Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R: Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1921-1930 0910512094, 9780910512091

Table of contents :
U. S. S. R.
Contents
Preface
1 The Dairen Conference
2 The Changchun Conference
3 The Gotö-Ioffe Talks
4 The Ioffe-Kawakami Talks
5 The Karakhan-Yoshizawa Talks
6 The Basic Convention
7 Exchange of Official Representatives
8 Concession Contracts
9 Fishery Talks
10 The Fishery Convention
11 Expanding Contacts
12 Lingering Mistrust
Epilogue
Appendix
Source Notes
chapter one: The Dairen Conference
chapter two: The Changchun Conference
chapter three: The Gotö-Ioffe Talks
chapter FOUR: The Iofle-Kawakami Talks
chapter FIVE: The Karakhan-Yoshizawa Talks
chapter six: The Basic Convention
CHAPTER SEVEN: Exchange of Official Representatives
CHAPTER eight: Concession Contracts
chapter ten: The Fishery Convention
chapter eleven: Expanding Contacts
CHAPTER twelve: Lingering Mistrust
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

LENSEN Japanese Recognition o f the U . S. S. R

O T H E R BO O KS B Y G EO R G E A LE X A N D E R LEN SEN

Reportfrom Hokkaido: The Remains o f Russian Culture in Northern Japan Russians Japan Expedition o f 1852 to 185$ The Russian Push Toward Japan; Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875 The W orld Beyond Europe: A n Introduction to the History o f A frica, India, Southeast A sia, and the Far East Russia’s Eastward Expansion (edited) Revelations o f a Russian Diplomat: the Memoirs o f Dmitrii l. Abrikossow (edited) Korea and Manchuria Between Russia and Japan 1895-1904: The Observations o f Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister to Japan and China (edited) The Soviet Union: A n Introduction The d’Anetban Dispatches From Japan, 1894-1910. The Observations o f Baron Albert d’Anetban, Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary and Derm o f the Diplomatic Carp (tn n tta k n end edited) The Russo-Cbinese W ar Trading under Sail o ff Japan, 1860-99. The Recollections o f Captain John Baxter W ill, Sailing-Master and Pilot (edited) Faces o f Japan: A Photographic Study Russian Diplomatic and Consular Officials in East Asia. A Handbook (compiled) Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Officials in Russia. A Handbook (compiled)

Yoshizawa and Karakhan at Peking.

Japanese Recognition of the U. S. S. R. Soviet-Japanese Relations 1921-1930

GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN

SOPHIA UNIVERSITY • TOKYO IN COOPERATION WITH

THE DIPLOMATIC PRESS TALLAHASSEE • FLORIDA

PUBLISHED BY S O P H IA U N IV E R S IT Y 7, KIOI-CHÖ, CHIYODA-KU TOKYO IN COOPERATION WITH T H E D IP L O M A T IC P R E SS, I N C 110 2 BETTON ROAD TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA Copyright in Japan 1970, b y Sophia University, all rights reserved Library o f Congress Catalog Card No. 70-95263 IS B N 910512-09-4

PRINTED INJAPAN THE VOYAGERS’ PRESS, TOKYO

To the memory o f IV E Y M O U T H

TYREE

JORDAN

friend\ colleague, and distinguished historian

Contents Preface

I

Cluster One: T h e Dairen Conference

5

d u fter Two: T h e Changchun Conference

49

d u fter Three: T h e Gotö-Ioffe T alks

85

Chapter Four: T h e Ioffe-Kawakami T alk s

127

d u fter Five: T h e Karakhan Yoshizawa T alks

141

Chapter Six: T h e B ask Convention

177

Chapter Seven: Exchange o f Official Representatives

203

Chapter Eight: Concession Contracts

227

Chapter Nine: Fishery T alks

241

Chapter Ten: T h e Fishery Convention

271

Chapter Eleven: Expanding Contacts

317

Chapter Twelve: Lingering M istrust

343

Epilogue

363

Appendix

375

Source N otes

385

Bibliography

403

Index

409

Pf

Kind no teb wa Kyd no tom .

(Yesterday’ s enemies [are] today’ s friends.) — from a Japanese song, popular after the Russo-Japanese War.

N ot one state, after recognizing our governm ent, was so friendly in its expressions toward us as the Japanese one. Satö [the Japanese chargé d’affaires] in his meetings w ith me is the very em bodim ent o f friendliness. Your reports about the receptions at the crown p rin ce, the empress dowager and the like also point to a strikingly, even exceptionally strikingly, underlined friendliness. W hat is the m eaning o f this? T h a t is w hat one m ust decipher. W hat do they expect? D o they w ant territory for im m igration, do they w ant concessions, o r do they w ant a safe rear for the com ing w ar w ith the U nited States? — from a letter o f Foreign Commissar Chicherin to Ambassador Kopp in T okyo, dated June 23, 1925.

Preface h e

Soviet Union is Japan’ s closest neighbor. O n a clear day

Russian-held islands can be seen from Hokkaido w ith the naked eye. Soviet waters abound in marine life coveted b y Japanese fishermen and the vast resources o f Siberia beckon Japanese industrialists. Prior to the Pacific W ar Japan had im portant concessions in the Soviet Far E ast; these she lost in 1945. Since the reestablishment o f diplom atic relations w ith the U .S.S.R. in 1956, Japan has tried to restore economic cooperation w ith the latter. T h e unprecedented growth o f the Japanese econom y has revived hopes in T o k yo and M oscow for renewed Japanese participation in the developm ent o f Siberia. There is litd e debate whether such cooperation is desirable, m erely on w hat terms it could be accom­ plished. T w o basic questions occupy Japanese and Soviet negotiators: (1 ) Can a satisfactory profit sharing arrangement be worked out between private Japanese companies and the Soviet state? and (2) W hat con­ stitutes a fair ratio o f investm ent on the part o f the tw o sides in the exploitation o f a given concession? T h e defeat o f Japan has turned bade the clock o f history to the third quarter o f the nineteenth century in the sense that the possession o f some o f the Kuril Islands is once more in dispute, at least from the Japanese point o f view . It is to the 1920’s, however, that w e m ust turn for historical precedents for the economic and political questions now under discussion. Y e t little has been w ritten on the history o f SovietJapanese relations from 1922 to 1930. Inexplicably A . N . Heifèts’ s detailed study o f Soviet diplom acy and the peoples o f the East from 1921 to

2

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

1927, published under the auspices o f the Academ y o f Sciences o f the U .S.S.R . in 1968, ignores this topic. It was m y intention originally to cover this period more briefly as part o f a general history o f Soviet-Japanese relations. But the more I delved into the documents o f the tim e, the more I was reminded o f points which I had discussed w ith Japanese and Russian diplomats in T o kyo in 1968 in an attem pt to assess the state o f contem porary Soviet-Japanese relations. T h e arguments which Ambassador O leg Aleksandrovich Troianovskii adduced in a speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ C lub in M ay o f 1968 to show how Japan, which had recently m oved to first place among capitalist countries in trade volum e w ith the U .S.S.R ., could profit b y closer economic ties w ith the Soviet Union were identical w ith those advanced b y his father, Ambassador Aleksandr Antonovich Troianovskii, forty years earlier. For example, in 1928 Troianovskii Sr. asserted that the Soviet Union constituted “ the m ost solid and reliable buyer and payer” ; in 1968 Troianovskii Jr. depicted the Soviet foreign trade organizations as “ reliable, dependable and honest partners w ith whom gpod business is possible.” In 1928 Troianovskii Sr. saw the key to successful economic relations in the avoidance o f ideological disputa­ tion: “ Don’ t touch on economic system s, talk as little as possible about principles and as much as possible about business.” In 1968 Troianovskii Jr. declared: “ O ne o f the reasons which contributed to the successful promotion o f our trade and economic relations was the fact that neither o f our countries has ever made these relations depend on any current political considerations.” I was struck also b y the sim ilarity o f questions that are bound to arise in connection w ith the recognition o f the Com ­ m unist regim e in Peking b y W ashington as w ell as T okyo. In the belief that a detailed reconstruction o f the negotiations leading to Japanese recognition o f the U .S.S.R ., the conclusion o f the various concession agreements, and the difficulties experienced in their execu­ tion w ill be o f more than academic interest today, I have w ritten this separate volum e, and have included the full text o f the major conventions and related correspondence in the body o f the work. I have given direct quotes (in m y own translation) particularly when dealing w ith telegram s,

PREFACE

3

letters and other documents not y e t published b y either side. (It m ay be o f interest to note parenthetically that w hile m y research has taken me both to the Soviet Union and to Japan, the texts o f m any o f the Russian dispatches— including those sent b y special courier— were found in Japanese archives.) W hatever one’s political convictions m ay be, it is sad to note that the tw o leading Soviet diplomats who served their country so w ell in the negotiations w ith Japan were to perish w ithin a few years in their fatherland— Ioffe b y his own hand, Karakhan b y the hand o f an ex­ ecutioner. T h is is the more intriguing if one recalls that Kawaji Toshiakira, the Japanese diplom at w ith whom V ice Adm iral Pudadn had concluded the very first treaty between Russia and Japan seventy years earlier, in 1855, also com m itted suicide— ironically upon learning that the T okugaw a forces had been defeated b y adherents o f the imperial regime w ith which Ioffe and Karakhan were to deal. I have followed traditional usage in giving Japanese surnames first; they are transliterated according to the new Kenkyüsha system . Russian names follow the Library o f Congress style. I acknowledge w ith thanks the support o f the Inter-U niversity Com ­ m ittee on T ravel Grants, which sponsored m y research in the Soviet Union, and o f the National Endowment for the Humanities, which awarded me a senior fellowship for research in Japan. I am grateful also to th e American Philosophical Society and to the Research Council o f the Florida State U niversity for providing me w ith fonds for the ac­ quisition o f source materials. Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to Professor Earl R . Beck, Dean Robert O . Lawton, and m y colleagues in the Departm ent o f H istory at the Florida State U niversity for m aking m y repeated research in Japan possible.

George Alexander Lensen Kyoto, June, 196g.

CHAPTER ONE

The Dairen Conference

T

h e r e is a thin line between love and hate. In the decade following

the Russo-Japanese W ar T sarist Russia and Japan abrupdy shed their hostility and became friends. It was a turnabout, reminiscent

in retrospect o f the dramatic reversal o f Japanese-American feelings after the Pacific W ar. In 1916 T sarist Russia and Japan launched a partnership that m ight have altered the entire course o f East Asian international relations. In desperate need o f supplies for her struggle w ith Germ any

and on the verge o f collapse at home, the T sarist governm ent purchased enormous quantities o f war materials and food from Japan; in fact, Japan sold to Russia all stocks o f ammunition not needed for her own defense and geared the entire output o f several governm ent arsenals and private factories to her demands. In the process Russia ran up a staggering debt to Japan, part o f which she m et by extensive economic concessions to the latter in the Russian Far East. T h e Com munist coup d*itat o f Novem ber 7 ,1 9 1 7 , gave a fetal blow to the Russo-Japanese alliance. Bolshevik cancellation in February o f 1918 o f the obligations and debts o f the Tsarist and Provisional governm ents, including the vast sums owed to Japan, were a serious violation o f Japanese interests; at the same tim e the tem porary prostration o f her m ighty neighbor was too great an opportunity for Japanese m ilitarists to ignore. Furnished b y the U nited States, G reat Britain and France with the pretext o f safeguarding m ilitary stores in Siberia from seizure by liberated German prisoners o f w ar and o f rescuing Czechoslovak soldiers stranded in Russia, the Japanese poured into the Russian Far East in April o f 1918 as participants in the Allied Intervention. Unlike the other A llies, they became involved in the C ivil W ar, supporting

6

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

and-Com m unist leaders in an attem pt to create a buffer state between their possessions and Soviet Russia. B itter clashes between Red partisans and Japanese troops occurred, and the passions o f hate once again over­ whelmed those o f love. Y e t w hile the Bolsheviks were dedicated to the overthrow o f capitalist governm ents everyw here, they wished to m odify rather than terminate their relations w ith the powers. A s early as December 1 , 1917— less than a month after the coup d’état and almost half a year before the landing o f Japanese troops— the People’s Commissariat o f Foreign Affairs ÇNarkomindeV) had approached the Japanese ambassador in Petrograd through T hird Secretary* Ueda Sentarö J i& fili& lp concerning the review o f all treaty relations between the tw o countries; it had proposed the con­ clusion o f a new commercial and economic agreement and o f a conven­ tion concerning the state o f affairs in the Far East and along the Pacific coast. Ambassador Uchida Yasuya

had agreed to convey the

m atter to T o k yo, but the imperial governm ent had made no reply. N or had Japan responded to a renewed proposal made b y D eputy Com ­ missar for Foreign Affairs L ev M ikhailovich Karakhan through Ueda in the spring o f 1918.1 T h e Japanese intervention did not still Soviet desires for an accomoda­ tion w ith Japan; on the contrary, it had made it the more urgent. In A pril o f 1919 the Far Eastern representative o f the Foreign Commissariat, V . D . Vilenskii-Sibiriakov, expressed his governm ent’s desire for negotiating an agreement w ith Japan to M atsudaira Tsuneo chief o f the civil affairs section o f the Vladivostok expeditionary force; again there was no response from the Japanese governm ent.2 In M ay o f the same • Leonid Kutakov, who bases his account on reference to the communication in a later note from Commissar Chicherin, dated February 24,1920, to the Japanese Foreign Office identifies Ueda (as did Chicherin) as consul; Tanaka Bunichirö notes in parentheses that he was secretary. Tanaka is correct. Neither Kutakov nor Tanaka give the full name o f Ueda or any name o f the ambassador. Such information in this and other instances was obtained from George Alexander Lensen (comp.), Japanese

Diplomatic and Consular Officials in Russia (Tokyo and Tallahassee: Sophia University in cooperation with the Diplomatic Press, 1968).

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE

7

year specific proposals for the regulation o f relations between the tw o countries were handed to Chargé d’Affaires ad interim M arum o Naotoshi at Vologda, where the A llied diplomats had moved from Petrograd in February o f 1918. There was no reply. Although the Soviets w ere prepared to recognize that Japan had special economic and com­ m ercial interests in the (Russian) Far East, Japan still had hopes o f greater gains b y direct m ilitary action or b y the support o f anti-com­ m unist forces.3 T h e Soviet commisar for foreign affairs, G eorgii Vasil’evich Chichcrin, w as a colorful figure. An old aristocrat and diplom at from T sarist tim es, fluent in three languages, and an able negotiator and talented politician, he had a broad outlook and seemed to desire a peaceful resolution o f the differences inherent in the Soviet and capitalist system s. In dealing w ith foreign diplom ats he showed great flexibility, the ability to maneuver and to find compromise formulas. O n February 24, 1920, he cabled to the Japanese ambassadors in France and Sweden that Soviet Russia wanted peace w ith Japan. H e assured them that his governm ent had no hostile intentions toward Japan and would not interfere in her dom estic affairs; it recognized Japan’ s preeminent economic and commercial interests in the (Russian) Far East.4 T h e Peoples o f Russia cherish no aggressive designs against Japan [Chicherin declared]. T h e Soviet governm ent has no intention ofinterfering in the internal affairs o f the Japanese people. It fully recognizes the special economic and commercial interests o f Japan in the [Russian] Far East, interests surpassing in several re­ spects those o f other countries. It is equally interested in con­ cluding an agreement on this subject which w ill be useful and beneficial to both parties. T h e Soviet governm ent wishes to establish a modut vivendi guaranteeing peace between Russia and Japan, and guaranteeing the reciprocal advantages to both countries which would result from the relations to be established between th em .. . . T h e People’s Commissariat therefore proposes to the Japanese

8

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. governm ent to engage in peace negotiations, in order to insure for the tw o peoples peaceful coexistence, friendly neighborly rela­ tions, and mutual satisfaction o f reciprocal interests.5 On M arch 9 ,19 2 0 , the Foreign Commissariat’ s diplom atic represen­

tative for the Far East and Siberia at Irkutsk forwarded to Foreign M inister Uchida Kôsai

a cable from Commissar o f Foreign Af­

fairs G eorgii Vasil’evich Chicherin, seeking the commencement o f negotiations between Russia and Japan to term inate hostilities and restore amicable relations.6 T h at month Com m unist partisans attacked the town o f N ikolaevsk on the Am ur R iver and massacred h a lf the population, including the Japanese consul and most Japanese residents. There were many con­ flicting accounts o f the event, bu t its essence was summarized in an article in the Contemporary Review. . . . on February 28th, 1920, an arm istice was concluded between the Bolsheviks and the W hite Guards, the latter laying down their arms after being given a pledge that they would be treated as prisoners o f war. In spite o f this, all the W hite Guards were mur­ dered b y the Bolshevik faction, who then demanded that the Japa­ nese contingent should also lay down their arms. T h is they refused to do, and from M arch 12th to M arch 17th fierce attacks were made b y the Bolsheviks on thejapanese Consulate and the barracks which the troops were holding. On M arch 17th, in face o f over­ whelm ing odds, the surviving Japanese troops, some 120 men, capitulated. T h ey were thrown into prison, and finally shared the fate o f the Russian W hite Guards, being murdered to a man under revolting circumstances. It was not until June 3rd that the Japanese reinforcements, so long overdue, arrived at N ikolaevsk, to find the d ty practically reduced to ashes. It was then discovered that the Bolsheviks, on learning o f the approach o f the Japanese relief force towards the end o f M ay, had murdered every Japanese man, woman and child in the city , the victim s numbering nearly seven hundred, including the officers and men o f the garrison and

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE

9

the Japanese Consul w ith his wife and children. T h e bodies o f all these unfortunate people had been dismembered and flung into the river.7*b W hether the atrocity had been the mad act o f a half-crazed commissar, as thought b y some, or the nervous response o f the partisans to a treacher­ ous Japanese attack, as claimed b y the Soviet governm ent later, the incident provided the Japanese m ilitary w ith a cause. T h ey erected a monument w ith the figure o f Justice, eyes covered and scales in hand, and the inscription that the murder o f the Japanese at N ikolaevsk would never be forgotten. T h e massacre served to bolster the argum ent for Japanese annexation o f a portion o f the Russian Far East to shield the inhabitants o f Manchuria and Korea from similar destruction. T h e Japanese did not accept Chicherin’s contention that the incident, on the contrary, was a com pelling reason for the cessation o f Japanese-Russian hostilities. T h e surest w ay to avoid such incidents, Chicherin had vainly cabled to the Japanese foreign m inister on M arch 22, was to initiate the peace talks proposed b y the Soviet governm ent.8 T o avoid a full-scale confrontation w ith Japan as the Red Arm y was b According to the memoirs o f Fetr Mikhailovich Nikiforov, chairman o f the council o f ministers o f the Far Eastern Republic, the Japanese consul had collected all Japanese (civilian) subjects with their wives and children in the consulate and had opened fire at the advancing partisans. “ Suddenly an explosion occurred in the consular building, smoke billowed from the windows, and the consulate burst into flames. Attem pts by the partisans to penetrate into the building o f the consulate in order to carry out the children were met by machine-gun fire.” Y et Nikiforov mentions that “ anarchists o f the Triapitsyn detachment** had committed “ criminal acts*’ during the withdrawal from Nikolaevsk and that Triapitsyn, chiefo f staflfNina Lebedeva, and their accomplices were tried by a people’s court and shot when Triapitsyn tried to liquidate some Communists who had disclosed his misdeeds. (P. M . Nikiforov, Zapitki prater* DVR. Pobeda Lemmkoi politiki v bor’ be t mterventaei

tu Dal’nem Vostoke [1917-1922 gg.J [Memoirs o f the premier o f the Far Eastern Re­ public. Victory o f the Lenin policy in the struggle with the intervention in the Far East (1917-1922)] [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963] pp. 186-87.)

IO

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SJ>.R.

pushing eastward in the C ivil W ar, toward the regions occupied by the Japanese, the Central Com m ittee o f the Russian Com m unist Party decided to create a tem porary buffer state in the territory east o f Lake Baikal. A resolution o f the Congress o f Toilers o f the Baikal Region, dated M arch 28,1920, stated that it was “ expedient and necessary*1 to form “ an independent autonomous government** and a w eek and a half later, on A pril 6, the Far Eastern Republic was proclaimed b y the Congress. T h e Far Eastern Republic, whose capital was first at Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude) and later at Chita, was the prototype o f a “ People’ s Repub­ lic.** Its governm ent began as a democratic coalition o f socialist parties and public organizations. O n April 17,19 2 0 , Vilenskii-Sibiriakov reiterated to the commander o f the Japanese expeditionary force that the Soviet governm ent had no hostile intentions toward Japan and did not intend to interfere in her dom estic affairs; he stated again that the Com m unist regim e recognized Japan’s special economic and commercial interests in the Far East. O nce more Vilenskii-Sibiriakov called for the revision o f the old treaties and the conclusion o f new ones, for consideration o f the abrogation o f the lia­ bilities incurred b y the previous governm ents, an exchange o f view s on Russo-Japanese peace talks and for the establishm ent o f commercial relations. H e also pressed for the withdrawal o f Japanese troops, pledged b y an imperial proclamation tw o and a half weeks earlier, on M ardi 31. Japan’s reluctance to give a concrete reply reaffirmed the wisdom o f the plan to deal w ith Japan indirectly, through the Far Eastern Republic.9 On July 15,19 2 0 , the Far Eastern Republic succeeded in signing an armistice w ith the Japanese; she pledged in a join t declaration the next day not to adopt Communism as the basis o f her social system . T h e idea o f a non-Communist buffer state between Soviet Russia and her own empire appealed to Japan. She had hopes at first o f gaining control o f its governm ent by support o f and-Com m unist Russians like Ataman G rigorii M ikhailovich Semenov, but even when she realized that such efforts were doomed to failure and that she would not be able to chart its destiny, she welcomed a buffer state as an Eastern cordon sanitaire to contain the spread o f Bolshevism.

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE

II

T h e Far Eastern Republic established commercial relations w ith the Allies and in 1922 was to send a delegation to the W ashington Conference to plead for the evacuation o f Japanese forces from Siberia. A n American trade mission in the summer o f 1921 was to pressure Japanese representa­ tives in C hita into holding a secret conference w ith the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic to solve various problems between the F. E. R . and Japan and to prepare for the establishm ent o f diplom atic relations between them. A n earlier American note to T o k yo demanding Japanese w ithdraw al from Siberia and N orth Sakhalin had already given rise to fear in T o k y o o f a Russo-American alliance against Japan. Y e t in the fall o f 1921 the Far Eastern Republic was to threaten the U nited States that if her trade mission were not adm itted to the U .S., she would be forced to conclude an agreement w ith Japan even if it meant ceding N orth Sak­ halin, w here concessions had recently been granted to Americans. A l­ though the Far Eastern Republic had neither the intention nor the author­ ity o f ceding N orth Sakhalin to another power, the note typified Soviet efforts to strengthen the Russian position b y playing Japan and the U nited States against each other. In due tim e the Far Eastern R epublic was to shed its dem ocratic façade, em erge as a Com m unist regim e, and rejoin the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (hereafter sim ply called Soviet Russia), but b y then its mission had been accomplished. As V ladim ir Il’ich Lenin, who had proposed the creation o f the tem porary buffer state, later boasted, the withdrawal o f the Japanese from Siberia was gained not b y Soviet m ilitary strength but b y Soviet diplom acy, b y exploiting Japanese-American differences and b y m aking diplom atic use o f the U nited States. Soviet diplom acy, he said, had succeeded not only in postponing w ar w ith Japan bu t in avoiding it altogether.10 T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic repeatedly called on the Japanese to withdraw from Siberia; at the same tim e it stressed its in­ terest in the resumption o f commercial relations. T h e foreign m inister o f the Far Eastern Republic addressed the Japanese foreign m inister direcdy; the deputy foreign m inister spoke to the Japanese chief o f the political affairs section in Vladivostok. In December o f 1920 D eputy Foreign M inister L S. Kozhevnikov asked w hat Japan’s conditions were

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

12

for the promised evacuation and the normalization o f Russo-Japanese relations. On January 18, 1921, Foreign M inister A . Krasnoshchekov w rote a lengthy letter to the Japanese foreign m inister in which he restated the need for Japan to “ adhere to the principle o f absolute non­ interference in the internal affairs o f the Far Eastern Republic and desist from rendering assistance to the separate groups o f the population in their inner struggles” and to set a definite date for the ending o f the Japanese occupation. He added: Considering the feet that upon the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic there is at present a Japanese diplom atic mission, the Governm ent is kindly asking to be informed whether the Japanese Imperial Governm ent w ill agree to receive our mission at T okio upon the ju st principle o f reciprocity w ith the aim to speedily establish political and economic relations based on such treaties that w ill be for the mutual benefit and friendship o f both the Japanese and Russian peoples. W e trust that this would speed the long hoped for day o f mutual understanding and peaceful neigh­ borly relations between the tw o peoples.11 In M arch D eputy Foreign M inister Kozhevnikov expressed the desire to proceed to T o k yo him self to exchange view s w ith Foreign Office officials. A t a tim e when G reat Britain had already established relations w ith Soviet Russia and« Italy was about to do so, it was a p ity, he said, that Japan was not y e t on friendly terms w ith the Far Eastern Republic. T h e feet that the other powers were beginning to negotiate w ith Soviet Russia alarmed T okyo. Germ any too had concluded a trade agreem ent; Belgium , Sweden, N orw ay, Denmark, China and Italy were negotiating or preparing to negptiate; the U nited States and France which had participated in the intervention were not y e t ready for official relations but they did not prohibit private commercial transac­ tions; G reat Britain was already studying conditions in the C hita region. There was m ounting danger, if not certainty, the Japanese realized, that to continue to ignore Soviet overtures would leave Japan at a disadvan-

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE

13

tage in comparison w ith the other powers. T h e Soviets had created the Far Eastern Republic in order to approach Japan and they had made repeated offers for friendly relations; if Japan failed to deal w ith the Soviets before they reestablished their strength she m ight find American and British nationals in commanding economic positions.12 Furtherm ore, Japan's continued occupation o f Siberia had aroused m ounting suspicion and antagonism in Europe and in the U nited States, and there was the possibility that Japan would be pressured into leaving w ithout the opportunity to “ stabilize the situation" if she delayed further in com ing to an agreem ent w ith the Far Eastern Republic. Japan was particularly concerned over Chinese efforts to take advantage o f Russia's weakness and difficulties to obtain from the Soviets the Chinese Eastern R ailw ay as well as foil control o f the Sungari and Am ur rivers. T o protect her own interests in these regions Japan had to join hands w ith the actual author­ ities in Russia, rather than w ith im potent opposition groups.13 Also by entering into negotiations w ith the Far Eastern Republic somewhere in Asia, she could avoid discussion o f the evacuation question at the W ashington Conference.14 On M ay 13 ,19 2 1, the Japanese cabinet agreed on the conditions for the withdrawal o f Japanese forces and the establishm ent o f commercial relations w ith the Far Eastern Republic: T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic was to put into effect east o f the Selenga R iver the “ propertied, democratic system ” which it had already proclaim ed; it was to refrain from radical propaganda in Korea and thejapanese homeland and to prevent acts b y Koreans and other nationals in the Far Eastern Republic aimed at causing disturbances in Korea;c it was to respect the

c A Foreign Office spokesman expressed the fear that rebellious Koreans in and around Vladivostok might injure Japanese. He asserted that many Koreans were enlisted in the Bolshevik army and that “ certain Koreans who were in collusion with the Bolsheviks had actually attempted an armed invasion o f the Korean border and burned a Japanese Consulate.” (Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.3:647) Erich von Salzmann, representative o f the Kölnische Zeitung and the Ullstein publishing house of Berlin, informed thejapanese in September o f 1922 that according to the Soviet*

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

14

treaty rights o f Japan and the life, property and vested rights o f Japanese subjects including fishery rights and contracts between Japanese sub­ jects and local governm ents; it was to give foreigners in general freedom o f entry and exit as w ell as o f residence and w ork and to allow them to own or to lease land in perpetuity; it was to dism antle fortifications and not construct m ilitary facilities threatening to Japan; it was to convert V ladivostok into a purely commercial port and was to make separate arrangements concerning the exchange o f diplom atic personnel and m ilitary attachés and the establishm ent o f trade. T h e question o f measures connected w ith the N ikolaevsk incident was to be left for later discussion. Japan also desired access to the Am ur and Sungari rivers, navigation o f which was restricted to Russians and Chinese, and reannexation b y the Far Eastern Republic o f Kamchatka and other territory which it had ceded to Soviet Russia at the end o f 1920.15 Continued Japanese protection, if not support, o f “ counteirevolutionary” bands prom pted an intem perate letter from Ignatii L. Iurin, foreign m inister o f the Far Eastern Republic, to the Japanese foreign minister, dated June 2 ,19 2 1. Charging that “ disorder in the Far Eastern Republic is evident only where there are Japanese troops, and where there are no Japanese troops one feels as safe as in Am erica,” Iurin posed five questions, to which he demanded “ a straightforward and definite answer” : 1. Do the Japanese Governm ent and the Japanese people consider ju st the constant interference o f the Japanese Command .with Russian affairs against the will o f the Russian people o f the Far East? 2. W ill the Japanese Governm ent continue to help the criminals and brigands o f the bands o f Semenoff, Ungem etc., and p ut obstacles in the w ay o f the authorities o f the Far Eastern Republic in their struggle against those bandits? ^diplomat Rigin “ the main object” o f propaganda schools in Moscow, Tom sk, Omsk, Irkutsk and Tashkent was “ to stir up Korea against Japanese rule.” (Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.7: 2605)

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3. Does the Japanese Governm ent consider it necessary to estab­ lish friendly neighbourly relations w ith the Governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic? 4. Does the Japanese Governm ent consider it necessary to protect the interest o f the Japanese merchants in the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic in the only possible w ay, nam ely, to enter into a commercial treaty w ith the Governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic? 5. Does the Japanese Governm ent intend to w ithdraw from the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic its arm y o f occupation, the presence o f which in Russian territory, [as] has been su f­ ficiently proved during the last three years, has in no w ay help­ ed to establish friendly relations nor to secure any privileges for Japanese residents, but on the contrary has been the source o f a grow ing hatred toward Japan?16 W hen no reply ensued, Iurin w rote to the Japanese foreign m inister: T h e disregard w ith w hich our note had been received, leaves no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese Governm ent is pre­ pared to acknowledge the m isconduct o f their officials, in which case, w e are w illing to dismiss the m atter w ith indulgence, being sensible o f the fact that the Japanese Governm ent has been forced into a somewhat awkward position in this affair. A t the same tim e w e entertain earnest confidence that Japan w ill endeavour to find means to replace the irrational connections o f to-day b y cordial good-will and natural trust, instead o f the anim osity which has prevailed in the relations o f the tw o people in recent years. Iurin reiterated the desire o f his governm ent for business dealings w ith Japan. “ It is no foult o f ours that up to now w e had been restrained b y Japanese bayonets,” he added. He called for the opening o f direct negoti­ ations in C hita or in T o k yo, whichever the Japanese governm ent pre­ ferred.17

16

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

W hile Iurin pushed for direct talks in either capital, a number o f meet­ ings took place in Harbin from June 8 to July 20, 1921, between the Japanese Vice-Consul Shimada % Œ (Masaharu iE*ft o f the Vladivostok Consulate General?) on one hand and D eputy Foreign M inister Ko­ zhevnikov and Councilor Somov o f the Far Eastern Republic on the other hand. According to Russian sources Shimada called on Kozhevnikov, w ho was passing through the city , and proposed the calling o f a con­ ference between representatives o f the Japanese governm ent and the Far Eastern Republic, a proposal that was accepted b y the Russians.18 According to Japanese sources it was the representatives o f the Far Eastern Republic who took the initiative. T h ey proposed m utual re­ fraining from propaganda; the granting o f land leases for about 60 years to Japanese subjects in the main cities o f the Far Eastern R epublic; the revision o f the fishery agreement (during the Intervention the Japanese had gready expanded their activity w ithout perm ission); the granting o f lumber and other concessions to Japan on N orth Sakhalin; purchase by the Far Eastern Republic o f Japanese vessels on the Am ur and Sungari rivers; the granting o f a loan b y Japan to the Far Eastern R epublic; the surrender o f Russian official residences, properties and vessels in Japan; the withdrawal o f Japanese forces; and the convening o f a conference at Dairend on A ugust 15 to negptiate an agreement on the basis o f these . points. Since the proposal was close to Japanese thinking in a number o f re­ spects, Japan agreed to negotiations at Dairen. In accordance w ith a decision made b y the cabinet and the Foreign Policy Research Board on July 12, Matsushima Hajime

chief o f the Political Affairs

Section o f the Vladivostok expeditionary force who had been in charge o f civilian affairs at Vladivostok, was sent to Dairen to confer w ith the delegates o f the Far Eastern Republic. Characteristically his mission was hidden from the Japanese public under the guise o f a tour o f inspec­ tion o f M anchuria.19 Matsushima had experience in dealing w ith Rus4 Dairen A 4 is the Japanese name for Talien (Chinese); while in Russian hands (1898-1905), it was known as Dalny (Dal’nii).

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sians and spoke the language. He had served in the Japanese embassy in S t. Petersburg before the revolution, from 1908 to 1917, as attaché and second interpreter, then third, and eventually second secretary. T h e Dairen Conference opened at the Yam ato H otel on A ugust 26, 1921. M atsushima was assisted b y Shimada, who had been involved in th e prelim inary talks at Harbin, and b y General Takayanagi

ch ief

o f staff o f the Japanese forces in the Russian Far East.e T h e Far Eastern R epublic was represented briefly b y Ignadi Iurin, its foreign minister and concurrently its representative in Peking, who arrived late because Japanese secret agents w ent through his luggage w ith meticulous care,20 and then, from the beginning o f September, b y D r. Fedor N ikolaevich Petrov, deputy chairman o f the Council o f M inisters o f the Far Eastern R epublic, assisted b y Kozhevnikov and Anokhin. Petrov was a physician and an old Com munist. An active participant in the m ilitary uprising o f 1905, he had been imprisoned in Warsaw for a year, had been confined to almost a decade o f hard labor in the Shlis­ selburg fortress near St. Petersburg (1907-191$), then had been exiled “ for life” to Siberia. A participant in the “ February” and “ O ctober” revolutions, he had become deputy chairman o f the Council o f M inisters as w ell as M inister o f Health and the Interior o f the provisional govern­ m ent o f the Far Eastern Republic in the autumn o f 1920, and deputy chairman o f the Council o f M inisters (i.e. deputy prim e m inister) and m ember o f the governm ent o f the permanent governm ent o f the re­ public in the spring o f 1921/

* According to Vasilii Konstantinovich Bliukher, who joined the conference. f Later, from 1927 on, Dr. Petrov became intim ately connected with the publica­ tion o f Bol’sbau sovettkaia entsikJopediia, the big Soviet encyclopedia, and eventually was named director o f the Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Institute. His revolutionary outlook imbued his scholarship as it had his diplomacy. “ T he encyclopedia consti­ tutes the strongest ideological weapon, reflecting the interests o f the class which created it,” Petrov wrote in his memoirs. Recalling the labor involved in “ cleansing** the old scholarly data o f its ideological foundations, Pavlov declared that scientific articles must “ convey scientific information not only correctly but examine it also*

i8

Japanese R écognition o f the U SS.R.

A hard-line revolutionary rather than a diplom at, Petrov found the situation at the conference "rather com plicated.” A s he asserted in his memoirs, the Japanese diplom atic service resorted to "blackm ail, threats, slander, and a highhanded disdainfol attitude toward its partner [in the negotiations].” "M atsushim a, the leader o f the Japanese delegation, was an old, experienced diplom at,” Petrov stated. "Sm all o f stature, w ith sly, shifty eyes and a smile which appeared and disappeared on his face as if b y order, he knew how to present the most impudent proposals in a deceivingly mild form.. . .” 21 Alm ost at once the negotiators w ere at loggerheads. It was the position o f the Far Eastern Republic that Japan w ithdraw her forces from Siberia before any agreement was concluded. T h e Japanese, on the other hand, demanded the conclusion o f a treaty prior to evacuation. O n September 6 the representatives erf the Far Eastern Republic presented a draft agreement o f twenty-nine articles in which they made the compromise proposal that the Japanese begin their withdrawal at once but com plete it within one month after the signature o f the agreement. T h e draft read: T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic on one hand and the Imperial Japanese Governm ent on the other hand, moved b y the mutual desire for the developm ent and strengthening o f friendly and gpod-neighborly relations between the Japanese and Russian peoples and for the strengthening and grow th o f economic relations, have decided to conclude an agreement o f peace, friend­ ship and trade on the foundations o f reciprocity, equal rights, justice and mutual benefits, as w ell as on the basis o f full reciprocal recognition o f the supreme prerogatives and sovereignty o f each o f the states on the expanse o f its entire territory and have ap­ pointed for this purpose as their representatives:*

*frotn the standpoint o f dialectical materialism.” (F. N . Petrov, 65 let v riadakb Leninskoi

partit. Votpomuumxia [65 years in the ranks o f Lenin’s party. Memoirs] [Moscow, 1962], pp. 139-40.

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H IS M A JE ST Y THE E M P E R O R OF JA PA N TH E G O V E R N M E N T OF TH E F A R E A ST E R N R E P U B L IC

who, empowered upon reciprocal communication o f their powers, recognized as having been drawn up in the appropriate and legal manner, have stipulated and concluded the following articles: A R T IC L E I

L et there be permanent peace between the Governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic and the Imperial Japanese Governm ent, as w ell as between the Japanese and Russian peoples in the Far East w ithout any exception for places or persons. a r t ic l e

n

T h e Governm ent o f Japan and the Far Eastern Republic have agreed, on the basis o f the principle o f the recognition o f the sover­ eign rights o f each people to its territories, not to interfere in the affairs o f the opposite party. T h e tw o Governm ents commit them­ selves not to allow in their territory the existence and activity o f any kind o f groups and organizations pretending to the role o f Governm ent as w ell as groups having as their objective the over­ throw o f the Governm ent o f the other party. a r t ic l e

m

T h e citizens o f the Far Eastern Republic and o f Japan have the right o f five arrival, travel and residence at any place whatever in the territory o f the other contracting party, subject to the observance o f its laws, both for purposes o f trade, profession and earning as w ell as for their personal needs. A R T IC L E IV

T h e personal safety and inviolability o f property o f the citizens o f Japan staying in the Far Eastern Republic and o f citizens o f the

Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R.

20

Far Eastern Republic staying in the territory o f Japan w ill always be under the patronage and protection o f the laws o f each o f the said states.

ARTICLE V T h e citizens o f Japan have the right in the entire territory o f the Far Eastern Republic and the citizens o f the Far Eastern R epublic in the entire territory o f Japan to engage unhindered in their professions as w ell as to trade freely in all objects in w hich trade is perm itted.

ARTICLE VI Citizens o f Japan departing for any purposes for the Far Eastern Republic and citizens o f the Far Eastern Republic departing for the territory o f Japan m ust have w ith them passports for foreign travel, issued b y the [legally] constituted authorities, certifying their citizenship. W hen citizens o f Japan proceed to the Far Eastern Republic and back the passports m ust be visaed b y consuls. a r t ic l e

vu

T h e citizens o f the Far Eastern Republic during their residence in the territory o f Japan and the citizens o f Japan during their residence in the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic enjoy the rights o f the free profession o f their religious and political con­ victions. a r t ic l e

vrn

Each o f the contracting parties has the right to have in the territory o f the other, where it considers it o f benefit for the interests o f its citizens and trade, its consular representatives, consuls general, viceconsuls and consular agents. U ntil such tim e as a special agreement is concluded between the contracting parties the consular service is regulated b y the standards custom ary in international relations and international practice.

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ARTICLE IX In criminal and civil cases the citizens o f the tw o contracting parties are subject to the court o f the country, in the territory o f which the given case has arisen. a r t ic l e

x

T h e Governm ents o f the contracting parties m utually stipulate the inviolability o f person o f the citizens o f one o f the contracting parties during the entire period o f th eir stay in the territory o f the other. T h e citizens o f either party m ay be arrested during their residence in the alien territory only b y order o f the appro­ priate judicial establishm ent and only upon accusation o f having com m itted a criminal act. E very arrest m ust be reported to the nearest consul w ithin 24 hours.

ARTICLE XI T h e contracting parties pledge in the near future, not later than tw o months from the day o f the signature o f the present agree­ m ent, to call together a conference o f its representatives for the w orking out o f a special agreem ent about the extradition o f persons, w ho having been prosecuted or convicted for specific crim es, com m itted in the territory o f one o f the contracting parties, take refuge in the territory o f the other party. a r t ic l e

xn

There m ust be free trade and navigation between the possessions o f the contracting parties.

ARTICLE xm T h e citizens o f the Far Eastern Republic in the territory o f Japan and the citizens o f Japan in the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic are subject to any sort o f state, provincial and municipal duties and taxes connected w ith the character o f their activity.

22

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R. T h e d ozen s o f the contracting parties m ust not be forced to pay other or higher taxes than those that are paid at the given tim e or in the future w ill be paid b y native d ozen s. A R T IC L E XIV

For the purpose o f w orking out a m utually beneficial customs tariff the Governm ents o f the contracting parties have agreed to the immediate establishm ent o f a mixed commission for the w orking out o f a tariff and o f general dedsions concerning the application o f customs regulations, whose dedsions, upon proper confirmation b y both Governm ents w ill have force as supplem entary articles to this agreement. a r t ic l e

xv

In those localities o f the contracting Governm ents where a con­ siderable number o f th d r dozen s are concentrated, the [above-] mentioned persons can, in foil compliance w ith local laws, establish th d r commercial and industrial associations, open stock ex­ changes, chambers o f commerce, trade and other unions, dubs and schools for their com patriots. A R T IC L E XVI

T h e governm ents o f the contracting parties m utually pledge to grant the right o f free en try o f the commercial vessels o f one party into all open ports o f the other. N ot one o f the vessels o f the Far Eastern Republic in the ports o f Japan nor one o f the vessels o f Japan in the ports o f the Far Eastern Republic nor th d r cargo and ship’s property can under any conditions and circumstances be subject to detainm ent or seizure. A R T IC L E

xvn

T h e Governm ents o f the contracting parties have stipulated the formation o f a spedal commission o f representatives o f the con­ tracting parties for the detailed w orking out o f regulations govern-

THE DAIREN CONFERENCE in g the sailing o f vessels between the ports o f the contracting parties. T h e time for [its] formation w ill be determined b y mutual agreem ent between the Governm ents, but [will be] not later than three months from the day o f the signature o f this agreement. a r t ic l e

xvm

T h e contracting parties have agreed to the immediate opening o f post-and-telegraph communications between Japan and the Soviet Union and for their regulation to form im m ediately upon signature o f this agreem ent a commission o f representatives o f both states. For the purpose o f regulating questions connected w ith the sending o f correspondence both to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist R epublic from Japan and the other w ay around, to propose at the conference o f the commission that representatives o f the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic participate also. a r t ic l e

XIX

T h e Governm ents o f Japan and the Far Eastern Republic, upon signature o f the present agreem ent, have to begin the immediate jo in t discussion o f a commercial treaty on the principles laid down in the present agreem ent. a r t ic l e

xx

T h e Governm ents o f Japan and the Far Eastern Republic have decided to begin at once revision o f the fishery conventions. Since these conventions were concluded between the Govern­ m ent o f Japan and the Imperial Governm ent o f Russia and since the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is interested in them, the Governm ents o f the contracting parties consider es­ sential the participation o f representatives o f Soviet Russia in the contem plated conferences.

ARTICLE XXI Recognizing the principle o f the Open Door, the Governm ent o f

23

24

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R. the Far Eastern Republic w ill show hill cooperation to all Japanese enterp risers in granting them concessions on bases m utually beneficial to both parties, on condition that the laws o f the country be observed. a r t ic l e

xxn

T h e Imperial Japanese Governm ent im m ediately begins to w ith­ draw its forces from the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic and com pletes this withdrawal during the period technically required for the completion o f the evacuation, but not later than one month from the day o f the signature o f the present agreement. a r t ic l e

xxm

It has been agreed that the tw o Governm ents o f Japan and the Far Eastern Republic w ill appoint their representatives who will have the responsibility o f assisting the evacuation o f the Japanese forces, the preservation and transfer intact to the legal [ly consum ed] authorities o f the property belonging to the Far Eastern Republic. A R T IC L E XXIV

T h e Governm ents o f the contracting parties take measures for the prom pt establishm ent o f normal diplom atic relations. T h e Governm ents pledge to conclude the negotiations concerning the establishm ent o f regular diplom atic missions w ithin a period o f three months. A R T IC L E XXV

T h e present agreem ent is enacted for ten years from the day o f the exchange o f ratifications; if six months before the terms o f this agreement neither contracting party expresses the desire for any changes in it or [for any] additions, all present stipulations remain in force for another decade.

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A R T IC L E XXVI

Each contracting party pledges to recognize and respect the flag and emblem [gerb] o f the other party as the emblem [emblem] o f a friendly state. T h e design o f the flag and emblem, as w ell as changes in them, should they follow , w ill be communicated reciprocally through diplom atic channels. A R T IC L E XXVII

T h e decision o f all commissions, formed on the basis o f the given agreem ent w ill, upon confirmation b y both Governm ents, have force as supplem entary articles o f the present treaty. A R T IC L E XXVIII

Concerning all questions, in connection w ith which the supple­ m enting or elaboration o f any stipulations o f this treaty is required, the above-mentioned parties m ay upon m utual agreem ent con­ clude articles supplem entary to this [treaty]. A R T IC L E XXIX

T h is treaty m ust be ratified b y the tw o high contracting parties in compliance w ith their respective constitutions and the ratifications m ust be exchanged in the d t y o f T o k yo as soon as possible, but not later than one month from this day. In witness w hereof w e, the undersigned, b y virtue o f our respective powers have signed this treaty in tw o copies, each in the Russian language, and have attached our respective seals. Done in tw o copies in the d ty o f Dairen, th e . . . day o f th e . . . month o f the year 1921. S ign ed .. . .

T h e Japanese refused to com m it themselves to a spedfic tim e lim it for

26

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

their evacuation. T h ey proposed an amendment o f the article which would have left the time o f withdrawal at their own discretion. When the delegates o f the Far Eastern Republic rejected this, the Japanese asked for a two-week recess.23 In late September or early October* the Japanese presented to the representatives o f the Far Eastern Republic a counter-draft, phrased in 17 public articles— hence commonly called “ the Seventeen Demands” — and 3 secret articles. T h e Japanese draft embodied the conditions for withdrawal decided upon at the cabinet m eeting o f M ay 13; it w ent further in demanding a pledge that the Far Eastern Republic would never keep any naval forces in the Pacific and scrap those vessels which it had, that N orth Sakhalin be leased to Japan for a period o f 80 years as com­ pensation for the N ikolaevsk incident, and that the Far Eastern Republic remain strictly neutral in the event o f a conflict between Japan and a third power (be it even Soviet Russia). Japan’ s policy in Siberia was a reflection o f Japanese policy toward China. T h e Seventeen Demands were similar in tone to the infamous Tw enty-one Demands which sought to convert the Chinese Republic into a Japanese satellite. When they became public knowledge later, the North China Star proclaimed that they unveiled “ the true designs o f Japanese militarism in no lesser degree than the 21 points presented by them to China, and no State, unless it openly agrees to become a colony o f Japan, w ill ever accept them.” So im portant were they as an indicator o f Japanese ambitions, that they deserve to be quoted in full: * Russian sources and studies based on Russian sources say October. (See, (or example, Dplomaticbeskii sJovar*, vol. r, p. 419; Xenia JoukofTEudin and Robert C North, Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927. A Documentary Survey (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 134; and John A. W hite, The Siberian Intervention (Prince­ ton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 411. But Japanese sources specifically state September 26. (Japan, Gaimushö [Foreign Office], Nihon gaikô uemfyô narabi ni sbuyi

bumbo

(Chronology and main documents o f Japanese

diplomacy) (T okyo, 1965), vol. 1, p.253; Tanaka BunichirS

IP, ASno

Kosbö-sbi Q V Ä f f l (H istory o f Negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union) (T okyo: Foreign Office, Europe and Asia Bureau, 1942), vol. ///A, pp. 47-48.

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1. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic shall convert Vladivostok into a purely commercial port, placing it under foreign control and taking no measures interfering w ith trade. 2. T h e tw o governm ents bind themselves, after signing this treaty, to review the Russo-Japanese fishing convention, increasing the rights o f Japanese fishers and extending the rights o f Japanese in Russian coastwise trade. 3. T h e tw o governm ents bind them selves, im m ediately on the signing o f this treaty, to reach an agreement concerning postal and telegraph connections. 4. T h e tw o governm ents m utually recognize freedom o f trade, communications, and navigation, and w ill not place citizens or ships o f the other governm ent in a less favorable position than those o f a third nation. Details in this connection shall be specified in a separate agreem ent on trade and naviga­ tion. 3. Both contracting sides bind themselves to conclude, on the signing o f this treaty, an agreement concerning tariff regular dons and tariff duties, on the basis o f A rticle 4. 6. Citizens o f each country, livin g in the other, shall have the right o f protection for their persons and inviolability o f their property, and shall not be placed in a less favorable position than citizens o f the other governm ent or o f a third governm ent. 7. Citizens o f each country m ay engage on the territory o f the other in commerce, industry, m anufacturing, handicrafts, professional and other occupations, and shall not be placed in a less favorable position as regards trade and industry than citizens o f the other governm ent or o f a third governm ent; as concerns industries, professions and trade, they shall be in the same position as citizens o f a third governm ent. 8. Citizens o f each country shall have the right o f entering the territory o f the other and o f freely traveling and livin g in

Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R.

28

the other country in accordance w ith its laws. On entering the other country national passports m ust be presented. 9.

Each country binds itself not to carry on hostilities against the other, and to abstain from any propaganda which m ight be dangerous to the other, and to take steps to prevent the entrance to the other country and the activity o f all or­ ganizations attem pting to carry on activities hostile to the other country. T h e procedure for turning over such persons to the other country shall be determ ined in a special agree­ ment.

10. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic guarantees the Japanese governm ent that it w ill never introduce the com­ m unistic regim e on its territory and w ill always maintain the principle o f private property not only in connection w ith Japanese subjects but also w ith its own citizens. 11. Recognizing the principle o f the Open Door, the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic m ust rescind in connection w ith Japanese subjects all restrictions existing on its territory, and not establish such restrictions in the future, concerning the m ining industry, agriculture, the tim ber industry, or, in general, concerning any extracting industry, and shall give to Japanese subjects freedom in trade and industry, putting them in the same position as its own citizens, and the Far Eastern Republic also binds itself to allow Japanese subjects the right o f ow ning land and full freedom in coast­ wise trade under the Japanese flag. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic binds itself to allow to Japanese subjects freedom o f navigation on the Am ur R iver under the Japanese flag and agrees to declare to the Chinese governm ent its desire that Japanese subjects be given the rights o f navigation on the Sungari R iver under the Japanese flag. T h is article applies only to Japanese sub­ jects, and the rights acquired hereunder m ay not be extended to other foreigners.

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12. Each country shall send to the other its representatives w ith the rights o f legation, and shall establish points for the residence o f consuls. 13. Both governm ents recognize the treaties and conventions existing between the Japanese governm ent and the old Russian governm ent, and both governm ents agree that all rights acquired b y citizens o f the other governm ent before the signing o f this treaty shall remain as they are. 14. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic [obliges] itself to take down and i f necessary blow up all forts and fortifica­ tions along the w hole Pacific coast, in the region ofV ladivostock and along the Korean border, and never to re-establish these, and also to undertake no m ilitary operations in the regions bordering on Korea and M anchuria. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic m ust adm it the official residence and travel o f special Japanese m ilitary missions and o f individual Japanese m ilitary officers through­ out its whole territory. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic obliges itself never to maintain a naval fleet in the Pacific and to destroy the existing fleet. 15. In settling the N ikolaievsk question, the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic binds itself to give to the Japanese Governm ent the northern halfofSakhalin as a lease for eigh ty years, as compensation o f the losses suffered b y Japanese subjects at the tim e o f the N ikolaievsk incident. 16. T h e present treaty shall be effective from the moment o f its ratification by the tw o contracting governm ents and remain in force until the conclusion in the future o f a perpetual treaty. 17. T h e present treaty shall be drawn up in both the Russian and Japanese languages, both o f which shall be considered official.

Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R.

30

S E C R E T A R T IC L E S

1. In case o f an armed conflict between Japan and a third power, the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic binds itself to observe strict neutrality. 2. T h e Japanese governm ent w ill evacuate its troops from the M aritim e Province at the tim e w hich in its own judgm ent w ill be convenient, when this shall be necessary. 3. T h e evacuation o f Sakhalin w ill take place after the northern half o f the island has actually been received in lease accord­ ing to A rticle 15 o f the treaty .a4*h T h e public articles did not stipulate any tim e for the withdrawal o f the Japanese forces. A t first the Japanese had wished to make no mention o f the subject at all. It was their attitude that they had intervened w ith the noblest o f intentions and would withdraw w ith similar goodwill. A secret clause eventually left the m atter to the discretion and con­ venience o f the Japanese. In vain the Japanese negotiators tried to re­ assure the representatives o f the Far Eastern Republic about the deletion o f a definite date for the evacuation o f Siberia, asserting that once a general agreement had been concluded the Japanese forces would w ith­ draw voluntarily, since w ith the conclusion o f the agreement the men­ ace to Korea and to Japanese residents and transportation w ould have been rem oved; all that would be needed then would be a m ilitary agree­ m ent to make the necessary arrangements for withdrawal. T h e Japanese had in mind the evacuation o f mainland territory; they did not envisage withdrawal from N orth Sakhalin, which, as stated, was to be leased for eigh ty years. A n y talk about Sakhalin and Kamchatka was com plicated, o f course, b y the fact that it was questionable whether the authority o f the Far Eastern Republic extended to these regions. N or could the delegates o f the Far Eastern Republic make commitments concerning fishery and economic m atters affecting Soviet Russia.25 k English wording received by U.S. State Department from T okyo through official channels.

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N egotiations at Dairen were soon deadlocked and virtually halted for a m onth. On N ovem ber 6 Iakov D avidovich Ianson, w ho had suc­ ceeded Iurin as m inister o f foreign affairs o f the Far Eastern Republic, wrote a letter to the foreign m inister o f Japan in which he reiterated the desire o f his governm ent to create amicable commercial intercourse between the tw o countries. But he decried the continuance o f "brutal activities” on the part o f "counter-revolutionary Russian organizations” in Japanese-held territory and noted that his governm ent was "forced to hold responsible for it, though indirectly, the Japanese M ilitary Command, who b y maintaining the expeditionary arm y in the M ari­ time Privince and b y the support and protection attended to the Rus­ sian W hite Guard organizations operating in that Province create the possibility for the violations com m itted against the peaceful Russian population to remain unpunished.” "T h e Governm ent o f the Far East­ ern R epublic believes,” Ianson concluded, "th a t the negpdations now proceeding at Dairen m ay be brought to a m utually favorable con­ clusion and m ay lead to the establishm ent o f friendly [?] economic relations between the contracting parties only on the actual evacuation o f the Japanese troops from the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic, the Japanese Governm ent thus proving the sincerity o f her friendly intentions toward the Far Eastern Republic.” 26 T h e same day, on N ovem ber 6, the Russian side suggested the re­ sumption o f the Dairen talks w ith Soviet participation in the discussion of fishery and other economic questions. O n N ovem ber 12 General Vasilii Konstantinovich Bliukher, com m andcr-in-chief and m inister o f war o f the Far Eastern R epublic, arrived to advise Petrov; discussions were resumed on the 14th.27*1 Matsushima had stated that the m atter o f evacuation would have to 1

1 Bliukher (spelled also Blücher, alias Galin, Galen and Galents) later was to play an important role in Chiang K*ai-shek*s conquest o f northern China ; in 1929 he commanded the Eastern Special Arm y o f the Soviet Union in the war with China over the Chinese Eastern Railway. He was dismissed during the purges o f 1937-38 aixf^mysteriously disappeared." [Eudin and North, p. 457].

32

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

bç worked out b y the m ilitary. W ith the arrival o f Bliukher the experts o f the tw o sides m et, but the Japanese generals, according to Petrov, were even more “ arrogant” than their diplomats. “ T h e y did not even w ant to hear out our representatives, bu t m et m erely to dictate their demands.” Under the circumstances it seemed useless to continue the m eetings o f the m ilitary experts and Bliukher soon returned to take command o f m ilitary operations o f the “ People’s R evolutionary A rm y” against the interventionists and w hite forces. “ Your m ilitary are not inclined to negotiate,” Petrov told Matsushima. “ T h ey prefer to fight. O ur commander-in-chief has decided to give them the oppor­ tunity. You and w e both w ill be w aiting for good news.” 28 On Novem ber 27 Petrov requested deletion erf*the three secret clauses from the Japanese demands, and presented revised and supplem entary articles. On December 5, when the Japanese notified him that th ey were about to relieve a part o f the Vladivostok expeditionary force, he tried to get a commitment concerning com plete evacuation and sought to settle the N ikolaevsk incident by givin g to Japan industrial concessions in N orth Sakhalin. H e took the opportunity to demand once more the participation o f a representative o f Soviet Russia on the fishery com ­ mission.29 T h a t day, on December 5, Iulian Iuzefovich M arkhlevskii arrived in Dairen. A Polish Com m unist (his name was also spelled M archlewski), he had a Ph. D . in economics from the U niversity ofZ iirich . H e had assisted Lenin in the establishm ent o f the M arxist paper Iskra and had been a leader in the Com m unist movements in Poland and Germ any. An agent o f the Com intern, he was assigned to various im­ portant negotiations b y the Soviet government.* T h e Japanese had refused to adm it a regular delegate from Soviet Russia, and M arkhlevskii came ostensibly as an observer. W hat the Japanese did not know was that from the moment o f his arrival the delegates o f the Far Eastern Republic were subordinate to him. T he Central Com m ittee o f the Russian Com m unist Party had decreed at itsi i Markhlevskii remained truly international until his very end. He died in 1925 in Italy and was buried in Germany; in 1950 his body was moved to Poland.

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m eeting o f N ovem ber 28, 1921 : “ From the moment o f the arrival o f Comrade M arkhlevskii in Dairen, com plete guidance o f the negotiations is to be surrendered to him, regardless o f the fact whether or not he w ill be adm itted officially to the conference.” 30 Official dispatches to Ianson were sent in the join t names o f M arkhlevskii and Petrov. Petrov in his memoirs describes his relationship w ith M arkhlevskii, an old friend from the days o f his revolutionary activity in W arsaw, as follows: W ith lu . Iu. M arkhlevskii w e discussed all points o f our and the Japanese treaty drafts and w ith the aid o f ciphers constantly con­ sulted w ith the People’ s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G . V . Chicherin. In such a w ay the representatives o f the People’s Com ­ missar for Foreign Affairs o f the R .S.F.S.R . took an active part in the Dairen Conference.31 Insufficient data is available to determ ine the precise im pact o f the change in leadership on the Russian position at the Dairen Conference. M arkhlevskii does seem to have bolstered opposition to Japanese de­ mands. B y February 20,1922, the negotiations were deadlocked again.32 The Japanese seemed reluctant to give up the many rights which they had obtained during and after the First W orld W ar. Joker lies in article tw o [five?] [the correspondent o f the Chicago Tribum wired on Decem ber 24, 1921], for this includes certain unspecified secret agreements w ith Kerensky, Kolchak and M erkuloff governm ents which believed give Japanese preferential rights maritime province also providing return money Japan advanced wherewith waged warfare against C hita governm ent. It is over this article that hardest battle occurred. G reat se­ crecy over this but reported deal entire Japanese method keeping province upset by playing financing one faction against other ob­ taining treaty promises in return.33 The failure o f anti-Com m unist elements whom the Japanese sup­ ported to halt the advance o f the Red Arm y on Vladivostok prompted

34

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R.

the Japanese governm ent after considerable deliberation to make another effort to come to an agreement w ith the Far Eastern R ep u b lic O n M ardi 20,1922, Foreign M inister Uchida cabled M atsushima to resume talks. Before the end o f the month full accord had been readied on the general agreem ent.34 Its 16 articles were a great im provem ent over die Seventeen Demands. T h e full text o f the “ Trade and General Agree­ ment,” as the docum ent was en tided, was as follows: PREAM BLE

T h e Imperial Japanese governm ent and the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic, desiring to establish between the tw o nations peaceful trade relations, as w ell as the developm ent o f economic and other intercourse, and realizing that it is necessary to conclude a prelim inary agreem ent between the tw o govern­ ments prior to the condusion in the future o f a formal treaty defining the economic and the political relations between the two peoples, it was agreed to fix the following clauses: I

Each o f die high contracting parties undertakes to respect the sovereignty o f the other, not to undertake hostile operations against one another, not to interfere in one another’ s affairs and not to carry on propaganda, direct or indirect, outside the borders o f its own territory which m ight threaten the established order o f State; each undertakes to take the necessary steps to prevent admission to its territory o f any person or group o f persons, and to disrupt all organizations and activity o f such persons, groups and organizations aim ing at the destruction o f the existing order o f things in the territory o f the other.

n T h e subjects or dtizens o f each o f the high contracting parties have the right, in accordance w ith the laws o f the given country, to stay, travel or to live w ithin the borders o f the other’s territory.

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Subjects or citizens ofeach of the high contracting parties intending to go to the territory o f the other shall be provided w ith the pass­ ports issued b y his or her country, issued b y the proper authorities and m ust obtain visé o f the representatives o f the other country.

m Subjects or citizens o f each o f the high contracting parties staying or residing w ithin the territory o f the other shall enjoy the full protection o f the law o f the country regarding personal safety and the inviolability o f property on an equal footing w ith the subjects or citizens o f that country or the subjects and citizens o f a third country. IV

Subjects or citizens o f each o f the high contracting parties shall enjoy foil liberty as to religious practices and liberty o f conscience) w hile in the territory o f the other, in accordance w ith the laws o f the country.

v Subjects or citizens ofeach o f the high contracting parties have the righ t to engage in commerce, trade, industry, and professions in the terri tory o f the other and in the case ofcom m erce and industry, subjects or citizens o f each o f the high contracting parties w ithin the territory o f the other shall enjoy all existing laws or such laws as m ay be enacted relating thereto on an equal footing w ith subjects or citizens o f the most favored nation. Those engaged in the pro­ fessions and trades shall be on an equal footing w ith the subjects or citizens o f a third country. T h is article does not infringe upon the rightsw hichareor m ay be granted tosubjectsorcitizensofa country bound b y convention w ith either o f the high contracting parties. VI

T h e governm ents o f the tw o countries simultaneously recognize

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

36

the laws o f trade, communication and navigation existing in each other’s country and each side agrees not to treat the subjects or citizens and vessels o f the other country in an inferior manner to treatm ent given the subjects or citizens and vessels o f any third country. T h e governments o f the tw o countries bind themselves im­ m ediately upon the signing o f this agreement to conclude a pact relating to subjects o f trade communication and navigation as w ell as tariffs and customs rules based upon the m ost favorable principles. T h is article does not apply to the rights now granted or which m ay be granted to subjects or citizens o f any country now bound b y an economic convention to either o f the high contracting parties. vn T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic agrees to revise and im prove those o f the existing port rules at Vladivostok and other conditions w hich hinder trade and navigation. vrn T h e governm ents o f the high contracting parties bind them­ selves, im m ediately upon the signing o f this agreem ent, to reach an understanding about the opening o f postal and telegraphic communications between the tw o countries.

