Jews and Muslims in Contemporary Spain: Redefining National Boundaries [1 ed.] 3110637901, 9783110637908

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Consolidation of Spanish Democracy and the National Identity Debate
3. Spanish Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Arab States
4. Spain and the Jews
5. Spain and the Muslims
6. Final Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Martina L. Weisz Jews and Muslims in Contemporary Spain

The Vidal Sassoon Studies in Antisemitism, Racism, and Prejudice

Edited by Manuela Consonni Editorial Manager Martina L. Weisz The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Volume 2

Martina L. Weisz

Jews and Muslims in Contemporary Spain Redefining National Boundaries

ISBN 978-3-11-063790-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-064214-8 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-063831-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019937009 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck Cover image: Monument to Tolerance, Seville, Spain; photographer: Rubén J. Wengiel www.degruyter.com

Dedico este libro a mi madre, Dora María, quien tuvo el valor de elegir la vida.

Acknowledgments First and foremost I would like to express my gratitude to Manuela Consonni, Raanan Rein and Ethan Katz for their crucial support for the completion of this book project. During my research trips to Spain, I met many people who shared with me their wisdom, their experience, and their precious time. In Madrid, I enjoyed the help and the warm hospitality of Beatriz Fernández-García and her family, as well as of Rachel and Jacobo Abecasis. José Carlos Rueda Laffond, Professor at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, arranged access to the University’s libraries for me. I am also indebted to those who agreed to be interviewed: Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, Uriel Macías, Rachel Henelde-Abecasis, Ester Bendahan, Jacobo Israel Garzón, Sidi Karim Viudes, Julia Escobar Moreno, María Dolores Álgora Weber, Enrique Rodríguez de Llera García and Masha Gabriel. Gail Diamond also contributed to this work with her wide knowledge and editing expertise. She has been an incredibly helpful and kind person to work with. Lastly, this endeavor would have been much harder without the support and encouragement of my mother Dora and my dear friend Michal Padoa. As always, I am profoundly grateful to my life companion Rubén Wengiel, who makes everything possible by the power of his love.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-201

Contents Acknowledgments

VII

1

Introduction

2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

The Consolidation of Spanish Democracy and the National Identity Debate 8 Current Trends in Spanish Nationalist Historiography Teaching the Nation 19 The New Spain 27 Concluding Remarks 39

3 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.4

Spanish Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Arab States 40 General Considerations 40 Spain and Israel 40 Getting Closer 40 Strategies, Prejudices and Foreign Policy 45 Preliminary Conclusions 52 Spain and the Arab World 52 Formative Years 52 Culture as Power 56 Spain’s Energy Dependency 59 Constructing a New Role for the New Spanish Self 60 The Friend as Other 64 Concluding Remarks 66

4 4.1

Spain and the Jews 69 The Jews of Spain: Between Normalization and Invisibility 69 Antisemitism: The Spanish Way 81 Spanish Newspapers, Philo-Semitism and Anti-Jewish Mythology (1997–2006) 89 El País: A View from the Center-Left 89 ABC: The Conservative Shift 101 El Mundo: In the Footsteps of the Jew? 109 Concluding Remarks 114

4.1.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.3

1

8

X

5 5.1

Contents

5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.4

Spain and the Muslims 118 Immigration and the Revival of the Spanish Muslim Community 118 Islamophobia and Border Anxiety 128 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006) 136 El País: Supporting the “Alliance of Civilizations” 136 ABC and Islam: From Ally to Enemy 147 El Mundo’s Pragmatism 163 Concluding Remarks 171

6

Final Conclusions

5.2 5.3

Bibliography Index

187

177

174

1 Introduction Events taking place in Spain and its colonies in the late medieval period and early modernity were crucial to establishing the global structures of religious and racial difference that persist in today’s world. It was indeed in the Iberian Peninsula, during the 1430s, that words like raza ‘race’ and linaje ‘lineage’, which had hitherto been associated to horses and dogs, begun to be applied to Jews and “Moors”. This phenomenon coincided chronologically with the appearance of anti-converso ideologies, which would turn theological categories (like Jew and Muslim), into biological ones (limpieza de sangre).1 It is precisely this concept of “race”, one that associates issues of blood purity with relatively recent conversion to Christianity, which was later applied to the classification of peoples in the Spanish colonies. This ordering was crucial for the correct organization of a colonial enterprise whose stated mission was to impose Christianity upon a population of pagans and heretics.2 Yet the consequences of these developments went far beyond the already vast Spanish Empire. Indeed, it was through the repudiation of its ethnic diversity and the subsequent establishment on the American continent of systems of production based on the exploitation of ethnically differentiated groups that Spain established, more than five hundred years ago, the fundaments of globalized modernity.3 In Spain, the conceptualization of religious difference as a biological “problem”, and the subsequent hierarchization of the human population along “racial” lines was indeed an intrinsic part of Empire building. This intimate relationship can be encapsulated in three decisive events that took place during the historic year of 1492. That was the year of the “discovery” of America by Christopher Columbus, but also of the definitive victory of the Catholic Kings over the Muslim-Arab rulers of Al-Andalus, a cultural-political entity that had ruled major parts of the Iberian Peninsula for almost eight hundred years. Lastly, that same year the entire Jewish community was expelled from the Catholic Kingdom by Royal Edict, establishing a precedent that would subsequently

1 David Nirenberg, “Race and the Middle Ages: The Case of Spain and Its Jews,” in Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires, ed. Margaret R.Greer et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 79. 2 Kathryn Burns, “Unfixing Race,” in Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires, ed. Margaret R. Greer et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 191. 3 Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Euroecentrism and Latin America,” Neplanta 1.3 (2000): 537. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-001

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be applied to Muslims as well.4 After the expulsion of Muslims and Jews, Spanish “racial-spiritual” purity was preserved in Spain and its colonies through the ‘blood purity statutes’ (estatutos de limpieza de sangre).5 Considered as a proof of the Spanish people’s chosennes, this “purity” became a central pillar of the imperial task of global evangelization. These seminal moments in Spanish history have affected the construction of Spanish national identity until this very day. Up to the eighteenth century, no relevant political group contested the assumption that the Spanish collective body had to be protected from the “contaminating” influence of both Muslim and Jewish blood through institutions like the blood purity statutes and the Tribunal of Inquisition. The advent of the Enlightenment broke this consensus, although it did not call into question the self-identification of the vast majority of the Spaniards with Catholicism. Even the Spanish liberals and reformists of the nineteenth century, despite their strong anti-clericalism and their vehement repudiation of anything related to Catholic integrism, perceived Spain as a Christian State. In fact, they claimed that both the Inquisition and the blood purity statutes went against the essence of the Spanish people precisely because tolerance is one of the core values of Christianity.6 This trend persisted until at least the first half of the twentieth century. According to Christiane Stallaert, the ethnic identification of the Spaniards with Catholicism was not only a fundamental trait of the Francoist side during the Civil War of 1936–1939, but was also widespread among the Spanish “reds” (socialists, communists and anarchists). Furthermore, some of these revolutionary Spaniards, such as Juan Machimbarrena and Segismundo Pey Ordeix, interpreted their Christian identity as the negation of Muslim/Jewish identity, in spite of the pluralistic and philosemitic politics of the government of the Second Republic during its first years (1931–1933).7 With the advent of democracy after Francisco Franco’s death in 1975, Spain created the institutional and political basis for the establishment of a multi-

4 A series of decrees from 1501 and 1502 mandated the expulsion of the Muslims of Granada and Castile. In 1525 and 1526, the Muslims of Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia suffered the same fate. 5 Joseph Kaplan, “Jews and Judaism in the Political and Social Thought of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” in Antisemitism through the Ages, ed. Shmuel Almog (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 153 –160. The purity of blood statutes were in force from 1449 to 1860. 6 Christiane Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España (Barcelona: Proyecto A Ediciones, 1998), 48 –49. 7 See Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, (2002), El antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812– 2002), (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002), 308–310. See also Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 52–53.

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ethnic and non-denominational state. Since that time, the Spanish government has expressed its desire for historical reparation through a series of official acts, like the declarations of both Judaism and Islam as religions with ‘clear and deep roots’ (de notorio arraigo) in Spain, declarations which took place in 1984 and 1989 respectively.8 In 2015, the Cortes (Spanish parliament) passed a law granting citizenship to the descendants of expelled Jews, which constituted an important landmark in the long process of re-encounter/reconciliation between Spain and Sephardic Jews all over the world. Without any doubt, the will of the successive Spanish governments of the democratic era to reconnect Spanish culture and identity to its Jewish and Muslim-Arab roots has been reinforced with its incorporation into the European Community, due to the Europe institutions’ emphasis on pluralism, multiculturalism, and respect for human rights. This book analyzes the place granted to Jews and Muslims in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity, with a special focus on the transition from an exclusive, homogeneous sense of collective self toward a more pluralistic, open and tolerant one, in a European context. The Spanish case is particularly suitable for this study, given Spain’s crucial role at the genesis of the global hierarchization of the world population along “racial” lines that took place about five hundred years ago. Interestingly enough, by the end of the twentieth century globalized modernity had produced an inversion of the ethnic and religious patterns that led to its establishment. The obsession with borders and collective homogeneity that pervaded early modernity was challenged by the increasing valoration of diversity, borders permeability, and coexistence of minority cultures within the nation state. In that sense, the efforts undertaken in the Spanish cultural, social and political realms to adapt the country’s structures to these dramatic developments can be considered as paradigmatic of the reassessment of religious difference and national identity in late modernity. The main focus of this study is on the period 1986–2006, which witnessed critical developments in Spanish contemporary history, but the analysis extends beyond these dates. In 1986, Spain became a member state of the European Community, and established diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Moreover, in 2006 the Spaniards commemorated the seventieth anniversary of the beginning of their last Civil War. The study of national identity is especially problematic in the Spanish case, given the secessionist tendencies of some of its Autonomous Regions like

8 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 170.

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Catalonia and the Basque Country. The complex dynamics generated by these tensions have been taken into consideration in this work, but the focus remains on the construction of Spain as an identity framework. While the contemporary struggles over the construction of a Spanish collective identity have been given considerable scholarly attention, the specific subject of the remodeling of Spanish national identity vis-à-vis its Others has inspired a number of academic publications only during the last few years.9 Jo Labanyi’s edited volume Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain, published in 2000, was a pioneer in analyzing the country’s recent engagement with its “ghosts” and dealing with the often-blurred boundaries between self and Others in a Spanish context.10 This book, whose efforts are mostly directed at cultural theorizations, offers important insights concerning the challenges and particularities of the Spanish cultural scene. The study of difference is mostly centered on gender and migration issues, as well as on Gypsy otherness. Regarding the Muslim as Other, one of the most important works in this field is Christiane Stallaert’s Etnogénesis y etnicidad (1998), in which she analyses Spanish ethnicity from the perspective of its confrontation with the “Moro” (‘Moor’), through the lens of an historical-anthropological analysis. Equally important is Kitty Calavita’s Immigrants at the Margins, which examines the dynamics of immigration, law, race and exclusion in

9 Different aspects of contemporary Spanish national identity have been approached, for instance, in Désirée Kleiner-Liebau, Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2009); Sebastián Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain. Nation and Identity since Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Walther Bernecker and Sören Brinkmann, “La difícil identidad de España. Historia y política en el cambio de milenio,”Iberoamericana IV, 15 (2004): 85–102; Juan Díez Medrano and Paula Gutiérrez “Nested Identities: National and European Identity in Spain,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, 5 (Sept. 2001): 753–778.; Inman Fox, La invención de España (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 1998); Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, España: 1808–1996. El Desafío de la Modernidad (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1997); Jo Labanyi, Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain: Theoretical Debates and Cultural Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Antonio Menéndez-Alarcón, “Spain in the European Union: a Qualitative Study of National Identity,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 3, 3 (2000): 331–350; Charles T. Powell, España en democracia, 1975–2000 (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001); Carlos Waisman and Raanan Rein, eds., Spanish and Latin American Transitions to Democracy (Brighton, and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); Penélope Harvey, Hybrids of Modernity: anthropology, the nation state and the universal exhibition (London: Routledge,1996); Marsha Kinder, Blood Cinema: The Reconstruction of National Identity in Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and also all through the special issue of History & Memory 14,1/2 (2002), guest-edited by R. Rein. 10 Labanyi, Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain.

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contemporary Italy and Spain.11 In addition, Parvati Nair, Daniela Flesler, Ana Rueda and Raquel Vega-Durán have focused on the social and identity issues raised by Maghribi immigration to Spain from cultural perspectives.12 Furthermore, Barbara Fuchs and Susan Martin-Márquez have analysed Spain’s ambiguous role in the orientalized-orientalizing dichotomy from cultural and historical perspectives.13 More recently, Avi Astor and Ana I. Planet Contreras have focused on different aspects of Islam’s presence in contemporary Spain.14 More general works on Spanish alterity include Gabriela Yones-Aharoni’s MA Thesis (in Hebrew) on the “Other” as reflected in the Spanish cinema between 1983 and 2000; Danielle Rozenberg’s Minorías religiosas y construcción democrática en España, which analyzes the place of religious minorities in the construction of Spain’s democracy; and Joshua Goode’s Impurity of Blood, dealing with the meanings of racial identity in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain.15 Moreover, in La política de inmigración en España: reflexiones sobre la emergencia del discurso de la diferencia cultural, Belén Agrela scruti-

11 Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 12 Parvati Nair, Rumbo al norte (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2005); Daniela Flesler, The Return of the Moor. Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008); Ana Rueda, El retorno/el reencuentro (Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2010); and Raquel Vega-Durán, “United Spains? North African Immigration and the Question of Spanish Identity in Poniente,” Afro-Hispanic Review 32, 1 (Spring 2013):159–180. 13 Susan Martin-Márquez, Disorientations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), and Barbara Fuchs, Exotic Nation: Maurophilia and the Construction of Early Modern Spain (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 14 Avi Astor, Rebuilding Islam in Contemporary Spain: The Politics of Mosque Establishment, 1976–2013 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2017); Ana I. Planet Contreras, “Islam in Spain”, in Handbook on European Islam, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 311 –349; and Ana I. Planet Contreras, ed., Observing Islam in Spain. Vol. 28 of Muslim Minorities, edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Aminah Beverly McCloud and Jörn Thielmann (Leiden: Brill, 2018). 15 Gabriela Yones-Aharoni, “Representation of the Other in Spanish Cinema: The re-construction of Spanish Identity, from Democracy to Globalization (1983–2000)” (M.A. Thesis, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2005). In Hebrew; Danielle Rozenberg, “Minorías religiosas y construcción democratica en España (del monopolio de la Iglesia a la gestión del pluralismo),” Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 74 (1996): 245 –265; and Joshua Goode, Impurity of Blood. Defining Race in Spain, 1870–1930 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009).

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nizes the cultural and societal aspects of Spain’s immigration policies from the standpoint of anthropology.16 Finally, important contributions on the phenomenon of antisemitism in contemporary Spain have been published in recent years. These include Álvarez Chillida’s El antisemitismo en España (2002); Joan i Tous and Nottebaum’s El olivo y la espada (2003); Álvarez Chillida and Izquierdo Benito’s edited volume on Spanish antisemitism (2007); Jacobo Israel Garzón et al.’s El estigma imborrable (2005); Rodríguez Jiménez’s Antisemitism and the Extreme Right in Spain (1999); Baer and Zukierman’s Nuevo antisemitismo, viejos estigmas (2004); and Baer’s Spain’ Jewish Problem (2009). As stated above, this book analyzes the role played by both Jewish and Muslim difference in the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity. The fact that this kind of analysis has rarely been done before is rather surprising, given the many parallels and points of contact between these two ethnic minorities throughout Spanish history. On the other hand, this trend fits the pattern followed by the whole field of Jewish studies, in which research projects including both Muslims and Jews within a single analytical frame have been until recently quite uncommon.17 The second main originality of this work resides in the three different perspectives from which this process is analyzed. At the national level, this study follows its reflection in historiography, the education system and the public debates on national identity. At the international level, it focuses on Spanish foreign policy towards Israel and the Arab-Muslim States in a changing global context. From the social-communicational point of view, the emphasis is put on the construction of the self – Other (that is, Jewish and Muslim Other) dichotomy as reflected in the three leading Spanish newspapers. In addition, attention is paid to the processes undergone by the Jewish and Muslim communities since the democratic transition. Clearly, these distinctions are made for the purpose of analysis; these dimensions are in fact interconnected and mutually influence one another. Finally, the research on which this work is based adopts a trans-disciplinary approach, bringing together elements from the disciplines of international relations, political science, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies and

16 Belén Agrela, “La política de inmigración en España: reflexiones sobre la emergencia del discurso de la diferencia cultural,” Migraciones Internacionales 1, 2 (January-June 2002):93 – 121. 17 See Ethan B. Katz, Lisa Moses Leff, and Maud S. Mandel, “Introduction: Engaging Colonial History and Jewish History,” in Colonialism and the Jews, ed. Ethan B. Katz et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2017), 9.

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history. It combines a qualitative approach to the sources with the quantitative methodology called “content analysis,” to conduct the assessment of the images of “Jew” and “Muslim” as reflected in the three main Spanish newspapers: El País, El Mundo and ABC.18 It makes significant contributions to the study of racism and antisemitism, Iberian studies, european studies, and history.

18 According to data from the Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión (OJI) for April 2008, the average copy circulation was of 460,102 for El País, 363,195 for El Mundo and 264,842 for ABC. See “El País crece el 4% en marzo y encadena 11 meses de subidas,” El País, April 28, 2008, accessed January 1, 2019, https://elpais.com/diario/2008/04/24/sociedad/1208988010_850215. html. The quantitative part of this work is based upon Ole Holsti’s Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. See Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 2.

2 The Consolidation of Spanish Democracy and the National Identity Debate 2.1 Current Trends in Spanish Nationalist Historiography One of the deepest social and cultural transformations triggered by the Second World War was the reconsideration of nationalism as the main source of social cohesion and political legitimacy on the European continent. Especially in France and Germany, there was a widespread feeling that the hate and destruction that had ravaged their countries during the first half of the twentieth century were to some extent the direct result of the nationalistic exultation of the former decades, as well as of the xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes that had been encouraged by it. Since these two countries were the main pillars of the European institutions, this perception became one of the leading principles upon which the European Union was erected.19 Among other things, these transformations deeply affected both the research and the teaching of history, a discipline engaged since its very beginnings with the construction and reproduction of nationalist feelings and ideas. From the late 1960s onwards, European historiography chose to emphasize the common roots, rather than the historical differences among its member states. At the same time, the indoctrination in an ethic of war and national grandeur gave way to the teaching of the values conceptualized as “Western” in the international context of the Cold War: individual freedom, democracy, and European cultural identity.20 Spain did not remain impervious to these developments. Since the 1960s, the combined effect of the defeat of Nazism and Fascism in World War II and the beginning of a successful modernization process contributed to the Francoist régime’s steady abandonment of some of the most outstanding features of its national-Catholic faith. This Francoist adjustment to the new spirit of the times was mainly cosmetic: according to Ramón López Facal, the régime’s unwillingness to adopt an alternative conception of nation proves that, to some

19 See, for example, Cris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2000), 58 –59. 20 See Ramón López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 115–117. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-002

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extent, these modifications were a mere concealing of the national-Catholic narrative under the cover of a more democratic and pluralist one.21 To some extent, this superficial covering of the uncomfortable features of Spanish nationalism has continued through the beginning of the twenty-first century. As stated by Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, the majority of the works written up until the year 2000 by Spanish historians followed the lines established by the two main trends of Spanish nationalist historiography: traditionalist and liberal democratic. After research, he concluded that in spite of their differences, these two historiographic roots share an essentialist and teleological perception of Spain, emphasizing both the preeminence of Catholicism as a defining element of Spanish “essence,” and the identification of the fate of the Spanish people with that of the Spanish dynasties: This assessment is re-confirmed by the reading of the latest and more original books. Spain is always considered as a nation-state whose social structure is founded on a romantic identity which is necessarily projected into a common future [. . .] Spain is represented as a nation-state that remains essentially unaltered along the timeline and whose inner actors and social relations have been behaving for centuries as if they were moved by an internal clockwork mechanism. In this respect, the forgetfulness concerning the Muslim monarchies or kingdoms in some generalist books, or their marginalization to exotic chapters, conceived as a parenthesis in Spanish history, is especially meaningful.22

Pérez Garzón introduced the book La gestión de la memoria (‘The Management of Memory’), which he edited together with other scholars, by indicating that the volume was published in the context of contemporary debates on both the form and the content of the teaching of history in Spain. Furthermore, he signaled that the publication aimed at calling into question the centrality of teleology in Spanish historiography. These stimuli were closely related to the main thesis of the book: that history as a discipline contributed to the socialization of

21 López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” 113–136. 22 In the original Spanish: “Esto se confirma una y otra vez en los más novedosos y actualizados libros, y siempre España se da por existente como una nación-estado cuya estructura de vínculos sociales se fundamenta en una identidad romántica que se proyecta obligatoriamente hacia un futuro común. [. . .] se nos presenta a España como una nación-estado unitaria en el tiempo y cuyas relaciones sociales internas y sus actores se vienen comportando desde hace siglos como cosas que se mueven en respuesta a un mecanismo interno de relojería. Es significativo a este respecto el olvido de las monarquías o reinos musulmanes en ciertos libros generales, o su marginación a capítulos exóticos, concebidos como paréntesis en el devenir español.” See Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “La creación de la historia de España,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 109. [All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.]

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people in nationalistic terms, creating not only Spaniards, Basques or Catalans but also, and at the same time, Europeans and Christians. At the end of the volume, Pérez Garzón reached the conclusion that, if Spanish society is to adopt a democratic and multicultural character, then history, as the discipline in charge of the management of memory, should reflect upon its sources, abandon teleological explanations, and also try to see historical events from the point of view of its “Others”.23 This last point is crucial since, as Pérez Garzón correctly asserted, the construction of an open and tolerant democracy presumes the dismantling of the self-celebratory monologue disguised as national history. As always in the case of otherness, the key lies in the capacity to look at the past (and therefore also the present) from the point of view of the Others and in granting this perspective an hitherto denied legitimacy. To illustrate this point, it is particularly useful to analyze how the liberal and the traditionalist nationalist perceptions, which according to Pérez Garzón constitute the fundaments of contemporary Spanish historiography, shaped nationally constructed Others.24 The first example is the narrative on the Melilla War of 1859–1860, usually called the “African War” (Guerra de África). In his celebrated volume Mater Dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX, José Álvarez Junco outlined that the main innovation of this conflict from the point of view of Spanish nationalism was the fact that it brought together, on the practical level, Catholic and liberal nationalists.25 In spite of the discrepancies between these two different political groups, they both supported the Cortes’ (Spanish Parliament) declaration of the African War. Quite predictably, each camp used different arguments: while the traditionalist Catholics put the accent on the defense of the Catholic faith, liberals justified the invasion in the name of a “civilizing mission.” In order to show the similarities between these two apparently contradictory visions, Álvarez Junco quoted, on the one hand, the pastoral blessings given by the Archbishop of Madrid to the Spanish troops leaving for Africa, and on the other, an article published around the same time by the republican

23 Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “Condicionantes e inquietudes de un libro: a modo de presentación,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 9. 24 For an analysis on the developments of the liberal and traditional nationalist perceptions during the twentieth century, see Sebastián Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga. The Reinvention of Spain. Nation and Identity since Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17–44. 25 José Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid: Santillana, 2001), 395.

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representative Emilio Castelar: “‘You are –said the archbishop- the inheritors of the victors of Cavadonga, las Navas and el Salado. You are going to fight the infidels [, who are] enemies, not only of your Queen and your Patria, but also of your God and your religion’. Castelar’s exhortation, on the other hand, was: ‘Soldiers: you carry in your weapons the sacred fire of the Patria. Yours is the cause of civilization. The Heavens have chosen you to fulfill the great purposes of modern history. You will open a new path to the glorious idea of progress [. . .] Victory awaits you, Heaven blesses you.’”26 The crucial role played by the idea of empire in the liberal program for creating a modern Spain, so clearly expressed in Castelar’s discourse, was synthesized by Alda Blanco in these words: “the nineteenth-century intelligentsia articulated its present and conceptualized ways of bringing to fruition the liberal project of constructing the modern Spanish nation as one inextricably linked to empire.”27 In other words, both the liberal and traditionalist national narrative constructed Spain’s grandeur at the expense of the predominantly Muslim North Africans, who were condemned by these cognitive and ideological frameworks to play the role of an essentially inferior people whose – religious or secular – redemption could only lie in Spanish colonization. At the same time, the material profits coming from the supposedly “altruistic” and “moral” endeavors of colonization would greatly contribute to enhance the metropole’s “civilized”, “modern” and “Christian” way of life. A second example of the “othering” process in Spanish historiography (this time of the Jews) comes from Nitai Shinan’s doctoral dissertation, which studied the history of Jews in medieval Spain as reflected in early modern Spanish historiography.28 Shinan differentiated between three schools of thought concerning the history of the Jews of Spain: the Liberal-Radical, the Neo-Catholic integralist, and the Moderate approach. In his study, he reached the conclusion

26 Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 395–396. In the original Spanish: “‘Sois –decía el arzobispo- los herederos de los vencedores de Cavadonga, las Navas y el Salado. Vais al combate a pelear contra infieles [. . .] enemigos, no solo de vuestra reina y de vuestra patria, sino también de vuestro Dios y vuestra religión’. La arenga de Castelar, por su parte, rezaba: ‘Soldados: lleváis en vuestras armas el fuego sagrado de la patria. La causa de la civilización es vuestra causa. El cielo os ha escogido para cumplir los grandes fines de la historia moderna. Vais a abrir un nuevo camino a la idea gloriosa del progreso [. . .] La victoria os aguarda, el cielo os bendice.’” 27 Alda Blanco, “Spain at the Crossroads: Imperial Nostalgia or Modern Colonialism?,” A Contracorriente 5, 1 (2007): 6. 28 Nitai Shinan, “From Stereotypes to Scientific Research: The History of the Jews in Medieval Spain as Reflected in Early Modern Spanish Historiography (1759–1898)” (Ph.D. diss., the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006). In Hebrew.

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that the Neo-Catholics openly perceived the Jew as Spain’s enemy, and that, at least with respect to the Visigoth period, the Liberal Moderates shared this perception.29 According to Shinan, the only school that developed a different attitude towards Spanish Jewry was the Liberal-Radical. This approach, whose most prominent representative was Adolfo de Castro y Rossi, severely condemned the persecutions and expulsion endured by Spanish Jews and the conversos throughout the centuries. The discrimination suffered by Spanish Jews was seen by Castro y Rossi as an outstanding example of the Catholic Church’s cruelty. He transformed these past grievances into an important asset in his argument for religious pluralism. Quite evidently, Castro y Rossi’s primary interest was the finding of relevant evidence of the Church’s shadowy past in order to counter its contemporary political influence.30 On the other hand, this approach also granted legitimacy to Jewish perspectives on Spanish history, despite the fact that Castro y Rossi refrained from delving into the cultural and religious aspects of Spanish Jewry. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a period marked by the struggle between traditionalists and liberals concerning the essence –past, present and future– of the Spanish Nation, debates on the history of Spanish Jewry became prominent. In this context Castro y Rossi’s approach to the Jews of Spain could be considered not only as a necessary axiom of his political convictions, but also as the inversion of antisemitism as a cultural code, in the terms established by Shulamit Volkov.31 Indeed, what was really at stake was not the fate of the country’s Jews – numerically and politically irrelevant – but rather the possibility of re-creating Spain as a modern and liberal nation, in clear opposition to interests of the institutions that had traditionally led the quest for “racial” and religious homogeneity: “In sum, what Adolfo de Castro did was to hold the Church and the monarchy responsible for national decadence. The Jews served

29 Shinan, “From Stereotypes to Scientific Research,” 303–306. 30 Shinan, “From Stereotypes to Scientific Research,” 303. 31 In reference to fin-de siècle Germany, Volkov wrote: “Thus, antisemitism gradually became the hallmark of the right, perhaps even the center-right, in Germany, too, a prominent feature of its worldview and cultural style. In the situation of social and ideological polarization in Germany at the turn of the century, it became a cultural code. Expressing antisemitic sentiments and attitudes –even by some Jews- was proof of belonging to this patently ‘German’ subculture, a sign of rejecting anything perceived as valuable and meaningful by the ‘other side.’ [. . .] Antisemitism [. . .] By the late nineteenth century, it had a unique role in demarcating the borderline between two major positions in the German public sphere. It thus acquired a new role, one that it never had before.” In Shulamit Volkov, Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 115.

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him as the first example.”32 Paraphrasing Shulamit Volkov, it could be said that for Liberal-Radicals the public condemnation of antisemitic sentiments and attitudes was a form of rejecting anything perceived as valuable and meaningful by the “other side” (i.e. traditionalists). At the same time, the liberals’ enemies not only regained strength in their anti-Jewish beliefs, but also associated the liberals with the Jews in order to further their demonization: “Just like the men who are lost/ love each other by sympathy,/all sects and parties/amalgamate/and are united in the Liberal/reconciled traitors/Jews and renegades,/they all share the same opinion./Erased be from memory/the infernal Constitution/shall it only be remembered in history/for its eternal damnation.”33 Notwithstanding these differences, the disputes between liberals and traditionalists on religious freedom have mostly been disputes between Catholics concerning the basis of their common faith and its social implications: Since all the liberals were sincere Christians, Catholics, the conflict of Spanish Catholicism consisted in deciding whether the political and social life in the country should be rooted in the ‘Church-institution,’ which was far away from the social realities of the people, or in the ‘Church-community.’ The hierarchy and the national clergy were unanimous in the defense of religious unity for reasons of ecclesiastical politics, while the Catholic liberals were inclined in favor of religious freedom for religious reasons.34

Indeed, even the Spanish liberals and reformists of the nineteenth century, in spite of their strong anti-clericalism and their vehement repudiation of anything related to Catholic integrism, perceived Christian religious unity as a core 32 Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 402. In the original Spanish: “En síntesis, lo que hacía Adolfo de Castro era culpar a la Iglesia, en connivencia con la monarquía, de la decadencia nacional. Los judíos le servían de primer ejemplo.” 33 Cited in Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, El antisemitismo en España: La imagen del judío (1812–2002) (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002), 112. In the original Spanish: “Como los hombres perdidos/por simpatía se aman/luego, luego se amalgaman/todas sectas y partidos; /y en el liberal unidos/traidores reconciliados/judíos y renegados,/forman sola una opinión.// Bórrese de la memoria/la infernal Constitución/y sólo sirva en la historia/ para eterna execración.” 34 Fox, La invención de España, 191. See also Pérez Garzón, “La creación de la historia de España,” 79. In the original Spanish: “Ya que casi todos los liberales eran sinceramente cristianos, católicos, creyentes al fin y al cabo, el conflicto del catolicismo español consistió en decidir si la convivencia política y social del país iba a radicarse en la ‘Iglesia-institución’, que se quedaba distante de las realidades sociales del pueblo, o en la “Iglesia-comunidad’. La jerarquía y el clero nacionales eran unánimes en la defensa de la unidad religiosa por razones de política eclesiástica, mientras que los católicos liberales se inclinaron del lado de la libertad religiosa por razones religiosas.”

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element of the Spanish nation. In fact, they considered that both the Inquisition and the blood purity statutes betrayed the “essence” of the Spanish people precisely because tolerance is one of the fundamental values of Christianity: “The liberals from the nineteenth century refuted one by one the arguments of the Spanish conservatives, without affecting the premise of the Catholic essence of the Spanish people. Since Spain was Catholic by definition and tolerance being the fundamental message of Catholicism, the law of the Spanish society could not, in their opinion, be intolerance but rather coexistence, tolerance.”35 These considerations show the active role played by the Spanish nationalist historiography of the nineteenth century in the perpetuation of Jewish and Muslim otherness. This is particularly relevant because these were the formative moments of Spanish nationalism, whose echoes still resonate until this very day. Still, Spanish nationalist historiography has undergone some significant changes since then. Nineteenth century approaches began to be contested in the 1960s, and especially following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, by an increasing number of historians willing to reinforce the legitimacy of the country’s regionalism and “peripheral” nationalisms. This trend was reinforced with the establishment of the ‘State of the Autonomies’ (Estado de las Autonomías) by the 1978 Constitution, an important milestone in the process of democratic consolidation: “the historiography of the Autonomous regions created a new field of knowledge which challenged the centralist perception of Spain, of Spanish nationalism, and also the classical historiographic approaches focused on the modifications experienced by the State, whose highest form of expression has always been located in Madrid.”36 Spanish “peripheral” historiography flourished during the 1960s and 1970s, when it was considered a form of intellectual resistance against the unitary and essentialist premises of the Franco régime.37 As a matter of fact, this process constrained the further development of Spanish nationalist historiography until 1975.38

35 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 48–49. 36 Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “Los historiadores en la política española,” in Usos públicos de la historia: Ponencias del VI Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea (Universidad de Zaragoza, 2002), ed. Juan José Carreras Ares and Carlos Forcadell Álvarez (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 120. 37 Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, Historiographical Approaches to Nationalism in Spain (Saarbrücken; Fort Lauderdale: Breitenbach, 1993), 138. 38 Núñez Seixas, Historiographical Approaches to Nationalism in Spain, 9.

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Nonetheless, Spanish historiography underwent an important renewal since the 1960s. This was particularly evident in the writing of the history of mediaeval Spain, a prestigious field of Spanish historiography that has historically had an “enormous weight” in the formation of Spanish national identity.39 The development of medievalismo ‘mediaeval Spanish history’ was intrinsically linked to the process of Spanish essentialist nation-building during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although it lost its hegemony during the 1960s following the global trend of de-legitimization of nationalist historiography and the process of transition from dictatorship to democracy.40 In 1998, the twenty-fifth Week of Mediaeval Studies took place in Navarra, Spain. The aim of the meeting was to provide an historiographic account of the history of mediaeval Spain during 1968–1998. The papers of the conference were published in 1999, and two articles at the end of the book summarized the main trends identified by the participating scholars. One of these trends was, according to García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, the “acknowledgement of the existence in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages of two global societies: the feudal Christian and the Andalusian, each one with its specific norms of organization and functioning.”41 By 1968, Spanish mediaeval historiography was dominated by the “Mozarab paradigm,” based upon Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz’s famous conceptualization of the Iberian Peninsula as the “vital context” (contextura vital) of the homo hispanicus.42 According to that perception, the pre-Muslim Hispanic elements remained mostly intact after the Muslim invasion of the Peninsula, a reason why – in Sánchez-Albornoz’s opinion – the history of Islamic rule and life in today’s Spanish territory lacks any significant relevance.43 This exclusivist version of Spain’s mediaeval history slowly gave way, since then, to the predominance of a model originally established by the historian Pierre Guichard,

39 Jaume Aurell, “Tendencias recientes del medievalismo español,” Memoria y Civilización 11 (2008): 63. 40 Aurell, “Tendencias recientes del medievalismo español,” 65. 41 José Ángel García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, “Glosa de un balance sobre la historiografía medieval española de los últimos treinta años (I),” in La historia medieval en España: un balance historiográfico (1968–1998): XXV Semana de Estudios Medievales, Estella, 14 a 18 de julio de 1998, ed. Gobierno de Navarra, Departamento de Educación y Cultura (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1999), 818. 42 García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, “Glosa de un balance sobre la historiografía medieval española de los últimos treinta años (I),” 818. 43 For a more detailed account of Sánchez-Albornoz’s positions, analyzed in the wider context of his famous polemics with Américo Castro and the challenges of contemporary Spain, see Manon Larochelle, “Romanos, godos y moros en la construcción de la morada vital hispana: reflexiones desde el multiculturalismo y la interculturalidad,” Tinkuy, 5 (2007): 41–50.

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who described Al-Andalus as “a global Islamic society in the West” where Muslims, Christians and Jews coexisted spatially.44 Concerning the Jews, Julio Valdeón Baruque asserted that the period 1968– 1998 witnessed a “formidable impulse” in the studies related to the Jewish minority in Sefarad (the name broadly attributed to Spain in Jewish sources).45 This expansion followed the general growth of historical research on mediaeval Spain: by 1998, 95% of all the scholarly works on mediaeval Spain ever written had been published during the previous thirty years.46 This increased awareness of the important role played by both Jews and Muslims in Spanish history and culture, seen in the historiographic trends described above, contributed to countering, to some extent, the essentialist and teleological premises still underlying Spanish nationalistic historiography by the end of the twentieth century. Indeed, although the essentialist readings of mediaeval Spain by intellectuals like Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Américo Castro, and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz were strongly challenged during the 1980’s by the nuevos historiadores ‘new historians’ who adopted a Marxist analytical framework, these approaches kept their place in mainstream Spanish nationalistic historiography until the final years of the second millennium.47 Significant examples of contemporary reinforcement of the essentialist and teleological elements of Spanish national historiography are two of the volumes edited by the Real Academy of History in the years 1997 and 2000. These works, titled respectively Spain: Reflections on the Spanish Being (España: Reflexiones sobre el Ser de España) and Spain as a Nation (España como Nación) are based on two cycles of conferences previously organized on the subject. The years of the books’ publication coincided with a period of agitated national debate on the content of the history curriculum for elementary and high school levels, as well as on the meaning of Spanish patriotism and identity. In this political

44 See García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, “Glosa de un balance sobre la historiografía medieval española de los últimos treinta años (I),” 820–821. See also Aurell, “Tendencias recientes del medievalismo español,” 83. 45 Julio Valdeón Baruque, “Glosa de un balance sobre la historiografía medieval española de los últimos treinta años (II),” in La historia medieval en España: un balance historiográfico (1968–1998): XXV Semana de Estudios Medievales, Estella, 14 a 18 de julio de 1998, ed. Gobierno de Navarra, Departamento de Educación y Cultura (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 1999), 841. 46 García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, “Glosa de un balance sobre la historiografía medieval española de los últimos treinta años (I),” 813. 47 See Aurell, 2008: 69–73. See also Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “La creación de la historia de España,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 63–110.

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context, the members of the Real Academia, an institution that since 1738 has enjoyed the support of the highest Spanish authorities, felt compelled to “. . . present an improved version [of the curriculum], based upon the materials and methods of the Science [of history]. . . regarding the successive realities that this living subject, ‘which we call Spain,’ has embodied along the timeline.”48 Together, the two volumes collected the work of about thirty historians. The only woman among them contributed an article significantly titled España desde fuera ‘Spain from the outside’. As to the role played by Muslims in Spanish history, it is interesting to note that two different articles included in these two volumes related to the Muslim name of Al-Andalus as some sort of historic continuation of the Roman Hispania, from which the name Spain derives.49 This could be interpreted as the consideration of the Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula as an integral part of Spanish history. In addition, another article praises the relatively peaceful coexistence of Christians, Jews and Muslims in Muslim Spain during the tenth to fourteenth centuries, considering it as an important part of the Spanish past and identity.50 Even so, the overwhelming majority of the articles consider, with some variations, that the only real Spaniards are those who strove for the construction of a Christian, European and Western civilization in the Iberian Peninsula. The Muslim population that fought the Christian kingdoms in these lands over the course of almost eight centuries is explicit or implicitly considered an inherent enemy of the Spanish Nation.51

48 Real Academia de la Historia, ed. España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 11. For a brief history of the Real Academy of History, visit its webpage, accessed December 28, 2009: http://www.rah.es/laAcademia/breveHistoria/realCe dula.htm 49 See Eloy Benito Ruano, “En principio fue el nombre,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 18; and Joaquín Vallvé Bermejo, “Al-Andalus como España,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 77–94. 50 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, “Las ‘Tres Culturas’ en la historia de España;” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 189–193. 51 See for instance Miguel-Ángel Ladero Quesada, “España: Reinos y Señoríos Medievales,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 97, 108; Manuel Fernández Álvarez, “España como imperio,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 153–154; and Carlos Seco Serrano, “España: ¿Estado plurinacional o nación de naciones;” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 319–321. See also Luis Suárez

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The Jews of Spain were depicted by the works included in these two volumes as historically marginal. Though their historical presence in the Iberian Peninsula was acknowledged by Antonio Domínguez Ortiz as having left its imprint on the country’s national identity, the conceptualization of Christianity as one of the pillars of modern Spain inevitably left the Jews outside the most “glorious” national episodes.52 Moreover, “Hebrew culture” was considered as limited to the specifically religious aspects of life.53 On this point Domínguez Ortiz concurred with Miguel-Ángel Ladero Quesada, in whose opinion the Jews of the Iberian peninsula “did not have a culture of their own, except in what derived directly from their religion, and they adapted themselves in almost all the other aspects to the life of the Islamic or the European occidental cultures, depending on the circumstances.”54 With the coming of the twenty-first century, some important changes took place. Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga argued that since the late 1990s the ‘revisionist’ historiography not only challenged the hitherto prevalent notion of the “weak nationalization of the [Spanish] masses”, but also put into question the unitary and essentialist conceptions of Spanish nationalism. They described a more nuanced scenario than the one drawn by Pérez Garzón seven years earlier. In the context of globalization and the consolidation of the European Union, on the one hand, and the Estado de las Autonomías on the other, the ‘revisionist’ trend of Spanish historiography asserts the basic compatibility of simultaneous identity frameworks at different political levels, as well as their constructed character.55 In synthesis, it can be said that from one standpoint, a strong line of continuity with the essentialist and teleological tenets of nineteenth-century

Fernández, “Hispania: los fundamentos de la nación española,” in Real Academia de la Historia, ed. España como Nación (Barcelona: Planeta, 2000), 21–23. 52 See Domínguez Ortiz, “Las ‘Tres Culturas’ en la historia de España,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 171–193. The role played by Muslims and Jews in the articulation of the Spanish language has been acknowledged in Rafael Lapesa Melgar, “España, creadora de una lengua universal,” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 507. For the recurrent consideration of Catholicism as one of the pillars of Spanish identity, see Luis Suárez Fernández, “Primera forma de Estado;” in España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1997), 140. See also articles cited in the previous footnote. 53 Domínguez Ortiz, “Las ‘Tres Culturas’,” 172. 54 Quesada, “España: Reinos y Señoríos Medievales,” 98. 55 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 26. For a further analysis of the historiography of Spain’s Muslim past see Martin-Márquez, Disorientations, 300–323.

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nationalist historiography persisted until the beginning of the twenty-first century. From another standpoint, significant anti-essentialist historiographical trends brought into the writing of history some critical approaches that favored a potential disarticulation of the mechanisms of otherness at the national level. To some extent, these ambiguous developments were also observable at the heart of one of the most important tools of mass nationalization in the hands of the State: the education system.

2.2 Teaching the Nation During the 1950s, the Franco dictatorship began a progressive withdrawal from national-Catholic rhetoric and indoctrination. This effort, however, was mostly cosmetic, aimed at pleasing Spain’s Western democratic allies but falling short of building a pluralistic national identity for the democratic transition.56 One of the milestones in this limited withdrawal from national-Catholicism was the approval of the ‘General Act on Education and Financing of Educational Reform’ (Ley General de Educación y Financiamiento de la Reforma Educativa, LGE). This law, enacted in 1970, not only made formal education mandatory until the age of 14, but also eliminated most of the topics of romantic nationalism from the previous decades from the teaching of history.57 Twenty-two years later, in 1992, this process was deepened in the new historical context of a consolidated Spanish democracy with the LOGSE (Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo – ‘Act concerning the General Organization of the Education System’) decreed by the socialist government. The LOGSE introduced increased measures of freedom and flexibility into the education system, considerably weakening the State’s control of both textbooks and curricula.58 Since then, most of the decisions concerning the actual contents transmitted by the school system were left in the hands of the curriculum authors, publishing houses, and teachers.59 56 See Ramón López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 114. 57 López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” 114–115. 58 See Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “Condicionantes e inquietudes de un libro: A modo de presentación,” in La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder, ed. Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón et al. (Barcelona: Crítica, 2000), 13. 59 See Rafael Valls Montés, “La enseñanza de la historia: entre polémicas interesadas y problemas reales”, in Miradas a la historia: Reflexiones historiográficas en recuerdo de Miguel Rodríguez Llopis, ed. Encarna Nicolás Marín and José Antonio Gómez Hernández (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2004), 148.

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At the political level, this important reform was the result of the unwillingness of the Spanish government to use the education system as a tool of nationalistic indoctrination. It is logical to assume that the legitimacy crisis of nationalist discourse at both the national and international level influenced this process, although the need to adapt the State structures to the system of Autonomies also played a considerable role. From the point of view of the construction of national identity, the LOGSE opened the door for the emergence of multi-layered identities, based on civic and pluralistic values rather than on nationalistic and unitary ones.60 Yet like their Francoist predecessors, the socialist reformists failed to provide an alternative model of national identity more closely aligned with their democratic and pluralistic platform. In 2000, the scholar Ramón López Facal published the results of his study on Spanish textbooks from the beginning of the democratic transition until the end of the twentieth century. His conclusion was that despite the absence of any perception of Spanish history grounded on Catholic integrism, and notwithstanding the freedom guaranteed for the teaching of history by LOGSE since 1992, the concept of nation implied in the history schoolbooks was still imbued with the essentialist and nationalistic premises which characterized Spanish historiography during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.61 Interestingly enough, even though the educational reforms of the 1990s produced, according to López Facal, a mere concealing of the traditional Spanish nationalism, they were radical enough to trigger the outraged response of Spanish conservatives. In October 1996, Esperanza Aguirre, the Minister of Education designated by the recently elected government of the Partido Popular ‘Popular Party’ (PP), expressed her government’s determination to reform the teaching of the humanities in the primary and secondary levels of the education system.62 This conservative move, aimed mainly at rolling back the education reforms carried out in the 1990s under the Partido Socialista Obrero Español ‘Spanish Socialist Party’ (PSOE) leadership, emphasized the importance of

60 See Pérez Garzón, “Condicionantes e inquietudes,” 13. 61 López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” 156–159. Some of the characteristics of the Catholic Integrist interpretation of the history of Spain listed by López Facal are providentialism, anti-liberalism, and the identification between Catholic and Spanish. See López Facal, “La nación ocultada,” 121. 62 Valls Montés “La enseñanza de la historia”, 142.

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recovering the traditional teaching of history for the strengthening of Spanish nationalism. In fact, this was the first step undertaken by the new government in the direction of what was called the ‘Plan for the Amelioration of the Teaching of the Humanities’ (Plan de Mejora de la Enseñanza de las Humanidades), a public electoral commitment of the PP in which Prime Minister José María Aznar was personally engaged.63 Clearly, this “salvaging” of traditional approaches for the teaching of history was a key element in the more ambitious project of the conservative PP under Aznar’s leadership (1989–2004): that of reinvigorating patriotic feeling as a necessary step to furthering Spain’s role as a world leader. Minister Aguirre’s “Plan for the Humanities” (Plan de Humanidades) strictly specified the minimal common contents for all the humanities courses of Mandatory Secondary Education (Educación Secundaria Obligatoria –ESO), aimed at children between 12 and 16 years. Through this tightened control of educational contents, the PP wanted to make certain that young Spaniards would approach history as a chronology filled by data on the life and deeds of the “great historical personalities,” instead of dealing with the potentially more problematic analysis of social structures and contemporary realities, as was the case before the planned reform.64 The project was criticized on both political and pedagogical grounds. Yet the strongest opposition to it came from the “peripheral nationalists” of the Autonomous Communities, who rejected any reference to the unitary character of the historic development of Spain and considered it an attempt to impose a biased perception of history.65 In the end, the project was rejected by the Spanish Congress in December 1997, due in part to the negative votes of the Catalan political party Convergència i Unió (‘Convergence and Union’ –CiU) and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (‘Basque Nationalist Party’ –PNV).66 The “second round” of the polemics began in June 2000, when the Real Academy of History (Real Academia de la Historia) made public its Informe sobre los textos y cursos de Historia en los centros de enseñanza media (‘Report on the Texts and Courses of History in High Schools’), which to a great extent

63 See Carlos Arroyo, “La oposición une su mayoría absoluta contra el plan de humanidades de Esperanza Aguirre,” El País, December 17, 1997, 26. 64 Valls Montés “La enseñanza de la historia”, 142–143. See also Arroyo, “La oposición une su mayoría absoluta contra el plan de humanidades de Esperanza Aguirre,” 26. 65 “Tussell propone consensuar un libro blanco sobre la enseñanza de la historia,” El País, October 27, 1997, 30. 66 See Arroyo, “La oposición une su mayoría absoluta contra el plan de humanidades de Esperanza Aguirre,” 26.

