too, with what movements is it moved by itself? For it is certainly not moved with the same movements both by other objects and by itself at the same time. For none of the [properties] belonging14 to it exists both in itself and externally at the same time, nor is it moved both because of itself and because of something else at the same time. Similarly neither is the movement of rivers, flame, or anything else of that sort. For [properties that belong] in and of themselves are inseparable and need no external cause. 17,25 But, [the critic] says, the objects of sense-perception do not move the [capacity] for perception, but instead have the status of a necessary condition,15 and he compares sense-perception to spiders that leap on the animals that fall into their webs, where it is not the [animals] that fall in that cause movement, but rather the inherent impulse [of the spiders]; for this is how objects of sense-perception ‘fall into’ the sense-organs and provoke the soul to discern them. 17,29 But if we have to adhere to these ingenious examples at all, then just as the gnat moves the spider, and every prey moves its hunters, and every object of desire those who desire it, so too would external things move the soul. In fact, [the critic] himself seems to condemn the [examples] as inapposite, since he switches from spiders to [the example of] the ground, and says that in relation to seeing the visible object has the same status as the ground in relation to walkers. Yet it is ridiculous for the objects of sense-perception to be a space and a place for the activities of the senses rather than resemble the objects that drag, call or stimulate. This is clearest in the case of objects of desire, since every object of desire is straightforwardly like something that drags the capacity for desire along in its wake, and not like being a place and a space [for it]. 17,39 (406b11-15) Also, will they now say that the soul is moved with these movements of the soul insofar as it is a soul, [18] or in respect of something else? If insofar as it is the soul (for in respect of that it also causes movement), then just as what is moved in respect of colour is removed from its colour, and that which is moved in respect of place is removed from its place, so too would the soul, if moved insofar as it is the soul, be removed from being a soul. Those who make it move in respect of one of its incidental [properties] (e.g. place, size or quality) are not compelled to admit that its movement must be a loss of its essence, but only of what is incidental to it insofar as it changes. But those who say that it is moved insofar as it is the soul, and who in effect make its movement its



essence, must admit the absurdity resulting from their theory. For if it is moved insofar as it is the soul, and its movement is its essence, then by being moved insofar as it is the soul, it would lose its essence. For just as flame, winds and rivers, when their movement occurs in respect of their essence, do not remain for a moment with the same essence (i.e. if a river is not flowing it is no longer a river, but water; and if wind is not in motion it is no longer wind, but air or an exhalation); so too is it necessary for the soul’s movement to be in continual and unceasing flux. What, then, is the source of our memory? What is the source of stability in bodies of knowledge? 18,16 If we come to grips with this theory,16 and admit that the movement of the soul is its essence (i.e. its nature), then this, [the critic] says, is why the soul is not removed from its essence the more it is moved. For its movement, he says, is its life, and living for it is the same as being moved.17 18,20 But the person who says this seems ignorant of the distinction between movement (kinêsis) and activity (energeia), i.e. that being active in respect of essence can preserve the nature of what is active, as seeing can for sight, whereas being moved in respect of essence always involves a loss of that essence from which it is moved. Also, while activity is perfect in respect of each part of the time in which it occurs, as with both seeing and thinking, movement is an imperfect entelechy and is continually adding on successively different things:18 place if [movement] in respect of place, size if [movement] in respect of size, and essence if [movement] in respect of essence, as with rivers and winds.19 The reason why the heavenly bodies are completely imperishable is that they are moved [only] in respect of external place, and so while their nature remains in just the same state, [only] their position constantly varies. 18,30 If they dispute that what we name ‘activity’ they call ‘movement’, then we shall not dissent over the name. For one is permitted to use names as one wishes, and particularly species in place of genera. For movement is a kind of activity, and so if something is a movement, it is also an activity; but if something is an activity, it is not always a movement, a [distinction] which it is clear that in many places Plato actually adopts in the same form.20 That is why there is no need to have a dispute over a name, but it must be realized that the references (ta pragmata) [of the names] are vastly different – an imperfect versus a perfected entelechy.21 18,37 (406b15-25)22 But those who believe that the soul is moved have surely never seen it moved in and of itself, yet on seeing an animal and its body, they supplied the belief that the soul had prior movement. [19] Sense-perception also gave them considerable evidence of this, since many objects that cause other objects to move are also themselves moved along with them. But if the soul is moved when it causes the body to move, then it would be at rest when it brings the body to rest; therefore it has the one added to it as much as the other, and so movement does not belong to it in

Book One


accordance with its unique definition, and least of all eternal and incessant movement. For how would animals acquire a state of rest? This [problem] also confronts those who dream up incorporeal movements of the soul, and obviously Democritus because his atoms are always in motion and never at rest when they cause an animal to move. In general, those who claim that the soul causes the body to move by being moved in respect of place are making a comparable claim to Philippus the comic poet.23 For his Daedalus, he said, made the wooden [statue of] Aphrodite move by pouring in quicksilver. That is just what these [philosophers] also say, although it is all too evident that an animal is moved not because its soul undergoes prior internal movement in respect of place, but because the body immediately obeys when the soul just makes choices and judges [objects]. 19,17 (406b26-9) Timaeus too, by claiming that the soul moves the body by being moved, would seem to provide a physical theory of the soul in the same way as Democritus.24 For he says that because the soul is combined with the body by being constituted from the elements expounded [in the dialogue], and, by being divided according to the harmonic numbers, it also carries the body round with it by its own movement, and is itself moved in a circle.25 Now it is abundantly evident from texts in many dialogues he composed that Plato does not think that the soul was a body. But [at 406b26] Aristotle does not say that he is contradicting Plato but [only] Timaeus who either thinks that the circle [of the soul] is a body, or else does not think that it is a body but gives it that name, and is open to scrutiny either for the doctrine, or for the expression, from those who in philosophy [generally], and particularly in the case of such major problems, prefer not to say something different from what they think. For what is acceptable in such cases is that what we think and express be identical, and result in our clarity exceeding the obscurity in the subject matter. In particular, those committed to the view that the soul, and much less so the intellect, is not a body have no doctrine to contest as much as that which produces the soul from the divine and heavenly body by devaluing all earthly bodies. For this doctrine is very plausible, and is implied in Plato by the luminous vehicle,26 and in Aristotle by ‘the analogue to the fifth body’,27 which he says exists in almost every animal’s soul. [20] Certainly [by comparison] there was nothing elevated28 about disproving [earlier] that the soul was fire, water, blood or the spherical atoms; that was easy for anyone, even someone far less clever than Aristotle. Now if on the way to attacking a doctrine that is powerful and traditional because it gets close to the nature of the soul, [Aristotle] puts forward [as his opponent] a character distinguished in philosophy to whom Plato attributed his dialogue, he could not be fairly criticized as quibbling over29 whether it is Plato or Timaeus. For his argument is essentially against the doctrine, not the individuals, even if what they say implies that they champion the doctrine [that the soul is a heavenly body].30



20,8 (406b29-407a2) For [Aristotle] next recalls the words of Timaeus,31 and says that when the demiurge had constituted the soul, he bent it from a straight line into a circle, and since there was a plane around the straight line of the soul he divided the single circle and made two [circles] linked at two points, the one on the outside and enclosing, the other on the inside and enclosed. He divided the inner one into seven circles, and for that reason the heavens were moved in a circle because the soul is a circle, and indeed the divine bodies are moved in harmony because the soul itself is also divided in accordance with the harmonic numbers. For because of these two [circles] it is divided into the musical ratios so that it can have an innate sense of harmony, and so that the universe can move with harmonious movements.32 20,19 (407a2-11) Now, first of all, he does not correctly describe the soul as a magnitude, even though he posits it as rational. For clearly Timaeus intends the soul of the universe to be rational in the same way as what is called ‘intellect’. For the soul of the universe will not need the other capacities, neither sense-perception, appetite or spirit. The secondary gods later on ‘weave’ these into the soul for individual animals,33 and in general the movement of these capacities is not circular movement. Sense-perception is in fact like rectilinear [movement] towards external objects, as is desire. So they are not correct to make the intellect a magnitude, whether they make its shape a circle or a sphere. For every magnitude is continuous, and is one by being continuous and by linking its parts to a common definition. Intellect, on the other hand, is one and continuous in a different way, assuming that we should apply ‘continuity’ to it at all. For since we shall in due course show that the intellect is identical with its its thinking (and I mean the actual intellect),34 it is of course clear that the intellect will have continuity in whatever sense its thinking does. But its thinking will be shown to be identical with its thoughts,35 and these have the [property of being] one by being in succession, and thus resemble number, not magnitude. For when we think one object [immediately] following another, the thoughts are divided, yet they are in [immediate] succession to one another, and the plurality [of thoughts] invariable culminates in a unity (as in deductive reasoning the premises end in the [single] conclusion), yet not by [the plurality] being continuous, or by linking up with a general definition. So if the [intellect’s] thoughts are a unity in this way, then clearly so too is the intellect [itself],36 and it is either entirely [21] undivided, as in its relation to the primary definitions, or it is continuous unlike a magnitude but in the sense in which we might refer to number [as ‘continuous’] if we numbered in [immediate] succession a unit, then a pair, and then a set of three.37 Indeed, in other respects it is unworthy both of Timaeus and of Pythagoras to think that the intellect is a magnitude. For how does it also think when it is a magnitude, and especially if, as Timaeus says, the soul and the intellect need ‘contact’,38 and proximity, in relation to the object of thought?

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21,6 (407a11-19) For [the soul] will either think a whole by touching [it] with each of its parts; or not with each of its parts, but with the whole circumference of the circle; or [it will think] the parts [by touching] with each of its parts, and [think] the whole [by touching] with the whole. 21,8 (407a11-15) Now if it thinks the whole with each of its parts, then since these parts are either points or magnitudes (assuming a point should even be called a part), then if [it thinks] in respect of a point and these [points] are infinitely numerous, it is clear that it will never completely traverse them. But if it thinks in respect of magnitude, then it will think the same thing either several times or an infinite number of times. But in fact just once is enough; for while the good is not the same in repetition, truth is so in a single instance. 21,13 (407a15-17) If it is sufficient for it to touch with any of its parts, why must the soul be moved, or even have magnitude, at all? For where magnitude contributes nothing to [an object’s] nature, that object would be in itself without magnitude, even if it were divided incidentally. A white thing a cubit long is, for example, no more white than one a foot long, nor indeed is a thing a foot long [whiter] than one a hand-span long. That is why magnitude too contributes nothing to qualities; instead, whiteness [for example] is undivided as whiteness, and also [when] in a magnitude.39 The same applies to the intellect too, and to its potentiality: [i.e.] if it is going to think the greater and the smaller part of the circle and the magnitude in the same way, then the magnitude [contributes] nothing to the essence of the intellect, if indeed its activity is its essence.40 For this is how we also say that some things come into existence without [reference to] time, where time contributes nothing to their perfection, but they are without qualification perfected and complete at any part of the time. 21,24 (407a17-19) But if they are not going to say that the circle thinks with each of its parts but with the whole [of itself], again what need is there for touch in respect of parts? Or how will it think as a whole if it comes from parts that do not think anything? Indeed, if this is why it touches, and touches with its parts, then it would think first with its parts. But if they flee both these [consequences] and go on to say that it thinks the parts with the parts, and the whole with the whole, how will it get to know objects without parts, given that many objects of thought are also without parts? 21,30 Why are we being pointlessly precise? For if the soul in general is a magnitude, and thinking occurs through touch and contact, then it cannot think by touching at a point, or by touching in respect of magnitude. For if it touches at a point, how will it apprehend objects that are divided into parts, given that it is impossible for what is not divided into parts to coincide with objects that are divided into parts? And if it touches in respect of magnitude, how again will it grasp objects that are not divided into parts? But the soul obviously does both when it thinks objects that are divided into parts, just as much as [when it thinks] objects that are not so divided. [22] Thus it could not be a magnitude, nor could it require touching



for understanding, but the intellect must be a different nature, entirely removed from the dimensions of body, and it thinks undivided objects because it itself is also not in a magnitude, and it grasps objects that are divided into parts because it also contracts41 these objects for itself, and so makes them as undivided as possible.42 For example, it makes the form and essence of each thing undivided (i.e. uncompounded) for itself, and the primary definitions are those forms that it thinks by extracting them from matter, even though they are in matter.43 22,7 (407a19-22) It is clear that those who posit the intellect as thinking in this way (I mean by being moved in a circle) concede that as a consequence this intellect is a circle and a magnitude. For if it thinks by being active in some other way, why do they pointlessly associate circular movement with it? And if [it thinks] by being moved in a circle, as they say, it will be a circle and a magnitude, if indeed [the demiurge]44 bent the straight line into a circle45 just so that it could think. So someone who makes thinking like this46 must encounter the [consequences] that we have stated. For [the soul] must either think in respect of a point, or in respect of a magnitude: if in respect of a point, then thinking about objects that are divided into parts will evade it; but if in respect of a magnitude, then thinking about objects that are not divided into parts will evade it. 22,15 (407a22-3) But the revolution [of the circle] is also eternal; so too, then, is its thinking. Now either it is always thinking and hence always thinking the same object, or [it thinks] one object after another. If it thinks the same object, such thinking will be more like a stationary condition [than movement]. But if it thinks one object after another, how [will it do so] when its circular movement is the same? And also when will it complete its thinking? So if it is never going to complete it, it will revolve to no purpose. So it will never be in a state of having [completed] thought. 22,20 (407a23-31) Yet there are limits to all thinking, both practical (always for the sake of something) and contemplative. The latter is similarly limited by the arguments that it also uses with a view to contemplation. An argument is either a definition, or a demonstration, and definitions are all limited, while no demonstration progresses to infinity, nor turns back to the original premises, but bodies of knowledge are more like a straight course. 22,26 (407a32-4)47 What is clear [from the Timaeus] is not how movement belongs to the intellect according to nature, but rather how it does so contrary to nature, indeed as something that can also harm its activity. For thinking is more like being in a static condition [than movement], entirely so when of the primary definitions, but equally the [thinking] that uses deductive reasoning is in the end a stationary condition and a state of rest rather than a movement and retreat48 from what has been demonstrated. (That is also why people think more [effectively] when sober than when drunk, at night better than during the day, and when the body is stable rather than when it is disturbed; and it is why young people think

Book One


less [effectively] than their elders, since their body is moved with a greater number of movements.)49 22,33 (407a34-b2) Movement, then, for the intellect is more contrary to nature than is rest. Thus what is discomforting [in this way] is not sublime, given that everything contrary to nature is enforced. Those who make movement the essence of the intellect certainly make its nature into one that harms its activities. Also, if movement is the essence of the intellect, how will it think [objects] that are non-material, and unmoved? And the [question] ‘how will it think objects that are in motion?’ cannot be turned back against [23] those of us who posit it as unmoved. For the intellect also thinks objects that are moved not as ones that are moved, but insofar as they have the same [unmoved] structure. For the intellect in actuality [thinks] in respect of form and essence and not matter, even when it apprehends [forms] that are accompanied by matter.50 In this way it also thinks movement itself by thinking its form and its definition, because that is what its activity is like. It is difficult for those who take movement to be the soul’s essence to explain the [activity of] thinking objects that are unmoved. 23,8 (407b2-5) It is also burdensome [for the intellect] to be mixed with the body if it cannot be released, but it [the body] should be fled if it is better for the intellect to exist without the body, as is usually claimed, and is the belief common to many, in the past and currently. (The latter are not ashamed to concede that the souls of animals are better than the human soul, if they can be released from the body, but the human soul cannot.)51 23,13 (407b5-11) From what is said [in the Timaeus] the cause of the heaven’s moving in a circle is obscure. For if we must focus on the text, the essence of the soul is not circular movement; instead, it was later bent into a circle from a straight line,52 since the latter nature is more intrinsic to it than that of the circle, and since circular movement is incidental and extraneous to it, being caused not by its original essence but in order to make the universe move with harmonious movements. Thus [Timaeus] makes the body the cause of movement for the soul, not the soul for the body.53 But Timaeus does not even define being moved as better for the soul than being at rest, and [define] being moved in this way. Yet this [property] must above all be sought among the actions of god.54 23,23 (407b13-20)55 This theory, and most theories that concern the soul, have the absurd consequence of linking the soul with, and positioning it in, the body, without also defining what causes this, and what state the body is in, and what affinity it has with the soul. For one thing does not randomly associate and link up with another, nor does everything act and get acted on by everything, nor everything cause movement for and get moved by everything, unless there is some association and affinity between those entities from which a single function results when they are combined.



This does not [arise] from random [pairings], such as a stone and a voice, or a human being and a tree.56 23,31 (407b20-6) They just try to state what kind of thing the soul is, without also defining what kind of thing the body is that receives it, as though it were possible, in line with the Pythagorean myths (which [Plato] used in a political form, although they use them [only] in natural philosophy), for any soul to settle into any body. For we see that each animal, or rather each body [found] among animals, acquires a unique form and structure, and that a worm’s body differs vastly from a horse’s, and a flea’s from that of a human being. But they [24] think that any soul can be lodged in any body (a gnat’s in an elephant’s, if chance has it), so that their claim is like someone perhaps saying that weaving settles into flutes, or metalworking into shuttles. Yet if it were natural for skills to cause themselves to settle into their instruments,57 then flute-playing would settle into flutes not into a lyre, and lyre-playing into a lyre not into flutes. So if bodies are the instruments for souls, each soul should migrate into the [body] belonging to it, but not really migrate so much as make the body belong to it and be adapted to it. For [the soul] moulds the body, and does not take it over ready-made, as lyre-playing does the lyre.58 So Timaeus kept silent about what the [body] belonging to each [soul] is and how it [exists], and what [the soul] is in advance of the body59 that it will find and fashion.

24,13 (407b27-32)1 There is another doctrine handed down about the soul, no less plausible than those described above, yet passing scrutiny when examined both in public and in private discussions.2 For it is said that it [the soul] is an attunement, indeed that the attunement is a blend and combination of opposities, and that the body is combined from opposites. So what brings these opposites (i.e. hot/cold, wet/dry, hard/soft, and all the pairs of opposites belonging to the elements) into concord and attunes them can only be the soul, just as the attunement of sounds unites high and low pitch. Now although this theory is plausibile, it is thoroughly disproved in numerous [arguments] by both Aristotle and Plato.3 24,22 [Plato argued]:4 (a) that while the one (i.e. the soul) is prior to the body, the attunement is posterior;5 (b) that the [soul] rules and commands the body and is often in conflict with it, whereas an attunement does not conflict with what has been attuned;6 (c) that an attunement admits differing degrees, whereas the soul does not;7 (d) that where an attunement is maintained it does not admit a non-attunement, whereas the soul admits vice;8 (e) that if non-attunement is sickness, ugliness or weakness, then the attunement of the body would be health, beauty9 and power rather than the soul.10 All the preceding points have been stated by philosophers elsewhere; the following points are what Aristotle states here. 24,30 (407b33-5) Attunement is a ratio between things that have been

Book One


attuned, and a combination of things that have been mixed, yet the soul is neither a combination nor a ratio. In fact the [soul] is a substance, but the [combination] is not.11 24,32 (407b35-408a3) The soul causes the body to move, whereas the attunement does not cause movement in what has been attuned, but supervenes on what has been attuned, while someone else imposes the attunement, as where the musician tunes the strings. This means that the soul will need another soul to provide its attunement.12 24,35 (408a3-5) The theory would obviously appear absurd if we tried to refer the affections and functions of each thing’s13 soul back to a specific attunement. For to what sort of attunement does sense-perception belong, [25] and what sort is there for loving or hating? 25,1 (408a5-18) This doctrine is primarily based on magnitudes that have position and movement, since whenever these are so juxtaposed that they admit nothing [else] of the same kind, they are said to be ‘correctly attuned’, and the name for their combination is an ‘attunement’, as with wood, stones and all the natural bodies that the crafts bring into attunement. Hence we also say that things that are mixed or blended in a given ratio are ‘attuned with another’ because they are mixed concordantly, and so are not dissociated or detached, and admit no other intervening ratio that would attune them and blend them together more [effectively], just as we also consider musical sounds to be attuned when no intervening ratio is found that would make the concord of sounds more pleasant. So in which of these senses can we call the soul an attunement? Not as a combination or juxtaposition, as of bones with bones, or bones with sinews. For it is ridiculous to say that the intellect or sense-perception is a combination of such parts. But neither is it like the ratio of a mixture or a blend; for then there would have to be a different soul for the different blend of each part, so that each thing would have many souls.14 25,16 (408a18-24) This is also the demand to be placed on Empedocles, since he blends each of the parts of the body by its special ratio: bones in one way, flesh in another. So will this ratio according to him be the soul, and if the ratios are more than one, will the soul be more than one too? Or is the soul implanted15 onto a pre-existing ratio as something else over and above the ratio? Also, is [Empedocles’ force] love (philia) the cause of this mixture, or of any mixture? And is love the ratio, or something else over and above the ratio? 25,23 So it is clear from what has been said here and elsewhere that those who claim that the soul is an attunement would seem to cast [their dice] none too close, nor yet too far, from the truth.16 The theory does, as I said earlier,17 have considerable plausibility. 25,26 (408a24-8) For again,18 if the soul is completely distinct from the mixture and blend, why does the soul immediately perish when they do? For when the ratio of the flesh is dissolved, as well as the [ratio] of each of the other [parts] like it, then [on this theory] the soul too is immediately



dissolved. But the problem must also be reversed:19 why, when the soul leaves the body, does the blend and mixture that they call ‘the attunement of the body’ immediately perish? For if the soul perishes when the blend also perishes, and if the blend perishes when the soul leaves, [the soul and the blend] would not be too remote from one another.20 25,33 But the soul, it is said,21 does not perish when the blend perishes, but [only] the ensoulment (empsukhia) that the soul grants to the body,22 since [the soul] itself is separate, but irradiates life [to the body],23 as the sun [does] light to the air. I am amazed at those who make these claims, first, because they regard examples as demonstrations when an example is the weakest type of proof.24 Next, because they do not adhere to the actual [examples]. For the [26] sun, which is one, supplies light to all bodies, yet they would not describe the soul that irradiates life to all animals as one. That is why the sun too is one, but not everything shares in light in the same way,25 but air, water, silver, stone and wood do so in different ways, and distinct colours do so in distinct ways. But if someone says that the soul is one, then by the same token animals must share in it in a variety of ways, and also [on this theory] will differ not in their souls but in their ensoulments. 26,8 Next, what [soul] will that one soul be?26 Whatever [soul] it is, it will make no difference to Aristotle’s theory at least. For he says that in the present work he is not inquiring into that soul that is single, nor is he defining it, but he is inquiring into the [soul] of a human being, and that of a horse and a cow,27 and whether they want to give it the name ‘ensoulment’ or ‘soul’ he will not object. Instead, just as in defining light as an entelechy of that which is actually transparent, Aristotle says that he is not defining the sun but what the sun grants, although he can alternatively say that the sun is an entelechy of that which is actually transparent,28 so here too in defining the soul he says that he is not defining the [soul] that is from without and single, but the entelechy that comes from that [soul] into bodies that have organs, while perhaps being able to define that [external soul] too in the same way.29 For nothing prevents one of the two entelechies of transparency from being more perfect (i.e. the sun), and the other less so (i.e. light). So too with the soul, one [entelechy] is more perfect (i.e. the soul from without), the other less so (i.e. the soul of each [individual]). So the soul of each individual to which you [my opponent] give the name ‘ensoulment’ and I [give the name] ‘soul’, he [Aristotle] says is inseparable and perishable,30 and perishable not in an unqualified way but as light is in water. You, as it seems, hold the same view; for while disputing the name, you all too obviously agree on its reference. 26,25 That it is reasonable for the soul of the universe to irradiate either soul or ensoulment to bodies by being a vital force extended through the universe would seem to be above all evident in spontaneously generated animals, which right [at birth] breathe, live and are self-moved through

Book One


their particular bodily temperament,31 as is reported of mice in Egypt, and as do worms, gnats and many similar animal species known to us. But this has nothing to do with the separability of such souls. But perhaps they will disregard the example [of the separate sun], and say that present in each [animal] is a unique soul that can produce the ensoulment for it. In that case let them tell us whether this applies to all animals, or just to humans. For in applying to all [animals] it may be more ridiculous than the myths if a flea’s soul is established by irradiating ensoulment to the flea. But if it just applies to humans, what is the allotment [of different souls to bodies], and where does the distinctness come from for these human souls, meaning the ones established from outside? [Obviously] they are all of the same kind, and everything that is of the same kind acquires distinctness by the division of matter into parts.32 26,39 In general, how will the [27] [soul] that supplies vegetative life be established in the body from without, or the one that supplies spiritedness or appetite?33 Intellect can perhaps be established from without and illuminate the soul with a rational capacity,34 but these [other] natures must exist in, and be connected with, bodies if they are going to provide their own functions. 27,5 (408a29-30)35 But subtlety of this sort will perhaps receive an independent discussion. Meanwhile, what is quite obvious from what we have said is that such a soul [i.e. an ensoulment] cannot be an attunement, nor [can it exist] without an attunement. 27,8 (408a34-b8) A more reasonable problem about the soul as moved might be raised by looking at the fact that we say that that the soul ‘fears’, ‘is cheerful’, ‘suffers pain’, as well as that it is ‘angry’, ‘perceives’ and ‘thinks discursively’. All these are thought to be movements; hence someone might think that the soul is moved with these movements. But that does not necessarily [follow]. For this claim has a double refutation: these affections are not movements of the soul; and granted that they are movements, they are still not movements of the soul but of the whole animal by the agency of the soul, as when in fits of anger the soul discerns that the situation justifies anger, while the animal’s heart is moved and the blood around it boils and swells up.36 Now if boiling and palpitation belonged to the soul, then the soul would be moved in respect of its fits of anger. But if those who posit the soul as incorporeal cannot concede this, then the animal will be moved when it gets angry, while the soul will just discern [things], and discernment is not a movement, but rather a state of calm and rest.37 It is the same situation in relation to fear too: [the soul] discerns what is frightening, while a given part of the body is contracted, chilled and altered. ‘They blanch through fear,’ says Homer, as well as ‘Paleness overtook his cheek.’38 These [cases] will obviously be affections and movements of the ensouled body, namely the animal, whereas it would be quite ridiculous for the soul itself to blanch or blush. 27,25 (408b8-11) And so discursive thinking, if it is a movement, should



belong to the whole human being, not [just] to the human soul, when some part that is analogous to the blood or the pneuma is altered internally.39 In the case of such affections the body with a soul is perhaps moved by the soul in two ways: either in respect of some spatial movement when parts of it are moved (as in anger the blood springs forth to the surface, leaping forward from the rest of the body), or in respect of alteration, as when [the body] is chilled when frightened. The question of what sort of affections involve what sort of bodily movement is for another discussion.40 27,33 (408b11-15) But those who refer the movements [caused] by the soul back to the soul itself act just as though one said that the soul ‘weaves’, ‘builds a house’ or ‘plays the lyre’. The soul is, in fact, the cause of these movements, since the hexis for house-building exists in it. But just as it is the house-builder who builds houses, not his craft, and the lyre-player who plays the lyre, not the art of music, although the house-builder does build by the art of house-building, and the lyre-player plays by the art of lyre-playing – so too it is not the soul that pities but the person, yet [that person does so] in respect of the soul (408b18), ,41 just as it is the person who washes, [28] breakfasts and swims, not the intention (gnômê) on the basis of which the person does these things. And when I say ‘in respect of the soul’ I do not mean that the movement exists in the soul, as when I say that a person is moved ‘in respect of his hand’; for there the hand itself undergoes the movement. 28,4 (408b15-16) But in what sense do I say that a person is moved ‘in respect of the soul’? [I say so] either as ‘[reaching] up to it’, or as ‘[starting] from it’. 28,5 (408b16-17) (a) When the soul perceives external objects of perception, the body is moved [to reach] up to the [line of] relay42 to the soul, because the sense-organs transmit to the source [of that relay; i.e. the soul] the affections that they receive as imprints from the external objects that the soul by itself perceives while remaining unmoved. We are, therefore, said to be moved with movement ‘in respect of the soul’ because the soul is the cause of the affection in our sense-organs, and of the transmission through them, since such an affection [from outside] certainly does not touch the organs belonging to a corpse. 28,12 (408b17-18) (b) Recollections, by contrast, [do] not [reach] up to the soul but [start] from it; that is because recollection starts where sense-perception ends. For the soul presents images from [within] itself, and by unfolding them arrives at recollection. So recollection is said ‘to start from the [soul]’ because the presentation of the images that the soul holds, as though in storage, starts from the soul.43 28,17 But if someone says that the residues of the objects of perception are not a movement but rather a state of stability and rest, that would make no difference to the present argument. For recollection often starts from the presentation of images and ends in just this [state of rest] without

Book One


implicating bodily movement, although frequently we blush on recollecting something disgraceful, or are nauseated if it is frightening, and frequently walk and converse on the basis of recollection. But walking, conversing, being nauseated, blushing and all such things are obviously movements, whereas acts of discernment and sense-perception are definitely not movements, or not of this kind, but are activities of the soul. Even if someone said that activities were also movements, there should not, as I also said earlier,44 be any dispute concerning the name, but a distinction should be drawn, because even if [activities] are also movements, they are still ‘a kind distinct from movement’,45 as he himself explicitly concedes in the following [passages in the de Anima]. For he says that where someone contemplates, thinks (phronein) and is taught, ‘this is either not an alteration (for the development of the thing is into itself and into activity), or is a different kind of alteration’.46 And again ‘that which from being potentially [knowledgeable] learns and acquires knowledge by the agency of that which actually knows,47 should either not be said to be affected, or we should say that there are two senses of alteration’.48 And again in Book Three: ‘Clearly the object of perception is what makes actual the capacity for perception from its being in potentiality; for [the capacity] is not affected or altered, which is why it is of a kind distinct from movement; for movement is an activity of what is imperfect, but activity in an unqualified sense is distinct; [29] it is [the activity] of what has [already] been brought to perfection.’49 In these [passages] he clearly speaks of movement in its strict sense, not as an activity in an unqualified sense, but as an activity of something imperfect. By contrast, he speaks in an unqualified sense of the activity of what is perfected, and that is why it is ‘a kind distinct from movement’. Clearly, then, he would not directly50 be contesting the soul’s being moved, but its being moved with the movements of the body. 29,5 These [issues] might be settled without difficulty in this way, although it is not very easy to gain full insight into them. For if a person gets angry in respect of the soul (without the soul itself getting angry), as a knife cuts in respect of its shape, and a sphere revolves in respect of its shape (without the actual shape either cutting, or revolving), then this is to make the soul too similar to incidental [properties]. In fact, the sphere cannot move from [within] itself with different movements emanating from different [parts], nor does the knife from [within] itself produce assorted cuts. The soul, by contrast, is itself the source of its movements, and can make the transition from one movement to another, and so ‘transition’ applies to it, and the term ‘change’ is not used in precisely the same sense in which it is applied to bodies. For all expressions such as [‘movement’ and ‘transition’] when applied to bodies signify that they are moved in a physical way, namely in time and by a continuous movement from imperfection to perfection. But in the case of the soul, all such changes are not in time, are isolated,51 and do not progress from potentiality to actuality in stages but all at once, as sight does from white to black things. But while



these [problems], as I have said,52 need not be laboured, what [Aristotle] presents regarding the intellect does require considerable investigation and reflection. 29,22 (408b18-29) [Here] it is necessary to quote the philosopher’s statement without rearranging anything53 for clarity’s sake. For what he says is not so much unclear as difficult to isolate and define. So to quote him. (a) ‘The intellect seems to come to exist in [us] as a kind of substance and not to perish. For [if it did], it would most probably perish through the enfeeblement of old age. But in fact what happens is the same as with the sense-organs. For an elderly person who acquired the right kind of eye would have the same sight as a young person, so that old age is not caused by the soul being affected but [by the thing] in which it exists [being affected], as with drunkenness and disease. And thinking (i.e. contemplating) wastes away through something else within perishing, while in itself it is unaffected’ (408b18-25). (b) ‘And discursive thinking, and loving or hating, are not affections of that thing [that reasons], but of the particular thing that has that [capacity], insofar as it has it. That is why when this also perishes, there is neither memory nor love. For these did not belong to it [the intellect], but to that [capacity held] in common [with it] which has perished. Whereas the intellect [itself] is surely something more divine and unaffected’ (408b25-9).54 29,35 In these [quotations] we must first inquire into the implications of his statements. This is because in the course of discussing [at 408a34b18] the soul’s not being moved, he says [at 408b18-19] that the intellect comes to exist in [us] as a substance and [30] does not perish, although there is no [logical] necessity to consider here the perishing of the intellect, since there is none regarding the rest of the soul too, but what, if anything, [should be investigated] is whether the intellect is moved or not. Next, [the arguments] that he introduces to confirm that the intellect does not perish will of course apply directly to the senses too. It is unnecessary for us to add any problem; instead, [Aristotle] himself explicitly says: ‘[if it perished], it would most probably perish through the enfeeblement of old age. But in fact what happens is the same as with the sense organs. For an elderly person who acquired the right kind of eye would have the same sight as a young person, etc.’ (408b19-22). From this it is clear that just as he posits sense-perception as not being affected along with the organs that are afflicted by old age, so he also [posits] the intellect as not being afflicted along with the internal organ. And he does not limit himself just to sense-perception, but ‘why’, to quote, ‘does it result that old age is not caused by the soul being affected but [by the thing] in which it exists [being affected], as with drunkenness and disease’? (408b22-4). So if the intellect ‘would most probably perish through the enfeeblement of old age’ (408b1920), yet does not in fact perish, but is itself ‘unaffected’ (408b25) and thereby immortal because of ‘something else within perishing’ (408b25), then the same also applies to the soul. For if ‘old age is not caused by the

Book One


soul being affected but rather [the thing] in which it exists [being affected], as with drunkenness and disease’ (408b22-4), then the soul too would be ‘unaffected’ and thereby immortal. But what would the organ of the intellect be that corresponds to the eyes, the one that he says ‘perishes within’ (408b25), while the intellect remains ‘unaffected’? And does this organ exist only in a human being, or also in the other animals? And, in general, if the intellect uses an organ 56 that is not visible, then surely it is reasonable to make the soul that has a capacity for sense-perception also separate from its organs? For having the organ [of the intellect] within, and that of [sense-perception] external and open to inspection, is not enough for a distinction as broad [as that between intellect and sense-perception]. 30,24 How does discursive thinking (dianoeisthai) differ from thinking (noein)? Is there thinking when [the intellect] grasps the uncombined definitions, and discursive thinking where these definitions are combined and divided? So which is the superior capacity? Is it the one that apprehends the uncompounded [definitions], or the one that combines and divides these uncombined ones?57 For the latter would seem to involve a more extensive capacity, just as with the crafts where knowing wood and stones as uncompounded is not the craft’s [job], but [knowing] their combination is. But this [problem] is not difficult to solve. For falsity as well as truth is present in combining, and while it is impossible to think falsely, it is possible to think discursively in this way. And just like the contrast between poor sight and clear vision, [thinking] involves a direct encounter (epibolê),58 and contact59 with the object of thought, whereas [discursive thinking] is like a movement in the direction of that object that amounts to an approach60 in a state too weak to retain the object without its being dispersed. 30,34 These and similar problems are the ones that might be raised [here], but we must store up the basic inference that we might [otherwise] be glad to draw concerning them for another occasion, when [Aristotle] himself distinguishes clearly between them.61 For in the present context he is more like someone who is raising a problem than someone providing an explanation [31]. 31,1 Next [Aristotle] refutes Xenocrates’ definition of the soul,62 not by contesting the term ‘number’, as Andronicus63 and Porphyry say, but by really inquiring into Xenocrates’ meaning, as is clear from the latter’s books On Nature where he would seem to make the soul a unit-like number. 31,5 (408b32-409a30) [Aristotle] says that this theory is by far the most illogical of those that he has discussed, since those who assert it (a) have the impossible consequences that follow from [the soul] being moved, then specifically those [that follow] from saying that it is a number. For how should one think of units being moved? Do some of them cause movement, while others are moved? Or does each of them cause movement and get



moved at the same time? If each of them does this at the same time, how could the soul, while being undivided and undifferentiated, be capable of causing movement and of being moved at the same time? For the latter are quite distinct [properties]. But if some [units] cause movement, while others are moved, it is not their compound structure (sustêma) as a whole that is the soul, but, if anything, only the units within the structure that cause movement. (b) In general, if a unit is moved, it must of course have position, and when a unit acquires position it becomes a point, and the movement of a point produces a line, not life. And the unit in the soul must have position, and thereby be somewhere. For so [must] the soul too. (c) Furthermore, if you subtract a number or a unit from a number, then a different number remains. But plants and many animals (e.g. insects) live when divided, and are thought to have a soul that is identical in kind. (d) In addition, if the units of the soul have position, then saying that the soul is [a set of] units will be no different from saying that it is [a set of] small bodies, like the spherical [bodies] of Democritus. Indeed, if someone assumed that Democritus’ spheres were not really spheres but points, and preserved only their quantity, there would be nothing to prevent some of them causing movement and others being moved, as though they were small bodies. For it is not by differing in largeness or smallness that some of them will be souls and others not; instead, if they preserved their number, smallness would certainly not prevent them [from being souls]. (e) How is it even possible for the soul to be [a set of] units? In what respect will they differ from the other units? For if it is only by position and by being moved, then they should therefore be called points, not units. Now since every body has points even independently of the soul, clearly the soul’s points will be in the same place as those that are in the body, and each point will occupy an area of the soul that is in the body. And what will prevent there also being two [points] in the same [place], and if two, why not still more, or even an infinite number? For things that have an undivided place do not produce a divided magnitude when they are made into a compound, nor do they need a larger place. But if the soul is the number of points in the body, why [32] do all bodies not have a soul? (f) Furthermore, how could [souls] be released from bodies, when points cannot [be released] from lines, nor lines from planes?

32,3 (409a31-b18) Those who posit [the soul as a number] share one absurdity with those who make the soul a rarefied body, and yet another with those who, like Democritus, constitute it from small spheres.1 In common with those who posit the soul as a body they put many points in a single point instead of two bodies in the same place, while they are unique in making an animal move2 by means of number, as we said that Democritus [did] by the number of his spheres. For what is the difference between

Book One


assuming that small spheres cause movement by flowing back and forth,3 or that units [do so], which, whether they are large or small, still move, and thereby cause movement. These and many other similar [absurdities] result for those who combine movement and number. For in general no notion of the form of the soul, the aim of every definition, can be reached from such a theory; in fact not even any of its incidental [properties] can be understood, as is clear if one tried to use this theory to define the affections and activities of the soul (e.g. ways of reasoning, sense-perceptions, pleasures, pains, and everything else of that sort). As stated earlier,4 it is not even easy to use them to make a guess. 32,195 Such, then, are the problems that Aristotle raises for Xenocrates’ definition of the soul. It would take another lecture6 to scrutinize those [raised by] the [philosopher]7 who termed Aristotle’s [arguments] ‘inconceivable’, and who himself paraphrased the correct and apposite arguments of others in a way that was neither correct nor apposite. Instead, we ought to contrast Andronicus’ [arguments] with those of that [critic], inasmuch as they offer at once a clearer and more plausible reconstruction of Xenocrates’ theory. [Andronicus]8 says: ‘They called the soul number because no animal was derived from an uncompounded body, but [only] where the primary elements were blended in accordance with specific ratios and numbers. So they made essentially the same claim as those who posit the soul as an attunement, except that they more clearly formulated their theory by adding in their definition that the soul was not every number, but [just] the self-moving number, as if these [others] too [had defined it] as not every attunement, but [just] the one that attunes itself. For this [type of] soul is the cause of this type of blend, and thus of the ratio and mixture of the primary elements.’ But, as I said,9 the way in which Xenocrates spoke of the soul as a self-moving number is to be understood from his own [works], and in particular from the fifth [book] of those On Nature that he composed. 32,34 (409b19-23) The next [text] consists of a recapitulation of the absurdities that follow for those who say that the soul is moved, and for those who posit it as a body, even if they make it the most rarefied [body], indeed the least corporeal of all. [33] 33,1 (409b23-410a13) [Aristotle] says that what remains to be investigated is how the soul is said to consist of the elements. For this claim is made so that the soul can perceive existing things, and come to know what state each thing is in, but necessarily their object is also not realized in this way. For by positing that like is known by like, they produce the [soul] from the elements, and think that that is how it will come to know all things. Correct, were the elements the only things existing; but, as it is, the [compounds] of the elements are far more numerous, indeed perhaps even infinitely so. Thus ‘we see earth by earth, and water by water’,10 but what about god? What about a human being? the other compounds like flesh and bone? For we do not, of course, [see] 11 the external horse by means of the horse in us. For each of these [compounds] is not any random state of the elements, but exists in a specific ratio and combination, just as Empedocles12 says of bone: The kindly earth in its broad-bosomed hollows Won of clear water two parts out of eight And four of fire; and so these became white bones. So there is no use in the soul being the elements, unless the ratio and combination for each [compound] is present in it. For in that way [the soul] will know by means of each [element] the [element] that is like it: by the elements from which it comes [it will know] the elements from which the [compound] comes, and by the combination [of elements] in it [it will know] the combination [of elements] in the [compound]. The impossibility of this does not need stating. For who would raise a problem over whether a stone or a human being is in the soul, and whether a plane-tree and a fig is, and similarly with what is and is not good, and in general with all existing things, and not just their ratios, but the actual things as wholes? 33,22 (410a13-22) How will the soul come to know the genera and universals listed in [Aristotle’s] Categories, i.e. substance, quantity, relation and the rest? For genera are certainly not elements too; they do not even come from the elements, but while [compounds] are more numerous than the , 13 [genera themselves] are entirely removed from even being considered elements, as with relation, acting or beingaffected, being-moved or being-in-a-state. Quality, if anything, and quantity are open to dispute, yet not even they [are elements]. For genera are our thoughts,14 and not elements of existing things. But take the position that the categories too are elements. Does the soul now consist of all of them? But elements do not seem to be common to all [the categories], e.g. to both acting and being-affected and their successors.15 But does it consist of only substance? How, then, will it come to know quantity? Will they say that there are elements for each kind, and special first principles from which the soul is constituted? But the soul is a substance, while from the elements of quantity a quantity and not a substance comes into existence, and from the [elements] of relation a relative and not a substance comes into existence. It would be ludicrous to inquire into the elements of acting, being-affected, being-moved and being-in-a-state, [34] if one must call the impossible ‘ludicrous’. That is why we must inquire into another explanation for the soul’s coming to know existing things and for its being existing things in a way. For those who say that the soul comes from all things just so that it can get to know all things, and be all things, encounter these and other similar absurdities. 34,5 (410a23-b9) More absurd than these [thinkers] are those who grant that like is unaffected by like, but also posit like as perceiving like,

Book One


and then say that sense-perception, thinking and knowing are [cases of] being affected by something. Empedocles is astonishing in claiming that ‘we grasp earth by earth’,16 as he does not see that even among the parts of an animal all those that consist exclusively of earth (e.g. bones, sinews, hair) are the most insensitive of all. Yet [for him] these [parts] should at least perceive things that are like [themselves]. Furthermore, each element will have more ignorance than understanding, since it will know one thing but be ignorant of many things – namely, everything else. Empedocles also has to make god the least intelligent [being], for god, as his sphere, comes forth from the confluence based on love, and, because he has no share in strife, will be the only one not to know strife, whereas all other mortal animals will know all things by sharing in all things; for mortals come from all of the elements. And, in general, what is the explanation for not everything that exists having a soul, when all things are elements, or consist of elements? 34,18 (410b10-13) Again, how according to them will the soul also be one? For the elements are a plurality. That is also why the soul is really more like matter, while there is some other substance with greater control that forms and blends the elements by holding them together and unifying them. So that [substance] rather than the elements should be posited as the soul, in that what is superior and stronger is the soul, and what holds [a thing] together, is always superior to what is dispersed. 17 34,23 (410b13-15) They are not ashamed of making the elements 18 even to the intellect, as if they could make matter [superior to] the craftsman.19 Yet it is reasonable that 20 [sc. the intellect] be the superior, being the very first to come into existence, and having the most control, and not the elements. 34,26 (410b16-21) One might make the general criticism that they do not speak about the whole soul, but some focus on the soul’s capacity for movement and belittle the remaining [capacities], others on the capacity that can grasp and come to know [things], without laying claim to the remaining [capacities]. Yet there are many animals that obviously have souls but stay in their place, so that they could not have the soul that causes movement, with which they are not involved. So one of these alternatives is necessary: these animals must either be posited as not having a soul, or if, as is believed, they do have a soul, our inquiry must be into why they do not move in respect of place, but instead are nourished, grow and perceive but do not change place at all. In fact, even if they move with these movements (i.e. growth and sense-perception) because they have a soul, they are still not moved by the soul alone, but externals also serve as contributory causes: [35] nutriment of their being nourished, objects of perception of their perceiving. But it is movement in respect of place that the soul is thought above all to control. 35,2 (410b21-4) Similarly, those who produce the intellect and sense-



perception from the elements, and believe that these capacities are quite unique to the soul, also neglect the vegetative capacity. On the basis of what sort of [capacity], then, are plants said to be alive, when they certainly have no sense-perception, intellect or movement in respect of place? 35,6 (410b24-411a2) When, like Democritus, they also say that senseperception and intellect are identical, surely they are contradicting what is all too evident? For many animals obviously share in sense-perception, but not in reasoning. So anyone agreeing with21 Anaxagoras on this, and taking the intellect to be in every soul and to be a part of this nature, and every soul to consist of all the capacities, would seem to have the same belief as [Empedocles] who said: For I have already been a girl and a boy and a shrub and a bird.22 Nevertheless, not even these [philosophers]23 would be speaking in universal terms about the soul in its totality; for they would not even be addressing all the capacities, nor even be discussing any [one] of them in its totality. This is also what happens to the account given in the ‘Orphic Verses’ where [Orpheus] says that animals share in soul at their first breath.24 In that case, how do non-breathing [animals] (meaning plants, ‘zoöphytes’,25 and insects) live? 35,20 (411a2-7) Those who produce the soul out of the elements,26 so that it can come to know existing things, also failed to notice that the soul did not have to be combined from everything just for this reason. For one component of a pair of opposites suffices to judge both itself and its opposite. Thus by means of what is straight we judge what is curved as well as what is straight, since the measuring rod is the judge of both, whereas what is curved is not a means of judging what is curved or straight.27 35,26 (411a7-16) There is still another doctrine about the soul beyond those [so far] described. It says that the soul is mixed with everything that exists, and so pervades the whole universe, and that every part of the [universe] has a soul. In fact this doctrine also caused Thales to think that everything was ‘full of gods’. In a similar [vein] too [are the lines]: All the pathways are full of Zeus and all the assemblies of men.28 The doctrine is perhaps also consistent with [that of] Zeno [the Stoic] and his followers, who posited God as pervading the whole of matter, and intellect, soul, nature and hexis as having different locations.29 (Perhaps [it harmonizes] even with Plato himself, since he says that ‘having placed soul in the centre [the demiurge] stretched it through the whole [universe], and moreover enveloped the body with it on the outside’.30) But this

Book One


doctrine too has many problems. What, for example, causes the soul in mixtures to produce an animal, but not the one in air and fire? Yet they say that the [soul] in the air is superior, but without supplying an explanation of just why the soul in the uncompounded bodies is superior [36] to that in the compounds.31 In fact, in both ways something absurd and illogical crops up. For to say that fire or air is an animal is rather extraordinary, and to deny that bodies that have souls are animals is really no less absurd. 36,4 (411a16-23) They seem to have believed that the soul was in the uncompounded bodies as wholes (e.g. in the whole of air and in the whole of water), because they saw that each of these [elements] was of the same kind as its parts. Thus, [they argued], if the water in us has a soul, then so does the whole of water. For just as the parts of the uncompounded bodies segregated in animals make them compounds consisting of all [the elements], so too the parts of the soul of each of the elements bring to completion [animals] that have souls. So then is it the case that just as the body of the air, both that of 32 [air] in us and that of the whole air, is of the same kind, so too there is a part in us that is of the same kind as the soul that is in the whole air? But they say that [the soul in the air] is not of the same kind, since they posit it as superior, and more immortal. But if it were not of the same kind, then the logic of [their argument], that the whole air has a soul because the part [of the air] in us [has one],33 would not go through in an orderly way, if indeed there is one kind of soul in [us] and another in [the air], and one of these kinds of soul belongs to the air in us, while the other does not, but [belongs] to the whole [air]. So either it must not be said that the [soul] in the whole air is immortal, while that in us is not, or else it does not necessarily follow from what they say that since the elements in us have a soul, the elements in the universe should also have one. (Anyone who wishes can easily see that our predecessors did not master this text.) 36,21 (411a24-6) So we must inquire into another explanation for the soul coming to know existing things rather than [the soul’s] being the combination of the elements, and another kind of movement must be attributed to [the soul], if it must have movement, and not be one of those things whose bodies are moved by it. Nor, in general, [must the soul be] the entelechy of what is imperfect, but if anything the activity of what has been perfected. 36,27 (411a26-b5) Since knowing, perceiving and opining belong to a human being through the soul, as well as [the activities of] showing spirit, having an appetite and willing34 (and [thus] the capacity of desire in general), then animals also have movement in respect of place through the soul, and furthermore growth, maturity and decline, growth and maturity directly, decline only indirectly when the outflow [of nutriment] exceeds the influx. Now someone forming a notion of these functions of the soul, and how distinct they are from one another, might reasonably raise the



problem of whether we activate each of them with the whole soul, and whether the whole [soul] causes sense-perception, knowledge, opinion, appetite, spiritedness, willing, and the others listed, in one and the same way, and displays them all by means of the whole of itself. Also, does life too come from one, [37] or more than one, of them, or from all of them, or from none of them, but from some other coexistent cause? So, to repeat, they are either all [caused] by the whole [soul], or else one part of it [causes] sense-perception, another knowledge, and a third appetite. That is also what Timaeus would seem to achieve when he claims that we think with one [part], show spirit with another, and have appetites with a third, and when he separately houses these parts of the soul in [respectively] the head, heart and liver.35 37,6 (411b6-19) So what more than anything else holds the soul together and unifies it, if indeed its parts vary as much as its activities, most of which do not even perceive one another? So what holds such dissociated capacities together? For the body certainly does not hold the soul together and unify it; for, on the contrary, [the body] seems more to be held together by the soul. Certainly when [the soul] leaves, [the body] is immediately dispersed, evaporates and rots. So if something else unifies it, that would more than anything else be the soul, and we would again have to inquire into whether [that which unifies] is also a single thing, or has many parts. Now if it is a single thing, why is the soul too not ipso facto a single thing? For we have to supply an explanation for the thing that holds the dissociated parts of the soul together being a unity, while the soul itself that holds together the far more dissociated parts of the body is not a unity. But if it is divided into parts is necesssarily 36 what can hold the divided [entity] together, obviously what holds the [divided] soul together will also be held together by something else, and that by yet another thing, and so it will progress to infinity, and neither will the argument nor the soul be constituted into a unity. For even if someone claims that the soul is one in substrate despite its using more than one capacity (as the apple is one in substrate but has, as distinct qualities, a sweet smell, good texture, shape, and colour),37 not even this assumption is indisputable, and particularly according to those who make one specific capacity [of the soul] immortal and the rest mortal. It seems to me that it is because Plato and Aristotle are basically aware of this [problem] that Plato houses the intellect apart from other [capacities] right in the compond [of soul and body], while Aristotle blends the intellect into [the body] from outside38 to prevent the form (logos) of its immortality being disturbed by perishable things, whether parts or capacities [of the soul]. (Those who produce the soul from parts are similarly impeded because its parts are just as dissociated [from one another] as mortal things are from immortal ones.) The theory is in difficulties both where the soul has many capacities, and where it has many parts, but more so in the second case. For if the whole soul holds the whole body together,

Book One


then each of its parts should also hold together a specific bodily part. But it is difficult even to fabricate the kind of part that the intellect will hold together, and its means [of doing so]. 37,34 (411b19-22) It is particularly evident in the case of plants that the parts of the soul are not separately housed in alignment with the parts of the body, since one part of the vegetative soul is not [housed] in the roots, [38] another in the base of the stem, and still another in the shoots, but [the soul] is entirely the same throughout the whole plant. Plants certainly go on living when divided, and when planted they produce a plant of the same kind. We also see that among animals too some insects on being sliced up still live for a considerable time, and move separately with each of their parts as though the soul were in them, although it is no longer one in number (how could it be in parts that are divided?), but one in kind. For each of the parts displays all the capacities for some time, since they obviously have sense-perception and movement in respect of place. (I myself have seen this happening with certain fish too, where the parts can hardly be held down, although the whole [body] has been sliced down the middle. With some creatures the tails can be seen wriggling for quite some time; with others, such as the land-based ostrich, the rest of the body [lives] without the head.)39 38,11 (411b25-7)40 So from all this it is clear that the parts of the soul are of the same kind both as one another (they are [parts] present in the divided parts of the body), and as the whole [soul] (they are in an animal before division). All the [capacities] also appear to be in the same [place], directed at a single object, and inseparable from one another, while the soul is not divided in itself, nor in its own capacities, but in respect of the volume of the body in which it exists. 38,17 (411b22-5; 27-30) There is also nothing odd about the parts of insects and fish not continuing to live and move. For they have no organs to preserve their nature; instead, all the parts of the soul that also pre-existed in the whole body belong equally to each of the [divided] parts. Plants certainly continue living [after division] and displaying [their] life as complete; for with regard to the vegetative capacity it is not worth disputing whether its [constituent capacities] of nutrition, growth and reproduction come from and belong to the soul. For this is the only soul that animals and plants share. So how is it the same soul when present in an animal, but not in a plant? Where does life come from for plants, if not from the soul? Certainly in the case of [plants] too living ones are distinguished from non-living ones by the capacity to be nourished, grow and reproduce. But if [the vegetative soul] is isolated in the case of plants, and is active by itself, that is no problem. For in the case of some animals the [soul] that can perceive is separated from the [soul] capable of movement in respect of place, but it is still the soul. That soul ‘by which we have life potentially’ may well also be the primary soul, as will later be demonstrated in greater detail.41

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Book Two of Aristotle On the Soul

38,34 (412a3-6) The [doctrines] handed down from earlier [thinkers] concerning the soul have been adequately described. Let us now begin anew, and try by ourselves [39] to define what the soul is, and what is the most widely-shared definition of it that will coincide with the whole soul, not only the human [soul], these being the [two] kinds of definitions into which some of our predecessors slipped unintentionally, others deliberately. 39,3 (412a6-10) Now among the things that exist we speak of one kind (the primary and most strictly meant) as substance, and speak of one [aspect] of this as matter, another as form, and a third as what comes from both. An adequate account of this has been given in the [work] On the First Principles of the Whole of Nature,1 but we must recall here too that substance as matter is a substance in potentiality and not yet in itself a particular thing (tode ti), but like a natural disposition for it, and a preparation for becoming a particular thing, whereas the form is the perfection and, as it were, fulfilment of the natural disposition, and the advancement of what is potential to its end. It is this [form] in respect of which [a substance] is, therefore, said to be a particular thing. What is, as it were, combined from these is a third [thing], to which both matter and structure belong, and this is the compound (to sunolon), and it is a particular thing not only in definition, but also in perception, since it is involved in coming into existence from the matter, and in being [what it is] from the form. But even so, [the compound] is said to be perfect, and in a perfect state (entelôs ekhein), only when it acquires its own structure for which it had been striving. 39,16 (412a10-11) It would be unfair to quibble with someone who gave this structure and form the name ‘entelechy’ (entelekheia) for using the name in a quite unfamiliar way.2 For if what we have just said is true, and for each [compound] the process of perfection (teleiôsis) comes from the form, and being in a perfect state (to entelôs ekhein) comes from the structure, then ‘entelechy’ would have to mean the hexis of the state of perfection (teleiotês).3 Yet ‘entelechy’ has two senses in the case of each [compound]: it is like knowledge (epistêmê), as well as like contemplating [what is known], the first being like a hexis, the second like a functioning

Book Two


of the hexis. So having reminded our pupils of this, let us advance4 them to the next [stage]. 39,24 (412a11-13) It is bodies, then, that more than anything else are thought to be substances, and among these the natural [bodies], such as earth, fire, water and air, and everything that nature brings to completion from them, since they are the first principles for [all] the other [bodies]. A bed, saw, coat and artefacts in general have the status of an incidental [property] in relation to the natural [bodies]. For the first is an incidental addition to wood, the second to iron, the third to wool, and every body that is an artefact is observed [as present] in a substrate that is natural. 39,29 (412a13-16) So setting aside artefacts, some natural bodies have life, others do not. Life we speak of as self-caused nutrition and growth.5 Therefore it is clear that every natural body that shares in life is a substance, and a substance by way of being a compound, and a compound from matter and form. So since what has life is not body in an unqualified way, but a body of a specific sort, and exists in [that body], then body is like a substrate and matter, and a body of a specific sort is structure and form. For nobody would say that the body is the form of the living body; for the latter has the status of substrate and matter, and so its [40] difference in relation to non-living bodies is not qua body, but qua body of a specific sort, i.e. qua being alive and having a soul. The soul must, therefore, be a form and an entelechy, and in that way be a substance as form. 40,4 (412a16-20)6 That the soul is not a body and does not have the status of a substrate has already been demonstrated earlier, but it is no problem to recall [the argument] here too. [Bodies] with souls differ from those without souls by having life, but do not differ by being bodies. Life is not, therefore, a body, nor indeed is the soul that is the cause of this life. This same [point] could also be clarified in the following way. Since in the compound substance both [soul and body] cannot be substrates, nor can both be forms, and since it is clear that the body is a substrate in the whole [compound] (for [the body] is what is advanced, moulded, structured and mastered, and is fit for dispersal and perishing unless held together by soul), it is absolutely necessary that the soul be a form and an entelechy. Indeed, we could not otherwise say that the animal was ‘from body and soul’, unless it was ‘from matter and form’.7 40,14 The [expression] ‘from specific things that exist in [a compound]’8 has three [senses]:9 (a) The most obvious is ‘from parts’, where we say that the house is ‘from bricks and walls’, and the animal ‘from bones and flesh’. Now that is one sense. (b) Another is [for example] where hydromel is ‘from water and honey’, and where in general the product of a blend is ‘from the things that have been blended’. This [sense] differs from the earlier one because there both the parts and the whole were spatially separated, whereas in the present case [constituent parts] that are [still] spatially separated are not yet blended. For while both the whole and the parts seem



to be in the same place, in truth the [parts] have perished, while the [whole now] exists. (c) A third sense is where we say that the statue is ‘from the bronze and the shape’, and the house ‘from bricks and their combination’. Thus when we also say that the animal is ‘from soul and body’, if we do so in accordance with the first sense, then the body would not be ensouled throughout, nor would it have sense-perception throughout itself, nor would it be nourished [throughout], but the soul would be in juxtaposition, either as the whole soul with the whole body, or as the parts [of the one] with the parts [of the other]. That is something of which we cannot even form a notion. Also, the soul will then contribute to an animal’s quantity, but not to its quality, just as parts do to the whole. Yet neither [is an animal from soul and body] in accordance with the second sense, since an animal does not come into existence when the soul perishes, nor when the body perishes, but, on the contrary, when each preserves its own nature and activity. Therefore the only alternative is that an animal comes into existence from soul and body in the third sense. Here one [aspect] is matter, the other form, and the body is not the form of the soul. This [soul] is, therefore, the form of the body. So an animal [has the name] ‘animal’ just as [something] has the name ‘statue’, in accordance with its structure; for it is in accordance with its soul that the one is called ‘an animal’, the other ‘a lifeless body’;10 for it is in step with the [soul] that life is present and absent in these cases. The soul is, therefore, in the case of an animal too, a specific form and a structure. [41] 41,1 (412a22-8)11 This [structure] has two senses: as knowledge and as contemplation, in the first as a hexis, the second as the activity of the hexis. This duality can thus also be found in the case of the soul: for example, sleep is like a hexis of the soul, but being awake is like an activity. I do not mean that the total activity of the soul stops during sleep, and only the hexis remains, since the soul’s nutritive ability (i.e. its capacity for nutrition) is sleepless even during sleep. But several capacities of the [soul] (specifically those for sense-perception and for movement in respect of place) are indeed inactive while animals are asleep. The soul, then, is the entelechy of the body that has life, and is so as the first [entelechy], not the second. For in the case of the same [person] knowledge is prior in terms of coming into existence: Socrates, for example, first acquires knowledge, then duly engages in contemplation. So it is 12 odd for someone to say that if the soul is an entelechy, sleep will not occur, if that person fails to understand what is explicitly said by Aristotle [in the following]: ‘For both sleep and waking,’ he says, ‘[are dependent] on the existence of the soul’ (412a23-4). Yet this [problem] must be investigated; for when we add ‘the first’ to ‘the entelechy’, the definition may include the rest of the soul, yet exclude the [soul] with a capacity for nutrition, since in the case of the latter the hexis is not separated from the activity. [The solution is that]13 whereas the hexis is always present along with the activity (and particularly among natural [bodies] which come into existence without any

Book Two


external direction and instruction), the activity is not always present along with the hexis. Thus someone defining the soul as first entelechy includes all the capacities, for during sleep some [capacities] have only the hexis, whereas the [soul] with a capacity for nutrition has the activity along with the hexis. 41,23 It has, then, been stated what the soul is in its genus: ‘It is a substance in accordance with its definition (logos)’ (412b10-11),14 and as an entelechy is the first.15 The next thing to define is what this is [the soul] of. Obviously it is of a body, but of what sort of body must next be determined more clearly. 16 41,25 Now some bodies are evidently natural, others not. By ‘natural’ I mean those that in and of themselves have a source of movement (e.g. earth, water, plants and animals); by ‘not natural’ those that do not have this (e.g. a bed, ship or coat). These have been clearly distinguished both by us, and by Aristotle before us, in the [books] On the First Principles of the Whole of Nature.17 Some natural [bodies] have life, others do not. (We have defined earlier what we mean by ‘life’, namely that it is self-nutrition and growth.)18 The [bodies with life] are animals and plants; for what we call ‘elements’ are natural [bodies] because they have a source of movement, but are not living because they do not nourish themselves. Growth in the case of stones is [only] homonymous, in that it is an [external] addition,19 or else, if stones do indeed grow throughout,20 they might also have a form of life, but one that is extremely indistinct. Some stones, in fact, are even said to reproduce, according to Clearchus.21 But even in these cases coming into existence is either homonymous, or has some other sense, for nature often reveals itself by minimal transformations, so that in some cases there is a dispute about whether something is an animal or a plant, and whether it is a plant or a stone. Anyway, since in the case of bodies some are natural, others not, and some [42] natural bodies have life, while others do not, the soul is neither the entelechy of body in general, only of natural body, nor of natural body in general, only of that which is also alive. 42,3 (412a28-b4) Everything that shares in life has organs, I mean everything that is mortal, and thus comes into existence. For all these [living] things need nutriment, and none of them has come into existence and exists in an unqualified way, but comes into existence perpetually and continuously, since this type of soul can never be at rest. That is why they need organs that can serve this purpose. This is obvious in the case of animals, for the mouth, stomach, veins etc. are organs for nutriment. In the case of plants the analogue [to these] is to be tracked down from their functions: for roots are analogous to the mouth (for both attract nutriment), the ribs [of leaves] and the piths [of plants] to veins, and bark and wood



are like bone and flesh, and ‘the leaf is like21a a covering for the pod, and the pod for the fruit’ (412b2-3), a pod being nature’s clothing for seeds, whether edible or not, and fruit the seed [of a plant]. 42,13 (412b4-9) Now if there is any definition common to every soul, then the soul would be ‘the first entelechy of a natural body with organs’. That is why there is also no need to inquire into how wax and its shape are one, nor in general into how the matter of each thing and that which is imposed on it are one. For just as being [what something is] comes from the form, so too does its being one come from it. Both being and [being] one have many senses (ten indeed), but still in all cases the form is the cause of both, and is what we call an ‘entelechy’. 42,19 (412b11-17)22 For example, if an axe were a natural body and had this [i.e. being an axe] as its form, so that it could cut not from being artificially [made], but from nature, then it would be an animal, and its body would be iron, while its soul would be its specific shape, its edge, and its cutting. For this is what it is to be an axe. And when blunted and altered in shape it is no longer an axe except homonymously, as neither was Socrates a human being after the hemlock, except homonymously. But in fact even if the structure is preserved, it is an axe, but not an animal; for the soul is not [defined as] ‘the form and definition of an artificial organ’, but ‘of a natural [body] that has life’, and this is [the meaning of] ‘having organs’.

42,27 If [in the definition of the soul] you23 would like to understand ‘having organs’ (412a28-b1, b6) instead of ‘having life in potentiality’ (412a20-1, 28),24 you would then have to understand it as ‘in a potentiality that is present’25 for which a supporting actuality is already established.26 This [for example] is how it is said to be possible for something that walks to walk, and in general [it is said] to be possible for something that already exists in actuality to exist. For this too is a sense of ‘possible’, as defined in the [discussion] of premises.27 So the soul is like a first entelechy of something that is already alive and that can live in this way, and this is the compound (cf. 412a16), i.e. ‘that which is from both [matter and form]’,28 and this can only be the animal. For forms come to exist in matter, but they are not forms of matter but of the compound. For each [animal] is in fact a particular thing. So ‘having organs’ must be considered an explication of ‘having life in potentiality’, without each [expression] having a distinct signification. 42,37 (412b17-25) Think through what has [just] been said for the case of the parts [of animals] too: for if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul, for it is the essence, form and structure29 of the eye, whereas the eye is the compound, [43] and the body of the eye is the matter for sight. When sight is lost, there is no longer an eye except homonymously, as with

Book Two


a sculpted or painted [eye]. What is said in the case of a part must be understood to apply to the whole living body. For there is an analogy between part in relation to part (i.e. sight in relation to the eye), between all sense-perception in relation to the whole body capable of sense-perception, and [finally] between the soul in relation to the body that has a soul. 43,6 (412b25-7) So it is clear from what has been said that the soul is the entelechy neither of the dead body, nor of the embryo (sperma):30 for the former has no life and so can no longer live; the latter does not yet have [life], and so can [live] only at a later time. ‘Potentiality’ applies to the [embryo] because it can come to have organs and thus receive life. For just as unstructured iron is potentially a saw because it can receive a specific shape, yet it is still a saw only after it has been given a structure and possesses a shape that can cut, so too the embryo is in potentiality an animal because it can become a body that has organs, but is an animal only when it can nourish itself through its own agency. 43,14 (412b27-413a3) Now being awake is an entelechy, as are sawing and seeing. Sleep is like the kind of constitution (kataskeuê) and hexis from which sawing and seeing [come into existence]. Of these [entelechies], one is the first entelechy, the other the second. So while the soul is both the entelechies, and more so the first, the body is the substrate. Again, as in the other cases, the saw31 is the iron together with the specific shape, and also the eye is both the eyeball32 and sight, so too is the animal the soul together with the body. 43,21 (413a3-8) So it is obvious that the soul is not separated from the body, either as a whole (if as a whole it is a form, as was the shape of the iron [in the saw]), or in some of its parts (if it is naturally divided into parts). For some parts of the soul are clearly the entelechy and perfection of some parts of the body, as sight is of the eye, yet this does not stop those parts of the soul that (unlike the shape and the form) are not an entelechy of either the whole body, or of some [of its] parts, from also having the capacity to be separated from the body. 43,27 (413a8-9)33 The intellect too seems to be like this, for it is not yet clear whether it is an entelechy of a specific body as described,34 35 whether it is the kind that is inseparable, or36 that is separated as the pilot is from his ship. For the [pilot] is an entelechy, but a separate one. 43,30 (413a9-10) So a definition of the soul as a whole may by now have been given in outline, but not in detail. Instead, the definition is like a sketch until we deal with all the capacities of the soul. That will make it clear whether [the soul] as a whole is a form that is separate from the body, or whether some parts of it are separate, others not.



43,35 (413a11-20) So let us state, as we have frequently been in the habit of doing,1 that what is clear relative to us and what is clear relative to a thing’s nature are opposites, and that while compounds are clear to us, uncompounded objects [are clear] by nature. In our reasoning too we must first progress from what is clear to us to what is so by nature. So regarding the soul too we must similarly believe that while it is itself uncompounded, the living body is the compound. [44] We must proceed, then, from the [body] to the [soul], for in that way we would reach the definition that indicates not only what it is, as do most definitions, but would also pinpoint the cause. As it is, most definitions are like conclusions to demonstrations: e.g. ‘What is squaring?’ – ‘The construction of a square equal to a rectangle with sides of different lengths.’ And while this is like a conclusion, the one that states that ‘Squaring is the discovery of the mean proportional’ states the cause of the entity [to be defined]. So let us get on with the discussion2 by establishing a starting point that is clearer to us for discovering what is less clear. 44,9 (413a20-31) Anything with a soul is distinguished from anything without a soul by being alive, and while the soul has numerous capacities, which we have often listed, we see [only] one adequate for just being alive, namely the ‘vegetative’3, whose three ways of functioning are causing nourishment, causing growth, and finally reproducing. This is why all plants are also thought to be alive, for they clearly have in themselves the sort of capacity and source through which they move to opposite locations at the same time. For anything that grows grows in an upwards direction with its shoots, and downwards with its roots. This does not happen to any of the bodies that are not alive but natural; they move in only one [direction].4 But plants grow not only in opposite directions, but also decline and decrease. But still this ‘vegetative’ capacity, and particularly its nutritive part, suffice for being alive. For often animals as well as plants that no longer grow or reproduce are still alive. 44,21 (413a31-b4) This capacity can be separated from the others, but the others cannot [be separated] from it (I mean just among mortals, since for more divine natures the intellect probably exists not just without the vegetative capacity, but without the other capacities too).5 That in the case of mortals this capacity is separated is evident from plants, for they have no other capacity of the soul. Because of this source, then, all living things have life, although an animal exists in a primary sense because of the capacity for sense-perception. (In fact there are [living things] that do not move in respect of place yet have some [degree of] perception, like testacea, [whether these be] ‘zoöphytes’ or even animals.) 44,29 (413b4-10) With sense-perception touch is the primary [sense] that all animals have. Just as the nutritive capacity can be separated from sense-perception, so again can touch be separated from the remaining

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senses in the case of ‘zoöphytes’. Also, all [animals] seem to have this sense, the sense of touch, I mean. Later we shall discuss the reason why the vegetative capacity can be separated from that of sense-perception, and the capacity for touch from the other senses.6

44,35 That the addition of sense-perception means that there is no longer a plant but actually an animal is evident from the names we use to indicate these entities. We speak of both plants and animals as ‘alive’ because [45] they are self-nourished, but they are not both called ‘animals’ because they do not both have sense-perception, but while the one is a plant, the other is an animal. Also, ‘being alive’ does not apply to both homonymously because, as some think, the one makes use of nature, the other of soul.7 For if causing nourishment and causing growth belong to nature and not soul, we must say either that we too are not alive when we are not perceiving, or that we have two lives – each of which is absurd. Again, there are also many [bodies] moved by nature, like the elements (e.g. earth and water), that make use of nature, but are not said to be ‘alive’, so that being alive is to make use not of nature but of soul, and of the primary [capacity] of the soul, namely its [capacity] for nutrition. Also, how is it consistent for them to make the reproductive part a part of the soul, while claiming that the vegetative capacity itself, whose function and end is reproduction, is not soul but nature? Our reply, then, must be that, through having a part of soul, plants too are alive and have souls, but are not animals. We also must not demand of [Aristotle] an account of why living things are not called ‘animals’, but common usage alone is to be applied, in that we say that plants ‘are alive’, but do not say that they are ‘animals’. For we do not call every runner an ‘athlete’, nor everyone who wrestles a ‘wrestler’; these names instead belong to the more developed hexis of the entity [in question]. So Aristotle in calling plants ‘ensouled’ but not ‘animals’ is half-way between Plato [who called them] both, and the Stoics [who called them] neither.8 45,19 (413b11-27) We would not need much argument [to show] that these primary capacities (I mean the vegetative and the [capacity] for sense-perception) in respect of with which things with souls are also called ‘animals’ must be entelechies of a natural body with organs. But since the soul is the source of other capacities and ways of functioning too (I mean desire, discursive thinking and motion in respect of place), these must all be addressed to see whether they too are necessarily entelechies in the same way as the ones [just] mentioned, or whether some of them are, but some are not. This [problem] might be clarified if we first decide whether each of the capacities mentioned above is a soul in itself, or a part of soul, and if a part, whether in such a way as to be separated only in definition, or also spatially. Now with regard to some it is not difficult to see that they



are separated in definition, but not spatially. The capacity for nutrition, growth and reproduction, is not in fact separated in the case of animals, nor a fortiori in the case of plants, where instead this type of source for the three [capacities] pervades the whole body. It is obvious that [plants] live even when divided and separated from one another, since the soul in them is actually present as a single thing in each plant, but potentially as more than one. It is similarly difficult to separate the capacity for sense-perception spatially from that of movement; in fact there is always a trace of movement where there is a trace of perception, as we said with reference to insects.9 Indeed, each of the parts [of an animal] has sense-perception and movement in respect of place; and if they have sense-perception, they also have some discrimination regarding what is compatible and incompatible, and thereby have pain and pleasure, and thereby [46] desire, so that, as I said, it is easy to separate all these capacities in definition (things whose ways of functioning are manifestly distinct are also obviously themselves distinct), but impossible to do so spatially. Concerning the intellect, however, (i.e. the capacity for contemplation), nothing is yet clear, but it seems that this alone can be a distinct kind of soul, as what is eternal [is distinct] from what is perishable.10 46,5 (413b32-414a3)11 Animals, then, are distinguished by this primary differentia: that all the capacities of the soul spoken of belong to some [living things], while some have more, others fewer, and some just one. The latter we do not call ‘animals’ but ‘living things’. A second [differentia] is the fact that the soul is defined12 in different degrees for different animals; but that is [a topic] for later on.13 For now let us understand from what has been said that anything with a soul is distinguished from anything without one by being alive, and an animal from what is not an animal by sense-perception too. 46,12 (414a4-14)14 Now ‘that by which we live’ and ‘that by which we have sense-perception’ have two senses, as does ‘that by which we know’. For ‘that by which we know’ has two senses in that it is ‘by the soul’ and ‘by knowledge’ [that we know]. ‘That by which we are healthy’ also has two senses in that it is ‘by the body’ and ‘by health’ [that we are healthy], and one of these is ‘that by which we receive’, the other is ‘what we receive’, and the first is like matter, the second like form. We know first15 ‘by knowledge’, for in respect of this, as well as ‘by the soul’, we are said to know. And we are healthy first ‘by health’, for it is because of this [that we are in health] also ‘by the body’. Therefore it is ‘by the soul’ in a primary sense that we are alive, and ‘by the soul’ that we have sense-perception.16 This, therefore, is the first cause of being alive, not as a substrate and matter, but as form and entelechy. For as in these [earlier examples] knowledge and health are a structure, form, definition and entelechy of what can receive [them] ([i.e.] what has the capacity to know and be healthy), so too is the soul in the case of living things. For even if sometimes knowledge and health come from others (from a teacher, for example, and

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a doctor), still we demonstrated in advance in the [books] On Nature17 that the activities of what produce affections are in what is affected and is disposed [to be affected]. Thus the soul too is in the body as form is in matter. 46,26 (414a14-19) ‘Substance’ has three senses (the same [definitions] often have to be recalled out of caution, lest we overlook anything): one is matter, another is form, and a third is what comes from both. Of these, matter is potentiality, form entelechy, and what comes from both is the particular thing and therefore the compound. Since anything that has a soul comes from both [matter and form], it is of course not the soul that is a substrate to the body, but the body to the soul. 46,31 (414a19-27) That also is why those who believe that the soul is neither a body, nor [exists] without a body, hold the correct belief. For the soul is not a body, but is something belonging to a body, and exists in a body, and in a body of a certain kind (I mean one that is natural and has organs). Earlier [thinkers] differed in fitting any soul into any body, although under no conditions is one random thing seen to receive another.18 (A stone could not receive a voice, nor a plant knowledge.) [Reception] in fact occurs in accordance with a [formal] definition: for not every soul is the form of every body, but only of the body that is fitted out with organs related to it, and is in a suitable state in relation to the capacities that belong to the soul. For we see that [47] the body of every animal is suitably moulded for its life and way of life, and is in a state specially [adapted] to the activities of the soul. Also, each form has matter without qualification – one type for a house, , – and while an animal has a natural organic body without qualification,19 a specific animal [has] a specific organ. 47,4 (414a27-8) It is clear from what has been said that [the soul] is the entelechy and definition of the thing that has the potentiality to be of this sort.

47,7 (414a29-b6) Some [living] things, as we have said, have all the capacities of the soul mentioned above, certain ones some [capacities], and some just one. the discussion proceeds, we must summarily take up again in sequence the capacities that we have mentioned: those for nutrition, sense-perception, desire, movement in respect of place, and discursive thinking. Plants have the capacity for nutrition, while animals also have the capacity for sense-perception, which that for desire necessarily succeeds. The capacity for desire is spirit, appetite and willing, and I do not claim that this capacity belongs in full to all animals that have sense-perception, for many have neither spirit nor willing, but just appetite, since all those without complete sense-perception do not have desire in full either. ‘Zoöphytes’ we see add on only touch. So just as they share



in the lowest of the senses, so also do they in the lowest and most widely shared desire, namely appetite. For all sense-perception discriminates between compatible and incompatible [objects respectively], and pleasure and pain1 succeed compatible and incompatible [objects], and appetite and revulsion [succeed] pleasure and pain. 47,21 (414b6-20) Zoöphytes perceive at least nutriment, for they employ touch in place of taste. That is because it is by objects that are dry or wet, and hot or cold, that all living things are nourished, and touch is the sense for these. So when they touch dry, wet, hot, or cold objects, and not just as objects of touch, but perceive them as objects of taste too, they admit the compatible ones, and reject those that are incompatible, so that they desire the one, and avert themselves from the other, as far as possible, as is evident in the case of all testacea. That nutriment is directly derived from these tangible pairs of opposites (i.e. hot, cold, wet, or dry objects) is evident from the appetites of hunger and thirst for nutriment, and the definitions of hunger as an appetite for what is dry and hot, and thirst as an appetite for what is cold and wet. We desire the other objects of perception as incidental to [types of] nutriment; sound, for example, contributes nothing to food, nor does colour or smell. Flavour too is above all an object of touch, in that it can be tasted (for all taste occurs through touching), but the flavour [itself] is not even nutriment, but a seasoning for nutriment. This must be clarified later on.2 For the moment it is sufficient to have determined [48] that those animals that have touch also have desire. Whether they have imagination too must be investigated later.3 The more developed animals have in addition to these capacities that for movement in respect of place too, and others also have both the capacity for discursive thinking and the intellect, as with human beings and anything else like them or of even higher status. (It is as yet unclear whether other such natures could exist, ones for whom even some of the lower4 capacities accompany the intellect.)5 48,7 (414b20-1)6 Now it has become clear that just as there is an order and sequence among [different] shapes, so too is there in the case of the capacities of the soul. So it is just as impossible in the case of these [successive] shapes to understand a common genus and single nature that similarly pervades them all, as it is with these capacities belonging to the soul. For what is predicated in common among things that have priority and posteriority does not signify a genus or a single nature that one can conceive of by separating it from what is indicated by it. That is also why the definitions supplied for these things resemble a complete listing rather than being [definitions] that indicate a generic nature. The definition of shape, for example, is like this, as also is that of a premise. That is clear from the fact that these definitions do not completely coincide with each of the species. But despite this often being the case, we should still not complain, but accept the definitions supplied when they are a consequence of the nature of the entities [being defined].