DC T h e governments o f the high contracting parties bind themselves to begin negotiations, im m ediately upon the signing o f this agree­ m ent, w ith the intention o f revising the Russo-Japanese Fishing Convention and the conclusion o f a tem porary pact replacing the above-mentioned convention, having agreed to cancel those clauses detrim ental to the fishing industry o f both countries, inasmuch as this does not interfere w ith the aims o f guarding the living w ealth o f the waters, as w ell as to add to the convention such clauses as

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m ight benefit the fishing industry o f both countries and the suc­ cessful protection o f the waters. T h e Governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic also agrees to discuss the question regarding the granting to the Japanese vessels o f the right o f coast navigation in so far as it is necessary for the promotion o f the fishing industry, based on the above-mentioned item in this clause.

x T h e Far Eastern Republic w ill recognize the principle o f the open door, and w ill abolish, for Japanese subjects, the restrictions w hich have hitherto been imposed on foreigners in regard to m ining, forestry, agriculture, industry, commerce and other oc­ cupations w ithin its borders, nor w ill it impose such restrictions again in future. It w ill grant the right o f land leasehold for a period not exceedingly 36 years, and w ill also agree to the participation o f Japanese subjects in companies engaged in coastwise trade o f ‘ the Far Eastern Republic.’ XI

T h e governments o f the tw o high contracting parties w ill enter into negotiations w ith a view to revising all pacts, conventions and agreements concluded between the Imperial Japanese govern­ ment and former recognized Russian governments. T h e governm ents o f the high contracting parties are binding themselves to recognize all rights which were acquired b y subjects or citizens o f both parties in the same form as at present, provided these rights do not, b y virtue o f their nature or the circumstances o f acquisition, conflict w ith the laws o f the land where they originated. R ights acquired b y the Japanese subjects, as from A ugust 26 to the moment o f the extension o f the jurisdiction o f the Far Eastern Republic over the territory remaining during this period outside its sphere o f influence are not to be recognized.

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

xn T h e governm ents o f the high contracting parties m ay send to the territory o f the other representatives and persons responsible to them who w ill enjoy the rights o f diplom atic representatives. T h e governments m ay also send to one another’s territory such persons as w ill fulfil the functions o f consuls and w ill enjoy such special rights as defined b y International Law. Details o f the number and places o f residence o f such representatives w ill be arranged b y special agreement between the tw o governm ents.

xm T h e articles o f this agreem ent are to come into force from the moment o f signature o f the same and continue until the conclusion o f a formal treaty as indicated in the preamble o f this agreement. XIV

A ll arrangements entered into and based on this agreem ent and all documents attached thereto as additional clauses are considered as having the same force as this agreement.

xv In case o f the necessity o f explaining any circumstances relating to this agreem ent, the governm ents o f the high contracting parties m ay b y m utual consent conclude additional clauses to this agreement. XVI

T h is agreement is drawn up in both Japanese and Russian lan­ guages and in its interpretation both texts are authentic.35»*

k The text o f the entire agreement was made public by V. G. Antonov o f Dal’ta. The Japanese Foreign Office agreed that the text was accurate, except for article X . T he Japanese version o f article X has been used here. T he Russian version read: *

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Petrov rejected Japanese demands for jo in t Japanese-Russian enter­ prises on the Sungari and Am ur rivers on the grounds that this would have been in violation o f the T reaty o f A igun o f 1858 which allowed navigation on these rivers to Russians and Chinese only. In their report to Ianson, dated M arch 2 7,19 2 2 , Petrov and M arkhlevskii w rote that the Japanese wished to conclude also various other agreements pertain­ ing to China, i f only the Russians would be w illing to talk to them about these questions “ openly and fo il o f trust.” T h e contention that Russia recognized the sovereignty o f the Chinese republic and would not discuss such m atters w ithout Chinese representation evoked only derogatory remarks about the Chinese from the Japanese delegation, according to an interview later given b y M arkhlevskii in Shanghai.36 Petrov repeated the demand that Soviet Russia be represented on the fishery commission. H e proposed simultaneous signature o f the general agreement and such agreements as the evacuation o f Japanese forces from the M aritim e Province and N orth Sakhalin and the settlem ent o f the Nikolaevsk incident. H e also asked that a m ilitary commission be set up to review the situation in the M aritim e Province. M eanwhile new instructions from Foreign M inister Uchida, dated March 27, reached M atsushima. H e was to show the Russian representa­ tives a draft m ilitary agreem ent which allegedly had taken the interests of the Far Eastern Republic into consideration both in the m atter o f the * *

The govem m entoftheFar Eastern Republic, notwithstanding the laws o f the Republic, will grant to Japanese subjects concessions o f mining and forest in­ dustries and others on conditions favorable to both parties subject to the observance o f the laws o f the country. In its efforts to develop coastwiseshipping, the Far Eastern Republic will grant to Japanese subjects the right to partici­ pate in Russian companies. The Foreign Office spokesman claimed that the Russian version was proposed to make it appear that the Japanese wanted vested rights in Siberia.

. . what was

really Chita’s proposition, which has not been acceded to by Japan, was published as Japan’s, and moreover in a manner to make it appear as i f it were one which had been rejected by Chita. This is proof o f the extent to which Chita has not scrupled to go in falsification and propaganda.”

Acbertuer, April 22,1922).

40

'Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R.

disposition o f confiscated arms and railroad w ork equipm ent and in the reduction in the Japanese defense area; at the same time he was to warn the Russian representatives that Japan would break o ff the talks unless the basic and the m ilitary agreements were signed b y A pril 15. Armed w ith these instructions, Matsushima explained the Japanese conditions on M arch 30, and conveyed the threat o f term inating the talks. Japanese willingness to promise withdrawal from the M aritim e Prov­ ince w ithin three months o f the signing o f an evacuation agreem ent was accompanied b y too many qualifications to satisfy the Russians. (O ne reporter labeled the draft m ilitary agreement a “ tru ly Asian docum ent.” ) T h e m ost ominous qualification was that the tim e fixed for the beginning o f the evacuation was to be calculated from the moment when arrange­ ments had been completed b y a join t commission o f m ilitary experts in the face o f the feet that no tim e lim it had been set for the w ork o f the commission.37 T h e Russian representatives insisted that th ey would not sign a general agreement unless Japan promised to evacuate N orth Sakhalin by the end o f the currentnavigadon season and would not oppose the entry o f the forces o f the Far Eastern Republic into Vladivostok.38 A t the sessions on A pril 1 and 3 the representatives o f the Far Eastern Republic presented to Matsushima the revised draft o f a m ilitary agree­ m ent, a draft docum ent stating that the Japanese w ould not obstruct entry o f the forces o f the Far Eastern Republic into V ladivostok, a draft document concerning private property, a draft protocol stating that the Japanese forces would be withdrawn from N orth Sakhalin b y the end o f the navigation season, and a draft statem ent concerning the dism antling o f fortifications. A lthough the officials o f the Far Eastern R epublic ex­ pressed the w ish to conclude all agreements w ithin five days, after prolonged discussion the tw o sides could agree only on the draft con­ cerning private property and the draft concerning the fortifications. On April 5 the imperial governm ent decided at a cabinet m eeting to break o ff negotiations if the Far Eastern Republic did not bow to Japanese demands b y A pril 15, the deadline previously announced. T h e various units o f the expeditionary force were to be relieved as scheduled.1 T h e The 8th and n th divisions were duly exchanged that month.

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government would bide its tim e to await changes in the Far Eastern situation and withdraw its forces at a favorable opportunity. On A pril 6 and 9 the Japanese made a last effort to persuade the Rus­ sians to accept the Japanese terms, but the Russians objected to the indefinite ending o f the Japanese occupation; they insisted that the Japanese agree to withdraw from the M aritim e Province w ithin 45 days from the signing o f the basic agreement. When it became clear that the conference would founder over the evacuation issue, the Japanese side suddenly introduced modifications in the provisions o f the trade and general agreem ent, so that the break­ down could be attributed technically to dispute over the latter. “ T h e modifications, as far as can be made out,” the Peking Daily News observed, “ raised w hole questions o f principle that had as a m atter o f fact already been agreed upon, and that they should have been raised at all suggests that they were raised m erely as an excuse for the breaking-off o f the negotiations, and to save the reputation o f the m ilitarist dictators o f Japan, w ho had been unable to support the idea o f a prom pt evacuation of the M aritim e Province.” 39 On A pril 15 the delegates o f the Far Eastern Republic rejected the Japanese demand that they accept all o f their proposals and tossed back the ultim atum ; if the Japanese failed to respond favourably to their de­ mands w ithin 24 hours, they would leave. T h e following day the de­ legates o f the Far Eastern Republic proposed to extend the tim e period for Japanese evacuation from 45 to 50 days and to do so (as a face saver) by secret agreement. Matsushima rejected this and pronounced the conference terminated. Petrov and his delegation left that very night for the north. T h e Japanese delegates politely bowed them o ff at the railway station, then departed themselves on the 20th.40 T he Dairen Conference had foiled for a number o f reasons. W ith a general to “ assist” M atsushima, the Japanese chief delegate’s hands may have been tied, for the m ilitary were determ ined to stay in the Russian Far East. Certainly the changing complexion o f the Far Eastern Republic had been a major foctor. A s long as the republic had appeared to be a democratic, non-Communist creation, there had been hope that

42

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

it m ight accept the Japanese demand that Communism be kept out o f Siberia, but as it turned obviously red, it became plain that the Japanese demand would never be accepted and that the negotiations were doomed to failure.41 T h e Russians made little effort to hide the fact that the Far Eastern R epublic was the mouthpiece o f M oscow. A s M ikhail Krichevskii w rote concerning the rupture o f negptiations in the Soviet journal Mezbdunarodnaia zb iztf (International life) in M ay o f 1922, the lengthy conference between the representatives o f Japan and the representatives o f the Far Eastern Republic “ had in feet been a conference between Japan and Soviet Russia.” H e remarked that it was evident from the polemics in the Japanese press that this had been realized not on ly by the Far Eastern Republic but also b y Japan.42 It was said that when M atsushima bade ferewell to Petrov he ex­ pressed surprise that such a small state as the Far Eastern R epublic had rejected the proposals o f a great power like Japan, for Japan herself had accepted the demands o f greater powers at the W ashington Conference w ith little discussion. Petrov had allegedly replied that behind the Far Eastern Republic stood Soviet Russia, which was as great a power as those whose demands Japan had accepted at W ashington.43 Both sides blamed each other for the collapse o f the Dairen Con­ ference, which, w ith some interruptions, had continued for eight months. Pointing the finger at the Far Eastern Republic, a Japanese Foreign O ffice spokesman asserted that her demand for a fixed tim e lim it for the com plete withdrawal o f Japanese troops im plied “ unwar­ ranted distrust.” Whereas Japan has . . . throughout the negotiations maintained a sincere and conciliatory attitude [the Foreign O ffice official declared], the Chita delegate entirely ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought up one demand after another, thereby tryin g to gain time. N ot only did he refuse to entertain Japanese proposals, but declared that he would drop the negoti­ ations and return to C hita im m ediately. T h e only conclusion from this attitude o f the C hita Govern-

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m ent being that they lacked the sincerity w ith which to try to brin g the negotiations to fruition, the Japanese Governm ent have instructed their delegate to quit Dairen.44 T h e Russians did not deny their m istrust o f the Japanese; they thought it warranted, however. "T h e methods o f the Japanese command in the occupied region," V . G . Antonov, T o k yo manager o f Dal’ ta (Far Eastern Telegraph A gency), the official organ o f the Far Eastern R epublic, declared on A pril 2 1, "m ade the Far Eastern Republic governm ent distrustful o f vague assurances that evacuation would take place ‘as soon as possible.’ ” 45 W hen the Japanese negotiators, visibly offended by Russian m istrust, spoke o f samurai honor and pride, the Russians responded that samurai pride could not take the place o f a docum ent in international relations.46 M any Japanese M e d to understand Russian m istrust; they really believed that their occupation o f Russian territory was a w orthy and unselfish cause and not an im perialistic scheme. A statem ent issued b y the Japanese on January 7 ,19 2 2 , reflected their exasperation: Japan, retaining her troops in Eastern Siberia from the sheer necessity o f self-protection, stricd y maintains neutrality in regard to Russian dom estic strifes, and as repeatedly stated in the dec­ larations o f the Imperial Governm ent, it is their desire that the tim e w ill soon come when the local political condition recovering itse lf they m ay be enabled to evacuate there. It is com plexing beyond comprehension that in spite o f this state o f things, there should be Russians, who, whenever anything occurs that m ay prove disadvantageous to their party or faction insinuatingly find fault w ith the attitude o f Japan, the more reckless o f them going the length o f m aking mischievous propaganda against her on the strength o f nothing more authentic than pure fabrications. W hen in M ay last year, a political upheaval occured in Vladivos­ tok, sweeping away the influence o f the C hita Governm ent, rumor was set afloat alleging that the Japanese force was behind the "W hite A rm y." O n the other hand, the m eeting, later, o f the

44

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. Dairen Conference, the secret visit o f Z etlin to Vladivostok, and the refusal o f the Japanese A rm y to supply arms to the M erkouloff Governm ent, gave rise to another rumour purporting this time, that the Japanese troops were helping the R ed Arm y. These malicious rumours were u tterly devoid o f foundation, the Japanese Arm y having throughout maintained strict neutrality and positively unpartial a ttitu d e .. . . T h e allegation that the Japanese troops are supplying the W hite Arm y w ith arms and are helping civil strife, in order to make it a pretext o f retaining the troops in Siberia, is too ludicrous to be seriously taken. Japan has no desire but to hope that the Russians w ill cease their internal strifes and peace and order may be established in the Far Eastern Russia as soon as possible, so that she may w ithdraw her troops w ith a sense o f relief. W hat the Japanese A rm y at Vladivostok have done is that in compliance w ith the request o f the local Consular body, they have handed to the local adm inistrative body a minimum supply o f arms absolutely necessary for the maintenance o f order, to be used b y a fixed number o f private policemen, whose existence has for some time been recognised. It is absolutely untrue to say that the Japanese troops have ever supplied the W hite A rm y w ith any arms. The truth o f w hat has ju st been said must be quite dear from the feet that the M erkouloff “ Governm ent” is blam ing Japan for her refusal to grant them any warlike implements, the Japanese troops having nothing w hatever to do w ith the latest activity o f the W hite A rm y .. . . T h e drcular [allegedly distributed b y the C hita government] declares further that “Japan has at the Dairen Conference made a demand o f such nature as the cession o f the shores o f the Tartary Strait” . Facts could not be more outrageously distorted. The prindpal object o f Japan at the Dairen Conference is to obtain assurances in connection w ith the security o f the life and property o f Japanese subjects, the elimination o f dangers to communica­ tion and the menace to the Empire o f Japan and the freedom o f

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com m erce and industry, in the Far Eastern Russia, thereby to be enabled to effect the withdrawal o f her troops from the M aritim e Province, and Japanese Governm ent harbours no other m otives o r w ishes.47 T o th e Russians it seemed that the Japanese were insincere, that they had participated in the Dairen Conference only to curb discussion o f the Siberian question in W ashington. T h ey believed that Japan had increased the tem po o f the negotiations had shown apparent w ill­ ingness to come to an agreement only w hile the W ashington Conference had lasted (N ovem ber 12 ,19 2 1, to February6,1922).“ Foreign M inister Ianson asserted in a letter tx> Foreign M inister Uchida on A pril 22, that the breakdown o f the negotiations had been “ entirely the fault o f the Japanese governm ent.” Ianson w rote that full agreem ent had been reached toward the begin­ ning o f A p ril on all provisions o f a treaty o f commerce as w ell as on a number o f questions concerning relations between the tw o sides. T h e vo id in g o f the text o f all the points o f the trade agreement and o f all supplements pertaining to other economic and political questions had been w orked out. T h e tw o sides thus had seemed on the verge o f the establishment o f commercial relations. Agreem ent had not been reached only on the question o f the evacuation o f Japanese troops from the Maritime Province. W henever this question had been raised during the Dairen talks, Ianson stated, the Japanese delegation had declared that this question w ould be solved concretely and positively and that evacuation would take place as soon as the possibility would arise for the conclusion of a general agreement between both sides. W hen, however, b y the beginning o f April such a possibility emerged very definitely, it became necessary to w ork out a w ritten act about the evacuation; as the tw o ■ In his memoirs Petrov recalls that the position o f his side had been stiffened by orders directly from Lenin. A t the time o f the Washington Conference Lenin had sent a directive to the negotiators at Dairen through Chicherin instructing them to take into consideration the clash o f interests o f the imperialists at the Washington Conference and to continue adhering to the hard line at Dairen. (Piettov, 91).

46

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

delegations were considering it, it became evident that the Japanese governm ent had changed its original opinion about the need erf"evacuat­ ing the Japanese troops from the M aritim e Province. T h e Far Eastern Republic could not accept the continuation o f the Japanese occupation, w hich made the reestablishment o f commercial and other econom ic relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic practically im ­ possible and the treaty o f commerce meaningless. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic believes that there can be peace in the Russian Far East and economic cooperation between Japan on one hand and the Russian Far East and Siberia cm the other hand only in the event o f the com plete evacuation o f Russian territory b y Japanese troops [Ianson reiterated]. T h e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic w ill strive b y all means to achieve this end; it declares, however, that further contacts between the tw o governm ents w ill be successful only if the Japanese governm ent w ill show a similar inclination.48 T h e Japanese governm ent rebutted Ianson’s note. It argued: Since the Imperial Japanese Governm ent has taken the decision to evacuate, there is not the slightest doubt that it w ill carry it ou t; this can be seen from the evacuation o f the Transbaikal and Am ur regions, which has already taken place. In spite o f this the C hita Governm ent does not believe in our sincerity and has formed a mistaken opinion about the Imperial Governm ent’s intentions concerning the evacuation. T h e Imperial Governm ent m ust ex­ plain such an attitude b y C hita as being due either to the mis­ taken view s o f their representatives in Dairen concerning the Japanese Governm ent or to the deliberate evasion o f the conclud­ in g o f any agreem ent whatsoever.49 T h e foreign press voiced conflicting view s. T h e North China Star accused Japanese diplom acy o f “ wilyness” and “ the capacity for perver­ sion o f the truth” and charged the Japanese delegates w ith “ bad frith and insincerity.” 50 T h e North China Standard, cm the other hand, declared

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47

that Japan had displayed a “ conciliatory attitude,” and attributed the failure o f the conference to the “ perem ptory tone” o f the C hita delega­ tion. R eferring to the “ ultimatum” o f the Far Eastern Republic that the Japanese evacuate the M aritim e Province in forty-five days, including prelim inary arrangements, and to the various other demands made on the Japanese, the North China Standard commented that “ no self-respect­ ing G overnm ent could have accepted such an ultim atum unless under stress o f force.” It added: “ W hatever m ay be thought erf*the Bolsheviks and th eir methods they have long since proved that they are no dip ­ lomats. W ith brutal force and recklessness no negotiations can be carried through.” 51 Tanaka Bunichirö

— W , a diplom at w ith long experience in

Russia, w ho years later analyzed the failure o f the Dairen Conference for the edification o f his colleagues in the Foreign O ffice, believed that it was th e Russian governm ent that had lost interest in the conclusion of an agreem ent between the Far Eastern R epublic and Japan, in fact gradually had come to think one undesirable. Tanaka attributed the change in Soviet attitude to the change in Russia’s international position. A t the outset o f the negotiations, in the summer o f 1921, Russia had been com pletely isolated from the rest o f Europe and her need for con­ sumer goods had been desperate; she had desired trade w ith Japan at any price. Follow ing the conclusion o f commercial agreements w ith Great Britain, Italy and Germ any and the im port o f American and Chinese goods, the need for trade w ith Japan had become less acute and the position o f the Far Eastern Republic correspondingly stronger. While the Far Eastern Republic had been established originally as a coalition buffer state for the purpose o f approaching Japan as w ell as o f avoiding conflict w ith her, its governm ent had eventually become Communist-dominated and in effect M oscow-ruled. A s the chances o f Soviet Russia’s recognition b y the other powers increased and the likeli­ hood o f their recognition o f the Far Eastern Republic as an autonomous state declined, M oscow deemed it best not to com plicate m atters b y an ' agreement between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic, recognizing the independence o f the latter. Tanaka observed furthermore that the

48

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

delegate o f the Far Eastern Republic had insufficient know ledge o f law and treaties to understand the Japanese proposals h illy and that he was not a man o f compromise. Last bu t not least» Tanaka realized, the re­ presentative o f the Far Eastern Republic suspected the intentions o f the Japanese m ilitary and did not have faith in their vague pledge o f with­ drawal.52

CHAPTER TWO

The Changchun Conference

O

N M ay 20,1922, V . G . Antonov, former head o f the Communist governm ent o f Vladivostok and now manager o f the T o k yo office o f Dal’ ta, the official news agency o f the Far Eastern R e­

public, sounded out M atsudaira Tsuneo, now director o f the Bureau o f European and American Affairs o f the Japanese Foreign Office, about the resum ption o f negotiations between Russia and Japan.* Matsudaira must have been encouraging, for on June 12 Antonov returned to convey that th e governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic wished to resume negotiations and had entrusted him w ith discussing the date and place for such a new conference. T h e Far Eastern Republic made tw o con­ ditions for the resumption o f talks: that a representative o f the Soviet governm ent be allowed to participate and that Japan fix a tim e for the evacuation o f her forces from the Russian Far East. A t a m eeting o f the cabinet on June 23 and o f the Foreign Policy R e­ search Board on June 24 the Japanese governm ent decided to withdraw its forces from the M aritim e Province, including the coast opposite Sakhalin, b y the end o f O ctober, before freezing, and made a public statement to this effect. It was the feeling o f the Japanese statesmen not only that the red terror had abated in Europe and in Siberia but that relations between Soviet Russia and the other powers had im proved to such an extent that the latter m ight insist on Japanese evacuation and

* According to journalist Albert Maybon, Antonov’s appointment as manager of the news agency had been a blind; he had been sent specifically to pave the way for talks between Tokyo and Chita. (VAsie Française, M ay 1923, in Japanese Archives, M T251.106.14:387-391)

50

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R.

Japan would risk the embarrassment o f having to w ithdraw in response to such demands if she continued the occupation. Deem ing it desirable to conclude an agreement w ith the Far Eastern Republic prior to evacua­ tion, the Japanese governm ent informed Antonov that it would fix a date for the evacuation o f the M aritim e Province and would allow the participation o f Soviet representatives in the proposed negotiations in order to obtain immediate Soviet approval o f an agreement between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan. T h e Japanese added that points settled at Dairen should be left untouched, discussion to proceed speedily on items where there had been differences o f opinion. T h ey thought that talks would be held again at Dairen. A s an inducement for a speedy conclusion o f an agreement, they stated that i f the governm ent o f the Far Eastern Republic signed the Japanese proposals for the basic agree­ ment and other points b y A ugust 15, the w ar stores held by them would be handed over to it (rather than to anti-Com m unist forces).1 Antonov left T o k yo on June 29 to convey the Japanese view s to the governm ent at Chita. T h e announcement o f Japan’s decision to evacuate her forces from the M aritim e Province came as a com plete surprise to the Far Eastern Republic. But welcome as the news was, the feeling o f relief was mixed w ith the conviction that the Japanese would now seek to reward themselves for the “ voluntary” withdrawal.2 W hile the Japanese were w aiting to hear from Antonov again, E. K. O zam in, the extraordinary representative o f the Far Eastern R epublic in the Chinese Eastern R ailw ay zone at Harbin, handed to Consul General Yamanouchi Shirö

a letter from Foreign M inister

Ianson to the Japanese foreign m inister, datedjunc 30. In it Ianson officially repeated the demand that Japan specify the date o f withdrawal from the territory o f the Far Eastern Republic and allow Soviet participation in negotiations between the tw o countries, noting that Russia w ould participate in “ a join t delegation w ith the F.E .R .” Ianson expressed the hope that the negptiations would take place and would “ open the w ay to the wide economic developm ent and commercial relations between the Russian Far East and Japan.” 3 Expecting word from A ntonov, the imperial governm ent m erely had Yamanouchi answer orally th at it

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51

agreed in principle to the resumption o f negotiations. W hen more tim e elapsed w ithout any communication from A ntonov, Japan replied in a w ritten note from the Foreign O ffice to the People’s Com missariat for Foreign Affairs, dated July 18 and transm itted b y Yamanouchi to O zam in the follow ing day, that withdrawal o f the forces from the M aritim e Province would be com pleted “ not later than N ovem ber 1” and that it had consented to Soviet participation in the com ing conference “ under conditions regulating the formulation o f the agreem ent.” T h e govern­ ment rem arked that the details o f this question had been discussed be­ tween M atsudaira and Antonov. “ A s a place for the conference,” the note concluded, “ it would be desirable to select Harbin or Dairen.” 4 M eanwhile a reply from Antonov to M atsudaira arrived in Harbin and was conveyed b y O zam in to Yamanouchi on the same day as the note from the Foreign Office to the People’ s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: T h e official resolution o f the Imperial Japanese Governm ent concerning evacuation makes it possible to suppose that this question w ill be solved at the forthcom ing Conference in a spirit satisfactory to both sides and that a w ay w ill be found to formulate this question in such manner as not to create difficulties for the Japanese Delegation [Antonov w rote]. T h e m atter o f the participa­ tion o f delegates o f the Russian [Soviet Federated Socialist] Re­ public is discussed in the note o f la. D . Ianson [of June 30]. T h e question o f the w orking out o f an agreement and its final drawing up can be left for the Conference itself, since it is impossible to decide in advance b y means o f the exchange o f telegrams and fragm entary negotiations.5 T h e desirability o f a reasonable compromise between the Soviet Union and Japan was noted b y the Peking Tientsin Times: It is politic for Russia to leave passion aside, and to give sym p­ athetic consideration to Japan’s economic desires, w hile resisting, as she m ust, if she is determined to preserve Russian sovereignty

52

Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R. over Eastern Siberia, her more threatening political pretensions. It is ridiculous to suppose that either the C hita Governm ent or the M oscow Governm ent w ill be able to develop the resources o f Northern Sakhalin unaided. And it is equally patent that the sub­ jects o f no other foreign Power w ill be prepared to sink the large amount ofcapital needed for the exploitation o f Northern Sakhalin in an attem pt to develop its resources if such enterprise evokes the hostility o f Japan.

Referring to reports from T o k yo that Japan was w eighing the possibil­ ity o f purchasing N orth Sakhalin from the Soviet Union, the paper regarded this, if true, as “ a bold bid not only for amicable liquidation o f the whole Siberian adventure, but for Russian political friendship.” “ I f the renewal o f Russian friendship is the fundamental m otive animat­ ing the Japanese Governm ent,” the Peking Tientsin Times concluded, “ the Katö M inistry, if it does nothing else o f constructive value, but achieves that, w ill have deserved w ell o f its country.” 6 Such a view was not shared by various W hite Russian groups which protested against Japanese dealings w ith the Com munists. T h e Council o f National State Associations (Sovet Natsional’no-Gosudarstvennykh O b’edinenii) in the d t y o f Harbin, for example, warned that negotiations w ith the Bolsheviks could lead to the destruction o f Japan’s own m ilitary m ight and the loss o f her significance in the Far East. “ T h e negotiations and the agreement and treaty about commercial relations w ith the Bolsheviks stemming from them w ill arouse general outrage am ong the Russian people, and they w ill not recognize the force o f a treaty con­ cluded w ith their tyrants, murderers and executioners o f . . . Russia.” 7 On July 28 Yamanouchi reiterated to O zam in that his governm ent wished to com plete an agreement b y A ugust is .7*b T h e following day, on July 29, the representative o f the Far Eastern Republic at Harbin handed Yamanouchi a letter, dated July 25 and signed jo in tly b y Lev 6 Tanaka states that Japan pressed Russia for a reply on July 27. It is possible that instructions were sent to Yamanouchi from Tokyo on the 27th; he then spoke to the Russian official the next day.

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53

M ikh ail Karakhan, D eputy People's Commissar o f Foreign Affairs o f R u ssia, and b y Iakov D avidovich Ian son, M inister o f Foreign Affairs o f th e Far Eastern Republic. In it they acknowledged the decision o f the im perial Japanese governm ent “ to carry out the com plete evacuation o f Japanese forces from Russian territory in the Far East.” T h ey expressed th e satisfaction o f the governm ents o f Russia and o f the Far Eastern R ep u b lic w ith the decision o f the Japanese governm ent to evacuate its troop s from the Russian Far East b y N ovem ber I, 1922. In view o f the mutual agreem ent o f Russia and the Far Eastern Republic on one hand, and Japan on the other hand, to start negotiations for the establishm ent o f peaceful and friendly re­ lations [the note continued], the governm ents o f Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic are o f the opinion that at the com ing conference Russia, the Far Eastern Republic, and Japan should be represented upon a basis o f equality, and that the com ing agreem ent should be signed in the name ofeach o f the governments represented at the conference. Russia and the Far Eastern Republic considered C hita or M oscow as th e m ost appropriate place for the conference; they pledged to secure for the Japanese delegation “ all necessary com fort for the negotiations and particularly good connection b y direct w ire w ith all points on the m ainland.” I f Japan had any objections to C hita or M oscow, the tw o governm ents were prepared to agree to Peking or T o k yo, preferably the latter, provided satisfactory communication w ith C hita and M oscow could be guaranteed. In conclusion the note named the delegates who had been appointed to represent Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic: A doPf Abra­ m ovich Ioffe, member o f the All-Russian Central Executive Com m ittee, and Ianson, m inister o f foreign affairs o f the Far Eastern Republic.8 T h e letter from Karakhan and Ianson, although transm itted to Yamanouchi after his demand for a reply, had not been the awaited response. O n A ugust I Yamanouchi handed to the deputy representative o f the Far Eastern Republic in Harbin a note in which he stated that he had

54

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

received instructions that day to seek a prom pt answer to his request of July 28. Reiterating that Japan would prefer to meet again at Dairen, he declared that if this were unacceptable, Japan would be w illing to meet in H arbin; she was unable to agree to T o k yo or Chita.c Yamanouchi noted that Japan had repeatedly declared that an agree­ m ent m ust be concluded before she could evacuate her troops. H e as­ serted that m ost points had been settled at Dairen; questions w hich had not been considered at Dairen, such as the fishery problem and the N ikolaevsk incident, could be discussed only after the signature o f the basic treaty. Yamanouchi observed that all this had already been com­ municated to the Far Eastern Republic through Antonov and repeated that the agreement m ust be concluded not later than A ugust i$ .9 O n A ugust 10 the representative o f the Far Eastern Republic handed to Yamanouchi a note from Karakhan and Ian son, dated A ugust 6, in reply to the statem ent o f the Japanese governm ent, conveyed b y him. Karakhan and Ianson w rote that their governm ents shared the desire for a speedy conclusion o f an agreement but that they doubted th at this could be done b y the 15th o f the same m onth; the representatives o f both sides could hardly get together b y that tim e, particularly since agreement had not y e t been reached on a place o f m eeting. For the sake o f saving tim e the governm ents o f Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic agreed to the Japanese proposal that a general agreem ent be considered and signed first, and that more detailed and concrete questions be examined after the signature at the same conference. T h e tw o govern­ ments felt that w ith mutual goodwill such a general basic treaty could be concluded quickly in view o f the negotiations that had taken place at Dairen.d * T he Russians felt that there was much popular support in Japan for the resump­ tion o f Russo-Japanese relations and that the Japanese government had refused to meet in Tokyo for fear o f political demonstrations in support o f the Soviet delega­ tion. (M ikhail Pavlovich [Vel'tman], Sovetskaia Rossta i imperialisticbeskaia Idpomu [Soviet Russia and imperialist Japan] [Moscow, 1923], p. 83) 4 It is curious to note a discrepancy in the text published by the Soviet Foreign Office in 1961 on the basis o f the wording that appeared in Izptttüé on August 10,*

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55

Since Japan had turned down M oscow and C hita as places o f negotia­ tion, the tw o governm ents felt that they could no longer insist on T okyo. Inasmuch as Japan had not objected to Peking, the governments o f Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic “ insisted] on this d ty ,” which had the added advantage that the Russian delegate, who had been appointed was at the same tim e the extraordinary plenipotentiary re­ presentative o f the R .S.F.S.R . to China and was already en route to Peking.10 On A ugust 14 the Japanese governm ent expressed its satisfaction with the consent o f the Far Eastern Republic to sign a general treaty before a detailed consideration o f separate questions and agreed to extend the dealine for concluding such an agreement “ for some time” beyond A ugust 15. It fully concurred w ith the view that the general agreement could be concluded quickly and declared that if the signature of the agreem ent took place shordy, it would be prepared to settle all matters that m ight arise in connection w ith the evacuation o f the Japa­ nese troops. It refused n> hold the conference at Peking, however, on the grounds that it was inconvenient to conduct negptiadons in such an international d t y on foreign territory, and instead proposed Harbin, Dairen, M ukden or Changchun. It promised good communication w ith Chita and stated that it w ould not object to the transfer o f further negotiations to another place upon mutual agreement. It concluded w ith die hope that the Far Eastern Republic would accept the Japanese proposal w ithout much loss o f tim e on prelim inary selection o f a place for the negotiations.11 T h e Russian side replied in a note, dated A ugust 24, signed jo in tly by Karakhan and Ianson, and transm itted through the Japanese con-*

*1922, and the typewritten copy, preserved in the Japanese Foreign Office Archives. The text published by the Soviet side states: “ T he governments o f the R.S.F.S.R. and the F.E.R. suppose that such a general basic treaty, in view o f the negotiations that had taken place in Dairen, can with mutual goodwill be signed [podpium\ in the shortest period.” T he text in thejapanese Foreign Office has “ worked out” [vyrabotm] instead o f “ signed.”

5r another tw o to three days to perm it them to w ind up their affairs. T h u s the Changchun Conference collapsed after thirteen sessions or tw enty-one days.42*r In a public statem ent made on Septem ber 25, M atsudaira review ed the course o f the Changchun talks. H e accused the Russian side o f “ a com­ plete ignoring o f the circum stances attending the conference and the upsetting o f the understanding arrived at in the prelim inary negotia­ tions.” W hile he declared that “ the entire responsibility for th e break­ up o f the conference rests w ith the Russians,” he expressed the “ con­ fident belief” o fh is governm ent that the collapse o f the conference would in no w ise effect “ the sym pathy and kind feeling entertained b y the Governm ent and people o f Japan towards the Russian people.” 43 Foreign M inister Uchida declared on Septem ber 27 that the failure of the Changchun Conference meant no change in the Japanese policy of

r According to a dispatch from Moscow, printed in the DeutscheAllgemeine Zeitung on October 4,1922, Ioffe’s departure was delayed by illness. T he Japanese delegation called on Ioffe to express their sym pathy and to assure him that the end o f the con­ ference was merely a temporary break in Russo-Japanese negotiations.

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w ithdraw al from Siberia: “ T h e w ithdraw al from V ladivostok and other mainland points w ill be concluded b y the end o f O ctober. A s for Saghalien, o u r retirem ent from the northern or Russian half o f the island w ill take place, as repeatedly stated, as soon as the N ikolaevsk affair has been settled. T h e Japanese G overnm ent has no territorial design in this or any other connection.” U chida restated the objectives w ith w hich Japan had come to the con­ ference: It w as made clear in advance that w e sought a w orking arrange­ m ent w ith the C hita Governm ent w hich w ould protect our fron­ tiers from lawless incursions, term inate hostile propaganda, and g iv e protection to Japanese and Koreans residing law fully in Siberia. W e hoped to obtain the recognition o f the rights ofp rivate ownership o f property for our people and freedom to trade and conduct their affairs : and these things, w e believed, would benefit the unfortunate Russians in Siberia as w ell as the approxim ately ten thousand Japanese and the Koreans, w ho still reside and attem pt to conduct their business there b y right o f treaty w ith the form er Governm ent o f Russia. Uchida asserted that in dealing w ith the M oscow representatives the Japanese diplom ats had encountered “ difficulties o f the same character” as their European colleagues and expressed doubt, in view o f Soviet Russia’s denial o f private ownership o f property in European Russia, of “ the sincerity o f the Soviet intentions at Changchun.” Y e t like Matsudaira he ended on a note o f goodw ill, proclaim ing that “ the Japanese G overnm ent in accordance w ith the wishes o f the Japanese people deeply sym pathizes w ith the affilicted Russian people and pro­ foundly desires that peace and order m ay be maintained in Siberia.” 44 Analyzing the failure o f the Changchun talks on the basis o f Japanese archival m aterial, Tanaka made m ention o f the fact that the Russians had had frequent contact w ith Japanese newspapermen. T h e y did so, he felt, not only to spread propaganda bu t also to gather information about conditions in Japan. O ne o f the reasons the talks collapsed, Tanaka felt,

7»

Japanese R ecognition o f tbe U S S R .

was that the Russians concluded from w hat they had heard from the newspapermen that there was much internal opposition to the govern­ m ent’s policy in Japan and that w ith tim e internal pressure from Japanese businessmen and workers w ould force the Japanese governm ent com e to more favorable terms w ith Soviet Russia. Sooner or later the Japanese would evacuate their forces from the M aritim e Province anyw ay. T h e y felt that the days o f the Far Eastern R epublic were numbered and th at it would soon be incorporated in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist R epublic w ith Vladivostok too reverting to Russian rule. It thus w as to their advantage to w ait until the situation was more favorable rather than to sign an im m ediate agreem ent that entailed considerable sacri­ fice.45 Ioffe’s high regard for newspapers and their use was common know ­ ledge. In a speech at Peking he him self had referred to the press o f Europe as “ the great power” and to the press o f China as “ the prim e great power.” 46 Soviet contact w ith Japanese journalists is borne o u t by Russian sources, w hich tell o f a secret memorandum that w as handed to the Russian delegation b y a Japanese newspaperman. T h e journalist stated that the failure o f the conference w ould be a disaster for both Russia and Japan. A sserting that he was sym pathetic toward Russia, he pro­ posed tw o w ays in w hich the conference could be concluded successfully, a step he deemed necessary for the recognition o f the Soviet regim e by Japan. H e promised to use the influence o f the Japanese press to hasten recognition, if either o f the tw o proposals were accepted b y the Soviets. Briefly, the journalist stated that Russia could either accept the Japanese proposals o f the Dairen Conference prom ptly and thereby gain Japanese goodw ill, obtain the confiscated w ar stores and soon recognition, or it could insist on the abolition o f the Dairen agreem ent and on the start o f negotiations for the conclusion o f a commercial agreem ent not only between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic bu t also w ith Russia. T o overcom e opposition to the latter course, Russia w ould have a choice of either offering to sell to Japan N orth Sakhalin or at least o f guaranteeing that she w ould cede neither Sakhalin nor the M aritim e Province to a third power, since Japan feared American seizure o f Asia. T h e journalist

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suggested, furthermore, that Soviet Russia pledge not to incite Koreans to seek independence from Japan.47 R eview in g the collapse o f the second round o f talks from the Soviet standpoint, Ioffe did not regard the Changchun Conference as the culm ination o f the Dairen Conference in the sense that all that had re­ mained to be done was for the Russian delegates to add a few finishing touches and sign the agreem ent hammered out earlier. In his view the international situation had changed dram atically, and the idea o f“ bufferism,” w hich had been tied closely tx> the Siberian intervention, could no longer play a role at the conference. T h e Russian delegation, there­ fore, w as prepared for an all-out figh t to regain for Russia her proper place on th e Pacific. W hen it became apparent that Japan’ s attitude to­ ward th e Soviet regim e had not changed and that it was regarded as just as w eak and beleaguered as it had been in the early days o f the R evolution, Ioffe realized that the talks w ere as y e t prem ature and that the Changchun Conference w ould be as fruitless as the Dairen Con­ ference had been. T h e Japanese had come to Changchun to discuss on ly trade and other problems between Japan and the Far Eastern R epublic and questions such as fishery, relating to the Russian Far E ast; they had not been ready for a general agreem ent w ith Soviet Russia. M atsudaira had frankly stated to Ioffe that the Japanese people had com e to tru st the Far Eastern R epublic, where there was a dem ocratic regim e rather than a Com m unist one, and that th ey were w illin g to establish econom ic relations w ith it. It had been found at Dairen that Soviet participation in negotiations w as necessary to solve such problems as fishery, bu t Japan was not y e t ready to m ake a more far-reaching agreem ent w ith the R.S.F.S.R ., though it thought that the projected agreem ent w ith the Far Eastern Republic w ould pave the w ay for a later agreem ent w ith Soviet Russia. In the eyes o f Ioffe Japanese diplom acy was unique in that it did not consider it necessary to compromise the points o f view o f the tw o negotiating parties in the conclusion o f an agreem ent. Japanese diplo­ macy, he w rote, was concerned exclusively w ith Japanese interests

8o

'Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

and was not even interested in know ing and understanding the interests o f the other side. In his w ords: Japanese diplom acy puts forth its demands. I f th ey are categori­ cally rejected, and it becomes necessary to retreat, Japanese diplom acy m erely moderates its appetite w ithout going out to m eet the other side, i.e. it does not seek to m ake compromises in the direction o f the interest o f the other side bu t m erely gives in herself, lim iting her ow n interests. T o be sure, a com promise results, bu t there is an enormous difference, since in the case o f the Japanese tactics there remains quite often till the end a lack o f un­ derstanding w hat the other side wishes, in w hat it is interested.48 Ioffe felt that the Japanese had lost their sense o f reality. D uring th e C iv il W ar the Soviets had been greatly interested in the disposition o f the m ilitary stores, the safeguarding o f w hich had been one o f th e pretexts for the Intervention. B y this tim e, however, they believed th at the m ost valuable part o f the supplies had been shipped to Japan, th at Siberia had been sufficiently pacified to an extent that the arms could no longer be effectively used against them , and that the Japanese w ould surrender the remainder to W hite forces anyw ay, regardless o f an y agreem ent. T hu s Ioffe thought it to have been unrealistic for the Japanese to try to blackm ail his governm ent w ith these m ilitary stores into agree­ ing to their terms. Ioffe attributed the Japanese loss o f a sense o f reality to prolonged Japanese dealings w ith weak Siberian governm ents and individual adventurers w ho depended on Japanese support. T h e y had forgotten how delegates o f a governm ent representing all o f Russia con­ ducted them selves.49 T h e Japanese had tried to hold the Russian governm ent responsible for the N ikolaevsk incident. Ioffe had argued that the incident did not give Japan any grounds for claim s against the Russian gpvem m ent, because at the tim e o f its occurrence neither the governm ent o f Soviet Russia nor the gpvem m ent o f the Far Eastern Republic had extended its authority to this region. Japan’s struggle here had not been w ith regular Russian troops but w ith local partisans operating on their own.

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N either at Dairen nor at Changchun had the Japanese stated w hat com pensation they desired for the N ikolaevsk incident; they had m erely declared that they continued to occupy N orth Sakhalin as a guaranty that com pensation w ould be made. T h e Russian delegates countered that the occupation o f territory as a guaranty was unbefitting relations between civilized states; at the same tim e they suspected that Japan had no intention o f w ithdraw ing from N orth Sakhalin in view o f its economic and strategic im portance, even liberal Japanese politicians talking o f the im portance o f the island to Japan.50 In a statem ent about the Far Eastern situation, published in Izvestiia on O ctober 25, 1922, Foreign Com missar Chicherin stated the official Soviet position that the negotiations w ith Japan had failed because “ the appetites o f the Japanese im perialists are still so great, that an under­ standing w ith them for us at that tim e was still im possible.” A lleging that Japan intended to annex N orth Sakhalin, which came so close to the mainland and particularly to the m outh o f the Am ur R iver that its sur­ render w ould mean the exposure o f navigation on the Am ur to foreign domination, he declared: “ T h e estuary o f Siberia’s m ost im portant river would practically be in Japanese hands. W e cannot agree to this under any circum stances, and if the Japanese governm ent w ill not retract this demand, there w ill not only be no agreem ent w ith Japan, but there w ill remain in existence a source o f future com plications.” 51 On N ovem ber 11 Ioffe, who had returned to his post in Peking, followed up Chicherin’s pronouncem ent w ith a note to the Japanese M inister Obata T orikich i

3 ■ #, which stated that the worker-peasant govern­

ment o f Soviet Russia protested “ in the m ost determ ined and energetic way” against the continuation o f the “ com pletely illegal and absolutely inadmissable occupation b y Japanese forces o f the Russian part o f Sakha­ lin.” Y et a t the same tim e Ioffe held open the door for renewed talks b y reminding the Japanese governm ent that he had stated definitely at Changchun in the name o f his governm ent that Japanese economic interests on Sakhalin could be satisfied in another w ay, b y granting appropriate concessions in the northern part o f the island, and that Russia, true to her w ord was still w illing to do so.52

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T h e rupture o f negotiations had been agreeable to both sides, so much so that the question arose w hether anyone cared for the Changchun Conference. W hether it is a success or failure, it does not seem to bother either the Russians or the Japanese [the Peking Daily News reported]. T h e Japanese delegates have shown, in a statem ent b y their official spokesman, that degree o f eagerness to return to T o k io th at one is induced to think that it was a serious blunder on their p art to have been ever at Changchun at all. T h e Russians have been equally firm in their resolution not to continue the useless bickerings w ith the representatives from T o k io — so m uch so that it seemed absolutely foolish to have ever undertaken w h at is obviously next to im possibility.53 Y e t w hile neither the Japanese nor the Soviets w anted to d rag the conference out further when it became evident that no agreem ent could be reached, both sides left convinced that this was not a final break but m erely a tem porary interruption in a continuing dialogue. T h e Japanese negotiators had been encouraged in their opposition b y letters from m ilitary and civilian W hite Russian organizations, w hich protested against any accomodation w ith the Com m unists. T o win Japanese support they inveighed against the danger w hich Bolshevism posed for Japan, one o f the few rem aining pillars o f law and civilization in their eyes. W hite Russian officers and soldiers reminded the Japanese that their blood had run together in the common struggle against the Reds and called upon them not to take the “ insane step” o f surrendering the w ar materials in Vladivostok. “ T h e tim e has com e,” M ajor General T kachev w rote to the Japanese delegates at the Changchun Conference, “ when the enemies o f mankind are directing their blows in yo u r direc­ tion too and long to raise the flag o f the International atop sacred M t. Fuji.” 54 T h e foreign press again was divided as to w hich side was responsible for the collapse o f the negotiations. T h e Peking Daily News p u t the re­ sponsibility squarely on the shoulders o f Japan. It regarded the demand

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«3

for a definite date for Japanese withdraw al from N orth Sakhalin as “ a natural question for the Russian representatives to ask a n d . . . a fair question for the Japanese representatives to answer.” 55 T h e North China Standard, on the other hand, once more blamed the Russians : A gain the failure was due to the overbearing attitude o f die Bolsheviks on the one hand and their dishonest— w e cannot find a m ilder word— practices on the other. For a man o f the position o f M r. Y ofle to come all the w ay from M oscow to start negotiations w hich are supposed to be undertaken w ith a view to conclude a friendly agreem ent and then to stand up and declare that he has never heard o f the m ost fundamental conditions upon w hich these negotiations are based is more than bluff, it is sheer im pudence.56 T h e North China Daily News held out hopes for the successful resump­ tion o f negotiations because o f changes in Japanese public opinion. “ It is more than interesting to note quite a considerable feeling in Japan favoring th e enlargem ent o f the scope o f the Conference, and naturally in the great industrial centre o f Osaka, where people are probably more interested in trade than politics, this sentim ent has been especially pro­ nounced.” T h e paper remarked that “ in the new condition o f opinion in Japan, as mirrored in the press there, one finds so great a desire to have finished w ith the Siberian business that compromise hitherto deemed o u t o f the question seems to-day alm ost possible.” A w eek later the paper added: “ Looking to the diplom atic m ethods pursued in other parts o f the w orld b y the Soviet representatives, w e have very little doubt that before long they w ill be prepared w ith fresh proposals b y w hich the Japanese can again be brought to the conference table.” 57 In N ovem ber o f 1922 the Japanese evacuation o f the M aritim e Province was com pleted and, w ith the Japanese armies gone, the raison d’ etre for die Far Eastern Republic had vanished. T h e Popular Assem bly repealed the constitution, renounced its power and requested and the same m onth obtained reincorporation o f the Far Eastern Republic into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. O n Decem ber 30 the various re­ publics o f Russia joined in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.58

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T h e “ menace” o f Japan, w hich had been the reason for the creation of an ostensibly dem ocratic buffer state had been also used as an argument for its liquidation. In its final declaration the Popular Assem bly asserted that Japan had sought to take advantage o f the sovereignty o f the Far Eastern Republic and o f its separation from Soviet Russia to gain com­ plete freedom for Japanese capital in the Russian Far East, w hich would have made possible the colonization o f this region b y Japan. T h e Popular Assem bly declared that the dem ocratic constitution o f the Far Eastern Republic had not protected it from the inroads o f Japanese and other im perialists. “ W e learned from our experience that the talk o f bourgeois dem ocratic governm ents about dem ocracy and freedom are words, hiding their rapacious im perialistic yearnings for the seizure and plunder­ ing o f weaker countries and colonies.” 59

CHAPTER THREE

The Gotö-Ioffe Talks m ong

the Japanese who spoke out for a Russo-Japanese rap­

prochem ent was G oto Shimpei

form erly foreign minis­

ter and currently lord m ayor o f T o kyo. Viscount G oto was no Com m unist-sym pathizer; his advocacy o f Russo-Japanese collaboration antedated the Revolution. In the decade follow ing the Russo-Japanese War G oto had advocated Russo-Japanese collaboration as a means o f blocking American penetration into the Far E a st H e had served as president o f the South M anchurian R ailw ay (1906-08), had negotiated with T sa rist representatives concerning econom ic cooperation between the tw o countries (1909-10) and in 19 15-16 had conferred w ith the Tsarist m inister about the conclusion o f an alliance. G oto w as connected w ith shipping and railw ay enterprises which had far-reaching interests in the Russian Far East before the R evolution. He was a highly effective, popular orator, dubbed at one tim e the “Japa­ nese [Teddy] Roosevelt.” H e associated w ith men o f diverse political views. In the words o f his biographer: “ H is right arm embraced even those patriots w ho belonged to the extrem e righ t w ing, w hile his left arm reached those socialists w ho were on the extrem e left w ing. Just as Bismarck, w hile enforcing an absolute governm ent on one hand, m et with Lassalle, an extrem e leftist, and utilized his wisdom and tactics on die other hand, so the Count’s arm was extended to the extrem e left wing in spite o f the fact that the Count him selfwas regarded as belonging to the bureaucratic establishm ent.” 1 In his advocacy o f Japanese recogni­ tion o f the Soviet regim e and o f renewed Russo-Japanese collaboration Goto thus reflected at once the feeling o f businessmen and o f w orkers; recognition o f Soviet Russia was one o f the planks o f the Japanese federa­ tion o f labor at its convention in 1922.

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G otö realized that the difficult econom ic situation in w hich Russia found herselfin the w ake o fth e Revolution presented a great opportunity for Japan to utilize the vast territory o f the Soviet Far East to further her own developm ent; he argued also that prom pt conclusion o f a treaty between Japan and Russia w ould forestall the normalization o f RussoAmerican and Russo-Chinese relations, either o f w hich m igh t leave Japan dangerously isolated.“ G oto brushed aside political differences, noting that the foundations o f foreign policy w ere land and people, not ideology. H e deemed economic collaboration between Japan and Russia not only desirable bu t necessary. “ T h e resources o f the eastern p art o f the Russian territory seem to be w aiting for our help in their exploita­ tion.” G oto did not confine his advocacy o f a Japanese-Soviet rapprochem ent to words. W hen he learned that Ioffe, w ho had been the ch ief Soviet dele­ gate at Changchun, had fallen ill, he decided to take the opportunity to in vite him to Japan for a cure and in the process to reopen informal talks. Like Ioffe, G oto was a physician b y training— he had received an M .D . in Germ any— and had been director o f the Public H ealth Bureau and ch ief inspector o f arm y hygiene. H e was also president o f the Russo-Japanese Association. It was natural, therefore, for him to com m unicate w ith Ioffe in terms o f his health as w ell as o f the state o f Soviet-Japanese relations. W hile Soviet sources suggest that the invitation was G otö’s idea, some Japanese sources assert that Ioffe had conveyed to G oto his desire to v isit Japan for recuperation and sightseeing and that G oto extended the invitation in response to this. A t any rate, G oto cleared the m atter w ith Premier K atö Tom osaburö £D jft:£H J$;b in fact, they secretly agreed • • W hile the Soviet Union did not yet present a formidable opponent, she could have been dangerous to Japan as an ally o f the United States, the latter having emerged from World War la s the most serious opponent ofjapanese expansion by champion­ ing the territorial integrity o f Russia and China. b Admiral Katö Tomosaburö, chief assistant o f Admiral T ögö Heihachirö during the Russo-Japanese War and chief delegate o f Japan at the Washington N aval Con­ ference, was premier from June 12,1922 to August 25,1923. Do not confuse with Katö Takaald, who became premier in June o f 1924.

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that th e private talks w ould eventually become unofficial negotiations.2 W hen G oto released to the press that the premier approved o f the invita­ tion to Ioffe, Foreign M inister Uchida spoke up against the resumption o f negotiations in this manner, bu t b y this tim e G oto and his followers had publicized Katö’ s support so w idely that the prem ier could not reverse himself. A t last the Foreign O ffice concurred on condition that Ioffe w ould com e as a private person. So long as Japan did not recognize the Soviet Union she could not extend to Ioffe diplom atic status and privileges. O n January 16,1923, G oto cabled to Ioffe : “ I extend m y sincere sym pathy for you r health and suggest w hether you cannot spend some time in Japanese hot springs for cure that m ight help clear misunder­ standings between our tw o nations.” 3 M eanw hile the Japanese Ambassador to Poland, Kawakami Toshitsune & c, on his w ay through the Soviet Union told Foreign Commissar Chichcrin that the cession o f N orth Sakhalin to Japan w ould m ake possible the normalization o f Russo-Japanese relations and the de ju re recognition o f Soviet Russia b y Japan. A lthough Chichcrin flatly rejected Kawakami’s suggestion and refused to consider the cession o f any part o f Russian territory as subject to discussion, he had Ioffe accept the Japa­ nese invitation to v isit T o k yo and enter into negotiations about the normalization o f Soviet-Japanese relations. H e made it clear, however, that this w ould be done w ithout any prior com m itm ent whatsoever.4 On January 2 3 ,19 2 3 , Ioffe arrived in Shanghai and cabled to G oto: “ I beg you to accept m y sincere thanks for your kind invitation w hich mark o f attention I m ay be perm itted to consider as expression o f feelings o f Japanese people reciprocated b y Russian people. Am leaving Shanghai for T o k yo Saturday tw enty-seventh.” 5 T h e follow ing day, on January 24, Consul General Tanaka w ired that Ioffe had m et Sun-Yat-sen, head o f the revolutionary Kuom intang govern­ ment; tw o days later, on January 26, a jo in t Soviet-Chinese communiqué was made public. In it Ioffe assured Sun that China had “ the warm est sympathy o f the Russian people and can count on the support ofR ussia” * * Also known as Toshihiko.

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in its quest for national unification. A s Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr. had w rit­ ten in O ctober o f 1922 : “ A nd Japan is frightened— far more badly frighten­ ed than ever before in her history— for, should Russia and C hina enter into m ilitary alliance against Japan, all the fruits o f N ipponese victories in the field, on the sea and at the conference tables would becom e pyrrhic victories.” 6 Home M inister M izuno Rentarö

warned the Japanese

consulate at Shanghai that there m ight be an attem pt on the life o f Ioffe, particularly b y a relative o f one o f the Japanese massacred at N ikolaevsk, and expressed the wish that Ioffe could be dissuaded from com ing. Foreign M inister Uchida, who had opposed Ioffe’s visit from the very beginning, instructed Tanaka to inform Ioffe that his visit at the present tim e w as undesirable; he repeated M izuno’s assertion that “ various elem ents” were vociferously opposed to his com ing and that, although th e police would do their best to protect him , there was danger o f an attack on his person. G oto cabled lo fe to give serious thought to the m atter in order to avoid m isunderstandings. W hen Tanaka tried once more to dissuade him from proceeding to Japan, Ioffe retorted that he m ust interpret this as a change in the position o f the Japanese governm ent and warned that this would make a m ost unfavorable impression in M oscow . U nable to accept the responsibility for the repercussions that m ight ensue, Tanaka declared that the desire o f his governm ent to normalize relations w ith the Soviet Union had not changed and that he did not object to the trip. Booking passage on the American steam er Empress o f A na, lo fe reached Nagasaki on January 29 and Yokoham a on February 1. H e was accompanied b y his young w ife M ary and their four year old son Vladim ir and b y his private secretary Levin.7»d G otö’s secretary M ori Közö

had joined lo fe at Kobe. H e ac­

companied Ioffe and his party to T o k yo , where they arrived at 12 *40 p.m.

d “ M r. Levin is a member o f the so-called extraordinary commission w ith privileges and special rights. He reports directly to M oscow; he is the controller o f M r. Joffe, and seems to me mote important as [than] Joffe himself,” von Salzmann had reported from Peking. (Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.7:2600 and M T 251.106.15:573)

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on February 1. T h ey proceeded from the station to the Tsukiji-Seiyoken H otel where G oto and Ioffe m et for the first tim e and talked for three hours. T h e following day Ioffe paid a return visit to G oto at his residence, then left for the hot spring resort o f Atam i where he was to confer w ith G oto in a relaxed atmosphere w hile recuperating.8 Japanese reaction to Ioffe’ s visit was m ixed. G oto had welcom ed him w arm ly and a large crow d o f well-wishers had greeted him at T o k yo Station. Capitalists w ho desired new m arkets because o f the decline in trade w ith China since 1915 and fishermen w ho longed for legal access to Russian waters were as relieved b y Ioffe’s arrival “ as i f they had m et Buddha in H ell.” T o some people, on the other hand, the shout “ Ioffe is com ing !” sounded like “ T h e M ongpls are com ing !” T h e police secretly went through Ioffe’s baggage w hile he was sightseeing in Yokoham a and spied on him so clum sily that lo fe remarked in irritation that in no other cou n try o f the w orld could he have encountered “ so m any and such disagreeable things as in Japan.” W hen popular excitem ent prom pted queries on the D iet floor, Foreign M inister Uchida replied that Ioffe’s visit w as purely personal in nature, and Home M inister M izuno promised to do his best to insure the safety o f the Russians. T h ere were those w ho thought that G oto had turned red. On February 5 members ofthe Sekkaböshidan

fcBjr jL ffl(T h e Anti-Bolshevik League)

forced th eir w ay into G otö’s residence in Azabu (Sakura-chö), demanded an interview w ith the viscount and when they teamed that he was not in, smashed his furniture, sliding doors and various articles. T h e y returned three w eeks later, on February 28, and bloodied the head o f G otö’s eldest son, Ichizö ~~fK, who m et them in place o f his father.9 In the archives o f the Japanese Foreign O ffice there is the English text o f a letter which Ioffe w rote to G oto from Atam i. Although very long, it is w orth reproducing in full for the lig h t it throws not only on the events related but on the personality and approach o f the w riter.