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strengthened the arguments used by the PP to further its education reform.67 In the end, the report was harshly criticized by numerous historians, to the point that the Real Academy had to publicly acknowledge its subjective and therefore fallible character.68 These obstacles did not discourage the conservative camp. On 23 December 2002, the PP government succeeded in passing its ‘Organic Law of Quality of Education’ (Ley Orgánica de Calidad de Educación, LOCE). This new law prioritized competition among students and the promotion of academic “excellence.” It also established a special program for the sons of daughters of illegal immigrants.69 In what concerns the Nation’s “soul,” it “not only made the teaching of religion [either Catholicism or the ‘Religious Fact’ (Hecho Religioso)] obligatory but also reintroduced a traditional history curriculum permeated by an obsolete interpretation of the past.”70 According to its critics, this resurgence of traditionalist historiography and of mandatory religious education in the Spanish education system was bringing Spanish society dangerously close to National-Catholicism.71 As expected, the Catholic Church stood firmly behind it.72 In the end, the LOCE never came into force. The new PSOE government, which won the 2004 elections, set a two years moratorium on the enforcement

67 The Real Academia de la Historia has been granted Real protection since 1738. Its final objective is to make clear “the important truth of the facts, dismissing the fables introduced by ignorance or malice, and leading to the knowledge of the many things that have been obscured by time or have been buried by neglect.” Original in Spanish, available at the official site of the Academy, accessed November 1, 2009: http://www.rah.es/laAcademia/breveHisto ria/realCedula.htm. On the comparisons between the Academy’s Report and the PP’s planned reform see Valls Montés “La enseñanza de la historia”, 143–144. A reproduction of the Report can be found in http://filosofia.org/his/h2000ah.htm (accessed February 24, 2009). 68 Valls Montés “La enseñanza de la historia”,145. See also M. Mariscal and J. Oliveres, “Los académicos desatan la guerra de la Historia,” elmundo.es, June 29, 2000; and Susana Pérez de Pablos, “Los profesores de historia critican la escasa precisión del informe de la Academia,” elpais.com, June 29, 2000. 69 See the comparative table between LOGSE, LOCE and LOE available in the official site of the Universidad de Valencia, accessed August 13, 2009: http://www.uv.es/moaroig/leyes/Com paracion.doc 70 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 100. Students could choose between a course on Catholicism and another on the ‘Religious Fact’. 71 Juan José Tamayo, “Religión en la escuela: ¿retorno al nacionalcatolicismo?,” elpais.com, September 15, 2003, accessed September 17, 2009, https://elpais.com/diario/2003/09/15/educa cion/1063576807_850215.html 72 See, for instance, Celeste López, “Los obispos se movilizan por la LOCE,” La Vanguardia, April 21, 2004, 27.

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of the law.73 About two years later, on April 6, 2006, the socialist government managed to pass a new ‘Act on Education’, the Ley Orgánica de Educación (LOE) that repealed the previous acts and inaugurated another reform of the education system.74 Some of the more debated aspects of this Act were the decision to consider that the grades obtained in the course on Catholic religious education would be irrelevant for applications to academic institutions, and the inclusion of a new course in the curriculum called ‘Citizenship Education’ (Educación para la Ciudadanía). These two measures were fiercely contested by the PP and the Catholic Church –among other members of the conservative camp, who perceived them as means of political indoctrination and a tool for the spreading of secularism.75 Furthermore, the PP accused the PSOE of going “one step further in the dismantling of Spain,” by creating “17 different education systems.”76 This criticism clearly alluded to the freedom the new law granted to the country’s autonomous regions in the area of education. These dramatic statements were particularly surprising considering the fact that the modification introduced by the PSOE law to the minimum common contents of non-university education – which triggered PP criticism- was a very tiny one. The LOCE established that the common education contents should ‘at least’ (“en todo caso”) fill 55% of the school schedule in the Autonomous Communities having another co-official language besides Castilian, and 65% of the teaching time in those who do not have another language. The LOE ratified these percentages, but without referring to them as being the minimal ones.77

73 EFE, “El sector editorial cifra en 50 millones de euros sus pérdidas por la paralización de la LOCE,” La Vanguardia, July 11, 2004, 27. 74 For more details, see Eurybase, “The Education System in Spain, 2007/8” (European Commission), accessed October 9, 2009, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/ressources/eurydice/eurybase/ pdf/section/ES_EN_C7_13_4.pdf 75 See, for instance, C. Moran and J.A. Aunion, “El Congreso aprueba la Ley de Educación con el voto en contra del PP y la abstención de CiU,” El País, April 7, 2006, 40. A point worth noting is that the teaching of the Shoah was included in the course on Educación para la Ciudadanía. Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón in Madrid, October 13, 2010. 76 See Pilar Marcos, “El PP afirma que la reforma educativa ‘rompe la unidad de España’”, El País, July 23, 2005, 32. See also C.M., “EL PP insiste en que ‘habrá 17 sistemas educativos,’” El País, May 25, 2006, 55. 77 Article 8.2 of the LOCE reads: “A los contenidos de las enseñanzas comunes les corresponde en todo caso el 55 por 100 de los horarios escolares en las Comunidades Autónomas que tengan, junto a la castellana, otra lengua propia cooficial y el 65 por 100 en el caso de aquellas que no la tengan.” BOE 307/2002: 45194. On the other hand, Art.6.3 of the LOE establishes that: “Los contenidos básicos de las enseñanzas mínimas requerirán el 55 por ciento de

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The reaction of the PP representatives to the modification introduced by the LOE to the minimal common contents of Spanish education should be understood in the framework of the accelerated process of decentralization undergone by the country’s education system since the return of democracy. The decentralization of educational responsibilities was established as a national objective in the Spanish Constitution of 1978, and developed progressively until the year 2000.78 Between 1990 and 2000, the Autonomous Communities’ portion of the expenditure on public education increased from 50.9 to 82.6% of the national total.79 Although this process was the direct result of the correlation of forces in democratic Spain, where the political parties representing peripheral nationalisms were an inescapable political interlocutor for both the PSOE and the PP, it clearly contradicted the conservatives’ declared aspiration of strengthening and reaffirming Spanish nationalism. In this issue, the PP was caught by a contradiction between its support for educational decentralization due to the electoral pressure of peripheral nationalisms, and the will to reinforce Spanish centralist nationalism as a core element of the party’s platform and ideology. The place given to Catholicism in the Spanish State in general and the education system in particular visibly divided the conservative and socialist camps. Yet in spite of their differences, the limits established both by the 1978 Constitution and the imperatives of democracy (namely the need to negotiate with peripheral nationalisms and the representatives of different religious minorities, as well as to adjust internal policies to the international context) considerably limited the range of public policies. As a result, the policy differences between the PP and the PSOE were often more declarative than actual. Despite this, there have also been divergences between these two political parties on substantial ideological and religious issues, like the place granted to Catholicism and minority religions in the construction of twenty-first century Spain. These different approaches have been particularly evident in the practical and legal developments concerning the teaching of religion in the country’s education system. Freedom of religion and worship are guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution in its article 16, which also establishes the non-denominational character

los horarios escolares para las Comunidades Autónomas que tengan lengua cooficial y el 65 por ciento para aquéllas que no la tengan.” BOE 106/2006: 17166. 78 See Eurybase, “The Education System in Spain, 2007/8,” 25. 79 Xavier Bonal and Jorge Calero, “Política educativa y descentralización,” La Vanguardia, May 22, 2003, 22.

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of the State.80 Accordingly, the cooperation between the public authorities and the different religions is regulated by a Concordat between the Spanish State and the Holy See, on the one hand, and by Cooperation Agreements with the representatives of the Evangelical, Muslim and Jewish communities, on the other. In these agreements, the State recognizes the fundamental right to a religious education and commits itself to guaranteeing the exercise of this right.81 As a matter of fact, this commitment has only been fully met in the case of Catholicism. The reasons for this are obviously related to the traditional influence of the Catholic Church in Spanish politics, culture and history; yet they are also linked to the mutations undergone by Spanish nationalism. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the privileged status of the Catholic Church in official institutions and the public sphere stood at the center of the political divide between socialists and conservatives. In November 2004, the late Secretary-General of the Islamic Commission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España), Mansur Escudero, declared in an interview that the agreements that had been signed between the Islamic Commission and the Spanish State during the Socialist government of Felipe González in 1996, and that established –among others– the State’s obligation to grant Islamic education to those students who formally requested it, had been blocked since the PP’s arrival in power that same year.82 This was a logic consequence of the emphasis placed by the conservative governments of Prime Minister José María Aznar on the revitalization of Spanish patriotism along traditional lines.83 Therefore, the PP’s consistent resistance to furthering non-catholic religious education during the eight years they stayed in power should be understood in the framework of what Balfour and Quiroga call an “implicit ethnic agenda”.84 The election of the socialist José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to the premiership in 2004 favored the unfreezing of the Cooperation Agreements signed in 1992 between the Spanish State and the representatives of the Islamic and Jewish communities.85 On 15 October 2004, the government approved the creation of 80 See the Spanish Constitution, available on-line on the official website of the Spanish government, accessed October 21, 2009: http://www.la-moncloa.es/NR/rdonlyres/79FF28858DFA-4348-8450-04610A9267F0/0/constitucion_ES.pdf 81 Eurybase, “The Education System in Spain, 2007/8,” 4. 82 See Aguirre Gómez Corta, Marta. “Cuatro credos en la escuela pública,” elpais.com, November 15, 2004. 83 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 118–120. 84 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 118–120. See also Juan G. Bedoya, “Tres millones para las religiones minoritarias,” elpais.com, January 26, 2005. 85 This is also true of the agreement with the Protestant communities, which falls outside the scope of this work.

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the Fundación Estatal Pluralismo y Convivencia ʽState Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistenceʼ, whose objective was to finance cultural, educational, and social integration projects proposed by the religious communities that had already signed the Cooperation Agreements.86 In 2005 and 2006, the Foundation received a grant of three million euros, a small amount compared to the more than 150 million received by the Catholic Church during those years.87 Even though this lack of proportionality can be explained by the historical, cultural and spiritual centrality of Catholicism in Spain, it aroused the bitter criticism of the religious minorities’ representatives.88 Mansur Escudero was right in his assessment. The agreements established in 1996 between the Spanish Government and Islamic Commission of Spain had to wait until Zapatero’s electoral victory in order for religious minorities to experience a substantial improvement.89 In 2005 Spanish Muslims exercised their right to Islamic education in the public schools of mainland Spain for the first time.90 Despite this progress, by June 2006 Riay Tatary, Secretary-General of the Islamic Commission of Spain, denounced the fact that only 10% of the 74,000 students who had formally asked the Government for Islamic religious education in Spanish public schools had been granted that right.91 86 See the official website of the Foundation, accessed October 26, 2009: http://www.plural ismoyconvivencia.es/quienes_somos/ 87 According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute, the country’s total population by January 2005 was 43,038,035 people. See the official site of the Spanish National Statistics Institute, accessed October 26, 2009: http://www.ine.es/. Within that number, the Muslim, Jewish and Protestant population of Spain amounts to about two million people. See Juan G. Bedoya, “Tres millones para las religiones minoritarias,” elpais.com, January 26, 2005. See also J. G. Bedoya, “ʻEstamos cansados de la discriminación’, dicen las otras religiones,” elpais.com, September 30, 2006. 88 See, for instance, Juan G. Bedoya, “Protestantes y judíos reclaman igual trato que a la Iglesia católica,” elpais.com, October 4, 1999. See also J. Bastante, “Las religiones minoritarias critican la falta de ‘avances eficaces’ con el gobierno”, abc.es, July 30, 2005. 89 The regulations concerning Islamic religious education in public schools can be found in BOE 16/1996: 1624, accessed October 29, 2009: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1996/01/18/pdfs/ A01624-01636.pdf, and BOE 107/1996: 15597, accessed October 29, 2009: (http://www.boe.es/ boe/dias/1996/05/03/pdfs/A15597-15598.pdf . 90 Prior to that year, the teaching of Islamic religious education was only available in the public schools of the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla, in North Africa. See EFE, “La Comisión Islámica pide más profesores de Islam para reforzar la enseñanza, ” diariosur.es, November 20, 2006, accessed October 29, 2009: https://www.diariosur.es/prensa/20061120/ ceuta/comision-islamica-pide-profesores_20061120.html 91 See Ndeye Andújar, “La enseñanza religiosa islámica en la escuela,” Revista Bordón 58 (4–5), 2006. Reproduced in Webislam.com, accessed September 17, 2009: https:// www.webislam.com/articulos/33011-la_ensenanza_religiosa_islamica_en_la_escuela.html.

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Concerning Jewish religious education in public schools, it has been limited to the Jewish school, Ibn Gabirol- Estrella Toledano, founded in 1965, which is a private school with public financing (Centro Concertado) ruled by specific agreements.92 Interestingly enough, also in the case of the Centros Concertados the imbalance between the public funds allocated for the teaching of Catholic religious education and those directed to the teaching of minority religions is striking: in 2007, there were only three Centros Concertados devoted to the teaching of nonCatholic religions, whereas 2,376 of them offered Catholic education. This gap is especially meaningful considering that, according to an estimate by the newspaper El País, about 6% of non-university students profess religions other than Catholicism.93 Not surprisingly, in 2008 a survey from an organization dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Education, found that almost two-thirds of high school students were unwilling to work together with young people of Moroccan origin and that more than half of them refused to share their desk with a Jew.94

2.3 The New Spain From the end of the Francoist régime (1975) until the 1990s, Spaniards mostly avoided any public discussion concerning Spanish nationalism and national identity. In the center-left, the PSOE government from 1982 on chose to identify Spanish incorporation into the European project as the shortest way to political and economic “redemption.” The emphasis was put on the new opportunities offered by the future, and the overcoming of the internal antagonisms of the country’s recent past was considered a pre-condition for the maximization of the country’s potential. These aspirations were seen as a new form of patriotism, a concept systematically used at the expenses of the more problematic nationalism, often associated with the Francoist régime.95 In the conservative

For more information on the teaching of Islam in Spanish public schools, see Ana I. Planet Contreras, “Islam in Spain”, in Handbook on European Islam, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 331–333. 92 See M.R. Sahuquillo, “Yahvé y Jehová no van a la escuela,” elpais.com, October 1, 2007. According to Jacobo Israel Garzón, there are two more Jewish schools which are private and receive no public financial support in Barcelona and Melilla. Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón in Madrid, October 13, 2010. 93 M.R. Sahuquillo, “Yahvé y Jehová no van a la escuela.” 94 See Antía Castedo and Anaís Berdié, “El racismo cala en las aulas,” elpais.com, July 18, 2008. 95 Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “Patriotas y demócratas: Sobre el discurso nacionalista español después de Franco (1975–2005),” Gerónimo de Uztáriz 20 (2004), 46–47.

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camp, according to Balfour and Quiroga “Spain was mostly absent from the debate (except among regional nationalists) precisely because Francoist discourse remained untouched.”96 This avoidance of nationalist exultation by the Spanish leadership during the first 25 years of post-Francoist democracy was characterized by Ángel Castiñeira as a mere keeping up of appearances, originating in the will to distance from anything that could be potentially associated with the strong nationalistic ethos of the Franco dictatorship. For this reason, as soon as the Spanish society succeeded in modifying its image as a traditionalist, authoritarian, and backward country, during the 1990s, the latent nationalistic and patriotic feelings re-appeared on the public scene, coming from both the right and the left sides of the ideological continuum.97 The lack of public nationalistic rhetoric that characterized the transition to democracy was countered by the reaffirmation of the essentialist premises of traditional Spanish identity through the choice of national symbols for the new democratic State. An outstanding example of this is the National Constitution of 1978, considered by scholars like Ulrich Winter as a Lieu de Mémoire that symbolized the “reconciliation” between the former enemies of the Civil War.98 Indeed, the Constitution was perceived as an historic achievement that changed forever the Nation’s destiny, and whose validity and permanence were essential to its future development.99 Consequently, the concept of nation established in this fundamental text is one of the pillars of the construction of contemporary Spanish national identity. There are strong lines of continuity between the democratic foundations established by the Constitution and the nationalistic traditions of the dictatorial past. Balfour and Quiroga succinctly enumerated these enduring elements: “It is true that tenets of traditional Spanish nationalism underlie the definitions of nation and identity [. . .] The Spanish nation appears as an organic entity independently of the consciousness of the people who live within its borders. The 96 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 101. 97 Ángel Castañeda, “Naciones Imaginadas. Identidad Personal, Identidad Nacional y Lugares de Memoria,” in Casa encantada. Lugares de memoria en la España constitucional (1978–2004), ed. Joan Ramon Resina and Ulrich Winter (Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2005), 70–71. 98 Ulrich Winter, “‘Localizar a los muertos’ y ‘reconocer al Otro’,” in Casa encantada. Lugares de memoria en la España constitucional (1978–2004), ed. Joan Ramon Resina and Ulrich Winter (Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2005), 30–31. 99 See H. Rosi Song, “El Patriotismo Constitucional,” in Casa encantada. Lugares de memoria en la España constitucional (1978–2004), ed. Joan Ramon Resina and Ulrich Winter (Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuert, 2005), 224.

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monarchy is identified as a defining institution of the state. And although no state religion is conceded, the text postulates ‘the religious beliefs of Spanish society’, which the authorities have to ‘take into account’, and correlates them indirectly, although unmistakably, with Catholicism.”100 Other often unnoticed, problematic tenets of Spanish traditional nationalism influenced the choice of the National Day. In October 1987, a law established October 12, the date commemorating Christopher Columbus’ “discovery” of the Americas, as the ʽSpanish National Dayʼ (Día de la Fiesta Nacional).101 The approval of this law concluded a debate opened on December 19, 1980, when a group of Socialist members of the Spanish Senate presented a proposed law declaring December 6, the anniversary of the national referendum that ratified the validity of the Constitution, as National Day.102 After two rounds of debates, the Spanish parliamentarians dismissed the opportunity to establish the foundations of democratic Spain upon civic values, choosing instead to preserve for this new historical period a superficially purified version of one of the ideological pillars of Francoism, saturated with ethnocentric overtones.103 Indeed, the language employed by the new law to validate the selection of October 12 as the founding episode of the Spanish nation, despite the absence of any explicit imperialist reference, rather cynically states that the date was chosen because it symbolizes the historical moment (October 12, 1492) when Spain, which was “about to conclude a process of construction of the State from our political and cultural plurality and the integration of the Kingdoms of Spain into one Monarchy, initiated a period of linguistic and cultural projection beyond European borders.” [My emphasis]104 The text of the law clearly demonstrates the centrality of what Edward Sampson defines as a “self-celebratory

100 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 47. The authors add: “In contrast, the Constitution of the Second Republic had pointedly avoided any reference to nation [. . .] and used the term Spain in a markedly neutral way.” Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 50. The English version of the Spanish Constitution available in the official site of the Spanish Congress, accessed November 18, 2009: http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/c78/ cons_ingl.pdf 101 For the historical precedents of the decision and an interesting analysis of the entire process, see Carlos Serrano, El Nacimiento de Carmen. Símbolos, Mitos, Nación (Madrid: Grupo Santillana de Ediciones, 1999, 318–329. 102 Jaume Vernet I Llobet, “El debate parlamentario sobre el 12 de octubre, Fiesta Nacional de España,” Ayer 51 (2003): 135–152. 103 Vernet I Llobet, “El debate parlamentario sobre el 12 de octubre.” 104 See the text of the law in the official website of the Spanish Congress, accessed November 18, 2009: http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/leyes_espa/l_018_1987.pdf

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monologue” that ostensibly ignores the experiences and points of view of the Other in the construction of the national identity of contemporary Spain.105 In fact, the year 1492 witnessed both the military victory of the Catholic Kings over the Muslim-Arab rulers of Al-Andalus and the expulsion of the Jews. Moreover, the Spanish “projection” overseas presented in benign terms was experienced by the American aborigines as a terrible crime and catastrophe.106 The politics of memory and the construction of a national identity for democratic Spain have therefore been characterized by the effort to cover up the essentialist and discriminatory elements underlying traditional Spanish nationalism, and a simultaneous return to these rejected elements, often in an implicit form. These traditional nationalistic principles (often considered as negative and undesirable in the context of the European construct) were widely associated with the Francoist past that the new democracy aspired to leave behind.107 Yet, as we already saw in the case of the Constitution and the National Day, in spite of these efforts “Spaniards are still largely deprived of possibilities of identification with their nation that are not replete with religious, military or cultural imperialist symbolism.”108 Interestingly enough, both the national flag (with some modifications) and the national anthem (which to this day has no words), were taken from the Francoist years rather than from the Second Republic.109 It was against this background that the “coming out” of Spanish nationalism took place during the 1990s, as the successes of the democratic transition favored its return to the public sphere. Not surprisingly, the nationalist call came chiefly from the conservative camp. In 1994, José María Aznar, then a candidate for Prime Minister from the conservative Partido Popular

105 Edward E. Sampson, Celebrating the Other: A Dialogic Account of Human Nature, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 3–16. 106 According to Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk, a careful reading of the text of the 1987 law shows that, “Even though the political and economic aspects of the conquest were thus silenced to soften the imperialist ring, it nevertheless remained an imperialist discourse.” See Paloma Aguilar and Carsten Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” History & Memory 14.1/2 (2002): 139. 107 Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” 124. 108 Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” 155. 109 See, for instance, Serrano, El Nacimiento de Carmen, 77–105; José Luis De Pando Villarroya, Los Símbolos Sagrados de la Nación Española (Madrid: Pando Ediciones, 1992); and Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 553–555. See also the official sites of the Spanish government, accessed November 18, 2009: http://www.la-moncloa.es/Espana/ElEstado/Simbolos/default. htm and http://www.la-moncloa.es/Espana/ElEstado/Simbolos/Elhimno.htm

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(PP, founded in 1989 as a succesor of Alianza Popular) published a book titled España: La Segunda Transición, in which he presented his vision as a national leader. The book provides some important clues concerning the perception of Spanish national identity underlying not only his activities as Spanish Prime Minister from 1996 to 2004, but also the conservative project as a whole. The document generally follows the lines established by the patriotic discourse of the right from the mid-1980’s onward, which often left untouched the traditional underpinnings of Spanish nationalism, despite the conservatives’ many efforts to modernize their conceptions of national and collective identity.110 In 1994, Aznar wrote as the leader of a highly centralized and hierarchical political party with a Francoist “skeleton,” which aimed to attain power with a center-right platform. This centrist facade was eagerly abandoned in favor of a more straightforward rightist stand after the 2000 election, in which the PP won an absolute majority.111 In the introduction to España: La Segunda Transición, the conservative leader emphasized the fact that Spain, “like many other great nations,” has a plural character. He also expressed regret for the wrongs created by “religious intransigence,” a “wrongly understood” Raison d’État and the “fratricidal struggles” which “sent away” groups “whose absence impoverished us both humanly and materially.” However, he added, “from an historical perspective, our attitude towards difference has been characterized by acceptance and tolerance.”112 In clear adherence to the political values appropriate for a center-bound political party during those years, he claimed that he “was not and had never been a nationalist”, and that he did not believe in “attaining cohesion of the people through uniting against a common, foreign enemy.” He added that the “appearance of

110 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 120. See also Núñez- Seizas, “Conservative Spanish nationalism since the early 1990s,” in The Politics of Contemporary Spain, ed. Sebastián Balfour (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 121–145; and Núñez- Seizas, Patriotas y demócratas, 54–71. H. Rosi Song reached a similar conclusion regarding the PP’s “Constitutional Patriotism of the Twenty-First Century,” one of the most important documents of today’s conservative nationalism. See Rosi Song, “El Patriotismo Constitucional,” 223–239. 111 See Balfour, “The Popular Party since 1989,” in The Politics of Contemporary Spain, ed. Sebastián Balfour (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 146–153. 112 José María Aznar, España. La segunda transición (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1994), 29. In the Spanish original: “Como muchas otras grandes naciones, España es plural: multilingüe, diversa, heterogénea y pluricultural. En ocasiones, la intransigencia religiosa, una mal entendida razón de Estado o los enfrentamientos fraticidas han alejado de nuestro seno a grupos cuya ausencia nos ha empobrecido humana y materialmente. Pero, con una perspectiva histórica, nuestra actitud frente a lo distinto se ha caracterizado por la aceptación y la tolerancia.”

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an ‘us’, when supported exclusively by the fear of a hostile ‘them’” filled him with “sadness” and “deep uneasiness.”113 In these lines, the Prime Minister noticeably adopted the language of tolerance and dialogue. Yet his praise of pluralism and of the benefits of difference was only unequivocal in regard to the Spanish citizens from the different autonomous regions, which had shared a “common historical heritage” since the “Romanization and Christianization of the Iberian Peninsula”.114 In the book, Aznar argued that what stood at the top of the list of contemporary political necessities was the need for all Spaniards to agree on a great national project. The key to this national mission began, in his eyes, with the re-valorization of the glorious and benign historical role played by Spain in human history during its successive territorial and cultural expansions, and the consequent projection of this legendary past into a leading role in European and international affairs.115 This stand obviously ignored the voices and points of view of those ethnic groups who were the historical victims of the creation of the Spanish Empire. This “implicit ethnic agenda” underlying most of the conservative patriotic discourse, came to the surface in Cartas a un joven español (Letters to a Young Spaniard), a book published by the PP leader in 2007.116 The political context in which Aznar wrote Cartas a un joven español was considerably different from that of 1994, when España: La Segunda Transición was published. In 2007, he had already been the Spanish Prime Minister for eight consecutive years (1996–2004). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had taken place and Aznar, together with President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, had led the military intervention launched in March 2003 in Iraq with the stated aim of restoring democracy. Toward the end of his second mandate, and more dramatically after he left office, José María Aznar became an outspoken critic of “Islamo-fascism.” These circumstances triggered the “outing” of the ethnic and religious tenets already present in the conservative camp’s rhetoric, particularly in the context of Spain’s national identity. José María Aznar’s writings contributed substantially to this process. In his 2007 book, the former Premier did not

113 Aznar, España. La segunda transición, 30. In the Spanish original: “Ni he sido ni soy nacionalista. [. . .] No creo en la cohesión de los pueblos conseguida contra un enemigo exterior. La aparición de un ‘nosotros’, apoyada exclusivamente en el temor a un ‘ellos’ hostil, no sólo me llena de tristeza sino que me produce un profundo desasosiego.” 114 Aznar, España. La segunda transición, 34–35. 115 See, for instance, Aznar, España. La segunda transición, 31, 152–155. 116 See Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 118. See also also Núñez- Seizas, “Conservative Spanish nationalism since the early 1990s,” 121–145.

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hesitate to proclaim, in direct contradiction to what he stated in 1994, that Spain was a nation constituted against Islam.117 Moreover, he reinforced the essentialist and teleological arguments he included in España: La Segunda Transición in order to legitimate the primary role that, in his opinion, Spain was predestined to have in global affairs. In Aznar’s eyes, Spain has historically been at the vanguard of the “Western enterprise,” and for centuries has assumed its correspondent “responsibility and leadership.” Although he acknowledged that there have also been some shadows in Spain’s history, he argues that his country is essentially a ʽworld powerʼ (potencia). From his perspective, he himself embodied a historical project that connected the leading roles Spain has played in the past with those it is destined to play in current and future circumstances.118 Most interestingly, the former Premier delineates the “vocation of universality” of Spain as another of its essential characteristics, a “vocation” it realized by “bringing its culture into the furthest corners of the world.”119 In sum, concludes Aznar, “the Spanish nation has known how to preserve its inner diversity, and in its foreign relations it has always been generous.”120 Clearly enough, Aznar completely ignores the Jewish, Muslim and American aborigines’ perspectives concerning Spain’s “generosity.” The most salient element of the 2007 text is the combination of an emphasis on Spain’s “vocation of universality” with the uncritical adoption of repeatedly quoted concepts from Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI, together with an ethnocentric vision of Western culture: “The greater the Western influence, the more developed and just are the societies.”121 In fact, Aznar believed that his Fatherland had providentially been given a Christian “civilizing mission,” a task it faithfully fulfilled in the past and would continue to perform today, in the context of the West’s war against “Islamo-fascism.” Not surprisingly, many of these perceptions were projected and mirror-imaged in his description of the West’s

117 José María Aznar, Cartas a un joven español (Barcelona: Planeta, 2007), 162. In the Spanish original: “somos una nación constituida frente al islam. . .” 118 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 64–65 and 68–71. 119 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 80–81. 120 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 84. 121 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 157. In the Spanish original: “Allí donde el influjo de Occidente ha sido más profundo, las sociedades son más justas y desarrolladas.” In September 2005, Aznar did not hesitate to declare that the Western civilization is “superior to the others”, at the time that he asked for a “recovery of Christian values” during a meeting of the European Right. See Mario de Queiroz, “Aznar dice que la civilización occidental es ‘superior a las otras’ y aboga por ‘recuperar los valores cristianos’ en la cumbre de la derecha europea,” ipsnoticias. net, September 27, 2005. Reproduced by Webislam.com, accessed December 17, 2009: http:// www.webislam.com/?idn=2263.

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enemies: “they” believe they have an exclusive channel of communication with God; “they” are expansionist and imperialist.122 A deeper understanding of José María Aznar’s conception of Spanish history and identity, and of the role played by Jews and Muslims in it, can be achieved through analysis of two volumes dealing directly with those subjects that he recommended in his 2007 book. Regarding Julián Marías’ España Inteligible, Aznar wrote that, “If you want to understand what it means to be a Spaniard, reading Marías is not only a pleasure, it is a must.”123 Similarly, he described Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz’s España: Un enigma histórico with these words: “It is the best explanation of the origin of our country, in an erudite book, passionate and enlightening, especially now that the multi-cultural caprices are coming back. . .”124 Interestingly enough, the two recommended authors sided with the Republic during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).125 In España Inteligible, philosopher and member of the Spanish Royal Academy (Real Academia Española) Julián Marías approached Spanish history from the standpoint of the elements that, in his opinion, made it intelligible. From his perspective, Spain was the result of a common project born during the Visigoth period and violently interrupted by the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. This “historical enterprise” consisted of the “reconstruction, under different principles, of the old Roman Hispania.”126 After the Muslim invasion, the Reconquista (re-conquest of the territories under Muslim influence) became the collective project of an essentially Christian Spain, a project that finally culminated in what he called a “resurrection.”127 In this mystical genesis of the Spanish nation, Islam played a fundamental role of Other, as the polar opposite against which the Spanish Christian soul galvanized.128 The radical rejection of Islam, and the eight-centuries-long fight against it, became the backbone of the Spanish nation. In that sense, Spain was the fruit of what he called a “chosen destiny,” a struggle for the adoption of a Christian, European and Western identity in a territory dominated by Islam.129 Consequently, historically speaking, the “real” Spain was therefore Christian, and its historical project consisted in the defeat and elimination of 122 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 90, 92. 123 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 196. 124 Aznar, Cartas a un joven español, 199. 125 Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz was the President of the Spanish Republican Government in exile between 1962 and 1971. 126 Julián Marías, España inteligible: Razón histórica de las Españas (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985), 84. 127 Marías, España inteligible, 94. 128 Marías, España inteligible, 103–105. 129 Marías, España inteligible, 116–119.

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Islam as an inadmissible intrusion in the Iberian Peninsula. As a result, Marías estimated that even though the “inhabitants of Muslim ‘Spain’ could be considered as Spaniards, it is more than doubtful that it [Al-Andalus] could actually be considered as Spain, in any sense.”130 Concerning the Jews, they should not be considered as being on equal footing with “Christian” or “Islamic” Spain: “There has never been a ‘Jewish Spain’ nor anything of the kind.” Because of their limited number, the Jews were a mere religious “minority” inside “Christian” Spain (or Al-Andalus), and their status as Spaniards is “indisputable.”131 In the context of this teleological and metaphysical explanation of Spanish history, the “discovery” of America was seen as the continuation of the “Spanish project.” America became an “object of hispanization,” and the American aborigines were considered as “matter for Christianization.”132 Of special interest is the comparison between this positive account of Spanish conquest and colonization of America and the description in negative terms of an equally “combative” Islam: “Since Muhammad, the Arabs mobilized themselves towards the exterior of their lands of origin, looking for plunder, wealth, power, the extension of Islam; and the certainty of Paradise if they fail.”133 Toward the end of the book, Marías clarified that, even though the historical project of Spain might not be identified with Christianity in the present and future, this religious aspect is a key to the understanding of Spanish history and identity as a transpersonal enterprise guided by a transcendental sense of mission.134 In España: un enigma histórico, the historian and Republican politician Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz affirmed the existence of a homo hispanicus from the times of the “celtíberos,” in pre-Roman times. Muslims and Jews are, in his view, essentially different from the Spaniards.135 Although Sánchez-Albornoz did not refer at length to the role played by Spain in America, its conquest and colonization were unmistakably presented in a positive light.136 Similarly to Marías, he extolled the forceful territorial expansion and evangelization practiced

130 Marías, España inteligible, 134. 131 Marías, España inteligible, 134–135. 132 Marías, España inteligible, 172 and 415. 133 Marías, España inteligible, 90 and 101–102. 134 Marías, España inteligible, 418–421. 135 See Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, 2 vols. (Barcelona: EDHASA, 1973). First edition 1956; Álvarez Chillida, El antisemitismo en España, 433–435; see also Carolyn P. Boyd, Historia Patria. Política, historia e identidad nacional en España: 1875–1975 (Barcelona: Ediciones Pomares – Corredor, 2000), 246–7. 136 Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, Vol. 1, 57, 77.

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by Spain in the Americas, but condemned analogous behavior on the part of Muslims during the Reconquista. Sánchez-Albornoz argued that the Christian Spaniards never “fought Mahomet’s followers to comply with a religious precept similar to the one that imposed on the Muslims the duty to propagate Islam by the force of the sword.”137 In other words, the central religious dimensions of the Reconquista and the colonization of America, among other “Spanish” arguably “providential” expansionist projects were completely denied by Sánchez-Albornoz, who was only able to perceive this crucial element of Spanish expansionism through the mirror of a Muslim Other. In addition, he included in this seminal work a whole chapter dedicated to the ʽLimits of the Judaic Contribution to the Forging of Spanishnessʼ (Límites de la contribución judaica a la forja de lo español), packed with a considerable array of antisemitic myths and stereotypes. Succinctly put, the Jews are, according to Sánchez-Albornoz, naturally exploitative, ungrateful, oppressive, unscrupulous, treacherous, ambitious, cruel, ignoble, and have in the achievement of wealth the “essential goal of their existence.”138 That is why the persecutions, tortures, and expulsion they suffered at the hands of their Christian compatriots were largely justified. In addition, this history book so warmly recommended by Aznar states that the Jewish influence in Spanish history was by and large a negative one, including both the Inquisition and the blood purity statutes, thereby implying that the Jews were responsible for bringing on these actions against themselves.139 Notwithstanding this particular perspective, Sánchez-Albornoz began the chapter with a phrase in which, on the one hand, he denied the existence of anti-Jewish attitudes in Spain, and, on the other, he reinforced them: “No educated Spaniard feels nowadays any kind of antipathy towards the Hebrew people, but the vicious acts of the Hebrews against Spain remain alive.”140 These considerations reveal some of the deep contradictions that permeated the PP leadership’s perceptions of Spanish history and identity. All too often, statements in favor of religious tolerance and pluralism were contradicted by conceptualizations of Spanish national identity as exclusively Christian. In the socialist camp, the objective of recovering a patriotic discourse rooted in the Spanish democratic and republican legacy that could be adapted to the context of contemporary Spain has remained constant since 137 Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, Vol. 1, 303. 138 Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, Vol. 2, 163–297, esp. 227. 139 Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, 284–297. 140 Sánchez-Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, 163.

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the mid-1980s.141 Generally speaking, only a few socialists would deny the existence of Spain as a nation with deep historic roots, even if the stress on Spanish “essence” has had a much lower profile in the socialist political platform than in the conservative one. However, this traditional nationalism coexisted with a leftist reinvention of Spain as a “modern, European and democratic nation” whose foundational myths were the transition to democracy and the 1978 Constitution. Besides, the PSOE holds, together with the rest of the political left, a “fragmented” notion of Spain, characterized by the constant tension between “national solidarity and regional devolution.”142 In this intricate context, the publication in 2001 of Mater dolorosa by José Álvarez Junco deserves special attention. Álvarez Junco is a leading Spanish historian ideologically associated with the center-left, who worked as the General Director of the ʽCenter of Political and Constitutional Studiesʼ (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales), which was dependent on the Prime Minister’s Office (Ministerio de la Presidencia) during the socialist premiership of 2004–2008.143 Mater dolorosa appeared at a crucial political moment. In March 2000, the PP had won the general elections that brought it to government for a second term, this time with an absolute majority. Once in power, the conservative intellectuals and politicians put in practice a program for the “re-nationalization” of Spain, on which they had been working for several years.144 The time was ripe for a competent historical account of Spanish nationalism from an ideological perspective closer to the PSOE to be published and to counter the conservative initiative. José Álvarez Junco opened his Mater dolorosa with a harsh criticism of the essentialist accounts of Spanish history and identity. A few pages later, he went even further and characterized the centuries-long fight of the Iberian Catholics against the Muslim kingdoms as a “crusade.” Perhaps not coincidently, he added in the crucial year of 2001, when religion made a dramatic comeback into international politics, that the crusades were a Christian version of the Islamic Jihad. In a few lines, the historian unraveled one of the most important collective projections of Spanish history: the Christian inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula behaved just like their Muslim enemies not only by fighting their own “Holy war,” but also by adopting a Christian version of Mahomet

141 See Núñez-Seixas, Patriotas y demócratas, 71–72. 142 Balfour and Quiroga, The Reinvention of Spain, 95–97. 143 The objective of the Center is the “study, research and publication of political and constitutional matters”. See the Center’s official website, accessed December 22, 2009: http://www. cepc.es/inicio.asp 144 Núñez Seixas, Patriotas y demócratas, 60.

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through the sanctified figure of Santiago “Matamoros” (ʽSaint James “the Moor Killer” ʼ), Patron of Spain. The name of Santiago, he added, “was used as a rallying and an attacking cry by the Spaniards, not only during the Middle Ages, but also during the conquest of America”.145 In this iconoclastic first chapter, Álvarez Junco unmasked the mirror-imaging in the self-celebratory accounts of Christian Spain’s history written by historians like Julián Marías and Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. The dividing line between “us” and “them” became blurred, and the nationalist reader was challenged to search for a new, more nuanced understanding of Spanish history. At a collective level, the Other was re-located inside the self. Regarding the American continent, the historian referred succinctly to that historical episode, in a rather detached way: the “discovery of some immense lands previously unknown for the Europeans,” he related, would “provide formidable incomes [. . .] to the Castilian crown during the following centuries. . .”146 Indeed, it is not insignificant that Mater dolorosa concentrated on the Spanish nationalism of the nineteenth century. It is incorrect, in Álvarez Junco’s opinion, to refer to political nationalism in the context of earlier centuries. What took place before that period could be considered as the cultural base of nationalism, or even “ethnic patriotism,” but not “pre-” or “proto-” nationalism. This conceptual distinction emphasized the element of choice in the creation of a collective identity for modern Spain. In fact, his focus on the nascent nationalism in the politically effervescent nineteenth-century Spain revealed the different, and sometimes even contradictory interpretations of the past over which the intellectuals of the period constructed their idea of Spain. In other words, José Álvarez Junco’s Mater dolorosa provided a perspective on Spanish history and identity from which a multiplicity of futures became possible. There was no inherent, “chosen” or teleological destiny. National identities are the peoples’ construction, and the only boundaries to its future development should, in Álvarez Junco’s eyes, be the use of peaceful, evolutionary and civilized means.147 There is an obvious asymmetry between the writings of a politician like José María Aznar and those of a historian like José Álvarez Junco. However, the analysis of Aznar’s texts is especially relevant because of the leading role he

145 Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 43. 146 Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 48. 147 José Álvarez Junco, paper presented at the Encuentro Cataluña-España de académicos e intelectuales, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer, January 14, 2006, Barcelona, Accessed December 24, 2009: http://www.upf.edu/enoticies/0506/_pdf/encuent/al varez.pdf. Page 17.

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had in the PP during a period of time in which the importance of Spanish symbols and identity were central to the party’s political platform. The comparison between Álvarez Junco’s book and those of Julián Marías and Sánchez Albornoz, all of them renowned Spanish intellectuals, is more symmetrical and no less interesting.

2.4 Concluding Remarks Since the return of democracy, the Spaniards have been faced with the task of constructing a national identity that could be considered legitimate in the contemporary European and global contexts. This was not an easy task since in Spain, as in most countries of the world, the process of nation-building has been concomitant with the construction of significant Others, a mechanism often problematic in post-holocaust Europe. The disarticulation of the mechanisms of otherness can therefore be considered as one of the most important challenges involved in the re-creation of Spanish identity after the return of democracy. This process is particularly complex because it implies not only a change in the previous distribution of material and immaterial values at the national level, but also a re-positioning of the country in the global scene. For instance, the maintenance of a perception of Spain as essentially characterized by goodness, power, leadership, and altruism necessarily entails ignoring those voices whose individual or collective experience contradicts that perception. From another standpoint, the acknowledgement of the fallible and perfectible condition of the nation could be perceived as harmful to the country’s national interest, since it opens the door to claims for reparative actions by its historical victims. This chapter evidenced the great malleability of national narratives, and the ease with which they can be adapted, at least superficially, to the spirit of the times. Yet the main challenges remain at the material level, where conceptual frameworks shape reality. That is why the almost universally consensual endorsement of pluralism, diversity and understanding between the different peoples and religions has often been countered by a less evident permanence of the most discriminatory and exclusivist traditions of Spanish nationalism. This central contradiction has permeated historiography, the education system, and also the different conceptions of nation that predominate in the country’s public space. In the following chapter we will focus on a complementary aspect of the place granted to Muslims and Jews in Spanish national narratives: Spain’s international relations with Israel and the Arab world.

3 Spanish Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Arab States 3.1 General Considerations The construction and reconstruction of identities always takes place in the context of relationships with the surrounding world. In the Spanish case, the year 1492 marked a seminal moment in the construction of its collective identity, through a series of events that established its boundaries vis-à-vis Others located both inside and outside the collective Us’ territory. As stated before, this was not only the year of the “discovery” of America, but also of the definitive victory of the Catholic Kings over the Muslim-Arab rulers of Al-Andalus (located in today Spain’s south), and the expulsion of the Jews from the Catholic Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. In previous chapters, we saw how the different interpretations concerning these historical events are still shaping the national narratives of contemporary Spain. In this chapter, we will consider the country’s approach to Muslims and Jews in the present by analyzing Spain’s contemporary relationships with Israel and the Arab countries (two international forces where these two historic Spanish Others are a majority).

3.2 Spain and Israel 3.2.1 Getting Closer Spain was the last member state of the European Community to formally establish diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, on 17 January 1986. For thirtyeight years following Israel’s Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948, the full development of diplomatic contacts was prevented by a plurality of factors among which the Israeli-Arab conflict was predominant. During 1948–1949, the Franco régime was eager to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, in an effort to ensure support for Spain in a hostile international milieu. At that time, Israel choose to turn down the Spanish offer on the basis of the country’s position of formal neutrality during the Second World War, the open sympathy of the Franco régime towards Nazi Germany, and also because of the ideological and material support granted by numerous Jews living in Mandatory Palestine to the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish government quickly turned this early refusal https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-003

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into a valuable asset in its relationship with the Arab world. During the 1950s, the initial roles adopted by Spain and Israel were reversed, and in 1956 it was Spain’s turn to reject Israel’s request for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. By then, Spain’s closeness to the Arab countries, known as the ʽtraditional Spanish-Arab friendshipʼ (tradicional amistad hispano-árabe), had become one of the pillars of its international policy. The potential benefits that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel might have brought to the country were unambiguously outweighed by the negative impact such relations were likely to have on its relations with its strategic Arab allies.148 On January 17, 1986, Franco’s “Israeli legacy” to the Spanish democracy – as described by the late Israeli diplomat Shmuel Hadas- was finally abandoned by the socialist Prime Minister Felipe González.149 Through a joint declaration signed by González together with his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres at The Hague (at the time the Dutch government was in charge of the rotating presidency of the European Community), the diplomatic “anomaly” was overcome and full diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. This important political step was not adopted without concern for the potential Arab reactions to it, and a series of diplomatic measures were adopted in order to ensure the continuity of Spanish-Arab friendship. A week before the Hague declaration, on January 10, 1986, the Spanish government called in the Council of Ambassadors of the Arab countries to formally inform them that during the following semester diplomatic relations would be established with the State of Israel.150 The message conveyed was unambiguous: the “traditional Spanish-Arab friendship” remained unchanged from the Spanish point of view in spite of the rapprochement with Israel. This position was formalized in the ʽDeclaration of the Spanish Government on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israelʼ (Declaración del Gobierno de España con 148 For an exhaustive analysis of Israeli-Spanish relations during 1948–1956 and beyond, see Raanan Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 149 Shmuel Hadas was the first Israeli Ambassador to Spain, and played a significant role in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. See Darío Valcárcel, “Israel y España, veinte años después,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 53–56. See also Shmuel Hadas, “Un legado para la transición: Israel,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (2007) (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 45–51. 150 Loles Oliván, “Prosionismo frente a pro-palestinismo: los gobiernos del PSOE, Israel y Palestina,” in España y la cuestión palestina, ed. Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio and Isaías Barreñada (Madrid: Los libros de la catarata, 2003), 81.

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motivo del establecimiento de relaciones con Israel) issued simultaneously with the joint Spanish-Israeli declaration declaring the establishment of full diplomatic relations. The Spanish government’s unilateral Declaration, which tripled in length the one issued together with Israel, affirmed the country’s representative intentions to “maintain its traditional policies of friendship and solidarity with the Arab World,” which is “tightly connected to Spain by virtue of a shared history and culture.”151 As a manifestation of this political determination, on August 14, 1986, the Spanish government granted diplomatic status to the office of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) established in Madrid. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel had important repercussions for the Spanish state’s approach to the Jews of Spain. The relatively short Spanish-Israeli declaration from The Hague referred to the “deep and ancient bonds uniting the Spanish and the Jewish peoples,” as one of the reasons for the establishment of official ties between the States. In the unilateral Spanish declaration the “feelings of friendship towards the Jewish people, whose legacy forms part of the cultural and historic patrimony of Spain,” are one of the main justifications listed for this important foreign policy shift.152 As a matter of fact, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel paved the way for a series of institutional and cultural moves aimed at what the Spanish officials called the “re-encounter,” and the Israelis termed the “reconciliation,” between the Spanish authorities and the Jewish people. The different terminology employed by the different countries was obviously not devoid of political significance. The Israeli term of “reconciliation” implied the existence of historical wrongs of the Spanish state towards the Jewish people – such as the expulsion of the Jews, the blood purity statutes and Franco’s connivance with Hitler and Mussolini – wrongs which had been overcome but not forgotten. The word “re-encounter,” on the other hand, brings up the memory of a shared past –the original “encounter” – evoked in neutral terms. From the

151 The commentary on the difference in length between the two declarations was made by the Israeli Ambassador Víctor Harel in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 37. See the monograph on Israel from September 2008 available in the web site of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, accessed January 25, 2010: http://www.maec.es/es/MenuPpal/Paises/ArbolPaises/Israel/Mono grafia/Documents/Israel.pdf, 33–34. 152 Monograph on Israel from September 2008 available in the web site of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, accessed January 25, 2010: http://www.maec. es/es/MenuPpal/Paises/ArbolPaises/Israel/Monografia/Documents/Israel.pdf, 33–34

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Spanish point of view, there were no “wrongs” to feel sorry about concerning the Jews. Despite these differences, both Spaniards and Israelis agreed in the need to open a brand new page in their relationships. Two days after signing the Declaration, the Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres noted that “the Golden Age brought to an end by Isabella the Catholic is being opened again.”153 Since that historic day, the Spanish government has promoted a series of measures aimed at furthering the normalization of Jewish life in Spain. This political will was especially explicit during 1992, the year of the commemoration of the fifth centenary of the “Discovery of America” which coincided with the anniversary of the expulsion of the Jews from Spanish soil. Some of the unprecedented events that took place during that year were the visit of the King and the Queen of Spain to the Madrid Synagogue on March 31 (the first such visit in Spanish history); the signing of a Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish government and the official organization of the Spanish Jewish Community (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España); and the implementation of Sefarad ’92, a special program aiming at ʽre-discovering Jewish Spainʼ (redescubrir la España Judía).154 Despite the lack of any official Spanish apology for the treatment given to the Jews throughout history, the space offered in the cultural and political spheres to diverse Jewish voices made room for a more pluralistic understanding of Spanish past and identity. In an article from 2007 dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the Hague declaration, the Spanish Ambassador to Israel unambiguously affirmed: “Israel is in some ways what prevents a complete separation [of Spain] from an essential part of its historic past.”155 Indeed, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel favored an increasing cultural exchange between the two countries’ civil societies. This trend is especially visible in the number of Israeli authors whose books are popular in Spain, and in the growing Israeli interest in Spanish language and culture. In the case of the translation into Spanish of works by Israeli authors, their number steadily increased between the end of the 1980s until 1993, when their popularity rose significantly. Since 1993, the work of Israeli authors on a variety of

153 Cited in José Antonio Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad: La política de España hacia sus judíos en el siglo XX (Barcelona: Riopiedras Ediciones, 1993), 344. 154 Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 349–369. 155 Eudaldo Mirapeix, “Factores que condicionan las relaciones hispano-israelíes,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 33.

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subjects have been more widely read by the Spanish public. This tendency coincides with the success of Israeli writers in the European market, although Spaniards still read fewer works translated from Hebrew than the Germans or French.156 As for Israeli interest in Spain and in Hispanic studies, these areas have experienced a veritable “boom” especially since the mid-1990s.157 For example, the number of secondary schools in Israel where Spanish is taught as a foreign language increased from 10 in the academic year 1998–1999 to 42 in the year 2004– 2005. During the same period, the number of Spanish language students at Israeli universities almost doubled.158 Among the reasons for this growing interest are the local community of Spanish speakers, who amount to 2.3% of the Israeli population; the 100,000 people in Israel who speak judeo-español (also known as Ladino; the language is a version of the old Spanish spoken by the Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 and still used by some of their descendants); the attraction exerted by Latin America as a tourist destination for young Israelis; and also the remarkable success of Latin American soap operas among the Israeli population.159 As interest in the artistic, cultural and scientific production of each other’s countries grows, so does the possibility for new forms of perception and understanding between the two peoples. Two specific initiatives of the Spanish government favored this rapprochement: the opening of a branch of the Instituto Cervantes in Tel Aviv in 1998, and the launching of the Casa Sefarad-Israel in December 2006. The former is an Institute financed by the Spanish government and aimed at contributing to the dissemination of the Spanish language and culture throughout the world; while the latter seeks to strengthen the social, cultural and economic relations between Spain and Israel, as well as to promote Spanish understanding of Jewish culture.160

156 According to data provided by Nili Cohen, Director General of the Institute for the Translation of Hebrew Literature, in an event held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on May 16, 2010. 157 See Ruth Fine, “El hispanismo en Israel,” in España e Israel: Una relación de veinte años, ed. Jacobo Israel Garzón (Madrid: FCJE-Hebraica Ediciones, 2006), 47; and Israel Garzón, “Autores israelíes publicados en España,” in España e Israel: Una relación de veinte años, ed. Jacobo Israel Garzón (Madrid: FCJE-Hebraica Ediciones, 2006), 98. 158 Ivonne Lerner, “El lugar de la lengua española en Israel,” ARI 502006 (27 April 2006): 2–4. 159 Lerner, “El lugar de la lengua española en Israel,” 4. 160 See the official webpage of the Instituto Cervantes, accessed June 6, 2010: http://www.cer vantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informacion.htm. Webpage of Casa Sefarad-Israel, accessed June 6, 2010: http://www.casasefarad-israel.es/es/nosotros/presentacion.aspx.

