Language and Logic in Personality and Society 9780231885324

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part 1: Background Essays
1. Language of Psychology
2. Memory and Context: Toward a Theory of Context in Ethnoscicnce
3. Language and the Production and Interpretation of Social Interactions
Part 2: Toward a Systematic View
Chapter 1. An Introspective Interlude on Ideals
Chapter 2. Two Epistemological Viewpoints: What Are Personality and Society?
Chapter 3. Defense and Knowing: The Foundations in Language and Logic
Chapter 4. Defense and Knowing: The Psychological Forms of Logic and Language
Chapter 5. Binary Logic: The Science of the Person and the Drama of Ideals
Chapter 6. Toward a Theory of Personality: The Language of Negation and Defense
Chapter 7. Toward a Theory of Personality: From Simple Patterns to Complex Drama
Part 3: Α Global Perspective
1. Origins of Human Personality and Social Systems
Name Index
Subject Index

Citation preview

Language and Logic in Personality and Society

Language and Logic in Personality and Society Harwood Fisher

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York

1985

Columbia University Press New York

Guildford. Surrey

Copyright ©

1985 Columbia University Press

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Library of C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g in Publication Data Fisher. H a r w o o d . L a n g u a g e and logic in personality and society. B i b l i o g r a p h y : p. Includes index. 1. Personality.

2. Personality and culture.

3. Psvcholinguistics. (Psychology) BF698.F556

4. Logic.

5. D e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s

I. Title. 1985

155.2

84-23305

ISBN 0-231-06012-2 C l o t h b o u n d editions of C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press b o o k s are S m y t h s e w n and p r i n t e d o n p e r m a n e n t and durable acid-frcc p a p e r

For M y Father

Contents Preface

ix

Acknowledgments

xv

Introduction Part 1: Background Essays 1. Language o f Psychology

1 23 25

C. Daniel Batson

2. Memory and Context: Toward a Theory o f Context in Ethnoscicnce

57

Oswald Werner and Gladys Levis-Pilz

3. Language and the Production and Interpretation o f Social Interactions

93

Harold B. Pepinsky

Part 2: T o w a r d α Systematic View

131

Chapter 1. An Introspective Interlude on Ideals

133

Chapter 2. T w o Epistemological Viewpoints: What Are Personality and Society?

139

Chapter 3. Defense and Knowing: The Foundations in Language and Logic

159

Chapter 4. Defense and Knowing: The Psychological Forms o f Logic and Language

176

Chapter 5. Binary Logic: The Science o f the Person and the Drama o f Ideals

203

Chapter 6. Toward a Theory o f Personality: The Language o f Negation and Defense

209

Chapter 7. Toward a Theory o f Personality: From Simple Patterns to Complex Drama

231

viii

Contents

Part 3: Α G l o b a l Perspective 1. Origins of H u m a n Personality and Social Systems

251 253

Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero

Name Index Subject Index

267 271

Preface From Terms to Themes R O G E L I O D I A Z - G U E R R E R O and I conceived this b o o k as a way to focus o u r interests in thought and language and as a means o f creating a better understanding o f the individual in his societal and cultural c o n text. T h e r e are four concepts to relate, and they are the terms named in the title o f the b o o k . H o w shall these t e r m s — l o g i c , language, and society—be

personality,

related? As an e x a m p l e o f h o w not to relate them, I pro-

pose that behavioral scientists are responsible for constructing themes to relate their thoughts and findings. T h e approach I am taking in this v o l u m e is not to seek out all possible permutations and c o m b i n a t i o n s o f the interrelations o f these terms. In that case the t h e m e o f the b o o k would be as i f orchestrated by o n e o f the machines m y h o m e state, N e w Y o r k , uses to give a rand o m m i x and toss to lottery balls in order to e m e r g e with a winning n u m b e r . T h e winning n u m b e r is thence found to have been purchased by a real person with a personality. M y first objection to this sort o f selection is that this is not a flattering w a y to define the societal context o f that personality. Society should be defined as m o r e than a random toss o f persons in a hopper, with " w i n n e r s " rising to the top by chance. H o w e v e r , a second objection occurs to m e after another m o m e n t o f reflection.

Since the winner o f the lottery already accepted that context

when he purchased a n u m b e r , his o w n choice o f self-definition is affected. T h e r e f o r e , m y second o b j e c t i o n is to the procedure by which the matter o f individual identity and o f personality is defined by lottery n u m b e r s or by s o m e randomized process. I think behavioral scientists do select their terms and their themes. W h e t h e r their thought and language is best captured by a 2 χ

χ

Preface

2 c o n t i n g e n c y table o r b y a table o f r a n d o m n u m b e r s is a decision that can o n l y be m a d e w i t h t h e scientists' c o g n i z a n c e that they are m a k i n g that decision; that is, the scientists' responsibility is to be aware that they select t e r m s a n d t h e m e s . It w o u l d be i n h e r e n t in that responsibility f o r scientists t o relate k n o w l e d g e o f their o w n psychological processes t o t h e k n o w l e d g e o f the s u b j e c t m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e m , t h e person and society. W e b s t e r ' s (1983) defines a theme as " a subject o r topic o f disc o u r s e o r o f artistic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " For o u r present p u r p o s e I t h i n k o f a theme as the relation of the terms to be discussed. I n d e e d there are m a n y levels o f d i s c o u r s e in t h e b o o k I a m i n t r o d u c i n g . T h e r e is the d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n t h e c o n t r i b u t o r s . T h e r e is the d i a l o g u e across disciplines. A n d t h e r e is a d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n the text and t h e reader. In o r d e r t o relate t h e t e r m s of these d i a l o g u e s in a d i s c o u r s e w i t h the reader, a t h e m e o r t h e m e s will h a v e t o be set in m o t i o n , a n d p e r h a p s this is an act o f artistic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . H o w s h o u l d I set f o r t h t h e t h e m e o f this b o o k ? W h e n I first m e t w i t h R o g e l i o D i a z - G u e r r e r o in 1971 in P a n a m a C i t y , m y a n s w e r w a s this: T h e t e r m s o f logic a n d l a n g u a g e are o b v i o u s l y b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r by a s t u d y of t h e p e r s o n a n d personality processes. At t h e t i m e I had been w o r k i n g on r e a s o n i n g a n d l a n g u a g e in psychological d e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s , I h a d f o u n d a s y m p a t h e t i c c h o r d in a 1954 paper o f D r . D i a z - G u e r r e r o , and w a s s u r e of this w a y o f l o o k i n g at the t h e m e . P a n a m a C i t y w a s n o t t h e G a r d e n o f E d e n , b u t it w a s n o t N e w Y o r k C i t y either! In c o n t r a s t t o t h e N e w Y o r k w i n t e r w i t h its cold, d e s t r u c t i v e rain a n d t h e relentless w e a r i n g a w a y o f asphalt, P a n a m a C i t y a b o u n d e d in a lush g r o w t h o f g r e e n e r y a n d a tropical climate o f w a r m , n u r t u r i n g rain. But m y "culture s h o c k " was not only geographical; it was also in the e n c o u n t e r w i t h D r . D i a z - G u e r r e r o ' s dedication to people a n d his v a l u i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t o f society. T o h i m society w a s a p r o d u c t o f c u l tural g r o w t h . His c o n c e r n w a s that this g r o w t h and d e v e l o p m e n t be as p r o f o u n d a s o u r c e o f life a n d m e a n i n g f o r p e o p l e as t h e natural e c o s y s t e m w a s f o r t h e incredibly varied a n d c o o r d i n a t e d patterns o f n a t u r e . A s a scientist. D r . D i a z - G u e r r e r o h a d identified the logical changes and g r o w t h o f c u l t u r e as a focal p o i n t f r o m w h i c h p s y c h o l o g y a n d p s y chologists c o u l d s t u d y h o w i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s realize dignity in their o w n societies. T h a t w o u l d be a first step in r e a c h i n g across cultures and scientific disciplines t o help people. N o r w e r e these ideas t h e o n l y s o u r c e of the shock w a v e f o r

Preface

χί

me; I felt a time shock as well. Would I—twenty years after m y focus on the individual person—decentrate? Would I c o m e to look at the theme of this book differently? Would I relate thought, language, and personality to the encompassing p r o b l e m s of culture and society? There is a Faustian question here: H o w does one account for future knowledge and geo-cultural perspectives? Diaz-Guerrero (1977)' states his position concerning a behavioral science vantage point as follows: I believe it is important to start f r o m the only multivariate " g i v e n " that exists for all h u m a n behavior: culture. C u l t u r e should be the baseline for the behavioral scienccs. Personality is the psychological " g i v e n . " Hence eulture and personality arc the most i m p o r t a n t o f the relationships for a science of h u m a n behavior. (p. 122)

However, there are four terms to relate. Diaz-Guerrero's perspective may be expressed as this analogy: Analogy I: Logic:Society::Language:Personality We have seen the primacy that he gives to the term culture, and in this book we shall see the importance he ascribes to the future of societies. However, in order to understand the role of logic as a central factor in relation to culture and society and as a major focus in his way of selecting a theme, it is necessary to introduce Diaz-Guerrero's concept of the hisloric-socio-cultural premise. He defines this concept as follows: T h e empirical construct to deal with culture is the historic-sociocultural premise (HSCP). An H S C P is an affirmation, simple or complex, that seems to provide the basis for the specific logic of the g r o u p . We say that w h e n the m e m b e r s of a given g r o u p think, their thinking starts f r o m these affirmations, properly called premises; w h e n they act. they will i m p l e m e n t these premises or their conclusions, unless a m o r e p o w e r f u l inner or outer forcc interferes. For quantitative purposes, an H S C P is "(a) a statement, a (culturally) significant statement, which is held by an operationally defined majority of the subjects in a given culture, and (b) it is also, preferably, a statement that will be held differentially across cultures."

(1977:123—24)2 Historic socio-cultural premises are the basic beliefs determining the structure of a society's value systems. Likewise, a study of natural language would provide a structural view of the individual within a given society.

xii

Preface H o w e v e r , it is p o s s i b l e f o r b e h a v i o r a l scientists t o shuffle the

t e r m s o f s u c h a n a n a l o g y in order to focus upon a t h e m e . I can e x p r e s s m y o w n v i e w o f t h e t h e m e o f this b o o k as a second analogy: A n a l o g y II: L o g i c : P e r s o n a l i t y : : L a n g u a g e : S o c i e t y M y t h e m e states t h a t a l o g i c s y s t e m is a basic s t r u c t u r e o f p e r s o n a l i t y a n d t h a t a s i m i l a r r e l a t i o n o b t a i n s f o r l a n g u a g e a n d society. N o w this a n a l o g y f o r m a t is basic. S u r e l y t h e r e w o u l d be d e rivatives o r c o r o l l a r i e s if I w e r e t o specify t h e :: relation f o r the t h e m e I selected. T h u s , if t h e t e r m s are Lo:P::La:S

( A n a l o g y II),

Lo = logic Ρ = personality

it is also p o s s i b l e t o p o s i t t h e d e r i v a t i v e

La = l a n g u a g e S = society

(Lo:P)>La:S. B y this d e r i v a t i v e I m e a n t h a t t h e f o c u s is o n the t e r m personality,

and

t h a t t h e t h e m e o f t h e p r e s e n t b o o k w o u l d g i v e rise to q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e logical s t r u c t u r e s o f p e r s o n a l i t y . T h e n in turn q u e s t i o n s w o u l d arise a b o u t h o w t h e s e logical s t r u c t u r e s explain o r entail the e x p r e s s i o n a n d s t r i v i n g s o f self as t h e s e u n f o l d in t h e l a n g u a g e o f p e r s o n s in their s o cietal c o n t e x t s . In s e t t l i n g d o w n w i t h a n a l o g y II a n d d e c i d i n g t o p u t f o r t h m y o w n t h e m e , I w o u l d first h a v e t o see h o w possible it is f o r d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o r a l scientists t o s h u f f l e t h e t e r m s o f m y a n a l o g y in o r d e r t o ask the questions relevant to their o w n chosen themes. H o w w o u l d c o m p u t e r scientists o r a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s a r r a n g e the t e r m s in an a n a l o g y t o suit their t h e m a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n ? I w o u l d h a v e t o j u s t i f y m y decision o n a t h e m e so as t o g i v e a v a r i e t y o f t h e s t u d e n t s o f p e r s o n a l i t y a n d society l a t i t u d e f o r t h e i n e v i t a b l e r e s h u f f l i n g s o f their o w n t h o u g h t s ,

disci-

plines, a n d p e r s p e c t i v e s . T h e s e s t u d e n t s a n d scientists w o u l d be c r o s s disciplinary and cross-cultural. I d e c i d e d t o f o c u s o n p e r s o n a l i t y because o f m y earlier interest in t h e l o g i c a n d l a n g u a g e o f d e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s a n d because I p e r ceived t h e n e e d f o r a dialectical s w i n g t o b a l a n c e the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s o f AI a n d c o g n i t i v e science. In m y v i e w , t h o s e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s h a v e

Preface

xiii

been deducting the individual's identity f r o m a relationship with logic, language, and society. T h e result is an empty slot in the analogy f r o m which the theme of this book is to be drawn. Accordingly, there are t w o m a j o r problems: h o w to justify the focus on personality and h o w to include m o r e than m y o w n limited focus. T h e justification for centering the spotlight on personality is the intuitive reaction that individual identity can be eclipsed if mind and personality can be simulated by computer. T o put it plainly, if this eclipsing is allowed by behavioral scientists, we w o u l d be entangled in tragic paradoxes and jokes on the nature of k n o w l e d g e and the k n o w e r . Awareness and personal identity would be lost in a hall of mirrors. It therefore became clear to me that 1 would have to come face to face with cpistemological issues before writing any essay on personality and before attempting any innovations in a m e t h o d of studying and expressing the relations between thought, language, and personal identity. In other words, the question behind the concept of person as thinker and speaker is " W h o is the k n o w e r ? " If the knowers are the scientists w h o arc doing the observing, the question " W h o are those k n o w e r s ? " still holds. H o w do they decide h o w to observe and k n o w about personality and society? H o w far I could get with these questions would depend heavily on the breadth of other scientists' experiences. Nevertheless, m y Faustian urge to transcend time and space in order to gain knowledge was best put into a human and manageable perspective: At least I could offer m y o w n limited view, and perhaps I could provide a context for others' views that would help me to coordinate m y o w n perspectives. I realized that in so pursuing my theme I would reveal to readers of the book facets I myself cannot see. The theme of this book requires that readers shift figure-ground focus to form gestalts of the person and of society. It is as if the readers have to a c c o m m o d a t e to a perceptual world in which they shift f r o m analogy I to analogy II—as a continuous state of affairs—and then take on the a w e s o m e h u m a n predicament of deciding h o w to hold a conceptual f r a m e w o r k constant. T h e essay contributions in part 1 of this book should show the necessity for this requirement. Moreover, 1 will spell out epistcmological reasons in chapter 2. The m a j o r aim of the book is to present a view of personality, which is the subject of part 2. T h e chapters in that part accomplish my aim by dealing with issues of epistemology and of the scientist's o w n

xiv

Preface

identity and values, as well as with relations between the terms of the theme. I will recount the nature of these chapters below in the introduction to the b o o k . T h e overall purpose of part 2 is to build secure relations between t e r m s to present m y t h e m e in the final chapter of that part, the chapter dealing with personality theory. H o w e v e r , m y vision of transcending time and space as binding perspectives on m y t h e m e is best viewed in the broad cross-cultural psychology of Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero whose contribution constitutes the last essay of the b o o k and takes that t h e m e far ahead of our time. H a r w o o d Fisher N e w York City

Notes 1. References in the prcface m a y be f o u n d at the end of chapter 7. 2. T h e t e r m s premise, logic, and statement arc aspects of the H S C P . T h e distinction between a logical proposition and a statement o r utterance is important. In addition, the question o f sentence s t r u c t u r e and word structure is involved. For a complete discussion ot the differences as I sec t h e m , see H. Fisher, 1983, Defense Language ami Context ( m a n u script in progress).

Acknowledgments A B O O K IS a forum for a dialogue. It is about fifteen years since I began to fold out the pages o f this dialogue. Why did it take so long? A reason seems to be apparent when we look at the surface structure o f the book. It consists o f t w o parts and so seems to be t w o books. But one can see more when peering through to a deeper structural level. Perhaps it is a dream level at which I can picture each o f two books opening its pages; one opens them to the left and the other to the right. T h e pages turn in unison. T h e first book is an oratorio; the second is an oration, interweaving with the voices o f the first. T h e first includes a chorus o f background essays. These are followed by the voice o f my own chapters, solitary, but playing out the themes that complete the opus. In my pursuit o f the sounds o f a dialogue, I sought the solid ground o f the scientific disciplines related to the things I wanted to say. In the course o f my research, I found the people who have helped me to formulate the words, meanings, and questions that gave me the forum to transform my thinking into dialogue. I also followed a pathway to the deeper reaches o f my own thoughts. And so there were two kinds o f digs. These two kinds o f digs seem scientific to me, and I want to refer to them as exogenic and endogenic, as Kenneth Gergen might. I could refer to two beginnings, one in external and one in internal context. In that case I would be borrowing Oswald Werner's terms. These two sets o f terms might help me explain the origins I sought. It would seem like a good idea to look at causes and origins scientifically. And it would also seem helpful to look at our selves and our contexts, as persons and as scientists, and to frame what we see in a systematic rationalist tradition. O u r aim could then be a scientific application o f linguistic analysis to the natural and social phenomena o f our selves, our dialogues, and our thoughts.

xvi

Acknowledgments

H o w e v e r , before I go any further, I want to express my appreciation to the people w h o have worked with me to make this book possible. T o those w h o made caring and meaningful professional contributions to this book, I want to acknowledge gratitude. T o those w h o gave love, I w a n t to express an indebtedness that cannot be repaid. T o characterize these sentiments, I must use an analogy different f r o m that of an archeological dig. I picture my explorations for the text of this w o r k as a search for lost children. That alone would explain the long time involved in writing the book. However, another reason is that my quest was so genuinely shared, particularly in the case of my cherished friends and colleagues, Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero and Harold B. Pepinsky. T h r o u g h their generosity of spirit, resolute integrity, and devotion to people and knowledge, the starch for continuity with the past widened. I am indebted to Dan Batson and Oswald Werner for their remarkable blending of stoic tolerance and the love of the knowledge and ideas we exchanged. I want to thank Susan Kosciclniak of Columbia University Press for her patience and understanding, but m o r e importantly for her courage to face the dangers of innovation. Such rare qualities in an editor do not guarantee the author's creativity, but do fight against the tragic forces of conformity. M y manuscript editor, Anne M c C o y , was marvelously empathic and meticulously scrutinized my style. Her immersion in both the technical aspects of the manuscript and the concepts of the work was at an entirely unique level of competence. For the problems and the shortcomings of this volume the responsibility is mine. I thank m y mother, Frieda Fischer, for her unending confidence in me—a gift of incalculable w o r t h that has provided me with a sense of unity and direction. This book is dedicated to the m e m o r y of my father. Samuel Fisher, w h o s e w o n d e r f u l gift was a deep love for logic and truth as truly durable ideals. But a singular aspect of his gift was that he never really expressed the f o r m of his ideals in words. This unuttered quality made his ideals timeless. I am forever indebted to m y excellent sons, Marc and Saul, for their brave, indefatigable teaching. And most important, 1 a m profoundly grateful to my wife Helene for the constancy of her support and love.

Language a n d Logic in Personality a n d Society

Introduction Harwood Fisher City College of City University of New York

Spotlight on Personality and Background Illumination The Theme and Context as Questions W H O OR W H A T is the individual? An arbitrary set of events that scientists may observe? A divine spark that societal and cultural contexts both ignite and are ignited by? What is our effect on science and h u m a n understanding if w e view matters from the vantage point of personality or from the perspective of culture?

Personality Can w e have a scientific definition of personality? Our positivist tradition is to study consciousness, m e m o r y , will, and personality in terms of their displays. These displays are in the " f o r m of action, and the unit of action in the nervous system is the reflex" (Robinson 1978: 2 8 8 - 2 8 9 ) . But this tradition hardly defines personality in a convincing w a y . A huge gap exists between the arrays of an individual's neural structure and the decisions that individuals make about socially meaningful messages that hop to and fro along their neural pathways. The Ribot, Janet, Charcot, Freud tradition can be identified as a point of departure for the present book. That tradition opened the is-

Introduction

2

sues o f the language and thought o f the individual but placed those issues in a f r a m e w o r k o f mind, self, and personality. Let m e describe the elements o f this tradition as positivistic. Personality is a linguistic display o f the organization o f sensations and perception. T h e s e in turn are materially determined by the neurophysiology o f the individual o r g a nism. In the Ribot tradition, it became "scientifically" convincing and fashionable to e x a m i n e individual differences within a safeguarding proscription: " L i k e every other experimental science, p s y c h o l o g y o u g h t to rigorously forbid itself all research relative to first causes" (Ribot 1894: 2, quoted in R o b i n s o n 1 9 7 8 : 2 8 8 ) . * In the search for a concept o f personal

identity,

R o b i n s o n (1978)

shows the conceptions o f J a n e t to have been grounded in the same positivist thesis o f a neurophysiological substrate. H o w e v e r , J a n e t ' s observations and speculations led him to describe an " I " and a personality. O f course, in order to do this, the problem o f describing mind came to the fore. With an " I " and with a personality, an account w o u l d have to be made describing h o w sensations and perceptions are directed, h o w they are organized, what it is that is selected for display, and what is not selected for display. Ultimately, such an approach leads to what Freud called compromise

formations.

" C o m p r o m i s e s , " such as slips o f the tongue,

can be regarded as language acts the individual selects for nondisplay, but that the individual then directs for display through camouflage or through another language (or, at least, signal)

system.

In the description above it should b e c o m e clear that in the present book we will be concerned with the development o f the individual's language and that to talk about the individual's thought will require descriptions o f the traffic patterns o f perceptions and sensations, o f the organization o f these patterns, o f their interpretation, and o f their rules and systems o f display. Hence this b o o k will include analyses o f c o n cepts o f speech, syntax, natural language, and—I will have to d e m o n strate further—logic systems. Robinson (1978) offers a valuable way o f looking at J a n e t ' s attempts to relate sensations and perceptions to the individual's personal syntheses and to their assimilation to personality. He sees J a n e t ' s descriptions as cognitive

and as involving an " i n f o r m a t i o n processing ap-

proach." * References in the introduction may be found at the end o f chapter 7.

Introduction

3

R o b i n s o n ' s analysis is particularly pertinent because of t h e m o d e r n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , descriptions, and potential in cognitive science. In brief, at the present t i m e there are t w o m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to c o g n i t i v e science a n d artificial intelligence (AI) that affect the questions o f m i n d , personal identity, and personality: the AI simulations o f lang u a g e and t h o u g h t and the w o r k o f language analysis, s o m e of w h o m w o r k w i t h i n t h e behavioral sciences. In this b o o k , I will e x a m i n e t h e b r o a d q u e s t i o n s o f the r e s p o n sibility o f t h e h u m a n sciences by focusing on w h a t w e can k n o w a b o u t personality f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of logic and language. M o r e o v e r , the q u e s t i o n o f responsibility in t h e h u m a n sciences is c o m p l e x because m a t t e r s o f m i n d , m e m o r y , consciousness and personality m a y be m a t ters scientists can s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o b s e r v e w i t h i n themselves and " o b j e c t i v e " o b s e r v a t i o n s they can m a k e o f o t h e r persons in a clinical o r e x p e r i m e n t a l setting. J a n e t — a n d Freud, t o o — o b s e r v e d the b e h a v i o r and the l a n g u a g e o f others, but they also " s p e c u l a t e d . " Freud, in particular, l o o k e d i n w a r d , f o r e x a m p l e , at his o w n d r e a m s and " s l i p s " o f l a n g u a g e and e x p r e s s i o n . It is not m y purpose here to g o into a history of ways in which various t h i n k e r s o b s e r v e d themselves. Clearly, finding the right m e t h o d o l o g y to o b s e r v e the self is s o m e w h a t like finding the right w o r d . Introspection has c o m e to be a dirty w o r d c o n n o t i n g W u n d t i a n e l e m e n tarism (cf. R o b i n s o n 1978:294). B u t speculation is also in disrepute, and self-analysis has limited appeal. A m o d e r n possibility is s o m e variation o f hermeneutics. H o w e v e r , I raise this issue n o t to s u p p o r t any particular m e t h o d b u t rather to s h o w the self-observation p r o b l e m in the scientist. A scientist m a y b e c o m e an o b s e r v e r of persons but r e m a i n s a person, t o o . In a w o r d , mind and self are t e r m s that are p r o b l e m a t i c for g r a m mar: Each o f these t e r m s automatically entails agent and object.

Culture W h a t e v e r the status o f the p r o b l e m o f the scientist's dual identity—selfo b s e r v e r and o b s e r v e r of o t h e r s — b e h a v i o r a l scientists can certainly e x a m i n e m a n ' s cultural c o n t e x t and ask w h a t m e a n i n g s and logic culture brings to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n ot individual personality and behavior. Rogelio D i a z - G u e r r e r o (1977) believes that societies each have their o w n set o f historic-sociocultural premises. T h e s e premises set t h e culture's value systems, its views o f the individual, and the social institutions and p u r p o s e s of the particular society. Even t h o u g h the origins

4

Introduction

o f such p r e m i s e s are a m y s t e r y b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of t h e present w o r k , w e m u s t ask w h a t t h o s e p r e m i s e s are, w h a t o u r d e f i n i t i o n of p e r s o n a l ity is, and w h a t a societal c o n t e x t is. M o r e o v e r , w e m u s t ask w h a t h a p p e n s t o o u r a t t e m p t s at a h u m a n science if w e f o c u s o n t h e role t h e individual person plays in creating the values and institutions of the culture. T h e s e q u e s t i o n s are such s t u f f as t h e o r i g i n s o f research are m a d e o n . In this b o o k w e c a n n o t w e n d o u r w a y back t o t h e historical s o u r c e o f o u r t e r m s , b u t w e can at least ask w h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of o u r t e r m s are. In o r d e r t o b u i l d a r e s p o n s i b l e h u m a n science o f p e r s o n a l i t y , asking d e f i nitions of o u r t e r m s is itself a b e g i n n i n g .