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Atami, February 7th 1923 Dear Viscount G oto, Insofar as I can ju d ge b y the Japanese papers th at I am in a position to read (and b y diese I mean, consequendy, m osdy die English w ritten ones), there exists a large m isunderstanding on the part o f the Japanese G overnm ent and the Japanese public at large in their concepdon o f the Russian Far-Eastern policy. I agreed perfectly w ith you when yo u gave o u t as a m otive o f your courteous invitation to me to com e to Japan for recuperating also the hope that m y stay in this country could help to d e a r the m isunderstandings that exist between Russia and Japan. M ost grateful as I am to yo u for your kind attention and hospitality shown to m e, I w ould not care to let an opportunity pass b y o f clearing up m isunderstandings w here such exist, as it seems to me. It can be perfecdy clearly surmised from reports having appeared in the above-m entioned papers that the Japanese Governm ent, or rather the M in istry o f Foreign Affairs, believe there exist several different points o f view am ong ruling circles in Russia on questions o f foreign policy in general and w ith regard to Japan, in particular. M r. Kawakam i, Japanese M inister Plenipotentiary and E nvoy Extraordinary to W arsaw, declared, in an interview , that though M r. Yoffe’s influence and im portance in Russia w ere v e ry great, y e t he could surmise from conversations w ith Russian statesm en that the policy o f M r. Yoffe at Changchun did not m eet w ith approval. A t the same tim e, one o f the Japanese papers openly declares that the question o f Russo-Japanese relations and o f the so-called third Russo-Japanese Conference is one o f personality, or, in other words, that this question depends on w hat persons the Japanese Governm ent w ill have to deal w ith ; and there are m any Japanese papers which report the view o f the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs purporting to say as i f in Russia, in her foreign policy, there were

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also w ith regard to Japan a certain current, headed b y M essrs. Krassin and Karakhan, w hich is supposed to be much more prone to compromise than the one w hich I represent. A few hints con­ tained in the papers seem also to convey the impression that there is a belief that it is possible to conclude solely a trade agreem ent precisely w ith this more com promising current, and this— regardless o f the question o f the Japanese occupation o f N orthern Saghalien. M ay I be allowed, esteem ed Viscount G oto, in the interest o f die elucidation o f truth, to assure you categorically th at all this is pure m isunderstanding and does not in the least correspond to the real situation as it stands. Since, on principle, the W orkers and Peasants' Governm ent does not recognise secret diplom acy, there can never in general be any currents in the foreign policy o f Soviet Russia, and this policy m ust always and w holly represent the true interests o f the m ajority o f the people, i.e. the toiling masses, o f Russia. Russian diplom acy is peoples diplom acy and there are not, nor can there be, any dis­ sensions am ong us w ithin the group engaged in diplom atic w ork. M r. Krassin is People's Com m issary o f Foreign T rade, and, as such does not take part in diplom atic w ork specially, being in charge o f m atters o f foreign trade. T ru e, M r. Karakhan is M em ber o f the Collegium o f the People’s Com m issariat o f Foreign Affairs and one o f the Assistant-“ Rem placants” o f M r. Chicherin; how­ ever, he has never held any special position o f his ow n, nor has he ever had too much influence on Russian foreign policy, in any special direction for these tw o reasons: first, ow ing, as already stated above, to the fact there exist no dissensions whatsoever b y us w ithin our diplom atic m ilieux, and then, secondly, because b y us as, also, anywhere also, Plenipotentiary Envoys represent all the R epublic and not alone the People's Com m issariat o f Foreign Aflairs. W hile I was conducting negotiations at Changchun in the name o f the R .S.F .S.R ., I was in the closest contact w ith m y Governm ent

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'Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. and com m unicated w ith the latter on every serious question. Each serious question was discussed b y all the G overnm ent as a whole, and so was too the opinion o f the D elegation on such question, and the voice o f the Departm ent concerned in a given question always carried special w eight. A s the negotiations were all through a m atter o f public knowl­ edge in Russia, the broad masses too had the p ossibility o f express­ in g their view s on the questions under discussion at Changchun, and I m ay safely advance that, perhaps, there never had y e t existed such solidarity between the D elegates, the G overnm ent and the peoples as at the tim e o f the Changchun Conference. N o t only is there no dissatisfaction being felt in Russia w ith m y Changchun policy, bu t, on the contrary, “ m y” policy at Changchun was and still is nothing bu t the policy o f m y people and m y G overnm ent A ll the peoples o f Russia and the whole o f her G overnm ent were altogether indignant at the conquering notes in w hich the Japa­ nese Delegation conducted negotiations at Changchun, and all shared this point o f view that until the evacuation o f Northern Saghalien b y the Japanese no negotiations w ere at all possible w ith Japan. O n the other hand, the Russian D elegation at Changchun had, in the name o f their people and G overnm ent, declared quite unam biguously their willingness to m eet half-way Japanese econo­ m ic interests in Saghalien too, doing it in some other w ay, w ithout acts o f violence on the part o f Japan. It would be out o f place here to dw ell more in detail on all the phases o f the Changchun Conference and the causes o f its disrup­ tion: I promised to w rite you another letter on this m atter, and, though the state o f m y health be a b ig obstacle thereto, I w ill yet w rite this letter. A t the present tim e, however, I m ay call your attention to the fact that even after the failure o f the Changchun Conference, the friendly attitude o f Russia towards Japan has not at all been changed. A fter the occupation o f the M aritim e and the Am ur provinces b y the R ed troops, the Japanese consuls w ere left

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everyw here on their posts, although up d ll now there are no Rus­ sian consuls y e t in Japan, and despite the fact that in this m atter the international law upholds very strictly the point o f view o f recipro­ city . N or was the attitude o f the Russian authorities to the Japa­ nese residents on the spots also after the rupture o f the negotiations such as would correspond to relations that should set in between hostile States, this attitude, on the contrary, being then and still rem aining extrem ely friendly. I m ay likew ise remark that y e t on the n t h o f N ovem ber 1922, acting in the name and upon the in­ struction o f m y Governm ent, I handed to the Japanese G overn­ m ent, through the Japanese M inister to Peking, a N ote o f protest against the continued occupation o f Saghalien, in w hich N ote it was once again and more definitely y e t pointed out that Russia was w illin g to grant concessions to Japan in N orthern Saghalien. H ow ever, no answer was forthcom ing to this N ote, and, on the contrary, the Japanese Governm ent continued its strongly hostile policy vis-à-vis Russia, ignoring her altogether and being, ap­ parently, forem ostly anxious lest anyone w ould take Japan under for being w illing to recognise Russia and show her even some prim itive courteousness. Just the reverse : when the well-known and quite inadm issibleact o f piracy o f Japanese ships against Russian had taken place, when m any peaceful Russian citizens were slaughtered and their pro­ p erty was seized, and when, again in the name and on the instruc­ tion o f m y own Governm ent, I sent, through M r. O bata, a N ote to the Japanese Governm ent, this N ote was first very courteously accepted (ju st as the first one had been) in thejapanese Legation at Peking, and then, after a few days it was brought back to the Rus­ sian Plenipotentiary M ission b y a Secretary o f the Japanese Legation, w ho declared that the latter had no righ t to receive it, and that the only w ay o f having this N ote sent to the Legation was b y m ail. W hen, however, this course was followed, a few days later the same Secretary o f the Japanese Legation brought the N ote to the Russian M ission again, declaring he had made a

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R . m istake, and that the N ote could not be accepted either b y mail. A lthough this N ote m ight very w ell have been refused imme­ diately, seeing that when it had com e b y post it w as q u ite dear that the mail came from the Russian M ission, and it w as m ore than easy to guess w hat the parcel contained, this w avering and am bigu­ ous policy was continued further. W hen your kind invitation to me was received to com e to Japan for recuperation, and M r. Fujita, w ho w as sent b y you, announced that the Japanese Governm ent accepted all those conditions which had been set b y me during prelim inary conversations, nam ely that the Governm ent guaranteed diplom atic im m unity for m yself and the party, the freedom o f m oving in Japan, the im m unity o f cor­ respondence and the righ t to use secret code and have couriers— m y staff, w ho, after the incident w ith the piracy N ote, had been directed b y me to discontinue all relations w ith the Japanese Lega­ tion at Peking, requested M essrs. Fujita and T agu chi to inquire w hether the Japanese Governm ent was actually granting to me all the above-enumerated guarantees. Both you r representatives brought from the Legation an answer in the affirm ative and left Peking to see me at Shanghai, w here I was preparing to go from for the South o f China. A t Shanghai, the A ctin g Japanese Consul General confirmed to m y Secretary, in the presence o f your representatives, quite official­ ly , that your G overnm ent actually gives all the above guarantees, w hile he enumerated each o f these guarantees. Then I decided to accept your courtesy and com e to Japan. H ow ever, some three or four days later, the A ctin g Consul General telephoned to m y Secre­ tary to the effect that his Governm ent could not give the abovementioned guarantees. I then informed your representatives that this being so, I w ould not go to Japan. T h e y answered this was a m isunderstanding, for the A ctin g Consul General had in view this fret alone that the guarantees in question could not be given in w ritin g, bu t that in fret they remained in force; at the same tim e a letter was received from the A ctin g Consul General, saying the

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attitu d e o f the Japanese Governm ent had not changed and that everyth in g he him self had declared was still perfectly valid. M y answer was that I never demanded w ritten declarations from official representatives o f Governm ents, for in m y relations w ith o th er Governm ents I am used to consider verbal statem ents as m ade b y their representatives quite as valid as w ritten ernes, but, how ever, fin: more dearness* sake, I requested your representatives to la y dow n in w ritin g all that had been declared to them , and also to m y Secretary in their presence, b y official representatives o f the Japanese Governm ent. H ow ever, ju st before boarding the ship leaving for Japan, the A ctin g Consul General com municated to m e a telegram received from th e Japanese M inistry o f Interior Affairs, stating that there had been discovered a plot against m e, and that, therefore, the G overnm ent could not guarantee m y personal safety. A lth ou gh I was rather astonished that thejapanese Governm ent, w hich is so susceptible in the m atter o f all international urns, could have adm itted that the Home O ffice should address itse lf direct­ ly— although all relations w ith foreigners, as according to inter­ national usus, go alw ays through the medium o f the Foreign Office— and although it made me absolutely astounded how a plot that had been discovered could y e t be dangerous, how ever, being used to risking m y ow n life, w hile in this telegram there was no refusal on the part o f thejapanese Governm ent o f the guarantees that w ere granted to me and w hile, at the same tim e, I had al­ ready booked m y tickets and m y baggage was already on board the ship— there thus remained nothing for m e to do bu t to be grateful to the Home M inister for his kind care for m y person and go on board the ship. And so that was exaedy w hat I did do. It w as at Yokoham a that the first case o f violation o f guarantees given took place: in the absence o f any one o f m y representatives, my baggage was opened w ith skeleton keys and examined careful­ ly, w hile even private letters w ere read. It was only follow ing upon your statem ent to m e, dear Viscount

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R. G otö, to the effect that this event really took place b y accident, and the promise that this case w ould be investigated, that I decided to stay in Japan and not to leave im m ediately. N ext, how­ ever, the Governm ent broke also the guarantee given for the cipher code, w hile it changed three tim es its attitude regarding the couriers. O ut o f respect for you, I decided to g ive w ay in the secret code question, bu t I cannot compromise in the m atter o f couriers. O n the other hand, the Japanese Governm ent has surrounded m e w ith such a w all o f spies that, instead o f the freedom prom ised, I find m yself as in prison; all m y correspondence is evid en tly being perlustrated, as letters reach me w ith a delay o f some four o r five days, besides w ith roughly visible signs o f their having been opened before they reached me, which signs cannot foil to fly in m y face, as I have behind me an experience o f fifteen years o f w ork under the C zarist regim e, and, consequently, have been used to methods much more perfect technically o f the Czar’ s secret police. D uring one m onth that I have been staying in Japan, w here I was invited to com e to b y the Lord M ayor o f the capital o f this country and one o f her m ost prom inent high officials, besides hav­ in g received prelim inarily so courteously guarantees from th e Japanese Governm ent, I have gathered the impression that not in any single country o f the w orld could I have had so m any and such disagreeable things as in Japan. D uring the five years’ run o f our power I have had the opportunity both officially and infor­ m ally to visit various countries and had to do w ith different Governm ents or their representatives— as w ell as those that recognise us both de ju re and de facto, and those which do so only de focto, as those that do not recognise us at all. N ow , I have also m any a tim e had to do w ith representatives o f countries w ith w hich w e w ere in a state o f w ar. Y e t never and nowhere have I had to face such unfriendliness, hostility and sheer lack o f tact as are shown towards me b y the Japanese Governm ent. A nd, indeed, on the background o f a m ost friendly attitude o f nearly all the layers o f Japanese public, on the background o f those expressions

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o f deep sym pathy w hich I receive alm ost every day in verbal or w ritten form, such a conduct o f the Japanese Governm ent can have bu t one meaning. It is precisely for this reason, and not w ith a view to m aking a com plaint that I have been w ritin g to you all that has been laid down in the foregping pages. A t Changchun the Japanese D elegation spoke to us in the language o f conquerors to conquered, ignoring altogether Russian interests and setting forth only their ow n, and, ow ing to this, the Changchun parley was even more painful than the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, for w hile at the Brest Conference the Germans put their rapacious ultim atum s, y e t th ey clad them in a fittin g form o f reciprocity. W hen I com e to think now o f the conduct o f the Japanese Governm ent vis-à-vis Russia, it seems to me that the former still m aintains the old Changchun attitude o f com pletely ignoring Russia as a sovereign G reat Power. Recent facts only confirm this. W hen m y Governm ent sent a protest to the Japanese against the arbitrary stationing, contrary to international usus, o f Japanese warshipsin Russian territorial waters, reports appeared in the news­ papers to the effect that the Japanese Governm ent meant to ignore this protest and sim ply leave it unanswered. W hen there w as some appearance that the question o f fisheries in Russian w aters could not be settled before the beginning o f the spring fishing cam paign, it was sem i-officially reported in the papers as i f the Japanese Governm ent intended to allow Japanese fishermen to fish in Russian territorial waters under the protection o f Japanese warships. W hatever the attitude towards the Japanese press, but i f the Governm ent does not deny such semi-official reports, one m ay be induced to believe the latter are correct. N ow , all these facts and those mentioned above can be ex­ plained bu t in one w ay on ly: w hat the Japanese Governm ent fears m ost is lest it be suspected o f being w illin g to recognise the Soviet Governm ent, and thus, in the attitude it assumes towards

?j;.: nn:+M : f rnr L'SS.R . ere lin e r , it o^ err-lrr? : 3 b szd and a x x b c ts sod) a p olicy as if, in r s o r s l R ^ s i w ere a x a s o v o e p S a t T h e Japanese G c v e m c : even Ä rg ers t h e m ere exists an immense difference as between last year and nie curren t ooe, for ill last year, Japan crAdi explain re r bebarir.g in Siberia artxtrarüy and lik e a t home b y the tact she had agreements erith k c a l G overnm ents, estab­

lished b y herse£ this year— there already exist no m ote such Governm ents, there being but ooe single G overnm ent o f Russia: he. the M o sco w one— the only name that such acts as those o f last year deserve as accordin g to the international law is simply “ piracy,” and nowhere and on the part o f no man w ill th ey meet w ith any sym pathy at alL As regards mutual relations w ith Russia, these acts rouse in die Russian people only feelings o f d eepest offense and rancour— which makes impossible tor tens o f years to com e any ag reement between the tw o peoples. When I first came to the Far East, I heard m uch o f d ie utmost susceptibility o f O riental peoples and the extremely b ig im­ portance they attach to “ sarin g bee.” I can understand this in the case o f China, w here foreigners actually behave them selves like at home. But I u tterly foil, how­ ever, to understand this w ith Japan. Indeed, Japan is one o f the greatest Powers in the w orld, and no one could possibly ta k eitin to his mind to treat her as a party w hich has not equal rights. O n the other hand, Russia is, to a large extent, also an O riental, A siatic State, and for m any reasons it is precisely Russia that has full right anyhow, much more than Japan to be susceptible in questions o f her prestige. N o t only is Japan recognised b y all, but juridically she is allied w ith the greatest Powers. Russia was bu t yet quite recently an arena o f a m ost arbitrary conduct w ithin her territory o f G reat Powers, interfering in her internal affoirs under the pretext o f supporting various black-hundred [i.e. ultra-reac­ tionary] generals and admirals, and, if w e do not count d ie smaller States, up to now Russia has been recognised de ju re b y

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Germ any alone. O n the other hand, Russia covers a territory larger than one seventh part o f the earth, and as for her natural riches, she is w ealthier than perhaps any other country in the w orld; her population is over 150 m illions, and her arm y is per­ haps the strongest that exists. T h ere are at the same tim e a great m any W hite Guards outside o f Russia who do their best to criticize and throw blame on the Russian Governm ent for everyth in g; w henever Russia take up an uncom prom ising attitude towards other States, she comes in for blam e for this same attitude, bu t if, on the contrary, she is conciliating, then a hue and cry is raised and people go on saying that “ w ith the C zarist G overn­ m ent no one w ould ever have even dared speak in such a w ay.” E vidently Soviet Russia has more righ t than anyone else to be susceptible about her prestige and more righ t too than anyone else to be concerned w ith “ saving her face,” th at is she has more right than all other States to demand full equality o f rights in her international relations. It is clear, therefore, that until the Japanese Governm ent w ill understand this, all agreem ent between Russia and Japan be­ comes extrem ely difficult, if at all possible. Inconditionsofnew Russian diplom acy, when all thenegpdadons are conducted openly in the face o f all the people, each and any Russian peasant or w orker takes part, so to say, him self or herself in the negotiations and is especially sensitive to any affront made upon Russia b y the other contracting party. It m ust stare everyone in the face w ho is acquainted w ith the sentim ents o f the large popular masses in Russia w hat a dif­ ference there is between the attitude to-day, following upon the Japanese intervention in Siberia. A ll the hardships o f the w ar o f 1904-05 and the heavy bloodshed in that w ar did not rouse such indignation among the Russian people as exists to-day, after the Japanese intervention o f recent years, and w hich is still aggravated b y the above-described attitude towards Russia on the part o f the Japanese Governm ent.

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R . In the conscience o f the Russian people— due, probably, to these very reasons— France and Japan are considered as the worst enemies, and any action, in itself perhaps not even m eant to be hostile, on the part o f the Governm ents o f these States calls forth im m ediately among the Russian people some suspicion of new inim ical actions against Russia. T h e same thing is happening now, when newspapers are publishing reports about the Japanese Governm ent planning to bring the W hite Guards from Gensan to Saghalien, and in Russia suspicion is being aroused generally that this means a new attem pt at intervention against Russia from Saghalien. Russia, on the other hand, does not in the least consider herself as a country beaten, w hile she esteem s, on the contrary, that she came out as victor from the w orld capitalisticintervention against Russia. T h e Russian people is proud thereof th at, through its own efforts and sacrifice, there are no more foreign troops on Russian soil, and, therefore, takes especially painfully the occupation b y the Japanese arm y o f the Russian part o f Saghalien. T o let alone the fact that all the Russian people understands perfectly w ell the strategic and econom ic im portance o f Saghalien, its occupation makes the people lack the conscience o f full pride o f and full satis­ faction at the unification o f all the Russian territories under the Russian R ed Flag. If w e were now to make concrete inferences from the foregoing, it w ill be evident that, from the Russian point o f view, lettin g q u ite alone the question as to how for these stipulations are acceptable to Japan— the resumption o f Russo-Japanese negptiadons is possible only under the follow ing stipulations: i . Recognition o f full equality o f the rights o f Russia w ith Japan, as w ell in the proceedings o f the negotiations, i.e. in the setting forth o f claims b y the other party, as in the trea ty itself, i.e. in the corresponding w ording and laying dow n o f the clauses them selves o f the agreem ent.

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2. W illingness to conduct negptiations not barely on a trade agree­ m ent, bu t on a lull treaty, inclusive o f the resum ption o f normal diplom atic relations, for there is a special decision in this reference o f the Supreme O rgan o f the Russian Republic. When at the tim e o f the Genoa Conference I made a report on the latter and also on the Russo-German T reaty (known as the Rapallo T reaty), the All-Russian Central Executive Com m ittee o f Soviets passed a resolution deciding that henceforth the Council o f People’s Commissaries shall not have the right to conclude half-w ay treaties o f the RussoBritish T rade Agreem ent type, w hile instructing it, on the contrary, to sign treaties o f the Rapallo T reaty type. And this latter T reaty differs, as is know n, in that in it : ( i) both parties renounce any claims and accounts for the past, and (2) both parties m utually recognise one another both de facto and de jure. W hen, after this Rapallo T reaty, a commercial treaty was concluded in Italy between this country and Russia, w hich did not contain such clauses, this latter treaty was, for that very reason, not ratified b y the All-Russian Central Ex­ ecutive Com m ittee o f Soviets. 3. A date, w hich w ould be acceptable, m ust be fixed for the evacuation o f N orthern Saghalien b y the Japanese troops. A s it was precisely on this question that the rupture o f the Changchun Conference occurred, it is perfectly clear that this stipulation is an absolutely indispensable condition. A s, due to the altogether peculiar and unprecedented-in-history attitu de taken up towards me b y the Japanese Governm ent, I have been now for about one m onth and a h alf cu t o ff from Russia in general and m y Governm ent, in particular— I am not in a position to ju d ge o f the feelings actually prevailing in Russia vis-à-vis Japan. H ow ever, I w ould believe that this attitude could not get better, in view o f the conduct o f the Japanese Governm ent referred to

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Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R. above, but, at the same tim e, I do not believe that the abovem entioned prelim inary condition m ay have changed, w hich I laid down in the present letter on the basis o f foregoing decisions o f the Russian Governm ent and m y know ledge o f the sentim ents o f the Russian people. W hat are in this respect the Japanese stipulations, I do not know , for since I have been staying in this country, the larger part o f the Japanese public and press demand sim ply an im m e­ diate recognition o f Russia de ju re and an immediate resum ption o f negotiations. H ow ever, as much space is being given in the press to the socalled “ N ikolaevsk Affair,” I m ay remind that the Russian Delegates at Changchun never refused to take up this issue im­ m ediately, but, that, on the contrary, it was the Japanese D elega­ tion that did not w ish, dedaring that this question, for some reason or other, in contrast to all the rest, could be discussed only w ith a Russian Governm ent recognised b y Japan, and insisting energetically on the connection between the question o f the “ N iko­ laevsk Affair” and the occupation o f Saghalien, or, in other words, exactly on such a proposition as, for the above-stated reasons o f prestige o f a sovereign State, was absolutely unacceptable to Russia. T h u s, this question having not been discussed at Changchun, no dedsion about it was taken in Russia. N ow , although it seems m ost strange to me that one p arty or the other should take upon herself the responsibility for events w hich m ust y e t be investigated b y both o f these parties, I never­ theless believe that there does exist, however, w ith regard to this question one, though a for distant, precedent W hen at Genoa our counter-partners claimed from us compensation for losses, w e w ere w illing on prindple to accept such demand, conditional upon the recognition o f our counter-claim s. A lthough it m ay be true, however, that the above-mentioned dedsion o f the A llRussian C .E .C . o f Soviets to take the Rapallo T reaty, containing

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m utual renouncement o f all accounts in the past, as prototype o f all future treaties concluded b y Russia— is in contradiction w ith that. Personally I believe that the Rapallo decision ought to be con­ sidered as the m ost reasonable diplom atically, for m utual re­ lations between peoples do not end, bu t begin, w ith the con­ clusion o f treaties and if, for odious m ercantile profits, both parties start turning over again all the horrors o f a w ar already gone through and partly forgotten, this hardly contributes to the settling o f friendly relations between corresponding peoples. I beg to ask your pardon f o r this extended letter, but I hope, however, that I have been able to satisfy your desire, and have laid down objectively the possible Russian point o f view on the resumption o f the Russo-Japanese Conference. I beg you, dear V iscount G oto, to accept the assurance that w hatever the future m ay have in store for Russo-Japanese mutual relations, personally for yourself I w ill alw ays have feelings o f profound esteem and heartfelt gratitude. Yours m ost sincerely (Signed) A . Jo f f e 10 Ioffe’ s contention that the Japanese were not livin g up to their ob­ ligations was supported in a telegram sent to him from Peking on Feb­ ruary 19 b y D avtian, w ho was in charge o f the Soviet mission during his absence. “ I strongly feel the lack o f communication w ith you,” D avtian cabled. “ T h e conduct o f the Japanese authorities violates the guarantees given [;] it is contrary to the courteous reception extended b y Russia to Ambassador Kawakam i.” 11 A m onth later, on M arch 2, Ioffe telegraphed: “ T h e attitude here is the same as before— the kindness o f Viscount G oto is exceptional and the friendship and sym pathy o f all classes o f society are clearly shown, b u t the governm ent, w hich as all assert is becom ing increasingly shaky, continues its arch-unfriendly line and resorts to chicanery at every step.” 12 T h e debate w hich ensued among Japanese statesmen as to w hether or

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not to establish diplom atic relations w ith the Soviet Union is reminiscent o f the debate that had raged over a century before w hether or not to establish commercial and eventually diplom atic relations w ith Tsarist Russia. Premier K atö, who had been Adm iral T o g o Heihachirô’s JM? ch ief assistant during the Russo-Japanese W ar, now served concurrently as m inister o f the navy. His support o f G otô’s view that a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement was desirable was a reflection o f naval thinking. T h e vice m inister o f the navy w rote in a secret letter to Tanaka Tokichi

vice m inister o f foreign affairs, on February 23,1923 :

“ T h e tim e has come to take steps for a rapprochement w ith Russia.” 13 T h e navy regarded the oil concessions o f N orth Sakhalin as vital to national defense and argued for the restoration o f amicable relations; it urged that friendship between Japan and Russia not be endangered b y dickering over minor issues or b y indiscrim inate fishing under the protection o f the imperial navy.” 14 W hile the international position o f Russia was gradually im proving in 1922-23, that o f Japan was deteriorating. N ot only had her prolonged occupation o f Siberia and her reluctance to w ithdraw from N orth Sakha­ lin increased American and British political opposition, bu t Am erican and English businessmen had taken advantage o f Japan’s econom ic weakness (due partly to the cost o f the Siberian venture) to regain the strong position which they had held in the m arkets o f China, M anchuria and the South Pacific prior to the Russo-Japanese W ar. A s Japanese trade in the South Pacific was cu t into half between 1920 and 1923 and the im port o f Japanese goods b y the U nited States dropped sharply, and as talk o f w ar between Japan and the U nited States (on whom the former depended to a considerable degree econom ically) m ounted, Japanese business circles turned their eyes on the Soviet neighbor, whose sprawling territory held forth the prospect o f huge m arkets and vast sources o f supply o f raw m aterials.15 T h e memories o f large-scale sales to Russia during W orld W ar I were still fresh in the minds o f Japa­ nese capitalists. T h e M inistry o f W ar, on the other hand, opposed recognition o f the U .S.S.R . in the desire to retain possession o f N orth Sakhalin; the Hom e

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Office w as against it also for fear that it would contribute to the spread o f revolutionary feeling inside Japan. In th e Foreign O ffice there was a division o f opinion. M atsudaira, director o f the Bureau o f European and American Affairs, and various old diplom ats including O bata, the m inister to China, and Foreign M inister Uchida him self were against recognition o f the Soviet Union, lest Japanese relations w ith the U nited States and England be adversely affected. O n the other hand, Ambassador Kawakam i and a number o f younger diplom ats, including Vice-Consul Shimada in Harbin and Consul G eneral M atsushim a, favored recognition o f the U .S.S.R . and evacuation o f Sakhalin. W hen Kawakami at a press conference labeled the old p olicy toward the Soviet Union ludicrous and outm oded, Uchida reprimanded him and not only told him not to express his personal view s but forbade him to m eet Ioffe on his arrival. T h e question o f recognition o f the U .S.S.R . had become a dom estic political issue. Access to Russian waters was vital for Japanese fishery. Soviet abrogation o fT sarist agreem ents, the collapse o f Russian adminis­ tration du rin g the C iv il W ar and the Intervention had provided Japanese with the opportunity for unrestricted fishing in Russian waters. But with the reunification o f Russia and the prospective exclusion o f poachers, the need for a new fishery agreem ent became obvious. W hile Uchida had adm itted to a group o f deputies o f the Köseikai party on Decem ber 6) 1922, before Ioffe’s visit, that the fishery question m ight w ell become the object and cause o f renewed negotiations and that Japan w ould be prepared to agree to a Russian proposal for a third conference if the Soviet Union genuinely desired one, he added: “ But o f this one cannot speak openly. W e are taking some secret measures in this direction.” On January 2 2 ,19 2 3, the opposition party, the Kenseikai, adopted a resolution calling on the imperial governm ent to take measures to establish control over radical ideas and to recognize the Soviet Union upon agreem ent w ith the other powers. Follow ing Ioffe’s arrival, re­ solutions w ere introduced (though not passed) in the D iet calling for die recognition o f the Soviet regim e, and there was considerable debate in and out o f parliament about the course that Japan should steer. On

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

one extrem e were ultra-conservatives w ho regarded Ioffe’s visit as an outright offense to the d ign ity o f the im perial fam ily. O n the other ex­ trem e were those w ho felt that the Soviet Union and Japan had equal reason to dislike the W est and thus w ere natural allies. N o argument could have brought home more effectively the failure o f current Japanese policy and the need to come to terms w ith the Soviet governm ent than the fact that thejapanese occupation o fN orth Sakhalin had n ot prevented the Russians from granting oil concessions in this area to the American firm o f H arry Ford Sinclair.16 A lthough Ioffe had been informed before his departure from China that he w ould be regarded as a private visitor w ithout diplom atic status and privileges, he raised the question again a fortnight after his arrival. H e told G oto on February 16 that he found it im possible to confer w ith him any further unless he be given the righ t to com m unicate w ith M os­ cow in code and to use diplom atic couriers. G oto asked K atö to allow Ioffe’s request, w arning the prem ier o f the danger o fa Soviet-Chincse rapproche­ m ent in the event that Ioffe was rebuffed. W hile the Japanese governm ent was pondering w hat to do, M oscow put pressure on Japan in support o f Ioffe’s demands. So long as an anti­ com m unist governm ent at V ladivostok had collaborated w ith th eja p a ­ nese, the visas issued to Japanese nationals b y the old Russian consulates in Japan had been honored. W ith the foil ofV ladivostok to the R ed forces such visas had lost valid ity overnight.17 Since Japan did not recognize the U .S.S.R . there w ere no Soviet d ip ­ lom atic or consular officials in Japan w ho could issue visas to Japanese travelers. A s a tem porary expedient Soviet officials boarded vessels w hich arrived in Soviet ports and there gave visas to Japanese visitors. But on January 19, 1923, the Far Eastern R evolutionary C om m ittee, which adm inistered the Russian Far East, decreed that the procedure o f issuing visas upon arrival be discontinued and so informed M atsum ura Sadao

A * , thejapanese consul general at V ladivostok, on the 22nd.

A t his request they delayed enforcem ent for a w hile, b u t on M arch 6 refused landing permission to passengers o f the Koji Maru> w ho had steamed into Vladivostok w ithout the necessary perm its. W hen W ata-

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nabe R iye 3 U É J Ï& , the Japanese acting consul general, wanted to discuss the problem , he was informed that the entire m atter o f SovietJapanese relations was being considered in T o k yo . T h e Russian action caused great alarm am ong banking, business and fishery circles and the governm ent was showered w ith demands for the reestablishm ent o f com m ercial and diplom atic relations w ith the neighboring state.18 O n M arch 7 Ioffe reiterated to G oto his governm ent’s conditions for th e resumption o f official talks: equal rights o f the negotiating parties, consent o f Japan to negotiate concerning the establishm ent o f diplom atic as w ell as o f commercial relations, and the fixing o f an acceptable date for the evacuation o f N orth Sakhalin. M atsudaira, to whom G oto took th e demands, replied on M arch 21 that Japan was w illin g to negotiate on an equal basis. A s for recognition o f the U .S.S.R ., however, Japan m ade it conditional on the setdem ent o f the N ikolaevsk incident and on th e Soviet Union’ s honoring o f its international obligations; the evacua­ tion o f N orth Sakhalin like the recognition o f the U .S.S.R . depended on th e setdem ent o f the N ikolaevsk incident. G oto conveyed the reply to Ioffe during his m eetings w ith the later on M arch 29 and 30.19 G oto talked also about the Japanese proposal o f M arch 30 about the exchange o f commercial agents w ho could perform consular functions until such tim e as diplom atic relations had been reestablished, although th e proposal seems to have been conveyed officially through the Japanese consul general at Vladivostok. T h e Japanese proposal had been prom pted b y Soviet notification o f A ctin g Consul General W atanabe (Hi February 2 0 ,19 2 3 , that his official authority w ould expire in three months unless h e obtained a formal exequatur. A n exequatur is a w ritten authorization o f a consular officer b y the governm ent to w hich he is accredited, and it w as obvious that W atanabe could not be accredited to a governm ent that w as not recognized b y his country.20»e T h e Japanese envisaged that they would send commercial agents to V ladivostok, N ikol’sk-Ussuriisk, C hita, Blagoveshchensk, N ikolaevsk-• • T h e same demand was made o f the American and British consuls, who con sequently withdrew from Vladivostok in M ay o f 1923.

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on-the-Am ur, Pctropavlosvk and M oscow ; Soviet officials w ould pro­ ceed to Yokoham a, N agasaki, Tsuruga, Hakodate and Gensan. T he commercial agents were to have the same rights as consuls o f third powers, including the right to use code in com m unication; they were to refrain from any political propaganda activity.21 In com m unicating the above to Ioffe, D eputy Foreign Commissar Karakhan cabled on A pril 6 : “ T h e Japanese proposal has m uch for and against it. Even if it w ere accepted in principle, it m ust be supplem ented. W e w ill give no answer w hatever until w e receive a ciphered reply from you. I hope the Japanese governm ent w ill understand that i f the pro­ posal is serious, )!£-§- became premier1* and Baron M atsui Keishirô

took over as foreign

b Yamamoto’s administration was in power from September 2,1923, un til January*

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m inister. In m id-February M atsui suddenly found him self in the m idst o f a long-distance diplom atic duel w ith Karakhan. Karakhan began the exchange at a press interview in Peking w ith an attack on M atsui for various statem ents allegedly made in a speech at a gubernatorial con­ ference in T o k yo. M atsui replied publicly “ as i f the opportunity w ere one for w hich he had been w aiting w ith eager anticipation” , as the Japan Advertiser p u t it. W hile it appeared that Karakhan had started the jou st on th e basis o f a faulty account o f M atsui’ s address, the exchange boiled down to Karakhan’s contention that the ravages o f the great earthquake had so weakened Japan that she would do w ell to make peace w ith M oscow and M atsui’s retort that the seismic disaster had left the Japa­ nese governm ent unaffected in the formulation o f its foreign policy. In reporting the Karakhan-M atsui controversy, th cja p a n Advertiser added th at at a m eeting on February 20, the day that M atsui replied to Karakhan, the Japanese cabinet had “ decided again to continue their policy o f ‘watchful w aiting’, a decision which apparendy is being reached as a m atter o f ordinary routine at each successive m eeting o f the Cabinet Council these days” and concluded that “ the Japanese policy o f ignoring the existence o f the Soviet R epublic o f Russia henceforth is to be main­ tained intact.” 5 Y e t actually the exchange w ith Karakhan m ay have prodded M atsui into action, for he instructed M inister Yoshizawa in Peking to m eet w ith Karakhan and ascertain Soviet view s concerning pending issues between the tw o countries. Yoshizaw a m et Karakhan on February 24 and several times there­ after. H e reported that Karakhan in turn had wished to learn the position o f the Japanese governm ent. O n M arch 15 M atsui instructed Yoshizawa, therefore, to convey to Karakhan w hat problems m ust be settled before Japan could recognize the Soviet Union.6 On M arch 19 Yoshizawa informed Karakhan that the Japanese govern­ ment had decided to recognize the Soviet governm ent and had instructed him to enter into negotiations w ith him. U nlike M atsushim a, M atsu-* *7»1924; Kiyoura Keigo became premier on January 7,19 24, and remained in office until June rr o f the same year.

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R .

daira, and Kawakam i, Yoshizawa did not speak Russian. H e had graduated from T o k yo Imperial U niversity w ith a degree in English literature. But he had been in the Foreign M inistry since the turn o f the century, and had served as director o f the Foreign Affairs Bureau before being appointed ambassador to China.6 Yoshizawa told Karakhan that he had a detailed draft o f recognition, but before transm itting it to him needed Soviet consent to three prior condi­ tions : (1 ) that the negotiations w ould be secret; (2) that the negotia­ tions would not be labelled anything— neither informal talks nor a formal conference— bu t w ould sim ply be conducted between the tw o represent­ atives in Peking; and (3) that the Soviet governm ent w ould imme­ diately, before recognition, settle the V ladivostok incidents— that it would free tw o Japanese officers still under arrest on a charge o f espio­ nage, would recognize the consul, and reestablish postal communica­ tion. Karakhan retorted that the Soviet side had not asked to see the Japanese draft; the imperial governm ent wanted to show it o f its ow n volition. H e could not agree to any prior conditions for accepting it. He told Yoshizawa that he had had no instructions to discuss this m atter with him and would request none if the Japanese posed conditions. On M arch 20 Yoshizawa seem ingly w ithdrew the prior conditions and Karakhan promised to request M oscow to settle the Vladivostok in­ cidents as soon as possible. H e made it dear, however, that he could guarantee nothing and could accept no responsibility for the outcome. Karakhan further warned Yoshizawa before taking the draft that no negotiations could take place until he had received instruction from his governm ent; it was possible that the Soviet governm ent w ould reject talks or m ight demand the calling o f an official conference. Acceptance o f the draft did not com m it the Russian side to anything.7 T h e plan o f the Japanese governm ent was as follow s: (1 ) the Soviet* * Yoshizawa was to be Japan’s delegate to the League o f Nations at the tune of the Manchurian Incident and the following year, in 1932, was to become Foreign Minister.

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Union was to give a w ritten expression o f deep regret about the N ikolaevsk incident; (2) the Japanese governm ent would forgo compensation for the incident on condition that it w ould receive favorable long-term concessions on Sakhalin; (3) the Portsm outh treaty was to remain in effect because o f its historical im portance for the Japanese people; (4) the Japanese governm ent w ould renounce the debts o f the T sarist and Provisional governm ents in return for free, long-term concessions on Sakhalin and in Eastern Siberia; (5) the Soviet Union was to agree to the return o f nationalized private property or to due compensation for it, though this m atter could be left for future consideration if the mostfavored-nation principle w ould be applied in the interim ; (6) recognition was to be made in the draft that the future treaty o f commerce would guarantee the safety o f Japanese subjects in Russia and the protection o f their property, private property as w ell as w ide trade and industrial a ctiv ity ; (7 ) both sides were to pledge to refrain from propaganda and hostile a c tiv ity ; (8) Japan was to w ithdraw her forces from Sakhalin and form ally recognize the Soviet Union. Yoshizaw a told Karakhan that the Japanese governm ent was prepared to realize the above in any formulation— b y an exchange o f notes, a declaration, or an agreem ent. W hen Karakhan replied that it was his personal impression that the Japanese governm ent had learned nothing and had no serious intention to adjust relations, Yoshizawa explained that he had m erely made an oral communication and w ould send a w ritten text for Karakhan to stu d y; i f there w ere unacceptable points, they could be discussed and changed. Karakhan refused to comment on the draft because he was not em powered to do so; he did state that it was his personal opinion that the m atter could be resolved only b y applying the British m ethod.8 T w o days later, on M arch 22, Yoshizawa transm itted to Karakhan the Japanese draft, together w ith a covering letter. T h e proposals w ere pre­ ceded b y the statem ent that since m any im portant questions between the tw o countries w ere still unresolved, Japan could not recognize the Soviet governm ent at once w ithout qualifications; she deemed it neces­ sary first to com e to a practical agreem ent concerning at least the m ost

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im portant o f the unresolved questions. T h e last provision, item 8, was phrased as follow s: “ Upon conclusion o f an agreem ent concerning die above points the Japanese governm ent w ill im m ediately end the occu­ pation o f N orth Sakhalin and w ill officially recognize the Soviet govern­ m ent.” T h e three prior conditions for holding negotiations, which Yoshizawa had posed on the 19th and then seem ingly w ithdraw n die next day, reappeared in the w ritten com m unication.9 Karakhan replied in the name o f his governm ent that w hile it had come forward against secret negotiations and desired to confer w ith Japan at an open conference, it was w illing to go along w ith the first tw o prior conditions, nam ely that the talks be secret and be held in Peking without a particular label as to their status. B ut he “ categorically rejected” the demand that the tw o alleged spies be fieed, declaring that this issue had no direct bearing on the reestablishm ent o f diplom atic relations between the tw o countries. A fter a lengthy exchange o f view s Yoshizawa gave in on this point, or so Karakhan understood. A fter studying the eigh t point draft o f the Japanese side, the Soviet governm ent empowered Karakhan to enter into negotiations w ith Yoshi­ zawa for the conclusion and signature o f an agreem ent w ith the Japanese governm ent. O n A pril 8 Karakhan discovered, however, that Yoshizawa did not have full powers. T h e Japanese governm ent planned to provide him w ith the letters patent at the conclusion rather than at the beginning o f the negotiations as was custom ary. Karakhan told Yoshizaw a that the Soviet governm ent was prepared to forgo a public, official conference, bu t it could not agree that such serious negotiations be begun without the tw o representatives showing each other their full powers to enter into negotiations and to sign an agreem ent10 O n A pril 19 Yoshizawa informed Karakhan that the Japanese govern­ m ent did not deem it necessary for the plenipotentiaries to exchange letters patent at this tim e. “ T h e Japanese governm ent is ready to issue such full powers at any tim e and to sign an agreem ent as soon as both points o f view w ill be in general concord and there w ill be hope for die possibility o f reaching an agreem ent.” Karakhan rejected this. T h e Japanese governm ent had strictly adhered

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to custom ary usage in the preceding negotiations at Dairen, Changchun and T o k y o . T h e exchange o f full powers had always come before the com­ mencem ent o f negotiations. T h is had been true even in the case o f the Ioffo-Kawakami talks, w hich both sides had agreed to regard as unofficial and n ot binding on either side. Karakhan insisted that letters patent be exchanged, particularly now that both sides had agreed to take im portant decisions leading to the im m ediate extablishm ent o f official relations between the tw o governm ents. W hen tw o weeks passed w ithout a reply, Karakhan transm itted to Yoshizaw a a note, dated M ay 5, in w hich he reviewed their contact since M arch 22 and repeated the request that Yoshizawa obtain due letters patent. A skin g that the Japanese governm ent answer as soon as possible, Karakhan expressed his governm ent’s expectation that the Japanese governm ent w ould not allow this m atter w hich had “ all the prospects o f yielding positive result” to come to naught even before negotiations had begun b y violating international usage.11 T h e follow ing day, on M ay 6, the Press Section o f the Foreign Com ­ m issariat issued a release in w hich it objected strongly to allegations in the Japanese press that the delay in Russo-Japanese negotiations was due to the fact that Karakhan did not have full pow ers.12 On M ay 13 Yoshizawa acknowledged receipt o f Karakhan’ s note o f the $th and promised to give a reply as soon as he heard from his govern­ ment, to w hich he had du ly relayed it. H e felt “ constrained” , however, meanwhile to correct some o f the Soviet assertions. R egarding the three prior conditions, w hich Karakhan had depicted as having been posed b y the Japanese governm ent, Yoshizawa asserted that he had explained to Karakhan orally during their m eeting on the 5th that the first tw o o f these “ so-called prior conditions” had not been proposed b y die Japanese governm ent and had not been p u t forth b y him as “ condi­ tions w hich m ust precede negotiations.” A s for the third condition, Yoshizawa w rote, the position o f the Japanese governm ent m ust be clear to Karakhan in view o f the representations w hich he had made to him “ so persistendy on so m any occasions.” H e took issue w ith the asser­ tion made b y Karakhan in the note that he had retracted the demand.

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Yoshizawa stated that it was true that he had agreed that this problem be considered independently o f the pending general negotiations, but he had done so w ith the im portant qualification that Karakhan himself, in his capacity as plenipotentiary o f the Soviet governm ent in the Far East, would make every effort to obtain the release o f the Japanese subjects arrested in V ladivostok. T h e fact that these Japanese w ere still in jail aroused deep resentm ent among the Japanese people. Yoshizaw*a also objected to the statem ent in Karakhan’ s note that Yoshizawa had agreed on A pril 8 to ask his governm ent for foil powers. T h a t is not an exact statem ent o f w hat actually took place at that m eeting [Yoshizawa w rote w ith obvious annoyance]. T h ere would seem to be a fondamental discrepancy o f view s betw een us on this question o f foil powers. A s has been explained to you almost

ad nauseam the Japanese Governm ent feel it o f extrem e importance that any repetitions o f the failures o f previous negotiations should be guarded against as for as possible. M y instructions are on that account none other than to enter into informal conversa­ tions w ith you and, through frank exchange o f view s on matters the settlem ent o f which is the pro-requesite o f the restoration on normal relationship, to inform m y governm ent w hether there is any fair prospect for formal negotiations, if entered into, to be brought to a successful conclusion. It never was their intention to open negotiations irrespective o f w hether there was such prospect or not. T h e idea o f investing me w ith foil powers for carrying on con­ versations o f the said character w ith you has never occurred to the Japanese G overnm ent. A ll that he had agreed to do, Yoshizawa declared, was m erely to relay Karakhan’ s demand for exchange o f foil powers. H e expressed satisfac­ tion, however, at Karakhan’s assertion that the proposed negotiations had “ all the prospects o f yielding a positive result.” Assum ing this statem ent to mean that the M oscow governm ent was w illin g to come to an agreem ent on the basis o f the considerations advanced b y Japan,

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he w as m aking every effort, he w rote, to induce his governm ent to take a decision in the conciliatory spirit expressed b y Karakhan.13 T h an k in g Yoshizawa for his letter, Karakhan w rote on M ay 15 that he understood that Yoshizawa m erely wished to clarify and supplem ent some o f the statem ents made in his note o f M ay 5. B ut “ to avoid misunder­ standings,” Karakhan declared it his d u ty to warn Yoshizawa that the statem ent that the negotiations had “ all the prospects o f yielding a p ositive result” m ust not be interpreted in the sense that the Soviet governm ent regarded the Japanese conditions handed to him on M arch 22 as acceptable. “ T h e thought which the phrase in question expresses means o n ly the general conviction that there are no problems vital to the peoples o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan on which the tw o countries could not reach agreem ent. T h is conviction is based on the fact th a t both countries have the intention o f reestablishing normal relations on the basis o f justice, equality and reciprocity.” 14 M eanw hile the Japanese cabinet had agreed to provide Yoshizawa w ith foil pow ers, as demanded b y the Soviet Union, and formal negotiations were begun at last on M ay 15. “ C ertainly, there is an enormous difference between the present parley and last year’s at T o k yo ,” Karakhan declared in a press interview . “ H ere the negotiations have an official character, while in T o k yo they w ere not binding on either party. T h e T o k yo negotiations had as object only a prelim inary preparation for the resump­ tion o f relations, w hile here, in Peking, the resumption o f formal relations is a direct object o f the conference.” 15 Karakhan handed Yoshizawa a Soviet draft agreem ent, drawn up “ for convenience’s sake” in an attem pt to reconcile Japanese and Russian views. T h is draft was to be used as the basis for discussions for the next three w eeks16 and deserves to be quoted in foil: T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics represented

b y . . . and

the Imperial Japanese Governm ent

represented b y . . . . * * Yoshizawa's full powers were issued on M ay 13,1924; a copy was transmitted to Karakhan only on M ay 29. (Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.19:2675-2676.

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Desiring to re-establish good-nei ghbourly relations, tending to promote friendship and economic operation between the people o f both countries, have agreed upon the following Articles: I

T h e two Contracting Parties agree that simultaneously with the signing o f the present Agreement normal diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the U.S.S.R. and the Japa­ nese Empire. T h e Government o f the U.S.S.R. shall adopt the necessary mea­ sures to transfer to the Imperial Japanese Governm ent the Em­ bassy, Consulates and other State property to be found in the territory o f U.S.S.R. In its turn, the Imperial Japanese Govern­ ment shall do the same w ith regard to the property to be found in the territory o f the Japanese Empire. n Imperial Japanese Government shall withdraw its troops from and entirely cease occupation o f territory o f Northern Sakhalin. Imperial Japanese Government agrees to begin to free the territory o f Northern Sakhalin from occupation immediately upon signing o f present agreement and complete same within two weeks, during which period territory must be handed over to proper authorities. m T w o Contracting Parties agree after re-establishment o f diplomatic relations to conclude a commercial treaty, on strength o f which nationals o f one party shall enjoy full protection in territory of other subject to laws existing in respective territory, both per­ sonally and in regard to their properties, and shall be able to widely engage in trade and industries, as in accordance w ith the existing laws.

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IV

In the interest o f promoting economic relations» the Government o f the U.S.S.R. is w illing to meet halfway needs o f the Japanese Empire in regard to natural resources existing in the territory o f the U.S.S.R. W ith this end in view» it is w illing to grant to Japanese subjects and juridical persons concessions for the exploitation o f minerals, forests, etc., in the territory o f the U.S.S.R. and, in particular, in Eastern Siberia and Northern Sakhalin.

v T h e Governm ent o f the U.S.S.R. is willing, immediately upon the re-establishment ofdiplom atic relations between the two Contract­ ing Parties, to conclude w ith the Imperial Japanese Government a fisheries convention on the conditions provided for b y the Ports­ m outh T reaty and the Fisheries Convention o f 1907. VI

Both Contracting Parties agree to discuss the question o f mutual state and private claims and debts, including the Japan’s claim in reference to the Nikolaievsk affair and ju stly settle them at a future conference. VII

Each o f the Contracting Parties agrees to annul, upon the signing o f the present agreement, all kinds o f treaties or agreements that may have been concluded between itself and third parties, pre­ judicing sovereign or territorial rights o f the other party, or constituting a menace to the safety o f the latter.

vm T w o contracting Parties m utually pledge themselves to respect national sovereignty o f the other party and refrain from any inter­ ference w ith its internal affairs and in particular from agitations,

I $6

'Japanese Recognition o f the U.SJS.R. propaganda and any kind o f intervention and from supporting them. T w o contracting parties pledge themselves not to create or support organizations whose aim is to carry on an armed struggle against the other party or prepare overthrow o f violence. In view o f this, both contracting Parties pledge themselves not to allow such organizations, their agents or organs to stay in their territory. DC

T he present agreement shall come into effect from the date of signature. In witness whereof, respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at c ity o f Peking this--------------17 On M ay 21 Karakhan cabled a progress report to the People’ s Commis­ sariat o f Foreign Affairs. He summed up the results o f the first five sessions in four points: 1. Yoshizawa now demanded merely an expression o f regret regarding the Nikolsevsk incident, saying that he would make every effort to make the formula acceptable to the Russians. “ I am rejecting [this],” Karakhan wired. T h ey had decided to postpone this issue for the time being. 2. Karakhan had worded the article regarding the evacuation o f Sakha­ lin. T h e Japanese would withdraw immediately upon signature o f the agreement and would complete the evacuation within two weeks, during which the territory would be surrendered to the Russians. Yoshizawa had queried T okyo by cable whether one could agree to a one month period or should stipulate simply to evacuate “ immediately upon signing.” 3. Karakhan had succeeded in obtaining Japanese renunciation of compensation in any form for the debts o f the Tsarist and Provisional governments. Japan agreed to postpone the matter, provided she would not be put in a worse position than third powers; she had accepted the Soviet qualification “ other conditions being equal.” Yoshizawa himself had proposed the following formula the day before on M ay 20: “ As regards

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the debts to Japan, the Japanese government agrees to settle this ques­ tion after further discussion on condition, however, that, other conditions being equal, the Japanese must in any case be treated on the part o f the Soviet Governm ent no less favorably than any third power.** Karakhan had declined this formula; he had insisted on a reciprocal formulation and on adding state and private claims. T his version frightened the Japanese w ith its intricacy. T h ey objected to a reciprocal formula concern­ ing debts, saying that they did not owe anything to the Russians. If absolutely necessary, Karakhan reported, he would be willing to accept their formulation about debts provided it would be followed by an article about state and private claims in the framework o f the same formula. 4. Yoshizawa had objected to the general statement in Karakhan’s draft that the Soviet Union was w illing to grant concessions to the Japanese “ in the territory o f the U.S.S.R., particularly in Eastern Siberia and North Sakhalin.** Yoshizawa wanted a more concrete commitment, specifying the regions and general conditions o f the concessions. Karakhan suspected that the Japanese would want to indicate that oil region on Sakhalin, where they were now working. According to his information the Japanese had succeeded in discovering rich sources o f oil, and he was sure that they would want to retain them.18 On M ay 23 Karakhan and Yoshizawa agreed on the statement pro­ hibiting propaganda; they could not get together in regard to a treaty of commerce, however. Yoshizawa proposed that their treaties with third powers be taken into consideration when concluding one. Karakhan reminded Yoshizawa that he had not received any answer from the Japanese government concerning the transfer o f Soviet em­ bassy, consular and other state property nor about the terms o f evacua­ tion o f Sakhalin. Yoshizawa promised to try to obtain a reply, and the talks were recessed for a week. Karakhan made good use o f the interlude to conclude some Chinese affairs. On the morning o f M ay 31 he signed an agreement w ith China whereby the Soviet Union regained Tsarist rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. When the Soviet-Japanese negotiations were

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resumed on the afternoon o f the 31st, Yoshizawa congratulated Karakhan “ from the soul” , but as Karakhan reported to Chicherin, it was obvious that Yoshizawa and many o f his countrymen were distressed.* In spite o f the week’s recess Yoshizawa had not received a reply con­ cerning the transfer o f Russian state property and the evacuation of Sakhalin. He requested from Karakhan clarification o f the clause “all things being equal” in the article on debts, and sought to separate the debt question from the Nikolaevsk question. But Karakhan insisted that he wanted an answer to his questions before discussing anything else. T h ey argued at length to litd e avail. Karakhan and Yoshizawa did touch on the m atter o f concessions and Yoshizawa produced three maps showing the regions where the Japanese government wanted concessions. T ry as he did, Karakhan could not find out whether the Japanese government wanted to get concessions for entire regions or for pieces o f land in the régirais. He made it dear, however, that the Soviet government could not grant concessions in specific areas, that such consideration would require the participation o f specialists and would delay the proceedings too much. Karakhan reported that it could be seen from the maps, which Yoshizawa would not leave him on the ground that they were the only copies, that the Japanese wanted to get a concession on the narrow strip o f eastern Sakha­ lin, where they had found oil. T h ey desired the southwestern portion o f N orth Sakhalin as a coal concession and the southern section o f North Sakhalin as a lumber concession.

* On June 7,1924, the Japanese government declared in a note from Yoshizawa to Karakhan that the rights and interests o f Japan and her subjects would in no way be affected by the Soviet-Chinese agreement. The Soviet government replied through a note from Karakhan to Yoshizawa, dated July 10, that the question o f the Chinese Eastern Railway concerned exclusively the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic and that no other power nor the citizens o f any other power could have any rights or inter­ ests in regard to the Chinese Eastern Railway. On October 4 Yoshizawa raised the question again in a note to Karakhan; Karakhan replied on October 25, reaffirming the Soviet position. (O.V.P., vol. vm , pp. 396, 512)

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It was Karakhan’s belief that Yoshizawa did not wish to press exhorbitant Japanese concession demands, realizing that they would be rejected b y the Russians, and had spent the week between the tw o meetings trying to persuade his government to modify its position. Karakhan reported to Chicherin that he had not yet agreed to the word­ ing (to which Chicherin had already consented) granting to Japan “favorable” and “ long-term” concessions. “ In order to leave him w ith the impression o f the absolute unacoeptability o f such a narrowing down to areas or [specifying] in any other respect,” Karakhan reported, “ I declined this proposal o f his [when he showed the maps] in the most categorical manner.” Yoshizawa promised to present a detailed, written statement o f the demands o f his government at the next m eeting.19 Karakhan had insisted on written specifics from the Japanese side, because he suspected, as he told Yoshizawa, that the Japanese govern­ ment did not evaluate the situation correctly and wished to create new difficulties. T h e Japanese draft agreement which Yoshizawa produced on June 4 and 7 and which hereafter replaced Karakhan’ s as basis for discussion did contain a number o f new Japanese demands and in some instances reversed agreements already reached.' Article 3 o f the Japanese draft stated that the Japanese would evacuate North Sakhalin within three months from the moment that the agree­ ment w ent into effect. A rticle 4 stipulated that oil, coal, forest and fishery concessions on N orth Sakhalin be granted for periods o f 99 years from the moment the agreement went into effect at a lease fix o f 5 % o f net income, w ith the Soviet government bearing all responsibility for compensating prior Russian interests that m ight exist in those places. Article $ laid down some basic principles for commercial and navigational relations between the two countries to be in effect until the conclusion of a treaty o f commerce and navigation, which would take them into r On March 22 the Japanese had seemed satisfied with the retention o f the Treaty ofPOrtsmouth only and with the vague concession statement o f Karakhan; on June 4 they demanded the review o f other treaties as well and more detailed commitments concerning concessions.

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consideration; it stressed reciprocal most-fâvored-nation treatment. A rticle 6 insisted on keeping the treaty o f Portsmouth o f 1905 in force and reviewing at a later conference other treaties and agreements between the two states to retain the rights and privileges which the governments and citizens o f the two countries enjoyed thereby; agreements made by the tw o powers in conjunction w ith other states would not be reviewed until agreement was reached on an international level. A rticle 7 stated that upon the agreement going into effect the tw o contracting sides would begin the revision o f the fishery convention o f 1907. A supplementary note, which accompanied the draft, stipulated that at the time o f signing the basic convention both contracting sides would declare that neither had any treaty or agreement about a military alliance or any secret agreement, concluded w ith any third power in violation o f the sovereign or territorial rights o f theother side or threaten­ ing the security o f the other side.20 During the session ofju n e 7 Yoshizawa also produced a separate docu­ ment w ith a draft o f the Soviet note ofregret for the Nikolaevsk incident21 Karakhan refused to accept the new concession demands. He said that the Soviet government m ight perhaps agree to modify the phrasing in the article he had proposed to state that the concessions would be “ favorable” and “ long-term” . If the Japanese government would be satisfied w ith this, he would take it upon himself to plead w ith Moscow. He pledged to exert every effort to have the Japanese wording acceptedall the while having Chicherin’ s permission for the modification. T h e Japanese proposals seemed to usher in a new phase. There were tw o stages in the negotiations [Karakhan wrote Chicherin on June 16]. T h e first was until June, when the negotia­ tions went rather smoothly and Yoshizawa during the discussion o f questions showed great compliancy, and if on some o f the ques­ tions in dispute he did not give final formulations, he at any rate expressed himself in such a w ay, that I obtained the impression that the negotiations would end favorably and even q u ick ly.. . . But on June 4 they put forth their plan about the exchange of

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instruments o f ratification [and other new demands]. A ll this forces me to think, that after the report o f Yoshizawa about the course o f the negotiations during the first tw o weeks he received new instructions, which differed basically from those he had been given at first. Karakhan wrote that Yoshizawa had exchanged many telegrams w ith his government during the week when they had interrupted the con­ ference and that from what Yoshizawa’s secretary had said Karakhan gathered that Yoshizawa was not satisfied w ith his new instructions and was trying to have them modified on the grounds that his discussions had already committed him to a certain degree. Karakhan’s impression was reinforced by Yoshizawa himself, who came to him on the 16th, the day Karakhan wrote the above letter, after another recess o f over a week, and told him that he had received permis­ sion from his government to proceed to T okyo to report in person. He expected to be away for two weeks, perhaps two or three days longer. He expressed the hope that Karakhan would be in Peking upon his return and that they could resume negptiations. Yoshizawa said that he had asked for permission to go to T okyo because he had been unable to convey the true nature o f the situation to his government. He asserted that he wanted to persuade his government not to insist on the wording which it had put forward regarding the concessions and to modify its stand on debts and other points on which the Soviets stood pat. Karakhan was convinced from his conversation w ith Yoshizawa that Yoshizawa was in disagreement w ith the excessive demands o f his government and wanted to gp to Tokyo to use his connections there in direct talks w ith ministers and the Foreign Office to get the concessions necessary to conclude the agreement. As former director o f the Foreign Affairs Bureau Yoshizawa had important connections in diplomatic and government circles; his father-in-law, Inukai Tsuyoshi £ .$ !& , had just become minister o f communications in the new Katö cabinet.*

* In his memoirs Yoshizawa merely states that the new cabinet wanted to hear*

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Karakhan believed that the changes in Yoshizawa’s instructions—and Japanese newspaper reports confirmed that new instructions had been sent toward the end o f M ay— had been for domestic political reasons. A t the time o f assuming office in January o f 1924, Premier Kiyouia Keigo had looked forward to the speedy conclusion o f a Soviet-Japanese agree­ ment during his administration. When he realized by the end o f May that he would have to give up the premiership, Karakhan felt, Kiyouia decided to make it more difficult for his successor to obtain credit for such an agreement and introduced new demands in order to commit his successor to a tougher (and unsuccessful) policy. When Karakhan shared this speculation w ith Yoshizawa, “ he laughed, but did not refute it ” 2* T h e new premier Count Katö Takaaki ;to»Ä&BE,h who assumed office on June 11, and his foreign minister, Baron Shidehara Kijürô flfrJÜ-Ä-ÄW, took a realistic look at the situation. Katö realized that with the withdrawal o f Japanese troops from Siberia the opportunity for imposing a settlement on the Soviet Union had passed and that further delay m ight make a satisfactory agreement increasingly difficult The demands o f the preceding administration reflected public opinionpressure from business circles and the m ilitary— but there was no sense in making demands that could not be realized. Thus Katö agreed with Yoshizawa to the modification o f the Japanese position, notwithstanding the objections o f some o f the ministers. T h e major subject o f discussion between Yoshizawa and his superiors in T okyo was the question o f oil concessions on North Sakhalin, on which the navy insisted as a condition for the conclusion o f an agreement On July 12 Yoshizawa was sent w ith a group o f seven experts to North

*the facts about the Japanex-Russian negotiations at Peking and ordered him to return home. (Yoshizawa, p. 74) h Count Katö Takaaki had been foreign minister at the time o f the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and at the time o f the presentation o f the Twenty-one Demands. He was premier from June 11,1924 until January 28,1926. Do not oonfiise with Admiral Katö Tomosaburö, who had been premier in 1922-23.

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Sakhalin in order to make an on-the-spot study. On the basis o f his findings it was determined to seek concessions for 60% o f all explored oil fields.23 A t a cabinet meeting on July 24 the Japanese gpvemment agreed to a modification o f Japanese demands in line w ith Shidehara’s general policy of conciliation. Yoshizawa was furnished w ith a new set o f guiding principles. T h e Japanese gpvem m ent was w illing to forego long-term concessions on N orth Sakhalin as compensation for the Nikolaevsk incident; it was w illing to reduce the length o f oil concessions that it wanted on N orth Sakhalin and to give Russia a share o f the profits; a Soviet expression o f regret would be sufficient to setde the Nikolaevsk afiàir. T h e Japanese government agreed to confine insistence on the re­ tention o f old treaties to the T reaty o f Portsmouth and to revise other agreements such as the fishery convention; to leave the m atter o f Soviet repayment o f the money owed by its predecessors to Japan (300 million yen to the Japanese government and 69 million yen to private companies and financiers) until international settlement o f the debt questions; to postpone likewise the m atter o f public and private claims for damages; to leave the conclusion o f a commercial treaty for future deliberation, securing meanwhile only a guaranty o f freedom o f trade and inviolability of private property. T h e Japanese government clung to the demand for mutual restraint from subversive propaganda and insisted on the w ith­ drawal ofjapanese forces from North Sakhalin within two months (rather than two weeks) after conclusion o f an agreement.24 On July 26 Premier Katö gave a press interview while on a train, travel­ ing to Ise. “Japan is ready to recognize Soviet Russia and settle questions in her favor, as for as possible, in case Russia should show herselfas acting on the principle o f international faith and in accordance w ith interna­ tional duties,” Katö declared. W hile Katö expressed confidence that the Russian question would be settled shortly in view o f Yoshizawa’s imminent return to Peking, he remarked: “ W hat perplexes the govern­ ment is that Russia is given to too much diplomacy.” 25 The patronizing tone o f the statement elicited an angry response from Karakhan. In a statement to the press on July 30 (the day that Katö’s

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Japanese Recognition o f the USS.R.

interview had been carried in Peking newspapers), Karakhan declared that Katö’s interview went far to explain w hy relations had not yet been restored between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. “ Indeed Japan thinks she is making a big concession and putting the Soviet Union under an obliga­ tion by recognizing the Soviet Government,” Karakhan stated and warned: “ Until Japan realizes that both sides are equally interested in the restoration o f mutual relations and that neither party is drang a favour in this m atter, but that both are but fulfilling what is essentially their own interests, it is difficult to obtain a common end.” 26 On August 3 Yoshizawa left Tokyo and returned to Peking.27 The following day, on August 4, he resumed his negotiations w ith Karakhan alternately at the Soviet and Japanese embassies. Yoshizawa had brought from T okyo a new Japanese draft treaty, including attached protocols, and the proposed text o f a Soviet note o f regret about Nikolaevsk. These he now handed to Karakhan. Although the Japanese press asserted before Yoshizawa’s return to Peking that the Japanese draft m et the Soviet demands, a contention that Yoshizawa repeated, Karakhan disagreed. He folt that most o f the modifications had been mainly editorial in com­ parison w ith the former Japanese draft. On the basic issue o f the North Sakhalin concessions, for example, the Japanese still persisted in their demands. A special protocol B, attached to the draft agreem ent, stipulated the granting to Japan o f concessions “ free from all restricting conditions” for the exploitation o f oil and coal resources on most o f N orth Sakhalin; provision was made also for Japanese right to cut lumber, build port facilities and railways, lay oil pipelines and establish electric communi­ cation on North Sakhalin. Nor was the Soviet government to put any restrictions on the employment o f labor and other personnel or to interfere in any way in the control or organization o f labor in the Japanese concessions, nor levy any taxes on the Japanese enterprises. In return Japan was w illing to reduce the original demand for 99 year leases to $$ years and to provide the Soviet government w ith 5% o f the oil and coal production. Protocol A put o ff the debt question until its solution on an international level, yet it linked it w ith the occupation ofN orth Sakhalin, stating that the troops would be withdrawn after this protocol went into

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effect. Japan insisted that the T reaty o f Portsmouth remain in full force, the other Russo-Japanese treaties to be revised or abrogated in the light of changed conditions upon deliberation at a separate conference in the future. A rticle 4 o f the draft treaty laid down conditions which were to form the basis o f a later treaty o f commerce and were to serve as interim rules until the conclusion o f such a treaty o f commerce. T he article stip­ ulated that citizens o f both states, subject to the laws o f the two coun­ tries, should enjoy freedom o f entry, travel, and residence as well as full protection o f person and property; wide and reciprocal rights o f private property and freedom to engage in commerce, navigation, industry and other peaceful business in no respect inferior to rights and privileges extended to citizens o f a third power. T h e article called for negotiation of a special treaty o f commerce and navigation in order to promote econo­ mic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.28 T h at day, in response to a proposal by Karakhan that each o f the con­ tracting parties agree to nullify any treaty or convention which con­ stituted an infringement upon, or a menace to, the sovereignty, territorial rights or national safety o f the other party and pledge not to enter into any such agreement thereafter, Yoshizawa brought a draft declaration to this effect. It was accepted by Karakhan and embodied in Protocol A . For five sessions, lasting three to four hours each, beginning on Monday, August 4, and ending on Saturday, August 9, Yoshizawa and Karakhan argued about the new Japanese draft treaty. Yoshizawa kept underlining that it had been composed on the basis o f Soviet objections and desires and— in Karakhan’s words— “ constantly tried to frighten” the Soviet plenipotentiary by asserting that this was the maximum and final Japanese proposal, that it had been confirmed by the Council ofM inisters and that if the Soviet side rejected it, there would be created a very serious situation from which there m ight not be a w ay out. T he entire week was devoted primarily to the discussion o f the Japanese proposal as a whole without going into details. “ I did not go into the substance of their proposals, refusing to discuss them,” Karakhan reported to Chicherin on August n ; “ we argued primarily whether it was necessary right now to determine merely a general formula, on the basis o f which

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Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

a concession treaty would be concluded in the future, or, as they insist, an agreement which w ill be signed right away and w ill constitute a final concession contract, on the basis o f which the Japanese can get to work right away.” Unable to budge Karakhan on this issue, Yoshizawa announced that he had to seek instructions from Tokyo. Karakhan had his doubts. Judging Yoshizawa by himself, Karakhan w rote: “ I suspect, that he has probably brought these new instructions w ith him and only makes believe that he is asking Tokyo.” Karakhan was supported in this view by the as­ sertions o f American and Japanese journalists that Yoshizawa had in­ structions which permitted him to make further concessions.29 T h e crux o f the problem was that the Soviets objected to extensive and specific concessions, lest they appear to be a condition o f recognition or o f evacuation and thereby violate the principle ofequality and reciprocity on which they insisted. T h e Japanese, on the other hand, felt no less strongly that the concessions would be merely nominal unless definite arrangements were worked out in advance. For example, they believed that the exploitation o f the mining concessions would be impossible if Soviet labor regulations were applied.30 Provoked by assertions in Japanese newspapers that he had not told the truth when he had declared in a press interview thatJapanese demands were excessive, Karakhan threatened to publish the text o f the Japanese drafts. When Yoshizawa reminded him that both sides had agreed to keep the negotiations secret, Karakhan retorted that he was sure the Japanese government had inspired the press articles which criticized the inflexibility o f the Soviet negotiators and had provided the news­ papers w ith at least partial information about the drafts and that there­ fore the Soviet side now was free to publish the text o f the Japanese and Russian proposals. So vehement were Yoshizawa’s objections, that Kara­ khan felt reassured in the belief that Yoshizawa had another draft and dreaded that publication o f Protocol B would embarrass his government Karakhan told Yoshizawa that he would honor his request and not make anything public in Peking, though he doubted that the government in Moscow would be moved by his considerations and expressed the thought

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that it m ight publish the Japanese demands and the Russian proposals. Karakhan kept his word literally speaking in that he did not make the exchange public in Peking, but he did not try to dissuade his government from publishing the Japanese demands; on the contrary, he advised M oscow to do so.31 In the free o f Soviet opposition to Protocol B, Yoshizawa brought a revised version thereof on September 28. It was proposed that the Soviet Union lease to Japan for 40 to 50 years oil concessions in an area totalling 4,000 square verst (over 2,600 square miles) and coal concessions, whose area was to be specified in contracts. R oyalty for the oil leases was to am ount to 20% o f net yield or between 5 and 15% o f shaft production; rental for the oil leases was to be 20 and 5% respectively. O n October 6 the Soviet delegation presented a counter-draft. In it the Soviet government agreed to lease to the Japanese 40% o f the oil regions being worked. T he lease areas were to be situated in chessboard fashion and must not be side-by-side. Japan would get the right, further­ m ore, to engage in oil exploration in a territory o f 1,000 square verst (about 650 square miles) o f the eastern shore o f N orth Sakhalin for a period o f five years. If, upon expiration o f this period, oil was found in this region, the Japanese companies which would engage in this exploration could obtain concessions on the basis o f 40% o f each oil field. T h e coal regions would be determined by later contract negotiations. Payment for the exploitation o f the resources would amount to between 10 and 15% o f shaft production for oil and between 5 and 10% o f shaft production for coal.1 T h e Soviets stated, furthermore, that until the conclusion o f con­ cession contracts w ith Japanese companies, during the transition period o f six months after the conclusion o f the general agreement, the Japanese would be allowed to continue work on existing enterprises on condition that they would not export from N orth Sakhalin all that they produced. Yoshizawa and Karakhan discussed the Soviet proposal at some length. 1 For the complete text o f the Soviet counter-proposal sec Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.19: 5061-5064.