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Despite these positive developments, evidence proves that the deeply-rooted traditions of Spanish antisemitism continue to resonate. In October 2002, a survey determined that 34% of Spaniards held beliefs that were mostly antisemitic, a higher percentage than the figures registered in France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.161 Since then, Spain “has been among the countries with the most negative views of Jews.”162 This tendency was confirmed by a Pew Research Center spring 2008 report which showed that 46% of Spaniards regard Jews unfavorably.

3.2.2 Strategies, Prejudices and Foreign Policy The establishment of full diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel was carefully timed. Only a few days prior, Spain became a member state of the European Community, and the amelioration of the relations with Israel was perceived as a necessary condition for assuring the country’s credibility in Europe. Indeed, since 1978 the European Parliament had been a tireless advocate for the “normalization” of diplomatic relations between the two countries.163 In this new regional context, it seemed that the positive consequences that an official rapprochement with Israel could have for Spain would offset the potentially negative repercussions it could have on Spain’s relations with the Arab countries. The pressure for normalization was especially strong since Spain’s incorporation in the European Community was the result of a ten-year-long national struggle with wide public support.164 The establishment of sound relations with the State of Israel was indeed a necessary condition for the full

161 See Anti-Defamation League, European Attitudes Toward Jews: A Five Country Survey (New York: ADL, October 2002) 162 See Anti-Defamation League, Polluting the Public Square: Anti-Semitic Discourse in Spain (New York: ADL, September 2009). According to a body dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Education, more than half of the country’s high school students would refuse to share their school desk with a Jew. See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslim on the Increase in Europe (Washington: Pew Research Center, September 2008). See also Castedo, Antía and Berdié, Anaís, “El racismo cala en las aulas,” elpais.com, July 18, 2008. 163 José Antonio Lisbona, “Presiones internas y externas a favor de las relaciones HispanoIsraelíes durante la democracia (1976–1986),” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 128. 164 See Ángel Viñas, “El lastre del pasado y la política exterior en la transición democrática,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 114–120.

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incorporation of Spain into a European community still traumatized by a relatively recent Holocaust. Concern for a smooth and rapid incorporation into the European Community was definitely the main, but not necessarily the only variable favoring the diplomatic breakthrough of 1986. Three other important external factors contributing to the move were Israeli pressure, lobbying by the American Jewish community, and the desire to please leaders and public opinion in the United States.165 The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly worked to “maximize the profit” that the “normalization” of the relationships with Israel could bring, in a strategic approach colored at times by traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes like the alleged Jewish control of the U.S. mass media and government. For instance, a letter sent by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Fernández Ordóñez to his Ambassador in the United States, Gabriel Mañueco, on January 20, 1986, urged him to “obtain political support or a positive attitude towards Spanish interests on the part of Jewish ‘opinion makers’ in the United States.” Another example is the note written by the Director General of North America and Asia at the Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Policy Secretary on February 5, 1986, observing that the American attitude towards Spain “has experienced a notable change,” and that the New York Times, for instance, “is granting wider and more positive coverage” of Spanish affairs since this country’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.166 The establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel substantially affected the Iberian country’s role in the European construction. It seems that the Spaniards’ ability to maintain the vitality of the “traditional Hispano-Arab friendship” despite their rapprochement with Israel contributed to the achievement of a prominent position for the country in Europe’s foreign policy.167 For example, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, former Spanish Minister of For-

165 See Viñas, “El lastre del pasado,” España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 117. See also Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 331–348. For a thorough description and analysis of the different external and internal factors involved in the process of establishment of full diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel, see Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 123–136. 166 Those quotes are cited in Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 345, in the Spanish original. 167 Miguel Ángel Moratinos and Bernardino León, “España y el proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo en el período 1975–1995,” in España y la cuestión palestina, ed. Ignacio ÁlvarezOssorio and Isaías Barreñada (Madrid: Los libros de la catarata, 2003), 112.

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eign Affairs, served between 1996 and 2003 as the first European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process. In addition, in October 1999 the Spanish Socialist Javier Solana was named High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, a post he held until December 2009. Following the “normalization,” Spanish-Israeli relations went through periods of proximity and distancing, mostly associated with the developments of the Arab-Israeli conflict.168 The Israeli Ambassador Víctor Harel divided the first twenty years of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel into four differentiated periods. During the first five years (1986– 1991), Spain’s attitude towards Israel was in his opinion “timid” and “cautious,” mainly due to fear of the Arab reaction.169 This assessment coincides with the opinion of the Spanish scholar Antonio Marquina: “With the achievement of membership in the EC [European Community] in 1986,” he argues, Spain “had to recognize the State of Israel, but bilateral relations were maintained at a relatively low level to avoid offending the Arab states.”170 Spain’s reticence is seen in the asymmetry of diplomatic travel. During 1989, Israeli President Haim Herzog, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Minister of Science and Technology Ezer Weizman paid official visits to Spain. So did Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Arens in 1990 as well as his successor David Levy in 1991. During those years, no high-level Spanish functionary was sent on a reciprocal mission to Israel.171 This asymmetry also corresponds with the results of Carmen López Alonso’s analysis of Spanish public opinion. During her research, López Alonso found that the beginning of the first Intifada triggered the development of a positive Palestinian image in the eyes of the Spanish public, a fact that placed the Israelis in a quite unfavorable light: “By December 1987, when the Intifada began, the Palestinian image dramatically changed. The Black September terrorists, the

168 Both Víctor Harel, former Israeli Ambassador to Spain, and Eudaldo Mirapeix, former Spanish Ambassador to Israel, coincided on this point in their remarks on the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. See Mirapeix, “Factores que condicionan”, 27; and Harel, “Dos décadas de relaciones Israel-España,” 38. 169 See Harel, “Dos décadas de relaciones Israel-España,” 39; see also Roland S. Süssmann, “Jérusalem et Madrid”, Shalom XLV (2006), 93. 170 Antonio Marquina, “Spanish Foreign and Security Policy in the Mediterranean,” in Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898, ed. Raanan Rein (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 236. 171 According to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Israel, 35–36.

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hijackers, assassins, authors of attacks such as those in Munich in 1972, gave way to the ‘freedom fighter’ image.”172 The Madrid Conference of 1991 marked the beginning of a more positive and fertile period in Spanish-Israeli relations. This second phase, to follow Ambassador Harel’s periodization, was characterized by a deeper Spanish involvement in the Middle East peace process and increased international influence. Spain’s central role in this crucial conference was a direct consequence of its search for a mediating position between Arabs and Israelis. To be sure, it was because of the good relations cultivated by the Spaniards with both sides of the conflict that the policymakers in the United States proposed that they host this important international event.173 Following the Madrid Conference, the Middle East peace process became one of Spanish foreign policy’s priorities. The Spanish leaders were determined to play a leading role in the process by making the most of the window of opportunity opened by the end of the Cold War. The Oslo agreements of 1993 and the Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 were important landmarks in this new international context where old rivalries could be transmuted into fruitful friendships. In 1995, the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, sponsored by the Spanish government, succeeded in creating the first Declaration in history to be signed by all the States of the region.174 Unsurprisingly, these developments went hand in hand with the historical idealization of the famed encounter between Muslims, Christians and Jews in Muslim Andalusia and also in the Christian territories of the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista years.175 Unfortunately, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin a few weeks before the Barcelona Conference revealed the existence of important obstacles on the way to peace, and the challenges to this process begun to

172 See Carmen López Alonso, Changing Views of Israel and the Israelí-Palestinian Conflict in Democratic Spain (1978–2006), Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 149, 9. 173 Viñas, “El lastre del pasado,” 121. 174 Moratinos and León, “España y el proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo.” For a wider analysis of the Barcelona Process see Alfred Tovias, “Spain’s Input in Shaping the EU’s Mediterranean Policies, 1986–96,” in Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898, ed. Raanan Rein (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 216–234. See also Antoni Segura I Mas, “El Proceso de Barcelona (1995– 2005): Balance y Perspectivas,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 171–181. 175 For a succinct account of these historical periods from the point of view of the mediaeval Jewish communities, see Yom Tov Assis, The Jews of Spain: From Settlement to Expulsion (Jerusalem: Akademon, 1988).

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multiply. Finally, the outbreak of the second Intifada in October 2000 reversed the positive trend in Spanish –Israeli relations inaugurated by the Madrid Conference of 1991. According to Víctor Harel, the third period in Spanish-Israeli relationships broadly overlaps with the second Intifada. From October 2000 until the beginning of 2004, these relationships were characterized, in the Ambassador’s view, by “coldness.” This change was nurtured by two different sources. The first was the Spanish adhesion to a European common policy in the Middle East which aimed at being balanced between the parties in conflict, and was considered by Israel as pro-Palestinian. The second was the negative image of Israel created by the Spanish media during that period.176 Eudaldo Mirapeix, Spanish Ambassador to Israel between 2004 and 2009, chose to make a more general analysis of the first twenty years of SpanishIsraeli relations. He took into consideration a larger number of variables than his Israeli counterpart, yet his analysis did not necessarily contradict Harel’s. Obviously, he did not characterize Europe’s policy as pro-Palestinian, but instead insisted on the European Union’s will to find a balanced position between the Arab and the Israeli positions, which are “to a great extent” perceived by the sides in conflict as a “zero-sum game.”177 Regarding public opinion, Mirapeix acknowledged that people in Europe in general and in Spain in particular condemn the way Israelis treat the Palestinians, and “clearly side with them [the Palestinians]”. This context, he argues, limits the maneuvering options of governments and institutions. On the other hand, he believes that Israeli perceptions of the EU and its member states are conditioned by a series of clichés which prevent anunbiased perception of Europe’s attitudes and deeds.178 Mirapeix’s assessment of Spanish public opinion towards Israel follows the sense of Alejandro Baer’s analysis, according to which “between 2000 and 2004 Palestine was raised to a privileged status by a broad segment of the Spanish press, which portrayed Palestinians as objects of compassion and as archetypes or metaphors for suffering and injustice.”179 In this article, Baer provides a

176 Harel, “Dos décadas de relaciones Israel-España,” 40–41. This issue will be dealt with more extensively in the following pages. 177 Mirapeix, “Factores que condicionan”, 28–33. 178 Mirapeix, “Factores que condicionan”, 29 and 31. 179 Alejandro Baer, “Spain’s Jewish Problem,”Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 18(2009), 95–96.

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particularly interesting example to support his assertion: “One illustration of this attitude is a cartoon in a left-wing alternative Spanish weekly, showing six scenes from the history of infamy: the assassination of native Americans in the United States, the lynching of an African-American by the Ku-KluxKlan, a Jewish child in the Warsaw ghetto, a Tibetan being abused by a Chinese soldier, an American GI trampling on a Vietnamese prisoner, and a woman in Chiapas confronted with the Mexican Army. Each victim shouts out: ‘I am a Palestinian!’”180 Two specific details of the cartoon bear in my opinion a special relevance. One is the choice, as the first scene of this “history of infamy,” of the killing of native American Indians in the United States instead of the much closer example of the Spanish massacres in Latin America. The second detail is the fact that each one of the portrayed victims say in English “I am Palestinian,” with the sole exception of the indigenous woman from Chiapas who shouts in Spanish “¡Yo soy Palestina!” to the Mexican Army oppressor. What is particularly significant in this cartoon from the point of view of otherness is that, in a double argumentative movement, the Israelis are portrayed as the ultimate victimizers of history and the Spaniards are transformed from historical victimizers to the ultimate freedom fighters. Actually, not only is the massacre of American Indians transformed into a moral crime exclusive to the United States, the fact that precisely the aboriginal woman from Chiapas, whose ancestors were the actual victims of Spanish colonialism, is the only character using Spanish (the language of her people’s historic aggressor) as a liberating tool is particularly striking. Such a discursive stratagem not only silences the voices of the Latin American Others, but also creates an inversion of historical truth in order to grant the Spanish nation merits it did not earn. In this cartoon, the link between the glorification of one’s own collective identity and the silencing of Others (in this case American aborigines who use Spanish words to liberate themselves) and demonization (of Jewish Israelis) is particularly striking. From Harel’s point of view, a fourth period in Spanish-Israeli relations began at the start of 2005, and was still open by the time of his analysis in March 2006. In his opinion, this shift was triggered by the terrorist attack of March 2004 in Madrid and strengthened by the death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, the emergence of a new Palestinian President, and the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip. During that period, the relative calm in the Middle East conflict favored

180 Baer, “Spain’s Jewish Problem,” 95. The description corresponds to Diagonal, March 3, 2005.

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a “warming” in the bilateral relationship. Some of the events that characterized these years were the visit by Israeli President Moshe Katzav to Spain, the official establishment of Holocaust Day in Spain, the Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance organized in Cordoba under the aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the inauguration of a square and a municipal health center in Madrid bearing the name of Yitzhak Rabin.181 Unmistakably, this “warming” in Spanish-Israeli relationships was seriously challenged during the Second Lebanon War that erupted from July 12 to August 14, 2006. In addition to the widely negative reactions of the world public opinion to the Israeli attacks in Lebanon, two specific events had a direct influence on such distancing. The first was the massive diffusion of a photograph of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero wearing a Palestinian keffiyeh at an International Festival of the Socialist Youth during one of the conflict’s first days.182 The second incident that widened the gap between the Spanish and Israeli representatives was a public declaration by José Blanco, who was at the time the PSOE’s Secretary of Organization (meaning the most important socialist leader after Prime Minister Zapatero), asserting that the Israeli army killed Lebanese civilians deliberately.183 In the end, Zapatero dismissed the relevance of the first event by arguing that his gesture was a “natural reaction” to the offer of a member of the Al-Fatah Youth to place the keffiyeh on his head for photographic purposes.184 As for Blanco’s words, the Prime Minister and PSOE Secretary-General explicitly supported the socialist leader by saying that the PSOE “speaks through him” and that their views coincide.185 José Blanco called the Israeli Ambassador to Spain, Víctor Harel, after the incident and succeeded in “putting an end” to the controversy and “opening a new page” in Spanish-Israeli relations. Yet he never apologized for his words nor modified his position.186 A few days before, Harel had already declared to the Spanish press that the relationship between the two countries was “not at its best,” and that the “very hard and unfair” criticism

181 Harel, “Dos décadas de relaciones Israel-España,” 41–42. 182 “El Gobierno critica la tibieza internacional y aboga por una ‘acción decidida’ para frenar la violencia,” elmundo.es, July 19, 2006. 183 G.L.A., “Blanco dice que los muertos civiles que causa Israel son un ‘objetivo buscado’ y luego rectifica,” ABC.es, July 25, 2006. 184 “Una reacción ‘natural’,” ABC.es, July 26, 2006. 185 Gonzalo López Alba, “Blanco acuerda ‘pasar página’ con el embajador de Israel, pero sin desdecirse de sus acusaciones,” ABC.es, July 26, 2006. 186 López Alba, “Blanco acuerda ‘pasar página’ con el embajador de Israel.”

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against his government that was being voiced in Spain “goes beyond” the official position of the EU.187

3.2.3 Preliminary Conclusions The relationship between Spain and Israel has traveled a sinuous path since the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1986. Despite this fact, this diplomatic breakthrough opened the door to a better understanding in Spanish society of the Jewish world in general and Spanish Jewish culture in particular, but without succeeding in eradicating age-old anti-Jewish stereotypes and prejudices. In 2008, a report by the Pew Research Center established that Spaniards held the highest percentage of negative views towards Jews of all the countries surveyed (besides Spain, the study focused on Germany, Poland, France, Russia, Britain and the U.S.). Moreover, it concluded that the country’s population held a similar level of prejudice towards Muslims. That same year, a survey from a body dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Education found that more than half of Spain’s high school students refused to share their desk with a Jew, and almost two-thirds of them were unwilling to work together with young people of Moroccan origin.188 Yet despite these negative perceptions, SpanishArab relations could be (unlike the relations with Israel) generally described as warm and smooth. In order to make sense of these contrasts, we shall delve into the unlikely and fascinating history of the ‘traditional Hispano-Arab friendship.’

3.3 Spain and the Arab World 3.3.1 Formative Years The seeds of the special relationship between Spain and the Arab world were sown during the ten and a half years (beginning in 1912) that the dictator-

187 EFE, “El embajador de Israel cree que las relaciones con España ‘no pasan por su mejor momento’,” elpais.com, July 20, 2006. 188 See Antía Castedo and Anaís Berdié, “El racismo cala en las aulas,” elpais.com, July 18, 2008.

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to-be Francisco Franco spent as an officer in the Spanish Moroccan Protectorate.189 It was during that period that Franco’s identity and assertiveness galvanized, and by 1926 he became the youngest of Europe’s Generals at the age of 33.190 The centrality of Franco’s experience in the North African Protectorate for the shaping of Spanish history during the twentieth century was particularly manifest in two different historical episodes: the last Civil War and the normalization of the Spanish presence on the international scene after World War II. During their service, the Spanish troops stationed in North Africa developed complex and sometimes even contradictory feelings towards Moroccans. The main cause for this ambivalence was the policy of “divide and rule” that lay at the center of the Spanish strategy for colonial dominance. This policy, aimed at taking advantage of the hostility between different Moroccan tribes, forced Spaniards to relate to Moroccans as both allies and enemies, depending on the circumstances.191 When the decision to overthrow the government of the Spanish Republic was taken in 1936, the authoritarian and anti-liberal mentality developed by the Spanish troops during their service in the Maghreb, combined with a complex cognitive and emotional approach towards the overwhelmingly Muslim Moroccans, was pivotal to the organization of the rebellion.192 During the Civil War, North Africa supplied the Nationalists with their first main base, and between 60,000 and 70,000 mercenaries. In order to legitimate their problematic alliance with the historically hated “Moors,” the rebels insisted on the “shared interests” that united Spain and North Africa, Christianity and Islam.193 Interestingly enough, the ideological response of the Republicans was to present themselves as the defenders of European values against the “Oriental” threat.194 In June 1940, Franco decided to seize the opportunity created by the Second World War and occupy the international zone of Tangier. He even considered invading French Morocco after France fell into German hands in 1940. At 189 Paul Preston, “General Franco as Military Leader”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series 4 (1994), 24. 190 See Enrique Moradiellos, La España de Franco (1939–1975): política y sociedad (Madrid: Síntesis, 2000), 27–9. See also Preston, “General Franco as Military Leader”, 24. 191 Sebastián Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 196. 192 Moradiellos, La España de Franco (1939–1975), 28. 193 Rein, 1999: 196–197. 194 Hishaam D. Aidi, “The Interference of al-Andalus: Spain, Islam and the West,” Social Text 87, 24, 2 (Summer 2006): 72.

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the same time, he implemented a pro-Muslim and relatively liberal policy in Spanish Morocco that granted him the respect and appreciation of influential Muslim leaders.195 With the defeat of the Axis, Spain had to deal with the international isolation which was imposed upon it through a condemnatory resolution of the United Nations (UN), issued in 1946. This censure resolution (Resolution 39, I of December 14, 1946), adopted by the UN’s General Assembly, gave a formal backing to the Mexican ambassador Luis Quintanilla’s motion of June 19, 1945, establishing that the countries whose political régimes had been established with the support of the former Axis powers could not be member states of the international organization.196 Spain was therefore impeded from becoming a UN member as long as Franco was in power, and was internationally isolated during the immediate post-war years. The Spanish dictator reacted to this situation by implementing a policy of “bridge and substitution,” aimed at getting closer to those countries (Arab and Latin American) “culturally and historically close to Spain,” as a first step towards diplomatic normalization.197 In 1946, the Arab states moved from their initial position of support of the UN condemnatory resolution to a more friendly abstention, probably encouraged by a few positive changes undertaken by Franco in his Spanish Morocco policy.198 As a matter of fact, the Franco régime implemented once again a clearly ambivalent policy: it supported the Arab nations’ wars of independence against the French and the British at the same time that it fought to retain its own protectorate in Morocco. According to María Dolores Algora Weber, the Arab abstention was a direct consequence of this paradox, and could be explained by the contradiction between Spain’s incessant efforts to gain Arab sympathy and the political pressure exerted by Moroccan nationalists, who insisted on reminding the recently founded Arab League that Franco’s Spain had not renounced its colonial grip on the Moroccan Protectorate.

195 Aidi, “The Interference of al-Andalus”:197–198. 196 See Alberto José Lleonart Ansélem, “El ingreso de España en la ONU: Obstáculos e impulsos,” Cuadernos de historia contemporánea 17 (1995): 103–104. 197 María Dolores Algora, “La cuestión palestina en el régimen de Franco,” in España y la cuestión palestina, ed. Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio and Isaías Barreñada (Madrid: Los libros de la catarata, 2003), 19–20. 198 Raanan Rein, “In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties,” in Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898, ed. Raanan Rein (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 200–201.

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The emergence of the “Palestinian question” in the framework of the United Nations changed this state of affairs.199 With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Israeli refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Spain became an important political asset for Spanish diplomacy. Without planning it, Spain found itself on the Arab side in an international conflict which lay at the top of the Arab League’s international agenda. The “Palestinian question” consequently relegated the “Moroccan question” to a marginal place. In addition, the closeness of the Francoist regime to Latin American countries was also attractive for Arab countries, which were in urgent need of favorable votes in international forums to achieve their own national objectives. In May 1949, the Arab states had renounced their abstention policy and supported Franco’s Spain by voting in favor of annulling the international boycott against it.200 That same year, King Abdullah of Jordan became the first Head of State in the world to pay an official visit to Spain since the Civil War.201 This convergence of interests between Spain and the Arab countries became one of the main pillars of Spanish foreign policy until 1986, the year of the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel. Unsurprisingly, the partnership was legitimized through the evocation of the cultural and historic background allegedly shared by Spain and the Arab world, conceptualized as the root of Spanish-Arabic “friendship.” In fact, the Francoist régime gave birth to a one-sided interpretation of Spanish history which was bound to have a promising future: “At the time that it eulogized the ‘Catholic sovereigns’, Isabella and Ferdinand, it tried to appropriate the achievements of the Jewish and Muslim cultures that had flourished in Spain during the Middle Ages until Isabella and Ferdinand took steps to extirpate them from Spanish soil. By manipulating the medieval history of his country, the Caudillo was able to present Spain as a bridge and a

199 María Dolores Algora Weber, “España en el Mediterráneo: entre las relaciones hispanoárabes y el reconocimiento del Estado de Israel”, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals 79 –80 (December 2007), 17–8. 200 Algora Weber, “España en el Mediterráneo”: 19–21; Rein, “In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties,” 202. 201 Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, El Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura y la Política Exterior de España hacia el Mundo Árabe. Paper presented at the 9th Congress of the Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, September 2008. Downloaded from the website of the Asociación de Historia Contemporánea: http://www.ahistcon.org/docs/murcia/contenido/pdf/15/miguel_her nando_de_larramendi_martinez_taller15.pdf (accessed July 11, 2010)

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mediator, a meeting-point between east and west, between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean cultures, between the Latin race and the Arab-Semitic race, between Christianity and Islam.”202 One of the most important symbolic gestures of a Spanish government confirming its “shared roots” with the Arab world was the treatment given by Adolfo Suárez, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Spanish transition, to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat in September 1979. Suárez was the first European Prime Minister to receive Arafat officially, in a ceremony marked by a particularly warm welcoming of the Palestinian leader.203

3.3.2 Culture as Power Culture has been an essential tool of Spanish foreign policy since the first decades of the twentieth century. In the case of the relationships with the Arab world, the cultural connection was one of the keys for the deepening and preservation of “Hispano-Arab friendship.” The first Spanish Cultural Centers in Arab countries were created during the 1930s, and during the 1950s they begin a period of further development.204 Between 1945 and 1955, as already discussed, Spanish interest in strengthening its relationships with the Arab world was mainly aimed at achieving the normalization of the country’s international status, and securing its access to the United Nations. When this objective was achieved in 1955, the political dimension of the relationship between these States lost its preeminence in favor of the cultural dimension. Spanish cultural policy towards the Arab world was perceived by Madrid as the best way to safeguard the vitality of the Arab friendship without arousing political issues that might not match its interests or ideological standpoint. Some of these “uncomfortable” developments from the Spanish point of view were the spread of Pan-Arabism among the Arab leaders, and even more dra-

202 Rein, “In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties,” 196. 203 Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition, 213. 204 Irene González González, Los Centros Culturales en el Mundo Árabe: Actores de la Política Exterior Española (1954–1967). Paper presented at the 9th Congress of the Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, September 2008. Downloaded from the website of the Asociación de Historia Contemporánea: http://www.ahistcon.org/docs/murcia/contenido/pdf/15/irene_ gonzalez_gonzalez_taller15.pdf (accessed July 11, 2010)

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matically the progressive rapprochement between these régimes and the Soviet Union since the late 1950s. Spain, which had regained its international legitimacy thanks to its virulent anti-Communism and strategic alliance with the United States, could hardly share the leftist enthusiasm of many of its Arab friends. In this new international framework, cultural diplomacy allowed the Spaniards to preserve their good relations with the Arab representatives despite their rapprochement with the enemy camp.205 Probably the main instrument of the Spanish cultural diplomacy towards the Arab world was the Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura (ʽSpanish-Arabic Institute of Cultureʼ – IHAC), created in 1954 under the aegis of the Foreign Ministry. The Institute was created following the model of the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica (ʽInstitute of Hispanic Cultureʼ), established in 1946. In general terms, its objectives were the revalorization of the cultural and historic bonds between Spain and the Arab world; the promotion of Arabic and Islamic studies in Spain and of Hispanic culture in the Arab-Muslim world; and the coordination of the different Spanish institutions working on similar activities.206 With the creation of the Institute, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to its first director, Emilio García Gómez, instructing him to abstain from establishing an office of the Institute in Morocco, where Spain had his Protectorate.207 Also in this field, the ambivalent Francoist policy towards its Arab “friends” was manifest. The activities of the Institute were perceived as an intrinsic part of the government’s foreign policy, and as such, were managed by diplomats. In 2008, Miguel Hernando de Larramendi presented a paper scrutinizing the different periods of IHAC’s development, framed in the larger context of Spanish-Arab relationships. In his work, he notes that during its first years of existence the Institute’s influence was weakened by an increasingly meager

205 Hernando de Larramendi, El Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura y la Política Exterior de España hacia el Mundo Árabe, 1. 206 González González, Los Centros Culturales en el Mundo Árabe, 3–4. 207 González González, Los Centros Culturales en el Mundo Árabe, 1. García Gómez has been considered the “master of modern Spanish Arabists,” and late in life became a member of the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, and also of the Royal Spanish Academy of History, among other important distinctions. In 1989 he became the director of the Royal Spanish Academy of History until his death in 1995. See the site of the Fundación Príncipe de Asturias: http://www.fpa.es/en/prince-of-asturias-awards/ awards/1992-emilio-garcia-gomez.html?texto=trayectoria&especifica=0. See also the site of the Royal Spanish Academy of History: http://www.rah.es/laAcademia/organizacion/director4. htm (both accessed December 26, 2012).

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budget which contradicted the pompous official rhetoric. Yet in 1974, as a direct consequence of the oil crisis of 1973 that exposed Spanish dependency on the Arab countries’ energy supplies, the Institute was “reorganized” and “revitalized” through a bureaucratic upgrading that included the near doubling of its budget.208 In 1978, after Spain’s return to democracy, the IHAC added another function to the original ones. From then on, it also dealt with the exploration and promotion of technical and scientific cooperation with the Arab countries, in a clear adaptation to the new technological needs of the time. Ten years later, a much more important change took place. By 1988, Spain had transformed itself from potential recipient to a donor of development aid, and the IHAC was transformed into the ‘Institute of Cooperation with the Arab World’ (Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe –ICMA), one of the three Institutes that formed the newly created ‘Spanish Agency of International Cooperation’ (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional –AECI). Beginning with this important turning point, not only was the budget of the ICMA increased significantly, but also the role of channeling Spain’s development aid towards the Arab states was added to its established cultural and technical competences.209 Two years after its accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), Spain adapted its traditional “friendship” to the approach widely adopted by its European neighbors from the north in its relations with the former colonies. The relevance of Spain’s cultural diplomacy and development aid to the Arab world might be explained through Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. According to Gramsci, social groups not only preserve their supremacy through coercion, but also, and increasingly in modern and complex societies, through an ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ he calls hegemony. Through this concept, he describes: “the predominance [is] obtained by consent rather than force of one class or group over other classes.”210 In order to build the social consensus they required to achieve or preserve their dominance, the dominant groups “promote values that have some universal appeal” and also make some concessions to the demands of the civil society,

208 Hernando de Larramendi, El Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura y la Política Exterior de España hacia el Mundo Árabe, 11–14. 209 Hernando de Larramendi, El Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura y la Política Exterior de España hacia el Mundo Árabe, 15–18. 210 Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Though: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process, (Oxford: Claredon Press1981).

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“without ever making any sacrifices that would affect the foundations of [their] power.”211 Although Gramsci‘s analysis focused exclusively on the national level, his insights are particularly helpful for the understanding of today’s North-South relationships. Indeed, the key for revealing the power structures that articulate global dominance lies more often in what is omitted than in what is openly stated: “as the North continues ostensibly to ‘aid’ the South –as formerly imperialism ‘civilized’ the New World – the South’s crucial assistance to the North in keeping up its resource-hungry lifestyle is forever foreclosed.”212

3.3.3 Spain’s Energy Dependency Probably the main variable influencing Spanish-Arab relations, in addition to the traditional alliance in international politics, is Spain’s energy dependency. According to a 2005–2006 report from the Spanish Ministry of Defense, since 1965, Spanish demand for petrol and gas has experienced an accelerated rate of increase that is much higher than the world average.213 During the period 1996–2006, Spain’s demand for oil increased at an average annual rate of 3.5%, a percentage that almost doubled the 1.8% world rate. A similar trend characterizes the Spanish demand for gas. Additional data provided by the report is particularly eloquent: “Nowadays, oil and gas together represent 70% of the primary energy consumed in Spain (against the 62% of 1990), a much higher level than the European average (64%) and an indicator that Spain is even more dependent on the principal hydrocarbons than the other advanced countries (65% in the United States, 64% in the OECD and 61% in the world).”214 This trend is especially relevant because more than 99% of the oil and the gas consumed in Spain in 2005 were imported. While almost 40% of the oil imports that year came from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Iraq and Algeria, nearly 60% of the gas imports that same year came from Algeria, Egypt and Libya.215

211 Esteve Morera, “Gramsci and Democracy,”Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, 1: 28–29. 212 Gayatri Chakravor Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),6. 213 Ministerio de Defensa, Panorama Estratégico 2005/2006. Available at http://www.realinstitu toelcano.org/publicaciones/libros/Panorama_2005-2006.pdf (accessed February 10, 2010), 41. 214 Ministerio de Defensa, Panorama Estratégico 2005/2006, 41. 215 Ministerio de Defensa, Panorama Estratégico 2005/2006, 43–45.

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The strategic consequences of this situation are clarified without euphemisms in the report: “what happens in the Persian Gulf and in Northern and Western Africa is of paramount interest for Spain, in view of the fact that it depends on these three zones for 40% of the primary energy it consumes. Even more than the majority of its European partners and its transatlantic allies (Canada and the United States), Spain has a fundamental interest in the stability and development of the Arab and Islamic world that surrounds it, as well as in the maintenance of good relations with the region.”216 The Spanish dependency upon oil and gas from Arab countries is indeed the most important economic connection between these two actors on the international scene. Trade in other goods and services, as well as foreign investment, has historically been limited, although both items have grown considerably since 2004. As is usual in North-South relationships, the main stream of foreign investment flowed from Spain to the Arab countries (especially Morocco, Egypt and Algeria) and not the other way around.217

3.3.4 Constructing a New Role for the New Spanish Self These elements illustrate the often complex relationships between strategic needs and national identity, between material considerations and cultural developments. This mutual influence is also apparent in the different political approaches adopted by Spain towards the Arab countries since its formal incorporation into the European community in 1986. As already mentioned, the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel was to an important extent motivated by the Spanish will to adapt to the European Community’s self-defined identity and international role. Yet the Iberian leaders worked to make sure that despite this diplomatic normalization the Spanish-Arab “friendship” remained unaltered. From the mid-1980s on, Spanish governments strived to redesign their country’s relations with the Arab world in a way that would suit its newly acquired

216 Ministerio de Defensa, Panorama Estratégico 2005/2006, 45–46. 217 See, for instance, Olivia Orozco de la Torre, De Marruecos a Omán: Expansión de las relaciones económicas entre España y los países árabes, published in the Economic Bulletin of Casa Árabe: http://www.casaarabe-ieam.es/uploads/html/boletines/boletin_16/OrozcoComen tarioBENCA16.pdf (accessed May 27, 2010). Official data on Spanish international investment can be obtained through the database of the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce: http://www.mityc.es/en-US/Paginas/index.aspx (accessed May 27, 2010).

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international role as an active partner in European construction, without harming their global interests. Since that time, Spain has sought to play a leading role in Europe’s attempts at finding a “balanced” position in the Israeli-Arab conflict and to contribute to the creation of a peaceful Middle East. This stance is instantiated by the Madrid Conference of 1991, which became a landmark in the Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives, and the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 at the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, with the aim of creating a regional partnership based on economic, financial, social, cultural, human, political and security aspects. The countries involved in the process are the members of the European Union, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Malta, Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.218 For a series of reasons that include the difficulty in achieving agreement between Israel and the Arab countries on rules, procedures and common objectives, the process did not go far. In 2005, ten years after its inauguration, the results of the endeavor have been considered “meager” and “undramatic.”219 In addition, Spain has also consistently supported the institutionalization of dialogue between the Western European Union (WEU) and the Maghreb states, as well as the policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) related to the Mediterranean area.220 Despite the broad consensus on this approach, there have been some differences between the PP and the PSOE regarding the Arab world. The PSOE demonstrated the importance of this part of the globe when in 1982, upon his election, Socialist Prime Minister Felipe González made the first official state trip of his term to Morocco, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs.221 In contrast, the PP government led by José María Aznar, which replaced González in 1996, merged the North African Department at the Foreign Ministry with the Asia-Pacific Department, in a clear signal

218 See Rory Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, “The Barcelona Process and Euro-Arab Economic Relations, 1995–2005”, Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, 2 (June 2005). 219 See Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, España en el Mediterráneo: una agenda recuperada ¿a tiempo?, ARI 153/2009 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2009), 2. See also Haizam Amira Fernández and Richard Youngs, The Barcelona Process: An assessment of a Decade of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ARI 137/2005 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2005). 220 Marquina, “Spanish Foreign and Security Policy in the Mediterranean,” 236–244. 221 Marquina, “Spanish Foreign and Security Policy in the Mediterranean,” 236.

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that Mediterranean affairs would be given a lower profile during his term in office.”222 During the Aznar administrations of 1996–2004, particularly during his second mandate (2000–2004) in which his party enjoyed an absolute majority in Parliament, the traditionally good relations between Spain and the Arab world experienced some turbulence. The Spanish leader’s reinforcement of diplomatic ties with the United States, the role he played in supporting the Iraq war in March 2003, and his harsh reaction to the Moroccan Government’s stationing of police forces on Parsley Island (a rock near Ceuta claimed by Madrid) in July 2002 did not exactly improve the ties with the Arab world.223 During the last years of his premiership, Aznar adopted a more militant position against what he termed as “Islamo-fascism,” in a global context marked by the fight between the West and what President George W. Bush called the “Axis of Evil.” By making use of the traditional image of the Spaniards as a Christian people who had won a Crusade against Muslim invaders, Aznar tried to position his country among the leaders of Western civilization. Not only did he work for the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s Christian origins in the EU’s constitution, but he also supported the wearing of special crosses dedicated to Saint James of Compostela, popularly known as ʽthe Moor-Killerʼ (Santiago Matamoros), by the Spanish troops serving in Iraq.224 The socialist electoral victory of March 2004, three days after the March 11 bombings in Madrid, marked the beginning of an amelioration of the relationships between Spain and the Arab World.225 Certainly, the decision taken by Prime Minister Zapatero to withdraw the Spanish troops from Iraq (an electoral promise), and his proposal for an Alliance of Civilizations, had a positive influence on Spain’s image in the Arab press. Despite the criticism and even the skepticism that the Alliance awakened in some Arab observers, the message that dialogue and mutual understanding between East and West are a viable alternative to the politics of violence and confrontation between the different “civilizations” was well received in Arab lands.226

222 Tovias, “Spain’s Input in Shaping the EU’s Mediterranean Policies, 1986–96,” 230. 223 See Paddy Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course. Aznar’s Legacy, Zapatero’s Prospects,” World Policy Journal 21, 2 (2004), 7–17. 224 Aidi, “The Interference of al-Andalus,” 83. 225 Pedro Rojo, “The image of Spain in the Arab Press,” Quaderns de la Mediterrània 8 (2007): 64. 226 Rojo, “The image of Spain in the Arab Press,” 64–73. For more information on the “Alliance of Civilizations,” see the official site of the initiative available at http://www.unaoc.org/ content/view/63/79/lang,english/ (accessed February 25, 2010).

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Paradoxically, President Zapatero’s positive image in the Arab countries is the result of his deepening of the trend, followed by his country since the democratic transition, through which the Francoist discourse on the “traditional friendship” with the Arab world adopted a left-wing (what the Spaniards call progresista) character.227 This not only includes the insistence on presenting Spain “as a bridge and a mediator, a meeting-point between east and west, [. . .] between Christianity and Islam”, but also a clear manipulation of the country’s past.228 Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this distortion of history is a statement included in the official website of the ʽArab Houseʼ (Casa Árabe). The Arab House was created in July 2006 with the institutional support of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (among others) with the purpose of strengthening the relations between Spain and the Arab world. By February 2010, this website stated: “Spain is, in the Arab and Muslim perception, the European country that arouses most credibility and sympathy because we share the common heritage of Al-Andalus and because it did not take part in the colonial adventure of the great empires” [emphasis mine].229 Significantly, the official Spanish approach to the Arab world is characterized by a deep contradiction: the persistent emphasis on the glories of a shared past coexists with the unwillingness to include Arab and Muslim culture in the construction of today’s Spain. According to an interviewee of Muslim origin, democratic Spain adopts a double and contradictory stance towards his fellow Muslims: on the one hand, Islamic and Moriscan culture are being rehabilitated and valued as part of the Spanish cultural heritage; on the other hand, the inclusion of Islam in the construction of contemporary Spanish identity has clearly been denied.230 This paradox is even more acute if we compare this approach to the one employed vis-à-vis the Jews: according to the former Prime Minister Felipe González, “the Jewish culture belongs to the Spanish self.”231 These contrasting 227 This development has been noted by Florentino Portero, “Las relaciones hispano-israelíes,” Araucaria 19 (2008), 185. 228 Rein, “In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties,” 196. 229 Original Spanish: “España es, en el imaginario árabe y musulmán el país europeo de mayor credibilidad y simpatía tanto porque compartimos ese patrimonio común que es Al-Andalus como porque no tomó parte en la aventura colonial de los grandes imperios.” Available at: http://www.casaarabe-ieam.es/p/que-es-casa-arabe (accessed February 4, 2010) 230 See European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia (Vienna: EUMC, 2006), 35. 231 Cited in Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 339. Original Spanish: “La cultura judía es algo del ser de España.”

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approaches were evoked by the Spanish Ambassador to Israel, Álvaro Iranzo, during an International Colloquium at Tel Aviv University on January 11, 2009. In his speech, Ambassador Iranzo offered a succinct account of Spanish history recalling that Spain has been linked to the Arab-Muslim civilization for about seven centuries, and added that it is “still debated” whether this civilization is part of the Spanish self. On the other hand, he stated that the expulsion of the Jews [in 1492] “deprived us of a part of our identity.” Significantly, the diplomat gave an important clue concerning the reason for this dissimilar treatment, by stating that “immigration is the core issue of otherness in Spain.”232

3.3.5 The Friend as Other Despite its solid material basis and longevity, during recent years the “traditional Hispano-Arab friendship” has been faced with important and unprecedented challenges. As stated above, particularly towards the end of his second mandate, Prime Minister Aznar adopted an increasingly distant and sometimes even hostile attitude towards parts of the Arab-Muslim world. In the case of Prime Minister Zapatero, the history of Spanish-Arab relationships has been idealized to the point that it sometimes contradicted the most evident facts of history. Yet this artificial light, aimed at consolidating the strategic alliance with the Arab world, projects a growing shadow. During recent decades, the flow of immigration coming to Spain has modified the ethno-cultural profile of the country, raising important questions related to national identity. For several years, people of Moroccan origin constituted the main cohort of immigrants; in 2006 there were 543,721 immigrants from Morocco.233 The Muslim population in Spain, according to a study carried out in December 2007, reached 1,145,424 in number, representing approximately 2.5% of the country’s population.234 That same year, about 30% of the Muslims residing in Spain were Spanish nationals, while the other 70% were immigrants (50%

232 Author’s notes taken at the opening ceremony of the Colloquium, January 11, 2009. The title of the Colloquium was: “The ‘Other’ in Contemporary Spain: Practices, Discourses, Representations.” 233 See the data from the Spanish government: Ministerio de trabajo y asuntos sociales, Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 2006, 1. Available at: http://extranjeros.mtas.es/es/Informa cionEstadistica/Anuarios/Anuario2006.html (accessed May 13, 2010). 234 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Available at: http:// mx.geocities.com/hispanomuslime/estademograf.doc (accessed November 18, 2008)

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Moroccan, 20% other).235 By December 2015, number of Spanish residents adhering to Islam rose to 1,887,906 people, 59% among them immigrants. They represented about 4% of the country’s total population.236 The presence of an increasing Muslim and Arab population has not always been well received by its Spanish hosts. Animosity against Muslims grew after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, but also after those perpetrated in Casablanca on May 2003. There was a definite increase in animosity after the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, in which Moroccan immigrants to Spain were involved.237 The terror attack of March 11, 2004, in Madrid was the worst in Spanish history. Ten bombs exploded in the proximity of the Atocha railway station, causing the loss of 191 lives and wounding 1,500 people. The police in charge of the investigation ascribed the intellectual responsibility for the crime to “the strategists leading Iraqi insurgency and Al Qaeda leaders.” According to the police report, it was Prime Minister Aznar‘s decision to support the Iraq invasion led by Great Britain and the United States in 2003 that transformed Spain into a target of global terrorism. A local terrorist cell was established in Spain to implement international strategic objectives, and had been planning the attack since 2003.238 The attack was unanimously condemned by the Muslim leaders of Spain, who also mourned the death of members of their own religious community. In fact, Spanish Islam went further than any other Muslim organization in the world by issuing a fatwa on March 10, 2005. The fatwa, signed by the SecretaryGeneral of the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE), Mansur Escudero, asserted that Bin Laden and all those invoking Islam to commit acts of terror have in fact abandoned Islam and should be considered apostates.239

235 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana, 10. 236 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Available at: http:// observatorio.hispanomuslim.es/estademograf.pdf (accessed May 5, 2016). Pages 7 and 14. 237 See Bernabé López García, “El retorno del ‘otro’: la comunidad marroquí en España”, in El otro en la España contemporánea, ed. Silvina Schammah Gesser and Raanan Rein (Sevilla: Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2011), 189. See also Ministerio de Defensa, Panorama Estratégico 2005/2006, 168. 238 Sonia Aparicio, “El mayor atentado de la Historia de España,” available at the web page of elmundo.es: http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados11m/hechos. html/ (accessed July 31, 2012). José Yoldi and Jorge Rodríguez, “La autoría intelectual del 11-M corresponde a ‘líderes de la insurgencia iraquí y de Al Qaeda’,” elpais.com, September 29, 2006. 239 CDPI, “Fatua contra Ben Laden: el impacto mediático,” Webislam.com, March 18, 2005. Available at: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/27503-fatua_contra_ben_laden_el_impacto_ mediatico.html (accessed July 31, 2012).

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Nevertheless, hostility against Muslims persisted and was sometimes translated into physical violence. The most severe of these forceful acts was the riot that took place in 2000 against Moroccan immigrants in the southeastern town of El Ejido. In 2006, racist attacks on mosques and Muslim religious centers were reported in various cities and towns, including Córdoba, Huesca, and Girona.240 These episodes of anti-Muslim violence expose the asymmetries of power between “old Christian” Spaniards and the “Moors,” re-enacting simultaneously the “Reconquista” period and the chronologically closer colonial scenes. Despite the efforts to avoid unpleasant memories from the past, massive Moroccan immigration to contemporary Spain has led to the resurgence of repressed images. From a psychological perspective, this very fact indicates that the content of those memories need to be made conscious and elaborated in order to be laid to rest.

3.4 Concluding Remarks The analysis of Spain’s international relations with Israel and the Arab world evidences the existence of a central contradiction between the insistence on establishing a self-celebratory monologue concerning the idyllic memory of the historic coexistence of Christians, Muslims and Jews in the Iberian peninsula, on the one hand, and the stubborn persistence of discriminatory practices and perceptions toward these two ethnic minorities, on the other. It seems that the more the Spanish leaders insist on presenting their nation-state as the incarnation of the Good principle in world history (be it Catholic Christianity or “development”), the greater is their country’s shadow, reflected in the Spaniards’ construction of their Others. In that sense, Ambassador Álvaro Iranzo’s affirmation that “immigration is the core issue of otherness in Spain” is especially relevant. The renewed efforts deployed by Spain to safeguard “fortress Europe” from the immigrants’ “invasion”, in the context of a public discourse where immigration is sometimes associated with criminality (particularly among the Spanish conservatives), mirror some dark aspects of Europe’s “development”: in their respective colonies, the Western European

240 See Raanan Rein and Martina Weisz, “Ghosts of the Past, Challenges of the Present: New and Old ‘Others’ in Contemporary Spain”, in A Road to Nowhere?, ed. Julius Schoeps and Olaf Glöckner (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 103–120.

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powers effectively invaded other countries and fought to impose an order based upon racism and exploitation.241 In addition, the very presence of the members of the former European colonies on Spanish soil makes tangible the contemporary persistence of global structures of coloniality. Economic migration exposes the fact that the natural resources, as well as the labor of the peoples of the South, are worth less than those of the North, and that people pay a very heavy price for being born on the “bad side of geography”.242 Spanish attempts at establishing a cultural hegemony in the Arab countries should be considered in this wider context. They are an effort to preserve Spain’s interests through the achievement of a moral and cultural consensus. On the other hand, this cultural sphere is also an arena where hegemony is contested. Clearly, historical narratives play a critical role in legitimizing the politics of the present. The dissimilar approaches of the Aznar and Zapatero administrations concerning the history of Spanish-Arab relations, for example, are indicators of the contrasting approaches of these two Spanish leaders concerning the role their country should play in contemporary world affairs. In the case of Israel, despite the rapprochement, many indicators point to the fact that this country is sometimes perceived as the ultimate victimizer against whom the identity of Spain as the supreme freedom fighter is defined. Interestingly enough, Spanish diplomacy’s adoption of international strategies colored by insinuations of Jewish control of the American press and government gives us an important clue concerning the construction of a new international role for contemporary Spain. In a globalized, capitalist world, the traditional stereotype of the Jew as financially clever, powerful, and influential paradoxically makes of him a player worth befriending. In the concluding paragraphs of “Latin America and Spain’s Image in the World,” the Spanish researcher Javier Noya, from the Real Instituto Elcano, showed unconventional sincerity. He asserted that the Spaniards should thank Latin Americans for their criticism of what they perceived as the “business recolonization of the 1990s,” because this “image of Pizarro coming back in the shape of a capitalist –equally cruel, although more civilized because the [new]

241 Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course,” 16; Teun Van Dijk, “El racismo y la prensa en España,” in Discurso periodístico y procesos migratorios, ed. Antonio Bañón Hernández (Donostia: Glakoa Liburuak, 2007), 37. 242 Javier De Lucas, “Ciudadanía: La jaula de hierro para la integración de los inmigrantes,” in Inmigración y procesos de cambio, ed. Gemma Aubarell and Ricard Zapata (Barcelona: Icaria, 2004), 223.

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conquistador employed money instead of arms- expanded the aura of Spain’s hard power among the world powers.” He further explained: “A less hostile reaction would not have raised as much respect among those who are not scandalized when they have to use the force of money or of arms to defend their interests, whether they coincide or not with those of the rest of Humanity. A Black Legend in Latin America can be a Pink Legend in the leading developed countries.”243 In other words, if you want to have power and respect in this harsh, competitive world, you might want to adopt some of the Evil’s characteristics. That is, you may be willing to imitate the antisemite’s mythic Jew.

