Logos and Pragma: Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans 9789070419189, 9782503563978

Table of contents :
Front Matter ("Table of Contents", "Introduction", "List of Professor Nuchelmans’ publications 1950-1987"), p. i

Free Access

The Strategy of Plato’s Philosophy of Language, p. 1
W.E. Abraham
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00022


The Anatomy of the Proposition: Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle, p. 27
L.M. de Rijk
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00023


Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow's Sea Battle, p. 63
Norman Kretzmann
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00024


The Views of Peter of Spain on Propositional Composition, p. 99
H.A.G. Braakhuis
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00025


The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus’ Two Commentaries on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, p. 121
E.P. Bos
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00026


Consequences in Ockham’s Summa Logicae and Their Relation to Syllogism, Topics and Insolubles, p. 141
Eleonore Stump
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00027


Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: the Development of the Complexe significabile., p. 161
K.H. Tachau
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00028


Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?', p. 189
E.J. Ashworth
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00029


Contradictions and Symmetry Rage in the Logical Interregnum. An Essay in Empirical Logic, p. 215
E.M. Barth
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00030


Propositions and All That: Ontological and Epistemological Reflections, p. 241
E. Morscher
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00031


Über das Verhältnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt. Ontologische Fragen unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Philosophie von J.A. dèr Mouw, p. 259
M.F. Fresco
https://doi.org/10.1484/M.ARTS-EB.4.00032


Back Matter ("Bibliography", "Index of Passages Quoted or Referred to", "Index of Names", "Index of Concepts and Terms"), p. 281

Citation preview

LOGOS AND PRAGMA

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics EDITORS L. M. de RIJK &

E. P. BOS Lei den

H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS & C. H. KNEEPKENS Nijmegen

Vol. 1: L. M. de Rijk, Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica ,Ad rudium" (edited from the MS Vat. lat. 946), Nijmegen 1981 Vol. 2: Ralph of Beauvais, Glose super Donatum, ed. C. H. Kneepkens, Nijmegen 1982 Vol. 3: L. M. de Rijk, Some 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes terminorum (Martin of Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and others), Nijmegen 1982 Vol. 4: Johannes Buridanus, Questiones Ionge super Librum Perihermeneias, ed. Ria van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1983 Vol. 5: John of Holland, Four Tracts on Logic (Suppositiones, Fallacie, Obligationes, Insolubilia), ed. E. P. Bos, Nijmegen 1985 Vol. 6: Thomas Bricot, Tractatus Insolubilium, ed. E. J. Ashworth, Nijmegen 1986

in preparation: H. A. G. Braakhuis, Nicholas of Paris (?), Summe Metenses: A Complete Edition C. H. Kneepkens, Ralph of Beauvais, Liber yYtan R. van der Lecq, Johannes Buridanus: Questiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, A Critical Edition E. P. Bos, Anonymi Introductiones Montane Maiores SUPPLEMENTA to ARTISTARIUM: Vol. 1: English Logic and Semantics, from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, Nijmegen 1981 Vol. II: Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L. M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1985 Vol. III: Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, Nijmegen 1987

ARTISTARIUM SUPPLEMENTA

------------111------------

LOGOS AND PRAGMA ESSAYS ON THE PHIWSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR GABRIEL NUCHELMANS EDITED BY L. M. DE RIJK

AND H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS

Nijmegen lngenium Publishers

1987

CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG Logos Logos and p~agma : essays on the philosophy of language in honou~ of P~ofesso~ Gab~iel Nuchelmans I ed. by L.M. de Rijk, H.A.G, B~aakhuis. - Nijmegen : Ingenium. (A~tista~ium. Supplementa ; 3) Met bibliog~., index, lit. opg. ISBN 90-70419-18-1 SISO 803.1 UOC 800.1 NUGI 612 T~efw.: taalfilosofie.

ISBN 90 70419 18 1 Copyright 198T by Ingenium Publishers, P.O. Box 1342, 6501 BH Nijmegen, The Netherlands. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher. PRINTED by KRIPS REPRO MEPPEL, THE NETHERLANDS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

vi

List of Professor Nuchelmans' publications 1950 - 1987

xi

W.E. Abraham (Santa Cruz, California): The Strategy of Plato's Philosophy of Language

1

L.M. de Rijk (Leiden): The Anatomy of the Proposition: Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle

27

N. Kretzmann (Ithaca, New York): Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow's Sea Battle

63

H.A.G. Braakhuis (Nijmegen): The Views of Peter of Spain on Propositional Composition

99

E.P. Bos (Leiden): The Theory of the Proposition According to John Duns Scotus' Two Commentaries on Aristotle's Perihermeneias

121

E. Stump (Blacksburg, Virginia): Consequences in Ockham's Summa Logicae and Their Relation to Syllogism, Topics and Insolubles

141

K.H. Tachau (Iowa): Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: the Development of the Complexe significabile.

161

E.J. Ashworth (Waterloo): Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?'

189

E.M. Barth (Groningen): Contradictions and Symmetry Rage in the Logical Interregnum. An Essay in Empirical Logic

215

E. Morscher (Salzburg): Propositions and All That: Ontological and Epistemological Reflections

241

M.F. Fresco (Leiden): Ober das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt. Ontologische Fragen unter besondere Beriicksichtigung der Philosophic von J A. der Mouw

259

Bibliography

281

Index of Passages Quoted or Referred to

299

Index of Names

311

Index of Concepts and Terms

317

v

INTRODUCTION This Summer Professor Nuchelmans will retire from our University. The present volume is meant to celebrate his many scholarly achievements. The editors felt that there was no better way to do so than by inviting a number of his colleagues and friends to contribute a paper on a subject closely connected with one of Professor Nuchelmans' favourite themes: the development of the theory of the proposition. The contributors to this volume cover the period from Plato to our days. The articles are chronologically ordered. 1.

In W.E. Abraham's contribution we may read how the Greeks were confronted

with the philosophical view that denied the existence of a fundamental reality, the possibility for the human mind to grasp such reality and the possibility of communicating such reality through language. Abraham shows how Plato (427-347 B.C.) responds to Gorgias and the Sophists by presenting an account of Plato's theory of language, a theory which ultimately concerns an enquiry into the nature of language and the conditions of its possibility.

2.

Starting with an outline of Plato's semantics of the statement making

expression and the key notions involved, L.M. de Rijk proceeds to examine Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.) views on the subject, discussing his notion of pragma including his conception of being and not-being. The latter are then discussed as the preliminaries to an interpretation of Aristotle's account of the logos, followed by an investigation of the notions of synthesis, dihaeresis, and the expression

einai 3.

In Aristotle's De interpretatione, Chapter 4, we read that expressions are

propositions only if they are either true or false. In Chapter 9, however, Aristotle rejects determinism. The question then is whether or not Aristotle accepts bivalence to be a differentia for all propositions, even propositions concerning future states of affairs. N. Kretzmann shows us how Boethius (480-526) interpreted Aristotle's views on the topic at issue.

4.

H.A.G. Braakhuis' contribution gives us the outlines of a theory of the

proposition presented by Peter of Spain (before 1205-1277) in his work on syncategorematic words. Peter of Spain is presented as an adherent of the view that every mental composition has an extramental counterprut, combining aspects vi

of both grammatical and logical-semantic theories on the proposition and, moreover, displaying a vivid interest in the mental activities leading to the assertion of a proposition. 5.

E.P. Bos confronts us with a theory of the proposition which has hardly been

studied at all, viz. the account given by John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) in his two commentaries on Aristotle's De interpretatione. Starting point for Scotus' theory is the well-known passage 16a4-8 in which it is claimed that language consists of signs of the affections of the soul which are likenesses of states of affairs. Bos argues that Scotus is to be considered a representative of the reist theory of the proposition, who, unlike other 'reist-adherents' stresses the part played by the intellect and the species. 6.

Eleonore Stump's contribution is an investigation of William of Ockham's

(1285-1349) view concerning the relationship between consequences on the one hand and syllogisms, obligations and insolubles on the other. Stump shows us how Ockham, in comparison with his predecessors, broadens the scope of logic by taking the rules of consequences as the guarantor of the validity of arguments, instead of the categorial syllogism. Thus not only formal considerations, but also semantic and metaphysical ones are accepted as criteria to evaluate inferences.

7.

Katherine H. Tachau's contribution deals with problems concerning the origin

of the notion of the complexe significabile. In order tosettle the question which author is to be given intellectual priority as regards this notion, Tachau examines the motivation for introducing the hypothesis of the complexe signijicabile, to be found only in the works of Adam Wodeham (d. 1358). Subsequently, Tachau attempts to solve the problems which have to do with the chronology of Wodeham's, Robert Holcot's (d. 1349) and William of Crathorn's careers.

8.

In E. Jennifer Ashworth's contribution we are presented with an interesting

view of the relation between words, concepts and things, namely that of Jacobus Naveros whose commentary on the Peri hermeneias was published in 1533. Ashworth also discusses a commentary on the Peri hermeneias by Alphonsus Prado (fl. 1530) and mentions other authors who also have written on the topic in

question. Finally, Ashworth makes use of her findings to add to the material presented by Nuchelmans and to explore the influence St. Thomas Aquinas (12251274), William of Ockham and John Buridan (1300-after 1358) may have had on other authors.

vii

9.

Many philosophers have argued that twentieth century logic is not suitable

for dealing with arguments developed in the social sciences and the humanities. Particularly the criticism of Hegelians have been ignored by logicians. E.M. Barth's contribution attempts to evaluate the arguments presented by Hegelians against modern logic. Barth focuses on the relationship between history of logic in general, the so-called dialectical contradictions and modern logic and examines Hegelianlogic on the basis of a historical survey.

10.

Throughout the history of philosophy (and other sciences) we have made

attempts to solve difficult problems by introducing novel entities. Starting from Balzano's (1781-1849) doctrine of the proposition, E. Morscher discusses various problems concerning the ontological status of the proposition. Morscher also gives an outline of two contemporary interpretations of statements and propositions and, fmally, presents a number of principles according to which he considers a future theory of the proposition is to be developed.

11.

In M.F. Fresco's contribution we are introduced to the views of the Dutch

philosopher and poet Johannes der Mouw (1863-1919), who has developed an interesting theory on the relationship between language, thought and the outside world. Der Mouw's views are examined with reference to the distinction briught forward by Karl Popper between the world of physical states, the world of mental states and the world of intelligibles.

The editors wish to express their thanks to rns. Caroline A. van Eck, phil. drs., who prepared the manuscript for the printer, and made the indexes and the bibliography, to ms. Joke Spruyt, phil. drs., who wrote the summaries of the contributions, and kindly corrected the editors' English, and to mr. Menno Lievers, who graciously permitted us the use of his compilation of Professor Nuchelmans' publications.

L.M. deRijk H.A.G. Braakhuis.

viii

PUBLICATIONS OF PROFESSOR NUCHELMANS (1950 - 1987)

1950

Studien aber Philologos, Philologia und Philologein. Ph. D. Thesis. Zwolle.

1951

'Notes on the Method of Convergence', Methodos 3, 'lf37-299.

1951a

'Historische kennis en logisch positivisme', A/gemeen Nederlands

Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeelte 44, 75-86. 1951b

'Counterfactual Conditionals and Singular Causal Statements' in

Actes du lle Congres International de Philosophie 8, 16-20. 1953

'The Analysis of Counterfactual Conditionals', Synthese 9, 48-63.

1954

Book Review of: G.J. de Vries: Antisthenes Redivivus. An

Examination of Plato's Critic, Mnemosyne, 79-80. 1956

'Oxford-wijsbegeerte',Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift

voor Wijsbegeelte 49, 142-52. 1956a

Book Review of: Holwerda: Commentatio de voce quae est physis,

Museum, Maandblad voor filo/ogie en geschiedenis 61, 151-2. 1957

'De waarheidsparadox in de gewone taal', Algemeen

Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeelte 50, 250-63. 1957a

'Betekenissystemen', ibid. 214-23.

1958

'Kan men het verleden kennen?', ibid. 51, 260-69.

1959

'Dingwoorden', ibid. 52, 157-68.

1960

'De dispositietheorie van het begrip', ibid. 53, 80-95. •

1960a

'Dispositionele verklaringen', ibid., 144-57.*

1960b

Book Review of: S. Hampshire: Thought and Action, ibid., 32-33.

1960c

'Taalperspectivisme', Wijsgerig Perspectief 1, 19-31.*"

1960d

'Betekenisonderzoek in de wijsbegeerte', ibid., 201-12.

1961

Book Review of: E. Gellner: Words and Things, Synthese 13, 88-97.

xi

1961a

'Austins term < performatief>, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor

1961b

'Wetenschappelijke en belletristische filosofie', Wijsgerig Perspectief,

1961c

Book Review of: D.W. Hamlyn: Sensation and Perception, ibid., 281-

Wijsbegeerte, 154-72. 2, 145-58.

84. 1961d

Book Review of: J.L. Austin: Sense and Sensibilia, ibid., 281-84.

1962

Book Review of: M.J. Charlesworth: Philosophy and Linguistic

Analysis, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 55, 109112. 1962a

'Alethische eenheden', ibid., 150-66.*

1962b

'De kritiek op de metafysica', Wijsgerig Perspectief3, 150-66.

1962c

'Taal en informatie', ibid., 235-42.

1963

'Kennis van andermans psyche',Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor

Wijsbegeerte 56, 38-56. * 1963a

Book Review of: R.C. Kwant: Fenomenologie van de taal, ibid.

1963b

'Taal en intersubjectiviteit', Wijsgerig Perspectief 5, 198-208.**

1964

Empirisme. Rede uitgesproken bij het aanvaarden van het ambt van gewoon hoogleraar in de wijsbegeerte aan de Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden op vrijdag 4 december 1964.

1964a

'Het pragmaticisme van Peirce', Wijsgerig Perspectief 5, 86-100.

1965

David Hume, Baarn, 1965.

1965a

Book Review of: D. Pole: The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein,

Foundations of Language 1, 232-33. 1965b

Book Review of: D. Favrholdt: An Interpretation and Critique of

Wittgenstein's Tractatus, ibid., 2, 271-73. 1965c

'Een Engelse kijk op de mens: Gilbert Ryle's ,

Dietsche Warande en Be/fort 110,727-744. 1965d

'De logische achtergrond van het vernieuwde positivisme', Wijsgerig

Perspectief 6, 167-80. 1966

'Het eigene der wijsbegeerte', Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor

Wijsbegeerte 58, 114-22.** 1966a

xii

'Taal en logica', ibid., 2-9.**

1966b

'Metafysica en ethiek in de analytische wijsbegeerte, Tijdschrift voor

filosofie 28, 399-417. 1966c

Book Review of: E. Stenius: Wzttgenstein's Tractatus, Foundations of

Language 2, 270-7 1966d

Book Review of: J. Hartnack: Wzttgenstein., ibid., 269-70.

1966e

'Regels en regelmaat', Handelingen van het 29e Nederlandse

filologencongres, Groningen, 52-57."* 1966f

Book Review of: R.C. Kwant: Phenomenology of Language, Lingua 16,413-14.

1967

Proeven van analytisch filosoferen. Hilversum. (Contains, besides an introduction and chapter 1: Wijsgerige analyse van taaldaden, the articles marked with an asterisk).

1967a 1967b

'Taaldaden', Forum der Letteren 8, 208-223. ** Book Review of: D.P. Dryer: Kant's Solution for Verification in

Metaphysics, Theologie und Philosophie 29, 646-48. 1967c

Book Review of: G. Frey: Sprache, Ausdruck des Bewusstseins, Lingua 18, 106.

1967d

'Een Stoicijnse definitie van het begrip', Wzjsgerig Perspectief 8, 121-27.

1968

'Wijsgerige interpretatie en reinterpretatie', Algemeen Nederlands

Tijdschrift voor Wzjsbegeerte 60, 119-30.** 1968a

'Wijsbegeerte en geldigheid', ibid., 200-15. • *

1968b

'Verificatie', Wzjsgerig Perspectief9, 69-72.

1969

OveTZicht van de analytische wijsbegeerte, Utrecht/Antwerpen.

1969a

'Plato. Inleiding', Wzjsgerig Perspectief9, 73-81.

1969b

Book Review of: E. Mikkola: Die Abstraktion. Begriff und Struktur.

Eine logisch-semantische Untersuchung auf nominalistischer Grundlage unter besonderer Bemcksichtigung des Lateinischen., Lingua 24, 203-4. 1969c

Book Review of: V.Z. Panfilov: Grammar and Logic, Janua Linguarum,

Lingua 23, 197-98. 1969d

Book Review of: T. de Mauro: Ludwig Wzttgenstein. His Place in the

Development of Semantics, Lingua 23, 310-12.

xiii

1970

'Bertrand Russell 18 mei 1872 - 2 februari 1970', A/gemeen

Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 62,69-70. 1970a

'Taaluiting en logische structuur', ibid., 162-74.

1970b

Book Review of: Enciclopedia filosofica, ibid., 283-84.

1970c

Book Review of: P.P. Hallie: The Scar of Montaigne. An Essay in

Personal Philosophy, Foundations of Language 6, 589. 1970d

David Hume, Baarn. (first edition: 1965).

1970e

Grondslagen van het wetenschappelijk denken: by J.P.M. Geurts, R.A.V. van Haersolte, M. Jeuken, J. Mansfeld, G.R.F. Nuchelmans and R. Wentholt. (Contains a series of lectures held for the academic community of Rotterdam and organised by the studium genera/e). Rotterdam.

1970f

'Taaluiting en logische structuur', Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift

voor Wijsbegeerte 62, 162-74. • • 1971

'Tractatus 4.113', Mind, 80 106-107.

1971a

'Kennisleer' in Wijsgerig denken. Hoofdstukken uit de wijsbegeerte

voor het V.W.O. By A. de Vroe, B. Delfgaauw, Kwee Swan Liat, G. Nuchelmans, C.A. van Peursen, R.F. Beerling, J.F. Staal, J.H.M.N. van Loenen and H. G .. Hubbeling. Amsterdam. 1971b

1972

'Orientatie: Logica', Wijsgerig Perspectief 12, 198-200.

'Alfred Ayer' in C.P. Bertels and E. Petersma, eds., Filosofen van de

20e eeuw. Assen. 1972a

'Het Mentaals. De opvatting van bet denken als een vorm van spreken in de antieke en middeleeuwse taaltheorie', Leuvense

bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor Gennaanse filologie 61, 295-309. ** 1973

Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Amsterdam.

1973a

'Meta-ethiek en normatieve ethiek', Algemeen Neder/ands Tijdschrift

voor Wijsbegeerte 65,209-18. 1973b

Book Review of: P. Juliard: Philosophies of Language in Eighteenth

Century France, Lingua 32, 172. 1973c

Book Review of: C.S. Hardwick: Language Learning in Wittgenstein's

Later Philosophy, ibid., 275-76. 1974

'Taalwetenschap en wijsbegeerte', in Controversen in de taa/- en

literatuurwetenschap. Wassenaar. • • xiv

1974a

'Bezeichnen und Behaupten', Conceptus 8, 45-51.**

1975

'Visies op filosofieonderwijs', Wijsgerig Perspectief 16, 59-62.

1976

'Die drei Hauptstromungen der angelsachsischen Sprachphilosophie',

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 68, 111-15. 1976a

Book Review of: R.A. Dietrich: Sprache und Wirklichkeit in

Wittgensteins Tractatus, Leuvense Bijdragenn 65, 79-80. 1976b

Book Review of: P.F. Strawson: Subject and Predicate in Logic and

Grammar, and of: J. Heintz: Subjects and Predicables. A Study in subject-predicate asymmetry, Lingua 40 263-64. 1976c

Wijsbegeerte en taal. Twaalf studies. Meppel. (contains articles marked with **).

1976d

'Waarheid' (Passages from William James' Pragmatism, with an introduction and translation), Wijsgerig Perspectief 17, 352-55.

1977

'Wat is taalftlosofie?', in B.T. Tervoort (ed.) Wetenschap en taal. Het

1977a

39 Articles in Winkler Prins Encyclopedie, 7th ed., reprinted in K.

verschijnsel taal van verschillende zijden benaderd. Muiderberg. Kuypers (ed.) Encyclopedie van defilosofie. Arnsterdam/Brussel. 1977b

Book Review of: P.A.M. Seuren: Tussen taal en denken. Een bijdrage

tot de empirische fundering van de semantiek, Leuvense Bijdragen 66, 197-202.

1978

'Philosophie und Philosophie-Unterricht in England' in Ed. Fey (ed.)

Beitrtige zum Philosophie-Unterricht in europtiischen Ltindem: ein Integrationsversuch. Munster. 1978a

Taalfilosofie: een inleiding. Muiderberg.

1979

Book Review of: Pauli Veneti Logica Magna. Secunda Pars. Fasc 6.

Edited with Notes on the Sources by Francesco del Punta. Translated into English with explanatory notes by Marilyn McCord Adams, Philosophical Books 20, 110-11. 1979a

'Significa. Ter inleiding.' Wijsgerig Perspectief 20, 33-60.

1979b

'Filosofische aanzetten tot de studie van taaldaden', ibid., 160-63.

1980

Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition. Amsterdam.

1980a

'Vrijheid van mening', Wijsgerig Perspectief20, 128-29. XV

1980b

'Adam Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences', Historiographia Linguistica 7, 177-87.

1980c

Book Review of: M. van Overbeke: Chomsky. Taal tussen weten en geweten,Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 72, 64-65.

1981

'Peter Strawson', in C.P. Bertels and E.J. Petersma (eds.) Filosofen van de 20e eeuw. Assen. (seventh, revised edition, ftrst edition Assen

1972). 1981a

Book Review of: S. Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Leuvense Bijdragen 70, 276-78.

1982

'The Semantics of Propositions' in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy etc. Cambridge etc. 1982.

1982a

Book Review of: Ockham's Theory of Propositions. Part Two of the Summa Logicae. Translation by A.J. Freddoso and H. Schuurman, Vivarium 20, 154-55.

1982b

'Analytische ftlosofte in Groot-Brittanie', Wijsgerig Perspectief 23, 233-36.

1983

Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant. Amsterdam.

1983a

Book Review of: J. Ritter and K. Gruender (eds.), Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, Band 3, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 75, 377.

1983b

Book Review of: Pauli Veneti Logica Magna. Prima Pars, fasc. 7: Tractatus de scire et dubitare. Edited, with an English Translation by P. Clarke, Philosophical Books 24, 15-17.

1984

Book Review of: John Buridan on Se/f-Reference.Chapter Eight of Bur/dan's Sophismata. Translated with an Introduction and a Philosophical Commentary by G.E. Hughes, Philosophical Books 25, 13-15.

1984a

'Geulincx' karakterisering van relationele predikaten en van voegwoorden' in Academiae Analecta: Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgii!, Klasse der Letteren 46, Brussel, 71-89.

1984b

'Geulincx' regels voor een goed verstaander' in Flores Debitorum: Opstel/en over recht en ethiek, aangeboden aan RA. V. van Haersolte. Zwolle.

xvi

1985

'Berkeley's betekenisleer', Wijsgerig

oectief, 26, 57-62.

1985a

'Stanislaus of Znaim (d. 1414) on 1ruth and Falsity' in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L.M. de Rijk.

Nijmegen, 313-38. 1985b

'Een wijsgerig pleidooi voor de studie der klassieke talen' in M.A. Wes (ed.), Van Pantheon tot Maagdenhuis. Moet het gymnasium blijven?, Amsterdam, 125-41.

1985c

Book Review of: A. Broadie: George Lokert, Late-Scholastic Logician, Vivarium 23, 154-56.

1986

'Restrictieve en niet-restrictieve betrekkelijke bijzinnen. Uit de geschiedenis van een onderscheiding', Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing 8, 241-50.

1987 1987a

'Alfred Jules Ayer' inKritisch Denkers Lexicon. Alphen aan de Rijn 'Voltrokken en beschreven predicering bij Ockham' in Ockham en Ockhamisten, Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch Society

for Medieval Philosophy 'Medium Aevum' on the Occasion of its lOth Anniversary, Leiden 10-12 September 1986. Nijmegen.

xvii

THE STRATEGY OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

W.E. Abraham

University of California

Santa Cruz

In a passage in the first chapter of his

Essay concerning human

understanding, John Locke writes (Par. 2):

"... he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect that either there is nb such thing as truth at all, or that mankind has no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it".

His words might well have been penned at the time of the Sophists in description of the course of pre-Socratic philosophy. Relying on the Eleatic style of argument, the most devastating to be devised by the Greeks, Gorgias of Leontini offered to show that the following three propositions were not true together: i) there exists a fundamental reality ("that which is" of pre-Socratic philosophy, to which everything else must be reduced); ii) such reality can be grasped by the human mind; iii) such reality can be communicated through language. The considerations which he advanced have been preserved for us by Sextus Empiricus (Sextus, Adversus mathematicos VII 65 et sqq), and in intent they were nothing less than a systematic assault on the very possibility of rational speculative metaphysics. His proofs threw philosophy into a crisis from which only Plato was to rescue it. The seeds of views such as this were latent in the very course of Greek philosophy. Between Thales' first use of cosmological thinking as a method of bringing conceptual clarity to the problem of change (and thereby promoting the

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idea of a naturalistic and internally unified cosmos) and the time of Gorgias, every possibility of cosmological philosophy had been canvassed. Some views, including that of Thales himself, conceived the world in terms of a single type of fundamental substance; others favored a basis of finitely many fundamental substances; several opted for indefinitely or even infinitely many. A few, with all the alternatives as to the number of basic substances exhausted, sought to oppose the current views by rejecting their common assumption, namely that change as opposed to invariance was what was philosophically problematic. This iconoclastic position (authored by Heraclitus) in one sweep turned philosophy upon its head; it was itself to provoke a prompt and equally dramatic rejoinder, which ironically bracketed Heraclitus with his predecessors in their common assumption of the possibility of change. This Eleatic and fifth kind of view argued the incoherence of the very idea of change. Now with Gorgias and in general the Sophists, what was discarded was, once more, not a partisan assumption distinguishing one school of philosophy or another, but an assumption indeed common to all the previous philosophical positions including cosmological ones, anti-cosmological ones like those of Anaximander and Heraclitus, and indeed Eleatic views as well. Gorgias in fact rejected the assumption of the viability of any search for the fundamental constitution of reality. In other words, he denied the possibility of rational

speculative metaphysics. The theoretical principles underlying that wholesale rejection form the burden of Gorgias of Leontini's arguments. To meet this challenge and at the same time reinstate the practice of philosophy as previously known and conducted, an argued and full response was undoubtedly required, a response not the inferior of the attack in subtlety, and its clear superior in compellingness. A response of this description was by no means to be elaborated by Socrates, and it in fact fell to Plato's lot to devise. He was called upon to design a strategy of argument which was completely new. Unfortunately, his genius in this has many times been clouded, not only in what he is frequently supposed to have borrowed from Socrates and gone on to extend, but also in the nature of the philosophical perception with which he has often been saddled. I shall address myself briefly to both charges the better to clarify what I take to be Plato's true strategy in the face of Gorgias' barrage.

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1. Socrates' interests

Socrates' reaction to the artifices of the Sophists was aimed at the restoration of absolute norms in place of their relativistic and, he would surely say, opportunistic naturalism. His response did not establish any general style of argument, and certainly not one calculated to re-establish the possibility of speculative philosophy; nor could it design its general course of development, as was the case before the Sophists. Socrates' motives and aims were not even theoretical, but instead were eminently practical: viz., the safeguarding of society from the depredations of those who recognized no intrinsic right or wrong. From the viewpoint of theory, his very procedure suffered from a measure of question begging. Had not Gorgias argued the absence of any absolute reality which we could intellectually grasp as well as linguistically communicate? How then could the reality of absolute moral and a esthetic norms come to be asserted except on the basis of arguments which are free of any ignoratio elenchi? Instead of such arguments, however, Socrates contented himself with assertion and reiteration, resting both on a bed of appeals to common parlance. Hardly ever is he portrayed as vigorously examining alternatives which might not appear to require any absolute realities in order to explain the possibility of normative terms. It was Aristotle (Metaphysics A6, 987b, 1-10) who first attributed to Socrates

the promotion of the "What is X?" question, and recognized in that promotion a putative interest in defmitions. He further imputed to Plato the extension of Socrates' practice beyond the normative ethical and aesthetic terms (to which Socrates had usually but in fact not always restricted himself), to epistemology and other sectors of Plato's theory of forms. The argument of this paper will also show that Plato's goal was not the defmition of terms at a11 1. Indeed, nothing less than a philosophical confrontation of Gorgias would restore the credibility of philosophy; and such a confrontation could not well take the form of a mere Socratic elenchus addressed to Gorgias' premises nor of dogged cavilling at his logic; for even if such questioning and cavilling were successful, the success would be purely ad hominem. On the other hand once Gorgias had indicated the way to raise deep doubts concerning the possibility of speculative philosophy, the suspicion would linger that a better conceived and superbly delivered coup de grtice was only a matter of diligence and time. It was not Gorgias' utterances as such nor even their practical consequences which constituted a danger to philosophy: the greatest danger lay in the very spirit

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which he exhibited and nurtured. It was that spirit which now needed to be eradicated; its radical threat called for a radical response. Aristotle's very manner of describing the relation between Socrates' pursuit and Plato's theory of forms obscures the deep difference between the two men. This difference and, indeed, the limited character of Socrates' interest as suggested by the range of terms which he explored2, are better brought out not by a comparison of the territory which they individually covered, but by a comparison of their aims and their methods. Socrates did have a deep and abiding interest in confuting the Sophists, and his motivation was the service and well-being of his fellow Athenians. He feared that unless the Sophists were decisively answered, their practice could, would indeed, gravely threaten society: unscrupulous persons, armed with rhetorical and eristic skills, would be able to marshal opinion behind themselves, make codes of conduct which respected no intrinsic right or wrong hold sway, and legitimize such modes of behavior as are in fact wrong. As Socrates tirelessly insisted, the morality of an action could not be determined by counting heads or by establishing a consensus; for moral ascriptions were objective claims, and were properly made or judged only by those possessing the requisite knowledge. It is altogether fitting that this his fervent contention should have been restated in those dialogues set for his last days. How, however, was Socrates to turn this belief into a refutation of the Sophists? Surely, any procedure which he had for doing this must constitute all the objective ground which there can be for Aristotle's assertion concerning Socrates' interest in definitions and Plato's extension of them. There actually are two steps in Socrates' procedure: the first is his identification of types of terms which he considered to be ascriptive, and whose warranted use he considered to require expert knowledge; the second is his inference of an objective reference for them which is independent of our personal or collective wishes, and is the principal objective factor in the correctness of our imputations, Both steps are abundantly illustrated in dialogues like Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, and Hippias Major.

If both steps were carried out with plausibility,

they would engender some doubt regarding the Sophists' denial of the existence of independent realities which we are able to know and also communicate through language. In the attempt to achieve this, Socrates paid particular attention to those terms which were not merely descriptive but also appraisive - including those of ethics, those of aesthetics, those involved in prognostications, in predictions, and in estimates concerning likely effects; roughly, terms whose 4

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language ascription can be said to require more than opportune perceptions and a grasp of vocabulary and syntax. Such terms are paraded in Theaetetus in the course of Plato's refutation of relativistic empiricism. Their use requires wisdom and involves intellectual operations. Thus, according to the protagonist, Socrates in that dialogue, not everyone can tell whether a ship would ride out a storm, whether a certain grape harvest will make a good year in wine, or the outcome of some culinary preparations, just as not everyone knows the prognosis for some affliction, or whether some occurence will prove advantageous; nor, indeed, Socrates adds, whether some conduct is honorable or dishonorable. The difference can be expressed perhaps somewhat conservatively by saying that according to the Sophists there was an irreducible conventional basis in all knowledge, which involved not just the agreement in use presupposed in a common language, but more especially agreement in assertion and belief; and that truth and correctness in judgement could not exceed this. Socrates, on the other hand, would claim that there were assertions, to whose truth and correctness agreement was irrelevant, and whose entire conventional feature lay only in the use of a common language. Socrates held that terms of the kind in view signified corresponding unities, which were invariant in every ascriptive use of terms (e.g., Euthyphro SD; Channides 159A; Laches 190D, 192A-B; Lysis 222E; Hippias Major 2870; Meno

710). It was not on account of the individual nor on account of some consensual

action that the terms were able to signify, or that the unities which they signified were available. There is not as yet (and not until Cratylus) any suggestion that this is the character of all categorematic terms. By Socrates' inference, the uses signified objective predication, with regard to which the unities served as patterns and as bases for the evaluation of truth-value (Euthyphro 6D). It is even suggested here, as also at Hippias Major 288A and 292C, that these unities are entitative; there are also hints of their metaphysical causativeness (Hippias Major 287C, 288A, 300A; Euthyphro 6D; Meno 72E), a point which would explain the appropriateness of their serving as patterns of objective predication. At Laches 190A-C, Socrates added that a full grasp of the unities would enable ns to communicate them, and to bring about the corresponding cognitive state in those under our tutelage. The clarification offered in Sophist (229E-230E) about the purpose of the Socratic elenchns completes the picture. The ultimate aim in all of this was the attainment of moral improvement, and the elenchus served to strip false confidence and erroneous beliefs concerning morality as a necessary preparation for the grasp of truth. Virtue is teachable! 5

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The point of Socrates' persistent question about the teachability of virtue becomes clear: if there was no school for virtue, it was only because those who might have taught it had not yet purged themselves of their false beliefs, and had neither sought out that standard whereby ethical judgements were to be tested, nor had themselves realized what it was that they wished to tell of and induce in their ward. In the end, even for Socrates, either virtue is teachable, or the elenchus prepared the ground for absolutely nothing. The importance of the two steps in Socrates' procedure cannot be exaggerated. The ascriptive use of certain terms involves a reference to objective unities which call for specific knowledge. Pronouncements on matters involving such unities are accordingly trustworthy only when left to those with the appropriate expertise. If Socrates is right, the Sophists cannot be wholly right.

2. Plato's needs

Clearly, there is little in all of the above which Plato can be considered to have borrowed or extended, except possible intimations of the idea of an objective and independent reference for categorematic expressions husbanded in full in

Cratylus, a notion to be discussed in what follows. The principal point is that Plato's motivation was theoretical, and the scope of his enquiry covered all of language, and not merely those terms which interested Socrates. At Pannenides 135, Plato cautions that if we reject the existence of absolute forms or, granting their existence, deny their knowability by the human mind (shades of Gorgias of Leontini!), we would in consequence be destroying the significance of all discourse, in other words, the possibility of language, and with it that of philosophy (cp. Sophist 260). In other words, Plato was concerned not with an enthousiastic and ebullient extension of Socrates' practice as Aristotle suggested, but with something that seemed to him to be the central question, the question of the nature of discourse and the condition of its possibility. The difference between this and Socrates' investigation of terms is surely poorly conceived as one of extent, nor is there really anything about Socrates' investigation of terms which could intimate a theory such as Plato's theory of forms, if conceived as the transcendental presupposition of the possibility of language and thought. Indeed, the difference in method and level of argument is profound. Socrates induced his discussants to concede that certain terms were used of each of 6

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language

several subjects in a synonymous rather than homonymous manner. This concession he usually secured by examples and analogies. No proofs were offered, nor was his exetasis, basanismus, or elenchus suited to constructive proof. His piecemeal approach could not lead to a general theory of the conditions of meaning. None of the accounts given of Socrates by his contemporaries, including Aristophanes, Euripides, and Xenophon (but not Aristotle, who was not a contemporary and did not know him) indicate otherwise. In truth, Socrates' method is one of those which Plato brought under the general rubric "en ergois", and deprecated in Phaedo. By contrast, the dialogues devoted to the construction of Plato's own theory, to its evaluation, and to its restatement abound in argument, among them some of the most subtle in philosophy. The second charge to be repelled is that Plato's philosophy of language consists in his mistaken assimilation of general terms to proper names. The idea is that, believing proper names to acquire significance by designating name bearers, and, being somewhat at a loss to understand conditions of meaning for general terms, he proceeded to treat the two kinds of terms in a parallel manner: a commonplace of Plato exegesis has it that the theory of forms is the invention of name-bearers for general terms to designate. It is presumably to disguise the implausibility of his invention that he put the new singular objects in a nonmaterial world. Since the aim of this sort of account is to show that Plato was confused over the difference between the two kinds of terms, there surely is a peculiar difficulty in giving it clear expression. In order to employ the name bearer model of meaning for proper names for the purpose of explicating the semantics of general terms, it is surely necessary to recognize a prima facie difference between the two kinds of terms. How could the initial perceived difference have been formulated in the first place, superficial though it may subsequently be declared to be? Would it not have been that proper names had significance by applying to proprietary name bearers, whilst there was a difficulty in conceiving the mode of significance of general terms in a similar way, that is, in terms of proprietary name bearers? Any assimilation of general terms to proper names along such lines would destroy all perceived difference between proper names and general terms as tenns. Any difference which may now be discovered, say between the types of entity which they designate would not relate to them as linguistic terms, but would relate instead, and with irrelevance to the tenns themselves, to the remarkable ability of certain entities to escape the particularizing confmement of space, time, and the senses. This distinction would surely be purely ontological, and would 7

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have no bearing on the explanation of the different modes in which proper names and general terms are used, a difference which underlies any minimum conception of the two sorts of terms, and whose irreducibility, as will be argued, is a foundation of Plato's theory of forms. The alleged assimilation, even if ever historical, would hardly have survived Sophist, in which predication is clarified and distinguished from identity. The notion of predication may not be easy to explain satisfactorily and, indeed, there is a little evidence that even the Stoics conceived Eleatic questions as simply highlighting problems regarding predication. Even so, any view which makes Plato assimilate general terms to proper names and, in consequence, predication to identity, must either deny that Plato held to that assimilation beyond Sophist or collapse in face of that dialogue.

3. Plato's response

Even a radical response to Gorgias and the Sophists in general such as Plato contemplated was still bound to begin from some initial position. Such a position could not merely be one left uncontested by Gorgias or other Sophists, but one which it would be impossible for them or anyone else successfully to contest. For such an initial position, only the fact of language would be feasible, for challenges to the fact of language are alone inescapably self-stultifying. The fact of thinking, which impressed Descartes, would not have been so secure a starting place, since Gorgias himself, or anyone else who cared to do so, could deny that Gorgias' arguments were devised by him by taking thought, and could allege that they were the message of a revelation of the Muses, like Parmenides' Way of

Truth. Hence, even if such revelations were to contain the truth, human reason would still not have been shown to be capable of uncovering it or of appreciating it when declared to it. By such a ruse, a Sophist could allege the impotence of reason before truth, a ruse which Descartes too was subsequently forced to confront in his wrestling with the devil. In the case of Plato, however, there is an additional consideration. For him, thinking was no more than a dialogue held by the soul with itself, and should be said by implication not to take place in the absence of language (Sophist 260, Theaetetus 189). In fact, Plato linked the conditions for the possibility of language with those for the possibility of thinking in just this way, when he claimed at Pannenides 135B-D that a total rejection of the existence of forms would not only spell the

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complete destruction of the significance of all discourse, but would also leave us with nothing on which to fix our thoughts. To parlay the impregnable fact of language into the restitution of philosophical inquiry, two questions in particular seem indicated: one, whether there are philosophical presuppositions of the possibility of language, the other whether there are philosophical consequences of the fact of language. The proof of the former would generate transcendental arguments, while the proof of the latter would generate metaphysical arguments. In combination, they would constitute Plato's proof of the reality and explanatory power of forms. He would argue that forms are necessary for the possibility of language, and since the reality of language is undeniable, so is that of forms; he would also argue that forms explain how terms become general (one over many). Now, Aristotle in Metaphysics A9, 990b gives a summary account of the different arguments used in support of Plato's theory of forms. His "one over many" argument in fact corresponds to the metaphysical argument, just as his "argument from the existence of the sciences" can be represented as particularizations of the transcendental argument. The rest relate to difficulties in expounding the theory, and in deciding which terms designate forms. Plato otherwise does not argue from the many to the one; he typically reminds his audience that they have been in the habit of postulating (not deducing) forms for general terms. Thus, at Republic 507B (cp also Phaedo lOOB) we have as follows:

"-we say of many beautiful things and of many good things that each is, and thus distinguish them in our speech. -We do indeed. Besides, we speak of goodness itself and beauty itself; and thus of all the things that we pronounced as many, we come back and pronounce the idea in each case as a single being, and lay each down as that which is".

As the so-called argument from sciences, Plato does not argue in the first

place that forms are required if knowledge is to be possible. This would even seem to beg the question against scepticism.

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4. The idea of the minimum structure of language

The first step towards a determination of the philosophical presuppositions or consequences of language is the formulation of some account of the nature of language. Plato says as much in Sophist 260 when in the face of the threat to the possibility of discourse he proposes a need for agreement on the nature of discourse. Programmatic requirements compel a recasting of this as the fixing of the minimum structure of language in association with an adequate reductionist thesis. The determination of the philosophical presuppositions and consequences entailed in such a minimum structure should be much simpler. If such presuppositions and consequences should possess a valency which reaches through the whole of language, then they would belong to language as such.

5. The nature of language

The inquiry into the nature of language falls into two parts: the fust deals with the general question how meaningful expressions are possible, while the second presents an essentially reductionist analysis of language. Plato broaches the first in a disquisition about "onomata", a Greek expression customarily rendered in English as "names", but in fact a term for which, as Professor Richard Robinson2 has shown, there is no good single word equivalent in the English language. In the present dialogue, Cratylus, it covers singular terms as well as general terms, and in general includes categorematic terms. I shall render it, for short, as "term". The initial discussion of the conditions for meaning for terms is summarized at

Cratylus 383-390A, where it is laid out in relation to four views. Two broad alternatives are actually involved in the four views, one purely conventionalist and the other objectivist; two additional views are tluown in in order to explain the reason or occasion for conventionalist theories of language. These discussions do not relate to the lexical content of different languages, or even of the same language, for as Plato observed in the Seventh Letter (342B), "nothing prevents the things that are now called curved from being called straight, and those now called straight curved; and those who have transposed the expressions, and use them in the opposite way, will fmd them no less stable than they are now". The discussions relate rather to the ground of the meanings of terms, and not at all

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The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language to their idiolectic identity. The well known passage in Aristotle's De Interpre-

tatione (16A) succinctly presents the idea: "the reason for the introduction of the qualification by convention is that nothing is a term by nature, being such only when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds like those emitted by brutes, are indeed significant, yet none of these constitutes a term". The first of the four views is defended by Cratylus himself, and its gravamen is that no idea of convention can fully explain the meaningfulness (as opposed to the meanings) of terms, and it is necessary to suppose an independent and objective basis for their meaningfulness. This objective basis is independent of our

will as of our particular constitution, and it is invariant and universal to all languages, whether Greek or foreign (383B). The second view, diametrically opposed to the first, is imputed to Hermogenes: it founds the meaningfulness of terms on convention, personal will and habit, in a manner which denies terms any objectively constant or independent nature. Both the third and the fourth views, respectively epistemological and metaphysical, do not directly relate to the ground of the meaningfulness of terms, and are only introduced by Plato as theses which, if correct, would make a conventionalist philosophy of language inescapable.

The epistemological thesis claims not merely the relativity of the basis of any claim to knowledge to such faculties as are possessed by the knowing subject, but in fact pronounces the very objects of knowledge themselves to be relative to the knowing subject, a sort of subjective idealism of the object of knowledge. Imputed to Protagoras, it is fraught with dire consequences for the nature of terms and language. By implication of the semantic view of meaning, an implication elaborated in the first part of Theaetetus, Plato will argue that this epistemological view in effect makes language logically private (to use the idiom of Wittgenstein), and is consequently destructive of all language (183). Even more extreme than this epistemological view in its consequences is the metaphysical view, for it conjointly ascribes all properties at once to all things (a sort of corruption of Anaxagoras). By thus adding implicational relations between predicates, it effectively deprives them of determinacy, and, in consequence, determinateness. This view is attributed to Euthydemus. Their full refutation is reserved for other dialogues, in particular Theaetetus.

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Plato proceeds to reject three of these views; and even the first, which is the preferred view, coincides with Plato's view only when properly interpreted. Plato himself rejects two of its co=on interpretations in Cratylus, a dialogue which is perhaps best treated as a propaedeutic in Plato's present enterprise of the restoration of philosophy. The refutations which it contains are only su=ary versions of arguments more extensively developed elsewhere. (Thus, the two interpretations of Hermogenes' conventionalist thesis are only given short shrift in the present dialogue). The flrst co=on interpretation would make terms meaningful on the basis of a personal flat. Thus, I could decide to call a man horse and a horse man; were I to suppose that I had thereby brought it about

either that men are horses and horses men, or that "man" would now signify horse and "horse" man, I should be merely deluded (385). This point is not in any

way contradicted by the passage quoted above from the Seventh Letter. That observation related to the nomenclature of a language, while the present discussion relates not to nomenclature but to semantic import. The second, and social, interpretation of the conventionalist view is indeed the more common (433E), and Plato recognizes two versions of it, depending on whether the term "convention" is taken to refer to mere custom or to a specific agreement (384D; 383A, 434-5). In both modes, it is rejected. A distinction should always be held between "meaningfulness" and "meaning". Indeed, nothing above is meant to suggest that it is by sheer chance that terms have meaning (397A, 420B), or to deny that personal flat, custom, and specific agreement have anything to do with language. Each has a role in the makeup of linguistic phenomena. These roles relate, however, to lexical matters which, in the present context, must be deemed to be comparatively superficial. They throw little light on the nature of language, which is the goal of theory. They are not sources of that correctness (orthot€s onomat6n) or right nature which Plato perceives to be required for language and which constitutes the goal of his theory (397A). It is easy to place crude construes on the claim that terms have meaning by

nature and not by convention. Plato himself took care to exclude some of the grossest travesties of interpretation. This claim that language has a true and invariant nature is not intended to refer to the fact that its spoken expressions are always collections of sounds which are produced by reliance upon natural organs of speech rather than, say, a flute, and upon which we, for the rest, impose some conventions of utterance (383A). Nor does it postulate some universal

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The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language language - an Adamic language - innate in us, and which perhaps ought not to vary regionally or dialectally even in its voiced expressions (cf 429A-433C). Also paraded are other equally mistaken though less crude interpretations, which somewhat surprisingly can be clustered together under the rubric of "the nature theory", a rubric commonly taken to designate a primitive view of meaning allegedly adopted by Plato. The mildest form of this so-called nature theory is that terms are meaningful only by virtue of reflecting their etymology, and are thus meaningful by nature. Thus, the name "Hermogenes" would have the etymological meaning "offspring of Hermes". Such a view would make it possible to claim, as Plato humorously remarks, that Hermogenes is known by a misnomer in light of his parlous circumstances (384C, 429C)! Of course, it is not through attribution, in the manner of so-called description theories of proper names, that proper names signify; and, in any case, any such etymological theory would surely pose a question concerning the ground of meaning of the etymological roots themselves. Re-iterated appeals to even deeper etymological roots, however protracted the tracking, would in practice terminate in roots whose own ground of meaningfulness would not be etymologically displayed. It is this very exigency which leads to a further and more dramatic, but

hardly desired interpretation of Plato's thesis. This is the idea that the source of meaningfulness of the primitive roots, and so their correctness, resides in onomatopoeic affinity, a claim which is indeed defended by Cratylus, while it is, as I shall argue, opposed by Plato. The primitive roots, stoicheia (422AB), would relate to the oldest terms (421D, 425A,E), and would adumbrate the universal proto-history of language. Richard Robinson (ibid.) was indeed correct in denying that in Cratylus, Plato is proposing a historical account of names. The reason for this should however be seen in the fact that Plato himself correctly described the laboriously spun onomatopoeic conceit, which fills so much of that dialogue, to be "truly wild and ridiculous" (426B). It cannot be missed that this so-called nature theory, which Cratylus espouses, and from which he draws the altogether appropriate conclusion that a term is either correct and truly onomatopoeic or not a term at all, is precisely what Plato argues against, when Socrates is made to confute Cratylus (429A-433C). Why, though, would a view which is not held by Plato have been discussed at such inordinate length? The reason is that the view has a certain bewitchment, and appears, just like the description theory of proper names, to offer a limpid explanation of the ability of terms to mark things, not simply by tagging them, but by distinguishing them objectively according to their own nature: the appeal 13

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to the onomatopoeic affinity of terms - to what one might call their isomorphic semantic counterparts - seemed to explain not only the meanings of terms, but also the reason for their ability to convey information, and our ability to learn, understand, and use language (387B,C; 396A,422C-E). In this account, meaning would be founded on reference. This view seemed vastly superior to that of Hermogenes, which recognized conventions as the only basis for meaning (433E434A), and was unable to explain how language was able to connect to the world at all; for the instituting of conventions itself requires a pre-existing and functioning language. Like Hermogenes' view, this view is naturalistic; but unlike Hermogenes', its greater apparent explanatory power justifies the thoroughness of its development and the necessity of its methodical refutation on the part of Plato, a refutation reaching far beyond his apt observation that many expressions derived from custom, agreement, or in general convention, have meaning even though they are not in the slightest degree onomatopoeic or iconic. The Sophists gave impetus to investigations of language, not only with a view to using it with persuasive effect, but also in order to sever it from any invariant metaphysical reality apt to obstruct their rejection of all knowable absolute reality. This second interest encouraged speculations concerning the origins of language. For Plato's purpose, a distinction between genetic accounts of language and accounts of its necessary and invariant character was all too important. The speciousness of the nature theory lay in its postulation of a genetic yet invariant character. The truth is that Plato's own view is not genetic in the least. What is required is not a naturalistic view of language. His claim that language has an objective and independent nature is based on an assimilation between terms and instruments. The crucial idea in this is that of function, such that nothing can be an instrument without possessing a function. It is true that we may, for example, use a sledge hammer to crack a nut without our thinking that a sledge hammer is an instrument for nut cracking. It would clearly be silly to suppose that on account of this success we could say that the function of a sledge hammer is the cracking of nuts. But, since we can so use a sledge hammer, we can equally well say that on the occasion of use we had given it that function. It served a function (=use), which was not its proprietary or true function (=purpose). Things can be given, and made to serve functions which are not their function. Plato's claim should be a truism: where there are no functions, there are no instruments. We can obviously ignore cases of perverted use, inappropriate use, or misuse, just as we can ignore irrational wishes. Although a knife made of ice would be useless for the purpose of a butcher wishing to use it in his shop, it is not his

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The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language purpose but the qualities of the ice knife which would render it unfit. Besides, irrational wishes are not purposes. As to purposes, they are always subordinated to the objective features which make things adaptable. It is to the qualities which make for a cutting instrument that the forger looks in fashioning a knife, and it is such qualities which permit purposes at all. Thus, one may purchase a table knife with the wish or even desire, but not the purpose, of using it to ride the surf. When Plato's carpenter who wishes to make a shuttle looks to that which is naturally fitted to be a shuttle (389A), what he looks to is hardly any transcendent form; rather, he looks to the idea which anyone wishing to craft a shuttle should have, and about which some of us could be in error. In Cratylus, Plato's idea of the knife or the shuttle would include general features; for example, it would require the idea of a sufficiently strong material without specifying wood or iron. The tool maker proceeds to embody the idea as appreciated by him in wood or iron. Because Plato aims at a unitary account which would apply to all categorematic terms (or what he calls "onomata"), irrespective of the diversity of languages, his account of terms is neither of categorematic expressions nor even of ideal terms, but applies rather to the idea of a categorematic term. Something of the same procedure was followed by Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus when he urged that "the real name is that which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common" (3.3411) or "the essential in a symbol is that which all symbols which can fulfill the same purpose have in common" (3.341). The aim, with Plato as with Wittgenstein, was to obtain results which are determinative of all actual languages, and thereby achieve general results about languages without empirical familiarity with all of them.

The claim is that nothing, whether natural or artificial, can be an instrument or have a function unless it has an objective and independent nature which fits it for the function in question. The aptness between instrument and function depends on the independent properties of the would-be instrument. The function is parasitic on just such antecedent properties. The function does not create the properties, although it makes clusters of them apt. This is clear in the case of artifacts. In this case, we give them their characteristics in order that they can have their function; they do not have their function in order that they can achieve their characteristics. The order of dependence is from characteristics to function. As with artifacts, so with nature. The functions of things or processes presuppose their properties, their properties do not presuppose their functions. 15

W.E. Abraham The next step in Plato's argument is his assimiliation of language to instruments, and this would require an objective nature both in language and in the objects to which it is directed, and which constitute its semantic dimensions: "But if neither of them < Protagoras and Euthydemus > is right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all things at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence; they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature (386D-E)".

Similarly, an objective and independent nature would be required in those resources of lexicon and syntax, which make the instrumentality of language apt and effective (389c,b). Is language an instrument? According to Plato, it is an instrument for giving information and for distinguishing things in accordance with their own nature (388b). The problem here is not the inanity of the analogy which Wittgenstein was subsequently to charge in Philosophical Investigations; for not even his own analogy between language segments and games denies the instrumentality of language; it denies instead any and every claim to the effect that there is a unitary and essentialist cluster of features, which characterize any and every language, and constitutes them into language. That games are not essentially instruments (although they could be) is quite beside the point. It is true that language is not a manufacturing or productive instrument, but then neither are legal instruments. It is an instrument of communication, even though it is better thought of as a cluster of means rather than a unitary instrument, if only because what is accomplished with it (excepting its perlocutionary effects) is not a physical state of affairs.

What is problematic in Plato's position is the insistence on its being a means for giving infonnation and for distinguishing things according to their own nature.

In other words, he identifies in language only a statement-making function. This move has always been the bane of semantic philosophies of language, and unless the claim is supplemented with a reduction and an analysis, the versatility of function and use which language permits would be completely lost. Wittgenstein ( op. cit.) made this point; and well before him George Berkeley made the same point. As the latter expressed it in the introductory section of The Principles of Human Knowledge:

16

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language

"Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language ...".(par.20) The same kind of caution was, as is only too well known, to dominate John Austin's work in the philosophy of language. Meanwhile, if language is a cluster of means, then it must meet whatever objective conditions are necessary for success. It must itself have the objective nature correlated with the satisfaction of those conditions. It is beside the point that there can be, and there indeed are, a variety of languages, every one of which must ipso facto be deemed to have met objective conditions, whatever they may be. The diversity of languages does not itself deny the unity of the objective nature of language any more than the diversity of species would deny the unity of their genus. The unitary nature comprises what is common in the full accounts of all languages, and must specify such universal features of languages as are not due to custom, agreement, or other convention, and is unchangeable by themtrue language universals. In Plato's view that without an initial fund of categorematic terms for distinguishing things and conveying information, none of the functions which language makes possible would be attainable, he was in fact putting forward the frrst extensive proposal for a semantic philosophy of language in which the notion of truth is basal. Truth is that relation which makes the linguistic map of reality possible. Without it, language would have no connection with reality, and would be irrelevant to it. Without it, nothing would be distinguished or conveyed, and there would be no linguistic expression of meaning. One should say that, according to Plato, the assertoric function, that function which is directly linked with the notion of truth, is the fundamental one in language. Without it, those putative languages in which it is only possible to give commands or only possible to ask questions would hardly be languages, although they could be means of communication - like the barking of a dog. All those parsimonious thought experiments involving language games that Wittgenstein promoted clearly derive all

17

W.E. Abraham

of their substance and coherence from the far richer language in which they are envisaged. In our own century, diverse reasons familiar to philosophers have been advanced in favor of a semantic approach to the philosophy of language. Thus, in this vein, some contemporary philosophers, like Michael Dummet (1973) 3, have presented considerations which treat truth as a motive and ideal of language in a manner which no other purpose of its use can be, and have argued that if people were not able to or did not represent themselves as telling the truthphilosophically as making assertions - no linguistic communication would be possible at all. Indeed, unless answers could be communicated as answers, and so assertions made, there could not even be a conception of questions, for questions are by correlation a search for answers; nor commands, for these presuppose the possibility of a conception of states of affairs which are describable as the fulfilling of commands, or nothing would have been commanded. For an analogous reason, there could be no conception of any other illocution or perlocution. Ostensive teaching itself, and in the end language acquisition, would not be possible, for ostensive teaching clearly presupposes the possibility of assertion. "Dog!", uttered in the context of ostensive teaching and accompanied by the appropriate gesture, must surely be equivalent to the ordinary assertorial utterance of some such sentence as "this is a dog" in order that the learner can grasp the intended lesson. Even vocabulary acquisition would hardly be possible without presupposition of syntactic place and semantic use. Could words be words if they lacked a place in possible sentences, and would sentences be sentences if

they lacked illocutionary use? In a similar manner, the vocative case would be unintelligible, and would degenerate into non-linguistic causality but for its presupposition of the nominative case. Surely, the idea of syntax could not be subsequently imparted, and only a being endowed with the idea of grammar could acquire vocabulary. In a more pragmatic vein, W.V. Quine4, too, has observed that the systematic investigation of sentence use must cut through the Gordian knot of those possible motives, intentions and purposes which are factors in illocutionary force. It has sometimes been objected that in making the notion of truth basic in the

philosophy of language, a semantic account, such as Plato's does not automatically render assertion basic, for, it is maintained, semantics is independent of illocutionary force. It is true that there cannot be a general counection between what a sentence means and the illocutionary force of its utterance, for any given sentence can, without change of meaning or grammatical mood, be uttered with a

18

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language variety of illocutionary intent and force. Even so, it is not a consequence of this that assertion is not primary. It only follows that a semantic theory of language carmot link truth with any particular mood or sentence form (e.g., the indicative) without further ado. A second consequence is that there is no general reason why any sentence of any form cannot be said to have truth value, even when the illocutionary force of its utterance is other than assertorial. But the reason why this is so is that any sentence of any form can be used to make an assertion! Moreover, it is an irrelevant consideration that a formal semantics for sentences of all moods can be devised without regard to the diversity of illocutionary force. Values, in other words, arbitrarily chosen entities, can always be paired with them under algorithmically stated circumstances. But in order to assimilate such arbitrarily chosen values to truth and falsity an interpretation is always required, and, in every case except assertion, considerable argument as well. Simply to call such values in formal semantics truth values is somewhat tendentious. Not only, however, does Plato demand truth-value for assertions in connection with the distinguishing of things and the giving of information,he also seems to demand truth-value or its analogue for even the categorematic constituents of propositions (385B-C). On this point, there is little merit in verbal cavilling; and indeed by the time of Sophist (263), he had reached a different formulation, demanding only of propositions that they have a truth-value, and of terms that they signify being (cp 260E). What he seeks in Cratylus appears to be semantic

conditions for these constituent terms, a proposal which is indeed cardinal in any semantic philosophy of language, even though the reason offered by Plato in that dialogue (385C; an argument from whole to part) reeks of the fallacy of division. Without semantic conditions for onomata as well as propositions, there would be no language whatever. Surely, it is the fulfillment of such demands which saves human language from being purely perlocutionary communication, and gives to syntax all of its point. The above two ideas are crucial in the development of Plato's entire philosophy: the priority of the assertoric function and the necessity of semantic conditions for the constituent terms of the assertoric proposition. They carry intimations of Plato's theory of forms. The steps of the development of Plato's theory of forms and the complete rebuttal of the Sophists from these early intimations are very complex and immensely rich; and they can only be summarily sketched in the available remaining space. The acute problem at this point is to show how from the assertoric function alone all other illocutionary functions can be derived or explained. Plato makes

19

W.E. Abraham only a beginning in this. On the assumption of the adequacy of the assertion as the basic illocution, Plato postulates a further reduction in terms of the simple assertorial form. This reduced form is treated at its clearest in Sophist (especially 261D et sqq). Here two kinds of terms are distinguished: this time they are identified as "onomata" or referring nouns and "rhemata" or verbs (predicates). This distinction somewhat parallels the Fregeau distinction between objects and functions or concepts, if the Fregeau distinction is taken as a distinction of function rather than an ontological distinction. Names of "rhemata" are onomata, and rhemata are so designated only in the light of their function in the sentence. Thus, the Greek infinitive, "legein", is not a rhema but an onoma, much as subsequently, for Frege too, the concept "horse" was not a concept but an object. Plato notes that a proposition cannot consist of terms of just one type, whether nouns or verbs. Thus, neither of the sequences "lion stag horse" and "walks runs sleeps" expresses a proposition (262A-B). A proposition requires a combination of singular terms and verbs, in such a manner as to "fit together" (261D, 262C). The appropriate combination of one singular term and one verb constitutes "the simplest and briefest kind" < of proposition> . This describes a simple proposition of the sort which was to become the basis of Frege's own analysis of language in his philosophy of logic. The example which Plato gives is however not the best imaginable, and is better rendered not as the ambiguous "a man flies" but as his own variant, "Theaetetus flies". No discussion or explanation is offered for the notion of fit, or for that of simplicity. One gathers that the two sorts of term, which enter the simple proposition are of different logical types; and that their relation suggests to Plato the image of two objects, one with something of a recess into which the other might fit. This is essentially like Frege's own subsequent images of the fit between saturated and unsaturated terms, or between complete and incomplete expressions. One might almost say that the distinction as conceived by Plato is quite like that between an individual constant and a predicate function. In any case, the effect is to present the simple assertoric proposition as comprising not a string of terms, but their interlocking, an interlocking whose upshot is not a complex tenn of either of the interlocking types, nor their hybrid, but something which is not a term at all, and which can now be said to be true or false. In particular, as Plato says in the words of the Eleatic Stranger, "now it gives information about facts or events in the present or the past or the future. It does not simply name something, but by weaving together verbs with names, it

20

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language leads you somewhere; indeed, it is this combination that we mean by the expression 'statement'" (2620). As to simplicity, however, it does not appear that Plato had quite distinguished grammatical simplicity and psychological simplicity from logical simplicity. Thus, simplicity is linked with brevity in his mind (262C). In fact, however, the simplicity of sentences or propositions must always be conceived in relation to some intended method of combination. Thus, logicians think of elementary propositions or sentences in relation to the logical operators or connectives, for which complete metalogical rules are easily stated. In grammar, sentences are simple, relative to recognizable, although not fully catalogued, particles for forming complex and compound sentences or statements. These include standard conjunctions, but surely also relative pronouns like "who". Thus, Plato's example of "Theaetetus, to whom I am at this moment talking is flying" (263A) is not really a simple sentence but a compound one, viz." Theaetetus is flying, and I am talking to Theaetetus". To treat it as enunciating a simple proposition, it would have to be construed somewhat as "I am talking to flying Theaetetus". It would seem that in calling this an example of a simple enunciation (263C), Plato was only thinking of the standard conjunctions of grammar. Even so, there is no attempt on his part to offer a grammatical account of simplicity, or of the connectives for combining simple sentences or statements. A tacit assumption of the existence of such connectives is however present, as is the assumption that such connectives preserve truth value possession. Assuming favorable results for such a reduction and assuming the highly problematic association of the simple indicative sentence with the simple assertorial proposition, Plato proceeded to reduce the theory of meaning to the theory of meaning for the simple assertorial proposition; and this he expounded in terms of the conditions for generality. The need for a procedure like this can be crystally seen· in Russell's treatment of Frege's distinction. It is known that Frege's own attempt to attach metaphysical force to his distinction between object and concept or function was not successful. In Russell's gloss on the distinction, an attempt is made to shift the entire connotative load of a sentence onto the predicate or functional expression, and to leave the singular expression entirely non-connotative. This was indeed the deep reason for his proposals in his theory of definite descriptions; and the desire is notationally attained in the distinction between individual constants and predicates. The metaphysical counterpart of this distinction was Russell's idea of pure particulars, intended designata of entirely non-connotative logical proper names which are supposedly knowable

21

W.E. Abraham by acquaintance. On the supposition of Russell's austere account, one would say that in the propositional sentence the entire stating task is carried out by the predicate and not at all by the singular term. A predicate would then be seen as a would-be statement, a quasi-statement in search of a subject, something intrinsically incomplete. Conventional proper names would represent a convenient hybrid, which on a Fregean interpretation makes them equivalent, though not synonymous, with referentially occurring definite descriptions operating as practical pointers to designata of proper names, and, according to Frege, sharing with the names a mode of presentation. In the light of all this, it is matter of relative ease to point up Plato's further discussion of the philosophical nature of language. It can be focussed on the idea of generality which makes the predicate possible. It is in this way that the theory of forms comes to be about generality, or, if you wish, general terms. Plato's task is to determine the philosophical presuppositions of the possibility of general

terms, and also to determine the metaphysical consequences of their reality. How is he to proceed? First, what is it for a term to be general? This secured, the rest would be a matter of determining the necessary conditions which make the essential features of generality possible. The determination of such necessary conditions and the means of satisfying them would evidently constitute the transcendental philosophy of Plato. To carry the stating load, a predicate or general term must be determinate, or nothing as such is stated. Detenninateness is not the same as lack .of vagueness, for vagueness relates only to the scope of application of a term, which is already determinate. Only a term with a specific content can be vague, that is, used with vagueness. A general term must also be capable of univocal application. Aristotle in Categories noted different ways in which the same expression may occur in sentences: homonymously, paronymously, and synonymously. Only in the third manner does an expression occur with univocity or fixity of sense, when it is

used in an unchanged manner and sense of its subjects. All three modes of occurrence however require determinateness of sense, or they could not even be distingnished from one another. This versatility of occurrence is quite graphically captured in Frege's depiction of the incompleteness of the functional expression. Multiple applicability implies fixity or univocity, which implies determinateness, while determinateness implies negatability. It is this negatability or obverse of determinateness which prevents the scholastic transcendental terms from being properly regarded as general terms. The view attributed to Euthydemus in Cratylus clearly precludes the determinateness of general terms, and consequently impedes

22

The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language language. Plato will argue in Theaetetus that the subjectivist view attributed to Protagoras, if fully developed, precludes univocity and fiXity, and so impedes language. His contention should not be taken to be ad hominem. Indeed, the question is whether special assumptions are indispensable in order to guarantee the necessary features of generality. Would empiricists not deny all need for mystical assumptions, claiming that on the basis of our senses we do observe fairly durable percepts whose similarities and dissimilarities we likewise observe, and that (whether with abstraction or not) we devise general terms in conjunction with this ability, and accordingly apply such terms? One might note, as Socrates did note, that even with the ad hoc invocation of an aesthetic sense, a moral sense, and a mathematical sense, it would be difficult in such a view to explain our knowledge of the import of those classes of terms and our application of them especially when necessity is involved. To be sure, in a post-Platonic tradition reaching to our own day, empiricists have bitten the bullet (if not the dust) by propounding a variety of doctrines, some of which deny that aesthetic and moral terms are cognitive, being indicative only of the evincing of attitudes, a sort of Wittgensteinian emoting paralleling his suggestion of the utterance of pain language as the civilized man's alternative to crying; some empiricist developments even declare mathematical terms to represent higher reaches of empirical abstraction. Socrates appeared content with the (to him) prima facie implausibility of claims of thiS ilk. Plato's work required him, far from engaging in ad hominem disputation, to argue that empiricism, or what in this context he calls the inductive thesis, is destructive of some at least of the necessary features required for the possibility of generality, and in consequence destructive of the possibility of language and with it knowledge. Hence his repeated refutations of empiricism. The refutation of empiricism, and thus the proof of its incapacity to explain general terms, necessitated the establishment of an alternative theory. For this, Plato had no model to which to look, and was constrained to look to a consideration of method. In the discussion of method in the autobiographical sections of Phaedo, Plato makes a broad distinction between procedures which he calls

"en ergois" and "en logois" (97-100). The former propose explanations in

terms of facts-- and observations, giving accounts which are in re. "En logois" explanations on the other hand proceed in terms of antecedent postulates, and give ante rem accounts. The former are laborious, and the latter yield the socalled "lazy reason". Typical of "en ergois" accounts are explanations in terms of

23

W.E. Abraham physis or constituent nature (cp Aristotle's material cause), for example the explanation of why Socrates is recumbent in prison in terms of his sinews and bones and perhaps his nerve structure and their physical operation. To this group belong all those pre-Socratic cosmologies founded on the idea of a fundamental stuff, whether its substance was identified as with Anaximenes or unidentifiable, as with the atomists. So do all of us who might explain growth in terms of accretion and nutrient extraction from food. These are qualitative "en ergois" explanations. Quantitative "en ergois" explanations might explain the difference between two horses or Theaetetus' greater height then Socrates by a head. A head makes one horse longer, just as it makes Theaetetus taller. Such is the explanation of two as a combination of units. According to Plato, however, whether qualitative or quantitative, "en ergois" explanations offer as reasons what are only enabling conditions, without which the true explanations would not apply. Thus, without sinews and bones, the true reason why Socrates is in his recumbent position, namely his desire to continue a conversation with his friends, would not apply. Without sinews, he could not have adopted that posture. "En ergois" accounts not only meretriciously substitute enabling conditions for the true reasons or causes; they also ignore intentionality. They attend to that "why?" of things which only amounts to a "how?". Plato on the contrary demands that an explanation give such reason for its explicandum as would, relative to that reason, establish the conceptual necessity for the explicandum (Phaedo 97D-E). In other words, a satisfactory explanation should offer an account from which the phenomenon explained can be derived in accordance with principles of reasoning, which for him, were principles of necessary sequence. In this respect, empiricism was seen

as incompetent. The leading trail of his own theory was to be conjured from the very shambles to which he had brought empiricism. He would promote the opposite of each of those features which in his argument brought empiricism down. Empiricism had rooted itself in a basis of relativism by making perception relative to the senses we happen to have, and by making the quality of the individual's perception relative to the functioning of the individual's senses. This perceptual relativism had been coupled with a bid for empirical incorrigibility (as with Protagoras), and in Theaetetus Plato sought to drive it into a morass, which was to engulf the cognate object of perception. His own theory would in the first place be nonrelativist. Secondly, mere objectivity would be inadequate, for empiricists had been known to reach for objectivity through inter-subjectivity. Nothing less than an

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The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language absolutely conceived objectivity would do. Accordingly, the elements which Plato sought for the purpose of guaranteeing necessary features of general terms were to be assigned an underived objectivity, and constituted without dependence on our attaining faculties. Another idea which had caused problems for empiricism early in Theaetetus was the initial supposed complexity of the object of perception. This complexity a

parte rei permitted different observers simultaneously to perceive the same object differently. This same complexity was given a destructive role in Theaetetus in the refutation of empiricism. Initially, it seemed that complexity a parte rei was to be avoided in Plato's own theory, and he proceeded to do so. The elements of his theory were, thirdly, duly proclaimed simple. Plato was however unclear what simplicity should mean, and fatefully interpreted it to preclude quantitative complexity (plurality of parts) as well as qualitative complexity (plurality of features). As destruction was supposed to occur through decomposition into parts, these elements were held to be indestructible. Nor, fourthly, were they able to change since none of them spanned simultaneous or serial features. Fifthly, all of this together seemed to take the elements out of the sensible world, for they could not be disclosed to sense. Instead they were "intelligible" objects, knowable ouly to mind. These elements are none other than Plato's forms conceived in the manner of the early theory. Of course, this manner of conceiving the forms led to serious difficulties which are paraded and acknowledged in the first part of Parmenides. These difficulties, however, never did prompt Plato to reject the theory of forms, and even Aristotle does not give the impression of criticizing a theory which Plato had abandoned. We must remember Plato's own warning at Parmenides (35) that the theory could not very well be abandoned. What was called for in the light of the difficulties was a modification and refmement. The present phenomena consisted in the fact of language, and to Plato's mind the best hypothesis had been found for explaining and rendering the phenomena intelligible, and thus saving them. The statement of the difficulties in the first part of Parmenides was not Plato's last word, and they are tackled in a number of dialogues. In the second part of Parmenides itself, Plato argues that the concept of the absolutely simple of the sort called for in the early theory was incoherent, that one could not even say of a specified form conceived with that degree of simplicity that it was real. In Sophist, he expresses the necessity for an inner complexity in forms which would permit their interweaving. And, fmally, in Philebus, he reviews the earlier

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W.E. Abraham difficulties (15B) 4, and links "the identity of the one and the many" (cp. the fixity of the general term) with every single sentence ever uttered, past and present, in other words with language (lSD), and proclaims that he now possesses a solution (16). The full details of the argument sketched in this paper form the subject of another work.

NOTES

1. There is a certain obscurity about Aristotle's opinion here that Socrates had

neglected the world of nature as a whole, and sought the universal in ethical matters, making the search for definitions the chief intellectual pursuit (Euripides had said that the search for unchangeable nature was the chief business of the intellect), whilst Plato absorbed the Socratic teaching but directed the search for definitions to non-sensible entities. This would mean the ceding of the world to the Sophists and empiricists, whereas in this as in other areas Plato always sought to save the appearances by divining their rational anchor. 2. See Robinson (1969: 100). 3 Dummett (1973) and (1978). 4. See Quine (1978).

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THE ANATOMY OF THE PROPOSITION:

LOGOS AND PRAGMA IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE L.M. deRijk University of Leiden

Introductory This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the definition of the bearers of truth and falsity. In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the statementmaking expression and a number of key notions involved. Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of

pragma including that of being qua truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the

onomazein level as well as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's statement-making utterance. 1.

Plato's Semantics of the Statement-making Expression

1.1

Logos in Plato For Plato, a logos is a significative expression which consists of a name

(onoma) and an attribute (rMma) or names and attributes. From several passages of the dialogues1 it may appear that a logos is always a many-worded expression designating or describing some thing. Any onoma may be part of a logos and thus either functions as a 'name' i.e. a word which refers to an entity, or as an attribute which is added to another onoma, in which case it serves as a rhema. In fact, any logos itself consisting of those (two or more) onomata functioning as entity-referring or as descriptive elements respectively may be used also for 27

L.M. deRijk referring to an entity (e.g. 'leukos anthropos'in 'hode ho leukos anthropos' = 'this pale man') or descriptively (e.g. in 'Sokrates esti leukos anthr8pos' = 'Socrates is a pale man'). Indeed like an onoma, a logos may serve just to evoke tile notion of a thing and to bring it before our or the hearer's mind. One need not be surprised that basically the logos has the same function as its constituents, namely that of bringing something up for discussion by describing it in some way or another, just as in its larger sense of 'discourse' (or 'exposition' being the comprehensive notion which includes all sorts of 'statement') the logos was aptly compared with painting by Plato (Cratylus, 424D- 425A) 2 . When it comes to searching for the nature of the logos in Plato's semantics it is of paramount importance to be mindful of its etymology. 'Logos' derives from the root 'leg-'

which basically means 'to collect in an orderly way' 3 . So logos

always has the connotation of 'order' or 'ordering' which is (or should be) accomplished in a situation which initially appears somewhat confusing4 . As will be clear from our discussion of Plato's view of knowledge (see below, nr. 1.3) the logos plays an important role in the cognitive procedure by which one tries to recognize the harmonious structure of the things observed. Before entering into this matter, however, we must first deal with a misunderstanding concerning Plato's view of 'logos'. The word 'logos', it is true, may be used to stand for 'statement' but for Plato, 'statements' should certainly not be identified with an expression usually referred to by our 'S is P' formula. It seems worthwhile now to pay some attention to Plato's view of predication.

1.2

Plato's View of Predication Quite naturally, Plato is fully aware of the phenomenon of statement-making as

contra-distinguished with merely naming something. In this framework, an explanation of the opposition between the onomazein level and the legein level is called for which Plato discusses in Sophist 261C6 ff.5 . The onomazein level is the domain in which names (onomata) are used just to bring things of the outside world before our mind, while on the legein level it is complete statements that are in the focus of our interest. Accordingly for Plato, logos (which may act merely as an (compound) onoma, as we have indicated before) appears to have a dual characteristic in that it (a) is a specific combination of names and attributes which is to mirror a (supposed) parallel communion of forms, or (b) (eventually, viz. when acting on the legein level) functions as a statement-making expression and supplies information about what is or is not the case.

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Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle Well, considering the fact that a logos, too, may be used on the onomazein level it is easily seen that it is not the logos as such (qua merely a combination of onomata, one in onoma position, the other one(s) in rhema position6) that brings the legein level about. For there is no question of a legein level unless the logos concerned is a logos actually asserted by somebody (or, at least, one which is supposed to be actually asserted). In this connection, it is most significant that Plato explicitly claims that "no information is supplied about something that is or is not, until somebody combines an attribute (rhema) with a name (onoma)", and that the user of a logos brings about something complete and states something in weaving together an attribute with a name" (Sophist, 262C3-5 and 26202-5). For the rest, to be a logos it makes on the legein level no difference whether it is actually used by somebody in inward or outward speech7 • So Plato's recognition of the logos as a statement-making utterance is beyond doubt. However, as we have indicated before, to him, 'statement' is of a quite different nature from that expressed in the well-known 'S is P' formula. In Plato's view the logos is always a 'more-than-one-word-expression'8 which while remaining precisely one expression, is not split up into two (syntactically) diverse elements such as our 'subject' and 'predicate'. When used on the legein level a logos really is (in Plato's words, Theaetetus 190A5) a logos

eir~menos,

or 'a logos

actually asserted' (or 'said to obtain') in either inward (as at Theaet. 190A) or outward speech. When considered in its deep structure Plato's statement-making utterance should be viewed as being composed of a formula expressing a pragma preceded by the sentential functor, 'obtains' or 'is the case', so that a statement such as 'A man is righteous' is to be read: 'obtains : [man, righteous]', where both man and righteous stand for what Plato calls dynameis, i.e. participata partaking in the transcendent Forms, MAN and RIGHTEOUSNESS. So our statement may also be read: 'obtains: [man-being, righteous-being]'. As to the tenses occurring in the surface structure sentences (for these, see

Sophist 26202-3) they bear on the functor only. E.g. 'A man was righteous' is to be transformed as follows:

'obtained: [man,righteous]'9.