Defining Personality and Culture A s k i n g f o r d e f i n i t i o n s o f t e r m s w o u l d s e e m o b v i o u s a n d reasonable e n o u g h . B u t w h e n b r o a d t e r m s like personality a n d culture are at issue, t h e p r o b l e m o f d e f i n i t i o n — a n d d i r e c t i o n f o r a science—is o v e r w h e l m i n g . For o n e t h i n g , a positivist e m p h a s i s w o u l d s u g g e s t that w e specify p e r s o n a l i t y a n d c u l t u r e b y their displays. W h a t p e o p l e say is o n e k i n d o f display. W h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s o r p r e m i s e s g u i d e a c u l t u r e could be revealed b y a n o t h e r k i n d o f display, n a m e l y , w h a t the c u l t u r e says and h o w it says it. M a y b e a Newspeak index! B u t such d e f i n i t i o n s o f p e r sonality a n d c u l t u r e are t h e scientist's o p e r a t i o n a l definitions. As o n e w o u l d start collecting such displays of speech and language in the h o m e , o n t h e j o b , at a serious talk, at a p l a y f u l o n e , etc., o n e w o u l d begin to c o n s t r u c t an e n t i t y o f p e r s o n a l i t y o r c u l t u r e that " g r o w s like T o p s y . " A scientist r e v i e w i n g such a collection of displays w o u l d be h a r d pressed to s h o w a n y c o n s i s t e n c y o f speech, let a l o n e o f p e r s o n a l ity, in t h e m . Scientists w h o use b e h a v i o r a l analysis as a w a y t o funnel a traditional p o s i t i v i s m i n t o p r e s e n t - d a y d e f i n i t i o n s o f p e r s o n a l i t y and c u l t u r e w o u l d p r o c e e d w i t h o p e r a t i o n a l definitions o f b e h a v i o r a l displays of speech a n d l a n g u a g e . T h o s e scientists w o u l d i d e n t i f y such displays as " f a c t o r s " o p e r a t i o n a l in t h e m u l t i f a r i o u s varieties o f situations p e r s o n s m a y e n c o u n t e r . B u t scientists will find such f a c t o r s t o v a r y in a m o s t fickle w a y . F u r t h e r , if t h e scientist tries t h e strategy o f declaring t h a t o n e set o f situationally d e t e r m i n e d factors, say, j o b b e h a v i o r s , is m o r e pivotal t o a d e f i n i t i o n o f p e r s o n a l i t y o r o f c u l t u r e than a n o t h e r set o f such factors, say, play b e h a v i o r s , then at issue is a n o t h e r p r e s u m p tion leading science directly to e g o c e n t r i s m , e t h n o c e n t r i s m , o r b o t h .

Introduction

5

Defining Personality and Culture by the Method of Scooping U p a Spill of Terms T h e operational definition leads to a spill of impersonal pronouns: "these," " t h o s e , " " w h i c h , " " w h a t " terms are on the table—in a mess. Let m e s h o w this briefly. Suppose one psychologist shows that the term personality is made u p of specific factors in a specific situation. For a r g u m e n t ' s sake, say the factors are c o n f o r m i t y to a model and rebellion f r o m a model's behavior, and say that the situation is a display of aggression. We are all familiar with this type of experiment, typical, perhaps, to the behavior analysis tradition. Such an experiment varies a situation and concludes that the personality display of the factors in question is a function of the specific way that situation is varied. T h e experimenter should be able to say, when done with the experiment, " T h e s e factors obtain in situation A . " This sort of statement w o u l d mean that a specific factor like conf o r m i n g to a model m a y obtain in a specific situation, like one calling for and using verbal aggression. T o see what I mean about the i m p e r sonal p r o n o u n s involved, assume that the factors in question are specific w h e n the experimenter refers to them by the ternis " t h e s e " or " t h o s e " factors and that the situation in question is specified by the experimenter's asking, " W h a t situation?" T h e first psychologist says that in experiment I " T h e s e factors are operative." T h e question, "In what situation are these factors operative?" is answered by the reply, "In situation A , " or by the reply—as in o u r example—"In a situation involving the model's use of verbal aggression." But a second psychologist does a second experiment and then points to the behaviors exhibited by subjects in that experiment. T h e scientist n o w says that " t h o s e " factors obtain in situation B. The problem is m o r e complex in that the second psychologist m a y s h o w and say that " N o t - t h e s e " factors obtain in situation B. That is, a second experiment (II) may be composed of a c o m p o u n d of factors f r o m I and II: In experiment I the factors are conformity behaviors. In experiment II the factors are again c o n f o r m i t y behaviors—but this time with a slightly new twist. Say the factors in experiment I revolve around imitations of the model's direct expressions of aggression toward a target. Say the factors in experiment II revolve around deflections of aggressive behavior t o w a r d irrelevant targets. In experiment II, the psychologist may have findings about the " t h e s e " factors of experiment I.

6

Introduction

T h e conclusions to experiment II may then involve "these," " n o t - t h e s e , " and " t h o s e " factors. Meanwhile, what is situation A and what is situation B , and does the difference between them tell us anything o f value? D o they both really belong in the same class o f situations? Let us suppose the " t h e s e " and the " t h o s e " factors are further delimited by a " w h i c h " factor, namely, which instrument or m e t h o d o f recording was used by the psychologists to select and measure a person's display? A n d in what situation? T h e impersonal pronouns, the " t h e s e s , " " t h o s e s , " " w h a t s , " and " w h i c h e s , " are in a spill. P s y c h o l o gists try to mark o f f deeper or shallower puddles as reference points. I will risk overextending m y metaphor o f the spill, but it really does sound like a H u m p t y D u m p t y , fallen o n t o the table in a mess, and w o r k e d on by teams o f psychologists dedicated to putting the puddles together again into a picture o f a person on the wall o f culture. O r is it a picture o f culture on a wall o f persons? I have extended the metaphor as a c o n venient way o f summarizing m y views o f s o m e problems with behavioral analysis as a basis for defining personality and culture. While this certainly leaves m a n y issues open, m y purpose in this introduction is to outline s o m e problems and reasons for the attempts o f definition in this v o l u m e and to explain the tradition relevant to m y choice o f t h e m e . H o w e v e r , I want to say another w o r d here about what I regard as a less limited model than a behavior approach, but one which g r o w s out o f the positivist elements in the Ribot, Janet, C h a r c o t , Freud tradition.

Other Problematic Legacies from a Tradition of Positivist Definitions In fairness to the positivist elements in the Ribot, Janet, C h a r c o t , Freud tradition, one could say that the material substrate, neurophysiology, is yet in its infancy. W e can assert this view particularly i f we consider the potentials involved in c o m b i n i n g the present-day neurosciences with c o m p u t e r science's " b r a i n - c h i l d r e n , " such as AI. S o the antipositivist argument may be temporary, or at least it may be a limited argument. W e shall see further in the course o f this b o o k . T h e problems o f defining our terms have even m o r e fundamental dimensions. T e r m s like personality and culture can be dislodged from their positions in relation to each other, that is, each term can be

Introduction

7

defined by w a y o f t h e o t h e r . O n e can close o n e ' s eyes to this and say, " L e t ' s j u s t g o ahead and define p r a g m a t i c a l l y . " C a n o n e be p r a g m a t i c and s i m p l y m a k e a choice f r o m a functional a n d / o r arbitrary s t a n d point? S u p p o s e I decide that t h e m a t t e r o f s h i f t i n g perspectives f r o m personality t o c u l t u r e is m e r e l y a m a t t e r of the task at h a n d , and that t h e r e f o r e I will g o ahead and select the task of k n o w i n g a b o u t p e r s o n ality as a consistent p h e n o m e n o n affecting certain displays o f persons. D o e s o n e have a " w o r k p e r s o n a l i t y " ? D o e s o n e have a " h o m e " p e r s o n ality?, etc. If I d o n o t f o r g e t the lessons above, n a m e l y t h e folly of t r y i n g to s c o o p u p H u m p t y D u m p t y a n d then put t o g e t h e r a definition o f a person, I will n o t fall into the trap o f m a k i n g a collection o f roles and then assigning w e i g h t s t o the m o r e " i m p o r t a n t " ones in o r d e r to arrive at a consistency in t h e character of an individual. If I avoid such a strategy, I will then be faced w i t h the f o l l o w i n g consequences o f the p r a g matic a n d / o r f u n c t i o n a l alternative. I will h a v e to select personality as m y " o r i g i n " t e r m . T h e t e r m personality will n o w b r i n g m e back to the issues raised in the Ribot, Janet, Charcot, Freud tradition, namely, mind and personal identity.

Will the Terms "Mind," "Awareness," and "Identity" Produce an Identity Crisis in the Definition of Personality? T h e reader can see difficulties, o n c e the p r o b l e m s o f m i n d a n d a w a r e ness arc raised, and b e c o m e w e a r y : a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n u n d r u m is n o bargain as a substitute for the p a r a d o x e s and mazes of a behavioral a p p r o a c h . In o r d e r not t o tire the reader I will n o w indicate the position I chose to take in this b o o k , m y p u r p o s e u p to this point h a v i n g been to indicate the tradition and problems most pertinent to that choice. T h e goal is to picture personality u p on that " w a l l . " It is a balancing act, but w h a t I w o u l d h o p e to m a k e clear in the course of the b o o k is w h a t is at stake. In the past, psychologists have tried to avoid the distortions of egocentric perception a n d t h o u g h t . W e are surely a w a r e of the e x t r e m e s to w h i c h positivism d e v e l o p e d in its radical reductionisms. M i n d and awareness were e x c o m m u n i c a t e d f r o m scientific inquiry, and their o n tological status was all b u t denied. H o w e v e r , as R o b i n s o n indicated, R i b o t ' s positivism could a n c h o r an investigation of m i n d in t w o ways:

8

Introduction

neurophysiological and cognitive. T h e latter, as Robinson pointed out, could clearly be seen in Janet's tradition as an information-processing approach. But assuming that we n o w model mind in the image of c o m puter simulations of affirmations and negations, we run the risk of a n e w direction of positivistic excess. With the g r o w t h of AI and cognitive science, distortions can go the other way: It is not individual m a d ness that can substitute for the checks and balances of social agreements on reality, but it is the individual mind that can be replaced by a real thing, namely, a robot.

The Theme as Thesis I propose in this book to work toward a modern theory of personality, and to begin to define the matter of societal and cultural contexts. T h e general theme will involve a focus on the individual person as an o b server and as a knower. In short, persons have minds and a personal identity. A study of the language of a person would provide a display of mind and personal identity. A study of the logic of a person, our spotlight on personality, will show that the individual has cultural highlights that illuminate the definition of his or her personhood.

The Requirements As I see the task of developing a modern theory of personality, it requires collaboration with colleagues of broad understanding and vision. T h e specific requirements are threefold. 1. An analysis of language is needed so that behavioral scientists m a y have a vantage point f r o m which to analyze the linguistic displays of persons they observe and f r o m which to analyze their o w n use of language, as observers. 2. T h e question of personality requires analysis from a varietv of disciplines. An anthropological perspective is necessary to look at the structures of language and thought that define the individual. For the individual to progress as an individuated organism, Ribot pointed out there must be m e m o r y (Robinson, 1978). Whether one agrees that a concept of m e m o r y should have an organic base or not, Ribot's point is inviting: M e m o r y , if describable, would be basic to an account of the individuality of a person. In addition, an anthropological viewpoint should show the role of culture in interaction with memory, and hence it should

Introduction

9

provide a shifting perspective on personal identity. Furthermore, the emergence of a cross-cultural psychology would require the integration of history and of considerations of logic and language with a biosocial approach to the individual in society. 3. In a sense, a computer is an observer, too. For example, " i t " scans the text of a person's linguistic display, and on the basis of " i t s " observation, " i t " analyzes the text. The computer analyzes language and thought, and in turn displays "its" analysis. At some level, albeit reactive, " i t " generates language and thought. T h e capacitities of the computer as an "analyst" and as a generator of language and thought should be examined relative to the psychology of personality. I have been fortunate to have the patient and inspiring collaboration of the other contributors to this volume, and I shall n o w show h o w their contributions are presented in a way that achieves these requirements and thereby allows me to proceed with my perspective on personality.

Background for This Book M y strategy is to divide the book into three parts. Part 1 is foundational and provides a series of background essays. Its purpose is to provide a sober, scicntific view of the dilemma of a h u m a n science: H o w d o we k n o w , and what language d o we use to express our knowledge about our subject, the person, and his experiences? As I have indicated, such a question can be insolubly reflexive, so that philosophers like Putnam might throw their hands up and say, " D o n ' t ask!" (For example, see Putnam 1960.) But there is the matter of social responsibility to make a realistic human science, and the saving grace is that we social and behavioral scientists have language to communicate our thoughts. Hence we have ways of expressing our dilemmas about the subjective and o b jective poles of knowing. T h e problems arc perhaps greater n o w than ever before. I say this at a time when colleagues in linguistics, philosophy, and computer science are joining behavioral scientists in a search for mind, for a concept of self, and for ways of thinking about the future of cultures and societies. This is indeed a lot to contemplate, and I must admit that m y view of other disciplines is limited to m y o w n viewpoint as a psychologist—and my o w n brand of philosophy.

Introduction

10

Overview of Background Essays T h e first r e q u i r e m e n t listed a b o v e w a s an analysis o f l a n g u a g e t o p r o v i d e t h e b e h a v i o r a l scientist w i t h a v a n t a g e p o i n t f r o m w h i c h t o v i e w linguistic d i s p l a y s o f o t h e r s a n d f r o m w h i c h t o v i e w their o w n l a n g u a g e as well. In t h e first essay D a n i e l B a t s o n has a t t e m p t e d a s o r t i n g in o r d e r t o classify t h e " l a n g u a g e g a m e s " t h a t can be p l a y e d b y t h e p s y c h o l o gist. A t t h e v e r y least t h o s e o f us w h o are o v e r w h e l m e d b y t h e s e e m ingly i n e x t r i c a b l e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s o f s u b j e c t i v e a n d o b j e c t i v e self w i t h society should benefit b y a s e m a n t i c t h e r a p y a p p r o a c h . W e could d o well t o k n o w w h e n , as scientists, w e are m i x i n g l a n g u a g e g a m e s , rules, categories, a n d i n t e n t i o n s . E v e n if o n e d e c i d e s t o p l a y a " m i x e d " l a n g u a g e g a m e k n o w i n g it is v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m n o t k n o w i n g it. T h e B a t s o n essay s h o u l d be o f s i g n i f i c a n t help in s e t t i n g a f o u n d a t i o n so that t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t can d e c i d e w h e n it is a n d w h e n it is n o t necessary t o s e p a r a t e l a n g u a g e s y s t e m s . It s h o u l d set t h e s t a g e f o r the scientist's a w a r e n e s s o f t h e l a n g u a g e s y s t e m s o f t h e p e r s o n (as t h e s u b j e c t o f a scientific i n q u i r y ) a n d f o r an his a w a r e n e s s o f the l a n g u a g e s y s t e m o f the scientist, n a m e l y , t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t as o b s e r v e r . A n d it s h o u l d h e l p t o clarify t h e task o f i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y t h i n k i n g a n d c o m munication. Later in this i n t r o d u c t i o n , I will try t o identify the m a j o r t e r m s o f the c r o s s - d i s c i p l i n a r y c o l l a b o r a t o r s o f this b o o k . I will t h e n discuss the m a t t e r o f m i x i n g a n d u n m i x i n g t e r m s . H o w e v e r , it is i m p o r t a n t to c o n s i d e r n o w h o w B a t s o n ' s t r e a t m e n t o f p s y c h o l o g i s t s ' language

games

raises q u e s t i o n s all b e h a v i o r a l scientists h a v e t o ask a b o u t t h e t e r m s a n d the l a n g u a g e t h e y use t o s t u d y t h e p e r s o n a n d societal c o n t e x t . T h e s e q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n n o t m e r e l y w h a t t e r m s a n d d e f i n i t i o n s are u s e d , b u t also h o w t o select a n d o r g a n i z e t h e t e r m s . W h e n s o m e t e r m s a n d d e f i n i t i o n s are s o r t e d o u t a n d " u n m i x e d , " d e c i s i o n s h a v e t o be m a d e o n priorities a n d o n h o w t o relate t h e t e r m s . F o r e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r these q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t e r m s a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d b e related: D o y o u use a t a b l e o f r a n d o m n u m b e r s t o f o c u s o n a t h e m e ? D o y o u best use statistical f o r m a t s f o r e x p e r i m e n t a l logic o n l y a f t e r y o u have agreed on y o u r definition o f the subject o r object of research? And o n l y after y o u u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h a t d e f i n i t i o n relates t o y o u r o w n p e r sonality and t o t h e h i s t o r i c - s o c i o - c u l t u r a l p r e m i s e s f r o m w h i c h it is derived and t o w h i c h it n o w a d d s a bit o f c o n t e x t ? It is clear t h a t a lan-

Introduction guage

or

languages

11 is needed

to

"relate"

the " u n m i x e d "

terms,

definitions, and g a m e s . H o w d o e s a scientist decide? H o w docs a p e r son decide? It will be m y v i e w in p a r t 2 o f this b o o k that personality is manifested by a variety of displays o f language games or systems. These displays m a y be conceptualized as " t e x t . " But a scientist should not c o m m i t the reductionist e r r o r o f t h e n d e f i n i n g personality as c o t e r m i nus w i t h text o r w i t h t h e m e t h o d o f s t u d y i n g text. T h a t sort o f r e d u c tion w o u l d leave o u t the q u e s t i o n o f w h o is to observe o r " k n o w " the text. A c c o r d i n g l y , in part 1 m o r e b a c k g r o u n d is p r o v i d e d to c o n sider w h a t I will have to say a b o u t logical " u n d e r s t r u c t u r e s " and their role vis-ä-vis the s t u d y o f a p e r s o n ' s l a n g u a g e and h o w a p e r s o n ' s lang u a g e relates to a p s y c h o l o g y o f p e r s o n a l i t y . T h a t b a c k g r o u n d f o r these " u n d e r s t r u c t u r e s " is the subject o f t h e second essay, w h i c h looks at m e m o r y as the d e e p s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e and t h o u g h t and at culture f r o m the perspective of an external c o n t e x t of language and t h o u g h t . This approach should provide an anthropological perspective and thereby should fulfill r e q u i r e m e n t 2 a b o v e . Let m e p r e v i e w the w a y t h e second essay relates an a n t h r o pological perspective to m e m o r y a n d its individual and cultural c o n texts of l a n g u a g e and t h o u g h t . T h e classification of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e is by definition a m a t t e r i n v o l v i n g cultural c o n t e x t . P e o p l e speak t o o t h e r people. M a n - c u l t u r e relations are a necessary tapestry f o r o u r view of the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a p e r s o n ' s m i n d and social being. A c c o r d i n g l y , an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s v i e w point is essential. T h e essay b y O s w a l d W e r n e r and G l a d y s Levis-Pilz depicts the linguistic w e a v i n g s o f a p e r s o n ' s m e m o r y , but s h o w s the cultural textures o f the internal a n d external contexts w h i c h operate as determinants. T o see w h y I use t h e t a p e s t r y m e t a p h o r , consider that a n y thing w o v e n into this tapestry m u s t be a speech act. T h e reader will o b s e r v e in the second essay t h e careful delineation of the p h e n o m e n a of the external context: speech, speech acts, and various f o r m s of social and cultural c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Each f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is w o v e n into the tapestry but is b o u n d clearly in its o w n territory. M o r e o v e r , the internal context of speech and l a n g u a g e is likewise kept w i t h i n b o u n d s of the speaker's p o i n t of v i e w b u t seen as a context w i t h i n

contexts.

T h e r e f o r e , the w e a v i n g s are still possible w i t h i n a flat t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l

12

Introduction

tapestry because the internal contexts consist of speech acts just as external contexts do. Hence, the Werner and Levis-Pilz essay provides a picture of the structure of the individual's memory. The authors picture the situation of memory as a changing entity, but, like a tapestry, the stillness of the structure counterpoints the shifting nature of the mind's memory. In terms of the book's theme one will have a picture of the predisposing viewpoints of memory which the individual personality brings to the acts of creating self and culture through language. O n e can spotlight the structure of individual memory with internal and external contexts and see whether the illumination brings highlights to Diaz-Guerrero's conception of the determining role of HSCPs. But in the second essay the reader will discern the introduction of a most difficult, and constantly challenging, task—that of accommodating to a figure-ground shifting. When focusing on structure, we can see the individual's memory brought to the foreground; then we shift the structure of individual memory to the background as we focus on the cultural force of HSCPs and observe their impact on the individual structures and personal context shifted to the background. In that background are the individual's predispositions as a person. Thus, to understand the structure of memory requires figureground shifts from a within-person context to a cultural context. Werner and Levis-Pilz show that the scientific observer must be capable of such shifts in perceptions of (and ultimately in conceptions of) the thinking—and the knowing—of the individual human being. This chapter should help provide the background for my treatment of the epistemological issues that are at the heart of my theme, and which are developed in my Chapters 1 and 2 in part 2. The third requirement for the background of this book is to analyze the computer as an observer and as a generator of language and thought and to consider these roles and capabilities relative to the psychology of personality. This requirement is fulfilled in the third essay by Harold Pepinsky and is a tantalizing orchestration of the technological potential to study personality and communication by computer production and interpretation of text. It is tantalizing because Professor Pepinsky not only shows the potentials of studying personality, as text, but also raises the clear questions of who orchestrates text, how it is orchestrated, who interprets it, how it is interpreted, and whether these matters are also expressible in language which is then reducible to text. His discussion of the act of orchestrating and of the need to

13

Introduction

classify ways o f analyzing the orchestration o f a text provide an exciting way o f reading the individuality o f a text. But the demonstration also suggests that were this turned the other way around—were the rules o f orchestrated structures used to construct an orchestration—our only comic relief would be to think o f the Sorcerer's

Apprentice.

What are the rules to interpret, to orchestrate, and to produce a text? And suppose the text we are considering consists o f rules to generate text. Is such a text a Sorcerer's Apprentice? Can a text be the Sorcerer himself? However far we can get with such questions, we surely can follow a regress to the basic—and then to the more basic—rules o f text. In Pepinsky's essay these basic rules are those o f syntax. Pepinsky also suggests some specific linkages that can be made by syntactic analyses o f the stylistic complexity

o f a text. For the moment

regard stylistic complexity o f a text its "display" o f its "personality." When the syntactic structure o f a text is our way o f knowing a personality, we stand at the frontier separating syntax from the elementally meaningful conceptions associated with syntax, such as the causality inherent in verbal terms and relations. Let me demonstrate briefly by a distinction between two levels o f the basic rules o f syntax. I shall call these Basic level 1 and Basic level 2. Basic level ί is a matter o f syntactic analysis by which natural language and personality displays are "reduced" to rules o f text.

Of

course, a natural language display can be an easily discernible mock-up, and as persons we easily can retaliate against the predictable rules a computer can follow to make such a simulation. For example, the second time you hear a synthesized voice over a telephone, you can think up a smart retort which would amuse any child but confound the c o m puter behind the voice. And the same goes for any Disneyland-type humanoid representing a "personality." We can laugh at the human-like figure which speaks the same lines over and over again. T o relieve our self-doubt we can burlesque " i t " and flaunt our flexible uses o f language. We therefore need a Basic level 2 if we are to have any real competition from the computer or i f we are to have a real informationprocessing model to study against Ribot's, Janet's, and Freud's speculations on and integrations o f mind, personal identity, and, to be sure, personality. Basic level 2 must therefore consist o f rules but must involve meaningful conceptions such as causality. When rules o f causality ac-

14

Introduction

c o m m o d a t e figure-ground shifts, i.e., when those rules refer to the individual as agent, or w h e n there is a shift in reference from the individual as agent to the individual's environmental objects as agents, then we have gone beyond a single discernible mock-up. With such syntactic rules we can enter the arena of self-reference, if not self-observation. These are matters central to the theme of the book. The groundwork in Pepinsky's essay cuts through the two basic levels I have described, exposing the foundation necessary for a modern theory of personality in which logic has a place in relation to language and the person. In the model I propose in part 2, the logic and the language of the person are posited as specific to the interaction of an individual's basic beliefs with his personality. Basic beliefs would be those such as the person's o w n views of causality. T h e logic system of the person is seen as an elemental level f r o m which to view personality and would be just as fundamental to the person as a knower as it would be to the person's sense of individual identity.

