Language of Conformity and Dissent: On the Imaginative Grammar of Jewish Intellectuals in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 9781618112392

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Language of Conformity and Dissent On the Imaginative Grammar of Jewish Intellectuals in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

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Perspectives in Jewish Intellectual Life Series Editor: Giuseppe Veltri (Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg)

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Language of Conformity and Dissent On the Imaginative Grammar of Jewish Intellectuals in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Giuseppe Veltri

Boston 2013

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: A catalog record for this title is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-61811-238-5 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-61811-239-2 (electronic) Copyright © 2013 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved Book design by Adell Medovoy On the cover, clockwise from top left: Leo Baeck, Leopold Zunz, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich August Wolf. Published by Academic Studies Press in 2013 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

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For my son, Carlo Azaria Giuseppe

“The desire of knowledge, like the thirst for riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it.” —Laurence Sterne (1713–1768)

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Contents

Acknowledgments 9 10 Introduction PART I: SEARCHING FOR A SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE 1.1 Athens and Jerusalem: Philology vs. Hermeneutics at the Beginnings of the “Science of Antiquity” 1.2 From Biblical & Classical to “Jewish Studies” Critica Sacra and Critica Homerica Antiquity and the Sciences: Wolf’s Educational Intention The Encyclopedia of the Classical Studies in the Works of Wolf and Boeckh Leopold Zunz as a Student of Friedrich A. Wolf and August Boeck Emancipation Because of/from Classical Studies?

1.3 Biography and Autobiography in the Early Years of the Science of Judaism “Ich, L. Zunz,” or Concerning the (Auto-)Biography The Autobiographies of Leopold Zunz and Isaak Markus Jost Biographies as Critical Literary History: On Zunz’s Biography of Rashi Biographies as Literary and Educational Creations A Versified Epilogue

1.4 A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz Protestant Topoi and Reformed Jews Religion and/or Wissenschaft: Perspectives of an Academic Antiquarian From Wolfenbüttel to Berlin: Academic Dreams of a “Jewish” Luther

1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany

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22 23 41 42 44 47 50 59 61 64 69 71 74 76 77 77 79 82 89

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PART II: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF A CONJUNCTION 2.1 Goethe & Judaism: Typology of an Ambivalent Relation Goethe’s Relationship to Judaism as Reflected in the Secondary Literature Goethe’s Judaism Political Conservatism The Culturally Exploitative Mind: the Materia poetica and its Ingredients “Fine Silence” and Reflections Loud and Clear

2.2 Johann Gottfried Herder, Mission and Judaism The Rhapsodic Theory of Ambiguity: On Pietism & Simone Luzzatto Concerning Leopold Zunz and Herder

2.3 Gesenius, his Colleagues, the Rabbis, and the Wissenschaft des Judentums PART III: CREATIVE LANGUAGES AND INTERSTITIAL SPACES 3.1 Creative Monotheism: Chayim H. Steinthal 3.2 Steinschneider on Magic and Interstitial Spaces Magic in the Wissenschaft des Judentums: Antecedents Steinschneider’s Way to Magic Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (i) The Maieutic Function Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (ii) Magic as Error, Prejudice, and Mania Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (iii) Magic, Faith, and Deformed Beliefs

3.3 On the Cultural Dynamics of the Jewish Religion: Lajos Blau’s Defense of Monotheism as a Driving Force Changes in Blau’s Time The Philosophical Background: Philo, Maimonides, and the Talmud Monotheism vs. Paganism: The Moral Mission Then and Now: Some Thoughts on the Debate on Monotheism

3.4 Appendix: Ludwig Blau’s “On the Present and Future of the Jewish Religion”

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100 100 101 109 113 118 119 124 124 135 150 162 163 179 179 181 183 186 188 192 192 195 198 200 204

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PART IV: DISJUNCTION, OR THE JEWISH DISSENT 4.1 The Outspoken “Dissenter”: Leo Baeck The Essence of Judaism The Essence of Leo Baeck’s Non-Conformism

4.2 The Dissenter as Enfant Terrible: Jacob Taubes The Trapeze Artist Reason and/or Religion

4.3 Emmanuel Levinas, or, The (Un-)Translatability of Jerusalem into Athens The Talmudic Discussion and Levinas’ Interpretation Philological Analysis and Philosophy

216 217 217 222 228 228 232 240 244 249

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION Jewish Philosophy and Islam from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries Jewish Philosophy? The Historical-Philological Approach to (Judeo)-Arabic Philosophy The Argument over Philosophy Closure

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Selected Bibliography Index

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252 252 258 261 266

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Acknowledgments As with every other work of my academic life, this book would not have taken its present form without the support of many friends, students, and research assistants. I am indebted to Dr. Anton Hieke, who translated and edited most of the chapters of the book from the original German. The chapter on Lajos Blau was edited by Bill Templer. The original German article by Blau was translated by Anne-Julia Schoen. Ruth Einstein of Atlanta, Georgia, kindly improved the entire manuscript from an American perspective. Most of the aspects covered in the book were the subjects of lectures I delivered on several occasions in Germany, Israel, Italy, Hungary, and Belgium. Igor Nemirosvky, director of Academic Studies Press in Boston, showed great interest in the book and supported me throughout its composition; his assistant Sharona Vedol was of great help in all production matters. This book is dedicated to my son, Carlo Azaria Giuseppe, and his desire for knowledge. Halle-Frohe Zukunft, Germany, February 11, 2013

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Introduction

This monograph explores two areas: the origin of new languages (or new expressions) and the consequent creation of new grammar that reflects the exigencies of the new linguistic and/or cultural coinages. In order to avoid any confusion for the attentive reader, I would like to emphasize that my usage of the terms “language” and “grammar” is a metaphoric one. I use these words to frame and broaden the understanding of cultural phenomena as the birth of a new current, as well as a movement in modern and contemporary Germany and Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Both assumptions have their roots in the well-known fact that every generation uses characteristic vocabulary and structures for expressive thoughts. The need for creating language capable of expressing changes, fluctuations, and deviations in human life is the first basis of every literature. This is even more true when the changes are revolutionary to such a degree that the old vocabulary cannot satisfactorily manage them. The generation of the 1960s in Europe, for example, was fond of using such terms as “revolution,” “atomic energy,” “economic development,” and “renovation of (political and economic) systems.” They were, at the same time, fond of utopian ideas relating to such subjects as how to confront the Cold War. Dreams of universal peace, the conquest of space, and political unity resulted. Succeeding generations have not addressed such topics: they have perceived these ideals as fallacies, and have been rather indifferent to protecting the environment and achieving world peace. Frustration and violent challenges of the establishment were followed by disillusionment. The atomic experience and the economic crises that came as the consequences of Western, as well as Arabic and Islamic, political strategies, and—above all—the failure of the preceding generation to take responsibility for its own violent past of Nazism and the Second World War, were fundamental elements of the new generation, for which key linguistic terms were “disillusion,” “involution,” “environment,” “anti-atomic reaction,” and the like. A comparable process—albeit different in shape, entity, and the people involved—took place during the nineteenth and early twentieth — 10 —

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centuries among Jewish scholars and intellectuals. During that period, linguistic changes stemmed from the enthusiastic acknowledgement of the scientific method and political activity of “conjunction” to the non-Jewish world. This era ended with the thorough disenchantment of Jewish scholars, caused by the indifferent, or even hostile, reactions of the neighboring cultural and academic entities, which finally led to the attempted desctruction of the Jewish European world. That was the situation of Judaism from the beginning of the nineteenth century, throughout the anti-Semitic attacks and the cruel destruction of European Jewry, until the reconstruction of Jewish “identities” today. I call this arsenal of literary expression the “language of conformity and dissent,” using Max Weber’s classic terminology, about which I do not need to say more.1 Understanding new grammar is essential to understanding new language, and specifically requires the study of the structure of every expression in a linguistic and cultural history and consideration of whether or not the connections are imaginative. The study of imaginative grammar is a chapter of (Jewish) intellectual history which is still unexplored, if it is considered at all in the scholarly community. The main purpose of the following chapters is to outline some aspects of this study as a narrative of the relationship between the Jewish intellectual world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and its environs. The focus on Germany is rooted in the well-known fact that this country during that period played a pivotal role as the intellectual laboratory of philosophy, philology, literature, and folklore. The products of this laboratory inspired neighboring cultures and political minorities to develop their own movements, such as the so-called Wissenschaft des Judentums, the cultural movement of scholarly study referred to as the “Science of Judaism.” Before we delve into the world of Judaism as presented in this book, some words are needed on the nature, extent, and impact of imaginative grammar. Every element of a culture in its written and oral dimensions is important for describing itself or comprehending the object of research. Grammar obviously is the expression of the inner dimension, yet at times it constitutes the unreflected structures through which 1

On the actual discussion of the topic, see the issue Nonconformism and European Histories of Religions, Journal for the Study of Beliefs and Worldviews 12 (2011). — 11 —

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communication becomes possible. As such, grammar should be learned first. The world of imagination, on the other side, is what we (mostly in an unreflective manner) believe to exist when speaking about an object. Imaginative grammar,2 therefore, is the conglomeration of images, concepts, and interpretations. It is also, however, the rules and the inner logic of a culture, seen from the perspective of a (fictional or imagined) intellectual creation. That is the definition we will employ in the following pages. The literary theorist Geoffrey H. Hartman uses the expression “imaginative grammar” in his discussion of Heidegger’s demythologization and descientification of philosophy: Mythology may be a more imaginative grammar than metaphysical ontologies, yet it too must be overcome, so that we can think what is thinkable and not create a vacuum in which conceptions breed that seek to fill that vacuum—political religions, Eric Voegelin called them, that cover up the sense of nonbeing, that concretize dreams of mastery or self-presence in the form of technological schemes that will devastate life on earth even more. 3 “Think what is thinkable,” as a “political religion” is a suitable description of the literary and philosophical movement in the German 2

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See Brent E. Whitted, “Locating the Anomalous: Gesualdo, Blake, and Seurat,” Mosaic (Winnipeg) 31.1 (1998); can be viewed online at http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20584872/ locating-the-anomalous-gesualdo-blake-and-seurat: “I have mentioned that the elusive state of betweenness that activates visionary power is expressed through the creative integration of sign systems towards an imaginative “grammar” whose rules have originated from the rudiments of traditional artistic conversation (that which can be periodized) but have bypassed this conversation to such an extent that they resist translation. This grammar is composed of new semiotic units; while these units are integrations of differing sign systems, the force with which these systems are fused no longer invites a disciplinary interrogation of how the different systems operate. This is what makes periodization so difficult and why we search for alternative languages and methods of discussing works that so aggressively challenge “disciplined” critiques. In the case of Gesualdo, Seurat, and Blake, all three develop a creative process of technical innovation to the point that this innovation becomes all-consuming; at the same time, this obsession attempts to respond to the human (or superhuman) condition that has made technique the only language through which these artists can articulate their positions with respect to this condition.” Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Unremarkable Wordsworth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 202. — 12 —

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speaking territories during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— during the time of Jewish emancipation in and from Germany and German culture. In almost every sector of Jewish life–beginning with philology and philosophy and ending with liturgy and prayer—there are a huge number of examples of attempts to find the connection with Germanness (Deutschtum) and the “German way of life.” I refer to this desire for integration as the trauma that is interpreted by an imaginative grammar. *** The main goal of this book is to outline some aspects of Jewish intellectual life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a consideration of the relationship between Jewish scholars and their cultural environment. It is seen as a language of conformity and dissent, and interpreted as an imaginative grammar. The book is divided into four parts: 1) Searching for a Scientific Language; 2) Political and Cultural History of a Conjunction; 3) Creative Languages and Interstitial Spaces; and 4) Disjunction, or the Jewish Dissent. 1. Searching for a Scientific Language The first step in our voyage through the landscape of the Jewish scholarship of the nineteenth century is the establishment of the philological and cultural-historical arsenal that is called the Wissenschaft, that is to say the scholarship concerned with the documentary tradition. The meaning of “scholarship” is an intriguing one, as on the one hand it aims at collecting, listing, and dating every document of the “classical” period—the value of antiquity is above all. On the other hand, scholarship also involves the critical selection of what should be considered “canonical” for coming generations of scholars. Jewish scholars at the beginning of the nineteenth century searched for a scientific language in order to delve into their own literary traditions. They also sought to present these traditions to an academic audience, hoping to find that language sufficient for communication with non-Jewish scholars and students. In this first part, we will address the development of a “Jewish scholarship” through the ages of European thought of the modern period. — 13 —

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In the chapter “Athens and Jerusalem,” the discussion of the metaphor for the Greek philosophical root of Christianity (Athens) and Jewish religious roots (Jerusalem) present the two poles of identification in German (Christian) philosophical thinking. We will identify and contextualize the three phases of development of these metaphors—clash, fusion, and consent—for connection and contraposition in the cultural history, in rejecting the incompatibility of Athens and Jerusalem. Leopold Zunz, the father of the scholarly research of Jewish culture, thought, and religion, saw the integration of “Jewish studies,” or “the science of Judaism,” into the body of German university education as one precondition for emancipation. In the chapter “From Biblical and Classical to ‘Jewish Studies,’” we will outline and follow the development of “Jewish studies” as a subject, with a thorough emphasis of its roots in classical studies. These considerations are to be followed by an overview of the genre of biography and autobiography for the early period of Jewish studies and the impact it had on the creation of the new subject. It is almost impossible to over-emphasize the role of Leopold Zunz for the “scientification” of Judaism in nineteenth-century Germany. His ideas, zeal, and determination eventually brought Judaism into the universities and into the awareness of German scholars. In his quest, he pioneered the establishment of the Jewish studies programs in existence today worldwide. Zunz was deeply involved in the Reform movement of his time. His upbringing and education as an “unenlightened” German “yeshiva boy” thrown into modernity, with his intellect and hunger for knowledge, made him—in the eyes of Zunz’s mentor—the ideal (and much needed) single reformer of Judaism: the Jewish Luther. In the chapter “A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz,” Zunz’s inner conflict between the merits of the expected religious future and his own scholarly ambitions for Judaism are discussed. The results of these ambitions for Jewish studies, for its standard integration into the university, finally broke Zunz’s optimism. In 1848, he applied for the establishment of a Jewish studies chair in a Prussian university. The application failed. This critical moment in Jewish studies in Germany will be discussed in the last chapter of the first part of this book, “Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany.”

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2. Political and Cultural History of a Conjunction The question I address in this section does not focus on the problem of grammar–or philosophy concerning logical connectivity (be it irrelevant or not).4 The problem of grammar is one of historical conjunction as a literary topos. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a number of studies, essays, and books on the topic of “Judaism and …,” appeared, for example on the relationship of a specific figure of German history and literature to Judaism. I call this subject the “historical and political conjunction.” A historical conjunction is the attempt to relate an important person of (German) history to Judaism and to analyze his attitude to Jewish literature, history, and culture. The aim of these works is obvious. They were written in order to heighten the awareness of readers of the importance of Judaism for German history, and to demonstrate that very important persons were devoted to a significant and vital German-Jewish/Jewish-German subject. We will follow, in the second part of the book, in the footsteps of the above-mentioned “Judaism and …” works, and shed light on the attitude of three prominent figures from German Central Europe from the late eighteenth century until the turn of the nineteenth century. Few things seem as significant in term of establishing self-identity for German Christians and Jews of the nineteenth century as the works of Germany’s poets and thinkers. Their attitudes to Jews and Judaism reflected those of the German intellectual and academic elite of the time. How did the elite perceive Jews in Germany? How did they present them, and how were Jews integrated into their works? Their ambivalence toward Jews was remarkable, as it blurs the distinction of antisemitism and philosemitism. Typically, the elite displayed both these traits at the same time. Jews, however, displayed a comparable ambivalence in respect to them by identifying antisemitism in their work while also adapting their cultural achievements, using them as vehicles to becoming true Germans. Germany’s so-called Dichterfürst (prince of poets), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, had the greatest impact on German culture in his time. In the chapter “Goethe and Judaism,” we will consider his ambivalent and contradictory attitude toward Jews in his private life and his works. 4

On the concept see J. Brian Pitts (2011) Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism, preprint from http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8659/ (accessed March 11, 2012). — 15 —

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Goethe personifies the degree to which the German intellectual elite occupied itself with Judaism, and Jews with the cultural dimension of Deutschtum (Germanness). With Goethe especially, there is a distinction between Jewish achievements of the past, i.e., during the time of biblical Israel, and the achievements of contemporary Jews in Germany. After discussing Germany’s “Prince of Poets,” we will turn to her “Prince of Thinkers”: the philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, whose work was equally adopted by the Jews of nineteenth-century Germany. In the chapter “Johann Gottfried Herder, Mission and Judaism” we will see that Herder might have displayed in his work an even stronger ambivalence toward Jews than Goethe did. He did display an appreciation for the merits of Judaism in terms of language and politics—again, with an emphasis on the biblical past. Yet his attitude toward the importance, emancipation, and equality of contemporary Jews might be described as not exactly supportive. The impact Herder’s thinking had on Zunz, however, will be a focal point of this chapter. In the last chapter of this section, “Gesenius, his Colleagues, the Rabbis, and the Wissenschaft des Judentums,” we will conclude with a view of Wilhelm Gesenius as a Christian representative of Judaism and Jewish culture in the intellectual and university landscape of Germany at the time. His German-Hebrew dictionary is a legacy. Gesenius was the most prominent exegete and grammarian of his era, whose greatest merit was to strip Semitic philology, Hebrew especially, from Christian theology. Yet he equally stripped Semitic philology from the Jews, it seems. We will not only discuss the realm of “Gesenius and Jews” but also the importance of the university at which Gesenius held his chair—Halle on the Saale—for the doctoral candidacies of rabbis in nineteenth-century Germany. The barely acknowledged importance of the University of Halle—Zunz himself earned his degree there—had a great impact on the development of the imaginative grammar of Jewish intellectuals during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 3. Creative Languages and Interstitial Spaces The third section of this monograph, “Creative Language and Interstitial Spaces,” discusses creative language, as I call the topic of monotheism from the end of the nineteenth century until the Shoah (the Holocaust), though the focus is clearly on the nineteenth century. The Wissenschaft — 16 —

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des Judentums, as it developed during that century, constantly invigorated the concept of monotheism as the essence of Judaism. This section of this volume is devoted to the philosophy of two of Germany’s important Jewish philosophers/philologists, Chayim Steinthal and Moritz Steinschneider, as well as observations concerning the evolution of Judaism in concept and reality as outlined by the Hungarian Rabbi Lajos (Ludwig) Blau. Chayim Steinthal, the Jewish philologist and philosopher, dedicated his work to the one quintessential and universal question of the origin of mankind as outlined in Genesis. In the chapter “Creative Monotheism: Chayim H. Steinthal” we delve into Steinthal’s linguistic concept of the oneness of mankind and the deity, and its implication for humanity. Yet, creativity as well as ethical monotheism, Steinthal concluded, was projected on the monotheism of a deity that was not yet fully realized but was subject to the evolution of the concept. Moritz Steinschneider’s contribution to the understanding of magic and superstition in the Wissenschaft des Judentums will be discussed in the second chapter of this section: “Steinschneider on Magic and Interstitial Spaces.” Magic, as a facet of cultural interaction, is presented as an interstitial component of political and social relevance, as I will point out. Steinschneider approached the subject from the perspective of a philologist in order to underline magic’s maieutic function and its position between the intellect (in the form of science) and instincts, which are ignorant, and fall between faith and religion and mere superstitious belief. Rabbi Ludwig Blau from Hungary was a scholar of Talmudic and classic literature. One of his articles that appeared at the turn of the twentieth century allows an inside view into the contemporary conceptual understanding of Judaism in the modern European world. In the chapter “On the Cultural Dynamics of the Jewish Religion: Lajos Blau’s Defense of Monotheism as a Driving Force,” our focus will be on Blau’s understanding of monotheism as the vital force in the Jews’ attachment to Judaism, which determined their self-concept in modern Europe. Here, the cultural and confessional dynamics of monotheism will be at the center of the discussion. In order to help the reader understand these dynamics, included at the end of this section is a translation of Blau’s seminal article “On the Present and Future of the Jewish Religion.”

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4. Disjunction, or the Jewish Dissent The last “regular” chapter of this volume is devoted to dissent and disjunction. Its focal point is the description of a phenomenon that had its beginnings in the early years of the last century, and then was manifested as a pattern and structure of thought: anti-conformism. I will briefly present three important figures: Leo Baeck, Jacob Taubes, and Emmanuel Levinas. The struggle for conformity within Judaism increasingly developed into an outspoken, direct, and expressive dissent during the twentieth century. The turning point for this can be placed long before the Shoah. The struggle for conformity should be interpreted as a reaction to the ever-increasing antisemitic attitude that was typical of modern German society. The Jewish presence in German society is acknowledged only to a small degree—or not at all—except as a target for exploiting a negative interpretation of the past, as well as for exploitation in the economic and social present. Leo Baeck, as a rabbi in Berlin and survivor of the Nazi concentration camp Theresienstadt, was a direct witness to the failure of the integration of Jews, even of members of the Jewish intelligentsia, in Germany. In the chapter “The Outspoken ‘Dissenter’: Leo Baeck” we will follow the conceptual failure of Baeck’s pre-war work. The struggle of Jewish intellectuals for a “Jewish theology” remained without resonance in the academic German world. We will follow the development of a Jewish religious philosophy toward Baeck’s answer for the failure of integration in his programmatic The Essence of Judaism. In his book, Baeck strongly emphasizes the otherness of Judaism, its incongruity and inherent difference from German/European Gentile society. In the words of Baeck, “[The Jew is] the great non-conformist in history, its great dissenter,” against history’s concept of leveling differences. Baeck was one of the last representatives of German Jewish intellectual scholarship of the pre-war and war period. His legacy of nonconformism was continued by Jacob Taubes, the representative of post-Shoah Jewish intellectualism. A native of Vienna and resident of Switzerland during the war, Taubes saw his academic career marked by uprootedness and life between the poles of Jewish identity. After holding positions in Israel and in the United States, he was one of the first Jewish people to return to Germany and held a chair for Jewish Studies and hermeneutics. The awkwardness of his position as a Jewish — 18 —

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academic in the country that had attempted to murder all Jews is reflected in his work and thought. In the chapter “The Dissenter as Enfant Terrible: Jacob Taubes,” we will discuss his concept of Judaism and monotheism from the point of departure of his own self-definition as a “trapeze artist.” Taubes argued, as I will lay out, that the underlying motives in the world are the universality of reason, social groups, and violence. The last chapter in this part of the volume is dedicated to “Emmanuel Levinas, or, The (Un-) Translatability of Jerusalem into Athens.” Levinas might function as the post-Shoah counterpart to Jacob Taubes. Unlike Taubes, Levinas swore never to set foot on German soil again after the horrors of the Second World War. As we will see, Levinas, a philosopher and Talmudic commentator, focused on translation and the translatability of Judaism and religion. In debating Levinas’ quintessential argument of a contraposition of “Jewish” and “European”/“Greek” culture—and thus the separation of both—we will discuss the role translation plays for the universality of Judaism as a culture and its adaptation/assimilation to other cultures. *** The final part of the book is not a “classical” conclusion, as might be expected. Instead, in these chapters, I offer a final overview of the state of affairs and a premise for further research on the topics discussed. Jewish philosophy has been a continual interest of Christian and Jewish thinkers since at least the Middle Ages. It is the common ground of communication between Christianity and Judaism. It is the place of interaction because of the ancestral proto-wisdom of mystical-kabbalistic origin; it is a space of interaction because of the common language spoken by Jews and non-Jews. It is a lesser-known fact that the occupation with Islamic philosophy might be regarded as the mother of Jewish philosophy. It is also uncommon knowledge that philological occupation with Islamic philosophy, its eventual rejection, and its replacement by the ethical commitment of Neo-Kantian philosophers is also a forerunner of Jewish philosophy. ***

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Last but not least, I would like to remind the reader that this is an edition of individual chapters, some of which have been published before in German, English, and Italian, respectively. They appeared in the following publications: Part I: Searching for a Scientific Language “Atene e Gerusalemme: Il contrasto tra ermeneutica e filologica critica nell’opera di Friedrich August Wolf,” Laurentianum 42 (2001): 53–65; “Athen und Jerusalem: Der Kontrast zwischen Hermeneutik und kritischer Philologie im Werk von Friedrich August Wolf.” In Gottes Sprache in der philologischen Werkstatt, edited by Giuseppe Veltri and Gerold Necker, 75–96. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004. “Altertumswissenschaft und Wissenschaft des Judentums: Leopold Zunz und seine Lehrer F.A.Wolf und A.Boeckh.” In Friedrich August Wolf. Studien, Texte, Bibliographie, edited by Reinhardt Markner and Giuseppe Veltri, 32–47. Göttingen: Steiner, 1999. “Biographik und Autobiographik in der Anfangszeit der Wissenschaft des Judentums,” Biblische Notizen (Fs Johann Maier) 116 (2003): 114–124. “A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 7 (2000): 338–351. “Ausgrenzung durch Einbeziehung? Unzeitgemäßes zur Geschichte eines ‘ordentlichen Lehrstuhles für Geschichte und Literatur der Juden’ an der Berliner Universität (1848).” In Kritische Religionsphilosophie Eine Gedenkschrift für Friedrich Niewöhner, edited by Wilhelm SchmidtBiggemann, Georges Tamer, and Catherine Newmark, 345–356. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010. Part II: Political and Cultural History of a Conjunction “Jews and Judaism in Goethe’s Esthetical and Reactionary World: A Typological Study,” Revue des Etudes Juives 162/1-2 (2003): 123–144. The first part of the chapter on Herder is original for this volume. “Implizite Rezeption: Johann Gottfried Herder und Leopold Zunz.” In Hebräische Poesie und jüdischer Volksgeist: Die Wirkungsgeschichte von Johann Gottfried Herder im Judentum Mittel- und Osteuropas, edited by Christoph Schulte, 153–166. Hildesheim: Olms, 2003. “At Gesenius’ School? Hebrew Philology, the Rabbis, and the Wissenschaft des Judentums.” Paper presented at the conference — 20 —

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“Hebräisch-deutsche Handwörterbuch von Wilhelm Gesenius als Spiegel und Quelle alttestamentlicher Forschung, 200 Jahre nach seiner ersten Auflage,” Halle an der Saale, March 14–18, 2010. Publication forthcoming. Part III: Creative Languages and Interstitial Spaces “Ethischer Monotheismus und Prophetie: Zu Steinthals dynamischer Deutung der Schöpfung.” In Chajim H. Steinthal. Sprachwissenschaftler und Philosoph im 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Hartwig Wiedebach and Annette Winkelmann, 171–185. Leiden: Brill, 2002. “Steinschneider’s Interstitial Explanation of Magic.” In Studies on Steinschneider: Moritz Steinschneider and the Emergence of the Science of Judaism in Nineteenth-Century Germany, edited by Reimund Leicht and Gad Freudenthal, 233–246. Boston and Leiden: Brill, 2011. The chapter on Lajos Blau is original for this volume. Part IV: Disjunction: The Jewish Dissent “Lo spazio del dissenso: Tre tipi di anticonformismo nel ‘900: Leo Baeck, Jacob Taubes e Yeshayahu Leibowitz.” In Giacobbe e l’angelo. Figure ebraiche alle radici della modernità europea, edited by Emilia D’Antuono, Irene Kajon and Chiara Adorisio, 495–509. Lithos: Rom, 2012. The second chapter on Taubes is original for this volume. “Philology versus Philosophy: A Critical Analysis of Levinas’ Interpretation of ‘translatability’ in his commentary on Bavli Megillah 8b–9b.” In Visage et Infini Analisi fenomenologiche e fonti ebraiche in Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Irene Kajon, 211–222. Firenze: La Giuntina, 2008. Conclusion “Die arabische Philosophie und der Islam im modernen jüdischen Denken: Vorüberlegungen zu einer Begriffsgeschichte.” In Jewish Lifeworlds and Jewish Thought: Festschrift presented to Karl E. Grözinger on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday, edited by Nathanael Riemer, 99–110. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012.

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PART I

SEARCHING FOR A SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE

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——1.1 Athens and Jerusalem: Philology vs. Hermeneutics at the Beginnings of the “Science of Antiquity” ——

1.1 Athens and Jerusalem: Philology vs. Hermeneutics at the Beginnings of the “Science of Antiquity”

The dialectical contraposition of historical characters marks the attempt to exhibit past events as typoi in a mythological manner, in which this process is authoritative for the continued preservation of typologies. The character—whose essence is rhetorically monopolized already—becomes something independent and detached from the environment in which it had evolved historically. Thus, it will be enabled to incorporate new functions that were incongruent with the original features. This aspect is especially visible in the hermeneutic history of contraposition (or connection) of Athens—the polis as a symbol of the Greek culture—and Jerusalem, the city of David, representing the Jewish environment.1 The cultural history of this metaphor for connection and contraposition developed back and forth through the centuries of the Christian era. This relationship veered between mythological clash, attempted (and sometimes forced) fusion, and even association without any mutual consent at all. Three phases are clearly visible in this process. (i) The first phase is the formulation of a struggle for survival. “What, then, has Athens to do with Jerusalem? Or the academy with the church? Or heretics with Christians?” (“Quid ergo athenis et hierosolymis? quid academiae et ecclesiae? quid haereticis et christianis?”) These questions were posed by the Christian apologist Tertullian.2 He 1

The contraposition of Athens and Jerusalem has become almost stereotypical for describing the relationship between Judaism and Hellenism. On the subject see, for example, H.S. [Hendrik Simon] Versnel, “Quid Athenis et Hierosolymis? Bemerkungen über die Herkunft von Aspekten des ‘Effective Death, ” in Die Entstehung der jüdischen Martyrologie, ed. Jan Willem van Henten (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 162–196; Philip S. Alexander, “Quid Athenis et Hierosolymis? Rabbinic Midrash and Hermeneutics in the Graeco-Roman World,” in A Tribute to Geza Vermes: Essays on Jewish and Christian Literature and History, ed. Philip R. Davies and Richard T. White (Sheffield: Continuum International, 1990), 101–124. See also Yaacov Shavit, Athens in Jerusalem: Classical Antiquity and Hellenism in the Making of the Modern Secular Jew (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1997). 2 Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticarum, 7:9: “Hinc illae fabulae et genealogiae interminabiles et quaestiones infructuosae et sermones serpentes uelut cancer, a quibus nos apostolus refrenans nominatim philosophiam et inanem seductionem contestatur caueri oportere scribens ad colossenses: videte ne qui sit circumueniens uos per philosophiam et inanem seductionem, — 23 —

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attempted to emphasize the semantic and religious abyss dividing the Stoic, Epicurean, and dialectical philosophical schools of his time from Christianity, the new religion that had developed under the “portico of Solomon.” The identification of a “new path” along with Judaism is an axiomatic posit that—even if it is not free from apologetic allusions— is aimed at the Roman power that had rejected Christianity, but at least had accepted the legitimacy of Judaism. (ii) The second phase consists of an early alteration of attitude that was based on a practical fusion. The continuous absorption of Greco-Roman philosophical ideas, concepts, and methods conciliated Christianity with philosophical academies and schools. The absorption was facilitated by the Alexandrinian schools of Clemens of Alexandria and Origines, and continued by the Cappadocian Church Fathers. Thus, Athens becomes the privileged representation of Christian scholarship, and Jerusalem the symbol for destruction and the dispersion of a people that uniquely—but “stubbornly” and “blindly”—accepts the historical connection with the traditions of the fathers. Jerusalem is the “Whore” of John’s apocalypse, a harlot knowing only carnal desire, whereas the pure spirit belongs to the one religion that does not accept the Jewish tradition from which it originated. The contraposition of Athens and Jerusalem does not represent opposition between philosophy and Judeo-Christianity anymore, but opposition between Christianity and Judaism. The former was seen as the material and spiritual fusion of the old Jewish tradition and the achievements of the Greco-Roman culture, the latter as the embodiment of stultitia (folly) and stubbornness. This perception prevailed until the Renaissance. During that time, Athens, alias Christianity, was considered to have received the old biblical tradition of the aetas aurea, which was perceived as the original one. Contemporaneous Judaism was barely noticed, because it was perceived as an outcome of the post-biblical spirit with its limited value. This view results in a fateful separation of the biblical generation from the Jewish people. The former was viewed as the prototype of humanitarianism, secundum traditionem hominum, praeter prouidentiam spiritus sancti. Fuerat athenis et istam sapientiam humanam affectatricem et interpolatricem ueritatis de congressibus nouerat, ipsam quoque in suas haereses multipartitam uarietate sectarum inuicem repugnantium. Quid athenis et hierosolymis? quid academiae et ecclesiae? quid haereticis et christianis? nostra institutio de porticu solomonis est qui et ipse tradiderat dominum in simplicitate cordis esse quaerendum. Viderint qui stoicum et platonicum et dialecticum christianismum protulerunt.” (Emphasis is mine.) — 24 —

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and the latter as the not-humane, and inhumane, if not anti-humane, residue. Let me point out the fact that from the time of Renaissance onward, the terms “Jewish” and “Hebrew,” respectively, were predominantly applied to the biblical tradition, while the academic scholarship was only marginally interested in Jewish commentaries on the biblical text—though there were some noteworthy exceptions.3 (iii) The third phase, which we will discuss in this chapter in detail, consists of the rejection of the hermeneutical and far-reaching contraposition of Jerusalem and Athens. After the ties between Judaism and the Bible were severed, those existing between the Bible and European culture were to be cut off. There is no distinction anymore between biblical culture and Judaism, since both originated in an environment that cannot claim the status of a “world culture,” which had already had been assigned to the Greek legacy. Athens is the symbol for enlightened, rational progress, which in kind refers to European culture, whose essence is self-evidently rooted in the German “nation.” This is the conviction of Johann Gottfried Herder,4 who compared Semitic and European languages. The first were, according to him, pious, stern, and fossilized. The latter, however, were creative, artistic, and dynamic. In his lectures held at the University of Halle in 1798–99 and transcribed by S. M. Stockman, Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824) retorts to these categories and concludes from them that the oriental peoples differ entirely from the most excellent peoples of antiquity. The Hebrews had never evolved in such a way that they might be seen as a nation of scholars, and are thus too dissimilar to the Greeks and Romans. It is thus self-explanatory that we have to exclude the works of such peoples like the Hebrews. Only the most learned nations enjoy the right to be the object of systematic research, he felt. Wolf stated that

3

4

These noteworthy exception are the seventeenth-century academic “dissertations” on the topic. For a first introduction see my article “Academic Debates on the Jews in Wittenberg. The Protestant Literature on Rituals, the Dissertationes and the Writings of the Hebraists Theodor Dassow and Andreas Sennert,” European Journal of Jewish Studies 6 (2012): 123-146. On Herder see below, pp. 124-149. — 25 —

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the Greeks and Romans especially belong to this category. Both [peoples] were the most intellectual in antiquity—even according to Jewish judgment. These [Jews] parroted the Greeks in everything; they educated themselves according to them. Before the Greeks, and next to them, no other people had enlightened itself.5 The humanistic education of a scholar, which was understood as vir trilinguis during the Renaissance, was reduced now to a vir bilinguis. One has to note, though, that Wolf only described the Greek language as the original one. Athens was victorious on all fronts. What, however, is the paradigm of this “victory”? There is no room for doubt that from the nineteenth century onward, classical studies referred to a methodology and curriculum that went beyond the scope of theology. The study of “Oriental” languages and cultures (also having deep roots in Halle, Leipzig, and Jena) gradually moved away from the missionary and Christian preconditions that were so prevalent in the most prominent school of Pietism and founded secular literary studies. The incompatibility of the Semitic culture with the Greek was accepted as a fact in the twentieth century. Greek rather then Jewish culture is now praised for having universalized Christianity. Gerhard Kittel (1888–1948) is the author of the rightly still-praised and still-used Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament [in German: Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament]. There, he posed as the hypothesis of his scholarship the antinomy between Athens and Jerusalem, as well as between logos and myth.6 From whence did this tendency that had spread so rapidly originate? Anthony Grafton came to surprising conclusions on the basis of an extensive discussion of the premises that had guided Friedrich August 5

6

German: “Die orientalischen Völker weichen gänzlich von den vorzüglichsten Völkern des Alterthums ab. Die Hebräer haben sich nie so ausgebildet, daß man sie für eine gelehrte Nation halten könnte, und daher sind sie zu verschieden von den Griechen und Römern. Es versteht sich also, daß wir Werke solcher Völker, wie die Hebräer waren, ausschließen müssen.” Friedrich A. Wolf, Encyclopädie der Philologie: Nach dessen Vorlesungen im Winterhalbjahre von 1789–99, ed. S. M. Stockmann (Leipzig: Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831), 9, quoted in Anthony Grafton, “Juden und Griechen bei Friedrich August Wolf,” in Friedrich August Wolf:  Studien, Dokumente, Bibliographie, ed. Reinhard Markner and Giuseppe Veltri (Stuttgart:  Franz Steiner, 1999), 28. See James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), where he addresses the ideological startpoints of Kittel’s dictionary. — 26 —

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Wolf in the composition of his philological encyclopedia. According to Grafton, Wolf can be seen as having made a clear distinction between the “classical studies” and “Jewish-Semitic studies.” The latter, however, were seen as no longer being appropriate enough to educate mankind. Wolf had employed the theories of Romanticism in order to solidify the position of classical studies at the expense of Semitic and especially Hebrew studies. Jewish culture was no longer perceived as worthy of belonging to the curriculum of classical studies.7 This hypothesis is intriguing because Wolf is depicted as a revolutionary of the academic and cultural environment, but his views led to tragic results concerning the Bildung of European individuals, who were stripped of their Jewish tradition. Wolf was a scholar of his times, an “antiquarian” of knowledge, an educated, very talented, and skillful philologist—but surely not a revolutionary ideologue.8 There is a tendency in modern scholarship to overemphasize the consequences of Wolf’s work, while—as Hermann Patsch had already noticed—the merits of his students, friends, and acquaintances are assigned to him.9 Indeed, Wolf referred to theories and ideas interesting to him without caring about or checking whether they were in accord with or contradictory to other theories and ideas to which he had referred earlier. One of his students, August Boeckh (1785–1867), was merciless in his verdict concerning the Meister: philologists cannot create ideas. He had in mind especially Wolf, whose propaedeutic realization of his encyclopedia was unsound when viewed with the eye of a philosopher.10 The work of the famous Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), classical philologist and university rector in Berlin, presents the same critical attitude. Schleiermacher criticizes the lack of systematic work in Wolf’s encyclopedia (see below). In the nineteenth century, too, Wolf’s work was scrutinized for something he could not offer: a universal introduction to hermeneutics. Almost all of Wolf’s work lacks exactly that, and he typically employed a traditional and general theoretical framework. My hypothesis, which I am about to outline and discuss, 7 8

See Grafton, “Juden und Griechen.” On this subject, see the classical work, Arnaldo Momigliano, “Ancient History and the Antiquarian,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 13 (1950): 67–106. 9 Hermann Patsch, “Friedrich August Wolf und Friedrich Ast: Die Hermeneutik als Appendix der Philologie,” in Klassiker der Hermeneutik, ed. Ulrich Nassen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1982), 76-107. 10 For details see below, pp. 36-37 and the corresponding footnotes. — 27 —

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is that the liberation that is suggested by the “revolutionary” Wolf is not one from theology or the “Oriental” languages and cultures. Wolf suggested liberation from classical hermeneutics, which had been seen to be the groundwork of philology. The weak point of several modern interpretations of Wolf’s work is the foundation of one specific idea of philology. In explaining it, however, at least two ideas should be considered. The first could be seen indirectly as acritical (“philosophical”), if the second would not precede it. I would refer to the representation of the second as a “Critique of Pure Philology” if I were not risking taking advantage of the terminology of Kantian philosophy for reasons that have little to do with philosophy. I will begin at the beginning. The antiquity of classical philology must not be confused with the history of a mere listing of grammatical and syntactical forms. The historical sources of philology date back to the beginnings of hermeneutics, which is proven by the attempts to derive a “genealogy” of words in antiquity (etymology as hermeneutic etiology). On the one hand, this older etymology was basically the outcome of imagination–when seen rigorously philologically. It is also of value from a socio-cultural standpoint, as it attempted to classify the individual within a particular social environment by applying a semantic tradition to someone. Clearly, when the first grammars were devised, or when at least the property of a language and its vocabulary were recognized, the attempt was made to proceed in a “scholarly” manner: through the classification of words and thus the identification of substantial regularities. This would later constitute the Alexandrinian “canon.” But the factors beyond the texts, such as the hellenitas, had influenced the scholars in their choice in this case as well. It was surely not the intended objectivity that had to be realized in the choice of their texts. The lack of citations of manuscripts that were used or referred to itself indicates that philologists in the past were not interested in creating textual criticism. Least of all were they interested in choosing a textus receptus (common text), which was largely considered as such through its contemporary use (and misuse). There is a surprising phenomenon that is hardly recognized in the scholarship of the field: the existence of three legends that supported their historical authenticity with the help of mutual quotation. These are, of course, the legends about the redaction of Homer’s poems; the “edition” of the Torah at the time and the work of Ezra; and finally, — 28 —

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the legend of the Greek translation of the Torah. Scholarly attention toward Homer’s compositions was, for reasons yet to determined, also supported by a legend in the first century BCE that concerned a pre-Alexandrinian redaction of the Homeric poems. It was said that Peisistratos, the tyrant of Athens, initiated a council’s edition of Homer’s scattered poems. At the same time as this legend evolved, an idea likely influenced by it, that Ezra the Scribe restored the books of the whole Bible after they had been burnt at the time of Nebuchadnezzar’s destruction of the First Temple, developed in Judaism.11 Perhaps before these legends, another story developed about the origin of the Greek translation of the Torah, at the time and under the supervision of the Egyptian ruler Pisitratos: 70 or 72 wise men translated the Torah in Alexandria, in Egypt, for its famous library. These three legends experienced a strange interdependency, as elements of one were integrated into the telling of the other, and then each was perceived as proof of the others,12 and this is the intriguing aspect of this phenomenon. Although there is no proof that an editorial team worked on the poems of Homer, an (extremely late) belief spread throughout the school of the grammarian Choiroboskos (ninth century CE) that a council for the edition constituted of 72 grammarians, and that the council in turn had recreated a text that had been corrupted, dispersed, and even destroyed earlier, since the days of Homer.13 Despite the fact that this story stands exposed as fictitious ever since John Tzetzes (twelfth century CE), it con11 See Johann G. Eichhorn, Einleitung in das alte Testament, Vierte Original-Ausgabe (Göttingen: Rosenbusch, 1823), 210 et seq.; also Emil Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135), New English version, ed. by Geza Vermes et al. (Edinburgh: Clarke, 1986), vol. 3.1, 301. 12 On this, see my own “Tolomeo Filadelfo, emulo di Pisistrato: Alcune note su leggende antiche di biblioteche, edizioni e traduzioni,” Laurentianum 32 (1991): 144–166. 13 On this, see Friedrich A. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Homerum sive de operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi (Halis Saxonum: E Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1795); Rpr. Hildesheim, 1963, 109–14; Homeros [Homer], Odyssa editit Guilielmus Dindorf. Praemittitur Maximilani Sengenbusch Homerica Dissertatio Posterior. Edition Quarta Correctior (Leipzig: Teubner, 1856); Karl Lehrs, “Zur Homerischen Interpolation,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 17 (1862): 481 et seq.; Fridericus Ritschl, Friderici Ritschelii opvscvla philologica (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1866); Victor Bérard, “Pisistrate, rédacteurs des poèmes homériques,” Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes 45, no. 3 (1921): 194–233; Thomas W. Allen, Homer: The Origins and the Transmission (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924); Repr. 1969, 225–248; Reinhold Merkelbach, “Die pisistratische Redaktion der homerischen Gedichte,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 95 (1952): 23–47; John A. Davison, “Peisistratos and Homer,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 86 (1955): 1–21; John L. Myres and Dorothea Gray, Homer and his Critics (London: Routledge & Paul, 1958), 290-291. — 29 —

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tinued to flourish. The humanist Giannozzo Manetti (fifteenth century CE), for instance, chose Peisistratos’ legend of the edition of Homer’s poems as his support for the truth of the legend of the Septuagint.14 The critiques of Justus Scaliger (1606) and Humphrey Hody (1705) left no room for doubting the factuality of the legends of the LXX and Peisistratos.15 At the same time, these critiques proved to be the thread connecting classical studies with biblical studies. In his wellknown Prolegomena ad Homerum, Friedrich August Wolf is not exactly original when he discusses both legends as being such a thread.16 In his critique of the plausibility of the Homeric legend, Wolf refers back to the parallel example of the LXX (fabula) in Aristeas’ work. Wolf was not interested in disqualifying the whole legend as fictitious, but he attempted to secure the core of it as a historical support of the so-called Gedichtentheorie, the “theory of poems.” This theory claims that historical circumstances can be recognized behind the fabulous aspects (historiam sub fabula occultam agnoscimus). This was said to be comparable to the historical results that the biblical scholars had garnered from the Aristeas narrative. In an annotation, Wolf quotes the German 14 Giannozzo Manetti, Apologeticum adversus suae novae Psalterii traductionis obtrectatores libri 5 (MS), mentioned in Charles Trinkaus, In our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italiaen Humanist Thought, vol. 2 (Chicago: Constable, 1970), 588–589; note 75 (p. 821). Manetti’s opinion was adopted by the Jewish scholar Azaria de’ Rossi. See his Me’or ‘Enayim, chapter 7, edition: Azaria de’ Rossi, Sefer Me’or ‘Enayim, ed. David Cassel, 3 vols. (Vilnius: Romm, 1864–1866, reprint, Jerusalem: Makor, 1970). 15 Justus Scaliger, “Animadversiones in chronologia Eusebii” in Thesaurus Temporum Eusebii Pamphili Caesareae Palaestinae Episcopi, ed. Joseph J. Scaliger (Leiden, 1606), 122–125; see also Jürgen C. Lebram, “Ein Streit um die hebräische Bibel und die Septuaginta,” in Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century: An Exchange of Learning, ed. Theodoor H. Lunsingh Scheurleer (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 36 et seq. (21-63); Humphrey Hody, “Contra historiam LXX interpretum Aeristeae nomine inscriptum dissertation,” in Hody, De Bibliorum textibus originalibus versionibus graecis et latina vulgata (Oxonii: Scheldoniano, 1705), 1–89. There existed, of course, criticism targeted against a reduction of the story to a fairy tale. See my Eine Tora für den König Talmai: Untersuchungen zum Übersetzungsverständnis in der jüdisch-hellenistischen und rabbinischen Literatur (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994), 5–6; Veltri, Libraries, Translations, and ‚Canonic‘ Texts. The Septuagint, Aquila and Ben Sira in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2006): 26–99. 16 “Quibus omnibus receptis collectisque ipsum statim congregrasse LXXII Grammaticos (Aristeae fabulam audis de LXXII interpretibus Bibliorum), eosque iussisse hanc farraginem in iustum ordinem redigere. In hoc consessu Grammaticorum prae ceteris Zenodoto et Aristarcho locus est, errore turpissimo, a quo tamen nec Eustathius nec recentiores quidam docti recesserunt. Atque huius unius fabulae auctoritate se tueantur ii, qui Pisistratum non prima scriptura collegisse et disposuisse Carmina, sed distracta, dissipata et divulsa restituisse contendunt. Nos, qui scire nobis videmur, qui inter fabulam et historiam intersit, illic historiam sub fabula occultatam agnoscimus, simili eruendam modo, quo versati sunt viri docti in Iudaico commento de LXX interpretibus.” Wolf, Prolegomena, 114. — 30 —

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Protestant theologian Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, calling him a most incisive scholar (acutissime).17 And not without reason: Eichhorn traced the origins of the legends back to the Jews of Alexandria and their ignorance of the Hebrew language. Concerning legends, he set the standard when he wrote that “legends that have received a fabulous turn through their oral tradition always have at least one factual foundation.”18 Thus, Wolf follows Eichhorn almost to the letter. Wolf was aware of the methodological correlation between classical and biblical studies that for once are not employed as distinctive scholarly subjects. The professor from Halle considered the critica sacra an essential part of philology, as he had outlined in his mentioned Prolegomena ad Homerum and his lectures. He explicitly emphasized the similarity of the Masoretic critique (critica sacra) to that of the Greeks, e.g. the Homeric one, when stating: No science is more interesting than this one [i.e., critique] when seen from a historian’s perspective. For the beginning, Walch is [leading away] with its de arte critica romana.19 Then, one can discuss the knowledge of the Homeric critique. One can clearly see from which tenuibus initiis (tenuous beginnings) this art has emanated. When somebody desires to penetrate the matter further he has to occupy himself with the history of the Masoretic manuscripts which had been created after the Greek critique, though. Yet there are several aspects that are similar to the Greek beginnings of critique. This much is clear: they are far from being as bold as the Greek scholars. Nevertheless, one must not believe that we do possess the original version of the Old Testament. As of today, nobody has ever endeavored a comparison between the Greek and Hebrew critiques.20 17 “Ut acutissime omnius Eichhorn, in Repert. Bibl. Et orient. Litt. T. I. p. 266 seqq. He refers to Johann G. Eichhorn, Einleitung ins Alte Testament: Erster Teil, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Weidmann und Reich, 1787). 18 German: “Wenn Erzählungen, die durch die mündliche Überlieferung eine fabelhafte Wendung bekommen haben, immer wenigstens von einem wahren Grund ausgehen.” Eichhorn, Einführung, 21. 19 That is an unprecise reference. Wolf probably means Johann Ernst Immanuel Walch (1725-1778), Diatribe de arte critica veterum Romanorum (Jena: Litteris Ritterianis, [1757]) 20 German: “Von Seiten der Geschichte ist keine Wissenschaft interessanter, als diese [die Kritik]. — 31 —

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Both criticae, the Greek and the Hebrew, are unsound, however, as Wolf argues on the occasion of a new edition of the scholia in 1791: But, it was impossible to rush to conclusions and deduct safe principles from that; especially because nowhere can we find a trace of the old manuscripts that the first critics might have used as the foundation—neither those manuscripts of P[e]isistratos nor those composed by the semi-fairy tale Homerides. Therefore, the Homeric critique seems to have had beginnings comparable to the Masoretic one.21 Wolf did not comprehend that texts were not chosen arbitrarily but rather according to, of course, uncritical principles that had originated in and evolved through philological hermeneutics. Several culturalphilosophical elements contributed to the creation of this conception of a critica textus, such as the search for the perfect language and the conception of the Greek ideal of education (Bildung) that—in the concept current in his time—had its roots in Jewish (and later also Christian) antiquity and in the message of humanism and the Renaissance. It bridged historically and symbolically the Hellenistic-Roman orient and modern Europe. This was enabled by the search of humanistic scholarship for the nature of language and its original structure. This search, in Für den Anfang ist Walch de arte critica romana. Dann kann man sich an die Kenntnis der homerischen Kritik machen. Schon aus einigen Büchern, besonders denen von Valesius und Maussacus zieht man hinlängliche Belehrung über diese Sache. Man sieht, von welchen tenuibus initiis diese Kunst ausging. Will Jemand tiefer eindringen, so muß er sich mit der Geschichte der Masoreten-Manuscripte beschäftigen, die aber viel später aufkamen, als die griechische Kritik. Doch ist viel Ähnlichkeit mit dem griechischen Anfange der Kritik. So viel ist klar, sie sind lange nicht so kühn, wie die griechischen Gelehrten. Dennoch darf man nicht denken, daß wir das alte Testament in seiner ursprünglichen Gestalt haben. Eine Vergleichung zwischen der griechischen und hebräischen Kritik ist noch nicht angestellt.” Friedrich A. Wolf, “Vorlesungen über die Alterthumswissenschaft,” in Friedrich August Wolf ’s Vorlesungen über die Encyclopädie Alterthumswissenschaft, ed. Johann D. Gürtler (Leipzig: Lehnhold, 1831), 311. 21 German: “Nur war es unmöglich, hierin gleich von sichern Grundsätzen auszugehen: zumal da nirgends eine Spur von alten Handschriften, weder der des Pisistratos, noch weniger einer von den halbfabelhaften Homeriden verfaßten vorkommt, die den ersten Kritikern zur Grundlage gedient hätten. Sofern scheint die Homerische Kritik einen ähnlichen Anfang gehabt zu haben, wie die Masoretische.” Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 1 (1791), col. 246. See, however, the 1876 edition of Prolegomena ad Homerum (Friedrich A. Wolf and Immanuel Bekker, Prolegomena ad Homerum, 2nd ed. [Berolini: Calvary, 1876]). Imannuel Bekker’s annotations are still largely unknown. I am grateful for Reinhard Markner’s suggestion to this reference. — 32 —

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turn, was based on the principle that—seen philosophically—there exists an inextricable connection between time and language. It followed the understanding of the aetas aurea, according to which the gods spoke directly to men—a mythological feature. The mythical aspect led to the theses entering modern hermeneutics, and not the rational consideration of the logos. The beginnings of the examination of the Greek language’s origin, peculiarities, and creation are to be found in Egyptian Alexandria, in the circle of the famous library of the Lagides, better known as the Ptolemaic dynasty. In the strict sense, the Ptolemaic kings assigned scholars for the more or less complete collection of manuscripts, and chose the better variants. Their assignment, however, moved far beyond the purely technical aspect and covered the search for grammatical, linguistic, and stylistic regularities that allowed a work to be classified. It was the purpose of the Greek grammarians to constitute a canon whose purity in employing the Greek language would serve as a role model for generations to come.22 The task of the Alexandrinian grammarians was therefore of a philological, grammatical, and stylistic nature, and they employed text criticism for the evaluation of the works and manuscripts of Greek authors and rhetors. The ideological paths the grammarians followed in their time, either consciously or sub-consciously, led them directly to an apologetic approach. This developed through their postulation—and emphasis—of the superiority of Greek culture, as expressed in the sheer number of works created by or attributed to Greek scholars and authors. It was the attitude of exemplarism and perfection of Greek literature that caused the reaction of the “barbarian” peoples, and made them attempt a defense and emphasis of the importance of their own works, for which they drew back on the principle of age.23 Such a reaction is based on two 22 “Panyasin ex utroque mixtum putant in eloquendo neutriusque aequare virtutes, alterum tamen ab eo materia alterum disponendi ratione superari. Apollonius in ordinem a grammaticis datum non venit, quia Aristarchus atque Aristophanes, poetarum iudices, neminem sui temporis in numerum redegerunt.” Quintilianus, Institutiones Oratoriae X,1,54. “Sed dum adsequamur illam firmam, ut dixi, facilitatem, optimis adsuescendum est et multa magis quam multorum lectione formanda mens et ducendus color.” Ibid., X,1,59. On the usage of “canon” in the classical Greek culture, see Hermann Wolfgang Beyer, “Kanōn” in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. 3, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1967), 600–602. 23 On this, I refer to my “Dalla tesi giudeo-ellenistica del ‘plagio’ dei Greci al concetto rabbinico del verus Israel: Disputa sull’appartenenza della ‘sofia’,” Revista Catalana de Teologia 17 (1992): 85– 104. — 33 —

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old traditions: the translation of the Bible into Greek, and the theory of the so-called “theft of the Jewish wisdom.” The Letter of Aristeas, or Letter to Philocrates, is a Judeo-Alexandrinian text dating back to the first century CE. This text summons this cultural environment through highlighting the Jewish splendor—the Torah–and Jewish traditions. In a description—or, to be more historically accurate, the fabrication of an account—of a banquet Ptolemy II Philadelphus gave in honor to the 72 translators of the Hebrew Bible, the author stressed the importance of Jewish culture, which was destined to participate in the Alexandrinian canon. It is not a coincidence that, according to Jewish sources, the translation of the written Hebrew tradition was the result of the Alexandrian Library’s efforts; the Library was the temple of the Hellenistic culture, and was, in the words of Alexander Parsons, the “glory of the Hellenistic world.”24 The claim of being ancient as a precondition of the Jewish tradition’s authority is the foundation of inquiries into the origin of the sofia, i.e., the “wisdom” that was perceived as a metaphysical truth in antiquity. The discussion concerning the Prōtos Heuretēs, “the first inventor,” had originated in the Greek self-reflection of inferiority to the wisdom philosophy and “Eastern” knowledge, especially those claiming Babylonian or Egyptian heritage. This inferiority complex was created indirectly through the Greek alphabet’s dependency on that of the Phoenicians; medical, technological and mathematical sciences being dependent on Babylonian and Egyptian scholarship; and the praised antiquity of the non-Greek peoples. The “barbarians”—as foreign people were commonly called—responded to the challenge of Greek culture not only by emphasizing these well-known elements, but also by making allegations of Greek plagiarism. They, the Greeks, it was argued, had illegitimately copied their philosophy from the oriental peoples. Not even the theory of the logos, of which the ancient Greeks were so proud, was in any way original to the content of their philosophy. Debating the age of tradition was later considered an important ingredient of the history of philology, because of its effects on the study of the alphabet’s origin and dissemination. It was also of importance for the old literati’s concept that a factual or assumed 24 Edward A. Parsons, The Alexandrian Library, Glory of the Hellenic World: Its Rise, Antiquities, and Destructions (London: Cleaver-Hume, 1952). — 34 —

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correlation existed between the various languages. Most important for the understanding of the later developments is the term “Holy Tongue,” which apparently was used for the first time in ancient Egypt, then was adopted later for use in rabbinical literature and medieval mysticism.25 It was in the transitional period from classical antiquity to the early Middle Ages that the mystical-philosophical tendency concerning the divinity of the Hebrew language took a foothold. The neo-Platonic and hermeneutic deliberations on the magic of language are one important precondition for the study of their effects on Jewish culture. Whereas this tendency to sanctify Hebrew, the language of the Bible, was at first only a marginal phenomenon and perceived in a hesitant manner, it acquired the meaning of an apodictic axiom at the end of the Middle Ages. An axiom does not require proof, as it is self-evident. The following three elements will later play an important role in humanism and the Renaissance: the adoption of the philologicalAlexandrian culture, the certainty of the superiority of Christianity, which was regarded as verus Israel and thus the true heir of the Hebrew culture, and the divinity of the Hebrew language. The humanist debate concerning the origin of language will be revived and altered later through progress in philology (thanks to Arabian-Jewish culture), but also through philosophical and mystical-kabbalistic deliberations regarding the origin of language. Printing the multilingual Bible would later concretize humanistic theories concerning the search for the perfect original language. Moreover, it would also give form to the philosophical premise of reductio ad unum, i.e., the reduction to the one language, the one text, the one word that was capable of describing the various changes of truth. The Jewish rebuttal to Christian claims would be a weak one, true, but it was rooted in the political situation. It would at least influence the following respublica litteraria with its references to the theories contained in Jewish works, such as the most prominent ones of Elia Levita and Azaria de’ Rossi. In his discussion of the term “hermeneutics” during a lecture held on 25 On the concept of “holy language,” see my “Übersetzbarkeit und Magie der ‘heiligen’ Sprache: Sprachphilosophien und Übersetzungstheorien,” in Tradition und Translation: Zum Problem der interkulturellen Übersetzbarkeit religiöser Phänomene: Festschrift für Carsten Colpe zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Christoph Elsas (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1994), 299–314; the same text has been published in Giuseppe Veltri, Gegenwart der Tradition (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2002), 38-54. — 35 —

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August 13 and October 22, 1829, Friedrich Schleiermacher references this philology and the works of Friedrich August Wolf and Friedrich Ast. He writes that I had high expectations when [Georg Gustav] Fülleborn’s philosophical encyclopedia, based on Wolf’s lectures, was published. But the few references to hermeneutics in it did not amount even to a sketch of a general hermeneutical theory. And since this was directed specifically to the literature of classical antiquity, just as most handbooks are designed specifically for the study of the Holy Scriptures, I found myself no more content than before.26 At the first glance, the reason that Fülleborn did not deduct from Wolf’s lectures anything touching upon hermeneutics appears grounded in the fact that Fülleborn did not have greater interest in the matter, or that his interest was not greater than his Meister’s.27 The two fields of science, biblical and classical studies, are mentioned collectively. Fülleborn suggests the same hermeneutic categories for the latter, as they are employed in the theological textbooks on the Holy Scripture. The same is noticeably present when Wolf discusses hermeneutics. His annotations do not differ from the common tractates concerning interpretation that are understood as explicari/interpretari. Wolf rejects each and every system and theory when stating that “hermeneutics and critique are arts which gain more when discussed in a practical lecture then through theory. They have to be developed for the sole purpose of guidance in the individual case.”28 Wolf rejects the systematic consideration of hermeneutics because it resembles the old system he was eager to leave. He is even more clear when concluding that

26 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke 3. Section, Vol. 3: Reden und Abhandlungen, ed. Ludwig Jonas (Berlin: Reimer 1835), 345. I used the English translation of this piece from Mary Gerhart and Fabian E. Udoh, The Christianity Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 113. 27 Schleiermacher refers to Georg G. Fülleborn, Encyclopaedia Philologica sive primae lineae Isagoges in antiquarum literarum studia ad usum lectionum ductae (Vratislaviae: Meyer, 1798). Wolf himself refers to it in his “Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaften,” 7. 28 Wolf, according to a stenographic transcript of Johann Gürtler. — 36 —

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this is something philosophical. It spreads over the first principles of everything explaining. There, there are many principles that are positive for particular hermeneutics, and many that are self-evident. The factual benefit of the general one is not great, especially when one is not occupied with explanation in praxi.29 Those familiar with Wolf’s aversion for philosophy will realize the fine irony shining through his words.30 Hermeneutics consists of one general part with limited benefit, and other parts that are self-evident through experience. If one was to view the rules and examples Wolf employs to explain the hermeneutics of a text, it becomes obvious that he describes nothing more than philology and its encyclopedic preconditions: the meaning of words by means of a linguistic comparison, the importance of the scripture, historical and philosophical explanations, etc. Wolf is not in any way a follower of hermenteutic-kabbalistic theories, according to which an obscure text contains true content. He does, however, specifically reference Quintilian’s “emendatio praecedat lectionem,” which he translates as “the practical critique has to precede the interpretation.”31 The assumption that Wolf takes as a starting point is a categorical one. Every sentence has a general meaning, from which he concludes that “every sentence has a true meaning.” The emphasis is not on “meaning,” but on “true.” When philosophy and hermeneutics argue that several meanings are possible, the one true meaning is splintered into the several meanings, according to Wolf. The impossibility of identifying the true significance of a text is, however, only the result of being unable to fully understand the historical events and correlations on which that text depends. This is nothing more than a criticism of pure philosophy, which disregards the correlation between text and reader, 29 Wolf, according to a stenographic transcript of Johann Gürtler. 30 On his aversion, see Wolf’s “Vorlesungen”: “If one was to proceed according to a certain philosophical classification, there are some pitfalls, and one will barely find his way. It is extraordinarily difficult finding one point all scholars will agree upon since there is too great a difference among the disciplines.” [German: “Will man nach einer bestimmten philosophischen Anordnung verfahren, so ist die Sache so häklicht, daß man fast nicht durchzukommen weiß; denn es ist außerordentlich schwer, einen Punkt zu finden, in dem sich alle Wissenschaften vereinigen, weil eine zu große Ungleichheit unter den Disciplinen herrscht.“] Wolf’s “Vorlesungen,” vol. 1, 3. 31 Wolf ’s “Vorlesungen,” vol. 1, 295. — 37 —

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although it is what brings man into his ethical dimension: the search for the true meaning. What is gathered through historical research and knowledge of immortal languages and culture, not the speculation on the possibility of meanings, uniquely contributes to the “harmonic advance of the mind and soul,” as Wolf describes it in his “Outlines of the Classical Studies” (“Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaften”). The theologian Schleiermacher appears to have been unaware, or wanted to be unaware, in his criticism of Wolf that it was not a coincidence that Wolf assigned a very low status to philosophical hermeneutics. This low status derived from the premise that the author expresses in his texts what Wolf sought to avoid. Schleiermacher writes that … it is an entirely different form of certainty. Also, as Wolf praises it as being from the critical certainty, it is more of a divinatory one resulting from the critic attempting to fully integrate into the universal condition of the author.32 Wolf rarely mentions authors; he is occupied with their works and speaks of literature, language, vocabulary, archeology of knowledge, etc. His concept of an encyclopedia determines that the entirety of a text lives within the text itself. Wolf is not interested in authors and their “divine” possibility and experience. Therefore, he claims as his own the “song theory” in connection to Homer’s works. The classicist Georg Gustav Heyne, however, had presented this theory in his lectures at the University of Göttingen—which Wolf had attended. It is not the theory that is new, but the way of argumentation. The scholar was to follow the historical facts but not his own gusto.33 As early as in ancient times, Homer’s authorship had been doubted.34 The new approach is to base these doubts on critical and historical deliberations. In this, Wolf could have referenced the authority of the Pentateuch and 32 “Es ist eine ganz andere Art der Gewißheit, auch—wie Wolf es von der kritischen rühmt –, mehr divinatorisch, die daraus entsteht, daß der Ausleger sich in die ganze Verfassung des Schriftstellers möglichst hineinversetzt.” For both references see above, fn. 22. 33 “Tota quaestio nostra historica et critica est, non de optabili re, sed de re facta. Potest fieri, ut novae ex illa difficultates nascantur, ut augeatur etiam admirabilitas rei: quid id ad nos? Amandae sunt artes, at reveranda est historia.” Fridericus A. Wolf, Homeri et Homeridarum opera et reliquiae (Leipzig: Göschen, 1806), XXV, see Grafton, “Juden und Griechen.” 19. 34 See Veltri, “Tolemoeo Filadelfo.” The respective bibliography is included there. — 38 —

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doubts concerning Mosaic authorship. The basic approaches of Wolf’s philology—long known but almost forgotten—derived from the critica sacra, as mentioned above. What Jean Morin (1591–1659) and Richard Simon (1638-1712) had employed in respect to the New Testament, the latter in his Histoire critique (1678), Wolf employed in the Homeric critique, according to the Lectures of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, who died in 1827. Bible criticism and philological critique rely on exactly this element, advocated by Wolf: the exclusion of the author’s inspiration (divination, in Schleiermacher’s terminology). The only aspect that matters is the literature of one particular people, and not its ancestry, or the philosophical, religious, “divinatory” adaptation of knowledge, as Schleiermacher would phrase it. It this sense, Wolf states that before the Greeks, we have not witnessed one nation, and apart from them no Oriental one, that knew the art of oratory. This was rooted in the fact that they were not allowed to address important issues. The reason Oriental people did not have prose is the fact that they did not orate. They never succeeded in the felicitous connection of sentences, which is the art of writing.35 The superiority of the Greeks is not based on their inspiration, but on an esthetic dimension, their literature and their “beautiful art.” Wolf is aware that this conception finds agreement among Jews as well, from the Jews of the times of the Alexandrian Library to Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz, his students in Berlin (see next chapter). Within the Talmud Yerushalmi is included the conviction that the Greek language was suitable for poetry and songs, Hebrew only for everyday life, Latin for the Empire, and Aramaic for wailing. Wolf had not separated classical from oriental studies. He had, however, decided in favor of the independence of philology from hermeneutics. The separation of philology from theology was the result of the work of others; Professor Wolf merely presented the outcomes. The fact that he mentioned the Masoretes and biblical criticism alludes to little more than parallel development in biblical studies. The significance for 35 Wolf, “Vorlesungen,” vol. 1, 33. — 39 —

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literature, according to the principles of historical and critical philology, is the basis for classical studies, which are liberated from the burden of hermeneutics and poetics of Platonic ancestry. Wolf, however, cannot be blamed for the rising interest in the nineteenth century in the national/nationalist character of German culture: the step is simply too short between the adoration of an ancient people’s superiority and German Bildung and the German spirit.