243 Javier Noya, La contribución de América Latina al poder blando de España en el mundo, Documento de Trabajo del Real Instituto Elcano 79/2008 (July 2008), 6. Original Spanish: “. . . esta imagen de Pizarro regresando ahora en forma de capitalista –igual de cruel, aunque más civilizado porque el conquistador empleaba el dinero y no las armas- expandió el aura de poder duro de España entre las potencias mundiales. Una reacción menos hostil no le hubiese granjeado tanto respeto entre quienes no se escandalizan cuando tienen que usar la fuerza del dinero o de las armas para defender sus intereses, coincidan o no con el resto de la Humanidad. Lo que es Leyenda Negra en Latinoamérica puede ser Leyenda Rosa en los países avanzados.”

4 Spain and the Jews 4.1 The Jews of Spain: Between Normalization and Invisibility Despite having settled in the Peninsula at an early stage – approximately during the Phoenician era – and having enjoyed periods of relative grandeur in these lands, the Jewish presence in the area of present-day Spain was also marked by a long history of death and persecution.244 By the fifteenth century, massive anti-Jewish violence had led to numerous conversions from Judaism to Catholicism, forming a population of New Christians estimated at more than one hundred thousand people. Within a few generations, these Christians of Jewish descent contributed in their majority to the creation of a new urban bourgeoisie, with a minority of them reaching the highest ranks in the priesthood and nobility. Marriages between converts and aristocratic families were common, to the extent that, according to Fernán Díaz, “almost all aristocratic houses have kinship ties with former Jews.”245 In 1492, the Catholic Kings decreed the expulsion of the Jews in an effort to assure the religious unity of their kingdom. This dramatic measure should have sufficed to “solve” Spain’s “Jewish question,” yet it catapulted it to an unprecedented level instead. The astonishing social ascent of the conversos was particularly resented by the common people, who witnessed how the sons and grandsons of the despised Jews gained pre-eminence over them. The agricultural poor, the only social strata with whom the conversos refused to mingle, argued that Jewish blood was impure, and that it had infected Spanish nobility through intermarriage. Consequently, the “purity of blood” of the Old Christians became for centuries an important asset which could not only cast a halo of honor over the underprivileged classes, but also serve as a fatal weapon against any rival suspected of having a “contaminated” past.246 Between 1449 and 1860, the blood purity statutes restored many of the social and economic obstacles that baptism had removed for the “New Christians” generations before.247

244 See Assis, The Jews of Spain. 245 As paraphrased in Yirmiyahu Yovel, The Other Within (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 63. See also pages 57–64. 246 Yovel, The Other Within, 73–74. 247 Yovel, The Other Within, 74; and Joseph Kaplan, “Jews and Judaism in the Political and Social Thought of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” in Antisemitism through the Ages, ed. Shmuel Almog (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 159. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-004

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It is particularly striking to attest that, while the blood purity statutes discriminated against Jews and Muslim descendants alike, they came about as a reaction against the Jewish conversos “excessively” successful assimilation. Paradoxically, the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609 was founded upon their alleged resistance to assimilation into the predominantly “Old Christian” society.248 As a matter of fact, the Statutes made explicit a racism that also permeated the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition in 1480, though this religious institution did not express it directly.249 According to Benzion Netanyahu, the only group mentioned in the royal decree establishing the Inquisition was the one formed by Christian converts from Judaism, whose inner beliefs it was intended to examine.250 Therefore, in Netanyahu’s wording, “it is on the assumed Jewishness of the Marranos that the whole case of the Inquisition rests.”251 In his opinion the conversos, contrary to what the Inquisition and the broad social consensus supporting it argued, were “consciously” and “willingly” engaged in their assimilation into the hegemonic Christian society when their persecution began.252 In fact, argues Netanyahu, what bothered the Old Christians was not so much their religious beliefs as the more cultural and social aspects of their being. In other words, the conversos were perceived as belonging to a “people”, a “race” distinct from the Old Christians. They “were considered not only an alien but also an enemy alien group, one that belonged to a different nation, which was ostensibly at peace with the Spaniards but actually at incessant war with them, as it was with all other Christian nations.”253 Interestingly enough, the historical perception of the Jews as a people and a “race” inimical to the Spanish people corresponds with the predominant Spanish approach towards Muslims, despite the fact that, unlike the Jews, the

248 The “obdurate opposition of the Moriscos to all the attempts to assimilate and Christianize them” was unanimously considered by Spanish historians and observers up through the early twentieth century to be the main reason for their expulsion. The veracity of this perspective is today under discussion. See Trevor Dadson, “The Assimilation of Spain’s Moriscos: Fiction or Reality?” Journal of Levantine Studies 1, 2 (2011): 12. 249 According to Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, the Spanish anti-converso racial discrimination shares a common pattern with the German response to Jewish assimilation. See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Assimilation and Racial Anti-Semitism: The Iberian and the German Models, Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture n° 26 (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1982). 250 Benzion Netanyahu, The Origins of the Inquisition (New York: Random House, 1995), 3. 251 Benzion Nethanyahu, The Marranos of Spain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1. 252 Netanyahu, The Origins of the Inquisition, 923. 253 Netanyahu, The Origins of the Inquisition, 997.

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Muslim kingdoms have engaged in lengthy armed conflicts with the Christian ones. Yosef Kaplan argued that hatred of the Jews and Judaism played a unique role in the construction of Spanish nationalism. Imperial Spain saw itself as replacing the Jews as God’s chosen people. Religious fervor and persecution of heresy, as well as anti-Judaism, were manifestations of such belief. From the Spanish perspective, the “cleansing” of their land from any Jewish presence was considered as evidence of this divine replacement. It is for that reason that the struggle for “racial-spiritual” purity was prolonged through the blood purity statutes, playing a key role in the consolidation of Spanish nationalism.254 This “chosenness replacement” was not without contradictions. Spanish obsession with the Jew’s conversion and expulsion could have been based, as argued by Langmuir, on the subconscious fear that the Jew’s interpretation of the sacred texts is correct.255 Whether this argument is right or not, the fact is that the Jews have often aroused the respect and admiration of Spanish elites. Moreover, they have historically been associated with forces which, although often considered as demonic, were also the source of power and prosperity. From the fifteenth century on, the physical absence of the Jews was countered by their persistent “virtual” existence in Spanish popular traditions and artistic creation. Following four centuries of “absent presence,” the Jews began their return to Spain following the African War of 1859–1860.256 Yet it was mainly during the twentieth century that the new conditions made possible what has been called the Jewish “return” to Spain.257 Since the mid-1950s, successive waves of immigration contributed to the growth of the community both in volume and in diversity. As the country progressed in consolidating its democracy, it favored a steady normalization of the Jewish “fact.”

254 Kaplan, “Jews and Judaism in the Political and Social Thought of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century.” 255 Cited in Chillida, El antisemitismo en España, 35. 256 See Carmen López Alonso, “La evolución de la opinión pública española con relación a Israel, el antisemitismo y el conflicto árabe-israelo-palestino,” in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 145–146. 257 Some of the concrete changes brought by the influences of the Enlightenment and modernity in Spain were the formal abolition of the Inquisition in 1834 and the enshrining of religious tolerance in the Constitution of 1869. See Carmen López Alonso, “La evolución de la opinión pública española,” 146–147 and Oren Cytto, Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain –A European Case Study, Working Paper 57/2007 ( Jerusalem: European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2007), 11–14. One of the most important books on Spain’s Jews during the twentieth century is actually called (originally in Spanish) “Return to Sepharad”. See Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad.

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The two main cohorts of Jewish immigration to Spain are originally from Morocco and Latin America. Numerous Jews arrived to Spain after Moroccan independence from the Spanish and French colonial yokes in 1956, and also after the Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1967.258 Regarding the Latin Americans, most of them emigrated during the 1970s, especially from Argentina, following the establishing of repressive military dictatorships. During the 1980s, the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, subsequent waves of Jewish immigrants arrived to Spain from the Latin American sub-continent as they escaped successive economic, political and social crises.259 According to Jacobo Israel Garzón, who served as the President of the ʽSpanish Jewish Communities Federationʼ (Federación de Comunidades Judías de España –FCJE) between 2003 and April 2011, there are currently about 40,000 Jews in Spain. In contrast, only 406 people had declared themselves as Jewish in the official census of 1877.260 Israel Garzón’s estimation is based on a broad definition of Jewishness that includes all those people having at least one grandparent considered as a Jew according to the religious orthodoxy (the same requirement of the Israeli Law of Return). In his opinion, between 60 and 65% of Spanish Jewry is of Hispanic-Moroccan origin, 30% are Latin Americans and 5% have other origins. Less than half of this population is actively involved in Jewish community life.261 Different waves of immigration contributed to the diversity of Spanish Jewry. The Jews of Moroccan origin settled in Spain during the last years of Francoist rule, even before the régime decided to promulgate a law establishing the State’s tolerance towards religious minorities. On June 28, 1967, a Law on Religious Freedom (Ley de Libertad Religiosa) was passed, in order to adapt the Spanish legislation to the Dignitatis Humanae Declaration of the Second Vatican Council. Paradoxically, the fact that Catholicism was the official State

258 A smaller number of Egyptian Jews also immigrated to Spain during the same period. 259 See Rein and Weisz, “Ghosts of the Past, Challenges of the Present,” 109. 260 Cytto, Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain, 12. There are substantial differences in the estimates of the number of members of the Spanish Jewish community. According to Sergio DellaPergola, in 2006 the community numbered 12,000 members. See Sergio DellaPergola, “World Jewish Population 2006,” in American Jewish Year Book 2006, ed. D. Singer and L. Grossman (NY: American Jewish Committee, 2006), 586. On the other hand, in March 2007, the newspaper El País published an article asserting that: “According to the Federation of Jewish Communities there are approximately 48,000 Jews in Spain. . .” See M.R. Sahuquillo, “La inmigración cambia el mapa religioso”, elpais.com, March 31, 2007. 261 Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón, Madrid, October 13, 2010.

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religion favored this relative tolerance of non-Catholic faiths. Yet neither the law nor its implementation reflected accurately the implicit principles of the Vatican declaration, which established the right to social and civil freedom on religious matters.262 Despite its promising name, the Law of 1967 maintained the official supremacy of the Catholic Church, as well as the legal discrimination against any other religious creed.263 The Jews of Moroccan origin are mostly Sephardic, and adhere to a rather traditional approach towards Judaism. Nominally, they belong to Jewish religious orthodoxy, yet they keep a flexible approach that allows them, for example, to ride a car on the sabbath in order to attend the synagogue service, an action which contradicts the orthodox interpretation of the commandments (mitzvoth). The synagogue lies at the core of their communitarian life, and Jewish continuity is seen as an important collective value.264 To some extent, the life of contemporary Spanish Jewry is colored by the experiences of this important migratory flow, which accounts for the majority of the Jewish community. This is particularly relevant concerning the social visibility of Spanish Jews. Despite the progress realized by the Francoist régime towards religious diversity, Catholicism remained the official State religion until the approval of the democratic Constitution of 1978. The survival strategy of the growing Jewish community in this political situation was discretion. They strove to live their Jewishness as unnoticed as they could, renouncing neither their values nor their identity. The structure of the main Madrid synagogue reflects this approach as it was built in a narrow street, and kept to a modest height.265 The arrival of Latin American Jews in the mid-1970s added to the variety of the religious, cultural and social life of Spanish Jewry, but did not challenge its invisibility. Argentinean Jews, who made up most of the Latin Americans immigrants, approached Judaism in a different way than their Moroccan fellows. Instead of the synagogue, they put their social, cultural and sports institutions at the center of Jewish collective life. Rather than being non-religious, they often adopted an anti-religious Jewish identity, emphasizing their secularism.266 Most of them were Ashkenazi, and had been socialized in Yiddish-speaking families, with Socialist and leftist-Zionist ideals. Often, those holding college degrees were more inclined than others toward intermarrying with non-Jews

262 María Antonia Bel Bravo, Sefarad. Los judíos de España (Madrid: Sílex, 1997), 380. 263 Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 287. 264 Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón. Madrid, October 13, 2010. 265 Personal interview with Rhoda Henelde Abecasis. Madrid, October 29, 2010. 266 Personal interview with Rhoda Henelde Abecasis. Madrid, October 29, 2010. Also personal interview with Esther Bendahan. Madrid October 13, 2010.

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and toward involvement in politics in their home country though workers unions, left-wing parties, and revolutionary movements.267 The relationships between these two distinct groups were not easy at first. Their different perceptions of Judaism and Jewish life prevented Latin Americans from smoothly joining in the community institutions created by their Moroccan predecessors. In this complex setting, one of the first and probably most important meeting points for Spanish Jews of different origins, in which the multiplicity of backgrounds and points of view was appreciated as an asset rather than seen as a limitation, was the journal Raíces, established in 1986.268 Raíces is a cultural review specializing in Jewish issues in general and Sephardic culture in particular. The founding group included both Moroccan and Latin American Jews. It can be considered as a success story, since it celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2011, an important achievement for a cultural publication of this kind.269 This uneasy encounter of Jewish diversity reached maturation at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Jews of Latin American origin established alternative communitarian institutions based on a cultural rather than a religious interpretation of Judaism. Moreover, for the first time in the history of Spanish Jewry the orthodox religious consensus was broken with the establishment of synagogues belonging to the Reform and Conservative movements.270 Some examples of this process are the establishment in Madrid of the cultural and social organization Hebraica in 1993, of the sports and cultural association Maccabi in 1995, and of the conservative synagogue Bet-El in 1995. In Barcelona, the year 1992 saw the establishment of the Reform congregation Comunitat Jueva Atid de Catalunya, the sports and cultural association Macabi and also the social and cultural organization Asociación Hebráica de Catalunya.271 With time, the initial frictions were overcome, and today Spanish Jews from different origins are much closer to each other, and tend to cooperate. For example, in October 2010, the President of Maccabi Madrid was Sandra Israel, the daughter of the former President of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Spain and a descendent of Moroccan Jewish immigrants.272 Naturally, this process

267 Danielle Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive (Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 2006), 211. 268 See the official website of the journal, accessed June 5, 2011: http://www.revista-raices. com/intro/intro.php 269 Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón, Madrid, October 13, 2010. 270 Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 217–218. 271 Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 217–218. 272 Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón. Madrid, October 13, 2010.

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was favored by the increasingly pluralistic atmosphere of democratic Spain, as well as by smaller but nevertheless significant waves of Jewish immigration. Several hundreds of Jews from South America arrived in Spain during the early 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, and some dozens of members from Balkan Jewish communities arrived during the violent conflicts that took place in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.273 The institutional blossoming of Spanish Jewish cultural, social and sports associations during the early 1990s took place in the particular context of the celebrations of the fifth centenary of the “discovery of America.” These celebrations, as well as their connected activities, deepened the process that begun with the approval in 1978 of the democratic Constitution, establishing the nondenominational status of the Spanish state. This process was reinforced with the approval of a ʽLaw on Religious Freedomʼ (Ley de Libertad Religiosa) in 1980, and a reform of the Civil Code in 1982 granting preferential conditions to Sephardic Jews who sought Spanish citizenship.274 In the early 1990s, this process was strengthened through the celebration of the cultural and religious diversity of the Spanish nation, in contrast to the pattern of the last hundred years. These events were marked by some important milestones. During 1992, the Spanish monarchs visited a local synagogue for the first time. The visit took place in Madrid on March 31, commemorating the signing by the Catholic Kings of the 1492 Expulsion Decree exactly five hundred years earlier. During that same year the first Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish government and the official organization of the Spanish Jewish Community (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España) was signed in September; and Sefarad ’92, a special program aiming at ʽrediscovering the Jewish Spainʼ (redescubrir la España Judía) was implemented. In 1990, the Prince Felipe de Borbón granted the Sephardic communities from all around the world the ʽPrince of Asturias Prizeʼ (Premio Príncipe de Asturias, a prestigious award bestowed by the heir to the Spanish throne). He welcomed the prize recipients with these words: “From the spirit of concord of today’s Spain, and in my position as heir of those who five hundred years ago signed the Decree of Expulsion, I welcome you with open arms, and with great emotion.”275

273 For a more detailed description of the amounts and the origins of Jewish immigration to Spain, see Cytto, Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain, 15–18. 274 Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 239. Some Sephardic Jews were granted Spanish citizenship during the first decades of the twentieth century, see Chillida, El antisemitismo en España, 268. 275 See Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 349–370.

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The magnitude and relevance of such events led some Jewish leaders like David Grebler, President of the Sefarad ’92 National Jewish Commission, to announce the “complete normalization of the Jewish element in the Spanish society.”276 Despite these triumphant statements, the celebrations of 1992 do not seem to have been so much a culmination as an important stage in the long process undergone by Spanish Jewry since the 1960s. After 1992, a series of events contributed to a moderate increase in the presence of Judaism in the Spanish cultural scene. In 1995, the Red de Juderías de España- Caminos de Sefarad was established with the objective of preserving the Jewish heritage of different Spanish cities, mainly for purposes of tourism.277 Beginning in 1999, Spain joined a project sponsored by the Council of Europe celebrating the “European Day of Jewish Culture.” Since the 1990s the Spaniards have also been showing a marked increase in interest in literature dealing with Spanish Jewry.278 Of particular relevance is the fact that the image of the Jew went through a process of idealization in Spanish literature during the 1980s, which metamorphosed into a “universalizing” of the Jewish condition in the 1990s, in the sense that “we all can experience marginalization, exile and persecution.”279 These developments expanded a positive trend initiated around the 1920s, which began to challenge the historical proliferation of anti-Jewish perceptions and stereotypes in traditional Spanish literature.280 Regarding the judicial-political scene, in 1995 antisemitism was for the first time explicitly mentioned as a criminal offense in the reform to the Penal Code. Likewise, the Commission of Inquiry on Gold Transactions with the Third Reich, German insurance companies in Spain and Art collections during World War II 276 Cited in Lisbona, Retorno a Sefarad, 13. 277 Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 273. 278 Daniela Flesler, Alexa Tabea Linhard & Adrián Pérez Melgosa, “Introduction: Revisiting Jewish Spain in the Modern Era,” Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 12, 1 (2011): 1–11. 279 Paloma Díaz-Mas, as quoted in M. José Díaz de Tuesta, “La comunidad judía resiste contra el tópico,” El País, June 3, 2003, 38. 280 José Manuel Pedrosa, “Judíos en la literatura tradicional española,” in Judíos en la literatura Española, ed. Iacob Hassán and Ricardo Izquierdo Benito (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2001), 403–436. Norbert Rehrmann, “El síndrome de Cenicienta: moros y judíos en la literatura española del siglo y XX,” in El antisemitismo en España, ed. Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida and Ricardo Izquierdo Benito (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2007), 207–235. Miguel de Cervantes, the great author from the Spanish Siglo de Oro, was a rare exception to this general trend. See Ruth Fine, “El entrecruzamiento de lo hebreo y lo converso en la obra de Cervantes: un encuentro singular,” in Cervantes y las religiones: Actas del Coloquio Internacional de la Asociación de Cervantistas (Universidad hebrea de Jerusalen, Israel, 19–21 de diciembre de 2005), ed. Ruth Fine and Santiago Alfonso López Navia (Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2008), 435–451.

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was established in July 1997, although with a questionable composition and no less dubious results.281 With the election of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in April 2004, the State adopted a particularly active role in the strengthening of Jewish voices and memories inside Spanish society. Three important measures of the socialist government gave shape to these changes. The first was the establishment in October 2004 of the ʽState Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistenceʼ (Fundación Estatal Pluralismo y Convivencia). The other two included the 2005 declaration of January 27th as the ʽOfficial Day of the Memory of the Holocaust and the Prevention of the Crimes against Humanityʼ, and the establishment of Casa Sefarad-Israel in December 2006.282 These institutions reinforced a trend that crystallized by the year 2000, in which Jewish communities began to show unprecedented initiative and assertiveness in their interactions with Spanish society and government. Uriel Macías, an expert on Spanish Jewry who has held positions at different local Jewish institutions as well as at the Embassy of Israel in Spain, emphasized the difficulties faced during that process. Between 2001 and 2008, he was the Secretary-General and also in charge of all cultural activities in the Jewish Community of Madrid. During those years he made considerable efforts, together with the President of the Community Jacobo Israel Garzón, to “open the community toward the whole of Madrid society”, by encouraging an “intense and varied” cultural agenda. In fact, they were expanding a development initiated a few years earlier during the community’s presidency of Isaac Querub. These efforts bore some fruits, since they elicited a modest but significant public willing to deepen their acquaintance with Jewish culture. For instance, today between 80 and 120 people participate each year in a guided visit to the Madrid synagogue.283 However, these activities did not attract much attention. This lack of concern was especially visible in the mass media: “. . .despite our efforts to be visible, to be in the society, to be part of the cultural and social fabric of Spanish society, [. . .] at the level of the mass media, there is a complete lack of interest regarding the Jewish community of Madrid and the Spanish Jewish communities. ” Macías proposed two possible explanations for this phenomenon. One is “ignorance, mental laziness, maybe a lack of understanding of certain things. . .” The other was expressed with a lilt of sadness: “after so many years of voluntary invisibility, they have even forgotten that we exist. . .”284 281 282 283 284

Alejandro Baer, “The Voids of Sepharad,” Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 12, 1(2011): 99. For further information on those two institutions, see chapters 2 and 3. Personal interview with Uriel Macías. Madrid, October 28, 2010. Personal interview with Uriel Macías. Madrid, October 28, 2010.

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This last argument highlights one of the most obvious characteristics of contemporary Spanish Jewry. This small community is well-integrated into the larger Spanish society, where its members have achieved remarkable success at the social, cultural and economic levels. Yet it has historically been (and to some extent continues to be) invisible. This phenomenon seems to be a residue of the invisibility adopted by the Jewish community as a survival strategy during Francoist times, yet it persists in contemporary Spain. For instance, Esther Bendahan, as she was already in charge of the cultural activities of the Casa Sefarad-Israel, expressed her disappointment at the fact that in Spain public figures of Jewish origin avoid publicly expressing their Jewishness.285 According to Jacobo Israel Garzón the growth of antisemitism has also led many Jews to conceal their Jewish identity.286 This last claim should nevertheless be qualified, taking into account that in a study conducted in 2007, 90% of the interviewees from the Madrid and Barcelona Jewish communities declared that “they had no fear of living as a Jew in Spain, or being identified as such.”287 On the other hand, as Uriel Macías noted, the Spanish majority has some difficulty accepting Jews as actual human beings instead of literary creations. This is not surprising since the “imaginary Jew” played a key role in the construction of Spanish collective identity and culture even before the Spanish State existed as such. It seems that Spanish society is unwilling to make a conscious transition from the imaginary Jew of its secular cultural traditions to the real Jews with whom they share their lives. During personal interviews, both Jacobo Israel Garzón and Uriel Macías expressed their belief that the Jews of Spain are mestizos, to use Israel Garzón’s expression; or that they have an identity composed of Jewish, Spanish, and sometimes other elements (in the case of immigrants), to cite Macías.288 This characteristic, which is common to most (if not all) Jewish communities in the Diaspora in particular, and to immigrant groups in general, coincide with Danielle Rozenberg’s findings. According to her, “Most Spanish Jews recognize

285 Personal interview with Esther Bendahan, Madrid October 13, 2010. 286 Personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón, Madrid October13, 2010. 287 Cytto, Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain, 32–33. 288 Personal interview with Uriel Macías, Madrid, October 28, 2010; and personal interview with Jacobo Israel Garzón, Madrid, October 13, 2010. These statements correspond with some tenets of the most recent Jewish diaspora historiography. See, for instance, Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein, eds. Rethinking Jewish-Latin Americans (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008); and Haim Avni et al., eds. Pertenencia y alteridad, (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2011).

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themselves in this formulation [. . .]: ‘I feel Jewish and at the same time completely Spanish.’”289 The Jews of Spain are therefore hybrid creatures, in the sense that their body and their culture are located in a place where different cultures meet, forming a transversal network that replaces the traditional dichotomy of being Spaniard or Jew.290 If Spanish Jewry can be considered as a hybrid entity, the same cannot be said of Spanish society as a whole –with regard to the majority’s approach towards Jews. According to Alfonso de Toro, hybridity also means “differance,” in the sense of being aware of the right to be different, but also of being recognized as such.291 The social invisibility of Spanish Jewish community to which we referred above is symptomatic of the difficulty in facing the issue of difference in Spanish society. When such a fact remains unrecognized, when minority members cannot be seen in their differences as well as in their similarities, then the soil is ripe for their instrumental manipulation and even their collective demonization. The ‘different’ loses its human features and becomes an Other, an empty receptacle ready for individual and collective projection. These arguments do not necessarily mean that the important institutional developments that marked the consolidation of democracy and religious pluralism in Spain during the last decades were irrelevant. Yet as Rhoda Henelde Abecasis, an active member of the community made clear: “the re-encounter [between the Spanish society in general and the Jews of Spain] took place on a minor level.”292 Many Spaniards endeavored in recent years to establish a closer contact with the Jewish people and in some cases even came to terms with their own Jewish roots. But most of them seem to perceive Judaism as an abstract element belonging to a distant past rather than as a concept defining fellow contemporary human beings with an ethnic, religious, or cultural mark of “differance.”293 As shown in Charts 4.1 and 4.2, the contrast between the main Spanish newspapers’ references to Spain’s Jewish past and contemporary Spanish Jewry during 1997–2006 strengthens this hypothesis.294 As clarified later in this 289 Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 223. 290 Alfonso De Toro, “Hybridité –Diasporisation-Globalisation. Le Maghreb (Abdelkebir Khatibi- Assia Djebar- Boualem Sansal),” in Le Brassage de la Culture Amazighe et de la Culture Arabe, ed. Moha Ennaji (Fès: Imprimerie Imagerie Pub., 2009), 85–86. 291 De Toro, “Hybridité –Diasporisation-Globalisation, ” 83. 292 Personal interview with Rhoda Henelde Abecasis, Madrid 29 Oct. 2010. 293 During the interview, Henelde Abecasis expressed her belief that Spanish society as a whole perceives Judaism as something abstract belonging to the past, detached from actual Jews. 294 Data for El Mundo available only since 2002.

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chapter, the peaks of interest in contemporary Spanish Jewry of the different newspapers correlate with internal and external developments only indirectly related to the Jews of Spain. All too often Spanish Jewry was approached as a means for the achievement of political objectives and not as an end in itself. In contrast, the concern with Spain’s Jewish past follows a more stable upward trend, coincident with the increased governmental backing of religious pluralism and cultural diversity.

Contemporary Spanish Jewry 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 El Mundo 2001 ABC 2000 1999 El Pais 1998 1997 0

2

4

6 8 10 Number of Articles

12

14

Chart 4.1.

Spain's Jewish Past 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 El Mundo 2001 ABC 2000 1999 El Pais 1998 1997 0

5

10 Number of Articles

15

20

Chart 4.2.

In order to better understand the complexities of such processes, especially as they relate to Spanish society and politics, we will now focus on the role played by the Jew as a Spanish Other. This will help contextualize a more in-depth

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analysis of how the main Spanish newspapers referred to the ‘Jew’ during the years 1997–2006.295

4.1.1 Antisemitism: The Spanish Way Since the beginning of the 21st century, various reports have ranked Spain among the European countries having the highest percentage of antisemitic prejudice and stereotypes. Such findings are not new, since the roots of the phenomenon lie deep in Spanish history.296 Given the historical identification of Spain with Roman Catholic Christianity, the foundations of Spanish antisemitism are deeply connected to the accusations of deicide promoted by the Catholic Church against the Jewish people from its earliest stages until the Nostra Aetate declaration of 1965.297 Even though pagans had previously engaged in violent xenophobic anti-Jewish attacks since Antiquity, the deicide charge made against the Jews by Christianity catapulted this hatred to a different qualitative dimension than other racist or anti-foreign phobias. Considered to be guilty of a crime of cosmic dimensions, the Jews came to be perceived as the incarnation of the desires of Satan, as the physical manifestation of Evil, against which every good Christian should resolutely fight.298 Over centuries, the Jew as Other has played a central role in the construction of the image that both Christians and Spaniards have had of themselves. Jews became the physical, psychological, and emotional receptacle for the collective projection of all those attributes considered to be essentially antagonistic to Christianity. By identifying Evil with Judaism, the groundwork was set for the proclamation of Catholic Spain as the representative of Goodness on Earth, invested with a providential evangelizing role.

295 For a lengthy scholarly analysis of the developments undergone by contemporary Spanish Jewry see Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive. 296 Portions of this analysis have been published in Rein and Weisz, “Ghosts of the Past, Challenges of the Present.” 297 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Christian theology and anti-Semitism, as well as of the implications of the accusation of deicide against the Jewish people, see Jules Isaac, L’enseignement du mépris: vérité historique et mythes théologiques (Paris: Fasquelle Éditeurs, 1962), and Robert S.Wistrich, Antisemitism. The Longest Hatred (London: Methuen London, 1991). 298 See Isaac, L’enseignement du mépris and Wistrich, Antisemitism. See also Álvarez Chillida, El antisemitismo en España, 40.

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Unlike in other countries such as France and Great Britain, in Spain the historic merging of the national ethnic identity with Catholic Christianity was endorsed by Spanish liberals during the nineteenth century, as well as by many of the “reds” (socialists, communists, and anarchists) during the years of the Second Republic and the Civil War.299 Today, despite the 1978 Constitution guaranteeing the State’s non-denominational status and the freedom of religion and belief, the Roman Apostolic Church maintains a privileged status in the country’s public institutions.300 A survey carried out in December 2006 showed that 77.1% of Spaniards viewed themselves as Catholics.301 Four months later, 19% of the total population agreed with the statement that the Jews are responsible for the death of Christ. Though far below the percentage found in Poland, where 39% answered affirmatively the same question, this belief was more widespread in Spain than in Italy, Germany or France (with 18%, 13% and 14% respectively).302 Without a doubt, secular and Christian antisemitism, strengthened by modern antisemitic movements from other European nations, continues to influence the image of the Jew in Spain.303 In October 2002, a survey determined that 34% of the interviewees in the country held beliefs that were mostly antisemitic, a higher percentage than the figures registered for France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.304 Since then, Spain “has been among the countries with the most negative views of Jews.”305 Such prejudices, whose traces remain in the

299 See Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 48–49. 300 See, for example, the article by Juan G. Bedoya, “Estado aconfesional sólo a medias,” elpais.com, July 5, 2008. See also Natalia Junquera, “A sus órdenes, mi capellán,” elpais.com, October 26, 2008. 301 See the Barometer from December 2006, CIS, question no. 28. Available at: http://www. cis.es/cis/opencms/Artchivos/Marginales/2660_2679/2666/e26600.html (accessed November 3, 2008). 302 See Anti-Defamation League, Attitudes Toward Jews and the Middle East in Five European Countries (New York: ADL, May 2007). 303 On the influence of modern anti-Semitism in Spain, see, for instance, Isidro González, “El antisemitismo moderno llega a España: el Affaire Dreyfus,” in El antisemitismo en España, ed. Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida and Ricardo Izquierdo Benito (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2007), 165 –180. See also Álvarez Chillida, El antisemitismo en España. 304 See Anti-Defamation League, European Attitudes Toward Jews: A Five Country Survey. 305 See Anti-Defamation League, Polluting the Public Square: Anti-Semitic Discourse in Spain. This tendency has been confirmed by a Pew Research Center report from Spring 2008 that found that 46% of Spaniards rate Jews unfavorably, and a July 2008 survey from a body dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Education, according to which more than half of the country’s high school students would refuse to share their school desk with a Jew. See The Pew

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country’s present-day popular culture, also affect the Spaniards’ opinion of the Jewish State, Israel.306 There are, certainly, other important variables explaining this phenomenon. One of them is the strategic alliance between Spain and the Arab states since the end of the Civil War in 1939. Another is the virulent antisemitic campaign used by the former Soviet Union (USSR) since 1967 in its struggle against the United States (USA) and its ally Israel during the Cold War, which has greatly influenced leftist perceptions (in Spain as in the rest of the world) of the Middle East conflict until this very day. Moreover, ambivalent Spanish behavior during the Second World War, and the fact that Spain did not experience the trauma of the Holocaust on its own soil like other European countries, add to the distinctiveness of the Spanish case.307 As already explained in our section dealing with its policy toward the Arab world, Spain transformed its lack of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel into an important strategic asset during the period 1948–1986. The SpanishArab “friendship,” in an international context in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at the top of the Arab countries’ concerns, to some extent prevented the formation of positive perceptions of the Jews and the State of Israel. One example of this influence were the protests voiced by different Arab embassies to the Francoist government against the activities of the Amistad JudeoCristiana (ʽJudeo-Christian Friendshipʼ), a Catholic institution founded on 1962 with the purpose of countering Christian theological antisemitism and bringing closer Jews and Catholics.308

Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslim on the Increase in Europe. See also Castedo and Berdié, “El racismo cala en las aulas”. 306 See José Manuel Pedrosa, “El antisemitismo en la cultura popular española,” in El antisemitismo en España, ed. Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida and Ricardo Izquierdo Benito (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2007), 31–55. See also Pere Joan i Tous and Heike Nottebaum, “El olivo y la espada: introducción,” in El olivo y la espada: Estudios sobre el antisemitismo en España (siglos XVI–XX), ed. Pere Joan i Tous and Heike Nottebaum (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2003): IX–XXIV. See also Alejandro Baer, ‘Tanques contra piedras’: la imagen de Israel en España, ARI 74/2007 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2007); and Jacobo Israel Garzón et al., El estigma imborrable: Reflexiones sobre el nuevo antisemitismo (Madrid: Hebraica Ediciones, 2005). 307 According to Alejandro Baer, “Another myth that was firmly entrenched during the dictatorship was that of Spain’s neutrality during World War II, when, in reality, Franco played both sides of the fence, as an open sympathizer with the Nazi cause and as a cautious nonbelligerent country for the Western allies.” Baer,“The Voids of Sepharad”, 98. 308 See Álvarez Chillida, El Antisemitismo en España, 445–450.

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In addition, the broader context of the Cold War and the alliances formed around the two superpowers have had a lasting impact on permutations of antisemitism since the end of the 1960s. The Israeli victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 inflicted a painful blow to the global aspirations of the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Arab allies. Despite its early support for the Jewish State and the formal proscription of antisemitism by the official Marxist-Leninist ideology, the “Six-Day War transformed the periodic but isolated anti-Jewish diatribes into a long and intensive anti-Semitic campaign without parallel in the history of the Soviet Union.”309 At the heart of this campaign was the work of intellectuals loyal to the régime that adapted the old antisemitic topics formerly used by Czarist intellectuals for counter-revolutionary purposes to make them fit the official Soviet ideology. Their narrative included the accusation that the Zionists duplicate Hitler’s crimes, as well as the alleged Jewish control of the Western capitalist economy, culture and politics. These topics, together with the manipulation of the Jewish concept of chosen people to present it as the religious justification for Jewish world domination, have significantly influenced worldwide leftist opinion to this very day.310 Another element that favored the persistence of Spanish antisemitism is the country’s relative lack of a “culture” of the Holocaust. In Spain, the memory of the Shoah is entangled with that of the Spanish Civil War. According to Alejandro Baer, the lack of existence of a culture dealing with the “Spanish tragedy” (i.e the Spanish Civil War) is at the root of Spain’s conflicted relationship with the memory of the Holocaust. Such a collective memory is, indeed, “uncomfortable” for a Spanish society that led a successful transition to democracy owing to the intentional silencing of the Francoist régime’s victims. As Baer starkly points out, these victims are “inexorably related to the history of Europe’s fascism.”311 Franco’s insurrection against the Spanish Republic in 1936 has been considered as an early success of the authoritarian forces of the extreme right that were increasingly challenging the European democracies of the time. That is why the military upheaval led by Franco against the legitimate Spanish government enjoyed the support of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In the words of the historian Julián Casanova, “Franco’s victory was also a victory for Hitler and Mussolini. And the Republic’s defeat was also a defeat for the democracies.”312 Yet unlike his

309 Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession (New York: Random House, 2010), 138–9. 310 Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession, 140–141. 311 Alejandro Baer, Holocausto. Recuerdo y Representación (Madrid: Losada, 2006), 237–239. See also José Carlos Rueda Laffond, “Memoria televisiva y representación de la identidad. La ‘españolización del Holocausto,’” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 90.8 (2013), 965–981. 312 Julián Casanova, “Setenta años de la Victoria de Franco,” elpais.com, March 29, 2009.

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international allies, Franco remained in power until his death in 1975, at the head of a dictatorship that did its best to adapt to the changing circumstances without losing its authoritarian and repressive character. It has therefore been extremely difficult to face the memory of the Shoah in a political context where Francoist crimes have been covered up by an institutionalized silencing. An example of this Spanish response to discussion of the Holocaust was seen at the first screening of Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah in Spain, in 1986. According to the film director, extreme right militants had placed a stand full of Holocaust denial publications just in front of the entrance to the event, before the impassive gaze of the Spanish police. When he came into the projection room together with a socialist deputy who accompanied him, they realized that “all the people in the audience were French.”313 However, if Spain wanted to participate in the cultural and identity construction of the European Union it had to change its approach to the memory the Holocaust. Between 1950 and 1989, Europe’s collective identity was based on two main pillars: anti-Nazism and antifascism. Since 1989, the breaking down of the Communist bloc triggered a series of public debates in many European countries concerning the role they had played in the process which led to Auschwitz.314 As a result of this collective examen de conscience, the Holocaust became a “negative apotheosis of European history”, which attained “the importance of a founding act.”315 This centrality of the Shoah in the construction of the New Europe has also been highlighted by Diana Pinto: “. . .the Holocaust [is] . . . becoming the filter through which a new reading of European identities is being fashioned.”316 In her opinion, for the first time in 2000 years of European history, “Jews and their collective history are thus entering into a dialogue with the various national pasts [. . .] The ‘Jewish space’ has penetrated into the heart of European national identity.”317 Spain was influenced by these developments.318 Commemoration of the Holocaust in the Spanish public space began in 1997, and in 2005 the Spanish 313 Quico Alsedo, “Claude Lanzmann. Director de cine. ‘Todavía hoy no sabemos lo que fue el Holocausto,’” El Mundo, April 27, 2003, 53. 314 See Lothar Probst, “Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust”, New German Critique 90 (2003): 54. 315 Dan Diner, quoted in Probst, “Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust,” 53–54. 316 Diana Pinto, A new Jewish identity for post-1989 Europe, Policy Paper 1 (London: JPR, June 1996), 6. 317 Pinto, A new Jewish identity for post-1989 Europe, 11. 318 For a further analysis of the memory of the Holocaust in Spain, including its relationship with European and global developments, see Baer, “The Voids of Sepharad.”

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government officially declared January 27th as the “Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust and for the Prevention of Crimes against Humanity.” In 2006, one of the two official commemorations was headed by the Spanish Monarchs and the Spanish Prime Minister.319 Reflecting this trend, during the 1990s different films and documentaries dealing with the Holocaust like Shoah and Schindler’s List were more widely shown on Spanish television and in movie theaters. The interconnectedness between the Shoah and the Spanish Civil War is crucial to understanding both the achievements and the limitations of such developments. On the one hand, one could agree with the argument of Alejandro Baer that “the memory of the Holocaust opened the door for the institutional acknowledgement of the Republican victims.”320 This acknowledgement is embodied in the inclusion of mention of Spanish Republicans and Gypsies in the official Holocaust commemorations, as well as in the ʽLaw for the victims of the Spanish Civil War and Francoism,ʼ also known as the ʽLaw for Historical Memoryʼ (Ley de Memoria Histórica), passed by the Spanish Parliament in December 2007.321 On the other hand, the limitations of the Spanish commitment to the remembrance of the Holocaust and prevention of crimes against humanity are evident in the fact that Judge Baltasar Garzón was temporarily suspended over his attempt to open an investigation into what he considered as crimes against humanity carried out by the Franco régime. The Spanish Supreme Court has tried him on charges of distorting the law for such an initiative.322 In June 2011, that same Supreme Court acquitted four people who had been found guilty by a lower court of promoting 319 Baer, “The Voids of Sepharad.” See also Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Conmemoración del día oficial de la memoria del Holocausto (Madrid: Dirección General de Comunicación Exterior, 2006). 320 Baer, Holocausto, 248. This influence has been also discussed by Isabel Estrada in her article “To Mauthausen and Back: The Holocaust as a Reference in Spanish Civil War Memory Studies,” in The Holocaust in Spanish Memory. Historical Perceptions and Cultural Discourses, ed. Antonio Gómez López-Quiñones and Susanne Zepp (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010), 37–50. 321 See José Álvarez Junco, “La ley de víctimas de la guerra civil y el franquismo,” Historia Contemporánea 38 (2009): 145–161. For further insights on the paradoxes and limitations of the 2007 law and Spanish “historical memory” in general see José Brunner, “Ironía de la historia española: observaciones sobre la política pos-franquista de olvido y memoria,” Historia Contemporánea 38 (2009): 163–183; and José Álvarez Junco, “Respuesta de José Álvarez Junco a José Brunner,”Historia Contemporánea 38 (2009):185–188. 322 See “Cronología: Garzón y la causa por los crímenes del Franquismo,” elpais.com, April 28, 2010.

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xenophobia and antisemitism by selling Nazi literature. Not surprisingly, the final judge on the matter, Adolfo Prego de Oliver, is known for his public endorsement of the military coup of 1936 and his clear position against the ‘Law for Historical Memory’.323 These shortcomings contribute to the tenacity of Spanish antisemitism. On March 2011, a new Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain detected an increase in antisemitic acts during 2010, in comparison to the previous year.324 One of the most interesting parts of the report is the analysis of the first study on antisemitism carried out by an official Spanish organization, whose results were presented in September 2010. According to Casa Sefarad-Israel, the institution that requested the survey, “its results rigorously contradict the opinion that Spain is strongly antisemitic, anti-Israeli or pro-Arabic.”325 On the base of this curious conclusion, the then Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos confidently declared, “The public opinion in our country is neither antisemitic nor anti-Israeli.”326 In contrast to these celebratory statements, the authors of the Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010 considered that the data provided by the survey are “highly alarming”: 34.6% of the Spanish population have an unfavorable or completely unfavorable opinion of the Jews, and 58% believe that “the Jewish people are powerful because they control the economy and the mass media.” This second percentage reaches 62.2% among university students and 70.5% among the people who declared themselves to be “interested in politics.”327

323 Abraham Barchilon, “Racismo y Xenofobia: El Tribunal Supremo no está en Europa.” Published in the Spanish Federation of Jewish Communities’s blog: http://fcje.blogspot.com/2011/ 06/racismo-y-xenofobia-el-tribunal-supremo.html (accessed July 5, 2011). 324 See the Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010, based on information published by the Observatory on Anti-Semitism in Spain, and in the Journals of Analysis about Anti-Semitism published by the Movimiento contra la Intolerancia (‘Movement against Intolerance’).The Report is available at: http://observatorioantisemitismo.fcje.org/wp-content/uploads/wpcf7_uploads// 2009/10/informe_observatorio_2010.pdf (accessed April 28, 2011). Unfortunately, the documentation and compilation of this data has only taken place since 2009, with the establishment of the Observatorio de Antisemitismo by the ʽSpanish Federation of Jewish Communitiesʼ (Federación de Comunidades Judías de España) and the ʽMovement against Intoleranceʼ (Movimiento contra la Intolerancia.) This limitation prevents the identification of long term trends regarding the phenomenon. 325 http://www.casasefarad-israel.es/es/virtual/Miguel-Angel-Moratinos-presento-la-primera-en cuest_2223.aspx (accessed April 28, 2011). 326 See the online magazine Libertad Digital: http://www.libertaddigital.com/sociedad/mora tinos-la-opinion-publica-espanola-no-es-antisemita-ni-antiisraeli-1276401321/ (accessed April 28, 2011). 327 Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010, 30.

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These data are particularly startling considering the small size of Spanish Jewry, which amounts to a mere 0.1% of the total population. This means that in Spain, as in Poland for example, the “deep-rooted classically anti-Semitic stereotypes” gave way, after the dramatic reduction in the size of the Jewish community, to the phenomenon characterized as “anti-Semitism without Jews.”328 The Report released in March 2011 contains other worrisome data. These include lectures given at the Faculty of Sociology of the important Universidad Complutense de Madrid by “recognized ultra-fascists” and neo-Nazi representatives, and the selling of “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” by “one of the largest, oldest and most prestigious chains of bookstores in Spain.”329 Such data reinforce the findings of the 2009 survey, which indicated that in Spain “the most anti-Semitic people are supposedly the most educated and well-informed.”330 If we also take into consideration the fact that people on the center-left have a more unfavorable opinion of Jews (37.7%) than the extreme right (34%), we reach the conclusion that the country suffers from a considerable degree of bien pensant antisemitism.331 This Spanish singularity seems to be born out of the combination of a number of different variables: the Catholic tradition, Arab-Spanish “friendship,” Soviet ideological influence on the Spanish left in the context of the Cold War, and the relative lack of any memory of the Holocaust. Furthermore, these elements were catalyzed by the institutionalization of silencing and denial. Despite the benefits that this approach might have brought to the Spaniards in the short term during the successful transition to democracy, this political strategy has also exacted a heavy price. The polemic that arose around the first official survey on antisemitism in Spain is a good example of the counterproductive outcomes of forced oblivion. We saw, in effect, that the results of the official survey that were considered as “highly alarming” by the Observatorio de Antisemitismo were celebrated by the government as proof of the lack of anti-Jewish sentiment in Spanish public opinion. According to Robin Stoller and Alejandro Baer, “the government-sponsored study proved to be an effort to address anti-Semitism by simply denying its existence.”332 These scholars asserted that the survey was initially divided into a

328 Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession, 457. 329 Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010, 18 and 22. 330 Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010, 30. 331 Report on Anti-Semitism in Spain in 2010, 30. 332 See Robin Stoller and Alejandro Baer, “A survey to deny a problem,” jpost.com, October 19, 2010. Available at: http://observatorioantisemitismo.fcje.org/wp-content/uploads/wpcf7_ uploads//2010/10/Jpost-_-Article_17_10_2010.pdf (accessed April 28, 2011).

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qualitative and a quantitative phase. Yet in light of the results of the qualitative phase, “which confirmed the existence of a large variety of anti-Semitic stereotypes,” [. . .] “Casa Sefarad-Israel shifted gears halfway through the study and, disregarding the qualitative part, produced a questionnaire that not only does not measure anti-Semitic bias, but contained questions drafted in a way that would elicit positive answers.” Moreover, the results of the qualitative part of the study were not disclosed to the public. The joint article ends with a blunt phrase: “The institutional denial of anti-Semitism in Spain exists and everyone – not only the Jewish community– should be concerned.”333

4.2 Spanish Newspapers, Philo-Semitism and Anti-Jewish Mythology (1997–2006) A valuable means for understanding Spanish antisemitism is content analysis of its most popular newspapers. As both the products and co-creators of Spanish culture and the political scene, the main Spanish dailies are a kind of porthole through which the evolution of the Spanish people’s perceptions of themselves and their Jewish Other can be observed. In this chapter, I analyze the main trends throughout 1997–2006. During those years, important developments which took place both on the internal and the external fronts led Spanish society to adopt changing and sometimes even contradictory positions on the self-Jewish Other dichotomy.

4.2.1 El País: A View from the Center-Left El País was established in 1976 and is currently “Spain’s largest circulation daily,” being “a source of reference for the most influential sectors of society.”334 It is a liberal newspaper that played an important role in the consolidation of Spanish democracy. Since the 1980s, El País has followed an ideological line

333 Stoller and Baer, “A survey to deny a problem.” 334 See LexisNexis® Academic. According to data from the Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión (OJI) for April 2007, the average copy circulation was of 432,204 for El País, 330,634 for El Mundo and 240,225 for ABC: http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/200705/25/socie dad/20070525elpepusoc_3.Pes.PDF.pdf (accessed February 28, 2011). This data has been confirmed in an official report for the period July 2009/June 2010: http://www.introl.es/Introl/Por tal/novedad_desarrollo/_GN1nDmFOmzO68MOYaWzenHjx6KyU1h-8 (accessed January 27, 2011).

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close to the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), a social-democratic party that has governed the country during the crucial years 1982–1996 (Felipe González served four successive mandates as Prime Minister), and from 2004 until December 2011.335 Like most of the world’s left, the Spanish socialists and communists underwent a thorough change in their approach to Jews, Judaism and the State of Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War of 1967. The Arab defeat triggered the adoption by its Soviet allies of a virulent antisemitic rhetoric that influenced leftist discourse around the world in different degrees. Spanish socialists were affected by this development, although their perception of the Jewish world was often nuanced by positive memories of the initially socialist character of the State of Israel, of the outstanding Jewish presence among the Brigadas Internacionales (‘International Brigades’) who fought on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War, and of the initial refusal of the State of Israel to establish diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain. Between 4,000 and 8,000 Jews volunteered in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War, a considerable proportion among the total number of volunteers of 40,000. This large Jewish participation in the defense of the Spanish Republic fueled the anti-Jewish sentiments of the victorious Nationalist side, but also reinforced the ideological affinity between the Republicans and most of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine.336 These shared memories were nurtured in the aftermath of the war by the participation of both the Spanish Socialist Party and the Israeli Labor Party in the Socialist International. In 1977, ten years after the Soviet Union had begun its antisemitic campaign against Zionism, the future leader of the Spanish democratic transition, Felipe González, recalled in a press conference in Tel Aviv that the Spanish Socialists, the Jews and the State of Israel had often been in the same camp: “we lay in the same trenches together, we fought together for the same principles. We are tied to the Israeli Labor Party.”337 In the same spirit, Carmen López Alonso highlights the fact that Israel “. . .was a model for the left wing, [. . .] for the whole group of “progres,” the common label given to the people who, however inarticulate, were against Franco’s dictatorship. Some of them were those in the sixties and the seventies who traveled to Israeli kibbutzim in a kind of peregrination [. . .] Among this group we can find many of those who later became very 335 See María Arroyo Cabello, “La prensa española en la Democracia (1982–2006): transformación, concentración y regionalización,” Estudos do Século XX 7 (2007): 139, accessed 5 February 2019, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/1647-8622_7_7 . 336 See Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition, 59–68. 337 Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition, 217.