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Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

When Yoshizawa stated that he could not accept it on the basis of his current instructions and must seek new instructions from Tokyo, the negotiations were recessed.32 Meanwhile, mi October 8, Karakhan gave a press interview in which he stated that the Soviet-Japanese negotiations had entered a final and decisive stage. After reviewing the various issues still in dispute, he stated: A t present the fate o f the conference depends on the commercial calculations o f Japan or o f those persons to whom Japan intends to leave the exploitation o f the Sakhalin concessions. We agree to these concessions only because we want an economic rapproche­ ment w ith Japan and want to assist her in supplying her with oil and coal, although Japan has no right to demand concessions from us on any ground whatsoever. W e have declared from the very beginning that the negotiations must not be complicated by sec­ ondary questions, but Japan herself has wanted this, and now we are drawn into endless details, which are beginning to threaten the favorable outcome o f the conference.33 T he following day, on October 9, Karakhan wrote to Chicherin: "O ne can consider that in all questions our points o f view are in agree­ ment w ith Japan. It is a m atter o f editorial changes, o f editorial cor­ rections. T he basic question is about the concessions, where the major [problem] is the question o f the areas o f the oil concessions to be given. A very great deal o f time has been spent w ith the Japanese on the discus­ sion o f this question.” 34 A memorandum, dated August 29, presented by Yoshizawa to the Soviets at their request, described the economic activity o f the Japanese on North Sakhalin. Japanese companies were prospecting for oil and obtaining it in eight regions, w ith a total o f 13,000 acres, and were working coal in two regions.35 T h e Japanese wished to lease all the eight regions, listed in die memorandum. As stated in the counter-draft o f October 6, Karakhan wanted to lim it the Japanese to some o f the regions, but to no avail. He

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proposed 40% , but they wanted all. A break in negotiations ensued as a result o f the deadlock. During the break Shimada, a diplomat who had participated in the negotiations, was sent by Yoshizawa to tell Karakhan that Yoshizawa had submitted his resignation; he had allegedly lost hope o f reaching an agreement. Karakhan suspected that this was another stratagem to frighten him into further concessions or at least to learn whether or not he would be w illing to make any. On the other hand, he thought, it was quite possible that the negotiations would come to naught over this issue, “ since the policy o f Japan was determined not only by the national interests o f that state, political considerations, the need to get out o f the isolated position and to strengthen its position in the Far East by means o f friendship w ith us [the Soviet Union], but there are also the interests o f the Mitsubishi Company, whose agents Katö and Shidehara are, and Mitsubishi is the firm which mainly works on Sakhalin and is interested in Sakhalin matters, and it is not impossible that, as it usually happens in all capitalist countries, the interests o f an influential clique o f capitalists may gain the upper hand over the overall national interests ofthe entire country, ofall bourgeois-nationalist Japan.” Shimada made the point that the Japanese had spent enormous sums on the Intervention and that no government could remain in office if it did not get favorable concessions which could justify all these great ex­ penditures. Furthermore, Shimada argued, the firms which were ex­ ploiting the resources on Sakhalin had received a subsidy o f 15 million yen from the Japanese government, money which had been used to drill wells. I f the Japanese now received only some o f the eight regions, the money invested in the others would be wasted, to which they could not agree. Although Karakhan had no information on the basis o f which he could conclude w ith certainty whether or not the Japanese would give in on this m atter, he was inclined to think that they would, because great as the influence o f Mitsubishi was, a break with the Soviet Union would seriously weaken the international position o f Japan, particularly in China and in the Russian Far East. This would be the more damaging to Japa­ nese interests now that Russia “ sat also on the Chinese Eastern Railway.”

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But Karakhan expressed concern in his letter o f October 9 to Chicherin that» even if he could come to an agreement w ith the Japanese in a week or two, the negotiations would fail because the Soviet Union had re­ peatedly insisted that there would be no agreement unless the Japanese evacuated N orth Sakhalin b y winter. According to his information it would be physically impossible for them to do so after the end o f October; the evacuation o f the eastern shore ought to have been completed by die beginning o f October and that date had passed already and there were still some 200 to 300 soldiers there. N oting that physical conditions might make it impossible to come to an agreement, Karakhan stressed that one must carefully weigh this matter. “ Personally I am in favor o f not signing an agreement if they cannot evacuate,” Karakhan wrote, “ because all the delay was their foult. T h ey arranged for endless recesses between one meeting and another, waiting for instructions from Tokyo. But inasmuch as it may be desirable from an overall point o f view to obtain Japanese recognition, the Soviet Union may find it possible to come to an agree­ ment on the basis that the evacuation would be completed as soon as physically possible, in which case one m ight be able to state, that our [Russian] authority on N orth Sakhalin would be restored and that the Japanese forces would live there unarmed and not as a fighting unit but as Japanese citizens until a steamer could carry them away.” 36 On October 21 Karakhan wrote to Yoshizawa that tw o weeks had passed since the last session o f the conference. He inquired when receipt of the new instructions concerning the Soviet counter-draft about the concessions could be expected from Tokyo. He reminded Yoshizawa o f Japanese statements that the approach o f winter would make the evacuation of N orth Sakhalin difficult and expressed the feeling that it would be a pity, now that they were so close to final agreement, if complications would arise because o f such a technicality as delay in the arrival o f instructions. Karakhan asked once again that Yoshizawa reply to the query made by him in October when clim atic conditions would perm it the evacua­ tion o f N orth Sakhalin. “ A s I had the honor to state to you, Monsieur le M inistre, at the session o f October 3, this question has the greatest significance for the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.” 37

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The talks were duly resumed three days later, on October 24.38 On October 27* Yoshizawa produced another Japanese draft o f Protocol B. The Japanese government demanded 60% o f the entire area o f the discovered oil fields, as well as 60% o f all oil fields which m ight be found by the Japanese in the future, 30% o f coal deposits in the restricted area and all mines outside this area.39 If the Soviet government within a period of three years did not begin exploitation o f the remaining oil fields, it must lease them to the Japanese.40 On O ctober 30 Karakhan handed to Yoshizawa the full text o f the revised Soviet draft treaty, w ith all the protocols and notes. “ I gave this a somewhat festive character and created an atmosphere, which had to convey to him, that this was our final decision, that either they must accept or else the negotiations w ill be broken off,” Karakhan reported to Chicherin on November 1. “ This was the easier to convey to him,” he remarked, “ since ju st on the eve [of the meeting] a telegram had been received about recognition o f us by France.. . . ” In handing the treaty draft and documents to Yoshizawa, Karakhan stated that editorial changes o f some o f the articles were quite possible and that in the con­ cessions article, which retained the 40% Soviet proposal, there was room for discussion about the percentage o f the output the Russians were to receive, but in so far as the size o f the concessions was concerned this was the final and definitive word: either they would accept it or the negotiations would be broken off. “ T h is made such a strong impression on Yoshizawa,” Karakhan re­ ported, “ that the next day, the 31st, regardless o f the fact that it was the Emperor’s birthday and he had various reoeptions and congratulations, he came to me and stayed for tw o hours.” In vain Yoshizawa sought some Soviet concessions or some supplementary material to help in­ fluence his government into coming to an agreement. Karakhan tightened the screws. In his words: T o increase the seriousness o f the situation, I told him, that the [Soviet] government is very dissatisfied w ith the endless interrup* On October 29 according to Tanaka (p. 92).

172

Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R. tions, which were allowed by the Japanese side system atically, that it is dissatisfied w ith the vagueness o f the reply about the evacua­ tion o f Sakhalin, that it is thought in Moscow that I have shown weakness and that this has led to such a great delay in the negotia­ tions, and that I, apparently, have acted without enough energy and determination and that, therefore, all there is left for me to do is to convey what I have received from Moscow. During the entire period o f the negotiations we did not have such a critical moment.

Yoshizawa objected to Article 3 o f the Soviet draft treaty.* T he article stated that the two sides agreed to revise the fishery convention of 1907 in accordance w ith the new conditions and laws o f the country and in conformity w ith the current system o f leasing fishing grounds. Until the conclusion o f the new convention the current system o f leasing fishing grounds to Japanese subjects would be continued. Yoshizawa rejected the last clause, demanding that w ith the next fishing season leases be granted in accordance with the fishery convention o f 1907, which the Japanese regarded as being still in force. Karakhan insisted that the article remain unchanged, adding that fishing grounds on North Sakhalin would not be leased, and that he wanted this spelled out in the protocol. Article 4 o f the Soviet draft concerned a trade agreement and was an edited version o f article 5 o f the Japanese draft o f June 1924, except for adding the point o f most-favored-nation treatment. It stipulated that the two countries would establish their trade relations in accordance w ith the laws o f the two lands and would take no measures to dis­ criminate against the other. Yoshizawa wanted the inclusion of a state­ ment regarding reciprocity. Karakhan reported to Moscow that he thought that this could be accepted if Yoshizawa continued to insist on it, since it would not affect Russian interests seriously, if at all. A rticle 2 o f Protocol A left the question o f the debt o f previous Russian governments for later negotiation, promising that the m atter would be k An English translation o f the entire draft was published in the Tokyo Nicbi-Nicbi

Sbimbun on November 4; see Japanese Archives, M T 251.106.19: 543a

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settled no less favorably for Japan than any other power; the m atter o f mutual claims also would be left for later consideration. Yoshizawa agreed to the protocol as a whole, but wished to break this article into tw o separate articles, to which Karakhan had no particular objections. In connection w ith Soviet acceptance o f the continued effectiveness o f the T reaty o f Portsmouth, the Soviet draft stated that such acceptance

'*

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“

R eœeTCMOHCKONy comaioraRnL

I W CM OCTMU

"U nde Sam has remained alone** — comment o f Izveitiu on Japanese recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

T h e arrival o f Ambassador Tanaka in Moscow, on July 14,192$. Tanaka stands hat in hand, Chargé d’ Affaires Satô hands in pockets. (From N iito gaikô kankei tb i,

vol. I.)

Signature o f the North Sakhalin concession contracts on December 14, 1925, at the meeting o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy in Moscow. Seated (from left to right): Ambassador Tanaka, Deputy Commissar o f Foreign Affairs Litvinov, Chairman o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy Derzhinskii, Admiral Nakasato, Director o f the Foreign Section o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy Gurevich, and Foreign Office official Kawakami. (From N ibon gaiko

byakttnen-sbi[History o f a hundred years o f rejuvenated Japan]

published by the Tokyo N ich t N ich t Sbim btut under the editorial supervision o f the Japanese Foreign Office in 1953, p. 138.)

CHAPTER SIX

The Basic Convention he

Basic Convention, concluded by Karakhan and Yoshizawa,

bore the lengthy title o f “ T h e Convention Embodying Basic Rules o f the Relations Between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.” Soviet historians generally refer to it as the “ Peking Convention” ( ”Pekimkaia Konventsiia) after the place o f its signature; Japanese scholars use the term “Japanese-Soviet Basic Treaty” (Nino Kibon Joyaku 0 7 $ W e have adopted “ Basic Convention” as brief and to the point. T h e Basic Convention in its final form, as communicated to the League o f N ations, consisted o f the convention proper, two protocols, one declara­ tion, an exchange o f two notes, an annexed note, the protocol o f signature, plus a memorandum. T h e full text o f these documents, in their official English wording, was as follows:

THE CONVENTION EMBODYING BASIC RULES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. JAPAN AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SO CIALIST, REPUB­ LICS, desiring to promote relations o f good neighbourhood and

economic co-operation between them, have resolved to conclude a Convention embodying basic rules in regulation o f such relations and, to that end, have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

178

Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R. HIS M AJESTY THE E M PER O R OF JAPAN :

Kenkichi Y o s h i z a w a , Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic o f China, Jushii, a member of the First Class o f the Imperial Order o f the Sacred Treasure; THE C E N T R A L EX ECU TIVE CO M M ITTE E OF TH E UNION OF SOVIET SO CIALIST RE PU B LICS:

L ev M ikhailovitch K a r a k h a n , Ambassador to the Republic o f China; W ho having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows: A R T IC L E I

T h e H igh Contracting Parties agree that, w ith the com ing into force o f the present Convention, diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between them. a r t ic l e

n

T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the Treaty o f Portsmouth o f September 5 th, 1905, shall remain in full force. It is agreed that the Treaties, Conventions and Agreements, other than the said T reaty o f Portsmouth, which were concluded between Japan and Russia prior to Novem ber 7 ,19 17 , shall be re­ examined at a Conference to be subesquendy held between the Governments o f the H igh Contracting Parties and are liable to re­ vision or annulment as altered circumstances m ay require. A R T IC L E m

T h e Governments o f the H igh Contracting Parties agree that, upon the coming into foroe o f the present Convention, they shall proceed to the revision o f the Fishery Convention o f 1907, taking into consideration such changes as may have taken place in the general conditions since the conclusion o f the said Fishery Convention.

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Pending the conclusion o f a convention 90 revised, the Govern­ ment o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall maintain the practices established in 1924 relating to the lease o f fishery lots to Japanese subjects. A R T IC L E IV

H ie Governments o f d ie H igh Contracting Parties agree that, upon the coming into force o f the present Convention, they shall proceed to the conclusion o f a treaty o f commerce and navigation in conformity w ith the principles hereunder mentioned, and that, pending the conclusion o f such a treaty, the general intercourse between the tw o countries shall be regulated b y those principles. 1. T h e subjects or citizens o f each o f the H igh Contracting Parties shall, in accordance w ith the laws o f the country: (a) have full liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories o f the other, and (b) enjoy constant and complete protection for the safety o f their lives and property. 2. Each o f the H igh Contracting Parties shall, in accordance w ith the laws o f the country accord in its territories to the subjects or citizens o f the other, to the widest possible extent and on condition o f reciprocity, the right o f private ownership and the liberty to engage in commerce, navigation, industries and other peaceful pursuits. 3. W ithout prejudice to the right o f each Contracting Party to regulate b y its own laws the system o f international trade in that country, it is understood that neither Contracting Party shall apply in discrimination against the other Party any measures o f prohibition, restriction or impost which m ay serve to hamper the growth o f the intercourse, economic or otherwise, between the tw o countries,itbeing the intention ofboth Parties to place the commerce, navigation and industry o f each country, as for as possible, on the footing o f the mostfavoured nation.

i8o

Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R. T he Governments o f the H igh Contracting Parties further agree that they shall enter into negotiations, from time to time as cir­ cumstances may require, for the conclusion o f special arrange­ ments relative to commerce and navigation to adjust and to promote economic relations between the two countries.

article v T h e H igh Contracting Parties solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live in peace and am ity w ith each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right o f a State to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own w ay, to refrain and restrain all persons in any governmental service for them, and all organisa­ tions in receipt o f any financial assistance from them, from any a ct overt or covert liable in any w ay whatever to endanger the order and security in any part o f the territories o f Japan or the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. It is further agreed that neither Contracting Party shall perm it the presence in the territories under its jurisdiction: a. o f organizations or groups pretending to be the Govern­ ment for any part o f the territories o f the other Party, or b. o f alien subjects or citizens who may be found to be actually carrying on political activities for such organisations or groups. A R T IC L E VI

In the interest o f promoting economic relations between the two countries, and taking into consideration the needs o f Japan w ith regard to natural resources, the Government o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics is w illing to grant to Japanese subjects, com­ panies and associations concessions for the exploitation o f minerals, forests and other natural resources in all the territories o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE BASIC CONVENTION

l 8l

A R T IC L E VU

The present Convention shall be ratified. Such ratification by each o f the H igh Contracting Parties shall, with as little delay as possible, be communicated, through its diplomatic representative at Peking, to the Government o f the other Party, and from the date o f the later o f such communications this Convention shall come into full force. T he formal exchange ofthe ratifications shall take place atPeking as soon as possible. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at Peking, this twentieth Day o f January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Tw enty-five. (Signed) K. Y o s h i z a w a (Signed) L. K a r a k h a n

PROTOCOL A Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, in proceeding this day to the signature erf* the Convention embodying Basic Rules o f the relations between them, have deemed it adviseable to regulate certain questions in relation to the said Convention, and have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations: A R T IC L E I

Each o f the High Contracting Parties undertakes to place in the possession o f the Party the moveable and immovable property belonging to the Embassy and Consulates o f such other Party and actually existing within its own territories. In case it is found that the land occupied by the former Russian

i 82

Japanese R ecognition o f the USS.R. Government at T okyo is so situated as to cause difficulties to the town planning o f T okyo or to die service o f the public purposes, the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall be w illing to consider the proposals which m ay be made b y the Japanese Government looking to the removal o f such difficulties. H ie Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall accord to the Government o f Japan all reasonable facilities in the selection o f suitable sites and buildings far the Japanese Embassy and Consulates to be established in the territories o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE n It is agreed that all questions o f the debts due to the Governm ent or subjects ofjapan cm account o f public loans and treasury bills issued b y the former Russian Governments, to w it b y the Imperial Government (/Russia and the Provisional Government which suc­ ceeded it, are reserved for adjustment at subsequent negotiations between the Government o f Japan and the Governm ent o f th e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. Provided that in the adjustment o f such questions the Govern­ ment or subjects (/Japan shall not, all other conditions being equal, be placed in any position less favourable than that w hich the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics m ay accord to the Government or nationals o f any other country on similar questions. It is also agreed that all questions relating to daim s o f th e Government o f either Party to the Government o f the other, or o f the nations o f either Party to the Government o f the other, are reserved for adjustment at subsequent negotiations between the Government o f Japan and the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE in In view o f clim atic conditions in Northern Saghalien preventing

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183

the Immediate homeward transportation o f Japanese troops now stationed there, these troops shall be com pletely withdrawn from the said region b y M ay 15,192$. Such withdrawal shall be commenced as soon as clim atic condi­ tions w ill perm it it and any and all districts in Northern Saghalien so evacuated b y Japanese troops shall immediately thereupon be restored in full sovereignty to the proper authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. H ie details pertaining to the transfer o f administration and to the termination o f the occupation shall be arranged at Alexandrovsk between the Commander o f the Japanese Occupation Arm y and the Representatives o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. A R T IC L E IV

T h e H igh Contracting Parties m utually declare that there actually exists no treaty or agreement o f m ilitary alliance nor any other secret agreement which either o f them has entered into w ith any third Party and which constitutes an infringement upon, or a menace to, the sovereignty, territorial rights or national safety o f the other Contracting Party. A R T IC L E V

T he present Protocol is to be considered as ratified w ith the ratification o f the Convention em bodying Basic Rules o f the Relations between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics, signed under the same date. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at Peking, this twentieth day o f January, one thousand nine hundred twenty-five. (Signed) K . Y o s h i z a w a (Signed) L . K a r a k h a n

184

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

PROTOCOL B T h e High Contracting Parties have agreed upon the following as the basis for the Concession Contracts to be concluded within five months from the date o f the complete evacuation o f Northern Saghalien by Japanese troops, as provided for in A rticle 3 o f Protocol (A ), signed this day between the Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 1. T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Government o f Japan the concession for the exploitation o f 50% , in area, o f each o f the oilfields in Northern Saghalien which are mentioned in the Memorandum submitted to the Representative o f the Union by the Japanese Representative on August 29,1924. For the purpose o f determining the area to be leased to the Japanese concerns for such exploitation, each o f the said oilfields shall be divided into checker-board squares o f from fifteen to forty dessiatines each, and a number o f these squares, representing 50% o f the whole area, shall be allotted to the Japanese, it being understood that the squares to be so leased to the Japanese are, as a rule, to be non-conti guous to one another, but shall include all the wells now being drilled or worked by the Japanese. W ith regard to the remaining unleased lots o f the oilfields mentioned in the said Memorandum, it is agreed that, should the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer such lots, w holly or in part, for foreign concession, Japanese con­ cerns shall be afforded equal opportunity in the matter o f such concession. 2. T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics also agrees to authorize Japanese concerns recommended b y the Government ofjapan to prospect oilfields, for a period o f from five to ten years, on the Eastern coast o f Northern

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Saghalien over an area o f one thousand square versts to be selected within one year after the conclusion o f the Conces­ sion Contracts, and in case oilfields shall have been established in consequence o f such prospecting by the Japanese, the con­ cession for the exploitation o f $0%, in area, o f the oilfields so established shall be granted to the Japanese. 3. T he Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant to Japanese concerns recommended by the Government o f Japan the concession for the exploitation o f coal fields on the western coast o f Northern Saghalien over a specific area which shall be determined in the Concession Contracts. T h e Government o f the Union erf*Soviet Socialist Republics further agrees to grant to such Japanese concerns the concession regarding coal fields in the Doue district over a specific area to be determined in the Concession Contracts. W ith regard to the coal fields outside the specific area mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs, it is also agreed that, should the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics decide to offer them for foreign concession, Japanese concerns shall be afforded equal opportunity in the matter o f such concession. 4. T he period o f the concessions for the exploitation o f oil and coal fields stipulated in the preceding paragraphs shall be from forty to fifty years. 5. As royalty for the said concessions, thejapanese concessionnaires shall make over annually to the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, in case o f coal fields, from 5 to 8% o f their gross output, and, in case o f oilfields, from 5 to 15% o f their gross output: provided that in the case o f a gusher, the royalty may be raised up to 45% o f its gross output. T h e percentage o f output thus to be made over as royalty shall be definitively fixed in the Concession Contracts and it may be graduated according to the scale o f annual output in a manner to be defined in such contracts.

186

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R. 6. T h e said Japanese concerns shall be perm itted to fell trees needed for purpose o f the enterprises and to set up various undertakings w ith a view to facilitating communication and transportation erf" materials and products. Details connected therewith shall be arranged in die Concession Contracts. 7. In consideration o f the royalty above mentioned, and taking also into account the disadvantages under which die enter­ prises are to be placed b y reason o f die geographical position and other general conditions o f the districts affected, it is agreed that the importation and exportation o f any articles, materials or products needed for or obtained from such enter­ prises shall be permitted free o f duty, and that the enterprises shall not be subjected to any such taxation or restriction as may in fact render their remunerative working impossible. 8. T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall accord all reasonable protection and facilities to die said enterprises. 9. Details connected w ith the foregoing articles shall be arranged in the Concession Contracts. T h e present Protocol is to be considered as ratified w ith die ratification o f the Convention em bodying Basic Rules o f the Relations between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, signed under the same date. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at Peking, this twentieth day o f January, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-five. (Signed) K . Y o s h i z a w

a

(Signed) L. K a r a k h a n

THE BASIC CONVENTION

IS?

DECLARATION In proceeding this day to die signature o f the Convention embodying die Basic Rules o f the Relations between the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned Pleni­ potentiary o f die Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics has die honour to declare that the recognition b y his Government o f the validity o f the T reaty o f Portsmouth o f September 5,190 5, does not in any w ay signify that the Government o f the Union shares w ith the former Tsarist Government the political responsibility for the conclusion o f the said T reaty. (Signed) L. K a r a k h a n Peking, January 20,1925

EXCHANGE OF NOTES Peking, January 20th, 1925 MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE

I have the honour on behalf o f m y Government, to declare d u t the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the work which is now being carried on b y the Japanese in Northern Saghalien both in the oil and coal fields, as stated in the Memorandum handed to the Plenipotentiary o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics b y the Japanese Plenipotentiary on A ugust 29th, 1924, be continued until die conclusion o f die Concession Contracts to be effected within five months from the date o f the complete evacuation o f Northern Saghalien b y the Japanese troops, provided die following conditions be abided by b y the Japanese:

188

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. 1. T h e work must be continued in strict accordance with the data o f the said Memorandum o f August 29th, 1924, as regards the area, the number o f workers and experts em­ ployed, the machinery and other conditions provided in the Memorandum. 2. T h e produce, such as oil and coal, cannot be exported or sold and may only be applied to the use o f the staff and equipment connected w ith the said work. 3. T h e permission granted by the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics for the continuation o f the work shall in no w ay affect the stipulations o f the future concession contract. 4. T he question o f operation o f the Japanese wireless stations in Northern Saghalien is reserved for future arrangement, and will be adjusted in a manner consistent w ith the ex­ isting laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics prohibit­ ing private and foreign establishment o f the wireless stations. I avail m yself o f this opportunity to convey to you, Monsieur le M inistre, the assurances o f my highest consideration. (Signed) L. K a r a k h a n His Excellency M r. Kenkichi YO SH IZAW A, Envoy Extraordinary and M inister Plenipotentiary o f Japan.

Peking, January 20th, 1925 MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR

I have the honour tx> acknowledge the receipt o f the following N ote from Your Excellency, under this date:

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“ Monsieur le M inistry “ I have the honour, on behalfo f m y Government, to declare that the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the work which is now being carried on by the Japanese in Northern Saghalien both in the oil and the coal fields, as stated in the Memorandum handed to the Plenipotentiary o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics by the Japanese Plenipotentiary on August 29th, 1924, be continued until the conclusion o f the Concession Contracts to be effected within five months from the date o f the complete evacuation o f Northern Saghalien by the Japanese troops, provided the following conditions be abided by by the Japanese: “ 1. T h e work must be continued in strict accordance w ith the data o f the said Memorandum o f August 29th, 1924, as re­ gards the area, the number o f workers and experts em­ ployed, the machinery and other conditions provided in the Memorandum. “ 2. T h e produce, such as oil and coal, cannot be exported or sold and may only be applied to the use o f the staff and equipment connected w ith the said work. “ 3. T he permission granted by the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics for the continuation o f the work shall in no way affect the stipulations o f the future Concession Contract. “ 4. T h e question o f operation o f the Japanese wireless stations in Northern Saghalien is reserved for future arrangement, and will be adjusted in a manner consistent w ith the existing laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics prohibiting private and foreign establishment o f wireless stations.” On behalf o f my Government, I have the honour to state that the Japanese Imperial Government agrees entirely w ith the said Note.

190

Japanese R ecognition o f the USS.R. I avail m yself o f this opportunity to convey to you, Monsieur l’Ambassadeur, die assurances o f m y highest consideration. (Signed) K . Y

o s h iz a w a

H is Excellency M r. Lev M ikhaikm tch K AR AK H A N , Ambassador o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ANNEXED NOTE In proceeding this day to die signature o f die Convention em bodying Basic Rules o f die Relations between the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned Pleni­ potentiary o f die Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics has the honour to tender hereby to die Government ofjapan an expression o f sincere regrets for the N ikolaievsk incident o f 192a (L S .) L . K a r a k h a n

Peking, January 20th, 1925

PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE Kenkichi YO SH IZAW A, His Imperial Japanese M ajesty’ s Envoy Extraordinary and M inister Plenipotentiary to China, and Lev M ikhailovitch K AR AK H A N , Ambassador o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics to China, authorised under their respective full powers, found in due and good form, m et this day at Pricing and d osriy examined the following documents:

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I9I

1. A Convention embodying Basic Rules o f the Relations between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 2. T w o Protocols. 3. One Declaration.

4. One set o f Notes. 5. One annexed N ote. H aving agreed upon every term and stipulation contained therein, the Plenipotentiaries have officially signed and sealed die respective documents. T h e tw o Plenipotentiaries further agreed that there should be apposed to the present Protocol the Memorandum, handed b y the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiary o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on A ugust 29th, 1924, and em bodying a statement on the conditions o f oil and coal fields worked b y the Japanese in Northern Saghalien. In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries o f the tw o H igh Contracting Parties have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language, and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at Peking, this twentieth day o f January, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-five. (Signed) K . Y

o s h iz a w a

(Signed) L. K a r a i h

an

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

192

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE REPRE­ SENTATIVE OF THE UNION BY THE JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE ON AUGUST 29th, 1924. O IL E X P L O R A T IO N O P E R A T IO N S I T h e exploration operations are being conducted by the Hokushinkai and Co. on behalf o f the Government. II Operations

Locations

Areas

T est boring O il

No oil

Oha

T w o and a-half miles west o f U rkt Bay, in the valley o f the R iver Oha.

2500 acres

4

7

Ehabi

One mile west o f Ehabi Bay.

1600

None

3

1200 acres

None

3

2500 acres

I

2

1200 acres

I

I

1600 acres

I

I

Pilutun

Six miles south­ west o f Kyakr Bay, along the River Pilutun.

N utovo

Five miles west from the mouth o f

acres

the River Nutovo. Chaivo

Three miles west o f Chaivo Bay along the Boatasin River.

N uivo

Seven miles west o f N uivo Bay, in the valley o f Nogric River (a branch o f the Tuim i River).

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Three miles south o f the mouth o f

193

800 acres

None

2

1600

i

4

the R iver Tuim i along the valley o f that River. Katangli

On the shore o f Lake Katangli

acres

north o f N abilisky Bay. Ill Experts employed Workers

20) • 1 in summer time. 400J

IV M achinery: Hydraulic Rotary system

for deep boring.

Standard cable system Diamond Boring system

2\ for shallow io l low boring.

Spring Boring system (worked b y man-power V

O utfit. a. For communication: Telephone lines connecting the several operations, wireless stations at Oha and Chaivo. b. For transportation: One small steamer and several motor boats which are used in summer time for con­ necting the several operations, besides a dozen lighters and junks. c. Establishment:

Houses for

Oha

Ehabi

Pilutun

N utovo

Chaivo

30

I

2

7

8

11

3

3

3

i

personnel and workers Boring rigs.

194

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. 6

0

0

i

0

O il reservoir (earthen)

3

0

0

0

0

Fuel oil

4

0

0

0

0

N uivo

Vuigrektui

Katangli

6

I

15

Boring rigs.

2

2

5

Boiler houses.

0

0

i

O il reservoir (earthen)

0

0

0

Fuel oil tank (steel).

0

0

0

Boiler houses.

tank (steel)

Houses for personnel and workers

V I Light railway: none. A trolley line extending for two and a-half miles between U rkt Bay and works at Oha, and another trolley line extending for about three miles between Katangli and Nabil. VII Exportation o f oil: none.

C O L L IE R Y W O R K S I

Exploiters. Doue M ine: T h e M itsubishi and Co. is working it on behalf o f the occupation army. Rogatui M ine is worked by the StaheefF and Co. and M itsubishi as a joint enterprise.

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195

Location o f the mines. Doue M ine: About six miles south o f the harbour o f Alcxandrovsk, in the valley o f Postvaya, close to the sea. There are tw o level pits now in operation, but no shaft. T h e output for 1923 was about 50,000 tons. Rogatui M ine: About ten miles south o f Alexandrovsk harbour toward the sea. T w o pits now in operation. N o shaft. T h e output for 1923 was about 30,000 tons.

m

T h e number o f experts and workers. Experts

Workers

Doue M in e ...................................................

5

about 200

Rogatui M in e............................................... (the numbers are those in summer time.)

3

about 150

IV M achinery. A t Doue mine small locomotives are used for the purpose o f transportation o f coal. In Rogatui mine no machinery is used, both digging and transportations being carried on by man-power and on horseback. V

Establishments. No special establishments for colliery purpose except a little more than a mile o f trolley line leading from the Doue M ine to the seashore, and another trolley line, less than a quarter-mile, at Rogatui.IV

V I Exportation. T h e output o f the Doue mine is consumed by the occupa­ tion army and the people residing within the occupation area, no part o f it being taken out o f the island. About 30,000 tons o f the output o f the Rogatui mine is said to have been exported in 1923 by M itsubishi and Staheeff. (Signed) K. Y o s h i z a w

a1

19 6

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

T h e Basic Convention was ratified by the U.S.S.R. on February 20, 1925; by Japan five days later. T h e ratification o f each contracting party was communicated to the government o f the other party through their representatives at Peking on February 26, and the convention and its related documents went into effect that day. T h e formal exchange o f ratifications was effected on April 15 at Peking.2 T h e convention was registered w ith the League o f Nations on M ay 20,192$. T h e conclusion o f the Basic Convention was an event o f utmost inter­ national importance. “Just as the materialization o f the German-Russian treaty o f Rapallo in 1922 aroused great attention among the other powers, so the fact that the conclusion o fa treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union has been accomplished deserves the most careful con­ sideration,” the Frankfurter Zeitung wrote on January 24,192$. T h e agree­ ment w ith China in 1924 had already boosted Soviet prestige in Asia; the convention w ith Japan further strengthened the Russian position. Japan in turn profitted strategically. “ In regard to the situation in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean the island empire has gained a great start over the United States,” the Frankfurter Zeitung noted. Karakhan had implied as much when he had held out as one o f the benefits accruing to Japan from recognition o f the U .S.S.R .: “Japan can always count on the fact that Russia as a Communistic Soviet State w ill not conclude w ith any imperialistic power a m ilitary alliance directed against Japan.. . .” 3 T h e Anglo-Japanese Alliance o f 1902 had safeguarded Japan from the intervention o f a third power in the approaching duel w ith Russia; now the convention w ith the U .S.S.R., which was w idely regarded as the prelude to (and by some as the cover for) a Soviet-Japanese alliance, seemed to give Japan the same protection for war w ith the United States, D. Elias Hurwicz wrote in the Hamburger Fremdenblatt on February 2. “ T h e immigration policy o f the United States has provoked a deep re­ sentment, against which all the amenities o f diplomacy are likely to count for little,” the Statesman o f Calcutta remarked and, though seeing “ no need to anticipate conflict,” warned that there was “ a fundamental clash o f interests in the Pacific” on the part o f the United States and Japan and that there were “ hot heads and violent tongues in all coun­

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tries.” 4 “ It develops that the United States N avy Department has not been oblivious to the significance o f the Japanese-Soviet treaty and its relationship to creating a reserve fuel supply o f great proportions for the Japanese navy,” Albert W . Fox reported.5 Sensational stories dissemi­ nated by The World earlier about the alleged conclusion o f a secret treaty between Russia and Japan, whereby Japan was to supply Russia w ith heavy artillery and warships, including vessels which she was supposed to scrap under the Washington naval treaty, in return for “ all rights to the oil fields o f Sakhalin” 6 no doubt had caused a stir in navy circles. Edgar Ansel M owrer reported from Berlin in July o f 1925 that “ the Japanese Government, alarmed by the increasing social unrest within Japan and the growth o f Communist doctrines, promises to observe benevolent neutrality toward any Russian action in China and further to manufacture and deliver to Russia heavy artillery and submarines” in exchange for Soviet agreement to withdraw all Communist agents from Japan. Though he acknowledged the “ mental reservations” w ith which both sides would have made such an agreement, M owrer regarded it as “ perhaps the most stupendous political event in the embittered fight for the control o f Asia which has developed since the Washington Con­ ference” and remarked that “ the first country to feel the w eight o f it unquestionably will be the United States.” 7 “ Because o f its possibilities, the pact between Soviet Russia and Japan is one o f the most dramatic political events in recent years,” the Oregon Journal declared. Relating the convention to the agreement between M oscow and Peking, the paper, which regarded the three nations as “ near kin b y blood and birth,” asserted w ith alarm that “ the situation is tantamount to a league o f the East facing an unleagued W est across the Pacific, w ith the west coast o f America as the first point o f contact in case o f conflict.” 8 Japanese publications foresaw the negative reaction o f G reat Britain and the United States to a Sino-Japanese-Russian alliance. “ A s the Nationalists o f China advocate a federation among Japan, China and Russia, the ties o f friendship among them w ill grow stronger,” the Cbugai Sbogyo wrote on January 26. “ This possibility will inevitably affect the British and American policy in the Far East, though we have no such

198

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R.

intention. W e must be watchful over the possible change o f the situa­ tion in the Far East.” Rooted in the fact that the Soviet Union had concluded agreements w ith both Peking and Tokyo, the rumors o f a Russo-Chinese-Japanese coalition were given impetus by remarks made by Foreign M inister Shidehara in a speech to the prefectural governors o f Japan that Russo-Chinese-Japanese cooperation was necessary for solving the diplomatic problems confronting these three states in East Asia.9 T h e China Press saw "slender foundation” for the hypothesis o f a possible alliance between Japan, Russia and China, " if for no other reason than that China is not likely for a long time to be in a position to effect any alliance either with Russia, Japan or any other country in the world.” "O bviously Japan would have been in a position o f grave disadvantage were she to remain alooffrom Moscow after an understanding had already been arrived at between China and Russia,” the paper commented. T h e China Press actually thought that the convention m ight constrain M os­ cow, that it m ight prove "an impregnable bulwark against the bolshevization o f China,” for "formal restoration o f relations w ith a well-ordered country like Japan is likely to impart to the Soviet a sense o f responsi­ bility which it has hitherto been sadly lacking.” 10 Y e t in April o f 1925, as rumors o f a secret treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Japan persisted, the China Press grew more alarmist: "T h e signature o f an Agreem ent by the Soviet w ith a puppet Government in Peking has its dangers, in all con­ science, but if to this is added the peril o f a secret treaty between the Soviet and Tokio, w e dread to contemplate the sinister possibilities o f such a situation.” 11 T h e North-China Daily Hem expected an increase in Communist pro­ paganda, now that the Soviet Union had received the right to open con­ sulates in Japan: In this respect the propaganda-prevention clause in the RussoJapanese T reaty is, o f course, not worth the paper it is w ritten on . . . , especially as the Soviet Government refused to be responsi­ ble for the doings o f the Third International. It may be technically

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true that the latter is not a Soviet Government organization; but, in fact it m ight as well be said that the sun has nothing to do w ith the maggots it breeds in a dead dog as to pretend that the two are not inseparably linked.12 T h e North-China Daily News expressed the view that the Soviet govern­ ment had needed the agreement w ith Japan for internal reasons as well— “ for the prestige which it gives the Soviet Government at home, where the necessity o f withstanding the anti-communist feelings o f the new bourgeoisie is increasingly felt.” 13 T h e Tokyo Nicht Ntcbi Sbimbun remarked that the convention would be used for domestic policy b y both countries. It was in the international arena, however, that both Russians and Japa­ nese now faced a crucial test: “ T h ey must show an excellent example to all the nations o f Europe and o f other continents, who pretend to be the champions o f international m orality,in their persistent advocacy o f inter­ national peace and justice. Should Japan and Russia err in this, they w ill be the laughing-stock o f the world.” 14 T h e Tomiuri was optim istic about economic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. “ It is our advice to the businessmen o f this country to form a body o f tourists so that they may inspect business conditions in Russia. T h ey must notice that warm spring is coming back to M oscow.” 15 Pointing to the desirability o f combining Japanese skill and experience w ith Russian natural resources, the Kokumin proclaimed: “ W e dare advise the [Japanese] Government to send able businessmen to inspect the conditions existing in the fields o f commerce, industry and econom y ofRussia that they may find an adequate market for our business­ men.” 16 T h e prospects o f a Soviet-Japanese agreement on the heels o f the Soviet-German agreement had alarmed Americans already in 1923. “ Political seers often conjure up the mirage o f a Japanese-Russo-German alliance extending from the N orth Sea to the Sea o f Japan. It is a prospect that naturally gives us pause, and is not looked upon as a consummation Americans should devoutly wish for.” 17 T h e potential implications o f a Japanese-Russian-German alliance were dramatized in 1925 in the novel

200

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

The Red Camarilla. In return for the cession o f Eastern Siberia to Japan, author E. J. Harrison envisaged, Japan would lend financial and perhaps m ilitary aid for the defeat o f Poland and its repartition between Russia and Germany. T h e allies would rally to the defense o f Poland and Japan would take advantage o f the European war to attack the United States.18 W hile some speculated whether a Russo-German-Japanese or a RussoChinese-Japanese alliance would be more likely, others raised the quad­ ruple threat o f a Russo-German-Chinese-Japanese block. T h e newspaper Progrès rejected the hypothesis o f such a four power alliance. “ But the feet that the new treaty [between Japan and the U.S.S.R.] could give birth to such lively anxiety,” it noted, “ is a warning; and the question o f the Far East, the question o f the Pacific deserves to be followed w ith atten­ tion.” 1» In the United States disclosure o f the Basic Convention triggered a debate as to whether or not Japan had violated the Open Door pledge made by Baron Shidehara at the W ashington Conference. “ In m y opinion, it makes the open door proposition a mere m atter o f phrases,” Senator William E. Borah, chairman o f the Senate foreign relations committee declared. Former Secretary o f State Robert Lansing concurred in this view .20 A spokesman for the Siberian Veterans association, made up o f men o f the U.S. Arm y, warned: “ Unless something is done to maintain America’s position, we feel that all the suffering and sacrifices w e went through in Siberia w ill have to be dedicated to Japanese exploitation rather than to our country and our flag and the great humanitarian w ork we undertook to do.” 21 A Public Ledger story reported that the consum­ mation o f the Soviet-Japanese convention had been suspended for six months through representations o f America, but that Japan went ahead w ith the agreement, “ pleading that it was not possible longer to post­ pone it and that political circumstances would not countenance the explanation that it was being held in abeyance out o f deference to the United States.” 22 Fuel had been added to the Open Door issue by Soviet cancellation o f the Sinclair concession in N orth Sakhalin in view o f American failure to recognize the Soviet regime. But the W hite House resisted pressure from

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the oil interests. In the words o f David Lawrence» “ the W ashington Governm ent refused to be swayed in its attitude tx>ward Russia at this tim e b y considerations o f oil.” 23 By April io the New York Ttmes reported th at President Calvin Coolidge and Secretary o f State Frank B. Kellogg, after studying the text o f the Soviet-Japanese agreement, had come to th e conclusion that there had not been any violation o f the Open Door principle on the part o f Japan. Japanese recognition o f the U.S.S.R. revived agitation in the United States for American recognition. As a correspondent had predicted before th e event, “ a Russo-Japanese rapprochement is likely to advance the recognitionist cause in the United States, if for no other reason than that some authorities w ill think that w e can no longer afford to stay out w here Japan has seen fit to go in.” 24 W ith the passing o f Kellogg’s pre­ decessor, Charles Evans Hughes, the bête noire o f the Bolsheviks, in the spring o f 1925, the Baltimore Evening Sun had remarked : There are business men and bankers who think that recognition is inevitable; and not only inevitable but extrem ely desirable. T h ey see that Japan has recognized Russia and that China has recognized Russia. T h at means that Japan w ill be on the ground floor when the inevitable development o f Eastern Siberia begins. It also means that American business men, hat in hand, w ill be ask­ ing for crumbs that foil from the loaded table. “ A s a m atter o f fact,” the San Francisco Examiner added, “ this recogni­ tion should have been accorded long ago, not as a m atter o f business, but o f simple right and common sense.” 25 In another column that day the San Francisco Examiner put it even more strongly : “ This Government [of the United States] should keep track o f Russia and Japan drawing together. And this Government should give up its idiotic claim o f a right to tell Russia or any other country w hat kind o f government it m ust have.” T h e San Francisco Argonaut took issue w ith the “ professional ‘viewers w ith alarm’ and jingoes generally” for using the agreement concerning Sakhalin “ as excuse to hoist again the bogey o f the yellow peril.”

Japanese Recognition o f the USS.R.

202

A ll sort o f deviltries have been discovered in the new treaty [thepaper wrote]. W e are solemnly warned that it is a sinister move to force the United States out o f Asia; that it is a menace o f sorts to Pacific Coast interests ; that it is another move to compel theU nitcd States to reconsider its immigration policies; that Soviet Russia expects by this treaty to compel the recognition that W ashington so long has withheld. These, and more, ad nauseam. As a matter o f fact, it is nothing o f the sort, in any o f these parti­ culars. It does mark the healing o f another sore spot in Asia, and sore spots in Asia are as dangerous as sore spots in Europe. T h e more o f them that can be cured, the stronger the assurance for continued world peace and orderly progress in thedevelopm entoftheOrient.26 T h e well-known Japanese journalist and author K. K. Kawakami ex­ pressed doubt about the implementation o f the Basic Convention. “ Although the instrument is apparently most carefully drawn, one must not be too optim istic as to its practical operation,” he warned. “ M ore nations than one have been disappointed by Soviet promises and agree­ ments.” Y e t should the convention prove workable, Kawakami admitted, “ the name o f Kenkichi Yoshizaw a. . . w ill long be remembered by his countrymen.” 27

CHAPTER SEVEN

Exchange o f Official Representatives PON the conclusion o f the Basic Convention the imperial govern­

ment notified the U.S.S.R. that it planned to send Satô Naotake then M inister to Poland, to the Soviet Unionas charge d’affaires ad interim to make preparations for the establishment o f a Japanese embassy. T h e Soviet government replied that while it had nothing against Satô, the appointment o f a temporary chargé would be unbecoming o f the new era. Y e t once the Japanese approved o f the appointment o f a Soviet ambassador to Tokyo, the Soviet government did not persist in its objection and furnished Sato w ith an entrance visa. H e arrived in Moscow on March 23, 1925, in the company o f Second Secretary Sasaki Seigo it. * tK # # and on the same day established a new Japanese embassy.1 T h e old Japanese embassy in the former capital (St. Petersburg, re­ named Petrograd then Leningrad) had been closed in February o f 1918. O ptim istically the Japanese had renewed the lease for another three years and had left a counselor and a caretaker in the building until 1921. B ut from the middle o f 1921 until the spring o f 192$ the building was left forsaken. When Satô came to reclaim the furnishings he found only part o f the contents. T h e silver, tableware, safe and records were mis­ sing. He asked the Foreign Commissariat to look into the matter, but it was evident that the objects could not be traced by this time.2 It was the Soviet government’s hope that Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who had negotiated the Basic Convention, would become the first Japanese ambassador to the U .S.S.R .; the Japanese government deemed him suited for the task and issued informal orders.3 On April 20,1925, Satô informed Foreign Commissar Chicherin that

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Yoshizawa was too ill to assume the post o f ambassador to the Soviet Union in the near future and that the Japanese government would like to send Tanaka Tokichi in his stead.* Tanaka had never served in western Europe; his whole career had passed in the Pacific region, at first in consular positions in America, China, and the English colonies, then as counselor o f the Japanese embassy in Washington. Later, Sato noted, Tanaka had been chief o f the commercial section o f the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs and was well versed in Far Eastern economic relations. During Admiral Katô’s administration Tanaka had been vice minister o f foreign affairs; he was amicably disposed toward the U.S.S.R. and was a cool-headed and business-like person. Satô raised some questions about the adequacy o f Russian housing, a topic that must have been embarrassing to Chicherin considering the fact that it was Westerners who usually complained about Japanese housing. Satô was staying in the best suite at the Savoy, yet was not sure whether such accomodations would be gpod enough for the ambassador; he had seen a club and wondered if that building could be acquired.4 T h e Soviet Union agreed to the appointment o f Tanaka, and the latter departed from T okyo on June 30. He arrived in M oscow on July 14 and the following day, on July 15, presented his credentials to M ikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, chairman o f the Central Executive Com mittee o f the U.S.S.R.5 Tanaka expressed his pleasure at the resumption o f diplomatic rela­ tions, but took the opportunity to state that the extent o f economic and intellectual intercourse still left much to be desired. He warned that economic relations alone could not develop genuine friendship between the tw o peoples; mutual understanding o f and respect for each other’s civilization and ideals were essential. Tanaka promised to work for Russo-Japanese collaboration in order to obtain a better life for everyone, • In his memoirs Yoshizawa writes that he had declined his government’s offer to send him to Moscow on the grounds that his involvement in the negotiations with the Soviet Union had been accidental and that he wished to continue in his position as minister to China. (Yoshizawa, p. 79)

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and looked forward to a “ better era, in which the ideals o f justice, equality and peace would govern.” In accepting Tanaka’s credentials, Kalinin echoed the hope that the normalization o f relations between the tw o countries would contribute to peace not only between them but in the Far East in general.6 Soon afterwards a bizarre incident occurred. Some tw enty Chinese were arrested in M oscow on the charge o f plotting the Japanese am­ bassador’s assassination. T h e alleged ringleaders o f the conspiracy were three members o f the Chinese embassy, who were subsequently recalled b y the Chinese government. T h e latter circulated the rumor that there had been a different reason for the arrests: the Chinese in question had managed to obtain the figures o f the Soviet Union’ s secret budget for Com munist propaganda in the Far East. T his was duly reported in the Japanese press, but as Tanaka Bunichirö wrote in his study for the Foreign Office, “ in regard to this m atter the explanations by both the Soviet Union and China are inaccurate and the truth is not dear.” 7 Tanaka Tokichi was to remain the Japanese ambassador to the U.S.S.R. for half a decade.8 Although he departed in October o f 1928, leaving the counselor as chargé d’affaires,9 and although Premier Tanaka on April 25, 1929, informed the Soviet ambassador in T okyo that Ambassador Tanaka would not return to M oscow because o f ill health,10 a month later, on M ay 24, Vice M inister o f Foreign Affairs Yoshida announced that the Japanese government had foiled in its search for a “ more suitable” ambassador and that Tanaka would return to the Soviet capital shortly.11 “ T h e question o f an ambassador is extrem ely important now in particular since the Japanese government strives to improve relations w ith the U .S.S.R .,” Yoshida declared, adding: “ Heretofore unfortunately the economic questions, and especially the fishery question, occupied the full attention o f both governments, but there are actually much more important political questions which must be considered by the govern­ ments.” 12 T h e establishment ofconsulates was at least as important as theopening o f an embassy, since Japanese fishery people and businessmen required visas and local protection. On March 2,1925, before the arrival o f Chargé

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d’Affaires Satö in M oscow, Ambassador Yoshizawa had notified Am­ bassador Karakhan in Peking that the Japanese government desired permission for its consulate general in Vladivostok to resume conduct­ ing business on an official basis; it also wished to open consulates general in Aleksandrovsk and Khabarovsk consulates in Petropavlovsk, Blagovesh­ chensk, Nikolaevsk and Odessa, and a branch office o f the Aleksandrovsk consulate general in Okha. Karakhan had replied on March 20 that the Soviet Union planned to establish three consulates in Japan (in Tokyo» Tsuruga and Hakodate) and that it was agreeable therefore, for the Japa­ nese to establish three consulates in the Soviet Union (in M oscow, Vladi­ vostok and Harbin); as for consulates in additional cities, the Soviet government wished to defer the m atter until its ambassador reached T okyo and could discuss it further. Satö, who arrived in Moscow later that month, reopened the issue. T h e Soviet Union insisted that the number o f consulates to be opened be equal for both countries. Agreement was reached by the end o f July, and on August 4 Ambassador Tanaka exchanged a verbal note w ith the Foreign Commissariat to the effect that the Soviet government had no objections to the establishment o f nine Japanese consulates in the U.S.S.R. (in M oscow, Vladivostok, Aleksandrovsk, Khabarovsk Petropavlovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Nikolaevsk, Odessa and Okha) and that the Japanese government in turn allowed the Soviet Union to open nine consulates (in Tokyo, Tsuruga and Hakodate as well as Osaka, Kobe, Yokohama, Nagasaki, Seoul and Dairen) w ith the understanding that the places where the consulates were to be located could be changed at a later dare b y mutual agreement. Meanwhile, on April 2, the Soviet government had informed A cting Consul General Watanabe R iye, who had been in Vladivostok since 1920, o f the recognition o f his official position (he was promoted to consul general later in the year). T h e action had come in exchange for the issuance o f an exequatur to Soviet Visa Officer Aleksandr Nikolaevich Loginov in Hakodate as consul. On M ay 8, furthermore, the Soviet government had given notice to Sato thatJapan could establish consulates in Aleksandrovsk and Okha following the completion o f the evacuation o f its forces from

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North Sakhalin; within a fortnight, on M ay 19, the consulate general in Aleksandrovsk had been duly opened. Following the exchange o f the verbal note o f A ugust 4, a Japanese consulate general was established in Khabarovsk (September 3) and con­ sulates in Petropavlovsk (August 18), Blagoveshchensk (Novem ber 1) and Odessa (January 4,1926). N o consulate was opened in Nikolaevsk; instead one was established in Novosibirsk (April 2 4 ,1926).13 T h e establishment o f Soviet diplomatic and consular offices in Japan was complicated b y the fact that representatives o f the Tsarist and Provisional governments had remained in possession o f the old buildings; they had even continued their official functions. So long as Japan had not recognized the Soviet regime, the old embassy, albeit an embassy without a governm ent, had continued to represent Russian interests in Japan and to minister to the needs o f the many refugees who had fled east. C u t o ff from the revenues o f the Russian state, the diplomatic corps in Japan and China had obtained the necessary operating funds from Peking, the Chinese government having agreed to continue making the Boxer indem nity payments to the Russo-Asian Bank, which in turn had sup­ ported the Russian diplomatic and consular officials in China and Japan. T h e Soviet government had demanded, o f course, that the old Russian embassy in T okyo serve the new regime, but the ambassador and staff had refused. T h e Japanese government had continued to recognize Ambassador Vasilii Nikolaevich Krupenskii as the Russian representative; in fact for a while he had remained Dean o f the Diplomatic Corps.14*b

b During the Siberian Intervention the embassy tried to support insofar as pos­ able every local movement against the Bolsheviks. Yet at the same time it sought to preserve the territorial integrity o f the Russian empire and had no illusions about any o f Russia’s allies. It worked against the sole intervention o f Japan in Siberia, aware o f the threat that this would pose to the Russian state. It also tried to stop Japanese support o f Ataman Semenov and the splintering o f Russian forces in the Far East. (George Alexander Lensen (ed.), Revelationso fa Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs

o f Dutttrü l. Abrikossow (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1964), pp. 258, 263-64,269,289).

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In about 1921 the Japanese government had decided that Krupenskii could not retain his full position. Though it did not close the embassy, it had informed him that he could no longer serve as Dean o f the Diplo­ matic Corps and would not be invited to court functions. Under the circumstances the ambassador had left for Europe and the embassy had passed into the hands o f Dm itrii Ivanovich Abrikossow, first secretary and chargé d’affaires, who had continued to live in a “ fool’s paradise.” 15 Ioffe’s arrival in Tokyo had alarmed Abrikossow, who had followed newspaper accounts o f the Soviet-Japanese negotiations with understand­ able concern. “ T h e behavior o f lo fe toward the Japanese was arrogant,” Abrikossow asserted.16 It had not been the bearing o f another “ betma gaijitf* (strange foreigner), however, but the great earthquake o f 1923 that had delayed Japanese recognition o f the Soviet Union and the sur­ render o f the old embassy to the Bolsheviks. Preoccupation w ith re­ construction had been one factor in the delay; there had been another. A s Abrikossow realized: “ Some o f the Japanese statesmen probably under­ stood the danger o f adm itting Soviet representatives w ith their inevitable propaganda at a time when the populace was still under the impression o f the great disaster.” 17 Y et the destruction wrought by the earthquake had made Japanese access to the resources o f the Russian Far East that much more urgent and the negptiations which had ensured between Karakhan and Yoshizawa in Peking had tolled the death knell for the old embassy. “ This time the Japanese did not insist on an apology or compensation for the N ikolaevsk massacre, and the negotiations proceeded quickly,” Abrikossow remembered. “ Hence all the grand phrases pronounced after the murder o f their subjects suffered the fate o f all grand phrases— they remained em pty words, and even the blindfolded figure o f justice erected as a re­ minder o f the tragedy was discreetly moved behind the temple o f Kudan so as not to ofend the eyes o f the new friends.” 18 T h e negotiations had been still in progress when the Foreign Office had invited Abrikossow to ask what he intended to do w ith the embassy and the rest o f the property o f the former Russian government upon the establishment o f diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

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T o this m y answer had long been ready [Abrikossow re­ minisced]. I declared that I would never hand over the Embassy and the rest o f the property to the Soviet government, because I did not consider it the rightful successor to the old government, adding, fond as we Russians are o f grand phrases, “ over m y dead body.” T h e Vice M inister looked astonished; surely I must re­ alize, he said, that upon Japan’s recognition o f the Soviet govern­ ment, the latter would be considered the legal Russian government and its representatives would have the right to occupy the old Embassy. I explained that I would be w illing to surrender the Em­ bassy to the Japanese government, providing I was permitted to declare in w riting that I did not recognize the [new] Embassy and that the whole m atter was so arranged as to avoid m y being placed face to face w ith the Soviet representative. T o m y surprise the Vice M inister consented. He promised that I would be given advance notice when negotiations entered their final stage and that provi­ sion would be made for a time lapse o f tw o weeks between m y surrender o f the Embassy to the Foreign Office and the arrival o f Soviet officials. I thanked the Vice M inister for this arrangement; while it did not alter the fact that the Embassy would fall into Bolshevik hands, it at least saved me from the humiliation o f a formal surrender.19 On January 25,1925, five days after the signingof theBasicConvention, Foreign Commissar Chicherin cabled to Karakhan in Peking: “ A R O STA report has been received from T okyo to the effect that local W hite guards are hastily cleaning out the building o f our embassy in Tokyo, carry­ ing away w ith them important documents, valuable things and property. I f this is so, special measures must be taken to forbid the plundering.” 20 T h e information was more or less correct, but Karakhan was unable to do anything. Ratifications had not yet been exchanged and the con­ vention was not in effect. Abrikossow recalled later how he had hastened back from the Foreign Office after the above-mentioned talk w ith the V ice M inister:

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Japanese R ecognition o f the USS.R. I returned to the Embassy and began to prepare m yself for the final act in m y diplomatic career. I instructed the Consulates to arrange w ith local authorities for the transfer to them o f the pro­ perty ofthe old Russian government. Iadded that I would not deem it possible for any o f the officials to enter the Soviet service ; if they wanted to leave Japan their passage to Europe or America would be paid. I must say that all o f them remained loyal to the former Russian government and not a single one went over to the Soviets. Then I spent many days going through the archives, considering it m y duty not to leave any letters or documents which could compromise those who had struggled against the Bolsheviks in Siberia and had not been able to escape. M any nights o f hard work went on this, but had the Bolsheviks found their names in the Embassy files the position o f many Russians could have become tragic.21

On February 16 Abrikossow surrendered the old embassy w ith its state property and archives to the office o f the governor o f Tokyo “ for safekeeping until transfer to the legally constituted Russian authorities.” A letter from Abrikossow to the governor, informing him o f the transfer, notes that the contents o f the archives were not examined at the time.22 A Letter from Abrikossow to Foreign M inister Baron Shidehara, listing in general what was being transferred, remarked that the archives con­ tained the note o f November 22, 1917, signed b y Foreign M inister Viscount M otono Ichiro — AS, relative to the cession o f the [railway] section connecting Kwanchengtze to the left bank o f the Sungari and [relative to] the navigation o f this river, a topic which the Soviets had refused to discuss.23 T h at day Foreign M inister Shidehara received Abrikossow in a fare­ well audience. In Abrikossow’s words: He assured me that it was not love for the Bolsheviks that had induced Japan to recognize Soviet Russia, but Russia was her close neighbor and unless she recognized the Soviet government she had no one to whom to address her claims and protests and could

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not avoid the constant violation o f her interests. N ow she could at least discuss the different questions which kept arising between the tw o neigboring states. When I expressed doubt that recogni­ tion would facilitate matters, because it would give the Soviets free entry into Japan and direct access to the Japanese public, the M inister acknowledged that the Japanese understood this very w ell and had obtained from the Bolsheviks the promise to abstain from spreading any propaganda in Japan, agreeing in turn not to allow any W hite activity in the country. It was obvious that Soviet-Japanese relations were not beginning in a particularly friendly atm osphere.. . 24 In a letter to Shidehara that day Abrikossow expressed his gratitude "fo r the kind and attentive treatment” which he had received in the difficult years when he had been chargé d’affaires o f the embassy. He was thankful for the assurance o f the Japanese government "th at the Russian refugees who, not being able to acknowledge the soviet authority, found their home in Japan, shall enjoy due treatment and protection in accordance w ith the Japanese laws and regulations as w ell as the rules o f International Law” and expressed confidence that they could safely continue living in Japan "outside the claims and regulations which the soviet representatives may deem necessary to apply to the soviet citizens in Japan.” 25 T h e ratifications o f the Basic Convention were exchanged in Peking on February 26,1925. On this occasion Ambassador Karakhan informed Ambassador Yoshizawa that the Soviet government wished to send V iktor Leont’evich Kopp, a member o f the Council o f the People’s Com­ missariat o f Foreign Affairs, as its first ambassador to Japan.6 T h e imc Soviet documents usually used the term “polpred” an abbreviation for “folnomocbnyipredstavitel” (plenipoten tiary representative) for Kopp and his early successors ; they referred to their building as “polpredttvo.” Occassionally, sometimes in the same document, they wrote “pood** (ambassador) and “posol’stvd** (embassy). Grigorii Besedovskii, counselor o f the Soviet embassy in Tokyo in 1926-27, wrote o f Kopp: “ Very intelligent, with a European education, [and] speaking foreign Ian-*

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penal government duly studied Kopp’s personal history and on M ardi 4 agreed to the appointment. Kopp was officially named ambassador on March 9 and a month later, on April 8, left M oscow w ith about a dozen subordinates. He reached T okyo on April 24 and on M ay 5 presented his credentials. A shadow was cast on his arrival soon afterwards by an “ unconfirmed” report that on his w ay to Japan he had told the Provincial Committee o f the Communist Party at Harbin that the Soviet-Japanese convention was but a scrap o f paper.26*d On March 3, 1925, prior to Kopp’ s official appointment, the Soviet government had informed Japan that it would send Nikolai Kirillovich Kuznetsov, first secretary o f the Soviet embassy in Peking, to take over the old embassy property and prepare for the arrival o f the Soviet em­ bassy to Japan. On March 16 the embassy property and documents, handed over by Abrikossow to the Japanese government, were trans­ ferred to Kuznetsov b y T oki Chinjirô, representing the gpvem or o f Tokyo» and b y Kawasumi Tadao J i| fl& t t representing the Foreign Office, in the presence o f D. A . Tsiurp, attaché o f the Soviet mission in China.27»* Y et although Japanese sources state that Kuznetsov seemed to have been satisfied w ith the meticulous care taken b y the Japanese govern­ ment o f the embassy property, Kopp upon his arrival missed more than the documents destroyed b y Abrikossow. On June 8 he protested in a *guages, Kopp has by nature little in common with revolutionary political activity. He is rather a political realist, seeking a compromise, very flexible, deep in his heart laughing ironically at experiments i la Borodin.” (G . Z . Besedovskii, Na putiakb k

termidoru [Iz vospominanii b. sovetsk. diplomata] [On the road to the Thermidor (From the recollections o f a former Soviet diplomat)] [Paris, 1930], vol. I, p. 225. 6 For the text o f his speech, see the chapter on “ Lingering Mistrust.” • The Japanese Foreign Office Archives contain inventory lists o f the furniture, equipment and other belongings, surrendered by the Russian embassy and the various consulates, also correspondence related to the transfer. See M T 251.106.23 : 211-213, 285-291, 322-324, 419-421, 538-540. For an architect's report on the damage suffered by the old embassy building in the great earthquake o f 1923, see M T 251.106.23:196-198.