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1.2 From Biblical and Classical to “Jewish Studies”

As was already discussed in the preceding chapter, Friedrich August Wolf was deeply connected to the development of modern philology in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The professor from Halle on the Saale is perceived as the founder of classical studies, as an extraordinary teacher and academic, and as the path-breaking scholar of the Homeric Question. It is less known, however, how much Wolf profited from biblical studies for composing his historical-critical, philological methodology.1 Also, remarkably few scholars are aware of the fact that Wolf, as a teacher, influenced the scholarly study of Jewish literature: one of Wolf’s students was Leopold Zunz, the founder of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, the “Science of Judaism.”2 Through this work, three academic disciplines were brought together into an inner philological correlation at the beginning of the nineteenth century: biblical and classical studies, and the “Science of Judaism.” The neo-humanist scholarship of Judeo-Christian thought, as well as that of classical antiquity, have one common root, as both fields had been researched by scholars since the fifteenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, a paradigmatic change in the research of 1

2

To my knowledge, the only scholar who has pointed to the fact is Anthony Grafton in his instructive “Prolegomena to Friedrich August Wolf,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44 (1981): 101–129. It was reprinted in a slightly abridged form in Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 214–243. See also Grafton’s study ““Man muß aus der Gegenwart heraufsteigen”: History, Tradition, and Traditions of Historical Thought in F.A. Wolf,” in Aufklärung und Geschichte: Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Hans E. Bödeker et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 416–429. An updated and very useful bibliography on the “Father” of the Wissenschaft des Judentums (as Cecil Roth refers to him) is Klaus-Gunther Wesseling, “Zunz, Leopold,” in BiographischBibliographisches Kirchenlexikon under www.bautz.de/bbkl/z/zunz.shtml (last accessed January 1, 1999). Unfortunately, the continuous abbreviation of common German termini makes this bio-bibliography not exactly reader-friendly for non-German speakers. See further the updated bibliography in http://www.jewish-archives.org/nav/classification/11170 (last accessed 8th December 2012). On the so-called “Science of Judaism” and Zunz see further, Céline TrautmannWaller, Philologie allemande et tradition juive. Le parcours intellectuel de Leopold Zunz (Paris: Du Cerf 1999); Henri Soussan, “The Science of Judaism: From Leopold Zunz to Leopold Lucas,” Center for German-Jewish Studies Research Paper 3 (1999), www.susx.ac.uk/Units/cgjs/pubs/rps/RP3.htm (last accessed 1 January 1999). — 41 —

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antiquity occurred. The ideal of humanist scholars was the homo trilinguis—as mentioned above—who was knowledgeable in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. This ideal gradually changed under the influence of national identity. The early history and genealogy of knowledge was reduced to the Greeks’ canon of reason. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) concentrated his educational ideal on this people, the Greeks, who were appreciated as the role models for ethical and intellectual perfection. Scholars bid farewell to the prisca theologia and philosophia perennis as categories of the archeology of knowledge. Consequently, Hebrew hardly played a role in the scholarship of this field anymore. This development found its expression in the Christian cliché of Judaism as the antecedent of Christianity, or, in Hegel’s case, Judaism as an abrogated religion. For the neo-humanists, the struggle between Athens and Jerusalem was brought to an end, with Athens victorious. Critica Sacra and Critica Homerica In the chapter above, we discussed the similarities in the traditions concerning Peisistratos’ edition of Homer’s poems, and Ezra the Scribe’s edition of the Torah. Please allow me a brief review to emphasize the point: Friedrich August Wolf doubted the Peisistratos’ legend in his Prolegomena ad Homerum, and compared it to the legend of the reconstruction of the Torah. Both facts were hardly original to Wolf, and were established well before him. Wolf, like Johann Gottfried Eichhorn before him, was convinced that the legends had a factual–historical core in them. In his lectures, Wolf emphasized the importance of the critica sacra for philology. He also pointed to the comparability of the Masoretes’ critique and the Greeks’. He called for a scholarly comparison of the two criticae; a desideratum he did not solve himself. Why did he not? Was it indeed due to a later alienation from the critica sacra, as Anthony Grafton concludes?3 Grafton is convinced that Wolf’s contribution to the detachment of oriental studies from the classical studies is most considerable. The price that secular classical studies had to pay for liberation from an antiquated philology based on theological interests was high. Thus, 3

Anthony Grafton, “Juden und Griechen.” — 42 —

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Grafton revised his own article “Prolegomena to F.A. Wolf,” from 1981. At that time of first writing, Grafton had pointed to the fact that Wolf’s students and successors had turned away from their Meister’s rudiments of comparing the Masoretic and Alexandrian criticae. The reason for that was to be found, according to Grafton, in the political restoration within Germany and the intensified marginalization of Jews in all social spheres that resulted from it. If this was the case, is it not remarkable that one of the most talented of Wolf’s students, Johann Severin Vater (1771–1826), moved away from classical studies? Vater authored textbooks and grammars of Hebrew and other Semitic languages instead, and his work earned him a professorship of theology and oriental studies at the University of Halle—surely not with the disapproval of his teacher.4 And in this, I challenge Grafton’s hypothesis: should we expect Jewish scholars to have fiercely attacked this new scholarly ghettoization of Judaism? On the contrary, the schoolfellows Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz attended Wolf’s lectures in Berlin. One, Jost, was to become the first modern Jewish historiographer; the second, Zunz, was the founder of the “Science of Judaism.” Without any comment, Zunz had taken down Wolf’s definition of classical studies, which Wolf stated at the beginning of each lecture on the encyclopedia: “We can only appreciate the Greeks and Romans as constituting antiquity, as they alone gave rise to an academic culture.”5 Surely, the two Jewish students were less impressed by 4

5

Vater earned his doctoral degree in 1794 with his study of the rhetoric of Aristotle. Among his works we find: Hebräische Sprachlehre, Nebst einer Kritik der Danzischen und Meinerischen Methode in der Vorrede (Leipzig: Crusius, 1797); Hebräisches Lesebuch (Leipzig: Crusius, 1799); Handbuch der Hebräischen, Syrischen, Chaldäischen und Arabischen Grammatik (Leipzig: Crusius, 1802); Commentar über den Pentateuch (Halle: Waisenhaus, 1802–03); Amos übersetzt und erläutert mit Beifügung des Hebräischen Textes und des Griechischen der Septuaginta nebst Anmerkungen zu letzterer (Halle: Hemmerde & Schwetschke, 1810). Vater occupied himself, among others, with German, Russian, Polish, Hebrew, Arabic, and Sanskrit. He was one pioneer of Slavic studies, and worked on general aspects of linguistics. See the biographical notes in Ernst Kuhn, “Vater. Johann Severin,” in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 39 (1895): 503–508 [online edition], http://www. deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118767372.html?anchor=adb (accessed September 5, 2012). The Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Preußischer Kulturbesitz) holds a collection of material from Vater’s account, but unfortunately no letters. Letters to Wolf are to be found in Krakow, Poland. I am grateful for Reinhard Markner having pointed out Vater and his achievements. German: “Unt[er] Alterthum könn[en] nur Griech[en] und Römer verstand[en] werd[en,] d[ie] allein s[ich] z[u] ein[er] gelehrten Cultur erhoben.” Leopold Zunz, Collegienhefte October 1815 to June 1817, page 341; Zunz-Archive Arc. 4 792/C 12, Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem. The holdings have been a part of the former Bibliothek der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, Berlin. — 43 —

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Wolf’s proclaimed educational ideal, as expressed by Humboldt, than by his encyclopedic range of knowledge. First and foremost, they were guided by Wolf’s critical methodology, which had become normative for any occupation with antiquity in general. Antiquity and the Sciences: Wolf ’s Educational Intention The comparison of biblical studies and the Alexandrian critique that Wolf had drawn in his lectures no longer appears in his “Outlines of the Classical Studies according to Terminology, Scope, Purpose, and Merit,” written in 1807.6 This programmatic essay introduced Wolf’s new journal, Museum der Alterthums-Wissenschaft (Museum of Classical Studies). It was merely a fraction of the larger philological discourse whose printing Wolf had postponed repeatedly:7 For a long time, the subject of this essay was intended to introduce a revision or an encyclopedic survey of the knowledge that typically is referred to as a philological one. Between 1783 and 1790, when the author began teaching at one of the seats of German scholarship then [University of Halle], he eagerly desired to ouline—for himself and his audience—the general terminology, scope, correlation, and main purpose of these studies. This is a survey to which none of the writings of the authorities could offer more than little satisfactory contributions.8 6

7

8

German: “Darstellung der Alterthumswissenschaften nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Wert,” Museum der Alterhtums-Wissenschaft 1 (1807). See, for instance, the reprint of 1986: Friedrich A. Wolf, Darstellung der Altertumswissenschaft nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Wert, 1807th ed. (Weinheim et al.: Act humaniora VCH, 1986). My citation refers to this reprint. See a description of the preparatory-steps Wolf had taken for this introduction to his encyclopedia in Friedrich A. Wolf, “Einführung in die Fragmente der Enzyklopädie der Altertumswissenschaft: Herausgegeben von Reinhard Markner,” in Friedrich August Wolf: Studien, Dokumente, Bibliographie, ed. Reinhard Markner and Giuseppe Veltri (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 48–75. German: “Der Inhalt dieses Aufsatzes sollte seit geraumer Zeit als Einleitung zu einer Revision oder encyklopäischen Uebersicht derjenigen Kenntnisse dienen, die man gewöhnlich philologische nennt. Zwischen den Jahren 1783 und 1790, als der Verfasser auf einem damals berühmten Sitze deutscher Gelehrsamkeit zu lehren anfing, fühlte er sich ohne Unterlaß beunruhigt von dem Wunsche, sich selbst und seinen Zuhörern Rechenschaft zu geben über den allgemeinen Begriff, Gehalt, Zusammenhang und Hauptzweck jener Studien; über welches alles die Schriften der — 44 —

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The justification for this subject was necessary, not only because of the fact that Greek and Latin literature were in danger of being swallowed by Christian theology, but also because the real benefit of occupation with antiquity was yet to be proven. In the past, according to Wolf, taking up an ancient language was predominantly rooted in the acquisition of “expertise” and the “improvement of the finances, the factories, commerce, agriculture, and domestic economy.”9 Thus, an occupation with antiquity served a pragmatic purpose, and was not part of the ethical improvement of mankind. Yet nobody should believe “that it was possible to reach through other means the perfect harmonic education of mind and soul that result from the historical research of antiquity, and through the acquaintanceship with the languages and the immortal works of the same.”10 The educational ideal that shines through these lines perfectly corresponds to that of Humboldt. The occupation with the antiquity educates the student comprehensively. Humboldt wrote to his friend Wolf in 1792, that … apart from all the studies and educations of man, there is yet another one, entirely unique, that almost connects the whole man. It does not only make him more skilled, stronger, better from this or the other side, but in essence makes him a greater and nobler man. This entails the strength of the intellectual ability, kindness of the ethical one, the capacity and the predisposition for an esthetic ability. This form of education gradually declined over the years, and was highest among the Greeks. Now, I think, it cannot be nurtured in any better way than through studying the great—and in this retrospect especially admirable—men, or, in a nutshell, through studying the Greeks. I believe … that no other people had fused such a degree of simplicity and nature anerkanntesten Kenner wenig Befriedigendes darboten.” Wolf, “Darstellung,” 3. German “Sachkennt­nissen” and “Verbesserung der Finanzen, der Fabriken, des Handels, der Land- und Haus-Wirthschaft.” Ibid., 5. 10 German: “daß das, was durch historische Unter­ suchungen des Alterthums und durch Bekanntschaft mit den Sprachen und den unsterblichen Werken desselben zur harmonischen Ausbildung des Geistes und Gemüths gewonnen wird, eben so vollkommen auf irgend einem anderen Wege könne erreichet werden.” Ibid., 9. 9

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with such a degree of culture. And, no other people has featured such persistent energy and capacity for every impression. I believe, I say, that I am able to prove that the Greeks are worth studying not merely before all modern peoples but also before the Romans.11 Without doubt, this was Wolf’s attitude as well. This becomes evident in a passage of his Encyclopedia-Lecture in which he points to some aspects constituting “the benefit of the entire science.” Standing in the tradition of the Enlightenment, he declares that one thing is “important to every educated human being: the knowledge of foreign nations in general … as a part of mankind’s history.” The larger the temporal distance, “the more peculiar facets they have to have; the more sides of the human nature do we learn.” The men of antiquity had not been superior from an ethical standpoint, but, as Wolf continues, “antiquity had brought forth such magnificently greater characters.” Concerning the sciences, they had been “great pragmatists and not theorists.” He stated that “there exists no thoroughness when we acquire the more modern languages if we do not look back to the old.” The same holds true for literature, as “the entire new literature” is based on the old, and the ancient works still dominate the canon. From all of this, Wolf concludes that classical studies are a branch of science in their own right, and one must not consider “the classical studies as only of importance for theology, jurisprudence, etc.”12 When looking at his argumentation, one has to come to the conclusion that Wolf saw the asset of the Greeks not in their ethics but in the 11 German: “Es [...] giebt, außer allen einzelnen Studien und Ausbildungen des Menschen, noch eine ganz eigne, welche gleichsam den ganzen Menschen zusammenknüpft, ihn nicht nur fähiger, stärker, besser von dieser und jener Seite, sondern überhaupt zum größeren und edleren Mensch macht, wozu zugleich Stärke der intellektuellen, Güte der moralischen und Reizbarkeit und Empfänglichkeit der ästhetischen Fähigkeit gehört. Diese Ausbildung nimmt nach und nach mehr ab, und war in sehr hohem Grade unter den Griechen. Sie nun kann dünkt mich nicht besser befördert werden, als durch das Studium großer und gerade in dieser Rüksicht bewundernswürdiger Men­schen, oder um es mit Einem Worte zu sagen durch das Studium der Griechen. Denn ich glaube [...], daß kein andres Volk zugleich soviel Einfachheit und Natur mit soviel Kultur verband, und keins zugleich soviel ausharrende Energie und Reizbarkeit für jeden Eindruk besaß, ich glaube, sage ich, beweisen zu können, daß nicht bloß von allen modernen Völkern, sondern auch vor den Römern die Griechen zu diesem Studium taugen.” Letter dated December 1, 1792 in Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich A. Wolf, Briefe an Friedrich August Wolf, ed. Philip Mattson (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 26. 12 Wolf, Encyclopädie der Philologie, 35, 39, 41, 45. — 46 —

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esthetics of language. It was in this that Wolf saw the great difference between classical literature and that of the Orient. Indeed, this is the only instance in which Wolf directly refers to Orientals in his “Outlines.” As stated above, he perceived them as utterly lacking the capacity for deriving the art of writing, and thus great literature, because of their language.13 Wolf substantially differs from Humboldt, for whom language is merely a medium in which is manifested the intellectual, ethical, and esthetical advantages of the ancient (wisdom, idea, culture, etc.). For Wolf, language is due to immediate significance.14 For this very reason, Wolf strongly argues against studying classical languages in such a way that it blocks the view of the big picture. He has to reject the “endless quest for all historical aspects of antiquity, in the languages especially, to gather the single fact as a single fact without acquiring strict general principles, without acquiring even a sense of the spirit that combines everything single into its harmonic entirety.”15 According to Wolf, the exploration of the languages from the past leads to the discovery of antiquity itself. He refers to the world in which language exists as Encyklopädie, encyclopedia. The Encyclopedia of the Classical Studies in the Works of Wolf and Boeckh For the description of their subject, Friedrich August Wolf and his student August Boekh refer to the term Encyklopädie. Wolf describes, in the curriculum for his first surveying lecture in Halle, that he considers the Philologic Encyclopedia the entirety of all classical disciplines.16 He 13 Ibid., 33. 14 Johannes Irmscher, the scholar of classical studies, rightly claims that “Wolf was and had remained a philologist void of speculation. Humboldt had approached the classical studies from the standpoint of a philosopher, and they were always subordinate to philosophy.” See Johannes Irmscher, “Friedrich August Wolf und Wilhelm von Humboldt,” in Konferenz zur 200. Wiederkehr der Gründung des Seminarium Philologicum Halense durch Friedrich August Wolf am 15. 10. 1787: “Innere und äussere Integration der Altertumswissenschaften”: Beiträge, ed. Joachim Ebert and HansMartin Zimmermann (Halle: Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1989), 81. 15 German: “[das] endlose Bestreben, in allem Geschichtlichen des Alterthums, besonders in den Sprachen, Einzelnes als Einzelnes zusammenzutragen, ohne sich fester allgemeiner Grundsätze zu bemächtigen, ohne von dem Geiste, der alles Einzelne zu einem harmonischen Ganzes bildet, nur eine Ahnung zu fassen.” Wolf, “Darstellung,” 141. 16 Or, in his original Latin, “encyclopaedia philologica, in qua, orbe universo earum rerum, quibus litterae antiquitatis continentur, peragrato, singularum doctrinarum ambitus, argumenta, coniunctiones, utilitates, subsidia, denique recte et cum fructu tractandae cuiusque rationes illustrabuntur.” — 47 —

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bases his concept of “encyclopedia” on the ancient term Enkýklios paideía, which is only roughly translatable as Artes liberales. This Enkýklios was “the entire incarnation of knowledge an educated man in antiquity had to acquire, typically in his adolescence, in order to emerge a scholar, or an expert of scholarship or literature.”17 Only in second place did the artes liberales exist in antiquity, “the knowledge of those arts that the free-born man exercised in antiquity to acquire the necessary education as a genteel and courteous man.”18 That Wolf refers back to the literal sense of the Greek word is not simply characteristic of his thoroughness. He describes the Encyclopedia of Classical Studies as “a scholarly description of the ancient studies that is combined with an introduction into the educated and suitable study of the same.” As stated, the encyclopedia was intended to transmit the “knowledge of the subject matter, its scope, its individual parts, its merits partially for this subject and partially for other subjects, and a description of the methodology.”19 Thus, Wolf renounces any universalistic claim of having derived a system of disciplines through categorizing the studies. He was content with a pragmatic “outlines” on the subject, according to “Terminology, Scope, Purpose, and Merit.” It is thus merely preparatory instruction that is intended to take on a life of its own, yet the content of the studies is not. Wolf simply attempts to offer the student the means for understanding antiquity. Consequently, he emphasizes the importance of the critique that he considers the criterion for the occupation with antiquity. Wolf’s sketch is therefore systematic only within limits. The primary aim for his time in Halle and his “Outlines” was to establish classical studies as an independent subject, in which he succeeded. The consistent collocation of the fields of knowledge was secondary to that aim. It is his student, Boeckh, who soon makes the critique that “the single established disciplines as well as the entity they form” of Wolf’s 17 German: “ganzen Inbegriff von Kenntnissen, welche im Alterthum ein gebildeter Mann gewöhnlich in der Jugend durchlaufen musste, um nachher als ein Gelehrter, oder als Kenner der Gelehrsamkeit oder der Litteratur zu erscheinen.” Ibid., 6. 18 German: “Kenntniss derjenigen Künste, die der freigeborne Mensch im Alterthume trieb, um sich die gehörige Ausbildung als feiner u. angenehmer Mann zu geben.” Wolf, Vorlesungen, 1. 19 German: “eine wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Alterthumskunde, verbun­ den mit einer Einleitung in das gelehrte und zweckmässige Studium derselben [vermitteln solle sie] Kenntniss ihres Gegenstandes, ihres Umfangs, ihrer Theile, ihres Nutzens theils für dieses Fach, theils für andere Wissenschaften und Darstellung der Methode.” Ibid., 5. — 48 —

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encyclopedia lack “a scholarly coherence.”20 His criticism is especially targeted at the postposition of philosophy within the teaching system. It is necessary that philosophy, which is occupied with questions relevant to all sciences, has to stand “on the top position and all individual sciences below of it.”21 The position Boeckh assigns to philosophy is a result of his idealistic ideas: “The studies in their entirety is philosophy; science of ideas.”22 Without further reason to believe otherwise, Boeckh was aware of the reason that philosophy was not pre-eminent in Wolf’s encyclopedia. Wolf was immune—and remained immune—to the idealistic zeitgeist, and he kept his distance from the systematic concepts of modern philosophy. He declared that it was impossible to determine the inner coherence of the sciences. Wolf stated that if one was to proceed according to a certain philosophical structure, the undertaking proves to be difficult to such a degree that one barely knows how to break through. This is rooted in the fact that it is extraordinarily complicated to find one point in which all sciences meet, as there is too great a dissimilarity among the disciplines.23 Wolf is most interested in liberating philology from its status as ancilla. For this reason he adds to it a variety of subjects that together comprise the classical studies. Boeckh affirms his idea that science and “positive religion … stand on an entirely different ground.”24 The concept of the comprehensive classical studies does not satisfy Boeckh’s systematic aspiration. He wrote that the classical studies contain an aggregation of various knowledge; everything that they are able to teach 20

“Sowohl den einzelnen aufgestellten Disciplinen als auch dem Ganzen, das sie bilden sollen, [fehlt] der wissenschaftliche Zusammenhang.” August Boeckh, Encyklopädie und Methodologie, 40. On the criticism of other scholars, see Peter L. Schmidt, “Friedrich August Wolf und das Dilemma der Altertumswissenschaften,” in “Innere und äußere Integration,” ed. Ebert and Zimmermann, 64–78. 21 Boeckh, Encyklopädie und Methodologie, 42. 22 Ibid., 9. 23 German: “Will man nach einer bestimmten philosophischen Anordnung verfahren, so ist die Sache so häklich, dass man fast nicht durchzukommen weiss; denn es ist ausser­ordentlich schwer, einen Punkt zu finden, in dem sich alle Wissenschaften vereinigen, weil eine zu grosse Ungleichheit unter den Disciplinen herrscht.” Wolf, Vorlesungen, 3. 24 Boeckh, Encyklopädie und Methodologie, 29. — 49 —

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does belong into another science. We thus do not have a distinction from the other sciences if we were not to put the concept of philology on another footing. Such a distinction from the other sciences cannot be found in the concept of the old as something irrelevant.25 It is paradox that Boeckh again sees philology as a Hülfwissenschaft, an auxiliary science. He does not, however, refer to philology as being in a subordinate role, but to the indispensability of the subject for all the other disciplines it has in common with philosophy. As such, he is able to claim that “it is philosophy and philology in which all other sciences are rooted.”26 August Boeckh’s student, Leopold Zunz, adopted this attitude. Leopold Zunz as a Student of Friedrich A. Wolf and August Boeckh Leopold Zunz—his Hebrew name was Jomtob Lipmann—was born in Detmold, the capital of the German principality of Lippe-Detmold, on August 10, 1796.27 In 1803, following the death of his father, Menachem, Zunz entered the Samsonsche Freischule in Wolfenbüttel, Brunswick. The Samsonsche Freischule was the most important house of learning for the Jewish community in the area.28 One of his schoolmates was, as mentioned, Isaak Markus Jost. Zunz was the first Jewish student accepted to the Prima of the Gymnasium in Wolfenbüttel, or, in other words, he was the first Jewish student ever to enter the senior year of the academic track high school there, and he graduated in 1811. He left Wolfenbüttel in the fall of 1815 and relocated to Berlin, which was to 25 German: “Unter Alterthumskunde ist ein Aggregat von allerlei Wissen enthalten; alles, was sie lehren kann, gehört in irgend eine andere Wissenschaft und es fehlt uns also, wenn wir den Begriff der Philologie nicht anders stellen, überhaupt an einer Unterscheidung von den übrigen Wissenschaften, die im Begriff des Alten, als eines Unwesentlichen, nicht liegen kann.” Ibid., 6. 26 Ibid., 18. 27 On Zunz’s biography, see, for instance, Nahum N. Glatzer, Leopold Zunz: Jude, Deutscher, Europäer, ein jüdisches Gelehrtenschicksal des 19. Jahrhunderts in Briefen an Freunde (Tübingen: Mohr, 1964), 1–72. See also Michael A. Meyer, Von Moses Mendelssohn zu Leopold Zunz: Jüdische Identität in Deutschland 1749–1824 (München: Beck, 1994). 28 On the Samsonsche Freischule see, for instance, Mordechai Eliav, Jüdische Erziehung in Deutschland im Zeitalter der Aufklärung und der Emanzipation (Münster and New York: Waxmann, 2001), 132– 139. — 50 —

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become his new home. He commenced studies at the newly established Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, today’s Humboldt University of Berlin. According to Zunz’ curriculum vitae, included in his application for the PhD examination procedure in Halle, he read in Berlin with renowned scholars such as the theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, with whom he was friends, and the professor of jurisprudence Friedrich Carl von Savigny.29 Concerning his teachers, Karl Wilhelm Stolger (for logic), Friedrich Rühs (ancient history), Boeckh and Wolf, Zunz noted that “I leave Stolger for he is boring, and Rühs for he is against the Jews. Boeckh instructs [belehrt]. Yet it is Wolf alone who attracts me [zieht mich an].”30 Michael A. Meyer commented on this sentence: “If one was to assess the influences on Zunz, one will have to take this note seriously.”31 Scholarship has indeed paid attention to the influence of Savigny, Wolf, and Boeckh.32 Luitpold Wallach sternly argues for the prevalence of Boeckh’s influence. Michael Meyer argues the opposite. He has unfortunately not taken into consideration Wallach’s work. It is, however, hardly justified to strictly differentiate between the Meister, as Boeckh referred to Wolf,33 and his confident student. Comparing Zunz’ note with the reminiscences of the contemporary philologian and art historian Gustav Parthey, it becomes apparent what Zunz might have had in mind with his contraposition of “Instruction/Belehrung” and “Attraction/Anziehung.” 29 In his original Latin, the information on his years in Berlin reads “Quum vero Anno MDCCCXV Berolinum me contulissem, ibique per quadriennium universitati ascriptus fuerim, praelectionibus philosophicis mathematicis historicis et philologicis celeberrimorum virorum Dr. Boeckh, Dr. Grueson, Dr. Ruehs, Dr. Stolger, Dr. Tralles, Dr. Wilken, et Dr. F. A. Wolf interfui, – Doctores etiam praeclaros Savignium et de Wettium, quorum alter juris romani historiam, alter introductionem in Scripturam Sanctam disserebat audivi.” Universitätsarchiv Halle, Rep. 21 II Nr. 15, Bl. 132. See also Zunz’s letter to Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, dated July 11, 1817, in Glatzer, Leopold Zunz, 86. 30 Leopold Zunz, Das Buch Zunz: Eine Probe, ed. Fritz Bamberger ([Berlin]: Officina Serpentis, 1931), 19. In 1816, Friedrich Rühs had published his pamphlet Die Rechte des Christenthums und des deutschen Volks, vertheidigt gegen die Ansprüche der Juden und ihrer Verfechter (The rights of Christiandom and the German nation, defended against the claims of the Jews and their supporters). (Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1816). 31 Meyer, Von Moses Mendelssohn bis Leopold Zunz, 181. 32 On the influence of Savigny, see Fritz Bamberger, “Zunz’s Conception of History: A Study of the Philosophic Elements in Early Science of Judaism,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research 11 (1941): 1-25. See also Meyer, Von Moses Mendelssohn bis Leopold Zunz, 184. On the influence of Wolf and Boeckh, see Leon Wieseltier, “Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography,” in Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert I—Philologie et herméneutique au 19ème siècle II, ed. Mayotte Bollack, Heinz Wismann and Theodor Lindken (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 215–29, see especially 217. 33 Boeckh, Encyclopädie und Methodologie, 39. — 51 —

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Parthey refers to Boeckh’s manner in the lecture hall of the university in Berlin: “Boeckh’s [style of] lecture was … dozy. Yet the substantiality of the content, the uncounted number of positive notes, the rightfulness of the judgment, and the depth of philological knowledge—all of this kept us bound with invisible thread.”34 The clean but lethargic quality of Boeckh’s instruction stood in contrast to Wolf’s style of lecturing. Wolf’s style was “of the most exquisite sophistication and elegance, not rarely spiced up with sneer and satire.” The grandson of Friedrich Nikolai wrote of his own experiences that “[in Wolf’s lectures one] always felt like listening to a rich man, who tells from the wealth of his possessions what he considered appropriate. Yet he possessed far greater treasures than that.”35 This skilled teacher knew how to attract his audience. Franz Passow, a student of Gottfried Hermann’s, found, as late as 1815, that Wolf’s “strength and brilliance [was] inexhaustible.”36 This quote contradicts Michael Meyer’s impression of Wolf having become “a grumpy and querulous man [griesgrämig und nörglerisch]” in Berlin. Wolf’s lectures, according to Meyer, “had not found a large audience anymore.”37 Whereas the young Zunz did not display any preference for modern philosophy (he apparently never attended one of Hegel’s lectures),38 he attended Boeckh’s “Introduction to Plato,” and later the lecture on the “History of Philosophy.” He attended Wolf’s “Antiquities,” the “Greek Literature,” the “Roman Antiquities,” and “Cicero’s De natura deorum.” Zunz followed both Wolf’s and Boeckh’s lectures on the “Encyclopedia of Philology.”39 In their lectures, Zunz might have considered the existence of a Jewish philology for the first time. He outlined it in his first treatise, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur (“Notes on the Rabbinic Literature”), published in 1818. It would become the manifesto of his 34

35 36 37 38 39

German: “Boeckh‘s Vortrag war [...] schläfrig, aber die Gediegenheit des Inhalts, die unermeßliche Menge von positiven Notizen, die Richtigkeit des Urtheils und die Tiefe der philologischen Gelehrsamkeit hielten uns wie mit unsichtbaren Banden gefesselt.” Gustav Parthey, Jugenderinnerungen von Gustav Parthey: Handschrift für Freunde. Neu herausgegeben (getreu dem Original) und mit einer Einleitung sowie Anmerkungen versehen von Ernst Friedel (Berlin: Frensdorff, 1907), 222. Ibid., 216. Albrecht Wachler, ed., Franz Passow’s Leben und Briefe (Breslau: Hirt, 1839), 200. See Meyer, Von Moses Mendelssohn bis Leopold Zunz, 184. Meyer employs the biography of Wolf’s son-in-law Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm Körte. Ibid., 182. Zunz Archives, Jerusalem, Table of Contents to the Collegienhefte. — 52 —

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scientia nova.40 Zunz considered researching the literature and history “on a grand scale,” unprejudiced and without theological premises, not only as a challenge, but as “a duty.”41 Zunz distanced himself from the contemporary approach of the rabbis when he ventured into the study of Jewish traditions without any considerations regarding “if their entire content should or would be normative for our own judgment.”42 He outlined this creed in a letter to his teacher in Wolfenbüttel, Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, when he wrote that “nothing is to be achieved before the downfall of the Talmud.”43 With that he referred to the primacy of the “cursed swashbuckling [Klopffechten, an exhibition fight of fencing]” as he called it in his treatise: the pilpul (the sharp analysis) of the “common tormentors of the Talmud [gemeine Talmudquäler].”44 The point of reference and departure for the Wissenschaft des Judentums, the “Science of Judaism,” was the Reformation, when “a lively study of the biblical books” commenced as a result of the classical education, the studia humanitatis.45 Consequently, the study of the Jewish tradition then was directed by the theological interests. Zunz wrote that …the theological knowledge of Hebrew was therefore limited to the Bible. When they [the theologians] graced with their attention later Jewish writings, they merely did so because they needed them for their understanding of the Bible: the theologians’ gaze and love was reserved for the words of God, not the Jewish author. The nontheological world did not take any notice of Hebrew.46 40 Leopold Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, nebst Nachrichten über ein altes bis jetzt ungedrucktes hebräisches Werk (Berlin: Maurer, 1818). I refer to the reprint of 1876: Leopold Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerschel, 1876), 1–31. See also Hans-Joachim Bechtoldt, Die jüdische Bibelkritik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart et al.: Kohlhammer, 1995), 64–83. Also refer to the rather undervalued Luitpold Wallach, “The Scientific and Philosophical Background of Zunz’ ‘Science of Judaism,’” Historia Judaica 4 (1952): 51–70. 41 Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 4. 42 Ibid., 5, fn. 1. Emphasis in the original. 43 Zunz to Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, October 13, 1818, in Nahum N. Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz: An Account in Letters, 1815–1885 (London: East and West Library, 1958), 13. 44 Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 29, fn. 1. 45 Ibid., 4. 46 German: “[...] die theologische Kenntniss des Hebräischen beschränkte sich demnach auf die Bibel, wenn sie gelegentlich späteren jüdischen Schriften Aufmerksamkeit schenkte, so geschah es lediglich, weil sie ihrer zum Verständniss der Bibel bedurfte: der Blick der Theologen und ihre Liebe galt dem Worte Gottes, nicht dem jüdischen Autor. Die nichttheologische Welt nahm vom — 53 —

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According to Zunz, there was but one way to be occupied with “our” science, and that was in a critical and scholarly manner. He did not differentiate between Jews and non-Jews,47 although he noted that the latter often had made Judaism the subject of their research for improper reasons. He concludes that a shameful collapse in the study of Jewish tradition occurred during the period after the Reformation: How can it be, one is inclined to ask, that at a time when a great gaze sets its magnificent eyes on all sciences, when even the most deserted corners of the world are travelled to, the unknown languages are studied, how can it be that our science alone is left barren? What is holding us back from knowing the entire content of the rabbinical literature, from understanding it properly, from happily explaining [it], from correctly judging [it], and comfortably surveying [it]?48 The young author explains the desolate condition of Jewish literature as due to the political situation of the “Hebrew” nation: “This nation, fallen from its political and intellectual height, appears to have lost the strength of reproduction over a long period. It has settled for the more or less successful exegesis of the rare writings from a better time”49 The poverty of Jewish literature is seen as the outcome of political conditions. This chorus is an old one, and has been heard at least since the days of Philo of Alexandria.50 That Zunz’s treatise is intended to be provocative becomes evident in its closure:

47 48

49

50

Hebräischen gar keine Notiz.” Leopold Zunz, “Die jüdische Literatur [1845],” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, 48. See Glatzer, Leopold Zunz, 10. German: “Wie geht es zu, könnte man fragen, dass zu einer Zeit, wo über alle Wissenschaften, über alles Thun der Menschen ein grossartiger Gesammtblick seine hellen Strahlen verbreitet, wo die entlegensten Erdwinkeln bereist, die unbekanntesten Sprachen studirt, und kein Material verachtet wird, dem Baue der Weisheit zu dienen, wie geht es zu, dass allein unsere Wissenschaft danieder liegt? was hindert uns den Inhalt der rabbinischen Litteratur ganz zu kennen, gehörig zu verstehen, glücklich zu erklären, richtig zu beurtheilen und bequem zu übersehen?” Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 5. German: “Diese, von ihrer politischen Höhe wie von ihrer intellectuellen herabgesunken, schien die Reproductionskraft auf lange Zeit verloren zu haben, sich begnügend mit der bald mehr bald weniger gelungenen Exegese der sparsamen Schriften aus der bessern Zeit.” Ibid., 3. See Philo’s De Vita Mosis, II:43. — 54 —

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Indeed, it is not our talent but only our fiery will to strive for the good and noble that might excuse our bold entry into the midst of the authors’ world in the eyes of readers capable of reason and leniency. Thus, we welcome the understanding treatise of this criticism so we do not have to consider it not noteworthy because it remained unnoticed.51 Zunz, therefore, preferred harsh criticism over damnatio memoriae (condemnation of memory); he wanted to step into a discussion with the “authors’ world,” and again make “our science” the subject of scholarly research the way it had been in the Renaissance. He was right, insofar as the “rubble … of the Hebrew canon” as the “foundation of the Christian states” had become an “industry of the mind” that was “more admirable than the Greek [one] because it had created its wealth from fewer resources.”52 Zunz paid tribute to the performance of the construction of a Christian culture from the ruins of that of the Jews. Humboldt had only acknowledged Greek antiquity. Zunz’ interest in classical studies, and the reason he delved into them, was apparently not influenced by Humboldt’s ideal of Bildung, which assigned to Hellas the designation of the peak of human culture. It was not Humboldt’s Greek cult but Wolf’s philological fervor that set its imprint on Zunz. Leopold Zunz followed in his agenda for a science of Judaism Wolf’s concept for the classical studies. This fact is evident in Zunz’s concept of critique, which entailed three levels: the “doctrinal” level, i.e., the explanation of Jewish tradition according to theology and humanities; the “grammatical” level, i.e., lexicography and philology, which had been so utterly neglected; and finally the “historical” level, i.e., the overall recording and creation of inventories of the tradition.53 By and large, Zunz thus follows Wolf’s approach. In his lectures, Wolf emphasized that critique includes “a great part of the art of explanation,” meaning hermeneutics. He subdivides critique 51 German: “Wahrlich, dass wir so dreist in die Mitte der Schriftstellerwelt treten, können unsere Talente nicht, kann nur unser feuriger Wille, das Gute und Schöne zu erstreben, in den Augen urtheilsfähiger und nachsichtsvoller Leser rechtfertigen. Drum sei eine verständige Kritik dieser Abhandlung uns sehr willkommen, dass wir sie nicht desswegen für nicht bemerkenswerth halten müssten, weil sie unbemerkt blieb.” Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 31. 52 Ibid., 3. 53 Ibid., 7. — 55 —

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into two main aspects: the philological, involved with the evaluation of words (Wortkritik) on the one hand; and the historio-philological (or higher) analysis on the other. Wolf stated that [t]he one [critique] entails rules according to which it is possible to conclude authenticity, age, and author of the ancient writings. This part belongs to historical critique [or Realkritik]. The second [critique] entails principles according to which it is possible to learn how to examine, judge, and recreate the accuracy of the texts in their words, either for the entirety of the texts or for only parts of them.54 The increase of philology’s autonomy as critica, which Wolf pursued, was an important stimulus for Zunz, because the “tormentors of the Talmud” pursued their exegesis for the sole purpose of the religious standardization of Judaism. Zunz sought something clearly distinct from that. He considered philology to be independent from judgment. This idea echoes the concept of Boeckh, who considered that the scientific natures of philology and philosophy made them worthy of comparison to the “exact” sciences. Boeckh wrote that … philology is as little connected to Christian conscience as are mathematics, chemistry, or astronomy. It has its essence in itself; a philologist could be Christian, and, the other way around, a Christian could be a philologist. Yet both are what they are for themselves. Is it not true that most men are Christians without being philologists, and Jews and Mohammedans had been skilled philologists; one does not have to mix all matters among themselves.55 54 German: “Der eine enthält diejenigen Regeln, wonach man Aechtheit, Alter und die Verfasser von den Schriften des Althertums erforscht. Dieser Theil gehört zur historischen [oder Realkritik]. Der zweite enthält die Grundsätze, wonach man die Richtigkeit der Texte in den Worten, theils im Ganzen, theils auch in einzelnen Stellen beurtheilt, prüfen und wiederherstellen lernt, wo es möglich ist.” Wolf, Vorlesungen, 305. 55 German: “So wenig als die Mathematik, die Chemie oder Astronomie etwas mit christlichem Bewusstsein zu thun haben, ebensowenig die Philologie. Sie hat ihr Wesen in sich, der Philologe kann ein Christ sein und umgekehrt ein Christ ein Philologe, aber beide sind jedes für sich. Sind ja doch die meisten Menschen Christen ohne Philologen zu sein, und Juden und Muhamedaner — 56 —

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Zunz assigned to philosophy a special position very similar to that which Boeckh’s described for the scholarly discipline. He wrote: Above the halls of science, above the entire playground of human endeavor, rules Philosophy in unrivaled majesty, ever invisible, devoting herself with invulnerable self-reliance to all that is humanly knowable. And that is why we have not wished to see her as a separate science, as the epitome of Jewish wisdom alone; for she is also the higher, historical awareness of how this wisdom spread over centuries, put down in writing to be treated and mistreated by Jews and non-Jews; she is the loftiest guide when we ourselves undertake to know the intellectual greatness of our people and to transmit that knowledge. In this manner, each historical date discovered through industry, deciphered with acumen, employed by philosophy, and arranged with discernment, becomes a contribution to human knowledge, the sole most worthy end of all inquiry. But it is also only this higher notion that behooves Science, who survives states and nations, exalted over all earthly pettiness; she alone can lead us one day to a true history of Jewish philosophy,56 in which the lines of thought pursued by great minds need be discerned and comprehended,57 and retraced in parallel with the comprehensive teachings of the earth,58 accordtüchtige Philologen gewesen; man muss nicht alle Dinge unter einander mischen.” Boeckh, Encyclopädie und Methodologie, 29. 56 My italics. Footnote by Zunz: “Authors were immediately treated as representatives of the entire people, and that, too, without distinction as to periods or countries. Buddeus provides only an introduction, and a sparse one at that.” 57 Footnote by Zunz: […] “The Yesirah is a little book that is neither as clever nor as silly as partisans of either view would have it. This is what has confused the majority of those who have attacked the Kabbalah; honest Reuchlin is still the one who manages best with it. Very much to the point is Andreas Sennert: ‘In our view there is one Kabbalah that is true, unquestioned and divine; after that there is a second, intermediate and human, that is commonly referred to as the Jewish Kabbalah; finally, there is a third, which is false, superstition, indeed demonic.’ The Messiah one finds in more recent Jewish religious books, and who is supposed to bring the world salvation and happiness, is the personified dogma that decrees what every reasonable human being should desire. It has replaced the former Jewish Messiah that now subsists only in form.” 58 Note by Zunz: “E.g., with the influence of Arab philosophy, of the study of grammar and astronomy, of scholasticism and of ideas of tolerance, etc.” — 57 —

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ing to the strict prescripts of History.59 For Zunz, philosophy has a claim to universality. In this he clearly and entirely follows the idealistic zeitgeist. “Jewish wisdom” is therefore nothing other than the manifestation of philosophy draped in a Jewish garment. Researching Jewish philosophy thus contributes to the history of philosophy in general. In his essays, the German philosopher Richard Schaeffler followed the influence of the philosophers of German idealism on the scholars of the science of Judaism. Schaeffler explains that the idea of Enlightenment’s reason harbored the danger that the emancipation of Jews (as individuals) had to be traded with the self-abandonment of Jewry (as a special community). And, the mere insistence on tradition increased the danger that Jewry would estrange itself from the rest of mankind. [Yet the reception of Hegel’s idea of the mind offered the opportunity to] perceive in one accord the individual right specialness, and its meaning for the universal.60

59 Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur,” 30–31. The whole German text reads: “Und über diese Räume der Wissenschaft, über den ganzen Tummelplatz menschlicher Thätigkeit herrscht mit ausschliessender Majestät die Philosophie, überall unsichtbar, sich aller menschlicher Erkenntniss mit unverletzter Selbständigkeit hingebend. Und darum haben wir sie nicht als spezielle Wissenschaft, als den Inbegriff jüdischer Weisheit allein ansehen wollen; denn sie ist auch die höhere geschichtliche Kenntniss, wie diese Weisheit durch Jahrhunderte fortgegangen, und in Schriften niedergelegt von Juden und Nichtjuden behandelt und gemisshandelt worden ist; – ja sie ist die höchste Führerin, wenn wir selber es übernehmen, die intellectuelle Grösse des Volkes zu erkennen und das Erkannte wieder zu geben. Solchergestalt wird jedes historische Datum, das der Fleiss gefunden, der Scharfsinn entziffert, die Philosophie benutzt, und der Geschmack an die angemessene Stelle gebracht, ein Beitrag zur Kenntniss des Menschen, welche allein der würdigste Endzweck aller Forschung ist. Aber auch nur diese höhere Ansicht geziemt der Wissenschaft, die, erhaben über alle Erden-Kleinlichkeit, Länder und Nationen überlebt; nur sie kann uns einst zu einer wahren Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie führen, worin der Ideengang der Köpfe ansgemittelt und verstanden und mit der parallelen umfassenden Ausbildung der Erde nach den strengen Vorschriften der Geschichte verfolgt werden muss.” On this topic see my book Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Boston: Brill, 2009): 21-38. 60 Richard Schaeffler, “Die Wissenschaft des Judentums in ihrer Beziehung zur allgemeinen Geistesgeschichte im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Wissenschaft des Judentums: Anfänge der Judaistik in Europa, ed. Julius Carlebach (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 124. — 58 —

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Schaeffler did not recognize, however, that Hegel’s understanding of the mind in the end, on a higher mindset, implicated the dissolution of the individual(s) and the manifestation of those “undifferentiated of the mind.” It was Hegel’s student Emanuel (Eduard) Gans who was aware of this consequence, and thus converted to Christianity for pragmatic reasons. In respect to Zunz, it remains debatable if his approach shows signs of more than superficial convergences with Hegel. Such similarities might be found in the termini rather than in the concepts.61 Emancipation Because of/from Classical Studies? The influence of Wolf and Boeckh on the new Wissenschaft des Judentums is a dual one: it is manifested in its comprehensive and “critical” approach and in its emphasis of its independence and autonomy. Critique is at the center of Wolf’s classical studies. Not surprisingly, the author Wolf moves behind the editor. The professor mostly invested his extraordinary knowledge and assiduity into the thorough composition of critical editions. One is inclined to see in this fact a reflection of Protestant heritage, inasmuch as critical work is necessarily connected to questioning tradition. Leopold Zunz, too, first and foremost saw the first steps to scholarly research of Jewish literature in the edition of reliable texts. The urgency of the task was evident, as the corpus of Jewish literature was virtually unknown. The critical work was carried out free from any doctrine. Wolf and Zunz concurred that philology must not be utilized in the service of interests outside the subject, be they theologically or politically motivated. Literature was to come into its own through studying it in its own right and carving out its contribution to the Bildung of the (European) man. The importance of the task becomes apparent if the historical and social coordinates of the emancipation of Jewry is considered. The journey from the ghetto to society had not been concluded entirely, and the prejudices of the Christian milieu and criticism from the Orthodox members of Jewish society equally put the acceptance of the new science in danger. Boeckh’s influence is visible in Zunz’s aim of leading the Jewish history of ideas into general philosophy. This aim might be seen 61 See, for instance, Zunz’s discussion in “Die jüdische Literatur,” 42. — 59 —

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as a reaction to the then-common philosophical perception of Judaism as a distant point of departure of the Christian idealistic Weltanschauung. Zunz viewed neo-Hebrew literature as an entity in itself. He thought the time had come to employ philological methodology in order to judge Jewish achievements.62 The account of tradition was not intended for Jewish education, but was meant to encourage emancipation through proving the Jewish contribution to European culture. While the study of Hebrew had been established as an independent subject under theological auspices, Wissenschaft des Judentums had to struggle relentlessly for acceptance. The 1960s saw its integration into the common university education.63 Yet the aim, making the study of Jewish culture an indispensable part of the European canon of education, has remained a desideratum ever since.

62 Zunz, Gesammelte Schriften, 32. 63 See further details below, pp. 89-97. — 60 —

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1.3 Biography and Autobiography in the Early Years of the Science of Judaism

In the preface of his Geschichte Wallensteins [History of (Albrecht von) Wallenstein, 1583–1634], which appeared in 1869, the historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) noted the correlation between history and biography. He wrote that when Plutarch once remarked that he did not write history but biography, he touched on one of the most striking difficulties of historical as well as biographical depiction. When wishing to present a character in a lively manner it is of essence not to forget the conditions under which he or she acts and realizes results. When wishing to present the progress of world-historic episodes it is of essence to take notice of the characters that affect them.1 Despite the great task of combining history and biography, Ranke justified—at least to himself—the literary genre of biography only under the condition that the biographical subject had an impact on “historic world events.” The Renaissance historian will recognize in this the personality cult that reached its peak in Machiavelli’s Principe, and had experienced a vivid revival at the end of the nineteenth century. Biography became, in the course of this development, a pendant and an illustration of history in general. History had to bow to the episodes 1

German: “Wenn Plutarch einmal in Erinnerung bringt, daß er nicht Geschichte schreibe, sondern Biographie, so berührt er damit eine der vornehmsten Schwierigkeiten der allgemeinen historischen sowohl wie der biographischen Darstellung. Indem eine lebendige Persönlichkeit dargestellt werden soll, darf man die Bedingungen nicht vergessen, unter denen sie auftritt und wirksam ist. Indem man den großen Gang der welthistorischen Begebenheiten schildert, wird man immer auch der Persönlichkeiten eingedenk sein müssen, von denen sie ihren Impuls empfangen.” Leopold von Ranke, Geschichte Wallensteins (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1872), preface. On this see also Eckhard Jander, “Untersuchungen zu Theorie und Praxis der deutschen historischen Biographie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Ist die Biographie eine mögliche Form legitimer Geschichtsschreibung?)” (PhD diss., University of Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, 1965). — 61 —

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that were created by extraordinary men, and had to fit the stage of the “play of the world” in a literary and methodological manner. This is not merely rhetoric if one considers that this personality cult especially created the blossoming affection for the Renaissance, as the battleground of heroes, statesmen, and artists, that echoes to this very day. One must assume that Alexander Marx, the historian and librarian of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, had in mind Ranke’s sentences when he prefaced his Essays in Jewish Biography (1947) thus: The four medieval scholars discussed herein [Rabbi Saadia Gaon, Rabbenu Gershom, Rashi, and Maimonides], though not statesmen who influenced the course of history, left a lasting impression on the development of Judaism.2 Marx shifts the emphasis from world history to the Jewish experience and thus indirectly points to the necessity of writing a Jewish biography. The emphasis on the adjective “Jewish” is intended to recall not only the lost battle for the emancipation of the Jews, but also the reasons that led to it. In essence, the idealistic understanding of a universal man failed dramatically in the course of history—possibly because the homo universalis had been influenced by cultures that had understood themselves as universal and thus thought in absolute terms.3 To compose a Jewish biography was the practical answer to the problem. The historians of the École des Annales (Annales School) produced a turning point in the mid-twentieth century. The first representatives of the École, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, created the process for it when introducing their journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale in 1929. A range of exemplary studies discussed almost unknown individuals in their respective social and cultural contexts. Subjects of these studies were not kings, saints, or popes, but citizens, peasants, women, workers, and representatives of minorities. The subject of research was not history, i.e., cultural phenomena in “their mainstream,” or institutions 2 3

Alexander Marx, Essays in Jewish Biography (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947), vii. On this aspect see my Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Boston: Brill, 2009), 11-38. — 62 —

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and wars, but microhistory, e.g. the trial of Martin Guerre or Domenico Scandella, aka Menocchio, to name some of the most popular figures.4 German historians long struggled to warm to the École des Annales, and began, as late as the 1980s, to respond to the impulses of the history of ways of thinking and the microstoria, or, in German, Alltagsgeschichte. The literary composition of what is experienced is at the heart of a biography. In their task of depicting all the pieces and aspects of another life, biographers are often challenged with facts borne of inaccurate or insufficient evidence and a lack of useful documentation. In addition (and in contrast to autobiographers), biographers have to identify the importance, the turning points, and the main characteristics of their “subject,” i.e., the person they wish to depict. In this context, an important question might be asked: to what degree is it reasonable to employ the genre of a comprehensive biography told chronologically, i.e., told from the womb to the tomb, for such a task? I believe it is more advisable to use a certain episode in the life of the presented person as a mirror reflecting the person’s entire life and work in a retro- and prospective manner. Jewish biographies are en vogue in Germany. Many authors occupy themselves with greater or lesser known figures of the Jewish, and especially German-Jewish, past: rabbis, philosophers, literary figures, geographers, political scientists, etc. The responses to these works give proof that there is a desire for dealing with the history of those individuals. Such a desire might not be based on the exceptionalism of historical existence, but also—and possibly even more so—it might be based on the perception of a person as “like you and me,” yet not entirely similar, an idea I borrowed from the historian Carlo Ginzburg. This disharmony and consonance between object and subject is part of scholarly work. I will attempt to explain this fact by taking the example of Leopold Zunz, who is rightly considered the father of modern Jewish biography.

4

On Guerre, see, for instance, the English version of Natalie Zemon Davis’ Le retour de Martin Guerre (1982), Natalie Z. Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller, translated by John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). — 63 —

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“Ich, L. Zunz,” or Concerning the (Auto-)Biography I. L. ZUNZ §1. was never Academic, Bailiff, Councilor of Commerce, Dastard, Eminence, First Sergeant, Gentleman, Housekeeper, Infant, Kneeling, Landlord, Magistrate, Nawab, Ordained, Professor, Quack, Remiss, Sportsman, Telepath, Ultra, Vengeful, Wizard, and Zulu.5 Thus begins the so-called Buch Zunz, The Book of Zunz, with his signature style, which the editor Fritz Bamberger described as a “catalogue raisonné, exhaustive like a botanical system.”6 Let us continue: §5. Schopenhauer proves the phantasm of metaphysics, and is also not more knowledgeable than the author of the Book of Qoheleth [Ecclesiastes] This sentence is not a reference to nihilistic theories as they appeared in the mid-nineteenth century until its end. It is a reference to a Socratic argumentation, as it concerns knowledge that cannot be reached because the essence of what is supposed to be described cannot be transmitted. Let us read another sentence from §8: “We recognize know understand are nothing.” This is a peculiar beginning for somebody who is attempting to write a diary or who wishes to transmit some autobiographical notes. It is, however, no different than the Delphic maxim of “Know thyself” (Gnothi seautōn), which Zunz points to while also stipulating a skeptical foundation. According to the rabbinical tradition “… the Torah is only with the one who ignores himself” (BT Soṭa 21a). The lack of knowledge of oneself—the emptying of every aspect of individuality—is the precondition for the knowledge of the Torah. The reason for that is that no one is allowed to add anything to the Torah, because its wisdom was revealed once and for all times. Scholars of the Renaissance brought this idea to a high point: Yehoshua Falk Cohen, a student of 5

6

German: “§1. war niemals Akademiker, Bürgermeister, Commercienrath, Duckmäuser, Erzbischof, Feldwebel, Geheimrath, Hoflector, Infante, Kriecher, Landrath, Mantelträger, Nabob, Ordensritter, Professor, Quacksalber, Rundschauer, Seiltänzer, Traumdeuter, Ultra, Vortänzer, Wahrsager und Zwerg.” Zunz, Das Buch Zunz, 9. Ibid., 6. — 64 —

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Rama (Moses Isserles, 1520–1572) and Maharshal (Solomon Luria, 1510–1573), wrote at the beginning of the seventeenth century that “in Hebrew, the word ‘I’ (ani) is written with the same letters as ‘nothing’ (ain).”7 In a time when the Jewish autobiography was only born as a genre employing the introspection of the ‘I’ in the process of tradition, early critical remarks on it were expressed in Prague. The Maharal of Prague (Judah Loew ben Bezalel, 1520–1609) was upset because of certain developments among the members of his generation. He thus reacted indignantly to Azaria de’ Rossi having introduced the word “I” into the history of scholarship: And now, in this generation that is so infused with imperfection and ignorance, somebody stands up and argues against the saints who lived more than a millennium before us. This person declares, “See my method and become a wise man!” In some places he used worldly and heathen scriptures in his support, and treated the words of our sacred and pious sages like void and fickle speeches!8 The logic which justifies the understanding of tradition is the heteronomy of science, which treats the individual as a creative being, but one who is always subjected to the place of a receiver of divine wisdom. There is no room for creativity beyond the confinement of the Torah because all—or almost all—scholars agreed to the principle that everything was already included in it. This was the apologetic conviction of Judah Messer Leon (Judah ben Jehiel Rofe, 1420/25–c.1498) in his rhetoric tractate Nofet Ṣufim.9 Comparable opinions can be found with the writ7 8

9

Binyan Yehoshua‘, 12:9, quoted in Alberto Cavaglion, “L’autobiografia ebraica in Italia fra otto e novecento: Memoria di sé e memoria della famiglia. Osservazioni preliminari,” Zakhor 3 (1999): 171. For the Hebrew edition see Judah Loew ben Bezalel, Be’er ha-golah, ʻal ḥarbeh ma’amare wehaggadot rabbotenu z’’l ([New York]: Talpiyot, 1952/53); for further details and translations of the text see my “Maharal against Azaria de Rossi: The other side of skepticism,” In Rabbinic Theology and Jewish Intellectual History. The Great Rabbi Loew of Prague, ed. Meir Seidel (Oxford: Routledge, 2012), 65-76. Judah ben Jehiel, The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow = Sēpher nōpheth ṣūphīm, ed. Isaac Rabinowitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). On the book Nofet Ṣufim see Solomon Schechter, “Notes sur Messer David Léon tirées des manuscrits,” Revue des Études Juives 24 (1892): 118– 38; Warren Harvey, “The Bible as Honeycomb. An Introduction to Rabbi Judah Messer Leon’s Concept of Rhetoric,” Yavneh Review 5 (1966): 47–57; Daniel Carpi, “Notes on the Life of Rabbi — 65 —

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ings of statesman and exegete Isaac ben Judah Abrabanel, also known as Don Isaac Abrabanel (1437–1508),10 of his son, the physician and philosopher Judah Abrabanel known as Leo Hebraeus (1465–c.1528),11 the physician and encyclopedist Avraham Portaleone (1542–1612), and the High Rabbi of Prague, Rabbi Loew.12 The character, the personality, of the individual must be seen, at best, as a manifestation of the divine. Ancient and medieval Judaism struggled with the creation of a cult of personality similar to what the Greeks and Romans had accepted for their philosophers, statesmen, emperors, artists, and the like. The search for a biography in the rabbinic literature that would be comparable to Suetonius’s De Vita Caesarum (The Twelve Caesars), Plutarch’s Vita Parallelae (Parallel Lives), or Jerome’s De Viris Illustribus (On Illustrous Men) is futile. In his first period of scholarship, which he himself described as a pre-critical stage, the American scholar Jacob Neusner approached the biographies of prominent rabbis of ancient Judaism, but it was in vain.13 Rabbinic traditional literature was a field of joint production, a literature of the tradition. What is attributed to Rabbi Akiva, for example, might as well be assigned to his opponent,

10

11

12

13

Judah Messer Leon,” in Studi sull’ebraismo italiano in memoria di Cecil Roth, ed. Elio Toaff (Rome: Barulli, 1974), 37–62; Abraham Melamed, “Rhetoric and Philosophy in Nofet Sufim by R. Judah Messer Leon” (in Hebr.), Italia 1 (1978): 7–39; Robert Bonfil, “‘The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow’ by Judah Messer Leon: The Rhetorical Dimension of Jewish Humanism in Fifteenth-Century Italy,” Jewish History 6 (1992): 21–33; Thomas Lehnardt, “Messer Leon, Judah ben Jehiel,” in Biographisch-bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 5 (1993), 1361–1363; Hanna Liss, “‘Ars rhetorica’ als Peshat? Jüdische Bibelauslegung in der Renaissance am Beispiel von Juda Messer Leon und Asaria de Rossi,” Trumah 9 (2000): 103–24. On the Jewish rhetorics in general, see, for instance, Giulio Busi, “Retorica e poetica ebraica nei secoli XVI e XVII,” in Busi, Il succo dei Favi: Studi sull’umanesimo ebraico (Bologna: Fattoadarte, 1992), 37–36. The administration of the Venetian Republic, for instance, in his interpretation of Ex. 18:17 et seq. On this, see my own “Streiflichter auf Simone Luzzatto oder von Nutzen und Nachteil der jüdischen Existenz in der Diaspora,” in Judentum und Christentum zwischen Konfrontation und Faszination: Ansätze zu einer neuen Beschreibung der jüdisch-christlichen Beziehungen, ed. Wolfram Kinzig and Cornelia Kück, 97–115 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002), 102–107. On this aspect, see Gianfranco Miletto, “Die Bibel als Handbuch der Kriegskunst nach der Interpretation Abraham ben David Portaleones,” in An der Schwelle zur Moderne. Juden in der Renaissance, ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Annette Winkelmann (Leiden: Brill, 2003). See my “Science and Religious Hermeneutics: The ‘Philosophy’ of Rabbi Loew of Prague,” in Religious Confession and the Sciences in the 16th Century, ed. Jürgen Helm and Annette Winkelmann (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 119–135. See Jacob Neusner’s first book, A Life of Rabban Yohanan Ben Zakkai (CA. 1–80 CE) (Leiden: Brill, 1962). On the subject, see also William Scott Green, “What’s in a name? The Problematic of Rabbinic Biography,” in Approaches to Ancient Judaism I, ed. William Scott Green (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1978), 7–98; Jacob Neusner, In Search of Talmudic Biography: The Problem of the Attributed Saying (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984). — 66 —

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Rabbi Eliezer. The impact of Jewish tradition was rooted more in the methodology of the traditum than in the personal characterization of the tradent. Biographical notes became of interest as late as the Middle Ages in chronicles and schoolbooks, such as the anonymously written Seder Tanna’im we-Amora’im (compiled c. 880s), Ibn Daud’s Sefer haQabbalah (1160–61), the Sefer Yosippon (a Hebrew elaboration of the opus of Josephus Flavius), and other comparable works containing accounts of the works of great personages. But, even when regarding these works, the reader should be aware of the fact that their aims were to educate, or at least to justify an educational methodology. Education in this context refers to maintaining the integrity of the chain of tradition through which the student might move from his own teachers to their teachers and all the way back to Moses. This is the idea behind the “chain of tradition” (shalshelet ha-qabbalah). It was during the Renaissance that the accuracy of such an orthopractic construction was called into question. The construction was still (within limits) considered valid during the days of Maimonides as the Maimonidean and anti-Maimonidean discussions show.14 During the Renaissance, the truth in the art of narration of the rabbis is questioned, and the first attacks against what Daniel had prophesized as a fragmentation of power (tradition, in this case) were undertaken. Such a process was impossible to halt. For this reason, scholars of the Renaissance and early modern times began writing autobiographies. Among those who occupied themselves with their own lives and the own stories were Yoḥanan Alemanno (1435–1504), Avraham Yagel (1553–1623), Leo Hebraeus, Leone Modena (1571–1648), Avraham Portaleone, and Glückel of Hameln (1646–1724). The mystic scholar and halakhist Yosef Karo (1488–1575) wrote his memoirs Maggid Mesharim as a kind of diary of his mystic experiences (first incomplete publication in Lublin in 1646, then in Venice in 1649). There is little evidence of biographies being written, however. I will not attempt to tell the story here of how autobiographies or autobiographical notes developed. Fabrizio Lelli has worked extensively on this subject and has outlined the importance of this genre for Jewish

14 See Johann Maier, “Intellektualismus und Mystik als Faktoren jüdischer Selbstdefinition,” Kairos 27 (1985): 230. — 67 —

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humanists.15 Michael Gaetz recently has pointed to the transformations of the genre, and has attempted an identification of the emphasis of the “I” in contrast to the consciousness of tradition and family as a peculiarity of modern autobiography.16 It is self-explanatory that the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century have propagated an emphasized and individual consciousness. Concerning the Renaissance and early modern period, some skepticism might be in order. When reading Leone Hebreo’s bitter autobiographical poem, one will find only the disappointment of a Jewish person being forced to struggle against his Christian colleagues and his own fate.17 While the “I” hardly ever appears in this poem, its own tragic existence stands in the foreground. I have stressed above the methodological evolution of Azaria de’ Rossi through the criticism of Rabbi Loew. Glückel of Hameln, who was from Hamburg, wrote in the seven-chapter autobiography she composed for her children that “I have to write a nice anecdote to counter the boredom of what has happened to us in order to prolong this book a little …” before telling the anecdote of how her newborn daughter was confused with her almost simultaneously born twin sister.18 “Boredom” is only a literary fiction in the memoirs of Glückel von Hameln, as is the earthquake in Azaria de’ Rossi’s Me’or ‘Enayim, the paralyzing sickness in Avraham Portaleone’s writing, or Leone Modena’s gambling addiction and death of his firstborn, among other examples. These fictions were included to explain to the reader the reason for the writing of the autobiography. In truth, the actual motive is the representation of one’s own existence as the reason, means, and eventual purpose of a literary composition on the literary stage, where all—or most—events of the cultural and bourgeois life are reflected. This character of autobiographies was preserved well into the 15 Fabrizio Lelli, “The Origins of the Jewish Autobiographic Genre: Yohanan Alemanno (1434–after 1504) and Abraham Yagel (1553–after 1623),” EAJS Newsletter 12 (2002): 4–11; Lelli, “Biography and Autobiography in Yohanan Alemanno’s Literary Perception,” in Cultural Intermediaries: Jewish Intellectuals in Early Modern Italy, ed. David B. Ruderman and Giuseppe Veltri (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 25–38. See also Arthur M. Lesley, “Hebrew Humanism in Italy: The Case of Biography,” Prooftexts 2 (1982): 163–177. For a general discussion, see Thomas F. Mayer, “Biography and Autobiography,” in Encyclopedia of the Renaissance, ed. Paul F. Grendler (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 1999), 226–29. 16 Michael Graetz, “Jüdische Mentalität zwischen Tradition und Moderne,” in Judentum zwischen Tradition und Moderne, ed. Gerd Biegel and Michael Graetz (Heidelberg: Winter, 2002), 117–33. 17 On this see Dan Almagor, Barbara Garvin, and Dan Jacobson, “A Complaint Against the Time by the Sage Don Yehuda Abrabanel,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 39 (1992–1993): 55–60. 18 Glueckel, Bertha Pappenheim, and Viola Roggenkamp, Die Memoiren der Glückel von Hameln (Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1994). — 68 —

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nineteenth century. An autobiography is a venture of placing oneself within the context of a world where the plurality of events, and not only the singularity of the experiences, reigns. The Autobiographies of Leopold Zunz and Isaak Markus Jost The historian Franz Rosenzweig handed down the philosopher Hermann Cohen’s “fierce” verdict on Leopold Zunz: “He could have been a historian but only was an antiquarian.”19 Zunz was indeed an antiquarian, and I believe he would have been comfortable with that designation. When comparing the memoirs of Leopold Zunz and Isaak Markus Jost on their common years in Wolfenbüttel, one can see clearly how autobiographies and autobiographical notes were composed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, it is possible to draw the line for this period between autobiography and biography. Zunz’s reminiscences of his years in Wolfenbüttel were likely written in the 1840s. They were dedicated to Philipp, the son of Zunz’s teacher, Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, and had not been intended for publication. The reminiscences became public knowledge almost a century after their composition, when Rabbi Ismar Elbogen published them from the papers of Ludwig Geiger in 1937.20 This autobiographical report was clearly not intended to be a coherent representation of events in Wolfenbüttel up to the point of Zunz’s departure for Berlin. It was more of a colorful and humorous sketch of the impressions Zunz’s years in Wolfenbüttel had on him His style is narrative, jaunty, and episodic, at times rhapsodic, but always leading to the “I” of the first person. There were reasons for that, as Zunz had indicated twenty years earlier in his first “scholarly treatise”: I do not wish to please critics of both factions when speaking of myself in a singular form in the introduction but in a plural form in the body of the text. I rather believe the writer personally steps into the foreground only 19 Quoted in Bamberger’s introduction to Das Buch Zunz, 3. 20 Ismar Elbogen, “Zum Andenken an Leopold Zunz gestorben 17. März 1886: 1. Zunz: Mein erster Unterricht in Wolfenbüttel,” Jahrbuch der Jüdischen Geschichte und Literatur 30 (1937): 131–140. — 69 —

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through events, travel accounts and those of his life, when attesting, etc.: with humor he employs the I and yet moves beyond his own person. Within the doctrinal sphere he chooses the modest [and representative] we through joining the whole battalion that walks into battle for the mute science.21 The memoirs of Isaak Markus Jost, however, appeared as early as the 1840s, and had been reprinted in the Sippurim of Wolf Pascheles in 1854.22 Jost’s autobiographical notes were composed in an elevated style, and were a work of literature comparable to The Autobiography of Salomon Maimon (1792/93) but written in a more refined style. Jost attempted to distance himself from his life in the Samson-Schule in Wolfenbüttel. Concerning the time in school he spent together with Zunz in Wolfenbüttel, which was so traumatic to him, Jost wrote that “without doubt numerous contemporaries have had the same experiences and lived through what I had lived through. Yet something may have been experienced differently owing to differences of the environment.”23 One does detect the ambition to distinguish oneself as a historian through pointing to similarities common to all who had to go through the emancipation of Jews at the time—though with local differences–. Whereas Jost is concerned with world history, Zunz is not. The reader of Jost’s memoirs likely is surprised when reading the concise, up-to-date descriptions, which are full of devotion to his teacher and friend Ehrenberg. Zunz seems more interested in Jewish microhistory than in the fate of Jewish Reform. Historians the like of von Ranke are surprised by where Zunz set his (ahistoric) accents. The reader is per21 German: “Daß ich von mir im Vorwort im Singular, und in dem Werkchen selbst im Plural rede, geschieht nicht, um es den Krittlern in beiden Partheien recht zu machen. Vielmehr glaube ich, daß nur in Acten, Reise- und Lebensbeschreibungen, Wechseln, Vorreden, Herausforderungen, Waschzetteln, Quittungen, Antikritiken, Wirthsrechnungen u. dgl., der Schreiber persönlich hervortritt: im Humor gebraucht er ich, und tritt dennoch aus sich heraus; im Doctrinalen wählt er das bescheidene wir, indem er sich unter das ganze Bataillon von stellvertretend mengt, die für die stumme Wissenschaft zu Felde ziehen.” Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 1. 22 Zunz, Das Buch Zunz, 14; Isaak M. Jost, “Vor einem halben Jahrhundert. Skizzen aus meiner frühesten Jugend,” in Gallerie der Sipurim: Eine Sammlung jüdischer Sagen, Märchen und Geschichten als ein Beitrag zur Völkerkunde, ed. Wolf Pascheles (Prague: Wolf Pascheles, 1854), 141–66. 23 German: “Ohne Zweifel haben unendlich viele Zeitgenossen mit mir gleiche Erfahrungen gemacht, und was ich erlebte ebenfalls erlebt, wenn auch manches sich nach Verschiedenheit der Umgebung anders gestaltete.” Jost, “Vor einem halben Jahrhundert,” 141. — 70 —

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fectly informed about the Jewish school in Wolfenbüttel and its teachers and students. The reader is especially informed about their eating habits, clothes, children’s games, features, haircuts, and the like—in other words, about everything the scriptores of the Historia Augusta and the French historians of the Annales would cherish. The historic turn from the Middle Ages to modernity, as Zunz put it, has to be measured with Zunz’s history of pants and shoes. On the beginning of his stay in Wolfenbüttel, Zunz noted, “I wore leather trousers and buckled shoes.”24 What was the result of his spartan education? “I became barbarized in this year of 1805 until I literally had no pair of pants or socks.”25 When the Inspector Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg commenced administrating the school, at first he had to clothe the “barbarized” ones: “When I once again wore a pair of socks, I felt like a shipwrecked man reaching the inhabitable shore again.”26 Additionally, the very day Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg arrived at the school is seen as a turning point of the story, like a peaceful French Revolution. “We had literally moved from the Middle Ages to a new age on one day; from the times of Jewish helots to the liberty of citizens.”27 The modern reader should not be surprised at the style of narration. As mentioned, Zunz was not a historian of the microstoria, but an antiquarian. He presents the same tendency in his biography of Rashi. Biographies as Critical Literary History: On Zunz’s Biography of Rashi28 Despite the fact that the composition of Jewish biographies was not a main focus of the Science of Judaism, Zunz wrote a biography of the French rabbi and scholar of the Talmud, Schlomo ben Yitzhaq, known as Rashi. This publication is of importance inasmuch as it was Zunz greatest publication after his “Notes on the Rabbinic Literature.” In the Rashi essay, which was published in 1822–23, Zunz distanced himself

24 25 26 27 28

Leopold Zunz, “Unterricht,” 133 (see above, n. 111). Ibid., 135. Ibid., 136. Ibid., 136 et seq. See Andreas Brämer, “Rabbinical Scholars as the Object of Biographical Interest: The Aspect of Jewish Historiography in the German-Speaking Countries of Europe (1780–1871),” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 45 (2000). See on Zunz himself ibid., 60–65. — 71 —

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from the admiring judgments of his Christian academic colleagues.29 According to Anthony Grafton, Zunz employed the methodology of criticism he had learned from Friedrich August Wolf. Christian scholars, and especially Giulio Bartolocci, praised Rashi as the “princeps et caput omnium expositionum.”30 Zunz acknowledged that Rashi was the founder of Jewish scholarship in the German-speaking world, but he did not ignore Rashi’s flaws, and rigorously scrutinized his works. I repeat and emphasize: Zunz analyzed Rashi’s work, and this is the main point of Zunz’s extensive essay. Even today, the commentary of Rashi (not the scholar himself) is considered the commentary par excellence, and the first step taken when studying biblical and Talmudic halakhic and aggadic exegesis is making recourse to Rashi. Accordingly, Zunz is interested in putting into perspective the myth of Rashi and allowing him an appropriate position. He calls him—likely in an ironic or even cynical tone—“my hero.” Not without hidden irony, Zunz writes that In the midst of these vivid times I guide you, oh reader, now, and in the strange world of buried Judaism. I will allow you to see the literature deriving from the French Jews in the picture of a man who one might call the representative of this époque, a man who has pointed the way through many centuries and is still active even today, who founded what Gershom, his predecessor, created, and what is unknown to no one, who goes by the name Rashi the Commentator.31 An unsurpassed piece of pure rhetoric! Zunz is apparently bothered by the aftereffect of this medieval exegete. “Rashi the Commentator” sounds as if this man was a fairy-tale hero out of the Arabian Nights, and 29 Leopold Zunz, “Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 1/2 (1823): 277–384; Grafton, “Juden und Griechen,” 30. 30 Zunz refers to Giulio Bartolocci’s magnum opus Bibliotheca magna Rabbinica de scriptoribus, et scriptis Hebraicis, ordine alphabetico Hebraice, et Latine digestis (Rome: Sacra Congr. de propaganda fide, 1693). 31 German: “Mitten in jene regsame Zeit, führe ich dich, mein Leser, jetzt, und in der fremden Welt des begrabenen Jahrhunderts, lasse ich dich der französischen Juden herauskeimende Literatur in dem Bilde eines Mannes sehen, den man den Repräsentanten jenes Säkulums nennen darf; – eines Mannes, der durch viele Jahrhunderte Richtungen angegeben, und noch heut thätig ist, – der das begründete, was Gerschom, sein Vorläufer, gestiftet, und welche unter dem Namen Raschi der Commentator Niemandem unbekannt ist.“ Zunz, “Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” 278. — 72 —

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Zunz wishes to present him as such. He justifies his criticism of Rashi’s image in scholarship thus: “They did mischief with this Talmudic hero the way they did with names and fatherland.” Enlightenment progresses further, and contrary to Rashi’s admirers Zunz remarks mercilessly: I do declare, however, that my hero had been ruled by the Talmud, and he was not tolerant in any way—that he was ignorant of the Persian, Arabic, Latin, and Greek languages, that his knowledge of German, astronomy, geography, and medicine was very limited, that he was a stranger to kabbalah, not free from superstition, and that he even came to conclusions concerning Hebrew through convention and exercise, not through conscious insights into its grammar.32 This is an attack on Rashi, not simply a biography! Isaak Hirsch Weiss writes that “This essay was a lesson to biographers in their art ... a biography like Zunz’s, written in a spirit of scientific criticism, had never hitherto appeared.”33 Zunz the biographer, in his metier, feels constrained by the literary decorations of the centuries, as they miss the core of the historic truth. Zunz’s conclusion, derived from his historic analysis, is clear: he recommends that we ignore Rashi’s status as a luminary and turn to his work. There we can find answers to the following questions: What material did Rashi have access to in his world? On what is his knowledge based? Where did he begin and to where did he move? This is nothing other than Zunz’s methodology of the “Science of Judaism” used in the case of Rashi. One is inclined to ask where the biography is in Zunz’s recital—page after page—of the references for sources of Rashi’s work, names of rabbis included, places, loanwords, etc. Is the biography somewhere within the minutiae that Zunz explores critically? The minutiae, however, contain the antiquarian knowledge which might—as in 32 German: “[I]ch aber sage von meinem Helden, daß er vom Talmud beherrscht, keineswegs tolerant gewesen—daß er vom Persischen, Arabischen, Latein und Griechischen Nichts verstanden,—daß seine deutschen, astronomischen, geographischen und medizinischen Kenntnisse einen unbedeutenden Inhalt gehabt, – daß er in der Kabbala ein Fremdling, nicht frei von Aberglauben, und selbst in der hebräischen Sprache, mehr durch Tact und Übung, als durch zum Bewußtseyn gekommene Grammatik, zu Einsichten gelangt war.” Zunz, “Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” 285. 33 Isaak Hirsch Weiss, “Leopold Zunz,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 7 (1895): 366. — 73 —

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Zunz’s autobiography—highlight the extraordinary. Zunz aims at the successors of Rashi with his criticism when he writes that “Neither the religious (Rabbanim) nor the civil (Parnasim) council had a sound grasp of contemporary developments.”34 Zunz ends the “biography” of Rashi with an indirect quotation by Johann Gottfried Herder, writing that “the progressing spirit of mankind may first cast away such an outdated and brittle system together with its accoutrements—as this century gratifyingly promises to do—before the time is ripe to see the man of history in a fair and just manner; to define him in all his times, and then to complement him.”35 To follow this idea, the critical biography is the path to cultural emancipation. Biographies as Literary and Educational Creations The bookseller and publisher Wolf Pascheles (1814–1857) from Prague collected the biographies of famous Jews, publishing them in booklets, called Sippurim, for the first time during the so-called pre-March (“Vormärz”) era in Bohemia (1847). The Sippurim are collections of legends, fairy tales, and biographies from biblical, rabbinical, and trivial-medieval sources, and they experienced an enthusiastic reception well into the twentieth century: they were, for instance, included in the library of Franz Kafka.36 A second collection was printed in Prague in 1853, containing the biography of Sabbatai Zevi by Ya‘acov ben Svi Emden (called Yaabetz, 1697–1776) and that of Don Isaac Abrabanel by Solomon Deutsch (1816–97). A third collection contained the autobiography of Isaak Markus Jost, mentioned above. The aim of the collection was—as Pascheles outlined in the preface of his fourth volume—to offer good and entertaining light reading that also has some educational value. It is intended to foster the knowledge of Jewish history, life, customs, and conditions of Jews. It offers to the children and children’s 34 Zunz, “Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” 380. 35 Ibid., 380–381. 36 See, for instance, Jürgen Born, Kafkas Bibliothek: Ein beschreibendes Verzeichnis; mit einem Index aller in Kafkas Schriften erwähnten Bücher, Zeitschriften und Zeitschriftenbeiträge (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990). — 74 —

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children examples for imitation in the biographies of famous Israelites of older and more recent ages, shining examples of strength of mind and nobility of heart, faithfulness in the religion and human kindness. It is intended to raise awareness of what needs to be groomed, created, or eradicated in narrations from the present.37 A long biography—consisting of 151 pages—of Rabbi Gutmann Klemperer of Prague is included in the fourth collection (1856). The author, Yonatan Eibenschütz, had also published a composition on the rabbinate of Prague. Meanwhile, Wolf Pascheles died on November 22, 1857. His son and successor, Jakob Pascheles, wrote of him in the publication of the fourth collection that, “It might be noted with satisfaction that this work has also contributed to the substitution of some of the pejorative concepts and ideas about Jewish nature held by some Gentile readers by more positive ones. Some unfortunate prejudices could be defeated.” The fifth collection concluded the Sippurim. It might be asked what purpose a collection that mixes scholarly treatises with purely legendary tales has, particularly if the reader is unable to decide where the first ends and the latter begins. Literature, the beautiful art of telling or describing what derives literarily from the autobiography, is the combining factor of all these narratives. In other words, it is used to provoke and feed the reader’s curiosity about the events in a literary way in order to provoke him to build up his own consciousness of history. Jakob Pascheles asked in 1864 whether … any nation is capable of presenting such rich chronicles? Just how many thousands over thousands of traces [proofs] are imprinted on the pages of this “book of remembrance” that speak of nobility, readiness to make sacrifices, heroism, strength of mind, and human kindness? They are worth being held up to the face of the 37

German: “[Es soll] eine gute und edle Unterhaltungslektüre zu bieten, die zugleich eine schätzbare Belehrung gewährt, die Kenntnis der Geschichte, des Lebens, der Sitten und Zustände der Juden fördert, die Biographie berühmter Israeliten alter und neuer Zeit, leuchtende Muster von Geistesstärke und Herzensadel, Glaubenstreue und Menschenliebe zur Nachahmung für Kinder und Kindeskinder aufstellt; in Schilderung aus der Gegenwart auf das aufmerksam zu machen, was gepflegt, was hergestellt, was beseitigt werden sollte.” Pascheles, Sippurim, preface to the fourth collection. — 75 —

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Jewish nation, like a mirror, whose reflection—even if it shines its light into a beautiful, bright time for us—at least honors the nation. Every nation honoring its past-honors itself.38 As such, we reach the point the editor sought to emphasize. The Sippurim are a brake for emancipation. This artful literature is intended to reflect the Jews, to express that Jews also have beautiful literature they can and should be proud of, which is comparable to the fairy-tales, fables, and legends of the Brothers Grimm.39 If one were considering baptism and conversion from Judaism to Christianity, one would consider the new biographies dedicated to Goethe, rather than those of Mendelssohn.40 Thus, Pascheles’ words are imbued with a bitter actuality. Autobiography was the justification of the self; biography became the literary instrument for an augmentation of self-identity. A Versified Epilogue Biography and autobiography stood between the seductive ideas that resulted from the new social systems and the sluggish reality that still had to fight with emancipation and emancipation from emancipation. Leopold Zunz wrote a little verse about this fact of “in-between-ness” in his notes (§7), likely concerning himself: Who tops the spirit, And runs behind, Will stoop at length.

Yet who buys beans and is still not baptized is not foolish.