Overview of Parts 2 and 3 Toward a Theory of Personality In part 2, I propose a logic model and relate it to rules of k n o w i n g and to rules of personality. But logic also relates to the ways a person may express the self in natural language. And—since the behavioral scientist is a p e r s o n — h o w the behavioral scientist chooses, interprets, and is responsible for the self in the expression of language will be raised in chapter 1. Therefore, I will discuss h o w individual persons select their own natural language displays of personality and h o w responsible scientists decide to display their observations—self-reflexive or not. Consequently, the chapters in part 2 relate to the perspectives on natural language set forth in the background essays. The focus by which to view the issues of natural language display set forth in the background essays is mv figure-ground shift metaphor. In short, there is the matter of the individual as speaker and of the individual's speech as a display of the person. T h e shift back and

Introduction

15

f o r t h , n o w t o t h e p e r s o n as an individual subject, n o w t o t h e l a n g u a g e displays as cultural objects, needs t o b e seen f r o m a b r o a d a n t h r o p o logical p e r s p e c t i v e as well as f r o m a m o r e telescoped psychological p e r s p e c t i v e . F r o m t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s v i e w p o i n t , t h e classification of t h o u g h t a n d u t t e r a n c e is a m a t t e r of h o w , w h e n , w h e r e , a n d w h y p e o ple talk, w h a t they say, and w h o they are. B u t these q u e s t i o n s m a y be raised either f r o m t h e speaker's p o i n t o f v i e w o r f r o m a sociocultural p o i n t o f v i e w . A n d so w e h a v e o u r c h a l l e n g i n g f i g u r e - g r o u n d - t y p e shifting again. This challenge is elegantly represented by the Werner and Levis-Pilz d e p i c t i o n o f internal and external context. T h i s representation provides the broad anthropological perspective required. T h e psychological p e r s p e c t i v e is telescoped in the P e p i n s k y essay, in w h i c h a vision o f c o m p u t e r analysis and o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l issues o f personality is o f f e r e d . H o w descriptions of talking a n d o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e and h o w the d i l e m m a o f s h i f t i n g v i e w p o i n t s o r c o n t e x t s m a y l o o k to scientists and c o m p u t e r s is p i n p o i n t e d in P c p i n s k y ' s c o n c e p t of text. A m a j o r issue in this b o o k is h o w b e h a v i o r a l scientists v i e w themselves as subjects. If the problem o f the person as observer, k n o w e r , a n d speaker is essential for any analysis o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e a n d / o r o f a logic s y s t e m , the behavioral scientist's l a n g u a g e and self fall w i t h i n the scope o f the i n q u i r y . In this regard, to orient t h e reader to w h a t I will h a v e to say in part 2, I will s h o w the relation o f the c o n c e p t o f language games t o t h e m a t t e r o f language, particularly as it b e c o m e s self-reflexive f o r t h e behavioral scientist. B a t s o n raises the question in t h e first essay: W h a t are the rules of t h e various language games the scientist uses? Perhaps w e can sec what d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e g a m e s and sets o f rules are necessary if w e consider t h e c o m p l e x responsibilities o f the b e h a v i o r a l scientist. T h e responsibility o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t w h o begins t o be able t o articulate his o r her c o n c e r n s w i t h the capacities o f AI and c o m p u t e r - d r i v e n m o d e l s of m i n d and p e r s o n is a w e s o m e . T h e very l a n g u a g e p s y c h o l o g i s t s use m a y g e n erate not o n l y s i m u l a t i o n s of m i n d and p e r s o n , b u t interactions o f these s i m u l a t i o n s w i t h t h e very n a t u r e o f the h u m a n p e r s o n a l i t y . T h e final step f o r t h e behavioral scientist is to e x a m i n e the relationship of lang u a g e t o t h e questions: W h o is the Sorcerer (Sorceress)? W h a t is the S o r c e r e r ' s role? W h a t is the self? T h e careful s o r t i n g o f different p u r poses and d o m a i n s f o r the l a n g u a g e p s y c h o l o g i s t s use s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e reader w i t h i m p o r t a n t w a y s of l o o k i n g at t h e issues o f a generative s t r u c t u r e t u r n e d o n itself. T h u s i m p o r t a n t scientific decisions are m a d e

16

Introduction

t o g e n e r a t e text in o r d e r t o represent v i e w p o i n t s o f the subject, o f the o b j e c t , o f that person—whoever it is, i n c l u d i n g t h e scientist—as the agent generating personality or text or both. Since I a m c o n c e r n e d w i t h the scientist's responsibility o f dealing n o t o n l y w i t h t h e individual as a p e r s o n b u t as a k n o w c r , I will also relate l a n g u a g e g a m e s t o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s . T h e p o s i t i o n d e v e l o p e d in part 2 is elucidated by B a t s o n ' s s t u d y o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c c p t o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s . M y o w n v i e w , p r e s e n t e d in c h a p t e r 1 of part 2, is that in r e g a r d t o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l issues, a n y l a n g u a g e game as a game is b o u n d , if n o t d o o m e d , b y limitations unless the scientist w i t h a d e e p sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is willing t o e x a m i n e a n d describe the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y a n d t h e k n o w c r — i n o t h e r s as well as in h i m self. T h i s delicate balance b e t w e e n t h e scientist as p e r s o n a n d k n o w e r b e c o m e s the s u b j e c t o f chapters 3 - 4 in w h i c h I s h o w h o w psychological defense m e c h a n i s m s can affect personality and epistcmic functioning, and can raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e interrelation o f d e f e n s e t h o u g h t , language, and epistemology. T h e t h e m e d e v e l o p e d in part 2 is that t h e logic a n d l a n g u a g e o f t h e p e r s o n are specific t o the interaction o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s basic beliefs w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s personality. T h e t e r m s a n d rationale o f the logic m o d e l are introduced in chapter 5. In that chapter the reader should k e e p in m i n d t h e specific a s s u m p t i o n s necessary f o r m y s y n t h e s i s of a p e r s o n a l i t y t h e o r y o f f e r e d in C h a p t e r s 6 - 7 . Part 3 o f this sion o f a cross-cultural p e r s o n a l i t y a n d society. essay extends o u r vision

w o r k represents P r o f e s s o r D i a z - G u e r r e r o ' s vip u r p o s e a n d m e t h o d o l o g y f o r the s t u d e n t of Based o n his considerable scientific research his and offers a view of w h a t the future m i g h t hold.

Bringing Some Vocabulary t o Terms and to the Theme It is difficult, a n d in t h e e n d it w o u l d be p r e t e n t i o u s , to try t o analyze t h e t h e m e o f this b o o k as if I c o u l d see all facets o f t h e v i e w p o i n t s of t h e o t h e r c o n t r i b u t o r s . H o w e v e r , I can consider s o m e aspects o f their v o c a b u l a r y as " a r r a y s . " In o r d e r f o r the a u t h o r s o f the b a c k g r o u n d c h a p t e r s to create a p i c t u r e of their o w n t e r m s , each has p r e s e n t e d m a n y

Introduction

17

levels of vocabulary. This allows the contributors to represent their experience, thought, scientific evidence, and professional conscience in ways that bring credit to their specific disciplines. Accordingly, we are confronted with the problems of crossdisciplinary reading, namely, accommodating to a number of disciplines, their viewpoints, and their special vocabularies. Ultimately crossdisciplinary readers must understand major terms from the several disciplines and subject those terms to integrative analogies in order to construct meaningful themes. But this understanding depends on two things: the clarity of the major terms and the trust the reader has that sufficient scientific groundwork has been laid to provide evidence and meaning for the terms. In the background essays of part 1 we should be able to discern several main concepts used by the contributors. These concepts are identified in the next portion of this introductory discussion in order to orient the reader to the terms guiding the technical vocabulary of each of the background chapters and to provide a sense of the relation of these terms to the theme of the book. Admittedly, this is the sense of these terms as I see them. However, my hope is that cross-disciplinary readers will try their own analogies using the major terms I will identify shortly. In so doing, readers may see if the themes that arise in their own thinking match my theme, augment it, or change its structure and direction.

Text, Context, and the Languages o f the Behavioral Scientist The main terms of the background essays are Language games—as applied by Batson Context—as examined by Werner and Levis-Pilz Text—as conceptualized by Pepinsky The remainder of the introduction will consist of a commentary on how these terms may be related to each other and to the theme of the book. My purpose is to show that the terms context and text capture the authors' concern for speech acts and for language behavior, as well as their concern for an understanding of the individual in relation to society. But the very nature of the different special vocabularies drawn from anthropology, psychology, and computer science make it all the

18

Introduction

m o r e necessary that I e x a m i n e the terms in the light o f the language game(s) o f the behavioral scientists.

Language Games, Context, and Logic B a t s o n uses the fecund yet mysterious n o t i o n language

game

that W i t t -

genstein put forth, in order t o s h o w that psychologists often address different research questions and theoretical explanations. Readers will find this approach a hermeneutics that helps a great deal to " s e e t h r o u g h " to how a particular author chooses to use language and therefore t o

what

that author is particularly concerned about in relation to our topics, personality and society. F o r the purposes o f this introduction, I will take B a t s o n ' s analysis and categorizations o f language games and apply them to the other t w o b a c k g r o u n d essays; that is, I will n o w look briefly at the language g a m e s o f o u r scientist-authors o f the second and third essays. W h e n l o o k i n g at W e r n e r and Levis-Pilz's concepts o f internal and external c o n t e x t o n e can point to their strong grounding in Dell H y m e s ' categorizations o f speech acts and utterances, and thereby account for m u c h o f the vocabulary and language in their essay as what B a t s o n categorizes as behavioral-situational. ner and Levis-Pilz terms internal and external with their o w n " h o s t " term context.

O n the other hand, the W e r at s o m e levels seem at odds

S o m e w h e r e along the line in their

a r g u m e n t there is s o m e fancy f o o t w o r k : O n e possibility is that they c o n f r o n t readers with a " m i x e d " language g a m e — w h i c h sounds like "doublethink"; e.g., intentional acts perceptual behavior (Isn't an intention one thing and an act another? Aren't a perception and a behavior to be contrasted rather than compressed?) Perhaps in the W e r n e r and Levis-Pilz essay it is necessary to unmix the g a m e s and thereby to achieve a fixed point o f conceptual distinction. F o r e x a m p l e , individual m e m o r y can be cast as a scries o f a n swers to H y m e s ' w h o , what, w h e r e , e t c . , questions, w h e n those answers are arranged in relation to each other. W h e n the " a r r a n g e m e n t " is done n o r m a t i v e l y , that is, b y w a y o f c o m p a r i s o n to m a n y respondents' answers, the societal c o n t e x t o f m e m o r y b e c o m e s manifest. T h e n

Introduction

19

the relationship of the who, what, where terms is that of a story or rather of an epic of a society, a culture, or a people. T h e "epic" w o u l d be a normative or nomothetic arrangement of the structure of questions displayed by the answers and speech acts of memory. But if the who, what, where questions are arranged as answers and displays of an individual's speech acts, an idiographic array w o u l d constitute the structure of m e m o r y . If we named the first sort of story an " e p i c , " we could call the second a " b i o g r a p h y " or, if you prefer, a " d r a m a t i c m o n o l o g u e . " Hence, m e m o r y is a matter of speech acts arranged in n o m o t h e t i c and idiographic statistical arrays. Readers will discern that I agree with Batson that scientists must not hide the fact that they play language games. H o w e v e r , I also feel that scientists must admit and take responsibility for the fact that they play mixed language games. T h e necessity for scientists to confess this seemingly untoward behavior has to d o with the tendency of m a n y in the h u m a n sciences to try to eliminate the problems of awareness, thought, and self f r o m their research. As I s h o w e d above, there comes a time when a fixed point of distinction is necessary. T h e games must then be " u n m i x e d . " But the experience, awareness, and self of the scientist arc rich resources of " m i x e d " games, and this must be acknowledged and made part of the picture (or tapestry). 1 realize that this is a s o m e w h a t oversimplified way of stating the problem of the scientist as person and k n o w e r , but these matters will be discussed m o r e fully in chapters 3 - 5 , when questions of epistemology are raised. Meanwhile, the heuristic value of the term language games is that it engages a hermeneutics for our o w n decisions as scientists—and as cross-disciplinary readers—to make speech acts and to select ways to examine and to explain those and other speech acts. Moreover, an u n derstanding of our selection of language games allows us to examine the language dimensions of our subject matter, personality, as well as our o w n personalities, as the personal bedrock of experience of the self, of the decisions, and of our language as scientists. Language game is in itself a term which is mixed. This point is appropriate because the ensuing questions impel us not to hide or repress mind, awareness, or personal identity. T h e questions are these: If communication is a game, what is not? Moreover, if a game is one possibility, what are the rules of play? Are rules of any play a game (in an infinite regress)? In the course of the book, I hope that these questions

Introduction

20

are touched on at least as they coalesce in the theme I put forth relative to the role of logic in thought and language and in the structure o f personality. The language games in Pepinsky's essay also involve more than one domain. Batson might describe these domains as two: matters of intention and matters of behavior. But this distinction gets confounded in cross-disciplinary writing, thinking, and reading. Readers should look at the language game Pepinsky plays when he considers the concept of text, but readers should also bear in mind h o w they related text to a concept like Werner and Levis-Pilz's context. Pepinsky's essay pivots on a point. If the essay, as it were, " p i v o t s on one f o o t , " the other foot comcs down sometimes on matters of "internal context," such as intention or interpretation, and sometimes on "external context" or behavioral-situational matters, such as dialogue or interaction. But the balance for the pivot is achieved through the use of the term text and also through its conceptualization. Text is a record of language behavior and hence a record of communicative acts such as speaking and writing. It is a record of the content—what is said—and of the process—how it is said. B u t such a record can be produced by a computer as well as by a person. C o m municative acts can therefore take place between persons,

between

computer and person, and as in the sci-fi fantasy The Forhin Project, between computers. One question Pepinsky's essay addresses is h o w to analyze and describe text as a record of communicativc acts. T h e direction he chooses is to show h o w the analysis may be done by computer and the description by grammatical categories and classification. T h e remaining questions of his essay follow logically. When analyzing communicative acts of persons and computers, w e ask " W h o is talking with w h o m ? " In what way does our computer analysis of text display the individuals who/that are communicating? Does a computcr-generated analysis of grammatical structures reveal the "personalities" of the communicators as well as of their patterns of interaction? O f course, to the degree that a computer analysis of text can make these revelations, personality can become at some point a production of the computer-generated analysis. When we deal with the question of personality, at least in terms of the dimension of its display in language behavior, we are concerned with meaning. T h e matter of meaning takes us directly to the main structures of personality, namely, awareness and personal identity. If w e can ask the questions correctly

Introduction

21

w c may have a point of balance for the pivot. Perhaps the question of personal identity is the " w h o " question, and our point of balance is then in finding a g r a m m a r or syntax to best accommodate questions of signification and meaning. Having set out to chart the grammatical structures of text, w e ask what happens to meaning. What d o we do about the serious question Wallace Chafe puts to behavioral scientists? Unless w c k n o w the nature of semantic structure, w e cannot describe in any adequate way the postsemantic processes which operate upon it, for w e are ignorant of the input to those processes. T o start somewhere in the middle of the postsemantic area, as m o d e r n linguistics has usually done, is like trying to describe the production of milk while omitting the cow. Without a k n o w l e d g e of semantic structure, wc arc ignorant of the processes which produce well-formed utterances, for these are the processes of semantic formation. Linguistics thus finds itself at the present time in an a w k w a r d position, for of all the things it has learned about the various parts of language, it has learned the least about semantics. It has handled this area with its left hand preferring to concentrate its attention on topics supposedly m o r e amenable to objective treatment. It has left semantics to a very large extent to philosophers, "behavioral scientists," and others w h o have had no scientific paradigm within which k n o w l e d g e about language could be systematically integrated. In consequence, w e still k n o w very little about the nature of language in spite of all the intelligent labor that has gone into its investigation for so long a time. (1970:73)

This challenge is a broadside. In Pepinsky's essay, there are technical achievements which enable us to think further. What specifically happens when a structural approach is pushed to its limits? T h e meaning that inspires a case g r a m m a r and is in turn inspired by it is a problem; it is another sort of infinite regress problem. Modesty is the solution: that is, Pepinsky offers heuristic concepts with which to view the question of language, communication, and personality. T h e language display is text. T h e personality factors are interpretation and o r chestration. These may be described in terms of grammatical structure. Chafe's challenge for the behavioral scientist could be eclipsed by too facile an avoidance of the infinite regress problem and by a substitution of the dazzling achievements of such AI products as ELIZA and P A R R Y . In this regard, Pepinsky's essay is a courageous attempt to take on the issues of the interpreter and the interpretation of text. With these issues raised, any premature dismissal of the behavioral scientists' responsibility to face epistemological questions can be rejected. O n the other hand, the danger of language games invading the

22

Introduction

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p s y c h o l o g y of t h e interpreter, the self, the p e r s o n , etc., will n o t be a v o i d e d in this b o o k . T h e C h a f e challenge m a y be e x t e n d e d t o t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n language game concept itself. H o w far d o w e w a n t to carry that m e t a p h o r f o r t h e sake o f scicnce? Is l a n g u a g e g a m e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in t e r m s : R e d u c i n g m e a n i n g t o a " g a m e " could i n v o l v e u l t i m a t e tragedies. T o t h e e x t e n t that I a m able to state c o n v i n c i n g l y in part 2 that this issue should be addressed, a n d t o t h e extent that I s h o w h o w it could be a d d r e s s e d b y scientists, I advance the p u r p o s e s o f this b o o k . T o achieve that e n d , I will place logic in a central position in m y theme.

Logic in a World of Chafe's Challenge As I have tried t o cut m y w a y t h r o u g h the b r a m b l e o f l a n g u a g e and personality, 1 have rejected o n e o f C h a f e ' s challenges. As I see it, it is n o t a m a t t e r o f C h o m s k y ' s picture o f s y n t a x versus a semantic base for t h o u g h t and l a n g u a g e . It is rather that a logic m o d e l is necessary to integrate the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f e p i s t e m o l o g y and personality in o r d e r to place l a n g u a g e b e h a v i o r a n d text in p r o p e r perspective. T h e W e r n e r and Levis-Pilz essay helps t o m a k e this p o i n t , a l t h o u g h it proceeds f r o m a d i f f e r e n t discipline t h a n t h e p s y c h o l o g i e s of the o t h e r a u t h o r s w h o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o this b o o k a n d uses v e r y d i f f e r e n t techniques, data, and v o c a b u l a r y . It d o c s n o t d u c k the q u e s t i o n o f internal c o n t e x t a n d h u m a n c o g n i t i o n in its classificatory d e s c r i p t i o n s of speech acts a n d language behavior. Cross-disciplinary

reading, t h i n k i n g , and w r i t i n g has criss-

crosses o f v o c a b u l a r y , m e a n i n g , and s y n t a x . T h e reader, as I, m a y be g r a t e f u l f o r t h e b r e a d t h o f t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l v i e w and the specificity o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t s ' research directions. B u t the value o f the e f f o r t to synthesize is in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r o v i d e d by the logic and language that w e can create f o r p u r p o s e s of a responsible h u m a n science. T h e lesson o f Daniel B a t s o n ' s chapter is c o m p l e x . T h e r e are separable l a n g u a g e g a m e s f o r the p s y c h o l o g i s t a n d f o r the behavioral scientist. B u t this d o c s not m e a n that h u m a n personality is u n d e r s t a n d able only as a T o w e r o f Babel in w h i c h n o l a n g u a g e g a m e is translatable i n t o a n o t h e r , o r in w h i c h t h e responsibility to o r c h e s t r a t e t h e g a m e s is vacated.

Part 1 Background Essays

1 Language of Psychology C. Daniel Batson University of Kansas

RATHER T H A N AN essay about psychology of language, this first essay is about the language of psychology. Such a starting point seems worthwhile when we remember that psychology of language is limited by an analog of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle: One can never fully explain language, for language must be used in the explaining. Doubtless the characteristics of the language used to analyze language affect the outcome of the analysis. This somewhat obvious point raises two questions that are frequently ignored: What are the characteristics of the language of psychology? And what are the implications of these characteristics for the way psychologists understand language? These are the questions 1 want to address, albeit in a preliminary and rather speculative fashion. Although my concern with such questions is as a psychologist, their metadisciplinary nature forces me to rely heavily on philosophy. Over the last half-century, analytic philosophers have been most generous in their attempts to provide psychologists with logical and linguistic clarification. But we psychologists have often been less than willing recipients. Certainly, Homer's dictum that we be wary of strangers bearing gifts should not be forgotten, but neither should some potentially important philosophical insights.

C. Daniel Batson

26

The Approach of Linguistic Analysis B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g w h a t the philosophical school o f linguistic analysis has to offer to an understanding of the language of psychology, w e should be clear a b o u t h o w these p h i l o s o p h e r s a p p r o a c h their task. T h e y h a v e n o i n t e n t i o n o f b e c o m i n g a m a t e u r psychologists, trying t o collect e m pirical data t o explain linguistic b e h a v i o r . Instead, they seek to analyze h o w w o r d s f u n c t i o n w i t h i n a given language. T h e psychologist sets his task as t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o r , i n c l u d i n g linguistic b e h a v i o r ; the analytic p h i l o s o p h e r seeks t o u n r a v e l the logic of such explanations. T h e a p p r o a c h o f linguistic analysis f o l l o w s f r o m but is also a reaction against that of logical p o s i t i v i s m . Logical positivism s o u g h t t o specify h o w a l a n g u a g e must be in o r d e r to be m e a n i n g f u l ; it m u s t r e p licate the logical f o r m o f empirical facts. Positivists regarded ostensive ( p o i n t i n g o r n a m i n g ) d e f i n i t i o n s as t h e basis of all valid language. B u t analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s , such as W i t t g e n s t e i n in his later years (in his earlier w r i t i n g s W i t t g e n s t e i n e s p o u s e d a f o r m o f positivism), a d m o n i s h us n o t to p r e j u d g e t h e n a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e b u t t o " l o o k a n d s e e " h o w lang u a g e is used. W i t t g e n s t e i n agrees that a language m a y be ostensively based, b u t he a r g u e s that this is n o t t h e o n l y " l a n g u a g e g a m e . " D i f f e r ent l a n g u a g e g a m e s h a v e d i f f e r e n t rules, a n d , as the rules o f checkers d o n o t a p p l y to chess, t h e principle o f o s t e n s i v e definition c a n n o t b e a p plied t o all l a n g u a g e g a m e s . W i t t g e n s t e i n in his Philosophical Investigations challenges t h e positivist to: T h i n k o f e x c l a m a t i o n s a l o n e , w i t h their c o m p l e t e l y different f u n c t i o n s . Water! Away! Ow! Help! Fine! No! A r c y o u i n c l i n e d t o call t h e s e w o r d s " n a m e s o f objects"? (1953:13e)

B u t i m m e d i a t e l y a q u e s t i o n arises: W h a t makes t h e different l a n g u a g e g a m e s all g a m e s ? Surely there m u s t b e s o m e universal essence that is characteristic o f all and can serve as a standard o f a d e q u a c y for the various g a m e s . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s reply is sharp: D o n ' t say: " T h e r e must

b e s o m e t h i n g c o m m o n o r t h e y w o u l d n o t b e callctl

' g a m e s ' "'—but look and sec w h e t h e r there is a n y t h i n g c o m m o n t o all. — F o r i f

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you look at t h e m you will not see s o m e t h i n g that is c o m m o n to all, but similarities, relationships, and a w h o l e series o f t h e m at that. T o repeat: d o n ' t think, but look! . . . A n d the result of this examination is: w e see a complicated n e t w o r k of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: s o m e t i m e s overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. 1 can think of n o better expression to characterize these similarities than " f a m i l y resemblances"; for the various resemblances between m e m b e r s of a family: build, features, color o f eyes, gait, t e m perament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same w a y . — A n d I shall say: " g a m e s " f o r m a family. (1953:31e-32e)

In light of this understanding of language, what specifically is the task of the philosopher? Wittgenstein views the philosopher as a logical therapist: " T h e philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (1953:91e). T h e philosopher seeks to heal language problems, but not in the positivist's sense of trying to set ordinary language in s o m e proper order. It is clear that every sentence in o u r language "is in order as it is." T h a t is to say, w e are n o t striving afier an ideal, as if o u r ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by u s . — O n the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order.—So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence. (1953:45c) 1

Rather than creating a logically pure language, the philosopher's task is to uncover the mixture of language games, that is, when a sentence f r o m one game is treated as if it belonged in another. In such instances, Wittgenstein speaks of language "on holiday," and Gilbert Ryle, another leading analytic philosopher, speaks of "category mistakes." Both are suggesting that within its o w n g a m e and in ordinary usage a sentence will operate very well, but when we begin to ask questions of that sentence f r o m the framework of another game, problems arise. Conceived in this therapeutic mold, philosophy does not propound truth; it is a rcactive discipline. In typically cryptic fashion, Wittgenstein c o m m e n t s , " W h a t is your aim in philosophy?—To s h o w the fly the way out of the fly bottle" (1953:103e). Hartnack (1965:82-83) draws t w o implications f r o m this metaphor. First, in healing a linguistic misunderstanding no solution is achieved; instead, the problem itself disappears. Second, the way out of a linguistic trap is by going back the same way one camc. Freedom lies in carefully retracing one's steps to uncover the logic implicit in the language.