29

L.M. deRijk 1.3

Logos and Knowledge in Plato 10 Though in a final analysis, for Plato the transcendent Forms are the true

objects of knowledge, it is the instantiations of the Forms which are the objects proper to knowledge. So to be true knowledge requires the correct discernment of the diverse instantiations (called dynameis by Plato) which are present in a particular. See e.g. Republic VII 523E-524D and VII 507B-C where the notion of true knowledge is explicitly associated with the correct assignment of names to different dynameis. The technique of the cognitive procedure is sometimes described by Plato as 'asking and answering questions' which should lead the mind to make its definitive choice by saying 'yes, it's this', or 'that' respectively. E.g. in Meno 81A-D and

Phaedo 72E-77E the well-known process of Recollection (anamnesis) is connected with a procedure of aptly asking and answering. See also Rep. VII 538D6-E3 where this procedure is made quite explicit. Of course, the most famous passage in this connection is Theaetetus 189D7-E3, where the soul's thinking is described as 'carrying mi. a discussion, asking itself questions and answering them in saying

Yes or No' 11 • The verb anapherein is used by Plato to refer to the procedure involved. It stands for 'reducing some participation to the corresponding transcendent Form'. In fact, anapherein comes to 'bringing home' so to speak, the sensations of the things of the outside world to the respective transcendent Forms which the things observed partake in 12 . In fact, the true process of cognition amounts to assiduously striving after the recognition and identification of Forms whenever we are faced with their immanent instantiations (dynameis) in the outside world, whereby, quite naturally, these instantiations (and the instances or particular things as well) are equally recognized and identified as participata of the transcendent Forms. On the other hand, Plato often associates knowledge of something with a man's ability to give a correct account of the thing involved; see e.g. Phaedo 73A9 and 76B5-7. At Symposion 202A5-9, Diotima asks Socrates whether he does not know that truly opining without being able to give an account for it is neither true knowledge nor ignorance. From this point of view, then, the logos plays an indispensable role in the cognitive procedure. In line with what has been remarked before (above p. 31) it may be asked now what precisely is the notion of 'being' involved in the logos formula, e.g. in :

'obtains: [man-being, righteous-being]'. 30

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle Well, to my mind the basic notion of the Greek 'be' is best characterized as what I have elsewhere called (De Rijk 1986: 348) 'hyparctic'. This term is used to avoid all controversial connotations inhering in the label 'existential' which is mostly associated rather closely with the (Aristotelian) notions of 'substance' and 'subsistence'; moreover, 'existence' is too often understood in opposition to 'essence', which is equally alien to Platonic thinking. The logos formula properly speaking13 refers to several dynameis or modes of 'being' found in the outside world, where 'being' qua experienced (or putatively observed, respectively) by the human mind amounts to 'being-locally-and-temporally-given-in-the-outside-world'. Thus the spatio-temporal aspect of the notion of 'being' seems to be preponderant, whereas what Charles Kahn has labelled (1973:331ff.) the 'veridical' notion is a secondary one which seems already to enhance the connotation of there being some human cognitive act 14• As to the functor 'obtains', this has a dual function. First, it stands for the speaker's actual recognizing and identifying that which is signified by the logos proper as occurring qua dynameis in the outside world. Besides it serves as the container of spatio-temporal notions: 'it obtained (or will obtain) here (or there)'

etc. 1.4

Pragrna as 'State ofAffairs' in Plato No doubt, the fundamental question which each theory of speech (speech act)

has to deal with is that of the relationship between linguistic tools and that which they are used to stand for; for Plato on this account, see e.g. the exordial question of Cratylus 383A. Prior to the distinction between what the Stoics later on called significate and referent (sernainornenon and tynchanon, respectively), we find, as early as in the oldest Platonic dialogues, Socrates making numerous attempts to determine the real nature of the entities designated by an onoma. They are called pragrnata or onta ('things there are') and these terms are indiscriminately used by him to mean 'things' appearing in the transient world or precisely their substantial natures as conceived of. In the later dialogues, too, Plato is involved in a continuous attempt to grasp the exact nature of the extralinguistic entity to which we refer when we actually use names in speaking about things in the outside world. To his mind, this trans-linguistic-entity is an ontic one, ultimately (from Phaedo and Republic onward) the transcendent Form itself. From the semantic point of view this trans-linguistic entity is the name's connotation or intension ('significaturn'), which in fact is the set of notions pertaining to any thing to which a given name is correctly applied. 31

L.M. deRijk It is noteworthy now, that the significate is not identical with the

transcendent Form (designated by the linguistic expression involved) but rather with that Form (or the corresponding immanent form or dynamis occurring in the outside world) as conceived of by human thinking 15• Here the question of the precise meaning of 'pragma' comes in. In Sophist, 257B-C 'pragma' is used to indiscriminately mean both the things of the outside world denoted and the significates of the expressions used. Now this means, in fact, that one should rather take the term to denote the outside thing as signified by the expression involved. For other evidence, see Protag., 349B3-4; Euthydemus 283E5-6; 284Dl; Crat. 386A2; El and 390El; Phaedo 103B3; Theaet.

197E4; Soph. 218C4; 244D3 and 257B9-C2. As opposed to 'ousia' ('being-ness'), 'pragma' conveys a similar mutual opposition as between 'being-stone' and 'being-stone' said of a particular stone. So 'pragma' seems to single out something's 'being such-and such' (this or that combination of dynameis, that is), whereas 'being-ness' ('ousia') primarily focusses on that thing's being (or partaking in BEING). So 'pragma' seems to stand for a dynamis as singled out by thought. We shall fmd a similar use of the word in Aristotle (mutatis mutandis, of course); see below, our nr. 2.1. There seems to be a close relationship between logos and pragma in that the former, the main constituent ('argument') in fact of Plato's statement-making utterance always represents a certain pragma. From this viewpoint the pragma equals a 'state of affairs'. It should be recalled, however, that the logos as such (qua 'more-than-one-word-expression' or 'composite name') is a 'state of affairs

formula' of the following type:

'being man plus being righteous', rather than an expression used on the legein level such as:

'man is righteous'.

Rather, it merely refers to a 'bundle of dynameis' or 'set of modes of being', e.g. (taking the well-known example found in theEuthydemus):

'wanting-one's-darling-to-be-dead-and-gone'

(or 'Ctesippus-wanting-Clinias-to-be-dead'). The logos asserted, on the other hand,

32

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle is nothing but an expression by which somebody actually posits the state of affairs designated by the logos involved 16 . Some striking evidence for this may be found in the hot discussion occurring in the Euthydemus. After Dionysodorus had maliciously inferred from Socrates' wish that Clinias, the darling of Ctesippus, become wise, that he apparently wished him to become "one that he is not and no longer one that he is" and, accordingly, "wanted him to be dead and gone", Ctesippus "flew into a rage for his darling when he heard this" (283C8ff.). His reply to Dionysodorus is full of indignation: "where do you get such an idea to charge me and the others with a pragma of this kind (toiouton pragma)?" (283E5-6). Obviously enough pragma stands for the 'state of affairs' 'that-I (we)-want-Clinias-to-be-dead', (or, if you like, a logos, something like 'Clinias-as-wanted-by-me (us)-to-be-dead') 17. One may interpret the meaning of pragma found in the Theaetetus along the same lines; here it apparently refers to the famous 'pieces of knowledge' which play such a vital role in the discussion of the true nature of 'knowledge' as opposed to 'opinion' (doxa) 16.

2.

Aristotle's Semantics of the Statement-making Expression

2.1 Aristotle's View of Pragma

In his pioneering study on ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity 19 Gabriel Nuchelmans has successfully argued for the view that in Aristotle, De interpr. 21b28 the word pragma has the same sense it apparently has at 16b23, namely that of 'state of affairs'. In support of this Nuchelmans also adduces some passages taken from Aristotle's other works. The evidence is important enough to justify a survey of Nuchelmans' findings, which I venture to modify in some details, especially where he considers Aristotle's use of pragma to be obscure and rather loose.

2.11 Some Evidence From the Texts

In Categ. 5, 4a34-b13 Aristotle claims that the logos as well as the doxa, even when they concern contingent events, (e.g. 'that-somebody-is-seated') remain absolutely the same, whereas their truth value depends on the pragma changing (4a34-b2). "For it is because the pragma is or is not, (he asserts, 4b8-10) that the logos is said to be true or false". Obviously pragma stands here for 'x-being-soand-so•20, whereas the pragma's change consists in the 'properties' (being-seated' 33

L.M. de Rijk or 'being-upright' or 'being walking' and so on) being changed, which, of course, results in a corresponding change of the entire pragma 'x-being-so-and-so'. When discussing (Categ.lO) the different ways of opposition, Aristotle says that 'what underlies an affirmation or negation' although it is not itself an affirmative or negative logos, nevertheless betrays the same manner of being opposed; indeed, in the same way as the affirmation 'he is sitting' is opposed to the negation 'he is not sitting', the pragma underlying the one is opposed to that underlying its counterpart, viz. 'to-be-seated' to 'to-be-not-seated' (12b10-6) 21 • Two points may be made now: (1) pragma is 'that which underlies an affirmation or negation' and (2) the term 'pragma' is used to mean a state of affairs whether or not applying to reality, whereby its actually being true or false

whenever it is actually asserted22 , depends upon the ontic situation in question. Categ. 11,14a10-4 is quite in line with all this. There Aristotle argues that "if 'Socrates-being-well' is contrary to 'Socrates-being-sick', and it is not possible for both [i.e. 'being-well' and 'being-sick'] to hold at the same time of the same person, it would not be possible, if one of the contraries is , for the other to be , as well; indeed, if Socrates-being-well is , Socrates-being-sick could not possibly be ". In Categ. 12, 14b9ff. Aristotle brings a special case of 'natural priority' up for discussion, which concerns the mutual implication of 'there being a man' and the truth of the corresponding logos. I quote the passage in full, in which the author tries to explain this remarkable case of 'natural priority' which always goes together with a complete reciprocation between A and B: 14b9-22: "There are, then, this many ways of speaking of 'the prior'. There would seem, however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned. For of those things, the being of one of which implies that of the other, that which is in some way the cause of the other's being might reasonably be called 'prior by nature'. And that there are some such cases is clear. For 'being-a-man' (to gar einai anthropon) reciprocates as to implication of being with the true logos about it: if he is a man, the logos whereby we say that he is a man is true; and reciprocally, for if the logos whereby we say that he is a man is true, he is a man. Well, whereas the true logos is in no way the cause of the pragma's being, the pragma does seem in some way the cause of the logos's being true; indeed, it is because the pragma's being or not-being that the logos is called true or false".

34

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle Ackrill (ad toe.) thinks it is odd to speak in such cases of 'a reciprocal implication of existence' (his rendering of 'tou einai akolouthi!sis): "we should not say that the existence of there being a man implies and is implied by the existence of the true statement that there is a man" (op. cit., 112). He is certainly right. However, he seems to mistake the einai of a logos for its existence as such, i.e. its being actually asserted by somebody. Instead, a logos being (or 'being the case') merely refers to its content being the case23 • That is why the interpretation 'being the case' (for Aristotle's einai) should be preferred to Ackrill's 'existence'. As to the meaning of 'pragma', here it stands again for 'state of affairs' and 'the pragma's being'

must refer to a state of affairs actually being the case in

the outside world. In De interpr. 3, 16b19-23 pragma must have a similar sense, viz. the state of affairs designated by a dianoia. But that some state of affairs is or is not the case is not indicated as long as a rhema is being uttered by itself, Aristotle claims. Nor is there any indication of a state of affairs if the verb 'to be' is used in isolation, he goes on, since not even einai or me einai is a sign of a pragma either (e.g. when you say: 'be-running'). In fact, you do not assert anything by using the word 'on' in isolation; you have to add some thing by saying e.g. '(being)-stone', '(being)-man' or 'tree-beautiful' 24 •

At De interpr. 12, 21b19-32

Aristotle points out that it must not always

(namely, not in modal formulas) be so that by adding the verb 'to be' (or 'not to be', respectively) an affirmation (or negation, respectively) is produced. Indeed, in order to deny a modal formula you have to add the negation to that formula instead of to the verb 'to be'. And so, Aristotle concludes, "just as in the previous examples [of assertoric formulas, that is, such as 'being-a-man', or 'being-a-pale-man'; 21blff.] 'to be' and 'not to be' are additions, whereas 'pale' and 'man' are the pragmata, -

hypokeimena

in the same way here [i.e. in modal formulas] 'to be' serves as

hypokeimenon, whereas 'to be possible' and 'to be admissible' are additions, which in the modal cases25 differentiate < the 'to be' which serves as hypokeimenon > as 'being-possible' and 'being-not-possible', in the same way as in the assertoric cases 'to be' and 'not to be' differentiate < the underlying pragmata > as being the case and being not the case (21b26-32) 26 . Obviously 'ta hypokeimena pragmata' at 21b28 stands for the states of affairs, 'to be a man' and 'to-be-a-pale-man', respectively27 • A similar use of pragma is found in Metaph. Th.lO, 1051b2-62, where Aristotle discusses 'being in the sense of true and false'. "This kind of being, he says, 35

L.M. de Rijk insofar as the pragmata are concerned (epi t6n pragmat6n) depends on their being combined or being separated, so that whoever thinks what is separated to be separated and what is combined to be combined, has the truth, whereas he whose thought is contrary to the pragmata is in error" (1051b2-5). This is further explained at 1051b6-9: "It is not because we think truly that you are pale that you

are pale, but because of the fact that you are pale, we who say this have the truth". Again, pragma obviously stands for a certain state of affairs ('your being pale'). However, there is a remarkable difference from what we found before in that pragma is used to mean the state of affairs occulTing in the outside world, as opposed to the state of affairs conceived of or believed in. Sure enough, the 'being combined' (or 'separated') is taken to be a feature of the outside world and does not refer to our act of mentally combining (separating) as is patently clear from what follows (1051b9-17).

Metaph. Kll, 1067b18 may be parallelled to Categ. 12b15 (discussed above, p.36) and De interpr. 21b19 (discussed above, p.37), although the Metaphysics passage speaks of

hypokeimenon rather than pragma or hypokeimenon pragma. Well,

hypokeimenon is here defmed as to kataphasei deloumenon, 'that which is expressed by a positive term', where, no doubt, it is at least suggested that it is opposite to 'what is expressed by an indefinite noun' (see De interpr. 2, 16a30-2). It might seem that Aristotle avoids using the term pragma when speaking in the

Metaphysics about a state of affairs conceived of. 2.12 The Different Senses of 'pragma'

It may be of some use to discuss the different senses in which pragma is used by Aristotle throughout his works. To begin with, pragma as sharing the semantic area with

prattein ('to achieve', 'to act') and praxis ('doing', 'action') is quite

naturally found in Ethics (e.g. II3,1105b5; IV6, 1126b12) in the sense of 'deed'. Quite a common use of pragma occurs in various cases where some distinction between mental activities and what they concern is called for. Thus pragma is opposed to the name by which it is designated: Soph. El. 1, 165a6: aula ta

pragmata: "the things themselves as opposed to the linguistic tools by which we designate them"; cf. ibid., 16, 175a8 where the domain of things is opposed to that of words (names); also 19, 177a..'l and 22,178a26. In Top. 118,108a21 Aristotle claims that the syllogism should concern the thing which is designated by a word, rather than just the terms used. In De general. 18, 325a17-8 theoretical views

(logoi) are opposed to the things which they are (supposed to be) about (pragmata). In Physics III 8, 208al5-6 pragma is opposed to thinking (noesis) which also 36

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle occurs in the opening chapter of De interpr. (1, 16a7-8). In Top. VI7, 146a3-13

pragma is opposed to to kata ton logon as the thing which should be defmed to the content of the definiens formula respectively. It is interesting that in the last passage pragma does not merely stand for a

thing in the outside world (as a matter of fact, in this context those things are referred to by tina = 'certain things') but rather means 'that to which our attention is directed'. A similar use is found in Poetics 14, 1453b2-5 and 1454a13-4 where ta pragmata are not merely the events occurring in the outside world but rather the events as told in a play, the 'plot'. However, continuing our exploration of the senses of pragma in which pragma is opposed to mental activities, Physics VIII 8, 263a17-8 may be mentioned where

pragma is juxtaposed to aletheia = 'pros to pragma kai ten aletheian' = 'in view of the actual state of affairs', viz. how movement in fact happens. In Metaph. A3, 984a18 auto to pragma means 'reality itself which use has a parallel in De anima III8, 432a4: pragma outhen = 'nothing real'. The use in Nicomachean Ethics IX 10, 1171a13-4: epi t8n pragmat8n

= 'on the side of things' = 'in practice' comes

quite close to this use. A different sense from the foregoing ones occurs in Politics III 9, 1280a17-9

and IV 15, 1299b18 where things (pragmata) are opposed to persons. Yet another kind of opposition is found in the many passages where pragma stands for a thing as opposed to its property or accident: Topics I 5, 102a19 and I 8, 103b8; Soph.

El. 24, 179a28; Physics IV 14, 223b25; V 3, 226b30 and V4, 227b28; Meteor. IV1, 379a32-b1. You may compare this use with the formula found in Rhetorics (Il, 1354a15-23; 1354b17; 1355a2 and 19; III4, 1415b6): ta ex8 tou pragmatos = 'beside the point under consideration'. Quite an interesting use of pragma as formally distinguished from thinking as such, although it is still part of the mental domain, is found in the well-known passage in Metaph. L where Aristotle deals with pragma as 'knowledge' and the internal object of thinking respectively: "in some cases the knowledge is the object (to pragma); ..... in the theoretical sciences the definition and knowing is the very object" (to pragma); L9, 1074b38-1075a3.

Pragma as 'state of affairs' conceived (or supposed) is found (apart from the cases in Categ. and De interpr. mentioned above, p.35ff., and the interesting passages of Poetics already referred to) in Anal.Pr. II 27, 70a32 where pragma stands for the claim 'that-all-wise-men-are-good'. A similar epistemic sense of pragmata ('states of affairs') occurs in De interpr. 7, 17a38 where the pragmata are divided into universal and particular ones. 37

L.M. deRijk Finally, Aristotle's Metaphysics provides us with two invaluable witnesses. In his so-called philosophical lexicon (book Delta) our author has a chapter on

pseudos ('falsehood') and the last chapter of Book E deals with 'being as true and not-being as falsehood'. In these two chapters the concept of pragma plays a vital role. In Metaph. D29 the different senses of 'falsehood' (pseudos) are discussed. When commenting upon this passage Christopher Kirwan complains (1971:78) that the classification given by Aristotle is surprising since the author 'ignores statements and beliefs in favour of states of affairs". Ross, too seems to feel somewhat uneasy with Aristotle's exposition in that "evidently there is no such thing as a false object or fact" (344). Besides, he has difficulties with one of the examples given, viz. the dream, because he believes it is nothing if not a state of mind. In my view, there is no need for surprise or any uneasy feelings. Aristotle clearly deals with (1) falsehood called Ms pragma pseudos ('falsehood taken as a thing') as contradistinguished with (2) falsehood called logos pseudes ('false account'). Item (1) is precisely concerned with (false) 'states of affairs' and is subdivided into (1.1) such cases as 'a diagonal's being commensurable' (which is always false, Aristotle remarks) or 'your sitting down' (which is sometimes false), and (1.2) such cases as a rough sketch (skiagraphia) (which is false (incorrect) by inaccuracy) or dreams (which "are something but not what they impose on us to image they are"; 1024b23-4). In the formula h6s pragma pseudos the word pragma always stands for 'state of affairs' taken as 'the content of some mental activity in its relation (which exactly results in its (possible) falsity) with reality'. So pragmata (at b25) should be taken to mean 'states of affairs', not 'actual things', as Kirwan has ad toe. Aristotle says: "Things ['states of affairs'], then, are called false in this way either from their not being < the case> themselves or from the fact that the imagination which results from them, is not the case" (1024b24-6). One should keep in mind, now that 'an account (or thought) not being ' is the

usual formula for saying that an account (thought) does not obtain2B. In the second paragraph of Metaph. D29 where 'false account' is discussed, it is not the false statement ('S is P') which is dealt with, as Kirwan has rightly remarked (ad loc.), but rather 'false descriptions', these being (false) more-thanone-word-expressions which are used as predicate expressions or just to denote something (e.g. in subject position). This will be discussed in our next sections (2.2 and 2.3). What is important now, however, is that, again, Aristotle thinks of falsehood as a state of affairs (in the sense of a description) wrongly ('falsely') attributed to something by someone. 38

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle At first glance, Metaph. E4 seems to offer quite a different sense of pragma, viz. 'real thing'. As a matter of fact it is commonly taken to have this sense here, (see Ross and Kirwan among others). Indeed, pragma being opposed to dianoia does seem to force this sense upon us: "falsehood and truth are not in the pragmata (the good one, for example, being true and the bad one eo ipso a falsehood), but in thought (dianoia)", we read at 1027b25-7. However, the opposition really concerns dianoia as 'thought taken as mental activity consisting in compounding or dividing' (see 1027b29-30)29 and thought-content as such (prag-

ma), quite apart from its being asserted or denied through such an act of compounding or dividing. Thus it is rightly claimed by Aristotle that properly speaking truth and falsehood is not in the thought-content ('state of affairs conceived of', e.g. 'your sitting' or '(Callias)-being-pale'), since as such it is indifferent to assertion or denial. The author explains, then, his rejection of the opposite view (viz. that truth and falsehood are in thought (content) as such) by adducing an absurd analogy: "as if, he says, a good pragma [e.g. '[(Callias)- beingwell'] would be the true one, and a bad one [e.g. ('Callias)-being-sick'] the false one"; 1027b26-7. Rather, true and false depend on the assertoric 'yes' or 'no' procedure implied in dianoia. This interpretation will be given some more support in our discussion at section 2.3 (below, p. 47). Concluding this section it may be stated that Nuchelmans seems to be not entirely right in speaking (1973: 33; cf. 35) of the 'obscurity of the word pragma'. Its constant meaning seems to be: 'state of affairs' either really occurring in the outside world, or conceived of. In the former case, it refers to things themselves

as 'faring well or ill'. (cf. eu and kak{)s prattein); in the latter, to the things as they are perceived and signified. For details concerning the close correlationship between the ontic use ('being-so-and-so', or 'x-being-so-and-so') and the epistemic use ('(x) conceived-of-as-being-so-and-so'), see e.g. De Rijk (1986: 171). This double connotation of pragma does not preclude, of course, either the ontic or the epistemic aspect sometimes prevailing. However, as with all sound argument, the context is usually a helpful means to arrive at the correct interpretation.

2.2

Logos and Some Related Concepts in Aristotle Quite similar to Plato's logos, the Aristotelian logos as such does not equal our

'statement' but 'account' or 'composite descriptive expression' (or definiens), quite irrespective of its use as the predicative part of a statement. This may appear from what Aristotle says about 'false account' (logos pseudes) at Metaph. D29, 39

L.M. deRijk 1024b26-3930, where 'false' is patently synonymous with 'not-applying', as al€th€s is used to mean 'applying•31. In the well-known deftnition of logos in De interpr. 4,16b26-8 the translations, 'account' or 'composite expression' will do perfectly well, even there where, at fust sight, the rendering 'sentence' or 'statement' seems more appropriate. So

logos = account not only at 16a22 (the phrase kalos hippos); 16bl, 19a28, 19b19 and 21b24 (as logos is defmiens at 17all

~nd

21a29) but also at 19a33: "since true

accounts are true in the same way as their pragmata (i.e. the states of affairs they signify) are true"; e.g. 'that-a-seabattle-will-take-place-tomorrow', where the

pragma is, rather than the seabattle which really takes place tomorrow, the state of affairs conceived of as expressed by 'that-a-seabattle ... etc. 32 . In this connection Categ. 5,4a24-5 and a37 may be referred to where the infinitival phrase, to katMsthai tina ('that-somebody-is-sitting') is called logos. The only difference with pragma is that logos rather means the linguistic expression whereas pragma stands for its content. That kataphasis is sometimes an expression which is or may be used as the predicate expression of an affirmative logos is quite in line with logos as 'composite expression'. Ackrill is certainly right in remarking (1978:150) that at

De interpr. 12,21b3-5 'affirmation' and 'negation' mean, not statements, but (roughly) predicative expressions. On the other hand, statement properly speaking, (though not in the sense of our 'S = P' formula) is designated by the term logos

apophantikos, deftned as that logos "in which there is truth or falsity" (17a2-3) and explicitly opposed to a prayer which is indeed a logos yet neither true nor false. Hence it appears that the logos as such does not yet contain a truth value and it is the element apophantikos that brings in the capacity to be either true or false33 . For there to be truth or falsehood something should be added, viz. to

einai or another verb containing it; see 16b28-30 juncto 21b5-10. 2.21

Naming and Asserting in Aristotle

This leads us to say a few words about naming and asserting in Aristotle. For the sake of terminological clarity it is worthwhile to catalogue the relevant terms (I heavily draw upon Nuchelmans' expositions (1973: 23-32 and Index):

I

•

Logos:' composite expression', 'more-than-one-word-appelation'. See above p. 42.

40

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle II -

'content of a logos (or name34)'

Pragma:

=

'state of affairs' expressed

by a composite expression. It is either ontic ('state of affairs in the outside world') or epistemic ('state of affairs conceived of), or a combination thereof. See above, p. 40f.

III -

Apophainesthai : 'lo make known', 'to assert that something is the case'.

See e.g. Categ. 7, 8b22; De interp. 5, 17al9; a27;

b2-9; 11, 20b29. For

apophainesthai ti peri tinos, see Bonitz, IndexArist. 88, a36-41.

apophansis:- 'assertion ('enuntiation') affirming or

denying something

('pragma') of something'. See De interp. 6, 17a20-26; 7, 17b5. taken as comprising either part of a contradiction (i.e. either kataphasis or apophasis) indifferently; see e.g. Anal. Post. 12, 72all.

apophansis is divided into 1.

kataphasis (i.e. kataphasis 2 ; see below) = apophansis tinos ('utterance affirming something of something')

2.

apophasis (i.e. apophasis 2 ; see below) =

tinos kata

apophansis tinos apo tinos

('utterance denying something of something'). See

De interp. 6,

17a25-6 Given the definition of apophansis (at 17a23-4: 'a significant spoken soundconstruct (phOne) about whether something(= 'pragma') does or does not obtain') the 'something of something' formula should be explained in terms of obtaining and not obtaining.

- Apophantikos: logos apophantikos

= 'statement-making composite

expression', defmed (De interpr. 4, 17a2-3) as 'the logos in which there is truth or falsity'

logos apophantikos is divided into 1.

logos kataphatikos

= 'affirmative statement' = kataphasis 2

2.

logos apophatikos

=

'negative statement'

=

apophasis 2

See De interpr. 4, 17a8-9

IV

Phanai

= - 'to

think', 'to be of the opinion' as opposed to noein, which

stands for just 'thinking', 'grasping'. - 'to say'

41

L.M. de Rijk

phanai occurs in a twofold sense: phanai1: 'to have in one's thought', 'to have before one's mind' without asserting or denying that it is the case. So Metaph. Th.lO, 1051b24 where truth is defmed as thigein kai phanai ('contact and grasping by thought') phanai2 : 'to say (think) that something is the case' ( = kataphanai; see below). See De interpr. 9, 18a36. et passim; 12, 21b20 Phanai2 is naturally opposed to apophanai as 'to affirm' to 'to deny'. So

De interpr. 9, 18b2; 12, 21b20; 22b12; Anal.Post. I 4, 73b23; Ill, 77a10 et passim; Soph.El. 11, 171b3; et passim.

The twofold phanai is parallelled by a twofold phasis.

phasis: phasis 1:

'expression' (either one-word-expression' or 'many-wordedexpression'). So De interpr. 4, 16b27; 5, 17a17; 12, 21b19 (tas

antikeimenas phaseis = 'opposite expressions'). At Metaph. Th.lO, 1051b24-5 phasis rather means 'mental expression', 'grasp'. phasis2 :

'assertion', taken loosely as 'a definite assent or dissent; (as opposed to dianoia

=

just thinking without being engaged in a 'yes' or 'no');

cf. Eth. Nic. VI9, 1142b13 and Plato's description of the soul's

'inward dialogue' in Theaet. 189E4-190A6 and Sophist 263E3; see Nuchelmans (1973: 19 and 24) and De Rijk (1986: 295-6; 338-9). Both phasis 1 and phasis2 may be subdivided into kataphasis and apophasis:

kataphasis 1:

'predicate expression used to affirm something of something'

apophasis 1:

'predicate expression used to deny something of something' See

Categ.10, 12b15; De interpr. 10, 19b7; U, 21b3-5; Physics V1,

225a6; Metaph. Kll, 1067b18; kataphasis 2 :

logos kataphatikos

apophasis2 :

logos apophatikos.

Phasis and apophasis are co-ordinated into an antiphasis ('contradiction'), which is defmed (De interpr. 6, 17a33-4) as 'an affirmation plus a negation which are mutually opposite'. See also De interpr. 9, 18b37; 11, 21a22 and 38ff.; 14, 23b24-32; 24b7; et alibi;

Anal. Post.I2, 72a12; Metaph.I?, 1057a34; et alibi. 42

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle Nota bene: as is quite understandable, like phanai the term phasis is also used to mean 'assent' (as opposed to 'dissent'). See s.v.phanai. Dividing these terms according to their belonging to either the onomazein level or the legein level the following scheme may be dressed: A) Onomazein level:

- logos when taken as such: 'composite expression' - pragma: 'content of a composite (or one-word) expression - phasis 1:

'expression' ('affirmative expression')

- kataphasis 1: expression used affirmatively - apophasis 1: expression used negatively B) Legein level:

- apophansis logos kataphatikos - logos apophantikos { logos apophatikos kataphasis 2 - phasis2

{

apophasis 2 . 2.22

Propositional strncture in Aristotle

In order to characterize the propositional structure found in Aristotle, Mohan Matthen (1983 :125-31) has introduced the notion of 'predicative complex'. He views it as the denotatum of e.g. 'Coriscus-artistic' or 'artistic-Coriscus', viz. "an entity formed, as Aristotle suggests in Metaphysics Z12, from a universal and a particular when that particular instantiates that universal" (ibid., 125). Matthen seems to take the 'predicative complex' as what we have indicated as 'pragma' and makes it consist of "individuals and predicables". A sentence is formed, then, by attributing monadic 'being' or 'non-being' to some predicative complex. So far his view seems quite attractive to describe the deep structure of Aristotle's sentence. However, Matthen's 'predicative complex' is taken to contain a copulative verb ('is') separating the individual ('Coriscus') and the predicable ('artistic'). Besides, his calling this complex 'predicative' might equally suggest that some subject outside the complex were its counterpart, whereas, at the same time, Matthen (quite correctly) speaks of 'being' and 'not-being' as a monadic functor. For that reason, we should rather label Aristotle's logos (which contains 43

L.M. de Rijk a pragrna, or 'state of affairs') an 'assertible or statable complex'. Indeed the 'statable complex' (which contains as such an individual plus an attribute, including both of them syncategorematic being [see below, our note 56]) may be 'stated', either affirmatively or negatively, by means of a monadic functor, viz. 'being' or 'not-being'. See also below, p. 50ff. and our note 60.

It may be gathered from the above survey (see above, pp. 45) that as such

neither logos nor phasis (kataphasis, apophasis) concern the speech acts of asserting or denying. This feature is most apparent in the final chapter of Metaphysics E. The discussion of this chapter will be preceded by dealing with

some key notions.

2.3 Some Key Notions Involved in Aristotle's Semantics of Logos

In the discussion of 'what-is' qua truth and 'what-is-not' qua falsehood which is found in Metaph. E4, the concepts of composition and division and that of pragma are of paramount importance. As is well known, pragmata is there opposed

to dianoia where it is said (Metaph. E 4, 1027b25-7) that truth and falsehood (which are concerned with composition and division; see 1027b18-9) are not in the pragmata but in dianoia. For that reason it is of some use to roughly sketch the

meanings of dianoia, synthesis ('composition') and dihairesis ('division'). In our section (2.4) the parenthetical remark found at 1027b23-4 will lead us to say also a few words about what Aristotle remarks about the mental procedure underlying the acts of composition and division, viz. the pair of 'thinking together' (to hama noein) and 'thinking separately' (to ch6ris noein ).

2.31 Dianoia and Pragma The word dianoia 35 is generally used to refer to the faculty, or activity of truly thinking, always together with the connotation of discernment (notice the prefix 'dia-'). Therefore dianoia mostly occurs in a context dealing with the uniting or disconnecting of notions36 . Apart from Metaph. E4 which will be discussed in our section 2.4, Metaph. K8, 1065a22 may be referred to where it is said that 'what-is' qua truth depends on a combination achieved by thought (en symplokei dianoias). Nichomachean Ethics VI2 offers some interesting evidence for

the use of the word dianoia. In that context assertion and denial in thought are parallelled with pursuit and avoidance in desire, both assertion and pursuit being

44

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle deliberate choices for 'yes' as denial and avoidance are choices for 'no' (1139a216). Well, whenever at Metaph. E4, 1027b25-7 pragmata is opposed to dianoia, we have to take the latter for thinking in the sense of the process of assertion and denial as opposed to merely 'bringing before the mind'. This interpretation fmds some cogent support in the next lines where it is said that in the case of simple apprehension, truth is not even found in (this kind of) thinking, since, as is obvious from Metaph. Th.lO, 1051b17ff., in that case truth equals 'merely contacting' (thigein) without any kind of assertion or denial

37 •

Of course, such

contacting is a mental process as well and as such 'in thought'; nevertheless it is perfectly true to claim that it is not in dianoia. Accordingly, one really has good reasons to take38 pragmata in this connection as standing for 'thought contents' which qua mental objects are opposed to the process of assertion and denial, rather than making pragmata directly refer to things in the outside world, as the word is usually understood by the co=entators of this passage.

2.32 Atethes and Pseudos

Before coming to treat synthesis and dihairesis it seems useful to discuss

atethes and pseudos, since the former pair are characterized (not only at Metaph. E4, 1027b18-22 but also in two well-known passages of Methaph. Th.lO) as the formal causes for there being truth and falsehood, viz. 1051b2-5 and 32-5:

Th.lO, 1051b2-5: "This (viz. 'what is' qua truth and 'what-is-not' qua falsehood] depends, on the side the things (epi ton pragmaton), on their being united

(synkeisthai) or being separate (diheiresthai) so that he who thinks what is separate to be separate and what is united to be united has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the 'things' is in error."

In this passage Aristotle first defines a compound object's being as an actual union of its constitutive elements (e.g. 'being man' plus 'being pale', or 'being man' plus 'being animal'; cf. the division given at 105lb9-13) and its not-being as an actually being separate of certain elements (e.g. 'being man' and 'being black' or 'being man' and 'being stone'), whereafter he defmes speaking trnly or falsely in terms of the correspondence between speaking and the outside objects (ta

pragmata).

45

L.M. deRijk In the next passage, however, the author confmes himself to the former item of the previous passage and, in fact, seems to take truth (to alethes) to stand for 'being the case', whereas the latter item viz. asserting (or denying) as being the case is left out of consideration:

Ibid., 1051b32-5: "As for 'what is' qua truth and 'what-is-not' qua falsehood, in

one case [viz. in the case of assertion and denial] there is truth [ = 'being the case'] if there is an union < of the elements designated by the logos > and falsehood [ = 'not being the case'], if there is not such a union."

In my view, the former passage forces us to understand aletheuein ('to have the truth') as to take what qua being united is a hOs alethes on as really a has alethes on, or what qua being not-united is a me on hOs pseudos as indeed a me on has pseudos respectively; and where being in error is concerned, the other way

round. If this view be correct, aletheuein may sometimes concern calling a me on has pseudos a me on has pseudos so that aletheuein, in such cases, does not

concern some on has alethes, but precisely some me on has pseudos. On this interpretation only it is understandable that Aristotle should claim that (in the case of assertion or denial) there is truth (or 'being the case') if the elements < designated by the compound name (logos) > are united, and falsehood (or 'not being the case') if they are not. Therefore one has to view the procedure of aletheuein ('speaking truly') or pseudesthai ('speaking falsely') as two opposite

ways of dealing with one and the same logos, so much so that to assert (or deny) amounts to assenting to (or dissenting from respectively) one and the same logos involved. For instance,

'obtains [man plus sickness]' and 'does not obtain [man plus sickness]',

respectively, where the logos [man plus sickness] stands for the pragma (state of affairs), 'that-the-man-is-sick'. This implies that the pragma (as well as its linguistic device, the logos) is never a negative one and, accordingly, always a product of synthesis, never of dihairesis. Some additional remarks should be made on the use of the words alethes and pseudos 39. First, one should distinguish between the phrases to alethes (to pseudos) and to on has alethes (to me on hOs pseudos). The latter refer to 'the

pragma involved being the case' or 'not being the case', respectively, while 46

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle alethes (pseudos) themselves are defmed (at Metaph. G7,1011a26-8) as two kinds of asserting (legein ): "to say that that which is, is not, or that which is not, is, is a falsehood; while to say that that which is, is and that which is not, is not, is a truth". This may be compared with Anal.Pr. I, 46, 52a32: "the expression 'it is true' stands on a similar foot to 'it is"' (Jenkinson) and with Metaph. Th.l0,1051b22-3; "as truth is not the same ... , so also being is not the same". At

Rhet. I 7, 1364b8-9 alethes is parallelled with pragmata as to make alethes have the meaning of 'true state of affairs'; cf. Methaph. D7, 1017a31-3: '"To be' and 'is' signify that is true, and 'not to be' that is not true but a falsehood, equally in the case of assertion or denial". Elsehwere (De anima III8, 432all-2) alethes and pseudos are called a composition (symplok€) of

concepts or linked up with such a composition (De anima III 6, 430a27-8 and De interpr. I, 16a12-3). From the evidence may be gathered that 'true' and 'false' are terms which are used to say of states of affairs (pragmata) that they are, or are not, the case. In line with this the phrases to on hOs alethes (being qua true) and to

m€ on hOs pseudos (not-being qua false) serve for describing a special kind of being and not-being, respectively. These pharases are frequently used, quite understandably, in the Metaphysics (E2, 1026a35; 4, 1027b18; 0-10, 1051blff.; K8, 1065a21-3; 11, 1067b25 and N2, 1089a28), where they in fact stand for true and false pragmata ('states of affairs') insofar as the latter are expressed by a statement-making utterance (logos apophantikos). 2.33

Synthesis and Dihairesis and the Role of einai (me einai)

What about synthesis and dihairesis? Well, quite in line with the foregoing interpretation, one should expect synthesis to be associated with the composition of elements designated by the names which make up a logos ('compound name', such as 'sick l)lan'). As a matter of fact composition is definitely a vital condition for there to be a logos, as the latter is opposed to simple, unconnected names. However, this 'composition' or 'connection' appears to be of a twofold nature. First synthesis refers to (from the logico-grammatical point of view) names 'connected' in the logos and it also denotes (from the ontological point of view) the union of their designates as being the case in the outside world. The former (logical) synthesis may be either a composition achieved on the onomazein level, or one achieved on the legein level and thus equal the assertion of (or assent to) the one achieved on the onomazein level. 47

L.M. de Rijk As a matter of fact, the word 'synthesis' has basically the following two uses throughout Aristotle's works: (1) meaning ontologically 'compound structure' or 'composite' said of the physical things40 or (2) referring to the logical operation of uniting two or more concepts (noemata) 41 . The term's latter sense may be marked by using the numerical subscript 'o', and labelled synthesis 0 . Now

synthesis a is neutral as between the two specific logical senses, viz. synthesis 1 meaning the union (or act of uniting) achieved on the onomazein level, and

synthesis 2 meaning in actu exercito 42 the assertion of a state of affairs as being part of the outside world43 . Aristotle's use of synthesis may now be schematized as follows: Ontological use:

synthesis:

either 'fitting together' or 'compound structure' ('composite')

Logico-grammatical use:

synthesis 0 :

any mental act of uniting two or more concepts

synthesis 1 :

uniting (union) of two or more concepts, making up a logos on the onomazein level assertion of a logos (pragma) on the legein level.

Nota bene: In fact synthesis 2 = the assertion (affirmation) of synthesis 1, while dihaeresis amounts to the denial of synthesis 1. It should be noted, now, that the counterpart of synthesis, viz. dihairesis is

always used as a nomen actionis and, accordingly, never has the ontological meaning of 'segmented structure' or 'non-coherent entity'44 . Besides its logicogrammatical use ('disconnecting', 'denial') is strictly confmed to the legein level and therefore it always acts as the counterpart of synthesis2 and, accordingly, means (in actu exercito) the denial of the union designated by the logos involved. The synthesis which is so basic for there to be real asserting or denying and, accordingly, falsehood and truth is discussed several times by Aristotle:

De intetpr. I, 16a12-8: "For falsity and truth have to do with uniting and disconnecting. Thus names and rhemata45 by themselves (e.g. 'man' or 'pale' when nothing further is added) are like the thoughts that are without uniting and disconnecting: for so far they are neither true nor false. < ........... > unless 'be' 46 or 'not be' is added, either simply or with reference to time." [cf. Categ. 4, 2a4-10].

48

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle Aristotle clearly speaks here of synthesis 0 including both our synthesis1 and

synthesis 2 , while dihairesis stands for the denial of the pragma designated by the logos involved (see above, p. 49). Our passage is also important in explicitly claiming that the addition required for there to be falsity and truth concerns the verb einai (me einai), which when it is used as a functor makes a logos a logos apophantikos (see above, p. 42) 47 This function of 'einai' is also discussed at Metaph. D7, 1017a31ff., where Aristotle explains it more fully than in the passage just quoted:

Metaph. D7, 1017a31-5: "Again, 'be' and 'is' signify that is true, while 'not be' that it is not true but a falsehood, < and that > equally in the case of affirmation and of negation. For instance: 'is 48 : Socrates-beingartistic'49 that this is true ['is the case'] or 'is: Socrates-beingnot-pale' that is true, while 'is not: the-diagonalcommensurable' that < this > is a falsehood."

This passage also makes clear that apophasis is used to refer, not to a negative

logos consisting of an onoma and an indefmite50 rhema (such as 'Socrates-beingnot-pale'), but rather to the denial performed by the negative functor 'is not'

(auk estin). Some more information about the functor 'be' may be gathered from a passage of De anima III 6, where assertion and denial are described:

De anima III 6, 430a27-bl (ed. Ross, Oxford 1961): "where 'true' and 'false' apply, there is already

51

some uniting (synthesis) of notions as belonging together. As Empedocles said that "where heads of many a creature sprouted without necks" they afterwards by Love's power were united, so here, too they [i.e. the notions] which were unconnected52 are united, e.g. 'incommensurable' and 'diagonal', whereby, if what is past or future, it achieves the uniting while including the date."

The synthesis mentioned at a27 is apparently our synthesis 1 (since it also applies to pseudos) but the syntithesi (or the participle syntitheis of the MSS reading at bl) has to do with the functor which expresses the tense of the verb einai 54 (and thereby the date of the pragma expressed by the logos) and, accordingly, concerns our synthesis2 . The next parenthetical remark seem to confirm this:

Ibid., 430bl-4: "Indeed, falsehood always involves a synthesis; for even in the 49

L.M. de Rijk case of 'is not: the pale being pale', one has made a synthesis of pale and not-pale 55. However, it is also possible to call all this a dihairesis56 ."

After this parenthesis Aristotle goes on to explain the structure of tensed sentences: Ibid., 430b4-6: "However that may be (all' oun), there is at any rate (ge) not

only possible the false or true < assertion> that Cleon is pale, but also that he was or will be . But in each and every case, that which unites is the mind (nous)." 2.4

A Re-interpretation of Metaph. E4

This chapter (after the treatment of to kata symbebekos on in the preceding chapters) goes on to discuss, not truth and falsehood as such, but being in the sense of truth and not-being in the sense of falsehood. Our author starts to repeat the claim that this kind of being (not-being) has to do with synthesis and dihairesis; obviously Aristotle has our synthesis2 ( = affirmation of our synthesis 1) and, as its counterpart, dihairesis ( = denial of synthesis 1) in mind. Next, the logical relatim:iship between being qua truth and not-being qua falsehood is made clear:

Metaph. E4, 1027b18-23: "That which is qua truth and that which is-not qua

falsehood are dependent on uniting and disconnecting (para synthesin esti kai dihairesin) and, taken together, concerned with the arrangement of the parts

of a contradiction. For truth covers the domain of the affirmation in the case of what is (actually) united and that of the denial in the case of what is (actually) unconnected, while falsehood has to do with the opposite of this arrangement."

A parenthetical remark is added about the mental procedure which lies at the basis of the act of asserting or denying. It makes clear, again, that both assertion and denial57 concern a logos the parts of which form a unity, not just a series of successive simple terms:

Ibid. 1027b23-5: "How 'thinking together' and 'thinking apart' come about is

another story: by 'together' and 'apart' I mean so that there is not just a succession but they become some one thing [ = pragma]."

50

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle The author further elucidates that the fact that truth and falsehood (which underly the kind of being dealt with in this chapter), are concerned with the acts of uniting and disconnecting respectively, does not imply that they depend on the pragrnata that are the contents of the logoi involved; surely, falsehood and truth

depend on the act of uniting or disconnecting, but not their contents, the pragmata (See also above, p. 47). And as far as simple apprehension (as opposed to dianoetical thought) is concerned, this even has nothing to do with dianoia, let alone with pragmata; but simple apprehension, he adds, will be discussed later on

(viz. inMetaph. Th.10): Ibid., 1027b25-9: "For falsehood and truth are not in thought-contents (pragrnata) (as if the good were truth and the bad eo ipso falsehood) - but in

discursive thought; though in the cases of simples, merely signifying the 'whats' of things, not even in thought; what needs study with regard to that which is or is not in this sense will have to be investigated later."

Next Aristotle argues that like 'being' accidentally 'being qua truth' (and 'notbeing qua falsehood', of course) may be dismissed for the present discussion of 'being-in-the-main-sense'. Again, the characteristic nature of being qua truth (as well as that of 'accidental being') is explained: Ibid., 1027b29-1028a1: "Well, since the combination (symploke) and the disconnection are in discursive thought, not in thought-contents, and that which is in this sense is a different 'thing-that-is' from those which are in

the fundamental sense (for the thought combines (synhaptei), or disconnects, a substantial being or a qualitative being or a quantitative being or whatever else it may be), -

that which is accidental being and that which is qua truth

must be dismissed. For the cause < ........... > of the latter is a certain affection of the thought58 ."

Some comment. Kirwan (1971: 198) rightly refers to the parallel at De interpr. 1,

16a9-18 (cf. above, p. 51). He is of the opinion that in the latter passage, Aristotle speaks of true and false thoughts (e.g. the thought 'that-Callias-is-pale') while at E4 it is not thought but things (e.g. Callias and pallor) which are united or disconnected. However, this view is plainly incorrect, since in the two passages (as well as at Metaph. D29,1024b18-9; see above, p. 40f.) one and the same logos (e.g. 'Callias-being-pale') is the object of assertion or denial.

51

L.M. deRijk Besides, Kirwan believes (199) he has found some confusion in Aristotle's exposition. First, he points to a 'confusion' between (1) 'a thought of pale Callias' and (2) 'the thought that Callias is pale'. However, the confusion seems to be on Kirwan's part in that he seems to ignore that for Aristotle (1) and (2) are quite the same and need not be distinguished, since for him, neither assertion nor denial (our kataphasis 2 and apophasis~ concern two single terms ('Callias' and 'pallor') which are either combined or separated, but one and the same logos ('Callias-being-pale'

= 'pale Callias') which is either asserted as such or rejected

as such, rather than split up59 .

52

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle

3 Epilogue We may summarize what we have found as follows:

1 For Plato, a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma) and an

1.1

attribute (rh€ma) which as such is not yet a statement-making utterance a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma ), i.e. an actual combination

1.2

of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world a logos eiremenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that the

1.3

pragma represented by the logos is actually the case. 2 For Aristotle, a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a rhema

2.1

which represents both a notional and an ontological state of affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex' a pragma is a state of affairs

2.2

either ontologically: state of affairs being part of the outside world or

semantically: state of affairs conceived of and expressed by a logos 2.3

a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos actually stated (either asserted or denied)

2.4

a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the

legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, phasis (kataphasis, apophasis) may be used on either of these levels 2.5

synthesis is either synthesis 1 = the act of uniting an onoma and a rhema into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on the legein level), while dihairesis is always the denial of such a union (on the legein level)

2.6

the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula, properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of ('it consignifies, to speak with De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2 . The onoma and rhema are already united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis 1 and, then, the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated60

2.7

The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be described as follows:

linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e. syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten categories of being) is 53

L.M. deRijk 'stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be'

semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case'). In conclusion we may present a short corollary on the anatomy of Aristotle's statement-making utterance. As to its deep structure the distinction between 'two piece and three piece predication' (see Kretzmann (1982: 495)) is hardly relevant. In spite of their linguistic differences, all negative statements as well as the affirmative ones have a monadic functor preceding one composite argument, viz. a logos. Viewed from their surface structure the adjectival verbs contain the monadic functor 'be' and the rhema part of the logos. Similarly, the substantive verb is splitted up into the monadic functor and the syncategorematic being which acts as a scheme implemented by those categories that are signified by the onoma and rhema parts of the logos involved.

NOTES

1.

See De Rijk (1986: 231-4, and passim).

2.

Ibid., 229.

3.

Ibid., 225-31.

4.

See ibid., 282 where, following Prauss (1965: 51) the close relationship between logos and dionomazein is pointed out.

5.

For the distinction between the onomazein level and the legein level, see

6.

See De Rijk (1986: 271-6).

7.

Ibid. 201-2 and 309-16.

8.

Ibid., 225-34.

9.

Plato's view of propositional structure is more fully discussed in De Rijk

Nuchelmans (1973: 14-7) and De Rijk (1986: 196-202) and below, p. 34; 45.

(1986: 306-16; 349-50; 353-4). 10.

For this section, see De Rijk (1986: 332-50) and the literature mentioned there.

11.

Cf. Mc.Dowell (1973) ad toe. and De Rijk (1986: 296 and 339). For a detailed description of the process of doxazein involved here, see Nuchelmans (1973: 19).

12.

54

See the important passages in Prauss (1965: 36; 110-22 and 191).

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle 13.

By 'logos properly speaking' I refer to the unasserted logos, or the logos taken apart from its being actually asserted respectively.

14.

See De Rijk (1986: 348-54). I am glad to see that in an extensive and quite penetrating review article of Kahn's book my Amsterdam colleague C.J. Ruygh had arrived (in Lingua 48 (1979: 43-83) at a similar conclusion: "Ia valeur fondamentale de 'es-en grec ancien est 'etre present, etre Ia', sans specification ulterieure" (p. 78). See also his paper: 'Sur Ia valeur fondamentale de einai, Une replique", in Mnemosyne 37 (1984: 264-70).

15.

See De Rijk, (1986: 248-53 and 281-2).

16.

See De Rijk (1986: 286-7; 322-6; 350-4). Throughout the whole passage (Euthyd. 283C-286B) pragma seems to stand for a subject including the

phenomenal condition(s) ascribed to it by the user of the logos. See De Rijk (1986: 285-90). 17.

For the context, see De Rijk (1986: 285-90).

18.

See De Rijk (1986: 293-302; 345).

19.

(1973: 33-6).

20.

Cf. what Plato calls (Sophist, 261D-C) praxeis ('appurtenances'; see De Rijk, (1986: 197), n.16)), where states as well as actions may be meant; see Nuchelmans (1973: 14 and 95).

21.

Nuchelmans as well as Ackrill (ad loc.) have 'his sitting' where Aristotle omits the subject accusative (to kathesthai). However, Nuchelmans did notice (35) that at 12b15 Aristotle only mentions the predicate expression 'sitting' instead of the complete affirmation. One might ask why Ackrill and Nuchelmans do not render, quite in line with their translations at 12b14-6, estin anthropos (at Categ. 12, 14b16 ff.): 'he is a man' rather than 'there is a man' (their rendition ad loc .) or 'is-a-man' (which I would prefer; see below, p.OO). For the rest, the difference between the two formulas is not very important, it seems.

22.

For this important requirement, see below, p.OO.

23.

For this use of logos and doxa, see Nuchelmans (1973: 17) and De Rijk

24.

For this difficult passage, see Ackrill, ad loc. I hope to argue for my

(1986: 194-5).

interpretation elsewhere. To be sure, the meaning of pragma as 'state of affairs' is not affected by the special difficulties of the passage. 25.

I cannot possibly make something out of the MSS reading epi tau einai

(rendered by Ackrill: "in the case of 'to be'"). Besides, the important opposition between the assertoric and the modal cases which is so neatly indicated at b27-29: ep' ekeinon, entautha) is obscured at b30-2 by ep' 55

L.M. deRijk ekeinon and epi tou einai, and therefore I would propose to read at b32: epi tou einai dynaton kai einai ou dynaton, where epi touton is

the counterpart of ep' ekeinon, and to einai dynaton kai einai ou dynaton that of to alethes. 26.

dihorizousai.. .....to a/ethes.

Note that here dihorizein means 'to

differentiate'= 'to constitute by differentiation', rather than 'to distinguish something into different types of it'. Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV 6, 213b 24-7, where the void is said to dihorizein things' natures or to establish things' different natures. Cf. Liddell and Scott: 'to determine one to be so and so', e.g. Demosthenes XX, 158 and Sophocles, Oed. Tyr., 1083. 27.

Nuchelmans seems to be wrong in assuming (1973: 36) that, unlike at Categ. 12b15 (where the underlying pragmata are 'Socrates's sitting' and

'Socrates's not sitting', respectively, at De interpr. 21b28 the (two) pragmata of the (supposedly) one example, 'A man is pale' would be 'man'

and 'pale'. Rather, 21b28 should be linked with 21a39-b3, where the two examples 'to-be-a-man' and 'to-be-a-pale-man' are mentioned, instead of just one example 'A man is pale', as is assumed by Nuchelmans, presumably starting from 21b28. Hence, it seems more reasonable to assume that two examples are put forward by Aristotle, and that the pragmata involved are 'to-be-a-man' and 'to-be-a-pale-man' respectively (or, if you wish, 'being-a-man', and 'being-a-pale-man')-. For that matter, at 21b28 we should rather read to men leukos < anthropos > , to de anthropos as this would be more in line with Aristotle's own examples.

For a similar use of 'pragma' seeAnal.Post., e.g. I 2, 71b12; 72a2b. 28.

Therefore Kirwan's speaking (1971: 178-9) of an inadequate treatment of false states of affairs by Aristotle seems to be beside the point. His objecting to Aristotle that he appears to take false states of affairs as non-existent is merely due to the fact that Kirwan seems to ignore that for Aristotle, 'a state of affairs is not' equals 'is not the case' = 'does not obtain'. Besides, Kirwan seems to have forgotten that he himself had correctly noticed that here the discussion concerns states of affairs ('descriptions') rather than statements. A similar optical error has been made by Ackrill where, when commenting upon Categ. 12, 14a26 ff., he says (1963: 111-2) that "it is odd to call this a reciprocal implication of existence (his italics; that between truly saying and actual being is

meant): we should not say that the existence of there being a man implies and is implied by the existence of the true statement that there is a man". Ackrill seems to ignore, indeed, that 'being ' said of 56

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle a statement (rather: 'account') does not refer to its being really asserted but to its content being the case in the outside world. - For this usage in the case of doxa and logos, see Nuchelmans (1973: 17) and De Rijk (1986: 194-5). 29.

For this sense of dianoia, see Bonitz Index aristotelicus, 186a, 52-5: "cogitandi actio, quae dianoia vacatur, praecipue cernitur in notionibus vel coniungendis vel dirimendis". (e.g. Metaph. E4, 1027b 27-35; K8, 1065a 22; Zll, 1036b 3; Eth. Nic. VI2, 1139a 21). For dianoia, see also below, our

section 2.3, and for nous as the grasping or uniting faculty, see Anal. Post. II 19, 100b8-11; De anima III 6, 430b6; Metaph. L7, 1072b21, et alibi.

30.

See De Rijk (1986: 115-7).

31.

Cf. Guthrie, (1978: 18, n.1) and De Rijk (1986: 116).

32.

I think that Ackrill's rendering of 19a33 ("since statements are true

according to how the actual things are") is not correct, grammatically speaking. Rather than that logos and reality are opposed, the corresponding kinds of 'being true' are compared. For a similar association of account (logos) and its content (pragma), see Categ. 10, 12b10-16. 33.

See also Nuchelmans who speaks about the additions apophantikos, kataphatikos and apophatikos and remarks (1973: 32): "These additions

make it probable that in such phrases (logos apophantikos etc. De R.) the word logos has for Aristotle the sense of an utterance; and the suffix 'tikos' in the adjectives indicates that the utterance is fit to be used or is properly used in a speech act of making known an opinion or of affirming or denying that something is the case". 34.

E.g. at De interpr. 3, 16b 22-3 the pragma may also be the semantic value of just one single word (onoma or rhema), I think.

35.

See the lucid entry in Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, esp. 186 a-b. For

36.

See above, n.29. A passage of the Nicomachean Ethics (1142b, 12-3) is

pragma, see above, pp. 38-42.

interesting in that it takes dianoia as a process of searching for truth (zetesis) as opposed to its result, viz. the assent or dissent resulting in

an opinion (doxa). See Nuchelmans (1973: 24) and above, p.41. However, dianoia is frequently found as including its effect; see Bonitz, Index, 186b

4-15. 37.

Cf. De anima III 6, 430a 26-7 and Metaph. L7, 1072b 19-21.

38.

See above, p.41.

39.

Notice the remarkable pair aleth€s (adjective noun) and pseudos

57

L.M. de Rijk (substantive noun); cf. Liddel and Scott,Greek-English Lexicon s.v. pseudos III. 40.

See e.g. Top. VI 13, 150b22-6 and 14, 151a20-32; Phys. II 3, 195a 21; Metaph. D2, 1013b22 and 4, 1014b37 and H 6, 1045b11; De anima I 4,

407b31; De parl. anim. I 5, 645a34-6 and II 1, 646a12; Problemata X 4, 89la34. - Of course, synthesis may also be used as a nomen actionis meaning the 'fitting together' of physical things; so e.g. Eth. Nic. X 4, 1173a24. 41.

E.g. Top. VI 14, 151a20-32; Soph. El. 4, 166a23-32; De anima III 6, 430a27; b2; Rhet. ad Alex. 23, 143b34 et alibi; Poetics 6, 1449b35; 1450a5 and 32; 23, 1459a22 et alibi; Eth. Eudem. VII 12, 1245b13. - In this sense synthesis is equivalent to symplok€ when the latter term is used to mean the composition of notions into one logos, e.g. Categ. 2, la16; 4, lb25; 10,

13b10; De anima III 8, 432all; Metaph. K8, 1065a22. At Metaph. E4, 1027b29 where it is opposed to dihairesis it seems to be equivalent with synthesis2 = asserlion.

42.

For the distinction 'in actu exercito' vs 'in actu significate', see Nuchelmans, The Distinction actus exercitus/actus significatus in Medieval Semantics in The Jan Pinborg Memorial Volume, forthcoming.

43.

So De interpr. 1, 16a12; Phys. V 1, 225a21; Metaph. E4, 1027b19 and K 11,

44.

See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v. Of course the pari. peif. dih€ir€menos

1067b26.

(opp. synkeimenos) is used to mean 'divided (disconnected) things'. See Bonitz s.v.v. 45.

The basic sense of the Greek rhema precisely is 'what is said' or 'what may be said'. Hence rhema may indiscriminately stand for any attributive expression, not only 'verb-predicates'. Therefore the usual rendering 'verb' is not entirely correct, just as 'sentence' for logos is not correct either. See De Rijk (1986: 198 f.; 222-5; 231-4; 269-82; 309-131); cf. Stenzel (1931: 88) One should notice e.g. Aristotle's instancing of 'pale' for rhema in the next lines.

46.

Because of the words 'either simply or with reference to time' added I would prefer the rendering 'be' for einai to 'is' (Ackrill).

47.

It should be stressed that on this interpretation, 'be' ('not be') acts as a

monadic functor and has the logos expressing the pragma (x being f) as its argument. 48.

The remarkable location of esti (at a33 and 34) and ouk estin (at a34) should be noticed.

58

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle 49.

The Greek hoti is often used where we have quotation marks (see Liddel and Scott,

s.v. II). Thus it may be found (like the article to; see

1017a34) to indicate a phrase autonymically used. 50.

It should be noted that the negative particle ou is used, not m§ as in the

phrase m§ einai indicating the functor. Cf. De anima III 6, 430b2 for the

use of the phrase m§ leukon (as opposed to ou leukon used at Metaph. D7, 1017a34). 51.

For §d§ expressing 'logical proximity', see Liddell and Scott, s. v. 4.

52.

For kechorismena

= 'unconnected', cf. the phrase

choris noein used at

Metaph. E4, 1027b23-4.

53.

no§sis mentioned at 430a26 is still the subject; cf. Ross ad Zoe, who

seems to be right in accepting Torstriks conjecture syntitMsi (MSS: syntitheis) at 430bl.

54.

Cf. Plato, Sophist, 262 D2-3 and De Rijk (1986: 201).

55.

reading: kai gar an to leukon m§ leukon, kai (with Vaticanus 256) tom§ leukon syneth§ken. Ross adds leukon kai> but seems to ignore the reading of Vat. 256, which renders a scribe's error by haplology more probable. In the latter phrase to m§ leukon (where you might expect to ou leukon standing for the concept 'not-pale'), them§ is due to Greek idiom which requires m§ (instead of ou) to negate a

substantivated adjective or participle. Cf. to m§ on ('the not-being') which equals touto ho ouk estin ('that which is not'). 56.

This possibility occurs when the example given is analyzed in such a way that the attribute 'pale' is disconnected from the subject by denying the union 'the-pale-being-pale'. Another piece of evidence for 'synthesis' comprising both assertion and denial is provided by Metaph. 7, 1012 a2-5. Some more evidence for esti is found at De interpr. 10, 19b19 ff. A real difficulty lies in in the text as handed down in our MSS at 19 b21-2: to esti triton ph§mi synkeisthai onoma § rMma en t§i kataphasei, ("here I

say that the 'is' is a third component whether name or verb - in the affirmation", Ackrill translates). First, synkeisthai is rather odd; (cf. Stephanus In Arist. De interpr. comm. p.43, 19: "ou kalos /egei; one should expect proskeisthai", Stephanus comments, and he rightly refers to b25 and b30). The correct verb should be proskeisthai; see b25 and b30 and Anal. Pr. I 1, 24b17. Besides, to call esti "an onoma or rh§ma" is clearly

at variance with 3, 16b22-5. For that matter, precisely the latter passage may suggest the emendation needed for our passage in claiming that esti "additionally signifies some uniting which cannot be thought of without 59

L.M. deRijk the components". (ton synkeimenon). Therefore one should rather read something like: to esti triton phemi proskeisthai tois synkeimenois and take onoma e rhema for a marginal gloss (to synkeimenois) that surreptitiously came into our text. This much is certain, however, that 19b19 ff. confirms the syncategorematic use of esti. See also below, note 60.

57.

In ignoring this Tredennick (Loeb edition) feels himself compelled to supply '"or not as a unity but as a succession' (this is separating in thought)".

58.

Cf. the parallellous passage in Metaph. K8 (1065a21-4) where symploke is also found. See above, p. 50. In the Categories the word symploke always stands for the combination of single words (as is the case at De interpr. 11, 21a5), i.e. our synthesis 1• One should not be led astray when seeing

that Aristotle (Categ. 4, 2a7-10, 13bl0-1 and elsewhere) claims there is no truth or falsehood without symploke, since in those passages he opposes symploke to merely saying single words (as at Categ. 1, 1a16-9) and

rightly remarks that for there to be truth or falsehood a combination of notions (our synthesis 1) is required, rather than pretending that this synthesis is a ratio sufficiens. Notice again Aristotle's merely speaking of synthesis, not dihairesis.

59.

One should be mindful that in fact for Aristotle, dihairesis or disconnecting amounts to rejecting the combination expressed by a logos by means of a negation being part of the functor (ouk esti); see above, p. 49. It might seem that both Nuchelmans' remark (1973: 35) about Aristotle not always clearly distinguishing between affirming that something is the case and affirming something of a subject as well as Hintikka's speaking (1986: 105) of Aristotle's "deeply ingrained habit of bracketing together the obtaining of (what we would call) facts and the existence of individuals seem to be on the same footing" are due to confusing modern

conceptions with the nature of the sentential procedure in Aristotle. They are right, it seems, in seeing no difference but wrong in charging Aristotle with not having made this distinction. 60.

The copula properly speaking did not appear until the emergence of the Latin tradition (Boethius), it seems. It is true, the Greek Commentators of Aristotle did use the word syndesmos to mean the dyadic esti, yet, unlike its Latin counterpart, copula, the Greek term generally meant 'conjunction' (gramm.) or 'binding together' ( = syndesis), or, later, 'connective' (gramm.-log.). The idea of esti as a copula between S and P

60

Logos and pragma in Plato and Aristotle came from Porphyry, it seems. See Boethius, In Perihenn. II 77, 13 ff. For the originally monadic character of esti it seems of some importance to point out the precise meanings of Greek proskeisthai and Latin adiacere. These verbs are likely to mean 'to lie upon (by, beside)' or 'to be

adjacent', or 'to be added', rather than 'to be placed in between' as the (putative) copula is supposed to be. To be sure, the phrase 'est tertium adiacens' (cf. De interpr. 19b21-2) which is later on used to refer to the copula does not mean '"is' taken as the third adjacent"', but rather "'is' qua a third element which is adjacent to the two other elements". This

provides some additional support to our taking 'the two other elements' as some unity, rather than viewing them as two separate items (subject and predicate) that owe their union ('composition') to the copula.

61

BOETHIUS AND THE TRUTH ABOUT TOMORROW'S SEA BATTLE

Norman Kretzmann Cornell University

1. Lukasiewicz and the oldest interpretation

In 1930 Jan Lukasiewicz published the following account of Aristotle on bivalence:

"The law of bivalence, i.e. the law according to which every proposition is either true or false, was familiar to Aristotle, who explicitly characterized a proposition ... as discourse which is either true or false. We read in De interpr. 4, 17a2-3, "not every expression is a proposition, but only those in which there is truth or falsity". Aristotle, however, does not accept the validity of this law for propositions dealing with contingent future events. The famous chapter 9 of De interpretatione is devoted to this matter. Aristotle believed that determinism would be the inevitable consequence of the law of bivalence, a consequence he is unable to accept. Hence he is forced to restrict the law" 1.

Lukasiewicz's account provides the basis for a dramatic reading of De

interpretatione. In Chapter 4 Aristotle declares bivalence to be the differentia of propositions, only to discover in Chapter 9 that that view of the essential nature of propositions entails a determinism under which "all things are and happen of necessity; accordingly, there will be no need to deliberate or to take trouble" (18b30-32). Aristotle is thus faced with a dilemma: He must either accept determinism with its radically counter-intuitive implications or deny what had appeared to him to be the essential nature of propositions. According to Lukasiewicz, Aristotle then simply grasps the second horn of the dilemma, restricting the application of the law of bivalence to propositions about past

63

N. Kretzmann events, present events, and such future events as are naturally necessitatedeclipses, for instance. Lukasiewicz's interpretation of Aristotle's response to determinism in De int. 9 has stood, in one version or another, at the center of the modern controversy that has its source in his 1930 article. His portrayal of Aristotle as confronted with the dilemma of either accepting logical determinism or abandoning universal bivalence, and as then opting for the latter, seems also to be the oldest interpretation on record. Boethius, in his commentaries on De int., attributes this view to the Stoics, along with other people whom he does not identify. Of those oldest recorded interpreters of De int. 9 Boethius says that they "thought that Aristotle says that contingent [propositions] about the future are neither true nor false" 2 • But those Stoics also thought that Aristotle had grasped the wrong horn of the dilemma. When they themselves faced up to the choice between tampering with bivalence and accepting determinism, the Stoics declared that "it is the foundation of logic that

whatever is stated ... is either true or false" 3 ; and, true to their

principles, they professed determinism. Lukasiewicz packs an impressive amount of original historical research on that oldest interpretation into a few paragraphs, but its status in antiquity is summarized more effectively in recent work by Richard Sorabji. He says that the interpretation adopted by Lukasiewicz (and by many others since 1930) "was the interpretation of Aristotle taken by the Peripatetics (i.e. the Aristotelian school) according to Simplicius .... Moreover, the denial of truth value .. was accepted as being a correct view in itself, necessary for avoiding determinism, by Epicurus, by the Platonist Nicostratus, and probably by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias, while being rejected by the Stoic Chrysippus, by the Academic Carneades, and by Cicero" 4 . Recent commentators on De int. 9, whether they accept or reject the oldest interpretation, have tended to follow Hintikka's lead in designating it "the traditional interpretation" 5 . Sorabji, for instance, says "I shall refer to this interpretation of Aristotle as the traditional one, although this is something of a misnomer, in view of ... the fact that there are rival interpretations just about as old" 6 .

64

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle 2. The second-oldest interpretation

My concern here is with the principal ancient rival to the so-called traditional interpretation, a rival whose subsequent medieval career was so long and so eminent that it provides another reason for feeling uneasy about calling the simple denial of universal bivalence "the traditional interpretation". Since the one I am focusing on is the second-oldest on record, I will refer to it simply as the second-oldest interpretation and continue referring to the denial of universal bivalence as the oldest. I will also continue to refer to both of them as inter-

pretations even when I am primarily interested in them as responses to logical determinism, regardless of their accuracy as interpretations of Aristotle. The second-oldest interpretation's claim to preserve bivalence while rejecting determinism is what essentially distinguishes it from the oldest interpretation. Its details will emerge gradually. Lukasiewicz, after expressing his own adherence to the oldest interpretation, admits that Aristotle does not restrict bivalence "decisively enough, and for this reason his way of putting the matter is not quite clear" 7 . The passage Lukasiewicz cites as "the most important" is certainly one whose ambiguities have given rise to differing interpretations, including both the oldest and the secondoldest:

"For regarding them [i.e., things that not always are and not always are not] it is indeed (i) necessary that the one or the other part of the contradiction be true or false - not, however, this one or that one, but whichever one happens - and (ii) [necessary] that one is indeed true rather than the other, but not already true or false". (19a36-39)

As my inserted numerals indicate, I think the passage is naturally read as presenting two claims. The occurrence of a sea battle tomorrow is one of those things that not always are and not always are not, and the parts of the relevant contradiction are (A) There will be a sea battle tomorrow (B) There won't be a sea battle tomorrow. The oldest interpretation, then, may seem to find support in claim (ii), which can be read as saying that although either (A) or (B) must become true, neither of them is true (or false) at this time; and so (A) and (B) are exempted from bivalence.

65

N. Kretzmann The second-oldest interpretation is one for which Lukasiewicz has little if any respect. He thinks it arose as an attempt on the part of the Peripatetics to defend Aristotle against the Stoics' charge that he had abandoned universal bivalence "by puzzling out a 'distinction' between the definitely trne and the indefinitely trne, non-existent in the Stagirite's works" 8 . I think his conjecture of

a Peripatetic source for the second-oldest interpretation is plausible. Boethius thought of himself as a Peripatetic in writing his two commentaries on De interpretatione9, and although he could not have been one of those Peripatetics among

whom the interpretation first arose, his elaborate presentation of it is expressly designed to defend Aristotle against the oldest interpretation. Boethius comments on claim (i) in the passage quoted above (19a36-39) in words that can serve as an introduction to the second-oldest interpretation:

"And so he [viz., Aristotle) concludes the whole question of propositions that are future and contingent, and says that it is evident that it is not necessary that all affirmations and negations be definitely true [or false]. ("Definitely" is missing [from Aristotle's claim], however, and so must be supplied in one's understanding.) For of those that are contingent and future it is never the case that one is definitely true [and) the other false" 10.

3. Sources of the second-oldest interpretation

Before trying to discover what Boethius might have had in mind here, I want to say what little there is to say about concrete evidence regarding sources of the second-oldest interpretation. Boethius's two commentaries may have been written not very long after Ammonius's, the earliest surviving commentary on De interpretatione. In commenting on a similar passage (18b4), Arnmonius, like Boethius, displays his confidence that he knows what Aristotle intended but neglected to say:

"As if concluding on the basis of a syllogism, then, he next introduces this: "therefore, it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation be true or false"- i.e., with "definitely" supplied in one's understanding". 11

As this comment suggests, Ammonius also subscribes to the second-oldest interpretation. But, despite the similarity between them on this point and others, it seems unlikely that Boethius depends on Arnmonius at all in commenting on De 66

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle interpretatione 12. Both of them do, however, make use of earlier commentaries now lost - e.g., those by Alexander, Porphyry, and Syrianus. Ammonius says that he is drawing on lectures by Proclus 13, and Boethius indicates that he relies on Porphyry's commentary14. In the absence of those sources of their commentaries, it would not be surprising if we could not say anything further about the origins of Ammonius's and Boethius's interpretation; but Robert Sharples has recently made some progress in that direction. In his translation and discussion of one of the

Quaestiones attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sharples claims that "it is in the final section of this text that the view of the Sea-Battle paradox which was standard in later antiquity [i.e., the second-oldest interpretation} makes, as far as I know, its first appearance" 15 . Here is the relevant passage in Sharples' translation:

"none of those things, of which one part of the contradiction referring to the future (sc. 'either p will be or p will not be') is true definitely, would be [the case] contingently. But they say that in all cases one part of the contradiction is true defmitely"16.

I think it is too much to describe this passage as an early appearance of the second-oldest interpretation, or to say "that it is only the definite truth or falsity of future-tense statements that is incompatible with contingency" 17, or to claim that it presents "the appearance, by implication, of the qualification 'true or false, but not defmitely"' 18 . Sharples himself characterizes "the standard view among later ancient writers", the view he discerns in this Alexandrian Quaestio, as the claim "that statements are either true or false, but neither definitely" 19• But only a few lines further on in that same fmal section of the text we can find what looks very much like the restricted-bivalence response to logical determinism, denying that such statements are either true or false:

"But [if] it is alike possible for the same thing to come to be and not to come to be, how is it not absurd to say, in the case of these things, that one part of the contradiction uttered beforehand (sc. 'either p will be or p will not be') is true and the other false, [when} the thing in question is alike capable of both?"20 "

If we assume that the Alexandrian Quaestio is genuine, or at least earlier than

Ammonius's and Boethius's commentaries, Sharples has called attention to a very

67

N. Kretzmann interesting anticipation of the terminology of their interpretation, but not to a clear instance of the interpretation itself, even on his own understanding of it21 • I know of no other sources in the surviving philosophical literature between Aristotle and Ammonius. I think Aristotle himself may provide a source, however, one likely to have been overlooked because of Lukasiewicz's attempt to dissociate this interpretation from Aristotle with his observation that Aristotle nowhere uses the expression "defmitely true" (al-ethes aphorismen-os) or "indefinitely true" (al-

ethes aorist-os) 22 • Nevertheless, in view of the confidence with which Ammonius and Boethius supply the adverbial modifier they think Aristotle must have had in mind at various points in Chapter 9, it seems only reasonable to look into Aristotle for some support for their use of "defmitely'' in emending his text. The support I think I have found fits Boethius's emendation more closely than Ammonius's. In commenting on claim (i) in 19a36-39, Boethius expounds the claim "not, however, this one or that one, but whichever one happens"2 3 as "it is not necessary that all affrrmations and negations be defmitely true [or false]", and then points out that he has added the "definitely'', which is "missing ... and so must be supplied in one's understanding" 24 . A warrant for Boethius's emendation lies no farther away than Categories Chapter 10, where Aristotle is discussing contraries such as white and black, hot and cold. One such contrary, he says, may belong to a thing by nature (in such a way that the thing has no affinity for the other contrary), "as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow; and in these cases it is necessary that the one or the other belong definitely, and not whichever one happens" 2 5. What Boethius could have seen in these Categories passages is that when Aristotle says of something's possession of either of two opposed characteristics that it is not a matter of whichever one happens, he also says it possesses the one and not the other of those characteristics definitely. And so when in De

interpretatione he says of something's possession of either of two opposed characteristics -- truth and falsity -- that it

is a matter of whichever one hap-

pens, he no doubt means to say also that it does not possess the one or the other of those characteristics definitely. I am not suggesting that Boethius was the discoverer of this Aristotelian warrant for the conceptual and terminological distinction that characterizes the second-oldest interpretation. The facts that there is evidence for Arnmonius's knowing of it too, and that the two of them depended on some of the same commentators, make it likely that the connection had already been pointed out in one of the no longer extant commentaries -· perhaps in Alexander's, if we extrapolate from the only available hint, the passage in tlie Quaestiones to which

68

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle Sharples has called attention. But I am suggesting that the connection is there to be discovered, and that Boethius seems to be relying on it.