38 German: ...“kann eine irgendeine Nation, eine so reichhaltige Chronik aufweisen? Wie viel tausend und aber tausend Züge von Edelmuth, Opferfreundigkeit, Heroismus, Geistesstärke und Menschenliebe, sind in den meisten Blättern dieses ‚Gedenkbuches’ eingeprägt? Diese sind es wohl wert, daß man sie dem jüdischen Volke vorhalte ein Spiegel gleichsam, dessen Reflexe, wenn sie auch in eine schöne, für uns helle Zeit fallen, immerhin der Nation zu Ehre gereichen, Jedes Volk, das seine Vergangenheit ehrt – ehrt sich selbst.” Jakob Pascheles, ed., Sippûrîm: Eine zammlung jidišer folkszagen, miṭhen, legeṇden, kroniken, denkwirdigkeiṭen und biografien berihmṭer juden aller jahrhunderṭe, inzbezondere dem miṭṭelalṭers Fifth Collection (Prague: Jakob Pašeles, 1864), 4. 39 On this, see Yoav Elstein and Avidov Lipsker, “The Homogeneous Series in the Literature of the Jewish People: A Thematological Methodology,” trans. by Ruth Bar-Ilan, www.biu.ac.il/js/ thematology/essay.html#1 (accessed September 1, 2012). 40 See part two of this book. — 76 —

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1.4 A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz

Protestant Topoi and Reformed Jews “Liberales Judentum,” “Reformjudentum,” or, by its English name, German Reform Judaism, has its intellectual roots in the Lutheran Reformation. This fact is well known. How close this affinity was can be shown through a perusal of the stereotypical terminology used, such as “Reform,” “Reformation,” and even “Renaissance.”1 Moreover, it becomes even more apparent through examining the leading figures of the nineteenth century and their willing acceptance of a stereotypical pattern of direct confrontation. They invoked similarities between two “religions,” namely Reform Judaism and “Reformed” Christianity. I believe that there is no figure of the nineteenth century who better embodies the contradictory attitude to Protestantism than Leopold Zunz. In the letters Zunz sent to and received from his teacher and friend Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, the adoption of Protestant topoi appears to have gone far beyond the conventional liturgical borrowing of vernacular language or artistic improvements of the synagogue architecture. Reform Jews were conscious of their dependence on ideas first expressed by the humanistic scholarship, which had culminated in the Lutheran Reformation. Veneration for the sources of ancient knowledge, and the rediscovery of ancient Latin, Greek, and especially Hebrew wisdom as an achievement and hence a prerogative of the Renaissance scholarship, were the coordinates of the (indeed complicated) Humanistic system which found an enthusiastic reception in the enlightened and romantic period, particularly in Judaism.2 Jewish scholars of the nineteenth century usually refer back to their esteemed precursors during the Renaissance to ground their actual critical preoc1

2

On the concept of “Renaissance” with reference to the 19th -20th centuries see Paul Mendes-Flohr, “Zarathustras Apostel: Martin Buber und die ‘Jüdische Renaissance,’” in Nietzsche und die jüdische Kultur, ed. Jacob Golomb (Wien: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 1998), 233–243. On the concept of a “Jewish” Philosophy in the nineteenth century and the premises in the Renaissance, please allow me to refer again to my own “Die humanistischen Wurzeln der ‘jüdischen’ Philosophie.” — 77 —

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cupation with the sources of Judaism. Zunz himself published the first Hebrew biography of Azaria de’ Rossi, considered the precursor ante litteram of the critical Science of Judaism.3 The Lutheran request for dealing with the ancient (holy) sources rather than with the ecclesiastic (unholy) tradition, and its demand for using the vernacular in liturgy rather than incomprehensible holy tongues (Latin, in Christian liturgy, and Hebrew, in Jewish) found eager reception in reformed Judaism, and hence in the young Zunz. It was perhaps no coincidence that Leopold Zunz wrote his epoch-making Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur in 1817, when Germany was celebrating the 300th anniversary of Luther’s Reformation. Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur was published in 1818, and effectively became Zunz’s program for the Wissenschaft des Judentums. This little treatise might be considered the Magna Carta of modern research in Jewish history and literature, and is the most important contemporary example of a “scientific” opposition against traditional Talmudjudentum, Talmudic Judaism, which was understood as advocating a law codex without a basis in reason.4 This perspective, Luther’s idea, which Zunz discussed in the well-known but also very enigmatic pages of his autobiographical Das Buch Zunz, can be appreciated in a better way: “The legal books must follow the rules of reason, not reason the rules of the legal books (Luther).”5 Zunz quoted Luther apparently without further discussion of the stated idea. One must take notice of the fact that Luther acts here as an authority against the Talmudjudentum. Yet the path to a (Jewish) Protestantism failed, in Leopold Zunz‘s view. His strong opposition to Orthodox groups was soon accompanied by antagonism to the liberal movement: he was caught between the front lines. On one side, there was Orthodoxy, which was strongly attached to the traditional ways and the interpretation of Judaism as ordered by the code of law outlined in the Shulḥan ‘Aruch. On the other side, there were Jews who argued for more freedom in re-forming Judaism, but did so without opening their eyes—in Zunz’s view—to the exigen-

3 4 5

Leopold Zunz, “Toledot le-R’ ‘Azarya min ha-Adummim,” Kerem Hemed 5 (1841); 7 (1843), 119– 124. See Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur,” 3–31. German: “Die Gesetzbücher müssen sich nach den Vernunft, nicht die Vernunft nach den Gesetzbüchern richten (Luther).” Zunz, Das Buch Zunz, 28: “ — 78 —

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cies of the present.6 He could not expect, of course, any support from Christian academic scholarship because of the academics’ ignorance of the Jewish patrimony and their patent and latent antisemitism. The task that was to be achieved was hence of a titanic nature: Studying and learning Jewish history and literature in academic sectors, not religious ones, was Zunz’s desideratum. He had already contemplated this at the beginning of his time at the university in Berlin. He failed to accomplish his goal after his petition to the Prussian government. Religion and/or Wissenschaft: Perspectives of an Academic Antiquarian In order to stress my point, allow me to reiterate. When comparing the memoirs of Leopold Zunz to that of Isaak Markus Jost, we can identify that there is a substantial difference between their approaches.7 As mentioned earlier, Zunz’s memoirs of his “scholastic” experience in Wolfenbüttel were likely written in the 1840s, were directed to Philipp, the son of Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, and were not intended to be published. Their initial publication took place nearly a century after they were written.8 Their purpose was not to describe the entire biography of the young Zunz, but to describe some aspects of his life and experiences from the time of his arrival in Wolfenbüttel until his departure for Berlin (actually, only up to his “confirmation”). The literal style is narrative, often episodic, sometimes rhapsodic, always written in first person, and, finally, very short. Jost’s memoirs, by contrast, appeared in the 1840s, and then were reprinted in 1853 in Prague. It is possible that the editor asked Jost to write this memoirs. The text is a piece of literal biography. Like Maimon, Jost sought to present the cultural differences between the medieval education provided by his ignorant teachers in Wolfenbüttel—who were also Zunz’s—and the culture of his present. At the beginning of his text, Jost states that his experience is similar to that described in the thousand Jewish biographies of his generation. Zunz dedicates more than 6 7

8

On this see Samuel Cohen, “Zunz and Reform Judaism,” Hebrew Union College Annual 31 (1960). For a deep and well-documented study of the successive development of Jost and Zunz, see Ismar Schorsch, “From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft: The Divergent Paths of Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 12 (1977). See Elbogen, “Zum Andenken an Leopold Zunz,” 131–140. — 79 —

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a few fleeting lines to describing minutiae (see also above). He concentrates on the achievements of Ehrenberg’s leadership, and, above all, on himself. The reader is always surprised to note the emphasis on Zunz’s everyday life, and sometimes on his “unhistorical” comments on historical facts. As I have discussed above, the historical change from medieval to enlightened Judaism is clearly pictured in the story of Zunz’s attire. With the arrival of Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, symbolized through Zunz’s clothes, the students were “literally in one day … turned from medieval times to a new age.” Zunz likely considered himself more an antiquarian than a historian. His studies of Judaism began with the reading of two extremely antiquarian works: David Gans’s Ṣemah David and Christoph Wolf’s Bibliotheca Hebraea. Friedrich August Wolf especially drew him to Wissenschaft, as discussed. Wolf was also an antiquarian in spirit, as his task was to classify the ancient patrimony of languages, history, and culture. It is thanks to Wolf’s (and also August Boeckh’s) studies that Zunz wrote his Libellus: Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur. Wolf’s study introduced him to the genre of ancient biography and of course influenced his biographies on Rashi and De’ Rossi.9 These facts comprise but one facet of the very complicated figure of Leopold Zunz. His antiquarian spirit is only at the surface of his mental and scholarly activity. A deeper look, made possible by his early letters, reveals his “messianic” component, the conviction that he could be the personality with whom a new era begins. The question to be asked, however, is whether the messianic tendency of Zunz was directed at religious and political aspects—as the traditional reading of “Messiah” suggests—or, alternatively and simply, to the academic wishes and aspirations of his unsuccessful career. His friend and schoolmate Isaak Markus Jost recognised Zunz’s abilities when he wrote in his memoirs that “Zunz was [in 1808] more capable than I was, in every respect.”10 This was said regarding one particular situation in which Jost, not Zunz, was chosen as a conversational partner. The acknowledgement is thus not free from coquetry. Yet it is 9 See also Schorsch, “From Wolfenbüttel,” 124–125. 10 The whole text reads: “Da erschien in September 1808 der Vorsteher der Anstalt, und äußerte den Wunsch, einen der fähigern Schüler zum Gesellschafter seiner Kinder nach Braunschweig zu nehmen. Die Wahl schwankte nur zwischen Zunz und mir, und ich erhielt den Vorzug, wahrscheinlich als der ältere, denn fähiger war Zunz in jeder Hinsicht.” Jost, “Skizzen,” 157. — 80 —

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also a testimony of respect for Zunz, who was Jost’s junior by one year but was also mentored by their teacher Ehrenberg. Although both Zunz and Jost were Ehrenberg the “Inspektor’s” “beloved sons,” Ehrenberg clearly preferred Zunz. Jost complained in a letter about this unjust preference of their mutual “father.” Ehrenberg avowed, of course, his indivisible love for both, but without convincing Jost, it appears.11 On the basis of Jost’s and Zunz’s memoirs, Nahum Glatzer summarizes the relationship between Zunz and his teacher, writing that the Ehrenberg family treated young Zunz like a son and gave him much loving care.... The friendly, harmonious environment of Ehrenberg’s home helped Zunz to bring under control his unruly temperament and to acquire a more considerate, confident, attitude to the young and old ones. A certain stubbornness, however, remained with him throughout life.12 Ehrenberg’s love for Zunz originated and was cultivated in Wolfenbüttel, where the “Inspektor” cared for the orphaned child. Ehrenberg saw some exceptionalism in Zunz, but he also understood the fragility of Zunz’s character, because the “old Adam” or perhaps one should say the yeṣer ra‘, evil inclination, as he noted, often awoke in Zunz. When Adam awoke, Ehrenberg concluded, “there arises a rebellion … in which reason has to give in.”13 In other words, the founder of the “Science of Judaism” occasionally displayed a quicksilver temper in his youth. For that reason, Ehrenberg was anxious about Zunz’s future, as he doubted that Zunz would be able to earn an income. In more than one letter, he praised his “son” for his publications; no doubt Ehrenberg was indeed proud of Zunz. Yet at the same time, he urged Zunz to do more for his earnings (Brodwissenschaft). Ehrenberg repeatedly reproached Zunz over the course of several years and could not hide 11 German: “Lieber guter Freund! Was Du dich doch ereifern kannst! Glaubst Du etwa, daß ich Dich weniger liebe als unsern Zuns [sic]? So thust [Du] mir Unrecht ...” Letter of Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg to Isaak Markus Jost, March 20, 1816, in Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 8. 12 Glatzer, Zunz, 13. 13 German: “Noch etwas—welches aber ein Naturfehler sein kann—der alte Adam erwacht sehr oft bei ihm, und, dann entsteht bei ihm eine Rebellion im Unterhause, bei welcher Sitzung das Ministerium der Vernunft oft unterliegt.” Ehrenberg to Jost, August 31, 1815, in Glatzer, Zunz, 2; Ehrenberg to Jost, September 15, 1815, in Ibid., 3. — 81 —

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his disappointment every time Zunz left a secure job and returned to Berlin. What was the real reason behind Zunz’s restless spirit and what was the trigger for his difficult behavior? From Wolfenbüttel to Berlin: Academic Dreams of a “Jewish” Luther On April 6, 1819, Jost wrote Ehrenberg a very confidential letter on the psychological condition of Zunz, who was at the time considering a crucial step in his life: baptism. Jost wrote that “baptism is much on [Zunz’s] mind, although he struggles hard with the idea and would not like to take the step. He stands too high above his brethren [Jews] to be esteemed by them, or to be maintained by them.”14 The first sentence describes, surely, Zunz’s serious reflection. The second sentence is not —as Glatzer interprets it—Zunz’s reason for the consideration, but reflects Jost’s bitter irony or sarcasm about the reputed reasons.15 Ehrenberg was aware of the possible psychological, but also material, aspects of the decision. On April 20, 1819, he wrote to Zunz to urge extreme caution, noting that he was worried about Zunz’s future and so he touches the central problem: the purpose of Zunz’s university studies. He wrote that, You are young and it makes you happy to continue your studies. However, you have to set yourself a goal, until then and no farther! You do not want to be private tutor; being a schoolteacher is also, certainly, not what you aim for, I think. For being a professor at the university, antisemitism [“rishus,” malice] is in your way. The way through which you can reach this goal should be contemptible and repugnant to you, unless I am mistaken about your way of thinking. Nevertheless, maybe you will become at first “Privatdozent” and then, with helpful connections, good friends and very good reputation, you can obtain that the [Prussian] King shows favor to 14

“Das Taufen liegt ihm sehr in Sinne, obgleich er sehr mit dieser Idee kämpft, und nicht gern daran will. Er steht zu hoch über seinen Glaubensgenossen, um von ihnen geschätzt, noch ernährt zu werden...” Jost to Ehrenberg, April 6, 1819, in Glatzer, Zunz, 13–14. 15 Glatzer, Zunz, xvi. — 82 —

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you and in that case, you can become Professor—similar to Friedländer in Halle [an der Saale in Prussia].16 The above-mentioned Friedländer likely is Ludwig Hermann Friedländer, who came from a Jewish family in Königsberg and became a professor of medicine in Halle in 1817. Most important, and problematic for Zunz in using him as a model, however, was the fact that Friedländer embraced Christianity and belonged to the Pietistic mystics of the time. The message of the Wolfenbüttler teacher was hence quite plain: to become a professor at a university, Zunz needed to be baptized.17 Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg saw in Zunz a skilled preacher who could have been the spiritual guide for reforming the Judaism of his time. After Zunz considered conversion to Christianity, Ehrenberg intensified his efforts to convince him of his mission as “Reformer” against Orthodox groups and, especially, their rabbis. Ehrenberg’s quest began with the letter of July 6, 1819: The black-dyers [black coats, i.e., traditionalists] do an enormous runt. The Rabbi of Amsterdam especially [Samuel Berenstein] who, apart from what he said there and—in an ancient manner—he excellently bandied courses about, threatens also to publish a special work in the German language. On the contrary! In Frankfurt [Main], Mr. Greisenheim [an employee of the banker Mayer Amschel Rothschild] sends circular letters all around to establish a new order in Jewish cult [liturgy]. Without a Jewish Luther and the active cooperation of the administrations, one is not able to do something 16 German: “Du bist jung, und es macht Dir Freude, Studien fortzusetzen, aber endlich must Du doch ein Ziel setzen, da es heißt, bis dahin, und weiter nicht! Hauslehrer willst Du nicht sein. Schullehrer, wie ich glaube, gewiss auch nicht. Professor an einer Universität, da ist Rischus [Hebr. in the original] im Wege. Und der Weg, durch welchen [Du] dazu gelangen könntest wird Dir, wenn ich mich anders in Deiner Denkungsart nicht geirrt habe, gewiß verächtlich und zuwider sein. – Doch ist es möglich, daß Du erst Privatdozend, und dann durch Konnectionen und gute Freunde, so wie durch einen sehr guten Ruf es dahin bringst, das der König Dich begünstigt, und in diesem Falle kannst Du, wie Friedländer in Halle, dennoch Professor werden.” Ehrenberg to Zunz, April 20, 1819, in Glatzer, Zunz, 14. 17 Glatzer, Zunz, 359. — 83 —

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against the rabbis. The common men, even the enlightened rabbis, are afraid of excommunication.18 In a letter dated December 3, 1819, Ehrenberg also made more precise the biblical basis of his messianic demand of Zunz: “We miss a reformer who is like Luther; who ‘omed ba-pereṣ [stand in the breach].”19 The Hebrew expression refers to Ezekiel 22:30: “And I sought for a man among them, that should make up the hedge, and stand in the breach before me for the land, that I should not destroy it; but I found none.“ The wish for a reformation like the Lutheran one, with notably messianic accents, re-appeared in one very interesting letter of Ehrenberg, dated May 5, 1820: To us it is also necessary to have a reformer who should be protected and favored by the governments, and who, if needed, can also sacrifice his life. Until this does happen, one has to be effectively alone in the schools. After twenty years, the new generation has to be a reformed mass without obstacles in its ways.20 Until this point, Ehrenberg may have been using mere commonplaces and pious wishes without having any specific person in mind. On September 20, 1820, he allowed more precise insights into his messianic plans when he wrote that “[God] may give you energy to have a lasting effect on Israel, and—as I would like to add—the enthusiasm, the voice, 18 German: “Die Schwarzfärber machen einen gewaltigen Lärm, und besonders der Amsterdammer Rabbiner, der, außer dem dort gesagten, worin er nach alter Art tüchtig mit Flüchen um sich wirft, noch ein besonders Werk in deutscher Sprache, herauszugeben droht. Dagegen schickt Hr. Geisenheimer in Frankfurt am Main Zirkularbriefe, zur Bewirkung einer neuen Ordnung im jüdischen Kultus umher. Ohne einen jüdischen Luther, und thätige Mitwirkung der Regierungen, richtet man gegen die Rabbiner nichts aus. Der gemeine Mann, ja selbst die aufgeklärten Rabbiner fürchten den Bannstrahl jener.” Ehrenberg to Zunz, July 6, 1819, in Glatzer, Zunz, 15. The explanations in brackets are taken from the brief but valuable comments of Glatzer. Notes in braces are mine. 19 German: “Ein Reformator, der so wie Luther omed ba-peretz [Hebr. in the original] ist fehlt uns.” Ehrenberg to Zunz, December 3, 1819, in Glatzer, Zunz, 15. 20 German: “Auch ein Reformator thut uns noth, der von der Regierung geschützt und begünstigt wird, der aber auch nothigenfalls sein Leben opfern kann. So lange das nicht geschieht; so sind es die Schulen allein, durch welche gewirkt wenden muß. Die neue Generation muß nach 20 Jahren als eine reformierte Masse dastehn, der kein Hinderniss mehr in Wege ist...” Ehrenberg to Zunz, May 5, 1820, in Glatzer, Zunz, 17. Emphasis in the original. — 84 —

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and the respect of a Luther. Then, you could be for us what he was for the Christians!”21 In a letter to Jost, dated October 6, 1820, Ehrenberg expresses comparable wishes for the success of Reform Judaism, but with other, noticeably different accents. He writes that “I hope that God may let Reform flourish, no matter might be the medium for that, if only it takes place [at all].“22 The reader might come to the conclusion that Ehrenberg channeled his hopes into the person of Zunz, for if Ehrenberg saw no difference between Zunz and Jost—as he claimed earlier letter—why did he not also call on Jost for becoming a new Jewish Luther? Leopold Zunz might have taken the ideas of his beloved Ehrenberg to heart, as a “Luther-like” episode shows. On October 7, 1820, a Shabbat Bereshit, Zunz preached on “Light and Darkness.” Ehrenberg was unaware of the content of Zunz’s sermon when he wrote almost a month later (on November 3) that “The old-believers23 denounce you already for your first sermon, even more so for your sermon on occasion of the Shabbat Bereshit [first Sabbath after Sukkot]. Nobody is able to tell me, though, what you actually did preach against Orthodox Judaism in your sermon. Now, continue on your way and be a Luther, and let [Gotthold] Salomon be your [Philipp] Melanchthon. May you work be as fruitful as theirs. If this happens in God, it will last with God.”24 In the following letter (November 20), he asks Zunz both in amazement and embarrassment: “Did you really call the old synagogues “dens of thieves” [German: Mördergruben]? They are indeed not much better than that, and it is true now as it was true then. The expression is, however, a little harsh for a

21 German: “[Gott gebe] dir aber die Kräfte recht viel Gutes in Israel zu wirken! Wohl möchte ich hinzufügen: Die Begeisterung, die Stimme und das Ansehen eines Luther, damit Du uns das werdest, was dieser den Kristen [sic] geworden!” Ehrenberg to Zunz, September 22, 1820, in Glatzer, Zunz, 18. Emphasis in the original. 22 German: “Ich hoffe zu Gott, daß er der Reformation Gedeihen schenken werde! Gleichviel durch wen solche bewirkt wird, wenn sie nur Stande kommt!” Ehrenberg to Jost, October 6, 1820, in Glatzer, Zunz, 19. 23 “Old-Believers” actually is a self-definition of the (traditional) Russian-Orthodox Christian Church, which seceded from the state church in the seventeenth century. 24 German: “Die altgläubigern verketzeren Dich, schon wegen Deiner ersten Predigt, noch mehr wegen der am Shabbat Bereshit [Hebr. in the original] gehaltenen. Obgleich mir Niemand sagen kann, was Du in dieser Predigt eigentlich gegen die Orthodoxen gesagt. Nun fahre nur so fort werde ein Luther, und laß Salomon Dein Melanchton sein, und möge Euer Werk so gedeiehen, wie das ihrige gedeihen. Und wenn es in Gott geschieht, so wird es auch Bestand haben mit Gott. ” Ehrenberg to Zunz, November 3, 1820, in Glatzer, Zunz, 20. Emphasis in the original. — 85 —

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public lecture and belongs to the times of Luther.”25 According to his beloved teacher from Wolfenbüttel, Zunz had to be a Luther without using his (Luther’s) vehement polemics. Zunz’s answer, dated January 5, 1821, and thus three day after he had received his doctoral degree from the University of HalleWittenberg, includes a very important detail on the context of the sentences: his attacks were not targeted at the synagogues but at the schools. Zunz writes that “Light shall be in the schools. So they shall be the homeland of Wissenschaft, of common decency, of virtues, and of religion. Oh, I should not remind you, my friend, of those institutions that are, alas, still to be found in Israel and which you call schools. They are not schools, innocent habitations of childish peace. No! They are caverns of assassins. Because they kill the hope of their parents, they kill the expectation of the State, they kill the embryo of so much spiritual life.”26 In this episode, Zunz shows a deep knowledge of Lutheran terminology. For the term “Mördergrube” [ “den of thieves,” or literally “pit of assassins or killers”] appears in Luther’s translation of the Bible in Jeremiah 7:11 as the German term for ham‘arat paāriṣim. Matthew 21:13, Mark 11:17 and Luke 19:47, in which the phrase reappears, are only quotations of the Old Testament text. To my knowledge, this translation is unique to Luther, as both the Septuagint and the Vulgata translate it unequivocally as a “den of robbers.”27 In the philological revision of 1912, the term was corrected to “Räuberhöhle” for the first time. To understand what is meant by “a pit of killers,” we have to refer to a sermon of Luther, delivered in Leipzig on August 12, 1545, when he explained Matthew 21:12-13: “Jesus entered the temple area and drove out all who were buying and selling there. He overturned the 25 German: “Hast du wirkl. die alten Synagogen ‘Mördergruben’ genannt? Viel besser sind sie freilich mit unter nicht. Doch wäre der Ausdruck, in einer öffentl. Rede ein wenig hart, und gehört in die Zeiten Luthers.” Ehrenberg to Zunz, November 29, 1820, in Glatzer, Zunz, 20. Emphasis in the original. 26 German: “Licht soll werden in den Schulen! Dass sie die Heimat seien der Wissenschaft, der Sitten, der Tugenden und der Religion. O, dass ich Euch, meine Freunde, nicht an jene Anstalten erinnern dürfte, des kindlichen Friedens unschuldige Wohnungen,—nein, die Mördergruben sind; denn sie morden die Hoffnungen der Eltern, morden die Erwartungen des Staates, morden den Keim zu so vielem geistigen Leben.” Zunz to Ehrenberg, January 5, 1821, in Glatzer, Zunz, 20. 27 See the Septuagint of Jeremiah 7:11: spelaion leston o oikos mou ou epikekletai to onoma mou ep’ auto ekei enopion umon kai ego idou eoraka legei kurios, and the Vulgata of Jeremiah 7:11: Ergo spelunca latronum facta est domus ista. — 86 —

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tables of the money changers and the benches of those selling doves. ‘It is written,’ he said to them, ‘‘My house will be called the house of prayer,’ but you have made it a pit of assassins.”28 Martin Luther does not see the scene as a criticism of the moneylenders and merchants profiting from the divine location of their moneymaking. Instead, he saw the criticism as targeted against the classes of priests, with their cults and ceremonies. “Pit of assassins” first and foremost refers to the blood sacrifice of the Jewish priests, which was seen as “proper liturgy” (ordentlicher Gottesdient). That was the proper divine service that Luther saw as valid, although it was abolished by Christ. Luther did not speculate about the Jews, of course, but about the Catholic Church, as it still offered and “murdered,” and even consumed, the son of God in the Eucharist of the Holy Mass. That should be the traditional service to God, while Christ, according to Luther, speaks, like Jeremiah, only of prayer. In this context, Luther uses for the “old” Jews and the “old” Christians, i.e., the Catholic Church, the reproachful term Seelenmörder (murderer of the souls). The Pope, the friars, and the monks acted like the priests of the old temples, he argued. They bought their services and murdered the souls of the poor.29 The sermon of Zunz evidently referred to and echoed similar criticism. The powerful sentences of the sermon demonstrate the intentions and ideals of the young Zunz. They disguise, however, the fact that Zunz only intended to thoroughly reform education in the school. Zunz’s agenda thus is not religion but Wissenschaft des Judentums, the Science of Judaism. His concept might be explained best as a concept of educating Jews toward Wissenschaft, or, in fact, German Bildung. Ehrenberg gave up on his propagandistic work of convincing Zunz to become a Luther: Zunz simply did not wish to be a religious reformer. If he had to enter the ring, he preferred being a Melanchthon rather than a Luther. Zunz aspired to be an effective teacher of Jewish literature and history. He sought to fulfill this goal in many ways, yet could never succeed. His attempt in 1848 to establish a professorship in the field of Wissenschaft 28 Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 51 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1914), 22–41. I thank Dr. Beyse, University of Halle, for the reference to Luther’s text. 29 German: “das da sollte ein Bethaus sein (wie Christus als Jesaja lvi. sagt), machen sie zu einem schendlichen kauffhaus, ja zur Mordgruben der Seelen” [31]. “Aber sie trieben allein auffs opffer on die lere und anruffen, Darüber ward das Haus zu nichts anderes denn zu einer Mordergruben. Denn damit verderbten sie die armen seelen” [33]. “…dann sie nichts sind denn Seelenmörder (weil sie nichts recht leren, wie man gleuben und beten sol)” [36]. Ibid., 31, 33, 36. — 87 —

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des Judentums at the University of Berlin failed utterly,30 as we will see in the next chapter. There were some fine differences in the understanding of “reform” between Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg, the teacher of Wolfenbüttel’s Bet ha-Midrash, and his “beloved son,” Leopold Zunz, in Berlin. There was also a gap between their expectations as concerned the factual ability to achieve “reform.” Zunz thought his new movement in Judaism concerning the entirety of Jewish culture, religion, and tradition—his Science of Judaism—to be a critical study of Jewish literature with a deeper knowledge of the subject. This, he believed, was a premise for a new “Reformation,” or “Renaissance,” i.e., true Reform Judaism. Ehrenberg, on the other hand, understood better than Zunz the political and personal difficulties involved in carrying out an academic occupation with Jewish literature and history without converting to Christianity, which he correctly perceived as a precondition for entering the field of Wissenschaft.31 Thus, he attempted to convince Zunz to be effective in the Jewish community as a “Jewish Luther,” striving for the modernization of Judaism, although this was also a rocky path.

30 See Glatzer, Zunz, 389, note 43. 31 But see Michael A. Meyer, The Origins of the Modern Jew: Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germay, 1749–1824 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967). I quote from the German translation in München: Beck, 1994, 171: “Zum Vermächtnis Ehrenbergs an Zunz gehörte freilich eines nicht: das Ideal der Wissenschaft, zu dem sich der ältere Mann niemals hingezogen fühlte.” — 88 —

——1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany ——

1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany1

In July of 1848, an almost revolutionary letter reached Adalbert von Ladenberg (1798–1855) a few days after he had become the Prussian minister for cultural affairs.2 The sender was the founder of the “Science of Judaism,” Leopold Zunz. He explained his proposal for a chair for Jewish history and literature at the Prussian university in Berlin without further ado, with the remark that The Science of Judaism does belong to the other subjects that are strangers to the universities. There is no instruction of the future civil servants and future law givers [of Prussia] in the history and literature of the Jews from the last two thousand years as they receive their education…. Thus strangers to the field are forced to turn to outdated books or living acquaintanceships. This way, they are not 1

2

The original subtitle of this chapter was “Anachronistic Thoughts on the History of the Chair for the History and Literature of Jews, at the University of Berlin since 1848.” The title was borrowed from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen: Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben (1874). All documents referring to Zunz’s proposal discussed below had been published in Ludwig Geiger, “Zunz im Verkehr mit Behörden und Hochgestellten,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 60 (1916): 245—262, 321—347, esp. 324 et seq. See also Heinrich Simon, “Wissenschaft vom Judentum in der Geschichte der Berliner Universität,” in [Khokhmat Yisraʼel]: Wissenschaft des Judentums—Anfänge der Judaistik in Europa, ed. Julius Carlebach (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 153–164. Simon largely bases his work on the findings of Geiger. The following documents can be found in the archive (I am grateful to Dr. Raimund Leicht for composing this overview): Archiv-Nr. 112: Die Vollständigkeit des Lehr-Kursus, Febr. 1820-Sept. 1922; Lit K, No. 2 (old signature); Content: Bl. 80: … v. 21.8.48 concerning a proposal by Dr. Zunz for the introduction of a full professorship for Jewish history and literature; Bl. 81–83: summary of proposal: Bl. 80: Letter by Ladenbergs to the department, dated August 12, for forwarding Zunz’s letter; Bl. 81: Replies from Trendelenburg, Boeckh, Ranke, and Petermann, dated Okctober 20, 1848 (agreement to attend); Bl. 82: Introduction of Trendelenburg to Boeckh, Ranke, and Petermann for a meeting on Oktober, 30, 6 p.m.; Bl. 83: accompanying letter by Trendelenburg, dated November 5, 1848, for a preliminary decision, special reference to the opinion of Boeckh; agreement of Ranke, Boeckh, and Petermann; Bl. 84– 88: Draft to be sent to the department, Berlin, November 9, 1848, note by Trendelenburg dated November 11, 1848; further note, November 13, 1848; letter to Stassling, November 25, 1848 [the text is reprinted in Geiger, “Zunz im Verkehr,” 337–341]. — 89 —

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protected from the oracle of ignorance or ill will whose influences will leave their traces in the decrees or laws.3 The integration of the Science of Judaism into the curriculum of the universities had become Leopold Zunz’s mission in life. As early as June 1, 1838, he sent a letter to his former teacher in Berlin, the theologian Wilhelm de Wette, stating that I have to blame the vileness with which a Jewish scholar has to struggle for my striving for perfection in the Science of Judaism, which has become my mission in life. He has to say plenty and do plenty to make a simple living. He rarely has enough means to travel, and lacks the invigorating support of a circle of listeners. And still! How much do we need a chair for Jewish literature at our universities! The ignorance is tremendous, the prejudice, the injustice in everything touching the Jews’ social and historical being [identity]: science, well-being, unity, morality do not gain from the fact that the taught Jew and his achievements are rejected in a way that is full of contempt, without any love, and in a true patrician manner.4 It should be noted that Zunz was not interested in placing into the university system the general education of possible rabbinical candi3

4

German: “Zu den auf Universitäten fremden Fächern gehört die Wissenschaft des Judentums. Über Geschichte und Literatur der Juden aus dem Zeitraum der letzten zweitausend Jahre wird da, wo die künftigen Beamten und Gesetzgeber ihre Vorbildung erhalten, keine Belehrung gegeben. ... so sind die Fremdlinge auf diesem Gebiet gezwungen, sich an veraltete Bücher oder an lebende Bekanntschaften zu wenden, nicht geschützt vor dem Orakel der Unwissenheit oder des bösen Willens, deren Spuren alsdann Verfügungen und Gesetze tragen.” Geiger, “Zunz im Verkehr,” 258–259. German: “Wenn ich mich in der Wissenschaft des Judentums, die den Inhalt meines Lebens ausmacht, mich allseitig vervollkommne, so haben daran die Widerwärtigkeiten schuld, mit denen ein jüdischer Gelehrter zu kämpfen hat, der vielerlei sagen und tun muß, sein Dasein zu fristen, selten Mittel zu Reisen hat und der Anfeuerung durch einen belebenden Zuhörerkreis entbehrt. Und doch! Wie sehr täte die Besetzung eines Lehrstuhls für jüdische Literatur an unseren Universitäten not! Groß ist die Unwissenheit, das Vorurtheil, die Ungerechtigkeit in allem, was der Juden soziales und historisches Sein betrifft: Wissenschaft, Wohlergehen, Eintracht, Sittlichkeit gewinnen nicht dabei, daß man den unterrichteten Juden und seine Leistungen so verachtungsvoll, so lieblos und echt patrizisch zurückstößt.” — 90 —

——1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany ——

dates. This had been rather common for a period. He himself had gained his doctoral degree with a thesis on the work of Rabbi Shem Tov ben Yosef ibn Falaquera (died 1209 in Spain) at the University of Halle. Apparently, the reason for his doctoral work was that he felt he could expect better employment prospects after receiving an advanced degree (this was as correct then as it is now).5 Many rabbis made pilgrimage to the city at the River Saale—Halle—and its university in order to earn a doctorate in an academic climate of Jewish tolerance.6 I use the word “pilgramage” deliberately, as most of the rabbis did not have to spend more than a few hours in the city, and arrived simply for the purpose of talking to famous professors such as Wilhelm Gesenius (1786–1842) and receiving their approval for doctoral candidacy. The applicants did not have to present further material or make any other effort. This was not a unique occurrence: the university in Breslau (also a Prussian city) even introduced a chair for Semitic languages and rabbinical studies in the 1870s. The first holder of the chair was a Christian student, Isidor Magnus, a student of Abraham Geiger. He became a full professor in 1872, in order to “have, on one hand, represented the rabbinic literature by a Christian [!] scholar, and, on the other hand, to move P[rofessor] Magnus to occupy himself especially with lectures on the theoretical discipline, and thus to spark interest for the same in the students, as well as keeping that interest alive.”7 It should be emphasized that not only did the university seek to integrate rabbinical studies into the curriculum, but it also sought to do so under Christian guidance, especially for the appearance of the education. We will revisit this issue at a later point.8 When Zunz wrote the Prussian minister in 1848, he was hoping for a breakthrough for the Science of Judaism within the canon of university subjects. His main aim was to counter the general ignorance of Jewish 5

6 7

8

Documentation in Halle proves this. Zunz wrote in his application that, “As I intend sending an important proposal to this administration [the Prussian administration] within ten days, it would be of extraordinary use for me to be able presenting myself as Dr. philos. Immediately.” Universitätsarchiv der Martin-Luther-Universität, Halle-Wittenberg: Acta Decanati Maassii, 12. Juli 1820 bis 12. Januar 1821, Blatt 128. On this aspect see further details below, pp. 150-161. I quote from the pioneering study of Carsten Wilke, “Rabbinerpromotionen an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 1845-1895,” in Jüdische Bildung und Kultur in SachsenAnhalt von der Aufklärung bis zum Nationalsozialismus, ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Christian Wiese, 261–315 (Berlin: Metropol, 2009); see also the last chapter or conclusion of this book, pp. 258-259. See below, pp. 93-98. — 91 —

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history and literature with an academic education free of prejudices and based on practical experience. Sadly, the time had not come for such a project, nor were the politicians he applied to willing to complement the general subjects with aspects of a special area of study—a paradoxical idea indeed. Why integrate into the general curriculum the culture of a religious minority? There were simply too many paradoxes for the Prussian administration, who were ruled by the idea of les idées claires et distinctes à la Descartes. As discussed earlier, Zunz’s biography and his work are exemplary considering the usual fate of Jewish scholarship in the nineteenth century. He was born during the time of the late Enlightenment, when the position of Jews in society was still debated. Through Samuel Meyer Ehrenberg he was introduced to the charm and suffering of the “Science of Judaism.” He dedicated his life to it, and hoped in vain of becoming a professor, although his teacher expected him to become the Reformer of Judaism. Ehrenberg saw better than his protégé the insurmountable obstacles placed before him in the academic world as a Jew without converting. Zunz had studied in Berlin under the famous theologian Wilhelm de Wette and Friedrich August Wolf. He mentioned both of them in a letter to de Wette: “Though the outer connection to you had been a brief one, the inner connection was the more lasting, because I owe to you the insights into biblical criticism. Next to you, I owe the scholarly perspective that I possess to Friedr. Aug. Wolf.”9 This cannot be overemphasized: biblical and classical studies were the midwives of the Science of Judaism. Zunz wrote in 1845 in the preface of his monograph Zur Literatur und Geschichte der Juden (On the Literature and History of the Jews) that the privilege and the primacy of violence and abuse are not appreciated in the realm of scholarship. Thought is mighty enough to prevail over pretension and injustice without resorting to pompousness and injustice [itself]. The society of the Oriental philologists has already introduced Jewish literature into their midst; its introduc9

German: “War so die äußerliche Verbindung mit Ihnen eine vorübergehende, so war die innere desto dauernder. Denn Ihnen verdanke ich die Einsicht in die biblische Kritik und nächst Friedr. Aug. Wolf, was ich überhaupt an wissenschaftlichem Blick besitze.” — 92 —

——1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany ——

tion into the academies and universities thus cannot take long.10 Zunz’s hopes were dashed when his proposal to the Prussian minister for cultural affairs was declined. The Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität refused to establish a chair for the history and literature of the Jews. To be fair, the responsible commission and the Prussian administration did grant the proposal significant consideration: the reviews and justification for the decision were extensive. The decision was thus the more serious for Zunz and the “Science of Judaism.” The commission dedicated to the task constituted the dean, the philosopher Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–1872), the classical philologist August Boeckh, the historian Leopold von Ranke, and the scholar of oriental studies Julius Heinrich Petermann (1801–1876). They praised Zunz’s scholarly achievements and his agenda of “setting the literature and history of the Jews in a benevolent correlation with the general sciences.” Yet they rejected the proposal on the grounds that … a professorship which is also dedicated to the intellectual preservation and strengthening of the Jewish nature in all its differences contradicts the idea of the new freedom dedicated to eradicating the previously solid differences. It would be favoritism to the Jews, an abuse of the university … which first and foremost does not have any other measurement than the inner content of science and in which … no outer agenda shall have to suppress the inner scholarly interest.11

10 German: “Das Privilegium und die Untrüglichkeit der Gewalt und des Mißbrauchs sind im Reiche des Geistes nicht anerkannt, und der Gedanke ist mächtig genug, ohne Anmaßung und Unrecht über die Anmaßung und das Unrecht zu siegen. Schon hat die Gesellschaft der orientalischen Philologen die jüdische Literatur in ihren Kreis eingeführt; die Einführung in die Akademien und die Universitäten kann wohl nicht lange mehr ausbleiben.” Leopold Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin: Veit, 1845), preface. 11 German: “Eine Professur, die mit dem Nebengedanken gestiftet würde, das jüdische Wesen in seiner Besonderheit ... geistig zu stützen und zu bekräftigen, widerspräche dem Sinne der neuen, die starren Unterschiede ausgleichenden Freiheit. Sie wäre eine Bevorrechtigung der Juden, ein Mißbrauch der Universität, ... die für ihre Lehrfächer zunächst kein anderes Maß kennt als den inneren Gehalt der Wissenschaft, und in der ... keine äußere Zweckmäßigkeit das reinere wissenschaftliche Interesse verdrängen soll.” — 93 —

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The commission pointed to the fact that there did not even exist a chair for German or Prussian history: “For that reason it is not advisable to tear out Jewish history from the scholarly nexus of the general one.” In the end, it was argued, there was also not a chair at the university in Berlin for Catholic theology and history. It is impossible to permit to the Jews what is rejected for the Catholics. Prussian scholars did not understand that only an independent occupation with Jewish tradition could do justice to the subject in a scholarly fashion. Thus, in the name of supposed equality, they factually aided the prevailing ignorance on the topic. Judaism was reduced to a simple chapter in the universal history of mankind, depicted according to the traditional Christian doctrine of salvation or the secular philosophy of history. This demonstrates clearly that the political emancipation of the Jews did not meet with cultural integration. Zunz paraphrased it more poignantly than Ladenberg: “The ghetto has been broken open, but the relegation has not been abrogated.”1 Zunz believed that antisemitic and anti-Jewish tendencies swiftly decline if the university education system would acknowledge Jewish culture as one among equals. With bitterness he wrote in a letter on August 21, 1876, that “The diminishing of Jewish authors, even if they are baptized, will not cease in Germany as long as Jewish history and literature are not taught at all universities, and by Jews who are full professors. As soon as this progress is achieved there will come the Ḥavle Mashiaḥ [sufferings of the Messiah].”2 The “sufferings of the Messiah,” as Zunz wrote, would, of course, bring the apocalyptic end of the world. Zunz points to the fact that in an environment of academic education that is marked by antisemitism and Christian-Protestantism, only a Jew is capable of teaching Jewish history and literature without prejudices. The academic corpus at that time did not wish to, or was unable to, think outside of the box. The story of Hermann Cohen’s chair at the University of Marburg, and the resistance to the call to the University of Göttingen by Edmund Husserl 1 2

German: “Das Ghetto ist gesprengt, aber die Verweisung noch nicht aufgehoben.” German: “Das Herabsetzen jüdischer Autoren, selbst der getauften, wird in Deutschland so lange bestehen, als nicht an allen Universitäten jüdische Geschichte und Litteratur von Juden, die ordentliche Professoren sind, vorgetragen wird. Sobald dieser Fortschritt eingetreten, kommen die ‫[ חבלי משיח‬Leiden des Messias].” Markus Brann, “Mittheilung aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen Zunz und Kaufmann,” Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur 15/16 (1902/03): 179. Hebrew characters are used in the original. — 94 —

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(1859–1938) are but a few examples of German universities working against Jewish professors. Zunz had, in 1876, anticipated that only an event of international importance could influence this aspect of history, because the academies themselves were incapable of internal reform. History, unfortunately, proved Zunz correct. The burning of books and the Holocaust put an end to the respublica litterarum as well. It had been incapable of accepting the varieties of cultural identity and defending them. The tremendous productivity and creativity of the German-speaking Wissenschaft des Judentums was ended violently. Many masterpieces of German-Jewish culture, begun but never completed, such as the German Encyclopaedia Judaica, still stand as monuments in their incompleteness. The academic study of Judaism in the context of the humanities did not become a reality in Germany until 1963. At that time, Jacob Taubes was named professor for hermeneutics and Jewish studies at the Free University in Berlin, placed in a field between philosophy and theology. From the very beginning, Jewish studies could not create its own identity, and had to find its way on a borderline between disciplines. Taubes was a renowned scholar who had begun his career as an assistant of Gerschom Scholem in Jerusalem.3 After separating from Scholem because of a “betrayal of confidence,” he moved to Berlin. Only about thirty years ago, the Hochschule für Jüdische Studien (Academy for Jewish Studies) was founded at the University of Heidelberg. It is an institution that (according to its constitution) “is dedicated to the fostering and development of Jewish humanities in the related disciplines.”4 In this we see the ambition for identity. At the same time, we also see the difficulty inherent in being heir to Jewish theological schools and, in another direction the attempted prevention of an implicit, external ghetto-ization of the Jewish academies. It is, as I see it, a Zunzian dilemma, if one were to see Zunz’s pursuit of a full professorship at the University of Berlin as an emancipation of the mind, and consider alongside it his teacher Ehrenberg’s hope for a promotion of the inner emancipation of the Jews from the ghetto of the pilpulistic yeshivah. After the Shoah, there is no need to talk about emancipation, of 3 4

See below, part IV, chapter 4.2. “Satzung der Hochschule für Jüdische Studien,” September 10, 2007, Hochschule für Jüdische Studien Heidelberg, http://www.hfjs.eu/hochschule/leitungsorgane/satzung.html (accessed September 16, 2012). — 95 —

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course. There is a need, however, to talk about a re-integration of Jewish culture and intellectual history into general education, to talk about a cultural integration and re-integration of Judaism and Germanness into the general European scene. We do not have to talk about a JewishGerman symbiosis, which some people “hate,” but about a cultural and social mutual perception. After the political turns stemming from the German unification, institutions and institutes are dedicated to Jewish studies have multiplied at the universities. This was likely, and there is very little reason to believe otherwise, rooted in the political will to demonstrate to the world the political ideas within the reunified Germany, and thus to make amends on the level of the universities as well. The integration of the history and literature of the Jews into education was not and is not an inner development of the universities, as was touched upon above, and that is the main weakness of the change. It raises the anxiety-inducing question of whether Jewish studies will be abandoned as soon as the historical German conscience has come to terms with itself. Jewish studies today will only stand on its own if it is capable of carving out its local, national, and European importance in its own home. In my eyes, Jewish studies might focus on two aspects that are also vital for its self-image: first, the awareness of Jewish identity within European intellectual history; and second, interdisciplinary research and teaching. Is the field of Jewish studies capable of adopting the paradigms that guided the so-called “Science of Judaism”? In point of fact, modern Jewish studies already follows its principles. Without a doubt there is a convergence between the two: the “Jewish Science,” i.e., Jewish studies, has to understand the study of Jewish literature, history, and philosophy as a perception of the identification process of Jews within European culture(s). This process did not work only through Judaism’s own sociological dynamics; since Moses Mendelssohn, it has been understood as a required correlation with the majority society. Two movements developed out of the Science of Judaism and are of importance in this context: the representatives of the first, including Samuel Hirsch or Salomon Ludwig Steinheim in the nineteenth century, attempted to present themselves as a Jewish theologian avant-garde against the Hegelian zeitgeist. The representatives of the second, e.g. Hermann Cohen, Emil Fackenheim, or Yeshayahu Leibowitz, were proponents of a Jewish neo-Kantian philosophy. — 96 —

——1.5 Separation through Integration? Dreams of a Chair of Jewish Studies in 1848 Prussian Germany ——

The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas allegedly once wrote on Judaism that it was “the stranger in ourselves.”5 With this quote, Levinas, who was himself Jewish, wanted to put in a nutshell the often tragic, but also often fruitful, dialectic of a history covering centuries. This history has manifested itself in internal and external evaluations as an element that has been constitutive for European culture, yet has not been assimilated. The current debate concerning the perception of the stranger, the unknown, within German society is a direct indicator of the current nature of this topic. Perception is, however, impossible if the historic, social, and philosophical coordinates of the subject and the object are not understood. This is the most important task of any university education: to strive for identification and to teach about the historical and contemporary forms of identity and self-determination. The difficult birth of Jewish studies in the German-speaking world proves just how reluctant most German and European universities are to integrate a cultural entity that is not denominational, yet is connected to religion; that is geographically and culturally European, yet “distinctive”; that is part of the European development of the mind, yet still ghettoized. The question springs to mind spontaneously and blatantly: is this subject, Jewish studies, to be interpreted as the stone of Daniel’s statue that questions the (already shaky) construction of the humanities? For a conclusion, allow me to repeat Hermann Cohen’s judgment concerning Leopold Zunz, saying of him that he “could have been a great historian but was only an antiquarian.” Cohen was wrong, I believe, as Zunz was not a historian. Neither was he properly an antiquarian, but only a philologist who knew how to, as Friedrich Nietzsche put it, “Work against the times, and thus during these times, and hopefully for the sake of future times.” The subject Leopold Zunz initiated and sought to establish within the canon of university subjects should follow its origin rather than leave its path. The German “Judaistik,” which was born out of the ruins of recent history—and whose name, incidentally, we find in the course catalog of the pre-WWII Hebrew University—is a subject that works “philologically” and historically. It transmits its content and form of education through a culture-historical methodology. This transmission must not be spoiled by the recent politics of culture and the univer5

I was unfortunately unable to locate this quotation in his works. — 97 —

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sities, which are relevant to the present time only. Recent politics always asks for the cui bono in academic and university circles. It always asks for the practical use of the learned, too. Every change, in the universities as well, should be followed and/or deliberated upon with the serenity of reading, not the haste of historic turmoil. The changes should be measured and considered with the love and preference for texts and the traditions of texts, not with the haste of subjects dedicated to practice and rush. This would be in full accord with Friedrich Nietzsche, who drew the sharpest deconstructive line between literature and contemporary history, experience and philology, revolution and regression: I have not been a philologist in vain—perhaps I am one yet: a teacher of slow reading. I even come to write slowly. At present it is not only my habit, but even my taste—a perverted taste, maybe—to write nothing but what will drive to despair every one who is “in a hurry.” For philology is that venerable art which exacts from its followers one thing above all—to step to one side, to leave themselves spare moments, to grow silent, to become slow—the leisurely art of the goldsmith applied to language: an art which must carry out slow, fine work, and attains nothing if not lento. For this very reason philology is now more desirable than ever before; for this very reason it is the highest attraction and incitement in an age of ‘work’: that is to say, of haste, of unseemly and immoderate hurry-scurry, which is intent upon “getting things done” at once, even every book, whether old or new. Philology itself, perhaps, will not “get things done” so hurriedly: it teaches how to read well: i.e., slowly, profoundly, attentively, prudently, with inner thoughts, with the mental doors ajar, with delicate fingers and eyes...6

6

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, trans. John McFarland Kennedy (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911), 9. Emphasis in the original. — 98 —

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Part II

Political and Cultural History of a Conjunction

— 99 —

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2.1 Goethe & Judaism: Typology of an Ambivalent Relation

In the natural sciences, typology is defined as methodological specialist knowledge applied to the description, characterization, and classification of empirical and theoretical phenomena. In antiquity and especially in the Middle Ages, “typology” was first and foremost used in biblical exegesis. The type was a “figure” from the world of the Old Testament who was reflected in that of the New Testament, and represented the latter typologically, admittedly in an obscure and imperfect manner. In other words, it was exegetically representative. According to this hermeneutic perspective, Adam, the first human being created, only fulfilled his task as the prototype of humanity in Christ, who, if we follow the apostle Paul, was the new (and thus, in the truest sense of the word, the “genuine”) Adam. The heuristic and hermeneutic method of typology therefore has a classifying, conservative, but also reconstructive and historicizing approach, implying at the same time a normative component by taking the past as its starting point and, through the present, hoping to point to the future. Is it possible to typologically analyze Goethe’s relationship to Judaism and exemplarily describe it? This question implies a further controversial aspect: how can an “ambivalent” relationship be characterised typologically? “Ambivalent” is the adjective that one often encounters in a typological treatment of Goethe, and the one that Wilfried Barner tries to refute in an article that appeared on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the writer’s death: “‘Ambivalent,’ yes, ‘contradictory’ is how people have repeatedly defined his attitude, to be sure all too often leaving it at that, without inquiring about nuances and historical reasons”1; and further: “In Goethe’s case the schemata of ‘anti-Semitic’ and ‘philo-Semitic’ alone ... do not do justice to the interlacement of motives.”2 With these observations in mind, Günter Hartung rightly 1 Wilfried Barner, “150 Jahre nach seinem Tod; Goethe und die Juden,” Bulletin of the Leo-Baeck Institute Jerusalem 63 (1982): 75. 2 Ibid., 76. Barner distinguishes between Goethe’s social “attitude” (76–77), his “aesthetic views” (70) and the “aesthetic-poetic and traditional stimulus” (77). He neglects, however, the relevant political aspects, specifically the changed and changing political situation of the Jews (during — 100 —

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refers to a further important aspect: “Goethe’s attitude [to Judaism] was ambivalent insofar as he was unwilling by way of a general concept to dissolve the contradiction between the biblical past and the present reality of the Jews, the ‘contrast between the ancestors and the descendants.’”3 Accordingly, such a stance implies an act of will, an active refusal or—rather more likely—an unwillingness to decide on Goethe’s part, which this paper intends to question. The aesthetic (and also ethical) will of Goethe has determined the orientation of this chapter, which aims to be nothing more than the typological reconstruction of the historical context, permitting a more exact classification of “Goethe’s Judaism.” At the same time, this will be an investigation into the exemplary nature of the relationship between Goethe and Judaism, which left its mark on German cultural and intellectual history, not only up to the Shoah but presumably for generations to come, over and above affecting the deepest layers of the German psyche and consciousness. With these remarks I have already hinted at the thesis that is argued here: Goethe’s relationship to Judaism, in the context of German, Jewish and, indeed, even European history, reveals nothing unusual or singular: Goethe embodied quite a typical attitude, which can probably best be defined with the help of the epithets “politically conservative” and “culturally exploitative.” Goethe’s Relationship to Judaism as Reflected in the Secondary Literature As Goethe’s attitude to Judaism is above all a barometer of the German preoccupation with Judaism, as well as the Jewish preoccupation with German-ness (Deutschtum), allow here some preliminary remarks that claim to be more than a description of the academic status quaestionis. Neither intensively nor extensively did Goethe preoccupy himself with Judaism, its history, and its literature, or with the Jewish scholarship of his day. We have only a few meager quotations, which—as others have emancipation) as well as Goethe’s political influence on the younger generation of contemporary Jews and Germans. See also Barner, “Jüdische Goethe-Verehrung vor 1933,” in Juden in der deutschen Literatur, ed. Stéphane Moses and Albrecht Schöne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986): 127–150; Barner, Von Rahel Varnhagen bis Friedrich Gundolf. Juden als deutsche GoetheVerehrer (Wolfenbüttel, Göttingen: Wallstein, 1992). 3 Günter Hartung, “Goethe und die Juden,” Weimarer Beiträge 40 (1994): 398. The quotation is from Goethe’s “An Zelter,” 19 May 1812. — 101 —

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noted often enough—are not far from the usual clichés, and thus are likely to be both used and misused.4 A second, even more astonishing, find is the growth since Goethe’s death of an extensive bibliography focusing on his attitude to Judaism, or rather on his silence regarding Judaism. Time and time again, bits and pieces or isolated quotations have been torn out of their contexts; uncompleted projects, table talk, and passing snatches of conversation have been evaluated in order to work out a supposedly overall Goethean concept of Judaism. This is how people drew conclusions about his “ambivalence”: by combining and arranging scattered and disparate bits into an artistically harmonic whole and presenting the result to an unsuspecting public. This harmonic unity, however, simply does not exist. In contrast to the study of Goethe’s attitude to Judaism, a look at the secondary literature on this subject up to the Nazi period is most revealing, much more eloquent than the topic of “Goethe and Jews” itself. The first attempt to “canonize” Goethe’s attitude to Judaism, to my knowledge, dates back to his secretary and assistant, Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer,5 an alumnus of Halle University (1794–1801) and student of the classical philologist Friedrich August Wolf, who himself was a friend of Goethe’s.6 In his thematically organized Reports on Goethe [in the original German: Mittheilungen über Goethe], written between 1838 and 1841, Riemer treats Jews as a separate category after a satirical chapter on “foreigners” (Fremde, meaning Englishmen and Frenchmen). We hardly learn anything about Goethe’s attitude toward Jews, but we do learn a lot about the Jewish critics of the great man. The objects of Riemer’s tirade are first and foremost the followers of Ludwig Börne. Börne is caricatured as “the most narrow-minded egoist” (der bornierteste Egoist) and prototype of the Jewish people. The Mittheilungen is an apologetic work,7 intended to defend Goethe against his critics and op4 William Rose, Men, Myths, and Movements in German Literature: A Volume of Historical and Critical Papers (London: Kennikat, 1964), 157. 5 From 1803 to 1805, Riemer was employed as tutor to Goethe’s son, August, and from 1805 to 1812 he was Goethe’s private secretary. For details on Riemer’s life, his relations with Goethe, and the trustworthiness of his information, see the antiquated but still useful study by Arthur Pollmer, Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer und seine “Mittheilungen über Goethe” (Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1922), 90. 6 Riemer belonged to the inner circle of the Halle professor. See Rudolf Hanhart, Erinnerungen an Friedrich August Wolf (Basel: Wieland, 1825), VII. 7 The term “apology” is used by Riemer himself in this connection; see Pollmer, Riemer, 90. — 102 —

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ponents as well as to cement the already advanced canonization of the poet in two volumes full of strongly polemic and apologetic rhetoric. His chapter on Jews demonstrates how important this polemic was to him. The Jewry that he has in mind is that of his own day. What infuriates him in particular is Ludwig Börne’s criticism of Goethe, which he viewed as typical of how Frankfurt’s Jews regarded the German writer. Riemer’s words become arrows dripping with anti-Semitic poison: Is it heard of, is it permitted that a Jew—a protected Frankfurt Jew (Schutzjude)8—be allowed to say to a Frankfurt nobleman, to the first poet of the nation, of whom it [the nation] has every reason to be proud and to whom it wants to erect monuments, to his face and before the eyes and ears of all of his fellow citizens and to have it printed for posterity: “(ever) since I am able to feel, I have hated Goethe; (ever) since I am able to think, I know why”? Yes indeed! A Jew enjoys the privilege of fools.9 The Jew as the pariah of Frankfurt society, who proves to be ungrateful to the aristocratic poet-prince (Riemer passes over the fact that Goethe was not of noble birth),10 who dares to rise up against him! Riemer reports that the criticism of Börne and his followers was directed at Goethe’s supposed lack of patriotism, which he regarded as shameless hubris, because it was the Jewish “nation” that was considered intolerant and displayed “theocratic egoism” for their religion. Jews were the enemies of humanity par excellence, because for over three millennia they had been cultivating the odium adversus omnes alios hostile, a phrase which Riemer borrowed from Tacitus.11 Obviously, at the root of this excitement stands a deliberate misun8

Status for German Jews granted by the imperial, princely or royal courts; on this see Michael Demel, Gebrochene Normalität. Die staatskirchenrechtliche Stellung der jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland. Zugleich Dissertation (Tübingen: Mohr, 2011), 46-86. 9 German: “Ist es erhört, ist es erlaubt, daß ein Jude, ein Frankfurter Schutzjude, einem Frankfurter Edlen, dem ersten Dichter der Nation, auf den sie stolz zu seyn Ursache hat, dem sie Monumente errichten will, ins Angesicht, und vor allen seiner Mitbürger Augen und Ohren sagen und es gedruckt der Nachwelt hinterlassen darf: ‘seit ich fühle, habe ich Goethen gehaßt, seit ich denke, weiß ich warum’? Doch! Ein Jude kann alles; ein Narr darf alles.” Riemer, Mittheilungen, 434. 10 Goethe did not belong to the old Hessian aristocracy, as Riemer suggests, but he was indeed ennobled—in Weimar, not in Frankfurt. 11 Tacitus, Historiae V, 5; Juvenal, Saturae XIV, mentioned by Riemer, Mittheilungen, 435. — 103 —

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derstanding of Börne’s statement. Börne employed the term “patriotism” in accordance with the understanding of the “leftists,” which was widespread after 1789. Political progressives, in fact, thought of themselves as “patriots” even when they advocated the French annexation of the Rhineland. Their understanding of “patriotism” was more or less synonymous with “cosmopolitanism.” Forty years later, the Jewish Goethe scholar Ludwig Geiger, son of the famous Reform rabbi Abraham Geiger, spoke out on the subject. Geiger was one of the most knowledgeable positivist Goethe scholars, the founder of the Goethe Society and the Goethe Yearbook, and the author of a biography of Goethe.12 Among his numerous treatises and shorter articles are several essays dealing with “Jews and German literature.”13 In his words these treatises had two purposes: First of all, the intention is to show what German writers thought about Jews, how they described these, in belletrist works especially, e.g., novels and dramas, whether and to what extent they had personal relationships with them. Second, the aim is to present how Jews themselves, regardless of whether they remained loyal to the faith of their fathers or not, contributed to German cultural work, how, owing to the peculiarity of their origins, they introduced new ideas into German literature, worked out the dominant views for themselves, and influenced contemporaries and foreigners by dint of their strange, but always idiosyncratic, ideas.14 12 A study of the life of this extraordinary figure of the so-called “German-Jewish symbiosis” would be a worthwhile project. 13 Vorträge und Versuche. Beiträge zur Litteratur-Geschichte (Dresden: Ehlermann, 1890); “Goethe, Bettine und die Frankfurter Juden, Berlin 1903” in Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, 1903, 1–13 [offprint from the property of the Goethe-National-Museum, Weimar]; “Schiller und die Juden” in Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, 1904, 1–42 [offprint from the property of the Hebrew and National Library, Jerusalem, formerly the property of the Jewish Community of Berlin]; Die deutsche Literatur und die Juden (Berlin: Reimer, 1910). 14 German: “Es handelt sich erstens darum, zu zeigen, wie die deutschen Schriftsteller über die Juden gedacht, wie sie dieselben, namentlich in den Werken der schönen Literatur, z.B. Romanen und Dramen dargestellt haben, ob und inwieweit sie in persönliche Beziehungen zu ihnen getreten sind. Zweitens ist darzulegen, wie die Juden selbst, mögen sie nun zeitlebens dem väterlichen Glauben treugeblieben sein oder nicht, an der deutschen Culturarbeit mitgewirkt haben, wie sie, vermöge ihrer Stammeseigenthümlichkeit neue Ideen in die deutsche Literatur eingeführt, die herrschenden Ansichten in sich verarbeitet und durch Seltsames, aber immer Eigenartiges auf — 104 —

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His studies on Schiller, Goethe, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bettina Brentano, and others enable us to determine the matters of interest to Jewish scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as they asserted and maintained their ground within the German cultural scene while preserving their own identities. In 1921, Max Maurenbrecher, a Protestant preacher, devoted a monograph to German writers and their attitudes to Jewry, creating a work with antisemitic theses whose message he tried to spread throughout Germany in lectures.15 To my knowledge, he is one of the first people who misused Goethe for antisemitic purposes.16 Goethe was made to function here as the alleged source of claims, for instance, that Jews were parasites who would poison the authentic Nordic culture. Maurenbrecher masks his conspiracy theory in sentences like the following: “Without the poisoning of our labour movement by its Jewish leaders, and without the subversion of our bourgeoisie in the press by the Jewish mentality, in literature and on stage, and by Jewish capital in banks, stock markets, and likewise in the press and in political parties— without this poisoning and subversion in our own midst—we would not have been defeated by the onslaught of our enemies in the World War [I]!”17 The conclusion of his anti-Semitic premises is quite consistent: “Goethe did not waver in his condemnation of Jewry ... and the liberal spirit of the times, the ‘sanctimonious humanity cant,’ and the ideas of the French Revolution did not muddle him in the least from feeling that the Jewish people, though significant, were alien in our midst.”18 Zeitgenossen und Fremde eingewirkt haben.” Ludwig Geiger, “Goethe und die Juden,” Zeitschrift der Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland 1 (1883): 321. Geiger thus treated this subject in the very first year of the periodical which he established! 15 Max Maurenbrecher, Goethe und die Juden: Eine Zusammenstellung (Munich: Boepple 1921) [Vol 3 of Deutschlands führende Männer und das Judentum]. 16 The first reference to an antisemitic misuse of Goethe is to be found in Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1912), see on this Günter Hartung, “Houston Stewart Chamberlains ‘Goethe,’” in G. Hartung and H. Orlowski, Traditionen und Traditionssuche des deutschen Faschismus (Halle, 1983) [Wissenschaftliche Beiträge der Martin-Luther-Universität, 1983/30 = F 43], 5–27; and Ursula Homan, “Goethe und das Judentum,” www://UrsulaHoman.de/GoetheUndDasJudentum/ komplett.html. 17 German: “Ohne die Vergiftung unserer Arbeitsbewegung durch ihre jüdischen Führer, und ohne die Zersetzung unseres Bürgertums durch jüdischen Geist in Presse, Schrifttum und Bühne, und durch jüdisches Kapital in Banken, Börsen und ebenfalls wieder in der Presse und in den politischen Parteien–ohne diese Vergiftung und Zersetzung im eigenen Inneren wären wir dem Ansturm der Feinde im Weltkrieg nicht unterlegen.” Maurerbrecher, Goethe, 2. 18 German: “Goethe [hat] in seiner Verurteilung des Judentums nicht geschwankt...und durch den liberalen Geist der Zeit, durch die ‚Humanitätssalbaderei’ und durch die Gedanken der — 105 —

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Oddly enough, the Jewish scholar Heinrich Teweles cites the very same passages in Goethe’s work that Maurenbrecher used in 1925, in a treatise on “Goethe and the Jews,” as evidence for the very opposite stance, that the poet’s sympathy was for the Jewish people.19 With the intention of not allowing Goethe to be left as a “crown witness” to the antisemites, Julius Bab, also Jewish, wrote a study the following year that was clearly politically motivated: “There is an emergency state of intellectual self-defense, and after nationalist agitators did not shy away from laying claim to Goethe as a crown witness for their brand of antisemitism, we have no choice but to confront them by examining the problem more thoroughly....”20 It is true that he does not ignore Goethe’s critical opinion of emancipated Jews, but this he ascribes to Goethe’s criticism of the Enlightenment and his rejection of the French Revolution. Even if he found specifically Jewish ways sometimes very foreign, he nevertheless treated Judaism with the “solidarity of the spirit of man.”21 The controversy about Goethe’s attitude to Judaism seems to have reached a turning point during the 1920s and 1930s. Leo Deutschländer in 192322 and Raimund Eberhard in 193223 devoted themselves to an old theme, Goethe’s relationship to the Old Testament. Back in 1880, Theodor Arnt had already published an essay on the subject.24 Bernhard Ziemlich followed him in 1883, and devoted an entire book to the subject.25 In 1887, Victor Hehn published a treatise on “Goethe and the Language of the Bible” (Goethe und die Sprache der Bibel) in the Goethe-Jahrbuch VIII. In 1890, Hermann Henkel wrote a work on the same topic, and scholars continued to produce similar volumes, not to französischen Revolution nicht im geringsten darin [sich] irremachen lassen, das jüdische Volk zwar als etwas Bedeutendes, aber als etwas Fremdartiges in unserer Mitte zu empfinden.“ Maurerbrecher, Goethe, 95. 19 Heinrich Teweles, Goethe und die Juden (Hamburg: Gunte 1925). 20 Julius Bab, Goethe und die Juden (Berlin: Philo, 1926), 34, quoted by Norbert Oellers, “Goethe und Schiller in ihrem Verhältnis zum Judentum,” in Hans Otto Horch and Horst Denkler (eds.), Conditio Judaica. Judentum, Antisemitismus und deutschsprachige Literatur vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, Tübingen 1988, 111, note 7. Unfortunately Teweles’ and Bab’s treatises were not available to me. 21 Bab, Goethe, 34, cited from Norbert Oellers, “Goethe,” 112, note 7. 22 Leo Deutschländer, Goethe und das Alte Testament (Frankfurt am Main: Omonuth, 1923). 23 Raimund Eberhard, Goethe und das Alte Testament (Vienna: Barth, 1932). 24 Theodor Arnt, “Goethes Verhältnis zum Alten Testament,” Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie 7 (1880): 162–183. 25 Bernhard Ziemlich, Goethe und das Alte Testament (Nuremberg: Korn’schen Buchandlung, 1883). — 106 —

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mention the numerous writings on Goethe and religion in general.26 Raimund Eberhard, who we have mentioned above, prefaced his book with a remark about its topicality: the work was born out of love for Goethe, and the “pain over the ignominious denigrating and denouncing of the Old Testament that has become customary in broad circles of our nation, and not just among radical antisemites.”27 Denigrated Jews are nowhere mentioned in his work, but at least the author clearly disassociates himself from the antisemites of his day, who were also discrediting the Old—and hence, at the same time, the New—Testament with their tirades of hate against Jews: “The Old and New Testament belong together, together for us Christians, and maybe one day the pious, non-religious uprooted Jews will recognize that this Jesus of Nazareth, as he grew out of their blood, also grew out of their spirit....”28 Two further items connected to this should not go unmentioned. In 1934, Mark Waldman of the College of the City of New York wrote an extensive work with a significant subtitle: “Goethe and the Jews: A Challenge to Hitlerism.” In the front of the book he placed as its motto a quotation from Goethe’s “Letter of the Pastor of *** to the New Pastor of ***” (“Brief des Pastors zu *** an den neuen Pastor zu ***”): “What ecstasy it is that the Turk who looks upon me as a dog, and the Jew who looks upon me as a pig, will one day look forward to being my brother.” Goethe is introduced as the opponent of fascism and persecution and thus as an antithesis to the Nazi reality in Hitlerland: Goethe stands out today as never before as a challenge to, and an indictment of, the cruelty, persecution, bigotry, oppression practiced by Hitler and his cohorts. We are certain that Goethe would not be welcome in Hitlerland and in all probability would have landed in a concentration camp or in exile: Verfluchtes Volk! Kaum bist du frei So brichst du dich in dir selbst entwei.“ 26 On this, see Eberhard, Goethe, 172–173. 27 Ibid., 3. 28 Ibid., 170. — 107 —

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[“Accursed nation! You are hardly free Then you break yourself in two within.”]29 In 1937, German literature specialist Franz Koch, who openly sided with the National Socialists, i.e., the Nazis, in a lecture in Hamburg replied directly to this book and reaffirmed: “His [Goethe’s] rejection of Jewish emancipation is rooted in the conviction that the Jews within the German nation comprise a foreign body, which is beginning to threaten the host nation in its way of life.”30 After 1945, one notices in the secondary literature a certain caution and reserve with respect to characterizing Goethe’s attitude to Judaism. However, the moderately critical attempt to pinpoint Goethe more exactly within the coordinate system of ethics and aesthetics ends up beating an ideological retreat in the face of his outstanding position and importance. Thus, William Rose emphasizes that “Goethe’s attitude to the Jews was typical of his attitude to his oppressed countrymen in general. As an artist and thinker he, in some ways, transcended the limits of space and time. In other ways ... he failed to soar beyond the prejudices of a courtier in a small 18th century German princedom.”31 In a learned article on Goethe’s and Schiller’s attitude to Judaism, Norbert Oellers compares Goethe to a trapeze artist: he was no friend of Judaism, but he unequivocally did not belong to its opponents either.32 The question of Goethe’s relationship to Judaism mainly concerns the attitude of Germans to Judaism, as well as that of Jews to Goethe and hence to German culture. From the perspective of a universal, humanist ideal of humanity, Goethe’s genius, as it was, took on a poetic form, which was supposed to be the standard for everyone, including Jews.33 He personified German culture, to which Jews were now finally entitled access as equals. The discussion of Goethe is seen as synony29 Mark Waldman, Goethe and the Jews. A Challenge to Hitlerism (New York: Putnam’s Sons 1934), XVI. 30 Franz Koch, Goethe und die Juden (Hamburg, 1937), 34. 31 Rose, Men, Myths, Movements in German Literature, 180. 32 Oellers, “Goethe,” 1988, 121. Here, one clearly recognizes Carl Schmitt’s categorization and emblematization of political theology, the attitude of the Germans to others in the categories of amicus and nemicus. 33 See, however, “Ernst Simon, Goethe und der religiöse Humanismus,” originally written in 1949 and published in Ernst Simon, Brücken: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1965), 220–245. — 108 —

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mous with the billet d’entrée into German culture, indeed, into modern European culture. Jews interpret Goethe’s aesthetic preoccupation with the manifold aspects of nature, science, literature, and art as a mandatory ethical imperative to follow his ideal of humanity and the world.34 Goethe’s Judaism In regard to their relationship to Judaism, Friedrich von Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe have one thing in common: neither was particularly preoccupied with Judaism, and Jews played no prominent role in their works, as Ludwig Geiger points out.35 Only in his youth did Goethe have direct contact with Jews from the ghetto or converse with Jews in his immediate surroundings. Regarding the Frankfurter Ghetto we have Goethe’s own description of his youthful impressions in a much-quoted passage of his work Poetry and Truth (Dichtung und Wahrheit, 4th Book), written many years after the incidents described, in 1811, when Goethe was in his early 60s. Among the presentient things that beset the lad, and no doubt the youth as well, was the state of the Jewish Quarter, actually called Jews’ Lane [Judengasse], because it consisted of barely more than a single street, which probably used to be jammed between city wall and moat like in a fortress bailey. The narrowness, the dirt, the throngs, the accent of a disagreeable language, everything combined made the most unpleasant impression even when one just looked inside passing by the gate. It was a long while before I dared to go inside by myself, and I did not go back there readily again, once I had 34 German Jews were, indeed, well aware that Goethe’s opinion of the Jews of his time, in contrast to his admiration for biblical prose and especially poetry, was not all that positive. In a lecture held at Frankfurt’s Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus on January 21, 1922, in the presence of Franz Rosenzweig on “Goethe, sein Verhältnis zu Religion and Religionen” (first published as a transcript in Vol. 12 of the Bulletin of the Leo Baeck Institut), Rabbi Dr. Nehemia Anton Nobel faults Goethe for his ignorance of Judaism, which, in his opinion, could be put down to the ignorance of Jews themselves about their own tradition. 35 Geiger, Schiller, 1. “Jews played no prominent role in Schiller’s life...,” Goethe, 321: “Jews play no big role in Goethe’s life.” — 109 —

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escaped the importunities of so many people tirelessly demanding or offering to hawk and haggle over something. All the while the old tales of the cruelty of Jews toward Christian children, which we had seen hideously illustrated in Gottfried’s “Chronicle,”36 floated gloomily through the youngster’s mind. And as to the question of whether they were better thought of in more recent times, the large painted ignominious caricature, which to their outrage was still quite visible under the bridge tower, still bore extraordinary witness against them: for it had not been produced, say, out of private malice, but by a public institution.37 Meanwhile they remained God’s chosen people and walked about, as it now happened, in memory of the oldest times. Moreover, they were, of course, also human beings, active, pleasant and one could not withhold his respect for the stubbornness with which they hung on to their customs. In any case the girls were pretty and certainly must have liked it if a Christian lad who encountered them on Shabbat on the fishing grounds (Fischerfelde) greeted them in a friendly and attentive manner. Therefore I was extremely curious to learn about their ceremonies. I didn’t let up until I had paid frequent visits to their school, attended a circumcision and a wedding, and got an idea of Sukkoth [Feast of the Tabernacles]. I was well received everywhere, well taken care of and invited for a return visit: for it was people of influence who either led me to these places or recommended them to me.38 36 Gottfried, Historische Chronik, 1633. 37 This was the so-called “Judensau” = “Jewish sow”; see Waldman, Goethe, 50–52; Isaiah Shachar, The Judensau: A Medieval Anti-Jewish Motif and Its History (London: Warburg Institute, 1974), 52–61. 38 German: “Zu den ahnungsvollen Dingen, die den Knaben und wohl auch den Jüngling bedrängten, gehörte besonders der Zustand der Judenstadt, eigentlich die Judengasse genannt, weil sie kaum aus etwas mehr als einer einzigen Straße besteht, welche in früheren Zeiten zwischen Stadtmauer und Graben wie in einem Zwinger mochte eingeklemmt worden sein. Die Enge, der Schmutz, das Gewimmel, der Akzent einer unerfreulichen Sprache, alles zusammen machte den unangenehmsten Eindruck, wenn man auch am Tore vorbeigehend hineinsah. Es dauerte lange, bis ich allein mich hineinwagte, und ich kehrte nicht leicht wieder dahin zurück, wenn ich einmal den Zudringlichkeiten so vieler, etwas zu schachern unermüdet fordernder oder anbietender Menschen entgangen war. Dabei schwebten die alten Märchen von Grausamkeit der Juden gegen — 110 —