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48,18 (414b21-32) So just as the definition of shape supplied here includes all shapes without being unique to any, so also the definition of the soul that has been stated has included all the capacities without being unique to a single one of them. It is difficult for those who dismiss this [definition] to find another comparable one. For if we define the soul on the basis of movement, [the definition] will be exclusive to the single capacity for movement; but if we do so on the basis of sense-perception, it will similarly [be exclusive to] the single capacity for sense-perception. That is why in the case of things that are predicated in common in such a way that they resemble things that are spoken of in many ways7 rather than genera, it is ridiculous to inquire into the kind of common definition that will be unique to none of the things indicated by the common term, nor belong to any of the undivided species (atoma eidê), but that will coincide with all species in the same way (if indeed we should call ‘species’ things for which no common nature is observed). [And it is ridiculous] to respect the kind of method possible for common definitions that we are also using here. In fact, even if this [definition] is not perfectly 8 to the whole soul, it is still the most widely-shared of all the definitions mentioned. That is why just as with shapes and numbers what is prior exists potentially in the next in sequence (as the triangle [does] in the quadrilateral, and the unit in the pair), so too with [beings] that have souls, the nutritive capacity [exists potentially] in that of sense-perception, and that of sense-perception in that of desire. 48,34 (414b32-415a12) The soul has, then, been described in outline, to the extent that it is possible to speak universally of something that does not exist universally. Anyone intending to give a more precise definition must supply in specific cases what the definition is of each soul: e.g. that of a plant is the entelechy of what has organs for nutrition [49] ;9 and again, that of a beast is the entelechy of what has organs for nutrition and desire. In this way the less developed [souls] must be included in sequence under those that are more developed, right up to the [soul] that is last in terms of coming into existence, but first in terms of potentiality, [namely] the [soul] with a capacity for reasoning. When nature had progressed that far, it stopped10 in the case of mortal [creatures]: for to the mortals to whom it has granted reasoning it first supplies all the other capacities as a bodyguard for reason, but does not [supply] reasoning to all the [animals] to whom it [supplies] the [others], and to some not even imagination, whereas more developed non-rational animals live exclusively by that [capacity]. (The contemplative intellect is for another discussion. Perhaps this is neither a capacity, nor a part of the soul described above, but a distinct substance that comes to exist as a superior in an inferior.)11 49,10 (415a12-13) It is clear from what we have said that someone who defines each capacity of the soul separately supplies a definition more



closely applicable [to the soul] than someone who disputatiously tries to find a definition of the whole soul as though it were a single nature. 1 49,13 (415a14-20) Someone intending to investigate these [capacities] must first understand what each of the capacities of the soul is (i.e. its definition), then use it to inquire into the secondary [properties] that in themselves belong [incidentally] to each capacity.2 If we have to state what each [capacity] is (e.g. what the capacities for thinking, senseperception or nutrition are), we should first investigate what thinking and perceiving are,3 given that the activities are prior and clearer relative to us than are the capacities. For we encounter them first, and then conceive of the capacities from them, and the form and the definition of each capacity is in accordance with its function, since that is its end. Also, there is nothing strange about nature supplying the capacities as a basis first, and endowing [living things] with them prior to the activities, given that what is prior in nature and prior relative to us are distinct. 49,23 (415a20-23) So once again, since the activity of each capacity is observed as [active] towards a specific object, and the functioning of every capacity is not [directed] towards the whole of matter, but [for example] towards the object of sight for the capacity for seeing, and toward the object of hearing for the capacity for hearing, and in that [the object and capacity] are, as it were, opposites in respect of being relatives,4 it would perhaps be appropriate for the objects of the activities to be defined before the activities [themselves], for they are clearer to us than the activities. So we must examine what the object of thought is before [examining] the [activity of] thinking, and what the object of perception is before [examining] the [activity of] perceiving, and [in the present case] what nutriment is before [examining] the [activity of] nutrition. That the objects of perception and nutriment are clearer than the capacities for nutrition and sense-perception, and the activities aligned with them, is obvious. The [objects] are openly available to perception, whereas the activities, and even more so the capacities, are tracked down by reason alone. But it is not easy to make a claim as to whether the object of thought is also prior to the activity of thinking. Still our discussion as it proceeds will investigate this [question], but for now let us follow Aristotle and deal with the most widely-shared and basic [50] of the capacities of the soul, its functioning, and the matter with which it deals. This is where we must begin. 50,3 (415a23-b2) The soul with a capacity for nutrition is the most widely-shared, and so all living things have it. For it is from it that life first comes, and its functions are to cause nourishment, growth, and reproduction, and other similar [activities]. For what is, as it were, the end, and also the most natural of all the functions of the soul with the

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capacity for nutrition, for all developed living things (excluding deformities, as well as things whose coming into existence is spontaneous, or artificially procured) is to produce something else like itself (an animal, a plant) in order to share in what is eternal and divine, as far as things that come into existence can. For everything that acts in accordance with nature desires this [end], and performs actions for the sake of it. 50,11 (415b2-3)5 That for the sake of which (to hou heneka) is twofold: that for which (to hou), and that for whom (to hôi) [sc. for whose benefit]. For, as was also stated in the Ethics, the end (telos) [of action] is twofold: that for which is [defined as] happiness, and that for whom is each person [acting] out of self-interest.6 Indeed, someone chooses happiness on account of himself, and so as to achieve this for himself, as also in the case of medicine that for which is health, and that for whom is the patient. 50,15 (415b3-7) In nature too the same duality must be posited for the end, and that for which [nature] exists must be said to be what is divine and eternal, and that for whom [it exists] an [animal] having a soul, and coming into existence. For nature wants to achieve for the latter a likeness of divinity and eternity, insofar as it can; and it can [do so] only by continuity, since no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same. Thus each thing shares in what is divine, to the extent that it can, in greater and lesser degrees: to a greater degree where there is never any cessation in [things] coming into existence from one another; to a lesser degree in the case of certain animals that seem to perish totally at one [season], but to come [back] into existence at another. Therefore each [individual] thing does not itself persist, but something like it does, not numerically one, but one in species. 50,26 (415b8-12) The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. Since ‘first principle’ and ‘cause’ have several senses, the soul likewise (in accordance with the senses distinguished in the [treatise] On the First Principles)7 is the cause of the living body in three senses: as that from which the movement itself [comes]; as that for the sake of which; and as form. 50,29 (415b21-7)8 That the soul is the cause as that from which movement [comes] will be obvious if we first list the kinds of movement, since [the soul] will be found to cause all [kinds of movement] for animals: movement in respect of place (even if not for every animal), and movement in respect of alteration (for sense-perception is considered an alteration, and nothing perceives without having a soul). Similarly, it causes growth too, since nothing grows naturally unless it is nourished, and nothing is nourished if it does not share in life. 50,35 (415b28-416a5) Empedocles [51] does not correctly furnish the cause of growth by referring it back to the tendencies of the elements rather than to the soul. For he says that plants put their roots downwards because the earth moves downwards, and to the extent that they contain more earth; while [they grow] upwards with their shoots, and to the extent that



they contain more fire.9 This is because he does not correctly understand that upwards and downwards are not the same for everything, but while upwards is the same for us and the universe, the opposite holds for plants. For what is downwards in the universe is upwards for them, since for a plant the root is what the head is for an animal, if organs [for the present argument’s sake] must be spoken of as [analogously] distinct and identical in their functions.10 So just as the head, where the mouth and organs for nutrition are,11 is upwards for animals, so are the roots through which they attract nutriment upwards for plants. 51,10 (416a6-9) One might also inquire of Empedocles when he speaks in this way: what is it that holds together earth and fire when they move in opposite directions? For when the movement of the elements occurs, they will be dispersed in opposite directions, unless what holds them together is superior and overcomes the opposed tendencies. This [cohesive force] would not be one of the elements; it would be the soul. In that case, it is the soul that is the cause of growing and of being nourished, not the elements. 51,16 (416a9-18) So while Empedocles makes earth and fire the cause of growth, others do not include earth in the list, but believe that the nature of fire is by itself adequate for growth. For fire is clearly the only element that is nourished and grows, so that [on this view] it has to be posited as the cause of growth for both animals and plants. But while it may be in some way a contributory cause, it is certainly not by itself the cause; instead, the soul that uses it is. For the growth of fire is unlimited as long as it has matter suitable for burning, while everything constituted by nature has a limit and a proportion (logos) both to its size and growth, and a proportion is a function belonging not to fire, but to soul and form instead of [such] matter. 51,26 (416a19-29) But since this capacity of the soul starts with causing nourishment and ends with reproducing, we must first offer a definition of nutrition, since it is by this way of functioning that [this capacity] is distinguished from the remaining capacities of the soul. Now some have believed that nutriment is as one opposite to another, not every opposite to every opposite, but just those opposites that not only come into existence from one another, but are also nourished or even grow [in this way]. For there are some [opposite] things that come into existence but are not nourished, like the sick person coming from the healthy one, and white coming from black. There are also [opposites] that in addition to coming into existence are also nourished from the thing from which they come into existence. Fire is like this, since it is nourished by moisture, and so by what is naturally fluid. Oil is indeed composed of water and air, both of which are fluid, as is everything that is viscous and soluble.12 Now in these cases too nutriment does not return upon itself; instead, anything moist is nutriment for fire, but fire is certainly not [nutriment] for anything moist. The reason is that fire is more like form, moisture more like matter. So

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matter is [52] nutriment for form, but form is not nutriment for matter. So with regard to all opposites that are said to be related to one another in this way, such as mositure and fire, nutriment is clearly of one opposite to another. Now while some hold this view, others, on the contrary, [hold] that like is nourished by like, and also grows in this way. Both have supporting arguments that must be heard. 52,6 (416a29-b3) The argument for nutrition being from opposites is that like is unaffected by like. Nutriment [on this view] must be affected and change, since digestion is change. Change for everything is into what is opposite or intermediary, so that in order to be assimilated13 [nutriment] should be impelled from an opposite nature into a like one, but nutriment has no way of being assimilated if, instead of being affected, it remains in the same nature, like [unconsumed] bread or meat. Nutriment is changed by the body that is nourished rather than the body by nutriment. For the body (I mean the body that has a soul and is an animal) attracts [nutriment] and alters it. So just as the carpenter is not changed by the wood, but the wood is changed by him, so too is the body with a soul situated in relation to its nutriment. If it were disputed that [nutriment] causes change too, the name [‘change’] should be conceded, but this should be posited as a different kind of change, in that it is a change from inaction to activity. For that is also how change occurs for the body that has a soul in relation to its nutriment, and for the carpenter in relation to his wood. This, then, is the [argument for nutrition] from opposites; the [argument] from like things, by contrast, relies on assimilation, since while opposite is not assimilated by opposite, like is by like. 52,22 (416b3-11) These, then, are what each [party] claims. Like arbitrators, we are justified in pressing them with the question: what do they mean by ‘nutriment’? Is it the last thing assimilated by the body, or the first? For example, which [of these] is first – bread or blood, bread being the primary nutriment, blood the ultimate? So clearly one of them will say [‘bread’], the other [‘blood’], whereas we will say ‘both’ in accordance with a specific sense, namely that the one is undigested nutriment, the other digested. In this way it could be correct to speak of both, for insofar as nutriment is undigested, it would be nutriment as an opposite for opposites, while insofar as it is digested, it would be [nutriment] as a like thing. Thus each [party] makes both a true and a false claim, as though at a half-way house, whereas someone who groups the two [senses] together states the truth. So if nothing is nourished that does not share in life, then what is nourished would be the body that has a soul, insofar as it has a soul, and not insofar as it is white or black, so that nutriment too is related to the [body] that has a soul, and not to [properties] incidental to such a body. 52,34 (416b11-20) Being nutriment and being capable of producing growth are distinct, and while identical in substrate, they differ in definition: for there is nutrition insofar as [nutriment] preserves the substance,



but growth insofar as it adds to the quantity. But both of these [processes] are not always linked, [53] but sometimes nutrition occurs without causing growth. That is because as long as there is a body with a soul nutrition is needed, but not always growth. Where a particular thing, such as a horse or a human being, exists, nutrition is needed, but where there is a foal or a youth, growth is needed too. But as soon as the body that has a soul reaches maturity, nutriment stops causing growth, but not nourishment; instead, by then it also makes [the body] reproductive (for semen is the residue of the ultimate nutriment).14 So at that point nutriment becomes the cause of generation too, but not the generation of the body that is being nourished (for that is [already] in existence), but of the thing that is reproduced from it. So nutriment has the three functions of causing nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The first is the most essential for the living body, in that it contributes to its existence and so to its essence; the others [contribute] to its having size, or being able to produce something else like it. Certainly this capacity desires what is divine, and imitates it, as best it can, by preserving its substrate and so establishing a link in the process of coming into existence.15 That is why an animal cannot exist if deprived of nutriment; for the capacity that preserves (sôzousa) it cannot be active without matter. 53,15 (416b20-3) There are not only three ways that this capacity functions, but also without [further] qualification three that are observed belonging to it: what is nourished, that by which it is nourished, and what causes nourishing. While the [capacity that] causes nourishing is the primary soul (meaning by ‘primary’ the [soul] with a capacity for nutrition), what is nourished is the body with a soul, and possessing this soul, while that by which it is nourished is the nutriment. So there have to be the three [of them] to constitute an animal capable of reproduction. 53,21 (416b23-5) Whether you call such an animal ‘capable of reproduction’ or ‘capable of nutrition’ will not make too much difference in [terms of] definition, except insofar as it is more justifiable to call everything after its end, and the end [here] is [for an animal] to reproduce something like itself, so that we would be more justified in calling such a soul capable of reproducing its like than [in calling it] capable of preserving what exists; for that is its end, and that for the sake of which there is [the activity of] preservation.16 53,26 (416b25-30) The two things that the soul uses to nourish the body that has a soul are the capacity for nutrition and the natural heat,17 but [it uses] the [capacity] as naturally continuous with the soul, the heat as a supporting instrument supplied as if from outside. This is like describing the ship’s pilot as using both hand and rudder to move the ship: the [hand] as naturally continuous, the [rudder] as separated on the outside. So the capacity, although unmoved, only causes movement, while the heat is moved by the capacity, and moves the nutriment, and the nutriment in turn is, like the ship, only moved. Also, all nutriment must be capable of

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being digested, for nutriment that cannot be acted on in this way is not even nutriment. Natural heat produces digestion, and that is why everything with a soul has this kind of heat. 53,35 (416b30-1) It has, then, been stated in outline what nutriment is; full clarification must come later in special discussions. For the present it is sufficiently clear that the capacity of the soul for nutrition is capable of preserving its possessor through its own activity [54] when nutriment is present; or [again] that it is the primary capacity of the soul, capable of reproducing a like thing for its possessor.

54,3 (416b32-5) With these distinctions drawn, let us speak1 first in general about all sense-perception, and then about each [sense] individually. All sense-perception is thought to involve being moved (kinesthai) and being affected (paskhein) in some way. (For now ‘being affected’ and ‘being moved’ must be understood in a rather unqualified way; the way in which we apply them to sense-perception will be defined later.) For everything that is altered is altered through some affection and movement, and senseperception by being altered is thought to receive the imprints of the forms of objects of perception,2 and as a result also to be affected. Our discussion as it proceeds will show in what sense ‘alteration’ applies to sense-perception, and how ‘being affected’ does not apply to it in a strict sense. For now, as I have said, all these terms must be understood in a rather unqualified way. 54,12 (416b35-417a2) Since some say that the sense-organ is also affected by what is like, others by what is unlike, and since it has already been determined in the general discussions3 [entitled] On Coming-intoExistence and Perishing that both [claims] are in a way true not just for sense-perception, but similarly for everything that we say ‘is affected’, they will be defined here too.4 For something that is affected by something [else] is potentially like what produces [the affection], since after it has been affected it is like what produces the affection, although it is unlike it while it is being affected. But, as I have said, we should await the progress of our discussion, since it will distinguish precisely how all these [terms] are applied to sense-perception. But first let us address the problems that might be raised about it. 54,21 (417a2-9) So if sense-perception is the [capacity] capable of perceiving objects of perception, and if each of the sense-organs is also an object of perception (for each of them is a body and comes from the elements, as with the eye, tongue and ear), why does the [capacity of] perception not also perceive the actual sense-organs, so as to be moved by the sense-organs, even though there is nothing present externally? Why, in that case, do we not see the eyes or [specifically] the colours of the eyes, but instead see other things by means of the eyes? And why do we not touch



the flesh and the heat belonging to the flesh instead of touching other things by means of the flesh? It is clear from this that the object of perception and the [capacity for] sense-perception are conjoined in the organs,5 and that each of them is potential, not actual. So just as what can be burnt is not burnt by its own agency, but by another thing that can cause burning (otherwise, of course, wood could ignite itself instead of requiring fire), so too the capacity for sense-perception cannot be active in accordance with the potentiality that it has unless the object of perception moves it, and that [object] moves it when external, i.e. when not conjoined with it nor like a unity. The hammer, screwdriver or saw, for example, does not independently cause movement in the craft [of carpentry] unless there is something out there ready to be sawn or bored. (Aristotle, I think, raises this problem not in unrestricted terms, but as one that particularly assails those who say that the soul capable of sense-perception is also separated from the body. [55] For why, if [the soul] can perceive even without organs, does it not also perceive the organs themselves?)6 55,3 (417a9-20) So since we use ‘perceiving’ in two senses (for example, of someone asleep as hearing and seeing, but potentially; and of someone now hearing and seeing, but actually [doing so]), both sense-perception and the [activity of] perceiving would have the two meanings of potentiality and actuality. Being active and being moved are not the same, in fact neither are being active and being affected, but if something is moved it is also always active, whereas something that is active is not always moved. Instead, activity in relation to movement is qualified as genera are to kinds. For while one type of activity is always perfect and so the same at any point in the time in which it occurs, the other [sc. movement] is imperfect and always different. As was said earlier,7 movement is not perfected but imperfect activity. What is potentially like something is always affected by things like it that actually exist. That is why in one sense it can be affected by what is like, in another by what is unlike; for what is unlike is affected, but after it has been affected, it is like. 55,15 (417a21-b2) Being active and being moved must, then, be defined as not identical, just like being active and being affected, and furthermore potentiality and actuality [must be distinguished] in universal terms as not having a single meaning. For a human being is called ‘knowledgeable’ because of being naturally fitted to receive knowledge, whereas a geometer is called ‘knowledgeable’ because of already having knowledge. Each of them has a potentiality (dunatos) in a different sense; while a human being [has a potentiality] because that is what a human being is like as a natural kind, the geometer [has a potentiality] because on wishing to contemplate [geometry] he can (dunatai) immediately do so, as long as there is no external impediment. Again, a third [sense] in addition to these is someone now doing geometry and contemplating, since that person actually has specialized knowledge and alone [of the three] is in a perfected state, whereas both the earlier [ones] had specialized knowledge potentially. For

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the first needs instruction and the associated alteration and change from the opposite hexis (namely, movement from ignorance to knowledge, and from lack of knowledge to knowledge), whereas the second person has the hexis (e.g. the skills of arithmetic and grammar), and needs only the activity. 55,29 (417b2-8) There is not, therefore, the same sense of ‘deficiency’ in the two cases of not having a hexis at all, but being naturally fitted [to acquire one]; and that of having a hexis but not using [it]. In other words, ‘being affected’ does not apply in an identical sense to both the case of (a) someone learning a body of knowledge, and where (b) someone [already] possesses [knowledge], but [with that knowledge] in an inactive [state]. Instead, (a) eliminates the disposition (diathesis) [for knowledge] that he possesses since, when knowledge enters, ignorance is eliminated and leaves, whereas (b) uses the knowledge [already] possessed whenever active in respect of it. Thus in the case of (a) a pre-existing quality perishes, but in (b), by contrast, the person’s is perfected.8 For someone who possesses knowledge comes to contemplate it, and this [process] does not destroy the knowledge, but perfects it. So that is why this [process] must not also be posited as an alteration, given that all alteration causes a removal from what is pre-existent, but here the development is into the [knower] himself,9 i.e. into [56] the perfection of what is pre-existent. 56,1 (417b8-16) But if someone favoured the name ‘alteration’ in the latter case too, a precise distinction would still have to be drawn, in that while the name may be the same, the reference (pragma) is not, but is a different kind of alteration. That is why it is not correct to refer to someone who has intelligence as ‘being altered’ on exercising it, or, for example, to the house-builder on building the house, or the smith on forging iron. Perhaps not even someone who is learning and acquiring knowledge from someone who is actually knowledgeable should be posited as being affected in a strict sense, but instead two senses of ‘being affected’ and ‘being altered’ [should be posited], one strict, the other not entirely so. For someone changing from knowledge to ignorance, and another changing from ignorance to knowledge, should not be said ‘to be affected’ in the same way, but while the first is ‘affected’ in a strict sense because of changing to a [state of] privation, the second is not affected at all, because of progressing to the hexis, i.e. to the perfection of an inherent nature, towards which the movement [was directed]. 56,12 (417b16-28) So just as with knowledge the person now in the process of learning is moved with the first type of change, while the person who has completed instruction by now has the hexis, but lacks the activity, so too with sense-perception the seed of the animal (i.e. the egg)10 changes in the first way, and in accordance with that becomes capable of senseperception, but when [at birth] it becomes an animal,11 it by then has the hexis, although it lacks the activity. Sense-perception differs from knowl-



edge to the extent that it must have external objects present to advance it to functioning ([e.g.] the objects of sight, hearing and touch), whereas knowledge has the objects of knowledge from within, in that thoughts are universal objects of knowledge that it amasses and stores up for itself. And it is in its power to make them available for itself whenever it wishes, while for sense-perception there are particular (i.e. individual) objects, but these are external and the activity of nature, not of the soul. That is why it is in our power to think whenever we wish, but not in our power to perceive. Instead, an object of perception has to exist externally. This is why those skills that are productive (called ‘sciences of objects of perception’ by Aristotle,12 and more involved with the particular than the universal) also do not engage in activity whenever they choose, since their matter too is external, as [for example] bronze is for forging, and stones for housebuilding. 56,29 (417b29-418a1, 5-6)13 But this is for a later discussion; for now we are saying that what can perceive is potentially like what the object of perception is actually. (It has already been explained that ‘potentially’ must be understood not in the sense of a child being potentially a general, but in the sense of an adult possessing the [relevant] hexis.) Thus [what can perceive] is unlike [the object of perception] while it is being affected, but after it has been affected is made like, and so is like, what [it is affected by]. 56,34 (418a1-3)14 We stated above how ‘being affected’ must be understood in the case of sense-perception, and that this is not its strict sense. For what is affected and altered in a strict sense has been adequately distinguished in earlier discussions. But since we have no unique name for potentiality to apply to what has the hexis, or to the change of the hexis into an activity, we use ‘in potentiality’ and ‘being affected’ in these cases in their general senses, although we do distinguish their significations. 15 56,39 From this [discussion] it is clear that [57] the sense-organ is not, strictly speaking, affected by the objects of perception, indeed that it is not even altered when it receives their forms. For [the sense-organ] does not perceive white objects by becoming white, nor hot objects by becoming hot, nor sweet ones by becoming sweet, but it receives the imprint of the forms of objects of perception, and [thus] their rational principles (logoi), without matter, just as wax does the form of a golden seal without the gold, yet without becoming matter for the form or being transformed corporeally, indeed without even acquiring a shape on its surface. For even though wax does not receive the matter of the seal, it still acquires a shape on its surface, whereas the sense-organ adopts the form of the object of perception throughout, and not by changing from the hexis it had earlier, but on

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the contrary, by perfecting and reinforcing through its activity the hexis that it [already] has.

57,10 (418a7-8) Sense-perception, then, is like this in universal terms, but each [sense] still has to be defined individually; for the definition of [sense-perception] common [to all the senses] could not be common in a precise way, since with sense-perception too1 there is something prior and something posterior. [Here] the objects of perception must be distinguished prior to the definition applicable to each sense. 57,15 (418a8-13)2 Now some objects of perception are objects of perception in themselves, others incidentally. Of those that are objects in themselves, some are common to all , others special to each individual [sense]. Special to each [sense] are those objects that another [sense] cannot perceive, and on which [a single sense] is least misled, if it is in a natural state, with no external impediment such as the [relative] position [of the object], or a disproportionate distance. Sight, for example, cannot be misled on colours when it is in an unadulterated condition, is active through [the medium of] clear air, and is at a suitably proportioned distance, and when the colours are similarly situated. Hearing is also like this for sounds: it has to be healthy [itself], the medium stable, and the distance suitably proportioned. So too with taste for flavours. 57,24 (418a13-16) Touch has a greater variety [of objects], and the object for this sense cannot be included in a single name,3 as ‘colour’ in the case of sight, and ‘sound’ in that of hearing. Touch in fact perceives objects that are smooth and rough, hard and soft, heavy and light, hot and cold, and dry and moist, and this set of five pairings is, to repeat, not called by a single name. Yet even if there are a greater number of objects for this sense, its activity towards them is in no way different from each of the other senses towards their special objects;4 it is actually the least easily misled regarding its own objects.5 Also, just as sight is not misled as to what a [given] colour is, but [only] as to what the coloured thing is, and hearing [not misled] as to what a [given] sound is, but [only] as to what the thing making the sound is, or what place it is in (whether it is to the right or the left, or behind or in front), so too touch in itself perceives [for example] a resistant object, but cannot by itself state what the resistant object is. 57,36 (418a16-20) Such [objects], then, are said to be special for each sense, but movement, rest, number, shape and magnitude are said to be common to more than one sense. Movement is in fact something common to all the senses, for both sight and hearing perceive it, [as, for example, in] ‘The thunder of swift-footed horses beats against my ears.’6 But smell too [58] [perceives] the onset and departure of the object of smell, and taste similarly [with flavour], while touch [does so] even more obviously. Per-



haps not only movement but also rest and number are objects of perception common to all the senses, in that each [sense] can at the same time as observing its special objects [observe] their number. But magnitude and shape are above all common to seeing and touch. 58,5 (418a20-4) Objects of perception are said to be incidental if in themselves they are not such objects, but [are so] through being incidental to things that are without qualification objects of perception. The son of Diares, or Diares [himself], for example, is an object of perception not qua Diares but because it is incidental to Diares also to be white. Aristotle explains the incidental objects of perception in the following way. One perceives x7 just because it is incidental to this white thing that is being perceived 8 x. This is like saying that one perceives Diares incidentally because it is incidental to the white thing to be Diares. [Aristotle] often has the habit of using the name ‘incidental’ in the case of subjects (hupokeimena) too, as in the Categories, where he refers to ‘the other [properties] incidental to a master being stripped away’,9 e.g. being a human being, etc.) ‘This is why,’ he says, ‘[sense-perception] is in no way affected’ by such [incidental objects], insofar as they are such,10 as, for example, sight [is not affected] by Diares, insofar as he is Diares. For Diares is not an object of sight, but Diares’ colour is. 58,17 (418a24-5) Among objects of perception in themselves the special objects are objects of perception in a strict sense, for they are the ones to which the essence and activity of each [sense] are naturally related. It is definitions of these that we shall give, beginning with sight.

58,22 (418a26-9) The special object of perception for sight is what is visible, for sight is seeing, and seeing is relative to what is visible. I speak of what is visible in a primary sense as colour. Our discussion, as it proceeds, will reveal whether there is anything else that is visible, since there are some objects thought to be invisible in light ([such visibility] being unique to colours), but to be luminous in the dark, and these have no single name. But, as I said, our discussion will as it proceeds decide these [issues];1 but for now let our opening assumption just be that what is visible is [by definition] colour. 58,27 (418a29-31) [Colour] is by its nature always on the surface of bodies,2 and this [surface] is visible in itself, but is [visible] not because visibility is present in its definition, nor because it itself is included in the definition of visibility (these were the two senses of ‘[properties] that are in themselves incidental’),3 but because it always contains colour on itself,4 and there is no surface of a body that can be found or imagined without colour. So since the cause of the surface being visible is in the surface itself, [59] the surface could, therefore, be called ‘visible in itself ’. Thus visibility and colour are identical in substrate, but distinct in definition; visibility is

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defined in relation to seeing, colour [defined] in itself. Once [the activity of] seeing has ceased, visibility does not exist except in potentiality, but nothing prevents a colour existing even if it is not being seen. 59,5 (418a31-b4) All colour is a movement of what is actually transparent, and this is its nature, and it is not visible without light, but each colour is always visible in light. That is why we must state what light is, if indeed colour becomes visible because of it; but prior to that, [we must state] what transparency is, since it is of this that light is an actuality and a perfection. 59,10 (418b4-9) So I say that what is transparent is what is visible, but not visible in itself in an unqualified sense, but [visible] because of a colour belonging to something else. Air and water are like this, and you could also cite certain stones, which are also called by this very name, [e.g.] glass, horns and other types of bodies, but in particular the eternal and divine body. And while this body is transparent in a primary sense, air is so in a secondary sense, and water in a third, followed by everything that we listed thereafter, and each of these is transparent not qua water, or qua air, but only insofar as they all share in a common nature. Because this belongs to them [by definition], they also are, and are called, transparent. So it is not because of a colour that belongs to them that they all become visible. For nothing transparent could be coloured, but everything fully lacking in colour is fully transparent. Thus if they are seen, they are seen because, as I said, of a colour belonging to something else. For they are moved by such colours, yet moved not so as to be altered or changed into them. Nor [are they moved] as wax is when it receives the stamps from seals. For [the wax is altered] on its surface, whereas air transmits colours to the organ of sight through the whole of itself, and sometimes the same [air] transmits at the same time opposite [colours] to more than one organ of sight.5 That would be impossible if at the same time it were simultaneously transformed and altered by colours. Air and the other transparent [bodies] mentioned transmit colours to the organ of sight only when they become actually transparent; and they become actually transparent through the presence of light. So the divine body is always actually transparent, since it also always has light, while air and the other [transparent bodies] are at different times potentially or actually transparent. 59,31 (418b9-12) Darkness is also present in the [bodies] in which light is potentially present, for darkness is just what is potentially transparent, and light is an entelechy and perfection of what is transparent qua transparent, not qua air, or qua water. For there is a different perfection for each thing according to what each thing is, and light is the perfection of everything [transparent] qua transparent. For it is ‘a kind of colour of the transparent’ (418b11), and I cited ‘kind of ’ because light does not colour the air as whiteness does snow, but is the cause of the air becoming visible, just as [60] colours become the causes of bodies being seen, since they advance what is potentially transparent to actually coming to exist.



60,2 (418b12-13)6 Light is neither fire itself, nor the sun, nor the other stars,7 but is their presence in what is transparent, and all such bodies share the capacity to make potentially transparent things actually so, and particularly the sun and the other divine bodies, but secondarily fire, and anything else like fire. So it seems that the giving of light belongs to fire, not qua fire, but insofar as it shares in some other nature. This is clear too from animals that we observe, such as ‘glow-worms’: they have no fire, yet still give light to the surrounding air in proportion to the size of their body. 60,11 (418b13-20) It has, then, been stated what transparency is, and similarly what light is too: that it is neither fire, nor body at all, nor an effluence of any body (that would also make it a body). Instead, it is the presence of fire or something like it in what is transparent, but a presence that is not like that of [objects] that are blended with one another, or juxtaposed with one another in the same place (for these are all ways that bodies are affected).8 Light is more like the activity of an agent in a thing that is being affected, specifically, in a thing that is brought to perfection. For body cannot go through body as a whole through a whole, nor can two bodies occupy the same place at the same time,9 as has been demonstrated at length earlier.10 In that case air would have to be denser when it contains light than when it contains darkness, although, in fact, the opposite is apparent. Put in another way: if darkness is the privation of the presence of fire in what is transparent, light is its presence. And a presence is always a relation of the thing that is present to what it is present in, and it is not [itself] a body. Furthermore, if light were a body, it would also be moved by winds. But its motion would not also be naturally downwards, if light is less dense than fire.11 Again, if light were a body, it would have to move in time; instead, a whole room is all at once illuminated when fire is brought in, and more [to the point], the whole air [is similarly illuminated] when the sun rises.12 60,27 (418b20-6) Empedocles, and anyone else making the same claim, is wrong to speak of light as moving, and coming between the earth , before [moving] towards the earth, and as eluding us because of the speed of its movement. That conflicts both with the truth in reason, and with observations; for over a short distance we might well miss the movement of just a small amount of light, but it is too much to assume that the movement of such a large body between east and west goes unnoticed. 60,34 (418b26-419a1) An object that has no colour can receive colour, and one that has no sound [can receive] sound, as one that has no shape of its own [can receive] shape, and one that has no flavour of its own [can receive] flavour. What is transparent is not coloured with its own colour. That is why it is transparent, and why it is set in motion by the colours belonging to other things, since if it had [a colour] of its own, that would intervene to block the perception of the [colours] belonging to other things. But [61] when it becomes actually transparent by the agency of light, light

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then becomes ‘a kind of colour’ (418b11) of it, and then it itself also becomes somehow visible and causes bodies to be seen. But when it is potential, as darkness is held to be, it is itself invisible and removes visibility from other colours. We said that darkness was invisible not because it is not seen at all, but because [it is seen] with difficulty; for sight distinguishes even darkness, in the same way as every sense [distinguishes] the privation of its object, and so the same nature and same object is at different times darkness and light, just as the same entity at different times sees and is blind.13 61,9 (419a1-6) Not all visible objects are visible in light, but while the colour belonging to each of them [is visible] only in light, some objects are not seen in light but move the sense-organ in darkness, and these must either not be called ‘colours’ (if the capacity to cause movement in what is actually transparent is correctly defined as unique to colour), or [must be spoken of] in another sense, as with those objects that appear fiery and brilliant at night. These are not of a single kind, and that is why they are not given a single name, but although numerous and differing in kind from one another, they do have the one common [feature] of appearing fiery, and of shining in darkness. Fungi and horns on certain animals are like this, as are the heads, scales and eyes of fish, and certain kinds of rotten wood. And while the colour belonging to each of them is seen in light, this fiery [quality] that also shines in the night is perhaps not even a colour, but a way in which our eyes are affected. 61,21 (419a6-7) [Aristotle] says that the reason why these [self-illuminating] objects are seen is ‘another discussion’, and one more appropriate to the [work] On Sense-Perception and its Objects. But Sosigenes, the teacher of Alexander [of Aphrodisias], provides it in Book Three [of his] On Vision,14 assuming that anyone finds Sosigenes’ claim plausible that [selfilluminating] objects also share slightly in the same kind of nature as the fifth body and fire, namely the ability to shine and light up the adjacent air, i.e. the transparent body. Thus at night the air is somehow lit up by these objects too, as long as it is not illuminated by a stronger [source of] light, and as long as the light derived from these [objects] does not become invisible because of being dimmed by more brilliant [light]. At night, however, they are able to light up the air adjacent to them for some distance, not so as to make other things visible too, but just to shine sufficiently on their own, since the mass from which their light comes is small. (Fire itself lights up the adjacent air in such a way that it makes the colours of other things visible, while [lighting up] the distant [air] in such a way that it makes only itself visible.) 61,34 (419a7-11) So this much is now clear: what is seen in light is colour in its strict sense, and this is because what it is to be colour itself15 is [identical with] what it is to be capable of causing movement in what is actually transparent. On the other hand, what is in darkness is either not colour, or is so in another sense. Visible objects and colours can, therefore,



be distinguished by some being seen in light but not in darkness, others being seen in darkness but not in light. 61,39 (419a23-5)16 Fire is seen in both [light and darkness]; [62] that is reasonable, since what is transparent becomes transparent through fire, and light is a power and presence in fire, so that fire is necessarily visible both by day and by night since it always has light belonging to it. And what is unique to the colour of fire is that it can light up the adjacent air, while this is certainly not so for the other colours, and perhaps not even for the colour of fire qua fire, except insofar as it shares in some other nature. That is why it is seen in darkness too, while the other [colours] are not. 62,7 (419a11-15) A sign that colour is capable of setting in motion [only] something that is actually transparent is that a coloured thing placed right on the eye will not be seen. Instead, colour sets in motion something transparent (like air), and the sense-organ is [in turn] set in motion by [the transparent medium], once the latter is continuous [with it]. But if nothing transparent were needed to transport17 colour to the eye, colour would be seen even when placed right on the eye. 62,12 (419a15-21) So Democritus is incorrect in thinking that if the intervening [medium were a void] sight would be more accurate. That is impossible, for seeing occurs [only] when the sense-organ is altered, and is as it were affected. Now it is not affected by the actual colour that is seen; for in that case it would be affected to a greater extent when [a colour] is placed on the eyeball. The only alternative is [that it is affected] by the medium, namely by what is transparent. So there is no way that we would see more accurately through the void; instead, we would not even see at all, if there is nothing that by first being altered itself thereby alters the sense-organ. 62,20 (419a25-b3) The same account applies to both sound and smell. That is because neither of them18 moves sense-perception by touching the organs; instead, the medium is moved by smell and sound, and the sense-organs [in turn] by these. If a sound or smell is applied [directly] to the organs themselves (for example to the channel in the ears or the nostrils), it would either not move these senses at all, or in a different way [from normal sense-perception]. (The same holds for touch and taste, although it does not seem to; the explanation will be given later.)19 The medium for sound and smell is air and water, not qua air and water, but just as transparency is a property shared by these two elements in particular through which they transmit colours, so must these same elements be believed to have some other common property by which20 they transmit sounds, and still another by which they transmit smells. (Commentators, not Aristotle himself, give these the names ‘sound-medium’ [to diêkhes] and ‘smell-medium’ [to diosmon].)21 Even creatures that live in water obviously have a sense of smell, but while human beings and all animals that breathe cannot smell without breathing, animals that live in

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water still have a sense of smell even without breathing. The explanation for this too will be given later.22 62,35 It is now clear from the objects of sight what sight is: it is the capacity that receives through a transparent medium the forms (logoi) of colours without the matter.23

63,1 (419b4-9) After sight hearing must be discussed, and before hearing sound. Sound is twofold: both actual and potential. We say that some objects (e.g. sponges and wool) have no sound at all, potentially or actually, while others do, but sometimes potentially, at other times actually, e.g. bronze, stones, and all solid and smooth objects that have sound potentially when they are at rest, but also actually when they are struck by one another. They make sound when they can produce actual sound in between themselves and the organ of hearing. 63,8 (419b9-18) Actual sound is always of something in relation to something and in something: e.g. of a solid body in relation to a solid body and in air. For an impact cannot occur without movement, and this is always in air. But it is not a random impact that produces sound, nor one involving random bodies, such as wool or a sponge. Things that are going to make a sound must instead be [objects] that are solid and either smooth, hollow, or flat. Smoothness causes air not to be dispersed (for if [air] is to move the organ of hearing, it must make its impact en masse and without being divided); flatness [causes] a greater amount of air to be held in check by [objects] that produce sound; while hollow objects1 produce quite a number of impacts following the first, since the air cannot escape once moved, but is enclosed and vigorously agitated (as happens mainly with bronze containers and [objects] that are also similarly accompanied by smoothness). 63,19 (419b18-25) Sound occurs in air and in water, but less so in water. Yet even if air contributes more to sound than to water, it is still not independent, nor in control of the sound, but it also needs specific objects and a specific impact – objects that, as we have said, are solid, smooth, flat and hollow, and an impact that is strong and swift to prevent the air being prematurely divided and so evading the movement of the thing that swishes it.2 Air is indeed easily dispersed, 3 and unstable; that is why the impact has to be swift, since even if you apply the object 4 a drum, to a drum gently, you will not produce a sound, while whips and sticks produce sound in the same way [as drumsticks do] by striking the actual air, and through their speed getting to the air in advance of its dispersal, just as if you struck a heap of sand in motion and got to it by means of the blow in advance of its moving [away]. Here the air acquires a double definition: that of the body that is struck, and that of what it is struck in.



63,32 (419b25-420a2) An echo occurs when the air that is struck by something that is making a sound or someone who is speaking, bounces back again like a ball; this is because it hits up against something solid and smooth, and because it is a single [object]5 on account of the space that confines it and prevents it from being dispersed. There is probably an echo every time, but not always a clear one; for the air that is struck6 is always reflected (it would otherwise be impossible for someone to hear himself speaking), but mostly the result is that the reflection goes unnoticed, just as with light. Light, indeed, is always [64] reflected; otherwise light would not also occur in shadows, but there would be total darkness outside the air illuminated by the sun. Light is reflected from all sides, but not as [it is] from smooth [bodies] like water or silver, which is why it does not seem to be reflected, for reflection from smooth and gleaming objects is more evident because the light that bounces off can also produce a shadow, and this is not the case with the other [types of] reflection. An echo too, then, occurs in this way from all sides when the air is reflected, but it does not make a sound from all sides unless the air that is struck hits up against something smooth, hollow and with a single surface (the surface of a smooth thing being single). At that point [the air] itself also becomes single and continuous, and bounces off as a single [mass] at the same time [that it is struck]. Roughness, by contrast, creates division and as it were multiplies the surfaces for air that is by its nature ‘friable’ (419b3) (i.e. easily divided). So air does not have complete control over sound, yet has more control than any other element. That is why even those who believe that the void controls hearing because they think that the air is void are not entirely mistaken. 64,15 (420a3-7) Whatever can move a single continuous [mass of] air up to the organ of hearing can produce sound, and air and the organ of hearing are naturally continuous. For nature has lodged in the ears air that is naturally continuous with the eardrum, and with the pneuma therein, in which the sense primarily exists.7 Now when the external air is moved, it replaces the [air] that is inside and continuous with it. For air is continuous with air, i.e. it is not in contact with it (just as water is also not [in contact with] water), but it becomes one with it.8 Hence the external air transmits the voice through the internal air; that is why an animal does not hear in every part [of itself], but only where nature has lodged air. 64,22 (420a7-11) In itself air is without sound, since it does not have its own source of sound but is easily dispersed, easily divided and yields easily to all bodies. But when it is prevented from being dispersed and diffused, its movement [constitutes] sound. The air in the ears, as I said, becomes continuous with the external air, but contrasts by being without sound in its own nature. Thus it accurately perceives all the varieties of external sounds as long as it is not disturbed by its own rolling movement (salos), for the air that is naturally continuous with the eardrum is like a no-man’s-land9 between the internal pneuma of the capacity of sense-

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perception and the external air, and it prevents the external air from striking the eardrum, and instead itself receives the forms of sounds and because it is one, smooth and undispersed it transmits them to the source of perception. 64,32 (420a11-13) Hearing occurs not through the entry of the external air, but through its striking not the eardrum but the air in the ears. This is above all evident when we hear even under water; for water will not enter as far as the eardrum, but [only] touches the air in the ears. In fact, in this case the difference between the elements makes it clear that there is contact. But air does not touch air; instead, the air that comes into contact immediately becomes continuous. In fact, just as we are prevented from hearing if water flows into the ear, so too [are we] when the external air [65] is struck violently and touches the actual eardrum. 65,1 (420a13-15) Nature took precautions against this [outcome] by fashioning spirals in the channel through the ears. As a result, it is not easy for water or the external air to settle into the organ of hearing. So just as the fluid in the eyeball, which is itself also transparent, receives the imprints of colours from the externally transparent [medium] and transmits them to the organ of sight, so the air in the ears receives sounds from the external air and transmits them to the organ of hearing. Nature, in fact, placed membranes in front of the fluid in the eyeball as a way of protecting against its dispersal (the moisture could not be stable unless enveloped in a special container). The eardrum, by contrast, surrounds the air in the ears (air that has to be continuous with the external air), but in place of a covering there are spirals that prevent the [internal air] from being itself dispersed and diffused. When the eardrum is afflicted, hearing is ruined; similarly, when the membrane on the eyeball is afflicted, sight is ruined. 65,13 (420a15-19) Although I said that the air in the ears is motionless, it must not be taken to be totally motionless, but [just] in the sense that it does not change place totally nor does it vary [in content], but always stays the same, since it is naturally continuous with the eardrum (the organ of hearing), since in its parts at least it is always moved with its peculiar smooth and undisturbed movement. That is why the ear also continually echoes with such a movement. Sound, however, is not this type of movement, but one that belongs to something else and is not unique [to the organ]. Movement is natural to all air; that is why air moves even under the most tranquil conditions. This is evident from motes [in a sunbeam] which are never at rest at all. That is why if we apply a horn to the ears we hear a sound because the air in the horn moves with its own movement. Echoing in the ears is a sign that the organ of hearing is healthy, for [then] the air that is naturally continuous with the eardrum is clearly in a natural state and like a living thing. 65,25 (420a19-21) Does the [object] that is struck or the [instrument] that strikes cause sound? Clearly both do, but the one by being affected,



the other by producing [an affection], and [here] being affected and affecting are identical in substrate but different in definition. In unqualified terms sound is an affection of the air but is of two kinds: [the sound] of the [air] between bodies that knock together, and [the sound] that rebounds successively in response to the movement of the air. And it is the latter that is heard when it reaches the organ of hearing. 65,31 (420a21-3)10 The example that Aristotle uses does not completely resemble this [process]. For he says, ‘Sound is a movement of what can be moved in the same way as the objects that rebound from smooth [surfaces] when someone strikes them.’11 Yet while ‘the objects that rebound’ are separated from the [surfaces] from which they rebound, the air that creates sound first does not itself ‘rebound’ towards the organ of hearing, but it moves the air [in the eardrum] that is continuous with it, and is more like waves that push each other forward in turn.12 65,37 (420a26-b5) The varieties of sounds are indicated in the actual sounds, since as long as objects have [only] the potentiality to produce sound, the variety of sounds coming from them is not evident. [66] For the case of sound is like that of the other objects of perception,13 which display their varieties only when they are actually being perceived. The primary differences in sound are high and low pitch, and these are applied metaphorically (kata metaphoran) from the objects of touch.14 To explain. Something sharp15 in outline (skhêma) moves the flesh (i.e. the body) a lot in a short time, whereas something blunt does so slightly over a long time. It is the same with high and low pitch in the case of hearing: for something high-pitched is like a stab, while something low-pitched is like a push, as with something blunt. This is because the first produces a lot of movement in a short time, whereas the second produces a little over a long time. Having a high pitch, then, is not identical with having a high speed, nor is having a low pitch identical with having a low speed, as some believe, but it is because it follows that the movement of anything high-pitched is at a high speed, and the movement of anything ‘blunt’ (meaning lowpitched) is at a low speed, that the reverberation from objects that are smoother, less dense, and more taut is produced at a higher pitch, since they endow the air, and via the air the organ of hearing, with a movement that has a greater speed. 66,15 (420b5-14)16 Voice is the sound made by an [animal] with a soul, for nothing without a soul makes vocal sound. The flute or lyre are said to be ‘in good voice’ [only] by a resemblance to the occasional expresssion even of speech17 by such instruments.18 Many animals (e.g. all bloodless ones, including insects, shell-fish and the crustaceans) have no voice. The reverberation produced by cicadas is just the noise of their covering [i.e. a wing]. Fish also have no voice, and that is predictable when the voice is a movement of the air, and [fish] admit no air by living in water. (The [fish] in the Achelous might be considered to be making a noise with their gills rather than having a voice.) So the voice is the sound made by an animal,

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not, as I said, by every animal, but also not with every part, nor with just any part; for example, we [humans] make sound by clapping our hands together, thus with some specific thing and in a specific way. 66,25 (420b14-22) So since every sound occurs through one thing striking, another being struck, and [the latter] being struck in something, what it is struck in does not exclusively involve the voice, but air is also involved in every sound, yet not involved with the voice in an unqualified way but [only] as the air that we exhale and inhale. For it is used for two functions, just as the tongue is both for taste and for articulate speech. Here taste is essential, since it contributes to our existence, which is why most [animals] have it, whereas communication has well-being as its purpose, and so only the more developed animals have it. Similarly nature also uses inhaling19 as essential both for internal heating and for the voice, and the latter has a superior purpose. 66,34 (420b22-7) The organ of breathing is the throat, and we breathe by inhaling and exhaling. The windpipe exists for the sake of the lung, and because of this part (the lung, I mean) land-based animals with blood have a greater amount of heat, since [the lung] adjoins the heart, the source of heat. [The lung] itself needs cooling, [67] and far more so the heart; that is why breathing is essential, for the external air enters to cool the [internal] heat [of these organs] by being drawn through the throat. 67,2 (420b27-33) Voice is the impact of this air that we inhale against what is called the windpipe. It depends on an impulse of the soul, and occurs through the organs of breathing. The organs of breathing are the tongue, palate and throat.20 Coughing is not the voice, even though it occurs through these organs, as it does not depend on an impulse [of the soul]. Neither are spitting and smacking the lips cases of voice-production, as they are not accompanied by an image (phantasia) (for the latter too must be added to the definition of voice); that is because voice is a sound that can communicate (sêmantikos), yet in some cases naturally, as with the noises made by non-rational animals (for even non-rational animals communicate their primary affections of pleasure and pain), in others by convention, as with the human [voice].21 67,12 (421b33-421a1) And to take another case coughing is not voice, since it is an impact on air as it is being inhaled, whereas the voice is not an impact on this air, but by it. For by means of [inhaled air] voice strikes the air adjoining the windpipe. The result must be thought of as the air that is inhaled striking the air in the windpipe, and this [in turn] striking the windpipe itself, just as in cases of hearing the air lodged in the ears is struck by the external air and then strikes the eardrum. 67,17 (421a1-3)22 Inhaled air serves the voice very effectively; a sign of this is vocal sound being impossible without inhaling and exhaling, since inhaled breath has to be held in to strike the internal air. For example, someone who can [hold his breath] for a long time can make prolonged



vocal sound. [Normally] the internal heat’s need for continuous cooling prevents this. 67,21 So, to sum up, voice is the sound made by an [animal] with a soul by way of its organs of breathing, when inhaled air meets [air] enclosed in the windpipe, or the windpipe itself. It depends on an impulse of the soul, and is accompanied by an image that can be communicated.

67,26 (421a7-15) It is not as easy to define what smell and the object of smell are, as it was for colour, transparency, and sound. That is because the object of smell cannot even be indicated by a name, as can the object of hearing as the voice, and the object of sight as light or colour. The reason for this is that [in smell] we possess our weakest sense, and many animals have a more accurate sense of smell than us, as do dogs among land-based animals, and vultures among winged ones. So we do not even grasp as many varieties of objects of smell as of sounds or colours, and we perceive none of the objects of smell without experiencing pain or pleasure in contrast with sight and hearing, which perceive many colours and sounds without such affections. (This is a sign, some claim, that smelling is designed for [performing] only the function [of smelling], and that it has assumed no further accuracy beyond [performing] that function.1 This is also why [68] we distinguish objects of smell as they are in relation to us, not as they [really] are.) Animals with hard eyes also probably perceive colours [as humans do smells],2 and because of the thickness of their organ [of sight] the varieties of colours are not obvious to them except where something is frightening. 68,4 (421a16-26) Yet while we do not grasp the names for the varieties of smells or their nature, we do apply a nomenclature metaphorically from objects of taste, and use by analogy the terms for flavours for the objects of smell.3 For no variety of flavour evades human taste, but we have this as an accurate sense, since taste is a kind of touch, and in accuracy of touch we [humans] surpass each and every animal. That is also why a human being is the most intelligent of animals; for our flesh is softer compared with the other animals, and this temperament4 is better suited for judgment. A sign of this is that even in the human race itself people with soft flesh have on the whole a superior natural endowment than those with hard flesh (I mean their natural temperament, and not where someone is [hard-fleshed] through training or exercise). The reason is perhaps that soft flesh is easily unblocked and permeated by the primary pneuma of the soul, whereas hard flesh is more like a knot, and a blockage. And while the other sense-organs serve a specific part of the pneuma and so are not recognizable features of the whole soul, the flesh [serves] the pneuma that totally pervades it.5 68,18 (421a26-b3) Yet, as I said, although we are not endowed with

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special names in the case of smell, we do use them metaphorically from taste, and so just as we give different flavours the names ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’, so we also [give] different smells [the names] ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’. Now sometimes in the case of both [taste and smell] the names and their references coincide, and, as with honey, the flavour that is sweet to the sense of taste is also sweet to that of smell; but many other objects (e.g. most perfumes) are sweet to the sense of smell but bitter to that of taste. Similarly, a smell is said to be ‘rough’, ‘oily’ and ‘sharp’, and all these [names] involve a [metaphorical] transition from objects of taste. (Neither the philosopher himself, nor any of his commentators, investigated why, although pleasure and pain also accompany objects of taste, taste is [still] more accurate than smell.)6 68,30 (421b3-8) Smell is of what can and cannot be smelled, in just the same way as hearing and sight are [respectively] of what can and cannot be heard, and of what can and cannot be seen. For the same [sense] can discern both the presence and privation of its special object, but discerns the [presence] in itself, the [privation] indirectly. And ‘what cannot be smelled’, just like ‘what cannot be seen’, is used in several senses. Indeed ‘what cannot be seen’ is (a) what does not belong at all to the nature of visible objects (e.g. sound and voice); (b) what is seen with difficulty (e.g. darkness); and also (c) what damages the eye, like [objects] that are too bright and reflect back into the eyes. Similarly, ‘what cannot be smelled’ is (a) what is not naturally fitted to give off smell at all [69]; (b) what has a slight and extremely insignificant smell; and (c) what the organ of smell cannot tolerate. The same distinctions apply also to what can and cannot be tasted.7 69,3 (421b9-10)8 Smell, like both taste and hearing, also needs a different body as a medium to transmit to it the varieties of objects of smell, and the same elements, air and water, are thought to serve this sense as serve hearing and sight, for animals that live in water seem to sense smell. And just as with sight transparency is a property shared by air and water, so with smell there is another shared property to which, as I have said, some give the name ‘the smell-medium’ (diosmon).9 69,10 (421b13-422a6) There is, in fact, nothing strange about all the senses being like one another, although that does justify raising a problem. For since among animals we see that even insects sense smell (bees, for example, certainly head towards food from a distance,10 and again flee from smoke used for fumigation),11 the inquiry that ‘(logically) follows’ (hepetai) is why human beings and all blooded animals exercise [their capacity for] smell when they inhale, but when they do not inhale, or when they hold their breath, [do] not [exercise the capacity for smell] at all, either when distant from or close by [the object of smell], not even when someone places [such an object] on their nostril.12 Now the latter [result] is not absurd, since it was, as we saw, [a feature] common to the other senses that have been discussed; for they too do not perceive the objects of perception that



are placed right on their sense-organs.13 In fact it is worth raising the problem of how insects [exercise the capacity for] smell when they do not breathe, since every sense has [only] one way [of operating] for those that have it. It might be that animals like [insects] have another sense over and above the type of smelling [discussed], or else an explanation has to be given for the difference. But they could not have another sense; for smelling is the perception of the objects of smell, as sight is of the objects of sight, and hearing of the objects of hearing. So it is impossible for [insects] to perceive the objects of smell, and to distinguish what is fragrant and repugnant to them by using a sense other than smell. Furthermore, these animals too are also seen to be destroyed by the same strong-smelling objects as animals that breathe, e.g. asphalt, brimstone and the like. Thus it is clear that [insects exercise the capacity for] smell, but we must explain how they do so without breathing. So for blooded animals this organ [of smell] seems to be different from that for insects. Just as with sight some animals use eyelids as protective sheaths, and when they do not move them by drawing them back they do not see, while other animals (like those with hard eyes) have no covering fixed in front, but instead have direct vision of as much colour as they can see entering the transparent [medium], so too then in the case of smelling, insects have an uncovered organ capable of smell, like the eye for animals (with hard eyes), whereas animals that breathe have a covering that is drawn back when they inhale [70] as the veins and channels expand. That is why animals that breathe do not exercise smell in water, for [then] they cannot even breathe; the result is that, because the channels [for smelling] cannot be uncovered, [these animals] predictably cannot use the organ of smell. So breathing [itself] is not to be posited as the cause of smelling, any more than are the eyelids of seeing, but [as the cause of] the uncovering of the channel that has the capacity to smell. 70,6 (422a6) There is smell of what is dry, as there is flavour of what is moist; fuming incense, for example, and burnt objects [generally] seem to have a stronger smell. [Discussions] in the [work] On Sense-Perception will demonstrate this in detail, and we must wait for them.14 70,8 (422a7) The organ with a capacity for smelling is that which is potentially like the object of smell, but once it is actually smelling, it is no longer [just] capable of smelling but is engaged in smelling.

70,12 (422a8, 10-11)1 The object of taste is an object of touch; thus the sense of taste is also [itself] a type of touch. The object of taste could be taken to be an object of touch by the following [argument]: since the object of taste can only be flavour, and since every flavour is present in something moist,2 and since anything moist is discerned by touch, necessarily the object of taste is also an object of touch.

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70,15 (422a8-10) So for this reason taste, since it is also a type of touch, does not need a foreign body as a medium to transmit the different kinds of flavour to it, as sight needs transparency, hearing the sound-medium, and smell the smell-medium. All these [three senses], that is, need a foreign medium through which to perceive the objects of perception, and this medium is not one that belongs to them [inherently], but is removed from the sense-organ. But because touch is not like this, neither is taste. But even if, as we shall demonstrate,3 these [two senses] also need a specific medium, our discussion will still find that this medium is something [inherently] belonging to the organs themselves, since this is what flesh or its analogue is like. 70,24 (422a11-19) Thus even if we are in water, we shall be able to perceive whatever flavour the water has,4 just like deep-sea divers who also perceive saltiness, but not through touch, but through taste, and not through the water as a medium, but because the flavour is mixed with the water. Indeed, we taste rivers that consist of water, but not through the water acting as a medium, but because [the water] itself receives flavour. But it does not receive it as transparency does colours; for colours are not seen by being mixed up with the air, i.e. by any of them flowing out5 and blending in with what is transparent. Flavour must, by contrast, blend and mix in with what is moist, and become like a form in matter.6 For flavour is a quality of moisture, but not qua moist, since moisture qua moist has other qualities, such as tractability, great fluidity, and easy divisibility, whereas flavour is a quality of everything moist because it is always present in something moist. So flavour belongs in itself to moisture because moistness is included in its being, either potentially or actually. [71] Salts, for example, are potentially moist; for as soon as they approach the tongue they are liquefied and completely moisten the tongue. 71,3 (422a20-31) So the medium, meaning the type that is a foreign [body], is missing in the case of the senses [of taste and touch], yet the remaining [features] are analogous: for just as colour can be seen, so flavour can be tasted; and as sight is of what can and cannot be seen (darkness being invisible, although sight discerns it too), so too is taste of what can and cannot be tasted. For each of the senses can perceive its own privation, and not just its privation but also its excess, although that involves its being damaged. Hearing, for example, does not perceive silence and sounds that are loud and violent in identical ways, but [perceives silence] by being immobile, and [loud] sounds by being destroyed. That is because excesses in objects of perception also become in a way imperceptible, because they overextend the capacity of the sense-organ, and that is why not only can a low sound not be heard, but also in a sense the loudest and most violent sound. Similarly ‘what cannot be tasted’ also has two senses: one by virtue of of excessive deficiency, as with stones, another through extreme excess that destroys the organ of taste, as with overly caustic, sharp or astringent [flavours]. A third meaning of ‘cannot be



tasted’ is that applying to [an entity] completely unfitted by nature to assume a flavour (e.g. sound or air). The same [trichotomy] also applies to [the expressions] ‘cannot be seen’ and ‘cannot be heard’; for the same sense of ‘impossible’ applies to them too.7 71,22 (422a31-4) So moistness is the first principle for objects of taste, through serving as the matter (matter also being a first principle) for flavours. Objects of taste also have drinkability, since it too is moist insofar as it has different degrees of flavour. But actually for animals there is something naturally [drinkable] (drinkable in a strict sense too), and something that can cause damage and destruction, and could instead even be called ‘undrinkable’, since it destroys taste. Also, what is drinkable must first be tasteable, and then in that way also come to be drinkable. Drinkability is common to touch and taste: touch perceives its moistness, taste its palatability. So if [something drinkable] becomes excessively disproportionate, then as an object of taste it destroys taste, but as an object of touch [it destroys] the whole animal. 71,31 (422a34-422b10) So since the object of taste is present in moisture, the sense-organ for it (I mean the organ that the soul uses for taste) must be neither actually moist, nor incapable of being moistened. For the organ of taste is affected by the object of taste qua tasteable, and so this [organ] has to be potentially moist, but become actually moistened in a way that maintains its inherent constitution even while it is being moistened. A sign of this is the tongue’s not perceiving either when very dry, or (as in sickness) excessively moist. For in [sickness] it perceives the basic [moistness in an object of taste] because of the moisture [originally] coating it,8 but it barely discriminates the other flavours, and so to the sick everything seems bitter [72] because [a bitter] flavour coats the tongue. Similarly when we first taste one strong flavour and then immediately a second one [like it],9 we do not perceive the distinctness [of the second] in the same way since we are already caught up in advance by the stronger [flavour].10 72,3 (422b10-14) The kinds of flavours are also analogous to those of colours: the [extreme] opposites (sweetness and bitterness) are undifferentiated qualities, while next to being sweet is being oily, and next to being bitter is tasting of salt, and in between are [the flavours of being] caustic, astringent, harsh and sharp, since these seem to be essentially [all] the varieties of flavours. 72,7 (422b15-16) The definition of this sense can be summarized along the same lines as the other senses: [viz.] the organ of taste is what is potentially of a certain kind, while the object of taste is what can make the organ actually of that kind.

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72,11 (422b17-27) The following two problems might be raised about touch. Is it a single sense, or more than one? Is flesh (and its analogue among animals lacking flesh) the organ of this sense, or is it instead the medium, while the organ is something distinct and internal? A sign that touch is not a single sense might be thought to be its inability to discern a single pair of opposites in the way that sight [can discern] only black, white and the intermediary [colours], hearing high-pitched, low-pitched and intermediary [sounds], and taste bitter and sweet [flavours], whereas the objects of touch include several pairs of opposites (e.g. hot /cold, dry/moist, hard/soft, heavy/light, smooth/rough), all of them [extremes] forming intermediaries on a mean conceived uniquely for each of them. 72,21 (422b27-33) Now perhaps an inadequate yet plausible solution1 [to the problem of the uniqueness of touch] would be that several pairs of opposites are evident with the other senses too; e.g. a voice can have not only high and low pitch, but also be large and small, and smooth and rough. For colour too one could perhaps find comparable varieties. But the solution is, as I said, unsatisfactory, in that being large and small is common to all the senses, and each perceives by itself what is large and small. ‘Smooth’ and ‘rough’ are either applied metaphorically [to other senses] from objects of touch, or from their shape, and these would exist even if the voice were posited as having a shape because of the air that is struck by it. (Shape is [by definition] common [to different senses] and can itself be perceived.) But this is not the case with the [opposites] hot /cold, hard/soft, and heavy/light; instead these are all special objects of perception belonging to touch, and none of them belongs to another sense. So what is the genus here, i.e. what is the nature of the object of this sense [of touch]? Is it one or more than one? For there is not even a name available for it, like ‘sound’ in the case of hearing, ‘colour’ in the case of sight, and ‘flavour’ in the case of taste. This, then, is the sort of problem [arising with touch]. 72,37 (422b34-423a6) The fact that the perception [of touch] is simultaneous with any contact [with its objects] could not be used as an accurate sign of whether the sense-organ for touch is within the flesh, or instead is without qualification [identical with] the flesh. [73] If one fashioned a sort of membrane (or ‘fine cloth’)2 and stretched it around the flesh, then heat and cold, and hardness and softness, or any of the other pairs of opposites, would still become evident immediately on contact [with it]. Yet the membrane is clearly [identified as] the sense-organ; for even if the membrane became naturally continuous [with the flesh] (as the legendary shirt [of Nessus] did for Hercules),3 the perception [of objects of touch] would actually penetrate [flesh] more rather than less [effectively]. 73,6 (423a6-12) So perhaps the part of the body represented by the flesh is in fact moulded around interior organs that are naturally related to each



of the pairs of opposites, and that are just as numerous as are the pairs of opposites, and is one and the same for all [organs] like a sheath.4 This is just as if air also naturally encircled us, was naturally continuous [with our bodies], and was to a point inseparable because it enveloped the contours of the solid body in which any animal exists; for then we would think that we were perceiving sounds, colours and smells through a single sense-organ, and that sight, hearing and smell constituted a single sense, since [corresponding] organs were not differentiated in the air enveloping [the body], but were always the same, whether we were seeing colours, hearing sounds or smelling smells. But since the organs through which perceptions occur are in fact distinct relative to the external surface of the body, the sense-organs just mentioned are clearly distinct. Yet in the case of touch it is unclear whether there is more than one, or just one [organ]. 73,19 (423a12-15) For what prevents the organ from being more than one, and the flesh [from being] externally the same for all [animals] and moulded around like a sheath? I have said ‘like a sheath’ because a body with a soul cannot consist [only] of air or water; that is because the [body] used by an animal that comes into existence and perishes must be [a three-dimensional] solid. The only conclusion is that the [body] is mixed from earth and the other elements, as flesh and its analogue have to be. But if someone assumed that animals consisted [only] of fire or of air, it would be difficult, as I said, to distinguish in their case the five senses and the sense-organs that each of them uses. 73,26 (423a15-17) Consider the argument [here], although it is not [explicitly] introduced.5 If all perception is through a medium, so too is touch. But between the object of touch and the capacity for touch there is no medium other than the body. The body through which the perception [of touch] occurs is, therefore, the medium, and it will differ from both air and water, which were the media for the other senses, because unlike them it is not separate, but is naturally continuous with the animal. 73,31 (423a17-21) Touch involving the tongue shows that the unity of the flesh through which we perceive the objects of touch just mentioned is an inadequate proof that the organ of touch is a single organ. That is because [the tongue] perceives all the objects of touch in respect of the same part [of the flesh] as it does flavour. So if [74] the rest of the flesh also perceived the other pairs of opposites as well as flavour, then the organs of taste and touch would be thought to be one and the same. But, as it is, they are obviously two, because the [two] sense organs ‘do not correspond’ (423a21) to one another, but while we perceive objects of touch through the same part of the flesh as [we do] flavours, we do not also always perceive flavours through [the same part of it] as [we do] objects of touch. 74,5 (423a22-9) Also, the following problem might be raised about touch. If every body has depth, with this as its third dimension; and if bodies between which there is another body cannot touch one another, given that only objects whose surfaces are together touch one another; and

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if moisture always surrounds moist and liquid things – then how could [three-dimensional] solid bodies touch one another [when juxtaposed] in water? For either their extremities have to be dry, even while they are in water, or there must be water between them with which their extremities are covered. If that is true, then in water one object cannot touch another, so that not even fish-hooks touch fish, nor do fish touch one another. And it is irrelevant if the intervening [distance] is as small as it is. 74,14 (423a29-b1) Someone might similarly claim for things that seem to touch one another in air too, that air always intervenes between [animals] that can touch and the objects of touch, but that we notice this less, because air is less perceptible in relation to touch than is water. Although this problem might involve a plausibile claim, it would also seriously overlook the questions of how things in water touch the water itself, and how things in air touch the air itself. They surely do not do so through some foreign [medium], be it larger or smaller than them, but instead the flesh directly encounters these elements. Still, this was not what we proposed inquiring into at the outset,6 but rather whether flesh is itself a sense-organ for objects of touch (as the eyeball is for objects of sight), or whether the sense-organ is internal, while flesh is [located] between the primary organ and the objects of touch. 74,24 (423b1-3) The present argument seems to discomfort us by making the same demand of touch as of the other senses, by claiming that both taste and touch too do not perceive their objects by touching and having contact with them, but do so through some medium, and that the difference [between them and the other senses] lies, if anywhere, perhaps only in their being at more and less remote distances [from their objects]; the other [senses], that is, are active through a medium of greater extent, whereas [taste and touch] [are active] through one of lesser extent. That is why we also fail to notice not only that the medium [itself] is small, but also that it is naturally continuous with the senses. 74,31 (423b4-8) But there is no need to be puzzled at how this organ can be called ‘touch’ even through a medium. For ‘touch’ has several senses. In one it is applicable in a general sense to all magnitudes, whether they are bodies or incorporeal (for even lines are said ‘to touch’ circles, and circles ‘to touch’ one another), in another it applies to objects of perception and the [corresponding] organs. In the first case, that is, we refer to where the extremities are together7 as touch only by juxtaposition, whereas in the case of touch as a sense [we do so] in respect of perception. Thus in the first case there cannot be medium, whereas with touch as a sense, insofar as it is not mere juxtaposition but a perception of an object available to it, there is nothing to prevent its also perceiving through some medium, and the medium escaping our notice, as also in the present case [75] when we touch [something] in water, the moistness that coats the extremities of the bodies that are in contact [with us] escapes our notice, and the result is just the same in air, although the medium is more elusive.



75,3 (423b8-12) The same thing would happen to us, as I said earlier,8 even if we perceived objects of touch through a membrane, which went unnoticed where it was interposed. In fact, just as we seem to touch tangible objects in water, and the medium goes unnoticed, so too perhaps with the primary organ of touch (and I mean by ‘primary’ the internal sense-organ); for with it we seem to make contact, and the medium is unnoticed, the more so where the medium is more naturally continuous with the organ. 75,10 (423b12-20) The existence of some medium must be posited for [touch] too, and the difference between touch and taste in relation to the other [senses] must not be in respect of this, but rather of the fact that in the case of the other [senses] the medium itself is not altered, but the sense-organ [is altered] through the medium. (It has already been explained how ‘being altered’9 is to be understood.) In the case [of touch and taste], on the other hand, the sense-organ and the medium are affected simultaneously; for the actual flesh is chilled and heated. The same thing, then, simultaneously [strikes] flesh and the organ of touch as in the case of someone who by striking a shield simultaneously strikes the hoplite [carrying it]. But [in the case of sight] the transparent [medium] is not altered by becoming white or black itself, nor [in the case of hearing] is the air lodged in the ears [altered] by itself becoming high-pitched or lowpitched as a result of the sound. So [sight and hearing] are distinct not because they use a medium while touch does not, but because distinct media serve distinct senses in equivalent ways. Flesh certainly has the same relation to touch as do air and water to sight and hearing. 75,22 (423b20-6) Consider the following too. If someone placed something white on the eyeball, or a sound on the air in the ears, or a smell on the channel through the nostrils, these organs would not perceive [it], whereas we do perceive objects of touch when they are placed directly on the flesh. So it is clear that flesh is not the primary sense-organ for objects of touch ([since] then it would be affected like the other [organs]); instead, this [organ] is internal, while [flesh itself is just] a medium. 75,28 In light of Aristotle being rather zealously engaged with this subject, the arguments concerning touch when grouped together are the following: (a) All sense-perception [occurs] through a medium; thus touch does too. And nothing but flesh is found between touch and tangible objects; thus flesh is the medium [for touch].10 (b) If we made contact through a membrane or through water,11 the medium would be unnoticed. So there is nothing odd about the medium being unnoticed in the present case either, given how much more naturally continuous [flesh] also is [with the body].12 (c) No sense-organ has perception when the object of perception is placed on it, but flesh does when objects of perception are placed on it; flesh is not, therefore, a sense-organ.13

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(d) We do not perceive the [opposite qualities] of light and heavy by having contact with them, but by means of the internal capacity [for touch]. So even if the same thing happens in the case of the other pairs of [tangible] opposites too [76], then there is nothing odd about us perceiving each of them [separately] by specific internal capacities, although we appear to do so by means of the flesh. (Argument [d] is not stated by Aristotle.) 76,3 Those are the [arguments] for touch occurring through a medium; the following [arguments show] that the sense of touch involves more than one sense-organ. (a)14 There is a single sense-organ for [each] single pair of opposite qualities; yet touch seems to involve more than one [such pair]; the sense of touch does not, therefore, involve a single sense-organ. Just as sight and hearing involve more than one sense-organ, yet are active through a single medium, so by the same token there is nothing to prevent there being more than one sense-organ for each of the tangible pairs of opposites mentioned above, although the [multiple organs] employ a single medium, namely flesh. 15 both taste and touch involve the same part [of the body] (i.e. the tongue) despite the senses being more than one,16 so17 there is nothing to prevent the same result with the whole of flesh too, [namely] that it perceives all the objects of touch through the same [bodily] part, although the sense-organs [themselves] are more than one. (b) If there were an animal composed [exclusively] of air, sight would not seem different from hearing, for the animal would hear and see through itself as a [single] whole.18 But there would still be two [senses] because of the difference in the objects discerned. So in the case [of touch] too, since an animal is composed of flesh and perceives all the objects of touch through flesh as a [single] whole, touch seems to, although it really does not, involve a single sense-organ; instead it involves as many [organs] as there are pairs of opposites.

76,16 Alexander’s inquiry into [Aristotle’s] account of flesh is inadequate, for he says: if flesh is not the sense-organ for the objects of touch, what else is there, as there must be some specific [organ] corresponding to the eyes for sight, the ears for hearing, the nostrils for the objects of smell, and the tongue for what falls under taste?19 [This is inadequate], for let him hear Aristotle [stating] that the sense-organ for objects of touch is in the region of the heart.20 Again, if we must inquire into the analogue [to touch] in the [other] senses, then, he says, just as the media for the other senses do not have perception, so neither must flesh have perception, if indeed touch occurs through it as a medium.21 But on this let him hear Aristotle, [who states] that an animal does not sense by means of flesh but ‘at the same time’ as the flesh.22 Thus the analogy [with the other senses] must not be applied



in all cases, since the medium for touch and taste is also naturally continuous [with the organ], but not [the medium] for the remaining [senses]. It is as impossible for more than one [sense-organ] to touch at the same time in respect of the same part of a body that is the same in number, as it is for more than one sense-organ to taste the same flavour at the same time, although it is possible for numerous people to see simultaneously the same colour and the same sound in their thousands, as in theatres.23 Let this, then, do as a statement and solution of this problem. 76,32 (423b27-424a2) Touch is, however, the most corporeal of the senses, since its objects are the most corporeal, and are varieties of body qua body (not qua body with a soul).24 For what produces forms in the elements, which are primary, are heat and coldness, and dryness and wetness, all discussed in detail in On Coming-into-Existence and Perishing. The sense-organ for objects of touch (the [organ] in which the sense called ‘touch’ exists primarily) should be called ‘capable of touching’, just like ‘capable of hearing’, ‘capable of seeing’ and ‘capable of smelling’, but it should be realized that the part in which this capacity of the soul exists primarily [77] has potentially the character that objects of touch actually have. So it is potentially hot and potentially cold etc., and that is why I said25 that it was itself also the most corporeal [capacity]. It has, in fact, been stated in general terms that perceiving is [by definition] being affected in a certain way,26 and that what is affected is also in one way the same as the object that produces the affection, in another is not the same; for it is not the same while it is being affected, but is the same after it has been affected.27 77,5 (424a2-10) This is why the organ of touch does not perceive what is equally hot, cold, hard or soft (and indeed not just the internal [organ], but not even the medium, i.e. the flesh), but [the organ perceives] the excesses and deficiencies, since the sense-organ is like a mean between the extremes [found] in the objects of perception. But it is not a mean in the way that we speak of the moral excellences as means in relation to vices, for they are, and are spoken of, as means by [reference to] their equidistance from the vices. Here, by contrast, [we speak of a mean] because the mean is potentially either extreme. And touch is not like the other senses, because it is also not a mean in an identical way, for in their case what the capacity for sight [for example] primarily exists in is totally colourless, and what the capacity of hearing primarily exists in is entirely without sound. But [what touch primarily exists in] cannot fail to share in every quality that can be an object of touch. That is because anything that can touch is a body, and it has been stated28 that the qualities that can be touched are qualities of body qua body. Touch and the remaining [senses] are, therefore, means in quite different ways: the [other senses are so] by possessing none of the [qualities] that they accept, whereas touch [is a mean] because it already possesses the intermediary [state] between the [opposites] hot and cold, ,29 and hard and soft. [In the case of touch], that

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is, the medium [itself] can discern the extremes because it becomes one of the actual extremes relative to the other, and is affected by each of the extremes not through being like it, but through being [in itself] unlike it.30 77,22 (424a10-15) Also, just as we saw that sight was in a certain way [the sense] for both what could and could not be seen, and that the other senses similarly applied to their specific privations,31 so too touch is [the sense] for what can and cannot be touched. What cannot be touched is [defined as] any object of touch that is identifiable in an entirely minimal and indistinct way, and conversely as anything excessive and capable of destroying [the organ] (too hot or too cold, for example). 77,26 (424a15-16) Each of the senses has, then, been described [only] in outline, since they are going to receive a special discussion.

77,28 (424a17-23) Concerning all sense-perception it is established as clear at a universal level that sense-perception is the capacity to receive forms without matter, as wax [can receive the form] of the ring without the iron and gold; for [wax] takes on the golden or iron imprint, but not insofar as [the imprint] is golden or iron. That is how sight too [takes on] the colour of a thing that is coloured, and hearing [takes on] sound, and equally taste and smell [their objects], even if they do not seem to, for qualities penetrate into these [capacities], while the matter and substrate are on the outside. The sense-organs are accordingly said ‘to be affected’ by the objects of perception. But the way that they are affected is far different from that by which inanimate things, meaning bodies without perception, are affected. For the sense-organs are said to be affected by objects of perception while the matter itself remains external, and only the form moves the sense-organ. By contrast, bodies that are cut [78], compressed, or burnt are affected when the matter of what produces the affection enters along with [the affection]. For example, sharpness does not cut, but the knife [does], i.e. the sharpness along with the iron. Also, it is fire that causes burning, not the structure and ratio (logos)1 of fire. That is why in these cases there is an affection in a strict sense, since it terminates in a transformation and change. Specifically, what is affected in a strict sense becomes the matter for what produces the affection, just as something that is being burnt, compressed, or cut [becomes the matter] for what causes the burning, compression or cutting. 78,7 (424a23-4) The senses, by contrast, do not become types of matter for the objects of perception. For perception is not turned white or black, or pitched low or high, but as we have often said and will go on to say,2 it receives only the form and the ratio. This is why [the senses] culminate in acts of both discernment and perception, for [by contrast] no [type of matter] has the capacity to discern the form that comes to exist in it, since matter is something that lacks understanding, discernment, and sense-



perception. The ratio, however, discerns the ratio [itself]3 as well as other objects, and so as a form it perceives a form. 78,13 (424a24-8) Sense-perception by being the capacity and structure of the primary sense-organ is its form and ratio. Sense-perception and the sense-organ are also identical in matter, as every form is [identical with] what receives it, but the organ and its power are different in being, since the organ is4 a physical magnitude,5 but the power is its ratio and form. 78,18 (424a28-32) Also clear from what we have said is why excesses in objects of perception destroy the sense-organs. For if the movement [caused by the object] exceeds the capacity of the sense-organ, the power is necessarily destroyed, since the ratio that defined perception is dissolved. For while every ratio is a specific proportion and attunement (and resembles a mean), everything that is attuned is destroyed by anything excessively out of tune, as with the concord and pitch of the strings [in a lyre] when they are too violently struck by the power in accordance with which they were attuned.6 78,25 (424a32-424b3) How the [perception of form without matter] occurs is clear from what we have said, as also why plants have no sense-perception, although they have a portion of the soul and are affected by objects of touch, when they are chilled, heated, moistened and dried. Now as far as the other senses are concerned, it would be unreasonable to raise the problem of whether plants [for example] hear or smell, but it would not be unreasonable [to do so] with regard to touch, given that plants are affected by objects of touch. Now plants are affected, but not in a way that results in their receiving the imprint of the ratio of the affection without the matter. For in general they have neither the kind of principle that can receive the mere forms of objects of touch,7 nor indeed is any part of their body, or the whole of their body, blended at a mean between the pairs of tangible opposites, as flesh and its analogue are in the case of animals. Instead, the body [of plants] tends towards one of the opposites. (Things like [opposites] are also lacking in sense-perception even more than are animals themselves.) Thus [plants] are affected because matter enters along with what affects them: they are moistened through having moisture enter them, and chilled through cold entering along with matter. So things that are nourished must have matter (namely nutriment) existing within them. [79] But this is not so for [animals] that have sense-perception, insofar as they perceive; instead [for them] the substrate of the object of perception has to remain outside them. 79,2 It would especially be to no purpose for plants to perceive when they cannot freely8 avoid what is incompatible or compatible (as animals observably do), but remain fixed and rooted in the same place. Yet since nature does nothing without a purpose, each [plant] attracts compatible fluid,9 not by discerning it as compatible but through nature conveying10 compatible [nutriment] without plants being aware of it. Nature does the same with animals too in conveying compatible, and repulsing incompat-

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ible, nutriment, without our being aware of what is happening. So there is no determinate organ for sense-perception in plants, nor one common to all sense-perception, like the pneuma that [in animals] is blended in a specific proportion.11 79,13 (424b3-5)12 Another general [problem] that might be investigated is whether something that cannot smell could be affected in any way by [an object giving off] a smell, or whether something that cannot see could be affected by colour, or that which cannot hear by sound. 79,15 (424b9-14)13 Now, anything that does not have the sense of hearing cannot be affected by something audible as an audible thing, and so stones that are being broken, or plants that are being riven by thunderbolts, are affected not by the sound as an audible thing, but because the sound is present in air, and it is this [air] that if struck too violently similarly strikes whatever it encounters. So too when tunics are soaked by sea-spray,14 they are not affected by the [salty] flavour of the spray, insofar as that flavour can be tasted, but [only] insofar as it has the particular quality [of being sprayed]. 79,21 (424b5-9, 14-18) The air is affected both by sound and smell, but we still say that the air gives off a smell, not that it has a sense of smell. Water too is affected both by sound and smell, but it does not therefore exercise sense-perception. But even if bodies with fluid boundaries are more easily affected, nevertheless sense-perception is still not [identical with] the [activity of] being easily affected, but is instead [the activity] of the form coming to exist without the matter in the perceiver, and remaining for some time, even though what causes the affection has gone away.15 16 79,26 For in general, as was also said earlier,17 something that is affected in a strict sense becomes the matter for what causes the affection: thus it is heated, chilled, dried and moistened, but the affection does not culminate in an act of discernment, but stops at just transformation and change. That is why flesh could also never be a sense-organ since, just like inanimate objects, it is in a way involved with the tangible pairs of opposites. For [flesh] is heated and chilled, and becomes like matter for the tangible pairs of opposites. But we do not see this in the case of the other sense-organs: thus the eyeball does not turn white, nor the air lodged in the ears have a lower or higher pitch. So flesh too is not a sense-organ since it cannot receive the imprint of the mere form and ratio [of the object of perception], but instead becomes matter for what produces affections, whereas something that engages in discerning [objects] must be unaffected by the object that is discerned.