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C. Daniel Batson

General Characteristics of Psychological Language Psychological language w o u l d seem to be an ideal client for the therapeutic concerns o f the analytic philosopher. Like other sciences, p s y chology attempts to develop an extraordinary understanding o f ordinary phenomena, and in doing s o it makes extra-ordinary d e m a n d s on ordinary language. T h e scientist is not content to k n o w what is; he or she wants to explain h o w and why as well, and in a particular manner. T h e scientist appeals to publicly verifiable " f a c t s " based on controlled observation and seeks prediction as a criterion for adequate explanation. Insofar as possible, the scientist would like to be able to say with confidence, " I f X , then Y " ; if X state o f affairs exists, then Y will follow. At a logical extreme, to explain events in this w a y one must k n o w all o f the possible h o w and w h y factors relevant to that event; only an e x haustive explanation is sufficient. T o seek exhaustive explanations is quite different f r o m the everyday nonscientific g a m e o f asking what, h o w , and why questions. In everyday language, as R. S. Peters (1958) has pointed out, a sufficient explanation does not require an exhaustive response. If we ask why J o n e s walked across the road, a reply o f " T o buy t o b a c c o " is sufficient. B u t the psychologist must persevere. Would J o n e s d o this whenever he encountered a road? O r whenever he saw a shop with a sign " T o b a c c o " in the w i n d o w ? O r only when his pouch was low? O r only when he was a bit anxious, perhaps worrying about an u p c o m i n g j o b interview? N o t until all relevant parameters have been uncovered can the psychologist rest, k n o w i n g that he or she can predict, insofar as possible, those X circumstances under which this Y behavior will and will not occur. O n l y then has the behavior been explained in the scientific sense. That the psychologist's scientific language g a m e seeks exhaustive explanations while in everyday language we are satisfied with far less w o u l d not be a problem were it not that the psychologist b o r r o w s many basic concepts f r o m nonscientific everyday language. T h e physical sciences have m a d e major progress toward developing a m a t h e m a t ical language that is better suited to the nature o f the scicntific g a m e , but in the behavioral and social sciences we are still heavily dependent on ordinary language concepts—concepts like behavior, action, thought, feeling, emotion, perception, meaning, disposition, intention, motive,

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and cause. O n e may use jargonistic synonyms; one may argue that some of these concepts are not necessary in order to explain behavior; one may attempt to provide more precise definitions, but the everyday language of h u m a n behavior still lies at the core of psychological language. By using ordinary everyday language in the extra-ordinary scientific language game, the psychologist invites linguistic "holidays" or category mistakes. And, indeed, the history of psychology might be characterized as a history of linguistic tangles, f r o m the early attempts of Wundt and his students to catalog the structure of consciousness to modern debates over the necessity of motivational concepts. T h e psychological language game is beset with other problems as well. Perhaps because the physical scicnces developed first, there has been a strong tendency to look to the physical sciences as paradigmatic for all science. T h e psychologist, awed by and envious of the progress of the physical scientist, often yearns to g r o w up to be like this older cousin. But imitation of the physical scicnces invites confusion. The early physicist or chemist could fall back on ostensive definitions to operationalize key concepts under analysis—"This is water; that is h y d r o chloric acid." (Indeed, the assumed ostensive character of the physical scicnces was the basis for the positivist's claim that all language should be ostensive.) T h e psychologist is not so fortunate. T o say, " T h i s is schizophrenia; that is cognitive dissonance," quickly leads to replies of " W h a t ? , " " W h e r e ? , " " H o w do you k n o w ? " Certainly the psychologist's game of explaining behavior requires that one's concepts have some empirical, operational base; they must be tied to experience. But how? T o accept the positivist's answer that all concepts must be defined ostensively leads to attempts to reduce psychological language to physical language (Schlick, 1935). Such a reduction has never received wide support a m o n g psychologists (see, for example, Manicas and Secord 1983), and with good reason. A physical reduction of psychological concepts ignores the dual emphasis on o b jective physical movement and the subjective consequences of that m o v e m e n t for the organism. This dual emphasis has been central to u n derstandings of behavior t h r o u g h o u t the history of psychology. In contrast to the positivist's physical reduction based on ostensive referents, Wittgenstein argues for the use of criteria to define concepts in the behavioral scicnces. At issue is whether the meaning of a concept is considered to be exhaustively defined by its observable, empirical adjunct. Wittgenstein suggests in The Blue and Brown Books:

C. Daniel Batson

30

I f m c d i c a l s c i e n c c c a l l s a n g i n a an i n f l a m m a t i o n c a u s c d b y a p a r t i c u l a r b a c i l l u s , a n d w c a s k in a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e " w h y d o y o u s a y this m a n h a s g o t a n g i n a ? " then the a n s w e r " I h a v e f o u n d t h e b a c i l l u s s o - a n d - s o in his b l o o d " g i v e s us t h e crit e r i o n , o r w h a t w c m a y call t h e d e f i n i n g c r i t e r i o n o f a n g i n a . ( 1 9 5 8 : 2 5 )

T h i s criterion by no m e a n s exhausts the meaning o f angina; it only determines the relevance o f the term to a particular situation. M o r e o v e r , what is taken as a criterion is in s o m e sense arbitrary; other s y m p t o m s o f angina m i g h t have been used as the criterion. A s Peters (1958) has s u g g e s t e d , the specific character o f the criterion used to define a concept in an explanation g a m e is dependent u p o n the specific type o f explanatory (how or w h y ) question asked. T o use criteria rather than physical referents to operationalize behavioral concepts m e a n s that " o p e r a t i o n a l " definitions will be different for the p s y c h o l o g i s t than for the physicist; the meaning o f a p s y chological concept will not be exhausted by defining the observable criterion. A s a result, to attempt a physical reduction m a y greatly distort and o v e r s i m p l i f y psychological language. T r u e , the psychologist must seek to be explicit a b o u t the behavioral criteria for his o r her terminolo g y . But to a s s u m e that the meaning o f a psychological concept is e x hausted by its operational criteria is misleading. Such an assumption could result not only in a failure to find the appropriate explanatory criteria, but also in a sacrifice o f the c o m p l e x nuanccs o f everyday language and the information it c o n v e y s about behavior. N o t only docs the place o f p s y c h o l o g y in the family o f sciences invite c o n f u s i o n , complexities within p s y c h o l o g y do, too. At a very general level, p s y c h o l o g i s t s m a y be called upon to fill t w o rather distinct roles, that o f change agent (therapist, social planner, etc.) and that o f research scientist. T h e s e t w o roles, having very different goals and involving very different procedures, imply very different language g a m e s . T h e questions asked arc different: " W h a t can and/or should we d o ? " vs. " W h y d o people d o t h a t ? " Appropriate, meaningful answers are also different. A n d yet, these t w o l a n g u a g e g a m e s share much c o m m o n vocabulary, p r o v i d i n g another invitation for the psychologist's l a n g u a g e to g o on holiday. (See Manicas and S c c o r d 1983 for further discussion o f this point.) E v e n within research p s y c h o l o g y , different language g a m e s exist. O f course, on this sub-sub-branch o f the family tree o f language g a m e s , there are m a n y shared features. Each l a n g u a g e g a m e in research p s y c h o l o g y seeks to understand and explain h u m a n behavior,

using

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publicly verifiable o b s e r v a t i o n . B u t h u m a n b e h a v i o r is e x t r e m e l y c o m plex and can be a p p r o a c h e d o n a w i d e r a n g e o f linguistic a n d c o n c e p t u a l levels. M o s t generally, p s y c h o l o g i s t s h a v e p r o v i d e d e x p l a n a t i o n s at a physiological

level b y a p p e a l i n g t o n e u r o m u s c u l a r processes, at a behav-

ioral-situational

level b y e x a m i n i n g the interaction b e t w e e n o r g a n i s m a n d

e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d at an actional-dispositional

level b y t a k i n g a c c o u n t o f

t h e c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s t h a t an o r g a n i s m uses t o i n t e r p r e t i n f o r m a t i o n c o m i n g f r o m its e n v i r o n m e n t . A s t h e classic debates b e t w e e n S k i n n e r a n d C h o m s k y illustrate, t h e possibility f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s o n these d i f f e r ent linguistic levels invites f a m i l y s q u a b b l e s . Such d i s p u t e s are o v e r m e a n i n g m o r e than data. Identical data processed t h r o u g h d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e g a m e s m a y lead t o v e r y d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s . Indeed, m o r e data m a y o n l y serve t o h e i g h t e n t h e differences. T o s u m m a r i z e t h u s far, I h a v e s u g g e s t e d that the p s y c h o l o g i s t is in a particularly precarious position linguistically. H e or she flirts with t r o u b l e because o f t h e e x t r a - o r d i n a r y scientific use o f e v e r y d a y l a n guage; i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h that o l d e r c o u s i n , t h e physical scientist; t h e multiplicity o f roles t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t is called u p o n t o play; a n d t h e v a riety of linguistic and c o n c e p t u a l levels on w h i c h c o m p l e x h u m a n b e h a v i o r can b e analyzed. L i v i n g d a n g e r o u s l y is exciting, b u t it can also lead to disaster. T o u n d e r s t a n d m o r e clcarly t h e pitfalls o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l language, it m a y help to shift o u r analysis t o a m o r e c o n c r e t e level a n d e x a m i n e several k e y q u e s t i o n s f o r the p s y c h o l o g i s t s t u d y i n g l a n g u a g e in t h e light o f linguistic analysis.

Philosophical Analysis of Psychological Language At t h e core o f a n y p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d y o f l a n g u a g e is a q u e s t i o n a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n certain physical e n t i t i e s — w h e t h e r s y s t e m a t i c squiggles o n p a p e r o r strings o f p h o n e m i c s o u n d s — u s e d t o f o r m a c o d e of letters, w o r d s , and sentences, and the m e n t a l processes t h a t p r o d u c e and i n t e r p r e t these physical entities. Scientific e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e link between language as a physical event and as a mental process has proven far f r o m easy. T h e m o s t n a t u r a l a p p r o a c h t o this task m i g h t s e e m t o be to d e t e r m i n e an i n d i v i d u a l ' s t h o u g h t s a n d feelings o n the o n e h a n d a n d his w o r d s on the o t h e r , a n d to m a p t h e causal links b e t w e e n the t w o .

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To propose such an analysis, however, assumes answers to a number of difficult questions: Do mental processes even exist? And if so, how can we know another's thoughts and feelings? In studying these processes, are we not forced to rely on subjective as opposed to objective data? Can we trust a person's linguistic expressions to reflect accurately his subjective experience? How do we know what a person's dispositional nature is? Why does a person say or do what he does? Psychologists studying language have offered a variety of answers to these questions, but few psychologists would consider the answers to be satisfactory. Perhaps this is because psychology is a young science, and we must be patient. But the linguistic philosopher suggests another possibility: Perhaps the problems lie more with the questions than with the answers. Each of the questions just asked involves a mixture of language games, and it may be the resulting logical tangles that impede the psychologist's progress. Wittgenstein contends: T h e c o n f u s i o n a n d b a r r e n n e s s o f p s y c h o l o g y is n o t t o b e e x p l a i n e d by calling it a " y o u n g scicnce"; its state is n o t c o m p a r a b l e w i t h t h a t o f physics, for instance, in its b e g i n n i n g s . (Rather w i t h that of certain b r a n c h e s o f m a t h e m a t i c s . Set t h e o r y . ) For in p s y c h o l o g y t h e r e are e x p e r i m e n t a l m e t h o d s a n d (onceptual confiisioti. (As in the o t h e r case c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n a n d m e t h o d s o f p r o o f . ) T h e e x i s t e n c e o f e x p e r i m e n t a l m e t h o d s m a k e s us t h i n k w e h a v e t h e m e a n s o f s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h t r o u b l e us; t h o u g h p r o b l e m a n d m e t h o d s pass o n e a n o t h e r b y . (1953: 232e)

In an attempt to uncover the sources of this conceptual confusion, let us examine the logical character of each of the above questions more closely.

Whence Language: Does the Mind Exist? Are mental concepts necessary and/or useful in psychology? What is the relationship of thought to language? Is thought, as Skinner suggested, subvocal speech? Discussions of the role of mental processes in linguistic behavior have usually hung on questions such as these, questions of the relationship between the mental and physical, questions which imply a gulf between mind and body. Linguistic philosophers have attempted to break the bonds of this mind-body dualism, but not by coming up with an answer to the questions. Instead, these philosophers have sought to show this "fly the way out of the fly bottle" by pointing out that we are ensnared by a confusion of language games.

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For Descartes, the initiator of modern dualistic interpretations of m i n d - b o d y relations, we consist of a rational soul inhabiting a physical machine; the only point of contact between mind and body is the tiny pineal gland at the base of the brain. T h e assumption that led to formulation of this dualism lay in Descartes' notion of substance. Descartes assumed that both mind and b o d y were substances, each with its unique essence. T h e essence of the body was extension, and the essence of the mind was t h o u g h t (see Vesey 1965). J o h n Locke adopted Descartes' view of substance and passed it on into the mainstream of e m piricism (and hence to m o d e r n psychology), but not without recognizing the arbitrary nature of this view. Locke noted that it was as easy to conceive that G o d " s h o u l d superadd to matter a faculty of thinking [as] that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinki n g " {An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, 3.6). But, following Descartes, Locke adopted the latter view, speaking of the " i m m a terial substance" of the mind. William James set the stage for the analytic approach to the mind-body problem by adopting Locke's first option, although he spoke not of a " f a c u l t y " but of a " f u n c t i o n . " In " D o e s 'Consciousness' Exist?" James denied consciousness any substantial nature, adding: T o deny plumply that "consciousncss" exists seems so it—for undeniably " t h o u g h t s " d o exist—that I fear s o m e no farther. Let m e immediately explain that I mean only stands for an entity, but to insist that it docs stand for a

absurd on the face of readers will follow me to deny that the w o r d function. (1904:478)

Paraphrasing James, the source of the dilemma of the existence of consciousness lies in raising the question in the first place. T h e concepts "existence" and "consciousness" belong to quite different language games. Even to ask whether consciousness exists invites confusion, for it involves a mixture of language games. Wittgenstein has carried the argument a significant step beyond James by explicitly pointing out the linguistic confusion involved. "Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit" (1953:18e). O r in more contemporary language there we may say are "cognitive processes." But Wittgenstein cautions us not to assume that " p r o c e s s " is used in the same sense here as when we speak of physical processes (PI, p. 103e). T h e interaction of ideas cannot be paralleled to the interaction of billiard balls. As a result, one must resist the temptation to build operational definitions of mental

34

C. Daniel Batson

c o n c e p t s in t h e s a m e w a y o n e b u i l d s o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l concepts. Gilbert

Ryle has presented

a most extensive and

t r e a t m e n t o f t h e m i n d - b o d y p r o b l e m in The

Concept

of Mind

eloquent (1949).

A c c o r d i n g t o R y l e , all d u a l i s m s in W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y since D e s c a r t e s are f o u n d e d u p o n t h e c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e m e t a p h o r o f " t h e g h o s t in t h e m a c h i n e . " F o r D e s c a r t e s , t h e b o d y w a s a m a c h i n e , a n d t h e m i n d w a s i n s i d e d i r e c t i n g its m o v e m e n t s . T o let R y l e s p e a k f o r himself: It would have been equally ridiculous to construct the disjunction "she came h o m e either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair." N o w the d o g m a of the Ghost in the Machinc does just this It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements. I shall argue that these and other analogous conjunctions are absurd; but, it must be noticed, the argument will not s h o w that either of the illegitimately conjoined propositions is absurd in itself. I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase "there occur m e n tal processes" does not mean the same sort of thing as "there occur physical processes" and therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two. (1949:22) V e r y s e l d o m , I t h i n k , d o c s t h e u s e r o f m e n t a l t e r m s in o r d i n a r y language need to w o r r y about c o n j o i n i n g or disjoining the lang u a g e o f m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s . W e s i m p l y u s e t h e l a n g u a g e as it c o m e s , a n d t h e issue n e v e r arises. B u t t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t d o c s h a v e t o w o r r y , f o r in t h e a t t e m p t e x h a u s t i v e l y t o e x p l a i n b e h a v i o r , t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t is b o u n d t o p u s h f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the m e n t a l (e.g., t h o u g h t ) a n d the physical (e.g., speech). In so d o i n g , h e o r s h e is t e m p t e d t o m a k e t h e s a m e a s s u m p t i o n as L o c k e , t h a t m e n tal a n d p h y s i c a l are t w o k i n d s o f p r o c e s s e s w h i c h , a l t h o u g h

distinct,

s h o u l d be d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s o f the s a m e c o n c e p t u a l p a r a m e t e r s .

Oc-

c a s i o n a l l y this h a s m e a n t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e p h y s i c a l as m e n t a l ( B e r k e l e y ) ; m o r e f r e q u e n t l y in t h e h i s t o r y o f p s y c h o l o g y , it h a s m e a n t r e d u c i n g the mental to the physical (operationism and positivism). P h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s m a k e s it e a s y t o see t h e logical fallacy in t h e s e s o l u t i o n s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , viable a l t e r n a t i v e s are n o t so e a s y t o see. T h e o n l y o b v i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s u g g e s t e d b y l i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y is that t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t stick w i t h o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e a n d a b a n d o n t h e e f f o r t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l . B u t to d o

Language of Psychology

35

this would mean abandoning the goal of scientific understanding altogether. As if the conceptual mire resulting f r o m having to w o r k with both mental and physical concepts were not enough, the psychologist must face another m a j o r problem. T h e remainder of Ryle's analysis in The Concept o f Mind makes it evident that there is no one u n i f o r m set o f law-like propositions to handle all mental language. T h e psychologist's problem is not simply the relation of mental and physical conccpts. Mental concepts themselves are used in a n u m b e r of different language games, and only family resemblances can be either expected or found.

H o w D o I Know What Is on Your Mind? As might be expected f r o m Ryle's treatment of the m i n d - b o d y p r o b lem, he considers much of the confusion concerning o u r k n o w l e d g e of other minds to arise f r o m a category mistake. H e argues that our k n o w l e d g e of others' minds is by inference and not by causal analogy, as had long been argued in philosophy. When we say that we k n o w someone else's mental state, an assertion with causal premises is not being made. Ryle examines the sentence, " H e boasted f r o m v a n i t y " and inveighs against assuming that " f r o m " is used in this instance in a causal manner. Rather, the sentence is an inference f r o m and a prediction of a tendency for the occurrence of certain types of behavior (see 1949:85ff.). M o r e generally, to say of someone, " H e is conscious," is categorically akin to the statement about vanity. Consciousness is not an occult cause of observed behavior but is a characteristic of those behaviors to which we apply such concepts as concentration, attention, heeding, etc. And these concepts can in turn be defined according to behavioral criteria. For example, we would say that s o m e o n e was concentrating or paying attention to what he was reading if he could respond appropriately to later questioning. Thus, to say that someone is concentrating and reading is not to say that he doing something in addition to or which is causing his reading but to say something about h o w he is reading (see 1949:138). Pointing out that mental concepts do not refer to causes of someone's behavior but instead to characteristics of the behavior reveals once again the danger of the physical-mental analogy.

C. Daniel Batson

36

W h e n w e characterize people by mental predicates, w e are not making (intestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams o f consciousness w h i c h w e are debarred f r o m visiting; w e are describing the w a y s in w h i c h those people conduct parts o f their predominantly public behavior. True, w e g o bey o n d what w e see them do and hear them say, but this g o i n g beyond is not a g o i n g behind, in the sense o f making inferences to occult causes; it is going bey o n d in the sense o f considering, in the first instance, the powers and propensities o f w h i c h their actions are exercises. (1949:51)

Wittgenstein deals with the problem of our awareness of the psychological states of others in a similar manner. He argues that when someone speaks of his pain he is not referring to a psychological state. T h e statement is itself part of a learned, " n e w pain-behavior." Wittgenstein is not suggesting that the word pain refers to crying and other unlearned pain-behavior; " o n the contrary," he says, "the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it" (1953:89e). N o r m a n Malcolm explains the significance of Wittgenstein's position: It has at least t w o important merits: first, it breaks the hold on us o f the question " H o w does one know when to say ' M y leg hurts'?," for in the light o f the analogy this will be as nonsensical as the question " H o w does one k n o w w h e n to cry, limp, or hold one's leg?"; second, it explains h o w the utterance o f a first-person psychological sentence by another person can have importance for us, although not as identification—for in the light o f the analogy it will have the same importance as the natural behavior w h i c h serves as our preverbal criterion o f the psychological states o f others. (1958:978)

The behavioral criteria become the base of our awareness of another's psychological state, but they do not exhaust the meaning of psychological state language. Recall our earlier discussion of Wittgenstein's distinction between ostensive and criterion operationalization. 2

Can We Trust Our Subjective Experience or Only Objective Data? T o document objectively what we k n o w subjectively that another person means by some utterance is fraught with difficulty. And yet science is said to rest upon dispassionate objectivity, not subjective experience. This conflict raises another Cartesian dilemma that has plagued Western philosophy over the past several centuries, the subject-object dichotomy.

Language o f Psychology

37

In The Blue Book Wittgenstein points to the linguistic c o n f u sion that lies at the base of the subject-object dichotomy. W h e n w e look at e v e r y t h i n g that w e k n o w and can say about the w o r l d as resting u p o n personal experience, then what w e k n o w seems t o lose a g o o d deal o f its value, reliability, a n d solidity. W e are then inclined t o say that it is all " s u b j e c t i v e " ; and " s u b j e c t i v e " is used derogatorily, as w h e n w e say that an opinion is merely subjective, a matter o f taste. N o w , that this aspect should seem to shake t h e authority o f experience and k n o w l e d g e points t o the fact that here o u r lang u a g e is t e m p t i n g us t o d r a w s o m e misleading analogy. T h i s should r e m i n d us o f the case w h e n the popular scientist appeared to have s h o w n us that the floor w h i c h w e stand o n is not really solid because it is m a d e u p o f electrons. W c arc u p against t r o u b l e caused by o u r way of expression. (1958:48)

At issue again is a confusion between t w o different language games— in this case a game of possession and a game of control. What one subjectively perceives or experiences is decidedly his (an ownership or possession game), but not in the sense that he can make of it what he will (a p o w e r or control game). But even though this logical distinction seems valid, it is not likely to settle the issue for the psychologist. Haunted by the ghost of introspection, the psychologist must inquire whether it is possible to reliably k n o w what our subjective experience is.

Does Language Give Us Knowledge of Our Subjective Experience? The linguistic philosopher would object to this question, contending that it, too, involves a mixture of language games. T h e concept " k n o w l e d g e " is most frequently used in a fact-oriented, ostensive game, the rules of which do not apply to the language of subjective experience. T h e r e f o r e , to ask about knowledge of subjective experience invites confusion. Recall Wittgenstein's analysis of expressions of pain presented earlier. H e suggested that much of our language about this subjective experience was not used as assertive propositions but as a learned part of pain-behavior. This example helps in a more general analysis of the way our language functions in relation to our subjective experience. Since truth and falsity are characteristics of assertions, to say that I " k n o w " I am in pain is decidedly odd. In Wittgenstein's words, In w h a t sense arc m y sensations private?—Well, only I can k n o w w h e t h e r I a m really in pain; a n o t h e r person can only surmise it.—In o n e w a y this is false, and

38

C. Daniel Batson

in a n o t h e r n o n s e n s e . If w e are u s i n g t h e w o r d " t o k n o w " as it is n o r m a l l y u s e d (and h o w else are w e to use it?), t h e n o t h e r p e o p l e very o f t e n k n o w w h e n I a m in p a i n . — Y e s , b u t all the s a m e n o t w i t h t h e certainty w i t h w h i c h I k n o w it m y s e l f ! — I t can't be said o f m e at all (except p e r h a p s as a j o k e ) that I know I a m in pain. W h a t is it s u p p o s e d t o m e a n — e x c e p t p e r h a p s that I am in pain? O t h e r p e o p l e c a n n o t b e said t o learn o f m y sensations only f r o m m y b e h a v i o r , — f o r I c a n n o t b e said t o learn o f t h e m . I have t h e m . T h e t r u t h is: it m a k e s sense t o say a b o u t o t h e r p e o p l e that they d o u b t w h e t h e r I a m in pain; but n o t t o say it a b o u t m y s e l f . (1953:89c)

T o paraphrase, it m a k e s n o sense f o r m e t o believe that I have o n e s e n sation while I actually h a v e a n o t h e r , f o r n o validity reflection is involved in o u r talk a b o u t o u r o w n subjective experiences. Such talk is expressive not inferential. As J o h n W . C o o k (1965) p o i n t s o u t , " I n o r der t o be in a position to use correctly the expression 'his pain' (as in ' H i s pain is w o r s e , so y o u h a d b e t t e r give h i m a h y p o ' ) , it is sufficient to k n o w who is in p a i n . " C o o k also suggests the significance o f W i t t genstein's reply to " A n o t h e r p e r s o n can't have m y p a i n s " — " W h i c h are my pains?" (1953:91e): A t issue is n o t w h a t is the right a n s w e r t o this question but that any a n s w e r a n d the question itself be recognized as spurious, the result of a c o n f u s i o n o f l a n g u a g e games. Wittgenstein s e e m s t o b e m a k i n g a similar point in his c o n t r o versial "beetle in the b o x " passage: N o w s o m e o n e tells m e that he k n o w s w h a t pain is o n l y f r o m his o w n case!— S u p p o s e e v e r y o n e had a b o x w i t h s o m e t h i n g in it: w e call it a " b e e t l e . " N o o n e can look into a n y o n e else's b o x , a n d e v e r y o n e says he k n o w s w h a t a beetle is o n l y by l o o k i n g at his b e e t l e . — H e r e it w o u l d b e quite possible for e v e r y o n e t o h a v e s o m e t h i n g different in his b o x . O n e m i g h t even i m a g i n e such a t h i n g c o n stantly c h a n g i n g . — B u t s u p p o s e t h e w o r d " b e e t l e " had a use in these p e o p l e ' s l a n g u a g e ? — I f so it w o u l d n o t b e u s e d as t h e n a m e of a t h i n g . T h e t h i n g in t h e b o x has n o place in the l a n g u a g e g a m e at all; n o t even as a something: f o r t h e b o x m i g h t even be e m p t y . — N o , o n e can " d i v i d e t h r o u g h " b y the t h i n g in t h e b o x : it cancels o u t , w h a t e v e r it is. T h a t is to say: if w e c o n s t r u e the g r a m m a r o f the e x p r e s s i o n o f s e n sation o n the m o d e l o f " o b j e c t a n d n a m e " t h e object d r o p s o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n as irrelevant. (1953:KK)c)

Wittgenstein's point is n o t that subjective experiences arc like t h e b e e tles and therefore their n a t u r e is irrelevant, but that to think of t h e m in this w a y leads to the a b s u r d i t y that they w o u l d have " n o place in the language g a m e at all." T h e p o i n t is that w e m u s t reject " t h e g r a m m a r w h i c h tries to force itself on us h e r e " (!953:102e) and not a t t e m p t t o

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39

deal w i t h sensations o n an object a n d n a m e basis. O u r a s s u m p t i o n that sensations m u s t be private c o m e s f r o m placing t h e m in a g r a m m a t i c a l a n a l o g y to physical objects, leading us to seek their m e a n i n g s in private o s t e n s i v e definitions. O n c e again, the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s p o i n t seems helpful: Linguistic expression can be part o f subjective e x p e r i e n c e a n d not s i m p l y used to describe it. B u t once again, this p o i n t b y n o m e a n s eliminates the p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s difficulties. A p e r s o n m a y speak a b o u t his o r her subjective experience w i t h the intent o f deceiving a listener. C o r r e c t l y interpreted, this p e r s o n ' s l a n g u a g e is a reliable vehicle f o r r e c o g n i z i n g this intention; the mask itself reveals the disguise. B u t misinterpreted, the language m a y systematically lead the listener astray. In an a t t e m p t t o ferret out h o w s o m e p e r s o n ' s linguistic expression s h o u l d be interpreted, the p s y c h o l ogist o f t e n seeks a b r o a d e r picture. W h a t sort o f person is this? W h a t are t h e p e r s o n ' s intentions o r m o t i v e s in this situation? Linguistically, such q u e s t i o n s lead to n e w possibilities f o r c o n f u s i o n .