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active in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel in 1986.”338 These different elements can actually be detected in El País’s approach to Jews, Judaism and the State of Israel. As a matter of fact, the daily occasionally publishes articles by the well-known liberal Israeli writers David Grossman and Amos Oz, as well as by the former Israeli Foreign Minister and member of the Israeli Labor Party, Shlomo Ben Ami. Sporadically, it also gives the Spanish public information on the political and cultural activities of Israeli liberals, leftists and/or pacifist groups.339 In July 2002, it even published an article by American historian Paul Kennedy that harshly criticized the academic boycott against Israeli Universities and highlighted the important role played by Israeli liberal intellectuals in the struggle against the “intolerant” politics of the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.340 Yet a systematic analysis of the articles published between 1997 and 2006 by El País reveals the predominance of pro-Palestinian interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, often wrapped in antisemitic motifs and stereotypes. According to Alejandro Baer, this trend has crossed ideological boundaries, and has become a common denominator for the mainstream Spanish press.341 Despite these general trend, between 1997 and 2006 there have been some important changes in the way El País approached issues like Palestinian terrorism, the delegitimizing of the State of Israel, and conspiracy theories related to the control of world affairs by a supposedly powerful “Jewish lobby.” As seen in Chart 4.3, the periods 1997–2001 and 2003–2006 marked an increase in the daily’s interest in the Jews in general. Chart 4.4 shows that, to some extent, this concern was related to the developments taking place in Israel, particularly in relation to the Palestinians. However, Charts 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6 also point at a rising interest in issues like antisemitism, the Holocaust and Spanish Jewish past.

338 López Alonso, Changing Views of Israel and the Israelí-Palestinian Conflict in Democratic Spain (1978–2006), 3–4. 339 See, for instance, David Grossman, “Últimos estertores de vida desde un barco hundido,” El País, April 4, 2002, 11–12; Amos Oz, “La espalda y la pared,” El País, October 24, 2003, 15– 16; F.S. “Miles de pacifistas israelíes piden en Tel Aviv la salida del ejército de los territorios palestinos,” El País, May 12, 2002, 4; and “Las mujeres de Israel,” El País, April 29, 2002, 12. See also this article from the electronic version of the newspaper El País: http://www.elpais. com/todo-sobre/persona/Shlomo/Ben/Ami/296/ (accessed March 7, 2011). 340 Paul Kennedy, “Una fiebre estival afecta a los académicos europeos,” El País, July 28, 2002, 12. 341 Baer, Spain’s Jewish Problem, 98.

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El País Total Number of Articles about Jews 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Chart 4.3.

El País Countries Number of Articles

100 80 60 40 20 0

1997

1998 Israel

1999

2000 Palestine

2001

2002 Spain

2003 US

2004 2005 Europe

2006

Chart 4.4.

The analysis of the appearance of the words “terror” and “terrorism” (terrorismo) in the same paragraph as the word “Jew” during the years 1997–2000 in El País shows that these two concepts (terror-Jew) have been connected linking the Nazi crimes to those of the Basque terrorist group ETA. In other words, Nazi terror against the Jews was often compared to ETA terrorist crimes. In addition, these words were used in stating the opinion that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat should not be called a terrorist, since Palestinian terrorism was held to be a direct consequence of Israeli policies.342

342 Javier Tusell, “El reproche y la tenacidad,” El País, July 19, 1997, 14; Antonio Elorza, “Ante un conflicto lejano,” El País, April 4, 1997, 16; Carlos Mendo, “La difícil paz,” El País, October 25, 1998, 4; and Fernando Savater, “La crispación,” El País, July 7, 2000, 15.

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Chart 4.5.

El País 300 200 100 0 1997

1998

1999

2000

Analyzed Articles

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Articles on the Holocaust

Chart 4.6.

However, from 2001 we also find references to the “terrorist attacks” of Hamas, Al Fatah and Islamic Jihad, beginning with the harsh images that filled the world news in the first months of the Second Intifada that began in October 2000.343 This association of Islam and/or Palestinian groups with terrorism was catalyzed by the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and to a greater extent by the terrorist attack of May 18, 2003, against the Casa de España (ʽSpanish Houseʼ) in Casablanca, Morocco.

343 “Un ‘comando’ Palestino mata a 10 israelíes en una emboscada. Israel bombardea Gaza y Cisjordania como represalia,” El País, December 13, 2001, 1; and Ferrán Sales, “Un misil del ejército israelí mata a cuatro dirigentes del grupo integrista Palestino Hamas,” El País, July 18, 2001, 2.

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The terrorist attack of May 2003, directed simultaneously against European and Jewish objectives, put the Spanish anti-terrorist police on maximum alert. Even though the newspaper considered Spanish involvement in the Iraq war (enacted by the conservative government of José María Aznar, despite the socialists’ disagreement) as the main trigger for anti-Spanish rage, the fact that both Spaniards and Jews had been targets of terrorist actions undoubtedly affected El País’ approach to the issue of terrorism.344 Probably the most eloquent example of this change is the editorial decision to publish an opinion article by Yaacov Cohen, the Israeli ambassador to Spain from 1992–1995, on November 19, 2003. Cohen opens his text with a reference to the killing of his parents at the hands of the Nazis and their Polish and Ukrainian collaborators. “After the war,” he writes, “I decided to leave the Europe of persecution and death and begin a new life in a Jewish State.” Several paragraphs later, Cohen brought arguments that challenged El País’ preponderant approach toward terrorism: Those who put into question Israel’s right to existence, those who equate Zionism to racism and consider putting a bomb in a bus, a restaurant, a synagogue or a Jewish school legitimate, those who call the terrorists guerrilleros, resistance members and kamikazes, hide ysterday’s anti-Semitism under today’s anti-Zionism. Today, the anti-Semites transfer their former hate of the individual Jew to a collective Jewish entity, represented by the State of Israel [my emphasis].345

In addition, other articles published that year defended Israel’s right to fight the “terrorist menace,” while also denouncing the antisemitism of Al Qaeda, and Jew-hatred that is covered by an anti-Zionist façade.346

344 See Jorge A. Rodríguez, “España pone en ʽmáxima alertaʼ a los grupos policiales que combaten al terrorismo islámico,”El País, May 18, 2003, 4. 345 Yaacov Cohen, “El antisemitismo hace 60 años y ahora, ” El País, November 19, 2003, 14: “Después de la guerra [. . .] decidí dejar la Europa de la persecución y la muerte para tratar de iniciar una nueva vida en un Estado judío [. . .] Quienes cuestionan el derecho de Israel a la existencia, quienes equiparan el sionismo al racismo y consideran legítimo poner una bomba en un autobús, un restaurante, una sinagoga o una escuela de niños judíos, quienes llaman guerrilleros, miembros de la resistencia y kamikazes a los terroristas, esconden bajo su antisionismo de hoy al antisemitismo de ayer. Los antisemitas transfieren hoy el antiguo odio al judío individual al ente colectivo judío, representado por el Estado de Israel. ” 346 See, for instance, Javier Valenzuela, “Hitler con turbante,” El País, November 18, 2003, 4; Javier del Pino, “El lugarteniente de Bin Laden anuncia nuevos ataques contra Occidente,” El País, May 22, 2003, 5; Alain Finkielkraut, “Una nueva forma de rechazo,” El País, December 28, 17; Berna Harbour, “‘Si los palestinos no cambian, entraran para siempre en el bando del terrorismo’, “ El País, December 7, 2003, 10.

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However, important domestic and international considerations moderated this trend. In March 2003, the Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, belonging to the center-Right Partido Popular (PP), became one of the leaders of the US-led military intervention in Iraq. This initiative, allegedly aimed at fighting global terrorism, was severely criticized by broad sectors of the Spanish population, including El País.347 The March 11, 2004, terrorist attacks in Madrid reinforced these contradictions. As in the 2003 attacks on the Casa de España in Morocco, the political left and center-left, among others, blamed Prime Minister Aznar and his Iraq policy. The Iraq invasion, as the main front in a “War on Terror” declared by the US, the UK and their Spanish ally Aznar, was perceived as a counter-productive and even barbaric way of dealing with terrorism. Although El País had begun to acknowledge the existence of global terrorism and to condemn it, they still severely criticized the ideological use of the concept in the international context of the “War on Terror.” 348 El País’ approach to terrorism should be understood in this political context, since the “War on Terror” in general and the Iraq invasion in particular have been widely perceived in Spain as responding to the interests of the United States, Israel, and the American “Jewish Lobby.”349 That is why, at the time that the term “terrorism” was slowly been incorporated into the description of Palestinian violence against Israeli civilians, its use was combined with references to Israeli “state terrorism”. Some authors even argued that the terrorism perpetrated by Palestinians served mostly Israeli and not Palestinian interests.350 In other words, despite some significant exceptions, terrorist actions perpetrated by Palestinians were still presented in relatively positive terms. For example, while the characterization of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as a “terrorist” was emphatically and systematically dismissed, the daily did not hesitate in using this term to describe former Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin.351 In a similar

347 Francisco Perejil and Pilar Marcos, “Avalancha sin precedentes contra la guerra, “ elpais. com, February 17, 2003: http://elpais.com/diario/2003/02/16/espana/1045350001_850215.html (accessed March 18, 2012). 348 See, for instance, “Seguridad y terrorismo,” El País, October 26, 2003, 14; Sami Nair, “En nombre de la civilización, la barbarie,” El País, May 28, 2004, 16. 349 See, for example, Joan de Sagarra, “La horma de mi sombrero. ‘Shoah’,” El País, April 4, 2002, 2; Norman Birnbaum, “Un Estado cliente,” El País, March 17, 2002, 10; and “Precisiones,” El País, March 19, 2002, 13. 350 Some examples: Henry Siegman, “La guerra ficticia de Sharon,” El País, January 10, 2004, 9; “La sombra de una sospecha,” El País, August 25, 2002, 8; and Gema Martín Muñoz, “Palestina y el juego de la manipulación,” El País, January 25, 2006, 14. 351 “La sombra de una sospecha,” El País, August 25, 2002, 8.

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vein, in an article analyzing different definitions of “terrorism”, the columnist argued that an attack by “Palestinian radicals” against Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories should not be considered as terrorism.352 Insistence on the “terrorist” character of the State of Israel, combined with the relativization and even justification of the use of extreme violence against Israeli civilians by Arabs, Muslims or Palestinians, was especially strong during the Second Lebanon War (July 12–August 14 2006) and its aftermath. Throughout that period, common references to Israel’s “State terrorism” and to Jewish terrorism during the British mandate in Palestine sometimes included wellknown antisemitic tenets.353 On 26 July 2006, an opinion article described the Old Testament an “emblematic terror story,” which “helps to understand the millenary poison that runs through the veins of Jewish integrism.” The text combines classic Christian antisemitic topics like “Jewish vengefulness” and a distorted interpretation of Jewish “chosenness” in order to establish an unequivocal association between Jewishness and terrorism. As is usually the case in these kinds of articles, its author nevertheless concedes that not all Jews are malevolent.354 A few months before the publication of this article, another one by Juan Miguel Muñoz quoted a Hamas representative, conveying the message that the “bad image” that the Islamist political party has in European eyes is a mere consequence of Israeli propaganda: “I am convinced that as soon as they [the Europeans] get in touch with us they will change their perception [. . .] they will realize that we are not extremists.” This favorable gesture toward this political association considered as terrorist by both the European Union and the United States was not enough for Muñoz. After that quote, he stated that the Jewish State wished Hamas good luck in the Palestinian election, because this would guarantee a “return to violence” after a one-year truce.355 The evolution undergone by El País in relation to the notion of “terrorism” is indeed intertwined with important internal and international political developments. Yet ideological and cultural trends concerning Jews and Judaism 352 I.C., “Discrepancias en la definición de terrorista,” El País, March 10, 2005, 7. 353 See Manuel Rivas, “‘Stand by’,” El País, July 22, 2006, 80; and Tom Segev, “El espíritu del hotel Rey David,” El País, August 1, 2006, 13. 354 Simone Zimmermann, “El pueblo elegido y los demás,” El País, July 26, 2006, 14. 355 Juan Miguel Muñoz, “Los radicales de Hamas protagonizan el cierre de la campaña electoral Palestina,” El País, January 24, 2006, 4: “ʽEstoy seguro de que cuando [los europeos] tengan contacto directo con nosotros cambiarán su manera de mirarnos. Israel les proporciona una imagen pésima de Hamás, pero se darán cuenta de que no somos unos extremistas.ʼ” This positive perception of Hamas is also evident in Gema Martín Muñoz, “Palestina y el juego de la manipulación,” El País, January 25, 2006, 14.

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probably contributed to this process. That is arguably why these developments paralleled to some extent the daily’s approach to the issue of antisemitism. As shown in Chart 4.5, a first look at the number of times the issue of antisemitism appeared in El País articles containing the word “Jew” shows a steep raise of the topic’s appeal during the period under analysis. There has been, indeed, a steady incorporation of the issue of antisemitism among the cultural issues referenced by the Spanish center-left. Probably the main reason for this interest is the relatively late yet increasing awareness in Spain of the horrors of the Holocaust. As mentioned earlier, public references to the memory of the Shoah have paralleled the integration of democratic Spain into the construction of a new European identity. This development is conspicuously reflected in the number of times the Holocaust appeared as a topic in the articles published by El País including the word “Jew” during 1997–2006, represented in Chart 4.6. Although the number of references to the Holocaust varied in relative terms during the period under analysis, the subject remained significant throughout those years. In 1997 such references amounted to 37.74 % of all the analyzed articles, while in 2006 the Holocaust was mentioned in only 20.46% of articles mentioning Jews. Apparently, this decreased percentage is due to an increased interest in Middle Eastern affairs following the Second Intifada, as well as interest in other issues like Spain’s Jewish past and antisemitism, which resulted in a great number of articles about Jews and Israel overall. The Holocaust, as the “negative apotheosis of European history” is intrinsically linked to the issue of evil. As the most extreme expression of the continent’s age-long antisemitic tradition, it is widely considered as a paradigmatic and horrifying example of the dangers involved in racism, xenophobia, and hate of the Other. Yet, as already noted, since 1967 the Holocaust came to be increasingly associated with Zionism and the politics of the State of Israel, especially on the political left. El País is no exception to this trend: “at the same time that it dilutes, minimizes or relativises the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust, it also refers to the Holocaust as a paradigm of absolute evil, projected onto the Jews of today, embodied by the State of Israel.”356 The most prominent example of such an approach is the article published by José Saramago in El País on April 21, 2002. In this article, Saramago resorted to antisemitic tenets, asserting that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the catastrophic result of the Jewish people’s belief in its own condition of “chosen people,” and of its “mental intoxication” with the “messianic idea of a Great Israel.” In an analysis in which the heterogeneity of Jewish political life is

356 Baer, Spain’s Jewish Problem, 100.

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thoroughly ignored, the Nobel Prize winner argues that “the Jews” incessantly scratch their own wounds in order to obtain from a world immobilized by guilt the absolute impunity for any possible crime: “From the point of view of the Jews, Israel can never be brought to trial, because it has been tortured, gassed and incinerated in Auschwitz.”357 The fact that this inclination is particularly strong in El País can be observed by comparing the different descriptions of the theater piece Conversación con Primo Levi (ʽConversation with Primo Leviʼ) in this daily and the conservative ABC from January 2006. The play, launched on the occasion of the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz and the commemoration of International Holocaust Victims’ Day, is an adaptation of the interview given by Primo Levi to the writer Ferdinando Camon in 1986, and aims at “recovering the historical memory and denouncing the barbarism of war that continues to exist in other places.” The play has been criticized for equating between Israelis and Nazis and building upon lies like the canard that Israelis harvest the organs of Palestinian children.358 These criticisms have been rejected by the director of the play, Mercedes Lezcano, who argued that out of the five blocks of images used in the play, four refer to the past suffering of the Jews and only one to the situation of the Palestinians. She claimed that “it all belongs to Primo Levi,” except for the last words of the piece, which she penned: “Until when will barbarism last? How can a people who has suffered so much inflict, years later, so much pain to another people? Primo Levi committed suicide by jumping out of the stairwell of his home in 1987, some months after this conversation. May he rest in peace.”359 According to El País, the performance “not only addresses the horrors suffered by the Jews during Nazism”, but also “shows other horrors in other scenarios and with other victims, according to its director.” This sober article finishes the description with a quote from one of the play’s actors, who considers that the most attractive trait of the Jewish writer Primo Levi is “his courage

357 Original Spanish. José Saramago, “De las piedras de David a los tanques de Goliat,” in elpais.com, April 21, 2002. Another Nobel Prize laureate for literature, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was also very active in re-legitimizing some of the old antisemitic stereotypes in his native Russia. See Ksenia Plouektova, “Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 200 Years Together and the ʽRussian Questionʼ,” Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism 31 (Jerusalem: SICSA, 2001). 358 Libertad Digital, “Denuncian el uso del Holocausto con fines antisemitas en un a obra de teatro del Círculo de Bellas Artes de Madrid,” libertaddigital.com, January 20, 2006. 359 Juan Cruz, “Mercedes Lezcano defiende sus ʽConversaciones con Primo Leviʼ,” elpais.com, February 11, 2006.

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to criticize without any grudge what his fellow men –the Israelis- do in Palestine, after all what he has suffered in Auschwitz.”360 In contrast, an article written by the ABC director, José Antonio Zarzalejos on the same play presents a very different perspective. The article, eloquently titled ʽConversation against Primo Leviʼ (Conversación contra Primo Levi), denounces the theater piece as encouraging the “satanization of the State of Israel, current mirror of Nazi Germany, where the victims have become victimizers.”361 The play is characterized as a ʽstaged infamyʼ (villanía teatral), nurtured by the resurgence of the antisemitic belief that the Jews and Israel incarnate an enemy that conspires in favor of wickedness, injustice, heartlessness and war. These contrasting perspectives illustrate the fact that the association of the Holocaust as a paradigm of evil with the State of Israel is particularly prominent in El País. Despite this general trend, since the end of 2003 there has been a growing awareness of the specific characteristics of today’s antisemitism and its associated dangers. Beginning in that year, the issue of the Holocaust came to be associated with terrorism in general and Al Qaeda in particular. In this context, Islamic antisemitism is no longer relativized nor is it presented as a mere response to Israeli policies, but rather it is re-interpreted as an integral part of a dangerous world-view which threatens the very core of Western democracy.362 It is relevant to note that despite its disengagement from the Iraq intervention, the Socialist government of Zapatero increased Spanish participation in the international force established in Afghanistan. In this political context, the association between terrorism and antisemitism reinforces the perception that by fighting terrorism in the lands of Islam, the government is participating in a legitimate struggle against evil forces. As we previously saw, El País has not

360 K.C., “Manuel Galiana lleva la voz de Primo Levi al escenario,” El País, January 11, 2006, 37: “Conversación con Primo Levi [. . .] no sólo aborda los horrores que padecieron los judíos durante el nazismo y la responsabilidad de los alemanes en todo lo que sucedió, sino que también muestra otros horrores en otros escenarios y con otras victimas, según la directora [. . .] para Víctor Valverde lo más atrayente del escritor judío es ʽsu coraje de criticar sin rencor lo que hacen sus paisanos -los israelíes- en Palestina, después de lo que padeció en Auschwitzʼ. ” 361 José Antonio Zarzalejos, “Conversación contra Primo Levi,” ABC, January 29, 2006, 3: “Emerge con apariencia inocua y, en realidad, inicua, la satanización del Estado de Israel, espejo actual de la Alemania Nazi, en la que las víctimas se han convertido en verdugos.” 362 See, for example, Javier del Pino, “El lugarteniente de Bin Laden anuncia nuevos ataques contra Occidente,” El País, May 22, 2003, 5; and Carlos Mendo, “El enemigo en casa,” El País, August 12, 2005, 2.

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always been unequivocally opposed to the political use of terrorism, as noted above regarding Hamas. This selective, and apparently instrumental awakening to the perils of antisemitism did not succeed in erasing age-old anti-Jewish prejudices, which like other pre-conceptions do not vanish in the air, but rather tend to resurface when the occasion is ripe. One of those occasions was the Second Lebanon War, which gave rise to criticism from around the world. During that conflict El País unleashed some of the antisemitic prejudices it had rationally tried to counter during the previous two years, in order to give voice to the anti-Israeli rage of important parts of the Spanish public and government.363 Yet this time something had changed. The interest displayed by El País in the “new antisemitism” joined a broader European concern with the explosions of anti-Jewish hate since the beginning of the Second Intifada.364 This political and intellectual atmosphere, together with the more dramatic Spanish experiences with terrorism, contributed to the formation, during the Second Lebanon War, of a critical mass among the socialist ranks who were against the delegitimizing of the Jewish State. This process led to the signing of a manifesto on “Israel and the Defense of Democratic Progress in Spain” that was publicly presented in April 2007.365 The document emphasizes the democratic character of the State of Israel, criticizing the silence of the Spanish left in face of the unyielding attacks against Israel by Spanish politicians and intellectuals. The document was signed by the Parliamentarians José Acosta and Dolores García Hierro, among others, as well as by the former Madrid Mayor Juan Barranco. On the other hand, the Socialist Government’s harsh criticism of the Israeli response to the Hezbollah attack was condemned as antisemitic by the conservative PP. As will be analyzed later in this chapter, at least for a few days, the issue of antisemitism was at the very center of Spanish public discourse and politics.

363 For an additional example of the resurgence of antisemitic motifs during the Second Lebanon War, see the illustration published in El País on July 25, 2006, and reproduced in Alejandro Baer y Paula López, “Israel en el callejón del gato,” in Estrella Israel et al. Israel en los medios de comunicación españoles (2006–2009) (Madrid: Hebraica Ediciones, 2010), 42. For a more detailed analysis of the Spanish government’s response to the Second Lebanon War, see chapter 3. 364 See for instance Robert S. Wistrich, European Antisemitism Reinvents Itself, (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 2005). 365 See the official site of the Movimiento contra la intolerancia: http://www.movimientocon tralaintolerancia.com/html/admin/verNoticia.asp?cod=1035&esBusq=True (accessed March 14, 2011). Alejandro Baer refers in fact to the “outing” of broad sectors of the Spanish society, not only the left. See Baer, ‘Tanques contra piedras’, 6–7.

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4.2.2 ABC: The Conservative Shift ABC is Spain’s third largest daily. It appeared for the first time in 1903 as a weekly journal, becoming a daily newspaper in 1905.366 It is known for its conservative political and religious views, close to those of the Partido Popular (PP), as well as for its enthusiastic defense of the Spanish Monarchy. The newspaper’s articles combine references to traditional antisemitic tropes of Catholic origin with a more sympathetic approach to Israel and the Spanish Jewish community than that of El País. Despite the age-long antisemitic tradition of Catholic Spain, there have been some historical precedents of sympathy toward Sephardic Jews among renowned Catholics, even before the changes introduced in Christian-Jewish relations by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). Some paradigmatic examples of these precedents go back to the pro-Sephardic activism of Dr. Ángel Pulido Fernández during the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century; and they include a certain philo-Sepharadism displayed by the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco.367 Neo-colonial ambitions motivated different Spanish figures at the beginning of the 20th century to strengthen the country’s bonds with the Sephardic Diaspora. They desired to use what they perceived as the financial and diplomatic abilities of the ‘Jews of Spain’ for enhancing the nation’s power and international influence.368 In a similar vein, the contemporary sympathy of many Spanish conservatives towards the Jewish community is sometimes driven by considerations of power politics. During the period 1997–2006, it was mainly the struggle against global terrorism, and the international alliances that were forged in the aftermath of 9/11 surrounding the “War on Terror,” which brought the Spanish conservatives close to Israel and the Jews. In fact the “Moor”, no less than the mythic Jew, has played a key role in the construction of Spanish Catholic identity (see chapter 5.2). In that sense, the “Islamic menace” touches very sensitive fibers of the Spanish Catholic and conservative self.

366 See the webpage of the parent company: http://www.vocento.com/Castellano/prensa/ abc.html (accessed June 10, 2012). 367 Alisa Meyuhas Ginio, “Reencuentro y despedida. Dr. Ángel Pulido Fernández y la diáspora sefaradí,” in in España e Israel Veinte Años Después, ed. Raanan Rein (2007) (Madrid: Dykinson, 2007), 57–66; and Rein, In the Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition. See also Andrée Bachoud, “Franco y los judíos: filosemitismo y antisemitismo,” in El olivo y la espada: Estudios sobre el antisemitismo en España (siglos XVI-XX), ed. Pere Joan i Tous and Heike Nottebaum (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2003), 379–390. 368 See Rozenberg, L’Espagne contemporaine et la question juive, 33–53.

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This explains why, unlike El País, ABC made references to terrorism perpetuated by Palestinians or Islamists as far back as 1997, and kept making them throughout the period under analysis. This approach, however, did not prevent the newspaper from making references to Israel’s “State Terrorism,” and referring to the Jewish State in clearly condemnatory terms.369 In a similar way to El País, ABC in its pages also equates the Warsaw Ghetto with Gaza and Israelis with Nazis.370 These are strengthened in ABC by the use of biblical references and/or topics close to the Christian antisemitic tradition. Even though the use of the accusation of deicide, as well as other tenets of this long anti-Jewish tradition, have been used by intellectuals with various ideological backgrounds in reference to Israel, in the case of ABC this trend is part of a broader approach to Jews and Judaism colored by antisemitic prejudices. In an article titled “The ‘round’ won by Jesus in his Passion,” Francisco Gil Delgado describes the conflict between Jesus and the Jewish High Priest before his crucifixion. Jesus is portrayed as a fighter against Jewish Orthodoxy and its leader Annas (Anás). The Jewish High Priest is described as a skillful negotiator with the “Roman Imperial Eagles” who had “occupied the promised land,” and as one who managed to “keep for himself and his people these emblems of the supreme Israeli prestige” [my emphasis].371 The choice of the word “israelí,” which clearly refers to the citizens of the State of Israel, instead of “israelita” which refers to the ancient Jewish nation/Jews, establishes an unambiguous correspondence between the wrongs fought against by Jesus, and the “arrogance”, the “cunning” of contemporary Israeli leaders. They, too, have managed to “occupy the promised land” thanks to their “skillful negotiations” with the American “Imperial Eagles.”372 369 See, for instance, Carmen Ruiz Bravo-Villasante, “El Estado Palestino, “ABC, April 5, 2002, 30; Luis Ignacio Parada, “¿Adónde mira Bush cuando enloquece Israel?,” ABC, August 11, 2003, 2; and Luis Ignacio Parada, “Terrorismo contra Terrorismo,” ABC Sevilla, July 14, 2006, 8. 370 See, for instance, the caricature published by Martín Morales in ABC, January 28, 2005, 8; see also Inmaculada Navarrete, “Pececitos de colores,” ABC Sevilla, April 7, 2002, 54. Another example of a more “mainstream” way of demonizing Israel is the phrase “We live in a sick world, and one of the main causes of the infection is the war between Israelis and Palestinians,” in Miguel Torres, “Guerra entre profetas,” ABC, March 20, 2002, 66. 371 Francisco Gil Delgado, “El ‘round’ que ganó Jesús en su Pasión,” ABC Sevilla, March 28, 1999, 54: “Anás era un hábil negociador con las Águilas Imperiales romanas, enésima ocupadora de la tierra prometida por Yaveh a Abraham y su descendencia [. . .] Anás demostró habilidad de viejo zorro para retener para sí y los suyos esas insignias del supremo poder israelí. . .” 372 The electronic version of the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española gives two meanings for the word “israelí”: 1-“Natural de Israel” and 2-“Perteneciente o relativo a este país de Asia” [my emphasis]. In both the reference is to Israel as a country and not to the Jews as a national or religious group. http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=is raeli (accessed March 15, 2011).

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In a similar vein, another article titled “From thee, Bethlehem, will come the ruler of Israel. . .,” reminds readers that Micah had prophesied in the Old Testament that Jesus, born in Bethlehem, would rule over (“dominar”) Israel. This explains why “as if attacked by a biblical curse, the city has since a long time ago ceased to be the capital of peace.”373 It can therefore be inferred that, had the “true messiah” (Jesus) been acknowledged by the Jews, this “biblical curse” would not have taken place. These articles are part of a wider corpus of references to Jews and/or Judaism tainted with Spanish Christian antisemitic motifs that appear in ABC. For example, an article from Torcuato Luca de Tena, a member of the Real Academia Española, about the Jewish convert to Catholicism Edith Stein, describes her as a “tireless searcher for Truth, unhappy and disappointed by the spiritually empty rituals of the Torah, the book of the Law of the Jews practiced by her parents and eleven brothers (and the absence of Hope and Charity together with Faith). . .” [my emphasis].374 In addition, in an interview in April 2004, the head of the Franciscan order declared that the sexual abuse scandal unleashed against the Catholic Church in the United States was the result of the “vengeance of certain groups,” among which he “underlined Jewish circles.”375 Also, an article on the “Jewish vote” in the United States ended with the conclusion that “the split between the two great world Jewish communities [US and Israel] is big, but not enough to silence, in case of need, the call of the race when it feels endangered once again” [my emphasis].376 It should not be forgotten that in Spain, unlike in the rest of Europe, the Catholic Church had participated in the institution of blood purity statutes (estatutos de limpieza de sangre) which preserved the supremacy of the “Old Christians” between the XV and the XIX centuries.377 This was done on the basis of racist considerations contrary to

373 Manuel Leguineche, “‘De ti, Belén, saldrá el dominador de Israel,” ABC, April 5, 2002, 30: “Como atacada por una maldición bíblica, hace tiempo que dejó de ser la capital de la paz.” 374 Torcuato Luca de Tena, “Edith Stein,” ABC, August 9, 1998, 3: “Buscadora incansable de la Verdad, descontenta y decepcionada de los rituales desprovistos de toda espiritualidad de la Torá, o libro de la Ley de los judíos, que practicaron sus padres y once hermanos (y de la ausencia de la Esperanza y Caridad junto a la Fe). . .” 375 Jesús Bastante, “Rodríguez Carballo: ‘Todavía no ha llegado el momento de abolir el celibato obligatorio en la Iglesia,” ABC, April 24, 2004, 54. 376 Francisco de Andrés, “El extraño voto judío,” ABC, November 4, 2004, 49: “La fosa entre las dos grandes comunidades judías del mundo es grande pero no como para ahogar, en caso de necesidad, la llamada de la raza cuando vuelve a sentir el peligro.” 377 According to Léon Poliakov, “. . .les Espagnols furent anti-juifs d’abord, et racistes ensuite. ” In Léon Poliakov, Histoire de l’antisémitisme. De Mahomet aux Marranes (Paris: CalmannLévy,1961), 288. See also Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 32–36; and Kaplan, “Jews

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the official Vatican doctrine.378 Therefore, the mention of race here has a particular resonance. Another, more subtle, example of the persistence of antisemitic motifs in ABC’s pages is a piece that was published on the Christmas Eve of 2005. The article, titled “The Birth of the Truth,” argues that what is commemorated at Christmas is in fact the birth of Truth. The article criticized Europe’s process of secularization, in terms which have some antisemitic connotations. The author wrote that “Christianity is not only one of the pillars of the European culture, but also its essential spirit.” The “de-Christianization” of Europe, he argues, means in fact its “dehumanization”. The argument goes even further: “Auschwitz [. . .] recreated the theology (or a-theology) of ‘God’s silence’. Where was God then? [. . .] It is paradoxical that those who refuse to listen to his voice speak of God’s silence, but perhaps we should make an inversion and think that Auschwitz does not proclaim God’s silence, but the previous oversight or refusal [of Him] by men”[my emphasis].379 These are troubling statements directed not only against non-Catholics in general, but also against the Jewish believers who were particularly (yet not exclusively, of course) shaken by “God’s silence” during the Shoah, besides being its main victims. As in the case of El País, ABC’s approach to Jews, Israel, antisemitism and terrorism has been conditioned by internal and international factors independent from the daily’s perception of Judaism itself. Concerning terrorism and its connection to Jewish issues, the contrast between Chart 4.7 showing the number of times the issue appeared in the same paragraph as “Jew” and Chart 4.8, indicating the number of Israeli victims of terrorist violence, shows the existence of additional factors in the terrorism-Jews link, beyond a simple interest in MiddleEast developments. If the relatively high number of references to the issue of terrorism during 1997, 2001 and 2002 could be correlated to the violent events taking place in Israel and the Occupied Territories, the increase in 2003, 2005 and 2006 clearly

and Judaism in the Political and Social Thought of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” 159. 378 See Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession, 92. 379 Ignacio Sánchez Cámara, “El Nacimiento de la Verdad,” ABC, December 24, 2005, 3: “. . . el cristianismo no es sólo [. . .] uno de los pilares de la cultura europea, sino su espíritu esencial.[. . .] la ‘descristianización’ es deshumanización y ‘deseuropeización’.[. . .] Auschwitz [. . .] recreó la teología (o ateología) del ‘silencio de Dios’. ¿Dónde estaba Dios entonces? [. . .] No deja de ser paradójico que quienes se nieguen a escuchar su voz hablen del silencio de Dios, pero acaso haya que invertir el orden y pensar que Auschwitz no proclama el silencio de Dios sino su previo olvido o rechazo por parte del hombre.”

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Chart 4.7.

Chart 4.8: Based on data from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Note: See the official site of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian +Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm (accessed March 16, 2011).

reflects other variables.380 As already noted, the year 2003 marked a turning point in Spain’s experience of terrorist violence. During that year, the Casablanca attacks against the Casa de España (among other targets), and the

380 According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the number of Israeli deaths caused by terrorism in 1997 were 41; in 1998, 16; and in 1999, 18: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/ 2000_2009/2000/1/Terrorism±deaths±in±Israel±-±1920-1999.htm (accessed March 16, 2011).

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leading role played by the conservative Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar in the Iraq intervention triggered a division of the Spanish polity into those who believed in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” and those who proposed an “Alliance of Civilizations.” There were, however, shades and nuances between these camps. In this rather dichotomized atmosphere, ABC sided with Aznar’s camp, as well as with those who were considered as strategic allies in a global “War on Terror”: the United States and Israel. This explains why the number of references to terrorism in the same paragraphs with the word “Jew” increased significantly during the years 2003, 2005 and 2006. Interestingly enough, beginning in 2003, a process is visible in which ABC criticizes the groups opposed to the Iraq intervention, and also criticizes accusations that the Iraq war is “a Texan caprice of George Bush Jr., an imposition from the Jewish ‘lobby,’ or a strategy pushed by the American oil industry.”381 On the other hand, the newspaper expressed the belief that the manipulations of the “Jewish Lobby” in the United States were behind what was perceived as the superpower’s tolerance of Israeli “excesses.”382 The belief in the existence of a powerful “Jewish Lobby” which supposedly lies behind United States policies is particularly interesting, as its customary negative connotation has sometimes been transformed into an incentive for friendship with the US, Israel, and the Jewish community. This inversion was particularly evident during the Second Lebanon War and its aftermath, when the issue of antisemitism gained unusual prominence on the Spanish political scene. During the conflict, the socialist government of José Luis Zapatero adopted a heatedly critical attitude towards the Israeli government, and the relationship between Spain and Israel went through some turbulence.383 In tune with this attitude, El País tended to emphasize the “terrorist” character of the State of Israel and at the same time relativize attacks directed at civilians perpetuated by Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular. The conservative PP reacted to this approach by accusing Prime Minister Zapatero of “antisemitism, anti-Zionism and Israelophobia.”384 ABC only partially supported these accusations. It published articles accusing the socialist Prime

381 Valentí Puig, “Un ajedrez en tres dimensiones,” ABC, March 25, 2003, 3. 382 Eduardo San Martín, “Vigilar al piloto,” ABC, June 15, 2003, 40. 383 See chapter 3.2. 384 L. Ayllón/G.López Alba, “El PP acusa a Zapatero de ‘antisemitismo e israelophobia’ en la crisis del Líbano,” ABC, July 20, 2006, 32.

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Minister of contributing to anti-Jewish hate, but not of being an antisemite.385 Yet the most revealing piece published in this context is, in my eyes, an article signed by José María Lassalle, a PP member of the Spanish Congress. Lassalle criticized Zapatero for exploiting “anti-Zionist semantics” for electoral purposes, and also of adopting a dangerously conciliatory approach to terrorism. “With his inadmissible gesture towards Israel”, he argues, “he achieved two things: that the transatlantic shores between the United States and Spain moved some hundreds of kilometers away from each other, and that we unnecessarily lost the support of the powerful North American Jewish lobby” [my emphasis].386 The article clearly refers to the “powerful North American Jewish lobby” as being of pivotal importance in international affairs, an entity that should be befriended and even respected. Paradoxically, this is done in the midst of an argument against the “new antisemitism,” with a quote from Pierre-André Taguieff’s work La Nueva Judeofobia (ʽThe New Judeophobiaʼ).387 Futhermore, in Chart 4.9, we can see that ABC and El Mundo are more explicitly concerned with the “Jewish lobby” than El País.

Number of Articles Mentioning the Jewish Lobby 5 4 3 2 1 0 1997

1998

1999

2000 El País

2001

2002

ABC

2003

2004

2005

2006

El Mundo

Chart 4.9.

385 Juan Manuel de Prada, “Que sea la última vez,” ABC, July 22, 2006, 5; and Valentí Puig, “Falacias de la paz perpetua,” ABC, July 22, 2006, 3. 386 José María Lassalle, “Paloma antisionista,” ABC, July 19, 2006, 7: “el Presidente Zapatero [. . .] con su gesto enemistoso hacia Israel ha conseguido dos cosas: que las orillas transatlánticas entre los Estados Unidos y España se alejen unos cientos de kilómetros más, y que, de paso, nos hayamos enajenado innecesariamente el apoyo del poderoso lobby judío norteamericano.” 387 Lassalle, “Paloma antisionista.”

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Lasalle’s article is also revealing in that it establishes a clear division between two camps in Spanish politics in which the Jews and Israel play an important role: the socialists are associated with the Alliance of Civilizations, oppose the Iraq War, are perceived as anti-Zionist and have been accused of being “new judeophobes.” On the other hand, the conservative PP and its allies are fighting a global war against Jihad; regard Israel, the “Jewish lobby” and the US as allies; and are supposedly aware of the dangers of anti-Jewish hate.388 This simplistic schema of Spanish politics sheds light on the reasons behind the sharp increase in ABC’s interest in contemporary Spanish Jewry during 2006, as reflected in Chart 4.1. It also explains the upsurge in articles pointing to the danger posed by contemporary antisemitism, and the publication of an interview with Natan Sharansky, a former Russian dissident and Israeli political hawk whose thought greatly influenced President George W. Bush.389 In Spain today, antisemitism has become a political tool both for the delegitimization of political opponents and for strengthening the legitimacy of one’s own camp. The approach to the subject is often superficial and instrumental. Thus, while the accusation of antisemitism is perceived as an injury, classic antisemitic myths like inherent Jewish wickedness, and excessive power (frequently projected on the State of Israel), are often considered as a given. These contradictory trends create awkward results. One more example of this ambiguity is an article published in ABC a few days before the above mentioned polemics, in which the columnist accused Israel of acting as a “terrorist” when facing enemy groups in Lebanon. The author denounced American support of Israel, as well as Western tolerance towards the Middle Eastern country’s “indecent” behavior. It closes with the words: “the Jewish lobby that dominates US finances and contributes to the funding of the electoral campaigns will in the following days accuse as antisemites those who, like the one signing these words, dare to touch the untouchable.”390

388 Lassalle, “Paloma antisionista.” Further references to the Iraq war as well as to the connections between Nazi antisemitism and the “new Judeophobia” are also made in Lasalle’s article. 389 See for example José Antonio Zarzalejos, “Conversación contra Primo Levi,” ABC, January 29, 2006, 3; Juan Manuel de Prada, “Que sea la última vez,” ABC, July 22, 2006, 5; Alejandro Baer, “No dibujarás. . .,” ABC, March 7, 2006, 7; Florentino Portero, “El trasfondo de un conflicto,” ABC, July 20, 2006, 3; and Valentí Puig, “Falacias de la paz perpetua,” ABC, July 22, 2006, 3. 390 Luis Ignacio Parada, “Terrorismo contra Terrorismo,” ABC Sevilla, July 14, 2006, 8. According to Alejandro Baer, “Conservative politicians speak of Nazi antisemitism, and whenever they draw attention to the fact that antisemitism is still alive today, they invariably use it as a dialectical weapon against their political opponents –in connection with the frequent excesses of the anti-Zionist left. They fail to mention the role played by Catholicism in the origin of Jew hatred

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4.2.3 El Mundo: In the Footsteps of the Jew? El Mundo was launched in 1989, and is currently the second largest newspaper in Spain. It is politically positioned towards the center-Right on the economic front, but holds a liberal-secular perspective on social and cultural affairs like gay marriage and secularism. Despite being the youngest among the three main Spanish newspapers, it has succeeded in replacing ABC as the leading centerRight daily.391 To some extent, its success reflects the transformations of the center-Right camp during the consolidation of Spanish democracy. Unlike its competitor ABC, El Mundo displays a militant secularism that is highly critical of the Roman Catholic Church and its antisemitic past.392 It perceives Spain as a heterogeneous society with a rich baggage of ethnic and cultural diversity, contradicting the vision of Spain as an essentially Catholic country.393 The daily also contrasts with ABC in its approach to Israel. While the latter is considered as being favorable to the Jewish State, El Mundo is considered to be unfavorable to its policies.394 The newspaper combines the different attitudes towards Jews and Israel detected in El País and ABC in a particular way. One motif which is often found in El Mundo is the reference to the “Jewish lobby.” This “lobby” is portrayed as a powerful global entity with a predominant influence in Hollywood, the US government, and Israel, and with a considerable amount of power over other important international actors such as the Vatican and the European Union.395 Of special interest is an article by Rafael Navarro-Valls, who holds a Chair at the

or the continuing presence of antisemitism in the Spanish Catholic Church.” In Baer, “The Voids of Sepharad,” 107. 391 For an analysis on El Mundo’s competition with ABC, see Elena de Regoyos, “El plan secreto para acabar con ABC”: http://blogs.periodistadigital.com/periodismo.php/2006/09/14/ el_plan_secreto_para_acabar_con_abc (accessed March 31, 2011). 392 See David Torres, “Zoom. Cuadrando círculos,” El Mundo, August 26, 2005, 2; Martín Prieto, “El purgatorio de los libros. La obra declinante de Juan Pablo II,” El Mundo, June 13, 2004, 4; Justin Sparks, John Follain and Christopher Morgan, “Un pastor para el siglo XXI/Los protagonistas. Sombras en el pasado del ‘cardenal Panzer’,” El Mundo, April 18, 2005, 30; and Raúl del Pozo, “Vicios de la corte,” El Mundo, June 15, 2005, 5. 393 See, for instance, Francisco Umbral, “Los placeres y los días. El pesimismo,” El Mundo, October 6, 2004, 64; and Fernando García de Cortázar, “España, deja que te nombre,” El Mundo, Septembert 4, 2004, 2–3. 394 Baer and López, “Israel en el callejón del gato,” 37. 395 See e.g., Luis María Anson, “Canela Fina. Bush ante las guerras colgantes de Irak,” El Mundo, November 10, 2006, 2; Pedro J. Ramírez, “La era post-Sadam/ Un año después de la invasión,” El Mundo, March 20, 2004, 34–5; José Manuel Vidal, “Los obispos relanzan la causa de beatificación de Isabel la Católica,” El Mundo, April 23, 2003, 18; “Spielberg ‘rodará’ la matanza

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Universidad Complutense de Madrid and is Secretary-General of the Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación (ʽRoyal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislationʼ.) In a paragraph explaining the reasons for George W. Bush’s unsuccessful re-election in 1992, he explains that: “It seems that part of the guilt lies with the Jewish lobby that withdrew its support [for Bush] in the elections when he decided, against Jewish interests, to support the efforts of the Madrid Peace Conference.”396 Similarly to ABC, El Mundo seems to have developed a more positive perception of Jews and Judaism partly based on the belief in the extraordinary powers of the “Jewish lobby”. The daily’s positive valuation of financial success and of the US capitalist model contributed, to some extent, to this limited metamorphosis, thanks to the stereotypical association of these topics with Jews and Judaism. The newspaper did not support Prime Minister Aznar’s involvement in the Iraq invasion of 2003, yet it did celebrate Spanish rapprochement with the United States. An editorial on Aznar’s visit to the US in July 2003 underlined the “opportunity” created by such closeness, as well as the need to make it bear fruit by providing “substantial content” to the “political, economic and cultural relations between our country and the United States.”397 The Jews, perceived as an ethno-national group that has succeeded in achieving a substantial degree of influence in a capitalist world led by the United States, are sometimes portrayed by El Mundo as positive role models. José Antonio Pérez-Nievas Heredero, businessman and co-founder of the Consejo España-EEUU (ʽSpanish-US Councilʼ), presented this approach when arguing that Spain should learn from the “Jewish” and “English” methods in the US, in order to secure the American superpower’s “preferential treatment” in international affairs, just like the United Kingdom and Israel.398 In a similar spirit, an article published during the Second Lebanon War contrasted the prosperity and influence of the American Jewish community that “has confronted marginalization inside the country and genocide abroad” with the powerlessness of the

de las Olimpiadas de Munich ’72,” El Mundo, April 22, 2004, 53; and María Ramírez, “La Eurocámara, en contra de limitar la libertad de expresión,” El Mundo, February 17, 2006, 25. 396 Rafael Navarro-Valls, “Tribuna Libre. Los presidentes y la guerra,” El Mundo, May 11, 2004, 4–5: “Al parecer, parte de la culpa la tuvo el lobby judío cuando el presidente apoyó los esfuerzos de la Conferencia de Paz de Madrid frente a los intereses judíos, que le retiraron su apoyo en las elecciones.” 397 “Editorial. Aznar explota el lado positivo de su apuesta por EE.UU,” El Mundo, July 14, 2003, 3. 398 José Antonio Pérez-Nievas, “Tribuna libre. El poder hispano en EEUU,” El Mundo, May 3, 2006, 4–5.

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massive Lebanese-American diaspora.399 Another example of this trend, also published during 2006, is an article on the investment bank Goldman Sachs: What runs the world [. . .] is The Firm, which is the informal name given to the venerable investment bank founded in 1869 by the Jewish-German immigrant born as Marcus Goldman [. . .] To the disappointment of the lovers of conspiracy theories, Goldman’s power is not based on any Judeo-Masonic-Globalizing plot. If the investment bank is a seedbed of world leaders, it is because of its profitability and efficiency.400

Such evaluations took place under the influence of the September 11, 2001, and March 11, 2004, terrorist attacks in the US and Spain. Like the ideologically close ABC, El Mundo adopted the perception of a global “clash of civilizations” between the “West” and “radical Islam.” From that point of view, Israel and the Jews shared with the Spaniards a common fate in their fight against Islamic extremism both inside and outside Spanish borders.401 This perception of a common threat led El Mundo to develop a more empathic perception of Israel’s policies, contributing therefore to a rehabilitation of the image of the Jewish State. Perhaps the most eloquent example of these changes is the interview with Enrique Múgica Herzog, a former Spanish Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) of Jewish origin, during the first days of the Second Lebanon War. This article is particularly relevant for a series of reasons. The first is that it amplified the voice of a highly respected personality whose contribution to Spanish society is widely recognized and appreciated. The second is that Múgica Herzog supported Israel’s “right to self-defense” during a critical period in which anti-Zionist and antisemitic attitudes were prominently displayed in the Spanish press.402 Lastly, he lost his only brother in an ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) terrorist attack. This third element is especially relevant, since the interview ends with Múgica’s warning about the correlation between antisemitism in the Spanish press and

399 Pablo Pardo, “Salma Hayek. . . Los otros rostros de el Líbano,” El Mundo, July 30, 2006, 15. 400 Pablo Pardo, “Internacional. Goldman Sachs, semillero de líderes mundiales,” El Mundo, June 4, 2006: 53: “Lo que dirige el mundo [. . .] es [. . .] La firma (The Firm), que es el nombre informal del venerable banco de inversión fundado en 1869 por el inmigrante judío alemán nacido Marcus Goldman [. . .] Pero, para decepción de los amantes de las teorías conspiratorias, el poder de Goldman no se debe a ningún complot judeo-masónico-globalizador. Si el banco de inversión es un semillero de líderes mundiales, lo es por su rentabilidad y eficiencia.” 401 See Fernando Mas, “La amenaza terrorista,” El Mundo, April 13, 2004, 1 and 8; Roberto Centeno, “Petróleo,” El Mundo, August 7, 2005, 28; and Magdi Allam, “Choque de civilizaciones. Miedo, el enemigo en casa,” El Mundo, February 4, 2006, 32. 402 See for instance Israel et al., Israel en los medios de comunicación españoles (2006–2009).