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note to Foreign M inister Shidehara that "a number o f Japanese banks keep sums o f money, deposited b y former officials o f the Tsarist govern­ ment and representatives o f various organizations and groups, which waged civil war on the territory o f the U.S.S.R. against the Soviet Govern­ ment.” Kopp asserted that these sums had been designated originally for official purchases and expenses and had unquestionably constituted government fonds; he insisted, therefore, that under article 1 o f Protocol A o f the Basic Convention these monies must be regarded as the property o f the U.S.S.R. and must be made available to the Soviet embassy. He made special reference to the sums o f the former Omsk government, deposited by Ataman G rigorii Semenov in the T okyo branch o f the Yokohama Specie Bank. T h e Japanese government rejected the Soviet daim in a note, dated June 22,1925. It interpreted the article as referring to the real estate o f the embassy and the consulates. “ Even if one were to admit that the deposits constituted the property o f some government treasury,” it added, “ it would still be impossible to consider that they belonged to one o f the embassies or consulates.” 28 B y the end o f 1926 Soviet consulates general had been opened in T okyo, Kobe and Seoul; consulates in Hakodate, Otaru, Tsuruga and Dairen.29 T h e consulate general in Kobe had been formally opened on January 28, 1926. Anatolii Kolesnikov, the new ly appointed consul, had proceeded to Kobe from T okyo several days later. T h e jurisdiction o f the Kobe consulate included H yögo, Okayama, T ottori, Hiroshima, Yam aguchi, Ehime, Kochi and Tokushima prefectures and the islets o f the Inland Sea. But there were few Soviet subjects whom the consulate had to serve. “ In Chugoku district there are only about 60 Russians under the Soviet Government and about a dozen o f the 400 local (Kobe) Russians are registered as Soviet subjects,” the Japan Chronicle reported. “ Regard­ ing the registration o f the remaining Russians the Prefectural Office, Far East Trading and Tim ber Office and Far Eastern Bank are now assisting, on the basis o f the resolution passed at the Geneva Conference in 1922.” 30 Like the embassy in Tokyo the Soviet consulates experienced conflicts

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w ith anti-Communist émigrés. This was particularly true in Dairen, the former Russian possession in Manchuria, where many W hite Russians lived. In February o f 1926 a group to W hite Russians invaded the con­ sulate in Dairen and tore down the red flag. Although the local police arrested one o f the émigrés, the Soviets felt that the case was not pro­ secuted w ith sufficient vigor and awareness o f the seriousness o f the crime. In a note to the Japanese government, dated March 8,1926, they demanded that the Japanese government give satisfaction to the Soviet Union for the insult to its flag, that it see to it that appropriate punish­ ment be meted out to the culprit and that measures be taken to prevent similar occurrences. T h e Japanese gpvemment on April 26 duly expressed its regrets, even though the culprit was not a Japanese subject.31 A more serious incident occurred on the afternoon o f November 10, 1927. Secretary Cherkasov was walking down one o f the streets in Dairen accompanied by his wife when suddenly the 18-year old son o f a Russian priest in that city attacked him from the rear w ith a knife and inflicted over sixteen wounds on his head, neck and arms. M rs. Cher­ kasov, who tried to ward o ff the blows from her husband was also injured slighdy. Again the Soviet embassy protested and the Japanese Foreign Office expressed its regrets.32 B y this time Kopp was no longer in Japan. He had been appointed Ambassador to Sweden at the beginning o f the year, swapping posts w ith Comrade Valerian D ovgalevskii, who moved from Stockholm to Tokyo.33 T h e change in Soviet ambassadors coincided w ith a change in the Japanese cabinet, Baron Shidehara, who had been foreign minister from October 1926 until February 1927, being succeeded at this time b y Baron Tanaka. Although Dovgalevskii received “ an extrem ely friendly and hearty reception” on his arrival in T okyo on March 25, his tenure was brief. Before the end o f the year he was named ambassador to France. He was followed by Aleksandr Antonovich Troianovskii who stayed from 1928 until 1932.34 In the months between Kopp’s departure and Dovgalevskii’s arrival Grigprii Zinov’evich Besedovskii had acted as chargé d’affaires ad interim.

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According to Besedovskii’s memoirs there had been a deep rift in the Soviet embassy in T okyo when he had arrived in the summer o f 1926. T h e split had been caused not by any political differences but by a running feud between the wife o f M ilitary Attaché Iakov Ianel and Ambassador Kopp, who had treated her contumely. As supporters o f the two accused each other o f various wrongdoings and the charges were transmitted to the Central Com mittee o f the Communist Party by the representative o f the Security Police, Moscow recalled both Ianel and Kopp. Besedov­ skii’s memoirs contain also reference to the nocturnal activities ofMadame D ovgalevskii, the wife o f Kopp’s successor, in Paris and her recall to M oscow for interrogation by the Security Police.35 Unfortunately Besedovskii became the “ self-acknowledged leader” o f “ the Besedovskii school” o f private forgers o f Soviet memoirs in the 1950’s and, as a result, his own memoirs are suspect. T h e delightful tales o f political and sexual intrigue in the Soviet embassy in T okyo may be apocryphal, for Besedovskii boasted in connection w ith his other books that when he portrayed “ Stalin or M olotov in pyjamas,” when he told “ the dirtiest possible stories about them— never mind whether they are true or invented,” they would be read by intellectuals and capitalist statesmen alike. “ Allah has given money to the stupid in order that the intelligent can live easily,” he sneered in justification o f his falsification o f history.36 O n the other hand, various statements made by Besedovskii in his own memoirs are corroborated b y Japanese sources. His recollec­ tions thus cannot be dismissed, even if they must be used w ith mental reservations. According to Besedovskii the two first secretaries Nikolai Kirillovich Kuznetsov and Georgii Aleksandrovich Astakhov knew Japan well and spoke Japanese and English. T h e second secretaries Lev Il‘ich Vol’f and Alfred Austrin were excellent chancery workers w ith “ really German accuracy.” T h e wife o f Professor Evgenii Genrikhovich Spal’vin, the noted Japanologist who served as interpreter o f the embassy, was “ a sym pathetic Japanese, a widow, whose first husband was knifed to death on a street in T okyo after the Russo-Japanese W ar because he was somehow accused in the Japanese press o f a suspicious

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acquaintance w ith the Russian m ilitary attaché then in T okyo.” 37 Besedovskii himself took a liking to Japanese culture. He settled in Kamakura, where he wandered about in kimono and geta. Like many students o f Japanese he was spellbound by the language. H aving begun the study o f the Japanese language I found, when pronouncing Japanese phrases, that I not only expressed some idea or other, but got a deep enjoyment from the sounds, from the combination o f words. T his was not merely satisfaction from the study o f a foreign tongue. I know several languages, which I learned easily, yet I got no pleasure in studying them. But Japanese phrases gave me the sort o f pleasure that a man gets who finally remembers a word he has forgotten.38 Besedovskii spoke highly o f the work o f Aleksandr Nikolaevich Loginov, the Soviet consul in Hakodate. A ble and tactful, Loginov was one o f the best consuls he had ever met. Besedovskii had a very different opinion o f Iurii Vladimirovich Mal’ tsev, the Soviet consul general in Kobe, an old member o f the Communist Party and a personal friend o f M olotov, who spent much o f his time playing cards and drinking w ith foreigners. Besedovskii found the consulates in Nagasaki and O taru tom by dissension and personal feuds. He attributed this to the lack o f work on one hand and the isolation o f the Soviet personnel from their country and the European and Japanese community on the other hand. Besedovskii was deeply impressed by the Japanese Vice M inister o f Foreign Affairs Debuchi. I shall not hide [the fact] that I was under the strong influence o f the intelligence, erudition and talent o f M r. Debuchi, and it was frequendy very difficult for me not to agree w ith him on some questions, which I had orders from the People’s Commis­ sariat o f Foreign Affairs to discuss w ith him. T h e strength o f the logical deductions o f M r. Debuchi was truly wonderful and I was sometimes literally delighted by the bright brilliance o f his argu­ mentation.39

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Besedovskii had to return to the Soviet Union because o f the deteriorat­ in g health o f his entire family, particularly o f his wife, who had frequent fainting spells. He was able to leave only after acquainting the new ambassador, D ovgalevskii, w ith the state o f affairs in Japan, a lengthy process because Dovgalevskii spent the summer months in his country home instead o f getting down to work in Tokyo. Besedovskii departed for Päris via Moscow in September o f 1927.40 T h e exchange o f official representatives between the Soviet Union and Japan was not confined to diplomatic and consular officials. In view o f the fact that foreign trade was a state monopoly in the U.S.S.R. the Soviet Union demanded official status for its trade representatives abroad. T h e issue gave substance to Japanese m isgivings that the development o f trade w ith the Soviet Union would be beset by difficulties because o f the difference in economic systems. T h e Soviet Union appointed as its first trade representative to Japan Iakov Davidovich Ianson, the former foreign minister o f the Far Eastern Republic who had assisted Ioffe in the negotiations at Changchun in 1922. Upon his appointment as trade representative, Ianson went to the Japanese embassy in M oscow and applied for a visa. Chargé d’Affaires Satô did not issue the visa at once. On April 20,1925, he asked Foreign M inister Chicherin for a specific written description o f the functions and rights o f the trade delegation Qorgpredstvo) and an indication o f the size o f its staff and the number o f members w ith diplo­ m atic privileges. Satö wanted to know whether the trade delegation would be a com pletely separate agency. When Chicherin alluded to the existence o f commercial attachés in other countries, Satô said that there would, o f course, be no objection to the inclusion o f a commercial attaché in the staff o f the embassy. Chicherin explained that in countries where foreign trade was in private hands the functions o f the commercial at­ taché were quite limited and essentially informative in nature, because business deals were concluded by the merchants; the Soviet trade rep­ resentative, on the other hand, b y whatever title he m ight go, conducted trade, since in the Soviet Union trade was a state enterprise. Satô rejoined that he recognized the difference but could not issue a visa unless the

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functions and rights o f the trade delegation were defined in writing. He pointed out that Ianson was a member o f the collegium o f the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade and therefore equal in rank w ith Am­ bassador Kopp; how could he be a simple attaché in Kopp’s embassy? If, on the other hand, his position was parallel to that o f Kopp, agree­ ment must be reached prior to his departure regarding the functions and rights o f his office. Satô reminded Chicherin that Yoshizawa had stated during the nego­ tiation o f the basic convention that it would be desirable to send “ not too many” officials following the re-establishment o f relations. T h e Japanese government had heard that the Soviet Union dispatched every­ where a large number ofpersonnel and was afraid o f this. Kopp had already brought some 16 or 17 collaborators and Ianson, according to his infor­ mation, wanted to take along 15. Chicherin countered that the trade dele­ gation and the economic organizations ÇAozorganf) had to perform the same tasks as those carried out by the large private firms o f other coun­ tries. He was sure that the M itsubishi Company o f Japan had a large number o f offices w ith many employees in America. Trade w ith the Soviet Union was impossible unless a well-staffed trade delegation be allowed to function. Chicherin said that at first a relatively small trade delegation would do, but that w ith the development o f economic rela­ tions between the two countries a larger delegation and representation from various economic organizations would be necessary. When Sato reiterated that he needed a written formulation o f the functions and rights o f the trace delegation and o f the number o f its collaborators and o f the officials w ith diplomatic privileges, Chicherin replied that he would send such a statement in a number o f days ; he had to discuss it w ith the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade.41 On M ay 5 B. N . M el’nikov, director o f the Far Eastern section o f the Foreign Commissariat, handed to Sato the desired memorandum. It described the functions o f the trade delegation as assistance in the development o f commercial and economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the regulation offoreign trade between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and the carrying out o f commercial transactions in Japan in the name o f

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the U.S.S.R. It did not specify the size o f the delegation, stating that this would be determined after the opening o f the trade delegation and its branches. It stipulated that the trade representative, the deputy trade representative and the members o f the soviet (council) o f the trade delegation would have diplomatic privileges; the remaining col­ laborators would be on a par w ith the technical employees o f the embassy. T h e building o f the trade delegation would enjoy extraterritoriality. T h e Soviet government would be responsible for commitments made by the trade delegation. Disputes that m ight arise concerning commercial transactions made between the trade delegation and Japanese subjects would be settled on the basis erf-Japanese laws.42 On June 3 Satö informed the Foreign Commissariat that his govern­ ment doubted the possibility o f allowing the trade delegation to fonction as a state agency w ith diplomatic privileges. N ot only would this be contrary to Japanese law, but it would violate the right to equal treat­ ment o f foreign merchants resident in Japan; indeed, the Japanese did not have such privileges in the Soviet Union. T h e Japanese government did not reject the Soviet proposal outright, but asked that a final decision be deferred until the conclusion o f a treaty o f commerce in which the problem could be worked out b y mutual agreement. As a temporary compromise Satö suggested that the trade representative and two or three collaborators be regarded as equivalent to the commercial attachés and secretaries o f other embassies; this would give them extraterritorial rights and diplomatic im m unity but their functions would be limited to licensing imports and exports and to assisting in the development o f economic relations; they would not be allowed to make trade deals. Such deals would have to be concluded by third persons or by a specially formed agency w ithout extraterritorial or diplomatic privileges.43 On July 1$ Kopp discussed the question with Shidehara in Tokyo. T h e Soviet ambassador argued that diplomatic privileges had been extended to Soviet trade representatives by Germany and other coun­ tries; it would be difficult to make an exception in the case o f Japan. Foreign trade, furthermore, was an important function o f the Soviet government and in many instances, such as in the ordering o f m ilitary

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supplies, required secrecy; it was necessary, therefore, to grant to trade representatives the same sort o f privileges and protection as to other state representatives. T h e compromise proposed b y Satö, Kopp added, conflicted w ith Soviet law. T h e Japanese foreign minister retorted that although Soviet trade representatives enjoyed diplomatic privileges in some European coun­ tries, this was not a universal practice. Japan had struggled long and hard to rid herself o f the extraterritorial rights o f foreign commercial enter­ prises in Japan; to allow them again, even as an exception, would be a step backwards. Government management o f foreign trade was not a ground for extending diplomatic privileges to trade representatives; in Japan the export, import and sale o f tobacco were a state monopoly ye t no need had been felt to obtain diplomatic privileges for officials in charge o f the transactions. T h e secrecy o f commerce was duly protected in Japan, except in cases involving the public good; the Japanese govern­ ment could not agree to absolute secrecy at the possible expense o f national welfare. Japan herself frequently purchased m ilitary supplies abroad w ithout finding it necessary to garb the officials involved in diplo­ matic privileges. Japan did not object to trade representatives being part o f the diplomatic establishment in so for as internal Soviet organization was concerned ; there was no need to extend to them diplomatic privileges in Japan. Shidehara made it clear that he was not objecting to the establish­ ment o f a trade mission— in feet would welcome one— so long as it con­ formed to Japanese laws.44 T h e feet that the privileges demanded by the U.S.S.R. would have put the Soviet trade representative in a position o f advantage that m ight have antagonized the foreign business community was a consideration that was voiced publicly. Privately, the Japanese government was con­ cerned lest the extraterritorial position o f the Soviet trade mission make it a base for Communist propaganda and permit it to evade the payment erf"taxes.45*f Ianson reputedly doubled as Comintern agent in Japan. (Eudin and North, pp. 459- 60)

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T h e Japanese had been first to raise the issue o f putting the functions and rights o f the Soviet trade delegation in w riting. As the Soviet side persisted in its demand for diplomatic and extraterritorial privileges, however, the Japanese sought to defer the m atter. Eager for trade w ith the Soviet Union and particularly for economic concessions on Soviet territory, they invited the U.S.S.R. to open the trade delegation w ithout prior agreement on its exact status. On July 26 Chicherin telegraphed Kopp that the Soviet Union was w illing to do so only if the Japanese government would engage in a w ritten note to extend extraterritoriality to the trade delegation and to take whatever measures m ight be neces­ sary to permit its unhindered operation. “ Under extraterritoriality is understood the extraterritoriality o f the trade delegate and his assistants, and o f the building o f the trade delegation but not o f its warehouses.” Chicherin put pressure on the Japanese by adding that a speedy decision was necessary not only to work out the schedule o f imports and exports for the following year but also to prepare apian for the concessions which Japan wanted. W ithout a trade delegation it was impossible to determine either the import and export possibilities or the contractors for the respective concessions.46 On September 18 Kopp handed to Shidehara a “ final” compromise proposal according to which the Soviet Union would send to Japan a trade delegate and three deputies as members o f the diplomatic mission, w ith the trade delegate having the right to conclude commercial deals. T h e transactions were to be subject to Japanese law, but the property o f the trade delegation was to be protected by extraterritoriality.47 In repeated talks between Kopp and Shidehara, the Japanese foreign minister argued that diplomats did not trade and that traders could not be diplomats; yet at the same time he did not wish to close the door to economic relations between the tw o countries. In Novem ber it was agreed to let Ianson proceed to T okyo as commercial attaché in order to assist Kopp in resolving the issue ; his role as trade representative would not be recognized for the time being and he would not be allowed to engage in commercial transactions. On December 12 Ianson set out for Japan, where he arrived by the end o f the year.

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Negotiations continued in 1926. T h e Soviet side eventually bowed to the Japanese conditions, but did not want this to be made public, lest her bargaining position on this issue be undermined elsewhere. When Shidehara pointed out that he could not guarantee the secrecy o f a regular agreement, which was subject to approval b y the Privy Council and the D iet, it was decided not to conclude a formal agreement on this subject, but to draw up a confidential “ exchange o f views” between Shidehara and Kopp for deposit in the archives. N ot only would such a document be leak-proof, but it would make it possible for the Soviet Union to assure Germany, Italy, France, and T urkey, which had ex­ tended diplomatic privileges to her trade representatives, that it had made no agreement to the contrary w ith Japan.48 On June 23,1926, after ten months o f negotiations, the “ exchange o f views” was approved at an “ interview” between Kopp and Shidehara. T h e provisions were regarded as tentative, the informal nature o f the document being underlined by the fact that it was not signed b y Shide­ hara or Kopp but merely b y the tw o interpreters, T . Yamaguchi and Evgenii Genrikhovich Spal’vin. It read as follows:

R E C O R D F O R A R C H IV E S

Confidential T h e following is the result o f the exchange o f views between the Japanese M inister for Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador o f the U.S.S.R. in their recent interviews on the subject o f the status o f the U.S.S.R. Trade Delegation: i . T h e functions oftheTradeD elegation w hichis to be established by the Government o f the U.S.S.R. in Japan shall be: (a) to encourage and facilitate trade and other commercial intercourse between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, (b) to control exportation from the U.S.S.R. to Japan and (c) to conduct commercial transactions on behalf o f the U.S.S.R.

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2. T h e Government o f the U.S.S.R. may designate the head o f the Trade Delegation and his assistants, respectively, as Commercial Counsellor and Commercial Secretaries o f the Em­ bassy o f the U .S.S.R., who, in such supplementary capacity, shall be authorized to exercise the same official functions and to enjoy the same diplomatic immunities as similar officials o f other foreign Embassies at T okyo. T h e Commercial Coun­ sellor shall be one in number and the Commercial Secretaries not more than three. 3. T h e head o f the Trade Delegation, recognized as Commercial Counsellor o f the Embassy o f the U .S.S.R., shall be authorized inter alia to issue licenses for export from and import into the U .S.S.R., thereby controlling exportation from the U.S.S.R. to Japan and importation into the U.S.S.R. from Japan. 4. T h e Trade Delegation, as well as its officials (i.e. head and members), except those recognised as Commercial Counsellor or Commercial Secretaries to the Embassy o f the U .S.S.R ., shall act in Japan subject to the laws and jurisdiction o f the country, and shall in all cases confine their activities within the limits o f the specified functions for which the Delegation is to be established. 5. A ll commercial transactions, w hich may be conducted in Japan b y the Trade Delegation as well as the properties o f the U.S.S.R. situated in Japan and connected w ith the business o f the Trade Delegation shall likewise be subject to the laws and jurisdiction o f the country. 6. T h e Trade Delegation shall carry on its business in an office outside the premises o f the Embassy ofth e U.S.S.R. ; provided, however, that the officials o f the Trade Delegation, recognised as Commercial Counsellor or Commercial Secretaries to the Embassy o f the U.S.S.R. may exercise their functions, due to such supplementary capacity, in the office o f the Embassy. 7. W henever it is intended to establish any agency or branch office o f the Trade Delegation in Japan, the consent o f the

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Japanese Government to such establishment shall be previ­ ously obtained. 8. A ll passports for officials o f the Trade Delegation proceeding to Japan shall be viséed at the Japanese Embassy at Moscow. In special circumstances, they may be viséed at the Japanese Consulate at Vladivostock or Habarovsk, and in that event the Government o f the U.S.S.R. shall previously communicate to the Japanese Embassy at Moscow the names o f the Officials whose passports are to be viséed at such Consulate. 9.

(i) T h e Embassy o f the U.S.S.R. in T okyo shall notify the Japanese Government (a) o f the names o f the officials o f the Trade Delegation who shall be authorized to conduct commercial transactions on behalf o f the Trade Delegation, and to sign contracts, bills and other commercial documents, based on such transactions, (b) o f the extent o f powers invested in each o f such officials, and (c) o f any subsequent change in such personnel or in the extent o f such powers. (ii) Upon receipt o f notification as aforesaid the Japanese Government shall in due course publish the terms o f the notification in the Japanese Official Gazette. (iii) Upon such publication in the Japanese Official Gazette, the designated officials o f the Trade Delegation may exercise their respective functions in accordance with the terms contained in the notification.

T h e above shall be regarded as provisional subject to further alterations which may hereafter be agreed upon.

/s/T. Y a m a g u c h i /s/ Spa lv in Tokyo, June 23d 192649

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On the same day Ianson called on V ice M inister o f Foreign Affairs Debuchi and made arrangements w ith him regarding the number o f his staff and the names o f the traders.50 T h e last obstacle seemed to have been removed for the development o f normal commercial and diplomatic relations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Concession Contracts soon as the exchange o f representatives had been effected in the spring o f 1925, work was begun on carrying out the provisions o f the Basic Convention. A commission, headed by Comrade Aboltin, was sent to North Sakhalin to accept the territory from the Japanese as they evacuated on M ay 1 5 ,192s.1 A rticle IV o f the Basic Convention provided for the granting “ to Japanese subjects, companies and associations concessions for the ex­ ploitation o f minerals, forests and other natural resources in all the territories o f the Union o f the Soviet Socialist Republics.” Protocol B, appended to the convention, laid down the basis for the concession contracts. It stipulated that the contracts be concluded “ within five months from the date o f the complete evacuation o f Northern Saghalien by Japanese troops, as provided for in Article 3 o f Protocol A .” Article III pledged completion o f the withdrawal b y M ay 1$, 1925. Full Russian sovereignty over N orth Sakhalin was duly restored on M ay 14,2 and the concession contracts were to be concluded, therefore, by October 15 o f the same year. In mid-July 1925 two Japanese delegations arrived in M oscow: an oil delegation, headed by Admiral Nakasato Shigetsugu rep­ resenting the Kita Sagaren Sekiyu K igyö Kumiai i X r f i J V 's & f a f e (Association o f North Sakhalin O il Enterprises), and a coal delegation under Okumura Masao, representing the Sakai Kumiai and the Kita Sagaren Sekitan K igyö Kumiai i K * ïiS \ / 's (Association o f North Sakhalin Coal Enterprises). W ith them came Kawakami Toshitsune, the Foreign Service officer, in the capacity o f an advisor. T h e Soviet Union formed a special commission

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o f the Main Concession Com mittee (Glavkontsetskom) to confer w ith them. Ioffe, who had negotiated w ith Kawakami in T okyo in 1923, was appoint­ ed chairman o f the concession committee.3 In a letter to Ioffe, dated M oscow, A ugust 1,19 25, Okumura expressed the expectation that the concession contracts would be concluded "quite smoothly and prom ptly.” N oting that the language o f the con­ ference was to be Russian, w ith the contracts and all other documents formulated in English, as had been done at Peking, Okumura conveyed a nine point list o f important items to be determined at the concession contract conference, and asked Ioffe to set the date and place for their first meeting.4 A general meeting cm August 14 inaugurated the conference, during which Japanese concession demands were matched against a 47-article oil contract draft and a 40-article coal contract draft, submitted by the Soviet side.5 In regard to the oil concessions the Soviet Union asserted that the buildings, machines and tools connected w ith the oil enterprises and located on the site o f the concessions were Soviet property. T h e Japanese could use them for an annual rental o f 10% o f the appraised value; they could install and use new equipment, but within tw o months after the expiration o f the concession contracts all property connected w ith the concessions had to be returned to the Soviets. T h e Japanese objected. Firstly, they argued, the enterprise property had been installed b y Japanese and thus was clearly Japanese and not Russian; secondly, if it were regarded as Russian, Japanese firms would have insufficient security to operate the concessions. T h e question could not be resolved and was left for future determination; the Soviet side gave in to the extent o f lowering the rental from 10% to 4% . Protocol B, appended to the basic convention, had stated that the period o f the concessions should be from 40 to 50 years. T h e Soviet draft offered concessions for 40 years; the Japanese wanted concessions for $0 years. T h e negptiators split the difference and agreed on 45 year terms, i.e. until 1970. In the matter o f determining the area o f the oil fields already in opera-

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tion a compromise was readied that was generally favorable to the Japanese side; although the Soviets had wished to postpone a dedsion on the ground that surveys had not been completed, they gave in to the Japanese demand that the locadon, size and method o f parddon be worked out on a map and attached to the contracts. T h e selection o f oil fields for future exploitation, on the other hand, was left for later; once an area o f exploration had been designated, the concessionaries would be free to conduct surveys and tests to determine whether or not to engage in exploitation; if they decided to go ahead the area o f exploitation was to be split between both sides. There was much debate about the rate o f compensation for the use o f the oil fields. T h e Japanese proposed to pay a royalty o f 5% for the first 100,000 tons o f oil obtained in a year, w ith an increase o f % % for each additional 10,000 tons, up to 15% for 500,000 tons. T h e Soviets insisted that the 5% royalty be limited to the first 20,000 tons w ith the 15% rate reached already at 420,000 tons. A Japanese compromise offer o f 5% up to the first 65,000 tons was rejected and the Soviet terms pre­ vailed. It was agreed that all compensation for the concessions be made in cash, prices to be based on California oil quotations in the case o f 25° Baumé or under and on G u lf o f Mexico oil in the case o f over 25° Baumé. Both sides began w ith different figures for royalty payments on gushers. T h ey compromised on a pay rate for gushers up to a daily yield o f 10 tons equal to that for ordinary wells, beyond that on 15% for gushers yielding between 10 and 50 tons, 20% for between 50 and 60 tons, 25% for 60-70 tons, 30% for 70-80 tons, 35% for 80-90 tons, 40% for 90-100 tons, and 45% for over 100 tons. As for gasoline plants, it was agreed that on the basis o f 1,000 cubic feet, compensation be 10% for up to 2 gallons, 15% for up to 3 gallons, 20% for up to 4 gallons, 25% for up to 5 gallons, and 35% for up to 6 gallons. There was considerable debate also about taxation, social security payments, Soviet priority in the purchase o f oil, the employment o f foreigners and the application o f the Soviet labor code, and incidental rights o f the concessionaires.6 In regard to the coal concessions there was lengthy discussion o f the

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question o f proprietary rights. It was agreed that at the time o f the expiration o f the contract the concessionaires surrender to the Soviet government w ithout compensation property, installed by them, on which depreciation had been com pleted; property which had not yet been fully depreciated was to be sold to the Soviet side. Rental for ex­ isting property was to be 5% , w ith the cost o f major repairs to be de­ ducted from the assessed value. There was considerable controversy about the location o f the colliery works. During the m ilitary occupation, as listed in the memorandum appended to the basic convention, the Japanese had operated the Due and Rogatui coal mines. T h ey now wanted to work the same mines plus some others. T h e Russians replied that the Rogatui mine was to be a Soviet state enterprise; they agreed to part but not all o f the Due mining held; and they rejected the other areas proposed b y the Japa­ nese. It was finally agreed that the Japanese syndicate be allowed to mine at Due (except for one area already granted to a Soviet enterprise) at Vladimirskii and at M achi; additional coal fields were to be provided to the Sakai Association at Agnevo and later to the Tsukahara Association at the upper reaches o f the Kosuchina River. T h e Japanese syndicate proposed a royalty payment o f 5% for the first 500,000 tens o f coal, w ith a l/4% increase for each additional 10.000 tons up to 8% for 1,700,000 tons; the Soviets demanded 5% for the first 25,000 tons, w ith 8% already for 320,000 tons. T h e two sides compromised eventually, the syndicate to pay in kind F.O.B. 5% for up to 100,000 tons w ith a l/4% increase for each additional 50,000 tons up to a total o f 8% for 650,000 tons and over; the Sakai Association was to pay 5% for up to 50,000 tons, w ith a % % increase for each additional 10.000 tons up to 8% for 160,000 tens and above. T h e Soviet Union demanded the prior right to purchase up to half o f the annual output by giving notice six months before the start o f work in a given operating year. T h e Japanese consented w ith the proviso that the Soviet side would exercise this option for the purpose o f purchas­ ing coal for its own consumption only. T h e Japanese desired exemption for their coal operations o f all taxes

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and imports other than the above-mentioned royalties; the Russian negotiators felt that Japanese enterprises should be treated on a par w ith Soviet state enterprises. In the end the two sides compromised on a tax o f 3.3% on F.O.B. sales. T h e Japanese did not quarrel w ith Soviet insistence that they comply w ith the Soviet labor code. T h ey objected, however, to the demand that over half o f their work force be recruited from among Soviet nationals, breaking the percentage down by degree o f skill. A s in the case o f the oil concessions, the Japanese strove for a 50 year term, the Soviets for 40 years; again agreement was reached eventually on 4S years. T h e Soviet draft stipulated a social insurance deduction o f 13% from the total annual wages; the Japanese negotiated a 3.5% deduction in view o f the fret that they planned to use their own medical facilities.7 T h e process o f hammering out the oil and coal agreements took longer than anticipated and the original deadline o f October 1$ had to be ex­ tended. Although the contracts were negotiated between private Japanese companies and Soviet state enterprises, Ambassador Tanaka smoothed the w ay in talks w ith Deputy Foreign Commissar Aralov. On November 30 agreement was reached regarding the oil concessions and two days later, on December 1, regarding the coal concessions. A fort­ night was needed to whip the provisions into shape and to formalize them in a resolution o f the Council o f People’s Commissars.8 T h e coal agreement was signed on the afternoon o f Friday, December 11, by Okumura, the Japanese coal delegate, who had to leave for Germany that evening. He did so in the presence o f Kawakami and the legal ad­ viser to the Supreme Council o f National Economy ( v o n k h ) , Etefovich. T h e formal signature o f the concession agreements took place after the weekend, on M onday, December 14, at the meeting o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy. Nakasato put his name to the oil agree­ ment for the Japanese side;9 F.E. Derzhinskii, chairman o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy, signed both agreements for the Soviet Union. D eputy Foreign Commissar Litvinov fastened them together. Present at the signing and photographed w ith the delegates were also

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Kawakami, the adviser o f the delegation, and Ambassador Tanaka and the secretaries o f the Japanese embassy, as w ell as the members o f the Soviet commission for the conclusion o f the agreements. M inkin, a mem­ ber o f the Main Concession Com m ittee, Gurevich, director o f the foreign section o f the Supreme Council o f National Economy, and M usatov, Stepukhovich, and Iampol’ skii.1 T h e coal agreement was between the Soviet government on one hand and Sakai Kumiai and Kita Sagaren Sekitan K igyö Kumiai on the other hand; the oil agreement was between the Soviet government and K ita Sagaren Sekiyu K igyö Kumiai. N either the Japanese nor the Soviet collec­ tions o f diplomatic documents nor the British or League o f Nations treaty series contain the text o f these “ private” agreements. But the following summary appeared in Izvestiia: An oil concession is granted on the eastern shore o f N orth Sakhalin; it is composed o f 8 oil deposits— Okha [Oha], N utovo, Piltun [Pilutun], Ekhabi [Ehabi], Chaivo, N yivo [Nuivo], Uiglekuty [Vuigrektui], and Katangli— w ith a general area o f 4,800 dessiatines [13,000 acres according to the memorandum on oil exploration appended to the basic convention]. $0% o f these fields to be exploited are to be given to the government o f the U.S.S.R. in chess-board fashion. T h e concessionaire is granted the exclusive right for a period o f 11 years to explore for oil, tara [?] and inflam­ mable gas in an area o f 1,000 square versts, w ith the understanding that in the process o f exploration he w ill narrow down his activity, exploring as a preliminary in areas o f 960 dessiatines [about 2,600 acres], then single out from these areas over a period o f three years• • On the same day that the concession contracts were signed (December 14, 1925) the Soviet delegation to the international railway conference gave a return banquet to the Japanese delegation. In addition to the Japanese railway delegation there were present Ambassador Tanaka and the staff o f his embassy as well as the Soviet railway delegation and members o f the collegium o f the People’s Commissariat o f Transportation and the People's Commissariat o f Foreign Affairs and their col­ laborators. ( Izvestiia, December 15,1925, p. 2)

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lots to be exploited. T h e concessionaire makes detailed topogra­ phical surveys o f the entire area and compiles corresponding maps. T h e coal concessions are situated on the western shore o f North Sakhalin: in the district o f Due 18 square versts [12 square miles] in size, in the region o f the Vladimirskii mine 14*4 square versts [about 10 square miles in size] and in the region o f Machi R iver 24 square versts [16 square miles in size]. As in the case o f the oil treaty agreement the concessionaire is granted the exclusive right to explore and mine coal in the agreed upon localities. T h e share to be deducted in the case o f the coal concession is set at 5% in the event o f an annual shaft production o f up to 100,000 m etric tons, w ith an additional 0.2$% for every additional $0,000 metric tons, paid by the concessionaire in kind. In the case o f the oil concession the share to be deducted is pegged at 5% for non­ gusher oil in the event o f a well production o f 30,000 metric tons, w ith an additional 0.2$% for every [additional] 10,000 m etric tons up to 15% . As for gusher oil, the share to be deducted is set at 1$% in the event o f a daily well production from 10,000 to 50,000 metric tons, w ith an addition o f $% for every 10,000 metric tons up to 45%) which are paid by the concessionaire in cash. Besides paying all state and local taxes, the concessionaires also make a lease payment o f 4% o f the value o f the property being handed over. For the coal concession enterprise the concessionaires are given the right to use within the territory o f the concession forest and minerals in general use. Outside this territory [wood] cutting areas are set aside according to the tariff o f 1912; the export o f lumber abroad can take place only on a universal basis; the extraction o f minerals in general use is done by the concessionaire on the general basis o f the mining legislation o f the U.S.S.R. T h e [Soviet] government has also granted to the associations the right to form and exploit all kinds o f subsidiary enterprises necessary for operating the oil concession. T h e coal concession contracts stipulate the right o f the con-

34

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. cessionaire to build a port provided he dears its location and building plan w ith the People’s Commissariat o f Transportation [NKPS] The constructed port comes under the jurisdiction o f the commisariat, which sets aside for the concessionaire a specific part o f this port on conditions agreed upon w ith him. T h e oil contract stipulates also the right o f the concessionaire to lay oil pipelines, provided he clears w ith the [Soviet] government all technical condi­ tions o f their construction and assumes also the obligation to let the [Soviet] government make use o f the pipelines at cost to pump through oil which it owns. In giving to the concessionaires the right to lay new telephone lines and to make use o f those already in existence, the [Soviet] government stipulated that this be done in concord w ith the plans o f the People’s Commissariat o f Post and Telegraph [Narkompochtel] and under the control o f its local organs; provision is also made for the right o f the government organs on Sakhalin to use the above-mentioned telephone lines freely. T h e importation o f all kinds o f machines, parts for them, and technical articles and materials for the supplying and outfitting o f concession enterprises as well as o f consumer goods and o f provi­ sions for supplying the workers and employees o f the concessions is carried out by the concessionaires duty free and without pay­ ment o f license foes. T h e concessionaires must supply the workers and employees w ith these articles at prices specially approved by the commander o f the mining district o f N orth Sakhalin ; imported consumer goods and provisions cannot be sold on the domestic market without the special permission o f local government organs. T h e export by the concessionaires o f the production o f the con­ cession enterprises is also done duty-free, without payment o f license fees. T h e coal concession contracts stipulate the right o f the concessionaires to sell coal on the domestic market, the amount o f the sale for every operational year being agreed upon in advance w ith the Far Eastern organs o f the [Soviet] government. T h e government has retained the preferential right to purchase from the

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concessionaires coal necessary for domestic use in the amount o f up to $0% o f the production o f the concession enterprises for every preceding year. T h e concessionaires insure all the property o f the concession enterprises in insurance institutions o f theU .S.S.R. at their expense and in the name o f the [Soviet] government. W orking conditions in the concession enterprises are regulated by the existing laws in the U.S.S.R. and by appropriate correspond­ ing collective contracts. A ll workers and employees o f the con­ cession enterprises must be furnished w ith living quarters, meeting sanitary-living norms established in the U.S.S.R. Besides Russian workers, the concession contracts stipulate also the employment o f a foreign labor force in the amount o f up to 50% for administrative-technical personnel and highly skilled workers and up to 25% for foreign workers o f medium skill and lower qualification and unskilled workmen. T h e above-mentioned ratio o f foreign and Russian workers is readjusted every three years downward [i.e. the proportion o f foreign workers is to be reduced]. T h e Soviet government retains the right to cancel the concession contracts in effect in the event that the concessionaire w ill be declared an insolvent debtor, if he violates the law and allows the predatory exploitation o f ores, if he does not pay his share o f taxes, and if he oversells consumer goods and provisions imported for the coal enterprise on the domestic market without appropriate permission. Disputes and disagreements which m ight arise both in regard to the interpretation as w ell as the execution o f the concession treaties are considered b y the Supreme Court o f the U.S.S.R. T h e period o f the coal and oil concessions is fixed by contract for 45 years. Upon the expiration o f the terms o f the contract, as well as in the event o f their premature cancellation, the conces­ sion enterprises are transferred to the Soviet government without compensation.10

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According to A rticle 9 o f the concession agreement the oil conces­ sionaires were to consolidate their activity on N orth Sakhalin in a jointstock company. In June o f 1926 the Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

was formed. Its stockholders included the

biggest oil producing concerns in Japan: Kuhara Kogyo, Mitsubishi Goshi, Okura Gum i, Nakano Kogyo and M itsui Kozan. On February 2 i) 1927, the new company concluded the supplementary agreement setting aside for exploration i }ooo square versts [about 650 square miles] o f oil fields on the eastern shore o f N orth Sakhalin, as stipulated in 1925.11 T h e operations o f the North Sakhalin coal syndicate Kita Sagaren Sekitan K igyö Kumiai also were consolidated in a joint-stock company, the Kita Karafuto Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha (the N orth Sakhalin M ining Company, L td.) in August o f 1926.12 Mean­ while another coal company, the Tsukahara Association (Tsukahara Kumiai), on February 19, 1926 concluded a separate agreement as an ordinary concessionaire (i.e. not on the basis o f the Basic Convention) for coal mining in the valley o f the Kosuchina River. T h e Soviet government also granted tw o alluvial gold mining con­ cessions near the city o f Okhotsk—one for the Rizhinskii (Lishinskii?) mine to Tanaka Yotaro jKW in the foil o f 1925 and one for the Vladimirskii, Pravyi (R igh t) and Levyi (Left) mines to the Shôwa Kinkö Kabushiki Kaisha in 1927. In addition to the mining concessions the Japanese obtained also lumber concessions. In the early 1920’s a number o f Japanese firms exploited the rich forest regions o f the Russian Far East. In 1924, on the eve o f Japanese recognition o f the Soviet Union, the following were active: the Kyokutö Shinrin Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha ■ frti (Far Eastern Forestry Industry Company), the Enkaishû Ringyö Dan fèJfcW+fcHÉSJ (M aritim e Province Forestry Com pany), the Kara­ futo Kögyö (Karafuto Industry), Fukushima Shoten WJfeNÜÆ (Fukushima Shop) and the Azhia Ringyö Kabushiki Kaisha (Asian Forestry Company, Ltd.) In January o f 1925 the Soviet authorities at Khaborovsk offered to

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Narita J&ffl, who had been conferring w ith them in the name o f the Japanese forestry interests since the preceding October, to grant forestry concessions up to a period o f tw enty years. T h e Japanese forestry com­ panies thereupon formed the Roryô R ingyô Kumiai JM üttt& lB .ê* (Russian Territory Forestry Association) and through N arita and Takiguchi ! □ entered into negptiadons w ith a Soviet Far Eastern Concessions Com mittee, headed by Far Eastern Agricultural Representa­ tive Mamonov, w ith the chief o f the Vladivostok Forestry Affairs Bureau Lebedev as his deputy. Preliminary talks were held at Khabarovsk from September 25,1925, until mid-November, w ith a brief interruption during which Narita returned to T okyo for consultation. Toward the end ofjanuary 1926 the Roryô R ingyô Kumiai sent Umeura Kenkichi to M oscow for formal negptiadons. For almost a year— from the beginning o f February until December— the two sides conferred on the basis o f a 78 article draft contract submitted b y the Soviet Union. In July an impasse was reached and the negptiadons were saved from collapse only by the intervention o f Ambassador Tanaka, who appealed to Foreign Commisar Chicherin. On December 4,1926, a contract was initialled.. T h e Japanese received forest concessions, totalling over I million hectares, in three regions (Shurukumu [?], Hajiya [?], and Murashiki [?]) for a period o f six years, w ith the right to fell 7 % million cubic feet [?] (over 560,000 koku) o f lumber a year. Disagreement developed after the initialling o f the contract in regard to payment for the concessions. In an attem pt to control the financial transactions so as to prevent the fall o f the value o f the ruble in the Far Eastern Region, the Soviet side tried to change the provision that the remittance and conversion o f business funds could be made either through the Soviet State Bank or through the branch o f a foreign bank (i.e. the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea) and lim it all transac­ tions to the Soviet State Bank. T h e Japanese regarded this as discrimi­ nation against the concessionaires and accused the Russians o f bad faith. Eventually a compromise was reached: the body o f the contract was modified in accordance w ith the Soviet demand, but a memorandum was

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attached in which the Concessions Bureau stated that the concessionaires could make use o f the Bank o f Korea so long as it continued the remit­ tance and exchange o f rubles (a right that the Soviet government could revoke if it felt the value o f the currency threatened). T h e forestry concession contract was finally signed on February 18, 1927, and in November o f the same year the Roryö R ingyö Kumiai was succeeded b y the incorporated Roryö R ingyö Kabushiki Kaisha I t 491 (Russian Territory Forestry Company, Ltd.). Kadono Jukuiö

head o f the former association became president o f

the new joint-stock company.13 Various other concessions were discussed. Viscount G oto envisioned the development o f rice paddy fields by Japanese peasants in the Lake Khanka region o f the M aritime province. In November o f 1925 he pro­ posed to his own government the founding o f the Kyokutö Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (Far East Exploitation Co. L td.) and in M ay o f 1927 handed to Ambassador Dovgalevskii a project for founding the Enkaishü Kaikon Kaisha

(M aritim e Pro­

vince Development o f N ew Land Company). On January 6,1926, Ambassador Tanaka had told Foreign Commissar Chicherin that Japan was in need o f more rice and strongly desired to see the development o f rice cultivation in neighboring countries. Japa­ nese enterprisers, he had said, were prepared to teach the technique o f rice cultivation to Russian peasants so that Russian peasants themselves eventually could develop rice cultivation in Soviet territory. He proposed the development o f mixed companies, and cited as an example the learning o f rice cultivation by American farmers from the Japanese. Chicherin replied that the memory o f the Japanese occupation and o f the partisan struggles against the Japanese forces m ight hinder the harmonious cohabitation o f Japanese agricultural workers w ith the native popula­ tion in the Maritime Province. He wondered whether agricultural con­ cessions m ight not fare better in Western Siberia, near Tom sk and Irkutsk, where there were no bitter feelings. Tanaka did not think so because o f the great distance o f the region from Japan.14 Gotö’s proposal o f M ay 1927 entailed a 75 year concession for over

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860.000 hectares (over 2 million acres) o f land. Counselor Besedovskii replied in August o f the same year that the matter m ight be considered favorably if the term were reduced to 30 years and the area to under 10.000 hectares (under 25,000 acres) and if application were made to the Central Concessions Com mittee in M oscow through the Soviet Trade Mission in T okyo, but the project never materialized.15 T h e conclusion o f the oil and coal concession agreements evoked vari­ ous comments in the Japanese press. In view o f the wide difference existing between Russia and this country in respect o f their national conditions, all negptiadons that have been opened up to the present have been attended w ith peculiar difficulties [the Japan Weekly M ail observed, and re­ flected :] Similar difficulties are experienced by all countries more or less in their dealings w ith Russia. Indeed, very few countries have ever succeeded in concluding detailed agreements w ith that cou n try.. . . When these facts are taken into due consideration, the conclusion o f the concession agreements between Japan and Russia may well be counted a great success for the negotiators on both sides.16 It was clear that there would be many problems ahead and that not all o f them would be due to the "w ide differences” between the two coun­ tries. "M any o f the Japanese semi-official concerns have done very badly in the past, partly because o f their party connections and partly owing to the arbitrary management o f their affairs by a few leaders,” the Japan Weekly Chronicle paraphrased an Asahi editorial. "T h ere are already sordied rumors afloat about the flotation o f shares for the new companies, and the T okyo journal hopes that those concerned w ill use special care to see that all matters are transacted squarely.. . .” 17 T h e Torodzu warned Japanese businessmen "against the illusion into which they are apt to fall that there is every opportunity o f making money in Northern Saghalien.” T h ey must know that the only profitable w ay is to carry on all

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undertakings in that territory on a sound and solid basis, ever mindful o f promoting Russo-Japanese economic rapprochement. Another important thing for the cultivation o f close economic relations is that both peoples should learn to know each other. Some Russians are apt to look upon Japan as a protagonist o f mili­ tarism, while, on the other hand, some Japanese regard Russia as if she were some devil conspiring to destroy Japan’s national con­ stitution. N either view is correct. A better understanding o f each other’s national characteristics w ill greatly help their economic co-operation. T h e closer the economic relations between Japan and Russia, the better assured w ill be the permanent peace o f the Far E a st.. . .18

CHAPTER NINE

Fishery Talks

T

he fishery convention o f 1907 had been signed for a period o f

tw elve years; it expired in September o f 1919. T h e Japanese, who at that time occupied Siberia, sought to extend the convention b y

agreements w ith local regimes. When local authorities in 1921 and 1922 rejected Japanese demands, Japanese fishermen resorted to unrestricted fishing as a means o f protecting, if not expanding, their interests. In 1923, after the withdrawal o f Japanese forces from Siberia and the inundation o f the Pacific coast by the Bolsheviks, Japanese enterprisers negotiated a one year contract for the lease o f fishery lots w ith the Soviet authorities at Vladivostok.1 On the eve o f the fishing season o f 1924 the Japanese press clamored for the resumption o f unrestricted Japanese fishing in Soviet waters under the protection o f Japanese warships if the Soviet Union did not accept Japanese demands and conclude the basic treaty. T h e Soviet Union responded by holding the auction o f fishing lots w ithout the Japa­ nese. T h e strong Soviet position forced the Japanese government to make concessions. A fteritagreed to abide by Soviet conditions, a supplementary auction was held in which Japanese fishermen obtained 229 fishing lots and one crabbing lot. T h at day, on April 6,19 2 4, a temporary fishery agreement was signed for a period o f three years. In the agreement the Japanese fishery people accepted the Soviet claim that they owed 2,750,000 yen for the use o f fishery lots since the Russian revolution and committed themselves to pay 1,550,000 yen in a lump sum and the remainder over a period o f three years w ith 8% interest, payment being guaranteed by the Bank o f Chosen.2 T h e Basic Convention stipulated that the procedure established by

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the fishery agreement o f 1924 be followed until the conclusion o f a new fishery convention.3 T h e first plenary session o f the Soviet-Japanese Conference for the Revision o f the Fishery Convention o f 1907 was held in M oscow on December 22,1925. It was chaired b y S. L Aralov, delegate o f the U.S.S.R. and member o f the Collegium o f the Peopled Commis­ sariat for Foreign Affairs. M artin Ivanovich Latsis was D eputy Delegate o f the U .S.S.R .; he was a member o f the Collegium o f the People’s Com ­ missariat for Agriculture. Ambassador Tanaka was the delegate o f Japan. T h e delegates were assisted b y seventeen experts— eight Russians and nine Japanese.* A large part o f the tw o hour conference was devoted to an exchange o f greetings and the expression o f hope that the question o f the exploita­ tion o f the fishery resources o f the U.S.S.R. could be settled to the mutual benefit o f the peoples o f both countries. Latsis stated that the fishery convention o f 1907 would be used as the basis for discussion. A t his suggestion the conference agreed to form a preparatory commission to determine the order ofbusiness ofth e conference and to prepare materi­ als necessary for the sessions.4*b Ambassador Tanaka presided over the second plenary session on January 4,1926. T h e following order ofbusiness was adopted: (1 ) T h e sessions o f the conference would be chaired alternately b y the Japanese and Russian delegates or the deputy delegates. (2) T h e negotiations would be conducted in Japanese and Russian. (3) In addition to the delegates, experts and secretaries, only persons assisting in the con­ ference in a technical capacity, such as interpreters, stenographers, etc. could be present at the sessions; the experts could speak only after

* G. N . Lashkevich, F. I. Andrianov, I. P. Babkin, N. A. Ergamyshev, M. A. Kozakov, G. A. Kryshov, N . G. Chem obæv, I. A. Chichaev, Yamazaki Jirö, Sako Shuichi, Nishi Haruhino, Shimada Masaharu, Miyakawa Funao, Matsumura Shinichirö, Koshida Tokujirö, Ide Masataka, Nakatani Sadayori. b The preparatory commission consisted o f Lashkevich, Chichaev, Andrianov, Kozakov, Babkin, Eragamyshev, Kryshov and Chemobaev for the Soviet side and Sako, Koshida, Shimada and Miyakawa for the Japanese side.

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prelim inary notice had been given to the other side. (4 ) M inutes o f the

sessions would be kept in Russian and Japanese; upon joint agreement they could be translated into English. ($) T h e minutes would be pre­ pared by the general secretariat o f the conference, consisting o f tw o secretaries, one appointed b y each side (Iagrin and M iyakawa). (6) T h e preparation o f materials necessary for the sessions, the drawing up o f the agenda and the preliminary examination o f questions selected by the conference were left to the preparatory commission. (7) T h e pre­ paratory commission was to present to the conference signed w ritten reports o f questions it had examined. (8) Press releases about the content and course o f conference proceedings could be made only after joint agreement b y the tw o delegates regarding the content and form o f the releases. (9) Upon the signature b y the tw o delegates o f the new fishery convention, both delegations would sign the final protocol, certifying that article 3 o f the basic treaty had been executed and that the con­ vention o f 1907 would be null and void the moment that the new fishery convention w ent into force. A t the second plenary session Latsis announced also the principles b y which the Soviet delegates would be guided in the revision o f the convention: (1) Japanese workers and Japanese employers o f Russian workers must be subject to the Soviet labor code; furthermore, in order to provide gainful employment to local inhabitants, a definite number o f Russian workers must be used in convention water fishery. (2) T h e fishing activity o f the coastal population must not be hindered, because fishery was vital to their livelihood; the local inhabitants should enjoy special privileges and advantages. (3) Japanese enterprises could obtain fishery rights equal only to those o f private citizens o f the U .S.S.R .; b y Soviet law the U .S.S.R.’s state enterprises and fishery cooperative had special rights. (4) Fishery must be set up on a rational basis to preserve the aquatic resources, which were basic to the economic development o f the Russian Far East; the Soviet government reserved the right to impose any restrictions for the sake o f conservation, the restrictions to be applied equally to all fishery enterprises.5 T h e aims o f the imperial government in conducting the negotiations

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R.

were: ( i) to revise the provisions in the old treaty, which were burden­ some or unfavorable to Japanese fishery people; (2) to supplement or revise provisions which were unclear; and (3) to modify provisions which had become dated in view o f technical progress.6 A t the third plenary session, on M ardi 17, the Japanese replied to the principles communicated by Latsis. (1) T h ey reserved judgm ent on the m atter o f extending the labor code to fishery until it was dear w hat effect this would have on fishery; as for the employment o f a definite number o f Russian dtizens in convention w ater fishery, they felt that the enterprisers should be free to hire the most suitable persons, regard­ less o f nationality. (2) W hile the Japanese agreed in prindple that the local population enjoy privileges and advantages, they insisted that the latter be lim ited so as not to violate the rights and interests o f the Japanese fishery people. (3) T h e Japanese objected to the special position o f Soviet state fishery enterprises and the fishery cooperative, saying that it left the Japanese fishery enterprises in a most unfavorable and unstable position in regards to the obtaining o f fishery ground leases, the paying o f taxes, etc.; they wanted regulations that would apply fairly to all fishery enterprises, regardless o f type and relationship to Soviet law. (4) T h e Japanese agreed that rational measures must be taken for the conservation o f fishery resources, but insisted that they be determined jointly by both countries; they demanded also that the sea fishing enter­ prises be left free to determine the most appropriate measures, as sea fishing differed greatly in character from river and lake fishing. Laris replied point b y point: (1 ) It was doubtful that the application o f the Soviet labor code to fishery would give course to serious disagree­ m ent; the Soviet delegation concurred that the special character o f fishery in the Far Eastern region required special [regulations in the regulation o f labor. Provision for exceptions existed in the Soviet labor code and the Russians would be w illing to consider all Japanese suggestions, particularly since the national customs o f employees hired abroad m ust be taken into consideration. But Latsis reiterated the demand that a certain percentage o f Soviet workers be employed in the Japanese enter­ prises; this was important in view o f the unemployment which then

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existed in the U .S.S.R .; furthermore it was a condition required o f all foreign enterprises adm itted to the Soviet Union. It was not a m atter o f supplying tire Japanese w ith unsuitable labor; they would always have the right to dismiss those who were not fit for such work. (2) Latsis accepted the Japanese demand that the privileges and advantages o f the local population and settlers be lim ited so as not to violate Japanese rights; die question had been dealt w ith in the protocol attached to the convention o f 1907. One would have to find a formula that would protect the rights o f Japanese enterprisers, particularly their right to retain convention fishery lots. Latsis asserted that there was no danger o f the local population eventually gaining the best fishery lots b y virtue o f their privileges, because this would be contrary to the fiscal interests o f the U .S.S.R .; Soviet finances depended in part on the sums realized from the auction o f the fishery lots. (3) T h e Soviet delegation felt that the m atter o f the rights o f private and state enterprises m ust be studied by a commission o f experts. W hile the state enterprises had certain privileges they also had certain obligations which the Japanese probably would not wish to assume. For example, the state enterprises in question paid to the People’s Commissariat o f Finances a tax o f up to 80% o f their income. T h e Soviet delegation felt that once a commission o f experts had clarified the situation it would not be difficult to regulate the matter. (4) Latsis stated that the Soviet side was pleased to learn o f Japanese willingness to cooperate in conservation measures and expressed the expectation that joint scientific w ork in this field would be o f great benefit in the future. Y e t the Soviet delegation felt that certain restrictions concerning fishing methods m ust exist for both Soviet and Japanese enterprises, and that the m atter should be studied b y a commission o f experts; quite possibily the conditions put forth b y the Soviet delega­ tion would prove to be not burdensome for the Japanese enterprisers. Tanaka expressed satisfaction w ith the Soviet reply and remarked that the view s erf" both sides were drawing closer. T h e Japanese were delighted w ith the idea o f setting up commissions o f experts to study points 3 and 4 and felt that the tw o commissions should be joined into one. Tanaka named six Japanese experts to the commission, Latsis five

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Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R.

Russians; both delegates reserved die right to call in specialists on questions o f a special character.7 D eputy Delegate Latsis was present at the fourth plenary session» which was held in M oscow on M ay 25, but Delegate Aralov had gone on leave and had been replaced b y B. S. Stomoniakov, another member o f the Collegium o f the Foreign Secretariat. Stomoniakov expressed pleasure at being able to participate in the conclusion o f a fishery con­ vention, which was o f enormous importance in the economic relations o f the tw o countries. T h e tw o delegations had exchanged drafts o f a new convention.8 Stomoniakov stated that he hoped that the differences in the Soviet and Japanese drafts would not be insurmountable. Tanaka acknowledged that the tw o versions were for apart; it was necessary, he said, to seek a general line o f agreement. A t Tanaka’s suggestion it was agreed that the commission o f experts study the tw o drafts and try to find a common basis for discussion by the conference plenum. Should this prove impossible, the commission was to present the divergent view s o f the two sides to the plenum. Both delegates declared that they had instructed their experts to increase the tempo o f the deliberations.9 A t the fifth plenary session, on September 7, Stomoniakov, who chaired the session, announced that the commission o f experts had partly harmonized the Soviet and Japanese convention drafts and protocols and had prepared a report to the plenum. T h e report was presented b y Sako, the chief Japanese member o f the commission. Sako stated that the commission had deemed it necessary to amplify the drafts by preparing a number o f declarations to be appended to the final protocol o f the plenary session. T h e stipulations concerning the labor o f Japanese workers on Japanese fishing lots had been formulated in a separate protocol, Protocol B, since they m ight be changed before the expiration o f the convention. T h e commission had prepared a total o f four documents for the plenum; a draft o f the fishery convention itself; drafts o f Protocols A and B, to be attached to the convention; and a draft o f the final protocol o f the conference.10 Sako pointed out that there had been agreement on over half o f the articles. T h e Soviet Union would not levy duties on fish or aquatic

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products caught in its Far Eastern waters when destined for export to Japan (A rticle 5) nor impose on Japanese lease holders any restrictions on the methods for the preparation o f fish and aquatic products from which Soviet citizens were exempt (A rticle 7). Both sides had concurred also on the issuance o f navigation and health certificates to Japanese subjects by Soviet consular officers and Japanese authorities respectively for direct navigation from Japan to the fishery grounds (A rticle 8); they had agreed that Japanese subjects required no licenses for the export o f fish or the import o f fishing equipment (A rticle 9) and that they be placed on a footing o f equality as respected the laws, regulations and ordinances concerning pisciculture (A rticle 10). Japan engaged not to levy any import duties on fish caught in Soviet Far Eastern waters (A rticle 12). T h e Soviet Union agreed to take into consideration Japanese habits and characteristics in the application o f its laws and regulations regarding the protection and regulation o f labor and to allow Japanese employees free passage between Japan and the fishery grounds as well as a share o f catches in addition to regular wages and free medical aid (A rticle 13); she granted to Japanese subjects the same treatment as to Soviet citizens in the fishing industry (A rticle 14). Both sides had agreed that the convention be ratified and ratifications exchanged in T okyo (A rticle 16). Sako stated that the above articles were being submitted to the plenum for approval, except that the question whether they should apply only to fish or to all aquatic products remained open for the present. Sako declared that the article dealing w ith taxes, imports and fees levied in connection w ith the fishing industry (A rticle 4) was only tentative and needed further study and elaboration. T h e preamble o f the convention as w ell as the articles dealing w ith the lease o f fishery lots (A rticle 2), the right to make free use o f the littoral within the lim its o f the fishery lots (A rticle 3), and the period o f the convention had been harmonized by and large but could not be regarded as accepted, because o f disagreement on individual points. N o agreement had been reached on the first article, stipulating the regions where Japanese subjects could catch and prepare fish, and on the articles requiring the employment erf*

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R.

a certain percentage o f Soviet workmen (A rticle 6) and giving the Japa­ nese the right to prepare fish and aquatic products in the landed lots set aside for them (A rticle 11). These articles were being subm itted to the plenum in parallel formulation. Sako announced that complete accord had been reached on the pre­ liminary part and most o f the articles o f Protocol A , elaborating on the provisions o f the fishery convention, and on the entire text o f Protocol B, regarding the protection and regulation o f Japanese labor. Protocol B and articles o f Protocol A which had been folly accepted b y the com­ mission ofexperts were subm itted to the plenum for approval; the others were presented for further discussion. Sako remarked that there had been almost complete agreement on the draft o f the final protocol o f the con­ ference by the plenum, and that it too was being subm itted for approval. O nly the declaration regarding the buildings erected b y Japanese sub­ jects on fishery lots was still in dispute. Statements concerning taxes also had been adopted tentatively in private wording; the commission regarded them as merely the basis for further negotiation. T h e following disagreements remained: 1. T h e Japanese experts deemed it necessary to make reference in the preamble o f the convention to the revision o f the fishery convention o f 1907; the Soviet experts disagreed. 2. T h e Japanese experts deemed it necessary to stipulate the right o f Japanese subjects to take aquatic products and to catch sea animals except fur-seals and sea-otters; the Soviet experts disagreed. (A rticle 1 o f convention and A rticle 20 o f Protocol A ). 3. T h e Japanese experts deemed it necessary to stipulate the right o f Japanese subjects to engage in fishery in the basin o f the Am ur river; the Soviet experts disagreed. (A rticle 1 o f convention, Articles 1 and 3 o f Protocol A ) 4. T h e Soviet experts wished to mention that the fishing rights o f Japanese subjects were lim ited to the mainland coast­ line o f the U .S.S.R .; the Japanese experts opposed this.