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The “disagreeable language” that he had heard in the ghetto was doubtless the Frankfurter Judendeutsch (lit. Jews’ German), a variation of West Yiddish. In his memoirs he writes that “by trying to learn the Jews’ baroque German and to write it just as well as I could read it, I soon found that I lacked a knowledge of Hebrew, which is the only source from which the modern corrupted and distorted language can be derived and treated with some certainty.”39 In his project of a “novel in seven languages,” in which seven brothers corresponded in seven different languages, “the youngest chose a kind of cheeky nest-squawking [naseweis Nestquackelchem].40 Yiddish he caricatured in a “Jews’ sermon” dating from this period, a laborious piece of mockery that is presented here in the original language: Sagen de goyen, wer hätten kä König, kä Käser, kä Zepter, kä Kron’; do will ich äch aber beweise, dasz geschrieben stäht: dasz wer haben äh König, äh Käser, äh Zepter, äh Kron. Aber wo haben wir denn unsern Käser? Das will ich äch och sage. Do drüben über de grose grause rothe Meer. Und do wäre dreymal hunerttausend Johr vergangen sey, do werd’ äh groser Mann, mit Stiefle und Spore grad’ aus, sporenstrechts gegange komme übers grose graue rothe Meer, und werd in der Hand habe äh Horn, und was denn vor äh Horn? Äh Düt-Horn. Und wenn der werd in’s Horn düte, do wären alle Jüdlich, die die Christenkinder, die wir in Gottfrieds “Chronik” gräßlich abgebildet gesehen, düster vor dem jungen Gemüt. Und ob man gleich in der neuern Zeit besser von ihnen dachte, so zeugte doch das große Spott- und Schandgemälde, welches unter dem Brückenturm an einer Bogenwand, zu ihrem Unglimpf, noch ziemlich zu sehen war, außergewöhnlich gegen sie: denn es war nicht etwa durch einen Privatmutwillen, sondern aus öffentlicher Anstalt verfertigt worden. Indessen blieben sie doch das auserwählte Volk Gottes, und gingen, wie es nun mochte gekommen sein, zum Andenken der ältesten Zeiten umher. Außerdem waren sie ja auch Menschen, tätig, gefällig und selbst dem Eigensinn, womit sie an ihren Gebräuchen hingen, konnte man seine Achtung nicht versagen. Überdies waren die Mädchen hübsch und mochten es wohl leiden, wenn ein Christenknabe, ihnen am Sabbat auf dem Fischerfelde begegnend, sich freundlich und aufmerksam bewies. Äußerst neugierig war ich daher, ihre Zeremonien kennen zu lernen. Ich ließ nicht ab, bis ich ihre Schule öfters besucht, einer Beschneidung, einer Hochzeit beigewohnt, und von dem Laubhüttenfest mir ein Bild gemacht hatte. Überall war ich wohl aufgenommen, gut bewirtet und zur Wiederkehr eingeladen: denn es waren Personen von Einfluß, die mich entweder hinführten oder empfohlen.” Gesamtwerk IX, 149–150; WAI 26, 235ff (see Oellers, “Goethe,” 108–109). 39 Dichtung und Wahrheit IV = Gesamtwerk 22, 145. 40 Quoted according to Geiger, Vorträge, 216. — 111 —

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in hunerttausend Johr gepöckert sind, die wären alle gegange komme ans grose graue rothe Meer. No was sagt ehr dazu? Un was äh gros Wonner sey werd, das will ich äch sage: Er wird geritte komme of äh grose schneeweise Schimmel; un was äh Wonner wenn dreymalhunert un neununneunzig tausend Jüdlich wäre of den Schimmel sitze, do wären se alle Platz habe; un wenn äh enziger Goye sich werd ach drof setze wolle, do werd ach kenen Platz finne. No was sogt ehr dozu? Aber was noch ver äh greser Wonner sey werd, das well ich äch och sage; un wenn de Jüdlich alle wäre of de Schimmel sitze, do werd der schimmel Kertze gerode sem grose grose Wetel ausstrecke, do wären de Goye denke; kennen mer nich of de Schimmel setze wer uns of de Wetel. Un denn wäre sich alle of de Wetel nuf hocke; Und wenn se alle traf setzen, un der grose schnee weise Schimmel werd gegangen komme dorchs grause rothe Meer zorick, do werd äh de Wetel falle lasse, un de Goye werde alle ronde falle in’s grose grause rother Meer. No was sogt ehr dozu?41 Despite appearing to be a crossbreed of Yiddish and the Hessian as well as Swabian variants of German, this parody in ludicrously distorted Yiddish exhibits some quite traditional Jewish concepts and related linguistic usage. “Dasz geschrieben steht,” for example, is a typical phrase from Jewish literary tradition that signals the start of a biblical quotation. Goyen is a German caricature of the Hebrew term for non-Jews (in Hebrew Goyyim); the singular Goye, however, is the feminine, and not as Goethe implies, the masculine form. Gepoeckert represents a mishearing (ck for g) for gepoeger (“kick the bucket”) from peger (Hebrew for “corpse,” “cadaver”). The whole story is probably not young Goethe’s creation, but based, according to Waldman, on a messianic concept of Lithuanian Jewry.42 These “unpleasant sounds” were what moved Goethe to learn Hebrew. In 1771, Herder and Eichhorn drew his attention to biblical criticism and Hebrew poetry. Three years later, Goethe translated The 41 Max Morris, Der Junge Goethe vol. 1 (Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1909–1912), 249. 42 Waldman, Goethe, 58–59. — 112 —

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Song of Songs, admittedly not directly from the original text (probably from the English version, in fact), after consulting the Hebrew original. During his time in Weimar Goethe had hardly any contact with Jews living there. He did, however, associate with some of the educated Jews of his day. Among these were, among others, Marianne and Sarah Meyer, who later became Frau von Eybenberg and Frau von Grotthaus respectively, as well as David Veit, young Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy, of course, Ferdinand Hiller, and Michael Beer, Moses Mendelssohn, Salomon Maimon, and Lazarus Bendavid. Friedrich Riemer, who was mentioned above, made a claim—an astonishing one in view of his other comments in “Mitteilungen,” and most flattering to Jews—about the reason for Goethe’s readiness to converse and associate with educated Jewish men and women: as far as Goethe was concerned, Jews had an advantage over Germans, as they are more obliging and more persistent in their admiration for both his person and his writings than many of his Christian contemporaries. Indeed, as a rule they show more pleasant attention and flattering sympathy than a German national, and their quick powers of comprehension, their penetrating intellect, and their peculiar humor make them a more sensitive public than the unfortunately sometimes rather slow-on-the-uptake and thick-headed true Germans of old stock [Echt- und Ur-Deutschen]. Women often possess these gifts in an even more gracious form.43 Political Conservatism Between the second half of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century, precisely during the years of Goethe’s active life, Jews experienced a quietly dramatic revolution: they were released from the hated inhuman ghetto into free bourgeois society, from a condition of unjust deprivation of liberty, forced upon them by Christian society, into the realm of enlightenment and emancipation. At long last, Jews 43 Riemer, Mittheilungen, 428. — 113 —

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were permitted to participate in public life, although that participation was still subject to restrictions. This was true, however, only on paper. As late as 1832 Leopold Zunz was still viewing emancipation and equality of rights as goals that Jews needed to achieve: “It is high time that Jews in Europe, especially in Germany, were granted justice and freedom instead of rights and freedoms: not a measly humiliating privilege, but the full, uplifting bourgeois status.”44 It had been a long time since Jewish history had undergone so much revolutionary ferment, but hardly anyone noticed it, or rather, hardly anyone really wanted to take notice of it, because everyone was familiar with its consequences. Some Christians regarded emancipated Jews as a subversive force threatening to cast doubt on the old order and reverse it. Among Jews themselves, the new freedom tore open a profoundly painful rift between those trying to reform Judaism and those wanting to abandon it. The dissolution of the special distinctive quality of Judaism and its melting into the Christian majority represented for some the logical consequence of events, while others struck out on new, sometimes adventurous, paths to “rescue” a “new” Judaism. Riemer looked upon this transformation with cool sarcasm, writing in connection with Goethe’s dealings with Jews in 1841 as follows: It seems that the term “Jew” is not supposed to be heard any more, at least it’s no longer supposed to be used as nomen gentis (the name of a people) or even as a vocabulum artis (word of a kind), i.e. in a technical way, as its previous bearers—to a man—would like to be emancipated and, if not Christian, called citizens with equal standing and rights [ebenbürtigen indigenatrechtskräftigen Staatsbürger];45 thus haste is necessary, as at the eleventh hour, in order to still speak in the near future of those who under the name of the old firm stood in friendly, pleasant, and written contact with G., 44 Leopold Zunz, Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt. Ein Beitrag zur Alterthumskunde und biblischen Kritik, zur Literatur- und Religionsgeschichte, Berlin 1832 (repr. Hildesheim, 1966), 7. 45 “Indigenat” originally denoted belonging to a higher social rank. In the early modern period it meant entitlement to hold public office and to own land. Siibnnce the granting of equal citizenship status in all federal German states Indigenat is identical with citizenship; cf. Meyers Encyklopädisches Lexikon, vol. 12 (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1974), 519. — 114 —

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and received from him evidence of his respect, trust, and kindness.46 Whether Goethe actually felt friendly towards Jews is questionable. In any case, it is certain that he viewed their emancipation with just as much scepticism as his secretary Riemer or other Christian contemporaries did. His silence on this matter is testimony not to his lack of interest, but chiefly to his contempt. I think that Riemer was correct in pointing to Goethe’s hatred for Jewish “intolerance” (Unduldsamkeit), whereby he meant the way the Jews held on to their religion: He hates the intolerance of that nation, which goes back to time immemorial and has continued down through all historical epochs, and he does not allow them to participate in the advantages of the highest culture in his fabulated symbolic-pedagogical province because they have proved their unworthiness [of this culture] by their denial of its source (Christ).47 Goethe’s secretary, who is otherwise not always reliable, probably presents in this passage a true picture of his master’s opinion. Goethe’s political attitude toward Judaism is doubtless not due to radical antisemitism, but his statements can by no means be simply referred to as “ambiguous” or neutral. Perhaps the best defining term would be “generally antisemitic.” By this I mean that he consciously or unconsciously adopted a certain vocabulary as well as certain concepts. In Chapter 2 of the second book of Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years (Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre),48 Goethe discusses rather openly his convictions regarding ancient and contemporary Jews: Among all the pagan religions, for the Israelite [religion] also is one, the latter has greater advantages of which I only want to mention several. Before the ethnic Judgement Seat, before the divine Judgement Seat the 46 Riemer, Mittheilungen, 427. 47 Ibid., 124. 48 See also the fourth book, Chapters 9 and 11. — 115 —

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question is not asked, whether a nation is the best, the most excellent, but whether it is lasting, whether it can subsist. The Israelite nation has never been much good, for which its leaders, judges, community heads, prophets have upbraided it thousands of times: it possesses few virtues and most of the faults that other nations have; but its independence, strength, bravery, and, when these no longer count, tenacity are unparalleled. It is the most persevering nation on earth; it is, it was, and will continue being so in order to glorify the name of Jehovah throughout all the ages. 49 By no means is this idea only to be found in the works of the older Goethe; we find it as early as in his “two important unaddressed biblical questions,” dating from 1773: “I regard the Jewish people as a wild barren tribe that stood in a circle of wild barren trees.”50 What, then, did Goethe expect of the Jews? He apparently expected their conversion to Christianity, admittedly as a preliminary stage on the path to his personal religious ideal, which, as is known, was one of a pantheistic hue. A well-attested episode illustrates his attitude: In 1823, the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach issued a new decree concerning the Jews: Jews were granted the right to practice their religion freely and 49 “Unter allen heidnischen Religionen, denn eine solche ist die israelitische gleichfalls, hat diese grosse Vorzüge, von denen ich nur einige erwähnen will. Vor dem ethnischen Richterstuhle, vor dem Richterstuhle Gottes der Völker wird nicht gefragt, ob es die beste, die vortrefflichste Nation sei, sondern ob sie dauere, ob sie sich erhalten haben. Das israelitische Volk hat niemals viel getaugt, wie es ihm seine Anführer, Richter, Vorsteher, Propheten tausendmal vorgeworfen haben: es besitzt wenig Tugenden und die meisten Fehler anderer Völker; aber an Selbständigkeit, Festigkeit, Tapferkeit und, wenn alles das nicht mehr gilt, an Zähheit sucht es seinesgleichen. Es ist das beharrlichste Volk der Erde, es ist, es war, es wird sein, um den Namen Jehowah, durch alle Zeiten zu verherrlichen.” The emphasis is mine. See also the statement of Karl August, Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, to Knebel and Herder: To Knebel, Frankfurt, January 1, 1793: he who sees this nation from close up has to develop a true repulsion for them; they are all very knowledgeable but any trace of human sentiment is eradicated in them. I have found none more similar to the Jewish character than the Frenchman’s.” [“An Knebel, Frankfurt, 13.1.1793: Wer diese Nation in der Nähe sieht, muß einen wahren Ekel für sie fassen; sie sind alle sehr unterrichtet, aber jede Spur eines moralischen Gefühls ist bei ihnen ausgelöscht. Ich habe nichts ähnlicher mit dem jüdischen Charakter gefunden als den der Franzosen.”] Heinrich Dünger, ed. Briefe des Herzogs Karl August von Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach an Knebel und Herder (Leipzig: Wartig, 1883), 103. I thank Reinard Markner for this reference. 50 Zwo wichtige bisher unerörterte biblische Fragen, beantwortet von einem Landgeistlichen in Schwaben (anonymous [Lindau am Bodensee, 1773]). — 116 —

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to attend Gymnasien (university-track high schools) and universities, as well as the freedom to enter the skilled trade of their choice. Jews were also allowed to marry Christians, albeit with the stipulation that the children of such unions be raised as Christians. In addition, however, considerable other restrictions and special regulations were imposed on them, including the requirement that German be the language of the worship service, and that rabbis were to be paid by the members of the Jewish community. According to Chancellor von Müller, Goethe had expressed “his passionate indignation over our new Jewish law” in a conversation on September 23, 1823. “He expected the worst and shrillest consequences, claimed that if the general superintendent had any character, he should have to resign from his position rather than marry a Jewess in the name of the Holy Trinity in the Church. All moral feelings within the families, which after all rested entirely on religious ones, would be undermined by such a scandalous law.”51 A look at Goethe’s diary confirms that this discussion really did take place. On September 29, 1823, he noted: “In the evening Chancellor von Müller; about Christians and Jews marrying, disagreeable conversation.”52 May we conclude from this episode that Goethe rejected the emancipation of Jews for antisemitic motives? It is not easy to answer this question. The only certainty we can determine is that, for whatever reasons, he resisted a “mixing” of Christian and Jewish matters. He was an opponent of Jewish emancipation, insofar as it was capable, in his view, of rocking the boat of the established political powers. His own peculiar ideal of humanity, which ignored both Judaism and Christianity, plays absolutely no role in this connection. One can claim with good reason that Goethe did not thoroughly think through the question of Judaism’s place in the history of the world, perhaps because he did not feel obliged or called upon to philosophize about it. Perhaps he even really believed that religion is a kind of reform school, “morally educating,” and that a religious intermingling would undermine the moral foundations of the state. Maybe the question could lead to the same error that I critically noted at the very outset of this chapter, namely the drawing of far-reaching conclusions about Goethe’s attitude toward Judaism from bits of conversation, etc. 51 Quoted from Goethe’s Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche Vol. 2, ed. Ernst Beutler, Tome XXIV, Vol. 2 (Zurich: Artemis, 1948-1954), 23, 298 et seq. 52 WA III, 9, 110; in Oellers, “Goethe,” 1988, 115. — 117 —

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Geothe’s clichéd antisemitic utterings could be a sign that he adopted no clear stance at all. However, the cited statement makes him appear not only “conservative,” but downright reactionary, inasmuch as he wanted to deprive the Jews of just those rights that the new political power had finally accorded them. The Culturally Exploitative Mind: The Materia poetica and its Ingredients On April 7, 1797, Schiller writes to Goethe: Among several kabbalistic and astrological works that I asked to borrow from the library here, I found also a “Dialogue on Love,” translated into Latin from the Hebrew, which is not only very amusing, I think, but has also enhanced my knowledge of astrology a great deal. The mixture of chemical, mythological, and astrological things has been carried on in quite a big way and lies there to be poetically used. I’ll have some amazing and richly significant comparisons of planets with human limbs written out for you.53 First permit me to make some historical and bibliographical remarks. Schiller was referring to the Dialoghi d’amore (Dialogues on Love) by Leo Hebraeus. The Latin translation, which Schiller probably read, was in the first volume of Artis Cabalisticae ... Scriptorum by Pistorius, published in Basel, in 1587. It is likely that Schiller came across Leo’s Dialoghi during his preliminary studies for Wallenstein, which views man—entirely in the Goethean sense—as “close to nature and firmly intentioned.”54 53

Cited in Carl Gebhardt, ed., Leone Ebreo. Dialoghi d’amore. Hebräische Gedichte (Heidelberg, London, Paris, Amsterdam: Curis Societatis Spinozanae 1929) (Bibliotheca Spinozana 3), 107-08: “Unter einigen kabbalistischen und astrologischen Werken, die ich mir aus hiesiger Bibliothek habe geben lassen, habe ich auch einen “Dialog Über die Liebe”, aus dem Hebräischen ins Lateinische übersetzt, gefunden, der mich nicht nur sehr belustigt, sondern auch in meinen astrologischen Kenntnissen viel weiter gefördert hat. Die Vermischung der chemischen, mythologischen und astrologischen Dinge ist hier recht ins Große getrieben und liegt wirklich zum poetischen Gebrauche dar. Einige verwundersam sinnreiche Vergleichungen zwischen Planeten mit menschlichen Gliedmaßen lasse ich Ihnen herausschreiben.” 54 According to Gebhardt, Leone, 108. — 118 —

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Leo’s presentation of the micro- and macro-cosmos must therefore have made a deep impression on Schiller. All of these elements were here, as he himself formulated it, “to be poetically used” as ingredients, building blocks of poetic inspiration. Goethe’s attitude to Judaism can be understood similarly. In his autobiographical Dichtung und Wahrheit he describes three episodes involving the “wandering Jew.” The third one concerns the wandering Jew’s visit to Spinoza, which Goethe “thought up as a worthy ingredient of that poem [he was writing],” but failed to elaborate upon. Here, too, as with Schiller, we encounter the idea that every element of reality or the imagination is nothing but an ingredient that the poet has at his disposal for poetical usage, like a painter uses his sketches and colors. In this sense, Goethe “exploited” Jews and Judaism by helping himself to them as materia poetica. It is not possible to derive an ethical judgment from an aesthetic one. Aesthetics can be placed alongside ethics, but one certainly not identical with with the other. “Fine Silence” and Reflections Loud and Clear In conclusion, let me quote Friedrich Nietzsche on Goethe, in his Beyond Good and Evil [Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 1886]. The poet, Nietzsche wrote, “never spoke clearly about many things around him and was good at keeping a fine silence all his life—and he probably had good reasons for this.”55 Nietzsche was referring to Goethe’s attitude to the Germans, but could this also hold true his attitude to Jews? Here we could say that the “fineness” of the silence is missing. Where Jews were concerned, Goethe neither voiced vague, ambiguous, or mixed feelings. When he values and emphasises particular aspects of Jews in a positive way, his judgement is connected with his aesthetic, not his humanistic, conception of things. Back in 1949, Ernst Simon in a little-noticed essay pointed out that the premises of Goethe’s principle of humanity needed to be called into question. Humanity here often means nothing more than good, socially acceptable manners. 55 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, in Werke, Vol. 3, Cologne, 177. I came across the quote while reading Fritz Stern’s article, “Das feine Schweigen und seine Folge,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 300 (28 Dec. 1998), 36. — 119 —

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Perhaps in studying Goethe’s writings, one should emphasise more aesthetic rather than ethical aspects, whereby politics, at least in his Weimar period, also played a significant role. All the elements and motives which ever stimulated him did so in the service of his genius poeticus, regardless of whether they derived from the Bible or other literature. Too much discussion about his attitude to the Bible has been carried out, as if to suggest that it represented the quintessence of his opinion of Jews and Judaism of his own day. The Old Testament does play an important role in Goethe’s creativity, undoubtedly, but only as a literary work. Admittedly, in his younger years, in a letter to the pastor Johann Caspar Lavater from Zürich written on July 29, 1782, he does adopt a stance opposed to the latter’s attacks “against the old God and his children.”56 In this debate, however, as is indicated in a further letter of August 9, 1782, he is concerned with beauty and usefulness (“You find nothing lovelier than the Gospels—I find a thousand sheets of writing by old and new people pardoned by God just as lovely and useful and indispensable and so on for humanity”). For Goethe, the literary qualities of the New Testament are inferior to those of the Old Testament. He even reinforces this view: “A great part of the Old Testament is written in an inspired cast of mind, with enthusiasm, and belongs to the field of poetic art.”57 As far as ethics is concerned, Goethe’s opinion of the Old Testament is clearly coloured by traditional Christian interpretations: the putative stubbornness of the Jews and their insistence on their own tradition are elements of Christian polemics against the Hebrew Bible of Judaism and the Jews in both ancient and modern times. But here, too, I have to repeat what I stated earlier: it is virtually impossible to identify a clear standpoint from the scattered remarks in Goethe’s writings. In his draft of the Reformation Cantata he even claims: Thus, Luther sees in the Old and the New Testament the symbol of the great essence of the world, ever repeating itself. There [i.e. in the former] the law that strives for love, here [i.e. in the latter] the love that, opposed to the law, strives back to it and fulfils it, but not through its own power and force, but through faith; and namely 56 Quotations and evidence in Eberhardt, Goethe, 10. 57 From the notes to Divan, cited according to Eberhardt, Goethe, 10. — 120 —

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through the exclusive faith in the announced Messiah who can bring about everything.58 Luther himself would not have been able to describe the Bible in such a succinctly Christian manner! One question requires closer examination: why have people, again and again and from all sides, preoccupied themselves with Goethe’s attitude to Jews and Judaism? He expressed nothing special or unusual about them, nothing that could be compared to the views of Reuchlin or Molitor, and not even to those of Lessing, Hegel, or Kant. The meager quotations from his work contain almost exclusively clichés such as one encounters elsewhere. However, the significance of this theme is not so much that Goethe spoke about the Jews, but rather that he was (relatively) silent on them, as Jews themselves have interpreted it. Goethe and Judaism—this theme provides the typology, often unrecognized, of the tragic Jewish-German relationship, laden with mixed and contradictory feelings. In a letter dated May 6, 1887, an unnamed reader and friend of Ludwig Geiger put his finger on the whole problem implied here. Because of its methodical reflections, it is worth citing in full: It is certainly also part of a characterization of Goethe to show how he thought about Jews, who were always a touchstone of a humane outlook and will continue to be so. It is also part of the history of German intellectual life and the progress of civilised life that such things should be illuminated, for example, in contrast to Lessing. However, if it is true that we should look at and judge every person as a human being, and that we should not ascribe faults or merits of a totality to an individual beforehand, then, in this sense, no Jewish question exists and we should not even appear to recognise such a question. And furthermore: The main thing … remains that such expositions should go further and not stop at the external facts, but explain 58 Cited in Eberhardt, Goethe, 4. — 121 —

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things deriving from the individuality [Eigenart] of the men, from their context with their intellectual characteristics, so that through a more in-depth treatment it [the individuality] takes on a general significance much more than [serving], for instance, as an example worthy of imitation and enlightened in itself. In Goethe’s case, for example, his aversion to the Jews and their attainment of equal rights is connected with his poetic views, which are oriented toward the individual and characteristic features [of a phenomenon], […] at any rate with his aversion to political innovations, which in turn requires a deeper explanation. In the thirties [1830s] there were frequent polemics about Börne and Heine, and Riesser’s writings [see the “Jewish Letters”]59 provide information about this [the fact that the opinions of Börne and Heine did not necessarily reflect the opinions of other Jews and could not be cited in the sense of a Jewish standpoint]. Should it now be [considered] a scientific advance that we concede even an iota of rights to the old spitefulness?60 The anonymous author/reader raises some important methodological questions that are still topical: should we be allowed to speak at all 59 Note of the author. 60 German: “Zu einer Charakterisierung Goethes gehört gewiß auch, dass gezeigt werde, wie er über die Juden gedacht hat, die ja immer ein Prüfstein der humanen Gesinnung waren und sein werden. Es gehört auch zur Geschichte des deutschen Geisteslebens und der fortschreitenden Gesittung, dass Derartiges beleuchtet werde, etwa im Gegensatz zu Lessing. Wenn es aber wahr ist, dass wir jeden Menschen als Menschen betrachten und beurtheilen sollen, dass wir Fehler oder Vorzüge einer Gesamtheit nicht dem Einzelnen im Voraus zuschreiben dürfen, so giebt es in diesem Sinne keine Judenfrage und dürfen wir auch nicht den Schein annehmen, dass wir eine solche anerkennen,” und weiter: “Die Hauptsache [...] bleibt, daß derartige Ausführungen weiter gehen müssten und nicht bei den äußeren Thatsachen stehen bleiben dürften, sondern aus der Eigenart der Männer, aus ihrem Zusammenhang mit ihren Geisteseigenschaften erklärt werden sollen, so daß sie durch tieferes Eingehen einer allgemeinen Bedeutung als etwa nachahmungswürdiges Beispiel und in sich selbst aufgeklärt und aufgelöst wurde. Bei Goethe z.B. hängt die Abneigung gegen die Juden und gegen ihre Gleichberechtigung mit seiner auf das Individuelle und die charakteristischen Züge gerichteten dichterischen Anschauung zusammen, [...] jedenfalls mit seiner den politischen Neuerungen abgeneigten Gesinnung, die wieder der tieferen Erklärung bedarf. In den dreissiger Jahren wurde über Börne und Heine [...] vielfach polemisiert, und die Schriften Riessers (s. d. “jüdischen Briefe), geben darüber Aufschluss [scl. daß die Urteile Börnes und Heines nicht unbedingt als das Urteil der Juden oder im Sinne eines jüdischen Standpunkts angeführt werden können, G.V.]. Soll nun das ein Fortschritt der Wissenschaft sein, dass wir der alten Gehässigkeit auch nur um ein Haarbreit ein Recht einräumen?” Vorträge und Versuche, 256 ff. — 122 —

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of the attitudes of an author without taking the social and religious-intellectual context of his or her times into consideration, and to what extent can the author in question be classified as typical with respect to his or her specific attitude. In other words, how representative of the society at large are the opinions of individuals? What conclusion can we draw from this for the questions about “Goethe’s Jews and Judaism”? Regarding the first point, Goethe is indeed typical for his generation, but not representative in the significance of his attitude. None of the attempts to find a “deeper explanation” for his behaviour toward the Jews lead, in my view, to a sound result. The Jews are the focus of neither his political perception nor his artistic endeavors. The reactions in support of and against Goethe, on the other hand, comprise the core of a German-Jewish conflict, with consequences reaching into the present. The discussion almost always centered on the question of the position of Jews between the generalness and the particular, on their striving for, or the granting to them of, equality before the law, and on the treatment of a minority. The unnamed reader and friend of Ludwig Geiger used plain language in formulating it: the “Jewish question” is nothing but “the general question of humanity, of civil justice, or confession.” Thus the question of Goethe’s relationship to Judaism is entitled, however difficult it might be, to a clear reply: “It is certainly also part of a characterization of Goethe to show how he thought about Jews, who have always been the touchstone of a humane outlook and will continue being so.”61

61 See above, fn. 58, p. 121. — 123 —

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2.2 Johann Gottfried Herder, Mission and Judaism

The Rhapsodic Theory of Ambiguity: On Pietism & Simone Luzzatto There are two aspects that are peculiar in Johann Gottfried Herder’s attitude toward Judaism: on the one hand, Herder was the first to understand the energetic potential of Judaism in responding to language and politics. On the other hand, he was also hesitant in regard to the position of Jews within European society. In 1723, Johann Müller, a preacher from Gotha, sent a small book (6 ¼ print sheets) to Professor Callenberg of Halle [on the Saale]. The book was dedicated to the mission of Jews, and had not found its publisher. Callenberg collected at the offertory and had it printed. He sent out to the world two poor students who had learned Hebrew in order to Christianize the Jews. Since then, several have traveled; maybe they still are travelling. This pious institution was called Callenbergs Institut zur Bekehrung der Juden [Callenberg’s Institute for the Conversion of Jews]; the authorities considered it a priviliged1 (institution).2 This is the beginning of Johann Gottfried Herder’s treatise, Conversion of the Jews (Bekehrung der Juden), penned one year before his death. The reader is left stunned and confused by the indirectness of the essay’s writing and its half sentences after reading it. It openly argues for enlightenment and tolerance, but is decidedly cryptic. The essay is 1 2

A priviled institution was an instution which had been granted some special rights (for example, was exempted from taxes). German: “Im Jahr 1723 schickte Johann Müller, Prediger zu Gotha, ein zu Bekehrung der Juden geschriebenes Büchelchen, 6 ¼ Bogen stark, das keinen Verleger gefunden hatte, an den Prof. Callenberg zu Halle. Dieser sammlete eine Kollekte, ließ dies drucken und schickte damit zwei arme Studiosen, die Ebräisch gerlent hatten, zu Bekehrung der Juden in alle Welt. Seitdem sind mehrere gereiset; vielleicht reisen sie noch. Man nannte diese fromme Anstalt Callenbergs Institut zu Bekehrung der Juden; es ward privilegieret.” Günter Arnold, ed., Johann Gottfried Herder - Werke: Vol. 10 - Adrastea (Auswahl) (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2000), 628. — 124 —

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a marked reference to a world in the process of change: the world of Judaism in an enlightened society—and one undergoing further enlightenment—at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The enlightened reader is not fully certain if Herder intended his essay to be taken seriously or provocatively. This work, however, is a typical example of the rhapsodic theory of ambiguity, or a model of how many topics can be discussed without the writer taking a real stance.3 Subtle irony and crude assertions speak to us from the text: Callenberg’s students have failed in their pious hopes. Herder concedes in a mitigating manner that “no pious hope must be sullied,” yet the goal of converting the Jews had not been much more than that, a pious hope, since “at the beginning, there was so little relation between the means and the end” (yet, the hope should not be sullied). Herder acknowledges the sincere intention of Callenberg’s students to convert Jews; the means (discussion), however, were from the onset pathetic and inadequate to the end (conversion). He remarks critically that “on a larger scale, conversion of Jews will surely not be the likely result of disputes in shelters and taverns.” He amplifies his point to the degree of provocation when stating that “…it [is] certain that on the occasion of disputes between Christians and Jews, the former have often rendered themselves a laughing stock in front of the latter.” Though it is not deductable from these few lines whether the theologian from Weimar had indeed read the reports of the Callenberg students, it is likely that he was aware of them. In the reports, or diaries, we indeed find a story of a Jew mocking the missionaries. He is quoted in a Christian report by Manitius: [The Jew said that] we should refrain from speaking in such a heated and tart manner, as we had come together for the sole purpose of discussion [to escape] tediousness. My comes [companion] rose upon that, and sternly said: No, we do not have to use the name and the word of God in vain for this. I will not say one word further.4 3

4

This stands in accord with Herder’s general view on Judaism. See my own “Implizite Rezeption: Johann Gottfried Herder und Leopold Zunz,” in Hebräische Poesie und jüdischer Volksgeist:  Die Wirkungsgeschichte von Johann Gottfried Herder im Judentum Mittel- und Osteuropas, ed. Christoph Schulte (Hildesheim and New York: Olms, 2003), 153–166. German: “Wir solten nur nicht so hitzig und so scharff reden, wir wären ja nur zusammen — 125 —

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Clearly, the Jew understood the discussion merely as a means of banishing his boredom, which enrages the missionaries—understandably, one might say. The Jew does not take them seriously; he simply lets them speak. There were even Jews who bought copies of the missionaries’ books, to the initial delight of the students, though it is likely that the missionaries ceased selling the books soon after they realized that they were being sold at the market of Naumburg for a higher price.5 Thus, the books had only been bought as mercantile goods. Ridicule, malice, and profit-seeking—is this the outcome of a missionary’s activity? What was the reason for the mission’s failure? The most striking aspect of these few lines of Herder’s criticism is that the sage of Weimar poignantly outlined the greatest weaknesses of the Callenberg missionaries: their discussions in taverns and shelters as means of conversion. What he does not take into consideration is the form their presentations take: they are disguised as Jews, with Hebrew-styled names (Johanan rather than Johannes), and they initiate disputes intended to spread what they feel is the true faith. As Luther had, Müller’s and Callenberg’s students proceed from the assumption that Protestantism, in essence, is nothing more than true “Judaism,” and accordingly Jews have to be made familiar with it as in the catechesis. The choice of the Yiddish language and the pseudonyms are nothing more than theatrical strategies of implementing this “sensitivity.” On the other hand, however, the main reason for this mission was rooted in the belief that the second coming of the Messiah was imminent (chiliasm and millenarianism were the leading apocalyptic doctrines of this period, and had influenced pietism as well).6

5

6

gekommen vor die lange Weile mit einander zu discutieren. Hierauf aber stand mein Comes [Mitgänger, Begleiter] mit ernsthaffter Mine auf, und sagte: Nein dazu müßen wir den Nahmen, und das Wort des heiligen Gottes nicht mißbrauchen, so rede ich nicht ein Wort mehr.” Archive of the Franckesche Stiftungen, Halle (Saale): AFSt/H K45, S. 56/28 (Dessau, 18 XI 1730). See also my own “Die Diari[a] des Callenberg-Instituts: Eine Quelle zur jüdischen Kulturgeschichte in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts?,” Jewish History Quarterly 4 (2006): 652–661. I read this episode, yet I cannot find the source. On the Callenberg−Institute and the Diaria see Christopher Clark, The Politics of Conversion: Missionary Protestantism and the Jews in Prussia, 1728−1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Jan Doktór, W poszukiwaniu żydowskich kryptochrześcijan (Warszawa: Tikkun, 1999); spec. 7−24; Martin Schwarz Lausten, De Fromme og jøderne (Kopenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 2000), 279 et seq.; Christoph Rymatzki, Hallischer Pietismus und Judenmission (Halle−Tübingen: Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen, Max Niemeyer, 2004). There exists a rich literature concerning chiliasm and millenarianism. See, for instance, Klaus Deppermann, ed., Chiliasmus in Deutschland und England im 17. Jahrhundert, Pietismus und — 126 —

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Even the title of Müller’s book, Light at Evening Time (in the original German: Licht am Abend), is merely an allusion to the messianic period that had been described by Zechariah 14:7: “And there shall be one day which shall be known as the Lord’s, not day, and not night; but it shall come to pass, that at evening time there shall be light.” There is a suggestion of the messianic period with a clear reference to Genesis 1. In his book, which, according to the title was written by a Rabbi Yoḥanan Qimḥi (a Hebrew form of the author’s name Johannes Müller),7 Müller retells a fictive dialogue between a “Rabbi Menachem” and the Jewish merchant “Samuel.” Müller’s use of the pseudonym Qimḥi might be an allusion to a medieval author. In 1710, there appeared in Constantinople the work Milḥemet ḥovah, in which is printed the Sefer ha-berit of Yoseph Qimḥi (1105–1170), a medieval exegete, poet, and polemicist.8 It is unclear whether Müller had actually read this book. Coincidentally, however, there is depicted a dialogue between a pious one (ma’amin) and a heretic (min) about the significance of the Torah. The Christian terms “original sin” and “incarnation” are questioned in this dialogue. Further studies are needed to understand if the book or its content were known to Müller or his sources (such as Johann J. Schudt).9 Yoseph Qimḥi not only discusses theological subjects but also the “standard” ones of Christian polemics, such as charging excessive interest. Through this book, which was written in Yiddish, Johann Müller attempted to pretend that the essence of Judaism is not dissimilar to

7

8

9

Neuzeit—Ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus 14 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1988). The Frankfurt Collection “Judaica” allows convenient online access to the original material. However, the reader will not find any reference to the fact that the book was published by a Christian under a Hebrew pseudonym. See Yoḥanan Qimḥi, Or le-ʿet ʿerev, http://sammlungen. ub.uni-frankfurt.de/jd/content/titleinfo/1737684 (accessed July 26, 2012). Milḥemet ḥovah (Constantinople: Defus Naftali Herts, 1710), 18b-38a. See the edition of Frank Talmage, ed. Milḥemet ḥovah of Joseph Kimḥi (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1974). The editor, however, assigns the book to his son David (Radaq). Johann J. Schudt, Jüdische Merckwürdigkeiten: Vorstellende Was sich Curieuses und denckwürdiges in den neuern Zeiten bey einigen Jahr-hunderten mit denen in alle IV. Theile der Welt/ sonderlich durch Teutschland/ zerstreuten Juden zugetragen. Samt einer vollständigen Franckfurter JudenChronick/ Darinnen der zu Franckfurt am Mayn wohnenden Juden/ von einigen Jahr-hunderten/ biß auff unsere Zeiten Merckwürdigste Begebenheiten enthalten. Benebst einigen/ zur Erläuterung beygefügten Kupffern und Figuren, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Hocker, 1714). In his Not Forestalling Concept (see below), Müller refers to Schudt by name and as a “very dear friend.” See the introduction. — 127 —

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the doctrines of Protestantism, or, inversely, that Luther’s theses were nothing other than authentic Jewish concepts. Thus, he unsurprisingly discusses chiliastic expectations (expectations of the return to Palestine, which Herder also mentions) and apocalyptic ideas of the last days, and concludes with an introduction to the Protestant doctrine of justification, which especially deals with original sin and hamartiology. Christian dogmatics (Christology, Trinity, and sacramental theology) must not be ignored, of course. Müller concedes that Jews must honor their own rites, i.e., commandments, as he had stressed in his Not Forestalling Concept (in German: Unvorgreifflichen Entwurf), printed in 1716.10 Let us return to Herder.11 The conversion of Jews had “to be seen differently” in his century, since Luther’s “utterances” concerning the Jews were considered to be harsh, yet the core of his words justified. What is it that Herder wants to suggest? He points to the abyss existing between Judaism and Christianity in his time, and the fact that nobody appreciates the desire of the Jews to “conditionally associate and affiliate with a new, enlightened Christianity.” His thoughts on the matter were based on extensive experience with conversion—or rather, attempts at conversion. Herder lists the reasons for the failures of these attempts in this context. First, what is there to discuss? The prophecies have a “cause and implementation determined by time and place,” fully consistent with the historical-critical methodology of his time, according to Herder. They have, through the world of exegesis, “ever more spiritual importance,” to which is connected “symbolically uttered hope and desires.” So far, so good. Herder moves beyond that as he rightly presupposes that Hebrew is a language of consonants, and polemically concludes that in this language, therefore “the contrary point of view [in a discussion] never lacks for feeble arguments.” He thus ascribes a conscious Jewish intention to leave open the meaning of the texts to the initial codification of the Bible without vowels. Consequently, the missionary is grammatically unable to keep up with the Jew, who is always capable of offering new exegetic 10 Johann Müller and Johann H. Majus, Unvorgreifflicher Entwurff, wie mit den Juden freundlich umzugehen, und von wahrer Hertzens-Bekehrung zu reden seyn möchte: In einem Gespräch vorgestellet (Giessen: Bey Johann Müllern, 1716). 11 In this section, all quotations are translations made from the text referred to above, Günter Arnold, ed., Johann Gottfried Herder - Werke: Vol. 10, 628 and ff. — 128 —

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possibilities. And the result: “spiritual desires, especially when based on a sense of nationality, can rarely be discussed away.” The Christians’ common allegation that Jews stubbornly cling to their cults, rites, and dogmas now receives a new dimension, which is described as the sense of nationality. He returns to this later. Second, Jews and Christians both expect the kingdom of God to come. So far, so good, says Herder. Thus, Christians do not have to convert anyone, because “both parties could tolerate each other and leave it to the future judge as to how to view the honor and contempt he experienced in his first coming.” Herder, however, wants to be more strident: the Christians expect another future kingdom that “will come in his glory, as their confession of faith affirms.” It is peculiar: why “their” and not “our”? Does not the theologian believe in the coming of God’s kingdom? Or is it merely an ironic remark addressed to the students? One must come to the conclusion that he entirely ignores the apocalyptical tendencies of the eighteenth century, or even mocks them, because he continues: “Nobody ought to forestall him. Soyez donc Juifs, parce que vous l’êtes, said Voltaire.”12 The sage of Weimar quotes the Enlightenment philosopher who had found his intellectual circle in Potsdam, the Enlightenment philosopher whose biting criticism was not only targeted at Islam and Judaism but at Christianity as well. In his famous letter to Frederick II of January 5, 1776, he wrote: “Tant qu’il y aura des fripons et des imbéciles, il y aura des religions. La nôtre est sans contredit la plus ridicule, la plus absurde, et la plus sanguinaire qui ait jamais infecté le monde.”13 Or, in English: “As long as we have rogues and fools, we will always have religion. Ours is, furthermore, the most ridiculous, absurd, and bloodthirsty that has ever infected mankind.” Is this, then, the expectation of the kingdom to come, the pastime of fools for fools? Third, here we have again the subject of the sense of nationality. Herder argues that “the religion of the Jews ... —and as they say themselves—is an heirloom of their race, their unalienable heirloom.” Herder’s conclusion is obvious: “This people consequently is and remains a foreign 12 Herder likely referred to vol. 32, page 504, of Voltaire’s collected works: “Soyez donc Juifs.” The ones speaking in this sentence were the Jews, according to Voltaire. See Jacques J. M. Decroix, ed., Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire: Avec des avertissements et des notes de Condorcet, imprimées aux frais de Beaumarchais, par les soins de M. Decroix, 70 vols. (Kehl: De L’Imprimerie De La Société LittéraireTypographique, 1784). 13 Voltaire, “Lettre à Frédéric II, roi de Prusse, datée du 5 janvier 1767,” Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, Vol. 12 Part 1, 472. — 129 —

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Asiatic people also in Europe; a people bound to this old law it once received under a distant sky, and this law is—according to the people’s own confession—eternal.” Thus Herder, as far as is known, advances the most radical elucidation of Jewish conversion in existence at that time: the shift of the Old Testament’s claim of truth from a theological problem to a political question, or, in his words: “The extent to which this law—and the modes of life and thinking that originate from it— belong to our states is not a question of religious discussion anymore, which addresses opinions and faith, but is rather a question of simple statehood.” In this respect, the question is not dissimilar to the one that would be posed by the immigration of “Sinese [Chinese], Indians, Persians, Gypsies, Mamluks.” Herder further adds (more vitriolically) that “because the mosaic-Sinaite law and its adherents, according to their own creed, belong to Palestine and not Europe, and because Israel identifies itself in its prayers as a people dissimilar to all other, how can other nations perceive it any differently?” Finally, fourth, when Jews do not belong to Europe, one has to take into consideration their business here. The question is, “How many of this foreign people could, in this European nation, conduct their business without a disadvantage to the natives? Under what conditions? Within what limits; under whose supervision?” Let us remain silent concerning the topicality of these remarks. Herder argues that Dutch tolerance was not exportable; Amsterdam was unique. Without introduction—and apparently without context—Herder the theologian builds a bridge to a book that had found a contemporary intellectual audience primarily in Amsterdam, but also in London and Berlin. In 1638 in Venice, Rabbi Simone Luzzatto published a book titled Discourse Concerning the Condition of the Jews, and in Particular Those Living in the Fair City of Venice (in the original Italian: Discorso circa il stato de gl’Hebrei et in particolar dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia).14 14 Simone Luzzatto, Discorso circa il stato de gl’Hebrei et in particolar dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia (Venetia: Appresso Gioanne Calleoni, 1638). For the Latin translation, see Joannes Christophorus Wolfius (Johann Christoph Wolf), Jo. Christophori Wolfi Bibliotheca Hebraea, sive notitia tam auctor Hebr. cujuscunq. aetatis, tum scriptor.quae vel Hebraice primum exarata vel ab diis conversa sunt ad nostram aetat emendata (Hamburg and Leipzig: Liebezelt, Felginer, 1715-1733), vol. III (1733), 1151; vol. IV (1733), 1115-1135; vol. III (1727), s.v. “Levi fil. Gerschem vel Gerson.” Jacques Basnage had translated parts of chapter 18 (“consideration”) into French in his L’histoire et la religion des juifs depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu’à présent (Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1707, 2nd edition La Haye: Henri Scheurleer, 1716), vol. V, 2119-2122, in the second edition (1716), vol. — 130 —

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The book is ninety-two pages long and was published as an octavo. In the preface, Luzzatto describes the primary elements of his political and empirical thinking, as well as his vision of the Jews’ conditions in the Diaspora. The Jewish nation—his choice of this term is telling—is defined as an integral part of the Venetian people. According to Luzzatto, the integration of the Jews into Italian society is comparable to the atoms of Democritus that made up the lower world and the evaporation of which fed the sun, the moon, and the other celestial bodies. All combined, they form the via lactea, the Milky Way, “that appears to us like a combination of tiny stars, each invisible, but together forms a beam of light.” In describing society, Luzzatto emphasized two correlated factors: the integration of each and every part, and the necessary urge for life. Every part should be integrated into society because only then can each element contribute to the common good. The Jewish nation, Luzzatto wrote, had found the strength necessary for existence and identity in the Diaspora.15 He thus interprets Jewish history as representative of a Machiavellian category: necessity (necessitas). Historically, the Jew has become a merchant not because it is in his “character” to do so, but because he had no other choice. The Venetian rabbi does not bemoan the bitterness of his fate, but offers the acquired skills of the Jews as merchants as the salvation of the Venetian economy, which by then was already past its prime. Herder especially emphasizes the element of usefulness of the Jewish mercantile business:16 “so modest, sophisticated, and wise was XV, 1061-1064; chapter 13 was translated into Hebrew in 1834 by Isaac Reggio, in his Iggerot Yashar, 2 vols. (Wien: von Schmid, 1834-36), 64–70. On the whole question, see Benjamin C.I. Ravid, Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth Century Venice: The Background and Context of the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1978), 7-9 and fn. 1. For a new edition of the Discorso, see Simone Luzzatto. Scritti politici e -filosofici di un ebreo scettico nella Venezia del Seicento, introduced, commented upon, and edited by Giuseppe Veltri in cooperation with Anna Lissa & Paola Ferruta, introduction, commentary, and notes by Giuseppe Veltri in cooperation with Anna Lissa and Paola Ferruta (Milan: Bompiani, 2013). 15 See my “Identity of Essentiality of the Jewish People: The Diaspora and the Political Theories of Simone Luzzatto in the Jewish Thought of the 20th Century,” in Homelands in Translation, ed. Stefania De Lucia and Gabriella Sgambati (forthcoming)). 16 Alexander Altmann in his introduction to Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem cites Luzzatto’s work and notes: “It would be appealing to compare Mendelssohn’s argumentation concerning the usefulness of Jews with those of Luzzatto, Manasseh, and Toland in detail. Even a brief comparison reveals the new access to the question that Mendelssohn finds in the populist theory. This theory, which was very popular in his days, understands the growth of the population as the most basic commodity and treasure of the state, and Mendelssohn adopts this point of view entirely to his own understanding.” See Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften: Jubiläumsausgabe, vol. 8, ed. — 131 —

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the Italian rabbi … not proud of his people’s culture, not insisting on the general rights of mankind that merely belong to the settlement of this question as an introduction.” Fully aware, however, that the “liberties” Luzzatto called for within Christian society could only insufficiently contribute to the formation of “the liberty,” Herder concludes his essay with an admonition: “They [the Jews] are not encouraged to live a life in honor and ethicality through new mercantile advantages: they raise themselves to such a life through purely humane, scientific, and citizens’ merits. Then their Palestine is everywhere where they live and act gracefully.” Here, the reader wonders: did he not state that Jews do not belong to Europe? Now he emphasizes quite the opposite: “Then their Palestine is everywhere where they gracefully live and act.” I believe we have gathered the arguments that aid our analysis. Hopes for the utopian project Herder predicts for the Jews at this point had by this time—as is well known—been dashed by German society, and the awareness of the political failure to create a Palestine beyond its actual borders had contributed to the creation of Zionist ideals. Even Luzzatto did not see the reason for the weakness of Jewish political selfdetermination in the lack of their proper cultural grandeur. He saw it rather in the fact that a cultural and ethnic group can only succeed in their struggle for political self-determination through leaping over the hurdle of their own political position, which has resulted from historical conditions. Or, to express Luzzatto’s own negative conclusion, Nonetheless, if someone still wishes to investigate which customs they share universally, one could say that they are a nation with an unusual and tired spirit, incapable in their present state of all political government, busy with their particular interests, quite—if not completely—unaware of their universal nature. (Discorso 36v-37r) 17 Luzzatto was probably making an indirect reference to Cusanus, who in De pace fidei wrote: “However, the presence of the Jews as residents does not prevent harmony, because they are few and they would be Alexander Altmann (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Fromann, 1983), xviii. 17 Translation by Benjamin Ravid, in manuscript. I thank the author for the permission to use it in my publication. — 132 —

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unable to disturb the peace of the world by the means of the force of weapons.”18 The development from a personal situation among the nations—the status of Jews—to the creation of a recognized Jewish state spurred the Zionist movement, whose aim was to build a Jewish state from Jewish dispersion. Let us go back to the beginning of Herder’s essay. Herder shows an attitude characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, indifference to Judaism, by referencing Luther’s notion that contemporary Christendom should not take further notice of it. Between the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth— exactly during Herder’s active years—Judaism experienced a revolutionary liberation, as I have mentioned earlier and repeat emphatically at this point: liberation from living in the much-hated ghetto, which was beneath human dignity to free bourgeois society, and from the social, religious, and intellectual captivity in which Christian society had held them to enlightenment and emancipation. While Jews were finally allowed to take part in public life (albeit with limitations), as noted earlier, the permission was little more than a fact of principle. As stated above, despite this sudden great degree of revolutionary spirit, hardly anyone took notice, And Herder points to this lack of interest without speaking to its ambiguity. This is an aspect of his personal style. With Herder begins the cultural phenomenon of the theory of ambiguity, the theory that is characterized by explaining ambiguities through the construction of further ambiguities. The Christian concept of truth is projected on the other world because recourse to the past, namely to Judaism, must be inherently untrue even if—or rather because—Christianity had derived from Judaism. The methodology of taking the bull by the horns is, however, not merely Christian but first Jewish and only then Christian. Thus, one ambiguity (true, because it is sustainable) is explained through another ambiguity (true, because it is no longer based on the past), which is based on an error: Jewry does not belong to the new Europe based on the theories of state, because the Jews persistently insist on maintaining their own character. At the very moment that Jews pursue their integration, however, the Christian18 “Haec tamen Iudaeorum resistentia non impediet concordiam. Pauci enim sunt et turbare universum mundum armis non poterunt.” De Pace Fidei, ed. Raymundus Kilibansky R. and Hildebrandus Bascour H. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1959), 39. — 133 —

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majority society rejects them. The ambiguity of past and future is solved through the rejection of an inconvenient part of society. One further ambiguity: Judaism represents the pinnacle of the biblical language’s ambiguity: they have handed down an ambiguous and consonantal text in order to be allowed to solve any ambiguity within their exegetic tradition. This statement is simply not true. The biblical text has been handed down in a consonantal form, true, but a tradition of vocalization has been established that establishes the text: this is known as the Masorah. At the very same time that Herder composed the Adrastea, Professor Friedrich August Wolf from Halle taught that the Masoretes had undertaken an editorial venture comparable to the work of the Alexandrines on the edition of Homer.19 I do not believe that Herder was unaware of this. Behind his attack on the Hebrew language stands a farewell to the Jewish Torah as decreed by Luther himself. The Torah was to be left to the stubborn Jews. Herder’s ambiguity in his last years of life might be explained by the fact that he seeks to justify the rejection of the Torah’s text through its seemingly insufficient vocalization. At the end, the Protestants of the nineteenth century might as well eschew the Torah of the Old Testament and focus on the prophets, who allegedly predicted Christianity. Thus a new vision of Christianity was created that brought about grave results. Judaism represents a political reading of the Torah, its own heirloom. This is the problem of Christians, be they pietists or philosophers of the enlightenment, such as Herder. Christians are not interested in the sectionalism of the Jews. They argue for a form of religion that faces mankind, a religion based on the Christian teachings and entailing a second revised version of revelation. Yet could truth, in the words of the deist John Toland,20 have been true once and be untrue now? Could God have proclaimed truth at one point and then declared it invalid at another? Is such a God trustworthy? Christians have based their concept of revelation on this aporia, which cannot preclude further revelations. Jews 19 See above, Chapter 1.1. 20 A follower of Luzzatto. See Isaac E. Barzilay, “John Toland’s Borrowings from Simone Luzzatto: Luzzatto’s Discourse on the Jews of Venice (1638) the Major Source of Toland’s Writing on the Naturalization of the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland (1714),” Jewish Social Studies 31 (1969): 75–81; Jonathan Karp, “The Mosaic Republic in Augustan Politics: John Toland’s ‘Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews’,” Hebraic Political Studies 1 (2006): 462–492; Diego Lucci, “Judaism and the Jews in the British Deists’ Attacks on Revealed Religion,” Hebraic Political Studies 3 (2008): 177-214. — 134 —

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have not done so. The idea that the conversion of Jews is not precluded, but at the same time is not necessarily required, is at the core of the matter. The Callenberg missionaries were unable to solve this problem, although they believed in it. The outcome was indeed modest; the zeal, however, was without limit. For that reason, they travel continuously ever after. Concerning Leopold Zunz and Herder …yet I hope for a comprehending audience of this book, not a consuming one, the same way that I hope for more artisans in science than I hope for quill drivers.21 Johann Gottfried Herder’s importance to Jewish studies was already acknowledged in the nineteenth century. In 1868, the literary and cultural historian Adolph Kohut published a lecture titled “The Merits of Herder for the Jews and Jewish Science” [Die Verdienste Herders um die Juden und die jüdische Wissenschaft] in Samson Raphael Hirsch’s Jeschurun.22 The importance of Herder’s role over Lessing’s, for instance, was clear to Kohut as he, Herder, was the “high priest of humanitarianism” in the style of Gustav Merkel.23 Herder was praised for his humanitarian ideals, his compassion for “[Asian] Indians” and “Negroes,” his abhorrence of the persecution of Jews, his admiration for the Jewish people,24 his dedication in speaking out against the barbarian anti-Jewish laws in Adrastea, his defense of the Jewish sense of welfare against the accusations of profiteering (“since not all Jews are Shylocks”), and 21 German: “... dennoch wünsche ich, wie der Wissenschaft mehr Kunstarbeiter als Notizenjäger, so diesem Buche nicht bloss nachschlagende sondern lesende Leser.” Leopold Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin: Veit, 1845, Repr. Hildesheim, 1976), vi. 22 Adolph Kohut, “Die Verdienste Herders um die Juden und die jüdische Wissenschaft,” Jeschurun 15 (1868–1869). The attitude of the German Bildung and culture was one key aspect of Kohut’s scholarly activity. See Kohut, Alexander von Humboldt und das Judentum: ein Beitrag zur Culturgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Pardubitz, 1871) and Kohut, Gekrönte und ungekrönte Judenfreunde (Berlin: Basch, 1913). 23 Kohut, “Die Verdienste Herders,” 160. 24 Kohut, “Die Verdienste Herders,” 162. Kohut quotes from Herder’s “Letters Concerning the Study of Theology”: “Where are such glorious people to whom the gods have drawn closer the way the Lord has done to this people? Where are such glorious people having such fair-minded mores and laws when these were God’s laws?” — 135 —

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his acknowledgement of Talmudic literature.25 During the second part of the lecture Herder merited further praise for study of the Science of Judaism and for his appreciation of the Bible as literature, in contrast to the historical-critical school of his and Kohut’s time.26 This appreciation was outlined in the “Letters Concerning the Study of Theology” [Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend], in the “Oldest Document of Mankind” [Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts], and in “Concerning the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry” [Vom Geiste der hebräischen Poesie]. The emphasis on the poetry of the Bible must not, Kohut emphasizes, obscure the fact that Herder places poetry as the “founding thought” of his philosophy. The nexus of Herder’s philosophy was monotheism. In him, monotheism found “an eager commentator and skilled champion.”27 At the end of his lecture, Kohut declares that Herder’s admiration for the prophecy of Isaiah, David, and Job was centered not only on their poetry, but also on the Masorah (the appraisal of the rabbis) and the kabbalah as the world “of creation, education, and above them the eternal, undisclosed one.”28 Let me give the reason for summarizing and discussing Kohut’s lecture by emphasizing that he outlined the main aspects of Herder’s insights and brought them to a point. Leopold Zunz does not provide the study of Herder with such a list, yet his work is markedly infused with Herder’s influence, as Luitpold Wallach established in his almost forgotten work. Herder’s influence leads in a direct line from Zunz’s debut of the Wissenschaft des Judentums to his great sketches concerning Jewish literature.29 25 “… So many splendid sayings and parables of the rabbis, based on the finest observations; is there anybody who is skilled and yet would read them without admiration?” Herder, quoted in ibid., 165. 26 “Thus the sometimes unfit question and point of view concerning whether the book of Job was a true story. Was the Song of Songs a true theological epos? Under no condition do they belong in such categories, not merely because (according to the rules) no such class was ever … invented but because there was not one scribe (in the sense of the Greeks or Romans, let alone the later ones) who wanted to be a poet. His poetry was not art but nature, property of the language, a tool to the aim, the result.” Herder, quoted in ibid., 232. I do not render the repeated emphasis of the original. 27 Kohut, “Die Verdienste Herders,” 238. 28 Ibid., 244 et seq. 29 Luitpold Wallach, “The Scientific and Philosophical Background of Zunz’s ’Science of Judaism’,” Historia Judaica 4 (1952): 51–70. His book Liberty and Letters: The Thoughts of Leopold Zunz (London: Institute by the East and West Library, 1959) is little more than an expanded version of his essay. Gershom Scholem read the work in parts and commented (maliciously and in biting criticism): “Breitgetretener Quark wird breit nicht stark,” which might be translated as “Balderdash isn’t bolder when rehashed.“ He referred to Wallach’s admiration for Zunz, which he, Scholem, could not tolerate. — 136 —

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As was already noted in the first part of this book (chapter 2), Zunz might have conceived the idea of a Jewish philology during the lectures of Friedrich August Wolf and August Boeckh. Zunz summarized the extent and aims of Jewish philology in his first treatise, Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur, published in 1818, which became the plan for the Science of Judaism.30 This little book (the first edition was merely fifty pages long; Zunz would discount it as the “immature work of an adolescent” as early as five years later) became a manifesto of the scientia nova, and followed the “spirit” of Herder.31 In his concept of literature, Zunz was certainly a student of Herder’s when following (and implementing) the idea of an encyclopedia, according to the understanding of Wolf, for his listing of “rabbinic literature.” He was also a student of Herder’s when he included the philosophical aspect, according to the understanding of Boeckh for the evaluation of the encyclopedia.32 According to Herder, the character of a nation finds its expression in its literature, which is determined by its physical and social surroundings, religion, climate, and historical fate. Zunz argues likewise: He who considers a nation’s literature as the entrance to the combined knowledge of its cultural development through all times, as in every moment its essence is carved out from the given and the added, i.e., from within and from the outside, as fate, climate, mores, religion, and coincidence interact as friends or foes, and, finally, as the presence stands as the necessary result of all occurrences having existed: truly, this one steps before this temple of the gods, and allows being led into the 30 Leopold Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin: Gerschel, 1876), 1–31. See also Hans-Joachim Bechtoldt, Die jüdische Bibelkritik im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, et al.: Kohlhammer, 1995), 64–83. 31 Wallach quotes Zunz from “Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur,” 31: “Fussing and cussing may fit the Roman statesman against the foreign tribe … but not the Christian minister against tolerated countrymen.” According to Wallach, but unfortunately without further explanation, this quote was indirectly aimed at Herder. Even if this was the case, I do not see why Zunz should refer to Johann Friedrich Röhr’s work but not to the original author, Herder. See Johann Friedrich Röhr, Palästina oder historisch-geographische Beschreibung des Jüdischen Landes zur Zeit Jesu zur Beförderung einer anschaulichen Kenntniß der evangelischen Geschichte für christliche Religionslehrer und gebildete Bibelleser (Zeitz: Webel, 1816). Between 1816 and 1852, eight editions of this book were published in Zeitz, Stuttgart, and Leipzig, and one translation (1843) in Edinburgh. 32 On Herder’s term of literature, see his Die Fragmente über die neuere deutsche Literatur (1767), and especially Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie (1782–1783). — 137 —

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entrance hall in order to enjoy the gracious view from the gable as a worthy one. To such worthiness will only rise the one who burdens himself with the ascent; and even he can only account the big picture sufficiently if he has seen all parts with the instructed eye of the artist. After this high-positioned view he will see our science transformed into a multiple set of sciences which all demand being groomed in all their parts if the whole should not be blemished by grave mistakes…. Keeping this in mind, we therefore theoretically subdivide criticism into three parts: the doctrinal (entailing the ideas), the grammatical (entailing the language), and the historical (entailing the history of these ideas from the moment of disclosure onward until us today receiving knowledge of them).33 At the end of his biography of Rashi mentioned above, Zunz indirectly mentioned Johann Gottfried Herder in an annotation, connected with the brief quote cited in an earlier chapter: Neither the religious (Rabbanim) nor the civil (Parnasim) council had a sound grasp of contemporary developments. The progressing spirit of mankind may first cast away such an outdated and brittle system together with its accoutrements—as this century gratifyingly promises to do—before the time is ripe to see the man of history in a fair and just manner; to define him in all his times, and then to complement him.34 With this concept, Zunz apparently references the central thought of Herder in his “Concerning the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry”: the text of the Bible has to be considered in its context as literature. Thus, it has 33 Zunz, “Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur,” 141. Emphasis in the original. 34 German: “Weder der religiöse (rabbanim) noch der bürgerliche (parnasim) Vorstand, erhielt sich auf der Höhe der Zeit. Erst also mag, wie das Jahrhundert erfreulich sich anzuschicken scheint, solch veraltetes und morsches, sammt seinen Anhängseln, von dem forschreitenden Menschengeiste hinweggerollt seyn, ehe das Zeitalter fähig seyn wird, frei und gerecht den Mann der Geschichte zu betrachten, ihn in allen seiner Zeit zu erklären, und alsdann zu ergänzen.” Zunz, “Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” 381. Emphasis in the original. — 138 —

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to be understood as an expression of a nation’s perception of the world from within its own world, including all of its peculiarities, such as, for instance, the climate. Some years later, Zunz assigned Herder a higher position than Goethe or Wilhelm von Humboldt. In an unpublished letter dated December 26, 1856, kindly provided by Céline Trautmann-Waller, Zunz declared in his own peculiar style: Sept 26, 1856: Winckelmann’s arrogance and martyr XXX [illeg.] lead to the reflection of the value and respect of man. Herder as a human being is greater than Göthe [sic] as a poet and W[ilhelm von] Humboldt as a thinker; the third seeks, the second pleases, the first loves.35 The assertion reminds one, to speak pointedly, of the three Fates: “the first moves, the second shoots, and the third composes again.”36 Moreover, as Trautmann-Waller understands following the school of Kohut, it alludes to Jean Paul’s appraisal of Herder in his Vorschule der Ästhetik, Nachschule. IV Vorlesung, ending with the following words: And, I tell myself, do everything you are capable of in your waning days—as if they were waxing ones—for the divine poetry that comforts and excites the poor and impoverishing people; do not spare any effort of your remaining years and strength and dying eyes for a sowing whose toils are smaller than the harvest will be for the friends of your heart. And, may the high spirit—with whose commemoration I concluded and beautified my past work on poetry—acknowledge my last endeavor and resolution,—Herder!37 35 German: “26 Sept 1856: Winckelmanns Hochmuth und Märtyrer xxxxxx [illegible] führen zur Betrachtung über Menschenwerth und Menschen achtung. Herder der Mensch ist grösser als Göthe der Dichter, als W. Humboldt der Denker; der dritte ergründet, der zweite gefällt, der erste liebt.” Céline Trautmann-Waller, Philologie allemande et tradition juive: Le parcours intellectuel de Leopold Zunz (Paris: Cerf, 1998), 204; Das Buch Zunz, fol. 73d et seq. 36 See my “The Meal of the Spirits, the Three Parcae and Lilith: Apotropaic Strategies for Coping with Birth Anxieties and Child Mortality,” in Henoch 23 (2001): 343-359. 37 German: “Und so tue denn, sag’ ich zu mir selber, alles, was du noch vermagst in deinen abnehmenden Tagen—als wären es zunehmende—, für die herrliche Dichtkunst, welche die — 139 —

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As for Goethe, however, he notes: Yet, may this opened portal of knowledge not lead us astray to the obviously wrong track of Goethe’s disciples and pedagogues. The poet may not only amuse the way Goethe does, but rather lifts like Klopstock; he may not only paint the near green of the ground the way the former does, but also paint the deep blue of the sky like the latter, whose color at the end lasts longer than the fading green.38 A letter from Adelheid Zunz to Philip Ehrenberg dated May 23, 1834, proves that Herder’s love for the cosmos and the common, poor man was a topic discussed in the Zunz home: My domestic gods are now Herder and Goethe, and how much more do I find in them than I have ever even expected. I have read Faust over and over again, and always read ideas for the philosophy of mankind’s history. God’s almightiness has only revealed itself to me then, and I love more passionately than ever every little blade of grass. How rich I have become through it, how differently do I now see nature, and how much is man—in all his faults—his creation which he receives with a father’s benevolence—in that you can follow me.39 armen und verarmenden Menschen tröstet und begeistert; und scheue keinen Aufwand von noch übrig gebliebnen Jahren und Kräften und absterbenden Augen für eine Aussaat, deren Mühe kleiner ist als die Ernte für die Freunde deines Herzens.—Und möge der hohe Geist, mit dessen Andenken ich mein früheres Werk über die Dichtkunst schloß und schmückte, meine letzten Anstrengungen und Entschlüsse billigen,—Herder!” Quoted from Project Gutemberg http:// gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/3210/98 (last accessed December 26th, 2012). 38 Ibid.: German; “Nur führe diese geöffnete Schulpforte nicht auf einen naheliegenden Irrweg der Goetheschen Nachspieler und Schulleute. Der Dichter erheitere nicht bloß wie Goethe, sondern erhebe auch wie Klopstock; er male nicht bloß das nahe Grün der Erde wie jener, sondern auch das tiefe Blau des Himmels wie dieser, das am Ende doch länger Farbe hält als das erbleichende Grün.” 39 German: “... Meine Hausgötter sind jetzt Herder und Goethe, und wie viel mehr finde ich in beiden als ich je geahndet habe. Ich habe den Faust wieder und wieder gelesen und lese immer: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Darin ist mir erst Gottes Allmacht klar geworden, und ich liebe inniger jedes Gräschen. Wie reich ich dadurch geworden bin, wie mit ganz anderem Auge ich die Natur ansehe, und der Mensch mir in seiner Verirrung doch sein Geschöpf ist, was er — 140 —

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The humanitarianism which David Kaufmann (and Jean Paul before him) had judged to be characteristic of Herder’s work is absent from his Ideas to the Philosophy of the History of Mankind [Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit], written between 1782 and 1788. In this work, humanitarianism is defined as “gracious edification toward reason and liberty, to refined senses and instincts, to the most frail and strongest health, to the gratification and mastery of the world.”40 But how can we understand Herder’s ideal of humanitarianism in the context of his speculations about the culture of a nation or nations?41 Does Herder indeed seek to let it be known that he does not believe in gradations between nations42 that then culminate in anti-Judaism/ antisemitism and the theology of races? There is—unusually enough— consensus among scholars, who feel that both ideas are to be found in Herder. The ideas about nationhood during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries belong to a general, perceptible, political and cultural atmosphere. However, the weight given to these concepts, and especially the emphasis placed on the concept of nationality, indicates the lack of both the internal and external sense of true nationhood if one declares nationality to be a program of political importance and evolves it into a sect.43 Herder foresaw this danger in his 29th Letter Concerning the Advancement of Humanitarianism: What is a nation? A large garden not cleared of weeds and herbs…. Let us, as much as we are capable, contribute to the nation’s honor; we also have to defend it when it suffers injustice … to praise it ex professo, however, I do consider self-adulation without results…. Nature has handed out its blessings differently; to different tribes mit Vaterhuld empfängt—das können Sie mir nachempfinden.” German: “…. edle Bildung zur Vernunft und Freiheit, zu feinern Sinnen und Trieben, zur zartesten und stärksten Gesundheit, zur Erfüllung und Beherrschung der Erde.” Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 82. 41 On this, see Frederick M. Barnard, “The Hebrew and Herder’s Political Creed,” Modern Language Review 54 (1959): 536; Karl Menges, “Integration oder Assimilation: Herders Äußerungen über die Juden im Kontext der klassischen Emanzipationsdebatte,” Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte 90 (1993): 1–30. See further Hans Adler, “Johann Gottfried Herder’s Concept of Humanity,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 23 (1993): 55–74. 42 On the term, see Frederick M. Barnard, “National Culture and Political Legitimacy: Herder and Rousseau,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983): 231–253. 43 On this, see also Frederick M. Barnard, “Herder and Israel,” Jewish Social Studies 28 (1966): 25–33. 40

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different fruits grow according to climate and cultivation. Who would compare these, or favor the wooden apple over the grape? Instead, we should find our delight like Sultan Suleiman in the fact that on the colorful lawn of the earth there exist so many various flowers and peoples, that there bloom so many different blossoms on this and on the other side of the Alps, and so many different fruits ripen there. It is likely an endowment of nature that not only a man but also a race and thus a nation learn with and from the other, learn continuously until all will have understood the bitter lesson.44 This corresponds to Zunz’s opinion, although he distinguishes between nation and country as political entities. The first is a cultural affiliation, which has developed over the centuries and has evolved around a society’s own language. The latter is the civic forum, in which liberty and justice are, or at least should be, granted to all. He who disregards the first also disregards the latter, as “the neglect of the Science of Judaism is related to civic disregard.”45 44 German also online: http://www.celtoslavica.de/goetheanica/herder.html (June 2013): “Was ist Nation? Ein großer, ungejäteter Garten voll Kraut und Unkraut. (...) Lasset uns, so viel wir können, zur Ehre der Nation beitragen; auch verteidigen sollen wir sie, wo man ihr Unrecht tut (...), sie aber ex professo preisen, das halte ich für einen Selbstruhm ohne Wirkung. (...) Die Natur hat ihre Gaben verschieden ausgeteilt; auf unterschiedlichen Stämmen, nach Klima und Pflege wachsen verschiedene Früchte. Wer vergliche diese untereinander, oder erkennete einem Holzapfel vor der Traube den Preis zu? Vielmehr wollen wir uns wie der Sultan Soleiman freuen, daß auf der bunten Wiese des Erdbodens es so mancherlei Blumen und Völker gibt, daß diesseit und jenseit der Alpen so verschiedene Blüten blühn, so verschiedene Früchte reifen. Offenbar ist’s die Anlage der Natur, daß wie ein Mensch, so auch ein Geschlecht, also auch ein Volk von und mit dem andern lerne, unaufhörlich lerne, bis alle endlich die schwere Lektion gefaßt haben.” The sense of national identity was, of course, an issue of the elite. The general people were largely unaffected and this sense was not altered according to regional differences. Philipp Ehrenberg wrote to Zunz on April 18, 1849: “Last week we hosted Fritzel Dembitz, a friend of Julie’s [Ehrenberg’s wife]. She and 26 other members of the family plan to leave on the Washington [my emphasis] for America. The fatherland is yet but a hollow sound for the Germans. Most see but the little parcel of land on which their house stands, and they take it with them the way Jews take with them a piece of Eretz Yisra’el [written in Hebrew characters in the original]. I have had only a minor interest in my hometown and my Brunswick fatherland from the beginning. If I had to I would pack my little wife just the following day and left without the slightest regret but with the dearest loved ones and Samson’s Free School [German: Samsonsche Freischule] to Potsdam and the deserted Sanssouci [Castle].” Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 219. 45 Zunz, Gesammelte Schriften, 32. — 142 —

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These quotes range from Zunz’s political attitude to his thoughts regarding poetry, and in them Herder is never quoted expressis verbis, but is clearly referenced. Zunz argues for a secular science that distances itself from the semi-divine adulation of religion. Zunz wrote to David Kaufmann on May 27, 1875: “I do not have to advocate any religion, just the human rights of its adherents, and I perceive the mode of religion simply as an effect of deeds and suffering. Thus, the existence and human benevolence of the nation are related but not subjugated by or outsold to the same.”46 This quotation might indirectly point to Andrastea, IV Vol. 7th Manuscript “Conversion of the Jews” (1802), in which Herder in his summary of Simone Luzzatto’s booklet on the Jews of Venice defines Jews in general as the “usable servants of the state.”47 Herder comments that “thus the Italian rabbi wrote modestly, intelligently, and in a refined way … not proud of the culture of his people, not assuming a defiant attitude and insisting on general human rights that belong to this question, merely an initial one.”48 One has to compare this to Zunz’s foreword to the “Liturgical Lectures” mentioned above: It is high time that European Jews, and those in Germany especially, finally receive rights, i.e., justice, and liberty rather than rights and exemptions. They finally have to receive, not pitiful and degrading privileges, but complete and uplifting citizenship.49 In Herder’s view, the Jews were an Asian people, as he writes, “this people is, and therefore will remain in Europe as well, a foreign Asian people strange to our continent.”50 Referencing David Hartley’s Observations on Man (1749), Herder, full of hope, predicts the return to Palestine.51 46 Markus Brann, “Mittheilung aus dem Briefwechsel zwischen Zunz und Kaufmann,” Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur 15 and 16 (1902/03): 168. 47 See above, Chapter 2.2. 48 Herders Werke Vol. 10, 632. 49 German: “Es ist endlich Zeit, dass den Juden in Europa, insbesondere in Deutschland, Recht und Freiheit statt der Rechte und der Freiheiten gewährt werde: kein kümmerliches erniedrigendes Vorrecht, aber ein vollständiges, erhebendes Bürgerthum.” Leopold Zunz, Die gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt: Ein Beitrag zur Alterthumskunde und biblischen Kritik, zur Literatur- und Religionsgeschichte (Berlin: Asher, 1832; Repr. Hildesheim, 1966), 7. 50 Herders Werke Vol. 10, 630. Emphasis in the original. 51 Ibid, 633. Herder, however, concludes with the statement “fine, bright people, a miracle of the — 143 —