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Book Three of Aristotle On the Soul

80,3 (424b22-7) It is credible that no other sense exists beyond the five [discussed], since when earlier we worked through the problem of whether the capacities for touch might be more than one because its objects were, we did not have to look around for some other sense that was missing.2 In fact, [as we saw], if the objects of touch are more than one, so too are the pairs of opposite [qualities], yet none of the latter escape discernment by the sense [of touch]. (Even if whatever is heavy or light does not make as directly evident an impact as what is hot or cold, it still does not elude the sense [of touch], for we have a specific capacity for discerning [bodily] tendencies [resulting from weight]. But we are not now inquiring into whether the latter [capacity] is correctly classified with our capacities for touch,3 but rather whether in general we are missing some way of perceiving the qualities belonging to bodies. Clearly we are not, since we discern and perceive them all.) Again, if we are missing a given sense, then we must also be missing the [relevant] sense-organ.4 80,15 (425a3-9) Every sense-organ capable of perceiving is [itself] a body, and every body consists of one or more of the elements. We have sense-organs that consist of both of the elements and of their compounds: the eyeball consists of water, the organ of hearing of air (or of water in the case of animals that live in water), and the organ of smell of either [element]. Nature made no organ from fire or earth [alone]. Fire was excluded because of being common to the blend of all [elements] (for heat is present in all [animals] and none can perceive without natural heat), while earth cannot in and of itself be an organ because it is the densest element, and thus unfitted for discerning [objects of perception]. That is also why the parts of animals in which it is preponderant (bones, hair, nails) are the least sensitive, although [earth] is more involved in the organ of touch than in the remaining sense-organs. So, as I said, we would not be missing any sense-organ formed of a single element,5 yet we do have [a sense-organ] composed of more than one [element]; this is indeed what flesh and its analogue are like, if [flesh] too must be located among sense-organs.6 So if none of the sense-organs is missing, neither is any capacity [of the soul] that uses the sense-organs. 80,29 (424b27-425a3) Again, since it has become clear that every one of our sense-organs perceives through a medium, this medium must either 1

Book Three


be a foreign [body], or naturally continuous [with the sense-organ]. We [humans] have one [medium] that is naturally continuous (the kind that taste and touch use), as well as foreign media such as air and water, which the remaining senses use to report their objects.7 For [the perception of] colours and sounds [the medium of] air satisfies land-based animals, and [that of] water animals that live in water, and either [medium] [81] is adequate for both [senses], and both [senses] for either [medium] (e.g. air and water for colours). So we are missing none of the [required] media, and if we have all those that deliver reports [to the sense-organs], obviously we also have the [sense-organs] to receive the reports. So there is no sense missing from animals. 81,4 (425a9-11) But I do not mean all [animals], only developed ones that are not stunted and defective. For ‘zoöphytes’ have touch as their single sense, while others perhaps also have taste, others maybe smell too, whereas those so developed that they can engage in forward movement have all five senses. For even the mole obviously has eyes beneath its skin, but since sight was inessential for its way of life, nature provided the full number of senses in its case too, but concealed [the organ of sight] under the skin since the animal did not need this way of discerning [objects of perception]. 81,11 (425a11-13) So if there is no other body beyond the four elements and their compounds (and these are all the bodies in this world),8 and if those bodies have no quality beyond those that they are currently thought to have, then there is no sense that animals are missing. Obviously nature always provides less developed capacities in advance as a complete support for more developed ones, so that a person with reason and intellect would already possess all the senses.9 81,18 (425a14-16) Yet the following claim cannot be made: that there must be a special sense-organ for those common objects of perception that, as we are,10 we perceive with all our senses, but that [this organ] is now missing, and that this is why, as we are, we perceive these objects in effect incidentally since we have no [sense-organ] assigned to movement, rest, shape, size, and number. Yet [this argument goes] there must at all events be that [sense] for which these common objects are objects, not as the common objects now are, but as special objects, since sight does not now perceive size, shape, rest, etc., directly, but, by perceiving colour and size itself, perceives along with them shape, and something moved or at rest, and as one (for all the senses recognize one thing or many, and this is number). So if we do perceive the [common objects] incidentally, there should be a sense-organ pre-established for them.11 81,29 (425a16-27) But this is impossible, since we do not perceive the common objects incidentally. For none of the incidental objects of perception causes movement in the sense-organ, alters it, and endows it with its special structure.12 For even if these [terms] are not used in a strict sense in the case of the senses, a kind of alteration still occurs to the organ of



sight through colour, and to that of hearing through noise, particularly at the time when the object of perception is active in relation to them. But the incidental objects are not like this, since [the phrase] ‘incidental objects of perception’ has two meanings. One is where we discern something sweet by sight. For example,13 we often see some fluid object that is gold-coloured and claim that it is honey, without waiting to perceive sweetness, and this happens because we perceive the qualities of being gold-coloured and being sweet together in [82] honey while we are actively perceiving it with both sight and taste, and these two [types of] perception terminate at the primary capacity [of the soul], that of sense-perception, which, because it is a single [capacity], is [the place] on which reports of all the objects of perception come to rest.14 Here this [single] capacity may be misled and immediately claim [without tasting] that the gold-coloured object is also sweet, in the belief that these [qualities] also coincide here in exactly the same way as when the two senses together caused movement in it. That is one sense of ‘incidental perception’. The other is when on seeing the son of Cleon approaching, we do not just claim that he is white, but also that he is the son of Cleon. For the son of Cleon, qua son of Cleon, is not an object of perception, but since the white thing is also incidentally the son of Cleon, sight does not stop at the stage of colour (the [object] that belongs to it), but also makes the added claim about something that is not unique to it or to any other [sense]. But it is not really sight that does this, but again that single [sense] at which the others also terminate. 82,13 (425a27-b4) These, then, are the meanings of ‘incidental’, and in respect of both of them sense-perception is not transformed, or affected, by the incidental object of perception when it engages in discernment regarding it, and assesses it. For example, sight is not affected by the son of Cleon, or by anything sweet, in identifying the gold-coloured object as honey, and the white thing as the son of Cleon. With the common objects of perception, however, when sight perceives size, the character of size comes to exist in it, and similarly with movement, unity, and shape. How, then, could it perceive incidentally objects from which it receives an imprint of the form no less than [it receives] the [form] of colour? So there is no special sense for the common objects of perception, but the senses discern one another’s special objects incidentally, because they all terminate in a single [sense].15 So when that single [sense] gets reports from [for example] taste and sight that one and the same fluid is bitter and gold-coloured, but at another time happens to grasp only the gold colour via sight, it immediately adds on bitter without waiting for [a report from] taste. Here it is not sight that is misled, but that single [sense] at which both sight and taste terminate. This is the [sense] that makes the functioning of the two [special] senses that of one, and it belongs to it to apply both ‘bitter’ and ‘gold-coloured’ to bile, and [state] that the two [qualities] belong to a single body. That is why it is also misled about this [body]. It is also misled about the son of Cleon whenever it claims from colour alone

Book Three


that someone is the son of Cleon. For the son of Cleon can be recognized not on the basis of [his] colour, but on the basis of many other [qualities], which one sense cannot combine and scrutinize, but [only] a distinct, indeed more valuable, capacity, one not shared by non-rational animals. [This capacity] is also misled about the common objects when it relies on a single [sense], such as sight for [identifying] shape, since shape is common to sight and touch. 82,38 (425b4-11) From what has been said it is clear that there are no more senses than these five. But someone might inquire why there is not a single [sense] by which sounds, [83] flavours and the remaining objects of perception can be perceived. Now, if all these objects had a single sense, the common objects would not be recognized as common. But, as it is, [those objects] are proven not to belong to a single [sense] because they do accompany more than one sense. So this is an adequate explanation, as is the fact that the common objects are so difficult to discern that several ways of discerning them have to act in concert. Also implied by what has been said is that if there were a single sense, there would also of course be a single sense-organ. But that is impossible, since the sense-organ is potentially what the object of perception [actually] is, yet not indiscriminately, but as a colourless [medium] is to colours,16 and a soundless [one] to sounds. (It has been adequately demonstrated elsewhere17 that it is not just anything that is naturally acted on, or affected, by just anything else.)

83,11 (425b12-17) Since we perceive that we are seeing and perceive that we are hearing, we must either perceive that we are seeing by sight alone, or by another sense that discerns sight. If indeed we do so by another sense and not by sight [alone], there will be two senses belonging to the same object: e.g. with colour there will be both sight that sees colour directly, and sight that perceives sight. That is because it is impossible to claim that sight sees without its being aware of what is being seen.1 And if sight needs another [sense] to discern [sight], why does the sense that [so] discerns not also need yet another sense, and that one another, in a progression to infinity? If in anticipation of this absurdity someone conceded that the sense that discerns sight would also have to discern itself, why not concede this for sight itself too? So let us agree that sight itself discerns itself. 83,21 (425b17-22) But colour is the special object of perception for sight; sight will, therefore, have colour [as its object]. Now ‘perceiving ’2 is obviously not used without qualification. Indeed, when we do not see, 3, we ‘discern [objects] by sight’, and not only perceive light but also perceive darkness along with it, yet not in exactly the same way. Thus we perceive that we are not seeing by the very same sense by which we also perceive that we are seeing, and this [sense] will be sight.



83,26 (425b22-5) Also, there is nothing absurd in the organ of sight’s being in some way coloured. For the sense-organ can receive the object of perception without the matter, which is why even when the objects of perception have gone away, sense-impressions and images are present. For the ratios (logoi) of the objects of perception that the sense gathered up remain for some time, even though the external [objects] are absent. But it is absurd for us to be aware by sight that we are seeing a colour as gold-coloured, but not to be aware by the same sense that we are seeing at all. Rather [we are aware of] both by the same [sense of] sight, but not in exactly the same way: for example, we say ‘gold-coloured’ because we are affected by it, while we say ‘we are seeing’ because we perceive the affection [of sight]. 83,35 (425b26-426a1) The activity of the object of perception and that of the sense is one and the same, but what it is to be them is not the same. I mean that what is actually heard and [the activity of] hearing, and what is actually seen and [the activity of] seeing, are the same. For without hearing an object could not be actually heard, nor actually seen without sight. But [on the other hand] what is potentially heard [84] and the potential [activity of] hearing can be distinguished from one another; for we can have an organ of hearing and not hear, and something can be audible and not heard, as with sound. But when something that can hear hears, and something that can be heard is heard, then actual hearing and the object that is actually heard exist at the same time. 84,4 (426a2-20) Both [what can hear and what can be heard] are present in [the capacity for] hearing because as a general truth every activity of something that can produce an effect and cause movement is present in whatever can be affected, as has been demonstrated in the Physics.4 Now this is the way in which the activity of the object of perception is also present in anything capable of sense-perception, and from this it is clear that not everything that causes movement must also be moved, at least if the objects of perception cause movement in the senses, but themselves often remain unmoved. This is evident most of all in the case of sight, since colour moves sight, but itself remains unmoved. The same might be said of touch when coldness alters flesh (or the senseorgan within the flesh), yet is not itself altered at all, not, that is, when it is [in the process of] causing the alteration. So in some cases there are names for the two activities, meaning that of the object of perception and that of what can perceive (e.g. the activity of what makes a sound can be called ‘sound production’, and [the activity] of what can hear ‘hearing’), but in other cases one of the pair lacks a name (e.g. the activity of [the capacity for] sight is called ‘seeing’, while that of [its object] colour lacks a name; and the activity of the capacity for taste [is called] ‘tasting’ while that of [its object] flavour lacks a name). 84,18 (426a20-6) So the earlier natural philosophers were wrong to believe that colour could not exist without sight, or flavour without taste.

Book Three


For [the expressions] ‘objects of sight’ and ‘objects of taste’ are used in two senses: in one the actual objects of sight cannot exist without being seen, in the other they can. White, for example, can exist even without being seen. So [these philosophers] should be criticized for using expressions that do not have a single sense as if they did. 84,24 (426a27-b8)5 If what is actually heard and actual hearing are identical, then the senses were rightly called ‘ratios’ (logoi). That is clear from the fact that mixed objects of perception always please us more than unmixed ones, as, for instance, concords in sounds, blended flavours, and mixed colours. That is why the arts of music, painting, cosmetics and cooking deal with the mixture and blend of extremes. Every mixture and blend is a ratio, which on becoming an actual object of perception, becomes identical with the sense-organ. Thus it is reasonable that the organ be a ratio, since it is identical with a ratio. Unmixed sounds and unmixed flavours, whether through excess or deficiency, either cause no movement in the organ, or else destroy it or cause it pain. They are certainly not ratios, blends or concords. 84,35 (426b8-17) But since we have often said6 that each sense exists in its own sense-organ and thereby discerns its object and its inherent distinguishing [properties], we shall investigate this [claim] in greater detail after taking up an earlier point.7 We perceive, then, not only white as different from black, but also [85] white as different from sweetness. So what is the capacity that discerns the distinction between white and sweetness? It is not sight, since it does not perceive sweetness, or taste, since it is not aware of white. Yet this [distinction] too must be discerned by sense-perception, since distinctions between objects of perception are also perceptible. So there was nothing odd about our thinking earlier that touch did not exist in flesh, but that the flesh was [the medium] between the tangible object and the organ of touch, or about someone even wishing to call flesh the sense-organ as long as it was not a primary [organ], i.e. not that in which the capacity for touch is established.8 Our discussion as it proceeds will find that this results not only with flesh, but also with the remaining sense-organs too, meaning, that is, the eyeball, 9 and the pores through the ears. 85,10 (426b17-23) But we must take up a slightly earlier [point].10 The [capacities] by which we discern that white and black are distinct [colours], and that sweetness is distinct from heat, must both be one. For capacities cannot exist separately and dissociated from one another, and different ones cannot perceive distinct objects and discern that the two are not identical. For in that case if you and I were to perceive distinct [objects], these would obviously also be [ipso facto] distinct from one another. But that is impossible. There must be a single thing that by perceiving the two denies that the two must be one and the same, when [for example] it says that white is not identical with sweetness. So it perceives the two objects



in just the same way as it speaks about them, and it speaks as a single thing after it has considered both. Thus in this way it also perceives them. 85,20 (426b23-9) It not only [perceives] as itself a single thing, but also at a single time. For when it perceives honey as gold-coloured and sweet, or snow as cold and white, it does not perceive the whiteness at one time and the coldness at another, but [both] at one and the same time. And it says that one of them is distinct at exactly the same time [it says that] the other is too. I mean that the [time] when [this happens] is not incidental. For example, I could here and now say that Plato the philosopher has arrived in Sicily, but I am [just] saying it now, but not that [it is] also [happening] right now. But the [sense] that distinguishes between white and cold also states that [distinction] at the time, and says at the time that [it is] also [true] at the time. It, therefore, [states both] at the same time, so that not only is it itself a single thing, but is [so] at a single time too. The capacity for sense-perception, at which different reports from the numerous sense-organs terminate, is then, a single thing. 85,30 (426b29-427a1) But still this is impossible. For the result will be that something that is the same and undivided has more than one movement at the same time and, worst of all, in undivided time. And why do I [just] say ‘more than one’? They may be ‘opposite’ (426b30) too. For it is clear that by means of this single sense, whatever it may be, not only do the eyeball and the tongue report the colour gold and [the taste of] sweetness, but also the eyeball by itself reports white and black, as when we encounter the written page. For there we perceive both white and black at the same time, and they are not only distinct but opposite in addition to being distinct. 85,38 (427a2-3) So how will it be moved as a single [sense] with opposite movements at the same time? The absurdity [86] involving the different senses11 was therefore not so great, for in their case the objects reported were different, yet not opposites, as with sweetness and the colour gold, but [here] it seems that in the case of a single sense and a single senseorgan the consequence is the more absurd one: that it somehow perceives the opposites at the same time. So is it good enough to take refuge again in the principle that states that the capacity for sense-perception to which all the incoming reports from the sense-organs are transmitted is one in number and substrate, but more than one in definition? For in several cases this principle has solved a number of problems for us.12 So then in one way this capacity, by being [itself] divided, perceives things that are divided, but in another way it is undivided; for while divided in being (i.e. in definition), it is undivided spatially and numerically. 86,11 (427a3-9) Yet with this problem at least, not even this [distinction] is good enough. For while perhaps there is nothing odd about the same thing being potentially both divided and undivided, just as the same thing is potentially cold and hot, or white and black, it still cannot be active at the same time in respect of both opposites. Instead, the different

Book Three


activities must either be divided in time, or belong to the things that are active. Thus it is also impossible to receive at the same time forms that are opposites, if sense-perception and thinking are such that they can receive the forms of objects of perception or thought. 86,18 (427a9-14) But here someone might more reasonably believe that the capacity for sense-perception is like the point, specifically, like the centre of the circle where all lines from the circumference terminate.13 For this point is at the same time both a single [point] and more than one [point]: it is single since the centre of the circle is so; but more than one, because it is the termination (peras)14 of several straight lines that are also different. Thus the point is both undivided and divided, and is like this at the same time. So we can agree that the capacity that must in its primary meaning be called both ‘capable of perceiving’, as well as ‘sense-perception’, receives this definition, since as a single entity it is a termination of several organs. So insofar as it is single and undivided, it is something that discriminates as a single thing and at the same time; but insofar as it is the termination of a number of divided things, the single [capacity] becomes more than one, so that nothing prevents it from also discriminating between more than one separate object as well as being a single [capacity]; that is because it is single and more than one at the same time.

86,28 Furthermore, as we have often said, this [capacity] is not itself at the same time turned white and black, or chilled and heated.15 That is after all absurd. Instead, while each sense-organ reports its own distinguishing features, [sense-perception], which is incorporeal in definition and based on pneuma ([pneuma being] the capacity for sense-perception in its primary meaning,16 from which all the sense-organs are exhaled as though from a fountain, and on which all the reports from the objects of perception converge), is not itself affected by opposites. Rather, by contemplating opposites it discriminates [between them] and [for example] claims that white is distinct from black, and white from sweetness. For what is absurd is not the [act of] discriminating between opposites at the same time (any more than is the [act of] arbitrating between individuals who are contradicting one another) but rather the [act of] being affected by opposites at the same time. [87] From all [that we have said] it is clear, then, that neither is sight in its primary meaning present in the eyeball, nor hearing in its primary meaning present in the ears, nor taste present in the tongue, but instead sight in its primary meaning, as well as taste, hearing, smell and touch, are present in the pneuma that is the primary capacity for sense-perception. And when we say that the senses are in total five, we are saying that the sense-organs are [in total] five,17 and [the senses] are like five conduits of the sensory pneuma, channelled from a single source through the organs,18 and that sense-perception in its strict and primary



meaning uses these [organs]. Its five [senses] play the role of incoming messengers, but the single [sense] plays that of ruler or king:19 for just as in the case [of a king] the [incoming] messengers are numerous but the man who judges them is one, so here too the organs importing messages are numerous, but the entity that decides about every [message from the senses] is one.20 So by means of this [single sense] we perceive by sight that we are seeing, and by hearing that we are hearing. For we perceive the activities themselves and the difference between them in exactly the same way. Hence we do not discern sight by sight, as seemed to be the case a little earlier,21 but by the single [sense] aligned with each of the senseorgans.22 87,15 (427a14-16) This will suffice as a definition of sense-perception.23 1 87,17 (427a17-26) Since we say that we know and discern [objects] not only by means of sense-perception but also by means of reason (i.e. discursive thinking),2 we must next inquire into how these means of discernment (kritêria) differ from one another. The inquiry is clearly not redundant,3 since the earlier natural philosophers virtually identify senseperception and reason. Thus Empedocles says ‘Wisdom increases for humans according to what is present’,4 since it is unique to sense-perception to be moved by the objects of perception that are ‘present’. Homer, who believes that the intellect5 is transformed and altered along with the surrounding world, thinks that reason has a corporeal nature,6 and he in effect makes the intellect into sense-perception. For the intellect (noos) of earthly humans is as the Father of men and gods bestows on them from day to day.7 87,29 (427a26-b6) In general, when [the natural philosophers] constitute the soul from the first principles of the universe, and then have it come to know existing objects by contact with something like it, they make the intellect exclusively body, and have it transformed along with the bodies that it comes to know. Yet they would not only have to explain to us how it comes to know by contact with something like it, but also how it is misled; for being affected [by being misled] is far more common for animals, and lasts for a longer period. But they [88] claim that the way that we come to know [objects] is by contact with something like [us], without adding an explanation of how we fail to have knowledge. They have no notion that what we know is a very small amount in comparison with what we fail to know, and in particular that knowledge and the failure to know are distinct from one another where [opposite] properties are concerned. For example, someone who knows that what is good is useful knows at the same time that what is bad is harmful, and someone who falls into error about one

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[of these opposites] falls into error regarding the other too. So [if we know like by like] we must either be at one and the same time made like opposites when we know opposites, or be made unlike opposites when falling into error about opposites. But both [alternatives] are equally impossible. 88,9 (427b6-11) But this [argument] is extraneous to the present discussion, whereas what it is most relevant to state is that sense-perception is not identical with the capacity of the soul for reasoning for [the following] reasons: (a) all animals share in [sense-perception], but only a human being shares in the [capacity for reasoning]; (b) while there are other varieties of the capacity for reasoning, there are just the five [kinds] of sense-perception; (c) there are distinct ways in which sense-perception and the intellect get things right. (There is no need to be disturbed if at different times we call this same thing ‘intellect’ (nous), ‘capacity for reasoning’ (logikê dunamis), ‘thinking’ (noêsis), and ‘discursive thinking’ (dianoia). We shall distinguish the terms more precisely as we proceed, but for now in speaking of its differences from sense-perception, we shall be making use of all these terms as though they had the same meaning.)8 (d) We also call the excellences of the intellect ‘right opinion’ (orthê doxa), ‘knowledge’ (epistêmê) and ‘practical judgment’ (phronêsis), but not those of sense-perception, and again the vices of reason ‘false opinion’, ‘lack of knowledge’ and ‘lack of judgment’, although nobody would call these the vices of sense-perception. 88,21 (427b11-16) Also (e), while sense-perception is of both the special and common objects [of perception], it is in most cases true for the special ones, whereas intellect, even if it in some other way has both special and common objects, is still led into error more with reference to the special than to the common objects.9 It certainly grasps the common objects before [anything else], since they are more evident. (It is beside the point if we say that even many non-rational animals share in discursive thinking, since in their case we mistakenly apply the term ‘discursive thinking’. Some [animals] have no share in discursive thinking at all, but a few perhaps in imagination, which is a capacity superior to sense-perception, but much inferior to discursive thinking, and is located as it were in a no man’s land10 between both of them, succeeding sense-perception, but preceding belief (hupolêpsis). 88,30 (427b16-17,24-6) I apply the name ‘belief ’ collectively to the whole discriminatory hexis of the [soul’s] capacity for reasoning. It is like a genus whose species could be considered to be opinion (doxa), knowledge (epistêmê) and practical judgment (phronêsis). So all these capacities need imagination [to] precede [them], although they are not identical with imagination. For in general holding a belief, whether as an opinion or [piece of] knowledge, or in respect of practical judgment, belongs to a different capacity [of the soul], and not to imagination. 88,35 (427b17-24) This way of being affected (imagination, I mean) is in our power whenever we wish to establish it as a foundation [for



thought].11 For we can choose to place before our eyes at different times a horse, dog, or anything at all, but we cannot believe and judge whatever we choose about something, but only what something believed as [being] clearly [the case] necessitates. For it is impossible not to deny what is manifestly false, but [89] while [for example] we must assent to twice two being four, whether we want to or not, nobody with knowledge of arithmetic would concede that twice two is five, or [to take other examples] that a human being is not a biped, or that fire is not hot. For even if you say that a human being is a quadruped, or that fire is cold, you may say it, but you do not thereby hold a belief. Our tongue, then, gives us the power to make true and false claims, but we have no control over opining or believing, and over internal assent or denial. Instead, these are involuntary affections of the soul; for what is believed clearly to be the case draws the soul to assent, while what is believed clearly not to be the case [draws it] to denial, and objects whose state is non-evident (adêla) [draw it] to a suspension of belief (epokhê).12 Imagining, however, does lie in our power, and not only [imagining] what is possible but also what is totally impossible, like manyheaded men (e.g. Geryon), winged ones (e.g. Boreas), and centaurs and Scyllas. For the soul has a freedom like that of painters to paint what they want. Furthermore, when we believe that something is awesome and frightening, we are immediately affected in our body too when we tremble or blanch, and similarly when we opine13 that something is encouraging, we get into the opposite state. But although we present images to ourselves of earthquakes as often as of beasts on the attack, we are not affected in the slightest. Instead, we view images in the soul as we do objects depicted in paintings, and are not affected at all. 89,21 (427b27-428a5) That imagination is totally distinct from belief and assent is clear from what has been said. But since we think of many things without giving assent or believing anything about them, the respect in which imagination differs from thinking would be the next thing to explain. For if intellect [in its thinking] always needs imagination as its precondition, that does not make the two identical. To grasp this [distinction] more precisely, imagination must first be defined by going back a stage. So if we set aside the remaining meanings of the term [‘imagination’] in which we use it metaphorically (for we often call even sense-perception and thinking ‘imagination’),14 we shall now discuss that type of imagination in respect of which we say that some image (phantasma) comes to exist in us as a kind of imprint (tupos) and form of the sense-impression (aisthêma)15 in the soul.16 So what we call ‘imagination’ in a strict sense is one of the capacities and hexeis of the soul for discernment, and it is by these that we make true or false claims. Sense-perception, opinion, knowledge and intellect are like this, and [here] we speak of ‘intellect’, as the name would be used precisely, [namely] as the [intellect] that does not miss the truth.17 Intellect in a strict sense is like this, as knowledge too in a strict sense is the [kind of knowledge] that does not make false claims.

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89,35 (428a5-22) That imagination is not sense-perception is clear from the following. (a) While asleep we engage in imagination, but not in sense-perception. For since sense-perception is spoken of both as potential and as actual, we cannot say that we have potential sense-perception in dreams [90] (dreams being a movement of the residues [enkataleimmata]18 left from sense-perception), nor a fortiori [do we have] actual [senseperception in dreams], since an animal could not be asleep while senseperception was active. (b) Again, people with defective sight are not prevented from imagining colours, although they are deprived of actual and potential sense-perception. (c) Also, all animals have sense-perception, while only some have imagination, while others do not. (Perhaps an ant and a bee have it, and certainly a dog and a horse and every [animal] that shares in discursive thinking,19 but a worm does not.) (d) Also, most perceptions are true of the special objects [of perception], while most cases of imagining are false, including [the case] where sense-perception breaks down. (This [particular case] is obvious, since when our activity directed towards objects of perception is [functioning] accurately we do not claim that we are ‘imagining’, but, on the contrary, [we do so] when we are not perceiving clearly. Nobody, for example, says ‘I imagine that that is Socrates’ on seeing him nearby, but only [does so] when he is far away, and thus when sense-perception is strained.)20 (e) Also, when our eyes are closed we cannot see colours, but we are not [then] prevented from imagining them. 90,15 (428a22-4) Imagination is distinct from sense-perception in these and many other ways, and [is also distinct] from intellect and knowledge because we always make true claims by means of these [two] states (hexeis), but rarely do so in cases of imagination. It remains, then, to inquire whether opinion and imagination are identical. But we have anticipated this by also distinguishing [imagination] from opinion. For when we separated imagination totally from belief, we also of course showed that it was distinct from opinion, since opinion is a species of belief. For imagination and opinion to make true and false claims is, then, a common [property] of both, but opinion entails commitment (pistis) (for someone who holds an opinion cannot be uncommitted to what he opines), and commitment entails conviction (to pepeisthai), and conviction reason (logos), given that opinion is a form of assent that involves reason. Yet some non-rational animals have imagination without sharing in reason at all. And, as we said earlier too,21 we do not have the power to hold impossible opinions (e.g. [that] winged men [exist]), but it is in our power to imagine [impossibilities]. 90,28 (428a24-b2) It is clear, then, that imagination is neither opinion accompanied by sense-perception, ,23 nor a combination (sumplokê) of opinion and perception. For Plato says that imagination is where we perceive something and add the opinion that this is the case. And it has been shown that



imagination does not always implicate opinion, as with paintings of things that are impossible and unrealizable.24 And quite apart from what has been said, it is clear that, if imagination is a combination of opinion and senseperception, then sense-perception and opinion should not be of distinct objects (e.g. the sense-perception of white, opinion of good), nor of the same object but in respect of distinct [properties] (e.g. if the object were white and good, but the opinion concerned it insofar as it was good, the sense-perception insofar as it was white). That is because opinion and sense-perception apply to the same object incidentally. So the combination of opinion and sense-perception must apply both to the same object and in respect of the same [property] [91], and furthermore be ‘in conjunction’, i.e. not be in conflict. 91,2 (428b2-9)25 So when there is discord between opinion and senseperception regarding the same thing and in respect of the same [property], and opinion makes a true claim, perception a false one, how can we claim that their combination is imagination? For when sense-perception states that the sun is a foot wide, while opinion states that it is far larger than the inhabited world, how can these [claims] be combined?26 How can there be a single blend27 arising from them, when [opinion] is making a true claim, [sense-perception] a false one? In this situation we must either discard the true opinion concerning the sun, so that we can adopt instead the false [opinion] consistent with sense-perception, or else continue to preserve the same opinion, but neglect the sense-perception in respect of which imagination is primarily imprinted.28 But each of these is impossible. The person who holds the opinion cannot abandon it, as long as the object [in question] also does not change but is preserved in the same state, assuming that the person himself is also stable.29 [That person] also cannot retain the true opinion that the sun is far larger than the inhabited world and [still] give credence to the imagination that it is a foot wide. In this [second] case opinion is not blended with sense-perception, but rather expels sense-perception, and imagination along with it. That is because imagination is [by definition]30 an imprint and trace (ikhnos)31 of senseperception, not a blend of opinion and sense-perception. (Nor in the case of the oar in water32 could imagination be a blend of opinion and senseperception; there imagination adheres to sense-perception, while opinion is in conflict with it.) So if imagination is neither sense-perception, nor belief (for it is neither opinion, practical judgment, knowledge nor intellect), no capacity of the soul in a strict sense would be left to which imagination had an undisputed relation. Now if intellect is always free from error, there is no [other remaining] capacity left [to be imagination]. But if there is a [kind of] intellect that can also err, and make false as well as true claims, imagination is not easily distinguished from it, when [such an intellect] is so similar. First, there is precisely what I have mentioned, their [shared] capacity to err; then there is the fact that it is equally in our power to think what we wish, and to engage in imagining. So let us inquire into the difference between imagination and the sort of intellect [involved

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in such thinking] in due course.33 But first the nature of each of them should be defined separately (that is how it will also become obvious to us how they differ from one another), and first [we must define] what imagination is. For so far we have stated not what it is, but everything that it is not. 91,33 (428b10-16)34 Now since many objects when moved by some object naturally cause a third [object] to move (as the lever moved by the hand causes the stone to move,35 and the sea moved by the wind causes the ship to move), there is nothing unusual about this happening with senseperception too. For it is moved by the external objects of perception, and adopts the form of what causes this movement, and in the case of the more developed animals [sense-perception] causes movement in that other capacity of the soul that we call ‘imagination’. It is the nature [of imagination] to retain in itself, and be stamped with,36 the imprints that senseperception hands over to it from the objects of perception, after it [itself] has received the imprint; and also [its nature] to be capable [92] of preserving the traces [from sense-perception] for some time, even though the objects of perception have gone away. So when those objects have gone away,37 the capacity for imagination is clearly differentiated from that for sense-perception; for then the activity [of sense-perception] has ceased, but [imagination] still retains the imprints that it has taken over.

92,4 At the point where the object of perception is [still] present and at the same time is provoking both [the activity of] perception and [that of] imagination, it is difficult to discover the difference between these capacities, for the activity of the two then seems to be [directed] towards the same object at the same time.38 But perhaps even then [the two activities are directed] toward the same object at the same time, yet not in exactly the same way, but while sense-perception focuses on (apereidetai)39 the external object of perception and is moved by it, imagination is [active] towards the form, the imprint of which sense-perception has received. Thus actual sense-perception becomes for imagination precisely what the object of perception is for sense-perception. But because both movements occur at the same time, the difference between them is particularly difficult to capture. That they are different is clear from the fact that sense-perception frequently ceases from its activity ahead [of imagination], while imagination endures. For at that point the trace that sense-perception retained in extending out to the external object of perception becomes an object [only] for imagination, just as though the wax [block] received the imprint of the seal right through itself, and after receiving the imprint and being enfolded in it40 had gone on to stamp the same imprint on the air, so that, even though the wax and ring had gone away, the surrounding air had acquired a structure.41 But [only] inanimate objects are affected in this way; a different sense [of ‘being affected’] applies to [bodies] that have souls, for



in their case being affected is [defined as] being active and perfected, with imagination being perfected by progressing to actuality through the agency of sense-perception, just as sense-perception is [perfected] through the agency of the objects of perception. 92,23 The difference can be best understood in the case of those animals which we say have sense-perception but not imagination (e.g. flies, worms, and many others like them). They are moved by objects of perception, yet not so as to be able to retain those objects. So by lacking a capacity that can retain objects of perception, [these animals] move unpredictably.42 So for them sense-perception is like a light blow;43 it does not endure at all. In the case of [animals] that have a ‘more solid block’ [for receiving impressions]44 from objects of perception, nature adds to sense-perception a further capacity, intended as a ‘store-house’ for sense-impressions. This, then, is why imagination does not exist without sense-perception, or [that is] without any other objects except those that are perceived. (For even if imagination of intelligible objects occurs at all, [imagination] is still attached to sense-perception.) 92,34 Now the same [block of] wax is naturally fitted to receive and preserve the seal, and insofar as it receives it, one could say that another capacity is observed belonging to it in respect of which it can yield to, and be easily imprinted by, the stamp. But insofar as it preserves [that stamp], it could be said to possess still another capacity in respect of which it has acquired a more solid and stable nature. It is precisely this [characteristic] that can be claimed for the soul too: that insofar as it is moved by the objects of perception it has the capacity for sense-perception, but insofar as it can preserve sense-impressions it has the capacity for imagination. So [93] it is clear that imagination is active towards the object of perception at just the same time as sense-perception. For [imagination] could not [otherwise] preserve, in the absence of [direct] awareness and perception, the trace [derived from sense-perception], after the object of perception had gone, nor [could it] present [the residual trace] to itself with recognition.45 93,3 (428b16-27) Now those animals that share in [imagination] often act or are affected in respect of it in correct or erroneous ways at different times, and being correct and incorrect is an addition derived by [imagination] from sense-perception. For imagination must be involved in the ways that sense-perception gets things right and makes errors, and must join with it in making true and false claims. Now sense-perception of the special objects [of perception] is [always] true, or in error [only] to a minimal degree. Secondly, [there is perception] of the substrates of the special objects, [the ones] to which those [substrates] are incidental;46 here it can also err, for it may correctly discern [an object] and claim that the thing approaching is white, but err about the person approaching being Socrates. Third [there is sense-perception] of the objects [of perception] that are common and are linked to the special objects (meaning, that is, movement, size, number and shape). In relation to these [common objects] sense-

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perception can be particularly misled when we turn the functioning of several [senses] over to a single one of them.47 93,16 (428b27-30) In just the same way imagination is also true in relation to the special objects of perception as long as sense-perception is active, but in relation to the incidental and the common objects [imagination] errs in the presence and in the absence of sense-perception: necessarily so in its presence, since it must err together with senseperception; but in its absence, if it does not maintain [perceptual] residues as it received them. It also [errs] particularly [in cases] where senseperception perceives a distant object of perception. 93,21 (428b30-429a2) So if it is plain to everyone that the capacity of the soul for imagination exists, and can, if our discussion has not discovered any similar capacity other than those that are listed, only be defined as a movement of the soul occurring through actual sense-perception. 93,25 (429a2-4) Since sight is by far the most valuable of the senses, imagination (phantasia) inherited even its name from light (phôs), since it is impossible to see without light.48 93,27 (429a4-8)49 And, as I said,50 because what is imagined endures and resembles sense-perceptions, animals perform many actions in accordance with [what is imagined], either because, as with wild animals, they have no other capacity with more control, or because, like human beings, the [capacity] that does have more control than imagination is often clouded by illness or sleep. 1 93,32 (429a10-13)2 The part of the soul that we use for contemplation and action may be spatially separate (as Plato thought when he established reason [94] in the head, spirit in the heart, and appetite in the liver),3 or not spatially distinct from the other capacities of the soul but separated only in definition, but what must be investigated about it here is what distinguishes it from the capacities already described (and particularly from imagination),4 and how thinking occurs at all. 94,5 (429a13-15) Now if thinking is analogous to perceiving (for the soul, as we also said earlier,5 discriminates and gets to know [objects] through both of these [activities]), then the intellect too would be in some way affected by the objects of the intellect, just as perception is by the objects of perception, and here too ‘would be affected’ has to be understood in just the same way [as with sense-perception].6 For it is said in a stricter sense that [the intellect] would be ‘perfected’ rather [than ‘affected’]7 by being advanced from potentiality to actuality. And it is obvious that [it is advanced] from potentiality. That is why we do not always think, nor even always think the same objects rather than different ones at different times. This is, in fact, a sign that this intellect exists in potentiality, as there can



be no transition from one activity to another unless a potentiality remains to display the different activities. 94,13 (429a15-18) The potential intellect must, then, be unaffected by what is affection in a strict sense; [it must] also not have a structure of its own but be capable of receiving every form; be potentially such [as form] but not [identical with] it; and have the same relation to objects of thought as sense-perception does to objects of perception. And just as actual [perception] is not any of the objects that it perceives, neither must this type of intellect actually be any of the objects that are being thought. Since it thinks all things, it must, therefore, be potentially all things, i.e. not have a form or structure of its own. 94,20 (429a18-22) Anaxagoras was not, then, inappropriately dreaming in making the intellect unmixed, and so of a nature different from everything that it comes to know. For with no [form] of its own intruding and coexisting, it would very easily gain knowledge; for any form that exists within it will exclude and block out the other [forms] as alien. An intellect of this sort must, therefore, have no nature or structure of its own except for its being able to comprehend alien natures and structures, and [it must] have no determinate form, since it is naturally disposed to grasp all [forms]. 94,27 (429a22-7) That [part] of the soul called ‘the intellect’ (by ‘intellect’ I mean that by which the soul thinks discursively and holds beliefs, not that [sense of ‘intellect’] that we often mistakenly apply to the imagination too)8 is actually, therefore, none of the objects that exist prior to its thinking of any [of them]. So it is reasonable for it also not to be mixed with the body, as mixture involves a body in relation to a body. A body must actually exist and have a structure of its own. But the intellect could not, like perception, use the body even as an organ; for that would involve it with the organ’s quality, which by always coexisting with its activities would exclude the other forms. 94,34 (429a29-b5) This is most evident from the capacity for sense-perception, which is not a body, but since it always uses bodily organs, is involved in how they are affected. This is evident with the sense-organs too; for when the organs are more intensely moved by intense objects of perception (e.g. hearing by loud noise, or sight by brilliant colour, or smell by pungent odour) they can no longer [95] easily perceive objects of perception that have grown faint and are more indistinct. Instead, the trace of the more violent impact persists to block out the more indistinct and weaker one. When, however, the intellect thinks some ‘intense’ object of thought, it thinks inferior things not less, but even more [effectively]. That, then, is why there is no sense-perception without body, whereas the intellect is separate from body altogether. 95,5 (429a27-9) Those who call the soul a ‘place of forms’ are quite correct, even if they mistakenly apply the term ‘place’, by failing to make an exception for it neither being the whole soul but only the two capacities

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by which we think and perceive, and for its not being place in the sense that it surrounds, rather than becoming, what it thinks and perceives. 95,9 (429b5-9)9 Now this potential intellect comes into existence even among infants. But when it can track down the universal from the objects of perception, and the images derived from them and the training associated with them,10 and group together what is similar in dissimilar objects, and what is identical in different objects, it then becomes a more perfect intellect, analogous to someone with specialized knowledge who has latched on to the theorems of his discipline and is able to be active by himself by making each of them individually available for himself, without the need for any external instruction or training. At that stage too, therefore, the intellect is in potentiality, yet not in the same way as before it learnt or made discoveries. For it is [now] endowed with something resembling an organ of sight that was not previously present in it, one that can see similar and dissimilar objects, and what [in those objects] is identical and different, and is implied and is in conflict. At that stage it can by itself think itself;11 for the intellect is nothing but its thoughts. Thus by becoming identical with what is being thought it also thinks itself at that stage. 95,21 So when it has only the hexis [of thoughts], its thoughts are as if set aside. But when active, it coincides with what is being thought, and at that stage thinks itself; for it is itself [identical with] the objects that it thinks. For just as a body of [specialized] knowledge is the [set of] theorems that are objects of knowledge (geometry, for example, being nothing other than the geometrical theorems), so too is the intellect [identical with] its thoughts. As long as the hexis is itself unmoved, so too are the theorems, but when the hexis is moved and is active, it is active in all cases towards one of its own theorems, and it becomes identical with what it is contemplating. For example, the knowledge that a triangle has two right angles is the theorem and reasoning by which the triangle is demonstrated as having two right angles. This too is how the intellect, when inactive, is said to have the hexis of thoughts, but when active towards one of its thoughts is at that time identical with what is being thought, and by thinking that thing thinks itself too. (The distinction between this sort of intellect and the capacity for perceptual imagination must be drawn in due course,12 after distinguishing the nature of each of the [aspects of the intellect] that have been described.) 95,35 (429b10-12) Now water and what it is to be water are different: for while water is the [compound] from form and matter, what it is to be water is the form of water, and that in respect of which water exists. Each is characterized not in respect of its matter, but in respect of its form. [96] It is the same with artefacts too: a house and what it is to be a house are distinct, as are a statue and what it is to be a statue. While a house is the shape accompanying the stones, planks and clay, what it is to be a house is the particular structure and combination [of matter]. Similarly a statue



too is the shape accompanying the stone and bronze, but what it is to be a statue is the form of the statue. But this is not the same in all cases, for in some the two are identical, as with a point and what it is to be a point, or anything completely non-material and uncompounded, where the definition of the essence, and the form in respect of which it exists, are identical with the total nature of the object. 96,8 (429b12-16) If this is indeed the case, then when we discern the structure in its conjunction with the matter, as, for example, cold and wet with matter (this is when we discern water as a whole, for water is the ratio of these [two] qualities and their combination with the matter), and discern water as a whole, or flesh as a whole, the capacity for senseperception (or rather, its partner imagination) is adequate for us. But when we examine what it is to be water and what it is to be flesh, what does the discerning is quite different, or [the same thing] in a different state. For perhaps just as there has to be a single capacity to discern that sweet [taste] is distinct from gold [colour], so correspondingly must this capacity that discerns that water and what it is to be water are distinct also be single, and it must perceive them both, yet in two different states when it inspects the matter along with the form, and when it extracts and separates the form. This is because in relation to water it needs the imagination to report [to it from sense-perception], but in relation to what it is to be water it is self-sufficient. 96,21 (429b16-18) So just as if the same line were both straight and bent you would describe it as the same, yet in two different states, so too13 would you [describe] the intellect both when it grasps the body as compounded, and when it grasps just the form itself and the structure. For [the intellect] is assimilated to the objects that it thinks, and sometimes becomes like a compound (when it thinks what is compounded), yet at other times like something uncompounded (when it extracts just the form): in the latter case it resembles the straight line, in the former the bent one. (Plato likens the activities of the intellect to the ‘smooth-running’ and the ‘straight[-running]’ [circles],14 but Aristotle compares them to a line that is both bent and straight, since the intellect becomes as it were double instead of single when it inspects the matter along with the structure.) 96,30 (429b18-22) Also with objects spoken of by abstraction some resemble water, others what it is to be water, for among these too straightness and what it is to be straight are different, and straightness is accompanied by extension, as with snubness (extension being the matter for straightness), while what it is to be straight is the definition of straightness. In the case of these abstract objects the intellect seems to discern both, meaning by ‘both’ the one that is compounded from the substrate and the structure, as well as the structure itself. But even then it is not [always] in the same state, but with these too it is sometimes as if uncompounded, while at other times like a compound. For even if one matter underlies perceptible bodies, another the objects that are spoken

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of by abstraction,15 we would still say that with these [objects] too the intellect’s activity of contemplation [97] was less compounded at one time, but more so at another. So when the intellect considers bodies, it needs the capacity for sense-perception, since in itself it cannot discern what is water or flesh if it completely eschews sense-perception. But for triangularity and straightness the intellect is more self-sufficient, in that just as these objects are separable from matter, so too is the contemplation by the intellect. So in that these [objects] can be separated in definition alone, yet in themselves could not really exist, so the intellect also sets about separating them in definition alone. 97,8 (429b22-31) Anaxagoras described the intellect in ways that were both correct and incorrect. For while he held the correct assumption in making the intellect completely unmixed with matter, he was wrong in neglecting to instruct us on how it will think all objects when it is like this, if thinking is [the same as] being affected. For nothing is affected unless it shares in matter, but this [matter] must be a substrate shared both by what is affected and by what produces an affection. Thus it is not just anything that is affected by anything (e.g. a line by a noise), but [only] things that also share in the same matter.16 But since Anaxagoras did not make this distinction, we must again recall distinctions that we have already often drawn. For if ‘being affected’ is not used in its strict sense in the case of sense-perception, is this not all the more so in the case of the intellect? Perception does at least use bodily [organs], and so would share a substrate with what produces affections (with the objects of perception, I mean); for by using body it is moved by bodies. But, as has been explained, the intellect is potentially all objects of thought, yet is in actuality nothing until it thinks. It is, therefore, further removed from being affected since it does not even acquire a determinate nature. 97,21 (429b31-430a2) Instead, with the intellect you get the same result as where letters are written on a tablet that has nothing actually written on it. Here you would call what is written a ‘perfection’ of the tablet, not an ‘affection’, since it has received that for which it came into existence. For when the intellect is active the intelligible objects, it is not affected but perfected, so that in respect of this [activity] it is unmixed and uncompounded. In general, the potential intellect, as Aristotle says, is actually none of the things that exist, and being none [of them] actually, could not be affected or mixed. For being affected and being mixed belong to what is actually something. And actual intellect comes into existence from the potential [intellect] when thoughts also come into existence for it, and at that point it is at once both intellect and object of thought. [The potential intellect] is not, therefore, affected by the objects of thought, but itself becomes [identical with] them. (And it seems that the potential intellect comes into existence only in the human soul, since only that [soul’s] affections also pay heed to reason and are naturally disposed towards it, while this is not so with the other animals.)17



97,34 (430a2-5, 6-9) But how is [the potential intellect] at the same time both intellect and object of thought? And is it so in the same respect, or does it become intellect and object of thought in distinct respects? Now in the case of the [forms] that are without matter,18 what thinks and what is being thought are identical (for knowledge that involves contemplation is identical with what is known in that way), but in the case of the enmattered forms the object and the intellect are distinct. For, as we know, these (enmattered forms, I mean) [98] are also not by nature objects of thought, but the intellect makes them such objects by severing them from matter, and they are [themselves] potential, not actual, objects of thought. This is because they are [only] in a suitable state for being thought, not because their [inherent] nature can in itself be thought. So it is reasonable that such [forms] are thought, but not that they think, .19 98,4 (430a5-6) This intellect (meaning the one in potentiality) is a potential object of the intellect in just the same way as it is a potential intellect. That is why it does not always think, and why thinking continuously tires it.20 For potentiality underlies it, so that it is not even always an object of the intellect, but so [only] when it assembles its thoughts. But if there is some intellect entirely without potentiality, it will always be at once both intellect and object. It is this intellect that we indeed discuss when we start again. 1 98,12 (430a10-14) Since each thing that comes into existence through nature has its potentiality in advance and its perfection as a later consequence, and does not stop at the stage of natural disposition and potentiality (for that would be to have them from nature to no purpose), clearly the human soul too does not [just] progress to the stage of having the potential intellect, and to being naturally fitted for thinking. Instead, the end for the sake of which it was prepared in this way by nature necessarily succeeds the natural disposition. Now the potential intellect must be perfected, yet nothing is perfected through itself, but [only] through something else. Therefore ‘it is necessary that these differences exist in the soul too’ (430a13-14), and while one intellect must be potential, the other must be actual, i.e. perfect and not at all potential, or due to natural adaptation, but an intellect that is actual, which, by being combined with the potential intellect and advancing it to actuality, brings to completion the intellect as a hexis, in which the universal objects of thought and bodies of knowledge exist.2 98,24 (430a12-13) To explain. A potential house and a potential statue (i.e. stones and bronze) could not receive the structure of a house or that of a statue unless a craft, by granting them its own power and imposing the form belonging to the craft on to the materials suitable for this [end],

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brought the house and statue to completion as compounds. Similarly, the potential intellect must be perfected by some other intellect that is already perfect, i.e. actual, not potential. [This intellect] moves the potential intellect analogously to the craft [moving matter], and it perfects the soul’s natural disposition for thinking, and fully constitutes its hexis.3 ‘And this intellect is separate, unaffected, and unmixed’ (430a17-18). As for the intellect called ‘potential’, even if we fully apply the same terms to it, it is still far more naturally cognate (sumphuês)4 with the soul (not every soul, I mean, but only the human soul). 98,35 (430a15-17) As light when supervening on potential sight and potential colours produces both actual sight [99] and actual colours, so too this actual intellect advances the potential intellect, and not only makes it an actual intellect, but also constitutes its potential objects of thought as actual objects. These are the enmattered forms, i.e. the universal thoughts assembled from particular objects of perception. Up to this point the potential intellect cannot distinguish between them, or make transitions between distinct thoughts, or combine and divide them. Instead, like a store-house of thoughts, or better like matter, it deposits the imprints from perception and imagination through the agency of memory. But when the productive intellect encounters it5 and takes over this ‘matter’ of thoughts, the potential intellect becomes one with it, and becomes able to make transitions, and to combine and divide thoughts, and to observe thoughts from [the perspective of] one another. 99,11 (430a12-13, 14-15, 18-19) So the status that a craft has in relation to its matter is the same that the productive intellect also has to the potential [intellect], and in this way the latter becomes all things, while the former produces all things. That is why it is also in our power to think whenever we wish;6 for is not outside the craft 7 its matter (as [for example] the craft of forging is with bronze, or carpentry with wood), but the productive intellect settles into the whole of the potential intellect, as though the carpenter and the smith did not control their wood and bronze externally but were able to pervade it totally. For this is how the actual intellect too is added to the potential intellect and becomes one with it. For [the compound] consisting of matter and form is one, and also has the two definitions of matter and creativity (dêmiourgia) by in one way becoming, and in another producing, all things. For in a way it becomes the actual objects [that it thinks] by being active in its thinking; and the one [aspect] of it, in which there is a plurality of its thoughts, resembles matter, the other [sc. its thinking] a craftsman. For it is in its power, when it wishes, to comprehend and structure its thoughts, since it is productive, and thus the founder (arkhêgos), of these thoughts.8 That is why it also most resembles a god; for god is indeed in one respect [identical with] the actual things that exist, but in another their supplier (khorêgos).9 The intellect is far more valuable insofar as it creates than insofar as it is acted on; that



is because the productive first principle is always more valuable than the matter [on which it acts]. 99,26 (430a19-21) Also, as I have often said, the intellect and the object of thought are identical (just as are actual knowledge and the very object of knowledge), yet not in the same respect. It is an object of thought insofar as it has conjoined with [itself] the potential intellect, while it is intellect insofar as it is itself actual. Thus in a human being the potential intellect is prior to the actual one, as every natural disposition is prior in time to its actuality. But in unqualified terms it is not prior; for imperfection is never prior to perfection, nor potentiality to actuality. 99,32 (430a17-18, 22-3) The essence of the productive intellect is identical with its activity (430a18), and it does not progress from potentiality, but its nature is of the same kind as its activity, and this9a intellect, as already stated earlier too, is really ‘separate, unaffected, and unmixed’ (430a17-18), ‘not thinking at one time but not at another’ (430a21-2). For although this [activity] persists when it provides the potential [intellect] as a basis, ‘this is exclusively what it is’ (430a22-3) when it itself exists in respect of itself. Its activity is unceasing, untiring, immortal and eternal. Being both intellect and object of thought [100] it is precisely the same, not at this stage by corresponding to successively distinct objects,10 nor on account of another [object], like the remaining objects of thought that the intellect as hexis produces as objects of thought by separating them from matter. Instead, it is an object of thought on account of itself, and by the nature derived from itself can be thought and can think. In the potential intellect, then, where crafts and bodies of knowledge belong, thoughts are divided [from one another], but in the actual intellect (in its activity rather, given that in its case the essence is identical with the activity), they would exist in a different way, harder to describe and more divine, in that [this intellect] does not make transitions from one thing to another, nor combine or divide [thoughts], nor make additional use of a process for the outlet (diexodos) of its acts of thinking, but has all the forms all together and presents all of them to itself at the same time. Only in this way would its essence and its activity be, as Aristotle says (430a18), identical. If it made transitions, like those who deal with bodies of knowledge, then its essence would have to persist while its activity changed into something else, and that means its essence being distinct from its activity, something Aristotle explicitly rejects. Indeed, he puts it in this way in Book One too: ‘Discursive thinking, loving and hating, are not ways in which it is affected’ (1.4, 408b25-6).

100,16 We, then, are either the potential intellect or the actual [intellect]. So if, in the case of everything that is combined from what is potential and actual, something (to tode) and what it is to be something (to tôide einai)

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are distinct, then I (to egô) and what it is to be me (to emoi einai) will also be distinct, and while I am the intellect combined from the potential and the actual [intellects], what it is to be me comes from the actual [intellect].11 Thus while the intellect combined from the potential and the actual [intellects] is writing what I am [now] discursively thinking about and composing, it is writing not qua potential but qua actual [intellect], for activity from the [potential intellect] is channelled to it.12 (It is not strange that the potential intellect is unable without being divided into parts to receive what the actual intellect grants in that way, for in the case of [physical] bodies their matter does not receive qualities without being divided into parts, although qualities are by their own definition not divided into parts; instead, matter receives in a state of division into parts whiteness [for example] that is [itself] not divided into parts.)13 So just as the animal and what it is to be an animal are distinct, and the latter comes from the soul of the animal, so too I and and what it is to be me are distinct. Thus what it is to be me comes from the soul, yet from it not in its totality – not, that is, from the capacity for perception, which is matter for the imagination, nor again from the capacity for imagination, which is matter for the potential intellect, nor from the potential intellect, which is matter for the productive intellect. What it is to be me therefore comes from the productive intellect alone, since this alone is form in a precise sense, and indeed this is ‘a form of forms’,14 and the other [forms] are substrates as well as forms, and nature progressed by using them as forms for less valuable [substrates], and as matter for more valuable [forms]. But as the ultimate extreme among forms is this productive intellect, and when nature had progressed that far it stopped, having nothing else more valuable for which it could have made the [productive intellect] a substrate. 100,37 (420a23-5) So we [101] are the productive intellect, and it is reasonable for Aristotle to raise for himself the problem: ‘Why, then, do we not, then, remember after death whatever we think here?’ The solution, implied both by his present and earlier statements about the intellect, is that the productive [intellect] is unaffected, the passive [intellect] perishable.15 We shall investigate what he calls ‘the passive and perishable intellect’ as we proceed, and the fact that he does not adopt this as the potential [intellect], but some other intellect (to which he gave the name ‘common’ in Book One),16 together with which [the productive intellect] thinks the things here,17 and with which it thinks discursively about those things, and to which loving, hating and remembering belong. But for now we can more confidently affirm that he believes that we are the productive intellect when he raises a problem, and solves it, by saying ‘But we do not remember because this [productive intellect] is unaffected, while the passive intellect is perishable’ (430a23-5). For the problem implied here is also common to everyone who posits the intellect as immortal: ‘Why after death do we not remember the content of our lives (ta en biôi), and exchange neither friendship nor hostility, nor appear to the family to whom we are



most attached?’18 This is why he considers it worth solving correctly both in Book One and here, and both in what he said about it at the outset, and in what he now addresses more explicitly, furnishes identical explanations of why our [productive] intellect has no memory. 101,18 He even employs almost exactly the same expressions19 when he says earlier (1.4, 408b25-9), ‘And discursive thinking, and loving or hating, are not an affection20 of that thing [sc. the productive intellect] but of the particular thing that has it, insofar as it has it. That is why when this too perishes, it [sc. the productive intellect] neither remembers nor loves. For these [activities] did not belong to it, but to the common [intellect], which has perished. And the [productive] intellect is surely something more divine and unaffected.’21 And [similarly] in the present context: ‘And in general neither [does the productive intellect think] in time,22 and it is not the case that it thinks at one time but not at another. And when it has been separated it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable. And without this [sc. the passive intellect], it [sc. the productive intellect] thinks nothing’23 (3.5, 430a21-5). 101,27 For [the statements] ‘Neither does [the productive intellect] think in time’ and ‘It is not the case that it thinks at one time but not at another’ (430a21-2) are 24 exactly the same as ‘It does not think discursively, but discursive thinking belongs to a distinct thing to which also belongs not thinking always but [thinking] in time.’ ‘And when it has been separated it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal’ (430a22-3) [is almost the same as] ‘whereas the [productive] intellect is surely something more divine and unaffected’ (408b29). ‘But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable. And without this [sc. the passive intellect], it [sc. the productive intellect] thinks nothing’ (430a23-5) [is almost the same as] ‘This is why when this too perishes, it [sc. the productive intellect] neither remembers nor loves. For these [activities] did not belong to it, but to the common [intellect], which has perished’ (408b27-9). Thus those who seem to criticise the Philosopher were all led astray in believing that he stated and solved the problem incorrectly.25 [102] 102,1 Why then do we not remember the objects of the productive intellect’s activity on its own, i.e. before it contributed to our constitution?26 For he says that when the common [intellect] perishes the productive [intellect] can neither think discursively nor remember: ‘For discursive thinking  did not belong to it, but to the commmon [intellect], which has perished’ (408b25, 28-9). Thus when he repeats ‘But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect can perish’ (430a23-5), he makes us the productive intellect, while saying that the common [intellect] perishes, and that that is why, being immortal, we cannot remember the activities that we carried out together with the mortal intellect. We must, then, compare both statements, and we shall

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certainly find them consistent with one another, and giving precise instruction on the Philosopher’s doctrine, since the following [statement] too is precisely consistent with those cited: ‘Concerning the contemplative intellect nothing is yet clear, but this seems to be a distinct kind of soul, as what is eternal [is distinct] from what is perishable.’27 For it follows that here [in 3.5] he solves in more precise terms the problem that he posed and solved in a limited way in Book One [ch. 4]. In Book One his problem was not, ‘Why does this perishable and passive intellect not remember the activities that the unaffected and eternal intellect carried out?’ That was not even worth raising as a problem, as it is a complete fool’s errand to work through the problem of how the [intellect] that perishes does not remember the activities of the imperishable [intellect].28 The question that on the contrary is worth raising is, ‘Why does the [intellect] that is not affected and does not perish not remember the activities [carried out] together with the [intellect] that does perish?’ He solves it by saying earlier, ‘That is why when this too perishes, it [sc. the productive intellect] neither remembers nor loves. For these [activities] did not belong to it, but to the common [intellect], which has perished’ (408b27-9), and by saying here, ‘But we do not remember because this [sc. the productive intellect] is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect can perish. And without this [sc. the passive intellect], it [sc. the productive intellect] thinks nothing’ (430a23-5), nor does it remember anything. 102,24 Theophrastus29 raises the problem in just the same way in his examination of Aristotle’s [views] concerning the productive intellect. He says,30 ‘For if the potentiality [of the intellect] is “like a hexis”,31 then if naturally cognate (sumphutos) [with the soul],32 it would have [to be so] perpetually and instantaneously. But if a later [development], with what, and how, is it created? Yet it seems that it is not created, if it is imperishable. Yet if it exists in [the soul], why not perpetually? Why is there loss of memory and confusion? It may be because of the mixture [with the passive intellect].’33

102,30 On the basis of the same statements it is justifiable to be puzzled too34 at those who believed that according to Aristotle this productive intellect is either the first god, or is [identical with] the premises, and with the bodies of knowledge derived from the [premises], which are subsequently present in us. For those who believe [that it is identical with] the premises have gone completely deaf, and do not even hear the Philosopher crying aloud that this intellect is divine, ‘unaffected’ (430a24), and has its activity identical with its essence (430a18), and that this alone is immortal, eternal, and separate (430a22-3). As for those who believe that the productive intellect is [actually] said by him to be the first god,35 why do they overlook the following [statement] in this very passage? [103] For



having prefaced the text by saying that in the whole of nature there is one thing that is matter, and another that moves matter and perfects it (430a10-12), he claims ‘It is necessary that these differences exist in the soul too’ (430a13-14), and that while one intellect is like this ‘by becoming all things’, another is so ‘by producing all things’ (430a14-15). In fact he states that an intellect like this is ‘in the soul’, and for the human soul is, as it were, an apportionment that is of the highest value. This is clear too from that statement that we cited just above:36 ‘Concerning the contemplative intellect nothing is yet clear, but this seems to be a distinct kind of soul, just as what is eternal [is distinct] from what is perishable.’37 Also where he says ‘This alone is immortal and eternal’ (430a23) he could not be speaking with reference to the first god, for he posits not only this [god] as immortal and eternal, but also virtually all the capacities of the divine bodies for causing motion that he also chooses to enumerate in his systematic treatise the Metaphysics.38 In the case of the human soul and its associated capacities, however, in defining [the productive intellect] alone as immortal he would be correct to say ‘and this alone is immortal’ (430a23). Indeed, on the basis of this same statement it can also be affirmed that he thinks that the productive intellect is either some [aspect] of us, or is [identical with] us. For it would be consistent of him to say ‘This alone [is] immortal’ as belonging to us, whereas to say without qualification ‘This alone is immortal’ would be inconsistent of him when he believes that many other things are immortal.

103,20 It is not difficult to solve these [problems] in this way. What does, however, justify a really extensive examination is whether this productive intellect is one or many. This is because based on the light with which it is compared [at 430a15] it is one. For light too, of course, is one, as even more is the [entity that] supplies the light, [the one] through which all sight among animals is advanced from potentiality to activity.39 So [on this analogy], the imperishability of the light shared [by everyone with sight] has no more relation to each organ of sight than does the eternity of the productive intellect to each [one] of us. If, on the other hand, there are many [productive intellects], and one for each [individual] potential [intellect], on what basis will they differ from one another? For where [individuals] are the same in kind, division occurs in respect of matter, and so the productive [intellects] must be the same in kind, given that they all have their essence identical with their activity, and all think the same objects. For if they do not think the same, but different, objects, what will be the process for apportioning [different intellects to different individuals]?40 From what source will the potential intellect also come to think all objects, if the intellect that advances it to activity does not think all objects prior to it? Now [the solution is that]41 the intellect that illuminates (ellampôn)

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in a primary sense is one, while those that are illuminated (ellampomenoi) and that illuminate (ellampontes) are, just like light, more than one. For while the sun is one, you could speak of light as in a sense divided among the organs of sight. That is why Aristotle introduced as a comparison not the sun but [its derivative] light, whereas Plato [introduced] the sun [itself], in that he makes it analogous to the good.42 103,36 There is no need to be puzzled if we who are combined from the potential and the actual [intellects] are referred back to one productive intellect, and that what it is to be each of us is derived from that single [intellect].43 Where otherwise do the notions that are shared (koinai ennoiai) come from?44 [104] Where is the untaught and identical understanding of the primary definitions and primary axioms derived from?45 For we would not understand one another unless there were a single intellect that we all shared. And Plato’s [statement] is true, ‘If there was not an that was identical, although individually different for different human beings, but instead any one of us was uniquely affected in comparison with other people, it would not be easy for that person to indicate to another how he was personally affected.’46 Similarly with bodies of knowledge, the teacher’s objects of thought are identical to those of the learner; for there would not even be any teaching and learning unless the thought possessed by teacher and learner was identical. And if, as is necessary, [that thought] is identical, then clearly the teacher also has an intellect identical to that of the learner, given that in the case of the intellect its essence is identical with its activity. But surely the reason why only in the case of human beings is there teaching, learning and mutual understanding generally, but not at all in the case of the other animals, is that the constitution of other souls is also not such that it can receive the potential intellect and be perfected by the actual intellect.

104,14 The inquiry pursued by some [thinkers], more recent as well as earlier ones, into whether all souls are one,47 would be better more correctly conducted into whether all intellects are one.48 For while the soul may according to them be one and separate, still its capacities are multiple, and plainly distinct from one another (the capacity for nutrition from that for sense-perception, and the latter from the capacity for desire). But in the case of the intellect, and above all the [intellect] that has a capacity for contemplation, the [answer to the] inquiry [into whether all souls are one] is necessarily entailed by admitting that in its case [sc. of the intellect] the essence is the same as the activity. For when one person teaches and another learns, either they do not think the same objects, or if they do think the same objects, then they have the same activity, and therefore also the [same] essence.



104,23 But if the capacity for sense-perception is not involved in the imperishability of light,49 then neither is the potential intellect involved in the imperishability of the productive intellect. Yet even if sense-perception is much more unaffected [by the body] than are its organs, and it is not affected along with them (for he does say [at 408b21-2] ‘An elderly person who acquired the right kind of eye would have the same sight as a young person’), it is still not entirely unaffected but is somehow involved in the affection along with the organs. The [potential] intellect, on the other hand, is entirely unaffected and separate. This is clear from what he said earlier, while he was still discussing the potential [intellect] and had not yet mentioned the productive [intellect]: ‘That the capacities for perception and thought are not similarly unaffected is’, he says, ‘clear in the case of the organs of perception and of sense-perception [itself]. For perception cannot go on perceiving in the wake of an intense object of perception, e.g. [perceiving] low sounds after loud noise, or indistinct smells and colours after intense colours and smells. [105] But when the intellect thinks an50 “intense” object of thought, it thinks inferior things not less, but even more. For the capacity for perception does not exist without the body, whereas [the intellect] is separate’ (429a29).51 For these distinctions are made directly concerning the potential intellect; for the transition [from superior to inferior things] is its [function]. And a little earlier [he says], ‘This is why it is reasonable for [this intellect] not to be mixed with body,  and not have an organ as does the capacity for perception’ (429a24-6). And a little earlier still, ‘The capacity for thinking must, therefore, be unaffected but capable of receiving the form’ (429a15-16). Thus he is clearly of the view that while sense-perception is less easily affected than the organs (those of perception, that is), it is neither entirely unaffected nor separate, whereas the intellect, insofar as it does not use a bodily organ for its activity, is entirely unmixed with the body, is unaffected, and is separate. 105,13 But if the potential [intellect] is like this, what finally would he describe as the intellect that is passive and perishable? This is what we were proposing to consider,52 and the simplest way to do so would be to adopt Aristotle as our partner. So let us see again what he says in working through the problem of the intellect in his preliminary discussion in Book One. If the Philosopher’s texts are repeatedly rubbed like tinder, his thought might flash forth.53 ‘And discursive thinking, and loving or hating, are not affections of that thing [sc. the productive intellect], but of the particular thing that has it, insofar as it has it. That is why when this too perishes, [the productive intellect] neither remembers nor loves. For these [activities] did not belong to it, but to the common [intellect], which has perished’ (408b25-9). He could, therefore, be saying that the common [intellect] is the one that is passive and that can perish. Yet regarding the potential intellect at least he explicitly says that it must be unaffected, separate, and ‘capable of receiving the form, and potentially such as [it]

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but not [identical with] it’ (429a15-16), and that it not be mixed with the body (429a24-5), nor have a bodily organ (429a26), and that it and senseperception not be unaffected in the same way (429a29-30). So if his claims about this [intellect] are not in conflict, then according to him the common and potential [intellects] must be distinct. While the common [intellect] is perishable, passive, and inseparable from and mixed with the body, the potential [intellect] is unaffected, unmixed with the body, and separate (for he says this of it explicitly). It is like a forerunner of the productive intellect, as the [sun’s] ray is of the daylight, or as the flower is a forerunner of the fruit. For in other cases too nature does not immediately provide the end without a prelude; instead, things that are deficient, but of the same kind as more perfect things, are the latter’s forerunners. 105,34 The potential intellect, then, is itself separate, unmixed, and unaffected (for he says this of it in his own words), yet it is not separate in the same way as the productive [intellect]. See again [106] what he says about the productive intellect in comparing it with the potential [intellect]: ‘And one intellect is like this by becoming all things, the other by producing all things, like a hexis such as light; for in a way light too makes potential colours actual [colours]. And this intellect is separate, unaffected and unmixed, being in its essence activity. For what produces [an affection] is always more valuable than what is affected, and the first principle [more so] than the matter’ (430a14-19). Just as if we were to describe the sun too as more separate than its ray. Thus he clearly believes that both [intellects] are separate, but that the productive [intellect] is more separate, more unaffected, and more unmixed, and that while the potential [intellect] is prior in time in coming to exist in us,54 the actual [intellect] is prior in nature, and in its perfection. Indeed he believes that the potential [intellect] does not even have priority in time, but that while it may be prior in its presence in me or you, it is not prior without qualification. But neither is the forerunner to the king, nor the [sun’s] ray to daylight, nor the flower to the fruit.

106,14 [Aristotle] describes as perishable the common [intellect] in respect of which a human being is something combined from soul and body in which there are displays of spirit and appetites. That Plato also takes these [affections] to be perishable is clear from what is said in the Timaeus: ‘When they had taken over an immortal principle of soul, they next fashioned for it a mortal body by framing a globe around it, building on another kind of soul that was mortal, and that had in itself terrible and necessary affections: first, pleasure, the strongest lure of evil; next, pains that flee from good; and also boldness and fear, two foolish counsellors; spirit hard to entreat, and hope too easily led astray. These they blended together with irrational sense and desire that shrinks from no venture,



and so compounded the mortal part of the soul. And in awe of polluting the divine part on account of all these, except insofar as was altogether necessary, they housed the mortal part apart from it, building between head and breast, as an isthmus and boundary, the neck, which they placed between to keep the two apart. In the breast, then, and the trunk (as it is called) they fastened the mortal kind of soul.’55 And in a general summary of what he had said about the soul he writes, ‘Concerning the soul, then, so much is mortal, and so much divine.’56 106,29 And most of the weightiest arguments concerning the immortality of the soul that [Plato] propounded essentially refer back to the intellect: the one based on self-motion (it was shown, that is, that only the intellect was self-moved,57 if we could think of movement in place of activity);58 [107] the one that takes the processes of learning to be [acts of] recollection;59 and the one [positing] the similarity to god.60 It would also not be difficult to apply to the intellect those of his other arguments thought particularly credible, as also the more credible of those elaborated by Aristotle himself in the Eudemus.61 107,4 From these [texts] it is clear that Plato too believes that while the [productive] intellect is ‘alone immortal’ (430a23), though also itself some [aspect] of the soul, the affections62 and the reason present in them (which Aristotle calls ‘passive intellect’) are perishable. For the affections of the human soul are not entirely non-rational in that they at least obey reason and are trained and admonished; but while the affections of non-rational animals entirely fail to comprehend reason, or in some cases barely reveal a dim trace of it, those in the human soul are combined with reason. Boldness, fear and hope, that is, directly reveal that they belong to the rational soul, for they extend into the future. Hence non-rational animals do not have them, but have only pleasure and pain at what is pleasant and painful in the present, and these affections are entirely insensitive to reason and intellect. In human beings this is so, but63 their affections also share in reason in such a way that when moderated they become virtues, a sign that not their nature but their lack of moderation is non-rational. Zeno [the Stoic] and his school were not wrong in taking the affections of the human soul to be ‘perversions of reason’, i.e. mistaken judgments of reason.64 107,18 And the passive intellect and rational affection (i.e. the affection of the [rational] human soul) could be called identical, and because the intellect is ‘housed’65 in the body, these [affections] come to share in, and pay heed to, reason. For the intellect could only be housed in the body by being bound and linked with it through the medium of the affections. As the god-like Plato says, ‘It is unlawful for the impure to be in contact with the pure.’66 Therefore ‘When they had taken over an immortal principle of soul,’ he says, ‘they next fashioned for it a mortal body by framing a globe around it.’67 So that this might be possible, and an immortal principle be ‘housed’ in the body, ‘They weaved’, he says, ‘another type of soul with it,

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mortal and destined to die.’68 For the bond joining the immortal with the mortal had itself to be mortal too; for when anything mortal perishes, the bond of the immortal with it also perishes.69

107,30 But it is better70 to quote Theophrastus’ [account] of the potential and actual intellects too.71 Now on the potential intellect he says, ‘How can the [potential] intellect, being from without (exôthen) and as if added (epithetos), still be naturally cognate [with the soul]?72 And what is its nature? For [the claim] that it is actually nothing, but potentially all things, in just the same way as [the capacity for] sense-perception, is correct. For it must not be interpreted as being itself nothing73 (for that would be captious), but as being some underlying potentiality, just as with material [bodies]. But ‘from outside’ is not then [to be understood] as ‘added’, but as ‘included in the first generation [of the soul]’. [108] ‘How can [the potential intellect] become the objects of thought, and what is the [activity of] being affected them? For this must [occur], if [the potential intellect] is going to come to actuality as sense-perception does. But what affection [is produced] on an incorporeal [object] by an incorporeal [object]?74 What kind of change [is this]? And is the source [of the change] from the object or from the [intellect] itself? Because [the intellect] is affected, it would seem to be from the object (for nothing that is affected is so from itself). Yet because the intellect is the source of all things, and thinking is in its power, unlike the senses,75 [the source of the change would seem to be] from within itself. But perhaps this too would seem absurd if the [potential] intellect has the nature of matter by being [in actuality] nothing, yet potentially all things.’ 108,8 It would prolong this to quote the next part too, although it is not stated at length, but in fact in too compressed and concise a way, in style at least. For in its content it is replete with numerous problems, analyses, and solutions. These are in Book Five of his Physics, and Book Two of his On the Soul, from all of which it is clear that they [Aristotle and Theophrastus] work through essentially the same problems regarding the potential intellect too76 (‘Is it from without or naturally cognate?’), and they try to define it as being in one way from without, but in another cognate. They say that [the potential intellect] is also unaffected and separate, just like the intellect that is productive and actual. ‘For this intellect’, he says, ‘is unaffected, unless it is passive in some other way.’ And [he says] that in its case ‘being passive’ must not be understood as ‘being moveable’ (for movement is imperfect), but as activity. And he goes on to say that there are no senses without a body, but the [potential] intellect is separate [from body]. 108,18 In also addressing the distinctions drawn by Aristotle regarding the productive intellect, he says,77 ‘What must be investigated is our



saying78 that in the whole of nature one thing is like matter, and is in potentiality, while another is causative and productive; and that79 ‘That which produces [an affection] is always more valuable than that which is affected, and the first principle [more valuable] than the matter.’ While accepting this, he still works through problems: ‘What, then, are these two natures? And what furthermore is the substrate for, and conjoint partner of, the productive [intellect]? For the intellect is in a way mixed out of the productive and potential [intellects]. So if the [intellect] that moves is naturally cognate [with the soul], it would also have [been so] instantaneously and perpetually. But if [the intellect that moves] is a later [development], with what, and how, does it come into existence? It seems that if indeed it is also imperishable, it is a substance80 that is not created. Yet if it exists in [the soul], why not perpetually? Why is there loss of memory, confusion and falsity? It may be because of the mixture [with the passive intellect].’ 108,28 From all this it is clear that we are not inappropriately assuming that one intellect is passive and perishable, which [Theophrastus and Aristotle] also call ‘common’ and ‘inseparable from the body’ (it is mixture with this [intellect] that Theophrastus says causes loss of memory and confusion [for the productive intellect]); and that another [intellect]81 is like a combination from the potential and actual [intellects], which they posit as separate from the body, imperishable, and uncreated. These intellects are natures that in different ways are one as well as two, for what [is combined] from matter and form is one. 108,35 But, as I have said, making claims about what philosophers believe involves special study (skholê)82 and reflection. Still, it does seem perhaps relevant to insist [109] that someone could best understand the insight of Aristotle and Theophrastus on these [matters], indeed perhaps also that of Plato himself, from the passages that we have gathered.

109,4 (430a26-31) So when this potential intellect receives the structure that belongs to it through the productive [intellect] illuminating it, it first thinks all the uncombined and undivided objects signified (i.e. those distinguished in the Categories).1 In these truth and falsity is as yet absent, but as [the intellect] progresses it also combines them with one another (e.g. ‘Socrates’ with ‘walks’), and in these [combinations] truth and falsity are by now present.2 [Intellect] does not combine them like a heap,3 but so as to make a plurality a unity again, and to congregate4 into into a single act of thinking the plurality of uncombined things that are signified. ‘Socrates does philosophy’, for example, is like this, and this combination of thoughts resembles the combination of limbs in Empedocles that he makes love combine from the dispersed limbs of animals. Just as not every one of his combinations of limbs produces an animal, so neither in this case

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does every combination [produce] truth, but one produces truth, another falsity (e.g. the incommensurable when combined with the diagonal produces truth, but [when combined] with the commensurable [produces] falsity). And just as [Empedocles’] animal re-emerges uncombined out of the [originally] uncombined limbs, so does the sentence (logos) re-emerge uncombined out of [originally] uncombined things that are signified.5 109,18 (430a31-b1, 4-5) The intellect also often adds the thought of time when it thinks discursively about objects that are in the past or the future, and apprehending time too, whether past or future, along with [such objects] is quite unique to the intellect in its role as the capacity [of the soul] beyond imagination. For sense-perception and imagination are entirely unable to apprehend time, and in particular past or future time, for no image or perception of someone who has done philosophy, or who has run, comes to exist in the soul, just as there is not even a likeness [of this]. Instead, each [object] just moves sense-perception or imagination as if [it is] in the present, and the intellect has to add the thought of time. Truth and falsity also apply to time; e.g. ‘Croesus the Lydian lived’ is true, but ‘Croesus the Lydian is alive’ is a falsehood. 109,27 (430b1-4, 5-6) Now [the intellect] often combines what belongs (to huparkhon) to the object as belonging to it (when it says ‘Snow is white’), and often what belongs as not belonging (when it says ‘Snow is not white’), for here it combines one type of thing with another as not belonging [to it].6 For someone to call [the latter] ‘division’ rather than ‘combination’ would not be incorrect, for negation resembles division and assertion combination. But perhaps they are also all divisions, in that the intellect divides what the imagination has received from perception as conflated.7 For example, the [imagination] has an image of Socrates walking as a unity, whereas the intellect divides into separate [objects] Socrates and walks, and gives a separate report about objects that are not separate. Yet after separating them, it again makes them one; for ‘Socrates does philosophy’ is a single sentence as well as a single thought, [110] and truth and falsity belong to it as to a single sentence. Unique to the intellect, then, are the capacity to group together many thoughts into a unity as a unity, and its addition of the thought of time. Neither [of these acts] is the function of imagination or perception. 110,5 (430b6-14) ‘Uncombined’ and ‘undivided’ have two senses: either where something is not divided either potentially or actually (as with the non-material forms, and the point), or where it is potentially divided but actually undivided (as with the line, and magnitude generally). Now both the intellect, and the time of which it makes additional use for thinking, are, as these [examples], both divided and undivided. In the case of the non-material forms both time and the intellect itself are completely undivided, but where the intellect thinks objects that are potentially divided but actually undivided, it thinks [them] by being itself actually undivided, and in undivided time. For it thinks length as one thing, and not this [half]



in one half of the time, and that [half] in the other. For then it would think two lengths and not length, and by dividing length into lengths it would also divide time. 110,15 (430b14-15)8 As for what is undivided not in quantity but by species, such as human being or Socrates (for both are undivided by species, for the thought of human being is not divided by species, but, if at all, by individuals, nor a fortiori is the thought of Socrates [divided]), the intellect thinks these objects that are undivided by species both in undivided time and by undivided thinking, not one half of Socrates in half [the time], then the other half in the other half. Nor is the combination involved in the thought [temporally] co-extended with the process leading to the emergence (diexodos) of the verbal act (lexis)9 through which we give voice to (propherometha) ‘human being’. For this is among the marvels of the intellect: that while it hears in time, it thinks not in time, but in the now that is either not even time at all, or is time that has no parts. And it itself thinks by [an act of] thinking that is undivided, since, as I said, it does not extend itself along with the word [being uttered], nor add on one part of the thought to correspond with one part of the word, i.e. with each syllable,10 but while the word is divided, the thought is undivided.11 110,27 (430b16-17) Someone who might dispute that the thought too is divided could call it ‘divided incidentally’, i.e. not divided in itself but [just] insofar as the word, and the phonetic act (phônê) through which the intellect gives voice to [the word] and also thinks, [are divided], and insofar as [the thought], although undivided, is in a manner hard to describe adapted to [the phonetic act], although the latter is divided into parts. Many objects are divided incidentally, and not in themselves, but [only] insofar as the [properties] by which they become known [are divided]. For this is how we might also speak of the limit of the time in which [the intellect] thinks as incidentally divided, because [that limit] is incidental to the time of which it is a limit, and becomes known by means of time. For unless the year that is now, along with the month, day and hour, completed the extended now, we would not even think the partless now.12 110,36 (430b17-20) The reason is that in everything that is divided there is also something undivided (just as there is something uncombined in all compounds), and while this [property] may not be separate from them, or [in other words] capable of really existing in respect of itself, it is [111] still present in them. For what is signified cannot be distinguished from the phonetic act that signifies, yet without an phonetic act it is impossible even to complete a statement, and perhaps [someone] cannot gain personal understanding without also adapting to himself [the phonetic act] by some verbal act. But even so this is what makes the verbal act partless although it has parts, and undivided although it is divided. Similarly there is something undivided in time too, in length, and in absolutely everything that is continuous, and [this property] makes both length and time one, for what is continuous is [identical with] what is one.