FISHERY TALKS (A rticle

i

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o f convention, A rticle 1 o f Protocol A )

5. T h e Soviet experts wished to mention that the convention applied merely to those regions, in which the Japanese had until the present tim e actually engaged in fishery; the Japanese disagreed. (A rticle 1 o f convention, A rticle 1 o f Protocol A ) 6. T h e Soviet experts wished to establish that Japanese sub­ jects required concessions (i.e. special contracts) for canning fish; the Japanese experts objected to this. (A rticle 1 o f convention, A rticle 21 o f Protocol A ) 7. T h e Soviet experts wished to state that the Soviet govern­ ment had the right to give up to 35% o f the existing fishery lots w ithout auction to its state enterprises, cooperatives and the local population; the Japanese disagreed. (A rticle 2 o f convention, A rticle 4 o f Protocol A ) 8. T h e Japanese experts wished to mention in A rticle 3 o f the convention that Japanese subjects had the right to obtain littoral lots for the preparing and preserving o f the fish, caught on ships; the Soviet experts felt that the Japanese could have such rights only in conform ity w ith A rticle 11 o f the convention. 9. T h e Soviet experts wanted to stipulate the obligation o f Japanese subjects to hire a certain percentage o f Soviet workers; the Japanese experts were against this. (A rticle 6 o f convention, A rticle 10 o f Protocol A ) 10. T h e Japanese experts favored stating that the convention would remain in force for 12 years; the Soviet experts con­ sidered that the convention should be concluded for four years. (A rticle 15 o f convention) 11. T h e Soviet experts desired to mention that the bay o f the city o f O khotsk was not open to Japanese fishermen; the Japanese experts were against this. (A rticle 1 o f Protocol A ) 12. T h e Japanese wanted to state that the Soviet Union would not close lots once they were opened; the Soviet experts

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R. objected, though they were w illing to state that the U.S.S.R. would not decrease the total area o f fishery. (A rticle 8 o f Protocol A ) 13. T h e Soviet experts wished to indicate that the fishery lots would be leased the first tim e after the conclusion o f the convention for a period o f one year, thereafter every tim e for periods o f three years. T h e Japanese experts folt that those lots which would be worked for the first time should be leased for one year; all other lots should be leased for five years. T h e commission believed that this m atter could easily be resolved once agreement had been reached on the length o f the duration o f the convention. (A rticle 6 o f Protocol A ) 14. T h e commission did not give final consideration to A rticle 18 o f Protocol A , feeling that the question it had raised re­ garding the rights o f Japanese subjects should be decided after a decision had been made about articles 2 ,4 , and 11 o f the convention. It presented A rticle 18 in the variant versions, proposed by the experts o f both sides.11

T h e conference approved the report presented by Sako and confirmed the text o f articles 5, 7-10 , 12-14, and 16 o f the convention, the pre­ liminaries and articles 2 ,5 ,7 ,9 ,1 1 - 1 7 ,1 9 , and 22 o f Protocol A , all o f Protocol B, and the entire Final Protocol. N o decision was reached con­ cerning aquatic products. Tanaka and Stomoniakov agreed to negotiate further regarding the variant versions o f the convention and protocol articles which had been subm itted in parallel construction, referring them back to the commission o f experts as the need m ight arise. T h e convention article about taxes (A rticle 4) and a corresponding statement in the Final Protocol were returned to the commission o f experts for further study as was the draft regarding the activity o f Japanese canneries, presented b y the delegates o f both coun­ tries. Kolchanovskii, the chief Soviet member o f the commission o f experts, reported on the text o f a press release about the state o f the negotiations;

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the committee approved it as the official communiqué o f the delegates o f both countries.12 On January 15, 1927, V ice M inister Debuchi told Chargé d’Affaires Besedovskii that there remained only one point beyond the possibility o f agreement, namely the desire o f Soviet state enterprises, which were to receive 20% o f the fishery lots, to participate also in the auctions o f the remaining fishery lots, something to which the Japanese govern­ ment could never agree. T h e other issues, Debuchi felt, could be worked out.13 On January 18 Karakhan instructed Besedovskii to tell Debuchi in his own name that he must not be well informed o f the course o f the negotiations if he thought that there was only one point o f serious disagreement left between them. Besedovskii was to state to Debuchi that according to information he had received from M oscow there were serious disagreements also concerning the Am ur Basin, taxes, canneries, the period o f the convention, etc. Besedovskii was to assert that w hile the Soviet side was constantly making concessions in the lengthy meet­ ings that took place almost every day, the Japanese kept presenting increasingly steep demands and to go back on concessions already made. T h e Commissariat o f Foreign Affairs was prepared to ask the govern­ ment for some sort o f compromise regarding the participation o f state enterprises in the auctions, but could not present this issue to the govern­ ment w ithout an account o f the state o f the negotiations as a whole. T h e decisions o f the government would depend to a large extent on the balance o f the negotiations. It was essential, therefore, to reduce the areas o f disagreement. T h e Japanese government could facilitate this, Besedovskii was to point out, b y instructing its delegation to make some conces­ sions.14 H alf a year passed between the fifth and sixth plenary sessions o f the fishery conference; the sixth plenary session was held in M oscow on February 19, 1927. T h e commission o f experts had been busy in the interim and the delegates had conferred on various problems. Tanaka, who chaired the sixth session, announced that full agreement had been readied on a number o f articles; on some there had been partial agree-

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m ent, but some remained com pletely unresolved. Tanaka proposed that the conference confirm the balance o f the negotiations, instructions to be sought from T okyo and M oscow regarding the articles on which agreement had not been reached. T h ey decided to use the parallel texts as basis for negotiation after receipt o f instructions.15 T h e variant versions presented at the sixth conference were as follows:

ARTICLE i (Japan) T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics grants to Japanese sub­ jects, in conform ity w ith the stipulations o f the present Conven­ tion, the right to catch, to take and to prepare all kinds o f fish and aquatic products, except fur-seals and sea-otters, along the Union coasts o f the Japan Sea, the O khotsk Sea and the Behring Sea, w ith the exception o f rivers and inlets. T h e inlets comprised in this exception are enumerated in A rticle I o f the Protocol (A ) attached to the present Convention. (U .S.S.R .) T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics concedes to the subjects o f Japan the right to catch and to prepare fish, along the mainland coast-line o f the seas o f Japan, O khotsk and Behring, extending from the southern entrance o f the Anadyr Liman (Cape G eta) to the Cape Povorotny, w ith the exception o f the Am ur Liman, and rivers and bays. T h e bays subject to the said exception are en­ umerated in A rticle I o f the Protocol (A ) hereby annexed.

ARTICLE 2 (Japan) Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products in the fishery lots lying both in the sea and on shores which are specially designated for the

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purpose o f catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic pro­ ducts. T h e lease o f the said fishery lots shall be granted b y public auction, w ithout any discrimination being made between Japanese subjects and citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Repub­ lics. It is understood, however, that the lease o f the said fishery lots m ay also be granted not b y auction, but b y special arrangements under agreement to be arrived at between the Japanese Govern­ ment and the Governm ent erf" the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics. (U .S.S.R .) Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in catching and preparing fish in the fishery lots lyin g both in the sea and on shores which are specially designated for the purpose o f catching and preparing fish. T h e lease o f the said fishery lots, w ith the exception o f those lots to be transm itted b y the measure specially provided for in the Convention and the instruments attached thereto, shall be granted by public auction, w ithout any discrimination being made between citizens o f the U .S.S.R. and Japanese subjects. T h e U .S.S.R ., however, reserves the right to transmit w ithout auction separate fishery lots situated w ithin the regions com­ prised under the stipulations o f the Convention, for exploitation b y the state enterprises o f the Union, one hundred per cent o f whose capital belong to the Governm ent, provided, that fishery lots, leased in accordance w ith the foregoing paragraph, m ay be transm itted only after the expiration o f their lease-term.

(Joint) T h e aforesaid auctions shall take place at Vladivostok in Feb­ ruary every year, and the dates and localities designated for this purpose, as w ell as the necessary details relating to the lease o f various fishery lots to be sold, shall be officially notified to the

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R. Japanese Consular officer at Vladivostok at least tw o m onths before the auctions. W ith regard to fishery lots for which there shall have been no successful bidder, they shall again be put to auction w ithin fifteen days, but not earlier than five days, after the preceding auction. Catching o f (whales) and codfish, as w ell as o f all fish (and aquatic products) which cannot be caught in special lots is per­ m itted to Japanese subjects on board sea-going vessels furnished w ith a special licence.

ARTICLE 3 (Japan) Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery lots in conform ity w ith the provisions o f A rticle 2 o f the present Convention shall have, within the lim its o f those fishery lots, the right to make free use o f the littoral. T h ey may there carry out necessary repairs to their vessels and nets, haul them ashore, and land, prepare and preserve their catches (and collections). For these purposes they shall be at liberty to erect there buildings, warehouses, huts and drying-sheds or to remove the same. (U .S.S.R .) In case the fishing industry by vessels furnished w ith a special licence calls for the use o f shores for its exercise, necessary landed lots shall, upon application therefore, be let to Japanese subjects engaged in the said industry. a r t ic l e

6

(Japan) N o restriction shall be established w ith regard to the nationality o f the employees ofjapanese subjects engaged in catching, (taking)

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and preparing fish (and aquatic products) in the districts specified in A rticle i o f the present Convention. (U .S.S.R .) However, the number o f the workm en-dtizens o f the U.S.S.R. engaged in the fisheries shall not be under a certain ratio to the whole number o f the workmen engaged, as defined in the A rt. 22 o f the Protocol (A ) hereby annexed.

ARTICLE 11 (Japan) Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in the preparation o f fish (and aquatic products) in the landed lots let to them outside o f the lim its o f the districts specified in A rticle 1 o f the present Convention, always com plying w ith the laws, regulations and ordinances which are or m ay be in force and applicable to all foreigners in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. a r t ic l e 15

(Japan) T h e present Convention shall remain in force for ten years and shall be renewed or revised at the end o f every tw elve years. (U .S.S.R .) T h e present Convention shall remain in force for six years and shall be renewed or revised at the end o f every six years. (Joint) Either o f the H igh Contracting Buries m ay give notice to the other o f its desire to revise the present Convention, tw elve months before the expiration o f the period abovemenrioned. Negotiations for the revision shall be concluded within the said tw elve months.

2j 6

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. (Japan) Should neither o f the H igh Contracting Partus give notice for such revision, the present Convention shall remain in force for the period o f another tw elve years. (U .S.S.R .) Should neither o f the H igh Contracting Parties give notice for such revision, the present Convention shall remain in force for the period o f another six years.16

Stomoniakov stated that the note appended to A rticle 21 o f Protocol A made it possible for Japanese subjects to open small canneries w ithout concession procedure. T h e Soviet government did not change its position that the fishery convention did not give Japanese subjects the right to build and operate canning factories; it m erely tried to help meet th e needs o f small Japanese enterprisers, not wishing to put Japanese subjects into conditions less favorable than private persons in the Soviet Union. Tanaka retorted that his government felt that the right to prepare fish entailed the right to can it and to operate factories for this purpose; it considered canning one o f the ways o f preparing fish. He would be w illing to recommend to his governm ent acceptance o f a text that could be worked out join d y for the practical solution o f this question. A com­ promise was approved b y the plenum in the form o f a statem ent made in connection w ith the confirmation o f A rticle 5 o f Protocol C w hich laid down the basic conditions o f concession contracts w ith Japanese fishing enterprisers concerning the right o f operating canning factories. T h e statem ent declared that w hile the Soviet delegate assumed that interested Japanese subjects must ask the main Concession Com m ittee o f the Council o f People’s Commissars o f the U.S.S.R. before the concession treaty expired to open negotiations regarding the renewal o f existing treaties or the conclusion o f new treaties and that these negotiations would lay the foundations for further operation o f the canning factories, the Japanese delegate felt that the m atter must be considered following

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the expiration o f the concession treaty as a revision o f the fishery con­ vention. In view o f the fact that this difference o f opinion had no practical meaning at the moment and since the delegates did not wish to delay the conclusion o f the fishery convention, the statement concluded, the delegates had agreed to leave the question open for further negotiations, as provided in paragraph 2 o f A rticle 5 o f Protocol G T h e conference appointed an editorial commission (Kolchanovskii, Kazakov, Ergameshev, Sako, Koshida, N ishi, and M iyakawa). Tanaka remarked that the most important phase o f the conference’s w ork had passed, and that remaining differences would soon be resolved. Stomoniakov added the hope that Tanaka and he would do everything in their power to sign the convention before the beginning o f the approaching auction o f fishery lots. Tanaka agreed.17 O n M arch 17 Stomoniakov cabled to the Soviet chargé d’affaires ad interim in T okyo, that agreement had been reached on the question o f the Am ur basin by giving to the Soviet Union the unrestricted right to grant fishery lots to its state and cooperative enterprises as well as to the local population w ithout auction; the question o f em ploying Soviet workers had been resolved b y means o f a joint declaration and the willing­ ness to conclude an agreement concerning the percentage o f such workers, who until then were to be hired on an equal basis w ith Japanese workers. Agreem ent had been reached also on the question o f the protection o f labor in canneries; the Japanese had accepted the Soviet conditions. In the m atter o f state enterprises, the Japanese had consented to a series o f Soviet demands concerning the method o f selecting lots, the period o f negptiadons, the reservation o f new fishery lots and the obligations o f the state enterprises toward private enterprisers. Disagreement remained regarding enterprises w ith a m inority o f state capital. T h e Japanese proposed that the Soviet government consult w ith the Japanese government concerning the method b y which such enterprises could obtain fishery lots; the Soviet side insisted on the right o f these enterprises to participate in the auctions. As for the co­ operative, Tanaka proposed on his own that it nominally be given the right to take part in the auctions, w ith the Soviet government

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pledging, however, to consult w ith the Japanese governm ent in th e event o f heed regarding other methods by which the cooperative w ould obtain fishery lots. Tanaka pointed out that if the cooperative did not present a threat to the Japanese at the auction, its participation in th e auctions would not be cancelled. T h e Soviets on the other hand continued to insist that the cooperative have an unlimited right to participate in auctions. T h e question o f new canneries remained unsettled, but Tanka pro­ mised to make a new proposal. T h e Soviet Union refused to allow un­ lim ited establishment o f canneries; Stomoniakov w rote that the Soviet proposal o f 20 canning factories was fully sufficient. In view o f Tanaka’ s stubbomess, the Soviet side had proposed to leave the question o f new canning factories open, agreeing to regulate it b y the fishing season o f 1928 while perm itting the construction o f two or three factories as concessions in 1927; Tanaka had not given a final reply. N o definite agreement had been reached on the question o f that year's auction. “ W e categorically rejected any idea o f a make-believe auction, proposed b y Tanaka, and feel the practice o f 1924 and especially o f 1925 to have been the most normal auction w ith the state enterprises participat­ ing,” Stomoniakov cabled. “ T h e Japanese object strenuously, believing that there had been collusion [against them] in those years and that in 1927 they should receive all their former fishery lots. I proposed either to schedule a normal auction immediately or to await the signing o f the convention, pointing out that I was doing so privately, since the fixing o f auctions was the internal business o f the U .S.S.R.” “ T h e question o f new canning factories is the most difficult,” Stomonia­ kov concluded, “ since the Japanese demand boils down to placing the Japanese in a more privileged position than our citizens, who according to our basic laws do not have the right to build and operate factories. W e are waiting for a compromise proposal o f Tanaka.” 18 On March 22 the Foreign Commissariat informed the Japanese Embassy in M oscow that the Soviet Union, in response to a request subm itted b y the Japanese Ambassador that the auction o f fishery lots for the catching o f herring and crabs be fixed as soon as possible, was w illing to announce

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immediately the auction o f such fishery lots. It expressed confidence that the fishery convention would be signed soon, a statement echoed by the Japanese embassy on the 26th, when it thanked the Commissariat for having m et its request.19 Y et on March 22, the day after w riting the note to the Japanese em­ bassy and before dispatch o f the Japanese reply, Chicherin telegraphed to the Soviet chargé in T o kyo: “ W e are getting the impression that Ambassador Tanaka is not inclined to hurry w ith the fishery convention. Indicate to Debuchi that he carry out his promise about concessions regarding the convention and put pressure on Tanaka so that w e sign it as soon as possible. Point out during the talks that the fixing o f auction for [fishery lots for] humpbacked salmon [garhuba] and Siberian salmon [keta] must take place in tw o to three weeks and that it would be desirable to sign the convention b y that time.” 20 On June 30 Stomoniakov communicated to Tanaka the decision o f the Soviet governm ent: (1 ) T h e Soviet Union agreed to give [to the Japanese] the right to build and operate an unlimited number o f factories for the period o f the lease o f the respective fishery lots, gping further than the Japanese demand that such permission be granted for 25 factories. (2) T h e Soviet Union agreed to exclude the point about labor from Protocol 3 and to delete the demand about the reliefo f workers in factories ; it did not agree, on the other hand, to give to the factories in case o f obstruction o f fish conventional rights and to fix the pay for overtim e work at not more than 50% o f the base salary. It had been pointed out to Tanaka that both these conditions applied to the catching o f fish, since it was not possible in the catching o f fish to operate on an eight hour day; but in factories, if there were ice boxes, the working day could be normal, and overtim e work and its compensation m ust be regulated b y agremcent between the enterprisers and the Labor Commissariat (Narkom trud) in Khabarovsk. (3) T h e Soviet Union was lowering considerably the amount deducted per crate o f canned goods and was prepared to decrease the total sum o f duties on fishery to 30% o f the lease fee. (4) As for the cooperative, the Soviet government wished to leave in the convention the stipulation that it would receive lots b y

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o f the U.S.S.R.

auction; it would, however, commit itself in a separate note to enter into negotiations about a different method o f obtaining lots, if the Japa­ nese would find in practice that the cooperative was in a privileged position. (5) Sim ilarly the Soviet Union wanted to leave in the conven­ tion the right o f enterprises w ith a m inority o f state capital to take part in auctions, while agreeing in an exchange o f notes that in the event o f the appearance o f such enterprises before the fixing o f a means o f their obtaining lots the Soviet Union would consult w ith the Japanese govern­ ment whether to give them lots w ith or w ithout auction. (6) T h e Soviet government was prepared to declare in the protocol o f the plenum that the Tsentrosoiuz (the central union o f consumers* cooperatives) did not intend to engage in fishery in the convention region during the period that the convention was in effect. Reporting the above decision o f the Soviet government to Ambassador Dovgalevskii in T okyo on June 30, Chicherin commented that Tanaka had received this information "q u ite indifferently” and declined to discuss it. N or had he deemed the tim e ripe to listen to the smaller decisions o f the Soviet government concerning other outstanding issues. "T h e general impression,” Karakhan cabled, "is [of] an unwillingness to conclude the convention now. T h e negptiations w ill be renewed upon receipt b y Tanaka o f the opinion o f the Japanese government regarding the above-mentioned proposals.” See the premier [Karakhan instructed D ovgalevskii], and an­ nounce to him that having made the stated significant conces­ sions on the most important questions in dispute, w e expect that the Japanese government, i f it at all wants to conclude the con­ vention, w ill make a concession to us concerning the cooperative. Point out that our proposals concerning the cooperative and mixed companies concur w ith the proposals made b y Tanaka in the preceding phase o f the negptiations but later retracted. T o deprive the cooperative o f the right to participate in the auctions would em bitter the local population and would turn it against the Japanese. T h e right o f the cooperative to participate in the

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auctions is im portant for us from the point o f view o f internal politics and is dictated also b y the long-term interests o f Japan. Insist on as quick as possible a decision: one m ust either conclude the convention or postpone the negpdadons. T h e question is so im portant that you must specially see Premier Tanaka.21 On O ctober 10, 1927, the fishery convention and the attached docu­ ments were initialled b y Karakhan and Tanaka. “ In view o f the fact that the above-mentioned texts received the prior approval o f the Japanese government, the receipt b y M r. Tanaka o f the formal plenary powers for the conclusion o f the convention is expected within the next few days, when its signature w ill follow,” Izvestiia announced on October 11 optim istically.22 Karakhan w rote to Ambassador D ovgalevskii on the same day that Tanaka m erely awaited the plenary powers to sign the convention. A s Tanaka had told him figuratively: “ You and I can take o ff on a vacation, leaving here only our right hands for the signature.” Karakhan added that Tanaka had raised the question o f fishery grounds not as an official demand o f the Japanese government, but as an unofficial desire. “ A fter the initialling our position has become stronger,” Karakhan informed D ovgalevskii, “ and gives you the necessary strength to decline all new proposals and to declare that the Japanese government is re sponsible for the delay in signing [the convention.]” 23 Unperturbed, the Japanese advanced new demands. T h ey felt that later difficulties could be avoided if agreement were reached before the signature o f the convention on its enforcement in regard to the fishery areas o f the state enterprises and fishery lots connected w ith the existing canneries; the Soviets believed that the m atter raised b y the Japanese was a needless complication.24 Eager to break the deadlock, Premier Tanaka asked Viscount G oto to approach the Russian govern­ ment. O ld and feeble though he was after a stroke, G oto had been planning a private visit to the U .S.S.R. ostensibly to look at the new Russia and observe the results o f the N ew Economic Policy. T h e underlying reasons for his one month visit to M oscow (from December 22,1927, to January

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2 i, 1928) were to confer w ith Soviet leaders about China and about economic concessions in the Russian Far East. A t Tanaka’s request G oto called on D eputy Foreign Commissar Karakhan on January 8,1928, in order to ask what was holding up signature o f the fishery convention. Karakhan replied that the Soviet government could not accept any conditions for the signing o f the protocol; he insisted on its signature without any conditions. He added that no additional safeguards for Japanese fishery people were necessary, because the convention itself stated that the Soviet government would consult w ith the Japanese government before taking back any fishery lots. G oto replied that thejapanese government insisted that fishery grounds then being worked b y the Japanese remain in their hands; he himself realized that such a demand complicated m atters, yet he reported this since thejapanese government had so decided and wanted to know the opinion o f the Soviet government direedy. He underlined that the Soviet position was officially correct, and that thejapanese government acted in the present case under the duress o f pressure from fishery enter­ prisers and from M inister o f Agriculture Yamamoto Teijirö. It was es­ sential for the Japanese government from the point o f purely internal political considerations to satisfy the fishery people. Karakhan responded that he had an idea, but did not know whether it would be acceptable to his own government, namely to declare orally at the time o f signature that in allocating lots for the state econom y the Soviet government would keep in mind the interests o f the Japanese fishery enterprisers within the lim its o f the convention being signed. G oto stated that he merely wanted to inform him self about the state o f the fishery convention and to assist in bringing the m atter to a conclusion b y bringing influence to bear on Tanaka and thejapanese government. He said that he would talk to Tanaka and if he found it convenient and purposeful he would undertake some steps to bring about the signature o f the convention.25*c c Japanese sources corroborate that Gotö “ interceded with the authorities o f both countries in an individual capacity.’* (Tanaka, p. 139)

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On January 11 G oto brought to Karakhan the draft o f the following declaration: “ T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics, recognizing the economic status obtained b y Japanese subjects in the fishing industry in the regions stipulated by the Fishery Conven­ tion, is prepared to see to it that the existing interests o f the Japanese subjects w ill not be harmed and w ill not propose in general to reserve for exploitation b y state enterprises any fishery lot, being worked by Japanese subjects in the year 1927.” T h e Soviet Union folt that it could not agree to leave all the fishery lots formerly exploited b y the Japanese in Japanese hands. A t the same tim e, in order not to delay further the signature o f the convention, the Soviet government on January 14 confirmed the text o f a modified for­ mula, which Karakhan on January 16 handed to Professor Yasugi [Sadatoshi o f T okyo University?] for transmittal to Goto. T h e Soviet version read: “ T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the great economic importance o f fishery, in which Japanese subjects engage in regions stipulated b y the fishery convention, is prepared to take into consideration that in conform ity w ith the said convention no harm be done to the reasonable and legal interests o f Japanese subjects.” In handing the statement to Yasugi, Karakhan asked that he convey to G oto that tlie formula had been accepted b y the Soviet government after prolonged discussion and that it deemed it unnecessary to supplement the convention, which had already been initialled. G oto hastened to the Foreign Commissariat the same day to declare that the Soviet formula was unacceptable and that his formula o f January 11 must be used instead. Tanaka called on Karakhan later in the day, on January 16, and handed him a new, even more specific formula, in which the Soviet government pledged “ in so for as possible” w ith few exceptions not to offer to reserve for exploitation b y state enterprises fishery lots worked by Japanese subjects in 1927 and declared itself ready “ in addition to the stipulations in the said Convention (in so for as pos­ sible) to see to it that the area o f fishery activity o f Japanese subjects would not be decreased.” 26

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On January 19 Karakhan asked Tanaka to come to his office. H e in­ formed Tanaka that the Japanese formula conveyed through G oto -was unacceptable and that the Soviet government stuck to its own form ula, presented to G oto on the 16th. I f the Soviet formula were accepted, the convention could be signed immediately. Karakhan explained th at the Soviet government had gone as for as it could in the convention and could make no further concessions. Tanaka made no effort to persuade Karakhan; he merely stated that he tried to find a w ay out o f the im ­ passé regardless o f which side was right or wrong. T h e Japanese govern­ ment had granted full powers to G oto and had thus drawn him into the m atter. It had consented to the signature o f the convention, leaving it up to him and G oto to agree on an acceptable formula in M oscow. Tanaka said that the formula he him self had presented could be modified so as to make it acceptable to the Soviet side. He argued that the Japanese formula did not exceed the convention and if the Soviets thought it did, it could be revised accordingly. Indeed he tried to alter his formula so as to approximate it to the Soviet version. He feared that the simple rejection o f the Japanese formula m ight make a “ bad impression” and have an adverse effect on the chances o f concluding the convention and on Soviet-Japanese relations in general. Tanaka stated that he did not insist that the formula be part o f the convention or be official in character; an informal letter addressed to him would be sufficient. But however much Tanaka asked that the Soviet government reconsider its rejection o f the Japanese proposal, Karakhan replied that there were no new focts to ju stify this.27 T h e following day, on January 20, Tanaka called on Foreign Com­ missar Chicherin to ask if he had anything to add about the formula concerning fishery lots. Chicherin replied no; the Soviet government regarded its own formulation as binding and final. Tanaka declared that he had come to point out the seriousness o f the present moment in Soviet-Japanese relations. Just now there was an attem pt to bring about a rapprochement w ith the Soviet Union. But should this extrem ely important and favorable moment be lost, the opposite tendency would be strengthened again, and these tendencies

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would grow increasingly; it was not m erely a m atter o f the fishery convention but o f Russo-Japanese relations in general. It was extrem ely dangerous in politics to miss the [right] moment, Tanaka asserted. In given periods some tendency begins to develop, but if this tendency leads to failure the opposite tendency is strengthened again and in view o f the missed moment such opposite tendencies can dominate for a long time. Sometimes an issue that seems o f secondary importance may play a determ ining role when it comes to the question as to whether the right moment has been missed or not. Gotö’s visit to the Soviet Union was one o f these favorable moments, that could have unfavorable consequences if it were missed. It was as if Japan stood at the crossroads, and the voyage o f G otö was o f the greatest importance for directing Japan to the road friendly toward the Soviet Union. Gotö’s voyage was o f decisive significance for the development o f good relations between the tw o countries. H e was leaving the next day. He had striven most energetically to reach an agreement w ith the Soviet Union. He was extrem ely worried about this question, since if the m atter intrusted to him would end in the rupture o f the negotiations, it would be a blow to his entire mission and have opposite effects. He was very w ell known in Japan and all o f Japan was w atching the outcome o f his visit. Tanaka asserted that both G oto and he him self were deeply disap­ pointed that Gotö’s friendly efforts had not led to success. Both had stated that their formulas were subject to change. Karakhan had refused to discuss the formulas in detail. Could Chicherin not state w hat was objectionable in them so that they could be modified accordingly? Chicherin replied that there were three objections to the Japanese formulas: (1 ) the assigning o f specific fishery lots to state enterprises; (2) the specific assigning o f the present lots to Japanese fishery enter­ prisers; and (3) the fact that change was proposed after the convention had been concluded and initialled. Chicherin added that he was not em­ powered to negotiate concerning these points, but had listed them because he felt that he could not leave Tanaka’s question unanswered. Tanaka denied that Japan wished to do any o f the above, and sug­

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gested that Chicherin make any necessary changes and add a statem ent to the effect that neither side would get any new rights not stated in the convention. Chicherin retorted that Tanaka him self had advised them before Gotö’s arrival not to give ground. Tanaka jumped up in surprise and said that that was a m istake; that he had not and could not have said any such thing. H ow would a Japanese ambassador tell another government that it should not make concessions to the Japanese government? W hat he had said was that when Chicherin would talk to G oto, he should give him a clear answer— yes or no— rather than to evade the issue or delay an answer. He had urged a clear answer not a negative one. When Chicherin asked w hy the Japanese had not proposed inclusion o f the provisions while the treaty was being negotiated, Tanaka replied that such questions were useless, for they did not alter the situation w hich had arisen since and made the addition necessary. I take the liberty o f pointing out to the Ambassador [Chicherin stated im patiently], that the whole course o f negotiations w ith Japan has left a strong aftertaste. Japan made proposals and then took them back. Japan came to an agreement w ith us on some points and the next day advanced new demands, which altered everything. It is not so w ith us, our word is a firm word. I f w e make a promise, w e keep i t . . . . N ow the ambassador says that one must take another little step, and everything w ill be alright. It was the same thing all the time. W e made concessions and the ambassador thereafter came and said that w e m ust take another little step. Finally after so many efforts the treaty was concluded. It contains a mass o f concessions on our part. T he population o f the [Russian] Far East is outraged by our concessions. A ll local authorities protest against our having made so many concessions, and after all this has been brought to an end, the ambassador appears and demands yet another step. T his means that everything has to be brought to an end and that w e then must begin all over again from the beginning. Let the ambassador

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think for him self how this reflects on the attitude o f our political leaders toward these questions. Tanaka refused to get into an argument about this w ith Chicherin; as he said, he could not criticize his own government. H e returned to the significance o f G o tô’s trip; it was a symbol, a turning point in SovietJapanese relations, designed to bring about a turn in Japanese policy favorable toward Russia. H e likened it to the voyage o f Marquis ltd Hirobumi to St. Petersburg in 1901 and warned that the failure o f the mission would give hostile forces in Japan a new impetus.* Tanaka accused the Soviet Union o f ruining everything b y refusing to come to an agreement w ith Goto. “ T h e price is very high. I deeply fear the consequences.” * Chicherin reiterated that he could not ask his government to re­ consider; its decision was final. “ Is it possible that you do not want to help me?” Tanaka asked in desperation. “ General Tanaka, your premier, can help you,” Chicherin replied unmoved. “ T ru ly only General Tanaka?” “ O f course, only General Tanaka, as it is up to him to preserve what we have agreed upon.” Tanaka asked Chicherin how he could be so strict and stonehcarted, and went over the same arguments again and again until Chicherin told him that it was like being on a merry-go-round. Tanaka replied 4 Russian unwillingness to negotiate with Itö seriously, contributed to the forma­ tion o f the Anglo-Japanese alliance and eventually to the outbreak o f the RussoJapanese War. • On his return to Japan Goto had some criticism o f the Japanese side. Speaking o f the need to conclude a commercial agreement with the U.S.S.R. and to solve various outstanding issues and above all to develop the natural resources o f Siberia, Gotö complained that the Japanese people showed “ more zeal over political squabbles than on the question o f bread and butter.” (Jap** Weekly Chronicle, February 16, 1928)

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gloom ily that Chichcrin’s observation was very fiinny but o f little consolation. Chicherin told Tanaka that when the question was being discussed b y the Soviet government he had stated that the Japanese side was w illing to declare that this formula did not go beyond the convention. T h e other members o f the government then had asked him for w hat purpose the Japanese needed the formula, if it contained nothing that w ent beyond the treaty. "Y o u are too logical,” Tanaka retorted. "In politics not everything is that logical. I f w e need some formula for internal political reasons that does not mean that the formula must go beyond the treaty. If one is to reason as you are, in such a case your formula o f January 14 [transmitted on the 16th] is also superfluous. B y agreeing to it you have broken the steel front o f your logic.” "T h e purpose o f our formula o f January 14 was to convey our good w ill,” Chicherin answered. "T h is is a specific purpose.” Chicherin agreed to see G oto the following day, but warned that he would tell him the same thing. Tanaka departed w ith the comment that he was leaving deeply shaken and full o f despair.28 T h e next day, on January 21, Tanaka informed Karakhan that the Japanese government had agreed to the Soviet formula and that he was prepared to sign the convention. T h ey decided that the signing take place on M onday, January 23, at 9 A.M. In cabling this to Ambassador Troianovskii in T okyo, Karakhan commented that although the efforts o f G oto had played a certain part in hastening the signature, the major impetus had been given apparently by internal political developments in Japan— the dissolution o f the D iet and the calling o f general elections for February 20.29 T h e final, seventh plenary session was held in M oscow on January 23,1928. It was the culmination o f tw o years o f negotiation, including over 160 meetings— 5 gatherings o f the preparatory com mittee, seven plenary sessions, about 81 meetings between the tw o plenipotentiaries and some 71 meetings o f the technical experts.30 Stomoniakov had been replaced as chief delegate and plenipotentiary b y Karakhan, who had

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signed the basic treaty o f 192$. Latsis, who had co-signed the basic treaty, had participated from the very beginning. Present also on the Russian side were People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin; Aralov, who had been the chief Soviet delegate at the outset o f the con­ ference and had become a member o f the Presidium o f the H igher Soviet o f the People’s [Popular] Econom y; A .V . Sabanin, chief o f the economiclegal section o f the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; B. N . M el’nikov, C h ief o f the Far Eastern Section o f the People’s Commisariat for Foreign Affairs, as w ell as five experts and a secretary (L Iu. Tsalerachuk). Tanaka and seven experts represented the Japanese side. T h e delegates together examined the definitive texts o f the fishery convention, three protocols (A ,B , and C ), one Final Protocol w ith tw o annexes and four exchanges o f notes. A fter agreeing on all texts and the contents there­ in, the plenipotentiaries signed the documents and affixed their seals.31

CHAPTER TEN

The Fishery Convention

T

he

official English text o f the Fishery Convention between Japan

and the U .S.S.R ., in the wording communicated b y the director o f the Imperial Japanese Office accredited to the League ofN ations,

was as follows: His M ajesty the Emperor o f Japan and the Central Executive Com m ittee o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics,* for the purpose o f concluding a Fishery Convention in conform ity w ith the provisions o f A rticle 3 o f the Convention em bodying Basic Rules o f the Relations between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics concluded at Peking on January 20th, 192$, have named their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: His M ajesty the Emperor o f Japan: Tokichi Tanaka, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten­ tiary to the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, Jushii, a mem­ ber o f the First Class o f the Imperial Order o f the Sacred Treasure; T h e Central Executive Com m ittee o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics: Lev M ikhailovich Karakhan, People’s D eputy Commissary for a The preamble o f the Soviet text reverses the order in the first sentence. It

begins : “ The Central Executive Committee o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor o f Japan.. . (Japanese Archives, Russo-Japanese Treaties, p. 32/56)

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Foreign Affairs o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, and M artin Ivanovitch Lads [Latsis] a member o f the Collegium o f the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture o f the Russian Sodalist Federative Soviet Republic; W ho, after having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following A rticles:

ARTICLE I T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics grants to Japanese sub­ jects, in conform ity w ith the stipulations o f the present Conven­ tion, the right to catch, to take and to prepare all kinds o f fish and aquatic products, except fur-seals and sea-otters, along the coasts o f the possessions o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics in the Japan, Okhotsk and Behring Seas, w ith the exception o f rivers and inlets. T h e inlets comprised in this exception are enumerated in A rticle I o f the Protocol (A ) attached to the present Convention. a r t ic l e

n

Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products in the fishery lots, lying both in the sea and on shore, which are spedally designated for that purpose. T h e lease o f the said fishery lots shall be granted b y public auction, w ithout any discrimination being made between Japanese subjects and citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. It is understood, however, that, as an exception to the fore­ going, those fishery lots for which the Governments o f the tw o H igh Contracting Parties have so agreed may be leased w ithout auction. T h e auction o f fishery lots shall take place at Vladivostok in February every year, and the date and locality designated for this

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purpose, as well as the necessary details relating to the lease o f various fishery lots to be sold, shall be officially notified to the Japanese Consular officer at Vladivostok at least two months before the auction. W ith regard to fishery lots for which there shall have been no successful bidder, they shall again be put up to auction within fifteen days, but not earlier than five days, after the preceding auction. T h e catching o f whales and codfish, as w ell as o f all the fish and aquatic products which cannot be caught or taken in special lots is perm itted to Japanese subjects on board sea-gping vessels fur­ nished w ith a special licence. a r t ic l e

m

T h e Japanese subjects who have obtained the lease o f fishery lots in conformity w ith the provisions o f A rticle II o f the present Convention shall have, within the lim its o f those fishery lots, the right to make free use o f the littoral. T h ey may there carry out necessary repairs to their boats and nets, haul them ashore, and land, prepare and preserve their catches and collections. For these purposes they shall be at liberty to erect there buildings, ware­ houses, huts and drying-sheds or to remove the same.

ARTICLE IV W ith regard to taxes, imposts and foes to be levied in connection w ith the fishing industry, Japanese subjects shall be subject to the following conditions and shall under no circumstances be subject to any treatment less favourable than that accorded to citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. i . T h e amount o f the business tax chargeable to Japanese sub­ jects having fishery rights shall not exceed three per cent o f the price on the fishery grounds offish and aquatic products caught, taken or prepared by them.

274

Japanese R ecognition o f tbe USS.R. 2. T h e said Japanese subjects shall be exempted from all kinds o f taxes, imposts and fees, except the business tax and the taxes, imposts and fees mentioned in A rticle 9 o f the Protocol (A ) attached to the present Convention. 3. T h e payment o f the business tax and other taxes, imposts and fees may be arranged b y a special agreement between the tw o Governments. 4. N o taxes or imposts shall be levied on the income o f Japanese employees having their domicile in Japan and engaged in seasonal labour on fishery grounds leased to Japanese subjects.

ARTICLE v T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall levy no duties on fish and aquatic products caught or taken in the Far Eastern waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, whether such fish and aquatic products have or have not undergone a process o f manu­ facture, when they are destined for export from the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan.

ARTICLE VI N o restriction shall be established w ith regard to the nationality o f the employees o f Japanese subjects engaged in catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the present Convention. a r t ic l e

vn

So far as concerns methods o f preparation o f fish and aquatic products, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics engages not to impose upon the Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the present Conven­ tion any restriction from which the citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics who have obtained fishery rights in the said districts are exempt.

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ARTICLE Vm T h e Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights may make use o f sea-going vessels furnished w ith a navigation cer­ tificate issued in Japan b y the competent Consular officer o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, as also w ith a health certificate issued by the Japanese authorities, for the direct navigation from Japan to their fishery grounds, from one o f their fishery grounds to another as well as from their fishery grounds to Japan; the said vessels may also proceed from the fishery grounds direct to a third state, provided they conform to the formalities required for the exportation to the said state o f the fish and aquatic products on board, caught or taken in the Far Eastern waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. T h e above-mentioned vessels shall be at liberty to transport, free o f imposts and taxation, the persons and things necessary for the fishing industry, as also catches and collections. T h e Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights may, free o f imposts and taxation, transport b y land, along shore or by sea, on board fishing boats the above-mentioned persons, things, catches and collections between their own fishery lots or vessels furnished w ith the licence mentioned in the last paragraph o f A rticle II o f the present Convention. T h e provisions o f the present A rticle shall equally apply to the case when the respective holders o f separate fishery lots or licences make use o f a vessel or a boat jointly. T h e provisions o f the present A rticle shall apply to the removal o f remaining properties in the fishery lots, the lease-term o f which has expired, to the other fishery lots or to Japan. T h e above-mentioned vessels and boats must in all other re­ spects com ply w ith the laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics which are or may be enacted respecting the coasting trade.

276

Japanese Recognition o f the U SSR . ARTICLE IX T h e Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights may freely export to Japan fish and aquatic products caught or taken by Japanese subjects, w ithout any export-licence, they m ay also export such fish and aquatic products to a third state, conforming to the formalities required for the exportation thereof. For the exportation o f fish and aquatic products bought from the state or other enterprises or citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, the said Japanese subjects shall conform to the formalities required fin1the exportation thereof. T h e said Japanese subjects are at liberty to import the neces­ saries solely intended for use for their fishing industry, as w ell as for themselves or their employees, w ithout any im port-licence. N o duties or imposts shall be levied on the importation o f the goods above mentioned; the said goods as w ell as their quantity w ill be defined in the list, which shall be formulated every year in due time by the competent local authorities subject to the approval o f the central authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics.

ARTICLE X W ith regard to the entry, stay, removal and departure o f the Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery rights, as w ell as o f their employees who are not citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Social­ ist Republics, the summary regulations which are or m ay be enacted by the authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics shall be applied in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the present Convention; in all other cases, Japanese subjects shall conform to the laws and regulations which are or may be enacted concerning the entry and stay in, and departure from, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, o f foreigners. T h e Japanese subjects and the citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics who have obtained fishery rights in the districts

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above-mentioned shall be placed on a footing o f equality as regards the laws, regulations and ordinances which are or may be enacted concerning pisciculture and the protection o f fish and aquatic products, the control o f industry germane thereto and all other matters relating to fisheries. Information o f new ly enacted laws and regulations, applicable to the fishing industry in the Far Eastern waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be furnished to the Japanese Government at least three months before they are put in force; information o f ordinances o f the same nature new ly issued by the local authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall be furnished to the Japanese Consular officer at Khabarovsk at least two months before they are put in force.

ARTICLE XI Japanese subjects are at liberty to engage in the preparation o f fish and aquatic products in the landed lots leased to them out­ side the limits o f the districts specified in A rticle I o f the present Convention, always com plying w ith the laws, regulations and ordinances which are or may be enacted and applicable to all foreigners in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE xu T h e Japanese Government, in consideration o f fishery rights accorded b y the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics to Japanese subjects in virtue o f the present Convention, engages not to impose any import duties on fish and aquatic products caught or taken in the Far Eastern waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, whether such fish and aquatic products have or have not undergone any process o f manufacture. a r t ic l e

xrn

Recognizing that Japanese employees, w ith their place o f habita­ tion in Japan, are engaged there and return thereto after carrying

278

*

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

on labour in the seasonal industry o f fishery; that their habits and customs are characteristic o f Japanese nationality; that free passage between Japan and fishery grounds and free rations during the whole term o f engagement are granted; that a share o f catches and collections is given them in addition to regular wages, and that medical aid and other means o f relief are provided for free o f charge. T h e Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to conform to the above-mentioned frets in the application o f its laws and re­ gulations regarding the protection and regulation o f labour, which are or may be enacted, to the labour o f Japanese employees in the fishery grounds leased to Japanese subjects in accordance w ith the provisions o f the present Convention.

ARTICLE XIV So far as concerns matters not specially dealt w ith in the present Convention, but yet relating to the fishing industry in the dis­ tricts specified in A rticle I o f the present Convention, Japanese subjects shall be entitled to the same treatment as accorded to the citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics who have obtained fishery rights in the said districts.

ARTICLE XV T h e present Convention shall remain in force for eight years and shall be revised or renewed at the end o f the said period; thenceforth the Convention shall be revised or renewed at the end o f every tw elve years. Either o f the High Contracting Parties m ay give notice to the other o f its desire to revise the present Convention, tw elve months before the termination o f the Convention. Negotiations for the revision shall be concluded within the said tw elve months. Should neither o f the H igh Contracting Parties give notice for such revision, the present Convention shall remain in force for a further period o f tw elve years.

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ARTICLE XVI T h e present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at T okyo at as early a date as possible and in any case not later than four months after its signature. T h e Convention shall come into force on the fifth day following the date o f the exchange o f its ratifications. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in the C ity o f M oscow, this 23rd day o f January, 1928. (Signed) L. K a r a k h a n (Signed) M. L a cis (Signed) T. T a n a k a

PROTOCOL A In proceeding this day to the signature o f the Fishery Convention between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, the Plenipotentiaries o f the tw o High Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I T h e inlets which are the object o f the exception contained in A rticle I o f the Fishery Convention are as follows: 1. St. Lawrence Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Pnaugun to Cape Khargilakh. 2. M echigme Bay. 3. Konyam Bay (Penkegunei Bay), up to a straight line drawn from Cape Netchkhonone to Grab Peak. 4. Abolechef Bay (Kalagan Bay). 5. Roum ilet Bay.

280

Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R. 6. Providence Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape L issovsky to Lysaya Golova. 7. H oly Cross G ulf, up to the parallel o f Cape M eetchken. 8. Anadyr Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape St. Basilius to Cape Geka. 9. St. Pavla Bay. 10. Shliupochnaya Harbour. 11. Tuilen Lake. 12. Six Feet Lake. 13. Northern portion o f Baron Korfa Gulf. 14. Kraga Harbour. 15. Bechevinska Bay. 16. Avatcha Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Bezim yanni to /Cape Dalni. 17. G ulfofPenjinsk, up to the parallel o f Cape Mamet. 18. M ilkachinsky Bay. 19. Iamskaia Bay. 20. Aian Bay. 21. Grand Duke Constantine Bay. 22. St. Nicholas G ulf, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Lamsdorf to Cape Groto. 23. Schasriya Gulf. 24. Baikal Gulf, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Tshauno to Cape V itovta. 25. Nuiskii Gulf. 26. Nabilskii Gulf. 27. Krestovaya Bay. 28. Starka Bay. 29. Vanina Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Vesseli to Cape Bumi. 30. Port Soviet, up to a straight line drawn from Cape M ilyudna to Cape Putyadna. 31. T em e Bay, up to the meridian o f Cape Strashni.

THE FISHERY CONVENTION

28I

32. St. Vladim ir Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Balusek to Cape Vatovskago. 33. Small inlet situated in the north-eastern portion o f Preobrazheniya Bay, as far as the meridian o f Cape M atveeva. It goes without saying that the exception in question shall not apply to high seas. As regards the northern coast o f the O khotsk Sea, from the estuary o f the Podkagemaya to Aian Bay, w ith the exception o f Penjinsky G u lf (see No. 17), M ilkachinsky Bay (see N o. 18), Iamskaia Bay (see No. 19) and Aian Bay (see No. 20), the inlets which are to come within the exception above referred to shall be determined according to the following definition: Such bays as shall penetrate into the mainland for a distance (measured along the deepest channel) which shall be more than three times the width o f the entrance. Fishing shall, moreover, be barred to Japanese subjects, as to other foreigners, w ithin the following bays not, as a m atter o f course, including high seas: 1. De Castries Bay w ith Fredericks Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Castries to Cape Kloster Kamp and up to a similar line from Cape Kloster Kamp to Cape O stri. 2. St. O lga Bay, up to a straight line drawn from Cape Manevskago to Cape Shkota. 3. Peter the Great Bay, from Cape Povorotni to Cape Gamova, including the islands situated in that bay. 4. Posiette Bay, from Cape Gamova to Cape Butakov. a r t ic l e

2

In matters concerning the boundaries o f rivers in relation to the sea, the two Governments shall follow the principles and usages o f the law o f nations.

282

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. a r t ic l e

3

T h e fishery rights accorded to Japanese subjects in the Liman o f the Amur in virtue o f the Fishery Convention are subject to the special provisions which follow: 1. Japanese subjects may obtain in this district fishery lots b y public auction on the same footing as citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 2. Japanese subjects who have obtained fishery lots are placed in all respects, so for as the fishing industry is concerned, under the same laws, regulations and ordinances which are or may be enacted respecting river fisheries in the basins o f the Amur, as citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics who are successful bidders for fishery lots, and in particular the provisions which forbid the lessees o f the fishery lots in this district to employ foreign workmen.

ARTICLE 4 Japanese subjects may upon making application therefore obtain in accordance w ith the provisions o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention the lease o f fishery lots in any part o f the districts specified in A rticle I o f the said Convention, subm itting to the laws, regulations and ordinances which are or m ay be enacted in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, for the culture and pro­ tection o f fish, for the control o f the industry germane thereto, and for all other matters regarding fisheries in the above-mentioned districts. In case the species o f fish to be caught are not defined in the contract for the lease o f fishery lots, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall not impose any restrictions on the species o f fish to be caught, unless they are rendered necessary for the protec­ tion o f fish o f the salmon tribe.

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ARTICLE 5 As regards the transfer o f fishery rights between Japanese subjects as well as between Japanese subjects and citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, permission shall be given upon ap­ plication therefore, in conformity w ith the formalities prescribed by the laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 6 T h e duration o f the lease o f fishery lots shall be determined as follows: One year, in the case o f lots which have been already opened, but not y e t worked, before the coming into force o f the Fishery Convention, or o f lots opened for the first time since then; Three years, in the case o f lots which have been worked for not less than one year; Five years, in the case o f lots which have been worked for not less than three years. It is understood that the above-mentioned terms may be modified in the case o f fishery lots which may be granted for special lease b y virtue o f the provisions o f the second paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention and the instruments attached thereto. a r t ic l e

7

T h e fishery rights, the terms o f which shall not have come to an end at the date o f the expiration o f the term o f the Fishery Convention, shall continue to be valid for the whole duration o f their terms, whatever may be the decision come to b y the tw o H igh Contracting Parties concerning the Fishery Convention itself.

284

Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. a r t ic l e

8

T h e fishery lots already existing in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the Fishery Convention shall remain open for exploitation for the whole duration o f the Fishery Convention.

ARTICLE 9 W ith regard to the provisions o f Paragraph 2 o f A rticle IV o f the Fishery Convention, Japanese subjects are liable to the following taxes, imposts and foes: 1. T h e local imposts on means o f conveyance (horses, automo­ biles, bicycles, motor-cycles, and motor-boats not provided w ith a navigation certificate). 2. T h e foe for inspection certificate for boilers, apparatus worked b y pressure, lifts and elevating machines. 3. T h e local imposts on building, now in practice in towns, when such imposts are to be applied to localities where there are fishery grounds. 4. T h e stamp-duties, notarial foes, judicial foes and other similar taxes, imposts and fees, instituted by the central authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics and having in­ direct bearing on fishery lots and the equipments o f fishery grounds, as well as the local taxes instituted by the local authorities on transactions carried out or registered at an exchange. $. T h e consular foe and the registration fee concerning entry into, stay in, and departure from, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 6. T h e consular and other official foes for the issue or certification o f documents. 7. T h e registration fee for lease contract o f fishery lot. 8. T h e imposts on timber sold out from forests. 9. T h e income-tax on profit accruing from sale o f fish and aquatic

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products for consumption in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, as also the transportation tax concerned there w ith.

ARTICLE 10 T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics en­ gages to maintain, for the duration o f the Fishery Convention, its present ruling exem pting from duties fish and aquatic products exported from the Far Eastern D istrict o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, except in the case when w ith regard to a particular third state or states, the duties applicable to goods in general exported thereto are to be altered. So for as concerns fish and aquatic products reimported into the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ithout having been worked upon in Japan, the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics engages likewise to maintain, for the duration o f the Fishery Convention, its present regulation exem pting from duties reimported gpods, the produce or manufacture o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE II T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics has no objection to the making o f manure b y Japanese subjects from herrings and other species o f fish which are o f minor value, as well as from refuse produced in the preparation o f fish and aquatic products. N or has the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics any objection to Japanese subjects preparing and curing fish o f the salmon tribe according to Japanese methods. a r t ic l e

12

T h e navigation certificate mentioned in the first paragraph o f A rticle VID o f the Fishery Convention is to be issued by the Consular officer o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the presentation of:

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1. Documents certifying the lease o f the fishery lot or lots to which the vessel desires to resort. 2. A certified list o fth e persons on board w ith documents o f their identification. 3. Documents certifying that the cargo o f the vessel consists solely o f goods mentioned in the third paragraph o f A rticle DC o f the Fishery Convention; in such documents amount o f the cargo is also to be indicated. T h e following shall be indicated in the navigation certificate: 1. T h e name o f the vessel and her port o f registry. 2. T h e name o f the lease-holder or lease-holders o f the fishery lot or lots. 3. A precise indication o f the fishery lot or lots, to which the vessel desires to resort. 4. T h e nature and amount o f the cargo. 5. T h e names o f the crew. Vessels furnished w ith the above-mentioned certificate and a health certificate are authorized to enter and remain at only those points o f the coast o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics which are mentioned in the navigation certificate. It goes w ithout saying that ports where there is a custom-house are always open to such vessels. Japanese vessels resorting to the Far Eastern waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics in virtue o f the last paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention must first put into one o f the ports o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics specially designated, where the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall issue to them a special licence for catching, taking and preparing fish and aquatic products, the said licence shall at the same time take the place o f a navigation certificate. T h e licence may also be obtained through a Consular officer o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics in Japan; in this case the said

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vessels shall not be required to proceed to any o f the abovementioned ports.

ARTICLE 13 T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics has no objection to the individual voyage in Japanese fishing boats (rybolovnye lodki) between fishery grounds leased to various Japanese subjects; in the case o f the voyage, w ith or w ithout boats tugged, o f fishing boats provided w ith motors, permission shall be obtained from the local authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

ARTICLE 14 Japanese steamers engaged in the fishing industry or in its auxil­ iary services, within the waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be provided w ith a Russian or English translation o f the log-book; Japanese sea-going motor or sailing vessels shall conform to the said stipulation so far as it is possible.

ARTICLE 15 T h e Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics guarantees that on formulating and approving the list mentioned in A rticle DC o f the Fishery Convention, the actual requirements o f the fishing industry o f Japanese subjects shall receive fullest consideration.

ARTICLE 16 Japanese subjects fitted for the work o f any branches o f fishing industry and not exceeding one hundred persons in all, shall have the right to winter in the fishery lots leased to Japanese subjects, provided they conform to laws and regulations relating to the en try and residence in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. Watchmen required for wintering in the said fishery lots shall be employed from among citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics.

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. article 17 For catching and taking the fish and aquatic products which may call for protective measures for their propagation, a standard b y which the amount o f such catching and taking m ay be lim ited shall be determined b y the authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, b y taking as a basis o f consideration the actual tendency o f their propagation both in the rivers and seas o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics in the Far East. T h e employment o f “ tateami” shall be authorized in all fishery lots leased to Japanese subjects, except in those lots which are situated in the closest proxim ity to estuaries; it is also agreed that in the case o f the fishery lots last mentioned, the employment o f “ tateami” shall be authorized in case fishing w ith movable nets prove impraticable there. M oreover, in no fishery lots shall any restriction be imposed on the use o f winches, escalators, conveyers, capstans, blocks or other instruments, machines and equipments which facilitate the working o f fishing industry.

ARTICLE 18 It is understood that the terms “Japanese subjects” and “ citizens o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics” employed in the Fishery Convention and in the instruments attached thereto include public and private enterprises o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics respectively, and that the term “ citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics” does not im ply local peasants and fishermen enjoying special treatment. It is further understood that, w ith regard to the matters particularly dealt w ith in A rticle TV o f the Fishery Convention as well as in A rticle 9 o f the present Protocol, the state enterprises and co-operative societies o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics are accorded special status.

ARTICLE 19 A t any time after the auction o f the fishery lots in the first year

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o f the duration o f the Fishery Convention shall have been con­ ducted, the Governm ent o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics m ay grant without auction the lease o f fishery lots situated in any part o f the districts specified in A rticle I o f the Fishery Con­ vention to the local peasants and fishermen who are now estab­ lished or may happen to establish themselves there; such grant may be given only in respect o f those districts where no application mentioned in A rticle 4 o f the present Protocol shall have been made for tw o successive years in the duration o f the Fishery Convention, or o f those fishery lots for which there shall have been no bidder at auction for more than three successive years prior to such grant. T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall take necessary measures in order not to contract by such grant the sphere o f fishing activities in the Far Eastern waters open for Japanese subjects, and in order to cause the competent authorities to conform to the desire o f Japanese subjects for the opening o f new fishery lots. T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics engages to put up to auction the fishery lots thus leased to the local peasants and fishermen, in case they shall not have been operated for two years in succession, as also to forbid sub-lease or transfer o f such lots to anybody other than local peasants or fishermen. T h e local peasants and fishermen are at liberty to obtain the lease o f fishery lots by auction in accordance w ith the provisions o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention, but those who have so obtained the lease o f fishery lots shall not at the same time be in possession o f fishery lots granted, sub-leased or transferred in virtue o f the present A rticle. It is agreed that the status o f the said local peasants or fishermen is accorded only to the persons and their families who engage personally in the fishery for their livelihood w ithout having recourse to the employment o f workmen.

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. ARTICLE 20 It is understood that the term “ fish and aquatic products” em­ ployed in the Fishery Convention and in the instruments attached thereto is to mean all kinds o f fish, animals, plants and other aquatic products, except fur-seals and sea-otters.

ARTICLE 21 T h e present Protocol is to be considered as ratified w ith the ratification o f the Fishery Convention signed this day and shall have the same duration as that Convention. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in the C ity o f M oscow, this 23rd day o f January, 1928.

(Signed) T. T a n a k a

(Signed) L. K a r a k h a n (Signed) M. L a cis [Latsis]

PROTOCOL B In proceeding this day to the signature o f the Fishery Con­ vention between Japan and the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, the Plenipotentiaries o f the tw o H igh Contracting Parties have agreed as follows: In consideration o f the provisions o f A rticle X m o f the Fishery Convention, the application o f laws and regulations regarding the protection and regulation o f labour to Japanese subjects having fishery rights and to theirJapanese employees, shall be conditioned as follows:.I

I. W ith regard to the supply b y the employer to his employees o f the clothing and other articles necessary for their w ork, as w ell as o f dwellings, the national habits and customs o f the employees shall receive due consideration.

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2. A basic amount o f wages may be arranged in the Japanese cur­ rency and for a whole fishing season, according to the usage in the fishing industry o f the Far Eastern D istrict; if the employee so desires, part o f the said basic wages shall be paid to him in advance. T h e said basic wages for the whole season shall, however, not be less than the amount corresponding to fifteen yen a month, even when the em ployer is responsible b y the contract o f engagement for the expenses o f the em­ ployees’ transportation and radons, and even when the em ployer allows his employees an extra pay corresponding to a certain proportion o f catches and collections in virtue o f the so-called “ kuichi” or similar practice. T h e above stipulation having been adopted by taking into consideration the law o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics concerning minimum wages on one hand and the actual economic and social conditions in Japan on the other, it is agreed that, when the stipulation shall have become inadequate, a necessary readjustment may be made by agree­ ment between the tw o Governments, w ith the view to suit new circumstances. 3. W orking hours in the fishery grounds shall as a rule be eight hours a day; however, in view o f the special features o f the fishing industry and in accordance w ith the laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics providing for the conditions o f w orking in seasonal labours, the em ployer m ay by agreement w ith his employees put them to work more than eight hours a day, provided he makes an arrangement w ith the competent local organs o f the People’s Commissariat o f Labour relating to the working hours as w ell as the wages, even for a whole fishing season. So far, however, as labour in fishing operations is concerned, at any time o f the season, on occasions o f an abundance o f fish com ing in shoals, the employees m ay, when they so agree, be put to work outside regular hours, on holidays and at night-

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. tim e, for which no arrangement w ith the above-mentioned organs o f the People’s Commissariat o f Labour is to be required. A s regards labour in canning operations, the above para­ graph is applicable only in the case when, ow ing to excessive accumulation o f catches on occasions o f an abundance o f fish coming in shoals, extra w ork is necessitated in order to prevent the quality o f the products from being deteriorated, subject to the condition that the employers concerned shall inform the local labour organs, as soon as possible and in any case before the closing the fishing season o f the correspond­ ing year, o f the conditions o f the agreement made between the employers and employees regarding the extra work. 4. (a) In case the em ployer owes the obligation to pay the social insurance premium in accordance w ith the laws o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, his employees, even after their return to Japan, or their families in Japan shall enjoy the same rights as citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics or their families residing in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. (b) In case the social insurance is due to Japanese subjects o r their families residing in Japan, it shall be paid to them by the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics through its Consular officers in Japan, w ithin four months after social insurance premium for the season shall have been paid. (c) In all calculations and payments pertaining to the social insurance, the respective m int value o f the currencies o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall be taken into account instead o f the current rates o f exchange. (d) T h e employer’s obligation for social insurance shall be lim ited to the following three categories: I. When the employee is temporarily incapacitated for w ork;

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H. W hen the employee is invalided or dies because o f an accident; m . W hen the employee needs medical treatment. (e) T h e em ployer shall be exem pt from the payment o f the premium for the case m o f the section (d), in case he undertakes in agreement w ith the sanitary authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics the supply o f medical aid. T h e em ployer shall be exempt from the payment o f the premium for the cases I and II o f the section (d), in the case when in accordance w ith the regulations approved b y the Japanese authorities, such measures o f relief shall be undertaken by a group o f employers o f other organi­ zations as shall prove equally or more favourable to the employees compared w ith those provided for in the social insurance o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics. 5. It m ay be stipulated in the contract o f engagement that, when the employer shall have cancelled the contract o f his own volition, he shall bear the expenses o f passage from the fishery ground to Japan, it being understood that the em­ ployer shall be responsible for the employee’s embarkation for Japan. When the em ployer shall have dismissed his employee on his fishery ground, the em ployer shall pay the expenses o f the latter’s return to Japan. A s a m atter o f course, a stipulation m ay be included in the said contract o f engagement for payment o f an indem nity in the case when the em ployer or employee shall not, w ithout due cause, carry out the contract before the employee’s departure from Japan. T h e provisions o f the present Protocol shall be subject to change or supplement b y a mutual agreement which may be arranged between the tw o Governments. T h e present Protocol is to be considered as ratified w ith the

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.SS.R. ratification o f the Fishery Convention signed this day and shall have the same duration as that Convention. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in the C ity o f M oscow, this 23rd day o f January, 1928. (Signed) L. K a r a k h a n (Signed) T. T a n a k a

(Signed) M. L a cis [Latsis]

PROTOCOL C In proceeding this day to the signature o f the Fishery Con­ vention between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics, the Plenipotentiaries o f the tw o H igh Contracting Parties have agreed as follows: T h e establishment and operation o f canning factories b y Japanese subjects having fishery rights, in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the Fishery Convention, shall be conditioned as follows, provided that, in all that concerns the canning industry, Japanese subjects shall not be placed in a position less favourable than that accorded to private persons or enterprises o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. (A ) In the fishery lots leased by auction to Japanese subjects they may establish and operate canning factories during fishing seasons o f their lease-term, b y giving notice in advance to the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, and subject to the application o f the provisions o f Sections (1), (2), (6), (7), and (9) o f Paragraph (B) o f the present Protocol. (B) For the operation o f the canning factories owned by Japanese subjects and actually existing at the time o f conclusion o f the Fishery Convention, special contracts shall be con­ cluded between the competent authorities o f the Union o f

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Soviet Socialist Republics and the Japanese subjects concerned in conform ity w ith

the following condi­

tions:

(0 Japanese subjects are at liberty to make alterations in the scope and equipments o f their canning factories, provided that, when such alterations are made, they shall make notification thereof to the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics, in accordance w ith the formalities prescribed b y the regulation o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. M oreover, they shall not be prohibited or restricted to transport fish and aquatic products from fishery lots granted to other lessees to the said canning factories, or to prepare them. (2 )

A ll the properties not belonging to the Government or citizens o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics in the fishery lots where canning factories are found m ay, after the expiration o f the term o f special contracts, either be transported b y the Japanese subjects concerned to other fishery lots or outside the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, or, w ith the permission o f the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, be sold o ff w ithin the territory o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, in case the said properties shall not have been disposed o f as above mentioned, within one year after the expiration o f the said contracts, they shall come into the possession o f the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ithout compensation.