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In his search for a mode of religion for the Jewish people, Zunz has to understand the texts in their original (historical) meaning, and thus he moves a little further than Herder, since the rabbis—according to him—had deprived the texts of their contextual meaning in order to canonize them.52 Zunz wrote in his foreword to Rebenstein’s new edition of and commentary on the Song of Songs, the Song of Solomon,53 a forerunner of a hypothesis that was rediscovered and explicitly held rather later, in 1987,54 by Arnold Goldberg, and which still retains its explosive character: For more than a millennium and a half, the meaning and significance of the Song of Songs has been sought in a distant place [far from its original context—GV], seeking the solution to the supposed riddle in all sorts of human knowledge [i.e. between the soul and God—GV] and in national relations [between Israel and God—GV]. This riddle was not something offered by the contents of the poem but rather by its place in [the canon of] Holy Scripture, in which a competitive song of tenderness did not appear to be a worthy text. But when the poet composed this song, the language had not yet died the painful death of the “Holy language” [some time after the composition of the Bible—GV]. Those who first took delight in its words did not know anything of the symbolic meaning of canonical books. It was necessary to cast off the dream which saw theological doctrines in those verses, rising to a genuine hermeneutics.55 times! According to the genial apostil of one of their rabbis, Esau and Israel cry arm in arm; the kiss hurts both of them but they cannot let go of each other.” Ibid,. 634. 52 Trautmann-Waller pointed out this fact in her Philologie allemande, 194. 53 Aaron Rebenstein [Bernstein], Das Lied der Lieder, oder, Das hohe Lied Salomo’s (Berlin: Friedländer, 1834). 54 Arnold Goldberg, “Die Zerstörung von Kontext als Voraussetzung für die Kanonisierung religiöser Texte im rabbinischen Judentum,” in Kanon und Zensur: Beiträge zur Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation, ed. Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann (München: Fink, 1987), 202–211; see my Libraries, Translations, and ‘Canonic’ Texts. The Septuagint, Aquila, and Ben Sira in Jewish and Christian Tradition (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006): 21-22. 55 Leopold Zunz, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Curatorium der Zunzstiftung (Berlin: Louis Gerschel Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1875): 142: German: “Länger als ein und ein halbes Jahrtausend hat man in weiter Ferne des hohen Liedes Sinn und Bedeutung, und in mancherlei menschlichen Erkenntnisses und nationalen Beziehungen die Lösung des vermeinthlichen Räthsels gesucht. — 144 —

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This deliberate reference was targeted at Protestant biblical criticism, which continuously stripped the Song of Songs of its traditional allegoric interpretation and only saw erotic love. Johann Michaelis went so far as to exclude the song from his German translation of the Old Testament—thus de-canonizing it—because “I understand this languish of love in such a way that I feel uncomfortable presenting it to my readers along with the Bible.”56 Zunz could only disassociate from this attitude to Jewish theology, because there was little he despised more than the theological approach of the rabbis. Zunz understood biblical literature as being nothing more than culture in its broadest sense, and he emphasized his concept for a Wissenschaft des Judentums in his Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur. Herder’s influence is most apparent in this work. In his book Concerning the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, Johann Gottfried Herder praised biblical poetry as the “expression of the inner love of the Jewish people.”57 The prophetic and poetic spirit, however, died with the destruction of the Second Temple. Zunz concurs that historiography was abandoned with the destruction of the Jewish state, but he assigns the same value to post-biblical poetry and rabbinic literature. As early as in his first publication, On Rabbinic Literature, he recognized that—and this is entirely in accord with Herder—the Hebrew canon became the foundation of the Christian state.58 Zunz writes in his Literary History of the Poetry of the Synagogue [Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie], published in 1865: We cannot be astounded that the Jewish Middle Ages can present neither historiographers nor historians: a Dieses Räthsel bot nicht der Inhalt der Dichtung dar, sondern ihr Platz unter den heiligen Schriften, deren ein Wettgesang zartlicher Liebe nicht wurdig schien. Aber als der Dichter sang, war die Sprache noch nicht den schmerzhaften Tod der heiligen gestorben, und die ersten, die sich am dem Liede ergotzte, wussten noch nichts von sinnbildlichen Deutung kanonischer Bücher. Man musste endlich aus dem Traum, der theologische Lehrsätze unter jenen Versen sah, zur ächter Hermeneutik erwachsen.” 56 Johann D. Michaelis, Joh. Dav. Michaelis deutsche Übersetzung des (Alten und Neuen) Testaments: Mit Anmerkungen für Ungelehrte (Göttingen et al.: Vandenhoek, 1758), 12th Part, XXIV. See also Grit Schorch, “Moses Mendelssohn und die Bibelpoesie: Prolegomena zur Shir-ha-Shirim-Übersetzung von Moses Mendelssohn,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Leipzig, 2000). 57 Glatzer, Leopold Zunz, 64. On the survey of aesthetic theories, see Allan Megill, “Aesthetic Theory and Historical Conciousness in the Eighteenth Century Historiography,” in History and Theory 17 (1978), 44 et seq. 58 Zunz, “Etwas zur rabbinischen Litteratur,” 3. — 145 —

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nation in partibus does not act; its suffering is able to bring about chroniclers and poets, but not historiographers. The scholarly mind, well, even the desire for it, is missing as regards the encouragement of historiography. The history of Israel—concluded with the destruction of the state and hindered by the dispersion of the people—lay there in completion and before the eye of the believer…. The freedom that had formerly grown together with legal prescriptions and teachings had remained the ideal of thoughts and longings, and thus the study of the law became the continuation of political life; exercise in the knowledge of laws became the token of eventual liberation.59 Twenty years earlier, in 1845, Zunz’s statement had been more pointed. He wrote in the foreword of his “Literary History” that The force acting in those who are gifted has often, possibly always, given direction to the people; the idea acting in them has set an imprint on the following time: the occurrences became the vehicles, not seldom the outcomes of the idea. The poetry of the synagogue can rightly claim to be the companion of the history of Judaism. Opinions concerning the value and meaning of the individual poem, the request for the position of the piyyut in the liturgy, cannot conceal the importance of this monument of the century-long struggle. He who, as a Jew, walks past the same with noble contempt is not called destined to being a historiographer: he who finds 59 German: “Wenn das jüdische Mittelalter keine Geschichtsschreiber und Geschichtsforscher aufzuweisen hat, darf uns das nicht wundern: Eine Nation in partibus verrichtet keine Thaten; ihre Leiden können Chronisten und Dichter, aber nicht Geschichtsschreiber hervorbringen. Zur Geschichtsforschung mangelte der wissenschaftliche Sinn, ja das Bedürfniss. Israels Geschichte, abgeschlossen mit dem Untergange des jüdischen Staates, durch die Zerstreuung des Volkes erschwert, lag fertig da dem Auge der Gläubigen erkennbar ... Die ehemalige Freiheit, mit den gesetzlichen Vorschriften und Lehren verwachsen, blieb das Ideal der Gedanken und der Gefühlen, und so wurde das Gesetzesstudium die Fortsetzung des politischen Lebens, die Uebung im Wissen des Rechten gleichsam ein Unterpfand der endlichen Befreiung.” Leopold Zunz, Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie (Berlin: Gerschel, 1865); Repr. Hildesheim, 1966, 1. — 146 —

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contempt in himself for his own tribe cannot describe its deeds.60 The appraisals of the Hebrew language, the Bible, and the poetry of the Hebrews that can be detected in Herder’s works surely did not grant Jews the illusion that the Science of Judaism had now become presentable. The struggle for intellectual acceptance was gradually lost, because the general public had not considered it as of equal value to other similar sciences. Zunz became the most prominent victim of this illusion: as mentioned earlier, the Prussian authorities never considered accepting the application for a professorship for the history and literature of Jews that Zunz filed on November 9, 1848.61 To conclude: Jean Paul wants to see Herder as a bridge between orient and occident, or, in his more beautiful and ornate language: “In the retrospect of the times (which would, of course, become countries) [Johann Ludwig] Tieck is a beautiful and baroque crossbreed of the flowers of old German and modern German times. He is, however, more related to the gifted receivers than to the creators. [Christoph Martin] Wieland is an orange tree with French blossoms and German fruits; at the same time—Goethe’s tall tree is rooted in Germany and bends his overhanging branches full of blossoms well into the Greek climate—Herder is a rich, flowery isthmus between orient and Greece.”62 Heinrich Graetz, however, is hardly known for his poetic language, and thus notes prosaically that ... even Herder, despite being steeped in his admiration for Jewish antiquity and the people in its biblical gran60 German: “Das in ausgezeichneten Menschen Waltende hat oft, vielleicht stets, den Völkern die Richtung gegeben, die in ihnen wirkende Idee sich der nachfolgenden Zeit als Stempel aufgedrückt: Die Begebenheiten wurden die Träger, nicht selten das Erzeugniss jener Idee. Die synagogale Poesie darf man die Begleiterin der Geschichte des Judenthums nennen. Meinungen über Werth und Bedeutung des einzelnen Gedichtes, Wünsche über die Stellung des Piut im öffentlichen Gottesdienste ändern nichts an dem Range dieses großartigen Monumentes vielhundertjährigen Kampfes. Wer als Jude mit vornehmer Verachtung an denselben vorübergeht ist unberufen zum Geschichtschreiber: wer in sich seinen Stamm verachtet kann dessen Thaten nicht darstellen.” Ibid. 61 Ludwig Geiger, “Zunz im Verkehr mit Behörden und Hochgestellten,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 60 (1916): 258. See also Heinrich Simon, “ Wissenschaft vom Judentum in der Geschichte der Berliner Universität,” in Wissenschaft des Judentums. Anfänge der Judaistik in Europa, ed. Julius Carlebach (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 159–60. 62 Paul, Vorschule der Ästhethik, 1st Abt., II. Prog., §10. — 147 —

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deur, and who has read the holy literature with the mind of the poet for the first time; even he was filled with contempt for the Jews, as it is presented in his relation to Mendelssohn…. Herder predicted a better time when Christian and Jew would work together and in mutual harmony on the construction of human ethos. Yet he resembled Bilam: he gave his blessings for Jews but was not pure in his heart.63 It is difficult to determine if the illustrious man from Detmold, Zunz, would concur with the opinion of Jean Paul, or rather, of Heinrich Graetz. Intellectual Jews especially viewed Herder—as Kohut already mentioned—as a secular messiah who would initiate a time of liberation. The Science of Judaism then would soon be recognized as of equal value to Christian or general studies. The French hymn of liberté, égalité, fraternité would soon be heard in Germany as well,64 as soon as the Science of Judaism would be taught at the universities and academies. It was a futile hope, as we know now: Herder’s attitude to Judaism had taken a step in the right direction—toward the acceptance of Jewish contributions to the European culture—but not one inch further than that. His appreciation of Jews as belonging to a Kulturvolk, a civilized and civilizing people, was based on a questionable national theory according to which the monad of a culture circles around its common language. Jewry, even today, has no common language and a diverse culture. The diversity Herder praises in his concept of humanitarianism65 is treacherous and comparable to a garden in which everything has its place—but I doubt that the German fruits hold an equal position to Suleiman’s. 63 German: “Selbst Herder, obwohl erfüllt von Bewunderung für das israelitische Altertum und das Volk in seinem biblischen Glanze, der zuerst die heilige Literatur mit dichterischsinnigem Auge betrachtete, empfand eine Abneigung gegen die Juden, die sich in seinem Verhältnis zu Mendelssohn kundgab. … Herder prophezeite zwar eine bessere Zeit, in welcher Christ und Jude in einmütiger Gesinnung am Bau der menschlichen Gesittung arbeiten würden. Aber er glich dem alten Bileam: er erteilte seine Segensprüche für die Juden nicht mit frohem Herzen.” Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Leiner, 1900), 234. 64 This is in marked difference to Herder, who hoped for a Bonaparte for the return to Palestine: “Fortune then if a Messiah-Bonaparte led them victoriously there, fortune to Palestine.” Herders Werke Vol. 10, 633. 65 On this concept see Frederick M. Barnard, “Particularity, Universality, and the Hebraic Spirit: Heine und Herder,” Jewish Social Studies 43 (1981): 121–36. — 148 —

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Herder’s knowledge of post-biblical Judaism is insufficient to let him truly appreciate it, at least if one disregards the kabbalah and “some remarks of the rabbis” with which he was familiar. Herder is not overly interested in post-biblical Judaism; neither is any other Christian, because it includes a combination of different cultures and modes of life that ought not to be thrown into the pot of “humanitarianism.” Using the “ashes” of the Jewish nation66 for the foundation of the Science itself was the task and aim of the Science of Judaism. This was the precondition of true liberty, or, in the words of Leopold Zunz: “This always unguarded literature, never rewarded, often persecuted, whose authors never belonged to the powerful of this earth, has a history, a philosophy, a poetry that makes it equal to the other literatures. This acknowledged, will Jewish authors and the Jews in general then not have to reach the citizenship of mind? Will not humanitarianism then grow among the people from the seed of science, paving the way for understanding and unity? The equal position of Jews in manner and life will follow the equal position of the Wissenschaft des Judentums [among the sciences].”67 Yet such equality has been a desideratum ever since.

66 On these ‘ashes,’ Trümmer in German, see Herder in Herders Werke Vol. 10, 641. 67 Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur, 21: “Dieses stets unbeschützte Schrifttum, nie bezahlt, oft verfolgt, dessen Urheber nie zu den Mächtigen der Erde gehörten, hat eine Geschichte, eine Philosophie, eine Poesie, die es anderen Literaturen ebenbürtigen machen; werden, dies zugegeben, nicht die jüdischen Autoren und die Juden überhaupt alsdann das Bürgerecht des Geistes erlangen müssen? Muss dann nicht aus dem Born der Wissenschaft Humanität sich unter das Volk ergießen, Verständigung und Eintracht bereitend? Die Gleichstellung der Juden in Sitte und Leben wird aus der Gleichstellung der Wissenschaft des Judenthums hervorgehen.” — 149 —

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2.3 Gesenius, His Colleagues, the Rabbis and the Wissenschaft des Judentums

The history of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism in Europe is mostly a story of misunderstanding and a lack of mutual knowledge and respect in everyday life. This is true of academic life, too, which Jewish students were for the most part not allowed to join or actively participate in until the nineteenth century. A noteworthy exception was the study of medicine in Renaissance and early Modern Italy. As a positive element in this complicated relationship, I would also like to emphasize that Protestant academies in the nineteenth century were somewhat more “tolerant” than the negative stereotype we are accustomed to hearing about indicates. In this chapter, I will describe some forgotten details of academic life at the University of Halle. There the Hebraist Wilhelm Gesenius was professor, and there a relatively large number of rabbinical candidates became doctores philosophiae. A look into the archives of the University of Halle reveals a number of intriguing facts that are mostly unfamiliar to contemporary academics, even those in Jewish studies. It is thanks to Monika Richarz’s dissertation of 1974, and Carsten Wilke’s article of 2009, that readers can gain insights into the academic corpus where 127 rabbinic candidates offered dissertations between 1845 and 1895.1 I have consciously used the verb “offered” and not “were supervised,” because of the strange submissions practices of PhD dissertations that were widespread among rabbinical candidates during the period I wish to describe. Let us begin with a historical statement. In the nineteenth century, holding a doctorate was not the rule among Christian protestant theologians or future pastors of Christian communities; it was meant only for those destined for an academic career. Monika Richarz maintains that a doctorate was attractive for future rabbis due to the lack of a state exam similar to the one through which pastors earned the title required 1

Monika Richarz, Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678–1848 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974), 105–106, and Wilke, “Rabbinerpromotionen,” 261–315. — 150 —

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for their election to a parish. It is also true that the title of “doctor” was the billet d’entré into society, proof that cultural emancipation had been completed. Thus, it brought parents and relatives the joy of social ascent. Even the famous historian Heinrich Graetz dreamed in 1836 of obtaining the Doktorwürde to bring joy to his parents (“… und also Freude meinen Eltern verursachen”). He subsequently applied for a doctorate in 1845 in lieu of taking a state exam. A title conferred state acknowledgment of the community and a “guarantee of the academic integrity of a Jewish theology candidate”: I can only mitigate the most striking aspect of this petition by remarking that it is because of the unequal standing potential theologians have in the eyes of the State and [Jewish] communities that they see it as necessary to assert their authority in the community with a title which, if the State bore responsibility for their academic-theological education, could be otherwise be conferred by way of a State Exam. The community which rightly requires academic competence in its spiritual counselor partly sees the title of a doctor as a guarantee of a Jewish theology candidate’s scientific eligibility.2 The doctorate also facilitated the candidate’s application to become a rabbi. In some communities having a PhD was the conditio sine qua non to access the rabbinate. For the most part, philosophical faculties all over Germany understood the situation and, as a rule, accepted these applications by conferring the title, even though the quality of the texts (to avoid calling them dissertations) did not always fulfill the prerequisite norms of a Doktorarbeit. To describe the mood at the time, 2

German: “Das Auffallende dieses Gesuches kann ich nur dadurch mildern, wenn ich vorausschicke, daß durch die schiefe Stellung, welche die angehenden jüdischen Theologen dem Staate u. den Gemeinden gegenüber [einnehmen], die erstern sich genöthigt sehen, durch den Titel sich bei den Gemeinden eine gewisse Au­torität zu [be]gründen, die ihnen sonst, wenn der Staat für ihre akademisch-theo­ lo­ gi­ sche Ausbildung Sorge trüge, das Staatsexamen geben würde. Die Gemeinden [soll heißen: Gemeinde], welche wissenschaftliche Tüchtigkeit mit Recht von ihren Seelsorgern verlangt, siehet in dem Doktortitel theilweise eine Garantie für die wissenschaftliche Würdigkeit eines Kandidaten der jüdischen Theologie.” Heinrich Graetz, Tagebuch und Briefe, ed. Reuven Michael (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977), 19; Universitätsarchiv Jena, M 307, S. 63 f., vom 5. 3.1845; quoted in German in Wilke, “Rabbinerpromotionen,” 268 n. 25. — 151 —

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Carsten Wilke claims that “The philosophical faculties were, to varying degrees, ready to renounce the humanities for the sake of humanity.”3 The University of Halle was popular among Jewish doctoral candidates. This was partially because it was a golden mean between the zealous academic modus operandi of the Bonn, Berlin, and Breslau universities and the modest and unpretentious procedures at the University of Jena, at which almost any document—a sermon, for example—was enough to obtain the title. There was a tolerant atmosphere in Halle, so to speak, and Jewish candidates were not refused admission. The fees were reasonable and a certificate of baptism (Taufschein) was not required, as it was in Breslau during the 1840s. Moreover, the philosophy faculty was sympathetic and the referees were very moderate in their judgments. The following quote written by the Arabist Richard Gosche (1824–1889) in his report (Gutachten) on Hermann Grünfeld’s 1837 dissertation De linguis in Mischna, Sifra, Sifri Mechiltha receptis, ac de eorundem librorum origine (Grünfeld was from Nikolsburg, Moravia) illustrates that fact: [The dissertation was] infected with rabbinical and Hungarian stylistics and almost incomprehensible superficialities which one must laboriously work through; [it] presents a complex topic which 40 pages and relatively poor use of resources could not exhaust. The very important works of A[braham] Geiger are only partially used, those of [Michael] Sachs not at all. I would therefore have voted for the candidate’s rejection if he had not shown adequate linguistic skills in the third part of the work, and because of my cognizance of the more lenient procedures applied to rabbinical candidates by my predecessors; it would not have been my place to go against this practice as the youngest member of the faculty.4 3 4

Wilke, “Rabbinerpromotionen,” 269. German: “Die Abhandlung des H. Grünfeld …, durch deren rabbinisch wie ungarisch inficierten Stil und fast unbegreifliche Flüchtigkeiten man sich mühselig durcharbeitet, hat sich ein zu weitschichtiges Thema gestellt, als daß es auf 40 Blättern und mit verhältnißmäßig nicht eben reichen Mitteln erschöpft werden könnte. Die wichtigen Arbeiten von A. Geiger sind nur zum Theil, die von M. Sachs gar nicht benutzt. Ich würde daher für Zurückweisung des Vfs stimmen, — 152 —

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Gosche’s tempered comments (a half page for a forty-page dissertation), recognizes the candidate’s excellent Hebrew expertise—an acknowledgment we can also find in other Gutachten. A very important aspect, however, is Goesche’s explicit reference to the university and faculty custom of showing tolerance toward rabbinic candidates. His judgment, therefore, is exceptionally moderate. In other cases, however, the judgments were not as sympathetic. The orientalist Emil Rödiger (1801–1874), a disciple and follower of Gesenius, was not as considerate to Esriel Hildesheimer (1820–1899) from Halberstadt. Hildesheimer was then rabbi in Eisenstadt and Berlin, and was the pioneering reformer of Neo-Orthodoxy. His dissertation was titled De vetere testamento recte interpretando. Professor Rödiger was not enthusiastic about this work, and reported that the “banal (triviale) work shows at times something wrong and immature which seems to be partly attributable to the incorrect conception of what he heard at lectures.”5 This does not mean to suggest that all those who obtained the desired title were unqualified or mediocre candidates; I am here omitting very classical names such as Hermann Cohen, and wish to refer here only to personalities pertinent to this volume, for example some very famous lexicographers. The first rabbi to receive a doctoral diploma in Halle was Jacob Levy (1819–1892), whose dissertation was titled De indole atque origine cum recentiorum hebraicorum tum Mischnaicorum librorum. Levy became rabbi of Rosenberg in Silesia and later moved to Breslau. Levy authored the Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Targumim in 1867‒1868 and received the title of “Königlicher Professor” from the Prussian government in recognition of this work. His magnum opus is the Neuhebräisches und Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim (4 volumes, 1876‒1889),6 with notes by Prof. Heinrich

5

6

wenn er nicht im 3ten Theile seiner Arbeit ganz erträgliche Sprachkenntnisse darlegte, und wenn nicht meines Wissens unter meinem Vorgänger gegen Candidaten von specifisch rabbinischer Vorbildung eine etwas mildere Praxis geherrscht hätte, welche vollständig aufzugeben mir als jüngstem Facultäts mit glie de nicht anstehen würde.” Universitätsarchiv Halle, Re 21 II, Bd. 100, Bl. 327 German: “hier und da Falsches und Unreifes, was sich zum Theil aus unrichtiger Auffassung des in Vorlesungen Gehörten herzuschreiben scheint.” Ibid., Bd. 65, Bl. 25r, review of Emil Rödigers on Esriel Hildesheimer, 1845. Isidor Singer and Caspar Levis, “Jakob Levy,” in Jewish Encyclopedia Vol. 8, ed. Isidor Singer, Cyrus Adler et al. (New York: KTAV, 1904). — 153 —

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Leberecht Fleischer from the University of Leipzig. He co-founded the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft and was mentor to such famous students as the Assyriologist Franz Delitsch (1813–1890), the Arabist Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921), and, of course, Emil Kautzsch (1841–1910). According to Arthur Kiron, Jacob Levy, during his lifetime, was already regarded as the “founder of modern critical rabbinic lexicography, and his dictionary had a tremendous influence on subsequent scholarship.”7 The 1924 Berlin and Vienna editions of his works were revised by Lazarus Goldschmidt, the famous German editor and translator of the Babylonian Talmud. Marcus Mordechai Jastrow (1829–1903) was another doctoral candidate from Halle who was to become well known in scholarly Jewish studies circles. He obtained the title of doctor in 1856, at the age of twenty-six, with his dissertation on De Abraham ben Meïr Aben Esrae Principiis philosophiae. In 1858, Jastrow moved to Warsaw to serve as a religious leader, and then in 1866 he moved on to Philadelphia. In 1886, he began publishing his magnum opus, A Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Talmud Yerushalmi and Midrashic Literature, in pamphlet form. These were finally completed and published in two-volumes in 1903, and have since been a popular resource for students of Talmud. Halle University was apparently also the first university to confer a doctorate in jurisprudence to a Jew. Julius Rubo, who studied in Göttingen and Berlin, moved to Halle, where he earned his doctor utriusque juris, in 1817. Rubo vainly tried to obtain a lawyer’s license in Hamburg, Holstein and Braunschweig.. After some years of activity in Halle, as Privatdozent he obtained a position in Berlin as secretary of the Jewish community. Rubo was probably also the mediator between the philosophical faculty and Leopold Zunz. In Zunz’s petition to the philosophical faculty he refers to his friend Rubo as guarantor. Wilke writes that Gesenius was Zunz’s “doctoral advisor,” which was not in fact the case.8 Zunz submitted his writings to a panel of experts, as did many other Jewish students. On November 17th, 1820, he applied for a doctoral degree from the philosophical faculty, and added that he needed it “as soon as possible” due to a job application.9 The 7 8 9

Arthur Kiron, “Jacob Levy,” Judaica Online Exhibitions, University of Pennsylvania http://www. library.upenn.edu/exhibits/cajs/jastrow/10.html (last accessed March 2010). Wilke, “Rabbinerpromotionen,” 262. Documents in Giuseppe Veltri and Annette Winkelmann, “’… daß er in Rabbinischer und — 154 —

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faculty council was impressed by Zunz’s potential and, only one month after his petition, conferred the title. The mathematician Johannes Friedrich Pfaff and the orientalist Samuel Friedrich Günther Wahl— not Gesenius—were his examiners and vouchsafed his qualification (Wissenschaftlichkeit). The fact that Wilhelm Gesenius did not advise Leopold Zunz could be due to a number of factors. First, Zunz did not mention Gesenius as a supporter of his application (Gesuch), and this, of course, raises the question pertinent to the topic of this chapter: what was Genesius’ relationship to coeval Jewish scholarship? Almost nonexistent, one could say, though this is not due to any prejudices. I will now explain my point of view by focusing on Gesenius and Leopold Zunz. In his introduction to the first edition of Handwörterbuch (1810), Gesenius did not cite any Jewish scholars or Jewish works concerned with lexicography. All authors cited are Christian Hebraists (above all Michaelis, Eichhorn, and Simonis). Yet, interestingly, he raises the question of whether to include other lexicographical material taken from documents not traditionally listed as the Protestant “Old Testament”— for example, the apocrypha. His answer in the negative is by no means ideological, but merely pragmatic. The user of his dictionary would not have looked for these terms within it, because he would not have expected it to contain them.10 In the first footnote to the 1834 fourth edition’s introduction, Gesenius tells the reader that the introduction is based on that of the second edition of 1823, and that it is only slightly modified, with some additions.11 This however, is a gross understatement, given that Gesenius here employs Jewish sources and Jewish names for the first time! The second edition also mentions Jewish documents, Jewish grammarians, etc., but in that case they were mostly taken from Christian sources. Rashi, the famous French exegete, is called Jarchius, and Ibn Ezra is called Aben Esra, etc. The fourth edition is the first in which we find reference to Jewish lexicography and concordance. Speaking of Marii in der Talmudischen Litteratur ziemlich bewandert ist’: Leopold Zunz und die Universität Halle-Wittenberg,” in Jüdische Bildung und Kultur in Sachsen-Anhalt von der Aufklärung bis zum Nationalsozialismus, ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Christian Wiese, 239–60 (Berlin: Metropol, 2009). 10 Wilhelm Gesenius, Hebräisch Deutsche Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament Vol. 1 (Leipzig: Vogel, 1810), xxiv. 11 Gesenius, Hebräisches und chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament Vol. 1 (Leipzig: Vogel, 1834), iii. — 155 —

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a Calasio’s Concordantia hebraicae (Rom, 1621) and Johannes Buxtorff the Father’s Concordantiae librorum hebraicae (Basel, 1632), Gesenius notes, “The first one is an almost unchanged translation of Isaac’s or Mordekhai ben Natan’s concordance; Buxtorf’s is a reworking of it.”12 In footnote 4 (p. V), he uses parallelism to determine the poetic uses of some obscure terms (karmel, karmil, from Song of Solomon 7:6), without offering the rabbinical sources. An important addition can be found in the passages of the Targum with references to the translation of Samuel David Luzzatto (= ShaDaL) of the Aramaic Targum of Onkelos (called Philoxenus [Ohev ger]).13 These are some of the very few references made in this edition to contemporary Jewish authors. An even more significant change can be found in the short history of Hebrew grammar included in the 1834 edition, which is mostly taken from his Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache und Schrift (1815); there are, however, some notable changes.14 He claims that his first edition of the History of Grammar from 1815 is in parts inaccurate and incomplete, because he did not have the opportunity to see all the original manuscripts and works.15 He mentions, among others, Saadya, Menakhem Saruk, and Yonah ibn Ğanah. He defers to the authority of Sephardic scholars for a better understanding of Hebrew grammar and vocabulary. Notable additions concern the position of Mishnaic Hebrew in the history of ancient Hebrew, and the contribution of Jews to lexicography. In this introduction to the Handwörterbuch of 1834, as well as in his history of grammar of 1815, Gesenius ends with the Jewish grammarian Elia Levita rather abruptly, as if to say that there were no Jewish grammarians or lexicographers after the Renaissance.16 One exception is ShaDaL, as was mentioned above. We do have some evidence that Genesius was aware of the absence of 12 Isaac Ben Nathan Calonimus, Sēfer meīr ... Concordantiae Bibliorvm Hebraicae innumeris locis emendatae, recognitae, auctae (Basel: Froben, 1581). 13 Gesenius, Handwörterbuch vol. 1 (1834), VII. 14 Wilhelm Gesenius, Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache und Schrift: Eine philologisch-historisch Einleitung in die Sprachlehren und Wörterbücher der hebräischen Sprache (Leipzig: Vogel, 1815). 15 German: “Da die früher von mir hierüber gegebenen Nachrichten nicht völlig und zuverlässig seyn konnten, sofern gerade das Wichtigste noch ungedruckt ist, so mögen jetzt, nachdem ich die wichtigsten Handschriften gesehen, untersucht und zum Theil excerpirt habe, die folgenden Notizen darüber hier als Ergänzungen stehen” Gesenius, Handwörterbuch (1834), x–xi. 16 German: “Mit dem Anfange des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts ging das Studium der hebräischen Sprache zu den Christen über, und die Juden, die mit einem Elias Levita ihren Culminationspunkt erreichten, treten von nun an fast ganz in den Hintergrund.” Gesenius, Geschichte (1815), 105. — 156 —

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modern contemporary Jewish authors in his history of Hebrew grammar. In 1934, the Semitist and Arabist Eugen Mittwoch published some letters from the estate of the orientalist Franz Ferdinand Benary, professor for Oriental studies at the University of Berlin and a former student of Gesenius in Halle.17 There were a number of letters from Gesenius to Benary, and one of them in particular is pertinent to our discussion. In a letter dated September 28, 1828, the professor writes, As part of my plans to edit my History of Hebrew Grammar for a new edition, I have to ask a favor. As you know, contemporary Jewish scholars complain that I have not taken any notice of their works from recent or current times. Well that is indeed true. To avoid further exacerbating the charges, I will actually require some assistance. Namely, I wish to make reference to 1) recent grammatical and lexicographic works, giving short, thorough acknowledgement; 2) [and] excellent distinct compositions in Ancient Hebrew, provided that these texts have proved to be a significant contribution to the life and the development of the language among the Jews. I would be most appreciative of any references you could, or would, want to give me on these matters. Where does Dr. Zunz live? Still in Berlin? This would be the man for the job. I found his treatise on Rashi exemplary in both its diligence and its judgment.18 His proposal to rework his grammar was never realized due to his 17 Eugen Mittwoch, “Aus Briefen von W. Gesenius, E. Rödiger, J.L. Saalschütz und J. Ch. Fr. Tuch an Fr. S. F. Benary,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 78 (1934), 203–211. 18 German: “Im Begriff mich an eine neue Ausgabe meiner Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache zu machen, hätte ich eine Bitte. Sie wissen, daß die neueren jüdischen Gelehrten sich beschwert haben, daß ich von ihren Arbeiten in neuerer und neuester Zeit keine Notiz genommen hätte. Das ist nun auch ganz richtig. Um diesen Vorwurf aber nicht auch ferner zu bedienen, werde ich wohl einiger Hülfe bedürfen. Namentlich, wünschte ich Nachweisungen zu geben 1) über neuere grammatische und lexicalische Werke, mit kurzer, gründlicher Würdigung; 2) auch über ausgezeichnete selbstständige Compositionen in althebräischer Sprache, sofern auch diese etliches für Leben und Fortschritte derselben unter den Juden beweisen. Was Sie mir von dieser Art etwa nachweisen könn­ten und wollten, würde mir höchst erwünscht seyn. Wo lebt den Herrn Dr. Zunz? Noch in Berlin? Dieser wäre ein Mann für dergleichen. Seine Abhandlung über den Raschi finde ich ausgezeichnet an Fleiß und Judicium.” Ibid. — 157 —

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premature death. However, if he did not know that Zunz was director of a cheder (Jewish school) in Berlin at the time, as the letter indicates, he certainly did not have strong ties to him. He also does not seem to have read Zunz’s first work, Etwas über die rabbinische Literatur, which was reviewed in the famous Allgemeine Literaturzeitung. As mentioned above, Zunz outlines the agenda for an academic Jewish discipline, in particular discussing it in terms of the lexicography and history of the Hebrew language and its grammar. Nor did Gesenius quote Zunz’s article on Masorah and grammar, which appeared in the journal Jedidja in 1819. The reference to the article on Rashi (“Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi”) is, however, a hint that the master from Halle was aware of the existence of the “Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.”19 A year after having written the above letter, on October 17, 1829, Gesenius appears to have made contact with Zunz. As Gesenius writes in another letter to Benary, Dr. Zunz sent me a letter and asked questions about rabbinic literature and some about my Thesaurus. Unfortunately I lost his letter and cannot answer it. It would be fine if he could put the question again, perhaps through [Fürchtegott] Leberecht, if he feels it is worth the trouble.20 The relationship between Leopold Zunz and Wilhelm Gesenius cannot be called close. However, Zunz does quote Gesenius in his first writings when referring to Gesenius’ thesis that Biblical Hebrew continues into Mishnaic Hebrew, and that is the point from which a new history of the Hebrew language begins.21 No reference is made to his Handwörterbuch. Like many other scholars of the Science of Judaism, Zunz viewed the Christian Hebraists of the Reformation as his precursors: With Reformation, which necessarily resulted in a flowering of classical education, a spirited study of the 19 Zunz, “ Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi,” 277–384. 20 Mittwoch, “Aus Briefen von W. Gesenius,…,” 210. 21 Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 19. — 158 —

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books of the Bible was initiated. This was coupled with what we may term a zealous curiosity to pore over and search through the Orient. Therefore one embarked with such fervour for a century on the study of rabbinical wisdom—a fervor that suddenly dissipated and vanished, perhaps forever, when patriotic, richer and more amicable products came to occupy hearts and minds.22 In his Zur Geschichte und Literatur, written in 1845, Zunz lists a total of 93 Christian scholars who dealt with Jewish writings from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century. He is, however, not entirely accurate when claiming that the Christian interest in Hebrew philology focused entirely on the Bible: What antiquity had bequeathed in that language [Hebrew] consisted only of the books of the Bible; these did not have a linguistic or historical bond with Christian Europe but only a religious one, mediated by the New Testament. So these books were only read by theologians and that solely because of their link with the Christian Church. Accordingly, theological knowledge of Hebrew was limited to the Bible. And if theology also occasionally looked at later Jewish writings, that was solely because it deemed these necessary for its understanding of the Bible: the perspective and love of theologians was centered exclusively on the word of God, not the Jewish author. The non-theological world took no interest whatsoever in Hebrew.23 As the archives of the Protestant universities from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century show, the academic interest of Protestant doctoral candidates covered every aspect of Jewish life, beginning with exegetic studies (where Rashi, Saadia, Abrabanel, and others are quoted), and extending to the development of grammars, lexicography, and 22 Translation according to Gianfranco Miletto, “Leopold Zunz and the Hebraists,” EAJS Newsletter 15 (2004), 51. 23 Ibid., 55. — 159 —

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treatises on Judaism. Contemporary university research more or less ignores the large number of Protestant dissertations on Judaism, which for the most part lie hidden in university archives. Together with the works of Christian Hebraists they form the academic milieu into which Wilhelm Gesenius was acculturated, and from which his standard and classical work originated. Ignorance of this aspect of Hebrew philology still persists today, and I hope to start new research on this very topic in the near future. Let us return to the relationship between Zunz and Gesenius. In 1840, Adolf Asher published his edition of The Travels of Benjamin of Tudela, which was a valuable source for Hebrew names and geography.24 In the second volume, there are explanatory notes written by the editors, Leopold Zunz, Salomon Munk, Rabbi Salomon Rapaport, and others. While Asher and Rapaport frequently cite and refer to Gesenius’s work, calling him the “learned professor” or the “very learned Gesenius,” etc., Zunz, notably, mentions him only sporadically. The aim of the Wissenschaft des Judentums was to attain social standing as a citoyen of the social network, and the distinction of academic acknowledgment as a scholar. Both of these goals were, for the most part, unsuccessful. There were, of course, well-intended initiatives for assisting Jewish scholars to acquire the necessary academic standards. However, the main problem was not the academy, but rather the political establishment, which did not accept Judaism as a religious confession or accept its academic contributions through Jewish scholars. Leopold Zunz’s goal was to have Wissenschaft des Judentums acknowledged as an academic branch of the human sciences. His view was that Jewish literature should have its place in the university, because critical studies of Judaism had been neglected up until that point. Universal history, as we know, cannot be based on the absence of the particular history. As mentioned, Zunz wrote that the political acknowledgement of equal civil rights should be accompanied by the recognition of equal cultural rights: “The ghetto has been broken open, but the relegation has not been abrogated” [Das Ghetto ist gesprengt, aber die Verweisung noch nicht aufgehoben].25 24 Adolf Asher, ed. and trans., The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, 2 vols. (London and Berlin: Asher, 1840–1841), 393–448. 25 See my own “A Jewish Luther?,” 338–351. — 160 —

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His silence on Gesenius should be seen and understood from this perspective. For Zunz, Gesenius represents the Christian academic establishment that ignored Jewish scholarship. Zunz advocated the presence of Jewish professors in the universities, as he felt the presence of Jewish professors was necessary to prevent the misuse of Jewish history and literature at the hands of Christian scholars, as he outlined in the above-quoted letter to David Kaufmann dated August 1876, here repeated: The diminishment of Jewish authors, even if they are baptized, will not cease in Germany as long as Jewish history and literature are not taught at all universities, and by Jews who are full professors. As soon as this progress is achieved there will come the Ḥavle Mashiaḥ [sufferings of the Messiah].26

26 Brann, “Mittheilungen,” 179. — 161 —

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Part III

Creative Languages and Interstitial Spaces

— 162 —

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3.1 Creative Monotheism: Chayim H. Steinthal

The philologist and philosopher Chayim H. Steinthal (1823-1899) directly addressed the interpretation of Genesis 1-11 for the first time in his public lecture “The Creation of the World, Man, and the Language of Genesis.”1 The lecture was presented in 1868 but not published until as late as 1890. This pericope, Genesis 1–11, has confounded every linguist from antiquity to modern times, yet at the same time it is a theoretical foundation for the classical and modern theories of language. No commentator, whether philosopher or theologian, teacher of religion or polemicist, rabbi or priest, could ever ignore these passages. They raise the basic questions about our origins, such as the one we have all been familiar with since childhood and which has been reopened by Ernst Bloch: “Where do we come from?” The chapter on the creation of the world, man, and language, therefore, is one of the most commentated-upon and recited passages of the Torah, and a component of refined mythological, cosmological, and linguistic discussions.2 Steinthal, as a student of Humboldt’s linguistic theory, also had to address these chapters of creation, known in Greek 1 2

Heymann Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie: Vorträge und Abhandlungen (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1890), 97–114. Concerning the origin of language(s) I refer to this one classic: George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of language and translation (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). See, also, my own “Übersetzbarkeit und Magie der ‘heiligen’ Sprache: Sprachphilosophien und Übersetzungstheorien,” in Tradition und Translation:  Zum Problem der interkulturellen Übersetzbarkeit religiöser Phänomene: Festschrift für Carsten Colpe zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Christoph Elsas and Carsten Colpe (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1994), 299–314. The subject of “Genesis and the Languages” is inexhaustible, see, for instance, the latest studies, and Pierre Swiggers, “Babel and the Confusion of Tongues (Genesis 11: 1–9),” in Mythos im Alten Testament und seiner Umwelt: Festschrift für Hans-Peter Müller zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Armin Lange, Hermann Lichtenberger, and Diethard Römheld (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1999), 182–195. On a specific philosophical and kabbalistic flipside of the myth of Babel, see Maurice Olender, “From the Language of Adam to the Pluralism of Babel,” Mediterranean Historical Review 12 (1997): 51–59; Christoph Schmidt, “Kant verirrt sich in Babel: Der Bericht vom Turmbau zu Babel als Urtext der säkularen Kultur,” in Zwischen den Kulturen:  Theorie und Praxis des interkulturellen Dialogs, ed. Carola Hilfrich-Kunjappu, Conditio Judaica 20 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997), 93–106; Schmidt, “Zurück nach Babylon … Die Stellung des Berichts über den Turmbau zu Babel zwischen Sintflut und Sintbrand,” Babylon 18 (1998): 90–111; Craig G. Bartholomew, “Babel and Derrida: Postmodernism, Language and Biblical Interpretation,” Tyndale Bulletin 49 (1998): 305–328. — 163 —

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as poieisis—for professional reasons, so to speak. Poieisis plays a central role in his theory’s etymological, cultural, and historical composition. It is the medium mundi et essentiae humanae, to some extent a dynamic mediator between not-being and perfection, between childhood and adulthood. Meaningfully, Steinthal’s etymology and epistemology was influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution, which he did not perceive as competing with the mythical-biblical accounts.3 Another apparently important reason for his interest in the book of Genesis must not be omitted. It is no coincidence that Steinthal thematizes the story of creation in the few lectures dedicated to his actual field of study during his later period. In 1872 Steinthal was appointed lecturer for biblical criticism and philosophy of religion at the Higher Institute for Jewish Studies (Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums) in Berlin. He was one of the leading figures of the Hochschule, which later became the Lehranstalt (Academy), and was perceived as the leading figure in Reform Judaism by, among others, the leaders of the so-called Neo-Orthodoxy. Esriel Hildesheimer warned of the dangers posed by the Berlin Hochschule in his call for the creation of an Orthodox rabbinical seminary in Berlin,4 referring to “Principal Dr. Geiger and Prof. Steinthal”5 as the Hochschule’s soul. Whether Steinthal indeed was seen as a leading figure cannot be sufficiently judged at this point.6 It is not clear whether Hildesheimer merely attempted to emphasize Steinthal’s position as a professor or sought to acknowledge his energetic activities at the Hochschule. Steinthal became an associate professor at the University of Berlin in December 1862 at the request 3 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 113. 4 For an account of the life of Esriel Hildesheimer (born in Halberstadt in 1820, died in Berlin in 1899), see David H. Ellenson, Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer and the Creation of a Modern Jewish Orthodoxy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990). For an account of the rabbinical seminar’s formation, see Mordechai Eliav, “Das orthodoxe Rabbinerseminar in Berlin,” in Wissenschaft des Judentums: Ḥokhmat Yiśraʾel: Anfänge der Judaistik in Europa, ed. Julius Carlebach (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), 59–73; further Christian Wiese, Wissenschaft des Judentums und protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein Schrei ins Leere? (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 76 et seq. 5 Quoted in Eliav, “Das orthodoxe Rabbinerseminar in Berlin,” 64. See also: Max Sinasohn, Die Berliner Privatsynagogen und ihre Rabbiner, 1671–1971 (Jerusalem: Author‘s Edition, 1971), 17– 21. 6 In his celebratory speech on the occasion of the Lehranstalt’s twenty-fifth anniversary, Steinthal praises the work of three scholars: Geiger, Philippson, and, of course, Lazarus. Heymann Steinthal and Gustav Karpeles, Über Juden und Judentum: Vorträge und Aufsätze (Berlin: Poppelauer, 1906), 243–250. — 164 —

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of Julius Olshausen, the specialist in Oriental studies.7 Because he was Jewish, he could not be appointed full professor. This was possibly rooted in the antisemitism prevalent at the Prussian court. Steinthal was a controversial figure even among his admirers. In 1907, eight years after his death, the monthly periodical Ost und West published an article on Steinthal’s life.8 Its author, Dr. Simon Bernfeld, was among Steinthal’s students at the Lehranstalt. He presented his personal image of the teacher without neglecting the contemporary impressions of his students. He wrote that “in certain circles, Steinthal was perceived as a radical in his religious convictions; some even claimed he was an atheist.” And furthermore, I often heard, when I was a student at the Academy for Jewish studies, the complaint, voiced both in surprise and disapproval, that it was strange that a freethinker such as Steinthal would work in an institute whose main purpose was even then to educate rabbis.9 Others, such as Gustav Karpeles and Joseph Stolp, emphasized those same qualities, stressing Steinthal’s peculiar combination of being a “freethinker, philosopher, and pious Jew all at once,” as Karpeles phrased it. “But, in the end, all contradictions and dissonances [are combined] into pure and complete harmony.”10 Karpeles, Stolp, and Bernfeld acknowledged in writing that Steinthal had a “pure, ethical idealism.” Steinthal personally embodied the mainstream of his ethical system, which he based on biblical prophecy as the query of ethical monotheism. This, his main concern, might explain his somersault in 1872: on December 6 of that year, he wrote to Gustav Glogau that since the death of his children he “was not interested in philology; ethics and religious philosophy occupy me.”11 It was the year of his appointment to the Hochschule. When reading the above-mentioned lecture on “The 7

Waltraud Bumann, Die Sprachtheorie Heymann Steinthals, Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung 39 (Meisenheim am Glan, Mainz: Hain, 1965), 11. 8 Simon Bernfeld, “Erinnerungen an Chajim Steinthal,” Ost und West: Illustrierte Monatsschrift für das gesamte Judentum 7 (1907): 703–708. 9 Ibid., 705 et seq. 10 Karpeles‘ Introduction to Über Juden und Judentum: Vorträge und Aufsätze, VIII. 11 Letter to Glogau, see note no. 40 in Bumann, Die Sprachtheorie Heymann Steinthals, 12. — 165 —

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Creation of the World, Man, and the Language of Genesis” from 1868 in light of Steinthal’s personal scholarship, certain categories of his thinking appear as seeds in the field of his biblical exegesis, promising a ripe harvest. Let us pick out one aspect from the treasure of indirect quotations, allusions, and intentionally brief remarks: the Imperative of Ethical Monotheism and Prophecy (Imperativ des ethischen Monotheismus’ und die Prophetie). In 1871, the Hungarian rabbi Leopold Löw, a contemporary of Steinthal who was both highly regarded and controversial, saw the central point of Steinthal’s thinking in his involvement with Renan’s piece Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère générale des peuples sémitique, et en particulier sur leur tendance au monothéisme.12 According to Löw, Renan sought to deny the advancement of the Jews in speculative thinking, for which reason he “invented … the Semitic instinct.”13 Although this is an abridged representation, Renan had indeed sought to diminish the “invention” of monotheism by the Jews, and to downplay its intellectual significance, by introducing this development as an “instinct.” Like Friedrich August Wolf, according to Steinthal, Renan viewed monotheism as a product “d’un esprit étroit, sec et dénué de toute flexibilité.”14 The reference to Wolf proves that Steinthal was aware of his controversial attitude to Judaism and its contribution to overall culture. Wolf does not appear to have been occupied to a significant degree with monotheism as a religious phenomenon, but was rather occupied with the language and literature that formed the people. A passage by Wolf, quoted earlier, deserves to be considered again here: Before the Greeks, we have not witnessed one nation, and apart from them no Oriental one, that knew the art of oratory. This was rooted in the fact that they were not 12 Ernest Renan, Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère général des peuples sémitiques, et en particulier sur leur tendance au monothéisme, Extrait No 3 de l’Année 1859 du Journal Asiatique (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1859). See the reply in Heymann Steinthal, “Zur Charakteristik der semitischen Völker,” Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft 1 (1860), 328–345; also in Steinthal and Karpeles, Über Juden und Judentum: Vorträge und Aufsätze, 91–104; published in an abridged form under the title “Zum Ursprung und Wesen des Monotheismus: Ein Dialog” in Heymann Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 180–188. 13 Leopold Löw and Immanuel Löw, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 1 (Szegedin: Alexander Baba, 1889– 1900), 150. Repr. Hildesheim, 1979. 14 Steinthal, “Vom Ursprung und Wesen des Monotheismus,” 180. — 166 —

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allowed to address important issues. The reason Oriental people did not have prose is the fact that they did not orate. They never succeeded in the felicitous connection of sentences, which is the art of writing.15 Moreover, Steinthal’s reply to Renan is of the highest importance for history and for conceptual history as well, inasmuch as it is known for having contributed to the emergence of the term “antisemitism.” In the following review, which appeared in the periodical Hamaskir–Hebräische Bibliographie, the Berlin-based bibliographer Moritz Steinschneider employed the term “antisemitic,” apparently then a novelty for the German language. And further: The critic [Steinthal] poignantly proves the contradictions in Renan’s beliefs and and the sterility of them for science and scholarship. The more Renan’s shiny, dialectical, and stylistic talent carried his readership along, the more it was of the essence to uncover the consequences, or rather, inconsequence of his antisemitic prejudices. They also could not have been allowed to remain uncommented upon. St[einthal] as well knew to give his article an appealing form and, what is more, it is marked by a solid, ethical tone … which does more justice to scholarly sobriety than glittering phrases.16 We have to agree with Steinschneider that Steinthal has set an “ethical tone.” At the same time, however, it exceeded the scope of a “personal letter attacking Renan’s belief concerning the character of the Semites,” as Steinschneider claimed. Steinthal charged Renan with only acknowledging the duality of 15 Wolf, “Vorlesungen über die Alterthumswissenschaft,” 33. See also Wolf, Encyclopädie der Philologie, 9. On this publication, see Grafton, “Juden und Griechen,” 9–31; see further Wolf, “Einführung in die Fragmente der Enzyklopädie der Altertumswissenschaft,” 61. See above, p. 39. 16 Quoted in Roger Thiede, “Der Kongreß zu Rhinocorura: Zur historischen Kontruktion des ‚Antisemiten‘,” Der Pfahl: Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft 5 (1991): 151. The emphasis is mine. I thank Reinhard Markner for having pointed out this source to me. Steinschneider is indeed believed to have coined the term. See Ismar Elbogen and Ellen Littmann, Ein Jahrhundert jüdischen Lebens: Die Geschichte des neuzeitlichen Judentums, Bibliotheca Judaica (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 635. — 167 —

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the soul’s activities (the reflective conscious and the unconscious), although prophetic activity stands in contrast to these workings of the soul. Even if the people of Israel had not been exceedingly “gifted,… I assume that Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the other Isaiah, and the many unnamed poets of psalms, were men of unrivalled intellectuality.”17 The use of the term “gift” in this context should be noted. It clearly referenced the romanticist’s perception of the ingenious man.18 Indeed, Steinthal at this point did not reflect a typical “ethno psychological” hypothesis, but rather a Jewish rejection of antisemitic utterances. Goethe, for instance, voiced this point of view when he wrote:19 The Israelite nation has never been much good, for which its leaders, judges, community heads, prophets have upbraided it thousands of times: it possesses few virtues and most of the faults that other nations have; but its independence, strength, bravery, and, when these no longer count, tenacity are unparalleled. It is the most persevering nation on earth; it is, it was, and will continue being so in order to glorify the name of Jehovah throughout all the ages.20 The monotheism of the Jews as a product of the intellectuality of prophecy could not be interpreted as a Pythagorean speculation of numbers. That the prophets appeared as preachers of monotheism was not based on the fact that the idea of the number One was associated with an idea of God, but the one God is merely the spiritual God. It 17 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 187. 18 It is interesting to note what Max Joseph had to report: “I once heard him say: One question will haunt me, I believe, for the remainder of my days. This question is whether the religion of prophecy has to be seen as just one of some other lonely giants of the soul and mind, or whether it had been born from the people and their ethical forces (as their highest peak), and thus eventually may be regarded as a people’s religion.” Max Joseph, “Hayim Steinthal zu seinem hundertsten Geburtstag,” Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur 25 (1923–24), 79–80. 19 See chapter 2.1 of part two, above, p. 116. 20 Second chapter of the second book of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre. On this, see above, chapter 2.1. — 168 —

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was not aimed only at destroying the idolatry of the natural forces, but also the spiritual ones, thus idolatry of all forces, and to replace them with the good deed and intention, the worship of the “holy and merciful” who is He, the “One and Eternal.” This cannot be achieved through any instinct or reflection and speculation; nor through playfulness and megalomania…. This can be achieved through a pure and perfect ethicality in an ordinary mind; a holy and yet firm will, a complete dedication of the entire being to the matter, to religion…. It is not within monotheism that Jehovah is Indra and Vritra in one, that He does alone what the gods share among themselves; but that He does something different altogether: He does not fight a dragon in the midst of a thunderstorm but rather reveals to mankind in a peal of thunder these ten words that are the eternal foundation pillars of all ethical human society. Even for the understanding mind logic is not the utmost, and guilt is as much a fertile mother of fallacies as ethicality is a sprouting seed of truth.21 Leopold Löw does not fail to mention the sources for Steinthal’s philosophy in his account. He refers to Maimonides’ concept of prophecy, which would especially emphasize ethical momentum: “Prophecy remains faithful to its ethical foundation in its declarations, instructions, and admonitions as well. The prophets never appear to praise the tribal virtues of their people. Rather, they raise an unheard-of criticism 21 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 187-188. German: “… dass die Vorstellung der Zahl Eins mit der Vorstellung Gott associirt werde; sondern der eine Gott ist nur der geistige Gott. Es war der Götzendienst der natürlichen nicht bloß, sondern auch der seelischen Kräfte, also der Götzendienst aller Kraft zu zerstören und dafür das gute Tun und Wollen, die Anbetung des ‚Heiligen und Barmherzigen‘ hinzustellen, der‚ der ‚Einzige und Ewige‘ ist. Das schafft kein Instinct, das schafft keine Reflexion und Speculation, kein Spielgeist und Weltherrschgelüste [...] das schafft bei einfachem Verstande eine makellose sittliche Reinheit, ein heiliger und zugleich felsenfester Wille, eine völlige Hingabe des ganzen Wesens an die Sache, die Religion [...]. Nicht das ist Monotheismus, dass Jehovah – Indra und Vritra zugleich ist, dass er allein tut, was die Götter unter sich verteilen; sondern daß er etwas ganz Anderes tut, als diese: dass er im Unwetter nicht einen Drachen bekämpft, sondern aus Donner und Blitz der Menschheit jene zehn Worte verkündet, welche die ewigen Grundsäulen aller sittlich-menschlichen Gemeinschaft sind. – Selbst für den erkennenden Geist ist die Logik nicht das Höchste; und die Schuld ist eben so sehr eine fruchtbare Mutter der Irrtümer, wie die Sittlichkeit ein quellender Keim der Wahrheit.“ — 169 —

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of some negative behavior of their tribe.”22 The unheard-of criticism of their own people is regarded as an asset of the Jewish people, whose essence was once and for all set in stone through the commandments received on Mount Sinai. Some remarks are of importance to understanding Löw’s comparison between Maimonides and Steinthal. It is hardly surprising that the scholar of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries refers back to the great philosopher of the twelfth century. Maimonides has ranked as the Enlightenment philosopher par excellence since the eighteenth century, and until the twentieth ranked in some secular and Reform-inclined circles as one who had fought the traditional “Orthodox” powers.23 Enlightenment philosophers had championed this belief as late as the early twentieth century. Isidor Scheftelowitz, a lecturer in Cologne and even today, unfortunately, undervalued as an ethnologist, wrote concerning Maimonides: “He was dedicated to peeling away from the core of religion the superstition that had proliferated over the centuries, and thus bringing to light the true essence of religion.”24 Maimonides was born in an era and locale which the Jewry of Berlin perceived as the most enlightened and happiest time in Jewish history. The comparison between Maimonides and Steinthal is not entirely convincing, though. Maimonides as a philosopher did not regard prophecy as an ethical moment—an ethical intellectuality—but as pure speculation and perfect knowledge that only few had ever reached or were capable of reaching. Prophecy, according to Maimonides, is the purest cognition, which allows one to see the thing in itself (and thus the effect of every action) and to understand its true essence.25 He was an intellectualist. To Maimonides, ethical momentum is a precondition of a speculative act, not its essence. It remains correct, however, that this Jewish Aristotelian considered the role of prophecy, and above all—in contrast to Islamic theology—the role of the prophet Moses, to be very important. “Ethical monotheism” became a catchphrase of Jewish discussion, used by figures ranging from Moritz Lazarus and Hermann Cohen to Leo 22 Löw, Gesammelte Schriften, 152. 23 Isaac E. Barzilay, “The Italian and Berlin Haskalah (Parallels and Differences),” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Studies 29 (1960–61): 17–54. 24 Isidor Scheftelowitz, Alt-Palästinensischer Bauernglaube in religionsvergleichender Beleuchtung, (Hannover: Lafaire, 1925; Repr. Osnabrück, 1975), 171. 25 On the concept of prophecy with Maimonides, see Alvin J. Reines, Maimonides and Abrabanel on Prophecy (Cincinnati, OH: Hebrew Union College Press, 1970). — 170 —

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Baeck in his remarks on the “Essence of Judaism” and up to the present day, by Emil Fackenheim.26 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “ethical monotheism” was Reform Judaism’s answer to the Christian charges that post-biblical Judaism was of a pharisaic nature, that Jews were slaves to the commandments and inflexible. Renan referred to this state as a lack of development—like reaching only an undistinguished manhood after a gracious childhood: “[les nations sémitiques], après une gracieuse enfance, n’arrivent qu’à une médiocre virilité ...”27 Twenty-five years later, on November 27, 1893, after Steinthal’s lecture, Ignaz Goldziher presented religious and historical reasons to reject Renan’s thesis on the occasion of his memorial address at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He argued that Renan generalized for all Semites “ethno-psychological” aspects that Renan believed were measurable in some Jews and Greeks from various historical periods. Goldziher, however, asserted that “monotheism … is the result of a long developmental process, quite often even of a revolution of mind.”28 This specialist in Oriental studies disassociates himself from Steinthal and Lazarus by means of employing the adjective “ethno-psychological.” By using the term “revolution,” however, he is in accord with them, as Steinthal indeed understood the radical change of polytheism through the intellectuality of prophecy as revolutionary. Prophecy as the proclamation of ethical monotheism and the connected destruction of polytheism, according to Steinthal, marks the biblical story since the beginning of the world, man, and language. Steinthal begins with the assertion that interpreting Genesis is not an easy task, as the “mediated immediacy” of the reader to what is read does not allow any historical or cultural distance. “One only understands scripture if it is comprehended within the context of all circumstances under which it was created.”29 In the case of ancient Hebrew literature, one not only has to “translate from a foreign tongue into another one intel26 On this concept, see Christian Wiese, Wissenschaft des Judentums und protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein Schrei ins Leere? (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 199 et seq. 27 Œuvres complètes, 1855, Vol. 8, 156. On the Jewish reactions, see Alessandro Guetta, Philosophie et Cabbale: Essai sur la Pensée d’Elie Benamozegh (Paris: Harmattan, 1998), 69–85. 28 Ignác Goldziher, Renan als Orientalist: Gedenkrede am 27. November 1893, Gedenkreden über die verstorbenen Mitglieder der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 8,2, trans. Friedrich Niewöhner and Peter Zalán (Zürich: Spur-Verlag, 2000), 39. 29 Steinthal, “Die Schöpfung der Welt, des Menschen und der Sprache nach Genesis,” in Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 98. — 171 —

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ligible for us, but we also have to translate thoughts from a very naïve form, which harbors childishness in our logical, educated thinking.”30 This was a reference to Johann Gottfried Herder’s theory of Hebrew poetry.31 We also see in this a Jewish scholar who uses the methodology of the then-critical biblical studies. As early as the eighteenth century, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn understood the duty of biblical studies as performing “research of the inner fabric of each individual book of the Old Testament by means of higher criticism (no new frame for any humanist).”32 What he was referring to was, above all, the “sense for antiquity and its language.” Simon Bernfeld apparently had not fully understood his teacher when he wrote about Steinthal that his métier was biblical criticism and religious philosophy. It was extraordinary that Steinthal was not much of a critic. He lacked philological objectivity, which is essential for biblical criticism. The Bible was to him not only the source of religion and religiosity but also the pinnacle of all poetic beauty.33 Bernfeld is wrong when he doubts Steinthal’s critical eye concerning the Bible. The lectures quoted here (as well as others) fully justify the claim that Steinthal knew the concepts of biblical studies of his time well, and did not disagree with them by any means. He even emphasized that the story of creation consists of components that are common with the stories of neighboring peoples. However, He [the prophet] may have used the entirety of material from them [the neighboring peoples], but he used it according to his own basic principle. Thus, the prophet produced an image of the creation of the universe, and the original story of mankind. This image outshines all 30 Ibid. 31 Johann G. Herder, “Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie,” in Herders sämmtliche Werke, vol. 12, ed. Johann G. von Herder and Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols. (Berlin:  Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1879), 234; for details see above, p. 000, 000. 32 Johann G. Eichhorn, Einleitung ins Alte Testament: Erster Teil, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Weidmannische Buchhandlung, 1787), vi. 33 Bernfeld, “Erinnerungen an Chajim Steinthal,” 704. — 172 —

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other peoples’ theogonies or cosmogonies through its grace of perception and expression, as well as its depth of insight. Moreover, this image appears to be a fundamental criticism of these systems because it is so similar to them.34 There is one characteristic that deserves to be emphasized: Israel, according to the quote above, was not an overly talented or inventive tribe compared to the others. Its true contribution to the “world being” was, in fact, its fundamental criticism of all existing systems. Today, it is difficult to grasp just how provocative, “revolutionary,” and convincing Steinthal really appeared to be with this hermeneutic perspective. From antiquity to the eighteenth century there existed (and still exists in traditional Jewish circles) the conviction that the world’s original people had received the entire truth, which is handed down to us only hazily and piecemeal. Knowledge has therefore, according to this Plotinian logic, a genealogy that might be tracked.35 People who were chronologically closer to truth were more likely to understand it than were those who followed them. Even the Greeks—according to Herodotus—suffered in that they came later than the Egyptians and Babylonians. The conviction that the grace of the people of Israel was rooted in their great age was cherished by Jews and Gentiles alike. This was one of the aspects, for instance, that made kabbalah acceptable in higher society from the fourteenth century until the Romantic era. Steinthal strongly argued against this view by underlining the fact that the quality of Judaism is based on its ethical qualifications, not on its (alleged or assumed) genealogy. In this context, it does not matter “whether the prophet’s perception of the world’s origin is consistent with the perception of modern science[….] Psalm 104 does present the creation story as well, but who would compare this poetry with science?”36 Steinthal’s reflections on 34 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 97. German: “Vielleicht sogar das gesammte Material von ihnen entlehnend, aber nach eigenem Grundgedanken verwendend, schuf er [der Prophet] ein Bild von der Entstehung des Alls und der Urgeschichte der Menschen, welches durch Erhabenheit der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks wie durch Tiefe der Erkenntnis sämmtliche Theogonien und Kosmogonien aller Völker weit überragt, ja, welches, gerade weil es diesen so ähnlich ist, als eine gewaltige Kritik dieser Systeme erscheint.” 35 See my own contribution, “Die humanistischen Wurzeln der ‘jüdischen’ Philosophie,” 249–278. 36 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 98f. — 173 —

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Darwin’s hypothesis regarding the origin of man are indeed in accord with the Talmudic school he visited as a boy: It could very well be that science is right and man descended from apes. Let us assume that this is indeed correct. Is an origin from clay nobler than that from apes? Is the body of the ape not the highest form of organized tissue? Why should God, when he wanted to create man, resort to inorganic matter like a sculptor who wants to create a lifeless image, rather than to an already animated tissue, a being that is immediately below the human? What does the prophet teach you? That man consists of dust and divine spirit. That is it. Where this dust, that is used for man, derived from (and the ape also consists of dust) should be of little importance to you; science may decide if it is capable of answering the question or interested in it.”37 One does detect some rabbinic echo in this. The presentation of God as a sculptor is an idea that inflamed passions as early as antiquity because of its inherent threat of anthropomorphism.38 The harmonization of science and tradition is typically rabbinic as well. The interpretation in its entirety, however, is not rabbinic: Steinthal reads the book of Genesis as prophecy, as an aim of mankind. The rabbis, on the other hand, do not. Yet it is his grammatical style that is most peculiar: “What does the prophet teach you?” is an address in the second person that recalls the tone of a sermon, but also expresses the distance of the 37

Ibid., 113. German: “Es könnte ja wol sein, dass die Wissenschaft recht hätte, wenn sie behauptet, der Mensch stamme vom Affen; und wir wollen einmal zugestehn, es verhalte sich in der Tat so. Ist denn der Ursprung aus Lehm edler, als der aus Affen? Ist nicht der Leib des Affen der höchst organisirte Stoff? Warum sollte Gott, als er den Menschen schaffen wollte, zu der anorganischen Materie greifen, wie ein Bildner, der ein totes Bild schaffen will, und nicht zu einem schon belebten Stoffe, einem Wesen, das unmittelbar unter den menschlichen steht? Was lehrt euch der Prophet? Dass der Mensch aus Staub und göttlichem Geist bestehe. Dabei bleibt es. Woher dieser Staub, der zum Menschen verwendet ist, stammt (der Affe ist doch auch Staub), kann euch sehr gleichgültig sein; die Wissenschaft mag es bestimmen, wenn sie kann, wie sie mag.” 38 See Midrash Rabba, Bereshit Rabba 1:9, and Warren Z. Harvey, “Rabbinic Attitudes toward Philosophy,” in “Open thou mine eyes …”: Essays on Aggadah and Judaica Presented to Rabbi William Gordon Braude on his Eightieth Birthday and Dedicated to his Memory, ed. Herman J. Blumberg (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 1992), 92 et seq. — 174 —

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lecturer. Was he attempting to disassociate himself from the subject? Or was he merely the “pious” atheist, as his contemporaries perceived him to be? Steinthal as a teacher refrained from presenting creation to his listeners as fictitious. He followed the audience’s belief and opinion. Twenty years later, he would change his main points, though, as Darwin had made an impact on him in the meanwhile: “Exposing the origin of language meant to me proving the origin of man in the animal.”39 The goal of his appraisal of Genesis remains an emphasis of biblicalethical monotheism: “One does […] not understand the prophet without the precondition that he wants to imprint on his listeners but the One: the one and sole, infinitely powerful and good God.”40 This is only the chorus of Steinthal’s view that the details of the world’s creation are not of great importance, but the aim of creation, revealing the oneness of God, is. “It is a powerful criticism the prophet offers; each and every of his repeated divine “Let there be” shattered a pagan structure of religion.”41 The creation of the world was, according to Steinthal, not an epic, or the explanation of the way existence came into being, but it was rather liberation from what already existed. As God, before his creating, had found the earth tohu va-vohu—“waste and void”—so has Israel’s prophet. The reduction ad unum, the usage of the One and the message that everything will be one is the cosmological element of creation or, better yet, the cosmological power. Steinthal offers the same structure of thinking, or the inner logical linkage of thought in respect to language: existence and power. “We find the idea in all peoples that the word voices the being of things, and they are thus directly interconnected.”42 Noun and thing are thus inseparable for many peoples to such a degree that they do not even have a notion of the origin of language, “because the becoming of things entails the origin of the name.”43 He continues by noting that “creation is has duality in Hebrew: things are first created as elements and materially, and then named. With their names, they receive their spiritual meaning for the

39 Heymann Steinthal, Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhange mit den letzten Fragen alles Wissens: Eine Darstellung, Kritik und Fortentwicklung der vorzüglichsten Ansichten, 4th ed. (Berlin: Dümmler, 1888), 353; quoted in Lazarus/Steinthal, Briefe, Vol. 1, CXIV. 40 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 99. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 104. 43 Ibid. — 175 —

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universe’s life and for the goings-on of man.”44 Steinthal is fascinated by the power of the word as God’s order: Through this, one could explain the idea, which is only found with the prophet and rarely with another people, that God’s omnipotence directly induces the creation through the word, the mere order. The pagans always imagine the gods as living limitedly and humanly. They consider them as very strong and powerful…, but as quintessentially living and acting like humans.45 Pseudo-Longinus had ridiculed Greek mythology at an early point, and Steinthal indirectly references this in his essay Peri hypsous (“Concerning the Sublime”).46 Steinthal also presents the story of the Tower of Babel in this light: “The pagans do not understand the concept of mankind; they only know many peoples. Thus, they cannot comprehend man before the diversification into peoples. The idea of a oneness of mankind is a direct result of ethical monotheism, to which we owe the story of the peoples’ dispersion.”47 This is the central point: the oneness of mankind as the logical consequence of the oneness of God. In conclusion, Steinthal specifically emphasizes in his reading of the Book of Genesis the one element that, seen exegetically, is least present: that of prophecy. Genesis is a mythological book that attempts to substantiate the story of the Exodus. God is seen as the founder of existence, who arrogates the same rule for Himself as the Israelite/Jew does after the revelation at Mount Sinai. This is a thought that had been expressed by Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, the Maharal, as well, although differently. The act of calling man from not-being into being is therefore based on the perfection of revelation and election. Steinthal could have 44 Ibid., 105. 45 Ibid. German: “Man könnte hieraus auch den Gedanken erklären, der sich ausschließlich beim Propheten findet und kaum bei einem andren Volke, dass Gottes Allmacht durch das Wort, den bloßen Befehl, unmittelbar die Schöpfung bewirkt. Die Heiden, die sich die Götter immer beschränkt und menschlich lebend und wirkend denken, stellen sich dieselben zwar sehr stark und mächtig vor [...], aber im Wesen leben und wirken dieselben wie die Menschen.” 46 On this aspect, see Menahem Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974), 364; John G. Gager, Moses in Greco-Roman Paganism (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), 56–63. 47 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 108. — 176 —

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referenced the Book of Deuteronomy, in which Moses’s prophecy is presented as the intellectuality that founded ethical monotheism and that distanced itself from the intellectuality of Egyptian magicians, the summoning of the dead, etc. Steinthal creates in his lecture a peculiar combination of involvement and distance concerning his subject. This might be explained by his usage of the term “criticism.” He limits the nature of prophecy to a “critical” force against any shade of polytheism. Steinthal explains the story of creation as a becoming, not a being—in which he differs markedly from the Maharal of Prague. It is a becoming that is clearly deduced from his view of language. Language is a “continuous active creation, no product ergon but an action energeia.48 In this respect, Steinthal is rooted in neo-Platonic and then kabbalistic thinking in a typical way. Here we find for the first time the hypothesis that words were “sounds filled with energy (resp. action).”49 This is a concept that was accepted by Pseudo-Longinus, as related to the story of creation. The great difference can be found in the fact that for the neo-Platonic, hermetic, and kabbalistic traditions energy is inherent only in some words, whereas for Steinthal, it is within all. The “holy” language does not play a special role for him, but is only language itself as being and becoming without a specific anthropological relevance. It is not a symbol of mankind as such, as Wilhelm von Humboldt had in mind; it requires the distinction/development of man from the animal.50 Humboldt did require the idea of a creating God for his hypothesis; Steinthal did not (anymore). Steinthal rarely mentioned a creating deity in his lectures, and when he did, it was only for the purpose of reproducing the opinion (or one might say the belief) of his audience. As language in its origin and being represents a perpetual energeia, so is creation a perpetual creation: it evolves. Thus Steinthal’s concluding verdict: the oneness of mankind is in 48 Steinthal, Der Ursprung der Sprache, 59; see also Hartwig Wiedebach, “Zu Steinthals Theorie vom Ursprung der Sprache und des jüdischen Monotheismus’,” in Chajim H. Steinthal, Sprachwissenschaftler und Philosoph im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartwig Wiedebach and Anette Winkelmann (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 89–112. 49 For references and the discussion of influential theories, see my own “Übersetzbarkeit und Magie,” 299–314. 50 Wilhelm von Humboldt and Heyman Steinthal, Die sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelms von Humboldts (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1884), 51; see also Lazarus/ Steinthal, Briefe, Vol. 1, CXIII. — 177 —

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the becoming, as is the oneness of the deity. While the prophets’ words espouse the latter, the former should be espoused by “brotherhood.” The brotherhood of mankind is a sacred idea. Each and every individual has to strive for its realization in his place in the world, as do each and every people in theirs. The oneness of mankind is not a fact of physical birth, but a pursuit of one’s ethical power. This is what the prophet demands and hopes for.51 It was a pious hope of the linguist Steinthal that the brotherhood/ oneness of mankind would be seen as an aspiration.52 Following the very same idea, ethical monotheism determines the oneness of God to be an objective, not a precondition. The world, man, and language therefore have one thing in common: the creation of a one-ness that is not inherent in their own origin.