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That is why we call the stadium ‘one’, and the day and the month ‘one’. This is what I speak of as undivided and uncompounded in length and time, despite [the latter too] being divided and compounded. For otherwise all quantities would be divided, and all be a plurality, but in fact even plurality is included under unity, and not only continuous quantity but indeed even divided [quantity]. A set of two, three, and ten [objects] is, for example, a plurality included under a unity. 111,13 (430b20-3) When I speak of the [geometrical] point and the now as ‘undivided’, they must be understood as undivided and uncompounded in a different sense, and as if their being undivided is natural and [occurs] in respect of themselves. For the [two] are undivided through the privation of continuous [magnitude]. The intellect certainly both thinks and defines them in this way, since through lacking any structure of its own it does not encounter them directly, but [only] by eliminating the dimension and quantity of which [the now and the point] are limits.13 For to the intellect, as much as to sense-perception, there are some objects of thought that [occur] in respect of a [direct] encounter (kat’epibolên)14 where [the intellect] also grasps15 their nature, others that [occur] in respect of privation and abstraction. For just as for sense-perception white and light [occur] in respect of a [direct] encounter, and black and darkness in respect of privation (and for hearing sound in respect of a [direct] encounter, silence in respect of privation), so too for the intellect good depends on a [direct] encounter, bad on privation. (The latter [process] might be [equivalent to] Plato’s claim that matter is ‘to be grasped by bastard reasoning’,16 for it is precisely a ‘bastard’ activity of both the intellect and sense-perception in that it occurs not in respect of a [direct] impacting (epereisis) of form [on the intellect] but in respect of a process of withdrawal (anakhôrêsis).17) 111,26 (430b23-4) Now if sense-perception did not have a potentiality both for being active and for being inactive but was always active, it would never perceive darkness (nor hearing, [for example], perceive silence). Similarly, unless there were also an intellect naturally fitted both for thinking and for non-activity (or better, both for thinking and for nonthinking), it would not think objects that are bad, nor think any object that is without structure and form. Now the potential intellect is like this, for in a specific way it comes to know opposites by opposites: [namely,] the forms by being active, the [objects that are thought] by privation by [being in] potentiality. For being potential and being active are in a way opposites. 111,34 (430b24-6)18 So if there is an intellect that does not share in potentiality, then neither does it think privations, nor, therefore, objects that are bad. Both the intellect from without is like this, and much more so [112] the first cause,19 through its far greater detachment from potentiality. For this is why this [intellect qua first cause] thinks what more than anything else is, i.e. what is more than anything else form, and is at the furthest remove from privation and from being unstructured. Because it is itself like this, it thinks itself, and it is this the essence of which it is



proper to describe as ‘activity’, and as what is in a precise sense separate, i.e. not adjusted in the least to potentiality. But this is not20 why this sort of intellect is more valuable than one that thinks opposites; for a more valuable intellect is not one that thinks a greater number of [objects], but one that thinks better [objects]. In its case the object of thought and the intellect are not divided [from one another], as in the case of the potential [intellect], but [this intellect] is an object of thought insofar as it is intellect, and also again intellect insofar as it is an object of thought. 112,8 (430b26-30) And truth in its case is without qualification; indeed it is itself truth, as it does not express truth by thinking something else but [by thinking] itself. But our [intellect], insofar as it bears a slight resemblance (indalma) to that [productive] intellect, does not also demonstrate truth without qualification, but [only] as what is opposite to falsity. For if truth is in assertion, falsity must be in negation, so that [our intellect] has falsity always confounded with truth, and contemplated alongside it. When, however, [our intellect] considers one of the uncombined things that are signified,21 and contemplates its form and the definition of its essence, it errs least, although it does not always hit upon what is [true]. Instead, like sight, which errs least [for example] in discerning a given white object, but errs frequently in stating that the white object is Cleon, [our] intellect is also in most cases free from error and thus from falsity as long as it stops with the thought (ennoia) of the essence (e.g. [the essence of] what is good or fine). But when it says that one thing is good and another fine, it frequently makes the wrong assignment, and confuses qualities of one kind with those of another, and in just such cases there is considerable falsity and error. It ought, then, to stop with the forms, and more than anything else inquire into those22 that are without matter, for it is the unique function of the intellect [to direct its activity] towards these [forms].23

112,25 (431a4-7)1 Yet even if the intellect is far superior to the capacity for sense-perception, most of its properties are still also analogous to sense-perception. For the activity of [sense-perception] is not an affection or alteration, in fact not even a movement at all; for a movement is of something imperfect that is always adding on successively different things, but the activity of sense-perception is always perfect, which is why it is also not a movement, i.e. is a kind distinct from movement.2 So similarly the intellect’s encounter with the objects of thought for someone who already has the [relevant] hexis is, like a specialist’s encounter relative to his objects of specialized knowledge,3 not a movement but an activity, since it is of something [already] perfected, and [as an activity] is perfect itself. For [by contrast] the [activity] of what is [just] potential

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resembles [the process of] coming into existence rather than of being perfected. 112,33 (431a8-14) This, then, is the analogy between [intellect and sense-perception], and in addition desire and avoidance [are analogous]. [Recapitulating] from a little earlier,4 perception sometimes claims only that a given object is gold-coloured, at other times that the gold-coloured object is pleasant. So when it states that an object is [113] gold-coloured, it neither avoids nor pursues it, but when it adds the claim that [the gold-coloured object] is pleasant (as with honey), it pursues it, and when it [adds] that it is painful (as with bile), it avoids it. Now observe the same in the case of the intellect too. When it thinks only the essence of health, it neither avoids nor pursues it, but when it adds the thought and opinion that health is good, it pursues it. Thus good and bad have precisely the same relation to the intellect as pleasant and painful do to sense-perception. That is because sense-perception can perceive neither good nor bad, but only what produces pleasure or what causes pain, whereas distinguishing between good and bad is [an activity] for the intellect alone, an intellect which, as we have often said,5 also adds in succession the thought of time. But nonetheless sense-perception [by itself] does believe that what is pleasant and what is good are identical, as are what is painful and what is bad; it draws [us] to pleasant objects and averts [us] from painful ones. The intellect, on the other hand, frequently counteracts the impulses of [sense-perception] by saying that what is pleasant is not identical with what is good, and that what is painful [is not identical with] what is bad. 113,14 (431a14-17) While images are available for the soul that can think discursively in the same way that sense-impressions are for senseperception, it is good and bad that are [available] to the former6 as pleasant and painful are to the latter. So when [this soul] combines, for example, the image with good or with bad, it either avoids or pursues [something], pursuit being like assertion, avoidance like negation. But as perception cannot be active without objects of perception, neither can the intellect that is naturally cognate to the soul be active without images from sense-perception.7 Indeed, whenever the intellect desires or avoids [objects], imagination is always its forerunner. (But if there is some intellect neither so deficient that it desires, nor so weak that it engages in avoidance, it would not need imagination.) While desire that can perceive is appetite, desire that can think discursively is [identifiable as] willing (boulêsis),8 and while appetite is for what is pleasant, willing is for what is good. Also, sense-perception and desire that can perceive are identical in substrate, but different in definition, just as both intellect and willing are identical in substrate but different in essence. Also, the capacities for desire and avoidance are not distinct from one another, nor [jointly] distinct from the capacity for perception, as neither are willing and not willing distinct from one another, nor [jointly] distinct from the actual capacity for thinking. Instead, the same capacity is naturally fitted both



to avoid and to pursue, as also both to will and not will, and these are all, without exception, cases of desire. For [this single capacity] desires [something] even when it is engaged in avoiding it, and thus when it is not willing [that thing], [it still desires] not to encounter what it does not will. 113,32 (431b2-12)9 We must now again take up something that we have often stated: that for the intellect the forms are in the images (just as for perception they are in the sense-impressions), and that [the intellect] thinks the [forms] in the [images]. The result for it, then, is that both in the presence and in the absence of sense-perception it moves desire in just the same way. For it is the opinion that the object of its thinking is good or bad that makes that object something to be pursued or avoided. For on seeing a person [114] to be avoided, and on realizing that that person is hostile, it engages in avoidance, yet even when it does not see [the person] but presents images to itself and adds its opinion, it performs the identical action. The preceding are the functions of the practical intellect; for its [function] is to cause desire to move, since the contemplative intellect only gets to know objects. It is, however, the case that truth and falsity are related to the contemplative [intellect] as [the properties of] pleasant and painful are to sense-perception, with truth replacing good, falsity bad. But the difference is that truth is true without qualification, and falsity similarly, whereas good and pleasant are [relative] to someone. The contemplative [intellect], therefore, discerns what is without qualification [true], whereas the practical [intellect discerns] what is [relative] to someone. 114,9 (431b12-17) The intellect thinks the objects of thought that [exist] in themselves differently from those spoken of by abstraction (I refer to line, surface, and the whole [intelligible] matter of geometry). For the latter are the limits of physical bodies, yet [the intellect] thinks them without conjoining physical body, just as though it could separate snubness from the nose or the flesh to which it is incidental. In that case it would think something that cannot really exist without the nose [as existing] without the nose. But in fact [the intellect] cannot do this in the case of snubness, since the definition of snubness includes the nose; for snubness is in all cases hollowness in nose and flesh. But hollowness itself, and the [properties of being] curved, straight, bent, triangular and quadrilateral are ones that the intellect can contemplate in and of themselves, although they do not really exist in themselves. The reason is that even if such [properties] are not separate from physical bodies, still their definition and essence do not implicate matter. That, then, is why, in order to contemplate quantity, the intellect can render separate for itself objects that in respect of real existence are not separate, and contemplating quantity does not require physical body, nor the affections belonging to it qua physical (e.g. heat, coldness, dryness or moisture), but just its dimensions and limits. (And so geometry and arithmetic are the types of knowledge most detached from physical matter because their demonstrations

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progress without including it in the accompanying contemplation. This is why they also need sense-perception as little as they do matter. Astronomy and music may also try [for this], but they do not solve their problems as easily; instead for them sense-perception is the source and termination of their contemplation.)10 114,31 (431b17-19) That, then, is how [the intellect] thinks abstract objects. But what must also be investigated later, as well as discussed now, is whether, by being present in the body and not separated from [physical] magnitude, [the intellect] can also think the forms that are naturally separate, and that are without qualification non-material. For it would seem reasonable that just as that divine intellect, which is separate and exists in actuality, thinks none of the enmattered forms, neither does the enmattered [intellect] think any of the separate forms. It is reasonable for the divine intellect to think none of the enmattered forms, as it has [115] no potentiality by which it will apprehend privations, and this is not its inferiority but its superiority, for by not having the potentiality for perishing, it is not made inferior to things that do. So, to repeat, if this [divine intellect] thinks none of the enmattered forms, it would seem to follow that neither does the enmattered [intellect] think any of the forms [that exist] apart from matter. Yet this is not true, as this [enmattered intellect] has to the full the potentiality for thinking the non-material forms too. For just as11 it also thinks the enmattered forms by separating them from matter, so is it clearly all the more naturally fitted for thinking the separate forms. For its inferiority in relation to the divine intellect is not that it can never think the non-material forms, but that it cannot do so continuously and perpetually.12 1 115,10 (431b20-4) Although the preceding [topics] deserve repeated investigation, let us for now summarize what has been said about the soul by repeating that the soul is in a way [identical with] all existing objects. That is because existing objects are either objects of perception or objects of thought, and actual knowledge is [identical with] the objects of knowledge, while actual perception is [identical with] the objects of perception. While the earlier account of how this is so was adequate, something else must still be added here. 115,15 (431b24-432a2) Now some objects that exist [exist] in potentiality, others in actuality, and this is how the soul too is potentially [identical with] some forms, but actually [so with] others. For when it has the hexis of sense-perception and intellect, but is not active, it is [identical with] existing objects potentially, but when it is active by means of both hexeis, it is [identical with] existing objects actually. And we are correct to claim that the soul is [identical with] all existing objects, since existing objects are the forms, and each thing is what it is in respect of its form,



while the matter is, by contrast, the cause of coming into existence, i.e. of coming into existence as opposed to being [something]. This is because the incessant flux2 of bodies is caused by matter, whereas each [body] is stable and identical for a given time [only] because of form. It is correct, therefore, to claim that the soul is [identical with] all existing objects, since it receives the forms of all existing objects through both the intellect and senseperception, and becomes identical with them. (Not that it becomes identical with objects in their totality; there is no stone in the soul, nor fire nor earth.) The only possibility, then, is that the soul becomes [identical with] the forms, and there is nothing to prevent one rational principle (logos) being attuned with another,3 i.e. one form with [another] form, ‘so that the soul is like the hand, in that the hand is the tool of tools’ (432a2) through which we use the other tools, and the soul ‘the form of forms’ (432a1-2)4 by which we apprehend the other forms. (Perhaps the soul is correctly said to be [identical with] existing objects because it not only receives all the forms, but also imposes the forms on matter. For it is that which structures matter with a complex variety of structures, and the life [derived] from it is much more striking5 in the case of animals, though more indistinct in the case of plants and the elements.)6 115,35 (432a3-10) The implication for those who believe that there is no separate object beyond perceptible magnitudes is that the forms that are objects of thought are placed among those that are [116] objects of perception, and that the objects spoken of by abstraction, and all states and affections of objects of perception, are like this, ,7 and the [perceptible qualities] confounded, as it were, with it, all [on this view] are nonetheless linked to it. A sign of this is a person blind and deaf from birth: he could not learn geometry, and perhaps not even imagine a circle or a triangle, except maybe one that was hot, cold, sweet, bitter, or with a pleasant or foul odour8 – [all qualities] that he also perceives.9 Also, from the outset the intellect collects [the concepts of] one, two, or number from the objects of perception. That is why even now when it contemplates such objects, it must do so along with an image, for images are like sense-impressions, except that they are without matter. 116,10 (432a10-14) The things that are spoken of and thought in combination are clearly distinct from images. For while the same images of day and light remain in the soul, the intellect combines them in a complex variety of ways in the [spoken thought] ‘If it is day, it is light’, or ‘It is day and it is light’, or ‘It is day but it is not light’, or ‘Let there be day and let there be light.’ All these combinations are different both from one another and from the [corresponding] images, and truth and falsity exist in respect of the combination, but are not [present] in the images. How will the uncombined and primary thoughts differ from being images? Well, not even these10 [thoughts] are [identical with] images, but images are a necessary condition for them. For the thought derived from Socrates and

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the image [of him] are not identical, but images are a kind of imprint and trace of sense-perception, and like an affection11 (if you could grant me the notion12 of affection as we have often spoken of it above),13 whereas the thought is the activity of the intellect towards the image that is its object. This, then, is how the intellect uses the [image] in a complex variety of ways by producing variations both in inflections and linkages.14 1 116,26 (432a15-22) The soul of animals is defined above all by the capacity for discrimination (the function of discursive thinking and sense-perception), and by the capacity for causing movement in respect of place. Sense-perception and intellect have for now been adequately defined. To be investigated next is what causes movement. Is it a single part of the soul? Is this part separate physically, or [only] in definition? Or is it the whole soul? And if a part, is it distinct from those usually mentioned, i.e. the parts that have the capacities for rational calculation, [117] spiritedness and appetite? Or is it [identical with] just one of these? 117,1 (432a22-30) Yet it is precisely the latter [question] that raises the major problem of whether the parts of the soul must be spoken of as physically and spatially separate, or as several distinct capacities in the same substrate, in just the same way as sweetness, a pleasant smell, and light colour apply to an apple.2 And if there are parts, then how numerous are they, and are there just the three, as some posit, or even more? Clearly the parts of the soul are none too easily enumerated once one takes note of the kinds of distinctions by which [others] separate spirit, appetite, and rational calculation.3 For other parts are obviously more distinct than these; for example, the capacity for nutrition, which belongs to plants and all animals, is much more distinct from the three [parts mentioned] than they are from one another. 117,10 (432a30-b7) Similarly the parts with a capacity for senseperception cannot be considered as itself possessing reason, nor as entirely non-rational. For insofar as it discerns differences among objects of perception, and is a starting-point and foundation4 for reason, it would seem to share in intellect. Yet insofar as it is equally present in non-rational animals, it could conversely be considered non-rational. Also, the part with a capacity for imagination is distinct in being in definition from those already mentioned. But if only the three parts mentioned belong to the soul, then [imagination] would have to be classified with either reason, appetite or spirit. In addition to all that we have said, the part with a capacity for desire, which is totally distinct both in definition, potentiality and activity from all those already mentioned, might be posited as one of the three [parts of the soul]. For it is perhaps absurd to disperse this capacity, and locate it in the [part] that has reason and also in the one that is non-rational, and not make it separate too, just like each of them.5



117,22 (432b7-14) But [returning] to [the point] at which we digressed:6 what is it that causes an animal to move in respect of place? For it might seem that the movement involving growth and decline (meaning the capacity for reproduction and nutrition), which all [living things] have, causes movement. (The capacity through which inhalation and exhalation occur must be investigated later, along with sleep and waking, which are also movements and alterations in an animal.)7 But we must investigate what we proposed at the outset regarding movement in respect of place: what causes an animal to move with forward movement (poreutikê kinêsis)? 117,29 (432b14-19) Now clearly the capacity for nutrition does not cause this movement in an animal. For movement in respect of place is always for the sake of something, and is accompanied by imagination, and by pursuit or avoidance for [animals] whose movements are voluntary rather than enforced. The capacity for nutrition, by contrast, does not share in imagination at all, and so not in desire either, given that desire always follows on sense-perception and imagination. So when animals desire nutriment, they move towards it, yet the capacity for nutrition is not thereby identical with the capacity for desire. A sign of this is that plants have the nutritive capacity, but not the capacity for desire, since they have neither sense-perception nor imagination. But if the capacity for movement in respect of place were [included] in the capacity for nutrition, plants would have a specific part as an organ for forward movement, since nature grants nothing without a purpose. [118] 118,1 (432b19-26) But neither is the capacity for sense-perception identical with that for movement in respect of place. For many animals have sense-perception, but are stationary and thus permanently immobile, with no capacity for movement in respect of place. For they would possess it to no purpose, yet nature even-handedly guards against both the purposeless addition of anything, and against deficiencies in anything essential (except with deformed and undeveloped [animals]). But [immobile] animals are developed, and thus not deformed. A sign of this is their capacity to reproduce others like them, and to mature and decline. 118,7 (432b26-433a3) Yet neither does the capacity for rational calculation (the one called ‘intellect’) cause movement. For there are two kinds of intellect: the contemplative . 8 does not contemplate about what has to be done, nor think discursively about what is to be avoided and desired, whereas movement in respect of place involves avoidance or pursuit. The practical intellect, on the other hand, does do some thinking (noei ti) about these things, yet does not control the movement. Certainly it often thinks discursively that something is worth fleeing (e.g. an earthquake or a wild animal), and then does not take flight.9 Instead, while ‘the heart leaps and the hairs stand on end’,10 the animal remains in its place. Often too when rationally calculating that something is pleasant, a specific part of its body shares in

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what is perceived, but the animal as a whole does not move. (The explanation is that it not only thinks discursively about what is frightening and pleasant in the present and in the future, but sometimes also, and especially in the case of a human being, about what is so in the past, although there cannot be movement towards the past.)11 Thinking, then, does not control change of place, but often, even when the intellect gives a clear command, and when discursive thinking gives the order to avoid or pursue [something], an animal does not move in accordance with its intellect, but in accordance with its appetite, as with an incontinent person. 118,21 (433a4-8) So neither intellect nor knowledge causes this type of movement in an animal. In fact elsewhere we see [for example] someone with medical skill not practising medicine,12 and someone skilled with horses not riding. For it is not the skill, nor body of knowledge, that controls movement, but something else. Yet neither do appetite nor spirit control this movement by themselves. When self-controlled people, for example, become spirited and appetitive, they keep calm because they are restrained by their rational calculation.

118,27 (433a9-17) The two causes of movement, then, are clearly intellect and desire, if imagination might also be posited as [a process of] thinking, given that human beings often follow images rather than knowledge, and that non-rational animals (for whom, given their lack of intelligence, imagination replaces thinking) are guided exclusively by images. But when I speak of the intellect as causing movement in respect of place, I refer to the practical intellect, which also rationally calculates and deliberates for the sake of something. It differs from the contemplative intellect by the frequently stated distinction that for the [contemplative intellect] the activity itself is the end, whereas for the practical [intellect] desire exists for the sake of something else beyond the mere activity. For what contemplation (theôria) and desire aim at [represents] the source of the practical intellect; for with this [aim] in sight, it calculates and deliberates about what is to be done. The ultimate [stage] in its thinking, at which it stops deliberating in order [119] to achieve its end, is where action has its source. Conversely, where action reaches its limit is where thinking has its source. 119,2 (433a17-26) So it is reasonable for us to inquire into the cause of forward movement in animals among this pair (desire and discursive thinking of a practical kind, I mean), because both also exist for the sake of the object of desire as an end. Indeed, when discursive thinking causes movement, it does so for the sake of an object of desire; hence it is also not without desire, given that things that are relative to something are relative to one another.1 The object of desire that causes movement in a primary sense is indeed a single thing, and so is the desire for this [object]. Also intellect and desire must not be posited as distinct (for the species is not



distinct from the genus), but desire is also [included] in the intellect, because willing involves desire. If intellect and desire were two things distinct from one another, and both caused movement, then there would be another capacity common to both of them, which they would share when they caused an animal to move, just as having feet [is common] to any three-footed and four-footed [animal]. But, in fact, the intellect clearly does not cause movement without desire (for it has been stated that willing is also desire),2 while desire [causes movement] even without intellect. For desire is both spirit and appetite, and often causes movement contrary to rational calculation. This is evident in the case of incontinent people who desire inferior objects when the intellect is causing them to move towards superior ones. 119,17 (433a26-30) Intellect, then, at least in its strict sense, is always correct, whereas desire is not always correct, indeed neither is imagination when separated from intellect, even though we have often classified it with the intellect. That, then, is why the object of desire always causes movement, although this [object] is either the good, or the apparent (phainomenon) good.3 In fact, the true good [causes] the intellect [to move], whereas the apparent good [causes] appetite and spirit [to move]. For what is pleasant appears good at the very moment at which it causes appetite or spirit to move. But not every good can move desire; for the primary [good] does not do so, nor does anything that is without qualification good and eternal. This [type of good] is perhaps the object of desire common to all [animals] and should be investigated along different lines later. But for now we are inquiring into the cause of movement for each [type] of animal, and this is after all the good in particular cases: that is, it [equally] can and cannot come about, and is [good] not in an unqualified way, but [good] for someone at a specific time and in relation to a specific thing. 119,29 (433a31-b4) Clearly such a capacity of the soul causes in animals the movement in respect of place that we call desire, and must be also be added to the list [of the capacities] by anyone who divides up the parts of the soul, assuming that they divide and separate them according to the capacities. The same goes for the capacities for nutrition, senseperception, contemplative reasoning and deliberation, [all] of which are also accompanied by this capacity for desire that has been the object of definition in our discussion. For these [other capacities] differ from one another more than do spirit, [120] appetite, and the capacities that import those affections. So there would not be three parts of the soul, as they claim, but far more. But we must get back to the immediate [topic]. 120,4 (433b5-6) There is, then, a single capacity that causes movement in animals in respect of place, and to this we have in most cases given the name ‘desire’, whether it is preceded by rational calculation, appetite, or spirit. For just as the existence of five senses did not prevent there being a single source of sense-perception,4 so too the capacity for desire is not prevented from being a single [capacity], although there are three activi-

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ties on which it [supervenes]. That is why desires also often turn out to oppose one another whenever rational calculation conflicts with appetite or spirit. 120,10 (433b6-7) This conflict between desires occurs in [animals] that perceive time, and above all in a human being. For [a human being] perceives time [as time is] in itself, but the other [animals perceive it] incidentally, since they [perceive] not time but [only] the way that they were affected at an earlier time. No [animals] of course perceive the future, since they are also not affected in the future. Ants, bees, and [all animals] that store up their food, may somehow be an exception in that they do perceive the future too. But only a human being is ‘at once turned front and back’,5 for it alone has an intellect by which to number what is prior and posterior, and this number is time.6 Thus by also referring to a human being as ‘the maker of time’ the commentator Alexander [of Aphrodisias] does not think that he has made an inappropriate claim, 7 by making time directly our conception (epinoia) and thus not granting it its own real existence (hupostasis) he was wrong, and unfaithful to Aristotle, if we must pay some attention to what is in the Physics.8 120,21 (433b7-13) But when the intellect conflicts with appetite, the former exercises restraint on account of the future, while appetite pursues what is imminently pleasant.9 For anything imminently pleasant appears to be pleasant and good without qualification, since appetite does not see the future. The capacity for desire , then, 10 one in kind, as also must the preceding object of desire which, by being thought or imagined, thereby causes movement without being moved. There is also nothing to prevent the things that cause movement, and that thus are objects of desire, from being more than one in number. 120,27 (433b13-18) So there are three things without which animals could not have this movement, in fact four: the cause of movement, that by which it causes movement, and that which is moved. I said ‘four’ because the cause of movement is twofold: one [aspect] is unmoved, as with the practical good, the other is moved and causes movement, as with desire. For [desire] causes animals to move when it is moved by the good, given that movement in respect of place is nothing other than the progress and actualization of desire into the open. But when it does not have the source [of movement] from within itself but from the practical good, we say that for that reason it both causes movement and is moved. But what is moved is the [121] animal. 121,1 (433b19-27) There are, then, these three [causes], and a fourth entering as an addition is the organ by which desire causes movement, and this is therefore corporeal11 and must be investigated in detail among the functions common to body and soul, although for now it must be stated just summarily that the organ that desire uses to cause movement in respect of place must be located in a part of the body where the same thing could be both a source and a termination, these being distinct in definition,



although physically inseparable. (The location of the heart12 is like this: for it is both the source and termination of the [directions] of right and left, and of up and down, in respect of which animals have movement.)13 To explain. For movement an animal needs two things that are stationary (i.e. at rest): one on the outside, in relation to which [the animal] reacts in its movement, the other on the inside, around which it moves by pushing forward the right and the left [parts] one part at a time (just as with hinges, for the hinges move around the stable linch-pin alternately). This is required because all animals move by pushing [forward] and pulling [back], for it is by expanding and compressing the right and the left [parts], one part at a time, that they move forward, and this process involves pushing [forward] and pulling [back]. So just as in a circle the [central] point must be stable and the circumference have the source of its movement from that [point], so too in an animal something must be stationary at the centre, and the movement of the parts must be both derived from this [source] and [directed] away from it.

121,19 (433b27-9) So in general, as has been stated,2 it is in so far as an animal has a capacity for desire that it has a capacity to cause itself to move, yet a capacity for desire needs imagination, and imagination in all cases involves a capacity either for reason or for sense-perception. 121,21 (434a5-10) While even non-rational animals have the [kind of] imagination that involves a capacity for sense-perception, only human beings have the [kind] that involves a capacity for reasoning. For [only humans] compare and contrast more than one image [and ask] whether one thing is to be chosen rather than another. This [activity] is the function of the capacity for rational calculation, and it must measure by a single [standard], since it is pursuing something [relatively] greater [than something else]. So as in [a set of] quantities [reasoning] discovers the greater among unequals by using a single standard of measure (e.g. the cubit or the palm), so too in [a set of] images [reasoning] discovers what is more choiceworthy by applying a single standard, such as pleasure or expediency, and it is not immediately attracted by what appears [to it], as are non-rational animals, but it also often combines [images] ([e.g. in reasoning that], ‘If A then B, and if B then also C’), and a single conclusion is reached on the basis of more than one [image]. 121,29 (434a10-12)3 This is why the desire of non-rational animals, given that it is moved by mere imagination,4 excludes opinion, for [as we have seen] it excludes inferential reasoning (sullogismos). By contrast, the desire of rational animals occurs both with and without opinion, and hence [their] desire does not in all cases also involve willing, whereas willing always involves desire too. 121,33 (434a12-15) Among human beings the irrational [desire] some1

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times defeats the rational one, at other times it is the reverse, and the one in control moves the one that is controlled, not by halting it from its impulse, but by carrying it around with itself,5 as in the celestial sphere the [sphere] of the fixed stars does not immobilize that of the planets, but while moving with its unique movement still carries [the lower sphere] around with it.6 So in the cosmos the naturally stronger [impulse] always [122] exercises control, since what is at the highest level is by nature more in command. But in human beings the naturally superior [impulse] is sometimes defeated, as in cases of incontinence. You could really speak of three movements [as present] in human beings: two are those of the desires, one that of the human being, with the [movement] of the latter being pulled in opposite directions by both [the other movements]. 122,5 (433b31-434a5)7 But since less developed animals (such as flies, worms, etc.)8 also have movement in respect of place, how do they move [in this way] without desire? Or [more specifically] how do they desire without the [kind of] imagination that we claimed they did not have?9 Such [animals] clearly have both pain and pleasure, and pleasure always implies appetite, and appetite always implies desire, and desire always implies imagination, yet it was imagination of which our earlier argument deprived them. Now [the solution is that] just as [animals] move in an unfocussed way, so too do they have imagination in an unfocussed way.10 Therefore they have imagination, yet it is unstructured and conflated,11 like their sense-perception, since they have that too in an imperfect and undefined way. This, then, can suffice as an inquiry into and solution [of the problem].12 122,14 (434a16-21)13 Since one [kind of] belief is of the universal, and another of the particular (for example, the universal says ‘Every philosopher should do good’, the particular ‘I am a philosopher’), which [of the two] has control over movement? Is it the particular [belief], or the universal, or both? Both certainly, but the [universal exercises control] more by being at rest, whereas the particular one [does so] by being [directly] linked with the movement. For the [particular] conclusion ‘This, then, is to be done by me’ depends on the [particular belief], as, barring any impediment, does the immediate movement itself. 1 122,21 (434a22-7) Now every animal that can come into existence and die must have a soul that has the capacity for nutrition, and this capacity must exist along with it from its coming into existence until its death.2 For everything that is reproduced grows, matures and declines, and without nutrition these [processes] cannot exist. It follows that there must be a capacity for nutrition in everything that grows and declines, yet the capacity for sense-perception need not be present in everything that takes



nutriment; for plants do not have it, as can be understood from [our] earlier [discussion] too. 122,28 (434a27-30)3 Of all the senses touch must exist before [the rest], since all the others employ it, whereas it employs none of those that come after it. Therefore living [creatures] that consist totally, or virtually, of a single element,4 cannot have the organ of touch, since that organ is at a mean between tangible pairs of opposites.5 But if they lack touch, they also lack the other senses, for nature has not given plants too a share in sense-perception, since their body consists virtually of a single element,6 and so it cannot receive form without matter, since it is deprived of the kind of mean [identified], and consists predominantly of earth, the least sensitive of the elements. (This is evident too from all of our [human] parts that consist predominantly of earth.) [123] If anything else that shares in life consists of a single element, then for just this reason it too cannot have sense-perception. 123,2 (434a30-b4) By contrast, sense-perception is essential for things that are not just living, but are also actually animals,7 with the additional qualification that they can have a capacity for forward movement (and even that suffices only if they also come into existence and die). This is because [animals] do not have nutriment channelled in from their immediate environment (enguthen),8 nor from the elements, 9 in which they are sown and planted. [Animals] instead have to procure it for themselves and pursue it. But how could they have this [capacity] without sense-perception, [in other words] unless they saw ahead of them, even at a long distance, [nutriment] that could and could not be assimilated, so that they could move towards the one, and avert themselves from the other? They would not survive even for a second unless they had reports from the senses about what they should and should not move towards. So nature would have created so many animals to no purpose10 if it did not intend to advance them towards their special end, and for every animal that comes into existence that end is to reproduce something like itself.11 The end, then, belongs [inherently] to plants in that they are stationary; i.e. they are nourished and reproduce [entirely] from within themselves, and nutriment does not cause them to change position; they have it instead right beside them through [the operation of] their [special] nutritive capacity. But those animals that have a capacity for forward movement, reproduction, and procuring food outside [their immediate environment] must have sense-perception as basic12 to the rest of the soul, including the intellect. Indeed, the intellect may be the most valuable capacity of the soul, but it is not through its intellect that an animal is nourished, but through the senses of taste and touch. So that is why animals must have sense-perception. 123,20 (434b4-8)13 But sense-perception is not essential for animals that by not coming into existence are eternal, yet do undergo movement

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in respect of place. The explanation [for this deficiency] is the same in this case too:14 namely, that nature creates none of these numerous [animals] to no purpose, but [creates] all of them either for the sake of something, or as ‘adjuncts’ (sumptômata)15 to [animals] created for the sake of something. ([The term ‘adjuncts’] might be applied to hair on certain parts of the body, and to warts.) But eternal and uncreated animals have no need of senseperception, either directly, or as an ‘adjunct’, because they do not need nutriment. Put otherwise, if they had sense-perception, they would have it as an improvement either to the soul, or to the body. But in fact neither [is the case]: their soul will not think more [effectively], but less so, if it is bothered by sense-perception, and their body will not be more [effective] because of sense-perception. Thus plants and heavenly bodies, as the extreme [kinds] among living things, have no share in sense-perception: [plants] because they are inferior to such a capacity, [the heavenly bodies] because they are superior to it, and both because they do not need to procure nutriment. Instead, plants have it from their immediate environment, while the heavenly bodies do not need it at all. All intervening animals, however, whether more or less completely developed, and insofar as they ,16 die, and move in respect of place, need the capacity for sense-perception for continuous survival. 123,36 (434b9-18) This is why no such [intermediary animal’s] body consists of a single element, but it is blended at a mean between the primary pairs of opposites, with the result that it has the capacity for touch. [124] Touch is also absolutely essential for animals that come into existence for the following reasons. Since an animal is a body that has a soul, and as a body must be in contact with bodies near it, it must also, if it is going to survive, have a capacity for making contact, and so for distinguishing between what is and is not compatible with it. For [animals] cannot be satisfied by just making contact with one another, as inanimate things are said to, by ‘nothing being in between them’;17 for instead animals touch as a way of discerning and perceiving whatever is in contact with them. So while the other senses operate through different [media], the sense of touch operates through flesh or its analogue. So unless [an animal] distinguishes between what is harmful and beneficial, it will be unable to evade the one and acquire the other, and if incapable of that, will also be incapable of survival. 124,10 (434b18-29) Now plants also have contact with food, but since they stay in their place their contact is close to that of inanimate objects, in that they are immobile in respect of their place. The reason that they also have no use for an additional sense of taste is that they would make such use of it to no purpose, since they are incapable of avoiding harmful [nutritive] fluids.18 Hence they are also easily destroyed by any tangible object that is incompatible with them. Animals [by contrast] use taste as a foretaste of nutriment, and that is why touch is essential to them. Indeed, taste is like touch, for taste is of nutriment, and nutriment is a tangible



body, since body is fed by body. But sound, colour and smell do not provide nutriment, nor do they produce growth and decline. [Taste and touch] are, therefore, essential to an animal, and clearly an animal cannot exist without touch, whether it be developed or undeveloped. (That is why ‘zoöphytes’ share slightly in an animal’s existence.) The other senses exist for well-being (to eu), and are therefore possessed not by just any [animal] species but [only] by those that are more developed, and thus have a capacity for forward movement. For if these animals are going to survive, they must also perceive at a distance what to avoid and pursue. That is why the organs of hearing, sight and smell serve this purpose for them, given that an animal exists through, and by means of, a medium. 124,24 (434b29-435a10) Where movement occurs when several [juxtaposed objects] push or are pushed according to their position, the first [in line] pushes forward without [itself] being pushed, while the last is only pushed, and the ones in the middle both push and are pushed (and can increase and decrease in size at different times).19 It is the same with [perceptual] alteration except that, while the cause of alteration [sc. the object of perception] remains in the same position,20 the alteration in the things that can naturally pass the effect along penetrates a considerable distance. For example, if a stamp [on a signet-ring] is dipped into wax, it moves up to a certain point and [the wax] receives the mark up to that internal depth, in contrast with a stone, which is completely unmoved by the application of the signet-ring, and water, which is moved so far that the stamp on the ring is even visible through it. Air is moved and affected the most, as long as it remains an undispersed unity. (This is why it is better to envisage reflection too in this way rather than as a sight-ray leaving the eye and being reflected back. For it is more plausible that air be affected by shape and colour where, as in the case of smooth and shiny objects, it can remain a unity. This is why [air] in turn causes movement in the organ of sight, just as though a mark on [a piece of] wax passed through to the [outer] limit.)

125,1 (435a11-20) But the [present] discussion1 also aims at a further demonstration that the body of an animal that comes into existence cannot be ‘simple’ (haploun),2 meaning ‘simple’ [in the sense of] consisting of just one of the three [elements], i.e. fire, water, or air (with the divine body excluded out of respect).3 This is because the organ of touch can consist not of a ‘simple’ body, but only of one blended [from several bodies] at a mean, and all the sense-organs that were shown to consist of ‘simple’ elements were shown to be involved in every sense except touch:4 i.e. water and air were involved in the organs of sight, hearing and smell.5 While the latter [three organs] needed to be in contact [with their objects], they nonetheless discerned [objects] by making [such] contact not with the actual objects of

Book Three


perception, but with a foreign body that served as a medium. The organ of touch, however, had to touch the actual objects of perception.6 In fact, its name comes from the [verb] ‘to touch’, (i.e. ‘to be in contact’). So the conclusion that must be conceded from this argument is that if animals must have the organ of touch, and if that [organ] cannot consist of one of the three elements mentioned, then neither can the body of the animal consist of one of them. 125,14 (435a20-b3) But does it consist of earth? The same argument applies here too: that the organ of touch is a mean between all the pairs of tangible opposites, not just cold and hot, but dry and wet too from among the [qualities] present in ‘simple’ elements. For certainly the [organ] that is going to perceive all of them is blended by nature from all of them, but earth per se is the element least capable of perception. Proof of this is that all our parts that consist predominantly of earth resemble plants in having no sense-perception [just] because they consist predominantly of earth. Therefore the body of an animal is not ‘simple’. 7 125,21 And, to repeat, when I say ‘of an animal’ I mean ‘of an animal that comes into existence’.8 For our argument has found that touch is essential to this [animal], whereas the divine [body] would have touch to no purpose, since it moves for all time through a [medium] that is of the same kind as it. Yet neither does it have taste, smell, hearing or sight, since in that region there is neither flavour nor air,9 in fact not even colour. For what will be its purpose in perceiving colours? Instead, the divine body is a different kind of animal, superior and more divine by far [than other bodies], and it perceives objects of perception in perhaps some other way, as [for example] animals that reproduce perceive their offspring.10 So while we say that the divine body is an animal that is also superior to senseperception, we leave it to others, who posit it as an animal, yet still claim that it consists of fire, and has use for nutriment,11 to explain how an animal can be nourished without having taste, or can have taste without touch, or have the other senses too without touch, or how touch can exist [by operating] through [the medium of] a ‘simple’ body. 125,33 (435b4-13) So it has become clear to us why animals must die once they are deprived of just this sense. It is because nothing can have touch without being an animal, nor be an animal without having touch. Indeed, touch is the primary sense that an animal has qua animal. Thus an excess in the other objects of perception destroys not the animal [126] but [only] the sense-organ, as any excess in colour, sound, and smell destroys the organs of sight, hearing, and smell. (It is clear what it means for an animal to be destroyed by thunder,12 since it is not thunder or noise that strikes13 it but wind and air. It is also not colour that shocks an animal, but the fear of colour that produces derangement in its body. Also, smell



[itself] does not [destroy a body], only the movement produced by smell. [Finally], flavour [destroys the body] not insofar as it is flavour, but insofar as it touches the [body’s] vital parts.14) 126,7 (435b13-19) Any excess in objects of touch does not destroy an animal incidentally; instead, where heat, cold and solidity are excessive, they [directly] destroy an animal, and all too predictably. For while [only] the sense-organ is destroyed when any [other] object of perception is in excess, in the case of touch the whole flesh, and thus the animal’s whole body, is the sense-organ, not some isolated part. So when the body is destroyed, so is the animal. 126,13 (435b19-24) I have already said earlier too15 that of the five senses touch alone sufficies for an animal to exist, whereas the [other] four are for its well-being, so that when they perish, so does well-being, but when touch perishes, so does the animal [itself]. To explain. An animal has sight not because it is an animal, but because of living in air, water, or, in general terms, in a transparent [medium]. It has taste in order to distinguish between what is pleasant and painful in food, and in order to pursue the one, and avoid the other; that is because the nutritve capacity [by itself] would be adequate only for nutrition, as it is for plants. [Finally, an animal] has hearing to have something communicated to it, and a tongue for the twofold purpose of taste, and of communicating with another animal.

Notes Book 1.1 1. The division of the de Anima into three books is recognized by Themistius (cf. below 28,34; 100,14; 101,7.15; 102,14.15), as it was by Alexander (e.g. DA 66,4; in Sens. 104,7). (The division of the Aristotelian books into chapters dates from the third edition of Erasmus’ edition published at Basel in 1550; see Hutchinson [1987], 378, n. 3. I have modified it only with reference to the division between 3.10 and 3.11; see 3.11, n. 1 below.) For reasons given above (Introduction, p. 1), the division of Themistius’ paraphrase into seven logoi (or discussions) will not be recorded in the present translation. 2. At 1,3 I delete tôi as well as kai, and omit ekthesthai, a correction by a second hand in MS Q. I take the infinitives in lines 4 and 5, that is, to be dependent on peirateon. 3. On this opening sentence and its significance for Themistius’ paraphrastic method see Introduction at pp. 3-4 above. 4. Literally their ‘starting-points’ (aphormai); cf. also 2,1 below. 5. This brief preface should be compared with Simplicius’ more elaborate proem at in DA 1,3-6,17. See Blumenthal (1976), 320-1 who notes the absence of any reference to Plato or any Platonists by Themistius, an important consideration in any effort to assess his Neoplatonism. 6. ‘Discussion’ (logos) in this sort of context identifies a subsection of the treatise, but it is sometimes difficult to know precisely what it covers. Here it probably refers to just 402a1-10, the prologue on the value of acquiring knowledge about the soul. 7. Here gnôsis kai epistêmê is Themistius’ gloss on eidêsis (402a1), a rare word used only this once by Aristotle. 8. See below 114,26-30 on the contrast between geometry and astronomy. There aisthêsis (sense-perception) is identified as the data of astronomy, rather than the present periphrasis to engiston (‘that which is very accessible’). For the Aristotelian background see An. Post. 1.27 on the relative precision of different sciences, and Themistius, in An. Post. 37,8-20 where astronomy is introduced to elaborate the account. 9. eskhatê (1,21). This term is used by Aristotle of the nutritive soul only at GA 741a24-5. 10. Themistius needs this qualification since ‘primary’ (prôtê) is sometimes applied to the vegetative (or nutritive) soul, as at DA 416b25; for the same usage see Themistius below at 53,18 (bis) and 54,1. This is logical priority; this soul is a necessary condition for the existence of any other capacity of the soul, whereas the intellect is ontologically prior, since it is separate and can function independently; cf. 49,3-4. 11. emphuesthai (1,23); the verb is probably derived from Plato, Phaedo 83E1, where it is used in a simile of the contaminated soul being replanted in the body. 12. cf. below 43,27-30 (ad 413a8-9) and especially 49,8-10 (ad 415a11-12), for similar statements of uncertainty about the status of the intellect; cf. also 103,4-6 with TGAC, 102, n. 115. 13. In addition to the considerations of accuracy and fascination. 14. hormêtêrion (1,26) might mean ‘incentive’, but the metaphor based on its meaning a launching place for ships fits well with the reference in the next sentence to an ephodion, the equipment for a journey. 15. In that case we might have expected that the practical part would have been contrasted with all three of the theoretical parts, the mathematical, natural, and theological (cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1026a18-19), and not just the philosophy of nature. Perhaps Themistius thought that the relevance of the soul to mathematics and first philosophy would be dealt with adequately later in this chapter; see 7,37-8,3. 16. cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, DA 1,4-2,4 where the link between the soul and self-knowledge is also drawn in a preface.


Notes to pp. 16-18

17. There is no immediate paraphrase of 402a7-10; it is introduced below at 2,26 as a preface to the inquiry into the essence of the soul. 18. para tois philosophois  kai para tois allois hapasi (2,11-12) is Themistius’ gloss on Aristotle’s undefined phrase pollois heterois (402a12). Most commentators and translators, however, take this to refer to the subject matter of the inquiry identified here, and Themistius is specifically criticised by Rodier (on 402a12) and Siwek (244, n. 17). Hicks (on 402a11) takes the phrase as a masculine plural, but sees a contrast implied between those inquiring into the soul and other inquirers. 19. Themistius sometimes uses the expression ta kath’hauta huparkhonta in the same sense as ta kath’hauta sumbebêkota. Cf. 5,19-30 below. Cf. also 17,21 and 109,27-30 where ta huparkhonta = ta sumbebêkota. 20. I transliterate this term in the present context since Themistius is making a point about terminology. I shall continue to translate the noun as ‘entelechy’, but use ‘in actuality’ for both the datives energeiâi and entelekheiâi. 21. cf. 39,16-20 (ad 412a9-10) below. 22. I follow the manuscripts of Themistius at 3,2 in reading apotmêthêsetai rather than Heinze’s emendation apotakhthêsetai. It conveys the same idea as diakrinesthai used just above at 2,38. 23. The term hexis will be transliterated throughout. See Introduction, p. 8, and cf. 39,16-23 below. 24. The parts of philosophy were mentioned at 1,28-2,5. 25. 3,13-15 (hoi – Stôikoi) = SVF 2.824. The early Stoics did not in fact use the language of ‘parts’ or align capacities with physical locations or organs but saw capacities as united in a single material substance, pneuma; see, e.g., SVF 2.826. Themistius alludes to the general doctrine of the psychic pneuma at 16,37-38 below, but it would seem that he did not have any precise knowledge of it. 26. tukhon de kai Platôn (3,15). This clause, here and at 9,7 below, must be translated in this definite form, rather than as ‘perhaps also Plato’, as do Moerbeke (forte autem et Plato) and de Falco (‘e fors’anche Platone’). It is true that tukhon as an adverb usually means ‘perhaps’. LSJ (s.v. tunkhanô I.A.5), however, cite one instance of its use in a definite sense. But it is anyway clear that Themistius was not uncertain about the Platonic doctrine of the alignment of capacities of the soul with organs of the body (cf. below 37,4-6 and 93,33-94,2), any more than he was about the definition of the soul with reference to movement that he introduces with the same locution at 9,7. 27. The same text is discussed at Alexander, Quaest. 1.11. As Sharples (1992), 50, n. 126 notes, Themistius’ solution to this problem at 4,7-9 resembles one of the two solutions forwarded by Alexander. See his discussion of why, if Themistius depended on this quaestio, he might not then have derived it from Alexander’s lost commentary on the de Anima. 28. Here Themistius is responding to Aristotle’s claim that ‘the animal as the universal is either nothing or is posterior’ (402b7-8). He explains the secondary status in terms of its being a thought (noêma) created by human thinking about the likeness between individuals. Aristotle’s idea is developed by the Stoics in the direction of saying that universals are ‘not-somethings’, but concepts (ennoêmata, SVF 1.65, 2.278 and 329), and by Alexander sometimes in the direction of saying that they are created by minds (DA 90,6-7; Quaest. 2.28,78,18-20; Sharples (1992), 5-6). This may seem to be in opposition to Plato’s denial (Parmenides 132B-C) that Forms are thoughts (noêmata). But in fact, Platonists came to distinguish universal concepts that are ‘amassed’ (sunathroizetai), as Themistius says here, in the Aristotelian way from Aristotelian forms in matter, from Platonic logoi in the mind of the demiurge, and from the transcendent Platonic forms. (See Mueller, especially 470-9, and A.C. Lloyd, 67.) What is un-Platonic about Themistius’ account here (as Prof. Sorabji has suggested to me) is not his making universals into thoughts, but his omission to draw together Neoplatonist distinctions. 29. The verb huphistasthai (4,1), and the corresponding noun hupostasis , are used to identify the state of being an autonomous substance (cf. ousia at 4,4), and in that sense ‘really existing’. 30. Sharples (1992), 54, n. 147 rightly wonders what happened to Pyrrha who accompanied Deucalion in the flood (see, e.g., Apollodorus, Bibl. 1.7.2).

Notes to pp. 18-22


31. I have deleted threptikên (‘nutritive’) at 4,13. The generic term ‘vegetative’ (phutikê) is sufficient here in view of the use of to threptikon (‘the nutritive capacity’) at 4,18 in contrast with the related capacities of growth and reproduction. Although threptikos can be used as the generic term for all three capacities (nutrition, growth and reproduction) this would seem an inappropriate context for it. It probably entered as a gloss at 4,13. 32. cf. Theaetetus 184D1-2, though it talks of senses, not souls. 33. I read ê tôn merôn (4,27), deleted by Heinze. I suspect that his deletion was designed to accommodate Spengel’s concern that prôton (4,26) ought to be emended to proteron. But in later Greek prôton (‘first’) is commonly used in the same sense as proteron (‘prior’). 34. See Aristotle, Cat. 11b24-33. Themistius wrote a paraphrase of the Categories, now lost. 35. Aristotle at 402b22-4 speaks of giving an account of incidental properties kata tên phantasian, i.e. as they appear to us in sense-perception. This emerges in Themistius as the repetitive phrase to phainomenon kai hê phantasia (5,11). The second component may well be a gloss, given the presence of kata to phainomenon just below at 5,21. I have ignored it in the translation, and conveyed the sense of the Aristotelian text. 36. 5,13-19 = SVF 2.1019. Cf. also Themistius, in An. Post. 49,21-6 also quoted at SVF 2.1019. 37. Here (5,28) paradêlôsai (‘conjecture’) contrasts with prodêloutai (5,22) (‘indicated in advance’). Thus Aristotle’s method (cf. 5,5-7) is to derive, for example, the non-definitional property of having interior angles equal to two right angles from the definition of a triangle in which that property is ‘pre-indicated’, but if, as in the case discussed here, the definition is inadequate, the non-definitional property will be a matter of conjecture or guesswork. 38. Moraux (1978), 306 with n. 104 argued that this was Porphyry, whose criticisms Themistius certainly cites elsewhere in the paraphrase of this book. He compares the language at 6,11 with that at 16,19 where there is corroboratory evidence for Porphyry. 39. The verb is proslambanein (6,13 bis), used technically (usually in the nominal form proslêpsis) in propositional logic by the Stoics (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 7.76) to identify the way that a second premise in an argument is ‘added on’ before the conclusion is drawn. See further Barnes et al. (1991), 24 and 67, n. 93, where they translate it as ‘co-assume’. I have chosen a more explicatory translation (after LS 1, p. 212) in the present context. (We might also infer from the fact that Themistius does not explain any of the logical terminology used in this passage that his students, as we might expect, had already passed through a course in logic based on Aristotelian works.) 40. In other words, the denial of the consequent in (i) does not entail the denial of the antecendent in (i). 41. Here and in the next example the modal modifiers are omitted, but obviously implied. I have left them out in translation to convey the elliptical character of the original. 42. See 6,9-10 above. 43. ephelkomenê (7,4). This may be a metaphor borrowed from Plato, Phaedo 66A1 where someone engaged in thought is said not to ‘drag in’ any of the senses. 44. These are all taken from Homer’s Iliad, respectively 1.104, 3.35, and 10.375. 45. On this principle, the subject of a treatise by Galen, the Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequantur (on which see G.E.R. Lloyd), and its use by the Greek Aristotelian commentators, see Todd (1977), 123-8. 46. Logos sometimes means rationality or reason, but can also mean something that is intelligible to reason or rationally intelligible. Accordingly, it may mean a ratio or rationally intelligible proportion, and also (as at 7,34, if we keep eidous ton logon; see n. 49) a definition, since that is rationally intelligible. Here at 7,24 it refers to form (eidos), and means an explanatory principle which is particularly intelligible to reason, or, for short, a rational principle. There are other meanings too, but, when convenient, the translation will preserve a connection with rationality, if there is one. The translation ‘enmattered’ for enulos, used here and elsewhere, is a convenient neologism, first coined, it seems, in Smith’s translation of 403a25; ‘material’ would be too imprecise, whereas ‘involved/implicated in matter’ (favoured by some) is too elaborate, and unhelpful in creating a contrast with aüla eidê, ‘non-material forms’, later; see, for example, 110,6 or 114,32. 47. In citing this part of the definition of anger from 403a31-b2 Themistius here, and in


Notes to pp. 22-24

a reprise below at 27,14-16, and at in Phys. 66,16-17, omits the words kai thermou (and ‘heat’), that follow ‘heart’ in an authoritative Aristotelian manuscript, and in the editions. As Renehan has shown, this was an interpolation that occurred around the fifth century A.D. Renehan (p. 63) comments briefly on Themistius. 48. For apodidonai here as ‘assign’ see Cope, vol. 1, 12; this is the language used in Smith’s translation as well. 49. I follow Spengel in deleting tou eidous at 7,34 so that Themistius’ text can directly reflect Aristotle at 403b1-2 where one way of defining is said to be by ‘assigning the form (eidos)’, with eidos then explicated by kai logos or rational principle (see Hicks on 403b2), since form is to a far greater extent than matter considered to be a rationally intelligible principle. The addition of tou eidous after logos would have someone ‘assign the form, i.e., the definition of the form’. Themistius later uses the expression ‘define (horizesthai) the form’ (8,3; cf. 8,25-6 and 31-2), and this may have led a scribe to add tou eidous because of taking apodidonai to mean ‘define’, and logos to mean ‘definition’. 50. Heinze erroneously placed a stop rather than a question mark at the end of this sentence (8,2). 51. The reference must be Aristotle, Phys. 2.1, 192b8-19. There is a more explicit reference to the same doctrine at 41,25-30 below. 52. to endees kai elleipon (8,15). 53. Aristotle uses ‘affections’ (pathê) at 403b15, although in the Categories (at 10a11-16) he distinguishes the properties associated with shape that Themistius mentions as examples here from what he calls ‘affective qualities’ (pathêtikai poiotêtes, cf. 9a28-10a10) that belong to natural bodies as such. The term ‘incidental property’ (sumbebêkos) is therefore introduced to classify these geometrical properties more generically, and perhaps to avoid any confusion. 54. This may be a reference to Aristotle, Phys. 2.2, 194b9-13, placed in some wider context by Themistius in an earlier discussion. 55. epistêmones (8,27). Cf. 95,13-16 for a fuller description of an epistêmôn, in an analogy where it also refers to a geometer. Cf. also 55,17-29 where the term is used in a more general sense of having knowledge, but again geometry is the paradigm case. 56. See n. 29 above. 57. Their relevance will emerge later in the account of the relation between the intellect and enmattered or non-material forms; see, for example, 97,35-98,7 and 114,31-115,9. 58. At 6,34-9 above on 403a12-16. Book 1.2 1. Themistius’ response to Aristotle’s accounts of earlier ideas about the soul in this chapter and elsewhere is, with the exception of Platonic material, unexpansive and uncritical. The scope for such treatment in modern scholarship can be appreciated from Mansfeld (1986), pp. 37-41. 2. I follow Spengel’s suggestion (supported by MS C) and read haptômetha (8,38) for the haptometha of the manuscripts. 3. Themistius adds to the Aristotelian verb sumparalambanein (403b22) (‘enlist’) the object koinônous that it has in two similar Platonic contexts, Laches 179E4-6 and Phaedo 65A10-B1. Cf. also 105,15 below for similar phraseology. 4. For Plato’s view that the soul is self-moving, see Themistius’ own identification of this doctrine at 106,30-1 below. 5. The addition of autên kinoumenên (9,13) supplied in the margin by MS Q is justified by 13,12 where being-moved is made dependent on the spherical shape of the psychic atoms. 6. This explication oversimplifies 404a14-15 where the inhaled atoms are said to prevent the atoms resident in the body from being extruded by the surrounding environment. 7. The manuscripts here (9,25) have pnoê (‘breathing’), where clearly a word for breathingin is needed. Heinze conjectured anapnoê, while de Falco preferred eispnoê. The latter might be preferable in the present context since a few lines earlier (9,20) anapnoê is used in the generic sense of ‘breathing’ (i.e. both in and out) referred to in the Aristotelian text (404a10). Heinze’s conjecture is supported by Aristotle’s subsequent use of anapnein (404a13) to mean inhalation.

Notes to pp. 24-28


8. Aristotle at 404a18 specifies these as the motes mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 9. 404a24-5 is not paraphrased; it repeats 403b29-30. 10. cf. Iliad 23.698 where the hero described is Euryalus (cf. Iliad 23.677). Aristotle also cites this description with reference to Hector at Metaph. 1009b28-30. Cf. Mansfeld (1986), 39-40, who thinks that Aristotle in these cases relied on an intermediate source. 11. DK 31B109, p. 351,20. 12. At 404b16 Aristotle has Platôn en tôi Timaiôi (‘Plato in the Timaeus’). This does not mean that he wants to dissociate Plato from the doctrines of the Timaeus; see 20,3-8 below, and n. 26 in this chapter. 13. Timaeus 35A1-4. 14. Here and subsequently Themistius uses phusis (‘nature’) where Plato (Timaeus 35A2) has ousia (‘substance’). 15. Here (10,33-4) Themistius glosses the Platonic prepositional phrase peri ta sômata (translated ‘in bodies’ throughout) by en tois sômasi to eliminate any misunderstanding about the implications of the former. 16. For this sense see 40,17-22 below; it involves the constituents losing their separate identity. 17. cf. Timaeus 35A3-5, and 37A2-C3. 18. cf. Timaeus 41A7-D3; 42D5-E4. The phrase ‘weave in’ is at 41D1-2. 19. 11,19-12,1 = Xenocrates F39, 172,36-173,18 Heinze (1892). 20. Themistius here instead of ta d’alla (404b21) has tas d’allas, a change that introduces a more specific reference to souls. 21. Although it is generally agreed that in the passage paraphrased here Aristotle is referring to his own lost dialogue de Philosophia, there are differences about the scope and intention of the passage at 404b18-27. Cherniss (who also thought that the passage ran to line 30) believed that it referred to Xenocrates (as Themistius himself suggests at 11,37-12,1). See Cherniss (1959) where he defends his position against Saffrey who thought that 404b1627 referred to Plato, and used Themistius to support this view (see Saffrey, 37-43). Themistius can be read as supporting Cherniss’ position, as the latter argues (especially at [1959], 75-9), if 12,28-30 is appropriately interpreted; see n. 26 below. 22. hoi andres ekeinoi. Cherniss (1959), 76, n. 1 notes that this plural does not preclude the subsequent passage referring to Xenocrates, since the representation of a single thinker’s doctrine in a collective form is both idiomatic Greek and paralleled in Themistius (cf. 32,24-31 where Xenocrates’ views are again represnted by an undefined ‘they’.) 23. A saying attributed to the Pythagoreans; see Saffrey, 39, n. 3 for a catalogue of references. It is a modification of Homer, Iliad 22.71, as de Falco, 21, n. 12 observes. 24. Here (11,28) and below (12,1-2) Themistius’ gloss on ‘animal-itself ’ (autozôon, 404b1920), Cherniss argues (1959, 77), is indebted to the doxography on Plato (see his references at 77, n. 1) since Xenocrates may not have used the term in this sense. 25. Xenocrates of Chalcedon, third head of the Platonic Academy (from 339-314 B.C.). On him see Dillon, 22-39. 26. As Cherniss (1959), 78 with n. 1 rightly remarks against Saffrey, Themistius here has no intention of distinguishing between Plato and Timaeus. Elsewhere he can attribute the same doctrine from the Timaeus to one as much as the other; cf. 37,4-6 and 93,33-94,2. Also cf. below 20,3-8 where Themistius dismisses as irrelevant Aristotle’s reference only to Timaeus at 406b26, and indeed suggests that authorship is of less concern to him than doctrine. 27. Cherniss (1959), 78-9 argues that this refers back to the discussion of the Timaeus at 11,12-18, and not as Ross (ed. with comm. 177) and Saffrey (42-3) thought, to the immediately preceding explication of 404b18ff. This would mean that the passage should be treated as a virtual aside, with houtô (‘in this way’) providing a broad link between the Timaeus’ theory of the relation between the soul and the elements and the Xenocratean theory summarized at 404b18ff. 28. Xenocrates; cf. below 31,1-5 for his doctrine that the soul is a number. 29. The first part of this parenthesis corresponds to DK 59B1 (p. 32,11); the description of nous separating things can be inferred from 59B12; cf. Simplicius, at DK 59A45 (p. 18,28). 30. Following de Falco’s suggestion I read theia (‘divine’) here at 13,32 (after Aristotle at


Notes to pp. 29-34

405a32) for the alla (‘but’) of the manuscripts in preference to Heinze’s unnecessarily radical emendation athanta (‘immortal’). 31. I have deleted en at 14,16, as Heinze suggested. It is tempting to delete huparkhein in the next clause at 14,18, but the parallel with 14,16-18 can still be maintained, since the literal meaning, ‘he grants that these oppositions belong to the soul’, is tantamount to saying that he endows them with these properties. 32. DK 31B109 (p. 351,20). 33. Aristotle leaves the paronymous relationship to zein implicit. Translators (e.g. Hicks and Smith) spell it out in the same way as Themistius. 34. This final remark is Themistius’, and a revealing indication that despite the lack of critical analysis in the treatment of Aristotle’s doxography, this commentator did recognize that as a historian of philosophy Aristotle engaged in some reconstruction. Book 1.3 1. Laws 10, 895E10-896A4. 2. metenekteon (14,35) is not just the importation of texts from the Physics, but their restatement in Themistius’ own words. See 32,21-2 below where metapherein clearly refers to a restatement of a text. There de Falco translates it by ‘parafrasare’, but here uses ‘ripetere’. 3. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 256a21-b3. 4. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 257b2-6 (Themistius, in Phys. 221,24-222,1). 5. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 257b6-11. 6. See 14,32-3. 7. This text is made a subordinate part of the paraphrase of 406a4-10, and an illustration of the principle stated at 406a10-12. The sentence tês – metekhei at 406a21-2 is an innocuous omission. 8. MS Q (Laur. 87.25) has at this point the name of Porphyry in the margin. Moraux (1978), 306 (cf. Moraux [1985], 228, n. 6) duly takes Porphyry as the source of the four criticisms of Aristotle’s attack on the Platonic notion of the soul as self-moved that Themistius addresses, offers supporting evidence at (1978), nn. 105, 109, 112, and states ([1978], n. 102) that Themistius probably used a lost treatise by Porphyry that attacked Aristotle’s definition of the soul. The title of this treatise (preserved only in the Suda lexicon) has been identified by others as Porphyry’s polemic against the Peripatetic Boethus (Henry [1937], 161), or a Plotinian treatise (Schwyzer [1951], col. 582). 9. This seems to be clearly a reference to an earlier course on Aristotle’s Physics. 10. On this work by Porphyry see Romano, and Moraux (1985). Moraux (1985), 228-9 refers to Themistius 16,19-31, which he also translates into French. 11. These are the Stoics. Hence the reference to Zeno at 17,3-5 below. 12. 17,3-5 is quoted in its wider context at SVF 1.145. 13. 406b7-10, the criticism of the position expounded here, is omitted. It restates the principle discussed at 406a4-10. 14. ta huparkhonta, specifically ta kath’hauta huparkhonta, or ‘per se incidental properties’, referred to eliptically as ta kath’hauta at 17,24. See above 1,1, n. 19. 15. Literally ‘they have the status of the things without which not’. 16. hôsper homose khôrôn; a Platonic saying. See Euthyphro 3C5, Republic 610C6, Theaetetus 166A1. 17. Moraux (1978), n. 112 notes Porphyry, Sententiae 21, p. 13,8-12 Lamberz where the soul is said to be ‘exclusively life’ (zôê monon). Porphyry adds that this is what Plato meant by the self-motion (to autokinêton) of the soul being its essence and definition. 18. cf. Themistius’ paraphrase of DA 3.7, 431a4-7 at 112,25-33 below. Also see the fuller discussion of the distinction between movement and activity at 28,25-29.5 below. 19. Rivers and winds do so, that is, in all three respects. 20. In light of this passage, it is appropriate to translate metalambanein as ‘adopt’ (cf. 91,8 below), rather than ‘understand in another sense’. The latter interpretation was proposed by Heinze in his Index Verborum, picked up by LSJ (metalambanein V), and followed by de Falco. But ‘adopt’ is defensible even without 106,31-107,1, since kai (18,35) emphasizes that Plato is to be added to those who accept these distinctions, while the force of meta in metalambanein

Notes to pp. 34-38


is conveyed in the fact that he does so ‘instead of ’, or ‘as an alternative to’, the unidentified ‘they’ of 18,30, who are probably notional opponents rather than actual Neoplatonists. Cf. 106,31-107,1 below where Plato’s arguments for the self-motion of the soul are said to be reducible to the idea that this is an activity. 21. For Aristotle’s definition of movement as an incomplete activity see Phys. 201b31-3, and Metaph. 1048b28-35. 22. The order of argument in this Aristotelian text has been modified in the paraphrase as follows: 406b15-16 (18,37-19,2); 406b22-4 (19,2-5); 406b17-22 (19,5-11); 406b24-5 (19,1114). 23. 19,8-11 = Kock, vol. 2, pp. 172-3 under the testimonia for Eubulus’ play the Daedalus, the work that he thinks is being referred to by Themistius. He is followed by Kassel and Austin, vol. 7, 354. Edmonds, vol. 2, 16 cites Themistius under Philippus. 24. The link with Democritus is Themistius’ addition, approved by Cherniss (1944), 393, n. 314. 25. This is a selective digest of Timaeus 34C-36E. The verb ‘carry around with’ (sumperiagein) is based more precisely on the use of periagein at Timaeus 36C3 than Aristotle’s pherêtai (406b30). The same verb is used later at 121,35 and 37 in a comparison of incontinence with a sphere at 3.11, 434a12-15 in terms of the relative movement of celestial spheres. But, as Hutchinson (1990), 18-19 has argued, the reference might well be to the soul-spheres of the Timaeus mentioned here. 26. to augoêides okhêma (19,33-4). The word okhêma is used by Plato in the Timaeus (41E2, 44E2, 69C7) in connection with the soul, and on the basis of these and other passages Neoplatonists developed an elaborate theory of the vehicle of the soul. The epithet augoeidês is not found in Plato but in later sources. Themistius clearly believes that the doctrine is securely based in the Timaeus, and is interested in it (as he is in that dialogue’s theory of the soul generally) for its analogue in Aristotelian thought. For a discussion of the okhêma and a survey of the literature see Finamore, 1-9. 27. cf. GA 2.3, 736b37-737a1. On the use of this passage by the Neoplatonists see Dodds, 315-16. 28. The pun here is entirely in the English. semnon (20,2) here probably means ‘awesome’, in the sense of religiously significant, because of the divine nature of celestial matter in both Aristotelian and Platonic cosmology. ‘Elevated’ points up the contrast with materialistic theories of the soul discussed in 1.2 that link it with ‘ground-level’ matter. 29. That is, Aristotle refers to Timaeus here, while he conjoins them at 404b16 above. For sukophantein meaning ‘quibble’ see LSJ I.2, and 39,17 below. 30. This is still a much stronger polarization of Aristotle and Plato than is found among Neoplatonist Aristotelian commentators. See, for example, Simplicius, in Cael. 640,27-32, for the claim that Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato are not substantive, but designed to criticize those who have only superficially grasped Plato. 31. Timaeus 36B6-D7. 32. This final sentence corresponds to 406b29-31, which Themistius has quite reasonably represented as an inference from the theory of the construction of the soul. 33. cf. Timaeus 41D1-2. 34. cf. 100,4-13 for a description of this intellect’s activity. 35. cf. below 95,19-20; 97,29-98,9; 99,38-100,1. 36. cf. below 110,5-15. 37. cf. below 111,10-13. 38. cf. Timaeus 37A6 where the verb ephaptesthai (‘to be in contact’) is used to describe the soul’s adhesion to being. 39. cf. 100,22-6 below where this example is used to illustrate the reception of the indivisible productive intellect in a divided form. 40. cf. Aristotle, DA 3.5, 430a18, a characterization of the intellect that plays a crucial role in the paraphrase of 3.5 below. 41. The verb here is sunairein. It is used by Plotinus, for example, to describe the mechanism of ‘contracting’ in vision at a distance, and the consequently reduced size of the image; see 2.8 [35].1.4. Themistius seems to be using it analogically of the intellect.


Notes to pp. 38-40

42. On the intellect thinking divided objects see the expansive paraphrases of DA 3.6 at 110,5-111,26 below. 43. On the intellect extracting (eklambanein) forms from matter see also 96,19 and 26 below. 44. cf. 20,8 above. 45. cf. Timaeus 36B8-C1. 46. At 22,12 ton noounta is not just an opponent who holds this belief about thinking, but one who defines thinking in this way. Cf. 1.5, n. 2 on this kind of usage. 47. Comment is omitted on 407a31-2, which repeats the point already made at 407a21-3. 48. At 111,26, by contrast, the phrase kata anakhôrêsin is used to describe the ‘regressive’ way that privations are contemplated. 49. The comment in parenthesis is probably derived from Alexander, DA 23,2-5. 50. cf. below 114,31-115,9, and on the general distinction between immaterial and non-mattered forms as objects of thought see 97,35-98,2. 51. I have not found a source for this Themistian comment. It certainly suggests a Neoplatonic source. 52. Timaeus 36B6-C1. 53. Themistius’ reading of this text is not followed by later commentators; see Hicks on 407b7. 54. This is a good example of a Themistian précis. He reduces 407b9-11 (kaitoi  allôs) to a general reference to the actions of the demiurge, presumably because Aristotle’s reference to his causing circular movement is familiar. 55. The sentence at 407b12-13 postponing further discussion for another time is omitted. 56. cf. below 83,8-10; 97,12-14, and see TGAC, 85, n. 30. 57. organa (24,5) cannot mean ‘tools’, as perhaps in the unillustrated Aristotelian text, but is required by the examples introduced by Themistius to mean ‘instruments’. 58. cf. Lucretius’ argument at de Rerum Natura 3.738-40: that immortal souls cannot enter ready-made (perfecta) bodies, since the relation between soul and body is too complex and intimate for this. 59. The phrase pro tou sômatos (24,11) refers specifically to the soul not just separate from the body and temporally pre-existing, but as in the specific state that precedes its entry into the body. Book 1.4 1. 24,13-30 and 25,23-5 = Aristotle, Eudemus F45: 51,4-30 Rose (this editor’s name will not be repeated in subsequent citations in this chapter). 2. Aristotle (407b29) refers only to koinoi logoi, which are probably nothing more than general discussions. Themistius adds the reference to idioi logoi (‘private discussions’) as an attempt to indicate that there were some circles in which the theory was respected. There seems no reason, however, to link the expression with the specific discussions in the Eudemus; the attunement theory scarcely acquitted itself well in that work. 3. For a recent discussion of Aristotle’s engagement with this theory see Charlton (1988), and for a study dealing particularly with Plato see Taylor. 4. Philoponus, in An. Pr. 6,14-18 cites Themistius (perhaps from his lost commentary on the Prior Analytics) as claiming that Plato preceded Aristotle in the use of deductive reasoning and demonstrations, with a reference to the Phaedo. This claim was perhaps founded on efforts akin to the present one to represent Platonic arguments in more a rigorous and abstract form. 5. cf. Plato, Phaedo 92A6-C3 and 94B4-E6; Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.11-12; Philoponus, in DA 142,6-14. 6. cf. Plato, Phaedo 92E3-93A10; Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.12-13; Philoponus, in DA 142,15-22. 7. cf. Plato, Phaedo 93A10-B7; Philoponus, in DA 142,22-6. For Aristotle substance in general does not admit of a more or a less; cf. Cat. 3b33-4. 8. cf. Plato, Phaedo 93B8-D7 and Philoponus, in DA 142,26-33. Cf. also another version cited from the Eudemus at Philoponus, in DA 144,30-145,7 (= Aristotle, Eud. F45: 50,12-23).

Notes to pp. 40-42


9. To have this triad correspond directly to the preceding one I have transposed kallos (‘beauty’) and hugieia (‘health’) at 24,28-9. 10. cf. Plato, Phaedo 94A1-4; Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.14-16; Philoponus, in DA 142.33-143.3; Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 173,22-4 (= Aristotle, Eud. F45, 52,3-4). 11. This parenthetical remark is not in the Aristotelian text. It is cited as a separate argument by Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.14. Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 173,21-2 (= Eudemus F45: 52,1-4) introduces it to explain the argument (attributed to the Eudemus by Philoponus, in DA 144,22-5 [= Aristotle, Eud. F45: 50,26-31]) that while an attunement can have a contrary, the soul cannot. The basic principle is Aristotle’s claim (Cat. 3b24-5) that there is nothing contrary to a substance. 12. cf. Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.17-23 where it is called the major argument against the theory. It is briefly epitomized by Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 173,28-9. 13. At 24,37 I read hekastou for hekaston. 14. cf. Plotinus, 4.7 [2].84.16-17, and Olympiodorus, in Phaed. 173,25-7. It is also worth comparing Lucretius, 3.117-27 for the same general argument based, however, on the premise that the soul is a separate body unequally distributed rather than an evenly distributed attunement. 15. emphuetai (25,21); cf. 1.1, n. 11 above. 16. The verb ‘cast’ (ballein) at 25,24 is used without an object. It has been suggested to me that the implied object must be a spear or an arrow. I have supplied ‘dice’ in light of Plato, Laws 968E7-969A1, where casting dice is used as an analogy for taking the risk of formulating a theory. Given Themistius’ predilection for Platonic echoes, this seems plausible. 17. At 24,21 above. What Aristotle actually said at 407b27-8 was that the theory was ‘no less plausible’ than the others described in earlier chapters. 18. palin here must refer to the argument at 24,30-2 where the soul is said not to be a ratio. That at least covers the antecedent in the question. 19. Themistius does this rather than rework 408a26-8 where Aristotle wonders what is destroyed when the soul leaves the body, if the soul cannot be identified with any bodily parts. Aristotle asks what difference the loss of soul will make to a body to which it is unrelated, whereas Themistius asks why that loss will lead to the perishing of the body. He may have had his reasons for exploring the theoretical viability of this theory. See next note. 20. Themistius knew the theory in Alexander’s de Anima that built on the attunement theory and represented the soul as a power that supervenes on a blend of the elements. See, for example, DA 25,2-4 and 26,26-30; for discussions see Donini (1971), and the surveys in Sharples (1987), 1203, and TGAC, 8-10. That theory was certainly an attempt to define the relation between the soul and a blend. But instead of exploring that possibility, Themistius uses the Aristotelian text as a basis for criticizing next the rather different theory that an inseparable, and blend-related, soul is secondary to that of a separable soul. 21. The text has phêsi (‘he says’), but this locution is also used to introduce doctrines impersonally. So although, as Moraux (1978), 307 with n. 114 argues, the theory identified here is Porphyry’s, this is not directly implied by the person of the verb used. The fragment of Porphyry’s Contra Boethum that Moraux cites (Fr. 7 = Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XV.11, 2-3) certainly uses the analogy of solar light in characterizing ensoulment, and suggests a distinction between the soul and its ensoulment. Gottschalk (250) translates this text, and shows that it is an argument against a theory of the soul that can be traced to Alexander and Andronicus (251-4), and probably Boethus (257). On Andronicus see n. 63 below. 22. In other words, the ensoulment is equivalent to attunement within this emanationist metaphysic. 23. ellampousa de tên zôên (25,35). For ellampein (‘illuminate’) to have as its direct object what it transmits in its illumination it is perhaps best to use a special translation for it, and in employing ‘irradiate’ I am following de Falco. The analogy is that as the sun irradiates air with light, so the soul irradiates the body with ensoulment, or, as it is also called (25,35; 26,2) ‘life’. Later (103,20-36) Themistius very briefly represents the productive intellect as a single source of light that can actualize potential intellects. That famous passage must have been written with an eye on the present passage, and the critique that follows. 24. cf. 17,29-35 above for a similar disdain towards examples, also in a critique of what is also almost certainly an argument from Porphyry.


Notes to pp. 42-44

25. cf. 103,32-4. 26. cf. 104,14-23 where Themistius claims that it is more legitimate to ask whether all intellects are one than whether all souls are one. This is because a single intellect can explain why thoughts are held in common, and such an intellect can be compared to an illuminating sun (cf. 103,32-4). A single soul, as the present text indicates, lacks any similar explanatory value. 27. cf. DA 1.1 402b1-9, and Themistius at 3,16-4,11 below. 28. This is a curious summary of DA 2.7, 418b9-13. There Aristotle defines light as the energeia of what is transparent qua transparent (418b9-10), but says nothing at all about the sun. He refers (418b11-13) only to the transparency being coloured by fire or something like ‘the upper body’ (i.e. the aether). In his paraphrase of 418b12-13 (60,2-6 below) Themistius does, however, mention the sun along with the other heavenly bodies in a gloss on ‘upper body’. So his present report is not a quotation but a summary of the implications he draws from the passage in DA 2.7. 29. ‘Perhaps’ here (26,17) reveals the strain in Themistius’ attempt to reconcile Aristotle with the theory that there is an external unified soul. Obviously he can reconcile Aristotle’s theory of the soul with the notion of ensoulment, if there are different ensoulments ‘internal’ to different species. But it is unclear how the external soul could also be defined ‘in the same way’ if only the intellect (as he claims at 27,2-5) can be plausibly identified as an externally derived capacity of the soul. It would seem that an Aristotelian adaptation of this theory would have to involve a contrast between intellect and the rest of the soul. That is essentially what Themistius provides later by contrasting the productive (or separable) and common (or inseparable) intellects: see 101,5-102,29 below. Themistius’ whole discussion here would have been more effectively undertaken in the context of his later account of the intellect, given the tangential relationship of this Neoplatonic theory to the theory of attunement. 30. For inseparability see DA 2.1, 413a3-5; perishability is a natural adjunct. 31. krasis (‘temperament’) is the general term for a blend or mixture, and so this argument concedes that at this lower biological level at least ensoulment can be an attunement, since the soul qua attunement is defined as the blend (or temperament) of the body (cf. 24,16). 32. cf. this paragraph with 103,26-32 below, an analogous piece of reasoning, although within a constructive aporia, against the thesis that there are a plurality of productive intellects and no centralising single one. The upshot will be that the productive intellect will not differentiate individuals, and that will have to be left (as in the present reasoning) to matter. 33. cf. 104,14-23 below. 34. This possibility is a reality at 103,32-3, and 109,4-5 below. 35. Themistius adopts the conclusion in this text that allows him to link the theory of attunement with that of ensoulment. The remarks concerning circular movement, and the references to the self-moving soul at 408a30-4 are ignored, as is the later recapitulation of this passage at 408b30-1. Presumably Themistius thought that these topics had been adequately covered in 1.3. 36. cf. above 1.1, 403a31-b1 and Themistius, 7,27-31. 37. cf. above 1.3, 407a32-b2 and Themistius, 22,26-36. 38. These quotations are from Iliad 15.4 (cf. Themistius, Or. 15, p. 275,21) and 3.35 respectively. A reader suggested that something may be missing from the text here, since no corresponding examples of blushing are given. 39. This is a periphrasis for the heart, referred to in the preceding paragraph. Elsewhere Themistius seems reluctant to identify the heart as the central organ in the body to which all the capacities of the soul are related. See Introduction, n. 37. 40. See further 2.8, n. 7, and 2.11, n. 20. 41. Reading the supplement after psukhê (27,39) suggested by the Arabic version: oude hê psukhê manthanei, all’ho anthrôpos têi psukhêi. See Browne, 225. 42. anaphora (‘[line of] relay’) is the term that Themistius uses to define more precisely the way that perception reaches the soul by being ‘referred back’ to it. ‘Relay’ is preferable to ‘referral’ since it captures better the psycho-physical process of transmission involved here. (For anapherein in the logical sense of ‘refer back’ to a basis or standard in this work see Themistius at 24,37 above.) The gloss ‘line of ’ here (28,6) is justified by the use of arkhê

Notes to pp. 44-47


(‘source’) in the next line; i.e. the soul is at one end of a line or process along which data are relayed, or ‘transmitted’ (see diadosis at 28,10-11). 43. The supplementary language used to describe the autonomous, or ‘self-starting’, activity of recollection in this paragraph needs comment. What is being described is an aspect of the activity of imagination, discussed more fully later. Thus for Themistius’ description of images held ‘in storage’ see 99,6-8 below, and for the soul ‘presenting’ (proballein) images to intself see 89,17 and 93,3 (cf. 114,2). Prof. Sorabji has suggested that in this context proballein (28,13) and probolê (28,15 and 28,19) should be translated as ‘project/projection’, but this seems not to accord with the use of anelittein at 28,14, a verb that defines a process of prolonged exposition, and is possibly a metaphor for the mode of reading a papyrus roll. Themistius may also be echoing Plato, Philebus 15E3 where the verb refers to a logical exposition and analysis. To maintain an unmixed metaphorical situation we have to see the soul as removing from its storehouse conflated images that it presents to itself and then articulates (or ‘unrolls’) in the process of recollection. The cinematic metaphor of projection would not capture the initial stage of conflation required here, analogous to the rolled-up state of an ‘ancient’ book. 44. At 18,30-7 above. 45. The language is that of DA 3.7, 431a6, although in that context the phrase as paraphrased by Themistius has a slightly different meaning; see 3.7, n. 1. 46. 2.5, 417b6-7 47. At 417b13 Aristotle’s text for this phrase is hupo tou entelekheiâi ontos kai didaskalikou. Here and in his paraphrase at 56,6-7 Themistius omits the phrase kai didaskalikou (‘and capable of teaching’) and makes the reference of entelekheiâi ontos (‘is in actuality’) explicit, here (28,33) by substituting entelekheiâi epistamenou (‘knows in actuality’) and at 56,6-7 by the equivalent phrase hupo tou kat’energeian epistêmonos. Since here at least he claims to be quoting Aristotle it would seem that he is following a manuscript reading rather than introducing his own gloss. 48. 2.5, 417b12-15 49. 3.7, 431a4-7 50. At 29,4 proêgoumenôs is transposed to follow ou in line with the Arabic version; see Browne, 225. 51. diôrismenai (29,18), i.e. ‘defined’ or ‘determined’, in a way that precludes any sequence of stages of development. 52. At 29,5-6 above. 53. metathentas (29,23). Cf. Themistius, in An. Post. 1,21; see Introduction n. 23. Here he is going through a text in the order of its exposition. Had he proceeded paraphrastically he might well have dealt first with the programmatic 408b25-9 before discussing the problems in 408b18-25. 54. This passage plays a major role in Themistius’ excursus to de Anima 3.5 where he develops his theory of different intellects. See especially 100,14-15, 101,15-102,24, and 105,13-34. The present translation of the passage does not, however, import any of his later interpretation, since he himself does not do so here. Thus the verbs mnêmoneuei (‘remembers’) and philei (‘loves’) (29,33-4 = 408b28) are rendered in an impersonal form (as they usually are by translators of the Aristotelian text), whereas in a later context they have a subject (see 101,35). It is clear, however, from his remarks at 30,34-8 below that Themistius is looking ahead to that discussion. 55. For the intellect as an eidos see 100,32-3 below. 56. At this point the Arabic version has an addition that (in Browne’s translation) reads: ‘if the mind uses an organ , then etc.’ The supplement in square brackets fills a lacuna in the Arabic. Browne (226) proposes the Greek as follows at 30,21: organôi aphanesterôi. I have translated his text in a different form. For kai tauta used concessively cf. 74,10. 57. The distinction made here is grounded in Aristotle, An. Post. 100b5-17; see Themistius, in An. Post. 65,2-66,7. 58. See the use of this term in descriptions of the activity of the intellect at 111,19, 23 and 112,30.