4. Boethius on truth and logical detenninism

Having said all I have to say about sources of the second-oldest interpretation, want now to try to say what it comes to. My ulterior motive for undertaking this critical exposition is my interest in the development of the response to logical determinism (and the interpretation of Aristotle's response) among medieval philosophers, for whom the second-oldest interpretation had the stamp of Boethius's authority. For that reason I have examined the interpretation in Boethius's rather than in Ammonius's version of it26 • Arnmonius's commentary remained inaccessible to the Latins until William of Moerbeke translated it in 1268, and so it is irrelevant to at least the earlier stages of the medieval development27 . Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation is based on his thoroughgoing Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth: "the nature of predicative [i.e., categorical] propositions is acquired from the truth [and] falsity of things, events, or states of affairs; for however they are, so will the propositions that signify them be" 28 . For that reason propositions "about past and present things, events, or states of affairs are, indeed, like those things themselves, stable and definite;... [and], for that reason, of that which has happened it is true to say definitely that it has happened... And concerning the present as well: whatever is happening has a definite nature in that it is happening. It is necessary to have definite truth and falsity in the propositions, too; for of whatever is happening it is definitely true to say that it is happening, [definitely] false that it is not happening"2 9.

Boethius often emphatically associates these definite truth values with the necessity (or impossibility) which is at issue in the controversy over determinism -- i.e., not logical necessity, but the condition of being beyond human power to bring about, to alter, or to prevent. (I will sometimes refer to this condition as ineluctability, following Ackrill3°, but it should be remembered throughout this discussion that the familiar modal words are not to be given their standard twentieth-century interpretations when they occur in Boethius.) For example, "if every affirmation is definitely true or definitely false, and [every] negation the same way, it will come about that all things occur with the inevitable character of necessity; and if that is the case, free choice comes to nothing" 31 ; and "if a

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N. Kretzmann thing is not settled or forthcoming by definite necessity, neither does the expression which designates that things have definite truth" 32 . So an event or state of affairs is ineluctable if a proposition about its occurrence, describing it in individuating detail, is definitely true, and all propositions about past or present events or states of affairs have definite truth values. But Boethius is on what he takes to be Aristotle's side against logical determinism, and so it is his view that future events or states of affairs and hence propositions about them are fundamentally different from those belonging to the past or present: "It is entirely clear, then, as regards present and past matters, even those having to do with things, events, or states of affairs that are contingent, that the outcome is definite and settled. As regards future matters, however, it is clear that either one of the two [contradictory opposites] can happen, although it is not the case that one of them is definite; instead, [each] is inclined to either part. It is also clear, of course, that necessarily either this one or that one comes about, but [also] that it cannot happen that this one (whatever it is) or anything else at all [come about] defmitely''33.

5. The main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation

Against that background of Boethius's theory of truth and his understanding of and opposition to logical determinism I want to consider the following representative statement by Boethius of the second-oldest interpretation as applied to contradictory pairs of singular propositions regarding a contingent future event:

"For [in such a case] it is necessary that either the affirmation be true or the negation, but not that either of them be definitely true, the other definitely false. For if someone else denies what we say - "Alexander is to be bathed"-

and says "Alexander is not to be bathed", it is indeed necessary that this whole [state of affairs] come about - that either he is bathed or he is not bathed - and it is necessary that one be true and the other false: either the affirmation, if he has been bathed, or, if he has not been bathed, the negation. But it is not necessary that definitely the affirmation be true, because in cases of this sort the negation could come about; but neither is it ever definite that the negation be true ([and] the affirmation false), because the negation can fail to come about. Accordingly, as

regard~

the whole contra-

diction it is of course necessary that one be true, the other false. But that 70

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle one be definitely true, the other definitely false - as is the case regarding things that are past and those that are present - is not possible in any way"34.

This passage contains more than a statement of the main thesis of the secondoldest interpretation, but since that thesis is my fust concern, I will extract it in what I intend. to be an accurate paraphrase. We can keep our original example, assuming that the occurrence of a sea battle on [tomorrow's date] is a contingent future event in the Aristotelian or Boethian sense of "contingent": Either (A) there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or (B) there won't be a sea battle tomorrow.

"The main thesis: It is necessary that this whole state of affairs come abouti.e., that either a sea battle occurs or a sea battle does not occur on [tomorrow's date]. But, as for propositions (A) and (B), although it is necessary that one be true and the other false, it is not possible that one be definitely true and the other defmitely false" 35.

I have chosen a relatively clear passage from among the many passages in Boethius's two commentaries in which he presents the main thesis of the secondoldest interpretation, and I have tried to paraphrase it accurately, but I think that what we have before us is at best ambiguous. And so, before appraising this thesis, I need· to sort out the readings of it that have occurred to me (and in some cases to Boethius's medieval readers as well).

6. Four readings of the main thesis

As a preliminary move in that direction it is worthwhile considering the possibility that by "defmitely true" and "defmitely false" Boethius really means no more than he means by "true" and "false", in which case his thesis seems to be just hopelessly confused, claiming that the same arrangement is both necessary and impossible. There certainly are passages in Boethius's commentaries, some of them lengthy and important to his analysis of Aristotle's position or his own antideterminism, in which Boethius derives ineluctability not from definite truth or falsity, but just from truth or falsity, using "true" and "false" in the way he more often uses "definitely true" and "defmitely false" 36 . But immediately following at least two such passages he seems to be reminding the reader that the preceding discussion has to be understood in terms of definite truth and definite falsiry3 7 . 71

N. Kretzmann And in other places he clearly is insisting that a proposition's being true or false is not to be confused with its being definitely true or definitely false • e.g., "as regards past things and those that are present, it is necessary as regards the affirmation and the negation not only that one be true and the other false, but the one is true definitely, and the other takes on falsity definitely" 38 • So the only reasonable working hypothesis is that Boethius has different senses in mind for "true or false" and "definitely true or definitely false". Proceeding on that hypothesis, I think the main thesis of the second-oldest interpretation might, more or less warrantably, be given any of the following readings.

I.

Merely epistemically indefinite truth values: As of this moment, either (A)

is true and (B) is false, or (A) is false and (B) is true, but no human being knows which. There are two apparent advantages to this reading: it preserves universal bivalence (a goal which is obviously an important motivation for Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation), and it is easy to understand. Furthermore, Boethius sometimes writes as if it is what he has in mind

e.g.,

"affirmations and negations regarding them [i.e., contingent future events] have indefinite truth or falsity; for one is always true [and] the other always false, but which of them is true or which false is not yet known as regards contingents"39 . Passages of this sort are misleading, however. Boethius plainly would, and sometimes expressly does, repudiate this frrst reading - e.g., "some one part of the whole contradiction is true [and) the other false, but unknowably and indefinitely - and not [just) from our point of view; rather, the very nature of the things that are expressed propositionally [is] dubitable" 40 ; "It must not be thought, however, that whatever things are unknown to us are in either of two ways and have the nature of contingents. ...Rather, the only things that should be thought to be undoubtedly so [i.e., contingent] are those that are unknown to us in virtue of the fact that by their own nature they cannot be known in respect of which sort of outcome they have, because by reason of their own instability of nature they are inclined toward both ... "41 Although medieval readers could have found passages in Boethius's commentaries that seem to support Reading I, and although some of them adopted it, it cannot be attributed to Boethius himself.

II.

Truth values mutable before the event occurs or becomes ineluctable: As

of this moment, either (A) is true and (B) is false, or (A) is false and (B) is true, but those truth values may change between now and the

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Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle beginning of a sea battle on [tomorrow's date] or midnight of that day, whichever is earlier. The stipulation "before the event occurs or becomes ineluctable" is needed because, although Boethius does not remark on it, more than one medieval pointed out that if an affirmative proposition about a contingent future event is true at all times or at any time before the event, it becomes always false at and after the event; and if a negative proposition of that sort is false at all times or at any time before the event, it becomes always true at and after the event. (False affirmatives and true negatives undergo no such automatic changes42 .) Reading II has only one advantage I can see: it preserves universal bivalence. But that advantage is entirely illusory in view of the fact that Reading II is incoherent. The claims "At 9 p.m. EST on [today's date] (A) is true" and "At 10. p.m. EST on [todays date] (A) becomes false" are incompatible. Nevertheless, there are passages in which Boethius can be read as taking that untenable position - e.g., "it is of course obvious that as regards a contradiction one is true and the other false; but just as the things, events, or states of affairs themselves are mutably and indefinitely going to be, so also the statements would be made with variable and not with definite truth and falsity" 43 . But I can see no reason for treating such passages as more than mildly unfortunate results of a rhetorician's attempt to avoid a monotonous vocabulary44 . There is absolutely no basis beyond such stray terminological suggestions for attributing Reading II to Boethius, and I am going to propose a different reading for Boethius's association of mutability with indefinite truth and falsity.

III. A third truth value: As of this moment, (A) has the truth value indefinite, and (B) has the truth value indefinite, but that intermediate

truth value will be superseded in each case by one of the two standard truth values, either very shortly before the beginn.ing of a sea battle on [tomorrow's date] (when there is no longer time for human choice or chance to intervene) or very shortly before midnight of that day, whichever is earlier. This reading's resemblance to Lukasiewicz's response to logical determinism is symptomatic of its most flagrant disadvantage: in introducing a third truth value, Reading III expressly abandons universal bivalence. If Reading III does not thereby simply reduce the second-oldest interpretation to the oldest, that is only because on this reading the second-oldest would add an affirmative detail to the purely negative thesis of the oldest interpretation: singular, temporally definite propositions about contingent future events are neither true nor false, but indefi73

N. Kretzmann nite. I have noticed one passage in Boethius's two co=entaries that might conceivably suggest a third truth value - "with both [the affrrmation and the negation] indefmite as regards truth and falsity and tending equally to truth and falsity" 45 - but I have no good reason to think that the notion of a truth value other than true and false ever entered his mind. Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that Boethius intends his version of the second-oldest interpretation to preserve universal bivalence. We have already seen him saying that in contradictory pairs of singular propositions about contingent future events "it is of course necessary that one be true, the other false" 46 . Here is his clearest, fullest statement to that effect: "Now some people, the Stoics among them, thought that Aristotle says that contingent [propositions] about the future are neither true nor false. For they interpreted his saying that nothing [of that sort] is disposed more to being than to not being as meaning that it makes no difference whether they are thought false or true; for they considered them to be neither true nor false [in Aristotle's view] - but falsely. For Aristotle does not say that both are neither true nor false but, of course, that each one of them is either true or false - not, however, definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters. [He says] instead that there is, in a way, a dual nature of statement-making utterances: some of them are not ~~~~~~~~is~in~~~~~=

of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false; of the other [statement-making utterances], however, one is true and the other false, but indefinitely and mutably - and this as a result of their own nature, not relative to our ignorance or knowledge" 47 .

Along with further indications of Boethius's own understanding of the main thesis, this passage presents clear evidence that he himself takes the second-oldest interpretation to preserve universal bivalence; and so Reading III cannot be ascribed to him.

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Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle IV

Either-tme-or-false as a disjunctive property: As of this moment, (A) is either:true-or-false and (B) is either-true-or-false, but neither proposition has either truth value definitely, although either very shortly before the beginning of a sea battle on [tomorrow's date] (when there is no longer time enough for human choice or chance to intervene) or very shortly before midnight of that day, whichever is earlier, either (A) will be true and (B) will be false, or (A) will be false and (B) will be true.

In the light of what we have seen so far, I think there can be no serious doubt that this fourth reading comes much closer than any of the preceding three to expressing what Boethius had in mind. It seems also to be the reading preferred by recent commentators who distinguish the second-oldest from the oldest interpretation, although they apparently see no need to explain it48. But what exactly is the disjunctive property either-true-or-false?

7. The disjunctive property either-tme-or-false

I am going to try to answer that question on the assumption that Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation is coherent and more than superficially different from the oldest, and that Reading IV is on the right track. If Reading IV is not to collapse into Reading III, a proposition's being either-true-or-false cannot be a third truth value; but either every-true-or-false is no more a truth value than either-red-or-green is a color. Nor can either-true-or-false as a property of a proposition be assimilated to either-odd-or-even as a property of the number of stars in our galaxy at this instant; otherwise Reading IV collapses into Reading I. And so it cannot be the case that a proposition's having the property either-true-or-false is entailed by its having the property true or by its having the property false; being either-true-or-false is different from being either true or false. The most helpful analogy that has occurred to me is either-winneror-loser as a property that belongs to each runner in a two-person race just after they've left the starting-line, when neither runner has the property winner or the property loser. But if I am right in thinking that that is what indefinite truth values come to and in thinking that Reading IV is an important part of what Boethius has in mind, then how does he think he rebuts the Stoics' charge that Aristotle abandoned bivalence, and in what interesting respect does the secondoldest interpretation differ from the oldest? Boethius's rebuttal of the Stoics' charge begins with the claim that "Aristotle does not say that both (the affirmation and the negation] are neither true nor

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N. Kretzmann false" - i.e., that Aristotle does not abandon bivalence - but, on the contrary, maintains that "each one of them is either true or false". So, according to Boethius, Aristotle remains faithful to universal bivalence; every proposition is either true or false, including propositions about contingent future events, the only candidates for exemption from bivalence. But, Boethius continues, propositions about contingent future events are not true or false "definitely, as with those having to do with past matters or those having to do with present matters", where "one of them is definitely true [and] the other definitely false" just in virtue of the fact that past and present matters are ineluctably settled. Because contingent future matters are not settled, Boethius interprets Aristotle as holding that of a contradictory pair of propositions about such matters "one is true and the other false, but indefinitely and mutably"49 . As far as I can see, to say that one is true and the other false indefinitely

must mean that such propositions are not yet definitely true or definitely false, but as of now either-true-or-false in the sense that the properties true and false exhaust the possibilities of which one is to be realized for each such proposition. The eventual realization of a definite truth value is the mutation alluded to in "mutably", I think - the exchange of the property either-true-or-false for the property ( defmitely) true or for the property (definitely) false. On Boethius's view a proposition is definitely true (definitely false) if and only if it corresponds (fails to correspond50) to an already extant state of affairs. And, given Boethius's strict adherence to the Aristotelian correspondence theory, it seems that once a definite truth value has been acquired by a proposition, it must attach to that proposition retrospectively. The proposition "There was a sea battle near Denmark on May 31, 1916" is defmitely true just because the event described is an ineluctably settled feature of reality. At any time before May 31, 1916, the proposition "There will be a sea battle near Denmark on May 31, 1916" was only either-trueor-false because there was not yet a fact to which it could correspond or fail to correspond. But now that that battle is a fact, the Aristotelian correspondence theory seems to entitle and to require us to recognize that now that future-tense proposition is defmitely true retrospectively for all time before May 31, 1916.

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Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle 8. Truth and falsity at a time and for a time

My attempt to work out the details of the Boethian position depends on maintaining a distinction between truth (or falsity) at a time and truth (or falsity) for a time: a proposition true at a time is eo ipso true for that time, but a proposition true for a time is not eo ipso true at that time. Thus although at no time before May 31, 1916, was it definitely true or definitely false that there would be a sea battle on that day, at the present time, in 1986, it is definitely true for all time before May 31, 1916, that there would be a sea battle on that day. At any time at which a proposition is neither true nor false, it is eithertrue-or-false; and every proposition eventually is definitely true or is definitely false for every time. For example, "There will be a sea battle on May 31, 1916" is at this present time defmitely true for every time before May 31, 1916 and definitely false for every time after that date 51 . It may be helpful to notice that present-tense and past-tense propositions are subject to retrospective acquisition of truth values in just the same way: the proposition "A sea battle is occurring today, December 31, 1999" is now in 1986 only either-true-or-false, as is its pasttense counterpart. And it may be reassuring to notice that the apparent changes of the past effected in the retrospective acquisition of truth values are only Cambridge changes, retrospective evaluations no more worrisome metaphysically than is the retrospective identification that enables me to say naturally and truthfully that my mother was born in 1905.

9. Narrow and broad bivalence

If, as I am suggesting, for each contingent proposition about the future one of

the two truth values is eventually and retrospectively going to become definite, Boethius's rebuttal of the Stoics' charge can be interpreted as his recasting of the principle of bivalence in order to show that the Stoics understood it too narrowly, having assumed that a proposition's actual possession of just the one or just the other truth value must be simultaneous with the evaluation of the proposition. Thus the Stoics' version of the principle might be formulated in this way:

Narrow bivalence: At any given time every proposition has exactly one of these two truth values: true or false. And the version I take Boethius to be depending on (or at least working toward) can be put informally in this way:

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N. Kretzmann Broad bivalence: For any given time every proposition eventually has exactly

one of these two truth values: true, or false; and so at any time at which it does not yet have one of those truth values it has the disjunctive property either-true-or-false 52 . Broad bivalence is the heart of Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation as I view it, and the only available basis on which he can support his claim to have preserved bivalence and rebutted the Stoics. And broad bivalence, as I see it, does justify Boethius's claim: necessarily, every proposition gets a definite truth value, and there is no time for which any proposition ultimately lacks a definite truth value, and although there are times at which some propositions lack definite truth values, at those times those propositions have the disjunctive property either-true-or-false. Returning to my foot-race analogy, suppose we lay down these rules in order to guarantee a decisive result: the two runners are arbitrarily assigned the numerals 1 and 2; in case of a dead heat or even if neither of them moves after the starter's gun has been fired, 1 is automatically the winner and 2 the loser; otherwise the runner who is ahead at the end is the winner and the other is the loser. Then necessarily if P is a runner in the race and the starter's gun has been fired, P has a race result: the differentia for having been a runner in this race is being either the winner or the loser of this race, and necessarily, ineluctably, between the firing of the gun and the end of the race P is eitherthe-winner-or-the-loser, "but indefinitely and mutably" because during that time P is not yet the winner nor is P yet the loser. I see no reason why universal bivalence for propositions should not be conceived of along the lines of my footrace bivalence. If it is conceived of in that way, there is no discrepancy between Aristotle's taking bivalence to be the differentia of propositions in De int. 4 and his claiming (as Boethius takes him to do) in De int. 9 that at certain times some propositions do not have a definite truth value. The Stoics' insistence that every proposition must have a definite truth value right now constitutes a gratuitous narrowing of the principle of bivalence - somewhat like objecting against taking rationality to be the differentia of human beings on the grounds that not every human being exhibits (actualizes) rationality at every time.

10. Boethius's second contribution

Important as it is to Boethius's interpretation and defense of Aristotle, broad bivalence is not all there is to his position. I will conclude by presenting and 78

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle examining the other component, which seems to have been completely neglected and almost completely overlooked in the literature53 . The hitherto-unrecognized component of Boethius's position is given a full presentation only once in the discussions of De int. 9 in Boethius's two commentaries, in connection with his second commentary on 18b9-16. The core of the material I want to focus on appears in this passage:

"Now impossibility of this sort [i.e., the determinist's conclusion] comes about on the basis of what was granted earlier - that all things of any kind that have happened could have been definitely truly predicted. For if that which comes about occurs necessarily, then it was true to say "It will be". But if it occurs not necessarily but contingently, it was not true to say "It will be", but rather "It can happen" (contingit esse). For anyone who says "It will be" puts a kind of necessity in that very prediction54, which is understood on this basis: if he says truly that that which is predicted is going to be, then it is not possible that it not happen, but it is necessary that it happen. Therefore, anyone who says of one of the things that come about contingently that it will be speaks falsely in that he says that that which perhaps comes about,

contingently, is going to be 55 • Even if the thing, event, or state of affairs he predicted should occur, he still spoke falsely; for it is not the outcome that is false, but the mode of the prediction. For he ought to have said "Tomorrow a sea battle contingently will come about" - which is to say, if it does come about, it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about56 . Whoever speaks in that way says what is true, for he has predicted the outcome contingently. But anyone who speaks in this way: "Tomorrow there will be a sea battle" announces it as if it were necessary. And if it should come about, he will still not have said something true because he predicted it, since that which contingently was going to come about he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for that reason that the falsity is not in the outcome, but in the mode of the prediction. For just as someone has spoken falsely if while Socrates is walking he says "Socrates necessarily is walking"not because Socrates is walking, but because he is not necessarily walking and he declared that he is necessarily walking - so also in the case in which someone says that something will be he is mistaken even if it happens - not because it has happened, but because it has not happened as he predicted it was going to be. If it were definitely true, however, it wonld be necessarily going to be. Therefore, whatever he annonnced was going to come about, without any other mode, he predicted was necessarily going to be. It is for

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N. Kretzmann that reason that the falsity is found not in the outcome of the event, but in the statement of the prediction57 ; for where contingents are concerned, if the statement will be true, it must predict in such a way that it does indeed say that something is going to be, but [also], on the other hand, in such a way that it leaves open the possibility that it is not going to be. Now it is the nature of a contingent [event J to be predicted 58 in a statement contingently; and regarding that which perhaps will come about, contingently, if anyone has predicted that it is simpliciter going to be, he predicts a contingent event as coming about necessarily. And, for that reason, even if that which is said has come about, he still spoke falsely in that the event has come about contingently, but he had predicted that it would come about necessarily" 59.

I apologize for quoting Boethius at such length, particularly since the passage is likely to seem repetitious and thus longer than it has to be. But the reason he says the same sort of thing more than once is, I think, that he is struggling to communicate a novel idea. In view of the historical setting of Boethius's commentaries, his idea may, of course, not have been brand new when he was writing. But I have not found it in Aristotle, I have no reason to think it occurs in the surviving works of any of Boethius's other predecessors60 , and, as I have said, I have not seen it discussed in the recent literature. So however new the idea may have been to Boethius himself, it is new to our (or at least to my) consideration of the problem of tomorrow's sea battle; for that reason alone it seems important to let Boethius say all he has to say on the matter61 .

11. Propositions and assertions

For purposes of extracting and examining Boethius's idea, it will be helpful to have a clear example in view. Assume that at this moment today, [today's date], the occurrence of a sea battle tomorrow is contingent - i.e., not predetermined, not yet causally necessitated or precluded, eluctable - and that at this moment John says (Al) "Tomorrow [tomorrow's date], there will be a sea battle"6 2 • (Al), the proposition John has just asserted, is the paradigm of propositions about contingent future events, and I am claiming that if Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation has anything of its own to offer besides its account of truth values in terms of broad bivalence, it is to be found in this passage. So it should come as a surprise to fmd that according to Boethius here, John in

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Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle asserting (Al) just now has spoken falsely. There is no mention of (Al)'s being indefinitely either-true-or-false, or of its being neither true nor false yet, just of John's speaking falsely. Moreover, it is not because of the way the world will turn out to be tomorrow that John has spoken falsely: "Even if the thing, event, or state of affairs he predicted should occur, he still spoke falsely" 63 . So he would also have spoken falsely if he had said (Bl) "Tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], there will not be a sea battle". Boethius does not expressly claim that the speaker would also have spoken falsely if he had asserted the negation, (Bl), but that feature of his idea seems entailed by what he does say; and when we see more clearly what he has in mind, there will be no doubt that he would indeed make the corresponding claim about the falsity of John's assertion of (Bl) now. Taken together, the pair of claims about the falsity of those two assertions is very likely to seem not just surprising but shocking, because in the very next passage of De int. 9 on which Boethius must comment - 18bl7-25 - Aristotle takes some trouble to reject the notion that both the affirmation and the negation might be said to be false. Without yet considering what Boethius has to say about this apparent embarrassment for his position, we might deepen the sense of perplexity by noticing what he has to say about some other (unidentified) people on this score: "if those who have thought that Aristotle thinks that both propositions [i.e., the affirmation and the negationJ regarding future matters are false would read very carefully through the things he says now [in 18b17-25], they would never fall victim to such gross error" 64 . We can make a fust step toward understanding Boethius's idea by noting that in this passage he is mainly concerned not with propositions simpliciter but with certain speech acts that involve propositions - saying, predicting, announcing, declaring, and the like. I propose to group all these under the convenient heading of assertion, and for present purposes I taken an assertion to be a speaker's use of a proposition in making a statement. Boethius's notions of a proposition and of a speech act involving that proposition are obviously not precise, and his distinction between them is not always sharp, perhaps not even always completely deliberate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that some sort of distinction between a proposition and assertions of that proposition is at the heart of Boethius's idea. One indication that this is so is the fact that nowhere in our passage is the truth value false ascribed to anything. Instead, the negative evaluations are mostly applied directly to the speaker or his speech acts: once he is described as mistaken (falsus est) 65 , four times he is said to have spoken falsely (mentitur, mentitus est) 66 , and there are two occasions on which something is rejected as

not true to say (non verum dicere, non verum dixerit) 67 • On the three occasions 81

N. Kretzmann when falsity is mentioned, it is carefully ascribed to "the mode [or the statement] of the prediction"68 , about which I will have more to say. In terms of our example, then, Boethius's claim is not that propositions (Al) and (Bl) are both false now -- such a claim would have put him in the same boat with "those who have thought that Aristotle thinks that both propositions regarding future matters are false" 69 - but rather that in asserting (Al) now John speaks falsely, just as he would speak falsely in asserting (Bl) now.

So it is my contention that understanding what is novel and interesting in our passage depends on attributing to Boethius a distinction between propositions and individual assertions of propositions70 • The distinction is important as an explanation of Boethius's readiness, soon after our passage, to reject as a gross error the view that both the affirmative and negative propositions about a contingent future event are false. But it also has a deeper importance if I am right in thinking that Boethius's evaluation of assertions is the other component of his response to logical determinism, complementary to his broad-bivalence account of the truth value of propositions.

12. Boethius's evaluation of assertion

Bringing out the distinction between propositions and assertions of them helps to clarify Boethius's claim that in asserting (Al) now John speaks falsely, but the distinction alone cannot justify the claim. We can more readily understand and appraise his own effort to justify it by supplementing our example with the stipulation that precisely at noon tomorrow a Swedish patrol boat unexpectedly locates a submerged, unidentified submarine well within Swedish waters, that the patrol boat's captain orders depth bombs dropped, that his orders are promptly carried out, and that the submarine is destroyed. According to this stipulation, until noon tomorrow it will not have been predetermined that a sea battle will occur then, but, we are supposing, a sea battle will in fact occur tomorrow. All the same, Boethius would claim, in John's presently asserting (Al) "Tomorrow

[tomorrow's date], there will be a sea battle" John is speaking falsely. How does he justify this claim? At the beginning of our passage we read that the determinist's intolerable conclusion stems from our having (too quickly) conceded that "all things of any kind that have happened could have been definitely truly predicted" 7 . Our familiarity with Boethius's version of the second-oldest interpretation is very likely to lead us to suppose that we know how he will propose amending the

82

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle concession: by pointing out that some things that have happened could have been predicted only indefinitely truly. But obviously he does nothing of that sort here: definite truth crops up only once more in the passage72, and the words "indefrnite" or "indefinitely" do not appear at all. Instead, Boethius takes the position that it is tme to say "It will be" or "There will be ..." (erit) if and only if the predicted event "occurs necessarily"73 , an expression which in this context evidently means the same as "is necessitated or ineluctable as of the time of the assertion". If that truth condition for asserting "erit" is acceptable, Boethius has, of course, justified his claim that John speaks falsely in asserting (Al) now, for on our hypothesis tomorrow's sea battle is not ineluctable now. But that truth condition appears to be ridiculously too strong: under its strictures I have to concede even now that I spoke falsely when I told the editor of this volume that my contribution would be a paper on Boethius. Boethius's first move toward warranting the super-strong truth condition on assertions of "erit" is to suggest, as he does regarding so many things in this passage, that it applies to the speaker: "anyone who says 'erit' puts a kind of necessity in that very prediction" 74 . It is part of Boethius's idea, I think, that the speaker is invariably responsible for the modality of his assertion not because it is invariably part of what the speaker chooses to assert - obviously it isn'tbut because it is invariably implied by the combination of his freely chosen act of assertion and the form of words he chooses to use in making his assertion,

whether or not he intends an ascription of modality as part of his assertion. When Boethius tries to explain why the falsity of John's present assertion is independent o.f the outcome of tomorrow's events at sea, he says several times in our passage in slightly different ways 75 that "the falsity is not in the outcome, but in the mode of the prediction"76 . The prediction, it seems clear, is John's assertion of (Al) before the event occurs and, on our hypothesis, before the occurrence of the event becomes ineluctable. I am not so clear about how to characterize the mode of the prediction, because "modus praedictionis" strikes me as ambiguous. On the one hand, Boethius's "modus" means something very close to the twentieth-century philosophical use of "mode", and in that sense the mode of John's prediction is, according to Boethius, necessity (i.e., ineluctability77): •anyone who speaks [as John does] in this way: 'Tomorrow there will be a sea battle' arrnounces it as if it were necessary. And if it should come about, he will still not have said something true because he predicted it, since that which contingently was going to come about he predicted was necessarily going to be"78 • But in a broader sense, more natural to a pre-scholastic Latin author, "modus• means something like "marrner", 83

N. Kretzmann or even "standard characteristic"79 . In that sense the mode of John's prediction is, I think, something like that which is properly inferable from his act of asserting (Al); and I think this interpretation is supported by the fact that in one of the three relevant passages the falsity is attributed not to the mode but to the

statement of the prediction (enuntiatio praedictionis) 80 • I also think that the mode in this sense can be brought out as an implicit proposition in which the asserted proposition is embedded, thereby rendering John's assertion of (Al) susceptible to evaluation in terms of ordinary truth values. Putting such an embedding proposition in a form not utterly anachronistic and alien to Boethius, we might try making the implicit explicit in this way: (Ala)

(At [this time] on [today's date] it is definitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], there will be a sea battle81 .

Since according to Boethius's broad-bivalence account of propositional truth values (Al) itself is now only either-true-or-false, (Ala), John's assertion of (Al), clearly is false, as is (Bla)

(At [this time] on [today's date] it is defmitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], there will not be a sea battle.

It looks to me as if Boethius may have thought that Aristotle provided a

suggestion leading to this account of assertional truth values. In a comment alluding, I think, to 18bll-13, Boethius says that Aristotle "connects the nature of present time with a statement of future [time]. For he says that to make a statement about future events is like making a statement about present matters, as far as the necessity of the truth is concerned. For if it is true to say that something is, it is necessary that it be; and if it is true to say that it will be, it is without doubt necessary that it be going to be"82 . Boethius himself assimilates assertions about the future to assertions about the present in the example of Socrates's walking8 3 . Suppose that Socrates is walking before our very eyes. In that case Socrates's walking now is settled, ineluctable, or "necessary'', and so the proposition "Socrates is walking" is defmitely true. If in those circumstances I assert that Socrates is walking, I speak truly, and if I assert that Socrates is not walking, I speak falsely; for, obviously, if every assertion is evaluated in terms of the truth value attaching to the complex proposition composed of the asserted proposition and the assertional prefix "At this time (t 1) it is defmitely true that ...", an assertion of a proposition that has a definite truth-value at the time of the assertion will itself simply have the truth value of the proposition embedded in it. But, returning to the example, suppose that in a misguided attempt to show that I have grasped the point about the ineluctability of present facts I assert that Socrates necessarily is walking. In

84

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle that case I have spoken falsely. The mode implicit in assertion itself is the necessity concomitant with definite truth, and so my explicit addition of a modal word to the asserted proposition leaves me asserting what I did not intend to assert - that Socrates's walking is necessitated rather than freely chosen. Although Socrates is now walking, and although it is therefore necessary that he is now walking, my second assertion is false because Socrates is not now walking as I said he was. If I had instead asserted that Socrates is necessarily not

walking, I would of course also have spoken falsely; but in that case the falsity of my assertion could be attributed to the fact that the asserted proposition is definitely false in fact, regardless of the mode of the assertion or of the proposition. Analogous considerations apply to the positive side of Boethius's evaluation of predictions regarding contingent future events. In terms of our original example, John ought to have said (A2)

"Tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], a sea battle contingently will come about"

- "which is to say, if it does come about, it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about. Whoever speaks in that way says what is true, for he has predicted the outcome contingently" 84 . In the context of Boethius's evaluation of John's assertion of (A2) we have every reason to think that it is like his evaluation of the assertion of (Al) in being independent of the outcome of tomorrow's naval activity. That is, (A2a)

(At [this time] on [today's date] it is definitely true that) tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], a sea battle contingently will come about

- John's present assertion of (A2) - is true whether or not a sea battle will take place tomorrow. We can make this plainer by replacing (A2) in the assertion with Boethius's analysis of it: (A2a*)

(At [this time] on [today's date] it is definitely true that) if a sea battle does come about tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], it comes about in such a way that it could have failed to come about.

It is easy to see in the same way that John's assertion now of (B2) would also be

true: (B2a*)

(At [this time] on [today's date] it is definitely true that) if a sea battle does not come about tomorrow, [tomorrow's date], it fails to come about in such a way that it could have come about.

Just as the explicit addition of a modal word to the asserted proposition in the Socrates example falsified an assertion that would have been true if the implicit mode of the assertion had been left alone, so here the explicit modal word 85

N. Kretzmann renders both the affirmative and negative asserted propositions true (on the hypothesis), thereby rendering both assertions true - assertions that would have been false if the implicit mode had been left alone.

13. Assertional trnth values and broad bivalence

When an assertion is treated as a proposition embedding the asserted proposition, assertional truth values are just propositional truth values. But can Boethius's account of assertional truth values be subsumed under broad bivalence? The only feature of this account that strikes me as likely to suggest any difficulty of that sort is Boethius's retrospective assessment of the truth value of John's prediction; for, on Boethius's view, tomorrow evening, after the sea battle, when we evaluate the prediction John made today, we are bound not to concede that after all what he said was true: "he will still not have said something true because he predicted it" 85. But according to broad bivalence, when proposition (Al) acquires its truth value very shortly before noon on (tomorrow's date], it acquires it retrospectively. Nevertheless, Boethius is right to insist that the falsity of John's prediction is not affected by (Al)'s becoming defmitely true. Even though at that time on [tomorrow's date] the proposition (Al) becomes true retrospectively for the time when John made his prediction on (today's date], John's assertion of (Al) at that time remains forever false because it implicitly includes the claim that (Al) was true at the time of the assertion, at a time when it had not yet acquired its truth value defmitely. As I understand Boethius's treatment of assertions of propositions about contingent future events, it is intended to show that the act of assertion makes the future-tense proposition the subject of a present-tense claim; and so future events do not affect the truth value of such a temporally defmite present-tense claim any more than they affect the truth values of any others. In developing the determinist's arguments in De int. 9, Aristotle observes that it makes no difference whether anyone ever actually asserted either of the contradictory propositions about the supposedly contingent future event (18b3638). In commenting on Aristotle's observation, Boethius brings out clearly the respect in which the proposition's being asserted or not makes no difference: "it would disturb nothing having to do with the necessity of the event that was going to come about" 86 (on the determinist's assumption of narrow bivalence). But by attending to assertions as well as to propositions Boethius has shown that someone's asserting an assertoric proposition about a contingent future event does

86

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle make a difference in the distribution of truth values in virtue of introducing a gratuitous falsehood.

Conclusion

In terms of subtlety, ingenuity, and precision, Boethius's commentaries on De int. 9 and his response to logical determinism cannot compete with some of those

developed during the thousand years of medieval philosophyll 7 , which began by depending altogether on his work. But for a straightforward, sensible antideterminism which preserves bivalence and remains faithful to Aristotle, no commentator I know of, medieval or modern, is better than Boethius, whose work in this area has been misperceived or altogether overlooked for centuries88.

NOTES

1.

I am quoting from H. Weber's translation of "Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalkuls" in McCall (1967: 63-64), but I am supplying detailed references to passages in ancient authors and translating the Greek and Latin quoted by Lukasiewicz and left untraiislated by Weber.

2.

Op. cit., p. 64, where Lukasiewicz is quoting from Boethius's second commentary on De interpretatione (ed. Meiser, Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis PERI HERMENEIAS; Leipzig: Teubner, 1877-1880, 2

vols.), II 208.1-3. See p. 76

below and n. 47 for the remainder of this

passage. 3.

Op. cit., p. 65, quoting Cicero, Acad. Pr. ii 95.

4.

Sorabji (1980: 92-93). See his thorough documentation of this summary account in notes 3 and 5 on those pages. It is not clear to me that the Simplicius passage cited by Sorabji (Commentary on Aristotle's Categories, ed. Kalbfleisch, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CIAG) 407.6-13 supports his claim about the Peripatetics. The occurrence of "aphorismenos" in lines 10-11 suggests that Simplicius may be ascribing to these

Perpatetics the interpretation Boethius presents as a Peripatetic antidote to the Stoics' interpretation of Aristotle as having denied bivalence (see pp. 67-68 below). 87

N. Kretzmann 5.

Hintikka (1964: 461-492); revised version in his Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973),

pp. 147-178, esp. pp. 148-149. 6.

Sorabji, op. cit., p. 92.

7.

Lukasiewicz, op. cit. p. 64.

8.

Ibid. Cf. remarks on Peripatetics in n. 4 above.

9.

See, e.g. II 193.24.

10.

I 125.16-22: "concludit igitur totam quaestionem de futuris et contingentibus propositionibus ornnes adfrrmationes et negationes definite verae esse (sed decst

d e f i n i t e

atque ideo subaudiendum est).

illarum enim quae contingentes et futurae sunt, numquam defmite una vera est, altera falsa". 11.

In librum Aristotelis De interpretatione, ed. Busse (CIAG), 141.18-20.

12.

See Taran (1978: VII-VIII, and n. 10), where he reviews Courcelle's evidence for Boethius's dependence on Ammonius and concludes "there is no reason to think that in his commentaries on the De interpretatione Boethius is dependent on Ammonius".

13.

See Taran, op. cit., pp. vi-vii, and n. 9.

14.

See e.g., II 201.2-6.

15.

Sharples (1982: 24).

16.

Op. cit., pp.36-37.

17.

Op. cit. p. 37.

18.

Op. cit., p. 38; note the emphasis on "by implication" inn. 79, p. 38.

19.

Op. cit., p. 37.

20.

Ibid.

21.

I think Sorabji is too generous when he reports that Sharples "has

pointed out that the same view [as the one found in Ammonius and Boethius] appears in Questiones I 4.. .'' (Sorabji, op. cit. p. 93, n. 10). 22.

See p. 67 above. Sharples appears to go much further than Lukasiewicz, but surely inadvertently, when he says "it may be noted, however, that Aristotle nowhere uses the terms 'defmitely' and 'indefinitely', though something like the positon of Ammonius and Boethius could be understood from de interpretatione 9, 19a36-8", Sharples (1978: 263-264) of his two claims here; for the falsity of the frrst, see n.25 below.

23.

De int. 9, 19a37-38: ou mentoi tode -e tode all' hopoter' etuchen.

24.

See pp. 67-68 and n. 10 above. Boethius also expressly claims that "'definitely' is to be understood" in commenting (II 204.23-25) on 18a34-

88

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle 35: "For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, it is necessary also that everything be or not be". 25.

Cat. 10, 12b38-40: epi de toulon aphorismen-os anankaion thateron huparchein, kai ouch hopoteron etuchen; 13a2-3: toutois aphorismen-os to hen kai ouch hopoteron etuchen. Boethius's translations: Cat. 10 12b38-40:

"in his autem necesse est defmite unum ipsorum inesse, et non hoc aut illud"; 13a2-3: "his defmite unum, non autem hoc aut illud"; De int. 9, 19a37-38: "non tamen hoc aut illud, sed utrumlibet". It seems that the "utrumlibet" he uses throughout De int. 9 to translate "hopoter etuchen" would have served better than "hoc aut illud" for the Categories passages as well. 26.

I have noticed the following passages in Arnrnonius's discussion of De int. 9 where he makes use of at least the distinctive terminology of the second-oldest interpretation. On definitely (or indefmitely) true (or false): 130.23-26, 131.2-4, 138.11-139.20, 141.18-25, 143.17-22, 144.9-14, 145.29-31, 147.20-22, 148.9-10, 149.16-18, 154.10-12; on definite or indefmite cognition: 133.15-16, 134.25, 135.2, 136.3, 136.14-15, 136.30-137.4, 137.13-14; on defmite or indefmite nature: 134.28, 136.2; on nature bringing about all things "definitely and necessarily"; 148.21-22.

27.

See Verbeke's edition (Arnrnonius 1961). The indispensable guide to the earlier medieval development is Isaac (1953).

28.

II 188.14-17: "praedicativarum autem propositionum natura ex rerum

veritate falsitate colligitur. quemadmodum enim sese res habent, ita sese propositiones habebunt, quae res significant". 29.

II 189.5-7, 9-10, 13-18: "de praeteritis quidem et de praesentibus, ut res

ipsae, stabiles sunt et definitae.

...idcirco de eo quod factum est verum

est dicere defmite, quoniam factum est. .. et de praesenti quoque: quod fit definitam habet naturam in eo quod fit, definitam quoque in propositioni'_ __ veritatem falsitatemque habere necesse est. nam quod fit defmite verum est dicere quoniam fit, falsum quoniam non fit". 30.

Ackrill (1963: 139).

31.

I 111.22-25: "si omnis adfirmatio vera est aut falsa definite et eadem

modo negatio, eveniet ut omnia inevitabili necessitatis ratione contingant. quod si hoc est, liberum perit arbitrium". 32.

I 124.21-23: "si res constituta non est nee defmita necessitate proveniens,

nee illa oratio, quae rem ipsam designat, defmitae est veritatis". 33.

II 191.2-10: "perspicuum ergo in praesentibus atque praeteritis vel

earundem rerum quae sunt contingentes definitum constitutumque esse 89

N. Kretzmann eventum, in futuris autem unum quidem quodlibet duorum fieri posse, unum vero defl.llitum non esse, sed in utramque vergere et aut hoc quidem aut illud ex necessitate evenire, ut autem hoc quodlibet defmite vel quodlibet aliud defl.llite, fieri non posse". 34.

I 106.30-17.16: "necesse enim est ut aut adfirmatio vera sit aut negatio, sed non ut definite quaelibet earum vera sit, altera falsa definite. nam quod dicimus Alexander lavandus est, id si alius neget dicatque Alexander lavandus non est, totum quidem hoc necesse est evenire, ut aut lavetur aut non lavetur, et necesse est unam esse veram, alteram falsam, aut adfrrmationem, si lotus fuerit, aut si non lotus fuerit, negationem, sed non necesse ut defl.llite adfrrmatio vera sit, idcirco quod in huiusmodi rebus poterit evenire negatio. sed nee umquam defl.llitum est, ut negatio vera sit, falsa adfrrmatio, idcirco quoniam potest non evenire negatio. quare in tota contradictione unam quidem veram, falsam alteram esse necesse est, ut autem definite una vera sit, altera falsa defl.llite, sicut in his quae sunt praeterita quaeque praesentia, nulla rerum ratione possibile est".

35.

In line with my remarks on p. 71-72 above, "necessary" and "not possible" are to be interpreted here as "unpreventable by human power" and "incapable of being brought about by human power", respectively.

36.

See e.g., I 109.24-110.18, 111.8-22, 118.15-119.1; II 206.8-207.11, 210.23211.26, 228.1-230.3.

37.

See, e.g., II 207.12-13,211.26-28.

38.

I 106.25-29: "quemadmodum in praeteritis et in his quae sunt praesentia non modo in adfrrmatione et negatione unam veram, alteram falsam necesse est, sed definite una vera est, definite altera suscipit falsitatem, ...''

39.

II 200.14-18: "de his adfirmationes < et negationes > indefl.llitam habent veritatem et falsitatem, cum una semper vera sit, semper altera falsa, sed quae vera qua eve falsa sit, non dum in contingentibus notum est". Cf. II 200.28-201.1: "in adfrrmationibus < et negationibus> contingentia ipsa prodentibus veritas quidem vel falsitas in incerto est quae enim vera est, quae falsa secundum ipsarum propositionum naturam ignoratur) ... " ("truth or falsity is of course uncertain as regards affrrmations and negations presenting the contingents themselves; for in accordance with the nature of the propositions themselves it is unknown which is true and which is false").

40.

90

II 245.9-12: "totius contradictionis una quaelibet pars vera sit, altera

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle falsa, sed incognite et indefrnite, et non nobis, verum natura ipsa harum rerum quae proponuntur dubitabilis, ..." 41.

II 193.6-8, 15-19: "non autem oportet arbitrari ilia esse utrumlibet et

contingentium naturae, quaecumque nobis ignota sunt. ...sed ilia sola talia sine dubio esse putanda sunt, quaecumque idcirco nobis ignota sunt, quod per propriam naturam qualem habeant eventum sciri non possunt, idcirco quoniam propria instabilitate naturae ad utraque verguntur, ... " See also II 208.1-18 (pp. 75-76 and n. 47 below). 42.

For an informative and insightful discussion of the Stoics' treatment of such changes in truth value, see Nuchelmans (1973: 80-85). To avoid unnecessary complication, I will ignore these automatic changes in the body of the paper, taking account of them only occasionally in the notes.

43.

I

126 17-21: "constat unam quidem veram esse, aliam vera in

contraclictione mendacem; sed sicut res ipsae mutabiliter et indefrnite futurae sunt, ita quoque enuntiationes variabili nee definita veritate et falsitate proferentur". See also II 247.7-10: "si res sint dubitabiles et indefinito variabilique proventu contraclictio quoque quae de his rebus fit variabili indefinitoque proventu sit" ("if the things, events, or states of affairs are dubitable and of an indefrnite and variable outcome, then the contradiction that is made regarding those things is also of a variable and indefinite outcome"); and I 108.4-5: "haec veritas atque falsitas indiscreta est atque volubilis" ("this truth and falsity is undifferentiated and alterable"). 44.

The passages suggesting variable truth values are balanced by such as these: "one is always true [and] the other always false" (II 200.14-18; p. 72 and n. 39 above); "in the latter [i.e., in contradictory opposites] it is

necessary that one always be true, the other always false" (I 115.30-31: "in hac enim unam semper veram necesse est, semper alteram falsam"). 45.

II 213.26-28: "utrisque secundum veritatem et falsitatem indefrnitis et

aequaliter ad veritatem mendaciumque vergentibus... " 46.

See pp. 72 and n. 34 above.

47.

II 208.1-18:"putaverunt autem quidam, quorum Stoici quoque sunt,

Aristotelem dicere in futuro contingentes nee veras esse nee falsas. quod enim dixit nihil se magis ad esse habere quam ad non esse, hoc putaverunt tamquam nihil eas interesset falsas an veras putari. neque veras enim neque falsas esse arbitrati sunt. sed falso. non enim hoc Aristoteles dicit, quod utraeque nee verae nee falsae sunt, sed quod una quidem ipsarum quaelibet aut vera aut falsa est, non tamen quemadmodum 91

N. Kretzmann in praeteritis definite nee quemadmodum in praesentibus, sed enuntiativarum vocum duplicem quodammodo esse naturam, quarum quaedam essent non modo in quibus verum et falsum inveniretur, sed in quibus una etiam esset definite vera, falsa altera definite, in aliis vero una quidem vera, altera falsa, sed indefinite et commutabiliter et hoc per suam naturam, non ad nostram ignorantiam atque notitiam". 48.

See, e.g. Rescher (1963: 43-54; 183-220) and Gale (1967: 183-220). As others have recently pointed out, Rescher is astonishingly wrong about Ammonius and Boethius, listing them along with Lukasiewicz as adherents of "the orthodox interpretation" (see, e.g. Gale, 1967: 186), and about the origin of what I am calling the second-oldest interpretation. Rescher calls it "the medieval interpretation" - a designation for which there is some warrant - but he also thinks it originated with Al-Farabi (ca. 870-950) (see, e.g., Gale 1967: 190). See also the articles by R.W. Sharples mentioned in nn. 15 and 22 above, esp. "Some Parallels", p. 263: "Both Ammonius and Boethius interpret Aristotle's position concerning the truth of future contingents as follows: before the event, of two propositions, one asserting that it will occur and the other that it will not, one is true and the other false, but neither definitely. This is to be contrasted with the view that predictions of future contingents do not have any truth value at all....". Also Sorabji, op.cit., p. 93. In Al-Farabi (1981: LXVIII), F.W. Zimmermann provides a variation on Reading IV: "although a proposition can be definitely true (or false) according to the usage of AlFarabi and his predecessors [such as Ammonius and Boethius], it cannot be indefinitely so. The opposite to a proposition's being definitely true (or false) is that it and its negation divide truth and falsity indefinitely. What it is for contradictories to divide the two truth-values indefinitely is best expressed by AI-Farabi at Treatise 79: indefinite division means that one of the alternatives is true (and the other false), but not this one rather than the other, In both expression and substance Al-Farabi's view of Aristotle's solution to the dilemma of De int., ch. 9 agrees with the standard interpretation of his Greek predecessors". Without presuming to challenge Zimmermann regarding AI-Farabi or his Greek predecessors, I think his reading of the second-oldest interpretation is plainly unsuited to Boethius, partly because of what Zimmermann has to say about the distinction between "definitely" and "indefinitely'', partly because of his altogether atemporal approach.

92

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle 49.

All the quotations in this paragraph are from the passage translated in full on pp. 76 above and quoted in Latin inn. 47 above.

50.

Failing to correspond is, of course, narrower than not corresponding Gust as failing to win a medal in the 1984 Olympics is narrower than not winning a medal in the 1984 Olympics). A proposition that fails to correspond to some state of affairs is one which properly understood purports to correspond and does not correspond to that (or such a) state of affairs.

51.

This pattern of truth values in terms of truth at a time and truth for a time can be presented more completely as follows (where the automatic truth-value change is also taken into account). Let J

=

"There will be a

sea battle on May 31, 1916", t0 = the instant at which the battle began, tm-to = the interval during which the beginning of the battle was ineluctable. Then the truth about the Battle of Jutland can be put this way: At every t before tm J was either-true-or-false (at t). At every t in the interval tm-to J was true (at t). At every t after t0 J was, is, and will be false (at t). At every t after t0 J was, is and will be true for all t before t 0 • 52.

Counter-examples by Christopher Hughes and Peter van Inwagen showed me that this simple, informal formulation of broad bivalence is satisfactory only if time comes to an end or only temporally definite propositions are considered. I am grateful to Carl Ginet for offering the following general formulation in response to those counter-examples. A proposition is either-true-or-false (E-T-F) at t if and only if it is neither true at t nor false at t, and either (a)

it will eventually have exactly one of those two truth values; or

(b)

(i) (ii)

it is of the form not-p, and pis E-T-F at t, or it is of the form p & q, and neither p nor q is false, and either pis E-T-F at tor q is E-T-F at t, or

(iii)

it is truth-functionally equivalent to a proposition satisfying either (i) or (ii); or

(c)

(i)

it is of the form (x)Fx, and no instance of Fx is false, and at least one instance of Fx is E-T-F at t, or

(ii)

it is of the form ( x)Fx, and no instance of Fx is true, and at least one instance of Fx is E-T-F at t.

53.

Sima Knuuttila calls attention to a detail of this component, but does not indicate what I take to be its significance. See "Time and Modality in Scholasticism" (pp. 163-257 in Knuuttila (1981: 176). 93

N. Kretzmann 54.

Reading ''praedictionis" for ''praedicationis", at Meiser's suggestion.

55.

Professor de Rijk tried at least twice to convince me that my translation of this passage cannot be supported by Boethius's Latin: "in eo quod futurum esse dicit id quod contingenter evenit fortasse mentitur". In his view the only supportable translation would read: "perhaps speaks falsely in that he says that that which contingently comes about is going to be". He is certainly right about the most natural reading of the passage. My reasons for retaining my translation are, fust, that the line of thought taken by Boethius in this passage appears to require "speaks falsely" rather than "perhaps speaks falsely" and, second, that later in this same passage Boethius appears to use ''fortasse" and "contingenter" as linked modifiers of "evenit" as I take him to be doing here - i.e., "id quod fortasse contingenter evenit" (see text inn. 60 below).

56.

Although I am reluctantly disagreeing with Professor de Rijk regarding the clause discussed in n. 55 above, my reading of this long, difficult passage has been improved at this point and elsewhere as a result of his comments on my translations of Boethius in "Nos !psi Principia Sumus: Boethius and the Basis of Contingency'', a companion-piece to this essay, in Rudavsky (1985: 23-50).

57.

Reading ''praedictionis" for ''praedicationis", at Meiser's suggestion.

58.

Reading ''praedici" for ''praedicare"; Meiser suggests ''praedicere".

59.

II 211.26-213.18: "evenit autem huiusmodi inpossibilitas ex eo quod concessum est prius, omnia quaecumque facta sunt definite vere potuisse praedici. nam si ex necessitate contingit id quod evenit, verum fuit dicere quoniam erit. quod si ex necessitate non contingit, sed contingenter, non potius verum fuit dicere quoniam erit, sed magis quoniam contingit esse. nam qui dicit erit, ille quandam necessitatem in ipsa praedicatione ponit. hoc inde intelligitur, quod si vere dicat futurum esse id quod praedicitur non possibile sit non fieri, hoc autem ex necessitate sit fieri. ergo qui dicit, quoniam erit aliquid eorum quae contingenter eveniunt, in eo quod futurum esse dicit id quod contingenter evenit fortasse mentitur; vel si contigerit res ilia quam praedicit, ille tamen mentitus est: non enim eventus falsus est, sed modus praedictionis. namque ita oportuit dicere: eras bellum navale contingenter eveniet, hoc est dicere: ita evenit, si evenerit, ut potuerit non evenire. qui ita dicit verum dicit, eventumenim contingenter praedixit. qui autem ita infit: eras bellum erit navale, quasi necesse sit, ita pronuntiat. quod si evenerit, non iam idcirco quia praedixit verum dixerit, quoniam id quod contingenter eventurum erat

94

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle necessarie futurum praedixit. non ergo in eventu est falsitas, sed in praedictionis modo. quemadmodum enim si quis ambulante Socrate dicat: Socrates ex necessitate ambulat, ille mentitus est non in eo quod Socrates ambulat, sed in eo quod non ex necessitate ambulat, quod ille eum ex necessitate ambulare praedicavit, ita quoque in hoc qui dicit quoniam erit aliquid, etiam hoc si fiat, ille tamen falsus est, non in eo quod factum est, sed in eo quod non ita factum est, ut ille praedixit esse futurum. quod si verum esse! definite, ex necessitate esset futurum. igitur ex necessitate futurum esse praedixit, quodcumque sine ullo alio modo eventurum pronuntiavit. quare non in eventu rei, sed in praedicationis enuntiatione falsitas invenitur. oportet enim in contingentibus ita aliquid praedicere, si vera erit enuntiatio, ut dicat qnidem futurum esse aliquid, sed ita, ut rursus relinquat esse possibile, ut futurum non sit. haec autem est contingentis natura contingenter in enuntiatione praedicare. quod si quis simpliciter id quod fortasse contingenter eveniet futurum esse praedixerit, ille rem contingentem necessarie futuram praedicit. atque ideo etiam si evenerit id quod dicitur, tamen iile mentitus est in eo quod hoc quidem contingenter evenit, ille autem ex necessitate futurum esse praedixerat". 60.

The closest approximation I have found in Ammonius to the material I want to call attention to in Boethius is at 145.9-19, where many of the features I think are most interesting in Boethius's account are not to be found. I know very little about the Greek commentators, and so my observation about Boethius's predecessors depends not on my first-hand knowledge of any sources other than Ammonius but only on my perhaps rash assumption that if it does occur elsewhere it would have been noted in the literature and I would have come across the notice of it.

61.

There is not much more in the second commentary that strikes me as directly relevant to this idea, and the corresponding portion of the first commentary (I 113.12-114.24) contains nothing essential to Boethius's idea here.

62.

Although Boethius's examples always involve indexicals rather than temporally definite expressions, it is clear that he takes them to be temporally definite. See II 202.27-28, where he says expressly of propositions involving "tomorrow" that they "define the time". Cf. n. 52 above.

63.

II 212.10-12; cf. II 212.26-213.1; 213.15-16. (References like these, to parts

95

N. Kretzmann of the long passage quoted on pp. 80-82p. 00 and in n. 59 above, will not be accompanied by the Latin in the notes.) 64.

II 215.16-19: "qui autem Aristotelen arbitrati sunt utrasque propositiones in futuro falsas arbitrari, si haec quae nunc dicit diligentissime perlegissent, numquam tantis raptarentur erroribus".

65.

II 213.1.

66.

II 212.10, 12, 23-24; 213.16 (In "Nos !psi Principia Sumus" [n. 56 above] I

67.

II 212.2-3, 18-19.

68.

II 212.12-13. 21-22; 213.6-7.

69.

Seep. 83-84 and n. 64 above.

70.

As Simo Knuuttila has pointed out to me, there is a suggestion of a

translated "mentitur" in some of these passages as "says something false".)

distinction between propositions and assertions of propositions in Boethius's De sylloqismo categorico I (PL 64, 803D). But it concerns only times of assertion and is irrelevant to Boethius's idea here. 71.

II 211.27-28.

72.

II 213.3-4.

73.

II 211.29-212.3.

74.

II 212.4-5.

75.

II 212.12-13, 21-22; 213.6-7; and cf. 212.18-20; 213.1-2, 15-18.

76.

II 212.21-22.

77.

See pp. 71-74 above.

78.

II 212.16-20.

79.

I translated it this way in my quotation of this passage in "Nos !psi

Principia Sumus" (n. 56 above). 80.

II 213.6-7.

81.

If I had no qualms about anachronistic formulations, I would lay out the implicit embedding proposition in this generalized way: As of the moment [time and date] of my present utterance of this very token of the (temporally definite) proposition p, it is already settled (i.e., definitely true) that p. intend this formulation to be appropriate for assertion (as Boethius conceives of it) regardless of the tense of p.

82.

II 210.15-21: "praesentis temporis naturam cum futuri enuntiatione

coniungit. ait enim simile esse de praesentibus enuntiare secundum veritatis necessitatem et de futuris: nam si verum est dicere, quoniam est aliquid, esse necesse est, et si verum est dicere, quoniam erit, futurum sine dubio esse necesse est..." 96

Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's seabattle 83.

II 212.22-213.2.

84.

II 212.13-16. Cf. II 212.1-3;213.7-10.

85.

II 212.18-19

86.

II 229.11-12: "de necessitate rei eventurae nihil moveret".

87.

For historical information about and philosophical appraisal of some of these developments see, e.g., Adams and Kretzmann (1983), Knuuttila (1982); Normore (1982); Knuuttila (1985: 3-22) and Normore in Rudavsky, op. cit. 3-22.

88.

I benefited immeasurably from being able to discuss the materials of this paper with Eleonore Stump as I was writing it, and I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen, Gail Fine, Carl Ginet, Christopher Hughes, Peter van Inwagen, Simo Knuuttila, L.M. de Rijk, Richard Sorabji, Michael J. White, and David Widerker for their comments on earlier drafts.

97

THE VIEWS OF PETER OF SPAIN ON PROPOSITIONAL COMPOSITION H.A.G. Braakhuis Catholic University of Nijmegen

As is well-known, in medieval and early modern theories concerning the nature and status of propositions the notion of combination or composition played an important role. This is mainly bound up with the influence of Aristotle's views with regard to that subject. Broadly speaking one may distinguish three aspects or levels concerning the notion of combination or composition. In the first place there is the combination or composition in the verbal sphere, i.e. a proposition always consists of a combination of words, especially a noun and a verb. Almost everyone was in agreement on that point. In the second place there is the combination or composition in the mental sphere. This is the idea that parallel to the combination in the verbal sphere there should also exist a combination or composition in the mental one. Many were in agreement as well about this aspect, though the precise nature of the combination or composition in the mental sphere could be interpreted differently. In the third place one may distinguish the combination or composition with regard to the content or object. This is the view that

the

combination on the part of the subject - either in the verbal or in the mental sphere - has a counterpart, viz. a combination or composition to which the 'subjective' combination is related. This combination then is seen as that which forms the content of the mental composition or the object of knowledge conveyed by the latter, or, to put it differently, as that which forms the propositional signification. As is already known, there were different views concerning the status of this 'objective' composition. Some regarded it as an external composite thing towards which the mental act of propositional composition is directed. Others, however, merely identified it with a peculiar mode of being in the mind. This mode of being was explained as a being within the field of intellectual vision or as being something known in the knowing mind,

as a kind of being, therefore, which is

completely dependent upon an act of conceiving. Those who supported this view 99

HA.G. Braakhuis

were the adherents of the so-called 'theory of objective existence'. Again others were of the opinion that one should assume a kind of being sui generis as the total or adequate significate of the propositional conception: they supported the 'complexe-significabile' theory. Although these complexe significabilia were not

considered as real entities in the sense of substances or accidents, they were nevertheless still regarded as quite independent of the acts of conceiving that may be directed towards them: they were considered as some kind of propositional things or states of affairs. Those who considered the external composite thing as the propositional signification may in a certain sense be regarded as the ones who· had the most complete conception of the composition. For with them it is most obvious that the composition covers all three areas of the verbal sphere, mental sphere and the outside world of real entities, while the compositions on these three levels are interdependent and mutually related to each other. In his monumental studies on the history of the semantics of declarative sentences, from which the above-mentioned has been taken 1, Gabriel Nuchelmans has drawn attention to three groups of representatives of this conception during the Middle Ages. The first are the contemporaries of Abaelard, whom he mentions as the ones who held the view that a proposition signifies - besides a composite thought - the things themselves that are signified by its parts: in this way a proposition of the form homo est animal as a whole signifies simultaneously both man and animal in such a way that the one is the othez-2. Secondly there is the conception of the enuntiabile referred to by the author of the Ars Meliduna. According to this view a true enuntiabile, such as Socratem esse album, is nothing but the circumstance that the property of being white

actually belongs to Socrates, the significate of a proposition thus being identified with a composition (or division) in the outside world3. Thirdly, there are notably the views of Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists, according to whom the composition in the mind, being the mental proposition, has a correlate in a composition in the things of the outside world (composition in re naturali), which is either an unity of matter and form or a unity of accident and

substance4• Thomas and the Thomists are doubtless the main representatives of the view that a composition in the outside world corresponds to the composition in the mind, since in their theories the mutual connection and dependence of the compositions on the various levels is the most obvious. For the e,omposition in the outside reality is explicitly considered as the foundation and cause of the mental

100

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

compositions. Furthermore, as has been made clear by Nuchelmans, these views of Thomas and the Thomists not only constitute one of the four main theories on the proposition in the Middle Ages, but they also formed part of the views which survived during the period of the birth of modern philosophy. They may therefore have influenced the views of modern philosophers. However, there is another adherent of the view that a composition m the outside world corresponds to the composition in the mind, who not only may have influenced the views of Thomas in this respect, but who on his own may also have had some influence in the Middle Ages and the early modern period, viz. Peter of Spain. This contribution is aimed at giving a frrst outline of his views concerning this subject.

In his Tractatus, Peter of Spain's most well-known and influential work in the field of logic, the notion of composition in the sense of propositional composition hardly figures at all. In fact he only refers to this sort of composition in the passage where he says that modal adverbs should be a determination of the composition6. In his other great work on logic, the Syncategoremata, on the other hand, the propositional composition is discussed in detail. As appears from the early editions of Peter of Spain's logical works - which sometimes also include the Syncategoremata - this work has exerted some influence as well, at least during the 15th and 16th century7 . The Syncategoremata probably dates from the same time as the Tractatus, i.e. the thirties of the thirteenth century. The treatise is constructed in such a way that frrst a short introduction is given on the meaning of syncategoremata in general (de significatione dictionum syncategoreumaticarum in genere), which is defined as the meaning of a disposition of the subject - or predicate term precisely in its function as such. Next the meaning of the separate syncategoremata is dealt with (de significatione earum in specie). Priority is given to 'est' and 'non', since, as is pointed out, 'est' and 'non' are conceived per se in the other syncategoremata, being indeed included within the definitions or descriptions of the other syncategoremata8 . The discussion of 'est' and 'non' is then followed by a discussion of the more or less usual series of syncategorematic terms9, though usually no indication is given of the precise nature of their connection·with 'est' arid 'non'. Since, as it is said, 'est' means the composition, the treatment of 'est' is arranged as a treatment of the composition 10 . And since the composition is not only found in 'est' - and on this basis in the other verbs - but also in other 101

H.A.G. Braakhuis

things, the treatment begins with composition in general. According to Peter composition belongs to the category of relation, since composition is a composition of the composed elements, these elements being composed by means of the composition 11 . Then a distinction is made between two kinds of composition: a composition of things (compositio rernm) and one of modes of signifying (compositio modornm significandi). The first kind is marked off in five ways; viz. the one of form with matter (jonne cum materia, ut anime cum corpore), the one of accident with its subject (accidentis cum subiecto, ut co loris cum corpore), the one of the capacities

together with that to which they belong (potentiarnm sive virtutum cum eo cuius sunt, ut intellectus cum anima), the one of the integral parts with their whole (panium integralium ad se invicem in suo toto) and the one of the differences

with their genus for the formation of species (differentiarnm cum suo genere ad constitutionem speciernm). Peter adds to this that some of these compositiones rernm belong to the physicist, others to the mathematician and again others to

the logician. One may assume that the fust applies to the compositions of the first three kinds, the second to the fourth one and the third to the fifth. So according to Peter the logician deals with compositions of things. When bifurcating the two kinds of compositions he had already observed that the composition of the modes of signifying belongs to the territory of the grammarian. This distinction between the territory of the logician and the one of the gra=arian and the assignment of the propositional composition - which belongs to the compositions of the modes of signifying - to the territory of the grammarian can both be seen as an indication of the significance of grammatical theories with regard to the effectuation of the medieval logical-semantic theories of the propositional analysis 12. We shall see, however, that the compositions of the modes of signifying are associated with certain compositions of things. The composition of the modes of signifying is in its turn also divided into two kinds: on the one hand the composition of the quality with substance (compositio qualitatis cum substantia), which is signified by a noun, and on the other the

composition of an act with substance (actus cum substantia). Since the propositional composition in which we are interested belongs to the second kind, we shall particularly concentrate on Peter's treatment of this one. In this connection, however, some aspects of the treatment of the fust kind are of importance as well. Peter makes it for clear for instance that both the

substanc~

and the quality

are signified by one and the same noun and that both are united by it 13· In this

102

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition connection he also indicates that although a noun signifies both a substance and a quality and therefore various things, there is still no question of equivocation, since the quality is the ratio or the principle of understanding the substance, so there are not two different meanings but only one 14 . A similar emphasis on the mutual connection between substance and quality by means of the composition comes to the fore when Peter declares that although according to reason a noun comprises three things, viz. substance, quality and their composition, in reality, however, there are only the substance and quality15• From the arguments he presents in this case we may conclude, first of all, that in his opinion this kind of composition of the modes of signifying is based on a composition of things. That means it is based on the composition of a form or quality with their subject, i.e. on the natural inclination of a form etc. towards that in which they are and without which they cannot be actual. In the second place it appears that for Peter a composition as a relation - and perhaps every relation - only has the status of a relational being and not of a real one. The discussion of the question why there is no double composition of the quality with substance is of special interest, since the answer to this problem already reveals some essential characteristics of the propositional composition. In the question it is stated that, just as with the composition of an act with a substance there is a double composition - viz. the composition of an united act (cornpositio actus WJiti), such as with a participle, and the composition of an act

that stands apart (cornpositio actus ut distantis), such as with a verb - this should also be the case with the composition of quality with substance; in this connection the difference between 'homo albus' and 'homo est albus' is pointed out. In his answer Peter maintains that only the composition of an act with substance can be double, since only an act can be conceived in two ways. The first one concerns the act in so far it has an inclination towards a substance, the act being said of something else according to this inclination: this composition is found within a verb, since a verb is a sign of something being said of something else. In the second way the act is taken without that inclination, which happens within a participle 16. Peter argues that such an inclination only occurs with an act and that this is the only way in which predication of a subject can come about, because it is precisely this constitution of the mind which brings about this particular inclination, for only by means of an act can the mind have an inclination towards reality in order to declare something of something else 17• According to Peter the examples 'homo albus' and 'homo est albus' are not correct, since in the example 'homo albus' we have an accidental quality in 'al-

103

H.A.G. Braakhuis bus', whereas the composition of a noun deals with the composition of a substance with its essential quality. In the case of 'homo est albus' there is indeed question of a composition with a distant quality, but this comes about through the inclination of the verb, viz. 'esse' 18 • In the following part on the composition of the act with a substance once again the distinction is brought forward between on the one hand the composition of the act which is united with the substance (compositio actus uniti cum substantia), which is found in the participle and on the other hand the composition

of the act, standing apart from the substance (compositio actus ut distantis a substantia), occurring within the verb 19.

Thus it becomes clear that Peter of Spain defmes the propositional composition as such a compositio actus ut distantis a substantia, since only this type of composition involves a relation of a predicate to a subject. It also becomes apparent that he considers the propositional composition as a certain kind of composition of the modes of signifying. This may also be confirmed from what he says about the difference between the three kinds of inclinations discussed before, viz. the inclination of the quality to substance and the one of the act to substance, the latter being either united or standing apart. For in this connection he states again that the inclination of the act as standing apart - being the inclination of the verb - is the inclination by means of which the act or verb is of something else as a predicate of a subject. Furthermore Peter emphatically declares that the composition of the verb differs from the two other compositions in the same way as the three inclinations do. It is of interest to note that he adds to this that the difference between the composition of the verb and the other kinds of compositions is properly speaking not related to the fact that the composition of the verb is subject to truth or falsity - for this is only a consequence and also does not always apply but only in case of a verb in the indicative mood20 . Thus far we have seen that Peter makes a distinction between three kinds of compositions of the modes of signifying, and in the section on composition only these three kinds mentioned are discussed. The section on the negation makes clear, however, that according to Peter there is yet a fourth kind. For Peter argues that a distinction should be made between an oratio negativa, in which the predicate is negated in relation to the subject, and an oratio affirmativa with a negative predicate or, to put it correctly, with an infinite predicate, so that a sentence as 'Sortes non currit' may be interpreted either as the negation of 'Sortes currit' or as 'Sortes est non-currens'. As a result o( this he assumes that

104

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

there are four kinds of negations: three of a term, viz. the one of a noun, the one of a participle and the one of the predicate term, and finally a negation of the sentence as the fourth kind. In accordance with this division of negation he now also indicates a fourth kind of composition besides the three mentioned before, for now a further distinction is made of the composition of the act as standing apart. On the one hand there is the composition of the act as standing apart from a substance with that separate substance (compositio actus distantis a substantia exteriori cum substantia exteriori), that is the compositio actus distantis, which we have come across up to now. On the other hand there is the composition of an act as standing apart from a substance with the substance inside that act (compositio actus distantis a substantia cum substantia intra). Consequently it becomes apparent that a sentence as 'Sortes currit' should properly speaking be analyzed as 'Sortes est res currens', 'res' indicating the substance which is internally conceived in 'currit'21 . In this way the propositional composition appears to be a composition of elements - subject and predicatewhich, as a noun, participle or verb, each by themselves, have their own internal composition. The propositional composition is the only one to effectuate a composition between things standing apart. We have seen before that Peter makes reference to the constitution of the mind in order to explain the propositional composition, since only the mind is able to declare something of something else by means of an act. The same aspect comes to the fore when he discusses the question why this composition is signified by the verb (the predicate) and not by the noun (the subject), though the composition is still equally related to both. In this connection Peter makes a distinction between the relation of the composition with regard to the objects and its relation with regard to the subject that brings about

the composition.

Concerning the objects of the composition the latter is equally related to both, but with regard to the subject (the mind) the emphasis is on the act and therefore on the verb22• The role of the mind and its activities also gets ample attention in the treatment of the problem concerning what precedes in the verb: the composition of which the result is that the act is of something else (compositio per quam actus est de altero) or the inclination of that act towards the substance (inclinatio actus ad substantiam). In this connection Peter observes that there is a double inclination of the act with regard to the substance, viz. on the one hand the inclination having the act as accident with regard to its subject, the

actus

in subiecto, which precedes the composition, and on the other hand the

105

H.A.G. Braakhuis

inclination of the act referring to the subject (actus de subiecto) in so far as the mind is inclined to enunciate the act of the substance, which follows after the composition23 . In order to illustrate this he presents a picture of the activities of the mind when understanding the similarities of reality: first the mind perceives that the realities conform to each other, then it agrees to this and combines the realities within itself and fmally it enunciates one of the other. The conformity is the startingpoint in this process, but it is caused by the natural inclination of one reality to another, that is the natural inclination of the act as accident within its subject (actus in subiecto ). The final stage is marked by the inclination of the mind to enunciate the act of the substance (actus de subiecto) and it is this second inclination through which the modalities of the verb come about24 . The latter is then further elaborated by Peter, indicating that within the mind, after it has apprehended the act with regard to the substance, an affect is effectuated concerning the relation between the act and the substance and that it is also that affect which determines that the inclination to enunciate the act of the substance is expressed in the form of a declaration, a command, etcetera25. The picture given here of the activities of the mind and especially their sequence of first perceiving (cognoscere, apprehendere) and then agreeing, combining and enunciating (consentire, componere and enuntiare) may indeed be compared with the scheme: receptio (or apprehensio) - judicium (the judicium being tied to the composition), which is found in the Expositio libri de anima, also originating from Peter26• This similarity between both works is yet another indication that Peter wishes to emphasize the prominent part being played according to him by the activities of the mind in the realizing of the propositional composition. From what has been said above it is evident that in Peter's view not only the composition of the noun, but also the propositional composition is based on the composition of things, in this case on the composition the act as an accidens has with its subject. The same aspect comes up again

when he discusses the question how this

composition may be conceived, since Aristotle declares that this cannot be done without the composita (De Interpretatione, 16b24-25). In this connection Peter explicitly points out that the composition of the act with the substance is conceived by means of the composita themselves, since the act is inherent within its subject on behalf of itself, as is the case with any accident27 . Following on Aristotle's remark Peter is of the opinion that this direct connection between the component parts indicates that the composition, separate from the things 106

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition composed, is nothing at all and therefore cannot be understood without the composita as well28 • And Peter adds to this - as if to remove any obscuritythat the composition of the verb - that is the propositional composition - is a sign of the composition being in reality, that is, the true composition which exists as something indivisible29 . The direct causal connection Peter makes between the verbal composition and the one in reality raises a difficulty. For this might imply that without a composition in reality there also cannot be a composition on the verbal level, which would deny the possibility of negative sentences. For in its indicating a division in reality the negation would have nothing on which to base the propositional or syntactical composition of the negative sentence. It is evident from a passage in the section on negation that Peter has been aware of this difficulty. For the problem is explicitly raised and it is argued that the negation removes the composition, but the composition forms the basis of the mood, which means that a negative sentence cannot have a mood and therefore also no indicative one, which implies that it cannot be either true or false. Peter solves this problem by making a distinction between a general composition and a special one: the latter indicates either a specific action or being-acted-upon of one (given by the extremes of the proposition) and the former indicates action or being-acted-upon in a general way. From this he concludes that the special composition is indeed removed by the negation, but that the general one is kept unimpeded, thus being the basis of the mood and consequently of truth and falsehood 30 . The above made reference to Aristotle's De intepretatione makes it absolutely clear that the expositions on the composition of the verb mentioned before should be considered as ultimately dealing with the composition being effectuated by the verb 'esse' (though this could already have been concluded both from Peter's comment on 'est' being implied in each verb and from his analyses of 'currit' as equivalent to '(est) res currens'). However, there is no indication whatsoever that Peter has a notion of the verb 'to be' as involving the nature of an act, that is, an actus essendi. The reference concerned also indicates in fact that the remarks made on the composition of the act with substance apparently should not be understood as merely referring to sentences as 'homo currit' and not to sentences as 'homo est animal' as well. From examples given by Peter we shall in fact see that this would not be correct. Finally it is evident from the reference to and Peter's interpretation of Aristotle's text, that the complete significative capacity of 'est' is enclosed in and 107

H.A.G. Braakhuis

limited to the indication of the composition, i.e. the indication of the composita in their composition, for in his opinion the composition is nothing without the composita. Indeed no indication may be found with Peter that besides indicating the composition, 'est' would have another significative capacity, viz. the function of a predicate indicating existence3 1• From what has been said before we have seen that according to Peter the verbal or propositional composition is not only based upon but also a sign of a composition in reality. One could conclude from this that Peter is of the opinion that a propositional composition should be based upon a composition really existing in the external, material or at least concrete, world. That this is not simply the case becomes evident, however, from the remaining part of his treatment of the composition, in which he focuses on the nature of being of the composition. In this part in the first place the question is brought forward whether the composition should be considered as a simple being or not. In this connection it is pointed out that the composition may both be found in existent objects ('homo est animal') as in non-existent ones ('chimera est non ens'), from which fact it should follow that the composition is a being in a certain manner (ens quodammodo). In his answer Peter completely agrees with this conclusion32. However, when discussing the next question whether the verbal composition is equally related to both the composition of beings and non-beings, Peter declares, though without giving any further arguments, that the composition primarily refers to the composition of beings33. Peter's view that the composition in its general form is a being in a certain manner is contested again, however. For, it is argued, the extremes indeed have their being according to the requirements of the composition, but when the composition is a being in a certain manner, a sentence as for instance 'the Antichrist is a man' would be equivalent to 'the Antichrist is a man in a certain manner', which is not correct. In .his answer to this objection, however, Peter sticks to his opinion that the composition in its general form is a being in a certain manner and according to him this also applies to the extremes. However, he adds that the composition considered as one of beings is a simple being. Thus, in the sentence 'the Antichrist is a man' one is dealing therefore with a composition of beings 34. Peter otherwise rejects the view that the extremes have their being according to the requirements of the composition, for he maintains that it is neither true that when the extremes are, their composition is, nor that when the composition is, its extremes are. For in a case like 'man is a donkey'

108

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

the extremes are but their composition not, while in a case like 'a chimera is a non-being' the composition is, but not is extremes. What is true, however, is that when the extremes are in conformity with each other, their composition is as well, or the reverse35 . The fact that in case of 'the Antichrist is a man' we are dealing with a composition of beings apparently depends on the extremes and possibly mainly on the predicate. That this is indeed Peter's opinion appears from the discussion of the last question in the section on composition. Once again the problem is raised whether or not the composition stands in an equal relation to the composition of beings and non-beings. For it is argued that both kinds of compositions may simply be true, but then also the truth of both kinds should be a simple being and therefore the composition of both kinds, as bearers of that truth, as well. In his answer Peter sticks to his opinion that the composition is primarily a composition of beings and secondarily a composition of non-beings. He accordingly rejects the view that both the truth of a composition of beings and the one of a composition of non-beings would be a simple being. According to him the truth of beings has the nature of a simple being, but the one of non-beings only of a being in a certain manner. For the truth of (the composition of) beings is brought about by (1) the conformity of the extremes (convenientia extremorum) and (2) the fact that the extremes are simple beings, the truth of (the composition of) non-beings, however, is only based upon the first-mentioned cause36 . This makes it evident that for Peter the nature of being of the extremes not only determines the nature of being of the composition, but also its nature of truth: only when the extremes are simple beings the truth of the composition is one as well. Further confirmation of the fact that according to Peter the extremes and especially the predicate indeed determine the relation of being of the composition is to be found in a passage from the section on negation. In connection with the question whether an infinite verb can be predicated of a being, it is stated there that this is indeed the case, since on such an occasion there is an affirmative composition which posits a being because it posits its subject as being. In his answer Peter indicates that this is not correct, since, as he declares here, a composition stands in an equal relation to beings and non-beings and only if the predicate is a simple being the composition posits its subject as being. If the predicate is a being in a certain manner, however, the composition does not posit its subject in being37. The preceding discussion leaves no doubt that to Peter the composition, and accordingly the verb 'est' as its sign, is essentially neutral with regard to being 109

H.A.G. Braakhuis and non-being, although there is a certain priority with regard to being. Or to put it differently: for Peter 'est' is a mere

container for a 'real' ('thing-like')

content conveyed by the predicate38. Furthermore it is obvious that Peter is of the opinion that the existential import comes from the extremes, especially from the predicate. It is only when the predicate is a simple being that the composition as a whole relates to simple being. The fact that nevertheless according to Peter the composition has a certain priority with regard to

being or reality may

perhaps be explained by the situation that most predicates are indeed related to being and reality. There are otherwise certain indications that for Peter the simple being or reality to which the propositional composition may refer because. of the right predicates, not necessarily needs to coincide with

concrete or factual being.