How D o We Know a Person's Dispositions? A l t h o u g h f r e q u e n t l y a s s u m e d to refer t o occult, hidden causes of b e havior, dispositional (personality, trait) c o n c e p t s seem to b e l o n g to an inferential l a n g u a g e g a m e , describing how n o t why s o m e o n e b e h a v e d . Dispositional concepts differ f r o m other inferential mental concepts (e.g., consciousness,

awareness,

heeding),

however,

because

dispositional

concepts i n v o l v e inferences that are e x p e c t e d t o generalize across a w i d e range o f behavioral settings. T h i s generality is b o t h a m a j o r s t r e n g t h and a w e a k n e s s . It is a s t r e n g t h because it m a y help o n e predict h o w a given i n d i v i d u a l will b e h a v e in the f u t u r e . It is a weakness w h e n o n e overgeneralizes, placing stereotypic e x p e c t a t i o n s on an i n d i v i d u a l — e x pectations that m a y even b e c o m e self-fulfilling prophecies. Ryle, in chapter 5 o f The Concept of Mind,

suggests that dis-

positional concepts belong to a quite d i f f e r e n t class of mental concepts f r o m t h e episodic consciousness or a w a r e n e s s concepts discussed above. He c o n s i d e r s each o f these classes t o h a v e valid f u n c t i o n s , but cautions against c o n f u s i n g the t w o . The verbs " k n o w , " "possess." and "aspire" d o not behave like the verbs "run," "wake u p , " or "tingle"; w e cannot say "he k n e w s o and so for t w o minutes, then s t o p p e d and started again after a breather," "he gradually aspired to be a bishop," or "he is n o w engaged in possessing a b i c y c l e . " . . .

40

C. Daniel Batson

There is, however, a special point in drawing attention to the fact that many of the cardinal concepts in terms of which we describe specifically human behavior are dispositional concepts, since the vogue of the paramechanical legend had led many people to ignore the ways in which these concepts actually behave and construe them instead as items in the descriptions of occult causes and effects. Sentences embodying these dispositional words have been interpreted as being categorical reports of particular but unwitnessable matters of fact instead of being testable, open hypothetical and what I shall call "semi-hypothetical" statements. (1949:116-117)

By a "hypothetical s t a t e m e n t " Ryle means one that does not describe any particular occurrence, but is instead a statement of or an inference f r o m a law. (For example, "If a b o d y is left unsupported, it falls at such and such a rate of acceleration.") Ryle notes that such statements are true or false, but not in the same sense as statements of fact. H y p o t h e t ical statements are not concerned with the truth of an individual matter of fact but w i t h h o w one m a y m o v e f r o m one particular matter of fact to explain another (1949:121). A statement that describes an occurrence is "categorical"; for example, " H e hit the ball." A "semihypothetical" (or " m o n g r e l categorical") statement is categorical in that it reports a particular occurrence, and it is hypothetical in that it explains the event by a rule of inference. Ryle's example is " Y o u would miss the last train" (1949:141). N o t only is the culprit reproached for having missed the train, but it is implied that he could have been expected to do so. As is well k n o w n a m o n g psychologists, " t r a i t " is a troubles o m e concept (see Mischel, 1973). Ryle's suggestion that dispositional language is hypothetical and not categorical w o u l d seem to have i m portant implications for understanding trait language. Traits are frequently used in personality theories and clinical diagnosis as if they explained w h y a given individual behaves as he does. Treated as causes of behavior, traits are assumed to refer to characteristics existing within the individual (aggressiveness, intelligence, honesty, etc.) that produce behaviors of a particular sort (for example, see Jones 1979 and Jones and Davis 1965). But to recognize the hypothetical nature of trait language reveals a linguistic confusion in such usage. As hypothetical language, traits are descriptions of how one behaves, not causal explanations of why one behaves. T h e same m a y be said for the social psychologist's beloved target-specific dispositional concept, "attitude"; attitudes are also h y pothetical terms, describing hou> not why one behaves.

Language of Psychology

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U n r a v e l i n g this linguistic tangle points u p a c o n f u s i o n in t h e c o m m o n a r g u m e n t that if traits o r attitudes exist, t h e n w e s h o u l d o b serve consistency in trait-relevant o r a t t i t u d e - r e l e v a n t b e h a v i o r across s i t u a t i o n s (see W i c k e r 1969). T o a d v o c a t e either a p r o o r c o n p o s i t i o n in this a r g u m e n t , o n e m u s t a s s u m e traits o r a t t i t u d e s a r e e n d u r i n g p e r sonal characteristics that cause b e h a v i o r . As t h e effect o f t h e s u n o n t h e e a r t h ' s path t h r o u g h space is c o n s t a n t , so should t h e effect o f traits a n d a t t i t u d e s o n b e h a v i o r b e c o n s t a n t . B u t to recognize that traits a n d attit u d e s are n o t causes b u t h y p o t h e t i c a l inferences a b o u t t h e character o f b e h a v i o r e m p h a s i z e s their predictive limitations. A t best, o n e s h o u l d e x p e c t trait o r a t t i t u d e i n f e r e n c e s t o p r o v i d e a likelihood e s t i m a t e o f the ability t o generalize f r o m a g i v e n individual's b e h a v i o r in o n e set o f situ a t i o n s t o a n e w situation. T h e chance o f accurate generalization w o u l d be c o n t i n g e n t u p o n b o t h t h e m a g n i t u d e o f the likelihood e s t i m a t e f o r t h e individual to b e h a v e in t h a t m a n n e r (an inferential statistic based o n t h e f r e q u e n c y o f t h e b e h a v i o r in t h e past) and t h e similarity o f the n e w situation to the situation o r situations f r o m which the inference was made.

Intentions, Motives, Reasons, and Causes: Why Did He or She D o It? T o ask why s o m e o n e acted in a particular m a n n e r m a y require o n e o f several types o f e x p l a n a t i o n in response. In general, b e h a v i o r can be e x plained in t e r m s o f its f u t u r e o u t c o m e s or its p r i o r a n t e c e d e n t s . F u t u r e o u t c o m e e x p l a n a t i o n s i n v o l v e intentions, reasons, o r m o t i v e s . P r i o r a n t e c e d e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s i n v o l v e causes. C o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n these general t y p e s o f e x p l a n a t i o n s has led t o s o m e of the bitterest c o n t r o v e r s i e s in p s y c h o l o g y (e.g., T o l m a n vs. Hull). Let us briefly c o n s i d e r e x p l a n a tions o f each type. Intentions, it is generally agreed, involve s o m e notion of an e n d state. A n s c o m b c f o r m s t h e logical s t r u c t u r e o f an i n t e n t i o n as "I d o Ρ w i t h a v i e w to Q . " She elaborates by n o t i n g that this i n t e n t i o n w o u l d be c o n t r a d i c t e d b y saying, " ' B u t Q w o n ' t h a p p e n , e v e n if y o u d o P , ' or ' b u t it will h a p p e n w h e t h e r y o u d o Ρ o r n o t ' " (1963:36). Reasons are a s e c o n d t y p e of explanation o f w h y a b e h a v i o r o c c u r r e d . A c c o r d i n g to Peters (1958), reasons arc based o n a " p u r p o s i v e r u l e - f o l l o w i n g m o d e l . " T h a t is, to ask s o m e o n e ' s reason f o r d o i n g this o r that is to ask " w h a t w a s t h e p o i n t of it, w h a t e n d h e had in m i n d " (1958:4). C l e a r l y ,

this c o n c e p t i o n o f reasons is q u i t e close t o

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s c o m b e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n s , a l t h o u g h r e a s o n s as d e f i n e d b y P e ters g o b e y o n d i n t e n t i o n s in p r e s u p p o s i n g that o n e has f o l l o w e d t h e s o cially p r e s c r i b e d rules f o r a t t a i n i n g s o m e goal. A t h i r d t y p e o f a n s w e r t o t h e w h y q u e s t i o n is an e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s o f motives.

Peters outlines three main requirements for the use

of a motive explanation: 1. It is used in c o n t e x t s w h e r e c o n d u c t is being assessed and n o t s i m ply explained, w h e r e there is a b r e a k d o w n in conventional e x p e c tations. 2. It is used t o refer to a reason o f a directed sort and implies a directed disposition in the individual w h o s e conduct is b e i n g assessed. 3. It m u s t state the reason w h y a person acts, a reason that is operative in the situation to be explained. T h e m o t i v e may coincide w i t h Iiis reason but it must be the reason w h y he acts. (1958:35-36)

P e t e r s ' s u g g e s t i o n that m o t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s arise o n l y " w h e r e t h e r e is a b r e a k d o w n in c o n v e n t i o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s " a n d i n v o l v e s the r e a s o n r a t h e r t h a n w h a t t h e a c t o r believes t o b e his r e a s o n s e e m s h e l p f u l . It i m p l i e s t h a t , at least in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , t o seek a m o t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r all b e h a v i o r w o u l d be b o t h u n n e c e s s a r y a n d m i s l e a d i n g . It w o u l d b e u n n e c e s s a r y w h e n a s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n c o u l d be p r o v i d e d b y c o n v e n tional r e a s o n s ; it w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g w h e n it i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y cast t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l r e a s o n s in d o u b t , s u g g e s t i n g that t h e y w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o explain the behavior. T o a n s w e r the w h y q u e s t i o n in t e r m s o f causes—a f o u r t h t y p e of response—is to focus on prior antecedents rather than on anticipated f u t u r e o u t c o m e s . T o speak o f causes o f b e h a v i o r implies, says P e t e r s (1958), t h a t s o m e o u t s i d e f o r c e is o p e r a t i v e , a n d , as w i t h m o t i v e s , t h a t s o m e kind of deviation f r o m the purposive rule-following m o d e l has o c c u r r e d , t h a t s o m e o n e has d o n e s o m e t h i n g that d o e s n o t m a k e s e n s e . F o r e x a m p l e , if s o m e o n e r e f u s e s t o t a k e t h e o n l y q u i c k r o u t e t o his d e s t i n a t i o n , o r if s o m e o n e c a n n o t r e m e m b e r a w e l l - k n o w n n a m e

when

p e r f o r m i n g an i n t r o d u c t i o n , o r if s o m e o n e h u r r i e s a l o n g w h e n he is n o t late, w e b e g i n to ask f o r the cause. W h i c h o f these v a r i o u s t y p e s o f r e s p o n s e is t h e r i g h t r e s p o n s e t o w h y s o m e o n e did s o m e t h i n g ? It d e p e n d s o n t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h " w h y " is a s k e d . Peters s u g g e s t s that w h e n a w h y q u e s t i o n is a s k e d in e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e , the asker is s e e k i n g a sufficient

explanation.

Thus,

f o r e x a m p l e , Peters n o t e s that a l e g i t i m a t e use o f causal e x p l a n a t i o n s e x ists b u t is q u i t e restricted.

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T o g i v e a causal explanation o f an event i n v o l v e s at least s h o w i n g that o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s b e i n g p r e s u m e d u n c h a n g e d a c h a n g e in o n e variable is a sufficient c o n d i t i o n f o r a c h a n g e in a n o t h e r . In t h e mechanical c o n c e p t i o n o f " c a u s e " it is also d e m a n d e d that t h e r e s h o u l d b e spatial a n d t e m p o r a l c o n t i g u i t y b e t w e e n t h e m o v e m e n t s involved. . . . M y case is n o t s i m p l y that causal explanations are otiose w h e n w e k n o w t h e p o i n t o f a p e r s o n ' s action in that, life b e i n g s h o r t a n d t i m e l i m i t e d , w e n o l o n g e r feel inclined t o ask " w h y " o n c e w e h a v e a c c o m m o d a t e d a piece o f b e h a v i o r w i t h i n t h e r u l e - f o l l o w i n g p u r p o s i v e m o d e l . It is also that if w e are in fact c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a case o f a g e n u i n e action (i.e., an act o f d o i n g s o m e t h i n g as o p p o s e d t o s u f f e r i n g s o m e t h i n g ) , then causal e x p l a n a t i o n s are ipso facto i n a p p r o p r i a t e as sufficient e x p l a n a t i o n s . Indeed they m a y rule o u t r u l e - f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s . T o ask w h a t m a d e J o n e s d o s o m e t h i n g is at least t o s u g g e s t that h e h a d n o g o o d reason for d o i n g it. Similarly t o ascribe a p o i n t t o his action is ipso facto t o d e n y that it can b e sufficiently explained in t e r m s o f causes, t h o u g h , o f course, there will be m a n y causes in the sense of necessary conditions. (1958:1112)

Peters suggests a similar difficulty w i t h i n v o k i n g an u n c o n scious m o t i v e as a sufficient explanation for w h a t p u r p o r t s t o be an action—an unconscious motive provides a sufficient explanation only w h e n the purposive rule-following explanation breaks d o w n ; that is, w h e n the b e h a v i o r is n o t an action as Peters uses the t e r m . T h u s , u n c o n s c i o u s m o t i v e s f u n c t i o n v e r y like causes. A c t i o n s can be w h a t Peters calls " o v e r d e t e r m i n e d , " having a plausible reason explanation, a plausible explanation in t e r m s of an u n c o n s c i o u s w i s h , and a plausible explanation in t e r m s of physical causes ( m o v e m e n t s o f the muscles, neural activity, etc.). But, says Peters, the o n l y n e e d e d explanation is the o n e that is sufficient. In the case of o v e r determined action, the context of the w h y question determines what sort o f a n s w e r w o u l d be a p p r o p r i a t e (see 1958:58-59). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , I d o not believe that the psychologist can rely u p o n Peters' criterion of sufficient explanation. T h e psychological g a m e o f asking " w h y " seems to d e m a n d o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e p s y c h o l o gist m u s t p u s h b e y o n d an initial a n s w e r to the w h y question to ask: W h y that i n t e n t i o n , reason, cause, etc.? O r h o w did that intention, reason, cause, etc., affect the behavior? In so doing, the psychologist skates o n t o v e r y thin ice, f o r t o ask these f u r t h e r questions implies that an ans w e r in t e r m s o f intentions o r reasons w a s not sufficient. A n d yet such q u e s t i o n s m u s t be asked because the a n s w e r s p r o v i d e a necessary part o f a psychological explanation of the b e h a v i o r in question. In the scientific l a n g u a g e g a m e , a sufficient a n s w e r to the w h y question m u s t include all necessary conditions for the behavior. B u t if c o n f u s i o n is to be

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avoided, it seems essential for the psychologist to recognize the linguistically odd rules for asking " w h y " that apply in this extra-ordinary scientific game. Recognition of the multiplicity of questions implicit in a psychologist's w h y also cautions us against seeking to develop a psychological theory of motivation that attempts to explain behavior on a single level. O n e of Peters' concerns in The Concept of Motivation (1958) was to argue that motivational theories are misguided when they try to answer all types of why questions concerning some behavior in the same way (e.g., in terms of homeostatic drive-reduction, reinforcement, or Freud's pleasure principle). Peters' point seems well taken. N o t only do such theories suffer f r o m a continual barrage of contrary data, because to be comprehensive they have to be stretched beyond their range of applicability, but they also gloss over important motivational distinctions that are already present in our ordinary language.

Implications of Psychological Language for Psychological Research Having gained some philosophical perspective on the conceptual confusion to which psychological language is heir, can we n o w begin to construct a proper language for psychology? If any lesson is to be learned f r o m even this brief excursion into linguistic philosophy, it is that the answer to this question is no. T o seek unitary neatness in psychological language seems not only impossible but inappropriate. Keying on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances, language about thought, feeling, and behavior simply does not display a unitary functional nature. But to accept a multiplicity of linguistic systems for psychology means that psychologists will continually risk confusion. Unless we wish to abandon the goal of scientific understanding altogether, we seem bound either to face squarely the conceptual implications of this multiplicity or to succumb to the confusion. As a first step toward facing the implications, it may help if we relate our philosophical analysis to the general characteristics of psychological language outlined previously.

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Using Ordinary Language in an Extra-ordinary Way First, the psychologist needs to recognize both the assets and the liabilities of w o r k i n g with a vocabulary b o r r o w e d f r o m everyday language. In discussing perception, C h i s h o l m outlines t w o options that seem to apply to the language of psychology in general: We might examine in detail the w a y s in which people talk a b o u t perceiving and then try t o s h o w that o u r philosophical questions arise because o f o u r failure to use our o w n language consistently or u n a m b i g u o u s l y . O r w e m i g h t propose new ways of talking about perceiving, ways of talking that are adequate to what w e k n o w or w a n t to be able to say about pcrcciving, and then try to s h o w that, b y restricting ourselves to these ways of talking, w e avoid the philosophical questions to which the use of ordinary locutions seem to give rise. (1957:v-vi)

Either approach has its problems. T h e first m a y mire one in category mistakes resulting f r o m mixing concepts f r o m different language games (e.g., Cartesian dualism). T h e second, however, runs the danger of being a giant step backward due to the loss of the subtle and valuable nuances of everyday language. As Peters has so ably s h o w n with regard to theories of motivation: T h e point of looking closely at ordinary usage, if one is a psychologist, is that it often provides a clue to distinctions which it is theoretically i m p o r t a n t to take account of. We k n o w so m u c h about h u m a n beings, and o u r k n o w l e d g e is incorporated implicitly in o u r language. (1958:50)

J. J. C. Smart (1953) goes a step further. H e argues that not only is it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to construct an "artificial language for scientific p u r p o s e s " (he was specifically attacking J. H. Woodger's attempt in The Technique of Theory Construction, 1939), but Smart also contends that the loss f r o m doing so affects the explanatory potential of one's language, as well as its conceptual sharpness. Assuming that psychologists arc not willing to pay the price of developing a n e w language, they would seem to have n o choice but to use old w o r d s in new ways in the quest for exhaustive, scientific explanations of behavior. Psychologists are caught recognizing, on the one hand, that the conceptual demands of this new " w a y of life" (Wittgenstein) defined by their discipline require conjoining concepts f r o m different language games and so invite linguistic holidays, and recognizing, on the other hand, that as scientists their goal must be exhaustive explanation. A partial solution to this dilemma may lie in an examination

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of what o n e means by exhaustive explanation. O n e should not lose sight o f Peters' o b s e r v a t i o n that e x p l a n a t i o n s are question-specific. A l t h o u g h e x h a u s t i v e m e a n s c o m p r e h e n s i v e , it need not m e a n final a n d / o r u n i tary. In t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e analytic p h i l o s o p h e r ' s e m p h a s i s on the m u l tiplicity o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s , e x h a u s t i v e m a y be m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y c o n ceived as m e a n i n g that o n e can and should ask questions a b o u t psychological p h e n o m e n a in a n u m b e r o f conceptual c o n t e x t s a n d that, ultimately, it is t h e h o p e o f t h e psychologist to p r o v i d e an a n s w e r in each. A l t h o u g h Peters can speak o f an e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e e x p l a n a t i o n of s o m e e v e n t in t e r m s o f reasons, m o t i v e s , or causes, the p s y c h o l o gist's task m a y be m o r e aptly characterized as d e v e l o p i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s in t e r m s o f reasons, m o t i v e s , and causes. Each d i m e n s i o n is necessary for a sufficient p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . 1

Resisting a Physical Reduction of Psychological Concepts T u r n i n g t o t h e s e c o n d s u g g e s t e d characteristic o f psychological language, t h e desire t o m o d e l t h e l a n g u a g e of behavioral science after t h e language o f physical science, o u r analysis counsels caution. T h e b e h a v ioral scientist m u s t deal with a m u c h w i d e r range of linguistic and c o n ceptual s y s t e m s than d o e s t h e physical scientist. Physical processes are a p p r o p r i a t e a n d necessary t o explain h u m a n b e h a v i o r on the p h y s i o l o g ical level, b u t e x p l a n a t o r y q u e s t i o n s raised at the behavioral-situational o r actional-dispositional levels require a n s w e r s in t e r m s of w h a t has traditionally been called m e n t a l processes. At these levels, any a t t e m p t to m o d e l o n e ' s i n q u i r y a f t e r t h e physical sciences is likely to be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . A l t h o u g h the goal of the sciences—explanation w i t h p r e dictive p o t e n t i a l — s e e m s t o r e q u i r e that psychological l a n g u a g e have a base in o b s e r v a b l e events, this r e q u i r e m e n t need n o t and s h o u l d not be c o n s t r u e d as r e q u i r i n g translation of psychological concepts into " p h y s ical t h i n g l a n g u a g e " ( C a r n a p 1938). Wittgenstein, with his distinction b e t w e e n criterion a n d o s t e n s i v e definitions, argues that a l t h o u g h lang u a g e based o n criterion definitions does have a relation to o b s e r v a b l e events, t h e m e a n i n g o f such l a n g u a g e is not exhausted by its empirical base. W o r k i n g w i t h i n a similar f r a m e w o r k , Ryle e m p h a s i z e s t h e d i f f e r ence b e t w e e n categorical o r o c c u r r e n c e s t a t e m e n t s — w h i c h allow for the direct asking o f w h e r e , w h e n , h o w long, and w h y q u e s t i o n s — a n d h y pothetical o r s e m i h y p o t h c t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . T h e latter i n v o l v e dispositional c o n c e p t s based on rules o f inference, and a l t h o u g h g r o u n d e d in

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behavior both in origin and in future validation of applicability, they have meaning that transcends a description of the physical events of o b servable behavior. T o be m o r e explicit about the implications of using criterion definitions for psychological concepts, let us consider s o m e specific examples. Cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) is not something to which one can point. Rather, it is inferred f r o m both the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the individual presumed to be experiencing it. But these behaviors by no means exhaust what is meant by cognitive dissonance and cannot be substituted for it. T h e same is true for our notions of a hierarchically ordered semantic memory (Bower 1970), and for a wide range of dispositional concepts, including traits and attitudes (Mischel 1973). From these examples it quickly becomes apparent that the criterion vs. ostensive definition distinction addresses the same problem that has traditionally been addressed in discussions of "intervening variables" or "inferred constructs" (Hull 1943). These traditional discussions, however, tend to be based on positivist assumptions and generally lead to the conclusion that because such constructs are not ostensively operationalized, they lack any empirical base. Accordingly, to call a concept an intervening variable has c o m e to carry a pejorative connotation. Such labeling might be considered the first blade of O c c a m ' s updated twin-blade razor; it sets up the concept to be shaved away by the second blade, parsimony. When we treat concepts like cognitive dissonance as having criteria rather than ostensive definitions, we point to their different as opposed to deficient status. But even this does not eliminate all p r o b lems. Indeed, it makes explicit a key difficulty in using criterionally defined concepts in a scientific game: T o use t h e m meaningfully in research the criterion must not be the dependent variable. T o o often in cognitive dissonance experiments, for example, the basic criterion for determining whether participants have experienced a state of dissonance is whether they behave in the predicted fashion. If they do, then this is taken as support for the theory; if they d o not, then it is assumed that dissonance must not have been aroused. Used in this way, a criterionbased theory has no chance to prove itself w r o n g . Said another way, theoretical propositions tend to be " i f . . . , then . . . " statements, and to test such a proposition, the " i f " must not be defined in terms of the "then."

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Recognizing T w o Very Different Language Games Within Psychology: Intervention and Understanding The third characteristic of psychological language is that it includes both intervention and understanding games, and these games have very different concerns and criteria for appropriate functioning. A clear illustration of the difference between these two language games is implicit in Wittgenstein's analysis of learned pain behavior. Building upon Wittgenstein's discussion, Cook (1965) suggests that all one need know in order to use the expression "his pain" correctly is to know who is in pain. In an intervention language game this may well be true, but it seems far less true in the understanding game of the research psychologist. The intervention game is built around finding needs and attempting to eliminate them, but the understanding game is not. The researcher is likely to be more interested in learning why the speaker thought this person was in pain, whether the person himself perceived the pain, whether physiological instruments would corroborate these perceptions, what caused the pain, whether the pain was more likely to be reduced by a local or general anesthetic, and so 011. Given these differences, it is not surprising that the research psychologist often looks askance at the clinician and wonders how the latter could have the nerve to feign the role of scientist while having little apparent concern for really understanding behavior. Conversely, the clinician may marvel at the apparent impotence of the researcher, at his or her inability to get anything real done. Of course, both enterprises are legitimate; these accusations result when the criteria of one game are inappropriately applied to the other. Such confusion is inadvertently encouraged by both enterprises being called psychology and by both having many key concepts in common. To relieve some of the tension, the differences between the intervention and the understanding games need to be recognized, not minimized. If the two enterprises reflect distinct language games, and so distinct ways of life, then an attempt to meld them into, for example, "action-research" may court danger. Certainly, one person can operate in the role of clinician and of researcher at different times, but to attempt research answers to action questions or vice versa seems doomed to failure.