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naivety concerning the dangers of terrorism.403 Although implicit, a natural association is created between Múgica Herzog’s tragic family experience with ETA and his perception of terrorism as a menace common to both Spain and Israel. This changing ideological context also favored, as we have seen, the development of a particular interest towards the issue of the “new” antisemitism, often associated with Islamism and the political left.404 During the above-related episode concerning the accusation of antisemitism made by PP representatives against Prime Minister Zapatero during the summer of 2006, El Mundo published an editorial criticizing the Spanish government’s approach to the Lebanon war. The article characterized a demonstration against the war organized by the governing PSOE and other groups, as “an exhibition of antisemitism”.405 Despite these changes, the demonization of Jews, especially regarding their relationship with money and power, as well as references to a “Palestinian holocaust” allegedly being carried out by the Israelis, were also present in the newspaper’s pages.406 With regard to terrorism, the development of a greater empathy towards Israeli and Jewish suffering did not prevent the daily from giving a platform to voices that sought to legitimize violent and indiscriminated attacks against the Israeli civilian population. Three days after the publication of the interview with Múgica Herzog, El Mundo printed another interview with Zaki Saad, Secretary-General of the ʽIslamic Action Frontʼ (Frente Islámico de Acción), who argued that “The Zionists are a colonial force that came to throw the Palestinians from their land. The very existence of Zionism in Palestine is terrorism, and resisting and attacking its occupation is legal.”407

403 Esther Esteban, “Enrique Múgica. “A mi hermano lo asesinaron brutalmente por ser socialista y defender el Estado de Derecho; ni perdono, ni olvido.” El Mundo, July 18, 2006, 12–13. 404 See e.g, David Gistau, “Al Abordaje,” El Mundo, February 8, 2006, 5; Sergio Romano, “Guerra contra el terror/La opinión. ¿Existe un ‘fascismo islámico?” El Mundo, August 13, 2006, 23; Federico Jiménez Losantos, “Comentarios liberales. Cuestión moral,” El Mundo, February 7, 2003, 4; and Umberto Eco, “Tribuna libre. ¿Dónde está el antisemitismo?” El Mundo, December 28, 2003, 5. 405 “Editorial. Manifestaciones contra Israel,” El Mundo, July 21, 2006, 3. 406 See e.g. Antonio Gala, “La Tronera. USA e Israel,” El Mundo, August 17, 2006, 3; Antonio Gala, “La Tronera. Oriente Próximo,” El Mundo, May 22, 2003, 3; Miguel Ángel Mellado, “Tránsitos. Ocho preguntas,” El Mundo, July 16, 2006, 11; and “Impresiones. Expulsar a Arafat no soluciona nada,” El Mundo, October 5, 2003, 5. See also Baer and López, “Israel en el callejón del gato,” 31–49; Baer, Spain’s Jewish Problem. 407 Javier Espinosa, “El Mundo que viene/Zaki Saad,” El Mundo, July 22, 2006, 8–9: “Los sionistas son una fuerza colonial que llegó para echar a los palestinos de su tierra. La propia existencia del sionismo en Palestina es terrorismo y resistir y atacar su ocupación es legal.”

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References to a “Palestinian Holocaust” are especially relevant considering the unique way in which Spanish culture addresses the memory of the Shoah (see the chapter 4.1.1). As shown in Charts 4.10 and 4.11, both El Mundo and ABC did dedicate a considerable proportion of the articles including the word “Jew” during the period under study, to issues related to the Holocaust. As in the case of El País, this interest reveals that to a considerable extent this issue has been incorporated into the image of Jews and Judaism transmitted by these important Spanish newspapers.

Chart 4.10.

Chart 4.11.

The Holocaust, as “a paradigm of absolute evil” has been associated by El Mundo not only with Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, but also with the Castro régime in Cuba, extremist Basque nationalism, and US military abuses in Abu Ghraib.408 In the case of ABC, Nazi policies are sometimes portrayed as

408 See e.g, David Torres, “Zoom. Los listos útiles,” El Mundo, August 26, 2004, 2; “Testimonio/Las víctimas del castrismo,” El Mundo, December 24, 2006, 10; Federico Jiménez Losantos,

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similar to the current Israeli ones, as well as to those of Basque nationalism.409 Finally, El País also established comparisons between Nazi and Israeli policies, and associated the term Holocaust with the violence against women all over the world, the Spanish Civil War, genocide in Darfur and also to the anti-Jewish diatribes of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to cite some examples.410

4.3 Concluding Remarks The content analysis of the three main Spanish newspapers during the period 1997–2006 reveals the persistence of anti-Jewish motifs in all three of them. Yet the references and emphases on each of these features vary according to the internal and external political circumstances, the ideological allegiances, and the repressed memories and passions of each daily’s readership. This persistence is particularly striking in the light of the involvement of Spanish writers and editors with the issues of the Holocaust and the “new” antisemitism. What seems evident is that these important issues have not yet been addressed with the necessary depth and reflection. As we saw in the part of this chapter dealing with antisemitism, especially in Spain, anti-Jewish hate and the Shoah are intrinsically connected to the issue of evil and the concept of “Crimes against Humanity.” True confrontation with these questions would require, therefore, a willingness to transform the age-long projection of evil against the individual and collective Jew (world Jewry, the State of Israel), into a conscious introspection into the roots of evil inside the Spanish individual and collective self. Spanish uniqueness in the European context, especially in relation to its transition to democracy and the pact of silence upon which it was based, has led to a closing of the gates that compartmentalize the worlds of the conscious and the unconscious, the self-image of goodness and the projected image of evil, Man and his shadow (in Carl Jung’s terms.)411 This compartmentalization explains the contradiction between rational acknowledgement of the existence “Comentarios liberales. Verdad y política,” El Mundo, January 31, 2005, 4; and Antonio Gala, “La Tronera. Cipayos,” El Mundo, April 9, 2005, 3. 409 For instance, see Inmaculada Navarrete, “Pececitos de colores,” ABC Sevilla, April 7, 2002, 54; and Fernando García de Cortázar, “Vuestros padres mintieron,” ABC, October 8, 2002, 3. 410 Hermann Tertsch, “Cristales rotos,” El País, July 25 July, 7; Lluis Bassets, “Vergueenza,” El País, February 16, 2006, 8; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “Un genocidio contra las mujeres,” El País, March 15, 2006, 13; Andrés Ortega, “Importan los Palestinos?,” El País, April 1, 2002, 6; and Luis José Herrero López, “La memoria, la historia y la verdad,” El País, April 16, 2006, 12. 411 Carl G. Jung, Man and his Symbols (New York: Dell, 1979).

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of Jews and the State of Israel as complex entities with essentially human characteristics and the phantasmagoric, demonic perception of a Jewish Other that keeps resurfacing in the three dailies’ pages. This stubborn re-emergence of monstrous images associated with the Jews are symptoms of what Sigmund Freud calls the “return of the repressed,” and they will not disappear unless the material that forms them is made conscious and elaborated. The virtual invisibility of contemporary Spanish Jewry has favored dissociation between the abstract, disembodied Jew and the actual Jew of flesh and blood with whom Spaniards share an essential part of their culture and life. There is no doubt that Spanish society as a whole has made major progress since the end of the 1960s towards a greater inclusion and acknowledgement of the Jewish world in general and Spanish Jewry in particular. Yet the difficulty of Spanish society in recognizing Jewish “differance” contributes to the persistence and multiplication of demonic traits in the construction of its image of the Jew. The analysis of the specific antisemitic stereotypes used to construct the “Jew” is especially useful for the identification of some of the main elements that are being repressed and/or denied in the different sectors of Spanish society. As we indicated, the Jew as Other can be approached as a mirror reflecting core issues which are not being acknowledged in a given society. In Henri Zukier’s words, the “‘other’ [. . .] embodies central and intimates features of his host society, which, like the outsider himself, have often been disavowed and repressed.”412 The scrutiny of the three main Spanish newspapers led me to identify three specific elements that are being projected onto the Jews. The first is the memory of Francoist crimes, the second is the memory of Spanish colonial expansion, and the third is the desire to return to the “glorious” days when Spain was the head of an empire on which, according to Phillip II’s famous words, “the sun never sets.” In his article on the “Ironies of Spanish History,” José Brunner argued that “Spanish democracy was consolidated through the adoption of Francoist means for democratic ends.”413 In his opinion, the political pact of silence on which the transition centered, was based on the political culture of self-censorship that was imposed during Franco’s dictatorship.414 The brutal crimes of Francoism, which according to the Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón fall under the definition of “Crimes against Humanity,” were committed with the active or passive 412 Henry Zukier, “The Transformation of Hatred: Anti-Semitism as a Struggle for Group Identity,” in Demonizing the Other: Antisemitism, Racism and Xenophobia, ed. Robert S. Wistrich (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), 120. 413 Brunner, “Ironía de la historia española,” 173. 414 Brunner, “Ironía de la historia española,” 171.

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complicity of broad segments of the Spanish population. The emotional and psychological suffering, as well as the social conflicts that the acknowledgement of such facts could have generated, has been avoided by expelling those memories outside the institutionalized public space. But they resurface through the ghostly figures of Spain’s Others. The same process happens with the memories of the Spanish colonial expansion on the American continent and in the Maghreb, spiritually supported and legitimized by the Catholic Church. As we saw in previous chapters, the “unpleasant” aspects of these historical memories have been banished from the official historical narratives. Despite this fact, the “benefits” brought by these expansionist policies, especially in terms of international influence and economic prerogatives, are often celebrated. This “glorious” imperial past has been interpreted, especially since the 1990s, as a proof of the Spanish nation’s “natural” leadership in the West. This has been especially evident in the conservative camp, where the desire to transform Spain into a world power with a marked global influence has been particularly popular. The demonic features attributed to the Jew and/or the State of Israel in the Spanish press are in effect grotesque representations of these repressed elements: the cruelty, racism, lust and desire for world influence that permeated yesterday’s empire and fuel today’s global ambitions are mirrored in the association between Jewishness and greed, inhuman cruelty, a materialistic approach to the Divine, or all-powerful lobbying. In Henri Zukier’s words, “In his congenital blindness, the imaginary Jew is the externalization of insight.”415 Indeed, it is the blindness towards their own “dark side” that causes Spaniards to project their own shadow onto a mythical Jewish Other. From the perspective of political influences, we can suggest a reading according to which El País has been shaped, in the external dimension, by Soviet influence, particularly in using the argument that Zionists duplicate Hitler’s crimes or the manipulation of the “chosen people” concept. On the social-psychological side, the forced silence imposed on Francoist crimes, to which the PSOE has greatly contributed despite having been persecuted during the dictatorship, appears as a particularly painful historical memory in desperate need of projection. Anti-Jewish prejudices of Catholic origin are especially strong in ABC’s pages. Regarding the repressed elements, the memories of Francoism and also of past colonial expansion, in which conservative and Catholic Spain played a

415 Henry Zukier, “The essential ‘other’ and the Jew: from antisemitism to genocide,” Social Research 43, 4 (1996), 1151.

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crucial role, seem to be predominant. So is the belief in a providential Spanish leadership of Western European civilization. This last aspect is mirrored in the particular approach of the daily to a presumed “Jewish Lobby,” which is both admired and condemned. In this case, the megalomaniac fantasies concerning Spain’s “chosen” destiny are projected onto a fearsome and all-powerful Jewish collective with global ambitions. El Mundo shares this emotional, paradoxical approach to an imagined “Jewish Lobby” with ABC, apparently based on similar repressed elements. Despite different emphases, all of these variables listed, as well as Spain’s specific approach the history and memory of the Holocaust, have influenced in different degrees each of the three newspapers’ approach to Jews and Judaism. Notwithstanding the increasing pluralism and tolerance of Spanish society, the steady revalorization of Judaism and the philo-Semitic trends, the force of antiJewish beliefs does not seem to recede. It probably will not unless the Spaniards find the necessary strength to look evil in the eye and realize that what they see is a monstrous reflection of their own denied self.

5 Spain and the Muslims 5.1 Immigration and the Revival of the Spanish Muslim Community In the early 1970s, Spain moved away from its historic role as an expelling country and begun to attract increasing flows of immigration.416 Yet as the living conditions improved due to economic growth and the accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), legal immigration was made increasingly difficult. In 1985, the “Ley de Extranjería” (Immigration Act), one of the strictest immigration laws of Europe, was passed, reinforcing Spain’s role as the gatekeeper of “Fortress Europe’s” south.417 The impact of this law was particularly strong in the autonomous Spanish North African cities of Melilla and Ceuta, which had permeable borders with Morocco and had been the historical setting for migration flows. Significantly, this legislation turned the cities’ inhabitants of Moroccan origins from residents to foreigners overnight, demonstrating Spain’s definitive separation from Africa and full incorporation into the European space.418 This restrictive approach, with variations, was supported by the two main Spanish political parties –Partido Popular (PP) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), most probably because of the anxieties and apprehensions created by the issue not only among Spaniards but also among Spain’s European counterparts.419 An opinion poll realized by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) in December 2006 showed that 59.2 % of Spaniards considered immigration to be the most important problem of their country.420 Also, according to data of the Press Dossier of S.O.S. Racismo, by the beginning of 2006, 6 out of every 10 Spaniards believed that there were too many foreigners in Spain, 416 See Nieves Ortega Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy,” Migration Information Source, 1. From the website of the Migration Policy Institute. Accessed March 1, 2008: http:// www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=97 . 417 See Agrela, “La política de inmigración en España,” 4. 418 Planet Contreras, Islam in Spain: From Historical Question to Social Debate, in Observing Islam in Spain, ed. Ana I. Planet Contreras, Vol. 28 of Muslim Minorities, edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Aminah Beverly McCloud and Jörn Thielmann (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 11. 419 For a critical assessment of the PP’s and the PSOE’s immigration policies see the communication from the Federación de Asociaciones de SOS Racismo del Estado Español entitled “El debate: Ganó la xenophobia y la falta de discurso alternativo” (26 Feb. 2008). Available at: http://www.sosracisme.org/accions/comunicat.php?doc=119 (accessed April 29, 2008). 420 See Barómetro Septiembre 2006, CIS, question 5. Available at: http://www.cis.es/cis/ opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2640_2659/2654/e265400.html (accessed June 3, 2012). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-005

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while 3 out of 4 considered that the arrival of immigrants resulted in an increase of delinquency.421 In addition, European concerns about immigration also had an undeniable influence on Spain’s politics, not only because of the important benefits obtained by the country from its accession to the European Community, but also due to the broad national agreement regarding the positive effects of such membership.422 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, immigration became one of the most important topics in the public discourse dealing with contemporary Spanish identity.423 In 2006, there were 3,021,808 immigrants legally residing in Spain, out of a population of 43,758,250 people.424 According to official data, the main cohorts of immigrants residing in the country in 2006 were originally from Morocco (543,721 people), Ecuador (376,233 people) and Colombia (225,504 people).425 In spite of the widespread fears and apprehensions that this wave of immigration aroused among Spaniards, according to an opinion survey, the importance of their contribution to the vertiginous economic growth of their new country has been acknowledged by 73.7% of the Spanish public.426 Significantly, this wave of Moroccan immigration was often perceived as a “return” of the “Moors” to

421 In Dossier de Prensa, from the Informe Anual 2007 sobre el racisme a l’Estat espanyol: 9. Available at: http://www.sosracisme.org/reflexions/pdfs/IA2007_DossierPrensa.pdf (accessed June 3, 2012). 422 According to the Eurobarometer, in April 2004 69% of the Spaniards believed that their country benefited from being a member of the European Community: information obtained through the Eurobarometer Interactive Search System. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/pub lic_opinion/cf/subquestion_en.cfm (accessed April 28, 2008). See also F. Musseau, “L’Espagne, fidèle à son mécène: Madrid a toujours été le plus gros bénéficiaire de l’Union, ” in http://www.liberation.fr/ (accessed December 28, 2006). 423 “From 1992 to 2000, the numbers of people from developing countries increased 214 percent annually, much higher than the 60 percent increase in the number of foreigners from industrialized nations.” Ortega Pérez, “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy,” 2. 424 According to data from the Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 2006, available at the oficial webside of the Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración: http://extranjeros.mitra miss.gob.es/es/ObservatorioPermanenteInmigracion/Anuarios/2006/index.html (accessed January 28, 2019). In addition, the number of immigrants whose legal situation is irregular amounts, according to estimations, to 750,000 to 1,000,000 people. In Dossier de Premsa, from the Informe Anual 2007 sobre el racisme a l’Estat espanyol, 6. 425 According to data from the Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 2006, 1. 426 See Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia, Opinión de los españoles en materia de racismo y xenofobia 2007, 40. Available at: http://www.oberaxe.es/files/datos/ 47a1f84c5596e/opinion2007.pdf (accessed April 28, 2008). See also Dossier de Prensa, from the Informe Anual 2007 sobre el racisme a l’Estat espanyol, 9.

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Spain, almost four hundred years after their expulsion.427 Interestingly enough, many of these immigrants came back to the same regions of Spain that had been populated by the Moriscos before the series of expulsions beginning in 1609.428 This return prompted the emergence of old buried memories from the historical past that were re-interpreted in the present social, political and cultural context. The re-encounter with the “Moor” was often mentioned in the debates on immigration and religion-state relations, and played a nodal role in the construction of contemporary Spanish identity. Moroccan immigrants were not always well received. In fact, they were “the immigrant group most ill-regarded by Spaniards.” “Statistics show that they are the ones afforded the least preference in facilitating their permanence in Spain, and those who earn the lowest level of acceptance as neighbors. They have also been the main victims of repeated and violent collective attacks.”429 These attitudes contrast with the Spaniards’ relative sympathy towards Latin American immigrants. According to Isabel Santaolalla, Hispanic Americans enjoy a special status because of the strong cultural and historical links between their countries of origin and the Madre Patria (‘Mother Country’): “their Otherness is of a relative rather than absolute nature.”430 These statements were confirmed by an opinion poll realized in 2006, in which 56.3% of the interviewees asserted that they had more confidence in the Latin Americans than in any other group of immigrants. In contrast, only 4.5% of Spaniards expressed more confidence in the émigrés from the “Arab world” than in those coming from other parts of the globe.431 These divergent perspectives are substantiated in Spanish law: “The Immigration Law from 1985 already established [positive] discrimination for the obtaining of Spanish nationality to benefit Latin Americans, Filipinos, Andorrans, Gibraltarians, Equatorial Guineans and Sephardim. Paradoxically, neither the Moroccans from the North, also colonized by Spain, nor even the inhabitants of the Ifni and Western Sahara, (transformed into Spanish provinces since 1958) 427 See Flesler, The Return of the Moor; Bernabé López García, “El retorno del ‘otro’: la comunidad marroquí en España,” in El otro en la España contemporánea, ed. Silvina Schammah Gesser and Raanan Rein (Sevilla: Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2011), 187–218; and Rueda, El retorno/el reencuentro. 428 López García, “El retorno del ‘otro’: la comunidad marroquí en España,” 187. 429 Flesler, The Return of the Moor, 2–3. 430 See Isabel Santoalalla, “Ethnic and Racial Configurations in Contemporary Spanish Culture,” in Constructing Identity in Contemporary Spain: Theoretical Debates and Cultural Practices, ed. Jo Labanyi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 65. 431 Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia, Opinión de los españoles en materia de racismo y xenofobia 2007, 33.

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were affected by this positive discrimination.”432 In July 2006, the president of the Junta Islámica de España (‘Muslim Committee of Spain’) formally demanded the extension of this privileged status –already obtained by the descendants of those Jews who were expelled from what is today Spanish territory– for the descendants of the Moriscos who suffered a similar fate. The initiative had the support of important institutions like the Fundación Tres Culturas and the UNESCO Chair in the International Resolution of Conflicts, but it was rejected nevertheless.433 This discriminatory treatment given to the descendants of the Moriscos compared to their Jewish counterparts is particularly surprising given the supposed depth and warmth of Spanish-Arabs relations, as well as the generalized appreciation of the cultural legacy of Al-Andalus. There is indeed a deep contradiction between the positive approach to the Iberian Muslims of the past and the fears and antipathy towards Muslims in contemporary Spain. Most probably, this phenomenon is exacerbated by concerns over political and territorial claims concerning the historic Muslim lands of Al-Andalus, despite the fact that most Muslims do not share this perception.434 Significantly, the late Mansur Escudero, who was the President of the Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities (FEERI, 1989–2003), Secretary-General of the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE, 1992–2006), and President of the Islamic Committee (Junta Islámica, 1989–2010), explicitly denied any territorial claim concerning AlAndalus.435

432 López García, “El retorno del ‘otro’: la comunidad marroquí en España,” 217: “La Ley de Extranjería de 1985 ya estableció una discriminación para el acceso a la nacionalidad española en beneficio de latinoamericanos, Filipinos, andorranos, gibraltareños, ecuatoguineanos y sefaradíes. Paradójicamente, ni los marroquíes del norte, también colonizados por España, ni siquiera los habitantes de Ifni y Sahara Occidental, convertidas en provincias españolas desde 1958, se encontraban afectados por esta discriminación positiva.” 433 See Europa Press, “La Junta Islámica pide para descendientes de moriscos la nacionalidad española,” ABC; reproduced by Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/noticias/47125-la_junta_ islamica_pide_para_descendientes_de_moriscos_la_nacionalidad_espanola.html (accessed February 29, 2012). See also “El II Encuentro de Alianza de Civilizaciones pide para los Moriscos el derecho preferente a la nacionalidad española,” Periodista Digital; reproduced by Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/noticias/47125-la_junta_islamica_pide_para_descendientes_de_Mo riscos_la_nacionalidad_espanola.html (accessed February 29, 2012). 434 This explanation was suggested by the Spanish scholar and specialist on the Arab world, María Dolores Álgora Weber, during a personal interview in Madrid, October 6, 2010. Joaquín Prieto, “‘Los ‘yihadistas’ ven España como tierra del islam invadida por infieles’,” elpais.com, December 19, 2004: http://elpais.com/diario/2004/12/19/domingo/1103431954_850215.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 435 Rebeca Tolebem, “ Reivindicamos el espíritu de al-Ándalus, no el territorio,” published in diariomalagahoy.com, and reproduced by Webislam.com on April 23, 2007: http://www.webi

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In spite of their marginality, Muslim claims to Andalusia have reinforced the centuries-long anxieties over the return of the “Moors”, already awakened by Moroccan immigration. Unlike the Egyptians, the Palestinians or the Saudis, who are seen in a more positive light, immigrants from North Africa are often perceived as “invaders,” as the historical “Moor” who persisted for centuries as a central character in Spanish culture and life.436 Since Moroccans are a majority among Spanish Muslims, the negative emotions raised by their presence in the Iberian Peninsula affect the whole religious group.437 On the other hand, Muslims have also enjoyed the new opportunities generated by the consolidation of democracy and religious pluralism. The Law on Religious Freedom (Ley de Libertad Religiosa) approved in 1980, and the Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992 between the Spanish governments and the representatives of the local Muslim community (Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado Español con la Comisión Islámica de España) established the legal foundations for a complete integration of Islam into Spanish society. Although the full potential of this legal structure is far from being achieved, it favored important developments in this direction.438 Two landmarks in this process of normalization were the establishment of the ‘Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation’ (Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia) in October 2004 and the teaching of the first courses on Islam in the public schools of mainland Spain during the academic year 2005–2006. Despite their limited scope, these two developments created substantial change in the relationship between the Spanish state and non-Catholic religions. As a matter of fact, these measures only put into practice some of the principles established in the Cooperation Agreement of 1992. Yet it took twelve years for them to be implemented. In 2004, José Luis Zapatero won the national elections with a political platform opposing Spanish involvement in the Iraq war and supporting the fostering of friendly relations with the Arab-Muslim world. These gestures of goodwill towards religious minorities in general and the Muslim community in slam.com/articulos/31238-mansur_escudero_reivindicamos_el_espiritu_de_al_andalus_no_el_ territorio.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 436 Ricard Zapata Barrero, “La reproducción del ‘otro’musulmán en España a través de prácticas sociales y reacciones políticas” in El Otro en la España contemporánea, ed. Silvina Schamma Gesser and Raanan Rein (Sevilla: Fundación Tres Culturas, 2011), 243–253. 437 María Dolores Álgora Weber, “Las raíces históricas de la cultura española como fórmula para abordar el debate de la inmigración contemporánea,” in Migraciones y desarrollo humano, ed. Iván Miláns del Bosh Portolés et al. (Madrid, Dykinson, 2003), 136–137. 438 Omayra Herrero Soto, “La comunidad musulmana española en la actualidad: aspectos religiosos y jurídicos. Bibliografía comentada,” AWRAW XXV (2008): 213–214.

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particular were an integral part of his national and international political strategy. This explains why Zapatero undertook some steps toward religious pluralism that the former socialist Prime Minister Felipe González did not dare to carry out during his last four years of mandate (1992–1996). These important political gestures made by Zapatero were received with gratitude by the Muslim community. In February 2008, Mansur Escudero asked Spanish citizens to “vote for progressive parties, because they are the ones who better defend an authentically secular State.”439 Some days before, the Spanish Episcopal Conference had issued voter guides criticizing the politics of the Socialist government, and reinforcing their stance against what the Valencia Cardinal Agustín García Gasco called “radical secularism.”440 What was at stake was, indeed, the further advancement of Spanish secularism and a deeper separation between the State and the Catholic Church. The sector of the Muslim community led by Mansur Escudero engaged in the struggle for the full secularization of the Spanish state and the respect of individual freedoms. The Muslim leader went as far as to support the legalization of homosexual marriages “despite it being forbidden for us.” In his opinion, “no denomination has the monopoly on religion, nor should impose upon the rest of the society its own criteria of morality. Neither should it feel attacked by the regulation of practices which are not accepted by its religion.”441 Significantly, a declaration signed on 19 April 2005 by the representatives of the Catholic Church, the Federation of Jewish Communities, the Evangelical Church and

439 J.B., “La Junta Islámica reclama el voto en las generales para ‘partidos progresistas’,” ABC.es, February 2, 2008: http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-02-02-2008/abc/Nacional/ la-junta-islamica-reclama-el-voto-en-las-generales-para-partidos-progresistas_1641607701203. html# (accessed March1, 2012). 440 Juan G.Bedoya, “Los obispos piden el voto para ‘el bien mayor’ con duras críticas al Gobierno Zapatero,” elpais.com, January 31, 2008: http://elpais.com/elpais/2008/01/31/actuali dad/1201771028_850215.html (accessed March 4, 2012). 441 Javier Salado, “Los musulmanes españoles debaten sobre el matrimonio homosexual,” reproduced on May 2, 2005 by Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/27603-los_ musulmanes_espanoles_debaten_sobre_el_matrimonio_homosexual.html (accessed March 4, 2012): “Ninguna confesión tiene el monopolio religioso, ni puede imponer al resto de la sociedad sus criterios de moralidad. Ni tampoco debería sentirse atacada porque se regulen prácticas que no estén aceptadas en su religión. Por esta razón los musulmanes no nos hemos opuesto a que el Estado regule el matrimonio homosexual, pese a no estar permitida para nosotros.” See also Juan José Tamayo, “Mansur Escudero, el san Francisco de Asís del Islam,” elpaís.com, October 4, 2010: http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/10/04/actuali dad/1286180225_850215.html (accessed March 5, 2012).

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Greek Orthodox Church against the legalization of same-sex marriage in Spain was not backed by the representatives of the Muslim communities.442 Yet Mansur Escudero did not represent the most liberal stream of Spanish Islam. Abdennur Prado, a Spanish Muslim intellectual who has been President of the Junta Islámica Catalana (2005–2011) and the director (2001–2005) and editor (2005–2011) of Webislam, the leading Muslim website in the Spanish language, actually supported the celebration of Muslim religious homosexual marriages.443 Moreover, he headed four international conferences on Islamic feminism (2005, 2006, 2008 and 2010).444 Pluralistic and liberal approaches are indeed far from being marginal among Spanish Muslims. However, as in the case of other religions, these perceptions coexist with more traditional interpretations of the sacred texts. For example, in September, 2004, Abu Ahmad Ibrahim Miguel Ángel Pérez published an article in Webislam titled ‘Islam and Homosexuality. A Note to Abdennur Prado’s Lies’ (Islam y homosexualidad. Una nota a las mentiras de Abdennur Prado). The text criticized the director of the webpage where his article was published in harsh terms, arguing that Abdennur Prado had lied in a previous article in which he stated that “Islam does not oppose homosexuality.” According to Abu Ahmad Ibrahim: as Muslims we cannot accept homosexuality as a part of our lifestyle. We should not allow that our children grow up thinking that homosexuality is something natural or normal. We should teach them to be tolerant and coexist with others, but also to discern what is correct from what is not. And of course we do not need people inside our community who want to distort the message and mislead us regarding the message of Islam.445

442 See the official site of the Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España (FEREDE): http://www.ferede.org/general.php?pag=vernoticia&cod=52 (accessed March 4, 2012). 443 See Javier Salado, “Los musulmanes españoles debaten sobre el matrimonio homosexual,” reproduced on May 2, 2005 by Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/27603-los_musul manes_espanoles_debaten_sobre_el_matrimonio_homosexual.html; and Terra, “ Colectivos religiosos y sociales critican documento conjunto sobre el matrimonio homosexual,” reproduced by Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/noticias/43829-colectivos_religiosos_y_sociales_critican_ documento_conjunto_sobre_el_matrimonio.html (both accessed March 4, 2012) 444 See Abdennur Prado’s blog: http://abdennurprado.wordpress.com/acerca-de/ (accessed March 4, 2012). 445 Abu Ahmad Ibrahim Miguel Ángel Pérez, “Islam y homosexualidad,” in Webislam, September 14, 2004: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/27331-islam_y_homosexualidad.html (accessed March 5, 2012): “. . . como musulmanes no podemos aceptar la homosexualidad como parte de nuestro modo de vida. No debemos permitir que nuestros hijos crezcan pensando que la homosexualidad es algo natural o normal. Debemos enseñarles a tolerar, a convivir, pero también a discernir lo que es correcto de lo que no lo es. Y desde luego, no necesitamos en el seno de nuestra comunidad a personas que quieren falsear y confundir el mensaje del Islam.”

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The many voices in which Islam speaks in Spain are reflected in the complex organization of its different communities. The first organizational structure of the Spanish Muslim Community was the ‘Federation of Spanish Islamic Entities’ (FEERI), founded in 1989, a few months after the formal recognition of Islam as having a ‘clear and deep-rooted influence’ (notorio arraigo) in Spain.446 Less than two years after its foundation, the lack of consensus between different members of the FEERI led to the creation of the ‘Union of Islamic Communities in Spain’ (UCIDE). These two organizations united in 1992 under the umbrella of the ‘Islamic Commission of Spain’ (CIE), a “legal fiction” created with the aim of negotiating, signing and supervising the Cooperation Agreement with the government.447 Since its creation, the CIE had a bicephalous structure with two Secretary-Generals, one from the FEERI and the other from the UCIDE. The lack of understanding between the two heads of the CIE “systematically prevented any possibility of application and development of the Cooperation Agreement.”448 Muslim immigration exacerbated the flaws in the representative structure of the CIE, leading by the beginning of the twentyfirst century to the decentralization of Spanish Islam. The CIE was created in response to the special circumstances of the Spanish Muslim community in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, twenty years later the needs of the Muslim community have little or nothing in common with those of the founding years, mainly because of its demographic growth and increased diversity. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, different religious federations had been formed in various autonomous communities. Although these entities were not allowed to participate in the implementation and development of the Cooperation Agreement, they acted as representatives of the Muslim community in their respective territories and claimed their right to represent the Muslim community at the national level.449 On October 14, 2011, the Council of Ministers approved by Real Decree the modification of article 1 of the Cooperation Agreement between the State and the ‘Islamic Commission of Spain’ (CIE). This change opened the door for the

446 Casa Árabe, Muslims in Spain. A Reference guide (Madrid: Casa Árabe, 2009), 11. 447 Casa Árabe, Muslims in Spain, 16–17. See also Iván Jiménez-Aybar, “Diagnóstico sobre la integración jurídica y social del Islam en España: bajo la sombra del 11-M,” Hesperia 5 (2006): 235–255. Reproduced on February 9, 2007 in Webislam: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/ 30802-diagnostico_sobre_la_integracion_juridica_y_social_del_islam_en_espana_bajo_la_s. html (accessed March 5, 2012). 448 Jiménez-Aybar, “Diagnóstico sobre la integración jurídica y social del Islam en España: bajo la sombra del 11-M.” 449 Casa Árabe, Muslims in Spain, 17.

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incorporation of many Muslim entities which had been established during the last years into the Commission, putting an end to the exclusion of more than a third of the 1040 Islamic communities registered in the Ministry of Justice from the formal negotiations with the Public Administration.450 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the Spanish public and government suddenly became concerned with the content of the religious teachings and sermons spread in local mosques, as well as with their financing and control. The facts that the largest mosques were financed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab-Muslim countries, and that many imams were “imported” from abroad became matter of concern because of the potential diffusion of violent ideologies. These fears further materialized in the virulent opposition of wide sectors of Spanish society to the further construction of mosques, and added to the alienation of the Muslim population.451 Yet again, there was a gap between the public debate and the social realities, as the Spanish government continued with its laisser-faire politics regarding mosques and imams. It is worth noting, however, that terrorism and the spread of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam were also a matter of concern for many Spanish Muslims. Significantly, the first association of self-declared young Spanish Muslims made its first public appearance immediately after the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid. They came to the Atocha train station, one of the sites where bombing took place, carrying a crown of flowers and a banner with the inscription: “No to terrorism in our name: barbarism has neither religion, culture nor race.”452 This concern was also reflected in an article penned by Abdennur Prado: The current situation of Islam is unsustainable, with the propagation of radical doctrines inside Muslim communities, discourses of rejection of all that is Western –which favors the creation of ghettos. This reality contributes to the growth of islamophobia and xenophobia, authentic evils of our times. Although most of us Muslims only want to live our spirituality with full normality, the sectarian (and even violent) attitude of the few can justify the rejection of citizenship and affects our lives. [. . .] The combatting of radicalism

450 Jesús Bustamante, “Las principales entidades musulmanas acuerdan la creación del Consejo Islámico Español,” Religión Digital, April 3, 2011. Available at: http://www.periodistadigi tal.com/religion/otras-confesiones/2011/04/03/religion-islam-consejo-islamico-espanol-organi zaciones-democracia-espana.shtml (accessed June 24, 2013). 451 Zapata Barrero, “La reproducción del ‘otro’ musulmán en España a través de prácticas sociales y reacciones políticas,” 223–226. 452 Virtudes Téllez Delgado and Salvatore Madonia, “Visibilizing ‘Invisibilized’ Spanish Muslim Youth”, in Observing Islam in Spain, ed. Ana I. Planet Contreras, Vol. 28 of Muslim Minorities, edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Aminah Beverly McCloud and Jörn Thielmann (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 124.

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inside the Muslim communities is an ethical imperative. We cannot allow another March 11, 2004 to take place, and its prevention is in our hands. [. . .] The Spanish government and the Generalitat de Cataluña should react in a creative way, and support progressive Muslims against the radical ones.453

Despite the difficulties, Islam has undoubtedly become an increasingly important element of Spanish society and culture. Since the 1990s, Moroccan immigration has become the subject of numerous books, films, and musical creations. In the cultural sphere, the power relations between North and South, colonizers and colonized, are often challenged or even subverted.454 The inherently hybrid realm of culture is indeed a privileged instrument for the elaboration and empowerment of the similarly hybrid experiences of immigration.455 According to an opinion survey from 2011, 83% of Muslim immigrants felt adapted to Spanish customs, 86% declared that they found no obstacles for the practicing of their religion, and 82% believed that Judaism, Christianity and Islam are equally respectable and none is superior to the others. These percentages have remained relatively constant since 2006, when the survey was conducted for the first time.456 With regard to Muslim-Jewish relationships, it is worth noting that in spite of the disagreements that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often provokes between these two communities, there has been no serious conflict between them to this day. On the other hand, despite the fact that the leaders from both religious communities sometimes interact in different forums and public activities, they seldom organize joint activities. An exception to that rule seems to be the Spanish southern region of Andalucía. In Seville, the Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo was established in March 1999 by the Kingdom of Morocco, the Junta de Andalucía (regional government of Andalucía), the Peres Center for Peace and the Palestinian National Authority, among others. The Fundación aims at promoting peace 453 Abdennur Prado, “Por un islam democrático en España,” Webislam, February 7, 2008: http://www.webislam.com/articulos/32945-por_un_islam_democratico_en_espana.html (accessed March 6, 2012). 454 See Rueda, El retorno/el reencuentro and Nair, Rumbo al norte. 455 See, for instance, Homi Bhaba, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994). 456 See Metroscopía, Valores, actitudes y opiniones de los inmigrantes de religion Musulmana. Quinta oleada del Barómetro de Opinión de la Comunidad Musulmana de origen inmigrante en España. Survey realized by Metroscopía for the Spanish government (2011), 7, 34, 28. Accessed February 6, 2019: http://www.interior.gob.es/documents/642317/1201485/Val ores%2C%20actitudes+y+opiniones+de+los+inmigrantes+de+religi%C3%B3n+musulmana+ %28NIPO+126-11-022-1%29.pdf/0bf98a9b-bd97-490f-8e53-0e6885a34e0a. The question concerning the comparison between the different religions was only done since 2008, and its results were more unstable: 78% in 2008 and 75% in 2009.

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and understanding between different people from the Mediterranean region, based on the principles of dialogue and tolerance.457 In addition, in Córdoba, the “Jewish brothers” of the local section of Casa Sefarad hosted the public candidacy of Morisco descendents for the prestigious prize Príncipe de Asturias, prompted by the Muslim representative Mansur Escudero in April 2010.

5.2 Islamophobia and Border Anxiety According to Christiane Stallaert, the “Moor” is the “Other catalyst of Spanish ethnic conscience,” the “quintessence of the foreigner.” In her opinion, the year 711, in which the Christian forces from the north of the Iberian Peninsula initiated the eight centuries long “Reconquista” (Re-conquest) of the southern territories under Muslim control, marked the starting point of Spanish ethnogenesis. Since then, “in situations of contact with Islam, the Spaniard keeps defining himself as essentially Christian.”458 Like the Jews, Iberian Muslims had to choose between conversion and exile at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Unlike the Jews, those who had converted as well as their descendants (the Moriscos) were also expelled from Spanish territory between 1609 and 1614.459 As observed by Stallaert, this decision, taken against the will of the Vatican, was “unique in the history of Christianity since it was the expulsion of a Christian community from Christian territory.”460 This policy was reinforced during the years that followed through ‘blood purity statutes’ (estatutos de limpieza de sangre) that explicitly discriminated against the descendants of Muslims and Jews until the nineteenth century. It structured a “biological Catholicism” that was officially sanctioned in Spain for the last time during the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975).461 According to Joshua Goode, Spain was in fact the “first racial state.”462 Although the descendants of both Jews and Muslims were considered “impure” and unredeemable, the otherness of each group has historically been differentiated in some important aspects. According to Christiane Stallaert, the principle of blood purity was based on the theological argument that baptism

457 See the official site of the Fundación: http://www.tresculturas.org/contenidoGeneral.asp? f3cs=-16786691 (accessed May 31, 2012). 458 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 10–11, 54, 168–169. 459 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 12, 34–35. 460 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 12. 461 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 9. 462 Goode, Impurity of Blood, 11.

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could not clean the “stain” of Jews nor Muslims’ “original sin.” In the case of the Jews, their “perverse morality” had manifested in the act of deicide. As for the Muslims, they were considered descendants of Hagar the slave, and therefore seen as a “bastard lineage, slave, unworthy of ruling or filling important positions.”463 This theological framework corresponded with the marginal place that Muslims and Moriscos had in Christian Spain from the Middle Ages until their expulsion. Unlike the case of the Jews, the lifting of the social and economic restrictions through baptism did not lead to an outstanding accession of Muslim converts to the highest socio-economic positions. The Moriscos, like their Muslim ancestors, filled mainly the role of a cheap labor force in the agrarian sector and the small trades.464 These early forms of Muslim otherness were reinforced with “Orientalist” elements during Spain’s expansionist program in northern Africa, particularly during the 19th and 20th centuries. The Spanish version of European Orientalism perpetuated and reinforced a series of preconceptions concerning Muslims that were already prevalent. Seen as exotic, the darkness of their skin was often symbolically associated with the darkness of evil. Muslims were often perceived as inferior to the Spaniards, and yet considered a dangerous threat. They were seen as fanatic, wild, lascivious and cruel. Also, the societies they formed were described as backward and repressive, particularly towards women.465 However, the negative images and stereotypes have historically coexisted with changing forms of Islamophilia. For instance, during the Spanish Civil War, the considerable participation of Moroccans in the victorious Nationalist army won the camarada moro (the ‘Moor comrade’) the respect and appreciation of the Francoist side, though the accolades also reflected a “paternalistic and oozing superiority.” On the other hand, Spanish Republicans reinforced traditional anti-Muslim stereotypes with the cruel features attributed to the Francoist forces to form the “moro fascista”(‘fascist Moor’)’s image.466 It should be pointed out, however, that these contrasting images were not homogeneous within each of the combating sides. 463 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 34–35. 464 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 29, 37. According to recent scholarship, at least one group of Moriscos formed a “rural middle class” some years before their expulsion. These findings contradict most of the research on the subject. See Dadson, “The Assimilation of Spain’s Moriscos: Fiction or Reality?,” 23. 465 Eloy Martín Corrales, “Maurofobia/islamofobia y maurofilia/islamofilia en la España del siglo XXI,” Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals 66–67(October 2004), 39–51. 466 These issues have been dealt with more extensively in the chapter on Chapter 3. See Eloy Martín Corrales, La imagen del magrebí en España. Una perspectiva histórica siglos XVI-XX (Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2002), 151–177, 179.

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The cooperation between the “Moors” and the Nationalists contributed to forging the strategic alliance between the Francoist state and the Arab nations, vaunted as the “traditional Hispano-Arab friendship.” The “friendship” was a crucial foreign policy asset for the Franco dictatorship, providing it with important assets like international legitimacy and energy supplies. Yet this friendly relationship with an important part of the Muslim world could not be maintained vis-à-vis Morocco, as long as the Spaniards insisted on keeping that country as the presumed beneficiary of their “civilizing mission.” As the Moroccans became more intransigent in their struggle for independence from Spain (which they finally achieved in 1956), their benign yet childish image was slowly transformed into that of despicable traitors, and the old negative stereotypes re-gained preeminence among the régime’s adepts.467 Such contradictions contributed to the construction of a rather contradictory image of Islam in Francoist Spain.468 On the one hand, the Spanish government reinforced its “friendship” with the Arab world by supporting its wars of independence against the French and the English. On the other hand, it unambiguously fought to preserve its own “Protectorate” in northern Africa. The way to solve this contradiction was relatively simple. As explained by Eloy Martín Corrales, the Spaniards often preserved a “very negative” image of the Moroccans while simultaneously maintaining “a more or less idyllic perception of the remaining Muslim nations, helped by the geographical distance that prevented ongoing contact or incidents.”469 These tensions were particularly visible in the contrast between the warmhearted, politically inclusive celebration of Spain’s Islamic past during the post-transition, and the growing antipathy towards North-African immigrants beginning at the end of the twentieth century. During the 1980s and the 1990s the redefinition of Spain as a pluralistic and democratic State was not only reinforced by the official recognition of Islam and the signing of cooperation agreements with its representatives. Economic incentives also led Spanish government municipal authorities and businessmen to favor the erection of major mosques, which symbolically embodied the revitalization of Islam in Spain. Yet none of these large-scale building projects was perceived as problematic insofar as they were financed by wealthy Arab elites, and served a predominantly middle class population coming from countries like Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon, whose relatively small numbers made them

467 Corrales, La imagen del magrebí en España,199. 468 Algora Weber, “España en el Mediterráneo”. 469 Corrales, “Maurofobia/islamofobia y maurofilia/islamofilia en la España del siglo XXI,” 49.

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practically invisible.470 This idyllic period was epitomized by the speech given by the King Juan Carlos on November 2, 1992 in the Medina Al-Zahara Palace in Córdoba, where he emphasized the cooperation between Spain and the Arab world.471 It wasn’t until the end of the 1990s, when the first waves of immigration from North Africa arrived to fill the most unrewarding and despised jobs, that Spanish Islam came to be perceived as a problem in social, cultural and political terms.472 With all its complexity, the image of the “Moor” as essentially inferior did fulfill a fundamental role not only in the galvanization of a Spanish Christian consciousness, but also in the process of legitimization of Spanish expansion and colonial occupation in the Maghreb. That is why these negative stereotypes have not vanished with the resolution of the conflicts that instigated them. As explained by Henry Zukier, once the Other is constructed and the demonization process is completed, this Other becomes an emotionally charged object with the ability to trigger powerful emotions and reactions in a “mechanical” way.473 Toward the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new millennium, massive Moroccan immigration confronted the Spaniards, for the first time in four hundred years, with the challenge of coexistence with a growing Muslim community. Although, as explained above, some significant steps have been undertaken by the government to guarantee healthy and respectful interfaith relationships, in present-day Spain the age-old negative images of the “Moor” continue to affect reality. In a school survey carried out among youth between the ages of thirteen and nineteen in 1997, 24% were in favor of expelling the “Arab-Moors” from the country.474 According to other studies, the percentage of Spaniards holding a positive view of Muslims decreased from 46% in 2005 to 29% in 2006, and in 2008 almost two-thirds of high school students declared their unwillingness to work together with young people of Moroccan origin.475 In addition to the increased feeling of being discriminated against, which haunts the large Moroccan immigrant population, several violent racist 470 Astor, Rebuilding Islam in Contemporary Spain, 14. 471 Danielle Rozenberg, “Minorías religiosas y construcción democratica en España (del monopolio de la Iglesia a la gestión del pluralismo),” Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 74 (1996), 258. 472 Astor, Rebuilding Islam in Contemporary Spain, 33–35. 473 Zukier, “The essential ‘other’ and the Jew,” 120. 474 Tomás Calvo Buezas, “Relaciones interétnicas en España: esquizofrenia entre el discurso igualitario y la praxis xenófoba,” Foro Hispánico 14 (1999), 99. 475 The Pew Global Attitudes Project. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view Each Other (Washington: Pew Research Center, June 2006), 10. See also Castedo and Berdié, “El racismo cala en las aulas”.

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acts have been carried out in recent years against the community; in some cases officials of the Spanish State have been implicated.476 Significantly, this discrimination condemns Moroccan to belong to the poorest and most disadvantaged among the immigrants.477 As with the Jews, evidence of anti-Muslim hatred coexists with a widespread narrative that often supports the principles of solidarity and pluralism in excessively abstract terms.478 These developments are particularly striking considering the fact that for centuries the Spaniards have themselves been considered by their northern neighbors as belonging more to the “backward” African continent than to “civilized” Europe. In The Return of the Moor, Daniela Flesler points to this deep ambivalence as the source of anti-Moroccan attitudes: “Perceived as ‘Moors,’ Moroccan immigrants embody the non-European, African, and oriental aspects of Spanish national identity. Moroccans turn into a ‘problem,’ then, not because of their cultural differences, as many argue, but because they are not different enough. Like Freud’s uncanny, or Derrida’s specters, Moroccans become for Spaniards the return of the repressed.”479 According to a rather insidious French saying, “Africa begins at the Pyrenees.” Indeed, from the point of view of the (non-Spanish) West, despite the defeat of Islam in the Iberian Peninsula and the Christian “purification” that followed, Spain historically remained associated with the “exotic” world of AlAndalus.480 This perception was strengthened during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries due to the difficulties faced by Spain in the construction of a modern nation-state, the loss of its imperial domains, its relative poverty, and the authoritarian government of Francisco Franco (1939–1945).481

476 See European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia. Migrants’ Experiences of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 Member States – Pilot Study. Vienna: EUMC, May 2006. In 2008, a Pew report showed a relative decrease in the negative views held against Muslims in Spain since 2006: from around 61% to 52%. Still, the country continued to have the highest percentage of unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims of all the countries surveyed, which included Germany, Poland, France, Russia, Britain and the US. See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe. 477 Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Moroccan Immigrants in Spain: An Overview of Main Topics and Normative Challenges”, The Maghreb Review 33, 1 (2008), 40. 478 Corrales, La imagen del magrebí en España, 243–244. 479 Flesler, The Return of the Moor, 9. 480 Fuchs, Exotic Nation, 1. 481 See, for instance, Fusi and Palafox, España: 1808–1996; and Daniela Flesler, The Return of the Moor. Spanish Responses to Contemporary Moroccan Immigration (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008),17–54.

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Paradoxically, Spain also participated in the wider European “Orientalizing” of North African and East Asian “Others,” creating a deep feeling of “disorientation.”482 The incorporation of Spain into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1986 reinforced the “Orientalizing” side of Spain: The importance of both decisions –Europe, NATO– was that Spain was defined, at last, as a Western and European country, and by achieving this, Spain recovered the international role that seemed to most suit its history, its geographic position, its cultural significance. [. . .] With its entry to Europe and NATO, Spain solved one problem –its role in the world– unresolved since it lost its overseas Empire, first between 1808 and 1826, and then in 1898.483

It is not irrelevant that Fusi and Palafox directly associated Spain’s definition as a “Western and European country” with the solving of the question concerning its role in the world, which had been left “unresolved since it lost its overseas Empire.” Although the scholars do not clarify exactly what that role consisted of, their allusions to the Spanish Imperial past are unequivocal. Belonging to Europe means being part of a rich and allegedly enlightened group of Western countries whose values and worldview have shaped the whole planet. It also means being on the historical side of the colonizers and not of the colonized. The Spanish leaders who established the bases of the post-Franco democracy were well aware of the importance of positioning their country on the more powerful side of the colonizers-colonized dichotomy. As discussed in chapter 1, in 1987 the Spanish Congress approved a law establishing October 12, the anniversary of the “Discovery of America,” as Spain’s National Day. The National Holiday of October 12 had been inherited by the new democratic régime under the Francoist name of “Día de la Hispanidad” (Hispanity Day.) The concept of Hispanidad became popular during the 1920s, at the time of the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, and its influence increased during the flourishing of Fascism and Nazism in Europe: [It] is conceived of as the community of Hispanic nations founded on the religious spirit of Spanish colonization, a specifically anti-liberal and traditionalist idea that was adopted by the Francoist regime as one of its ideological pillars. The concept was

482 Martin-Márquez, Disorientations, 9. 483 Fusi and Jordi Palafox, España: 1808–1996, 392: “La importancia de ambas decisions – Europa, OTAN– estaba en que España se definía, al fin, como un país occidental y europeo y en que, al hacerlo, recobraba el papel internacional que mejor parecía adecuarse con su historia, con su posición geográfica, con su significación cultural. [. . .] Con la entrada en Europa y en la OTAN, España resolvía un problema –su papel en el mundo– pendiente desde que perdió su Imperio ultramarino, primero entre 1808 y 1826, y luego en 1898.”