Especially with regard to predication of essential forms as in 'homo est animal' Peter appears to be of the opinion that the composition in reality forming the basis of the truth of the propositional composition concerned is a composition on the level of a relation of essences, the latter being independent of concrete or factual being, in this case concrete or factual men39 • Having come to the end of the present discussion of Peter of Spain's views concerning the propositional composition, we may safely conclude that he presents not only a comprehensive but also a well elaborated theory with regard to this subject. The views concerned are apparently derived from the opinions of grammarians, especially the ones developed since the second half of the 12th century. They are also connected, however, with certain views regarding the activities or operations of the mind, which though ultimately springing from Aristotle may have been influenced by Avicenna. It is evident in any case that Peter's views on the propositional composition

should be considered an important chapter within the history of propositional theories. This is not only because of the influence they may have exerted on Thomas Aquinas40, but also because they have certainly influenced Thomists and other scholars later on in the :LS~h and 16th century. Finally, however, they are also of importance in their own right.

NOTES

1. 110

See Nuchelmans (1973), (1980) and (1983).

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

2.

Nuchelmans (1973: 150 cfr also 209).

3.

Ibid., p. 171. Cfr. alsop. 209.

4.

See Nuchelmans (1980: 37, 70-76) and Nuchelmans (1983: 14-16).

5.

Cf. e.g. Thomas Aquinas, In XII Libras Methaphysicornm, IX, 11, n. 1898: Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et materiae, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis compositioni quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Referred to by Nuchelmans (1982: 15).

6.

See Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. de Rijk,. p. 1125-122, 128 - 16. Cf. also the Index verbornm et rernm, s.v.

comparatio, complexio and compositio,

concerning the minor role of the notion of propositional composition. 7.

Editions of the Syncategoremata may especially be found in the editions of Peter's logical works edited by the Cologne Thomists (bursa Montana); this is the case with those of 1489 ( = Hain 8702), 1490? ( = Hain 8700), 1493 ( = Hain 8704) and 1494 ( = Hain 8705). The same goes for the editions combined with Johannes Versor's commentary, that is in the Venetian editions of this work, probably as early as in the one of 1496 ( = Hain 8693) and subsequently up to the one of 1610 (Cf. Mullally: 1945: 139-141 and 157-158 and Risse 1965). As to the editions by the Cologne Thomists, the socalled

Copulata-

editions, it should be noticed that they present in fact an adaption of the Syncategoremata. This adaption differs not only from Peter's text with

regard to the internal structure of the sections of the treatise, but it also presents doctrinal points of divergence with Peter's text. This is especially the case with the sections on the consecutive terms and the one on modal terms. These editions only remain rather faithful to Peter's own text from the section on 'nisi' onwards. The same applies, of course, to the translation of Mullally (1964). One of the Venetian Versor-editions, viz. the one of 1572 (apud F. Sansovinum ), has been reprinted anastatically in 1981 ( = Petrns Hispanus

1981). As has become apparent from that edition, the Parvornm logicalium Petro Hispano ascriptum opus is no other than Peter's Syncategoremata. This

111

HAG. Braakhuis edition presents a text that, apart from a replacement of the sections on 'incipit' and 'desinit', on 'necessaria' and 'contingenter' and on the reduplicatio 'in eo quod', is equivalent to the text as given in the manuscripts. In the citations, which are based on some of the manuscripts, I shall refer, for reasons of convenience, to the folia-numbers of that reprint. 8.

Habito quod dictiones sincategoreumatice significant dispositiones subiecti inquantum est subiectum et predicati inquantum est predicatum, et sic cognita significatione earum in genere, nunc dicendum est de significatione uniuscuiusque earum in specie, et prius de prioribus, quia ut vult Aristotiles: de prioribus prior est speculatio. Cum ergo in dictionibus syncategoreumaticis per se intelligantur 'est' et 'non' et non econverso, ideo 'est' et 'non' sunt priora illis et ideo prius de hiis est dicendum .... Sciendum ergo quod 'est' et 'non' intelliguntur in dictionibus sincategoreumaticis secundum primum modum eius quod est 'per se', quia intelliguntur in diffinitionibus sive descriptionibus earum. 'Solus' enim sive 'tatnum' est: "non cum alio", et 'desinit': "quod est et de cetero non erit" vel "nunc ultimo est", et sic de aliis. Et ideo 'est' et 'non' sunt priora dictionibus sincategoreumaticis. (f. 264r + v).

9.

They are, in this order, the dictiones exclusive, ut 'tantum', 'solus', the dictiones exceptive, ut 'preter', 'preterquam' et 'nisi', the dictiones consecutive, the verba 'incipit', 'desinit', the dictiones 'necessaria' et 'contingenter', the coniunctiones 'an' and 'vel' and 'et' and 'nisi', the reduplicatio 'in eo quod', the coniunctio 'quin', the dictio 'quanto', the dictio 'quam', and the dictio 'quicquid'. Finally, there are short discussions de interrogatione et responsione, de divisione sillogismorum a parte conclusionis and de ostensione sillogismorum. This way of ordering based on 'est' and 'non' as the principles of the syncategorematic terms, is in agreement with the ordering as found in the treatises of John le Page, Nicholas of Paris and Henry of Ghent, and Peter presents in this way what might be labeled the continental ordering. For the differences between on the one hand the continental treatises on syncategorematical terms and on the other the insular ones, cfr. Braakhuis 1981, esp. pp. 138-141. For a general presentation of Peter of Spain's Syncategoremata and of the other 13th century treatises on syncategorematic terms, see Braakhuis 1979.

10. In fact, Peter says here that 'est' consignifies the composition (nota ergo quod hoc verbum 'est' consignificat compositionem, f. 264v); we shall come back to this point later on. 112

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition 11.

Sciendum ergo quod compositio ad aliquid est, quia compositio est compositorum compositio et composita sunt compositione composita; quare compositio in predicamento relationis est (f: 264v-265r).

12.

For this influence, cf. de Rijk (1967).

13.

Omne ergo nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate. Verbi gratia: homo, ut ita dicam, est res habens humanitatem. Et res est substantia eius, humanitas autem, secundum quod significatur per hoc nomen 'homo', est qualitas eius, et non secundum quod significatur per hoc nomen 'humanitas', quia hoc nomen 'humanitas' est nomen aliud et diversum ab hoc nomine 'homo', et unum non est qualitas alterius neque econverso. Sed qualitas uniuscuiusque nominis per ipsum nomen significatur; 'homo' enim significat suam substantiam et suam qualitatem et hec duo sunt unita in eo, ita quod unum significatur in altero sive per alterum (f. 265r).

14.

Qualitas enim nominis est ratio sive principium intelligendi ipsum nomen et suam substantiam. Et sic qualitas significatur per nomen ut principium intelligendi, substantia vero significatur per ipsum nomen ut quod intelligitur per ipsam qualitatem. Et primum intelligitur per alterum, ideo non sunt ibi deverse significationes sed una. Et propter hoc iste modus significandi plura non facit equivocationem (f. 265r).

15.

Compositio qualitatis com substantia est aliquid, et in nomine non sunt nisi duo secundum rem, tria vero secundum rationem, scilicet substantia et qualitas et compositio earum, quia qualitas se ipsa componitur cum substantia propter inclinationem quam habet ad substantiam. Omnis enim forma et omnis qualitas et etiam omne accidens naturalem habet inclinationem ad id in quo est, quia non habent esse actuale sive esse in actu, nisi in eo in quo sunt (f.265v).

16.

Et dicendum quod compositio actus cum substantia debet esse duplex et non compositio qualitatis cum substantia, quia actus sumitur duobus modis. Uno enim modo secundum quod habet inclinationem ad substantiain, secundum quam inclinationem dicitur de altero. Verbum enim, ut vult Aristotiles, est nota eorum que de altero predicantur. Alio autem modo sumitur actus privatus ista inclinatione, et sic est in participio. Et quia actus sumitur hiis duobus modis, ideo duplex est compositio actus cum substantia, et una est in participio et alia est in verbo, que est compositio actus ut distantis, eo quod verbum per earn est de altero ut predicatum de subiecto (f. 265v).

17.

Sed quia predicta inclinatio non potest esse in qualitate, sed tantum in actu, eo quod anima non potest inclinari ad res ut enuntiet unum de altero nisi 113

H.A.G. Braakhuis

mediante actu et non mediante qualitate, ideo qualitas non potest significari ut distans, sed semper significatur ut unita (f. 265v-266r). 18.

It is a pity that Peter does not discuss the example of 'homo albus'

thoroughly. That would have been informative as to the point whether he accepts, besides compositio actus distantis, something like composition indistans, as was done in the 14th century by John Buridan, cf. Nuchelmans 1973:

244-246). Anyhow, Peter is certainly aware of the referential difference between 'homo albus' and 'homo est albus', see the Tractatus, ed. de Rijk, pp. 200.11-12 and 210.9-25. 19.

Dicta de compositione in communi, cuius alia erat compositio rerum et alia compositio modorum, et iterum compositio modorum subdividebatur, quia alia erat compositio qualitatis cum substantia, alia vera compositio actus cum substantia, cum habitum sit de compositione qualitatis cum substantia, consequenter dicendum est de compositione actus cum substantia. Compositionis ergo actus cum substantia alia est actus uniti, ut in participio, alia vera est actus distantis, ut in verba .... Quod autem in verba sit compositio actus ut distantis a substantia patet per hoc quod actus significatus per verbum semper significatur ut de altero - cum enim dico: 'currit', oportet intelligere subiectum determinatum vel indeterminatum de quo dicatur 'currit'- ut predicatum de subiecto (f. 266v).

20.

Et per se loquendo non differunt iste tres compositiones per hoc quod compositio verbi est subiectum veritatis et falsitatis, alie vera non, quia ista differentia est sumpta a posteriori. Preterea compositio verbi non est subiectum veritatis et falsitatis simpliciter, quia hoc tantum est in indicativa modo et non in allis modis in quibus est compositio (f. 266v). This text may be indicative of the fact that in Peter's views on propositional composition the role of the declarative proposition is not as dominant as is usually the case in the history of semantics.

21.

Quod autem sint quattuor compositiones patet quia quedam compositio est qualitatis cum substantia, ut in quolibet nomine; et negatio ei opposita facit nomen infinitum, ut 'non-homo'. Et alia est actus uniti substantie cum substantia, ut in participio; et negatio opposita ei facit participium esse infinitum, ut 'non-legens'. Tertia vera compositio est actus distantis a substantia exteriori cum substantia exteriori ut 'Sortes currit'; et negatio ei opposita facit orationem negativam, ut 'Sortes non currit'. Quarta vera est actus distantis a substantia exteriori cum substantia intra; et negatio ei opposita facit verbum infinitum, ut 'non-currit', 'non-laborat', ... Et nota

114

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

quod verbum duplici substantie comparatur, scilicet substantie exteriori, que reddit ei suppositum, ut 'Sortes currit', et substantie interiori, que infinite intelligitur in ipso, quia 'currit' idem est quod 'res currens'. Et currens est ipse actus, res est substantia interius intellecta (f. 268v-269r). 22.

Dico ergo quod compositio secundum comparationem quam habet ad obiectum sive ad obiecta equaliter se habet ad utrumque extremorum. Sed secundum comparationem quam habet ad subiectum, quod est ipsum componens, magis se habet ad unum quam ad alterum, quia cum ipsum componens sit anima et anima non possit componere nisi mediante actu, ideo magis se habet compositio ad actum quam ad relictum extremorum, et cum actus significetur per verbum et non per nomen, ideo magis debet compositio significari per verbum quam per nomen (f. 266v).

23.

Et dicendum quod actus duplicem habet inclinationem ad substantiam; et una earum natura prior est compositione altera vera posterior, quia cum omnis actus sit accidens et non econverso, ipsi actui debetur quedam inclinatio inquantum est accidens, cum omne accidens naturaliter inclinatur ad suum subiectum; et hec inclinatio natura precedit compositionem. Alia autem inclinatio debetur actui inquantum est actus non ut in subiecto sed de subiecto prout inclinatur anima ad enuntiandum unum de altero; et hec inclinatio natura posterior est compositione. Et sic patet quod una inclinatio antecedit compositionem et quod altera sequitur earn per naturam (f. 266v267r).

24.

Hoc etiam patet per operationes anime, quia cum anima apprehendit rerum similitudinem, prius cognoscit res sibi invicem convenire, postea consentit et deinde componit apud se eas et postea enuntiat unum de de altero. Cum ergo anima natura prius co,nsentiat quam componat et prius videat convenientiam quam consentiat et convenientia unius rei ad alteram vel aliam causetur per naturalem inclinationem unius rei ad alteram, ideo oportet quod naturalis inclinatio actus, inquantum est accidens, precedat compositionem actus cum substantia. Et iterum cum anima apud se prius natura componat quam inclinet se ad enuntiandum unum de altero mediante actu, ideo compositio actus cum substantia natura precedit inclinationem actus per quam anima inclinatur ut actus sit de substantia, et per istam secundam inclinationem reperitur modus in verlro (f. 267r).

25.

As to the view that the affectus animae regarding the relation of act to substance forms the basis of the moods of the verb, Peter associates himself with the views expressed by the grammarians, not only Priscian (Inst. gramm. 115

H.A.G. Braakhuis VIII 63: modi sunt diversae inclinationes animi varios eius affectus demonstrantes), but also those from the second half of the twelfth century onwards. Cfr. e.g. Ralph of Beauvais, Glose super Donatum ed. Kneepkens, p. 30, 2-5: Realis modus est affectus animi circa actionem vel passionem. Et sunt quatuor affectus: indicandi vel imperandi vel optandi vel dubitandi. 26.

For this scheme, and the influence it may have had on Thomas Aquinas' views, see B. Garceau (1968: 73-76). With regard to the view that the propositional composition is based on the conformity of realities which is caused by the natural inclination of the one reality as an act to the other as its substance, the following text from the Expositio is also very illumniating, Expositio libri De Anima. ed. M. Alonso, p. 33.58-33.62: Dicit igitur quod compositio est eorum que insunt; quandocumque enim unum duorum intelligibilium se habet ut absolutum et relativum ut respectu alterius dependens, tunc illius alterius intelligibilis est compositio cum primo, poterit enim tunc intelligi intentionem illius dependentis inesse substantie deferenti intentionem ipsius absoluti ... similiter etiam de compositione, scilicet, quod ipsa intelligibilia prius accipiuntur divisa ab invicem et componuntur consequenter in eodem subiecto, scilicet, quod intentio predicati ipsius significatur inesse substantie deferenti intentionem subiecti.

27.

Et dicendum quod compositio actus cum substantia intelligitur per extrema, quia actus se ipso inheret subiecto suo, sicut quodlibet aliud accidens se ipso inheret subiecto in quo est, et non aliquo alio mediante, quia sic contingeret abire in infinitum, ut prius dictum est de qualitate nominis (f. 267v).

28.

Ideo dicit Aristotiles quod 'est' significat quandam compositionem quam sine compositis non est intelligere, cum solum habeat intelligi per illud quod inclinatur et per illud cui inclinatur, quia inclinatio verbi que est ipsius actus ad substantiam remotis quod inclinatur et cui inclinatur nichil est. Et ideo compositio sine extremis nichil est. Et quia unumquodque intelligitur per illud quod dat ei esse, cum extrema dent esse compositioni, ideo compositio habet intelligi per extrema, ut dictum est (f. 267v).

29.

Nota quod etiam ilia compositio secundum veritatem est in re et est quoddam indivisibile, in verbo autem est ilia compositio ut in signo, sicut sanitas secundum suam veritatem est in animali ut in subiecto, in urina autem ut in signo (f. 267v).

30.

Primo ergo queritur utrum negatio orationis faciat contradictionem. Et videtur quod non ... negatio removet compositonem; se.d compositio est causa modi; ergo removet modum; ergo nulla oratio negativa est alicuius

116

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition modi; ergo neque modi indicativi - locus a genere; ergo nulla oratio negativa est vera vel falsa: sola enim indicativa est ilia que verum vel falsum significat. Solutio. Sicut hoc nomen 'homo' duplicem habet significationem, scilicet generalem et specialem - generalis significatio est significare substantiam cum qualitate, specialis vero significare bane substantiam, que est homo - et sic in verbo est duplex significatio, scilicet generalis et specialis: generalis est significare agere vel pati, specialis vero significare istum actum vel istam passionem, ut Iegere vel legi, percutere vel percuti. Similiter duplex est compositio: generalis vel specialis; generalis autem compositio inquantum est de se communiter se habet ad omnia componibilia. Cum enim dicimus quod verbum significat compositionem, non dicimus bane compositionem vel illam, sed compositionem in genere; et hec compositio est generalis et debetur ipsi agere vel pati in communi communiter sumpto, sicut dictum est prius. Specialis autem compositio est per extrema compositionis. Et negatio removet compositionem specialem, et hoc sufficit ad contradictionem, et relinquit generalem, ratione cuius accidit modus (f. 270v). 31.

Most of the mss. of the Syncategoremata give Aristotle's dictum as "quod 'est' significat compositionem". This reading does indeed suggest quite clearly that the significative capacity of 'est' is limited to indicating composition. But also in case the dictum should be read as "quod 'est' consignificat compositionem", it could have to my mind no other meaning than that, according to Peter, 'est' signifies the composition together with the composita.

32.

Item. Queritur utrum compositio sit simpliciter ens vel non. Et videtur quod non, quia reperitur in rebus existentibus ut: 'homo est animal' et· in rebus non existentibus ut: 'chimera est non-ens', ergo reperitur in eis per aliquod repertum communi in ipsis, ... sed nichil est commune enti et non-enti, nisi ens quodammodo; ergo compositio prima sequitur ens quoddarnmodo, ergo non est simpliciter ens. Et dicendum quod compositio importata per verbum communiter se habet ad compositionem entium et ad compositionem non-entium. Unde primo sequitur ens quoddarnmodo, ut obiectum est, et ipsa in communi est ens quoddarnmodo et non simpliciter (f. 267v).

33.

Et dicendum quod compositio in communi per prius convenit compositioni entium et per posterius compositioni non-entium (f. 267v).

117

H.A.G. Braakhuis

34.

Et dicendum quod compositio in communi est ens quodammodo, ut dictum est prius, et extrema eius similiter in communi sunt entia quoddammodo. Sed compositio contracta ad illam partem eius quod est compositio entium est simpliciter ens. Unde in hac: 'Anitichristus est homo' contract a est ad compositionem entium; unde non ponitur hie 'homo' quodammodo, sed simpliciter, et ideo hec: 'Antichristus est homo' non equipollet huic: 'Antichristus est homo quodammodo' (f. 267v-268r).

35.

Ad illud autem quod obicitur quod extrema ponuntur secundum exigentiam compositionis, dicendum quod falsum est, quia cum extrema sint, non propter hoc sequitur quod compositio sit. Unde cum dico: 'homo est asinus', extrema sunt, non tamen compositio est. Et si compositio est, non tamen sequitur quod extrema sint, ut 'chimera est non-ens', ilia compositio est, non tamen extrema sunt. Sed hoc sequitur: 'extrema sunt sibi invicem convenientia, ergo compositio eorum est', et est locus a causa; et e converso sequitur: 'compositio est, ergo extrema sunt sibi invicem convenientia', et est locus ab effectu, quia convenientia extremorum causa est compositionis et compositio est effectus convenientie extremorum (f. 268r).

36.

Ad illud quod obicitur quod cum utraque earum sit simpliciter vera, ergo veritas earum simpliciter est ens, dicendum quod non sequitur, quia veritas entium est ens simpliciter, veritas autem non entium non est ens simpliciter sed quodammodo. Quod patet, quia veritas entium est per convenientiam extremorum, a causa: et econverso sequitur: 'compositio est, ergo extrema sunt sibi invicem convenientia: et est locus que est causa compositionis in affrrmativa, ut: 'homo est animal', vel per repugnantiam extremorum, que est causa divisionis in negativa, ut 'homo non est asinus'. Unde veritas entium est per convenientiam extremorum ad compositionem vel per repugnantiam ad divisionem, et etiam per hoc quod extrema sunt simpliciter entia. Sed veritas non entium non habet nisi alteram istarum causarum, scilicet convenientiam extremorum ad compositionem et divisionem, et non habet entitatem eorundem, quia extrema non sunt entia, immo sunt non entia. Et ideo veritas non entium est ens quodammodo, veritas autem entium est ens simpliciter; et ita compositio entium est ens simpliciter, compositio autem non entium est ens quodammodo (f. 268r).

37.

Ad illud autem quod obicitur quod compositio affrrmativa ponit ens, quia ponit subiectum in esse, dicendum quod utrumque est falsum, quia compositio equaliter se habet ad compositionem entium et non enti\lffi. Unde virtute compositionis affrrmative, inquantum affrrmatur, nichil ponitur, sed virtute

118

The views of Peter of Spain on propositional composition

predicati aliquando ponitur subiectum in esse, ut quando predicatum est ens simpliciter, et aliquando non ponitur subiectum in esse, ut quando predicatum est ens diminutum vel quodammodo. Et sequitur: 'lapis est homo; ergo lapis est' et non sequitur: 'lapis est opinabile, ergo lapis est' (f. 270r-v). 38.

For this formulation, see de Rijk 1986, p. 124. Incidentally, Peter of Spain's views on 'est' agree remarkably well with those of Peter Abailard.

39.

That in the case of essential predications Peter seems to respect a certain existential neutrality, is especially clear in his discussion of the sophism 'omnis homo necessaria est animal' (ff. 308v-309r). According to Peter, this proposition is true, since, as he says, it involves termini simpliciter (that is, terms that have a necessary being) under which no termini ut nunc (that is, terms that sometimes are and sometimes are not, like 'Sortes') can be subsumed. For the argumentation to the effect that

termini simpliciter,

according to Peter, do in fact supposit for the essences of things, see Braakhuis (1979: 254-256). 40.

It is not my intention to question Peter's influence on Thomas Aquinas as

regards the point of receptio-judicium, and on other points as well, an influence that has been sufficiently established by B. Garceau (1968). I merely wish to draw attention to the fact that Thomas Aquinas' views on 'est' show a remarkable difference from Peter's, precisely on the point that according to Thomas 'est', even when used as a copula, has the primary signification of actualitas or in actu esse, and that it consignifies the composition only together with this primary signification; cf.. A. Zimmermann (1971: esp. 290-295) and H. Weidemann (1986). In fact, Thomas Aquinas' views on this point seem to be more in agreement with those of William of Sherwood, for which cf. Braakhuis (1977: 120-125).

119

THE THEORY OF THE PROPOSITION ACCORDING TO JOHN DUNS SCOTUS' TWO COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE'S PERIHERMENEIAS E.P.Bos University of Leiden

1. Introduction

In his three books on 'apophantics' 1 or, in more familiar terms, on the theories of the propositions as the bearers of truth and falsity Nuchelmans discusses those theories from ancient to modern times. In the first volume2, on ancient and medieval conceptions of true propositions, he starts his investigations with the sophist Gorgias (ca. 483·367 B.C.), in the third volwne • which is the last in the series for the time being - the philosopher who lived until the most recent year, is Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802-1896) 3. Nearly all well-known philosophers from Gorgias to Drobisch are discussed: Aristotle, who in his

Perihermeneias laid the foundations for the development of research concerning the proposition, William of Ockham, Petrus Ramus, Descartes, Kant, to name just a few highlights. Nevertheless, a discussion of the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus' theory of the proposition is missing. This John (1265/6 - 1308/9), who, in my view, is one of the greatest thinkers of the Middle Ages, especially in theological matters4 , is mentioned only once in Nuchelmans' volume I, thrice in volume II and once in volume III without much discussion5 • It should be mentioned, however, that some followers of Duns Scotus are discussed in volum II, viz. Petrus Tartaretus (floruit end XVth century), John Ponce, or Poncius, (1603-1672/3) and Bartholomeus Mastrius (1602-1673) 6 . This omission could be justified by the opinions on Duns Scotus' significance presented by important medieval scholars as Balic and Pinborg. Balic wrote7 : 'Duns Scotus'

( ... )

Logicalia did not exert a great influence upon the history of 121

E.P. Bos Scotism. The fact that they came down to us only in a few fourteenth-century codices seems to support this view'. Inspection of surveys of manuscripts in critical editions shows, however, that the number of manuscripts containing Duns Scotus' two commentaries on Aristotle's Perihenneneias can compete with the number of manuscripts, in which the commentaries on the same work by other logicians have been handed down, logicians who are generally recognized to have been influential. From Lohr's lists we learn that of Duns Scotus' flrst commentary twelve manuscripts have survived, and seven of his second commentary. William of Ockham's (ca. 1285-1347) commentary (expositio) on the same work9 is preserved in ten manuscripts; Marsilius of Inghen's 10 (ca. 1340-1396) abbreviatio of the

Perihenneneias has been handed down in ten manuscripts, his expositio in only one, his questiones in flve. Moreover, we can also learn from Lohr's lists 11 that the number of printed editions of Duns Scotus' logical works before the edition 'Wadding-Vives' (Paris, 1891) was fifteen, ranging from the late fifteenth to the nineteenth century, whereas, as Ashworth says 12, authors who have added greatly to the development of late medieval logic - such as Buridan, Strode, Heytesbury, Peter of Ailly, Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen - drop out of the picture altogether. Not only Balic, but also Pinborg has doubts concerning the necessity to evaluate Scotus' views, as is apparent from what he says in an article of 197913: 'And even if Scotus had a tremendous impact on other aspects of English theology and philosophy in the 14th century, I fmd his importance for the speciflc change in conceptual languages here studied negligible'. A reply could be that such a judgement is only possible after a thorough study of Duns Scotus' logicalia, which is still wanted. In the present contribution I hope to add to Nuchelmans' pioneering studies by discussing the main outlines of John Duns Scotus' conception of the proposition, as far as these can be gathered from his two commentaries on Aristotle's Peri-

henneneias.

2. Two preliminary remarks First: I shall only present Duns Scotus' theory of the proposition as far as it emerges from his two commentaries (questions) on Aristotle's Perihenneneias. In these works the problem is discussed more systematically than elsewhere; a study of all Duns' works would be quite beyond the limits of this contribution.

122

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus Duns' two co=entaries contain questions on of Aristotle's Perihenneneias, which was divided into two books by the Medievals 14 . These co=entaries are of unequal length and discuss different problems to some extent. The first co=entary, which I shall henceforth call 'opus I', just as the Wadding-Vivesedition does 15, was written before the other one, which I shall call 'opus II': there are references in opus I to a later work, viz. opus II, e.g. for the discussion of the so-called res verbi 16 • To opus II, a short preface is added. According to the Wadding-Vives-edition, both opera are reportationes, that is: student-versions of Duns Scotus's lectures; they are not ordinationes or authorized versions. Both opera are considered authentic by modern scholarship, and date from an early period of Duns Scotus' life, most probably when he taught in Paris (12931297). The years of this stay can only be inferred from statutes, and an exact date of compilation can not be given at the moment. The two opera have been compiled shortly after each other, which I infer from the general doctrinal similarity, from the specific doctrine that conventional terms do not refer directly to things (as Duns Scotus teaches in later works 19), and that the term 'contingens', so prominent in his other and later works, is not yet used. This conclusion can not be definitive, however. In the subsequent discussion I shall treat the two commentaries as one single source. My second remark: I intend to discuss here what I consider to be the main outlines of Duns Scotus' theory of the proposition. 'Proposition' primarily stands for an indicative or declarative sentence which signifies the true and the false20 • There seems to be a remarkable unanimity in the Middle Ages about the definition of the proposition21. I shall not, however, deal with all problems raised by Duns Scotus in his opera I and II concerning the proposition. Problems concerning past and future tense, the unity of propositions and propositions containing infinite and relative terms will as such not be discussed here22 •

3. Aristotle's Perihenneneias 16a4-8

The fundamentals of theories of the proposition are laid by Aristotle, as Nuchelmans explains23. Notably in the first chapter of his Perihenneneias 24 , or (in proper Latin) De interpretatione, Aristotle develops a theory of signs. Now, according to Duns Scotus25, logic is a 'rational' science26, of which the subiectum (we might say 'formal object') is an enuntiatio or 'statement' in the mind, taken

123

E.P.Bos apart form its being true or false 27 • This mental entity is a kind of language in the mind and any language, be it thought, spoken or written, is by definition significative according to the Medievals. So, Aristotle's theory of signs is relevant for Duns Scotus' theory of the proposition. In Perihenneneias 16a4-8 Aristotle says (in my translation): "Now, spoken sounds are symbols of the affections in the soul, and written marks are symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of - the affections of the soul - are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of- states of affairs - are also the same"28 Aristotle apparently aims to distinguish between various levels of language, and to determine the relations between those levels. The spoken and written language varies among men, Aristotle says. These kinds of language are symbols, or signs of the 'affections' (Greek: pathemata) of the soul, which, in their turn, are 'likenesses' (Greek: homoiomata) of 'states of affairs' (Greek: pragmata).

4. Duns Scotus' theory of the proposition in his Commentaries on Aristotle's

Perihenneneias Reality, intellection and signification

4.1

It is amazing to see in what ways these short remarks made by Aristotle have

been interpreted and elaborated in the Middle Ages. The Latin translations, e.g. by William of Moerbeke29, are interpretative and suggestive in some respects30, the interpretations offered by Duns Scotus and other Medievals bring us even further from what Aristotle seems to have intended. There is here, as elsewhere, a difference between Aristotle and Aristotelianism. So, Duns Scotus too is one of the Medieval interpreters of Aristotle's text given above. In order to have a greater understanding of Duns Scotus' interpretation, something should be said about our master's view on reality and the way in which the human intellect understands it. From the two commentaries we can conclude that according to Duns Scotus reality consists of individual things, viz. God (an immaterial thing) and creatures (both immaterial (angels) and material things (e.g. men)). Material things consist of 'natures' (naturae) realized in matter. This nature as such is neither universal,

124

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus nor individual. It is an absolute entity, prior both to generalization and individualization.

4.1.1

Reality

In reality this nature can be individualized and exist as an individual, or, to express it in Duns Scotus' terminology3 1, a 'this' can be added to the nature. To give an example: to the nature man a 'this' can be added with an individual of a certain nature, e.g. 'Cesar' or 'Sortes', as a result. Duns Scotus emphasizes the part played by the nature in this composition. So Cesar is primarily a man which happens to be Cesar. The nature man as existent is an essence having properties such as whiteness, curly hair etcetera.

4.1.2

Intellection

The human intellect can abstract the concept man from the nature. Then the nature exists as a generalized concept in the mind. This concept does not imply that the thing, or things, denoted by it, exist. According to Duns Scotus, the view that intellection is related to existing objects amounts to Platonism32 . For according to Plato, the intellect knows the Ideas as the truly existents. A corollary to this view: it can very well be the case that in the order of reality, one thing exists prior to another, e.g. God is prior to creatures, but in the order of understanding man first understands that which is prior to

his

knowledge, viz. the creatures, and then he might arrive at an understanding (as far as is possible to him) of God. As Prentice33 points out, Duns Scotus elaborates the differences between the two orders in his Commentary on

Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi. 4.1.3

Signification

Duns Scotus closely connects the concepts signification and intellection: signification follows intellection, he says34, intellection is that without which there is no signification. The species existing in the mind, or, as Duns (traditionally) calls them: the

species intelligibiles such as man, animal, can be combined, e.g. into 'man is an animal' (homo est animal) 35 . Now, these species are not meant as things in

125

E.P.Bos themselves, existing as accidents in a subject, as Scotus calls it, but in so far as they are signs36. Accordingly, 'man is an animal' does not mean that the concept man is the concept animal, which of course is false, but that man being an animal

is true in reality. Because the understanding of a concept does not imply existence, as has been said above37, for the truth of the proposition 'man is an animal' it is not required that the things referred to exist: there need to be things understood38• In this case the necessary proposition 'homo est animal' is true, regardless of existence or non-existence39• The intellect can form propositions concerning individuals, too. Here, an important distinction can be found in Duns Scotus' opera. The human intellect can form a proposition about an individual thing, that is, in Scotus' terminology, a nature to which a 'this' is added on the one hand, as what I call 'actual' regardless its existence or non-existence, and, on the other hand, this same indi-

vidualized nature can be referred to as what I label 'factual' 40, that is, as existent. So, someone who is living now, e.g. Queen Beatrix, can be referred to as an individualized nature, to be identified apart from the changing circumstances connected with existence. Then it is true to say 'Queen Beatrix is a human being', or 'Queen Beatrix is queen Beatrix'. In this interpretation of an individual nature it is also true to say 'Cesar is a man' and 'Cesar is Cesar' though Cesar no longer exists. In the example 'Cesar is a man', the nature 'man' is predicable of many, in the example 'Cesar is Cesar' Scotus says, the nature is predicable of one only4 1. It must be said, I feel, that in Scotus' line of thought, the distinction between 'Cesar is Cesar' and 'Cesar is a man' is not an very easy one to grasp: for in both propositions the nature man is the predicate. The human intellect can also refer to an individual as factual, that is as one individualized nature with attributes, such as 'whiteness', 'curly hair', attributes that change in the course of time. In this respect 'Cesar is white' can not be true, Scotus says. For such a predicate as 'white' implies actual existence42 . It could be added here that the propositions true of individuals as actual

individuals are merely the concern of the intellect, while for propositions which are true of individuals as factually existing the senses play a part as well.

The signification of a 'vox'

4.2

We shall now discuss Duns Scotus' concept of signification of a vox. In the first question of his opus II Duns considers two possible solutions to the problem how and what a vox primarily signifies. In the first solution it is said that the

126

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus vox does not signify the intelligible species, because the order of signification is based on the order of intellection, and the essence of a thing is what is understood primarily43 • Nor is the individual existing thing signified primarily: the intellect can consider its object (the essence) without individual traits in factual existence44 • According to this solution, the vox signifies primarily the thing as conceived45, which is Scotus' interpretation of Aristotle's words that a noun

primarily signifies an affection (passio) of the sou146 • Duns Scotus finds another solution more probable, however, presumably because he thinks the former solution is too 'realistic', laying too much emphasis on the part played by the essence in the outer world. According to the second solution, the vox primarily signifies the species in the soul, which is the means by which it, secondarily, signifies the thing outside (that is: the essence) 46 . Duns Scotus considers this approach to be Aristotle's intention. To say that the thing is signified by the vox in an absolute way is utter nonsense47 • A reist-position in this sense is unacceptable for Duns Scotus48 • So, according to our master, the species is the 'immediate significate', the essence as absolute nature the 'ultimate'

significate (a traditional Medieval distinction) 49 . From all this it can be concluded that in his earlier period Duns Scotus considers it more probable that what is primarily signified by a vox is the concept as the means of signification, not the essence of the thing. Later, in his Ordinatio, as Nuchelmans indicates50, Duns opines that the primary significate of

a vox is a thing, not a concept. Duns Scotus thinks it is important to establish that this intricate way of signification is accomplished by one single act. In his opus

.z5 1

he says that by

one single act a vox is a sign of a sign (here: the species), and of the thing signified (the ultimate significate). There is only one impositio ('namegiving') 52• In his opus II he returns to this problem. According to a marginal note in the Wadding-Vives-edition53, Duns criticizes Albert the Great (1193 or 1206/7-1280) for making signification equivocal: indeed, from Albert's Commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias54

one might conclude that the vox signifies the

concept first, and the thing outside secondarily, but the vox signifies equivocally two different things. Duns Scotus solves this problem by interpreting the concept as the means by which the vox signifies. So to his mind, he establishes what could be labelled a 'transitive'55 relation between vox, concept and thing, and does not, like Albert the Great, conceive of three things in a certain order. It must be said that the difference between Duns Scotus and Albert the Great is not very great in this respect. 127

E.P. Bos

Necessary truths, contingent truths and true propositions without

4.3

referents in the outside world

Wha< has already been touched upon above will now be elaborated in more detail. Fnm Scotus' two commentaries under discussion three kinds of true prop03itions can be distinguished, viz. necessarily true: propositions, contingently true proilositio:ts and true propositions without referents in the outside world. It will appear that the predicates determine the truth of a proposition.

4.3.1

Necessary truths

Duns Scotus is primarily interested, it seems, in necessary truths. The intellect can form a true proposition consisting of intelligible species which is true, as has been pointed to above, because of meaning of the terms used, regardless of the existence of the thing or things thought ofm. During the thirteenth century the

possibility of signification of beings and non-beings was one of the most important topic< 57 • Now, a composition of species is only true, Duns Scotus says in both opera, with reference to its significates, that is: homo est animal ('man is an animal') is tru:; not because the species homo is identical with the species animal (which is false), !Jut because it is a primary s:gn of the understanding by the intellect that a man is an allimal in reality. This does not mean, as has been said, however, that for the truth of tl::e proposition it is required that a man

exists, and that

the proposition thus be verified. Especially in his opus If Duns Scotus draws a sharp distinction betweer. the level of significatio and that of verificatio5B. Duus tells us in his opus I that, when the intellect has abstracted its first object, that is: the essence of a material thing, it can know all other things witiwm a proper species corresponding to the truths deduced 59 . Apparently, Duns Scotus me;;ns that from the knowledge of e.g. man, all other intelligible species can be deduced, e.g. animal, organic being, substance. Duns allows perhaps also that corresponding necessary propositions can be deduced from e.g. 'Socrates is a man': 'Socrates is an animal', 'Socrates is an organic being', 'Socrates is a substo.nce'. In this respect, knmvledge would be analytic. Thi;;

lead~

us to Scotus' definition of a true proposition in his opus I: it is a

compositio rerum ('composition of things'), Duns says60 . This composition should

be \" .-:aerstood as a composition caused by the intellect and existing in the

128

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus

intellect of things known. In this way not only species, but also things are in the intellect, Scotus adds, that is: things as signified, not as existing. In opus II Duns does not explicitly defme truth as a composition uf th;ngs understood, perhaps because he had already done so in opus I. There

i~

no doubt,

however, that his conception of a true proposition in opus II is the same as in his first commentary. Duns says6 1, e.g., that truth and falsity is about (circa) the composition and division of the intellect only as in a subject, knowing its significates.

Contingent trnths

4.4

I shall now turn to Duns Scotus' analysis of what I label 'continge..1t truths', e.g. Socrates est albus ('Socrates is white'). In this case, Duns says, the predicate is a real accident, viz. 'white', and this is only true of an existing substance. So

C,;sar est albus ('Cesar is white') is a false proposition, becaus'\ Cesar no longt.,r exists62 .

True propositions without referents in the outside world

4.5

In his two commentaries Duns Scotus is also very much L:lterested in propositions which are true even though no referent, or referents, e'cist I can not go into all kinds of examples brought forward by Duns. For the present purposes I have selected two kinds of such propositions, of which the examples are: 1) a.

Cesar est homo ('Cesar is a man'); b. Antichristuv est homo ('The Antichrist is a man'): are these propositions true even though neither Cesar nor the Antichrist exists63 ?

2) a.

Homo est homo ('Man is a man'); b. Socrates est Socrates ('S::>crates is Socrates): are these propositions true even though no man exists (a), and Socrates does not exist (b)64?

I shall not discuss examples of propositions of the past a:td the futetre6 5 , or propositions like Cesar est homo mortuus ('Cesar is a dead man') 66 , Homems est

poeta ('Homer is a poet') 67 , Socrates semper est ('Socrate~ always is') 68 . Interesting though they are, they need more room for elucidation than is available here. As a general rule to interpret these two kinds of examples which come up for discussion in this paper, Duns Scotus says in opus

? 9,

that the intellect gr..tsps a

nature either as general, or as inhering in an individual, but this docs not imply the factual existence of this nature70.

129

E.P. Bos

Now I shall apply this ru1e to the two kinds of examples: ad 1)

In the proposition 'Cesar is a man' and 'Antichrist is a man' the human nature conceived as predicable of many is predicated of the human nature as a this 71 . For the truth of the proposition it is not necessary that the referent, or referents, exist?2 . Existence and non-existence are extrinsic, or accidental, to the nature man. The concept man is not equivocal for that reason, but univocal, Duns Scotus says73, and in this respect his opinion is contrary to that of e.g. Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292/94f4 •

ad 2)

In 'Man is a man', 'Socrates is Socrates', 'is' signifies that the predicate actually is identical with the subject without regard to the factual existence75 •

4.6

The res verbi

It is clear, I think, that in true or false propositions, e.g. 'homo est animal',

'est' plays an important part. To evaluate its function, something should be said about what is traditionally called by the Medievals the res verbi. Duns elaborates on the meaning of 'est' in 'homo est animal', where 'est' is a tertium adiacens (third part of the proposition). 'Est', he says76, is not part of

the subject or predicate (the opinion of e.g. William of Sherwood77), nor is it the subject or predicate78, but, according to Duns, 'est' just denotes that the predicate actually is the same as the subject? 9• For only what is actual can be understood, that is, according to a proper form of the thing understood. The meaning of 'est' is to denote an actual composition; 'est' need not mean factual existence. Like other verbs, 'est' has a res verbi, that is: a content belonging to the verb. The res verbi of 'est' is, Duns Scotus says in opus I, ens ('being'), just as the res verbi of 'secat' ('cuts') is cutting. In the case of 'est',

ens is specified,

as Duns Scotus expresses it in his opus I, by 'animal' in the above mentioned example, and so 'being animal' is predicated of 'homo'80• In his opus II Duns Scotus gives, as he has promised in his opus

J8 1, some

more information on the res verbi. Every verb has two meanings, viz. the res verbi of 'est', which is actuality, is the aspect (ratio) under which everything is

predicated of something82 . The implication of existence, e.g. in 'a man is white' is a secondary function of 'est'. The primary meaning of 'est' is merely to denote the act of predication. This is in accordance with the general lines of Duns Scotus' semantical theory.

130

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus

Duns Scotus' views of the proposition as compared to some other

5.

medieval ones.

5.1

Duns Scotus and some Parisian masters

To determine Duns Scotus' position in the history of theories of the proposition is difficult. If one considers three important aspects of his theory, viz. 1) his emphasis on the species, both intellectual and sensible, corresponding to natures (essences in reality) and individualized properties and accidents in the thing known; 2) his view that a term (written, spoken or mental) signifies both beings and non-beings so that the signification of a term remains when the referent or referents do not exist; and 3) that a term's signification is univocal, and not (as e.g. Roger Bacon thinks) equivocal as regards existence and nonexistence, Duns Scotus can be compared with e.g. William Arnauld (ca. 1245)83, one of the earliest commentators on Peter of Spain, and Albert the Great84 who uphold the same views on these points. Duns must have been acquainted with the works of these Parisian masters as he probably compiled his two commentaries on Aristotle's Perihermeneias in Paris.

5.2

Duns Scotus and Walter Burley

As I have pointed out above85 , Duns Scotus defmes a true proposition as a composition of things signified regardless of their existence or non-existence. So one may get the impression that Duns Scotus adheres in his way to what Nuchelmans calls a 'reist'-position86 • According to a reist-theory of truth the thing or things signified play a predominant part. Between the composite thought and the things in the outside world there is supposed to be a third item, the thing signified, distinct from the sign. This idea of a specific kind of connection between thought and thing can already be found in the works of Augustine. In his On Trinity 87 this author says that, when e.g. some stone is seen, three things can be distinguished: 1) the thing that is seen (viz. the stone itself); 2) the act of seeing, that was not there before someone or the stone; 3) the intention of the soul retains the act of seeing the thing and makes them into a composition which itself is not the stone or the act of seeing. In some way, thought and thing are combined: the advocates of the reist-view perhaps try to express that our knowledge can possess a primary, unadulterated picture of realityBS.

131

E.P. Bos

The adherents to this theory of truth discussed by Nuchelmans, contemporaries of Dun~ Scotus, are Walter Chatton (1285-1344) 89 , William of Crathorn (who was activ~ as theoloeian about 1330-40)90 and Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5) 91 . I cannot compare the views of all

three philosophers with Duns Scotus' theory: I

single out Walter Burley, for he wrote a commentary (questions) on Aristotle's

Peri.'zermeneias in 130192, almost at the same time as Duns Scotus wrote his question-commentaries on that work. Nuchelmans does not discuss this first work of Burley's (which was not edited until 197593, that is: after Nuchelmans compbtd his book), but only Burley's third commentary, viz. his Scriptum in Periher-

meneias, dated (in last version) 133~4 . There are at least two differences between the earlier Burley and Duns Scotus: 1) according to Burley the vox does not primarily signify the species, but the thing by way of the species95 . As we have seen, according to Duns Scotus' early co•nm~.mtaries,

the

vox primJTil;• signifies the species, which is the means by

which tl:.e vox signifies the thing. Burley seems to Jay emphasis on the thing, or things, i:ither universal or particular, other than Scotus does. 2) When analyzing enuntiatio ('statement') Burley says96 it is threefold: spoke'1, written and mental. The mental one is primarily important for the lcgician, and this is a composition of things which the intellect asserts to be the same or diverse. The enuntiatio 'homo est animal' is composed of things, Burley s'iys, in an intellectual composition97 • Burley's view on the proposition is more rt,alistic than Duns Scotus', I think. The former lays the emphasis on the thing signified, the latter on the species by which the significate is signified. If Duns Scotus would have criticized Burley, he perhaps would have objected

to the one-sided emphasis Burley lays on the thing signified to such an extent that he could not account for signification of non-existing and non-present things. To conclude: although Duns Scotus may be said to defend a composition-theory

of the truth of a proposition in the sense discussed (if only because he himself defmes truth as 'composition of things') he emphasizes the part played by the intellect and the species. This species is formally similar to the essence in material things. Duns Scotus' theory of signification is primarily intensional, however: words stand for their concepts; the concepts are signs and stand for their signifzcates, but are never linked up with things (universal or singular) in reality as some of the proponents of the reist-theory opine.

132

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus

Duns Scotus and William of Ockham

5.3

It may be fruitful to compare Duns Scotus' views on signification and on tn;e

propositions with the other famous Franciscan thinker, William of Ockham. According to Duns the first significate of a universal. word is the species, which is the natural likeness of the essence or nature in a material thing. This may be called an 'intensional semantics. Ockham98 , however, claims th~t a universa! vox signifies all referents of past, present and future, belonging to the tenn. The signification is the complete denotation: this may be called an extensional semantics. In his conception of a true proposition as the composition of

thing~

understood, Scotus again can be contrasted with Ockham, who interprets trath

a~

a property of a proposition which refers to (or, in Medieval teiminology, 'supposits for') an individual, or individuals in the outside world99 . The intellect u~ing general terms in a proposition does not posit anything irl reality, Ockham says 100, probably criticizing what he inteq:rets to be Duns Scotus' views. Tl-ere is no generality outside the mind, as Ockham frequently ;JOints out 100 •

6. Conclusion

As I have noted above, scholars have not been very interested in Duns Scotus as a commentator on Aristotle's logic, or generally, L" Duns Scotus' logicalia. For a proper judgement of Duns as logician, a thorough study of his lcgical works is needed, and the present contribution hopes to invite to this. In crder to judge Duns Scotus' importance in this respect, the theories of other philosophers, e.g. of his masters 102 (in Paris) Gonsalvus of Spain, James of Casceto or Quarcheto, and (in England) William of Ware should be analyzed. A further subject which deserves attention is a comparison of Duns Scotus' views on the proposition i11 his other works, and of later logicians (including Scotists, of course). Perhaps, after such an inquiry, scholars would subscribe to the following lines, added on f. 57r in manuscript Oxford, Balliol College 291 103, contaicung Scotus' teachings en the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle:

"Hoc qui fecit opus Duns Subtilis vocitatur, Doctor theologus logica cunctis

do~;,~atur.

Qui cupit in logica merito consultus baberi discat dicta sua si cautus h3.bet retineri ( ...)" 133

E.P.Bos

["Who compiled this work is called the subtile Duns, the theologian doctor dominates all by his logic. He who wants to be rightly considered experienced in logic, should learn his words, if he should be considered as careful (... )"].

NOTES

1. Nuchelmans (1983: 3).

2. Nuchelmans (1973: 7-8. 3. Nuchelmans (1983: 242; 245). 4. Duns Scotus is also one of the most difficult to interpret, however. 5. See the indexes added to Nuchelmans' three books under discussion. 6. Nuchelmans (1979: 8). 7. Balic, (1965: 22-23). 8. Lohr (1970: 191-192). 9. Cf. Ockham, Expositio in libros Porphyrii, praedicamentorum et Perihermeneias (1978: 7*-13*). 10. Cf. Lohr (1971: 324-327) 11. See my note 8. 12. Ashworth (1982: 790) 13. Pinborg (1979: 32) 14. The dividing line is at the beginning of chapter 10 (opus I), (in Aristotle: 19b5). 15. For the present contribution I only consulted the Wadding-Vives-edition (1891) not the manuscripts. In the margins of this edition it is noted where some manuscripts deviate from others. In the Wadding-Vives edition, the frrst commentary occupies 41 pages (539a-579b), the second 21 pages (581-601b). 16. For res verbi see below, p. 132. 17. Eg. Balic (1965: 16). 18. See e.g. Little (1932: 571-572); Balic (1965: 11); Prentice (1969: 40); Pinborg (1979: 32). 19. Cf. below, p. 129. 20. Ashworth (1974: 49) 21. Cf. Nuchelmans (1980: 3-6). 22. For other limitations in this contribution, see also below, p. 13:),.

134

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scot us 23. Not only in his three books of 1973, 1980 and 1982, but also e.g. in an article of 1976: 153 e.v. 24. In medieval logical texts Aristotle's work is usually designated as 'Perihermeneias'. 25. Ed. Wadding-Vives (1891: 539a-b). 26. Not, by contrast, a 'sermocinal' science (that is: a science about linguistic

entities), was the common interpretation up to Albert the Great (1193 or 120617- 1280). See e.g. Kretzmann (1965: 370). 27. Note that the first formal object of logic is not a sentence signifying the true or the false, as was the opinion of e.g. William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain. Duns Scotus emphasizes the part played by the intellect, especially over the existence of the signiftcates. See also below, p. 127. 28. Cf. Ackrill's translation and commentary (1963). 29. See Aristotelb De Interpretatione vel Perhermeneias ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Brugge-Paris (1965). 30. Especially the translation of 'pragma' (by which a 'state of affairs' is meant (see Nuchelmans (1973: 33-34)) by 'res' ('thing') seems to suggest a realist, or 'reist' (cf. this contribution, p. 131) interpretation. Also the translation in Duns Scotus' text , ed. Wadding-Vives: 540b) of Greek 'protos' ('in the first place') by 'primarum' (the adverb is changed into a genitive plural) is suggestive, for in that way the affections in the soul are qualified as 'fust', not the way in which the written and spoken signs signify. (It must be said that the Greek tradition is not unanimous on this score: see Ammonius, Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote, ed. 1961: 41). See for a detailed description of the translations by Boethius and William of Moerbeke Verbeke's introduction to Ammonius' above mentioned commentary, ed. 1961: LXXXVIII-XCII. 31. See e.g. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 552a; 553a). This 'this' is what Duns Scotus elsewhere calls 'haecceitas', a reality, formally distinguished from the nature of a thing. For this subject, see e.g. Grajewski (1944). 32. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 551b-552a). 33. Prentice (1969:45). 34. Opus I, qu. II (1891: 544a). 35. The distinction between various operations of the intellect is expressed in Opus I, qu. I (1891: 540a), but more clearly in the prologue to opus II, p. 581: 'Sicut dicit Philosophus 3. de Anima, text com. 21, duplex est operatio intellectus; una quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, secundum quam 135

E.P. Bos

dicitur intellectus formare conceptus simplices: alia est operatic intellectus, secundum quam componit, et dividit; et dicitur compositio, vel divisio. Istis duabus operationibus additur tertia, quae est discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut a notis ad ignota'. 36. Opus I, qu. 2 (1891: 541b): 'Ad questionem dicitur, quod species intelligibilis immediate significatur per vocem, sed ilia duplicitur consideratur, aut inquantum est quid in se accidens, scilicet informans animam; aut inquantum repraesentat rem. 37. Opus I, qu. II.(1891: 542b-543a). Especially opus II, qu. I , ed. 1891: 584b: 'Ad primum argumentum dico, quod oratio nee vera, nee falsa dicitur quantum ad primum significatum; quia sic dicendo, Homo est animal quantum ad primum significatum, non significat prima hominem in re esse animal, sed est primum signum huius, quod est hominem esse animal in re, ut ipsius intellectus'. 38. Opus I, qu. II ( 1891: 542a): 'Compositio ergo specierum ad invicem, ut illae sunt signa rerum, non est judicanda vera vel falsa, nisi a significatis (signatis ed.), id est, a rebus'. 39. Opus I, qu. V ( 1891: 546a): '( ...) quod res secundum quod existit, non est significatum (signatum ed.) per speciem intelligibilem in anima, sed res secundum quod intelligitur'. 40. For the opposition between 'actual' and 'factual', see De Rijk (1981: 2-32).

41. See my note 32. 42. Opus I, qu. VIII

(1891: 553b-554a): '( ... ) quia accidens reale, sive per

accidens cuiusmodi est album , nulli subjecto inest nisi existenti'. 43. Opus II, qu. I (1891: 583a): ' Primum non significatur prima per vocem; quia quod quid est, prima intelligitur quam species rei intelligatur, et quod prima intelligitur, prima significatur'. 44. Ibid.: 'Tertium vera, scilicet res existentes individualiter suam rationem

propriam non possunt prima significare, quia (... ) (583b ), intellectus non intelligit prima singulare sed quod quid ist, sine conditionibus materialibus

( ...)'. 45. Ibid.: 'Unde nomen significat passionem intellectus, id est rem ut concipitur. 46. Opus II, qu. I . (1891: 583b-594a): 'Si quis velit sustinere quod nomina significant similitudinem rerum, et quae existunt in intellectu, dicendum quod nomen mediante specie in anima, quam prima significat, significat posterius rem'.

136

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus

47. Ibid., 584a: '( ... ) sed secunda via videtur magis consona dictis Aristotelis, et Boetii; sed dicere quod res absolute significatur, est omnino in conveniens'. 48. I shall discuss a reist conception of the proposition (viz. of Walter Burley) below, paragraph 5, 2. 49. Opus I, qu. 2 (1891: 542)a. Cf. Spade (1982: 189). 50. Nuchelmans (1972: 196) refers to Duns Scotus' Opus Oxoniense, I, dist. 27, qu.3, n.19, in Opera omnia ed. Vaticana (1963: 97). 51. Opus I, qu. II

(1891: 542a): '( ... ) ideo non est aequivocatio, quia primum

significatum (signatum ed.)

in quantum est significatum (signatum ed.) est

signum significati (signati ed.)'. 52. Ibid.: '( ...) si diversis actibus significandi significaretur utrumque (viz. species

andres- E.P. Bos), et diversa impositione'. 53. Opus II, qu. I (1891: 582b). 54. ed. A. Borgnet, Lyons (1890: 381). 55. Cf. Spade (1983: 189n.). 56. See also above, p. 128. 57. See e.g. Braakhuis (1985: 111). 58. Opus II, qu. I (1891: 583b): 'Ad aliud dico quod primo enuntiatur de re sensibili, ut illa res significatur, hoc est accipiendo nomen absolute; verificatur tamen primo per singularia'. 59. Opus I, qu. II (1891: 543a): 'Ad tertium dico quod species non cognoscitur per aliam speciem, quia solum illud, quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu, scilicet primum obiectum intellectus, quod est quod quid est rei materialis, cognoscitur per speciem in intellectu, omnia alia cognita per reflexionem, et per discursum cognoscuntur sine propria specie'. 60. Opus I, qu. II

(1891: 343b): 'Ad aliud de compositione et divisione

intellectus, dico quod compositio est illarum rerum, non tamen ut existentium, sed ut intelliguntur (... ) et in illo modo sunt res in intellectu, non species solae'. 61. Opus II, qu. III (1891: 588b): 'Et per hoc dico quod verum et falsum sunt in intellectu componente vel dividente sicut in cognoscente. 62. Opus I, qu.VIII (1891: 553b-554a): ( ... ) Cesar est a/bus, quia accidens reale, sive per accidens cuiusmodi est album, nulli subiecto inest nisi existenti'. 63. Opus I, qu. VII; qu. XII. 64. Opus I, qu. VIII. 65. Opus I, qu. X. 66. Opus I, qu. VIII (1391: 551a). 137

E.P.Bos

67. Opus I, qu. XIII (1891: 568a-b). 68. Opus II, qu. VII (1891: 596a). 69. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 551b-552a). 70. Cf. above, p. 128. 71. Opus I, qu. VIII

(1891: 552a): 'sed possibile est apud intellectum, eadem

modo concipere naturam, ut dicibilis est de pluribus, et eandem ut non dicibilis est de pluribus'; see also above, p. 128. 72. Opus I, .qu. VIII

(1891: 552a): 'ergo equaliter habet rationem suppositi,

quando existit et quando non'. 73. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 553b): 'Dico, quod existere et non existere cum sint extraneae naturae, ut significatur per terminum, non faciunt aequivocationem in termino'. 74. Cf. De Libera (1982: 184). 75. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 555a-b). 76. Opus II, qu. VI (1891: 594b): 'Ideo ad quaestionem, sciendum est, quod hoc verbum est, quando praedicat tertium proprie, nee est subiectum, nee est pars, nee praedicatum, nee eius pars'. 77. See William of Sherwood, Syncategoremata , ed. 1941: 70. 78. I could not find an advocate ofthis opinion. 79. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 551b): '( ...) quod cum dicitur, Socrates est Socrates quod hie non praedicatur Socrates tantum, sed; illud tatum Ens Socrates, quia res huius verbi est, cum eo quod specificat ipsum, praedicatur, quando praedicatur tertium adjacens ( ...). 80. Opus II, qu. VI (1891) (continuing the text of my note 65): 'sed tantum denotat praedicatum esse idem subjecto actualiter, vel secundum actum. Ad quod sciendum quod omne intelligibile (intellectivum ed.) intelligitur per modum actus'. 81. Opus I, qu. VIII (1891: 551b). 82. Opus II, qu. VI (1891: 593b-594a): 'Quodlibet enim verbum duo importat, scilicet rem verbi, quod est de essentiali intellectu verbi, inquantum significat rem quae concipitur a mente, et importat compositionem, quae est ipsius inquantum verbum. Unde ratione rei, quam importat hoc verbum est, cum ilia sit actualitas, est ratio sub qua quodlibet praedicatur de aliquo'. 83. Or: Guillelmus Arnaldi, See De Rijk (1969: 125-127). For Arnaldi's views on the subject at hand, see ib.: 142-143; 146. 84. E.g. in Albert's In Perihenneneias (1890, esp. 380a-b).

85. See above, p. 130. 138

The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus

86. Nuchelmans (1972: 209 ff). 87. Esp. Book XI, II, 2 (1968: 334): 'Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, consideranda sunt et dinoscenda. Primo ipsa res quam videmus ( ... ). Deinde visio quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensus sentiremus. Tertio quod in ea re quae videtur quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, idest animi intentio'. See also ib. XI, II, 5 , ed. 1968: 338339. Cf. Pinborg (1969: 403). 88. Cf. Bos (forthcoming). 89. Nuchelmans (1972: ch. 3). 90. Cf. Schepers (1970: 321-325). 91. I have tried to show elsewhere (Bos, forthcoming) that William of Ockham defended a reist-theory in his early years. 92. Cf. Weisheipl (1968: 175); Brown (1973: 42). According to Brown (1975: 201), MS Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 645/688 gives as date: CCC0p0 : does 'p' in the manuscript stand for '4'? 93. By Brown (1975). 94. See Nuchelmans (1973: 220). 95. Quaestiones in librnm Perihermeneias

(1975: 1.71: 212) '( ...) hoc nomen

"homo" significat rem extra animam'. 96. Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias , (1975: 3.55: 248). 97. Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias

(1975 :3.55: 250): 'Ulterius est

intelligendum quod propositio in mente non componitur ex rebus compositione reali sicut domus componitur ex !ignis et lapidibus, sed solum est ibi compositio intellectualis quae fit ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit aliqua esse eadem et diversa'. 98. See e.g. Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, 14 (1974: 48-49); cf. Pinborg (1972: 106). 99. See e.g. Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, 63 (1974: 193). 100. Cf. Pinborg (1971: 127). 101. See e.g. Ockham, Summa Logicae, II, 2 (1974: 250-251). 102. Balic (1965: 11). 103. Cf. Balic (1965: 22).

139

CONSEQUENCES IN OCKHAM'S SUMMA LOGICAE

Eleonore Stump

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

and State University

1. Ockham's Theory of Consequences: The Issues

The third treatise of Ockham's Summa logicae, which comes after the treatises on terms and on propositions, is devoted to arguments, and it is itself divided into three parts. The first part considers the nature of a syllogism and its valid moods; the second discusses demonstrative syllogisms, and the third considers consequences. This third part of the third treatise is the one that is of most interest for a consideration of the relation of consequences to syllogisms, Topics, obligations and insolubles in Ockham's work. In this part, Ockham adds to his earlier discussion of the nature of a syllogism, presents a thorough account of consequences, makes use of traditional Topical material, and rounds out his examination of consequences with a brief discussion of obligations and insolubles. In examining Ockham's work on consequences here, I want to consider the following issues. First, what does Ockham think consequences are, and how does he think they are related first to Topics, and then also to syllogisms, obligations, and insolubles? And, second, what are his criteria for the validity of a consequence, and what, if anything, do these criteria correspond to in contemporary logic? Finally, I want to say something briefly about the place Ockham's theory of consequences occupies in the history of logic and its relation to the work of the thirteenth-century terminists.

2. Aristotelianism in Ockham's Logic

Ockham begins Treatise III with a discussion of the syllogism because he believes in the primacy of the syllogism among species of arguments 1. But b:Idamental to his account of the syllogism are the principles dici de omni et

141

E. Stump nullo, which Ockham explains in this way. Something is said of all (dici de omni) when nothing is subsumed under the subject unless the predicate is said of itwhich is what is denoted by every universal affirmative proposition. Something is said of none (dici de nullo) when the predicate is denied of whatever the subject is said of - which is what is denoted by every universal negative proposition2 . Every syllogism, on Ockham's view, is regulated either directly or indirectly by one or the other of these principles3 . The valid moods of the first figure are regulated directly by

dici de omni et nullo and the valid moods of the other

figures are regulated indirectly by these principles in virtue of the fact that they are warranted by reduction to the valid moods of the first figure. By 'regulated' here, Ockham seems in fact to mean 'justified'; the fust chapters of this part of Treatise III consist in an investigation of a variety of syllogistic forms to determine whether or not they are regulated by dici de omni et nullo, and those that are not are therefore rejected as demonstrably invalid. In addition, when he discusses the reduction of the valid moods of the second and third figure to those of the fust figure, Ockham recognizes the importance of conversion, reduction to the impossible, and transposition of premisses in effecting the reduction\ and he thinks of cases of conversion (at least) as consequences5. Hence, though Ockham begins his treatise on arguments by emphasizing the primacy of the syllogism in the traditional way, reminiscent of the Aristotelianism of the terrninists, it quickly becomes apparent that he conceives of the validity of the syllogism as dependent, first, on the principles dici de omni et nullo and, secondly, on certain consequences, such as those of conversion. The primacy of the syllogism is thus considerably undermined, and the categorical syllogism is no longer thought of as the ultimate guarantor of validity in arguments. The traditional distinction between dialectic and demonstration is also weakened in Ockham's work. On· his view, all syllogisms are divided into those that are demonstrative, those that are Topical, and those that are neither (this group at least includes and perhaps coincides with sophistical syllogisms) 6 . Demonstrative syllogisms are those whose premisses are necessary; Topical syllogisms, on the other hand, consist of probable propositions7 . So far, Ockham's account is reminiscent of views from the first half of the thirteenth century, but what Ockham goes on to say is a repudiation of the spirit of those early thirteenth-century views. First of all, he takes the probable to be what is true, readily believable, and necessary (an addition repugnant to early thirteenthcentury Aristotelianism); all that is excluded from the probable is what is selfevident or derivable from what is self-evident. So a Topical syllogism, consisting

142

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae of probable premisses, is deficient in neither the matter nor the form of a syllogism8. Secondly, in the section on consequences, he claims that all syllogisms (including then, presumably, demonstrative syllogisms also) hold in virtue of "an extrinsic means", by which he understands a general rule of consequences; and the extrinsic means he cites in examples are often traditional Topical ma.xims9 . So though Ockham casts his discussion of syllogistic and dialectic in Aristotelian terminology, his views diverge widely from the Aristotelianism characteristic of logicians in the first half of the thirteenth century.

3. Ockham 's account of consequences

Ockham introduces the third section in Treatise III, the one devoted to consequences, as his discussion of arguments which are not in syllogistic form, by which he seems to mean enthymemes; and he claims that what follows will enable the diligent student to hold correct views about all non-demonstrative (i.e., Topical · perhaps even sophistical) syllogisms 10• This third section, then, is apparently devoted to arguments which are not demonstrative and not syllogistic inform. Ockham begins this section by drawing a number of general distinctions among kinds of consequences 11 • He tends to organize the material of this section along the lines of all these distinctions, but for my purposes here only three of the distinctions are significant. (1) Some consequences are simple (or absolute) and others are as-of-now (ut

nunc). Simple consequences are such that there is no time at which the antecedent can be true and the consequent false. As-of-now consequences are such that there is some time at which the antecedent can be true and the consequent false, but at this time · the time at which the consequence is offered · the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent 12 . (2) Some consequences hold by an intrinsic means and others by an extrinsic means. Those that hold by an intrinsic means are those that are valid in virtue of a proposition employing at least some of the categorematic terms used in the consequence itself. 'Socrates is not running; therefore a man is not running' is a consequence holding by an intrinsic means, because it is validated by the addition of the proposition 'Socrates is a man'. Consequences holding by an extrinsic means are those that are valid in virtue of a general proposition employing categorematic terms different from those employed in the consequence itself.

143

E. Stump 'Only a man is a donkey; therefore every donkey is a man' is a consequence holding by an extrinsic means, because it is validated by the rule 'An exclusive and a universal (proposition], with the terms transposed, signify the same thing and convert'. All syllogisms, Ockham maintains, hold in virtue of an extrinsic means 13• What exactly he means by this claim is not clear; it may be that he is thinking of the principles dici de omni et nullo as ru1es of consequences and taking them as extrinsic means warranting (directly or indirectly) all valid modes of the syllogism. Some consequences which hold through an intrinsic means look as if they also hold by an extrinsic means, thus impugning the distinction between the two sorts of consequences. For example, the consequence 'Socrates is not running; therefore a man is not running' holds by the intrinsic means 'Socrates is a man'. But someone might object that it also holds by the extrinsic means 'From a singu1ar to an indefinite (proposition] with a negation which does not attach to the singular or indefinite subject term (postposita negatione) is a good consequence'. In reply to this objection Ockham says that the extrinsic means here cannot validate the consequence unless we add to the consequence the proposition that Socrates is a man. And therefore, this consequence and others like it (for example, all enthymemes) hold directly by an intrinsic means and indirectly or u1timately by an extrinsic means 14. (3) Some consequences are formal and others material. A formal consequence can be either of two sorts. It can hold in virtue of an extrinsic means which has to do with the form of the proposition that is the consequence, such as that given above, 'From an exclusive to a universal proposition with the terms transposed is a good consequence'. Or it can hold directly by an intrinsic means and indirectly by an extrinsic means which has to do with the general conditions of propositions (which I will say something more about shortly). A material consequence, on the other hand, holds in virtue of its terms and not in virtue of an extrinsic means having to do with the general conditions of propositions. Ockham's examples of material consequences are these: (a) 'If a man is running, God exists' and (b) 'A man is a donkey; therefore God does not exist'.

Ockham understands the consequent of (a) to be necessary and the antecedent

144

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae of (b) to be impossible. These two consequences, then, seem to hold by the rules that (RN) what is necessary follows from anything and (RI) anything follows from what is impossible. Since Ockham explicitly recognizes and accepts these two rules as general rules of consequences 15, it seems at first glance inconsistent for him to hold that consequences (a) and (b) are material consequences, not validated by extrinsic means. What he appears to have in mind, however, is the thought that we cannot recognize the consequent of (a) as necessary or the antecedent of (b) as impossible unless we take into account the meanings of the terms. It is just the meanings of the terms 'god', 'man' and 'donkey' which render the relevant propositions necessary or impossible. And so Ockham seems right to say that these consequences hold in virtue of their terms. We might, of course, still be inclined to think that these consequences, like the consequence 'Socrates is not running; therefore a man is not running', hold indirectly or secondarily by an extrinsic means, namely, the general rules (RN) and (RI) cited just above. Ockham, however, does not claim that no extrinsic means validate such consequences. Rather he says they are not validated by any extrinsic means having to do with the general conditions of propositions. What exactly he means by "general conditions of propositions" is not clear; but when he first introduces the notion of an extrinsic means having to do with the general conditions of propositions, he glosses it by speaking of an extrinsic means having to do with the general conditions of propositions, rather than with truth or falsity, or necessity or impossibility. This gloss suggests a reason for Ockham's maintaining that material consequences hold only in virtue of their terms and not in virtue of an extrinsic means having to do with the general conditions of propositions: he takes the relevant sorts of extrinsic means to be only those which do not have to do with the truth or falsity, necessity or impossibility, of the antecedent or consequent in the conditional inference; and so rules (RN) and (RI), which clearly violate such a restriction, are not extrinsic means of the relevant sort, namely, those having to do with the general conditions of propositions 16• Ockham's three basic divisions of consequences overlap in a hopelessly untidy way. Consequences holding by an intrinsic means can be simple or as-of-now

145

E. Stump

consequences, though only simple consequences can be consequences holding directly by an extrinsic means. Formal consequences include those holding directly by an intrinsic or an extrinsic means; and formal consequences can be either simple or as-of-now consequences, whereas material consequences are always simple consequences and hold in virtue of their terms as well as (directly or perhaps only indirectly) in virtue of a special sort of extrinsic means. Most of the rest of the third section of Treatise III is devoted to presenting and discussing rules of consequences, and the succeeding chapters are divided roughly in this way. First, Ockham deals with assertoric consequences, beginning with those that hold in virtue of an intrinsic means; then he turns to assertoric consequences that hold by an extrinsic means. Though Ockham does not use the technical terminology generally associated with the Topics, Topical maxims and arguments traditionally associated with one or another of the Topical Differentiae are scattered throughout this part of the treatise. Consequences depending on definition, description, explanation of a name, superior and inferior (that is, genus and species), integral whole and part, opposites, generation and destruction, and conjugates, for example, can be found recurrently throughout these chapters; and at one point even the old Boethian rule from authority, that the judgment of an expert in his field must be accepted, is discussed as a rule of consequences and accepted in a qualified form, restricting the authority in question to an infallible authority, such as Scripture 17 . Though none of Ockham's vocabulary suggests that he thinks of these consequences as Topical, it is hard to believe he does not recognize them as such. (In fact, in discussing the fallacy of the consequent in his commentary on Aristotle's Soph. Et. 18 , Ockham maintains that the rules for the conversion of consequences, on which recognition of the fallacy of the consequent depends, should be learned form Aristotle's Topics.) The succeeding chapters, Chapters 10-16, deal with modal consequences; if there is Topical lore in these chapters, it is much less evident than in the preceding chapters. All the consequences in Chapters 2-16 are those in which the terms supposit personally19. Beginning in Chapter 17, Ockham discusses consequences whose terms supposit materially. Under this heading, he deals in detail with Aristotelian Topics, considering them in roughly the same order in which they occur in Aristotle's Topics (that is, first consequences dealing with accident, then those dealing with genus, then property, and finally defmition). Then he discusses what are traditionally known as "the things annexed" to one of these four predicables, such as consequences having to do with sameness or difference, which is annexed to defmition. After several chapters on consequences involving induction and

146

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae equivocation, Ockham concludes this part of the third section with a brief chapter on eight general rules of consequences (with some corollaries). The rules are these: (1)

A false proposition never follows from a true one.

(2)

A true proposition can follow from false ones.

(3)

The opposite of the antecedent follows from the opposite of the consequent.

(4)

Whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent. [Ockham attaches numerous corollaries to this rule, such as these:

(4a) Whatever the antecedent follows from, the consequent follows from also; (4b) Whatever is incompatible with the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent also.] (5)

A contingent proposition does not follow from a necessary one.

(6)

An impossible proposition does not follow from a possible proposition.

(7)

Anything follows from an impossible proposition.

(8)

A necessary proposition follows from anything20.

Some of these rules are, of course, unimpeachable; others, such as rule (5), need more discussion and examination than the scope of this paper allows.