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Recognizing the Different Language Games Within Research Psychology The final characteristic of psychological language suggested earlier is the existence within the language of research psychology of a number of different language games. This diversity includes both different conceptual structures and different levels of analysis. Some of the different conccptual structures can be seen clearly in Ryle's distinctions between hypothetical, semihypothetical, and episodic concepts and in the distinction Peters and others make between intentions, motives, reasons, and causes. It seems essential for the psychological researcher to be aware of these different types of concepts and the different games they imply, if he or she is to avoid the conceptual tangles that can result from working across languages. Concerning levels of analysis, it was suggested earlier that there are at least three major levels on which explanatory questions can be asked in psychology—the physiological, the behavioral-situational, and the actional-dispositional. We are now in a position to outline some explanatory questions asked at each level, the phenomena in the psychological study of language to which each seems particularly applicable, and the research methods most appropriate in generating responses at each level. Analysis of behavior on the first level, the physiological, seems most appropriate in response to questions concerning how a given psychological process is possible or how it operates physically. Applied to language, one may ask how it is possible for one to speak, or what parts of the brain are involved in various aspects of verbal and nonverbal communication. Such questions ask for a causal explanation based on a description of the underlying physiological process. This is the type of explanation, although not in these terms, on which Fodor focuses in Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology (1968). In general, the research procedure most appropriate in responding to questions at this level appears to be direct intervention in the physical processes—changing the physical structures and then examining the effect of such intervention on behavior. Intervention may involve either destruction of or addition to the physical structures. For example, one may study accident victims and the effects of various accidents on speech patterns or on linguistric behavior more generally. Sperry's (1969) split-brain studies provide a dramatic demonstration of

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the value o f this t y p e o f research. C o n v e r s e l y , o n e m a y s t u d y the effects o f electrical o r c h e m i c a l s t i m u l a t i o n o f t h e brain, as has been d o n e b y Penficld (Penfield a n d R o b e r t s 1959) a n d o t h e r s . T h e behavioral-situational

level o f analysis focuses u p o n t h e h a -

bitual activity of an organism. Explanations of linguistic behavior at this level are directed t o q u e s t i o n s like: W h y d o p e o p l e say this u n d e r these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? S u c h q u e s t i o n s ask w h y a given e n v i r o n m e n t elicits b e h a v i o r o f a particular k i n d . In so d o i n g , a t t e n t i o n is directed t o t h e b e h a v i o r a l h i s t o r y o f t h e o r g a n i s m in t h a t o r similar e n v i r o n m e n t s . M o tives and p s y c h o l o g i c a l causes discussed b y Peters and Beck

seem

particularly appropriate in p r o v i d i n g explanations of this type, as d o either classical o r o p e r a n t c o n d i t i o n i n g . T h e p r o s and c o n s of e x p l a n a t i o n at this level h a v e been discussed in detail b y C h a r l e s T a y l o r in The nation of Behavior

Expla-

(1964).

T w o research p r o c e d u r e s a p p e a r t o be m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e at this level. First, o n e m a y repeatedly e x p o s e t h e s a m e individual t o a given e n v i r o n m e n t and record the effects of that exposure on p e r f o r m a n c e over t i m e . T h i s is t h e classic learning p a r a d i g m . O n e of t h e clearest e x a m p l e s o f its application t o linguistic b e h a v i o r is G r c e n s p o o n ' s (1955) s t u d y o f t h e effects o f differential r e i n f o r c e m e n t o n the use o f plural n o u n s . A s e c o n d research s t r a t e g y used at this level is the b c t w e e n - g r o u p s e x p e r i m e n t a l design. D i f f e r e n t individuals are r a n d o m l y assigned to d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i m e n t a l t r e a t m e n t s o r c o n d i t i o n s , a n d the effects of the t r e a t m e n t s o n b e h a v i o r are r e c o r d e d . Each i n d i v i d u a l is e x p o s e d to only o n e situation, b u t because o f r a n d o m a s s i g n m e n t the e x p e r i m e n t e r can g e n e r alize results t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n f r o m w h i c h the s a m p l e is d r a w n . U s e o f this s t r a t e g y in l a n g u a g e research is characteristic o f studies e x a m i n i n g t h e effect of social c o n t e x t o n linguistic b e h a v i o r (see C a z d e n

1966;

C o w a n . W e b e r , H o d d i n o t t , and Klein 1967). T h e t h i r d level, actional-dispositional,

tends t o focus o n q u e s -

tions o f i n t e n t i o n . At this level, o n e asks to w h a t e n d does t h e person speak? W h a t is h e o r she t r y i n g t o gain? A sufficient a n s w e r m u s t take a c c o u n t o f the individual s p e a k e r ' s p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e situation and t h e s p e a k e r ' s strategies. A t this level, psychological t h e o r y b e c o m e s a t h e o r y o f theories (Epstein 1973); t h e theorist is c o n c e r n e d to u n d e r s t a n d t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f h o w p e o p l e u n d e r s t a n d as well as respond to their experience. T h e p s y c h o l o g i s t g o e s b e y o n d t h e s e m a n t i c s t r u c t u r e o f speech and asks not simply what the speaker means but what this meaning m e a n s in the larger c o n t e x t of t h e speaker's intentions and goals. E x -

Language of Psychology

51

planations o f this t y p e h a v e been discussed b y H a r r e a n d Secord in The Explanation

of Social Behavior

(1973), by Miller, Galanter, a n d P r i b r a m

in Plans and the Structure of Behavior chology of Interpersonal

Relations

(1960) a n d b y H e i d e r in The

Psy-

(1958). T h e essays collected b y O r t o n y

(1979) a n d the w o r k o f Pollio et al. (1977) e x a m i n e linguistic b e h a v i o r at this level. Little explicit a t t e n t i o n has been g i v e n t o research p a r a d i g m s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r g e n e r a t i n g data relevant t o w h y a n d h o w q u e s t i o n s at t h e actional-dispositional level. Indeed, this is p r o b a b l y t h e m a j o r r e a son that d a t a - b a s e d e x p l a n a t i o n s at this level r e m a i n rare, in spite o f t h e increasing p o p u l a r i t y o f such e x p l a n a t i o n s in theoretical w r i t i n g s . O n e p a r a d i g m that seems t o hold p r o m i s e f o r a n s w e r i n g q u e s tions at this level has e m e r g e d in recent research b y c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l ogists o n i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g a n d retrieval. T h e researcher p r o v i d e s an individual w i t h a l o n g series o f p r o b l e m s in w h i c h t h e r e is s y s t e m a t i c variation. Analysis o f t h e pattern o f responses b y d i f f e r e n t individuals across the r a n g e o f p r o b l e m s a l l o w s o n e t o infer the c o g n i t i v e strategies b e i n g used. T h i s p a r a d i g m s u g g e s t s a general p r o c e d u r e f o r g e n e r a t i n g data relevant t o actional-dispositional e x p l a n a t o r y q u e s t i o n s : R e p e a t e d l y e x p o s e individuals to a systematically v a r y i n g e n v i r o n m e n t , w i t h the variations selected so as t o p e r m i t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n possible r e s p o n s e strategies. T h i s a p p r o a c h m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d a synthesis o f t h e m o r e c o m m o n p a r a d i g m s used at t h e b e h a v i o r a l - s i t u a t i o n a l level, in w h i c h a single i n d i v i d u a l is repeatedly e x p o s e d t o t h e s a m e e n v i r o n m e n t or different individuals are exposed to different environments. Either a p p r o a c h can p r o v i d e data relevant t o the e x a m i n a t i o n o f episodic (perf o r m a n c e ) c o n c e p t s , b u t d o e s n o t allow o n e to p r o b e t h e c o g n i t i v e strategies o r d i s p o s i t i o n s that u n d e r g i r d the p e r f o r m a n c e . In c o m b i n a tion, h o w e v e r , t h e y m a y a l l o w f o r e x p l o r a t i o n o f c o g n i t i v e strategies. A n o t h e r research p r o c e d u r e that addresses q u e s t i o n s at the actional-dispositional level that also f o l l o w s t h e general pattern o f repeated e x p o s u r e t o systematically varied i n p u t s is c o m p u t e r s i m u l a t i o n . In a c o m p u t e r s i m u l a t i o n , o n e a t t e m p t s t o u n c o v e r t h e c o g n i t i v e s t r a t egics h u m a n s u s e b y d e v e l o p i n g c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m s based o n specified strategies a n d b y c o m p a r i n g the c o m p u t e r responses to h u m a n

re-

sponses across a r a n g e o f relevant situations (cf. A b e l s o n 1968; C o l b y and Schank 1973; N e w e l l , S h a w , and S i m o n 1958). S u g g e s t i v e w o r k for the application o f c o m p u t e r simulation to linguistic behavior has been d o n e by S c h a n k and A b e l s o n (1977).

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Although the three levels o f analysis outlined here are extremely general and are by no means exhaustive, they do suggest s o m e o f the different linguistic and conceptual levels that exist within psychology, levels for which psychological research is both appropriate and necessary. M o r e generally, the outline suggests the importance o f recognizing that the type o f data needed to respond to a given how or why question is contingent upon the linguistic context in which the question is asked. T o provide physiological data in response to an actional-dispositional question, for example, will prove insufficient. This is not because a physiological analysis is intrinsically insufficient for psychological explanations, but it is insufficient for explanations in an actionaldispositional linguistic context. T h e psychologist must, it seems, be prepared to accept not only a proliferation o f linguistic and theoretical systems, but also o f research paradigms. O n c e again, the quest for a single, right, true approach seems inappropriate.

Conclusions T h e present emphasis on multiplicity, both in theory and in research methods, presents the psychologist with extreme complexity. H e or she m a y yearn for a simpler world, one in which a single linguistic system and research paradigm reigns. But has it not been precisely this desire for a unitary, universal theory and research paradigm that has led to much o f the intramural squabbling and cliquishness within psychology? The hard-nosed behaviorist speaks o f the irrelevance o f physiological explanations and o f the " s o f t n e s s " o f cognitive and personality explanations (and, indeed, sometimes refuses to be concerned with explanations at all, limiting his or her research to successive descriptions). T h e physiological psychologist, on the other hand, cannot imagine that the ability to shape and control habit patterns explains anything. Rather, this is precisely the behavior that requires explanation in terms o f neural substrates. T h e social and personality psychologist spurns either a purely behavioral or a physiological explanation as failing to take account o f those intentions and perceptions o f the organism that must be considered if complex behavior is ever to be adequately explained. T h e arguments that I have reviewed from linguistic philoso-

Language of Psychology

53

phy suggest that each o f these different psychologists is both right and wrong. Each is right in what is affirmed—that physiological, behavioral-situational, or actional-dispositional explanations are necessary for a sufficient psychological explanation of human behavior. But each is wrong in what is denied—that explanations at the other levels are also necessary. Once the psychologist accepts the legitimately different meanings of operationalization and objectivity at each level, he or she is no longer faced with a dilemma o f choosing between levels o f analysis. He or she instead faces the even more awesome task of combining multiple explanations in order to respond to questions regarding behavior asked from various language games. At a minimum, it seems essential for the psychologist to recognize the existence of the different games, the differences between them, and the advisability o f not trying to play them all at once. More optimistically, it also suggests the positive value o f forming research teams specifically selected to involve players at each level as a means of moving toward an explanation o f human behavior that does not oversimplify its complexity.

Notes 1. T h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n is l i m i t e d to the p r e d o m i n a n t l y B r i t i s h s c h o o l o f a n alytic p h i l o s o p h y , b u t interesting parallels c o u l d be d r a w n b e t w e e n this s c h o o l ' s c o n c e r n t o d i s c o v e r and treat linguistic a i l m e n t s a n d the attention g i v e n to l a n g u a g e a n d the p r o b l e m s o f l a n g u a g e in recent continental p h i l o s o p h y , m o s t n o t a b l y existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y (sec especially, G u s d o r f 1965; M e r l e a u - P o n t y 1964; R i c o e u r 1970). 2. Parenthetically, it m i g h t be n o t e d that W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t r e a t m e n t o f o t h e r s ' s t a t e m e n t s o f pain m a k e s clear the i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f labeling h i m a " l o g i c a l b e h a v i o r i s t " or " o p e r a t i o n a l i s t , " as d o C . S. C h i h a r a a n d J . A . F o d o r (1965). C h i h a r a and F o d o r assert that for W i t t g e n s t e i n " t o e x p l a i n the criteria w e u s e is t o e x p l a i n the m e a n i n g s o f w o r d s . " B u t for Wittgenstein the relation between criteria and m e a n i n g s appers to be m o r e c o m p l e x — e x p r e s s i o n s m a y h a v e a critcrional b a s e (especially in the e m p i r i c a l e x p l a i n i n g l a n £ u a g e o f the b e h a v i o r a l sciences), but their m e a n i n g is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y this base. 3. If this line o f a r g u m e n t is correct, then the f r e q u e n t l y i n v o k e d criterion f o r g o o d scientific t h e o r y , p a r s i m o n y , is called into q u e s t i o n . T o search f o r the s i m p l e s t theoretical m o d e l w i t h w h i c h to a c c o u n t for s o m e set o f data, insisting on unity and c o h e r ence within that m o d e l , m a y be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e in p s y c h o l o g y . A l t h o u g h o n e d o e s n o t v.ant to m u l t i p l y c o n c e p t s unnecessarily, a t t e m p t s t o m i n i m i z e the c o n c e p t s u s e d to e x plain behavior m a y lead to a failure t o p u r s u e an e x p l a n a t i o n in all relevant linguistic a n d conceptual d o m a i n s . If I can a c c o u n t for s o m e o n e ' s b e h a v i o r u s i n g r e i n f o r c e m e n t p r i n c i ples, can't I i g n o r e his intentions, p e r c e p t i o n s , etc.? If a purely c o g n i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g e x p l a n a t i o n will a c c o u n t for the data, can't I i g n o r e m o t i v a t i o n ? T h e quest f o r

Daniel Batson

54

parsimony may lead to unnecessary confusion as one seeks to reduce concepts f r o m one linguistic domain to another (e.g., to translate cognitive processes into reinforcement principles). It may be m o r e appropriate for psychology to expect and even to seek a range of theories to explain a given p h e n o m e n o n , each theory responding to h o w and why questions asked within a given language game.

References A b c l s o n , R . P. 1968. S i m u l a t i o n o f social b e h a v i o r . In G . L i n d z e y a n d E . A r o n soti, e d s . The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2:274-356. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Weslcy. A n s c o m b c , G . Ε. M . 1963. Intention,

2d c d . I t h a c a , N . Y . : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y

Press. B e c k , L. W . 1966. C o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s m o t i v e s . Mind, B o w e r , G . H . 1970. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l f a c t o r s in m e m o r y . Cognitive 46.

75:155-179. Psychology 1 : 1 8 -

C a r n a p , R . 1949. L o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e u n i t y o f s c i e n c e . In H . Feigl a n d W . Scllars, e d s . , Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p p . 4 0 8 - 4 2 3 . N e w Y o r k : A p p l e t o n - C c n t u r y - C r o f t s . First p u b l i s h e d in 1938. C a z d e n , C . B . 1966. S u b c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s in child l a n g u a g e . Quarterly, 12:185-219.

Merrill-Palmer

C h i h a r a , C . S. a n d J . A . F o d o r . 1965. O p e r a t i o n a l i s m a n d o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e : A c r i t i q u e o f W i t t g e n s t e i n . American Philosophical Quarterly, 2:281-295. C h i s h o l m , M . 1957. Perceiving: University Press.

A Philosophical

Study.

Ithaca. N . Y . :

Cornell

C o l b y , K . a n d R . S c h a n k , e d s . 1973. Computer Simulation of Thought and Language. S a n F r a n c i s c o : W . H . F r e e m a n . C o o k , J . W . 1965. W i t t g e n s t e i n o n p r i v a c y . Philosophical Review, 74:281-314. C o w a n , P. Α . , J . W e b e r , B . A . H o d d i n o t t , a n d J . K l e i n 1967. M e a n l e n g t h o f s p o k e n r e s p o n s e as a f u n c t i o n o f s t i m u l u s , e x p e r i m e n t e r , a n d s u b j e c t . Child Development 38:191-203. E p s t e i n , S. 1973. T h e s e l f - c o n c e p t r e v i s i t e d o r a t h e o r y o f a t h e o r y . Psychologist,

American

28:404-416.

F e s t i n g e r , L. 1957. A Theory versity Press.

of Cognitive

Dissonance.

F o d o r , J . A . 1968. Psychological Explanation: An Psychology. N e w York: Random House.

Palo Alto: Stanford U n i -

Introduction

to the Philosophy

of

G r c e n s p o o n . J. 1955. T h e r e i n f o r c i n g e f f e c t o f t w o s p o k e n s o u n d s o n t h e f r e q u e n c y o f t w o r e s p o n s e s . American G u s d o r f , G . 1965. Speaking

(La Parole).

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of Psychology,

68:409-416.

E v a n s t o n , 111.: N o r t h w e s t e r n

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sity P r e s s . H a r r e . R. a n d P. F. S c c o r d . 1973. The Explanation N.J.: Littlefield. A d a m s .

oj Social

Hehavior.

Totowa.

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Hartnack, J. 1965. Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy. N e w Y o r k : N e w York University Press. Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. N e w York: Wiley. Hull, C. L. 1943. T h e p r o b l e m of intervening variables in molar behavior theory. Psychological Review, 50:273-291. James, W. 1904. Docs " c o n s c i o u s n e s s " exist? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 2:477-491. Jones, Ε. E. 1979. T h e rocky road f r o m acts to dispositions. American Psychologist, 34:107-117. Jones, Ε. E. and Κ. E. Davis. 1965. F r o m acts to dispositions: T h e attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2:219-266. N e w York: Academic Press. Locke, J. 1924. Am Essay Concerning Human Understanding. O x f o r d : Clarendon. Malcolm, N . 1958. K n o w l e d g e o f other minds. Journal of Philosophy, 55:969978. Manicas, P. T. and P. F. Sccord. 1983. Implications for psychology of the n e w philosophy of science. American Psychologist, 38:399-413. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964. Signs. Evanston, 111.: N o r t h w e s t e r n University Press. Miller, G. Α., Ε. Galanter, and Κ. Η . Pribram. I960. Plans and the Structure of Behavior. N e w York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Mischel, W. 1973. T o w a r d a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. Psychological Review, 80:252-283. Newell, Α., J. C. Shaw, and H . A. Simon. 1958. Elements of a theory of h u man problem solving. Psychological Review, 65:151-166. O r t o n y , Α., cd. 1979. Metaphor and Thought. N e w York: C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r sity Press. Penfield, W. and L. Roberts. 1959. Speech and Brain Mechanisms. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Peters. R. S. 1958. The Concept of Motivation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pollio, H. R . , J . M . Barlow, H . J . Fine, and M. Pollio. 1977. Psychology and the Poetics of Growth: Figurative Language in Psychology, Psychotherapy, and Education. Hillsdale, N.J.: E r l b a u m . Ricoeur, P. 1970. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. N e w Haven, C o n n . : Yale University Press. Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. N e w Y o r k : Barnes & Noble. Schänk, R. C . and R. P. Abelson. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Schlick, Μ. 1949. O n the relation between psychological and physical concepts. In H. Fcigl and W. Sellars, eds.. Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. 3 9 3 407. N e w York: A p p l e t o n - C c n t u r y - C r o f t s . First published in 1935. Smart, J. J. C . 1953. T h e o r y construction. In A. Flew, ed.. Logic and language, pp. 222-242. O x f o r d : Basil Blackwell. Sperry, R. W. 1969. A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review, 76:532-536. Taylor. C. 1964. The Explanation of Behavior. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Vescy, G. N . A. 1965. The Embodied Mind. London: Allen & U n w i n .

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W i c k e r , A. 1969. A t t i t u d e s v e r s u s actions: T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f verbal a n d o v e r t b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e to a t t i t u d e objects. Journal of Social Issues, 25 (4):41 —78. W i t t g e n s t e i n , L. 1953. Philosophical investigations. N e w Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n . W i t t g e n s t e i n , L. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r . W o o d g e r , J. H . 1939. The Technique of Theory Construction. C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press.

2 Memory and Context: Toward a Theory of Context in Ethnoscience Oswald Werner Northwestern University

Gladys Levis-Pilz University of New Mexico

We arc in the position o f s o m e o n e w h o learned to play chess without ever h a v i n g the rules formulated and w h o wants such a f o r m u l a t i o n . J o h n R. Scarle

S O C I O L I N G U I S T S S T U D Y L A N G U A G E as a dimension o f social behavior. A m a j o r goal is to explain communicative and cultural c o m petence in " c o n t e x t . " T h e p u r p o s e o f our study is to review the concept o f context as it is presented in the literature. Finding that it fails in large measure as a theoretically useful concept, w e offer s o m e thoughts on m a k i n g it m o r e viable. T o achieve this end, we integrate the notion o f context with notions o f m e m o r y in an ethnoscience framework. In the process we find context in close relation to the speech situation and illocutionary acts, and both in turn relate to strategies o f speaking (analT h i s w o r k w a s in part s u p p o r t e d b y g r a n t M H - 1 0 9 4 0 f r o m the N a t i o n a l Institute o f M e n tal Health. T h i s s u p p o r t is g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d g e d .

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ogous to rule sequences, e.g., in chess). Central to this essay we find that in an ethnography of speaking, questions of context are identical to questions about the folk classification of words and larger units of speech such as speech acts.

Typology Anthropologists talk about a n u m b e r of kinds of context: context of culture; social context; context of situation; context of use; and verbal, semantic and syntactic, textual, and discourse contexts. At the lowest level of abstraction these fulfill an organizational requirement necessitated by the bulk of material relevant to communication studies. H o w ever, social scientists must partition their investigations into units which are heuristic as well as economic. H y m e s (1964b, 1972), for example, sees communication as a hierarchy of language-relevant units: speech community, speech network, speech situation, speech event, and speech act. These distinctions are made presumably f r o m the standpoint of the speaker and are arranged in descending order of the scope of the units within which a speaker operates communicatively. Such a scale is useful because it provides a progression f r o m broader to n a r r o w e r categories of analysis. T o use Fishman's w o r d s (1968), it also provides "a p r o gression from . . . generally descriptive adequacy to predictive power." T u r n i n g to a consideration of each category we find that the criteria of analysis and the motivation for focusing on one or another type of context depends on the interests of the individual investigator. Several questions arise which we feel are relevant to demonstrating the value of context to a large portion of the literature: (1) What is the scope o f cach kind o f context? This seeks to reveal where investigators sec c o n t e x t operating and h o w important this location is to their overall theories o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n and social behavior. (2) What d o investigators focus on within each contextual domain? Since it appears there arc inumerable foci, the purpose o f this question is to s h o w w h e t h e r differences arc qualitative or ones o f degree. (3) H o w is cach level o f con text related to the other levels? Where this question applies, it should point to the u n i f y i n g elements o f c o n text w i t h o u t w h i c h a unified theory is i m p o s s i b l e .

Memory and Context

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(4) Are there explanations as to how context works? This is the most crucial question for our purposes. The bulk of this paper deals with this question. Without some integrated theory of the mechanisms of context's operation we believe the concept itself to be like the weather—"Everybody talks about it, but no one does anything with it."

Context of Culture A c c o r d i n g to Firth (1964) " C o n t e x t s are nested within contexts, each o n e a f u n c t i o n of the b i g g e r c o n t e x t , and all . . . f i n d i n g a place in the c o n t c x t of c u l t u r e . " T h i s view accomplishes d i v e r g e n t ends. First, it m a k e s context relevant to all aspects of language behavior. Second, in so d o i n g , it limits the i m p a c t that context o f culture has o n a total view of language behavior. T h o s e w h o discuss contcxt in relation to culture view w h o l e c o m m u n i t i e s and their c o m m u n i c a t i o n matrices as they fit in the larger cultural field. T h e y e m p l o y t e r m s like " w h o l e culture patt e r n s " (Albert 1964) and " t o t a l s y s t e m s " (Pike 1964) so they can speak of "cultural principles" (Friedrich 1972) and "cultural g r a m m a r s " (Hymes 1964c) d e t e r m i n i n g speech usage. Such discussions read like cultural inventories. T h i s b r o a d scope carries over into functional considerations of context of culture. T h e views differ slightly, but they are all expressed in t e r m s of the " c o n t e n t , intention, and effect o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n " (Albert 1964). A c c o r d i n g l y , the context of culture limits appropriate s u b ject m a t t e r (Greenbcrg, 1964); develops n o r m s of reaction (Pike 1964); facilitates m e a n i n g f u l c o m m u n i c a t i o n in a c o m m o n f r a m e of reference (Basso 1967); and provides the set of culturally significant questions and potential answers, with procedures for arriving at the correct ones (Frake 1961). T h i s does not m e a n that context of culture is operationally explanatory. Functional interpretations d e p e n d s o m e h o w on the " b a c k g r o u n d of c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n s , closely shared identifications and interests, and a system of shared e x p e c t a t i o n s " (Bernstein 1964b). N o one goes b e y o n d this rather b r o a d statement. Part of the p r o b l e m lies in the scope of this level. E x p a n d i n g the arena in which context operates multiplies the variables inherently i m p o r t a n t to adequate description. T h e n , too, the investigations discussed in connection w i t h c o n t e x t of culture are all directed at particular g r o u p s . H o w e v e r , theoretical statements based on these studies are in-

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tended to apply to culture as a general phenomenon. This greatly decreases the chances for prediction of appropriate behavior. Clearly, context of culture alone does not explain language behavior. Social context is the next step d o w n . From the amount of attention it is given, it appears that investigators imbue it with greater explanatory power.

Social Context T h e problems of dealing with context are multiplied in the case of social context. T h e word "social" appears no less that 30 times in attributive combinations with other concepts. Each of these is perceived as having some bearing on the operation of context. T o facilitate our discussion we have grouped these concepts under six headings which will be dealt with in turn.

SOCIAL MATRIX This concept concerns membership in a c o m m u n i t y ; it implies unconscious familiarity with cultural values and beliefs, institutions and forms, roles and personalities, and the history and ecology of the c o m m u n i t y (Hymes 1964a). Awareness of membership translates into the ability of the individual to distinguish appropriate behavior in terms of communicative events and social situations (Gumperz 1972). Earlier, community was characterized as any human aggregate in regular and frequent interaction over a significant span of time (Bloomfield 1933). Today investigators are more concerned with the total range of a speech community. Therefore it is not measured in time and space, but by the extent to which speakers share knowledge of communicative constraints.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Strictly speaking, social organization refers to programmatic and structural aspects of interaction within the larger speech community (Scheflen 1967). This is not to be confused with society, often mislabeled as a static sum of structures. Given the fluid definition of community, this social level refers to a " n e t w o r k of partial or complete understandings between members of organizational units of every size and complexity . . . which is being re-animated every day by particular acts of a communicative nature" (Sapir 1967). In this way speech is

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the means by which social structure becomes part of the individual's e x perience (Bernstein 1964a; H y m e s 1964c).