Notes to pp. 47-51

59. cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1051b24 for the use of the verb ‘to touch’ in the context of a discussion of the kind of thinking that Themistius is referring to here. 60. epeleusis (‘approach’) (30,33) is a rare term, used once by Plotinus (2.8 [35].1.10) together with diexodos (the process that leads to thought as the output); Themistius at 100,8 below himself uses diexodos to indentify the kind of discursive thinking characterized here. 61. On the distinction between intellect and sense-perception see 104,23-105,4 below, where reference is actually made to 408b21-2 at 104,26-7, and use is made of 3.4, 429a29-b5. The second problem (the distinction between thinking and discursive thinking) is addressed at de Anima 3.5, 430a21-5 and is presented later as a ‘more explicit’ (101,18) version of 408b25-9. 62. 31,1-6 = Xenocrates, F61: 183,11-17 Heinze (1892). 63. Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.), the Peripatetic responsible for an edition of Aristotle’s works; see Moraux (1973), 45-141. On this particular text see Moraux (1973), 132, and Themistius at 32,19-37 below. Book 1.5 1. At 32,5 I read sphairôn for sphairiôn. Cf. 32,9, and 31,22; on the latter Heinze rightly notes that Themistius seems to have followed those Aristotelian manuscripts that have sphairôn rather than sphairiôn at 409a12. 2. For kinousi (‘they make [an animal] move’) at 32,8 the Arabic version suggests kinousi (‘they say [that an animal] is moved’); see Browne, 226. This unnecessary clarification is nonetheless instructive. It points up how verbs used within a theory can also be used to express the view of the thinker who formulated the theory. The usage can normally be ignored in translation. There are several examples in the present context. Thus tois poiosuin (‘those who make’) at 32,4 really means ‘those who say [that the soul] is made’. See also, for example, 32,5; 33,4; 35,3, 21; 37,25. 3. Themistius gratuitously introduces this metaphor of ebbing and flowing (metarrhein) as a substitute for Aristotle’s straightforward verb of motion, pheromenas (409b10). 4. Ross suggests that this Aristotelian reference is probably to 1.4, 408a3-5, but Hicks rightly prefers 402b25-403a2. 5. 32,19-34 = Xenocrates, F61, p. 183,18-33 Heinze (1892). 6. skholê here could mean a written discussion, but may well be evidence of Themistius’ oral teaching. Cf. its other use at 108,36, where it appears in a similar postponement of a full discussion of some alternative views. These disclaimers also reflect the limitations imposed by the paraphrastic method. 7. Clearly Porphyry, as manuscript Q indicates by adding an abbreviated version of his name in the margin. See also 31,1-3 above where Porphyry and Andronicus are linked as critics of Aristotle’s polemic against Xenocrates. 8. For a discussion of this passage see Moraux (1973), 132-3, and Donini (1982), 98, nn. 46 and 47. 9. 31,3-5 above. 10. Empedocles, 31B109 DK, p. 351,20. 11. This supplement at 33,9 is based on the Arabic (see Browne, 227). Thus after dêpou read etc. 12. DK 31B96, p. 346,5-7. 13. Reading at 33,24 ta men pleiô tôn de, in conformity with the Arabic version; see Browne, 227. 14. cf. above 3,32-5. 15. I omit anthrôpou at 33,30. It is clearly inappropriate. 16. DK 31B109, p. 351,20. 17. I have followed Heinze’s suggestion, adopted by de Falco, and transposed to gar beltion aiei poiei (34,24) to the preceding line. Clearly it cannot stand as the commentator’s parenthetical explanation of why materialists make the elements ‘superior to the intellect’ (lines 23-4; see next note for the reading), when he immediately accuses them of thereby making matter superior to the craftsman (24-5). At most this clause could be the materialists’ own rationale, and that seems implausible. The Arabic text has the transposed clause in the same

Notes to pp. 51-55


position as the Greek. Browne (228) retains it there with a minor supplement (, the relative pronoun, before poiei) to reflect the Arabic ‘for the maker is always better’. 18. The second stoikheia in line 24 was suspected by Heinze, but defended by de Falco. The Arabic has the more plausible ‘they make the elements better than the mind’ (Browne’s translation); I have followed Browne (228) in substituting beltiona here. 19. cf. below 99,13-23 where Themistius represents intellect as a craftsman, a model at least partly suggested by the comparison at DA 3.5, 430a12-13. 20. This insertion of auton after eulogon at 34,25 is justified by the Arabic version; see Browne, 228. 21. At 35,9 Themistius uses sunkhôrêseien (‘agree’) as, presumably, a gloss on Aristotle’s parakhôrêseie (410b25). But the latter is usually taken to mean that the preceding problem about plants living without perception could be ‘side-stepped’ (Lawson-Tancred) or ‘waived’ (Smith) rather than accepted, as Themistius suggests. See further Hicks on 410b24. 22. Empedocles, DK 31B117, p. 359,1-2. 23. Editors (e.g. Ross, Siwek) agree that Themistius’ manuscript(s) of Aristotle here (410b26) had the reading houtoi (‘these people’) for houtô (‘in this way’). This may have encouraged his effort to supply as the reference of this demonstrative pronoun some specific philosophers. 24. 35,17-19 are cited at Kern, 96. 25. Here I am basing my translation on the form zôophuton, found as a variant reading in one of the manuscripts, for this minimal type of animal life. zôphuton, favoured by Heinze, would seem to refer elsewhere only to plants (see LSJ under zôphutos), whereas Themistius, here and elsewhere, identifies zoöphytes as animals. 26. The four elements were earth, air, fire and water. 27. See Ebert (1983), 189 on the use of krinein and cognates in this passage. As he notes, they have the sense of ‘judge’ or ‘reach a decision’ rather than ‘discern’/ ‘discriminate’, their usual sense in the de Anima. 28. Aratus, Phaenomena 2-3. 29. 35,32-4 = SVF 1.158. These different manifestations of life are not in different locations within the same organism, but different organisms are separately defined by them. The usual Stoic trichotomy (see for example SVF 2.714-16) is psukhê/phusis/hexis (soul/nature/hexis), applied to animals, plants, and less animate entities like stones (nothing being inanimate in this system). Themistius’ insertion of intellect can perhaps be attributed to his own Aristotelian presuppositions. 30. Timaeus 34B2-3. 31. The additional question at 411a11-13 (why is the soul in air better and more immortal than that in animals?) is omitted; its principle emerges below at 36,12. The compounds referred to here are all bodies other than the four elements, if we ignore the special case of celestial matter. 32. Following a reader’s suggestion I read to te tou en hêmin at 36,10. 33. This is so ex hypothesi; see 36,6-7. 34. At 36,29 the manuscripts of Themistius (followed by Heinze) have bouleuesthai (‘deliberating’), as do some manuscripts of Aristotle at 411a28. Other Aristotelian manuscripts have boulesthai (‘willing’). Following Spengel and Victorius I have adopted the latter here. Cf. just below at 36,36 where the triad constituting the capacity of desire is identified in nominal form as epithumia, thumos, and boulêsis; cf. also DA 3.9, 432b5-6. 35. cf. 93,33-94,2 below where this view is attributed to Plato. In light of that passage I have transposed epithumein and thumousthai at 37,5 so that these capacities are identified in the order corresponding to the sequence of organs at 37,6. 36. De Falco suggested inserting ho logos zêtêsei from Aristotle 411b12-13 after ex anankês at 37,17. This seems preferable to Heinze’s proposal to insert sunekhetai de before ex anankês. But to achieve better syntax, we should read ho de logos zêtei; that is what is translated here. 37. For this illustration cf. Alexander, DA 31,4-5, and cf. 117,3-4 below. It was employed by the Stoics to illustrate the inseparabilty of the capacities of the soul in the psychic pneuma; cf. SVF 2.826 (p. 226,11-13). 38. cf. Aristotle, GA 2.3, 736b27-8. 39. There is a rich literature on animal dissection in ancient philosophical texts, but


Notes to pp. 55-58

usually in arguments about the location of the ‘regent part’ (hêgemonikon) of the soul; see Mansfeld (1990), 3111-12. 40. Themistius takes this text as a more important implication of the evidence of life after division than 411b22-5 and so transposes it. 41. This is an insertion bridging the way to Book Two. For this definition of the soul see de Anima 2.1, 412a20-1 and 28, and cf. Themistius 42,27-37 below. Book 2.1 1. At 41,29-30 below this title is used to introduce a reference to Aristotle, Physics 2. There is also evidence that a similar composite title was used in antiquity to refer to Physics 1-4; see Simplicius, in Phys. 801,13-16. (One half of it is used at 50,28 below, where the reference is, contra Heinze, to the Phys.; see 2.4, n. 7.) The problem with the present reference (at 39,6) is that it has no direct parallel in Aristotle’s Physics. Heinze referred to Metaph. 9.1 (he presumably had in mind 1042a26-31). But although that parallel is close, the title here cannot be a reference to the Metaphysics. It may be that the distinction between matter and form at Phys. 2.3, 194b23-9 is intended. 2. In what follows Themistius delivers the justification for using entelekheia promised in Book One, at 3,1 above. 3. ‘Perfection’ here refers to the telos (end, final state) of the compound, and that notion is linguistically and conceptually contained in all the expressions linked in this sentence with entelekheia. Although Themistius is not overtly concerned with the etymology of entelekheia, it is interesting that he uses the phrase ‘being in a perfect state’ (entelôs ekhein; 39,19) since Graham, 79, has recently suggested that the formation entelekheia is derived from it. 4. A Themistian pun? He may be echoing proagôgê (39,10), and hinting that he is actualizing his students’ potentialities. 5. Themistius omits ‘decline’ (phthisis) included at 412a14-15. A reader also notes that di’hautou (‘self-caused’) at 412a14 must refer not just to trophê (‘nutrition’), as in many translations of Aristotle (although not that of Hicks), but to auxêsis (‘growth’) too, since Aristotle links these nouns by te kai (‘both and’). 6. Here Themistius stops his reading of the text at the conclusion that the soul is a substance as a form of a body (412a20), and for the moment excludes the additional points that the body is ‘natural and has life in potentiality’ (20-1). He explores the sense in which the body in this case is natural at 41,25-42,3, and does not return to consider the clause ‘having life in potentiality’ until he has examined the sense in which the body has organs; i.e. 42,3-27 sets the scene for the discussion at 42,27-37. 7. cf. 412a9 above for the phrase echoed here, to ek toutôn, literally ‘that from these’, paraphrased at 39,11 as ‘that combined (sunkeimenon) from these’. In what follows Themistius focuses upon the meaning of ‘from’ in this phrase. 8. ek tônde hôs enuparkhontôn; this is the general formula for the phrase referred to in the previous note. 9. The trichotomy that follows, and the subsequent analysis, is based on Alexander, DA 11,14-12,7. 10. ‘Corpse’ for nekron at 40,36 seems inappropriate. The statue is lifeless, but has not died and so is not a corpse. Like Admetus’ statue of Alcestis (cf. Euripides, Alcestis 348-52) it is only homonymously a corpse. This explains my looser translation of hama in the next clause, for there is no time at which a soul is present in a statue. 11. Here again (cf. n. 6) Themistius omits the qualification (at 412a28) that the body of which the soul is an actuality is ‘natural and has life in potentiality’. He confines 41,1-22 just to the thesis that the soul is an actuality of the body. 12. As a reader noted, the text cannot stand, if it states that it would be odd for someone who did not understand Aristotle to draw the wrong conclusion. That is exactly what we would expect them to do. So the negative has been added in the main clause to yield this sense. For the impersonal ouden thaumaston following a conditional see 38,18.28; 49,22. The parallel is not exact, since here we have a personal use of thaumastos following an inference. But given the desirability of the emendation, this is perhaps good enough. 13. I take ê at 41,17 to be introducing a definitive solution, and 15-17 to be a speculative

Notes to pp. 59-61


rationale for the problem raised by the misreading of the Aristotelian text, and not, as a reader suggested, a first solution to which 17-22 is an alternative, introduced by ê in a disjunctive sense. If nothing else, ê is consistently used to introduce definitive solutions to problems; see the Greek-English Index. 14. This text is imported almost literally from its later location to provide a transition to the delayed analysis of the status of the body. There is no reason to think that it was actually located at 412a28 in Themistius’ manuscript. 15. On the rephrasing of 412b10-11 here, and the significance of its establishing the first entelechy as a genus, see Ebert (1987), passim, and with particular reference to Themistius at 577. Ebert’s study puts Themistius’ position in a wider exegetical and historical context. 16. This interpolated discussion makes up for the earlier omission of ‘natural’ at 412a20 and 412b5 in the paraphrases of those texts. 17. A reference to Book 2 of Aristotle’s Physics; see also 50,28-9 below. In this paragraph Themistius has specifically drawn on Phys. 2.1, 192b8-19. 18. At 39,31 above on 412a14-15. 19. prosthêkê (41,34). The term might be more freely translated ‘graft’. Organic growth, on the other hand, is, to use an analogous compound term, a proskrisis, a process of assimilation; see 52,20 below. 20. diolou; ‘throughout themselves’, or ‘organically’. 21. Clearchus of Soli (c. 340–c. 250 B.C), was a Peripatetic writer on various subjects. The passage at 41,30-7 is cited at Wehrli F99 (p. 37) and discussed on p. 81. On Theophrastus’ claims that stones gave birth see Sharples (1988), 43-4. 21a Here (42,11) Themistius has shifted hoion (‘like’) at 412b2 to modify skepasma (‘covering’), in keeping with the preceding description (42,8-11) of the parts of plants as analogous to human organs. In the Aristotelian text it modifies the whole phrase ‘the leaf is a covering for the pod’, and carries the meaning ‘for example’, with reference to the statement (412b1-2) (omitted by Themistius) that the parts of plants are very simple organs. 22. As we have seen, 412b10-11, omitted here, has already been used at 41,23-4 above. 23. Here Themistius seems to be addressing Aristotle, although other such second-person singular apostrophes are addressed to an actual, or notional, audience; see 59,12 and 70,13 below. 24. Here Themistius recalls in more precise terms the components of the definition of the soul that he recapitulated at the end of the preceding paragraph. 25. At 42,29 it may be justifiable to supply , the definite article, which would emphasize that this phrase is quoted, as it does with the immediately preceding phrases. 26. ‘Already’ is supplied here as implied by the perfect tense hupobeblêtai. On this passage see Hicks (on 412a20) who puts Themistius’ point in the context of an older exegetical tradition. In the modern literature it has an echo in Ackrill who argues (126) that ‘no distinction can be drawn for organs and their bodies between their being potentially alive and their being actually alive’. I am grateful to Prof. Sharples for advice here. See Sharples (1992), 104-5 for an annotated translation of Alexander, Quaest. 2.8 where there is an interestingly comparable reflection on Aristotle’s definitions of the soul. 27. Heinze refers to Aristotle, An. Pr. 25a37-9, but, as Hicks (on 412a20) notes, a more exact Aristotelian source is Int. 23a3-11. 28. Themistius refers to his own rephrasing (at 39,5) of 412a9 (to ek toutôn, ‘what comes from these [sc. form and matter]’). 29. Here ‘form and structure’ (eidos kai morphê) are a gloss on the more difficult Aristotelian expression hê kata ton logon (412b19-20) (‘in accordance with its definition’ or ‘rational principle’) used to qualify ousia (‘substance’). 30. Although sperma at 412b27 is usually translated ‘seed’, Themistius clearly understood it as referring to an imperfectly developed embryo (a legitimate Aristotelian sense; see Balme, 131). See also 56,15 below with 2.5, n. 10. 31. At 43,19 the Arabic version supports the simple change from hote sidêros to ho te sidêros. See Browne, 228-9. Heinze toyed with deleting hote. 32. This is how I propose to translate korê. Sorabji (1974), 72 n. 30 has rightly protested against the traditional translation ‘pupil’. The word acquired that sense in antiquity only when knowledge of the anatomy of the eye allowed the identification of the iris (or at least a


Notes to pp. 61-64

tunic of the eye that included the iris) and the definition of the pupil as a perforation in it; see Philoponus, in DA 368,1-3, doubtless following Galen, de Usu Partium 10.4-5. On the other hand, Sorabji’s claim that korê means ‘eye jelly’ needs qualification. Aristotle refers to the skin ‘on’ the korê (420a14 below), and fluid ‘in’ the korê (GA 780b23). It may be best to take korê as referring to the structure of the fluid that for Aristotle constituted the whole eye. ‘Eyeball’ is designed to convey this vagueness. 33. This celebrated text, if we follow Tracy (1982), refers back to the soul as the entelechy of the body, and says that it is unclear whether it is ‘as it were’ that of pilot to boat. Themistius has substituted intellect for soul, looking ahead no doubt to his later discussion of its separability in the paraphrase of 3.5. His interpretation is endorsed by Nuyens, 273. Hicks (on 413a8) reviews the reaction to the text by the Greek commentators. See also Lefèvre, 23-5. 34. ‘As described’ is houtôs (literally ‘in the preceding way’), my emendation for houtos (‘this’) at 43,28. It is supported verbally by Aristotle at 413a8, and in meaning by the convincing analysis at Tracy (1982), 108-11. The error is anyway a typical aural confusion. 35. At 43,28 the following supplement suggested by the Arabic version is adopted: entelekheia ara (the interrogative, not inferential, particle printed by Heinze). See Browne, 229. 36. Ross in both his texts supplied the disjunctive particle ê before the reference to the pilot at 413a8. In Ross (1956) he claimed Themistius’ support, but not in Ross (1961). Lefèvre, 23, n. 9 rightly argues that Themistius’ paraphrase offers no support for this emendation. Book 2.2 1. This may reflect earlier instruction on Aristotle’s Physics; cf. Phys. 1.1, and ps.-Themistius, in Phys. 1,18-20, with the rest of this sentence. 2. At 44,7 I read legômen for the legomen of the manuscripts; see 43,35 above. 3. tên kaloumenên phutikên (44,11), literally ‘what is called vegetative’. The term phutikos (‘vegetative’) in this context means ‘plant-like’, since plants are the living things that possess only this capacity. But in a more complex organism the phutikê dunamis identifies the lowest capacity within a soul, and therefore has to be rendered in more general terms; only a periphrasis could capture its three aspects of nutrition, growth, and reproduction, and so ‘vegetative’, the traditional equivalent, has been adopted as a compromise. It should be noted that only in the case of this capacity is the term identifying it translated adjectivally, while all other terms describing capacities are rendered as ‘capacity for’ a given acitvity. This is intended to avoid the implications of ‘capacity for vegetation’. 4. These are the four elements. 5. cf. 125,21-32 in the paraphrase of 3.13 for the argument that the divine body (i.e. the aether) exists without any recognizable form of sense-perception. 6. This is Aristotle’s reference to 3.13 below. 7. This is a general reference to the Stoics; see next note, and 35,32-4 above with 1.5, n. 29. 8. For Plato see Timaeus 77A3-C5. For the Stoics see SVF 2.708 and 710 for confirmation that they regarded plants as having a separate life-principle, phusis (nature). Themistius, 45,16-18 = SVF 2.709. Further on the psychology of plants see Zimmermann, 25, n. 1, and Sorabji (1993), 97-100. 9. cf. 38,3-5 above on the survival of dissected insects. 10. cf. 102,11-13 and 103,6-9 where this text (cf. 413b24-7) is cited in the context of Themistius’ reconstruction of the doctrine of the intellect. Huby (1991), 140-1 suggests that in referring in those later texts to a ‘contemplative intellect’ (rather than a ‘capacity’) Themistius is ‘misquoting’ the Aristotelian text that he cites correctly here; it is perhaps best to say that later on he is interpreting its meaning, not its letter. Themistius was also probably influenced by the reference to the contemplative intellect (theôrêtikos nous) at 415a11-12 (= 49,8) below. 11. 413b27-32 is omitted, presumably as repetitive. 12. Literally ‘exact’ or ‘precise’ (akribês, 46,9) in different degrees. Cf. 115,32-4 below where the degree of definition that the soul has in differently developed organisms is identified by the adjective tranês, ‘striking’, or ‘manifest’.

Notes to pp. 64-67


13. This whole sentence is Themistius’ response to 413b33-414a1 where Aristotle says that the different distribution of capacities will provide a diaphora among animals, i.e. a way of differentiating or classifying them. So Themistius’ ‘second’ differentia is really a corollary of the first. The reference to a later discussion is Aristotle’s, and is generally taken to point to the discussion of the definition of animals in terms of their capacities in DA 3.12-13. 14. The paraphrase that follows can be profitably compared with two modern close readings of this difficult passage by Sprague and Robinson. 15. prôton here is ‘first’ in the sense of being prior, and Themistius is anticipating 414a13 where prôtôs (‘in a primary [or prior] way’) will identify the status of the soul. But at this point this priority does not apply to the soul, since the soul would have to be that which receives knowledge. Like Aristotle, Themistius raises this spectre without identifying it, and eliminates it by emphatically enlarging on 414a12-14 where priority is claimed for the soul; see next note. 16. Aristotle at 414a12-13 says that the soul is ‘that by which we live, perceive, and think in a primary way (prôtôs)’. Themistius has interpreted this ‘way’ as ontological, and goes on in the next sentence to introduce his own phrase ‘first cause’ as a prelude to restating 414a13-14. Robinson (9-11) has the interesting suggestion that there is an ambiguity in prôtôs between ontological and definitional priority. 17. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 3.3, 202a13-21; see also 84,5-6 below. 18. cf. 23,23-24,12 above. 19. At 47,3 the text in the Greek manuscripts is helpfully corrected from the Arabic version as follows: oikiâi (not oikeia) men hêdi, , kai zôôi men haplôi (not haplôs) etc. See Browne, 229-30. Book 2.3 1. I have deleted kai apostrophê (‘and revulsion’) at 47,20-1 where it is a confusing explication of lupê (‘pain’) when in the next clause apostrophê is represented as a consequence of pain. 2. This is Aristotle’s reference to 2.10 below; see also 2.11, 423a17-21. 3. Aristotle’s reference, probably to 3.11, 433b31-434a7. 4. tôn hupokeimenôn tines dunameôn (48,6); literally ‘some of the capacities that are underlying [i.e. are substrates]’. In justification of this translation cf. 100,29-37 below for the hierarchy of the capacities restated in terms of the lower ones being the matter for the higher ones. 5. Here Themistius wonders if some super-human being would have the intellect along with other capacitites, rather than the intellect all by itself, as envisaged at 44,23-4 above. The passages might be reconciled by supplying a negation in this sentence, but if the likeliest sense of kai is ‘even’ at 48,6, that would be ruled out. Themistius’ musing again looks ahead to the discussion of the capacities of the divine body at 125,21-32 below. 6. This comment also includes a general rationale for the whole argument at 414b20415a12. 7. The locus classicus for ‘things spoken of in many ways’ in Aristotle is Metaph. Book 4, ch. 2. Themistius sees an analogy between what has come to be known as the doctrine of ‘focal meaning’ in that text, and the notion of a successive series as the basis of definition in the present chapter. 8. At 48,30 the Arabic version supports the emendation houtos ge teleios; see Browne, 230. Browne notes the symmetry that this creates at 48,30-1 ( ge – koinotatos ge). Also cf. with teleiôs the phrase akribôs koinos at 57,12 in a sentence that alludes to the principle involved in the present discussion. 9. The Arabic version justifies the supplement at 48,37: tou pros trophên . See Browne, 230-1. 10. The same language is used later at 100,36 in the account of the intellect. 11. Although this is Aristotle’s expression, this ‘other discussion’ for Themistius is the paraphrase of DA 3.5. See especially 105,13-106,14 below, and 108,28-34 for the ‘productive intellect’ supervening on the inferior ‘potential intellect’, and their joint association with the even more inferior ‘common intellect’.


Notes to pp. 68-72 Book 2.4

1. This chapter should be compared with the more reconstructive exercise at Alexander, DA 31,7-38,11. Much like this predecessor (although see Todd [1977], 121-3, and Accattino [1987] and [1993]), and in contrast with Philoponus two centuries later (see Todd [1977], 99-121, and [1984]), Themistius does not place Aristotle’s discussion of the nutritive capacity, or of any other of the capacities of the soul, in the context of Aristotelian biology, or of any later medical ideas. 2. As Hicks (on 415a15) notes, Themistius omits the phrase kai peri tôn allôn (415a16) that Aristotle adds to peri tôn ekhomenôn. 3. It may be unreasonable in a work of this sort to wonder whether a reference to the activity of nutrition corresponding to the preceding reference to the capacity has dropped out from this list. 4. cf. Aristotle, Cat. 11b24-33. See a similar reference to this text at 4,36 above, where relatives are referred to as ta pros ti, the reading to be adopted here (at 49,27) in preference to to pros ti. 5. This text has been called a footnote out of place in this exposition; see, for example, Hicks (on 415b2). Themistius tries to establish links with both adjoining texts. 6. This is not directly verifiable from any Aristotelian text, but to Themistius may have represented a gloss on a text like EN 1.1. Certainly at in Phys. 43,9 he converts Aristotle’s reference (194a36) to this distinction being drawn en tois peri philosophias to the reference to the êthikoi logoi found in the de Anima. Commentators generally accept that it should be referred to the lost Aristotelian dialogue de Philosophia. 7. A reference to Book 2 of Aristotle’s Physics; see also 39,6 (with 2.1, n. 1) and 41,29-30 above. (For this title applied to Physics 1-5 by Adrastus [second century A.D.] see Simplicius, in Phys. 4,11-15.) The three senses of cause briefly identified here are displayed in more detail at Aristotle, Phys. 2.3, 194b26-195a3, and repeated almost verbatim at Metaph. 5.2, 1013a26b3. Heinze ad 50,28 refers to the latter vaguely as ‘Metaph. 5 1.2’. 8. There is no comment on 415b12-21, which deals with the second and third senses; the second, discussed at 415b15-21, has already been covered at 415b2-7 above, while the third, soul as form, has of course been exhaustively discussed in 2.1. 9. The text at 415b29-416a2 is imperfectly glossed here. We would have expected a reference to the upward movement of fire to balance the reference to earth’s downward movement, as at 416a1-2. Perhaps the ellipse is understandable in view of the preceding reference to the ‘tendencies’ (rhopai) of the elements. 10. This apology (416a5) is Aristotle’s. Although his actual analogy between the human head and a plant’s roots has a parallel at PA 686b31-687a1, the apology is probably motivated by his sensitivity to the use here of what he elsewhere classifies as a proportional metaphor (see Poet. 1457b16-25). 11. Themistius is relying here on Iuv. 468a10-11. 12. Themistius’ reference to oil identifies a more plausible source of nutriment for fire than Aristotle’s vague to hudôr (416a26), ‘moisture’. On Aristotle and Alexander on the nourishment of fire by moisture see Hicks (on 416a26) and Todd (1976a), 228. 13. The verb here is proskrinesthai, and is not found in Aristotle. Accattino (1993), 169, n. 1 thinks that it was introduced by Alexander who uses it frequently in his discussion of nutrition in his de Anima. See also Todd (1974), 207. In their editions both Ross and Siwek assume that Themistius had a text in which at 416b3 the participial form prosginomenon (‘be added to’) was replaced with proskrinomenon. For Themistius cf. 52,23-4 below with 416b3-4. If so, it was an intrusive gloss, assuming that Themistius did not prefer to paraphrase with a more exact verb for Aristotle’s vaguer one. 14. Alexander, DA 36,3-4 also includes this standard definition from Aristotelian biology (see Bekker, Ind. Ar. 691a50-5). 15. This sentence must be an echo of Aristotle, GC 2.10, 336b32-4 where the same verb suneirein (‘link’ or ‘establish continuity, or coherence’) is used in a related description of the eternal nature of genesis (‘coming into existence’). Cf. Alexander’s different expression of the point at DA 36,7-10. 16. The use of phulattein (‘protect’) here at 53,25 to refer to self-preservation supplants

Notes to pp. 72-76


the normal use of sôzein in this sense, as Heinze notes in his index. Cf. diaphulattein substituted for sôzein (416b14) at 52,35 above. 17. The qualification ‘natural’ (emphutos) with ‘heat’ here, and at 53,34-5 below, seems to have an Aristotelian precedent only at Meteor. 355b9-10. Book 2.5 1. Reading legômen (54,3) with several Aristotelian manuscripts for the legomen in the Themistian manuscripts reported by Heinze. 2. A partial anticipation of the comprehensive definition at 2.12, 424a17-19, exploited more fully at 56,39-57,10 below. 3. Here the koinoi logoi at GC 1.7-8 are ‘general’ discussions in the sense that they offer a basic account of acting and being acted on, in contrast with the present specific application. Themistius has substituted koinoi for Aristotle’s katholou (417a1). 4. At 54,16 I delete de. I prefer this to the asyndeton accepted by de Falco. Perhaps we should read nun dê for nun de. 5. The capacity and the organ are the same ‘in substrate’ (tôi hupokeimenôi), but distinct in being (tôi einai); see below 78,13-18 on 2.12, 424a28. 6. It is tempting to suggest that Themistius is implicitly identifying a Platonic, or Neoplatonic, target for Aristotle’s argument. But Prof. Sharples notes that Themistius could be thinking of the general notion of disembodied perception, something attacked by Lucretius, 3.624-33. Given the brevity of Themistius’ observation, it is perhaps unwise to assume too specific an historical context. 7. cf. 18,30-7 above; also 29,1-5. 8. Reading Browne’s supplement at 55,35 on the basis of the Arabic version: teleiôsis . 9. Here I have translated eis auto hê epidosis (55,38 = 417b6-7) by taking auto to be an ellipse for auto to ekhon tên epistêmên (55,6 = 417b5-6). Shorey’s emendation to the Aristotelian text of hauto (accepted by Ross [1956] and [1961]) is, although supported by a few sources in the direct and indirect tradition, unnecessary. See also Sharples (1994) for a translation of Alexander, Quaestiones 3.2, an explication of DA 417b5-7, and at 128, n. 203 (cf. 132, n. 240) for a pertinent discussion of the text at 417b6. 10. Themistius is making it clear that here sperma (‘seed’) means the embryo in its early stage of development (what Aristotle otherwise calls a kuêma), as it does at 412b27 above. This is understandable since earlier (2,40-1 above) Themistius had distinguished the sperma of a plant from the egg of an animal. On the senses of sperma in Aristotle see Balme, 131. 11. Since this is a gloss on Aristotle’s hotan de gennêthêi (417b17-18), ‘when [the embryo] is born’, I have added a gloss in the translation. 12. This is presumably a general reference to Aristotle, Metaph. 1.1; see especially 981a15-b13. 13. The recapitulatory remarks at 418a1-5 are omitted. 14. Heinze followed Spengel in beginning the paraphrase of 2.6 at this point. 56,34-57,10 is, however, best taken as a contribution to the exegesis of 2.5. 15. This digression allows Themistius to bring the forthcoming discussion of the special senses in 2.7-11 within the orbit of a general definition of sense-perception. See also 62,36-8 below. Hutchinson (1987), 379 would like to relocate de Anima 3.12-13 between 2.4 and 2.5 so that, among other things, the illustration of perception by the imprinting of wax at 3.12, 435a2-5 could precede the general discussion of sensation. It is interesting, therefore, to find Themistius importing that illustration from 2.12 into the present context, and later at 59,23-6 doing the same with the version in 3.12. Finally, this passage is the first of several places in which Themistius commits himself to a non-physiological reading of Aristotle’s account of sense-perception, or its ‘dematerialization’, to use Sorabji’s term; see Sorabji (1991), 228-35 on the prevalence of this reading in all the major Greek commentators. Whether the commentators were right is a matter of controversy; they are criticized by Sorabji (1991) and (1992), but endorsed by Burnyeat (1992), 18 (with reference only to Philoponus), and in general terms at (1993), 263, n. 1.


Notes to pp. 77-81 Book 2.6

1. i.e. as also with the capacities of the soul; cf. 414b28-32 and 415a20-2. 2. In the paraphrase of this text Themistius has clearly drawn on Alexander, DA 41,13-42,3. 3. heni perilabein onomati (57,25); for this expression see Aristotle, EN 1130b3. 4. At 418a15-16 Aristotle says: hekastê [sc. aisthêsis] krinei peri toutôn. Ebert (1983), 190 argues that here krinein should be translated as ‘judge’ or ‘decide about’, rather than as ‘discriminate’, or ‘discern’, the meaning that he legitimately advocates for this verb’s use elsewhere in the DA. Themistius, however, has rephrased Aristotle’s statement in generic terms as the activity (energein) ‘towards’ or ‘focussing on’ (peri) the aisthêta. Perhaps he was uneasy with the non-standard phraseology krinein peri, and thought it safer to eliminate krinein and convert peri from the sense ‘about’ or ‘concerning’ (with the genitive) into its use with the accusative to describe the relation of sense to object. 5. The prominence given touch here in comparison with the brief notice (418a13-14) by Aristotle, probably reflects Themistius’ concern about the peculiarity of this sense, which he will later explore in the paraphrase of 2.11 in greater detail than any of the other senses. 6. Homer, Iliad 10.535 7. Literally ‘this thing’ (touto), but clearly it is a variable for which Diares in the next sentence is an example of a value. 8. At 58,9 I read dioti tôi leukôi hou aisthanetai toutôi sumbebêken with Browne, 232, on the basis of the Arabic version. Heinze’s text was taken from Aristotle. Themistius’ manuscripts had the word order to which Browne’s supplement has been added, with touto for toutôi. 9. Aristotle, Cat. 7a35-7. 10. Here Themistius draws close attention to the text at 418a23-4, and quotes it verbatim except for converting the reference to the object of perception in a generic singular to the plural. Book 2.7 1. cf. 61,9-62,7. 2. In the Aristotelian passage there is no direct reference to the surface (epiphaneia) of bodies, but only to colour as ‘on what is in itself visible’ (epi tou kath’hauto horatou) at 418a29-30. Themistius reasonably enough glosses this as ‘surface’. 3. ta kath’hauta huparkhonta (58,30-1); on this locution see above 1.1, n. 19. 4. Aristotle (418a30-1) refers to what is visible in itself as having ‘in itself (en heautôi) the cause of being visible’. Themistius applies this point specifically to the surface of a body, which has colour, the cause of visibility, ‘on itself ’, explained in the following clause as the necessary co-existence of colour and surface. 5. This example is an adaptation of 3.12, 435a2-6. 6. Themistius treats this clause (hupo – tauton) as a separate point. 7. Themistius in this way unpacks Aristotle’s vague reference to the aether as ‘the upper body’ (418b12-13). The mention of the sun is crucial to an earlier polemic; see 26,12-18. 8. cf. this contrast between the definition of light as an activity and the two physical relations of blending and juxtaposition with 40,14-38 above where the definition of the soul as the form of the body is developed through the same contrast. 9. The equivalence of these two expressions, the first of which has Stoic origins, is frequent in the Aristotelian commentators; see Todd (1976a), 75-81. 10. See Themistius, in Phys. 104,14-22, where there is a reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ major discussion of this topic in his de Mixtione. 11. cf. Alexander, Mant. 138,12-14 for a similar, if slightly more elaborate, argument along these lines. 12. cf. Alexander, Mant. 139,19-24 for an argument relying on the same basic principle. 13. At 61,7-8 Themistius uses hupokeimenon in the sense of an entity, and so compares darkness and light in one entity (transparency), with sight and blindness in another. 14. On this work and the present report by Themistius see Moraux (1973), 358-60. Moraux

Notes to pp. 81-84


believed that Themistius gained his knowledge of Sosigenes from the lost commentary by Alexander on Aristotle’s de Anima. 15. I read to before autôi khrômati at 61,36. 16. By expanding the paraphrase of 419a7-11 to contrast things that are visible in light and in darkness, Themistius provides a context for the description of the visibility of fire in both light and darkness at 419a23-5, which he therefore transposes. The summation at 419a22-3 thus becomes superfluous. 17. diaporthmeuein (62,11) is almost certainly borrowed from its single Platonic use (Symposium 202E3) to describe the intermediary role of daemons in Diotima’s account of erôs. 18. I delete oude in 62,21. 19. This is Aristotle’s reference to 2.11 below, 422b34-423a6. 20. At 62,30 and 31, I follow de Falco in reading hôi (‘by which’) for ho (‘which’, the nominative of the relative pronoun). This is the reading in MS C that Heinze tentatively favoured. As de Falco rightly notes, this coordinates these clauses with that at 62,28 where di’hou (‘through which’) introduces a similar relative clause describing the medium through which the elements transmit a sensation. 21. For diosmos see Theophrastus, 277C FHS&G, a passage from Philoponus’ commentary on the de Anima which attributes the term to Theophrastus, although other commentators use it without attribution; see the references in the edition of Theophrastus cited, and Alexander, DA 53,5. See also Ellis, 296 with n. 26. 22. This is Aristotle’s reference forward to 2.9, 421b13-422a6. 23. This interpolated conclusion reflects the earlier interpolation at 56,39-57,4 from DA 2.12 of the general definition of sense-perception. Book 2.8 1. I have followed de Falco in accepting Heinze’s suggestion in his apparatus criticus to delete hoti at 63,16. It might be possible to understand something here; i.e. ‘Hollow objects [cause sound] because they produce etc.’ 2. Aristotle’s use of the verb rhapizein (‘swish’, ‘thrash’) at 419b23 has generated these remarks on various forms of beating and whipping motions, as a background to a restatement of Aristotle’s image (419b24-5) of striking a mobile heap of sand. 3. The Arabic version suggests an additional epithet here at 63,25. Browne, 232-3 proposes eudiakhutos but admits that eudiairetos is possible. I favour the latter. Apart from the parallel at 64,23-4 that Browne notes, there is also the the explication of mê thruptesthai by mê diêrêmenon at 63,14. 4. At 63,26 the Arabic version suggests the reading ei di’hou tupteis tumpanon tumpanôi; see Browne, 233-4. Apart from the fact that, as Browne notes, the Greek text proposes the implausible action striking a drum with a drum, there is also the use of paraplêsiôs (‘in the same way’) at 63,27-8. The supplement thus creates a parallel between whips and sticks and the drumstick. 5. With de Falco, 97, n. 5 (following Torraca’s suggestion) I read heis ôn for heni onti at 63,36. Clearly it is the air and not the body that is a unity, as Aristotle states at 419b25-6. 6. At 63,36 the Arabic version (see Browne, 234) supports the deletion of heis adopted here. The phrase ho plêgeis aêr simply repeats 63,32, as well as 64,7 (noted by Browne). 7. For Themistius’ development of this role for pneuma with application to all the senses see 86,28-87,15 below. He mentions it again in connection with hearing (64,29 below), but mostly depicts it in general terms as primary to sense-perception and its organs (cf. 68,15-18; 79,11-12). But he never develops this topic in any detail in analysing the operations of the different senses, in contrast, for example, with Philoponus who applies pneuma along Galenic lines particularly in elaborating Aristotle’s theory of vision; see Todd (1984), 106-8. He also (with the exception of 76,20-1 and 121,7) does not link it with the heart as the focus of all the capacities, a theory that Alexander strongly emphasizes (DA 94,7-100,17) with some degree of medical knowledge (see Accattino [1987]) as part of his reconstruction of Aristotle’s de Anima. On the role of the heart in Aristotle’s de Anima see Tracy (1983), 325-8. On Themistius see further 2.11, n. 20. 8. Themistius employs the distinction between continuous (sunekhês), i.e. having extremi-


Notes to pp. 84-88

ties as one, and being in contact, i.e. having the extremities together (hama), to gloss 420a3-4 where air called ‘one by being continuous’. For the Aristotelian sources see Phys. 5, 227a10-13, and 6, 231a22-3. He draws on the same contexts to clarify DA 3.12, 434b12-14 at 124,4-5 below. In view of sumphuês (‘naturally continuous’) and sunekhês (‘continuous’) being used interchangeably in this passage, it is worth also noting Phys. 227a23-7 where Aristotle comments on sumphusis or ‘natural union’, something that Themistius (in Phys. 173,32) illustrates inter alia by grafts onto plants; but the fusion of the parcels of air involved in hearing would equally qualify. 9. hôsper methorion (64,28). methorion is an area between two bounded areas, and is used without apology in other contexts; e.g. Aristotle, GA 778b30. But since Themistius qualifies it with hôsper (‘like’, ‘as if ’), I use Saunders’ felicitous translation of its literal use at Plato, Laws 878B5, a passage that may well have suggested its use to the commentator. See also 88,29 below. 10. Themistius reasonably enough omits comment on 420a23-6; it recapitulates 419b6-9 and 419b13-15. 11. This quotation is in indirect speech, but it is verbatim except for one very minor difference. 12. Sorabji (1991), 231 with n. 16 notes that this comparison is also found in Boethius, de Musica 1.14, 200,6-21 Friedlin. Since Boethius was familiar with some of Themistius’ works, he may have adopted it from the present text. 13. I read aisthêtôn at 66,1, the reading in MS C tentatively favoured by Heinze, instead of the aisthêseôn of the manuscripts. 14. On this use of metaphor see 2.9, n. 3. 15. By translating oxus as ‘high-pitched’ in the case of sound the pun linking physical and auditory sharpness is lost. But it is not parallelled by the link between being low-pitched and being blunt. 16. The summarizing sentence at 420b5 (peri  diôristhô) is omitted. 17. Here lexis (‘speech’) is contrasted with sound (psophos) as an example of phonê (voice). Later, it will be contrasted with phônê, as articulate human speech in contrast with an utterance. See 111,1-4 below. 18. Here Themistius’ précis is perhaps too concise in failing to specify that the apostasis, melos, and dialektos (length, pitch, and timbre) of the sounds produced by these instruments is what resembles a voice. 19. Aristotle just refers to ‘breath’ (pneuma, 420b20) here, but Themistius picks up on his earlier gloss on 420b17 (anapneomenôi, ‘inhaled [air]’) as ‘inhaled and exhaled’ air. 20. cf. Aristotle, HA 492b26-7. This is the only place where Aristotle uses huperôia (here at 67,5) for the palate. 21. cf. Aristotle, Int. 16a3-8, 19, 26-7. 22. The observation on fish at 421a3-6 is omitted; Themistius perhaps regarded it as covered at 420b10-13. Book 2.9 1. The term translated ‘function’ here is khreia. Literally, this means the use or service to which something is put, but in some contexts Aristotle uses it to describe the specific function of, for example, an organ in the body; see PA 670b28 or 691b8. This sense is exploited here to define the narrow purpose served by smell, in terms of its cognitive range, where it is confined to subjective impressions (67,37-68,1), and is like the sense of sight in a defective species, which furnishes only blurred impressions (68,1-4 = 421a13-15). This creates a valuable gloss on Aristotle’s terse remark (421a13-14) that the organ of smell is not accurate. 2. Themistius omits the clause at 421a15-16 in which Aristotle makes the point contained in this supplement. 3. Themistius’ expansion of Aristotle’s brief reference to an analogy with taste (421a16-18) is grounded in the analogical use of metaphora (‘transference’) described at Aristotle, Poet. 1457b25-30 where one of the elements in an analogy may lack a name. For Themistius’ interest in metaphor see Olympiodorus, in Cat. 35,4-8. For a brief criticism of this particular case see Simplicius, in DA 151,14.

Notes to pp. 88-92


4. krasis; i.e. the temperament of the body resulting from the balance (or blending, the more literal translation of krasis) of the humours. 5. On pneuma and perception (not a preoccupation of Aristotle’s in the DA) see 86,28-87,15 below. 6. cf. 67,33-4 and 35-7 above where it is noted that pleasure or pain always accompany objects of smell, and make that sense relative to us rather than independently accurate. 7. cf. below 71,14-19. 8. Themistius omits the further remarks in this passage that the water-based animals that seem to smell may or may not have blood, and that aerial animals may also smell and be guided by this in pursuing prey. 9. At 62,32 above. See 2.7, n. 21. 10. cf. Sens. 444b11 for the specific reference to bees, absent in the present Aristotelian text. 11. cf. Aristotle, HA 623b20-1. 12. The meaning is clear in this conditional at 69,16 but the absence of an object for epithêi is awkward, even though inherited from Aristotle at 421b16. Cf. 75,22-3 for an analogous sentence in which the object applied to the organ is explicitly identified. 13. See 2.7, 419a11-27 (Themistius, 62,7-26). 14. See Aristotle, Sens. 4 and 5. This reference is interpolated by Themistius, and may indicate that the de Sensu formed part of his teaching, although it may simply be a note to readers. Book 2.10 1. Aristotle’s opening claim in this chapter (422a8) is made dependent on his reasoning at 422a10-11, and his claim about its medium not being a foreign body (422a8-10) made a secondary point. 2. Themistius omits Aristotle’s qualification that flavour is in moisture ‘like matter’ (hôs hulêi) (422a11), but interpolates it at 71,23 below in paraphrasing 422a31-2. 3. See 75,10-15 below. 4. Themistius conveys the sentence at 422a11-12 not as a present contrary-to-fact conditional (‘if we lived in water, we would perceive ’) but as a future more vivid (‘if we are in water, we shall be able [dunametha at 70,24 is a present standing for a future] to perceive ’). This reflects his manuscript reading; see Ross and Siwek ad loc. 5. aporrhein, reflecting Aristotle’s statement (422a15) that colour is not seen ‘through effluences’ (tais aporrhoiais). This is a reference to Empedocles’ theory of vision (or at least an aspect of it) briefly criticized by Aristotle at Sens. 440a15-20, more fully by Alexander, Mant. 136,29-138,2, and in Sens. 56,8-58,22. 6. The introduction of this point, postponed from 422a11, has been anticipated by the use of dekhesthai (‘receive’) at 70,29-30. This is the verb that crucially describes the way that a sense-organ acquires a form. Cf. to dektikon at 424a18 (= Themistius, 77,29) and hupodekhetai at 78,9. 7. cf. above 68,34-69,2. 8. Aristotle (422b6-7) just says that there is ‘contact with the original moisture’ (haphê  tou prôtou hugrou), where this means that a sick person tastes a fluid with just the basic saliva on the tongue. Themistius seems to apply prôtou to the object of taste to identify its ‘original’ or basic moistness, and sees this as being apprehended by the primary saliva on the tongue. But a significantly flavoured fluid served to a sick person would hardly have such a basic flavour. Also, the analogy that follows of tasting one strong flavour after another (see next note) shows that there is no flavour at all in the second fluid, only a residual moistness on the tongue. 9. The second flavour here has to be strong too, although not as strong as the first. Translators of the Aristotelian text are often vague about this, while Hicks seems wrong to say ‘some other flavour’, since there is nothing indefinite in the Greek. 10. The final clause here, tôi prokatekhesthai tôi sphodroterôi (72,3), is taken to mean ‘because [the second flavour] is absorbed by the stronger one’ by de Falco. But since the subject of the main verb is ‘we’ it seems reasonable to take that to be the subject of the infinitive.


Notes to pp. 93-97

Certainly katekhesthai can be used to refer to a person being mentally transfixed; see Aristotle, Insomn. 459a7. Book 2.11 1. Although without detectable impact on the translation, Spengel’s dialuseien at 72,21 is probably better than the dialusei of the manuscripts, given that this would otherwise be the only instance of the future indicative with an in this work. 2. This poetic gloss on Aristotle’s phrase ‘sort of membrane’ (hoion humena) at 423a3 is taken from Empedocles, DK 31B84 at p. 342,11, where the phrase ‘fine cloths’ (leptai othonai) is used as equivalent to ‘membranes’ (mêninges) in the eye in a passage explaining vision. The fragment is quoted at Aristotle, Sens. 437b26-438a3, but Themistius got the idea of substituting leptê othonê for humên from Alexander’s commentary on the de Sensu where he specifically says that Empedocles used othonai for humenes; see DK 31B84 at p. 341,26-8 (= Alexander, in Sens. 23,23-24,2). 3. cf. the description of Hercules’ unpleasant condition at Sophocles, Trachiniae 767-9, where interestingly another peri compound, periptuesthai (line 767), is used to describe the encirclement of the body, and, like two of those used by Themistius in the present context (periplassein, ‘mould round’ at 73,9 and 20, and perikheisthai, ‘spread round’, at 73,12,15), is a metaphor drawn from some form of artificial moulding, or gilding. Aristotle at 423a3 was content with the simpler verb periteinein, ‘stretch round’ (here at 73,2). 4. hôsper elutron. Also at 73,20, 21 below. Although elutron is used by Aristotle at 421b29 to identify eyelids, Themistius is surely reflecting the only Platonic use of this noun at Republic 588E1, where it describes the body as a sheath for the soul. Similarly the verb translated ‘moulded around’ (periplassein, 73,9, 20) must be taken from its use in the same context (Rep. 588D10, E2) to describe the relation of the sheath to the body; these too are the only occurrences in Plato. 5. 423a15-17 offer only a conclusion for which Themistius provides the premises. My translation of 73,26-7 follows Moerbeke’s (vide autem rationem et si non adducitur), and thereby his Greek source which must have located kai before ei to produce the required concessive clause. 6. At 72,12-14, on 422b20-3. 7. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 6.1, 231a22-3. 8. At 73,1-6 above. 9. For tou alloiousthai (75,13) about which Heinze raised an undefined doubt read to alloiousthai with Moerbeke and the Arabic version; see Browne, 234-5. This is simpler than Torraca’s transposition and emendation that de Falco followed: to de alloiousthai hopôs akousteon. 10. cf. the argument reconstructed by Themistius at 73,26-31 above. 11. cf. above 75,5-6 ad 423b10-12. 12. cf. 423b8-12, and 423a2-5. 13. cf. Aristotle, 423b20-6 with Themistius, 75,22-7. 14. Aristotle, 422b23-7. 15. At 76,8 I follow Browne’s suggestion (235-6) on the basis of the Arabic version and read kai hôsper before peri to auto morion. I do not, however, follow his further proposal to read homoiôs (‘in a similar way’) for homôs at 76,9; here I think that Heinze was right to follow the correction in MS Q against the vulgate transmitted by the Arabic version too. We then have parallel clauses: kai homôs pleious eisin hai aisthêseis (76,9-10), and einai de pleious tas aisthêseis at 76,11-12. The kai before homôs at 76,9 is not conjunctive, but in the sense of ‘even’ just reinforces homôs. 16. cf. 423a17-21. 17. I read ouden kôluei instead of ouden oun kôluei at 76,10. I agree with Browne (236) that oun can be eliminated once kai hôsper is read at 76,8, but it would be unusual for Themistius not to have a responsive houtôs in such correlative clauses. 18. cf. 423a6-12. 19. This is a paraphrase of Alexander, DA 58,2-5: ‘In the case of touch is the sense-organ

Notes to pp. 97-100


something else over and above the flesh, analogous to the eye for the organ of sight? Something like this seems to be meant by Aristotle.’ 20. Alexander was well aware of this; see DA 96,26-7 where in a lengthy discussion of the thesis that the heart is the central organ of the soul he refers to taste and touch as having their source in the heart. For Aristotle see Sens. 439a1-2, Iuv. 469a12-14, and PA 656a29-31. When Themistius himself came to identify pneuma as the substance in which all the senses inhere, he showed none of his present interest in the heart as the centre of sensation; see 86,28-87,15 below, and cf. 2.8, n. 7 above. 21. cf. Alexander, DA 57,20-58,2. What he in fact says is that ‘while in the case of touch it is impossible to place tangible objects on the capacity for sense-perception (tôi aisthêtikôi), when however they are placed on the organ (i.e. the flesh) sensation occurs, because the sense does not need any other medium.’ By contrast, the other senses do ‘need some other medium’ (57,19-20), because they have no sensation when objects are placed directly on their organs. It would seem that Themistius ignored, or did not have in his manuscript, the word ‘other’ (allou, 58,2). Curiously, Fotinis’ translation (66) also ignores allou and gives us Themistius’ claim: ‘this sense does not need any medium between [its organ and its object].’ 22. hama têi sarki (76,25). Cf. 423a1-2 where the sensation of touch is said to occur immediately on contact (hama thinganomenôn). 23. Given Themistius’ intimacy with the Platonic corpus, this example was probably suggested by Ion 535D4-5 or Symposium 175E6, both of which also refer to audiences numbered in ‘myriads’ (muriades), the term translated ‘thousands’ here. 24. Sorabji (1991), 231-2 rightly notes with reference to this passage that Themistius emphasizes the corporeality of touch by an expansive paraphrase. Sorabji also notes that there is an Aristotelian precedent only in the vague contrast at EN 10.5, 1175b36-1176a1 between sight and touch in terms of their differing purity. 25. See 76,32 above. 26. At 2.5, 416b33-4 above. 27. cf. 2.5, 417a18-20. 28. At 76,32-3 above on 423b27. 29. This supplement is derived from the Arabic version; see Browne, 236. He also places a definite article before ‘cold’ in the preceding phrase. Thus 77,19-20 translated reads tou thermou kai psukhrou kai tou sklêrou kai tou malakou. 30. There is no comment on 424a7-10 where Aristotle says that the organ of touch must be neither hot nor cold in actuality, just as sight must be neither black nor white in actuality but only so in potentiality. 31. For smell see above 421b3-8 with Themistius, 68,30-69,2; for taste see 422a20-31 with Themistius, 71,3-21. The case of sight is dealt with in the first of these passages. Book 2.12 1. Here ‘ratio’ is an appropriate translation for logos in view of the definition at 78,21-2. This ‘ratio’ is the same ‘rational principle’ identified at 57,4, but now given a more precise definition. 2. cf. above 54,8-9; 56,39-57,4 (see 2.5, n. 15); 62,36-7; 64,30-1, all passages that anticipated 2.12. For a repetition see below 79,35-7. 3. The Arabic version has aloga (‘non-rational’) after alla (‘other things’) at 78,12. (See Browne, 236), but this is an unnecessary gloss. The ‘other properties’ are not non-formal, but incidental to the object perceived. 4. Hicks (on 424a26) notes that Themistius converts Aristotle’s an eiê (at a26) to an indicative (esti) at 78,17, as part of his evidence for this use of the optative in conclusions in an entirely definite indicative sense. But see 45,8; 62,38; and 69,8 above, and 79,35 or 125,13-14 (= 435a20) below where Themistius uses the optative in that way himself. 5. Literally, ‘a magnitude and a body’ (megethos ti kai sôma), with ‘and a body’ being Themistius’ addition. 6. At 78,21-4 Themistius is addressing Aristotle’s analogy at 424a31-2 with striking a lyre too violently to loosen the tension of the strings and thus the pitch (tonos), as well as the concord (sumphônia) between the setting of the different strings. Themistius’ object is to


Notes to pp. 100-103

introduce a general principle for this case by recycling the language used in the discussion of the soul as an attunement (harmonia) in the paraphrase of DA 1.4 above; cf. 24,20-1; 34-5. But this seems to come unstuck in his referring to the ‘capacity’ (dunamis) that set the harmony as being the cause of its dissolution, since just above (78,19) dunamis was used to describe the inherent power, or ‘capacity’, of a sense-organ, which is not established by the capacity of objects of perception, as an attunement is by the lyre-player. 7. ‘Mere’ (psila at 78,32), in the sense that there is no associated matter. Cf. 79,36 below where it is used to describe the ‘mere’ form that is received in sense-perception generally. 8. This action is not ep’autois (79,3); i.e. they are not the source of it. 9. Here khumos (79,6) cannot carry the sense of ‘flavour’, but refers to the ‘juice’ by which plants are nourished. See LSJ under khumos I.1 for this sense, and cf. 124,13 below. 10. The verb here (79,7), and at 79,9 below, is prosagesthai, used by Aristotle to describe how nutriment is ‘brought towards’ an animal; see, for example, PA 658b35. 11. For Themistius’ development of the idea of pneuma as primary to sense-perception, see 86,28-87,15 below. 12. Themistius’ treatment of 424b3-18 is basically to reduce Aristotle’s series of questions to conclusive statements. 13. Themistius provides examples only of sound and flavour physically affecting inanimate bodies without reference to their status as objects of perception. He does not indicate how light and darkness (mentioned at 424b10) have this effect. He could well have included light by adding the fissiparous effect of lightning to thunder. 14. A reader suggests that we imagine rowers being sprayed as they move along. 15. This final remark about the persistence of sense-perception anticipates 425b23-5 below (cf. Themistius, 83,26-34). 16. Here Themistius returns to where he began at the end of the paraphrase of 2.5, when (56,34-57,10) he interpolated a programmatic passage describing the general nature of sense-perception. In the present summary he has included his expanded discussion of touch, which in 2.11 he regarded as the most controversial sense because of the role of flesh. 17. At 78,5 above. Book 3.1 1. Themistius’ presentation of the opening argument of this chapter (424b22-425a13) as directly claiming that there are no more than five sense is standard (cf. earlier Alexander, DA 65,21-66,8), although an alternative has recently been proposed; see Maudlin. Themistius’ paraphrastic exercise is to break up an extremely long Aristotelian sentence into a succession of shorter claims. 2. cf. 72,14-36 on 2.11, 422b23-33. 3. On the status of heaviness and lightness in Themistius’ account of touch see above 75,35-76,2. 4. After stating the main problem raised at 424b26-7, Themistius inverts the order of Aristotle’s argument, and first presents the case for there being no sense-organ missing (80,15-29), and then the claim that there is no medium of sense missing (80,29-81,4). 5. After aisthêtêriôn (‘sense-organ’) (80,26) the Arabic version has an unnecessary supplement equivalent to kai tôn sunthetôn (‘and of the compounds’). Browne, 237, argues that it should be admitted to produce a contrast within this sentence. But the same contrast between uncompounded and compounded sense-organs is effectively produced by the sentence that immediately follows. 6. That flesh is not a sense-organ has been argued above; see 2.11 passim. 7. The verb eisangellein used here (80,34) and elsewhere in the paraphrase of 3.1 and 3.2 along with the simple form angellein, is an extension of Aristotle, Sens. 437a2, 6, and Insomn. 461b3. 8. ‘This world’, or literally ‘here’ (entautha at 81,13). Cf. 101,7-8 below. 9. This sentence is paraphrased at ps.-Philoponus, in DA 450,9-19 from which it was epitomized by Michael Psellus, Opusc. 13, 62,1-2 O’Meara. 10. The use of nun, a temporal adverb meaning literally ‘now’, in this passage needs comment. Themistius is reconstructing more expansively than Aristotle an argument for

Notes to pp. 103-109


there being a special sense-organ for the common objects of perception. This creates a contrast between the ‘present’ situation defined by the Aristotelian view that there is no such organ, and the alternative situation in which we have one. The former is indicated by nun at 81,19, 20 (bis), and 23 (bis). With the exception of the first two of these, I translate it ‘now’. At 81,19 Hicks’ loose version (426) offers guidance: ‘it may be said that there ought to be a special organ for the common sensibles, but that this is lacking to man’ (my italics for his way of handling nun). 11. Themistius is almost certainly referring to Alexander’s argument at DA 65,10-21 for the existence of a common sense (koinê aisthêsis), over and above the special senses. If Torstrick’s unacceptable emendation at 425a17 of kinêsei (‘by movement’) to koinêi (‘by the common [sense]’) were made, then Aristotle would be expressing Alexander’s position. 12. This is Themistius’ interpretation of the problematical claim at 425a17 that we perceive the common objects ‘by movement’ (kinêsei). Some commentators prefer to take it as referring to the perception of movement as basic to the perception of the common objects. See Hicks (on 425a17), and more recently Modrak (1981), 408-9. 13. cf. Themistius’ effort to unpack this text with an illustration by Lawson-Tancred, 241, n. 74. 14. The verb apostêrizesthai (82,4) is used metaphorically here to convey the idea that the primary capacity of perception carries the weight of, and thus coordinates, all the incoming reports; cf. Aristotle, MA 699a5 where apostêrizesthai refers to physical support carried by something that thus ensures stability. 15. This sentence reflects the statement (at 425a28) that there is no special sense for the common objects, combined with Aristotle’s remarks at 425a30-2. But 425a28 is an inference drawn from a preceding claim (425a27-8) that ‘we have a common sense (koinê aisthêsis) for the common objects that is not incidental’. Themistius, however, avoids any mention of the common sense in favour of emphasizing in this paragraph, and elsewhere, the single sense that allows individual senses to discern one another’s special objects. Presumably he had a manuscript in which the phrase koinê aisthêsis appeared, and must have known Alexander’s emphatic claims (DA 62,16-22; 63,6-13; 65,2-21; 78,10-17; 97,13-14) about the role of the koinê aisthêsis, including its discernment of common objects (65,10-17). Perhaps he wisely thought that this was too problematical a topic for an elementary paraphrase. 16. At 83,8 read khrômata for khrôma after the Arabic version. See Browne, 237. 17. cf. DA 1.3, 407b17-19 (Themistius, 23,26-31); 2.2, 414a22-5 (Themistius, 46,35-6); and 3.4, 429b25-6 (Themistius, 97,11-14). Book 3.2 1. Kosman, 501 rejects Themistius’ reasoning as a ‘mystifying’ way of supporting Aristotle’s claim that a sense which perceives a sense also perceives its objects. 2. At 83,22 the supplement to aisthanesthai is supported by the Arabic version (see Browne, 237-8) as well as by Aristotle at 425b20. 3. At 83,23 the complementary supplement after mê horômen is supported by the Arabic version. See Browne, 238. 4. Notably at Aristotle, Phys. 2.3, 202a13-21. See also 46,24-5 above. 5. 84,24-34 is translated by Hicks, 440. 6. See 73,13-18 on 2.12, 424a24-8 above. 7. cf. 3.1, 425a21-4 with Themistius, 81,36-82,6. 8. See 2.11, 422b34-423a11 with Themistius, 72,37-19. 9. After korên (85,10) the supplement is supported by the Arabic version. See Browne, 238-9. 10. cf. 82,24-31 above. 11. cf. the discussion of incidental perception at 81,29-82,13 above, in connection with 3.1, 425a16-27. 12. cf. 4,29; 52,34; 59,1-2; 65,27, and below 113,24-5. 13. This unpacking of the cryptic Aristotelian comparison in this passage in terms of the radii meeting at the centre of a circle must be derived from Alexander, DA 63,8-13. Alexander uses it to identify the role of the ‘common sense’ (koinê aisthêsis), a notion that, as we have


Notes to pp. 109-110

seen (3.1, n. 15), Themistius avoids. It was later used by Plotinus, 4.7[2].6.10-15. For a contemporary acceptance of Alexander’s type of reading see Modrak (1981), 417-18. 14. peras (86,22, 27) is in Aristotle at 427a13, and is used in the same sense as stigmê (427a10; here at 86,19.21.23), to refer, on this interpretation, to the centre of the circle. But its natural meaning is ‘limit’ or ‘extremity’, and so it is advisable to identify it as the ‘end-point’ at which the senses, like radii, ‘terminate’ (teleutân) (cf. 86,20 for this verb in the geometrical analogy; and 82, and 85,30 for its use with reference to the meeting-point of incoming perceptual data). 15. 85,20-86,18 passim sustains this. 16. Themistius’ identification of pneuma as the physiological basis for sensation (anticipated at 68,15-17 and 79,11-12 above; see 2.8, n. 7) has had modern supporters. For recent discussions that review the secondary literature see Nussbaum, 143-64 and Modrak (1987), 73-5. Alexander did not introduce a sensory pneuma, at least in his main account of perception, but includes the ‘connate pneuma’ of Aristotle, MA ch. 10 in his quotations from that treatise at DA 77,5-6 and 11. He links it with the heart in the latter case, and thus by implication with the common sense, which he locates in the heart (DA 97,13-14). 17. cf. above 3.1, 424b22-425a13 with Themistius, 80,3-81,17. 18. This general simile is probably adapted from Plato, Timaeus 43B5-D2, although the rare verb apokheteuesthai (‘channelled’) is perhaps taken from one or both of its two Platonic appearances at Republic 485D8 and Laws 736B3. 19. The analogy here may be based on Aristotle’s quotation of Homer, Iliad 2.204 at Metaph. 1076a4 about a ruler being one. Cf. also ps.-Aristotle, Mund. 398a26-35. 20. In this proportional metaphor (cf. Aristotle, Poet. 1457b17-33), the description of sense-perception is coloured by the analogy in the description of the single sense as to peri pantôn apophainomenon (87,11), literally ‘that which makes a claim about all [things]’. To preserve the analogy with regal power, I have translated this more freely to identify a reaction to the content of perceptual input. pantôn refers not just to the organs, but to the data ‘channelled’ through them (cf. 87,6-7 above). 21. At 83,11-21 above on 425b12-17. 22. Yet Themistius avoids the epithet ‘common’ (koinon) for pneuma, as he does at 79,11 above where he in effect calls it to koinon pasês aisthêseôs (‘that which is common to all perception’). It is as though he wants to avoid using pneuma in a way that conflicts with the view that there is no common sense (see 3.1, n. 15). 23. An abbreviation of a conclusion in which Aristotle says that this suffices as a definition ‘of the principle by which we say that an animal is capable of perception’. Book 3.3 1. In this chapter Themistius offers perhaps the least adventurous discussion of phantasia to be found among the Greek commentators, although it has the virtue of being a classic statement of the notion of imagination as the entertainment of images; see Todd (1981). It can be compared with the treatments of the topic offered by other commentators, and discussed in Blumenthal (1977); Lautner (1993) and (1995); Modrak (1992); Sheppard (1991); and Todd (1995). Alexander’s account of phantasia at DA 66,9-73,13 was Themistius’ most important source for his general position. 2. Themistius ignores Aristotle’s contrast between the capacity for movement in respect of place, thought and perception in order to concentrate on the contrast between the latter pair. In drawing it he substitutes for Aristotle’s phrase tôi noein kai tôi phronein (‘by thinking and by exercising intelligence’ [427a18]) his own dyad logôi kai dianoiâi, with logos here referring to all forms of thinking, dianoia specifically to discursive thinking. 3. parelkousa (87,19); on this term see Barnes (1980), 166, n. 8. 4. DK 31B106, p. 350,21. 5. This anachronism has to be tolerated here, as in the historical survey in 1.2. 6. Browne (239) regards 87,24-5 as corrupt in light of the reading implied by the Arabic version. This suggests that after periekhonti (87,25) sômatikên should be replaced by sômati, kin and the passage construed as ‘the mind is changed and altered by the body that encompasses it, and that the nature of the rational capacity is moved’ (Browne’s version of

Notes to pp. 110-112


the Arabic). I hesitate to accept this. It is not true, as Browne claims, that ‘the words tôi periekhonti seem strangely unspecific’. At DA 1.5, 411b19 Aristotle talks of animals becoming ensouled by drawing in part ‘of what surrounds them’ (tou periekhontos), and at 2.7, 418a22-3 criticizes Empedocles for his view that light moves between the earth and ‘what surrounds it’ (tou periekhontos). The first passage seems directly relevant to the present text. Odyssey 18.136-7, that is, is interpreted as the theory that the intellect comes out of the physical environment, and is therefore physical or ‘corporeal’, as our text has it. Perhaps in this case the Arabic version transmits a corruption rather than eliminates one. 7. Odyssey 18.136-7. These verses were used by the Stoics to epitomize their concept of fate (see Augustine, de Civitate Dei 5.8), and were Latinized by Cicero in a missing portion of his de fato; see Sharples (1991), 56-7 and 162. Themistius may have adapted them from their use in such a context. 8. Aristotle bequeaths this problem to his commentator; note the generic use of dianoia and cognates for reasoning at 413b13, 414a32, 414b18 (where it is linked with nous), and 415a8 (where it is linked with logismos). Themistius has already (30,24-34) addressed the distinction between dianoeisthai and noein. In the course of the paraphrase of DA 3.4-8 different forms of reasoning will be more clearly distinguished. 9. cf. below 112,14-24 for a rather different use of the analogy suggested here between the intellect and sensation; there Themistius works with the distinction between special and incidental objects. 10. cf. 2.8, n. 9 above. 11. hupoballesthai (88,36); i.e. it is laid down as a foundation for thought. 12. This acknowledgement of the grounds for scepticism does not push Themistius to any serious reflection on the role that scepticism about sense-perception plays in Aristotle’s account of phantasia. See n. 16 below. 13. There is a problem with phantasthômen at 89,16 if taken in the sense of ‘imagine’ (the sense that it carries elsewhere in this chapter), since that would destroy the contrast between thought and imagination in this text. (It is hardly being used in a metaphorical sense to mean ‘think’; cf. 89,28-9 below.) Aristotle uses doxazein (‘opine’) to characterize the intentional attitude to both frightening and cheering things; following that lead I have read doxasômen for phantasthômen. 14. For noein (‘to think’) used to mean imagine or conceive see, for example, 58,32 above, and perhaps also Aristotle below at 433b12 (= Themistius, 120,26); cf. n. 49 below. The type of metaphor involved here does not, however, isolate one sense from another. In terms of the programme at Aristotle, Poet. ch. 21 this metaphor is a ‘transference from species to species’ (1457b13-16), and, as Aristotle’s example there shows, two terms can have the same basic meaning while being metaphorically interchangeable. By the same token, both senseperception and thinking can be cases of imagination, and arguably without any reference to the so-called ‘strict’ sense of phantasia that Themistius (89,30-1) defines as the presence of a post-perceptual image in the soul. 15. cf. Aristotle, Mem. 450a30-2. Alexander in his account of phantasia took special pains to eliminate any materialistic implications from this comparison; see DA 68,10-21 (a critique of the Stoics), 70,3-5, and 72,5-13 (on the metaphorical use of words like ‘imprint’, ‘residue’, and ‘trace’). 16. This anticipates the full development of this interpretation of phantasia at 91,33-93,3 below. The Aristotelian text here refers only to a phantasma (428a1) (literally ‘thing that appears’) coming to exist in us; its definition as a secondary imprint is entirely the work of the commentator who for the remainder of the paraphrase of this chapter abandons the term in favour of the unambiguous terms ‘imprint’ (tupos), ‘residue’ (enkataleimma), or ‘trace’ (ikhnos). Interestingly Alexander in his version of this text (DA 66,20-3) does not introduce the account of phantasia in terms of residual images that he later develops (68,21-69,17). His caution is understandable in view of a still later passage (70,23-71,21) in which he deemphasizes the role of images in order to analyse cases of non-standard sense-perception in terms that resemble sceptical treatments of illusions. For a contemporary rejection of the Themistian interpretation of phantasma at 428a1 in terms of images see Schofield (1978), 115-20; he, like Alexander, at least implicitly at DA 70,23-71,21, stresses the connection beween phantasia and non-standard cases of perception.


Notes to pp. 112-115

17. cf. the definition of noein (thinking) at 30,31 above. 18. cf. Aristotle, Insom. 461b21-2 where the noun hupoleimma is used. enkataleimma is more widely used by Alexander than Themistius in describing the images involved in phantasia. On the term see Todd (1974), 210-11. 19. Reading dianoias (90,7) with the Arabic version (see Browne, 239) for the impossible aisthêseôs of the Greek manuscripts, which Heinze rightly judged to be an error. De Falco followed Torraca’s suggestion and deleted the whole clause hosa – aisthêseôs as a misguided gloss. dianoias is justified by 88,24-30 above where it is admitted that some animals do have such reasoning, even if in a qualified sense. See also 35,8-9 above. The present clause gives specific examples of such high-status animals. 20. As I argue at Todd (1981), 53 with n. 42, Themistius’ use of phantazesthai (‘imagine’) in this argument does imply the entertainment of images, given its use at 89,10 and 90,4 above. 21. At 88,35-89,14 above. 22. cf. Sophist 264B1-3. Aristotle makes no explicit reference to Plato, although his discussion here is an implicit critique, well discussed by Lykos. 23. At 90,28 both the Arabic version and the Aristotelian text (at 428a24-6) support the following supplement after aisthêseôs: . See Browne, 239. 24. cf. above 89,14-20. 25. There is a different Arabic version of 428b2-429b31, at Lyons, 160-6. Professor Lyons kindly provided me with an English translation. He does not believe (Lyons, xiii) that it was interpolated in the Arabic tradition. My impression is that it is consistent with the text in the Greek tradition, but on points of detail this passage might well repay some close comparison with the Greek. It is not discussed by Browne. 26. The epistemological problems raised by the apparent size of the sun were widely debated in later Greek philosophy; see Barnes (1989). Themistius shows no more interest in the astronomical data that some philosophers took into account in dealing with this issue than he does in the medical data that often entered into discussions of Aristotle’s theory of nutrition and growth; see 2.4, n. 1 above. 27. The reference to a blend (krasis) is found in Alexander’s version of this text at DA 67,25-68,4. Plato, Sophist 264B2 used summeixis, although Aristotle (at 428a29) used sumplokê, literally ‘intertwining’ or ‘weaving’, which some translators anyway render as ‘blend’ (Hamlyn) or ‘blending’ (Smith). I have used ‘combination’ (Lawson-Tancred), the usual translation for the term in Aristotle’s Categories. Aristotle, as Hicks (on 428a24) suggests, substituted sumplokê by misquoting, or perhaps echoing, the philosophically more important use of the term a little earlier (Sophist 262C6) that clearly influenced him (cf. Cat. 1a16-19, or DA 432a11-12). 28. See Todd (1981), 53-4 for criticism of Themistius for importing into this particular case the reading of phantasia as the entertainment of images developed more fully at 91,32-93,3 below. 29. Literally the text refers to the person here ‘being preserved’ (sôzomenos) in correspondence with the stable condition of the thing perceived. Themistius is presumably thinking of an observer in good health and optimally functioning sense-organs; cf. 57,20 and 23 above, reflecting Alexander’s insistence on healthy sense-organs for veridical perception at DA 41,15-16. 30. cf. 89,29-31 above. 31. Alexander uses this term for an after-image at DA 63,1 in a passage (62,22-63,4) that reflects Aristotle, DA 3.2, 425b22-5. Cf. also Alexander, DA 72,11-13 where its metaphorical status is noted. 32. The oar that appears bent in water was a stock example with the Sceptics in arguments for the unreliability of the senses. See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 7.244 and 414, and Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.119. Like the case of the sun appearing minuscule, it does not lend itself to a Themistian analysis in terms of residual images. 33. cf. 94,4 below, where the inquiry into the reasoning part of the soul is said to be primarily concerned with determining its relation to imagination. 113,14-114,2 offers an

Notes to pp. 115-116


expansive version of DA 3.7, 431a14-17 and 431b2-10, in defining the role of images in thought. 34. For some discussion of Themistius’ reading of this passage, and the long excursus that follows at 92,4-93,3 see Todd (1981), 51-3. 91,33-92,4 is also worth contrasting with Alexander’s restatement of 428b10-16 at DA 69,20-70,5. 35. At DA 69,21-2 Alexander uses the illustration of a stick that is itself moved by something else causing a stone to move. Themistius wisely changed this to a lever moving a stone and thereby initiating a further motion. In Alexander’s example, the fact that the stick is moved by something else is irrelevant to the series of movements that it initiates via the stone, as objects of perception do when they lead to phantasia. Alexander seems to have made casual use of a quite differently designed illustration of movement through the use of a stick in the hand presented by Aristotle at MA 702a33-b11. 36. ensphragizesthai (91,40) refers particularly to a stamp from a signet ring, an illustration developed more explicitly at 92,17 and 34-5 below. It is borrowed from Aristotle, Mem. 450a32, who knew it from Plato, Theaetetus 191D6-7; Alexander, DA 72,5-13 warns against taking it literally, as Themistius does in somewhat different terms at 92,20-4 below. 37. apelthontôn tôn aisthêtôn (92,1; cf. 93,3), an echo perhaps of Aristotle, DA 425b24-5 (although apienai, ‘go away’, is used in several related contexts; see Hicks on 425b24), a passage that Alexander (DA 63,1-3) seems to restrict to the specific case of after-images formed from particularly intense sensations. In his later account of phantasia Alexander speaks only of perception or its objects being absent (apeinai), following Aristotle at DA 3.3, 428b27-9; cf. Themistius, 93,16-21. 38. Ps.-Philoponus in DA 508,19-24 and 514,29-31 criticized Themistius for this view. For the details see Todd (1981), 49-50. 39. This verb is used in this sense at Plato, Republic 508D5 where it refers to the rational soul focusing on what is illuminated by the sun-like Form of the Good, a context that Themistius himself refers to at 103,35 below. 40. periptugeis seems to convey the idea that the whole of the wax block in this case is stamped with an imprint. The rather fanciful metaphor of enfolding is probably adapted from the single Platonic use of periptuein at Symposium 196A2. 41. This illustration is borrowed from DA 3.12, 435a2-5. 42. Reading hopêi kan tukhêi at 92,27 (Spengel followed by de Falco) for hopêi kai tukhoi (codd.). An optative without an would be unparallelled in this work, even though it is possible in later Greek. 43. plêxis here at least suggests a light blow, although the term itself does not necessarily suggest a blow that leaves the patient unaffected. 44. ekmageion (92,29) is the single noun translated by the phrase ‘block  impressions’. Themistius here, and at 92,34-40, is reflecting Theaetetus 191C8-D1 where the soul is compared to a wax ekmageion, one type of which is also said to be of ‘harder’ wax; cf. Theaetetus 191C10-D1 with 92,29 here. 45. But this recognition could be a case of memory or recollection, as Alexander notes in general at DA 69,17-19, and polemically at 68,20-21 in rejecting a crude materialistic theory of images. Themistius has nothing to say about memory in paraphrasing this chapter, even though the illustration of the signet is used by both Plato and Aristotle (references in n. 36 above) to describe memory. He briefly refers to the operation of memory elsewhere at 28,19-21 and 99,6-8. 46. At 93,10 I delete kai so that Themistius can better reflect Aristotle at 418a22-3, 425a26-7, and perhaps 428b20 (although Ross’ text is emended by a transposition). As Themistius’ text stands, he first describes perception tôn hupokeimenôn tois idiois, i.e. of the things that are substrates to special objects (e.g. Socrates the substrate in which white inheres), and then says kai hois ekeina sumbebêke. De Falco translates this as ‘e degli enti a cui i sensibili propri ineriscono’. This makes the clause repetitive and epexegetic by taking tôn hupokeimenôn as understood before the relative clause, but fails to capture the sense of sumbebêke which must describe the incidental relation that the substrate (e.g. Socrates, or being Socrates) has to the special object (e.g. white) (see 418a22-3, 425a26-7). It is better to delete kai and have the relative pronoun refer directly to idia, and ekeina to the hupokeimena. For hupokeimena used to mean sumbebêkota, see below at 93,17.


Notes to pp. 117-122

47. This diagnosis of error regarding common objects of perception is taken from the paraphrase of DA 3.1, 425a30-b3; cf. 82,35-6 with 93,15-16. 48. cf. Alexander, DA 73,3-7. 49. Alexander, DA 71,21-72,5 paraphrases this text expansively, seeing it as relevant to the general topic of practical reasoning. He then (72,13-73,1 and 73,7-13; 72,5-13 and 73,3-7 are, I believe, displaced passages; see Todd [1976b]) gives a programmatic sketch of the role of phantasia in practical reasoning, anticipating his free reconstruction of Aristotle, DA 3.9-11 at 73,14-80,15. Themistius, by contrast, does not explore practical reasoning here. When he comes to a relevant text at 3.10, 433b12 that uses the verb phantazesthai to mean ‘be thought of ’ he just paraphrases it without comment on the relation between its use there to describe the formulation of the goal of desire, and its use in this chapter (89,10; 90,4, 12, 14; 91,27) to mean just the presentation of images. The later use is hardly clarified by being called metaphorical in the version of 428a1-5 at 89,26-35 above. 50. At 92,13-15 above. Book 3.4 1. Book Three, chs 4-8 are are translated at TGAC, 77-133. The present translation is extensively revised, and is accompanied by some different notes; the earlier work can therefore be consulted for further documentation on several points. See further Introduction, p. 9. For discussions of Themistius on the intellect see in addition to TGAC, 37-9; Ballériaux (1943) and (1989); Bazán; Blumenthal (1991), 194-5; Huby (1991), 140-3; Martin; Montoya, 140-2; and Verbeke, xxxix-lxii. On the extent to which the Themistian noetic is Plotinian (advocated notably by Ballériaux [1995]), I essentially agree with Blumenthal (1979b, rev. 1990), 120-3 against Mahoney (1982), 264-6, n. 1, that this is more a matter of the use of terminology than the assimilation of doctrine. But, this is a topic better pursued elsewhere. On Alexander of Aphrodisias’ earlier treatment of the intellect at DA 80,16-92,11, and in the pseudonymous Mant. 106,18-113,24, see Sharples (1987), 1204-14, and Schroeder at TGAC, 1-31 and 45-74 (a translation with commentary). See also 102,30-103,19 below for Themistius’ critique of Alexander. 2. There is a different Arabic version of this chapter up to 429b31; see 3.3, n. 25 above. 3. cf. 37,4-6 above where this distribution is attributed to Timaeus. 4. cf. 3.3, n. 33 above. 5. cf. 87,17-18 above. 6. cf. 56,7-12 above. 7. I have reverted to the text in Heinze’s edition at 94,9; cf. TGAC, 78, n. 6. 8. cf. 89,27-9 above. 9. 95,9-32 should be compared with Themistius’ paraphrase of An. Post. 2.19, particularly in An. Post. 63,2-64,16. See also Alexander, DA 83,1-23. 10. tês peri tauta gumnasias (95,11) seems to be a deliberate echo of Plato, Theaetetus 169C1 where it is used more loosely as a metaphor for engagement in argument rather than the process of familiarization with sensory input envisaged here. 11. This (95,21) along with 95,23 ands 32 indicates that Themistius read de hauton at 429b9; Ross (in both his editions) accepted Bywater’s emendation di’hautou. For a full discussion of this see Owens. 12. cf. 113,32-114,30. 13. I omit de at 96,22 with the medieval Latin version. 14. Timaeus 37B7, C1. 15. There is another brief reference to this ‘intelligible matter’ at 114,11 below. 16. cf. on this principle 23,26-31 above. See also 46,35-6 and 83,8-10. 17. See further on this point 106,14-107,29 below. 18. On these non-material forms (cf. also 110,6; 114,31-2; 115,6 below), see earlier 8,24-31 above where they are anticipated in the description of what are ‘really forms’. Themistius has undoubtedly overinterpreted the reference to ‘things without matter’ at 430a3; see Berti, 147, n. 32. 19. At 98,4 after noei de ou read the following supplement proposed by Browne (240) on the basis of the Arabic translation: kai noêton men hekaston, nous de ou.

Notes to pp. 122-126


20. kamnei (98,6). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1050b24-7, and 1074b28-9 (with Themistius in Metaph. 12 31,7-9). Cf. 99,38 below for the ‘unwearying’ activity of the productive intellect. See also TGAC, 87, n. 39. Book 3.5 1. 430a22-3 (khôristheis  monon) is the latest text from DA 3.5 referred to (at 99,37 below) in the paraphrase proper. The remainder of the chapter (430a23-5) is then quoted within the subsequent excursus; see 101,26-7 and 25-7. In the paraphrase itself it is difficult to correlate Themistius’ paraphrases with the Aristotelian text as precisely as in other chapters. 2. This whole paragraph should be compared with 39,3-11 above where similar language is used in an expansive description of the relation between form and matter. Later this hylomorphic relationship recedes into the background to be re-emphasized in the conclusion at 108,28-34. 3. hexin kataskeuazein (98,32). Cf. 43,15 above where the nouns hexis and kataskeuê (‘set-up’ or ‘constitution’) are used as synonyms. The productive intellect creates a compound, and it might have been clearer if the verb sunistanai had been used; cf. the use of sustasis at 102,2 below. 4. The use of this term is analogical. In a biological context (e.g. 53,28 above) something sumphuês would be inseparable, but the potential intellect is not. In fact it is the ‘common intellect’ that could be called this without qualification, and, relative to it, the potential intellect is ‘less sumphuês’. On the basic relation between these two intellects see especially 105,26-34. 5. cf. 109,4-7 below where this ‘encounter’ is described as an illumination, on the basis of 103,32-3. 6. cf. 56,23-4 above on 417b24-5. 7. The translation incorporates after exôthen at 99,13 the supplement proposed by Browne (240) from the Arabic version: tou dunamei nou ho poiêtikos, hôsper exôthen. 8. Here the language, though not the idea, is probably taken from Timaeus 21E5 where there is a reference to a ‘founder deity’; cf. also Laws 848D6. 9. See Pinès (1987), 186-7 on this sentence, and see Pinès (1981), 223-4 and (1987) passim on the significance of Themistius’ claim that God is identical with objects of thought rather than with himself. On this parallelism between human and divine intellection see also 114,36-115,9 below, and TGAC, 129, n. 218. There are also passages describing divine intellection in Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, that resemble the whole description of intellection at 100,4-10 below; some are discussed by Pinès (1987). This is a topic that needs further attention. 9a. houtos here (99,34), supported by the Arabic version (Browne, 241) is preferable to houtôs; cf. 98,32-3. 10. See 110,25-6 below for a specific example of this programmatic description. 11. Whatever the wider historical background to the concept of the self introduced here (see, for example, Moraux [1978], 323, n. 136 and Ballériaux [1989], 226), in the first instance this distinction must surely be referred back to DA 3.4, 429b10-14 from which Themistius seems to have borrowed the language in which he defines the self in terms of the intellect. 12. It should be noted that the use of the first-person singular in this passage yields to that of the first-person plural when Themistius moves on to the problem of remembering an earlier life, or the present life after death. But he never explores the problem of identifying a collective and disembodied self. 13. cf. this parenthesis with 103,20-32 below on the pluralization of the productive intellect. Cf. also 21,16-19 above on the indivisibility of a quality in bodies. 14. cf. below 3.8, 432a2, with Themistius 115,26-30. 15. cf. 430a24-5. 16. Yet in his paraphrase of the text referring to ‘the common thing’ (to koinon) (DA 1.4, 408b28-9) Themistius gives no indication that this is how he reads it. See 1.4, n. 54. 17. i.e. in this life. Cf. the phrase ta en tôi biôi at 101,13-14 just below. 18. See TGAC, 96, n. 91 where I suggest a possible Neoplatonic source for this problem.