4. Elementarium Logicae & Tractatus minor

In addition to the Summa logicae (SL ), two other treatises on logic, the Elementarium logicae and the Tractatus mino?- 1, have traditionally been assigned

to Ockham22, though current scholarly opinion seems inclined to deny the attribution23. The treatment of consequences in both treatises but especially in the Elementarium bears a strong resemblance to Ockham's discussion of the subject in SL. The author of the Elementarium, for example, gives the same sort of status to the syllogism as Ockham does, and he accords the same role and the same prominence to the principles dici de omni et nullo as Ockham does. His basic divisions of consequences also closely resemble Ockham's. There are, however, some major discrepancies as well. For example, both these smaller treatises make unabashed use of the traditional vocabulary of the Topics, which Ockham so carefully eschews in SL. The Elementarium follows the old Boethian divisions of Topics, discussing not only intrinsic and extrinsic, but also intermediate Topics; Ockham in SL discusses only intrinsic and extrinsic means. The Tractatus does mention an intrinsic means at one point but apparently takes it to be a rule24

147

E. Stump

rather than a proposition formed from the same terms as those in the consequence validated by the intrinsic means, as Ockham has it25 . Most important of all, however, both treatises understand material consequences in a way different from Ockham's in SL. The Tractatus26 explains the distinction between material and formal consequences simply by saying that a formal consequence holds in virtue of the form of the propositions and a material consequence in virtue of the matter, that is, of the particular terms in the propositions. The Elementarium is more explicit27 • After giving the same general explanation as the Tractatus, the Elementarium gives this example of a material consequence: 'An animal is disputing; therefore a man is disputing.' This is not a formal consequence, because, in general, inferences of this sort from genus to species are not valid. But it is a good material consequence

in virtue of the

meaning of 'is disputing', because disputing is something which only men among all animals can do; and so if an animal is disputing, it follows that a man is disputing. This is plainly not the same as Ockham's exposition of material consequences in SL, where he takes material consequences to be only those in which the antecedent is impossible or the consequent necessary28 . In view of the strong doubt concerning their attribution to Ockham, then, I will not consider these treatises further here.

Obligations and insolubles

5.

The chapter on the general rules of consequences looks like the appropriate ending for Ockham's consideration of consequences. It is at first surprising, then, that Ockham feels compelled (as he says) to add one Chapter on obligations and another on insolubles to complete his investigation of consequences29. Ockham is not alone in associating consequences, obligations, and iusolubles; such an association is, in fact, common in the fourtheenth-century and afterwards30. But, philosophically considered, it appears strange that Ockham treats obligations and insolubles as included within the general subject of consequences. Ockham himself gives us the explanation in the case of insolubles: if in an apparent consequence (one that appears to be governed by necessary rules) a contingent antecedent yields its opposite, a sophisma involving an insoluble occurs; they are called 'insolubles' because such consequences are difficult to block31 . Ockham sees iusolubles, then, as a special kind of consequences. They involve only contingent propositions, and they have to do wi!h just one sort of fallacious reasoning, namely, that in which by means of apparently unimpeachable

148

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae rules of consequences a proposition appears to entail its opposite. Ockham's technique for dealing with insolubles consists at least in part in exposing a particular consequence as the essence of a sophisma involving an insoluble and then arguing that that consequence is not valid, as in the case of this example in which Socrates says (S) 'Socrates says what is false' and (S) is the only statement Socrates makes:

"For the solution of this insoluble and of all others like it, one should know that such a contingent proposition [as (S)], from which its opposite may be inferred, either contains the term 'false' (or something similar) or the term 'true' (or something similar). If the former ..., one ought to say that the proposition is false ... [If the latter],

one ought to grant that the propo-

sition is true ... And if one argues [in this way]: 'If this is true: "Socrates does not say what is true", and if Socrates says this proposition, then Socrates says a true proposition' - one ought to say that this consequence is not valid: 'Socrates says this proposition, and this proposition is true; therefore Socrates says a true proposition'. And the reason for this denial is that in this proposition 'Socrates does not say what is true', the predicate cannot supposit for the whole proposition of which it is a part .. .'132•

It is harder to see why Ockham includes obligations among consequences unless

we recognize that obligations consist in consequences in a disputational context. That is, the consequences to be evaluated in obligations are (or at least must be considered as being) presented in an oral exchange which occurs between two disputants and which takes place during a stipulated interval of time. The interesting cases are those in which the disputational context makes a diference to the evaluation of the consequence or to any of its constituent propositions. It is perhaps easiest to generate such interesting cases by including in the premisses of an obligations argument a reference to the evaluator of those premisses33 . For example, an opponent in an obligations disputation may want his respondent to maintain as true the proposition that he, the respondent, is dead. But if the respondent were to maintain such a proposition as true, he would be in trouble in the disputation, not because this proposition is incompatible with some other proposition which the respondent has granted, but instead because it is incompatible with the action of the respondent - it is not possible for the respondent to be dead and also responding in an obligations diputation34 . And so the reference in the premisses to the evaluator of the premisses in conjunction

149

E. Stump

with the context of an oral disputation creates difficulties which would not arise in connection with, for example, the statement 'Socrates is dead' (unless that statement were proposed in an obligations disputation in which Socrates is the respondent). Or, to take another example, the passage of time involved in the presentation of an argument must sometimes also be taken into account in obligations35 . Ockham acknowledges this case in passing, mentioning propositions which become necessary or impossible in the course of time during an obligations disputation35. One of the things that apparently interests Ockham himself most in his treatment of obligations here, however, involves the peculiar circumstance in which the positum, the proposition laid down by the opponent at the beginning of an obligations disputation, is an impossible proposition. Ockham begins his discussion of this case in a way that seems puzzling at first glance, by claiming that there is a great difference between an impossible proposition in the positio and a consequence composed of impossible propositions37 • The consequence 'God is not three persons; therefore God is not God' is acceptable, on Ockham's view; it is, in fact, a material consequence, warranted by the seventh of Ockham's general

rules of consequences, namely, that anything follows from an impossible proposition. Nonetheless, according to Ockham, if the antecedent of this acceptable consequence - 'God is not three persons' - is laid down as the positum, a respondent ought to deny the consequent, 'God is not God', if it is put forward subsequently in the disputation. On the basis of this puzzling claim, Ockham makes two further sets of stipulations about an impossible proposition as positum. In the fust place, he maintains that not every impossible proposition can be laid down as the positum, but only such as do not manifestly or obviously entail a contradiction. In the second place, not all the rules of consequences hold for cases in which the positum is impossible. No as-of-now consequences or material consequences are acceptable in any obligations disputation in which the positum is impossible. This second stipulation makes sense out of the original claim, namely, that although the consequence 'God is not three persons; therefore God is not God' is a good consequence, the consequent is to be denied if the antecedent is posited. This is a material consequence; and if all such consequences are to be rejected in disputations in which the proposition posited is impossible, then, of course, the respondent cannot maintain that 'God is not God' follows from 'God is not three persons'. But why would Ockham stipulate that material consequences are to be rejected in such cases? There are, I think, two reasons - the fust practical and

150

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae the second philosophical - for his stipulation. If we accept the rule that anything follows from an impossible proposition in an obligations disputation where the positum is impossible, it will not be possible to have anything but a trivial disputation, because no matter what proposition is put to the respondent, it is clear from the outset that the respondent will have to grant it as following from the proposition posited. Hence if we accept this rule of consequences in the context of an obligations disputation, we cannot have a disputation which is of any philosophical interest. Secondly, if we reject this rule of consequences in such obligations and allow only simple, formal consequences, the result will be philosophically interesting, because what we will have in such cases then is something roughly similar to a logic of counterfactuals for a restricted class of propositions. The purpose of obligations disputations in which the positum is impossible is apparently to see what is entailed if one takes as true such propositions as 'God does not exist', 'The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son', or 'Man is not capable of laughter'. This enables us to understand Ockham's other stipulation, namely, that an impossible proposition which can be used as a positum must not manifestly and obviously entail a contradiction. If it did obviously entail a contradiction, the disputation would again end quickly in an uninteresting way. The opponent would derive the contradictory propositions entailed by the posited proposition, which the respondent would be forced to grant; and the disputation would be over because the respondent had granted contradictory propositions. Furthermore, even if the opponent agreed to forego such a cheap victory, interesting and rational

results would still be unlikely since all sorts of incompatible propositions are quickly derivable from an impossible proposition which obviously entails contradictories. Ockham includes obligations among consequences, then, because he conceives of them as providing special, philosophically interesting difficulties in the evaluation of consequences in virtue of the disputational context in which these consequences are presented, and because on his view they include a study of a special kind of consequences, namely, certain sorts of inferences from a restricted class of impossible propositions.

151

E. Stump 6. Ockham's Theory of Inference

Various scholars have claimed to find different theories of inference in Ockharn's work on consequences. Boehner, for example, identified Ockham's material consequences with material implication3S. Moody, on the other hand, took all as-of-now consequences as instances of material implication39; and both scholars tended to interpret the remaining sorts of consequences as cases of strict implication. Moody's and Boehner's views have come under attack in recent years by Mullick40 and by Adams41 . Adams' work in her excellent article "Did Ockham Know of Material and Strict Implication?" is somewhat broader in scope than Mullick's; she argues that both Moody and Boehner are mistaken and that none of Ockharn's particular divisions of consequences is to be identified with material implication. Adams's insightful and scholarly arguments on this score are, I think, altogether convincing. But she concludes her article with a brief section maintaining that Ockharn does have "a basic notion of inference that coincides exactly with material implication"42, and there I think she is mistaken. She argues for her view in this way: "Grounds for this claim can be found in Ockharn's opinions, if one focuses again on the division between simple and as of now inferences. Since this distinction is among good inferences and true conditionals, any inference or conditional that satisfies either conditions (i) that it is not the case now that the antecedent is true and the consequent false, and (ii) that it is possible that the antecedent should be true and the consequent false at some other time; or conditions (iii) that it is not the case now that the antecedent is true and the consequent false, and (iv) that it is not possible that its antecedent should be true and its consequent false at any other time; is a good inference or a true conditional. But it is a necessary truth that every inference and every conditional proposition either is such that it satisfies (ii) or is such that it satisfies (iv). For any conditional proposition, it either is or it is not possible that its antecedent should be true and its consequent false at some time. Consequently, all that one needs to determine, in order to determine which inferences are good and which conditional propositions are true, is to determine which ones meet condition (i) (which is the same as condition (iii))i.e., one must determine which inferences and conditional propositions are 152

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae such that it is not the case that their antecedents are true and their consequents false. Ockham's discussion of simple and as of now inferences thus suggests that satisfying condition (i) is sufficient for an inference's holding good or for a conditional proposition's being true. This is so, even though satisfying condition (i) is not a sufficient condition for an inference or conditional proposition to be a good inference or a true proposition of a

parlicular sort - e.g., a true simple conditional proposition, or a true material conditional proposition" 43. Adams suggests, then, that on Ockham's view material implication is the genus of all valid inferences from which the species such as simple inferences are constructed by the addition of certain qualifications to the truth conditions for material implication. Thus, the criteria for simple inferences are constructed by adding condition (iv) - that it is not possible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false - to the conditions for material implication. But, on this interpretation, the criteria for as of now inferences are constructed by adding condition (ii) to the conditions for material implication. Condition (ii) is not a truth-functional condition, as Adams points out44 ; but it is a condition that holds for all cases of material implication (though not for strict implication). Therefore, if condition (i) is equivalent to the truth conditions for material implication, as

Adams claims, the class of as-of-now inferences should coincide with the class of instances of material implication; condition (ii) adds nothing which restricts or alters the conditions in such a way that as-of-now inference differs from material implication. But Adams herself argues effectively that it is a mistake to identify as-of-now inference with material implication. Furthermore, even given the truth conditions for simple and as-of-now consequences as Adams presents them, condition (i) is not equivalent to the truth conditions for material implication. Condition (i), as Adams gives it, is "it is not the case now that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false". This is more restricted than the conditions for material implication. It contains a reference to present time, as the conditions for material implication do not; and it leaves open the possibility, again contrary to the conditions for material implication, that at some time other than the present the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Even if Ockham held condition (i), then, and even if we agreed with Adam's argument that by Ockham's own standards satisfying condition (i) is sufficient for the validity of an inference, it would not follow that satisfying condition (i) is equivalent to satisfying the truth conditions for material

153

E. Stump implication or that Ockham's basic notion of inference "coincides exactly with material implication". Finally, I do not think condition (i) does accurately represent Ockham's view of one of the conditions for as-of-now inferences. What Ockham in fact says about as-of-now inferences is this: "An as-of-now consequence occurs when the antecedent can be true without the consequent for some time but not for this time"45 . And he goes on to give an example which strengthens the impression of the remark: "For example, this consequence is only as-of-now: 'Every animal is running; therefore Socrates is running', because for this time, in which Socrates is an animal, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent; and nevertheless for some time the antecedent will be able to be true without the consequent because when Socrates will be dead, the antecedent will be able to be true although the consequent is false" 46 . The first condition for as-of-now inferences, then, is not equivalent to the truth conditions for material implication but rather should be read as this: (i') it is not the case now that the antecedent can be true and the consequent false. Adams recognizes that Ockham's text contains a definition of as-of-now consequences in terms of (i'); but she argues that no matter what interpretation we give to the modal operator in (i'), some view which is obviously false or incompatible with other views of Ockham's results. And she concludes therefore that what Ockham means is "that if 'p; therefore q' is an as of now inference, the conjunction 'p . - q' is false now, while '-(p .- q)' is true" 47 • But the text of Ockham's account of as-of-now inferences is unambiguous and makes it clear that it is condition (i') rather than Adams's (i) to which Ockham is committed. Adams claims that if the modal operator 'not possible' is interpreted as 'contradictory', "the claim is too obviously false for Ockham to make", because he would have to be claiming, for example, that "the conjunction 'Every animal runs and it is not the case that Socrates runs' is contradictory now, although there is some time at which it is not contradictory" 48 • It seems to me, however, that this is just what he is claiming, and I do not think it is obviously false. The consequence in question is one which, on Ockham's view, is validated by an intrinsic meansnamely, the proposition 'Socrates is an animal'. The consequence in its validated form, then, is 'every animal is running and Socrates is an animal; therefore Socrates is running'. This is, of course, a valid inference; and the conjunction 'every animal is running and Socrates is an animal and Socrates is not running' is contradictory. It is apparently Ockham's view49, however, (and this view is common in the scholastic period) that when the subject (erm of a proposition

154

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae refers to what is non-existent, the proposition is false. In other words, it apparently is Ockham's view that when Socrates is dead (for example), it is not true that Socrates is an animal. That view evidently lies behind Ockham's discussion of this particular example, where he claims that when Socrates is dead, it will be possible for the antecedent of the consequence to be true and the consequent false. And so, on Ockham's account, the denial of the consequence 'Every animal is running; therefore Socrates is running' - namely, the conjunction 'Every animal is running and Socrates is not

running' - which is contradictory

when Socrates is alive, is not contradictory when he is dead in virtue of the fact that when he does not exist he is not an animal. I think, then, that the first condition for as-of-now inferences must be taken as (i') rather than as (i), and that when it is taken in that way it does not commit Ockham to any obviously false or inconsistent positions about the nature of valid inferences. Hence, I think the claim that on Ockham's view the truth conditions for material implication are sufficient for the validity of an inference is mistaken. And since Adams has shown convincingly that none of Ockham's basic divisions of consequences is to be identified with material implication, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Ockham did not recognize or accept material implication. That he did recognize and accept strict implications is, I think, not open to serious doubt, though there is ample room for controversy over some of the particular inferences Ockham seems to take as examples of acceptable simple consequences (i.e., as instances of strict implication) - as, for example, 'the generation of a man is good; therefore a man is good'.

7. Conclusion If we compare Ockham's logic in light of all these considerations with that of

the thirteenth-century terminists, his seems both more and less formal than theirs. Peter of Spain, for example, has a formal logical system of a sort, but it is a very restricted one, in which the sole guarantor of the validity of any argument is the categorical syllogism. All non-syllogistic arguments, such as Topical arguments, the terminists tend to force into syllogistic form, as can be seen most clearly in William of Sherwood's treatment of Topics. Conversion inferences in particular pose a problem for the terminists because they are clearly non-syllogistic, and the validity of certain moods of the syllogism depends in crucial ways on the validity of some conversion inferences. By contrast, Ockham's account of formal logic is much broader. It recognizes, accepts, and accounts for

155

E. Stump a large variety of non-syllogistic inferences, including obligational inferences, without trying to force them into syllogistic form; it includes syllogisms as one species of consequences among others; and it takes consequences in general, including syllogistic concequences, to be warranted directly or indirectly by rules of consequences. In this way, it gives a more unified and systematic treatment of a greater number of types of arguments than does the approach of the terminists. On the other hand, to the extent to which the terminists use the flrst-figure syllogism as the ultimate guarantor of validity in arguments, to that extent they have a purely formal logic, in which arguments that are valid are so solely in virtue of their form. In contrast, many of the rules of consequences which Ockham accepts as validating consequences have to do not just with the form of a consequence but also, for example, with certain semantic features of the terms in the consequence or metaphysical features of things referred to by the terms. Ockham seems to broaden the scope of the evaluational procedures of logic, away from the very restricted criteria of terminist logic, in a way that compromises the formal character of logic. In the terminists, then, the foundations of logic are highly formalized but also extremely restricted in scope, involving only the valid moods of the categorical syllogism. In Ockham the scope of logic is greatly broadened, but the broadening is accomplished at the cost of some of the formality. Nonetheless, by comparison with the work of his predecessors Ockham's logic clearly represents an enormous advance, showing a development towards a logic that is both formal and able to account for as large a variety of inferences as possible50.

NOTES

1.

William Ockham, Summa logicae (1974: 359.2-5).

2.

Ibid., p. 363.41-50.

3.

Ibid., p. 362.32-35.

4.

Ibid., pp. 362-4.

5.

Ibid., ·pp. 322.18-23, 323.40-50, and 323.67-324.86. The following twenty

6.

Ibid., p. 360.43-6.

7.

Ibid., p. 359.

8.

Ibid., p. 360.20-4, 360.35-6.

pages contain many such examples.

156

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae

9.

Cf., ibid., p. 588.23-25.

10.

Ibid., p. 587.4-9.

11.

For a general discussion of this material, see Bird (1961: 65-78).

12.

Ockham (1974: 587.10-588.22).

13.

Ibid., p. 588.34-5.

14.

Ibid., pp. 588.23-589.44: "Et si dicatur contra istam distinctionem quod ista consequentia 'Sortes non currit, ergo homo non currit' tenet per istud medium extrinsecum 'a singulari ad indefinitam post posita negatione est bona .consequentia', quod est medium extrinsecum: Dicendum est quod tenet per istud medium extrinsecum remote et mediate et insufficienter, quia praeter istam regulam generalem requiritur plus, scilicet quod Sortes sit homo ...." (p. 588.36-42).

15.

For Ockham's discussion of the distinction between formal and material consequences, see ibid., p. 589.45-58. For his acceptance of (RN) and (RI) as rules of consequences, see ibid., pp. 730.88-731.92.

16.

For a detailed discussion of Ockham's distinctions among consequences, see Adams (1973: 5-37).

17.

Ockham (1974: 614).

18.

Ockham, Expositio super Iibras Elenchorum, ed. F. del Punta, (The Franciscan Institute, 1979), pp. 61.23ff.

19.

Ockham (1974: 649.4-650.6).

20.

Ibid., pp. 727-31: (1)

"ex vero numquam sequitur falsum" (727.2-3);

(2)

"ex falsis potest sequi verum" (728.12);

(3)

"ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis" (728.21-2);

(4)

"quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens" (729.41-2);

(4a) "quidquid antecedit ad antecedens, antecedit ad cousequenS"(729.456); (4b) "quidquid repugnat consequenti, repugnat antecedenti" (729.60-1);

21.

(5)

"ex necessaria non sequitur contingens" (730.73);

(6)

"ex possibili non sequitur impossibile" (730.74);

(7)

"ex impossibili sequitur quodlibet" (730.88);

(8)

"necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet" (731.89).

Edited by E.M. Buytaert in "The Tractatus logicae minor of Ockham", Franciscan Studies 24 (1964) 34-100, and "The Elementarium logicae of

Ockham", Franciscan Studies 25 (1965) 151-276 and 26 (1966) 66-173. 22.

See Buytaert's introductions to his editions cited above.

23.

Cf. Ockham (1974: 62*-66*). 157

E. Stump

24.

Tractatus (1964: 77-8).

25.

Ockham (1974: 588.24-28).

26.

Tractatus (1964: 77).

27.

Elementarium (1965: 255).

28.

Ockham (1974: 589.55-8).

29.

Ibid., p. 731.3-6: "Quoniam logici circa obligationes et insolubilia speciales faciunt difficultates, ideo ad istius Summae completionem, quae de omni modo arguendi generalem tradit notitiam, sunt aliqua brevia perscrutanda".

30.

Seed Green (forthcoming), Introduction, Chapter II; and Stump (1980: 249-

64). 31.

Ockham (1974: 744.5-8): "Unde sciendum quod insolubilia sophismata sunt quando per consequentias apparentes, quae videntur regulari per regulas necessarias, ex propositione aliqua contingenti infertur sua opposita; quae ideo dicuntur insolubilia, quia difficile est tales consequentias impediri".

32.

Ibid., p. 745.22-40: "Et ad solutionem istius et aliorum omnium est sciendum quod talis propositio contingens, ex qua debet inferri sua repugnans, vel habet hunc terminum 'falsum' vel aliquem consimilem, vel hunc terminum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem. Si primo modo ... debet dici quod sit falsa ... Si autem propositio contineat hunc terminum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem ... tunc est concedenda quod ilia propositio est vera ... Et si arguitur: si haec sit vera 'Sortes non dicit verum', et Sortes dicit hanc propositionem, igitur Sortes dicit propositionem veram, dieendum est quod ista consequentia non valet 'Sortes dicit hane propositionem, et haec propositio est vera, igitur Sortes dicit propositionem veram'. Et ratio huius negationis est, quia in ista propositione 'Sortes non dicit verum' praedicatum non potest supponere pro ista tota propositione cuius est pars ... ".

33.

See Stump (1980), op. cit.

34.

Ockham (1974: 735.21-736.26). Ockham uses this example to make a technical point whose exposition is unnecessary for my purposes here. I am concerned to show only that on Ockham's view we may need to consider the incompatibility of a proposition with the action of a respondent.

35.

See, for example, the example discussed in Stump (1980: 259-260).

36.

Ockham (1974: 738.96-104).

37.

Ibid., pp. 739.1ff.

38.

Cf. Boehner (1958: 319-51).

158

Consequences in Ockham's Summa logicae

39.

Cf. Moody (1953: 64-80).

40.

Mullick (1971: 117-24).

41.

Adams (1973).

42.

Ibid., p. 6.

43,

Ibid., pp. 35-6.

44.

Ibid., p. 11.

45.

Ockham (1974: 587.11-13): "Consequentia 'ut nunc' est quando antecedens pro aliquo tempore potest esse verum sine consequente sed non pro isto tempore".

46.

Ibid., pp. 587.13-588.18: "Sicut ista consequentia est ut nunc solurn 'omne animal currit, igitur Sortes currit', quia pro isto tempore pro quo Sortes est animal, non potest antecedens esse verurn sine consequente; et tamen pro aliquo tempore poterit antecedens esse verurn sine consequente, quia quando Sortes erit mortuus, poterit antecedens esse verurn consequente existente falso".

47.

Adams (1973: 13).

48.

Ibid., p. 12.

49.

Cf. Ockham (1974: 72, 87, and 764ft). I am grateful to Rega Wood for these references.

50.

I am grateful to Norman Kretzmann for numerous helpful comments and suggestions.

159

WODEHAM, CRATHORN AND HOLCOT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE*

K.H. Tachau University of Iowa

This paper is intended to contribute to the history of the creation of the notion of the complexe significabile, with some attention to the degree to which it can usefully be characterized as Ockhamist, anti-Ockhamist, or neither. Among twentieth-century scholars, the notion of the complexe significabile has usually been most strongly associated with Gregory of Rimini 1; nevertheless, over fifteen years ago, Heinrich Schepers established and Gabriel Nuchelmans appreciated that the Dominican Crathorn had defended against Holcot a view quite similar to Rimini's2 • Since then Father Gedeon G~ established that a question of Wodeham's

Lectura secunda was a source for Rimini, a finding that Rimini's editors have confirmed by tracing further quotations to Wodeham3 • This has presented us with the problem of intellectual priority: is credit for the complexe significabile to be given to Crathorn or to Wodeham? Some later fourteenth-century authors, such as Peter Ceffons and a Johannes de Burgo, did attribute the doctrine to Wodeham, although Ceffons in the same breath also mentions Chatton, which might be a scribal error for Crathorn4 • Any answer to the question of priority requires some resolution of the problems presented to the historian by the confused state of Wodeham manuscripts vis-~-vis

the chronology of his, Holcot's and Crathom's scholarly careers; and to

these matters the second and third parts of the present article will be devoted. But an answer also requires a renewed examination of the motivation for the hypothesis of the complexe significabile. This one cannot find clearly in Holcot's or Crathorn's oeuvre. Only in Adam Wodeham's discussion does such a motivation emerge.

161

K.H. Tachau

1. The Development of the Complexe Significabile in Wodeham's Thought

The best place to begin is with an explanation of what the complexe

significabile is: in E.J. Ashworth's lucid terms, it is a simultaneous answer to three separable questions, namely: (i) what is the object of knowledge and belief; (ii) what is the bearer of truth and falsity; and (iii) what does a mental

complexum, or propositional statement, signify? 5 If an answer to all three questions, it is from the last of these that the term complexe significabile (or complexly signifiable) comes, for to Wodeham, what is referred to by such a complexum or mental proposition, is "only complexly signifiable" 6 . In speaking this way of the notion I will be discussing as a "what", or "it" or "thing", I do not want to raise one of the most problematic aspects of the doctrine of the

complexe significabile, both from the standpoint of some modem scholars and from that of scholars from the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries who attacked it. This problem was the complexe significabile's ontological status, that is, whether it could be said to exist and, if so, in what way. I suspect, however, that this difficulty may not be quite the embarrassment critics of the theory made it seem7 . Chatton's attack on the view that the mental proposition is the object of scientific knowledge, the object to which one assents as true or from which one dissents as false, had become the major critique of that view by about 1325. At Oxford, Rodington identified the view Chatton attacked as that of Duns Scotus; in London, Wodeham made the same point8 . There, however, the similarity ends, for Rodington's own response was to insist that the object of scientific knowledge and the object of assent differed; that is, as he says, "science is primarily of the proposition", specifically, "the conclusion of a demonstration", while "assent is primarily with respect to the thing" 9• Where does this view land Rodington? The evidence that he knew that Chatton's target was really Ockham is irrefutable; and here, as elsewhere on epistemological issues, Redington deliberately rejects the Venerable Inceptor's position. It seems to me that Rodington intends to align himself with Scotus, albeit with modification. In other words, he accepts Scotus's opinion that what is primarily known is the proposition, on the grounds that (quoting Scotus), "only the True is known, and only the proposition is True, as Truth consists in the [mental] composition and division [of mental terms]" 10. Rodington's discussion deserves our attention here not because it affected Wodeham's discussion; rather, Rodington's lectures are significant as one of the most important routes by which

162

The development of the complexe significabile the debate between Chatton and Ockham was crystallized at Oxford during the time that Wodeham was away at London11 . Wodeham's own views are preserved in two separate sets of lectures on the Sentences, namely the so-called Lectura secunda preserved in one known

manuscript, and the Oxford lectures, preserved in Reportatio and Ordinatio forms, with several manuscript witnesses and various redactions 12. In advance of the second section of this paper, it must suffice to note that many questions from the present Lectura secunda, including those of concern here, contain Wodeham's views as elaborated before he composed his Oxford lectures. The latter are, of the existing two sets of commentaries, by far the less important for the doctrine of the complexe signijicabile. This is not only because the Oxford lectures contain references to the complexe significabile but no extensive explanation of or argumentation for it 13, but because the structure of the Lectura secunda shows us either how Wodeham arrived at the solution, or how he wanted to explain the foundations upon which it rests. Thus, the opening nine questions of the Lectura secunda proceed through an unprecedented and systematic exploration of psychology and epistemology, with the conclusions of each question linked to those of the adjacent questions. During this exposition, Wodeham rejects many aspects of both Chatton's, and Ockham's theory of knowledge14 . Nevertheless, Wodeham concurs in principle with Ockham's insistence that one has not sufficiently derived and explained the object of knowledge by positing the construction of contingent mental propositions from mental terms signifying extramental things known by means of intuitive cognitions; a further adjudicative act (iudicium) of assent or dissent is required. Although Wodeham does dispute Ockham's reservation of such judgments to the intellectual, rather than sensitive faculties 15, on the question of the object of that assent - i.e., what is being assented to - the differences among Wodeham's, Chatton's and Ockham's understanding of such adjudicative acts are not central to their disagreement 16.

In the question edited by Father Gal, Wodeham first distills Chatton's lengthy discussion into arguments in support of the claim that the extramental thing signified by the terms of a mental proposition is the object of scientific knowledge and of this act of "assent" 17 . It is, incidentally, significant for developments at Oxford later, that Wodeham's distillation does not replicate Redington's, although some items appear on both lists. Wodeham takes most of

163

K.H. Tachau Chatton's arguments to play at best a supporting role for the sixth, which, in Wodeharn's eyes, makes the crucial point: "Assent to a [mental] proposition presupposes assent to the thing itself signified by the proposition, because first [one] assents that 'thus it is in reality as is denoted by the proposition' rather than that the proposition is true. Hence the assent caused by means of a proposition which signifies some thing, does not have that proposition as an object but [instead] the thing signified by means of [the proposition]" 18. Furthermore, as Wodeharn notes, Chatton had confirmed this by considering scientific demonstration. The conclusion of a demonstration, Chatton had stressed, is formally related to the premises such that assent to the conclusion presupposes

assent to the thing signified by the mental proposition (complexum) 19• This confirming argument was evidently one of several that opened for Wodeham the issue of precisely which mental propositions could be claimed as the object of scientific knowledge, and persuaded him that not merely those which functioned as the conclusion of a demonstration, but also the premises are parts of that total object20 . The first claim, too, that we assent "that things are in reality as they are denoted to be by the proposition" before we assent to the truth of the proposition itself, was for Wodeham a trenchant criticism of Ockham's view that the object of assent was the mental proposition itself. It is one of three arguments that Wodeharn advances against Ockham for, as Wodeharn says, "Experience teaches that assent frequently falls upon it being thus on the part of the thing; for example, I assent that you are sitting there, and the assent almost is not carried to the proposition, but [is carried] most strongly and

directly to 'thus it is in reality"•21. Why, therefore, did Wodeharn not accept Chatton's view, that the object of assent and scientific knowledge was the thing itself? Chatton had suggested that just as the species (or mental intention) is an entity by means of which the object from which it is generated is known, so the mental complex created by joining together those intentions was a means by which the same thing is known, such that the complex "man is white" signifies the man referred to by the subject term22 . Now this term 'man', according to Chatton, Wodeharn, and Ockharn, is a

164

The development of the complexe significabile first intention, and when Wodeham treats Lombard's twenty-third distinction, he notes that Chatton holds that "a first intention is that which signifies a thing to be such as it is in being" 23. To this Wodeham responds that: "Although this approaches the truth, it is false, because nouns do not signify a thing to be such as it is nor such as it is not ... for so to signify is [proper] only to a proposition, and not to any simple noun"24• The reason for this is that the term 'to be', which is an awareness (nota) of composition, signifies something, inasmuch as a proposition consists not only of subject and predicate terms25 • Thus, Wodeham insists, "Whether [the copula] signifies inherence or composition on the part of the thing [i.e., in reality], or unity and identity between the extremes - or what is signified by the extremes · of a proposition, always the result is that a proposition signifies something or somethings that is not signified by the subject or by the predicate"25. Because of the inherently different significates of the terms of a proposition and of the proposition itself, then, Chatton's answer cannot be sufficient. Faced with Ockham's alternative, can Chatton's critique be defeated? One might argue on Ockham's behalf that, in the case of evident propositions, the "thus it is in reality" (sic esse in re ), that is, what is signified by the copula, is entailed by their construction from terms known intuitively. In other words, because the sufficient mediate or immediate cause of these evident propositions, is the intuitive cognition of the things signified by their terms27 ; and because intuitive cognition is "that cognition by means of which is known that a thing exists when it exists, and does not exist when it does not"28 ; and because the awareness of existence can be taken as the import of the copula29, which Wodeham thinks makes a proposition signify other than as the terms signify; it might seem that Ockham's evident proposition would suffice as the object of assent, dissent, or scientific knowledge. If so, Wodeham's complexe significabile would be either redundant or reducible to Ockham's solution. To understand why neither is the case, we must turn to Wodeham's analysis, in question four of the Lectura secunda's prologue, of Ockham's discussion of experiences of illusion posed by Peter Aureol. As these experiences were posited as instances of naturally occurring intuitive cognitions of non-existent objects,

165

K.H. Tachau both Chatton and Ockham had endeavored to give alternative explanations of the phenomena30. Ockham's response to three of these illusions are particularly important to Wodeham's analysis: (i) the fact that a stick partially submerged in water appears bent; (ii) that swirling a burning wand can make one perceive a flaming circle in the air; (iii) that, under specified circumstances, it will appear to a passenger in a boat that the trees along the shore move3 1. In reinterpreting the evidence of these experiences, Ockham had insisted that these do not give rise to perceptual errors in the sense of sight, but to

intellectual errors which result from "equivalent apprehensions". These, Ockham elaborates, are apprehensions equivalent in the effects they produce to those that would be obtained if reality actually were as perceived to be; that is, if there were an actual flaming circle, or bent stick, or moving trees32. But if these apprehensions are equivalent, they cannot be distinguished by introspective means from veridical apprehensions, as Ockham himself seems to admit when he states, for example, that the equivalent apprehensions would have as their result that "the intellect comes to believe in the truth of a proposition such as 'the circle is in the air'". In short, the intellect assents to the proposition "the circle is in the air" 33 . Wodeham disagrees with Ockham's analysis on several points34, among them that, on Ockham's own grounds, this assent must be construed as evident, because the apprehensions on the basis of which the mental proposition was constructed were intuitive and the resulting proposition was thereby evident. Nevertheless, Wodeham stresses, the proposition is false, for it signifies reality to be other than it is35 . Wodeham thinks that Ockham has reached an impasse; given the equivalence of propositions that in fact "signify reality to be as it is" to those that do not, the intellect can give evident assent to either. Wodeham himself thinks instead that these errors are perceptual errors in the interior senses, and not yet at the level of intellectual errors36, and he suggests that in order to assent to a proposition, one is ruled by other experiences or arguments that reality is or is not as it appears to be37. This tacitly assumes that, while sense experience is the basis for evident assent, no single simple apprehension suffices for such assent. What is only mentioned here, however, is argued for in question six of the prologue, where - in a set of arguments that Rimini would later adopt verbatim - Wodeham uses again the example of the stick partially submerged in water which appears bent. This shows, Wodeham concludes, that contrary to Ockham, "intuitive cognition of a thing does npt cause assent to a contingent proposition immediately''38. That is, we must go through a discursive

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The development of the complexe significabile process of collating the experiences of our several external and internal senses first. Part, then, of what makes the object of scientific

knowledge, or assent an

"enuntiable"39 only complexly signifiable is that, contrary to Chatton, the signification of a proposition (complexum) is not identical to the signification of its subject term. And, against Ockham, the object of assent is not the proposition itself; instead, as Wodeham says: "The immediate object of the act of assent is the total object of the complex necessitating assent (speaking of simply evident assent). Or, generally speaking, its object is the total object or significate immediately conforming to the total proposition, concausing the proposition and necessarily presupposed by the proposition ... [Further] the significate of the proposition is that it is or is not as the proposition denotes"40 .

Thus, a proposition signifies a state of affairs; and because this significate of a proposition "concauses" the proposition, and is necessarily presupposed by the proposition, when that proposition functions as a premise, its significate becomes part of the total significate of the demonstration, but is not absorbed into the total significate of the conclusion41 • This is because, just as the significate of a proposition is not identical to the significate of its terms, so the significate of a demonstration is not identical to the significate of its premises. Thus, the enuntiabile that is only complexly signifiable is for Wodeham - and following him, Rimini - not merely an Abelardian dictum of a proposition; at the least it is the dictum of both premises and conclusion42 . Hence, both the considerations that motivate the hypothesis of the complexe significabile, and the extent to which - without adopting Chatton's views - Wodeham accepts the point of his critique of the Venerable Inceptor, preclude our understanding Wodeham's theory of the complexe significabile as reducible to Ockham's position, especially where the bearer of truth and falsity is concerned. The doctrine should be seen, rather, as the via media between Chatton and Ockham that it appears prima facie to be43, one perhaps slightly on Chatton's side of the path.

167

K.H. Tachau 2. The Debate Between Holcot and Crathom

Nearly two decades ago, Professors Schepers and Nuchelmans brought to light a debate between the Dominicans Holcot and Crathorn over the object of scientific knowledge, belief, and doubt. This debate was carried on in several of Holcot's works and in Crathom's Sentences commentary and lost Biblical question. AU were composed across the three or four years that began with the 1331-32 academic year. In the fall of that year, FitzRalph incepted as regent master; Holcot and Wodeham started lecturing as bachelarii sententiarii at the Oxford convents of their respective orders; and Crathorn, who had already been teaching Lombard's Sentences for a year, continued his lectures44 • As the views of Holcot and Crathom have been the subject of several comprehensive examinations, we may be content here to put into relief some aspects of their discussions which help us to clarify their relation to Chatton and Ockham on the one hand, and to Wodeham on the other45. Contrary to much that has been written about Holcot, his understanding of mental propositions is neither Ockham's nor Ockhamist"6. Among the major points of disagreement is Holcot's acceptance of the object-generated species that Ockham had rejected47 • Like Chatton before him, Holcot instead embraces them as the incomplex terms from which propositions, as complex knowledge, derive. Holcot proposes that, "just as incomplex knowledge is nothing other than the species or some concept, so complex knowledge is many species ordered [together], or many cognitions ordered [together]" 48 . Again unlike Ockham (at least before the abandonment of the fictum theory), Holcot is willing to identify species with mental acts, and asserts that the proposition, precisely as a composite of ordered cognitions, can under some circumstances be considered the very act of knowing scientifically (actus sciendi). The requisite circumstances obtain when and only when, as a result of other evident propositions, it is evident to the intellect that external reality is as it is designated to be by this composite49 • Because the intellect is not always certain· of such correspondence, the same proposition can be known, or merely believed, or doubted, depending upon the intellect's certainty that extramental reality is as the proposition signifies. Holcot, by the same reasoning, introduces a significant restriction of any identification of species with cognitive acts and habits, for "this thing (fes) which is the species of a stone is not always the act of knowing, nor all at once a

habit, just as it is not always a part of a proposition, nor always what the intellect uses"50.

168

The development of the complexe significabile Thus, on Holcot's view, propositions are ordered composites of concepts (intentions) that signify not merely by convention but, as likenesses of their producing objects, naturally; consequently, the propositions themselves represent the ordering of realicy51. Things themselves, and not their ordering, had been proposed by Chatton as the object of knowledge. Hence, if Holcot sides in part with Chatton in treating species as the constituents of propositions, the Dominican nevertheless disputes the latter's opinion on the immediate object of knowledge more than Ockham's in concluding that "the proposition (complexum), and not the thing signified, is the object [that is] scientifically known or believed or opined". After all, Holcot continues with an example, one does not know (or believe) a rock, but 'that the rock is hard' 52 • While Holcot's position, like Wodeham's, demarcates a

via media between

Chatton and Ockham, the Dominican's compromise nowhere evinces any acquaintance with Wodeham's discussion of the complexe signijicabile. It is not obvious, for example, whether Holcot, who clearly does not consider states of affairs to be the object of knowledge, would even accept them as significate& of propositions. This question is especially problematic given the vehemence of his critique of Crathorn, whose notion of a proposition's "total significate" clearly does encompass states of affairs153. Crathorn's understanding of propositions is, like those of his two socii, incompatible with those of Chatton and Ockham alike54 . Accepting species like Chatton and Holcot, but unlike them rejecting the identification of such species with cognitive acts, Crathorn argues instead that concepts (or mental words) formed from these species are the primary object of the intellect. Inasmuch as extramental objects are neither the proposition itself nor a part of it, Crathorn stresses, each mental word that is thus formed consequently represents a single object and not a state of affairs55 . Put another way, these mental words are not initially generated within mental propositions; instead, propositions are subsequently produced by further cognitive acts. Even then, the components of mental propositions are not the object-generated "actual cognitions", but "generated cognitions" multiplied from them56. On Crathorn's account, then, the process by which propositions are formed requires several steps, and each requires the passage of time, however short, as well as the continuing duration of the mental entities thereby produced57 • The temporal steps that Crathorn thinks are involved in the generation of propositions are among his grounds for disputing Ockham's derivation of evident judgments directly from intuitive cognitions. The Dominican bachelor contends 169

K.H. Tachau

that although according to Ockham intuitive cognition is had with respect to incomplex objects, to know that, for example, a white thing exists, or that it does not exist, is not to know something simple. Rather, what is known is complex, i.e. propositional58 . Moreover, such a state of affairs (totale

signijicatum ), rather than a proposition that intuitive cognitions are sufficient to cause, as Ockham had proposed, is for Crathorn the immediate object of scientific knowledge. Thus, to him it seems that Ockham's account of cognition is inadequate to explain how this total significate of a proposition is known59. By asserting the "total significate" of a proposition as the object of knowledge, Crathorn identifies one of the elements that Wodeham had incorporated within what is "only complexly significable". Although Crathorn should probably be evaluated as having approached the latter notion more nearly than Holcot, only their Franciscan colleague enunciated it, howevermuch all three Oxford socii travelled a path midway between Chatton and Ockham.

3. The Relation of Wodeham's Lectura Secunda to the Oxford Debates

Let us now take up the historical problem presented by a puzzling set of facts which, because they resist forming a picture, have perplexed everyone working on Wodeham. First among the pieces to deal with is the fact that Adam Wodeham's

Lectura secunda combines material from his early London lectures with material from his later Oxford Sentences lectures. Gregory of Rimini allows us to match the contents of the London lectures against the magnificently and innovatively systematic Lectura secunda, and materially - but not entirely formally - there is a good fit. That is, arguments occur where cited, if we ignore the division between prologue and the first distinction, and instead number questions consecutivelyBO. To do so, however, ignores both Rimini's and the commentaries' internal evidence that this division was deliberate, and probably reflects the revision after Oxford61 . Still, given all the scribal confusions in the manuscript, the extant

Lectura secunda is clearly neither the London lectures themselves nor the finished version at which Adam Wodeham aimed. The second puzzling "fact" is that, in terms of the scholastic voices Adam heeds, the contrast between his Lectura secunda and Oxford commentaries is like that between sunny and rainy days: while there is enough in common to establish that Wodeham authored both, they are nevertheless overtly diverse in focus. Thus, for instance, the Lectura secunda never mentions FitzRalph, who looms almost as

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The development of the complexe significabile large as Ockham and Chatton in the Oxford lectures62 ; only once mentions Rodington, never Kilvington nor any of the Oxford socii (including Holcot, Crathorn, and Skelton) all of whom are important, indeed, crucial to the content of the Ordinatio63. Instead, the Lectura secunda is structured extremely closely around the arguments of four confreres: Ockham, Chatton, Aureol, and Scotus. Generally, the views of the latter two are subordinated to those of the former pair with whom we believe Wodeham was at London64 . There are also cameo roles for other scholars, such as Campsall and Reading. For years, I thought this argued strongly for the early composition of the Lectura secunda, i.e. about 1324 or so, before Wodeham knew FitzRalph or the rest of the Oxford crowd65 . Among the advantages of this hypothesis is that it might help to explain how Wodeham could have overlooked Ockham's late Quodlibetal response to some of the critiques from Chatton that Wodeham deemed trenchant66 . If, however, the Lectura secunda is indeed such an early work, how should one explain the presence of the later Oxford material in the Lectura secunda? 67 This is a third puzzle: if the Lectura secunda was created after the Oxford lectures, i.e., if Wodeham was prepared at that point to revise the London lectures, why did he not revise more completely? Why is there silence on all the (often meaty) debates with his Oxford socii that occurred after the London lectures? On the other hand, if the Oxford lectures are later - and Wodeham himself refers to his earlier London lectures in the Ordinatio - why is the

complexe significabile so ill-explained in the Oxford lectures? There he mentions and depends upon the innovative notion of the complexe significabile, but (at least as far as I can find) never gives it any detailed explanation, nor any significant supporting argumentation - certainly not on the scale of the Lectura

secunda's opening nine questions68. Indeed, having decided on the unique structure that those nine questions constitute, why did he not do anything comparable in the Oxford lectures, or reuse them, or really even refer to them? It has long seemed to me psychologically unlikely that Wodeham was unaware of how novel this prologue was, especially given his propensity to mention his priority vis-a-vis Ockham and Chatton of various controversial positions69. Finally, there is the problem of the relationship of Wodeham's discussion of the complexe significabile to the debate between Holcot and Crathorn. It has been puzzling that Holcot clearly does not know any of Wodeham's discussion of "what is complexly signifiable", while Crathorn does discuss the "total significate" of a proposition70 • Does this mean that Wodeham got the notion from Crathorn, which in turn means construing the discussion in the Lectura secunda as after Crathorn?

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K.H. Tachau This seems to be ruled out by the absolute absence of Crathorn and - more important - FitzRalph in the Lectura secunda; neither appears even tacitly as an unspecified "quidam"71 . Holcot's ignorance can in fact be explained. In the first place, there is to date no evidence that he ever knew the contents of Wodeham's London lectures. For that matter, Holcot appears equally unfamiliar with other products of the Franciscan studium at London, such as Ockham's Quodlibetal acceptance of Chatton's understanding of concepts as intellectual acts72 • Moreover, Holcot's fust opportunity to discover Wodeham's epistemological and semantic views came in 1331-32, when Crathorn's views had already been presented to the Oxford co=unity. As Professors Courtenay and Schepers realized long ago, Holcot's critiques of Crathorn recycle several arguments originally aimed at Chatton73 • What I think has been overlooked, however, is an important aspect of Holcot's rehearsal of Chatton's arguments, namely its similarity to Rodington's discussion. Chatton's arguments are in fact so difficult to follow that at least two traditions developed of restating them before Chatton's own revision of his Reportatio into an Ordinatio74 : one includes, and probably begins with Wodeham75 ; the other includes Rodington, a Dominican named Hartmanus, and - more loosely, possibly with an intermediary - Holcot16. This is significant not so much because it confirms Holcot's independence from Wodeham's discussion, as because it confirms what is apparent on other issues: Holcot's positions were already fairly well formed before he encountered Crathorn's or Wodeham's viewsn. Thus, he may not have appreciated that Wodeham had introduced a third account of the object of knowledge which could not be subsumed under the alternatives posed in the earlier debate between Ockham and Chatton. This allows us not to worry so much about Holcot's silence concerning this notion. Crathorn's account of knowledge is elaborated from the opening folios of his lectures on the Sentences, which he began to deliver a year before Wodeham became an Oxford bachelor of the Sentences. Hence, Crathorn cannot have arrived at the notion of the "adequate object of a proposition" from a reading of Wodeham's Oxford lectures - where the complexe significabile is, after all, relatively unexplained. As unlikely as Holcot to have seen Wodeham's London co=entary, Crathorn's discussion of the total significate of a proposition in any event parallels Wodeham's only in part. Unlike Wodeham, neither Crathorn nor Holcot supposes that there is one answer to the three questions of (i) the object of knowledge and belief; (ii) the bearer of truth and falsity; and (iii) the signification of a mental proposition.

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The development of the complexe significabile If Holcot and Crathorn were not in a position to know or to recognize

Wodeham's novel account of knowledge, his vantage point where their debates were concerned was much better. His silence concerning their accounts of knowledge probably indicates that they did not appear to Wodeham, who had already achieved a systematic resolution, as appreciably advancing the issues beyond the debate between Ockham and Chatton. More difficult to understand is why Wodeham did not shape the Oxford commentary with a prolegomenon on knowledge as he had the London lectures. That is, why did he fail to use a heuristically useful model he has already created? The possibility that Wodeham was not permitted to do so by the practice of Oxford lectures on the Sentences, is worth considering. After all, one of the most striking features of Oxford Sentences commentaries from the early 1330s (if not also earlier) is how many commentaries there are with similar questions: some so similar, that the incipits are nearly identical in wording78 • From the mid-1320s, moreover, the very construction of Sentences commentaries is novel, for they are increasingly structured around conclusions and dubia79 • Further indications that these commentaries were constructed not to incorporate debates, but to constitute debates, include Holcot's and Wodeham's frequent insistence that they are responding to the critiques of their colleagues (socii) 80 . There is, in other words, evidence that Oxford in the 1330s was already seeing the practice that about thirty years later was mentioned at Paris in a papal letter of promotion and at Amiens in the explicit to a Sentences commentary: "Explicit super prima Sententiarum, a fratre Johanne dicta de Burgo, disputatum in conventu..."B 1• Let us assume, then, that the focus of the Oxford commentary largely reflects Wodeham's restructuring and to some extent rethinking of his views along the lines of required or evolving debate issues. Does this help us to explain the difference in tone from one set of lectures to the other where his attitudes towards Chatton and Ockham are concerned? Can we now explain the sense that the Lectura secunda conveys of immediate involvement with the arguments of Chatton, Ockham, and Aureol? I think we can now guess why the Lectura secunda was revised only to the extent that it was, namely it is a very Franciscan commentary. That is, with the exception of Harclay and Campsall (and, the Magister Abstractionum, if Wodeham did not know him to be a Franciscan), every scholar from Scotus onwards whom Wodeham considers in the Lectura secunda was a Franciscan. That is not usual if we take Oxford commentaries as our norm. But this may reflect the origin of the Lectura secunda at the London convent by a Franciscan trained, up to that time, largely in Franciscan convents (even if one

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K.H. Tachau

of them was Oxford), and may also reflect its ultimate intended audience after whatever revisions Wodeham planned. If so, then no matter how great the Oxford commentary's influence upon subsequent scholars, the compilation known as the Lectura secunda retains for Wodeham his claim to intellectual priority in

developing the notion of the complexe significabile, even while presenting the most mature expression of his account of knowledge and semantics.

NOTES

* The present paper is offered with gratitude to Professor Nuchelmans, whose work, ever since the late Jan Pinborg introduced me to it, has enriched my own from a distance. The research that forms the basis for this study has been undertaken at the Institut for Graesk og Latinsk Middelalderfilologi and the Villa I Tatti, supported by grants from the George C. Marshall Memorial Fund in Denmark, Harvard University, and the Leopold Schepp Foundation.

1.

Medievalists are indebted especially to Elie (1936) for the association of this doctrine with Gregory of Rimini, an association expanded by Dal Pra (1956: 287-331); Wendland (1981: 241-300); and most recently by Bottin (1982: 186-191).

2.

Schepers (1970: 320-54); (1972: 106-36); Nuchelmans (1973: 212-219, 22737); and idem (1980: 177-87).

3.

Gal (1977: 66-102); Trapp, (1981: 25n in I Sent. pro!., q. 1).

4.

Johannes de Burgo, in I Sent. q. 2 (written 1357; Wroctaw, Mil. F. 64), f. 91rb-92rb; cf. 91rb (margine Rationes Ade): "Hanc conclusionem probat Adam primo sic: qnia si complexum sit totale obiectum sciendi, tunc scire non esset causam respectu cognoscere, et quoniam illius est causa et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere, quia complexum non est causa rei nee cognoscere complexum precise esset cognoscere quoniam istius est causa et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere. Secundo sic: experientia docet quod assensus cadit frequenter ... [etc., as_ in Gal 1977: 79] Hanc conclusionem probat Gregorius ex tribus suppositionibus veris ..." On Johannes de Burgo, see Tachau (1984: 41-80). Peter Ceffons, 0. Cist., In I Sent., q.21 (composed ca. 1348, Troyes 62), f. 48ra: "Sed hie potest moved dubium de hoc quod tactum est ad partem unam questionis de significabilibus complexis, utrum istis diebus sit securius ea ponere sicut ea

174

The development of the complexe significabile posuerunt Adam, Chaton, et Gregorius, aut ea negare sit securius, aut ea ponere saltim per ymaginationem sit securius; et posset argui pro qualibet parte"; cf. also q.25, fol. 51va: "Sed tamen circa rem sciendum quod est una opinio que tenet significabilia complexa multum general et multas conditiones eis attribuunt et ilia non recito, quia possunt inveniri in Adam in primo opere, et Gregorius super primum in prologo, et credo etiam quod aliquid vidi de ea in Crathone.. ." Scribal confusion between Chatton and Crathorn is not totally unknown, occurring in manuscripts of Holcot's debate with Chatton (see below). 5.

E.J. Ashworth (1978: 85).

6.

Tbis seems to me a more idiomatic translation into English of Wodeham's "complexe significabile" than such locutions as "complexly significables" in, e.g., Spade (1980: 10). That tbis is the genesis of Wodeham's terminology is suggested by a related discussion in I Ord., d.1, q.12 (Paris, Mazarine 915, fol 56ra): "Nam quod aliquid sit cognitio complexa alicuius, puta A, vel quod aliquid, puta A, cognoscatur complexe per illam cognitionem -- que duo habeo pro eodem -- potest tripliciter intellegi. quod A sit obiectum totale illius notitie complexe, et iste sensus est negandus; vel < secundo > quia A cognoscatur de ali quo complexe; vel < tertio > quod aliquid cognoscatur complexe de A. < Secundo > modo et tertio potest concedi quod aliqua propositio sit cognitio complexa..."

7.

For fourteenth-century attacks, see: Nuchelmans (1973:243-71); Spade (1980:10-11); for later debate, see Ashworth (1978); Wendland (1981).

8.

See particularly Chatton, Lectura in I Sent., pro!., q. 1, ed. in M.A. Reina (1970: 48-74, 290-314). For Joharmes de Rodington, in I Sent., pro!., q.1 (emending the edition in Tweedale (1965: 294): "Tertium dubium, quoad eius obiectum, ubi est maior difficultas, et est bic una opinio quae videtur Doctori Subtili VI Metaphysicae, q.6, quod primum quod scitur est complexum, et sic idem est cui post adhaeret". For Wodeham, see Gal (1977: 79-80).

9.

Rodington, I Sent., pro!., q.1 (ed. Tweedale), p. 296, Conclusio propria: "In isto articulo non videtur uniformiter dicendum de scientia et assensu, nee de notitia quam habet fidelis et de assensu suo; scientia enim est primo complexi, assensus autem primo respectu rei. Probatur: non assentio primo

illi quo scio, sed illi pro quo scio. Unde potest dici quod scientia non est nisi conclusio demonstrationis in mente, quia ponam, sicut patebit infra,

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K.H. Tachau

quod ipsa cognitio sit ipsa propositio cognita per eandem cognitionem, et ilia sci entia erit propositio scita". 10.

Ibid., p.294, "Preterea, tantum verum scitur; tantum complexum est verum, cum in compositione et divisione consistat veritas et falsitas; igitur etc.". For more extensive discussion of Rodington's views, see Tachau (1987: Chapter VIII).

11.

See below, discussion of Holcot.

12.

See W.J. Courtenay (1978).

13.

The most extensive mentions within the Ordinatio occur at I Ord., d.1, q.12 (references are to Paris, Mazarine 915), fol. 54rb, nona conclusio; 55va-56va; I Ord., d.1, q.l3, fol. 58va; d. 33, q.1, fol. 103(bis)ra; III Ord., q.2, fol. 176ra.

14.

See Tachau (1982a: 426-32, esp. n. 107).

15.

Ibid., pp. 426-427, nn. 109-110.

16.

This is discussed in more detail in Tachau (1987: Chapters VII and X).

17.

Wodeharn, Lect. sec., d.1, q.1, ed. Gal (1977: 73 §7, 76 §17). These arguments either rearrange Chatton's considerably or, more probably, show the order of Chatton's Reportatio which has been replaced by the current Lectura.

18.

Ibid.:Gal (1977: 75 § 14): "Sexto sic: assensus propositioni praesupponit assensum ipsi rei significatae per propositionem, quia prius assentitur sic esse in re sicut denotatur per propositionem quam quod propositio sit vera. Igitur asseusus causatus per propositionem quae significat rem aliquarn, non habet propositionem illarn pro obiecto sed rem significatam per earn". Cf. Chatton (ed. Reina (1970: 59, 282-87).

19.

Ibid. (Gal1977: 75 § 15; cfr. also 74 §§ 7-9).

20.

Below, at nn. 38,41. Wodeharn thus reaches a position that cannot be

21.

Wodeham (Gal 1977: 78 §§ 26-28): "Ad istum articulum: prima, non videtur

reconciled either with Ockharn or Rodington.

mihi quod complexum sit obiectum totale actus sciendi... Item, experientia < < docet > > frequenter assensus cadit supra sic esse a parte rei, put a

assentio quod vas sedetis ibi, et quasi non fertur super complexum sed potissime < et > directe ad sic esse in re. Item, nee assensus est solum ipsa propositio, sicut probatum erat quaestione praecedenti -- etsi esset, haberetur propositum, quia propositio non est distincta apprehensio sui ipsius... Igitur est apprehensio vel istorum quae apprehenduntur apprehensionibus praeviis, ut ibi tenui, vel istorum et simul complexi. Et 176

The development of the complexe significabile

ita non est praecise respectu complexi". This 1s the passage quoted by Johannes de Burgo (above, n. 4). 22.

For Chatton's position, see e.g. pro!. q.1 (Reina 1970: 54-55, 94-99, 12040). See also Wodeham (Gal1977: 87 §57).

23.

Wodeham, Lect. sec. d.23, (ed. Tachau (1981: 40)]:"14. Contra Chatton. Iuxta istam viam est una alia cuiusdam moderni fere eadem isti", i.e. Ockham, "sed in ilia modico quo discordat evidenter falsa: 'difficile', secundum eum, 'est assignare bonam differentiam. Dico tamen', inquit, 'quod intentio prima est ilia, que significat rem esse talem, qualis est in essendo; secunda que significat rem esse signum alterius rei', vel unius vel plurium".

24.

Ibid. (ed. Tachau, p. 41): "15. !stud dictum, licet appropinquat veritati, falsum est, tum quia nomina non significant rem esse talem qualis est nee qualis non est, nee esse signum nee non esse signum; sic enim significare est solius propositionis et non nominis alicuius simplicis..."

25.

Ibid. (ed. Tachau, p. 41): "16. Unde, secundum Philosophum, I Perihermenias, capitulo de oratione, 'aliquid', inquit, 'partium orationis significativum est separatum, ut dictio (tamen] non ut affmnatio; dico aut em ut 'homo' significat (aliquid] sed non quoniam est vel non est; sed erit affrrmatio vel negatio, si aliquid addatur'. Hec ilie". What is added is the "nota compositionis" (see, e.g. Gal; 1977: 90 § 63); this is explained most fully in the preceding question,

Lect.sec. pro!., q.6 (fol. 123vb):

"Aliter posset responderi iuxta doctrinam quam scribit Hokham ... pro quo sciendum quod quando intellectus format propositionem, componit aliquid cum aliquo -- non aliquid unum per se constituendo, quia unum sibiipsi vel alteri mediante nota compositionis importata per hoc verbum 'est', quod verbum mentalis est quidam conceptus comparativus eiusdem ad seipsum vel ad alterum comparando, et hoc vel affirmative... vel negative apposito conceptu negationis ... Sed hoc potest quadrupliciter intellegi. Uno modo intellectus componat rem ipsam quam per subiectum formaliter intellegit sibiipsi vel alteri quam per predicatum formaliter intellegit seu apprehendit. Componat, inquam, prima modo predicto per notam copule que comparet..." See also I Ord., d.1, q.12, f. 56va R: (Mg. "R. Quod nulla cognitio intuitiva nee abstractiva significat formaliter sic esse vel sic non esse, nisi sit propositio, licet bene virtualiter) "Nam secundum philosophum in Perihermenias, 'esse' significat quamdam compositionem; et

177

K.H. Tachau alibi etiam hoc probavi diffuse". This may be a reference back to the questions of the Lectura secunda under discussion here. 26.

I Lect. sec., d.1, q.1 (Gal 1977: 77 § 23): "Item, aut ly 'esse', quod est nota compositionis, aliquid significat aut nihil. Si nihil significat nee consignificat, frustra ponitur in oratione. Si aliquid, et non magis unum quam aliud, quia indifferenter repraesentat quidlibet entium, et quodlibet potest copulari cum quolibet. Et sive signficat inhaerentiam sive compositionem a parte rei, sive unitatem et identitatem inter extrema vel significata per extrema propositionis, semper habebitur quod propositio significat aliquid vel aliqua quod non significatur per subiectum vel praedicatum".

27.

Ockham, I Ord., pro!., q.1 (1967: 5,18 - 7,3): "Circa secundum, scilicet quae notitia est evidens, dico quod notitia evidens est cognitio alicuius veri complexi, ex notitia terminorum incomplexa immediate vel mediate nata sufficienter causari (...) aliqua notitia terminorum sufficit ad causandum notitiam evidentem veritatis contingentis, scilicet intuitiva, sicut post patebit, aliqua autem non sufficit, scilicet abstractiva. Unde si aliquis videat intuitive Sortem et albedinem exsistentem in Sorte, potest evidenter scire quod Sortes est albus ... " Wodeham discusses this requirement in Lect. sec. pro!., q.6 (Gonville and Cains College MS. 281/674) f. 123va, "prima conclusio". Note that Ockham speaks more precisely of contingent propositions evidently known, for which "evident propositions" should be construed merely as a shorthand expression.

28.

Ibid., pp. 70-71; also Quodl. V, q.5 [1980: 496]: "per notitiam intuitivam non tantum iudico rem esse quando est, sed etiam non esse quando non est". See further discussion in Tachau (1987: Chapter V).

29.

I have not found a clear discussion of the signification of the copula in Ockham; in Lect. sec. pro!., q.6, Wodeham discusses whether it is subsumed within the predicate according to Ockham (see above n. 25).

30.

For Peter Aureol's discussion, see Tachau (1983: 122-50). Chatton's and Ockham's discussions of Aureol are summarized in Tachau (1982b: 185217); and in (1987: Chapters IV and VII) .. See also Cova (1976: 227-51).

31.

Wodeham, Lect. sec. q.4 (Gonville and Cains college Ms. 281) ff. 117ra118va: " Prima quidem, quia cum quis portatur in aqua, arbores existentes in ripa videntur moveri... (118ra) Secunda est experientia in motu subito circulari baculi igne igniti existente apparet [apparet] enim quidem circulus in aere fieri ex baculo sic moto ... (118va)

178

The development of the complexe significabile

Tertia experientia est de apparentiis fracture baculi, cuius pars est in aqua; non enim fractura habet esse verum, sed tantum apparens". These "experiences" are the first three of the eight Aureol enumerates in his I Scriptum, d.3, s.14 (see Tachau 1983: 127-32). 32.

Ockham I Ord. d.27, q.3 (1979:241-251, particularly p. 244, lin. 16-24; p. 245, lin. 3-11; p. 246, lin. 14-19; p. 247, lin. 12-17). The relegation of these errors to the intellect depends in turn upon Ockham's distinction between apprehensive and adjudicative cognition in I Ord. pro!. q.1 (1967: 16; 21-22), where he argues that only the intellect (rather than, e.g. the sensus communis) is capable of judgment; cf. Tachau (1982b: 206).

33.

Ockham, I Ord. d.27, q.3 (1979: 246): "per idem dico ad secundam experientiam quod nullus circulus apparet oculo. Intellectus tamen aliquando credit istam propositionem esse veram 'circulus est in aere'. Sed oculo nullus circulus apparet nisi aequivalenter, hoc est, habet apprehensionem vel apprehensiones aequivalentes quantum ad operationes eliciendas apprehensioni vel apprehensionibus circuli. Qualiter tamen hoc possit fieri, longum foret declarare".

34.

Wodeham appreciates that neither Ockham nor Chatton understands Aureol's hypothesis of the esse intentionale vel appa.rens for which these experiences are evidence; thus Wodeham stresses (f. 116rb) that Aureol's motivation is disclosed in the latter's questions on I, d.27 (passages unknown to Chatton and Ockham): "in qua responsione stat intentio totius operis sue disperse per totum opus suum..." Thus, Wodeham corrects Ockham's misunderstanding of Aureol as having posited both true and false apparent being (f. 115vb). More important, Wodeham believes the hypothesis of an esse apparens can be obviated by accepting from perspectivist theory the causal efficacy of the multiplication of specieswhich species Ockham denies; cf. Tachau (1982a).

35.

Lect.sec. pro!., q.4 (117va-118rb): "Ad secundum...Sed est ista apprehensio

quedam complexa, habens pro subiecto vel predicato vel utroque visionem ipsam arboris, ...et quia composita ex cognitionibus [ut] evidentibus, ideo est multum evidens apprehensio in tantum quod ipsa posita, appareat homini velit, nolit sicut ipsa esse significat. Sed non oporteat eum assentire aut dissentire, licet ipsa quantum est ex parte illius nature sit causare assensum ... (118rb, ad secundam experientiam) Aliter posset < dici > sicut respondet Ockham distinctione 27, quod nullus circulus apparet oculo, licet intellectus credat istam propositionem esse veram: 'circulus 179

K.H. Tachau

est in aere'... Sed ten endo is tam responsionem, dicerem consequenter quod quia oculus prosequitur attente extremitatem istam ignitam circulariter motum, intellectus statim ex visione eadem concausata ... componit propositionem,... qua propositione formaliter apparel 'ignis ille esse circulus' que propositio propter hoc quod componitur ex cognitione intuitiva, que multum est evidens cognitio, est propositio multum evidens, licet falsum in tantum ..." 36.

Ibid., f. 117rb: "Et per consequens, contra < Ockham > ilia apparitio qua apparet homini quod arbores moveantur est actus sensus. Sed per te nullum iudicium quo assentitur aliquid esse actualis vel actualiter se habere est actus sensitivus. Igitur minor probatur, quia etiam brutis apparent arbores ilie moveri interim quod si naves movetur usque arbores, fugerent < sicut> si essent eis terribilia quedam ..." For Wodeham, as for the perspectivists, the perception of motion resides not in the external senses but in the common sense. This dispute with Ockham over whether errors in judging motion are located in the senses or intellect is not trivial; for the solution is crucial to Wodeham's attempt to establish that intellectual certitude is not circumscribed by the fallibility of the senses; see in particular his remark (f. 117va) that "eadem difficultas est contra fere omnes; nam contra Chattonem est, manifestum est, quia ipse completior quam ego contra Scotum et Ockham et Petrum Aureoli est, quia illi ponunt intuitivam intellectivam concomitari sensitivam..."

37.

Ibid., f. 117va: "assensum quod sic sit < sicut ipsa esse significat > [sed] per aliud regitur, puta per experientiam aliunde vel aliunde, vel rationem quod non sit ita sicut apparel esse".

38.

Ibid., pro!., q.6, f. 128ra: "Sed istud non apparel mihi evidens, quia non minus unum indicium esset talis propositio quam aliud, sed aliquod indicium non est talis propositio sicut patet de iudicio quo iudicatur baculus esse fractus cuius pars est in aqua; aliter aliquis - ut alias probavi - simul assentiret et dissentiret sic esse. Probatio consequentie, quia eadem propositio numero vel eiusdem rationis potest manere in assentiente sic esse prius, post experientiam quam certificatus est per demonstrationem vel < experientia > aliunde quod non sic sit, et non sicut ut prius ita nee modo potest sibi non videri ita esse, licet certus sit quod non ita sit < sicut > prius assumpsit et modo non..." The point for which this argument is adduced is stated on f. 123va: "(Marg. Secundus articulus: contra Ockham per idem Chatton questione 1 prologi) ...sciendum quod ilia

180

The development of the complexe significabile

opinio mulitipliciter impugnatur. Primo enim probatur contra eum dupliciter quod notitia intuitiva de re non causat assensum complexo contingenti immediate sicut ille < Ockham > videtur sentire. Quid autem ego circa hoc sentiam patebit proxima questione sequenti". Rimini's quotation of Wodeham in I Lectura pro!. q.1, (Greg. Arim. Lectura I ed. Trapp 1981: 25-26, esp. 26, lin. 6-12) is evidently from a manuscript with fewer scribal errors than the Gonville and Cains ms. in which the Lectura

secunda is preserved. 39.

Wodeham, III Ord. q.2 (Maz. 915, f. 176ra): "... nullum verum enuntiabile, i.e. complexe significabile - cuius sunt scibilia - est verum veritate intrinseca, sed veritate aliena extrinseca a qua vera sunt et vera dici possunt pro eo quod significantur in eo quod talia signo vero creato vel increato vel utroque".

40.

Lect. sec. d.1, q.1 (Gal 1977: 86 § 49): "Sexta conclusio est quod immediatum obiectum actus assentiendi est obiectum totale complexi necessitantis ad assensum, loquendo de assensu simpliciter evidenti. Vel generaliter loquendo, eius obiectum immediatum totale est obiectum totale seu significatum totale propositionis immediate sibi conformis, concausantis ilium et necessaria sibi praesuppositae, vel obiecta totalia multarum propositionum talium"; p. 87 para. 57: "Ad primum istorum < dubiorum > dicendum quod obiectum totale propositionis est eius significatum; eius autem significatum est sic esse vel sic non esse sicut per propositionem denontatur".

41.

Ibid., pp. 93-94, para. 80-83; pp. 99-100, para. 104-108. Wodeham begins the next question (d.1, q.2) thus (fol. 132rb): "Habito ex precedenti questione quod scientia realis causata per apprehensiones tantum rectas habet pro obiecto 'sic esse a parte rei' et non complexum, nee tantum 'sic esse sicut significatur per conclusionem', sed etiam 'sicut significatur per premissas', durnmodo sit scientia evidens evidentia intrinseca, iam restat descendere in speciali ad notitiam theologicam ..."

42.

Although it thus seems to me that Nuchelmans' inclusion of the complexe

significabile within the heritage of Abelard requires qualification, I have been alerted to the significance of references to enuntiabilia by Nuchelmans (1980a) and (1982). 43.

As Gal suggested in the introductory remarks (1977: 67-68) to his edition of Lect. sec., d.1, q.l., Wodeham's debt to Chatton's position is evident again when, in the subsequent question (d.1, q.2), Wodeham reiterates 181

K.H. Tachau

that, "omnis scientia proprie dicta realis est de rebus vel quod sic sit a parte rei vel non sit, et non de complexis, ex precedenti questione". 44.

Schepers (1970) and Courtenay (1978: 76-81, 95-111) established the relative chronology of Holcot's and Crathorn's work. But until K. Walsh (1979: 171-6) arrived at the correct year for FitzRalph's inception as master of theology, both Courtenay and I erred in the absolute dates we presented of Wodeham's and Holcot's Oxford reading of the Sentences, which must take into account FitzRalph's inception, as well as evidence not available to Courtenay and Walsh at the time of their writing. Thus, the present reckoning corrects my earlier dating, and is explained in the introduction to Courtenay, Gelber, Streveler, Tachau, eds., Robert Holcot on Future Contingents forthcoming.

45.

In addition to the works of Schepers and Nuchelmans, I have learned much from several unpublished papers by H. Gelber, including: "The Contingencies of Propositions as Contingent Facts: the Dominicans William Crathorn and Robert Holcot" (May, 1985); "I Cannot tell a Lie: Hugh of Lawton's Critique of Ockham on Mental Language" (October, 1985; forthcoming, Franciscan Studies). For editions of some of Holcot's discussions of the object of knowledge, see: Brinkley (1972: appendices); Courtenay (1971: 1-21).

46.

For characterizations of Holcot as Ockharnist on this issue, see, e.g. Pinborg (1976: 266); Schepers (1972: 107ff); Nuchelmans (1973: 195-208). Kretzmann (1970: 767-87) construed Holcot's stance on the complexum not as an extension of Ockham's view, but as a partial criticism (p. 781).

47.

Tachau (1982a: 413-17). What follows it developed more extensively in Tachau (1987: Chapter IX).

48.

Courtenay (1971: 4-5, lin. 35-40): "Dicitur quod sicut primum cognitum est similitudo vel species rei. . . ita primum cognitum cognitione complexa, puta actu

sciend~

credendi, vel opinandi, est ipsum complexum. Et sicut

cognitio incomplexa non est nisi ipsa species vel conceptus quidam, ita cognitio complexa est multae species ordinatae sive multae cognitiones ordinatae". 49.

Ibid., lin. 40-46.

50.

Ibid., pp. 19-20 lin. 346-362, which begins with the explanation that, "ista res quae est species lapidis non semper est actus

intelligend~

nee statim

est habitus; sicut non semper est pars propositonis nee semper est illud quo utitur intellectus". Cf. also Ibid., p. 17, lin. 306-11. 182

The development of the complexe significabile

51.

Ibid., p. 20 lin. 363-71; Tachau (1987: Chapter IX).

52.

Courtenay (1971: 7, lin. 81-88).

53.

See especially Schepers' discussion (1972: 127-34).

54.

Tachau (1982a: 417-25; 1987: Chapter IX, at nn. 42 ff.).

55.

Crathorn, I Sent., q.2, ed. J. Kraus (1937: 38-9). The importance of this passage was established by H. Gelber (in the papers cited in n. 45 above) to whose interpretation the following is indebted.

56.

Ibid., p. 38, lin. 18-21: "Ergo verbum mentis, quod est similitudo rei, que non est propositio nee pars propositionis, sed illud, de quo propositio formatur, non est propositio mentalis nee pars eius". Among the reasons Crathorn offers for this stand (pp. 38 lin 29-p. 39 lin. 7) is the ability of any given word to be combined into multiple propositions. (See also Tachau 1982a: 421 n. 92).

57.

Ibid., p. 38, lin. 10-18: "Formatio propositionis mentalis et partium eius presupponit duratione vel natura cognitionem actualem rei, de qua formatur. Sed illud, quod primo intelligitur et primo terrninat actum intelligendi, est verbum mentis vel conceptus mentis. Ergo formatio propositionis mentalis vel partium eius, quia propositio mentalis non est aliud quam partes propositionis mentalis, presupponit tempore vel natura formationem verbi mentalis illius rei, de quo formatur". See also Wodeham, above, n. 38.

58.

Crathorn, I Sent. q.1 (Basel, Universitatsbibl. B.V. 30, p. 27): "Secunda arguo sic : cognitio intuitiva est respectu alicuius incomplexi ut albedinis vel alicuius alterius; sed albedinem esse vel albedinem non esse non est aliquid incomplexum, sed complexum. Igitur cognitio non dicitur intuitiva respectu talium complexorurun 'albedo hec est', 'albedo hec non est', et consimilium... Preterea, notitia intuitiva posse causare notitiam evidentem talium complexorum 'hec res est', 'hec res non est', presupponit ipsam esse intuitiva; igitur cognitio non dicitur intuitiva esse quia potest causare notitiam evidentem talium complexorum ..." (See also Nuchelmans, Theories, pp. 214-15.)

59.

Seen. 70, below, and Schepers (1972: 122-26).

60.

As pointed out by Courtenay (1978: 123-30, esp. 127 at n. 27).

61.

Consider Courtenay's evidence (1978: 126-7;171).

62.

As Gal (1977: 71) notes. An indication of FitzRalph's importance in Wodeham's Oxford lectures is conveyed by the non-exhaustive catalog of overt citations in Courtenay (1978: 75-78); compare citations of Chatton, 183

K.H. Tachau

ibid., pp. 71-74, and of Ockham, pp. 63-64. Since Michalski, the interaction of Wodeham and FitzRalph has been frequently noted; cf. e.g Leff (1963); Tachau (1975: 11-18; 53-65); Walsh (1981: 41-52, 61-62). 63.

For this the reader can rely upon Courtenay's citation lists in (1978: Chapter II c. 2-3, 81-111).

64.

As established by G. Gal and S. Brown, introd. to Guillelmi de Ockham Summa Logicae Opera philosophica I ( 1974: 47*-56*);Gelber (1974: 201-5);

Courtenay (1978: 160-64). 65.

See Tachau (1981: 31).

66.

At nn. 18-19 above (and in his response), Wodeham overlooks Ockham's answer to Chatton in IV Quodlibet q.16 (1980: 376-80). This omission may instead confirm Wey's hypothesis that these questions were edited at Avignon (1980: 41*).

67.

Courtenay (1978: 127, 211) draws attention to the absorption of materials from Wodeham's Ordinatio Oxoniensis withinLect. sec., d.1, q.4.

68.