SOCIAL RULES AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR Rules are defined as the sociological variables which d e t e r m i n e the actor's choice a m o n g culturally available m o d e s of action. T h e y w o r k in accordance with the constraints i m posed by intent, setting, and identity relationships (Gumperz 1972). T h e action of these rules has been compared to the w a y syntactic e n v i r o n ments narrow broader dictionary definitions (Blom and Gumperz 1972), T h a t is, they w o r k positively and definitively. A m o n g the i m p o r t a n t variables are age and sex differences, social position or status, degree of in- or o u t g r o u p n e s s , and role relationships. G o f f m a n (1964) s u m m a rizes the i m p a c t of social rules on social behavior: " T h e r e is n o social variable that doesn't have its little systematic effect on speech behavior. . . . N e w social determinants are always being r e p o r t e d . "

SOCIAL INFORMATION W h e n an utterance is used in context, the social significance, meaning, or value of that act of speech is automatically implied. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n transmitted is k n o w l e d g e about a person or events in t e r m s of role relationships, status positions, etc. In closed systems m a r k e d by a restricted code, n e w i n f o r m a t i o n is available t h r o u g h extraverbal channels.

SOCIAL CHANGE Social change in this instance refers to sociolinguistic factors w o r k i n g on language. While language, as a finite set of elements, conditions what changes can occur, i n t r a c o m m u n i t y variables in a range and succession of social situations and relationships influence the innovations that do occur. T h e direction these variations take is full of social i n f o r m a t i o n (Gumperz, 1972). Successful d e v e l o p m e n t of social context depends on integration of the different social concepts with the other kinds o f context. T h e social situation is the stage for social behavior. T h e k n o w l e d g e and assumptions of the social matrix arc the same as the b a c k g r o u n d of c o m m o n participation in a culture. Social i n f o r mation, g r o u n d e d in this matrix, is passed back and forth and affects social situations. T h e r e is a great deal in this to tic things together, but

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it still lacks explanatory power for the operation of context. Let us turn to the even more specific "context of situation."

Context of Situation Malinowski (1923) said: " A statement in real life is never detached f r o m the situation in which it is uttered." This assertion is echoed t h r o u g h o u t the literature wherever investigators address themselves to the question of context of situation. In scope this category is " d e e p " rather than " b r o a d , " and anthropologists go to some lengths to dissect situational context in sharp detail. A major weakness of both social and cultural context is the variety of variables subsumed under these general headings. With the context of situation investigation is directed toward specific definition of the social constraints on language attached to particular constellations of participants, activities, and locales (Blom and Gumperz 1972). Definition is made easier by the empirical concrctcness of many situations. N u m e r o u s anthropologists provide excellent ethnographic accounts of "structured settings" in which behavior is culturally prescribed. Then, too, a situation by its very nature lends itself more easily to analysis. Any time t w o or more people come together, this intersection is a situation. The verbal exchange can occur on a continuum from prescribed "standing behavior patterns" such as greetings (Ervin-Tripp 1967) to free variation. T h e sociolinguist is interested in what is said, in h o w it is said, and under what circumstances it is said. This does not mean the operation of context of situation is simplified to the point of transparency. Situations arc definable behaviorally, physically, or by a combination of the t w o in specific co-occurrences. Cultures define situations, people define situations, and anthropologists define situations according to their theoretical orientation. Situations are used to explain behavior, or they are themselves created by behavior of a specific type. Adequate explanation of situational context requires adequate interpretation on all these levels. T h e approach most studies take involves explanation in both general and specific terms. T h e first part of the approach includes discussion of communicative form and function as they are integrated in situations. This entails enumeration of one or more of the following aspects of human interaction: kinds of participants; channels of c o m m u nication and their m o d e of use; codes shared by the participants; phys-

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ical setting; f o r m and genre o f the message; topic o f the message; and kinds and characters o f events themselves, as whole entities ( H y m e s 1964a, 1964c, 1974). Various investigators differ in which o f these aspects they stress as the most important feature o f the integration o f form and function (see the discussion under " S p e a k i n g " ) . T h e second part o f the approach is based on specifying identifiable behavioral units and settings as empirical demonstrations. With respect to f o r m , these examples are either labels such as speaking, writing, and reading substituted for the classes listed above, or they are descriptions o f " w h o l e e v e n t s " like hunts and meals. H y m e s (1964) calls the latter "naturally described contexts o f situations." T h e same kinds o f phenomena hold for function. Firth (1964) lists " t y p e s o f linguistic function" including such things as argument, endorsement, wishing, and challenge. M a l i n o w s k i carries the functional importance o f situational context further than anyone else with his context o f use. In his parad i g m , meaning is only derivable from the pragmatic reference o f w o r d s in practical activities where people act on the w o r d s (Malinowski 1965). Situations that are culturally defined events give us our best clues to the operation o f context. In these instances activity revolves around a prescribed routine. Participants are familiar with appropriate behavior because o f regular reoccurrencc. It is at this point that contcxt o f culture plays a role. As long as the situation is part o f that segment o f the whole culture's values, arts, and artifacts o f which the individual has k n o w l e d g e , he has s o m e guidance in dealing with it and can behave as successfully as m o s t people. Malinowski (1923, 1965) hints at the underlying mechanisms. O n c e a situation is learned, reusing the ingredients o f that situation is a matter o f recalling f r o m m e m o r y the physiological, intellectual, and emotional experiences associated with the verbal aspects. According to Malinowski, context works as a " m e c h a n i s m o f reference" or a " s i g n situation." We will elaborate. T h e amount o f effort that has been expended in developing context o f situation in the literature (see " C o n t e x t o f Situation") indicates that it is a key concept for sociolinguists. H o w e v e r , there is danger in accepting what has been written as sufficient explanation. T h o s e areas in which the operation o f context is most handily resolved arc special kinds o f situations easy to deal with because o f their reoccurrence or their pragmatic nature. T h e daily encounters which really treat cultural competence are not developed anywhere, nor is contcxt integrated into viable theoretical models.

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Verbal Context T h e last major contextual type does not really solve this problem, although it is the only level where prediction of appropriate behavior is possible. According to C h o m s k y (1968) anyone w h o learns a language must internalize a sytem of rules that relates sound, structure, and meaning in a particular lawful way. Syntactic rules, collectively called the g r a m m a r of a language, must c o n f o r m to structural patterns k n o w n and recognized by all interlocutors. Their elements cannot co-occur randomly and mean something as a whole. This patterning is the syntactic context, and it produces intelligible utterances. The semantic aspect of verbal context deals with meaning and therefore with the acceptability or appropriateness of a w o r d or utterance. This meaning is contextual in t w o ways. First, meaning is a function of so-called n o n linguistic phenomena—the cultural, social, and situational contexts of the utterance. Second, more specific contextual meaning comes from the "relationships among the constituent elements of discourse" (Albert 1964). The ultimate goal of ethnoscience is a formal, structural statement which will account for or predict the terms or utterances that are appropriate in various circumstances. It is testimony to the thoroughness with which syntactic and semantic contexts have been developed that anthropologists are beginning to become aware of h o w these t w o are integrated. Both are perceived as w o r k i n g on relations among verbal components by constraint or co-occurrence restrictions. This is the only area in which we can use " c o n t e x t " with a certain degree of confidence. The problem of context as a marginal explanatory concept does not lie in the scope of investigations. Beginning with the least abstract level of verbal context, semantic theory implicates all the external experiences of human beings as crucial aspects of their ideational systems. The basis for consistency in language rests on c o m m o n participation in and ordering of the experiences. In turn, the organization of behavior is instituted through systems of social relationships based on the operation of social rules. Behavior does not occur in a void; hence the physical aspects of settings and situations enter in. Given the interrelatedness of all these factors, investigators would be remiss not to include them. The relations between levels of context are not problematic— in fact, they are crucial. O n e cannot speak of any aspect of h u m a n behavior without talking about culture, social organization, and so on. Context to be operative must pervade all levels. T h e key is not just inclusion of all possible factors but some consideration of h o w to include

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them in a coherent theory o f context. We are particularly interested in viewing context from an ethnoscience perspective, that is, from the point o f view o f the insider in a culture or a social system. T h e "inside view" (on which we will elaborate) will necessitate focusing on the individual and his reaction to contexts. We begin with an application o f Hymes' (1972) context o f situation to the problem o f speech behavior, i.e., the ethnography o f speaking. We cannot overemphasize our conviction that channels o f communication other than speech are no less important. Our choice o f study rests on our own interests and goals as well as on the realization that progress toward a theory o f context is impossible if one tries to explain everything.

Speaking Hymes presents a useful typology o f elements o f context o f speech situations (Hymes 1972:65). We use it as our point o f departure. He introduces the mnemonic word S P E A K I N G in which S stands for Setting, Ρ for Participants, Ε for Ends, A for Act sequence, Κ for Keys, 1 for Instrumentalities, Ν for Norms, and G for Genres. We assume that a fieldworker compiling an ethnography o f speaking keeps this mnemonic word in mind while making sure that none o f the eight elements are neglected. Provisional Working Definition: We will call, quite arbitrarily, the union or sum o f these eight elements context. While trying to apply the mnemonic word S P E A K I N G to the analysis o f speech events, we found Hymes' typology difficult. T h e eight elements arc not necessarily exclusive and overlap considerably in some cases. Casting about for clearer alternatives, we found Hymes' (1962:112113; pagination refers to the reprint in Fishman 1970) earlier analysis o f context. T h e equivalent to the eight factors is presented as a set o f simple everyday questions: 'Who said it? Who'd he say it to? What words did he use? Did he phone or write? Was it in English? What'd he talk about? Where'd he say it?" By slightly reordering Hymes' questions, coordinating them with the mnemonic S P E A K I N G , and elaborating on them, we derive the following schema shown in table 1.2.1. By keep-

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Table 1.2.1 Cue

Word

Questions of Context Elaborated

Questions

Mnemonic

Elements

Where?

Where did he say it?

Setting

s-

Who?

W h o was there?

Participants

Ρ-

Ends

Ε-

Act Sequence

Α'

What words did he use?

Key

What language did he use?

Instrumentality

κΡ

Who! was expected of him?

Norm

Ν'

Did he phone or write?

Genre

G-

How long did it take?

Duration

D

W h o said it? W h o ' d he say it to? Why?

W h y did he say it? W h y did he say it that way?

What?

What did he talk about?

How?

How did he say it?

When?

When did he say it?

Time

Τ

(absolute and relative) Under what conditions d i d

Condition

C

he say it? (What conditions were met?) * following Hymes 1962, 1972

ing close to the six interrogative pronouns listed in the left column of the table and adding a few other considerations, we expand the factors by three (Time, Duration, and Conditions). We justify this expansion below (see discussion of Searle 1969). Further inspection of table 1.2.1 reveals that the major emphases and elaborations of ethnographies of speaking are the various manners of communication (the How?). In this essay we consider only spoken (or written) utterances that are usually in middle-class English. Consequently at the highest illocutionary level (the highest sentence in an embedded set) we always use the verb " s a y . " By selecting speaking as the sole method of c o m munication w e have greatly restricted our view of possible modes of communication. This restriction is purely tactical and lays no theoretical claims beyond making the problem of context m o r e manageable. Searle's (1969) illocutionary rules can n o w be easily integrated with the schema of table 1.2.1. (1) Rules of Propositional Content. These are restrictions on the p r o p ositional content of the actually uttered sentence. Thus, for example, the verb " p r o m i s e " requires reference to a future act and " t h a n k s . " to λ past act; "assert," on the other hand, has n o such restriction. This kind of rule places constraints on what, and in what

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way (how), a speaker can talk about things that are promised, thanked for, asserted, etc. At the same time the rules also imply a proper time (T), for example, for making promises. (2) Preparatory Rules. These are conditions (C) that have to be met before the illocutionary act that follows is appropriate. T h u s the illocutionary act is in a time-sequence relation to preparatory rules. An example is, for the verb " p r o m i s e , " the condition that a statement o f a promise can be uttered only if the hearer w o u l d prefer the speaker's doing the promised act to not doing it and if the speaker believes (knows) that the hearer would prefer the doing of the promised act to its not being done. A further condition preceding a promise is that it must be obvious to both speaker and hearer that the speaker would not d o the promised act in the n o r mal course of events. (3) Sincerity Rules. These are part of the ends (E) of the illocutionary act. For example, a speaker utters a promise of an act only if he intends to d o this act for the hearer's benefit, or if he intends to deliberately mislead the hearer. (4) Essential Rules. These are part of the norms (N) of an interaction. For example, a promise is contained in the taxonomic classification of a promise as an obligation (e.g., " A promise is a kind of obligation."). This is understood by both the speaker and the hearer. Welching on a promise is defaulting on an obligation that the speaker has incurred vis-ä-vis the hearer. Searle's analysis yields t w o o f the n e w elements: C o n d i t i o n s (C) that m u s t b e m e t b e f o r e u t t e r i n g a s p e e c h act, a n d T i m e (T) at w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r i l l o c u t i o n a r y act is a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i n c l u s i o n o f D u r a t i o n ( D ) in t h e d o m a i n o f c o n t e x t is b a s e d p r e d o m i n a n t l y o n e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e : In d i f ferent contexts people respond with answers of different lengths.

For

e x a m p l e a q u e s t i o n in an e x a m i n a t i o n o n a g i v e n t o p i c m a y r e q u i r e a n s w e r s l a s t i n g u p t o s e v e r a l h o u r s . In e v e r y d a y d i s c o u r s e t h e s a m e o r a highly similar question rarely c o m m a n d s the same degree of elaborat i o n . In s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e b r e v i t y is essential ( e . g . , t r a n s p a c i f i c t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s ) still g r e a t e r p a r s i m o n y o f e x p r e s s i o n is t o b e e x p e c t e d . R u l e s o f D u r a t i o n c o m p l e t e t h e set o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y rules: (5) Duration Rules. These may or may not be part of the n o r m s (N) of an interaction. In the case of thanks, for example, duration m a y be described by adverbs of manner. O n e can give perfunctory (brief) thanks or can offer profuse thanks, which can go on at great length. W e arc n o w ready to a m p l i f y o u r w o r k i n g definition of context: Definition:

Context

o f a s p e e c h act is an e x p l i c i t a n d m o r e o r less c o m -

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p l e t e — d e p e n d i n g on r e q u i r e m e n t s — a n s w e r to the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n : " W h o said w h a t , u n d e r w h a t conditions, w h e n , where, f o r h o w l o n g , t o w h o m , h o w , and w h y ? " In o t h e r w o r d s , context is the c o m p l e x i n terrelation b e t w e e n : Persons (speaker and audience) Messages (Topics) Points in T i m e P o i n t s in Space Duration Preconditions Manner (Norm) Motivation T h e last three factors, as w e shall d e m o n s t r a t e , tend to be of a d i f f e r e n t type f r o m the first five. Answering the set of interrogatives, Where, W h o , W h a t , H o w , W h y , and W h e n , leads to t h e description of an i l l o c u t i o n ary act (e.g., Searle 1969). G e n e r a t i v e semanticists and s o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s try to separate t h e c o n t e n t of a sentence (the " W h a t " ) f r o m o t h e r aspects o f the illocutionary act, o r r o u g h l y f r o m the rest of t h e i n t e r rogatives. T h e separation o v e r l o o k s a n u m b e r of complexities. T h e selection of lexical i t e m s and the application of certain g r a m m a t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s that affect the style of the u t t e r a n c e m u s t all be c o n s i d e r e d as part o f the illocutionary act. It is p e r h a p s safer to say that o n l y that i n f o r m a t i o n gets into the l o w e r sentence (the l o w e r being t h e " m e s s a g e " , the higher the illocutionary act) w h i c h finds explicit verbalization in t h e discourse. T h e o v e r t verbalized part m a y , h o w e v e r , also contain parts of illocutionary acts in the f o r m o f explicit adverbs, t o n e o f voice, style, w o r d selection, and o t h e r similar devices. T h e h i g h e r sentence in w h i c h the l o w e r is e m b e d d e d usually contains all o r a v e r y large part of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n that is left implicit. Since it is not explicitly e x p r e s s e d b u t m u s t be inferred as m u c h as possible f r o m the explicit parts o f t h e message o r f r o m m e m o r y , it is always o p e n t o interpretation. In o t h e r w o r d s , mistakes o f interpretation o n the tacit illocutionary level are m o r e c o m m o n than mistakes of interpretation on the uttered sentence level. O b v i o u s l y neither level is free o f possible m i s j u d g m e n t s . It is i m p o r t a n t t o stress that explicit l a n g u a g e contains m a n y devices for m a k i n g large parts of t h e illocutionary aspects o f sentences part of the explicit u t t e r ance. Clarifications of illocutionary intent by a speaker are an e x a m p l e o f t h e use of such devices.

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Memory and Context

O u r a p p r o a c h is i n s p i r e d b y e t h n o s c i e n c e . W e are i n t e r e s t e d in a theory of the internal v i e w of culture and context. T h e individual's p e r c e p t i o n a n d his m e m o r y o f p a s t p e r c e p t i o n s are t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s f o r s t u d y i n g c o n t e x t u a l p a r a m e t e r s . B u t first w e m u s t t u r n t o a n a m plification o f a n d a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e internal v i e w a n d t h e e x t e r n a l view.

Internal View Firth's (1964) conclusion that " c o n t e x t s are nested within c o n t e x t s , " that is, a h i e r a r c h i c s t r u c t u r e o f c o n t e x t u a l d e t e r m i n a n t s , is j u s t i f i e d . C u l t u r e m a y b e v i e w e d as r i t u a l i z a t i o n o r as a s y s t e m o f s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g p r o p h ecies that a c c r u e t o t h e a v a i l a b l e k n o w l e d g e o f a n y social s y s t e m o v e r t i m e a n d s p a c e . Social s y s t e m s a r e n e s t e d , o n e w i t h i n the o t h e r : i n d i viduals w i t h i n diads, diads w i t h i n p r i m a r y g r o u p s , and all h u m a n g r o u p s (blocks, alliances, etc.) eventually w i t h i n all h u m a n i t y (cf. W e r n e r 1975). T h e level at w h i c h the e t h n o g r a p h e r e n t e r s t h e social s y s t e m ( i n d i v i d ual, g r o u p , t r i b e , n a t i o n , h u m a n i t y ) d e t e r m i n e s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n s a n d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c o n t e x t . A t t h e l o w e s t level is t h e i n d i v i d u a l . H e r e t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n t e x t b y O g d e n a n d R i c h a r d s (1923:146) is r e l e v a n t : " C o n t e x t is . . . a mental process o r c o m p l e x o f mental processes w h i c h a c c u r e to an o r i g i n a l idea t h r o u g h t h e s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s h i m s e l f . " Yet e v e n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n t e x t w h i c h b e g i n s w i t h " m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s , " that is, i n t e r n a l variables o f t h e h u m a n o r g a n i s m , c o n t i n u e s — w e believe i n c o n s i s t e n t l y — b y e m b r a c i n g an a m b i g u o u s stance a n d c o n c l u d i n g " w h i c h a c c r u e t o a n o r i g i n a l idea t h r o u g h t h e s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s h i m s e l f . " T h e a m b i g u i t y is c r e a t e d b y t h e use o f " o r i g i n a l i d e a " a n d t h e accrual " t h r o u g h the s i t u a t i o n . " T h e e x ternal ( p e r h a p s f o r c o n v e n t i o n ' s s a k e w e s h o u l d m e n t i o n that it has also been called t h e etic) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e n v i s i o n s t h e h u m a n o r g a n i s m w i t h its m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s a n d o r i g i n a l ideas u t t e r i n g these in a " s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s h i m s e l f . " T h i s is the i m a g e r e p o r t e d b y an e x t e r n a l o b s e r v e r w h o sees t h e h u m a n o r g a n i s m e m b e d d e d in his a m bience ( f i g u r e 1.2.1). T h e internal interpretation of the above definition

involved

r e a d i n g t h e " a c c r u a l " n o t as c o m i n g f r o m t h e o u t s i d e b u t as a c u m u l a -

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F i g u r e 1 . 2 . 1 The e x t e r n a l o b s e r v e r sees the o r g a n i s m i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h its e n v i r o n ment.

t i v c m e n t a l p r o c e s s in w h i c h t h e " o r i g i n a l i d e a " a n d t h e " s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h an individual finds h i m s e l f " are aspects o f an integrated w o r l d p i c t u r e ( f i g u r e 1.2.2). T h e a c c r u a l o f c o n t e x t t o a n o r i g i n a l idea as e x p r e s s e d b y O g d e n a n d R i c h a r d s (1923) is t h e r e f o r e m i s l e a d i n g . Since it is i m p o s s i b l e f o r h u m a n b e i n g s t o u t t e r a n y t h i n g o u t s i d e o f some c o n t e x t , it is d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e h o w a n y " o r i g i n a l i d e a " c o u l d e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t o f it. W h a t s e e m s t o b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e p o p u l a r n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e is a f u n d a m e n t a l o r i g i n a l idea w h i c h is s o m e h o w e n h a n c e d b y accrual f r o m t h e o u t s i d e (by t h e o r g a n i s m ' s a c t u a l l y o b s e r v i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ) is t h a t c e r t a i n basic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f w o r d s o r s e n t e n c e s s e e m t o b e r e c u r r e n t . H o w e v e r , s u c h r e p e t i t i o n s h a v e m o r e in c o m m o n w i t h s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h i n an i n t e r n a l w o r l d p i c t u r e t h a n w i t h " o r i g i n a l i d e a s . " A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l s in f o l k t a x o n o m i e s elicited in a m b i g u o u s c o n t e x t s . T h e r e are m a n y t e r m s in e v e r y f o l k t a x o n o m y t h a t a p p l y t o s e v eral levels o f g e n e r a l i t y . In N a v a j o ( W e r n e r a n d M a n n i n g 1973), f o r e x a m p l e , ch'osh m a y refer t o " v a r m i n t s " o r " u n u s u a l a n i m a l s , " specifically " s n a k e s , reptiles, a m p h i b i a n s a n d i n s e c t s , " w h i l e in a m b i g u o u s s i t u a t i o n s it is a l w a y s t r a n s l a t e d as " b u g s . " T h e s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n of t h e t e r m s e e m s t o be t o " b u g s . " If in d o u b t a b o u t t h e p r o p e r c o n t e x t i n f o r m a n t s will a l w a y s select t h e " s a f e s t " r e a d i n g , o n e w i t h t h e h i g h e s t frequency of occurrence, or possibly the m o s t cathected one. Whether t h e " b u g " m e a n i n g o f ch'osh " o r i g i n a l i d e a " is d e b a t a b l e a n d p o s s i b l y b e s i d e t h e p o i n t at this s t a g e o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e N a v a j o l a n guage.

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F i g u r e 1.2.2 The internal view is a construct of a constantly changing world picture based on impressions on the boundary of the organism. (The world picture in memory is used lo check all sense impressions and to add new knowledge as it is acquired.)

T h i s a m b i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n t h e so-called etic (external) and emic (internal) v i e w o f c o n t e x t s is n o t limited t o O g d e n and Richards. T h e v i e w that " t h e sentence, as o r d i n a r i l y treated by linguists, is valid o n l y f o r a n a r r o w l y referential f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e " (Scherzer a n d Darnell 1972:87) c o m e s v e r y close t o the " o r i g i n a l i d e a " o f O g d e n and R i c h ards. Such s t a t e m e n t s as " C o n t e x t distinguishes shades o f m e a n i n g s of / w o r d s / " (Albert 1972:87), " T h e m e a n i n g o f w o r d s is a l w a y s affected by c o n t e x t ' ( G u m p e r z 1972:15), and " A c o n t e x t can s u p p o r t a r a n g e o f m e a n i n g s . . . . T h e effective m e a n i n g d e p e n d s o n t h e interaction o f the t w o . . . / f o r m a n d c o n t e x t / " ( H y m e s 1972:105) set u p a similar e x p e c tation of " o r i g i n a l i d e a s . " T h e s a m e a u t h o r s o f t e n also e s p o u s e t h e internal v i e w — f r e quently in the same article. G u m p e r z (1972) formulates the internal view m o s t consistently: " T h e s p e a k e r first takes in s t i m u l i f r o m the o u t s i d e e n v i r o n m e n t , e v a l u a t i n g and selecting f r o m a m o n g t h e m in t h e light of his o w n cultural b a c k g r o u n d , personal history, and w h a t he k n o w s about his interlocutors. H e then decides o n t h e n o r m s that apply to the situation at hand. These n o r m s determine the speaker's selection f r o m a m o n g the c o m m u n i c a t i v e o p t i o n s available for e n c o d i n g his i n t e n t " ( G u m p e r z 1972:15). T h e individual lies at t h e l o w e s t level o f social o r g a n i z a t i o n , as the q u o t e f r o m G u m p e r z implies. T h e first level of a t h e o r y dealing w i t h c o n t e x t f r o m t h e internal p o i n t o f v i e w is o n this level. Interest-

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ingly, t h e inside v i e w a p p e a r s t o b e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y s i m p l e r than the e x t e r n a l v i e w o f t h i r d p e r s o n o b s e r v e r s . In o t h e r w o r d s , o u r m o d e l is a m o d e l o f a speaker f r o m the speaker's point of i'iew.] W e discuss t h e e x t e r n a l p o i n t o f v i e w w i t h reference to illoc u t i o n a r y acts (see " S p e a k i n g " ) first: " H e l said X t o h i m 2 , there, then ( u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s Y), f o r d u r a t i o n Z , (in m a n n e r Ρ a n d because of Q ) . " T h e i d e n t i t y o f " h e l " a n d " h i m 2 , " t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e location specified as " t h e r e , " a n d t h e t i m e " t h e n " w h e n all c o n d i t i o n s Y f o r u t t e r i n g X arc m e t a n d w h e n " h e l " has uttered t h e m e s s a g e ' X ' 2 w h i c h lasted f o r " Z " units o f t i m e can be at least to s o m e d e g r e e part o f an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o r d , f o r e x a m p l e , b y i n t e r v i e w s (for s o m e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s Y), by v i d e o t a p e , and b y field notes (for t h e others). T h e situation is m o r e c o m p l e x w i t h r e g a r d t o the parenthesized e x p r e s s i o n . In G o f f m a n ' s (1969) t e r m s " h e " has given o f f verbal and n o n v e r b a l b e h a v i o r , and " I " o r a third person observer noted or recorded the behaviors given o f f . H o w e v e r , n o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o r d is possible w h i c h c o u l d tell us h o w m u c h o f t h e b e h a v i o r given o f f w a s given b y " h i m l " i n t e n t i o n ally, u n d e r his m o r e o r less c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l and h o w m u c h w a s b e y o n d his c o n t r o l and t h e r e f o r e " t r u l y " g i v e n - o f f . W e can t r y t o i n t e r v i e w b y asking q u e s t i o n s o f clarification, b u t " t h e r e is not a m e t h o d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t [rather] i m m e n s e l y v a r i o u s m e t h o d s o f u n d e r s t a n d ing. . . . T h e i r m u l t i t u d e is indicated in t h e endless list o f w a y s that a p e r s o n s p e a k s " (Garfinkel 1972:321). T o this m u s t be a d d e d , " a n d the endless c o n d i t i o n s o r reasons f o r the endless list of w a y s that a p e r s o n speaks." T h e p r o b l e m b e c o m e s simpler if w e take t h e insider's v i e w . T h i s is traditionally t h e v i e w taken b y e t h n o g r a p h e r s (e.g., Spradley & M c C u r d y 1971). T h e internal v i e w a s s u m e s t h e key q u e s t i o n t o be: "I said X to h i m , there (under c o n d i t i o n s Y), t h e n , f o r Ζ units of t i m e , h o w a n d w h y . " T o the e x t e n t t o w h i c h Τ a m capable o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n and self-control, t h e m a n n e r o f s p e a k i n g a n d ' m y ' m o t i v a t i o n s f o r s p e a k i n g a particular m e s s a g e in a particular w a y are u n d e r ' m y ' c o n t r o l . T h e r e arc o b v i o u s l y aspects Ί ' d o n o t c o n t r o l . Such is the b e h a v i o r that Τ a m g i v i n g o f f — u n b e k n o w n s t to me, or k n o w n to m e perhaps only t h r o u g h s o m e vague

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feelings. However, if we try to imitate human speaking behavior by a model or device that can respond in a more or less human fashion, it is difficult to see how one could account for behavior given o f f at all. We simply do not know enough about the nature o f vague feelings and hunches that human beings have. For this reason it is the best policy for the time being to exclude involuntary behaviors given o f f from consideration. T h e questions which remain are thus reduced to an implementation o f a model structure that is capable o f accounting for the explicitly transcribable (written) message proper (see note 2), the manner o f speaking, and some o f the motivations for particular speech events—In short, for what was defined as " c o n t e x t " in this essay. In the next section we will attempt to formalize the internal notion o f context in a model that should act and react as human-like as possible. We will describe the current status o f the model and add features and capabilities to it while making it compatible with our understanding o f the human internal uses o f context.