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instrumentalized to exalt the heroic image of the old Spanish empire and the period when Spain was amongst the most important powers of the world, stressing the religious and political aspects much more than the cultural and literary ones.484

The defeat of the Axis powers and the subsequent change in the global ideological atmosphere favored a shift in the interpretation of this concept, from the metaphysical level to a greater emphasis on the shared cultural and linguistic background between Spain and its former colonies.485 This reformed conceptualization of Hispanidad, avoiding any imperial reference, has been advanced by King Juan Carlos I and the Spanish Congress. In its democratic and European version, the Spanish colonization of America was reinterpreted as an “encounter between cultures” which contributed to the cultural and political construction of Spain as a bridge between different cultures and nations.486 Despite the camouflage, the decision to establish the anniversary of the “Discovery of America” as Spain’s national day unequivocally reinforces Spain’s historical “credentials” as a former imperial power that deserves to enjoy all the benefits of membership in the European Community. According to Anibal Quijano, the Spanish colonization of America was crucial to the construction of Europe and America as modern identities, triggering a “global model of labor control” that expanded throughout the world hand-in-hand with European colonialism. Quijano argues that the “idea of ‘race’” and the “constitution of a new structure of labor and its resources and products” are the two pillars of this global model of power, which persists until this day: “What is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Euro-centered capitalism as a new global power [. . .] Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality.”487 These concepts resonate with Kitty Calavita’s work on contemporary immigration in Spain and Italy. In both countries, she argues, the law plays a key role in the re-construction of workers from the third world as “racially and culturally different Others,” whose marginality forces them to do jobs often despised by the locals. This material subordination, she argues, is in part a 484 Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” 137. 485 Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” 137–138. 486 See Harvey, Hybrids of Modernity, 61; Aguilar and Humlebæk, “Collective Memory and National Identity in the Spanish Democracy,” 139. 487 Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Euroecentrism and Latin America,” 533–534.

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product of the global inequalities rooted in colonialism and imperialism. It is, indeed, “colonialism in reverse”488 In today’s globalized world, the trend to free the movement of goods and capital while imposing increasing restrictions on the migration of persons is essential to the preservation of the inequalities between countries where the wealth is enjoyed and those where it is mainly produced.489 In that context, the stereotypes created by the “Orientalizing” process in particular, and the prejudices against the colonized populations of the past in general, are essential to the legitimation of the structural asymmetries underlying today’s North-South relationships. Notwithstanding its credentials as a European and Western country, Spain did not succeed in erasing its “Oriental” traits. María Dolores Algora Weber, a Spanish scholar specialized in the Arab-Muslim world, explained in a personal interview the cultural closeness between her country and the Arab world: “When I travel to an Arab country and I integrate into it [I perceive that] their behavior is similar to mine. In contrast, if I go to Finland I can assure you that even if we both are in the European Union I have nothing in common with the Finns.”490 In a similar vein, the French writer Stendhal argued that “Blood, customs, language, way of living and fighting, in Spain everything is African. If the Spaniard were Muslim he would be completely African.”491 Integration into the European Union did not succeed in solving Spanish “disorientation.” Instead this contradiction deepened with their determination to prove to their northern neighbors that they can be exemplary Europeans by efficiently protecting the Southern gates of Fortress Europe, on the one hand, and the reminder of their own “Orientalized” traits mirrored by the growing Moroccan population on Spanish soil, on the other.492

488 Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 158. 489 Following Dal Lago and Mezzadra’s conceptualization. Cited in Étienne Balibar, “Europe, an ‘Unimagined’ Frontier of Democracy”, Diacritics 33, 3–4: 37, 39. 490 Algora Weber, personal interview, October 6, 2010: “Es que yo, cuando viajo, cuando yo viajo y me integro en un país árabe y tal, es que en su forma de comportamiento tienen muchas conexiones con mi forma de comportamiento. En cambio si voy a Finlandia, pues te puedo asegurar que por mucho que seamos de la Unión Europea, es que no tengo nada que ver con los finlandeses.” 491 Cited in Fuchs, Exotic Nation, 11: « Sang, moeurs, langage, manière de vivre et de combattre, en Espagne tout est africain. Si l’Espagnol était mahométan il serait un Africain complet.” 492 As Daniela Flesler’s states: “Contemporary Moroccan immigrants represent an acute conflict for Spanish society precisely because they embody a very old history of efforts to extricate the ‘Moorish’ from the ‘Spanish.’” Flesler, The Return of the Moor, 15.

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A graphic example of this intractable conflict is the case of an ad produced during the late 1990s with the aim of creating a positive image of immigrant integration into Spanish society. Since the North-African population could not be physically distinguished from “normal” Spaniards, the publicists decided to include instead some sub-Saharan Africans.493 As indicated by Flesler, “Barriers are necessary, then, because in reality there are none.”494

5.3 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006) 5.3.1 El País: Supporting the “Alliance of Civilizations” Between 1997 and 2000, El País often denounced the discrimination and xenophobia to which the Muslims were subjected in Spain, emphasizing the need to facilitate their integration.495 In some cases, the condemnation of anti-Muslim phobia was reinforced by the memory of a Spanish Muslim past. An eloquent example of this “linkage” is the article by J.J. Pérez Benlloch, in which he contrasts the “obstinate refusal” of the Valencia Municipality to approve the establishment of a Muslim cemetery in the region (which he considers “a form of racism”) with the uncovering of the remains of an ancient Muslim cemetery in the subsoil of Ciutat Vella. In his opinion, the discovery is the “testimony of an antique and vibrant coexistence,” which should help the Valencia functionaries understand that “nothing new is being requested” by the local Muslim community.496 As shown in Charts 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US triggered a sharp increase in the attention towards Muslim affairs in the Spanish press. Despite the changing circumstances, El País reinforced the trend it followed during preceding years, insisting that both society and government should contribute to the successful integration of the Muslim minority into a democratic and pluralistic Spanish society. On October 14, 2001, an article by Luis Gómez acknowledged that September 11, 2001, had awakened a “sudden” interest in the Spanish Muslim community. Such interest, observed Gómez,

493 Corrales, La imagen del magrebí en España, 236. 494 Flesler, The Return of the Moor, 15. 495 See for instance Xavier Rius-Sant, “Racismo, tópicos y medios de comunicación,” El País, July 29, 1998, 2; and Juan Miguel Muñoz, “Los musulmanes denuncian trato discriminatorio para residir en Melilla,” El País, November 23, 1998, 24. 496 J.J. Peraz Benlloch, “Prevengamos el racismo,” El País, July 22, 1999, 2.

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Chart 5.1.

El País Articles Mentioning Countries 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1997 Spain

1998

1999 Europe

2000 Vatican

2001

2002 United States

2003

2004 Irak

2005

2006

Balkan Countries

Chart 5.2.

combined “mere curiosity with preoccupation.”497 Indeed, the terrorist attacks in the United States caused Spaniards to wonder whether their country was “safe from fundamentalism” or not. In Gómez’s opinion, the government’s withdrawal from its responsibilities concerning the local Muslim community, particularly in the areas of religious practice and integration policies, created a void that was being filled by foreign governments like Saudi Arabia, which hold a

497 Luis Gómez, “La minoría mayoritaria en España,” El País, October 14, 2001, 10.

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Chart 5.3.

“very rigorous interpretation of Islam.”498 The article acknowledged the existence of potentially dangerous interpretations of Islam, although the author asserted the importance of not falling into the demonization of Muslims. As expected, following 11 September 2001, and even more so following the Madrid terror attacks of 11 March 2004, the daily published many articles on terrorism in the Muslim world.499 However, this tendency was expressed in parallel with a conscious emphasis on the importance of avoiding the demonization of the Muslim communities, as well as on the need to provide Muslim immigrants with support for smooth integration into Spanish society without making them renounce their culture and beliefs.500 In the articles, terrorism is not always presented as an exclusive problem of Islam, but rather as a problem that also exists in the West.501 In addition, the similarities between what was perceived as some of the most problematic aspects of political Islam (like its attitude towards women’s

498 Gómez, “La minoría mayoritaria en España.” 499 Joan B. Culla I Clara, “La naturaleza del conflicto,” El País, October 26, 2001, 3; Gabriel Jackson, “Sobre Israel y Palestina,”January 30, 2002, 14; Vicent Franch, “Honestidad,” El País, April 7, 2004, 2; Antonio Elorza, “Religión y violencia,” El País, April 16, 2004, 16; and Antonio Elorza, “El ángel exterminador,” El País, July 20, 2005, 14. 500 Antonio Elorza, “El círculo,” El País, November 23, 2001, 24; Gema Martín Muñoz, “La política de EEUU y el Islam,” El País, January 2, 2003, 12; “Oratorio de discordia,” El País, May 23, 2002, 12; and Antonio Elorza, “La espada de Tariq,” El País, September 25, 2004, 22. 501 Antonio Elorza, “Seis meses después,” El País, March 15, 2002, 25; Norman Birnbaum, “¡Ánimo, señor Zapatero!,” El País, March 22, 2004, 11; and Emilio Menéndez del Valle, “Alianza de civilizaciones,”El País, August 18, 2005, 11.

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rights and democracy) and certain “bad habits” of the Spanish Catholics are also noted in El País.502 This approach to terrorism contributes to dismantling a political narrative that constructs Islam as an essentially violent religion completely foreign to more familiar Christian traditions and ideologies. The determination to counter cognitive frameworks that construct Muslims as Others, who are inherently irreconcilable with Spanish culture and identity, is evident in El País’ pages. Interestingly, Chart 5.4 shows that the daily paid particular attention to the topic of discrimination against Muslims or Islamophobia in the aftermath of the September 11 and March 11 attacks, in the context of the increased fear of terrorism among the Spanish population. As in the case of the Jews, the issue of Islam became increasingly intertwined with political and ideological issues that transcended Spanish borders.

Chart 5.4.

In the post-September 11 international context, El País often blamed Israel for triggering terrorism.503 Prime Minister José María Aznar, who was among the 502 Eduardo Haro Teclen, El País, July 25, 2001, 53; and César Gavela, “Hiyab y topless,” El País, February 19, 2002, 16. 503 Gabriel Jackson, “Sobre Israel y Palestina,” El País, January 30, 2002: 14; Antonio Elorza, “Seis meses después,” El País, March 15, 2002, 25; Octavi Marti, “Jean Delumeau desentraña

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main supporters of the global “war on terror” led by President George W. Bush, was sometimes characterized as holding discriminatory views on Muslims in general: “Aznar’s Moor-phobia [maurofobia] is a well-documented fact.”504 This accusation of anti-Muslim phobia against Prime Minister Aznar reinforced the argument that he had alienated Spain from its strategic role as a bridge between the West and the Arab-Muslim world, especially in the context of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.505 The terrorist attacks against the Casa de España in Casablanca in May, 2003, and in Madrid in March, 2004, were interpreted by many opposition politicians as mere reactions to Spain’s aggression against the Arab-Muslim world.506 However, references to the existence of other variables influencing terrorism can also be found in the daily.507 In the aftermath of the Madrid massacre of 2004, a growing tension could be observed between acknowledging the phenomenon of terrorism and the concern to avoid any demonization of Islam. One way of dealing with this issue was by making comparisons between terrorist acts and discriminatory practices against women perpetrated by Muslims, and Western examples of terrorism and gender discrimination. Another way of avoiding a negative essentialist interpretation of Islam was through positive references to the Iberian Muslim past of Al-Andalus, as well as by advocating a formal Spanish apology for the expulsion of the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula more than four centuries ago.508 In fact, as shown in Chart 5.5 the number of references to Spain’s Muslim past grew considerably during 2003 and 2004, the years of the Casablanca and Madrid terrorist attacks.

las claves del ‘miedo en Occidente’,” El País, April 7, 2002, 40; El País, May 18, 2003, 12; Jean Daniel, “Europa frente a Al Qaeda,”El País, March 19, 2004, 15; Miguel Mora, “ ‘El terrorismo es fascismo, no religión’,” El País, March 29, 2004, 40; and Selim Nassib, “¿Hay una Palestina después de la muerte?,” El País, November 16, 2004, 4. 504 Ian Gibson, “La otra mejilla,” El País, March 4, 2003, 2. See also Juan Goytisolo, “Respuestas, respuestas, respuestas,” El País, September 9, 2002, 14; and Ian Gibson, “Al Andalus, tierra añorada,” in El País, March 23, 2004, 2. 505 Gibson, “La otra mejilla”; and Sami Nair, “España, ¿en qué lío te has metido?,” El País, March 13, 2003, 17. 506 P.E., “‘España está hoy en el rincón, en la cuneta de la historia’,” El País, March 10, 2004, 24; and Javier Valenzuela, “Los expertos escrutan la sombra de Bin Laden,” El País, March 13, 2004, 23, 30. 507 Editorial “Métodos de barbarie,” El País, May 18, 2003, 12; Fernando Reinares, “España, Al Qaeda y el terrorismo global,” El País, March 15, 2004, 48; and Vicent Franch, “Honestidad,” El País, April 7, 2004, 2. 508 Ian Gibson, “Al-Andalus, tierra añorada”; and Andrew Sim, “Un congreso reivindica la riqueza cultural de la historia de España,” El País, May 22, 2004, 42.

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Chart 5.5.

The newspaper’s choice to shed a positive light on the Spanish “Muslim past” has to be considered in the wider frame of the political-ideological divide about whether Spain should or should not act as a bridge between the West and Islam. The Spanish political scene became increasingly polarized around these alternative approaches, particularly after the events of September 11 in New York and March 11 in Madrid. Such polarization involved not only the adoption of different standpoints concerning the present, but also different interpretations of the Spanish past and national identity. Particularly after the Madrid massacre, a conservative stream led by former Prime Minister Aznar became increasingly involved in the assertion of a Spanish Catholic national identity that had crystallised during the almost eight centuries of struggle against the Muslim “invaders” between the 8th and the 16th centuries. Probably the most paradigmatic example of the use of this traditional nationalistic perspective in the construction of contemporary Spanish identity is the widely quoted address by José María Aznar at Georgetown University on September 21, 2004: If you take the trouble to focus on what Bin Laden has written and stated in recent years [. . .] you will realize that the problem Spain has with Al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the Iraq Crisis. [. . .]. You must go back no less than 1,300 years, to the early 8th century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity. This Reconquista process was very long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully. There are many radical Muslims who

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continue to recall that defeat, many more than any rational Western mind might suspect. Osama Bin Laden is one of them.509

In his speech, Aznar built on a narrative that presented Spain as a nation that fought for centuries against the “Moor” in order to preserve its Christian identity. The political utility of such discourse was clear: in the contemporary global context, the country’s centuries-long “expertise” in fighting these “Moors” gave Spain the necessary credentials to be among the leaders of the world struggle against “Islamic terrorism.” El País aimed at countering this narrative, which was adopted more wholeheartedly by Aznar after he left office. A good example of this opposition is the article of September 25, 2004 by Antonio Elorza, a frequent columnist. The article commented on Aznar’s speech at Georgetown arguing that, in fact, the former Prime Minister reinforced Al Qaeda’s arguments by identifying the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula thirteenth centuries ago with the contemporary terrorist organization, just as they do.510 Both Bin Laden and Aznar were “poking the fire of a war of civilizations,” and these confrontational attitudes could bring no good. The right way of tackling the problem of terrorism, in Elorza’s opinion, was the “dialogue of cultures and a policy of justice in political and economic relations” with the Muslim world.511 This is, in fact, the approach favored by the former socialist Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero, who presented a proposal for an Alliance of Civilizations at the General Assembly of the United Nations on the same day as Aznar’s famous speech in Georgetown, September 21, 2004.512 On July 14, 2005, the project presented a year earlier was transformed into a United Nations initiative co-sponsored by the Spanish and Turkish

509 Cited in GilesTremlett, “Welcome to Moorishland,” in In the Light of Medieval Spain: Islam, the West and the Relevance of the Past, ed. Simon R. Doubleday and David Coleman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xvii. A Spanish translation is available at the on-line Spanish journal El Siglo de Europa 618, October 4, 2004: http://www.elsiglodeuropa.es/siglo/ historico/politica/politica2004/618Aznar.htm (accessed January15, 2012). 510 Antonio Elorza, “La espada de Tariq,” El País, September 25, 2004, 22: “En su discurso de Georgetown, el expresidente Aznar evoca la España eterna que se vio mancillada en esa misma fecha por la morisma y supo resistir al ataque mediante una larga batalla que duró ochocientos años. El círculo se cierra: los de Al Qaeda reivindican la invasión de hace trece siglos y Aznar cree que es lo mismo Al Qaeda que aquella empresa victoriosa.” 511 Elorza, “La espada de Tariq.” 512 Andrés Ortega makes a similar case against Aznar‘s arguments, which he claims are “nurtured” by the “type of Spanish History taught during Francoism,” and in favor of Zapatero‘s proposal for an “Alliance of Civilizations.” See Andrés Ortega, “Entre 711 y 1683,” El País, September 27, 2004, 4.

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governments: the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC.)513 The initiative was well received by El País. Emilio Menéndez del Valle, for instance, wrote an enthusiastic endorsement of the project, recalling that previously, in October, 2004, he had called it “a weapon loaded with future.”514 His article followed the main political line of the daily, that the intelligence work and military fight against terrorism should be complemented with a deeper knowledge and understanding of the Muslim world. Menéndez del Valle also pointed to the need to keep in mind the Muslim viewpoint in order to improve dialogue between the West and Islam: The Western citizens –but especially Rumsfeld- should bear in mind that public opinion and historical memory also exist in the Muslim world, and that the great majority of it feels as personal the aggression in Palestine or Iraq, as they still remember the coup d’ État organized by the Western countries in 1953 in Iran [. . .] to make the Shah come back after the overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh, who had nationalized the oil (controlled by British Petroleum) and carried out agrarian and fiscal reform after winning democratic elections.515

Francisco Bustelo reinforces this argument, describing that: “We have forgotten it, but there are hundreds of millions of people who know that the West’s advances have been reached in part thanks to the exploitation of whole populations, whose descendants often live in poverty and have no reason to feel grateful towards us.”516 He also added another argument that often appeared in El País: “The Muslim world [. . .] has to be secularized and should separate State and religion if it wants to progress.” Empathetically, the author stated: “Looking at our recent past, Spaniards could certainly recount the advantages that

513 See the Spanish government’s and UN’s official sites: http://www.maec.es/es/Home/ Alianza/Paginas/etapas.aspx; http://www.unaoc.org/ibis/about/who-we-are-un-alliance-ofcivilizations/ (both accessed January15, 2012). 514 Emilio Menéndez del Valle, “Alianza de civilizaciones,” El País, August 18, 2005, 11. See also Antonio Elorza, “Alianza de civilizaciones,” El País, September 20, 2005, 16. 515 Menéndez del Valle, “Alianza de civilizaciones,” 12: “Los ciudadanos occidentales –pero sobre todo Rumsfeld- han de tener presente que en el mundo musulmán existen también la opinión pública y la memoria histórica, y que la gran mayoría siente como propia la agresión en Palestina o en Irak, igual que todavía recuerda el golpe de Estado organizado por países occidentales en 1953 en Irán. [. . .] para hacer regresar al shah tras derrocar al primer ministro Mossadeq, que había nacionalizado el petróleo (controlado por la British Petroleum) y hecho la reforma agraria y fiscal después de ganar unas elecciones democráticas.” 516 Francisco Bustelo, “Humildad frente a belicismo,” El País, September 9, 2005, 14: “A nosotros se nos ha olvidado, pero hay centenares de millones de personas que saben que los avances de Occidente se lograron en parte gracias a la explotación de poblaciones enteras, cuyos descendientes, que suelen vivir en la pobreza, no tienen motivos para estarnos agradecidos.”

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these changes bring.”517 Once again, the parallels between some features of the Muslim world often considered as negative (such as the union between State and religion) are de-demonized by recalling the relatively recent alliance of the Catholic Church and Spanish State during the Francoist era (1939–1975). A similar attitude was adopted by El País during the crisis generated by the publication on September 30, 2005, of 12 editorial cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.518 The caricatures were considered as offensive and blasphemous in the Muslim world, sparking large-scale and sometimes violent opposition. The daily’s position on the subject can be summarized by the phrase attributed in one of its articles to “Christian Thinkers”: “Yes to freedom of expression; but also respect.”519 Several articles published on the subject highlighted the importance of exercising freedom of speech within the limits of respect for “the principles and beliefs of all religions”, as well as solving problems through dialogue.520 For example, in order to make clear to the overwhelming Spanish Christian majority what was at stake for Muslims, an article adopted as its title the words of a Palestinian artist who asked: “Would you show Jesus fornicating?”521 At the same time, an editorial published on February 1, 2006, though it emphasized the importance of freedom of press and expression, also pointed to some dangerous tendencies inside the Muslim world: “Freedom of the press and freedom of expression should have no more restrictions than those fixed by law for all the citizens, and whoever feels offended or insulted has the right to make an appeal to the tribunals.”522 “Fanaticism”, added the editorial, “is a plant that grows in many religions, but the Islamic world offers today a very 517 Bustelo, “Humildad frente a belicismo”: “El mundo musulmán [. . .] ha de laicizarse y desestatizar la religión si quiere progresar. [. . .] Mirando a nuestro pasado reciente, los españoles, por cierto, podríamos hablar de las ventajas que ello reporta.” 518 For two detailed analyses of the repercussions of the “caricatures crisis” in the Spanish press, see Van Dijk, “El racismo y la prensa en España,” 58–68; and Zapata Barrero, “La reproducción del ‘otro’ musulmán en España a través de prácticas sociales y reacciones políticas,” 237–243. 519 “Pensadores cristianos: ‘Libertad de expresión sí; pero respeto también’,” El País, February 7, 2006, 35. 520 J.M. Marti Font, “La ONU pide que la libre expresión no choque con el respeto a las religiones,” El País, February 3, 2006, 2; Sami Nair, “‘Se benefician los extremos’,” El País, February 7, 2006, 33; and Olivier Roy, “Las caricaturas: el islam europeo, secuestrado,” El País, February 8, 2006, 11. 521 Naiara Galarraga, “‘¿Mostrarían a Jesús fornicando?,” El País, February 5, 2006, 6. 522 “Cuidado con la sátira,” El País, February 1, 2006, 12: “La libertad de prensa y la libertad de expresión no deben tener más cortapisas que las que fija la ley para todos los ciudadanos, y quien se sienta ofendido o injuriado tiene el derecho a acudir a los tribunales. . .”

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vast harvest of it. [. . .] Believing that religious intolerance exists only in the Islamic world would be a fatuous exercise in self-complacency. But ignoring the fact that religious fundamentalism expands vertiginously among Muslim believers would be to put on a blindfold against reality.”523 In the end, the daily decided to publish a caricature of the prophet Mohammad drawn by Plantu for the French newspaper Le Monde, which was considered to be more respectful of Muslims than the Danish ones. The message was clear: we are in favor of publishing caricatures that might go against some religious beliefs, but we are against the diffusion of discriminatory or prejudice-inducing images.524 During the period under study, the traumatic experiences of terrorist attacks, the Spanish involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the uncovering of terrorist networks managed by Muslims established in Spanish soil, contributed to the multiplication of references to violence, extremism, authoritarianism and primitiveness in a Muslim context.525 On the other hand, the pages of El País also allowed for the expression of some Muslim voices, particularly concerning Islamophobia and the Spanish past. In addition to the abovementioned examples, the newspaper reproduced, for example, the opinion of the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Benaissa, criticizing the “inadmissible” occupation by Spain of Ceuta and Melilla, two “cities located on

523 “Cuidado con la sátira”: “El fanatismo es una planta que crece en muchas religiones, pero el mundo islámico ofrece hoy una cosecha muy extensa. [. . .] Creer que sólo en el mundo islámico existe la intolerancia religiosa sería un ejercicio fatuo de autocomplacencia. Pero ignorar que el integrismo religioso se expande vertiginosamente entre los creyentes musulmanes sería ponerse una venda ante la realidad.” 524 Two distinct analyses of El País’ treatment of the “caricatures crisis,” one by the freelance journalist Francesca Cicardi and the other by the scholar Teun A. van Dijk can be found in http://francescacicardi.com/documents/trabajo01.pdf and http://www.discursos.org/oldar ticles/racismo%20y%20prensa.pdf (both accessed January 16, 2012). 525 Carles Boix, “resentimiento y terror,” El País, October 25, 2001, 24; Joan B. Culla, “La naturaleza del conflicto,” El País, October 26, 2001, 3; Gabriel Jackson, “Sobre Israel y Palestina,” El País, January 30, 2002, 14; Pere Ríos, “El Imam de Fuengirola se escuda en el Corán para justificar el maltrato a mujeres,” El País, December 10, 2003, 24; Fernando Reinares, “España, Al Qaeda y el terrorismo global,” El País, March 15, 2004, 48; Vincent Franch, “Honestidad,” El País, April 7, 2004, 2; Antonio Elorza, “Religión y violencia,” El País, April 16, 2004, 16; Adolfo García Ortega, “El antisemitismo,” El País, June 9, 2004, 14; María José Viñas, “Cada año se producen cerca de 90 atentados suicidas, la mayoría por motivos religiosos,” El País, July 19, 2004, 10; Jorge A. Rodríguez, “Detenidos 13 islamistas más por su relación con el grupo que quería volar la audiencia nacional,” El País, October 29, 2004, 27; I. Cembrero, “Argelia promulga una ley para frenar el avance del cristianismo,” El País, March 22, 2006, 10; and Carlos Mendo, “Ahmadineyad y el Holocausto,” El País, December 22, 2006, 2.

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Morocco’s land, in the African continent, in an Arab, Muslim and independent country, under the pretext that they were occupied 300 years ago.”526 Unsurprisingly, some of these positive approaches to Islam were adopted as weapons in the political struggle against the conservative policies of Prime Minister Aznar or the Spanish Catholic church. There is indeed a correlation between the will to improve the relations between Spain and the Muslim-Arab world and the adoption of an anti-Islamophobic approach by the political left and center-left. Moreover, this stand in favor of religious pluralism and tolerance contributed to a series of political decisions in the domestic sphere which, like the creation of the Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia, benefited the Spanish Muslim and Jewish communities alike. However, it is worth pointing that El País’ criticism of the power politics of Aznar and the Bush administration did not prevent it from longing for the “good old days” of Spanish imperialism. Quite on the contrary, an analysis of the arguments used to oppose the US-led Iraq invasion of 2003 actually unveils the strength of center-Left nostalgia for Spain’s colonial past. On 25 October 2001, Carles Boix, a Political Science professor from the University of Chicago published an article in El País on the roots of Islamic “resentment” towards the West, which he concluded with a reference to the causes of Spanish antipathy towards the United States. The scholar was shocked by the fact that in Spain, as in some parts of the Middle East, many people condemned the September 11 attacks but added in personal conversations that the Americans probably deserved it. “I imagine,” writes Boix, “that the roots of this reaction, half way between the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 and Eisenhower’s visit in 1953, are too deep to be controlled without making a conscious effort to achieve that.”527 Boix’s intuition concerning Spanish resentment towards the US was partly confirmed in an article that appeared in El País on March 20, 2003. The text by M. A. Bastenier, entitled “A Universal ‘98,” compared the Iraq invasion of 2003 with the war of 1898 between Spain and the US, which concluded in the Spanish loss of Cuba and the Philippines. The defeat of 1898 was perceived in Spain as a “disaster” that symbolized the definitive

526 “Benaissa dice que España no tiene ningún título de propiedad sobre Ceuta y Melilla,” El País, August 27, 2002, 19. 527 Carles Boix, “Resentimiento y terror,” El País, October 25, 2001, 24: “Imagino que las raíces de esta reacción, a medio camino entre la pérdida de Cuba y Filipinas en el 98 y la visita de Eisenhower en el 53, son demasiado profundas como para que, sin realizar un esfuerzo consciente, puedan ser dominadas.”

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collapse of the Spanish Empire, and was followed by a passionate and painful national debate on Spanish national identity and the reasons for its “failure.” According to this article, in 2003, the Americans reproduced their 1898 victory, which Bastenier termed a “profitable outrage against a declining Spain.” In both cases, the atrocities of the governing powers were allegedly manipulated to legitimate an invasion that ultimately replaced them with a “much more asphyxiating yoke.” The former belief in the “contaminated” character of the “Iberian specie” was replaced by anti-Islamic xenophobia.528 Even though the alleged arguments against the Iraq invasion in 2003 are the defense of international law and the fight against the unilateral use of force, the comparison with the 1898 conflict shows that what most disturbs the article’s author is not the illegitimate use of force in international relations (Spain’s colonies, including the ones it lost in 1898, were acquired by force), but rather the United States’ military victory over a “declining Spain” at the end of the 19th century, and its current political and military hegemony. The association between the events of 1898 and those of 2003 shows the persistence of Spanish resentment over the U.S. victory more than a century before, and current frustration concerning Spain’s secondary role in international affairs.

5.3.2 ABC and Islam: From Ally to Enemy ABC is a conservative newspaper that fervently supports the Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Church. From the late 1990s until the events of 11 September 2001, it adopted an increasingly receptive and friendly attitude towards Muslims. For instance, a short article from 1998 entitled “The woman and Islam,” argued: “There is no religious or moral principle in Iran that prevents a woman from being in government. Islam as a religion is one thing and another very different aspect is the fanatic and intransigent puritanism of Islamic integrism.”529 On the same page, another short article centered on the Alhambra museum explained that “the civilization and culture of Islam have offered, in every field, considerable examples.” The “eight centuries of Muslim presence in Spain” were described as a period that “with its light and shadows, is also part of our history.”530

528 M.A. Bastenier, “Un ‘98’ universal,” El País, March 20, 2003, 10. 529 “La mujer y el Islam,” ABC, October 18, 1997, 18: “No hay ningún principio religioso ni moral en el Islam que impida que una mujer pueda gobernar. Una cosa es la religión del Islam y otra muy distinta el puritanismo fanático e intransigente del integrismo islámico.” 530 “Museo de la Alhambra,” ABC, October 18, 1997, 18.

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Addressing global issues, an article from June 1998 warmly recommended the reading of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations.” While the existence of “fracture lines” between “civilizations” was acknowledged, the article endorsed the role of Spain as a bridge or mediator between the West and the north of Africa: “Spain has housed diverse civilizations and in the future, when it seems that religious and cultural aspects will have more influence in international relations, it will have to play a major role. This role will undoubtedly be to defend and apply the values of respect, coexistence and mutual enrichment.”531 This sympathetic attitude towards Muslims and Islam paralleled the unprecedented steps taken by the late Pope John Paul II in this direction. For example, on 2 June 1998, an article announced that “The Holy See establishes an alliance with the main Islamic center in the World. The Vatican and the AlAzhar University will combat terrorism.” The agreement officially aimed at promoting the “common values of Christians and Muslims” in order to fight “religious fanaticism.” It constituted a “great step toward the rapprochement between the Holy See and Islam, confirmed in recent years in the common positions adopted by the Vatican and the Islamic countries in the UN conferences celebrated in Beijing, focused on women, and in Cairo, which focused on population.”532 In fact, since the mid-1990s, the Vatican together with the Muslim countries had led a global “Islamo-Vatican crusade” (in El País’ wording, 30 August 1994) against the advancement of the rights of women and sexual minorities. According to Prof. Louise Chappell: the Vatican together with a number of Islamic governments has used their religious standing to advance arguments that sit in direct contrast to the rights agenda proposed by the transnational feminist movement. They have framed their discussion about gender and equality, sexuality and reproduction and women’s place in the family in ways which commonly appropriate human rights discourse but for conservative, patriarchal ends.[. . .]

531 Manuel Pimentel, “España y el ‘choque de civilizaciones’,” ABC, 27 June 1998: 44: “España ha sido solar de diversas civilizaciones y en un futuro, donde los aspectos religiosos y culturales parece que tendrán mayor peso en las relaciones internacionales, le tocará jugar un papel destacado. Y ese papel sin duda debe ser el de defender y aplicar los valores de respeto, convivencia y enriquecimiento mutuo.” 532 Pedro Corral, “La Santa Sede establece una alianza con el mayor centro islámico del mundo,” ABC, 2 June 1998: 55:”El Vaticano y la Universidad Al Azhar lucharán contra el terrorismo. [. . .] El acuerdo supone un gran paso en el acercamiento entre la Santa Sede y el Islam, verificado ya durante los últimos años en las posiciones comunes adoptadas por el Vaticano y los países islámicos en las conferencias de la ONU celebradas en Pekín, sobre la mujer, o en El Cairo sobre la población.”

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Essentially, the aims of the network are negative in character –it seeks to obstruct, and in some cases, reverse, the expansion of women’s rights norms. [It] has achieved important victories, including the exclusion of rights related to reproduction and sexuality from being included in UN conference documents.533

It is worth noting that according to ABC, the Catholic Church was sometimes even more radical than the Muslim theocracies in its opposition to rights for same-sex couples. In 1995, for example, an article reported that the Vatican’s opposition to the European Union’s Platform of Action at the UN conference in Beijing (aiming at adopting a definition of family legitimizing homosexual couples) was “even stronger than the one used by outstanding Muslim integrist countries like Sudan.” As indicated by Chappell, the Church instrumentalized human rights arguments to advance conservative and patriarchal objectives. For example, Joaquín Navarro Valls, the Spanish spokesperson of the Vatican, argued at the Beijing conference that “the European Union did not respect human dignity, human rights and the family.”534 For some years this successful cooperation against the advancement of individual rights was supported by ABC through the stressing of the spiritual elements common to Islam and Christianity. Ramadan, for instance, was defined as “the period when the soul is purified through fasts and prayers” and considered similar to the Christian Lent: “The fast, however, is meaningless, as in the Christian Lent, if it is not accompanied by an inner fast, an inner renewal.” Moreover, the life of the Muslim population of contemporary Andalucía was described as “normal,” and their integration into the overwhelmingly Christian society as unproblematic: “Respectful of their own traditions, the five thousand Muslim who live in Granada pray and lead a normal way of life, assisting as spectators, like other citizens, in the Christian festivals such as the recent Cabalgata de Reyes Magos.”535

533 Louise Chappell, “Contesting Women’s Rights: The Influence of Religious Forces at the United Nations” (paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Adelaide, September 29– October 1, 2004), 2. 534 Juan Llata, “La Unión Europea y el Vaticano mantienen sus diferencias sobre el término ‘familia’,” ABC, September 11, 1995, 86. 535 Rafael Troyano, “Ramadán en paz y sin problemas para los 25.000 musulmanes andaluces,” ABC, January 12, 1998, 43: “[Ramadán] Es el período en el que el alma se purifica a través de ayunos y oración. [. . .] El ayuno, sin embargo, no tiene sentido, como en la Cuaresma cristiana, si no va acompañado de un ayuno interior, de una renovación interior. [. . .] Respetando sus tradiciones, los cinco mil musulmanes que viven en esta provincia granadina rezan y llevan su vida con normalidad, asistiendo como espectadores, como otros ciudadanos más, a las fiestas cristianas, como, recientemente, a la Cabalgata de Reyes Magos.”

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In a similar vein, an extensive two-page article published in the cultural supplement of ABC empathetically portrayed the spiritual search of a Spanish artist who converted to Islam. The title and the first phrase of the sub-title are eloquent enough: “‘Blessed are all the minutes of one’s life.’ From the movida madrileña to Sufi Islamism, passing through Compostela and Mecca, as a proof of the Heraclitean truth that the path downwards and upwards is one.”536 Islam is shown here as a spiritual path that is as legitimate as Christianity (the path goes through the Spanish Christian shrine of Compostela and also through Mecca – the holiest of Muslim places). These words of introduction convey the message that there is “only one” spiritual path which is not exclusive to any religion and that Islam is a faith that sanctifies life. This approach was reinforced in the article by the artist himself, who said “My workshop is a mosque: I make the pieces while I pray. ‘Ora et labora’, right?”537 The Latin motto “ora et labora,” meaning in Latin “pray and work,” is the maxim of the Catholic Benedictine order, and is widely associated in Spain with Christian spirituality. By using these words in a Muslim context, the artist recognizes a spiritual legacy common to Christianity and Islam. Another example of ABC’s positive approach to Islam at that time was an article from January 2000, describing the discovery of an ancient Muslim cemetery in Avila, Spain. The uncovering of what was considered as the main cemetery of Muslims who lived in the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula was celebrated as a symbol of the fruitful coexistence between Christians and Muslims during the Middle Ages: “The recovery at the beginning of the new millennium of a medieval Muslim cemetery in the heart of Spain becomes an act full of symbolism: the acknowledgement that the secular coexistence of Christians and Muslims was beneficial.” In a Spanish context marked by an unprecedented Muslim immigration and the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment (only a couple of weeks later the racist riots of El Ejido took place in the Spanish south), the description of medieval religious coexistence as “beneficial” contributed to the creation of a welcoming attitude of dialogue towards the new immigrants.538

536 Ignacio Ruiz Quintano, “‘Benditos sean todos los minutos de la vida de uno’,” ABC cultural, December 3, 1998, 38: “De la movida madrileña al islamismo sufí, pasando por Compostela y la Meca, como prueba de la verdad heraclitiana de que el camino hacia abajo y hacia arriba es uno.” 537 Ruiz Quintano, “‘Benditos sean todos los minutos de la vida de uno’,” 39: “Mi taller es una mezquita: hago las piezas entre oraciones. ‘Ora et labora’, ¿no?” 538 Rosa Valdelomar, “Hallan el mayor cementerio mudéjar de España,” ABC, January 22, 2000, 50. “Recuperar en los inicios del nuevo milenio un cementerio medieval musulmán en el corazón de España se convierte en un acto lleno de simbolismo: el reconocimiento de que la secular convivencia entre cristianos y musulmanes fue beneficiosa.”

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ABC’s reaction to the violent expressions of xenophobia that took place in 2000 was to publish articles full of empathy towards Muslims and immigrants. A few days after the events of El Ejido, the late journalist and diplomat Alfonso de la Serna published a plea on behalf of religious pluralism and respect for the Other. De la Serna opened his article by pointing to the secular conflict between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. He then recalled the times when some teachers “. . . led us frequently not only to the ignorance of the other religions, but also to antipathy and even open hostility towards them.”539 These attitudes, he reckoned, “. . . reflected a radical ignorance and an aberrant inversion of the religious essence that is summarized in the three words of one common message: peace, shalom, salaam. [. . .] If we do not want to ignore the essence of the Biblical, Evangelical and Koranic message, we will have to ‘desacralize’ to some extent our political presence in the world, and universalize more our life, taking it out of the limits of a concrete and limited civilization.”540 These were the thoughts, wrote De la Serna, that came to his mind when “the racist and xenophobic barbarism sprouted in El Ejido and the obscure, false, unfair image of the heretic ‘Moor’ was exhibited again.” The conservative intellectual was indeed aware of the potentially dangerous power of negative images, as he established a direct link between xenophobic crimes and negative perceptions of the ‘Moor.’ In addition, his call in favor of “desacralizing” and “universalizing” political life aimed at improving the coexistence between different religions and cultures, on the basis of “dialogue and love.” A critical point, in his opinion, was to replace the “belligerent understanding of the ‘other’” with the “the true knowledge of the ‘other’”, as well as the acknowledgement that both the truth and the root of a future brotherhood lies within the three religions.”541

539 Alfonso de la Serna, “Cristianos, Moros y Judíos,”ABC Sevilla, February 16, 2000, 3: “Cuando los que ya tenemos muchos años teníamos muy pocos, las enseñanzas de algunos maestros nos conducían frecuentemente, no sólo a la ignorancia de las otras religiones, sino a la antipatía hacia ellas, y hasta a la abierta hostilidad.” 540 De la Serna, “Cristianos, Moros y Judíos”: “Todo esto, que hoy parece una anécdota anacrónica, reflejaba una radical ignorancia y una inversión aberrante de la esencia religiosa que se resume en las tres palabras del mensaje común: paz, shalom, salam.[. . .] Si no queremos ignorar la esencia del mensaje bíblico, evangélico y coránico, tendremos que ‘desacralizar’ algo nuestra presencia política en el mundo y universalizar más nuestra vida, sacándola del reducto de una civilización concreta y limitada.” 541 De la Serna, “Cristianos, Moros y Judíos”: “Pensaba yo en todo esto cuando en días pasados brotó la barbarie racista y xenófoba de El Ejido y se exhibía de nuevo la oscura, falsa, injusta, imagen del ‘moro’ hereje.[. . .] Frente al entendimiento beligerante del ‘otro’, levantemos el verdadero conocimiento de ese ‘otro’ y reconozcamos que en las tres religiones hay su verdad y su raíz de hermandad futura.”

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This deep understanding of the phenomenon of otherness, followed by the encouragement of more positive attitudes towards the overwhelmingly Muslim immigrants who were reaching Spain from the South was reinforced, for example, in an article by Alfonso Armada published in August 2000. The article entitled, “The new Berlin wall,” made an explicit comparison between the fortified wall erected in the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants and the infamous Berlin wall.542 Armada stressed the significant similarities between the two countries separated by the wall: Morocco and one of the Spanish North African enclaves. The only actual difference between the two sides of the border in his opinion was the fact that one belonged to the rich North and the other to the poor South: As we talk we hear a cockerel sing on the Muslim side, and it sings just like a Christian cockerel. The houses that can be seen from both sides of the border, this new Berlin wall that no longer separates two religions, two ideologies, but the rich North and the poor South, are identical: the same shapes, the same color.543

This description was followed by the denunciation of the discriminatory practices of staff on the boat that connects Ceuta with the port of Algeciras, in mainland Spain: “. . . the crowd is expressly ill-treated by Transmediterránea, which does not even have the deference of informing the passengers about the safety conditions of the boat in Arabic. [. . .] All the Maghribis are suspicious in the eyes of the police.” As a concluding reflection, Armada elaborated on the importance of developing open and welcoming attitudes towards the Other: “Maybe when we lose the fear of being others, and of being impregnated by others, we will be more ourselves than ever.”544 This increasing awareness concerning the construction of otherness, and the multiplication of efforts destined at countering it, was interrupted and grad-

542 Alfonso Armada, “El nuevo muro de Berlín,” ABC Sevilla, August 24, 2000, 77. 543 Armada, “El nuevo muro de Berlín”: “Mientras hablamos oímos cantar a un gallo del lado musulmán, y canta igual que un gallo cristiano. Las casas que se miran desde ambas orillas de la frontera, este nuevo muro de Berlín que ya no separa dos concepciones del mundo, dos religiones, dos ideologías, sino el Norte rico del Sur pobre, son idénticas: la misma hechura, el mismo color.” 544 Armada, “El nuevo muro de Berlín”: “. . . la muchedumbre es expresivamente maltratada por Transmediterránea, que ni siquiera tiene la deferencia de informar al pasaje en árabe de las condiciones de seguridad del buque. [. . .] Todos los magrebíes son sospechosos a ojos de la policía [. . .] Quizá cuando perdamos el miedo a ser otros, y a ser impregnados por otros, seamos nosotros mismos más que nunca.”

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ually reversed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. On October 3 of that same year, an article argued that “Islamist fundamentalism is the negation of every civilization, and it covers in this moment most of the Arab world.”545 In contrast, a few months before, an article covering the historic first visit of John Paul II to a Damascus mosque indicated that the late Pope had broken down the wall dividing Catholics and Muslims, and that “it should be our task to continue the job.”546 Less than a month after the terror attacks in the US, an article evoked what would become one of the main argumentative lines of the newspaper toward Islam in the years to come. This narrative gained further prominence after the terrorist attacks of March 2004 in Madrid: “Our Western society is, because of some of its characteristics, superior to the others. . .” Such superiority is based upon norms that “form the essence of an open society: the respect of individual freedoms, the defense of private property and contracts, equality of all before the law, participation of the citizens in the government of their nations.”547 In this new discursive framework, ABC surprisingly became a fervent advocate of women’s rights. As a matter of fact, women’s rights are probably the most striking example of how, in the aftermath of September 11, Spanish Catholic conservatives turned some of the elements upon which their global alliance with the Muslim countries had been founded into an argument against those countries. For example, the fact that “the advancement of women’s rights only reached its zenith in Christian civilization” was now considered as a self-evident truth.548 On the other hand, the fact that the Quran “does not contemplate the possibility that a woman could

545 César Alonso de los Ríos, “Los amigos del fanatismo islamista,” ABC, October 3, 2001, 15: “. . .el fundamentalismo islamista es la negación de toda civilización, y alcanza en estos momentos a la mayoría del mundo árabe.” 546 Juan García Pérez, “Grandeza histórica,” ABC, May 7, 2001, 70. 547 Pedro Schwartz, “El éxito de Occidente,” ABC, October 15, 2001, 3: “La confusión mental reinante en Occidente lleva a que se tilde de eurocéntrica, intolerante e incluso racista esta afirmación de que nuestra sociedad occidental es, por alguna de sus características, superior a las demás existentes hoy y también a las que decayeron en el pasado. [. . .] la superioridad de nuestra civilización radica en unas normas que, a lo largo de varios siglos, hemos ido descubriendo sin pretenderlo y que conforman la esencia de una sociedad abierta: el respeto de las libertades individuales, la defensa de la propiedad privada y los contratos, la igualdad de todos ante la ley, la participación de los ciudadanos en el gobierno de sus naciones.” 548 Inmaculada Navarrete, “El Imán y el tanto monta,” ABC, January 19, 2004, 7: “. . .el avance de los derechos de la mujer sólo ha alcanzado su cénit en la cultura cristiana, como es de Perogrullo observar.”

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have more authority than a man” is highlighted, as if a woman having such authority were in fact a possibility in the rigid patriarchal structure of the Catholic Church.549 Astonishing as it may be, as shown in Chart 5.6 toward the end of the period under analysis, ABC became vehemently critical of the status of women in Islam, publishing far more articles related to the subject that the more liberal El País and El Mundo. Articles about Status of Women-Islam 2006 2005 2004 2003 El Mundo 2002 El Pais

2001

ABC

2000 1999 1998 1997 0

5

10

15

20

Chart 5.6.

ABC’s metamorphosis concerning women’s rights in the Muslim world is an outstanding example of an “enemizing” process.550 This involves the convenient negation of some uncomfortable features of one’s identity and its subsequent splitting and projection onto a group defined as an enemy. As discussed before, by the end of the twentieth century Spanish conservative circles close to ABC, particularly the Catholic Church, had won significant victories in their fight against the advancement of individual rights in general and women’s rights in particular, thanks to their alliance with

549 Luis Ignacio Parada, “El saludo es lo de menos, hermanos,” ABC, October 29, 2002, 2: “. . . el Corán [. . .] No contempla el supuesto de que una mujer pueda tener más autoridad que un hombre.” 550 As described by Ofer Zur, “The Psychohistory of Warfare: The Co-Evolution of Culture, Psyche and Enemy,” Journal of Peace Research 24, 2 (1987): 125–134.

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Islamic governments. This “crusade” against some of the pillars of modernity caused them to be perceived among the more liberal public as reactionary and anachronistic, especially in a Spanish context marked by the struggle over the secularization of the State and the consolidation of democracy.551 The reaction to the September 11 and the March 11 attacks led to increasing degrees of repression, negation, splitting and projection onto a Muslim Other among the Spanish conservatives. ABC’s criticism of the discrimination against women, the lack of separation between Church and State, and the authoritarian values of the Muslim world are in fact a caricature of some of the more traditional views defended by the newspaper. For example, both the Catholic Church and the Spanish Monarchy, two of the institutions most venerated by ABC, embody hierarchical, patriarchal and non-democratic structures, being contemporary remnants of pre-Enlightenment values. As the cross crowning the Royal Palace in Madrid clearly illustrates, these two institutions have always been closely associated. Another revealing example of this splitting-projection process is the article published on December 6, 2001, by the Administrative Law professor José Manuel Díaz Lema. The article’s main argument is that “In the new political situation which originated after September 2001, the modernization of political structures in the Islamic countries fills a central place, and Spain should play a leading role in this undertaking inside the European scene. [. . .] From a judicial-political perspective”, argues Díaz Lema, “States based on the Muslim religion are subject in the eyes of a Westerner to a deep archaism, in which Religion and State are one and the same. . .”552 A particularly interesting point in this article is the acknowledgement that Spain has been exceptionally slow compared to other European states in producing an effective separation of Religion and State: . . . the separation of Religion and State was the most prominent consequence of the religious wars that devastated Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

551 See Chapter 2. 552 José Manuel Díaz Lema, “¿Una ostpolitik para el mundo musulmán?,” ABC, December 6, 2001, 24: “En la nueva situación política originada a partir de septiembre de 2001, la modernización de las estructuras políticas de los países islámicos ocupa un lugar central, y a España le corresponde desempeñar un papel de primer orden en esta tarea dentro del concierto europeo. [. . .] Desde una perspectiva jurídico-política, los Estados de religión musulmana se hallan sumidos a los ojos de un occidental en un profundo arcaísmo, donde Religión y Estado son una y la misma cosa.”