See n. 13, above, for location of discussions in the Ordinatio. The opening questions of the Lect. sec. are: (1) pro!., q. 1: Utrum actui scientie in nobis necessaria presupponatur aliqua simplex apprehensio realiter distincta a< b > omni sensatione; (2) pro!., q.2: Utrum anima nostra in via naturaliter cognoscere possit actus suos cognitionibus intuitivis realiter distinctis ab abstractivis; (3) pro!., q.3: Utrum notitia intuitiva sensitiva vel intellectiva possit naturaliter causari vel conservari sine existentia rei vise; (4) pro!., q.4: Quarto quero de articulo omisso prioris questionis: utrum per visionem causetur esse aliquod apparens vel esse visum distinctum a visione et visibili; (5) pro!., q.S: Utrum viator possit stante statu vie apprehendere Deum apprehensione aliqua simpliciori et propria; (6) pro!., q.6: Habito ex quinta questione quod Deus potest sine visione sui causare abstractivam simplicem sui, nunc sexto quero et ultimo quoad prologum: utrum Deus sine visione sui possit immediate causare in intellectu omnem evidentiam complexam quam potest causare mediante visione sui; (7) d.1, q.1: Quoniam, secundum beatum Augustinum, De doctr· ina christiana, c.1, "omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum", ut allegat

Magister d.1, ideo quesito circa prologum de actibus previis actui scientie, iam querendum est de ipso actu sciendi, qui est actus iudicativus quidam, de quo habitum est immediate. Et primo quero . . . utrum actus sciendi habeat pro obiecto immediato res vel signa, idest complexum in mente vel res signillcatas per complexum; (8) d.1, q.2: Habito ex precedenti questi184

The development of the complexe significabile

one quod scientia realis causata per apprehensiones tantum rectas habet pro obiecto sic esse a parte rei et non complexum, nee tantum sic esse sicut significatur per conclusionem, sed etiam sicut significatur per premissas, dummodo sit scientia evidens evidentia intrinseca, iam restat descendere in speciali ad notitiam theologicam ubi primo quero: utrum aliqua scientia theologica sit scibilis scientia proprie dicta; (9) d.1, q.4 [sic!]: Quarto et ultimo quero circa istam distinctionem: utrum fruitio sit qualitas realiter distincta a cognitione et delectatione. The notion of the complexe significabile is discussed in extenso in qq. 6, 7, 8, with related

discussions in several other questions; for a list of Wodeham's questions, see Courtenay (1978: 210-14). 69. 70.

See Courtenay's references (1978: 35 n. 66 and 164 n. 11). I base this upon my reading of several manuscript copies of Holcot's Sentences and Quodlibetal questions which I have studied in the course of preparing the edition mentioned above, n. 44; at the least, no discussion of the complexe significabile is conjoined to analyses of Chatton's, Crathorn's, or Ockham's views (when one would most expect). For Crathorn, see: "Et sicut dictum est de conclusionibus, eodem modo intelligendum est de principiis et intellectu principiorum, quia non omne, quod intelligitur, est propositio mentalis vel vocalis, sed illud, quod per propositionem mentalem vel vocalem significatur. Unde intelligens istud principium 'omne totum est mains sua parte' non proprie intelligit, secundum quod intellectus dicitur esse principiorum, istam propositionem 'omne to tum est maius etc.', sed intellectus est proprie tota/is significati istius propositionis 'omne totum est maius sua parte'. . .." as quoted in

Schepers (1972: 123 n. 79). Schepers does not mention, and I have not yet found, any explicit identification by Crathorn of this total significate as a complexe significabile, although Crathorn's notion seems consonant with

the views ofWodeham and Rimini. 71.

FitzRalph one would expect to fmd because, on such related aspects of Wodeham's theory of knowledge as the issue of the soul's identity with its acts, Wodeham qualified his views at Oxford in response to FitzRalph's critique. Compare Wodeham, I Ord., d.1, q.14, "dubium de nobilitate voluritatis" (Paris, Universite ms. 193, fols. 72vb-74va; Vatican, Vat. lat. 955, fols. 98v-100v) to Lect. sec. pro!., q. 1 (fols. 106ra-107vb); discussed in Tachau (1987: Chapter VIII).

72.

But see above, n. 66. 185

K.H. Tachau

73.

In fact, the first steps in unravelling the problem of the object of Holcot's attack were Moody's. In "A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holkot, O.P. on the Problem of the Objects of Knowledge and of Belief' (1964; repr. in Moody 1975), Moody recognized that Holcot's otherwise evident familiarity with Ockham's position ruled out Holcot as the originator of the ascription of Chatton's view to Ockham in the Trechsel edition (Lyons: 1497) of Holcot's Sentences commentary. This was confrrmed by the discovery of Chatton's or Crathorn's name (Moody construed these as scribal variants) in a Quodlibetal question in which Holcot covered the same ground as in his earlier I Sentences, q.2. In reediting the Quodlibetal question, Courtenay (1971:2) corrected Moody in a note; it was left to Schepers (1970: 341-44) to separate the arguments Holcot directed at Chatton from those targetting Crathorn, and to note (1972: 127-29) the reuse against the latter of a critique originally aimed at the former.

74.

The only extant version of Chatton's I Sent. pro!., q.1, is from the Ordinatio, and the order of the arguments in it does not correspond to any restatement or paraphrase by Ockham, Wodeham, Rodington, Hartmanus, or Holcot. Hence, he must have revised at least the internal order of his discussion. On the dating of Chatton's Reportatio and Ordinatio, see Gelber, Courtenay, Gal and Brown, n. 64 above.

75.

For Wodeham's quotation of Chatton, see Gal (1977: 74-76); reference to Gal's notes 11-25 will reveal how greatly Wodeham's order diverges from that of Chatton's Ordinatio.

76.

On Hartmanus, whose Sentences commentary is preserved in Krak6w, Bib!. Jagiell. 1276, see Tachau (1987).

77.

See Tachau (1987: 109-23).

78.

Compare, for example, the incipit to Kilvington's commentary, "Utrum deus sit super omnia diligendus. Quod non, quia ceteris paribus eligibilius est diligere proximum quod Deum" (as, e.g., in Firenze, Bib!. naz. Magliab. IIli. 281, fol. 43r) to the coeval anonymous, "Utrum deus sit super omnia diligendus. Quod non arguitur, quia si Deus foret super omnia diligendus, igitur deus foret diligendus super hominem" (in Vat. lat. 13002, fol. 87ra).

79.

Discussed by Courtenay with respect to the generation of Mirecourt (1973: 243-45). The practice has become usual probably by the mid-1320s, to judge from the commentaries of Hartmanus, Wodeham, and Crathorn (in order of composition).

186

The development of the complexe significabile 80.

See Schepers' discussion of Holcot's Sex articuli (1970: 340-49); Courtenay (1978: 89-111).

81.

Quoted and discussed in Tachau (1984: 55, 56 n. 27). It should be stressed that however compelling the practice may have been, it may never have been supported by statute law.

187

JACOBUS NAVEROS (flea. 1533) ON THE QUESTION:

'DO SPOKEN WORDS SIGNIFY CONCEPTS OR THINGS?'

E.J. Ashworth

University of Waterloo

1. Introduction

In a volume dedicated to the celebration of Gabriel Nuchelmans' achievements,

it seems appropriate to pick up one of the themes that he himself has discussed. In his seminal work on post-medieval philosophies of language, Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, Nuchelmans devoted a section to the

relation between written, spoken and mental propositions 1 • In it he made reference to a few writers from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as George of Brussels and Petrus Tartaretus, and he spoke of their reactions to arguments put forward by Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan. In this paper I intend to explore in more detail the question of whether words signify concepts or things, as it was discussed by Jacobus Naveros, a Spaniard who studied and taught at Alcala, and whose lengthy and interesting commentary on the Perihennenias was first published in 15332 . I shall also discuss the 1530 commentary of Alphonsus Prado, who taught at Alcala until 1534, when he moved to Coirnbra3 . Both men were influenced by the strong school of logic at Paris, and I shall make particular reference to the Parisian authors Johannes Raulin (1443-1514), Petrus Crockaert de Bruxellis (1465/70-1514), and Johannes Dullaert (ca. 1470-1513)4 . Anumber of other authors who discussed the question in some detail will be mentioned in passing, particularly in the footnotes 5 . I shall thus use my examination of Naveros to add to the material given by Nuchelmans, and to explore further the impact of Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan on later writers. The debate about whether words signified concepts or things was not, of course, a new one. It was already raging in the late thirteenth century, when Roger Bacon said that there was "not a moderate strife among famous men" 6 . A little later, Duns Scotus wrote of "a great altercation"7 . Nearly everyone who wrote a commentary on the Perihennenias had something to say on the issue, and

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it was also discussed in Sentence commentaries and in Buridan's Sophismata. The debate had been triggered by the words of Aristotle, who had opened his

Perihennenias (16a3) by saying that spoken words were signs of affections in the mind. As translated by Boethius the passage reads: "Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce" 8 . What Aristotle himself had intended to assert can be ignored here9 , for the later debate began not just from Boethius' Latin, but from a particular interpretation of it. Notae were taken to be

signa, passiones were

taken to be concepts 10 ; and ea quae sunt in voce were taken to be primarily such substantive nouns as 'human being' and 'animal'. Those words which themselves stand for signs were excluded for the obvious reason that, at least in the case of mental signs, the referents must be concepts 11 . In his analysis of the passage in question 12, Naveros argued that because nothing is called a sign of something unless it is representative or significative of it, Aristotle intended to assert that spoken words do signify concepts. Moreover, because Aristotle went on to state that spoken words were not the same for all men, Aristotle had meant to assert that this signification was ad placitum, i.e. conventional. Naveros strengthened the claim by adding the word proprie: the signification is not merely conventional, but conventional in the strictest sense. On the face of it, Naveros came down very strongly on one side of the debate. However, as we shall shortly see, this did not involve him in any denial that words also signified things. Indeed, the very theory of signification committed him to the assertion of a word-thing relationship. 2. The Doctrine of Signification

Before we consider Naveros' interpretation of the rest of the passage, we must consider the meaning he attached to the key notions of signum, significare, and

significare ad placitum proprie. In his Praeparatio Dialecticae of 1542, Naveros gave an account which placed him firmly within a tradition stemming from Peter of Ailly, and elaborated by various Parisian logicians of the early sixteenth century13• Peter of Ailly had written that "a term is a sign ..."14; that "... to 'signify' is the same as to be a sign of something" 15; and that "... to 'signify' is to represent (a) something, or (b) some things or (c) somehow, to a cognitive power by vitally changing it" 16. Naveros did not quote these words, but he began by making it clear that the word significare could be used interchangeably with

repraesentare; and that to represent is to make known, i.e. facere cognoscere 17. He emphasized the primarily epistemological character of his concern by giving a

190

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' short account of how the cognitive power employs both senses and intellect before he turned to the classification of the four main ways in which representation can come about 18. One of these four ways, repraesentare effective, is irrelevant to our purposes. Something was said to represent in this way when it was that very cognitive power through which a cognition was brought into existence. Naveros explained that this was a kind of representation because for something to produce that without which no knowing is possible was for it to make known and hence, to represent. This attempt to present efficient causality as being a type of signification had already been severely criticized by Domingo de Soto, who had argued that no sign was involved, since the cognitive power was not something by knowledge of which one came to the knowledge of some other thing19. Soto's position was to become commonplace in the second half of the sixteenth century, but Naveros only hinted at it. For instance, he remarked in passing that

significare effective was perhaps not as proper as the other three modes, but that he would not discuss the matter here (sed non hie ostendendum )20 . A second category (presented first by Naveros) is that of repraesentare

forma/iter. This was the property of that accident of the cognitive power, variously called conceptus,

rei cognitio, or notitia21 , which was such that

knowing took place by means of it, and without it, no knowing could occur. Naveros later explained that significare forma/iter was identical with significare

natura/iter proprie 22 : a cognition represents by virtue of its very nature, and it does so without any element of choice or convention. As Aristotle had said at the beginning of the Perhermenias (16a5), concepts are the same for all. Because of the category of formal representation, Naveros defmed significare as either to be a cognition or to produce a cognition: significare est cognitionem esse vel

cognitionem facere 23 . He added that a sign was either a cognition or a cognitionproducer: signum ...est cognitio aut cognitionem faciens 24 . This approach to concepts and their signification was standard in the sixteenth century. It is true that it seems to be at odds with the causal definition of significare as "to establish an understanding", said by Spade to be the central medieval definition25 ; but in fact this defmition was rarely mentioned by sixteenth-century logicians. The Parisian author, Raulin, didexamine it; but he argued that it applied only to instrumental signs26. The third way of representing is repraesentare obiective. This occurred when an object either made itself known or, as in the case of the image of a king, made something other than itself known. This too was later classified as a form 191

E.J. Ashworth

of natural signifying, significare natura/iter communiter; and Naveros gave a number of examples: spatially extended whiteness moves one to form a notitia of whiteness; an image moves one to form a cognition of a king; smoke leads to the cognition of fire; an invalid's groan leads to the cognition of his ill-health27 . There are three things to notice about this account. First, it is much wider than that given by such near-contemporaries as Johannes Celaya, whose only example of the case in which something had objective representation, by virtue of being the object of a notitia, was that in which an object made itself known28 • However, accounts similar to that of Naveros are found in Peter of Ailly29 and in Raulin30 . Second, like Raulin, Naveros included much of what others called instrumental signification under this general heading of objective representation. Smoke, for instance, was usually classified as a natural instrumental sign, i.e. a sign which was non-conventional but which served as an instrument by producing knowledge of something beyond itself. Third, Naveros included groans and other such noises in the same category as smoke, whereas some early sixteenth-century authors had put them in the special category of significare natura/iter ex instinctu naturae 31 • Naveros himself recognized this fact, and he remarked that

one could introduce ex instinctu naturae as a third kind of natural signification if one wished32 . A final point to note is that Domingo de Soto had disallowed objective representation in the narrow sense from being a kind of signification at all. A sign must make something known other than itself, he claimed33 . There is a faint echo of this argument in Naveros. At the very end of his discussion of natural signs he remarked that perhaps something is not properly called a sign when it represents only itse!f34 . The fourth category is that of repraesentare instrumentaliter. Naveros, unlike many of his contemporaries35, defined this type of representation as involving human choice. For something to represent instrumentally was for it to be as it were the instrument of some art produced by man's will and used in accordance with his will. Thus spoken and written words were the prime examples of instrumental signs. As a result, Naveros identified instrumental signification with signification ad placitum, i.e. conventional signification. In the later section where Naveros gave a fuller explanation of conventional signification, he listed three kinds36 . Signification ad placitum proprie came about when the imposition of the word, i.e. its primary endowment with signification, was direct and independent. Signification ad placitum propter similitudinem came about when the sense of a word was dependent on some previous imposition. Thus homo, directly imposited to refer to human beings, could also refer to human beings in paintings. Finally, 192

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' signification ad placitum ex quadam consuetudine et usu came about where something served as a sign as the result of some customary activity. For instance, a dog which always preceded Socrates to class could be taken as a sign of his master's approach. This last example illustrates the fact that, as Naveros did explain, non-verbal signs, such as the sound of a trumpet in battle, were counted among conventional signs. It should also be noted that here we have yet another classification which Soto had already rejected. He had argued, with particular reference to the dog example, which was also found in Celaya, that those signs whose signification depended on custom and use were really natural signs37 . A final cross-classification of signification which N averos used in his Perihermenias commentary was that between significare immediate and significare discursive 36 . Both objective representation, at least when it involved the

representation of something other than the sign, and instrumental representation could be so divided. Immediate signification occurred when no further process of reasoning was involved in arriving at the significate, whereas discursive signification occurred when such an intermediate process was required. Thus a doctor who observes urine comes to see it as a sign of either sickness or health after some argumentation which, as a result of practice, may take only a little time to perform.

3. Words Signify by Means of Concepts

Naveros devoted article one of the first question of his Perihermenias commentary to further exploration of certain aspects of the doctrine of signification39. The points he raised merit close attention, since they have to do with the exact place of concepts in the significative process. He began by claiming that spoken and written words signify things in a strict conventional sense by means of concepts: voces et scripturae significant ad placitum proprie res mediantibus conceptibus 40 • He explained that the key issue had to do with the

meaning of the phrase: terminus significans mediante alia; and he set out to give a precise definition, which he tested against a number of counter-examples. The definition turned out to be a complex one:

"A term which signifies by means of another term is a term which has signification only because another term, synonymous with it either simply or by virtue of supposition alone, had signification before it. Est ergo terminus

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significans mediante alio terminus qui ad sui significationem praesupponit alium terminum sibi synonymum simpliciter vel in supponendo prius significasse" 41 .

The heart of this definition lies in the phrase "another term ... had signification before it". Naveros first explained the common-sense point that spoken words could not be endowed with signification in the absence of some cognition of the things to be signified42 . For instance, if Socrates has never seen a lion, a wouldbe impositor cannot imposit the sound 'a' to signify a lion when he is speaking to Socrates. Either the sound would signify nothing, or it would suggest some undefined range of unknown objects. However, if the impositor gives Socrates a long verbal description of a lion, he can then imposit 'a' to signify a lion in the knowledge that the sound will move Socrates to form a concept similar to the one he had already formed by virtue of the description. It should be noted here that the word conceptus was not used by Naveros to refer to a permanent mental content, but rather to a temporally-limited mental act. It should also be noted that since a concept just is a mental term, the requirement of a prior cognition or concept is equivalent to the requirement that another term had signification before the spoken term did. The point would seem to be established, but Naveros had more to say43 • Without mentioning any names, he took an argument presented by Alphonsus Prado in his Perihennenias commentary and examined it. Prado had claimed that spoken words do not signify by means of concepts because the spoken word has to incite the intellect to form a concept, and this incitatio or immutatio is not only prior to the concept but constitutes the spoken word's signification44 . If someone were to reply that a spoken word signifies only because of a previous knowledge of the relationship between the word and the thing signified, then one could take the case of the non-significant word buf. This word incites the formation of a concept, i.e. a concept of the spoken word itself, despite the absence of previous

wledge of a link between word and significate. Prado concluded

that the claim that words signify by !Ileans of concepts was false unless understood in its proper sense; and this proper sense was that the intellect could never understand a thing through a spoken word unless by means of a concept whose formation had been brought about by that word. Naveros' response was a simple one. He pointed out that on Prado's view the desired relation is reversed, and it is now the concept which signifies by means of the spoken word. He then repeated his main claim in other words, arguing that a spoken term can only signify to a person if at some previous time the relevant concept has been

194

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' present in that person's mind. In two later passages, he took up the point about bu/'5, and said that it did not signify itself ad placitum proprie by means of a

concept, even if a synonymous concept could be formed by someone hearing the utterance. In his explanation of the other clauses found in his definition, Naveros made several further points concerning signification which are worth mentioning briefly46 . One point had to do with the place of so-called non-ultimate concepts, namely those concepts which have as their object spoken words as such. He argued that, while it is true that an utterance can only be imposited to signify if one has a concept of that utterance, one cannot go on to claim that the spoken word signifies by means of the non-ultimate concept. Before imposition took place, that non-ultimate concept did not signify what the spoken word now signifies; and synonymy is required between the spoken word and the term by means of which it signifies. The same condition of synonymy was used to counter the argument that the previous presence of a concept signifying things or animals in general would be enough to satisfy the definition when applied to the term homo. If the only concept Socrates has is that of a being or an animal, the word homo will not lead him to cognize human beings any more than it moves him to cognize horses or lions. Moreover, if synonymy is defmed as signifying the same things in the same way, the same requirement of synonymy can be used to deal with problems concerning syncategorematic terms and propositions, both of which do depend on other concepts. A syncategorematic term, which is an act at the mental level, depends on the mind's prior possession of categorematic terms. A proposition which, like a syncategorematic term signifies in some way (aliqualiter)47 also depends on the mind's prior possession of other concepts, those of

its parts. However, in both cases the parts signify aliquid or a/iqua; and there can be no synonyny between two terms, one of which signifies aliquid or aliqua and the other of which signifies aliqualiter. A related problem was that of complex terms which were not propositions. If one considers animal album or equus hominis, it seems that these complexes are significative, yet there need be no previous synonymous concept48 . To argue that one cannot understand an adjective unless it is joined with a substantial term, or a genitive unless it is joined with a direct term, does not help, because the speaker may have first met album in the phrase lignum album, or hominis in the phrase leo hominis. The reply Naveros gave was two-fold. If one wants to claim that complex phrases acquire their signification through direct imposition, then indeed a previously-existing synonymous concept is required. However, if one 195

E.J. Ashworth

holds that the signification of a complex results from the signification of the parts, then the only requirement is that there have been preceding concepts of these parts, and that the imposition of the spoken parts have been known. He added that one could if one wished express the latter condition by saying that a concept which was virtually rather than formally synonymous was pre-required. So far nothing has been said about the phrase "or by virtue of supposition" in the clause "another term, synonymous with it either simply or by virtue of supposition". This clause was there to deal with a problem of religious language which was first introduced very briefly, in the general discussion of the defmition49. Here Naveros remarked that we may use a singular term such as 'Michael' (the name of the archangel) to pick out some object even though we have no apparent concept of it. The requirement, then, is that at least we should have prior cognition of some term with the same supposition. Naveros expanded considerably on this problem in a separate section of article one which concerned our knowledge of insensible objects50 • The common view was, he said, that in this life we carmot acquire a distinct notitia, that is, a notitia which is singular, absolute, non-complex and precisely representative, of any spiritual being, whether God or angels. Now, if one takes the term 'Michael', one has a spoken or written term which was imposited to signify Michael singulariter et absolute. Yet we have no appropriate concept. We thus face the general question: can a term signify a thing distinctly to an intellect which cannot cognize that thing distinctly? Moreover, should such a term be said to signify by means of an indistinct concept to which it is subordinated, even though the two terms (spoken and mental) are not synonymous? In his reply, Naveros made two main points. F"rrst, a term can be imposited to signify a thing distinctly for all users by a being who has a distinct concept, even though the other users of the term do not. Thus Gabriel can imposit the sound 'Michael' to signify Michael both for himself and for human beings, who lack Gabriel's concept. More interestingly, Naveros used the example of two blind students at Alcala, one of whom he had taught. This blind student was able to use the word 'white' appropriately in disputations even though he lacked the requisite cognition. Second, Naveros claimed that a term could be imposited to signify a thing distinctly by an impositer who, like the other users, lacked a distinct concept. Thus human beings can indeed use such terms as 'God' and 'angel' with a precise reference to individuals. The defect lies not in the reference, but in our own understanding of the item referred to. His final solution to the problem of reference to Michael was that there is a cencept by means of 196

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?'

which the spoken term signifies, but this concept is an indistinct one and hence is synonymous with the spoken term only by virtue of its supposition or reference. It should be noted that Naveros disagreed with Aquinas who had argued that one cannot both hold that spoken words primarily signify concepts and that words can signify more distinctly than our concepts warrant51 .

4. Words First Signify Concepts

The discussion so far has emphasized the view that spoken words were imposited to signify things in the outside world. Naveros never wished to deny this, any more than did other authors. However, he did wish to claim that words also signified concepts, and that there was some priority to this kind of signification. In the second article of the first question of his Perihennenias commentary, he turned to consider how Aristotle's words were to be construed in relation to the claim that words first signify concepts52. It is important to consider the Latin version, both of Aristotle's words, and of Naveros' construal of these words:

[Aristoteles] "dixit: "Quarum hae primum notae sunt, eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt", i.e. passiones sic sunt eaedem omnibus, quarum, scilicet passionum, hae, i.e. voces, primo sunt significativae."53

In examining the passage, Naveros argued that words do not first signify things, since they are said first to signify concepts. If this is so, they must signify concepts conventionally, since this is the kind of signification that spoken words have. Moreover, the signification must be ad placitum proprie, since all improper conventional signification is dependent on proper conventional signification and hence can have no priority. He added that any attempt to construe 'first' as meaning 'principally' would leave this point about signification ad placitum proprie unaltered. However, it is only later in the second article that Naveros specified exactly what kind of priority he took Aristotle to have had in mind

54 .

It turns

out that the priority was not a temporal one; and that it could be defined in terms of the relationship already discussed, i.e. 'signification by means of another term'. To say that words first signify concepts, is just to say that words signify things by means of concepts rather than concepts by means of things.

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5. Words Signify Concepts Conventionally

We can now turn to Naveros' main answer to the question whether spoken words signify concepts or things. His immediate response was two-fold. First, Aristotle had intended to say that spoken words signify concepts ad placitum proprie. Second, this. claim is true55. In saying this., Naveros pointed out, he was

adopting the view popularly attributed to Buridan. However, as we shall see, his reasons for supporting the view were somewhat different from Buridan's largely because of the subtleties involved in Naveros' construal of the question. He gave one short argument in support of his view, leaving the burden of proof to be carried by his refutation of several arguments against the view, and by his own arguments against alternative views. The short argument goes like this 56. In teaching logic, the master tells his pupils that the term homo corresponds in the mind to a concept of all human beings, and when the pupils hear this they are moved to apprehend their cognition of human beings by another reflex concept. This is by definition a case of signification; it is a case in which a concept is signified; and it cannot be a case of improper signification since if the signification of the concept were a consequence of the word's signifying actual human beings, the pupils would have been aware of this. consequence, and they would not have needed the master to point it out to them. Naveros reinforced his claim by comparing the grammar master who teaches Spaniards that homo signifies human beings with the logic master who teaches that homo signifies a concept. Whether this is a case of primary imposition or of pointing out an existent imposition does not matter; in both cases it is signification ad placitum proprie that is involved. The two main arguments which Naveros formulated against his. own position had to do with experience57• First, if homo does signify an ultimate concept, it would follow by defmition of 'signify' that anyone hearing the spoken word would formulate a reflexive concept of the ultimate concept. But this does not happen. Second, peasants never formulate such a reflex concept. In answer to the first problem, he took the example of equivocal terms, such as canis, which have more than one principal signification. Experience shows, he said, that even logicians when hearing the term canis are much more likely to think of the barking animal than of the dog star or the dog fish. This is so because in normal conversation the spoken word simply is used most frequently in accordance with the first signification. All that is needed to prove that a word has more than one signification is that it should sometimes, in some contexts, move a hearer to think

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Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' of the other significations. In answer to the second problem, he made an extremely important point. In order for a term to signify an object, one must be aware of the imposition, i.e. of the relation established between the two. Just as non-Latin speakers do not know that homo signifies human beings, so peasants do not know that homo signifies a concept. Later in the article Naveros said more about the question of imposition in relation to concepts58 . There were two alternatives. Either the first impositor of the word homo realized that he himself had a cognition of human beings which he wished to make known to others by means of the same word he used to make known the things; or there was some subsequent impositor, who already knew that homo signified human beings, but now wished to imposit the same word to make

known the concept in question. The latter case reinforces the point that two impositions and hence two significations are involved. Naveros expanded on this notion of dual signification by explaining how it applied to syncategorematic terms59 . Normally, these make known the modes of things, but in some contexts, such as "Ly 'omnis' est in mente actus sincategorematicus", they function as categorematic terms which pick out an act of the mind. On the other hand, oblique terms such as hominis cannot enjoy dual signification. The inflection indicates that things alone are being signified60. The view that in most cases words enjoyed dual signification was one which had always aroused some controversy. Duns Scotus had mentioned the view; and argued that it might be seen as involving equivocation, for a thing is a substance whereas a concept is an accident, and both cannot be univocally signified by the same word. His own reply was that an equivocal term involved different acts of signifying and that only one act was involved here 61 • Clearly Naveros could not have accepted this solution, since he had separated the two acts of imposition, at least in principle. The fiftheenth-century logicians of Mainz and Naveros' contemporary Prado believed that the view really did involve equivocation62 ; but a number of others including Petrus Crockaert claimed that equivocation arose only if things and concepts were signified with equal primacy63. Thornists introduced a

special vocabulary to indicate that there was no equal primacy: the concept was called the immediate and less principal significate, or significatum quo; and the thing was called the mediate and principal significate, or significatum quocf34. The debate was to" continue into the seventeenth century, with the Jesuits of Coimbra opting for two significates65 ; and John of St. Thomas rejecting such a view66 .

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6. The Scotist Arguments against Naveros' Position

In his examination of arguments against his main claim, Naveros also drew on a sequence of arguments which were found in John Duns Scotus' first commentary on the Perihennenias, three of which had become extremely popular67• The first of these took its starting point from a passage in the Categoriae (lb25) where Aristotle had remarked that simple terms signified objects belonging to each of the categories, including substance and quality68 . Duns Scotus had argued that if terms signified concepts, then, contrary to Aristotle they would turn out to signify accidents and never substances. Naveros replied that there was no problem here, because the categories were intended to apply only to external objects, and because no one wished to deny that spoken words do signify external objects69 • The second argument found in Scotus had to do with the truth of affirmative propositions. The first case involved such predications as Homo est animal which, it was claimed, would be false if both the terms signified concepts70. It should be noted that all the logicians who made this point assumed the identity interpretation of the copula, whereby the sentence would mean "The concept homo is identical to the concept animal'', an obvious falsehood. The second case involved sentences in which a real act was predicated of a subject, as in "A human being is running" 71 • This again would be obviously false if interpreted as meaning that a

concept was running. Naveros considered only the first case, and he said of it that just as the word homo did not always move the intellect according to every signification that it had, so it did not always supposit according to its every signification. In the quoted sentence homo supposited only in accordance with its signification of human beings72 • Some authors preferred to put this point in terms of ultimate and non-ultimate significates, and wrote that a word may signify a concept which is its non-ultimate significate, while suppositing for a thing, which is its ultimate significate73. The last major ar

nt put forward by Duns Scotus had to do with our

awareness of the concept (or species in his vocabulary) which was said to be signified by a given spoken word. If signification is indeed a kind of making known, then the concept would have to be made known. Yet since the concept is that by which external things are known, if' it is itself known, it must be known by means of another concept. This was developed into an infinite regress argument by later writers, including Raulin, who argued as follows74 • If the spoken word homo signifies the concept of human beings, this must be by means of a second concept, since conventional signification takes place only by means of

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Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' a concept. If it did not, the external object could be signified directly, and the problem under discussion would not arise. Now let us consider the second concept. If this is not signified by the spoken word, then a spoken word can signify by

means of a concept which it does not signify. It then follows that there is no point in claiming that any concept is signified by the spoken word. On the other hand, if the spoken word does signify the second concept, it must do so by means of a third concept, and so on ad infinitum. This conclusion is ridiculous, so once more we have good reason to deny that any concept is signified by a spoken word. Scotus himself had argued that knowledge by reflexion did not require an extra species75 ; but Naveros evaded the point by arguing that even if homo signified a direct concept by means of a reflexive concept, it did not follow that it also signified that reflexive concept by means of another reflexive concept, since it was never imposited to signify such ·a concept76. It would follow from Naveros' definition that the word did not signify by means of the second concept either, since the word and the second concept are not synonymous; and hence Raulin's argument would be undercut.

7. Buridan's Arguments

Naveros concluded the discussion by saying that he found the position of Buridan to be the most probable77 . However, it is noteworthy that the arguments which Buridan himself had used to support the position that words signify concepts were dismissed by Naveros as of no importance (nullius momenti/ 8 . One of these arguments had to do with synonymy. Buridan had argued that various words such as 'being', 'one', and' 'diverse' were not synonymous despite the fact that they have exactly the same significations if one considers things rather than concepts. Hence, it must be the concept which is signified rather than the thing. This argument was repeated, and rejected, by five authors from our period, including Naveros79 • Petrus Crockaert, who was followed by Dullaert, argued that one could also ask whether the concepts said to be signified by the words 'being', 'one' and so on are themselves synonymous. If the answer is 'No', we must ask why. The explanation cannot lie in the fact that these concepts are themselves subordinated to different concepts, so there must be some other reason. Yet any reason not to do with subordination to different concepts must be a reason which could be appealed to directly in order to show why spoken words are not synonymous. Both Dullaert and Prado pointed out that synonymy required that the

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terms involved not only signify the same things, but that they should also have the same modes of signifying. Naveros made the same point. Buridan's next argument, which had to do with equivocation, fared little better. He had referred to Aristotle's distinction between univocal and equivocal terms, and argued that if a univocal term was a term having only one significate, whereas an equivocal term had several, the difference could be explained only if concepts were the significates of terms. Of the later authors only Dullaert, Prado and Naveros repeated this argument, and all three refuted it by saying that the difference had to do not with the number of significates but with the number of concepts used in signifying8°. Thus, to use an English example, 'bank' involves two different concepts (on different occasions) when it is used significatively, whereas 'desk' involves only one. The other argument that Buridan had used rested on the analogy Aristotle had drawn between written and spoken words. Spoken words signify concepts just as written words signify spoken; and the proof that written words signify spoken rests on the way in which boys are taught the alphabet. The point had already been discussed by Raulin, Silvester, Mair, Dullaert and Prado; and not one of them accepted it81 . They agreed that there was a correspondence between written and spoken words, though Raulin and Dullaert argued that even this was not essential, for one could in principle have written words without spoken equivalents. However, there was no general agreement on details. Silvester said that written words signify things by means of spoken words, just as spoken words signify things by means of concepts; whereas Raulin accepted the signification of spoken by written words, but denied the analogy with the word-concept relation. Silvester said that students who read silently do best, and hence spoken words are not as important as people think. Raulin said that students learn best from lectures, and this shows spoken words to have a latent energy which makes them more important than written words. He added that writing causes problems because we need a larger set of concepts to handle written words than we do spoken. Naveros himself began by placing some qualifications on the claim that written words signify spoken82 • While this is true in practice, given the way boys are taught, one cannot claim that written words must signify spoken, because it is easy to imagine situations in which written words are directly imposited to signify things. He also mentioned the case of mutes, for whom written signs will represent not spoken words but nods and other bodily signs. He then took up an argument found in Mair, Dullaert and Prado to the effect that ordinary things may be said to signify spoken words in just the way that written words do83 . For

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Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?'

instance, a child can be taught by its mother to say something different in the presence of bread than in the presence of milk, and the presence of these objects will then move the child to produce the appropriate sound. Naveros replied that neither bread nor milk is imposited to signify, and in so far as they do signify, it is a result of the imposition of the word. Thus the signification involved is consecutive and improper84 • If a reader does not like this solution, he added, appeal could be made instead to discursive signification which, once more, is improper. Another argument hinted at by Dullaert and Prado was that all written signs including buf signify because they call to mind the appropriate utterance85 . Naveros replied that although this was true, written signs were called significative because of their relation to external things, and bufhad no such relationshipss.

8. The Common View

Naveros contrasted his own view with two others: the so-called common view which came ultimately from William Ockbam, and the view of the Realists. The main tenet of the common view, as described by Naveros, was that written and spoken words do not signify the ultimate concepts to which they are subordinated

ad placitum proprie, though they do signify them ad placitum consecutive 87 • Furthermore, what Aristotle meant to say was that a word signifies by means of a concept, and nothing more. The word primo in the Latin translation merely indicated that the presence of a concept was required as a prior condition; not that the concept was itself properly signified. Here Naveros was reporting accurately the view of such men as Prado88; but he did not mention another variant of the common view stemming more directly from Ockbam according to which concepts were not said to be signified even in an improper sense89 • As Eckius put the point in early sixteenth century: "Spoken words are the signs of concepts, not through signification but through subordination. They are signs that such concepts are in the mind" 90 • However, this variant is not different in essence from the common view as presented by Naveros. There was disagreement about the application of the word significatio but none about the indirect but essential part played by concepts in the significative process. In his discussion of the common view, Naveros devoted most space to a claim found in Mair, Silvester and Prado to the effect that written, spoken and mental terms could signify each other according to all possible combinations, albeit only in a consecutive or improper sense91 . This claim rested on the further claim that

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since all three kinds of term agreed in that they could signify properly, a concept common to all three kinds of term could be abstracted. It was by virtue of the similarity captured by this common concept that one type of term could be said to signify another. In his reply, Naveros distinguished between two types of concept, i.e. a common concept, and an adequate concept; and he argued that an adequate concept was required if one term was to be said to signify another. Thus, the word Tullius is similar to the word Marcus, in that both of them have conventional reference to Cicero, but the adequate concept of Tullius remains different from the adequate concept of Marcus. Hence it is simply false to say that the word Tullius signifies the word Marcus 92 . Analogously, even though the concepts ens and animal apply to all kinds of creature, someone who has only these general concepts does not know a rhinoceros, because he lacks the requisite adequate concept, i.e. one which applies only to a rhinoceros.

9. The Realist View

Finally, let us turn to the Realist view. Naveros first said a few words about Duns Scotus93 . Where Duns Scotus had stood was unclear, for in his fust commentary on the Perihermenias he discussed both the theory that concepts were signified, which he called "the more probable according to the authorities", and the theory that things were signified, which he called "the more probable according to reasons"9 4 . In his Sentence commentary he was firmly in favour of things95 . Later authors were not sure what to make of these different stands. Silvester asserted that Duns Scotus was in favour of concepts, and Michael of Paris, a professed Scotist, seems to have agreed96 . Dullaert said that both Duns Scotus and Aquinas believed concepts to be signified, but that they meant by this only that things were signified by means of concepts97 . Naveros himself said that it was doubtful whether Duns Scotus wrote a Logica at all, and that one should follow the Sentence commentary in ~hich Scotus had agreed with the common doctrine of the nominalists9B. The opinion of the Thomists was more difficult to come to grips with. Aquinas himself had argued that the word homo signified human nature in abstraction from singulars, and that since there were no separate Ideas in the Platonic sense, the human nature thus signified could exist only as a conception in the human intellect. Hence, spoken words immediately signified concepts 99. This argument was reproduced exactly by the fifteenth-century Thomists at Cologne and by

204

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' Petrus Crockaert, who was also a Thomist200 . Raulin mentioned it only to reject it 101. Naveros himself paid some attention to Aquinas 102, but was more interested in later developments of the doctrine of the verbum mentale as the possible immediate significate of spoken words103. Naveros frrst explained that on one view the verbum mentale was not identical with the concept that he had spoken of earlier. Rather, a perceived object, by virtue of a species, produced an act of understanding (Naveros' conceptus); and by means of this act a further quality was produced which was as it were an image of the object. This terminative object of the act of understanding was the verbum mentale. On another view, the verbum mentale was identifred with the thing

known in so far as it was known, also called a conceptus obiectivus. Such Thomists seem to have been found at Cologne, for after noting Aquinas' arguments, they wrote: "And 'concept' should not be taken here to mean 'similitude' or 'intelligible species', but 'the thing conceived', which sometimes is a substance, and sometimes an accident, and is called verbum intelligibile" 104• Petrus Crockaert remarked that the verbum could be taken in an improper sense to mean the thing understood, and that a man, while he was understood, could be called an objective concept105. There was a much longer discussion of the matter in Prado, though he attributed the doctrine to Duns Scotus rather than to the Thomists 106 . Prado claimed that Scotus had drawn a distinction between the conceptus formalis and the conceptus obiectivus, which Prado defmed as follows:

"The objective concept is the object known or the thing conceived, and thus this term 'objective concept' signifies something by connoting that it is perceived by the intellect". He argued that Duns Scotus had held that spoken words signified objective concepts, and that the view involved the postulation of eternal objects outside the understanding in which every act of understanding would terminate. He noted that nominalists did not believe that acts of understanding had to terminate in some absolute object; and he exaruined various arguments against the doctrine of objective concepts, which he took to provide good reason for not adopting it. Naveros himself also believed that the position could not be sustained. Aristotle's presentation of the problem showed that no identifrcation between passio and res was possible. Moreover, he said, there was no reason to believe

that the view was properly attributed to Aquinas. Hence he devoted the last part of his discussion to the exaruination of various objections to the frrst version of the doctrine of the verbum mentale, together with replies to these objections.

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E.J. Ashworth

10. Arguments not Discussed by Naveros

The Perihennenias commentaries of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries included various arguments for and against the signification of concepts by words which were not discussed by Naveros, but which deserve a brief mention. One group of arguments, in favour of the thesis that concepts were signified, had to do with the part played by concepts or intelligible species in the significative process. Duns Scotus had given two slightly different versions of what is basically the same argument. In the first version it goes: words only signify what is understood, intelligible things are in the intellect, as Aristotle showed when he remarked that not the stone but the species of stone is in the mind (De Anima 431b30); therefore words signify species 107 • In the second version it goes: nothing is signified except through a species, therefore the species is more importantly (magis) signified 108 . The frrst version was mentioned by John of Glogovia, with reference to Aquinas 109; and the second appeared briefly in Ockham, the commentators of Mainz, and Dullaert, though none of them accepted it 110. A second argument had to do with the purpose of spoken language. Words, said Ockham, reporting an argument he was to reject, were invented in order to express our concepts; therefore, words signify concepts 111 • Versor, George of Brussels and Johannes de Lapide were to repeat this argument, though only Versor and Johannes de Lapide accepted it112 . Both arguments were to receive somewhat greater emphasis in the scholastic writers of the seventeenth century11 3. The second group of arguments was in favour of the thesis that words signified things. As with the opposing thesis, the standard argument was drawn from Aristotle, this time from De Sophisticis Elenchis 165a5, where he remarked:

"It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them". A supplementary argument was also drawn from Aristotle, this time from Metaphysica 1012a23 which in Latin translation reads: ratio enim cuius nomen est signum, definitio est rei 114 • The definition was said to indicate the essence of the thing def'!ned, and this essence was not a concept; hence the name used was not the sign of a concept 11 5. Duns Scotus noted that this argument could also be used in support of the view that concepts were signified, since it might be taken to demonstrate that things were also signified, though not inunediately116• A third argument from Aristotle involved Boethius' translation of Perihennenias 16b20 as: Ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba nomina sunt et significant aliquid - constituit enim qui dicit intellectum 117 • On this basis it was said that to signify is to establish an under-

206

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' standing, and that what we understand is the external thing118 . Others put the point more simply: if someone utters the word homo, what we come to know is not a concept but individual human beings 119 . In the same vein Ockham remarked that it had been the intention of the impositor of language to signify things rather than concepts 120. Curiously, this obvious point was to receive greater emphasis in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it did during the earlier period121. Naveros, of course, had used it, but as part of his claim that concepts were also the intended significates of spoken words.

11. Conclusion

I would like to conclude by making three brief observations. First, any modern attempt to construe the thesis that spoken words signify concepts as a theory of meaning involves a simple misunderstanding of the verb significare. Second, although Naveros, like others, asserted that spoken words did signify concepts, he had no intention of overlooking the referential function of words. Nor did those who asserted that spoken words signified things have any intention of overlooking the place of concepts in the significative process. In many ways the dispute between the two groups was verbal rather than real. Third, when one considers the influence of the great medieval philosophers on the discussions found in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, it seems that Duns Scotus held pride of place, followed closely by Buridan. Ockham's conclusions were influential, though his arguments were not; and the arguments presented by Aquinas in his

Perihermenias commentary had little effect.

NOTES

1.

Nuchelmans (1980: 16-24).

2.

For some details about Naveros' life and works, see V. Muii.oz Delgado

3.

For some details about Prado, see Muii.oz Delgado, op.cit., pp. 184-187.

4.

For details of these and other authors, see Lohr (1974-1982).

5.

On the other hand, there are many Perihermenias commentaries I have

(1968: 193-200).

looked at and shall not make any further reference to. Details of most of the works I exclude are to be found in Risse (1965). I have looked at and 207

E.J. Ashworth

rejected the following: Claudius Alberius (1577); Johannes Arboreus (1542); Tiberius Bacilerius (1512); Hieronymus Balduinus (1575); Martinus Borrhaus (1541); Thomas Bricot (1489); Laurentius Florentinus (1500); Gaspar Lax (1530); Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples (1503); Johannes de Magistris (1490); Magentinus (1539); Franciscus de Mayro (1517); Thomas de Mercado (1571); Augustinus Niphus (1559); Julius Pacius (1597); Joachim Perion (1551); Johannes Parrent (1501); Angelus Politianus (1551); Petrus Rauledius (1519); Honoratus de Robertis (1598); Antonius Scaynus (1599); Jacob Scheck (1570); Jodocus Trutvetter (ca. 1500); Erasmus Wonsidel (1509); Laurentius Valla (ca. 1500); Marcus Antonius Zimara (1508). I have been unable to see A. Baroccius (1569); Gaspar Cardillus Villalpandeus (1556); L. Lemosius (1558). Risse's listing of Johannes Stobnicensis (1508) is erroneous, as Stobnicensis merely wrote the preface to a commentary by Michael of Paris. 6.

K.M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen and Jan Pinborg, "An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's 'Opus Mains': 'De Signis'", Traditio 34 (1978: 132).

7.

John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 1 d.27 qq.1-3, n.83 (1963: 97).

8.

Aristoteles Latinus II 1-2. De Interpretatione vel Periennenias Translatio Boethii Specimina Translationum Recentiorum (1%5: 5).

9. 10.

For an interesting discussion of the issue, see Kretzmann (1974: 3-21). "... per notas nil aliud intelligit quam signa; et per passiones nil aliud quam conceptus secundum omnes expositores ... " Jacobus Naveros, Expositio super

duos Iibras Perihennenias Aristotelis (Compluti, s.a.), fol. ivva. 11.

Ibid., fol.vvb. "Dixi 'quibus utimur pro rebus et non pro signis' nam aliquae voces bene significant conceptus ad placitum proprie, ut ly 'conceptus' ...

12.

Ibid., fol.ivva.

13.

See Ashworth (forthcoming).

14.

Spade (1980: 16).

15.

Ibid., p.17.

16.

Ibid., p.16.

17.

Jacobus Naveros, Praeparatio Dialecticae (Compluti, 1542), fol.vivb.

18.

For the cognitive power's use of senses and intellect, see ibid., fol.viira. For the four types of repraesentare, see ibid., fol.viira_va. Cf. Naveros,

Expositio, fol.viva. There is a brief discussion of the topic in Nuchelmans, op.cit., pp.14-15. Nuchelmans quotes John of St. Thomas, but it should be

208

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?'

noted that John of St. Thomas' discussion was dependent on that of Domingo deSoto: see the paper cited in note 13 above. 19.

Domingo deSoto, Summulae (Burgis, 1529), fol.vb.

20.

Naveros, Praeparatio, fol.vii1b.

21.

For the vocabulary used, see Naveros, Expositio, fol.viiva_ vb; Antonius Silvester, Dialectices sititoribus questionum pars prima super summularum

Buridani tractatum primum ([Paris] s.a.) sig.c vva. Silvester used the terms intentio, conceptus, notitia, actus intelligendi. Silvester's cliscussion of the question, "What do spoken words signify?" is one of the few found outside Perihennenias commentaries. For another, see Hieronymus Pardo,

Medulla dya/ectices (Parisius, 1505), fol. cxlixvb_ fol. cxl'a. 22.

Naveros, Praeparatio, foJ.Jtb.

23.

Ibid., fol. vii'b.

24.

Ibid., fol.viiva.

25.

Spade (1982: 188). See also notes 117 and 118 below.

26.

Johannes Raulin, In logicam aristotelis. Commentarium ([Paris]1500), sig.g yra_rb,

27.

Naveros, Praeparatio, fol.xva.

28.

Johannes Celaya, Dialectice introductiones (Aureliacii [1516]), sig. A vii1•

29.

Spade (1980: 70).

30.

Raulin, sig. g yra,

31.

See, e.g., Celaya, sig. B iiv.

32.

Naveros, Praeparatio, fol.xvb_fol.xi'a.

33.

Soto, fol. yrb-va.

34.

Naveros, Praeparatio, fol.xi'a.

35.

For an alternative see e.g. Soto, fol.vva.

36.

Naveros,Praeparatio, fol.ixva_vb,

37.

Soto, fol.vva_vb; Celaya, sig. B ivv-sig. B v.

38.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.viva_vb. Cf. Naveros, Praeparatio, fol.xvb.

39.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.ili 1a-fol.ivb.

40.

Ibid., fol.iii'a.

41.

Loc.cit. I have omitted "et ad similem conceptum virtute suae significationis est immutativus". This extra phrase was added to guard against a misunderstanding about the notitia abstractiva and the notitia

intuitiva: see fol. mva. He gave a second version of the main definition on fol.iiiva: "Terminus significans mediante alio est terminus qni ad sni significationem praerequirit alium terminum sibi synonymum simpliciter vel 209

E.J. Ashworth in supponendo tantum prius significasse; et ad illi similem virtutem suae significationis est immutativus". 42.

Ibid., fol.ili' 8 •

43.

Ibid., fol.iii'b.

44.

Alphonsus Prado, Quaestiones Dia/ecticae supra libros Perihennenias

45.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.ilivb and fol.v' 8 •

46.

Ibid., fol.ili'b.

(Compluti, 1530), fol.iiiva_vb.

47.

For the doctrine that a proposition signifies aliqualiter, see Ashworth(1978: 107-114). This paper is reprinted in Ashworth (1985). See also Nuchelmans, op.cit., pp.45-73.

48.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.iv'a_rb.

49.

Ibid., fol.iliva.

50.

Ibid., fol.ilivb_fol.iv' 8 . The references Naveros made and the further details he added show that he was fully acquainted with the debate on this issue found in Sentence commentaries. For more on the issue, see Ashworth (1980: 29-38).

51.

Thomas Aquinas (1929: 532).

52.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.ivva.

53.

In the translation of Boethius, the Latin is: "... quorum autem hae primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt". Op.cit., p.S.

54.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.v.'b.

55.

Ibid., fol.ivva.

56.

Ibid., fol.ivva_ vb.

57.

Ibid., fol.ivvb_fol.v' 8 •

58.

Ibid., fol. v'a_rb.

59.

Ibid., fol.vva.

60.

Loc.cit.

61.

John Duns Scotus, Super Librum I. Perihermenias (1891: 541B-542A). Cf. Arnold of Tongern, Epitomata sive reparationes logice veteris et nove Aristotelis ([Cologne] 1496), sig. r iv -sig. r ii'; Gerard of Harderwijk, Commentum super veterem artem Arestotelis secundum viam Albertistarum

([Cologne]1486), sig. aa iv'8 • 62.

[Mainz] Modernorum de collegia Maguntino exercitata librorum Perihennenias clarissima ([Speier not before 1490]), sig. a vi'; Prado,

fol.iv'b_va.

210

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?'

63.

John of Glogovia, Argumentum in librnm porphirii peripatetici ysagogicum in kathegorias arestotilis ... Exercitium veteris artis (Civis Cracoviensis,

1504), sig. R vir; [attributed incorrectly to Lambertus de Monte] Copulata supra veterem artem Arestotelis secundum viam thomistarnm ([Cologne]

1488), fol. clOCXVva. Cf. Bartholomaeus de Usingen, Exercitium veteris artis (Erffordie, 1513) sig. T ir; Petrus Crockaert, Acutissime questiones et quidem perntiles in singulos Aristotelis logicales Iibras ([Paris] 1509), sig.

g ivvb, sig.g yra. 64.

Arnold of Tongern, sig.r iv; Gerard of Harderwyk, sig.aa iiivb; John of Glogovia, sig. r ivv; [Lambertus de Monte] fol. ClOCXVva; Johannes Versor, Questiones ... in veterem artemArestotelis (Coloniensi, 1497), fol.J.xfa.

65.

[Sebastian Couto] Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In

66.

John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus L Ars Logica

67.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib.!, p.541A-B. The three less popular arguments

Universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coloniae, 1607), cols. 39-40.

(Torino: Marietti, 1930), pp.105A-106A.

were the third, having to do with a possible contradiction in Aristotle's claim that not the stone but its species existed in the mind; the fourth, to do with existential judgments; and the fifth, to do with a perfect syllogism. Argument three is found in Michael of Paris, Questiones veteris ac nove logice ... ad intentionem doctoris Scoti (in civitate Cracoviensi,

1508), sig. t vil; argument four is found in Michael of Paris, sig. t viv and in Gerard of Harderwyk, sig. aa iiiva; argument five is found in Gerard of Harderwyk, loc.cit. 68.

For reproductions of this argument see Gerard of Harderwyk, sig.aa iiirb; John of Glogovia, sig.R viv; John Mair, Quaestiones Logicales ... cum eiusdem literali expositione succincta in veterem Aristotelis Dialecticen Joanne Argyropilo Interpraete (Parisiis, 1528), fol.lOCX.Viiivb; Michael of

Paris, sig. t viv; Crockaert, sig. g ivb; Prado, fol.iirb; Petrus Tartaretus, Commentarii in Isagogas Porphirii et Iibras logicornm Aristotelis

(Parrhisiis, 1520), fol.lOCXVivb. 69.

Naveros, Expositio, fo!.va.

70.

The argument was reproduced by Michael of Paris, sig.t viv; Prado, fo!.iirb; Raulin, sig. g vb; Silvester, sig. c vvb. Cf. Crockaert, sig. g ivvb.

71.

See- Gerard of Harderwyk, sig. aa iiirb_va; Michael of Paris, loc.cit.; Tartaretus, fol.xxxvivb.

72.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.va. Cf. Duns Scotus, Super Lib.!, p.542A. 211

E.J. Ashworth

73.

See Usingen, sig. S viv-sig. T ir; George of Brussels, Expositio in logicam

Aristotelis (Lugduni, 1504), fol. Jix"b; [Mainz], sig. a vv; Michael of Paris, sig. t viv; Prado, fol. iiva; Tartaretus, fol. xxxvivb. 74.

Raulin, sig. g ivb_va. See also George of Brussels, fol.Jix"b; Michael of Paris, sig. t viir; Silvester, sig. c vv8 ; Versor, fol. Jxf8 • Cf. Johannes Dullaert, Textus Perihennenias Aristotelis Joanne Argyropilo Bizantio

interprete. C/arissima eiusdem expositio a magistro Joanne Dullaert (Parrhisiis, 1519), fol. iiiva. 75.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib.!, p.543A. Other arguments found in the literature are that the unlearned are aware of things without being aware of concepts: see Dullaert, fol.vra, [Mainz], sig. a viv; and that direct cognition precedes indirect, so that things must be known before the concepts of things are known: see Usingen, sig. T ir; Prado, fol. iiv 8 ; Raulin, sig. g vva.

76.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.v 8 • See also ibid., fol.viira_rb.

77.

Ibid., fol.vvb.

78.

Ibid., fol.virb. For Buridan's arguments, see Johannes Buridanus (1977: 2425).

79.

Dullaert, fol.iiivb_fol.ivra; Mair, fol.xxxviiivb; Crockaert, sig. g ivv8 ; Prado, fol.iivb; Naveros, Expositio, fol.virb.

80.

Dullaert, fol.iiivb_fol.ivra; Prado, fol.iivb_fol.iiira; Naveros, Expositio, fol.virb.

81.

Dullaert, fol.iva_rb; Mair, fol.xxxviiivb; Prado, fol.iivb_fol.iiira; Raulin, sig. g ivb, sig. g ivvb; Silvester, sig. c vvb, sig. c virb.

82.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.iiira_rb, fol. vV8 -fol.vira, fol.virb.

83.

Dullaert, fol.iva_rb; Mair, fol. xxxviiivb; Prado, fol.iiira.

84.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.vva_vb.

85.

Dullaert, fol.ivb; Prado, fol.iiira.

86.

Naveros, Expositio, folvvb.

87.

Ibid., fol.vvb_fol.vira.

88.

Prado, fol.iivb. See also George of Brussels, fol.lixv8 ; Usingen sig. T ir_v; [Mainz] sig. a vv.

89.

See Dullaert, fol.v 8 ; Mair, fol.xxxviiivb; Silvester, sig. c virb; Raulin, sig. g vb; Tartaretus, fol.xxxviirb. For Ockham, See Ockham (1979: 50), Ockham (1978: 342).

90.

Johannes Eckius, Aristotelis Stagyrite Dialectica ([Augsburg] 1516-1517), fol.xxiir 8 :

212

" •.•voces

sunt notae passionum non per signjficationem sed per

Jacobus Naveros: 'do spoken words signify concepts or things?' subordinationem, vel sunt notae, i.e. signa, quod tales conceptus sint in anima". 91.

Mair, fol.xxxix"a; Silvester, sig. c virb, sig. d iva_vb; Prado, fol.iiiva; Naveros, Expositio, fol.vira_fol.vivb.

92.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.viva_vb. Cf. Silvester, sig. c vira.

93.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.viiva.

94.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib.!, (1891: 544B).

95.

Duns Scotus, Ordinatio,(1963: 97).

96.

Silvester, sig. c vira; Michael of Paris, sig. u iiir.

97.

Dullaert, fol.iiiva_vb.

98.

Tartaretus also followed the Sentence commentary: fol.xxxviirb.

99.

Aquinas (1964: 10-11).

100.

(Lambertus de Monte], fol.cxxxvva; Crockaert, sig. g ivva.

101.

Raulin, sig.g ivb and sig.g virb.

102.

Naveros, Expositio, fol.viivb.

103.

Ibid., fol.viiva_fol.viiira. See also Crockaert, sig. g ivva; [Larnbertus de Monte], fol.cxxxvva; and Prado, fol.ivb. For further discussion of the notions of verbum mentale and conceptus obiectivus see Nuchelmans(1983: 9-26).

104.

[Larnbertus de Monte], fol.cxxxvva: "Et non debet 'conceptus' hie capi pro similitudine vel specie intelligibili, sed pro re concepta, quae quandoque est substantia et quandoque accidens, et vacatur 'verbum intelligibile"'.

105.

Crockaert, sig. g ivva. Cf. Nuchelmans o.c. p.13.

106.

Prado, fol.iva: "Conceptus vero obiectivus est obiectum cognitum sive res concepta, et ita iste terminus 'conceptus obiectivus' aliquid significat connotando quod ab intellectu percipiatur". An indication of such a view is to be found in Duns Scotus' second commentary on the Perihermenias, where he wrote: "Aristotle and Boethius understood by passions not similitudes in the soul, but the thing as it is conceived in the soul ...." John Duns Scotus, In Duos Libras Perihermenias Operis Secundi in Opera Omnia I, (1891: 583B).

107.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib./ (1891: 540B-541A).

108

Ibid., p.541A.

109.

John of Glogovia, sig. R ivv. However, he used the reference to argue that concepts must be involved in the significative process as a medium rather than as the primary significates.

213

E.J. Ashworth

110.

Ockham, Ordinatio, (1979: 47); [Mainz) sig. a vir; Dullaert, fol.ivva_vb; Cf. Usingen, sig. T ir.

111.

Ockham (1979: 46); Usingen, sig. T ir.

112.

Versor, fol.lxvb_fol.lxira; George of Brussels, fol.lixvb; Johannes de Lapide, Libri artis logice Porphyrii et Aristotelis ([Basle] s.a.), sig.l iivb.

113.

Ashworth (1981: 312-313). The paper is reprinted in the Variorum volume

114.

E.g. as given in Augustinus Niphus, Expositiones in Aristotelis Libras

(1985).

Metaphysices (Venetiis, 1559: Facsimile edition, Frankfurt/Main: Minerva

GmbH, 1967), p.256B. 115.

Duns Scotus, In Lib.I, p.541A; Ockham (1979: 47); Gerard of Harderwyk, sig. aa iiirb; [Lambertus de Monte], fol.cxxxvva; Crockaert, sig. g ivvb.

116.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib.l (1891: 542A).

117.

Boethius, p.7.

118.

Duns Scotus, Super Lib.l (1891: 541A); Arnold of Tongern, sig. r iv; Gerard of Harderwyk, sig. aa iiirb; John of Glogovia, sig. R vir; Tartaretus, fol.xxxvivb; fol.xxxviirb.

119.

Dullaert, fol.iiiva; [Mainz] sig. a vir; Silvester, sig. c vva_vb.

120.

Ockham (1979: 47). The argument was repeated by George of Brussels, foJ.Jixfb; Crockaert, sig. g ivvb.

121.

214

Ashworth (1981: 322).

CONTRADICfiONS AND SYMMETRY RAGE IN THE LOGICAL INTERREGNUM

An essay in empirical logic

E.M. Barth University of Groningen

Introduction 1* Is it true, as members of certain older philosophical schools have held, that twentieth-century logic is seriously deficient as an instrument of exposition and of ratiocination in the social sciences and in the humanities? Is it true that wherever political philosophy and ethics are concerned modern logic is even harmful, and that pride of place should be given to older systems of thought? The postulated shortcomings are usually attributed above all to the fact that, like classical logic, modern logic shuns contradictions (contradictory expositions) and aims at eliminating them wherever they occur. Now modern logic does have features that are ill suited to the demands of the human arena. These features are remnants from earlier periods in which literally no one saw them as flaws. Let me mention two: (1) the assumption of cumulativity of what has been 'proved', and (2) its deductive form. However, the cumulativity assumption (which is relatively well suited to companies of mathematicians) can be eliminated so that much more realistic systems of rules ensue. Furthermore, the rules of deduction can be replaced, without loss, by rules for discussion. These are serious changes. Clearly those who recommend them, as the present writer does, thereby admit that orthodox twentieth-century modern logic does have shortcomings. These arguments are, however, not the same as those much older arguments which have been offered by idealist or materialist adherents of Hegel's so-called dialectics and which are the focus of the present paper. * C.G. Hempel, E.C.W. Krabbe, M. LOb, J.J.A. Mooij and I. Rusza kindly offered critical remarks to an earlier draft of this paper. E. Garda and H. Isaacson

suggested a number of corrections to my English. I thank all of them.

215

E.M.Barth Most logicians have preferred to ignore the criticism of the Hegelians since it has hardly ever been formulated with enough coherence to interest them intellectually. The criticism is almost always - there are exceptions - voiced by persons who have very little knowledge of logic. However, in view of the social importance of these objections and particularly in view of the fact that these objections have been widely propagated all over the world and are often believed, inside the universities and outside, the logicians' standpoint ought rather to be that it is not only their right but also their philosophical duty to take up these objections and the arguments that are adduced in their favor for debate. More specifically it would seem that the time has come to examine the wellknown clash between modern logic and 'dialectics' in the sense of Hegelian logic also from a historical point of view and particularly from the point of view of the history of logic itself. Most philosophers will agree that philosophical ideas are to a very large extent functions of the age in which they are uttered. However, few general philosophers have been prepared to look more deeply into the problem history of the subject called logic. My foremost grievance is that wherever logic is concerned Hegelians are entirely lacking in historical consciousness. I will attempt to show that the problem of the 'dialectical contradictions' in particular must be studied in a historical context and should not be approached in a purely synchronic systematical manner before the historical situation has been laid bare and is fully understood. This is my main criticism also of the investigations by Routley and Meyer and by Mitroff and Mason. 1 I shall subsume Aristotelian logic, scholastic logic and also more recent versions of non-Hegelian pre-Fregean logic under 'classical logics'. There are, then, at least three important kinds of logic to be taken into consideration, viz. classical logics, Hegelian logic, and modern logic, Fregean and post-Fregean. 2 In the criticism of logic by Hegelians two positions can be distinguished. The oldest one consisted in the thesis that logical contradictions in the strict sense are of positive value, and that this was taught by Hegel. The second, which became widespread, especially in East European countries, held that 'dialectical contradictions' does not mean logical contradictions in the strict sense, so that formal logic deserves a place but has to be supplemented by a study of 'dialectical' contradictions. Chronologically, the development of this position seems to coincide with a growing recognition among general philosophers that classical logic had been overthrown by Fregean logic. This second position, however, amounts to little more than a negative definition of the expression 'dialectical contradiction': this expression, it is said,

216

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum does not mean the same as 'logical contradiction' or contradiction in the logician's sense. This negative defrnition has never been supplemented by a positive defrnition of what is meant by the expression 'a dialectical contradiction'. Until this happens there hardly seems to be any reason (discounting the appeal to authorities - Hegel, Marx, Engels or Lenin - who, for chronological reasons, lacked training in modern logic) for accepting the statement that modern logic, albeit as I believe a science still in its infancy (or perhaps rather: in its early teens) is in need of supplementation by a 'higher' science called 'dialectic'. What is more, this negative position, as it may be called, is likely to give the impression that there are no systematic or historical connections at all between 'dialectical' and 'formal' contradictions. But this is quite wrong: there is indeed a strong and important connection between the two. This connection carrnot be properly understood unless it is studied in a historical perspective. The relationship between the history of logic in general, the so-called dialectical contradictions, and modern logic has been neglected both by Hegelians and by most modern logicians. An exception is Weinberger's instructive essay from 1965.3 I hope to contribute to the further clarification of these topics by offering an analysis of Hegelian logic on the basis of a historical survey. I shall try to distinguish the motives underlying Hegel's logic from the means by which they have been expressed; in this I am following Weinberger. The following quotations may serve as an introduction to this undertaking:

1 "Two types of category oversimplification seem to be particularly common in early Greek argumentation. (1) Opposites of any type tend to be taken as mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: a choice is put in the form either A or B, when it may be that logically the possibilities both A and B, and neither A nor B, are open. (2) The relationship of similarity tends to be assimilated to that of complete identity: analogical arguments were often claimed to be demonstrative ..."4

2 "Ramus' thesis about the priority of pre-Aristotelian logic partly results from historical, partly from systematic deliberations. Historically he declares Prometheus to have been the founder of logic, points to the logical tradition in pre-Aristotelian Greek logic and considers the apex of logical development to have been reached with Plato ... Similarly for dissentanea, i.e., the various kinds of negation. Ramus (1515-1572) uses the concept of contradictio as a common appellation for negations of all kinds, also for contrary statements. 217

E.M. Barth

And from this he draws the conclusion, much as Pescator did, that contra-

dicentia, too, may both be false." 5 3 "Species are contrary in so far as they are merely different, namely: through the genus as objective nature they have a form of Being which is Being-inand-for-themselves,-- contradictory, in so far as they exclude each other." 6

4 "... under the concept of a 'real contradiction' one may subsume as diverse things as, on the one hand, thesis and negation and on the other, say, North pole and South pole; the distinctions between contradictory, contrary, subcontrary, polar (etc.) objects, which are so familiar to every logician in the West, were not even mentioned."7

1. The logic of Light and Darkness: thinking in polarities

The logic of Light and Darkness is the logic of that thought which operates with polar opposites. Since ancient times this form of thought has characterized many metaphysical systems as well as the workings of human brains in more practical pursuits. There is thus little reason to be surprised at the fact that around 1800 there was a revival of the pre-Aristotelian logic of polar opposites. As everyone knows, the eighteenth century witnessed an intensive and successful

investigation of the natural polar phenomena of magnetism and electricity. Let us recall a few historical facts. In the first half of the century Du Fay discovered that there are two kinds not only of magnetism, but of electricity as well; the Cavendish experiments date from 1773 and Coulomb formulated the laws which were to carry his name in 1785. Franklin introduced the names 'positive' and 'negative' for the two kinds of electricity. Around 1800, therefore, there were many good reasons for a renewed trust -

taphysical

- other

·

iples of

dichotomic opposition as general principles of exposition and explanation. This in turn inspired an active search for such principles, and even their creation where they were not readily available. At the end of the eighteenth century the polar form of thought had even penetrated the conception of anatomy, so that parts of the body, such as hand and foot, were regarded as polar opposites, in terms of

which anatomical understanding was to be sought. Goethe's theory of colours (1810) and his attack upon the Newtonian analysis, according to which white light is composed of many colours, has become 218

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

notorious. Goethian optics, being the literal application of the polar logic of Light and Darkness to optical phenomena, was defended in our century as late as in the fifties, especially by anthroposophists. 8 At the universities it has never obtained scientific recognition. Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik is most interesting in this connection. The author summarizes Goethe's theory, without mentioning his name, in the third book (1816), viz. in a section called Das disjunktive Urteil (Disjunctive Judgement). In Newton's 'Disjunktion' of 'die Farbe' into violet, indigo, blue, green yellow, orange and red, the 'empirical impurity' of the theory is immediately obvious. In Hegel's opinion this analysis is impure precisely because it is derived from empirical investigations. Hegel expresses his disgust for this analysis in even stronger terms: "sie ist von dieser Seite, fiir sich betrachtet, schon barbarisch zu nennen". 9 His own opinion is: "Wann die Farbe als die konkrete Einheit von Hell und Dunkel begriffen worden, so hat diese Gattung die Bestimmtheit an ihr, welche das Prinzip ihrer Besonderung in Arten ausmacht".

Light and Darkness taken together thus form the principle of the genus Colour, in terms of which the species of Colour should be explained. Both Hegel and Goethe consider violet and orange to be mixtures, composites, and not pure colours. The word 'Disjunktion' should here as elsewhere in the tradition be read as exclusive disjunction, hence as classilication of mutually exclusive kinds. If we now proceed to the preface that Hegel wrote to the second edition of his logic, it may look as if he has changed his mind since the appearance of the first edition and now abjures Goethe's theory of colours. For in his preface we read: "Wann z.B. in der Physik die Denkbestimmung der Kraft vorherrschend geworden ist, so spielt in neuerer Zeit die Kategorie der Polaritiit, die iibrigens zu sehr

a tort

et

a travers

in alles, selbst in das Licht eingedriingt wird, die

bedeutendste Rolle ..."10

He now seems to consider it a mistake to speak of polarity precisely in connection with the theory of light. It is of course entirely possible and acceptable that someone should change his point of view, but is would be hasty to conclude that Hegel did: for the dichotomic theory of the nature of light which he expounded in the first edition is nowhere explicitly rejected in the second edition. I draw the conclusion that his reservation, expressed in the preface to the second edition, is caused by something else. It is not too difficult to discover 219

E.M.Barth

what. Observe, first, that polarization of light had been discovered, but not explained, by Chr. Huygens. The polarization of reflected light was discovered by Malus in the year 1808. The first scientific theories of polarized light were the work of the Scottish physicist Sir David Brewster; his Treatise on Optics was published in the year 1831. The preface of the second edition of Hegel's work on logic is dated November 7th, 1831. In all probability the expression

'a

tort et

a travers' refers to the empirically

based investigations into the polarization of light by Malus and Brewster. In view of Hegel's notable contempt for empirically founded scientific theories, it must especially have annoyed him that light can be polarized by human intervention. Light can become polarized by human hand, but polarization of light is in general not there 'by nature'. Therefore one cannot speak of positive and negative light. Hegel answers these empirically based developments in optics by expressing his regret that the notion of ('pure') polarity is 'shoved into' (eingedriingt in) the (empirical) study of light. In spite of this development in optics it is not difficult to understand that the philosophical trustworthiness of the principle of dichotomic polarity was strongly enhanced by the successes of the theories of the two kinds of electricity and of magnetism. The principle is enthusiastically hailed by Hegel in 1831 as well:

"- dass auf solche Weise von der Form der Abstraktion, der Identitat ... fortgegangen, und die Form des Bestimmens, des Unterschiedes, welcher zugleich als ein Untrennbares in der ldentitat bleibt, herausgehoben und eine gelaufige Vorstellung geworden (ist), ist von unendlicher Wichtigkeit". 11 The conception Hegel describes here, viz. the conception of two distinguishable but inseparable things which together constitute an entity with an identity of its own, is illustrated by the constitution of a magnet. Schelling saw the universe as a whole as a 'Totalmagnet'. Any magnet one may choose to investigate, whether natural or man-made, has, by the nature of magnetism, two poles which are different from one another but which cannot exist separately: they belong to and at the same time constitute the same (individual) magnet:

220

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

+

M

M

M

s

p

p

Q

In 1831, no less than fifteen years earlier, Hegel took 'Das Prinzip des Entweder-Oder' 13 as a genera/logical point of departure (in all probability also in matters of optics, provided the nature of light is approached by pure Reason rather than experimentally). Are there many polarities in nature? C.S. Peirce, one of the founders of the logic of relations (an extremely important fact about him in this connection) is inclined to a negative view:

"Calling any distinction between two equally decided characters to which no third seems to be coordinate (although a neutrality separates them) a polar distinction, in the external world polar distinctions are few. That of past and future, with the resulting two ways of passing over a line (and consequent right- and left- handed spirals and helices, whence probably the magnetic and possibly the electric poles - supposing the latter to be truly 'polar' in our sense), with the right and left sides of our bodies, 14 and the two sexes, 15 seems pretty much to exhaust the list of them. Yet for the much smaller universe of psychology, polar distinctions abound, most of them referring to volition" .16

As for the occurrence of polarities in volition, it would seem that to stress polarities as logical patterns and as a method of cognition might lead to Manichelsm in ethics. Walter Kaufmann expresses surprise at the fact that many admirers of Hegel show symptoms of a manifest practical Manichlsm. In our opinion this is not ouly not surprising, but very much to be expected, as a consequence of the dyadic basis of Hegelian logic. 17

221

E.M.Barth

2. The Ramist tradition

The depth and success with willch the natural phenomena of electricity and etism ·

o studied explains why the logic of polari

expe1

:::.ed a revival

around 1800 in the works of Schelling and Hegel, but it cannot explain why this revival took place precisely in Germany. The investigation of electrical and magnetical phenomena, forces and energies was not a specifically German activity on the contrary. For tills question, too, there is a illstorical answer. I shall try to give part of the answer in this section and will return to the question at the end of the paper. Let us start from the well-known fact that, according to ills 'Wissenschaft der

Logik, Hegel does not distinguish between the notions contrary and contradictory. It is well-known too, that he does not seem to distinguish between the definitions

of contradictory and subcontrary either. Neglect of the difference between 'contrary' and 'contradictory' leads to a literary style willch is easily learned. Hegel speaks as

if two concepts willch exclude one another are also ipso facto

exhaustive of the possibilities. Consequently, in so far as he is terminologically consistent he would have to consider the concepts Cat and Dog as contradictory, although for a domain of animals the adequate propositional form would generally be: S is not both Cat and Dog. If one is a Hegelian one arrives too easily at phrases like 'entweder Katze, oder Hund'. There is, then, a contradiction or 'Widerspruch' between Cat and Dog. Hegel, as we have seen, adheres to 'das Prinzip des Entweder-Oder' (the Either-Or Principle) in both editions of ills 'Wissenschaft der Logik. Tills 'Entweder-Oder' he applies to the 'objektive Allgemeinheit', 'Totalitat' or 'Gattung' of any topic, willch traditionally is indicated by an 'M' for 'middle term'. Hegel, however, uses the letter 'A';

"A ist entweder B oder C",

and:

" Entweder- Oder schliesstjede weitere (Art, species) aus, und schliesst eine totale Sphiire in sich ab". 18

222

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

Utterances of this kind are easily interpreted in terms of the sixteenth century logic of Peter Ramus (Pierre de Ia Ramee), who recommended a continuous dichotomization of concepts as the only true 'method'. Let the concept which is to be studied be A. When this concept is analyzed 'methodically' in the Ramist manner, then it is given a priori that the domain determined by A can be exhaustively partitioned into two concepts, B and C (see also the second quotation in our introductory section):

lour'

light

darkness

'totale Sphiire'

male

+

female 't.s.'

't.s.'