Notes to pp. 126-128

19. I adopt the transposition at 101,18 of tois rhêmasi autois to tois autois rhêmasi, followed by de Falco without explanation. It seems justified by the reference to tas autas aitias at 101,16, and the use of tauton at 101,28-9. 20. Themistius seems to misquote. The text at 408b26 has the plural pathê (‘affections’), correctly given at 29,32 above, and also at 105,19 below, rather than the singular pathêma given here. 21. The supplements here reflect the meaning that Themistius (see 101,7 above) finds in this text. 22. The subject here has to be the productive intellect, yet the phrase ‘not in general in time’ (holôs de oude khronôi) at 430a21 is usually taken to refer to the potential intellect, as indeed it seems to in a paraphrase at 106,11 below. See TGAC, 97, n. 96. 23. The supplied subjects are required by the overall context, but the final expression ouden noei (‘it thinks nothing’) is now confined to the kind of discursive thinking typical of the passive intellect. See TGAC, 97, n. 97. 24. I have supplied skhedon before antikrus at 101,29 on the basis of the parallel at 101,18. 25. I follow Moraux (1978), 324, n. 137 in reading kakôs for the first kai in order to supply a negative idea in this statement. 26. This is a question pursued in a fragmentary work on the soul attributed (plausibly) to Porphyry and preserved only in Arabic; see Kutsch, 11, who notes the present passage from Themistius. Given the responses to Porphyry in the paraphrase of Book 1, Themistius’ impatient rejection of this question suggests that he may well have known some version of this treatise. This evidence was not known to me when I suggested on general grounds at TGAC, 98, n. 100 that the question came from Platonic sources, and had its answer in the theory of recollection. 27. This is an altered verson of DA 2.2, 413b24-7, in which the phrase ‘contemplative intellect’ has been substituted for ‘contemplative activity’; see 2.2, n. 10 above. Themistius also omits monon (413b26), since it is obvious that ‘only’ the intellect is a candidate for separability. 28. This is a question raised by ancient and modern commentators, and thought to be answered in DA 3.5 at least by the assertion that such memory is impossible; see Hicks, 508, on both the questions identified by Themistius. 29. 102,14-29 = Theophrastus, 320B FHS&G. All the quotations from Theophrastus in Themistius are now edited and translated in FHS&G. (This collection supersedes Hicks, 589-96 and Barbotin, 248-73.) These passages contain a number of difficulties, and there is to date no commentary on them, and so I have not commented on places where my translation differs from the new one. Barbotin represents the fullest study of Theophrastus’ noetic; see also Devereux (1992); Huby (1985) and (1991), 134-5. Clearly, the Themistian contribution needs to be studied carefully in light of the whole collection of texts at Theophrastus, 307A-327 FHS&G; here I can only hope to provide some service by presenting them in their Themistian exegetical context. 30. cf. 108,25-8 below for a slightly different version of this fragment. 31. This is a quotation of Aristotle, DA 430a15. 32. Whatever the Theophrastean fragment may mean, Themistius must be assimilating it to his own earlier description (98,34) of the potential intellect as ‘naturally cognate (sumphuês) with the soul’. The use of sumphutos is probably of no significance since sumphuês is used below in a quotation from Theophrastus at 107,32. 33. Again, this supplement is based on the assumption that for Themistius this fragment contributes to the solution of the problem raised about memory of a pre-existent state. Cf. also 108,30-1 for this as Themistius’ paraphrase of Theophrastus. 34. In addition, that is, to being puzzled by the critics mentioned at 101,36-7 who were responsible for the question dismissed at 102,17-18. 35. cf. Alexander, DA 88,17-91,6, the target of this celebrated attack. On the use of the plural for an individual see 1.2, n. 22 above. 36. At 102,11-13. 37. DA 2.2, 413b24-7. 38. See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, itself the subject of a paraphrase by Themistius. 39. On this reference to the sun as the supplier (khorêgos) of light see 26,1 above, the

Notes to pp. 128-132


paraphrase of 418b12-13 at 60,2-6, and also our discussion of 26,12-15 at 1.4, n. 28. The comment below (103,34-5) regarding Aristotle’s preference for light as the object of comparison with the productive intellect is also prefigured at 26,13-15, although the notion of unity is not introduced there. 40. The same problem was raised earlier in Book One for the possibility that each person has a separate soul that creates its life; see 26,31-9 with special reference to 26,36-9. 41. This identifies the particle ê at 103,32 as introducing a definitive solution to the preceding problem, not just a tentative suggestion, as it sometimes can. 109,5 below shows that the productive intellect is regarded as ‘illuminating’ the potential intellect. This is the major reason why Merlan (50, note) cannot be right in suggesting that 103,32-6 is ‘a marginal note by a reader critical of Themistius’. (Merlan too readily embraced the casual remark at Kurfess, 23, n. 26, about there being possible interpolations in Themistius’ paraphrase; that was an overreaction to the inevitably loose composition of this paraphrase, which may in part be due to its containing later accretions by Themistius himself.) Merlan’s concerns about the implications (so important in later Aristotelianism) of a plurality of productive intellects are legitimate enough, but cannot be addressed by such radical surgery. The real difficulty (see TGAC, 104, n. 121) is with the clause ‘and that illuminate’ (kai ellampontes, 103,32-3). For what do illuminated intellects go on to illuminate? 42. Republic 6, 508B-509B. But Plato also thinks that the light of the sun is what is crucial to visibility; cf. 508D4-6. 43. The phrase hekastôi hêmôn to einai would make more sense as a parallel to the various expressions used at 100,16-28 above if it were written to hekastôi hêmôn einai. Note Heinze’s apparatus at 100,28 where he makes just this kind of transposition. Whether or not we change the text here, the parallel with 100,19-20 makes it essential for us to read this as ‘what it is to be each of us’, i.e. what we really, or essentially, are. 44. At TGAC, 105, n. 126 I argued that these notions were explicated by the reference to definitions and axioms in the next sentence. Certainly the phrase can be used in this sense, rather than with reference to less formal concepts. For this interpretation to apply we must assume that the Platonic quotation below (104,3-6) is intended merely as an analogy for the functioning of formal disciplines (such as geometry), and that these must be implicitly identified at 104,6-14. 45. See TGAC, 105, n. 126. 46. Gorgias 481C5-D1. 47. This problem is discussed at Plotinus, 4.9[8]. 48. This position must have arisen from the critique in Book One of the view that a single soul establishes an ensoulment for individuals. See especially 26,39-27,5 where the possibility of a single intellect is raised instead of a soul that is the carrier of all the capacities. 49. cf. 103,24-6. 50. I omit Heinze’s addition of ti here (105,2) from the Aristotelian text. 51. cf. Themistius at 94,34-95,4 above. 52. At 101,5-6 above. 53. For the simile cf. Plato, Republic 435A1-2 and Ep. 7 344B1-C1. 54. This is more precise than saying that it is ‘more naturally cognate’ to the soul; cf. 98,34 above. 55. Timaeus 69C5-E4, based partly on Cornford’s translation. Themistius deviates slightly from the received Platonic text; see Heinze’s apparatus. At 69C7 he omits Plato’s reference to the body serving as a vehicle (okhêma), although he mentions the Neoplatonic doctrine of the ‘luminous vehicle’ of the soul at 19,33-4. 56. Timaeus 72D4. 57. cf. Phaedrus 245C5-246A2. 58. Plato is said to accept that movement is a species of activity at 18,33-5 above. 59. cf. Phaedo 72E2-77A5. 60. cf. Theaetetus 176B1-3. 61. 106,29-107,5 = Aristotle, Eudemus F38: 45,29-46,8 Rose. 62. The translation ‘affections’ for pathê, maintained here for consistency, breaks the etymological link with the ‘passive’ (or in this case ‘passionate’) intellect. We have to think of the affections being linked to the passive intellect.


Notes to pp. 132-135

63. For de houtôs ara (107,15) read Browne’s proposal (241) de houtôs alla based on the Arabic translation. 64. 107,17-18 = SVF 1.208 (= 3.382). 65. This echoes Timaeus 69C8 and 69D7 (= 106,18 and 24 above). 66. Phaedo 67B2. 67. Timaeus 69C5-6. 68. cf. Timaeus 41D1-2 and 69C6-7. ‘Destined to die’ (epikêros, 107,27) is not in the Timaeus. 69. cf. Timaeus 42E7-43A6. 70. Better, that is, than to quote Plato’s rather vaguer remarks. As a good scholastic, if not a Peripatetic, Themistius finds more exegetical help in the Peripatetic than in the Platonic tradition. 71. 107,30-108,18 = Theophrastus, 307A FHS&G. 72. The supplement here (and at 108,25 below) is based on the assumption that Themistius is reading Theophrastus in light of the same claim made about the potential intellect at 98,34 above. The same applies to the supplement at 107,36 below used to explicate the reference to a ‘first generation’. 73. For oude (107,34) read ouden in light of the Arabic translation (cf. Browne, pp. 241-2), a change that reflects 107,33 (as Browne notes), as well as 108,7. 74. At 108,3 I read asômatou (Barbotin, Hicks; con. Heinze; FHS&G) for sômatos. This follows the reading in a similar passage in Priscian (= 307C FHS&G, line 7). 75. I follow the punctuation in Hicks, Barbotin, and FHS&G, with a comma following noein rather than mê at 108,6. Cf. the similar contrast at DA 2.5, 417b24-26. (Heinze’s punctuation would mean ‘thinking and not thinking is in [the intellect’s] power, as with the senses’.) The clause kai me hôsper tais aisthêsesin is awkward, and that may be why de Falco (without explanation) omitted hôsper – aisthêsesin. That deletion, if such it is, might be supported from a Themistian perspective by 111,29-30 where the potential intellect is said to be able to think and not to think. 76. cf. the context of the earlier quotation from Theophrastus at 102,24-9 above. Also cf. 106,7-14 where the potential intellect is seen as an external intellect that precedes the actual intellect in the soul; 107,35-108,1 was perhaps support for this view. 77. 108,18-109,1 = Theophrastus, 320A FHS&G. 78. Aristotle, DA 430a10-12. 79. Aristotle, DA 430a18-19. 80. For d’oun hôs (108,26) I read d’ousia, proposed by Browne (242) on the basis of the Arabic version; the variant is apparently not in the Arabic in the earlier version of this passage at 102,28. It is supported by 108,32-4 where Theophrastus is taken to be proposing that the actual and potential intellects are a separate compound related as form to matter; also cf. Themistius at 49,9 above for the contemplative intellect spoken of as an ousia. 81. The productive intellect. 82. This term might also mean ‘lecture’. Book 3.6 1. cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4, 1b25-2a4. 2. cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4, 2a4-10, although the functioning of the intellect is not of course identified there. 3. This is almost certainly an echo of Aristotle, Metaph. 1040b9, where the context (1040b5-10) includes the same reference to unified parts of animals that Themistius develops out of Aristotle’s reference to Empedocles in the present text. 4. periagein seems to be an unusual verb in this kind of context. In a similar phrase at 110,2 below sunagein is used. 5. See 109,33-6 below where the intellect keeps two components separate before combining them; here Themistius is referring to the reverse process of separating such components after they have been combined. 6. The language used to expand Aristotle’s terse description of affirmation and negation reflects Int. 17a26-9.

Notes to pp. 135-138


7. sunkekhumenôs (109,33); cf. 122,11-12 where this term is used to characterize nonrational responses by animals. 8. There is a loosely translated version of 110,15-111,7 in John Philoponus’ commentary on de Anima 3.4-8 (extant only in Moerbeke’s translation); see 78,14-80,54 Verbeke (1966). For an English translation see Charlton (1991), 93-5. 9. lexis is a meaningful verbal act. It can cover terms or propositions, and their components (letters and syllables). See Aristotle, Poetics 1456b20-1, where it is standardly rendered as ‘diction’. Below (111,1-4) it is distinguished from phônê, which is the sound of speech considered without reference to meaning. In Stoic semantics, by contrast, phônê is used to identify inarticulate sound (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, 7.57) in contrast with lexis; here as elsewhere (e.g. in his use of pragma as the reference of a term, or prosêgoria [68,6]), Themistius is employing terminology to which Stoicism had given currency, without attention to its precise meaning within that system. Similarly, propheresthai (‘give voice’) used here at 110,21 and 29 is probably of Stoic origin; cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.57. 10. cf. 100,1 above where thinking is characterized generally as not ‘corresponding to successively different things’ (ouketi kat’allo kai allo). 11. The example introduced by Themistius of a word being thought of as undivided is probably based on Aristotle, Int. 16b28-32, where the same example of ‘human being’ (anthrôpos) is used, although there the point is that its separate syllables signify nothing. 12. For the contrast between the now in a strict sense and ‘the extended (en platei) now’ see Themistius, in Phys. 157,10. On the expression en platei see Sharples (1994), 91, n. 405. 13. The syntax of this sentence can be better defined by changing Heinze’s punctuation; I place a comma after horizetai (111,16), and put the clause oude  oikeian (111,17) in brackets rather than between stops. 14. cf. 30,32 above where this term is also used to characterize thinking. It may be remotely derived from its Epicurean use, but, like epereisis (111,26 below), has acquired a general validity. 15. Reading drattomenôi (proposed by Heinze in his apparatus ad 111,19) for the drattomena of the manuscripts. 16. Timaeus 52B2. 17. For anakhôrêsis as the contrary of what is achieved by deductive reasoning see 22,30 above. epereisis is used analogically; it may have had a use in Stoicism to describe the physical process of sense-perception (see Alexander, Mant. 130,22, 26,30; 131,22). 18. On this paragraph see TGAC, 122-3 with nn. 188-92. See Berti, 146, for an alternative interpretation that does not require the positing of a subject that thinks itself. 19. I take this to be the ‘divine intellect’ (theios nous), described at 114,34-115,9 below; cf. earlier 99,24-5. 20. I have deleted the second ou in 112,5 to make this sentence into a denial that an intellect dissociated from potentiality is more valuable just because its objects are thereby fewer. 21. cf. 109,5-6 above. 22. At 112,23 I read ta for the first to. 23. peri tauta at 112,23 is a prepositional phrase that regularly follows energein (‘be active’) to describe the activity of a capacity towards its object. Book 3.7 1. DA 431a1-4 (= 3.5, 430a19-21) is not commented on, although noted at 99,27-31, and 101,23-4 above. Other ancient commentators (see the apparatus criticus at Ross [1956] ad loc.) knew it as part of DA 3.7. For Themistius’ verbatim quotation of 431a4-7 see 28,34-29,1 above. 2. cf. 18,30-7 and 28,25-8 above on activity as a genus with the two kinds, the perfect (= activity), and the imperfect (= movement). Thus as an activity sense-perception is not a movement, but is an example of the other kind of perfected activity. At 112,29 ê has to be taken in the sense of ‘i.e.’ to ensure that it is identified as a ‘kind distinct from movement’. 3. energeia kai (112,31) is omitted with the Arabic version. Its deletion avoids making the conclusion that such an encounter is not a movement but an activity (112,32) superfluous.


Notes to pp. 139-143

The Arabic translation has the negative at 112,30 corresponding to oude that Heinze deleted and reads ‘so the mind’s encounter with thoughts is not the activity of one to whom accrues the natural disposition, as you would say the scholar’s encounter with data is not movement but activity’ (tr. Browne). Browne proposes adding energeia after êdê at 112,31. I prefer to retain Heinze’s deletion of oude. The hexis at 112,30 is not really a natural disposition but the precondition for thinking exemplified by someone thoroughly acquainted with a body of knowledge and able to actualize it at will (cf. 95,9-32 above). For the analogy between this condition and that actualized in sense-perception cf. Aristotle, DA 2.5, 417a22-5 and 417b1618. At 112,30-1 Themistius introduces it into his analogy between thinking and perceiving, and so hôsper  epibolê (112,31) is best read as a subordinate clause. In that way thinking and its illustration can be presented together as paralleling the case of sense-perception (112,26-7) in being an activity and not a movement. 4. cf. Aristotle, DA 3.1, 425a30-b4 (Themistius 82,23-31); the example of bile is used there too. 5. See 109,18-27 above. 6. At 113,15 read têi de to agathon for to de agathon following the suggestion by Browne (243) on the basis of the Arabic version. 7. This is the potential intellect; see 98,34-5 above, and on its reliance on images see 95,9-11 and 99,6-8. 8. ‘Willing’ here and subsequently is a verbal noun. 9. Themistius has omitted comment on 3.7, 431a17-b1. 10. For a briefer account of this comparison between disciplines see 1,14-17 above. 11. Reading hôs (after the Arabic translation) for hos at 115,6. See Browne, 243. 12. On Themistius’ characterization of the divine intellect in this paragraph see his paraphrase of Metaph. 12.7 and 9; some relevant passages from the Arabic version are translated in Pinès (1987), 180-6 who also (186-9) makes comparisons with the paraphrase of DA. See also TGAC, 129, n. 218. Book 3.8 1. For Alexander’s more programmatic version of this chapter see DA 91,7-92,11. 2. cf. 18,15 above where this Heraclitean phrase is used in a reductio ad absurdum of the view that movement is the defining characteristic of the soul. 3. The soul, that is, can absorb a plurality of forms and integrate them into a structure analogous to a musical harmony. 4. The productive intellect is called a ‘form of forms’ at 100,33 above, a claim that Aristotle makes of the intellect here at 432a2-3, although Themistius applies it to the soul as a whole, thereby incorporating Aristotle’s parallel statement that perception is the ‘form of the objects of perception’. 5. At 115,33 I have deleted hê as well as the gloss tês hulês deleted by Heinze. 6. cf. 46,8-9 above for the application of this idea just to animals of differing levels of complexity. 7. At 116,2 after pathê I read the supplement: alla ta men aphestêkota mallon tês hulês. It is based on the reading that Heinze quotes in his apparatus from Marcianus Graecus 261. Like him I favour aphestêkota over this manuscript’s aphistamena. I have also omitted hôsper before that participle since it is not figurative language as is sumpephurmena in the next clause. 8. Heinze supplied hôs at 116,5; I have omitted this and also followed de Falco (who follows Torraca) in omitting the definite articles before euôdes and dusôdes at 116,6. 9. For this illustration cf. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.96. 10. I read tauta at 116,18 with the manuscripts of Themistius. Heinze preferred talla (‘the other things’) with Aristotle at 432a13. Ross (1961), 310 has tauta in his text of Aristotle on Themistius’ authority. See now Magee, 108-9. 11. For peisis used, in essentially the same sense, and with no apology for being figurative, see Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.22, and Adv. Math. 7.384. It is cognate with pathos, the usual term for an affection of sense or feeling. 12. It would be best to understand nooiês (116,21) as though it were ennooiês, from ennoein,

Notes to pp. 143-146


the standard verb for forming a notion, or concept, of something (see above 36,33; 40,28; 88,2). Indeed the text could be easily emended to accommodate this required sense. 13. cf. above 92,19-23 on how animals with souls are affected by images. 14. At TGAC, 133, n. 236 tais ptôsesin exallattôn kai tois arthrois (116,23) was taken to mean inflections in nouns and definite articles. But Zimmermann (xxxiii, n. 4) argues convincingly that the clause should have a wider application to cover inflections in the forms of related nouns and verbs (cf., e.g., Aristotle, Top. 118a34-9), in the case of ptôseis, and logical as well as grammatical connectives in the case of arthra. There may be confirmation for the latter at 122,11 below. Book 3.9 1. Themistius’ paraphrase of DA 3.9-11 can be profitably compared with Alexander, DA 73,14-80,15, a more programmatic treatment of the capacity of motion that differs notably by introducing (at 76,16-78,2) related material from Aristotle, MA chs 7-8. 2. On this illustration see 37,21-3 above, with 1.5, n. 37. 3. ‘These’ are Plato or the Platonists; cf. above 37,4-6, and 93,33-94,2. 4. The image is probably borrowed from Alexander, DA 71,27, where hupobathra is used for ‘foundation’ instead of Themistius’ epibathra. For the latter ‘foundation’ rather than its commoner meanings of ‘ladder’ or ‘means of ascent’ seems to be required here. 5. Themistius’ account is unfavourably contrasted by scholars with that of Simplicius (in DA 291,5), who took diaspân (432b5) to mean the separation, and isolation, by Platonists of the capacity of desire from the other parts of the soul, although it already plays a role in the rational and non-rational parts. Themistius, however, takes diaspân to mean a dispersal rather than segregation. See Rodier (on 432b4) and Hicks (on 432b5). 6. i.e. 116,29 above. 7. This is Aristotle’s reference to discussions in treatises in the Parva Naturalia on sleep and respiration. 8. At 118,8 the supplement from the Arabic (see Browne, 243-4) must be read: ho men theorêtikos , ouden theôrei tôn praktôn etc. 9. Here Themistius has interpreted Aristotle’s pollakis dianoeitai phoberon ti  ou keleuei de phobeisthai (‘often [the intellect] thinks of something frightening  but does not enjoin fear’) at 432b30-1 in the Homeric sense of the verb ‘to fear’, where it means ‘to take flight’. This avoids the oddity of someone not fearing what they think of as frightening. Rodier (on 432b30) endorses his interpretation. Hicks thinks that the text makes sense as it stands, and implies that Themistius goes beyond it. Actually, Aristotle at DA 3.3, 427b21-4 identifies the general case of thinking that something is frightening without experiencing any corresponding emotion. Interestingly Themistius uses the same example of earthquakes and wild animals here (118,12) as he does in his paraphrase of that earlier text (89,17-18 above). 10. Themistius may be echoing Plato, Ion 535C7-8, although the language there is slightly different. These psychophysical responses are of course noted elsewhere in classical literature. For the leaping heart see, for example, Plato, Symposium 215E1-3; for hairs standing on end see Homer, Iliad 24.358-60, and Sophocles, Oedipus Coloneus 1624-5. See also Aeschylus, Choephori 32, for orthothrix (‘hair-raising’) as an epithet for a shriek. 11. The parenthesis represents an interesting Themistian suggestion about why we hesitate to perform an action. He implies that an agent can be immobilized by past habits, and this supplements Aristotle’s account of deliberation at EN 3.3, 1112a18-b15. 12. At 118,22 Themistius has either read, or substituted, the verb iatreuein for Aristotle’s iasthai (433a4). The latter verb unambiguously means ‘cure’, whereas the former need not carry this sense, and here probably refers to the general activity of practising medicine. Book 3.10 1. Thus both desire and reasoning are in relation to a shared object of desire relatives ‘of ’ something else (cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6b2-6), but also relative to one another in the sense that they are similar to one another (cf. Cat. 6b9-10). 2. For this see 119,9, and cf. 113,31-2.


Notes to pp. 146-148

3. The problem here, as in the source text, is that the translation ‘apparent’ puts all the emphasis on epistemological deficiency and severs the etymological and conceptual link with imagination (phantasia). This phrase could almost be translated ‘the imagined good’. Cf. 120,26 (= 433b12) where phantazesthai is used to describe how the object of desire is conceived. 4. That source was the pneuma that is the capacity for perception ‘in a primary sense’; see above 86,28-87,15 for the main account. There Themistius does not link the source of perception with the heart as he does the source of movement in respect of place at 121,7-9 below. 5. Homer, Iliad 3.110. 6. cf. Aristotle, Phys. 4.11, 219b1-2, 220a24-5. 7. I follow the Arabic version in reading antikrus at 120,19, and placing a comma rather than a stop after didous at 120,20; see Browne, 244. 8. On Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle on time see Sharples (1982), 68-71 and notes; the present passage should be added to Sharples (1982), 80, n. 71. 9. Here Themistius interprets the elliptical hê d’epithumia dia to êdê at 433b8 not as meaning that appetite restrains us in the same way as intellect, but that in contrast to the intellect it pursues its object. Rodier (on 433b7) endorses Themistius’ gloss, which is also reflected in Smith’s translation (‘epithumia is influenced by what is just at hand’). I have translated êdê (433b8 = 120,23) as ‘imminent’, i.e. hovering in the immediate future; see Rodier and Hicks on 433b7. 10. I follow the Arabic version in reading after eidei at 120,24; see Browne, 245. 11. Hicks (on 433b19) notes that the Greek commentators identify this corporeal instrument with the ‘connate pneuma’ (sumphuton pneuma) introduced by Aristotle at MA 703a928. But he is wrong to include the present passage from Themistius, although this commentator refers elsewhere (see 86,32 and 87,4 above) to this pneuma. He might have added that Alexander, DA 77,5-15, in his version of Aristotle, DA 3.9-11 drew on that passage from MA. 12. ho peri tên kardian topos. This does not mean ‘the area around the heart’ (‘la regione che è intorno al cuore’, de Falco). The prepositional phrase peri tên kardian does duty simply as a genitive case. This is a usage with classical and Aristotelian precedent (see Stevens, 212-13), and has recently been documented for Cleomedes (see Goulet, 234-5). The sentence toioutos – estin at 121,7 is in fact lifted verbatim from Alexander, DA 94,19 (= 40,1-2), where it involves a claim about the nutritive capacity; in both cases the position of the heart is not at issue, and so the peri phrase may be more loosely used, but in the mechanics of locomotion position is crucial, and at Alexander, DA 97,24-5 (cf. next note) the phrase in question here obviously refers to the position of the heart itself, not some pericardial area. 13. cf. Alexander, DA 97,23-8, Themistius’ source for this parenthetical remark; cf. preceding note. Book 3.11 1. It seems best to begin the paraphrase of ch. 11 here rather than at 122.5 (= 433b31sq.), as Heinze (following Spengel) does. This provides a clearer indication of Themistius’ reordering of Aristotle’s exposition in 3.11. He seems to have converted hôsper eirêtai (DA 11, 434a6) (a reference back to DA 10, 433b29-30) into a verbatim restatement of DA 10, 433b27-9, while omitting 433b29-30 and moving straight on to its recapitulation at 434a5-7. 433b31-434a5 is then postponed until near the end of the paraphrase of DA 11 at 122,5-14 below. 2. cf. above 433a9-11 with Themistius, 118,27-9. 3. The relation between paraphrase and Aristotelian text is particularly complicated here because of editorial responses to the text. It would be rash to conclude much more than that Themistius sought to fit this elliptical text into an ongoing argument, and that at 434a11-12 he may not have had a text in which desire (orexis) was said not to involve to bouleutikon (the deliberative capacity), but probably read to boulêtikon (the capacity for willing). This allows him to describe the desires of rational animals as both rational and irrational. 4. Here ‘mere [literally ‘simple’] imagination’ is haplê phantasia, a phrase used, for

Notes to p. 149


example, by Alexander, Fat. 15, 186,6-8 to describe the appearances (‘appearance’ is in many ways preferable in the present context) to which irrational animals respond involuntarily and uncritically. They are ‘simple’ in the sense that they have none of the compound structure associated with practical reasoning; see the gloss on 434a4-5 at 122,10-13 below. Cf. also Alexander, DA 73,7-9 for a description of involuntary assent epi tois haplois (‘to simples’) where this means merely noting that something is or is not present. In both these texts Alexander distinguishes this involuntary reaction from free and rational choice in a way that seems to reflect DA 3.11, although his wider purpose is not exegetical but polemical against Stoic determinism; see Sharples (1983), 139-40, who discusses the extent to which the Stoics also acknowledged the status of animal-like assent. The same concept is also present in ancient Scepticism, but in a more complex way since it involves human assent. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.22 is representative, and for discussion see Burnyeat (1980) passim. For the contrast between the appearances available to humans and animals drawn by the Sceptics’ dogmatic opponents (such as Peripatetics) see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 8.276 (where the expression haplê phantasia is used), and cf. Adv. Math. 8.288. 5. The verb here, sumperiagein, is used in exactly this astronomical sense by Theon of Smyrna, Expositio rerum mathematicarum, 151,10 Hiller. 6. For a recent discussion of this image, which also contrasts Themistius’ interpretation with that of other commentators, see Hutchinson (1990), especially at 17-18. 7. Reasonably enough Themistius presents this aporia as a secondary issue, subordinate to the wider account of desire at 434a10-15. 8. The reference at 434a1 to undeveloped animals having only a sense of touch is reasonably enough omitted as gratuitous at this point. 9. cf. above 121,21 on 434a5-7. 10. This corresponds to Aristotle 434a4-5, and the adverb aoristôs translated here ‘in an unfocussed way’ is also his. Commentators are rightly puzzled by it, but it is clearly a remark confined to the ratiocinative powers of animals, as Themistius’ gloss (see next note) correctly implies. In other words, Aristotle is not saying that the motion of animals is inherently ‘indeterminate’ (the favoured translation), but that it is not based on any articulately defined limit (horos) or ‘focus’, and so may be subject to abrupt changes. ps.-Philoponus (in DA 592,27-9) could only come up with zoöphytes (minimal animals) as an example of inherently random animal motion. 11. ‘Unstructured’ is adiarthrôtos (122,11). The term is used elsewhere in a biological sense to describe an ‘unarticulated’ organism (e.g. Aristotle, PA 660b33), but it would perhaps be better here if, instead of being metaphorical, it could carry a genuinely logical sense of ‘unconnected’, reflecting the possible meaning of arthron at 116,23 above; see 3.8, n. 14. Its partner here, ‘conflated’ (sunkekhumenos), would then identify the failure of animals to reason sequentially (cf. its use at 109,33-4 above, and see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 8.276 with n. 4 above). 12. This sentence, with which Heinze began a new paragraph at 122,14, is best kept as the conclusion of the preceding paragraph. 13. Themistius makes disappointingly little effort to elaborate this important and suggestive text. Notably, he just repeats Aristotle’s remark about the universal belief being ‘more at rest’ (434a20-1), without any attempt to unpack the metaphor. Book 3.12 1. Hutchinson (1987) has argued that DA 3.12 and 13 were probably originally located between DA 2.4 and 2.5. As we have seen (2.5, n. 15), Themistius does show some signs of unease with the structure of Book Two, but here he shows no qualms about the abrupt transition from 3.11 to 3.12. Alexander, DA 92,12-94,6 offers a programmatic rationale of those aspects of 3.12-13 that deal with the relation between the capacities of the soul, and so implies that these chapters are a summation of the whole system of capacities in the de Anima. But he also discusses the capacity for motion before the intellect; i.e. he deals with 3.9-13 (at DA 73,14-80,15) before presenting his version of 3.4-8 (at DA 80,16-92,11). 2. Here and subsequently I have translated the terms usually rendered ‘perishing’ or


Notes to pp. 150-152

‘perishable’ (phthora, phthartos) as ‘death’ or ‘can die’, since that is what ‘perishing’ is for an animal in the biological context of these chapters. 3. The bracketed clause oute  zôion at 434a28-9 was not read by Themistius and some other Greek commentators. 4. ‘Single element’ translates ‘simple’ or ‘uncompounded’ body (haploun sôma), since here and later the focus is on the status of such a body as an element. This is made explicit at 125,2-4 in the way that 435a11-12 is paraphrased. 5. Here Themistius is responding to 434a29-30 where Aristotle denies touch to ‘those things [i.e. plants] which are incapable of receiving the forms without their matter’. He reasonably enough rephrases it in light of its earlier statement at DA 2.12, 424b1-3, and his own paraphrase at 78,30-79,2. See also Hicks (on 434a28). 6. At 122,33 the text must either read engus haplou (cf. 122,30) or engus haploun (cf. 125,20-1 below). engus haplou, printed by Heinze, is too awkward a way of describing the component of the body of plants. 7. For the distinction see 44,35-45,2 above. 8. Literally this means ‘from nearby’, but while in Greek this adverb connotes close proximity, this English equivalent implies some distance between a plant and its nutriment, whereas the point is that it is directly accessible, like a drip-feed (cf. epirrheousan, 123,5 translated ‘channelled’ here). 9. This supplement is derived from the Arabic version. After stoikheiôn (123,6) read hôsper ta phuta enguthen ekhei kai ek tôn stoikheiôn. See Browne, 245. 10. The further reference at 434a32 to some things being ‘adjuncts’ (sumptômata) of nature’s purpose is postponed until 123,23-4 below. 11. Themistius has been criticized for identifying the goal referred to at 434b1 as the continuation of the species. See Hicks (on 434b1), and Barnes (1987), 64 who, unlike Hicks, is also unsympathetic to later commentators who identified this goal as survival. Barnes sees this text as further evidence of what he terms Aristotle’s ‘soteriological epistemology’ whereby our cognitive capacities match the external world. 12. Literally ‘as prior’ (proteran, 123,16), i.e. biologically so. 13. Themistius has transformed this text so as to produce a contrast between created and uncreated animals. The crucial move is in not taking the clause alla – genêton at 4-5 parenthetically, as do some modern editors (some of whom also delete it), and then in not having a negative (as Ross [1956] does) in the question at 434b5. Thus his Aristotle is saying: ‘But still an uncreated thing does not [have sensation]. For why will it?’ The commentator then provides a full answer at 123,26-32. See Hicks (on 434b4) for a doxography of commentators’ readings of this text. 14. cf. 434a31-b1 above with 123,10-13. 15. Themistius is highlighting Aristotle’s term at 434a32. He implies that it is unusual in this sense, and he may have been aware of its use in Epicureanism to describe secondary properties; see, for example, Epicurus, Hdt. 70. 16. At 123,34 I have supplied gennêta kai. Cf. 122,22, and 123,4-5. 17. This is actually the definition of being ‘in succession’ (ephexês), rather than being ‘in contact’ (haptesthai); see Aristotle, Phys. 5.3, 226b34-227a1, and 6.1, 231a21-3. 18. See 2.12, n. 9 above. 19. The parenthesis is by Themistius, and envisages a form of squeezing and stretching that would depend on the relative density of the objects in the series. He may have been thinking of the description of movement at 3.10, 433b22-7 where he himself glossed ôsis (‘pushing’) and helxis (‘pulling’) as expansion and compression (121,14). 20. At 435a1-2 Themistius takes menontos en tôi autôi topôi (the text without Ross’ emendation) to refer to the object of perception (the aisthêton), and has been rightly criticized (Hicks, 582; Siwek, 352, n. 810) for thereby failing to distinguish alteration from the form of local motion with which it is being contrasted at the beginning of the passage (434b29-435a1). It must rather be the recipient of motion, the perceiver, who remains in the same place.

Notes to pp. 152-154


Book 3.13 1. This logos is presumably Book Three, chs 12 and 13, considered as a unit. 2. haploun has to be translated literally since Themistius seems proccupied with glossing the term used only once by Aristotle at 435a11. To translate it interpretively as ‘uncompounded’ would undermine his purpose. 3. cf. 125,21-32 below; there is no reference to this fifth element in the Aristotelian text. 4. cf. above 423a15-17 with Themistius 73,26-31. 5. Taste is omitted, and implictly subsumed under touch. 6. cf. above 423b12-17 with Themistius 75,10-19. 7. This excursus is anticipated at 44,22-4 above (cf. also 46,4-6) in an aside on the existence of the intellect ‘among divine natures’ without either the vegetative capacity or that of sense-perception. 8. cf. 125,2 (on 435a11) above, and 122,21-2. Cf. also 123,20-35. 9. One might have expected ‘sound’ as the object of perception corresponding to hearing. 10. This aside perhaps means that perception would be unerring, and in some way instinctual, rather like the cow at Lucretius, 2.352-66 who senses her missing calf. 11. This is a reference to the Stoics. They identified the uppermost element in their cosmology as aithêr or a fiery body, and claimed that it was nourished by exhalations from the waters on the earth. It was an animal insofar as the whole cosmos for the Stoics was alive. For some representative evidence for this theory see SVF 2.663 and 2.690; also Cicero, de Natura Deorum 2.83 (with Pease’s note ad loc.). 12. The clause an mê kata sumbebêkos at 435b9-10 is postponed until the summation at 126,7-8. 13. Aristotle refers to the plêgê (435b11) that is produced by a sound, and this is reflected in Themistius’ use of eplêxen (‘strikes’) (126,5). Then in expanding the reference to destructive visual effects (horamata, 435b11), he uses the compound form of that verb, exeplêxe (126,5) that can cover both physical and mental shock. He might have recalled at this point DA 3.3, 427b21-2 with his gloss at 89,14-16. 14. This felicitous translation of ta kuria merê (126,7) was suggested by a reader. It is justifiable since Themistius is using a term from Aristotelian biology (e.g. GA 744b31, 745a13), where it does indeed identify the parts of an animal that are essential for life. 15. cf. above 434b22-5 with Themistius, 124,17-21.

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English-Greek Glossary abstraction: aphairesis absurd: atopos accrue: prosginesthai action: praxis active (be active): energein activity: energeia, ergon actuality: energeia (see ‘entelechy’) actual (in actuality): energeiâi, entelekheiâi (dative), kat’energeian add: prostithenai adequate: hikanos affected (be affected): paskhein affection: pathos, pathêma affinity: sungeneia aim: skopos air: aêr alien to: allotrios altered, be: alloiousthai alteration: alloiôsis always (in all cases): dia pantos amass (be amassed): sunathroizesthai analogous: analogon anger: orgê animal: zôion animals, blooded: zôia enaima; bloodless: zôia anaima; hard-eyed: zôia sklêrophthalma; non-rational: zôia aloga; land-based: zôia peza; winged: zôia ptêna antecedent (of a conditional): hêgoumenon appear: phainesthai appetite: epithumia apprehend: antilambanesthai argument: logos assent (n.): sunkatathesis assent (v.): sunkatatithesthai assert: apophainesthai assertion: kataphasis assimilation (of food): proskrisis be assimilated: proskrinesthai assume: hupotithesthai assumption: hupothesis attune: harmozein attunement: harmonia audible: akoustos avoid: pheugein avoidance: phugê aware (be aware of): ginôskein bad: kakos become: ginesthai being: to einai

belief: hupolêpsis believe: dokein, oiesthai, hupolambanein belong to: huparkhein (with dative) belonging to: oikeios bird: ornis bitter: pikros black: melas blend (n.): krasis, kirnan blend (v.): kerannunai blood: haima blooded: enaimos bloodless: anaimos blunt: amblus body: sôma boil (v.): zein boiling: zesis bone: ostoun breadth: platos breathe: anapnein (see: inhale, exhale) breathing: anapnoê (see: inhalation, exhalation) calculate (rationally): logizesthai calculation (rational): logismos call (i.e. apply a name or term): epikalein, kalein, legein, prosagoreuein can, be able: dunasthai capacity (of soul): dunamis; for desire: orektikê; for discrimination: kritikê; for imagination: phantastikê; for movement in respect of place: kinêtikê kata topon; for nutrition: threptikê; for reasoning: logikê; for reproduction: gennêtikê; for sense-perception: aisthêtikê, antilêptikê; for thinking: noêtikê; for touching: haptikê; vegetative: phutikê (capacity of soul): for appetite: to epithumêtikon; for deliberation: to bouleutikon; for desire: to orektikon; for emotion: to thumikon; for growth: to auxêtikon; for hearing: to akoustikon; for imagination: to phantastikon; for movement in respect of place: to kinêtikon kata topon; for nutrition: to threptikon; for rational calculation: to logistikon; for reproduction: to gennêtikon; for seeing: to horatikon; for sense-perception: to aisthêtikon; for showing spirit: to thumikon; for smelling: to osphrantikon; for thinking to noêtikon; for touching: to haptikon

English-Greek Glossary cause (see: explanation, reason): aitia, aition change (v.): metaballein, trepesthai change place: metabainein change (n.): metabolê, tropê circle: kuklos claim: apophainesthai, legein clarity: saphêneia clear: dêlos, phaneros, saphês cognate, naturally: sumphuês coincide: epharmozein, suntrekhein cold: psukhros coldness: psukhrotês, to psukhron colour (n.): khrôma colour (v.): khrômatizein combination: sumplokê, sunthesis combine: sumplekein, suntithenai coming into existence: genêtos common: koinos (see ‘definition’) common usage: sunêtheia compatible (nutriment): oikeios complete (adj.): holoklêros compound: sunkeimenon, sunolon, suntheton concede: sunkhôrein conceive (mentally): epinoein conclude: sumperainein conclusion: sumperasma conditional: sunêmmenon conflict (logically): makhesthai consequent (of a conditional): hepomenon, lêgon consequence (be a consequence): hepesthai constitute (trans.): sunistanai, kataskeuazein contact (n.): thixis contact (v.): thinganein contemplate: theôrein contemplation: theôria continuous: sunekhês continuous (naturally): sumphuês contribute: suntelein corporeal: sômatikos craft: tekhnê criticize: enkalein darkness: skotos decline (n.): pthisis decline (v.): phthinein deficiency: elleipsis define: horizein, horizesthai, diorizein, apodidonai definition: logos, horismos, horos; common: koinos logos; most widely-shared: koinotatos logos in definition: logôi deliberate (v.): bouleuesthai demonstrate: apodeiknunai, epideiknunai, deiknunai demonstration: apodeixis denial: apophasis


depth: bathos desire (n.): orexis desire (v.): oregesthai destroy: phtheirein (active; for passive see ‘perish’) destruction: phthora destructive: phthartikos developed (biologically): teleios differentia: diaphora difficult: khalepos digestion: pepsis discern: krinein discernment, discrimination: krisis discriminate: krinein, diakrinein discussion: logos dispersal: thrupsis disperse: thruptein distinction: diaphora be distinct from: diapherein distinguish: diorizein divide: diairein divided: diairetos divided into parts: meristos divine: theios division: diairesis division into parts: merismos divine: theios doctor: iatros doctrine: doxa drinkable: potos dry: xêros dryness: xêrotês, to xêron ear: ous ear-drum: mêninx earth: gê element: stoikheion (see: uncompounded bodies) emotion: thumos end: telos enforced: biaios enmattered: enulos ensouled, having a soul: empsukhos ensoulment: empsukhia entelechy: entelekheia entity: pragma envisaged, be: theôreisthai equal: isos essence: ousia, to ti ên einai essential: anankaios eternal: aïdios evade: pheugein evident: dêlos, enargês, phaneros examine: exetazein excess: huperbolê exhalation: ekpnoê exhale: ekpnein exist: einai, huparkhein; pre-exist: proüparkhein exist, really: huphistasthai existing things: ta onta


English-Greek Glossary

existence, come into: ginesthai existence, coming into: genesis existence, real: hupostasis explanation: aitia, aition external, from without: exôthen extract: eklambanein eye: ophthalmos eyeball: korê eyelid: blepharon false: pseudês fire: pur fish: ikhthus flavour: khumos flesh: sarx follow: akolouthein, hepesthai foot: pous foreign (body): allotrios forerunner: prodromos form: eidos, idea forms, enmattered: eidê enula; non-material: eidê aüla friable: psathuros function: ergon future (n.): to mellon in general: holôs genus: genos god: theos gold: khrusos gold-coloured: xanthos good: agathos grasp: katalambanein, lambanein group together: sunagein growth: auxêsis happen: sumbainein hairs: trikheis hand: kheir hard: sklêros harm: blaptein hate: misein have: ekhein, huparkhein (with dative case) head: kephalê hearing: akoê, to akouein hearing, organ of: akoê heart: kardia heat: thermotês, to thermon heavenly: ouranios heavens: ouranos heavy: barus help: ôphelein hexis: hexis hot: thermos hold together: sunekhein horse: hippos human being: anthrôpos hunger: peina illuminate: ellampein image: phantasma

imagine: phantazesthai imagination: phantasia immortal: athanatos impact: plêgê imperfect: atelês imperishable: aphthartos implicate: sunephelkesthai implication: akolouthia implied: akolouthos impossible: adunatos imprint (usually sensory): tupos (see: residue, trace) imprint, receive an: anamattesthai impulse: hormê inanimate (without soul): apsukhos incidentally: kata sumbebêkos incidental properties: ta sumbebêkota, ta huparkhonta include: perilambanein, sunephelkesthai incompatible (nutriment): allotrios incontinence: akrasia incontinent: akratês incorporeal: asômatos indicate: dêloun individually: idiâi individuals: ta kath’hekasta ingenious: glaphuros inhalation: anapnoê inhale: anapnein inherent (belonging to): oikeios inquire: zêtein, epizêtein inquiry: zêtêsis, zêtêma inseparable: akhôristos insight: gnôsis intellect: nous; common: koinos; contemplative: theôrêtikos; actual: energeiâi (dative); divine: theios; enmattered: enulos; from without: exôthen; passive: pathêtikos; potential: dunamei; practical: praktikos; productive: poiêtikos intend: mellein investigation: theôria, skepsis investigate: episkeptesthai, theôrein involved in, be: apolauein, sunapolauein iron: sidêros irradiate: ellampein judgment, practical: phronêsis; exercise: phronein; endowed with: phronimos juxtapose: paratithenai juxtaposition: parathesis kind: eidos; of the same kind: homoeidês, sungenês know: epistasthai, ginôskein, gnôrizein know, come to: gignôskein, gnôrizein knowledge: epistêmê knowledge, body of: epistêmê knowledge, person with: epistêmôn known: gnôrimos

English-Greek Glossary large: megas learn: manthanein length: mêkos life: zôê light (n.): phôs light (adj.): kouphos like: homoios line: grammê link: sunaptein live (be alive): zên liver: êpar living things: zônta long: makros love: philein low-pitched: barus lung: pneumôn magnitude: megethos make: poiein matter: hulê; enmattered: enulos; non-material: aülos maturity: akmê mean (n.): mesotês mean (v.): sêmainein medium: to meson, to metaxu; smell-medium: to diosmon; sound-medium: to diêkhes membrane: humên metaphorically: kata metaphoran; use metaphorically: metapherein method: methodos mix: mignunai mixture: mixis moist: hugros moistness: hugrotês, to hugron moon (n.): selênê mortal: thnêtos move (trans.): kinein move (intrans.), be moved: kineisthai, pheresthai movement: kinêsis, phora; cause: kinein; forward movement: poreia, poreutikê kinêsis; in respect of place (= locomotion): kinêsis/kineisthai kata topon must, be necessary: dei name (n.): onoma name (v.): onomazein natural: phusikos naturally: kata phusin, phusei naturally continuous: sumphuês naturally fitted, be: pephukenai Nature (personified): phusis nature (of something): phusis; by nature: kata phusin, hupo phuseôs; contrary to nature: para phusin necessary: anankaios noise: psophos non-material: aülos non-rational: alogos nostril: muktêr


notion: ennoia; form a notion: ennoein now, the: to nun number, in number: arithmos, arithmôi nourish (trans.): trephein nourish (intrans.): trephesthai nutriment: trophê; self-nutrition: di’hautou trephesthai object(s), of perception: aisthêton/a, hupokeimenon/a; common: koina; incidental: kata sumbebêkos; in themselves: kath’hauta; special: idion; of desire: orekton; of hearing: akouston; of sight: horaton; of smell: osphranton; of taste: geuston; of touch (tangible): hapton observe: horan, theôrein obvious: dêlos, saphês odd: thaumastos opinion: doxa opine, hold an opinion: doxazein opposite: enantios opposites: ta enantia opposites, pair of: enantiôsis organ: organon, (sense) organ: aisthêsis, aisthêtêrion; of hearing: akoê; of sight: opsis; of smell: osmê; of taste: geusis; of touch: haphê having organs: organikos pain: lupê painful: lupêros palate: huperôia paraphrase: paraphrasis part: meros, morion; divided into parts: meristos particulars: ta kath’hekasta particular thing: tode ti partless: amerês past: to parelêluthos peculiar (= proprietary): idios perceive: aisthanesthai, antilambanesthai perception: aisthêsis, antilêpsis perfect (v.): teleioun perfect (adj.), perfected: teleios perfection (state of): teleiotês perfection (process of): teleiôsis perhaps: isôs perish: phtheiresthai perishing: phthora perishable: phthartos philosopher: philosophos philosophy: philosophia phonetic act: phônê place: topos (see: space) plane: epipedon plant: phuton plausible: pithanos pleasant: hêdus pleasure: hêdonê plurality: plêthos pneuma: pneuma


English-Greek Glossary

point: stigmê posit: tithesthai position: thesis, topos possess: ekhein possible: dunatos posterior: husteron potentiality: dunamis potential, in potentiality: dunamei, kata dunamin practical: praktikos presence: parousia present (n.): to paron preserve: sôzein primarily (in a primary sense): kuriôs principle, first-principle: arkhê prior: proteron privation: sterêsis problem: aporia problem, work through a: diaporein problem, raise a: aporein produce: poiein productive: poiêtikos (see: intellect) propose: protithesthai proprietary: idios, oikeios pursue: diôkein pursuit: diôxis push: ôthein puzzled, be: thaumazein qualification, without: haplôs quality: poiotês rarefied: leptomerês ratio: logos rational: logikos; non-rational: alogos really: ontôs reason (n.): logos reason (= explanation): aitia, aition reasonable: eulogos reasonably: eikotôs receive: dekhesthai, lambanein receiving, capable of: dektikos recognize: gnôrizein recollection: anamnêsis reflect (light): anaklan reflection: anaklasis reject (in argument): anairein remember: mnêmoneuein, memnêsthai report: angellein, eisangellein reproduce: gennan reproduction, capable of: gennêtikos residue (sensory): enkataleimma rest (n.): êremia rest, be at: êremein result: sumbainein reveal: mênuein ridiculous: geloios ring (n.): daktulion root: rhiza rough: trakhus

same in kind: homoeidês say: legein, phanai seal (on signet-ring): sphragis see: horan seeing: to horan, horasis sense (n.): aisthêsis sense (of a word): tropos sense-impression: aisthêma sense-organ: aisthêtêrion sense-perception: aisthanesthai, aisthêsis separate (v.): khôrizein, diistanai separate (adj.): khôristos, kekhôrismenon shape: skhêma show: deiknunai, dêloun sign (n.): sêmeion signet-ring: sphragis sight: opsis sight, organ of: opsis signify: sêmainein sinew: neuron size: megethos skill: tekhnê small: smikros smell (n.): osmê smell (v.): osmasthai smooth: leios soft: malakos solution (to a problem): lusis solve (a problem): apoluesthai, epiluesthai soul: psukhê; (having, not having): empsukhos, apsukhos; belonging to: psukhikos soul (having a capacity): see: capacity sound: psophos, phthongos sound, make a: phônein source: arkhê space: khôra special: idios (of objects of perception) species: eidos sphere: sphaira spirit, show: thumousthai spirit, spiritedness: thumos stamp (produced by a seal): glumma state (v.): legein, phanai state, state of possession: hexis statement: logos stone: lithos strictly, in a strict sense: kuriôs, prôtôs strike: plêttein strong: iskhuros structure (n.): morphê structure (v.): morphoun substance: ousia substrate: hupokeimenon suggest: hupopheresthai suitable: epitêdeios supply: khorêgein surface: epiphaneia surround: periekhein sweet: glukus swift: takhus

English-Greek Glossary syllable: sullabê tangible: haptos taste (v.): geuesthai taste (n.): geusis teach: didaskein terminate: teleutan theory: logos thing: pragma think: noein think discursively: dianoeisthai think (exercise intellect): theôrein think (believe): dokein, oiesthai thinking: noêsis, theôria thirst: dipsa thought: noêma thought, discursive: dianoia throat: pharunx thunder: brontê time: khronos tongue: glôtta tooth: hodous total: holos, pas touch (n.): haphê touch (v.): haptesthai, ephaptesthai trace (sensory): ikhnos (see: imprint, residue) transparency: to diaphanes transparent: diaphanês tree: dendron true: alêthês unaffected: apathês


unassimilable: allotrios uncompounded: haplous uncompounded bodies (= elements): hapla sômata understand: lambanein undeveloped (biologically): atelês undivided: adiairetos, amerês unique: idios unit: monas universal, in universal terms: katholou universe: kosmos, to pan use: khrêsthai utterance: phônê valid (logically): hugiês valuable: timios variety: diaphora viscous: liparos voice: phônê volume: onkos water: hudôr wax: kêros well-being: eu einai white: leukos whole: holos willing: boulêsis, boulesthai windpipe: artêria winged: see: animals wish: boulesthai wishing: boulêsis without qualification: haplôs wooden: xulinos

Greek-English Index A complete Index Verborum for a paraphrase of a text is unnecessary. A paraphrast inevitably repeats, and usually augments (or in Themistius’ case often inflates), the language of the original. Since there is a thorough modern index of Aristotle’s de Anima (G. Purnelle [ed.], Aristote, De Anima: Index Verborum, Listes de fréquence, Liège 1988 [Fascicule 14 of the Série du Laboratoire d’Analyse Statistique des Langues Anciennes, Centre Informatique de Philosophie et Lettres, Université de Liège]), the reader of this translation can use it, along with the Aristotelian references provided in the present translation, to locate places where Themistius will be following Aristotle closely. Yet an index to this paraphrase cannot consist only of words that do not appear in the de Anima. In some cases (e.g. entelekheia, ergon, pragma, hupokeimenon, teleios), Themistius expands Aristotelian usage in interesting ways. In others (notably nous and its epithets), his use and expansion of Aristotelian language is of particular historical interest, and the reader will want to be guided to it. In still others (e.g. diaphora, idios, phusis, ousia), different senses need definition (although not always exhaustively) as a supplement to the Glossary. Accordingly, the present index is a selection that consists of all significant items in Themistius’ paraphrase that are not to be found in the de Anima, along with those from the de Anima judged to be of special importance. (Some of the latter are included to illustrate the scope of paraphrastic repetition. In all such cases the relative frequency of the word in the de Anima and in the paraphrase is recorded in brackets, with the Aristotelian figure given first.) The procedure adopted here means that a number of terms that are simply repeated by Themistius in their Aristotelian sense are not fully recorded: e.g. psukhê, aisthanesthai (and some related terms), hulê, megethos, paskhein, poiein; some terms for bodily organs, for sensory capacities and their objects, and for elements and their qualities. This economizing has the practical goal of keeping this index within reasonable limits. I have, however, usually cited all the instances of terms (or senses) that are recorded (whether from the de Anima or not). The wide diffusion of the CD-ROM of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (from which, with the generous help of Christopher S. Morrissey, I created a concordance of the in DA) obviously makes such a customized index no obstacle to further study of this author’s language. References are to the page and line numbers of the CAG text.

adêlos, unclear, non-evident, 7,6; 23,13; 43,23; 46,2; 65,38; 73,19; 89,9; 125,3 adiablêtos, disproved, 6,28 adiairetos, undivided, 21,18; 31,33; 85,31.32; 86,; 110, 12(bis).; 111, adianoêtos, inconceivable, 32,21 adiarthrôtos, unstructured, 122,11 adunatein, be incapable, be unable, 62,34; 63,17; 114,15; 124,9 adunaton, impossible (in reasoning), 5,9; 14,33.38; 16,12; 21,34; 27,18; 33,18; 34,25; 46,3; 62,14; 69,24; 71,33; 73,21; 74,12; 79,14.16; 81,29; 85,31; 86,14; 91,11; 122,24; 123,16; to adunaton, (the term) ‘impossible’, 71,21; ta adunata, (physical) impossibilities, 90,26.32

aerinos, consisting of air, 73,25; 76,12; 125,3 agathos, good (adj.), 90,35.37(bis); 112,20; 113,5.7.36; 119,22(bis),23; 120,24; ameinôn (comp.), 30,26; 51,14; 88,27; 107,30, 112,6; 119,15; 125,26.28; beltiôn (comp.), 11,6; 23,9.11.20; 34,; 35,38.39; 36,12; 49,10; 66,34; 112,35; 113,27.31; 124,35; kreittôn (comp.), 121,37; 122,2; beltistos (superl.), 16,39; to agathon, the good (n.), 33,20(bis); 88,4; 111,23; 112,19; 113,; 114,6.8; 119,19.20.26; 120,30.31.33; to phainomenon agathon, the apparent good, 119,20 agein, bring, 24,17; (pass.), be attracted (= helkein), 121,27; be advanced (to having

Greek-English Index a form) (cf. Alexander, DA 85,4), 40,10; hup’arithmon agein, enumerate, 103,12 ageustos, unable to be tasted, 69,2; 71,7.15.17 agnoein, be ignorant, 6,15; 8,1; 18,20; 34,12; be mistaken, 88,1.3 agnoia, ignorance, 6,15; 34,11; 55,27.33; 56,10(bis); mistake, 88,4 agôgê, proof (in a formalized argument), 6,11 aïdios, eternal, 5,19; 19,5; 22,15.16; 46,5; 50,17; 59,14; 99,38; 101,26.31; 102,13.17.36; 103,8.10.11; 119,24; 123,20.24 aïdiotês, eternity, 50,18; 103,26 aisthanesthai (94/113), perceive, engage in sense-perception; kata sumbebêkos aisthanesthai, perceive incidentally, 81,21.28.29; 82,20 aisthêma, sense-impression, 89,30; 92,30.40; 113,15.34; 116,9 aisthêsis (148/365), sense-perception, a perception, organ of perception; (plu.) sense-impressions (= aisthêmata), 83,28 aisthêtikê (dunamis), capacity for sense-perception, 7,18; 10,32; 30,22; 38,29; 41,8; 44,27.33; 45,20; 47,10.12; 48,24; 82,3; 85,29; 86,6.19; 92,2.39; 94,35; 96,12; 104,19.24; 112,25; 113,28; 122,26; 123,35 aisthêtikon (to), capacity for sense-perception, 4,20; 28,35; 43,5; 45,34; 48,34; 49,17; 54,31; 56,30; 75,14; 84,7.14; 104,31; 105,3.7; 118,1; 119,32 aisthêtikos, having a capacity for sense-perception, 3,26; 4,4.6; 14,1; 17,29; 37,3; 55,1; 56,16; 64,29.31; 80,15.21; 95,33; 100,29; 113,23.25; 120,6; 121,21(bis); prôton aisthêtikon, prôtôs aisthêtikê, primary capacity for sense-perception, 86,24.32; 87,4 aisthêtos (56/120), ta kath’hauta aisthêta, objects of perception in themselves, 57,15.16; 58,5-6.17; kath’hekasta aisthêta, individual objects of perception, 99,4; aisthêta kata sumbebêkos, incidental objects of perception, 57,15-16; 58,5.8; 82,15; see also idios and koinos aitêma, assumption, 60,33 aitia, explanation, cause, 7,10.12; 9,22.30; 13,7; 14,13; 17,24; 23,14.25; 25,21; 27,35; 28,10; 32,10.31; 34,2.17; 35,22.37.39; 36,22.35; 37,2.15; 40,6; 44,3.33; 46,19; 50,; 51,15.20.35; 53,7; 60,37; 61,21; 62,26.35; 63,14; 69,21; 83,4; 101,16; 113,3; 115,20; 123,2.21 aition, explanation, cause, 10,5; 23,19; 42,19; 44,7; 50,30; 51,21.37; 58,33; 59,37; 61,2; 67,29; 68,14; 70,4; 108,21; 114,9;


118,15; 119,25; to prôton aition, the first cause, 112,1 akhôristos, inseparable, 6,37; 8,5.17.33; 17,24; 26,22; ; 38,15; 43,29; 73,11; 105,28; 108,30; 121,7 akhrômatistos, without colour, 59,20 akhronos, not in time, 29,18; akhronôs, without [reference to] time, 21,22 akhrous, colourless, having no colour, 60,34.36; 77,13; 83,8 akinêtos, unmoved, 22,37; 23,1.7; 28,8; 53,31; 65,14.15(bis); 84,9; 85,10; 118,2; 120,29 akmê, (biological) maturity, 36,31(bis); 42,22; 53,4; 118,7; 122,24 akolouthein, follow (logically or temporally), 17,7; 22,7; 32,35; 115,36; succeed (temporally), 47,12.20; 48,6; 83,3; 98,17; adhere (consistently), 14,26; 17,30; 25,38; 36,14; 91,19; 118,29; follow (i.e. adhere to [Aristotle’s views]), 1,2; 49,36 akolouthêsis, implication, 6,23 akolouthia, implication, 6,16.32; akolouthos; consistent, consequential, implied, 16,14; 83,5; 95,18; 101,3.12; 104,20; 115,4; to akolouthon; the implication (of a conditional), 6,26 akolouthôs, consistently, 16,39 akouein, hear, 55,3.4; 64,21; 73,16; 76,13.29; 78,29; 63,37; 64,13.33.38; 65,22.30; 79,16; 83,11; 84,2(bis).3(quater); 87,12; understand (word, term, argument): 52,5; 54,5.11; 56,31.34; 75,13; 94,8; hear, attend to (text), 76,20.24; 102,34 akoustikos, having a capacity for hearing, 76,37; (dunamis) akoustikê: capacity for hearing, 49,26; 77,15; to akoustikon: capacity for hearing, 84,15 akouston, object of hearing, 4,35; 49,26; 56,19; 67,28; 68,30; 69,23; 79,15.16.17; 83,37.38.39; 84,2.4.24 akrasia, incontinence, 122,2 akratês, incontinent, 118,20 akribeia, precision, 1,13.20; 67,37; 68,9; di’akribeias, in detail, 121,3 akribês, accurate (of sense-perception), 62,13.17; 67,31; 68,8.27; detailed, precise (of an exposition), 1,15.18.19; 38,31; 48,36; (biologically) defined, 46,9; ep’akribes, in a precise way, in detail, 15,15; 76,35 akribologeisthai, to be precise, 22,30 (cf. Plato, Cratylus 415A1) akribôs, accurately, precisely, in detail, 11,25; 15,3; 43,31; 54,19; 56,2; 57,12; 64,26; 70,8; 89,34; 90,10; 100,1.32; 102,10.11; 111,25; 112,4; (comp.), 84,37; 88,16; 89,25; 102,15


Greek-English Index

akroasthai, hear (of an audience at a lecture), 39,33 akros, extreme (among forms), 100,35; ta akra, extremities (of a body), 74,10; extremes (of qualities), 77,9.20.21(bis); 84,29; extremes (in biological kinds), 123,30 alêtheia, truth, 1,28; 10,3; 25,24; 40,22; 60,31; 89,34; 112,9 alêthês, true, 1,26.27; 16,15; 39,18; 54,14; 74,12; 88,22; 91,11.13; 93,9.17; 104,3; 109,27; 114,7; 115,5 alêthes (to), truth, 9,38; 12,11; 21,13; 30,31; 109,; 110,1; 112,; 114,5.6.7; 116,6 alêtheuein, make a true claim, 52,30(bis); 89,5.32; 90,16.20; 91,3.7.25; 93,8; 112,9 alloiôsis, alteration, 15,30; 27,31; 28,31.34; 50,32.33; 55,26.37(bis); 56,2.3; 81,33; 112,27; 117,26; 124,28.29 alloioun, alter, 15,8(bis); 27,22.27; 28,30.36; 52,13; 54,7.8(bis); 56,4.8.35; 57,1; 59,22; 62,14.19(bis); 75,12.13; 81,31; 84,11.12.13; 124,29 allois, (en) elsewhere (in cross-references), 24,30; 25,5; 83,10 allôs, in another way (introducing an alternative statement), 12,5; 26,14; 60,20; 67,12; 123,26 allotrionomein, make the wrong assignment, 112,21 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 195A7) allotrios, alien, belong to something else, 59,11.21; 60,37.38; 94,23.25; foreign (of a medium for perception), 70,16.19; 71,3; 80,31.32; incompatible, unassimilable (of nutriment), 45,38; 47,19.20.26; 79,4.9; 123,8; 124,4.14; irrelevant, 8,32 alogos, non-rational, 10,34; 11,5; 31,6; 49,7; 67,10(bis); 82,35; 88,25; 90,24; 106,22; 107,; 117,11.14(bis). 21; 118,29; 121, amblus, blunt, 66,6.8.11 amêkhanos, unable to be realized, 52,10; 83,6; 90,32 amelein, neglect, 26,32; 35,4; 91,9 amerês, partless, undivided (into parts), 3,7.9; 16,28; 21,; 22,2.5.15; 31,10; 100,25; 110,24(bis).30.36; 111,4 ameristos, without parts, undivided, 10,24.26.36; 11,11; 21,36; 22,4; 110,26 amerôs, by being divided into parts, 100,23(bis).25 amigês, unmixed, 13,17; 14,12; 94,20; 97,26; 98,33; 99,35; 105,34; 106,5.9 amorphia, state of being unstructured, 112,3 amorphos, without structure, 10,30; 111,31 amorphôtos, unstructured, 43,10 amphisbêtein, dispute, 26,24; 38,22; 41,39

amphisbêtêsimos, open to discussion/ dispute, 2,11; 33,27; 91,22 amudros, indistinct, 3,33; 7,11; 41,36; 77,25; 95,2.19; 105,1; 115,33; amudrôs, indistinctly, 107,10 anagein, refer back (to a source), 14,8; 106,30 anaimos, bloodless, see zôion anairein, destroy, 55,36; 126,8; reject (a proposition in a conditional), 6,13.14 anairesis, rejection (of a proposition in a conditional), 6,17.19.31 anaisthêtein, be without sense-perception, 10,1 anaisthêtos, without sense-perception, 13,37; 34,10; 71,12; 77,36; 78,35; 80,24; 122,35; 125,18 anakhôrêsis, retreat (= from object of thought in discursive reasoning), 22,30; kata anakhôrêsin, by withdrawal (used of reasoning about privations), 111,26 anaklasis, reflection, 63,37; 64,4; 124,35 anaklasthai, be reflected, 63,36; 64,3.7 analambanein, adopt (a form in sense-perception), 57,8; 91,37 (cf. Alexander, DA 61,31); take up (i.e. resume an earlier discussion) 8,24; 47,10; 84,37; 85,11; 113,33. See anôthen. analogon, analogous, 103,36: analogon ekhein/einai, be analogous, 43,3; 68,6; 71,4; 94,5; 95,13; 98,30; 112,26(c. huparkhein).34; to analogon, what is analogous, 19,34; 27,27; 42,8.9; 70,24; 72,13; 73,24; 76,21.25; 78,34; 80,27; 124,8 anamartêtos, free from error, 91,23; 112,20 anamattesthai, receive an imprint (of the objects of perception), 28,8; 54,9; 78,31; 79,36; 91,40; 92,10; (of the imprint of a signet-ring), 92,17 (bis). See ekmattesthai. anamimnêskein, revise (a topic), 39,22; see also analambanein, and hupomimnêskein; (middle), recollect, 28,21 anamnêsis, recollection, 28,; 107,1 anamphisbêtêsimos, indisputable, 37,24 ananeuein, deny, 88,40; 89,7 anankaios, necessary, essential, 2,26; 5,2; 6,16.23.31; 13,18; 16,22; 66,30.34; 67,14; 106,19; 118,5; 123,3.21; 124,1.15.18; 125,22; anankaion (esti), it is necessary, must be, 5,31.36; 14,36; 22,12; 27,12; 31,14.16; 33,3; 34,32; 36,24; 40,2; 45,21.24; 47,12; 51,27; 53,33; 81,20; 89,1; 93,19; 94,24; 98,17.28; 104,20; 122,25.26; 123,19; 125,10.11; anankaiôs, necessarily, 62,2; 78,20 anankê, necessity, usu. anankê (esti), it is necessary, 1,18; 7,33; 8,39; 14,33.37;

Greek-English Index 16,36; 17,12; 18,5.8.14; 22,13; 27,3; 30,1; 36,18; 40,12; 53,20; 56,25; 70,14; 71,31; 74,10; 80,15.30; 83,12; 84,8; 85,3.13; 86,15; 91,7; 93,7; 94,18.31; 96,15.16; 100,12; 103,2.28; 104,9; 106,24; 107,27; 112,11; 116,8; 121,17.24; 122,21; 124,2.3; 125,33; ex anankês, necessarily, 6,29; 37,17; 93,19 anapherin, refer back to, 24,37; 27,33 anaphora, (line of) relay (to the soul in perception), 28,6 anaplêrôsis, fulfilment (of potentiality), 39,9 anarmostia, non-attunement, 24,25.26 anastrephesthai, be engaged (intellectually), 75,28 anatithesthai, propose (for discussion), 105,14 anazôgraphêsis, painting, 90,32 anelittein, unroll, 28,14 (cf. Plato, Philebus 15E3) angeion, container, 17,3.6; 63,18; 65,9 angelia, report (from senses), 85,30; 86,34 angellein, report (metaph. of senses), 86,2; 87,9 aniesthai, to be remitted (of intense emotions), 7,16 anoia, non-thinking, 111,30 anônumos, without a name, 57,29; 58,25; 84,16.17.18 anosphrantos, unable to be smelt, 68,32.34.38 anôthen, above (with reference to an earlier discussion), 8,11; 89,26; 112,34; 122,27; anôthen analambanein, resume (from an earlier point in the discussion), 84,37; sim. 8,24; 47,10 antepistrephein, turn (an argument) back against (its proponents), 23,37 anthrôpinos, human, 3,22; 26,37; 68,7; 97,32; 98,15.35; 103,5.13; 107, anthrôpos (23/78), human being, person, etc.; (definition of), 3,26; 4,5-7; man (= male person), 89,11; 90,26 antibainein, counteract, 113,12; react, 121,11 antikeimenon, contradictory (of a consequent in a conditional), 6,13.14 antikeisthai, be opposite, 4,36; 16,5; 49,26; 51,13.14; 112,11 antikrus (adv.), directly, exactly, 19,7; 30,4; 101,18.29; 105,4; 120,19 antilambanesthai, apprehend (with the intellect), 21,33; 23,5; 115,1.29; perceive (= aisthanesthai), 10,17; 21,33; 23,5; 28,6.8.24; 30,26; 37,9; 54,24; 57,; 69,18.24; 71,29.38; 73,13; 74,40; 80,30; 81,19; 83,1.33; 93,21; 96,17; 113,8; 125,18.25.27 antilegein, contradict, 19,24; 86,37 antilêpsis, perception (= aisthêsis), 69,23;


70,19; 73,33; 74,27.37.39; 75,24.34; 79,7; 80,12; 82,2.7; 124,6 antilêptikos, capable of perceiving, 54,21; 71,8 antilupêsis, revenge, 7,33 antiphrattein, block, 60,38; 94,23 antispasthai, be pulled in contrary directions, 122,4 antistrephein, convert (propositions in an argument), 16,15; (intrans.) correspond, 74,3 antistrophê, conversion (of propositions in an argument), 16,22 anupostatos, without real existence, 3,32 aoratos, invisible, unable to be seen, 61,4.5; 68,31.34.35; 71,6(bis).20; 77,20 aoristos, indefinite (of the Platonic dyad), 12,15.18.19; unlimited (of growth), 51,22; with a fluid boundary, 79,24; unfocussed (of sense-perception), 122,13; aoristôs, in an unfocussed way (of animal behaviour), 122,10.11 apaitein, place a demand, 25,17; 45,13; 74,25 apallattesthai, be detached, 112,1 apangellein, report, 81,2; 96,20 apantan, confront, 19,6; crop up, 2,21; 36,2; head for, 69,12 apartasthai, be detached, 5,11.16; 25,7 apatasthai, be misled, 2,6; 57,18; 82,4.27.31(bis).35; 93,15 apatê, error, 102,29; 108,27.31; 112,22 apatheia, state of being unaffected, 104,31; 105,26 apathês, unaffected (used of the intellect), 29,31.35; 30,15.17; 34,5; 52,6; 79,37; 94,13; 98,32.35; 101,; 102,16.23.35; 104,25; 105,; 108,14.15 apaustos, incessant, 115,21 apeiros, infinitely numerous, 9,10; 11,25; 13,1; 21,11; 31,33; 33,7; ep’apeiron, to infinity (of a progression), 14,37; 22,4; 37,19; 83,18 apeptos, undigested, 52,27.28 apereidesthai (with pros), focus on (an aisthêton in perception) 92,9, (cf. Plato, Republic 508D5) apergazesthai, bring to completion, 36,9; 39,25; 98,23.28 aperkhesthai, go away, 59,4; 79,26; 83,27; 92,1(bis).18; 93,3 aphairein, eliminate, 8,21; subtract, 31,17; (middle), deprive, 122,10; eliminate, 14,11; 16,16; 111,17; remove, 61,4 aphairesis, abstraction; ta ex aphaireseôs, abstract objects, 114,31; ta aphairesei/ex aphaireseôs (legomena), objects (spoken of) by abstraction, 96,30.34.39; 114,10; 116,1


Greek-English Index

aphallesthai, rebound, 65,33(bis).34 aphestanai, be distant from, 77,11; be detached from, 114,26; aphienai, dismiss (in argument), 39,29; 48,21; eschew, 14,4; 97,3 aphistanai, detach (form from matter), 8,7.35; (middle), 7,26 aphorizesthai, define (middle), 7,30; 32,29; 49,11; (passive), 61,12; aphôrismenos, determinate, isolated, 76,18; 79,10; 94,26; 97,21; 126,12 aphormê, foundation, starting-point (in reasoning), 1,9; 2,1; 117,12 aphrôn, unintelligent, 34,13; foolish, 106,21 aphtharsia, imperishability, 37,27; 103,25; 104,24 aphthartos, imperishable, 18,28; 102,18; 105,28; 108,33 apoballein, discard, reject, 91,8.11 apoblepein, look at (a topic), 10,12; 27,9 apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 15,17; 60,18; 83,10; 90,19; 95,29 apodeixis, demonstration, 1,13.16; 2,15.21; 5,; 22,23.24; 25,37; 44,3; 114,28 apodidonai, assign (to a definition), 7,34 (403b1); define, supply (a definition) 5,29; 7,27; 12,29; 23,7; 32,16; 41,24; 48,36; 49,10; 67,27; display (activities of the soul), 6,7; 36,37; 38,7.21; 94,13; apodedomenos logos, supplied (i.e. received) definition, 48,17.18 (plu.); explain, supply (an explanation), 12,29; 23,7; 35,39; 37,15; 41,24; 48,36; 67,27; produce (a plant), 38,3 apodosis, definition, 12,30 apokeisthai, be set aside, 95,22 apokheteuesthai, be channelled, 87,7 (cf. Plato, Republic 485D8) apokhrê, it suffices, is adequate, 21,12; 51,18; 96,20; 124,5; 126,14; apokhrôn, sufficient, adequate, 44,11.19; 83,4; 96,12; 123,4; apokhrôntôs, adequately, 72,12 apoklêrôsis, apportionment, 26,37; 103,39 apokrinesthai, segregate, 17,18 apolambanein, receive (form), 39,15; 97,24; 98,25; 109,4; (pass.) be secreted (of air in windpipe), 67,14 apoleipein, leave, 37,11; be lost (of sight), 43,1 apollunai, destroy, 11,3; 55,32; apolôlen (408b29), perish (of the common intellect), 29,34; 101,22.36; 102,4.22; 105,21 apologia, defence, 17,4 apoluesthai (middle), solve (a problem), 30,30; 103,20; (passive), be removed, 70,20

apomattesthai, receive a sense-impression, 82,21 apopallesthai, bounce off (of sound), 63,34; 64.5.9; 65,30 apophainesthai, assert, make a claim, 9,30; 12,31.40; 13,7; 19,9.18; 49,35; 81,37; 82,; 83,15; 86,35; 87,11; 92,39; 93,12; 108,35; 112,17.35.36 apophasis, negation, 109,32; 111,12; 113,16 aporein, raise a problem, 25,29; 27,8; 30,35.37; 32,19; 33,19; 36,34; 54,20; 72,11; 74,5; 92,27; 101,37; 102,14.15.26; lack, 92,27 aporêma, problem, 101,12 aporia, problem, 35,36; 54,36; 72,36; 74,17; 86,8.11; 108,10; 117,2; axion aporias, worth raising as a problem, 69,11.19; 102,17.19 aposkeuazesthai, reject, 47,26; 89,26 apostêrizesthai, (trans.) support, 7,5; (intrans.), stabilize, 82,4 apostrephein, avert, 113,12 apostrophê, revulsion, 47,[20].21 apoteleisthai, be produced (of sound), 66,13.20 apotemnesthai, be isolated (of sense of a term), 3,2 (see 1.1, n. 22) apôtheisthai, repulse, 79,9 apothnêiskein, die, 125,34 apseudês, free from falsity, 112,20 apsophos, lacking sound, 60,34; 64,22.26; 77,14; 83,8 apsukhos, without a soul, not having a soul, inanimate, 8,3; 34,32; 40,6; 44,9; 46,11; 66,15; 77,36; 79,31; 92,20; 124,4.11 aretê, excellence, 2,28; 77,10; 88,18; 107,16 arithmein, list, 50,31; 55,28; number, 120,17 arithmêtikê, arithmetic, 55,28; 114,26 arithmos (32/53), number; = list, 4,11; eidêtikos arithmos, eidetic number, 11,25; 12,; harmonikoi arithmoi, harmonic numbers, 19,20; 20,16; autos atithmôi, same in number, 76,27; hen/mia arithmôi, one in number, 38,5; 50,20.24; 86,7; hetera arithmôi, different in number, 16,23 arkhê, (cosmological or metaphysical) first principle, 9,35; 10,15.18 (bis); 11,31; 12,; 13,; 14,8.15; 33,32; 39,26; 99,26.32; 106,6; 108,22; (methodological) first principle, starting point, 2,24; 5,19; first principle/source (of the soul or its capacities), 2,3; 28,13; 41,27.33; 44,14.26; 45,22.32; 50,26.27; 78,32; 106,17; 107,24.26; 108,3.5; 114,30; 119,1.2; 120,6.33; 121,6; (physical) source (of sound), 64,23; (matter as) first principle, 71,22.23; beginning (of an exposition in the text), 6,4; 38,35; 44,7;

Greek-English Index 58,19; 98,9; ex arkhês, at the outset, 22,25; 23,18; 74,21; 116,7; 117,27 arkhêgos, founder (metaph. for the productive intellect in relation to thoughts), 99,25 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 21E5) arkhein, rule, 24,24; 87,9 arkhesthai, begin, start, 1,11.21; 4,28; 5,23; 28,15.19; 51,26; 101,17; 121,16 arkhikos, in command, 122,1 arnêsis, denial, 89,9 asômatos, incorporeal, non-bodily, 10,24; 11,20; 12,39; 13,28; 14,6.8; 19,6; 27,18; 32,37; 74,34; 86,31; 108,2 assumetros, disproportionate (distance), 109,15; to assumetron, (geometrical) incommensurability, 109,15 asthenês, weak (logically), 25,37 asunetos, without understanding/comprehension, 78,11; 93,2; 107,9 asunthetos, uncompounded, 111,9.14 atelês, imperfect, 15,13; 18,25.37; 26,19.21; 28,37; 29,2.16; 36,25; 55,11.12; 99,32; 112,27; (comp.) (biologically) less developed, 49,2; 81,15; 118,5; 122,5; 123,23; 124,19 athanasia, immortality, 106,29 athanatos, immortal, 13,31(bis).32; 30,15.17; 36,12; 37,24.30; 99,38; 101,13.25.31; 102,8.35; 103,; 106,17; 107,; 36,12 athrous, en masse, 30,34; 63,14; athroôs, all at once, 29,19; 60,26; 100,9 atomos, atom, 9,10.18.26; 13,13; 19,7; 20,2; atoma eidê, undivided species, 48,27 atopos, absurd, 15,9; 17,7; 23,23; 24,36; 32,3.35; 34,4.5; 36,1.4; 45,5; 69,16; 83,18.26.30; 86,; 108,7; 117,20 augoeidês, luminous (of the vehicle of the soul in Platonic psychology), 19,33 aülos, non-material, 10,24.26; 22,37; 96,7; 110,6.10; 114,32; 115,6.8, see eidos autarkês, self-sufficient, independent, 54,34; 63,21; 97,4; able to stand alone (of arguments), 15,16 autokinêsia, self-movement, 106,30 autokinêtos, self-moved, 9,32; 15,; 106,31 auxein/auxanein, cause growth, 45,4; 52,36; 53,1.5.9; auxesthai/auxanesthai, grow (intrans.), 4,22; 15,16; 34,34; 38,27; 41,35; 44,12.15(bis).17.20; 50,34; 51,16.19.31; 52,4; 53,2.4; 122,25 auxêsis, growth, 8,13; 15,30; 34,35; 36,30.31; 39,31; 41,32.34; 50,34; 51,; 117,23; 122,23; 123,17 auxêtikos, having a capacity for growth, 52,34; (dunamis) auxêtikê, capacity for


growth, 38,23; to auxêtikon, the capacity for growth, 4,18; 45,29 axiôma, axiom, 6,32; 104,2 axion, worthy (of attention), 27,15; 38,22; 52,23; 69,11.19; 102,17.19.30; 103,20; 118,12. See aporia. axiopistos, credible, 2,5; 107,2 axioun, judge, 3,13; 74,26; 101,16 badizein, to walk, 6,22; 28,22.23; 42,30(bis); 109,8.35.36; proceed (in reasoning) 44,1 bainein epi, be based on, 86,32 baptein, dip, 124,30 barus, heavy, 57,27; 72,17.20.31; 75,36; 80,8; low-pitched, 24,20; 66,; 75,18; 79,34; pungent, 94,39 basileus, king, 87,9; 106,13 bathos, depth, 11,20.32.36; 74,6 bebaios, strong (of an affirmation), 101,9 bebaiotês, stability, 18,16 bebaioun, reinforce (a conclusion), 6,33; 57,10 bêxis, coughing, 67,6.12 biâi (dative), by force, 16,1.3; 17,11; 117,31 biaios, enforced (movement) 15,37; 16,1.5; 17,12; 22,35; violent (sense-perception), 71,10.14; 95,2 biblia, books, 85,35 bios, way of life, 47,1; 81,9; life-span, 101,14 blabê, damage, ruin, 65,12.13; 71,9 blaberos, harmful, 88,4 blaptein, harm, 68,37; 124,18 blepein, have sight, 29,28; 30,8; 104,27 blepharon, eyelid, 69,30; 70,5 boêtheia, benefit, 9,23 boêthein, aid, support, 8,16; 52,5 bômos, altar, 5,13 boulêsis, willing (noun), 36,36; 47,13.15; 113,24.26; 119,9.13; 121,32(bis) boulesthai, to want or will, 2,14.20; 4,1; 14,27; 16,2; 18,32; 20,21; 32,14; 36,21.; 50,18; 55,22; 56,22.24; 85,7; 88,36; 89,1.14; 91,28; 99,13.22; 113,28(bis).30.31.32(bis); to intend (a meaning), 2,20; 4,1; 20,21; 32,14; boulesthai einai, to have to be, 3,35; 73,24 bouleuesthai, deliberate, 118,32.36.37 bouleutikon (to), capacity for deliberation, 119,32 bous, cow, 26,11 bradus, slow-moving, 66,10.12 brankhion, gill (of fish), 66,10 brontê, thunder, 79,17; 126,3(bis) daktulios, ring, 77,30; 92,19; 124,33 dedienai, fear, 7,15 deiknunai, show, demonstrate, 13,11;