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culminating in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). [. . .] Of the great European States only Spain clung to the old medieval notions, which accentuated its isolation and in the end deviated into a national-Catholicism that contributed not a little to the implosion of the Civil War in 1936.553

Spain, indeed, has often been considered by its European neighbors as a primitive and exotic country. This is precisely the image of Spain that the successive governments since the democratic transition have been trying to change, with considerable success. Yet the most interesting part of this argument is the fact that it has been published in a newspaper that mainly expressed the voices of a conservative camp which, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, was involved in a fierce political struggle against the complete secularization of the Spanish State. This article was published during a period when the conservative camp, led by the Catholic Church and the PP, fought not only to preserve the many privileges of the Catholic Church in the education system, but also to reinforce conceptions of Spanish history and identity similar to those criticized by Díaz Lema. Désirée Kleiner-Liebau reveals the persistence of some important elements of national Catholicism, in which State and Religion are closely intertwined, on the Spanish right: On the right-wing of the political spectrum different constructions and elements of national identity coexist. There still can be found an almost nostalgic memory of the national Catholicism propagated by the Francoist regime. Although as an ideology it persists only within the far-right political parties and organizations, some elements seem to have survived in the discourse of the conservative PP. For instance the importance which is given to the Catholic faith or the historic events it defines as constituting, such as the ‘Reconquista’ or the conquest of Latin America. [. . .] These concepts of Spain’s historical and religious foundations are rarely openly displayed, but implicitly do still guide part of the political discourse and attitudes of politicians. . .554

With these elements in mind, the following arguments of the article published in ABC are particularly eloquent:

553 Díaz Lema, “¿Una ostpolitik para el mundo musulmán?”: “. . . la separación de Religión y Estado fue la consecuencia más destacada de las guerras de religión que asolaron Europa durante los siglos XVI y XVII, y que culminaron en la Paz de Westfalia (1648). [. . .] De los grandes Estados europeos sólo España se aferró a las viejas nociones medievales, lo que acentuó su aislamiento y a la postre derivó en un nacionalcatolicismo que contribuyó no poco a la implosión de la Guerra Civil de 1936.” 554 Kleiner-Liebau, Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain, 62.

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. . .social and economic progress is impossible without State policies where the individual’s autonomy is fully guaranteed. This process was put in motion in the Western world since the affirmation of religious freedom and the subsequent neutrality of the State, and this is precisely the step that the Muslim world resists taking. Often this reticence toward the evolution of the Western society is justified by fear of the loss of traditional values closely related to family, religion, etc.555

A few years later, in the political context of an electoral victory of the Socialists that prefigured a further process of secularization, some articles published by ABC criticized Spanish society in terms similar to those which, according to Díaz Lema, are widespread in Muslim countries: “Symptoms of cultural suicide are being detected: de-Christianization (religion is an essential ingredient of civilizational identity); erosion of the family. . .”556 Similarly, in December 2006, ABC columnist Juan Manuel de Prada published an opinion article in which he argued that the confinement of Christianity to the private sphere would bring about the cultural degeneration of the West: Our epoch has decided to relegate religion to the private sphere, as if its mere expression were a crime. [. . .] The fact that this expulsion of religion to the pariahdom of privacy is impelled by the schools, under the façade of scrupulous secularism, should force us to reflect on the sense of education. There is no true education that does not transmit a meaning concerning reality, that would not allow us to recognize ourselves in our history, in our traditions, in our cultural configuration. [. . .] Our epoch postulates a reality where there is no place for the spirit, for the transcendent. Without realizing it, we are favoring a cultural degeneration where the world vision is reduced to the purely material. [. . .] Christianity is the synthesis incarnated in Christ between the faith of Israel and the Greek spirit. The West was born from this synthesis and is supported by it; if this synthesis is extirpated, it would cease to be the West.557

555 José Manuel Díaz Lema, “¿Una ostpolitik para el mundo musulmán?,” ABC, December 6, 2001, 24: “. . . es imposible el progreso social y económico sin unas formas estatales en las que la autonomía del individuo esté garantizada plenamente. Este proceso se puso en marcha en el mundo occidental a partir de la afirmación de la libertad religiosa y la subsiguiente neutralidad del Estado, y éste es justamente el paso que el mundo musulmán se resiste a dar. Con frecuencia las reticencias de éste ante la evolución de la sociedad occidental se justifican en el temor a la pérdida de valores tradicionales muy vinculados a la familia, al laicismo, etc.” 556 Francisco J. Contreras Peláez, “Zapatero y Huntington,” ABC, October 22, 2004, 75: “Pues se detectan síntomas de suicidio cultural: decristianización (la religión es ingrediente esencial de la identidad civilizacional); erosión de la familia. . .” 557 Juan Manuel de Prada, “Pagana, lúdica y consumista,” ABC, December 2, 2006, 5: “Y nuestra época ha decidido relegar lo religioso al ámbito privado, como si su mera expresión fuese constitutiva de delito. [. . .] Que esta expulsión de lo religioso al lazareto de la privacidad se impulse desde las escuelas, bajo una fachada de escrupuloso laicismo, debería obligarnos a reflexionar sobre el sentido de la educación. No existe verdadera educación que no transmita

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ABC’s transformation of the Muslim world into an “enemy” triggered by September 11 was catalyzed by the March 11 events in Madrid. The praise of historical coexistence and religious pluralism, so common before September 11, was progressively discarded from the daily’s narrative. On April 17, 2004, for instance, the deputy director of the Córdoba section of ABC wrote an article condemning the request of some leaders of the Spanish Muslim community to allow Muslim prayers in the Cathedral and former Great Mosque of Córdoba.558 In his article, Fernando del Valle Lorenci referred explicitly to the consequences of the Madrid terror attack: March 11 and its repercussions have again focused our attention and sowed distrust towards a culture and some beliefs that necessarily coexist among us and whose members unceasingly increase.[. . .] For these reasons, the well-intentioned Muslims that coexist with us should accept the fact that the current situation is not idyllic and that the idea of a melting pot of cultures is left for wilted and obsolete brochures for tourism promotion.559

Not surprisingly, the number of articles including the word “Muslim” rose steadily in 2004, both in numeric and relative terms, vis-à-vis El País and El Mundo (see Chart 5.1.) Two areas in which “enemy” images have been widely used are to be found in the contradictory approach towards secularism and the multiplication of references to Al- Andalus. As explained above, the rise to power of the Socialist Prime Minister Zapatero increased the tensions between the Catholic conservatives and Spanish liberals who supported a further secularization of the State.

un significado sobre la realidad, que no permita reconocernos en nuestra historia, en nuestras tradiciones, en nuestra configuración cultural. [. . .] Nuestra época postula una realidad en la que no tiene cabida el espíritu, lo trascendente. Sin darnos cuenta, estamos favoreciendo una degeneración cultural en la que la visión del mundo se reduce a lo puramente material. [. . .] El cristianismo es la síntesis encarnada en Cristo entre la fe de Israel y el espíritu griego. Occidente nace de esa síntesis y se sustenta en ella; extirpado de esa síntesis, dejará de ser Occidente.” 558 The Mezquita-Catedral de Córdoba (Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba) was originally a pagan temple. With the successive Christian and Muslim conquests of Andalucía, a region located in today’s Spain’s south, it became a Visigothic Christian Church, then a Mosque, and since the thirteenth century it has been a Christian temple. 559 Fernando del Valle Lorenci, “El Mihrab sensate,”ABC Córdoba, April 17, 2004, 5: “El 11-M y sus repercusiones han vuelto a enfocar la lupa y sembrar la desconfianza hacia una cultura y hacia unas creencias que coexisten necesariamente entre nosotros y cuyos representantes aumentan en forma imparable. [. . .] Por eso, los musulmanes de bien que conviven con nosotros deben aceptar que la situación actual no es idílica y que lo del crisol de las culturas queda para ajados y obsoletos folletos de promoción turística.”

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This conflict reached its zenith with the legalization of same-sex marriage in July 2005, an event considered by the Spanish Episcopal Conference as “the worst thing that happened to the Catholic Church in 2000 years.”560 Once again, the daily emphasized the importance of upholding Catholic values in the public sphere, at the same time that it asked Muslims to keep the commandments of their faith in the private realm. The comparison between two editorials, one directed at the Zapatero government and the other dealing with European Islam, is particularly instructive. The first editorial deals with the relations of the Zapatero government with the Vatican, one day before an important demonstration against the education reform where “the Church [had] a particular prominence.” In the editors’ opinion, the Zapatero government “has wanted since the beginning to give a secularizing orientation to its legislative action, as reflected by the law on homosexual marriage [. . . Yet] it should revise its positions on matters that gravely affect the conscience of millions of people.”561 In contrast, another editorial argues that the first thing that Europe should do in relation to Islam is “to trust the democratic values and the system of freedoms and individual rights upon which European progress is constructed, which are incompatible with a theocratic sense of personal and collective life.”562 In other words, while ABC was in favor of maintaining a privileged collaboration between the Catholic Church and the Spanish government that limits the rights and freedoms of the individual, these rights and freedoms are taken as arguments against the political expressions of Islam. Consequently, as the national conflict over secularism escalated, so did ABC’s references to the religious aspects of Islam (instead of the cultural or political ones,) as shown in Chart 5.7. The multiplication of references to Al-Andalus from 2004 on, and particularly during the year 2006 as seen in Chart 5.8, should also be read in the wider context of the national struggle over the place assigned to the different religions in the public space. This conflict was fostered by the stream of Muslim immigrants coming originally from Morocco, which begun to challenge the hitherto undisputable spiritual hegemony of the Catholic Church. No less importantly, 560 See Juan G. Bedoya, “Las cesiones del Gobierno,” elpais.com, August 14, 2011 (accessed January 29, 2012.) 561 “Urgencias ante el Vaticano,” ABC, November 11, 2005, 4: “El Ejecutivo que preside Rodríguez Zapatero ha querido dar desde el principio una orientación laicista a su acción legislativa, como bien refleja la ley sobre el matrimonio homosexual [. . .] el Ejecutivo debería revisar sus posiciones en asuntos que afectan gravemente a la conciencia de millones de personas.” 562 “Los españoles y el Islam,” ABC, April 20, 2006, 4: “Ante la pregunta de qué debe hacer Europa en su relación con el islam, parece claro que lo primero es confiar en los valores democráticos y en el sistema de libertades y derechos individuales sobre el que se asienta el progreso europeo, incompatible con un sentido teocrático de la vida personal y colectiva.”

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Articles about Religion-Islam 2006 2005 2004 2003 El Mundo 2002 El Pais 2001 2000 ABC 1999 1998 1997 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Chart 5.7.

Chart 5.8.

the approach of the Socialist government in power since 2004, which adopted measures that undermined some of the privileges of the Catholic Church in the public sphere, increased the conservatives’ concerns about the challenges to the important role played by Catholicism in Spanish society and politics. During 2005 and 2006, the Vatican institutions appeared more frequently in the articles dealing with Islam, showing a rise in the inclusion of Catholic considerations in articles related to Islam: see Chart 5.9.

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5.3 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006)

ABC Articles Mentioning Countries 50 40 30 20 10 0 1997 Spain

1998

1999 Europe

2000 Vatican

2001

2002

United States

2003

2004 Irak

2005

2006

Balkan Countries

Chart 5.9.

Between 2004 and 2006, Spanish Muslims gained access to privileges which had previously been exclusive to the Catholic Church, like the right to receive public financing, implemented through the ‘Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation’ (Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia) established in 2004, and the 2005 designation of the first teachers of Islamic religion in public schools on the territory of the Iberian Peninsula. On the other hand, this slow “normalization” of the Muslim presence in Spain was countered by the persistence of anti-Muslim prejudices.563 As shown in Chart 5.10, ABC was aware of these developments and granted increasing attention to the problem between 2004 and 2006. This concern was reflected in the publication of opinions criticizing antiMuslim prejudices, such as an article noting that the president of the Episcopal Conference, Rouco Varela, had spoken against making all Muslims responsible for terrorism; and the publication of an interview with the writer Grian Cutanda, who argued against discrimination toward Arab culture and denounced some negative consequences of the Christian “reconquest” of Al-Andalus.564 Yet towards the end of the period researched, the historical memory of the eight centuries of struggle between “Christian Spain” and “Muslim Al-Andalus” was often invoked as a weapon against what was perceived as the “silent invasion” from the South.

563 See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe. See also Castedo and Berdié, “El racismo cala en las aulas”. 564 J. Bastante, “Los obispos rechazan la idea de Alonso de controlar las actividades religiosas,” ABC, 4 May 2004, 12; Luis Miranda, “ ‘Con la Reconquista se intentó aplastar el recuerdo de Al-Andalus’,” ABC, December 13, 2005, 56.

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Chart 5.10.

For instance, an editorial published in the Córdoba edition of ABC argued that “. . .even among the moderate sectors of Islam, any initiative consisting in increasing the presence of the Muslim community in Spain is driven by the idea of the ‘return’ to a land over which, they still claim to have some rights, because it was under Muslim control until more than five hundred years ago.”565 A few days later, a regular ABC columnist contended that It is useless to try to convince a Muslim that Al-Andalus ceased to exist [. . .] Islam considers that Spain belongs to it; it claims it and infiltrates it. I wouldn’t worry if it were faced by a strong society. But this is not the case. [. . .] the Zapatero government favors the teaching of the Islamic doctrine in the schools at the same time that it puts obstacles in the face of Catholic ones. The invasion is silent [. . .] but both in the eighth and the twenty-first centuries, the Spanish institutions are a reflection of society, and only if it is strong, will it know how to counter the menace.566

565 “Córdoba, Al-Andalus y el islam,” ABC Córdoba, December 17, 2006, 4: “. . .incluso en los sectores más moderados del islam, cualquier iniciativa que consista en ampliar la presencia de la comunidad musulmana en España se ve impulsada por la idea del ‘retorno’ a una tierra sobre la que, por haber estado bajo dominio musulmán hasta hace más de quinientos años, aún reclaman un derecho histórico propio.” 566 Juan José Primo Jurado, “La invasión silenciosa,” ABC, December 20, 2006, 6: “Es inútil convencer a un musulmán de que Al-Andalus dejó de existir [. . .] El Islam considera que España le pertenece, la reclama y se infiltra en ella. No me preocuparía si, en frente, se encontrase una sociedad fuerte. Pero no es el caso.[. . .] mientras el gobierno de Zapatero favorece la

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Precisely those common values shared by Christianity and Islam that were positively valuated in the late 1990s came to be perceived at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a threat. In the eyes of the Spanish conservatives, the struggle against the “Muslim invasion” had become not only political and cultural, but also a spiritual fight for the eternal salvation of the Spanish Catholic soul.

5.3.3 El Mundo’s Pragmatism As seen in Chart 5.1 El Mundo paid much less attention to Muslims during the period under study than did ABC and El País. Out of pragmatism, the daily usually refrained from getting involved in disputes related to the religious aspects of Spanish identity, generally dealing with the Muslim past in the Iberian Peninsula as an historical fact without vital consequences in contemporary life. Despite this reticence, an April 2003 interview with Karen Armstrong, a British author and former Catholic nun, refers specifically to the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spanish territory as “ethnic cleansing,” acknowledging furthermore that it had tragic consequences for Jews and Muslims alike: The ethnic cleansing of the Catholic Monarchs in Spain worked as an advance party of modernity. It is a dark part of your own History, but that’s how it was. It seems simplistic to reduce everything to 1492, but it is then when the beginning of a new world, symbolized in the discovery of America and the construction of a centralized and modern State are connected, with catastrophic consequences for the people that, let’s say, were in the middle, like Jews and Muslims. They have suffered enormously as a result of the advances of modernity in the West.567

A strictly secular approach led El Mundo’s editors to develop similar approaches to Islam and to the Catholic Church. In both cases, the religious establishments were described as backward and obscurantist institutions, which

enseñanza de la doctrina islámica en las escuelas en tanto pone trabas a la católica. La invasión es silenciosa, no a las bravas como en la época de don Rodrigo.” 567 Ana Romero, “Voces del milenio. Karen Armstrong,” El Mundo, April 20, 2003, 8–9: “‘La limpieza étnica de los Reyes Católicos en España funcionó como la avanzadilla de la modernidad. Es una parte oscura de vuestra propia Historia, pero así fue. Parece simplista reducirlo todo a 1492, pero es entonces cuando se vincula el comienzo de un nuevo mundo, simbolizado en el descubrimiento de América, y la construcción de un Estado centralizado y moderno, con consecuencias catastróficas para la gente que, digamos, estaba en medio, como judíos y musulmanes. Ellos han sufrido enormemente como resultado de los avances de la modernidad de Occidente.’”

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should be tolerated insofar as they comply with the rules of liberal democracy. For instance, an article published a few days after the March 11 terror attacks, described the special ceremony that took place in the Great Mosque of the Islamic Cultural Center of Madrid in front of the corpses of four of the eight Muslim victims who were killed. This gesture contributed to countering the idea that all Muslims are terrorists, by highlighting the fact that they too were victims of political and religious extremism. In one of the article’s opening lines, as it described the Mosque’s interior, the author Ignacio Amestoy also noted that “the women, behind the lattice of the second floor, looked like cloister nuns.”568 While it might have seemed ridiculous to some readers to force women to hide behind a lattice, the comparison made clear that this is not very different from some traditional Spanish Catholic traditions. A similar attitude was shown in an article from October 2003 recounting an “honor killing” that occurred in London, in which a Kurdish immigrant stabbed his daughter to death because of her “excessive westernization.” Interestingly enough, the article did not mention the religious denomination of the immigrant. Instead, it pointed to the existence of shadow sides in different religions and not only in Islam. According to the author, “honor killings” are: called such because they are crimes justified by the presumed dishonor caused by the victim to the family or the community to which he or she belongs. They take place as much among Muslim and Hindu as among Christian populations. Lorca portrayed with exceptional mastery this kind of crime in his famous play Blood Wedding (based on a real story that occurred in Almeria one hundred years ago).569

As seen in Charts 5.1 and 5.11, similar to the other two newspapers surveyed, El Mundo increased its interest in the events of the Muslim world related to Spain after 2004.570 Yet despite an initial interest in issues related to discrimination and immigration, Charts 5.12 and 5.13 show that these topics were relatively

568 Ignacio Amestoy, “Madrid KM 2012,” El Mundo, March 21, 2004, 24: “Las mujeres, tras las celosías de la segunda planta, parecían monjas de clausura.” 569 Irene Hdez. Velasco, “Parricidio/Violencia en Familia. Muertas por un honor atávico,” El Mundo, October 5, 2003, 8: “El de Heshu es uno de los 12 asesinatos de honor cometidos en Gran Bretaña en lo que va de año. Se les llama así porque son crímenes que se justifican en la presunta deshonra que la víctima ha ocasionado a la familia o a la comunidad a la que pertenece. Se producen tanto entre musulmanes e hindúes como en poblaciones cristianas. Lorca retrató con excepcional maestría este tipo de delitos en su famosa obra Bodas de Sangre (basada en un hecho real ocurrido en Almería hace un centenar de años).” 570 Differences in the countries included in the charts reflect the variations in the attention paid by the newspapers to each of them. Only the countries that were referred to most frequently by a particular daily were included in the charts.

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5.3 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006)

EL Mundo Articles Mentioning Countries

10 8 6 4 2 0 2002

2003

2004

2005

Spain

Morroco

Europe

France

United Kingdom

Afganistan

2006 Vatican

Chart 5.11.

Articles about Discrimination-Islamophobia 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 0

2

4

6

8

El Mundo

10 El Pais

12

14

16

18

ABC

Chart 5.12.

neglected in 2005 and 2006, a period in which these questions were particularly prominent on the Spanish scene. Instead, Chart 5.14 demonstrates that the daily principally focused attention on the cultural aspects of Islam. Also, Charts 5.15 and 5.16 reveal that the religious dimension and the general aspects of the Spanish Muslim community were referred to more frequently after 2004, though their increase was less sharp. During 2004, El Mundo paid special attention to the issues of immigration and anti-Muslim discrimination. The news that the March 11 terrorist attacks had been committed by Moroccan Muslim immigrants triggered a wave of anti-Muslim

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Articles about Immigration 2006 2005 2004 2003 El Mundo 2002 El Pais

2001

ABC

2000 1999 1998 1997 0

5

10

15

20

25

Chart 5.13.

Chart 5.14.

sentiment, and favored a further problematization of the issue of immigration. As described above, El Mundo did make efforts to avoid the stigmatization of Islam. Regarding immigration, it argued in favor of respect for cultural and religious diversity, in a democratic and pluralistic context. Yet unlike El País, El Mundo positioned itself against the Alliance of Civilizations, which it considered as a

5.3 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006)

167

Chart 5.15.

Chart 5.16.

“chimera” that ignored the threat of terrorism and the vices of theocracy, societal backwardness and the systematic human rights violations taking place in the Muslim world.571

571 Casimiro García-Abadil, “Crónica de la semana,” El Mundo, July 18, 2005, 16; Fernando Peregrin, “La Alianza de Religiones,” El Mundo, December 2, 2006, 34.

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At the same time, Eugenio Trias, a member of the Editorial Board of El Mundo, criticized Prime Minister Aznar for abandoning the political center and shifting dangerously to the right through his involvement in the global fight against the “Axis of Evil.” The paper also criticized the political manipulation of the term “terrorism”: “Terrorism is, in the mind of the national or foreign extreme right, a broad, generous word, impossible to subdue and differentiate. Terrorism is everything that opposes by violent means the aggressive military policies that this extreme right in power usually favors. Armed opposition to an iniquitous invasion of Iraq is terrorism.”572 Although the newspaper considered terrorism a real and actual threat, it sought to avoid the automatic association between this term and Islam: “We keep identifying rational or irrational hate with cannibals who came from exotic countries to annoy us or to devour one another. Things coming from black Hutus and Tutsis, from Sunni and Shia Moors, from brainless illiterates.”573 But, noted the article, there are also Protestants and Catholics, Basques and Irish, rich and poor who are terrorists.574 From El Mundo’s point of view, there was a clash of civilizations between the West and radical versions of Islam, yet this struggle should not be dealt by military but rather by cultural and political means. The newspaper pointed to the existence of liberal and moderate trends in the Muslim world, and emphasized the need to reinforce them.575 This perspective prompted it to draw the Spanish public’s attention to some personalities of the Muslim world who succeeded in combining Islam with the defense of liberal, democratic, and even feminist values.576 572 Eugenio Trias, “Tribuna Libre. La pérdida del centro,” El Mundo, March 31, 2004, 4–5: “Terrorismo es, en la mente de la extrema derecha nacional o foránea, una palabra ancha, generosa, imposible de matizar y de diferenciar. Terrorismo es todo lo que se opone con medios violentos a la política bélica agresiva que esa extrema derecha en el poder suele propiciar. La oposición armada a una inicua invasión a Irak, eso es terrorismo.” 573 Carlos Boyero, “El Voyeur. El infierno es el vecino,” El Mundo, July 15, 2005, 60: “Seguimos identificando el odio racional o irracional con caníbales venidos de países exóticos para jodernos la existencia o que se devoran entre ellos. Cosas de negros hutus y tutsis, de moros suníes y chiíes, de analfabetos descerebrados.” 574 Boyero, “El Voyeur. El infierno es el vecino”. 575 See, for instance, Antonio Gala, “La Tronera. A vueltas con lo mismo,” El Mundo, August 18, 2005, 3. 576 David Jiménez, “El mundo que viene/ Anwar Ibrahim,” El Mundo, October 8, 2005, 8–9; Pablo Pardo, “El mundo que viene/ Azar Nafisi,” El Mundo, October 15, 2005, 8–9; Tim Reid, “De portavoz talibán a universitario en Yale,” El Mundo, March 6, 2006, 23; Rosa Meneses, “El zoo del siglo XXI/ Amr Jaled,” El Mundo, May 10, 2006, 64 and 26; and “Diplomacia/Del 11-M en la ONU a Dublín. ¿Primera musulmana diplomática?,” El Mundo, July 2, 2006, 12.

5.3 The Construction of Muslims in Spanish Newspapers (1997–2006)

169

From the daily’s perspective, Islam was not different from other religions in terms of its integration into the Western model of democracy. Every religious establishment had historically struggled against the values of the Enlightenment, but in the end they had accommodated themselves to the hegemony of political liberalism. In the European case, El Mundo backed up the argument that Islam can be as European as Christianity, if it is given the chance: “with the passage of (not much) time, Muslim Europeans will be like Catholic Europeans or Protestant Europeans. That is: Europeans.”577 Regarding the debate between “integration and tolerance,” (fueled by the discussions over the use of the veil in public spaces) the model for Europe –according to El Mundo– should be the United States, where “schools allow the presence of every religious symbol.”578 In May 2005, an article significantly titled “The new Europe under the veil” described the lives of five adolescent Muslim girls living in Spain. A series of interviews gave voice to the feelings and experiences of the young girls, whose faith in Islam and decision to use the veil were not perceived as impediments to the adoption of a European identity. On the contrary, according to the daily, “the new Europeans are girls like Batul and Rifkat.”579 El Mundo combined these tolerant attitudes with the unequivocal rejection of some features of the Muslim world which it perceived as authoritarian, fundamentalist and archaic. For instance, an article dedicated to the critical assessment of Islamist fundamentalism, argued that “while in Copenhagen the third millennium begins to shine, in Mecca they are just leaving the Middle Ages.”580 In a similar vein, in April 2005 an editorial was titled “Mohamed VI, a medieval king.”581 The fact that the Moroccan king Mohamed VI pardoned more than seven thousand prisoners to celebrate the circumcision of his son was harshly criticized in this article: “the fact that the vicissitudes of the private

577 Juan Antonio Rodriguez Tous, “Prisma. Otra vez Anglada,” El Mundo, October 30, 2002, 4: “Con el pasar del tiempo (no mucho), los musulmanes europeos serían como los católicos europeos o los protestantes europeos. Esto es: europeos.” 578 María Ramírez, “La nueva Europa bajo el velo,” El Mundo, May 28, 2005, section Yo Dona, 40–45. 579 Ramírez, “La nueva Europa bajo el velo”. 580 David Torres, “Y yo con estos pelos. Hamás de los hamases,” El Mundo, Febrero 4, 2006, 2: “mientras en Copenhague empieza a alumbrar el tercer milenio, en La Meca apenas acaban de salir de la Edad Media.” 581 “Mohamed VI, un rey medieval,” El Mundo, April 16, 2005, 3.

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life of a king could change the sentences is fitting for a medieval world and something impossible to accept in democratic countries.”582 El Mundo did not believe in cultural relativism, but rather in the supremacy of Western democracy and economic liberalism. What it was really interested in was the construction of an open and efficient Spanish society, with an increasing economic, political and cultural global influence. That is why religion and culture remained secondary issues as far as they could be relegated to the private sphere and did not challenge democratic values. This is probably why as shown in Charts 5.12 and 5.13, the problematic issues of discrimination and immigration were relatively neglected by the newspaper during the years 2005– 2006. It seems that the complex issues raised in Spain during those years, like the place of Catholicism in Spanish identity, the frictions between Spaniards and the immigrant newcomers, and the historical roots of anti-Muslim discrimination had mostly been pushed aside. The emphasis was placed more on the need to promote democracy and guarantee friendly relations with the Muslim world. The message was clear: we might not like them, but for strategic and economic reasons, we should preserve friendly relations with the Muslim world. In June 2004, an article by the French intellectual Max Gallo made an argument in this vein: “The United States fights like us against terrorism, but the methods they use favor its expansion. And now the Europeans are in the frontline of fire of the Muslim world, which is much more present on European soil (probably 10% of the French population). However, our geopolitical interest is not conflict, but non-aggression, economic leadership and exchange.”583 Similarly, a piece by Augusto Zamora (a professor of International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) on the common interests between Russia and Europe pointed out that: The strengthening of world peace and security is another fundamental field of confluence, as manifested during the war against Iraq. The convergence of France, Germany and Russia was a decisive factor in the political defeat of the Bush government and the

582 “Mohamed VI, un rey medieval”: “Que los avatares de la vida privada de un rey puedan cambiar las sentencias y las penas es propio de un mundo feudal y algo imposible de aceptar en países democráticos.” 583 Max Gallo, “60 aniversario del día D/ Europa frente a Estados Unidos,” El Mundo, June 6, 2004, 28: “EEUU lucha como nosotros contra el terrorismo, pero los métodos que utiliza favorecen su expansión. Y ahora los europeos estamos en primera línea de fuego frente al mundo musulmán, que está mucho más presente en suelo europeo (probablemente el 10% de la población francesa). Y sin embargo, nuestro interés geopolítico no es el conflicto, sino la no agresión, el liderazgo económico y los intercambios.”

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de-legitimization of that barbaric aggression that turned into a disaster. Even in egoistic terms, the EU needs to promote that alliance. For Europe, that receives 40% of its oil from the Middle East, it is indispensable to preserve the peace in the region, mostly because its dependence on Muslim oil will continue to rise, as signaled by the EU itself”.584

For El Mundo the Muslim countries represent to an important extent an extreme version of some undesirable religious and traditional trends which are also present in Spain. On the other hand, the success of Spain’s transition from a traditional national-Catholic régime to liberal democracy proves the feasibility of a similar change in the context of both foreign and local Islam in the foreseeable future. In the end, what really seems to matter for the editors is that we all find a way of living and prospering together in peace, without giving too much thought to structural differences and past grievances.

5.4 Concluding Remarks Following the terrorist attacks of September11, 2001, in the US and March 11, 2004, in Madrid, Muslims gained increased mentions in the Spanish press. As exposed in Charts 5.17, 5.13 and 5.7, the issue of terrorism became particularly prominent, together with the topics of immigration and religion. As indicated elsewhere, the mere fact that problematic or negative issues are rife in the press treatment of Islam contributes to the formation of an unfavorable image of this social group.585 The three main Spanish newspapers approached these issues differently, according to their ideological perspectives and interests. El País and El Mundo showed a greater willingness than ABC to acknowledge and amplify the many voices of Islam. Yet all three newspapers mostly avoided dealing with the

584 Augusto Zamora, “Tribuna libre. La confluencia de intereses entre Rusia y Europa,” El Mundo, September 30, 2006, 4–5: “El fortalecimiento de la seguridad y la paz mundiales es otro campo fundamental de coincidencias, como se puso de manifiesto a raíz de la guerra contra Irak. La convergencia de Francia, Alemania y Rusia fue un factor decisivo en la derrota política del Gobierno de Bush y en la no legitimación de aquella bárbara agresión, convertida en desastre. Incluso en términos egoístas, la UE necesita promover esa alianza. Para Europa, que recibe 40% de su petróleo de Oriente Medio, es imprescindible mantener la región en paz, sobre todo porque su dependencia del petróleo musulmán seguirá aumentando, como lo ha señalado la propia UE.” 585 Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, La Imagen del Mundo Árabe y Musulmán en la Prensa Española (Sevilla: Fundación Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2010), 146.

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Articles about Terrorism 2006 2005 2004 2003 El Mundo 2002 El Pais ABC

2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 0

10

20

30

40

50

Chart 5.17.

structural bases of North-South relationships, which have historically constructed racism, orientalism, and today’s neocolonialism.586 Moroccan immigrants are indeed a reminder that the same global structures that secure for the Spaniards their privileged status as Europeans condemns to exclusion and poverty the inhabitants of the world’s South. On Spanish soil, the duality between the full rights granted to Spanish citizens and the often instrumental, and sometimes even dehumanizing treatment of immigrants concretizes even more global asymmetries: “The immigrant carries the stigma of having born badly, at the wrong moment, on the bad side of geography.”587 There is, however, a significant difference between the Spaniards, the English and the French. The first know by experience how it feels to live on the “bad side” of geography. Over a period of decades they have accepted in the rich European North the most unrewarding, harsh and socially despised jobs, as their inferior status was legitimized by an array of negative preconceptions and

586 Teun A. Van Dijk argues that Spanish press both contributes to the dissemination of racism in the society at large and denies its existence in the mass media. See Van Dijk, “El racismo y la prensa en España,” 71–74. 587 De Lucas, “Ciudadanía: La jaula de hierro para la integración de los inmigrantes,” 223: “El inmigrante arrastra el estigma de haber nacido mal, a destiempo, en el lado malo de la geografía.”

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stereotypes. They know how it feels, how it hurts. They also know that there is something in their faces, in the color of their skin, and in their customs, that will preserve forever their otherness compared to “true” Europeans.588 Around 2008, the pendulum begun to swing the other way. The deep economic crisis, rampant unemployment and consequent social unrest have blown apart the Spanish dream of eternal European prosperity. The French media, for example, have been enjoying this “return to normality,” re-Orientalizing Spain by commenting ironically on its people’s allegedly spurious (drug-induced) achievements in sports and by celebrating a movie portraying Spanish characters as belonging to an “exuberant” and “folkloric” world filled with “simple pleasures.”589 The Spanish artist Aleix Saló put it bluntly in a cartoon describing the housing crisis of 2008: “. . . we discovered, suddenly, that we were poor. And what is worse, that we had never ceased being such. And that maybe this is not Spain anymore, but Españistán.”590

588 According to Kitty Calavita, “immigration exposes, and is implicated with, the contradictions inherent in late modernity, and in the process reveals the similarities among immigrants and the vast number of others who are dislocated and under siege.” Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins, 164. 589 See “La embajada en París se queja a Canal Plus Francia,” elpais.com, February 9, 2012. Available at: http://deportes.elpais.com/deportes/2012/02/09/actualidad/1328775728_850215. html (accessed March 14, 2012); and the review of the film Les femmes du sixième étage by Philipe Le Guay (2010) in the French reference site AlloCiné: http://www.allocine.fr/film/fiche film_gen_cfilm=133404.html (accessed March 14, 2012). 590 See Saló’s blog dedicated to his book Españistán: http://estepaissevaalamierda.word press.com/ (accessed March 14, 2012): “. . .y descubrimos, de pronto, que éramos pobres. Y lo que es peor, que nunca habíamos dejado de serlo. Y que quizá esto ya no era España, sino Españistán.”

6 Final Conclusions By the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, religious difference had acquired in Spain a certain malleability. Empathy and appreciation were often incorporated into official policies and public discourse dealing with Jews and Muslims. Leaders from across the political spectrum explicitly considered pluralism and respect for difference as core values in the construction of a democratic Spanish identity, as overtly xenophobic and discriminatory ideologies were mostly marginalized. Yet this book has also shown the tenacity of negative conceptualizations of religious difference whose roots go deep into history. In the case of Muslims, these prejudices resurfaced massively following immigration waves towards the end of the 1990s, when many North Africans came to Spain to fill the role of a cheap labor force. The contrast between the negative perceptions of lowskilled workers whose contribution to the growth of the country’s economy was acknowledged by many, and the positive attitudes toward the mostly middleclass residents of Arab origin who had arrived in Spain as students one or two decades before, and were absorbed successfully into the local social fabric, are very telling. Clearly, the numeric difference between the relatively few young immigrants from Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and other parts of the ArabMuslim world who went to Spain to study between the 1970s and the 1990s and decided to stay, and the more massive cohorts of immigrant workers that arrived from the end of the 1990s are significant, and may to some extent explain the change in the Spaniards’ attitudes. Yet the economic factor is also important, and should not be underestimated. There is a strong line of continuity between the perceptions of Muslims prevalent at the birth of the Spanish empire, which according to Anibal Quijano laid the basis for the global structures of coloniality still prevalent in today’s world, and those widespread in today’s Spain.591 Although in-depth analysis of the place of both Muslims and Jews in the Spanish colonial system must be left for further research, it is possibly to identify some important elements of continuity. As mentioned earlier, the theological justification for the establishment of blood purity statutes against Muslims in early modernity was that they were considered descendants of Hagar the slave, and therefore seen as a “bastard lineage, slave, unworthy of ruling or filling important positions.”592 This early

591 Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Euroecentrism and Latin America.” 592 Stallaert, Etnogénesis y etnicidad en España, 34–35. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-006

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“racializing” of religious difference that initially took place in the Iberian Peninsula acquired a global magnitude with the utilization of the figure of Santiago Matamoros (Saint James “the Moor-Killer”) as a “rallying and attacking cry” in the conquest of the American continent, and the incorporation of the blood purity statutes into the legal system of the Spanish colonies.593 This development had far-reaching consequences, since the conceptualization of the colonial populations as inherently inferior and unworthy of ruling even themselves lies the very core of global structures of coloniality. During the period under study, Muslim otherness had two main dimensions: the complementarity between their legal marginalization as immigrants and their incorporation into the economic system as underpaid laborers, on the one hand, and their construction as internal and external enemies, on the other. If in the first case otherization legitimized both their economic exploitation and the denial of rights as citizens, in the second it conveniently contributed to developing a sense of a “civilizing” mission that immediately translated into territorial invasions of “uncivilized” lands. When none of those functions were necessary, as in cases of the “Spanish-Arab friendship” or building projects in Spain by wealthy Arab elites, Muslims lost their “color” and became “white”. Just as by the end of the eighteenth century mestizos in the Spanish colonies could be officially considered as “white” by paying a tax (Gracias al sacar), Muslim otherness can also be neutralized when doing so leads to political, economical and cultural rewards. In the case of Jews, the central role they have historically played in the construction of Spanish national identity and their small numeric presence in contemporary Spain make their difference more conceptual than practical. Unlike Muslims, Jews – even those coming from North Africa – are not “colored” in contemporary Spain. They are not assigned attributes of “racial” inferiority to justify economic exploitation and/or political paternalism. Instead, Jewish otherness is related to deeply rooted notions of extraordinary power and moral purity/impurity. As stated, Imperial Spain saw itself as replacing the Jews as God’s chosen people, and the “cleansing” of their land from any Jewish presence was considered by the Spaniards as evidence of this divine replacement. Thus the struggle for “racial-spiritual” purity played a key role in the consolidation of Spanish nationalism.594 In this context, demonization of the Jew became the mirror

593 Álvarez Junco, Mater dolorosa, 43. 594 Kaplan, “Jews and Judaism in the Political and Social Thought of Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century,” 1988.

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against which the notion of Spanish righteousness was historically erected. In the contemporary setting, this conceptual mechanism remains active across the Spanish political spectrum, as it serves to establish a sense of moral superiority and legitimize the many privileges enjoyed by Spaniards in today’s globalized world. A strong continuity can also be detected in the association of the Jews with forces which, although often considered as demonic, are also the source of power and prosperity. This tendency, observable throughout Spanish history, is at work in contemporary Spain in the perception of Jews as the dominant force in the financial world, the government of the United States, the mass media, and countless other conspiracy theories. Sometimes, the negative conceptualization of this extraordinary power attributed to the Jews is inverted and transformed into an incentive to befriend them. The Spanish case shows how in late modernity the symbolic and material roles attributed to both Muslims and Jews remain intrinsically linked to global structures of coloniality. Moreover, just as the imposition of the blood purity statutes in the Iberian Peninsula inaugurated a process of “racialization” that changed the face of the globe, in today’s world Muslim difference is still often constructed as a justification for economic exploitation, political paternalism and military intervention. No less importantly, demonized or idealized images of a “Jew” that often surpass any religious or “racial” definition are also a remnant of the imperial period. In the contemporary setting, as in the past, these images are often used in the context of power politics or claims of Spanish moral superiority, playing a key role both in the struggle for cultural hegemony and the pursuit of economic, political and military supremacy.

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Index Acosta, José 100 Aguilar, Paloma 30n106, 30n107, 30n108, 134n484, 134n485, 134n486 Aguirre, Esperanza 20, 21, 21n63, 21n64, 21n66, 25n82 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 114 Algora Weber, María Dolores 54, 55n199, 55n200, 130n468, 135, 135n490 Álvarez Junco, José 10, 10n25, 11n26, 13n32, 30n109, 37, 38, 38n145, 38n146, 38n147, 86n321, 175n593 Amestoy, Ignacio 164, 164n568 Aragon, Ferdinand II of 1, 30, 40, 55, 69, 75 Archbishop of Madrid 10 Arens, Moshe 47 Armada, Alfonso 152, 152n542, 152n543, 152n544 Armstrong, Karen 163, 163n567 Astor, Avi 5, 5n14, 131n470, 131n472 Aznar, José María 21, 25, 30, 31, 31n112, 32, 32n113, 32n114, 32n115, 33, 33n117, 33n118, 33n119, 33n120, 33n121, 34, 34n122, 34n123, 34n124, 36, 38, 61, 62, 62n223, 64, 65, 67, 94, 95, 106, 110, 110n397, 139, 141, 142, 142n510, 142n512, 146, 168 Baer, Alejandro 6, 49, 49n179, 50n180, 77n281, 83n306, 83n307, 84, 84n311, 85n318, 86, 86n319, 86n320, 88, 88n332, 89n333, 91, 91n341, 97n356, 100n363, 100n365, 108n389, 108n390, 109n394, 112n406 Balfour, Sebastian 4n9, 10n24, 18, 18n55, 22n70, 25, 25n83, 25n84, 28, 28n96, 29n100, 31n110, 31n111, 32n116, 37n142, 53n191 Barranco, Juan 100 Bastenier, M. A. 146, 147, 147n528 Benaissa, Mohamed 145, 146n526 Benedict XVI 33 Bin Laden, Osama 65, 94n346, 99n362, 140n506, 141, 142 Blair, Tony 32 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110642148-008

Blanco, Alda 11, 11n27 Blanco, José 51 Boix, Carles 145n525, 146, 146n527 Borbón, Felipe de 75 Brunner, José 86n321, 115, 115n413, 115n414 Bush, George W. 32, 62, 102n369, 106, 108, 109n395, 110, 140, 146, 170, 171n584 Bustelo, Francisco 143, 143n516, 144n517 Camon, Ferdinando 98 Castelar, Emilio 11, 11n26 Castile, Isabella I of 43, 55 Castiñeira, Ángel 28 Castro, Américo 15n43, 16 Castro, Fidel 113 Castro y Rossi, Adolfo 12, 13n32 Chappell, Louise 148, 149, 149n533 Cohen, Yaacov 44n156, 94, 94n345 Columbus, Christopher 1, 29 Cutanda, Grian 161 De la Serna, Alfonso 151, 151n539, 151n540, 151n541 Del Valle Lorenci, Fernando 158, 158n559 DellaPergola, Sergio 72n260 Díaz, Fernán 69 Díaz Lema, José Manuel 155, 155n552, 156, 156n553, 157, 157n555 Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio 17n50, 18, 18n52, 18n53 Elorza, Antonio 92n342, 138n499, 138n500, 138n501, 139n503, 142, 142n510, 142n511, 143n514, 145n525 Escudero, Mansur 25, 26, 54, 65, 121, 123, 123n441, 124, 128 Fernández Ordóñez, Francisco 46 Flesler, Daniela 5, 5n12, 76n278, 120n427, 120n429, 132, 132n479, 132n481, 135n492, 136, 136n494 Franco, Francisco 2, 8, 14, 19, 20, 27, 27n95, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 53, 53n189,

188

Index

53n190, 53n192, 54, 54n197, 55, 57, 63, 72, 73, 78, 83, 83n307, 84, 84n312, 86, 90, 101, 101n367, 115, 116, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 142n512, 144, 156 Freud, Sigmund 115, 132 Fusi, Juan Pablo 4n9, 132n481, 133, 133n483 Gallo, Max 170, 170n583 García de Cortázar y Ruiz de Aguirre, José Ángel 15, 15n41, 15n42, 16n44, 16n46 García Gasco, Agustín 123 García Gómez, Emilio 57, 57n207 García Hierro, Dolores 100 Gil Delgado, Francisco 102, 102n371, 126n452 Gómez, Luis 136, 137n497 González, Felipe 25, 41, 61, 63, 90, 123 Goode, Joshua 5, 5n15, 128, 128n462 Gramsci, Antonio 58, 58n210, 59, 59n211 Grebler, David 76 Grossman, David 72n260, 91, 91n339 Guichard, Pierre 15

Joan i Tous, Pere 6, 83n306, 101n367 John Paul II 33, 148, 153 Jordan, Abdullah of 55 Kaplan, Yosef 71 Kennedy, Paul 91, 91n340 Kleiner-Liebau, Désirée 4n9, 156, 156n554 Langmuir, Gavin 71 Lanzmann, Claude 85 Lassalle, José María 107, 107n386, 107n387, 108n388 Lezcano, Mercedes 98, 98n359 López Alonso, Carmen 47, 48n172, 71n256, 71n257, 90, 91n338 Luca de Tena, Torcuato 103, 103n374

Iranzo, Álvaro 64, 66 Israel Garzón, Jacobo vii, 6, 9n22, 10, 10n23, 16n47, 19n58, 23n75, 27n92, 44n157, 72, 72n261, 73n264, 74, 74n269, 74n272, 77, 78, 78n286, 78n288, 83n306, 86, 86n322, 115 Israel, Sandra 74

Machimbarrena, Juan 2 Macías, Uriel vii, 77, 77n283, 77n284, 78, 78n288 Mañueco, Gabriel 46 Marías, Julián 34, 34n126, 34n127, 34n128, 34n129, 35, 35n130, 35n131, 35n132, 35n133, 35n134, 38, 39 Marquina, Antonio 47, 47n170, 61n220, 61n221 Martín Corrales, Eloy 129n465, 129n466, 130, 130n467, 130n469, 132n478, 136n493 Martin-Márquez, Susan 5, 5n13, 18n55, 133n482 Menéndez del Valle, Emilio 138n501, 143, 143n514, 143n515 Menéndez Pida, Ramón 16 Mirapeix, Eudaldo 43, 43n155, 47n168, 49, 49n177, 49n178, 64 Moratinos, Miguel Ángel 46, 46n167, 48n174, 87 Mosaddegh, Mohammad 143 Múgica Herzog, Enrique 111, 112 Mussolini, Benito 42, 84

Jiménez, David 112n404, 113n408, 125n447, 125n448, 168n576

Navarro Valls, Joaquín 149 Navarro-Valls, Rafael 109, 110n396

Harel, Víctor 42n151, 47, 47n168, 47n169, 48, 49, 49n176, 50, 51, 51n181 Hdez. Velasco, Irene 164n569 Henelde Abecasis, Rhoda vii, 73n265, 73n266, 79, 79n292, 79n293 Hernando de Larramendi, Miguel 55n201, 57, 57n205, 58n208, 58n209 Herzog, Haim 47 Hitler, Adolf 42, 84, 94n346, 116 Humlebæk, Carsten 30n106, 30n107, 30n108, 134n484, 134n485, 134n486

Index

Noya, Javier 67, 68n243 Oz, Amos 91, 91n339 Palafox Jordi 4n9, 132n481, 133, 133n483 Pérez, Abu Ahmad Ibrahim Miguel Ángel 124, 124n445 Pérez Benlloch, J.J. 136, 136n496 Pérez Garzón, Juan Sisinio vii, 8n20, 9, 9n22, 10, 10n23, 13n34, 14n36, 16n47, 18, 19n56, 19n58, 20n60 Pérez-Nievas Heredero, José Antonio 110 Phillip II 115 Pinto, Diana 85, 85n316, 85n317 Poliakov, Léon 103n377 Prada, Juan Manuel de 107n385, 108n389, 157, 157n557 Prado, Abdennur 124, 124n444, 126, 127n453 Primo de Rivera, Miguel 133 Primo Jurado, Juan José 162n566 Pulido Fernández, Ángel 101, 101n367 Quijano, Anibal 1n3, 134, 134n487, 174, 174n591 Quiroga, Alejandro 4n9, 10n24, 18, 18n55, 22n70, 25, 25n83, 25n84, 28, 28n96, 29n100, 31n110, 32n116, 37n142 Rabin, Yitzhak 48, 51 Ramírez, María 109n395, 169n578, 169n579 Rein, Raanan vii, 4n9, 41n148, 41n149, 42n151, 43n155, 45n163, 45n164, 46n165, 47n170, 48n174, 54n198, 65n237, 66n240, 71n256, 78n288, 101n367, 120n427, 122n436 Reza Pahlavi, Mohammad 143 Rodríguez Carballo, José 103 Rodríguez Jiménez, José Luis 6 Rodriguez Tous, Juan Antonio 169n577 Rodríguez Zapatero, José Luis 25, 26, 51, 62, 62n223, 63, 64, 67, 77, 99, 106, 106n384, 107n386, 112, 122, 123,

189

123n440, 138n501, 142, 142n512, 157n556, 158, 159, 159n561, 162, 162n566 Rueda, Ana vii, 5, 5n12, 84n311, 120n427, 127n454 Saad, Zaki 112, 112n407 Saló, Aleix 173 Sampson, Edward 29, 30n105 Sánchez-Albornoz, Claudio 15, 15n43, 34, 34n125, 35, 35n135, 35n136, 36, 36n137, 36n138, 36n139, 36n140, 38 Santaolalla, Isabel 120 Saramago, José 97, 98n357 Sharon, Ariel 91 Spain, Juan Carlos I of 43, 131, 134 Spain, Sofía of 43 Stallaert, Christiane 2, 2n6, 2n7, 3n8, 4, 14n35, 82n299, 103n377, 128, 128n458, 128n460, 128n461, 129n463, 129n464, 174n592 Stein, Edith 103, 103n374 Suárez, Adolfo 17n51, 18n52, 56 Toro, Alfonso de 79 Torres, David 102n370, 109n392, 113n408, 169n580 Trias, Eugenio 168, 168n572 Valdeón Baruque, Julio 16, 16n45 Varela, Rouco 161 Vega-Durán, Raquel 5, 5n12 Volkov, Shulamit 12, 12n31 Weizman, Ezer 47 Zamora, Augusto 170, 171n584 Zarzalejos, José Antonio 99, 99n361, 108n389 Zukier, Henri 115, 115n412, 116, 116n415, 131, 131n473