Memory Ethnoscicnce theories are insufficiently developed and have not concerned themselves intensively with the relationship o f constructs o f cultural knowledge to a theory o f language in general. Without fail these theories deal with (usually some subproblem of) the structure o f the lexicon. While anthropologists in ethnoscience have approached the problem o f cultural semantics from the side o f the lexicon, grammarians (linguists)—even those who deny the existence o f an autonomous syntax—have approached the problem almost entirely from the side o f syntax. A combined approach may yield better results for considerations o f the nature o f context in a generalized theory o f language and cultural knowledge. We will take such a generalized schema as our starting point. The fundamentals o f figure 1.2.3 are freely borrowed from generative semantics. O u r primary concern is with the internal structure o f the top box, which we have labeled " m e m o r y " or " s e m a n t i c s , " and which includes some representation o f the lexical resources o f a language, or a " d i c t i o n a r y . " 1 We currently assume the identity o f input

Werner and Levis-Pilz

74 Semantic Includes A "Dictionary" Memory P(O)'

1

P(n)

P(O)

•

•

•

•

•

•

Deep Structure Phrase Maker (Parsing Tree) >- Transformations Surface Structure Phrase Maker

1,P(n)

Phonology Question

Figure 1.2.3

'

™ Answer

Schema illustrating the identity of semantics and memory.

and output paths, though this is not very likely. A question is viewed as traveling from the bottom of the schema to the top, being "deciphered" phonologically, being "detransformed" to its deep structure, and being interpreted in the light of previous knowledge contained in m e m o r y . It is here, in memory, that answers to the questions are someh o w formulated, expressed as deep phrase markers, transformed into a surface structure, interpreted phonologically, and finally displayed as a physical (acoustic or graphemic) response to an input question. Some previous work in linguistics—notably the work of Katz (with Fodor 1963; and 1972)—has suggested a semantic theory independent of a speakerhearer's knowledge of the world. This separation was at best a tour de force, especially since the open, memory-like character of the semantic determiners was overlooked. These determiners ultimately contain perhaps all of an individual's world knowledge that enters into the cultural (and semantic) interpretation of sentences. (For details see Werner 1974.) Werner (1972, 1974, 1977, 1978) has argued for three levels of memory: a long-range, virtually limitless lifetime depository of all experience, an intermediate memory, and a short-range small memory which contains maximally the now famous 7 ± 2 chunks of information arranged as a linear string (Miller 1956). The two extreme forms of human memory (the long-range and the short-range) arc relatively well

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k n o w n . T h i s m a y be d u e to the fact that the e x t r e m e s are m o r e accessible t o verification by psychological e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n than the p o o r l y d e f i n e d , v e r y c o m p l e x , and m o r e process-like center. For u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w h u m a n s k n o w t h e w o r l d t h e i n t e r m e diate m e m o r y is t h e m o s t fascinating. W e r n e r (1974) considers it t h e central e x p l a n a t o r y concept o f ethnoscience. T h i s can be easily d e m o n strated: T h e l o n g - r a n g e m e m o r y is far t o o large to have practical utility w i t h o u t s o m e m e d i a t i o n . T h e m e d i a t i o n o f all t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t an individual possesses is a c c o m p l i s h e d b y t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e m e m o r y . T h a t is, the processes of i n t e r m e d i a t e m e m o r y are responsible f o r the r e d u c tion of all k n o w l e d g e to that part o f the total k n o w l e d g e w h i c h is rele v a n t to a particular current t o p i c / c o n t e x t o f discourse. Still f u r t h e r , it is ultimately a r e d u c t i o n t o that small a m o u n t o f i n f o r m a t i o n that can be " s q u e e z e d " t h r o u g h the limits set by s h o r t - t e r m m e m o r y — a t best a f e w h u n d r e d o r so bits, if t h e i n f o r m a t i o n is c h u n k e d , and m o r e usually 7 ± 2 chunks. O n the basis of Mandler's (1970) information Werner (1974) estimates that t h e r a n g e of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e m e m o r y is s o m e w h e r e b e tween ( 5 ± 2 ) chunks.

5±2 + 1

, or f r o m 100 to a b o u t 5,000,000 bits o r possibly

T h e larger figure m a y represent all ( m a x i m a l l y

possible?)

k n o w l e d g e o n a g i v e n , relatively circumscribed topic rather than all easily verbalizable k n o w l e d g e . A f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n is that l o n g - r a n g e m e m o r y is n e v e r accessible in t o t o a n d is naturally partitioned into c o m p a r t m e n t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g r o u g h l y t o cultural d o m a i n s or topics of k n o w l e d g e . T h e p a r titioning is n o t absolute. T h e i m a g e o f m e m o r y as a g r a p h o f associations contains areas that are strongly connected with boundaries and also less w e l l - c o n n e c t e d areas. T h e s t r o n g l y connected areas are the c u l t u r ally recognized d o m a i n s that constitute relatively c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t u a l w h o l e s . For p u r p o s e s of discourse the separation of the d o m a i n s m u s t be relatively h e r m e t i c . T h e m a i n justification for this is f o u n d in t h e a p parent (rather than real) a m b i g u i t y of speech. T h e separation of t h e d o mains is sufficiently i m p e r m e a b l e so that in e v e r y d a y discourse t h e awareness o f a m b i g u i t y is t h e exception rather than the r u l e — w e are usually u n a w a r e of t h e a m b i g u i t y of speech. At the same t i m e it a p p e a r s t o be clear that e v e r y w o r d and every sentence tends to be m u l t i p l y a m b i g u o u s . T h e c o m p a r t m e n t s of m e m o r y separate m o s t of the possible a m b i g u o u s interpretations. T h i s fact implies that separate

compart-

m e n t s of d e e p m e m o r y m a y contain separate but contradictory p r o p o sitions. T h o u g h c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are n o r m a l l y isolated f r o m each o t h e r ,

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they enter consciousness only at times of stress: when perceptions and cognitions are in dissonance or in the proccss of reorganization. H o w ever, the high-level compartments of the long-range m e m o r y are only the first level of contextualization by the processes of intermediate m e m o r y . Each large cultural domain is kept separated in long-range m e m o r y ; that is, a cultural domain up for discussion is brought into focus by the processes of the intermediate memory. Each successive reduction of the content of a cultural domain represents further contextualization. In intermediate m e m o r y knowledge relevant to given perceived circumstances is gradually sharpened and focused into relatively small amounts of information that arc ncccssary for the understanding and/or production of the current utterance. This is precisely the picture envisioned by Firth (I960) w h o does not see context but a nested hierarchy of contexts. Chafe (1974) has used the analogy of a spotlight for the focusing power of intermediate memory. T h e analogy can be n o w amplified: T h e long-range m e m o r y per se is not accessible in its totality at any time; most of it is in complete darkness. The processes of intermediate memory arc the spotlight. Its lens focuses the light of the source into concentric circles—the hierarchy of levels. The widest circle of the range of the spotlight illuminates very softly all potentially available information relevant to a particular topic. As the topic is reduced in scope it moves into closer proximity to full awareness; circles get closer and closer to the center, the brightest spot of the light. The brightest spot is very small and is in the dead center of the entire lighted disc. In it arc only items in the focal awareness of the speaker/hearer. It is small in size and contains not more than a single input or output of short-range m e m o r y , or one unit o f 7 ± 2 chunks. Figure 1.2.4 illustrates the process by means of a branching tree. A sentence that may result from this series of partitions is, for example, the following, "Studies have shown that the majority of American couples have intercourse at least twice a w e e k . " This could be a quote from a news release. A similar informational content is expressed in the following sentence: "I've read that most Americans get laid at least twice a w e e k . " The distortion is intended. This could represent an exchange between t w o young, married males speaking informally about the same news story. T h e partition of speaking styles was accomplished somewhere on both the fifth and sixth levels, according to figure 1.2.4. Instead of the first, relatively formal medical context,

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All of Long-Range Memory

F i g u r e 1.2.4 Nested partitionings of memory.

the s e c o n d c o n t e x t is part o f an i n f o r m a l , slightly vulgar e x c h a n g e . Interestingly, the identical s e c o n d s e n t e n c e could be uttered as a c o m m e n t on t h e s a m e n e w s s t o r y but in a d d i t i o n cither as a c o m p l a i n t a b o u t the speaker's sexual activities o r as a boast; that is, the partition o f the relevant k n o w l e d g e m a y begin on t h e t h i r d level w i t h " m y sexual b e h a v i o r " c o m b i n e d w i t h f u r t h e r p a r t i t i o n i n g based o n an evaluation o f " m y sex l i f e . " T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is that t h e partitionings of m e m o r y are n o t necessarily exclusive; that is, rather than being represented by a b r a n c h ing tree, partitions m a y be better represented by a semi-lattice, in w h i c h t h e s a m e o r h i g h l y similar e l e m e n t s m a y be reached by d i f f e r e n t paths (see f i g u r e 1.2.5). H o w e v e r , the semi-lattice structure (at least in o u r e x a m p l e ) m a y be m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n real. In t h e a b o v e sentence the use in positively evaluative c o n t e x t s is surely implied by p r e c e d i n g s e n tences, by t o n e o f voice, a n d possibly by c o m m u n i c a t i v e b e h a v i o r s in o t h e r channels. T h e s e f a c t o r s w o u l d m a k e the t w o sentences q u i t e d i f ferent. In spite o f o u r e x a m p l e it is still conceivable that the s a m e p a r titioning n o d e can be reached f r o m d i f f e r e n t higher level n o d e s . W e will s h o w later that t h e path of the focal hot spot of the spotlight a n a l o g y of m e m o r y f o l l o w s r o u t e s o f s t r o n g e s t associations. T h e s e associations are a l o n g t a x o n o m i c , a t t r i b u t i v e , o r sequential linkages. T h e d y n a m i c p a r t i t i o n i n g o f m e m o r y i n v o k e s d i f f e r e n t s t r o n g associations if t h e d i -

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My Sexual Behavior

Positively Evaluated

Negatively Evaluated

Figure 1.2.5 Example of the semi-lattice structure of memory partitioning.

rection of the approach is different. It is conceivable that the s a m e rem e m b e r e d sentence, like the above, can be accessed f r o m the positively as well as f r o m the negatively evaluated side, but w i t h varying levels and different strongest (most cathected) associations. T h e tone of voice, etc., that may signal bragging or complaint m a y be d e p e n d e n t on the direction f r o m which the sentence (as stored and associatively connected in m e m o r y ) was approached.

Nature of the Nodes T h e nature of the nodes in the partitioning diagram (figure 2.4) needs amplification. T w o versions of the same story, each in a different style, follow: The Game of Death The hognosc is a nice snake. He has no rattle. He has no poison. He never bites. When an enemy is near he docs a funny thing. He puffs up his body, lashes his tail and hisses. If the enemy won't go away, the hog-nose tries a new trick. He rolls over and plays dead. Then he peeks to see if it is safe to move. If someone flips him over, he flips right back. He probably thinks he looks more dead upside down. 4 The Hognose Snake The hognose (genus heterodon. family colubridae) is any one of several h a r m less, nonvenomous snakes. In the face of danger it displays a curious behavior

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pattern. At first it has a tendency to inflate its body, to move its tail violently, and to emit a sibilant sound. If the danger persists, the "aggressive" phase is followed by a " f e i g n i n g " phase. T h e snake accomplishes this feat by exposing its ventral area and remaining motionless. The feigning may be interrupted briefly by a cautious inspection of its surroundings. If an animal or human agent returns the snake during feigning to its normal upright position, it will quickly resume the feigning. T h e p a r t i t i o n i n g d i a g r a m a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e t w o stories is s h o w n in f i g u r e 1.2.6. T h e p a r t i t i o n i n g s b y s u b j e c t m a t t e r — t h e first six levels o f t h e p a r t i t i o n i n g t r e e — a r e r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h e s u b d i v i s i o n s are t a x o n o m i c . S o m e y o u n g i n f o r m a n t s , f o r e x a m p l e , m a y s k i p t h e level o f " r e p t i l e s , " w h i l e f o r o t h e r s it m a y b e part o f the scientific g e n r e o f s p e a k i n g . Since c r o s s - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are n o t e x c l u d e d , t h e scientific a n d p o p u l a r classification c o u l d i n t e r s e c t w i t h t h e f o l k t a x o n o m i c classification virtually

at any level. T h a t it a p p e a r s in f i g u r e 1.2.6 o n t h e b o t t o m

level is p r i m a r i l y a m a t t e r o f c o n v e n i e n c e . It is also likely that h u m a n b e i n g s o f t e n c r o s s b a c k a n d f o r t h b e t w e e n f o r m a l a n d i n f o r m a l styles, f o r e x a m p l e , f o r c o m i c relief (see " G a m e s m a n s h i p " ) . T h e s u b p a r t i t i o n s o f figure 1.2.6 c o u l d also o b v i o u s l y f o l l o w d i f f e r e n t l e x i c a l / s e m a n t i c r e lations: p a r t i t i o n b y c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e , f o r e x a m p l e , in t o p i c s such as All of Long-Ronge Memory

Figure 1.2.6

A hypotheticol partitioning tree of memory, illustrating two versions of

a story about the heterodon, or hognose snake.

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80 The Gome of Death

Taxonomic information

The Hognose Snake

Taxonomic information

Aggressive Phase

Feigning Phase

F i g u r e 1.2.7 The simplified story structure of the two narratives. (The double arrow represents the part-whole relation, or "A is a part of B." The single horizontal arrow represents the relation of queuing, or the temporal succession of the narrative.)

" t h e v o c a b u l a r y of the h e r p e t o l o g i s t . " — t h a t is, any o r all of the w o r d s associated with the care, feeding, and s t u d y o f a m p h i b i a n s and reptiles. O t h e r possibilities are subdivisions by plans o r t h e q u e u i n g relation— f o r e x a m p l e , the feigning b e h a v i o r sequence o f t h e h o g n o s e snake, or in a recipe, the m a k i n g o f beer. H o w e v e r , in neither of the t w o cited e x a m p l e s is t a x o n o m i c consideration totally absent in the partitioning. T h e narrative s t r u c t u r e of the t w o stories reveals a p r o m i n e n t plan o f b e h a v i o r (time sequence o r q u e u i n g relation) in b o t h stories, as s h o w n in figure 1.2.7. T h e story pattern is r o u g h l y the s a m e in each case. First, there is a t a x o n o m i c s t a t e m e n t establishing the location of " h o g n o s e s n a k e " (or heterodoti) in the s c h e m a o f snakes w h i c h is p r e s u m a b l y k n o w n to fit into the schema o f a n i m a t e t h i n g s , i.e., " s n a k e s " and is assumed to be k n o w n i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e reader o r hearer. T h e s e c o n d part of the story is the description o f t w o plans. In the " s c i e n t i f i c " s t o r y these arc explicitly labeled as the " a g g r e s s i v e p h a s e " and the " f e i g n i n g p h a s e . " In the i n f o r m a l story they are a n n o u n c e d by " h e docs a f u n n y t h i n g , " a m b i g u o u s l y referring to the entire b e h a v i o r sequence o r to the " a g g r e s s i v e p h a s e " only, and " [ h e ] tries a n e w t r i c k " f o r the " f e i g n i n g p h a s e . " T h e p o p u l a r story closes w i t h an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i z ing s t a t e m e n t a b o u t the rationalizations h o g n o s e snakes could be m a k ing in o r d e r to j u s t i f y their e x t r a o r d i n a r y b e h a v i o r . In the " s c i e n t i f i c " p a r a p h r a s e all reference to the snake's t h o u g h t s is d r o p p e d f o r o b v i o u s reasons. First, a w o r d is needed about t h e t a x o n o m i c subdivision into cultural d o m a i n s and subarcas. Since the p a r t i t i o n s are t a x o n o m i c , each l o w e r n o d e in figure 1.2.6 represents a s u b t r e e of the next higher n o d e . T h i s p a r t i t i o n i n g can be r o u g h l y pictured in f i g u r e 1.2.8. T h e lowest partitioning implies a classification by the attribute " n o n p o i s o n o u s " rather

Memory and Context

81 All of Long-Range Memory (All That Is Known)

F i g u r e 1 . 2 . 8 Taxonomic partitioning by subtrees, which the triangles represent.

than by a usual or customary taxonomic label. Unfortunately, a classification in a t a x o n o m i c sense and a classification by attributes are not that distinct. Attributes and attribute bundles are also the criteria for taxonomic contrast. T h e main difference which creates the feeling o f an unusual classification may be that "absence o f v e n o m " cuts across several species o f snakes. T h u s a subclassification and partitioning by an attribute or a set o f attributes can always be interpreted taxonomically, though it may be a classification that cuts across more conventional taxo n o m i c structures. In other words, in areas o f cross-classification, or in so-called semantic paradigms, it is always possible to select and isolate a single value o f a single dimension and make it the basis for a new or temporary classification, at least for the duration o f a discourse, or possibly, for longer time periods. Obviously temporary taxonomies are set up by speaking human beings all the time. Discourse may then proceed from one such temporary t a x o n o m y to the next. This implies the d y namic nature o f the partitioning o f long-range memory. In the language o f the spotlight analogy with the central hot spot, as the hotspot m o v e s across the face o f the dark long-range m e m o r y , with it m o v e the concentric circles o f the less and less well-illuminated related topics. In this picture it is important to note that the hot spot cannot wander at will but can proceed only into the areas nearest to full awareness. In this view it is the t a x o n o m i c relation that holds topics together. This applies to partitioning by attributes and to plans as well. Both can be interpreted as subclassifications by attributes, and both appear late in the subclassification o f taxonomies. T h a t plans, too, are kinds of attributes can n o w

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b e j u s t i f i e d . For e x a m p l e , the d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w beer is b r e w e d is o n e o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f beer, as m u c h as t h e d i r e c t i o n s for t h e u s e o f s o m e m a c h i n e r y arc also i n h e r e n t l y linked t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f its c h a r a c t e r istics. S i m i l a r l y , t h e d e f e n s i v e p l a n s o f h o g n o s e snakes are inalienable attributes of heterodons. O u r s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n will t o u c h o n l y u p o n the t a x o n o m i c a s p e c t s o f t h e p o p u l a r a n d / o r scientific k n o w l e d g e a b o u t h o g n o s e s n a k e s . T h e t w o phases o f t h e b e h a v i o r plan o f this s n a k e will n o t be discussed, t h o u g h b o t h f o l l o w a pattern analogous to the attributes s h o w n in f i g u r e 1.2.9. T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e g r a p h is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h e last p a r t i t i o n s h o w n in f i g u r e 1 . 2 . 6 c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e t w o sides o f f i g u r e 1.2.9. T h e left is b r o u g h t i n t o f o c u s in a f o r m a l scientific d i s c o u r s e , w h i l e t h e r i g h t is f r o m a p o p u l a r c h i l d r e n ' s b o o k and is b r o u g h t i n t o f o c u s in a s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , c h i l d r e n . T h e n a r r a t o r o f the story m a y have additional t a x o n o m i c information regarding h o g n o s e s n a k e s , b u t t h e a b o v e i n f o r m a t i o n is all that is g i v e n in the s t o r y , i . e . , it is all that can b e recalled ( m a x i m a l l y ) b y s o m e o n e w h o has h e a r d a b o u t h o g n o s e s n a k e s f o r t h e first t i m e . T h e t e r m " n i c e " a p p e a r s t o be a c o v e r t e r m , w h i c h later in t h e s t o r y b e c o m e s e l a b o r a t e d b y " h a s n o p o i s o n , " "has n o rattle," a n d " n e v e r bites." All these characteristics listed in t h e c h i l d r e n ' s v e r s i o n , e x c e p t f o r " n i c e , " are applicable b u t o n l y p a r tially s t a t e d explicitly o n t h e " s c i e n t i f i c , " o r left side. All c h i l d r e n are a s s u m e d t o k n o w t h e t e r m " n i c e , " w h i l e t h e y are a s s u m e d to b e less f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e relatively f o r m a l " h a r m l e s s . " H o w e v e r , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n (except f o r t h e p i c t u r e a c c o m p a n y i n g the s t o r y w h i c h s h o w s a s n a k e a b o u t 6 0 c m , o r 24 inches, l o n g ) d o e s n o t j u s t i f y c i t h e r " n i c e " o r " h a r m l e s s . " T h e t h r e e characteristics in q u e s t i o n (i.e., n o p o i s o n , n o rattle, a n d n o bite) are a p p l i c a b l e t o a b o a c o n s t r i c t o r as well, t h o u g h h a r d l y a n y o n e w o u l d call a b o a " n i c e " o r " h a r m l e s s . " In this sense t h e t h r e e a t t r i b u t e s m u s t be v i e w e d as a m p l i f i c a t i o n , i.e., f u r t h e r a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f t h e first m e n t i o n e d " n i c e n c s s " o r " h a r m l e s s n c s s " o f the h o g n o s e snake. T h e c o n c e p t s ( h e t e r o d o n ) and ( h o g n o s e ) refer t o t h e s a m e a n i m a l ; t h a t is, t h e t w o n a m e s f o r this s n a k e are referentially o r e x t e n s i o n ally identical. H o w e v e r , the two lentis are not therefore synonymous.

Though

( h e t e r o d o n ) a n d ( h o g n o s e ) m a y refer t o t h e s a m e snake, their a t t r i b u t e spaces, that is m o s t s i m p l y , " h a r m l e s s a n d n o n v e n o m o u s " a n d " n i c e a n d h a v i n g n o p o i s o n , " etc. are not identical. W e also k n o w that the t w o a t t r i b u t e spaces b e l o n g t o d i f f e r e n t u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e , t h a t is,

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" h o g n o s e " and " h e t e r o d o n " are not equivalent sociolinguistically. In o u r culture t h e w o r d " h e t e r o d o n " is classified as a scientific t e r m a n d " h o g n o s e " as a p o p u l a r t e r m . It is conceivable that o n e could elicit f r o m A m e r i c a n E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g i n f o r m a n t s sentences of the f o l l o w i n g f o r m " H e t e r o d o n is t h e scientific t e r m (name) f o r the h o g n o s e s n a k e , " a n d possibly also " H o g n o s e is t h e p o p u l a r t e r m (name) f o r t h e h e t e r o d o n . " T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e location o f t h e classification of t h e w o r d " h e t e r o d o n " as a scientific t e r m a n d " h o g n o s e " as a p o p u l a r t e r m is s h o w n in f i g u r e 1.2.10. Parallel t o a classification o f t h e attribute b u n d l e s o f w o r d s a n d sentences (their Μ and Τ triangles) there exists in h u m a n m e m o r y a classification of n a m e s , t e r m s , w o r d s , and spcech acts; that is, t h e p h o n ological (or g r a p h e m i c ) representations of speech units receive an att r i b u t e space all their own. T h e parallel structures and folk-classifications o f (heterodon), the l e x e m i c / s e m a n t i c representation, and of / H E T E R O D O N / , the p h o n e m i c (graphemic) representation, express t h e s a m e n o t i o n as C h o m s k y ' s (1965) dual s t r u c t u r e o f lexical items ( C , P ) w h e r e C represents the conceptual c o n t e n t a n a l o g o u s to (hcterdon) a n d Ρ r e p resents the p h o n o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t a n a l o g o u s to / H E T E R O D O N / . O u r (Nome)

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