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14,34; 15,31; 16,25; 20,30.33; 40,4; 46,26; 54,9; 66,3; 70,7; 84,6; 90,30; 125,5.6 dein, to be necessary, 6,12; 76,22; 85,18; 105,23; deisthai, to lack, need, require, 8,8; 29,9.21; 53,3.36; 54,31; 55,25.28; 66,38; 70,16.21; 89,24; 96,20; 97,40; 113,23; 114,23; 123,; 125,7 dekakhôs, in ten senses (with reference to the categories), 42,18 dekhesthai, receive, accept, 23,32; 24,25; 43,9; 46,15.21.36(bis); 48,17; 55,18; 57,2.7; 59,23; 62,37; 65,4.6; 66,21; 70,29(bis); 71,18; 77,18; 78,15.32; 81,2; 86,17; 92,34.35; 100,23.24.26; 104,14; 122,34; 124,31 dektikos, capable of receiving, 55,21; 60,34; 77,29; 83,27; 94,15; 105,8.24 dêlôsis, indication (by naming), 44,36 dêloun, show, indicate, 44,2; 48,13.14.26; 65,37; 67,28; 73,33; onomati dêloun, indicate by naming, 67,28 dêmiourgein, create, 99,25 dêmiourgia, creativity, 99,19 dêmiourgos, demiurge, 11,15; 20,10 dendron, tree, 2,41; 23,31 derma, skin, 81,8.10 desmos, knot, bond, 68,16; 107,29 despotês, master (of a household), 58,14 diadidonai, pass along, 124,30 diadosis, replacement, 64,18; transmission, 28,10 diaduesthai, pervade, 9,13 diaginôskein, distinguish between, 68,1; 69,25; 126,17 diairein, define, distinguish, divide, 3,31; 5,32; 8,32; 20,11.13.17; 21,16; 30,26.27; 31,19.34; 38,; 45,32; 55,15; 57,14; 63,14.24; 64,10; 69,2; 86,; 99,6.10; 100,4; 109,30.34.35; 110,6.14(bis).28; 112,7 diairesis, division, 2,19; 38,14; 109,31.32.33 diairetos, divided, 86,32; 110,; 111,9 diaitan, be an arbiter, 52,22; (middle), live (in a medium), 66,22; 126,16 diakheisthai, be diffused, 65,12 diakonein, serve (a function), 42,6; 125,9 diakrinein, differentiate, discriminate, distinguish, segregate, 2,38; 10,31; 13,20; 61,6; 71,39; 73,25; 88,16; 90,18; 91,25; 97,14; 99,5; decide, settle, solve (problems or issues), 3,21; 29,6; 45,25; 58,26; 76,31 dialambanein, understand, 122,27 dialegesthai, converse, discuss, 28,22.23; 35,16; 104,30 dialektikê, dialectic, 6,15 dialektikos, dialectician, 7,30.31; 8,4.26

dialektos, articulate speech, 66,30 diallattesthai, be dissociated, 37,29 dialuein, solve (a problem), 72,21; 86,8; 101,37 diamakhesthai, conflict with, 91,20; 120,9 diamartanein, err, be mistaken, 64,14; 89,34; 93,12; 112,17.18 diamenein, remain, persist, 30,19; 50,20.24; 65,16 diametros, diameter, 109,16 diamonê, continuity, 123,34 dianemesthai, be assigned (in a classification), 9,5 dianoeisthai, think (in general), 94,28; think discursively, 27,10.25; 29,31; 30,24.25.32; 100,20; 101,8; 102,3.4; 105,18; 109,19; 118,9.12 dianoêsis, act of thinking, 17,18 dianoêtikos, capable of thinking (in general) 4,13; 47,11; capable of discursive thinking, 48,3; 113,14.23 dianoia, thinking (in general), 17,18; 35,8; 45,23; 116,27; discursive thinking, 87,18; 88,15.25.26(bis).28; 109,9; 118,19; 119,4.5; meaning (of a text or idea), 31,3; 105,18 diapempein, transmit, 64,32; 69,4; 86,6 diapherein, be different, be distinct, 3,11.13.31; 4,17; 8,3.37; 10,2; 12,36; 18,36; 26,7; 28,18; 30,24; 31,; 32,9; 38,26; 40,6.19; 46,6; 51,28; 52,35; 56,17; 61,15; 65,27; 69,29; 73,29; 75,20; 76,12; 84,38; 85,2.11.30; 86,15.22; 87,18; 89,21.24; 90,15; 91,30; 92,3; 94,21; 96,16; 103,27; 113,26; 116,15.17; 117,3.10.18; 118,32; 119,34; (middle), dissent, 18,32 diapherontôs, differently, 7,29 diaphônia, discord, 91,3 diaphora, difference, distinction, variety, 2,16; 3,2; 11,9; 12,35; 18,20; 26,29; 30,24; 36,33; 57,25; 61,37; 64,27.36; 65,37; 66,1.2.3; 67,32; 68,3.4.7; 69,5.22; 70,17; 72,3.7.25; 74,28; 75,11; 76,14.33; 77,25; 84,37; 85,1.4.27; 86,31; 87,12; 88,12.17; 91,29; 92,6.13.23; 94,3; 95,32; 98,20; 103,3; 117,7.12; 118,33 diaphoros, different, 2,16; 3,13; 4,21; 37,22; 77,36; 86,1; 94,13; 95,12 diaphtheirein, destroy, 126,9; (pass.), 40,22 diapneisthai, evaporate, 37,12 diaporein, work through a problem, 80,4; 102,17; 105,16; 108,12.22 diaporthmeuein, transport, 62,11 (cf. Plato, Symposium 202E3) diapseudesthai, make a false claim, 91,4 diarithmeisthai, be listed fully, 2,35; 33,22; 36,36; 93,23 diarrhêdên, explicitly, 28,28; 30,5; 41,13; 100,13; 105,23.30

Greek-English Index diasaphein, to make clear (in exposition), 10,4; 13,14; 53,36 diasêpesthai, rot, 37,12 diasôzesthai, survive (biologically), 123,9 diaspan, disperse, 51,12; 117,20 diaspeiresthai, be dispersed, 109,13 diastasis, distinction, 117,8 diastellesthai, distinguish, 56,39 diastêma, dimension, 8,22; 22,1; 111,17; 114,25; distance, 57,19; 60,31 diastrophê, perversion, 107,18 (Stoic) diasôzein, maintain (a theory), 13,24; (middle) survive (biologically), 123,9 diatêkesthai, be soaked (i.e. with water), 79,19 diatelein, continue, 38,17.21 diathesis, disposition, 55,32 diatithesthai, be disposed, be in a state, 7,20; 46,24; 89,16 didaskein, explain, instruct, teach, 2,12; 4,30; 15,8; 17,16; 28,29; 30,38; 41,19; 46,24; 87,32; 88,2; 89,23; 97,10; 104,7.8(bis).10.11.22 didonai, endow, give, grant, offer, 1,28; 14,16.17; 16,38; 20,7; 23,21; 24,14; 26,14; 27,13; 34,5; 36,23; 49,5; 100,23; 117,38; 120,20 to diêkhes, the sound medium, 62,31; 70,18 dielenkhein, refute, 20,2; 24,21; 31,1 diexienai, traverse (a series), 21,11 diexodos, process for an outlet, (of thought) 100,8; (of speech) 110,21 diikneisthai, pierce, penetrate, 73,6; 77,34; 124,29 diiskhurizesthai, insist, 109,2 diistanai, separate (i.e. distinguish between two things), 45,35; 46,2; (pass.) be dissociated, be distinct from, 23,36; 25,7; 37,9.15.17; 85,14; 94,2; 117,3; be riven, 79,17 dioikizein, house separately (metaph. for Plato’s location of parts of the soul in the body), 37,5.26 (cf. Plato, Symposium 193A2) diôkein, pursue, 79,4; 113,; 118,10.19; 120,23; 121,24; 124,23; 126,18 diokhleisthai, be disturbed, 37,28 dioran, gain insight into (a problem), 29,7 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 62B5-6) diorizein, define, draw a distinction, divide, 2,28; 3,14; 4,17; 6,4; 11,19.22; 12,8; 13,3; 20,34; 29,18; 30,37; 38,35; 41,25.29; 43,31; 46,11; 47,36; 49,28; 50,27; 51,27; 54,; 56,2.35; 73,17; 87,16; 89,26; 91,30; 97,15; 108,19; 109,6; 111,10.11.12; 103,14; 116,28; 119,34 diorthôsis, correct solution (of a problem), 101,15


to diosmon, smell-medium, 62,32; 69,9; 70,18 diôxis, pursuit, 113,18; 117,31 dogmatizein, uphold (an idea), 17,1 dokein, seem, be the view held by, 4,25.29; 13,8; 25,24; 26,27; 27,11; 30,27; 31,4; 35,11; 37,4.25; 39,24; 51,29; 72,7; 73,11; 74,2.15; 75,6.8; 76,1.4.12; 77,33; 85,5; 87,14; 88,39; 89,8.9; 90,22; 101,36; 107,2; 108,4; 114,34; 115,4; 117,13.24; to dokoun, doctrine, 102,10; 108,35 doruphoria, body-guard (metaph.), 49,6 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 70B2) doxa, opinion, 8,39; 9,5; 10,22; 12,7.10.11; 19,25.29.33; 20,3.7.8; 24,12; 25,37; 35,; 36,35; 88,18.31; 89,33; 90, 35.37.38; 91,; 113,36; 114,2; 121,30; 121,32 doxastikôs, as an opinion, 88,34 doxazein, opine, 36,27; 89,6; 90,22.25; 91,13 dran, perform an action, 60,16 drattesthai, grasp, 111,19 (cf. Plato, Lysis 209E5) drimeus, caustic, 71,16; 72,6 dromeus, runner, 45,15 duas, dyad, 11,30.33; 12,9; 21,3; 48,33; 111,12; aoristos duas, indefinite dyad, 12,15.18.19 dunamis (80/369), capacity (of soul) for an activity; meaning (of an argument; cf. LSJ III.1), 6,12; dunamei, potential, in potentiality; see also nous dunatos, capable, 55,20; 94,25; 108,7; dunaton (esti), (it is) possible, 1,2; 8,35; 15,3; 21,32; 31,27; 32,14; 40,28; 42,29.30; 48,12; 60,12; 70,2; 76,30; 84,22(bis); 86,16; 88,39; 107,25; 125,34; to dunaton, the possible (in modal logic), 42,31 duskathektos, hard to hold down, 38,9 dusôpein, discomfort, 74,24 dusparamuthêtos, hard to entreat, 106,21 (= Plato, Timaeus 69D2) duspathês, not easily affected, 105,9 dusphrastos, hard to describe, 100,7; 110,30 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 50C6) dusthêratos, difficult to capture, 92,13 (cf. Plato, Sophist 218D3, 261A5) ê, (particle introducing a resonse to a question, or proposed solution to a problem), 8,2; 65,26; 79,15; 83,1; 86,11; 103,32; 104,25; 116,18; 122,10 êdê, already, by now, 15,13.14; 53,4.6; 54,13; 55,4.19.23; 56,14.17; 62,10; 97,15; 99,35; 126,13; (in non-temporal senses; on which see Cope, p. 13; LSJ êdê 4a and 4d; Bekker, Ind. Ar. 314a10-17; Lexicon Plotinianum col. 476), already, by virtue


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of, thereby, in fact, actually (thus emphasizing the truth, or reality, of a claim or inference based on a prior statement, or a prevailing situation), 3,36; 4,21; 5,18; 11,32; 12,11.21; 30,30; 31,16.29; 39,11; 42,35; 44,35; 46,30; 63,16; 70,10; 71,25; 77,19.21; 82,34; 93,11; 96,14; 98,30; 109,8.20; 110,22; 111,11; 119,26; 120,25; 121,2; 122,2; 123,3; 124,21 eidenai, know, realize, 8,27; 18,36; 76,38; 85,3 eidêtikos, eidetic (number), 11,25.29; 12, eidikos, like form, 51,38 eidopoiein, form (trans.), 34,20 eidopoios, causing form, 76,34 eidos (38/180), form (opp. matter), e.g.; 39,; 40,34; 46,; 51,38; 57,6; 70,33; 96,18-19; 115,; kind, species (opp. genus), e.g. 4,10; 28,28; 29,3; 36,15.16; 48,27(bis); 72,3; aüla eidê, non-material forms, 110,6.10; eidê aneu hulês, forms without matter, 97,35; 112,23; enula eidê, enmattered forms, 12,23 (sing.); 97,37; 98,1; 99,3; 114,35.36; 115,4; hen eidei, one in form, 50,25; 120,24; ontôs eidê, what are really forms, 8,30; mathêmatikon eidos, mathemathical form, 8,25; phusikon eidos, natural form, 8,25(bis); tekhnikon eidos, artifical form, 8,25; 97,27-28; autos (etc.) eidei, same in kind, 31,19; 38,6; 103,27.28 eikotôs, reasonably (of conclusions), 12,27; 13,6; 36,34; 62,1; 70,3; 84,31; 95,23; 98,4; 101,1; 114,36; 126,10 einai, being, existence, 7,25; 39,14; 42,17.18; 53,11; 66,31; 70,36; 86,10; 107,10; 115,21; 117,15; 124,20; 126,14.15; (to) einai (with dative), what it is to be (something), 61,36(bis); 42,23; 83,36; 95,35.36; 96.2(bis).; 100,; 103,37; to ti ên einai, essence, 3,24.29; 5,; 22,5; 23,4; 96,7; 112,15.19; 113,4; 114,20; to ti esti, what something is (as the object of a definition), 5,3; 49,13; to on, what exists (= ta onta), 35,27; to malista on, what is [form] more than anything else, 112,2; ta onta, things/objects that exist, 1,21; 2,16.18; 10,14; 11,8.27; 12,; 13,16.26.29; 14,11; 33,; 34,2(bis).18; 35,21; 36,22; 39,4; 87,30; 94,29; 95,27; 97,27; 99,24; 115,; ontôs (adv.), really, 8,30; 99,35 eisangelia, report (n.), 81,2

eisangellein, report (v.), 80,34; 82,3.25; 86,6.30.34; 85,34; 87,8 eisduesthai, settle into, 23,34; 24,5(bis); 65,3 eisoikizesthai, be lodged (metaph.), 24,1 ekdêlos, evident, manifest, 7,13; 64,4; 65,21 ekdidonai, publish, 16,30 ekhein (203/332), have, possess; (the category) possession, 33,26; toumpalin ekhein, be opposite, 43,36; 51,6; ekhomena, secondary [properties], 49,15 êkhein, echoing, 65,18.24 êkhos, reverberation, 66,13.20 ekhthra, hostility, 101,14 ekkaleisthai (middle), provoke, 7,10; 17,29; 92,4 ekkeisthai, be expounded, 19,19 ekkrouein, expel, block out, 91,15; 95,2 eklambanein, extract (forms from matter by intellect), 22,6; 96,19.26 ekluesthai, break down (of sense-perception weakening), 90,9 ekmageion, mould (n.), 92,29 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 191C9, 194D6, 194E6, 196A3, 196B5) ekmattesthai, receive an impression (from objects of perception) 57,4 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 191E1, 191D8). See anamattesthai ekstasis, loss (by removal), 18,6.23 ektrepesthai, digress, 117,22 (cf. Plato, Republic 543C5) ektupousthai, be imprinted (in imagination), 91,10 elenkesthai, be proven, 83,3 elenkhos, refutation, 27,12 ellampein, illuminate, 103,33,34; 109,5; irradiate, 25,35; 26,2.25.35; 27,3 elleipein, lack, be missing, 8,15; 56,17; 71,4.15; 80,; 81,4 elleipsis, deficiency, 8,17; 77,8 elutron, sheath, 69,31 (of eyelids); (around the body), 73,10.20.21 (cf. Plato, Republic 588E1) emboan, cry aloud (metaph. for explicit statements in a text), 102,34 emmesos, intermediate, 72,19 empalin (adv.), opposite, contrary, 6,18; 25,29; 43,36; 51,6; 52,3 emperiekhesthai, be included (in the essence of something), 70,37(bis) emphainein, reveal, 107,10.11; (middle), be manifest, 5,21 emphanês, manifest, 7,5; explicit (of exposition), 101,18; eis toumphanes, openly, 49,33; 120,32 emphraxis, blockage, 68,16 emphuesthai, be implanted, 1,23; 25,21 emphutos, natural (of heat in an organism), 53,27.34

Greek-English Index empsukhia, ensoulment, 25,34; 26, empsukhos, having a soul (of an animal, or a body), 3,26; 4,4.6; 9,3; 10,12; 13,23; 16,3; 27,24.29; 34,30.32.35; 35,28; 36,; 40,; 44,9; 46,10.30; 48,33; 50,17; 52,; 53,; 66,15; 67,22; 73,22; 76,34; 92,20; 124,2 enaimos, bloodless, see zôion enantios, opposite, 16,7; 44,14.18; 52,9.28; 55,26; 85,33.37.38; 86,2; 111,33; 120,8; (to) enantion/ (ta) enantia, opposite(s), 14,16; 24,16.17(bis); 51,12.29(bis).30(bis); 52,1.3(bis).6.20. 21(bis).29; 59,25; 60,20; 72,4; 78,35; 86,; 88,3.6(bis).7; 111,32(bis); 112,6; tounantion (adv.), on the contrary, 37,11; 40,31; 57,10; 102,18 enantiôsis, opposition (between a pair of contrary qualities), 14,15.18; 24,19; 35,23; 47,28; 72,15.18.22; 73,; 74,34; 75,37; 76,4.16; 78,34; 79,31.32; 80,7; 122,31; 123,37; 125,15 enapolambanesthai, segregate, 36,7 enargês, clear, 6,32; 19,12; 35,8; 88,39; enargôs, clearly, obviously, 7,8; 28,24; 89,8.9; 90,11 enarmozein, adapt (of the intellect to speech), 110,31; 111,3 endeiknusthai (middle), indicate, 12,33; 104,6 endekhesthai, to be possible, 6,; 9,8; 15,25; 23,13.32; 46,5; 48,29; 50,19; 53,13; 74,7; 90,22; 93,11; 119,26 endekhomenôs, possibly (modifying a formal inference), 6,25 endidonai, endow (with a property), 1,9; 49,22; 66,13; 81,31; 98,27 enduesthai, settle into, 24,3; 99,15 energeia (54/214): activity, actuality; energeiâi (dative), actual, in actuality, see nous energein, be active (absol.) (mostly of sense-perception and thinking), 3,13; 18,21.22; 22,9; 38,28; 41,8; 54,32; 55,; 56,27; 57,10.30; 74,29; 76,6; 86,14.15; 90,3; 92,3.8.21; 93,5; 95,22.26.31; 99,21; 100,22; 102,8; 111,27.28.32; 113,19; 115,17.18; (with peri), be active towards an object of perception or thought (cf. 428a13), 57,30; 82,1; 90,10; 92,7.8; 93,1.17; 95,27.31; (see Bekker Ind. Ar. 579b10-16; LSJ peri C.3; for Alexander see DA 69,9; 81,1; 85,21-22; 86,10) enginesthai, come to exist in, 7,33; 26,16; 29,24.37; 49,10; 78,11; 82,19; 89,30; 95,17; 106,10; 109,23 enistasthai, object to, 6,11; 16,19


enkalein, criticize, 6,15; 101,36 enkataleimma, residue (of sense-perception), 28,17; 90,2; 93,20 enkathidrusthai, be established (metaph. for the location of a sense), 85,8 (cf. kathidruein) enkatoikizesthai, be housed (metaph. of the intellect in the body), 107,21.26 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 69D7 = 106,27), enkatoikodomeisthai, be lodged (of air in the ears), 64,16.22; 67,16; 75,18; 79,34 ennoein, form a notion of, 16,27; 36,33; 40,28; 88,2; 110,36; 111,31; think (= noein), 37,4 ennoêma, thought, 3,32; 109,11 ennoia, notion, 32,13; thought, 112,19; koinai ennoiai, notions that are shared (prbly. axioms), 103,38 enokhleisthai, be bothered, 123,28 ensêmainesthai, pin-point (a cause), 44,3; stamp, 92,18 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 191D7) entelekheia, entelechy, 3,1.4(bis); 16,29; 18,25.37; 26,12.14.17; 28,30.31.33; 39,17.20.21; 40,3.13; 41,; 42,; 43, entelôs ekhein, be in a perfect state, 39,15.19 entithenai, impose (form on matter), 98,28; 115,31 entoma, insects, 31,19; 35,20; 38,3.17; 45,36; 66,18; 69, entunkhanein, encounter (in perception), 85,36 enudros, living in water; see zôion enulos, enmattered; see eidos, logos, nous enuparkhein, inhere (in a definition), 28,2; 58,29; 59,17, exist in, or within, something 94,23; 102,28; 108,27 eoikenai, be like, resemble, seem, 3,23; 4,1; 5,3; 6,1.15; 7,1.15; 9,32; 13,21.31; 14,7; 16,30; 17,33.37; 18,20; 22,5.18.27; 26,24; 29,24; 34,20; 36,4; 46,4; 48,14.25; 60,6; 63,35; 65,31.35; 69,5.10.29; 86,3.19; 92,28; 96,26.31(bis).35; 97,31; 99,24; 102,12.28; 103,8; 108,26; 109,11.32; 113,17 epagein, adduce (an argument), 29,21; epagesthai martura, bring in (a quotation) as a witness, 9,39 (cf. Plato, Republic 364C5-6) epakolouthein, succeed (temporally), 88,29 epallattein, confuse (contradictory predicates), 112,21 epanienai, return (in discussion), 120,3 epêkoos, paying heed to (metaph. for the relation of affections to the intellect), 97,33; 107,21 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 70B8)


Greek-English Index

epeleusis, approach (to objects of thought in discursive thinking), 30,33 epexerkhesthai, address (a topic), 4,10; 35,15; 43,32; 45,23; 54,20 ephaptesthai, touch, 21,33.35.26(bis); 107,23 epharmozein, coincide with, apply to (of definition to definiendum) 21,34; 39,2; 48,16.27; (in thinking), 21,34 ephelkesthai (middle), implicate, 7,4; 28,20 (cf. Plato, Phaedo 66A1) ephexês, next, successively (in a series), 9,8; 20,33.35; 21,2; 33,23.30; 48,7.32; 49,2; 59,15; 113,10; 122,9; next, what follows (in expository order), 2,27; 3,1; 20,9.30; 28,28; 39,23; 41,25; 47,9; 87,19; 91,29; 95,34; 108,8 ephistasthai, treat (a problem) in detail, 1.4; be established, 26,35; 27,1.3 epiballein, encounter (directly), 111,17 epibolê, direct encounter (mental), 30,32; 111,; 112,30 epideiknunai, demonstrate, 38,31; 70,22; (middle), 112,11 epikalein, criticize, 20,6; 34,27; apply (a term), 45,13 epikêros, destined to die, 107,27 epiklêsis, application (of a term), 68,6 epiluesthai, solve (a problem), 102,14(bis).20; 122,14 epinoein, conceive, 48,12; 49,20 epinoia, conception, 120,19 epipedon, (geometrical) plane, 2,24; 5,6; 8,34; 11,35; 12,10; 32,2; (plane) surface, 64,8.9.10 epiphaneia, surface, 58,32.33(bis); 59,33; 73,17; 114,10 epipolês (adv.), on the surface, 27,30; 57,7.8; 59,24 episkepsis, investigation, 29,21 episkeptesthai, investigate, 3,23; 33,37; 48,2; 49,17.35; 84,37; 101,5; 105,14.15; 108,20; 115,10; 117,28; 119,25 episkopein (act. and middle), consider, 3,21; 4,25; 30,1; 85,20; 97,1; 112,14 epistasis, state of rest, 22,7; analysis (of problems), 108,10 (see ephistasthai) epistêmê, knowledge (in general), knowledge (of something), (specialized) body of knowledge, 1,12.18.19; 3,8; 4,27; 5,8; 12,6.8.9; 18,16; 22,25; 28,32; 36,35; 39,21; 41,10.11.38; 46,; 55,18(bis).; 56,; 88,; 89,35; 90,16; 91,21; 95,24.28; 95,14(bis).24; 98,24; 100,5; 102,32; 104,7; 115,13; 118,24.29; sun epistêmêi, systematically, 1,2; 2,22; epistêmê theôrêtikê, knowledge that involves contemplation, 97,36 epistêmôn, knowledgeable (in general),

55,18.19; (in a special discipline), 8,27; 55,24.25; 95,13; 100,11; 112,31 epitêdeios, fit, suitable, 46,39; 47,39; 51,23; 68,11; 98,3.16.27; epitêdeiôs, in a fitting state, 47,1; 98,16; epitêdeiôs ekhein, be fit, suitable, 46,39; 98,3.27 epiteinesthai, to be intensified (of emotions), 7,16 epithetos, imposed (from without), 107,32.36 epithumein, be appetitive, 5,37; 36,28; 37,5; 118,26 epithumêtikê (dunamis), capacity for appetite, 10,33; epithumêtikon meros, part (of the soul) involving appetite, 37,3; 117,1 epithumia, appetite, 20,22; 27,2; 36,36; 47,; 106,15; 113,23; 117,7; 118,20.24; 119,14.21.22; 120,; 122,8.9 epitithenai, place on, impose, 42,16; 62,16; 69,16.18; 75,22.24 epitrekhein, survey (a topic), 8,39 epizêtein, inquire, 26,10(bis); 29,36; 31,3; 49,15; 51,11; 68,29; 76,17; 119,26; 122,14 epokhê, suspension (of judgment), 89,10 epokheteuesthai, be channelled (metaph.), 100,22 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 251E3) eranizesthai, collect (as a contribution) (metaph.), 11,11; 116,7 êrema (adv.), in stages, 29,19 êremein, be at rest, be immobile, 9,31; 15,21.36; 19,3.8; 22,17; 23,20; 42,6; 57,23; 63,5; 65,22; 81,26; 118,15; 121,10; 122,18; be inactive (of knowledge as a hexis), 55,32; 95,26(bis).30 êremêsis, state of rest, 22,30 êremia, rest, 15,37; 16,2; 19,5; 22,34; 27,20; 28,18; 57,37; 58,2; inactivity (of thought), 111,30 êremizein, bring to rest, 19,3 êremos, smooth (movement), 64,31; 65,17 ergôdês, laborious, 2,26; 29,21 ergon, function, or functioning (of something; usu. soul, body, or capacity of the soul), 5,32; 6,; 7,29; 8,7.12; 23,29; 24,36; 27,4; 32,16; 36,33; 39,22; 42,9; 44,11; 45,10; 46,2; 50,1.4.6; 51,8.28; 53,9.16; 56,23; 66,29; 82,28; 93,15; 110,4; 112,23; 114,3; 116,27; 121,3.23; (plu.) actions, 23,22; task (to be performed), 2,8 eristikos, captious, 107,34 erôtan, propose (theories) (cf. LSJ II.2), 106,29 eskhatos, lowest (capacity, or sub-capacity, of the soul), 1,21; 47,17.18; ultimate (nutriment; i.e. blood), 52,25; 53,7; ta eskhata, extremities (of a body), 74,11; 75,2 ethelein, want, wish, 8,19; 26,11; 42,28

Greek-English Index to eu (einai), well being, 21,13; 66,32; 124,20; (opp. to einai, existing), 126,14.15 eudiairetos, easily divided, ; 64,11.23; 70,35 euexapatêtos, easily misled, 57,31 eulogos, reasonable (of the conclusion of an argument), 13,7; 16,13; 30,21; 34,25; 36,13; 68,1; 94,30; eulogôs, reasonably, 66,21; 78,28; 119,2; (comp.), 86,18 eupathês, easily affected, 79,23 euphuês, of good natural disposition, 68,13; euphuôs, naturally disposed, 3,3; 97,33 euphuïa, natural disposition, 39,8.10; 98,14.17.31; 99,31 euporein, be readily supplied with, 68,19 euporia, ease in supplying (problems), 1,8 euthuôria, straight line (in construction of the soul in the Timaeus), 20,10.11; 23,15 euthus (adj.), straight, 6,36; (to) euthu, straightness, 6,38; 8,19; 35,24(bis).25; 96,32(ter).34(bis); eutheia (grammê), straight line, 5,6; 6,35.36; 8,10; 16,24; 86,22; 96,26.33; 114,17; kat’eutheian, rectilinearly, 20,25 euthus (adv.), immediately, 1,11; 6,4; 6,36; 19,13; 25,27.29.30; 26,28; 37,12; 55,22; 64,37; 72,2; 73,2; 89,15; 102,27; 105,32; 108,25; 121,28; 122,19; 125,34; directly (in a spatial sense), 69,32; 74,20; 80,9; without qualification, directly, ipso facto, 9,4; 37,14.26; 21,23; 72,38; 82,5; 107,11; hoion euthus, for example, 4,18 exallattein, produce variations, 116,23; (middle) vary, 3,12; 37,8; 100,12; 116,23 exapatasthai, be misled, 57,32; 87,33; 88,5(bis).7.23 exarithmeisthai (middle), ennumerate, 1,8 exatonein, be strained (of sense-perception), 90,13 exêgêsis, explication, 42,35 exêgêtês, commentator, 62,31; 120,18 exêgoumenos, commentator, 68,28 exergazesthai, elaborate (a text), 1,5; 15,15; elaborate (arguments), 107,4 exetasis, examination, 103,21 exetastês, critic, 16,19 exetazein, examine, scrutinize, 8,22; 24,14; 32,22; 49,29; 82,34; 96,13; 102,25 exeuporein, supply (demonstrations), 114,30 exeurein, discover, find, 2,34; 11,10; 49,11; 92,6; 93,23; 125,22 exikhesthai, manage (to accomplish), 1,8 existanai, remove from, 55,38; (intrans.), be removed from, 18, exugrainein, moisten, 71,2 gastêr, stomach, 42,7


gê, earth (one of the four elements), 14,2; 34,9; 16,10; 39,25; 41,27; 45,7; 51,2.12.17(bis); 60,29(bis); 73,23; 80,19.21; 115,26; 122,35.36; 125,18.19.20 gegônein, make a sound, 64,7 genesis, coming to be, coming into existence, 12,15; 41,10.37; 42,3; 49,3; 50,; 53,7.8.14; 54,15; 76,35; 107,36; 112,33; 115,20; 122,22 genetê, birth, 116,3 genêtos, [subject to] coming into existence, 73,22; 123,4.12; 124,1; 125,2.21 genikos, generic, 48,14 gennan, reproduce, 4,18.22; 38,27; 41,36; 44,12.21; 45,11; 50,5; 51,27; 53,9.10.23; 122,23; 123,12.14; 125,27(bis) gennêtikon (to), reproductive part/capacity, 45,9.30; 117,24 gennêtikos, having a capacity for reproduction, 53,6.21(bis); 118,6; 123,16; (dunamis) gennêtikê, reproductive capacity, 38,23; 54,1; (psukhê) gennêtikê, reproductive soul, 53,24 genos, genus, kind, 2,34.38.39; 3,; 4,10; 18,33; 28,31; 33,32; 39,3; 41,23; 46,4; 48,9.12.25; 55,20; 56,3; 61,14; 68,12; 72,33; 88,31; 102,12; 103,8; 106,23.27; 119,8; 124,20 geôdês, composed of earth, 51,3 geômetrein, do geometry, 55,23 geômetrês, geometer, 55,18 geômetria, geometry, 1,14; 94,24; 114,11.26; 116,14 geôrgia, farming, 8,16 gêrôs, old age, 29,26.28; 30, geuesthai, taste, 70,27; 76,28; 125,31 geustikos, having a capacity for taste, 72,9; 84,17 geuston, object of taste, 47,24.34; 68,4.26.27; 69,2; 70,7.12.13(bis).15; 71,; 72,9; 79,20; 84,20 gingulmos, hinge, 121,12.13 ginôskein, know, get to know, be aware, 2,5.8.14; 5,33; 10,14.22; 11,17; 12,27.31.34; 13,20.25; 14,9.11.12; 21,29; 30,29; 34,2.7.12; 35,21; 36,22; 83,16.30.31; 88,; 89,2; 93,3; 94,21; 114,4; 126,18 glôtta, tongue, 54,23; 66,30; 67,5; 71,2.37(bis); 72,31; 73,33; 76,9.20; 85,34; 87,2; 89,5; 126,20 glukus, sweet, 57,3(bis); 68,20.21.23(bis); 72,4.5.18; 81,36.38.39; 82,17; 85,2(bis).; 86,2.36; 96,15; 116,5 glumma, stamp (on a signet-ring), 124,30.33 gnômateuein, discriminate, 82,16 (cf. Plato, Republic 516E8)


Greek-English Index

gnômê, intention, 28,1 gnôrimos, known, 5,9; 88,24 gnôrisma, recognizable feature, 68,17 gnôristikê dunamis, capacity to come to know, 34,29 gnôrizein, get to know, recognize, be aware of, 33,; 34,4.5.16; 81,27; 83,2; 87,17; 94,6.22; 110,32; 111,32 gnôsis, insight, 1,11; 109,1; knowledge (opp. ignorance), 55,27 gnôstikê dunamis, capacity for knowledge, 12,32 gnôstos, recognizable, 82,33 gonê, seed, 13,34 gramma, letter, 97,23 grammateion, tablet, 97,22.23 grammatikê, skill in grammar, 57,28 grammê, line, 8,34; 16,25; 31,15; 32,2(ter); 74,34; 86,20; 88,7; 96,21.27.28; 97,13; 110,7; 114,10 graphein, paint, 43,2; 89,13.19; write (see sungraphein), 19,23; 85,36; 97,22,23; 100,20.21; 106,28; ta gegrammena, texts, 19,23; 23,14 graphikê, art of painting, 84,28 gumnasia, training, 68,14; 95,11.15 gups, vulture, 67,32 haima, blood, 7,27.31; 13,35.36; 20,35; 27,16.27.30; 52,25(bis) hairetos, choiceworthy, 121,23.26 haliskesthai (c. gen.), be attached to, 101,15 (cf. LSJ I.4) hamartanein, err, 91,24.27; hêmartêmenôs, erroneously, 93,5 hamartêma, error, 93,7 haplôs, without qualification, in an unqualified/unrestricted sense, 6,25; 26,23; 28,37; 29,2.3; 34,9; 39,33; 42,5; 47,2.3; 53,16; 54,5.11.36; 55,17; 58,6; 59,11; 65,28; 66,28; 83,22; 84,23(bis); 99,31; 103,18; 106,12; 111,5; 112,9; 117,7.8.32; 119,23.27; 120,23.24; 123,4 haplous, basic, simple, uncompounded, uncombined, unqualified, 3,9; 22,5; 32,25; 43,39; 72,4; 80,25; 96,7 (= aülon, immaterial).26.37.40; 109,10.17(ter).18; 110,5.37; 112,11; 116,17; 122,29(bis).33; 123,36; 125,2(bis).4.20.32; (of Anaxagoras’ nous), 13,17; 14,12; 97,26; ta hapla, uncompounded (objects of intellection), 30,26.27.29; cf. haploi horoi, primary definitions, 20,28; haplê phantasia, mere imagination, 121,30; hapla sêmainomena, uncombined things that are signified, 109,5.10; 112,14; hapla (sômata), uncompounded bodies (= elements), 35,39; 36,4.7; 43,37; 45,7; hapla stoikheia, uncompounded elements, 80,16.17; 125,5.17 haptesthai, touch, be in contact, 6,35;

28,11; 47,24; 62,21; 64,19.35.37; 65,1; 73,2; 74,; 75,1.7.32; 76,28; 124,2.5.10; 125,9.10; 126,7; deal (with a subject), 8,38; 108,18 haptikos, having a capacity for touch, 123,37; 124,3; (dunamis) haptikê, capacity for touch, 44,33; 80,12 (plu.); 85,8; to haptikon, capacity for touch, 73,28; 74,16 (plu.); 77,16; 85,6 hapton, object of touch, 47,24.28.34; 56,20; 66,4; 70,12.13.15; 71,31; 72,18.28; 73,28.32.34; 74,4(bis).16.22.24; 75,; 76,; 77,5.25; 78,; 79,31; 85,6; 122,31; 124,13.16; 125,15; 126,16 harmozein, attune, 24,; 25,; 32,30; 78,22.24 hêdesthai, experience pleasure, 67,11.34 hêdonê, pleasure, 2,31; 32,17; 45,38; 47,20.21; 68,27; 106,19; 107,13; 122,8(bis) hêdus, pleasant, 25,10; 68,24; 84,25; 107,13; 113,; 114,5.8; 118,14.15; 119,21; 120.23(ter); 121,27; 126,17 hêdusma, seasoning, 47,35 hêgeisthai, believe, think, 10,18; 64,13 hêgoumenon, antecedent (in a conditional), 6, ta kath’hekasta, individuals, 3,34; 4,1; 56,22; 122,15; ta kath’hekasta aisthêta, individual objects of perception, 99,4 hekousiôs, voluntarily, 117,31 hêlios, sun, 8,16; 13,32; 16,25.32; 25,35; 26,; 60,3.5.27; 91,5.8.14 helkein, attract, drag, draw, 13,22; 16,23.24(bis).31; 17,37.38; 42,9; 51,10; 52,13; 79,5; 89,8; 113,11 hêmera, day, 22,32; 62,2 hêmisus, half, 110,13(bis).19.20(ter); ex hêmiseias, ‘at a half-way house’, 52,29 hen, one (i.e. identical), 42,15.16; 113,10; hen arithmôi, one in number, 50,20.25; hen eidei, one in form, 50,25; 120,24 hêpar, liver, 37,6; 94,2 hepesthai, be a consequence, 48,17; 98,13; follow (logically), be entailed by, 16,17; 69,13; 89,23; 90,22.23 hepomenon, consequent (in a conditional; opp. lêgon), 6,; consequence (of an argument), 16,13; hepomenos, [temporally later] consequence, 98,13; hepomenôs, faithfully (of interpretation), 120,20 hermêneuein, explain, 58,8 hetoimos, fit (= epitêdeios), 40,11 hêttasthai, be defeated, 122,2 heuresis, discovery, 5,2.13.31; 44,6.8 heuriskein, discover, find, 3,2; 24,11; 25,10; 41,3; 48,21; 50,32; 70,23; 72,24; 75,31; 85,8; 95,17; 102,9; 121,25.26 hexis, 3,5.6; 35,34; 39,20.22;

Greek-English Index 41,2(bis).; 43,15; 45,16; 55,26.28; 56,; 88,30; 95,21.26.(bis).30; 98,23.32; 102,26; 115,18; 116,2; kath’hexin, see nous hikanos, adequate, satisfactory, sufficient, 5,11.18; 7,10; 18,39; 21,13; 35,22; 38,35; 39,6; 56,36; 73,31; 76,17; 80,35; 86,5.12; hikanôs, adequately, 38,35; 39,6; 56,36; 115,4 himation, coat, 39,26 hippeuein, ride, 118,23 hippos, horse, 3,18.19.25; 4,15; 6,24.25(bis); 23,37; 26,11; 33,9(bis); 88,37; 90,7 histanai, immobilize, 121,36; histasthai, come to a stop, 79,29; 82,11; 98,13; 112,18.22; 118,37; be stationary, 120,10; limit oneself, 30,11; assume (in argument), 33,28 historia, body of information, 14,4.26 hodos, see meterkhesthai and probainein holoklêros, complete, 21,24; 38,21; 47,16; 50,23; 81,16; holoklêrôs, completely, 48,15 holos (18/88), whole, total; holon di’holou, throughout 7,4; 40,26(bis); 57,8; 59,24; 60,17; di’holou (adv.), throughout, 92,16; holôs, in general, 2,9; 5,38; 6,39; 14,33; 15,17; 19,8; 20,24.30; 21,14.31; 26,39; 30,21; 31,13; 32,13; 33,21; 34,17; 36,25.29; 39,26; 40,18; 42,16.30; 55,30; 60,12; 62,18.24; 63,2; 68,35.38; 78,31; 79,26; 80,12; 83,31; 87,29; 88,33; 94,36; 97,26; 101,23; 104,12; 110,23; 112,27; 123,32; 124,32; 126,17 homoeidês, of the same kind, 3,16; 26,28(bis); 36,; 38,3.12; 125,23 homogenês, of the same kind, 99,34 homoiomereiai, homoiomerous bodies, 13,17 homoiotês, likeness, resemblance, 3,33; 4,2; 66,16; 91,26; 107,2 homoiousthai, be made like, 88,6 homologein, admit, agree, 18,6.17; 23,11; 26,25; homologoumenon, consistent, 45,9 homônumos, homonymous, 41,34.37; 42,24.25; 43,2.3; homônumôs, homonymously, 42,24(bis); 43,2 hôra, hour, 110,35; season, 50,23 horasis, seeing, 4,35; 17,35; 43,14; 58,4.22.23; 59,3.4; 70,17; 83,37; 84,17.21 horaton (16/46), object of sight, visible, visible object, 4,35; 17,34; 49,25; 56,19; 58,16.22.23(bis).; 59,; 61,2.9(bis).; 62,3.36; 67,29; 68,31.35; 69,23; 71,5.6; 74,23; 77,22; 83,37.39; 84,20.21 horismos, definition, 2,; 3,; 5,;


22,23; 31,38; 32,14.19; 44,2; 48,13.15; 49,14 horistikos, pertaining to definition, 2,10.19 horizein, define, 2,37; 5,13; 7,25; 8,3.6.10; 22,22; 26,; 41,20; 48,22.36; 111,16 hormasthai, be impelled, 52,9; 125,1 hormê, impulse, 17,28; 67,3.7.24; 113,13; 121,35 horos, definition, mark, 8,36; 9,19; 12,20(bis); 14,30; 20,28.37; 22,6; 30,25; 67,8; 106,25 huelos, glass, 59,13 hugiainein, be healthy, 46,14.17.22; 51,32; 57,23; 65,23 hugiazein, cure, 15,8.9 hugieia, health, 15,9; 24,29; 46,; 50,15; 113,4.5 hugiês, valid (logically), 6,12 hugrainesthai, be moistened, 71,; 78,27.37; 79,28 hugros, fluid, moist, wet, consisting of water, 47,; 51,34.37(bis); 57,28; 65,7.9; 70,6.14(bis).27(bis).29.33.34(ter).35.36(bis); 71,; 72,20; 74,8; ; 78,37; 81,37; 82,24; 96,10 hugrotês, moistness, wetness, 8,13; 10,28; 14,17.21; 70,32.37; 71,38; 74,9; 75,1; 76,35; 114,25; 125,16 hulê (35/141), matter; phusikê hulê, natural matter, 8,34; 114,27; (plural) 78,7; 98,26; see eidos hulikos, like matter, 51,38; composed of matter, 107,35 humên, membrane, 65,8.13; 66,20; 73,2.4; 75,4.32 hupakouein, pay heed (metaph. for affections obeying reason), 107,8 huparkhein (74/96), be, exist, e.g. 17,22; 30,20; 38,17; 46,33; belong to (with dative), e.g. 6,26; 8,18; 10,10.11; 36,16.28; 37,19.20; 44,26.27.29; huparkhon, what belongs (to a subject in predication), 109,28(bis).29(bis); ta huparkhonta (= sumbebêkota), (incidental) properties, 5,10.28; 17,21; ta kath’hauta hurarkhonta, essential properties (= ta kath’hauta sumbebêkota), 2,14-15; 5,22.25; 49,15-16 hupeidesthai, be basically aware, 37,25 huperballein, to be in excess, 71,16.30; 77,25; 84,32; 126,8 huperbolê, excess, 71,9.12; 77,8; 78,19.22; 125,37; 126.1(bis).8.10 hupêretein, serve (a purpose), 124,23; (middle), obey, serve, 7,17; 68,17; 69,5; 75,20 huperokhê, superiority, 115,2 huphistasthai, really exist, 4,1.4; 11,22; 97,6; 110,38; 114,14.19


Greek-English Index

hupnos, sleep (n.) , 41,; 43,16; 89,36; 93,20; 117,26 hupnôttein, sleep (v.), 90,3 (cf. Plato, Republic 534C7) hupobainein, be inferior, 88,28 hupoballesthai, to be supplied as a support, 42,29; 53,28; 88,36; 99,36 hupodekhesthai, receive, 64,30; 78,9 hupographê, sketch, 43,31 hupokeimenon, substrate (= matter), 3,12.14; 38,15; 39,29.34.36; 40,4.9.10; 43,18; 46,19.31; 53,13; 77,34; 96,36; 100,33.37; 108,23 (cf. 107,35); 117,3; substrate (of objects of perception), 79,2; 93,10; object (of activities of capacities of the soul, particularly sense-perception), 4,21.33; 49,24.27; 57,25.30; 76,33; 80,5; 84,36; 90,36(bis); 92,7.16; 97,18; 116,22; incidental object of perception, 93,17; (physical) object, 61,8.9; (living) entity, 61,8; hupokeimenai dunameis, lower capacities (of the soul), 48,6; hupokeimena, subjects (of predication), 58,12; hupokeimenôi, in substrate (= content), 37,21; opp. logôi (in definition), 4,19; 59,1-2; 65,27; 86,7; 113,24-5; opp. to einai (being), 52,34; 78,14-16; opp. tôi ti ên einai (in essence), 113,26-7 hupokeimenos, underlying (as subject matter for treatment), 1,13.15; of dunamis (potentiality), 3,3; of hulê (matter), 7,26; 8,10.35; of phusis (nature), 12,18; phusis hupokeimenê, nature of the object (of a sense), 72,33 hupokeisthai, be a substrate, 96,38; 97,12; be an object (of perception) 81,23; 56,22 hupolambanein, believe, 9,18.32.39; 13,; 14,29; 18,37; 21,4; 35,12; 36,4; 43,39; 46,32; 51,18; 62,29; 64,13; 65,14; 84,19; 86,18; 87,24; 88,34.38; 89,; 94,28; 102,33.37; 106,8.16; 107,5 hupolêpsis, belief, 88,29(bis); 89,21; 90,18.20; 91,20; 122,15 hupomenein, persist, 94,13; 99,36; 100,12; undergo, 28,4 hupomimnêskein, recall (text or point discussed earlier), 8,11; 20,8; 39,7; 40,5; 46,27; 97,15 hupomnêsis, recapitulation (of an earlier text), 32,34 huponoein, assume, infer (the basic meaning, or implication, of an idea or text), 10,26; 11,23; 13,6; 15,7; 30,36; 97,9; 108,29 huponoia, (basic) implication (of a theory), 19,34; 20,8 hupopheresthai, slide into [proposing] (in derogatory sense) 9,29; 14,5; 39,3 hupostasis, real existence, 8,31; 120,19;

kath’hupostasin, in respect of real existence, 114,21 hupothesis, assumption, 13,2; 16,27; 17,1; 37,23; hypothesis, 4,7 hupotithenai, posit, 12,15; 13,17 hupotithesthai, assume, 31,22; 32,9; 73,24 husteron (10/24) (adv.), later; posterior (in definition), 57,13; 120,16 iatreuein, practise medicine, 118,22 iatrikê, medicine, 3,9; 8,16; 50,14; 118,22 iatros, doctor, 46,24 idea, form (Platonic), 11,29.33; 12,4.7.12 idiazein, to define (uniquely), 11,4 idios, unique, proprietary, 19,4; 23,36(bis); 25,18; 26,32; 33,32; 38,16; 77,27; 81,31; 82,22; 100,25; 104,5; 108,36; 112,23; 121,36; unique, proprietary (to something), 2,29.30; 6,; 13,21; 32,7; 35,4; 48,19.21.26; 56,37; 58,25; 61,12; 81,19; 82,12; 83,21; 87,23; 110,1; special (of objects of perception), 57,17.31.36; 58,3.17.22; 81,23; 82,23; 88,21.22.23; 90,8; 93,9.10.16 (see also aisthêta); idioi logoi, private (i.e. unpublished) discussions, 24,15; idiâi (dative), in particular, in specific or individual cases, 31,7; 48,36; 54,4; 57,11; 95,15 ikhnos, trace (= image from sense-perception), 45,35; 91,17; 92,1.15; 93,2; 95,2; 116,20; trace (from reason), 107,10 ikthus, fish, 38,8.18; 61,17; 66,20; 74,13(bis) iluspasthai, wriggle, 38,10 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 92A7) indalma, resemblance, 112,10 is, rib (of a leaf), 42,10 iskhurizesthai, rely on (in an argument), 52,20 (LSJ II.2; cf. R. Renehan, Greek Lexicographical Notes, Ser. 1, p. 113) iskhuros, powerful (doctrine), 20,3, (cause), 7,9; strong (flavour), 72,2, (smell), 69,26; intense (colour), 104,35 isos, equal, 44,4; ison (adv.), equally, 77,10; kat’ison, evenhandedly, 118,4; isôs (8/39), perhaps; surely (408b29), 29,35; 101,32 kaiein/kaein, burn, 51,23; 54,30; 78,1.3.6 kairos, appropriate time, 30,36; en kairôi, appropriately, 32,21(bis) kakia, vice, 5,26; 24,27; 77,10; 88,19.21 kakos, bad, 113,37; kheirôn, inferior, 49,10; 123,30; to kakon, bad (n.), 88,4; 106,20; 111,23; 113,; 114,6; ta kaka, evil (objects of thought), 111,31.35; kakôs, incorrectly (of reasoning), 16,39; 107,17; kakôs legein, make an incorrect claim, 109,32

Greek-English Index kalein, call (= apply a name or term), be called, 11,25; 12,18; 17,37; 18,31; 25,11; 31,29; 32,34; 45,37; 48,28; 53,24; 76,37; 85,7; 86,24; 88,15; 89,28.31; 91,38; 119,30; kaloumenos, so-called (sometimes omitted in translation and indicated by quotation marks), 9,15; 20,21; 35,17.20; 44,11.19; 47,16; 60,8; 67,4; 76,36; 81,5; 94,27; 118,8; 124,19 kalos, fine, 1,12; 112,20; to kalon, what is fine, 112,19; kalôs, correctly, 5,3.8.9; 10,1.5; 25,4; 32,21; 33,6; 46,31; 51,4; 56,4; 104,16; 107,33; kalôs legein, to make a correct claim, 9,2(bis); 32,21; 62,12; 115,18.23 kamatos, sickness, 65,12.13 kamnein, be sick, be afflicted, 30,9; 51,32; 71,37.39; be a patient, 50,15; grow tired, 98,6 kampulos, curved, 5,6; 35,24.25(bis) kardia, heart, 7,27.31; 27,16; 37,6; 66,38; 67,1; 76,21; 94,1; 118,13; 121,7 kataduesthai, dive deep, 70,25 katakhrêsthai, misapply (a term), 88,26; 94,28; 95,6 katakratein, master (an argument), 36,21 katalambanein, grasp (by perception or thought), 22,3; 30,25; 67,32; 68,5; 94,26; 96,23; 99,9; (pass.), be (physically) contained, 63,16 katalêpsis, grasp (cognitively), 12,29 katalêptikê (dunamis), capacity to grasp (cognitively), 34,29 kataphasis, affirmation, 109,33; 112,12; 113,18 katarrhizousthai, be rooted, 79,5 (cf. Plato, Timaeus 76C1; 77C4) kataskeuazein, constitute, set up, fit out 20,9; 46,38; 98,32; 99,3; (middle) construct (geom.), 44,5 kataskeuê, constitution (= hexis) of soul, 43,15; 104,13; (of sense-organ), 71,36; supply (of definitions), 5,27 katêgoreisthai, be predicated, 48,11.24 katêgoriai, categories, 33,28; Categories (title of Aristotelian work), 2,35; 33,22; 109,6 katekhein, occupy, 60,18; retain (knowledge, belief, sense-impressions), 30,34; 91,13.40; 92,4.15.26; retain (air in lungs), 67,19; 69,15 kathaptesthai, 54.37 assail (in argument) (cf. Plato, Crito 52A6) katharos, clear (air), 54,37; (morally) pure, 107,23(bis) kathektikos, capable of retaining (objects of perception), 92,27 katheudein, be asleep, 41,7; 55,3 kathidruein, settle (trans.), 94,1 kathistasthai, be 16,12; 18,15; be stable, 22,32


katholou (adv., adj.), universal, in universal terms, 3,23.25; 8,11; 55,16; 57,11; 84,5; 98,23; 122,17; katholou legein, speak universally, 35,15; 48,36; 77,3; to/ta katholou, universal/s (opp. individuals), 4,27; 33,22; 56,21.27; 95,11; 122,15 katoikisis, housing (of intellect in body), 107,20 katoikizein, house, 106,24 (= Plato, Timaeus 69D7) katorthôma, way of being (epistemically) correct, 88,13; 93,7 keisthai, be assumed, 15,21; 58,27; be in a state, 57,22; 88,29; 89,10 kenologein, speak vacuously, 8,4 kephalaion, summary, 5,1; 47,9; en kephalaiôi legein, summarize, 121,4 kephalaiousthai, be characterized in general terms, 3,33 kephalê, head, 37,6; 38,11; 51,7.9; 94,2; 106,25 kerannusthai, be blended, mixed, 11,6; 12,24; 17,4; 25,6; 32,26; 40,18.21; 70,32; 78,33; 79,11; 84,26.28; 123,37; 125,5.17 kêros, wax, 42,15; 57,5.7; 59,23; 77,29; 92,17.19.34; 124,30.38 khalepos, difficult, 2,8; 4,17; 23,7; 30,30; 37,30.32; 40,5; 45,28.34; 48,21; 73,25; 92,5; 103,20; khalepôs, with difficulty, 29,6; 107,3 khalepotês, difficulty, 2,17.23 khalkos, bronze, 40,23; 56,29; 63,5; 96,5; 98,25; 99,14 khalkous, made of bronze, 6,37; 63,18; 77,31(bis) kharaktêr, character, 82,19 kharaktêrizein, characterize, 8,32; 96,37 kheir, hand, 6,30; 28,3.4; 66,25; 115,28 khiôn, snow, 59,37; 85,22; 109,28.29 khitôn, ‘shirt’ (of Nessus), 73,5 khitônion, tunic, 79,19 kholê, bile, 82,29; 113,2 khôra, space, 17,35.39; 31,31; khôran ekhein (with gen.), to have the status of, 39,27.36; 40,4; 87,8 khorêgein, supply, 12,20; (light) 26,1; (life) 27,1 khorêgos, supplier (of thoughts) (= God), 99,25; (of light = sun) 103,23 khôrein, come, go, 18,17; 60,17 khôris, apart from, separately, 3,26; 6,9; 38,4; 49,11; 53,15; 55,37; 78,31; 83,38.39; 84,21.22; 90,32; 91,29; 96,19; 106,24.26; 109,35.36(ter); 114,14; 117,21; 119,18; 120,27; 125,4.30.31(bis) khôristos, separate, 6,32; 25,35; 26,31; 30,22; 43,; 45,28; 93,33; 95,5; 97,4; 98,32; 99,35; 102,36; 104,17.29; 105,; 106,4.7.8;


Greek-English Index

108,; 110,38; 112,4; 114,34; 116,30 khôrizein, separate, (pass.) be separated, 4,21; 6,; 8,30; 10,2; 38,28.29; 40,20(bis); 41,17; 43,26.29; 44,; 45,29.30.32; 48,12; 53,30; 54,37; 65,34; 73,30; 84,1; 85,13; 86,28; 90,19; 94,3; 97,5.6; 100,2; 101,24; 109,36; 114,; 115,6.7.36; 117,8; 119,31 khrê, it is necessary, must be, 18,36; 28,27; 30,36; 31,8; 32,22; 48,17.28; 49,16; 51,8; 54,5.10; 67,14; 71,27; 74,32; 78,38; 81,22; 88,6.14; 102,9.27; 103,38; 108,25; 111,14. khrêsthai, use, employ (as a means to an end), 1,17; 2,13; 11,7.24; 12,6; 22,22.29; 30,21; 37,21; 45,3.7.8; 47,22; 51,22; 53,26.29; 55,30.34; 65,31; 66,29.33; 69,25.30; 70,3; 71,32; 72,38; 73,22.26; 75,19(bis); 76,8; 80,29.32.33; 87,8; 93,32; 94,32.35; 97,19; 100,34; 105,10; 115,28; 121,4.25; 124,14; 125,30; use (a term, usu. in a specific sense), 10,2; 14,22; 18,32; 39,18; 44,36; 56,38; 58,12; 68,6; 88,17; 101,18; 116,22 khreia, need, utility, 2,7; 21,5.26; 62,11; 83,16; 123,25; (useful) function, 67,36.37 khrêsimos, useful, 2,33.34; 5,3; 67,18 khromatizein, colour (v.), 57,32; 59,19.36; 83,26 khronos (18/65), ho mellôn khronos, the future, 107,12; 109,21; 120,15.24 khumos (25/48), flavour (as the object of taste); fluid (that nourishes plants), 79,6; 124,13 kinein (207/314), move/cause movement; kineisthai, be moved, move (absol.); to kineisthai, (the category) movement, 33,26; attack (a doctrine), 20,23; stir up (a problem), 54,36 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 163A10) kinêtikos, having a capacity for (or for causing) movement, 10,13; 13,7.21; 31,10; 34,31; 61,12.36; 62,7; 64,15; 103,11; 119,3.23; 121,20; 123,20.34; (dunamis) kinêtikê (kata topon), capacity for movement (in respect of place), 12,33; 34,28; 38,29; 41,8; 47,10; 48,3.23; 84,5; 116,27; to (kata topon) kinêtikon, the capacity for movement (in respect of place), 45,34; 117,37; 118,1 kinêtos, moved, 31,11 kirnasthai, be blended, 22,36; 34,12; 60,14; 70,32; 91,15 klasthai, be bent, 114,17 klêronomein, inherit (metaph. for paronymy), 93,26 klinê, bed, koilos, hollow, 114,17 koilotês, hollowness, 114,16 koinônein, share in, 35,8; 38,24; 50,21.35;

60,8; 82,35; 88,27; 104,3; 111,34; 117,13; 119,11; 124,20 koinônia, association, 23,28 koinos (32/81), common, general, universal, commonly shared, etc.; koina (aisthêta), objects of perception common (to more than one sense), 57,16.36.38; 58,2.4; 72,26; 81,18.22.30; 82,18.22.36; 83,1.4; 88,21.23(bis).24; 93,13.18; koinoi logoi (opp. idioi logoi), widespread discussions, 24,15; common definitions, 48,29; 54,13-14; koinêi, in common, in general, 34,26; 48,24; 54,3; koinôs, in a general sense, 56,38.39; 74,33; koinos nous see nous kôluein, prevent, 15,5; 17,11; 26,18; 31,23.26.32; 43,25; 55,22; 59,5; 60,38; 63,34; 64,24.38; 73,19; 74,39; 76,6.10; 90,4; 94,23.34; 115,27; 120,6.27; 122,20 kompseia, subtlety, 27,5 (cf. Plato, Phaedo 101C8) kompseuesthai, play cleverly (on words), 14,22 kompsos, ingenious, 17,30 kôphasthai, to be made deaf, 102,33 kôphos, deaf, 116,3 korê, eyeball, 43,20; 62,16; 65,4.7.13; 74,23; 75,22; 79,33; 80,17; 85,10.34.35; 87,2 kosmos, cosmos, universe, 11,14.28.31; 12,2; 35,27 kouphos, light, 57,28; 72,20.31; 75,35; 80,8 krama, blend, 11,4 krasis, blend (= mixis), 24,16; 25,15(bis).; 32,30; 84,29.30.33; 91,17.18; temperament (of the body), 7,15.16.21; 26,28; 68,11.13 kratein, control, 121,34(bis); 122,1 krinein, discern (an object of perception or thought; i.e. the activity of perception), 27,15.19.21; 68,32; 70,14; 71,6; 76,14; 78,11.12; 79,6.37; 80,10.13; 81,36; 82,16.22; 83,; 84,36; 85,; 87,13.17; 93,12; 94,6; 96,; 114,9; discern, discriminate, distinguish (differences among objects of perception, or between senses), 47,19; 85,; 86,; 97,2; 112,16; 113,9; 117,12; 124,3.8; judge (= form a belief); 19,13; 35,23.24; 87,10; 88,38 krisis, discernment, discrimination, 16,20.25; 27,20; 45,37; 78,10; 79,29; 80,8.23; 81,11; 83,4; 124,6; 125,8; judgment (of reason), 107,18 kritêrion, means of judgment, 35,25; means of discernment, 87,18 kritês, partisan (of a theory), 14,1; judge, 35,24 kritikos, having a capacity for

Greek-English Index discrimination, or discernment, 72,16; 77,20; (dunamis) kritikê, capacity for discrimination/discernment, 80,10; 116,27; hexis kritikê, discriminatory hexis, 88,30; 89,32(plu.) kubernêtês, pilot, 43,29; 53,29 kuklophoria, circular movement, 20,25; 23,15 kuklos, circle, 5,20; 16,5.31; 19,21.25; 20,10.12.14(bis).26; 21,7.20.25; 22,8(bis).10(bis).11; 23,13.15.17; 73,10; 74,34(bis); 86,20.22; 96,27; 116,4; 121,15 kuma, wave, 65,35 kuôn, dog, 67,31; 88,37; 90,7 kurios, controlling, having control over, 34,20.26; 35,2; 63,21; 64,11.12.13; 89,7; 93,29.30; 118,; 122,17; kuria merê, vital parts, 126,7 kuriôs, in a strict sense, 11,1; 29,1; 54,11; 56,; 57,1; 58,17; 61,35; 71,25; 78,4; 79,24; 81,32; 87,7; 89,31.35(bis); 94,14; 97,16; 119,17; (comp.) 94,8; (superl.) 39,4 lambanein, accept, acquire, adopt, receive, take, 2,38; 9,2; 14,2; 15,16; 28,32; 29,27; 30,7; 41,11; 56,6; 76,25; 77,30; 93,20; 104,26; 106,17; 107,24; 115,24.30; 124,9; grasp, take, understand, interpret, 1,2; 2,17.28.34; 11,37; 32,15.33; 42,28(bis); 43,2; 46,10; 48,9; 49,13; 51,5; 70,13; 82,25; 88,24; 92,23; 107,1.34; 108,17; 111,24; 117,7; ta eilêmmena, assumptions, 16,19 lampein, shine, flash, be luminous, 7,6; 58,25; 61,14.16.26 lampros, brilliant, shiny, 61,29; 94,39; 124,37 lanthanein, evade, escape notice, go unnoticed, 60,29.32.33; 68,7; 74,16.30.40; 75, legein (234/391), legein epi (with genitive), to apply (a term; i.e., predicate), 20,30; 54,10; 74,35; 84,11; ta pollakhôs legomena, terms with many senses, 48,25; haplôs legein/legesthai, to use/be used in a single (or unqualified) sense, 55,17; 83,22; 84,23(bis); 103,18; dikhôs legein/legesthai, use/be used in two senses, 46,26; koinôs legesthai, be used in a general sense, 56,38.39; kuriôs legesthai, be used in a strict sense, 97,16; sunelonti eipein, to sum up, 67,22 lêgon, consequent (in a conditional), 6,12 leios, smooth, 57,27; 63,; 64,3.8(bis); 66,12; 72,24.27; 124,37 leiotês, smoothness, 63,13.19; 72,24.27 leipesthai, to be deficient, 20,3; leipetai, ‘it remains’ (introducing a discussion, or conclusion, reached by elimination of


alternatives), 33,1; 40,32; 62,16; 73,23; 90,17; 91,22; 93,23; 115,26 lêmma, premise, 20,36 lepis (plural), scales (on fish), 61,17 leptomereia, state of being rarefied, 13,25 leptomerês, rarefied, 13,9; 14,16; 32,4.36 leptos, fine (of cloth), 73,2; (comp.), less dense, 60,24; 66,12 lêthê, loss of memory, 102,29; 108,27 leukainesthai, be made white, 78,8; 86,29; 79,33 leukos, white, 21,16.17.18; 29,20; 33,14; 51,32(bis); 57,2(bis); 58,7.9.11; 59,36; 72,16; 75,17.23; 82,8.10.17; 84,22.38; 85,1(bis).; 86,13.35.36; 90,35.36.38; 93,11; 109,29.30; 111,21; 112,17(bis); 117,4 leukotês, whiteness, 15,23; 21,18(bis); 59,36; 85,23; 100,25 lexis, verbal act, speech, 66,17; 110,21; 111,3.4; style, 108,9; text (under immediate interpretation), 36,20 liparos, viscous, 51,36; oily (-smelling), 68,25; oily (-tasting), 72,5 lithinos, sculpted, 43,2 lithos, stone, 7,36; 13,22.23; 23,30; 25,4; 26,4; 30,29; 33,19; 41,; 46,36; 56,29; 59,12; 63,5; 71,5; 79,16; 91,34; 96,3.4; 98,25; 115,25; 124,31 logikos, rational, having a capacity for reasoning, 49,4; 90,23; 107,19; 121,20.22.33; logikê dunamis, capacity for reasoning, 88,10.12.30; logikê psukhê, rational soul, 10,35; 11,5.13; 107,11; zôion logikon, rational animal (= definition of human being), 3,26; 4,5.6(plu.); 121,31(plu.) logismos, reasoning (in general), 32,16; 49,5.7; 111,24; rational calculation (in practical reasoning), 117,8; 118,26; 119,14; 120,5 logistikon (to), capacity for rational calculation, 116,31; 118,7; 121,23 logizesthai, rationally calculate, 118,14.32.36 logos, (a) argument, process of reasoning argumentatively, theory, 2,12.23; 6,11; 8,22; 12,5; 14,38; 15,37; 18,9; 20,7; 22,22.23; 23,23; 24,21.36; 25,25; 26,9; 27,13; 31,5; 32,; ; 36,14; 37,20.31; 43,37; 45,21; 52,4; 60,31; 73,26; 74,25; 75,28; 76,2; 95,29; 106,25; 125,11.22; ouden pros ton logon, irrelevant (to an argument), 16,34; 74,14; 88,25 (b-i) definition (in general), account, rationale, 4,9; 8,9; 17,26.36; 23,21; 37,28; 39,1.2; 41,16; 43,32; 45,13; 47,31; 48,; 49,12; 53,22; 57,12.13; 58,29.30; 62,20; 63,30; 72,8; 76,17; 86,5.8.24; 96,7.11.34; 99,11.19;


Greek-English Index

logôi, in definition, 4,19.29; 39,13; 45,29; 52,35; 59,2; 65,27; 86,10.31; 94,3; 97,5.7; 113,25; kata logon, in definition, 116,30 (b-ii) definition (qua form), defining principle of something, 3,36; 19,6; 23,6; 41,24; 42,26; 46,21.37; 47,5; 48,37; 49,20; 51,24; 62,37; 100,25 (b-iii) rational principle (opp. definition based on matter), 7,32.34; 8,1.2.8; 57,4; 115,27(bis); logoi enuloi (403a25), enmattered rational principles, 7,24-5 (c) discussion, exposition, discursive treatment of a topic, 1,11; 24,15; 26,10 (= DA); 27,6.33; 28,18; 47,9; 49,8.36; 53,37; 54,9.14.18; 56,36; 58,24.26; 61,21; 70,23; 77,27; 85,8; 88,9; 93,23; 119,34; 122,10; 125,1. (d-i) ratio (in general), proportion, 20,17; 24,31.32; 25, 20.22(bis).28; 32,25.31; 33,10.15.21; 51,24; 84,30.31 (d-ii) ratio (with particular reference to Aristotelian form), 78,3.10.12(bis).13.17.31; 79,36; 83,28; 84,25.33. (e) reason (as a capacity of the soul), 10,34; 49,6.34; 60,31; 81,16; 87,18.20.25; 88,19; 90,23.25; 93,3; 97,33(bis); 107,; 117,11.21 (f) sentence, 109,18.37 loipos (6/38), other, remaining; loipon (adv.), next, finally, 8,38; 10,36; 105,13; kai ta loipa, et cetera, 42,8; 81,25 louesthai, wash (intrans.), 27,39 luesthai, be dissolved (of a ratio), 25,28.29; 78,20 lumainesthai, harm, 22,36 lumantikos, capable of harming, 22,27; 71,26 lupê, pain, 2,31; 32,17; 45,38; 47,20.21; 68,27; 107,13; 122,7 lupein, cause pain, 84,33; harm, 124,13; (pass.) suffer pain, 27,9; 67,11.34 lupêros, painful, 107,14; 113,; 114,5; 126,17 lura, lyre, 24,6; 66,16 lusis, solution (to a problem), 101,2; 108,10 makhê, conflict (between desires), 120,10 makhesthai, contest, 24,24.25; 29,4; 31,2; be in conflict with, 91,1; 95,19; 105,26 makros, prolonged, 108,8; makrôi (adv.), by far, 117,9; makrôs, at length, 108,8 malakos, weak, soft, 1,16; 24,19; 57,27; 68,10; 72,20; 77,6.19 malakotês, softness, 68,14; 73,3 mallon (23/124), mallon de, indeed, in fact, rather, specifically (used to correct or specify an immediately preceding statement; cf. LSJ mala II.3), 6,39; 11,25; 23,35; 24,8; 33,7; 60,16.26; 77,36;

78,5; 82,12; 86,19; 96,13; 100,5.33; 103,23; 106,8.11; 109,2; 112,9; 120,28 manthanein, learn, 1,25; 5,6; 15,8; ; 28,32; 55,31; 56,6.13.14; 95,17; 104,; 116,4 marturein, provide evidence, 19,1 martus, witness, 9,39 (see epagein) matên, pointlessly, to no purpose, 21,30; 22,9.19; 79,3.5; 117,38; 118,3.4; 123,11.22; 124,12 mathêmata, mathematics, 5,5.24 mathêmatikos, mathematical, 8,25; mathematician, 8,9; mathêmatikê, mathematics, 8,20 mathêsis, instruction, learning, 55,25(bis); 107,1 megas, great, large, 2,17; 5,8; 10,8; 21,20; 30,28; 32,10; 60,33; 71,14; 72,27; 91,5.13; 94,38; 106,19; 117,8; 121,24.25; loud, 71,10; 104,34 meiousthai, decrease, 44,18 mêkhanasthai, be fashioned, 65,2; 67,36 mêkos, length, 11,; 110,12.14(quater); 111,5.6.8 melainesthai, be turned black, 78,8; 86,29 melas, black, 15,23; 29,20; 51,33; 52,32; 72,16; 75,17; 84,38; 85,35.36; 86,35; 111,21 meli, honey, 40,18; 68,24; 81,37; 82,1.31; 85,21; 113,2 melikraton, hydromel, 40,18 melissa, bee, 69,12 mellein, to be going, be intending, be about (to do something), 2,22; 20,3; 27,4; 48,36; 49,13; 54,35(bis); 63,13; 70,16; 118,16; 123,11; 124,4.22; 125,17; to mellon, the future, 120, (see also khronos) mêlon, apple, 37,22; 117,4 melos, limb, 109,12(bis).13.17 memphesthai, reproach, 84,23 menein, remain, be stable, 18,12.30; 28,9; 41,5; 52,11; 77,37; 79,2.5.26; 82,27; 84,9.10; 94,13; 116,12; 118,13; 121,13.16.17; 124,34 mêninx, ear-drum, 64,; 65,; 67,17 merismos, division, 26,39; 103,28 meristos, divided (into parts), 3,7(bis); 10,; 11,3.12.36; 12,26; 21,33.34.36; 22,3.14; 37,16.18; 110,30; 111,4 merizesthai, be divided (into parts), 19,20; 20,16; 103,28.34; memerismenôs, in a divided state, 100,26 meros, part, 1.22.28; 3,; 4,; 5,8; 6,26.27; 12,2; 33,13; 35,10.23; 37,; 38,; 40,; 42,37; 43,3(bis).4.22.23(bis).25.26.34; 44,20;

Greek-English Index 45,9.10.37; 49,9; 55,10;56,23; 76,27; 88,2; 117,6.16; 119,31; 120,2; 121,5; 122,36; 123,23; 125,19; en merei, in individual/particular cases, 56,23; 119,26; 122,17 meson, medium (for sense-perception), 74,; 75,; 77,12.20 mesotês, mean, 77,9(bis).10.13.17; 78,22.33; 122,34; 123,36; 125,5 metabainein, change place, 34,34; 118,18; 123,14; switch (subjects), 17,34; make a transition (of state), 29,13.14; 41,38; 94,12; make a transition (in discursive thinking), 99,9; 100,11 metaballein, change, 18,7; 29,14; 42,23; 52,; 55,26; 56,9(bis).16.37; 59,22; 100,7 metabasis, transition (between concepts), 105,5 metabolê, change, 29,18; 52,8(bis); 56,14.16.18; 78,4; 79,29 108,3 metadidonai, give a share, 122,33 metalambanein, adopt (as an alternative), 18,35; 91,8; share in, 26,3; 35,18; 93,4 metapherein, paraphrase, 14,35; 32,21; use metaphorically, 68,5.20; 89,27 metaphora, metaphor, 66,4; 72,28 metapiptein, change, 91,12 metatithenai, rearrange (passages in a quotation), 29,23 metekhein, share in, 15,27; 34,16; 39,32; 42,3; 50,9.20; 52,31; 80,23; 88,11.25; 90,7; 123,1; consist of, 122,35 meterkhesthai, make a transition (in thought), 68,26; 99,5; pursue (nutriment) 123,7; pursue (a problem) 2,27; 12,5 metaxu, (25/60), in between, intervening (as a medium); to metaxu, intermediary, 52,8; medium (for sense-perception), 57,23;; 70,20; 77,7.22 methistasthai, change position, place, 16,17; 65,15 methodos, method, 1,8; 2, methorion, border area (‘no man’s land’) 64,28; 88,29 (cf. Plato, Laws 878B5; Euthydemus 305C7). methuein, be drunk, 22,31 metokhos, sharing in, 107,15.20 metrein, measure, 121,24; (passive) be moderated, 107,15 metriôs, in a limited way, 102,14 miainein, pollute, 106,23 mignunai, mix, 12,39; 23,8; 24,31; 25,6.7; 35,27.33; 70,27.33; 80,24; 84,27; 94,30; 97,28.29; 105,5.29 mikros, small, slight, 10,8; 32,4.9; 60,31; 69,38; 71,13; 72,27; 77,24; 104,35; mikrôi, mikron (adv.), small (distance in


the text), 85,10; 87,14; 103,6; 105,5.7; 112,34; ou para mikron, not insignificant, 3,32 miktos, mixed, 35,38; 73,23; 108,24 mimeisthai, imitate, 53,13 mimnêskein, recall (= quote a text), 20,9; cf. hupomnêsis mimnêskesthai, remember, 101,17; 102,1.9.19; mention (a subject), 104,31 misein, hate, 100,15; 101,8.19; 105,19 mixis, mixture, 25,; 32,31; 84,29; 102,29; 108,28.31 mnêmê, memory, 18,16; 99,8 mnêmoneuein, remember, 29,33; 101,; 102,; 105,20 moira, apportionment (of the productive intellect), 103,5 monadikos, unit-like, 31,4 monas, unit, 11,24; 21,2; 31,; 32,10 monimos, stable, stationary, 34,30; 92,38; 118,2; 123,13 morion, part, 4,16.25; 16,17; 18,24; 20,29; 21,7.8(bis).9(bis). .29(bis); 25,13.15.18; 27,21.27.29; 34,9; 35,28; 36,; 37,; 38,12.20.30; 40,27.28; 45,12.27(bis); 64,21; 65,17; 66,24.36; 67,23;68,17; 73,7.34; 74,3; 76,8.11.38; 78,26.33; 80,23; 93,32; 110,25.26; 116,29.31; 117,; 118,14 morphê, structure, 3,35; 23,3.36; 39,12.15.16(bis).19.35; 40,35.38; 42,24.39; 43,27; 46,21; 78,3.14.15; 89,30.31; 94,; 95,37; 96,; 98,26; 109,4; 111,17; 115,27(bis).32 morphoun, impose structure, 40,11; 43,11; 92,19; 99,23; 115,32 mousikê, (art of) music, 27,37; 84,28 muia, fly, 92,24; 122,6 muktêr, nostril, 62,24; 69,16; 76,19;

murmêx, ant, 90,6; 120,4 naos, temple, 5,14 naus, ship, 15,20.21 nautian, be nauseated, 28,22 neikos, strife (in Empedocles), 10,19; 34,15(bis) nekron, lifeless body, 40,36; 43,6 nekrôsthai, be turned into a corpse, 28,11 nênemia, calm, tranquillity, 9,31; 65,20 neos, young, 22,32; 104,15 nêphein, be drunk, 22,31 nêpios, infant, 95,10 neuein, tend, 78,35 neuron, sinew, 14,1; 25,13; 34,9 nikan, defeat, triumph over, 1,18; 121,33 noein (53/145), think; (opp. dianoeisthai),


Greek-English Index

30,24-34; take (a term in a given sense; cf. LSJ IV), 107,1; 116,21 noêma, thought, 3,37; 4,2.4; 20,33.35.38; 33,27; 56,20; 95,; 97,30; 98,7.23; 99,; 104,8; 109,37; 110,; 116,19.21 noeros, rational, 27,3 noêsis, thinking, act of thinking, 2,30; 18,25; 20,31.32(bis); 22,; 23,7; 86,17; 88,15; 89,24.29; 99,21; 100,9; 109,10; 110,9.19.24; 111,29.30; 118,18.30.37; 119,2 noêtikos, having a capacity for thought, 113,29; to noêtikon, the capacity for thought, 49,16; 104,32; 105,8 noêtos, object of thought, 4,36; 11,28.31; 12,12; 49,29.34; 86,18; 92,33; 94,7; 95,3; 97,; 98,5..7.9; 99,27.29; 100,1.2(bis).3; 114,9; 115,12.36 nomizein, believe, consider, envisage, 72,15; 105,9; 117,14; 124,35 nosos, disease, sickness, 24,28; 29,29; 30,13.17; 93,30 nothos, bastard (of the apprehension of matter), 111,24.25 (= Plato, Timaeus 52B2) nous (71/304), intellect, etc.: in Anaxagoras, 13,16; 14,12; 94,20; 97,8; dunamei nous, potential intellect, 95,9; 98,; 99,; 100,; 101,6; 103,31.37; 104,14.25.30; 105,; 107,30.31; 108,12.24.32; 109,4; 111,31; 112,7; energeiâi nous, actual intellect, 98,21.22; 99,21; 100,16.19; 103,37; 108,15.32; enulos nous, enmattered intellect, 114,35; 115,4; exôthen nous, intellect from without, 111,35; kat’energeian nous, intellect in actuality, 99,17; 100,5; kath’hexin nous, intellect as a hexis, 98,23; 100,2; koinos nous, common intellect, 101,7.22.36; 102,; 105,21.22.27; 106,14; 108,30; pathêtikos nous, passive intellect, 101,; 102,; 105,13.22; 107,19; 108,29; poiêtikos nous, productive intellect, 99,8.11..15.23.33; 100,35; 101,4.10; 102,; 103,; 104,25; 105,31.35; 106,1.9; 108,15.19.24; 109,5; praktikos nous, practical intellect, 114,3; ; theios nous, divine intellect, 102,34; 114,34.36; 115,8; cf.10,6 (Anaxagoras); 29,35 (= 408b29); 44.23; theôrêtikos nous, contemplative intellect, 49,8; 102,11; 103,8; 104,20; 114,4.5.8; 118,8..32; thnêtos nous, mortal intellect, 102,8; thurathen nous, intellect from without, 37,27 noutheteisthai, be admonished, 107,8

nuktôr, at night, 61,27 nun (to), the now, the instant of time, 110,23; 111,13; to en platei nun, the now extended (over time), 110,34-5 nuttein, stimulate, 17,37 nux, night, 22,31; 61,14.20.29; 62,3 oiesthai, think, believe, 5,14; 8,37; 13,12.18; 15,3; 19,22; 24,37; 25,9.37; 27,11; 33,5; 35,29; 45,3; 62,13; 66,10; 82,5; 87,25; 101,9; 103,16.19; 113,10; 120,18 oikeios, appropriate (to a topic), belonging to, inherent, [its] own (sim. idios), (often of form or structure), 2,18.22; 4,10; 9,33; 11,3.22; 12,20.34; 13,3; 14,28; 15,22.35; 17,28.33; 24,7.8.10; 39,16; 48,22.27; 49,10; 53,38; 59,18; 60,35(bis).36.37; 61,10.19; 64,23.28; 65,17.23; 68,19; 71,8.35; 72,19; 77,23; 84,36; 86,31; 94,; 98,27; 109,4; 111,17; 120,20; 123,12(bis); compatible, assimilable (of nutriment), 45,38; 47,19.20.26; 79,4.6(bis).7.8; 123,8; 124,3; oikeioi, (human) relatives, 101,15; oikeioi logoi, special discussions, 53,37 oikia, house, 7,34; 40,16.24; 96,1(bis).2.3; 98,24.26.28 oikodomein, build, 27,32; 56,5 oikodomikê, house-building, 27,36.38; 56,29 oikoumenê, inhabited world, 91,5.14 okhêma, vehicle (of the soul in Platonic psychology), 19,34 okhetos, conduit, 87,6 (cf. Plato, Timeaus 43D1) ôkhrian, blanch, 7,5; 27,25; 89,16 omma, eye, 29,27; 30,8.18; 68,38; 69,35; 88,37; 104,27 oneirata, 90,1(bis), dreams oneiropolein, dream up, 14,7; 19,6; 94,20 (cf. Plato, Republic 534C6; Timaeus 52B3) onkos, volume, 3,8; 11,22; 38,16 onoma, name, term, word, 14,22.24; 28,26; 31,2; 39,18; 52,17; 54,12; 56,1; 57,25.29; 58,12.26; 59,12; 61,15; 67,28; 68,4.19; 72,34; 84,14; 88,; 89,27; 95,6; 110,25(bis).27; opp. pragma (reference), 18,31.32.35; 26,24; 44,36; 45,16; 56,2; 68,22 onomazein, call, name, 8,19; 14,23; 18,31; 19,25; 25,4; 26,11.22; 32,20; 39,17; 40,35; 56,26; 59,18; 61,14; 62,31; 68,21; 69,10; 88,29; 89,34; 101,7; 108,30; 120,4 ôon, egg, 2,40; 56,15 ôphelein, benefit, 124,8; help (pass.), 5,7 ôphelimos, beneficial, 88,4 opsopoiia, cooking, 84,29 opthalmos, eye, 6,30; 42,38.39;