51 Steinthal, Zu Bibel und Religionsphilosophie, 114. 52 David Baumgardt, “The Ethics of Lazarus and Steinthal,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 2 (1957): 205–217, especially 216. — 178 —

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3.2 Steinschneider on Magic & Interstitial Spaces

Magic is a cultural phenomenon that escapes precise and easy definitions. Scholars of past generations speak of its nature mostly by inviting comparisons while polemically or apologetically distinguishing it from other phenomena, such as religion, human science, and scientific developments. Magic clearly does not possess an existence of its own; rather, it posits relationships that are supposed to exist between the performers and actors of magical practices and reality. Therein it emerges in the interstitial space, where the magician is the protagonist and the magic circle the magician’s sole preserve: the “work” of a magician always presupposes the existence of a real or imaginary audience without which the magical act cannot take place. Magic is an in-between space—the interstitial component of political and social relevance. My aim in this chapter is to outline some of the interstitial characteristics of magic as identified in a rather neglected text by Moritz Steinschneider.1 He was among the first to describe, and also to understand, the phenomenon of those in-between spaces of human perception, alleged experience, and their results. I shall start by summarizing the presentations of Jewish magic offered between the Enlightenment and the end of the nineteenth century, with its increased interest in anthropology and ethnology. Then I will analyze the three definitions of magic suggested by Steinschneider: magic as fulfilling a maieutic function and as situated between ignorance and science; magic as situated between the erroneous and the pathologic, i.e., between error, prejudice, and mania; and finally, magic as situated between faith and deformed belief. Magic in the Wissenschaft des Judentums: Antecedents Studying rabbinic texts on magic, superstition, and healing was certainly not the foremost interest of thescholars of the “Science of 1

Moritz Steinschneider, Der Aberglaube: Vortrag im Verein junger Kaufleute zu Berlin (Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt u. Druckerei AG [vormals J.F. Richter], 1900), 346. — 179 —

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Judaism.” Quite to the contrary, they avoided approaching the subject, largely because they held a vision of Judaism—deriving from the Enlightenment—as a rational religion. They feared that if they studied Jewish magic the entire Jewish tradition could be viewed as a prolongation of the medieval mystical movement of kabbalah (although some Jewish authors, such as Salomon Maimon, held them apart from each other). Thus, in the manifesto of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, composed by Leopold Zunz, the presence of magic traditions in rabbinic literature is denied, or at least its significance is belittled.2 In Zunz’s monumental work on liturgy, the huge number of magical traditions scattered throughout the liturgical texts is not mentioned once, though they exist, for example, in siddurim, machzorim (prayer books), and the surviving fragments of ancient liturgical texts. From the second half of the nineteenth century onward, the earlier approach of deliberately ignoring the topic gradually transformed into an open expression of a rationalist polemic against the earlier, “obscure,” centuries, in which Judaism was affected by magical beliefs. This discourse became an anti-apology for what was described as the Jewish adoption of “foreign customs,” i.e., of non-Jewish magical traditions and superstitious practices, including the sources of kabbalah and Jewish mysticism. A second reason for the rise of interest in magic and superstitions is the characteristic tendency of the Wissenschaft des Judentums to collect and “encyclopedize” every piece of Jewish literature and tradition, be it originally Jewish or adopted from a foreign source. Yet even before the Wissenschaft des Judentums became open to this field of inquiry, considerations of the value of magic and superstition were by no means wholly unknown. In 1806, Johann Andreas Lebrecht Richter penned some thoughts and considerations on the value of magic in religion.3 These were published in Sulamith, the first periodical in the German language addressed to Jewish and non-Jewish readers alike.4 The 2

3 4

Zunz wrote, “Die unheilige rabbinische Litteratur hat keine hierobotanica, hierozoica, physicas und medicas sacras aufzuweisen, obgleich es billig gewesen wäre, nicht stets vom Aberglauben zu schreien, ohne seine Gegnerin, die Physik, angehört zu haben. Ihr zur Seite geht die M e d i c i n, gestützt auf die Kenntnisse der Natur, des Menschen (d.h. Psych- nebst Anthropo- und Physiologie) und die geschickte Anwendung dieser Kenntnisse.” Zunz, “Etwas über die rabinische Litteratur“ 14. Johann A. L. Richter, “Fragmente einiger Betrachtungen: Über den Aberglauben in der Religion,” Sulamith 1 (1807): 82–86. Werner Grossert, “‘Sulamit,’ die Friedliebende aus Dessau (1806–1848): Die erste jüdische — 180 —

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first modern treatise on Jewish magic was written by Gideon Brecher in 1850.5 A physician in Prossnitz (Prostějon) Moravia, Brecher considered magic an incidental phenomenon in Judaism which was adopted from the non-Jewish environment during the biblical and rabbinic periods. Rabbi David Heymann Joël followed a similar approach. In 1883, Joël collected legal and narrative rabbinic sources on the topic,6 seeking to show that biblical and Tannaitic sources (the latter referring to rabbinic sources of the first two centuries CE) were free of magical beliefs and practices, an erroneous view also shared by Israel Finkelscherer in his short 1894 book on the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides.7 In addition to these publications, some detailed studies on particular aspects of rabbinic folklore appeared at that time. Among these, the works of Max Grünbaum in 1877 and Israel Lewy in 1878 deserve mentioning,8 as they point to parallels between rabbinic views on magic and Jewish magic in the Graeco-Roman world. The authors of these early studies of ancient Jewish magic and superstition were primarily concerned with upholding a rationalist image of Judaism in the post-Enlightenment period, rather than with actually studying ancient rabbinic sources. Still, their work contributed greatly to mapping out magic in ancient Jewish literature and tradition, and was an indispensable foundation stone in the modern scientific study of the topic. This also holds true of the work of the great bibliographer Moritz Steinschneider. Steinschneider’s Way to Magic Steinschneider concerned himself with magic in several publications. As Zeitschrift in deutscher Sprache und deutscher Schrift,” in Jüdische Bildung und Kultur in SachsenAnhalt von der Aufklärung bis zum Nationalsozialismus, ed. Giuseppe Veltri and Christian Wiese (Berlin: Metropol, 2009), 133–46. 5 Gideon Brecher, Das Transcendentale, Magie und magische Heilarten im Talmud (Vienna: Klopf und Eurich, 1850). 6 David H. Joël, Der Aberglaube und die Stellung des Judenthums zu demselben, 2 vols. (Breslau: Jungfer, 1883). 7 Israel Finkelscherer, Mose Maimunis Stellung zum Aberglauben und zur Mystik (Breslau: Schottländer, 1894). 8 Max Grünbaum, “Beiträge zur vergleichenden Mythologie aus der Hagada,” Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 31 (1877); Israel Lewy, “Über die Spuren des griechischen und römischen Alterthums im talmudischen Schriftthum,” in Verhandlungen der 33. Versammlung Deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878), 77–88. — 181 —

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early as 1848, he published a book on magic and folklore called Alpha Beta de-ben Sira.9 In 1863, he devoted a study to the genre of oneirology,10 and twenty years later to the genre of divination.11 Another example of his immense curiosity, which including an interest in things irrational, manifests itself in two articles investigating the symbolic meaning and values of the numbers 70, 71, 72, and 73 in both Islam and Judaism.12 These publications are of great philological, cultural, and historical interest, being mostly encyclopedic surveys of traditions and texts. Steinschneider did not seek to conceptualize magic theoretically except, to the best of my knowledge, on a single occasion: a lecture held at the Verein Junger Kaufleute (Association of Young Merchants) in Berlin in 1900,13 to which I shall devote my attention here. The script for this speech is a little known writing of Steinschneider’s, due to the fact that it was published as part of a little-known series addressed to laypeople. This stands in contrast to his alleged tendency to publish only in highbrow journals—a practice that according to Ludwig Geiger revealed Steinschneider as a “mercantile mind” (merkantiler Geist)14—yet his concern with magic derived from his pedagogic concern, and was part and parcel of his Enlightenment program, a preoccupation that stood in the foreground of his lecture. In Steinschneider’s view, the literature of magic belongs neither to the realm of the beautiful nor to that of the true and good.15 It therefore 9

Alfa Beta de-Ben Sira: rishonah u-sheniyah, ‘im ha-perush ha-yashan ha-kolel meshalim u-ma‘asiyot u-midrashot. Alphabetum Syracidis (Berlin: Typis Friedlaender, 1848). New Edition with German Translation by Dagmar Börner-Klein, Das Alphabet des Ben Sira: Hebräisch-deutsche Textausgabe mit einer Interpretation (Wiesbaden: Marix, 2007). 10 Moritz Steinschneider, “Das Traumbuch Daniels und die oneirokritische Litteratur des Mittelalters,” Serapheum 24 (1863): 193–201, 209–216. 11 Moritz Steinschneider, “Losbücher,” Hebräische Bibliographie 6 (1863): 120 et seq. 12 Moritz Steinschneider, “Die kanonische Zahl der muhammedanischen Secten und die Symbolik der Zahl 70–73, aus jüdischen und muhammedanisch-arabischen Quellen nachgewiesen,” Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 4 (1850): 145–170; ibid., 57 (1903): 474– 507. 13 Associations of (young) merchants were very popular in nineteenth- and twentiethcentury Germany. See the entry of the Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon, vol. 10 (Leipzig: Biblioigraphisches Institut, 1907), 772; accessible online under: www.zeno.org/Meyers-1905/A/ Kaufm%C3%A4nnische+Vereine (last accessed December 2, 2008), and Steinschneider, Der Aberglaube. 14 In Berliner Tagesblatt No. 160, quoted in W. Ahrens, “Zum Charakterbilde Moritz Steinschneiders,” Ost und West: Illustrierte Monatsschrift für das gesamte Judentum 16 (1916): 349–352; accessible online. 15 On this concept, see Moritz Steinschneider, Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters (Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938), 12. — 182 —

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has no place on the Olympus of the intellectual canon. Steinschneider further states that magic belongs to the domain of notorious yet unreflected things that cannot be explained—though explaining it is a task to which scholarship will set itself in future generations, he adds in a hopeful mood. To accomplish his pedagogic undertaking and come to terms with magic, Steinschneider enumerates three ways of looking at it: (i) consideration of examples of magical convictions/beliefs; (ii) comparison with other similar concepts; and finally, (iii) viewing it with the linguistic attitude. Accordingly, he offers three components of a definition and functions of magic. Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (i) The Maieutic Function Superstition, Steinschneider states, is very difficult to define because of its very nature. One should consider, he suggests, whether a false conviction is per se a superstition.16 If we believe that it is, we have to consign all superstition to the history of human follies (Thorheiten des Menschen). Steinschneider indeed arrives at such a worldview. Accordingly, to him superstition encompasses the entire sphere of mistakenly interpreted phenomena—for example, it includes the view that upholds the heliocentric cosmology against the biblical and Christian mappings of the universe. Still, the history of superstition is a good are for research, as it is often the starting point for good science. To express this motif, Steinschneider quotes Ludwig Börne: “I admire divine Providence, which knows how to fish in muddy water” (Ich bewundere die Vorsehung, die so im Trüben zu fischen versteht).17 Steinschneider’s perspective of interpretation—at least at this point—thus clearly envisions magic as a matrix of the sciences: magic, and superstition generally, have some merit.18 He offers the well-known examples of alchemy, the mother 16

“Wir wollen den Begriff des Aberglaubens finden; ist jeder falsche Ansicht von der Welt und Natur ein Aberglaube?” Steinschneider, Der Aberglaube, 4. 17 Ibid., 5. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify Börne’s original quotation. 18 “In der That haben Wahn und Aberglaube die wichtigsten Wissenschaften erzeugt.” Ibid. And more precisely on p. 11: “Die Geschichte des Aberglaubens führt also nicht zur Verzweiflung an der menschlichen Vernunft und der göttlichen Weisheit, sondern umgekehrt, sie lehrt uns, daß auch die Verirrungen die Menschen zu dem erhabenen Ziel führen, zu dem sie bestimmt sind, und — 183 —

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of chemistry, and astrology, the forerunner of astronomy. “A talented chemist really produces gold [i.e., succeeds in earning money], indeed without employing magic formulas and conjuration.”19 Similarly, magical obstetric practices gradually led to scientific practice. Steinschneider’s comments on astrology are interesting. He claims that the heavens initially became an object of human observation for a very practical reason: to align the vital cycles in accordance with the movements of the stars and the planets. Later, the belief arose that heavenly designs inform human life, through the influence of the macro- on the micro-cosmos. Here, the attentive reader can detect a first contradiction in Steinschneider’s reasoning: he wavers on whether astrology is the beginning of astronomy, or whether it is astronomy that came first, before being overwhelmed by astrological beliefs. More generally, is science indebted to non-scientific enterprises (such as astrology and magic), or is the progress of science autonomous? This interesting issue will not be discussed here, but is worth consideration elsewhere. Steinschneider’s thesis, which posits that the value of magic is that it constituted the beginning of science, is of course the view later supported by Lynn Thordike (1882–1965) in his monumental A History of Magic and Experimental Science (1923–58). This is also the view of Marcel Mauss, who writes: Magic is linked to science in the same way as it is linked to technology. It is not only a practical art; it is also a storehouse of ideas. It attaches great importance to knowledge—one of its mainsprings. In fact, as far as magic is concerned, knowledge is power.... It quickly set up a kind of index of plants, metals, phenomena, beings and life in general, and became an early store of information for astronomical, physical, and natural science. It is a fact that certain branches of magic, such as astrology and alchemy, were called applied physics in Greece. That wenn leider noch so viel des Aberglaubens unter uns inmitten der edelsten Bestrebungen nach Aufklärung herrscht, so wird auch dieser noch zur Förderung unserer Kenntnis dienen, so lange es nicht an Männer fehlt, welche mit Selbstaufopferung dem Streben nach Wahrheit sich hingeben.” Ibid. 19 German: “Ein tüchtiger Chemiker macht wirklich Gold ohne Zauberformel und Beschwörung.” Ibid. — 184 —

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is why magicians received the name of physikoi and that the word physikoi was a synonym for magic.20 The theory of the origin of scientific thought in magic is, however, a weak one, as historians of science know today. Magic cannot be attributed to such a function, because magicians refuse the first principle of science, namely the existence of a necessary link between cause and caused (effect), and the inference from the caused to the cause. Although the magician agrees to take causality into consideration, he does not recognize it as the sole explanation of phenomena. In rabbinic Judaism, medicine and astrology are the only two sciences of empirical and theoretical “scientific” value. The rabbis accepted them, although the written Torah issued an interdiction on consulting physicians and astrologers, inasmuch as these practices run against the notion of divine unity and the idea of divine providence. This allows us to understand how foreign ideas could infiltrate Judaism: the usefulness of medicine and the scientific solidity of astrology were generally accepted in late antiquity, although the efficacy of medical practices and the reliability of astrologers were under discussion. Medicine and astrology are also discussed in the Talmud Yerushalmi, where they are regarded as coming from foreign knowledge, the socalled darkhey ha-emori. According to the rabbinic way of thinking, foreign knowledge could not be rejected outright as idolatrous or harmful even when it opposed the Torah. We have here an instance of an aspect of rabbinic Judaism which should not be underestimated: science is considered to be an activity that is complementary to preoccupation with the Torah. Rabbinic Judaism accepts or rejects new and old sciences only on the basis of their practical-pragmatic “scientific” value, and not according to whether they are supported or condemned by the Torah. The Babylonian Talmud summarizes this attitude in the well-known dictum, “Whoever, even among the nations of the world, speaks words of science/wisdom, is considered a wise man” (kol ha-omer divre hokhmah afilu be-ummot ha-‘olam niqra hakham; BT Megillah 16a). Let us return to Steinscheider’s definition of magic as serving a ma20 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic: Transl. from the French by Robert Brain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 143. It was originally published in Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris 19663, 136; it is mentioned in Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean tradition (Oxford et al.: Clarendon, 1995), 229. — 185 —

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ieutic function to science. This definition, let me emphasize, is rooted in Steinschneider’s very positivist, Enlightenment-inspired ideas with regard to the impact of the sciences on society. According to this concept, the sciences gradually illuminate the darkness of ignorance in an ongoing process whose end, he acknowledges, cannot be foreseen. Steinschneider was visibly troubled by the fact that the use of magic was still alive and well in his own time. By arguing that the process of education and enlightenment is endless he could uphold his Enlightenment optimism, ascribing to future generations the disappearance of magic. He thereby tosses the wheat against the breeze of Enlightenment, freeing it from the chaff of magical practices. Conversely, he reveals the impotence of human beings in their efforts to free themselves from superstitions. This takes us further, to Steinschneider’s second topic. Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (ii) Magic as Error, Prejudice, and Mania In his second proposal for a definition of magic, Steinschneider adopts a psychological characterization of magic as situated between error (Irrtum), prejudice (Vorurtheil), and mania/illusion (Wahn). Following a line of thought based on developmental theories, he argues that an erroneous opinion is based on insufficient knowledge. For example, in the Middle Ages the phenomenon of a reddish color to raindrops (which we now know to be caused by dust particles which at times cover the earth), was regarded as bloody rain.21 An erroneous judgment in turn can give rise to superstition. This was the case, for example, when molten lead is dropped into cold water on St Sylvester’s eve, resulting in an object which resembles a coffin nail, and which is subsequently interpreted as a death omen. The typical New Year’s Eve party in Germany, for instance, still entails honoring this magic tradition of lead-pouring. Even worse than an error, according to Steinschneider, is mania, as it is attractive and emotionally intriguing. It mobilizes one’s instinctual feelings in an effort to change one’s future existence. Whereas error and superstitions are usually inactive (untätig) and therefore innocuous (unschädlich), mania, Steinschneider maintains, can bring about one’s demise. 21 See John S. P. Tatlock, “Some Mediaeval Cases of Blood-Rain,” Classical Philology 9 (1914): 442–447. — 186 —

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According to Steinschneider, magic and superstition can produce mania if they originate from an inner desire to dominate and control someone or something. Steinschneider’s reference to mania in this context is telling, for at the end of the nineteenth century there was a notable production of literature on mania.22 Nietzsche, for example, draws on the notion of mania to explain the phenomenon of the founder of a religion, referring to mania as an experience that is independent of one’s wishes.23 The third and last type of superstitions is prejudice, according to Steinschneider. Prejudice is a “positive illness,” indeed a “tumor” (Aftergebilde), of the activity of the intellect, which alters the perception of reality. Whereas a healthy intellect reaches the stage of judgment after having examined matters, prejudice dictates rules and assessments of observance of reality. From this vision Steinschneider infers that the remedy for prejudice cannot be other than obtaining “enlightenment about ourselves and about the nature of our understanding.”24 The source of Steinschneider’s notion of prejudice is of course the Enlightenment philosophy and literature of the nineteenth century. The Brockhaus Bilder-Conversations-Lexikon, published in 1841, offers a definition of prejudice identical to Steinschneider’s; the suggested healing method is also the same, namely using philosophy and reason as self-therapy.25 Another source of Steinschneider’s view of magic was Jacob Grimm’s well-known book on magic and superstition.26 This book was very influential, being both a collection of oral materials gathered in situ and 22 See, for example, August Krauss, “Der Sinn im Wahnsinn,” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychologie XV/XVI (1858–59); A. Kazodowsky, “Zusammenhang von Träumen und Wahnvorstellungen,” Neurologisches Centralblatt 20 (1901): 440–447, 508–514; Oscar Pfister, “Wahnvorstellungen und Schülerselbstmord: Auf Grund einer Traumanalyse beleuchtet,” Schweizerische Blätter für Schulgesundheitspflege 9 (1909). 23 Daniel Havemann, Der “Apostel der Rache”: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2002), 114–115. 24 German: “… Vorurtheile durch Aufklärung über uns und die Natur unseres Verstandes.” Steinschneider, Der Aberglauben. 25 Brockhaus Bilder-Conversations-Lexikon Vol. 4 (Leipzig 1841): “Vorurtheil, eine vorgefaßte, nicht von Erfahrungen und von keinen oder doch nur unhaltbaren Gründen unterstützte Meinung von irgend etwas, also ein Irrthum, welcher dadurch entstand, daß ohne oder vor der Prüfung geurtheilt wurde…. Bekämpfung der Vorurtheile ist insbesondere eine Aufgabe der Philosophie, aber auch die Vernunft schon fordert von Jedem, sich von ihnen möglichst frei zu machen und zu erhalten.” The text is accessible online: www.zeno.org/Brockhaus-1837/A/Vorurtheil (last accessed January 3rd, 2009). 26 Jacob L. K. Grimm and Elard H. Meyer, Deutsche Mythologie, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1968); reprint of Ed. 1875–1878, 923 et seq. — 187 —

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a source-book of ancient and medieval literature and folklore on magic. Not only was Steinschneider a reader, but Lewi’s and later Lieberman’s commentaries on the magical material in Tosefta Shabbat 6–8 directly or indirectly follow Grimm’s pioneering work. Grimm refers to superstition (Aberglaube) as false belief (falscher Glaube), and he follows the contemporaneous definition and understanding of mania, probably thinking of such German terms as Zauberwahn (Witchcraft),27 and Traumwahn (belief in the prophetic might of dreams). 28 However, Steinschneider’s closest source may be rather unexpected, namely Goethe’s Farbenlehre (Theory of Colors), wherein the Weimar poet wrote: “Who could affirm … that superstition and mania, superficiality and prejudice, do not persevere hand in hand with the most intense activity and productivity, just as do belief and hope?”29 Goethe, like Steinschneider later, expresses in a light tone a sentiment of resignation regarding the continuity within society of human phenomena such as superstition. Steinschneider on the Functions of Magic: (iii) Magic, Faith and Deformed Beliefs Steinschneider’s last, very brief discussion draws on philology in order to point to the purifying role of theology with respect to magic and superstition. He explains the word Aberglaube (superstition) with a reference to Glaube (belief), namely as something that is “on,” “over,” or “against” belief. Aberglaube is, according to him, the distortion of belief (Verdrehung des Glaubens), a riot of feelings (Ausschreitung des Gefühls), and therefore a humiliation of the human spirit and mind (Erniedrigung 27 A very common word for magical practices; see the contemporary and influential work by Joseph Hansen, Zauberwahn, Inquisition und Hexenprozeß im Mittelalter und die Entstehung der großen Hexenverfolgung (München and Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1900). 28 For all these expressions see the Deutsches Wörterbuch, edited by Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm. 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854–1960); accessible online: http://germazope.uni-trier. de/Projects/WBB/woerterbuecher/woerterbuecher/dwb/wbgui (last accessed January 2009). 29 “Denn wer kann sagen ... daß er sich nicht neben dem ernstesten Thun und Leisten, wie mit Glauben und Hoffnung, so auch mit Aberglauben und Wahn, Leichtsinn und Vorurtheil hinhalte.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Zur Farbenlehre, Part I, quoted from Goethe-Wörterbuch, ed. Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen und der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 1.4: A-inhaftieren (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1978–). See the digital edition: http://germazope.uni-trier.de/Projects/ WBB/woerterbuecher/woerterbuecher/gwb/wbgui (last accessed January, 2009). — 188 —

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des menschlichen Geistes). Following a typical Enlightenment topos, Steinschneider claims that progress in theological and religious knowledge creates protection against superstition. Enlightened religion is a rampart against magical beliefs and concepts, preventing them from taking over and causing the deterioration of the religious belief itself. He links the development of the magical arsenal of concepts with the Zoroastrian dichotomy between good and evil, which later became a (Gnostic) division or incompatibility between the power of the divine and the devil in Christianity. Steinschneider is right when he seeks to explain the diabolical origins of magic in ancient Occidental systems of thought by tracing them back to Babylonian influences. However, the conviction that a demon is at work in the magical act goes back to the Augustinian interpretations of magic,30 while in Judaism it first appears, also in late antiquity, in the Babylonian academies.31 By contrast, the Persian doctrine of the two powers seems not to have had a great impact. This becomes clear if we consider the following clear statement about the nature of magic: sorcery (kishshuf) “lessens the power of the divine agencies” (BT Sanhedrin 67a).32 This statement is preceded by a quotation from Deut. 4:35: “There is nobody except Him.” The text thus clearly suggests that there is only one power, namely divine power. Consequently, the sorcerer who operates must do so by drawing on God’s power. This is why the magician lessens the power of God. In this theological framework, divine power can act without God’s explicit will. In this last paragraph, Steinschneider implicitly presupposes two commonly-held scholarly opinions on magic: that the demons are fallen divinities and that magic is related to the permanence of pagan beliefs and customs that neither Judaism, Christianity, or Islam could 30 For the identification of magic with demonology in Augustin see Jean-Claude Schmitt, “Les ‘supersititons,’” in Histoire de la France religieuse, Vol. 1: Des dieux de la Gaule à la papauté d’Avignon (des origines au XIVe siècle), ed. Jacques Le Goff et al. (Paris: Seuil, 1988), 416–551; Robert A. Markus, “Augustine on Magic: A Neglected Semiotic Theory,” Revue des études augustiennes 40 (1994): 357–388; see also Thomas O’Loughlin, “The Development of Augustine the Bishop’s Critique of Astrology,” Augustinian Studies 30 (1991): 83–103. 31 See BT Sanhedrin 67b: R. Aibo bar Nagri said (in the name of) R. Hiyya bar Abba: b‘latehem (Exod. 7:22) refers to the effect by demons, b’lahatehem (Ex. 7:11) refers to the effect by sorcery. For it has been written, The glow of the sword, which swings around itself (Gen. 3:24). R. Abbaye said: He who cares for the vessel he uses operates through demons; he who does not care operates through magic.” 32 See also Simcha Fishbane, “‘Most Women Engage in Sorcery’: An Analysis of Sorceresses in the Babylonian Talmud,” Jewish History 7 (1993): 28–29. — 189 —

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totally eradicate. A reason why this was the case has been implied by Jacob Grimm in a well-known statement that concluded his treatment of superstition: “We are glad to have laid to rest so many superstitious practices. Yet, they filled the lives of our ancestors not only with fear, but also with consolation.”33 This same aspect of consolation also appears in Steinschneider’s last topic of consideration, when he refers, with regret, to the continued presence of magic in the industrial and scientific age of Enlightenment. He quotes Lessing’s Nathan the Wise: The superstition in which we were brought up Will though we have seen through it thereby not lose its power over us. Not all are free who mock at their own fetters.34 Steinschneider was neither a philosopher nor a theoretician. He was a historian of books and manuscripts, a bibliographer, and above all a philologist. His main concern was to portray the “primitive” nature of magic as running against sophisticated philosophical and theological ideas of the divine, due to the absence of a scientific mind characterized by logical activity. He was preoccupied by the continued presence of magical ideas in later, enlightened periods. He largely followed Jacob Grimm, who argued that the demarcation between religion and magic, between science and superstition, is blurred, making it difficult to find clear-cut criteria for distinguishing them. This is why Christianity, for example, did not eradicate magic and superstition. Steinschneider is aware that magic is not a simple phenomenon, and refuses to follow Grimm in simply ascribing all superstition to the credulity of the masses: the phenomenon is too widely spread in every stratum of society. In my opinion, the nature of magic lies in the process that leads from the hidden to the unhidden, and vice versa. In a given operation, it is 33 German: “Wir sind froh des vielen Aberglaubens auch ledig zu gehen; doch erfüllte er das Leben unsrer Voreltern nicht allein mit Furcht, sondern auch mit Trost.” Grimm, Mythologie, 960. 34 German: Der Aberglaub‘ in dem wir aufgewachsen Verliert auch wenn wir ihn erkennen darum Doch seine Macht nicht über uns. Es sind Nicht alle frei, die ihrer Ketten spotten. Lessing, Nathan IV, 4; English translation in Christoph von Mettenheim, “Einstein, Popper and the Theory of Relativity,” The Critical Rationalist 1 (1996): 1.169. — 190 —

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neither the origin nor the goal that is magical, but rather the way. Magic is distinguished by how elements borrowed from one culture interplay with other elements, without those who use them being willing or able to understand the contents. The magician’s interest, in other words, is less aroused by a theory than by the effects of a text on which he draws, and by the practice in which he is engaged, like that of bringing about cures through magical formulae hic et nunc. It is not only the sense of magic that is uncovered in such practice, but even more so the energy which it sometimes unleashes when certain conditions are fulfilled. However, even a practice crowned with success does not necessarily mean that a rule can be derived from it; the goal of the practice is not to produce scientific knowledge. Magic is thus the empirical science par excellence, a feature that clearly comes to the fore in its affinity with medicine: both sciences apply to human beings in given contexts, yet both also lay claims to the empirical value of their achievements. It is at this point that we find the characteristic paradox: magical knowledge is empirically bound by the parameters of its context, but it makes absolute empirical claims, transcending any time framework. Contrary to certain speculations that claim otherwise, the center of every magical concept lies in man himself, in his very own humus. It is not super-stitio that inspires man’s worldview and value system, but only that which is perceived anthropologically as the I or ego. Everything else serves him, just as colors and internally envisioned images serve a painter. Equipped with this awareness, the “magician” sets out to study the provable and the proven, the possible and the impossible; things that he can use as materia magica. The magician is neither monotheist nor polytheist, but pragmatist. This element of an “a-” or “over-” theistic value makes the magician a perpetual interstitial element within society, between power and belief.

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3.3 On the Cultural Dynamics of the Jewish Religion: Lajos Blau’s Defense of Monotheism as a Driving Force

Changes in Blau’s Time The Jahrbuch für Jüdische Geschichte und Literatur, the popular journal of Jewish history and literature, was founded and—until his death in 1909—coedited by Gustav Karpeles, the German Jewish historian of literature and editor. In the Jahrbuch in 1901 the Hungarian rabbi and scholar of Talmudic and classic literature Lajos (Ludwig) Blau (18611936) published an important lecture on the concept of the Jewish religion in what was then the present and future. Blau is known for his studies on ancient magic, the Talmud, documents, and classical languages. This document is important inasmuch as it gives us an accurate idea of Blau’s intellectual world and his thoughts about the conditions of Jews in European countries. The historical frame of his article was the so-called Jewish question: how to react to the pogroms against Jews in Hungary and above all the assimilation process that threatened to obliterate Jewish identity from the map of Europe. The prime aim of his writing was to suggest that monotheism constituted the vital force of the Jewish commitment to the religion of the fathers, and to address the Jewish identity and presence in the modern world. His lecture was an answer to the challenges the modern world posed for Jewish identity, and was also a chapter in the process we can term “the cultural and confessional dynamics of monotheisms.” In other words, it was a chapter on systems of social and cultural changes, their instruments, inner forces, revolutions, and inversions, and their impact on contemporary and future society on the basis of religious confessions and beliefs in monotheism. Among Jewish intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century, the word “monotheism” was the cohesive element in the confession of the internal and the existential liaison between past and present. I use the term “confession” deliberately here, for two reasons: first, monotheism was considered a religious act with an impact on the group and its identity, not merely a set of beliefs. And, second, Ludwig Blau defended the — 192 —

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Jewish religion by employing this word in this specific context. Let me begin by looking at his contribution in greater depth. Blau begins his general complaint by noting the low interest in traditional piety, a reduced religiosity attributable to a widespread and general disinterest in religion in his secular times. For this reason, he believed that the doctrines and liturgical practices of Reform Judaism were not a real remedy. He apologetically comments that the Jewish religion had overcome its long history of oppression and had survived it. In the changing situation in nineteenth-century Hungary, his intent was “to discover those ideas whose driving force is still alive and intact within the souls of the educated.” At the beginning of his defense of Jewish idea and belief, Blau presents monotheism as the driving force (German: Triebkraft) of the Jewish religion and thus the core of its excellence. And that is not a casual remark. The reader of the text can refer not only to the contemporary discussion stirred by Sigmund Freud and his theory of the sexual energy of the soul, but—and perhaps much more deliberately and explicitly— to the preceding philosophical debate on world energy, the energy of nature which infuses the macro- and microcosm. Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, envisaged the will as world principle; Georg Simmel saw love as the motive force powering the macrocosm. The conception of the energetic principle of love infusing the cosmos was not totally unknown to Judaism. As early as in the sixteenth century, Leo Hebraeus had maintained that love was the force that gave rise to all life in the universe in Dialoghi d’amore. Shortly before Blau wrote his essay (in 1888), Jeanette Schwerin-Abrabanel translated parts of Hebraeus’s dialogue into German, and in 1886 and 1892, Rabbi Bernard Zimmel published his doctoral thesis and other studies on him. One reason for focusing on monotheism was, of course, the classic polarity between Christianity as a doctrine of love and Judaism as a tradition of law. Much more cogent, however, was the consideration that the Romantic concept of love refers to the polytheistic world of nature and to “where the wild things are.” It is a view that permeated Romantic thinking in the German tradition especially, and thus its intellectual impact on Europe. According to Blau’s introduction to the cultural dynamics of contemporary Judaism, the first step is to look at the changes in Jewish society that might have damaged its cultural and/or religious heritage. Blau lists the historical developments in the nineteenth century as follows: — 193 —

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Then

Now

Education (ability of writing) limited to an elect few

“Today more than six times the number of our co-religionists are attending secondary schools and universities.”

“Jews were forced to assimilate into European culture through harsh governmental laws.”

“We see them expelled from higher education institutions by even harsher laws in Romania and Russia.”

“When people used to frighten their children with demons and Jews, Moses Mendelssohn came close to being a world-renowned miracle.”

“A substantial number of Jews are working in the fields of literature, poetry, and science, and rarely without success.”

“Jews were thought to be incapable and utterly untalented in the arts due to their religion, which forbids them the worship of images.”

“The present time also sees Jewish names amongst the great stars that sparkle in the firmament of painting, sculpture, and music, and there are an appreciable number of Jewish actors.”

“The majority of members of our confession were traveling merchants.”

“The Jews have become major leaders in commerce, industry and agriculture. Once pariahs, when they were allowed to participate the Jews have also provided representatives of the art of governance.”

The reasons behind these changes are well known: 1) The school system introduced under the Edict of Tolerance (1782) in the Habsburg Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century spread general education (reading and writing in the national languages, teaching of mathematics, etc.) among Jewish families and fostered secular instruction in many Jewish communities; 2) Access to universities was likewise no longer prohibited to Jews. Beginning in the early years of the nineteenth century, Jewish students were allowed to attend university. Full equality was long in coming, as is clear from the history of Hermann Cohen’s chair at the University of Marburg and the resistance to the appointment of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) at the University of Göttingen. The educational integration of Jews was not fully achieved in Eastern Europe (in Russia and Romania, especially) because of the trend of excluding Jews from universities. 3) After Mendelssohn and the emergence of the Haskalah (Enlightenment) a growing number of Jews were engaged in belle lettres, painting, sculpture, and music. Here it is interesting to note that — 194 —

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Mendelssohn was by no means the perfect example of a fully and successfully integrated Jew. Members of Mendelssohn’s own family converted to Christianity, such as the whole family of the composer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who later converted to Judaism. 4) Out of the stereotypical Shylock, a new Jewish image developed, presenting Jews as leaders in commerce, industry, and politics. With the notable exception of Germany, Jews were relatively influencial in political matters in a number of countries. Yet Blau notes that the regeneration happened too quickly and “the new culture greedily devoured, has seriously damaged, our religious way of life, but not the ideas of our religion.” New customs and social behavior did not entirely change the Jewish religion and its ancient established principles. To explain the changes over time, Blau uses the contrast of religiosity vs. religion. Religiosity might have been affected by the crisis in various ways, but religion and its core were not. It would be erroneous to infer that Blau focuses on the private, personal dimension of religion, the way Schleiermacher’s Über die Religion (1799) had before him. On the contrary, Blau addresses the typical attitude of Reform Judaism in contrasting and interpreting Jewish customs and rites. Religiosity in this context is the ceremonialia Judaeorum, the legal dimension of the Jewish religion. In contrast to this vision, religion, according to Blau, is something else more sublime: it is the core claim of monotheism as moral commandment and mission. The Philosophical Background: Philo, Maimonides, and the Talmud Blau places Philo and Maimonides into the foreground as the great thinkers of the Jewish religion. Both of them were closely connected to two Jewish cultural revolutions, the first in antiquity and the second during the Middle Ages, rnvolving the Jewish Hellenistic heritage and the Islamic background of medieval Jewish philosophy and science respectively. Yet by indirectly quoting Jewish chronicles of medieval literature, Blau frames the typical discourse as an “assault” against Israel and a “resistance” by the Jewish people against the coalescent and oppressive power of the “Gentiles.” Blau writes that “The Jewish people has merged two world cultures in the course of its long existence: the — 195 —

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Hellenistic culture of antiquity and Arabic culture during the Middle Ages. Both mounted an assault on Israel, but our great thinkers illuminated the treasure of our knowledge and wisdom that will never lose its attraction.” Blau may place too much emphasis on the influence on the Jewish intellectual world by Hellenistic and Arabic cultures through their origination of new ideas and creation of new concepts and philosophies (although that impact was, of course, substantial). The central figure in Blau’s presentation of philosophy is Philo, the true father of Christianity. The summary of his credo, which focused on God as the creator of the world, is very important. Echoing the Hungarian Reform Rabbi Leopold Löw, Blau summarizes Philo’s teaching as follows: First, God exists and rules. In this teaching, Moses contradicts the atheists, many of whom doubt the existence of God. Some even deny His existence with impudence by claiming that only those who obscure the truth with fantastic poetry believe in it. Second, God is One. Here, he contradicts polytheists, who are not ashamed to transfer an imperfect form of government, namely ochlocracy, from earth to heaven. Third, the world was created. This lies in opposition to the opinion of those who refuse to see God as the origin of creation, and assume that the world was not created, but has existed eternally. Fourth, the created world is the only one, just as the Creator is One, etc. Fifth, the world is governed by God’s providence. The Creator cares for his creation, which is a general and necessary law of nature, just as parents care for their children. Blau is fully aware that Philo’s importance is above all centered on his cosmology and theodicy. This is exemplified by the Halle theologian August Ferdinand Dähne (1807–1893) in his Historical Introduction to — 196 —

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the Jewish Hellenistic Philosophy of Religion (1834). Dähne considered the Jewish Alexandrian philosophy as the praeparatio Evangelica, a preparation for the Gospel. Blau adds: “The Hellenistic-Judaic worldly and wise philosopher draws his teachings from the Holy Scripture; he was well aware that the Jewish religion encompassed and promulgated other teachings, such as ethical principles.” Blau does not mention which specific moral principle Philo developed. He could of course also have consulted Dähne, which he did not. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the emphasis on cosmology and theodicy has to be interpreted as “counter[ing] the prevailing and dangerous doctrine of paganism.” Strangely enough, Blau mentions Maimonides’s contribution to monotheistic ideals very briefly, despite the fact that Maimonides’ teachings and impact on German-Jewish culture were quite significant at that juncture. Blau only refers to Maimonides’ reception of Aristotle, his stress on the differences between Jewish and Islamic religious teachings, and his refutation of scriptures different from the Torah, and concludes that “he managed to protect Jewish doctrine from contemporary attacks and successfully averted any diseased currents of fundamentalism.” The viewpoints Maimonides has endured in the history of Jewish scholarship have, as is generally known, been many and varied; controversies in how to understand him abound, and his intellectualism was a matter of vehement dispute even during his lifetime. Nevertheless, his confession of monotheism and his 13 principles of faith were a powerful beam of support in the architecture of Jewish “theodicy” and ritual prayer in the synagogue. The absence of any special emphasis in Blau’s work is perhaps due to the use and abuse of Maimonides’ philosophy during this period. Also very brief and to some degree banal are Blau’s references to the Talmud, which he concludes with the observation, “I will not continue along these lines, since my aim is to prove that Judaism has never isolated itself from philosophical currents or closed its eyes in order to ignore innovative ideas.” He continues, “instead, it has always enhanced the encounter of its inherited teachings with other ideas for the benefit of humankind.” The lack of discussion on the Talmudic contribution to the philosophical study of monotheism was clearly based on the fact that—as aTalmudist—Blau was quite aware that there is little speculation on this matter in the Talmud. The Talmud is a work of narrative (Aggadah) and legal decision (halakhah), not a treatise of philosophy. — 197 —

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The second part of the apology of monotheism is only a very quick reference to the world of the past, which calls to mind two eras during which a dynamic exchange between Judaism and its milieu took place. However, it was not Blau’s aim to emphasize the common heritage between Judaism and its environment, but rather to illuminate the differences. And these were, naturally, best expressed in the evaluation of and emphasis on the argument of Jewish monotheism. Monotheism vs. Paganism: The Moral Mission The third aspect of Blau’s defense of religious tradition is the main point of his article: the Jewish religion as a “lively and energizing factor” (lebendinger und treibender Faktor) which can be summarized in the doctrine of monotheism. The monotheistic God is not a tyrant “who arbitrarily rules human beings according to his inclination, begrudging and envying each mortal’s earthly prosperity, like his pagan ancestors.” No, this God is “holy, righteous and moral.” The Christian reader of Blau will note his indirect allusion to St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans (7:12): “So then the Law is holy, and the commandment is holy and righteous and good.” Blau does not discuss the “Law,” the way St. Paul does, but rather God and His people. Blau incorporates a Jewish-Christian vision of the law and interprets it as the core of monotheism. Blau opposes Christian theology and anthropology. For “Gods are like the people and people are in turn like their gods,” and hence “A loving, perfect, righteous, holy and good God demands from his creatures that they value love, holiness, and lead a good life.” The Jewish foundation of morality is based on the Jewish vision of God; however, the dissemination of monotheism seems not to have been a goal of Jewish missionary policy. Blau indirectly quotes Maimonides’ last chapter of Hilkhot Melakhim, commenting that “Judaism has fulfilled its mission, since monotheism has been spread among all civilized peoples.” He alludes to the 800 million Christians and 300 million Muslims who were alive in his time, who contributed to the dispersal of monotheism. Nevertheless, Blau’s pronouncement is the first part of a critique of Christianity and Islam, the alleged proselytizing vehicles of monotheism. According to Blau and to Jewish apology more generally, Christianity is still closely related to polytheism and violence. Regarding this first as— 198 —

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pect, Blau refers to Alfred F. Berner’s Judaism and Christianity and Their Future (1891). Berner critically mentions the “polytheistic elements in Christian doctrine” and praises Judaism, which maintains and preserves “the most ancient and powerful historical roots of monotheism.” Monotheism alone, i.e., monotheism devoid of moral content, is impossible, because “the cosmos is governed by a most perfect Being, who demands a government of virtue among mankind.” This means that “Adonai demands human perfection, a morally pure life, mercy and justness. In Judaism, the unity of the Creator is proclaimed as a unity of Creation and the unity of humankind.” Or in other words: “Faith and ethics are inseparably interconnected.” The second point of criticism against the other established monotheistic religions comprises concerns about the violence originating from political intents and entanglements, and dogmatic ideology: “Judaism does not depend on ruling its followers with religious dogmas like a state that governs its subjects with police regulations useful to it.” Blau adds that “the power of Judaism does not flow from physical violence, but from the irresistible attractiveness its ideas exerts on its followers.” The reason for Judaism’s lack of political power is the absence of a land over which it can exercise power and promote religion, and therefore it concentrates on moral commitments. Thus, Blau writes, “Judaism is the only confession that has never insisted on its share of worldly power; furthermore, it even denies the well-known principle of cuius regio [eius] religio.” The absence of political violence is also the reason why the Jewish religion expounds a “universal love of mankind, eternal peace, and the prospect of a more glorious age.” It does so according to the biblical— though Christian—commandment “love thy neighbour as thyself,” or, as the dictum of Rabbi Hillel in a more popular (and genuinely Jewish) form has it, “What you despise, let not your neighbour suffer from it.” I would add here that the absence of political power in Judaism was also a topic commented upon by the Venetian rabbi Simone Luzzatto. Luzzatto wrote in the seventeenth century that “Nonetheless, if someone still wishes to investigate which customs [Jews] share universally, one could say that they are a nation with an unusual and tired spirit, incapable in their present state of all political government, busy with their particular interests, quite—if not completely—unaware.” In his De Pace fidei, XIII, Nicholas of Cusa wrote that “However, this resistance of — 199 —

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the Jews will not impede harmony, for [the Jews] are few in number and will not be able to trouble the whole world by force of arms.” In contrast to Luzzatto, Blau sees the absence of a country as the precondition for the policy of peace enshrined in Judaism in its Diaspora and dispersion. Blau was aware that the political situation in Hungary in his era was far removed from that of the scholars’ dreams. His hopes are comparable to the summary of the French philosopher and former Foreign Minister Jules Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire (1805–1895): “The Jews must protect and keep their faith and religion, which has existed for the past three millennia and which time has never shaken.” And, curiously, Blau also quotes Ernest Renan: “Judaism, which has achieved great things in the past and has served many noble purposes, will do so in the future. […] In one word, this pure religion, that we sense as the sole bond holding together all of humanity, will be the realization of the religion of Isaiah, an ideal Jewish religion that will be purified of all added slag.” Blau concludes as he began: “Judaism is a great and daring idea in history; its legacy is the true Torah and eternal life; its eminent past is an obligation to a great future in the field of eternal and glorious worship of ideas and ideals.” This is, possibly, an optimistic view of history, of the past as well as the present and hope for the future. Then and Now: Some Thoughts on the Debate on Monotheism It is important to emphasize that a very significant part of the discussion about the Jewish religion is not about its nature but rather concerns its impact on its neighboring societies, whether or not they are monotheistic. The real question is, what is the reason for the antisemitic or antiJewish attacks on Jews in world history if Jews do not proselytize and their credo is focused on their own monotheism? Ludwig Blau seems to believe that the doctrine of pure monotheism and its moral legacy, as the essence of the Jewish religion, should be the stimulus for the young Jewish generation, because “Judaism is a great and daring idea in history.” Yet his reference to Ernest Renan is not complete. Renan was not enthusiastic about the Jewish conception of monotheism. As mentioned above, the Hungarian Reform rabbi Leopold Löw commented on Renan’s Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère générale des peuples sémitique, et en particulier sur leur tendance au monothéisme, ac— 200 —

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cusing him of denying any Jewish advancement in speculative thought, for which reason he “invented … the Semitic instinct.” Although this is an abridged representation, Renan sought to diminish the “invention” of monotheism by Jews and its intellectual significance by introducing the idea that the development of monotheism was simply a matter of “instinct.” According to a contemporary German-Jewish scholar, the linguist Steinthal, Renan viewed monotheism as a product “d’un esprit étroit, sec et dénué de toute flexibilité.” Monotheism, in Renan’s view, is not a positive part of Judaism, but indeed an entirely negative aspect. Monotheism was not a beloved concept during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, considered as a motive force for social and religious behavior—at least not predominantly so. Other words and concepts were privileged, and a canon of “energy-based” terminology was formed and utilized, as reflected in Schopenhauer’s concept of the world as will and idea, Neo-Platonist and romantic love, and Marxist conceptions of labor. The use of monotheism as a motive force was merely a Jewish argument espoused by the likes of Steinthal or Blau, while others, despite the Christian focus on theodicy, tried to revalorize the pagan contribution to European culture. If we look back on the history of attacks by non-Jews against Jews that were incited by the Jewish belief in monotheism, we find an interesting pattern of explanation. Rabbi Simone Luzzatto stated in his presentation of Jewish customs and beliefs that [I]f anyone should ask the Hebrew what was the reason for which God did not care to have his religion and the observance of rites propagated in antiquity among the Gentiles, he would respond that that remains enveloped among the profound secrets of the divinity … and if it is possible to add any human reason to the secrets of His Divine Majesty, it could further be replied that according to the Hebrews, God, wanting to conserve religion among them, did not wish that the Hebrew rites spread to the neighboring Gentiles. [55v] And the reason for this was that as the antiperistatic motion reinforces the qualities of natural things and strengthens it, and the cold surrounding the hot develops the virtue/energy, while the stoics said that the — 201 —

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cold air which suddenly assails the new baby makes it live by re-concentrating the heat, so too the domination of the enemy and the terror strengthen the people and infuse it with military spirit, so in the same way the repugnance of the religion of the surrounding neighbours rendered the national faith more lively in its own belief and more militant in the defense of its native rites.1 Luzzatto’s argumentation is carefully constructed. He begins with the absence of missionary activity in Judaism in antiquity, here explained as a divine secret. God did not care to spread the Jewish religion into neighboring lands and peoples. Luzzatto merely refers to “antiquity” and the “Gentiles.” There is a simple explanation for what motivated the Venetian rabbi: proselytizing for Judaism was punishable by death in Luzzatto’s time. But how should we explain the absence of monotheism, which has to be considered the core of divine religion, yet was unfortunately not spread to the Gentiles? Christianity has, of course, the Pauline argument of the advent of Christ, who permitted the expansion of the belief in a true God and his rites. Luzzatto, in contrast, has resorted to the argument of the secrets of God. It was, perhaps, a poor and in essence evasive argument. The second point is much more important and surely of salient significance for the rabbis. We may ask: how can we explain the persistence of Jewish beliefs, rites, and monotheism in the broader context of the pagan world? Luzzatto refers to the doctrine of the “antiperistatic motion,” which “reinforces the qualities of natural things and strengthens them.” He mentions its physical application, the medical observation regarding—or, more accurately, speculation on—birth and respiration attributed to Stoic philosophy, the military aspect of the enemy, and finally, the repugnance of the religion practiced by the surrounding neighbors. As I see it, the reinforcement of identity by reinforcement of a “national faith” seems to be a specific aspect of Luzzatto’s political thinking. He retains the reinforcement of Jewish monotheism, the other side of the coin of the pagan attacks on Judaism. The more the “Gentiles” attack Jewish beliefs, the more the belief in monotheism is reinforced. Rabbi Blau would certainly agree. 1 Luzzatto, Discorso 55r-v. — 202 —

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According to Lajos Blau, changes in human society and even persecution do not affect the Jewish religion as a monotheistic confession in a liberal state, because of the vital force inherent in it. In a period in which monotheism was not properly the treibende Kraft, the vital driving force in society, in a period impregnated by the (German?) Romantic ideas of social, political, divinatory, and largely unconscious forces directing history, Blau tried to steer Jewish philosophy toward a path of morality. This was the morality necessarily inherent in the Jewish concept of moral mission. The Jewish German philosopher Hermann Cohen stated this aspect more precisely: Monotheismus ist zum Messianismus geworden (monotheism has become messianism), an idea encapsulated in the perspective of Maimonides regarding the knowledge of the Torah as a moral commitment to the world. To me this seems a naïve opinion far beyond the dangers of the developments of “modern” European history, because of the attempt to create a cultural dynamic within the Jewish community based on monotheistic commitment. The social and historical dynamics of political power resemble a process of systemic thought, which can be not described as similar to human development from childhood to maturity, as Hegel would have it. Social and historical dynamics are complex phenomena, capable of an inversion of paradigms. Minority religious groups can experience periods of tolerance and respect despite the social dynamics connected to the systems of majority-rules politics involved. They also know, however, inversions of tendencies, recourses to violence and oppression, and refutations of other possible monotheisms, and at times they have been brought to ruin by the absurd folly of Reason, to recall a topos of the Frankfurt school. We have to note here that monotheism is not a factor of dynamics at all: it is not the reason behind the long social and cultural struggle, intolerance is: a lack of tolerance for those who refuse to be integrated into the social and religious mainstream. For a majority in power, religion is, in my opinion, mostly only an instrumentum regni. This is the very reason behind and source of violence. Intolerance and violence originate from the inability to recognize the validity of different hermeneutic approaches and commitments to a person’s mission in the world. The question of whether the deep reasons for such an inability are of historical, sociological, or religious origins is another, perhaps more difficult problem.

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3.4 Appendix: Ludwig Blau’s “On the Present and Future of the Jewish Religion,” An English Translation1

There is a general complaint about the current absence of traditional piety, and [a complaint] that religious life is slowly but surely disappearing within family life, that synagogues are being deserted. It cannot be denied that a religiosity that used to strive to reach an ardent boiling point has increasingly declined over the past decades to the point of freezing. The reformation of the [congregational] service, its exterior enhancement and interior refinement that raised expectations about a general turn toward the better, has, on the contrary, proved itself a deceptive hope. Other well-known and admirable attempts to raise religious consciousness and life have similarly failed to achieve the desired goals. This is not to say that they were absolutely to no avail. We all share the feeling that the legacy of our ancestors, our pride, our faith and covenant of a thousand years, which our fathers have steadfastly kept throughout all the tempests and challenges of centuries, must not be abandoned to decline and ruin. Complaints and tears will not do: they might offer momentary relief to our hearts, but they cannot remedy the deplorable state of affairs. We need to remain conscious about where we have come from and about where we are going. We need to clearly envision the past and the future in order to be able to recognize the causes that have led to this bleak present; we also need to explore the forces which govern Jewish life today, so that we are able to discover those ideas whose energy is still alive and intact within the souls of the educated. * * * It is a well-known fact that the decline of religiosity begins with the forward advance of modern education. The immense transformations 1

Translated from the German by Julia Schoen, edited by Bill Templer. Blau added some bibliographic notes in the text. I have incorporated them in the footnotes and supplemented them with bibliographic details. — 204 —

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that have affected the core of Western European Jewry over the course of the last century is a development unparalleled in human history. A hundred years ago, the art of writing the address on a letter was limited to a select few: today more than six times the number of our co-religionists are attending secondary schools and universities. A century ago, Jews were forced to assimilate to European culture by harsh governmental laws: today we see them expelled by even harsher laws from higher education institutions in Romania and Russia. A hundred years ago, when a people used to frighten its children with demons and Jews, Moses Mendelssohn came close to being a world miracle; today a substantial number of Jews are working in the fields of literature, poetry, and science, and rarely without success. A hundred years ago, Jews were thought to be incapable and utterly untalented for the arts due to their religion, which forbids them the worship of images: the present also sees Jewish names amongst the great stars that sparkle in the firmament of painting, sculpture, and music, and there are an appreciable number of Jewish actors. During the last century, the majority of the members of our confession consisted of traveling merchants: today the Jews have become major protagonists in commerce, industry, and agriculture. Pariahs, when they were allowed to participate, have also provided people with representatives of the art of governance. It is not my intention to flatter our vanity; these few outlines are meant to show that the outer appearance of Jewish life has been altered beyond recognition. Regeneration happened too quickly; a veritable revolution has flooded and almost drowned modern Jewry, albeit without the rattling of sabers or gun fire, nevertheless not without heavy social and religious upheaval. And there is still no end to these upheavals in sight, since the process of rejuvenation is occuring now right before our eyes, including all its dazzling as well as darker sides. Like the European Renaissance, the Jewish renaissance was not favorable to religiosity. The new culture greedily devoured, [and] has seriously damaged our religious way of life but not the ideas of our religion. Our religiousity has grown weaker, but not our religion. We must not despair, but instead should search the past for hints and signs pointing toward the future. * * * Neither culture nor its side effects are new to the history of the most — 205 —

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ancient living people. The Jewish people has merged two world cultures in the course of its long existence: the Hellenistic culture of antiquity and the Arabic culture of the Middle Ages. Both had mounted an assault on Israel, but our great thinkers illuminated the treasure of our knowledge and wisdom, which will never lose its attraction. There are two religious philosophers, namely Philo and Maimonides, who have developed the Jewish religious system from the highest prospects that their contemporary education would offer them. It would be difficult to convey an adequate picture of their teachings in this short essay; luckily enough, they themselves highlighted what they regarded as the most basic assumptions of the Jewish religion, which are at least known with regard to Maimonides, since his 13 principles found entry not only into our textbooks, but also into our liturgy. Philo, whose immense impact on the Christian faith has continued to the present, lived in Alexandria at the beginning of our age. This innovative thinker and prolific writer, who reminds us of Plato in many ways, commented in his Midrash about the creation of the world on the basic teachings of Judaism as follows: Moses teaches many things in his description of the Creation; thanks to him we received five of the most beautiful and superior teachings, such as: 1st God exists and rules. In this teaching, Moses contradicts the atheists, many of whom doubt the existence of God, some of which even deny His existence with impudence by claiming that only those who obscure the truth with fantastic poetry believe in it. 2nd God is One. Here, he contradicts polytheists who are not ashamed to transfer an imperfect form of government, namely ochlocracy, from earth to heaven. 3rd The world was created. This lies in opposition to the opinion of those who refuse to see God as the origin of creation, but assume the world as uncreated and believe that the world has existed eternally. 4th The created world is the only one, just as the Creator is One, etc. 5th The world is governed by God’s providence. The Creator looks after his creation, which is a general and — 206 —

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necessary law of nature, just as parents look after their children.2 The Hellenic-Judaic worldly-wise philosopher draws his teachings from Holy Scripture; he was well aware that Jewish religion comprised and promulgated other teachings, such as ethical principles. In an extraordinarily subtle way, he develops those in his own theological writings; however, he limits himself to the five above-mentioned basic theses in order to counter the prevailing and dangerous doctrine of paganism. In short, Philo was highly relevant. The thirteen religious principles of Maimonides should be addressed from the same stance. During the seventh century, while European people were enshrouded in darkest night, Arabic culture was a blazing sun. The great creations of the Greek mind fertilized the intellectual world of the aspiring Arabs, whose guiding light was Aristoteles. Maimonides was also a follower of Aristoteles, whose systematic approach dominated many thinkers. One of his greatest endeavors was to harmonize Jewish doctrines with Aristotelian wisdom and simultaneously emphasize fundamental differences between Jewish and Islamic religious teachings. This becomes obvious when one focuses on his thirteen principles. Here we find teachings about Creation, as well as on the unity, immateriality, harmony, and omniscience of God, that are not directed against views among people or groups other than Judaism. However, there are other doctrines, such as that Moses was the greatest and most eminent prophet, or that the Torah in its present form which is in our possession was revealed by Moses himself. Similarly, there is the belief that God will not replace this Torah with another scripture or abrogate it. The belief that the Savior of humankind has not yet appeared, and all the aforementioned doctrines, obviously and primarily offend Islamic religious teachings, but are also directed against Christian doctrines. It is therefore safe to conclude that Moses ben Maimon, the eminent Eagle of the Synagogue, was also highly relevant; he managed to protect Jewish doctrine from contemporary attacks and successfully averted any diseased currents of fundamentalism. Apart from the teachings of philosophers like Philo and Maimonides, we will find similar aspirations in authorities of the Talmud. Their per2

See Immanuel Löw, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Szegedin: Baba, 1889), 50. — 207 —

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spective draws on the Scripture and on the living source, which is the soul of the people, and it contains several elements helpful to averting and protecting against prevalent views that are damaging and harmful. They sought to declare those teachings to be the most relevant doctrines that were mostly attacked by dominant ideas of the time, and therefore were the most endangered. However, I will not continue along these lines, since my aim is to prove that Judaism has never isolated itself from philosophical currents or closed its eyes to ignore innovative ideas. Instead, it has always enhanced the encounter of its inherited teachings with other ideas for the benefit of humankind. * * * The strength of the Jewish religion lies in its wealth of ideas and the diversity of its ideals, which help to establish it in any phase and formation of human development as a vital and energizing factor. Ancient people believed in so many gods that it seemed much easier to encounter a god than to meet with a human being. The Jews confronted paganism with the idea of monotheism. However, the God of Judaism is not a tyrant who arbitrarily rules human beings according to His inclination, begrudging and envying each mortal’s earthly prosperity, like his pagan ancestors. Nor does He disrespect propriety like the Baals of the Phoenicians, but rather He is holy, righteous, and morally good. Gods are like their peoples, and people in turn are like their gods. This only holds true for those people who have naturally developed their ideal of God, but cannot be applied to those people who have come under the influence of foreign ideas, in which case an abyss between ideal and reality will always emerge. A loving, perfect, righteous, holy, and good God demands from his creatures that they value love and holiness, and lead a good life. The Holy Scriptures abound with a host of ideas that are displayed in all their diversity. In that respect, Judaism has fulfilled its mission, since monotheism has been spread among all civilized peoples. The prophet has ceased to teach since his doctrine is victorious; more than 800 million people have received and share the same faith, in both the old and the new world. We would like to avoid any polemic controversy; however, we need to stress the fact, against this claim, that the same doctrines had been preached for 1,500 years until the Reformation — 208 —

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completed its work with the help of the Hebrew Bible. I would like to refer now to Professor A[lbert] F. Berner from Berlin, an enthusiastic follower of his faith who in his presentation on “Judaism and Christianity and their future” likes to refer to the “polytheistic elements in Christian doctrine” that will only be eliminated some time in the future (pp. 19, 40).3 I would like to quote verbatim another passage wherein he elaborates on his personal opinion, with an impartiality rarely seen today: Now it is Judaism where the most ancient and powerful historical roots of monotheism are stored and which has kept it to the purest degree to this day. This most ancient and strongest power of pure monotheism that deserves to claim the enduring merit of having offered faith in the one and eternal God to mankind, is obviously the most suitable to take up the fight against atheistic currents of our time (p. 28). Furthermore, we insist on bringing to the fore another generally known but rarely appreciated fact. Over the course of 600 years, the end of the specific mission of Judaism was announced over and over again, until suddenly the prophet of the East appeared and helped to win the victory in spreading the Judaistic idea of God to many vast areas. Today, the Islamic faith comprises no less than 300 million followers. Almost half of all mankind, namely [those living] where higher culture has erected its abode, worship the monotheistic religion in one or another form. Monotheism has helped this culture to ascend from paganism’s morally stagnant pond of sin. However, to believe in one God does not entail [believing in] a God in Whom all the goddesses and gods of the Greek pantheon and of the Oriental peoples have been comprised into one, but [believing] that the cosmos is governed by a most perfect Being, He who demands the rule of virtue among humankind. The worship of idols manifested itself as licentiousness, whereas Adonai demands human perfection, a morally pure life, mercy and righteousness. In Judaism, the unity of the Creator is proclaimed as a unity 3

Albert Friedrich Berner, Judenthum und Christentum und ihre Zukunft, Vortrag gehalten im Berliner Unions-Verein am 30. Januar 1891 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1891), 19, 40. — 209 —

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of Creation and the unity of humankind.4 Thousands of years before Rousseau and the enlightened eighteenth century, the prophets of Israel had already promulgated the equality of all human beings. “Have we not all one Father, hath not one God created us?,” as it says in Malachi 2:10. God’s voice is heard through Jeremiah (9:23-24): “Let not the wise boast of their wisdom or the strong boast of their strength or the rich boast of their riches, but let the one who boasts boast about this: that they have the understanding to know me (...).” What now is this knowledge of God? It is the knowledge “that I am the LORD, who exercises kindness, justice and righteousness on earth, for in these I delight (...)” The duties of men are subsumed by Micah in but a few words (6:8): “He has shown you, O mortal, what is good. And what does the LORD require of you? To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God.” According to the Talmud, all 613 commandments to be found in the five Books of Moses are encapsulated in two words of prophecy: “Seek ye me, and ye shall live” (Amos 5:4). To “search God” and to “practice good deeds” are identical terms according to Judaism. Faith and ethics are inseparably interconnected. There are two basic elements fundamental to Judaism: religious and moral truth. The eminent Jewish historian H. Grätz claims that the association of religion and ethics is one of the most fundamental characteristics of Judaism. He goes on to develop the content of these two elements as follows: Both elements have a positive and a negative side; the one element is ethical, the higher ethics, including in its positive aspects, love of mankind, benevolence, humility, justice, and in its negative aspects, respect for human life, care against unchastity, subdual of selfishness and the beast in man, holiness in deed and thought. The second element is religious, and in it the negative side is predominant, to worship no transient being as God, whether belonging to the animal kingdom, the race of men, or the heavenly world, and in general to consider all idolatry as vain and to reject it as one and unique, and 4

Samuel Davide Luzzatto, Israelitische Moral-theologie: vorlesungen, von Samuel David Luzzatto; aus dem italienischen uebersetzt von L. E. Igel (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung, 1870), 13. — 210 —

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as the essence of all ethical perfections, and to worship it as the Godhead—in a single word, Monotheism in the widest acceptation of the term. The ethical is so far intimately connected with the religious element, because divine perfection gives the ideal for the ethical life. ‘Be ye holy even as I am holy’ is the perpetually recurring refrain in the oldest records of Judaism.5 These are not new truths discovered by ingenious scientists, but rather have been vitally present in the Jewish soul for thousands of years. These truths have been promulgated by our scholars in their texts, by our rabbis in synagogues, by our teachers at school. Neither are they secret or hidden from the outside world. An eminent Hungarian scholar once claimed that the Jewish religion equally satisfies a philosophical brain. Renan is known to have joked that Jewish religion demanded a minimum of faith. The prophets as well as the rabbis did not attain their religious and ethical truths by mere metaphysical thinking: those truths seemed to burn like fire in their bones. They only expressed those feelings and thoughts already present in the peoples’ soul and they forged a suitable formula and expression for them. Consequently, the Jewish people alone are called to safeguard, protect, and disseminate these truths. Learned truths and doctrines can be forgotten, put aside in a surge of passion and exchanged for others, but the true soul of a people is not interchangeable. Judaism does not depend on ruling its followers with religious dogma, like a state that governs its subjects with police regulations useful to it. The power of Judaism does not consist in physical violence, but in the irresistible attraction of its ideas exerted on its followers. The vocation of Judaism in world history is to set an example for other peoples, and not to increase its own power and reputation through the conquest of others. Eminent Jewish scholars and thinkers have indeed never been conquerors, but they were heroes of mind and character. In that sense, the much maligned scholars of the Talmud declare that a person who conquers and defeats his passions is a hero. Judaism has a mission but it does not proselytize, since it does not know 5

Jewish Quarterly Review I, 9 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449852?origin=JSTOR-pdf (accessed 10 September 2012). — 211 —

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how to traffic and make deals and has never done so in the past. Indeed, Judaism is the only confession that has never insisted on its share of worldly power; furthermore it even denies the well-known principle of cuius regio illius religio. Unlike other citizens, Jews are not a nation, and this renders them more than suitable to serve as a historical example for others, since their goals and tasks are purely religious in nature. Peoples come and go, rise and fall, but the Ten Commandments are and will be alive as long as human society exists. Judaism is the only faith that is not supported by any worldly power but exclusively persists through the truth of its ideas and the purity of its feelings with which it affects human sense and sensibility: its triumphs are not those of the sword but of ideals. Having said that, it is important to point out the wealth of Israel’s ideals. From the beginning of ancient times, it has promulgated universal love of mankind, eternal peace, and the prospect of a more glorious age. Will anyone dare to deny that setting up these higher goals has been beneficial to mankind? However, the commandment of Moses to “love thy neighbor as thyself” has surely not been fulfilled yet, just like the saying of Hillel that expresses charity and love in a more popular form, and which is taken directly from the Jewish soul: “What you despise, let not your neighbor suffer from it.” Does anyone dare to deny the triumphal procession that this commandment has already achieved throughout the world, and does anyone doubt its potential to win against race theories of the past? From the perspective of religion and ethics, are not those theories merely polished pagan views about human relations? And so the high hopes of the prophet about the lamb and the wolf peacefully eating, one next to the other, or about the different peoples will beat their swords and spears into ploughshares, have not yet been fulfilled either. Does anyone deny, however, that during the past two and a half thousand years the followers of eternal peace have increased, not only in the wretched huts, but also among those on powerful thrones? After all those promising beginnings, the hope for a better future where the Knowledge of God will fill the heart of humankind like the water fills the sea, and where justice will prevail throughout the world, cannot be mere longings for an unreachable utopia. Time is infinite. * * *

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Within this very narrow frame, I naturally was not able to exhaust the full wealth of ideas of Jewish culture and religion. I simply selected some representative religious truths and moral demands. The entire universe of ideas in Judaism is expressed in its great literature and within the living sentiments of its followers, and so it perpetually draws upon these resources according to its needs. And due to these inexhaustible sources, Judaism can neither ossify nor become obsolete. Even socialism as a problem governing our present and the nearest future has not only drawn inspiration from but has even directly borrowed several ideas from the Bible. The modern “Sunday day of rest,” namely the prohibition to work on Sunday, is nothing other than a transfer of the ancient custom of Shabbat onto Sunday. Even ancient peoples admired the custom of the Jewish Shabbat. Not to mention the ritual laws and their ethic foundations and implications. However, the few ideas we have discussed make it possible to convey an image of the impact of Judaism in the past and its future mission. Some of my readers might conclude that the Jewish theologian spends his days among the eminent wise men of the past, with the spirits of the ancestors hovering around him on quiet nights. They pass on to him the tales of past struggles of the mind and its victories and defeats, its martyrdom and calling. In other words, the readers might get the impression that the scholar spends his days in a dream world and merely fantastic realms and will not know about practical life. Therefore, the bustling and industrious life of people and a time that is marked by their feverish existential struggle will be utterly alien to him, and so he will not be able to adequately assess the present and draw conclusions for the future. So please allow me to end by quoting two eminent nonJewish/Gentile thinkers who have lived in the real world and among real people and who, without bias, have shared their views on Judaism. When we think back to the sad memory of the year 1882, where a wave of antisemitism swept over Hungary and with it accusations of ritual murder, an eminent German scholar came to defend the Jews but gave them advice for apostasy. At the same time and as a reaction to this, the French philosopher and former Foreign Minister Barthélemy-SaintHilaire stated when asked about the issue of baptism of Jewish citizens: No, the Jews should never let themselves be baptized. I would deem this conversion a terrible misfortune for — 213 —

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the whole of mankind, never to be reconciled. There is no people on earth which is such a remarkable example of persistence, resilience and faith; there is no other that has had such a powerful impact. Its Bible containing the book of Genesis and the Psalms surpasses even the most holy books of all other nations, and it is this Bible which has turned it into God’s chosen people. This would be the most wretched and unfortunate of days if the Jews turned into Christians. The cleft that would gape after this conversion will never be filled and closed again. The Jews must protect and keep their faith and religion that has existed for the past three millennia and which time has never shaken. The human mind would lose its ideal image that has no equal on earth; this loss would be the more terrible, since at the present time the idea of God is—hopefully only temporarily—weakened and almost disappearing in the heads of those thinking themselves educated and enlightened. Human conscience will always be dependent on Israel’s living protestation and the steadfast support that it draws from it against its own flaws and those doubts that also threaten Christianity. I am talking in the name of philosophy. This view is nothing new for those who know me; I have expressed it elsewhere in public many times before. However, I hope that the Jews will endure the present persecutions with the courage that has carried them through other and more cruel persecutions. These barbaric and disgraceful abuses will end some day. The Israelite will be the same as in France, a citizen like all the others, and the Jews, just like Catholics and Protestants, will be governed by universal laws, applicable to everyone alike.6 This enthusiastic thinker has since passed over into the realm of eternal truth and has not lived to see how his own fellow citizens, after only one and a half decades, have moved heaven and hell in order to set the 6

See J. Singer, Briefe berühmter christlicher Zeitgenossen über die Judenfrage (Vienna: Frank, 1885), 78. Blau erroneously gives the year 1884. — 214 —

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French Nation back at least a century. However, these enormous efforts only provide further proof for Israel’s calling to promulgate true mercy, benevolence, and other ethical ideals. The other eminent thinker whom I wish to quote is Ernest Renan, the renowned historiographer of Christianity and ancient Israel. He examined the past of those religions and explored their future with the following conclusion and result: “Judaism, which has achieved great things in the past and has served many noble purposes, will do so in the future. […] In one word, this pure religion, that we sense as the sole bond holding together all of humanity, will be the realization of the religion of Isaiah, an ideal Jewish religion that will be purified of all added slag.”7 Judaism is a great and daring idea in history; its legacy is the true Torah and eternal life; its eminent past is an obligation to a great future in the field of eternal and glorious worship of ideas and ideals.