(3) For the operation o f the canning factories now in existence, each canning factory shall be provided w ith the fishery lot where the factory is situated and also w ith another fishery lot lying in the neighbourhood, both o f which are to be leased w ithout auction

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. in accordance w ith the provisions o f the second paragraph o f A rticle H o f the Fishery Convention. In case Japanese subjects make application to the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics for the lease o f fishery lots for the purpose o f establishing therein canning factories, in accordance w ith the provisions o f the second para­ graph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention, the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ill agree to enter into negotiations w ith the Japanese Governm ent, w ith a view to granting such lease so far as the circumstances permit.

(4) T h e term o f special contracts concerning the canning factories mentioned in Section (3) shall be ten years. A s regards measures to be taken w ith respect to the canning factories after the expiration o f the term o f the said special con­ tracts, the tw o Governments shall enter into negotiations on this question either on occasion o f the negotiations for the revision o f the Fishery Convention, or one year before the said expira­ tion.

(5) Japanese subjects who desire to conclude the special contracts mentioned in Section (4) shall be recommended b y the Japanese Government to the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. («) T h e special royalty (dolevoe otchislenie) for the operation o f canning factories shall be calculated in the gold currency o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics at the following rates for the actual amount o f the fish and aquatic products prepared in the canning factories concerned: i . For red salmon, 20 copecks per case.

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2. For silver salmon, king salmon and dog salmon, 16 copecks per case. 3. For humpback salmon, 9 copecks per case. 4. For crabs, 40 copecks per case. It is understood in this connection that one case o f canned goods contains forty-eight cans o f one pound each, or ninety-six cans o f half a pound each. T h e said special royalty, together w ith the taxes, imposts and foes chargeable thereon, shall be paid in December every year. T h e above-mentioned rates o f the special royalty may be altered b y mutual agreement, in case the market price o f the respective merchandise now obtaining has considerably changed. (7 )

As regards taxes, imposts and foes, the provisions o f A rticle IV o f the Fishery Convention as w ell as those o f the instruments attached thereto shall be applicable, it being understood in this connection that the term “ royalty” employed in the said in­ struments shall be held to include the royalty for the lease o f fishery lots and the special royalty (dolevoe otchislenie) for the operation o f canning factories provided for in Section (6). (* ) For the purpose erf" determining the amount erf"ordinary royalty for the fishery lots leased in accordance w ith the provisions erf" Section (3), the following method shall be adopted: Every three years shall be taken, as a standard, fishery lots amounting so for as practicable to four in all, which are leased b y auction and lie in the closest proxim ity to the fishery lots ap­ pertaining to canning factories and where the same kinds o f fish are caught as in the latter, and the quotient obtained through dividing the sum total o f the royalty for their lease b y the sum total o f their standard amounts o f catch shall be considered as basic unit; the royalty in question shall be computed expressed in the

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Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R. gold currency o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics b y mul­ tiplying the said basic unit b y the standard amount o f catch assigned to the fishery lots concerned.

(9) In all that concerns the operation o f canning factories and fishery lots and which is not specifically dealt w ith in the present Protocol, the provisions o f the Fishery Convention and the instruments attached thereto shall be applicable. (10) For the purpose o f concluding special contracts concerning the canning factories now in existence, the Japanese subjects con­ cerned shall as soon as possible apply to the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics for the opening o f negotiations w ith a dear indication o f the fishery lots which they propose to obtain w ithout auction according to the present Protocol. T h e negotiations shall be concluded w ithin tw o months after the coming into force o f the Fishery Convention.1 (1 1 ) In case the said negotiations fail to be conduded w ithin the stipulated time, the Japanese subjects concerned may continue the operation o f the canning factories in the fishery lots con­ cerned, in conform ity w ith the arrangement that shall be agreed upon between the tw o Governments on the basis o f the provisions o f Paragraph (B) o f the present Protocol. T h e above-mentioned negotiations shall, as far as possible, be concluded within six months thereafter. Should for any reason any special contract concerning the canning factories owned b y Japanese subjects and actually existing at the time o f conclusion o f the Fishery Convention fail to be concluded, or any special contract so concluded become void, the

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fishery lots assigned to the canning factory or factories in ques­ tion shall, as a m atter o f course, be put up to auction w ith a view to ensuring the continuance o f their exploitation. T h e present Protocol is to be considered as ratified w ith the ratification o f the Fishery Convention signed this day and shall have the same duration as that Convention. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol in duplicate in the English language and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in the C ity o f M oscow, this 23rd day o f January, 1928. (Signed) T . T

anaka

(Signed) L. K a r a k h a n (Signed) M . L a c i s

FINAL PROTOCOL In proceeding this day to the signature o f the Fishery Con­ vention between Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics as w ell as o f the Protocol A and the Protocol B attached thereto, the Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics have made the following declarations: PART I I. re A rticle l i e f the Fishery Convention

A . W ith regard to the provisions o f the first paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention, the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare as follows: i . Under normal conditions, the upset [price at auction o f a fishery lot which has already been operated is to be deter­ mined by taking as standard its upset price at the last auction, it being understood that, should there be any change in the economic value o f the said fishery lot after the last auction, its upset price may be correspondingly adjusted; in the case o f a fishery lot which is new ly opened

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Japanese Recognition o f the UJS.S.R. for exploitation, its upset price is to be determined by taking as standard the proportion between the royalty paid on, and the standard amount o f catch assigned to, the neighbouring fishery lots. 2. As regards a fishery lot for which there has been no suc­ cessful bidder at auction, its upset price is to be published im m ediately after the auction, and in putting it up tx> the following auction, due consideration w ill be paid in the determination o f its upset price w ith a view to affording a better chance o f success to bidders. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. B. W ith regard to the provisions o f the second paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention, the Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that they have agreed to the following:

I. T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ill grant, w ithout auction and for the lease-terms provided for in the first paragraph o f A rticle 6 o f the Protocol A attached to the Fishery Convention for the duration o f the said Convention, the lease o f fishery lots lyin g in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the said Convention to its state enterprises for their own exploitation. It is understood that in the case o f fishery lots dedicated to catching fish o f the salmon tribe, the grant o f such lease shall be lim ited to those lots, o f which the standard amount o f catch does not exceed 2,000,000 poods in aggregate, corresponding to about tw enty per cent o f the total standard amount o f catch obtaining at the time o f coming into force o f the said Convention. In the case o f fishery lots dedicated to catching or taking the other fish and aquatic products, the said grant shall be lim ited to those lots, o f which catches and collections in aggregate correspond to tw enty per cent o f

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the total amount o f catches and collections o f respective fish and aquatic products. 2. When the state enterprises have w holly and com pletely operated for themselves all the fishery lots w ithin the abovementioned lim it, the tw o Governments shall, if the Govern­ ment o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics so propose, enter into further negotiations on the increase o f the stand­ ard amount and the number o f fishery lots to be granted to the said enterprises. 3. In determ ining the fishery lots to be leased to the state enterprises, the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ill be guided, as for as practicable, b y the principle o f apportioning the percentage mentioned in the foregoing Paragraph 1 to each o f the groups into which the fishery lots m ay be classified according to the kind and amount o f catches and collections, and having due regard to the reasonable desire which m ay be entertained b y the Japanese subjects interested, and also to the fact that in the year 1927, i.e. at the time o f the negotiations for the conclusion o f the Fishery Convention, the fishery lots operated b y the state enterprises did not amount to tw enty per cent, w hile those operated b y Japanese subjects exceeded eigh ty per cent, o f all the fishery lots then leased for exploitation, the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics w ill confer w ith the Japanese Govern­ ment before coming to final decision as to the said deter­ mination. 4. T h e fishery lots, destined for lease w ithout auction to the state enterprises, but not actually operated by them , shall cither be put up to auction in due course o f time before the fishing season o f the corresponding year, for lease for one year or more, or be leased to local peasants and fisher­ men w ithout auction. It is understood, as a m atter o f course,

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Japanese Recognition o f the USS.R. that the fishery lots so leased shall not be considered as operated b y the state enterprises. 5. So far as concerns the Fishery Convention and the instru­ ments attached thereto» the term "state enterprises” shall be held to im ply all kinds o f enterprises more than one half o f whose capital is invested by the organs o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, or o f its component Republic or Republics, or more than one half o f whose directing officials are appointed b y the said organs. So far as concerns any enterprises which do not belong to the said category, and in which the said organs participate in some form or other, or any enterprises in which some organs o f the various local adm inistrative organizations in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics participate w holly or partly in whatever form or manner it may be, the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall confer w ith the Japanese Governm ent for deciding whether, for the purpose o f obtaining fishery lots, the enterprises in ques­ tion shall be enabled to participate in auctions or be in­ cluded in the category o f the state enterprises prescribed in the present Protocol. Provided, however, that any enter­ prises which m ay have, in the course o f ordinary com­ mercial transactions w ith the organs o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, or o f its component Republic o r Republics, or o f local organizations, placed themselves in a position o f debtor in relation to the latter, or a m inority o f whose shares m ay have come into temporary possession o f the latter, shall be considered as outside the scope o f the foregoing provisions. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions o f the Fishery Convention and the foregoing paragraphs, the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics may lease w ithout auction the fishery lots, irrespective o f their number, which are or m ay be opened in the Liman o f the Am ur, to the state enter-

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prises and various cooperative societies, as well as to local peasants and fishermen. It is further agreed, however, that when fish in the Liman o f the Am ur have conspicuously increased, the present stipulation may be modified b y agreement between the tw o Governments. C . W ith regard to the provisions o f the last paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention, the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare: 1. T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics has in view the issue in a near future o f a regulation, in conform ity w ith which Japanese subjects m ay obtain the licence mentioned in the last paragraph o f A rticle II o f the Fishery Convention. 2. T h e Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics is ready to lease to Japanese subjects engaged in the fishing industry landed lots as basis for whaling, up to a number not more than five. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 2. re A rtide III o f the Fishery Convention Regarding the provisions o f A rticle m o f the Fishery Conven­ tion, the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics declare: i . In case the landed area o f a fishery lot proves to be too steep or swampy, or mo small, for providing equipments necessary for the fishing industry, application may be made for the lease o f a littoral in the neighbourhood; the authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall take the application into due consideration and, when it is found reasonable, shall grant the said applica­ tion.

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2. T h e refuse produced in the operation o f fisheries may be thrown away in the offing. 3. T h e authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall have no objection to granting the application for obtaining tim ber, fuel as w ell as water from outside fishery lots, when necessary for the fishing industry; it goes with­ out saying that the charges and dues which m ay be re­ quired in this respect shall be paid b y the persons interested. 4. Buildings, warehouses, huts and drying sheds erected in accordance w ith the provisions erf-A rticle in o f the Fishery Convention shall be removed w ithin one year after the expiration o f the lease-term o f the fishery lots concerned, or transferred to the new lessee thereof. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 3. re Articles IV and X o f the Fishery Convention and A rticle 9 o f the Protocol A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare:1 1. T h e determination o f “ the price on the fishery grounds” o f fish and aquaticproducts shall be made b y deducting h eigh t and other charges connected w ith transportation from the average price o f respective kinds o f such merchandise ob­ taining in their principal market in Japan or in any third state. However, the business tax on dealings in fish and aquatic products carried out between individual fishery lots shall be levied on the basis o f the price actually paid. 2. T h e consular fee concerning entry into, and departure from, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics o f Japanese subjects mentioned in the first part o f the first paragraph o f A rticle X o f the Fishery Convention shall be, when

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included in a list presented for collective visé, fixed at the rate o f fifty-five copecks per capita, and the registration foe for their stay in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall be ten copecks per capita. 3. T h e consular foe and the registration fee for Japanese sub­ jects excluding those mentioned in the foregoing paragraph and including those mentioned in A rticle 16 o f the Pro­ tocol A shall be charged in conform ity w ith general regula­ tions applicable to foreigners proceeding to the territory o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 4. T h e registration fee on lease contract o f fishery lot shall not exceed three per cent o f the royalty for the lot concerned. 5. T h e question concerning the inheritance o f fishery lots, as w ell as the equipments and personal belongings which may be left there shall be, in so far as the deceased are Japanese subjects, an object o f special arrangement w ith the Japanese Government. 6. T h e provisions o f A rticle 9 o f the Protocol A shall not be construed to prevent the change o f term inology o f any o f the taxes, imposts and foes mentioned therein, provided the taxes, imposts and foes so affected shall retain the same character as before. 7. So far as the burden shall not fall exclusively on Japanese subjects, consumption tax and im port d u ty on things purchased in the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, as w ell as taxes and imposts to be levied concerning acts, done outside the fishery grounds, shall be regarded to be outside the scope o f A rticle IV o f the Fishery Convention and chargeable to Japanese subjects in accordance w ith general regulations. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no ob­ jection thereto.

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Japanese Recognition o f the U.S.S.R. 4. re A rticle V I o f the Fishery Convention 1. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics declare that the term “ nationality” employed in A rticle V I o f the Fishery Convention shall be understood to correspond to “ grajdanstvo [grazhdanstvo]” and “ poddanstvo” o f the Russian language. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objec­ tion thereto. 2. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that they have agreed as follows: T aking into consideration that the Japanese subjects having fishery rights have employed and are always ready to em ploy citizen-workers o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, so for as it is practicable and on equal conditions to those applying to Japanese labourers, the question o f em ploying a certain number o f such citizen-workers b y the said Japanese subjects shall, when circumstances warrant, be negotiated between the two Governments. $. re Article F i ll o f the Fishery Convention In answer to the inquiry o f the Plenipotentiary o f Japan, the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics de­ clare that, as a m atter o f course, Japanese vessels and boats shall, in case o f stress at sea, enjoy the right o f refuge at any point o f the coast o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 6. re A rticle IX o f the Fishery Convention T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare:

I. T h e formalities other than export licence, which may b e required concerning the exportation to Japan o f fish and

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aquatic products caught or taken by Japanese subjects in the waters o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, shall not be o f any prohibitive or restrictive character against such exportation. 2. T h e formalities other than import licence, which m ay be required concerning the importation into the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics o f goods mentioned in the third paragraph o f the above mentioned A rticle, shall not be o f any prohibitive or restrictive character against such im­ portation, so for as these goods are included in the list mentioned in the said Article. 3. T h e formalities which m ay be required concerning the exportation, other than that mentioned in Paragraph 1, b y Japanese subjects o f fish and aquatic products shall be o f summary order. 4. Japanese subjects having fishery rights are at liberty to buy or sell fish and aquatic products, to or from other Japanese subjects having fishery rights, or citizens or various enter­ prises o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, so for as such fish and aquatic products are destined for export from the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. 5. When Japanese subjects having fishery rights desire to sell their fish and aquatic products in mass transactions for the home market o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, they shall enter into an arrangement regarding the said sale and its amount in each business year, w ith the com­ petent local authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics; such an arrangement shall not be required w ith regard to the transactions o f small amount carried out individually by the said Japanese subjects, as when selling such fish and aquatic products to the local population. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto.

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7. re Articles IX and X o f the Fishery Convention T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that the provisions o f Articles IX and X o f the Fishery Convention do not, as a m atter o f course, in any degree exempt Japanese subjects from the application o f proper measures for the prevention o f sm uggling. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he shares the same opinion. 8. re Article X III o f the Fishery Convention and the Protocol B T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agree that the provisions o f A rticle X m o f the Fishery Convention and those o f the Protocol B attached thereto have no application o f the persons, mentioned in A rticle 16 o f the Protocol A , w ith regard to whom the laws and regulations which are or may be enacted regarding the protection and regulation o f labour shall be w holly applied. 9. re A rticle 1 o f the Protoad A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that, in order to prevent future misunder­ standings regarding certain inlets mentioned in A rticle 1 o f the Protocol A , they have agreed to annex to the present Final Protocol the maps showing the precise boundaries o f the said inlets. 10 re Article % o f the Protocol A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that they have agreed as follows:

I. T h e term “ the Liman o f the Amur” indicates the extent o f waters contained in the following boundaries: In the North— a straight line drawn from Petrovskoe Spit to Cape Tshauno.

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In the South— a straight line drawn from Cape Lazarev to Cape Pogobi; In the W est— the coast-line o f the Far Eastern D istrict o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics; In the East— the coast-line o f Northern Saghalien. 2. (a) It goes withoutsaying that the restrictions regarding nationality mentioned in Paragraph (2) o f A rticle 3 o f the Protocol A are not to be applied to persons who do not come within the category o f workmen, such as managers, overseers, e tc (b) T h e Japanese subjects who have obtained the lease o f fishery lots for more than one year may obtain for a period o f less than one year the lease o f landed areas to be used for the preparation o f fish, in the localities situated over one h alf verst from these fishery lots. In these landed areas and in fishery lots leased for less than one year, no restrictions shall be imposed as to the nationality o f workmen employed there and not en­ gaged in the actual fishing. 11. re A rticle % o f the Protocol A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that, as a m atter o f course, the provisions o f A rticle 8 o f the Protocol A shall not apply to cases o f closing fishery lots, caused by elemental forces. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 12. re A rticle 11 o f the Protocol A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agree that o f the total amount o f fish o f the salmon tribe caught by Japanese subjects, no more than sixty per cent may be prepared in the “ bara” method, and that manure from herrings may be made in ten fishery lots to be leased to Japanese subjects.

Japanese R ecognition o f the VSS.R.

3 io

13. re A rticle 13 o f the Protoad A T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics agree that fishing boats provided w ith motors up to three horse power belong to the categpry o f the fishing boats (rybolovnye lodki) mentioned in the first part o f A rticle 13 o f the Protocol A . 14. re A rtide 17 o f the Protoad A 1. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Re­ publics declare: (a) T h e standard amount o f catch, which w ill be established w ith regard to each fishery lot, is detepnined first o f all by taking into consideration the actual amount o f fish caught in the past either in the fishery lot (in case it has already been operated) or in the lot lyin g in the nearest proxim ity thereto (in case the lot in question has been new ly opened) when, therefore, Japanese sub­ jects shall have made an application, w ith a detailed statement o f reasons, for the alteration o f the standard amount thus determined, the authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall give due considera­ tion to the application and, when it is found reasonable, take necessary steps to alter the said amount. (b) In case the total amount o f catch in a given fishery lot proves, as a result o f the last netting before the assgined standard amount is reached, to be in excess o f the latter amount, the excess amount shall be regarded as lawful catch. 2. Concerning the “ tateami” mentioned in the second para­ graph o f A rticle 17 o f the Protocol A , the Plenipotentiary o f Japan maintains that the term “ tateami” indicates not only the ordinary “ tateami” and “ nakanukiami” , but also the so-called “ kairyoami” , while the Plenipontentiaries o f

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. 3 11

the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, not objecting in principle to the contention o f the Plenipotentiary o f Japan declare that the employment o f “ kairyoami” b y Japanese subjects shall be autom atically authorized when the em­ ploym ent thereof shall be authorized to any o f the state, cooperative or private fishing enterprises o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics. . re A rticle 19 o f tbe Protoad A 1. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Social­ ist Republics agree that the periods o f time provided b y the first paragraph o f A rticle 19 o f the Protocol A have no application to those fishery lots which were granted w ith­ out auction to local peasants and fishermen before the com ing into force o f the Fishery Convention. 2. Regarding the provisions o f the first paragraph o f A rticle 19 o f the Protocol A , the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare: According to the first paragraph o f A rticle 19 o f the Protocol A , the fishery lots for which there shall have been no bidder at auction for more than three successive years, may be granted w ithout auction on lease to local peasants and fishermen; however, considering that the appraisement b y the competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics o f a fishery lot at auction is to be deter­ mined b y taking into account the economic value o f the lot and the existing royalty either o f the said lot (in case it has already been operated) or o f neighbouring lots (in case the lot in question has new ly been opened) and also considering that bidders in determ ining their bidding price take into account the same factors, the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics reserve the right to hold a lot or lots as open to lease w ithout auction to local peasants and fishermen, even when there shall have been actual bid-

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ders, provided their bidding price shall have been notably at variance w ith the appraisement determined b y th e competent authorities o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e ­ publics on the aforementioned bases. It goes w ithout saying that the present declaration shall not be held to restrict in any degree the right o f the com ­ petent authorities o f the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics to determine the equitable appraisement o f individual fishery lots. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 3. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics declare that the provisions o f A rticle 19 o f th e Protocol A shall not prevent the local peasants or fisher­ men mentioned in the last paragraph o f the said A rticle from em ploying workmen up to tw o persons when engaged in fishery by themselves individually or w ith their ow n family. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 16. re Paragraph 2 o f the Protocol B T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that if the employee so desires» the em ployer may o f course pay in Japan the wages o f all kinds as well as the extra pay due to the employee. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 17. re Paragraph 3 o f the Protocol B T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare: i . There shall be no objection to the view that the wages for additional w ork on Japanese fishery grounds shall» under

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normal conditions o f the industry, correspond in general to fifty per cent o f the basic wages for a whole fishing season. 2. T h e term “ the local organs o f the people’s Commissariat o f Labour” mentioned in the said Paragraph, indicates the organs stationed at Khabarovsk, and the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics shall issue neces­ sary instructions directing these organs to make the arrangement referred to in the said Paragraph, w ith Japanese fishing enterprises on terms most favourable to the latter. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 18. re Paragraph 4 o f the Protoad B T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that the insurance premium for all the three categories o f insurance, mentioned in the section (d) o f the said Paragraph, constitutes 8.3 per cent o f the wages due to the employees, and m ay be subject to changes in future. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto. 19. re Protoad B T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declare that the Japanese fishing enterprises in the districts specified in A rticle I o f the Fishery Convention may adopt for the rules o f internal order the Specimen Rules for these enterprises, attached to the present Final Protocol. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan declares that he has no objection thereto.

PART 11 T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist

3 14

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. Republics have agreed that w ith the coming into force o f the Fishery Convention signed this day, the provisions o f the first paragraph o f A rticle 3 o f the Convention o f Peking concluded on

January 20th, 1925, shall be considered as com pletely executed, and the Fishery Convention o f 1907 as o f no further force o f effect. Signed in the C ity o f M oscow, in duplicate in the English Language, this 23rd day o f January 1928. (Signed) T . T

(Signed) L. K a r a k h a n

anaka

(Signed) M . L a c i s T w o annexes and eight notes completed the Fishery Con­ vention.* Prior to signing the various documents the Japanese and Soviet Plenipotentiaries made the following clarification: » W ith regard to the provisions o f A rticle X V o f the Fishery Con­ vention, the Plenipotentiary o f Japan expressed the following view : Should occasion present itself when the negptiations for the revision o f the Fishery Convention do not end within the period prescribed in the said A rticle, it is a m atter o f course that a modus vivendi shall be agreed upon between the tw o Govern­ ments. T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist R e­ publics states that they shared the same view . (*) W ith regard to the provisions o f A rticle 10 o f the Protocol A attached to the Fishery Convention, the Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics gave the following reply to the Japanese Plenipotentiary’s inquiry: b See Appendix.

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T h e phrase “ except in the case when, w ith regard to a par­ ticular third state or states, the duties applicable to gpods in general exported thereto are to be altered” in the first para­ graph o f the said A rticle is meant to refer to such extraordinary cases in which the Government o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics is compelled to make any alteration in the export tariff, as when the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics may enter into a tariff war against a particular third state or states. (3) T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics stated that, should any fishery lots opened for exploitation in accordance w ith the provisions o f the Fishery Convention be granted for lease to local peasants and fishermen w ithout auction by virtue o f the provisions o f A rticle 19 o f the Protocol A , the duration o f the lease o f fishery lots provided for in the first para­ graph o f A rticle 6 o f the Protocol A shall, as a m atter o f course, be applicable to the above-mentioned lease. T h e Plenipotentiary o f Japan concurred. (4) T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics concurred that the first part o f the declaration o f Section (2) o f Paragraph 15 in Part I o f the Final Protocol has in view the prevention o f unfair bidding at the auction o f fishery lots, and shall not be held to affect in any w ay the provisions o f Division (I) in Section A o f Paragraph 1 in Pärt I o f the Final Protocol.

(5) T h e Plenipotentiaries o f Japan and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declared that each o f the tw o Governments holds itself ready to render necessary facilities to the experts o f the other,

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desiring to make officially or privately technical or scientific investigations into matters relating to fishery, and, whenever in future either o f the two Governments deems desirable, it w ill invite the experts o f the other to cooperate in such investiga­ tions. ( T h e Plenipotentiaries o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics declares that the Governm ent o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the great economic significance o f the fishing industry o f the Japanese subjects in the D istricts under the purview o f the Fishery Convention, is prepared to pay due regard to the effect that in accordance w ith the said Convention the reasonable and lawful interests o f the Japanese subjects may not be impaired.2 T h e signature o f the convention did not spell an end to the fishery negotiations. T h e agreement could not take effect until ratified, and ratification was delayed by Japan for five months. Soviet sources suggest that the Japanese delayed ratification in an attem pt to retain all the fishery lots in their hands in 1927.3 M eanwhile another fishing season approached and agreement had to be reached on w hat procedure to follow. T h e Soviets felt that the spirit o f the new convention should be applied forthw ith; the Japanese preferred to adhere to the practice o f the preceding year. T h e Russians gave in, and at last on M ay 23,1928, ratifications were exchanged in Tokyo. T h e convention w ent into effect five days later, on M ay 28,1928.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Expanding Contacts he Basic Convention and related agreements laid down the

ground rules for Soviet-Japanese relations. In a telegram dated February 25, 1925, Foreign M inister Shidehara expressed satis­ faction w ith the ratification o f the convention that day. “ N othing could give me greater pleasure than the thought that the friendly goodneighborly relations between our tw o peoples have been reestablished anew officially and are now firm ly secured.” Chicherin, his Soviet counterpart, cabled back the same day that Shidehara’s feelings were shared in M oscow.1 W ith the conclusion o f the Basic Convention sincere efforts were made b y individuals and organizations on both sides to improve Soviet-Japanese relations by personal and cultural contacts. Exchange visits were paid by performing artists, industrial representatives and fliers. T h e RussoJapanese (later Soviet-Japanese) Society in T okyo, which was under the patronage o f Prince Kan-in and included among its membership, besides its president Viscount (from 1928 Count) G oto, prominent Japanese bureaucrats and businessmen, worked for the development o f mutual understanding and the strengthening o f cultural ties and friendly feelings. It promoted cultural exchange and closer economic relations. “Just now it is the fashion in Japan to emphasize things Russian,” the Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported on April 8,1925. “ Recent news articles from Tokio have told how hundreds o f Japanese are studying Russian, and thousands are hoping to enter Siberia and exploit that rich and undeveloped country.” In order to expedite Russo-Japanese trade the Russo-Japanese Society fostered a Russo-Japanese commercial and industrial exhibition at the

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Daimaru department store in Osaka in January o f 1926. A s the Japan Weekly Chronicle reported in advance: "A ll the exhibits consist o f those having export probabilities to Japan, and among samples to be shipped from the Habaiovsk Governm ent are timbers, ores, skins, medicinal plants, rice, cereals, etc., those from the Siberian district include butter and other produce, and from European Russia tobacco, kerosene oil, and many other specimens.” 2 On the death o f Emperor Taishö (Yoshihito), the Soviet government was freed w ith the question o f whether its representative should lay a wreath on the grave o f the emperor, participate in the religious cere­ monies and generally conform to a court etiquette which it disdained. T h e Politbureau decided in the affirmative, because M oscow "extrem ely valued gpod relations w ith the Japanese at the moment o f the develop­ ment o f the Chinese revolution.” Besedovskii was instructed to lay a wreath which bore the Soviet state emblem but tactfully om itted the m otto "Proletarians o f all countries unite!” In O ctober o f 1926 a delegation from the Academ y o f Sciences o f the U.S.S.R. attended the third Pan-Pacific Congress in T o k yo in response to a Japanese invitation. According to Besedovskii’s memoirs the Polit­ bureau had at first decided against Soviet participation under the misap­ prehension that it was to be a m eeting o f pacifists rather than o f Pacific scholars.3 In 1927 a group o f agricultural, industrial and financial experts from the Russian Far East and a group o f Soviet university professors, heads o f scientific and research institutes and museum directors toured Japan. T h e works o f Soviet painters were exhibited in T okyo and in Osaka in M ay o f 1927 under the auspices o f the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations w ith Foreign Countries (VO K S) on the Soviet side and the Japan-Soviet Society and the newspaper Asabi on the Japanese side. In return, Japan sent the prominent industrialist Kuhara Fusanosuke accompanied b y Baron ltd Fumikichi General Saitö Hiroshi

and Consul

to inspect economic conditions in the

U.S.S.R. and in Germ any; Kuhara met w ith the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and w ith Anastas Ivanovich M ikoian, commissar for foreign and

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domestic trade. G oto, president o f the Soviet-Japanese Society, him self visited M oscow for some three weeks in December o f 1927 and, as has been seen, used his influence to further the signature o f the fishery con­ vention. A specialist in rice cultivation was delegated b y the Soviet-Japanese Society to study the possibility o f establishing rice plantations in the Russian Far East. T h e maritime region bordering Korea had already attracted a rapidly growing number o f agriculturists, Korean b y nation­ ality, Japanese by citizenship. According to Russian statistics there had been about 54,000 Koreans in the M aritim e Provinoe in 1917; six years later there were almost 95,000. (T h is was an increase o f over 76% and compared w ith an increase o f only 10% — from 285,000 to 315,000— in the population o f Europeans and a decrease o f 5% — from about 5,500 to about 5,200— in the population o f Chinese in this area.)4 Thus there was reason for the Japanese to hope that they could turn the M aritim e Province into a source o f rice for themselves as w ell as for the local in­ habitants— an interesting tw ist, if one recalls that eighteenth and early nineteenth century Russian attem pts to open Japan and establish com­ mercial relations w ith her had been m otivated to a large extent b y the desire to obtain Japanese food for the Russian Far East. In July and A ugust o f 1928 Ichikawa Sadanji Tfî;i|;£R |& and his Kabuki troupe thrilled audiences in M oscow and Leningrad. "T a k e into consideration that there are coming to us celebrated artists who enjoy enormous fame in Japan,'* Ambassador Troianovskii had cabled to Foreign Commissar Chicherin; "th eir impressions from the trip, parti­ cularly in the present situation, w ill have great significance.**5 T h e Soviet-Japanese Society and the newspaper Asabi sbimbun also took an active part in organizing a welcome reception for the Soviet fliers who visited T okyo in September o f 1925 in return for a visit o f Japanese aviators to M oscow. T h e tw o Japanese Breguets, sponsored b y the Asabi, had left Y oyogi, T okyo, on July 25 at 9:07 a.m .; they had reached M oscow on August 23 at 5 p.m. after a total flying time o f 503 hours and 53 minutes. (A s part o f the promotion o f the flight the Asabi offered a prize o f a residence covering 15 tsubo (about 534 feet) to the

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U JS .R .

reader guessing most closely the actual tim e taken; it also gave prizes for the successful completion o fa cross word puzzle, made up o f the names o f the places passed by the Japanese planes.)6 T h e Soviet pilots were members o f tw o flying associations; theirs was the extension o f a good w ill visit to China. On September i they set out in tw o planes from T aiku, Korea. A s in the case o f some o f the other good­ w ill missions, unexpected complications threatened to dispell the friendly atmosphere in which they had been undertaken. In this instance heavy fog over the Japan Sea separated the tw o machines. W hile one duly landed on the eastern parade ground o f Hiroshima, the other made an em ergency landing at Hikoshima, an island in the fortified zone o f Shi* monoseki, flight over which w ithout prior permission o f the commander o f the fort was forbidden by law under penalty o f imprisonment for a term not exceeding a year, or detention for over eleven days, or a fine not exceeding 50 yen. By order o f the minister o f war the machine that had landed on H iko­ shima was taken apart and moved b y the troops outside the fortified zone. Although Volkoveiov, the pilot, was urged to continue his flight from here, he refused to do so w ithout instructions from Ambassador Kopp. He dismantled the plane and proceeded to T okyo b y rail. Both sides is­ sued statements to the effect that the respective actions had been una­ voidable and did not adversely affect their friendship, yet the very fact that such statements were deemed necessary showed how sensitive rela­ tions were between the tw o countries. Still, there was genuine en­ thusiasm when the other plane arrived at Tokorozawa airport near T okyo on the afternoon o f September 2. Since morning the town had festively waited for the Russian aviators. Every house hoisted flags, and school children, girl pupils, ex­ soldiers, and young men assembled in the aerodrome w ith the binomaru [rising sun] and red flags in their hands in the afternoon [the Japan Weekly Chronicle reported]. T h e aerodrome was deco­ rated gorgeously w ith festoons, flags, etc. In motor-cars, M r. Kopp, the Soviet Envoy and his staff, about

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fifty Russian residents» General Sugiyama, proxy o f the Aviation Headquarters, M r. Hatano, Director o f Aviation Bureau, Lieut.Col. Kodama, many other army and navy generals, admirals, and officers reached the scene, and joined the crowds o f spectators. Shortly after 2 p.m. a telegram was received stating that the Soviet machine passed above Osaka at 1.58 p.m. and later over Shizuoka at 3.5$ pm.. A t 3.40 p.m . tw o m ilitary aeroplanes started from Tokorozawa to meet the oncoming Soviet machine. About an hour later the Russian aeroplane was sighted to the southwest o f the aerodrome. Deafening cheers rose from the crowds below. A fter a circuit over the ground the Russian flying machine de­ scended w ith admirable dexterity amid a tremendous ovation at 4.42 p .m .. . ? Another Soviet goodwill flight took place tw o years later, in August o f 1927, when Pilot S. A . Shestakov and Mechanic D. V . Fufkev flew from M oscow to T okyo in eleven days, a noteworthy achievement in those days. “ T h e difference in the political structure o f the U.S.S.R. and Japan does not hinder the development o f mutual friendship between both peoples, the Asahi remarked and asserted: “ W e believe that the development o f air communication between Japan and the U.S.S.R. w ill contribute to the deepening friendship between both countries, and w e therefore warm ly welcome the Soviet pilots.” 8 Japan offered technical assistance to the Soviet Union. In February o f 1927 a group o f Japanese railw ay experts proceeded to Russia at the invitation o f the Soviet government to assist in the assembly and repair o f locomotives and o f passenger coaches for the Kazan line. W orking prim arily at the Murom railway plant the Japanese so impressed the Soviets, that the latter wished to apply Japanese methods to all the Soviet railways; they frankly called it “Japanizadon” o f the lines. In Feb­ ruary o f 1931 the Japan Weekly Chronicle reported optim istically: T h e use o f Japanese methods o f repairing locomotives in the Murom railway shops have given favourable results. T h e [a]mount o f labour has been decreased and locomotives have been

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Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R. capitally repaired in three days. Japanese methods are also being introduced to maritime and river transport repair shops. In 1931 Japanese methods are expected to enable a saving in expenditure o f 29,000,000 roubles. T h e Commissariate o f W ays and Communications is sending to Japan thirty railwaysmen to make a further study o f Japanese methods. T h e Japanese repair system has been introduced in to transport colleges and schools as the regular discipline.9

But b y the end o f the year a reorganization o f the People's Com m is­ sariat for Communication and a shake-up in its leadership led to a shift in policy, and the employment o f Japanese technicians was discontinued. Conceivably the retention o f Japanese technicians appeared dangerous in view o f mounting Soviet-Japanese friction. T h e idea o f Soviet em ploy­ ment o f Japanese hydroelectric engineers to supervise the construction o f Russian hydroelectric power stations, broached to Foreign M inister Shidehara b y Ambassador Troianovskii was dropped in 1931. N e­ gotiations for Japanese technical assistance in the development o f Soviet sericulture similary were discontinued. Experts in the manufacture o f cans, employed through the Hakodate office o f the Soviet T rade M is­ sion in the spring o f 1930 as instructors at the cannery o f the Sakhalin Development Com pany, on the other hand, were reemployed for some tim e.10Japanese industrial know-how continued to arouse respect; Soviet economists pointed to the need o f studying the Japanese technical school system and the practical factory training received b y Japanese students.11 T h e prospects for trade between Japan and the Soviet Union appeared bright as the i92o’s drew to a dose. During the First W orld W ar, when the closing o f the Black Sea and Baltic ports had cut Russia o ff from her traditional markets and sources o f supply, Russia had become Japan's No. i customer.12 Throughout the d v il war and the Japanese intervention in Siberia, Russo-Japanese trade had continued on a large scale, w ith consumer goods being the major category o f Russian im port. Following the Japanese evacuation and the consolidation o f Communist power in the Russian Far East, the volume o f trade had declined sharply, but the

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feasibility o f large-scale commerce between the two countries had been demonstrated. W hile the situation at the time o f W orld W ar I and the civil war had been abnormal, “ abnormal” conditions were becoming increasingly normal; the perennial shortage o f foreign exchange ex­ perienced b y the Soviet Union left open the door for large-scale barter transactions between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Early Soviet-Japanese trade differed in nature as w ell as scale from Tsarist-Japanese trade,as theU .S.S.R. tried to industrialize her Far Eastern regions. T h e motivation was not merely economic, but also political and ideological. T h e Soviet Union wanted to industrialize Asiatic Russia as a showplace o f socialist building to impress and win over the neigh­ boring colonial and “ semi-colonial” peoples. T h e Soviet Union continued to purchase some foodstuffs, notably tea and seafood, but 30 per cent o f her imports in 1926-27 consisted o f spun materials such as nets and ropes for the fishing industry in the Okhotsk-Kamchatka region and the Amur estuary. She also bought ores, metals, metal products, lumber and chemical products (mainly iodine and camphor). Russian exports con­ sisted prim arily o f lumber and fish products as w ell as agricultural produce and oil-cakes.13 W ith the growing industrialization o f the U.S.S.R. a further change in the character o f trade occurred. Shipments o f fish, lumber and agri­ cultural produce from Russia declined while industrial exports rose. O il, charcoal, manganese, asbestos, fertilizers, ferrous metal and chemical and pharmaceutical goods which had once been imported from Japan, now were sold to Japan. By 1930 industrial exports accounted for almost 73 per cent o f Soviet sales to Japan.14 In 1929 the total volume o f trade between the two countries had increased by 2$% over 1928. It amounted to 15 million yen each for export to Japan and import from Japan. Large Japanese firms were beginning to participate in the exchange, among them M itsui, M itsubishi and Akura Gum i.15 Protocol C o f the Fishery Convention had provided for the conclusion o f special contracts for the establishment and operation o f canning facto­ ries. In July o f 1928 Shindô Shintaro

proceeded to M oscow

as representative o f the N ichi-Ro G yogyö Kaisha and three other cor­

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porations, recommended b y the Japanese governm ent, to negotiate concerning this matter. On Novem ber 3,1928, he concluded a ten year contract. It provided that there should be tw o fishing grounds for everyone o f the 22 canneries in operation by the Japanese at the tim e o f the conclusion o f the convention.16 There were difficulties in the application o f the Fishery Convention. It had been agreed in the Final Protocol (part I, B 1) that the Soviet govern­ ment could grant w ithout auction to its own state enterprises fishery lots corresponding to about tw enty per cent o f the total, catch. Late in 1928 the Soviet government accordingly set aside 84 fishery lots for the Kamchatka Com pany, Inc. (A ko), a state enterprise established in 1926 for the purpose o f developing fishery, agriculture, forestry, m ining and transportation on Kamchatka. But the 84 fishery lots included 30 which had been operated by the Japanese for many years. Japan protested against the requisitioning o f these lots and demanded that the action be revoked or that other lots be given to Japan in compensation w ithout auction. T h e Japanese objected, furthermore, that the Russians had inflated the number o f fishery lots reserved by underestim ating the yearly catch o f these fishery lots. T h e Soviets agreed to let the Japanese have 12 o f the disputed fishery lots; the Japanese continued to demand the remainder, keeping alive the “ 18 fishery lot issue.” T h e Russians finally gave to the Japanese some other fishery grounds in compensation for the 18 in dispute, but in January o f 1931 included some o f these in a group reserved for their own state enterprise, and the argument con­ tinued.17 T h e auctioning o f fishery lots also was accompanied b y controversy. In protest against the above-mentioned Soviet reservation o f fishery lots for its state enterprises Japanese fishery concerns boycotted the auctions on February 28 and on March 1$, 1929. When they participated on April 5, 1929, they were outbidden b y one o f their own countrym en, Uda Kanichirö |p, who was not a member o f the association o f Japanese fishery in Soviet waters. Uda, backed by Shima Tokuzo £ HÄ, acquired 78 fishery lots heretofore exploited b y the N ichi-Ro G yogyö Kaisha.18

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A great hue-and-cry went up in the Japanese press that the Japanese fishery people were being deprived o f their legal rights. Troianovskii protested. He told Premier Tanaka on April 25,1929, that the conven­ tion o f 1928 had given the Japanese more rights than the convention o f 1907. T h e share o f Soviet state enterprises had been lim ited to 20% o f the total catch and in fact did not amount to 20% ; Soviet; small private enterprisers had less than 10% . O ver 200 new fishery lots had been opened in 1929 and more were operated b y the Japanese in 1929 than the preced­ ing year. It was the Soviet Union which had cause for alarm. T h e fishery convention stipulates that Japanese subjects obtain fishery lots b y competition at auction, which in accordance w ith the fishery convention must be held not later than February [Troianovskii declared]. An auction is an auction,i.c. it presupposes free competition o f the participants in the auction, including the Japanese fishery enterprisers. Auctions are stipulated by the con­ vention o f 1907; auctions are stipulated by the convention o f 1928. An exception is made for lots set aside for canneries. Reports have reached us that the Japanese fishery enterprisers o f the [Roryo Suisan] Kumiai association o f fishery enterprisers have conspired concerning the distribution o f the lots among themselves and concerning the prices on them. But w e did not know anything about them, at least officially, and could not know. But now, to m y surprise, the M inister o f Agriculture Yamamoto [Teijirö d i ÿ “f f — f f] , a member o f the cabinet, declares that he is an opponent o f fiee com petition o f the Japanese among themselves at die auctions and that he sees in this free com petition, even though it is stipulated b y the convention, a violation o f Japanese rights. In point o f fact a compart before the auction annuls the auction and is contrary to the laws o f the U.S.S.R. as w ell as o f Japan. I do not understand how a member o f the cabinet can in such a w ay call for the violation o f the fishery convention and for intolerable ac­ tions.19 Ignoring the irony o f Communist insistence on free competition

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Japanese Recognition o f the U.SS.R.

(so long as it involved others, whom such competition hurt), Tanaka replied that Yamamoto had been misquoted. T h e Japanese were concerned that Uda had paid too much for the lots, but, he agreed, the action had been legal and gave no cause for government intervention.20 Uda and the N ichi-Ro G yogyö Kaisha eventually reached an agree­ ment and Uda gave up the acquired lease on the ground that it was improfitable at the high price which he had bid, yet his action cost the Japanese fishery industry dearly, for the rent at which the N ichi-Ro G yogyö Kaisha was able to regain the fishery lots was much higher than before. In 1928 the average rent for a fishery lot had been about 7,500 rubles; in 1929 it rose to almost 18,000 and b y 1931 exceeded 20,000 rubles. A t the auction in 1930 the Japanese bade successfully for only 86 out o f 241 fishing lots, the others going to Soviet bidders at what seemed to the Japanese as unreasonably high prices. Alarmed lest Japanese fishery rights become merely nominal, the Japanese exerted strong diplom atic pressure. Another auction was held at which the Japanese acquired 61 out o f 85 fishery lots. Adding other fishing grounds exploited b y the Japanese, the latter held a total o f 318 fishery lots in Soviet waters in 1930. Although this represented an increase o f only 15 lots over the preceding year as compared w ith an increase o f n o lots for the Russians, the Russians still operated only 272 fishery lots, i.e. less than the Japanese in Soviet territory.21 T h e increase in rental for fishery lots was aggravated b y the decline in the value o f the ruble and b y Soviet insistence in September o f 1930 that the rent be paid at the official rate o f exchange as quoted b y the Vladivostok branch office o f the Bank o f Korea (called also the Bank o f Chosen), the chief credit organ o f the Japanese fishery interests. There was a difference o f between 5 and 6 million yen between the cost o f the ruble on the open market and the official rate o f exchange, and the Japanese felt their enterprise drained o f profit. Japanese objections that they used to purchase rubles at a lower rate first fell on deaf ears, the Russians replying that the m atter was beyond the scope o f the fishery convention. But the continuance o f amicable economic relations w ith

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Japan was in the Soviet interest and a compromise was finally worked out. Since it was difficult to fix a separate rate o f exchange for Japan, it was decided that the Soviet state enterprise A ko issue bonds and sell them to Japan at a discount for use as paym ent for fishery lots rental and other charges. Dispute continued over the percentage o f discount to be allowed. On April 2 6,19 31, a provisional agreement was signed, providing for the purchase o f the A ko bonds by Japanese fishery interests at the rate o f I ruble fo r 0.325 yen.

In spite o f the settlem ent o f the ruble issue the Japanese remained uneasy about the future o f their fishery concessions. T h ey felt that the increasing agressiveness w ith which the Soviet Union began to exploit her own fishery resources threatened Japanese interests. In 1930 pressure by fishery concerns had prompted both houses o f the D iet to pass re­ solutions calling for the security o f Japanese fishery rights in the nor­ thern waters.22 In the spring o f 1931 Japanese politicians once again urged their government to pursue a stronger policy toward the U.S.S.R. On M arch 16 ,19 3 1, prior to the conclusion o f the provisional agree­ ment, Marquis Sasaki Yukitada

and tw elve other peers

introduced a resolution in the House o f Peers urging the defense o f Japan’s fishery rights and interests in the northern seas. Viscount Nomura Masuzo asserted that the Soviets brought pressure to bear upon Japanese fishery interests, imposed heavy levies, sought to transfer many Japanese fishery grounds to Russian state management, defied the custom o f a three-mile territorial lim it and even committed “ savage acts” against the Japanese; y e t Japanese negotiations w ith Russia were at a standstill. Admiral Baron Sakamoto Toshiatsu

accused the Soviet Union

o f violating the rights granted to Japan by the T reaty o f Portsmouth and b y the Basic Convention.* Sakamoto declared that the only w ay to save the Japanese fishing interests was for the government to make Russia

Sakamoto was quoted as having referred to the treaty signed between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1928 by Yoshizawa and Karakhan. The Fishery Convention o f 1928 was signed between Karakhan and Tanaka; the Yoshizawa and Karakhan agreement was the Basic Convention o f 1925.

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'Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R.

desist from her current attitude o f defying the treaty. T h e resolution, which was regarded as a “ sharp reminder” to the governm ent, passed almost unanimously.23 T h e Koseikai, an influential faction in the House o f Peers, which had spearheaded the sponsoring o f the resolution continued its agitation for a stronger policy after the conclusion o f the provisional agreement. A t a meeting at the Shôwa Kaikan on M ay 2, 1931, the political inquiry committee o f the Koseikai condemned the Foreign Office for its conclu­ sion o f the agreement on terms decidedly unfavorable to Japan. It threatened to impeach the Foreign Office officials if they continued their weak policy. On M ay 6 M r. Sasaki, Vice President o f the Russian W aters Fishery Union, and M r. Endo, a director o f the N ichi-Ro Fisheries Com pany, addressed a plenary session o f the Shöwa Club, which included not only members o f the Koseikai but o f other factions in the House o f Peers (th e Doseikai, Dowakai, Kayokai and Koyu C lub) on the subject o f the RussoJapanese fishery problem. On M ay 13 the Kenkyükai, the biggest faction in the House o f Peers, and the Koseikai held separate meetings to discuss the same issue. “ There is general discontent among the members o f all fiictions w ith the weak attitude o f Baron Shidehara, the Foreign M inister, towards Russia,” the Japan Weekly Chronicle reported on M ay 14. “ M uch regret is expressed at the fact that after tw o years* negotiations, no settlement is yet reached o f many disputes outstanding between the tw o countries.” 24 Responsible Foreign Office officials realized, however, that the Soviet Union would not agree to amending the fishery convention prior to the tim e stipulated for revision. T h e Japanese governm ent, therefore, sug­ gested to the U.S.S.R. that an attem pt be made to smooth JapaneseSoviet relations b y ironing out remaining problems w ithout m aking any changes in the existing convention. T o this M oscow consented. On November 2 6 ,19 31, Ambassador H irota Köki proposed to D eputy Commissar o f Foreign Affairs Karakhan that they discuss d if­ ferences in the interpretation and application o f the fishery convention and appended protocols and consider concrete measures for the improve-

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ment o f Japanese-Soviet relations. Hirota had instructions to focus on specifics, lest a debate about principles lead nowhere. He stressed, therefore, the need to stabilize the fishing grounds o f both sides and proposed that the fishery lots already allocated be retained in the same hands for five years (excepting the lots attached to the crab-packing plants where 10 year leases were in effect); fishery lots not yet leased were to be divided equally between both sides. Karakhan replied on December 7 that Hirota’s position was contrary to the auction system , which was a basic tenet o f the convention. W hile he refused, therefore, to go along w ith the automatic retention o f all the fishery lots by both sides, he offered a compromise: the Japanese were to keep 70 (he later w ent as high as 75) per cent o f their fishery lots w ithout auction, the rest to be put up for public tender again. A t the same tim e the Soviet state enterprises were to be exempt from the auction process or from prior agreement w ith Japan in acquiring fishery lots so long as Russian fishery was less developed than that o f Japan. (It was specified later that the total number o f fishery lots reserved for Soviet state enter­ prises could not exceed 40% o f the total standard catch in the northern w ater.) Karakhan further demanded as condition for the Soviet conces­ sion that Japan sign an agreement recognizing a 12 nautical m ile lim it for territorial waters and drop the objections she had raised to the assignment o f a number o f fishery lots to the Soviet state enterprise (the 18 and 7 lots, etc.) W hile Karakhan’ s proposal was tossed back and forth, the 1932 auc­ tion was held. It turned out very favorable for the Japanese. Japanese bidders obtained 13 out o f 15 lots which they had leased in 1931 for one year, 14 lots which had been exploited by the Soviets in 1931, as well as a number o f additional lots. T his gave the Japanese a total o f 392 fishery lots in 1932 as compared w ith 309 in 1931; o f these 52 were "stabilized” (44 were under special contracts, 8 on five-year leases). Consequently the Japanese shifted their position. Instead o f demanding the stabilization o f the fishery lots which they had held in 1931, they proposed on M ay 14,1932, that 41 fishery lots— half o f the 82 which they had obtained at the auction that year—be subject to re-auction; the rest

330

Japanese Recognition o f the U SS.R.

were to remain autom atically in Japanese hands. T h e Soviets countered on M ay 18 that 60 fishery lots should be auctioned off; the remaining grounds— 280 out o f 340 or 80% would remain unchallenged in Japanese hands until the expiration o f the convention. T h ey did not insist on the 12 mile lim it for territorial waters, advanced as a condition earlier. T h e Japanese agreed to put 60 o f their lots up for auction, provided they could determine which ones. T h ey dropped their objections to Soviet reservation o f lots for their state enterprises, cooperatives and local in­ habitants, and agreed that the number o f salmon fishing grounds re­ served for state enterprises could be increased to a certain extent until 1936. Negotiations continued about the degree to which the number of lots set aside for Soviet state enterprises could be increased, the w ay in which this degree could be calculated, and whether this required prior consultation with the Japanese. T h e m atter was complicated b y the many shades o f meaning o f the Japanese word “ kyögi” 1& A ; it was not clear whether the convention had provided for Soviet consultation of the Japanese, or for discussion, deliberation, the formation o f a council or the holding o f a conference in connection w ith the reservation of fishery lots for Soviet state enterprises. On August 13,1932 , Ambassador Hirota and Deputy Foreign Com­ missar Karakhan signed an agreement. It provided for the auctioning o f the abovementioned 60 Japanese fishery lots as well as o f fishing grounds which the Japanese wished to exploit new ly and o f other grounds. A s for the question o f consultation or discussion, the tw o sides agreed in a secret document that in the case o f reserved fishing grounds selected from among those that had been in Soviet hands in 1932, discussion or consultation was to be regarded as having been com pleted; all the Soviet Union had to do was to provide Japan w ith information about the number, location and standard catch o f the particular grounds. In other instances discussion w ith the Japanese would be necessary; mere notification by the Soviet side would not meet the provisions o f the treaty. T h e Hirota-Karakhan agreement did not settle all outstanding pro­ blems. M any issues were left for direct discussion between the Japanese enterprisers and local Soviet authorities.25

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T h e dispute over the extent o f Soviet territorial waters, mentioned above, was not confined to words. In the years between the conclusion o f the basic convention and the signature o f the Hirota-Karakhan agree­ ment Japanese crab and fish packing vessels were repeatedly seized by Soviet naval vessels. Although Chargé d’Affaires Besedovskii informed Vice M inister o f Foreign Affairs Debuchi in fall o f 1926 that Japanese vessels which violated Soviet waters would not be seized so long as they stayed more than two miles from shore, they were taken into custody sometimes within the undisputed three mile lim it, sometimes within the tw elve mile lim it proclaimed by the U.S.S.R. and occasionally even farther out on the high seas. One need not reconstruct all the incidents, catalogued in the Japanese Foreign Office archives, or seek to determine which side was legally right in a given situation to understand the danger w ith which these confrontations were fraught. T h e arrest, trial and temporary detention or fining o f Japanese for poaching was less seri­ ous than the very act o f seizure, which was often accompanied b y gun fire. Repeatedly Japanese were injured and killed. Eventually the Japa­ nese began to return fire. In one instance, in June o f 1930, Japanese fisher­ men captured and held captive Soviet officials until a Japanese destroyer ordered their release; in another instance the following month Japanese gun fire injured a Soviet official. T h e success o f the fishery talks in the summer o f 1932 prompted the Soviet side to desist from its insistence on the tw elve mile lim it and the incidents which had entailed the risk o f an accidental collision between regular naval forces dwindled.26 W hile Japanese sources contend that the Soviet side did not live up to the obligations o f the fishery convention, Russian sources accuse the Japanese o f wrongdoings. “ T h e agreement was testim ony o f the good­ w ill o f the Soviet state, o f its striving to help the Japanese solve serious economic problems. But the good-neighborly and benevolent policy o f the Soviet Union did not meet w ith understanding on the part o f the Japanese ruling circles,” Dr. Leonid Kutakov asserts. Soviet officials registered hundreds o f infractions o f the convention b y the Japanese. N ot satisfied w ith the wide economic advantages which they had gained, the Japanese, according to Kutakov, tried to turn Kamchatka and several

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Japanese Recognition o f the US.S.R.

other regions into their spheres o f interest. Japanese consular officials who visited Kamchatka sought to meddle in the dealings o f the Soviet authorities w ith local Japanese fishery people. T h e Soviet Union there­ upon restricted their travel, but the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank of Korea, which handled the transactions between the Japanese fishery enterprises and Soviet organizations continued to undermine Soviet authority and, according to Russian sources, to disorganize the Soviet money market. T h e threat o f Japanese economic domination in the Soviet F ar East prodded M oscow to strengthen the Soviet enterprises b y recruiting and training suitable labor and by supplying greater funds in the form o f credit to state, cooperative and private fishery enterprises. It w as this assistance that perm itted Soviet enterprises to participate in th e auc­ tions more vigprously and to gam er a m ounting percentage o f fishery lots. In 1928 the Japanese obtained 86% o f the fishery lots, in 1929 65% and in 1931 only 5 i% .27 T h e exploitation o f the Japanese concessions also was beset w ith dif­ ficulties. Protocol B o f the Basic Convention had provided for th e pro­ specting o f oil fields by Japanese concerns on the east coast o f N orth Sakhalin over an area o f one thousand square versts (650 square m iles) “ to be selected within one year after the conclusion o f the concession contracts.” In April o f 1925, prior to the conclusion o f the concession contracts, the Japanese government asked Soviet permission to send a geological survey party; precise knowledge o f the area seemed neces­ sary before the boring region could be selected. T h e Russians turned down the Japanese request on the ground that such an investigation would take a year or a year and a half and thus would exceed the time lim it o f the protocol; they also felt that since the Japanese government had not yet named the companies that were to exploit the concessions all m atters connected w ith the choosing o f the boring area should be left until the conclusion o f the concession contract. During the negotiation o f the contract, dispute arose as to which side should select the said area. It was finally agreed that the Soviet side do so w ithin a year after the contract w ent into effect. Applications b y Japa-

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nesc concerns to send geological survey parties to the unexplored regions o f the east coast o f N orth Sakhalin and diplom atic representations in their support were again turned down b y the Soviet side. In Novem ber o f 1926 a series o f discussions was begun in M oscow between the appro­ priate Soviet authorities and representatives o f thejapaneseoil companies, granted the concessions. Both sides proposed different areas and it was not until three months later— after the expiration o f the original dead­ line— that agreement was reached. T h e following eleven areas were set aside for oil exploration by the agreement, signed on February 18 ,1927: Severnaia O kha; Ekhabi; Kydylan’i; Poromai (Paromai); Sevem yi Boatasin; Iuzhnyi Boatasin: Chem erin-Dagi; Katanoki-Noglin (KatangaN ogliki?); M yngi-Kongi; Chakre-Kampi Changu; and Vengri-Bol’shaia Khuzi (Daifuji).28 Another source o f dispute was the question o f the ownership o f the old concession property and royalty payments for its use, a m atter that had not been settled in the concession contracts but left for later delibera­ tion. T h e Soviet side argued that the buildings, machines and tools connected w ith the old oil enterprises— first the Hokushin-kai t t & d S M itsubishi ■ =•£, and the Oriental Syndicate and later b y their succes­ sors, the Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, Kita Karafuto Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha, and the Sakai Kumiai during the Japanese Occupation o f N orth Sakhalin had all become Soviet property under the provisions o f the mining enterprises nationalization law. T h e Japanese countered that they had purchased some o f the property from Russian enterprisers (Stakhcev and Kuznetsov) and had contracts stipulating joint owner­ ship o f other property. T h e Soviets replied at first that arrangements made before the revolution and during the Japanese occupation were null and void, but later modified their stand and offered to recognize Japanese ownership o f property which had been the fruit o f purely Japanese in­ vestm ent, independent o f any Russian enterprisers. N o agreement was reached and a running dispute continued in consequence about royalties, the Soviet authorities demanding payment and the Japanese conces­ sionaries refusing it.29 There was controversy in this connection also about the insurance o f

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Japanese Recognition o f the U SS.R.

concession property. T h e Soviet authorities on N orth Sakhalin demanded in the spring o f 1927 that the Japanese concessionaries draw up a list o f all the property and insure it at their expense, listing the Soviet govern­ ment as the beneficiary. T his the Japanese refused to do lest their daim s to ownership o f the property be compromised. T h e periodic revision o f collective labor contracts in the oil and coal concessions, Soviet extension to the Japanese concessions o f extra pay allowances to Soviet workers to induce them to move to Sakhalin, the attem pted Soviet levy o f a surtax on social insurance premiums, and controversy over the proper division o f land for boring areas complicated the resolution o f Japanese-Soviet differences. Japanese efforts to make substitutions in the allocated m ining areas were unsuccessful. O n the positive side, contracts were signed in 1928 and in subsequent years for Japanese purchase o f Okha crude oil. W ith the inauguration o f the first five-year plan in 1928 the Soviet government openly clamped down on foreign concessions; all bu t those o f Japan were forced to suspend operations. Increasingly from the closing days o f 1930, pressures mounted on the Japanese coal concessions. New domestic labor legislation provided for a seven hour work day, and fines were imposed on the Japanese for violating this or other provisions o f the labor laws or o f collective contracts. T h e Japanese were forced to reduce the prices o f goods which they furnished to their Soviet employees. A t the same time Russian wage demands soared w ith every labor contract renewal. T h e difficulties posed for Japan by the steady rise in operating costs were compounded b y political harassment, such as the arrest o f Soviet employees loyal to the Japanese company and repeated demands for the revocation o f various leases.30 As noted before, the maintenance o f a branch office o f one o f their own banks in the Soviet Union was regarded as vital b y the Japanese. T h e Bank o f Korea was a Japanese bank. It had opened a branch office in Vladi­ vostok in Tsarist times. Refusing the demand o f Soviet officials who had come to power in Vladivostok following the withdrawal o f Japanese oc­ cupation troops in 1922 that the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea apply for a license as a Soviet commercial bank, the Japanese succeeded

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in Novem ber o f 1923 in obtaining the M aritime Province’s recognition o f their branch office as the branch office o f a foreign bank, and the follow­ ing year, in 1924, received permission to engage in the business o f foreign exchange. A fter the conclusion o f the basic convention the Soviet People’s Commissariat o f Finance in September o f 1926 formally confirmed the right o f the Bank o f Korea to operate the branch in Vladivostok. In Feb­ ruary o f 1928 the branch office registered w ith the Department o f Com­ merce o f the Vladivostok district; it renewed the registration annually. Soviet finance officers inspected the bank records and found nothing amiss.31 T h e Soviet Union was as sensitive about reciprocity and equality o f treatm ent as Japan. She insisted on the establishment o f a branch office o f her Far Eastern State Trade Bank in Kobe. Japan granted permission in September o f 1925 lest the operation o f the Bank o f Korea be endangered. She refused to give a 25 year business licence requested b y the Soviet Union, however, and insisted on annual renewals until a comprehensive Japanese-Soviet commercial agreement was worked out.32 In the fall o f 1930 inspectors from Khabarovsk suddenly descended upon the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea and after a long and careful inspection forbade it to remit money abroad and tojtrade in Soviet currency except at the official Soviet rate o f exchange. T h e Japanese government protested against the manner o f the inspection and against the prohibition. It argued that the order was contrary to the historical function o f the bank and would make its continued operation difficult. D eaf to the representations o f the Japanese government and to the plea that the branch played a key role in the development o f economic rela­ tions between the two countries, the People’s Commissariat o f Finance ordered on December 7 that the office be dosed, a fine be paid and three o f the bank officers be put on trial. Although the Japanese government foiled in its efforts to keep the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea open, it arrived at a foce-saving arrangement w ith the Soviet govern­ ment whereby Japan "voluntarily” closed the bank office and the Soviets dropped the m atter o f a fine and the trial o f the Japanese bank officers.33 "T h e offidal explanation from M oscow o f the reasons for closing the

33

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

Vladivostok brandi o f the Bank o f Korea is not altogether satisfactory,” the Japan fVeekly Chronicle declared on January 8, 1931. “ I f the bank’s transaction in paper roubles disturbed the Soviet’s financial programme— which it is difficult to believe— that is mainly the fault o f the Soviet Government which tries to maintain a fiction regarding the value o f its currency. It is evident that the ordinary operation o f a foreign banking house is, in such circumstances, impossible.” 34 T h e closing o f the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea led to the departure o f some 400 Japanese residents from Vladivostok b y mid-July 1931. T h e Japanese primary school in that d ty and the Japanese news­ paper Vladivostok Nippô (Vladivostok D aily N ews) were dosed. The Japanese consulate general and the agencies o f the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the Kawasaki Steamship Com pany remained the only Japanese inter­ ests in that region.35 During their occupation o f N orth Sakhalin the Japanese had com­ municated w ith th d r homeland b y radio-telegraph from Aleksandrovsk via Toyohara

on South Sakhalin. There had been contact also be­

tween Aleksandrovsk, Japan proper, Korea and Khabarovsk, and wireless stations had been set up by the Japanese navy at Okha and C haivo for communication via Otomari (South Sakhalin) and Soya (H okkaido). Since the Japanese received concessions for the exploitation o f N orth Sakhalin’s natural resources as they withdrew , it was agreed that they continue operation o f th d r radio stations under Soviet supervision. T h is was confirmed in a protocol concerning the Okha and Chaivo stations, signed by the commander o f the Japanese army o f occupation on N orth Sakhalin and the Soviet committee which officially accepted the territory from him on M ay 1,19 2 5. Difficulties arose almost at once. T h e U.S.S.R. protested to the Japa­ nese government on O ctober 17,19 2 5 , that the Japanese authorities had carried away a large part o f the equipment o f the radio-telegraph station at Aleksandrovsk, that the Japanese consul at Aleksandrovsk denied access to the Japanese stations to Soviet telegraphers who had come to establish communication w ith the rest o f the U.S.S.R. and, above all, that the Japanese stations continued to send messages from private

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Japanese in code w ithout revealing the code to the Soviet authorities. T h e Japanese replied on October 29 that they would look into the m atter o f the alleged removal o f radio-telegraph equipment from Aleksandrovsk, but that no changes in the operation o f the stations should be made until an agreement was worked ou t; they argued that the use o f code “ could not call forth objections.” 36 T h e Soviet government responded on Novem ber 13 that the U.S.S.R. had regained full sovereignty over N orth Sakhalin. Soviet laws pro­ hibited the use o f code b y private individuals and associations; to allow it to the Japanese would be tantamount to granting them extraterritori­ ality. Hence the practice must cease forthwith.37 On Novem ber 24 the Japanese M inistry o f Foreign Affairs reported that investigation showed no evidence that all the items listed in the Soviet inventory had been at the radio stations when the Japanese had first taken the over. A ll that they had removed was some new equipment installed b y themselves. As a m atter o f fact, the Japanese M inistry o f Foreign Affairs declared, they had left some Japanese equipment behind to assure the continuance o f communication.38 In December o f 1925 operation o f the Okha and Chaivo wireless stations was assumed b y the Kita Karafoto Sekiyu Kaisha.39 On M ay 5, 1926, the Foreign Commissariat o f the U.S.S.R. informed the Japanese embassy in M oscow o f its desire to set a date for the commencement o f negotia­ tions to draw up regulations for the operation o f the Japanese wireless stations at Okha and Chaivo. Upon consultation w ith T okyo the Japanese embassy on A ugust 19 agreed to hold discussions.40 On September 11 the Soviet Foreign Commissariat proposed that negotiations begin on O ctober 15. T h e Japanese embassy on October 8 accepted the date, and negotiations were duly opened a week later. Accord was reached on such matters as allocation o f time for the operation o f the wireless stations and the use o f the Japanese telegraph code and the international code. But the Japanese were reluctant to accept the Soviet proposal that Japa­ nese telegraph operators be replaced by Soviet nationals if the latter became folly qualified in the use o f the Japanese telegraphic code, and the talks were recessed temporarily— until the summer o f 1928 as it turned out.41

33»

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

Communication b y mail also was the subject o f prolonged discussion. Service had been resumed following the conclusion o f the basic conven­ tion. T h e Japanese side forwarded mail to the post offices at Vladivostok and M oscow; the Soviets delivered mail to Tsuruga. In regard to North Sakhalin it was decided that mail to and from the Aleksandrovsk district be carried b y coal ships o f the concession company during the summer; in winter mail would be exchanged at Handazawa

on the Japanese-

Soviet border on the island. M ail to and from Okha and other places on the east coast o f N orth Sakhalin would be carried b y oil concession vessels in the summer months. M ail to and from d ie Petropavlovsk dis­ trict o f the Kamchatka peninsula was conveyed b y regular Japanese liners in summer; in w inter it was forwarded b y w ay o f Vladivostok. In February o f 1931 the Soviet government proposed the conclusion o f a treaty for the exchange o f mail at the Japanese-Soviet frontier in winter. Japan replied in A ugust that it preferred an agreement between the postal authorities o f both countries. Although no comprehensive agreement was concluded at this tim e, it was decided b y the end o f the year that as o f mid-January 1932 mail between Aleksandrovsk and Onor be exchanged tw ice a week in winter. T h e above arrangement did not extend to parcel post. T h e U.S.S.R. seemed less eager for such an exchange and Japan had to make repeated overtures before M oscow agreed to a round o f conferences. Negotiations dragged on from O ctober o f 1928 until Novem ber o f 1931 as the Japanese vainly tried to lower Soviet postal rates and to extend delivery to countries which had not concluded a postal agreement w ith the U .S.S.R . The parcel post agreement was signed cm Novem ber 2 3 ,19 3 1 ; it w ent into effect almost a year later, on A ugust 2 3 ,I932.42*b A series o f conferences was held also in regard to railway communica­ tion. T h e location o f Russia left overland transportation between Japan and Western Europe at her m ercy, and Japan was eager to regulate the matter. On M ay 11,19 2 5 , the Japanese embassy in a note verbale proposed

b For the French text o f the parcel post agreement, see Japanese Archives, RussoJapanese Treaties, 34/1-34/28.