Greek-English Index 43,; 54,23.25.26(bis); 61,18.20; 76,19; 81,8; 90,13 oregesthai, desire, 17,32; 47,27.33; 50,10; 53,12; 113,21.31; 117,33; 119,15; 122,6 orektikos, having a capacity for desire, 120,27; 121,19.20; (dunamis) orektikê, capacity for desire, 17,39; 36,29; 47,10.12(bis).14; 104,19; 117,35.36; 120,7; to orektikon, capacity for desire, 4,20; 48,34; 113,27; 117,18; 119,33 orekton, object of desire, 17,; 118,9; 119,; 120,25 orexis, desire, 7,27.30.32; 17,17; 20,26; 45,23; 46,1; 47,16.18; 48,36; 49,2; 113,36; 114,3; 117,32.33; 118,34.35; 119,; 120,; 121,; 122,6.9(bis) organikos, having organs, 26,17; 42,; 43,4.9.13; 45,21; 46,34; 49,1.2; 117,37; organikôs, with organs, 46,38 organon, organ (of the body; usu. sense-organ), 7,17.19; 17,29; 28,11; 30,; 38,10.18; 42,6.8.26; 47,4; 51,8.9; 54,29; 55,2.37; 62,21.23; 66,17.34; 67,4.5.6; 68,4; 69,18.35; 71,32; 72,; 73,; 74,3.24; 75,9; 78,15.17; 79,10; 80,; 86,25; 87,7.10; 94,32.33.36; 104,26; 105,; 121,2.4; instrument (used to effect action), 24,5.7; 53,28; 115,28(bis).29.30 orgê, anger, 7,10.26.32; 27,15 orgizesthai, get angry, 5,37; 6,34; 27,10.19; 29,9 ornis, bird, 2,41 ôsis, pushing forward, 121,13.15 osmasthai, smell, 62,34.35; 69,19; 70,2.4; 73,16; 79,22 osmê, smell, organ of smell, 47,34; 62,; 67,26; 68,; 69,1.7.12; 70,6; 73,13.16; 75,24; 79,14.21.23; 94,39; 124,17; 126,2.6 osphrainesthai, smell, 69,14.28; 70,10(bis); 78,29 osphrantikos, having a capacity for smell, 69,35; 70,5.9.10; 76,38 osphranton, object of smell, 67,; 68,7.32.37; 69,4.22.24; 70,9; 76,19 osphrêsis, smell, organ of smell, 57,39; 67,31; 68,28.31; 69,; 70,4.18; 73,14; 77,33; 80,18; 81,7; 87,3; 94,39; 124,23; 125,7.24; 126,2 ôthein, push (forward), 16,4; 17,11; 66,8; 124.25(bis).26(ter).27(bis) othonê, cloth, 73,2 ouketi, non-temporal (see Cope, p. 14; J.R. Wilson, Glotta 65 [1987] pp. 194-8;


Lexicon Plotinianum col. 770), emphasizing a contrast by exclusion; 3,20; 15,3; 18,13.14; 23,24.32; 28,12; 34,34; 36,13.17.18; 38,5; 41,16; 42,24; 43,1; 44,35; 45,1.12; 51,37; 52,1; 56,11; 62,5; 70,11; 81,37; 84,33; 97,33; 100,1; 104,13 ouranios, heavenly, 18,28; 19,32; 121,35 ouranos, the heavens, 13,33; 20,14; 23,14 ousia, essence (of something), 2,28.33(bis); 3,2; 4,30; 5,16.32; 15,34; 17,14; 18,; 21,21.22; 22,35.37; 23,7.15.18; 58,18; essence (of the productive intellect, identical with its activity), 99,33; 100,; 102,35; 103,29; 104,11.21.23; 106,5 (430a18); (the category) substance, 23,23; substance, a substance, 2,35.37; 3,3.26; 4,4.6; 24,32; 29,25.37; 33,; 39,4.7.32(bis); 40,3.9; 41,23; 42,39; 46,27; 49,9; 52,35; 53,11; ; matter (in its totality), 35,32 (Stoic); physical mass, 61,31 oxus, sharp(-edged), 66,5; sharp(-flavoured), 71,17; 72,6; sharp(-smelling), 68,26; high-pitched (sound), 66,4.5. 7(bis).10.11.13; 72,17; 75,18 oxutês, high-pitch, 72,23; sharpness, 78,2(bis) pakhus, dense, 80,22 pakhutês, thickness, 68,3 pan/to pan, the universe, 20,20.22; 26,25.27; 35,35; 51,7; 87,29; 121,37; pan to on, everything that exists (= the universe), 35,26-7 pantos (dia), always, 73,15; 74,5 pantôs, always (in the logical sense of ‘in all cases’), 6,8; 11,31; 15,32; 16,22; 18,23.34; 41,18.19; 45,35; 55,7.8; 58,31; 59,7; 62,3; 63,10; 70,35; 74,9.15; 81,22; 89,24; 90,31; 95,27; 113,21; 114,16; 121,33; 122,8.9 paraballein, compare, 17,26; 32,22; 103,22.35; 102,9; 106,1 parabolos, extraordinary, 36,2 paradeigma, example, 17,30; 25,37.38; 26,32; 65,31 paradekhesthai, admit (a property), 25,3.7; 86,16; admit (a proposition), 104,20 paradêloun, conjecture, 5,28 paradidonai, transmit, 14,25; 24,13; 38,24; 91,39; 105,33 paragein, create, 6,9; 123,11 paraginesthai, to be present (from an external source), 56,18; 102,32; 106,12 parakolouthein, accompany (as a secondary property), 68,27


Greek-English Index

parakouein, misunderstand (an argument), 6,12 paralambanein, admit (into a theory), 8,7; 101,6; take over (from a source), 24,9; 92,3; enlist (as a partner), 105,15 paralogos, illogical, 36,1 paramenein, endure (temporally), 87,34; 92,15; 93,27 parapempein, transmit, 28,7; 30,31; 59,24.26; 62,29.30.31; 64,20; 65,5.7; 70,16 parapheresthai, be led astray, 101,36 paraplêsios, comparable, like, similar, 19,9; 24,2; 50,5; 75,2; paraplêsiôs, 13,30.33; 20,25; 26,3.24; 45,24; 84,11; 94,8; 113,36; 114,7; 117,11 paraskeuê, preparatory state (= potentiality), 39,8 parateinesthai, to be (temporally) coextensive with, 110,20 parathesis, juxtaposition, 25,12; 74,36.39 paratithesthai, (middle), quote, 29,22; 107,30; 108,8; (passive), be juxtaposed, adjacent, 40,27; 60,15; 61,26; 123,15 pareinai, be present (= belong to), 26,32; 39,12; be present (= at hand), 42,29; 54,24; 60,22(bis); 83,29; 87,23; 93,18(bis); 113,35; be present (in time), 107,13; 109,24; 111,16; 120,23; ho parôn logos, the present work (= DA), 26,10; present argument, 28,18; present discussion (= DA 3.3), 88,9 parelkôn (participle), redundant, 87,29 paremphainesthai, coexist, 11,31; be manifest alongside, 94,22 parerkhesthai, to be past (of time), 109,21; 118,16.17 paroran, neglect, overlook, 3,22; 46,28; 74,18; 97,11; 103,1 parousia, presence, 54,1; 59,29; 60,3.21(bis).22; 62,2; 68,32 paroxunesthai, be irritated, 7,11 paruphistasthai, exist alongside, 12,21 paskhein (511/106), be acted on, be affected; to paskhein (the category), 33,26 pathêma, affection, 6,5; 8,36; 101,20; 104,6; 105,19 pathêtikos, passive; see nous pathêtikos pathos, affection (of matter in general), 8,; 54,7; 78,4; 94,14; 112,27; 116,2; ta en pathei (Theophrastus), things that are affected (in general), 108,5; affection (of qualified matter, especially the elements), 62,28.29; 65,28; 69,8.9; 79,28; 81,13; 97,24; 114,24; 124,30; (inherent) property, 69,8.9; affection (of the soul of a living, usually human, animal; of the body, of sense-organs), 2,29; 5,32.38; 7,; 8,33; 24,36; 27,13.24.32; 28,8.10.11; 29,32; 32,16;

61,20; 67,10.35; 77,35; 78,31; 80,13; 83,33; 87,34; 88,35; 89,7; 94,36; 97,32; 100,15; 104,5.28; 105,19(bis); 107,; 108,3; 120,1.13 peirasthai, try, 1,3; 2,13; 6,14; 24,36; 38,35; 108,13 peisis, affection (= pathos), 65,26; 92,20; 116,20 peithesthai, be convinced, 90,23 peithô, conviction, 90,23 pelasis, proximity, 21,6 pelazein, approach, 13,10; 71,1; be in the vicinity, 124,2 pephukenai, to be naturally adapted, naturally fitted, 43,23; 55,18; 58,28; 68,38; 71,18; 73,8; 91,33; 98,16.21; 111,29; 113,30; 115,7; 124,29 pepsis, digestion, 52,8; 53,34 peras, limit, extremity, termination, 8,21; 22,21; 51,24; 74,8.36; 86,22.25.27; 110,32.34.36; 111,18; 114,11.25; 119,1; 124,39 peri, towards (of activity towards object of sense-perception or intellect), 49,25.26;; 93,; ; 112,23 periagein, bring round (of the intellect combining objects), 109,10 periekhein, surround, 17,6; 20,13 (bis); 65,10; 95,8; (pass.) be included (in a definition), 58,30; to periekhon, surrounding world, environment, 9,20; 60,29; 87,25 perikheisthai, envelop, coat (a surface), 71,38; 72,1; 3,11.15; 75,1 perilambanein, comprehend (concepts), 94,25; 99,22; 111,11.13; include (in a definition) 41,16.21; 48,19.20; 49,3; 57,25; 114,16; (passive), enclose, 67,24 perimenein, await, 54,18; 70,8; 82,6 periphragma, protection (of eyelids), 69,13 peripiptein, encounter (of the intellect’s thinking), 113,32 periplassesthai, be moulded round, 73,9.20 (cf. Plato, Republic 588D10, E2) peripoieisthai, achieve (an end), 50,14.18; 119,1 periptuein, enfold, 92,17 (cf. Plato, Symposium 196A2) perittôma, residue, 53,6 pêrôma, (biological) deformity, 50,7; 118,5.6 pêrousthai, be (biologically) defective, 81,5; 90,4 phainesthai, appear, seem, be seen, 3,7; 4,23; 5,11.21.38; 9,15.16.38; 15,10; 21,35; 22,26; 24,36; 28,34; 38,14; 41,25; 44,13.32; 46,35; 51,19; 52,2; 61,13; 62,32; 69,7.26; 71,39; 72,22; 74,2; 80,13; 81,8; 88,40; 99,21; 101,14; 108,6; 117,6; 119,12,20.22; 120,23; 121,27; 122,7; ta phainomena, observations, 60,31

Greek-English Index phaneros, clear, obvious, 17,38; 30,37; 40,8; 43,38; 44,7.25.36; 45,25; 46,4; 47,5; 48,5; 49,12; 78,18.25; 82,38; 83,22; 93,22; 94,37; phanerôs, clearly, obviously, 13,15; 24,35; 27,24; 34,30; 40,15; 104,18; 116,10; 118,18 phantasia (37/96), imagination (as a capacity of soul); image (entertained in imagination), 91,14; 93,28; phantasia aisthêtikê, imagination involving sense-perception, 95,33; 121,21 phantasma, image (involved in imagination), 28,14.15.19; 89,20.29; 109,23; 113,; 114,2; 116,8.9.11(bis).15.17.18(bis).20.22; 121,26 phantastikos, having the capacity for imagination; (dunamis) phantastikê, capacity for imagination, 92,2.40; 93,22; 100,30; to phantastikon, capacity for imagination, 4,20; 117,15 phantazesthai, imagine, 89,10.16.37; 90,; 109,34; 116,4; 120,26; 122,11 pharunx, windpipe, 66,35.36; 67,2.5 phaulos, degenerate (temperament), 7,21; insignificant (smell), 69,38; (comp.), inferior, 11,5; 119,16; phaulôs, inappropriately, 94,20; 108,28; 120,9 pherein, bear, carry, import, 4,15; 112,10; 120,1; cause locomotion, 15,7; adduce (in argument), 30,3; pherein epi, apply (a term) to (something) (= legein epi), 94,28 (cf. LSJ A.IV.6) pheresthai, move, 15,7; 16,32; 20,18; 22,8; 23,13.18; 51,3.12; 63,29; 92,26 pheugein, flee, avoid, 23,9; 69,13; 79,3; 113,; 114,1; 118,; 124,9,12.22; 126,18 philein, love, 6,34; 7,3; 25,37; 29,32.34; 100,15; 101,; 102,21; 105,18.21 philia, love (in Empedocles), 10,19; 25,21; 34,14; 109,12; friendship (in general), 101,14 philonikein, dispute (captiously), 18,31.36; 28,27; 49,11; 52,16; 110,28 philosophein, do philosophy, 109,11.37; 122,16(bis) philosophia, philosophy, 1,28; 3,9; 11,19; 19,26; 20,4 philosophos, philosopher, 2,11.12; 24,30; 85,26; 108,35; ho philosophos, philosopher (= Aristotle), 16,34; 29,22; 30,37; 68,28; 101,37; 102,10.34; 105,18; ho prôtos philosophos, first philosopher (i.e. metaphysician), 8,31 philotimôs (comp.), ambitiously, 75,29 phleps, vein, 42,7.10; 70,36 phobeisthai, fear, 7,2.11.14; 27,9 phoberos, frightening, 7,14; 27,21; 28,21; 68,3; 89,15; 118,15


phobos, fear, 7,10; 8,36; 27,21.32; 106,20; 107,11 phoitan, pervade, 35,33; 45,31; 99,17 phônê, phonetic act, 19,26; 29,16; utterance, 110,29; 111,1.2; voice, 46,36; 64.21; 66,; 67,5.6.9(bis).; 68,36; 71,18; 72,23.24.29 phônein, make a sound, 63,33.37; 66,15.20.23; 67,7.19 phortikos, tactless, 1,4; phortikôs, crudely, 13,33 phôtizein, give light, illuminate, light up, 60,7.9.26; 61,; 62,4 phrittein, stand on end (intrans.), 118,13 phroimiazesthai, conduct a preliminary discussion, 105,16 phronein, think, 9,39; 19,28; 28,29; be intelligent (exercise practical judgment), 56,4 phronêsis, thinking, 10,10; intelligence (practical judgment), 56,4; 68,11; 88,19.32.34; 91,21; 118,30 phronimos, intelligent (endowed with practical judgment), 68,10 phrontis, reflection (on a problem), 1,25; 4,12; 108,36 phrontizein, reflect on, 3,23; 8,1 phthartos, perishable, able to die, 26,23(bis); 37,28; 46,5; 49,4; 50,20; 71,26; 72,23; 77,26; 101,; 102,; 103,9; 105,22.28; 106,14.16; 107,6; 108,29; 122,22; 123,5.34 phtheirein, destroy, 71,16.27.30; 78,19; 84,33; 125,37 phtheiresthai, be destroyed, perish, die, 25,27(bis).30.31.32(bis).33.34; 29,25.31.33; 30,3.6.14(bis).19.37; 40,30.31; 50,23; 55,33; 69,26; 70,11; 78,20.22; 101,21; 102,; 105,20; 107,28; 115,2; 124,13; 126,3.10.12(bis) phthinein, decline, 44,18; 122,26 phthisis, decline, 8,13; 15,30; 36,31(bis); 117,23; 118,7; 122,24; 124,17 phthongos, (musical) sound, 24,20; 25,9.10 phthora, destruction, 7,35; 17,5; 30,37; 40,11; 54,14; 55,35; 76,36; 122,23; 126,15(bis) phugê, avoidance, flight, 106,20; 112,34; 113,18; 117,31; 118,12 phulaktikê psukhê, soul capable of preserving (itself), 53,25 phulattein, preserve, 31,26; 53,25; 91,9; (middle), guard/protect against, 9,1; 65,8; 118,4 phullon, leaf, 42,11 phuomena (= phuta), plants, 44,13.25 phusikos, natural philosopher, 7,; 8,6(bis).26; 13,30; 87,20; phusikon eidos, natural form, 8,25(bis);


Greek-English Index

phusikon ergon, natural way of functioning, 51,6; phusikê hulê, natural matter, 8,34; 114,27; phusikon hupokeimenon, natural substrate, 39,29; phusikon sôma, natural body (also plural), 5,26; 8,11.18(bis); 25,25; 39,25.30.32; 41,26(bis).28.30.40; 41,18; 42,1.2(bis).15.19.27; 44,16; 45,21; 46,34; 47,3; 114,12(bis).20.23; phusikai poiotêtes, natural qualities, 8,23; phusika stoikheia, natural elements, 41,33; phusikôs, with reference to natural philosophy, 23,34 phusiologein, provide a physical theory, 19,17 phusiologos, natural philosopher, 84,19 phusis (35/176), nature (personified as the subject or agent of verbs), 6,9; 39,25; 49,4.21; 50.18; 64,17.22; 65.2.8; 66,3; 79,5.7.8; 80,19; 81,10.15; 92.29; 98,17; 100,34.36; 105,32; 118,3; 122,33; 123,11.22; 125,17; entity, type of thing, 3,10.34; 4,1.3; 23,29; 27,3; 44,23; 48,5; 94,25; 108,23.34; natural (plant) life, 45,; he holê/pasa phusis, the whole of nature, 39,6; 41,30; 103,1; 108,20 phuteuesthai, be planted, 38,2 phutikos, vegetative (i.e. associated with the capacities of nutrition, growth, and reproduction; see 2,2, n. 3); (dunamis) phutikê, vegetative capacity, 1,21; 4,13; 10,29; 35,4; 38,22; 44,; 45,10.20; phutikê psukhê, vegetative soul, 15,6; 38,1; phutikê zôê, vegetative life, 27,1 phuton, plant, 2,5.40.41(bis); 20,18; 37,36; 38,; 41,39(bis); 42,8; 44,35; 45,2.31.33; 46,36; 47,11; 48,37; 50,9(bis); 51,; 79,7.10; 115,34; 117,9.35.38; 122,27.33; 123,13.30; 124,10.20; 126,19 pikros, bitter, 68,20.21.24; 71,39; 72,5(bis).18; 82,24.26.30; 116,5 pisteuein, be committed, find credible, 9,33; 19,30; 80,4; 90,23; 91,14 pistis, commitment (as a species of belief), 90,22.23; proof, 25,37 pithanos, plausible, 13,7; 24,12; 34,23; 61,24; 124,35; pithanôs, plausibly, 72,21; 74,17 pithanotêta ekhein, be plausible, 19,32; 24,21; 25,25 plassein, invent, fabricate, 10,2; 37,34; mould, 24,9; 40,10; 47,1 pleonektein, surpass, 1,12; 68,9 plêthos, plurality, quantity, 1,7; 3,10; 11,22; 12,; 13,1; 34,19; 99,21; 109,10; 111,10(bis).12 plôtêr, sailor, 15,20.21 pneuma, wind, 18,28; 60,2; 91,35; 126,4;

matter of the soul (in Stoicism), 16,37; primary capacity of perception, 64,17.29; 68,15.17; 79,11; 86,32; 87,4.6 pneumôn, lung, 66,36(bis) poiein (68/138), act cause, produce; to poiein (the category), 33,25 poiêtikos, productive, 12,19; 26,33; 53,12; 56,26; 84,5; see also nous poiêtikos poion, (category of) quality, 33,26; 40,29; quality (opp. quantity), 40,29 poiotês, quality, 8,23; 10,27; 11,4; 14,20; 18,5; 21,18; 55,35; 70,33.34.35; 77,16.17.34; 94,33; 100,24 pollakhôs, having several senses, 42,17; 48,25; 68,34 poludamnos, multi-capacitied, 2,13; 37,31 polumerês, having multiple parts, 3,14; 37,14.31.32 poreutikos, having a capacity for forward movement, 81,7; 123,4.15; 124,21 porizesthai (middle), procure, 123,6.16; (passive), 50,8 poros, channel (in sense-organs), 62,24; 70,1.3.5; 75,22; poson, (category of) quantity, 33,27; 40,28; quantity, 11,21; 40,28; 111,11; 114,22.23 pragma, object of perception or thought (= aisthêton, noêton) 4,34; 27,15; 92,32; 96,8.24; 97,4; 99,20; 110,9; 115,25.35; physical object, 33,; 96,8; reference (of a name), an entity (named or defined), 18,36; 26,24; 44,6.37; 45,16; 48,18; 56,3; 68,23; 88,15; object of a belief, 91,11; subject (of incidental properties = hupokeimenon), 5,4.28; 109,28; subject-matter, 1,14; 2,22; 19,29; 108,9 pragmateia, treatise (= Themistius’ paraphrase) 1,3; 8,32; (= DA), 1,7; way of treating (a subject), 2,16.19 pragmateuesthai, deal with (a subject), 1,16; 8,30; 50,2 praktikos, practical, 2,1; see nous praxis, action, 93,33; 119,2 proagein, advance (something from potentiality to activity), 60,1; 98,22; 99,1; 103,24.31; (middle) 56,19; (to a biological end), 123,11; (audience to the next topic), 39,23 proagôgê, advancement (to an end), 39,10 proaireisthai, choose, have a goal or object, 5,13; 19,14.26; 33,3; 56,28; 88,37.39; 103,13 probainein/hodôi probainein, go through (to a logical conclusion), 36,13 proballein, present (images to oneself), 28,13; 89,17; 93,3; 100,9 (middle); 114,2; place in front of, 65,8; 121,2; pre-exist, 25,21 problêma, problem, 1,7; 3,21; 19,27

Greek-English Index probolê, presentation (of images to oneself), 28,15.19 prodêlousthai, be indicated in advance, 5,22 prodromos, forerunner (metaph. for necessary condition), 105,30.31; 106,13 proêgoumenos, preceding, pre-established (as a necessary condition), 81,29; 88,33; 120,5; proêgoumenôs, directly, 29,4; 36,31 (opp. kata sumbebêkos, incidentally); 47,29; 81,24; 83,14; 123,24 proentunkhanein, encounter (perceptually) first, 49,19 proerkhesthai, progress (to actuality), 98,16; 99,34; 109,7; (in reasoning), 114,27 proexallesthai, leap forward from, 27,31 (cf. Themistius, Or. 2, p. 44,8) proienai, progress (to a hexis), 56,11; (to actuality), 16,29; 29,19; 92,22; 109,7; (in a formal demonstration), 114,27; proiôn ho logos, ‘the discussion as it proceeds’, 49,35; 54,9; 58,24.26; 85,8 proistasthai, champion (a theory) 20,8; cite (an authority) 20,5 (cf. Plato, Laws 629A4) prokalumma, front covering (for eyes), 69,32 prokeisthai, be available, be proposed, 16,34; 49,33; 113,14; prokeimenos, available, proposed, present, 2,7; 8,32; 74,39; ta prokeimena, immediate (topics), 120,3 prokheirizesthai, deal with, 50,1; make available, 56,22; 95,15 prokheiros, accessible, available, 2,9; 72,34; relevant, 88,10; 109,2; ta prokheira, (logical) commonplaces, 6,15 prolambanein, precede, 88,29; 98,12; understand in advance, 5,; (physically) get hold of in advance, 63,28.29 proodos, progress (in reasoning), 5,23; (to a goal) 120,32; to infinity, 22,24 proôthein, push forward, 65,36 propêdan, spring forth, 27,30 (cf. Themistius, Or. 2, p. 44,7) propheresthai, give voice (to an utterance) 110,21.29 pros ti, (the category) relative, 33,23.25; ta pros ti, relatives, 4,36; 119,6 prosagein, apply (an object to something), 62,23; 63,26; 121,27; convey (food), 79,7.9; introduce (an argument) 73,27 prosagoreuein, call (= kalein, onomazein), 13,17; 53,23; 59,13 prosangellein, report (metaph. of senses), 123,10 prosbibazein, reduce (arguments of one kind to something else), 107,3 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 229E2) prosdoxazein, add an opinion, 90,30; 113,5


prosêgoria, name, 68,6 prosêkei, it belongs, is appropriate, proper, fitting, 1,6; 3,27; 24,8; 27,26; 31,29; 37,33; 49,27; 52,9; 54,18; 61,22; 72,33; 76,37; 79,37; 81,29; 82,11; 83,3; 90,34; 112,4 prosekhein, attend to (a written text), 23,14; 120,21; (middle), be proximate to (of a species to individuals), 3,30 prosekhês, proximate, 2,36; (adv.), 7,23 prosginesthai, accrue, be added to, 2,31; 8,12.14; 44,35; 93,6; 99,18 prosiesthai, admit, 18,9; 24,26.27; 47,26 proskrinesthai, be assimilated (in nutrition), 52,10(bis).21.24 proskrisis, assimilation (of nutriment), 52,20 proslambanein, add, 11,10; 18,26; 26,39; 31,14; 67,37; 110,26; 112,28; 115,14; add (an understanding), 8,22; add (a premise in an argument) 6,13(bis) prosnoein, add a thought (in reasoning), 109,25; 110,3; 113,4 prosôpon, person (represented in a written work), 20,5 prospiptein, encounter (cognitively), 7,9; (violently), hit up against, 63,23; 64,8; encounter (physically), 74,21; 79,19; (intrans.), make an impact, 63,15 prospoieisthai, lay claim to, 34,29 prosthêkê, addition, 32,28; 41,34 prostithenai, add, 8,14; 9,7.10; 14,20; 41,15; 52,36; 82,26; 92,30; 114,2; 118,4; apply (an object to an organ), 65,22; 75,34.35 protasis, premise, 12,9.11; 22,25; 48,15; 102,32.33 protithêsthai, be available (as object of perception or imagination), 49,33; 74,39; 113,14; propose (for discussion) 14,4; 15,16; 16,34; 74,21; 117,27 prôtos (41/131): first, primary, prior; en tois prôtois, in Book One, 100,14; 101,7.15; 102,14.15; prôtôs, in a primary meaning, or sense (= kuriôs), 44,27; 58,23; 59,14; 65,34; 86,24.25.32; 87,7; 103,32; 119,6; proteron (adv.), earlier, e.g. phusei proteron, naturally prior, 49,23; 106,10; hoi proteron, earlier (thinkers), 3,22; 38,34; 84,18; to proteron, what is prior (in definition), 48,11.32; 57,12; 120,6 protrekein, be a forerunner (metaph. for being a necessary condition), 105,33; 113,21 proüparkhein, pre-exist, 38,20; 55,38; 56,1; 81,17; 122,28 proüpoballesthai (med.), pre-establish (lower capacities of the soul) as a basis (for higher ones), 49,6.19.21; 81,16 proüpeinai, pre-exist, 89,21


Greek-English Index

psathuros, friable, 64,11 pseudês, false, 14,32; 90,9; 109,27; to pseudos, falsity, 12,11; 30,31; 88,40; 93,10; 108,28 (art. om.); 109,; 112,; 114,5.7; 116,16; pseudôs, falsely, 30,31 pseudesthai, make a false claim, 52,30; 89,6.32.35; 90,21; 91,4.7.25 pseudodoxia, false opinion, 88,19 psilos, mere, 74,38; 78,32; 79,36 psophein, make sound, produce sound, 57,33; 63,7(bis).16.22; 65,25.34; 66,22.25; 84,15 psophêsis, making sound, 84,15 psophêtikos, having a capacity to produce sound, 65,38 psukhê (237/516), soul, psukhê anthrôpinê, human soul, 3,22; 26,37; 97,32; 98,15.35; 103,5.13; 107,; he prôtê psukhê, the primary soul, (= the intellect), 1,22; (= the nutritive soul), 53,18 psukhesthai, be chilled, 75,15; 78,27.37; 79,28.32; 86,29 psukhikos, belonging to the soul, 17,14.40; 48,10; 78,26 psukhros, cold, 14,24; 24,18; 47,23; 72,20.31; 77,; 78,38; 80,9; 84,11; 85,22.27; 86,13; 89,4; 96,10; 116,5; 126,9 psukhrotês, coldness, 8,13; 14,17; 47,24.29.32; 57,28; 73,3; 76,34; 77,6.19; 85,23; 114,24; 125,16 psulla, flea, 23,37; 26,35.36 ptênos, winged; see zôion ptôsis, inflection, 116,23 rhabdos, rod, 63,27 rhaidios, easy, 2,2.7; 5,6.23.36; 16,2; 20,2; 22,35; 32,18; 36,21; 46,2; 49,35; 65,3; 67,26; 91,25; 94,22; 105,14; rhadiôs, easily, 2,7; 5,23; 79,24; 94,22; 95,1; 104,6; 105,14; 124,13 rhapizein, strike, 63,25 rhaistônê, ease, 29,6 rhêgnusthai, be broken, 79,16 rhein, flow, 13,28; 18,13 rhêma, expression (used in a text), 101,18 rhêsis, statement (quoted from a text), 102,9.30.37; 103,6.16; 106,16; 109,1 rhêtôs, in his own words, 105,34 rhis, nose, 114,13.14(bis).16(bis) rhiza, root (of plant), 37,36; 42,9; 51,7 rhizousthai, to put [down] roots, 51,2 rhoê, flux, 18,15; 115,21 rhopê, directional tendency (of a body), 51,1.14; 80,11 saphêneia, clarity (in an exposition), 29,33 saphês, clear, obvious, 4,; 14,35; 19,28; 32,23.27; 41,25; 43,36.37;

49,28.31; 58,2; 63,35; saphôs, clearly, 13,19; 17,16; 26,25; 29,37; 41,29 seismos, earthquake, 89,17; 118,12 selênê, moon (n.), 13,32 sêmainein, signify (a meaning), 29,16; 42,37; 88,17; 111,1; communicate, 67,10; 126,20.21; ta sêmainomena, significations, 56,39; 89,27; (uncombined) objects signified (in the Aristotelian categories), 109,6.10.18; 112,14 sêmantikos, capable of communicating, 67,9; 67,25 sêmeion, (evidentiary) sign, 62,8; 65,23; 67,17.36; 68,12; 71,36; 72,15.38; 94,11; 107,16; 116,3; 117,35; 118,6; point, 11,34(bis); 21,32.33; 121,16; mark (on piece of wax), 124,31.38 sidêros, iron, 13,22; 39,28; 42,22; 43,10.19.22; 77,30; 78,2 sigê, silence, 71,10 simon (to), snubness, 96,33; 114,15(bis) simotês, snubness, 114,16 skepsis, investigation, 2,17; 9,1; 49,13 skeptomai, consider, investigate, 3,7; 41,15; 85,20; 87,18; 94,3; 114,33; 115,10; 116,29; 117,24 skhêma, shape, 5,7; 6,38; 9,10.13.22; 11,35; 13,12; 29,7.8(bis); 37,23; 40,23; 42,16.22.23; 43,; 48,; 57,37; 58,4; 60,35(bis); 66,5; 72,28.29.30; 73,11; 81,22.24.26; 82,20.36.37; 93,14; 96,2.4; 124,36 skhêmatizein, make into a shape, 20,27; 57,6.8 skholê, scholarly discussion/lecture, 32,22; 108,36 skidnasthai, be dispersed, 37,12 sklêros, hard, 24,18; 57,27.34.35; 68,16; 72,20.31; 73,3; 77,6.19; 126,9 sklêrotês, hardness, 73,3 skôlêx, worm, 92,24; 122,6 skopein, consider, 15,26; 75,22 skopos, aim, 118,35 skotos, darkness, 58,25; 59,32(bis); 60,20(bis); 61,; 62,7; 64,1; 68,36; 71,6; 83,23; 111,21.28 smikros, small, 7,11; 8,18; 21,21; 31,21.24; 32,11; 112,10; kata smikron, minimally, 41,38 smikrotês, smallness, 31,25.26; 72,23.26 sôma (126/357), theion sôma/theia sômata, divine body/bodies, ; 19,32; 20,15; 59,14.29; 60,6; 103,12; 125,3.26.28; pempton sôma, fifth body, 61,25; see phusikos sômatikos, corporeal, 12,38; 17,9; 22,2; 27,32; 28,20; 76,32; 87,25; 94,36; 97,17; 105,11.15; sômatikôs, physically, 29,16; 57,6

Greek-English Index sômatôdês, corporeal, 13,9 sôros, heap, 63,29; 109,9 sôtêria, survival, 123,35 sôzein, maintain, preserve, 6,9; 16,29; 24,26; 38,19; 40,31; 42,24; 53,13.15; 71,35; 91,12; ensure survival, 14,25; (middle), survive, 6,9; 124,4.10.22 sphaira, sphere (geom.), 6,35.37.38; 20,27; (phys.) 29,7.11; 63,35; (in Xenocrates’ theory of the soul) 31,22(bis); 32,.9(bis); heavenly sphere, 121,35 sphairika (ta), spherical (bodies) (i.e. atoms), 31,22 sphairoeidês, spherical, 9,; 13,13; 20.35 sphairos, (Empedocles’) sphere, 34,14 sphragis, seal (on a ring), 57,5.7; 59,23; 92,17.35 spoudazein, to strive (passionately) for, 39,16 (cf. fort. Plato, Symposium 205D6) stasis, rest, static condition, 22,29; 27,20; 81,22.24 stereisthai, to be deprived, 53,14 stereos, solid, 9,17; 11,37; 12,12; 63,5.9(bis).12.23.33; 73,11.22; 74,9; 92,29.37 sterêsis, privation, 56,11; 60,20; 61,7; 68,33; 71,8.9; 77,23; 111,; 112,2 steriskesthai, be deprived, 53,14; 122,35; 125,33 stêthos, breast, 106,25.26 stigmê, point, 6,35.39; 21,9.10(bis); 22,13.14; 31,15(bis).; 32,2.7(bis); 86,19.21.23; 96,6(bis) stoikheion (34/75), element; see hapla sômata stoma, mouth, 7,7; 42,7.9; 51,9 sukophantein, quibble (in argument), 20,6; (pass.) be object of a quibble, 39,17 sullabê, syllable, 110,26 sullambanein, associate, conjoin (in definition or thought), 7,36; 9,38; 54,28.33; 88,31; 95,14; 96,9; 99,29; 114,12 sullankhanein, join [by lot] with (metaph.), [95,14] sullegein, assemble (thoughts in the intellect), 98,7; 99,4 sullogismos, deductive reasoning, 20,36; 22,29; inferential reasoning, 121,31 sumbainein, happen, occur, turn out, result, be a consequence, 5,24; 8,4; 18,9; 23,23; 29,27; 30,7; 32,12; 33,3; 34,4.13; 44,17; 54,5; 63,19.37; 64,6.33; 66,10; 75,37; 76,10; 78,25; 81,38; 82,4.10.25; 85,9.36; 91,36; 92,12; 97,24; be incidental to, 2,29; 58,; 93,10; 110,33; 114,13; to sumbainon, conclusion, or consequence (of an argument), 6,18; 86,4; 125,11; the result (of an analysis of observations), 38,8;


67,14; 75,3; ta sumbainonta, consequences, 31,7 sumballesthai, contribute (to producing an effect), 5,14; 47,33; 66,31; mega meros sumballesthai, make a major contribution, 5,8 sumbebêkos/sumbebêkota, incidental property/properties, 2,33; 5,; 8,19; 15,22-3; 18,5.7; 29,10; 32,15; 39,27; 52,33; 58,12; kata sumbebêkos, incidentally, 15,32.33; 17,10; 21,16; 23,17; 36,32; 47,32; 57,15; 58,; 68,34; 81,20.28,; 82,; 85,25; 90,38; 110,31.33; 120,12; 126,8 summetria, proportion, 71,30; 78,21; 79,11 summetros, suitably proportioned (distance), 57,21.23; to summetron, (geometrical) commensurability, 109,16 sumparalambanein, enlist (as a partner), 9,2 sumparateinein, to coexist with, 122,22; (middle), be temporally coextensive with, 110,24-5 sumparatheôreisthai, to be contemplated alongside, 112,13 sumperainesthai, be concluded, 121,29 sumperasma, conclusion, 12,9; 20,36; 22,29; 44,3.5; 122,19 sumperiagein, rotate around with, 19,21; 121,35.37 sumperilambanesthai, be included in, 107,36 sumphanês, evident (from a written source), 14,14; 19,22 sumpheron (to), expediency, 121,27 sumphoitan, converge, 86,33 sumphônein, be consistent 103,19; act in concert, 85,5 sumphônia, (musical) concord, 24,17; 25,10; 78,23; 84,27.34 sumphônos, harmonious, 20,18; 23,18; consistent, 91,8; 102,9.11; 103,17; in accord with, 35,32 sumphuês, naturally cognate with, 53,28.30; 64,16.17.28; 65,16.24; 73,5.31; 74,30; 75,5.9.32; 80,31(bis); 98,34; 107,32; 108,13.14; 113,20 sumphuresthai, be confounded with, 112,13; 116,2 (cf. Plato, Phaedo 66B5) sumphutos, innate, 13,6; 20,15; naturally cognate (Theophrastus), 102.26; 108,25 sumplekein, combine (lit. ‘intertwine’; = suntithenai), 8,36; 12,30; 19,19; 91,6; 98,22; 107,10; 113,16; 116,12 sumplokê, combination (lit ‘intertwining’; = sunthesis), 90,28.33.39; 91,4; 116,10.15.16; 123,25 sumptôma, adjunct (property), 123,23.25 sunagein, (physically) compress, 9,20; group together (in reasoning), 11,9;


Greek-English Index

52,30; 95,11; 110,2; group (texts as evidence), 108,36 sunairein, contract (in thinking of divided objects), 22,4 sunaisthanesthai, perceive simultaneously, 47,26; 81,26; 83,24; 118,14 sunaition, contributory cause, 51,21; 34,36 sunanairein, carry a rejection (of a proposition) along with (another), 6, sunantilambanesthai, perceive together with, 109,20 sunapolauein, be involved with, 17,12; 27,32; 93,6; 94,36; 104,24.28 sunaptein, link, 20,12.28.37; 23,24.27; 52,36; 93,13; 107,22; 122,18 sunarmozesthai, be attuned (metaph. for relation between forms), 115,27 sunartasthai, to be the (dependent) partner of, 108,23 sunathroizesthai, be amassed, 4,2; 56,21 sundesmos, bond (linking mortal and immortal souls), 107,27 sundioikizesthai, to be separately housed (as a part of the soul) in alignment with (the body), 37,35 sundromos, partner (metaph. for intellect in relation to its object), 95,22 sunekheia, continuity, 50,19 sunekhein, hold together, 34,21,23; 37,; 40,12 sunekhês, continuous, 11,21; 16,27; 17,19; 18,15; 20,; 21,1; 29,17; 51,12.14; 62,10; 64,; 65,11.35; 67,21; 96,33(bis); 111,6(bis).15 sunektikos, capable of holding together, 37,16 sunêmmenon, conditional, 6,28 sunephelkesthai, implicate (in a definition or concept), 7,29; 90,31, 114,21 sunesis, understanding, 22,1; 34,12; 104,1 sunêtheia, common usage (of a term), 14,23; 45,14 sungeneia, affinity, 7,19; 11,6; 14,10; 23,26.28 sungenês, of the same kind, 1,23; 2,25; 13,6; 25,3; 105,33 sungraphein, compose, 100,20 sunienai, understand, realize, 41,13; 104,2.12; 111,2; 114,1 sunistanai, constitute, 11,3; 13,13.27; 14,15; 32,4; 87,29; (middle), 12,35; (pass.) be constituted, consist of, 19,19; 37,20; 51,24; 73,21; (middle) reconstruct (ideas from texts), 1,4 sunkatathesis, assent, 16,21.26; 89,9.21; 90,24 sunkatatithesthai, assent, 89,1.6.23 sunkeisthai, be combined, conflated, 5,34; 10,16; 11,26; 12,23.24.26; 16,28; 24,17;

39,11; 81,12; 100,17.19; 103,37; 106,15; 108,32; 122,11; sunkekhumenôs, in a conflated way, 109,33 sunkephalaioun, summarize, 72,7 sunkerannunai, blend together, 10,25; 11,1.2; 25,8; 106,22 sunkhein, conflate, 10,7 sunkheisthai, be conflated, 122,11 sunkhôrein, agree, allow, concede, not object, 2,18; 8,8; 14,11; 15,28.36.37; 16,39; 26,12; 27,18; 35,9; 52,17; 83,19; 89,2; 100,14; 122,11 sunkrima, compound, 17,5 sunkrinein, combine, 10,31 sunkrisis, confluence (of matter), 34,15 sunodeuein, be in conjunction (metaph.; = agree), 91,1 sunolon (to), compound, 6,39(bis); 39,12; 42,39 sunopsis, summary, 16,30 suntagma, (plu.) composition, 1,5 suntattein, classify, 80,11; 117,17; 119,18 suntaxis, systematic treatise (= Aristotle’s Metaphysics), 103,12 suntêkesthai, be liquefied, 71,2 suntelein, contribute (to an end), 21,15.18; 22,19.20; 40,28; 53,11; 63,21; 102,2 sunthesis, combination, 2,20; 24,16.31.32; 25,4.12.14; 30,31; 33,; 36,22; 96,4.10; 109,; 110,21 sunthetos, compounded, (state of being a compound), 39,32(bis); 40,8; 96,23.25; 97,1; 100,21; to suntheton, compound, 42,33.35; 43,39; 46,30; 80,26; 96,25.35; ta suntheta, compounds, 33,8; 36,1.8; 43,36; 80,17; 110,37 suntithenai, combine, 11,22.36; 23,29; 30,25.27; 31,34; 35,22; 82,34; 99,6.10; 100,8; 109,; 121,28 suntrekhein, coincide, accompany, 1,18; 63,19; 68,22; 82,5 suntrepesthai, be transformed along with, 87,24.31 sunuparkhein, coexist, 37,2; 94,22.33 sustasis, confirmation (of an argument), 30,3; reconstruction (of a theory), 32,24; composite, constitution (of soul, or organism), 11,17; 37,26; 53,20; 102,2 sustellein, contract, 27,21; 121,14 suzugia, pairing (of elementary qualities), 57,29 suzugos, partner (lit. yoke-partner) (metaph.), 96,13 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 254A5) takhus, fast-moving, high speed (movement), 9,18; 63,16.24.26; 66,10.11.13 takhutês, speed, 60,30; 63,28 tamieion, store-house (metaph. for imagination), 92,30

Greek-English Index tamieuesthai, be stored up, 30,36 (cf. Plato, Republic 508B6) tarattesthai, be disturbed, 64,27; 88,14 tattesthai, be located (in a genus), 2,35; be assigned, aligned with, 81,21; 87,15 tautotês, sameness, 11,9 taxis, position (in a hierarchy), 12,25; order (of items in a series), 48,7 teinesthai, be extended, be taut, 26,27; 66,13 tekhnê, art, craft, skill, 3,8; 27,36; 30,28.29.30; 42,21; 50,8; 54,34; 56,25; 98,26.30; 99,11.14; 100,5; 118,24 tekhnitês, craftsman, 8,27; 34,25; 99,22 tekmêrion, proof, 73,31; 125,19 teleios, perfect, (biologically) developed, 15,13; 18,24.37; 21,24; 26,19.20; 28,16; 39,15; 45,16; 48,2.30; 49,2.7; 50,7; 55,10.11.24; 66,32; 81,5.7.16; 91,38; 95,13; 98,21.28; 105,33; 112,29.32(bis); 118,6; 123,33; 124,19.21 teleiôsis, (process of) perfection, 21,23; 39,18; 55,35; 97,23; 112,33 teleiotês, perfection, 39,10.20; 43,24; 56,12; 59,; 98,13; 106,10; (plu. = aretê, excellence), 2,1 teleioun, perfect, bring to perfection, 55,37; 57,10; 60,16; 92,21(bis); 94,9; 97,25; 98,18(bis); 103,2; 104,14 teleisthai, be perfected, 29,3.37; 36,26 teleutaios, last, 44,12; 49,3; 52,23 teleutan, culminate, terminate (in a state), 20,35; 28,12; 51,27; 78,4.10; 79,28; 82,; 85,30; 86,20 teleutê, point of termination, 121,6.8 telos, end (of actions or processes), 20,3; 39,10; 45,10; 49,21; 50,5.12.16; 53,22.23.25; 98,17; 105,32; 114,30; 118,33; 119,1.4 temnein, cut, 29,7.8.12; 42,20.22; 77.38; 78,2.6.7 têrein, maintain, preserve, 16,27; 31,23; 92,35.37.40; 93,2 terpein, produce pleasure, 113,8 tetras, tetrad, 11,30.36; 12,12 thanatos, death, 101,2.14 thaumastos, astonishing, odd, 34,7; 41,12; fascinating, 1,; ou/ouden thaumaston, ‘there is nothing odd/puzzling’ (expression used to disarm a problem), 9,14; 38,18.28; 49,22; 69,10; 75,32.37; 85,5; 86,13; 91,35 thaumazein, be amazed at, be puzzled (by a problem), 1,6; 25,36; 74,32; 102,30; 103,38 theasthai, view, 81,37; 89,19; consider (an argument), 73,26 theios, divine, 44,23; god-like (epithet of Plato), 4,15; 107,23; to theion, the divine (= eternal), 50,9.17; 53,13; see also nous and sôma


theiotês, divinity, 50,18 theôrein, contemplate (as activity of the intellect), 8,20.26; 29,30; 39,21; 55,22.23; 95,28; 114,18; investigate, inquire into, 14,5; 42,37; observe, 86,34; theôreisthai, be observed, 3,11; 39,29; 48,28; 49,24; 53,17; 72,19; 92,36 theôrêma, theorem (geom.), 95, theôrêtikos, contemplative; see nous theôrêtikos thêrama, prey, 17,31 theôria, contemplation (by the intellect), 2,31; 22,22; 93,32, 96,40; 114,22.23.30; investigation, inquiry, 1,9; 2,3.7.26; 3,32.37; 4,10; 8,24.38 theos, god, 5,13.18; 11,15; 20,23; 23,22; 33,8; 34,13.14; 35,23; 99,24; 107,2; prôtos theos, the first god (i.e. prime mover), 102,31.36; 103,10 thêran, hunt, 17,31 thêreuein, track down (in an inquiry), 5,10; 42,8; 49,34; 95,11 thêrion, beast, 49,1; 89,18; 93,29 thermainesthai, be heated, 70,7; 75,15; 78,27; 79,27.32; 86,30 thermos, hot, 9,9; 14,23; 15,13.14; 47,; 57,3(bis).28; 66,37; 72,20.30; 77,; 80.9; 85,12; 86,13; 89,3; 116,5; 126,9; thermon emphuton, natural heat, 53,27.35 thermotês, heat, 8,13; 14,17.20; 53,35; 54,27; 57,35; 66,33.38; 67,2.21; 73,3; 76,34; 80,20; 114,24; 125,16; emphutos thermotês, natural heat, 80,21 thêsaurizein, store up (images), 28,16 thêsaurizesthai, store up for oneself (metaph. for acquisition of universals) 56,21 (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 276D3) thêsauros, store-house (metaph. = potential intellect), 99,6 thesis, (relative) position, 57,19 thinganein, touch, have contact with, 21,6.14.32; 73,1; 74,26; 75,5.36; 80,9; 87,33; 124,6; 125,8(bis).11 thixis, (physical) contact, 21,31; 87,30; 88,34; contact (involved in thinking), 30,32 thnêskein, die, 16,18; 60,30 thnêtos, mortal, 3,27; 4,5.7; 11,15; 34,16.17; 37,25.30; 42,3; 44,23.25; 49,5; 106,; 107,25.27.28(bis).20; thnêtos nous, mortal intellect, 102,8 threptikos, having a capacity for nutrition, 53,22; (dunamis) threptikê, capacity for nutrition, 38,23; 41,22; 47,10.11; 49,31; 53,27.37; 104,18; 117,29.32.35; 122,25; 123,15; psukhê threptikê, soul with a capacity for nutrition, 4,13; 41,16; 50,3.6; 53,18;


Greek-English Index

122,21; to threptikon, capacity for nutrition, 4,18; 41,6; 44,20.30; 45,9.29; 48,34; 49,17; 117,9.24.37 thrupsis, dispersal, 63,29 thruptesthai, be dispersed, 63,14.34; 64,24; 65,12 thumikos, capacity for showing spirit, 10,33; 117,1 thumos, spirit, 8,35; 20,23; 27,2.30; 36,36; 47,15; 94,33; 106,15.21; 117,7.16; 118,25; 119,; 120,10 thumousthai, show spirit, 7,2; 36,28; 37,5; 118,26 thurathen, from without, 9,23; 37,27 thurokopeisthai, have a door knocked (metaph.; = perceive), 17,17 timios, valuable, 1,12; 10,8; 48,4; 82,35; 93,25; 99,25.26; 100,37; 103,6; 106,6; 108,21; 112,5.6; 123,18 timiotês, value, 1,13 tithenai, place, position, locate, deposit, 23,24; 35,35; 99,7; 106,25; 117,20; 121,5; posit, take (to be the case) (= tithesthai), 14,15; 35,9; 36,12; 108,33; 117,19 tithesthai, posit (in reasoning), 4,12.17; 10,8.20; 11,27; 12,34; 13,; 14,6.28; 17,6; 20,20; 22,7; 23,7; 27,18; 30,9; 32,3.27; 33,3; 34,6.22.32; 35,33; 50,16; 51,20; 52,17; 55,37; 56,7; 70,4; 72,29; 80,28; 101,13; 103,11; 107,18; 115,36; 117,5.11; 119,7; 121,5 to ti, what something is (in definition), 2,8; 44,2; 49,14 tode ti, particular thing, 39,7.9.11; 42,35; 46,29; 53,2 topikos, in respect of place, 16,21 topos (27/86), place; area of discussion, 75,29; topôi, spatially, 40,20(bis); 45,28.29.35; 46,2; 94,2; 117,2 trakhus, rough (-surfaced), 57,27; 72,20 trakhutês, (surface) roughness, 64,10; 72,24.27 trekhein, run, 45,15; 109,4 trepesthai, be transformed, 57,6; 82,15 trephein, nourish, be nourished, 4,22; 15,6; 34,33; 35,1(bis); 38,27; 41,34; 43,14; 44,12; 45,1.4; 47,23; 49,30; 50,4.35(bis); 51,; 52,; 53,; 78,38; 122,26; 123,14.18; 124,16.17; 125,30; 126,19 tropê, transformation, 78,4; 79,29; (physical) derangement, 126,5 trophê (34/67), nutriment, (process of) nourishment,7,12; 8,13; 39,31; 41,32; 42,4.8.10; 47,; 48,37; 49,1.30.31; 51,10(bis).; 52,; 53,5.7(bis).; 54,1; 69,13; 79,1.8; 117,33; 120,15; 122,24;

123,; 124,; 125,19; 126,18 tropos, manner, sense (of a term), way (of being understood), 2,18; 4,26; 7,24; 10,23; 15,4.25.27; 16,13; 19,17; 20,29.32; 23,21; 25,11; 26,6,18; 28,33; 29,15; 36,23; 40,; 41,37; 42,31; 48,29; 50,28; 52,26; 55,20.29; 56,8; 57,30; 58,30; 61,13.17.37; 65,32; 69,19; 71,14.17.20; 74,33; 76,31; 79,31; 81,35; 82,7.14; 92,20; 100,6; 103,34; 106,3; 110,30; 111,14.32; 119,24; 125,26; procedure (for reasoning), 2,10.20; 5,29; method, 48,29 tumpanon, drum, 63,26(bis) tunkhanein, light upon, acquire, 27,5; 77,27; 92,38; 112,16; (absol.) chance to happen, 24,2; 92,27; tukhôn/tukhousa/ tukhon, random, any, 23,20.34(bis); 24,1(bis); 25,22; 46,35(bis).36(bis); 63,11(bis); 65,24; 66,24; 83,9(ter); 97,13(bis); 124,21; tukhon (adv.), actually, indeed, 3,15; 9,7 tuphlos, blind, 116,3 tuphlôttein, have poor sight, 30,34 tuphlousthai, be deprived of sight, 61,9 tupos, imprint, 77,31; imprint (= image from sense-perception), 65,5; 77,31; 89,30; 91,16; 92,3; 99,7; 116,20 tupôi (adv.), in outline, 43,31; 48,34; 53,35 xanthos, gold-coloured (of honey or bile), 81,37.39; 82,; 83,30; 85,22; 96,16; 112,35.36; 113,1 xenos, unfamiliar (sense of a term), 39,17 xêrainesthai, be dried, 78,27; 79,28 xêros, dry, 24,18; 47,; 57,28; 70,6; 72,20; 74,10; xêrotês, dryness, 8,13; 10,28; 76,35; 114,24; 125,16 xulinos, wooden, 6,38; 19,11 xulon, wood, 7,36; 16,23.31; 25,4; 26,5; 39,28; 42,10; 52,14; 96,3; 99,14.16 xumboulos, counsellor, 106,21 xusma, mote, 9,14; 65,21 zein, boil, 14,23; 27,16 zên, live, be alive, 9,19.25; 14,23; 18,19; 26,29; 31,19; 35,5.19; 36,37; 38,; 39,36; 40,2, 37; 41,33; 42,2.32; 43,3.8; 44,; 45,; 46,; 50,4.26.28; 53,10; 65,25 zesis, boiling, 7,27.31; 27,17 zêtein, inquire, 2,32; 3,37.28.29(bis); 4,11; 5,1; 23,22; 34,1.2.34; ; 36,22; 37,13; 42,15; 48,25; 69,13; 74,22; 76,22; 80,11; 82,39; 90,17; 91,29; 104,15.16; 112,23; 119,3 zêtêma, inquiry, 3,16; 104,20 zêtêsis, inquiry, 87,19 zôê, life, 18,19; 25,35; 26,2; 27,1; 31,15;

Greek-English Index 38,22; 39,30(bis).32.33; 40,6.7; 41,; 42,; 43,7.9; 50,35; 52,1; 115,32; 123,1 zôgraphos, painter, 89,13 zôion (95/271), animal; contrasted with zônta (living things), 45,12; 46,8; (zôia) aloga, non-rational animals, see alogos; anaima, bloodless, 13,36; 66,18; empsukha, having a soul, 34,30.32.35; 36,3.9; 40,5; 45,12.19; 48,33; enaima, blooded, 66,37; 69,14.29; enudra, that live in water, 62,32.34; 69,7; 80,18.35;


logika, rational, 3,26; 4,5.6; 121,31; malakostraka, crustaceous, 66,19; ostrakoderma, shell-fish, 66,19; peza, land-based, 67,31; 80,34; ptêna, winged, 67,31; sklêrophthalma, hard-eyed, 68,2; 69,32.35 zôn/zônta, living thing/s, 38,26.27; 40,36; 42,32; 43,39; 45,13; 46,8; 47,23; 122,30; 123,3 zôophuton (see 1.5, n. 25), zoöphyte (minimal form of animal life), 35,20; 44,29.32; 47,16.22; 81,6; 124,19

Index of Passages Omitted from this index are all references, and cross-references, to Themistius’ paraphrase of the de Anima. The references to Aristotle’s de Anima are selective, and include only discussions in the notes. ‘Th.’ is used to identify passages in Themistius, in DA, that are cited in other collections. References are to the pages of this book.


Choephori 32: 193 n. 10 ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

de Anima 1,4-2,4: 155 n. 16; 11,14-12,7: 168 n. 9; 23,2-5: 162 n. 49; 25,2-4: 163 n. 20; 26,26-30: 163 n. 20; 31,4-5: 167 n. 37; 31,7-38,11: 172 n. 1; 36,3-4: 172 n. 14; 36,7-10: 172 n. 15; 40,1-2: 194 n. 12; 41,13-42,3: 174 (2.6) n. 2; 41,15-16: 184 n. 29; 53,5: 175 n. 21; 57,19-20: 179 n. 21; 57,20-58,2: 179 n. 21; 58,2: 179 n. 21; 58,2-5: 178 n. 19; 62,16-22: 181 n. 15; 62,22-63,4: 184 n. 31; 63,1: 184 n. 31; 63,1-3: 185 n. 37; 63,6-13: 181 n. 15; 65,2-21: 181 n. 15; 65,10-21: 181 (3.1) n. 11; 65,21-66,8: 180 n. 1; 66,4: 155 n. 1; 66,9-73,13: 182 n. 1; 66,20-3: 183 n. 16; 68,10-21: 183 n. 15; 69,21-2: 185 n. 35; 68,21-69,17: 183 n. 16; 70,3-5: 183 n. 15; 70,23-71,21: 183 n. 16; 71,21-72,5: 186 n. 49; 71,27: 193 n. 4; 72,5-13: 183 n. 15, 185 n. 36, 186 n. 49; 72,11-13: 184 n. 31; 72,13-73,1: 186 n. 49; 73,3-7: 186 nn. 48, 49; 73,7-9: 195 n. 4; 73,7-13: 186 n. 49; 73,14-80,15: 186 n. 49, 193 n. 1, 195 n. 1; 76,16-78,2: 193 (3.9) n. 1; 77,5-6: 182 n. 16; 77,5-15: 194 n. 11; 77,11: 182 n. 16; 78,10-16: 181 n. 15; 80,16-92,11: 186 n. 1, 195 n. 1; 83,1-23: 186 n. 9; 88,17-91,16: 188 n. 35; 91.7-92,11: 192 n. 1; 92,12-94,6: 195 n. 1; 94,7-100,17: 6 n. 37, 175 n. 7; 94,19: 194 n. 12; 96,26-7: 175 n. 20; 97,13-14: 181 n. 15, 182 n. 16; 97,23-8: 194 n. 13; 97,24-5: 194 n. 12 de Anima Libri Mantissa 106,18-113,24: 186 n. 1; 130,2: 191 n. 17; 130,26: 191 n. 17; 130,30: 191 n. 17; 131,22: 191 n. 17; 136,29-138,2: 177 (2.10) n. 5; 138,12-14: 174 n. 11; 139,19-24: 174 n. 12 de Fato 186,6-8: 195 n. 4 in de Sensu 23,23-24,2: 178 n. 2; 56,8-58,22: 177 (2.10) n. 5; 104,7: 155 n. 1 Quaestiones 1.11: 156 n. 27; 2.8: 169 n. 26; 2.28: 156 n. 28; 3.2: 173 n. 9


DK59A45 (18,28): 159 n. 29; DK59B1 (32,11): 159 n. 29; DK59B12: 159 n. 29


Bibliotheca 1.7.2: 156 n. 30 ARATUS

Phaenomena 2-3: 167 n. 28 ARISTOTLE

Analytica Posteriora 1.27: 155 n. 8; 2.19: 186 n. 9; 100b5-17: 165 n. 57 Analytica Priora 25a37-9: 169 n.27 Categories: 16, 50, 134; 1b25-2a4: 190 n. 1; 2a4-10: 190 n. 2; 3b24-5: 163 n. 11; 3b33-4: 162 n. 7; 6b2-6: 193 (3.10) n. 1; 6b9-10: 193 (3.10) n. 1; 7a35-7: 174 (2.6) n. 9; 9a28-10a10: 158 n. 53; 10a11-16: 158 n. 53; 11b24-33: 157 n. 34, 172 n. 4 de Anima 404b18-27: 159 n. 21, 159 n. 27; 408b28-9: 187 n. 16; 412b10-11: 169 n. 15; 413a8: 170 n. 36; 413a8-9: 170 n. 33; 413b24-7: 188 n. 27; 416b25: 155 n. 10; 417b6-7: 173 n. 9; 417b13: 165 n. 47; 419b23: 175 n. 2; 422b6-7: 177 n. 8; 424b22-425a13: 180 n. 1; 422b34-423a6: 175 n. 19; 423a3: 178 n. 2; 423b12-17: 197 n. 6; 424b22-425a13: 180 n. 1; 425a17: 181 (3.1) n. 11; 425b24-5: 185 n. 37; 425a27-32: 181 n. 15; 427b21-2: 197 n. 13; 429b9: 186 n. 11; 430a22-3: 187 n. 1; 430a23-5: 187 n. 1; 431a1-4: 191 n. 1; 431a6: 165 n. 45; 431a21-5: 166 n. 61; 432a13: 192 (3.8) n. 10; 433b8: 194 n. 9; 433b12: 186 n. 49, 194 (3.10) n. 3; 434a11-12: 194 (3.11) n. 3; 434b1: 196 n. 11; 434b4: 196 n. 13; 435a1-2: 196 n. 20; 435b9-10: 197 n. 12 de Generatione Animalium 736b27-8: 167 n. 38; 736b37-737a1: 161 n. 27; 741a24-5: 155 n. 9; 744b31: 197 n. 14; 745a13: 197 n. 14; 778b30: 176 n. 9; 780b23: 170 n. 32 de Generatione et Corruptione: 98; 1.7-8: 173 n. 3; 336b32-4: 172 n. 15 de Insomniis 459a7: 178 n. 10; 461b3: 180 (3.1) n. 7; 461b21-2: 184 n. 18 de Interpretatione 16a3-8: 176 n. 21;

Index of Passages 16a19: 176 n. 21; 16a26-7: 176 n. 21; 16b28-32: 191 n. 11; 17a26-9: 190 n. 6; 23a3-11: 169 n. 27 de Iuventute 468a10-11: 172 n. 11; 469a12-14: 179 n. 20 de Memoria 450a30-2: 183 n. 15; 450a32: 185 n. 36 de Motu Animalium ch. 10: 182 n. 16; 699a5: 181 n. 14; 702a33-b11: 185 n. 35; 703a9-28: 194 n. 11 de Partibus Animalium 656a29-31: 179 n. 20; 660b33: 195 n. 11; 686b31-687a1: 172 n. 10 de Sensu: 81, 90; ch. 4: 177 n. 14; ch. 5: 177 n. 14; 437a2: 180 (3.1) n. 7; 437a6: 180 (3.1) n. 7; 437b26-438a3: 178 n. 2; 439a1-2: 179 n. 20; 440a15-20: 177 (2.10) n. 5; 444b11: 177 (2.9) n. 10 Ethica Nicomachea 1.1: 172 n. 6; 1112a18-b15: 193 n. 11; 1130b3: 174 (2.6) n. 3; 1175b36-1176a1: 179 n. 24 Eudemus: 132; F38 (45,29-46,8; Th. 106,29-107,5): 189 n. 61; F45 (50,12-23): 162 n. 8; F45 (50,26-31): 163 n. 11; F45 (51,4-30): 162 n. 1; F45 (52,3-4): 163 n. 10 Historia Animalium 492b26-7: 176 n. 20; 623b20-1: 177 n. 11 Metaphysica: 128; 4.2: 171 n. 7; 12: 188 n. 38; 981a15-b13: 173 n. 12; 1009b28-30: 159 n. 10; 1013a26-b3: 171 n. 7; 1026a18-19: 155 n. 15; 1040b5-10: 190 n. 3; 1040b9: 190 n. 3; 1042a26-31: 168 n. 1; 1048b28-35: 161 n. 21; 1050b24-7: 187 n. 20; 1051b24: 166 n. 59; 1074b28-9: 187 n. 20; 1076a4: 186 n. 19 Meteorologica 355b9-10: 173 n. 17 Physica 1.1: 170 n. 1; 192b8-19: 169 n. 17; 192b8-19: 158 n. 51; 194a36: 172 n. 6; 194b9-13: 158 n. 54; 194b23-9: 168 n. 1; 194b26-195a3: 172 n. 7; 196a36: 5 n. 29; 201b31-3: 161 n. 21; 202a13-21: 171 n. 17, 181 n. 4; 219b1-2: 194 n. 6; 220a24-5: 194 n. 6; 226b34-227a1: 196 n. 17; 227a10-13: 176 n. 8; 227a23-7: 176 n. 8; 231a21-3: 196 n. 17; 231a22-3: 176 n. 8, 178 n. 7; 256a21-b3: 160 n. 3; 257b2-6: 160 n. 4; 257b6-11: 160 n. 5 Poetica 1456b20-1: 191 n. 9; 1457b13-16: 183 n. 14; 1457b16-25: 172 n. 10; 1457b17-33: 182 n. 20; 1457b25-30: 176 n. 3 Topica 118a34-9: 193 n. 14



F99 (= Th. 41,30-7): 169 n. 21


7.57 (LS 33A; SVF 3, 213, 5-20): 191 n. 9; 7.76 (LS 36A): 157 n. 39


DK31B84 (341,26-8): 178 n. 2; DK31B84 (342,11): 178 n. 2; DK31B96 (346,5-7): 166 n. 12; DK31B106 (350,21): 182 n. 4; DK31B109 (351,20): 159 n. 11, 160 n. 32, 166 n. 10, 166 n. 16; DK31B117 (359,1-2): 167 n. 22


Epistula ad Herodotum 70: 196 n. 15 EUBULUS COMICUS

Daidalos F1 (PCG VII, 354; Th. 19,8-11): 161 n. 23 EURIPIDES

Alcestis 348-52: 168 n. 10 GALEN

de Usu Partium 10.4-5: 170 n. 32 HOMER

Iliad 1.104: 157 n. 44; 2.204: 182 n. 18; 3.35: 157 n. 44, 164 n. 38; 3.110: 194 n. 5; 10.375: 157 n. 44; 10.535: 174 (2.6) n. 6; 15.4: 164 n. 38; 22.71: 159 n. 23; 23.677: 159 n. 10; 23.698: 159 n. 10; 24.358-60: 193 n. 10 Odyssey 18.136-7: 183 nn. 6, 7 LUCRETIUS

de Rerum Natura 2.352-66: 197 n. 10; 3.117-27: 163 n. 14; 3.624-33: 173 n. 6; 3.738-40: 162 n. 58 MICHAEL PSELLUS

Opuscula 13 (62,1-2): 180 (3.1) n. 9 OLYMPIODORUS

in Categorias 35,4-8: 176 n. 3 in Phaedonem 173,21-2: 163 n. 11; 173,22-4: 163 n. 10; 173,25-7: 163 n. 14; 173,28-9: 163 n. 12 ORPHICA

F27 (96,26-8; Th. 35,17-19): 167 n. 24


in Analytica Priora 6,14-18: 162 n. 4 in de Anima I & II 142,6-14: 162 n. 5; 142,15-22: 162 n. 6; 142,22-6: 162 n. 7; 142,26-33: 162 n. 8; 142,33-143,3: 163 n. 10; 144,22-5: 163 n. 11; 144,30-145,7: 162 n. 8; 368,1-3: 170 n. 32; 409,28-410,3: 11 n. 62; 410,1: 11 n. 62; 410,35: 11 n. 62; 418,25-31: 11 n. 62 in de Anima III 78,14-80,54: 191 n. 8 PS.-PHILOPONUS

de Civitate Dei 5.8: 183 n. 7

in De Anima III 450,9-19: 11 n. 62, 180 (3.1) n. 9; 508,20-4: 11 n. 62, 185 n. 38; 514,29-31: 11 n. 62, 185 n. 38; 592,27-9: 195 n. 10






de Mundo 398a26-35: 186 n. 19 AUGUSTINE

de Musica 1.14 (200,6-21): 176 n. 12 de Natura Deorum 2.83: 197 n. 11

Bibliotheca Codex 74: 2 n. 10, 11 n. 63 Epistulae 7, 344B1-C1: 189 n. 53


Index of Passages

Euthyphro 3C5: 160 n. 16 Gorgias 481C5-D1: 189 n. 46 Ion 535C7-8: 193 n. 10; 535D4-5: 179 n. 23 Laches 179E4-6: 158 n. 3 Laws 736B3: 182 n. 18; 848D6: 187 n. 8; 878B5: 176 n. 9; 895E10-896A4: 160 n. 1; 968E7-969A1: 163 n. 16 Phaedo 65A10-B1: 158 n. 3; 66A1: 157 n. 43; 67B2: 190 n. 66; 72E2-77A5: 189 n. 59; 83E1: 155 n. 11; 92A6-C3: 162 n. 5; 92E3-93A10: 162 n. 6; 93A10-B7: 162 n. 7; 93B8-D7: 162 n. 8; 94A1-4: 163 n. 10; 94B4-E6: 162 n. 5 Phaedrus 245C5-246A2: 189 n. 57 Philebus 15E3: 165 n. 43 Republic 435A1-2: 189 n. 53; 485D8: 182 n. 18; 508B-509B: 189 n. 42; 508D5: 185 n. 39; 588D10: 178 n. 4; 588E1: 178 n. 4; 588E2: 178 n. 4; 610C6: 160 n. 16 Sophist 262C6: 184 n. 27; 264B1-3: 184 n. 22; 264B2: 184 n. 27 Symposium 175E6: 179 n. 23; 196A2: 185 n. 40; 202E3: 175 n. 17; 215E1-3: 193 n. 10 Theaetetus 166A1: 160 n. 16; 169C1: 186 n. 10; 176B1-3: 189 n. 60; 184D1-2: 157 n. 32; 191C8-D1: 185 n. 44; 191C10-D1: 185 n. 44; 191D6-7: 185 n. 36 Timaeus 21E5: 187 n. 8; 34B2-3: 167 n. 30; 34C-36E: 161 n. 25; 35A1-4: 159 n. 13; 35A2: 159 n. 14; 35A3-5: 159 n. 17; 36B6-C1: 162 n. 52; 36B6-D7: 161 n. 31; 36B8-C1: 162 n. 45; 36C3: 161 n. 25; 37A2-C3: 159 n. 17; 37A6: 161 n. 38; 37B7: 186 n. 14; 37C1: 186 n. 14; 41A7-D3: 159 n. 18; 41D1-2: 159 n. 18, 161 n. 33, 190 n. 68; 41E2: 161 n. 26; 42D5-E4: 159 n. 18; 42E7-43A6: 190 n. 69; 43B5-D2: 182 n. 18; 44E2: 161 n. 26; 52B2: 191 n. 16; 69C5-6: 190 n. 67; 69C5-E4: 189 n. 55; 69C6-7: 190 n. 68; 69C7: 161 n. 26, 189 n. 55; 69C8: 190 n. 65; 69D7: 190 n. 65; 72D4: 189 n. 56; 77A3-C5: 170 n. 8 PLOTINUS

2.8[35].1.4: 161 n. 41; 2.8[35].1.10: 166 n. 60; 4.7[2].6.10-15: 182 n. 13; 4.7[2].84.11-12: 162 n. 5; 4.7[2].84.12-13: 162 n. 6; 4.7[2].84.14: 163 n. 11; 4.7[2].84.14-16: 163 n. 10; 4.7[2].84.16-17: 163 n. 14; 4.7[2].84.17-23: 163 n. 12; 4.9[8]: 189 n. 47; 6.3[44].7.22: 5 n. 30


Contra Boethum F7 ap. Eusebium, Praeparatio Evangelica XV.11,2-3: 163 n. 21 Sententiae 21 (13,8-12): 160 n. 17 QUINTILIAN

Institutiones 4 n. 25; 10.5.4-5: 4 n. 25


Adv. Math. 7.244: 184 n. 32; 7.384: 192 (3.8) n. 11; 7.414: 184 n. 32; 8.276: 195 nn. 4, 11; 8.288: 195 n. 4 Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.22: 192 (3.8) n. 11, 195 n. 4; 1.96: 192 (3.8) n. 9; 1.119: 184 n. 32 SIMPLICIUS

in de Anima 1,3-6,17: 155 n. 5; 151,14: 11 n. 62, 176 n. 3; 291,5: 193 n. 5 in de Caelo 69,9-10: 2 n. 11; 188,30: 2 n. 15; 640,27-32: 161 n. 30 in Physica 112,30: 3 n. 22; 4,11-15: 172 (2.4) n. 7; 801,13-16: 168 n. 1; 1122,26: 3 n. 22 SOPHOCLES

Oedipus Coloneus 1624-5: 193 n. 10 Trachiniae 767-9: 178 n. 3 STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA (SVF)

1.65 (LS 30A): 156 n. 28; 1.208 (Th. 107,17-18): 190 n. 64; 1.145 (Th. 17,3-5): 160 n. 12; 1.158 (Th. 35,32-4): 167 n. 29; 2.278 (LS 30E): 156 n. 28; 2.239 (LS 30D): 156 n. 28; 2.663: 197 n. 11; 2.690: 197 n. 11; 2.708: 170 n. 8; 2.709 (Th. 45,16-18): 170 n. 8; 2.710: 170 n. 8; 2.714-16: 167 n. 29; 2.824 (Th. 3,13-15): 156 n. 25; 2.826 (LS 28F): 167 n. 37; 2.1019 (Th. 5,13-19): 157 n. 36; 3.382 (Th. 107,17-18): 190 n. 64


in Analytica Posteriora 1,2-12: 3 n. 20; 1,16-2,4: 4 n. 24; 1,17: 3 n. 21; 1,21: 165 n. 53; 37,8-20: 155 n. 8; 49,21-6 (SVF 2.1019): 157 n. 36; 63,2-64,16: 186 n. 9; 65,2-66,7: 165 n. 57 in Metaphysica XII: 187 n. 9; ch. 7: 192 (3.7) n. 12; ch. 9: 192 (3.7) n. 12; 31,7-9: 187 n. 20 in Physica 1,18-20: 170 n. 1; 43,9: 172 n. 6; 66,16-17: 158 n. 47; 104,14-22 (14-19 = LS 48F; SVF 2.468): 174 (2.7) n. 10; 157,10: 191 n. 12; 173,32: 176 n. 8; 221,24-222,1: 160 n. 4 Orations 15 (275,21): 164 n. 38; 23 (89,20-90,5): 3 n. 17 THEON OF SMYRNA

Expositio rerum mathematicarum 151,10: 195 n. 5 THEOPHRASTUS

Fragments (FHS&G) 277C: 175 n. 21; 307A-327: 188 n. 29; 307A (Th. 107,30-108,18): 190 n. 71; 307C: 190 n. 74; 320A (Th. 108,18-109,1): 190 n. 77; 320B (Th. 102,14-19): 188 n. 29


F39 (172,36-173,18; Th. 11,19-12,1): 159 n. 19; F61 (183,11-17; Th. 31,1-6): 166 n. 62; F61 (183,18-33; Th. 32,19-34): 166 n. 5

Subject Index This selective index is intended to be used along with the English-Greek Glossary, GreekEnglish Index, and Index of Passages. References are to the pages of this book.

abstract objects (of thought), 120-1, 140-1 activity (energeia), distinct from movement (kinêsis): 34, 74, 133, 138-9; see intellect Adrastus of Aphrodisias, 172 n. 7 affection (paskhein), in imagination: 115-16; in intellection: 121; in sense-perception: 73, 121 Alcinous, 9 n. 50 Alcmaeon of Croton, 28 Alexander of Aphrodisias, on bodily interpenetration: 174 (2.7) n. 10; on the heart as the central organ: 175 n. 7; on imagination: 182 n. 1, 183 n. 16, 184 n. 29; influence on Themistius: 1; on intellect: 186 n. 1, 188 n. 35; lost commentary on the de Anima: 1 n. 5, 156 n. 27, 174 n. 14; on the soul: 163 n. 20; on time: 147, 194 n. 8; on touch: 97-8 alteration (alloiôsis), 75 anakhôrêsis, 162 n. 48, 191 n. 17 anaphora, 164 n. 42 Anaxagoras, 23-4, 28-9, 121 Anaximines, 28 Andronicus of Rhodes, 49, 163 n. 21 animals, and plants: 63; imagination in, 194-5 n. 4; reasoning by: 195 n. 10, 195 n. 11 Apollo, 19 apostêrizesthai, 181 n. 14 Aristotle, brevity of: 3 n. 22; see also Index of Passages Asclepius, 19 astronomy, 15, 141, 184 n. 26 attunement theory of the soul: 40-3 Barbaro, Ermolao, 7 Boethius, 176 n. 12 Boethus of Sidon (Peripateticus), 160 n. 8 Bonaventura, Federigo, 6 capacities of the soul, 62-8, 125; see soul, sense-perception, and under specific capacities categories, 16, 50, 134, 138 Chrysippus, 19 Clearchus of Soli, 169 n. 21 colour, 78-9 conditionals, 20-1

Critias, 29 de Anima, division into books: 155 n. 1; order of chapters: 173 n. 15, 195 n. 1 definition, 16-20; distinction by definition: 181 (3.1) n. 12 Democritus, 23-4, 35, 48, 52 Deucalion, 18 dianoia (discursive thinking), 183 n. 8; and noein (thinking): 47 diexodos, 166 n. 60 Diogenes of Apollonia, 28 diosmon (smell-medium), 175 n. 21 eidêsis, 155 n. 7 ekmageion, 185 n. 44 elutron, 178 n. 4 Empedocles, 29, 80, 110, 134-5, 178 n. 2 ensphragizesthai, 185 n. 36 entelekheia, 156 n. 20, 168 nn. 2, 3 epibolê, 137, 165 n. 58, 191 n. 14 Epicurus, 196 n. 15 Erasmus, 155 n. 1 focal meaning, 171 n. 7 form, enmattered and non-material forms: 23, 122, 157 n. 46; and matter: 56 Galen, 157 n. 45, 170 n. 32 genera, as thoughts: 17-18, 50, 156 n. 28 god, see intellect hearing, 83-6 heart, and locomotion: 148, 194 n. 12; and sense-perception: 6 n. 37, 97, 175 n. 7, 179 n. 20 hêgemonikon, 167 n. 39 Heraclitus, 28 Hercules, 178 n. 3 hexis, 8, 17; see intellect Hippo (of Samos?), 28 hupostasis, 157 n. 29 illumination, and ensoulment: 42-3; and intellection: 123; and unity of the productive intellect: 128-9 images, and speech: 87-8; and thought:


Subject Index

142-3; Greek terms for: 183 n. 16, 184 n. 18 imagination, and sense-perception: 113, 115-16; and belief: 112; and opinion: 111-12 incidental properties, 156 n. 19 incontinence, 145, 149 intellect, affectable (common, passive): 130-3; and communication: 129; as hexis: 119, 122, 127, 131; potential: 122-3, 129-31; productive: 122-34; relation to Aristotelian god: 127-8, 141; separability of: 15, 61, 67, 125-7, 131 Ishaq ibn Hunain, 7; variant translation of Themistius: 184 n. 25; 186 n. 2 khreia (function), 176 n. 1 kinêsis/kineisthai, 8 koinê aisthêsis (common sense), 180 (3.1) n. 10, 181 n. 15, 182 n. 22 korê (eyeball), 169 n. 32 lexis, opposite psophos: 176 n. 17; opposite phônê: 191 n. 19 light, 79-80; see illumination logos, senses of: 155 n. 6, 157 n. 46 manuscripts, Marcianus graecus 261: 192 n. 7; Mediceus-Laurentianus 87.25 (Q): 10, 155 n. 2, 160 n. 8, 162 n. 7, 166 n. 7; Monacensis graecus 330 (M): 10; Parisinus Coislinianus (C) 386: 10, 158 n. 2, 176 n. 13 memory, and the intellect: 125-7; in formation of universals: 123 metalambanein, 160 n. 20 metaphor, 86, 88, 93, 112, 172 n. 10, 182 n. 20, 183 n. 14 mixture, 57-8, 184 n. 27 Moerbeke, William of, 7, 10-11, 156 n. 26, 178 nn. 5, 9, 191 n. 8 movement: of animals, 143-9 Neoplatonism, 10 noein, 8, 183 n. 14, 184 n. 17 nutritive capacity, 68-73 okhêma (vehicle of the soul), 161 n. 26, 189 n. 55 Orpheus, 52 paraphrasis, 4 n. 25 paraphrastic method of exegesis, 2-7, 160 n. 2 paronymy, 160 n. 33 phantasia, see imagination; haplê: 194 n. 4 phantasma, 183 n. 16 phantazesthai, 184 n. 20, 186 n. 49, 194 n. 3 Pheidias, 3 Philippus (comic poet), 35 Philoponus, John, 175 n. 7, 191 n. 8

phutikê dunamis (vegetative capacity), 170 n. 3 plants, in relation to animals: 63; and sense-perception: 100 Plato, contrasted with Aristotle: 35, 161 n. 30; on the common intellect: 131-3; on movement as activity: 34, 132; see also Index of Passages Plotinus, 2, 10; see Index of Passages pneuma, and sense-perception: 44, 109, 175 n. 7, 177 (2.9) n. 5; connate pneuma in Aristotle: 194 n. 11 Porphyry, 2, 160 nn. 8, 9, 163 nn. 21, 24, 166 n. 7, 188 n. 26 pragmateia (commentary), 3 n. 18 proballein, 165 n. 43 proskrinesthai, 172 n. 13 proslambanein, 157 n. 39 Pythagoras, 36 Pythagoreans, 24, 40 Scepticism, and imagination: 183 n. 12, 183 n. 16, 184 n. 32, 195 n. 4 semen, 72, 172 n. 14 sense-perception, dematerialization of: 76, 99-101, 106, 173 n. 15; and reason: 111; and imagination: 115-16; and celestial matter: 153; and the senses of: hearing, 83-5, sight, 78-83, smell, 88-90, taste, 90-2, touch, 93-9; objects of: 77-8, 103-5, 111, 116-17 sight, 78-83 Simplicius, see Index of Passages sleep, 58, 61 smell, 88-90 Sosigenes, 174-5 n. 14 soul, capacities of: 62-8; definition of: 56-68; earlier views of: 23-9, 56; movement and the soul: 23-40; and number: 26-7, 47-8; and selfhood: 124-7, 155 n. 16, 187 nn. 11, 12; see intellect, sense-perception sperma, 169 n. 30, 173 n. 10 Stoics, 52, 132, 156 n. 25, 167 n. 29, 170 n. 8, 183 n. 15, 191 n. 9, 197 n. 11 stones, life in: 59 sumplokê, 184 n. 27 sun, apparent size of: 184 n. 26; Platonic image for intellection: 129 taste, 90-2 text (transmission of), indirect tradition: 11; manuscripts: 10-11; editions: 10 Thales, 28 Themistius, on Alexander of Aphrodisias: 1, 97-8, 147; alleged interpolations: 189 n. 41; allegedly lost commentaries: 11 n. 63; on imagination: 182 n. 1; on intellect: 186 n. 1; and medical ideas: 157 n. 45, 172 n. 1; method of paraphrasing: 2-7;

Subject Index and Neoplatonism: 10; and predecessors: 1-2 Theophrastus, 127, 133-4, 175 n. 21, 188 n. 29; treatises On the Soul and Physics: 133 thumos/thumousthai, 8 Timaeus, cited as author of Plato’s Timaeus: 25, 27; relation to Plato: 35, 159 n. 26 time, and practical reasoning: 147; and thinking: 135-6 touch, as a capacity of the soul: 93-9; corporeality of: 179 n. 24

translation, principles of: 7-8 Trincavelli, Vettore, 10 universals, formation of: 119, 123 Vettori, Piero (Victorius, Petrus), 10 voice, 86-8 Xenocrates, 10 n. 56, 26, 47-9 Zeno of Citium, 52, 132 zoöphytes, 167 n. 25