7

Ernest Renan, Judenthum und Christenthum. Ihre ursprüngliche Identität und allmälige Scheidung. Vortrag gehalten von Ernst Renan in der Gesellschaft für das Studium des Judenthums zu Paris, am 26.Mai 1883. Autorisierte Übersetzung (Basel: Bernheim, 1883), 27-28. http://goo.gl/JnBXa (accessed 13 October 2012). — 215 —

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Part IV

Disjunction, or The Jewish Dissent

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4.1 The Outspoken “Dissenter”: Leo Baeck

The Essence of Judaism Leo Baeck is the personification of strident resistance, which was, however, a “Schrei ins Leere” (cry in the dark) as Gershom Scholem phrased it.1 Baeck was born in 1873 in Lissa, a city in Prussian Poznań, and died in London in 1956. He attended the rabbinical seminary of Breslau and the Higher Institute for Jewish Studies (Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums) in Berlin. There, Baeck earned his doctoral degree at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität with the theologian, philosopher, and philologist Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) as advisor. Baeck’s doctoral thesis, Spinoza’s First Influence, discussed Spinoza’s early effects on Germany (1895).2 His principal work, Das Wesen des Judentums (The Essence of Judaism), published in 1905, was known only in Jewish circles. In it, hecritically discusses Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity/Christendom), a volume written by the Protestant theologian Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930). Before presenting Baeck’s main arguments, let us have a brief look at the subject of the “essence” of Judaism, and then at the Christian debate targeting Judaism at the beginning of the twentieth century. The discussion that lasted throughout the Middle Ages and up to the so-called Modern period was concerned with the truth of tradition and its nature. The understanding of the so-called truth is a cognitive process that rarely leads to generally accepted or valid results, as practical experience teaches us. In a mindscape in which man is defined through reason, and reason appears to work through the general rules of logic, the lack of concurrent opinions had to be a surprising fact. From antiquity to the modern period, the development of various opiniones was 1

2

Gershom Scholem, “Wider den Mythos vom deutsch-jüdischen Gespräch [1964],” in Gershom Scholem, Judaica Vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 7-11; esp. 8. See also Christian Wiese, Challenging Colonial Discourse: Jewish Studies and Protestant Theology in Wilhelmine Germany (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004). It was published the same year as Spinozas erste Einwirkungen auf Deutschland (Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1895). — 217 —

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not understood as the outgrowth of a multitude of truths, but more as the result of the insufficiency of the subject striving for knowledge. Scholasticism thus worked according to the one general rule—ascribed to Thomas of Aquin—“quidquid recipitur per modum recipientis recipitur”: “Whatever is received is received in the manner of the receiver.”3 The interconnected questions about the truth of the tradition of truth and those concerning the judgment of reason in the acquirement of knowledge have occupied the occidental world for a very long period. However, during the Middle Ages, when the two sources of knowledge, revelation and reason, were not perceived as generally standing in accord with each other anymore, the questions became more emphatic. With one exception, the so-called Maimonidean Controversy, the problem of revelation vs. reason was first addressed in the Jewish sphere in the sixteenth century.4 The discussion entered the Jewish world when Azaria de’ Rossi from Mantua dismissed the Aggadah, the classic rabbinic literature, as unhistorical. The Aggadah was, according to Azaria, not to be taken literally, as it was the collection of “invented assumptions.”5 Maimonides himself had doubted the historical trustworthiness of rabbinic, non-legalistic literature earlier. He had considered it to be an allegorical part of the rabbinic literature. In Moreh Nevukhim, the Guide for the Perplexed, which he wrote in the twelfth century, Maimonides understood the Aggadah as “poetic metaphors.”6 The “traditionalists” criticized this hermeneutic methodology not only because of its ostentatious tendency to rationalize Jewish traditions, but also because of the 3

4

5 6

In another version, it reads: “quidquid conoscitur per modum conoscientis conoscitur,” or in translation, “Whatever is known is known in the mode of whom is knowing.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, quaestio 12, a. 4. On the Maimonidean Controversy, see Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy, 1180–1240 (Leiden: Brill, 1965); Bernard Septimus, “Meir Abulafia and the Maimonidean Controversy of the Thirteenth Century” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1975); Sarah Stroumsa, The Beginnings of the Maimonidean Controversy in the East: Yosef Ibn Shim‘on’s Silencing Epistle Concerning the Resurrection of the Dead (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1999); Sholom Sacks, R’ Yosef Ya’avetz and the Maimonidean Controversy (Jerusalem: Touro College, 1999); Avraham ben Moshe ben Maymon, Abraham Maimonides’ Wars of the Lord and the Maimonidean Controversy, ed. and trans. Fred Rosner and Jacob Israel Dienstag (Haifa: Maimonides Research Institute, 2001). See further details below. William G. Braude, “Maimonides’ Attitude toward Midrash,” in Studies in Jewish Bibliography, History, and Literature in Honor of I. Edward Kiev, ed. Charles Berlin, 75–82 (New York: KTAV, 1971), 75–82. See also my contribution “Zur jüdischen und christlichen Wertung der Aggada,” Frankfurter Judaistische Beiträge 22 (1995): 61-75. — 218 —

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utilization and exploitation of Jewish internal debates by the Christian side that it provoked. The morality of having a critical attitude toward tradition became an open question that was heatedly debated as late as the Renaissance period. It became a public question especially in the context of the Christian “sense of the past.”7 The question of an “essence of Judaism” is always present in the debates concerning “foreign/un-Jewish thinking.” This discussion became active after Maimonides’ presentation of the so-called principles of faith (the ‘Iqqarim), and continued far beyond the temporal limits of the Middle Ages. At the core of the discussion was the question of whether a division existed within the Jewish tradition between important and unimportant principles of faith. This discussion, which did not play a role in Maimonides’ work itself, became of eminent importance in the generations succeeding him and gained the greatest magnitude during the Renaissance. At that time, it likely reflected the debates concerning the content of faith that were raging between Catholics and Lutherans. In the work of Azaria de’ Rossi (we treat him as a mirror of the debates here, rather than as an independent thinker) we do find some clear indications that the Jewish discussions were a reflection of Christian debates. For example, Azaria—as the first Jewish author—addressed the position of Philo of Alexandria within the Jewish tradition, writing that In my opinion, this person [Philo] fell between two stools, so that it is impossible to judge him unequivocally. Based on the things dealt with in this chapter I tell the children of Israel: I won’t judge this Yedidya or Philo—this is his Greek name—on his purity or impurity, or regarding his importance or the honor that should be given to him. I will call him neither Rav nor Ḥakham [wise man, Rabbinic title], likewise I won’t call him heretic or Epicurean. The name I am going to use is Yedidya, the Alexandrian. And whenever I quote him in my book, I won’t quote him as member of my people. We will mention him in the same manner as the other sages of the world [Christians] in order to clarify side 7

See the discussion in my Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity (Boston: Brill, 2009), 73–96. — 219 —

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aspects (milleta be-‘alma), but not regarding the essence (u-be-may de-la’shayyeke be-gawwe). Regarding the rest of his ideas and books, the reader should be able to find his own judgment accounting to his own opinion.8 These concluding remarks contain in nuce the intention behind Azaria’s discussion of Philo. The reader is held to be lector prudens, the ideal educated reader, which might be an adequate translation of Azaria’s qore maskil.9 It is up to the reader to freely develop his own assessment of Philo’s writing. At the same time, Azaria emphasizes that Philo was not a Ḥakham according to Jewish tradition, but simply a “worldly teacher.” Philo’s authority was only valid when regarding side aspects (milleta be-‘alma). With Azaria we find—again, for the first time in Jewish history—the differentiation between the essence of tradition (be-may dela’shayyeke be-gawwe), which is unquestionable, eternal and sacrosanct, and the milleta be-‘alma (side aspects) that might be controversial. The basis of tradition, according to Azaria, is the law, the halakha mi-sinay. Through this limitation of Torah and halakhah, Azaria sought to pave the way for comparing Judaism to other faiths—especially Christianity. It is not a coincidence that Leopold Zunz resorted to Azaria de’ Rossi, the “antiquarian,” in order to grant some historical justification to his methodology for the critical research of Judaism.10 The philosophical self-conception of the Science of Judaism’s scholars was based on the much-lauded enlightener Maimonides. It was also based, however, on the critical attitude of the “Jewish” Renaissance, with its search for the essence of Judaism, to which Azaria de’ Rossi offered the most important contribution in matters of differentiation.11 The question of the essence of Judaism marks the internal and external debates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Kant’s philosophy thoroughly infused Jewish thinking of this period, as Julius Guttmann 8

Azaria de‘ Rossi, Me’or Enayim: Imre Birna 6, ed. Dawîd Qassel (Vilnius: Romm, 186 –1866; repr. Jerusalem: Makor, 1970), 129. 9 For a detailed discussion, see my essay “Der lector Prudens und die Bibliothek des (uralten) Wissens: Pietro Galatino, Amatus Lusitanus und Azaria de’ Rossi,” in Christliche Kabbala, 133– 142, ed. Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2003). 10 Zunz, “Toledot le-R’ ‘Azarya min ha-Adummim,” Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 131-58 and 7 (1843): 119-24. 11 See Friedrich Niewöhner, “Judentum, Wesen des,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, ed. Karlfried Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1976), 649–653. — 220 —

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has already noted. Historical realism and universal ethics supplanted the belief in an eternal wisdom (the philosophia perennis), which in fact was the mythological and religious foundation for metaphysics. Mendelssohn, for instance, understood the essence of Judaism in terms of the Aristotelian theoretical reasoning of treatises and the revelation of laws, rather than the practical reasoning and historical religion that form the categories of mind. Here are some examples: In Die Religion des Geistes (The Religion of the Mind), the religious philosopher Salomon Formstecher (1808–1889) defined Judaism as an idea, in the conception of Hegel. Formstecher posed the following triad of central concepts: Revelation (Offenbarung, in contrast to the religion of philosophers), Mind (Geist, the concretization of the absolute in human self-awareness), and Nature (Natur, in the pantheistic sense). Judaism, according to Formstecher, was a religion of revelation, and therefore dissimilar to the pagan religions. For that reason Judaism remained isolated among the nations. Thus, the intellectual grace of Judaism was the only reason for its isolation.12 Judaism was, at the same time, a religion of the mind, whereas those of the pagan were religions of nature. Christianity and Islam took a position somewhere in the middle. The aim of Judaism was to retain its shape, while Christianity was supposed to finally free itself of the remnants of paganism in order to acquire the shape of Judaism (Geist). Samuel Hirsch published Die Religionsphilosophie der Juden (The Religious Philosophy of the Jews) in 1842. Hirsch designed his developmental model for Judaism in a dispute with Hegel’s understanding of Judaism as an inferior religion. In contrast to Hegel, Hirsch understood the religions as having equal value, but assigned to Judaism alone full maturity (intensive Religiösität, intensive/internal religiosity).13 Christianity represents an external religiosity, as it seeks the immediate spread of the one true faith among the pagan world Human development would only come to a conclusion if the internal and external religiosity would meet; then the Messianic Age of absolute religiosity would begin. Salomon Ludwig Steinheim dedicated four volumes to the subject of Offenbarung nach dem Lehrbegriff der Synagoge (Revelation According 12

On these very brief notes to Jewish philosophers of the nineteenth century, see Julius Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Judentums (München: Reinhardt, 1933, repr. Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1985), 321– 327. 13 Ibid., 333. — 221 —

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to the Doctrinal Concept of the Synagogue). In them he turned against the rationalist tendency for an explanation of revelation on the basis that reason and revelation precluded each other. The basic principles of Judaism, said Steinheim, contradicted those of reason. The truth, however, was on the side of revelation. In such a way, he separated reason from truth (“‘Nothing comes from nothing,’ says reason. To this, revelation answers: ‘Something comes from nothing.’”) The doctrine of revelation thus breaks off with the necessitarianism of reason. This way, it simply proves to “have derived from a source other than reason.”14 Hermann Cohen had an entirely different opinion on that matter. The Kantianism within Jewish philosophy, the latest of which we observe at least in the writings of Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–1888), finds its most prominent exponent in Cohen. Cohen’s concept of true religion in the Kantian sense was that it was a religion of reason, that is to say a religion of ethics/a moral doctrine. Judaism was the actualization of this concept of religion. Cohen wrote that “in the Jewish understanding, there is no differentiation between religion and ethics.”15 At the end of the nineteenth century, it became more apparent that the Jewish occupation with philosophical-religious questions (what was later termed a “Jewish theology” in Jewish circles) barely resonated, or did not resonate at all with the non-Jewish world. The gesture, made to get in with the world of Bildung and academy, was largely ignored. The Protestant academic world was occupied with itself and its proud knowledge, which itself represented the German ideal of Bildung. In this context, the debate concerning the essence of Christianity, and the answer concerning the essence of Judaism referring to it, developed. The Essence of Leo Baeck’s Non-Conformism As stated, Leo Baeck’s work Das Wesen des Judentums (The Essence of Judaism) was published in 1905 as an answer to Harnack’s Das Wesen des Christentums (1899/1900). Leo Baeck’s work covers the entire field indicated in its title. After a delay of more than twenty years, the book 14 Ibid., 341. 15 Hermann Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1988), 38. — 222 —

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was at the center of a heated debate that began with the publication of an essay by Isidor Scheftelowitz. In addition to defining Judaism as a religion and commenting on the content of the faith and its dogmas, Baeck compared Judaism to other religions (especially Christianity) and questioned a national Weltanschauung.16 Baeck based his work on Hermann Cohen’s definition of Judaism as “ethical monotheism” and sternly denied that there existed dogmatics in Judaism, and thus orthodoxy.17 Those voices discussing Jewish dogmas would assign to Judaism the position of a confession. The teachings of Judaism, however, were not teachings of a faith, but “teachings which have to be fulfilled; teachings determining the path of life.”18 As far as comparability was concerned, Baeck was convinced that it would essentially support assimilation while “[Judaism was] something un-ancient in the ancient world, something un-modern in the modern world. The Jew has to be thus in order to live as a Jew: the great nonconformist in history, its great dissenter.”19 In his book, Leo Baeck identifies the essence of Judaism as prophecy, the dialectical polarity between mystery and order. This was exactly what Harnack identified as the essence of Protestant Christianity: individuality, personality, and will. The following quote is emblematic in this context. Moreover, it is well-known and tends to be repeated on occasions when people wish to say something nice about Judaism. The last time these words were publically uttered, to my knowledge, was when Karl Lehmann, the Bishop of Mainz, received the Abraham Geiger Award in 2006. Baeck wrote, And thus it was indeed Judaism that was left alone by itself this way: something un-ancient in the ancient world, something un-modern in the modern world. The Jew has to be thus in order to live as a Jew: the great 16 See Isidor Scheftelowitz, “Ist das überlieferte Judentum eine Religion ohne Dogmen?,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 70 (1926): 65–75; Leo Baeck, “Besitzt das überlieferte Judentum Dogmen?,” ibid., 225–236; Felix Goldmann, “Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der jüdischen Religion,” ibid., 440–457; I. Scheftelowitz, “Konnte das alte Judentum Dogmen schaffen?,” ibid,, 433–439; Julius Guttmann, “Die Normierung des Glaubensinhalts im Judentum,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 71 (1927): 241–255. 17 Leo Baeck, Das Wesen des Judentums, 5th ed. (Wiesbaden: Fourier, 1991), 87. 18 Ibid., 53. 19 Ibid., 291–292. — 223 —

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non-conformist in history, its great dissenter. That was the purpose of his existence. That was why the fight for religion had to be a fight for this self-preservation. There was no thought of might involved in this fight, as this would have contradicted the purpose—not power but individuality, personality for the sake of the eternal will, not power but strength. The Jewish being exists as the strength of this world, and strength is greatness.20 Lehmann interpreted Leo Baeck’s sentences as a calling for the “preservation of a Jewish identity, but also for the exemplary life of the ethical-religious ideal on which this identity rests.”21 This, however, is not the point. Baeck’s train of thought has to be seen in the context of the debate concerning the essence of Judaism, not least in the context of the debate caused by Harnack’s lectures in Berlin in the years around 1900. Harnack construed Judaism to be the Pharisaic remnants of traditional but obsolete customs and a mentality that had been replaced by the Christian religion. Harnack’s idea was in accord with Christian-Thomist and later Lutheran “philosophy.” This is representative of the so-called Christian understanding of the ancient period, which is considered to be a fundamental and formative period in the history of Christianity: when Judaism and Hellenism met and Christianity evolved. Even the recently retired German Pope, Benedict XVI, has referred to this era and pointed to the Catholic novelty of having connected the Greek theology of logos with the Jewish prophetic spirit. In Benedict’s (unfortunately questionable) understanding of the Protestant nineteenth century, he charges evangelical theology with 20 German: “Und so war in der Tat das Judentum gewesen, um so allein weiterhin zu sein: das Unantike in der antiken Welt, das Unmoderne in der modernen Welt. So sollte der Jude als Jude sein: der große Nonkonformist in der Geschichte, ihr großer Dissenter. Dazu war er da. Um dessentwillen musste der Kampf für die Religion ein Kampf um diese Selbsterhaltung sein. Kein Gedanke der Macht war darin, er wäre der Widerspruch dazu gewesen—nicht Macht, sondern Individualität, Persönlichkeit um des Ewigen Willens, nicht Macht, sondern Kraft. Als Kraft in der Welt lebt das jüdische Dasein und Kraft ist Größe.” Ibid. 21 German: “Bewahrung jüdischer Identität, aber auch um das exemplarische Vorleben des sittlichreligiösen Ideals, auf dem allein diese Identität beruht.” Lehmann, Karl Kardinal, “ Festvortrag von Karl Kardinal Lehmann, Vorsitzender der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, bei der Verleihung des Abraham Geiger Preises am 20. März 2006 in der Bayerischen Vertretung in Berlin,” March 20, 2006, Pressemitteilungen der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, http://www.dbk.de/fileadmin/ redaktion/presse_import/abraham_geiger_preis_festvortrag.pdf (accessed October 12, 2012). — 224 —

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having closed Protestants’ minds to Hellenism.22 There is nothing further from the truth. The spirit of the logos especially—together with the understanding of prophecy according to Schleiermacher’s divination—formed the foundation of Harnack’s views of the “metaphysication” and “prophetization” of Christianity. Prophecy is the term that marked the era. Pharisees and Pharisaic Judaism, the core of contemporary Judaism, were perceived as unprophetic and un-modern—as always. Harnack wrote that They [the Pharisees] understood God as a despot who guarded the ceremonial duties of his rules of the house; he [Jesus] took his breaths in the presence of God. They saw Him only in His law, which they had transformed into a maze of gorges, wrong tracks, and secret exists; he saw and felt Him everywhere. They possessed thousands of His laws and therefore believed to know Him; he only had but one law from Him and therefore knew Him. They transformed religion into an earthly profession—there was nothing more contemptible—he heralded the living God, the nobility of the soul.23 And further: “The priests and the Pharisees kept the people as bondsmen and murdered their souls.”24 Judaism went so far as to form a positive identity out of the sclerotic clinging to its own traditions and customs that had been attacked. The Jews themselves, whom Christians referred to as stubborn Pharisees, were in fact accepted at least by some intellectual rabbis as the essence of this positive Jewish identity. Rabbi Eugen Gärtner thus wrote in 1922 that They [Christians] make it appear as if the Pharisees had entirely externalized religious exercise; as if they had seen nothing other than the religious commandments 22 Joseph Ratzinger, “Faith, Reason and the University. Memories and Reflections,” http://www. vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html (last accessed June 2013). 23 Harnack quoted in Hans-Günther Waubke, Die Pharisäer in der protestantischen Bibelwissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 291 et seq.. 24 Harnack, quoted in ibid., 294. — 225 —

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we call ceremonial law and had largely or even entirely disregarded the commandments for an ethical life.25 Let us summarize: the non-conformism of prophecy—which was once perceived as sectarian and therefore would have to be interpreted in the context of the categories of Max Weber—is included in the authoritative theology, and is targeted against the minority group that had once established the majority. This is not merely a paradigm change, but the denial of former paradigms that were once used against the establishment but have now been adopted by the establishment for the sake of its own identity. Prophetic novelty is thus construed as a political factor in order to emphasize the singularity, the novelty, of one’s own religion, and to grant it an eternally valid, non-conformist status. Communist regimes walked the same path in order to style themselves as “eternally revolutionary.” From the perspective of Leo Baeck, non-conformism is the resistance against general society through battling modernity that appears to be totalitarian. The “self-preservation” of the Jews is seen as non-conformist because the majority of the society, which was Gentile, followed the globalizing path of leveling differences—as was seen during the nineteenth century in Prussian Germany. It might be remembered, as we have discussed above, that the Prussian authorities denied Leopold Zunz a university chair of Jewish history and literature with the explanation that “A professorship which is also dedicated to the intellectual preservation and strengthening of the Jewish nature in all its differences contradicts the idea of the new freedom, which is dedicated to eradicating the formerly solid differences…. [I]t is not advisable to tear Jewish history out of the scholarly nexus of general history.” Thus, there is no room for Judaism, as the (Protestant) concept represents everything—including non-conformism. Describing something as non-conformism is, here and in the logic of the majority, a political action intended to crush the minority’s right to 25 German: “Sie [die Christen] lassen es so erscheinen, als ob sich den Pharisäern die religiöse Übung ganz veräußerlicht habe, als ob ihnen der Bereich religiöser Forderungen, den wir Zeremonialgesetz nennen, alles und die Gebote eines ethischen Lebenswandels wenig oder nichts gegolten hätten.” Eugen Gärtner, “Das Feindbild schlechthin: Die Pharisäer,” in Lehren des Judentums nach den Quellen, Vol. V: Juden und Umwelt, ed. Fritz Bamberger and Simon Bernfeld (Leipzig: Engel, 1928– 1930), accessed October 12, 2012, www.judentum.org/judenmission/judenmission/baeck-1.htm. — 226 —

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have a diverging opinion. From the perspective of the minority, however, non-conformism is a negative answer, a willful reaction, to threats to its tradition and life style. The conformist Pharisee becomes the dissenter, so to speak. This character has been adopted—mutatis mutandis—and eventually altered completely by the German Jew Jacob Taubes.

— 227 —

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4.2 The Dissenter as Enfant Terrible: Jacob Taubes

The Trapeze Artist Non-conformism is able to present itself as a kind of stage play, a production of what is not taken seriously when discussed. This is not refined skepticism but its enactment, a “sandtable exercise” that is sometimes a sign of showmanship. Jacob Taubes might be understood according to this terminology: he belonged among the most extravagant public figures of post-Shoah German Jews. Quintus Horatius Flaccus, known as Horace (65 BCE–8 BCE), the master of poetry and art, coined the phrase we typically misquote as disiecta membra, scattered fragments. The original version reads a little differently: disiecti membra poetae, the limbs of the dismembered poet. Horace wondered if it was still possible to identify the poetic essence of a piece if its meter is destroyed by, for example, rearranging the words.1 Today, the question would be whether the reduction of poetry to prose is still poetry. Are the limbs of the poetic-rhetoric body still visible, or is all that is left on the morgue slab of exegesis just a philological carcass? I will raise the same questions, altered minimally, when referring to one of the notable individuals of recent German-Jewish history whose own life was marked by the Diaspora—the dispersion and scattering: Jacob Taubes. Let us discuss whether or not the destruction of philosophical systems that Taubes attempted through his eclectic, de-theorizing, and apocalyptic considerations still allows the visibility of the potential of philosophy based on reason: disiecti membra philosophi. What is enlightenment, what is reason? Or, is there enlightenment without reason? Or, might we substitute technology for reason? Jacob Taubes was born into a family of rabbis in Vienna. He was among the few Jewish scholars who willingly relocated to the land of the perpetrators of the Shoah. He gave the Free University of Berlin the choice of whether he would be a philosopher of religion there, a “Judaist” (as Gerschom Scholem dismissively characterized him), or a professor of 1 Horace, Satires IV, 62. — 228 —

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hermeneutics: he himself was unsure in which field to teach. His intellectual and academic wandering through the fields was as restless as his own biography. When I commenced my education in Jewish studies in Berlin in 1986, Taubes was not regularly present at the institute anymore. I hardly remember him, actually. He came in like a flash and was gone with the same speed. No sooner had he died on March 21, 1987, than I realized—uninformed student that I was—the importance and the hermeneutic breadth of this Jewish scholar. Posthumously, he is recognized for his busy productivity, and he reached the height of academic fertility through his students and his lectures, which seem to remain unrivaled.2 I can still recall that the SFB (Sender Freies Berlin, the local TV-station in the Cold War island city of West Berlin) broadcast one of Taubes’ lectures (recorded in 1963) on the first anniversary of his death in 1988.3 His lectures and essays were carefully saved and edited. Let us first consider his biography and personality. Jacob Taubes was born in Vienna in 1923. Three years later, the family moved to Zürich, Switzerland, where Taubes later concluded his rabbinical education. Afterward he studied philosophy and history. After an unhappy cooperation with Gerschom Scholem in Jerusalem, as I mentioned earlier, Taubes moved to New York to teach religious philosophy at the Jewish Theological Seminary. In 1956, he was engaged by Columbia University as professor of religious history and religious philosophy. Another call took him to Berlin’s Free University in 1962 as a full professor for first its Jewish studies program and then hermeneutics. In his private life, he was married to the Hungarian-American scholar Susan Taubes (1928–1969)4 and the German philosopher Margherita von Brentano (1922–1995). He also had a long-term affair with the popular Austrian writer Ingeborg Bachmann (1926–1973). Jacob Taubes was one of the intellectuals who made Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), a prominent antisemite and the so-called Kronjurist des Dritten Reiches, the leading theoretical lawyer of the Third Reich, socially acceptable (again).5 2

3 4 5

Among them were the editors of Jacob Taubes‘ Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft, ed. Aleida and Jan Assmann, Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, and Winfried Menninghaus (Munich: Fink, 1996). “Freud als Philosoph,” Recorded December 10, 1963, Broadcasted SFB–Sender Freies Berlin, WestBerlin, March 24, 1988. Author of, among others, Divorcing: A Novel (New York: Random House, 1969). I will not discuss the results of this relationship in this chapter. On this topic, see Herbert Kopp— 229 —

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The publishers of Taubes’ Vom Kult zur Kultur summarized his hermeneutical approach as the “Hermeneutics of Suspicion” (“Hermeneutik des Verdachts”).6 This essentially erroneous assumption was only possible because Taubes played with the meanings of words: he was an artist of hermeneutics with sarcastic tendencies.7 Shortly before his death, he participated in a debate in Paris with the political scientist Kurt Sontheimer on the subject of Carl Schmitt. In his introduction, Taubes proclaimed: So, there is no misunderstanding; we do not wish to hug at the end. We think that at the end we will still say the same only in other words—all of this is the behavior of consensus. Here we seek to outline…. We thus will have to steer between the outline on the one hand, and the avoidance of extravagance on the other hand; we, [Sontheimer/Taubes] do not need the verbalizations8 of trapeze artists because we have known each other since ancient times.9 Taubes, the master of the word, knew that in such a discussion only the trapeze artist, the tightrope balancer, will prevail in fulfilling the expectations of the circus of the public audience. He also knew that he, as a Jew in Germany, represented Judaism and Jewry in a country that had aimed to exterminate them. 6 7

8 9

Oberstebrink, ed., Jacob Taubes–Carl Schmitt: Briefwechsel mit Materialien (Paderborn: Fink, 2012). Jacob Taubes, Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft—gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions—und Geistesgeschichte (Munich: Fink, 1996). He wrote, for instance, to Isi Hepner that “it will always be personally tragic for OG [physician and religious philosopher Oskar Goldberg, 1885–1953] and EU [philosopher Erich Unger, 1887– 1950] that such people can only grow from the foundations of liberal society. They destroy in their theoretical works the same society that offers them the opportunity for research—in the [sic] Tibet, among the Negroes in the Congo, OG, EU, and you yourself would have been killed.” Quoted in Manfred Voigts, Oskar Goldberg: Der mythische Experimentalwissenschaftler–Ein verdrängtes Kapitel jüdischer Geschichte (Berlin: Agora, 1992), 336. A precise agreement similar to those of trapeze artists. German: “Es gibt also keine Mißverständnisse, wir wollen uns am Ende gar nicht umarmen, meinen, wir sagten am Ende dennoch dasselbe in verschiedenen Worten—all das ist ein KonsensVerhältnis, hier geht es darum, zu konturieren. (...) Wir werden also steuern müssen zwischen Konturierung einerseits und Vermeidung einer Überspanntheit; die Formulierung der, sagen wir, Trapezkünstler Sontheimer/Taubes, das haben wir beide nicht nötig, wir kennen uns seit urlangen Zeiten.” “Streitgespräch,” in Jacob Taubes, Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fügung (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1987), 46. — 230 —

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Taubes’ philosophy—if one calls it such—rather lacks distance from its object. It is not a subconscious fact of his intellectual work; it is a conscious creed indeed. Taubes sought to “understand in an existential way” what he spoke of as a “condensed experience.”10 This is not the rhetoric of hermeneutics; this is something that stuck onto his person like a magic garment that one has to put on before uttering the defensive formula of exorcism against the enemy. He considered himself an enemy of Carl Schmitt, and he had repeatedly emphasized this fact by referring to Hitler and the Shoah. Taubes was fully aware of the difficulty of representing Judaism and Jewry in post-war Germany. This awareness is present in the (mostly oral) notes from his last years. He stated that “… it is not a secret that I am a Jew, consciously, and an arch-Jew that is! And that is what raises some issues for me in the German lands.”11 This polarization into friend/foe basically is a process of constructing myths concerning—and demonizing—historical characters Taubes played off against themselves. Concerning Judaism and Jewry, Taubes thought nothing of the voices that were to be heard that were free from the notions of conflicts: … [it has] become fashionable in the last twenty years to cover and distort these differences [between Christianity and Judaism]. For this reason, they have to be identified again. One should not shy away from that, because it might be expected with good reason that there is more to gain from definition and understanding of the respective differences in the practical sphere than from their obfuscation and the pretense that they did not exist.12 Taubes characterized Christianity and Judaism as law and love. 10 Ibid., 47, 51. 11 German: “... es ist kein Geheimnis, daß ich Jude bin, und zwar bewußt und Erzjude als solcher, und das bringt für mich einige Probleme mit sich überhaupt in deutschen Landen.” Ibid., 46. 12 German: “...[es ist] in den letzten zwanzig Jahren Mode geworden, diese Unterschiede [zwischen Christentum und Judentum] zu bemänteln und zu entstellen. Deshalb müssen sie wieder neu festgestellt werden. Davor sollte man sich nicht scheuen, denn mit guten Gründen läßt sich erwarten, daß sogar im praktischen Bereich durch Definition und Verständnis der betreffenden Probleme mehr zu gewinnen ist als durch deren Verdunkelung und die Vortäuschung, es gäbe sie gar nicht.” Jacob Taubes, “Die Streitfrage zwischen Judentum und Christentum,” in Jacob Taubes, Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft – gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions- und Geistesgeschichte (Munich: Fink, 1996), 85. — 231 —

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Christianity would eventually prevail in the duel between these two powers. Yet, in the long term, only the “justice of the law” could question the arbitrariness of love.13 Such a relationship, which is burdened with conflicts, could not even come to rest in the eschaton. This is exactly valid, according to the nihilism of Taubes’ last years. These succinct, strange sentences uttered by Taubes in the context of his relationship to Carl Schmitt are an expression of his fundamental apocalyptic attitude: like Pilate, he washes his hands of what will not save his soul. What he might have had in mind as “saving” might be judged from his words in a lecture held in 1963: “The spirit that remembers its history is saved from the burden of the past.”14 Taubes is not a non-conformist, because he understands himself as a conformist deformity that was thrown from the past into the present. Carl Schmitt—like Hitler—defined Jews as enemies—inimici—and this definition becomes the hermeneutic key. In essence, this is a borrowed identity that yet becomes the hermeneutic property: an apocalypse is about to happen.15 The apocalypse is not to be taken entirely seriously, as this world is not worth being saved—a nihilistic idea. Reason and/or Religion Taubes was always looking for a home. He led a restless existence and always despised the claim of reason as the sole ruler of the understanding of the world without acknowledging the world process. One has to bear in mind, however, that Jacob Taubes was an enfant terrible and thus is not easy to handle in a scholarly way, let alone to domesticate. Thus, it is not my intention to leave Taubes alone in the Olympus of science. I 13 Ibid., 98. 14 German: “Der Geist, der seine Geschichte erinnert, ist befreit von der Last der Vergangenheit.” See my article, “Jüdischen Philosophie: Eine philosophisch-bibliographische Skizze,” in Wissenschaft vom Judentum: Annäherungen nach dem Holocaust, ed. Michael Brenner, Stefan Rohrbacher (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2000), 150. 15 On “borrowed identity,” see, for instance, Jennifer Kelly, Borrowed Identities (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), or my own essay “Geborgte Identität im Zerrspiegel: ‘Jüdische Riten’ aus philosophischpolitischer Perspektive,” in Zwischen Zensur und Selbstbesinnung: Christliche Rezeptionen des Judentums; Beiträge des von der Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung geförderten interdisziplinären Symposiums am 15.–16. Februar 2007 im Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald. Julia Männchen zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, ed. Christfried Böttrich, Judith Thomanek, and Thomas Willi (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009), 125–145. — 232 —

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will not let this particular enfant terrible play without supervision in the glassware store that is history. He would break into pieces and destroy everything what would not fit into his aesthetic-hermeneutic ideal. In his essay “Four Ages of Reason,” published in 1957 and thus twelve years after the end of the catastrophe, Taubes balances accounts with the entire system of the philosophical “think tank” that has been the world since Aristotle. He begins with the Socratic dilemma: understanding “the contradiction between the claim of philosophy to the universality of reason, [and] the actual split of society into antagonistic groups,” that is also responding to violence.16 The universality of reason, social groups, and violence are thus the triad struggling for world power. Therefore, Taubes terms the philosophical undertaking that does not take into consideration the split of social structure as chimerical. But is it possible to “pollute” the search for universal reason with factual, particular history, i.e., sociology? Taubes specifically asks: “Do we not invite chaos if we approach a ‘systematic’ problem of philosophy like an inquiry into the concept of reason by analyzing reason in its historical context?”17 He concludes the introduction with the statement that “a historical analysis of reason, therefore, would endanger the purity of the scientific pursuit.”18 This would be the general question that has moved the world of philosophical scholarship since Aristotle: Opiniones et/sive veritas, historia et/sive axioma (opinion and/or truth, history and/or axiom)? However, Taubes, the son of a rabbi, is not interested in how a haskamah (the consensus of a decision) is reached, i.e., how controversial hypotheses might be integrated into the conduct of life that is principally able to reach consensus. Taubes is more interested in how the conflict between reason as an instrument for finding truth, and violence as an instrument for pushing through what is considered truth has to be understood. He is also more interested in how to reconcile the belief in the ever-expanding progress of technology—which was a certain belief then—with the retreat from social rationality. Thus, do we have progress that promises 16 Jacob Taubes, “Four Ages of Reason,” Archiv für Rechts—und Sozialphilosophie 42 (1956): 1-14. I refer to the English version edited and published in 2010 by Charlotte Fonrobert and Amir Engel: Jacob Taubes, From Cult to Culture: Fragments towards a Critique of Historical Reason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 268. 17 Ibid., 268–269. 18 Ibid., 269. — 233 —

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reason and yet actually produces barbarism? The most urgent question that is present in Taubes’ “Four Ages of Reason” is, of course, entirely posed in the pragmatic formulation of the Frankfurt School: unde malum barbaricum, “How did it come about that a society that staked its future on the progress of reason ended up in barbarianism?”19 This question takes us to the core of exile studies per se. It takes us to the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, which was housed at Columbia University, where Taubes later taught religious philosophy. Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) and Max Horkheimer (1895– 1973) had returned to the Goethe University in Frankfurt seven years earlier. Taubes stands in the full tradition of the critical dialectic with his essay. Throughout the 1950s, the critical dialectic had pursued the question of the failure of reason in the age of Nazism. In 1966, Theodor Adorno wrote that “philosophy, which was once believed to have been defeated, remains alive because the moment of its realization was omitted.”20 This was a sentence that somehow sounded apocalyptical. Well, was the moment omitted? By whom? For what reason? Or had philosophy omitted the moment systemically? Taubes continues the discussion and refers to the essence of philosophical frustration: the search for the methodology of philosophy “more arithmetico.” Through abstraction philosophy seeks to reach the “security of the pure operation.” In philosophy—in contrast to mathematics—this boils down to “eclipsing the foundations on which all operations are built: man.”21 Taubes states that “the price for a pure field of operation is ignorance about the genesis of judgment.”22 He concludes that an operation “that is established in a purely self-subsistent realm without recourse to its genesis in human consciousness only testifies to the alienation of man from the products of his own making, from the products of his own reasoning.”23 What Hegel charged man with, Taubes applies to philosophical discourse in general.24 Alienation does 19 Ibid., 268. 20 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003). 21 Taubes, From Cult to Culture, 269. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Hegel wrote: “What the spirit aspires for, is to reach its own conception (the place in which it is in theoretical and practical harmony with the universe); but the spirit covers the same, is proud and full of indulgence in this alienation from itself.” Quoted in Reinhart K. Maurer, Revolution und “Kehre”: Studien zum Problem gesellschaftlicher Naturbeherrschung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), 107. — 234 —

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not originate in man, but rather in the moment philosophy becomes estranged from man. Taubes moves further in his criticism by recalling the epistemological moment according to which the truthfulness of a statement might not be scrutinized according to the state of an individual. The truthfulness of a statement has to be distanced from the particularity. Taubes’ answer to this is that such an anthropologic idea has to be based on an abstraction of man, as if he or she were a tabula rasa. This is clearly not the case if man is seen sociologically: individuals are born and integrated into a social system of language and signs.25 This observation, which seems so simplistic and naïve, actually eradicates the foundations of any abstract enlightenment that colonialistically forms beyond man hic and nunc, and that disregards the essential contribution of the sociohistorical in context. Reason has, however, a stronger social component than is commonly agreed upon, according to Taubes, as it can only be communicated through language, and its logical rules can only be represented through language. Without being aware of it, Taubes embodies the approach of non-European cultures to some independence in philosophical discourse, because all communication has to be rooted in one’s own native language. What holds true for mathematical operations cannot automatically hold true for all human systems of knowledge. Yet in mathematics as well, the scholar is aware that everything depends on the system, and certain operations keep their validity only within the limits of that system. The universal validity that is achieved and which is required cannot be hypostatized—i.e., made concrete—in a more precise realm, as philosophy is abstracted from it and thus loses the insight into the source of all meaning: man in his historical existence.26 An utterly abstract sentence is valid, and yet is not a “verdict,” not a form of judgment, because philosophy distinguishes between the genesis and the validity of a judgment. Every form of philosophy, Taubes concludes, that isolates the subjective pole of reference in a logical or existential manner leads to the antinomy of psychologism. Yet equally problematic is a philosophy that is too abstract, too free from all subjective elements in its analysis of reason. The same holds true for a 25 Taubes, From Cult to Culture, 270. 26 Ibid. — 235 —

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philosophy that postulates a distinctive realm of validity.27 The contribution of the conception of reason to the developmental process, its critical function according to Taubes, was the “progressing stages of the development of enlightenment.” Its function is, in the categories of Max Weber, the de-mystification of the universe. Thus, the reader wonders, where is the evil tooth threatening to bite into philosophy’s flesh? Where is Taubes’ cynical sting? Philosophy here is a critical science that descends from the Ivory Tower of abstraction and de-mystifies the myths. But take notice that here is the turning point: Taubes states that the process of enlightenment and the progress of rationalization seemed identical for the generation as late as that of the French Revolution. It is not the case of “for us” (who?, one might ask). Rationalized reason is a tool that might be used for enlightenment as well as for eclipse or idealization. Thus reason, according to Taubes’ philosophy, is not a system, not an intellectus agens or passiv. Is it logical deduction, pure logic? Not necessarily, I would say. When Taubes begins analyzing the history of philosophy, he understands the process of rationalization in the Middle Ages as identical with the theological conception of reason, as contrasting with the juridical conception of reason. The first, the theological conception of reason, is supposed to be the divine conception, its hierarchical order. The juridical belief, however, that has been developing since the twelfth century, understands itself as struggling against theology. I have to say that I question this concept, historically, as there was no juridical conception of reason in the twelfth century. I am also in doubt because professors of law at the University of Bologna, including Irnerius and above all the Glossar Lothair, had indeed written opinions in favor of the Holy Roman Emperor Barbarossa (Frederick I, 1122–1190) and against the Pope.28 Yet to construe a juridical conception from that might be tricky, as it was purely a political struggle. Taubes, however, wishes to present the Corpus Iuris as a source of the conception of reason that later served the enlightenment. He also wishes to present this Corpus Iuris as a secular science fighting theology. He writes that “A new elite propagates the cult of justice. Its priests are the lawyers and judges. Their profession 27 Ibid., 271. 28 I am using here the short notices of Quentin Skinner, “Political Philosophy,” in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 390-391. — 236 —

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becomes a sacred officium…. Lawyers and judges are the hierophants of the mystery of justice (iusticiae mystericum).”29 Further, and with even more problematic understanding for the Latin language, “The ‘cult of iustitia’ (a term we find in Frederick’s Liber Augustalis as a chapter heading: de cultu iustitiae) challenged the sacramental cult of the medieval hierarchical church.”30 I do not wish to correct mistakes here, as Taubes could not have lived without apocalyptic contrasts. It might be agreed that there was a struggle. This struggle, however, was of a political nature and between the Pope and the Emperor for their respective powers. Both referred to the same texts and to the same contradictions in the gospel. “Give to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s” is not a new concept, but the application of Roman jurisdiction. It had not become cult in any stage of history—if we were, necessarily, to exclude the Kronjurist of the Third Reich, Carl Schmitt (“Give to Hitler…”). Taubes, however, needs the contrast to move from the world of theology to the world of a non-theological order, from “Divine Providence” to the secular necessity (necessitas rerum31—one might see a Machiavellian term in this), in order to form the “immanent order of justice.” This immanent order of justice is a term Taubes borrows from the works of Spinoza (1632–1677), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), and Isaac Newton (1642–1726). The professor of the Free University of Berlin concludes that “The authority of law was secularized authority, but it was not yet an authority based on naked force.”32 Consequently he quotes in his annotations items from Ex Capivitate Salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47, by a certain C. Schmitt. Taubes’ reader might have expected it earlier. The discussion of the immanent order of justice follows the economic conception of reason, the impetus for profit, which “eclipses the ‘objective’ element of justice.”33 Just prices and just wages sounded, according to Taubes, archaic, and were viewed as such. The subjective element is thus integrated into the economic conception of reason, which thus becomes the domination of nature. It becomes the judge, as Emmanuel 29 Ibid., 272. Emphasis in the original. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 273. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. — 237 —

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Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason.34 The technological conception of reason, following the economic one, de-mystifies nature and leads to a “mathematization” of the universe. Taubes states that “man pays a price for this knowledge in the horizon of power [as well]. In exercising reason as power over nature and society, man is alienated from the elements he dominates. He knows only insofar as he can manipulate.”35 There is Hegel, again, standing in the background: knowledge as liberation and alienation at the same time, as Max Weber and Georg Simmel described the tensions in the functioning of human reason. Jacob Taubes looks at this point like a nostalgic who looks upon the Old Country while leaving it for good on his ship: Scepticism has purged the idea of reason of so much of its content, of the element of freedom, of the element of happiness, of the element of justice, that at the end the very idea of reason appears like a ghost that has emerged from the cloudy linguistic usage…. The “philosophy” of technical reason is occupied in exposing the bankruptcy of all ideas that go beyond the brute and naked realm of facts.36 This takes us to the core of Taubes’ assertion: technology has mastered the world, but not the religion, which has created an “overarching” world that we cannot escape. He writes that “The Asiatic and African nations were not converted to Western religion, but they have become convinced by the methods of Western technological reasoning.”37 Taubes died in 1987. Had he lived only a few more years, he would have experienced the return of the religions, or better, religiosity which sought to defy technology, the technological alienation that is also an economic one Yet that could be a false contrast, for religions do not succeed without technology, and religions that do exercise power require technology to uphold the faith. Is the return of the gods connected to the dominance of technology? I do not think so. It is, rather, connected to the identity of human beings, 34 Ibid., 274. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., 277. 37 Ibid., 278. — 238 —

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who are unwilling to do without their tradition of truth. The abandonment of the universality of man is the subject exile studies ought to take to heart, for the reason that especially in exile, elements of being oneself break through the surface. In one’s “own” world, or the one understood as such, they are rarely reflected. Technological reasoning has proven that the satisfaction of basic needs (food, well-being, communication, and globalization) is insufficient for the satisfaction of man. Human beings want more than they actually are, more than they eat, and this hope for more rules human society in a positive way as well as in a negative one. And thus we have returned to the Aristotelian search for happiness—by, with, or despite Taubes’ philosophical speculations.

— 239 —

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4.3 Emmanuel Levinas, or, The (Un-)Translatability of Jerusalem into Athens

Translation theories are a consistent integral component of the philosophy of language–if they aren’t at the core of it. That realm of discourse is commonly perceived as a reflection of the communication between the thought, word, and feeling, and the combination of letters, gestures, or (artistic) compositions as its expression. An almost continuous discourse on theories of language and translation has been going on at least since Plato’s speculation on the logos, and the Hermetic and Neoplatonic theories of the magic power of the word.1 This has included discussing the origin of every idiom, its divinity, and its profanation in expressing the divine. The discourse has also included the translatability of a text, a tradition, or a word, the meaning of creating a translated text that always refers to the original one, the world of reference that a translation recalls, and more. Every theoretical premise of translation is then only the point of departure for developing more general theories about human communication. It is a wide field of speculation, where the contingency of the communicative issue in concrete form struggles against the demand for universality of reason and understanding. Following this idea, translation as a literary and oral product is a field of research where culture and language, as well as their appropriate or inappropriate expressions, are a constant object of criticism. The immanent state of a translation is its contingency with regard to time and cultural context, because a translated text does not, for the most part, claim to stand as eternal, as the original does. Yet the history of theories and practices relating to translation shows that translations might also cross the border of temporary contingency and become a substitute for the original. This is of course especially true with lost works. In that case, translations might be the only documents of the original composition in existence. They might also be literary translations, which have had an impact on texts and traditions. In addition to this, a very interesting case is the translation of religious texts, 1

See my “(Un)übersetzbarkeit und Magie der ‘heiligen’ Sprache,” 299-314. — 240 —

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which are considered to be at least temporarily authoritative. Often they become a substitute for the original text, until the religious community changes its attitude to tradition and to authoritative text. However, translation is the most difficult field of literary and philosophical activity, because of the eternal question of how true the translated word is to the original content, and to what degree the words are “equally powerful” in terms of thoughts and feelings. Within one’s own native language there is already a substantial discrepancy between human thought and the adequate (such as immanent inadequate) expression thereof. It is commonly felt as inadequate de principio. In a translation, there is a doubled decrease of meaning, meaning the immanent inadequacy between thought and expression, and between original expression and the translation thereof. The degree to which this doubled decrease varies is dependent upon the degree of the translator’s talent for finding comparable expressions in the target language. Among the ancient Mediterranean cultures and their Oriental neighbours, dealing with the multifarious problems and difficulties of translating was the subject of intense discussion and probing scrutiny.2 Cicero plastically depicted the binary dilemma in translating texts word by word (verbum e verbo) and meaning by meaning (sensus e sensu). This might be the first instance in the Western world of a scholar tackling the nature of translation and suggesting a theory. However, an earlier discussion on the perfect/imperfect way of translating the writings of one nation (in a the language of a minority) into the common language, or lingua franca, had already taken place: in Alexandria, in a discussion between Jewish and Christian scholars. The translation of the Torah into Greek was, as stated earlier, according to legend a joint venture of seventy or seventy-two Jewish elders for the library of Ptolemaic Alexandria.3 It is the well-known first example of a literary and legal translation of an entire shelf of books. It is also the first example in which the problems of quality and the differences between original and translated text are raised. The philosopher and Talmudic commentator Emmanuel Levinas 2 3

See my own Libraries, Translations, and “Canonic” Texts: The Septuagint, Aquila, and Ben Sira in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). See the first part, chapter 1, pp. 23-40 — 241 —

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(1906-1995) focused on the aspect of translatability of the Jewish tradition and religion. It is not a coincidence that Levinas started from this legend of the seventy(-two) translators, as transmitted later through the Gemara (the traditional commentary to the Mishnah in the Talmud) in the Babylonian Talmud. The Babylonian Talmud was completed in its entirety between the fifth and sixth centuries CE, and includes traditions that can be dated to more recent scholars as well as ancient ones. This is characteristic of rabbinic Judaism, in which time does not play a substantial role. Besides rabbinic discussions on legal and religious topics, the Babylonian Talmud also amasses texts and traditions which reflect rabbinic attitudes toward the Greek and Roman cultures, cults, and belief systems. Levinas was convinced that he could find a sea of eternal knowledge embodied in the letters of an almost cryptic text, could locate signs and symbols foreshadowing the present in the Talmudic texts. Consequently, his “lectures talmudiques” are an approach to various topics not primarily of a Talmudic interest, but rather of significance for modern philosophical discussions.4 Levinas claims that “a page of the Talmud is above all … the expression of a doctrine: Jewish culture and wisdom.”5 It does not bear close scrutiny. A Talmudic page is a window to and mirror of a Talmudic discussion in which present and past times are fused and moved outside of time itself, so to speak, but remain difficult to decode without the supplementary commentary. The lenses of successive generations can be dangerous filters, it is true: they might be a canonical Procrustean bed for previous scholarly tradition. However, it is impossible to read a page of the Talmud under the assumption that the reader is indeed able to directly connect to the Talmudic academies, to Nehardea’s or Pumbedita’s circles of learning. A Talmudic page is not the expression of a doctrine, but rather the transmission of exegetic 4

5

On Levinas’ talmudic lectures, see Ira F. Stone, Reading Lévinas/Reading Talmud: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1998); Catherine Chalier, “Levinas and the Talmud,” in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100–118; Shmuel Wygoda, “A phenomenological outlook at the Talmud: Levinas as reader of the Talmud,” Hebrew University and Herzog College, to be downloaded at http://ghansel.free.fr/wygoda.html (accessed October 5, 2012). For a critical view of Levinas’ approach to Talmud and Judaism, see Alessandro Guetta, “Levinas: quel Judaïsme? Conférence faite dans le cadre du Colloque ‘Actualité de la pensée d’Emmanuel Lévinas’” (September 15, 1997), manuscript. French: “Une page du Talmud est avant tout… l’expression d’une doctrine: de la culture e de la sagesse juive.” Emmanuel Lévinas, A l’heure des nations (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988), 48. — 242 —

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tools to learn and judge earlier traditions while coping with the challenges of the present. The Talmudic text of BT Megillah, which is the object of Levinas’ analysis, is a discussion on writing a biblical text on parchment, on the halakhic premises for purity and impurity, and finally on the Greek translation of the Torah, known as the Septuagint. Like every other Talmudic text, it consists of discussions, mostly with a premise from the Mishnah, the oldest literary and legal product of the rabbinic schools in Palestine, and various opinions that the redactor melts down within a continuous literary text. A student of rabbinic texts should be very careful not to consider the text transmitted here to be a “doctrine” in the modern sense of the term.6 Talmudic discourses are always snapshots of a sea of hermeneutic approaches to older texts and traditions. They are not tractates of an analytical philosophy. There are no doctrines, but rather beginnings of discourses. They are tools to determine hermeneutical difficulties, because Talmudic academies were more interested in questions than answers. Nevertheless, Talmudic teachers set the foundation for future discussions. They reduced the polysemantic field, deconstructed texts of the past, and contextualized tradition and legal texts. La traduction de l’écriture was published by Levinas in 1984.7 After translating the Talmudic text, Levinas focuses in his commentary on six points: preliminary considerations; the language and the letters; the incommunicable, untranslatable cores of Judaism with cult and persecution; the privilege of the Greek language; the limits of assimilation; and finally the beauty of Japheth.8 I would like to limit my analysis here to some aspects which deal with the more general problem of translations and the function of the Hebrew and Greek languages as vehicles of culture and revelation.

6 7

8

For a very similar critical comment, see Robert Gibbs, Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 285–303. This first publication was in Jean Halpérin and Georges Lévitte, eds., Israël, le judaïsme et l’Europe (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). I refer to the later print, Lévinas, A l’heure des nations (1988), 43–65. An English translation is available in In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (London and Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 33–54. On Levinas’ text in the context of his thinking, see Gibbs, Why Ethics?, 285-303. See further, Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 170–174. — 243 —

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The Talmudic Discussion and Levinas’ Interpretation In his preliminary considerations, Levinas contemplates the question of to which halakhic problem the Gemara refers. In his understanding, the subject under discussion is whether a foreign language is able to express the Jewish religion without jeopardizing its dignity and spiritual scope.9 He mentions one other related aspect: the question of whether the translation of the Bible preserves the properties (virtus) of the original or whether it is a profanation. The question is the “spiritual authenticity of a translation if it affects the revealed thought of a monotheism historically entrusted to the genius of the Hebrew language.”10 Readers of Levinas’ work are aware of just how central the monotheistic idea is in his thought. This idea is thus the main, explosive message of the revelation, entrusted only to the Hebrew language. Levinas’ conception is one that we first find in the work of the linguist and philosopher Chayim H. Steinthal in a critique of the criticism of Ernst Renan. We discussed this aspect in an earlier chapter. Levinas’ analysis of the Talmudic text is well structured in a crescendo of motifs, interwoven with considerations and notes from modern literature, philosophy, and correspondent authorities. The first motif is the universal translatability of the Hebrew text. The audience of Levinas’ Talmudic lectures should be aware that the Talmudic texts and the traditions transmitted often use “write in a language” synonymously with “translate.” At the same time, the phrase is used as a technical term for the transliteration of a text into another alphabet. A third meaning, which Levinas does not consider, is that “write in a/another language” means the act of writing an official document, according to the Talmud. The language is a secondary element, while the act of “writing” is of importance in this context.11 Talmudic academies preferred the oral transmission over the written. Writing was reserved, at least in principal, for official and religious documents, as a written text claims to be eternal, which contradicts the concept of perpetual discussion. The text of the mishnah under discussion is: “The difference between books and tefillin [phylacteries] and mezuzot [small containers at the 9 French: “sans compromettre la dignité et la portée spirituelles.” Levinas, A l’heure des Nations, 47. 10 French: “lˊauthenticité spirituelle dˊune traduction, quand elle concerne la pensée révélée du monothéisme confiée historiquement au génie de lˊhébreu.” Ibid. 11 See on this peculiar aspect my own Eine Tora für den König Talmai. — 244 —

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doorpost containing sections from Deuteronomy 6:4-9 and 11:13-21] is that books are allowed to be written in all languages while tefillin and mezuzot [should be written] only in Assyrian (characters). Rabbi Shim‘on ben Gamliel says: Also in the case of books, they permitted only Greek characters.” Levinas starts by stressing the openness of Mishnaic halakhah, which allowed translation/writing in every language, concluding that this text shows the universality of the Bible and of Judaism. However, Rabbi Shim‘on ben Gamliel limits this universality to translation into the Greek language, and thus excludes all other languages. The Gemara applies the entire discussion to the liturgical state of books that “render the hands impure” (liturgically impure, that is to say).12 Purity might only be achieved if the text is written in Assyrian or square characters, with ink and on parchment.13 According to Levinas, the Gemara speaks to the untranslatability of Judaism if it is not carried out according to the Jewish traditional shape (“Il n’y aurait du Judaism une signification universelle séparable des formes traditionnelle. Judaïsme intraduisible”). The obvious inconsistency between the text of the Mishnah (the items can be translated into all languages), the limitation of Rabban Gamliel (they can be translated only into Greek) and the limitation of the Gemara (they can be translated only if written in Assyrian with ink and on parchment) is, according to Levinas, neutralized if we follow Rabba. He states that all translations are allowed, provided that they are written in “our characters.” In other words, a translation into a foreign language is not allowed if it is written in characters other than those of Hebrew. Abbaye rejects this and suggests that one must view the Mishnah as the authoritative text, and regard the teaching of Rabban Gamliel only as an opinion. Successive rabbinic discussions suggest a way to contextualize the object, the elements (“books,” “tefillin, mezuzot”), and the “Greek language” dealt with by the halakhah: the Mishnah refers to books, which are allowed in every language; and the Baraita (the statement by Shim‘on ben Gamliel) to tefillin and mezuzot, whose wording and writing should remain in Assyrian letters. The exegetic link to this interpretation is the Hebrew verb “vehayu,” which appears in Deuteronomy/Devarim 6:6, in a passage that is written on tefillin and mezuzot. “Vehayu,” ac12 See my “Voraussetzung zur Kanonbildung und die Yavne-Legende,” in ibid, 23–37.  13 Levinas’s translation “et sous forme de livre” is erroneous.  — 245 —

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cording to Levinas, has the literal translation, “they will always be this way.”14 Levinas concludes that this is a nice pretext for the distinction of cult and culture.15 Books are valid in every language, whereas liturgical and religious Judaism is steadfast. The cult—the liturgical aspect—of Judaism is firm, while its culture is open to modernity. Further discussion of the value of the Aramaic parts of the Bible shows that the Babylonian teachers sought to avoid the contradiction by applying the halakhah of the Baraita only to the Book of Esther. While the Mishnah mentions other books, the Baraita mentions only the one special book that renders the hands impure, even when it is written in the language of the Gentiles: the Book of Esther. This book tells us outright that Mordecai wrote it to the Jews in all languages and in all alphabets (Esther 8:9). Levinas, belonging to the generation of the Shoah, sees in this only the essence of the Diaspora. Levinas considered the Book of Esther a “book of persecution, a book on anti-Semitism, which can be understood by the Jews only in their language and their writings, the language of victims.” The Babylonian teachers further contextualized the teaching of the Mishnah: the opinion of Rabban Gamliel should be seen in connection to a particular experience of Israel, the translation of the Torah into Greek in Egyptian Alexandria, which we discussed earlier: The permission of our teachers to write in Greek is extended only to the Pentateuch because of the events with the King Ptolemy. It is taught there: It so came to pass that King Ptolemy summoned seventy-two Elders and put them in seventy-two houses without communicating to them why he had summoned them. He went to every one separately, saying to them: write out for me the Torah of Moses, our teacher. The Holy one, blessed be He, placed knowledge in the heart of every one and they agreed with each other in their judgement. They wrote for him: (here follow the changed verses). (BT Megillah 9a-b)

14 French: “ils seront toujours ainsi.” Levinas, A l’heure des Nations, 54. 15 Ibid. — 246 —

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Philology and cultural history are not Levinas’s primary philosophical interests, of course. His reference to the history of the Jews in the Diaspora of Alexandria is just a confirmation of his theory that the Talmudic text refers to an assimilation into Europe.16 The theory of the inspiration of the Septuagint is not connected to the JewishHellenistic and Christian influences on Jewish sources (as I tried to prove elsewhere),17 but is rather a concession made by the Babylonian Talmud regarding the assimilation of Jews in Alexandria. A limit to the assimilation are the corrections/changes in the biblical text the translators prepared in order to demonstrate that there is an untranslatable domain in the heart of the Pentateuch itself. Levinas’ theory does not withstand closer scrutiny for the simple fact that the Baraita deconstructs the history of the Septuagint. It is stated that the translation was written for King Ptolemy, not for the Jews. The tradition of writing a Torah for the king is not new in rabbinic sources, and refers to Deuteronomy 17:18: “When he takes the throne of his kingdom, he is to write for himself on a scroll a copy of this law, taken from that of the priests, who are Levites.” Katav lo (so the Masoretic text) can either mean that he should write it for himself or that someone else should write it out for him.18 That is also the explanation of Talmud Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 2:4 (20c): “They wrote for him (which means) in his name.” According to Sifre Devarim, the priests corrected the copy of the king, while the above-quoted Sanhedrin 2:4 adds that the Sanhedrin should correct the copy on the basis of the scroll of the Temple court. In this context, it is obvious that the text of Deuteronomy 17:18 reads in a different way: instead of mishneh torah, they understand meshanneh torah (he changes the Torah) or even meshunnah torah (an altered Torah). This tradition is also present in rabbinic tradition as an expression of a change to the Torah (perhaps in the messianic era), a possible reference to the change of the Torah beginning in Ezra’s time.19  The Midrash Leqah Tov transmits a very intriguing tradition:

16 Ibid., 59. 17 See my Libraries, Translations, and ‘Canonic’ Texts. 18 See M.A. Friedman, “u-katevu lo, ose lo ktav [Hebrew, “They wrote for him, he makes for him a Writ”],” Sinai 84 (1979): 177–179.  19 See Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 11 (71b); Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:7–8; Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 21b–22a. — 247 —

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Bereshit bara’ elohim (In the beginning created God): This is one of the passages which the Elders of Israel changed for the king Ptolemy. They wrote for him: Elohim bara’ bereshit (God created in the beginning). For he [the King] did not have enough knowledge to reflect on the Midrash of the Torah (Leqah Tov to Gen. 1:1). The text of the Torah was changed because of the king’s ignorance of the meaning of the Torah. A king is not a student from a rabbinical academy, capable of reaching the deeper meaning of the text. Consequently, he needs an abridged, simplified, or better yet “altered” version, in which the difficulties or mysteries of a verse are unmistakably explained by a clear change in the corresponding translated verse. This version of the Torah is a Torah for the King. This midrashic interpretation is also echoed by the testimony of the Church father Jerome, who reports that, according to Jewish tradition, the seventy-two translators of the Torah changed the text in order to prevent the monotheistic king developing a misconception of a possible dualistic conception of reality in the Hebrew text.20 Allow me to sumarrize Levinas’ main points in his interpretation of the Talmudic text. The Mishnah allows every language to be used for the translation and transcription of the biblical text. This openness shows the universality of Judaism as a culture. The restriction of the halakhah to mezuzot and tefillin, stating that only they cannot be translated into other languages, is based on their nature as cultic texts; they are untranslatable and may be written only in Assyrian characters, which are now considered the Hebrew characters. A further restriction of Rabbi Shim‘on ben Gamliel allows a translation even for books only if it is into the Greek language. The following rabbinic discussion focuses on further restrictions: according to Babylonian teachers, only the book of Esther might be translated into any language and written with any characters. According to other rabbis, the restriction of Rabbi Shim‘on ben Gamliel refers to a special case, namely the translation of the Torah 20 Latin: “Iudaei prudenti factum dicunt esse consilio, ne Ptolomeus, unius dei cultor, etiam apud Hebraeos duplicem divinitatem deprehenderet, quos maximi idcirco faciebat, quia in Platonis dogma cadere videbantur.” Prologus in Pentateuchum, Patrologia Latina 28:121. See also Biblia sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem. ed. Robert Weber and Bonifatius Fischer (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1975), 3–4. — 248 —

———————4.3 Emmanuel Levinas, or, The (Un-)Translatability of Jerusalem into Athens ———————

into Greek. Levinas is of the opinion that the first restriction (which allows translation and transcription into any language only for the book of Esther) is based on Jewish history and its history of persecution. The second restriction, which allows for the case of the Septuagint, affects the nature of Judaism as it exists in the Diaspora. The limits for translation are intended to serve as limits for assimilation, as posed by the rabbis. 

Philological Analysis and Philosophy Modern scholars of history, ideas, and philosophy serve two proverbial masters. One master demands that the claim of philosophical discourse to read and interpret ancient texts beyond time and place must be honored. The second demands philological research to construct and deconstruct texts and traditions. The philological approach, according to the classical philologist Nietzsche, will have an “anachronistic effect, namely against time, and in that way on time and hopefully in favor of a future time.”21 In my perception, the polarization between philology and philosophy is the only way to gain knowledge. The Midrash Sifra includes an ironic dictum of Rabbi Yishmael, who quoted Rabbi Eliezer: “Rabbi Yishma‘el says: You say to the text (katuv): be silent until I explain you.”22 The silence of the text is the indispensable premise for revelation through the commentary and is the premise for philosophical discourse. Silence, not the love for the word, which is philology. Yet, the silence of the word leads to very dangerous generalizations, such as the equation of “Greek” and “European,” which we find very often in Levinas’s lecture.23 Levinas’s claim that Greek culture is syn21 German: “So viel muß ich mir aber selbst von Berufs wegen als classischer Philologe zugestehen dürfen: denn ich wüßte nicht, was die classische Philologie in unserer Zeit für einen Sinn hätte, wenn nicht den, in ihr unzeitgemäß—das heißt gegen die Zeit und dadurch auf die Zeit und hoffentlich zu Gunsten einer kommenden Zeit—zu wirken.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen: Zweites Stück (Leipzig: Fritzsch, 1874), preface. 22 Midrash Sifra Tazria, par. 5 Negaim 13:2. On the irony of this dictum, see Günter Stemberger, Der Talmud. Einführung, Texte, Erläuterungen (Munich: Beck, 1982), 67. 23 The word which reoccurs with particular emphasis in Levinas’ commentary is “Europe.” The subject of the lecture is “Judaism, Europe and Israel.” Levinas, A l’heure des Nations, 48. He links the Greek language to European civilization (ibid, 47); he considers a conceptual limitation of the universality of the Greek language—the concept of universality does not recognize the Greek — 249 —

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onymous with European culture in reference to the latter’s “civilization” is not new. That idea had its early roots—as mentioned—in the German cultural history and philosophy of the nineteenth century, meaning from Friedrich August Wolf onwards. Despite the temptation of an ideological condensation of European culture from Greek culture, there have been centuries of mixed influences and religious upheavals between the Greek world system and the alleged European civilization. Europe was never addressed in any of the Talmudic discussions. The reference to Greece, Greek culture, etc. is likely a simple synonym for Greco-Roman philosophy, culture, and the Greco-Roman way of life.  Greek was the culture of the elite, to which leading rabbinic groups in Palestina aspired. If we read and analyze the Talmudic Babylonian text in detail, we can note beyond a reasonable doubt that in the text of the BT Megillah 8b–9b, there is no general conception that the Greek language is synonymous with European culture. The Greek language was important in approaching the experience of a Jewish community, i.e., within the Hellenistic Diaspora. In the Babylonian academies, the Hellenistic Diaspora was only one face of the past to be remembered. The Greek language was no longer spoken at the Babylonian academies the way it was spoken within the Palestinian culture and in the cultural environment there. The Talmudic page we are interpretating along with Levinas cannot be read as a debate on the value of Jewish culture against the background of European civilization. The passage in the BT Megillah is only a Talmudic debate on how to interpret the Mishnah and the successive discussions on the liturgical use of other languages and writings. The very intriguing Levinasian word play between cult and culture does not fit into the Talmudic debate. Rather,the debate is concerned with the justification of the Aramaic language, the common language of rabbinic Babylonian academies. The system of reference was hardly the Greek “European” culture, but rather pre-Islamic Sassanian Babylonia. The language to be canonized was Aramaic, from which the “Assyrian” characters originated; the culture to be assimilated into was Assyrian, not Greek. If a general debate on cult and culture would be identifiable in translation of the Torah into Greek. On the Eurocentric vision in Levinas’ philosophy, see also John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 23–24; also, on the “double loyalty,” Chalier, “Levinas and the Talmud,” 99 et seq. — 250 —

———————4.3 Emmanuel Levinas, or, The (Un-)Translatability of Jerusalem into Athens ———————

the Talmudic passage, it would underscore the value of the cultures of all Jewish communities. It would equally put into the foreground the ability of Jewish culture to absorb them all. In my opinion, the universality of Judaism is not strengthened by the monotheistic claim or challenge, but rather by the Jewish ability to integrate, absorb, and re-engage with every element of the environment. Instead of a conclusion, let us have a look at the main question of whether the translation of an authoritative text can be interpreted as a process of the universalization of Jewish culture, according to the rabbinic mind. I do not think so. Translations of an authoritative (liturgical or didactic) text can be defined as the decisive interference of an “observer” of the written tradition—with the aim of establishing what is important for transmission and what should be suppressed (by censorship, for instance). “Rabbi Yehudah says: Whoever translates a biblical verse as it reads is a liar. Whoever adds something is a blasphemer. It is not allowed to the meturgeman who is before his sage to subtract or add or change something, unless he is his father or a Rav.”24 The dictum of Rabbi Yehudah clearly links the authoritative canon and translation, i.e., the heritage of the tradition and the transmission thereof. In this respect, the role of the rabbi as a mediator of the text is similar to that of Moses: he is to combine the task of receiving the Torah and the duty of explaining it to the community. That is in nuce the meaning of divine revelation, the gift of interpreting the textual tradition that eventually combines translation and transmission. The ancient scholar of the rabbinical academy claims for himself the duty and the right to control the text, which ultimately is the chief overarching aim of canonization. The hermeneutic task of commenting or translating is the privileged path of the ancient scholar, who must pursue and carry through a canon of traditions. Translation is the medium of the effective canon, not an end in itself. The translation of the Septuagint, albeit with divine inspiration, cannot be seen as a canonical document of universal value, because it was only an experience.