B

C

't.s}

B=-C (Hegel, Jenenser Logik, p.107)

The logic of Peter Ramus, or as one said in the sixteenth century: his

dialectic, constituted a tremendous simplification vis

a vis the complicated logic of

the Schoolmen. According to Norman E. Nelson and Walter J. Ong it was developed and formulated especially for the benefit of extremely young students, and 'did not stand up under the inspection of mature university professors'. 19 It was a 'logic without tears' (to paraphrase an expression of Bertrand Russell's), a

ne plus ultra of logical simplification. Hegel described the philosophy of the Schoolmen in general, their logic included, as a 'barbarische Philosophie des Verstandes',20 but speaks with appreciation of Ramus and his simplified logic:

"Er ... trug zur Vereinfachung des Formalismus der dialektischen Regeln sehr vie! bei". 21

223

E.M.Barth

The logic of Ramus left deep traces in Germany, France and the Netherlands. After the death of Ramus, Germany became the center of the Rarnist school. The Ramists and semi-Ramists Ochslein (Taurellus, 1547-1606), Goclenius (1547-1628), Althusius (1557-1638) and many others were very influential. The encyclopaedist Johann Alstedius described the Rarnistic doctrines at length in his expositions of logic and metaphysics, and his Compendium Lexici Philosophici went through a large number of editions. Ramus had an especially large following in Calvinist circles. Ong accounts for this on the basis of the Calvinists'bourgeois mentality:

"The Rarnist account-book interpretation of knowledge and actuality appealed strongly to the bourgeois mind" .22 It may safely be assumed that Burghers and students alike were happy with this

ultra-simplistic doctrine of a logical debet (-) and credit ( + ). In this section I shall provide yet two more arguments, each of them independent of what has been said so far, for my thesis that, consciously or unconsciously, Hegel was strongly influenced by the Ramist tradition in Germany and by its effects on the general intellectual climate of that country. First, his strange nomenclature for the Aristotelian syllogistic figures and his use of these figures are telling in this respect. Both U eberwe!f3 and Trendelenburg24 hold that Hegel considered his 'Schluss der Analogie' in Wissenschaft der Logik as being an inference form in what is known as the second Aristotelian figure, this being the third figure according to Hegel's own numbering. In other words, they hold that

Hegel interchanged the numbers of the second and the third syllogistic figures. Trendelenbur!f5 maintains, however, that in classical logic an argument by analogy cannot be formulated in the second figure at all (in traditional classical logic arguments by analogy are supposed to be expressed in the third figure). Furthermore, he rightly goes on to say that whatever his intentions may have been, Hegel fonnulated his 'Schluss der Analogie' in the decidedly not in the

second. 26

first figure and

It seems, then, that in Hegel's Logic not only the

first and the third, as well as the second and the third, figures are confused, conflated or given each other's numbers, but also, and more importantly, the first and the second figure. It is therefore extremely interesting to learn from Kneale and Kneale that precisely Ramus, "for no obvious reason, makes Aristotle's second figure his first and Aristotle's first his seeond. 27

224

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

Hegel further makes the surprising statement that the study and development of 'die Richtigkeit des Denkens' is a task for the science of pedagogy, and not, as one might think, for the logicians. 28 This startling assertion becomes somewhat less enigmatic when we take the following into consideration. Ramistic logic, which had a follower in Comenius, was very much linked up with educational goals and thought, no less than the logical activities of Melanchton. It should be added, however, that Ramus does not pay any attention to the critical function of logic; he had an 'exclusive concern for the transmission of arts', and so he called the discipline he worked on by the name of 'ars disserendi' 29. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the 'pure Aristotelian' Fonsecato mention only one other sixteenth century logician of cultural importance - who influenced Suarez, who again influenced the thought of Christian Wolff, had ideas about logic which in many respects were rather similar to those of the 'antiAristotelian' Ramus - much more similar than would be expected on the basis of the additional classification of Renaissance logicians into 'Aristotelians' and 'antiAristotelians'.30 In general, sixteenth-century activities in logic were of decisive importance for the development of a logic such as Hegel's in Germany. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the idealist and Marxist 'dialectic' we know today is a heritage from fifteenth and sixteenth century logicians, whose noncritical dichotomizations in the interests of massive cultural transmission could boom on the background of the new science of electricity and magnetism. The sixteenth century was also the last one in which logical pursuits were called 'dialectica' rather than 'logica', the name used by the Schoolmen.31

3. Why Ramus was so successful in Germany: Cusanus

Just how important is the form of speech and of thought which Ramus cultivated with such enthusiasm, the form which is called 'exclusive alternatives' or 'dilemma's'? In the opinion of quite a few people its importance is very small:

"Dilemmatic arguments are however more often fallacious than not, because it

is seldom possible to find instances where two alternatives exhaust all the possible cases, unless indeed the one is the simple ne rda

:h the

0

· ~ of the

1

luded middle",

225

E.M.Barth thus Jevons in 1870.32 Lloyd presents a large body of material in support of his statement that this logic of exhaustive alternatives, the Dilemmatic form of thought, is characteristic of early Greek culture as well as of the thinking of alchemists and other speculative thinkers.33 However, this 'Entweder - Oder', 'the great either - or', as Fearnside and Holther put it (borrowing an expression of Judge Frankfurter), 34 also constitutes an important kind of fallacy. Since the Renaissance German logicians have shown little or no interest in fallacies. And in the logic of Hegel this analysis into Black-and-White, into 'entweder Hell oder Dunkel', is the point of departureintentions and supplementations notwithstanding. So far we have explained this by tracing a certain amount of influence upon Hegel as deriving from Peter Ramus- Pierre de Ia Ramee- and his followers and semi-followers, who are known to have been particularly many and particularly effective in Germany. But why was that? One may, of course well ask why the dichotomizing thought of this Frenchman could get such a fum foothold in any country at all. This latter question should probably be answered by reference to certain parts of Greek philosophy, and to the pitfalls and delight in black-white simplifications of the human mind in general. But how could he get his largest following in Germany? The answer to the latter question seems rather obvious. Before Ramus there was, in Germany, the philosophy of Nicholas of Kues (Cusa). It seems to me that the impact of the fifteenth-century German cardinal and philosopher of mathematics goes a long way to explain why .the sixteenth-century Frenchman Pierre de Ia Ramee was to have such a success in that country. Conversely, in Germany, the Rarnism that swept over Europe must have reinforced the philosophy of Cusanus (and kindred spirits) which was already there. It is fairly well known that there are systematic similarities and connections between the thought of Nicholas of Cusa and that of his nineteenth-century fellow-countryman Hegel. It is also not uncommon to conjecture that, due to the mediating influence of Hegel's logic, there are systematic and even historical connections between the philosophy of Cusanus and the structure of the thought of Karl Marx. In this chain the impact ofRarnism and semi-Ramism is, however, left out. Without the large movement of Ramism and Semi-Rarnism which (as Walter J. Ong has described) was extremely powerful in respect of impressing a certain mental pattern upon considerable parts of European culture, it seems highly

226

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum doubtful whether Cusanian philosophy could have had a lasting impact on German thought. This paper therefore pays attention primarily to the importance of Ramism. No attempt will be made here to spell out the details of the systematic or the historical connections of the problems discussed here with Cusanus' doctrines concerning 'contradictions', 'limit' and 'infinity', and with his notion of 'the infinitely small' which according to Cusanus 'does not differ from the infinitely Large'. 35

4. Relative negations: Aristotle's three concepts and their connections with

modem logical categories

In the ontology that became established - in scientific circles, at least - as a consequence of the process that Dijksterhuis has called 'the mechanization of the world picture', relations between things are allowed to be simply that: relations between things, and they are left as such by theorizing philosophers, as well as by scientists. Fregean logic, which is a still later phenomenon, is perfectly suited to this situation. Relations between things are expressed and logically dealt with by means of a special manoeuvre, viz. Frege's introduction of polyadic predication as a feature of logical syntax: a (relational) predicate is ascribed to several things together. Also, it makes no difference whether the predicate refers to a symmetric or to a non-symmetric relation: the new device expresses them all with the same ease. The category of negation, however, is almost always unary, or monadic, in modern logic: the word not is usually taken to be an operation on one sentence, or on one class-name or term, at a time. Lacking the Fregean feature of polyadic predication (with its companion feature of multiple quantification), former logicians needed other ways of conceptualizing relations between things and of dealing with them logically. Before the mechanization of the world picture one usually tried to understand relations between things as resultants of 'logical' relations of two kinds: (1) the relation of each thing to some universal, (2) relations between these universals. All these were regarded either as relations of the mind or as 'real' (objective) logical relations. If this is true of traditional philosophical ontology, then it

follows that we should regard all attempts at defining and expressing relations between universals, or between judgements, or between propositions, as possibly having been invented as means for dealing with relations between things. 227

E.M. Barth

The relatively high frequency with which the terms 'contradictory', 'contrary' and 'subcontrary' occurred in pre-Fregean philosophy can be explained from this point of view. These terms are relative terms, pertaining to pair's of propositions, of judgements and of concepts. Henceforth I shall call them relative negations. Aristotle introduced and distinguished three kinds of relative negation. Applying them to the four sentence forms A, E, I and 0 - the only ones he assumed in his theory of inference - he taught that, for the same values of 'S' and 'P', any two propositions of the forms all S are P and some S is not P are mutual contradictories (mutually contradictory propositions) whereas all S are P and no S is P merely are contraries (mutually contrary propositions) and some S is P and some is not P are mutual sub-contraries (mutually subcontrary propositions). Following

Aristotle, most logicians define these three terms for logical relations as follows: 36 they say of two propositions p and q

(Def.i)

that they are mutual contradictories iff they cannot be both true or

both false, so that the one must be the negation of the other; their conjunction then is a logical contradiction and the two propositions are mutually inconsistent or incom-patible; (Def.ii)

that they are mutual contraries iff (1) they cannot both be true, but

(2) they can both be false; in this case, too, their conjunction is a logical

contradiction and the two propositions are

mutually inconsistent or

incompatible; (Def.iii) that they are mutual subcontraries iff (1) they cannot both be true;

they are then compatible and mutually consistent: (Def.iv)

that they are logically equivalent if they must be both true or both

false.

Def. i, Def. ii. and Def. iii may be said to defme three different kinds of

relative sentence negation or relative judgement negation. A number of features of pre-Fregean logical theory gravely obscured the meanings of these classical notions. First, no one before Frege was able completely to formalize the (first-order) logic of the quantifiers all and some. As a consequence, there flourishes vague 'generic' readings of the 'exposed term' in that step of a syllogistic argument that Aristotle called ekthesis (exposition). 37 Today this step is generally recognized among logicians to be either the operation that we now call universal generalization or its coun_terpart, existential

228

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

instantiation. The habit of regarding the exposed term as a logos-carrying 'floating individual' (individuum vagum), accessible only to the philosophical eye and not to formalization, becomes particularly interesting in connection with the problem of the semantics and logic of 'generic' quantifier-free propositions, such as Man is just and similar general statements that are grammatically singular. Aristotle's own discussion of the distinctions he himself had introduced becomes muddled precisely where he tries, in the seventh chapter of De interpretatione, to define 'contraries' and 'contradictories' with respect to quantifier-free propositions. 38 Second, with respect to German traditional logic around 1800 no systematic distinctions can be made between a modal and a non-modal logic of properties. Both Kant and the Dutch Hegelian Bolland explicitly state the impossibility of regarding modality as a constitutive feature of 'das Urteil'. Let us, therefore, see what happens when we disregard the modal expressions 'can be' and 'must be' in Defmitions i - iv. By disregarding these modalities we may hope to arrive at a more historically adequate and illuminating analysis of traditional and Hegelian applications of the technical to terms 'contradictories', 'contraries' and 'subcontraries', as applied to terms or to concepts or to properties. The ensuing simplified definitions (below) are, then, explications (in Carnap's sense) of the usage of the expressions 'contradictory', 'contrary', 'subcontrary' and 'equivalent' (or, rather, of 'equal'), particularly in European continental philosophy during the Interregnum between Medieval and modern logic (ca. 1450-1850, at least). Of the following definitions the first three may be said to define types of relative concept negation (relative negation of concepts). Let P and Q be

concepts. We can then say: 39

(Def.I)

P and Q are mutually contradictory concepts iff precisely one of the

two propositions S is P, S is Q is always true, whatever S stands for.

One might also say: (Any) S is P iff S is not Q; or (Any) S is P aut S is Q (exclusive disjunction, autjunction), in German: Entweder S ist P oder S ist Q; or P

=

Q', in other words: the extension of P is the complement of that of Q, and

vice versa - the concepts are incompatible (in a given domain).

(Def. II) P and Q are mutually contrary concepts iff (1) at most one of the propositions S is P, S is Q is true (at least one is false), whatever S stands for, and (2) for someS, both propositions are false. 229

E.M. Barth

The second clause (2) of Def. II has the effect of making the division between pairs of contradictory concepts and pairs of contrary concepts exclusive, so that to any pair of concepts P, Q, at most one of the expressions 'mutual contradictories' and 'mutual contraries' applies. The first clause, (1), is still more important for us. That it is satisfied by P and Q can be expressed in various manners, viz. by either one of the assertions: (For any S,)

if

S is P, then S is

not Q; Not: S is P and S is Q; S is P I S is Q (Sheffer's stroke); or by: P ¢ Q

(the intersection of the extensions of P and Q is empty).

(Def. III) P and Q are mutually subcontrary concepts iff (1) at least one of the

propositions S is P, S is Q is true (at most one is false), whatever S stands for, and (2)for some termS, both propositions are true.

With respect to the second clause (2) of Def.III, the same holds as for clause (2) of Def. II: its only function is to prevent that pairs of concepts which are contradictories according to Def. I may also be called subcontraries. Clause (1) is again the interesting part of the definition; that it holds for given P and Q can be expressed in various manners, by asserting one of the following statements:

foranyS,

- if S is not P, then S is Q: - SisPvSisQ

(inclusive disjunction or veljunction);

or by:

PUQ = V

(the inclusive, or Jevonsian, sum, or union, of the extensions of P and Q is the universal class).

(Def.IV) P and Q stand for logically equivalent concepts or classes iff, whatever

S stands for, both propositions Sis P, S is Q are true or both are false.

230

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum That this holds for given concepts or classes can be expressed in various manners, by one of the following assertions: (For any S) - S is P if and only if S

is Q (i.e., the material or another kind of equivalence holds in all instances); - not: either S is P or S is Q; - not: S is P aut Sis Q; or by:

P=Q (identity of the classes called P and Q). Clearly the type of relative concept negation called contradiction is related to the notion of exactly one and to the propositional autjunction: either - or, whereas the type of relative concept negation called contrariety goes with at most one and with Sheffer's stroke: not both. Finally, subcontrariety belongs conceptually together with at least one and with veljunction: the inclusive or. The modalized variants of Def. I - Def. IV obtained by changing is and are into must be, may be called the classical definitions of relative concept negation. Let us call them Def. I* - Def. IV*. The defmiens in one of our definitions I - IV follows logically from the defmiens of the corresponding (starred) classical definition, so that if two concepts do not satisfy the frrst, then they do not satisfy the latter either. The third quotation in our introductory section clearly shows that Hegel was prepared to call all different concepts, and a fortiori all concepts whose extensions do not coincide, 'kontriire Begriffe'. According to his terminology two concepts are to be called 'kontriire Begriffe' even if the extension of the one is a non-trivial part of the extension of the other, and also if they are subcontraries according to the classical Def. III* so that their extensions overlap. Any two concepts which exclude one another, hence any two concepts which are contraries according to the de-modalized Def. II, would be called 'kontradictorische Begriffe' according to this passage in Wtssenschaft der Logik. If other works by Hegel are taken into consideration, the confusion in Hegelian logic becomes even more conspicuous.

231

E.M. Barth

"Hegel hat sich urn den subkontriiren Gegensatz nicht gekiimmert, obschon er ihn in der Naturphilosophie oft mit dem kontradiktorischen Widerspruch verwechselt", Behn writes40 . Far from being an unimportant terminological quibble, the issue has deep logico-historical significance. This is clearly shown by Hegel's strong emphasis upon and frequent use of the exclusive (autjunctive) form of speech entweder-

oder: "im disjunktiven Urteil ist der wesentliche Begriffsunterschied gesetzt" 41 . Hegel's neglect of the classical notion of subcontrariety shows that he had even less understanding of the importance of inclusive (veljunctive) disjunction than the other traditional logicians - the 'classical logicians' - had. And that is to say: none at all.

5. Symmetric thought and language, and the importance of contrariety

According to Norman E. Nelson the dichotomic logic of Ramus rests on a symmetry assumption:

"The disjunctive syllogism as Ramus used it is simply a perverted adaptation of the indispensable principle of contradiction, and could attain importance only in a system of logic founded on the metaphysical dogma that the universe is divided into pairs of opposites by a symmetrically minded God." 42

Should the principle of metaphysical dichotomies be characterized as a symmetry assumption? If so, in what sense? We may state right away that the means of expression of this dillemmatic form of thought, such as 'either

or .. .', and its negation 'equivalent to' (in modern

logic) or 'identical with' (in traditional logics), are symmetrical in all respects. The truth-tables belonging to Def. I and Def. IV are not only symmetrical in P and 0 - a property that belongs to Def. II and Def. III as we11. 43 But unlike the latter two definitions, Def. I and Def. IV are associated with truth-tables that

232

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum

undergo no change when they are stood on their heads. In other words, the truth-table connected with autjunctions is also symmetrical with respect to truth and falsity. One cannot expect to build up a dyadic asymmetry from such a connective, since:

(not: Sis P) aut (S is Q)

means exactly the same as (Sis P) aut (not: Sis Q)

and exactly the same as

not (Sis P aut Sis Q), i.e., as

(Sis P)

iff (Sis Q).

There are two connectives, each of which is sufficient for the definition of all the other truth-functional connectives, including those that are not symmetric. One of these is the English expression not both - and ... which is symbolized by Sheffer's stroke and which is associated with the category of contrariety - see Def. II. The other one is the English expression neither - nor ..., symbolized by Quine's dagger. For example, not p can be rendered as pip, i.e. as not both p and p, 'p and p are contraries'. It can also be rendered as p

+p, i.e.,

as neither

pnorp. This means that of the three Aristotelian relative negations, the relation of contrariety is an especially important logical category. It may indeed be regarded as fundamental, since one does not really need any of the usual connectives and, or, if - then ... ,

if and only if, or the unary not

if one is familiar with this

particular relative negation. A brain which is programmed with this logical category, contrariety, can generate all the usual truth-functional connectives, including the non-symmetrical ones, i.e., those that are not symmetrical in p and q. For though each of the said two connectives is symmetrical in its arguments, they are not symmetrical as to truth and falsity. The material implication and all other interpretations of

if- then ... as well, are not symmetrical in either of these 233

E.M. Barth

senses, but do not lend themselves for a definition of simple unary negation unless one introduces the concept of absurdity and a sign for it. (If we do this, then we can define not pas: ifp, then Absurdity.) Now notice that Hegel assigned the principal role in his logic to the autjunctive judgement and inference forms, not to judgements expressing contrariety. He even ranked the autjunctive judgement form higher than the wenn

- so ... judgement form, and thus he avoided, whether intentionally or not, all the commonly available ways of representing non-symmetrical facts and nonsymmetrical cognitive patterns. The whole school of Fichte and Hegel is steeped in a verbal symmetry rage that is unequalled in history. To start with, Fichte defined the copula expressed by ist, as a symmetrical relation. 44 Hegelian practice is in accordance with this definition. Leisegang illustrates the Hegelian logic in a humorous manner by means of the following example: in the logic of Fichte and Hegel, the judgement 'Der Hund ist eine Katze' ('The Dog is a Cat') must be considered as a true judgement, namely 'wenn ich daran denke, dass beide Haustiere sind und an nichts anderes'. 45 Who can then possibly doubt that the Cat is also a dog? And, indeed, the Master as well as his Dutch disciple G.J.P.J. Bolland never tire of pronouncements of the form: the such is so, and the so is such. At the same time Cat and Dog constitute a 'contradiction'. This particular paradoxical feature falls into place as soon as the notion 'judgement' is identified with the notion 'middle term' and analyzed dichotomically in the manner of Peter Ramus:

Example:

'Haustier'

ist

}f.

§.{

is not

(ein, der)

(eine, die)

Hund{

}Katze

ist nicht Just as in Fichte's and Hegel's logic, S and P are here symmetrically positioned with respect to M.

234

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum The English logician Bernard Bosanquet is known to have been deeply influenced by Hegel. He held, in the 1880's, that for a hypothetical judgement If A is B, then it is C to be really fundamental, it must be 'reciprocal' or symmetric

in B and C, so that it justifies the inference to: If A is C, then it is B. This may be understood as follows: If [an] M is S, then it is P must be reciprocal inS and P, so that one can draw the conclusion: If [an] M is P, then it is S. Or, from [Every M-thing which is] S is P follows: [Every M-thing which is] P is S.

Bosanquet's explanation is that the relation of the 'ground' (M) to what is grounded (S) is reciprocal, so that the premiss can be written: If [an] S is M, then it is P:

"The relation of Ground is ... essentially reciprocal, and it is only because the 'grounds' alleged in everyday life are burdened with irrelevant matter or confused with causation in time, that we consider the Hypothetical Judgment to be in its nature not reversible", Bosanquet concludes.46

To this outlook Charles Sanders Peirce remarks that

among the vagaries of some German logicians of some of the inexact schools, the convertibility of illation (like almost every other absurdity) has been maintained".

47

'Illation' means inference: from - follows ..., rather than

if - then ..., but in

Hegelian logic (more generally, in idealist concept-logic) there is no difference between inference and judgement either. So since only symmetric judgement connections are taken seriously, the convertibility of illation was only to be expected. The convertibility of judgement and of illation as well is probably part of the heritage from the sixteenth century, in which the science of logic reached its lowest level (a few sparkling exceptions such as Hospinianus and Jungius notwithstanding). The 'Third Law', which Ramus took from Proclus and which he used to attack Euclid, 'implies that every statement is convertible'. 48 This is the conclusion of an author on Peter Ramus' writings on mathematics. Another startling example from roughly the same period:

235

E.M. Barth One of the theses of John of St. Thomas, who was active around 1600, was that one may draw a 'formal consequence', i.e., a consequence in a 'necessary matter', from some to

al/.49 This implies the convertibility, in 'necessary mat-

ters', of many inferences (illations) that are not normally considered as convertible. If Augustus de Morgan, one of the fathers of the new logic of relations, may

be trusted, uneducated people are particularly prone to convert statements of forms that are not convertible: "A beginner in geometry, when asked what follows from 'Every A is B', answers 'Every B is A, of course!''50 Add to this the quite common inclination of logically untrained persons, of any country and of any walk of life, especially when emotionally or ideologically preoccupied, to treat any kind of opposition as an exhaustive alternative and to treat analogies as identities.51 It then becomes clear how wonderfully well the sixteenth-century logic of Peter Ramus and others, and the more recent logics of Fichte and Hegel as well, are suited to unexperienced thinkers who, offhand and without restraint, formulate judgements and draw conclusions according to principles they imagine to be of the greatest profundity, and which they for some reason hold to be valid, particularly in matters of metaphysics. The social significance of all this appears to have been underestimated. We have seen that the relative negation called contradictories is systematically related to the exclusive disjunction, either - or ... . Like everyone else who assumes that this relative negation and this connective are more fundamental for cognition than subcontrariety and inclusive

or, and that they are more

fundamental even than contrariety and not both (Sheffer's stroke), Hegel cannot expect his own brain, or those of his followers, to bring forth and to emphasize non-symmetric combinations, such as for instance

if - then ... . And in fact he

does not use this expression much in his logic, neither as material implication nor as a stricter kind of implication. Symmetrical notions and cognitive categories hold undivided sway in Hegel's logic, both at the level of judgement combination and at the level of judgement construction. It is still possible that 'dialectical' logicians may have tried to accommodate

the logical category of asymmetry in other manners, or to offer some sort of compensation for its absence. Whether this is at all likely, and, if so, how they attempted to do it, are problems that will be dealt with in another paper. 52

236

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical intel7egnum Conclusion The emphasis on relative negation in Hegelian logic or dialectics may be understood as motivated by the wish to give the category of relativeness pride of place in some corner of logic - in the theory of negation, if nowhere else. The emphasis on 'contradiction' should basically be understood as issuing from this attempt. The way this project was carried out is another matter. Hegel's discussion of Aristotle's categories

of' contradiction, contrariety and subcontrariety

consists in deprecizations and confusions that can be traced back to a number of sources - ranging from the impact of the theories of electrical and magnetic polarities in seventeenth-century physics to the impact of Ramism in Germany. Several facts about Hegel's text in his Science of Logic together firmly establish a strong influence of Ramus' logic on Hegel's so-called dialectics. The resulting rejection of contrariety as a separate logical category distinct from contradiction has the serious effect of making it impossible to generate

1. Veljunctions

2. Non-symmetric propositional Qudgemental) connections (such as if-then).

This restricts the faithful user of that logic to symmetric combinations of judgements and of concepts. And that is clearly counter-productive with respect to the said motive, since non-symmetric relations are left out of possible consideration at a deep cognitive level. Today Hegelian logic has no advantages relative to the official logic of the universities, and many disadvantages. In particular, the thesis that this is so carmot be refuted by reference to his emphasis on 'contradiction'.

NOTES

1.1

Routley and Meyer (1976: 1-25); Routley (1979: 301-331); Mitroff and Mason (1982).

2.

A critical discussion of the deductivist philosophy of logic may be found in : Barth (1987); and in: Barth and Krabbe (1982), which also contains discussions of the principle of cumulativity. See also: Krabbe (1985: 191217).

3.

Weinberger (1965). 237

E.M. Barth

4.

Lloyd (1966: 434).

5.

Risse (1964: 123ff, 129); my translation.

6.

Hegel (1967: II, 299); my translation.

7.

Lobkowicz (1959: 2).

8.

Cf. Bjerke (1963).

See also the surprising statement by P. Lorenzen

(1969: 34). 9.

O.c., part I, p. 11. In English: "Regarded from this side, and in isolation, it may even be called barbarous." Next quotation: "When colour is understood as the concrete unity of Light and Darkness, then this genus has that definition [definite-ness] which constitutes its particularization into species."

10.

O.c., part II, p. 300. In English: "Although in physics, for instance, the cognitive category force has become preponderant, more recently the most important role is played by the category polarity -- which, however, too often and at all costs is shoved into everything, and even into Light."

11.

O.c., part I, p. 11. In English: " - that in this manner one has left the form of abstraction, of identity ... and that the form of definition, of distinction, which at the same time remains in the Identity as something inseparable; that this latter form has been put forward and has become a familiar concept/image, this is of infinite importance".

12.

Schelling (1865-1861: IV, 156).

13.

O.c., part II, p. 299.

14.

Cf. Bennett (1970: 175-19)1; Corbellis and Beale (1971: 96-104).

15.

Cf. Baer (1970).

16.

Peirce (1965: I, 165).

17.

Kaufmann (1969). This paper also appeared in Midway,

18.

Oc. part 11, p. 297, p. 298.

19

Ong (1959: 299).

20.

Hegel (1928: 19, 111). In English: 'a barbarous Philosophy of the Intellect'.

21.

O.c., p. 252; my italics. In English: "He ... contributed substantially to the

Chicago, 1970,

under the tile: Beyond Black and White.

simplification of the formalism of dialectical rules". 22.

Ong (1967: VII, 67).

23.

Ueberweg (1882: 442).

24.

Trendelenburg (1862: II, 32).

25.

O.c., p. 340.

26.

Cf. Hegel (1967: II, 325).

238

Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical interregnum 27.

Kneale (1962).

28.

O.c., part II, p. 329.

29.

Cf. Ong (1959: 160 ff and passim). 160ff and passim; Verdonk (1966: 389).

30.

Cf. Risse, o.c., p. 364,366.

31.

Cf. Scholz (1959 < 1931 >: 8).

32.

Stanley Jevons (1957 < 1870 >: 168).

33.

O.c., p. 84.

34.

Fearnside and

35.

The relation of the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa to the development of

Holther (1963: 44); translated from: Fallacy, the

Counterfeit ofA18Ufnent, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J., 1959. the calculus and the influence of that philosophy on the German idealist philosophy of the calculus are discussed in my papers (1972: and The logical paradigm in dialectical philosophy and science, Erkenntnis 11, 1977, 291-322. 36.

Cf. Rescher(1964: 122ff), and Hamblin (1969: 31).

37.

Cf. Beth (1956-1957: 361-380).

38.

Cf Ackrill (1963).

39.

Compare Rescher, o.c., p. 28.

40.

Behn (1925: 71).

41.

Hegel, o.c., part II, p. 298. In English: "In the disjunctive judgement the essential conceptual difference has been posited".

42.

Nelson (1947: 11).

43.

Cf. Lenk (1968: 197), in connection with the logic of Fichte, who identified 'Begriff with 'Disjunktion iiberhaupt'.

44.

Fichte (1794: 32). Cf. Nelson (1962: 434; 515; 519) translated as: Progress

and Regress in Philosophy; also Lenk, o.c., p. 207, p. 279. 45.

Leisegang (1928: 195).

46.

Bosanquet (1911: I, 246-48).

47.

Peirce (1965: III, 299 ff).

48.

Verdonk, o.c., p. 323.

49.

John of St. Thomas (1955: 103).

SO.

De Morgan (1966: 211).

51.

Compare the description in Lloyd, o.c., p. 434, of 'category oversimplification' in early Greek argumentation, quoted in our Introduction; also Fearnside and Holther, o.c..

52.

A survey of results can be found in Barth (1981: 46-65).

239

PROPOSITIONS AND ALL THAT:

ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS*

E. Morscher

University of Salzburg/Austria

1. Some general historical remarks

The attempt to solve a problem has very often resulted - in philosophy as well as in other sciences - in the introduction of a new kind of entity. Philosophers have at times been very generous in this respect. Whenever a problem arose and could not easily be solved with the means and instruments already at hand, some new conceptual distinction was introduced, or a new entity was forced into existence. Thus, during the history of philosophy, it happened not infrequently that the world of philosophy became overcrowded, and philosophers who came afterwards could not fmd their way in this philosophical jungle of entities and distinctions. After a while however, philosophers always come along who bring a fresh and sceptical wind into the discussion. They become suspicious and critical of their predecessors and of the world which they constructed and stuffed with obscure entities. But then, a new philosophical generation comes up - they no longer know of the troubles with all the entities flying around, and they start afresh with the introduction of propositions, statements, states of affairs, and so on and so forth. This is what is happening again nowadays. Thus, in a way, the history of philosophy can be described as a history of alternate inflations and deflations (I borrow these terms from Richard L. Cartwright (1960) who in turn borrowed them from Isaiah Berlin (1949-50)). I have told you this introduction story and I have caricatured the extreme positions in this philosophical debate in order to make clear that I am aware of the dangers in dealing with such a delicate problem.

241

E. Morscher

2. Terminology Having said this, I hope I am now safe from being misunderstood when I propose the terminology I will use in what follows. This terminology will serve the purpose of talking about, describing and criticizing different positions in the debate about propositions and similar entities, inflationist as well as deflationist positions. For this purpose, the terminology applied must be rich enough to describe all these different positions, and it therefore seems useful to employ as many distinctions as possible which have already been drawn in this debate. The introduction of these terms and distinctions does not imply any ontological commitment but serves only as a tool for describing certain positions; if I want to say that a certain distinction collapses or that certain kinds of entities are superfluous, I need names for them. Thus the mere appearance of a term in the following list does not, automatically, mean that I am accepting a corresponding entity which is denoted by it. A) Sentences: I take sentences to be linguistic entities, pieces of language. In the following, I will restrict the use of the term 'sentence' to declarative sentences, i.e., sentences which are capable of being true or false, and I will neglect other types of sentences (like imperatives, questions, etc.). Furthermore, I will not focus on the distinction between a sentence-token and sentence-type and the utterance of such a sentence-type (by a person on some occasion). In what follows, I will only explicitly mention the distinction where necessary to avoid confusion. B) Thoughts: I take thoughts to be psychic entities (mental acts or mental phenomena). Thoughts in the sense introduced here are either judgements or mere assumptions, but never single and isolated concepts or ideas. C) Statements: A statement is involved in every thought as its "content". It is what is asserted or assumed when we make an assertion or an assumption. It differs from linguistic entities as well as from psychic phenomena. D) Propositions: A proposition is the sense or the meaning of a sentence. It is neither a thought nor identical with the sentence itself. E) States of affairs: A state of affairs is a part or constituent of a possible world or a possible part of a world. A possible world is composed of states of affairs which are by themselves composed of attributes and things. F) Facts: Facts are parts or constituents of our real (actual) world. Like states of affairs they are composed of things and attributes; in the case of facts, however, these are things of our real world. Facts account for the truth and

242

Propositions and all that

falsity of sentences, thoughts, statements and propositions, they "verify'' or "falsify'' them, they make them true or false.

Sentences, thoughts, statements and propositions are capable of being true or false, but this is not the case for states of affairs and for facts. States of affairs are only capable of obtaining or not obtaining; every fact, however, obtains. The entities mentioned above can enter into manifold relations with each other. No definite terminology has been developed for these relations, but the usual formulations are the following: sentences express thoughts; they express or mean statements and propositions; they describe or designate or denote (or, again, express) states of affairs and facts. Thoughts "contain", "grasp", or "catch" statements, propositions, states of affairs or facts, etc.

3. A historical sketch

Bernard Balzano was one of the first philosophers in modern times to develop explicitly a complete theory for entities like propositions, statements and states of affairs. I will first describe and clarify the main features of his theory, and then sketch the subsequent development up to our day.

A) Balzano's theory of sentences-in-themselves:

Balzano introduces his sentences-in-themselves (Siitze an sich) via entities with which we are all quite familiar - sentences and thoughts.

1. Sentences and sentences-in-themselves: Balzano starts with spoken and

written sentences, i.e., sentences as linguistic entities or, in our terminology, simply sentences. From the sentence we have to distinguish its sense or meaning which Balzano calls a sentence-in-itself or an objective sentence. According to Balzano, a sentence-in-intself P is the sense of a sentence S iff (if and only if) S expresses or means P. One and the same sentence-in-itself P may be expressed by different linguistic sentences, not only by different sentence-tokens of the same shape, but also by different sentence-types, including sentences from different languages (synonymy); in such cases, P itself is not multiplied. And one and the same linguistic sentence can express different sentences-in-themselves (equivocation, ambiguity). Balzano's sentences-in-themselves are, in our terminology, propositions (II D). I will

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therefore use from now on the term 'proposition' instead of the long-winded phrase 'sentence- in-itself. 2. Thoughts and propositions: The other starting-point for Balzano's introduction of propositions are thoughts which

occ~

(or as Balzano says, appear)

in peoples' minds, i.e., judgements and "mere thoughts" (assumptions). Balzano calls them 'subjective sentences' or 'thoughts'. Thoughts, like all mental phenomena or psychic acts, are real entities which are distinct from one another at least in those cases where they occur in different persons and/or at different times. Distinct thoughts, however, can have something in common: they can have the same "content", which Balzano sometimes calls their 'matter' or 'stuff. According to Balzano, the content of a thought (especially of a judgement - it is more complicated with respect to other thoughts) is a proposition. Again: Balzano says that a proposition P is the content (stuff) of a judgement T iff T "grasps" or "catches" P. As Balzano himself confesses, 'catching' and 'grasping' are metaphoric expressions for the relation in question Every judgement "grasps" a proposition; every judgement has as its content a proposition. Every proposition may, but need not be, grasped by a judgement. The same proposition P may be grasped by different judgements, even by different persons; P is not thereby multiplied. From this description it becomes clear that for Balzano propositions are, in our terminology, statements (II C). Thus, whilst Balzano does not confuse statements and propositions, he identifies them in his theory. 3. What kind of entity is a proposition? a) Every proposition is compound, it consists of three ideas- in-themselves which are entities similar to propositions. The "canonical" form of every proposition is or can be expressed by ''A has "b" where ''A", the subject-idea, can be any ideain-itself, "b", the predicate-idea, is (at least for true propositions) an idea of an attribute, and "has" is the copula. The subject- and predicate-idea may themselves be compound; if so, they consist ultimately of simple ideas-in-themselves because every complex (compound) idea-in-itself can be analysed into a sequence of simple (primitive) ideas-in-themselves. This analysis can be expressed by a chain of defmitions. If we replace the subject- and predicate- idea of a proposition P by these sequences of simple ideas-in- themselves which are uniquely determined, we get the primitive (basic) form F(P) of the proposition. Such a primitive form of a proposition is composed of simple ideas-in-themselves built up recursively by means of logical operations. To every proposition P there corresponds one and

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only one proposition F(P) which contains only primitive ideas-in-themselves and is the primitive form of P. b) Every proposition is true or false, whereas an idea-in- itself can never be true or false. There are not only true propositions (which are called 'truths-inthemselves'), but also false propositions, for which no special name was introduced by Bolzano. For this reason some historians of philosophy have overlooked them. c) Although propositions are closely connected with linguistic expressions (sentences) and psychic phenomena (thoughts), they are completely different from either of them and they are completely independent of them. Moreover, propositions do not exist, are not real, whereas linguistic and psychic entities are ('being real' and 'having existence' are used synonymously by Bolzano). It is rather unclear what Bolzano meant exactly by this claim, but it becomes perhaps a little clearer if we consider the consequences which he drew from it. These consequences are: first, propositions are not causes or effects of anything; second, they are do not change; third, they do not originate (come into being) or pass away; fourth, they are not spatio-temporal at all, hence, ftfth, they are not perceptible. All of these are properties which render propositions

similar to

numbers and other mathematical entities. d) Because of their being not spatio-temporal or perceptible, the identification of propositions becomes an important issue. Under what conditions are propositions P 1 and P2 identical with one another? How do we identify them? Because we never "personally meet" a proposition, but have to deal with its "representatives", especially linguistic sentences, an even more important question for us will be: When do two sentences S 1 and S2 - perhaps of different shapeexpress one and the same proposition; when do they have the same sense? Following Bolzano, we can state certain principles concerning these questions: (i) If the sentences S 1 and S2 express one and the same proposition P (i.e., if they have the same sense), S 1 and S2 are logically equivalent. (ii) If S 1 and S2 are logically equivalent, they need not express one and the

same proposition, but may express two different propositions. From the fact that S 1 and S2 are logically equivalent and that S 1 expresses P 1 and S2 expresses P 2, it does not follow that P 1 is identical with P2 . (iii) If S 1 and S2 express the same proposition P, S 1 and S2 may nevertheless be different and they may differ in their shape, i.e., they may be occurrences of different sentence-types. The main identity principle for propositions, however, of which (i), (ii) and (iii) are mere corollaries, is the following:

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(iv) Two propositions P 1 and P 2 are identical with one another iff F( P 1 ) =F( P2 ), i.e., iff they have the same primitive form (as defmed under III A3a).

By (iv), the identity of propositions is reduced to the identity of the primitive forms of propositions which in turn can be reduced to the identity of (sequences of) ideas-in-themselves. The identity of ideas-in-themselves is defmed in a quite similar way via their primitive form (i.e., the corresponding sequence of simple ideas-in-themselves), so that we have "only'' to find a way to determine the identity of simple ideas-in-themselves in order to determine the identity of complex ideas-in-themselves and the identity of propositions. e) Although propositions do not exist, i.e., are not real, we can properly say according to Bolzano that they are objects and that there are (es gibt) such objects as propositions. But, again, they are independent of their linguistic representations in languages and of their psychic representations in human minds. If you were to have asked Bolzano why or for what purpose he introduces

propositions, he would probably have answered: "I did not introduce them, I found them - they are just as objective as numbers, independent of our knowledge and

will". And Bolzano tries to prove -very naively - that there are propositions. These proofs, however, are rather poor. The proof he himself takes most seriously, and which he thinks to be most striking, consists in his refutation of scepticism. He reconstructs in an interesting way the traditional refutation of scepticism by self-application, and whilst he makes it much clearer than it was before, it is still unacceptable to us because he fails to separate clearly the different levels of propositions (by analogy with the distinction between objectand meta-language) or employ any similar device which is sufficient to avoid antinomies. And even if this proof had been successful, it still would not have proved what Bolzano set out to prove by means of it, namely that there are truths-in-themselves, i.e., true propositions, and therefore propositions. What he would have proven at the very best would have been that there are truths of some kind, and therefore that there are some objects capable of being true or false, but not necessarily that these are propositions. Another attempt of Balzano's to prove that there are propositions runs as follows: (1) There are judgements. (2) For every judgement there is a proposition which is its content or which is grasped by it. (3) Therefore, there are propositions. Here the second premise is questionable. Bolzano would answer an attack against it by referring to the definition of 'judgement' as a mental act which grasps a proposition. But confronted with such a definition the first premise (i.e., that there are judgements) is no longer as harmless and obvious as it seemeq to be. The whole 246

Propositions and all that

proof becomes more or Jess question-begging. All Balzano's other attempts to prove his claim that there are propositions are even less worthy of consideration. Balzano, however, was not quite as naive as he is purported to be. He certainly had his reasons for introducing or finding his propositions. His two main motives were, first

o account for the universality of logic, i.e., of logical

concepts and logical laws, and, second, to account for the objectivity of these concepts and laws. He believed that when logic is conceived as dealing with linguistic sentences or with thoughts, this is much too restrictive. The real scope of logical laws is much wider: they apply also to propositions which are never expressed (and perhaps cannot ever be expressed) by linguistic sentences and which perhaps no human being ever has grasped or ever will grasp. And in addition he thought that the central and basic concepts of logic, i.e., the concepts of logical truth and logical consequence, of which he was the first to give precise definitions, are purely objective, such that in their definition we must not refer to mental phenomena. We must now ask critical questions like: (i) Does the introduction of propositions really achieve either of these two aims?

(ii) Are there no alternative and perhaps simpler means available by which the same aims and results could be achieved?

(iii) Can we accept the aims which Balzano indicates? Whatever the outcome, in asking these questions we have changed the viewpoint completely. We now are dealing with a question similar to one with which we are often confronted in science: in order to account for a phenomenon we cannot explain by the Jaws and methods already available, we introduce an entity to take care of it. The purpose of such an entity consists in its accounting for a phenomenon which could not be explained - at least not as easily and simply - without it, i.e., the introduction of such an entity is the simplest solution at present available. The entity thus introduced can be a "normal" one, for example a planet, in which case we can afterwards try to fmd out whether or not it really exists. There are other cases where it does not make sense to ask if this entity really exists. Its so-called existence consists in being used for solving a certain problem. In these cases we speak of theoretical entities. (As you can see, I am simplifying matters for lack of space.) Are propositions similar to such theoretical entities of science? Do they have a similar status? According to Balzano, they do not resemble these theoretical entities, but rather the "normal" ones. They are ontologically perfect entities (objects) and not just dummies or 247

E. Morscher

problem-solvers. In my opinion, however, Bolzano did not sufficiently clarify their ontological status, and as long as such a clarification is lacking, I can only take a pragmatic standpoint towards his propositions.

B) Statements, propositions and similar entities after Bolzano:

Let me now complete my historical sketch. Up to now I have only discussed Bolzano's doctrine of propositions. I concentrated on Bolzano's doctrine because I think that he gave the clearest account, the clearest description of propositions available in his time, and that none of the philosophers who followed, including Frege, has made an essential improvement in this respect. Although Bolzano's doctrine, his description of the propositions and the ontological status he ascribes to them, is far from being satisfactory, because it is insufficiently clear, no other philosopher up to our time has done any better. I have therefore explained Bolzano's

doctrine in more detail in order to have one representative traditional

doctrine to which I can refer in what follows. What seems very interesting to me and what I have always been very impressed by is the fact that philosophers with completely different backgrounds and from different schools developed, at the same time as Bolzano and afterwards, quite similar views, sometimes using almost the same words as Bolzano, without being familiar with his work. Although this is far from being a proof for the truth of his doctrine, it is nevertheless a fact a philosopher cannot pass bybecause it indicates that this is not the doctrine of an eccentric outsider. On the contrary, it has attracted many philosophers, including such prominent ones as Frege, Wittgenstein and Russell, Husser! and Meinong, Windelband and Rickert. (I have described the views of some of these philosophers and compared them in another paper: Morscher (1972)). In what follows I would like to discuss some particular questions concerning these entities, i.e., entities referred to in German by means of names such as

'Satz an sich',

'Urteilsgehalt', 'Urteilssinn', 'Urteilsinhalt', 'Objektiv',

'Sachverhalt', 'Gedanke', 'Bedeutungseinheit', 'Proposition', etc. First (in section 4), I will try to answer the question of why or in what sense entities like statements, propositions etc. seem more dubious than other, "normal" entities. Then I will deal with two interpretations of statements and propositions which are typical for the philosophy of our time: the interpretation through definitions by abstraction (V) and the interpretation through possible- world semantics (VI).

248

Propositions and all that Finally (VII), I will propose some principles or postulates for a future theory of propositions and similar entities.

4. In what sense are statements, propositions etc. dubious entities?

I have taken it for granted that statements, propositions etc. are a kind of entity which should be considered with reservation, because they seem - to some - more or less dubious and obscure. If we were asked which of the entities listed in section II about terminology - from A (sentences) to F (facts) - are dubious, I am pretty sure that most of us would answer: Sentences (A) and thoughts (B) are "normal" entities, but the obscurity begins with C (i.e., statements), and from there on the entities listed are more or Jess dubious. Is it justified to draw the line just after B so that A and B are on the one side and the rest on the other? Aren't thoughts problematic entities too? A materialist, for example, would deny that thoughts are entities in their own right, they have only a derivative kind of existence. Good, then let us draw the line between A (i.e., sentences) and the rest! Here too we must face a possible objection: Do you mean sentence-tokens or sentence-types? Sentence-types are far from being "normal" entities. They are to be reduced to sentence-tokens by means of an equivalence relation (namely, "being of the same shape"); a sentence-type is an equivalence class with respect to this relation in the class of sentence-tokens (i.e., a class of sentence-tokens of the same shape). Thus, the only "normal" entities in our list are the sentencetokens? Even this last resort can be questioned: what really exists are atoms and waves etc., out of which sentence-tokens are constructed. Considered from this point of view, no "normal" entities remain on our list, every one can and must be questioned. The reason why we are automatically and naturally prepared to draw the line between A and B on the one side and the rest on the other consists just in our being more familiar with the former kinds of entities. We know (or at least we seem to know) how to deal with them, how to integrate them in one way or another into our world. With respect to statements, propositions and similar entities, however, we are much less secure. No wonder that we expect from a theory of statements,

propositions etc. an answer to the

question of how to treat such entities. The uses to which Balzano's propositions can be put are obvious, even though he himself said little about them. It is, however, far from obvious what kind of entity they are, even though Balzano expended much ink on it. It is therefore hardly surprising that from the moment Balzano presented his doctrine of propositions, attempts were made to clarify and

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interpret it, and this also holds for the doctrines of his successors. Several interpretations have been offered, two of which became especially important and popular in our time. I will discuss them in sections 5 and 6.

5. The introduction of statements and propositions through definitions

by

abstraction A definition by abstraction uses an equivalence relation on a set and defines the concept in question as an equivalence class in this set. Two such definitions have been offered, one taking statements as equivalence classes of thoughts (A), the other one taking propositions as equivalence classes of sentences (B).

A) Statements as equivalence classes of thoughts:

The equivalence relation in this case is the relation of "having (or grasping) the same content" or "being equal with respect to content", abbreviated as

~1.

This is

an equivalence relation on the set of thoughts. As an equivalence relation on this set, this relation generates a partition of the set of thoughts. The content M(1) of a thought T is then defined as the set of all thoughts having the same content as T: M(1):

{1": T' is a thought Gudgement) & T'

M T}

A statement, then, is any such content of a thought, i.e., an equivalence class with respect to M in the set of thoughts. In short: M* is a statement iff there is a thought T such that M* = M(1). The advantages of this interpretation are the following: flrst, statements are no longer kinds of entities on their own, but are reduced to "normal" or at least "less obscure" entities, namely thoughts; second, the relation of "grasping" or "catching" which holds between a thought and its content is completely clarified: a judgement (thought) T "grasps" or "catches" a statement M* (or, conversely, M*

is the content of 1) iff Tis a member of the set M* (TE M*). The following objection may be raised against this interpretation. According to it, a statement is a set of thoughts (with the same content). But what kind of thoughts does this interpretation take into account - only real ones, which a human being has already had or has or will have? But this is too little if state· ments are the bearers of logical laws, because logical laws hold also for statements which in fact never have been and never will be grasped. In order to answer this objection we would have to include here all possible thoughts.

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Propositions and all that

Possible thoughts, however, are a rather obscure kind of entity too, so that the reduction which results seems no great achievement. In this case, we could from the outset identify a statement with a possible thought - an interpretation which in fact has often been proposed since Leibniz. The objection mentioned seems to be the reason why Bolzano, for example, rejected this interpretation of propositions. Of course, he was not familiar with the interpretation in the technical form given before, but with the corresponding informal version which had already been offered for his doctrine in his time by his correspondent, Franz Exner. The question was about truths-in-themselves, but Balzano's answer holds in the same way for all propositions and ideas-inthemselves: "it [i.e., a truth-in-itself] is not a thought in abstracto, i.e., it is not something extracted from its psychic context, because even as extracted from its psychic context, a judgement still exists in a thinking being at a certain time ... which is not the case for a sentence-in-itself" (Balzano (1935: 30, free translation; cf. also 41 ff., 65 ff., 70 f., 82 ff.)). And Balzano's protege Prihonsky says, "A sentence-in-itself is not a judgement in abstracto because this would still be a real thing" (Prihonsky (1850: 3, free translation)). The reason given by Balzano and Prihonsky for their refutation of this interpretation would not apply to the interpretation in the form in which it is offered here. A class of thoughts does not share the properties of thoughts (i.e., it is not itself psychic etc.). The basic idea, however, which seems to be behind Balzano's argument, is the one sketched in the preceding paragraph. For the same reason Balzano rejects also the interpretation of propositions as possible thoughts (Balzano (1935: 84), Prihonsky (1850: 2)). In an untechnical form, an interpretation of the same kind was also offered by Husser! for Balzano's propositions. According to Husser!, a proposition is the universal, or the species, corresponding to a feature common to .all actual assertions of the same sense. The proposition relates to acts of judgement just as the species "redness" relates to instances of the "same" red (Husser! (1903: 290)), or, to give a slightly different account also due to Husser!, the proposition differs from the act of judgement in the same sense as the species "redness" differs from a red thing (Husser! (1903: 291); cf. also Husser! (1901: 100 f.)). By this interpretation, the relation of "grasping" is reduced to the relation between an instance of a species and the species itself, i.e., to a relation which is very familiar in philosophy, though far from being clear. In addition, despite Husserl's claim of the independence of a species from its instances (Husser! (1901: 291), this independence seems to be less than the one Balzano had in mind.

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Let us now turn to another interpretation by means of equivalence classes.

B) Propositions as equivalence classes of sentences:

Two equivalence relations on the set of sentences may be considered here: the relation of logical equivalence (t,) and the relation of synonymy (.e). The former was suggested by Carnap (Carnap (1956: 32, 152)), the latter by Russell and Quine (Russell (1943: 166), Quine (1943: 120)). 1. Starting with the relation of logical equivalence, we can define the sense

P(S) of a sentence S as the set of sentences which are logically equivalent with S. Let t, be the relation of logical equivalence; then we can express this definition as follows: P(S) : = {S': S' is a sentence & S' L,S}

A proposition, then will be any such set of logically equivalent sentences: P* is a proposition iff there is a sentence S such that P*

= P(S). The advantages of such

an interpretation are, as before: we have a clear reduction of propositions to "normal" entities, namely sentences; in addition, it becomes quite clear according to this interpretation what is understood by saying a sentence S expresses or means a proposition P* -it means that Sis a member of the set P* (StP*). But again the earlier objections recur in a similar way. What kind of sentences do we mean here? Actual ones, or all possible ones? A still greater difficulty is this: according to this interpretation different propositions could no longer be logically equivalent and we would have only one logically true and only one logically false proposition, which seems to be unnatural and opposed to our intuitions - at least it is in clear opposition to Balzano's doctrine. It contradicts Balzano's identity principle III A3d(ii). 2. If S, is the relation of having the same sense or being synonymous, we can define the sense P(S) of a sentenceS as follows: P(S) : = {S': S' is a sentence & S' S,S}

The advantages of this interpretation are the same as before. Concerning the objections, it is still unclear for which kind of entities this equivalence relation is defined - actual sentences or possible sentences. Instead of having the problem of violating Balzano's identity principle, however, we now have the problem of how to defme the relation of synonymy - a concept which, according to Qnine, is no less problematic than the concept of a proposition itself.

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Propositions and all that

6. Interpretations by means ofpossible world semantics

A very common way to understand propositions today consists in interpreting them as functions from possible worlds to truth- values. Two allegedly equivalent formulations are usually proposed (cf. Hintikka (1975: 80), Stalnaker (1976: 80)): (i)

A proposition is a function taking possible worlds into truth-values.

(ii)

A proposition is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence expressing the proposition denotes the truth- value "true". Now the first problem which arises here is about possible worlds in general.

How can such an interpretation help us in understanding the concept of a proposition if it uses itself such an obscure concept as that of a possible world? I think this attack, which is very common today, is not quite fair, because despite all the problems about possible worlds, it can at least be made fairly clear what a possible world is, and, what is more, if it cannot be made completely and sufficiently clear, it can at least be shown how useful this concept is in different respects - how it functions in different fields. I therefore think that this is the least important defect in the possible-world interpretation of propositions. Another possible objection is this: Why should we define propositions by means of possible worlds - why not go the other way around and define possible worlds by means of propositions? I do not agree with this objection either, because possible worlds are, according to my intuition, sets of states of affairs, not sets of propositions. A much more serious objection consists in the problem that according to this interpretation - as in the case of the interpretation by means of logical equivalence - the identity principle mentioned there must be given up. If two sentences are logically equivalent, they express the same proposition (Stalnaker (1976: 85)). I think that this makes the possible world interpretation of propositions much less natural than its adherents suggest (e.g., Hintikka (1975: 80): "This definition [i.e., the defmition of propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth-values] is most natural because it is natural to say that to understand a proposition is to know what restrictions its truth places on the world".). Stalnaker, in his paper (Stalnaker (1976)), tries to flnd a way out of this puzzle, but as sophisticated and interesting as it is, it still remains "unnatural". Now, my question is: Does the possible-world interpretation of propositions necessarily have the consequence that logically equivalent sentences express the same proposition? In my opinion, this is only a consequence of formulation (ii) but not of formulation (i) of the possible world-interpretation. If so, (i) and (ii) 253

E. Morscher

are not equivalent as their adherents claim. More precisely: (i) and (ii) are equivalent only when we take the word 'function' in its common sense, i.e., when we take it to mean what may otherwise be called a 'function in extension'. According to this understanding which is usual in mathematics, two functions are identified if they have the same range and have, for each argument in the range, the same value. "If the way in which a function yields or produces its value from its argument is altered without causing any change either in the range of the function or in the value of the function for any argument, then the function remains the same; but the associated function concept, or concept determining the function ... , is thereby changed" (Church (1956: 16)). If we were to take 'function' in the sense of 'function concept' or 'function in intension', however, (i) and (ii) would no longer be equivalent, and it would no longer follow from (i) that logically equivalent sentences must express the same proposition. Taking propositions as functions in intension from possible worlds to truthvalues meets the main objection brought forward against the possible world view of propositions. This therapy, however, seems to suffer from a sinister disease: it cures one ailment by another malady. Its aim is to explain (or even explain away) a certain kind of intension, i.e., propositions, and it does so by using another kind of intension, i.e., functions in intension. What is such a "solution" good for? Is it any help at all in our situation? It would be completely useless, of course, if we were to apply the same procedure to all kinds of intensions and were to explain all of them as functions in intension from possible worlds to appropriate extensions. The point of the proposal, however, is to take all intensions except propositions in the usual way as functions in extension from possible worlds to

corresponding extensions. The functions in intension, then, have been already taken care of and can now be used without conscience in our treatment of propositions. What we have to overcome is merely the fixed idea that all kinds of intensions must be treated in exactly the same way. (I am aware that this suggestion looks like an ad hoc solution, but in my view it is at least not completely ad hoc, since though we lose the uniformity of the usual account, we retain its reductive import.) Let me now state some principles or postulates which - according to my intuitions - a theory of statements, propositions, states of affairs etc. should satisfy.

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Propositions and all that

7. Postulates for a future theory of statements, propositions, states of affairs etc.

A) Before an entity like a statement, proposition etc. is introduced, the framework for this introduction should be clarified, i.e., it should be stated as clearly as possible what the problem is which is dealt with and in which context the entities in question are going to be introduced. B) Then it should be shown, firstly, that the problem can be solved by the introduction of the entity in question, and, secondly, that no other means and tools already available could solve the problem in question, or at least that it could not be solved in such a simple way. It has to be shown that the solution of the problem by introducing this new kind of entity has an advantage over possible alternative solutions. By this I mean to exclude the mere accidental introduction of such entities whenever a problem comes up. Another purpose of this postulate consists in its protecting

new entities against unfair attacks. A new entity

should never be damned for not solving every problem, but only for solving no problem at all. C) It is not forbidden for one and the same kind of entity to account for two

or more different problems. On the contrary, one should always try to be as economical as possible in this respect. For example, many philosophers (such as Bolzano, Rickert, Husser! etc.) have explicitly identified statements and propositions. Such an identification need not be a matter of confusion as Cartwright has charged (Cartwright (1962: 92 ff.)), but might be a matter of economy. Incidentally, Cartwright draws many interesting distinctions in his paper and he makes many aspects of the problem very clear. Concerning the distinction between statements and propositions, however, his arguments seem to me poorhe basically only offers arguments taken from the usage of everyday language. He does not distinguish between an explicit theoretical identification of statements and propositions and a mere conflation of statements and propositions. A linguistic or a conceptual distinction, however, need not always result in a real difference, i.e., there is no need to always have two different entities whenever we can distinguish them. D) Concerning a theory of propositions, the interpretation of propositions as functions in intension from possible worlds to truth-values seems promising to me. This approach, however, has a disadvantage which cannot be overlooked: it no longer reduces a proposition to such a comparatively harmless entity as a function in extension (plus possible-worlds), but to another intensional entity, i.e., a function in intension (plus possible worlds). These functions in intension, however,

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E. Morscher

could be treated in the usual line of possible-world semantics so that our proposal need not be a mere Pyrrhic victory. E) The identity principles stated by Bolzano seem to me to be intuitively correct and natural. In my opinion, they should, therefore, be retained. The basic idea of Balzano's solution is the conception of a primitive form of a proposition. I think that we need something like this to account for the identity of propositions in a natural way. This holds mutatis mutandis, i.e., the necessary changes and modification must always be made. In particular, when Bolzano takes ideas-inthemselves as parts of propositions, we have to consider what the parts of a proposition are under another approach. What are the parts of a proposition when we conceive of it, e.g., as a function in intension from possible worlds to truthvalues? Following Bolzano, they should be at least "of the same status" as the proposition itself. Because a proposition is the sense (intension) of a sentence, its parts should be senses (intensions) of certain parts of the sentence (after transformation into a canonical form). The proposition itself is then a function in intension which might be conceived as the result of logical operations on other intensions. F) In the list of entities mentioned, I have attributed a special status to facts.

According to my intuition, facts are perhaps the only entities in this list with a real "ontological" status. They therefore need special attention. This does not preclude them from accounting for something and being used for solving certain problems. In my opinion, facts have basically to account for truth and falsehood. They "verify" or "falsify" propositions, statements, thoughts and sentences, they make them true or false. Facts differ from statements, propositions and states of affairs in the following respect: a statement, proposition or state of affairs exists whenever its constituents exist. A fact, however, need not exist even though its constituents (i.e., things and attributes) exist. (This feature of facts was brought to my attention by Kit Fine.) To me the fundamental ontological question is this: What is a fact? And the "answer" to this question closes my paper: A fact is a fact is a fact is a fact ...

Postscript Professor Nuchelmans' important work on propositions covers the long history from ancient and medieval period (Nuchelmans (1973)) through late-scholastic and humanist times (Nuchelmans (1980)) to modern time from Descartes to Kant

256

Propositions and all that (Nuchelmans (1983)). My own work starts where Professor Nuchelmans' work published to date ends, i.e., after Kant. I am pleased and honoured to have my paper included in the Festschrift for Professor Nuchelmans, and I dedicate it to him with great respect.

* This paper was ftrst presented to a colloquium of the Seminar for AustroGerman Philosophy at the University of Sheffield in September 1978. In its present form it is part of a research project which is supported by the Jubili.iumsfonds and the 6sterreichische Nationalbank under nr. 2670. I am indebted to Peter Simons for his valuable help in preparing this paper.

257

UBER DAS VERHALTNIS VON SPRACHE, DENKEN UND WELT

ONTOLOGISCHE FRAGEN

UNTER BESONDERER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG

DER PHILOSOPHIE VON J.A. DER MOUW

M.F.Fresco

University of Leiden

G. Nuchelmans hat in seinem Vortrag 'Bezeichnen und Behaupten' 1 abermals auf die ontologischen Schwierigkeiten und Streitigkeiten, zu denen der Aussage-Inhalt einer falschen Aussage fiihren kann, hingewiesen und zu weiterer Diskussion solcher Probleme anregen wollen. Folgender Beitrag mochte in bescheidener Weise versuchen, sich an diesen Diskussionen zu beteiligen. Es kann selbstverstandlich nicht daran gedacht werden, die ganze Problematik, wie Nuchelmans sie in drei starken Biinden2 von der Antike bis Kant aufgerollt hat, bier gerecht zu werden. In sofern nachfolgende Uberlegungen historisch orientiert sind, kniipfen sie besonders an die Auffassungen des niederlandischen Philosophen Johan Andreas der Mouw (1863-1919) an. Die Frage, die bier vor allem erortert werden soli, ist, welchem Bereich die

proposition als bearer of truth and falsity (vgl. Nuchelroans (1973) Titel) angehort.

1.

Einige terminologische Erlauterungen und Stipulationen mogen der Klarheit wegen vorangeschickt werden. Dabei werden aber schon sofort weiterfiihrende Bemerkungen eingeflochten.

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Das lateinische 'propositio', das englische oder franzosische 'proposition', das deutsche 'Satz' habben aile gemeinsam, dass sie meistens als Trager von Wahrheit und Unwahrheit betrachtet werden, jedoch in schillerndem Wechsel das eine Mal als sprachliches Gebilde, das andere Mal als einem anderen Bereiche, dessen ontologischer status noch zu kliiren bleibt, angehorend. 'Statement' und 'Satz' werden von dem Laien meistens als dem sprachlichen Bereich zugeordnet erfahren. Historisch trifft dies auch fiir 'propositio' zu, obwohl vielleicht sogar mancher Fachmann sich dessen kaum bewusst ist, fiir 'Satz' eigentlich nicht3 . Trotzdem werde ich hier 'Satz' verwenden, wenn es sich urn ein sprachliches Gebilde handelt und 'Urteil", wenn dies nicht der Fall ist. Zwar ist in der Vergangenheit gerade Urteilen oft, aber besti=t nicht immer, als die Handlung (der Akt) des Urteilens, d.h. der Verbindung von Individuum oder Spezies mit Attribut (Eigenschaft), beziehungsweise des sprachlichen (?) Priidizierens betrachtet worden, bei Kant jedoch schon oft, wenn nicht meistens, als das Resultat des Urteilens. In welchen Bereich das Urteil damit gestellt werden soli, ist wiederum eine noch ungekliirte Frage. Vorliiufig ist nur wichtig, keine Unklarheit dariiber bestehen zu lassen, wie ich die tennini verwende, und ich bin vollig der Meinung Der Mouws4 , dass die Etymologie und historische Bedeutungsentwicklung eines Wortes zwar interessant, aber fiir den aktuellen Wortgebrauch - jedenfalls in der diskursiven Rede, der Argumentation - unwichtig und irrefiihrend sind. Ja, ich meine hier noch einen Schritt weiter gehen zu miissen und versuchen, wo der Wortgebrauch auch heute noch verworren ist, diese Verwirrung zu vermeiden. Dass ich 'Wort' dem sprachlichen Bereich zuordne, 'Begriff nicht, wird klar sein, obwohl auch hier weit grossere Schwierigkeiten und Grund zu Streitigkeiten vorhanden sind als man naiverweise annehmen konnte. Besonders interessant sind die Verwirrungen, die das englische 'meaning' nach sich zieht. Zwar ist schon vieles

iiber 'The Meaning of Meaning' geschrieben

worden, aber wenn jemand wie Quine5 dieses Wort, wenn ich richtig sehe, nicht eindeutig gebraucht, dann ist Vorsicht angebracht. Es ist in dieser Hinsicht vielleicht sogar giinstig, dass ich diesen Artikel deutsch und nicht englisch schreibe. Betrachten wir Quine (1970) etwas genauer. Bekanntlich lehnt er "propositions" ab und befiirwortet "eternal sentences", "whose tokens all have the same truth value" (S.13). Er will die Sprache rein extensional, nicht intensional betrachten. Erstens fragt es sich, ob es moglich ist, zweitens ob es - wenn schon moglich - die beste, d.h. fruchtbarste Art von Sprachphilosophie ist. Bleiben wir jetzt erst mal bei der Mehrdeutigkeit von 'meaning'. Seite 3 schreibt Quine:

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Uber das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt

"Thus suppose we are reporting a man's remark in indirect quotation. We are supposed to supply a sentence that is like his in meaning. In such a case we may be counted guilty of distorting his meaning when we so much as substitute a derogatory word for a neutral word having the same reference. Our substitution misrepresents his attitude and, therewith, his meaning. Yet on another occasion, where the interest is in relaying objective information without regards to attitudes, our substitution of the derogatory word for the neutral one will not be counted as distorting the man's meaning. Similar shifting of standards of likeness of meaning is evident in literary translation, according as our interest is in the poetic qualities of the passage or in the objective information conveyed".

Nach meiner Meinung ist Quine hier furchtbar naiv. Erstens scheint er tatsiichlich an so etwas wie "objective information" zu glauben; meinentwegen. Aber gerade seine letzte Behauptung zeigt an, dass wir an sie nur selten interessiert sind. Er kann "be counted guilty" an was man in der Literaturwissenschaft so schon die 'failacy' der Paraphrase nennt. Was nicht ganz und gar trivial ist - und Poesie ist es nie- , liisst sich gar nicht buchstiiblich ubersetzen, vielleicht uberhaupt nicht ubersetzen. Dies ist mit Recht von vielen, auch von Der Mouw betont worden7 . Fur Quine handelt es sich nur urn "information" und "communication" in einem ganz neutralen, extensionalen Sinne (ibidem). Ich glaube aber, dass es bei aiien nicht vollig trivialen Aussagen nicht so extensional vorgeht, wie Quine will. "Attitude", also Haltung oder wahrscheinlich besser: die Einstellung desjenigen, der den Sprachakt vo11zieht, inklusive Wertungen, ist nicht ganz auszuklammern, behiilt auch ihren Einfluss auf den Aussage-Inhalt. Die negative Qualifikation gehiirt zur 'meaning' in beiden Fallen, urn so mehr, weil er ja "his meaning" und "the man's meaning" schreibt, aber auch wenn er "the meaning of the utterance" gesagt hiitte, bliebe ich bei meinem Einwand. Er hiitte wahrscheinlich am liebsten das erste Mal "the man's meaning" (was der Mann gemeint hat), das zweite Mal "the meaning of the utterance" (die Bedeutung der Aussage) geschrieben, aber dann ware die Zweideutigkeit unmittelbar ins Auge gefailen. Fur Quine ist also 'meaning' zweierlei: subjektiv gefiirbte Meinung und objektive Bezeichnung ( = Bedeutung?). Im ersten Fail, in dem auch fiir Quine die Einstellung des Sprechenden mitziihlt, ist 'meaning' was der Sprecher meint, d.h.

beabsichtigt zu sagen; im zweiten Fail die Bezeichnung eines Sachverhalts, der (in der wie auch aufgefassten aussersprachlichen Wirklichkeit) wohl oder nicht der Fail ist. Die These, die ich vertrete, lautet jedoch, dass, wenn dasjenige ausser

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acht gelassen wird, was fiir Quine in diesem zweiten Fall keine Rolle spielt, der gemeinte, ja der bezeichnete Sachverhalt nicht mehr genau der gleiche ist; dies bedeutet, dass auch der Aussage-Inhalt verschieden ist. Und damit ist ein Argument fiir das Zwischenschieben zwischen Sprachhandlung und (Sachverhalt in der) Wirklichkeit einer dritten Entitii.t, Aussage-Inhalt, proposition, Urteil, gewonnen. Deshalb mochte ich eine weitere kritische Bemerkung Quine gegeniiber, die auch erst spii.ter folgen konnte, schon hier vorbringen. Sie passt zu gut in diesen Zusammenhang. Ebenfalls Seite 3, kurz vor dem schon angefiihrten Zitat, schreibt Quine:

"If there were propositions, they would induce a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between sentences themselves: those sentences would be equivalent that expressed the same proposition...".

Diese Folgerung ist nicht schliissig; man konnte behaupten, dass ein bestimmter Sachverhalt hundertprozentig nur mit einem Satz (als Sprachgebilde, 'sentence') korrespondiert, ohne damit bewiesen zu haben, dass es Urteile ('propositions') nicht geben kann. Aber dann ist die Annahrne von Synonymitii.t oder Aquivalenz von Sii.tzen nicht mehr notwendig. Extensionale Aquivalenz will Quine iibrigens fiir die 'tokens' seiner ewigen Slitze doch beanspruchen (siehe oben), und die Moglichkeit vollstlindiger Synonymitlit habe ich ja selbst gerade in Frage gestellt. Sagar banale Beispiele, wie sie nur Philosophen seit Platon und Aristoteles einfallen, konnen diese These illustrieren. Socrates currit mag mit Socrates est

currens liquivalent sein, von Synonymitilt ist m.E. nicht die Rede, schon einfach deshalb nicht, wei! es keinem Normalverbraucher der Sprache je einfallen wiirde, I

den zweiten Satz auszusprechen oder zu schreiben. Di¢5er existiert nicht als use, er kommt nur als mention vor. Ein zweites Beispiel: "Es regnet" muss man, wenn man nicht iiber genauere Kenntnisse verfiigt, mit "It is raining" iibersetzen. Der englische Satz enthlilt aber mehr, zieht engere Schranken als der deutsche, der noch einiges offen llisst, das in dem englischen Satz schon festgelegt ist. Also auf dem ersten extensionalen Blick erscheinen beide Siitze als wahr, aber bloss in dem

im wirklichen Leben nur selten eintretenden Fall, dass man - wie offensichtlich manchmal Quine, siehe oben - nicht an dem weiteren Kontext interessiert ist, sind sie intensional wirklich synonym. Semantisch/intensional kann der deutsche Satz durchaus noch wahr sein in einer Lage, in der es der englische eigentlich nicht mehr ist, d.h. dem Sachverhalt in der 'Wirklichkeit' nicht ganz entspricht, eben 262

Ober das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt wei! die progressive fonn nebenbei noch eine weitere, im Deutschen fehlende, Mitteilung enthalt. 'Meaning' bringt uns unweigerlich auf 'Bedeutung', 'Bezeichnung' u.s.w. Nun, ich habe vor, 'Bedeutung' intensional, also m.E. dem normalen deutschen Sprachgebrauch entsprechend, zu verwenden, also nicht als 'reference', pace Frege, den ich in diesem Punkt seiner Terminologie nie habe verstehen konnen. Noch eine terminologische Schlussbemerkung: 'Konnotation' werde ich nicht in der seit Mill in der Logik und Philosophie i.iblichen Weise gebrauchen, sondem so wie Sprach- und vor allem Literaturwissenschaftler diese Vokabel verwenden, also mit Bezug auf dasjenige, was bei einem Wort oder Ausdruck neben der Hauptbedeutung mitschwingt und unter Umstiinden, z.B. in Poesie oder in der Politik (Diplomatie), das Bedeutsarnste und Bedeutungsvollste sein kann.

2.

Wer sich heutzutage mit ontologischen Fragen befasst, denkt unweigerlich an die von Popper seit 1967 vertretene Theorie der drei Welten8 . In (1968) z.B. erklart er:

"...the first is the physical world or the world of physical states; the second is the mental world or the world of mental states; and the third is the world of intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense•. (Popper 1972, S.154).

Konnen wir die 'bearers of truth and falsity', also die 'propositions' oder 'U rteile' bei Popper flir unsere Frage befriedigend unterbringen? Dass Sprechhandlungen, Schreibhandlungen und deren Prodnkte in einem gewissen Sinne der ersten Welt angehOren, ist richtig, bringt uns aber nicht weiter. Auch Quines 'ewige Siitze' gehoren ihr nicht an, eben wei! sie type, nicht

token sind. Man kann es sich bequem machen und Sprache mit allem, was dazu gehort, in Poppers zweite Welt unterbringen, wiihrend man dann in der dritten Welt einen schOnen Platz fiir das objektive Gebilde, das Produkt des Sprechensund dies bedeutet in dem beschriinkten Rahmen dieses Beitrags: den wahren oder falschen Aussage-Inhalt, das Urteil - gefunden hatte. Ich glaube jedoch nicht, class dieses Problem sich so glatt liisen liisst. Bevor wir darauf zuriickkommen, ist jetzt der Augenblick gekommen, uns die so interessante Persiinlichkeit von

D~r

Mouw

niiher anzusehen. 263

M.P. Fresco

3.

Der Mouw, in seiner Zeit zu Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in eigenem Lande ein ziemlich bekannter Mann, wurde nach seinem Tode mehr oder weniger vergessen, gilt heutzutage aber als einer der hervorragendsten Vertreter der damaligen geistigen elite. Wer die niederliindische Sprache nicht lesen kann, hat jedoch nur wenig Moglichkeiten, ihn einigermassen kennen zu lernen9 . Ein Grund, sein Leben und Wirken hier kurz zu skizzieren. Zeitlebens hat er sich mit Sprache und Sprach-problematik b4fasst: als Philologe, Lehrer der (alten)

Sprachen,

Sprachwissenschaftler, Polyglott, Philosoph und als Dichter. Diese Reihenfolge entspricht ungefiihr der Chronologie seiner Biographie. Wenn wegen der Einheitlichkeit dieses Bandes ich mich nicht auf seine Auffassungen

iiber Satze und

Urteile konzentrieren miisste, ware eine Dreiteilung: seine sprachwissenschaftlichen Auffassungen, seine philosophischen Auffassungen in bezug auf Sprache und sein Wirken als Sprachkiinstler, als Dichter, eigentlich selbstverstiindlich, zumal da sich ganz natiirliche Verbindungen zwischen dem Linguisten, dem Philosophen und dem Dichter aufweisen lassen6 . Johan Andreas der Mouw wurde 1863 geboren, absolvierte das humanistische Gymnasium, studierte Altsprachen, Philosophie und Sanskrit in Leiden (1883-1887), wurde bald Gymnasiallehrer in einem kleinen Provinznest, promovierte 1890 in Leiden - der Titel seiner Doktorarbeit war: Quomodo Antiqui Naturam Mirati

sunt? 10

-,

unterrichtete ab 1907 in Den Haag bis zu seinem Tode (1919) als

Privatlehrer aile damals iiblichen Fiicher. Zeitlebens hat er geschrieben; nicht alles ist veroffentlicht, obwohl noch manches erhalten geblieben ist, dessen Veroffentlichung sich lohnen wird 11 • Seine Doktorarbeit war vor allem eine kulturhistorische Studie, die schon im Keirn viele Themen und Probleme seiner spateren Werke vorwegni=t und ihn eigentlich schon als einen Romantiker zeigt, dem die Verbundenheit mit der Natur eine Lebensnotwendigkeit ist 12. Der lange Titel seines zweiten Buches (1900, aber zum Teil schon 1897 vollendet) ist in Anmerkung 7 bereits angefiihrt worden. Es ist sein Hauptwerk als Sprachwissenschaftler. Deshalb werde ich gleich niiher auf dieses Buch eingehen. J etzt nur dies: Es ist aus der praktischen Situation, fast hiitte ich geschrieben: Notlage, entstanden. Das Hauptanliegen ist eigentlich nicht linguistisch, sondern es betrifft Der Mouws Bildungsideal. In den theoretisch-wissenschaftlichen Auffassungen seines Kollegen und Freundes Hoogvliet glaubt er ein auf aile Fiille praktisch wirksames Mittel gefunden zu haben, den altsprachlichen Unterricht, der amals das humanistische Gymnasium ja noch dominierte, besser zu gestalten. Was 264

Ober das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt

hier mit besser gemeint ist, werde ich zum Teil unten nii.her ausfiihren; 'besser' bedeutet fiir Der Mouw jedcnfalls auch, dass nicht hauptsachlich das verdummende Gedachtnis geiibt, sondern zum selbstandigen Denken angeregt werden soli, und es bedeutet, dass Zeit gewonnen wird und die Gelegenheit zur wirklichen Allgcmeinbildung, die das humanistische Gymnasium - nach Der Mouw ohne Berechtigungfiir sich beansprucht, nicht Ianger fehlt. Was Der Mouw eigentlich will, ist Iauter uomini universali bilden, wie er selbst einer war. Dass er also etwas Unmogliches

wollte, war ihm our zum Teil bewusst. Aber manche sehr verniinftige, immer noch nicht iiberholte Bemerkung iiber Sinn und Form einer Allgemeinbildung macht er. Die Philosophie bleibt in diesem Buch im Hintergrund. Man merkt zwar des ofteren, wie gut Der Mouw auf der Hohe ist, aber er bezweckt hier ja Anderes. Merkwiirdig ist iibrigens, dass Hoogvliet seine Theorien vor 1900 our bruchweise und sehr unvollstiindig veroffentlicht hatte. 1903 schreibt er sein Hauptwerk, Lingua, das vielleicht sogar im Ausland mehr Interesse erregte als in den

Niederliinden selbst. Aber Der Mouw reagierte mit einer ausfiihrlichen Rezension. Merkwiirdigerweise ist sie, so weit bekannt, nie veroffentlicht worden. Dass Der Mouw es zwar versucht hat, sie zu publizieren, aber wegen der Lange ohne Erfolg, ist moglich, aber kaum wahrscheinlich. Eher kommen folgende Erkliirungen in Frage, vielleicht sogar die Verbindung beider: Obwohl er Hoogvliet auch lobt und am Schluss einen genialischen Menschen nennt, hat er scharfe philosophische Kritik. Als U nterrichtsmethode ist, was Hoogvliet bringt, wertvoll, aber das philosophische Fundament taugt iiberhaupt nicht. Eine erste Erklarung ware, dass Der Mouw aus Freundschaft seine Besprechung nie publiziert hat, eine zweite ware, dass trotz Unterschiede das philosophisch Wesentliche, zum Teil in weiter entwickelter Form, in Der Mouws niichstes Buch einverleibt wurde, wodurch die Veroffentlichnng der Rezension v~n Lingua weniger wichtig war. Letztere Oberlegung ist in sofern nicht unberechtigt, well dieses Buch Het absoluut idealisme zwar erst 1905 erschien, aber eine ausfiihrliche, zum Teil fast gleichlautende Vorarbeit wahrscheinlich aus dem Jahre 1903, also dem selben Jahr, in dem Lingua publiziert wurde, in Manuskript erhalten blieb. Ich werde es nach der

zweiten Auflage als Band IV der VeTZamelde Werken zitieren. Het absoluut idea/isme ist nicht our Der Mouws wichtigste philosophische

Leistung, es ist auch fiir unser Thema ein wichtiges Buch. Wieder mochte ich hier our einiges hervorheben, das fiir unser Thema weniger wesentlich ist, und das Sprachphilosophische fiir einen spiiteren Abschnitt meines Beitrages aufheben. Hier also our einige kurze Bemerkungen. Der Titel ist eigeotlich irrefiihrend, denn das Buch ist keine Verteidiguog des absoluten Idealismus, sondern es enthiilt 265

M.P. Fresco

einen Angriff auf die Art und Weise, wie der Neu-Hegelianer und Leidener Philosophie-Professor Bolland diesen vertritt. lm ersten Teil wird neben die philosophische Skepsis eine 'psychologisch begriindete' Skepsis gestellt und Bolland vor allem vorgeworfen, dass er durch vielerlei Sprachgaukeleien unverantwortet, d.h. falsch und nur scheinbar argumentiert. Bolland vergewaltigt die Sprache. Die Unklarheit seiner Sprache verriit die Unklarheit seines Denkens. Dann nimmt Der Mouw das 'Aschenbrodel' der Philosophie, den Solipsismus, in Schutz und zeigt an, dass eigentlich jeder mehr behauptet als er verantworten kann. Die Angst, dem Gefii.ngnis des Bewusstseins nicht entrinnen zu konnen, in dem solipsistischen Kerker ganz alleine zu sein, nicht einmal

iiber die Sicherheit eines Ichs zu

verfiigen, wird vollig ernst genommen. Dies fiihrt dann zu dem 'riskantesten Schritt' der Annahme des Dinges an sich, und zwar eher so, wie Eduard von Hartmann es auffasst, nicht so, wie es bei Kant gedacht wird. Wie gross der Unterschied ist und in wiefern Der Mouw sich dessen bewusst war, kann in diesem Rahmen nicht erortert werden. Ein Jahr spater (1906) erweitert Der Mouw die in Het absoluut idealisme entfalteten Gedanken in Kritische studies over psychisch monisme en NieuwHegelianisme, als Band V der Verzamelde Werken neu aufgelegt. In diesem Buch

setzt er sich zwar kritisch, aber doch mit vie! Sympathie mit den Auffassungen des bekannten Groninger Philosophen Heymans auseinander und verfolgt immer energischer seine Polemik gegen den Neu-Hegelianismus. Dieses Buch konnen wir hier beiseite lassen. Auch einige Artikel, die er nebenbei noch schreibt bleiben hier unbesprochen. Aber 1918, also ein Jahr vor seinem Tode, stellt sich heraus, dass er seit etwa sechs Jahren hauptsachlich als Dichter gewirkt hat. Die Erscheinung der beiden Bande (1919 und 1920), die diese Poesie umfassen, erlebt er nicht mehr. Sie ist, wie der Titel

Brahman angibt, religios-metaphysisch und immanent-monistisch

orientiert. Hier kann Sprache leisten, was sie letzten Endes im diskursiven Denken der Philosophie und Wissenschaft nicht bringen konnte. Diese Poesie wird heute als einer der grossten Leistungen der niederlandische Literatur zu Anfang dieses Jahrhunderts betrachtet, aber auch eine nahere Begriindung dieses Urteils passt nicht in den Rahmen dieses Sammelbandes 13 .