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discussion in M oscow o f the restoration o f railway traffic between Japan, Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. Before the [First] W orld W ar the above-mentioned com­ munication took place by w ay o f three routes, namely via Vladivo­ stok, Korea and Dairen [the Japanese note stated]. T h e main purpose o f this direct communication was the facilitation o f passenger and freight transport between the major cities o f Japan proper, Korea, Manchuria, as w ell as Siberia and European Russia. T h e following railway and steamship companies participated in the transportation: the Japanese government railways, the rail­ ways o f the Korean governor-generalship, the South Manchurian railway, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, the Russian Volunteer Fleet, the Ussuri and other Russian railways, interested in communica­ tion. T h e M inistry o f Railways wishes subsequently to exchange opinions regarding the question o f the restoration o f direct pas­ senger and freight communication between Japan and Western Europe via the U .S.S.R., prim arily o f direct passenger and freight communication between T okyo and Berlin or Paris via M oscow, as well as direct conveyance o f silk from Japan to M oscow via Vladivostok.43 T h e Japanese planned to send representatives o f the Railw ay Bureau o f the Korean governor-generalship o f the South Manchurian railway and o f the Osaka Shosen Kaisha along w ith their delegation. T h e Foreign Commissariat replied on June 16 in a note verbale that it did not object to a conference for the improvement o f communications between Japan and the U .S.S.R ., but inasmuch as the negotiations were bound to touch upon the interests o f the Chinese Eastern Railway (which was under joint Russian-Chinese management), it deemed it essential that representatives o f this company participate.44 T h e Japanese embassy responded on July 13 that it agreed fully that representatives o f the Chinese Eastern railway must participate in the conference and that their exclusion had been inadvertent.45 On August

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18 the Japanese Foreign Office informed the Soviet embassy in Tokyo that representatives o f the Soviet merchant marine were invited too, and proposed that the conference begin in the first ten days o f October. T h ey reiterated that they wished to discuss communication w ith West­ ern Europe after transportation between Japan and the Soviet Union had been settled.46 Ambassador Kopp replied on September 2 that his governm ent agreed to the opening o f discussions regarding Japanese-Soviet railw ay trans­ portation in early October. A s for the m atter o f transit through the U.S.S.R. to Western Europe, he reported that a railw ay conference between his country, Estonia and Latvia had already been set for Novem­ ber 2, and invited Japan to participate.47 A Japanese delegation consisting o f the M inistry o f Railway’ s Traffic Bureau Director Taneda

Section C h ief Usami

o f th e South

Manchurian Railway, and o f representatives o f the Korean railw ay and the O.S.K. (Osaka Shosen Kaisha) shipping company duly proceeded to Moscow. On O ctober 19 negotiations were begun, w ith the Soviet delegate Rudyi acting as chairman o f the conference, Taneda and the representative o f the Chinese National Railways as vice-chairmen.48 On August 25 the Soviet M inistry o f Communications had cabled an invitation to the management o f the Chinese Eastern Railw ay to attend the conference. When the Chinese Foreign Office, informed o f this by the Chinese Eastern Railway authorities, on September 25 requested from the Soviet embassy detailed information about the make-up and agenda o f the conference, the embassy in its reply on O ctober 3 invited the Chinese government to send a plenipotentiary representative o f its own. T h e Soviet note stated that representatives o f the Soviet railways, the Japanese railways, the South Manchurian Railw ay and the Korean railways as well as o f Sovtorgflot (the Soviet merchant marine) and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha steamship company would participate in the SovietJapanese railway conference to deal w ith a draft convention between the governments o f the U .S.S.R ., China and Japan concerning direct pas­ senger and freight communication, draft regulations for the transport o f passengers and freight, regulations for sea transport, the question o f

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passenger routing) rates, currency, classification, the regulation o f mutual compensation, and the calculation o f through handling o f rolling stock in direct communication via the Chinese Eastern railway. T h e Chinese embassy in M oscow replied on O ctober 10 that represent­ atives would be sent from the Chinese M inistry o f Communications as well as from the Chinese Eastern Railway. On O ctober 1$ the Chinese Foreign M inistry notified the Soviet embassy that it was sending the director o f international direct transport as its representative; he would come together w ith the representative o f the Chinese Eastern Railway. But inasmuch as no detailed data on the points to be discussed had as yet been furnished and the invitation to send a plenipotentiary represent­ ative had only ju st been received w hile the conference was about to begin, it could not grant to the representatives plenipotentiary powers since they were not prepared for this. “ Therefore,” the Chinese note continued, “ the representatives both o f the M inistry o f Communications and o f the Chinese Eastern Railw ay can participate only in the examina­ tion o f questions concerning the exploitation o f the Chinese Eastern R ailw ay; concerning all questions o f territorial sovereignty, political authority and others pertaining both to the Chinese Eastern Railway and the national railways o f China, however, the M inistry m ust, o f course, make the qualification that such questions w ill not be valid w ithout confirmation by the government [of the republic o f China].49 T h e tripartite conference began on O ctober 19 but broke down a month later, on Novem ber 24, at the third session, because the Chinese delegation did not have the powers to conclude an agreement about freight transport and because it had received instructions while the negotiations were in progress not to sign the agreement about through passenger service between the U .S.S.R., China andjapan. (China objected to through train service via the Chinese Eastern Railway w ithout chang­ ing trains.) Japan and the Soviet Union continued their discussions at an international railway conference in M oscow on December 7-16 . In addition to Estonia and Latvia, w ith whom the U.S.S.R. andjapan had already negotiated, Poland, Germany and France joined the talks. An agreement was duly worked out for direct European-Asian passengor and

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freight communication via Siberia. Passengers were to be served by an international train o f eight cars. Through traffic w est o f M oscow was to proceed via R iga; in die Far East there were four routes: VladivostokKhabarovsk, Vladivostok-Harbin, Harbin-Pusan, and Harbin-Dairen. T h e conferees reserved the right for China to join in the agreement at a later date.50

CHAPTER TWELVE

Lingering Mistrust

N

o tw ith sta n d in g honest efforts on both sides to improve

Japanese-Soviet relations, neither party lowered its guard. T h e U.S.S.R. arrested a number o f Japanese. In April o f 1925

four Japanese working in Vladivostok were taken into custody on sus­ picion o f trying to bribe a Soviet official. In June o f the same year M ajor Shibuya and a civilian companion, M r. Nakai 4 * # , en route from Germany to Japan by w ay o f Siberia, were detained as m ilitary spies. T w o other Japanese, Shirahama Fuku matsu

9

and Kiyokaze Fuku-

were jailed in July on the double-barrelled charge o f

spying and illicit transportation o f liquor. O ther Japanese were arrested on the suspicion o f spying, for violating the Soviet frontier, and for failure to pay the wages o f some o f their employees. In the spring o f 1930, on the eve o f the sudden inspection o f the Vladivostok branch o f the Bank o f Korea, several Japanese and Russian money changers in Vladivostok were seized for trading in rubles at other than the official rate.1 Soviet vigilance was nourished b y lingering m istrust o f Japanese intentions. A s Foreign Commissar Chicherin wrote to Ambassador K oppin T okyo on June 23,1925: N ot one state, after recognizing our governm ent, was so friendly in its expressions toward us as the Japanese one. Satö in his m eetings w ith me is the very embodiment o f friendliness. Your reports about the receptions at the crown prince, the empress dowager and the like also point to a strikingly, even exceptionally strikingly underlined friendliness. W hat is the meaning o f this?

344

Japanese R ecognition o f the U.S.S.R. T h at is what one must decipher. W hat do they expect? Do they w ant territory for immigration, do they want concessions, or do they want a safe rear for the coming war w ith the United States? There is a clash between us and the Japanese first o f all on the approaches to the Chinese Eastern Railway. T h is question is most serious. If the Japanese have further designs on Eastern Siberia, there can be further friction w ith them and they w ill be beset b y disappointment. As for our future trade w ith Japan, Japan is, o f course, in great need o f our fish, raw materials and lumber, but there is skepticism in our country about what w e can import from th ere .. . .2

T h e Japanese trusted the Soviets as little as the Soviets trusted them. T h e Communist Party o f Japan was a blood relative, if not the offspring, o f Moscow. T h e program o f the Japanese Communist Party had been drafted by Nikolai Bukharin at the fourth congress o f the T hird Inter­ national in M oscow in Novem ber 1922. T h e platform o f the Japanese Communist Party, formulated at its first convention in Ichikawa, Chiba Prefecture, in February o f 1923, had been based on the M oscow program and had included demands for the abolition o f the Japanese monarchy, the army and police, Japanese withdrawal from Russian territory and recognition o f the Soviet government.3 A police round-up in 1923 had seriously curtailed the Communist Party o f Japan, yet the following year it had been reorganized and had recruited a sizeable membership.4 T h e Japanese authorities, therefore, did not have frith in the Soviet pledge, made in the Basic Convention, not to subvert the Japanese government or to spread propaganda. Japanese m isgivings were justified. N ot only had Foreign Commissar Chicherin publicly stated on M ay 14,192$, at the third session o f the Soviets o f the U.S.S.R. that the Soviet Union would continue its prop­ aganda at home, for “ to say that all propaganda in general must be stopped in the Soviet Union that is to demand that the Communist Party cease to be the Communist Party,” 5 but Ambassador Kopp had made all too plain his disdain for the Basic Convention.

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M ention has been made o f the “ unconfirmed” report which swept Japan shortly after Kopp’s arrival that he had dismissed the Basic Con­ vention as a scrap o f paper. T h e report was not “ unconfirmed” as far as the Japanese government was concerned, for a copy o f the stenographic transcript o f Kopp’s speech before the Politbureau o f the Harbin Pro­ vincial Com m ittee o f the Communist Party, dated April 17, 192$, recorded b y Ershova and testified to be true by Secretary Anokhin, was obtained by the Foreign Office. It was stamped “ top secret” in Japanese, however, and not released to the press since its publication would have been at least as embarrassing to the imperial government as to the Foreign Commissariat. In the Far East, in foreign policy, I shall adhere to the theses laid down b y the Central Com m ittee [of the Communist Party], and make use o f Japan as an enemy [Kopp had confided to his country­ men] ; prior to the official recognition o f Soviet Russia b y America, our close alliance w ith Japan constitutes a threat to American society, which w ill react to our surrender o f the mineral re­ sources in the Far East to exploitation by Japanese capital b y putting pressure on its government to hasten official relations w ith Soviet Russia. As for the alliance w ith Japan, as [an alliance] w ith a country w ith an imperialist system , it is not particularly solid; it w ill be a m ythical treaty, binding us to nothing in the event o f good relations w ith America, merely giving us the possibility for the legal existence in the territory o f Japan o f the leading organ o f the vanguard o f the revolution. In regard to the question put to me in the note about m y political work in Japan— I look upon it com pletely differently, on the basis o f the above-mentioned theses o f foreign policy, i.e. I leave the con­ duct o f the political work in Japan entirely in the hands o f the Japanese socialists, giving them only moral support in getting rid o f defects, perm itted by Japanese workers in party building, again I repeat, making use o f Japan as a threat to America in the Far East.

346

Japanese Recognition o f the U.SS.R. M y outlook on party building, approved b y the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs and the Central Com m ittee, is as follows: to use our mission in Japan in regards to the party in so for as possible in the preparation o f future workers w ithout attaching to them the label o f party-membership, but to lim it ourselves to the found­ ing o f associations [zemliacbestpa] (socialist circles), to which all those elements w ith a bent for socialism w ill be drawn spontane­ ously and w ill contribute to the strengthening o f the general work, which particularly has the special purpose o f dissem inating among the workers and peasant masses appropriate literature, which the Comintern Z[emliachestvo] soon plans to publish local­ ly. A t the same time new and especially valuable groups o f workers who know village work more intim ately are picked o u t as village [political] workers; this branching ofT w ill be done at the expense o f the union o f workers, who w ill w ithout question belong to us when the struggle o f the w orking class w ill enter the phase o f direct struggle for socialism and w ill follow our party, to which the future belongs.6

T h e Japanese police kept Soviet visitors under close surveillance. When four delegates o f the All-Union Soviet o f Trade Unions stayed in Japan in the foil o f 1925, Japanese policemen in T okyo, Osaka and Kobe invaded their private buildings and refused to leave when asked to do s a T h ey kept most private Japanese individuals from visiting the Soviet delegates. When a few individuals, notably some newspapermen, after prolonged interrogation about the specific purpose o f their visit, were adm itted, the police remained in the room during the discussions and recorded what was said. Policemen accompanied the visiting delegates when they w ent out and if they took a car climbed in w ithout invita­ tion. When a large crowd gathered at the time o f the departure o f the delegates, the police assaulted and battered persons who tried to approach them. Among the Japanese who were thus beaten up was a Japanese em­ ployee o f the Soviet Embassy who was helping the delegates w ith their baggage. Ambassador Kopp protested in a note to Foreign M inister

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Shidehara, dated September 2 9 ,192s» that the restrictions imposed on the Soviet trade union delegates were “ contrary to the elementary rules o f international courtesy” and a violation o f the Soviet-Japanese agree­ ment. Kopp asserted that the treatment o f the delegates was not an excep­ tion— Japanese policemen treated all Soviet citizens in this fashion. First Secretary Nikolai Kirillovich Kuznetsov had already made an oral representation to V ice M inister Debuchi about a number o f cases o f the illegal actions o f the Japanese police in regard to Soviet student trainees. Although Debuchi had promised that the illegal restrictions would be lifted, they had in fact become more severe. “ T h e students who are here are subject not only to the most troublesome police surveillance— numerous police agents do not confine themselves to following on their heels watching their every movement— but quite frequently these agents enter an apartment, where, in their opinion, a given person has stopped too long and invite him to depart for home. W hen the students ride in an automobile the police agents take a seat in the automobile and refuse to get out, in spite o f the most persistent invitations [to do so].” Kopp complained that other Soviet citizens, particularly those work­ ing in Soviet offices in Japan, were treated in the same fashion. Employees o f the Far Eastern Bank and o f the Far Eastern State Trade Bank in Kobe, the director o f the telegraph agency o f the U.S.S.R. and his fam ily, and the technical employees o f the Embassy in T okyo all were under similar police surveillance. In every instance the surveillance was expressed “ in the following o f police agents after the employees and members o f their fam ily, in attem pts to penetrate into their private apartments b y the most diverse contrivances, directed toward carrying out a search w ith­ out having any legal right to do so.” When Soviet citizens who were being shadowed told the policemen who followed them that they would appeal to the embassy for protection, the policemen made “ inappro­ priate and sometimes downright insulting” remarks directed at the person o f the ambassador. T h e most serious violations o f international law are com-

34»

Japanese Recognition o f the U SS.R. m itted b y the Japanese police in regard to the em bassy o f the U.S.S.R. itself and its members, who enjoy extraterritoria lity [Kopp protested to Shidahara]. In recent days I have repeatedly noticed instances o f police agents being on watch at the very gates o f the Embassy. These agents looked into the automobiles which were driving out from the courtyard o f the Embassy. T h e private apartments o f the Embassy secretaries, Messrs. [Georgii] Astakhov [First Secretary] and [Lev] Vol’f [Second Secretary], who live out­ side the embassy, are persistently besieged b y the police, w ho make all sorts o f attem pts to penetrate into the building. T h e members o f the families o f the said persons are so terrorized thereby that they declare it impossible to continue living in Japan unless the il­ legal actions o f the T okyo police w ill be terminated.

Kopp expressed the “ liveliest concern” for the future developm ent of relations between the U .S.S.R. and Japan” if the police harassment of Soviet citizens would not be halted; he warned that if the measures were not cancelled the Soviet Union would retaliate in kind. T h e meas­ ures would not remain “ one-sided” , as he put it diplom atically.7 In a conversation w ith Kopp on O ctober 5 Shidehara expressed regret at the conduct o f the Japanese police. He asserted that although he had not had the opportunity to familiarize him self w ith Kopp’s letter, the the Japanese government definitely did not condone police actions which m ight adversely affect relations between the tw o countries.8 Y et within a fortnight, on O ctober 18, another incident occurred. Professor Evgenii Genrikhovich Spal’vin, who served as Japanese Secre­ tary o f the Soviet embassy, was to read a paper on “ T h e Pedagodal Principles in the U .S.S.R.” at a general m eeting o f the Literary-Artistic Japanese-Russian Society (Literatum o-artisticheskoe iaponorusskoe obshchestvo), a group dedicated to the study o f various aspects o f the intellectual life o f theSoviet Union. ProfessorSpal’vin was the fifth speaker. He was preceded b y four Japanese, who gave papers on Russian art, drama, and music. Spal’vin got up and after a few introductory remarks turned to the meat o f his talk. N o sooner did he utter “ Communist

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doctrine constitutes the underlying principle in the Soviet U nion," however, than a plainclothes police officer interrupted him and forbade him to continue. When Spal’vin asked w hat was the m atter, the officer beckoned to several uniformed policemen who approached and grabbed Spal’vin. O nly w ith difficulty did he dissuade them from arresting him and taking him to the station house, pointing out that he had diplomatic im m unity. In a note to Foreign M inister Shidehara Ambassador Kopp expressed his “ deep surprise" at the action o f the police. It was obvious, he w rote, that the Japanese police were w ell informed about the papers to be read and the persons who were to present them. T h ey knew that Pro­ fessor Spal’vin was associated w ith the embassy and enjoyed diplomatic im m unity. T o lay hands on him and to order his arrest (even though the order was not carried out) was, therefore, not a misunderstanding but a crime under article 91 o f the criminal code o f Japan. For the sake o f the friendly relations existing between the tw o countries Spal’vin refrained from bringing charges— for the time being— provided the Japanese themselves thoroughly investigated the m atter at once and informed the ambassador o f the punishment meted out to the policemen con­ cerned.9 Y e t fear o f subversion remained alive in both countries. T h e Japanese government was disconcerted that the crews o f Japanese merchant ships were propagandized at the International Seamen’ s Club in Vladivo­ stok, and on January 14,192 7, Vice M inister o f Foreign Affairs Debuchi complained to Chargé d’Affairs Besedovskii that Japanese fishermen were subjected to Communist propaganda in concessions along the Soviet coast. T h e propaganda was disseminated b y pistol-packing Japanese and Korean Communists, who came to the Japanese fishing sheds al­ legedly under the protection o f the Soviet secret police, made speeches and distributed printed material. Besedovskii promised to telegraph his governm ent and ask that such activity be stopped.10 In his memoirs Besedovskii elaborated on Soviet propagandization ofjapanese fishery workers and remarked:

Japanese R ecognition o f the U JiS.R.

350

Nom inally, it was difficult for the Japanese to protest: th e prop­ aganda took place on Soviet territory. But the K habarovsk authorities did everything to irritate the Japanese governm ent as much as possible. T h e Japanese workers on the concessions were literally corailed into the dubs and there forced to listen to speeches b y Korean agitators o f the Com intern. A gents o f the G.P.U . [Security Police] w ith revolvers were stationed a t the doors o f the club and did not let the workers out until th e e n d o f the meeting. I f anyone o f the workers, among whom there w ere sometimes Socialists, spoke up in protest, he was im m ediately arrested and after a beating at the G .P.U . [office] was deported to Japan.10 In A ugust o f 1926, on instructions from the Soviet governm ent, Besedovskii proposed to Vice M inister o f Foreign Affairs D ebuchi the conclusion o f a Sovict-Japanese non-aggression pact, analogous to the Soviet-German pact, concluded in Berlin in April o f that year between Ambassador Nikolai Nikolaevich Krestinskii and Foreign M inister Dr. G ustav Stresemann.* It was the hope o f M oscow, Besedovskii later noted in his memoirs, that a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact would drive a wedge between England and Japan and prevent them from coordinating their policy versus the U.S.S.R. and forestall their inter­ vention in the Chinese revolution, which Borodin sought to Soviedze. On September 17 Debuchi informed Besedovskii that he w ould re­ ceive him shortly to discuss Soviet-Japanese relations in general and the non-aggression pact in particular. T h e m eeting took place on September 30. Debuchi declined the Soviet proposal w ithout rejecting it. He shelved the issue for a number o f years by saying that the fishery con­ vention and the treaty o f commerce, envisioned in the Basic Convention o f 1925, must be concluded before a new agreement, em bodying pro­ * The Treaty o f Berlin was a treaty o f “ friendship and neutrality.** The Soviet Union and Germany agreed to consult with each other on all major political and economic questions and to remain neutral if the other was attacked by a third power or subjected to an economic boycott.

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visions o f non-aggression and arbitration, could supercede the Basic Convention. He feared that a new treaty at this time m ight be misunder­ stood b y the Japanese public as an attem pt on the part o f M oscow to replace the Basic Convention before all o f its provisions had been carried out. Although Besedovskii sympathized w ith Debuchi's position, he deemed it his d u ty to state that the Soviet-German treaty confirmed the obligations o f the T reaty o f Rapallo and that the non-aggression pact w ith Japan could sim ilarly reconfirm the Basic Convention, so that there could be no question about the Soviet Union's intention to live up to the obligations which she had assumed, but Debuchi did not change his mind. In his memoirs Besedovskii asserts that he exchanged oral assurances w ith Debuchi that neither side planned to attack the other. T h is was a “ gentlemen’s agreement,” not a secret oral non-aggression pact, rumored in the press.11 In a lengthy speech before the lower house o f the D iet, Foreign M inister Shidehara stated on January 18, 1927, that in the tw o years since the signature o f the basic convention Japanese-Soviet relations had been steadily strengthened and held out great possibilities for the future.12 T h e question o f a non-aggression pact was raised again b y Ambassador D ovgalevskii in a conversation w ith Premier Tanaka on M ay 24. R e­ ferring to the objections voiced b y Debuchi, Dovgalevskii asserted that the Soviet gpvem m ent had carried out the economic points stipulated in the basic convention; it was not its fault that the conclusion o f a fishery convention was being delayed. He declared that the Soviet government was prepared to negotiate w ith Japan concerning a treaty o f commerce and to be favorably disposed toward granting to Japanese new concessions in the Soviet Far East. He noted that no complaints had been received by the Japanese government in connection w ith the Soviet pledge not to intervene in the internal affairs o f Japan and expressed confidence that no cause for complaint would be given in the future also. Tanaka replied on June 16. He expressed satisfaction that the Soviet government would be favorably disposed toward granting new con­ cessions to Japanese and that it loyally adhered to its promise not to

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Japanese R ecognition o f the US.S.R.

engage in propaganda or meddle in the internal affairs o f J a p a n . But although he assured D ovgalevskii that the Japanese g o v e rn m e n t was not involved in any negptiations w ith England about the re n e w a l o f the Anglojapanese alliance and had received no official proposals reg a rd in g this, the tenseness o f the international situation made the s ig n in g o f a political pact— i.e. a non-aggression pact— between the S o v ie t Union and Japan inopportune and expressed the belief that it w ould b e p ossible to return to this question after the strengthening o f econom ic relations between the tw o countries. Dovgalevskii replied on July I that the Soviet governm ent w ould assist the Japanese through the Far Eastern authorities when gra n tin g them new concessions. It expected that the Japanese governm ent w ould give to its ambassador in M oscow the necessary instructions to bring the fishery negotiations to a successful conclusion. T h e Soviet govern­ ment felt that the commercial relations were hindered prim arily b y the absence o f a treaty o f commerce and it was prepared to begin negptia­ tions for its conclusion; naturally during the negotiations consideration would be given to Japanese desires to facilitate the developm ent o f economic relations between the tw o countries. D ovgalevskii expressed regret that the Japanese government deemed it inopportune to conclude a non-aggression pact since ju st such a pact could contribute to the les­ sening o f international tension and normalize the general situation in the Far East.b Tanaka declared that negotiations concerning a treaty o f commerce would be begun following the conclusion o f a fishery convention.13 b On October 19, 1928, Deputy Foreign Commissar Litvinov telegraphed to Troianovskii that Ambassador Tanaka during his farewell visit had inquired “ for some reason*' whether the Soviet Union was still interested in a non-aggression pact. “ I replied affirmatively,** Litvinov cabled, “ since the pacts proposed by us include neutrality, which is not in the Kellogg pact, whose fate, furthermore, is not known, while bilateral pacts can be realized more easily and quickly. I also mentioned that bilateral pacts about non-aggression symbolize friendship more clearly than does a multilateral pact. Am reporting this for your information, just in case." (D.V.P.,

vol. xi, p. 543)

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On M arch 8,1928 a most interesting two-hour tête-à-tête took place in the Soviet embassy between Ambassador Troianovskii and General Tanaka G iichi, who was concurrently Premier and Foreign M inister. One o f the army’s top experts on Russian affairs and chairman o f the Siberian W ar Planning Com mittee o f the General Staff at the tim e o f the Japanese intervention, Tanaka was an economic rationalist identified w ith a “ positive” policy on the continent. Troianovskii had asked for an appointment w ith Tanaka to discuss the general state o f Soviet-Japanese relations; he had arrived in the midst o f Tanaka’s election campaign and there had been no opportunity for leisurely discussion until now. Tanaka had replied that he would prefer to visit Troianovskii— to come to the Soviet embassy informally on foot, so as not to arouse the jealousy o f the ambassadors o f the other powers; too frequent (public) meetings w ith Troianovskii could lead to unnecessary talk. Troianovskii agreed and on M arch 8 Tanaka strolled unobtrusively into the embassy, accom­ panied only b y the interpreter Sawada. Troianovskii and Tanaka con­ ferred as they ate bliny (Russian pancakes). Tanaka spoke m ostly in Japanese, Troianovskii in French. Sawada did all the interpreting. A remarkable exchange took place in this informal atmosphere. Tanaka declared that he wanted to have an unofficial, com pletely private and absolutely frank talk w ith the ambassador. H e asked Troianov­ skii to tell him everything that he thought in regard to Russo-Japanese relations, both pleasant and unpleasant, openly, not as one diplomat to another but as a private person who desired to remove all misunderstand­ ings and to lay the groundwork for the strengthening o f friendship between Japan and the U.S.S.R. N ot being a diplomat by profession he preferred such talks, feeling that they would contribute more to a rapprochement than negotiations accompanied by all kinds o f formalities. Besides, as a m ilitary man he found matters o f protocol very difficult. He wanted to hear Troianovskii’s frank view s, give an immediate answer to some and think the others over to give an answer later, if necessary. Troianovskii agreed that unofficial talks paved the w ay for official talks and facilitated ascertaining the position o f both sides in order to find a common language and basis for official negpdadons. He said that

354

Japanese R ecognition o f the U SS.R.

he too liked such frank discussions and had frequently resorted to than in his former commercial activity in order to find the possibility of re­ conciling the true desires and interests o f the negotiating parties; such method o f talking gave good results most o f the time. Troianovskii stated that such a private frank conversation was particularly appropriate in the present case, since he had no instructions from his government concerning quite a number o f questions about which he w as going to talk. He felt that his obligations as ambassador were not limited to carrying out instructions but included taking the initiative for finding and paving the w ay for the improvement and developm ent o f SovietJapanese relations and to make appropriate recommendations to his government. Tanaka asserted that he had confidence in Troianovskii and expressed the hope that Troianovskii had similar confidence in him. H e asked that Troianovskii take as broad a view as possible o f current Japanese-Soviet relations since this was a private conversation. He w ould listen with attention and, he repeated, wanted to hear unpleasant as w ell as pleasant things. Troianovskii agreed, asking that Tanaka not take offense if he said something that the latter did not like. Troianovskii declared that Soviet-Japanese relations w ere developing satisfactorily and that friendship between the tw o countries w as grow­ ing, since it no doubt corresponded to the interest o f the tw o great neigh­ boring countries. But the unpleasant aftertaste o f recent history had remained in the Soviet Union and there were some m isgivings o f the true plans o f Japan toward the Soviet Union. Statements made b y Tanalca him self to Valeriian Dovgalevskii (Troianovskii’s predecessor) on June 16 ,19 2 7 that the open door policy should be applied to Siberia as well as various hints made b y such people as Kuhara Fusanosuke, th e Minister o f Transport, made Russians suspect that Japan harbored some grand designs toward Siberia. Tanaka asserted that this was purely a misunderstanding and formally assured Troianovskii that the Japanese government had not the remotests thought o f seizing Soviet territory, attacking the U .S.S.R ., intervening or doing anything o f the sort. Japanese policy toward the Soviet Union

LINGERING MISTRUST

355

was being formulated in terms o f economic relations. Economic dealings could and should be developed considerably but, he insisted, by peaceful means. Troianovskii agreed that there must have been a misunderstanding. T h e Japanese government could not harbor any aggressive desings toward the Soviet Union, for such designs— their mere existence— would be as harmful to Japan as to the Soviet Union. Y e t Troianovskii deemed it necessary to add that any attem pt to realize such plans would lead to a struggle unto death, for in spite o f all the m ight o f the Japanese people and its arm y, the Soviets knew how to stand up for themselves. Tanaka retorted somewhat irritatedly that the m atter was not w orth discussing, because as he had ju st said Japan had no aggressive plans whatever. He wanted Troianovskii to address him self to the questions which he regarded as most important in Soviet-Japanese relations. Troianovskii replied that the fishery question had not been concluded y e t; the convention had been signed but not yet ratified. M eanwhile the new fishing season was upon them. H e suggested that the spirit o f the new convention be applied in the interim. Tanaka agreed that a temporary arrangement was necessary. He said that ratification would not occur soon. T h e Privy Council included old diplomats, scholars and lawyers who studied every letter, every para­ graph at length; ratification could take several months longer. He sug­ gested, therefore, that the practice o f the preceding year be continued. He had duly instructed Ambassador Tanaka in M oscow and hoped he would come to an agreement w ith Karakhan. Troianovskii then turned the conversation to the question o f a com­ mercial treaty and proposed that discussions be held in M oscow, because the Soviet Union was currently negotiating commercial treaties w ith a number o f countries and could not send delegations everywhere. T h e Japanese representatives in M oscow were experienced men who had suc­ cessfully concluded the fishery convention; he him self had only recently come to Japan and should concentrate on becoming acquainted w ith Japan; he would not like to begin his service as ambassador w ith negotia­ tions concerning a commercial treaty.

35 158-60» 165-71» 203-204, 209» 217, 221, 237-38, 259-60,264-69,317,343-44» 367 China Relations with Japan, 26,8ft 339-40, 357,370 Relations with Soviet Russia, 12-14, 28, 39, 47, «6-88, 106, 108, 136, 157- 58, 196-97, 201, 205, 207, 262, 318, 32ft 339-42, 350, 357, 366-67,371 Chinese in Russia, 319 Chinese Eastern Railway, 31, 56,157, 158ft 169, 210, 339- 42, 344» 357

Index Chinese National Railways, 340 Chita, 9 -10 ,12 ,15 ,3 3 ,3 9 ,4 2 ,4 6 ,5 0 , 5356,60,69,107 Chosen, set Korea Code, use of, 94, 10 8 -m , H 7n, 337 Commercial agents, 107-108, i l l , 217 set also Trade delegation Commercial treaty, discussion of, 23, 154,16$, 17 2 .179»350. 35*,358 Communist Party o f Japan, 344-46, 358-60 Communist Revolution, impact on Russo-Japanese relations, 5 Communist subversion in Japan, 6 3 ,6 7,10 8 -10 9 ,12 5,132 , *37~39» 149» 155-56, 163, 180, *97-199,208,220,344,349,358-61 in Korea, 13-140,79 Concessions American in North Sakhalin, 10 -11, 10 6 ,119,200 Japanese in the Russian Far East, 1-2 ,16 ,2 9 , 32-33, 39,66, 8 1 ,93» n o , 119, 128-29, *31» 149» *55» 157, 180, 229-40, 262, 332-35,

370-71 see also North Sakhalin Consular representation, seeDiplomatic and consular representation Coolidge, Calvin, 201 Czechoslovaks in Siberia, $ Dairen (Talien, Dalny), 16, 50-51, 54- 55» 62, 129, 206, 214, 339, 342, 359 Dairen Conference, 5-48, 61-63, 67, 69-70, 74^79***9, 151 Dal’ta (Far Eastern Telegraph Agency), 3811,43,49

411

Davtian, la. Kh., 103 Debts, pre-revolutionary, 5, 110-12, 119-20,126-32,144, *49» *56-57» 163 Debuchi, 2 16,22 5,251,2 59 ,331,347, 349- 51»360 De Castries (De-Kastri) Bay, 281 Denmark, 12 Derzhinskii, F. E., 231 Dietrichs, M. K ., 66 Diplomatic and consular representation, 93,10 6-10 ,117,143, 148,178,203-25,336 Old Russian embassy and consulates, 106, 154, 157, 181-82, 207-12 Old Japanese embassy, 203 Doseikai, 328 Dovgalevskii, Valerian, 214,217,238, 260-61,351-52,355 Mrs. Dovgalev­ skii, 215 Dowakai, 328 Due mine, 194-95,230,233 Earthquake, 137-38,142,145-47,208,

365 Economic interests, Soviet recognition o f Japanese preeminent interests in Russian Far East, 7,9 -10 Economic organizations (Khozorgany), 218 Ehabi (Ekhabi), 192-93,232,333 Enkaishü Kaikon Kaisha 238 EnkaishQ Rinyö Dan, 236 Equality and reciprocity, Soviet in­ sistence on, 98, 10 0 ,10 7 ,117 ,15 7 , 179 Ergamyshev, N . A ., 244,257 Ershova, 345 Espionage, alleged Japanese, 137,148, 150,152,343

412

Japanese Recognition o f the U SS.R.

Estonia, 340-41 Etefovich, 231 Ettinger, Dr., 114 Evacuation, tee Intervention and North Sakhalin Far Eastern Bank, 347 Far Eastern Republic, 9-84,365 Far Eastern State Bank, 335,347 Fischer, Louis, 365 Fishery, 14 ,16 ,2 3 ,2 7 ,3 0 ,3 2 , 54,63, $9» IOS» n o -13 , ia i, 139» HS» 155» ido, 165, 17a» 174» 178» *41-316, 323- 32, 349- 50»355»37S-84 France;, 5,12,10 0 ,222,341 Fredericks Bay, 281 Fufaev, D. V ., 321 Fujita,94 Fukushima Shoten, 236 Furuno Inosuke, do

Habomai Islands, 369 Hajiya, 237 Hakodate, 108,208,216,322 Handazawa, 338 Harbin, 16 -17,3 0 -56,59-60» 68n, 105, 206-207,212,342,345 Harrison, E.J., 200 Hatano, 321 Heifets, A. N ., I Hikoshima, 320 Hiroshima, 213,320 Hirota Köki, 328-30,367 Hokkaido, 1 , 336 Hokushinkai, 192,323 Holy Cross Gulf, 280 H ostility, Russo-Japanese, 5, 8-9, 15, 96-92, 99» II9, 145, 331, 358- 59»

363 Hughes, Charles Evans, 75-76,201 H y6go,2i3

Galen, tee Bliukher Genoa Conference, 102, i n , 119 Gensan, 100» 108 Germany, 5,12,47,99,20 8 -20 0 ,219, 222, 231, 318, 341, 344, 350» 356 tee also Rapallo, Treaty o f Gold mining, 23d Gorkii, Maksim, 141 Gotö Ichizö, 89 Goto Shimpei, 85-128, 142-46» 238, 261-68,317,319 Grab Peak, 279 Grand Duke Constantin Bay, 280,378 Great Britain, 5, 12-13, 47, 101-107,

I*grin, 243 Iampol’skii, 232 Iamskaia Bay, 280-81,378 land, Iakov, 215 Ianson, Iakov Davidovich, 31, 33, 39, 45-46, 50-67 fästiMj 76, 2 17-18 , 22011, 221,225 Ichikawa, 344 Ichikawa, comrade, 360 Ichikawa Sadanji, 319,360 Ide Masataka, 242 IijQin Hikokichi, 143 International Seamen’s d u b , 349 Intervention, Japanese in Russian Far

136,196-97» 350, 25a, 356,364,36970 G ulf o f Fenjinsk, 280,281 Gurevich, 232

East, 5- 15» 26, 30-31» 39-83 fnttim, 92, 99, 104, 112, 130, 162, 2071», 238, 322, 363, 370 tee also North Sakhalin

Index Ioffe, Adol’f Abramovich, 3, 53-83 passim, 86-146, 151, 208, 217, 228 wife Mary, 88 daughter Nadezhda, 114 son Vladimir, 88 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 161 Irkutsk, 14,238,371 Italy, 12,47,10 1,10 2,222 Itö Fumikichi, 318 Itö Hirobumi, 267 Iurin, Ignatii L., 14-17,68 Iuzhnyi Boatasin, 333 Izvtstiia, criticism of, 122 Jackson, Andrew, 368 Japanese attack on U.S., expectation of, 196,200 Japanese diplomacy, Soviet appraisal of, 122-23 Japanese-Russian-German alliance, prediction of, 209-200 “Japanization” o f Soviet railways, 321-22 Joffe, see Ioffe Kadono Jukurö, 238 Kalagan Bay, 279,378 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 204-205 Kamakura, 216 Kamchatka, 14,30,65,332 Kamchatka Co., set Ako Kan-in, Prince, 317 Karafuto, tee Sakhalin and North Sakhalin Karafuto Kögyö, 236 Karaga Harbor, 378 Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich, 3, 5355, 62, 70, 72, 91, 108, 115, 135» 141-78, 181-211 passim, 251, 260-

413 71,279,290,294, 329, 314, 327-30,

355»359- 60,379-84 Katangli, 193,194,232 Katanoki-Noglin, 333 Katö Takaaki, 86n, 161-63, 169, 174 KatS Tomosaburö, 52, 86-87, I04, 106-108,116-17, >24» 205 Kawaji Toshiakira, 3 Kawakami, K. K. 202 Kawakami Toshitsune, 87, 90, 103, 10 5,125n, 126-39,148,175,227-28, 231-32 Kawasumi Tadao, 212 Kayokai, 328 Kellogg. Frank B., 201 Kellogg-Briand pact, 352n Kenkokukai, 359 Kenkyukai, 121,328 Kenseikai, 105 Kcrbi, 130 Kerenskii, Aleksandr Fedorovich, 33 Khabarovsk, 130, 224, 236-37, 259, 277» 313» 318» 335- 36,342,350 Khanka, Lake, 238 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 371 Kita Karafuto Kögyö Kabushiki Kaisha, 236 Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 236,333,337 Kita Sagaren Seidtan Kigyö Kumiai, 227,232,236 Kita Sagaren Sekiyu Kigyö Kumiai, 227, 232 Kiyokaze Fukumatsu, 343 Kiyoura Keigo, 146-47,162 Kobe, 88,108-109,206» 213,216,335, 346-47 Köchi, 213 Kodama, Lt. Gen., 321

412

Japanese Recognition o f the USS.R.

Estonia, 340-41 Etefovich, 231 Ettinger, Dr., 114 Evacuation, jar Intervention and North falrlialin Far Eastern Bank, 347 Far Eastern Republic, 9-84,365 Far Eastern State Bank, 335,347 Fischer, Louis, 365 Fishery, 14 ,1 6 ,2 3 ,2 7 ,3 0 ,3 * 54»63» 69» 10s, n o - 1 3 ,12 1,13 9 ,14 3 ,15 5 , 160, 165, 172, 174, 178, 241-316» 3*3- 3* 349- 50»355»375-84 France, 5,12,100,222,341 Fredericks Bay, 281 Fufaev, D. V ., 321 Ftijita,94 Fukushima Shoten, 236 Furuno Inosuke, 60 Galen, m Bliukher Genoa Conference, 102, m , 119 Gensan, 100,108 Germany, 3 ,12 ,47,99 ,2 0 8 -2 0 * 219, 222» 231, 318, 341» 344» 350» 356 ttt also Rapallo, Treaty o f Gold mining, 236 Gorlrii, Maksim, 141 GotB IchizS, 89 Gotö Shimpei, 85-128, 142-46, 238, 261-68,317,319 Grab Peak, 279 Grand Duke Constantin Bay, 280,378 Great Britain, 5, 12-13, 47» 101-107, 136» 196-97,350,252,356,364,369-

70 G ulf o f Fenjinsk, 280,281 Gurevich, 232

Habomai Islands, 369 Hajiya, 237 Hakodate, 108,208,216,322 Handazawa, 338 Harbin, 16-17,50-56,59-60,68n, 105, 206-207,212,342,345 Harrison, E.J., 200 Hatano, 321 Heifets, A. N ., 1 Hikoshima, 320 Hiroshima, 213,320 Hirota Kdki, 328-30,367 Hokkaido, 1,336 Hokushinkai, 192,323 Holy Cross Gulf, 280 Hostility, Russo-Japanese, 5, 8 -9 ,15 , 96-9* 99» « 9» 145, 331» 358- 59,

363 Hughes, diaries Evans, 75-76,201 Hyögo»2i3 bgrin,243 Iampol’skii, 232 Iamskaia Bay, 280-81,378 land, Iakov, 215 Ianson, Iakov Davidovich, 31, 33, 39, 45-46, 50-67 petnm, 76, 217-18, 2200,221,225 Ichikawa, 344 Ichikawa, comrade, 360 Ichikawa Sadanji, 319,360 Ide Masataka, 242 IijOin Hikokichi, 143 International Seamen’s Club, 349 Intervention, Japanese in Russian Far East, 5-15» *6, 30-31, 39-63 penim, 92, 99, 104, 112, 130, 162, 20 7* 238, 322, 363, 370 jer also North Sakhalin

Index Ioffe, Adol’f Abramovich, 3, 33-83 ftmuy 86-146) 151, 208, 217, 228 wife Mary, 88 daughter Nadezhda, 114 son Vladimir, 88 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 161 Irkutsk, 14,238,371 Italy, 12,47,10 1,10 2,222 Itö Fumikichi, 318 ItS Hirobumi, 267 Iurin, Ignadi L., 14-17,68 Iuzhnyi Boatasin, 333 Ixvestiia, criticism of, 122 Jackson, Andrew, 368 Japanese attack on U.S., expectation of, 196,200 Japanese diplomacy, Soviet appraisal of, 122-23 Japanese-Russian-German alliance, prediction of, 209-200 “Japanization” o f Soviet railways, 321-22 Jolfe, see Ioffe Kadono JukurS, 238 Kalagan Bay, 279,378 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 204-205 Kamakura, 216 Kamchatka, 14,30,63,332 Kamchatka Go., see Ako Kan-in, Prince, 317 Karafuto, see Sakhalin and North Sakhalin Karafuto KSgyS, 236 Karaga Harbor, 378 Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovich, 3, 5355, 62, 70, 72, 91, 108, 115, 13s, 141^78, 181-211 péssim, 251, 260-

413 71,279, 290,294, 329, 314, 327-30,

355»359- 60»379-84 Katangli, 193,194,232 Katanoki-Noglin, 333 KatS Takaaki, 86n, 161-63, 169, 174 KatS TomosaburS, 52, 86-87, 104, 106-108,116-17,124,205 Kawaji Toshiakira, 3 Kawakami, K. K. 202 Kawakami Toshitsune, 87, 90, 103, 105,12511,126-39,148» 175» 227-28, 231-32 Kawasumi Tadao, 212 Kayokai, 328 Kellogg, Frank B., 201 Kellogg-Briand pact, 352n Kenkokukai, 359 Kenkyukai, 121,328 Kcnseikai, 105 Kerbi, 130 Kerensldi, Aleksandr Fedorovich, 33 Khabarovsk, 130, 224, 236-37, 259, 277» 313» 3 18 ,335- 36,342,350 Khanka, Lake, 238 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 371 Kita Karafuto KSgyS Kabushiki Kaisha, 236 Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, 236,333,337 Kita Sagaren Sekitan KigyS Kumiai, 227,232,236 Kita Sagaren Sekiyu KigyS Kumiai, 227, 232 Kiyokaze Fukumatsu, 343 Kiyoura Keigo, 146-47,162 Kobe, 88,108-109,206,213,216,335, 346-47 KSchi, 213 Kodama, Lt. Gen., 321

414

Japanese Recognition o f toe USS.R.

Koji M an, 106 Kolchak, Aleksandr Vasil’cvich, 33 Kolchanovskii, 250,257 Kolesnikov, Anatolii, 2x3 Konyam Bay, 279,378 Kopp, Viktor Leont’evich, I3pn, 2 11I j , 218-22,320,340.343-49 Korea, 9> 13-14» 29- 39» «I» *39»33 339- 40,366 Koreans in Russia, 13-14,77,319 Korean Communists, 349-30 Korean railways, 340 KSseikai, 10$, 328 Koshida Tukujirö, 222,237 Kosuchina River, 230,236 Koyu Club, 328 Kozakov, M. A., 242,237 Kozhevnikov, L S., 12 ,16 ,17 Kraga Harbor, 280 Krasnoshchekov, A., 12, H 7-4* Matsui Keishirö, 146-47 Matsumura Sadao, 106-107 Matsumura Shinichirö, 242 Matsushima Hajime, 16-18, 31-39, 4 2 ,56 ,10 5,12 7,14 7 M atveev, N . M ., 64 Maybon, Albert, 4911 Mechigme Bay, 279,378 Meiji, Emperor, 116 Mel’nikov, B. N ., 218,269 Merkulov government, 33,44 Mikoian, Anastas Ivanovich, 318-19 Milkachinsky Bay, 280-81,378 Minkin, 232 Mitsubishi Company, 169, 174, 19495,218,323 Mitsubishi Goshi, 236 M itsui Company, 323 M itsui Kazan, 236 Miyakawa Funao, 242-43 Miyake Setsuiei, 115-11611, 121 Mizuno Rentarö, 88,89 Molotov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, 216 Mongolia, 366 Motono IchirS, 210 Mori K6z5, 88,146 Moscow, fasum Mowrer, Edgar Ansd, 197 Mukden, 55,56,60 Murashiki, 237 Murom, 321 Musatov, 232 Myngi-Kongi, 333 Nabilskii Gulf, 280 Nagasaki, 88,108,206,216

415

Nakai,343 Nakano K ogyo,236 Nakasato Shigetsugu, 227,231 Nakatani Sadayori, 242 Narita, 237 Narkomindd, 6 Nationalism, revival in Russia, 57 Nichi-Ro Gyogyo Kaisha, I27n, 32324,326 Nikiforov, Peter Mikhailovich, n n Nikolaevsk Incident Massacre, 8-9,129-31 Settlement of, 14 ,2 6 ,2 9 ,3 2 ,3 9 ,5 4 , 57, 61, 65, 71-164 fMttim, 190, 207-8 Nikolaevsk-on-the-Amur, 108,206 Nikolaevskij, Boris Ivanovich, 368 Nikol’sk-Ussuriisk, 66,107 Nishi Haruhino, 242,257 Nomura Masuzo, Viscount, 327 Non-aggression pact or pledge, 34, 69,71-73,160 ,181,350 -58 NorthSakhalin,10,16,26,30,32,39-40, 52, 65, 71-207 ?*m*h 227-40, 309, 322,333-38,306-70 Norway, 12 Novosibirsk, 207 Nuiskii Gulf, 280 Nuivo, 192,194,232 Nutovo, 192-93,232 Obata Torikichi, 81,93,105 Occupation, set Intervention and North Sakhalin Odessa, 206-207 Oil concessions, 104, 106, 119, 157, 173^75, 192- 94, 227-36, 332-33 tee also North Sakhalin Ogasawara, Count, 360

4 i6

Japanese Recognition o f the U SS.R.

Okha (Oha), 192-93,206,232-38 Okhotsk, 69,236,249 Okhotsk Sea, 281 Okumura Masao, 227-28,231 Okura Gumi, 236 Omsk, 14 Omsk Government, 213 Onor, 338 Open Door, principle of, 23-24, 69, 200-201,354,364 Osaka, 83,206,318-19,346 Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 336,339-40 Otaru, 216 Otomari, 336 Ozamin, E. K ., 30-32 Pacific War, 1,5,363,368 ,371 Pan-Pacific Congress, 318 Paris, 341,364 Paromai (Poromai), 333 Peace Preservation Law, 338 Peking, 33-36, 39-60,78, 81,94* 103, 1 4 1 ,146-47» 15 0 ,16 1-6 4 ,167» 174» 181-87,196,209,211 Fenkegunei B ay,279 Pensacola, 369 Pieter the Great Bay, 281 Petrograd, 6 ,7 Petropavlovsk, 108,206-207,338 Petrov, Dr. Fedor Nikolaevich, 17-18, 31- 33, 39»42»45n»640,68 Petrovskoe Spit, 308 Philippines, 337 Pilutun, 192-93,232 Podkagemaya River, 281 Poland, 202,341 Port Arthur, 129 Port Soviet, 280 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 112-13, 119,

128, 132, 149, I3J, 160, 163, 16 5, 173,178 ,18 7,327 Possiette Bay, 281 Pravyi mine, 236 Preobrazheniya Bay, 281 Providence Bay, 280 Provisional Government, 33 Pusan, 342 Putiarin, Evfimii Vasil’evich, 3 Radek, Karl, 364 Radio-telegraph communication, 33637 Railway communication, 338-41 tee also Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railway Rapallo, Treaty of, 10 1-10 3,143,196,

331 Recognition, Japanese o f U.S.S.R., 83, 87, 102-103, n o , 116-17, 1232 7 ,13 2 ,14 1,14 7 -5 0 ,17 0 ,2 0 1,2 11, 344,366; tee also Agreements, Basic Convention o f the People's Republic o f China, 2 The Red Camarilla, 200 Riga, 342 Rigin, I4n Rockefeller, John D ., 366 Rizhinskii mine, 236 Rogatui mine, 194-95,230 Roryô Ringyô Kabushiki Kaisha, 238 Roryô Ringyô Kumiai, 237,238 Roryô Suisan Kumiai, 323 Roumilet Bay, 279,378 Rudyi, 340 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, 11-83 Russo-Asian Bank, 207

Index Russo-Chinese-Japanese alliance, spe­ culation about, 15)6-97 Russo-German-Chinesc-Japanese block, speculation about, 200 Russo-Japanese Association, 86, 317 Russo-Japanese War (1904-15)05), 5, 85,86n, 9 9 ,10 4 ,112 ,13 2 ,2 16 ,2Ö7n,

363 64 369 -

>

Sabanin, A. V., 269 St. Lawrence Bay, 279 St. Marks, 369 St. Nicholas Gulf, 280 St. Olga Bay, 281 St. Pavla Bay, 280,378 St. Peterbsurg, 17,127,20 3,267 St. Vladimir Bay, 281 Saitö Hiroshi, 318 Sakai Kumiai, 227,230,232,333 Sakamoto Toshiatsu, 327 Sakhalin, 29,100,368-69 see also North Sakhalin Sako Shuichi, 242,246-48,257 Salzmann, Erich von, I3-I4n, $9,88n Sasaki, vice president o f Nichi-Ro Fisheries Company, 328 Sasaki Seigo, 203 Sasaki Yukitada, 327 Satô Naotake, 203-206,217-20 Sawada, interpreter, 353 Sawada, member o f the Mitsubishi combine, 174 Schastiya Gulf, 23 Secret police Japanese, 95-96,346-49 Russian, 96,350 Seiyükai, 121,135 Sekkaböshidan, 89 Selenga River, 13,14

417

Semenov, B., 366 Semenov, Grigorii Mikhailovich, 10, 14,213 Seoul, 208,213 Seventeen Demands, 26-32 Severnaia Okha, 333 Sevemyi Boatosin, 333 Shanghai, 39,87,88,94 Shestakov, S. A., 321 Shibuya, 343 Shidehara Kijurö, 162, 169, 174, 200, 213-14, 219-22, 317» 328» 347-51 Shima Tokuzo, 324 Shimada Masaharu, 16-17, i5> 169,

242n Shimonoseki, 320 Shindd Shintaro, 323 Shirahama Fuku, 343 Shliupochnaya Harbor, 280 Shöwa Kinkô Kabushiki Kaisha, 236 Shurukumu, 237 Siberia, Japanese development of, 1, 50, 62, 8 6 ,10 4 ,137» 146, 208,237-

38,317,332» 345» 354» 370-72 Siberian Veterans Association, 200 Sinclair, Harry Ford, company, 106, 119,200 Six Feet Lake, 280 Skvirskii, Boris Evseevich, 365 Somov, 16 South Manchurian Railway, 56, 85,

1270,339-40* 347 South Sakhalin, 369 Sovet Natsional’no-Gosudarstvennykh Ob'edinenii, 52 Soviet-Japanese Society, 317, 319 see also Russo-Japanese Association Sovtorgflot, 340 Soya, 336

4 i8

Japaeuu Recognition o f the U SS.R .

Sugiyama, General, 321 Spain, 369 Spaask, 118 Spal’vin, Evgenii Genrikhovich, 21 j , 222,348-49 Mrs. Spal’vin, 215 Stakheev (Staheeff) Go., 196-97,333 Stalin, Joseph, 318,363,367 Starka Bay, 280 Stepukhovich, 232 Stomoniakov, B. S., 246,236-58,268 Stiesemann, Gustav, 350 Sun Yat-sen, 87 Sungari River, 13,16 ,2 8 ,39 ,210 Suzuki KisaburS, 359 Sweden, 12 Taguchi UnzS, 94,116 Taiku, 320 Taishö, Emperor (Yoshihito), 318 Takayanagi, General, 17,4 1 Takiguchi, 237 Tanaka BunichirB, 6n, 47-18, 72, 77, I27n -28 n ,I33n ,205

Tanaka, consul general, 87-88,94-95 Tanaka Giichi, 205, 214, 261, 267, 325-26,351-58

Tanaka Tokichi, 104, 204-206, 23171 pamMj 290, 294, 308, 314, 3*7» 352n, 379-84 Tanaka Yotarö, 236 Taneda,340 Tashkent, 14 Tatar Strait, 128 Technical aid, Japanese, 322 Terne Bay, 280 Third International, 198-199,344 Tkachef, Major General, 82 Toki Chinjirö, 212

Tokushima, 213 T okyo,/uni« Tom sk, 14,238 Tottori, 213 Toyohara, 336 Trade, 2 ,6 ,4 5 ,5 0 ,10 8 ,344»3J6 Trade and General Agreement pro­ posal, 34-3*, 6 9 ,3**-*3 Trade delegation (torgpiedstvo), 2x7* 4» Shimoda, Treaty of, 3 Triapitsyn, u n , 130-31 Troianovskii, Aleksandr Antonovich, 2, 205, 214» 319» 3**» 3* 5» 35*n, 353-60 Troianovskii, Oleg Aleksandrovich, 2 Trotskii, Leon, 58 Tsalemchuk, I. Iu., 269 Tsarist Russia, relations with Japan, 5, 85, 104-105, 129, 131, 144- 45» 178,187,213,322,356,383,368,370 Tsiurp, D. A., 212 Tsukahaia Association, 230,236 Tsuruga, 108,206,338 Tuilen, Lake, 280 Turkey, 222 Twenty-one Demands, 26 Uchida KSsai, 8 ,3 4 ,3 9 ,45»7*» 76-77, 87-89,105,108, n o , 113 ,12 4 ,12 6 , 130,132 Uchida Yasuya, 6 Uda Kanichirö, 324-25 Ueda Sentarö, 6 Uiglekuty (Vuigrektui), 193-94, * 3* Ulan-Ude, set Verichneudinsk Umeura Kenkichi, 237 Ungem-Shtemberg, Baron, 14 Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics,

419

Index formation of, 83 United States relations with China, 2 ,86n relations with Japan, $, 10 -13 ,4Sn> 104-105, 137» I9Ö-P7, 200, 34445, 357, 363- 69,373 relations with Russia, 3 ,10 -13 ,4 7 , 86, 106-107, 136, 197, 200-202, 345, 356- 57,363-69,373 Usami, 322 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, Jr., 88 Vanina Bay, 280 Vengri-Bol’shaia Khuzi (Daifuji), 333 Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude), 9 Versailles, Peace Conference, 137,364 Vilenskii-Sibiriakov, V. D ., 6,8-10 Visas, 106,205,217-18,224 Vladimirskii mine, 230,233,236 Vladivostok, 13 -14 ,16 ,2 7,2 9 , 33,40, 43-44, 65-66, 77-78, 82, 106-13, 127, 130, 138, 143, 148, 152, 206, 224, 241, 253-54, 272-73, 326, 332, 335- 39. 342- 43,349 Vladivostok Niffô, 336 Vol’f, Lev Il’ich, 217,348 Vologda, 7 Volkoveiov, 320 Volunteer Fleet, 339 Vuigrektui (Uiglekuty), 193-94,232

War debts, see Debts Washington, 2,365 Washington Conference, 10, 13, 42, 45,5 6 ,7 6 ,137, 197,200,364 Watanabe Riye, 106-107, n o , 206 White Russians harassment o f Soviet representatives, 213-14 protest against Japanese dealings with Soviets, 52-82 sailed vessels into exile, 112 support by Japanese, 14, 3 1 ,43- 44, 50, 66-75, 80» 98, 100, 106, 113, 142,156,18 0 ,207n, 213 Yalta Conference, 369 Yamaguchi, 213 Yamaguchi, T ., 222,224 Yamamoto Gombei, 141,1460-470 Yamamoto Teijirö, 262,325-26 Yamanouchi Shirô, 50-54 Yamazaki Jirô, 242 Yokohama, 88-89,95,108,137,142 Yoshida, 205 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 141, 147-78, 181, 183, 186, 188, 190, 191, 195, 202-8,211,218,327 Zetlin, 44