24 Tosefta Megilla 4:41. — 251 —

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Instead of a Conclusion: Jewish Philosophy and Islam from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries

Jewish Philosophy? In the preceding chapters we have discussed the variety of Jewish contacts with the European tradition of culture and Bildung. This conclusion is not a summary of the results, which cannot be of general validity. Rather, this “conclusion” will offer a discussion of a subject that appeared parallel to the Jewish participation in European cultural history: the contribution of Islam to the Jewish (and common) thinking from the early modern period until the acknowledgment of Jewish scholars. It is not necessary to point to the fact that Jewish scholarship not only assimilated Islamic philosophy, but also publicized it in works and institutions. At the same time, however, Jewish scholarship distanced itself from Islamic philosophy. This is, at its core, also a history of a conform dissent. Anyone who attempts to define the term Jewish philosophy must often have to agree with Socrates: “I know that I know nothing,” because of the fact that he knows neither the object nor the methodology of the matter to be analyzed. While the adjective “Jewish” limits the field of research to a historical and cultural experience, the word “philosophy” seeks to break such confinements. It is inherent in philosophy to search in the potentially logic sphere of being and becoming, these terms that move beyond all contingents. The categorical imperative, point of departure and arrival for every scholarly life occupied with Jewish philosophy, is always the same: find proof for the existence of a Jewish philosophy distinctive from universal philosophy in matters of methodology and subject. As long as one seeks the answer to this question—or better yet, calling—only in the ethnical, geographical, or cultural dimension of the philosopher in question, one will never succeed in solving the problem. Judaism will never be easily integrated into ready-made models and terminology without further consideration of the complications of certain questions: what — 252 —

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is the Jewish element in the philosophy of Isaac Israeli or Shlomo ibn Gavirol in the Middle Ages, or Simone Luzzatto or Baruch Spinoza in the early modern period? It is even more complicated to identify the Jewish element in the (post-)modern Jewish philosophy of Karl Marx (1818–1883), Ernst Bloch (1885–1977), Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), or Jacques Derrida (1930–2004). The issues raised in this “conclusion” are not new ones. They form the basic stock of every treatise on Jewish philosophy, at least from the Early Modern Period to this day. What is new is the understanding that the debate concerning the importance of Arabic culture and philosophy tremendously influenced Jewish thinking at the turn of the twentieth century. The debate influenced Jewish thinking to such a degree that it led to a clear distinction between philology (understood as the history of thought in its textual and contextual verbalization) and philosophy (understood as the analytical, logical, and terminological search for paradigms of thought). When the study of Islamic-Arabic culture was introduced into European universities, it became the pinnacle of philology and cultural history. It was exactly at that point that Jewish philosophers—German ones especially—moved away from the matrix that had enabled them to view Judaism in a Platonic and Aristotelian sense. The first sketch of Jewish philosophical history that clearly outlined the problem of research was carried out by Simone Luzzatto, the rabbi from seventeenth-century Venice I mentioned above.1 When, in his Discorso,2 Luzzatto explained to his Venetian audience the advantages of integrating Jews into the general commerce of the city and maritime freight to the East, he referred to the Jewish history of culture and Jewish traditions in order to present the Jews as an essential part of Venetian society.3 Although his audience was urbane and sophisticated, they were not willing to see the presence of Jews in Venice in a favorable light. Luzzatto began his excursion with a description of Hellenistic thought, followed by introducing thinkers such as Saadia Gaon, Moshe 1 2 3

To my knowledge, there is no earlier manuscript available discussing the evolution of philosophy in ancient and medieval Judaism in such a (more or less) systematic manner. Published as the mentioned Discorso circa il stato de gl’Hebrei et in particolar dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia. On a summary of the treatise, see my “Alcune considerazioni sugli Ebrei e Venezia nel pensiero politico di Simone Luzzatto,” in Percorsi di storia ebraica: Atti del XVIII convegno internazionale dell’AISG (Cividale del Friuli-Gorizia, 7-9 settembre 2004), ed. Cesare Ioly Zorattini (Udine: Forum, 2005), 247–266. — 253 —

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ben Maimon (Maimonides), Levi ben Gershon (Gersonides), Hasdai Crescas (c.1340–c.1410), Joseph Albo (1380–1444), and Abraham Ibn Ezra (1089–1164). Luzzatto did not describe the kabbalists individually, but he did explain their theories in detail. He presented them not as thinkers, but as a class of intellectuals.4 This first treatise on the history of Jewish philosophy is not a long one—it only covers eight octavo pages—but it is important inasmuch as it points to two peculiarities of Jewish thinking in the Middle Ages: first, to a discussion concerning the Arabic origin of Jewish philosophy, and second, to the Arabic and Judeo-Arabic historical identity. Following Luzzatto’s introduction of Philo of Alexandria and Josephus Flavius as the main representatives of the Judeo-Hellenistic philosophy, there is, surprisingly, no reference whatsoever to the rabbinic teachings—neither to the Talmud nor to the midrashim. The most essential element Luzzatto put into the foreground was the translatio sapientiae, i.e., the fact that “after the fall of the Roman Empire its teachings were transferred to the Arab nation.”5 After the disintegration of Roman hegemony, the knowledge of the philosophers found a new refuge in the Moslem-Arabic academies, and there Jews found a new cultural home as well. Luzzatto reveals in this sketch particularly his conviction that philosophy is a universal teaching that is unrelated to any special rights of one particular nation, e.g., biblical revelation. From a philosophical 4

5

On this subject, see François Secret, “Un texte mal connu de Simon Luzzato sur la cabbale,” Revue des Études Juives 118 (1959/1960): 121–128, and Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 5. I also refer to my own “Von der ‘philosophia giudaica seu ebraeorum’ zur ‘jüdischen Philosophie’: (Ver)wandlungen eines Begriffes im Kontext der Kabbala Denudata,” Morgen-Glantz: Zeitschrift der Christian Knorr von Rosenroth-Gesellschaft 16 (2006): 323–341. See especially the discussion concerning Luzzatto on 334–340. Italian: “…passarono le dottrine nella nazione araba dopo la declinatione dell’imperio romano.” Luzzatto, Discorso, 78 et seq. The excerpt in standardized Italian is: “Dopo questi due preclari uomini non si trovano altri della nostra nazione ch’abbiano lasciato loro monumenti in lingua greca, overo latina; ma poi che passarono le dottrine nella nazione araba dopo la declinazione dell’imperio romano, molti della nazione composero libri de varie scienzie in lingua araba; fra li più antichi che si riserba memoria appresso la nazione fu Rabbi Saadia che visse gia otto cent’anni detto l’eccellentissimo, che ci arrichì d’un dottissimo libro circa gli articoli della fede, e cosi tutti quegl’ebrei che li seguirono per il corso de 500 anni in circa, se d’alcuna dottrina umana ragionarno, composero li loro libri in lingua araba e agarena, che quasi tutti per l’ingiuria de tempi e declinazione dell’imperio arabo si sono smariti; fra gli uomini dotti di quel tempo si erresse e sublimò Rabbi Moise cordubense spagnolo, ma per abitatione detto egizio, che fu quasi coetaneo di Averoe Comentatore, il quale per eccelenza di dottrina e universalità di tutte le scienzie, è reputato delli maggiori uomini che giamai fiorì nella nazione.” I am currently working on an anthological edition of the Discorso in standardized Italian with an introduction and commentary. — 254 —

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perspective, that was developed further in Luzzatto’s 1651 Socrate overo dell’humano sapere (Socrates, or, on Human Knowledge),6 he understood this dottrina umana (human doctrine) as the result of the mind, and thus essentially treacherous. If Luzzatto associates philosophy with brittle knowledge, then why does he dedicate an entire sophisticated chapter to prominent figures of ancient and medieval Judaism? The reason is, as I see it, that Luzzatto wishes to exercise a disguised yet identifiable criticism: he turns against all those who want to harmonize philosophy with revelation. It is not a coincidence that he refers to the intellectuals he discusses not as philosophers but as teologi filosofanti (philosophizing theologians). The term philosophantes is not a neutral one; it invokes the difference that the Scottish theologian and scholastic Johannes Duns Scotus emphasized in the twelfth century: the difference between those philosophers who do not necessarily demand the existence of revelation, such as Aristotle and Averroës (1126–1198), and those intellectuals who want to solve the seeming incongruity between philosophy and revelation through mutual appreciation.7 When Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) referred to himself as one of the philosophantes in his Quaestio de aqua et terra, he wrote “inter vere philosophantes minimum.” He did so because he demanded of himself what Thomas Aquinas had denied all poets in general: to be a philosopher.8 In the age of humanism and the Renaissance, the De Dignitate of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) shows that the word took on an esoteric meaning.9 Another hundred years 6

7 8

9

Simone Luzzatto, Socrate overo dell’humano sapere esercizio seriogiocoso di Simone Luzzatto Hebreo Venetiano opera nella quale si dimostra quanto sia imbecile l’humano intendimento, mentre non è diretto dalla divina rivelazione (Venice: Tomasini, 1651). I am currently working on an edition of this text with a commentary. See also David B. Ruderman, “Science and Scepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World,” in Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, ed. David B. Ruderman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 164–81; Ariel Viterbo, “La mitzwàh di studiare le scienze nell’opera di Rac Simchah (Simone) Luzzatto,” Segulat Israel 4 (1997): 54–67; Viterbo, “Socrate nel ghetto: Lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto,” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. See Johannes Duns Scotus (1266-1308), De primo principio III. See also Etienne Gilson, “Les ‘Philosophantes,’” Archives d’Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 19 (1952): 135–140. See the beginning of the tractate in Dante Alighieri and Giambattista Giuliani, Le opere latine: Reintegrate nel testo con nuovi commenti (Florence: Le Monnier, 1882). Thanks to the work of the Bibliotheca Augustana in Augsburg, Bavaria, the text is accessible online: Dante Alighieri, “Quaestio de aqua et terra [le opere latine],” Bibliotheca Augustana, http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/ Chronologia/Lspost14/Dante/dan_aqte.html; Aquinas, Summa theologica I, 1, 9. Pico della Mirandola wrote: “Once we, inspired by the Cherubic spirit, have reached this point through the art of speaking or of reasoning, that is, philosophizing according to the grades of — 255 —

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later, during the sixteenth century, in Christian rhetoric philosophantes were those intellectuals who were unaware of true philosophy.10 The term “philosopher” then took the meaning it still has today. According to Luzzatto, philosophy is a universal science common to all cultures and is to be separated entirely from revelation. In his philosophical treatise Socrate, published thirteen years after Discorso, Luzzatto referred to neither Jewish nor Christian authorities, to whom he makes indirect implications. Rather, he spoke of the Socratic academy that had to be addressed—from a historical standpoint—apart from all Jewish or Christian influences. The subject of the treatise was mostly the relationship between authority and religion, between the treacherous mind and the school of Athens. In Discorso, Luzzatto referred to this paradigmatic separation as standing at the core of his thinking. In his description of Jewish philosophy he criticized the teologi filosofanti because the philosophizing theologians reduce the sayings and claims of the old to generally accessible science; and as they are convinced that one special truth might not necessarily preclude another, and that the opinions of the old scholars do not contradict the apparent truth, they believe their authority might compensate for the flaws of Judaism and the human mind.11

Nature, penetrating the whole from the center to the center, we will then descend, dashing the one into many with Titanic force like Osiris, and ascend, drawing together with Apollonian force the many into one like Osiris’ limbs until at last, resting in the bosom of the Father Who is at the top of the ladder, we will be made perfect in theological bliss.” The original Latin is translated into English and made accessible online through the Pico Project of the Department of Italian Studies at Brown University and the Università di Bologna. Pico della Mirandola, De Dignitate 15, § 87, Pico Project/Progetto Pico, http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/pico/text/ ov.html (accessed September 12, 2012). 10 See the Bulla Apostolici Regiminis von 1513 (DH 1440): “de natura praesertim animae rationalis, quod videlicet mortalis sit, aut unica in cunctis hominibus, et nonnulli temere philosophantes secundum saltem philosophiam verum id esse asseveren.” Heinrich Klee, Katholische Dogmatik, 2nd ed. (Mainz: Kirchheim Schott u. Thielmann, 1840), 289. 11 Italian: “[I teologi filosofanti riducono] li detti e pronunciati de gl’antichi in conformità delle dottrine comunemente abbracciate, e ben che tengono per fermo che le verità non s’oppongono l’una l’altra, e che la semplice openione delli antichi dottori non si deve opponere all’evidenzia, così la loro autorità supplisce a gl’ebrei, ove che la ragione umana è manchevole e difettosa di potere con si suoi argomenti arrivarvi.” Luzzatto, Discorso, 80v. — 256 —

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Philosophy represents a weak, errant human mind, in the view of the skeptical Venetian rabbi-philosopher Luzzatto. It is most interesting, though, that Luzzatto does not discuss in this treatise either the topic or the truth of revelation. In fact, Spinoza would later adapt such skeptical categories in order to question the objectivity of the Jewish concept of revelation. The second element that Luzzatto considers in his brief treatise is the function of Egypt as the central school of the mind. In this regard, Luzzatto refers to a topos of Christian origin, of Egypt possessing a role in salvation: the place of Moses’ revelation; the place of the seventy translators of the Torah; the place of refuge for Jesus of Nazareth from Herod Antipas’s persecution.12 Luzzatto takes this topos from a Jewish point of view: Egypt is the homeland of the lawgiver of the Jews, Moses, the Platonizing philosopher Philo of Alexandria, and the philosophertheologian Maimonides.13 In this statement, it is easy to identify the function of Arabic culture and geography as the source of Jewish thinking. It is easy to identify, too, the role of Egypt as the land of revelation. It is surely not a coincidence—as the Rabbi Luzzatto likely would phrase it—that one midrash, which was transmitted in the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishma’el, poses the question of why the revelation took place outside the land of Israel. The Jewish experience in lands under Islamic rule played a central role in the development and solidification of Jewish identity during the nineteenth century. In that century, the edicts of emancipation granted Jews access to German schools and universities—though the edict was one that all German sovereigns implemented at their own pace. Egyptian Alexandria was considered the ideal cultural center. The remembrance of Alexandria and the history of the Jewish community in Muslim Spain and in Cairo, the city of Jewish rebirth, became markers of identity for German Jews, as evidencedmost visibly through the new Moorish style architecture of synagogues. German Jews were now enabled to discuss through scholarly-philological means their own antiquity and culture. 12 Veltri, Libraries, Translation, and ‘Canonic’ Texts, 62–63. 13 See Luzzatto, Discorso, 79r: “Et è notabile che siccome l’Egitto diede esordio alla celebrità della natione hebrea per cagione de protenti e miracoli ch’a favor suo occorsero, così anco produsse et educò li tre piu famosi uomini ch’in la natione fiorirono; Moise profeta sommo legislatore nel principio della loro solevatione, Filone eloquentissimo oratore mentre ancor’erano appresso le nationi in alcuna stima; Rabbi Moise ora sopranominato, egregio et eccelent. dottore nella loro caduta et oppressione.” — 257 —

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Leopold Zunz, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, wrote that this new science should also include the scholarly and historical study of Jewish philosophy and the related influence of Arabic philosophy.14 It is not a coincidence that Zunz researched the ideas of a Spanish philosopher, Shem Tov Falaquera, in his own doctoral thesis (begun in Berlin, presented in Halle).15 The relationship between the Arabic language, Islam, and Judaism represents an aspect of contemporary scholarship that has been largely neglected until now. Unfortunately, there is still no available monograph that illuminates the concepts of religion and philosophy from the perspective of an exchange between the cultures mentioned above. We do have several studies proving the Jews’ interest in Arabic culture, and several contradicting voices have been raised, thanks to historian Edward Said’s Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient,16 in which he points to the contributions of the Jews to Arabic scholarship, history, and philosophy. Nevertheless, no one has yet researched the importance of Arabic thinking for the Jewish philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is necessary to outline the historical-philological approach before elaborating on this subject. The Historical-Philological Approach to (Judeo)-Arabic Philosophy As we have identified and outlined, many rabbis earned their doctoral degrees at the same university as did Leopold Zunz, Halle University. Many worked on various subjects of Arabic and Judeo-Arabic philosophy for their theses. Examples of their subjects are - -

Maimonides’ thirteen principles of faith,17 the two philosophical treatises of Abu al-Hasan

14 Zunz, Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur, 30–31. 15 Leopold Zunz, “De Schem-Tobh Palkeira, imprimis de ejusdem libro, qui inscribitur Sepherhamaaloth” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1821); Material in relation to Zunz’s dissertation has been published in Veltri and Winkelmann, “… daß er in Rabbinischer und in der Talmudischen Litteratur ziemlich bewandert ist,” 239–260. 16 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, 2nd paperback ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995). 17 Marcus Laisch (Treptow, Pomerania), “Maimonidis XIII articuli fidei ex Eduardi Pocockii ‘Porta Mosis’ transscripti, versi, atque ad fontem Veteris Testamenti reducti” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1821). — 258 —

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(died c.1065), a student of Ibn Sina Bahmanyar ibn alMarzuban,18 - the Kalam (Islamic philosophical theology) in the edition of the Karaite Jew Yūsuf al-Baṣīr (c.960– c.1038),19 - the concept of free will in medieval Jewish philosophy,20 and, - the letter of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rushd (Averroës, c.1126–1198) on the possibility of a conjunction with the active intellect (a letter based on a medieval Hebrew translation).21 Together with these doctoral theses there dawned an interest among Jews in the critical history of Islamic sources. In 1833, the Reform rabbi Abraham Geiger published Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen? (What has Muhammad Adopted from Judaism?, translated and published as Judaism and Islam).22 Geiger devised the idea for this text from a prize question, a quaestio, posed by the philosophical institute of the University of Bonn: Inquiratur in fontes Alcorani seu Legis Mohammedicae eas, qui ex Judaismo derivandi sunt. In the first part of his responsio, Geiger asked if Muhammad had had the historical opportunity for an adaption of Jewish elements and, if so, whether he used the op18 Salomon Popper (Lissa, Poznań) (Posen), “De duobus Behemenjari ibn el-Merseban libellis philosophicis” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1851); published as Salomon Poper [sic], Behmenjâr, Ben-el-Marzubân, der persische Aristoteliker aus Avicenna’s Schule: Zwei metaphysische Abhandlungen von ihm Arabisch und Deutsch (Leipzig: Voss, 1851). 19 Pincus Fritz Frankl (Moravia), “Beiträge zur Kunde des “Galam“ und der muslimischen Sekten: Nach den im Codex 41 Warner. der Leydner Universitäts-Bibl. erhaltenen Schriften des AbuJakub (Jussuf) al-Bazir” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1871). See also Yūsuf Baṣīr, Das Buch der Unterscheidung: Judäo-arabisch–Deutsch, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Wolfgang von Abel (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005). 20 Ludwig Stein (Erdö-Benye, Hungary), “Die Willensfreiheit und ihr Verhältniss zur göttlichen Präscienz und Providenz bei den jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1881). 21 Ludwig Hannes (Fraustadt, Poznań) (1868), “Des Averroes Abhandlung: ‚Über die Möglichkeit der Conjunktion‘ oder ‘Über den materiellen Intellekt’ in der hebraeischen Übersetzung eines Anonymus nach Handschriften zum ersten Male herausgegeben, übersetzt, erläutert, mit Einleitung und Parallelstellen versehen” (PhD diss., University of Halle, 1882). The Averroës tractate had received special attention in Jewish circles. See, for instance, Ibn Rushd, The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect, trans. Kalman P. Bland, comment. Moses Narboni (New York: KTAV, 1982). 22 It is accessible online: Abraham Geiger, Judaism and Islam, trans. F.M. Young, accessed September 12, 2012, http://www.bible.ca/islam/library/Geiger/Judaism/index.htm. — 259 —

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portunity. Geiger devoted the second part of his answer to the terminology and history of biblical characters that are discussed in the Qur’an. In the appendix, Geiger offered several quotations from the Qur’an in which Judaism is rejected. It is rather interesting that Geiger’s text was translated into English in Bangalore in 1896, i.e., several decades after its composition. In India, it was used as a reference text for Christian missionary activities among Indian Muslims. The philological research of the common heritage of Jews and Arabs mirrors the new wave of interest in the Orient. It was during this period that the so-called Morgenländische Gesellschaft (Oriental Society) was founded. Its main purpose was to make Oriental culture accessible to the the West.23 From the beginning, Jews became members, and the first issue of the Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Periodical of the German Oriental Society) included contributions by Jewish authors. Most noteworthy was Ignaz Goldziher, a Hungarian Jew, to whom we have referred above.24 Goldziher was one of the founders of Arabic studies in Europe and had studied in Budapest, Berlin, Leipzig, Leiden (Netherlands), and Cairo. He became the first Jewish professor at a Hungarian university (Budapest, 1905). Goldziher’s relationship to Islam marked a milestone in the understanding of Arabic culture and philosophy. “Understanding” might be a poor word, as Goldziher actually sought a home in Islam as he was unable to find it in the Science of Judaism.25 In an excerpt of his diary (published by Alexander Schreiber in 1978), it is apparent that Goldziher considered himself a Muslim: I have settled into the Muslim spirit over the weeks to such a degree that I am finally convinced within that I am a Muslim myself. I have found out in an intellectual way that this is the only religion which might satisfy philosophical minds, despite its doctrinal-official shape 23 Holger Preissler, “Die Anfänge der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,” Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 145 (1995): 241–327, and Constitution of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, October 2, 1845, revised and adopted in Leipzig, September 29, 1849. 24 See p. 000-000. 25 On Goldziher and his attitude to Islam, see his exchange of letters with the German Arabist Martin Hartmann (1851–1918). I highly recommend the following edition: Ludmila Hanisch, “Machen Sie doch unseren Islam nicht gar zu schlecht…”: Der Briefwechsel der Islamwissenschaftler Ignaz Goldziher und Martin Hartmann 1894-1914 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000). — 260 —

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and formulation. My ideal would be to raise Judaism to a comparable, rational level. Islam is, according to my experience, the only religion in which superstition and rudiments [of paganism] are not rejected by rationalism but by Orthodox teaching.26 In this excerpt Goldziher distanced himself from the traditional form of Judaism in the same way that he distanced himself from the rationalist interpretation (Haskalah) that was so popular in his time. The fact he considered Orthodox teachings the sole form of Judaism capable of keeping superstition and paganism at bay was an indirect criticism of the kabbalah and mystical Judaism. It offered, at the same time, an answer to anyone who considered Islam a pagan religion.27 A new philological research on Maimonides’ Arabic works not only flourished in Germany (with the extraordinary scholarship of Moritz Steinschneider discussed above), but also in France through Salomon Munk (1805–1867), who was of German origin. The Jewish university that was founded in 1854 in Hungarian Preßburg (today Slovakia’s capital Bratislava) also offered philological-philosophical studies. The research of Judeao-Arabic sources of pedagogy by Moritz Güdeman (1835–1918), and the studies of David Kaufmann on Jewish poetry in the Arabic language, on the doctrine of attributes (Attributenlehre), and on the senses, played an important role for the history of Jewish thought. However, it went beyond that: the emphasis on philology also forms the central point of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen’s criticism of the nature of Jewish philosophy. The Argument over Philosophy At the beginning of the twentieth century there occurred a shift in the mentality of Judaism. Throughout almost its entire existence until its closure by the National Socialists in 1942, Berlin’s Higher Institute for Jewish Studies, the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums, which 26 Ignaz Goldziher, Tagebuch, ed. Alexander Scheiber (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 59. 27 Such a stance was not new; it had already existed in humanist and modern Christian circles. See Victor Segesvary, L’Islam et la réforme: Étude sur l’attitude des réformateurs zurichois envers l’Islam, 1510 - 1550 (San Francisco, CA: International Scholars Publ., 1998), 35 et seq. — 261 —

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that owed its fame to the gathering of Jewish intellectuals, did not have a chair for Jewish philosophy. This was the result of nota lack of interest, but a lack of means. Jewish philosophy was taught nevertheless, but according to the old classical-philological method, i.e., as a history of philosophy. Because the golden age of Jewish philosophy, however, was the Muslim-Arabic Middle Ages, Jewish philosophy was predominantly taught by Arabists such as those Fritz Bamberger, the student of Julius Guttmann, discussed.28 Subjects of study also included, of course, Arabic philosophy, Muslim theology and its schools, and especially the relationship between Arab philosophy and Jewish thought. Prominent scholars in the field were Manuel Joël (1826–1890) and Saul Horowitz (1831–1912). During the first years of the last century, the connection to the classical-pedagogic tradition disintegrated entirely. On January 6, 1904, Hermann Cohen made a speech before the trustees of the Hochschule for the introduction of a chair for ethics and religious philosophy.29 According to Cohen, it was not enough to teach the history, and thus the exterior, of Jewish ethics, because the singularity of Judaism consists of the correlation between ethics (Sittenlehre) and theodicy (Gottesidee, concept of God). The concept of God refers to the unique and exclusive idea of the ethicality of man. Cohen argued that Jewish philosophy did not form a part but instead the essence of critical philosophy, and that this essence could not be grasped without philosophy in general.30 He attacked anyone who wished to reduce the study of philosophy to philological studies, and called for putting the study and teaching of theology and Arabic philosophy into the hands of specialists. The independent study of ethics and religious philosophy, supervised by specialists, should be in the center of science and education.31 Hermann Cohen did not present a clear stance on Arabic philosophy in his work. This might be rooted in the fact that he was not sufficiently familiar with the classical writings and philosophers such as Avicenna, Averroës, or the movement of the Kalam. The only reference 28 Fritz Bamberger, “Julius Guttmann: Philosopher of Judaism,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 5 (1950): 3–34. 29 Hermann Cohen, Hermann Cohens Jüdische Schriften, vol. 2, ed. Bruno Strauss (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1924), 108–125. 30 Bamberger, “Julius Guttmann,” 10. 31 Ibid., 11. — 262 —

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to these writings and philosophers is included in his treatise on Jewish philosophy, Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (Religion of Reason from the Sources of Judaism).32 The references there, however, are largely confined to clichés that were apparently influenced by Maimonidean thought. The Talmud, for instance, whose philosophical property Simone Luzzatto had rejected, was presented in Cohen’s work as harboring traces of “independent philosophy.”33 Cohen himself rejects any influence of Muslim-Arabic philosophy on the concepts of monotheism and prophecy, which had been en vogue in medieval Jewish academies. Any possible similarities between the two religions, Judaism and Islam, should be assigned to a mother-daughter-relationship, as Cohen a-historically notes.34 Cohen sees the role of Islam (and Christianity) according to the perspective of Maimonides’ Hilkhot Melakhim in a functional-saving manner. Islam clearly has the advantage of having spread the idea of monotheism.35 We owe it to Hermann Cohen (and Ismar Elbogen) to recognize that he exercised his influence over the board of trustees of the Hochschule regarding the introduction of a chair for philosophy. We further must note that he called Julius Guttmann to this chair in 1919. Guttmann was the son of Jacob Guttmann, a specialist of medieval and Jewish philosophy, and Cohen’s interest in him might be the result of mutual philosophical interests. In 1903, Guttmann presented his dissertation on Kant and the conception of the divine.36 He was among the most important historians of Jewish philosophy of all time. I think it is justified to emphasize that his contributions to Jewish scholarship are still valid today. In his history of Jewish thought, published in 1933 as Philosophie des Judentums, he described this history as “reality” and identified monotheism as the core of Judaism. As a complete authority on Arabic philosophy, Guttmann argued that medieval Jewish philosophy had originated in the Islamic

32 33 34 35

36

Hermann Cohen, Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (Leipzig: Fock, 1919). Ibid., 34. Ibid., 108. See Maimonides, Mishne Tora, Sefer Shoftim, Hilkhot Melakhim 11,4; Cohen, Die Religion der Vernunft, 281–282; see also Avraham ibn Migas: Kevod Elohim. Constantinople 1585, fol. 128r-v, repr. Chaim Hillel Ben-Sasson (Jerusalem, 1976). Julius Guttmann, “Der Gottesbegriff Kants” (PhD diss., University of Breslau, 1903); later revised and published as Guttmann, Kants Gottesbegriff in seiner positiven Entwicklung (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1906). — 263 —

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world, under whose influence it stood entirely.37 Salomon Ludwig Steinheim undertook early attempts to critique Islamic philosophy and religion by employing the models of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) and Hegel. Apart from this early example, the critique of Islamic philosophy and religion had its roots in another philosophical approach, which was developed in Stern der Erlösung (Star of Redemption) published by Franz Rosenzweig in 1921.38 Rosenzweig, a student of the Hochschule in Berlin, had shown his interest in Arabic philosophy as early as 1917 when he was a soldier in the Balkan Campaign of World War I. During that time he was able to read some texts in their original Arabic, which he had learned in Belgium in 1914. The sources of Rosenzweig’s critique were, according to the philosopher Shlomo Pines, Ignaz Goldziher in Vorlesungen über den Islam (Lectures on Islam) and Hegel in Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion).39 The first criticism to which Rosenzweig subjects Arabic philosophy was that Muhammad had adopted an already existing conception of revelation without also adopting its preconditions.40 Muhammad, according to Rosenzweig, had plagiarized the old ideas of revelation, creation, and redemption without experiencing the inward reflection or, in Rosenzweig’s words, the inner turn (innere Umkehr). This experience is capable of turning a shapeless god into a creating God, or, as the moral philosopher Emilia D’Antuono phrases it, “the pagan god is a metaphor that creates the appearance of a crystalline core of truth that factually does not explain it [the pagan god].”41 According to Rosenzweig, the Qur’an is comparable to the New Testament without an Old Testament; it is revelation without prophecy. In this sense, he refers to Kalam’s criticism of Islamic Orthodoxy and 37 Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Judentums, 56. 38 Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Frankfurt am Main: Kaufmann, 1921). See Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William H. Hallo (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). 39 Shlomo Pines, “Ha-islam lefi kokhav ha-ge’ula le-heker megamotav u-mekorotav shel Franz Rosenzweig,” Bar Ilan. Year Book of the Bar Ilan University 22/23 (1987/1988): 303–314; Matthias Lehmann, “Franz Rosenzweigs Kritik des Islam im ‘Stern der Erlösung,’” Jewish Studies Quarterly 1 (1993-1994): 340–361. 40 Rosenzweig, Stern der Erlösung, II/36. 41 Italian: “Il divino pagano è metafora che fa apparire un nucleo cristallizzato di verità che non lo dispiega.” Emilia D’Antuono, Ebraismo e filosofia: Saggio su Franz Rosenzweig (Naples: Guida, 1999), 105. — 264 —

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especially to the idea that the Qur’an is as eternal as God. Following this Islamic concept, the word is pre-existent, not a created attribute of God. The school of Mu’tazila (an Arabic school of thought founded in Iraqi Basra) understood in this concept a threat to monotheism, because it questions the oneness of God. For this reason, the school developed the idea that the Qur’an had been created—an idea that opposed Islamic Orthodoxy. This concept of the school of Mu’tazila enjoyed some success but was not far-reaching enough to survive, and the old dogma prevailed. Consequently, Rosenzweig understood Islam as incapable of prophecy. Because creation and revelation are considered eternal and pre-existent, there was an ingredient missing, which Rosenzweig termed Prophezeiungswunder, the miracle of prophecy. Even if the Qur’an had been pre-existent, hidden, and disguised and then had simply settled into history, this idea remained a contradiction in termini for Rosenzweig, who was none too enthusiastic about mysticism. In contrast to the Hegelians, who assigned to Islam the advantage of having overcome particularism through universalism, Rosenzweig criticized the Islamic theory of love. In the theology of the Qur’an, according to Rosenzweig, love was to be understood as something impersonal and beyond creation, as it is all-embracing (Alliebe) yet shapeless and free from passion. Such a form of love does not necessarily include relationships with other humans. It is simply a form of compassion that does not require an answer. Thus, Rosenzweig sees in the universalization of Islam the de-personalization of every condition in which the human being has to be understood as a binomial of “I” and “You.” This stands in perfect accord with the teachings of the philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965). After the Shoah, Jewish thought naturally turned to the subjects that are closely connected to that catastrophe and the destruction of European Jewry. One example is the work of Emil Fackenheim (1916– 2003), who the philosopher Leo Strauss (1899–1973) considered to be the greatest of all American-Jewish philosopher.42 Fackenheim studied philosophy at the university in Halle with the Kantian Paul Menzer (1873–1960), and Oriental studies with the theologian Otto Eißfeldt (1873–1973). After Fackenheim’s escape from Germany during the 42 Leo Strauss and Heinrich Meier, Gesammelte Schriften, 3 Vols. (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 2003), 767 — 265 —

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1930s, he lived in exile in Canada, where he continued his studies. It should be emphasized that Fackenheim focused on Arabic and Hegelian thought during the first and second stages of his scholarship; only afterward did he turn to Jewish thought from the perspective of the Shoah. Rather well-known are Fackenheim’s studies on the Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā (the “Brethren of Purity” in tenth-century Basra), Ibn Sina/Avicenna, al-Farabi/Alpharabius (c.872-c.950), and Maimonides.43 Further noteworthy works discuss Schelling, Kant, and Hegel. Closure Any analysis of modern Jewish thought cannot disregard Arabic philosophy. Since the Middle Ages, Judaism tends to follow the scholarly methodology of philosophy, and to a certain extent neglects the “horizon of the Qur’an,” as the philosopher Cristina D’Ancona calls it.44 However, it has never truly ignored the latter entirely. The Arabic concepts of monotheism and prophecy surely might be understood as spurring Jewish philosophy, at least in the case of Maimonides. Then, however, Judaism rejected these two concepts, ironically on the basis that they were elements of Arabic origin. Both the theology of Kalam and that of Avicenna and Averroës had an impact on Jewish philosophy from the late Middle Ages to the beginning of the modern period. During the nineteenth century, two directions developed that are entirely incongruent in matters of methodology and content. The first is of a historical-philosophical nature, and seeks to understand the fertile soil, or rather, the philosophical background on which Jewish philosophy was conceived, grew, and matured. The second direction, however, evolved out of a religious concept from the Protestant academies, and criticizes the monotheistic as well as the cosmological concepts of Islam, which has been banished to the realm of paganism. The influences of Hegel and Schleiermacher’s 43 See Emil Fackenheim, “The Conception of Substance in the Philosophy of the Ikhwan as-Safa (Brethren of Purity),” Medieval Studies 5 (1943): 115–122; Fackenheim, “A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina: Translated from the Arabic, with Introduction and Notes,” Medieval Studies 7 (1945): 208–228; Fackenheim, “The Possibility of the Universe in al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides: Arabic, with Introduction and Notes,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 16 (1947): 39– 70. 44 Cristina D’Ancona Costa, Storia della filosofia nell’Islam medievale Vol. 1 (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), xix. — 266 —

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romantic dynamics on the idea of prophecy as divination are evident. Equally evident are, however, the importance of Arabic thought for the European academies. According to both anti- and philo-Semites, Judaism keeps an (unstable) balance between the Western world, which it helped to shape, and the Eastern world, to which it belongs. On one side stand Moorish-style synagogues that represent the aetas aurea of a cultural, philosophical, and scholarly rebirth.45 On the other side there are the Protestant synagogues in the church style that symbolize the cultural adaptation that should have led to a perfect integration and appreciation of Judaism’s function within the European context. The project unfortunately failed. Jewish philosophy will have to set sail for new horizons, as the conformity to European culture caused a historical dissent that discharged into a divergence that may be irreconcilable.

45 See Ivan Davidson Kalmar, “Moorish Style: Orientalism, the Jews, and Synagogue Architecture,” Jewish Social Studies 7 (2001): 68–100. See also Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, ed. Orientalism and the Jews (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2005). — 267 —

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Geiger, Ludwig. “Zunz im Verkehr mit Behörden und Hochgestellten.” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 60 (1916): 245–262, 321–347. Gerhart, Mary, and Fabian E. Udoh. The Christianity Reader. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. Gesenius, Wilhelm. Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache und Schrift: Eine philologisch-historisch Einleitung in die Sprachlehren und Wörterbücher der hebräischen Sprache. Leipzig: Vogel, 1815. Gesenius, Wilhelm. Hebräisch Deutsche Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament. Leipzig: Vogel, 1810. ------. Hebräisches und chaldäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament. Leipzig: Vogel, 1834. Gilson, Etienne. “Les ‘Philosophantes’.” Archives d’Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 19 (1952): 135–140. Ginzburg, Carlo. Der Käse und die Würmer: Die Welt eines Müllers um 1600. Berlin: Wagenbach, 1990. Glatzer, Nahum N. Leopold and Adelheid Zunz: An Account in Letters, 1815-1885. London: East and West Library, 1958. ------. Leopold Zunz: Jude, Deutscher, Europäer, ein jüdisches Gelehrtenschicksal des 19. Jahrhunderts in Briefen an Freunde. Tübingen: Mohr, 1964. Glueckel, Bertha Pappenheim, and Viola Roggenkamp. Die Memoiren der Glückel von Hameln. Weinheim: Beltz Athenäum, 1994. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Goethe’s Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gespräche, edited by Ernst Beutler. Zurich: Artemis, 1948-1954. Goldziher, Ignaz. Tagebuch, edited by Alexander Scheiber. Leiden: Brill, 1978. Golomb, Jacob, ed. Nietzsche und die jüdische Kultur. Wien: WUVUniversitätsverlag, 1998. Graetz, Heinrich. Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. 2nd ed. Leipzig: Leiner, 1900. Graetz, Heinrich. Tagebuch und Briefe, ed. by Reuven Michael, Tübingen, 1977. Grafton, Anthony. Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. ------. “Prolegomena to Friedrich August Wolf.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44 (1981): 101-29. — 272 —

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Grimm, Jacob L. K., and Elard H. Meyer. Deutsche Mythologie, 2 vols., 4th ed. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1968; Reprint of 1875-78 edition. Grünbaum, Max. “Beiträge zur vergleichenden Mythologie aus der Hagada.” Zeitscchrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 31 (1877): 183–359. Guttmann, Julius. Die Philosophie des Judentums. München: Reinhardt, 1933. Hanhart, Rudolf. Erinnerungen an Friedrich August Wolf. Basel: Wieland, 1825. Hansen, Joseph. Zauberwahn, Inquisition und Hexenprozeß im Mittelalter und die Entstehung der großen Hexenverfolgung. München and Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1900. Hartung, Günter. “Goethe und die Juden.” Weimarer Beiträge 40 (1994): 398-416. Havemann, Daniel. Der “Apostel der Rache”: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002. Hody, Humphrey. De Bibliorum textibus originalibus versionibus graecis et latina vulgata. Oxonii: Scheldoniano, 1705. Homeros [Homer]. Odyssa editit Guilielmus Dindorf. Praemittitur Maximilani Sengenbusch Homerica Dissertatio Posterior. Edition Quarta Correctior. Leipzig: Teubner, 1856. Humboldt, Wilhelm von, and Friedrich A. Wolf. Briefe an Friedrich August Wolf, edited by Philip Mattson. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990. Idel, Moshe. Kabbalah: New Perspectives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Joël, David H. Der Aberglaube und die Stellung des Judenthums zu demselben, 2 vols. Breslau: Jungfer, 1883. Jost, Isaak M. “Vor einem halben Jahrhundert. Skizzen aus meiner frühesten Jugend.” In Gallerie der Sipurim: Eine Sammlung jüdischer Sagen, Märchen und Geschichten als ein Beitrag zur Völkerkunde, edited by Wolf Pascheles, 141–66. Prague: Wolf Pascheles, 1854. Judah ben Jehiel. The Book of the Honeycomb’s Flow: Sēpher nōpheth ṣūphīm, edited by Isaac Rabinowitz. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. — 273 —

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Judah Loew ben Bezalel. Beer ha-golah, ʻal harbeh maamare ve-hagadot rabotenu ZaL. New York: Talpiyot, 1952/53. Kazodowsky, A. “Zusammenhang von Träumen und Wahnvorstellungen.” Neurologisches Centralblatt 20 (1901): 440-447; 508-514. Kingsley, Peter. Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean tradition. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995. Kinzig, Wolfram, and Cornelia Kück, eds. Judentum und Christentum zwischen Konfrontation und Faszination: Ansätze zu einer neuen Beschreibung der jüdisch-christlichen Beziehungen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002. Klee, Heinrich. Katholische Dogmatik, 2nd ed. Mainz: Kirchheim Schott u. Thielmann, 1840. Kohut, Adolph. “Die Verdienste Herders um die Juden und die jüdische Wissenschaft.” Jeschurun 15 (1868-69): 155-167; 228-245. Krauss, August. “Der Sinn im Wahnsinn.” Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychologie XV/XVI (1858-59). Lebram, Jürgen C. “Ein Streit um die hebräische Bibel und die Septuaginta.” In Leiden University in the Seventeenth Century: An Exchange of Learning, edited by Theodoor H. Lunsingh Scheurleer, 21–63. Leiden: Brill, 1975. Le Goff, Jacques, René Rémond, Paul-Albert Février, and J.-Ch Picard, eds. Histoire de la France religieuse. Paris: Seuil, 1988. Lehmann, Matthias. “Franz Rosenzweigs Kritik des Islam im ‘Stern der Erlösung.’” Jewish Studies Quarterly 1 (1993-1994): 340–361. Lehmann, Karl Kardinal. “Festvortrag von Karl Kardinal Lehmann, Vorsitzender der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, bei der Verleihung des Abraham Geiger Preises am 20. März 2006 in der Bayerischen Vertretung in Berlin.” Pressemitteilungen der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz. Accessed October 12, 2012. www.dbk.de/fileadmin/redaktion/presse_import/abraham_geiger_preis_festvortrag. pdf (accessed October 12, 2012). Lehrs, Karl. “Zur Homerischen Interpolation.” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 17 (1862): 481–507. Lelli, Fabrizio. “The Origins of the Jewish Autobiographic Genre: Yohanan Alemanno (1434-after 1504) and Abraham Yagel (1553-after 1623).” EAJS Newsletter 12 (2002): 4-11. — 274 —

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Lévinas, Emmanuel. A l’heure des nations. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988. Levy, Jakob. Chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Targumim und einen großen Theil des Rabbinischen Schriftthums, Leipzig: Baumgärtner, 1881. ------. Neuhebräisches und chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim. Nebst Beiträgen von Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer, 4 vols. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1876-1889. Lewy, Israel. “Über die Spuren des griechischen und römischen Alterthums im talmudischen Schriftthum.” In Verhandlungen der 33. Versammlung Deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner, 77–88. Leipzig: Teubner, 1878. Luther, Martin. D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 51. Weimar: Böhlau, 1914. Luzzatto, Simone. Discorso circa il stato de gl’Hebrei et in particolar dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia. Venetia: Appresso Gioanne Calleoni, 1638. Maier, Johann. “Intellektualismus und Mystik als Faktoren jüdischer Selbstdefinition.” Kairos 27 (1985): 229–40. Markner, Reinhard, and Giuseppe Veltri, eds. Friedrich August Wolf: Studien, Dokumente, Bibliographie. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999. Markus, Robert A. “Augustine on Magic: A Neglected Semiotic Theory.” Revue des études augustiennes 40 (1994): 375–388. Marx, Alexander. Essays in Jewish Biography. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947. Maurenbrecher, Max. Goethe und die Juden: Eine Zusammenstellung. Munich: Boepple, 1921. Maurer, Reinhart K. Revolution und “Kehre”: Studien zum Problem gesellschaftlicher Naturbeherrschung. Franfort am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975. Mauss, Marcel. A General Theory of Magic: Transated from the French by Robert Brain. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. Mendelssohn, Moses. Gesammelte Schriften: Jubiläumsausgabe. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1983. Merkelbach, Reinhold. “Die pisistratische Redaktion der homerischen Gedichte.” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 95 (1952): 23-47. Meyer, Michael A. Von Moses Mendelssohn zu Leopold Zunz: Jüdische Identität in Deutschland, 1749-1824. München: Beck, 1994. Michaelis, Johann D. Joh. Dav. Michaelis deutsche Übersetzung des (Alten — 275 —

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und Neuen) Testaments: Mit Anmerkungen für Ungelehrte. Göttingen: Vandenhoek, 1758. Miletto, Gianfranco. “Leopold Zunz and the Hebraists.” EAJS Newsletter 15 (2004): 50–60. Mittwoch, Eugen. “Aus Briefen von W. Gesenius, E. Rödiger, J.L. Saalschütz und J. Ch. Fr. Tuch an Fr. S. F. Benary.” Monatschrift für die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 78 (1934): 203–211. Momigliano, Arnaldo. “Ancient History and the Antiquarian.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 13 (1950): 285–315. Morris, Max. Der Junge Goethe. Leipzig: Insel, 1909-1912. Müller, Johann, and Johann H. Majus. Unvorgreifflicher Entwurff, wie mit den Juden freundlich umzugehen, und von wahrer Hertzens-Bekehrung zu reden seyn möchte: In einem Gespräch vorgestellet. Giessen: Bey Johann Müllern, 1716. Myres, John L., and Dorothea Gray. Homer and His Critics. London: Routledge & Paul, 1958. Nassen, Ulrich, ed. Klassiker der Hermeneutik. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1982. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Dawn of Day, translated by John McFarland Kennedy. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen: Zweites Stück. Leipzig: Fritzsch, 1874. Oellers, Norbert. “Goethe und Schiller in ihrem Verhältnis zum Judentum.” In Conditio Judaica. Judentum, Antisemitismus und deutschsprachige Literatur vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, edited by Hans Otto Horch and Horst Denkler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1988. O‘Loughlin, Thomas. “The Development of Augustine the Bishop’s Critique of Astrology.” Augustinian Studies 30 (1991): 83–103. Parsons, Edward A. The Alexandrian Library, Glory of the Hellenic World: Its Rise, Antiquities, and Destructions. London: Cleaver-Hume, 1952. Parthey, Gustav. Jugenderinnerungen von Gustav Parthey: Handschrift für Freunde. Neu herausgegeben (getreu dem Original) und mit einer Einleitung sowie Anmerkungen versehen von Ernst Friedel. Berlin: Frensdorff, 1907. — 276 —

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Pascheles, Jakob, ed. Sippûrîm: Eine zammlung jidišer folkszagen, miṭhen, legeṇden, kroniken, denkwirdigkeiṭen und biografien berihmṭer juden aller jahrhunderṭe, inzbezondere dem miṭṭelalṭers…. Prague: Jakob Pašeles, 1864; fifth collection. Pfister, Oscar. “Wahnvorstellungen und Schülerselbstmord: Auf Grund einer Traumanalyse beleuchtet.” Schweizerische Blätter für Schulgesundheitspflege 9, no. 1 (1909). Pines, Shlomo. “Ha-islam lefi kokhav ha-ge’ula le-heker megamotav umekorotav shel Franz Rosenzweig.” Bar Ilan: Year Book of the Bar Ilan University 22/23 (1987/1988): 303–314. Pollmer, Arthur. Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer und seine “Mittheilungen über Goethe.” Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1922. Preissler, Holger. “Die Anfänge der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.” Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 145 (1995): 241–327. Qimḥi, Yoḥanan. “Or le‘et erev: le-ha‘ir ene Yisra‘el we-yir‘u bi-neḥamat Tsiyyon … li-semor et kol mitswotaw …; dos licht kign abnd tzait … / baʿal ham-meḥabber.” http://sammlungen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/jd/ content/titleinfo/1737684 (accessed July 26, 2012). Ranke, Leopold von. Geschichte Wallensteins. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1872. Richarz, Monika. Der Eintritt der Juden in die akademischen Berufe: Jüdische Studenten und Akademiker in Deutschland 1678-1848. Tübingen: Mohr, 1974. Richter, Johann A. L. “Fragmente einiger Betrachtungen: Über den Aberglauben in der Religion.” Sulamith 1 (1807). Ritschl, Fridericus. Friderici Ritschelii opvscvla philologica, vol. 1 1. Leipzig: Teubner, 1866. Rose, William. Men, Myths, and Movements in German Literature: A Volume of Historical and Critical Papers. London: Kennikat, 1964. Rosenzweig, Franz. Der Stern der Erlösung. Frankfurt am Main: Kaufmann, 1921. Ruderman, David B. “Science and Scepticism: Simone Luzzatto on Perceiving the Natural World.” In Jewish Thought and Scientific Discovery in Early Modern Europe, edited by David B. Ruderman, 161–184. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. — 277 —

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------, and Giuseppe Veltri, eds. Cultural Intermediaries: Jewish Intellectuals in Early Modern Italy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. “Satzung der Hochschule für Jüdische Studien,” September 10, 2007, Hochschule für Jüdische Studien Heidelberg, http://www.hfjs.eu/hochschule/leitungsorgane/satzung.html (accessed September 16, 2012). Schorch, Grit. “Moses Mendelssohn und die Bibelpoesie: Prolegomena zur Shir-ha-Shirim-Übersetzung von Moses Mendelssohn.” M.A. Thesis, University of Leipzig, 2000. Schorsch, Ismar. “From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft: The Dibergent Paths of Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz.” Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute 12 (1977): 109–128. Schudt, Johann J. Jüdische Merckwürdigkeiten: Vorstellende Was sich Curieuses und denckwürdiges in den neuern Zeiten bey einigen Jahrhunderten mit denen in alle IV. Theile der Welt/ sonderlich durch Teutschland/ zerstreuten Juden zugetragen. Samt einer vollständigen Franckfurter Juden-Chronick/ Darinnen der zu Franckfurt am Mayn wohnenden Juden/ von einigen Jahr-hunderten/ biß auff unsere Zeiten Merckwürdigste Begebenheiten enthalten. Benebst einigen/ zur Erläuterung beygefügten Kupffern und Figuren, 3 vols. Franckfurt and Leipzig: Hocker, 1714. Schulte, Christoph, ed. Hebräische Poesie und jüdischer Volksgeist: Die Wirkungsgeschichte von Johann Gottfried Herder im Judentum Mittel— und Osteuropas. Hildesheim: Olms, 2003. Schürer, Emil. The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.-A.D. 135), vol. 3.1. New English version, ed. by Geza Vermes et al. Edinburgh: Clarke, 1986. Segal, Lester A. Historical Consciousness and Religious Tradition in Azariah de’ Rossi’s Meʾor ʻEinayim. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989. Shachar, Isaiah. The Judensau: A Medieval Anti-Jewish Motif and Its History. London: Warburg Institute, 1974. Steinschneider, Moritz. Der Aberglaube: Vortrag im Verein junger Kaufleute zu Berlin. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei AG (vormals J.F. Richter), 1900. ------. Allgemeine Einleitung in die jüdische Literatur des Mittelalters. Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1938. — 278 —

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------.“Die kanonische Zahl der muhammedanischen Secten und die Symbolik der Zahl 70-73, aus jüdischen und muhammedanischarabischen Quellen nachgewiesen.” Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 4 (1850): 145–170. ------. “Losbücher.” Hebräische Bibliographie 6 (1863): 120–123. ------. “Das Traumbuch Daniels und die oneirokritische Litteratur des Mittelalters.” Serapheum 24 (1863). Tatlock, John S. P. “Some Mediaeval Cases of Blood-Rain.” Classical Philology 9, no. 4 (1914): 442–447. Taubes, Jacob. Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fügung. Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1987. ------. Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft—gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions—und Geistesgeschichte. Munich: Fink, 1996. ------. From Cult to Culture: Fragments towards a Critique of Historical Reason. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010. Trautmann-Waller, Céline. Philologie allemande et tradition juive: Le parcours intellectuel de Leopold Zunz. Paris: Cerf, 1998. Trinkaus, Charles. In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italiaen Humanist Thought, vol. 2. Chicago: Constable, 1970. Veltri, Giuseppe. “A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 7 (2000). 338–351. ------. “Altertumswissenschaft und Wissenschaft des Judentums: Leopold Zunz und seine Lehrer F.A. Wolf und A. Boekh.” In Friedrich August Wolf: Studien, Dokumente, Bibliographie, edited by Reinhard Markner and Giuseppe Veltri, 32–47. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999. ------. “Dalla tesi giudeo-ellenistica del ‘plagio’ dei Greci al concetto rabbinico del verus Israel: Disputa sull’appartenenza della sofia.” Revista Catalana de Teologia 17 (1992): 85–104. ------. “Die Diarii des Callenberg-Instituts: Eine Quelle zur jüdischen Kulturgeschichte in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts?” Jewish History Quarterly 4 (2006): 652–661. ------. Libraries, Translations, and ‘Canonic’ Texts: The Septuagint, Aquila, and Ben Sira in the Jewish and Christian Traditions. Leiden: Brill, 2006. ------. Renaissance Philosophy in Jewish Garb: Foundations and Challenges in Judaism on the Eve of Modernity. Leiden: Brill, 2009. — 279 —

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------. “Tolomeo Filadelfo, emulo di Pisistrato‘: Alcune note su leggende antiche di biblioteche, edizioni e traduzioni.” Laurentianum 32 (1991): 146-66. ------. Eine Tora für den König Talmai: Untersuchungen zum Übersetzungsverständnis in der jüdisch-hellenistischen und rabbinischen Literatur. Tübingen: Mohr, 1994. ------ and Christian Wiese, ed. Jüdische Bildung und Kultur in SachsenAnhalt von der Aufklärung bis zum Nationalsozialismus. Berlin: Metropol, 2009. Viterbo, Ariel. “La mitzwàh di studiare le scienze nell’opera di Rac Simchah (Simone) Luzzatto.” Segulat Israel 4 (1997): 54–67. ------. “Socrate nel ghetto: Lo scetticismo mascherato di Simone Luzzatto.” Studi Veneziani 38 (1999): 79–128. Voigts, Manfred. Oskar Goldberg: Der mythische Experimentalwissenschaftler–Ein verdrängtes Kapitel jüdischer Geschichte. Berlin: Agora, 1992. Wachler, Albrecht, ed. Franz Passow‘s Leben und Briefe. Breslau: Hirt, 1839. Waldman, Mark. Goethe and the Jews: A Challenge to Hitlerism. New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1934. Wallach, Luitpold. “The Scientific and Philosophical Background of Zunz’ “Science of Judaism.”” Historia Judaica 4 (1952): 51–70. Waubke, Hans-Günther. Die Pharisäer in der protestantischen Bibelwissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998. Weiss, Isaak Hirsch. “Leopold Zunz.” The Jewish Quarterly Review 7 (1895): 365–397. Wiedebach, Hartwig. “Zu Steinthals Theorie vom Ursprung der Sprache und des jüdischen Monotheismus.’” In Chajim H. Steinthal, Sprachwissenschaftler und Philosoph im 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Hartwig Wiedebach and Annette Winkelmann, 89-112. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Wieseltier, Leon. “Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography.” History and Theory 20 (1981): 135–149. ------.“Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography.” In Philologie und Hermeneutik — 280 —

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im 19. Jahrhundert II—Philologie et herméneutique au 19ème siècle II, edited by Mayotte Bollack, Heinz Wismann, and Theodor Lindken, 215–29. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983. Wolf, Friedrich A. Darstellung der Altertumswissenschaft nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Wert. 1807 ed. Weinheim: Act humaniora VCH, 1986. ------. Encyclopädie der Philologie. Nach dessen Vorlesungen im Winterhalbjahre von 1789-99 herausg. u. mit einigen literarischen Zusätzen versehen von S. M. Stockmann. Leipzig: Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831. ------. Friedrich August Wolf ‘s Vorlesungen über die Encyclopädie Alterthumswissenschaft, edited by Johann D. Gürtler. Leipzig: Lehnhold, 1831. ------. Homeri et Homeridarum opera et reliquiae. Lipsiae: Göschen, 1806. ------. Prolegomena ad Homerum sive de operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi. Halis Saxonum: E Libraria Orphanotrophei, 1795; reprint . Hildesheim, 1963. Wolf, Friedrich A., and Immanuel Bekker. Prolegomena ad Homerum, 2nd ed. Berolini: Calvary, 1876. Zunz, Leopold. Das Buch Zunz: Eine Probe, edited by Fritz Bamberger. Berlin: Officina Serpentis, 1931. ------. Die gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt: Ein Beitrag zur Alterthumskunde und biblischen Kritik, zur Literatur—und Religionsgeschichte. Berlin: Asher, 1832; Repr. Hildesheim, 1966. ------. Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur: Nebst Nachrichten über ein altes bis jetzt ungedrucktes hebräisches Werk. Berlin: Maurer’sche Buchhandlung, 1818 (=idem, Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben vom Curatorium der “Zunzstiftung.” Hildesheim: Olms, 1976. Band I, 1–31). ------. Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Gerschel, 1876. ------. Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie. Berlin: Gerschel, 1865; Repr. Hildesheim, 1966. ------. “Masora, Talmud, Kabbala: Grammatik in historischer Wirksamkeit.” Jedidja 2/4 (1818–19), 265–268 (=idem, Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben vom Curatorium der “Zunzstiftung.” Hildesheim: Olms, 1976. Band III, 80–82). — 281 —

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------.“Salomon ben Isaac, genannt Raschi.” Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 1/2 (1823): 277–384. ------. Zur Geschichte und Literatur. Berlin: Veit, 1845; Repr. Hildesheim, 1976. ------.“Toledot le-R’ ‘Azarya min ha-Adummim.” Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 131–158. Zunz, Stiftung, ed. Gesammelte Schriften: 3 Bände in einem Band. Hildesheim: Olms, 1976. Reproduction of earlier edition: Berlin 1875 –1876.

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Index

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Index Italics indicate conceptions, concepts, religions, and subjects.

Abrabanel, Don Isaac See Abrabanel, Isaac ben Judah Abrabanel, Isaac ben Judah 66, 74, 159 Abrabanel, Judah See Hebraeus, Leo Abraham ibn Daud 67 Abraham ibn Ezra 254 Abu al-Hasan 258 Adam 81, 100 Adorno, Theodor 234 Akiva ben Joseph See Rabbi Akiva Albo, Joseph 254 Alemanno, Yohanan 67 Alexandria, Egypt 29, 31, 33, 54, 206, 241, 246– 247, 257 al-Farabi See Alpharabius Alighieri, Dante 255 Alpharabius 266 Amsterdam, Netherlands 83, 130 Anti-Conformism 18 Anti-Judaism See Antisemitism Antisemitism 11, 15, 18, 79, 82, 94, 100, 103, 105–106, 115, 117– 118, 141, 165, 167–168, 200, 213, 229, 246, 267 Apologetics: Christian Apologetics 23, 24 Arabic Philosophy See Philosophy : Islamic Ph. Arabic Studies 152, 154, 157, 260, 262 Aristeas 30, 34 Aristotle 43, 197, 207, 233, 255 Arnt, Theodor 106 Asher, Adolf 160 Assimilation 19, 192, 223, 243, 247, 249

Ast, Friedrich 36 Astrology 118, 184–185 Athens 23–26, 29, 42 Augustin of Hippo 189 Averroës 255, 259, 262, 266 Avicenna 262, 266 Bab, Julius 106 Babylon 34, 246, 248, 250 Bachmann, Ingeborg 229 Baeck, Leo 18, 171, 217, 222–224, 226 Bahmanyar ibn al-Marzuban, Abū I-Ḥasan 259 Bamberger, Fritz 262 Bangalore, India 260 Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, Jules 200, 213 Bartolocci, Guilio 72 Beer, Michael 113 Bekker, Imannuel 32 Belgium 264 Benary, Franz Ferdinand 157, 158 Bendavid, Lazarus 113 Benedict XVI (Joseph Ratzinger) 224 Benjamin, Walter 253 Berenstein, Samuel 83 Berlin, Germany 18, 27, 39, 43, 50–52, 69, 79, 82, 88–90, 92, 94–95, 130, 152–154, 157–158, 164, 167, 170, 182, 209, 217, 224, 228–229, 237, 258, 260– 261, 264 Berner, Alfred F. 199, 209 Bernfeld, Simon 165, 172 Biblical Studies 30–31, 36, 39, 41, 44, 172

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Bildung 27, 40, 55, 59, 87, 222, 252 Blau, Lajos/Ludwig 17, 192–193, 195–204, 209 Bloch, Ernst 163, 253 Bloch, Marc 62 Boeckh, August 27, 47–52, 56–57, 59, 80, 93, 137 Bohemia, Austria 74 Bologna, Italy 236 Bonaparte, Napoleon 148 Bonn, Germany 152, 259 Börne, Ludwig 102–104, 122, 183 Brecher, Gideon 181 Brentano, Bettina 105 Brentano, Margherita von 229 Breslau, Germany 91, 152–153, 217 Brunswick, Germany 50, 154 Budapest, Hungary 260 Buxtorff, Johannes 156 Cairo, Egypt 257, 260 Calasio, F. Marii de 156 Callenberg, Johann Heinrich 124– 126, 135 Calominus, Isaac ben Natan 156 Canada 266 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart 105 Choiroboskos 29 Christianity 14, 19, 24, 26, 35, 42, 59, 76–77, 83, 88, 114, 116–117, 128–129, 133–134, 150, 189–190, 193, 195–196, 198–199, 202, 209, 214–215, 217, 220–225, 231–232, 247, 263; Catholicism 87, 94, 214, 219, 224; Chiliasm 126, 128; Christology 128; Millenarianism 126; Pietism 26, 124, 134; Protestantism 25, 31, 59, 77–78, 94, 105, 126, 128, 134, 145, 150, 155, 159–160, 214, 219, 222–224, 226, 266–267; Trinity 117, 128 Cicero 52, 241

Index

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Classical Studies 14, 26–28, 30–31, 36, 38–44, 46–49, 55, 59, 92, 102 Clemens of Alexandria 24 Cohen, Hermann 69, 94, 96–97, 153, 170, 194, 203, 222–223, 261–263 Cologne, Germany 170 Communism 226 Cusa, Nicholas de See Cusanus, Nicolaus Cusanus, Nicolaus 132, 199 Dähne, Friedrich August 196–197 Daniel 67 Darwin, Charles 164, 174–175 de Wette, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht 51, 90, 92 de’ Rossi, Azaria 35, 65, 68, 78, 80, 218–220 Deism 134 Delitsch, Franz 154 Dembitz, Fritzel 142 Derrida. Jacques 253 Descartes, René 92 Detmold, Germany 50, 148 Deutsch, Solomon 74 Deutschländer, Leo 106 Deutschtum See Germanness Diaspora 131, 200, 228, 246–247, 249–250 Dilthey, Wilhelm 217 Eberhard, Raimund 106, 107 Egypt 29, 33–35, 177, 246, 257 Ehrenberg, Julie 142 Ehrenberg, Philipp 69, 79, 140, 142 Ehrenberg, Samuel Meyer 51, 53, 69–71, 77, 79–85, 87–88, 92, 95 Eibenschütz, Yonatan 75 Eichhorn, Johann Gottfried 31, 39, 42, 112, 155, 172 Eisenstadt, Germany 153 Eißfeldt, Otto 265 Elbogen, Ismar 69, 263 — 284 —

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Elijah 168 Emancipation 13–14, 16, 58–60, 62, 70, 76, 94–95, 108, 113–115, 117, 133, 257; Cultural E. 74, 151 Emden, Ya‘acov ben Svi See Ya‘acov ben Svi Emden Enlightenment 25–26, 46, 58, 68, 73, 77, 80, 84, 92, 106, 113, 122, 124–125, 128–129, 133– 134, 170, 179–182, 186–187, 189–190, 194, 210, 214, 228, 235–236; Enlightened Religion 189; Haskalah 194, 261 Estheticism 101, 109, 119–120, 233 Ethics 17, 19, 38, 42, 45–47, 101, 109, 119–120, 165, 167, 169– 171, 173, 176–178, 197, 207, 210–211, 215, 224, 226, 262 Europe 10–11, 17, 32, 114, 130, 132–133, 143, 150, 159, 192, 193–194, 247, 250, 260 Exegesis 16, 54, 56, 72, 100, 128, 134, 159, 166, 228, 242, 245 Eybenberg, Marianne von (née Meyer) 113 Ezra the Scribe 28–29, 42, 247 Fackenheim, Emil 96, 171, 265, 266 Febvre, Lucien 62 Finkelscherer, Israel 181 Flavius Josephus 67, 254 Fleischer, Heinrich Leberecht 154 Formstecher, Salomon 221 Frankfurt/Main, Germany 83, 103, 109, 111, 203, 234 Frederick I Barbarossa, Holy Roman Emperor 236–237 Frederick II, King of Prussia 129 Freud, Sigmund 193 Friedländer, Ludwig Hermann 83 Fülleborn, Georg Gustav 36 Gamliel, Shim‘on ben 245–246, 248

Index

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Gans, David 80 Gans, Emanuel (Eduard) 59 Gärtner, Eugen 225 Geiger, Abraham 91, 104, 152, 259, 260 Geiger, Ludwig 69, 104, 109, 121, 123, 164, 182 German Culture See Germanness Germanness 13, 15, 16, 96, 101, 108, 109 Germany 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 40, 43, 63, 78, 94, 95, 96, 105, 114, 143, 147, 148, 151, 161, 186, 195, 217, 226, 230, 231, 261, 265 Gershom ben Judah See Rabbenu Gershom Gersonides See Levy ben Gershon Gesenius, Wilhelm 16, 91, 150, 153– 158, 160–161 Glogau, Gustav 165 Glückel of Hameln 67–68 Goethe, August 102 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 15, 16, 76, 100–109, 112–123, 139, 140, 147, 168, 188 Goldberg, Oskar 230 Goldschmidt, Lazarus 154 Goldziher, Ignaz 154, 171, 260–261, 264 Gosche, Richard 152–153 Gotha, Germany 124 Göttingen, Germany 38, 94, 154, 194 Graetz, Heinrich 147–148, 151, 210 Greek Culture See Hellenism Grimm, Brothers (Wilhelm and Jakob) 76 Grimm, Jacob 187–188, 190 Grotthaus, Sarah von (née Meyer) 113 Grünbaum, Max 181 Grünfeld, Hermann 152 Güdemann, Moritz 261 Guerre, Martin 63 — 285 —

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Index

Gürtler, Johann 36 Guttmann, Jacob 263 Guttmann, Julius 220, 262–263 Halberstadt, Germany 153, 164 Halle/Saale, Germany 16, 25–26, 31, 41, 43–44, 47–48, 51, 83, 91, 102, 124, 134, 150, 152–154, 157–158, 196, 258, 265 Hamburg, Germany 68, 108, 154 Harnack, Adolf von 217, 222–225 Hartley, David 143 Hasdai Crescas 254 Haskalah See Enlightenment Hebraeus, Leo 66–68, 118–119, 193 Hebrew Literature See Literature : Jewish L. Hebrew Philology See Philology: Jewish Ph. Hebrew Studies 27, 150 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 42, 52, 58–59, 121, 203, 221, 234, 238, 264, 266 Hehn, Victor 106 Heidegger, Martin 12 Heidelberg, Germany 95 Heine, Heinrich 122 Hellenism 25–26, 31, 34, 39, 42–43, 45–46, 166, 171, 173, 195, 206, 207, 247, 250; Greco-Roman Culture 24–26, 32; Greek “Bildung” 32; Greek Culture 23, 26, 33–34, 45, 55, 66, 249–250; Greek Ethics 46; Greek Language 26, 29, 33–34, 39, 42, 73, 243, 245–246, 248–250 Henkel, Hermann 106 Hepner, Isi 230 Herder, Johann Gottfried 16, 25, 74, 112, 124–126, 128–141, 143– 145, 147–149, 172 Hermann, Gottfried 52 Hermeneutics 18, 23, 25, 27–28, 32– 33, 35–40, 55, 95, 100, 144, 173,

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203, 218, 229–233, 243, 251 Hermetism 240 Herod Antipas, Tetrarch of Galilee 257 Hesse, Germany 103 Heyne, Georg Gustav 38 Hildesheimer, Esriel 153, 164 Hillel 199, 212 Hiller, Ferdinand 113 Hirsch, Samson Raphael 135, 222 Hirsch, Samuel 96, 221 Hitler, Adolf 107, 231–232, 237 Hody, Humphrey 30 Holocaust See Shoah Homer 28–30, 32, 38, 42, 134 Horace 228 Horkheimer, Max 234 Horowitz, Saul 262 Humanitarianism 24, 135, 141, 149 Humboldt, Wilhelm von 42, 44–45, 47, 55, 105, 139, 163, 177 Hungary 17, 192–193, 196, 200, 213 Husserl, Edmund 94, 194 Ibn Daud See Abraham ibn Daud Ibn Ezra, Abraham Ben Meir 155 Ibn Rushd, Muhammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd See Averroës Ibn Sina, Abu ʿAli al-Husayn ibn ʿAbd Allah See Avicenna Irnerius 236 Isaac Israeli 253 Isaiah 168 Islam 21, 129, 182, 189, 198, 221, 252, 258–261, 263–266 Israel 16, 18, 35, 84, 86, 130, 144, 146, 168, 173, 175, 195–196, 206, 210, 212, 214–215, 246, 248, 257 Isserles, Moses 65 Italy 131, 150 Jastrow, Marcus Mordechai 154 Jena, Germany 26, 152

— 286 —

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Index

Jeremiah 87, 168 Jerome 66, 248 Jerusalem 14, 23–26, 42, 95, 229 Jesus of Nazareth 86, 107, 225, 257 Jewish Studies 14, 95–96, 97, 135, 150, 165, 229 Jewish-German symbiosis 96 Joël, David Heymann 181 Joël, Manuel 262 Johannes Duns Scotus 255 Joseph, Max 168 Josephus Flavius See Flavius Josephus Jost, Isaak Markus 39, 43, 50, 69–70, 74, 79–82, 85 Judah Loew ben Bezalel See Rabbi Loew Judah Messer Leon 65 Judaism 11, 14–19, 24–25, 29, 42–43, 54–56, 58, 60, 62, 66, 72, 76–78, 80, 83, 85, 87–88, 92, 94–97, 100–102, 106, 108– 109, 114–115, 117, 119–121, 123–129, 133–134, 136, 146, 148, 150, 160, 166, 171, 173, 180–182, 185, 189, 193, 195, 197–202, 206–213, 215, 217, 219–226, 230–231, 243, 245– 246, 249, 252–253, 255–256, 258–263, 266, 267; Kabbalah 19, 35, 37, 57, 73, 118, 136, 149, 173, 177, 180, 261; Maimonidean Controversy 67, 218; NeoOrthodoxy 153; Orthodoxy 59, 78, 83, 85, 164, 170, 261; postbiblical J. 149, 171; Rabbinic J. 185, 242–243; Reform J. 14, 70, 77, 85, 88, 164, 171, 193, 195, 259; Universality of J. 19, 239, 245, 248, 251. See also Language, Literature, Philology, Philosophy, Poetry Kabbalah See Judaism : Kabbalah

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Kafka, Franz 74 Kant, Immanuel 121, 220, 238, 263, 266 Karo, Yosef 67 Karpeles, Gustav 165, 192 Kaufmann, David 141, 143, 161, 261 Kautzsch, Emil 154 Kittel, Gerhard 26 Klemperer, Gutmann 75 Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb 140 Koch, Franz 108 Kohut, Adolph 135–136, 139, 148 Körte, Friedrich Heinrich Wilhelm 52 Krakow, Poland 43 Ladenberg, Adalbert von 89, 91, 93, 94 Language 10–13, 16, 19, 28, 32–33, 35, 38, 45, 47, 77, 83, 98, 109, 111, 117, 123–124, 128, 134, 138, 142, 144, 148, 157, 163, 166–167, 171–172, 175, 177–178, 235, 240, 241, 243–244, 245–246, 248–250, 261; Arabic 73, 258; Aramaic 250; Classic L. 47, 192; German 73, 111–112; Hebrew 16, 20, 25, 31–32, 34–35, 39, 42, 43, 50, 53–55, 60, 65, 67, 73, 77–78, 84, 97, 111–113, 118, 120, 124, 126–128, 134, 144, 147, 153, 156–160, 171–172, 175, 177, 243–245, 248, 259; Latin 39, 42, 45, 73, 77–78, 118, 237; Oriental L. 47; Persian 73; Yiddish 111, 112, 126–127 Lavater, Johann Caspar 120 Lazarus, Moritz 164, 170–171 Leberecht, Fürchtegott 158 Lehmann, Karl 223, 224 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 237 Leibowitz, Yeshayahu 96 Leiden, Netherlands 260 Leipzig, Germany 26, 86, 154, 260 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 121, 190

— 287 —

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Levi ben Gershon 254 Levinas, Emmanuel 18–19, 97, 240–250 Levita, Elia 35, 156 Levy, Jacob 153–154 Lewy, Israel 181 Lexicography 55, 154–159; Jewish L. 155 Lippe-Detmold, Germany 50 Lissa (Prussia), Germany 217 Literature 10–11, 15, 17, 33, 36, 38–41, 45–48, 53, 59, 66, 68, 70, 76, 78–79, 87–90, 92–94, 96, 98, 101–102, 104–105, 108–109, 120, 137–138, 147, 166, 171, 181–182, 187–188, 194, 218, 226, 244; Bible as L. 136; Biblical L. 145; Classic L. 17, 36, 46–47, 192; Jewish L. 54, 60, 72, 136, 148–149, 160–161, 180, 192, 195, 205, 213; Oriental L. 47; Rabbinic L. 35, 54, 66, 91, 137, 145, 158, 180–181, 218; Talmudic L. 17, 136 Lithuania, Russia 112 London, United Kingdom 130, 217 Lothair 236 Löw, Leopold 166, 169–170, 196, 200 Lublin, Poland 67 Luria, Solomon 65 Luther, Martin 14, 78, 82–88, 120– 121, 126, 128, 133–134 Luzzatto, Samuel David 156 Luzzatto, Simone 124, 130–132, 143, 199–202, 253–257, 263 Machiavelli, Niccolò 61 Machiavellism 131 Magic 17, 35, 179–192, 231, 240 Magnus, Isidor 91 Maharal of Prague See Judah Loew ben Bezalel Maharshal See Luria, Solomon

Index

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Maimon, Salomon 70, 113, 180 Maimonides 62, 67, 79, 169–170, 181, 195, 197–198, 203, 206– 207, 218–220, 254, 257–258, 261, 263, 266 Manetti, Giannozzo 30 Manitius (Pietist student in Halle) 125 Marburg, Germany 94, 194 Marx, Karl 253 Maurenbrecher, Max 105–106 Melanchthon, Philipp 85, 87 Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Felix 113, 195 Mendelssohn, Moses 76, 96, 113, 148, 194–195, 205, 221 Menocchio See Scandella, Domenico Menzer, Paul 265 Merkel, Gustav 135 Messianism 112, 127, 203, 221 Michaelis, Christian Benedikt 155 Michaelis, Johann 145 Mirandola, Giovanni Pico della 255 Mittwoch, Eugen 157 Modena, Leone 67, 68 Molitor, Franz Joseph 121 Monotheism 16–17, 19, 136, 166, 168–169, 171, 175–177, 192– 193, 195, 197–203, 208–209, 211, 244, 248, 251, 263, 265–266; Ethical M. 17, 165–166, 170, 178, 223 Morality 90, 198, 203, 219 Mordekhai ben Natan 156 Morin, Jean 39 Moses 67, 168, 177, 196, 206, 207, 212, 246, 251, 257 Mosheh ben Maimon See Maimonides Muhammad 259, 264 Müller, Friedrich von 117 Müller, Johann 124, 126–128 Munk, Salomon 160, 261 Mysticism 35, 67, 180, 265 — 288 —

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Index

Mythology 12, 23, 33, 118, 163, 176, 221 Nationality 129, 141, 148 Naumburg, Germany 126 Nazism 10, 18, 102, 107– 108, 234 Nebuchadnezzar 29 New Testament 39, 100, 107, 120, 159 New York, United States 107, 229 Newton, Isaac 237 Nietzsche, Friedrich 97–98, 119, 187, 249 Nikolai, Friedrich 52 Nikolsburg, Austria 152 Non-Conformism 18, 222, 224, 226– 228, 232 Old Testament 26, 31, 86, 100, 106–107, 120, 130, 134, 145, 155, 172, 264 Olshausen, Julius 165 Onkelos (Targum) 156 Oriental Studies 39, 43, 157, 165, 171, 265 Origines 24 Palestine 128, 130, 132, 143, 148, 243, 250 Parthey, Gustav 51–52 Pascheles, Jakob 75–76 Pascheles, Wolf 70, 74–75 Passow, Franz 52 Paul (Apostle) 100, 198, 202 Paul, Jean 139, 141, 147–148 Peisistratos 29–30, 32, 42 Petermann, Julius Heinrich 93 Pfaff, Johannes Friedrich 155 Philadelphia, USA 154 Philippson, Ludwig 164 Philo of Alexandria 195–197, 206– 207, 219–220, 254, 257 Philocrates 34 Philology 11, 13, 16–17, 19–21, 23,

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25–28, 31–37, 39–42, 44, 49–50, 52, 55–56, 59, 86, 92, 98, 165, 172, 182, 188, 228, 247, 249, 253, 257–258, 260–262, See also Hellenism; “Oriental” Studies 26, 28; Classic Ph. 249; Encyclopedia 27, 36, 38, 43, 46–49, 52, 137; Etymology 28, 164; Grammar 10, 11–13, 15–16, 28, 33, 43, 55, 57, 73, 138, 156–159, 174; Jewish Ph. 17, 52, 60, 137, 159–160 Philosemitism 15, 100, 267 Philosophy 11–13, 15–17, 24, 27–28, 37, 47, 49–50, 52, 56–59, 63, 66, 69, 93–97, 129, 136–137, 140, 152, 163–165, 169–170, 172, 187, 196–197, 200, 207, 213– 214, 222, 228–231, 233–236, 238, 240–241, 243–244, 249– 250, 252–258, 262–266; Christian Ph. 224; Epicureanism 24, 219; Epistemology 164; German Ph. 14, 58; Greco-Roman Ph. 24; Greek Ph. 14, 34, 207, 254; Hegelianism 58–59; Humanism 26, 32, 35, 42, 77, 108, 119, 255; Islamic Ph. 19, 57, 207, 252, 254, 258–260, 262–264, 267; Jewish Ph. 17–19, 57–58, 149, 181, 195, 197, 203, 207, 220, 252–254, 257–259, 261–263, 266– 267; Kantianism 28, 220, 222, 263, 265; Marxism 201, 253; Metaphysics 12, 34, 64, 211, 221; Neo-Humanism 41–42; Neo-Kantianism 19, 261; Neo-Platonism 35, 177, 201, 240; Nihilism 64, 232; Ontology 12; Oriental Ph. 34; Platonism 40, 52, 253, 257; Prōtos Heuretēs 34; Socratism 64, 233, 256; Stoicism 24, 201–202; Theodicy 196–197, 201, 262 Phoenicia 34, 208 Pilate 232

— 289 —

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Pines, Shlomo 264 Pisitratos 29 Plato 52, 206 Plutarch 61, 66 Poetry 39, 112, 136, 139, 143, 147, 172–173, 194, 196, 206, 228, 261; Biblical 145; Hebrew 136, 138, 145; Jewish 145–146, 149, 205 Political Religion 12 Polytheism 171, 177, 193, 198–199, 209 Portaleone, Avraham 66, 67, 68 Potsdam, Germany 142 Prague, Austria 65, 66, 74–75, 79, 176–177 Preßburg, Hungary 261 Prophecy 136, 145, 165, 168–171, 174, 176–177, 188, 210, 223– 226, 263–267 Prossnitz, Austria 181 Prussia, Germany 14, 79, 82–83, 89, 91–94, 147, 153, 165, 217, 226 Pseudo-Longinus 176–177 Ptolemy, King of Egypt 34, 246–248 Qimḥi, Yoḥanan See Müller, Johann Qimḥi, Yoseph 127 Quintilian 37 Qur’an 260, 264–266 Rabbenu Gershom 62, 72 Rabbi Akiva 66 Rabbi Eliezer 67, 249 Rabbi Loew 65, 66, 68, 176–177 Rabbi Yehudah 251 Rabbi Yishmael 249 Racism 141 Rama See Isserles, Moses Ranke, Leopold von 61–62, 70, 93 Rapaport, Salomon 160 Rashi 62, 71–74, 80, 138, 155, 157–159 Reason 19, 42, 55, 58, 78, 81, 141,

Index

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187, 217–218, 222, 228, 232– 238, 240 See also Philosophy, Enlightenment Rebenstein, Aaron [Bernstein] 144 Renan, Ernest 166–167, 171, 200– 201, 211, 215, 244 Reuchlin, Johannes 57, 121 Revelation 134, 176, 218, 221–222, 243–244, 249, 251, 254– 257,264–265 Rhineland (Prussia), Germany 104 Richter, Johann Andreas Lebrecht 180 Riemer, Friedrich Wilhelm 102–103, 113–115 Riesser, Gabriel 122 Rödiger, Emil 153 Rofe, Judah ben Jehiel See Judah Messer Leon Roman Culture 43, 46, 66, 198 Romania 194, 205 Romanticism 27, 77, 173, 193, 201, 203, 267 Rosenberg, Germany 153 Rosenzweig, Franz 69, 264 Rothschild, Mayer Amschel 83 Rubo, Julius 154 Rühs, Friedrich 51 Russia 194, 205 Saʻadiah ben Yosef Gaon 62, 156, 159, 253 Sabbatai Zevi 74 Sachs, Michael 152 Salomon, Gotthold 85 Samuel 168 Samuel (Jewish Merchant) 127 Sanssouci (Castle near Potsdam), Germany 142 Saruk, Menakhem 156 Savigny, Friedrich Carl von 51 Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Germany 116 Scaliger, Justus 30 — 290 —

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Index

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Scandella, Domenico 63 Scheftelowitz, Isidor 170, 223 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 264, 266 Schiller, Friedrich 105, 108–109, 118–119 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 27, 36, 38–39, 195, 225, 266 Schlomo ben Yitzhaq See Rashi Schmitt, Carl 229–232, 237 Scholasticism 218 Scholem, Gerschom 95, 217, 228– 229 Schopenhauer, Arthur 64, 193, 201 Schudt, Johann J. 127 Science of Judaism 11, 13–14, 16–17, 41, 43, 53, 59–61, 71, 73, 78, 81, 87–93, 95–96, 136–137, 142, 145, 147–149, 158, 160, 164, 179–180, 220, 260–261 Sennert, Andreas 57 Septuagint 30, 86, 243, 247, 249, 251 ShaDaL See Luzzatto, Samuel David Shem Tov ben Yosef ibn Falaquera 91, 258 Shlomo ibn Gavirol 253 Shlomo Yitzchaki See Rashi Shoah 16, 18–19, 95, 101, 228, 231, 233, 246, 265, 266 Shylock 135, 195 Simmel, Georg 193, 238 Simon, Richard 39 Simonis, Johann 155 Socialism 213 Socrates 252, 255 Sontheimer, Kurt 230 Spain 91, 257 Spinoza, Baruch de 119, 217, 237, 253, 257 Steinheim, Salomon Ludwig 96, 221–222, 264 Steinschneider, Moritz 17, 167, 179, 181–190, 261

Steinthal, Chayim 17, 163–178, 201, 244 Stockmann, S. M. 25 Stolger, Karl Wilhelm 51 Stolp, Joseph 165 Strauss, Leo 265 Suetonius 66 Sultan Suleiman 142, 148 Superstition 17, 179–181, 183, 190, 261 Switzerland 18, 229 Tacitus 103 Talmud 17, 19, 53, 56, 71, 73, 78, 154, 174, 192, 195, 197, 207, 210–211, 241–244, 247–248, 250–251, 254, 263; Aggadah 72, 197, 218; Bavli 154, 185, 242, 246–247, 250; Gemara 242, 244–245; Halakhah 72, 197, 220, 245–246, 248; Mishnah 242–243, 245–246, 248, 250; Yerushalmi 39, 154, 185, 247 Taubes, Jacob 18–19, 95, 227–239 Taubes, Susan 229 Tertullian (Church Father) 23 Teweles, Heinrich 106 Theology 16, 18, 26, 28, 36, 39, 42–43, 45–46, 53, 55, 60, 94, 95, 127–128, 130, 144–145, 151, 159, 170, 188–190, 198, 207, 213, 222, 224, 226, 236–237, 255, 259, 262, 265–266 Theresienstadt 18 Thomas of Aquin 218 Thordike, Lynn 184 Tieck, Johann Ludwig 147 Toland, John 134 Torah 28–29, 34, 42, 64, 65, 127, 134, 163, 185, 197, 200, 203, 207, 215, 220, 241, 243, 246– 248, 251, 257 Trendelenburg, Friedrich August 93 — 291 —

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Tzetzes, John 29 Unger, Erich 230 United States of America 18 Vater, Johann Severin 43 Veit, David 113 Venice, Italy 67, 130–131, 143, 253 Vienna, Austria 18, 154, 228–229 Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) 129

Index

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Zunz, Adelheid 140 Zunz, Leopold 14, 16, 39, 41, 43, 50–60, 63–64, 69–74, 76–95, 97, 114, 135–149,154–155, 157–161, 180, 220, 226, 258 Zunz, Menachem 50 Zürich, Switzerland 120, 229

Wahl, Samuel Friedrich Günther 155 Walch, Johann Ernst Immanuel 31 Waldman, Mark 107 Wallach, Luitpold 51, 136 Warsaw, Poland 154 Weber, Max 11, 226, 236, 238 Weimar, Germany 103, 113, 120, 125–126, 129, 188 Weiss, Isaak Hirsch 73 Wieland, Christoph Martin 147 Winckelmann, Johann Joachim 139 Wissenschaft des Judentums See Science of Judaism Wolf, Christoph 80 Wolf, Friedrich August 25–28, 30–32, 36–49, 51–52, 55–56, 59, 72, 80, 92, 102, 134, 137, 166, 250 Wolfenbüttel, Germany 50, 53, 69–71, 79, 81–82, 86, 88 Ya‘acov ben Svi Emden 74 Yaabetz See Ya‘acov ben Svi Emden Yagel, Avraham 67 Yedidya See Philo of Alexandria Yonah ibn Ğanah 156 Yūsuf al-Baṣīr 259 Ziemlich, Bernhard 106 Zimmel, Bernard 193 Zionism 132–133 Zoroastrianism 189 — 292 —