4.

Das 19. Jahrhundert war das Zeitalter der historischen Grammatik. Die Entdeckung des Sanskrit am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts hatte tiefgehenden und 266

Ober das Verhaltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt

dauernden Einfluss gehabt. Zwar war das meistens auf die Gramrnaire von Port Royal zuriickgehende 14 Interesse fiir eine 'universelle Grammatik' nicht verschwunden, aber die historische, d.h. also die diachronische Sprachwissenschaft war vorherrschend. Und man darf selbstverstandlich synchrone Sprachauffassung und Interesse an universelle Grammatik nicht gleichschalten, aber sie sind verwandt und es zeigt sich, dass es oft die selben Personen sind, die sich fiir den Gedanken der 'grammaire universelle' und fiir synchrone Sprachbetrachtung einsetzen. Das in Anmerkung 14 genannte Buch von Noordegraaf bietet einen breiten und gut dokumentierten Uberblick iiber die Sprachwissenschaft in den Niederlanden wahrend des 19. Jahrhunderts. Einer der fesselndsten Wissenschaftler, den Noordegraaf ausfiihrlich behandelt, ist Taco Roorda (1801-1874). Roorda war griindlich philosophisch unterlegt, kannte auch nicht-indoeuropii.ische Sprachen und vertrat vie! Aufsehen erregend (zwar aufgrund sprachwissenschaftlich betrachtet unrichtiger Voraussetzungen)

den Wert der Synchronie in den

sprachwissenschaftlichen Studien. Wahrscheinlich wurde er von Hoogvliet als einer seiner Inspiratoren anerkannt. Hoogvliet (1860-1924) 15 war ein Original, wie Der Mouw urspriinglich Altphilologe, Gymnasiallehrer und Polyglott. Er war der Meinung, dass man in kurzer Zeit sich eine allgemeine Gramrnatik aneignen und damit eine geniigende Grundlage fiir das schnell Erlernen von allen moglichen Sprachen erreichen kann. Und er war ein fanatischer Anhiinger der synchronen Sprachauffassung. Gewisse Obereinstimmung mit den (spiiteren) Theorien von De Saussure und Chomsky liesse sich nachweisen. Leider hatte Hoogvliet eine ganz eigene und umstandliche grammatische Terminologie entworfen; sie war zwar folgerichtig, hat aber sicher dem Erfolg seiner Ideen im Wege gestanden. Wie wir schon wissen, war Der Mouw einer der wenigen, die Hoogvliets Auffassungen ernst nahmen, und er war sogar der einzige, der sie ausfiihrlich zu verteidigen versuchte. Einige andere haben Hoogvliets Verdienst in kurzen Besprechungen gelobt und sonst nichts getan. Der Mouws Anliegen war, wie gesagt, ein padagogisches. Es ging Der Mouw

darum, dass das Lemen von

Fremdsprachen - und durch seinen damaligen Beruf dachte er natiirlicherweise an erster Stelle an die beiden Altsprachen, aber nicht ausschliesslich - einen sinnvollen Zweck erfiillte. In seinem Buch von 1900 nennt er einen dreifachen Nutzen, die er (VI S.319) so zusammenfasst:

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M.F. Fresco

"Aus drei Griinden ist das Studieren (Lemen) von Sprachen also niitzlich: Erstens , weil es das Mittel ist, derartige

Sprachkenntnisse zu erreichen, die

genau zu verstehen, was ein Yolk gedacht und gefiihlt (empfunden) hat, erst ermoglichen; zweitens weil es durch die Notwendigkeit, Begriffe zu zergliedern (analysieren), die Zusammengesetztheit eigener scheinbar einfacher Begriffe einsehn lehrt und unseren nationalen Vorrat bereichert; drittens weil es den Begriff 'Denken' erweitert und gleichzeitig uns als cine Art Geistesgymnastik in mancherlei Weisen mit unseren Vorstellungen arbeiten lehrt und uns geistig gelenkiger macht". Zu jedem dieser drei Punkte einige Bemerkungen: Zum ersten Punkt: Dass fiir Der Mouw Sprechen und Denken eng zusammen geh6ren, werden wir spater naher ausfiihren. Deshalb halt er es fiir sehr wichtig, dass das Denken nicht von individuellen psyehologischen Eigenheiten oder von "ethnopsychologischen" Faktoren (wir wiirden vielleicht sagen: ethnologisch und kulturell bedingten Faktoren) eingeschrankt wird. Wenn wir das Denken und Empfinden anderer Volker, die sich anderer Sprachen bedienen, kennen lernen, erweitert sich unser Horizont. Diese Auffassung bringt er auch noch in Het absoluut idealisme.

Der zweite Punkt fiihrt den ersten weiter aus und richtet sich hauptsachlich auf das Denken. Durch die enge Verbindung zwischen Wortern und Begriffen (siehe unten) ist es sehr wichtig, dem in der Muttersprache bereitliegenden begrifflichen Apparat seine Selbstverstandlichkeit zu nehmen. Der dritte Punkt zielt wohl hauptsachlich auf die syntaktischen und morphologischen Unterschiede in den verschiedenen Sprachen. Man sol! eben nicht iibersetzen, sondern Wort fiir Wort in der gleichen Reihenfolge wie im Original naeh-denken, was in der anderen Sprache vor-gedacht worden ist. Diese Geschmeidigkeit des Denkens und Empfmdens tragt zur wirklichen Bildung und zum klaren Denken bei. Einige Beispiele m6gen dieses gelenkige Nach-denken und Nach-empfmden erlautern. Das erste entnehme ich Der Mouw (1900), S.335, wo er den Anfang der Odyssea folgendermassen behandelt, vor allem den Satzteil ''pol/a d' ho g' en pont6i pathen algea:

" ... gegeben die (visuelle) Vorstellung des Meeres, dort Odysseus, Schiffbruch und hungerend; dazu gegeben der Gedanke, dass diese Leiden in der

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Vergangenheit lokalisiert werden miissen; dann sagen, d.h. dann denken, dann explizitieren wir diesen Vorstellungskomplex so: Er hatdafiir kann ich einstehen, er so gut wie ein (anderer) - auf dem Meer vie! Blend ausgestanden. - Ein Grieche teilt anders ein; ibm fiillt es auf, dass dieser Mann so abnormal vie! Blend erlitten hat; etwas Verdruss hat jeder, viet er; in der vorangehenden Zeile war gesagt worden, dass er viele Stadte gesehn hatte, und ohne Schaden kam damals keiner davon, der eine Reise machte, aber auch auf dem Meer hatte er es nicht Ieicht gehabt, seitdem er den Sohn des Poseidon so roh operiert hatte; deshalb denkt der Grieche die Meer-Vorstellung unmittelbar hinter

'er, an einer Stelle, wo das Wort, das diese Vorstellung zum

Klingen bringt, ausserdem durch das Metrum betont wird. So entsteht Folgendes: Viel(e Dinge) weiter er (bestimmt! du kannst mir glauben!) auf dem Meer (... ) erlitt-er Verdriesslichkeiten".

Also in Palla d'ho g'en pontoi pathen algea... werden, nach der Meinung Der Mouws polla und algea weit von einander geriickt, urn polla und pathen algea zu betonen und urn ho g'en pontoi zusammenstellen zu konnen. Seines Erachtens wird hier also anders gedacht; semantisch, nach Intension und Bedeutung, ware die niederliindische oder deutsche Dbersetzung mit dem griechischen Satz nicht identisch. Ob auch nach Extension ein anderer Sachverhalt dargestellt und bezeichnet wird, diese Frage wird nur am Rande gestellt. Ich vermute jedoch, dass Der Mouw geantwortet hiitte: Im gewissen Sinne ist auch der bezeichnete Sachverhalt, beziehungsweise der Aussage-Inhalt, nicht ganz identisch. Ein zweites Beispiel (Der Mouw 1900, S.337) stammt aus Vergils Ecloga V, 5657: Candidus insuetum miratur limen Olympi sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis. Der Mouw betont, dass dies eine psychologisch iiberzeugende Darstellung

ist. Die strahlende Person, die so unerwartet gleich zu Anfang an die Himmelpforte gestellt wird, ist - wie man erst am Schluss des Satzes bemerktder von den Menschen totgeglaubte Daphnis.- Man konnte in diesem zweiten Fall einwerfen, dass der Dichter hier sich auch nicht der normalen Umgangssprache bedient. Dass man aber so vie! erreichen kann, beweist Der Mouw selbst in seinen eigenen, gerade in seinen lateinischen und griechischen Gedichten. Fiir Beispiele siehe man Fresco (1971) und Fresco (1984). Noch kurz zuriick zum Thema der Allgemeinbildung. Wie Hoogvliets Methode dem Bildungsideal Der Mouws, das beide "Kulturen" Snows umfasst, dienen kann, urnreisst Der Mouw noch einmal VI S.362-363. Ubrigens glaubt er nicht, dass der

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Unterricht der Altsprachen die vielgeriihmte Formalbildung bringt. Da konnten Mathematik, Logik, Astronomie und Physikalles vorsichtig dosiert natiirlich - wahrscheinlich mehr leisten. Das erste Ziel, das man anstreben soil, ist doch, einen Einblick in die wissenschaftliche Methode zu bieten. Dies erscheint Der Mouw fiir die damalige Unterrichtpraxis ebenso illusorisch wie das andere Ziel, ein "excitans zum SchOnheitssinn" zu sein (5.358359, vgl. S.353). Im Gegenteil, das stumpfsinnige "Thatsachenthier" mit seiner Scheingelehrtheit wird gefordert, das nach Erklaren und Verstehen trachtende "Ursachenthier'' lasst man schlummern (S.348, die hervorgehobenen Vokablen auch

im Urtext deutsch geschrieben.) Freude am Verstehen (S.345-346) erweckt man so

nicht.

5.

Philosophisch scheint fiir Der Mouw 1897-1900 noch manches unproblematisch zu sein, das er 1903 und 1905 als schwierige, nicht wirklich schliissig losbare Fragen betrachtet. So die Existenz der Aussenwelt (Poppers World 1), iiber die gesprochen, geschrieben und gedacht wird. Auch die Logik wird problematisch, wenn auch eigentlich nicht ihre unentrinnbare Giiltigkeit. Wei! es den zweiten 'Nutzen' des Erlernens von Fremdsprachen weiter erlautert und zum neuen Abschnitt iiberleitet, noch ein langeres Zitat aus dem Hoogvliet-Buch (VI S.283284):

"Jeder ist davon iiberzeugt, class der logische Apparat, der bei unserem diskursiven Denken funktioniert, imrner und iiberall derselbe ist und war, so weit die Geschichte reicht. ( ...) Und was ist das Fundament allen diskursiven Denkens? Das Urteil. Nun ist es nebensachlich, wie wir das Urteil auffassen, als Verbindung zweier (begrifflicher) Vorstellungen zu einer gemeinsamen oder als die Trennung (Zerlegung) einer znsammengesetzten in zwei verschiedene.

Solange man ausschliesslich den logischen Wert des Urteils als Pradizieren fiir wichtig h alt, betrachtet man es hauptsachlich als Verbindung von Vorstellungen, womit die Prioritat des Begriffs betont wird; beachtet man jedoch das psychologische Entstehen des Begriffs, ohne noch an dessen logische Bedeutung zu denken, dann merkt man, class das Urteil als Dichotomie die wichtige Funktion ist. Begriffsbildung und Urteilsbildung gehOren zusammen, ergiinzen sich gegenseitig (... ); hoch-Wald (deutsch im Text MFF), maharaja ( = 270

Ober das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt

Grosskonig) sind Begriffe, (... ) Wald (ist) hoch (deutsch im Text MFF), raja (asti) mahan sind Urteile, die nur dadurch gebildet werden konnen, weil man ( ... ) die Hoch-heit, die Gross-heit schon aus nach Substanz- und Akzidenzkategorie getrennte Gesamtvorstellungen geur-teilt =

getrennt hat.

Jedenfalls miissen wir daran festhalten, dass das Vorkommen zweier Vorstellungen in einem Urteil eine absolute Notwendigkeit ist". (Alle Betonungen von D.M.).

Auch currit ( = er oder es Hiuft) ist nach Der Mouw ein aus zwei Vorstellungen bestehendes U rteil. Er braucht also den schon angefiihrten Sokrates nicht; er hat recht und weist auf das franzosische 'il court' hin, in dem das t unausgesprochen bleiben kann, eben weil 'il' vorhanden ist. Ein Beispiel, in dem die urspriingliche Unterscheidung von zwei Begriffen nicht mehr bemerkt wird und also auch keine aktuelle Bedeutung hat, ist hertog (Herzog, bei dem im Niederliindischen so wie im Deutschen keiner mehr an das urspriingliche 'Heer-Fiihrer' denkt, das Wort jedenfalls in einer Aussage nicht mehr so gebrauchen kann (VI S.284 ff.). Es steckt kein Urteil, das zwei Vorstellungen verbindet, mehr dahinter. Es wird klar sein, dass Der Mouw sich hier noch kaum ontolog!sche Sorgen macht. Es erweckt fast den Eindruck, dass er lustig die verschiedenen Bereiche, vor allem Poppers zweite und dritte Welt durcheinanderwirft. GehOren Begriffe und Urteile hier der dritten Welt an? Vorstellungen etwa auch? Es ist aber doch von Denken die Rede und von Sprechen, die beide der zweiten Welt anzugehoren scheinen. Oder hiitte Der Mouw recht, weil die Unterscheidung nicht durchgefiihrt werden kann? Wir werden sehen, wie er dem Problem 1905 gegeniiber steht.

6.

Ohne Kategorien kann man nicht denken, behauptet Der Mouw. Kategorien sind in dem Lauf der Geschichte der Philosophic ganz verschieden aufgefasst worden. Gerade der fiir Der Mouw wichtige Kategoriebegriff von Eduard von Hartmann unterscheidet sich sehr von dem Kants, mehr als Der Mouw selbst wahrscheinlich eingesehen hat, wie mein ehemaliger Assistent Pieter W. Adriaans schOn dargelegt hat 16. Der Philosoph des Unbewussten und der indnktiven Metaphysik gibt den Kategorien eine seiner Philosophie gemiissen Bedeutung und Stellung.

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Denken im eigentlichen Sinne ist fiir Der Mouw immer diskursiv logisch denken, so wie Philosophie und Wissenschaft es erfordern. "Aber" so sagt Der Mouw ganz energisch (VI S.303),

"die Wissenschaft ist ein fortwiihrender Sieg iiber den Schein; kein schwiicheres Argument als die ohne umsichtiges diskursives Denken einfach auf den Schein hin akzeptierte Plausibilitiit und 'einfache' 'Natiir'lichkeit, die briichige Waffe

des 'gesunden Menschenverstandes', der in theoretischen Dingen chronisch krank ist. Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Philosophie ist ein Ianger Kampf gegen den 'gesunden Menschenverstand'".

Diesen Kampf wird Der Mouw schon in seiner Besprechung von Lingua unternehmen und erst recht in Het absoluut idealisme. Aber schon hier, also 1897 (oder vielleicht 1900) weisen seine Argumente eine auffiillige Analogie mit Humes Skeptizismus auf: Wir halten Wahrnehmungsgewohnheit fiir Verstehen, Grund fiir Ursache, bemerken den Unterschied zwischen dem principium cognoscendi und dem principium fiundi nicht! (VI S.304-5); vgl. ferner S.306-307, wo ganz klar wird, dass er nicht dem damals noch vorherrschenden Psychologismus in der Logik zum Opfer gefallen ist. Platzmangel verbietet mir eigentlich, ausfiihrlich auf die

Lingua-Rezension

einzugehen. Ich kann es aber doch nicht bleiben lassen: Zu sehr reizt es mich, gerade dieses unveroffentlichte Werk mit einzubeziehen 17 • Die Selbstverstiindlichkeit, mit der Hoogvliet von der aussersprachlichen Wirklichkeit spricht, wird von Der Mouw kritisiert (S.8 des 41 Seiten ziihlenden Manuskripts). Diese Kritik zerlegt Der Mouw in vier zusammenhiingende Punkte: 1) Erkenntnistheoretische Fragen und psychologische Fragen, die zwar zusammengehoren, aber keineswegs identisch sind, werden durcheinandergeworfen. 2) Was iiber Wahrnehmung, das Hauptproblem der Erkenntnistheorie gesagt wird, ist unhaltbar. 3) Die grosse erkenntnistheoretische Schwierigkeit in bezug auf das Entstehen des sinnlichen Weltbildes wird vollig iibersehen und dem sekundiiren Problem der Vorstellungen, unter denen die Begriffe, zugeordnet: Wieder wird der psychologische und der erkenntnistheoretische Bereich nicht getrennt. 4) Die ganze gebotene Unterbauung ist ungeniigend. (S.S-9). Zur Erliiuterung: Das Bewusstsein kann nicht aus sich heraustreten, kennt nur eigene Beschaffenheiten, d.h. die Hypothese einer Aussenwelt muss begriindet werden, und jede Begriindung fehlt bei Hoogvliet einfach (S.9-10). Hier wird also schon das Ernstnehmen des Solipsismus-Problems von 1905 vorweggenommen. 272

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Und dann: Wie entsteht der Begriff? Urn die grosse Schwierigkeit, das Psychologische und das Erkenntnistheoretische auseinanderzuhalten, hat die deutsche Philosophie der letzten 150 Jahre sich sehr verdient gemacht und Hypothesen formuliert, die man nicht, wie Hoogvliet es offensichtlich tut, unbeachtet lassen kann; man braucht sie nicht zu unterschreiben, dann muss man sie aber begriindet kritisieren, was Hoogvliet ebenfalls nachliisst. Grundlage bleibt die Wahrnehmung fiir alles psychische Geschehen, aber wie aus oder durch sie intellektuelle Phiinomene (Begriffe, Argumentation oder Gedankengang) zu stande kommen, ist immer noch eine ungeloste Frage. Hoogvliet sieht aber die Schwierigkeiten gar nicht. Ihm wird sogar erkenntnistheoretisch der "grassliche" Irrtum aus der Bliitezeit des Biichnerschen Materialismus vorgeworfen. (8.10-12). Trotz der Vokabel 'Wahrnehmung' scheint Poppers 'first World' jetzt in Frage gestellt zu werden. In Anbetracht des 4. Punkts seiner kritischen Bemerkungen sagt Der Mouw, dass Hoogvliet von einem vereinfachten, abstrakten Weltbild spricht, das 'intern' ware, aber warum das abstrakte Weltbild mehr Poppers zweiten Welt angehoren soli als "der Blitz, den ich sehe", deutet Hoogvliet nicht an. Abermals wird also von Der Mouw die World 1 in Frage gestellt. Wie in Het abso/uut idealisme breit ausgefiihrt wird, kann Der Mouw - konsequenter als Descartes - kein Kriterium entdecken, das Phiinomene aus der zweiten Welt, die mit Sachverhalten oder Dingen aus einer eventuellen ersten Welt korrespondieren, von reinen Phantasiegebilden, denen nichts entspricht, unterscheidet. Der Geist bildet und ordnet die psychischen 'Elemente', dass sie zu Wahrnehmungen (waarneemse/s) werden, diese, dass sie zu Begriffen werden, die Begriffe so, class sie zu Gedanken werden, class diese wieder zu Gedankenreihen (Argumentationen, diskursivem Denken) werden, letztere, class sie zur Wissenschaft werden, und Wissenschaft, class sie zu einem weltumfassenden System wird; dies alles aber nicht ohne Bedenken und Zuriickhaltung, wei! diese Vorgiinge sich im unsicheren Licht des Bewusstseins vollziehen (etwa 8.12-15).- Alles scheint sich also auf die zweite Welt zu konzentrieren, es klingt wie ein wenig iiberzeugter Idealismus. (Nebenbei sei bemerkt, class 'Wahrnehmung' hier und ofter eine nicht ganz befriedigende Obersetzung ist. Es hat mit Erfahrung zu tun, ist aber individueller, isolierter.) Doch steht Der Mouw hier nicht ohne weiteres auf einem idealistischen Standpunkt. Das ganze Wort 'Wahrnehmung' ware nicht mehr angebracht. Under schreibt (8.19-21) etwa: Das wirkliche Verstehen kann nur durch Gedankenverbindung (diskursives Denken) erreicht werden. Aber auch: Das diskursive Denken kann die Kontinuitiit des Naturgeschehens nicht reproduzieren, ist

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niemals mehr als ein Symbol. Wir denken ja in Worten. Das Charakteristische des logischen Denkens ist gerade, dass es durch Worte stattfindet und so sich von Phantasiegebilden unterscheidet. Hoogvliet jedoch setzt sprachliche Phiinomene mit dem unbewussten (unvollstiindig bewussten) Denkakt gleich, d.h. mit Vorstellungen, Begriffen und ihren Verbindungen. Diese (d.h. deren Existieren MFF) stellt das Bewusstsein fest, aber stellt es auch fest, was die Begriffe bildet, was die Verbindungen der Begriffe zustandebringt? Darauf kommt es eben an. Vollzieht sich diese geistige Aktivitiit in dem Bewusstsein oder bleibt dasjenige, was sie hervorbringt, hinter seinem Produkt verborgen? Scheint es vielleicht nur so, genau so wie die Bilder eines Films zu bewegen scheinen, wiihrend sie die sich fortwiihrend abwechselnden Produkte einer im Dunklen bleibenden Wirksamkeit sind.( ... ) Der Mouw liisst also die Tiire zu einer riitselhaften, dunklen first world geoffnet, aber ob und wie die Verbindung zwischen der ersten und der zweiten Welt sich gestaltet, die Frage bleibt eine riitselhafte Frage. Zwar wird der der Empiric trauende 'gesunde Menschenverstand' die Sache nicht so tragisch nehmen, andererseits kann man doch nicht leugnen, dass dies ein riitselhaftes, giinstigstenfalls symbolhaftes Verhiiltnis ist. S.40, also am Schluss, sagt Der Mouw:

"Die Wahrnehmung ist selbst ein Produkt des Geistes, das zustande kommt, indem psychische Elemente (Atombewusstsein [in dem Gehirn]?) und vollig unbewusste geistige Funktionen, die Kategorien, zusammenwirken, und zwar so, dass diese Elemente das Material bringen, dass das System der Kategorien der Baumeister und die Wahrnehmung das Produkt ist."

Hier ist es ganz klar, wie sehr Der Mouws Auffassungen hinsichtlich der Kategorienlehre von Eduard von Hartmann beeinflusst worden sind (vgl. Anm.16) und dass diese ibm nicht die Sicherheit bringen konnte, nach der er sich so sehr

sehnte. Scheinbar haben wir uns bei der Behandlung dieses linguistischen Manuskripts weit von unserem Thema entfernt. Schein aber triigt auch bier, wie wir am Schluss dieses Beitrags sehn werden und wie ein letztes Zitat aus diesem Text zeigen kann: "Darum erscheint es mir genau so falsch zwischen Sprachphiinomenen und Denkarbeit nicht zu unterscheiden, wie aus der eventuellen Moglichkeit, logische Verhiiltnisse symbolisch im Raum darzustellen, von der die analytische

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Geometric ein unvergleichliches Beispiel ist, auf das Existieren im Raum einer Welt von Begriffen zu schliessen.... " Trotz oder gerade wegen dieser Unterscheidung bleibt die Frage nach dem Verhiiltnis zwischen Sprechen und Denken ein dringendes Problem. In Het absoluut idealisme wird iiber dieses Verhiiltnis Wesentliches gesagt, aber wei! dieses, sein

philosophisches Hauptwerk ja relativ bekannt ist, werde ich dariiber nur kurz berichten. Denken als senna intemus hat eine lange Geschichte hinter sich, die man bei Nuchelmans (1973), (1980) und (1983) ausfiihrlich studieren kann. In sofern bringt Der Mouw auf den ersten Blick nichts Neues. Auch die Auffassung, dass das korrekte diskursive Denken eine Jogische zwingende Verbindung von Urteilen, dass diese wieder meistens eine Verbindung von Begriffen sind, scheint nicht sehr neu. Sogar, dass Der Mouw Bolland ausfiihrlich und iiberzeugend vorwirft, dass bei ihm die logische Verbindung zwischen den Urteilen meistens fehle, eben wei! die Begriffe nicht konsequent in gleicher Bedeutung gebraucht werden, ist etwas, das eigentlich immer gefordert wird, wenn auch selten wirklich ganz befolgt. In seiner Polemik liisst Der Mouw

S.27 durchblicken, dass er Begriffe als

Wortbedeutungen auffasst, also zwei Bcreiche underscheidet. Ob diese Unterscheidung ontologisch aufgefasst werden muss, ist noch eine andere Frage, denn schon S.8 schreibt Der Mouw:

"Wir denken durch Worte, was wir auch unter Denken verstehen wollen.( ... ) Der Begriff, ega! wie wir ihn auffassen, muss an etwas Konkretes Sinnliches festgelegt werden,( ...) sie (d.h. die Worte) sind die Anker, durch die die Begriffe an den sinnlichen Menschen festgeheftet sind."

Sprache ist als etwas Gottliches verherrlicht worden (S.9). Mit Recht, aber die Sprache, die keine Individuen kennt, (Der Mouw betont offensichtlich, dass die meisten Worter Begriffe, also Allgemeines bezeichnen) macht dadurch nicht nur die Wissenschaft moglich, sie ist auch teuflich, sic ist ein Mephisto (S.lO, ein Bild, das Der Mouw - wie er es Iiebt- weiterfiihrt und unerwartet vie! spiiter wieder aufninunt). Das Teufliche ist vor allem die Mehrdeutigkeit der Worter, wiihrend Eindeutigkeit der Begriffe erste Bedingung fur klares Denken ist. Nebenbei sci gesagt, dass er bier Beispiele anfiihrt, die eben den Wert der synchronen Sprachauffassung betonen. Leider sind die meisten Denkfehler Bollands so eng an den falschen Gebrauch der niederliindischen Sprache gebunden, dass man gar nicht

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Ubersetzen kann. Es ist schade, denn oft weiss man nicht, ob man dabei lachen soli oder weinen. Meistens kann man aber doch lachen, eben wei! Der Mouw Bollands Fehler so geistreich anprangert. S.32 sagt Der Mouw abermals, wie gefiihrlich die Sprache als Denkinstrument ist. Wer nicht genau aufpasst, fiillt dauernd der teuflichen Art der Sprache zum Opfer: Sie verfiihrt zu Ieicht zu Verwechslung von Begriffen. Man braucht, um dieser Faile zu entgehen, dauernde Aufmerksamkeit und ein feines Sprachgefiihl (Fingerspitzengefiihl und Ohr). Wenn er sich zeitweise von der Polemik gegen Bolland loslOst, kommt er zu einer interessanten Betrachtung Uber den Begriff. Er ist der Meinung (etwa ab S.80), dass der Begriff nicht durch einfache Abstraktion aus der Anschauung des

Einzelnen (ofters deutsch im Text) zu stande kommt. Wir konnen, sagt er, uns nicht wirklich ganz von der Nebenvorstellung des Individuellen, beziehungsweise des Spezifischen befreien, wenn wir das Allgemeine denken. In diesem Nebengedanken ist immer ein Stellvertreter vorhanden. Metall oder Dreieck hat gewisse Eigenschaften nicht, die ein konkretes StUck Metall, die ein tatsiichlich in konkreter Form dargestelltes Dreieck hat. Man kann sie verwechseln und in der Anschauung bei dem Nebengedanken sich ein StUck Metall oder ein Dreieck mit

anderen Eigenschaften vorstellen, aber nicht ohne Eigenschaften. Daraus liisst sich folgern, dass fiir Der Mouw der Begriff irgendwie in world 2 verhaftet bleibt und g!eichzeitig, dass die Verbindung mit der ersten Welt doch auch nicht aufgegeben worden ist. Darnit bliebe aber, so scheint es, das Urteil ausserhalb der dritten Welt und der Aussage-Inhalt ebenfalls. Es mutet fremd an, ist aber von Der Mouw folgerichtig gedacht. Paradox gesagt: er braucht die dritte Welt, wei! er keine Sicherheit Uber die erste Welt erreichen kann. Deshalb muss er ein Ding an sich

im Sinne Eduard von Hartmanns riskieren. Uber den fiir das Urteil und also fiir das Denken so unentbehrlichen Begriff noch eine kurze Bemerkung. S.83 betont er, dass er 'Begriff' in zweierlei Hinsicht als ein Ideal betrachtet, das nur scheinbar durch Stellvertretung erreicht werden kann. Er mUsste niimlich zwei Bedingungen g!eichzeitig erfiillen: Der Begriff mUsste zum einen das Gemeinsame sein, das in der unbestimmten Vielheit von Individuen wohnt, und dabei mUsste das Gemeinsame selbst das einzige Objekt des Vorstellens sein, wiihrend die unbestimmte Vielheit doch mit zur Anschauung gehort, und zum anderen trotzdem idealiter von diesen Individuen getrennt und fooert sein. Beides ist unmoglich. Man bemerke, dass in der Fixierung noch der alte Begriff 'Begriff' - ante Wittgenstein - dargestellt wird.

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Dbrigens tritt statt des Begriffs normalerweise als 'Abbreviatur' das Wort, das als Fixativum doch schon unentbehrlich ist. Und so wird eine sehr enge Verbindung zwischen heiden gegeben. Folgendermassen liisst sich Der Mouws Theorie iiber das Verhiiltnis von Wort und Begriff und damit gleichzeitig von Satz und Urteil etwa zusammenfassen: Zwar muss man Sprache von einem anderen Bereich unterscheiden, d.h. Worte und Begriffe nicht identiftzieren, Siitze und Urteile ebenso wenig, und erst recht nicht Sprechen und Denken; aber andererseits sind Begriffe, Urteile als Verbindungen von Begriffen, und ist diskursives Denken als Verbindung von Urteilen eigentlich nur durch ihre sprachlichen Widerparte praktisch moglich, trotz aller Tiicken der teuflichen Sprache. Offensichtlich bleiben wir fast ausschliesslich in world 2, wei! 'Bereich' nicht auf einen ontologischen Unterschied hinzuweisen braucht. Ist dies das letzte Wort? Ich glaube nicht. Was man klar denken kann, kann man auch klar sagen. Genau das geht Bolland Ieider ab. Ein Beispiel soil hier doch noch geboten werden, wei! es uns den weiteren Weg von Der Mouw zeigen konnte. Bolland macht keinen Unterschied zwischen 'besef und 'begrip'. Obwohl beide unter Umstiinden mit 'Begriff

iibersetzt werden konnen - und wer weiss,

vielleicht hat dieser Umstand den Neu-Hegelianer beeinflusst -, ist der Unterschied sehr gross. Der Mouw bespricht ilm (1905 = IV) S.38ff. 'Begrip' hat mit begreifen, verstehen zu tun, ist zwar auch von conceptus zu unterscheiden, gehort aber doch dem Denken an, d.h. man darf nur von 'begrip' sprechen, wenn es moglich ist rational von dem, was man begreift, Rechenschaft zu geben. 'Besef hingegen ist etwas, sogar eine Wahrheit, tief empfinden, vor allem, wenn man nicht im stande ist zur rationalen Rechenschaft, jedenfalls das Bediirfnis dazu eben nicht hat. Und Der Mouw, der in Het absoluut idealisme noch ernsthaft versucht, der Hypothese eines eher die erste Welt vertretenden Dinges an sich nachzugehen, auf diese Weise von den himmlichen Eigenschaften der Sprache gebrauch zu machen, verwirft am Ende diese Moglichkeit. Als Instrument zum philosophischen Denken (im his jetzt gemeinten Sinne) verfehlt die Sprache fiir Der Mouw ihr Ziel. Darin

unterscheidet er sich gerade von Bolland. Er sagt sich von Wissenschaft und Philosophie los; in vielen Gedichten spricht er es deutlich aus, z.B. Der Mouw (1986), 8.36-37. Nur Erkenntnistheorie war auf diesem Weg moglich gewesen und eine rein hypothetische Ontologie. Eine metaphysische Sprache, die nicht mehr in Siitzen spricht, nicht mehr in Urteilen Begriffe mit einander verbindet, sondern symbolisch und metaphorisch das metaphysische 'besef aussagt, die Sprache blieb

ihrn under wurde einer der grossten Dichter seiner Muttersprache 18 • 277

M.F.Fresco

Man kann es auch so sagen: Der Dichter Der Mouw !Osst das ontologische Problem im Sinne einer Identitatsphilosophie: Subjekt und Objekt sind zwei Seiten der selben Medaille; die Welt ist Selbstentfaltung des Subjekts. So iibernimmt Der Mouw die These 'Die Welt is meine Vorstellung.' Das kann er, well das grosse gottliche Weltsubjekt, oft Brahman genannt, mit dem kleinen individuellen Subjekt (als Funken des Weltfeuers oder als Tropfen im Weltozean dargestellt) identisch ist. Ohne sich explizite dariiber auszusprechen, hatte Der Mouw die Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit unterschrieben; aber wie dieses Korrespondieren vor sich geht, und erst recht, wie wir uns die Art dieser Korrespondenz denken miissen, ist - auch nach meiner Meinung - eine ungeloste, vielleicht eine unlosbare Frage. Schon in seiner Lingua-Rezension hatte Der Mouw das Ratselhafte dieser Verbindung zwischen der ersten Welt einerseits und der zweiten (und dritten) Welt andererseits betont. In seiner philosophischen Prosa, also hauptsachlich in Het abso/uut idea/isme, hatte er sich durch eine ausserst riskant genannte Hypothese, die des Dinges an sich, gewissermassen als Aussenwelt aufgefasst, weiter vorwarts gewagt, aber die Hypothese eines zwar ebenfalls ratselhaften Weltsubjekts oder Welt-x war fiir ihn ein geringeres Wagnis, das er iiberdies als Dichter nicht durch Argumente zu verantworten brauchte.Als Philosoph im Alltagsleben scheint er iibrigens Agnostiker geblieben zu sein.Aber auch rein philosophisch lasst sich verstehen, dass diese Hypothese die einfachere ist: Welt 1 ist mit Welt 2 (sogar mit Welt 3) identisch: Das Riitsel der Korrespondenz ist zum Scheinproblem geworden 19. Aber die Moglichkeit, dass Siitze (gerade "ewige Siitze") und Urteile (Un)wahrheitstriiger sein konnen und also auch einer third world angehOren konnen, scheint mir von dieser Identitatshypothese nicht beeintrachtigt zu werden.

ANMERKUNGEN 1.

Nuchelmans (1974: 45-51) (in niederliindischer Ubersetzung auch in Nuchelmans (1976: 129-141).

2.

Nuchelmans (1973; 1980; 1983).

3.

Fiir 'Satz' und 'Urteil' im Deutschen siehe z.B. Nuchelmans (1983: Kap.

4.

Spater gehe ich genauer auf die Frage ein, wie Der Mouw dies gemeint

13.4).

hat. Er fordert dies fiir alles !dare, diskursive Denken. In seiner Poesie 278

Uber das Verhiiltnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt jedoch liebt er es, verblasste und vergessene Etymologien als Metaphorik zu neuem Leben zu erwecken. Beispiele frndet man durch das Register (S.313-330) in Fresco (1984). 5.

Quine (1970: Kap. I).

6.

Fiir diese Ausdriicke werde ich mich weitgehend dem

iiblichen

technischen Sprachgebrauch anschliessen, also z.B. 'intensional' in enge Verbindung mit 'semantisch' setzen. 7.

Z.B.

der Mouw (1942-51: VI 257-387) Die gemeinte Stelle (VI S.315):

"Eine Ubersetzung is wie cine beschlagene Brille, die die Bedeutungsschattierung, wie ein schmutziger Trichter, der das Aroma verdirbt. Nur das Unbedeutende, das Wertlose kann ohne grossen Schaden iibertragen werden".- Dbersetzungen aus dem Niederliindischen sind von mir MFF. Von deren geringem Wert bin ich mir also bewusst. 8.

Popper (1967; 1968 ( = 1972: kap. 3 und 4)); (1974).

9.

Selbst hat Der Mouw seine Doktorarbeit, wie damals iiblich, lateinisch verfasst, in den Kantstudien 1908 auf Deutsch cine Buchbesprechung veroffentlicht, ferner etwa 30 lateinische, 6 griechische, 2 franzosische und ein deutsches Gedicht geschrieben. Dber Der Mouw gibt es auf Deutsch die Zusammeufassung von Fresco (1971: 671-687). Fiir den Leser der niederliindischen Sprache ist die beste Moglichkeit bis jetzt, ihn kennen zu lernen, der in Anmerkung 4 genannte Sammelband, der etwa 20 Artikel von verschiedenen Autoren enthiilt.

10.

In den Niederlanden kannte und kennt man keine Habilitationsschrift und cine gute Doktorarbeit erfiillt also den doppelten Zweck.

11.

Die Tochter, Frau H.H. Patijn-der Mouw, war so liebenswiirdig, mir vor einigen Jahren als einzigem schriftlich die Erlaubnis zu erteilen, aus dem Nachlass ihres Vaters alles zu veroffentlichen, was von wissenschaftlicher oder literarischer Bedeutung erscheint, beziehungweise die Veroffentlichung zu veranlassen. Dafiir danke ich ihr recht herzlich.

12.

Dber diese Doktorarbeit orientiert man sich am besten durch Cram-Magre (1962: 9-12). Auch Fresco (1971) und Fresco (1984) bieten manches: Man benutze die Register.

13.

Der Mouws Poesie ist gerade neu herausgegeben worden und zwar in einer bereicherten Form, die viele nicht in Brahman enthaltene, sogar manche noch nie eher veroffentlichte Gedichte bringt: Der Mouw (Adwaita) (1986).

14.

Siebe z.B. Nuchelmans (1983: 70ff) und Noordegraaf (1985: 453-490).

279

M.P. Fresco 15.

Uber Hoogvliet siehe z.B. Noordegraaf, S. 473-476 u.o. und Hesseling (1924: 86-96) (mit Bibliographie). Nach Koster sind die Angaben Hesselings manchrnal ungenau: Koster (1925).

16.

Adriaans (1986: 1-20). Der beste, verhaltnismassig kurze Dberblick iiber seine Kategorienlehre bringt Ed. von Hartmann selbst in System der Philosophie im Gnmdriss, Band I: Grundriss der Erkenntnislehre, Bad

Sachsa im Harz 1907, 8.128-222. Natiirlich ist der weite Dberblick s.v. in

J. Ritter u.a. (Hrsg.), Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie Band IV, Spalte 714-776, sehr interessant. 17.

Vg. Anm. 11.

18.

Eine schone Vorahnung bietet schon Ret absoluut idealisme S.62-63, eine Stelle die man ganz lesen muss. Jedenfalls kann, • sagt Der Mouw - wer Metaphorik und Symbolsprache meidet, zwar ein guter Mathematiker, aber kein guter Psychologe und erst recht nicht ein guter Metaphysiker sein. ( ... ) Die Dichterseele ist die unbewusste Prophetin, aus der die Allwissenheit Orakel spricht, und das Bild (im Sinne der Bildersprache MFF) ist die Enthiillung, ehrfurchtsvoll von dem Priester Verstand entratselt.

19.

Uber die 'Brahman-Hypothese' siehe Fresco (1971: Band I, 11ft). Dafiir, dass der Dichter nicht zu argumentieren braucht, siehe Fresco (1984: 120ft).

280

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297

INDEX OF PASSAGES QUOTED OR REFERRED TO

Adam Wodeham Lectura secunda

I Ordinatio

III Ordinatio

pro!. q.l pro!. q.4 pro!. q.6 d.1 qq 1-9 d.1 q.1 d.1q.2 d.1 q.4 d.23

185-86 180 178-79 185-86 177,179,182 182 179, 185 178

d.1 q.12 d.1 q.13 d.1 q.14 d.33 q.1 q.2

176, 177-78 177 186 177 177,182

Ordinatio Oxoniensis Albert the Great In Perihermeneias

185

380a-b

Alphonsus Prado Medulla Dyalectices Quaestiones Dialecticae Ammonius In librum Aristotelis De interpretatione

139

209 210,212

130.23-26 131.2-4 133.15-16 134.25 134.28 136.2 136.3 136.14-15 136.30-137.4 137.13-14 138.11-139.20 141.18-25 143.17-22 144.9-14 145.9-19 145.29-31 147.20-22 148.9-10 148.21-22 154.10-12

Antonius Silvester Dialectices (... )pars prima

89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 88-9 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89

209,211,213,214

299

Aristoteles Categoriae

De interpretatione

1, 1a16-19 2,1a16 4, 2a4-10 2a7-10 13b10-11 5, 4a24-25 4a34-b13 4a37 7,8b22 10 10, 12bl0-16 12b15 12b38-40 13a2-3 11, 14al0-14 12, 14a26ff 12, 14b9ff 12b15

60 58 49 60 60 40 33 40 41 68 34,57 43 89 89 34 34 34 36,56

1, 16a 16a7-8 16a12 16a12-13 16a12-18 16a30-2 3, 16b19-23 16b22-23 16b24-25 4 4, 16a22 16b1 16b26-28 17a2-3 17a8-9 17all 18b30-32 19a28 19a33 19b19 21a29 21b24 5,17a17 17al9 17a27 17b2-9

10 37 58 47 49 36 35 57 53 78 40 40 40,42 42,63 42 40 63 40 40 40 40 40 42 41 41 41

6, 17a20-26 17a33-34 7, 17a38 9 9,18a36 18b2 19a36-38 10,19b7 19b19ff 19b21-22 11,20b29 21a22 300

41 43 38 63,78,86 42 42 89 43 59 59,61 41 43

21a38ff 12, 17a2-3 21b3-5 21b5-10 21b19 21b20 21b26-32 22b12 14, 23b24-32 24b7 16b20 16a3 16a4-8 16a5 16b23 16b24-25 16b28-30 21a39-b3 21b28 18a34-35 18b4 19b5 I 1, 24b17 I 3, 16b22-5 I46, 52a32 II 27, 70a32

43 40 40,43 40 42 42 36 42 43 43 206 190 125 191 33 106 40 56 56 89 66 134 60 60 47 38

Anal. Posteriora

I 2, 71b12 72a2b 72a11 72a12 I 4, 73b23 I 11, 77a10ff II 19, 100b8-11

56 56 41 43 42 42 57

Topica

I 5, 102a19 I 8, 103b8 I 18, 108a21 VI 13, 150b22-26 14, 151a20-32

37 37 37 58 58

Physica

Ill, 225a21 Il3,195a21 III8, 208a15-16 IV6, 213b24-27 IV14, 223b25 V3, 226b30 V4,227b28 VII, 225a6 VIII8, 263a17-18

58 58 37 56 37 37 37 43 37

Metaphysica

A3,984a18 A6, 987bl-10 A9, 990b D7, 1012a2-5 1017a31-3 1017a34 1017b23-24

37 3 9 59 47,49 59 59

Anal. Priora

301

D29, 1024b23-24 1024b24-26 E E2,1026a35 E4, 1027b18-29 1027b19 1027b291028al 1027b25-27 1027b27-35 1027b291028al Z11,1036b3 Z12 H6,1045bll ThlO, 1051blff 1051b2-5 1051b2-62 1051b9-13 1051b24-25 1051b32-35 I7, 1057a34 K8, 1065a21-24 1065a22 K11, 1067b18 1067b25 1067b26 L7, 1072b19-21 1072b21 L9, 1047b381075a3 N2,1089a28

37 48

Ethica Nic.

II3, 1105b5 IV6, 1126b12 VI2, 1139a21 VI2, 1139a21-26 VI9, 1142b12-13 1142bl3 IJClO, 1171a13-14 )(4, 1173a24

36 36 57 45 57 42 37 58

Ethica Eut.

VII12, 1245bl3

58

Rhetorica

Il, 1354a13 Il, 1354b17 Il, 1355a2 1355a19 17, 1364b8-9 III4, 1415b6

37 37 37 37 47 37

Rhetorica ad AI.

23, 143b34

58

Poetica

6, 1449b35 1450a5 1450a32 14, 1453b2-5 1454a13-14

58 58 58 37 37

302

38 38 44 48 46,48, 51, 59 58 52 44 57 52 57 44 58 48 46 36 46 42 46 43 60 45,57 36,43 48 58 58 57

De generat. an.

18, 325a17-18

37

De partibus an.

15, 545a34-36 Ill, 646a12

58 58

De anima

14, 407b31 III6, 430a26-27 430a27 430a27-28 430a27-b1 430b1-4 430b2 430b4-6 II17,431b30 HIS, 432all

58 58 58 47 50 50 59 50 206 58

Soph.El.

1, 165a6 4, 166a23-32 11, 171b3 16, 175a8 19, 177a31 22, 178a26 24, 179a28

36 58 42 37 37 37 37

Meteorologica

1V1, 397a32-b1

37

Arnold of Tongeren Epitomata Augustine De Trinitate

210,211

XI,II,2 XI,II,5

131, 139 139

Augustinus Niphus Expositiones in Aristotelis libros Metaphysices

114

Bartholomeus de Usingen Exercitium veteris artis

211-12,214

Boethius Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis 1.106.25-Il.230.3 Peri hermeneias 1.108.4-5 1.113.12-114.24 1.115.30-31 1.125.16-22 1.126.17-21 II.77.13ff II.188.14-204.25 II.193.24-201.2-6 II.193.6-245.9-12 II.208.1-18 II.210.15-215.16-19 II.213.26-28

90 91 96 91 88 91 60 89 88 91 92 96 92 303

Cicero Acad. Pr. II Demosthenes Orationes

95

XX, 158

56

Domingo de Soto Summulae

191

Eckius Aristotelis Stagyrites Dialectica

213

Gregory of Rimini I Lectura prot. q. 1

182

Jacobus Naveros Expositio super duos libros Perihermeneias

208, 210,212-13 208-9

Preparatio dialectica Johannes de Burgo I Sent. q.2

161,177

Johannes Celaya Dialectice introductiones

209

Johannes Dullaert Textus Perihermeneias Aristotelis

212-14

Johannes de Lap ide Liber artis logice Porphyrii et Aristotelis

214

Johannes Raulin In logicam Aristotelis: Commentarium

209, 211, 213

Johannes Versor Quaestiones( ... ) in veterem artem Aristotelis

211,214

Johannes Duns Scotus In duos libros Perihermeneias Quaestiones ('Opus I')

304

533a 539a-b 540a 540b 541a 541b 541b-542a 542a 542b-543a 543a 543b 542b-543a 544a 544b 546a

135 135 136 135,213 214,213 136 210 137-7,212 136 137,212 136 136 213 136

551a 551b-552a 552a 553a 553b-554a 555a-b 568a-b Q.X Q.XII Q.XIII

138 135, 138 135 135 136-38 138 138 138 138 138

In duos libros Perihermeneias quaestiones octo ('Opus II') 581-582b 583a 583b 583b-594a 584a 588b 593b-594a 594b 596a

136 136 137-37,213 137 137 137 138 138 138

Opus Oxoniense I dist. 27 q.3 n.l9

137

Ord. I. d. 27 qq. 1-3 n. 83

208

John of Glogovia Argumentum in librum porphirii peripatetici ysagogium

211,214

John Mair Quaestiones logicales

211

John of St. Thomas Cursus philosophicus thomisticus

211

Mainz, Logicians of Modernorum de collegia Magentino exercitata librorum Perihermeneias clarissima

210,214

Michael of Paris Questiones veteris ac nove logice ... ad intentionem doctoris Scoti

213

Peter Aureol I Scriptum d.3 q.14

180

Peter Ceffons In I Sent. q.21

175

Peter of Spain Expositio de anima

p. 33.58-33.62

116

305

Petri Hispani Summulae

f. 264r+v f. 264v-265r f. 265r f. 265v f. 265v-266r f. 266v f. 268v-269r f. 267r f. 267v f. 267v-268r f. 268r f. 270r-v f. 270v f. 308v-309r

112 113 113 113 114 114-15 115 115 116-17 118 118 119 117 119

Tractatus

p. 11.25-12.2 p. 12.8-16 p. 200.11-12 p. 210.9-25

111 111 114 114

Petrus Crockaert de Bruxellis Acutissime questiones et quidem perutiles in singulos Aristotelis logicales libros

211,213,214

Petrus Tartaretus Commentarii in Isagogas Porphyrii

211-13

Plato Charmides

159A

5

383A 383-390A 383B 384C 384D 385 385B-C 385C 386A2 386D-E 387B-C 388B 389A 389B-C 390E1 396A 397A 420B 421D 422AB 424D-425A 422C-E 425A,E 426B 429A-433C 433E 433E-434A

12,31 10 11 12 12 11 19 19 32 15 13 16 13 15 32 13 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 13

Cratylus

306

Euthydemus

283C8ff 283E5-6 284Dl

33 32-33 32

Eutyphro

5D 6D

5 5

Hippias Major

287C-D 288A 292C 300A

5 5 5 5

Laches

190D 192A-C

5

Lysis

222E

5

Meno

71D 72E 81A-D

5 5

Parmenides

35 135B-D

25 8

Phaedo

72E-77E 73A9 76B5-7 97D-E 97-100 lOOB 103B3

30 30 30 24 23 8,9 32

Philebus

15B 15D 16 349B3-4

25 25 25 32

VII 507B 507B-C 523E-524D 538D6-E3 342B 218C4 229E-230E 244D3 257B-C 260 260E 261C6ff 261C-D 261Dff 261D-262C 262A-B 262C3-5 26202-5 263

9,30 30 30 30 10 32 32 32 6,8-9 19 28

202A5-9

30

Prot agoras Republic

Seventh Letter Sophist

Symposium

5

30

5

55 19 19 19 29 29,59 19

307

183 189 189D7-E3 189E4-190A6 190A 190A5 197E4 263A 263C

11 8 30 42 29 29 32 20 21

Priscian Inst. Gramm.

VIII.63

116

Ralph of Beauvais Glose super Donatum

p. 30.2-5

116

Theaetetus

Robert Holcot I Sent. q.2

187

Sebastian Couto Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae

211

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos

VII 65ff

1

Simplicius Commentary on Aristotle's Categories (CIAG)

p. 407.6-13

87-88

Stephanus In Aristotelis De interpretatione commentaria p. 43.19

59

Walter Burley Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias

139

Walter Chatton Lectura in I Sent., pro!. q.1

176,187

Y..... 1

:rathorn :sent q.1

184 184

I Sent. q.2 William of Ockham Ordinatio I Ord., prol., q.1 I Ord., d. 27, q.3 Quodlibeta

214 179-80 180

IV, q.16

V,5

308

185 179

Summa Logicae

Tractatus de praedestinatione

I c.14 I c.22 I c.26 I c.63 II c.2 II c.22 111.1 c.1 111.1 c.2 111.1 c.3 111.3 c.1 111.3 c.7 111.3 c.8 III.3 c.15 111.3 c.38 111.3 c.39 111.3c.41 111.3 c.42 111.3 c.46 III.4 c.5

139 72

87 139 139 156 156 156 156 156-59 157 157 157 157 158 158 158 158 159 158

309

INDEX OF NAMES

Abelard Ackrill, J. Adam Wodeham Claudius Alberius Albert the Great Albert of Saxony Alexander of Aphrodisias Al-Farabi Alphonsus Prado

119 40, 55-58, 90, 135 161-187 208 127, 131, 135, 139 122 64,66-67 92 189, 194, 199, 201-3, 212

Alstedius, Johann Ammonius Anaximander Johannes Arboreus Aristophanes Aristoteles

225 66-69, 89,96,135 2 208 6 3-63 passim, 65, 1067, 110, 118, 121-24, 233-35, 146, 189-90, 197, 200, 206, 227-28, 236 202 100 134-35, 162 139 114 16 11

Arnold of Tongeren Ars Meliduna Ashworth, J .E. Augustinus Augustinus Niphus Austin,J. Avicenna

Tiberius Bacilerius Hieronymus Balduinus Balic, Chr. Bartholomeus de Usingen Berkeley, G. Berlin, I. Bird, 0. Boehner, Ph. Boethius Martinus Borrhaus Bolland, G.J.P.J. Bolzano, B. Bonitz, H. Bosanquet, B. Braakhuis, H.A.G. Brown,S.F.

208 208 121-22, 134-39 211 16 241 157 152, 158 60, 63-99 passim, 190 208 229, 234, 265-66, 27576 243-256 passim 43,57-58 234-235 112,117,119 139

Carnap, R. Carneades Cartwright, R.L. Chomsky, N. Chrysippus

252 64 241 267 64 311

Cicero Comenius Courtenay, W.

64,87 226 172

Demosthenes Der Mouw, J.A. Descartes, R. Domingo de Soto Drobisch, M.W. Dummett,M. Dijksterhuis, W.J.

56 259-80 Passim 8, 121 191 121 17,26 227

Eckius Epicurus Euclid Euripides Exner, F. von

203,213 64 235 6,25 251

Fichte, J.W. Laurentius Florentinus Fonseca, P. Frege, G.

234,236 208 226 19-22, 227-28, 248, 262

Gal, G. Gale, R. Garceau, B. Gerard of Harderwijk Goclenius Goethe, J.W. Gonsalvus of Spain Goclenius Gorgias of Leontini Green, R. Gregory of Rimini Guthrie, W.K.C.

161,163 92 116,119 210ff 225 218-19 133 225 1-3,8 158 161 57

Hartmann, Ed. von Hartmanus Hegel, G.W.F. Heraclitus Hintikka Hospinianus Hoogvliet, J.M. Husser!, E. Huygens, Chr.

271,274 172,186 216-237 passim 2 60,64 235 264-73 passim 248,251,255 219

Isaac, J.

89

Jacobus Naveros

189-214 passim

312

John of Glogovia John Mair John of St. Thomas Jungius

133 225 161, 177 192-93 189,202-3,206 206 162-63, 170 189-202,212 206 114, 189, 201-2, 209, 212 121-139 passim, 162, 171,189,200-6,209 211 202,213 199,202,209,235 235

Kahn, Ch. Kant, I. Kaufmann, W. Kirwan, Chr. Knuuttila, S. Kretzmann, N.

31,55 121,229,257,259-60 221 38-39, 52,56 94,96-97 99, 135, 159

Gaspar Lax Leibniz, G.W. Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples Lemosius, L. Lenin Libera, A. de Locke, J. Lohr, Ch. Lukasiewicz

208 251 208 208 217 138 1 122,134 63-65, 68, 75

McDowell, J.H. Magentinus Magister Abstractionum Johannes de Magistris Francesco de Mayro Mainz, Logicians of Marsilius of Inghen Marx, K. Matthen, M. Meinong, Alexis Melanchton Thomas de Mercado Michael of Paris Lambertus de Monte Moody,E.A. Morgan, A. de Mullaly, J.P. Mullick, M.

54 208 173 208 208 199 122 217,226 4 248 226 208 204,211,212 213-14 152, 159, 186 235 111 152,159

James of Casceto Jevons, W. Johannes de Burgo Johannes Celaya Johannes Dullaert Johannes de Lapide Johannes de Rodington Johannes Raulin Johannes Versor John Buridan John Duns Scotus

313

Newton, I. Nicostratus Nuchelmans, G.

219 64 33, 39, 41-41, 54, 5558, 60, 91, 99, 110, 113, 114, 121, 129, 131-135 passim,161, 168, 174, 189, 209, 256-57,259

Ong, W.J.

226

Julius Pacius Johannes Parrent Joachim Perion Pescator Peter of Ailly Peter Aurea! Peter Ceffons Peter Lombard Peter of Spain

208 208 208 217 190,192 165,171,173 161 165 99-119 passim, 131, 135, 155 189,199,201,205,211 121, 217, 222, 225-26, 236-37 189,211 121,123,134,139,174 2-63 passim, 217 208 121 263,270 65,66 199 54 125,134 251 116 66,235

Petrus Crockaert de Bruxellis Petrus Ramus Petrus Tartaretus Pinborg, J. Plato Angelus Politianus John Ponce Popper, K. Porphyry Hieronymus Prado Prauss, G. Prentice,R. Prihonsky, F. Priscian Proclus Protagoras

Quine, W.V.

Ralph of Beauvais Petrus Rauledius Rescher, N. Richard Campsall Richard FitzRalph Richard Kilvington Rickert, H. Risse, W. Robert Holkot Honoratus de Robertis Robinson, R. Roger Bacon Roorda, T. Ross, D. 314

24

18,26,252,260-63

116

208 92

171, 173 168, 170, 172, 182-85 170, 186 248,255 111 161-187 passim 208 10,13,26 131, 189 267 38

Russell, B. Ruygh, C.J. Rijk, L.M. de

21,248,253 55 113, 119, 136, 139

Saussure, F. de Antonius Scaynus Jacob Scheck Schepers, H. Schelling, F.W.J. Sebastian Couto Sextus Empiricus Sharples, R. Simplicius Socrates Sophocles Sorabji, R. Spade, P.V. Johannes Stobnicensis Stump, E. Francesco Suarez Syrian us

267 208 208 161, 168, 172 221 211

Taurellus (Ochslein) Thales Thomas Aquinas

225

1

67-68 64,87-88 2-6,22-25 56 64,87,92 137 208 158 225 66

1

Thomas Bricot Thomists Thomisits, Cologne Tredennick, H. Trendelenburg, A. J odocus Trutvetter

100, 111, 116, 119, 189, 197, 204-6, 209, 213 208 100 204-5 60 224 208

Uberweg,F.

226

Laurentius Valla Verbeke, G. Gaspar Cardillus Villalpandeus Vergilius

208 135 208 269

Walter Burley Walter Chatton

132, 139 132, 159, 161-187 passim 208 139 131, 139 132, 161-187 passim 69,124

Erasmus Wansidel Weisheipl, J.A. William Arnauld William of Crathorn William of Moerbeke

315

William of Ockham

William of Sherwood William of Ware Windelband, Fr. Wittgenstein, L. Wolff, Chr. Wood, R.

121-22, 133-34, 139, 141-159 passim, 161189 passim, 203, 206, 209,213 119,135,138,155 133 248 15-17,248,276 225 159

Xenophon

6

Marcus Antonius Zimara Zimmermann, A.

208 92-93,119

316

INDEX OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS

Act, temporally-limited mental

194

Actual

126

Actus Compositio actus uniti

103

In actu exercito

49,58

In actu significato

58

Adiacere

61

Ad placitum

190

Ad placitum consecutive

190,203

Ad placitum proprie

203

Affectus animae

115

Alethes Alethes aoristos

68

Alethes aphorismenos

68

Allgemeinbildung

269

Anamnesis

30

Anapherein

30

Anti-determinism

87

Aphorismenos

88

Apophainesthai

41

Apophansis

41-42

Apophantics

119

Apophasis

41,49

Apprehendere

106

Arguments, transcendental vs. metaphysical

8

Assent, evident

165

Assertible or statable complex

44

Asserting

41

Act of asserting Assertion

51 80

Boethius' evaluation of assertion

82

Propositions and assertions

80

Super-strong truth conditions on assertions of 'erit'

83 317

Assertoric Priority of the Assertoric function

19

Simple assertoric proposition

20

Aussage-Inhalt Aussage-Inhalt einer falscher Aussage Autjunction Autjunctive

259 261-62 202 233

Be, to Nomadic functor 'be'

54,58

As an awareness (nota) of composition

164

Bedeutung

262

Begriff

260,272,277

Begriffe als Wortbedeutungen

275

'Wie entsteht das Begriff?'

272

Being

201

Notion of being

30-31

Qua truth

27

Veridical Notion of factual being

110

Bezeichnung

202

Bivalence

87

Aristotle on bivalence

63

Assertional truth values and broad bivalence

86

Denial of universal bivalence

64

Laws of bivalence

63

Narrow and broad bivalence

77

Universal bivalence

73

Categorematic Categorematic expressions

6

Categorematic terms

5

Category Category oversimplification Change, problem of

200 217 1

Cognition intuitive cognition

166

intuitive cognition of non-existent objects

166

318

30

Cognitive procedure Cognoscere

106

Complex, assertible or statable

44

Complexe significabile

100,161,171,173,175

Development of the complexe significabile

161

Motivation for the hypothesis of the complexe

161

significabile Complexum

171

Componere

106

Compositio As simple being

108

Being effected by the verb 'esse'

107

Compositio actus cum substantia

102

Compositio actus uniti

103

Compositio actus ut distantis

103

Compositio generalis vel specialis

107, 117

Compositio modorum significandi

102

Compositio qualitatis cum substantia

102

Compositio rerum

102,127

Composition as a relation

103

Composition cannot be done without the composita Composition in the mind

106

corresponds to

Composition in the outside world

100, 101

Composition of the modes of signifying

102,104

Composition of the noun

106

Composition of things

102

Objective composition

99

Propositional composition

101, 106

Concept Refers to a temporally-limited mental act

194

Non-ultimate concept

195

Ultimate concept

198

Conceptus conceptus formalis

205

conceptus obiectivus

205

Connectives, truth-functional

233

Consciousness, historical

216

Consentire

106

319

Consequences

141ff

Absolute or simple

143

As-of-now (ut nunc)

143

Eight general rules of consequences

146

Some are formal

144

Some hold by an extrinsic means

143

Some hold by an intrinsic means

143

Some are material

144

Ockharn's theory of consequences

141, 143

Ockharn's three basic divisions of consequences overlap

145

Rules of consequences

146

Values of consequences

141

Contingent Contingent future events Contingently true propositions

70 126

Contradicentia

217

Contradictio

217

Contradiction Dialectical contradiction

216

Logical contradiction

216

Contradictory

218

Contrary

218

Copula

200,233

Cosmos, unified

1

Cumulativity assumption

202,215

Deduction, rules of

215

Definition Definition by abstraction

250

Socrates' interest in definition

3-4

Deflation Deflationist positions Demonstration Scientific demonstration

239 242 142 165

Denkarbeit

274

Denying, act of

51

Determinateness

22

320

Determinism

63-65

Boethius on truth and logical determinism

69

Logical determinism

70,87

Determinist

79,86

The determinist's arguments Dialectics Dialectical contradictions Dianoia

142,215 216 45,51

Dianoia including its effect

57

Dianoia oppposed to pragma

39

Dici de omni et nullo

141, 147

Dictum, Abelardian

166

Dihaeresis

27,48

Diheiresthai

46

Dionomazein

54

Discourse Destruction of all discourse

8

Nature of discourse

6

Significance of all discourse

8

Discussion, rules for

215

Disjunction, inclusive

230

'Disjunktion', Newton's

219

Disposition, of the subject or predicate

101

Diverse

201

Division

129

Dynarnis

30,53

Ede, expressing logical proximity

59

Einai As a monadic functor

27

Qua syncategorematic container of categorial being

27

Ekthesis

228

Empiricism

23

Plato's refutation of relativistic empiricism En ergois

4 23

321

Ens Ens quodammodo

108

Actus essendi

107

Entities In what sense are propositions, statements etc. dubious entities?

149

Intensional entities

130-31

Enuntiabile

100

The object of assent, or enuntiabile is only complexly signifiable

166

Enuntiare

106

Enuntiatio

122

Enuntiatio analysed as threefold: spoken, written and mental Esse

130 204

'Est' 'Est' a tertium adiacens

128

'Est' means the composition

101

'Est' as a mere container

109

Significative composition of 'est' is limited to indicating composition Treatment of 'Est'

117 101

Ethics

215

Existence

35

Existential

110

Explication

229

Explications, in Carnap's sense

252

Experience, of illusion

166

Exploration, of psychology and epistemology

164

Expression, statement-making

27

Extensional

260

Extremorum, convenientia

189

Factual

110,124

Fact

242

Special status of facts

256

'Fallacy' der Paraphrase

261

322

Falsehood

44,46,50,107

Falsehood called logos pseudes

38

Falsehood called hOs pragma pseudos

38

Different senses of falsehood Falsity, definite truth or falsity of futuretense statements

67

Forms Absolute forms

6

Inner complexity in forms

25

Knowability of the forms

6

Theory of forms

3

Function, Frege's distinction between object and concept or function

21

Functor Einai as a monadic functor

27

Monadic functor

44,54,58

Negative functor

50

Future-tense statements, definite truth or falsity of

67

Generalizations, universal

228

Gordian knot

18

Grammar, standard conjunctions of

21

Grammarian Of the 12th century

110

Territory of the grammarian vs. that of the logician

102

Haecceltas

131

Homoiomata

122

Humanities

215

Ignoratio elenchi

3

IUocution

17

Immutatio

194 323

Implication, material and strict

152ff.

Impositor, of language

199,207

Inclination Towards reality

103

Double inclination of an act towards a substance

103, 105

Inclusive

230

Individual

44

'Floating individual' ('individuum vagum')

228

Individualization

123

Inductive thesis

23

Inference No difference between inference and judgment

235

Obligational inference

156

Ockham's theory of inference

152

Infinite verb

109

Inflation

239

Inflationist position

242

Information, objective

261

Insolubles

141,148

Instantiation, existential

228

Intellection

123

Intellect us Duplex est operatio intellectus

134

Verum et falsum sunt in intellectu componente vel dividente

135

Intensional

130,131,260

Intuitive cognition, of non-existent objects

164

Judicium

106, 162

Judgment

235

Kataphasis

40-42,44

Kategorie

271

Knowledge, Chatton's and Ockham's theory of

162

324

Language Acquisition of language

18

Assertoric function of language

17

Assimilation of language to instruments

15-16

Conventionalist vs objectivist views of language

10

Fact of language

8

Impositor of language

199,207

Language has an objective and independent nature

14

Philosophical nature of language

21

Plato's philosophy of language

7

Semantic philosophies of language

16, 17, 19

Sophists' impetus to investigations of language

13

Spoken and written language

122

Universal language

12

Universal proto-history of language

13

Law, third

235

Legein, level of

27,28,43,53

Logic Classical logic

216

Dichotornic logic

232

Hegelian logic

215,217

Logic of Light and Darkness

218

Logic of polarities

228

Modern logic

215-16

Modern logic shuns contradictions

215

Priority of pre-Aristotelian logic

217

Twentieth century logic

215

Logician

102

Logos

27,41,53

And some related concepts

40

apophantikos

40-41,47

apophatikos

42,53

Appears to have a dual characteristic

28

Aristotle's logos an assertible or statable complex

32

Aristotle's semantics of logos

44

Aristotelian logos as such does not equafour 'statement'

40

Close relationship between logos and pragma

32

Einai of a logos

35 325

En logois

23

Etymology of logos

27-LB

As a more-than-one-word-expression

29

Logos eiremenos

53

Logos kataphatikos

42

Meaning

260

Name bearer model of meaning

7

Distinctionbetween "meaningfulness' and "meaning"

12

Mentitur, mentitus est

81

Mention

262

Metaphysics, possibility of a rational speculative

1-2

Mind, and its activities

105

Monadic

61

Category of negation always monadic

227

Einai as a monadic functor

27

Monadic functor

44,54,58

Mutual Mutual contradictories

22B

Mutual contraries

22B

Mutual subcontraries

22B

Name Name bearer model of semantics

7

Proper names vs general names

7

Naming

41

Naturalism

2

Necessary Necessarily true propositions

126

Necessity or impossibility

145

Negation

107

Category of negation

227

Relative negation

226-27

Relative negation of concepts

229

Relative sentence negation

22B

Norms, absolute

2

Not-being, qua falsehood

326

21

Nota

166, 190

Notitia

192

Notitia abstractiva

209

Notitia intuitiva

209

Noun, signifies both a substance and a quality

102

Object Adequate object of a proposition

172

First formal object of logic

133

Frege's distinction between object and concept or function

21

Object of scientific knowledge

165,167,169

Things themselves as the object of knowledge

171

Objective Theory of objective existence Objekt

99 27

Obligations

141, 148

One

201

Onoma

10, 19, 27, 53

Orthotes onomaton

12,15

Onomazein, level of

27,28,43,53

Opponent and respondent, in an obligations disputation

149

Ousia

32

Particulars, idea of pure

21

Passio

125,190,205

Perception, complexity of the object of

24

Perlocution

17

Phanai

42

Phasis

42,44

Philosophy, political

215

Polarity principle of dichotomic polarity

220

topic of polarities

221

Positio

149-50

Positum

149-50 327

Pragma

31, 41, 44, 51-53

Aristotle's view of

33

Close relationship between logos and pragma

32

Different sense of

36

Precise meaning of

31

Opposed to dianoia

39

Translated as 'state of affairs'

133

Predicable

44

Predication

83,88

Objective predication

5

Polyadic predication as a feature of logical syntax

227

Predication vs identity

7

Problems regarding predication

7

Two piece and three piece predication

54

Predicative complex

44

Probable

142

Propositio

260

Proposition

242,260

Adequate object of a proposition

172

Balzano's doctrine of propositions

248

Canonical form of every proposition

244

Considered as the very act of knowing

169

Future theory of propositions, statements etc.

255

Introducing propositions

247

Mental propositions as the objects of scientific knowledge

163

Necessary true propositions

126

Are propositions dubious entities?

249

Propositions about past and present things, events, or states of affairs

69

Propositions and assertions

80

Propositions are ordered composites of concepts

169

Propositions as bearers of truth and falsity

259

Propositions represent the ordering of reality

169

Propositions are equivalence classes of sentences

252

Propositional structure in Aristotle

44

Semantics and logic of'generic', quantifier-free propositions

228

Status of propositions

99

328

True propositions defmed as a composition of things

131

True propositions of the past and the future

129

True propositions without referents in the outside world

128

Writen, spoken and mental propositions

189

Proskeisthai

61

Realist view

204

Reality Duns Scotus on reality

122

Fundamental constitution of

2

Sophists' denial of the existence of independent reality

4

Receptio

106

Reist position

129

Relations

227

Repraesentare

190

Repraesentare effective

191

Repraesentare formaliter

191

Repraesentare instrumentaliter

192

Repraesentare obiective

191

Res Res verbi Rhema Basic sense of rhema

Satz

205 123,130 19,27,57 58

260,277

Sciences, social

215

Sea battle

63,65

Sea battle paradox Semainomenon

67 31

Semantics Semantics of declarative sentences

100

Extensional semantics

133

intensional semantics

133

Possible-worlds semantics

253

Semantics of general terms

7 329

Sentence

242

Propositions as equivalence classes of sentences

252

Sentence-types

242

Simple indicative sentences vs simple assertorial propositions

21

Sentences-in-themselves (Siitze an sich)

243

Spoken and written sentences

243

Sentential Nature of sentential procedure in Aristotle

60

Sermocinal

133

Sermo internus

275

Significare

190,207

Significare ad placitum proprie

190,203

Significare ad placitum consecutive

203

Significare discursive

193

Significare effective

190

Significare formaliter

191

Significare immediate

193

Significare naturaliter communiter

191

Significare naturaliter proprie

191

Significare singulariter et absolute

196

Significate Immediate significate

127

Ultimate significate

127,200

Significatio, generalis et specialis

117

Significatum Significatum quo

199

Significatum quod

199

Signify Do spoken words signify concpts or things?

189ff

Words signify by means of concepts

193

Words first signify concepts

197

Words signify concepts conventionally

198

Signum Notae taken to be signa

190

Simplicity Distinction between grammatical, psychological and logical simplicity

330

20

Skepsis Philosophische Skepsis

265

Psychologisch begriindete Skepsis

265

Ski agraphia

38

Solipsism us

265

Soul, thinking of the

30

Species intelligibilis

123,134

Sprache, als Denkinstrument

276

Sprachphiinomene

274

State of affairs

168,242

State of affairs as a totale significatum

172

Future theory of statements, propositions, states of affairs etc. Statement

255 242,260

Anatomy of Aristotle's statement-making utterance

54

As equivalence classes of thoughts

250

Defmite truth and falsity of future-tense statements

67

Future theory of statements, propositions and states of affairs

255

Stoicheia

13

Subcontrary

218

Subiectum, as formal object

122

Subjekt

277

Supposition By virtue of supposition Terms supposit personally

196

146

Syllogism

141

Symmetry, assumption of

232

Symploke

47,52

Syncategoremata, Petrus Hispanus'

101

Syncategorematic, being

44

Syndesis

61

Syndesmos

61

Synkeisthai

46

Syntax, idea of

18

Synthesis Different senses of synthesis

27,53 48

331

Tense Tensed sentences

29 50

Term Ascriptive use of terms

6

Categorematic term

5, 15, 17, 195

Complex terms which are not propositions

195

Equivocal terms

202

General terms vs proper names

7

Plato's account of terms

15

Possibility of general terms

21

Simple terms

200

Syncategorematic terms

195

Terms synonymous either simply or by virtue of supposition alone

193

Univocal terms

202

Terminist, logic

156

Terminus Termini simpliciter vs termini ut nunc

119

Tertium adiacens

130

Thigein

45

Things as the object of knowledge

170

Thinking, possibility of

8

Thought

242

Polar form of thought

218

Possible thought

250-51

Symmetric thought

232

True Definitely true

65,69, 71

Either-true-or-false as a disjunctive property

74

Indefmitely true

65

Truth

17, 44, 46, 50, 107, 128, 129

Boethius on truth and logical determinism

67

Contingent truths

129

Definite truth and falsity

69

Definite truth or falsity of future tense statements

67

Necessary truth

128

Truth and falsity at a time and for a time

76

332

Truth-condition, on assertions• of 'erit' Truth-value Assertional truth-value and broad bivalence

83 5

86

Intermediate truth-value

73

Merely epistemologically indefinite truth-values

72

Truth-values mutable

72

Tynchanon

31

Urteilen

260,277

Urteilen, d.h. der Verbindung von Individuum oder Spezies mit Attribut

260

Use

262

Veljunction

230

Verbindung, von Individuum oder Spezies mit Attribut

260

Verbum Verbum mentale

205

Verbum intelligibile

205

Verificatio

126

Verum et falsum sunt in intellectu componente vel dividente

135

Via media between Ockham and Chatton

166

Virtue, leachability of

5

Vox

124, 130

Wahrheit, Korrespondenztheorie der

278

Welt, Theorie der drei Welten

263

Words Do spoken words signify concepts or things?

189

First signify concepts

197

Referential function of words

207

Signify by means of concepts

193

Signify concepts conventionally

198

Written or spoken words

202

333

World World of mental states

263

Possible world semantics

253

Wort

334

260,277